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PART 11 

JUNE 5, 1961 

Printed for the use of the CJommittee on the Judiciary 

Bos to ^^^^ ibrary 
Superinteno^rt.sQ'^ Documents 

NOV 1 1961 

43354 WASHINGTON : 1961 


JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 

OLIN D. JOHNSTOX, South Carolina 
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina 
JOHN A. CARROLL, Colorado 
THOMAS J. DODD. Connecticut 
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan 
EDWARD V. LONG, Missouri 
WM. A. BLAKLEY, Texas 


EVERETT Mckinley dirksen, imnois 

ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 
NORRIS COTTON, New Hampshire 

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Inteenal Secueitt 
Act and Othee Internal Security Laws 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut, Vice Chairman 

OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 
JOHN J. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 
SAM J. ERVIN, Je., North Carolina 

ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 
NORRIS COTTON, New Hampshire 

J. G. SouRWiNE, Counsel 
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 



MONDAY, JUNE 5, 1961 

U.S. Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 

OF the Internal Security Act and Oitier Internal 
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D.G. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 :35 a.m., in room 2820, 
New Senate Office Building, Senator Thomas J. Dodd presiding. 

Present: Senators Dodd, Norris Cotton, and Kenneth B. Keating, 

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel, re- 
search director; Frank Schroeder, chief investigator. 

Senator Dodd. The hearing will be in order. 

Mr. Counsel? 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Joe Louis, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Louis is ac- 
companied by i\Ir. William Rowe, as the chairman knows from the 
executive session. I would respectfully suggest that botli men be 
sworn. Tlieir stories will supplement one another. 

Senator Dodd. You will both rise and raise your right hands. 

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony given before the subcom- 
mittee will be the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Barrow. Yes, I do. 

Mr. Rowe. I do. 


Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Louis, what is your full name ? 
Mr. Barrow. Joe Louis Barrow. 
Mr. Sourwine. And your address ? 

Mr. Barrow. 1711 Wellington Road, North Inglewood, Calif. 
Mr. Sourwine. What is your present business? 
Mr. Barrow. Public relations. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were the heavyweight cliampion of the Avorld? 
Mr. Barrow. Yes, I was. 

Mr. Sourwine. For how long and from what period and until what 

Mr. Barrow. From 1937 until 1948. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, Mr. Rowe, what is your full name? 
Mr. Rowe. William L. Rowe. 
Mr. Sourwine. And your present address? 
Mr. Rowe. 1 Fenamore Road, New Rochelle, N.Y. 
Mr. Sourwine. Your business or profession ? 
Mr. Rowe. Public relations. 

Mr. Sourwine. You and Mr. Jce Louis Barrow are associated ? 



Mr. EowE. Yes, I am president of the firm with -which he is asso- 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Louis, in the course of this committee's hear- 
ings we have dealt to some extent with recent events in Cuba. Have 
you been in Cuba ? 

Mr. Barrow. I was in Cuba in 1959, 

Mr. SoTjRwiNE. Did you go tliere for business or for pleasure ? 

Mr. Barrow. My first trip was for pleasure. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You were there more than once ? 

Mr. Barrow. I was there again in January of 1960. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I think this latter trip was a business trip, sir? 

Mr. Barrow. It was. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. What was the purpose of this trip ? 

Mr. Barrow. Down there with Al Lockhart who also was an asso- 
ciate in the Louis, Rowe & Lockhart official offices, to negotiate a con- 
tract with the Tourist Commission. 

Mr. SoxjRwine. The Tourist Commission of Cuba ? 

Mr. Barrow. Right. 

Mr. SouRwixE. What was the nature of this contract, Mr. Louis ? 

Mr. Barrow. Well, the Tourist Commission of Cuba wanted to en- 
ter into an agreement with our firm to develop tourists to come to 

Mr. SouRwiNE. "Wliat kind of tourists ? 

Mr. Barrow. Just American tourists to come to Cuba. 

Mr. SouR^^^:NE. I mean were you conducting tours, were you ar- 
ranging package deals where a number would come ? 

]\Ir. Barrow. No, we weren't arranging package deals — just we 
would put ads in the Negro publications, radio, and so forth. 

Mr. SouRWiisTE. You were just trying to get individuals to go? 

Mr. Barrow. Right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Not necessarily groups ? 

Mr. Barrow. Right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, who conducted these negotiations in Cuba, 
you or IVIr. Rowe ? 

Mr. Barrow. Al Lockhart and Mr. Rowe. At the time I was down 
there I was onlj down there with Mr. Lockhart. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Rowe, did you initiate these negotiations or 
did someone come to you to initiate them ? 

Mr. Rowe. No, it was brought to our office by Mr. Lockhart. Mr. 
Lockhart was a friend of mine and he was the advertising director of 
the Amsterdam News at that particular time. 

Mr. SouRwiNE, That is a New York newspaper? 
Mr. Rowe. Yes. I was doing the public relations for that particular 
paper for its 50th anniversary and Mr. Lockliart was interested in 
becoming a part of our office and we talked about different things and 
he said, "Well, perhaps I might be able to bring in a big account." I 
said, "If you can bring in a big account, we want you as a member of 
our firm." 

So he came in and said, "I just received a telegram, a cablegram 
from Cuba." I said, "No kidding." And he said, "Yes." He said, 
''They would like to have me come down and discuss a proposition 
with them during — when the victory celebration takes place." I think 
it was in January of 1958 or the year before when Castro had invited 
all of these thousands of newspapermen down to what he called, I 
believe, a Peace Corps, I think. 


Mr. SouRwiNE. Let's get the dates straight. Castro came into 
power in January of 1959. 

Mr.RowE. Was it 1959? 

Mr. SouR\\T^NE. Yes. 

Mr. RowE. Well, it was the time. He had all of the newspaper 
people down there. I think they had it or called it a Truth ('orps 
when thev were doing all the shooting and he said, "Would you like 
to go to Cuba with me?" He said, "The government is going to pay 
the expenses." I said, "Certainly." So he got three tickets, one for 
himself, one for Mr. Fisher,^ and one for me. This was December 
19. We went down to Cuba to meet with the Cuban Tourist Com- 
mission. We didn't know what it was all about at that point, but 
we had certain ideas in our mind which we, of course, vrould discuss 
with them once we got there. And we met Dr. Martinez, who is a 
subdirector of tourism in Cuba. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Is that Dr. Jesus Martinez ? 

Mr. RowE. Right. It was around 6 o'clock and we met with him 
at midnight in the Havana Riviera Hotel. He said he would like 
to have about 30 guests from America come down for Christmas and 
to stay over for the anniversary celebration which would be New 
Year's Eve. We said it was very difficult to get Americans to leave 
home on Christmas but thought we could arrange it for a New Year's 
celebration. He said, "Fine," and he wanted to know whom wo 
would invite. We said certain people. We didn't have the names 
offhand that we would have to go over our list and find out who we 
thought would be the proper people to invite. 

He asked if we could bring Roy Campanella, Jackie Robinson, 
Willie Mays, and Joe Louis. We said we didn't know, that we would 
see, and the meeting ended on that note. 

He came back the next afternoon or should I say the next evening 
and went into the situation again about inviting people. It went from 
35 to 50 and they decided that Dr. Castellanos, who was head of the 
Cuban Tourist Commission, would send the cablegrams of invitation 
to the people, to the names we gave them. We didn't have all of the 
addresses with us and we would have to send them back to Cuba 
and he said that when he got back to New York, or when we got to 
New York, to give him the names and addresses. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You did not send the invitations yourselves, then ? 

Mr. RowE. No. we did not send the invitations but we sent out 
from America a followup so the people we would know, those whom 
we invited, would know what it was all about. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You contacted these people yourself? 

Mr. RoAVE. We contacted some by phone and some by telegram. 

Mr. SouR\viXE. For instance, Roy Campanella, who got in touch 
with him? 

Mr. RowE. Mr. Fisher, I believe, Mr. Fisher discussed this witli 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Willie Mays ? 

Mr. RowE. Willie Mays, we discussed this w^ith Willie Mays on 
the phone because he was out of town. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Jackie Robinson? 

Mr. RoAVE. We discussed it with him. 

i Charles Fisher, a former partner of Louis & Rowe, who had handled the Cuban ac- 


Mr, SoTJRWiNE. Did those gentlemen go ? 

Mr. Rowt:. Well, Willie Mays said he would go. But at the last 
minute, he couldn't make it. His wife was ill or something, he said, 
and anyway he decided he couldn't make it at the last minute but 
accepted the invitation. 

Roy Campanella felt the trip was too strenuous. 

Mr. SouRWiXE. Did Jackie Robinson go ? 

Mr. RowE. No, he said he had to be home with his kids. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You have a list of those who did go on this trip? 

Mr. RowE. Yes, we have. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Will you offer that for the record at this time? 

Mr, RowE. I can offer it for the record, certainly, but they were 
just people. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes, but you mentioned some of those whom you 
tried to get and we just want to make a record of who did go. 

Mr. RowE. We have the list. 

Senator Keating. May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman? 

There is no sinister implication in this question. I think we ought to 
rest on that. The list is not intended to convey anything improper. 

Mr. RowE. Yes, because I am sure these people — it was just an 
invitation to a party like we would send out to a party at my home 
or your home. 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Just an invitation. 

Mr. RowE. We have the list. 

Senator Dodd. It may be included and made a part of the record, 
subject to objection. 

Senator Cotton. Would the witness prefer it was made a part of the 
record, but not made a public part of the record in case the public 
misunderstood some of these things ? 

Senator Dodd. Well, I don't know. What is your feeling about that ? 
Do you prefer that it not be made public ? 

Mr. RowE. I think. Senator, that I would prefer that because I 
am sure these people would get all kinds of sinister implications these 
days about Cuba. 

Senator Dodd. We don't need to make it pnbl Ic. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 58" and or- 
dered retained in subcommittee files, but not made public.) 

Mr. SouRwiNE. All right, now, we are back to the time when you 
had agreed that you were going to go back to the States and furnish a 
list of these names. 

Now was that the whole of it, the agreement, or was there any more 
formal contract at that time ? 

Mr. RowE. We had a contract, an agreement, a paragraph on that 
agreement, the amount of money that they were going to pay and what 
the money was going to be for. 

Mr. SoiTRwiNE. Are you offering that contract for the record ? 

]Mr. RowE. Yes, you may have this contract for the record. It is in 
Spanish, by the way.* 

Mr. SouRwiNE. May that be received, Mr. Chairman, with the in- 
struction that it be translated and the English translation be printed ? 
Senator Dodd. Yes. 

*The document given the subcommittee was not, In fact, a contract, but a letter trans- 
mitting certain sums for worls done by the firm. 


(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 59" and an 
English transhxtion reads as follows :) 

Exhibits No. 59 

Revolutionary Government, 
National Institute of Tourism, NITI,^ 

Havana, December 21, 1959. 
Messrs. Louis & Rowe, Inc. 

Deab Siks: Attached please find a check [made out] in the name of that 
[your] company in the amount of two thousand 00/100 ($2,000.00); $1,000.00 
expenses and $1,000.00 [professional] fees for publicity in the United States for 
this organization. 

Sincerely yours, 

(S) jEStJs Montane Oropesa, 

Subdirector of theNITI. 
Translated by William Springer, Library of Congress. 

Mr. RowE. The only thing I can miderstand there, it was $2,000, and 
$1,000 was for expenses and $1,000 was our fee. 

Mr. SouR^viNE. Did you receive that money at that time ? 

Mr. RowE. No, it was about 3 days later they gave us a check for 
2,000 pesos and we didn't know at the time, of course, there was no 
monetary exchange between America and Cuba and we accepted the 
2,000 check in pesos. We came back to America and turned it m to my 
bank and my bank says, "Do you want me to make notes on this or give 
it back to you ? " They said they couldn't cash it. 

Senator Keating. That is funny to us but not to you. 

Mr. RowE. We were already about $900 out. 

Senator Cottox. What did you do with it ? 

Mr. Rowe. We called Dr. Martinez and told him the bank would not 
cash the check and he said, "Well, I am not surprised." Pie said, 
"However, we'll make the check good. We will send you a check on 
the bank of the United States." But we were going back to Cuba for 
the party and we decided rather than to sweat out the mail we would 
just be on the scene and would then accept the check on the American 
bank which they gave us for $2,000 which covered most of the nego- 
tiations on getting these people to Cuba. We ran $900 over the original 
agreement which they paid us, oh, I guess it was about a month later, 
because he expressed to us that this was a very poor government and 
that they did not want to be spending a lot of money that they couldn't 
afford. But we received that payment, and the party, instead of 50 
people, it turned out we had 72 people which we invited because they 
kept extending the list, kept saying, "Let's just go ahead and go all out 
on this." 

The party took place at the Havana Hilton Hotel. They had a 
special room, I think, on one of the higher floors, in which they in- 
vited themselves, a certain amount of outstanding Cubans and the 
place was decorated with American and Cuban flags. Castro was 
there and he made a little — a short speech of welcome to the people 
and the place was quite crowded because he decided to let everybody 
in, even those who didn't have an invitation and wanted to come. 
They all came in and they served food and what not and the same 
party business and I think they had a little more television cameras 
at that point than they have now. It was well covered. The President 

^ Literally, The Touristic Industry. 


was there and Mr. Louis was there with Mrs. Louis. Mrs. Louis was 
the quietest person in the house. Everybody was ha\ang quite a time 
and we left, I assume, about 2 :30 and Castro was still there and the 
party went on. 

Mr. SouKwiNE. This was a party in celebration of the Cuban revo- 
lutionary anniversary, was it ? 

Mr. KowE. Right. 

Mr. SoTJRwiNE. It was on a national level in Cuba because Castro 
was there? 

Mr. RowE. I imagine it was. There were a lot of TV cameras on. 
They had the thing back here in America on television. The stories 
were carried back here in America — meaning the names of some of 
the guests that attended this affair. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. It was an outstanding public relations stroke; 
wasn't it? 

Mr. RowE. Well, I would say so. As a public relations man I 
thought it was a great job. I was only sorry I hadn't thought it up. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. All right, go ahead. 

Mr. RowE. Well, that was the end of that particular situation and 
we were the guests and were allowed to stay. They were given 3 to 5 
days as guests of the Government. In other words, the Government 
picked up the hotel bill. They supplied the tickets for transportation 
and they supplied the food, but they did not supi^ly anything harder 
than water to drink. If you wanted anything harder than water to 
drink you had to buy it yourself. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. They paid all expenses except the hard liquor? 

Mr. RowE. Right, and so we were going to stay over 3 days after 
the party. Some people were going to stay 5 days and the next day 
we were told that an official of the Cuban Government was going to 
come over to the hotel to speak with all the invited Americans and 
they stressed the fact that they wanted us to invite both white and 
colored, not just the colored Americans. So there were quite a few 
white Americans with the party and they had been distributed in all 
the hotels in Havana. So we had to get them together to be on hand 
to be greeted by this official of the Cuban Government. They didn't 
tell us who it was going to be. 

About 10 o'clock, a lot of people were in swimming and we were 
told that this Government official was upstairs in the particular room 
provided for this in the Havana Hilton Hotel — rather the Havana 
Riviera Hotel — to greet us and many of us went up in our bathing 
suits and some of the girls had on their play suits; the ladies were 
all quite ready to go out and we went up and to our surprise, of course, 
it was Castro. 

Now this was our first formal introduction to Castro and it was 
just the American guests that he came in to see. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. This was before the party ? 

Mr. RowE. After the party. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. After the party. You had seen him at the party 
but not a formal introduction ? 

Mr. RowE. No formal introduction, you see, and he spoke to us. 
He discussed the relationship between America and Cuba and he 
gave us the impression that he was very sorry about this relationship 
and that things will be better and we assumed that things would be 
better because here he was going to spend all this money with us to 


invite American tourists and we knew that American tourists would 
not go to Cuba if there was bad relations between the two Govern- 
ments. We assumed this would be better and we asked questions and 
he answered all the questions and I think he probably stayed there an 
hour and a half or 2 hours talking to us and he reiterated to us in 
the talk to stay longer. He said, ''I want you to see the people. Go 
to the different parts of Cuba and find out for yourselves what is 
going on. There will be no guides, no guards, no anything. You 
just go and do what you want to do and then you will know for 

Senator Dodd. I have here a preliminary study by the subcommittee 
staff on the subject "Cuba and the American Negro." I think I shall 
order it printed as an appendix in connection with this hearing.* 

Mr. Rowe, will you continue please ? 

Mr. RowE. Some of the people had reservations and wanted to get 
back. He said, "Don't worry about that. If you have to get back 
we will supply a plane for you," and of course he did. They chartered 
a plane to bring back 12 people. 

Mr. Fisher. Ten or twelve people. 

Mr. Ro^vE. Ten or twelve people who had to get back, who lost 
their reservations because they decided to stay over and it was after 
this particular party and after this particular meeting that we then 
started discussing with Dr. Castellanos and Dr. Martinez this business 
of inviting tourists to Cuba. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, who is Dr. Castellanos ? 

Mr. RowE. Dr. Castellanos is the director of INIT, Avenida Linea 
y A. INIT is what they call the Tourist Commission in Cuba and lie 
thought it would be a tremendous idea and the tremendous thing 
for them to go into negotiation or rather to effect a contract with us 
to do a public relations and promotional job for Cuba to get tourists, 
people to come to Cuba, both individually and in groups. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. This is of some importance. You were discussing 
a contract to be public relations counsel, not for Castro but for Cuba. 

Mr. RowE. That is right, for the Tourist Commission. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The Tourist Commission of the Republic of Cuba. 

Mr. RowE. Right. I mean as far as the Government was con- 
cerned, it never entered into the picture at all because we were not 
political in any way, shape, or form and couldn't afford to go into 
any political type of contract because we won't, you know, we just 
can't do it. The only thing we know to do politically is to build 
up a candidate for office. 

Senator Keatixg. I am glad to liear that. 

Mr. Rowe. You remember that from my statement. 

Senator Iveatixg. The Amsterdam News is very capable. 

Mr. RowE. Let me say you are very kind. Senator. My wife hap- 
pens to write a column for the Pittsburgh Courier. 

Anyway, we discussed the program of how we would go about 
bringing tourists to Cuba. He was very insistent whereby they 
wanted to hire our firm to do this job; that they wanted us to do 
an interracial job as far as tourists were concerned. They did 
not want us to go into the white press or the daily magazines because 
they have a $6 million contract, I believe it was, with Harris & Co., 

*The document is printed at p. 789. 

43354— €l—pt. 11 2 ' 


of Miami, Fla., for that particular phase of American tours. I be- 
lieve he just sued them. I believe he was going to get $200,000 and 
some-odd whicli they owe him. Unfoitunately, we lost about $150,000 
and I don't think we are going to be able to 

Mr. SouRWiNE. They owe you $150,000 ? 

Mr. RowE. $150,000 on the contract which we signed with them. 
That is the balance. In drawing up tlie contract we were ^-ery care- 
ful — in fact, nobody even discussed anything except tours and how 
we would bring these tourists into Cuba. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. This advertising campaign was to inspire the 
tours — you weren't to be a tourist bureau ? 

Mr. RowE. No. 

Mr. SouRwixE. You were to carry on a public relations campaign, 
including advertising in the Negro magazines and newspapers? 

Mr. RowE. Right. 

Mr. SouRw^iNE. Inspire a desire among the people to go to Cuba? 

Mr. RowE. Right. I have a couple of the ads which we placed in 
the paper which j^ou can have for the record. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. May they be received, Mr. Chairman ? 

Senator DoDD. Yes. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits 60, 60-A, and 
60-B" and are reproduced on adjoining pages :) 

Exhibit 60 




MAY 20th - MAY 30th 







CUBA --'-Wi^eri' thf'te ts frit«"tt)i;;;(5ss "fiom itK trp '  
the beat to {he peopto on ttie streets, 

VISIT "~V*i*h tiS fof this gigantic May 20t)' 
thry M-ay 30th i;;;r)g-v.'efk-e!id cc-!ebration, 
SPECIAL —low. tow co-it —v.'hatfjve!- 
way you ;,r3v"et— whetevsr you stay, 




t- (fie Ade ;',>r:i^^teJi<'T Ontf,-(, H^-n y^irj^ City 


Exhibit 60-A 

Special I bonus 


Each night that one of your clients spends at any hotel in Cuba -providing it is a prepaid booking. 
means to you a SPECIAL S 1.00 BONUS that you will easily collect by just discounting the 
total due amount from your remittance to the Hotel or to your Agent in Cuba. 

This offer applies as follows: 

I On the total number of nights included in advertised ALL - INCLUSIVE TOURS 
' to Cuba. 

2 On the total number of nights included in prepaid INDEPENDENT- INCLUSIVE 
TOURS to Cuba. 

On the total number of nights included in o HOTEL COUPON, i. e.; 


If you issue a HOTEL COUPON for 3 nights at tfie rate of $ 10.00 single 
per nigfit -totalling $ 30 00-. you are entitled to » $ 3 00 BONUS. 
(One person. 3 nights: $ 3 00). 


If you issue a HOTEL COUPON for 3 nights at the rate of $12 00 double 
per night -totalling $36 00-. you are entitled to a $ 6 00 BONUS. 
(2 persons. 3 nights: $ 6 00). 

On the number of nights covered by a reservation for which a deposit has been 
collected and a HOTEL DEPOSIT COUPON (ssued, i. e.: 

\ If you issue a HOTEL DEPOSIT COUPON for $10 00. covering a 

Q/ $ 10 00 single lor 3 nights, you are entitled to a $ I 00 BONUS, since 

the deposit is the equivalent to one night at the hotel. (One person. 

one night: $ 1 .00 ). If you issue a double instead of a single, you would 

be entitled to a $ 2 00 BONUS. (2 persons, one night: $2 00), 


If you issue a HOTEL DEPOSIT COUPON for $ 20 00. covering a $ 10.00 
single for 5 nights, you are entitled to a $ 2 00 BONUS, since the 
deposit IS the equivalent to 2 nights at the hotel, (One person, 2 nights: 
$2 00 ),lf you issue a double instead of a single, you v^ould be entitled 
to a $4 00 BONUS (2 persons, 2 nights: $4.00). 

In addition to the SPECIAL $1.00 ROM'S offer, you are also entitled to the folloicing 
commissions-discmoitablctis xcetl from your remit/, mcc to the Hotel or to your .Agent in Cuba: 

• Special 15 ■.commission on all prepaid ALL-INCLUSIVE 
TOURS to Cuba, either advertised or independent. 

• Special 20",, commission on limousine service between 
airport and hotel -and back-, at the fare of $ 1.25 
each way (ALL-INCLUSIVE TOURS only ). 

• Regular 10;,, commission on ordinary hotel reservations 
for independent travellers. 

As you can sec, now -more than ever- the more clients you send to 
Cuba, the more profit you make! Eaeh client means to you a quite 
generous amount of commission -dollars! 



Exhibit 60-B 



rVlAV 20th - IVIAY 30th 




' COLORFUL --ti!ffl€Hi::3~-MAR!rJAS--SPAS"-F.WUNTA!;>i RtSORTS: 
CUBA ■— Wt.ff!*:- iiiacu IS rVjftiv.-jiiOfss -freiv. t!>e cup on thv i-,%at to thi^ peopte 

ViSiT — vViti! us tor u\!i gigsftt.', V'ay 2'jfh thfu May SOii' tougvvefck.i^nri 


SPECiAL --ios iijw c;.:;.r— /vh.itt.^fs wHy yuy irsvei—- whetfivfef vou iliy , 



Vtcr.eMUf. «is-ts'e;;e,- Ci7<.t?r ,N'fw ■^1:.r^ fNiy 
33^ f^'^; n^ict'r ?i' , K^>;^?n' — ia 9.d-^t:iw>, Vi?oar^j, l-^j^.b^rM 

Mr. SouRwiNE. These are ads prepared by you? 

Mr. Ro^vE. Right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Which did run? 

Mr. RowE. Right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Where did these ads run? 

Mr. RowE. In most of the larger Negro papers — the Amsterdam 
News, the Pittsburgh Courier, the Chicago Defender, the Afro- 

Mr. SouRWiNE. How big was your advertising budget on this par- 
ticular account? 


]Mi-. IvowE. The entire budiret — it isn't broken down, but the entire 
account was $287,000. 

^Ir. SouRwiNE. When you placed these ads, did the Cuban Govern- 
ment i)av for them or did you oblio^ate yourselves as an agency to pav 
tor them : 

]Mr. RoAVE. "VVe obligated ourselves to pay for them. 

Mr. SoFRWixE. And you subsequently did pay for them? 

Mr. RowE. Yes, we did. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you accept and receive reimbursement from the 
Cuban Government ? 

Mr. RowE. On two occasions, yes, we received two checks from them. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do they still owe you money for reimbui-sement for 
ads you placed and paid for? 

Mr. RowE. Yes. 

]Mr. SouRwixE. How much ? 

Mr. RowE. On the advertising, I think it is a little less than $6,000. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And in addition to that, they owe you approximateh' 
$140,000 more as compensation for your part in the campaign I 

Mr. RowE. For fees and additional expenses. 

Mr. SouR\viXE. You didn't receive very much as fees out of this deal, 
then, did you ? 

Mr. RowE. No. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, was there a second advertising campaign ? 

Mr. RowE. No, there wasn't a second. We had one prepared but it 
never Avent out because we had decided that we were going to resign 
the account. 

Mr. SouRwixE. What happened to your magazine advertising? 

]\lr. RowE. We weren't going to advertise, only the Johnston publi- 
cations. All the other magazine advertisements were being taken 
care of by Harris & Co. 

]Mr. SouRWixE. When was it that you decided that you were going 
to resign? 

Mr. RowE. Well, we decided we were going to i-esign in March but 
we had a 6-month clause in our contract. 

Mr. SoiTRwiXE. That is you had to give 6 months' notice ? 

i\Ir. RowE. That's right. 

Mr. SouRwixE. Did you give that notice in March of 1960? 

^Ir. RoM-E. No, we didn't give them notice on that. We were going 
to do this in June because I went out of the country. I went to Mexico 
and we were going to take care of this matter when I got back because, 
in the first place, we were trying to get the additional money out of 
theui before we let them know we were going to resign, because we 
were on the hook for about $6,000 or so. 

Mr. SouRwiXE. Did you e^-entually send a letter of resignation of 
the account? 

Mr. RowE. I didn't hear }■ ou. 

Mr. SouRWixE. Did you eventually send a letter resigning the 
account ? 

Mr. RowE. Yes, I did. 

Mr. SouRWixE. AVlien was this ? 

Mr. RowE. This was in July— July 7, 1960. 

Mr. SouRwixE. Do you have a copy of that letter ? 

JSIr. RoAVE. Yes, I do. 

JSIr. SouRWiXE. May we have it for the record ? 


Mr. Eo\VE. You certainly may. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. May this be received ? 

Senator Dodd. It may be received. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 61" and reads as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 61 

July 7, 1960. 

Dr. Baudilio Castellanos, 

Director, INIT, 

Avenida Linca y A, Vedado, Havana, Cu'ba 

Dear Dr. Castellanos: In view of the political chess game, which has de- 
veloped into virtually a war of words between our two governments — Amer- 
ica and Cuba, we regretfully submit our resignation as the public relations 
representative of the Instituto Nacional de la Industria Turistica. 

There can be no question as to the titanic nature of the heated arguments 
between our two nations which have brought them to the brink of severing re- 
lationship. Repercussions of this political strife between your country and ours 
cannot help but lessen the effectiveness of our noblest efforts on the behalf of the 
Cuban Tourist Commission. It was the hope of our firm, when we entered into 
a contract with you in February 1960, that we would have an opportunity to 
bring about a better relationship between the people of our two countries. At 
that time, we felt that the new leaders of Cuba would take over their politically 
ravished country with the same human affection and intensity for the rights 
of humanity that successfuly brought them down from the hills of Oriente 
Province to the luxury and comfort of Havana, the capital of Cuba. We felt 
that there would be a strict observance of justice, public faith, and a sturdy 
adherence to virtue in public office. We saw the people of Cuba reaching for 
that something called identity. We heard their leaders speaking out things 
that have long required clarification. But through it all, together in their 
own land, we believed they would put others in other lands into proper per- 
spective, keeping in mind the faith and hope of those who died to make it 

We understood and appreciated the banning of discrimination in Cuba, and 
felt prone to publicize Cuba as a new Utopia, where the promise of first-class 
treatment as tirst-class citizens would be a reality for American Negroes, who 
have been intimate with toil and sorrow, and who have too long dreamed of 
equality — in work and play — with other freemen enjoying respect and dignity. 
However, the conflict of interest, of which you are familiar, has continued 
to multiply, and the failure of the (INIT) to overcome its financial prob- 
lems leaves us no alternative except to resign. Mr. Lockhart, the Account Execu- 
tive, will be in touch with you to effect the final closeout. 

It was a tremendous pleasure working with you and your staff, and being 
able to visit Cuba as INIT's Representative. It is heartbreaking to have to 
sever our financial relationship, and I hope it will be compensated by the con- 
tinuation of our friendship. I am sincere when I repeat that I hope that the 
day is not too far in the distant when our two countries can see eye to eye, 
and shake hands instead of fists. 

Mr. Lockhart's report will show that in view of the pressures and the job 
we tried to do put us in the red in excess of the budgets we received several 
months ago. some $5,000-$6,000. In addition, there is a fee of $6,250 due on 
the basis of our signed agreement. I do hope that once the report is complete 
that this amount will be forthcoming. 

In closing, I would like to say that we terminate this agreement with no 
rancor or regrets, but with the hope that soon we can get together again : and 
that there will be no obstacles to prevent us from doing the kind of job that all 
of us are aware can be done for so fine a country and such wonderful 

Rearetfully yours, 

William L. Rowe, 
President, Louis, Rowe, Fisher, Lockhart Enterprises, Inc. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, who signed this letter? 

Mr. RowE. I signed the letter as the president of the firm and I 
would like to read part of it to you. 


Senator Dodd. Go ahead. 

Mr. RowE. It is dated July 1960— July 7— and sent to Dr. Baudilio 

Dear Db. Castellanos : In view of the political chess game which has de- 
veloped into virtually a war of words between our two governments — America 
and Cuba — we regretfully submit our resignation as the public relations repre- 
sentative of the Instituto Nacional de la Industria Turistica. 

There can be no question as to the titanic nature of the heated arguments 
between our two nations, which have brought them to the brink of severing rela- 
tionships. Repercussions of this political strife between your country and ours 
cannot help but lessen the effectiveness of our noblest efforts on the behalf of the 
Cuban Tourist Commission. It was the hope of our firm when we entered into 
a contract with you in February 1960, that we would have an opportunity to 
bring about a better relationship between the people of our two countries. At 
that time we felt that the new leaders of Cuba would take over their politically 
ravished country with the same human affection and intensity for the rights 
of humanity that successfully brought them down from the hills of Oriente 
Province to the luxury and comfort of Havana, the capital of Cuba. We felt 
that there would be a strict observance of justice, public faith, and a sturdy 
adherence to virtue in public oflSce. We saw the people of Cuba reaching for 
that something called identity. We heard their leader speaking out things that 
have long required clarification. But through it all, together in their own land, 
we believed they would put others in other lands, into proper perspective, keep- 
ing in mind that faith and hope of those who died to make it so. 

We understood and appreciated the banning of discrimination in Cuba, and 
felt prone to publicize Cuba as a new Utopia, where the promise of first-class 
treatment as first-class citizens would be a reality for Ajnerican Negroes, who 
have been intimate with toil and sorrow, and who have too long dreamed of 
equality — in work and play — with other freemen enjoying respect and dignity. 

However, the conflict of interest of which you are familiar, has continued to 
multiply and the failure of the INIT to overcome its financial problems leaves 
us no alternative except to resign. 

I tried to express in here the true feeling and the real reason "why we 
relinquished the contract. We had one feeling when we went into the 
contract and as things progressed, of course, we got another feeling 
and it was impossible to do a job when one country was talking 
against another country and it got to the stage where it was sort df 
like it was becoming a political situation and we stepped out. 

Mr. SouEwixE. Did the Cubans accept your resignation on this con- 
tract without any argument ? 

Mr. RowE. Yes, they did. They never did it in writing but they 
called up when they received the latter and Dr. Castellanos said he 
was sorrv and he would straig-hten out whatever differences that we 
had as far as moneys that was due us was concerned. 

Mr. SouRWiXE. Did they do that ? 

Mr, RowE. Xo, we haven't heard from him. We didn't hear from 
him any more. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Wliat efforts have you made to get your money? 

^Ir. RowE. Frankly, we haven't made too much effort. We sent 
them a report and that was the end of it. I spoke to our firm's lawyer 
in relationship to the money and he made contact with Harris & Co. 
in Miami to find out just what their lawyers had done and how they 
went about getting whatever money they are going to receive as a re- 
sult of the confiscation of the planes which Cuba had here at one time 
and he is still negotiating this now with the lawyers down there so 
perhaps something might come out of it as a result of that. Of course, 
I understand that the money the planes were bringing will bring far 
more money than is due Harris & Co. which is in excess of $200,000. 


Mr. SouRwiNE. Are you party to this action ? 

Mr. RowE. No, we are not. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you inform the Justice Department of the 
United States respecting what had happened to your contract ? 

Mr. RowE. Yes, we did. We had to fill out the necessary papers 
just like you have to register, you have to unregister so to speak and 
we did that and we kept in touch with the Justice Department at each 
step of the way because when they sent us any number of folders we 
had to fill them out and send them back. In fact, everything that 
came from Cuba, even in relationship to the special bonus tours and 
all that, we first contacted the Justice Department before we did any- 
thing about them. 

Mr. SouRw^ixE. What is that document you just referred to? 

Mr. RowE. A document that says — well, it says $1 bonus for any 
hotel in Cuba. In other words, they were giving away packages. 

Mr. SoTJRwiNE. Is this part of your publicity or public relations or 
something that came from Cuba ? 

Mr. RowE. This came from Cuba and this is a bulletin they sent us. 
It had a speech by Dr. Raul Roa before the General Assembly of the 
United Nations which was made on November 6, 1959. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you distribute copies of that speech ? 

Mr. RowE. No, we didn't. They sent them to us and we sent a letter 
to the Department of Justice asking them whether or not, and plus a 
copy of this — asking whether or not this was all right to send out and 
they wrote us back and said it was political and it was not. 

Mr. SouRwixE. May we have copies of that correspondence ? 

Mr. RowE. Yes, you may. 

(The docimients referred to were marked "Exhibits 62 and 62A" 
and read as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 62 

Ju.xE 24, 1960. 
Mr. .1. Walter Yeagley, 

Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, 
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 
(Attention : Mr. Nathan B. Lenvin.) 

Gextlemen : Enclosed please find a sample of a mailing that we would like 
to make to colleges throughout the United States. 

Because of the circumstances that prevail between ours and the Cuban Gov- 
ernment, however, we would appreciate some type clearance or authorization 
before making this mailing. 

Thank ,vou for your cooperation in this matter. 
Very truly yours, 

m. a. lockhart. 

Exhibit No. 62-A 

U.S. Department of Justice, 
Washington, D.C, July 19, 1060. 
Re Registration No. 1348. 

Louis, RowE, Fisher, Lockhart EivrTERPRiSES. Inc., 
200 West 57th Street, Netv York, N.Y. 

Gentlemen : The ending of the agency relationsihip with the Institute 
Nacional de la ludustria Turistica, Habana, Cuba, a.s stated in your letter of 
July 8, 1960, will permit the termination of your registration under the Foreign 
Agents Registration Act of 19.38, as amended, provided you file a final statement 
in accordance with rule 260 thereunder. 

The final statement should be submitted on the enclosed forms and should 
cover the period from April 6. 1060, to the date on which the agency relationship 
ended. It should give a full description of all activities performed during that 


period on behalf of the foreign principal as well as a detailed accounting of 
all funds received or expended in connection with these activities. This state- 
ment must be filed in duplicate. 

In view of the termination of your connection with the Cuban tourist agency, 
the inquiry made in your letter of June 24, 1960, concerning the dissemination 
of literature on its behalf will not require a detailed reply. For your informa- 
tion, however, the material submitted is considered political propaganda and 
its dissemination within the Unitetl States would require compliance with the 
filing, labeling, and reporting requirements of section 4 of the act and the rules 
and regulations thereunder. 

J. Walter Yeagley, 
Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division. 

By Nathan B. Lenvin, 
Chief, Registration Section. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Xow, I am just a little bit concerned as to this 
material that has been admitted to the record. I think it is all still 
there in front of you and I would like to get it separated and phys- 
ically in the hands of the committee so that we may be sure about it. 

There is your contract ; there is the letter to the Department of Jus- 
tice and their letter of reply. There were two advertisements. 

Mr. EoAVE. You have everything so far. 

Mr. SouRWixE. And a letter of resignation. 

Mr. RowE. That is in. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You showed us two ads. Are they over there ? 

Mr. Ro^vE. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwixE. The letter of resignation is over there. There is a 
list of pei*sons who went on this first trip. 

Mr. RowE. That I haven't got yet. 

Mr. SonRwixE. That will be furnished, not for the printed record, 
but for the committee. 

All right, I think that is everything up to now. 

XoAv, was it you or Mr. Louis who talked with Mr. Martinez, on the 
occasion of this first trip, in terms which involved a separation and a 
conflict between the people of tlie United States and the Government 
of the United States ? 

Mr. RowE. No. Mr. Louis wasn't in Cuba at that time. It was Mr. 
Fisher and Mr. Lockhart and myself. 

It was Dr. Martinez who said that one of the main things that was 
wrong was that the American Government had the wrong impression 
about the Cuban i-evolution and that the American press was giving 
the people the wrong impression and that they wanted the people to 
know that Cubans did not hate Americans and so on down the line. 

I told them then that there was no separation between the Ameri- 
can people and the American Government; that it was one and the 
same ; that the Government was the people, and vice versa. He said, 
"Be that as it may." We didn't discuss this any further, you see. 

Mr. SouRw^iNE. Xow, who prepared this contract which you signed 
with the Cuban Government, your attornej-s or the Cuban Govern- 
ment ? 

Mr. RowE. The Cuban Government prepared the contract and our 
attorneys just looked it over and said it was all right, that it was in 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Louis, on the occasion when you went down to 
Cuba, when you went on business, with whom did you talk ? 

Mr. Barrow. Well, I talked with Dr. Benavides. 

Mr. SouRWixTE. Wlio is he ? 


Mr. Bareow. He is himself a member of the tourist commission. 

Mr. RowE. He is the head. Enrique Benavides is a colored Cuban 
who is in charge of the special markets for the Cuban Tourist Com- 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know if he is any relation to the famous 
Manuel Benavides ? 

Mr. RowE. I think there is a family line some place. I am not too 
sure because at that particular time we had a biographical sketch. "We 
have a biographical sketch if you would like to have it. 

Mr. SouR-w'iNE. Yes. May that be admitted, Mr. Chairman ? 

Senator DoDD. Yes. 

(The docmnent referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 63" and reads 

as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 63 

Biographical Sketch, Enbiqxje Benavides, Director of Special Market 
Promotion, Department of the Cuban Tourist Commission 

Enrique Benavides, 34 years old, married. Studied Social Science and Law at 
the University of Havana. Possessor of a Bachelor's Degree. He was a class- 
mate and is a close friend of Dr. Fidel Castro. He was a member of the Revolu- 
tionary Movement in the struggle against Batista and is today a member of 
the Revolutionary Government. He was the foremost leader in the planning 
and the eventual abolition of all forms of discrimination in Cuba. 

He is the former head of all the public beaches of Cuba. He was Captain 
during the revolution, at which time he organized an integrated revolutionary 
league, which worked within the cities of Cuba to aid the revolutionary armed 
forces. He is at present a member of the Revolutionary Government and Direc- 
tor of Special Market Promotion Department of the Cuban Tourist Commission. 
He is the Secretary General of the Gastronomic and Touristic Industry Union. 

April 15, 1960. 

Senator Dodd. I am sorry but I have to leave because I have made 
another engagement that I must fulfill. 

I want to thank you, Mr. Louis and Mr. Rowe and Mr. Fisher, for 
helping us unravel this whole story. We have been working on it for 
some time and I will ask Senator Keating if he will preside here in my 

Mr. SouRAViNE. What was the nature of the discussion with Mr. 
Benavides, Mr. Louis ? 

Mr. Barrow. Well, to tell the truth I didn't do any talking at all 
about contracts or that the condition that we were going to bring the 
tourists to Cuba on because that was the part we left up to Bill Rowe 
and Al Lockhart. So I just started the conversation about it, what 
we intend to do for them, and Lockhart took it on from there. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You were both present ? 

Mr. Barrow. I was just there and started the conversation and I 
went out on the balcony and at no time did I stay and listen to the con- 
versation on the idea on how they were going to develop the tourists. 

Senator Keating (now presiding). Is that January 1960? 

Mr. Barrow. January 16, 1960. 

Senator Keating. You were not there after that ? 

Mr. Barrows No, I was there on the 29th of December 1950 and 
January 16 of 1960. I never Avent back. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Wliat did you, j'ourself, do in connection with the 
performance of this contract, ]\Ir. Louis ? 

Mr. Barrow. Nothing. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Rowe, what did you, yourself, do in connection 
with the performance of this contract ? 


Mr. Eo^vE. Well, more or less I drew up the montli-to-month plans 
and I Avrote the releases that went out to newspapers and drew up the 
ads which went out to the newspai^ers. We had several programs 
which we reall}' never entered into. The program itself never really 
got off the ground because of this barrier of understanding. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Since the termination of your contract with the 
Cuban Government have you had any dealings with them^ 

Mr. KoAVE. Xone whatsoever. 

Mr. SouRWLNE. Except, of course, your efforts to get your money. 

yir. KowE. That is the only thing. 

Mr. SouRwixE. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions of these 

Senator Keatixg. Just let me ask a question or two. 

Have you, Mr. Louis, had any contact with the so-called Fair Play 
for Cuba Committee ( 

Mr. Barrow. No, I haven't. 

Senator Keaiing. Have they entered into any communications with 
you at all? 

Mr. Barrow. I don't think so. 

Mr. Eowe. They haven't called our office at all. In fact, we don't 
even know who they are. We didn't know it until we saw the ads in 
the newspapere. 

Senator Keating. There is a Mr. Gibson who is now the executive 
director, executive secretary. 

Does eitlier of you know him ? 

Mr. RowE. Xo, I don't know him. 

Senator Keatixg. You don't know him, Mr. Louis ? 

Mr. Barrow. Xo. 

Senator Keatixg. He hasn't been in touch with you ? 

Mr. Barrow. X"o, sir. 

Senator Keatixg. There was some evidence taken here, and I don't 
know if it was anything that came to your knowledge about Mr. 
Robert Taber taking tourists to Cuba and having taken $19,000 from 
a bank account of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee to pay the 
expenses of these tourists. Is that operation anything that you knew 
about ? 

Mr. RowE. Xo. 

Senator Keatixg. Did you ever meet Mr. Robert Taber? 

]Mr. Rowe. Xo, I don't know him. 

Senator Keatixg. Senator Cotton, do you have any questions ? 

Senator Cottox. Xo. 

Senator Keatixg. Well, we certainly are very grateful to all three 
of you. 

I think perhaps counsel's name should be entered in the record. 

]Mr. Fisher. I am not the counsel. I am a former partner of the 
firm that handled the account. 

My name is Charles Fisher, 

Mr. Barrows My wife is the counsel. She is behind us. Every 
time I make a mistake she will pull my coattail. 

Senator Keatixg. Thank 3^011 very much. We appreciate your 

(Whereupon, at 11 :15 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, subject 
to the call of the Chair.) 


Cuba and the American Negro 

Once again the forces of international communism and its allies are utilizing 
their powerful resources in an effort to subvert the American Negro against his 
own Government. 

Cooperating in this effort are the Cuban Government, the Fair Play for Cuba 
Committee, and the Communist Party, U.S.A. 

From the time of the establishment of the movement in 1919, the Communists 
have always looked upon the American Negro as so much explosive tinder 
for the revolutionary conflagration they seek to incite within the United States. 
At the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International in August- 
September 1928, the question of the American Negro came up for prolonged dis- 
cussion in which American Communists participated. On the basis of the con- 
gress decisions, the then representative of the Communist International in the 
United States, John Pepper, proclaimed for the United States the slogan that 
"The Negro Communists should emphasize in their propaganda the establish- 
ment of a Negro Soviet Republic" to be restricted to the Black Belt in the 
South.^ In other words in furthering this slogan in pursuance of their revolu- 
tionary goal, the Communists advocated for a number of years the sacrificing of 
American Negroes to a bloody civil war for a Negro Soviet Republic, in which 
they would be the chief victims. 

Within recent years and imder the guidance of Moscow, this slogan has been 
abandoned by the Communists. After the establishment of the government of 
Fidel Castro, however, the Communist forces entrenched in Cuba have sought to 
make that island a beachhead for the subversion of the American Negro against 
his own Government. They endeavored to enlist his support for the pro-Soviet 
and anti-American government of Castro, 90 miles from our shores. The efforts 
made in this direction during the past 2 years have been manifold. 

In the May 1961 issue of the Crisis, official organ of the National Association 
for Advancement of the Colored People, is an article by Dr. Juan Rene Betan- 
court, who was appointed by Castro a delegate-interveuor in the National Fed- 
eration of Negro Societies, Cuba's main Negro organization. In his article he 
declares that "One can truthfully say, and this is without the slightest exaggera- 
tion, that the Negro movement in Cuba died at the hands of Senor Fidel Castro." 

"When Fidel Castro returned to Cuba from New York," says Senor Betan- 
court, "he had us to understand that he had won over the American Negro and 
that he was going to bring 300 of them to Cuba to view the 'terrestrial 
paradise.' " In other words, Castro is making a decided effort to build up the 
reputation of Cuba in the eyes of the American Negro as a land which recognizes 
no racial discrimination, as a shining model in contrast with the United States. 
Yet Betancourt has declared that "Cuban Negroes do not own a single hotel 
or commercial establishment, or industry * * * Cuban Negroes continue to live 
as pariahs." 

In line with Castro's effort to enlist the support of American Negroes, the 
Cuban Institute Nacional De La Industria Turistica (INIT) signed a contract 
in February 1960 with a New York public relations firm including Joe Louis, 
former heavyweight champion of the world, and William L. Rowe, a former 

^"Amprican Neprro Problems," by ,Tohn Pepper (the Communist. October 192.S, pp. 628 
and 634). Other relevant Communist references: "The Nepro Question in the United 
States," bv .Tames S. Allen (International Publishers, New York, 19.S6^ : "The Negroes in 
a Soviet America," by James S. Allen and .Tames W. Ford (Workers Library Publishers, 
New York, 1935) ; "The Communist Position on the Negro Question," pamphlet (New 
Centurv Publishers, New York, 1947) ; "Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the 
Colonies and Semi-Colonies." 6th World Congress of the Communist International (Inter- 
national Press Correspondence, No. VIII, 1928, pp. 1659-1676). 



New York deputy police commissioner, both Negroes, to encourage Negro tourists 
to come to Cuba. Castro appeared and was publicly photographed with Joe 
Louis in connection with this project." However Messrs. Louis and Rowe re- 
fused to lend themselves to Castro's anti-American designs and canceled the 

On September 19, 1960, Fidel Castro came to New York for a meeting of the 
U.N. General Assembly, he ostentatiously move<l his headquarters from the 
Hotel Shelbui-ne to the Hotel Theresa in the heart of Negro Harlem.^ In an 
equally spectacular bid for Negro favor, Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev 
visited Castro at the hotel on the next day.* On the same day the employees 
of Havana's swank Hotel Riviera decided to change its name to the Hotel 
Theresa.® The Hotel Theresa is known as the Waldorf-Astoria of Harlem, 
where most leading social and political functions of the area are staged. 

In connection with the Hotel Theresa incident. Representative Adam Clayton 
Powell made the following caustic comment. He deplored the use of Harlem by 
Premier Fidel Castro "as a battleground for his own political ends" and added 
that "His staying in Harlem is sheer hypocrisy." He warned that the hospital- 
ity extended to Fidel Castro "will end the moment he launches any Communist- 
inspired activity or rioting in Harlem." " 

Addressing the North Carolina State Conference of NAACP Branches, Gloster 
B. Current, national director of NAACP branches, declared that Russian Premier 
Khrushchev's Harlem meeting with Cuban Premier Castro was an attempt to 
make it appear that "Negroes of America are friendly to the Communist con- 
spirators." He made it plain that "Negroes are not fooled by the Communists." ' 

On Saturday, September 24, 1960, Benjamin Davis, a Negro Communist 
Party leader, and his followers sought to get into the act by staging a rally at 
126th Street and 7th Avenue in New York's Harlem, which drew less than 150 
onlookers. No prominent Negroes responded. 

The Fair Play for Cuba Committee arranged a private reception for Castro in 
Harlem, but this drew only a few minor officials. Langston Hughes, Mrs. 
Daisy Bates, State Senator James Watson, and NAACP Branch President 
Joseph Overton refused to attend. 

In a telegram to Governor Rockefeller and Mayor Wagner, the Baptist Minis- 
ters' Conference of Greater New York and Vicinity, representing 500 clergymen 
and over 100,000 Baptists, the largest religious group in Harlem, deplored and 
condemned "any attempts by Fidel Castro to make the Harlem community a 
battleground for his ideologies and a cesspool of his doctrine of hate and greed, 
and importing anti-U.S. agitators who have by their riotous actions brought 
discredit upon our community." ^ 

According to Conrad Lynn, a member of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, 
accommodations at the Hotel Theresa for Fidel Castro were arranged through 
Robert Taber, executive secretary of the committee, who is now in Havana.* 

Within, the United States the bulk of the campaign to popularize Cuba among 
Negroes is carried on by the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, shown by testimony 
before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee to have been supported 
financially by the Cuban Government.'" Its acting executive secretary is Richard 
Gibson, a Negro who invoked the fifth amendment in refusing to answer questions 
regarding his activity. He was one of eight Negroes among the founders of the 
committee. The others included Frank London Brown, John Killens, and Julian 
Mayfield. Joanne Alileen Grant, a Negress, who has been listed as the secretary 
of the Fair Play Committee, invoked the fifth amendment on October 10, 1960, be- 
fore the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in refusing to answer all ques- 
tions regarding her Communist Party affiliations. 

Mr. Gibson has estimated that about one-third of the 3,000 members belonging 
to the Fair Play for Cuba Committee were Negroes." 

Robert F. Williams, NAACP chairman in Monroe, N.C., who was suspended for 
6 months in 1959 by the NAACP for urging Negroes to "fight violence with 

2Timp, Apr. 18, lOfiO, p. ?,7. 
3 New York Times. Sept. 20, 19R1, pp. 1 and 16. 
* Ibid., Sept. 21, 19R0, pp. 1 and 16. 
sihid., Sept. 21. IDfiO. p. 17. 
8 Ibid., Sept. 26, 1960. 

T New York News. Oct. 1, 1960, p. 36. 
8 Tbid.. Oct. 1. 1960, pp. 1 and 35. 
«Ib!d., Oct. 1. 1960. p. 1. 

'Tnir Plav for Cuba Committee, hearings of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, 
Apr. 29. Mav 5. Oct. 10. 1960, and .Tan. 10, 1961. 
" New York Times, Sept. 21, 1960, p. 17. 


violence," is one of the founding sponsors of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee 
and the editor of the Negro newsletter, Crusader. He was part of a Fair Play 
delegation to Cuba in I960.'- 

Williams organized a Fair Play delegation to visit Cuba including John Henrik 
Clarke, Negro historian, Artist Edward Clark, Poet LeKoi Jones, Fair Play Secre- 
taries Pat Linden and Lee Kolk, an-d Philadelphia Writer Joseph Hunter."^ 

While in Havana, AVilliams demonstrated at the American Embassy in protest 
against alleged anti-Negro activity in Monroe, N.C., and ridiculed the American 
demand for elections under Castro.'* 

In September 1960 he wrote a letter to Fidel Castro inviting him to visit him at 
his home in Monroe, N.C. Fair Play for September 16, 1960, referred to the 
invitation as a "time bomb." 

Speaking before the Fair Play for Cuba Committee of Columbia University on 
February 10, 1961, Robert F. Williams remarked, "I don't know what kind of 
'ism' they have in Cuba today, but whatever it is, we could use a little of it in 
the United States." This was evidently part of an EPCC tour covering Indiana 
University, Antioch College, Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, 
Portland, Vancouver, and Denver.'" In his newsletter, the Crusader, Williams 
has carried to his Negro leaders, a glowing description of Castro's agrarian 
reform program." 

In June of 1960 a literary supplement to the Havana newspaper Revolucion 
was published on the American Negro. It carried an original poem by Langs- 
ton Hughes, who has in the past supported Communist candidates for public 

The hands of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee were clearly visible in a pro- 
Castro-Lumumba demonstration held in United Nations Plaza, New York City, 
on February IS, 1961. Placards displayed read as follow^s: "Cuba Si, Congo 
Oui, Yankee No." "Hands Off Cuba." Chanted slogans were: "Viva Lumumba !" 
"Viva Fidel Castro !" "Down With Yankee Imperialism !" " 

Leaflets advertising a forthcoming Fair Play for Cuba Committee picket line 
at the White House were distributed. The demonstration was glowingly de- 
scribed in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee Student Council Bulletin for Feb- 
ruary 25, 1961. 

The Haviina Radio Centro broadcast on June 6, 1961, condemned the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision and the "virtual outlawing of the Communist Party and, 
in practice the outlawing of all those * * * who declare themselves in favor 
of * * * the rights of the Negroes." 

William W. AVorthy, Jr., a Negro, is a featured writer in the bulletins of the 
Fair Play for Cuba Committee. During his career he has displayed a marked 
hostility to the United States and its laws. On April 25, 1944. he was iiulictcd 
before a Federal grand jury in Philadelphia for violation of the Selective Service 
and Training Act of 1940. He failed to report for a physical examination in 
Boston on March 10, 1942, as a conscientious objector. He failed to report to 
a conscientious objectors' camp at Kane. Pa., on December 8. 1943. as ordered and 
on June 12. 1944. upon a plea of guilty, was sentenced to 1 day in prison by the 
Federal court in Philadelphia. 

In the 1950's. Worthy went to Communist China without an American pass- 
port and in violation of passport regulations prohibiting such travel, as a result 
of which he lost his passport. In December 19.54 his passport was restored to 
full validity and he made a trip for CBS to the Soviet Union. He is a corre- 
spondent for the Afro-American newspapers of Baltimore. 

In the January 10, 1961, issue of the Afro-American, Worthy wrote from 
Havana about an alleged bombing attack for which he holds the United States 
responsible. He said : 

"After the Cubnn newspapers published photographs of the bombing mate- 
rials seized by the police — pictures of dynamite containers clearly marked 
'Made in U.S.A.' — 50 ashamed American visitors went to a Havana hospital and 
donated blood for the innocent Cuban victims of the bombings. 

"The Americans were among the 800 who visited the island under the aus- 
pices of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee." 

^Fair Plav. July 8. 1960, p. 4. 
w Ihifl.. Aug. 5, i9G0. p. 2. 
M Ibid. 

^5 Student Council. Fair Play for Cuba Committee, Feb. 25. 1961. p. 
^« Xew York Times. Sept. 21. 1960, p. 17. 
" Ibidi., Feb. 19, 1961, pp. 1 and 18. 


In the Afro-American of April 29, 1961, there appeared a large advertisement 
called "A Declaration of Conscience by Afro-Americans" and sponsored by the 
Fair Play for Cuba Committee. In testimony of Dr. Charles A. Santos-Buch 
on January 10, 1961, it was shown that a previous advertisement of this com- 
mittee appearing in New York Times of April 6, 1960, was paid for in major 
part by an official of the Cuban Government. In the April 29, 1961, advertise- 
ment, William Worthy is quoted as saying : 

"If Cuba is attacked, I and others who know the facts will denounce the at- 
tack as an evil and wicked colonial war deserving of opposition and resistance 
by Afro- Americans." 

Despite voluminous evidence and reports to the contrary, Worthy claims 
that neither Fidel Castro nor his revolutionary movement are Communist and 
that he himself is anti-Communist. Ignoring the testimony of knowledgeable 
Cubans, Worthy claims that Cuba today is free, allowing habeas corpus, the 
freedom to speak, to publish, to worship, to travel at home or abroad. He de- 
clared : "It is obscenely hypocritical for North Americans to preach sermons to 
Cuba about the 'urgency of free elections.' " He charges that "Politically wild 
and in-esponsible elements in the Pentagon, dehmnanized cold-war fanatics in 
the CIA and FBI, and powerful economic interests opposed to the revolution are 
spreading the lie that Catholic Cuba has become a base of world commu- 
nism * * *.'^ 

The 17th Convention of the Communist Party, U.S.A., held in December 
1959, adopted a resolution with reference to Cuba, which clearly delineates how 
the party proposes to capitalize the present situation. It said : 

"The people of the United States can learn much from Cuba's democracy. 
The new government, in enunciating its set of principles a year ago, placed the 
elimination of racism as one of its major immediate objectives." ^* 

James E. Jackson, Jr., a Negro, is listed in Communist sources as the Com- 
munist Party's secretary for southern and Negro affairs^" and as secretary of 
the National Committee of the Communist Party, U.S.A.^ 

He was the first American Communist leader to publicly address a meeting 
of the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, according 
to the Worker of April 19, 1959, page 16. Part of his remarks were made in 
Russian. Mr. Jackson was convicted under the Smith Act on July 31, 1956, sen- 
tenced to 2 years' imprisonment, and his case was dismissed by the court of 
appeals on August 4, 1958. According to the Daily Worker of December 2, 1954, 
.lackson believes that "the South is that region of the United States where the 
most powerful revolutionary pressures may develop." What Mr. Jackson did 
after his return from Moscow is therefore significant. 

On August 19, 1960, Jackson, who was listed as a member of the party's 
ruling secretariat, addressed the Eighth National Assembly of the Popular Social- 
ist Party (Communist Party) of Cuba held in Havana, heading the American 
party's delegation. He paid ardent tribute to Fidel Castro as "that outstand- 
ing national hero and stateman" and spoke with pride of the "militant mass ac- 
tions of the Negro people — featuring mass sit-in actions, marches, and demon- 
strations" in the United States.^ 

This is the same James E. Jackson, Jr., who in the past has been one of the 
stanchest advocates of an independent Negro republic in the South, which would, 
if carried forward, have embroiled the Negroes of the South in a bloody and 
costly civil war. Thus far it is evident Fidel Castro and his Communist hench- 
men have been unsuccessful in entangling American Negroes in their nefarious 

JSFalr Play, .Tulv 22, 1960, pp. 3 and 4. 
i» Political Affairs, March 1960, p. 96. 
«) Worker, Dec. 14, 1958, p. 14. 

21 Moscow Pravda, Jan. 26, 1959. 

22 Political Affairs, September 1960, pp. 31-34. 


Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attached no significance 
to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organiza- 
tion in this index. 

A Page 

Allen, James S 789 

Afro-American (newspaper) 780, 792 

Baltimore 791 

American Negro Problems 789 

Amsterdam News 772, 777, 780 

Antioch College 791 

Appendix — Cuba and the American Negro 789-792 

Avenida Linea y A 777 


Baptist Ministers' Conference of Greater New York and Vicinity 790 

Barrow, Joe Louis. {See Louis, Joe.) 

Bates, Mrs. Daisv 790 

Batista 786 

Benavides, B]nrique 785, 786 

Betancourt, Dr. Juan Rene 789 

Brown, Franli Loudon 790 


Campanella, Roy 773 

Castellanos, Dr. Baudilio 773,777,782,783 

Castro, Dr. Fidel 772, 773, 777, 786, 789, 790, 792 

Castro-Lumumba demonstration 791 

CBS. (See Columbia Broadcasting System.) 

Central Intelligence Agency 792 

CIA. (See Central Intelligence Agency.) 

Chicago Defender 780 

Clark, Edward 791 

Clarke. John Henrik 791 

Cohimbia Broadcasting System 791 

Communist (publication) 789 

Communist International, Sixth World Congress 789 

Communist Position on the Negro Question, the (pamphlet) 789 

Communist Party, Soviet Union — 21st Congress 792 

Communist Party, USA: 

17th Convention of 792 

National Committee of 792 

Cotton. Senator Norris 771 

Crusader (Negro Newsletter) 791 

Cuba 771-792 

Cuba and the American Negro (appendix) 777,789-792 

Cuban Instituto Nacional de la Industria Turistica (INIT). (See Insti- 

tuto Nacional de la Industria Turistica) 
Cuban Tourist Commission. {See Instituto Nacional de la Industria 

Turistica) . 


Daily Worker 792 

Davis, Benjamin 790 

Denver 791 

Dodd, Senator Thomas J 771 

i I 




Exhibit No. 58 (List of guests at Castro party (unpublished)) 774 

Exhibit No. 59 (Letter December 21, 1959, re publicity contract between 

NITI and Louis & Rowe) 775 

Exhibit No. 60 (Advertisement for Cuba Independence Day celebration)- 778 

Exhibit No. 60-A (Advertisement re low hotel rates for Cuba visitors) — 779 

Exhibit No. 60-B (Advertisement for U.S. tourists to visit Cuba) 780 

Exhibit No. 61 (Letter July 7, 1960, from Rowe to Director of INIT 

resigning contract) ^^2 

Exhibit No. 62 (Letter June 24, 1960, from Lockhart to Department of 

Justice inquiring if proper to distribute Cuban advertising to colleges- 784 
Exhibit No. 62-A (Letter from Department of Justice to Louis Rowe 

firm acknowledging termination of Cuban contract) 784 

Exhibit No. 63 (Biographical sketch of Benavides) 786 


Fair Play (publication) 791 

Fair Play for Cuba Committee 787,789-792 

FBI. (/See Federal Bureau of Investigation.) 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 792 

Fisher, Charles 773, 786, 787 

Ford, James W . l^^ 

Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 784 


Gasstronomic and Touristic Industry Union 786 

Gibson, Richard 'J'87, 790 

Grant, Joanne Alileen 790 


Harris & Co 777,781,783 

Havana 775, 782, 783, 791 

Havana Hilton Hotel 77l>, <76 

Havana Radio Centro 791 

Havana Riviera Hotel 773, 776 

Hotel Shelburne "^0 

Hotel Theresa 790 

Hughes, Langston . 790, 791 

Hunter, Joseph 791 


Indiana University 791 

INIT. {See Instituto Nacional de la Industria Turistica.) 

Institute Nacional de la Industria Turistica 772, 773, 

775, 777, 779, 782-784, 786, 789 

International Press Correspondence 789 

International Publishers 789 


Jack.son, James E., Jr 792 

Johnston publications 781 

Jones, LeRoi 7^ 

Justice Department 784 


Kane, Pa 791 

Keating, Senator Kenneth B '71 

Khrushchev, Soviet Premier Nikita S 790 

Killens, John 790 

Kolk, Lee 791 


L Page 

Lenvin, Mr. Nathan B 784, 785 

Library of Congress 775 

Linden, Pat : 791 

Lockhart, M. A. (Al) 772,782,784,786 

Los Angeles 791 

Louis, Mrs 776 

Louis, Joe (Joe Louis Barrow) 771, 785, 789, 790 

Testimony of 771, 785 

Louis & Rowe, Messrs 773, 775 

Louis, Rowe & Lockhart 772 

Louis, Rowe, Fisher, Lockhart Enterprises, Inc 782, 784 

Lynn, Conrad 790 


Martinez, Dr 773, 775, 777 

Martinez, Dr. Jesus 773 

Mayfield, Julian 790 

Mays, Willie 773, 774 

Mexico 781 

Miami, Fla 778, 783 

Monroe, N.C 790, 791 


NAACP. (See National Association for the Advancement of the Colored 

People. ) 

National Association for the Advancement of the Colored People 789, 790 

North Carolina State Conference of 790 

National Federation of Negro Societies 789 

National Institute of Tourism. (See Instituto Nacional de la Industria 


Negro Question in the United States, The (book) 789 

Negro Soviet Republic 789 

Negroes in a Soviet America, The (book) 789 

New Century Publishers 789 

New Rochelle, N.Y 771 

New York Amsterdam News 790 

New York Times 790-792 

North Inglewood, Calif 771 


Oriente Province 783 

Oropesa, Jesus Montane 775 

Overton, Joseph 790 


Peace Corps 772 

Pepper, John 789 

Pittsburgh Courier 777, 780 

Political Affairs 792 

Popular Socialist Party (Communist Party), Eighth National Assembly 792 

Portland 791 

Powell, Representative Adam Clayton 790 

Pravda, Moscow 792 


Revolucion (newspaper) 791 

Revolutionary Government 775, 786 

Revolutionary Movement 786 

Roa, Dr. Raul 784 

Robinson, Jackie 773, 774 

Rockefeller, Governor 7JK) 

Rowe, William 771-787, 789, 790 

Testimony of 771-787 


S Page 

San Diego 791 

San Francisco 791 

Santos-Bucli, Dr. Charles A 792 

Seattle 791 

Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 791 

Smith Act 792 

Springer, William 775 

Student Council Bulletin, Fair Play for Cuba Committee 791 

Supreme Court, U.S 791 

Taber, Robert 787, 790 

Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi- 
Colonies 789 

Time (magazine) 790 

Tourist Commission of Cuba. {See Instituto Nacional de la Industria 


Truth Corps 773 


United Nations, General Assembly of 784 

United Nations Plaza 791 

University of Havana 786 


Vancouver 791 


Wagner, Mayor 790 

Watson, State Senator James 790 

Williams, Robert F 790, 791 

Worker 792 

Workers Library Publishers 789 

Worthy, William W., Jr 791, 792 

Yeagley, Mr. J. Walter 784, 785 

• O 











PART 12 
Testimony of Robert C. Hill 

JUNE 12, 1961 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

NOV i 1961 


43354 WASHINGTON : 1961 


JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 



SAM J ERVIN, Jr., North Carolhia KENNETH B. KEATING, New York 

JOHN A. CARROLL, Colorado NORRIS COTTON, New Hampshire 

THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut 
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan 
EDWARD V. LONG, Missouri 
WM. A. BLAKLEY, Texas 

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Inteenal Security 
Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 

THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut, Vice Chairman 
OLIN D JOHNSTON, South Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 


SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina KENNETH B. KEATING, New York 

NORRIS COTTON, New Hampshire 

J. G. SoURWiNE, Counsel 
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 



MONDAY, JUNE 12, 1961 

U.S. Senate, 
Subcommittee to Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act 

AND Other Internal Security Laws, of the 

Committee on the Judiciary, 

Wa^shington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 :45 a.m., in room 457, 
Old Senate Office Building, Senator James O. Eastland (chairman of 
the full committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Eastland, Thomas J. Dodd, Olin D. Johnston, 
and Kenneth B. Keating. 

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel, re- 
search director ; and Frank Schroeder, chief investigator. 

Senator Johnston (presiding). The subcommittee will come to 

Mr. Sourwine. Our witness this morning is Mr. Robert C. Hill, 

Do you care to be sworn, ISIr. Hill ? 

Mr. Hill. Yes, sir. 

Senator Johnston. Do you swear that the testimony that you give 
in this cause will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Hill. I do. 


Mr. Sourwine. Would you give the reporter your full name and 
address ? 

]Mr. Hill. Robert C. Hill. My address is The Boulders, Little- 
ton, N.H. 

Mr. Sourwine. What is your business or profession, Mr. Hill? 

Mr. Hill. I am a representative in the General Court of the State 
of New Hampshire. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you a former Ambassador of the United States 
to the Republic of Mexico ? 

Mr. Hill. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. During what time did you hold that position? 

Mr. Hill. I was Ambassador of the United States to JSIexico from 
April 1957 until January 1961, 



Mr. SouRwiNE. You have had a substantial career in the Foreign 
Service prior to that, have you not ? 

Mr. Hill. Yes, I have had experience in the Foreign Service in a 
number of other posts, inchiding India, Costa Eica, and El Salvador. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You were vice consul in the diplomatic service, 
Calcutta, India, 19M to 1945 ? 

Mr. Hill. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You later became assistant vice president of the 
W. R.Grace & Co.? 

Mr. Hill. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You became Ambassador to Costa Rica in 1953 ? 

Mr. Hill. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And thereafter, Ambassador to El Salvador. 

Mr. Hill. That is correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. In 1956 and part of 1957 you were Assistant Sec- 
retary of State in charge of Congressional Relations? 

Mr. Hill. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Then from May of 1957 until January 3, 1961, you 
were Ambassador of the United States to Mexico? 

Mr. Hill. That is right. I took my post, actually in the field in 
July of 1957. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Your period of service as Ambassador to Mexico 
covered the entire time in which Fidel Castro was making his coup in 
Cuba and including his rise to power there, did it not? 

Mr. Hill. Tliat is correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You are here in response to a subpena, Mr. Hill. 
You have testified before this committee on a prior occasion in execu- 
tive session ; is that correct ? 

Mr. PIiLL. That is correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Hill, the committee has heard considerable testi- 
mony with regard to the part played by certain officials of the United 
States in Castro's rise to power. 

Now, do you have any information with respect to that subject ? 

Mr. Hill. Yes, sir. I have been a witness during the period while 
Fidel Castro was making every effort to overthrow Batista, the former 
President of Cuba, and take over the country. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. When did you first know or come to the conclusion 
that Fidel Castro was surrounded by Communists and was Coimnunist 
dominated ? 

Mr. Hill. Well, I had known about Castro and his activities in Bo- 
gota during the Bogotasso. I believe that was in 1948. Also I was 
aware of his arrest in ^lexico in June of 1955, later to be released in 
July of 1956. It was known then that he was going to try and return 
to Cuba. I thought at the time that this fellow might be oriented 
toward communism. 

As far as conclusive evidence of Fidel Castro and communism is 
concerned, I was convinced early in 1959 that he was not an inde- 
pendent agent; that he was being directed by ^Moscow and Peiping. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Upon what did you base this conclusion ? 

Mr. Hill. Intelligence reports that were available to me as U.S. 
Ambassador in Mexico City. 

Mr. SouRAViNE. You mentioned Castro's connection with the Bogo- 
tasso. What was that and what do you know about it? 


Mr. Hill. Well, I know very little about this particular instance, 
Mr. Sourwine, except what I have read in the newspapers. In 1948 
he went to Bogota, Colombia, to agitate at the Foreign Ministers' 
conference. At that time he was active in associating with known 

I believe the only evidence against Mr. Castro at that time was that 
he was known to be passing out Communist literature in Bogota 
during the conference, 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you aware that this committee has had testi- 
mony that Fidel Castro was on the radio in Bogota at that time 
making, among other declarations, the statement: "This is a Com- 
munist revolution"? 

Mr. Hill. I was not aware of that, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiXE. What is the intelligence that led you to the con- 
clusion you have referred to, intelligence which was available to the 
State Department in Washington, was it ? 

Mr. Hill. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you acquainted with Mr. William Wieland ? 

Mr. Hill. I have met him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who is Mr. Wieland ? 

Mr. Hill. William Wieland, at the time I was Ambassador of the 
United States to Mexico, could be properly classified as my superior 
because he was in charge of the Cuban-Mexican affairs. It is interest- 
ing to note that during the period of time I was Ambassador of the 
United States in Mexico, I heard from Mr. Wieland only twice by 
telephone and once or twice through the mail. He did come to Mexico 
on several occasions, accompanying Dr. Milton Eisenhower, who was 
there often as a guest of the 5lexican Government. 

]\Ir. Sourwine. What has been your experience with Mr. Wieland? 

Mr. Hill. It is most unsatisfactory. 

Mr. Sourwine. What do you mean by that ? 

Mr. Hill. Well, I did not regard him a competent officer or a man 
who could be trusted. I was warned by members of the Foreign 
Service about Mr. Wieland; that he was an opportunist and a dilet- 
tante and that I should be very careful in my dealings with him. 

It certainly was verified by the personal experiences I had with him 
when he accompanied Dr. Eisenhower to Mexico. 

Mr. Sourwine. Tell us about this visit he made to Mexico. 

Mr. Hill. He made several visits, Mr. Sourwine, to Mexico. "Which 
specific one are you interested in ? 

Mr. Sourwine. You have mentioned a visit which he accompanied 
Dr. Eisenhower. 

Mr. Hill. He accompanied the doctor on each of his trips to Mexico. 
I think the most important visit, where there was some controversy, 
was the time he came to Mexico with Dr. Eisenhower in August of 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that the occasion of his first visit to Mexico with 
Dr. Eisenhower? 

Mr. Hill. No; I believe he was in Mexico once before with the 
doctor; whether it was 1958 or 1957 I would have to check my records 
to determine. 

Mr. Sourwine. '\^niat was there about this visit of 1959 that makes 
you consider it important ? 


Mr. Hill. The U.S. Embassy in Mexico was very concerned about 
the Cuban problem and how it would affect our relations with Mexico. 
We felt that with Dr. Eisenhower coming to Mexico, it would give us 
an opportunity to at least give him our point of view regarding the 
danger of Castro and communism in Cuba and how it might affect the 
relations between the United States and Mexico. We felt, because of 
the relationship of the doctor to the President of the United States, 
that, quoting from our own intelligence reports, perhaps we could 
adequately brief Dr. Eisenhower about communism in Cuba. He, in 
turn, could bring to the direct attention of the President our concern 
about communism and Castro and how it affected us in Mexico. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Hill, you told us in executive session that this 
was a very critical time in our relations with Mexico. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Hill. That is right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You told us that you did not think you could hold 
the line in Mexico unless there was some positive action on the part of 
the State Department in Washington in dealing with the Cuban prob- 
lem, is that correct? 

Mr. Hill. That is correct. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. "What kind of action did you have in mind? 

Mr. Hill. I felt that if one did his homework he would be aware 
of the fact that patience and forbearance which was the U.S. policy, 
would not work in dealing with Castro. In the past it certainly has 
proven unsatisfactory in dealing with communism. 

The proximity of Mexico to Cuba was such that the agents coming 
from Moscow and some from Cliina would go back and forth between 
the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and Cuba. Propaganda was flow- 
ing into Mexico at this time from Cuba and from behind the Iron 

The peasants were very sympathetic to the Castro cause and that 
is understandable, because he has done something for the peasants of 
Cuba. The Embassy knew that there would be demonstrations in 
Mexico which could very seriously affect our relations between the 
United States and Mexico. If Castroism was not restrained in 
Mexico, it could continue on to the Central American countries and 
through the Caribbean into Latin America. If the United States did 
not act affirmatively, you could have a solid Communist bastion on the 
doorstep of the United States. We wanted to do our part in Mexico 
to prevent such a thing happening without intervening in the affairs 
of the Mexican people. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do I understand you correctly that it was your hope 
that, through briefing Dr. Milton Eisenhower, this situation could 
eventually be brought to the attention of the State Department and 
result in some action ? 

Mr. Hill. That is correct. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Surely, you had some way of getting this informa- 
tion from the State Department other than through Dr. Eisenhower ? 

Mr. Hill. We had the normal, diplomatic channels and we utilized 
those channels. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. With what result ? 

Mr. Hill. We had no positive results. It concerned us greatly. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. And so you hoped to bring this to the attention of 
the State Department through a briefing of Dr. Eisenhower ? 


Mr. Hill. We brought to the attention of every Congressman, every 
Senator, every neAvspaperman and every person of importance that 
came to Mexico : the seriousness of Castro and the Communist problem 
in Cuba. We had a briefing session for every important person that 
came to Mexico from the United States. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did Dr. Eisenhower assent to the briefing you had 
in mind ? 

IVIr. Hill. He was our house guest. I asked the doctor, I think it 
was the first night that he was at the Embassy, if he would be willing 
to take the time to have the senior officers of the Embassy brief him 
about the seriousness of the Communist problem in Cuba. 

The doctor had just returned from his trip to Russia with Vice 
President Nixon. He was tired and wanted a few days rest. He was 
there as the guest of the Mexican Government, but when I made the 
request he said : "Certainly, Bob, I would be most happy to have the 
point of view of the American Embassy in Mexico." 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Was this briefing of Dr. Eisenhower opposed by 
anyone ? 

Mr. Hill. When the briefing started, it was opposed by Mr. Wie- 
land because he gave the impression that we were misrepresenting the 
situation in Cuba. 

Mr. SoLTRWiNE. \Vlien and where was this briefing held ? 

Mr. Hill. As I pointed out, the doctor was there as a guest of the 
Mexican Government and he had 2 or 3 days rest before taking one of 
his trips to Mazatlan. I asked the doctor if I could take along the 
counselor of the Embassy for political affairs, Mr. Raymond Leddy. 

Mr. Leddy is one of the most knowledgeable men in Latin American 
affairs in the Department of State. The doctor said, "By all means." 
There were other people that accompanied us on the trip, but Mr. 
Leddy knew the problem in Cuba firsthand, having lived there as a 
Foreign Service officer. I asked Mr. Leddy if he would brmg with 
him the documentation to support our position. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did he do this ? 

Mr. Hill. He did. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did the briefuig take place on an airplane on the 
way to Mazatlan ? 

Mr. Hill. It did, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Tell us about this in as much detail as you 

Mr. Hill. Well, soon after we took off from Mexico City I spoke to 
the doctor and I said: would it be possible for us to utilize the time 
between Mexico City and Mazatlan to give him our point of view re- 
garding the problem of communism in Cuba. He said, "Fine." Then 
we sat down together. It w^as a C-47 airplane that had a divan in the 
middle and bucket seats along the side. The doctor was seated on the 
divan with Mr. Leddy so he could personally view some of the docu- 
ments. Mr. Wieland was seated on the divan. Mr. Leddy started 
to give his report based on his judgment and based on his experience. 
This was August of 1959. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember the date ? 

Mr. Hill. Eight months after Mr. Castro came into power. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. But do you remember the date ? 


Mr. Hill. I would say within the vicinity of the 15th to 20th of 
August. Each time Mr, Leddy would say, "This is Communist dom- 
inated" or "This man is a Communist" he was met with Mr. Wieland 
saying "It is not true." 

In the middle of what turned out to be quite a long discussion, 
Colonel Glawe, who was the air attache, came back and joined in the 
discussion and became involved in supporting Mr. Leddy's point of 
view. Each time that communism was mentioned and its control of 
the situation in Cuba, it was discounted by Mr. Wieland. 

Mr. Leddy had an intelligence report for tlie month of June 1959 
which supported many of Mr. Leddy's contentions. It was obvious to 
me that Mr. Wieland had not read the report, although he was di- 
rectly responsible for the area. But when Mr. Leddy attempted to 
project the actual documents into the picture, an argument ensued, 
not a serious one, but I mean men disagreeing on the issue. Colonel 
Glawe referred to Mr. Wieland as either a damn fool or a Communist 
and, of course, it caused tempers to flare and Dr. Eisenhower said he 
did not want to hear any more about the situation. 

The Chairman. The man said Wieland was either a damn fool or 
a Communist? 

Mr. Hill. Yes, sir ; that was said in the temper of the moment. I 
don't believe Wieland is a Communist. 

Senator Keating. You didn't comment on the other part of the 

Mr. Hill. Do you think it is necessary, Senator ? After the meet- 
ing. Dr. Eisenhower did thank us for the briefing. I think it had 
considerable impact on his thinking. Whether there was any fol- 
lowup with the information that was made available, I do not know. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Can you tell us, please, who else was present in the 
airplane on this occasion besides those you have named ? 

Mr. Hill. My assistant, Jimmy Johnson, vras aboard, handling the 
details of the trip; Dr. Eisenhower's secretary, a gentleman by the 
name of Keith Spalding, and I believe that Mrs. Leddy was present, 
also Ruth Eisenhower and my wife. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. No one else that you can now recall ? 

Mr. Hill. There may have been others on the plane, but those were 
the important ones aboard. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did Mr. Wieland assert to Dr. Eisenhower that 
Castro was not a Communist or was not surrounded or influenced bv 

Mr. Hill. In every instance where we tried to present Communist 
infiltration in the government of Castro it was met with a rebuff by 
Mr. Wieland. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember telling us in executive session, 
Mr. Hill, that you felt Mr. Wieland had made efforts to undermine 
your status as Ambassador ? 

Mr. Hill. There is nothing unusual about that, Mr. Sourwine. I 
was a political appointee. I had taken a strong stand on various 
issues involving Latin America. It was well known in the Depart- 
ment. I had been warning my friend, the late Secretary of State, 
Mr. Dulles, since 1953, that Latin America was being lost and that we 
had to do something about the problem in Latin America consistent 
with our friendship and respect and agreem.ents with the various 
countries. If not, we were going to be in serious trouble. 


There were those who disagreed with ine. Onl}'^ events will prove 
whether I was right or wrong. I don't know why Mr. Wieland didn't 
particularly have a liking for me because I had a veiy little contact 
with him. But I do know from officers in the Embassy that, when he 
had occasion to be in Mexico, he would utilize the time he was there 
at cocktail parties in casting snide remarks about his Ambassador. 
I hardly think that is the way to build someone up in the eyes of his 
staff or in the eyes of the nationals of the country. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You knew about this before you embarked on this 
airplane trip to Mazatlan? 

Mr. Hill. I did. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. As a result, did you at any time or at the time of 
departing on this trip, have any animosity toward Mr. Wieland ? 

Mr. Hill. None whatsoever, 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Were your relations with Mv. Wieland correct in 
the sense that there was courtesy on both sides, if not cordiality ? 

Mr. Hill. I would say they were coiTect. Mr. Wieland always 
greeted me pereonally as if there were normal relations existing be- 
tween the two of us. I tried to return the same assurance toward 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Have you detailed information respecting the in- 
telligence which reached Mr. Wieland's desk about Castro's com- 
munistic connections ? 

Mr. Hill. No ; because after we sent our reports to the Department 
of State, from the various attaches in the Embassy, including the 
Pentagon, the CIA representative, the FBI representative. I had no 
knowledge where those papers went, but I do understand the pro- 
cedure followed in the Department of State. Anyone that has direct 
responsibility in the area gets a copy of a dispatch or a cable communi- 
cation from the Embassy that has something to do with the area 
that he has responsibility in. So I would only assume that our com- 
munications are passed over his [Mr. Wieland's] desk. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you personally ever send any intelligence to 
Mr. Wieland^ 

Mr. Hill. I sent nothing to Mr. Wieland. I sent ra^ papers to the 
Secretary of State and to the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin 
American Affairs, Mr. Eubottom. 

Mr. SouRwixE. Now, what intelligence did you send or forward to 
the Secretary of State dealing with the matter of Castro's Communist 
connections ? 

Mr. Hill. There was a continuous flow of information from the 
Embassy, Mr. Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Beginning when? 

Mr. Hill. As soon as I arrived in Mexico, in 1957. At my first 
staff meeting there was brought to my attention by senior officers in 
the staff meeting the fact that a serious situation was developing in 
Cuba. There were a number of individuals on the staff that were 
aware of Mr. Castro's background. 

We didn't have the detailed information in 1957 that we had in 
1958. Also it kept coming in during 1959 and 1960 until the tinie I 
retired voluntarily from the diplomatic service to accept political 
office in the State of New Hampshire. Wiat information we did have 
was sent on to Washington through appropriate channels. 

43354— 61— pt. 12 2 » 


Mr. SouRwiNE. You say the tenor of this intelligence at all times 
from 1957 forward and gro\Ying stronger as the years progressed, was 
that Castro was surrounded by Communists and influenced by 
Communists ? 

Mr. Hill. That is correct. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. In addition to this intelligence which you for- 
warded, did you see other intelligence reports from the Pentagon, 
CIA, and from the State Department which had the same purport ? 

Mr. Hill. I read a great many reports from the intelligence com- 
munity. I would say the best reporting came from the Pentagon. 
The CIA reports I saw, the reviews that came in from the Department 
of State — the monthly reviews — often times contained a mass of data 
without conclusions. Coming from the State Department was bio- 
graphic data and intelligence data that came on a monthly basis. On 
some of these reports, I recall taking issue with the Department, be- 
cause I thought that they were prejudiced and were favorable to the 
Castro regime. On occasion, I wrote the Department of State, cited 
my differences of opinion and said I thought it was unfortunate that 
these pro-Castro documents were being circulated among the embassies 
around the world, because this man was evil and would cause embar- 
rassment and trouble for the United States. 

Mr. SouKwiNE. Now, what pro- Castro documents did you see that 
were being circulated ? 

Mr. Hill. Well, this is the fine line, Mr. Sourwine. It doesn't come 
out and say "This is a pro-Castro document," ^'S'lien you read the 
paper you can't help but come to a conclusion that it is favorable to 
Castro. Much of the intelligence data was favorable to Castro, in my 

Mr. Sourwine. "\'\^iere did that data come from ? 

The Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, he came to power in January 
of 1959. 

Mr. Hill. Right, sir. 

The Chairman. You were receiving intelligence reports in 1958 
that he was a Communist. 

Mr. Hill. No, that we were receiving reports that he was pro- 

The Chairman. Pro-Communist, and they went on to Washington. 

Mr. Hill. That is correct. 

The Chairman. To the State Department, through channels. 

Mr. Hill. Yes, sir. 

Senator Johnston. How much did you know about his brother? 

Mr. Hill. In Mexico, the Embassy always considered Raul Castro 
a Communist. I recall seeing an official Government document sent 
by the American Embassy in Moscow to the State Department. One 
of our second secretaries had attended a lecture. Somehow or other, 
he was admitted. I believe this was in May 1959, and the Russians 
themselves identified Raul Castro as a Communist. I remember send- 
ing comments back to the Department that they had been searching 
for concrete information and here was a Communist docmnent, re- 
ceived from our Embassy in Moscow, showing that a Russian had 
identified Raul Castro as a known Communist ; not a Communist sym- 
pathizer, but a known Communist. 


As you gentlemen know, an Ambassador or any member of the 
Foreign Service is not allowed or does not permit documents to be 
carried away from the Embassj^', but I recall making a note at the 
time I saw this very interesting document from Moscow and I think 
I have here the date, in case it might be of interest to you. 

It is American Embassy, Moscow, dispatch No. 666, dated May 22, 
1959, Tliis document was entitled "Soviet Attitude Toward Latin 
America" and in there, they identify Kaul Castro as a Communist. 

Senator Keating. That is a dispatch from whom, to whom? 

Mr. Hill. The American Embassy in Moscow to the State De- 
partment and in tliere, they identify a Russian as stating, in a lecture 
in Moscow, that Eaul Castro was "one of us" — a Communist. I 
thought it was important information. 

Senator Johnston. You remember what date that was? 

Mr. Hiu.. At the time, sir, I copied down the dispatch number, 
the date from the Embassy in Moscow, which was May 22, 1959, or 
5 months after the Castro brothers had been in power. This docu- 
ment clearly identified Eaul Castro as a Communist. 

Senator Keating. Do you remember the date when Mr. Phillip 
Bonsai, the Ambassador to Cuba, came back to Washington for con- 
sultation? Was that in the middle of 1959? 

Mr. Hill. As far as Ambassador Bonsai's travels are concerned, 
Senator Keating, we would see from time to time from the Embassy 
in Havana that Mr. Braddock was charge d'affaires and Mr. Bonsai 
was out of the country. Often we would read in the newspapers 
that Ambassador Bonsai was back in the United States on consulta- 
tion but the actual dates of his being in Washington is something 
that you would have to get from the records of the State Department. 
I do recall being in Washington one of the times that Ambassador 
Bonsai was there. It was in February of 1960. Both of us testified 
before the Foreign Relations Committee. The Foreign Relations 
Committee was interested in the points of view of Ambassador Bonsai ; 
Mr. Rubottom, who was then the Assistant Secretary ; Mr. Mann, the 
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, and myself. 

Mr. Bonsai and I disagreed on that occasion as we disagreed before, 
regarding Mr. Castro. 

Mr. Sour WINE. Mr. Ambassador, do you recall the source or sources 
of the pro-Castro papers which you say you saw? 

Mr. Hill. There is an intelligence research section in the Depart- 
ment of State that has the responsibility of reviewing all intelligence 
that comes in from the field. In my opinion, many of those docu- 
ments were slanted in favor of Fidel Castro. 

I recall one, for instance, that dealt with Castro's first year in 
power. Now this is a very interesting document, biographic report 
No. 312, dated March 17, 1960. I thought it treated Castro in a much 
kinder fashion than this infamous character deserved. I wrote the 
Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Rubottom, and I recall writing 
down once again on this piece of paper, the following statement. I 

Those of us serving in the area of Latin America during this critical time, 
will have to stand the judgment of history as to whether or not we have done 
a good job for our country. I do not thinli that this intelligence report reflects 
yours or the Department of State's viewpoint accurately. 


Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you recall telling us in executive session 

Senator Keating. Excuse me. Who prepared that report ? 

Mr. Hill. I believe that was prepared by the Office of Intelligence 
of the Department of State. 

Mr. SouKwiNE. Was that out of Washington ? 

Mr. Hill. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Keating. Not from the field ? 

Mr. Hill. That is correct. We were concerned about these reports. 
I had each one of them analyzed, when they came in, by competent 
members of the Embassy in Jilexico. The reports, we believed, were 
not accurately portraying the situation in Cuba. We wrote back to 
Washington citing our point of view. I can remember writing Am- 
bassador Hugh Cummings, a very fine Foreign Service officer, on 
November 16, 1959, complaining about another intelligence brief, No. 
179, which was dated July 24, 1959. 

I had a long reply from the Ambassador explaining that this par- 
ticular report had been prepared by a junior officer and perhaps 
should have been more carefully scrutinized by the Department. But 
remember, the intelligence reports that come back to us in the field 
are supposed to be the considered judgment of the intelligence that 
the field has sent to Washington and then reevaluated and sent back 
to us for use in our conversations with government officials. I was 
concerned because many of these reports were slanted inaccurately 
and were favorable to Mr. Castro. 

The Chairman. Was there a meeting called in Central America in 
which an attempt was made to sell Castro? 

Mr. Hill. I believe you are referring. Senator, to the Ambassadors' 
Conference in San Salvador. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Hill. That was in April 1959, a little over 3% months after Mr. 
Castro came into power. 

The Chairman. Yes. . ^ _ 

Mr. Hill. I attended that meeting, sir. 

The Chairman. I asked. Was the purpose of that meeting an at- 
tempt to sell Castro to our ambassadors ? 

Mr. Hill. I have my opinion. Senator, as to the purpose of that 

The Chairman. Well, what is your opinion ? 

Mr. Hill. My opinion was that the meeting was designed to set 
the policy of patience and forbearance in dealing with Mr. Castro. _ 

I took issue with Ambassador Bonsai, because I felt that, despite 
his excellent presentation — and he is entitled to his opinion, and he was 
on the ground in Cuba, we were on the ground in jMexico — that 
patience and forbearance in dealing with a Communist would lead to 
disaster for the United States. 

The Chairman. Tell us what happened at the meeting. Describe it. 

Mr. Hill. I had just returned to JMexico, Senator Eastland, from a 
trip to the Iron Curtain countries, when Mr. Cecil Gray showed me a 
cable saying that there would be an Ambassadors' Conference in San 
Salvador. I believe the dates were April 9 to 11 or 10 through^ 12. 
I told Mr. Gray at the time I did not want to attend the meeting. 
He was somewhat concerned. He is a very fine gentleman, a man with 
a fine Service career. He has served his country with dignity and 


pride. He said, "You have to go, Mr. Ambassador." I said, "I 
don't want to go do\Yn there because there will be more of this attempt 
to soft sell on Castro. The sooner the United States recognizes the 
problem and can get the cooperation from our Latin American neigh- 
bors in dealing with this problem consistent with the agreements we 
have signed, we can start to have the proper relations with Latin 
America. But if we are going to condone Castro at tliis meetmg, it 
can lead to very serious problems for the United States." 

AVell, the meeting was designed to discuss the problems of Castro 
and his influence in the Caribbean countries. Naturally, Ambassador 
Bonsai, who has had many years of experience in Latin America and 
who was then Ambassador in Cuba, had an opportunity to give his 
point of view. I complimented him on his presentation but I told him 
I wanted the record to show that I was 100 percent in disagreement. 
I told the conference the time to deal with Castro was then. We had 
the instruments, if we wanted to resort to the Organization of Amer- 
ican States, to deal with the problem. I tried very hard to get the 
Conference to accept a point of view that I thought had some merit ; 
I believed that all evidence of communism in Cuba should be submit- 
ted by the United States to the Organization of American States, 
and that the United States request appropriate action. I had con- 
siderable difficulty. I was unable to get that language adopted. 

Now the only Ambassador that supported me was Ambassador 
Willauer from Costa Eica. I think history will judge that was the 
time for the United States to look at the Communist problem in Cuba 
realistically. Naturally there were differences of opinion and of quite 
serious nature expressed at the meeting. 

The Chairman. "What was Mr. BonsaPs position? 

Mr. Hill. Mr. Bonsai's position, and he certainly was entitled to 
his opinion, was that Castro was in power; that he had tremendous 
popular support; that there was considerable support in the Hemi- 
sphere for Castro and Castroism, and that we ought to go slow in 
dealing with him. He said we should be very patient with him de- 
spite the fact that he was constantly insulting the United States, our 
President, our Secretary of State, and our Vice President practically 
on marathon TV programs night after night in Cuba criticizing the 
United Statas. Bonsai felt that eventually, Castro would see the light 
and return to the family of Latin American nations. He said Cuba 
needed a revolution and Cuba then would start to prosper and make 
its contribution to the Latin American family. 

As I say, Ambassador Bonsai is entitled to his opinion. I happen 
to have disagreed with him concerning Castro and his objectives. 

Senator Keating. May I ask there, what did Ambassador Bonsai 
indicate at that time as to Castro's communism ? 

Mr. Hill. The Ambassador pointed out that Fidel Castro had com- 
munistic associates. However, he made it clear in his opinion that 
Castro made the decisions and that he would, if patience was used by 
the United States in dealing with Cuba and in dealing with Castro, 
that eventually he would see the light. I don't think communism 
ever sees the light. 

Senator Keating. I want to follow that up with one question. Did 
he indicate that in his opinion, Castro hacl some kind of theory on 
the way to run a country which was neither communism nor our 


system, but something in between and that he, himself, was not a 
Communist ? 

Mr. Hill. Ambassador Bonsai did not think Fidel Castro a Com- 

Senator Keating. He indicated to me that Castro was advocating 
something else. 

Mr. Hill. A third country position. 

Senator Keating. That was his position. 

Mr. Hjll. Communism, our way of life in the United States, and 
a third country position. Well, I think now we have an opportunity 
to judge whether it is a third country position or whether it is com- 
munism. I say it has been Communist from the start, beginning on 
January 1, 1959, when he came to power. He completely destroyed the 
military, one of the first moves, destroyed the bureaucracy. His 
technicians were from Communist China and Moscow. I assume they 
weren't there advocating a third country position; that they were 
there promoting communism. 

Senator Kjeating. The Ambassador must have known when they 
were there, 

Mr. Hill. I would assume so. 

The Chairman. You knew they were there. 

Mr. Hill. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And our State Department knew they were there. 

Mr. Hill. If they read the reports. Senator, they would know they 
were there. 

We had a policy in the Embassy in Mexico that anything that had 
to do with Cuba was cabled to the American Embassy in Havana. 

The Chairman. These were Communist teclinicians ? 

Mr. Hjll. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dodd. Ambassador Hill, was a claim ever made by Am- 
bassador Bonsai, or anyone else who had a different opinion than 
yours with respect to Castro, that Bonsai or anyone else had informa- 
tion not available to you ? 

Is my question clear? 

Mr. Hill. No, it is not quite clear, Senator Dodd, excuse me. 

Senator Dodd. Well, let me put it this way. You were in a dispute, 
so to speak, with Bonsai about Castro, weren't you ? 

Mr. Hill. Are you referring to the San Salvador conference ? 

Senator Dodd. Yes. 

Mr. Hill. That is correct. 

Senator Dodd. Did he ever offer as an excuse^ or as an explanation 
of the difference, that he had information which was not available 
to you ? 

Mr. Hill. No, sir. 

Senator Dodd. Was this also true of others with whom you had dif- 
ferences about our policy with respect to Castro ? 

Mr. Hill. At the San Salvador meeting, the differences of opinion 
regarding Ambassador Bonsai's approach and mine were restricted 
pretty much to exchanges between Ambassador Bonsai, Secretary 
Rubottom, Deputy Under Secretary of State Loy Henderson, and 
myself. There were comments made by other ambassadors, but the 
majority of the exchange took place between Ambassador Bonsai and 
myself. Secretary Rubottom emphasized time and time again the 


seriousness of the Castro problem and that the U.S. Government and 
the press in the United States were beginning to be more concerned 
with the problem m Cuba. He said the purpose of the meetmg was 
to discuss this. 

As I have said, Ambassador Bonsai's opinion was that we must be 
patient; that eventually Castro would return to the family of good 
neighbors in Latin America. He maintained this position during his 
tenure of office as ambassador of the United States to Cuba. As a 
result, he must bear the responsibility as the chief architect of the 
Cuban disaster. 

Senator Dodd. I understand that. I am trying to pin down what 
I consider a very important fact here. I can hear some of these 
people saying tomorrow that Ambassador Hill simply did not have 
the information. 

Mr. Hill, I had the same information that Ambassador Bonsai 
did, because of the way the Department of State communications 
system is set up, Senator Dodd. Copies flow back and forth between 
the embassies. Because of the importance of Mexico and the im- 
portance of Cuba, the intelligence fraternity m Havana and Mexico 
had proper liaison. 

Does that answer your question, sir? 

Senator Dodd. Yes. I was just trying to make the record clear. 
I knew what your answer would be, but I mean a lot of people in 
this comitry feel that some ambassadors have not had enough in- 

Mr. Hill. We have had so much information on Castro and com- 
munism that it grew rather tiring reading about it. 

Senator Johnston. Did you ever have occasion to talk to the Am- 
bassador to the Dominican Eepublic about the Cuban situation? 

Mr. Hill. You mean Mr. Farland ? 

Senator Johnston. Yes. 

Mr. Hill. Mr. Farland was at the meeting in San Salvador, Sena- 
tor. I know Ambassador Farland but didn't have an opportunity to 
exchange any conversation with him. 

Senator Johnston. It is true that he was pretty close to the situa- 
tion at the time. 

Mr. Hill. He was a respected and informed ambassador. He is 
regarded as one of our finest officers and has been rewarded for his 
competence by taking on the very difficult assignment of U.S. Am- 
bassador to Panama. 

Senator Keating. Mr. Eubottom was the top man and Mr. Wie- 
land, in the hierarchy, was next to Mr. Rubottom. Was he at the 
next level? 

Mr. Hill. No, I believe there was another officer present that out- 
ranked Mr. Wieland in Latin American affairs, Alan Stewart. There 
was a senior officer present, Loy Henderson. But the point in this 
meeting — and I did not think it was an illogical suggestion, and 
this is April of 1959 — that there was so much evidence of com- 
munism in Cuba that w^e had an obligation to submit this evidence 
to the Organization of American States consistent with our treaty 
agreements and let them look into it. If our information was false, 
at least nothing has been lost. But something has been gained if 
our reports were correct. 


Mr. SouRWiNE. You say you felt that you did have that obligation ? 

Mr, Hill. I felt we had the obligation to furnish all evidences of 
communism in Cuba to the Organization of American States and 
ask for appropriate action. We have signed treaties at Bogota, at 
Caracas and at Rio that deal with this specific problem. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was Mr. Wieland present at the discussions in 
El Salvador which brought out the fact that there was substantial 
intelligence respecting Castro's Communist connections ? 

Mr. Hill. I had no contact other than "hello," or "goodby" with 
Mr. Wieland in El Salvador. He was there but not an active par- 
ticipant in the conference. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember telling us in executive session 
that, on the occasion of this airplane trip to Matzatlan, which of 
course followed the El Salvador conference, that Mr. Wieland had 
declared that Castro was an idealist; that he knew Castro personally; 
that there had been lots of charges and misrepresentations, but that 
there was no evidence in the State Department files to confirm Mr. 
Leddy's point of view that Castro was a Communist or surrounded 
and controlled by Communists? 

Mr. Hill. I recall the conversation. We referred to the intel- 
ligence report of June 1959, to substantiate Mr. Leddy's claim that 
there was evidence in the files of pro-Communist and commmiistic 
associations by Fidel Castro. 

When I was assigned to Costa Eica in 1953 and 1954 we knew that 
Che Guevara was a Communist. He has been one of the most im- 
portant leaders for promoting communism in Cuba and he was sitting 
right along with Fidel Castro from the first day that he came into 
power. So there is the second one, 

Mr, SoimwiNE. Did Mr, Leddy get an opportunity to show Dr, 
Milton Eisenhower this intelligence report? 

Mr. Hill. If I recall correctly, Mr. Sourwine, he took it out of his 
briefcase, but that was the point that the meeting broke up. The 
doctor felt that tempers had risen and it would be unproductive to 
pursue the matter any further. 

Dr. Eisenhower was a very attentive participant in this attempt 
by Mr. Leddy to present the facts. Dr. Eisenhower did not repri- 
mand Mr. Wieland for his interruptions. 

Mr, Sourwine. I want to read to j^ou from your executive session 
testimony and ask you if, according to your present recollection, this 
is exactly what happened. 

You told us that, after Mr. Wieland had interrupted the briefing 
to defend Castro against the charges of communism or Communist 
connections, you finally turned to Mr. Wieland and said : 

I do not recall asking you to be in on this conversation. Dr. Eisenhower 
has agreed to listen to a man of integrity and experience in Latin America * * * 

Mr, Hill. That is correct, 
Mr. Sourwine (reading) : 

* * * As far as I can see, you do not qualify because what Mr. Leddy is dis- 
cussing at the moment comes from the joint intelligence report of June 1959, 
regarding Communist infiltration in Cuba. 

Mr, Wieland said, "There is no evidence of Commimist infiltration 
in Cuba," 


Mr. Hill. That is correct. 

Mr, SouRwiNE. With that, Colonel Glawe said, "You are either a 
damn fool or a Communist." 
Mr. Hill. That is correct, and thereb}- concluded the session. 

Mr. SouEWiNE. You said that is when the meeting became very 
heated and then it went along in the line that you have recounted 
here ? 
Mr. Hill. That is right. 

The Chairman. Now you slate all the intelligence from the CIA 
and other agencies in 1957 and 1958 before Castro grabbed power in 
Cuba indicated that he was pro-Communist? 

Mr. Hill. I don't say all the intelligence did, Senator Eastland, but, 
as I said earlier, Castro and his affiliations were brought to my atten- 
tion by intelligence representatives of the United States that were 
assigned to ^lexico. They started talking to me about Castro and tlie 
problem early in 1957. I was very busy getting started in Mexico as 
the Ambassador and much of 1957 went by before I could review the 
developments in Cuba regarding Mr. Castro. The intelligence reports 
from our Embassy in 1958 started to pick up — and 1959 — showmg 
more and more indications of communism, pro-Communism — and 
Communists that were surrounding Fidel Castro in Cuba. 

The Chairman. That is correct. It picked up before he assumed 
power in 1959, the reports that he was pro-Communist and sur- 
rounded by Communists. 

Now the question I am going to ask you is this: Wasn't it your 
judgment that the Caribbean desk of the State Department of the 
United States was pro-Castro ? 

Mr. Hill. Before I went to Mexico? 

The Chairman. Sir? 

Mr. Hill. I recall the fact that in the spring of 1957 Earl Smith, 
who went to Cuba as the Ambassador, came to my office and asked 
me to talk with him about his preparations for his Cuban assignment. 

I had known Ambassador Smith at the Republican conventions held 
in Chicago and San Francisco. I actually worked with him in 1950 
in San Francisco on foreign policy matters. 

I said, "Earl, I am sorry that you are going to Cuba. You might 
be interested to know that 'Chip' Bohlen was supposed to go to Cuba." 
This sort of set him back. He said, "What do you mean, that Am- 
bassador Bohlen was going to be transferred from Moscow to 
Havana?" I said, "That was the plan a few months ago. Then tlie 
President and Secretary Dulles decided to send him to Manila. You 
are assigned to Cuba to preside over the downfall of Batista. The 
decision has been made that Batista has to go. You must be very 

The Chairman. The decision made where? 

Mr. Hill. I am talking about the corridors of the State Depart- 
ment, Senator. 

The Chairman. But it was your judgment that tlie decision liad 
been made by the State Department that Batista had to go? 

Mr. Hill. I am not saying the decision at the top, but the decision 
down at the lower level. 

The Chairman. I asked vou about the Caribbean Section. 

43354— 61— .pt. 12- 



Mr. Hill. It was common knowledge in the Department of State 
that Batista had to go. I told Ambassador Smith this. 

The Chairman. That Castro would come into power? 

Mr. Hill. That is correct. I told Ambassador Smith that he 
should request from the Secretary of State to take men that he had 
confidence in, to Havana with him, including his Minister because, 
if he was not careful, his reputation would be destroyed. I recall 
that we had lunch at the Chevy Chase Club along with my wife. At 
that time he asked me if I had any suggestions as to who might be 
available for the Minister's job at the Embassy at Havana. I gave him 
the names of Foreign Service officers that I felt could be helpful 
and had a knowledge of the area. None of them would accept the 
job. Some of the men told me privately, "I don't want to go to Ha- 
vana because Castro is coming into power." They told me that there 
is going to be grave trouble down there. They said they had young 
children and did not want to become involved. 

I further told Ambassador Smith not to leave the Embassy. I said, 
"You stay in the vicinity of your residence in the chancery until you 
know what is going on in Havana. Don^t travel outside the area of 
the capital." I tried to be as helpful to him as possible. 

The Chairman. Well, it was your judgment, wasn't it? 

Mr, Hill. It was my judgment at that time that Castro was being 
assisted into power and that there had been some activity along the 
corridors in the Department to support his cause. 

The Chairman. Activity to put him in power? 

Mr. Hill. To promote Castro's rise to power. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You remember telling us in executive session that 
you told Mr. Smith on the occasion of this conference with him that 
you have described, "Earl, you are going to preside at the liquida- 
tion of Batista. You should not take this assignment. You will be 
blamed for the downfall of Batista and be blamed for the rise of the 
man that is going to take his place, Mr. Castro." 

Mr. Hill. That's correct. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you describe this to Mr. Smith as direct in- 
tervention in the affairs of the Cuban Government, a policy supposedly 
the U.S. Government frowned upon? 

Mr. Hill, Well, of course, it is direct intervention if we promoted 
Castro's rise to power and I say we did. 

Mr. SouRWiNE, Your executive session testimony is not clear as 
to whether you said this to Mr. Smith or whether this was your own 
expression of opinion. 

Mr. Hill. I believe it was my own expression of opinion, Mr. Sour- 

Mr. SouRWiNE, Do you recall telling us of a paper which you pre- 
pared with recommendations respecting the Latin American situa- 

Mr. Hill. Yes, and I have a copy with me this morning. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Would you furnish that for the record, sir, and 
tell us exactly w^hat it is and when it was submitted and to whom ? 

Mr. Hill. This is a confidential report with suggestions on Latin 
America. Some of these suggestions would have bearing on events in 
Cuba. This I prepared at the request of Governor Bowles and Robert 


Mr. SouRwiNE. When was this transmitted and to whom? 
Mr. Hill. I mailed this report to Robert Kennedy in January of 
this year. 
The Chairman. That may be received. 
(The docmnent referred to reads as follows :) 

Confidential Report and Suggestions on Latin America 

As we near the end of 1960, revolutionary unrest and nationalism, the Com- 
munist offensive, and our own ineptness, threaten the peace and security of the 
free world. No area is exempt from the tides of these swirling currents. Latin 
America is presently a target of Communist subversion. In the past, Latin 
America has always been a vital zone of U.S. security. Loss of any part of the 
area to Communist control, or even its neutralization, would strike a mortal 
blow to the defense of the Western Hemisphere. It would also undermine the 
strength of the United States, and with it, the free world's freedom. 

Right now, one key country— Cuba — is lost. Cuba is dominated and directed 
by Communist leaders as faithful to Moscow and Peiping as any of their Euro- 
pean satellites. Cuba under Castro is no longer a peaceful tropical island but 
an advance landing strip of the Soviet Union and Communist China at our very 
doorstep. It is the Communist takeoff field for the penetration and subjugation 
of Mexico, Central America, Panama, and the nearby areas of South America. 

There is no reason to concede the permanent loss of Cuba, nor the prospec- 
tive loss of any other country of Latin America if the United States has a deci- 
sive policy to deal with this critical problem. 

Firm policies, intelligently implemented, can be the first barrier to Com- 
munist expansion in this hemisphere. These should be devised and carried out 
on a nonpartisan basis. The ills of the continent are old, run through the terms 
of many U.S. administrations, and have survived in many cases ill-advised 
policies made by Republicans and Democrats alike. 

I can myself recall that almost 8 years ago, I told the Secretary of State we 
were on the road to losing Latin America ; he replied that I was the only person 
who thought so. 

The Communists have never turned away from their long-term goal of splitting 
Latin America away from the United States, and then conquering it piecemeal. 
They have aimed for four decades at the overthrow of the United States, after 
the road through Latin America is opened to them. 

The following observations and suggestions are intended to outline some con- 
crete steps which can be taken to thwart the Communist plan to take over this 
vital area. 

As a first step, we must improve greatly the caliber of U.S. diplomatic personnel 
at home and abroad. 

In the Department of State, the position of Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
American Affairs should be filled by a man of outstanding experience, knowledge 
and ability. He should be well versed in our economic relations and ix)licies. 
The present incumbent, Thomas C. Mann, in many ways fills these requirements. 

The immediate assistants to this top oflBcial should be of ambassadorial rank. 
This applies to the two Deputy Assistant Secretaries, one for political, the other 
for economic affairs. The directors of the four geographical ofl^ces under them 
should be career ministers of the Foreign Service. Originally undertaken in 
1950, a similar plan was never fully carried out during the past 10 years. It is 
now essential that, to deal adequately with Latin problems, and to nego- 
tiate properly with representatives of Latin America, our oflicials should be 
of comparable experience and rank, and not "desk oflScers" from the middle or 
lower ranks of the Service. 

Officers of the seasoned judgment, decisionmaking responsibility and personal 
prestige of ambassadors and ministers would be able to take off the shoulders of 
the Assistant Secretary some of the backbreaking loads now carried, and give 
him time for the more critical responsibilities of his oflfice. 

Our ambassadors sent to Latin America should be selected with greater care. 
They should have previous experience in the area — 10 years, let us say, at least. 
The officer staffs of their missions should have prior demonstrated ability. We 
must stop assigning personnel to Latin America just because they are unwanted 


Particular attention should be given, in personnel administration, to the 
rotation of officers between Latin America and Europe. For dec;)des, the Euro- 
pean countries have been an exclusive club for a small group of Foreign Service 
officers vpho make the circuit of the principal European capitals their profes- 
sional career. Tims the benefit of their experience is lost to our Latin American 
relations. Likevs^ise, personnel in Latin America are deprived of the improve- 
ment of professional skills which European experience offers. We must remem- 
ber that it is flattering to Latin Americans to have a Foreign Service officer 
assigned to their country who has served in London, Paris, Rome, or Madrid. 

It may not be possible to deal with programs of personnel improvement solely 
on an area basis. An overall program is urgently needed. The Latin American 
area merits leading attention in such a program. The essential aspect is the 
enforcement of the measures undertaken. Old "personnel improvement pro- 
grams" fill the drawers of the Department. Many, after a brave start, have 
never been really enforced. 

Language skills are of special demand but receive inadequate attention. The 
efforts of the Department of State have not borne the hoped-for results. Some 
form of sanction or incentive is needed. Frequent testing — every 6 months, for 
instance—and the grading of results into promotion channels, would do much to 
produce lasting results. The language schools established a few years ago should 
be revitalized ; the Spanish language school maintained in Mexico City was 
ordered closed this year, a real step backward, and does little credit to the voice 
of congressional criticism which brought it about. 

It should be unheard of that a career American diplomatic officer does not 
speak Spanish or Portuguese in the Latin countries where these languages are 
spoken. Chiefs of mission should also be encouraged to master the tongue of 
their country of assignment. Personally, I felt that my effectiveness as Ambas- 
sador would have been greatly enhanced had I been able to speak Spanish more 

Contrary to some schemes of improving personnel by adding more staff, all 
that is immediately needed is the proper utilization of the present staffs. In a 
word, quality, not quantity. One capable officer in Latin America is worth three 
mediocre officers. 

Continual control and supervision of personnel is essential to improved stand- 
ards. I saw personnel administration so weakly handled that an officer, whose 
conduct became a serious security breach and embarrassment to the Embassy 
was given no more discipline than a 2-week suspension, and was then reassigned 
to a higher position as political officer in a most important embassy. Closer 
discipline and undivided loyalty should be purposely sought in the career 
service. To do this the security office must be respected and strengthened. 

The disparaging distinction between ambassadors who are "career" and 
"political" must be wiped out. I have seen too often in Latin America that staffs 
serve differently a chief of mission who, though appointed by the President, is 
considered by some smart alecks to be less qualified than a member of the career 
corps. Such an intolerable attitude can be promptly eliminated by the Depart- 
ment if suitalile directive is given. 

Parenthetically, I would point out that ambassadors and officer personnel 
returning to Washington from abroad should be given more facilities than 
presently available in the Department. They often can find no place to hang 
their hat or a seat at a desk. An American ambassador so left "on his own" 
in his headquarters loses some of the authority his position abroad warrants, 
and leaves him at a disadvantage in dealing with other embassies in Washington 
who do not understand his downgrading in rank while on duty in Washington. 

With improved personnel, the devising of policies can go forward more 
securely. As a premise, it is necessary to recognize that each country should be 
treated individually. Broad generalizations of "Latin American policy" should 
be replaced by the closer formation of Argentine, Brazilian, etc., policy ; that is, 
policy on a country-to-country basis. 

Priorities should be given to the relative urgency of policy and action within 
the total area. It is confusing to our cause to treat Paraguay and Bolivia, 
though neighbors, on the same basis of priority ; the first is relatively tranquil, 
the second explosive. 

Organization of our relations and implementation of effective policies will be 
stymied unless we install the mechanics of modern methods. At present, there 
is no mechanism set up for the formulation and implementation of policy in 
Latin America. Policy is formed under extreme pressure and carried out under 
crisis. Too little, too late, and always too clumsy. 


Adhering for years to the practice of crisis decisions, we have lost the re- 
spect and confidence of Latin America. Their leaders do not see the United 
States as a strong, firm, and dominating power, but as a confused, weak, and 
vacillating guide, who is not sure himself where he is going or how to ge there. 
This is the basic cause for the present growth of neutralism, which now affects 
even so stanch an ally as Brazil. It is only natural that if not given strong 
and clearcut leadership, Latins will prefer to get out of the East-AVest struggle 
for a safer position on the sidelines. 

We should eradicate promptly the mythical distinction often cited between 
democratic and dictatorial governments as a basis for policy. The plain truth 
is that there is hardly a single truly democratic government in the hemisphere 
south of the United States. Many have the forms of democracy, such as elec- 
tions and i-epresentative bodies of government, but the means of attaining both 
are, with the possible exceptions of Uruguay and Costa Ilica, not too different 
than the methods used in the countries glibly tagged dictatorships. 

Valuable intelligence reports prepared for the Department by the Army, Navy, 
Air Force, FBI, and the Department's own research intelligence staff, very 
often give the true picture on these governments. Yet I was amazed to learn 
that these reports are sometimes not even read, much less utilized. An oflScer 
responsible for our Cuban relations in August 1959, was unaware of an excellent 
analysis of the Castro government leaders prepared by the Department's re- 
search staff just 6 weeks before. His own thinking betrayed a most serious 
lack of accurate information on the Communist nature of the Castro move- 

Failure to utilize the product of our Intelligence agencies shows a disturbing 
lack of coordination between the information gathering services and the policy- 
making oflScials of the Department of State. Such a gap can be fatal ; it has 
the seeds of a Latin American loss akin to Pearl Harbor. Closer contacts and 
direct regular meetings between State and the intelligence community should be 
systematically expanded. 

Study of adequate intelligence information on Castro could have prevented 
the mistaken policy of sympathy for him before he took over Cuba. His Com- 
munist affiliations were well known to our in Mexico, when he was a 
refugee in that country in 1955. They were fully reported to Washington, yet 
we went ahead 3 and 4 years later and kidded ourselves that Castro was not a 
Communist. We built up an atmosphere of sympathetic acceptance of his 
movement, ignoring its commie leadership and purposes. In end result, it may 
be plainly stated that we put Castro in power. Those responsible for decisions 
which had this ultimate effect have not yet been called to account. Under our 
constitutional system of checks and balances, the legislative branch may well be 
called upon to demand explanations of the blunders of the executive branch in 
this mess. 

Castro's movement constitutes our first and most serious i)roblem in Latin 
America. It must be turned back and defeated, or the peace and security of all 
Latin America will be violently disrupted. It is a race against time, time that 
is already running out on us. Until Casti-oism disappear.?, all other parts of 
our programs to save Latin America will be fruitless. Castro has stirred up the 
students and the poor people. We have no effective program or contact with this 
important element in Latin America. 

Our hemispheric policy should not be deluded by leftist propaganda to reduce 
drastically or eliminate completely the armed forces of Latin American govern- 
ments. These forces have often been abused, but they continue to represent one 
of the very few stabilizing influences in this time of turbulent change. Their 
existence under prudent leadership will permit conditions in which orderly evo- 
lution may be carried out, rather than destructive revolution. 

The Communists want to destroy armed forces, so that they them- 
selves can disrupt public order and overthrow governments. In almost every 
Latin American country, the armed forces literally stand between the Commu- 
nists and the palace. Venezuela is a clear current example. Should their ef- 
fectiveness be reduced, we might well find order easily subverted by trained 
agitators, working on the all too susceptible lower classes. 

As a guard against the spread of the Castro movement, already gaining ground 
everywhere, the armed forces in Latin American countries should receive our 
sympathetic assistance. Equipment and training made available to them under 
military assistance programs must take more fully into account the risks to in- 


ternal order. This can be done without violation of the principle of noninter- 

It is high time we looked at the realities of the threat to Latin America, which 
is internal Communist subversion and not external attack. The reality is that 
no armed conflict of any consequence whatever has occurred between Latin 
American countries in decades, and with existing peace machinery none appears 
likely to occur. A carefully planned and supervised program of building up 
the capability of Latin armed forces to preserve order and defeat Communist 
agitation should supersede large-scale military assistance. The latter, when 
reaching such forms as aircraft carriers, is absurd and self-defeating. The 
former can save the state, as has been done in Italy. 

We have shied away from such programs at the mere whisper of intervention. 
It is time we begin to act like a world power and not panic in face of false accu- 
sations. Unfortunately, our thinking has become so conditioned and stereo- 
typed that, like Pavlov's dogs, we respond automatically to the bell of anti- 
American charges. 

Revamping of our defense concepts in Latin America is long overdue and 
should not await the advent of the space age. Present antiquated concepts are 
based exclusively on the World War II type of combat. The role of our south- 
ern neighbors in any future conflict would probably bear little resemblance to 
1939-45 conditions. Only defeated generals make a profession of fighting the 
battles of the last war. 

Wider hemispheric concepts must replace such out-of-date ideas. A broader 
political basis for such joint defense, and of economic collaboration as well, 
should be sought as early as possible with Canada as part of the hemispheric 
concept. Steps should now be taken, actively but discreetly, toward the entry 
of Canada into the vacant seat in the Pan American Union, already waiting for 
them and the incorporation of our northern neighbor into the inter-American 
system. One such step within the Department of State would be the extension 
of the present direction of our inter-American relations into the entire conti- 
nent. The appropriate title would be Assistant Secretary for Western Hemi- 
sphere Affairs. Some thought has been given to the title of Under Secretary for 
this position. No justification for denying Under Secretary title could be made 
to other geographic areas (Europe, Africa, etc.) if given to the Western Hemi- 
sphere, in spite of the latter's primary interest to us. The distinction would 
thereupon disappear. Whether Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary, the im- 
portant point I wish to make is that the functions should be broadened to include 

Canada's importance to our hemisphere relations is growing every day. 
Now, for instance, Cuba is playing hard for Canada's support against the 
United States, offering to make in Canada the purchases formerly made in the 
United States. Were Canada incorporated into the treaties of inter-American 
cooperation, a strong barrier to this kind of game would already exist. 

Linked to the concept of hemispheric defense is the proposal for an inter- 
American Defense Force, sometimes referred to as an inter-American "police 
force" to preserve peace. Latin American governments have been slow to ac- 
cept this idea ; it is nevertheless basically sound and merits continued exami- 

The U.N. peace forces in the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and the Congo are ex- 
amples of a beginning in successful international action to prevent or limit 
armed conflicts. There is no reason why the Organization of American States, 
with its greater history and experience, cannot be equally effective. The record 
of the OAS Peace Committee has proven the capability of the inter-American 
system in taking quick action to terminate armed conflicts. 

The present trend, pushed by our enemies, to supplant OAS action by throw- 
ing Western Hemisphere disputes into the U.N., results from our weakness in 
vitalizing the inter-American machinery. We need strong representation eco- 
nomically and politically in the OAS to accomplish our objectives. We need 
strong policymakers in Washington and New York to reverse the trend to under- 
mine the OAS, in favor of the U.N., where the Soviet is ready with its veto 
to paralyze our actions. The inter-American Defense Force may well be one 
means to restoring our position of strength in peace in this hemisphere. 

Economic problems are, of course, at the core of our Latin American rela- 
tions. It is too often forgotten that our primary obligation, as government, is 
to defend our own interests and not to assume a supposed responsibility for 
others. As a result, our Latin investments are under serious attack, and our 
ability and will to defend them show an alarming weakness. 


There should be no question whatever of our obligation to give strong de- 
fense and protection to our legitimate interests in Latin America. Even with 
Cuba subtracted, we have a total investment valued at $10 billion. This is 
worth preserving. 

To be cowed by the nationalistic and communistic enemies of the American 
system, is to give up the defense before it is undertaken. Americm business- 
men and industrialists in Latin America are, by and large, disappointed with 
the lack of spontaneity of official interest in their plight shown by our diplo- 
matic missions. 

I have seen the rising tide of anti-Americanism, in its economic form, sweep 
from country to country. It has already engulfed Cuba completely. In Mex- 
ico, it has raised a mist of doubt over future investments. 

But we occupy a position of considerable resistence. The cards in our 
hands, in the case of commodity purchases such as sugar and in granting loans 
through official agencies, are very strong cards. We do, however, misplay 
them frequently. I have seen our Government extend very valuable credits, 
obtainable nowhere else, to other governments at the precise time when our 
legitimate, legal investments were suffering discriminating or even unfair 
treatment. I have seen huge and unexpected purchases made of sugar, with- 
out the slightest reference to continued lack of cooperation on matters touch- 
ing our vital security, such as the activities of the Communists or cooperation 
on defense planning. 

Such blunders cast off our strongest cards at the very moment when they 
should be most shrewedly played. By our own actions, we invite ridicule and 
disrespect. How painful it is to be told by Latins, less fortunate than our- 
selves, they would have no problems at all if they had our economic resources 
at their disposal. 

The simple answer is to enforce coordination between the many — too many — 
lending agencies of our Government and the Department of State, and to give 
the Department a stronger voice in the determination of economic decisions. 
When a political objection is raised, the voice of the Department of State should 
amount to a veto. This is provided we have strong and knowledgeable men 
administering the programs. 

Coordination and consultation would prevent such absurd incidents as I 
myself witnessed. While I, as American Ambassador, was making determined 
efforts to persuade a foreign government to rescind its unfair prosecution of 
a major U.S. industry, the head of the Eximbank, arriving and speaking without 
notice, declared that the country's credit rating with this principal U.S. lending 
agency was so good it would permit a billion dollars of loans. 

The main reason why we muff the use of foreign purchases and credits is 
the belief we can buy friendship. Latin America is particularly sensitive and 
scornful of this attitude. To the Latins, our credits are a straight business 
proposition, in which each side benefits. We could learn much from them, as 
they know friendship is not as important as respect in international relations. 
We miss out because, in case after case, we fail in our timing and coordination 
between our economic actions and our political objectives. 

Latins like to refer to the Roosevelt period as the high point of good relations 
with the United States. Roosevelt, they say, was the first, perhaps only, U.S. 
President to "understand" them and to be a "true friend." Yet Roosevelt 
sponsored no aid program.s, and only very limited loan assistance. FDR's 
unique ability to create a favorable psychological climate is obviously not easy 
to reproduce. We can, however, learn from his period that friend.ship and 
economic assistance are not necessarily companions. 

By treating money as a cure-all for our ills in Latin America, we not only 
failto make friends but frequently lose them. 

Large loans which, purposely or not, have channeled large profits into the 
pockets of a few individuals, have tied around our neck the odious albatross of 
class conflict. Where a few rather than the many have gained as the result 
of our assistance, the many have come to identify the United States with the 
interests of the few. In Cuba, we are being paid back in the coin of hatred 
for our help. 

Graft and corruption are always widespread in Latin American Governments. 
When some part of our funds made available for government projects find way 
into the pockets of venal officials, we add one more .stone to the weight of popu- 
lar opinion against us. To accept graft as unavoidable is to overlook its dire 
threat to our long-term interests. A corrupt Latin official is as dangerous to 


us as a Communist oflacial. If corrupted by money, he is always susceptible to 
Communist corruption. In any case, he lowers the moral authority of govern- 
ment, on which our common defense stands. 

Our plans for economic assistance for Latin America will lose friends for us 
if care is not exercised to prevent corruption. 

Land reform plans are now sweeping the southern continent. Legislation in 
varying forms is being drafted. In the normal course of events, these govern- 
ments will be seeking from us the funds to finance these plans, and will be 
approaching the principal source of such funds, the United States. 

We will increase opportunities for graft and hatred if these funds are fun- 
neled through governments, and we will also saddle ourselves with some re- 
sponsibility for the way the agrarian reform is carried out. Both undesirable 
results can be avoided by a simple preventative : deal not with governments but 
private banking institutions. We should therefore announce, clearly and 
promptly, our intention to do so, and head off the demands which governments 
are likely to make on us, to our ultimate embarrassment. 

This same kind of thoughtful advance planning should be applied across 
the board to our economic relations. Too many scattered proposals are tossed 
into Washington to make any economic sense at all. "Massive aid, a bold new 
approach to our neighbors' plight, a Marshall plan for Latin America, a new 
giant leap forward, urgent emergency economic development," etc., etc. — these 
head a few of the more frequently proposed economic projects. Everybody 
seems to agree that "something must be done" but few can agree on what that 
something is. The $500 million for economic development recently allocated 
to our southern neighbors is hardly that "something" and has so far failed to 
satisfy anyone. Unfortunately it is known as the Castro plan. 

Without fear or panic, the new administration has the opportunity to put 
these ideas under careful review and to decide on a general, coordinated, work- 
able and effective plan for Latin American economic needs. 

The effectiveness of our aid program and information services in Latin Ameri- 
ca should be reassessed. Doubt is justified that ICA is accomplishing what it 
is set up to do in many countries. In brief, many ICA staffs appear too large 
and the kind of technical assistance they furnish too long delayed in producing 
practical re.sults. Likewise USIA has yet to prove it is in a propaganda war. 
Its personnel rarely show imaginative and skillful application of our vast in- 
formational resources without unfounded criticism (which can only lower morale 
and harm the situation). The new administration must still take a fresh and 
hard headed reappraisal of both agencies. 


To sum up, my recommendations are 23 in total, under four principal heads, 
as follows : 


(1) Improve the caliber of Foreign Service personnel in Latin America and 
raise the level of key officials in the Department of State to ambassadorial and 
ministerial rank. 

(2) Rotate Foreign Service personnel more widely between Europe and Latin 

(.3) Raise their Spanish-Portuguese language skills by new programs which 
include incentives, and reinstitute the Spanish Language School recently closed, 
in Mexico City, or in some other appropriate Latin American city. 

(4) Administer personnel with firmer discipline and enforce respect for all 
Ambassadors, whether career or political appointees. 

Policy formation 

(5) Recognize the difference in policy requirements and priorities for each 
Latin American country. 

(6) Create a group mechanism for advance preparation of basic policies, in 
order to avoid recurrence of "crisis decisions." 

(7) Stop distinguishing between so called "democratic" and "dictatorial" re- 
gimes as a basis for policy. 

(8) Coordinate the intelligence services more closely with the policymaking 
level at the Department of State, gearing together what must be done about our 
No. 1 problem, the Castro Communist movement. 


Policy recommendations, security and political 

(9) Support Latin American armed forces at reasonable levels and improve 
their capabilities to maintain domestic order. 

(10) Update the relationship of these forces to current militarj' concepts. 

(11) Invite Canada into the inter-American system and broaden the function 
of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs to include the entire 
Western Hemisphere. 

(12) Appoint a strong representative to the OAS and resist the trend to 
supersede tlie OAS by the U.N. 

(13) Study the proposal for an Inter-American Defense Force as a means to 
preserve peace in Latin Ajiierica. 

Policy recommendations, economic and propaganda 

(14) Defend vigorously the $10 billion U.S. investment in Latin America. 

(15) Coordinate our economic assistance with our political objectives, elim- 
inate dreams of buying Latin American friendship. 

(16) Adopt controls to eliminate grafting by Latin American oflScials in con- 
nection with our economic aid. 

(17) Assist agrarian reform, while channeling any financing by the United 
States to private banking institutions. 

(18) Undertalve a broad view of Latin American economic needs, planning 
in advance the general role the United States may play. 

(19) Examine critically the effectiveness of ICA programs. 

(20) Weigh USIA performance and take action to improve it. 

(21) Use our influence to revise the tax laws. Few people in the know 
pay the full extent of their taxes. 

(22) Utilize the vast sources of information of Americans residing in Latin 
America. They are anxious to be of help to their country, but receive little 
guidance and encouragement. 

(23) Consider forming a university similar to West Point and the Naval and 
Air Force academies. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Were you about to add something, Mr, Ambassador? 

Mr. Hill, No, sir. 

The Chairman. Did Mr. Smith tell you he had been appointed as 
Ambassador to Cuba ? 

Mr, PIiLL. I read it in the newspapers that Ambassador Smith was 
briefed by Herbert Matthews of the New York Times, Herbert 
Matthews has always been an enthusiastic supporter of Fidel Castro. 
He believes the movement is not Communist-motivated. I recall his 
statement that he made in October of 1959, 1 believe, at Stanford Uni- 
versity, where he defended Castro's regime. I had one of the officers 
in the Embassy go to that conference so we would know what the 
thinking was in the intellectual circles in the United States regarding 
Fidel Castro. 

I believe just a few days ago Mr, Matthews spoke again about Fidel 
Castro at a gi-aduation exercise in New York. Certainly from the 
newspapers I gathered the opinion that he still felt that Castro was 
not a Communist and that the United States bungled its policy in 
dealing with him, which has led to this very difficult situation. 

The Chairman. But the fact tliat the State Department would have 
Mr. Matthews brief the Ambassador to Cuba ratlier than the State 
Department doing its own briefing is a link in the chain to show where 
the activities of the Caribbean desk in the State Department have 
been directed. 

Mr. Hill. I do not know firsthand from Ambassador Smith about 
this briefing, but it has been widely reported in the newspapers that 
this is true. 

The Chairman, He has testified. 


Mr. Hii.L. It is rather unusual. You may be interested to know that 
I wasn't briefed before I went to Mexico or debriefed when I came 

The Chairman. That is a link in the chain to show that that Di- 
vision in the State Department was active in promoting Fidel Castro, 

Mr. SoTiRwiNE. IMr. Hill, do you recall telling us of the communi- 
que that was presented at the ambassadors' meeting in El Salvador? 

Mr. Hill. Do I recall what, Mr. Soui-wine ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Reverting to the occasion of the meeting of ambas- 
sadors in El Salvador, do you recall telling us about a proposed com- 
munique which was presented immediately after the meeting ? 

Mr. Hill. Yes, I do. 

Mr. Sourva^ine. What was that communique ? 

Mr. Hill. The first day that the meeting opened, within 5 minutes 
after the conference opened, we were given a communique and asked 
to agree to it. We had only been in the conference for 5 minutes, and 
I objected. I said, "The normal procedure would be to write the 
communique at tlie end of the conference, not the begimiing." I took 
the time to read the communique and it said nothing except platitudes. 
After my protest the communique was withdrawn. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was it subsequently presented again ? 

]\fr. Hill. In different form, somewhat stronger. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Well, if it said nothing the first time, what did it 
say the second time ? 

Mr. Hill. There v>-as some improvement in the language. It talked 
about the need for economic development. The one part of the com- 
munique that I had hoped to get my amendment inserted in was the 
part dealing with the knoAvn Communist activity in Cuba. I was 
unsuccessful in getting my language adopted. But there was ref- 
erence in the final communique to the troubles in the Caribbean asking 
for an appropriate consideration by the respective governments, et 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember asking for a recess so that you 
might have an opportunity to study this second communique after it 
was presented ? 

Mr. Hill. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you get the recess ? 

Mr. Hill. Yes. Later we adopted modified language. Mr. Ru- 
bottom and Mr. Henderson and Mr. Dreier accepted some modified 
language which was offered by Ambassador Willauer that made diplo- 
matic reference to the problem in Cuba and that was published. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was there some difficulty between you and Mr. 
Bonsai over this communique ? 

Mr. Hill. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Tell us about that. 

Mr. Hill. Well, Mr. Bonsai felt that anything in the communique 
that cast any reflections upon Castro would make his job in Cuba very 
difiicult. He hoped that a diplomatic communique of good will and 
the importance of the area would be issued rather than anything that 
would bo considered provocative by Fidel Castro. He opposed the 
inclusion of the modified language that was offered by Ambassador 


Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember telling us in executive session 
that after studying the communique, you said you could not go along 
with it, calling it a whitewash of Castro? 

You said you told them : 

"You are going to discourage every country in Latin America that 
fears the Castro menace. There are certain aspects of the connnuni- 
que that are helpful, but I cannot go along with a communique that 
whitewashes Castro." 

]Mr. IIiLL. That was the communique as drawn. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is what you said at the time. 

Mr. Hnx. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You remember telling us that Mr. Bonsai said to 
you, "If you cannot be a team player, why not resign ?" 

Mr. Hill. That is correct. I suggested that it was not up to Mr. 
Bonsai to deal with my resignation. That was up to the President 
and the Secretary of State. 

Mr. SouRwixE. Would you say you were successful or partially 
successful in that communique? 

Mr. Hill. Partially successful at the time and at a later date un- 
successful because nothing was done. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember presenting this committee with 
a statement respecting your position as to dictators? 

Mr. Hill. I do. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you have the statement with you, sir ? 

Mr. Hill. I just submitted it to you, I would like to have it back. 
Unfortunately, it got attached to the recommendations I gave you. 
May I read the statement because I don't think the committee has 
seen this ? 

As the members of the committee well know, the dictator problem 
in Latin America has been very serious for the United States. The 
United States has been criticized on many occasions for favoring 
dictators. It is always referred to when the United States is raked 
over the coals for its handling of its foreign relations in Latin 

I believe I told the committee that I thought it was most un- 
fortunate that Vice President Nixon had become involved in this 
problem when he said an embraso for a Democrat and a handshake 
for a dictator. In Latin America they look upon dictators perhaps 
a little bit differently than we do. 

In my statement I submitted to the committee I said : 

In order to clarify the record, may I make an additional comment regarding 
dictators : 

In the years I have lived abroad, I have come to the conclusion that there is 
something equally as dangerous as dictators to our security in this Coinniunist- 
threatened world. That is the blindness with which we refuse to face the fact 
that outside of the United States, England, and a few European and Common- 
wealth countries, there are few countries that are governed by truly representa- 
tive democracies, irrespective of what the written constitutions may say. 

In Latin America the culture pattern tends to be built around the heroic 
figure of the Conquistadors, who were dictators among dictators. It will take 
many years before that hero model of success in government disappears from 
the practicalities of government in all of these countries. 

It is simply a recognition that other people chocse to live by different patterns 
than we do. We should not be so intolerant as to refuse to believe that someday 
history may tell us that, over the period of centuries, they had better instincts 
for the kind of government suited to their needs. 


The democratic way of life is an unusual phenomenon that has been available 
for few fortunate nations. It is not necessarily translatable, at this particular 
time, into the historical or economic conditions of other peoples. It is something 
that people should fight for and die for. It should not be handed out to those 
who do not want it, or to the undeserving. 

This cannot be interpreted that I do not cherish democracy. We must protect 
this democracy that we have won for ourselves, but we must not foolishly assume 
a condition contrary to fact in other countries. In substance, at this time, there 
are many lands in Latin- America where we have, unless we are very careful 
and very skillful, no choice except between dictators of the right and dictators 
of the left. The Castro experience should be the final proof of that. If we do 
not temper our enthusiasm with this realism we may experience an endless 
drain on our resources in our attempt to attain unattainable ends. 

Now Mr. Sourwine, I respectfully request that this be made a part 
of your record. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have already read it in. 

Do you recall telling us of a conversation about you between Am- 
bassador Bonsai and Ambassador ^Vlielan, the former ambassador to 
Nicaragua, which was subsequently recounted to you ? 

Mr. Hill. I believe diplomacy is like a football game. After you 
finish the game, you go about your business. Evidently, Ambassador 
Bonsai did not agree with this approach to life. After the conference 
in El Salvador was over, he saw Ambassador Whelan at the hotel. He 
said, ''Mr. Ambassador, I noticed that you did not join in support 
of Ambassador Hill regarding his position on Castro. You have in- 
fluence in the Republican National Committee. I hope you will utilize 
that influence to get rid of Hill." 

There is some question as to whether Ambassador Willauer was in- 
cluded in the statement. 

Mr. Sourwine. Ambassador Willauer had been the only other Am- 
bassador at the conference that supported your position? 

Mr. Hill. That is correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were minutes taken of this meeting of Ambas- 
sadors in El Salvador ? 

Mr. Hill. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you see a copy of these minutes ? 

Mr. Hill. Well, I was under the impression that the meeting was 
taped. I wrote Secretary Rubottom and asked him if I could have an 
exact tape recording of the meeting. I received in return more or 
less a synopsis of what took place. It was a very inaccurate report 
as far as my position was concerned, so I wrote Mr. Rubottom, who 
is a friend for whom I have a high regard. I gave him a list of about 
10, 12, maybe 14 corrections. I suggested that, if the report was sub- 
mitted to the Foreign Relations Committee, at least my position should 
be accurately reported. I have not had a reply. 

Mr. Sourwine. I will read you from your executive session testi- 
mony. You said you wrote Mr. Rubottom : 

As wherein your minutes have been whitewashed and I will not be a part to 
it. If you send this report to the Capitol I respectfully request my letter be 

Mr. Htll. Words to tliat effect. 
Mr. Sourwine. You know whether that was done ? 
Mr. Hill. I have no Imowledge whether it was sent to the Foreign 
Relations Committ*^ or not. I have had no reply to the letter. 


Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever see any intelligence reports of the 
FBI to the State Department respecting Castro's Communist con- 
nections ? 

Mr. Hill. I worked very closely with the representatives of the 
FBI in Mexico. They were very cooj)erative with the Embassy. They 
were there with the full understanding of the Mexican Government. 
The reasons for their being in Mexico were well known to the Mexican 
Government. The representatives of the FBI told me of their con- 
cern over Castro and Cuba. They saw, from time to time, representa- 
tives of the FBI in Cuba. I was told by a representative of the 
agency that it was their understanding the reports had not reached 
the upper echelon of the Department of State. 

Mr. SouRAViNE. You are saying reports of this nature respecting 
Castro's Communist affiliations had been transmitted but were told 
they had not reached the upper echelons of the State Department ? 

Mr. Hill. That is correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you told where they were sidetracked? 

Mr. Hill. DoAvn at the desk level. 

Senator Keaiixg. Who is in chaige of the desk ? 

Mr. Hill. Well, the desk officer for Mexico was INIr. Osborne. The 
desk officer for Cuba during part of this time was a Terence Lynn- 
hardy, who is now the consul in Nogales. I do not want to imply 
they withheld reports, because I do not know. 

Senator Keating. Who is their immediate superior? 

Mr. Hill. Mr. Wieland. 

The CiiAiRMAx. "Wlio is his superior ? 

Mr. Hill. Mr. Wieland's superior was Mr. Rubottom. 

IMr. SouRWiNE. Do you recall telling us that personnel from the 
Embassy in Havana and Cubans who came to Mexico City urged you 
to go to Washington to try to clear up the situation because the Em- 
bassy was considered pro-Castro, that is our Embassy in Havana ? 

Mr. Hill. That is correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. When was this ? 

Mr. Hill. Late 1959 and 1960. I saw a cable from the Pentagon 
intelligence as late as September of 1960 saying there was allegedly 
a pro-Castro cell in the U.S. Embassy in Havana. This was Sep- 
tember of 1960. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. What was the source of that? 

Mr. Hill. Naval Intelligence. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And to whom was that addressed ? 

Mr. Hill. It was addressed to the Chief of Xaval Operations. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you recall telling us that in May of 1960 you 
saw a cable over the signature of Ambassador Bonsai, the purport of 
which was that Fidel Castro wanted to get along with the United 
States and was being helpful or hopeful ? 

Mr. Hill. Regarding the cable in May, this was May of 1960, Mr. 
Sourwine, the Foreign Minister of Cuba had a meeting with the Latin 
American Ambassadoi-s in Havana and in Canada. Indications 
were given to the diplomats that it was the wish of the Cuban Gov- 
ernment to resolve their differences with the United States. This 
cable was sent to Washington and repeated to Mexico City. I thought 
it was rather late, in May of 1960, for this type of reporting to go to 
Washington. I had seen no indications, based on my reports and on 


conversations with individuals that were familiar with the Castro 
and Communist problem, that he was doing anything but trying to 
goad the United States into direct intervention in Cuba. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you recall or did you have a top level confer- 
ence at the State Department in "Washington in the spring of 1960 on 
the Cuban situation ? 

Mr. Hill. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Will you tell us first how this came about and then 
what took place at the conference ? 

Mr. Hill. In January of 1960 a friend of mine, Tom McCabe, was 
visiting in Mexico. I believe he is the president of a paper company 
in Philadelphia. There were several prominent businessmen at the 
dinner from the United States. Their interest was in what was going 
on in Cuba. 

Colonel Glawe of the Embassy accompanied me to this dinner. I 
told Mr. McCabe that if they were interested in my giving them a 
rundown on the seriousness of the situation I would be very happy to 
do so. 

I gave Mr. IMcCabe and his friends my version of the problem in 
Cuba, the Communist infiltration, tlie seriousness of tlie situation. 
I told Mr. McCa,be that if something was not done about it by the 
U.S. Government that the whole of the Western Hemisphere was in 
jeopardy of communism. 

Mr. McCabe showed considerable concern and I said, "You are a 
prominent member of the Republican Party. I would be very happy 
to present the story to appropriate authorities, Mr. McCabe. I have 
had no success to date, but I am willing to try again." JNIr. McCabe 
telephoned me from Philadelphia a few days later and said he was 
having dinner with Douglas Dillon. Would I give him permission 
to discuss with Mr. Dillon my concern about the Cuban problem. I 
said to Mr. McCabe, "You certainly have that privilege." 

The dinner was on a Friday night, if I recall coiTectly, and Satur- 
day afternoon I received a cable to come to Washington. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. This was when ? 

Mr. Hill. This was in January of 1960. The cable to me was that 
President Eisenhower was visiting Latin America and would be glad 
to have my views regarding the Communist problem in the hem- 

I came to Washington. Governor Herter, then the Secretary of 
State, Alien Dulles and one of his associates from the CIA, and Mr. 
Eubottom and myself met in Governor Herter's office. Nothing much 
was accomplishecl. The Secretary, as you know, is a very busy man. 
All we discussed Avas the actual traffic of Communists from Cuba to 
Mexico and to the Soviet Embassy and to the Cuban Embassy there, 
the amount of courier service going back and forth and how serious 
I thought this problem was. 

Then Governor Herter's time was up and we were to have further 
discussions at the CIA to lead to some sort of a presentation to the 
Government of Mexico to solicit their support in restricting this traffic. 
But we never did get to the real core of the problem, communism in 

Evidently, Senator Fulbright knew that I was in Washington. 
I was invited to the Foreign Relations Committee. It was an execu- 


tive session and to proceed, INIr. Chairman, I would have to have your 
permission or permission from Senator Fulbright to discuss what took 
place in that meeting. 

The Chairman. We do have to clear it with the Foreign Relations 

Mr, Hill. But that was the total extent of that particular effort 
to once again bring home the Communist problem in Cuba and its 
seriousness all through the hemisphere. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Hill, do you recall telling this committee in 
executive session "there is no doubt in my mind that individuals in 
the State Department, with the help of individuals of the New York 
Times, put Fidel Castro in power" ? 

Mr. Hill. There is no doubt in my mind that is a true story. 
Individuals in the State Department and individuals in the New 
York Times put Castro in power. 

Mr. SouRwiisrE. What specific individuals do you have in mind? 

Mr. Hill. Well, remember, Mr. Sourwine, that we are dealing here 
with tlie personalities. The Foreign Service has got many outstand- 
ing officers. I believe that that particular question should be answered 
in executive session because it involves their names. I could be wrong 
and they could be right. This is an open hearing and I think that to 
mention specific names at this particular time would not be productive. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall telling the committee that you had 
been told by a responsible official of our Embassy in Havana that 
there was a CIA representative in Havana who was pro-Castro ? 

Mr. Hill. That is correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. Does the same situation you recounted prevent you 
from giving us the name of this individual ? 

Mr. Hill. That is correct. 

Mr. SoLTiwiNE. Mr. Hill, in j^our service in the State Department 
have you run into the problem of homosexuality as a security risk 
and a security problem ? 

Mr. Hill. I believe it is well known, Mr. Sourwine, that it has 
been a problem in our Government. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am asking about your own experience. Do you 
know it to be a problem in the State Department ? 

Mr. Hill. I certainly recognize that there is the problem and know 
it first hand. 

Mr. Sourwine. Wimt can you tell us respecting the extent of this 
problem ? 

Mr. Hill. I want to cooperate with the committee, Mr. Chairman, 
but I do believe that a subject of this nature should be confined to an 
executive session. 

The Chairman. Well, as long as you won't call names I think the 
testimony is pertinent. After all, there is a security problem. 

Mr. Hill. I felt, Mr. Sourwine, that you expected me to give names 
and pei-sonal experiences and I felt that was unfair. The ones that I 
have to give have suffered the penalty of loss of jobs. I think you 
are referring to the case that happened in ^Mexico City, Mr. Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. I wasn't referring to a particular case. I had in 
mind the information you had given the conmiittee in executive session 
respecting the extent of this problem and respecting a particular num- 
ber of such individuals who have been found in the Department. 


Do you recall this ? 

Mr. Hill. I certainly do. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Suppose you go into that without naming particular 
names ? 

Mr. Hill. If you recall, I was Assistant Secretary of State for Con- 
gressional Relations and this is one of the unfortunate problems that 
came to my attention because from time to time the Bureau of Secu- 
rity in the Department of State filed reports to the appropriate con- 
gressional committees dealing with those that were employed in the 
State Department that were severed because of homosexual tendencies 
or admissions of being a homosexual. 

My first 2 weeks in JNIexico City — I believe I rej^orted this to you 
and the committee — there were seven members of my staff who resigned 
from the service because of this problem. 

Senator Keating. How large a staff did you have ? 

Mr. Hill. The percentage was on the right side, Senator. We had 
over 500 employees. 

The Chairman. Do you have any estimates of the number within 
the State Department ? 

Mr. Hill. When I served as Assistant Secretary of State for Con- 
gressional Relations I was told by the officer responsible for conduct- 
ing investigations on this problem that about 1,400 had been severed 
from the Department of State. 

The Chalrman. That is out of how many employees ? 

Mr. Hill. I think at the time there were 21,000 employees. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Do you know of any instances in which homosex- 
uality was discovered in the case of a particular individual but that 
individual was not severed from his position in the Department ? 

I will not ask you for the names of the individuals. 

Mr. Hill. I know of no individual that was not severed from the 
Department of State that admitted homosexual activities, Mr. 

Mr. Sourwine. You remember, sir, telling the committee that you 
knew there were 75 security risks in the Department in whose cases 
security hearings had been recommended by the responsible officer 
but who had been cleared for security without such hearings ? 

Mr. Hill. There is an Executive order, I believe, that still exists 
that if there is adverse information in the file regarding an individual 
that the Attorney General and the Secretary of State may waive 
that information if they believe it is inconclusive. 

Once again, that was a problem that came within my supervision 
as far as Congi-ess was concerned, in keeping them informed regarding 
the security problem. The same individual that gave me the informa- 
tion regarding the homosexual problem told me that he personally 
had recommended the severance of approximately 75 individuals in 
the Department but had been overruled by the Attorney General and 
by the Secretaiy of State because, in the opinion of both men, there 
was inconclusive evidence. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any knowledge as to whether those 
75 men or any of them are still employed in the Department ? 

JNIr. Hill. I know of one that is over in the area of the Belgian 


Mr. SouKwaNE. Here again this is a name you do not want to give 
the committee in public session. 

Mr, Hill. That is right. 

Mr. SouRwixE. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions of this 

Senator Keating. ]\Ir. Hill, you have given us A'ery important in- 
formation about Cuba and your impressions of the various stages of 
Castro's affiliations have been borne out by the facts. 

Now a hearing of this character loses much of its value unless it can 
be used in the future. A great number of us, including myself, have 
been urging for some time a complete embargo against shipment of 
goods to Cuba. Up to the present time, the Department of State has 
said they are considering such a step. But that is as far as they 
will go. 

Do you feel that an embargo against Cuba would prove to be an 
effective instrument for our country to use in a situation in which it 
now finds itself? 

Mr. Hill. Senator Keating, I had been advocating a complete 
embargo, air and sea, for many months and to no avail. I have stated 
it publicly in speeches that I have made in the United States. There 
is no reason in the world for the United States to allow Communist 
arms to be shipped into this hemisphere through Havana. 

It is in violation of every treaty we have signed with Latin America 
that deals with the common defense of the area. Until such an 
embargo is placed, the arms will continue to be brought into tills 
country and will be used to overthrow governments that are not in 
favor with INIoscow. 

I would wholeheartedly subscribe to a total and complete air and 
sea embargo. 

Senator Keatixg. And it would be, in your opinion, most effective 
and would be in accordance with any treaty commitments that we 
have ? 

Mr. Hill. That is correct. Wliat you have to do is convene the Or- 
ganization of American States and go through channels. This should 
have been done many months ago. 

All the nations of Latin America have signed the various treaties 
of Bogota and Rio that deal with this problem. Castro is not a prob- 
lem solely of the United States. It is a problem of the Westeni 
Hemisphere. If Latin America lives up to the treaties and they join 
with the United States and the Organization of American States ef- 
fectuates the embargo, it will have much more effect. 

Now, as you know, Senator, there is considerable concern in Latin 
America about Castroism. We might not have the necessary votes to 
bring about an embargo. 

It that should happen, then we should act unilaterally. 

Senator Keating. I could not agi'ee with you more. 

Do you think that we should continue to trade with Cuba, even 
though that trade, outside of the sugar problem, although the trade 
is small, do you think the trade should be continued ? 

Mr. Hill. There should be no trade with Cuba — period. The most 
serious foreign policy problem that faces the United States today out- 
side Communist China and Russia is Cuba. If something isn't done 


about Cuba the freedom of the Western Hemisphere is in serious 

Senator Keating. And does it make any sense to you to have Amer- 
ican dollars sent to Cuba which Cuba can use to purchase arms to 
destroy other comitries in Latin America and to try to destroy us ? 

Mr. Hill. It is inconceivable, but I know it has been going on. 

Senator Keating. Are there other possible steps in addition to that 
which you would like to see the United States or the Organization of 
American States take to deal with the situation in Cuba ? 

Mr. Hill. Yes, it is interesting for me to note that 14,000 or 15,000 
miles away, we lost 150,000 American boys or they were maimed for 
life or many of them seriously injured and killed in the defense of 
Korea and in the fight against the Communists. But in Cuba, only 
90 miles from the United States, we are unwilling to take affirmative 

Now, there is still available to the United States ways and means, 
positive steps that we can take to try and resolve the Cuban problem. 
It is very late but it has to be done, because if it isn't done, communism 
will overrun this hemisphere. 

We should request a reconvening of the Organization of American 
States and I recall. Senator, as you do, Secretary Dulles pointing 
with pride that this was the oldest organization among international 
organizations, with many years of experience and just how successful 
it had been in dealing with problems in Latin America. All of a 
sudden, that success has been lost. 

But the instrument is still there. If the United States will show 
some leadership, reconvene the Organization of American States, then 
clearly and consistently outline the problem — the problem of com- 
munism — and suggest that we invoke the Caracas resolution or the 
Rio resolution, then you can move with your economic sanctions with- 
in the prerogatives of the Organization of American States, if the 
majority agrees. 

If the majority does not agree, then the U.S. Government has the 
opportunity to put on notice our friends south of the border. I am 
sure you know of my respect for the Latin American people. You 
know of my aspirations for a better way of life for these wonderful 
people in Latin America. If they can't see fit to protect what is their 
own security, then the United States must concern itself with theirs, 
as well as our security. Then the United States could bring about the 
total embargo which I believe is necessary in Cuba, stopping all trade 
with Cuba, recognize a Cuban Government in exile that is not a Fidel 
government without Fidel. If the Cuban Government in exile requests 
the United States to intervene or if Castro continues to provoke the 
United States, we give Mr. Castro 48 hours. At the end of 48 hours 
if he is still in Cuba, then we go in. 

Now I am well aware of intervention and the problems that it 
presents. If we cannot get our friends in Latin America to join us, 
we have no other alternative. 

I will assure you that Russia will not force a showdown in Cuba 
and Castro will fall. I would doubt that there would be any loss of 
life. They recognize the power of the United States. Latin America 
is looking to the United States to lead and not to be led. 


Senator Keating. In the agreements between countries of this 
hemisphere to repel Communist aggression in the Western Hemi- 
sphere, is it not your opinion that the intent of the parties with respect 
to Communist aggression went further than the landing of Soviet 
troops ? Aggression meant also to involve infiltration, subversion, 
the supply of armaments and other items as well. 

Mr. Hill. You understand the Communists recognized many years 
ago that the way to bring the United States to communism was through 
Latin America. 

Reportedl}^, the Communists are spending more money in Latin 
America on propaganda than the total budget of the United States 
Information Agency progi'ams, worldwide. 

Senator Keating. Mr. Murrow said yesterday when he was a guest 
on my television program that Castro was spending considerably more 
in Latin America than we were. 

Mr. Hill. I do not know that, sir. I don't deal or think in terms 
of what Castro does or Cuba does. It is what the Communists do, 
because I do believe that Castro has been controlled by tlie Commu- 
nists for many, many months. The money that he is spending is 
coming directly from Peiping or Moscow. 

Senator Keating. I am sure that is so. 

Are there other areas of Latin America where the United States 
must be on the alert against Soviet penetration ? 

Mr. Hill. In my personal opinion, communism is a problem in 
every country in the western hemisphere. But I would watch Brazil 
very closely in the future. 

Senator Keating. Do you feel that, as a result of your experiences 
which you have outlined for us, the decisionmaking machinery in the 
Department of State is capable of reacting properly or let us use the 
phrase "with deliberate speed" in such times as we presently face ? 

Mr. Hill. I think we are bogged down by too many committees. 
Senator. To arrive at a decision takes a tremendous amount of time 
and certainly during the period of time I was in the Department it 
was very difficult to make a c^uick decision. 

Senator Keating. That was your own personal experience. 

Mr. Hill. Yes. 

It is clumsily organized. 

Senator Keating. I think that you have given us some veiy valu- 
able information. Ambassador Hill. We are very grateful to you. 

Is Mr. Wieland still in the Department ? 

Mr. Hill. I have no idea where he is. Senator Keating. It was in 
the newspapers a few weeks ago that he was at a Foreign Ser^^ce 
school in preparation for an assignment in Europe. 

Senator Johnston. Following up what has been said here, what do 
you think would happen if Russia, with a shipload of arms goiug to 
Castro, ran into an embargo around Cuba? 

Mr. Hill. They would back down. 

Senator Johnston. You think they would back do^vn ? 

Mr. Hill. In my judgment they would. Thev are not prepared for 
a showdown at this time. You understand I Iiave read intelligence 
reports that state that Russia has been amazed with the ease with 
which they have been allowed to take over in Cuba. 

826 COMMUlSriST threat to U.S. through the CARIBBEAN 

Senator Johnston. I noted you make the recommendation here 
that we defend vigorously the $10 billion U.S. investment in Latin 

What about the property Castro has taken over ? 

Mr. Hill. Nothing has been done. 

Senator Johnston. You think something ought to be done? 

Mr. Hill. I certainly do and there are instruments available for 
the United States to at least start the processing through the interna- 
tional courts for some sort of remuneration for the companies that 
have lost their money. 

But Senator, in January of 1959, one of the vice presidents of the 
Export-Import Bank Avent to Cuba. He had an appointment to see 
"Che" Guevara, to inquire about the intentions of the Castro govern- 
ment regarding $39 million worth of loans to Cuba and to inquire if 
the Government w\as prepared to repay the U.S. Government. You 
might be interested in what Mr. Guevara told the vice president of 
the Export-Import Bank. He said : 

We liave no intention of repaying this money. I suggest that the American 
companies, who have derived so many profits out of Cuba and the Cuban people, 
repay the loan. Good-day, sir. 

I think that this story should have been made known to the Ameri- 
can people a lot longer ago. They might have been aware of the type 
of people we are dealing with in Cuba. I agree with you that the loss 
of $1 billion in Cuba is a serious problem, not only for the companies 
but for the United States. If we allow Cuba to get away with taking 
over our properties without remimeration, it will be done elsewhere 
throughout the world. 

Senator Johnston. Isn't that going to affect other countries that 
need help from the United States? 

It will prevent individuals from going into those countries. 

Mr. Hill. That is correct. 

Senator Johnston (presiding). Now, I notice that you make an- 
other statement here : 

Stop distinguishing between so-called Democratic and dictatorial regimes as 
a basis for departure. 

What do you mean by that ? 

Mr. Hill. I mean, sir, who rules Guatemala and who rules Peru 
and who rules any country in Latin America is the business of the 
country itself and its people. When we start trying to distinguish 
between democrats, dictators to the left and to the right, it is direct 
intervention on the part of the United States. I read a paper some- 
tim.e ago to the committee giving some thoughts regarding this vei7 
difficult problem. We all want to see Latin America free and demo- 
cratic. We had to fight and die for our freedom. They should take 
their own time in bringing this about and we shouldn't try to push 
them too fast. 

Senator Johnston. In other words, tliat is the business for each 
countiy ? 

Mr. Hill. That is correct, unless communism enters the picture. 

Senator Johnston. We find that true in the United States when 
one State tries to tell another State what to do. 

Mr. Hill. Yes. 


Senator Johnston. I notice some other statements in here. 

I think they are very beneficial to us right at this time. 

For instance, you said our phms of economic assistance to Latin 
America will lose ground for us if care is not exercised to prevent 

Isn't that what has happened in a great many countries where 
we have gone in with aid ? 

Mr. Hill. The United States has been blamed for many of the 
evils of the countries where we had loaned large sums of money 
because much of that money has, unfortunately, found its way into 
the pockets of political leaders in the country. The peoples them- 
selves know that this money has come from the United States; and 
they see 1 he rich get richer and the poor get poorer. If we are going 
to loan our resources to these very poor areas, in a part of the world 
that I have spent off and on some 13 years traveling and living in, 
Latin America, then there should be some wise controls regarding 
the use of this mone3\ It should not be used for personal benefit 
of any individual. 

Senator Johnston. I notice you go on to say that by treating 
money as a cure-all for our ills in Latin America we not only fail 
to make friends but frequently lose them. 

Isn't it true that the Latin American people are not desiring any 
gift from us but what they want is for us to do business with them 
and deal with them and let our money help build up their country 
and that is all they want ? 

Mr. Hill. I can certainly attest to that in Mexico, Senator. 

In this country which is going through the industrial revolution, 
they have made it very clear to the United States that they need 
capital to build their counti-y. They don't want grants. They don't 
want any gifts. They want to be able to borrow, pay interest to 
develop the resources in their country. They have done an excellent 
job, certainly during the period of time I was in Mexico. But you 
understand the $500 million plan, which lias just been adopted by 
tlic Congress of the United States, is referred to in Latin America 
as the Castro plan. He was given credit for forcing the United 
States into a position where they put the money up. That is very 

Senator Johnston. That is very unfortunate, to say the least. It 
hurts us in anything we try to do at the present time to oust Castro, 
doesn't it? 

Mr. Hill. Certainly it does. 

Look at the situation that has developed in Brazil recently. I un- 
derstand we have made a commitment to Brazil of around $2 billion. 
When President Kennedy's representative went to Brazil in February 
of this year, according to the information available to me, President 
Kennedy's representative had to wait 2 or 3 days before seeing Presi- 
dent Quadros. We had already let it be known that we looked with 
favor upon a $2 billion credit — not million but billion. When the 
President's representative called on President Quadros, he said, "We 
are not going to help you with the Cuban problem." During the con- 
versation he went on to say Brazil must move into a more neutral 
position and not be so closely alined with the United States. He said, 


"We are considering recognizing Czechoslovakia, Communist China, 
and Moscow." 

I say to you. Senator, it would occur to me that perhaps the better 
part of wisdom would be take a little longer look before a decision is 
made in making such amounts of money available to a country that 
gives you that sort of treatment. I am not speaking about the Brazil- 
ian people. I'm speaking of President Quadros. He allegedly told 
that to Mr. Berle of the Department of State. I think we would be 
respected if we took time and reconsidered any further loans to Brazil 
until such time as we perhaps had a common meeting ground of mu- 
tual interest. 

Senator Johnston. We have many problems not only in the Carib- 
bean but in South America. 

Mr. Hill. That is correct. 

Senator Johnston. Doesn't the situation that just happened down 
in the Dominican Republic raise another serious question at this time ? 

Mr. Hh.l. It certainly does. 

Senator Johnston. We are going to have to be very careful and if 
we rush in there and try to say we are against dictators and are for 
a democratic form of government, aren't we likely to drive another 
country into the Communist fold ? 

Mr. Hill. It could possibly happen. 

Senator Johnston. The committee will be recessed, subject to the 
call of the Chair. 

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, subject to 
the call of the Chair.) 


Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance 
to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organiza- 
tion in this index. 



Batista 807,808 

Belgian Congo 822 

Berle, Mr 828 

Bogota, Colombia 794, 806 

Bogotasso 794 

Bohlen, Ambassador 807 

Bonsai, Ambassador 802-805, 816-818 

Bowles ( Governor) 808 

Brazil 827 


Caracas resolution 824 

Castro, Fidel 794, 796, 804, 807-819, 827 

Castro plan 827 

CIA 799, 807, 820, 821 

Communist China and Moscow 804 

Cuban Government 819 

Cummings, Hugh 802 


Dillon, Douglas 820 

Dodd, Thomas J. (Senator) 793 

Dominican Republic 828 

Dreier, Mr 816 

Dulles, Allen 820 


Eastland, Senator 793 

Eisenhower, Dr. Milton 795, 797, 798, 806 

El Salvador conference 806 

Export-Import Bank 826 


Farland, Ambassador 805 

FBI 799,819 

Foreign Relations Committee 818, 820, 821 

Fulbright, Senator 820, 821 


Glawe, Colonel 798, 807, 820 

Gray, Cecil 802 

Guatemala 826 

Guevara, "Che" 806, 826 

Havana 821 

Henderson, Loy 804, 805 

Henderson, Mr 816 

Herter (Secretary of State) 820 

Hill, Robert C, testimony of 793-828 


830 INDEX 


ICA 814 


Johnson, Jimmy 798 

Johnston, Olin D. (Senator) 793 


Keating, Kenneth B. (Senator) 793 

Kennedy, Robert 808, 809 


Leddy, Raymond 797, 798, 806 

Leddy, Mrs 798 

Lynnhardy, Terence 819 

McCabe, Tom 820 


Mann, Thomas C 809 

Matthews, Herbert 815 

Mexican Governni'ent : 819 

Murrow, Mr 825 


New York Times 815, 821 

Nixon, Vice President 797 


OAS 815 

OAS Peace Committee 812 

Organization of American States 805, 806, 812, 823, 824 

Osborne, Mr 819 


Pan American Union 812 

Peru 826 

Quadros, President 827, 828 


Report and Suggestions on Latin America, Confidential 809^815 

Rio resolution 824 

Rubottom, Mr 799, 804, 805, 816, 818-820 

Russia 825 


Schroeder, Frank 793 

Smith, Ambassador 807. SOS 

Spalding, Keith 798 

Stanford University 815 

State, Department of 807, SOS, 812, 815, 819. 820. 822, 823, S2S 

Stewart, Alan 805 


United States Information Agency 825 

USIA 814,815 


Whelan, Ambassador 818 

Wieland, Mr 795, 797, 709, 805, 806. 819, 825 

Willauer, Ambassador 803, 816, S18 

W. R. Grace & Co 794 











PART 13 

MARCH 29, APRIL 26, JUNE 1, AND JULY 27, 1961 

Printed for the use of the Ck)mmittee on the Judiciary- 
Boston Public Library 
Sunerintendent of Documents 

DEP ^m^^i 

90331 WASHINGTON : 1962 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 



JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 

SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina KENNETH B. KEATING, New York 

JOHN A. CARROLL, Colorado HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii 

THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania 
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan 
EDWARD V. LONG, Missouri 

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administeation op the Intebnal 
Secueity Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut, Vice Chairman 
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 


SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina KENNETH B. KEATING, New York 

HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania 
J. G. SoDRWiNE, Counsel 
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 



Resolved hy the Internal Security Siibconiinlttee of the Senate Com- 
mittee on the Judiciary^ That the following testimony taken in execu- 
tive session be released from the injmiction of secrecy, declassified 
where necessary, and with such expurgation as may be required for 
security or objectionable for other good cause be authorized to be 
printed and made public : 

William A. Wieland, January 9, 1961; William A. Wieland, Feb- 
ruary 8, 1961; Samuel Shaffer, February 15, 1961; Col. Benoid E. 
Glawe, jNIarch 15, 1961 ; Andres Perez-Chaumont, March 29, 1961 ; 
Scott McLeod, April 4, 1961; Col. Oscar Doerflinger, April 26, 1961; 
Raymond Leddy, June 1, 1961 ; Jorge Garcia-Tunon, June 1, 1961 ; 
Ricardo Artigas-Ravelo, June 1, 1961 : Whiting Willauer, July 27, 
1961 ; Elmer R. Hipsley, November 16, 1961 ; Oiio F. Otepka, Novem- 
ber 16, 1961; Harris Huston, November 16, 1961; Salvatore xl. Bon- 
tempo, January 9, 1962; William A. Wieland, February 2, 1962; 
Roger Jones, March 8, 1962; Abram Chayes, January 15, 1962; Wil- 
liam O. Boswell, March 8, 1962: Frank Becerra, Jr., March 12, 1962; 
Elmer R. Hipsley, IVIarch 15, 1962 : Capt. Charles R. Clark, Jr., April 
12, 1962; Otto Otepka, April 12, 1962; Frances Knight, May 16, 1962; 
Robert D. Johnson, May 16, 1962; Abram Chayes, June 7, 1962; Roger 
W. Jones, June 7, 1962 ; John Leahy, Jime 12, 1962 ; Andreas Lowen- 
field, June 7, 1962; Andreas F. Lowenfield, June 12, 1962; Abram 
Chayes, Jmie 19, 1962. 

James O. Eastland, 


Thomas J. Dodd, 

Vice Chairman. 

Oliist D. Johnston. 

John L. McClellan. 

Sam J. Ekvin, Jr. 

Roman Hruska. 

E\t:rett jM. Dirksen. 

K. B. Iveating. 

Hugh Scott. 
Dated October 4, 1962. 



Testimony of — Page 

Artigas Ravelo, Ricardo 852 

Doerflinger, Col. Oscar Maynard 839 

Garcia-Tunon, Jorge 85 1 

Leddy, Raymond 843 

Perez-Chaumont, Andres 831 

Willauer, Whiting 861 



United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Ad:ministration 
OF THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D.C. 
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 :40 a.m., in room 2300, 
New Senate Office Building, Senator James O. Eastland (chairman) 

Present : Senators Eastland and Roman L. Hruska. 
Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Benjamin Manclel, 
research director ; Frank Schroeder, chief investigator. 
The Chairman. If you will hold up your hand and Ije sworn. 
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give will be 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 
Mr. Chaumont. I do. 


Mr. Sourwine. Would you give the reporter your name, please, and 
your address ? 

Mr. Chaumont. My name is Andres Perez-Chaumont. My ad- 
dress — my home address — is 3744 Aberdeen Way, Houston, Tex. 

Mr. Sourwine. What is your business or profession ? 

Mr. Chaumont. I am export manager for the American Glass Tint- 
ing Corp., and that is a Du Pont corporation which distributes 
throughout the world. 

That is a glass tinting product, and I am in charge of the distribu- 
torship to all foreign countries. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are a Cuban national, are you, Mr. Chaumont ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, when did you leave Cuba ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Well, I left Cuba in 1957, at the beginning of 1957, 
when I was appointed military attache to the Cuban Embassy in 
Mexico, and to tlie Embassy in Central America. I only went back 
once, that was in November 1958, for 2 clays, 3 clays. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were then an Army man ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. What was your rank ? 

Mr. Chaumont. A lieutenant colonel. 

Mr. Sourwine. In what branch of the service ? 



Mr. Chaumont. Well, I had started as infantry, but then I had a 
specializing command in general staff, and I had gone all the way to 
be subdirector of the school of commanding general staffing in Cuba. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you serve in intelligence work at all ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes; I was in charge of all the intelligence 
throughout Mexico and Central America. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. During what period were you in charge of this 
intelligence ? 

Mr. Chaumont. 1957 and 1958. , 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you, or did you, know one William Arthur 

Mr. Chaumont. If I knew him personally, no. I have known him 
by references. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. What do you mean, you have known him by ref- 
erences ? 

Mr. Chaumont. I believe he was a Cuban that had another name, 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was that Arturo Guillemio Montenegro? 

Mr. Chaumont. I would not remember, sir. I have heard also that 
because I turned in very many beautiful reports on all Communist 
activities throughout the time I was there to the U.S. Embassy in 
Mexico, and usually I did not see action concerning all the information 
I had given. And somehow or other I was told that there was a 
gentleman named Wieland that had been a Cuban named Montenegro, 
that was the one that sort, of had been an obstacle for those reports 
to have been properly evaluated. 

Mr. SouRw^NE. This was in 1957 and 1958 ? 

Mr. Chaumont. 1958. 

Mr. SouRwiNE, Wlio was the American Ambassador ? 

Mr. Chaumont. In Mexico? Robert Hill. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was Mr. Wieland in the Embassy ? 

Mr. Chaumont. I do not recall whether he belonged to the Embassy. 
There was a young 

Mr. SouRWiNE. This is just hearsay, then, about Mr. Wieland ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you told this by personnel in the Embassy ? 

Mr. Chaumont. By personnel of the American Embassy there ; yes, 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall who told you this ? 

Mr. Chaumont. About Mr. Wieland's information ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Chaumont. Well, Ambassador Hill, yes, because I would com- 
plain to him ; I would say that what would happen with those reports, 
that they were very definite, they were very precise, very concise, 
with facts all over, dates, names, and places, and nothing was done 
about it, ever. 

Senator Hruska. Mr. Witness, what action was called for by your 
reports ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Well, I would, for instance, to make it very clear 
for the Government of the United States, the Communist connections 
of Fidel Castro and all his group of exiles and his party members 
and everything that were in Mexico at the time. They had close 
connections with the Communists, they were in close contact with 


the Czech commercial attache, with tlie Russians — they "would receive 
these reports. 1 mean, those reports were very concise, I woukl give 
veiy definite action, and yet when I woukl inquire about the reaction 
they would say, well, nothing has been done about it, and I would 
see that they were still not considered as Coiranunists somehow or 

I even turned in records, I remember. For instance, once there were 
about 80 of them that went to make a demonstration in front of the 
British Embassy when they decided to sell arms to the Cuban Gov- 
ernment, when the United States decided not to. Then about 80 
or 90—89 exactly 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Of whom? 

Mr. Chaumont. Of the Cuban exiles in IMexico, made a demonstra- 
tion in front of the British Embassy. I told tliem all about it, to 
prove that they were Conununists. And they would start singing all 
the time the Communist international song. 

Then the police came and put them in cars. They kept singing 
all the time, and when they got to the police station, all 89 of them 
kept singing. Even in the prison they had there they kept singing 
the Communist song and all that. They even made records of the 
song and everything, and the names of everyone was taken. I turned 
all that over to the Embassy so they could see that that was a definite 
Communist-oriented movement. 

And, well, like that, hundreds of times I turned things like that in. 
Names exactly, the 89 names, what they sang — you could hear them 
singing the Communist international song and everything; their 
connections with the Czech commercial attache, with the Russian 
Embassy — all that sort of thing. 

Senator Hruska. Were some of those in that demonstration before 
the Embassy known to you as having been active in Communist work ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes. Some of them even belonged to the Com- 
munist Party. For instance, I have the Communist identification of 
Mrs. Guevara, who was later to become one of the most prominent 
people in Cuba. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The wife of "Che" Guevara ? 

Mr. Chaumont. The wife. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. What was her maiden name ? 

Mr. Chaumont. I do not recall. But I have the copy, and I even 
sent a photostatic copy to the U.S. Embassy once. I sent ever^-thing 
to Colonel Doerflinger, who was the assistant military attache there 
and who was the contact man with me, because I would make all my 
intelligence reports to Cuba and always I would give a copy to them. 

Senator Hruska. To whom did Colonel Doerflinger report? To 
whom did he report within the Embassy ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Within the Emliassy I do not know about the pro- 
cedure. I know Ambassador Hill was very well informed because 
he would tell me whenever I met him there, he would say, "Your 
report on this and this was very good," and certainly this was ap- 
proved, and he would comment with me. But I do not know the pro- 
cedure inside the Embassy, who took it. 

Senator Hruska. Were these reports that you gave the American 
Embassy furnished to the Embassy with the approval of your own 
Government ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes. 

90331—62 2 


Senator Hruska. President Batista had ordered cooperation with 
the American Embassy ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes. 

General Tabernilla was in charge of the command of all the armed 
forces— navy, air force, army, and everything. 


Mr. SouRwixE. In your intelligence report, Mr. Chaumont, did you 
deal with any information on the question of whether Fidel Castro 
himself was a Communist? 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Tell us what that information was, as best you 
remember it. 

Mr. Chaumont. I had other reports of his actions since he first 
started in Bogota, where he participated there in that sort of revolu- 
tionary action that was there once. 

Well, the whole story of the comments, how he acted to people he met 
with there, how he developed things there and took refuge, and got on a 
l)lane and went over. And, of course, the basic thing for which I 
know definitely, when Fidel Castro decided to attack in Cuba for the 
first time in 1953, he went to Oriente Province, to Moncada where I 
was in command. I was the commanding officer there. That was his 
first action. 

On the 26th of July, as a matter of fact, the day that gave name to 
his movement, he went there with 295 men and he attacked us at about 
5 o'clock in the morning. 

Of course, after the action there and the persecution and everything 
Later on, they were completely defeated. They had about 190 dead 
and 70-something captured, and the rest got away. 

Well, among the things we collected were some records which had a 
musical background of all these military marches and everything. 
They were going to be played in all the radio stations there as soon as 
the movement succeeded. In those records he spoke in his usual 
manner and his program was definitely outlined there. That was in 
1953, the 26th of July. It was all about the agrarian reform, taking 
away all the land and distributing it and all that, distributing the 
stock of all industries to the people. 

On those records he only said 50 percent of the stock, of course, but, 
later on, it turned out to^be all of it. And taking away all the idle 
money that was in the banks. 

Of course, there he said substituting it by bonds and things, but get 
it in circulation at once. And nationalizing, of course, all foreign 
enterprises there, all services, electric company, and all that sort 
of thing. 

Well, all his program that he has taken, has carried on later on, 
was outlined on those records. 

We took them and we sent them, I sent them, over to General Taber- 
nilla for him to see. And I remember when I wrote sending it, I said, 
"Here you can see this is plainly a Communist movement ; it would be 
very good for this to be made Imown, maybe not to the general public, 
but certainly to the American Embassy and to all owners of indus- 
tries and land and sugar mills and everything," so they would know 
what they could expect from this movement. 


I understood that Tabernilla, of course, took them immediately to 
Batista. And I understood also that they had been made known to the 
American Embassy at that time in Cuba. 

Senator Hruska. Now, Mr. Chaumont, how many records were 

Mr, Chaumont. There were four. 

Senator Hruska. A series of four? 

Mr. Chaumont. Four records, yes, because they were going to be 
pLaved in four different stations. 

Senator Hruska. But each of those records was the same? 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes, they were the same. They were going to be 
played in the different radio stations. 

Senator Hruska. They were what we call platters ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes. 

They were records ; yes, platters. 

Senator Hruska. And whose voice was on those records between 
the songs? 

Mr. Chaumont. Fidel Castro's, personally. 

Senator Hruska. Did you listen to those records ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes. 

Senator Hruska. And you recognized his voice ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Oh, yes. 

Senator Hruska. And he identified himself on the records, that it 
was Fidel Castro? 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know w^here those records are ? 

Mr. Chaumont. No, I would not know. I know I sent them to 
General Tabernilla. And the instructions that were sent were to be 
sure and let them know— I rememloer I made the comment not to the 
general public, because there would be a lot of people that would sym- 
pathize with these things: "Oh, taking away from everybody and 
giving it to everj^body; that is going to be wonderful," you laiow. 
But to all the people who were going to be affected, all industries, 
commerce, factories, international enterprises, U.S. Embassy, of 
course. That was the first one I mentioned. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you have any information, sir, respecting any 
connections between Cuban or Mexican or Iron Curtain coimtry 
Commmiists and American Communists ? 

Mr. CiiAuivroNT. Not firsthanded, no. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. There were a number of American Communists in 
Mexico around this time ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes. 

]Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you have any knowledge of any contacts be- 
tween them and the Communists in your coimtry ? 

Mr. CHAU3I0NT. No. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you have any knowledge about any of the activi- 
ties of Maurice Halperin ? 

Mr. Chaumont. No, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Does the name "Martha Dodd" or "Martha Dodd 
Stern" mean anything to you ? 

Mr. Chaumont. No. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Alfred K. Stem ? 

Mr. Chaumont. No. 


Mr. SouRwiNE. "William Berges ? 


Those, of course, are the names of the American Commmiists that 
were there and all that, but I do not know of any connection with the 
Cuban people that were there. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is all I am asking. But I have two more 
names I want to ask you about. 

You obviously cannot answer until you hear them. 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes, 

Mr, SouRWiNE, Walter Illsley ? 

Mr. Chaumont. No, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Frederick Vanderbilt Field ? 

Mr, Chaumont. No, sir. 

Senator Hruska, Before we get too far away from those records 
which you found, I just want to make our record here complete. 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hruska. When was it that those records were seized by 

Mr. Chaumont. Well, in the movement of the 26th of July when 
we were attacked, when they attacked us there. 

Senator Hruska, Wliatyear? 

Mr, Chaumont, 1953. 

Senator Hruska. Thank you, 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you have any losses yourself in that struggle ? 

Mr, Chaumont. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. How many were lost on your side ? 

Mr. Chaumont, Twenty-one men I lost there. My aide was one 
that was killed there a yard away from me, and my lieutenant was 
killed also. Twenty-one all together. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. How many did you have in your garrison, mider 
your command ? 

Mr, Chaumont. When we were attacked we only had there at the 
moment about 49 or 50, at that very moment. It was sort of a holi- 
day, a carnival there, and everybody was out and they were having a 
good time. And we had given permission to most of them. It was 
very well figured out by them. 

Mr, SouRwiNE. You had 49 or 50 and Castro had 295 

Mr. Chaumont. Exactly, yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE (continuing). Of which he lost 190 to 195 that were 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And some 70 captured ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Seventy captured, more or less; yes. About 40 
got away. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. About 30 or 40 got away ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was Castro himself captured ? 

Mr, Chaumont. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. He was subsequently released, was he not? 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes, sir; a year later he was released. He got an 

Mr. SouRwiNE, Got an amnesty by Batista ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes, 

Mr, SouRWiNE. Do you know how that was arranged ? 


Mr. Chaumont. Politicians and the press and the priests and, I 
mean, the bishop and cardinals. Everyone would talk to him and 
they convinced him that it would be a good jjesture and it would make 
him appear favorably in the eyes of the public, of the people, and it 
would be a good thing to release him, and release everybody. 

Mr. SouRwixE. And Castro was then exiled, was he not ? 

Mr. Chaumont. He went after, yes. When he was released, he 
went into exile. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, you spoke of Fidel Castro's connection with 
the uprising in Bogota ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwaNE. Do you know if he had anything to do with the 
assassination of Gait an ? 

Mr. Chaumont. According to the reports — I wasn't there at the 
time, but according to the reports, even the confidential reports said, 
and what the military attache of Colombia at that time, in Mexico, 
gave me, he was definitely connected with it. I was president of the 
Association of ^Military Attaches in Mexico and was on very good 
terms with all of tliem, and they would interchange information. 

Mr. SouR"\viNE. Did your own intelligence community regard Fidel 
Castro as a Communist at the time he was in the Sierra Maestra in 
1957 and 1958? 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes, sir ; definitely. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You knew he was accompanied by "Che" Guevara ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Yes, sir ; he was. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You knew that Guevara was a Communist ? 

Mr. Chaumont. Oh, yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you have information about Kaul Castro ? 

Mr. Chaumont. About his connections with communism ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes, if any. 

Mr. Chaumont. "Well, not directly with him. But I had heard — 
that was secondhand — I mean I had received information that he was 
a Communist and he participated in the Communist ideas, and that 
he was even much more extreme than his own brother. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have information about A'^ilma Espin ? 

Mr. Chaumont. That she M'as a Communist, too, and that she 
participated directly with the ideas of the Communist group, and 
that was the information. I did not know directly, I mean, but I 
would receive it in the reports and in information from people that 
were even with them in the Sierra Maestra, as a matter of fact. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have information regarding Haydee Santa- 
mar i a ? 

Mr. Chaumont, Yes. She participated in the attack at Moncada. 
There were 2 women among the 290-something and she was one. And 
at the time I did not know she w^as a Communist, of course. I knew 
she was an awful type of woman because she would talk and act even 
worse than the men. But I did not know her Communist connections 
at the time. Later on, of course, I was sent reports that she belonged 
to that group. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr, Chairman, I have no other questions of this 

The Chairman. Recess. 

(Whereupon, at 11 :15 a.m., the committee recessed, subject to call 
of the Chair.) 



United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 

OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 

Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, B.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:25 a.m., in room 
2300, New Senate Office Building, Senator Thomas J. Dodd pre- 

Present: Senators Dodd, Norris Cotton, and Kenneth B. Keat- 

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel: Benjamin Mandel, 
research directors: Frank Schroeder, chief investigator. 

Senator Dodd. The committee is called to order. 

Do you want to be sworn ? 

Colonel Doerflinger. Yes. 

Senator Dodd. Will you raise vour right hand ? 

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give to the 
committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
tiTith, so help you God ? 

Colonel Doerflinger. I do. 



Senator Dodd. Give us your name, please. 

Colonel Doerflinger. Oscar Maynard Doerflinger — that is M-a-y- 
n-a-r-d- D-o-e-r-f-l-i-n-g-e-r. My present home address is 2006 Co- 
lumbia Pike, Arlington. 

Mr. Sourwine. What is your present assignment. Colonel ? 

Colonel Doerflinger. My present assignment is Chief of the Oper- 
ations Branch, OACSI, which is Army intelligence. 

-Mr. Sourwine. How long have you been in intelligence ? 

Colonel Doerflinger. Well, I have been in military intelligence 
off and on. I have been on this job since last August 1. Prior to that 
I spent 4 years in Mexico as assistant army attache, which is, of course, 
an intelligence job. 

Mr, Sourwine. Yes. You had intelligence functions in Mexico? 

Colonel Doerflinger. Yes, overt. Some years previous, I served in 
a similar capacity in Chile. 

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, the committee had testimony recently 
from a Mr. Chaumont, C-h-a-u-m-o-n-t, who was a former officer of 



the Batista forces in Cuba. Colonel Cliaumont told us that he had 
made various reports to you and given you various material. Do you 
remember Mr. Chaumont ? 

Colonel DoERTLiNGER. Oh, yes ; very well. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember the nature of the material he 
gave you ? 

Colonel DoERFLiNGER. Well, it was quite varied, in fact. Andre 
Perez-Chaumont was initially a major, promoted to lieutenant colonel 
while he was serving the Cuban Government in their Embassy in 
Mexico. I worked with him because we were naturally associated, 
both being members of the Attache Corps accredited to Mexico at that 
time. I had frequent contact with him. We were both officers of the 
Attaclies Association, which is a thing which commonly exists in 
various capitals of the world, where the host go\^ernment desires that 
an organization be set up through which the service attaches — Army, 
Navy, and Air^ — of the various countries accredited maintam their 
relationships, introduce each other, and make themselves known to 
the govenunent. They make trips together. 

It is a convenient device through which the host government can, to 
some extent control the activities of the foreign service attaches. 

Well, he was an officer of the association, and so was I. We worked 
together, arranging various meetings, and he was always very coopera- 
tive, extremely cooperative with the American Embassy. 

During this period, Fidel Castro was in Mexico starting his opera- 
tion which led into the landings in Cuba. Naturally, Perez-Chaumont 
was very concerned, because he knew perfectly well that this operation 
was directed against the government he represented, which was that of 
Fulgencio Batista. He received various reports about the operations 
and plamiing of the Castro crowd and passed some of this informa- 
tion to us. 

Some of it he passed verbally. Sometimes he gave us newspaper 
clippings, sometimes he gave us written reports prepared in his own 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did these reports include evidence that Fidel Castro 
had Communist connections or associations? 

Colonel DoERFLiNGER. Yes; this was commonly asserted. I recall 
in one instance that there was a demonstration, I believe opposite the 
British Embassy, at the time that British aircraft was delivered to 

I remember Chaumont stating at one time that the crowds were 
singing the Internationale in their demonstration. I do not know 
whether this was proved out or not. 

I will tell you the way this was handled. I worked very closely 
with Ambassador Hill, and he runs a very strongly commanded Em- 
bassy. Everything I received, including the information I received 
from Chaumont, I passed on to Ambassador Hill or, when not to Hill 
personally, I passed it over to the designated representatives of his 
political section. These were Mr. Raymond Leddy, the political 
counsel, and Mr. Winston Scott. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Winston Scott was what, security officer? 

Colonel DoERFLiNGER. No, sir ; he was the so-called head of the po- 
litical research section. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You examined and noticed this material as it went 
through your hands ? 


Colonel DoERFLiXGER. Oh, yes. 

Mr. SouRwixE. As an intelligence agent, what was your evaluation 
of it ? Was it convincing to you as to Castro's Communist connection ? 

Colonel DoERFLiNGER. I do not believe there is much question about 
Castro's Communist affiliation. It was generally accepted that he was 
supported by Lazaro Cardenas, the ex-President of Mexico, a man of 
strong leftist convictions, who protected Castro at every turn. I can- 
not testify to this personally. I do not know personally that Fidel 
Castro was supported by Lazaro Cardenas but this was commonly 
accepted in ]\Iexico as a fact at that time. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. This is very interesting, and I am sure you meant 
it to be responsive, but the particular question was your evaluation of 
the material given to you by Chaumont, the material that came to you 
from Cuban sources, as to your particular judgiiient whether this was 
convincing as to whether Castro was Communist connected. 

Colonel DoERFLiNGER. I was not in a position to evaluate the in- 
formation given to me, because I had no way of checking it out. I 
was inclined to believe it, but I could not say that this is accurate. 

For example, I know that the Ambassador directed the other ele- 
ments of the Embassy to check this information out, because these 
other elements had personnel and facilities through which it could be 
checked out. I was merely the channel through which it was passed 
to the Embassy. 

Mr. SouRwaxE. A^liat I was attempting to get at is whether you are 
in a position to tell us that information was or was not forwarded 
through your Embassy and through channels to Washington which 
would establish Castro's Communist connections or associations. 

Colonel DoERFLiNGER. This I could not say ; I do not know. 

Mr. SouRwiNE, What were the 4 years you were at that Embassy? 

Colonel DoERFLiNGER. I was there from, I believe, June of 1956 to 
July of 1960. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. When was it that Castro first invaded Cuba ? 

Colonel DoERFLiNGER. Batista fell on the 1st of January 1959, I 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is correct. 

Colonel DoERFLiNGER. So he went in there around the middle or 
early, I believe, of the previous year. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. He went in in 1958, not 1957? 

Colonel DoERFLiNGER. That is right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. So you were at the Embassy in Mexico for at least 
2 years while Castro was operating in Mexico ? 

Colonel DoERFLiNGER. That is correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. During this time you received — was it a large num- 
ber of reports from Chaumont? 

Colonel DoERFLiNGER. A fair amount. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You saw them, but you were unable to evaluate 
them as to whether they were convincing with respect to Castro? 

Colonel DoERFLiNGER. I was unable to state positively whether they 
were true, because I had no opportunity to check them out. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I understand this, that knowing the source, you 

Colonel DoERFLiNGER. I have confidence in Perez-Chaumont. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. That is what I am trying to get at, your own judg- 
ment as an intelligence officer. 

90331—62 3 


Colonel DoERFLiNGER. I have great confidence in Perez-Chamnont. 
He is a fine man, a reliable man. In my opinion, his statements are 
worthy of credence. 

Mr. SouKwiNE. When this material was forwarded, was it for- 
warded with anything in the nature of an evaluation '( 

Colonel DoERFLiNGER, This I did not know, because I did not for- 
ward it. I turned it over to the Ambassador, to Mr. Scott, or to Mr. 
Leddy, and the form in which they forwarded it was not known to me. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. One of the things Mr. Chaumont said he gave you 
was detailed information with respect to the wife of "Che" Guevara, 
positively identifying her as a Communist. Do you remember this? 

Colonel DoERFLiNGER. I do not recall this. 

H« ^ V ^ H" "J" ^ 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you, yourself, as a result growing out of your 
intelligence function in the Embassy, procure and deliver any infor- 
mation dealing with the Castro activities ? 

Colonel DoERFLiNGER. No, because at that time, my function was 
that of an overt intelligence officer, in the military field. There were 
other people in the Embassy who were charged with the other field of 
endeavor. In my capacity as an Army attache I would not normally 
have gotten into this type of thing. 

Senator Dodd. Off the record just a minute. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Colonel, do you or did you know William Wie- 

Colonel DoERFLiNGER. I have never met him. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You had no comiections with him ? 

[Colonel Doerflmger nods.] 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you have any questions, Mr. Mandel? 

Mr. IVIandel. I have none. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any questions, Mr. Schroeder? 

Mr. Schroeder. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. We 
called the colonel mainly for the corroboration of prior testimony. 
We have covered that point. 

Senator Keating (presiding). Thank you. Colonel. 

The committee is adjourned. 

( Wliereupon, at 11 :37 a.m., the committee recessed, subject to the call 
of the Chair.) 



United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To In\t:stigate the Administration 

OF THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal 

Security Laws of the Committee on the Jlt^iciary, 

Washington^ D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11 :10 a.m., in room 2300, 
New Senate Office Building, Senator Thomas J. Docld presiding. 

Present : Senators Dodd and Kenneth B. Keating. 

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel, 
research director; and Frank Schroeder, chief investigator. 

Senator Dodd, Mr. Leddy, raise your right liand. 

Do yon solemnly swear that the testimony j'ou will give before this 
subcommittee will be the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you 

INIr. Leddy. I swear. 


Mr. Sourwine, You are Raymond Leddy ? 

Mr. Leddy. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are in the Foreign Service of the U.S. State 
Department ? 

Mr. Leddy. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Your present position, sir ? 

Mr. Leddy. I am counselor for political affairs, assigned to the 
American Embassy at Mexico City. 

Mr. Sourwine. How long have you been in that position ? 

ISIr. Leddy. One month short of 4 years. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you serve in that capacity under former Am- 
bassador Hill ? 

Mr. Leddy. I served with Ambassador Hill during the entire time 
of his tenure as Ambassador from July of 1957 through December 
of 1960. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr, Leddy, did intelligence go through the Em- 
bassy in Mexico to your knowledge dealing with the Communist 
affiliations and associations of Fidel Castro ? 

Mr. Leddy. Prior to my arrival in Mexico, reports had been avail- 
able at the Embassy concerning Castro's stay in Mexico. 



Mr. SouRwiNE. How do you know what was available at the Em- 
bassy prior to your arrival ? 

Mr. Leddy. Because it was discussed in Embassy meetings. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Tell us what you know about it while you were there. 

Mr. Leddy. From the time of my arrival in July of 1957 we received 
information from some local sources in Mexico and from the Embassy 
of course, in Havana, and the Department of State. 

The information from Mexico showed Castro's Communist affilia- 
tions prior to his departure. 

Mr. SouRWiisrE. From where? 

Mr. Leddy. The departure from Mexico to invade Cuba, and also 
showed the support of the Communists in Mexico for Castro when he 
already was in Cuba. 

The information from our Embassy in Havana and from the State 
Department was of a wide nature and showed information, some of 
which was communistic affiliations and others which were not. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember a particular occasion when Mr. 
Milton Eisenhower visited Mexico and when he was briefed with re- 
gard to Castro during an airplane ride? 

Mr. Leddy. I do, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Will you tell us, first, were you on the airplane? 

Mr. Leddy. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Wlio else was on the plane ? 

Mr. Leddy. The plane is the airplane of the air attache who was 
then Col. Benoid E. Glawe. Colonel Glawe was aboard the 
plane — from Mexico to Mazatlan where Dr. Eisenhower was to spend 
a weekend during the course of his visit of approximately 1 week as 
the guest of President Lopez Mateos. Dr. Eisenhower and the Secre- 
tary, Mr. Keith Spaulding, were on the plane, and Ambassador Hill, 
myself from the Embassy. Our wives also accompanied us, Mrs. Hill 
and my wife, and Mr. William Wieland of the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. That was all except for the pilot ? 

Mr. Leddy. That is right, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, who gave Mr. Milton Eisenhower the briefing 
on Castro? 

Mr. Leddy. I was asked by the Ambassador to discuss the conclu- 
sions of the fifth meeting of Foreign Ministers at Santiago, Chile, that 
same weekend. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you do this ? 

Mr. Leddy. In the course of this discussion we got into the entire 
Cuban situation since the meeting at Santiago had been called pri- 
marily to deal with the Cuban problem. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you express your synthesis of the intelligence 
which had come to you with respect to Castro ? 

Mr. Leddy. Yes, sir; I reviewed a number of items which con- 
cerned the conclusions of the Foreign Ministers' meeting and their 
relation to the Cuban Government and then discussed the composition 
of the Cuban Government and its actions up to that time, which was 
the last week of August of 1959 when Castro was in power for about 
8 months. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you express a conclusion respecting Castro's 
communistic connections or his affiliations ? 

Mr. Leddy. Yes, sir; I pointed out that the information which 
we had available would indicate in my mind conclusively that Castro 


was, himself, pro-Communist and that his government was falling 
under the control of Communists and that, as such, it constituted a 
danger to other countries and a matter of serious concern to our 
own Government. 

Mr. SouKwiNE. Were you interrupted at all during this briefing? 

Mr. Leddy. ISIr. Wieland expressed disagreement with me througli- 
out the period of an hour and a half. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Specifically, did he express disagreement with what 
you have just told us you said about Castro's communistic comiec- 
tions and affiliations? 

Mr. Leddy. Yes, sir; he expressed disagreement with each of the 
points which I raised for discussion. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did he declare that Castro was not pro-Coimnu- 
nist ? 

Mr. Leddy. He said that Castro was not a Communist and that 
there was no conclusive evidence that any of the people in his govern- 
ment were Communists. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did anyone else enter into these discussions ? 

Mr. Leddy. Ambassador Hill entered the discussion occasionally 
and, near the conclusion, Colonel Glawe entered the discussion. 

]\Ir. SouRwiNE. In what way did each of those gentlemen enter? 

Mr. Leddy. On the part of Ambassador Hill, to explore further 
the reasons for the statements which I had made and to query Mr. 
Wieland for his reasons, and on the part of Colonel Glawe, to ex- 
press very strong disagreement with the position which was taken by 
Mr. Wieland. 

INIr. SouRwixE. Do you remember the words in which Colonel 
Glawe expressed this disagreement ? 

Mr. Leddy. I do very clearly because at the end of the discussion, 
Colonel Glawe turned to me and said, "I disagree with Mr. Wieland 
of the State Department. In my mind, he is either pro-Communist 
or a fool." 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did he say this to you alone for your ears only ? 

Mr. Leddy. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRw^ixE. He didn't say it loudly ? 

Mr. Leddy. He spoke to me directly. Whether he spoke to any 
others I do not know. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You don't know whether any others heard him? 

Mr. Leddy. I do not know. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were all of the persons who were on the airplane in 
a position to hear this interchange; that is, your briefing on Ambas- 
sador Hill's part ? 

Mr. Leddy. All the passengers were in position. The plane is a 
DC-3 type. The seats are bunched together in the forward section of 
the plane on the left-hand side and the right-hand side has a type of 
sofa or lounge and we were seated on the lounge; that is to say Dr. 
Eisenhower, myself, Mr. Wieland. and facing us was Ambassador Hill 
and the ladies were on the next seats facing us. Mr. Spaulding was 
just beyond the ladies in a small area, and I believe the conversation 
was clearly audible to all. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Even Mr. Spaulding could have heard the con- 
versation ? 

Mr. Leddy. Yes, sir. • 


Mr. SouRwiNE. Did he participate ? 

Mr. Leddy. Not to my recollection. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did the ladies participate ? 

Mr. Leddy. No, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Am I correct in understanding that Ambassador 
Hill and Colonel Glawe both supported your position ? 

Mr. Leddy. That is correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That Mr. Wieland was alone in defending Mr. 
Castro to Milton Eisenhower ? 

Mr. Leddy. That is correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. How did this briefing terminate? Did you con- 
clude with what you had to say or was it broken off in some other way ? 

Mr. Leddy. I concluded the points which I had in mind as bearing 
on the Conununist nature of the Castro government and at that point 
Ambassador Hill turned to Dr. Milton Eisenhower and asked whether 
he had any further questions. Dr. Eisenhower said that he had none 
and he stood up and went to the forward part of the plane. That 
terminated the briefing. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was any documentary evidence offered in connec- 
tion with this briefing or any papers proffered to Mr. Eisenhower? 

Mr. Leddy. No, sir; only the newspaper versions of the final account 
of the fifth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, which was the starting 
point of the discussion. 

Mr. SouR^VINE. Wlien did you first meet Mr. Wieland ? 

Mr. Leddy. My first acquaintance with Mr. Wieland was in 1954 
in the Department of State. I was then in charge of Central American 
and Panamanian affairs, and Mr. Wieland was brought into the De- 
partment on temporary assignment during the difficulties with the 
Guatemalan Government of Arbenz in the spring of 1954. We worked 
together for a period of about 3 months. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And thereafter, what was your dealing with him or 
your acquaintanceship with him ? 

Mr. Leddy. My subsequent meeting was when Mr. Wieland made a 
visit to Mexico in the summer of 1958 in his capacity as officer in charge 
of what was then called middle American affairs. 

Mr. Sourwixe. Was that the occasion when Mr. Eisenhower came 
down there ? 

Mr. Leddy. No, sir ; that was a year later in August of 1959. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. After that visit, did you see Mr. Wieland again 
before 1959? 

Mr. Leddy. No, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember the exact day of this airplane 
trip to Mazatlan ? 

Mr. Leddy. If I recall rightly it was the 22d of August. It was, 
however, the Saturday of the week on which the meeting of foreign 
ministers was concluded and the date can be very easily fixed. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. This was in 1959 ? 

Mr. Leddy. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. When Mr. Wieland was in Mexico in 1958, did you 
discuss with him, or did you hear him discuss, Castro or Cuban 
affairs ? 

Mr. Leddy. No, sir; we had a very brief meeting at that time. I 
accompanied Mr. Wieland in a call he made on the Foreign Minister, 


and apart from that, my meetings with him the Embassy were purely 
casual. We had no briefings. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, from your knowledge of the intelligence which 
you saw in your official capacity, were you able to form an opinion 
respecting the position INIr. AVieland took during the briefing of Mr. 
Eisenhower in the airplane in August of 1959 ? 

Mr. Leddy. Well, Mr. Sourwine, as far as opinion goes I had cer- 
tainly an impression at that time based on the statements made by Mr. 

Mr. Sourwine. What was this opinion? 

Mr. Leddy. In the first place, that he was not fully informed of all 
the facts bearing upon the Communist penetration of the Cuban Gov- 
ernment, and secondly, that he was not willing to accept the inter- 
pretation of those facts which were offered in the course of the dis- 

Mr. Sourwine. What information did you have that was not avail- 
able to him or would not have been available to him in his position? 

Mr. Leddy. I knew of no information which came to me in any 
special way. It was all official information. 

Mr. Sourwine. You say he was poorly informed. He had access 
to all the information you had access to and more; didn't he? 

Mr. Leddy. In the course of the conversation, he made a point of 
the fact that he saw all of the reports whereas we could only see part 
of them in Mexico. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did this point seem valid to you ? 

Mr. Leddy. I felt that the totality of reports would have in no way 
changed the facts which were pretty solid about the Communists in 

Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact it was well known in IMexico 
that Castro's group had been under Communist influence and in Com- 
munist association when they were organizing and training in Mexico; 
isn't that true? 

Mr. Leddy. The history there showed that the Government had 
taken action against Castro's group and that they had Communist 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you take issue with Mr. Wieland during this 
briefing when he interrupted you to challenge what you had said ? 

]Mr. Leddy. To take issue in tlie sense of expressing my disagree- 
ment with his viewpoints, certainly. 

Mr. Sourwine. You didn't enter into any argument with him that 
would involve personalities? 

Mr. Leddy. None whatsoever. 

Mr. Sourwine. You simply stuck to your points? 

Mr. Leddy. Exactly. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is there anything about this briefing that you have 
not been asked about that you think the committee should know? 

Mr. Leddy. My recollection of the incident is very clear, Mr. Sour- 
wine, and I felt the concern which I think was common to the Am- 
bassador and Colonel Glawe. We had been watching developments 
in Cuba from the Embass}^ in Mexico for many reasons, among the 
first of which was our responsibility for reporting on Communist de- 
velopments in Mexico. The affiliations which Castro had in Mexico 
were known. When the Batista government fell, a great number of 
refugees from Cuba visited our Embassy and many of them were 


known to officers in the Embassy who had served in Havana, and many 
of them made their way to the"^ Embassy to inform us about develop- 
ments in Cuba. We listened to and reported tlieir information and it 
indicated to us a growing pattern of Communist takeover and we ex- 
pected to see this reflected in the reports from the State Department. 
It was not, however, until midsummer of 1959 that in our reviews of 
incoming material we could discern an acceptance of the reality that 
Castro was communistic and that the people around him were 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You say 3'ou could discern an acceptance of this 

Mr. Leddy. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That Castro was a Communist and the people were 
Communist around him in midsummer of 1959 in the State Depart- 
ment summaries of reports? 

Mr. Leddt. In the State Department and intelligence commmiity 

Mr. SouRWixE. Coming down from Washington ? 

Mr. Leddt. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. When was the Castro visit to the United States ? 

Mr. Leddy. If I recall correctly it was approximately April 1959. 

Mr. Sourwine. This was after he had come to the United States 
and had gone ? 

Mr. Leddy. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Before that time you saw no evidence of State 
Department recognition of his Communist affiliations and connections? 

Mr. Leddy. That is correct. I recall particularly that there was a 
summary prepared as of the end of June under the auspices of the 
intelligence community. It summarized the characteristics of the 
Castro government and its tendencies after 6 months in power. 

Consequently, when we had this discussion late in August we felt 
real concerned that the facts as they had now been developed and 
summarized and digested were still not fully accepted by the State 
Department officer. 

Mr. Sourwine. You say this estimate was prepared after 6 months? 

Mr. Leddy. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. After the end of June ? 

]Mr. Leddy. It bore a date of June 30, 1959. 

Mr. Sourwine. "V^Hio prepared this estimate ? 

Mr. Leddy. The intelligence community under the chairmanship 
of the CIA. 

Mr. Sourwine. And this was a final paper in the sense that it was 
disseminated to the full list that gets such estimates? 

Mr. Leddy. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. It Avas a top-level paper and purportedly definitive 
with regard to its subject as of its date ? 

Mr. Leddy. It was a comprehensive report of the situation as of the 
first 6 months of Castro. 

Mr. Sourwine. You saw this estimate ? 

Mr. Leddy. Yes; we received it at the Embassy as we do all such. 

Mr. Sourwine. And did this estimate indicate that Castro was pro- 
Communist ? 

Mr, Leddy. It did. 


Mr. SouRwiNE. Did it indicate that he was also a Communist him- 

Mr. Leddy. No, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did it indicate that he was surrounded by Com- 
munists ? 

Mr. Leddy. It characterized his immediate advisers as either Com- 
munist or pro-Communist. 

Mr. Sourwixe. Did it refer to Che Guevara as a Communist? 

Mr. Leddy. The exact words I don't recall l^it I do remember that 
it placed Che Guevara in the Communist camp without saying that he 
was a Communist. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did it make reference to Gen. Alberto Bayo? 

Mr. Leddy. I don't remember the name of Gen. Alberto Bayo. 

Mr. SouRwiXE. Did this estimate reach conclusions with regard to 
the Communist or non-Communist nature of the Castro regime ? 

Mr. Leddy. Its conclusions were in the sense that unless the trend 
were checked, the Communist plan to further infiltrate and control the 
Government would go on rapidly. 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. The position which was taken by Mr. Wieland dur- 
ing the airplane ride to Mazatlan was contrary to this estimate; was it 
not ? 

Mr. Leddy. Yes, sir; Mr. Wieland said there was no conclusive 
evidence whatsoever that Fidel Castro or any of the people in the 
government were Communists. 

Senator Keatixg. Again, what was the date of that ride ? 

Mr. Leddy. Late August of 1959. 

Mr. Sourwixe. Do you know whether Mr. Yv^ieland had access to 
this national intelligence report? 

Mr. Leddy. I would feel certain that such an estimate circulated to 
the Embassy would be fully circulated to the responsible officers of the 
State Department inasmuch as they are primarily concerned, and the 
State Department is one of the agencies of the*^ Government which 
participates in preparing the estimates. 

Mr. Sourwixe. Now, as a matter of fact you know that he not only 
had access to it, it was his duty to see it and read it and understand it; 
wasn't it ? 

Mr. Leddy. I would think so. 

Mr. Sourwixe. This was in his special field. Was the existence of 
this estimate called to his attention in connection with the discussion 
in the airplane ? 

Mr. Leddy. Yes, sir; I cited it as one of the bases for the statements 
I had made concerning individuals in the Government and the plans of 
the Government. He said he had access to all of the material, but did 
not recall this particular report. 

Mr. Sourwixe. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Keatixg. No questions. 

Senator Dodd. I don't have any. 

Mr, Sourwixe. We are grateful to you for coming up here today, 
Mr. Leddy. We regret that we didn't get to hear you last week. 

Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Leddy. 

(Whereupon, at 11 :30 a.m., the subcommittee recessed.) 

90331—62 4 



United States Senate, " 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 

OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 

Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursiuant to call, at 2 p.m., in room 2300, 
New Senate Office Building, Senator Kenneth B. Keating presiding. 

Present : Senator Keating. 

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel, 
research director; and Frank Schroeder, chief investigator. 

Senator Keating. The subcommittee will come to order. 

General Garcia, raise your right hand and be sworn. 

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence which you give in this 
proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth, so help you God ? 

General Garcia. I do. 

Senator Keating. General, during the recess, certain questions have 
been put to you to which you have made certain answers. These 
liave been transcribed in English and I have them in my hand. In 
order to save time, I will ask you, with the aid of your interpreter, to 
read these questions and answers; and if your answers have been 
correctly transcribed, we will then ask you to sign this with your 
name at the end of it. Then it will be made a part of the record. 

Now, Mr. Ravelo, will you stand and raise your right hand ? 

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence which you give in this 
proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth and nothmg but the 
truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Ravelo. I do. 

Senator Keating. Would the interpreter please stand and raise 
vour right hand ? 

Do you solemnly swear that you will truly and correctly interpret 
in this proceeding ? 

Mr. Romero. I do. 

My name is Mario S. Romero. I am an interpreter, in room 519, 
Mills Building, Washington, D.C. 

Senator Keating. Mr. Ravelo, you heard what I said to General 

Mr. Ravelo. Yes, sir. 



Senator Kjeating. And I will ask you to do the same as the general 
and to sign this at the end. 

Mr. Eavelo. Yes, I will. 

Mr. SotTRWixE. Ask if he has any corrections he wants to make be- 
fore he signs it. 

Senator Keating. I want to explain to both of you that you may 
make any change or correction before signing it. 

Now, Counsel, do you have further questions ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I have just one or two, Mr. Chairman. 

General Garcia, the statement here mentions a document, which 
is a copy of an original which you gave to Mr. William Wieland. 
You have just handed me a document which is a carbon copy of seven 
pages. This is the document you referred to ? 


The Interpreter. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, may this be ordered in the record 
at the appropriate place ? 

Senator Keating. Yes, and that is the document in Spanish which 
he gave to Mr. Wieland ? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Yes, and if the Chair would wish to order that this 
be translated by the interpreter, and the English translation be printed 
in the record rather than the Spanish, that would be desirable. 

Senator Keating. So ordered. 

(The document referred to reads as follows :) 

[Translation from the Spanish language, January 1958] 

Observations Regarding Fidel Castro's Letter to the Junta for the 

Liberation of Cuba 

(1) This document establishes a new correlation of forces, as the document 
itself affirms. It contains a true immediate program of the "fidelismo." It is 
directed mainly to public opinion. Jumping over all moral barriers and re- 
nouncing any possible help from the factions represented in the Junta of Libera- 
tion, Fidel Castro throws himself alone to the attainment of his revolutionary 
objectives. Observe — and it is probably not a mere coincidence — that the rest 
of the opposition is condemned in the document, while at no time is a pronounce- 
ment made against communism. 

(2) The letter should not be interpreted as the simple act of breaking the 
unity of the opposition. What it does is to concentrate the entire opposition 
around the 26th of July movement. It sweeps away all the political hierarchies. 
"I am the opposition," it says, and because of the dramatic overtone and the 
circumstances in which the letter is produced, it is possible to assert that this 
stroke gives considerable advantage to the "fidelismo" and places it right at the 
top of the political situation. With just one bold gesture Fidel Castro has 
become the anti-Batista. 

(3) In the face of Fulgencio Batista's absolutism, Fidel establishes his own 
absolutism and liquidates the very little prestige left to Carlos Prio Socarras. 
Now there is only one rebel chief and his name is Fidel Castro. It would not 
be farfetched to prognosticate that SO percent of the Junta of Liberation will 
incorporate itself into the "fidelismo." 

(4) Until now the opposition to Batista's regime, which opposition is headed 
by Prio and the "ortodoxos," was planning within the country to substitute 
Batista and his team. As a matter of fact, they were insurrectional plans of a 
political type, more or less gangster-like, but never with revolutionary objectives 
aimed at creating a real social agitation. This is substantiated by the scanty 
participation of the workers in the insurrectional movements. It was a dis- 


possessed political minority, partially discredited, aspiring to regain control of 
the State. 

(5) Fidel Castro has launched, for the first time, revolutionary aims directed 
toward wider sections of the population. Reassured by his heroic gesture, he 
tries to gather behind him the entire Cuban population. It should be noted that 
Fidel Castro, in this program, proclaims himself the source of law and promises : 

(a) Designates the executive power. 
(6) Abolishes the legislative power. 

(c) Creates new workers leadership, sweeping out the present ones, which 
means, simply, that the new worliers movement which he promises will have 
revolutionary overtones. In the next few days he will have to launch ex- 
tremely radical objectives in order to mobilize the satisfied Cuban working 

( d ) Dismisses wholly the judicial power. 

(e) Liquidates the armed forces of the Republic, traditionally bureau- 
cratic and free from political partisanship, and promises to substitute them 
with elements of revolutionary extraction, which means simply that the 
armed forces he promises will consist of the armed peasants who second 
him in his struggle and who have already been equipped with a revolutionary 

(/) Abolishes the system of political parties, the bulwark of any demo- 
cratic government, since he stresses that the political parties will have no 
right to participate in the provisional government. Only the 26th of July 
Party, his own, will have access to the new structure of the revolutionary 
regime he proposes. 

(g) It should be noted that all the aims which come forth from the revo- 
lutionary program of Fidel Castro are directed toward the creation of a 
totalitarian regime. Compare : "All the power to the Soviets," said Lenin 
in 1917. "All the power to the 26th of July," says Fidel Castro in 19.j8. 

(h) Proclaims harsh penalties for all those committed to the Batista 
regime and hints at the possibility of extending those penalties to those com- 
mitted to prior regimes, which makes obvious his intention of satiating the 
revolutionary appetite of the masses. 

(6) In summary, if the program briefly disclosed by Fidel Castro in his letter 
to the Junta of Liberation is analyzed thoroughly, one arrives at the conclusion 
of it being an integral revolution made by workers, soldiers, and peasants, be- 
cause it tends to mobilize all three components : the workers' revolutionary 
movement, in the hands of revolutionary leadership of the 26th of July ; revo- 
lutionary soldiers, at the service of the 26th of July ; peasants mobilization w'ith 
agrarian reform and distribution of land, something which has often been 
proclaimed previously. At no time, either now or before, does Fidel make a clear 
anti-Communist declaration ; however, he does not hesitate to condemn the tra- 
ditional politics ; his allies of yesterday and the most traditional institutions of 
the country. He takes a radical attitude against everybody, with the exception 
of communism. The revolution which he proclaims, and to which he is giving 
impetus with weapons in his hands, is mainly a social type revolution. Future 
development will bring him to coincide with the Communist tactics. What Fidel 
Castro promises at this time does not differ greatly from what was promised by 
Arevalo and Jacobo Arbenz, in Guatemala, in their time. It also shows points 
of coincidence with the "peronista" teachings. It must be noted that this is the 
first time in the history of Cuba in which one man is successful in creating a 
disciplined army of peasants and students, and proclaims total conquest of power, 
displacing the existing regime and all the traditional political leaderships in the 
country. This is particularly grave taking into consideration that the romantic 
aura Fidel Castro possesses gathers behind him the great majorities. 


If within the next few days Batista's regime were to collapse, or Batista 
himself were slain in any of the assassination ])lots being i)lanned against him, 
without the previous existence of a plan of military strengthening which would 
be useful in keeping order and channeling the political activities of the country, 
the revolutionary thesis of Fidel Castro is the one which would arouse the 
country from one end to the other. At the sudden collapse of Batista's dic- 
tatorship, nothing could prevent "fidelismo," with its radical objectives, from 
controlling all the power. The army, dismembered and leaderles.s, would not 
have the fortitude to stop the sweepiiig advance of the masses agitated by the 


"fidelismo" and would end by joining the "fidelista" movement in order to 
survive. The case of Santiago de Cuba ought to be remembered, when, several 
months ago, an aroused and fervently "fidelista" population practically took 
over the city for several days. It should be noted that the fact of Batista 
remaining in power is no longer dangerous in itself, but only because of the 
possibility of provoking social chaos. Any delay in arriving at an adequate 
solution to the Cuban pi'oblem is extremely dangerous because it allows the 
revolutionary teachings of "fidelismo" to deepen into the innermost core of the 
the people, and perhaps the time will come when it is no longer restrainable. 
The new correlation of forces brought about by this sudden breach in the opposi- 
tion unity, compels an emergency treatment. The revolutionary "fidelismo" 
is of no importance militarily at this moment and it will be difficult for it 
to organize the takeover of power, but it is undermining the little institu- 
tionalism which is left in the country. It arouses the masses, infiltrates the 
unions, and lately is concentrating all its efforts toward the physical liquidation 
of the workers' leaders. A few days ago, in Oriente, the "fidelistas" assassi- 
nated a prominent workers' leader. It is known, also, that Mujal himself is 
seriously threatened. On the other hand, Fidel Castro's document admits that 
the labor section of the 26 of July is organizing the strike committees in every 
working place and sector of industry, together with the oppositionist elements 
of ALL MILITANCIES willing to join a work stoppage. Here is, clearly defined, 
the live and pulsing presence of the collaboration with the Communist agitators 
in the "fidelista" movement. Fidel Castro, soclear in his attitudes, so courageous 
in his declarations, does not exclude the support of the Communists, and he does 
it in a delibei-ate manner. Such support suits him well and he proclaims his 
willingness to accept it. This aim of a general strike makes evident the 
definite direction the "fidelismo" has taken in this phase of the struggle against 
Batista's regime, which is none other than the infiltration of the unions in order 
to accomplish its revolutionary objectives. In less than one year the "fidelismo" 
has made the insurrectional leadership of Carlos Prio critical and has put 
aside the two major political parties in Cuba ; that is the "autenticos" and the 
"ortodoxos," which help to explain the swiftness of his action and the deliberate- 
ness of his plans. If he is allowed to advance further, if a plan is not executed 
rapidly in order to stop the "fidelista" agitation, he will succeed in bringing 
about a catastrophic social convulsion. The order to burn the sugar fields 
emanating from the Sierra Maestra, seems to be directed against Batista, and 
perhaps many have been fooled by this appearance, but the truth is that the 
intention is to hurt the United States, and it would not be difficult to uncover 
in this order some hidden Communist instigation. 

Only the immediate liquidation of Batista's regime, and its substitution by 
a strong military power, unobjectionable to the country and to the political 
parties, could contribute to the equilibrium of the forces which make up the 
organization of the Cuban Nation. Only swift and effective action could deprive 
this rising revolution of the elements which form the basis of its sustenance. 
The "fidelismo" teachings, now oi>enly revolutionary, radical and very agreeable 
to the oppressed Cuban people, feeds itself and grows by Batista's presence in 
power. Replace Batista's regime with a strong military power, closed to any 
revolutionary infiltration, and those teachings lose all their emotional value 
and are reduced to their just limits. The only remedy will be for the movement 
to incorporate itself into the civil struggle and to abandon the revolutionary 


This is to certify that the foregoing document is a true and correct transla- 
tion from the Spanish language to the best of my knowledge and ability. 

Mario S. Romero, 
10 f^ 17th St. NW., Washington 6, D.C. Telephone DI-7-2090. 
District of Columbia, ss : 

Sworn and subscribed before me a notary public in and for the District of 
Columbia on this 7th day of June of 1961. 

[seal] H. Douglas Frisbie, 

Notary Public. 
My commission expires June 14, 1962. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I am addressing- myself to General Garcia now. 
Do you have any Imowledge of the number of Czechs, Chinese, and 
Russians in Cuba today ? 


The Interpreter. No; I don't have a correct number because at 
this time they are big. There are different sources of information, 
and it is hard to determine which of the sources is correct. 

]\Ir. SouRwiNE. The same question of Mr. Artigas-Ravelo. 

The IxTERPRETER. The number is veiy, very hard to put, but to 
give you a general idea, I believe that they exceed 15,000 persons. 

Senator Keating. Where did you get that information ? 

The Interpreter. The agents that are in Cuba and they come from 
Cuba and that are organized with us. Also by the number of houses, 
apartment houses and residences which have been taken over where 
Czechs, Russians, and Chinese live in those apartments. 

Senator Keating. And they live mostly by themselves ? 

The Interpreter. They live with their families. 

Senator Iveating. But I mean are they in a certain part of Havana 
by themselves or in certain parts of the country ? 

The Interpreter. They are contained in certain sections and in 
country clubs. 

Senator Keating. And they have taken over houses and apartments 
belonging to Cubans ? 

The Interpreter. The whole houses and apartments, not the whole 
building, but the apartments, that is correct. Just in the Russian 
personnel now, there are registered 275. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. General Artigas, in your questioning which is in- 
cluded in this statement that you are to read and sign, there was men- 
tion of communication by letter between you and Mr. William Wie- 
land. Do you have a copy of the letter you wrote Mr. Wieland from 
Atlanta, Ga., in January 1958? 

The Interpreter. No; it was in May of 1959, not January, from 

Mr. SoLTRW^iNE. I understand that General Artigas-Ravelo stated 
that he wrote Mr. Wieland a letter from Atlanta, Ga.,, in January 

The Interpreter. From Miami. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. This is 1958 telling him of the two top men in the 
Cuban Communist Party. 

Do you have a copy of that letter ? 

The Interpreter. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, while we were waiting for tliis hearing to 
begin you told us of knowledge you had respecting Communist sup- 
port for Castro while his forces were assembling in Mexico. Would 
you tell us that briefly for the record, please, and so the Senator may 
hear it? 

The Interpreter. Well, I did not say that. It was General Garcia. 

Mr. Sourwine. The question was addressed to General Garcia. My 

The Interpreter. The time that I was in Mexico, is that your 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. You told us what the Cuban Ambassador told 

The Interpreter. Dr. Oscar de la Torre, Ambassador of Cuba in 
Mexico, a friend of mine, when I visited him he told me that the Com- 
munists were backing the political activities of Castro inclusive in 
those days and they had attacked the Cuban Embassy in Mexico with 
Molotov cocktails. The Ambassador showed me the damage that was 


Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you have knowledge that the Mexican police 
had taken action against the Castro group ? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And that the police when they raided the head- 
quarters of the Castro gi'oup had found Communist documents? 

The Interpreter. Yes; they found Communist literature in the 
Castro headquarters. 

Mr. Sourwine. This was made public at the time, was it not? 

The Interpreter. The arrests and the raid were public. But a 
friend that I know, a Cuban, showed me a copy of the police record 
and he promised to give me a copy of that police record but I have 
not received it. 

Mr. Sourwine. What did that police record show, as you remember 

The Interpreter. Well, other than the Communist literature, which 
was the matter of interest to us, I remember that he mentioned the 
name of the brother of Castro as a person who participated in almost 
every activity. 

Mr. Sour^vine. Is that Raul ? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember anything more about this police 
report ? 

The Interpreter. I remember, but the purpose of the arrest was 
not because of political activities but because of gangster activities. 

Senator Keating. Were these activities made known by you to Mr. 

The Interpreter. I don't remember, but if I did mention it to him, 
it was just orally. 

JNIr. Sourwine. Do you have any information about the situation in 
Cuba, or Castro's intentions, which you want to give this committee 
for this record ? 

The Interpreter. Well, I have already given information at the 
end of 1959 that the Communist propaganda of Castro was going 
to be intensified among the colored people in the United States and 
now in this province, racial problems are coming up to surface which 
I believe are a consequence of the activity of the Castro agents in this 

Mr. SomwiNE. General Artigas, you told us of your belief that 
Castro intends to move against Santo Domingo. 

The Interpreter. I am sure he will do it because that is his plan. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any advice for the United States under 
these circumstances? 

The Interpreter. I have been trying for the past 5 years to help, 
but all my help has been sterile. 

Mr. Sourwine. I was giving you an opportunity on this record to 
make any recommendations that you wanted to make. 

The Interpreter. What we were talking about previously about 

Mr. Sourwine. Off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

The Interpreter. I believe sincerely that the actual situation is 
higlily dangerous, without this meaning that we are going to the 
panic situation. But I believe at this time we are sitting on top of a 


A'olcano and millions of TNT, just sitting on them. Under no circmn- 
stances do I believe the United States should allow in Santo Domingo 
the same situation which now is happening in my country. Castro's 
plan is not Castro's — Castro is really the instrument of the Soviets, 
and his plan is greater penetration into Latin American countries. 

The principal objective at this moment in Castro's plan is to occupy 
Guatemala, and in effect, Mr. Arbenz is now in Cuba with this subject 
in mind ; also in Bolivia and Colombia and the other places in America 
they have named. We know through sources which are to be believed 
that they have this plan now in Cuba, that there is now in Cuba one 
of the chiefs of the Spanish revolution — Lister — he was the one that di- 
rected tlie l)attle in Spain. Another object of the Castro government 
is, if the situation in Santo Domingo turns worse, they will try to 
turn that situation into a revolution and take it over. If that happens, 
then the situation will turn into the worst one of today. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you have information respecting the threat 
of Communist aggression in liritish (iuiana 'I 

The Interpreter. No ; I have no knowledge about that. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you. General Garcia ? 

The Interpreter. No. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman, 

Senator Keating, All right, thank you very much, gentlemen. 

Now you look at that testimony and, with the help of the interpreter, 
make any changes or corrections you might want, 

Mr. SoTjRwiNE. You understand that, do you? Read it through. 
Any changes that you want to make in your answers should be made. 

Senator Keating. And, when that is done, we will place it in the 

(The prepared testimony of Gen. Jorge Garcia-Tunon and Mr. 
Ricardo Artigas-Ravelo, as signed by both, is as follows:) 

General Jorge Garcia-Tunon 

Birth : July 22, 1913, France. Cuban citizen, Retired Army General (Inf.) 1952. 

Education : Military Academy, Havana, Cuba. 

Residence: Miami since 1956. Pension stopi>ed by Batista Government in 

Question. When was the first time that you saw Mr. Wieland? 

Answer. I was introduced to Mr. Wieland by Mr. Piad in June 1957. I saw 
Mr. Wieland after this approximately 15 times. 

Question. When was the second time that you saw Mr. Wieland? 

Answer. November 1957. But, the first time that I saw Mr. Wieland, we 
spoke about the Cuban problem, about doing something to get rid of Batista as 
the situation was very bad in Cuba with Batista and we wanted to do something 
about it. Also present at this meeting was Mr. Stewart, an assistant to Mr. 
Wieland, and Mr. Hardin. Mr. Stewart was not against Batista and favoretl 
leaving the situation as it was. 

Question. At the time of your second meeting, November 1957, did you ask 
Mr. Wieland about the document? 

Answer. I had not given the document to anyone at this time. I gave it to Mr. 
Wieland in January 1958. He said he would advise me, but I never heard from 
him about it. 

Question. What did you discuss at the second meeting? 

Answer. Mr. Wieland asked me for all information that I had about the Gov- 
ernment, the military, and everything that I knew. 

Question. When did you see Mr. Wieland again? 

Answer. I went to see him around December 1957, but I saw Mr. Stewart in- 
stead. I went to discuss this same Cuban problem and to tell him of an organiza- 
tion, Junta de Liberacion, which had been created in Miami. Mr. Stewart was 

90331—62 5 


annoyed with me because of the way that I insisted upon discussing this prob- 
lem about Batista. 

Question. When did you see Mr. Wieland again? 

Answer. January 1958. At this time, I submitted the document to Mr. 

Question. Would you describe this document? 

Answer. Well, Fidel Castro had written a letter from the moimtains in the 
Sierra Maestra, which was public knowledge, in which he dissolved the Junta 
de Liberacion, which was an organization against Batista and which comprised 
all such organizations against Batista. In dissolving this organization, Fidel 
Castro took charge of the organized efforts against Batista. 

This letter was addressed to all the heads of the different factions organized 
in Miami against Batista. 

On the basis of this letter, we prepared a document which was an analysis 
of the contents of this letter and a comparsion of its thoughts and ideas with the 
tenets of ]\Iarxism. We compared the 26th of July Movement with Lenin's 
slogan, "All Power to the Soviets." 

While Castro does not mention Commiinism by name, all of his plans are the 
same, his methods are the same : he is going to dissolve the Army and arm the 

All this we advised Mr. Wieland. Mr. Wieland was alone, but I was accom- 
panied by Mr. Artigas, in Washington. 

Question. What did Mr. Wieland say? 

A. Mr. Wieland said that he'd look it over and advise me. I never heard from 
him about it. We also suggested in that document that Batista should be sub- 
stituted by a military jimta. To this suggestion Mr. Wieland gave me the 
distinct impression without actually saying it, that this was very probable, that 
it could be done. We even discussed the names of military men who could form 
a military junta. 

Question. Did he ask you to tell him who could do this? 

Answer. Yes. I told him : General Cantillo, Colonel Barquin, who was in 
prison at the time, General Diaz Tamayo, General Sosa, and myself, General 

Question. Were any of those mentioned as possibilities for the Junta takeover? 

Answer. Yes, General Cantillos, we later learned, had been meeting secretly 
with Castro in the mountains. 

Question. Did you ever ask him aliout the document? 

Answer. Yes ; but Mr. Wieland said that there was nothing that he could do 
but report this information to his superiors. 

Question. When was the next time that you contacted Mr. Wieland? 

Answer. I saw him several times after January 1958. I was residing in 
Washington then. 

Question. Did you ever discuss this document again? 

Ajiswer. Yes. I insisted that there should be found a solution to the Cuban 
problem, and he told me that there was nothing we could do. All he could do 
was to gather information and report it to his superiors. 

Question. Did Wieland ever mention Castro? 

Answer. I saw Mr. Wieland several times and I do not recall exactly when he 
spoke about Castro, but generally speaking I told him that Castro seems to be 
working for the Communists. He told me that anyone who was against the 
Batista Government was always accused of being a Communist. 

I want to make clear, that in those days, Castro was never the center of the 
conversation. It was Batista. 

Question. Do you recall any of your visits after January 1958? 

Answer. After .January 1958, I spoke to him several times always about this 
same Cuban problem. 

Question. Did he tell you that he had stopped shipment of arms to Batista? 

Answer. On one occasion, we talked about that, but he did not tell me that 
he had stopped shipments of arms to Batista but that the Government did in 
order to avoid any more bloodshed in Cuba. 

Question. Did you ever tell Mr. Wieland that, in your opinion, Castro was a 

Answer. I do not recall exactly that, but I discussed this in the document and 
I told him about Castro Communists and their activities in Mexico. 

Question. How did you know about this? 


Answer. It was said that when Castro was detained by the Mexican Police 
in Mexico, they acquired quite a few luioks and documents of Castro's on 

Question. When was the last time that you saw Mr. Wieland? 

Answer. It was in 1959 — twice, in May and .July or Au'^ust. When I left 
Cuba in April through the Ecuador Eml)assy, I went to live in Atlanta and 
then I wrdte from there to him, telling him everything that had happened in 
Cuba, all that was happening at that moment, and everything that would happen. 

Question. Did he reply? 

Answer. No. I told him about the dangers to the United States of the Cuban 
situation and asked him if good offices of the United States could be used to 
solve this i)rol)lem. He never replied. 

Question. What happened when you came to Washington in May? 

Answer. I saw him and told him that Castro was a Communist and that he 
should be stopped. 

Question. What did he say? 

Answer. He told me that Castro was not a Communist. We did not discuss 
the document. 

RiCARDO Artigas Ravelo 

Question. What was your rank in the army? 

Answer. I held the rank of Commander in the Police Force; I was chief of 
investigations in Havana for 4 years. I am now retired. 

Question. Did you serve under the Prio government? 

Answer. Yes ; I was director of the national lottery under Prio. 

Question. When did you arrive in the U.S.? 

Answer. I arrived here on March 13, 19.52, in Miami. 

Question. Would you describe yourself as being anti-Batista or anti-Castro? 

Answer. lam both anti-Batista and anti-Castro. 

Question. Did you ever meet with William Wieland? 

Ajiswer. Yes ; I have met with him some 25 or 30 times. 

Question. When did you first see him? 

Answer. I first saw him in June 1957 in the company of General Garcia, at the 
State Department here in Washington. 

Question. Was General Garcia with you on any subsequent visits to Mr. Wie- 

Answer. Yes ; I believe he was with me on two other occasions. 

Question. What was the purpose of your visits to Mr. Wieland? 

Answer. I wanted to give him information on the very bad situation in Cuba 
and let him know the serious nature of Communist infiltration there. 

Question. When did your second visit with Mr. Wieland take place? 

Answer. I saw him again in August 1958. I might add that I was in constant 
touch with him by telephone. 

Question. In your visits with Mr. Wieland, did he ever mention to you any- 
thing about the stopping of ax"ms shipments to Batista? 

Answer. Yes ; Mr. Wieland told me that the State Department would no longer 
allow the shipment of arms to Cuba. 

Question. Did you ever suggest a solution to Mr. Wieland regarding the prob- 
lems existing in Cuba at that time? 

Answer. Yes, prior to the fall of Batista and the takeover by Castro, I sug- 
gested to Mr. Wieland that a military junta be formed to prevent Castro from 
assuming power. 

Question. Why did you feel a junta would be a good thing? 

Answer. I knew of Castro's i)revious activities and of his Communist attitude. 
I cited several instances of this attitude such as the Bogota uprising, etc. 

Question. What did Mr. Wieland say when you told him of Castro being a 
Communist ? 

Answer. His answer was that Castro was not a Communist. 

Question. Did you warn him of Castro being a Communist on any other oc- 

Answer. I constantly warned him about this and his answer was always the 
same, that Castro was not a Communist. 

Question. Prior to the Castro takeover, did you ever tell Mr. Wieland of 
Communist Party members joining the Castro forces in the Sierra Maestras? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. When was this? 


Answer. I wrote Mr. Wieland a letter from Miami, Fla., in Januai'y 1958. I told 
him that the tw^o top men in the Cuban Communist Party had gone to the Sierra 
Maestras to join Castro. They are Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Ladislao Gon- 
zalez Carvajal. I even told Wieland the day on which they went. 

Question. Did Mr. Wieland ever reply to your letter? 

Ajiswer. No, never. 

Question. After you wrote this letter you saw Mr. Wieland again, did you 

Answer. Yes, I saw him after that. 

Question. Did you again mention to him the episode about the two Commu- 
nist Party leaders joining Castro in the Sierra Maestras? 

Answer. Yes, I asked him what the United States could do about the Cuban 

Question. Did you ask him why he did not reply to your letter in which you 
told him of the Communist leaders joining Castro? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. What did he say? 

Answer. He replied that the United States could do nothing about the Cuban 

Question. W^hen did you last see Mr. Wieland? 

Answer. I saw him for the last time in March 1959 at the State Department 
here in W^ashington. 

Question. What was the purpose of your visit at that time? 

Answer. I came to Washington with a Cuban Army colonel named Corzo. 
He went with me to see Wieland, and we submitted a military plan to over- 
throw Castro. 

Question. To whom did you submit this plan? 

Answer. We gave it to Mr. Wieland. 

Question. What did Mr. Wieland have to say about the plan. 

Answer. He again said that Castro was not a Communist and defended him 
as he had done on every occasion in the past when I had brought up Castro's 

Question. Did you say you saw Wieland 25 or 30 times in all? 

Answer. Between 1957 and 1959 I made about 17 trips to Washington to see 

(Whereupon, at 3 : 15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.) 


THURSDAY, JULY 27, 1962 

United States Sexate, 
Subcommittee To In%'estigate the Administration 
OF THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal 

Security Laws, of the Com:mittee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D.C. 

The subcoiiimittee met, pursuant to call, at 1 :25 p.m., in room 2300, 
New Senate Office Building, Senator Thomas J. Dodd presiding. 

Present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research 
director; Frank Schroeder, chief investigator. 

Senator Dodd. On the record. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you wish to be sworn, Mr. Ambassador? 

JSIr. "Willauer. I would like to be sworn. 

Senator Dodd. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Willauer. I do. 


Mr. Sourwine. Would you give the reporter your full name? 

Mr. Willauer. Whiting Willauer. 

Mr. Sourwine. And j^our present address ? 

Mr. Willauer. ]My present address, which is a temporary address, 
summer address, is Westcliff, Nantucket, Mass. 

My home is Antigua, Guatemala. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you presently employed by the U.S. Govern- 
ment ? 

Mr. Wii^LAUER. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have been U.S. A».mbassador to Costa Rica? 

Mr. Willauer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have been special assistant to the Secretary of 

Mr. Willauer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were educated at Exeter and Princeton, where 
you received your B.S., cum laude, in 1928 ? 

IVIr. Willauer. Correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. You then attended Harvard Law School, from 
which you secured an L.L.B. in 1931 ? 

]Mr. Willauer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouR'\^^NE. Graduating in the top 10 percent of j'our class? 

Mr. Willauer. Yes, sir. 



Mr. SouKWiNE. At Princeton you played varsity football and la- 
crosse, among- various other extracurricular activities ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I did, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You hold a pilot's license for multiengine aircraft 
witli more than 3,000 hoiire in the air ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Foreign pilot's license, not from the United States. 

Mr. SouRAViNE, You are an expert scuba diver ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes ; I have done a great deal of it. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You got a commendation for rescue work performed 
in 1957 while you were Ambassador to Honduras ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes; here in the Senate and locally by the au- 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You recovered several bodies in a very difficult 
operation which involved the risk of your own life ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. That is true. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You speak Spanish, French, Chinese, and German, 
as well as English ? 

Mr. Wellauer. Well, I am on the professional level or very close 
to it in Spanish. I used to be pretty good in French, but that is gone. 
I used to have some Chinese ; that is gone. And the others are child- 
hood languages, I would only really claim Spanish today. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You are very modest, Mr. Ambassador. 

You are a practicing attorney and have had a substantial private 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. With general experience in labor, banking and in- 
surance matters, and with admiralty law as a specialty ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You were legal coordinator of Admiral Byrd's sec- 
ond Antarctic expedition ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I was. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You have been attornev for the Civil Aeronautics 
Board, and were coordinator of legal matters in connection with the 
construction of the Washington National Airport ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. That is correct. ^ 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You have been a special assistant to the Attorney 
General of the United States ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Handling first cases of judicial and political cor- 
ru]>tion, and you had all such cases under your charge for a time? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I did. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And later handling Comm.unist and Nazi matters? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I did. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You were special counsel for the Federal Power 
Commission ? 

Mr. WiLiiAUER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And you were assistant to the President and ex- 
ecutive secretary of China Defense Supplies, 1941-44? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes. sir. 

Mr. SoFRwiNE. Tell us what was China Defense Supplies. 

Mr. WiLLAUER. China Defense Supplies was an organization — in 
fact, it was a Delaware corporation— set up in this country, the medium 
through which the Chinese Government operated to obtain its lend- 


lease supplies during- World War II, and was the principal back- 
stopping agency for General Chennault's Flying Tiger operation dur- 
ing the war. 

Air. SouRwiNE. You were assigned to the Chinese Government first 
to assist in the formation of the Flying Tigers and later in all phases 
of the Chinese war effort ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. That is true. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you assist in pioneering the so-called hump 
air route from India to China ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I had a great deal to do with that. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. And with its operations after it got underway ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes, sir. 

]Mr. SouRwiNE. About half your time between 1941 and 1944 was 
spent in China and India ? 

]Mr. WiLLAUER. That is right. 

Mv. SouRwiNE. You were commended by General Chemiault, among 
others, for your work there. 

Mr. WiLLAUER. That is correct. He wrote me a very nice letter. 

Mr. SouRw^iNE. In 1944 and 1945 you were Director of the Foreign 
Economics Administration, Far Eastern and Special Territories 
Branch ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. That is right. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Tliis included operations in the fields of foreign aid 
and economic intelligence, procurement of strategic material, economic 
warfare, and postwar planning? 

JNIr, WiLLAUER. That is right. 

Mr. SouRw^iNE. You had responsibilities in all those areas? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. From August of 1945 until V-J Day you were spe- 
cial representative of the President of the United States in the 

Mr. WiLLAUER. That is right. 

Mr, SouR"\\aNE. AAHiat was your assignment there, sir? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. To try and reconstitute the civilian economy. Con- 
currently at that time I served also, or continued to serve as Director 
of tlie Far Eastern Branch of the FEA. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You also had an assignment to ari-ange with Gen- 
eral MacArthur for transition from military to civilian control ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Well, that was the Philippine assignment to which 
we referred. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes, sir. 

Now. in 1946 you established residence in China as foreign counsel 
for various organizations? 

Mr. WiLLAT'ER. Yes. 

Mr. Sour WINE. Including International Correspondence Schools, 
Time, and others? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. A nd others, yes. 

Mr. SoURWiNE. Did vou also form a partnership with General Chen- 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I did. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. For what purpose? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. For the purpose of forming an airline. We par- 
ticularly wanted to have an airline there to help in the rehabilitation 
and reconstruction of China. 


Mr. SouRwiNE. And did you form such an airline ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. We did. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Tliat was the CAT Airline ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. That is correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You were its general manager and executive vice 
president, and later became president and vice chairman of the board ? 

Mr, WiLLAUER. That is right, 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you act as adviser to the director of operations 
of UNRRA? 

Mr, WiLLAUER. I did. Informally, 

Mr. Sour WINE. In what area ? 

Mr, WiLLAUER, In China, infonnally, 

Mr, SouRwiNE. Who was the director of operations of UNRRA at 
that time ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Ralph Olmstead, 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you also act as adviser to the Premier of China 
on reconstruction problems ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER, Yes ; but informally, 

Mr, SouRwiNE. Did you also serve in Shanghai as a member of 
the Committee on Western Jurisdiction ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER, Jurisprudence. 

Mr. SouRwiNE, Western Jurisprudence ? 

Mr, WiLL.\uER. Yes, 

Mr, SouRwiNE, What was the objective of this committee? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. We hoped, through influencing Western-trained 
Chinese lawyers, to get a gi-^ound swell m favor of a constitutional 
government in China. 

Mr. SouRWTXE. You were also adviser to various American concerns 
doing business in China ? 

Mr, WiLLAUER, Yes ; I was, 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, in connection with the CAT airline, that was 
the air transport facility for both TTNRRA and ECA, wasn't it? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. That is correct. That is the way it started, 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is the w\ay U,S, aid got into China ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. That is how we redistributed it through China. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. At one time, specifically in 1948, CAT airline was 
the largest aircargo caiTier in the world, wasn't it ? 

Mr, WiLi.AUER, According to the best statistics we could find, 

Mr. SoLTRAviNE. It had a very higli rating by intelligence sources as 
a deterrent to early Red Chinese Communist victoiy. 

Mr, WiLLAUER. Yes. That was after the reconstruction phase. 
When the war, the hot war, broke out, after the failure of the Mar- 
shall mission, and we had really hot war between Chiang Kai-shek's 
forces and the Commie forces, we became more and more carriers of 
military supplies for the Chiang Kai-shek forces; we used to drop, air- 
drop, or land under fire all over China in beleaguered cities. 

Mr. Soi'RwiNE. You were the major medium for evacuation of anti- 
Communist refugees to Hong Kong and Formosa, were you not? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I think so. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. And a very important transport facility for the 
U.N. Command during tlie Korean vrar. 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes, indeed — two-thirds of our fleet was there. 
And we, I think, were rated rather highly by that command. 


Mr. SouRwiNE. You were also an important air transport facility 
( lurinir the stiaiirgle in northern Vietnam ? 

Mr, WiLLAL ER. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwixE. CAT is still operating as an airline, is it not? 

Mr. AViLLAUER. Yes, and it is a fairly large one. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. It is operating pretty well all along the periphery 
of comnuniism in the Orient? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. That is what we do. From Korea down to Bangkok. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. After the Chinese Communist victoi-y on the main- 
land in 1949, other Chinese airlines defected to the Communists, did 
they not? 

Mv. WiLLAUER. They did ; two of them. 

Mr. SouRWiXE. And so did the Chinese merchant marine. 

Mr, WiLLAUER. That is correct. 

Mr. SoLTRwiNE. Most of the airline equipment was in Hong Kong 
at the time? 

Mr. WiLLAUER, That is right, 

Mr, SouRwiNE, And CAT fought quite a legal battle to get its 
equipment out? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. That is right. We won it after losing it about eight 
or nine times. We won it in privy council, which is the supreme court 
for colonial matters. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. How long did you remain in the Orient and con- 
nected with the CAT Airlines ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Until 1953, the early summer of 1953, when one of 
my children was killed in an accident, and I returned home, in con- 
nection with that accident, and at the same time I was being ap- 
proached by Gen, Bedell Smith, who was then the Under Secretary 
of State, as to whether I would take on the job of Ambassador to 
Honduras, which I later did, 

Mr. SouRwiNE, You were appointed to that position in 1954? 

Mr, WiLLAUER, Yes, I was. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, were you at that time familiar with the situa- 
tion in Guatemala ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I had a very extensive briefing on that situation. 

Mr, SouRA\aNE, By 1954, Guatemala had become controlled by in- 
ternational communism, had it not? 

Mr, WiLLAUER. There was no doubt about it. 

Mr. SouRwixE. There was then in existence an anti-Communist 
revolutionary movement ? 

Mr. Wn^LAUER. Yes, and it was largelv based in Honduras. 

Mr. SouRWiXE. And was it part of your job to assist that movement ? 

Mr, WiLLAUER. Yes; it was. In fact, after the revolution was suc- 
cessful, I received a telegram from Allen Dulles in which he stated 
in effect that the revolution could not have succeeded but for what 
I did. I am very proud of that telegram. 

I also received a telegram from Secretary Dulles, which was in more 
general language, complimenting me on my work. 

Mr. SouRwixE. You served 4 years as Ambassador to Honduras ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Approximately ; yes. 

Mr, SouRWixE, Is it your judgment, sir — as the committee has been 
informed — that you were appointed Ambassador to Honduras mainly 
because of your 15 years of practical experience in fighting interna- 
tional communism ? 

90331—62 6 


Mr. W11.LAUER. This is what I was told. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. At the tirne you were employed ? 

Mr. WiLi.AUER. At the time I was appointed. Actually, the period 
is even longer than that. 

I got my first indoctrination in communism way back in — from 
Mr. Mandel, actually, when he was on the Dies committee, and I w^as 
in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, during your 4 years as Ambassador to Hon- 
duras, there were a series of crises, were there not ? 

Mr, WiLLAUER. Yes; they were* terrific. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Four different governments? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And to capsule this, this period ended with the first 
freely elected government in Honduran history in power ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. That is right. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. And throughout all of these crises, you were active 
in combating communism, and trying to help establish a stable gov- 
ernment in Guatemala ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. No, in Honduras. That was my major work, 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, after your 4 years as Ambassador to Hon- 
duras, were you then appointed Ambassador to Costa Rica ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I was. 

Mr. SoLTRwiNE. And how long did you serve there? 

Mr. WiLLAiTER. I believe I actually took over the Embassy in May 
of 195S, and I was terminated as of April 30, 1961. 

Mr, SouRWiNE, Mr. Ambassador, was there something of a team in 
working to overthrow the Arbenz government in Guatemala, or were 
you alone in that operation ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. There was a team. 

Mr. SouRWiNE, Jack Puerif oy was down there ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes, Jack was on the team over in Guatemala ; that 
is the principal man, and we had Bob Hill, Ambassador Robert Hill, 
in Costa Rica, wliere there was certain side effects. And we had Am- 
bassador Tom Whelan in Nicaragua, where a lot of the activities were 
going. And, of course, there were a number of CIA operatives in the 

Mr. SouRwiNE. ^^-liat was Mr. Dulles' involvement in that area? 

Mr. WiLLAUER, Mr. Allen Dulles ? 

Mr, SouRwiNE. Yes. 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Well, the CIA was helping to equip and train the 
anti-Communist revolutionary forces, 

Mr, SouRWiNE. Would you say you were the man in charge in the 
field in this general area of all these operations ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I certainly was called upon to perform very impor- 
tant duties, particularly to keep the Honduran Government — which 
was scared to death about the possibilities of themselves being over- 
thrown — keep them in line so they would allow this revolutionary ac- 
tivity to continue, based in Honduras. 

Mr. SouRwiNE, Do you know of any other instances of the suc- 
cessful overthrow of a Communist government in this hemisphere? 

Mr, WiLLAUER, No. 

Senator Dodd. Or any hemisphere ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I have never heard of another one. 


Mr. SouRwiNE. Xow, Costa Rica is pretty rrenerally rated as a very 
fjood example of effective democracy, perhaps tlie best example of 
such in Latin America, isn't that right ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes; and I believe that rating is correct. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. It has been for a long time an important focal point 
of non-Communist liberal movements in the Caribbean area? 

Mr. Wii.LATTER. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. As a result, close contact with liberal leaders in 
Costa Rica and a number of other Latin American countries was es- 

Mr. WiLLAuER. Yes. It was one of my major duties to maintain 
such contact. 

Mr. vSouRwiNE. Was it part of your job — did you consider it part of 
your jol) — to assist in awakening the leaders of the surrounding coun- 
tries to tlie Communist nature of the Castro regime? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I did — insofar as I could do it through my con- 
tacts as they came through Costa Rica, or through one of their more 
important leaders, ex-President Figueres. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Ex-President of what country ? 

Mr. WiLLATTER. Ex-Presideiit of Costa Rica. 

Mv. SouRwiNE. When did you first become convinced that the 
Castro regime was Communist? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I was very suspicious of it fairly — well, I should say 
toward the last quarter of 1958, before they took power — when I heard 
that "Che" Guevara was in the act in a big way, and having met — 
crossed his trail, I should say, in the Guatemalan picture, where I be- 
came very much alarmed, and then when I began to hear, in tlie latter 
part of 1948, about 

Mr, SoFRwixE. 1958. 

INIr. WiLLAUER. 1958 — about agrarian reform, and a few things 
like this, began to remind me of China a great deal. And my nose be- 
gan to twitch, in the last quarter of 1958. 

Mr. SouRwixE. Did you prepare any communications for the State 
Department with regard to your aroused worries about the Com- 
munist nature of the Castro regime? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I did, but not in 1958. On Januaiy 26, 1959—1 
will have to give you a little backgi'ound to answer this question, I 
think, sir, if you will permit me, Mr. Chaimian. 

Senator Dodd. Of course, Mr. Ambassador, go right ahead. 

Mr. WiLLAUER. On January 26, 1959, my suspicions having been 
very, very strongly aroused, 1 had a conference with ex-President 
Figueres at lunch. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. This was 25 days or 26 days after Castro came into 
power ? 

Mr. WiLLAtiER. That is correct. And I said to Mr. Figueres "You 
and your liberal gi'oup of Betancourt, Munoz JNIarin, and others, of 
course, put this man into power, or at least supported him very 
strongly. And I feel, Mr. Figueres, that the chances are very strong 
that he will ]>e dominated by connnunism, if lie is not already a Com- 
munist. And liow do you feel about it ?"' 

He said, "Well, I am worried about this man, but I don't think he 
is going to go this way." 


I then said, "Well, if it does go this way, if I prove to be right, you 
and the liberal movement will be forever discredited unless you do 
something about it, and do it quick." 

And after some discussion along these lines, he said, "Well, you 
have got me really worried." 

And I then said, "Well, what are you going to do about it?" 

He said, "Well, in 2 weeks" — actually he said, "On February 13, 
President Betancourt is going to be inaugurated, and I and the rest of 
our liberal team are going to all be there, and we will discuss this 

As later proved — which I will go on and tell you about later — this 
was done, and it had certain results. 

On the 27th of January, the day after this conversation, I reported 
it in full in a letter to Assistant Secretary Rubottom, with copies to 
the Secretary of State and other interested officers in the Department. 

Mr. SoLTiwiXE. May I ask at tliis point — it may seem to be an ex- 
traneous question — is this common practice, to file a report and to send 
copies to others in the Department ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I felt that it was perfectly proper practice. I don't 
know how common it is. But I have always felt this — that the dis- 
tribution machinery in the Department is clumsy, and one copy of a 
dispatch is inclined to sit on a fellow's desk for a long time. And, 
therefore, when I had a matter as hot as this one seemed to me, it 
seemed best to send it to all concerned directly. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, did you follow up after this communication 
with a series of recommendations to the Department? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I did. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. On overall T^.S. policy in Latin America, and spe- 
cifically on the Castro Communist dictatorship problem? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I certainly did. There is a long series of letters, 
the dates of which I will furnish the committee. I may not include 
all of them, but if you would like the dates I will give them to you. 

Mr. SouRW'JNE. Go ahead. 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Tliis letter which I mentioned already of January 
27, 1059. February 3, 1959 ; March 10, 1959 : March 13, 1959 ; April 1 6, 
1959; April 30, 1959; January 29, 1960; March 8, 1960; March 22, 
1960; March 30, 1960; July 18, 1960; and a dispatch. No. 14 of our 
Embassy, of July 11, 1960. 

This was supplemented by a number of trips which I took myself, 
sometimes at my own expense, to try to explain my views. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. To whom in the Department did you explain your 
\'iews on those trips ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. On all occasions to Mr. Rubottom. On certain 
occasions to Secretary Herter. On one occasion to Deputy Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs Robert Murphy. On all occasions to 
Mr. Allan Stewart, who was the officer in charge of Central America. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. He was the desk officer ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. The desk officer for Central American countries and 

There may have been others, but those were the most prominent. 

And additionally, of course, I had a great deal of contact over in the 
CTA, principally with Col. J. C. King, who runs Latin American 
Affairs, with Richard Bissell, and others. And Allen Dulles himself. 


Mr. SouRAViNE. Now, this was, of course, a developing situation. 

Some changes were rapid. 

But is it fair to say that the general tenor of all of these communi- 
cations was the same ? 

]Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE, In what way ? Were you sounding an alarm against 
Castro communism in all instances? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I was. 

Might I give you a little background ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. And tell us, if you will, in your own words, 
what you were urging the Department to do. 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Well, first, by way of background, following up 
the meeting of Figueres and his liberal group on February 13, at the 
Betancourt inauguration, Figueres returned to — returned on March 
13 or 14 — no; it was a little before that. But I saw him after liis 
return on INIarch 13, 1959, and he had— he told me that his group 
had appointed him to go to Havana and to talk sense, or to try to 
talk sense, with Castro. That they were worried about it, and that 
Figueres was first to sur\^ey the situation, see if it was along the lines 
that I had claimed it was, and if he found that thino-s were not all 
right he was to talk sense to him. He was using this — the occasion 
for this trip was an invitation which Castro had issued to Figueres, 
as a great revolutionary figure himself. 

Mr. SouKwiNE. Figueres had assisted Castro with certain arms and 
ammunition ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. That is right. And there was to be a labor rally, 
and Figueres was to come and make one of the principal speeches. 
And, incidentally, I assisted Figueres in some parts of his speech, by 
giving him some ideas. His speech, as it ultimately resulted, ran 
aroimd this theme: That whatever you may feel about liberalism 
or coimnunism, there is a cold war going on, and Latin America 
must be on the side of the United States and against Russia in a 
showdown between those two sides. Figueres told me in the process 
that he would have liked to have played up the Communist angle 
more. But he felt lie could l)o more elective if he didn't emphasize 
that as much as the necessity of being on the side of the United 

I think all of you know that he went to Havana, he was unable to 
consult with Castro. Castro refused to see him. 

The onlv words he ever had with Castro were when he, Fi<nieres, 
was mounting the rostrum to make his speech, and they were very 
short words. 

Figueres started to make this speech. A labor leader named David 
Salvador grabbed the microphone away from him. Castro took over, 
and denounced Figueres in no uncertain terms as a reactionary and 
called him all sorts of nasty names. Figueres then returned from 
this trip with two or three of his top advisers. 

I talked to all of them. And every one of them, from Figueres 
on down, said, "We have no doubt that this matter is a Communist 
matter, or if it is not already it is about to be." 

The date of Figueres' return was about ]March 13, 1959. 

In any event, that is wdien I had my talks with him and reported 
this to the Department in a letter; once again distributed to Rubottom 


and the others. I thought that this was particularly significant be- 
cause it illustrated that even the liberals who would be inclined to 
favor the man that they had put in a power were at that early date 
convinced that they backed the wrong horse, and that this thing was 
headed surely for communism. 

Now, the second part of your question, if I remember it correctly, 
Mr. Sourwine, was what was the general nature of my recommenda- 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WiLLAUER. The general nature was that we should try to get, 
in the first instance, the Organization of American States more ac- 
tively interested by feeding to them all of this type of information 
on a vei-y concerted basis, because at this time the general feeling 
around the hemisphere was that this Castro thing was nothing more or 
less than an overdue social revolution. Simultaneously there was go- 
ing on in liberal circles, Latin American liberal circles, a movement 
to have the OAS Charter changed so that dictators could not belong 
to the Organization. 

And I suggested, by — by dictators they were talking about dic- 
tators of the right. 

And I suggested that if this tendency grew into a real movement, 
that we ought to insist and arrange that the exclusion should include 
dictators of the left as well as of the right who, of course, are more 
dangerous, since they are backed by Russia. 

In the early stages that w^as the tactic that Iwas recommending in 
general, and appears in these letters which you have been told about. 

Mr. SouRwixE. Did you make arrangements for the use of Costa 
Rica as the site for the OAS meetings of August 1960 on the Domini- 
can and Cuban problems ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes, at the request of the Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. iVnd you assisted the Costa Rican Government in 
the prevention of a major Communist effort to sabotage these meet- 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes, we had quite a setup there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Tell us about that Communist effort at sabotage. 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Well, we had very reliable information tliat they 
had sent in almost unlimited funds to try to get riots going and the 
usual techniques, the Bogota technique. And what liappened 
was that I arranged, and with the assistance of my staff to alert 
the Costa Rican public and their officials to this information, and we 
helped them form voluntary citizens detective — voluntary citizens 
committee, voluntary detectives, and other countermeasures, in addi- 
tion to the official measures, to put a stop to this thing. 

And the result of that was that there was practically no trouble at 

I must say I am not taking credit for what the Costa Rican people 
did. I just assisted them in some of the techniques. 

Senator Dodd. Well, I think you are very modest, if I may inter- 
rupt. I think you deserve great credit. I want that to appear on the 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You sent all these communications to the Depart- 
ment, What reaction, if any, did you get from the Department, or 
officials of the Department ? 


Mr. WiLLAUER. Well, I think, if I might go back a bit, there is a 
very important first step in this thing, which was the El Salvador 
Conference, becanse this was the first real reaction. 

In April, if my memory does not fail me — I made some notes of a 
lot of these things, because I thought it would be important — in 
April tlirongh 11 we had a meeting 

Mr, SouRwixE. What year? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Of 1959 — we had a meeting in El Salvador of all 
the ambassadors, American ambassadors, whose countries touched 
upon the Caril^bean Basin. 1 think there were 14 of us there. The 
meeting was headed up l>v Deputy Under Secretary Loy Henderson, 
and by Assistant Secretary Eubottom, and was attended by other 
officials, besides the ambassadors. 

At that meeting, some very peculiar things happened, or at least 
they seemed peculiar to me. 

Before the meeting was convened, I had a private conversation with 
Ambassador Bonsai. Ambassador John Cabot, our current Ambas- 
sador in Brazil, was with me at the time. I don't know whether I 
asked this question or Cabot asked the question, but one of us asked 
Bonsai what he thought of Castro. And much to my amazement, in 
view of what I have told you before, of what I had thought about 
him, and what Figueres thought about him, and the rest of the intel- 
ligence, he said that he wasn't a bad fellow, tliat he was, of course, 
eccentric, that he — let me just refer to a few notes here — he said he 
wasn't such a bad fellow, and he thought tliat he probably could be 
liandled, and he. Bonsai, probably could handle him, if he was left 

He said he was in favor of a soft glove approach, of an approach 
of patience- — and very serious consideration of a possibility of aiding 
Castro, if he got himself into an economic jam. He said that Castro 
was a terrific person, physically and mentally, he was far from crazy, 
that he was not living on pills, and that he was not a Communist. 

Well, part of this occurred in this private conversation. The rest 
occurred in the open meeting which started thereafter. And I have 
difficulty in separating in my memory which is which. 

But all of what I said came out in the open meeting. 

At this point, Ambassador Hill and I, who felt very strongly that 
this was developing into a Communist situation, if it already was not 
one, and we argued as strongly as we could for a position of the Con- 
ference to the effect that this was a dangerous potentially Communist 
situation, and that our communique or repoit to the Secretary of State 
should include recommendations for a more extensive concentration 
on the problem, through the OAS, and any other media that we covild 

And there was a very, very heated dispute in this Conference. 

The only support Hill and I got at all, except from Eubottom on 
occasion — I must say that Eubottom seemed rather skeptical of Bon- 
sal's view, but — he was chairing the meeting, it wasn't really his 
place, I suppose, to argue with him. 

But he showed some skepticism. 

The only support we got was from our Ambassador Whelan. He 
Avas, until recently, our Ambassador to Nicaragua. 

Senator Dodd. And a very good one, I might add. 


Mr. WiLLAUER. Now, not to give you all the details of this very in- 
volved meeting, an impasse arose about this communique, in which 
Ambassador Hill said that he could not sign a soft communique, and 
he would have to file a separate report to the Secretary, or protest this 
thing, unless it could be modified. 

And I supported him in that position. 

Finally, the impasse got so bad that ISIr. Henderson and Mr. Eubot- 
tom took Mr. Hill into a private room, and asked me to come along. I 
was able to suggest certain language which, while it wasn't as strong 
as either Hill or I wanted, at least to those who knew the background, 
it would point up what we thought was required to be done. 

But I must say on the whole, even, that compromise language was 
pretty weak, and, in my opinion, inadequate to the situation. 

I don't laiow, at this point, whether I have fully answered your 

I wonder 

Mr. SouEWiNE. The question was "Wliat reaction, if any, you got 
from the State Department or officials of the Department to this series 
of communications and recommendations that you had been sending 

]\Ir. WiLLAUER. Yes. 

Well, that is why this meeting is really tlie first real reaction I got. 
I mean I got certain letters back. None of tliem that I received back 
accepted my point of view. Most of them argued against it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Well, did you hear from Allan Stewart about this 
series of recommendations ? 

Mv. Wallauer. I didn't hear anything directly, other than in con- 
versations, excepting one very important thing whicli came to me 

On one occasion, my deputy chief of mission, the man who is the 
No. 2 in the Embassy, Mr. Roy I. Kimmel, a career Foreign Service 
officer, who was just retired, was in Washington on leave or consulta- 
tion, and had a conversation with Mr. Stewart whicli Mr. Kimmel 
reported to me on his return. According to Mr. Kimmel, Mr. Stewart 
said the following: He said, "First, Willauer is going to get nowhere 
with these recommendations. They are not going to do any good. 
And, second, we are going to put a stop to his frequent visits to 
Washington, trying to sell these ideas." 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You were never told, by Mr. Stewart or anyone 
else, to desist from making such recommendations ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Indeed not. And, in fact, from Secretaiy Herter 
himself I received several letters, commending me on the reporting 
and the ideas that I was advancing. 

Mr. SouRwi^T^E. You know, then, that Secretary Herter got your 
letters and your recommendations? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The copies you sent to him were received by him? 

JNIr. WiLLAUER. Certain of them were. I particularly remember 
that he commended me for my report on the Figueres situation, for 
one. As to the others. I cannot be sure, because I don't have the files; 
they are all secret, and I don't have access to them. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you familiar with the material of an intelli- 
gence nature about Cuba and Castro which was coming out of the 
State Department during this period ? 


Mr. WiLLAUER. No, not all of it. 

Mr. SouRWixE. You saw some of it ? 

Mr, WiLLAUER. I saw some of it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Well, what was the nature of that which you saw? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Well, I was far from impressed that the general 
tenor of what I saw 

Mr. SouRwiNE. What was that general tenor ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Well, the general tenor is : We are not sure what 
this thing is, it may be just an agraiian social reform, the Commies 
are gaining in some fields, but, generally speaking, Castro is a strong 
and dedicated person. That is the general tenor of what I saw. 

Mr. SouRAviNE. Now, you have a situation, do you not ? You were 
sending intelligence in 

Mr. Willaut:r. Yes. 

Mr. SotTRwiNE (continuing). Which clearly portrayed the Castro 
regime as Communist or Connnunist controlled ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. That is right. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You saw other intelligence of this nature going to 
the Department? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes. 

Mr, SouRWiNE. You did not see any intelligence of this nature 
coming from the Department for dissemination to the field ? 

Mr, WiLLAUER, Precious little in my area. 

Mr. SouRwiNE, The evaluated intelligence, which I think is the 
proper name for it, which you saw coming out of the Department, 
had a different tenor ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER, Vrell, such as I saw. But, remember, the way the 
thing is institutionalized, down in my area it was just the accident of 
my contacts with Figueres and the liberal movement and my general 
knowledge of conmiunism that got me into the Cuban act at all,_ And, 
therefore, I was not on the receiving line of the direct intelligence, 
that is, the whole volume of tlie intelligence, 

]\Ir. SouRwiNE. Yes. And you do not know what that was ? 

Mr, WiLLAUER, And I do not know what that was, I mean we would 
get monthly summaries and things of that sort. But not the day-to- 
day flow, 

Mr, SouRwiNE, Xow, in October 19G0 you were appointed delegate 
to the U,]Sr, General Assembly, as a member of Secretary Herter's 
personal staff, were you not? 

Mr, WiLLAUER, I was. 

Mr. SouRWiNE, Your job included liaison with all Latin American 
delegations ? 

Mr. AViLLATJER. That is correct, 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You were subsequently, in December 10, 1960, ap- 
pointed Assistant Secretary of State? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Special" Assistant to the Secretary. 

Mr. SouRwiXE. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 

And when did you leave that post ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER, Officially as of April 30 of this year, 

Mr, SouRwiXE, Now, did you have functions as Special Assistant 
to Secretary Herter which mvolved dealing with the CIA and with 
the anti-Castro Cuban factions? 

Mr, WiLLAUER, Yes, I did. But if I might — if you will permit me, 
there is some necessary background before I can get into that. 


Senator Dodd. Go right ahead. 

Mr. SouRWiisrE. I am just trying to open this up, not to steer it, Mr. 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I appreciate that. 

On April 30, 1959, I wrote a letter, which is mentioned in this list 
of letters, to Mr. Rubottom, reviewing the situation again, since we 
had our conference in El Salvador, and concluded the letter by a 
strong recommendation saying that the intelligence community should 
be convened, and that they should be asked the specific question of 
whether Cuba and Castro, and Castro's government, was dominated 
by communism, was not dominated, or to what degree it was domi- 

What I was talking about, althougli I didn't use this phrase, is what 
we call a national intelligence estimate which, as you gentlemen know, 
is a very formal document, can only be gotten in the usual course by 
the request of the Secretaiy of State or some other high official, such 
as the President, or Secretary of Defense, under the orders of the 
Security Council, I believe the procedures are, and requires the intelli- 
gence community to sit down and fish, cut bait, or go ashore, on the 
question that they are asked. 

What I wanted to do v/as to make sure that the President got 
himself such a document, because had it been prepared it would have 
been inevitable that he would see it. In other words, from my con- 
versations and the reactions that I was getting, that there was at least 
enough confusion in the lower echelons of the State Department as to 
just what this was, that the alarm bells were not being rung high 
enough up in the chain of command. And I was sure that if I could 
get an NIE, national intelligence estimate, that the alarm bells would 
be rung. I was particularly sure because I later came up to Washing- 
ton, in connection with this recommendation, and I talked to the CIA 
people, who would have been preparing this. They were very anxious 
to prepare such an estimate, and told me that they certainly would 
label this thing communism, 

Now, the reason that is backgroimd is that it got me — my 
difficulties in getting this idea accepted, got me pretty much to the 
attention of a little higher echelon than Rubottom in the Department, 
on how I felt about this thing, and what I wanted to do about it, and 
I think in part led directly to this final assignment of mine. 

I might say, parenthetically, that, in my opinion, if a national intel- 
ligence estimate had been prepared at that time, and it had come out 
< he way the CIA told me that it would come out, this invasion effort 
would have been commenced at least 9 months earlier, and thereby 
would have liad at least a 50-percent better chance of success than it 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, returning to the question of your functions as 
special assistant to Secretary Plerter, which involved dealing with the 
CIA and with the anti-Castro Cuban factions, what were your func- 
tions there? 

Mr, WiLLAUER, Mr. Herter called me into his office on December 10, 
I960. He said, "President Eisenhower and I have a very special job 
which we have chosen you to do if you are prepared to accept it," He 
then said "what we want you to do is this : There has been going on 
since March 17, 1960, the preparations of an invasion, backed by the 


CIA, but run by Cubans. There is quite a lot of doubts about whether 
this phm is correct, what the timing should be, various problems about 
pulling the thing together. I want you to be the senior partner of a 
partnership of two people. Your junior partner will be a top CIA 
man. And you will report to'"^ — and he switched legal terminology 
here to "a board of directors" — of Under Secretary level, who were 
set up under the Eisenhower administration to deal with this type of 
situation. "You are to have access to every piece of information, you 
are not to do anything in writing that you can avoid putting down on 
]iaper. But get in there and take a good hard look at this thing. 
Give us your real opinion on it." 

And so I went to work. I couldn't go to work that day, because I 
had a previous speaking engagement on the coast. But on the 15th 
of December I went to work on that and continued, and I liad a num- 
ber of suggestions to make and changes in the plan that I thought 
ought to be done, and one thing or another like this. I might say 
parenthetically that I felt one of the great weaknesses of the plan was 
the lack of provision of top air cover for the low-level strafing mis- 
sions of B-2G bombers which were su])posed to carry out the beach- 
head. And I felt that that top level cover should come from jets. 

Now, I am not a military man, but I lived at the right hand of Gen- 
eral Chennault from 1942 until 1953, and I had absorbed quite a little 
about air strategy, naturally, from him. 

Well, there were certain problems about how those jets could be 
supplied, and one thing or another like that. There Avere also prob- 
lems about the Joint Chiefs of Start' not having been cut in until I got 
them in. There w^as another very important thing which I would 
prefer not to go into, because we might have to use it, but a device 
which I think should have been added to this thing. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. ^lay we go completely otf the record ^ 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Back on the record. 

]Mr. WiLLAUER. Well, continuing with my functions, both Tom 
Mann and I felt that, if we were to undertake this invasion effort — 
we were not convinced at this point whether it should be done or 

Mr, SouRwixE. Who Mas Tom Mann ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. He was then the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Latin American xlffairs. 

He is now our Ambassador to Mexico. He and I were both con- 
vinced that this thing should not be done or undertaken unless there 
vras practically no chance that it would fail, and that we should have 
to commit ourselves in advance to see that it was backed up, so that it 
could not fail. 

Now, I continued working, drawing together these strings, formu- 
lating my ideas, talking, cross-examinimr })eo])le. 

Incidentally, some of my old pilot friends were in on the training 
of the Cubans and I talked to them as to the abilities of the Cubans 
as pilots. 

And various other things that one does as a coordinator in a thing 
like this. 

Then the administration changed. And on Sunday, the 22d of 
January, there was a full dress meeting, chaired by Secretary of State 


Rusk, attended by the Secretary of Defense, and many other high 
officials, including Allen Dulles and the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Lenmitzer, myself, Mr. Mann, and others. Gordon 
Gray — no, Gordon Gray wasn't there. 

Robert Rendy was there. I don't know whether one of the Bmidys 
was there or not. 

Paul Nitze was there. 

Tliis whole operation was reviewed. 

I might say, parenthetically, Allen Dulles told me that, long before 
December 10 when I came on, he had been to Miami, I believe, or 
Palm Beach, and had somewhat filled in the incoming President on 
the operation. 

On January 26 I received a telephone call from the Secretary of 
State, asking whether I would continue in the same functions as I had 
been performing, and I said I would be glad to, there was nothing in 
the world I would rather do, because I felt very strongly about this 

On February — let me just consult a note here, if I might, I want to 
be sure about my dates. 

On February 8, at 11 :30 a.m., I was called to a meeting in the Secre- 
tary's Office, attended by Mr. Berle, who had just come aboard as head 
of this special task force for Latin America, Mv. Bowles, Mr. Mann, 
Mr. Theodore Achilles, former Ambassador Achilles, who at that time 
was working with Mr. Berle, and myself. I don't believe there was 
anybody else at the meeting. 

This meeting was called preparatory to a conference at which Presi- 
dent Kennedy was to have that afternoon at 3 o'clock at the Wliite 
House to review this situation. There was considerable discussion, 
but the discussion mostly revolved around the problems of the Organi- 
zation of American States, and whether we could count on their sup- 
port, and how we could get their support. 

And I made a few remarks about the operation, but it wasn't really 
on the operation, but rather on the political aspects, the hemisphere 
political aspects, that they were emphasizing. 

Near the end of the meeting, the Secretary announced that he had 
just gotten word from the White House that President Kennedy did 
not want too large a meeting, and, therefore, that the Secretary was 
going to take — was going himself, with Mr. Berle and Mr. Mami. So 
I didn't go. 

I walked out of the office and went— I thought Mr. Berle motioned 
me to follow him. But as I came to his office door, he went in first, 
and Mr. Achilles and Mr. Mann went in, and I started to follow in, 
and Mr. Berle said, "You are not needed.'' 

So I went away. 

Then on February 16, at 12 o'clock, I had a meeting with Under 
Secretary Bowles, who I had never met before, and who, under the 
old system, would have been the man to whom I Avould directly report, 
unless I felt it necessary to ask for an audience wnth the President or 
the Secretary of State. 

Mr. Bowles reviewed my record with me, and was rather laudatory 
about some of the things that he had heard about me, and that he knew 
I had done, and said that "although you are rated a Republican, you 
are the kind of a fellow I think that we ought to have around this 


administration, and I would like to talk with you later, but I want to 
talk with Mr. Berle first," and one tiling or another like this. 

Mr. Berle was down south, down in South America, trying to work 
on this OAS problem in Brazil and various other places. 

When he got back, and I finally ascertained that Mr. Bowles and 
Mr. Berle had met, I asked for an appointment with Mr, Bowles to 
see Avhere I stood. 

Well, one of the reasons I wanted this appointment was the follow- 

I had come to the conclusion that these ideas of mine had reached 
a point where they had to be put on paper, that I had to go firm on 
what I thought should be done. And I needed to talk to the CIA 
about certain aspects of the possibilities of setting up this jet cover. 
And so I had arranged an appointment with the appropriate officials 
in the CIA for a few days later, when they could see me. 

Some of them were out of town. And either the day of the ap- 
pointment or the day just before it — anyhow, just on the eve of the 
appointment, shall we call it — my opposite number, IMr. Tracy Barnes, 
my junior partner in this partnership, called me up and said, "We 
can't talk to you any more. We can only talk to other people." 

And he mentioned Mr. Berle, and I believe Mr. Mann. 

Now. this is the only official word that I ever had that I was cut 
out of the operation. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. This was when ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. This is on or about February' 1.5. It could be as late 
as the 20th. I didn't keep a record of this kind of thing, by orders 
from Secretary Herter. 

And I had nothing to do with the operation from there on in. 

The surprising thing, however, to me was — and I have no reason 
to resent boing cut out. I mean I am not running this administra- 
tion. It is up to President Kennedy and the superiors to decide who 
they want to have do something. But you will recall tliat having been 
asked by the Secretary of State to do something, I rather thought at 
least I better tell somebody that I wasn't able to do something. 

Mr. SorRwiNE. You did not feel you could be pulled off the job 
by a telephone conversation from your opposite number in CIA ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. That is right. 

Now, the Secretary was out of town, I believe, at the SEATO Con- 
ference, and \'arious other things. And since I knew that INIr. Bowles 
was supposed to be the man, at least under the old setup, I kept trying 
to get an appointment with him. I tried for 30 days straight. I 
called his secretary every day, or went up to see her. I saw him once 
in the hall. He said, "I am awfully busy, I will see you later.'" 

And I finally gave up after 30 days and started working on certain 
other things that had come to my attention about Honduras and like 
that. And that is the end of that story. 

I did see Mr. Berle a couple of times. I couldn't get anything from 
him about any suggestions that I would work on. I asked him what 
I was supposed to do. He said, "I don't know." 

I just got a general runaround. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you eventually get any official expression to 
the etTect that you were called off of this job? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. No, I never have to this day, excepting to be told 
that I was no longer to be continued as a special assistant. 


Mr. SouKwiNE. ~\'\^ien were you told that, and by whom? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I was told that by a telephone conversation with 
Mr. Findley Bums. 

]Mr. SoLTiwiNE. Who is he ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. He is an assistant to Mr. Jones, who is the head 
of — who is the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration in the 
State Department, who telephoned me on, I believe it was, Tuesday, 
April 11. Anyhow — no, it wasn't. It was the day before the invasion 
started, which I think would make it the 16th of April, while I was 
in San Jose. 

Now, the thing which I told General Taylor, and which I felt amazed 
him, and certainly amazed me, is that I have no quarrel with having 
been pulled off the job. It is quite natural, I think, for a new adminis- 
tration to want to have their own people — although I am neither 
really a strong — I am a nonpolitical. I am ostensibly a Republican, 
but I have worked for the New Deal, and everything else. That is not 
the point. They are entitled to do anything they want to. 

But the thing that amazed me most was that I was never, as they 
say, debriefed, and, therefore, never had an opportunity to express 
these ideas, wliicli I think might ha^'e been of some value in the chances 
of success of the operation. 

Mr. SoiTiwiNE. Now, you were called on the phone by this gentle- 
man you named, who was assistant to Mr. Jones ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And what did he tell you ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Well, prior to leaving to say goodbye in San Jose — 
for it is the custom for an Ambassador to make an official goodbye — I 
knew the papers v\-ere lieing processed, to make me a Special Assistant 
to the Secretary of State under t]ie new administration in a formal 
manner. That is on a payroll. "Wlien I was a special assistant before 
I had been paid as Ambassador, on consultation. And I was told by 
Mr. Jones himself that these papers were going to be decided upon by 
Mr. Bowles. 

Before I left to go down to say goodbye in April of 1961, I wrote 
a memo with a copy to Mr. Bowles. I thmk it was addressed to 
INIr. Jones. Anyhow, he got a copy — saying that I would like very 
much to know as soon as possible, preferably while I was down there, 
what my future status was going to be, because it would make a 
difference what I would pack up and send where and all that sort of 
thing. And he called me. As he said, "I am doing this as a courtesy 
by telephone, rather than by telegram, because we don't necessarily 
want to spread this all over the Department while you are still down 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And what did he say ? 

Mv. WiLLAUER. Pie said, "I regret to inform you that you will noc 
be continued on, and that your services will be terminated as of 
April 30." 

Mr. SouRwixE. "Wlien you ended as Ambassador? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. "Wlien 1 ended as Ambassador. And I was accorded, 
at my request, the courtesy of 30 days inore occupancy of my office 
because this had come as a rather sudden thing, and I had to clean u]) 
my files and all that. So I actually left the Department, although I 
wasn't paid, as of the end of May. 


Mr. SouR^^^NE. And you never were called in for a debriefing or 
final consultation? 

Mr. WiLLAuEK. No; excepting after General Taylor was called in 
to look into the failure — I spent approximately an hour telling him 
just what I have told you gentlemen. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, do you know who it was that teraiinated you, 
or by whose order ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. No; I haven't the vaguest idea. Nor liave I made 
any attempt to find out. I have been told by the CIA, by high officials 
in the CIA, that they were extremely dissatisfied by the fact that they 
could not continue to work with me, because they had worked with me 
for years and years and years, and, they said, very successfully. 

]Mr. SouRwiNE. Had the date for the invasion been set in February 
at tlie time they cut you out of the operation ? 

]Mr, WiLLAUER. No. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. So that you did not know about this, and it actu- 
ally came as much of a surprise to you as any person on the outside? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. In a sense; yes. Although I knew we were working 
against certain probable deadlines. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you know Mr. William Wieland ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I knew him, but not well. 

Mr. SouRwixE. Do you have any information respecting Mr. 
Wieland's views at any particular period of time about Castro, and 
the Castro government in Cuba ? 

Mr. WiLLAFER. The only conversation on this subject that I can re- 
call with Mr. Wieland — and I think it probably was the only conversa- 
tion — certainly the only one of any importance — was some time in 
the latter part of 1958, when I happened to drop in to see him, just as 
a matter of courtesy, while I Avas in Washington on a consultation trip. 
I said, "How about this Castro business?" 

And he said, ''Well, we are worried about Castro, and we are trying 
to get some sort of an arrangement between Castro and Batista, some 
sort of a coalition, to live and let live, or other kind of government. 
The church is trying to help us. But we are not getting very far with 
it, because Castro is very stubborn on it, and claims he Avants the 
personal privilege of shooting Batista." 

Mr. SouRwiXE. Was this the first you had heard that the State 
Department was working for a coalition government in Cuba ? 

jNIr. WiLLAUER. Yes. 

Mr. SouRAViNE. You had had experience with the State Department 
seeking a coalition government in China, had you not ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I sure did, under the ^larshall mission. I was there 
and watched that one. 

Mr. SouRwixE. Do you have any firm impression about the possi- 
bilities of the success of a coalition government that involves a 
Communist faction ? 

]Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes; it is going to be A'ery successful for the Com- 
munists inevitably. It always has been. 

Mr. SouRAVix^E. Have you any information that has not been elicited 
from you with respect to either the position of the State Department 
or anyone in the State Department, or wliich otherwise would shed 
light on the question of why the United States took the action or 
course of inaction which it did with respect to Castro? 


Mr. WiLLAUER. Not that I can recall. If anything comes to mind, 
I will be glad to contact the committee and appear again, if you so 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Have you read the public testimony before this 
committee of former Ambassador Robert Hill ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes ; I read it last night. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you have any comments on his testimony that 
you think might be helpful to the committee ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Insofar as the matters contained therein are of my 
personal knowledge, and a great deal of it is of my personal knowl- 
edge, it seems to me a hundred percent correct. Certain opinions that 
he may hold I don't necessarily fully share as strongly as he does — 
things like what Mr. Wieland said and did and all that. I don't know 
anything about it other than by hearsay. But the general tenor of 
his testimony — and certainly the part about what happened at Sal- 
vador, where I was a witness, is absolutely correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember Mr. Hill's recommendations about 
the necessity for changing both procedure and motivation in the 
State Department in order to put this country in a position to cope 
with the Castros and the other Communists ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I certainly do. I helped him in the formulation of 
that part of his testimony. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You would concur in this completely ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I do. I am sort of coauthor of that end of it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, I have no other direct questions of 
this witness. I have covered the situation, as far as I know, where he 
has any information. 

Senator Dodd. Yes. Well, I must say it is a very interesting and 
helpful piece of testimony. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, I have one piece to offer for the 
record. It does not concern this witness. I think this is a good place, 
however, to put it in. It is the earliest chance we have had. 

This is a letter addressed to the chairman, dated July 26, and signed 
by Mr. Brooks Hays, Assistant Secretary of State, and it is in response 
to the cliairman's request for certain correspondence between Am- 
bassador Hill and Mr. Rubottom, which Mr. Hill told us about. The 
Chair might wish to order that this go in the record at this point. 

Mr. AViLLAUER. Might I ask for one more thing in the record ? 

I don't know whether it is in — that I am here in response to a sub- 
pena which was served on me in Nantucket by a U.S. marshal last 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is correct. You are not a volunteer. 

Senator Dodd. Yes, of course, Mr, Ambassador, you were sub]>enaed 
to appear here as a witness under subpena, and the record will show 
this, as counsel has indicated, and as I have. 

And the letter of July 26, addressed to the chairman of this subcom- 
mittee, signed by Brooks Hays, is included as requested by counsel, and 
made a part of the record. 

(The letter referred to is as follows :) 

Department op State, 
Washington, July 26, 1961. 
Dear Mr. Chairman : On behalf of the Subcommittee on Internal Security, 
your chief counsel, Mr. Sourwine, has asked that we furnish certain correspon- 
dence between former Ambassador Robert C. Hill and Mr. Roy R. Rubottom, 


former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, concerning the 
report of the chiefs of missions meeting at San Salvador, April 9 to 11, 1959. 

As you know, reports such as the report of the chiefs of missions meeting at 
San Salvador and related correspondence are as a rule not made available out- 
side of the executive branch. The free and frank exploration of policy by high 
level officers would be impeded if remarks made while the policy was in the 
process of development and formulation were to become available to outsiders. 
In order to assist the subcommittee in its inquiry in this case, however, I am 
very glad to summarize below the background and substance of the exchange of 
letters iroui Amuassador Hill to Mr. Rubottom dated June 1, 1959, and from Mr. 
Rubottom to Ambas.sador Hill dated July 2, 1959. 

The Hill-Rubottom exchange concerned a report of the San Salvador Con- 
ference circulated by the Department to all the participants. In brief, Ajiibas- 
sador Hill wrote that the report as prepared in Washington did not coincide 
with his recollections of what had been said in some of the discussions in San 
Salvador, and in particular did not record in sufficient detail some of his own 
comments. He attached a memorandum of suggested corrections. Mr. Rubot- 
tom replied that in his view the report did portray "with a broad brush" what 
took place at the meeting. 

Ambassador Hill's letter itself acknowledged receipt of the report, confirmed 
a telegraphic objection to the report on the grounds of inaccuracies and omis- 
sions, and stated that tlie attached memorandum of comments on the report was 
based "on my own recollection." The letter went on to express the belief that 
the suggested corrections could be made without great difficulty, and Ambassador 
Hill ottered to help "in any way I can toward this end." Ambassador Hill stated 
that Mr. Rubottom's direction of the discussion was "unfailingly fair and con- 
structive," and that the good results achieved at the Conference were very largely 
due to his efforts. 

Mr. Rubottom, in reply, stated his view that the reiwrt was substantially ac- 
curate, and expressed re.arets that it did not satisfy Ambassador Hill. He said 
no tape recording or stenographic transcrii)t of the proceedings had been made, 
but that the report had been prepared from notes kept at the meeting. Mr. Rubot- 
tom stated his conclusion that the best thing to do was to circulate the Confer- 
ence report, leaving to each chief of mission the opportunity to write in such 
comments as he desired. Mr. Rubottom said he would file Ambassador Hill's 
comments with the record unless Ambassador Hill desired otherwise, and the 
comments were so filed. 

I trust that this will be of assistance to you in completing your investigation. 
If we in the Department can be of further help, please do not hesitate to call on us. 
Sincerely yours, 

(S) Brooks Hays, 

Assistant Secretari/ 
(For the Secretary of State). 

Mr. SouRWixE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Mr. Chairman, I have one more request, or sug- 

Some time ago I prepared a paper called "The Crisis in United 
States Interests in the Caribbean,'' in which I go into this problem of 
the State Department and all of this same material as Ambassador Hill 
went into. I have prepared this in the summer of 1958, while on a 
short home leave. 

And I did submit it to the State Department at at later date, in 
connection with a letter that I wrote to Secretary Herter. I think it 
might be of interest in connection with my testimony as to how I feel 
about Ambassador Hill's views, if you would be interested in receiv- 
ing it. 

Mr. SouR^\^NE. INIay this be printed in the record, Mr. Chairman ? 

Senator Dodd. Surely. 

Mr. WiLLAUER. I have a copy of this, Avhich I would be glad to 


(The paper referred to is as follows :) 

The Crisis in U.S. Interests in the Caribbean 

America's most important interests in the Caribbean are facing ultimate extinc- 
tion at the hands of the international Communist conspiracy and its running 
mate, ignorant supernationalism. 

The threat today is vastly more serioiis than in previous times when similar 
threats were faced ; and in the current world political climate, the means of 
protection are infinitely harder to find and mobilize. 

In the past, American interests in the Caribbean have been threatened by 
pirates, by hostile national actions from abroad, or by greedy dictators. Direct 
action to fight these menaces was acceptable and accepted due to the clearness 
of the immorality of the threat and public tolerance of the principle of self-help 
by force. 

Several decades ago few were shocked when we sent marines into countries 
of the Caribbean to protect our interests from confiscation. The difference today 
is that international communism operates so subtly that only the initiated 
recognize the drift of events until it is too late. Even when communism is 
entrenched in command of a government — as was the case in Guatemala in 
1954 — many will be found to disbelieve this to be so. Furthermore, the horror 
of the use of force by the "colossus of the north" is so great that practically 
no offense of a Latin country is big enough to justify force in the eyes of many 
of our own citizens, and practically all Latin Americans abhor and condemn it. 
This in turn has caused the United States to tie its policy to the twin concepts 
of "nonintervention" and the Organization of American States. 

The OAS is in substance a junior or regional United Nations without a "secu- 
rity council" and the veto power. It acts solely through a "general assembly" 
type of organ where every nation of the 21 in the hemisphere votes equally. 
Although the character of the OAS" preserves the right of individual self- 
protection, in practice, in Latin American affairs, the United States has watered 
this down greatly in comparison with its attitude and actions in other parts of 
the world : and in practice since the charter of the OAS was adopted we have 
never acted unilaterally in Latin America. 

In contrast elsewhere, with but slight hesitation, we come to the rescue of 
"dictator" Chiang at Quemoy, needing only the fact that we have a treaty to 
protect our morality. But it is argued that in the Orient the Communist nature 
of the aggression is open and clear, as if that should make a difference as to 
whether or not we live up to a treaty. 

Or if the overtness of the Communist threat is still felt to make a controlling 
difference, what about our entrance into Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese 
Government? Here there was a threat of communism, but it was subtler and 
masked behind nationalism. Also there were indeed "legitimate revolutionary" 
forces at work in the area at the time — a factor which, in Latin America, we use 
to inhibit activation of our treaty obligations to protect all recognized govern- 
ments in Latin America, even though their regimes are accused of being 

Accordingly, when Somoza or Trujillo asks for aid, we scuttle to the OAS 
where we know that the aid will not be effectively given. This we do, in part, 
as an instinctive reaction because of our abhorrence of dictators, but we also 
are responding to our fear that, if we live up to our treaty obligations, we will 
be charged with protecting rightwing dictators, even though our treaty obliga- 
tions require us to protect them as well as leftwing dictators. 

Worse, still, we at least subconsciously recognize that we are ducking our 
obligations so we lull our consciences by playing up every shred of factual 
doubt as to whether there is a reason to act under treaty obligations. Thus we 
halfway welcome evidence that there is no outside intervention, that the 
matter is an internal one, and that we cannot prove international Communist 
control or participation. 

Why such a fundamental difference in our firmness in acting? Is it because 
of real abhorrence of dictators? If so, how differentiate our policy toward 
China, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, and Korea, in all of which we 
are openly supporting dictatorial regimes. Do we feel differently then about 
dictators in the Western Hemisphere than in other parts of the world? Ap- 
parently so ; but do we really? 


The answer is difficult to find until we break down the problem into an 
analysis of whose feelings we are talking about when we say "our." There 
is pretty clear reason to believe that "our" means two things when we refer 
to Latin America : on the one hand, the American people as a whole ; on the 
other hand, the officials of the Latin American Division of the Department of 
State as the spokesman and policymaker of the executive branch of the U.S. 
Government. The opinion of the American people, as a whole, is clearly against 
dictators everywhere, but, at the same time, it recognizes that the international 
Communist conspiracy is the most ruthless dictatorship of them all. So, when 
thinking as Americans, we have little trouble in choosing in favor of Chiang 
over Mao. Had our press and our Government properly informed our popular 
opinion as to the true nature of what is going on in Latin America, we would 
be in a much better position to decide where our best interests lie. Unfortu- 
nately, as to Latin America, both of these molders of opinion (the press and 
the Government) seem to be repeating for us their sorry performance of the 
previous decade which lead to the capture of China by international com- 

The Edgar Snows of Chinese communism are I'eplaced today by the Herbert 
Matthews of Caribbean Communists. Neither the Snows nor the Matthews are 
Communists, and both can be fairly credited with abhorring it — if and when 
they recognize it. The trouble with this type of journalism is that it is carrying 
a banner for a cause, and, in its hate of the dictators, it is blind to the nature 
of the forces of communism which are infiltrating the legitimate revolutionary 
forces. Today, as yesterday, they fail to see through the agrarian reform ; 
through the rent-control measures aimed against the wicked landlords. They 
do not recognize the familiar Communist plot to liquidate the middle class and 
other opposition elements. How is this possible with the history of Red China 
so clearly and recently written? Truly, it seems that even among our highly 
educated modern press there are many in high places of whom it must be said 
that "none are so blind as those who will not see." 

But what of our Government? The Eisenhower supporters campaigned in 
19.52, in large part, on the disgrace of the loss of China. Treason in the State 
Department was alleged. Are we heading for a similar campaign issue in 1960? 
This time with the Democrats on the offensive and Latin America (or at least 
^he Caribbean) substituted for China? How is it that our President is briefed 
by the State Department to say that communism in Cuba has not been proved, 
and to say it in a context that might easily be interpreted (and unhappily was 
by the New York Times and Walter Lippmann) as proving that the threat of 
Cuban communism is very minor? 

Clearly, such briefing of the President could only come from one place — the 
Ijatin American division of the State Department. What indeed does this divi- 
sion think about the current Caribbean situation? What are the conditioning 
factors and what, if any, program does it really have? 

The Latin American division of the State Department suffers from weaknesses 
which are awesomely similar to those which existed in the China division at 
the time of the loss of China. The keynote in both situations, personnelwise, is 
mediocrity. .Just as the problems of China, a few decades back, received a low 
priority of high-level attention, so, in recent history, have those of Latin Amer- 
ica. It is a fact that with the notable exception of a brief flurry in the time of 
Cordell Hull, with Adolph Berle and Sumner Welles stimulating his interest, no 
Secretary of State, since the beginning of AVorld War II, has paid real attention 
to policymaking in this hemisphere. This has naturally meant that the smarter 
officers of the Department ^^■ere chosen for, or maneuvered themselves into, other 
branches of the service. This, added to the greater attractiveness of life in the 
continental capitals, largely left the field of Latin America free for the second 
run of our diplomats. There have been some notable exceptions, but these were 
largely accidental. Thus the three top career policymakers in the Department 
today, Henderson, Murphy, and Merchant, have had no Latin American experi- 
ence. Anyone naming our 10 most prominent career diplomats would have a 
hard time finding more than 1 or 2 who could be, in any way, considered Latin 
American experts. 

With this large field of approximately 2.5 percent of all foreign posts left open 
in Latin America, the second run of our diplomatic service has proceeded to 
entrench itself very much in the pattern of the old China service. They have 
cultivated a "mystique" about the area. The emphasis is on speaking Spanish 
or Portuguese, on being "simpatico," and all the other little skills that add up 
to a false substitute for deep thinking and sound policymaking. 


Most convenient of all for the second-raters came the sacrosanct policy of 
nonintervention. When so desired, this is truly a sword and a buckler for those 
who want to continue to do nothin,^, because they are incapable of figuring 
out what to do. As a companion piece to that kind of nonintervention, the 
second-raters have forgotten the adage of our first and greatest diplomat, 
Benjamin Franklin, who felt that to represent your country well in another 
country you had to be a little unpopular there. The reason is obvious. You 
must represent your country's interest ahead of the interest of the country 
where you serve. This is, however, not the way to win a popularity contest, 
and to be rated as "simpatico." 

The foregoing weaknesses did not become too damaging or too glaring so 
long as our diplomats in Latin America did not have to face up to very serious 
problems or meet foreign competition by experts in their own field. So without 
the exposure of our weakness, things drifted along the lush postwar years 
when the Latin American economies were thriving and Russia was working 
only covertly and so quietly that she did not attract much public attention. 
When finally faced with disagreeable proof of the steady growth of Communist 
influence south of the border, most of our diplomats were as inexperienced 
with the techniques of the international Communist conspiracy as their Latin 
American friends. 

Practically none of our men had served face to face with the raw facts of 
Communist technique and so, despite "midcareer" and other formal depart- 
mental schooling, they secretly shared the. Latin American view that the Com- 
munists were patriots first, or that being Catholics, local Communists were no 
more than members of another political party. Various devices and catch 
phrases were used to explain away or soft-pedal the menace of communism. A 
favorite one was to talk about pure Marxism, as if that somehow was innocuous. 

Thus tragically today we find ourselves with the international Communist 
conspiracy firmly entrenched in Cuba and ready to spread throughout the 
Caribbean. Its strength in Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia and most of 
Central America is great. In all countries of the Latin American area it is a 
vital factor, and because of ignorance of the Latin American masses and the 
naivete among the educated, there is little chance that the seriousness of 
the menace will be recognized indigenously and the necessary local measures 
to check it taken spontaneously. Unfortunately, at the same time, much of our 
press and of our State Department cannot be counted on for effective help with 
the problem. 

Before proceeding to discussion of courses of action it is necessary to clear 
away some areas of possible misunderstanding which may have arisen in some 
of the previous statements. 

First, what about Latin American "dictatorships"? Despite what has been 
pointed out above concerning our treaty obligations to protect them, on balance 
"dictatorships", even though benevolent, are bad in the Latin American scene. 
That, however, does not mean that we can lightly embrace a policy of overthrow- 
ing them by force, or of turning our backs to revolutionary movements. It is 
a favorite thesis of ex-President of Costa Rica Figueres that dictators cause 
communism. Figueres does not mean exactly this but he does mean that be- 
cause there are dictators and the Communists have hypocritically managed to 
convince a vast majority of those who oppose dictators that they (the Com- 
munists) are enemies of dictators, the existence of dictatorships encourages the 
acceptance of communism as a means to overthrow them. 

Those who thus accept the Communists give little heed to the problem of 
the price which will be collected by the Communists when the dictator falls. 
Figueres fully recognizes this problem and says he prefers to oppose any 
Communist aid in antidictator movements. But Figueres really has no practical 
answer to the problem of how to prevent communism from filling the vacuum 
after a dictator is overthrown. 

Next, what is the correct evaluation of the so-called non-Communist anti- 
dictator Latin American liberals : Figueres, Muiioz Marin, Betancourt, and so 
forth : Many feel they are Communists (or just as bad) and certainly Betancourt 
by his own admission was once a party member. Since no one has ever produced 
a shred of direct evidence that any of them are Communists now, or even fellow 
travelers, the case both for and against them must rest on circumstantial 
evidence with the footnote that the degree of knowledge of the Communist 
machine available to our intelligence services is suSiciently direct so that it is 
an odds on bet that if they were Communists we would know it. As for the 
circumstantial evidence, it is in favor of their being foes of communism. Their 


public utterances and actions have done so much harm to the Communist cause 
that the only possible argument that they are Communists is that they are 
under the deepest of possible cover and are being reserved for some long-range 
use, the nature of which it is difficult to discern. 

Finally, reference has been made to knowledge of languages and other trap- 
pings of the "mystique" of our "Latin American diplomats." This does not 
mean that knowledge of the language and of customs is to be looked down upon 
as a qualification for a diplomat anywhere. What we need is a set of priorities. 
Brains and ability first. To a man with these, the language and customs 
will come easily and rapidly as has often been proved. This is particularly true 
in Latin America because a working knowledge of Spanish or Portuguese is one 
of the easiest linguistic accomplishments to achieve rapidly. 

Incidentally, for obvious reasons it has never seriously been suggested that 
all of our top diplomats everywhere should have a working knowledge of the 
language of the post in which they are about to serve before they are appointed. 
If anyone were so bold as to seriously advocate such a requirement I am sure 
that the Foreign Service career officers would be in the vanguard of the 
opposition to such a suggestion. Clearly, if knowledge of the language of the 
people were a requirement for top diplomatic appointments, this would limit 
such appointments in approximately one-third of our embassies to veterans of 
private enterprise in the countries where the basic language of the people is 
not one of the half dozen major languages of the world. Knowledge of the 
major languages of the Western World, such as English, French, Spanish, Ger- 
man, and so forth, will serve a diplomat well. However, it will only serve him 
well in his contacts with the educated upper crust of the ex-colonies. It is a 
provocative thought that a knowledge of English alone will assure the diplomat 
of contact with the upper crust. 

I am a great believer in and personally practice the study of foreign lan- 
guages with some measure of success. But I submit that given ordinary linguis- 
tic ability, our modern technique of language teaching, a working knowledge 
of any language sufficient to serve as a basis of contact with the people of 
any country can be achieved in 90 days. I also believe that a superficial knowl- 
edge of an "exotic" language may well tempt our diplomats into the trap of 
trying to do business in that language when he ought not to do so. 

I attach for comment a partial list of countries where the language of the 
people is clearly outside the scope of what we should expect from our top dip- 
lomatic officers.* 

Much has been said of the Latin American Division as a whole, but what 
about the men who have headed it in recent years. As to those who have been 
other than out and out career men, there is a considerable body of opinion, 
especially in the U.S. Senate, that the policies they pursued and their tactics 
with theLatin leaders were better designed to further their future intended pri- 
vate careers than to face up to the hard and unpleasant decisions which would 
possibly have altered events but which undoubtedly would have harmed their 
personal popularity. 

As for the career incumbents, they have been of the gi-oup which specialized 
in Latin American affairs and which have been thoroughly discussed above. 

What is to be done at this late date to make a beginning at extricating our- 
selves from the mess in which we find ourselves? Among the steps which should 
be taken are at least the following : 

1. An alliance of the forces vitally interested in finding a solution is an obvious 
first step. In some articulate form, and as unobstrusively as possible at first, 
liaison for exchange of ideas, for formulation of plans, and for taking action 
must be established. Until our Government policy radically Improves, this 
mechanism must be created outside of Government. Indeed, one of its major 
objectives must be to radically reform our Government policy and mechanisms 
for the ai-ea. 

While this alliance probably must start with U.S. private interests in the 
area, it should as rapidly as possible ally itself with like-minded Latin American 
interests. It is extraordinary how much can be accomplished by partnershii)s 
of this kind in handling international problems. It is equally extraordinary to 
those who have practical experience that so little has really been done along 

*Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon. Denmark, Egj-pt, Ethiopia, Finland, Holland, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq. Israel. Japan, Jordan. Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, 
Malaya, Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, Saiitli Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, 


these lines. Indeed, an observer who comes to the Latin American area from 
other areas of the world is struck by the lack of real policy thinking and im- 
plementation by large interests in the area. One explanation for this persistently 
suggests itself; in the formative era of the establishment and growth of these 
interests it was easy to capture the local forces that counted. All-powerful 
dictators could be had for a price. National awakening, social aspirations for 
a better life, and the urge to greater human dignity had not then been aroused 
in the area. 

Wherever possible liaison with sympathetic elements in our own and foreign 
government should be created. Fruitful help in the United States can be hoped 
for from our Department of Defense, from the intelligence community and from 
the legislative branch. There are many officials in the State Department high 
command and some few even in the Latin American Division who, if made aware 
of the true nature of the problem, might be prepared for action. At the very 
least they can be softened up so as not to oppose a positive program. 

2. Perhaps the most important is how and whom to enlist as allies from among 
the Latin Americans. A iirst obvious group in view of the immediate problem • 
in the Caribbean is that of Figueres, Munoz Marin, Betancourt, etc. This, how- 
ever, requires much more careful exploration and at the very least a great deal 
more mutual understanding on the part of the original backers of the suggested 
new movement on the one hand and the Figueres group on the other. Business- 
men with good reason mistrust the high degree of socialism inherent in the 
Figueres thinking whereas Figueres and his friends are suspicious of the methods 
and objectives of private foreign and local interests. 

3. The ideal solution is to form a partnership of local and foreign interests. 
At first this seems an objective unlikely of accomplishment. But is it so hard 
really? And in any event, by working toward it would not much be accom- 
plished ? 

If the advisability of forming a partnership with local interests were sug- 
gested to a sound American enterprise doing a profitable business and with 
no nationalistic threat of a takeover, much persuasion would be needed. Re- 
sistance would be bolstered with the "swapping in midstream" argument. 

But how about those who are today facing expropriation in Cuba? And 
those who are fearing similar action elsewhere? Clearly they must take some 
action. What action is better than to join in partnership with local interests, 
even if the latter have to be lent the money to acquire their share? 

It may be that the partnership suggestion goes too far but, in exploring it, 
some variations acceptable all around may be hit upon. 

One factor must always be borne in mind. It is basic in the legal philosophy 
of all nations that enterprises essential to the survival of a state have to be 
in some manner put under effective control of the state. The means of this 
control vary from state ownership to state regulation, down to majority (or 
substantial) ownership by citizens of the state. Thus in the United States 
we deem our airlines and ships essential to our survival because of their essen- 
tiality in the economy and the national defense. We, therefore, require them 
to be 75 percent owned by our citizens for domestic operation. 

It must be recognized that wherever in Latin America we find a one or two 
commodity economy the essentiality of that commodity can be made by skillful 
politicians (and there are now such trained by Moscow all over the world) 
to appear to the citizens of that country as more important than all our own 
public utilities put together are to us. Therefore, even if there is no indigenous 
communism or socialism in the picture, we must expect that the local people 
will be made apprehensive whenever the commodity is under foreign control. 
Under such circumstances in the long run nothing short of at least some ap- 
pearance of a partnership type of interests will satisfy local opinion; and 
business simply cannot be done without consciously assuming the cost and risk 
of paying that price. U.S. capital which does not have the nerves to stand 
the fluidity of such a relationship neither should stay in nor get into foreign 
business as it has now in reality become in the world. The sooner we get on 
with the mechanics of realistic steps to bring about the appropriate new relation- 
ships the happier the solution will be. 

Indeed, as proven in Mexico and China, and now widely threatened elsewhere 
de facto expropriation under the guise of land reform or greatly increased 
taxation or labor costs is the alternative that all of our interests may shortly 
have to face. The longer we delay the greater the chance that the international 
Communist conspiracy will persuade local governments to make the necessary 
moves to wipe out U.S. interests. Although this will also do infinite harm to 


local interests by drying up effective production, the local people will not under- 
stand this until the harm to them and to our source of supply has been accom- 
plished. The only other recourse for us is to use force, which in today's world 
and our own internal climate we will not face. 

4. There is, however, an intermediate kind of force, economic in nature, which 
involves the deliberate control of the access of the Latin raw materials to 
American markets. This, if skillfully manipulated, could be used to deter 
economic aggression against the American interests in the suggested new partner- 
ship relationships. 

5. In the present state of Latin American managerial know-how a considerable 
foreign management is and will for some time be essential to assure produc- 
tion. Thus for anything in Latin America now owned by Americans where we 
considered that continued production is essential to our future national interest, 
a U.S. official policy must be contrived to preserve this production. Since the 
partnership by local interests is by far the best all-around solution, our Govern- 
ment should institute an addition to our foreign investment guarantee procedure 
to make easy the financing of these local partnerships and to obtain for them 
the adequate recognition and protection needed from local governments. 

As to the vital problem of who shall be the major partnership and in control 
of management, this should be solved by an evaluation process. Obviously, 
here as in every other relationship the caliber of the management provided 
for oversea service will control the result. One of a number of possible tech- 
niques is to provide for U.S. managerial control until the debt for acquiring 
the partnership interest is paid down to the point where an arbitrator would 
state the remaining U.S. interest in the investment is safe, at which time the 
control would pass. 

6. Many will criticize this approach to the fundamental problem of Latin 
American relations because its primary approach is economic and in the private 
enterprise sector. Nothing is further from the truth. Full recognition is given 
to the problems of cultural relations and to the desirability of person-to-person 
understanding brought about through face-to-face dealings. However, it is sub- 
mitted that none of these other things can really thrive until the bread-and-butter 
part of the problem is brought into better condition, and that the business part- 
nership in some variation of its possible forms is the most hopeful basis of a 
sound and lasting solution. 

There are other political ideas which I do not wish to put in wi-iting at the 

Mr, SouRwiNE. I have nothing more, sir. 

Senator Dodd. All right. I want to thank you very much for your 
helpful testimony. We are trying to find out just what went on here, 
mostly so we can prevent a recurrence of it. It is shocking to me, I am 
frank to say, on the record, that a man of your background, who has 
been engaged in the preparations for this affair, was treated so 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Well, of course, I don't mind how I was treated, 
Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Dodd. I know. That is not the point. 

Besides that, when I say treated so shabbily, I mean the welfare 
of the country was treated shabbily. It is just unthinkable to me that 
this sort of thing can happen. I don't care whether they liked you 
or not. 

You understand my saying that. But obviously it seems to me you 
were a man who simply had to be consulted, and certainly should have 
been given an opportunity to wind up your affairs in an orderly 
fashion, at least. 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Well, that is the way I felt about it, if I might 
be permitted to make a remark. The only thing I think that was 
terribly, I might say, unorthodox, or bad for the country, was that 
my brains were not picked when they decided to shift the authority. 

Mr. SoTjRwiNE. Mr. Chairman^ there is one minor matter I might 


bring up. It is a little bit of a loose end. You told us of several per- 
sons to whom you carried your story about the situation in Cuba. 
And one of them whom you mentioned was Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. WiLLAUER. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you actually have an opportunity to complete 
your presentation to Mr. Murphy ? 

Mr. WiLLAUER. No. This was on the attempt to get an NIE, national 
intelligence estimate. And he was called out of the room to see the 
Secretary, and he never really got the whole thing. 

Incidentally, I forgot to tell you gentlemen that when I went into 
this job on December 10, I was put in touch with an office in the 
State Department which has control of all those NIE's, I found 
that the only NIE on this subject in existence was one which was still 
in the process of preparation on December 10, 1960, 

Now, whether or not there has been other special reports to the 
President or not, I do not know. 

But I was assured by the Chief of that office, Mr. Joseph Scott, that 
this NIE that I saw in December, in. an uncompleted fonn, was the 
only one in this situation. 

Senator Dodd. I was going to ask a question that had to do with 
your description of the financial backing at the time of the meeting 
in Costa Rica, the GAS meeting. 

You used the language, "almost unlimited funds." 

Mr. WiLLAUER. We had what we thought fairly solid intelligence 
that the Central Bank of Cuba, or whatever it is called, the one that 
"Che" Guevara is in charge of, had allocated $500,000, which would 
be the equivalent of $5 million in the United States or more, $50 
million, perhaps, to the sabotaging of this conference. This intelli- 
gence came to us through what we deemed to be pretty reliable sources 
out of El Salvador. 

Senator Dodd. Well, this matter of these moneys, these unlimited 
funds, I think, as you accurately describe them, has interested me for 
a long time. I think it is something that we really should take a look 

(Wliereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, subject to 
the call of the Chair.) 

Appendix I 

The following text of an address on the Cuban situation by Secre- 
tary of State Dean Rusk on January 25, 19G2, was ordered printed as 
an appendix to this record : 

[Department of State, press release January 25, 1962] 

Address by Hon. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, at the Eighth Meeting 
OF Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, 
Punta del Este, Uruguay, Janu.iry 25, 1902 

Mr. Chairman, fellow Foreign Ministers, it is a very great personal pleasure 
for me to be here for my first meeting with my colleagues of the Americas. 
The fact that I find among them a number of old friends enhances that pleasure. 

I join my colleagues in expressing our deep appreciation to the Government 
of Uruguay for the warm liospitality which we are enjoying in this lovely 
place, and for all the arrangements which were made on relatively short notice 
to make this meeting possible. Secretary of State Stettiuius once said that 
there might not have been a Charter of the United Nations had it not been for 
the weather and charm of San Francisco. I am confident that Punta del Este is 
making its own special contribution to the unity, strength, and progress of the 
inter-American system. 

For the second time in 6 months, the nations of the Americas met here in 
pursuit of their common goal — social progress and economic growth within a 
community of free and independent nations. But this time we come to make 
measures to safeguard that freedom and independence — so that in the future 
we may devote all our efforts to social progress and economic growth. 

We are assembled again on the eastern shore of a vast continent. Across 
this continent millions of our people are struggling to throw off the bonds 
of hunger, poverty, and ignorance— to affirm the hope of a better life for 
themselves and their children. Last August we joined in an historic document — 
the Charter of Punta del Este — setting forth the goals, the machinery, and 
the commitments necessary to transform that hope into reality. Last August 
we joined hands in a great alliance — the Alianza Para Kl Progreso. 

Since that time, in every part of the hemisphere we have moved forward 
with fresh energy in fulfillment of the pledges we solemnly undertook to the 
peoples of the Americas. Tlie task ahead is vast. Everyone in this hall knows 
the mighty effort which will be required to break the ancient cycle of stagnation 
and despair. But the need for action is urgent. Across the world the winds 
of change are blowing ; awakening peoples are demanding to be admitted to 
the promise of the 20th century. For Americans, north and south, tliis is a 
historical challenge. As the 19th century saw the Western Hemisphere enter 
the epoch of political independence, so the 20th century — if those of us in this 
room, and the Govei'nments we represent, have boldness and faith — will see 
this hemisphere enter the epoch of economic abundance. 

The means by which we seek our ends are the intelligence, decision, and will 
of the governments and people of the hemisphere. We cannot hope to make 
progress unless the governments of our nations faithfully meet the needs of their 
peoples for education and opportunity — unless we press steadily forward with 
the measures of self-help and social reform which make development possible and 
spread its benefits among all the people. This work has already begun. Let me 
say that it is unfinished business in the United States itself. Many Latin 
American nations are engaged in national plans and programs, internal reforms 
and action to build houses, schools, and factories, roads and dams. My own 
country has already made large commitments for this fiscal year and will have 
no difficulty in meeting the more than $1 billion pledged to tiie first year of the 
Alliance for Progress. We have together established international machinery 
to stimulate and review national plans. 



This is a notable beginning. Tliere is, of course, much more to be done. Our 
task is to be measured, not in the months of this year, but in the years of this 
decade. I wish tliere were some way in which we could transmit to you the 
depth of our affectionate interest in the economic and social prospects of this 
hemisphere. Perhaps you would forgive me for a personal recollection. Like 
millions of present-day North Americans, I spent my earliest years in what 
people would now call underdeveloped circumstances. We were prescientific and 
pretechnical : we were without public health or medical care ; typhoid, pellagra, 
hookworm, and malaria were a part of the environment in which providence had 
placed us. Our schools were primitive. Our fathers and mothers earned a 
meager living with backbreaking toil. 

But the great adventure through which many of its have lived has seen the 
transformation of our lives in a short period — a transformation brought about 
by the magical combination of education, health, and increasing productivity. 
On our farms we felt the impact of the indispensable partnership among educa- 
tion, scientific research, and the extension of knowledge to those who could put 
it to practical use. Neighbor helped neighbor to build a house, a barn, or to 
pass along news about new prospects and new methods. They joined together 
to build roads until public funds could take over the burden. They pooled their 
limited resources to hire a schoolteacher or a doctor. Bits of capital began to 
accumulate and this was reinvested in growth and development. More and more 
young people managed to get to the university and more and more of these 
brought their learning back to the benefit of their own people. 

These changes did not take place without struggle. Years of thought and 
work and debate were required to prepare America for the necessary steps of 
self-help and social reform. I remember well the bitter resistance before Frank- 
lin Roosevelt was able to win support for the Tennessee Valley Authority, that 
immense network of dams and power stations and fertilizer factories and agri- 
cultural extension offices which has wrought such miraculous changes in our 
South. But a succession of progressive leaders, determined to bring about social 
change within a framework of political consent, carried through an alliance for 
progress within the United States. 

Other parts of the hemisphere have experienced similar improvements. What 
has been done for some must now be done for all. It shall be our common 
purpose to labor without cease to advance the cause of economic progress and 
social justice within the hemisphere — to advance the autonomous and peaceful 
revolution of the Americans. 

There are those in every land who resist change — who see the society they 
know as the climax of history, who identify their own status and privilege with 
the welfare of their people, and who oppose the vital land and tax reforms 
necessary for the completion of our work. But their resistance is doomed to 
failure. The 19th century is over ; and, in the 20th, people across the earth are 
awakening from centuries of poverty and oppression to claim the right to live 
in the modern woi-ld. "The veil has been torn asunder," wrote Bolivar, "We have 
seen the light ; and we will not be thrust back into the darkness." No one can 
hope to prolong the past in a revolutionary age. The only question is which 
road we mean to take into the future. 

This is not a question alone for this hemisphere. It is a question faced every- 
where in the world. On the one hand are those who believe in change through 
persuasion and consent — through means which respect the individual. On the 
other are those who advocate change through the subjugation of the individual 
and who see in the turbulence of change the opportunity for power. 

I do not believe that I have to argue the moral superiority of free society 
anywhere in the Americas. I do not think, other things being equal, that any 
rational person would prefer tyranny to tolerance or dictatorship to democracy. 
But there are some who doubt the capacity of freedom to do the job. And 
turn in resentment and desperation to totalitarian solutions. They are wrong. 
History shows that freedom is the most reliable means to economic development 
and social justice, and that communism betrays in performance the ends which 
it proclaims in propaganda. The humane and pragmatic methods of freemen 
are not merely the right way, morally, to develop an underdeveloped country; 
they are technically the efficient way. 

We meet here at Punta del Este to consider the tragedy of Cuba. There 
have been many elements in that tragedy. One was the failure of the dictator- 
ship which preceded Castro to concern itself with the elementary needs of a 
people who had a right to be free. Another was the disillusionment of the 
hopes which rode with Castro at the beginning of his resistance movement. And 


now we see the Cuban people subjected to a regime which has committed itself 
to Marxist-Leninist doctrines at the very time when this answer to economic 
and social problems has proved itself to be brutal, reactionary, and sterile. 
If there is one lesson which we in the Americas can learn from observing 
what is happening from East Germany to North Vietnam, it is that Castroism 
is not the answer to economic and social development. If there is tension in 
Berlin today, it is because of the failure of the regime in East Germany and 
the flight of tens of thousands of its people toward freedom and expanding 
opportunity. It is worth noting that vast areas of the world with remarkable 
natural resources have failed to provide even the elementary needs of food, 
contrasted with the surpluses which abound throughout much of the free world. 
The needs of the individual have been ruthlessly subjected to the requirements 
of the power-hungry apparatus of the state. What we know in the free world 
as the consumer is brushed aside and men are called upon to submit themselves 
to the requirements of ambition and appetite. 

"Wherever communism goes, hunger follows. Communist China today is in the 
grip of a vast and terrible famine, which, in turn, has led to stagnation and 
decline of industry. There is hunger in North Vietnam, whatever contribution 
communism has appeared to make to industrial development comes only because 
it does what Marx charged 19th century capitalism with doing : That is, it grinds 
down the faces of the poor and forces from their postponed consumption the 
capital necessary for arms and industry. Communism — once in power — has 
turned out to be the most effective and brutal means known to history for ex- 
ploiting the working class. 

Recognizing its failure in the underdeveloped world, recognizing that its great- 
est enemy is the process of peaceful and democratic development, communism in 
recent years has concentrated — in Asia, in Africa, in the Middle East, now in 
our own hemisphere — on using the troubles of transition to install Communist 
minorities in permanent power. The techniques by which communism seeks to 
subvert the development process are neither mysterious nor magical. Khru- 
shchev, Mao Tse-tung, and Che Guevara have outlined them in frankness and 
detail. They seek first to lay the political basis for the seizure of power by 
winning converts in sections of the populations whose hopes and ambitions 
are thwarted by the existing order. They then ti-y to capture control of broadly 
based popular movements aimed ostensibly at redressing social and economic in- 
justice. In some cases, they resort to guerrilla warfare, as a means of intimi- 
dating opposition and disrupting orderly social progress. At every point, the 
Communists are prepared to invoke all the resource of propaganda and subver- 
sion, of manipulation and violence, to maximize confusion, destroy faith in the 
democratic instriunentalities of change and open up the way for a Communist 

As for its claim to social justice. Chairman Khrushchev himself has given the 
most eloquent testimony of the inevitability of monstrous injustice in a system 
of totalitarian dictatorship. The crimes of Stalin — crimes fully acknowledged 
by his successor — are the inescapable result of a political order founded on the 
supposed infallibility of a single creed, a single party and a single leader. Under 
the banner of the society, communism has become the means of establish- 
ing what the Yugoslavia Communist Milovan Djilas has termed the "new class" — 
an elite as ruthless in its determination to maintain it prerogatives as any 
oligarchy known to history. 

Nothing shows more clearly the failure of communism to bring about economic 
development and social justice than the present condition of Europe. The 
bankruptcy of communism is etched in the contrast between the thriving econo- 
mies of Western Europe and the di'ab stagnation of Eastern Europe — and it is 
symbolized in the wall of Berlin, erected to stop the mass flight of ordinary 
people from communism to freedom. 

The proponents of free society need have no apologies. AVe have moved far 
beyond the rigid laissez-faire capitalism of the 19th century. The open society 
of the mid-20th century can offer the reality of what the Communists promise 
but do not and cannot produce — because the means they are using, the tech- 
niques of hatred and violence, can never produce anything but more violence 
and more hatred. Communism is not the wave of the future. Communists 
are only the exploiters of people's aspirations — and their despair. They are the 
scavengers of the transition fi'om stagnation into the modern world. The wave of 
the future is the peaceful, democratic revolution symbolized for the Americas in 
the Alliance for Progress — the revolution which will bring change without chaos, 
development without dictatorship, and iiope without hatred. 

892 COMMUlsriST threat to U.S. through the CARIBBEAN 

This is our faith, because we have pledged ourselves to this road into the 
future, we have no more urgent obligation than to guarantee and protect the 
independence of the democratic revolution. Because communism has its own 
ambitions, communism everywhere directs its most intense effort to making 
democratic change impossible. It is in this setting that I ask you to consider 
the question of the purposes and methods of communism in our hemisphere. 

If the one striking development of the last years in our hemisphere has been 
the rise of the Alliance for Progress, the other striking development has been 
the defection of Cuba from the inter- American system. 

Let us be clear about the character of the problem presented by Castro and 
his government. 

We have no quarrel with the people of Cuba. As this week we have welcomed 
a free Dominican Republic back into the inter-American community, so we 
looked forward to the day when a free and progressive government will flourish 
in Havana, and the Cuban people can join with us in the common undertakings 
of the hemisphere. 

Many of us in this hemisphere had no quarrel with the avowed puri^oses of 
the revolution of 1959. Many rejoiced in the aspirations of the Cuban i>eople 
for political liberty and social progress. Nor would we have any quarrel with 
changes in the economic organization of Cuba instituted with the consent of 
the Cuban people. Our hemisphere has room for a diversity of economic sys- 
tems. But we do condemn the internal excesses of the Castro regime — the viola- 
tions of civil justice, the drumhead executions, the suppression of political, 
intellectual, and religious freedom. But even these things, repellent as they are, 
have been known to our continent. If kept within the confines of one unhappy 
country, they would not constitute a direct threat to the peace and the inde- 
pendence of other American states. What we cannot accept — and will never 
accept — is the use of Cuba as the means through which extracontinental powers 
seek to break up the inter-American system, to overthrow the governments of 
other countries and to destroy the autonomous democratic evolution of the 

The Castro regime has extended the global battle to Latin America. It has 
supplied communism with a bridgehead in the Americas, and it has thereby 
brought the entire hemisphere into the front line of the struggle between com- 
munism and democracy. It has turned itself into an arsenal for arms and 
amnumition from the Communist world. With Communist help Dr. Castro 
has built up the largest military establishment in Latin America. 

Within the United Nations, the Cuban delegation has abandoned its bi-ethren 
of the hemisphere to play the smirking sycophant for the Communist bloc. 
Out of the 37 rollcall votes taken on the most important issues in the last session 
of the General Assembly, a majority of the members of the Organization of 
American States voted together 35 times. But, of these 37 votes, Cuba voted 33 
times with the Soviet bloc — and only 5 times with the OAS majority. Cuba 
opposed the resolution appealing to the Soviet Union not to explode the 50-mega- 
ton bomb ; it was the only delegation in the United Nations, besides the 10 avowed 
members of the Soviet bloc, to do so. In the same manner, Cuba alone joined 
the Communist bloc to oppose the resolution calling for a nuclear test ban treaty 
with international controls. On several occasions, Cuban representatives fol- 
lowed other members of the Communist bloc in walking out of the General As- 
sembly when delegates of states not approved by the Soviet Union dared take 
the floor. 

At the seventh meeting of Foreign Ministers at San Jose in August I960, our 
governments together rejected any attempt on the part of the Communist powers 
to exploit the political, economic, or social troubles of any American state. Since 
San Jose, the Cuban Government has alined itself more flagrantly than ever with 
those dedicated to the overthrow of the inter-American system and the destruc- 
tion of inter-American freedom. The Soviet-Cuban communique of September 
20, 1961, and the Chinese-Cuban communique of October 2, 1961, both signed by 
President Dorticos, proclaim an identity of views on foreign policy between the 
Cuban and the Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes. Only a few weeks ago, 
Dr. Roa, the Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, made clear once again that the 
primary allegiance of the Castro Government is not to its brethren in the Ameri- 
cas but to its comrades beyond the Iron Curtain. "The Socialist camp, led by 
the invincible Soviet Union, is with the Cuban revolution," Dr. Roa said. "We 
are neither alone nor helpless. The world is with the Cuban revolution, and the 
future belongs entirely to the universal Socialist society that is coming, and of 
which, forever, Cuba already forms part." 


When Dr. Castro himself said on December 2, "I am a Marxist-Leninist and 
I shall be a Marxist-Leninist until the last day of my life," he could have sur- 
prised only those who have paid no attention to the evolution of the Castro 
regime. This public oath of fealty to Marxism-Leninism underlines Dr. Castro's 
commitment to the Leninist use of deception and violence, to the Leninist con- 
tempt for free institutions, and to the Leninist injunction that obedience to 
the international Communist movement is the highest duty. 

Driven by this Marxist-Leninist faith, the Castro regime has dedicated itself, 
not to the struggle for democracy within the hemisphere or even within Cuba, 
but to the perversion and corruption of this struggle in the interests of world 
communism. Part III of the report of the Intei'-American Peace Committee 
sets forth the ties of the Government of Cuba with the Sino-Soviet bloc, its 
subversive activities within the hemisphere, its violations of human rights, 
and the incompatibility of its behavior with the Charter of the Organization 
of American States. 

Fourteen years ago at Bogotii, the Ninth International Conference of Ameri- 
can States in its Resolution XXXII on "The Preservation and Defense of 
Democracy in America" declaimed that "By its antidemocratic nature and 
its interventionist tendency, the political activity of international communism 
or any other totalitarian doctrine is incompatible with the concept of American 
freedom. This resolution condeunied "interference by any foreign power, or 
by any political organization serving the interests of a foreign power, in the 
public life of the nations of the American continent." The American Republics 
solemnly resolved "to adopt, within their respective territories and in accordance 
with their respective constitutional provisions, the measures necessary to eradi- 
cate and prevent activities directed, assisted, or instigated by foreign govern- 
ments, organizations, or individuals tending to overthrow their institutions by 
violence, to foment disorder in their domestic political life, or to disturb, by 
means of pressure, subversive propaganda, threats, or by any other means, the 
free and sovereign right of their peoples to govern themselves in accordance 
with their democratic aspirations." 

Three years ago at Santiago, the Foreign Ministers of the American Re- 
publics reaffirmed the Bogota Resolution in the Declaration of Santiago, con- 
demning "the methods of every system tending to suppress political and civil 
rights and liberties, and in particular the action of international communism 
or any other totalitarian doctrine." 

No one can doubt, on the basis of hard evidence compiled by committees of 
the OAS and known to every observer in our hemisphere, that the Castro 
regime has placed itself in a position of systematic and contemptuous hostility 
to these principles of our inter-American system. Beyond the evidence, every 
delegate in this hall knows in his mind and heart that those behind Castro hope 
to overthrow his Government and every other Government in Latin America. 
The (3astro regime, by repudiating the principles and philosophy of the inter- 
American system and making itself the American agent of world communism, 
has created a clear and present danger to the prospects of free and democratic 
change in every country in Latin America. The time has come for the American 
Republics to unite against Communist intervention in this hemisphere. We 
believe in the inter-American system. We stand on the principles of the Charter 
of the Organization of American States. We are faithful to the ancient hope of 
a hemisphere of free democracies, bound together in independence and common 
purpose. Else we would reject that hope, forsake our faith itself, exposed in 
its isolation to every gust of political or ideological fanaticism. 

The Alliance for Progress is the best way of attacking the longrun sources of 
the Communist appeal— poverty, hunger, and ignorance. But the Alliance cannot 
by itself provide a means of warding off the shortrun Communist tactics of dis- 
ruption and subversion. Vitamin tablets will not save a man set upon by hood- 
lums in an alley. If the Alliance is to succeed, we need to protect the Democratic 
processes of change — we need a shield behind which constructive measures can 
take effect in steady and secure progression. We have seen the effect of Commu- 
nist disruptive tactics in other lands and other continents. Let us take action 
now to guard our own continent and our programs of Democratic reform against 
those who seek to replace democracy by dictatorship — those who would trans- 
form our fellowship of free states into a bondage of satellites. 

I am confident that this meeting of foreign ministers will hearten the Demo- 
cratic forces of this continent by making it clear that we will not stand still while 
the enemies of democracy conspire to make Democratic change impossible. 
Against Dr. Castro's Communist allie.';, let us reaffirm our faith in our own good 



neighbors ; let us commit our minds and our hearts to the success of our free 
Alliance for Progress. 

What is our working task here at this meeting? I suggest we must move in 
four major directions : 

First, we must recognize that the alinement of the Government of Cuba with 
the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc, and its commitment to extend Communist 
power in this hemisphere, are incompatible with the purposes and principles of 
the inter-American system and that its current activities are an ever-present and 
common danger to the peace and security of the continent. 

Second, we must now make the policy decision to exclude the Castro regime 
from participation in the organs and bodies of the inter-American system ; and 
to direct the Council of the Organization to determine how best to give rapid 
implementation to this decision. Within our own competence, since the Inter- 
American Defense Board was created by a meeting of consultation, we can and 
should now exclude the Government of Cuba from membership in the Inter- 
American Defense Board. This step would correct at once the most obvious in- 
congruity arising from the participation of a regime alined with the Sino-Soviet 
bloc in a body planning the defense of the hemisphere against the aggressive 
designs of international communism. 

Third, we must interrupt the limited but significant flow of trade between Cuba 
and the rest of the hemisphere, especially the traflSc in arms. 

Fourth, we must set in motion a series of individual and communal acts of 
defense against the various forms of political and indirect aggression mounted 
against the hemisphere. The acts of political aggression which the Castro 
regime is committing have an immediate and direct impact in the general Carib- 
bean area near the focus of infection. Yet with one exception there is not a 
foreign minister present whose country has not felt the impact of the interven- 
tionist activities which constitute essential elements of the international Com- 
munist design. We must find adequate means to strengthen our capacity to 
anticipate and overcome this constant gnawing at the security of our peoples. In 
particular, we should direct the Inter-American Defense Board to establish a 
special security committee to recommend individual and collective measures to 
the Governments of the American States for their greater protection against any 
acts or threats of aggression, direct or indirect, resulting from the continued 
intervention of Sino-Soviet powers or others associated with them. 

As we confront these decisions let us face, as old friends and neighbors, a few 
basic facts in our situation. The weight of Communist aggressive techniques 
is felt unequally among us : the nature of the Communist threat is understood 
in different ways among our peoples; and the OAS itself is confronted, as a body, 
with a form of aggressive action relatively new in its history. 

We have heard references to the intrusion of the cold war into this hemi- 
sphere. There may be some who wonder whether the Americas are being 
caught up, as innocent bystanders, in a struggle among the giants. 

But let us think clearly about what the cold war is and what it is not. The 
Communist world has dedicated itself to the indefinite expansion of what it calls 
its historicallv inevitable world revolution. The cold war is simply the effort 
of communisiii to extend its power beyond the confines of the Communist bloc 
and the effort of free men to defend themselves against this systematic aggres- 
sion. The cold war would have been unknown to us had the Soviet Union deter- 
mined at the end of World War II, to live in peace with other nations in accord- 
ance with its commitments under the Charter of the United Nations. The cold 
war would end tomorrow if those who control the Communist movement would 
cease their aggressive acts, in all their many forms. Nothing would be more 
gratifying to the citizens of my country than to have the Soviet Union bring 
about "the revolution of peace by a simple decision to leave the rest of the world 

alone. . , ^i, xt -^ i 

But the cold war is not a contest between the Soviet Union and the United 
States which the United States is pursuing for national ends. It is a struggle 
in the long story of freedom, between those who would destroy it and those who 
are determined 'to preserve it. If every nation were genuinely independent, and 
left alone to work out its relations with its neighbors by common agreement, the 
tensions between Washington and Moscow would vanish overnight. 

Speaking last October, before the 22d Communist Party Congress, Mr. 
Khrushchev said : , ., , , ■, r,., 

"We firmly believe that the time will come when the children and grandchil- 
dren of those who do not understand and do not accept communism will live 
under communism." 


This is his belief. Were it only his belief we need not care ; but it is also the 
program of action of the Communist powers — and about that we care a very 
great deal. 

We know that the Communist effort to impose their system on other nations 
and peoples will fail and that the next generation will dwell in a community of 
independent nations, each freely pursuing the welfare of its people. We know 
this is so because history confirms that freedom must win because it is rooted 
in the nature of man and in his relations with God. 

Our problem today is to combine a sense of the necessities of the harsh real- 
ities with the dreams upon which civilized man has steadily built. A shining 
future is waiting for us in this hemisphere — a future in which every child will 
have a decent chance for life, for education, for medical care, for constructive 
labor, and creative contribution : in which every republic on this continent will 
cooperate to improve lagging standards, to elevate culture, and to raise man to 
his full dignity in freedom. 

We have the talents, the resources, and the aspirations. We need not retreat 
into the murky shadows of a conspiratorial society developed on the steppes of 
central Asia because we can move ahead in the great tradition of a civilization 
which was born in the free discourse of the early Mediterranean world more 
than 2,000 years ago, was nourished in Western Europe, and came to this hemi- 
sphere to be extended by Bolivar and San Martin, by Marti, Jefferson, and Lin- 

Our task today is not to let a petty tyrant who has appeared among us divert 
us from these great tasks but to put him in his place while we proceed with the 
great adventure upon which we are embarked together. 

Appendix II 

The following chronology of events in Cuba was prepared by the 
Department of State at the request of Senator Morse and was ordered 
printed as an appendix to these hearings : 

Chronology of Important Events in United States-Cuban Relations, 1957-62 


The attached chronology for the period. 1957-62 records, on the one hand, 
U.S. Government attempts to get along with the Castro regime in Cuba, and on 
the other, that regime's hostility toward the United States and betrayal of the 
Cuban revolution to international communism. 

As early as 1957 the U.S. Government expressed its concern over political 
unrest in Cuba. In 1958 we suspended arms shipments to the Batista govern- 
ment which, in disregard of an agreement with the United States, had used them 
to combat the revolutionary movement headed by Fidel Castro. When the Castro 
regime came to power in 1959, the United States looked upon it with sympathy, 
recognized it almost immediately, and welcomed its promises of political freedom 
and social justice for the Cuban people. We made clear our willingness to dis- 
cuss Cuba's economic needs. Despite our concern at the Cuban regime's mount- 
ing hostility toward the United States and its growing Communist tendencies, we 
attempted patiently and consistently from early 1959 until late 1960 to negotiate 
differences with the regime. 

Elements in the Castro movement engaged in anti-American activities during 
the revolution against Batista. Soon after it came to power in 1959, the Castro 
government turned away from its previous promises, permitted Communist 
influence to grow, attacked and persecuted its own supporters in Cuba who 
expressed opposition to communism, arbitrarily seized U.S. properties, and made 
a series of baseless charges against the United States. It ignored, rejected, or 
imposed impossible conditions on repeated U.S. overtures to cooperate and 
negotiate. In 1960 Cuba established close political, economic, and military 
relationships with the Sino-Soviet bloc, while increasing the pace and vehemence 
of measures and attacks against the United States. We did not take defensive 
measures until the last half of 1960. 

The United States terminated relations with the Cuban Government in January 
1961 because of Cuban demands which placed crippling limitations on our ability 
to carry out diplomatic and consular functions in Cuba. The adoption by the 
present Cuban Government of a totalitarian Communist system and its aline- 
ment with the international Communist movement, which were already clear at 
that time, have become more complete since then. These developments cul- 
minated in December 1961, when Castro openly espoused Marxism-Leninism. 

July 25, 1957 : U.S. Ambassador Earl T. Smith, upon presentation of credentials, 
states that the American people are saddened and concerned over the political 
unrest which has led to bloodshed in Cuba. 

March 14, 1958 : U.S. suspends arms deliveries to Cuba. 

June 22, 1958 : Raul Castro, rebel commander in northern Oriente Province, 
issues a military order for the detention, effective June 27, of all U.S. 
male citizens for the purpose of "stopping U.S. military shipments to the Batista 
government." Pursuant to this order, starting June 26, Cuban rebels kidnap 43 
U.S. citizens, including 30 sailors and marines, from the U.S. Naval Base at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The last of those kidnaped are released July 18. 

September-October 1958 : Cuban rebels set up a system for levying taxes on 
both Cuban and U.S. enterprises operating in rebel-occupied territory in eastern 
Cuba, and harass several U.S. companies in an attempt to collect funds and ac- 
quire supplies and equipment. 

October 20, 1958 : Cuban rebels kidnap two Americans employed by the Texas 
Oil Co., and release them 3 days later. 



January 1, 1959 : President Batista flees Cuba. 

January 2, 1959 : Fidel Castro proclaims provisional government headed by 
Manuel Urrutia as President. 

January 5, 1959 : President Urrutia appoints Jose Miro Cardoua as Prime 

January 7, 1959 : The United States recognizes the Cuban Government, noting 
with satisfaction the assurances given of the Cuban intention to comply with 
international obligations and agreements, and expresses the sincere good will of 
the Government and people of the United States toward the new Government and 
the people of Cuba. 

January 7, 1959 : The Communist Party daily, Hoy, appears in Havana for 
the tirst time since 195.3. 

January 9, 1959 : Ernesto Guevara, commander of La Cabana fortress in 
Havana, says that many members of the Communist Party lost their lives lighting 
Batista while the Batista government was receiving weapons from the U.S. 
Government, and that the Communists have earned the right to be just another 
party in Cuba. 

January 13, 1959 : By this date, almost 200 persons have been "tried" by revo- 
lutionary tribunals, found guilty, and summarily shot. By the end of 1959, tb** 
count is over 600. 

January 27, 1959: Nine U.S. companies operating in Cuba have made advance 
payments of $2,560,000 on taxes which are not due until March 30. 

February 16, 1959 : Fidel Castro succeeds Miro Cardona as Prime Minister. 

March 2, 1959 : U.S. Ambassador Philip W. Bonsai presents credentials. He 
brings cordial greetings and heartfelt good wishes from President p]isenhower for 
the happiness, prosperity, and progress of Cuba. He states to President Urrutia : 
"We wish you every success in your announced objective of raising the standard 
of living of your country. I shall devote particular attention to all opportu- 
nities of increased cooperation in the economic field which may present them- 

March 4, 1959 : The Cuban Government intervenes the Cuban Telephone Co.. 
the first intervention of a U.S. -owned firm. 

March 16, 19.59 : Cuban Ambassador Ernesto Dihigo presents credentials. 
President Eisenhower expresses hope and desire for ever closer relationship 
between Cuba and the United States. 

March 22, 1959: Prime Minister Castro charges that U.S. authorities were lax 
in keeping track of arms purchases and other activities in the United States 
directed against Castro. United States denies charge on March 23. 

April 13, 1959 : Ambassador Bonsai tells Prime Minister Castro that the United 
States considers Castro's forthcoming visit to the United States very important, 
and offers to help in any way required. 

April 16, 1969 : During lunch given by Secretary of State Christian Herter for 
Prime Minister Castro in Washington, Assistant Secretary of State Roy R. 
Rubottom, Jr., in conversation with the president of the Cuban National Bank, 
Felipe Pazos, arranges further conversations for the following day with Cuban 

April 17, 1959: Assistant Secretary RulMittom gives Minister of Economy 
Regino Boti, Minister of Treasury Rufo Lopez Fresquet, and Pazos friendly 
welcome and invites them to indicate Cuba's needs. He says the U.S. Govern- 
ment desires to be helpful. The Cubans rebuff offer. 

Later the same day Prime Minister Castro, in a speech to the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors, says he has not come to the United States to ask 
for money. 

May 17, 1959 : Cuban Government approves agrarian reform law, providing 
for taking of agricultural properties, payment to be in 20-year bonds at 4i/4 per- 
cent interest. 

May 27, 1959: Assistant Secretary Rubottom tells Ambassador Dihigo that the 
United States understands that the Cuban revolution is deep and meaningful for 
the Cuban people, that its eventual course is matter for their decision, and that 
we understand the desire and need for land reform. 

June 1, 1959 : Ambassador Bonsai, in informal conversation with Minister of 
State Roberto Agramonte, states that the United States supports sound land 
reform, and recognizes Cuba's right to expropriate private property, provided just 
and prompt compensation is made. He states that it is in the interest of both 
Cuba and the United States to work together, to get along amicably, and to afford 
each other a full hearing before taking actions materially affecting the other. 


June 11, 19.59 : Commenting on Cuban agrarian reform law, United States ex- 
presses sympathy for the objectives of agrarian reform ; recognizes the right of 
a state to take property for public purposes, coupled with an obligation to pay 
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation ; expresses concern as to the ade- 
quacy of the law's provisions for compensation to U.S. citizens whose property 
may be expropriated ; and expresses hope for further exchanges of views. 

.June 12, 1959 : Ambassador Bonsai urges on Prime Minister Castro the impor- 
tance of close relations between Cuba and the United States because of the inter- 
related economies and the proximity of the two countries. 

June 20, 1959 : In Washington. Assistant Secretary Rubottom offers Ctiban 
Minister of St^ite Raul Roa full cooperation in returning problems of United 
States-Cuban relations to normal, nonpublic diplomatic channels, as advocated 
by Ron. 

June 22, 1959: In Washington, Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon tells 
Minister of State Roa of the sincere desire of the United States that Cuba grow 
and prosper, and expresses the hope that the mutually beneficial traditional 
relationship between the United Stiites and Cuba continue. 

June 25, 1959 : Cuban Government seizes three of U.S.-owned cattle ranches in 
Camaguey Province, first such .seizures subseijuent to the agrarian reform law. 

June 27, 1959 : Cuban Government seizes U.S.-owned cattle ranch in Oriente 

July 1, 1959: Maj. Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz resigns as head of the Cuban Air 
Force, charging Communist infiltration of the armed forces and Government. 

July 12, 1959 : Prime Minister Castro describes reported appearance of Major 
Diaz Lanz before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in executive session 
as an unfriendly act and as U.S. interference in the internal affairs of Cuba. 

July 13. 1959 : President Urrutia, appearing on television, states that commu- 
nism is not really concerned with the welfare of the people, and that it con- 
stitutes a danger for the Cuban revolution. 

July 14, 1959: Major Diaz Lanz testifies publicly before the Senate Internal 
Security Subcommittee on communism in Cuba. 

July 14, 19.59 : Acting Minister of State Armando Hart denounces Diaz Lanz's 
appearance befoi-e Senate Internal Security Subcommittee as blatant interven- 
tion in Cuban internal affairs. 

July 17, 1959 : In television appearance, Fidel Castro resigns as Prime Minister 
and accuses President Urrutia of treason because of July 13 speech. Urrutia 

July 23, 1959 : Ambassador Bonsai expresses to Minister of State Roa the 
general sympathy of the United States for the objectives of the Cuban revolution 
and our support for agrarian reform programs of a sound nature. States that 
in connection with the Diaz Lanz case, U.S. policy has been correct and faithful 
to our highest principles. Expresses concern over the deterioration in Cuba- 
United States relations as a result of anti-American statements of principal 
Cuban Government leaders. Expresses wish of U.S. Government to cooperate in 
any way in obtaining information on various incidents. 

.July 26, 1959: Fidel Castro announces that he will resume position of Prime 

July 31. 1959 : On at least six occasions during the month, Cuban Govern- 
ment officials seize or place cattle on land owned by U.S. citizens. 

August 15, 19.59: Prime Minister Castro charges complicity of U.S. officials 
in permitting planes participating in counterrevolutionary activities against 
Cuba to take off from the United States. 

August 21, 19.59 : Assistant Secretary Rubottom emphasizes to Ambassador 
Dihigo that he believes that the United States and Cuba urgently need to sit 
down together and talk over various problems to arrive at an understanding. 

August 31. 39.59: On at least three occasions during the month, Cuban Gov- 
ernment officials seize or harvest land owned by U.S. citizens. 

September 2, 1959 : Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William P. Snow, in 
conversation with Ambassador Dihigo, expresses regret at the continuing at- 
tacks on the United States by Cuban Government officials, concern at the failure 
of the Cuban Government to hear the views of U.S. business interests before 
the passage of laws affecting them, and the hope that the Cuban Government 
might arrive at a better understanding of the U.S. position in defense of de- 
mocracy against the world Communist conspiracy. 

September 3, 1959: In first interview since June 12, Ambassador Bonsai ex- 
presses to Prime Minister Castro our general sympathy with the objectives of 
the revolution, concern at anti-American statements made by Cuban officials and 


al insinuations by Cuban oflScials that our relations have not been straight- 
forward and correct, at the treatment received by American interests in Cuba, 
and at the failure of the Cuban Government to see the implications of inter- 
national communism. 

September 10, 1959 : Assistant Secretary Rubottom tells Cuban representa- 
tive on Inter-American Economic and Social Council, Enrique Perez Cisneros, 
that the United States is still disposed to carry out a policy of friendship and 
fairness toward Cuba despite considerable provocation during the past 9 months. 

September 21, 1959 : Ambassador Dihigo informs Assistant Secretary Rubot- 
tom that President Osvaldo Dorticos and Minister of State Roa are completely 
receptive to the idea that Cuba and the United States begin immediately to 
discuss their problems and endeavor to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions. 
He requests that the United States compile a list of the general and specific 
problems now troubling the United States in its relations with Cuba, and present 
the list to the Cuban Government. Rubottom indicates his pleasure at this 
request and says that we will immediately give consideration as how best to 
meet it. 

September 30, 1959 : On at least eight occasions during the month, Cuban 
Government ofiicials seize water system, forest and other lands, and place cattle 
on land owned by U.S. citizens. 

October 6, 1959: Ambassador Bonsai tells Minister of State Roa that the 
United States is generally in sympathy with the stated democratic social ob- 
jectives of the Cuban revolution, but also is perplexed and in doubt about 
Cuban attitudes toward the United States and the free world. 

October 12, 1959 : United States presents note to Cuban Government reaffirm- 
ing our understanding and sympathy for the goals which the Cuban Govern- 
ment has declared to be the purpose of its agrarian reform. 

October 19, 1959 : Maj. Hubert Matos, a rebel army leader during the revolu- 
tion, resigns as military chief of Camaguey Province, charging Communist 
penetration of the Government. Matos is arrested and on December 15 is 
sentenced to 20 years in prison for conspiracy, sedition, and treason. 

October 21, 1959: Maj. Diaz Lanz makes an illegal fiight from the United 
States over Havana. Prime Minister Castro charges that the plane bombed and 
strafed Havana resulting in deaths and injuries. 

October 26, 1959: Prime Minister Castro accuses the Unites States of tolerat- 
ing air incursions against Cuba and of threatening Cuba with economic strangu- 

October 26, 1959 : Cuban Government passes law imposing confiscatory taxes 
upon the Nicaro nickel facilities, owned by the U.S. Government, in violation of 
a binding international agreement. Subsequently the Cuban Government inter- 
mittently embargoes the export of the product and continually harasses the 
operation by delaying or failing to approve the exportation of the product and 
the importation of critically needed supplies and replacement parts. 

October 27, 1959 : Referring to October 21 incident, United States states that 
the plane distributed leaflets over Havana, that it was impossible for the plane 
to bomb or strafe, that the Cuban police reported no bombing or strafing, and 
that deaths and injuries from the incident must have resulted from Cuban anti- 
aircraft fire or bombs thrown by terrorists. Rejects implication that the United 
States approved the flight or was in any way responsible. 

October 27, 1959 : Ambassador Bonsai tells Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos 
and Minister of State Roa that the "United States awaits a resolution by the 
Cuban Government of the issues involved on a basis of friendship and observance 
of international law which have traditionally characterized negotiations between 
Cuba and the United States." Bonsai also expresses the hope that normal 
negotiations will not be distorted to obscure the deep sympathy with which the 
entire United States views the efforts of the Cuban people to achieve their social, 
economic, and political aspirations. 

October 31, 1959 : On at least 12 occasions during the months, Cuban Govern- 
ment officials seize lands, cattle, and equipment, order cattle moved, deny access 
to pastures, order cutting of timber, open fences and plow up land, and place 
cattle on land owned by U.S. citizens. 

November 6, 1959: Cuban Ministry of State distributes brochure entitled 
"Cuba Denounces Before the World." Brochure repeats allegations about Octo- 
ber 21 plane incident and charges that the United States is providing political 
asylum to Cuban fugitives from justice. 

November 9, 1959 : United States protests November 6 brochure as disregard- 
ing facts on plane incident. Also states that Cuban Government has never re- 


quested extradition of alleged fugitives from justice under extradition treaty 
with United States. 

November 24, 1959 : Daniel M. Braddock, Minister-Counselor of American Em- 
bassy, Havana, states to Minister of Economy Boti that although various indi- 
vidual matters have been discussed between Cuba and the United States, little 
or no progress has been made on them. Braddock says that some American 
companies in Cuba fear that the ultimate intention of the Cuban Government 
is to take them over. 

November 30, 1959 : On at least nine occasions during the month, Cuban Gov- 
ernment officials seize land, cattle, and equipment, and place cattle on land owned 
by U.S. citizens. 

December 4, 1959 : Ambassador Bonsai reviews for Minister of Economy Boti 
the principal events in United States-Cuban relations since October 12, noting 
the deterioration that has occurred in the meantime. He refers to the Cuban 
offer of November 13 to continue negotiations on pending questions, and asks 
if Boti is disposed to resume these discussions. Boti indicates assent. 

December 31, 1959 : Cuba and Communist China sign trade agreement under 
which Cuba is to sell Peiping 50,000 tons of sugar. 

December 31, 1959 : On at least seven occasions during the month, Cuban 
Government officials seize land, equipment, property, remove timber, borrow 
equipment (most of which is not returned), and use repair shops owned by U.S. 

January 11, 1960: United States protests seizure of U.S. property in recent 
weeks by Cuban officials in violation of agrarian reform law. States that with- 
out court order or any written authorization, lands and buildings have been 
seized and occupied ; equipment has been confiscated and removed ; cattle have 
been taken ; wood has been cut and sold ; productive pastures have been plowed 
under without the consent of their owners ; and fences and boundaries have been 
arbitrarily moved. 

January 21, 1960: Prime Minister Castro says that notes from the U.S. State 
Department and statements by U.S. officials encourage counterrevolutionary 
activities against Cuba and indicate that a policy of hostility against Cuba is 
more evident every day. He implies that the United States exploited Cuba for 
50 years. 

January 26, 1960 : President Eisenhower reaffirms the adherence of the United 
States to the policy of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, 
including Cuba ; explicitly recognizes the right of the Cuban Government and 
people to undertake social, economic, and political reforms which, with due 
regard for their obligations under international law, they may think desirable; 
and expresses the sympathy of the American people for the aspirations of the 
Cuban people. 

January 27, 1960 : Answering President Eisenhower's statement of January 
26, President Dorticos states that the Cuban Government is fully disposed to 
discuss differences between Cuba and the United States through diplomatic 
negotiations, and will hear and consider complaints and claims regarding in- 
dividual cases raised by U.S. citizens, in accordance with Cuban and international 

January 31, 1960 : On at least 11 occasions during the month, Cuban Govern- 
ment officials seize a marine dredge, land, stores, cattle and horses, and brand 
cattle owned by U.S. citizens. 

February 4, 1960 : Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan arrives 
to open a Soviet exhibition. 

February 4, 1960 : Charge d'Affaires Braddock states to Minister of State Roa 
that the United States is disposed to take President Dorticos' statement at face 
value and is prepared to return to diplomatic norms. Braddock mentions the 
desirability of leading officials of both Cuba and the United States working 
within the traditional spirit of United States-Cuban friendship, maintaining 
an atmosphere free of public recriminations, and observing standards of inter- 
national and domestic laws applicable to each other's nationals. 

February 10, 1960 : United States states that it considers the January 27 state- 
ment of President Dorticos consistent with a desire for a return to normal 
diplomatic channels and welcomes the readiness of the Cuban Government to 
negotiate pending problems. 

February 13, 1960 : Prime Minister Castro and Deputy Premier Mikoyan sign 
joint Soviet-Cuban communique describing their conversations as "carried out 
in an atmosphere of frank cordiality." 


February 13, 1960 : Cuba and Soviet Union sign trade and economic aid agree- 
ments. Soviet Union to buy 1 million tons of Cuban sugar in each of ensuing 
5 years. Soviet Union extends $100 million credit for purchase of equipment. 

February 15, 19G0 : Replying to U.S. protest of January 11, Cuban Government 
states that no property has been confiscated under the agrarian reform law ; that 
where agrarian reform officials have occupied properties, steps are being taken 
for their fair appraisal ; and that if the United States considers that Cuban 
laws have been violated, U.S. nationals have the right to appeal through 
appropriate channels. 

February 15, 1960 : Commerce Minister Cepero Bonilla states that the United 
States pays a premium price for sugar in order to bolster "inefficient and ex- 
pensive" domestic sugar producers who cannot compete with "efficient and cheap 
producers such as Cuba." 

February 20, 1960 : Cuba signs trade and payments agreement with East 

February 22, 1960 : Cuban Government announces that it has decided to name 
a commission to begin negotiations in Washington, under the condition that 
the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. Government will adopt no 
measure considered prejudicial to the Cuban economy and people while the 
negotiations are in progress. 

February 24, 1960: Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro blames the United 
States for exploitation of Cuba since the beginning of the century. 

February 29, 1960: United States tells Cuban Government that it wishes to 
seek a solution of outstanding problems through negotiations, but cannot ac- 
cept the condition proposed by the Cuban Government that no measure of a 
unilateral character be adopted by the legislative or executive branch of the 
U.S. Government, and wishes to explore the subjects to be discussed before 
initiating negotiations. 

March 2, 1960: National Bank President Ernesto Guevara states that the 3 
million tons of sugar which Cuba sells annually to the United States "at 
supposedly preferential prices" have meant and mean slavery for the people 
of Cuba. 

March 4, 1960: French munitions ship Ln Couhre explodes in Havana Harbor. 
On March 5 Prime Minister Castro identifies the United States as the re- 
sponsible agent of the explosion. 

March 7, 1960: The United States categorically and emphatically denies the 
charge by Prime Minister Castro implying involvement of the U.S. Government 
in the La Conhre disaster. 

March 9, 1960: Secretary of State Herter states at press conference that 
"we have been hopeful throughout that the atmosphere of our relationship 
with Cuba would allow us to settle through displomatic means such differences 
as we may have with Cuba." 

March 15, 1960 : United States expresses shock and dismay at Prime Minister 
Castro attributing responsibility for La Conhrc disaster to United States; 
rejects Castro's suggestion that the United States wants to keep Cuba defense- 
less in order to oppress Cuba ; states that it is prepared to discuss various other 
matters, on which Castro has been critical of the United States through normal 
channels of communication ; and continues to hope that the United States 
and Cuba can settle their differences through diplomatic means. 

March 20. 1960: National Bank President Guevara states, "Our war * * * 
is against the great power of the north." 

March 20, 1960: Plane from the United States leaves Fort Lauderdale, and 
is damaged by Cuban gunfire as it lands on a highway in Cuba the next day. 
U.S. grand jury later indicts "William J. Shergalis, a U.S. citizen, and Hector 
Garcia Soto, both of whom arranged for the flight, for acting as agents of the 
Cuban Government without filing the registration statement required by law. 

March 31, 1960 : Cuba signs trade and payments agreement with Poland. 

April 11, 1960: United States asks Cuban Government if the March 2 views 
of National Bank President Guevara on sugar represent the oflicial Cuban 
position. No reply ever received from Cuban Government. 

April 19, 1960: Prime Minister Castro states that the U.S. Government 
takes advantage of every opjwrtunity to create confusion with respect to 
United States-Cuban relations. He states that the U.S. Government seems 
to have adopted the policy used in the past to encourage fascism. 

April 19, 1960 : The first shipment of Soviet crude oil arrives in Cuba on 
the Soviet tanker Vishinskij. 


May 6, 1960: Cuban Coast Guard patrol vessel fires without warning upon 
U.S. submarine Sea Poacher on the high seas 11 miles from the Cuban coast. 

May 16, 1960: Cuba and Czechoslovakia establish diplomatic relations. 

May 13, 1960: Prime Minister Castro, referring to Sea Poacher incident of 
May 6, states that the Cuban Coast Guard cutter Oriente sighted a U.S. sub- 
marine 5 miles off the Cviban coast. In the same speech Castro states that 3 
miles is the limit of Cuban territorial waters. 

May 14, 1960: United States expresses astonishment and protest to Cuban 
Government over Sea Poacher incident and requests explanation. On June 11 
Prime Minister Castro says that no explanation will be given. 

May 16, 1960 : Cuba and Czechoslovakia astablish displomatic relations. 

May 17, 1960 : National Bank of Cuba informs U.S. oil companies in Cuba that 
each of them will be required to purchase 300,000 tons of Russian petroleum dur- 
ing the balance of 1960. 

May 17, 1960: Minister-Counselor Braddock reminds Cuban Under Secretary 
of State Fernandez Font that Minister of State Roa told Ambassador Bonsai that 
Roa would be soon getting in touch with Bonsai to resume discussions on the 
possibility of negotiations on pending problems. 

June 4, 1960: United States reviews the record of the Cuban Government's 
campaign of slander against the United States, and the efforts of the United 
States to maintain its traditionally friendly relations with the people of Cuba. 
The record includes Cuban confiscation and expropriation of U.S. property, fail- 
ure of the Cuban Government to compensate U.S. property owners, payments due 
to American exporters, Cuban attacks on U.S. sugar premium, air incursions, 
and the La Coubre and Sea Poacher incidents. 

June 7. 1960: United Slates objects to "fallacious" and "offensive" Cuban Gov- 
ernment pamphlet containing thinly veiled charges implying U.S. Government 
involvement in La Coubre disaster. 

June 8, 1960 : Antonio Nuiiez Jiminez, Director of the Agrarian Reform Insti- 
tute, says in Moscow that of all the Latin American countries, Cuba is "the 
Soviet Union's greatest and most loyal friend." 

June 9, 1960 : Prime Minister Castro, referring to the United States, says that 
powerful interests which wanted to destroy the revolution provoked the La 
Coubre incident. He calls this type of disaster "criminally conceived and 

June 10, 1960: Cuban Government seizes four U.S.-owned hotels in Havana. 

June 10, 1960 : Cuba signs a 5-year trade and payment agreements with Czecho- 

June 10, 1960: Prime Minister Castro states that U.S. officials participated m a 
plot to mount an invasion attempt in Cuba against Nicaragua under the leader- 
ship of a Nicaraguan exile, for the purpose of embarrassing the Cuban Govern- 
ment. U.S. [asserts] allegations are false. 

June 10. 1960: Cuban Minister of State Roa says in Montevideo that Cuba 
decided "to break the structure of its commercial relations with the United 

States " 

June 1.5, 1960 : Cuba and Poland establish diplomatic relations. 

June 18, 1960 : Joint Cuban-Soviet communique in Moscow notes the fruitful 
development of trade, economic, and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and 

Cuba. ,,^, ^ 

June 18, 1960 : Agrarian Reform Director Nunez Jiminez states The Commu- 
nist Party of Cuba is * * * the party whose members are receiving the benefits 
of the revolution." 

June 27. 1960: United States explains the unusual precautions it has taken 
against illegal air incursions from U.S. territory affecting Cuba. States that the 
Cuban Government has shown no recognition of these efforts, has continued to 
picture the United States as permitting and encouraging these incursions, and 
has never provided the United States with data which would aid in investigating 
the incursions. . 

June 27, 1960: United States submits memorandum to the Inter- American 
Peace Committee on provocative actions of the Cuban Government. Memoran- 
dum mentions La Coubre incident. Sea Poacher incident, air incursions, and false 
Cuban allegations of U.S. complicity in plot to invade Nicaragua. 

June 29, 1960 : Cuban Government seizes Texaco and Esso refineries, on grounds 
that they had violated Cuban law in refusing to refine Soviet crude oil. As of 
this date, the oil companies had voluntarily financed over .$50 million worth of 
crude oil imports for which the Cuban Government had refused to release dollars. 


July 3, 1960 : Agrarian Reform Director Nunez Jiminez states in East Berlin 
that Cuba desires relations not only with the Soviet Union but with all Socialist 

July 3, 1960 : U.S. Congress gives President authority to reduced import quota 
on Cuban sugar. 

July 3, 1960 : Jose Miro Cardona, Ambassador-designate to the United States, 
resigns, stating that the "ideological differences between the plans of the Govern- 
ment * * * and my conscience were impossible to resolve." He takes asylum 
in the Argentine Embassy. 

July 5, 1960: United States protests seizui'e of U.S. -owned oil refineries as 
arbitrai-y, inequitable, and contrary to Cuban law, and expresses the hope that 
the Cuban Government will rescind these actions. 

July 6, 1960 : Cuban Government passes nationalization law, authorizing na- 
tionalization of U.S.-owned pi-operty through expropriation. Authorizes pay- 
ments to be made from fund to be derived from receipts from annual purchases 
of Cuban sugar over 3 million tons, at price of at least 5.75 cents a pound. Pay- 
ment to be in 30-year bonds at 2-percent interest. 

July 6, 1960 : President Eisenhower, "with the most genuine regret," orders a 
cut of 700,000 tons in Cuba's 1960 sugar quota, on grounds that Cuban commit- 
ments to pay for Soviet goods with Cuban sugar have raised serious doubts as 
to whether the United States can depend on Cuba as a source of sugar. 

July 7, 1960 : Prime Minister Castro says that the United States acted in a 
"frenzy of impotence and hatred * * * in a fit of rage" in cutting the sugar 
quota, but defies the United States and says that his revolution will triumph. 

July 9, 1960: Soviet Premier Khrushchev states that the U.S.S.R. is "raising 
its voice and extending a helpful hand to the people of Cuba * * *. Speaking 
figuratively, in case of necessity, Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban 
people with rocket fire." 

July 9, 1960: President Eisenhower says that Khrushchev's statement imder- 
scores the close ties that have developed between the Soviet and Cuban Govern- 

July 10, 1960 : Prime Minister Castro devotes an entire speech to expressing 
satisfaction at the support offered Cuba by the Soviet Union and to attacking 
what he describes as the aggressive policies of the United States. 

July 10, 1960 : National Bank President Guevara states that Cuba is defended 
by the Soviet Union, "the greatest military power in history." 

July 10, 1960 : President Dorticos hails "the message of solidarity spoken by 
the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and coming to us in our most difficult 

July 16, 1960: U.S. protests nationalization law of July 6 as discriminatory, 
arbitrary, and confiscatory. 

July 21, 1960 : Cuban press reports Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro stat- 
ing in Moscow that Cuba "is grateful for political and moral support from the 
Soviet Union." 

July 23, 1960: Cuba signs a 5-year trade and payment agreement with Com- 
munist China, calling for Chinese Communist purchase of 500,000 tons of Cuban 
sugar in each of the next 5 years. 

July 30, 1960: National Bank President Guevara states that the U.S.S.R., Com- 
munist China and other Socialist countries are Cuba's friends. 

August 1, 1960 : United States submits document to the Inter-American Peace 
Committee entitled "Responsibility of Cuban Government for Increased Inter- 
national Tensions in the Hemisphere." Document deals principally with the 
relations between Cuba and the Sino-Soviet bloc, and the emergence of a dic- 
tatorial pattern of political control in Cuba. Document states that the Cuban 
Government has taken discriminatory actions against the property of U.S. citi- 
zens in Cuba valued at over $850 million, and that no effort has been made by 
the Cuban Government to assure them anything approaching adequate com- 

August 6, 1960 : Under authority of the nationalization law, Cuba nationalizes 
through forced expropriation the properties of 26 companies wholly or partially 
owned by U.S. citizens. The United States protests this action on August 8. 

August 6, 1960 : Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro says Cuba is grateful for 
Soviet support, and that U.S. aid always has strings attached, while aid from 
the Soviet Union is disinterested. 

August 7, 1960 : Prime Minister Castro justifies the confiscation of the invest- 
ments of U.S. citizens in Cuba by accusing the United States of "economic ag- 
gression" in reducing Cuba's sugar quota. 


August 10, 1960 : United States issues 23-page document containing evidence of 
the aggressive intent of tlie Cuban Government in its discriminatory trade and 
financial policies, and its confiscation of the property of U.S. citizens. Estimates 
the value of confiscated U.S. property at about $1 billion. States that the back- 
log of payments due to U.S. exporters because of the failure of Cuban authorities 
to make the necessary foreign exchange available is over $100 million. States 
that about one-half of U.S. investments had been seized before any change was 
made in the Cuban sugar quota. 

Document states that property seized under nationalization law of July 6 
covers only the most recent cases of the arbitrary taking of such property with- 
out prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. In prior cases, starting in 
June 1959, the Cuban Government has shown little or no consideration for the 
rights guaranteed proijerty owners under the laws of Cuba. It has seized and 
occupied lands and buildings of U.S. citizens, confiscated and removed equip- 
ment, confiscated and removed cattle from the pastures of owners, seized timber- 
land resources, plowed imder productive pastures without the consent of owners, 
and arbitrarily moved fences and boundaries. In many cases no inventory was 
taken at the time of seizure nor receipt provided, nor indication given that any 
payment would be made. The value of American owned property affected by 
such acts is estimated at $350 million. 

August 13, 1960 : Commerce ISIinister Cepero Bonilla declares that for the 
coming year "it would be much more advantageous to Cuba if the United States 
did not buy a single grain of sugar." 

August 16, 1960 : Cuban press reports on message from Prime Minister Castro 
to Premier Khrushchev, expressing thanks "for the support of the Soviet people, 
which is irrefutable proof that the peoples fighting for their independence are 
not alone in their struggle." 

August 24, 1960 : Prime Minister Castro charges the United States with sup- 
porting counterrevolutionaries and states that Cuba will be friends with the 
Soviets and the Chinese People's Republic. 

August 29, 1960 : The Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, meeting 
at San Jose, Costa Rica, approve Declaration of San Jose, stating that the 
acceptance by an American state of extraeontinental intervention endangers 
American solidarity and security. They also create an ad hoc good offices 
committee to help settle controversies between governments in the Americas. 

August 29, 1960 : Prime Minister Castro reiieats charges of United States 
aggression against Cuba and says he will not renounce Soviet support. 

September 2 : In reply to the Declaration of San Jose, Prime Minister Castro 
presents "Declaration of Habana," which bitterly attacks the United States and 
the OAS, denounces United States intervention in Latin America, accepts offer 
of assistance from the Soviet Union, and denies that the Soviet Union or Com- 
munist China have interventionist intentions in the Western Hemisphere. States 
Cuba will establish relations with the Chinese People's Republic. 

September 12, 1960 : United States offers to present its charges for examina- 
tion by the good offices committee created August 29, and express the hope that 
the Cuban Government will cooperate. 

September 15. 1960 : Cuba and Hungary sign trade and payments agreements. 

September 17, 1960: Under authority of the nationalization law. Cuba na- 
tionalizes 3 U.S. -owned banlvs through forced expropriation. United States pro- 
tests on September 29. 

September IS, 1960: National Bank President Guevara accuses the United 
States of aggression and genocide. Says that Cuba has received arms from 
Czechoslovakia and is expecting many more from any power that will sell them. 

September 23, 1960: Cuba and North Korea establish diplomatic relations. 

September 26, 1960: Prime Minister Castro makes series of untrue and dis- 
torted allegations against the United States at the U.N. General Assembly. 

September 30, 1960: Communist Prime Minister Chou En-lai states that "in 
the event of necessity the Chinese Government and people will give all possible 
support and aid to the Cuban people." 

October 7, 1960: Cuba and Bulgaria sign trade and payments agreements. 

October 12, 1960 : United States submits document to the U.N. Secretary Gen- 
eral entitled "Facts Concerning Relations Between Cuba and the United States," 
replying to Prime Minister Castro's allegations of September 26. 

October 13. 1960 : Unidentified men raid the Cuban consulate general in Miami. 
Cuban Government states that the attack was permitted with the "suspicious 
indifference" and the "manifest collusion of the American authorities" and that 
the identities of those responsible are known to the authorities. 


October 19, 19G0: United States prohibits exports to Cuba except for non- 
subsidized foodstuffs, medicines, and medical supplies, to defend the legitimate 
economic interests of the people of the United States against the discriminatory, 
aggressive, and injurious economic policies of the Castro regime. 

October 24, 1960 : Under authority of the nationalization law, Cuba nationalizes 
through forced expropriation 166 properties wholly or partially owned by U.S. 
citizens. United States protests on November 19. 

October 26, liJMjO : Cuba and Rumania establish diplomatic relations and sign 
trade and technical assistance agreements. 

October 27, 1960 : United States rejects "emphatically and categorically" the 
Cuban protest of October 13. States that the United States does not condone 
the violation of its laws by anyone, that it makes every effort to prevent such 
violations, that an investigation into the incident is continuing and that the 
United States has told the Miami police of the need for special police protection 
for the consulate general. 

October 28, 1960 : United States reiterates September 12 offer to cooperate with 
good offices committee and expresses hope that committee will carry out its mis- 
sion promptly. 

November 14, 1960 : Cuban Government rejects the United States statements of 
October 27 as "mendacious and detrimental" and refers to an "alliance" between 
the executioners of the Cuban people and the United States Government. 

November 18, 1960: United States states that at least 12 Soviet ships have 
delivered arms and ammunition to Cuba since .July 1960 and that Soviet bloc 
arms provided to Cuba amount to at least 28,000 tons. 

December 2, 1960: Cuba and North Vietnam establish diplomatic relations. 

December 9, 1960: Cuba and Outer Mongolia establish diplomatic relations. 

December 11, 1960: National Bank President Guevara expresses wholehearted 
support for the December 6 statement of the Congress of 81 Communist Parties 
which met in Moscow, and states that Cuba "should follow the example of 
peaceful development set by the Soviet Union." 

December 1.5, 1960 : Ctiba and Albania establish diplomatic relations. 

December 16, 1960 : President Eisenhower fixes the Cuban sugar quota at zero 
for the first quarter of 1961. 

December 17, 1960: Cuba and Hungary establish diplomatic relations. 

December 19, 1960 : Cuba and the Soviet Union sign joint communique through 
which Cuba ojienly alines itself with the domestic and foreign policies of the 
Soviet Union and indicates its solidarity with the Sino-Soviet bloc. 

January 2, 1961 : Cuba holds military parade. Many Soviet and bloc arms 
displayed, including tanks, assault guns, and field guns. Prime Minister Castro 
says this represents only a "small part" of the arms which C\iba has received 
from the bloc. 

January 2, 1961 : Prime Minister Castro demands that the U.S. Embassy in 
Havana he reduced to 11 officials within 48 hours. 

January .3, 1961 : United States terminates diplomatic and consular relations 
with Cuba in view of Castro's demand of January 2, which placed crippling 
limitations on the ability of the United States to carry out normal diplomatic 
and consular functions. Cuba turns over its diplomatic and consular affairs 
to the Embassy of Czechoslovakia in Washington. 

February 23. 1961 : Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro declares that the 
Chinese People's Republic has sent Cuba hundreds of machineguns. 

March 31, 1961 : President Kennedv fixes the Cuban sugar quota at zero for 

April 3, 1961 : The United States issues "Cuba" pamphlet, expressing determi- 
nation to support future democratic governments in Cuba to help the Cuban 
people achieve freedom, democracy, and social justice, and calling on the Castro 
regime to .sever its links with the international Communist movement. 

April 3, 1961 : Department states in "Cuba" pamphlet that since mid-1960 
more than .30.000 tons of arms, with an estimated value of .$.50 million, have 
arrived in Cuba from beyond the Iron Curtain ; that the Cuban armed forces are 
dependent on the Soviet bloc for the maintenance of their armed power ; that 
Soviet and Czech military advisers and technicians have accompanied the 
fiow of arms ; that Cubans have gone to Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union for 
training as jet pilots, ground maintenance crews, and artillerymen : and that 
Cuba has, except for the United States, the largest ground forces in the hemis- 
phere, at least 10 times as large as those maintained by previous Cuban Govern- 
ments, including that of Batista. 


April 16, 1961 : Prime Minister Castro describes his regime as Socialist. 

April 17-19, 1961 : Cuban patriots fail in attempt to redeem the independence 
of their homeland. 

April 20, 19G1 : President Kennedy states that any unilateral American inter- 
vention would have been contrary to our traditions and to our international 
obligations, but that we do not intend to abandon Cuba. 

April 21, 1961 : Cuba votes with the Soviet bloc on almost every major inter- 
national issue during the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations, which 
ran from September 20 to December 20, 1960, and March 7 to April 21, 1961. 

April 30, 1961 : Minister of Industries Ernesto Guevara declares that the 
Castro movement was "the first Socialist revolution in Latin America." 

May 1, 1961 : Prime Minister Castro speaks of "our Socialist revolution" and 
says that a new "socialist constitution" will be prepared for Cuba. 

July 26, 1961 : Prime Minister Castro announces formation of Integrated Re- 
volutionary Organizations (ORI) as the precursor of the United Party of the 
Socialist Revolution to be the only party in Cuba. 

September 20, 1961 : Soviet-Cuban commimique proclaims "identity of posi- 
tions of the Soviet Union and Cuba on all the international questions that wei*e 

October 2, 1961 : Chinese-Cuban communique proclaims complete agreement 
between the Cuban and Chinese Communist regimes on "the current interna- 
tional situation and the question of further developing friendship and cooper- 

December 2, 1961 : Prime Minister Castro states : "I believe absolutely in 
Marxism * * * j ^m a Marxist-Leninist and will be a Marxist-Leninist until 
the last day of my life." He admits that he hid his true political ideology during 
his revolutionary struggle because he felt that "if we, when we began to have 
strength, had been known as people of very radical ideas, unquestionably all 
the social classes that are making war on us would have been doing so from that 
time on." 

December 6, 1961 : United States submits document to the Inter-American 
Peace Committee entitled "The Castro Regime in Cuba" containing information 
on Cuba's ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc and her threat to independent govern- 
ments in the Western Hemisphere. 

December 20, 1961 : Cuba votes with Soviet bloc on 33 out of 37 major issues in 
16th session of U.N. General Assembly. 

January 14, 1962: The Inter- American Peace Committee reports that Cuba's 
connections with the Sino-Soviet bloc are incompatible with inter-American 
treaties, principles, and standards. 

January 31, 1962 : The Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, meeting 
at Punta del Este, declare that as a consequence of its public alinement with the 
international Communist movement, the present Marxist-Leninist government of 
Cuba is excluded from participation in the inter-American system. 

March 27, 1962 : United States states that Sino-Soviet bloc has furnished about 
.$100 million worth of military equipment and technical services to Cuba and 
that several hundred Cuban military personnel have received training, including 
pilot training, in the bloc. Arms include 5 to 75 Mig jet fighters ; 150 to 2.50 
tanks ; 50 to 100 assault guns ; 500 to 1,000 field artillery ; 500 to 1,000 antiair- 
craft artillery; 500 mortars; 200,000 small arms, and some patrol vessels and 
torpedo boats. No evidence of missiles, missile bases, or bombers. 


Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance 
to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organiza- 
tion in this index. 

A I'age 

Achilles, Theodore 876 

Agramonte, Roberto 897 

xVlbania 905 

Alliance for Progress (Alianza Para El Progreso) 889, 891-894 

Amei'ican Glass Tinting Corp 831 

Arbenz, Jacobo 846, 853, 857 

Arbenz government 866 

Arevalo 853 

Association of Military Attaches 837 

Bangkok 865 

Barquin, Colonel 858 

Batista 834-836, 840, 852, 853, 857-859, 879, 897, 905 

Bayo. Gen. Alberto 849 

Berges, William 836 

Berle, Adolph 876, 883 

Berlin 891,903 

Betancourt 867-869, 884, 886 

Bissell, Richard 868 

Bogata 834, 837, 870, 893 

Bolivia 857 

Bonsai, Ambassador Philip W 871, 897-900, 902 

Boti, Regino 897. 900 

Bowles, Chester 876, 878 

Braddock, Daniel M 900, 902 

British Guiana 857 

Bulgaria 904 

Bundy 876 

Burns, Findley 878 

Byrd, Admiral 862 


Cabot, Ambassador John 871 

Camaguey Province 898, 899 

Cantillo, General 858 

(^f^ Tflf^Tlfl ^ Tjfl 7*1 T*0 841 

Castro, Fidel ""!_"" "~832,' 834^837, 840, sTl, 843, 844, 846-849, 852-855, 

858-860, 867. 869-874, 879, 880, 890, 892-894, 896-898, 900-906 

Castro, Raul 837, 856, 896, 901, 903, 905 

Castro Regime in Cuba, The (document) 906 

CAT Airline 864, 865 

Central Bank of Cuba 888 

Central Intelligence Agency 848, 866, 868, 873-875, 877, 879 

Cepero Bonilla 901, 904 

Chaumont {see also Perez-Chaumont, Andre) 839, 840, 841 

Chennault, General 863 

Chiang Kai-shek 864, 882 

Chile, Santiago 844 

China 863, 864, 867, 879, 883, 886, 891, 900, 903 

China Defense Supplies (Delaware corporation) 862 

» _ 



Chinese-Cuban communique 906 

Chinese People's Republic 904 

Chou En-lai 904 

Civil Aeronautics Board 861,862 

Committee on Western Jurisdiction 864 

Communist/s, American 835 

Communist Party, Cuban 855 

Colombia 837,857 

Costa Rica 861, 866, 867, 870, 884, 888 

"Crisis in United States Interests in the Caribbean, The" 881-887 

Cuba 831-906 

Chronology of events in 896-906 

Cuba Denounces Before the World (brochure) 899 

Cuban Embassy 831 

Cuban Telephone Co 897 

Czechoslovakia 902,905 


De la Torre, Dr. Oscar 855 

Diaz Lanz, Maj. Pedro Luis 898,899 

Diaz Tamayo, General , 858 

Dies Committee 866 

Dihigo, Ernesto 897, 898, 899 

Djilas, Milovan 891 

Dillon, C. Douglas 898 

Dodd, Martha 835 

Doerflinger, Col. Oscar Maynard 833,839 

Dominican Republic 870, 892 

Dorticos, President Osvaldo 892, 899, 900, 903 

Dulles, Allen 865, 866, 868, 876 


Ecuador Embassy 859 

Eisenhower, Milton 844, 845, 846, 847 

Eisenhower, President 874, 883, 897, 900, 903, 905 

El Salvador 871, 874, 888 

El Salvador Conference 871 

Espin, Vilma 837 

Esso refinery 902 


Facts Concerning Relations Between Cuba and the United States (docu- 
ment) 904 

Federal Power Commission 861, 862 

Field, Frederick Vanderbilt 836 

Figueres, President 867, 869, 871-873, 884, 886 

Flying Tigers 863 

Font, Fernandez 902 

Foreign Economics Administration 863 

Formosa 864 

Fort Lauderdale 901 


Gaitan, Dr. George Eliecer 837 

Garcia Soto, Hector 901 

Garcia-Tunon, Gen. Jorge 851 

Testimony of 857-859 

Germany, East 901 

Glawe, Col. Benoid E 844-847 

Gonzales Carvajal, Ladislao 860 

Gray, Gordon 876 

Guantanamo Bay 896 

Guatemala 853, 865-867, 882 

Guevara, "Che" 837, 842, 849, 867, 888, 891, 897, 901, 903-906 

Guevara, Mrs 833 


H Page 

Hardin, Mr 857 

Hart, Armando 898 

Havana 869, 892, 899, 900, 901 

Declaration of 904 

Hays, Brooks 880 

Letter to Senator Eastland 880, 881 

Henderson, Loy 871, 872, 883 

Herter, Secretary Christian 868, 872-874, 881, 897, 901 

Hill, Ambassador Robert 832, 833, 840, 843-846, 866, 871, 872, 880, 881 

Hill, Mrs 844 

Honduras 861, 862, 865, 866 

Hong Kong 864, 865 

Hoy ( newspaper) 897 

Hull, Cordell 883 

Hungary 904, 905 


lUsley, Walter 836 

India 863 

Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI) 906 

Inter-American Defense Board 894 

Inter-American Peace Committee 893, 902, 903, 906 

Jones, Roger W 878 

Junta de Liberacion 857, 858 

Justice Department 866 


Kennedy, President John F 876,905,906 

Khrushchev 891, 894, 903, 904 

Kimmel, Roy I 872 

King, Col. J. C 868 

Korea 865 

Korea, North 904 

Korean war 864 

La Cabana fortress 897 

La Coubre (French munitons ship) 901,902 

Lebanon 882 

Leddy, Raymond 840, 842 

Testimony of 843-849 

Lemnitzer, General 876 

Lippmann, Walter 883 

Lopez Fresquet, Rufo 897 


MacArthur, General 863 

Mandel, Ben 866 

Mann, Tom 875, 876 

Mao Tse-tung 883, 891 

Marshall mission 864, 879 

Mateos, President Lopez 844 

Matos, Maj. Hubert 899 

Matthews, Herbert 883 

Mazatlan 846,849 

Merchant, Mr 883 

Mexico 831-833, 837, 839-841, 843, 846, 847, 859. 875 

Miami 904,905 

Mikoyan, Anastas I 900 

Miro Cardona, Jose 897.903 

Moncada 834,837 

Montenegro, Arturo Guillermo 832 

Montevideo 902 

Morse, Senator Wayne 896 

Moscow (U.S.S.R.) 886,902,905 

Munoz Marin 867, 884, 886 

Murphy, Robert S68, 883, 8SS 


N Paso 

National Bank of Cuba 902 

New York Times 883 

Nicaragua 866, 871, 902 

Nunez Jiminez, Antonio 902, 903 

Observations Regarding Fidel Castro's Letter to the Junta for the Libera- 
tion of Cuba (document, January 1958) 852-854 

Organization of American States (OAS) 870,871,876,882,892,893,894,904 

Oriente (Cuban Coast Guard cutter) 902 

Oriente Province 834, 896, 898 

Outer Mongolia 905 

Panama 868 

Pazos, Felipe 897 

Perez-Chaumont, Andres (see also Chaumont, Colonel) 840,841 

Testimony of 831-837 

Perez Cisneros, Enrique 899 

Philippines 863 

Piad, Mr 857 

Poland 901, 902 

Prio Socarras, Carlos . 852, 854, 859 

Puerifov, Jack 866 

Punta del Este 890, 906 

Cliarter of 889 


Quemoy 882 

Ravelo, Ricardo Artigas 851 

Testimony of 859-860 

Rendy, Robert 876 

Roa, Raul 892, 89,8-900, 902 

Rodriguez, Carlos Rafael 860 

Romero, Mario S. (interpreter) 851-860 

Roosevelt, Franldin 890 

Rubottom, Roy R 868, 869, 871, 872, 874, 880, 881, 897-899 

Rumania ^^^ 

Rusk, Secretary Dean 876 

Text of address re Cuba 889-895 


San Jose 878, 892, 904 

Declaration of 904 

San Salvador 881 

Santo Domingo 8a7 

Santamaria, Haydee 837 


Declaration of 893 

Scott, Joseph 888 

Scott, Winston 840, 842 

Sea Poacher (U.S. submarine) 90L 

SEATO Conference 877 

Shanghai ^||"1 

Shergalis, Wm. J ^^l 

Sierra Maestra ^'^^ 

Sino-Soviet bloc 89.3, 894, 906 

Smith, Gen. Bedell 865 

Smith, Ambassador Earl E. T 89b 

Snow, Edgar 2cS 

Snow, Secretary William P 8J» 

Somoza 2-q 

Sosa, General -^^ 8o^ 

Spaulding, Keith 844, 845 

Stern, Alfred K 835 

Stem, Martha Dodd -r-~-"~"r~"""--srs^""s--r^r-zz^-^ ^^ 

Stewart,' AllahV_-__V_J--- ^-—- °o< - 8«8, 87^ 


T Page 

Tabernilla, Gen. Francisco J 834, 835 

Taylor, General 878, 879 

Texaco refinery 902 

Texas Oil Co 896 

Trujillo 856,882 

26tli of July movement 852,853,858 


United Nations 889, 892, 894, 906 

UNRRA 864 

Urrutia, President 897, 898 

Uruguay 889 


Vietnam 864,865 

Nortli 905 

Vishinsky (Soviet tanker) 901 

Welles, Sumner 883 

Whelan, Ambassador Tom 866, 871 

Wieland, William Arthur 832, 842, 844, 845, 847, 849, 852, 855-860, 879, 880 

Willauer, Whiting, testimony of 801-881 



3 9999 05442 1837