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Full text of "Conduct of espionage within the United States by agents of foreign Communist governments. Hearings, Ninetieth Congress, first session"

CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

BY AGENTS OF FOREIGN COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS 

- 

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ^^ -^" ^ 

FEB 8 1968 HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NINETIETH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 



APRIL 6 AND 7, MAY 10, JUNE 15, AND NOVEMBER 15, 1967 
(INCLUDING INDEX) 



Printed for the use of the 
Committee on Un-American Activities 




U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
79-422 WASHINGTON : 1967 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Oflace 
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 50 cents 



COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 

United States House of Repbesentatives 

EDWIN E. WILLIS, Louisiana, Chairman 

WILLIAM M. TUCK, Virginia JOHN M. ASHBROOK, Ohio 

JOB R. POOL, Texas DEL CLAW.SON, California 

RICHARD H. ICHORD, Missouri RICHARD L. ROUDEBUSH, Indiana 

JOHN C. CULVER, Iowa ALBERT W. WATSON, South Carolina 

Francis J. McNamara, Director 

Chester D. Smith, Oeneral Counsel 

Alfred M. Nittle, Counsel 



CONTENTS 



Faee 

Synopsis 553 

April 6, 1967: Testimony of— 

John Hiuninik, Jr 571 

Afternoon session : 

John Huminik, Jr. (resumed) 583 

April 7, 1967: Testimony of — 

John Huminik, Jr. (resumed) 601 

May 10, 1967: Testimony of— 

Leonard I. Epstein 618 

June 15, 1967 : Testimony of— 

Frank John Mrkva 644 

November 15, 1967 : Testimony of — 

Natalie Anna Bienstock 692 

Index i 

in 



The House Committee on Un-American Activities is a standing com- 
mittee of the House of Representatives, constituted as such by the 
rules of the House, adopted pursuant to Article I, section 5, of the 
Constitution of the United States which authorizes the House to deter- 
mine the rules of its proceedings. 

RULES ADOPTED BY THE 90TH CONGRESS 

House Resolution 7, January 10, 1967 

RESOLUTION 

Resolved, That the Rules of the House of RepresentativciS of the Eighty-ninth 
Congress, together with all applicable provisions of the Legislative Reorganization 
Act of 1946, as amended, be, and they are hereby, adopted as the Rules of the 
House of Representative's of the Ninetieth Congress * * * 

• *«**•* 

Rule X 

STANDING COMMITTEES 

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress, 
******* 

(r) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members. 
******* 

Rule XI 

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES 



18. Committee on Un-American Activities. 

(a) Un-American activities. 

(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by ^subcommittee, 
is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, charac- 
ter, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) 
the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda 
that is instigated from foreign countrie,s or of a domestic origin and attacks the 
principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) 
all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary 
remedial legislation. 

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the 
Clerk of the Houjse if the House is not in session ) the results of any such investi- 
gation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable. 

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American 
Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times 
and place,s within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has 
recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of 
such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and 
to take such testimony, a,s it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under 
the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any 
member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person 
designated by any such chairman or member. 

******* 

27. To assist the House in apprai.sing the administration of the laws and in 
developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, 
each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness 
of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any la\vs. the subject 
matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee ; and, for that pur- 
ix>se, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by the 
ajgencies in the executive branch of the Government. 



SYNOPSIS 

On March 8, 1967, the committee determined to hold hearings on the 
"activities within the United States of agents of foreign Communist 
governments * * * with particular reference to the conduct of espionage 
and other intelligence gathering activities * * *." The hearings were also 
to encompass techniques employed by Communist agents in their efforts 
to recruit the assistance of U.S. citizens in their espionage and intelli- 
gence gathering activities. The legislative purpose of the hearings was 
"to provide factual information to aid the Congress in the enactment 
of any necessary remedial legislation * * *." 

Pursuant to this resolution, the chairman appointed the Hon. 
William M. Tuck (D-Va.) chairman of a subcommittee to conduct 
these hearings and named himself, Hon. John C. Culver (D-Iowa), 
Hon. Richard L. Roudebush (R-Ind.), and Hon. Albert W. Watson 
(R-S.C.) as associate members. 

The subcommittee held hearings in Washington, D.C., on April 6 
and 7, May 10, June 15, and November 15, 1967. It received the testi- 
mony of four witnesses in the course of these hearings. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN HUMINIK, JR. 
(APRIL 6 AND 7, 1967) 

Mr. John Huminik, Jr., 31, after being sworn, gave his birthplace 
as Washington, D.C. Mr. Huminik received his early education in the 
District of Columbia. He subsequently attended various technical insti- 
tutes and military schools, as well as completing many correspondence 
courses from which he received diplomas and certificates in machine 
design, metallurgy, industrial metallurgy, aircraft structural main- 
tenance, and aircraft materials. 

Mr. Huminik is a scientist and businessman by profession. He has 
been associated with the defense industry in and around Washington, 
D.C, in the capacity of engineer, scientist, and corporation officer. He 
is presently a consultant on metallurgical and welding technology, as 
well as chairman of the board of Chemprox Corporation, a small 
chemical manufacturing company. 

The witness has written a technical text dealing with "rocket reentry 
coatings and high temperature materials," entitled High Temperature 
Inorganic Coatings^ related to space and rocketry programs, plus in- 
numerable technical papers. Mr. Huminik has also been a member of 
several technical societies, including : American Ordnance Association, 
American Society for Metals, American Welding Society, and the 
Inter- American Relations Committee of the American Society for 
Metals. 

Mr. Huminik served as chairman of the Washin^on chapter of the 
American Society for Metals (1965-66) and of the American Welding 
Society ( 1961-62) , was awarded the Welding Society's meritorious cer- 

553 



554 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

tificate in 1963, and was listed in Who^ Who in Commerce and In- 
dustry (13th edition) . 

In the past, Mr. Huminik has held positions with a number of 
companies in the Washinofton, D.C., area, such as : head of metallur^cal 
group, Melpar, Inc.; vice president and senior scientist, Value Engi- 
neering Company ; and manager, Materials Engineering Department, 
Fairchild Hiller Corporation. 

Mr. Huminik was honorably discharged from the Military Reserves 
after 12 years of both active and reserve duty. Attached to the U.S. 
Army Chemical Corps, he received a commission in the Chemical Corps 
Reserve and commanded the 312th Chemical Company and the 419th 
Cliemical Biological and Radiological Center. He also completed a 
2-year Chemical Officer Career Course. 

In 1961. Mr. Huminik became a voluntarv% unpaid operative working 
under the guidance of the FBI against Soviet diplomats who were 
conducting espionage operations out of the Soviet Embassy and con- 
sulate in Washington. 

The witness told the subcommittee of his happenstance meeting with 
Aleksandr Izvekov, a Russian diplomat, who gave the witness and his 
visiting relatives a personal tour of the Soviet Embassy. Later, an asso- 
ciate of Izvekov, Dr. Sergei Stupar, applied for membership in the 
American Society for Metals (of which Mr. Huminik was secretary). 

The witness, of Russian ancestry, suspected the two Soviet diplomats 
of trying to utilize their new-found friendship with him as a means of 
gleaning highly technical data in the field of metallurgy and, at an early 
point in his contacts with the Russians, sought the advice of the FBI. 
He agreed to work hand in hand with the Bureau to uncover the clan- 
destine espionage activities of a highly trained Soviet spy ring. 

Dr. Stupar was admitted to membership in the American Society for 
Metals, a large society representing 20 countries with a 35,000 mem- 
bership in this country, and told Mr. Huminik that he was a "scientist 
and not interested in politics." 

Through his acquamtance with Dr. Stupar, the witness was intro- 
duced to Anatole Kuznetsov, a third secretary of the Soviet Embassy, 
and Vladimir Boutenko, the assistant commercial consular, who also 
received membership in the American Society for Metals. Boutenko 
was extremely interested in the society and "took copious notes" and 
"made contact with as many ASM members as he could" at its meetings, 
according to the witness. 

Vladimir Boutenko offered the witness a "trade agreement" with 
Chemprox Corporation (Mr. Huminik's company) and stated that if 
he "cooperated with the diplomats they would get * * * [him] some 
nice trade agreements with the Soviet Union." 

Boutenko gave the witness several gifts in the process of their re- 
lationship: diaries, perfume, address books, chemical catalogs, cal- 
endars, and vodka. 

Another third secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Vladimir Zorov, 
attended a meeting of the American Society for Metals with Boutenko. 
The witness told the subcommittee that Zorov stated to him: "Mr. 
Huminik, we would be glad to pay very good prices for any informa- 
tion that you could give to our government." Zorov, however, added a 
solemn warning : "We take care of our friends and we also take care 
of our enemies." 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 555 

The witness surmised that both the civilian (KGB) and military 
(GRU) intelligence agencies of the Soviet Union were represented in 
the operation through the various Soviet officials with whom he made 
contact. He said the two Soviet intelligence organizations appeared to 
be vying with each other for his services and, thereby, the classified 
information they hoped to obtain through him. 

Mr. Huminik told of still another contact with Soviet intelligence, 
in the person of Aleksy R. Malinin, the assistant commercial consular 
at the Soviet consulate at that time. Malinin, declared persona non 
grata by this country in 1966, posed as a welding expert and was in- 
volved with U.S. Air Force Sergeant Herbert W. Boeckenhaupt in still 
another espionage operation, not related to Huminik's. (Boeckenhaupt 
was later convicted of conspiring with Aleksy Malinin to steal U.S. 
codes and communications data.) Huminik's meeting with Malinin 
was happenstance and took place at an American Welding Society 
meeting in 1964. 

Another of the witness' many contacts was Valentin Revin, who was 
the assistant scientific consular of the Soviet Embassy and a successor 
to Dr. Stupar. Mr. Huminik stated that Revin, a very intelligent, alert, 
well-spoken, and thoroughly Westernized Soviet official, wels very close 
to himself in mannerisms, temperament, and even age, build, and stat- 
ure. The witness proposed that through Revin, the Embassy was at- 
tempting to "match an intelligence agent" with the person to be 
exploited. 

Revin gave Mr. Huminik several gifts, including a $180 Omega 
wristwatch and more vodka. 

The witness gave his personal views as to why the Soviets would 
choose him as a "target,-' stating his Russian ancestry, his being an offi- 
cer in the American Society for Metals, his personal accessibility, his 
access to Government officials and reports, and his extensive research 
into and knowledge of "reentry coatings" on satellites and rockets, all 
of which, combined, made him a very desirable subject to cultivate for 
critical intelligence information. 

After stating that all the Soviet agents he had had contact with had 
either left this country or been declared persona non grata, he noted 
that his "assessment period" by the Soviets had taken a full 4 years 
"before they really got down to business." During this 4-year period 
the Soviets attempted various means of gaining control over the wit- 
ness : (1) By telling him that they had located relatives of his in Russia 
(Georgia) ; (2) by obtaining from him handwritten reports bearing 
his signature wliich presumably could be used later for blackmail 
purposes; (3) by having him perform minor intelligence-type assign- 
ments. 

In 1964 Boutenko asked the witness to obtain all information neces- 
sary to become "employed in the United States Government." The 
agent wanted not only Government Form 57, but all other documents 
and information pertinent to application for Government employment. 
The witness deduced that armed with the proper information the 
Soviets might conceivably attempt to place one or more of their people 
in U.S. Government jobs. 

The Soviet agents also requested Huminik to obtain copies of all 
papers necessary to establish a corporation in the U.S. and asked if he 
would be willing to employ a Soviet in his chemical firm, both of 



556 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

which, of course, would facilitate their establishing cover for 
"illegals." 

Dr. Stupar made a direct approach to the witness asking for data 
on industrial machines, chemicals, blueprints, and other technical 
subjects. The industrial equipment was unidentifiable in the public 
hearing and, while not Government restricted, would not be sold to a 
foreign power. At this point the Soviet agents were prepared to have 
the witness commit a felony by either stealing the device or making a 
scale drawing of it. The chemicals the Soviets wanted were used in 
manufacturing a high-grade steel and were unavailable in Russia or 
her satellites. For reasons of national security the witness could not 
identify the rocketry materials the Soviet agents were interested in 
obtaining. The witness was told that his cooperation in obtaining the 
items desired would merit him a forged passport, escape route, and an 
excellent job in Russia should the FBI become aware of his activities. 
If all went well, he would be rewarded with trade agreements and 
money. 

Mr. Huminik stated to the subcommittee that his contact with the 
Soviet agents turned to a full-scale clandestine operation on March 
22, 1965, when Valentin Revin first met with the witness at his home 
on that date. Revin incorporated in the operation the use of danger 
signals, alternate plans, and a system of "dead drops" (places of con- 
cealment where objects can be deposited and later picked up by another 
person), escape plans and "live passes" (objects or information passed 
directly from one person to another). Various means of contacts were 
all prearranged in successive meetings with Revin. 

The witness gave several elaborate examples of "dead drops" and 
"live passes" that actually had taken place between him and Revin. 

Mr. Huminik told of the special camera the Soviet agents gave him 
$300 cash to purchase. The camera was designed especially to photo- 
graph documents and was outfitted with a closeup lens. He was also 
instructed to buy a special brand of high-speed film for use in photo- 
graphing documents with ordinary light. 

The Soviet agents provided the witness with additional money to 
buy a tape recorder and instructed him to recapitulate entire conversa- 
tions which he held with various scientists and defense officials known 
to him in the Pentagon. 

Mr. Huminik revealed that over the 5i/^ years he worked under FBI 
guidance, he made approximately 75 personal contacts with Soviet 
agents. The Soviets, he declared, were primarily interested in scientific 
and engineering reports. The witness conjectured that the reason for 
the demand for this information was an apparent Soviet lack of the 
superior technology that is abundant in this country. He added : 

They don't need to know troop movements and things like this as the espionage 
people did during World War II. They want technology, new weapons, faster 
airplanes, rockets, things like this. They wanted proprietary industrial proc- 
esses * * *. They wanted details * * *. 

They also wanted machines, rocket propellants, things on the Sur- 
veyor Moon Program, information concerning weapons, and "back- 
ground information on scientists, specific scientists, and they wanted 
proprietary chemicals also." 

In a warning to the American people, Mr. Huminik said : 

My personal lesson indicates to me that there is danger to the small business- 
man, the scientist, and the engineer. The Soviets want technology more than 
anything else, and it is their plan to get it from technical people. ♦ * * 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHINT THE UNITED STATES 557 

The witness offered a special word of caution to technical people of 
Slavic descent whom the Soviets feel will be more susceptible to their 
approach. 

Mr, Huminik then stated : 

They will use money, promises of business, and many other ploys to entice Ameri- 
cans to work for them. They often strive to achieve such a firm grip on an indi- 
vidual that he would be afraid to go to the FBI * * * 

The Soviets proved to me that they will penetrate our country as far as possible 
and by any means. * ♦ * 

In his statement, the witness added, "The Soviet Union has not 
changed its policy regarding espionage in this country for at least the 
last 20 years ** *." 

Mr, Huminik read from two articles which had been printed in 
Izvestia, official newspaper of the Soviet Government, which made 
derogatory allegations about him and said that American press ac- 
counts of espionage by Soviet Embassy officials were merely "anti- 
Soviet slander campaigns," 

At the close of his testimony, Mr. Huminik indicated his personal 
agreement with earlier statements of the FBI to the effect that 80 to 85 
percent of the Soviet diplomats are engaged in intelligence and espio- 
nage operations. 

TESTIMONY OF LEONARD I. EPSTEIN 
(MAY 10, 1967) 

Leonard I. Epstein, 40, of Paramus, N.J., was sworn in and gave 
his birthplace as New York City. Mr. Epstein is vice president and 
sales engineer of Trans- American Machinery and Equipment Corpora- 
tion, a firm engaged in the purchasing, rebuilding, and resale of sur- 
plus machinery and machine tools. 

Mr. Epstein is a graduate engineer of Case Institute of Technology 
in Cleveland, Ohio. After college graduation he went into the armed 
services and after discharge from the Army worked for Chance Vought 
Aircraft in Stratford, Conn,; Stone and Webster Engineering in 
Baton Kouge, La, ; Fluor Corporation in Houston, Tex. ; and the Red 
River Arsenal, U.S. Army Arsenal at Texarkana, Tex. 

Upon leaving the Red River Arsenal, Mr. Epstein attended school 
under the G.I. bill at Stevens Institute of Technology in Hoboken, N.J. 
After completing his studies at Stevens Institute he was employed with 
the U.S. Naval Research Laboratories at Bayonne, N.J. 

Mr. Epstein entered the machinery business 14 years ago after leav- 
ing the U.S. Naval Research Laboratories and was employed by S and 
S Machinery, Johnson Machinery, and Jem Machinery. He formed 
his own corporation in 1956 and went into business with Mr. George 
Yohrling. His business. Trans- American Machinery and Equipment 
Corporation, is located at 27 East 23d Street, Paterson, N.J. 

Leonard Epstein is a member of the American Society of Mechan- 
ical Engineers, as well as a past member of both the Society of Auto- 
motive Engineers and the American Society for Metals. He is a vice 
president of the Case Alumni Association, New York chapter, and 
is a past commander of the Jewish War Veterans of the United States 
in his hometown. 

Mr. Epstein told the subcommittee that his partner, George Yohr- 
ling, was, as himself, involved in all the details of the various contacts 



558 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHEST THE UNITED STATES 

made with a Russian United Nations employee. He then gave the sub- 
committee a brief background of his partner : 

Mr. Yohrling is 49 years old. * ♦ * He has been in the maichinery J)usiness * * * 
approximately 30 years. He is * * * an ex-tool and die maker that got into re- 
building and finally into machinery purchases. 

He is also a former U.S. paratrooper, and he holds a Silver Star for gallantry. 

* * * 

Mr. Epstein related the nature of his business as buying and selling 
machine tools for rebuilding and retrofitting. Machines, primarily 
purchased from Government and private surplus sales, are updated 
and resold for a profit. 

The witness said that his half-million-dollar-a-year business usually 
made machine tool and other equipment purchases on a bid basis, with 
sale going to the highest competitive bidder. 

Mr. Epstein, in his testimony, said that equipment can be purchased 
from the Atomic Energy Commission, from the Navy Department, 
and other military departments. The material is usually "screened" 
and is demilitarized by the buyer or seller prior to resale. 

While there is evidently no restriction of resale, the witness added, 
there are definite restrictions "as to what you can ship overseas and 
to what nations." 

Saying that U.S. machine tool and other equipment is at least 20 
to 40 years ahead of the rest of the world, Mr. Epstein spoke briefly 
of his recent trip to a machine tool show in Chicago where the Soviet 
Union exhibited a piece of equipment that manufacturers in the U.S. 
stopped making 40 years ago. He added that American equipment such 
as the type bought and sold by his firm "is of very definite interest to 
foreign countries, whether friendly or unfriendly." 

The witness was asked if he ever knew a person named Vadim Isakov. 
He told the subcommittee that Isakov was a Russian employee of 
the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF), in the position of procurement officer. (Isakov came to 
theU.S.inl962.) 

Mr. Epstein first met Isakov through a neighbor who was selling 
hospital and laboratory equipment to UNICEF. Isakov had asked 
Mr. Epstein's neighbor for the name of someone who handled tech- 
nological equipment. 

Vadim Isakov called the witness and said he was interested in ob- 
taining technological equipment for underdeveloped countries. On Juiy 
15, 1965, Mr. Epstein and Mr. Yohrling made an appointment with 
Isakov at the United Nations building in New York City. 

At the first meeting, the procurement officer wanted to buy laboratory 
supplies. The witness and his partner told Isakov that they did not 
handle this type of equipment and instead offered him an entire surplus 
plant for the manufacture of watch parts. The Russian did not seem 
interested, but stated that he would like to visit Mr. Epstein's plant in 
Paterson, N.J, 

On his first visit to the plant, Isakov was very interested in a surplus 
missile computer and asked for the nomenclature of the model. Addi- 
tionally, Isakov produced a list from which he proceeded to read the 
descriptions of four items which he noted could be sold to a "customer" 
of his in Europe. The items included: (1) an underwater robot made 
by Vare Industries, which is designed to explore the bottom of the 
ocean. Cost, over $300,000; (2) an accelerometer made by American 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 559 

Bosch Arma Corporation or similar company. The accelerometer is an 
intricate device which measures the pull of gravity on any vehicle such 
as a missile or space-orbiting device. The device costs about $6,000 ; (3) 
a miniature computer [valued at $45,000] manufactured by Sperry 
Gyroscope. The computer was to be small and compact enough to be 
carried on board a missile or rocket (upon subsequent investigation, 
the witness found that Sperry Gyroscope never manufactured any 
such device), and finally (4) a quantity of titanium pressure vessels. 
Mr. Epstein called a well-known manufacturer of pressure vessels and 
asked about a 9000 p.s.i. vessel. When told that the company would be 
happy to sell the vessels in steel, Isakov stated, "No, no. It must be light, 
it is going to go up." 

Isakov stated that upon delivery of these items the witness and his 
partner would be paid in cash. Furthermore, the high cost of the items 
did not seem to bother the Russian at all. 

After the first plant meeting with Isakov, Mr. Epstein, now sus- 
picious, contacted a neighbor who was an FBI employee, and related 
the entire story to him. The following week FBI agents instructed Mr. 
Epstein and his partner to "lead the man on" and "find out what he 
wanted." 

Between the second and third meeting with Isakov, the Russian had 
taken a trip out of the country. Upon his return, he called Mr. Epstein 
and stated that the miniature computer he wanted was not manufac- 
tured by Sperry Gyroscope but was instead a "Red Man" minicomputer 
made by IBM. Likewise, he was well armed with many of the technical 
requirements concerning the four items which he lacked on his first 
visit. 

In October of 1965, Isakov began to push for delivery on the accel- 
erometers. The witness surmised that the urgency had something to do 
with the fact that the Soviets had smashed three vehicles onto the sur- 
face of the moon. 

That same month the U.S. Government began putting various types 
of missile sites up for sale. Isakov had received previous information 
regarding the sales and was most interested in obtaining a brochure 
on the sites. 

The witness told the subcommittee how he "stalled" Isakov for "quite 
some time" on the purchase of the accelerometers, by telling the Rus- 
sian that the company had run out of stock and had to go completely 
through the manufacturing process which, because of the delicate na- 
ture of the instrument, would take from 60 to 90 days. 

Mr. Epstein recounted the incident which led to his discovery, "quite 
by accident," that the accelerometers were indeed classified. The wit- 
ness had walked into a surplus electronics store and simply asked if 
they had the device in stock. After finding two of the instruments on 
a shelf in the back of the store, the witness asked the clerk to call the 
manufacturer and check the characteristics. The clerk called in the 
presence of the witness. The company was shocked that the store had 
obtained the devices and immediately sent an armed guard to retrieve 
them. 

The Russian became quite anxious to obtain an accelerometer and 
set up a clandestine meeting at a shopping center for the transaction. 
The witness called the FBI and was told to simply avoid the meeting 
with Isakov. Mr. Epstein explained his missing the contact to Isakov 



560 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

with the pretext that he had been out of town on business and that they 
had not yet received shipment of the device as scheduled. 

At this point in the relationship, the Russian would no longer come 
to the New Jersey plant for meetings, believing he would become too 
well known to the plant employees. A second meeting was set up at a 
restaurant near the plant, at which Isakov attempted to have the wit- 
ness ship the device overseas for him. When Mr. Epstein refused, the 
Russian said that it did not matter, as he would "get it out in a diplo- 
matic pouch." The witness asked the UNICEF procurement officer 
how he was going to get the underwater robot out of the country. The 
answer was the same, "under diplomatic pouch," although, in his 
position, he had no diplomatic standing. 

One of the final meetings the witness had with the Russian had to 
do with an item that was included in the sealed-bid package on the 
missile sites which were offered for sale and took place on December 4, 
1965. Isakov requested Mr. Epstein to purchase a device from the mis- 
sile site called a Sylphon bellows. The item was described as a flexible 
connector used to fuel missiles just prior to launching. The witness 
attributed the impetus of the Russian's desire to purchase this pai*- 
ticular device to probable difficulty with Soviet missile fueling tech- 
niques. The Sylphon bellows, like the other items, was never delivered 
to Isakov. 

The witness told the subcommittee that he had had 20 different con- 
tacts with the UNICEF procurement officer — 10 in person and 10 by 
telephone — from July 1965 to December of that same year. 

On January 12, 1966, a newspaper broke the story of the clandestine 
operation being conducted by Isakov out of the U.N. and brought an 
end to the case. Two weeks later, on January 22, Vadim Isakov re- 
signed his post after a State Department protest which stated he was 
involved in activities not in keeping with his U.N. position. 

In his closing statements to the subcommittee, Mr. Epstein told of 
the apparent critical need which exists in the Soviet Union for U.S. 
advanced technology. He stated his objections to our giving up our 
advances for the sake of a few dollars' profit. Here the witness stressed 
that he was not talking about military secrets, but rather our tech- 
nological secrets. 

Mr. Epstein was of the opinion that the proposed opening of addi- 
tional Soviet consulates in this country would create further problems 
for the U.S. with reference to technological espionage. He also saw 
the need for tighter controls on classified or advanced surplus material 
sales by the armed services in screening certain items destined for dis- 
position on the open market, 

TESTIMONY OF FRANK JOHN MRKVA 
(JUNE 15, 1967) 

The witness for the day was Mr. Frank John Mrkva, 39, chief of the 
Field Service Branch, Domestic Operations, Passport Office of the U.S. 
Department of State. Mr. Mrkva was born in Beaver Falls, Pa., and 
currently resides in Lanham, Md. 

Mr. Mrkva attended high school in Beaver Falls, Pa., graduating 
in 1947. He graduated from Garfield Business Institute in Beaver 
Falls in 1949 and was subsequently employed with the Babcock and 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 561 

Wilcox Tube Company in Beaver Falls; the Jones and Laughlin 
Steel Company of Aliquippa, Pa. ; and for Michael Baker, Jr., a land 
surveyor and consulting engineer in Eochester, Pa. He was also em- 
ployed with Wilco Builders, working on the Ohio Turnpike. 

Mr. Mrkva entered the U.S. Army in December of 1950 with the 
809th Engineering Battalion, served in Korea, and was discharged in 
1952. He also served 5 years in the Inactive Reserves. He is a member 
of the American Legion and the World War II Vets of West Mayfield, 
Pa. He is married and the father of three children. 

Upon being hired at the Department of State in 1955, Mr. Mrkva 
began his duties as research clerk. In time he was promoted to control 
clerk and, later, time and attendance clerk, visa courier, and general 
services officer. It was while he was working as visa courier in _ the 
Diplomatic Section of the Passport Office that he came into contact 
with Zdenek Pisk of the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Washington. 
Pisk served as third secretary and later as second secretary of the 
Czechoslovakian Embassy during the years 1961-63. 

The witness first met Mr. Pisk in 1961 when he had occasion;! to 
call at the Czechoslovakian Embassy at regular intervals in connec- 
tion with his normal duties as visa courier. Pisk invited the wit- 
ness to attend a social reception at the Embassy and later began meet- 
ing him for dinner on a social basis. The witness explained to the 
subcommittee that his parents were from Czechoslovakia and that he 
had a natural interest in talking to someone about conditions in the 
Czechoslovak nation. The witness said that he spoke enough of the 
language to "get by" and that he enjoyed the occasional social sojourns 
in the company of Pisk, who, as the witness noted, was a very personable 
and cordial companion. 

From his initial contact with Pisk, Mr. Mrkva worked closely mth 
his State Department superiors in the Passport Office and with the 
FBI. 

The rapport between Mr. Pisk and the witness eventually de- 
veloped into an intimate social relationship. The two men had dinner 
at a restaurant in the Georgetown section of "Washington on May 25, 
1962, at which time the Czech Embassy secretary stated his inter- 
est in the operation of the passport division at the State Depart- 
ment. He inquired about the methods of processing passports and the 
type of equipment used at the Passport Office. He appeared very 
interested in the fact that the State Department had streamlined its 
Passport Office operation through modernized forms and machines. 
The information discussed, although unclassified in nature, was not 
available to Czech intelligence other than through a person such as 
Frank Mrkva. 

On June 17, 1962, Pisk and the witness drove to Mayo Beach for an 
outing. No State Department business was discussed. However, on Sep- 
tember 6, 1962, the two again met at the same Georgetown restaurant, 
and the Czech official once again pressed the witness for information on 
the equipment in the Passport Office and asked Mr. Mrkva to get any 
form samples for him that were unclassified. 

Mr. Mrkva, after clearing the matter with his superiors, wrote a 
detailed report on passport processing which he passed to Mr. Pisk at 
Haines Point one Saturday morning shortly after the June meeting. 
After this meeting, the two had five additional meetings at various 



562 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

restaurants in Maryland. The meetings were arranged so that the wit- 
ness would drive to the rear of a bank at an intersection in Maryland 
and wait. Pisk would, after checking the area, join Mr. Mrkva in his 
car, and the two would drive to a nearby restaurant. The witness noted 
that Pisk was never observed arriving for the pickup at the bank in 
an automobile. The Czech official was always punctual and cautioned 
the witness "not to talk in the car." During the last series of meetings 
with Pisk, Mr. Mrkva told the subcommittee, further information con- 
cerning the U.S. system of processing passports was discussed, plus a 
continuing debriefing of his background by Pisk. 

At this point in the hearing, Mr. Watson queried the witness as to 
State Department policy regarding private social contacts with em- 
ployees of Communist embassies. Mr. Mrkva replied that the contacts 
were not prohibited, but that the Department wanted to be made aware 
of such contacts. 

The witness declined to comment on the preferability of a State De- 
partment ban on personal social contracts with Communist embassy 
employees. However, the witness saw nothing wrong in this type of 
contact as long as it was reported to superiors. 

Mr. Tuck noted that but for these private social contacts there would 
be no way for the Government to engage in a form of counter- 
espionage. Mr. Watson observed that the U.S. always seemed to "end 
up on the short end of the stick" in these types of meetings, mainly 
because the Communists are "well trained in espionage" and Amer- 
icans are so "friendly and kind and longsuffering," and "have faith in 
everybody." 

Mr. Mrkva told the subcommittee that he received an envelope con- 
taining $100 from Pisk just before the Czech secretary left the country. 
He also received as gifts : a bottle of Czech brandy, a glass vase, an ash 
tray, and several other small items. 

Pisk's time in the United States was growing short, and at a meeting 
prior to his departure on May 8, 1963, Pisk told Mr. Mrkva that the 
both of them would "mutually benefit," "financially," if Mrkva were 
to continue meeting with a soon-to-arrive "friend" of Pisk's. At this 
meeting on March 27, 1963 — the witness' last with Zdenek Pisk — Mr. 
Mrkva was told that the "friend" was a "professional" who would 
contact him as soon as he was established at the Czechoslovakian 
Embassy and who would give the recognition signal : "I bring greet- 
ings from Zdenek." 

On December 20, 1963, Mr. Mrkva and his wife had just returned 
from shopping. As they parked in front of their home they noticed 
a man standing at their door talking to their daughter. As the Mrkvas 
approached, the man brushed aside Mrs. Mrkva and shook hands with 
the witness, saying, "I bring greetings from Zdenek." The witness 
knew immediately that the man was Pisk's replacement. 

The new arrival was a very businesslike attache of the Czech Em- 
bassy, whose name was Jiri Opatmy and who served in this capacity 
from 1963 to 1966, when he was declared persona non grata by the 
State Department. 

Opatmy handed the witness an envelope containing a $100 bill and 
an ash tray of Czechoslovakian manufacture. The witness described 
Opatrny as 30, aggressive, nervous, a heavy drinker and all business; 
as opposed to Pisk who was mild and friendly. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 563 

Opatmy attempted during their next meeting to indoctrinate the 
witness to the Communist philosophy. However, Mr. Mrkva stated that 
his only interest was monetary, which conformed with his statements 
to Pisk on this matter. At this statement Opatrny seemed relieved. 

The many meetings with Opatmy in future months were more of a 
clandestine nature. True to widespread espionage tactics, danger sig- 
nals were incorporated into their meetings : If the witness suspected 
he was being watched or followed, he was to go to a predesignated place 
and mark a spot on the wall with a red "X," which would be later ob- 
served by Opatrny and mean the meeting was canceled. If Mr. Mrkva 
had a classified document to pass to the Czech agent, he was instructed 
to send a post card to the Embassy with a short "Thank you" message 
and sign the card "Charles." 

The meetings were preceded by an elaborate system of interceptions, 
observations, and precautionary maneuvers designed to confuse any 
attempt by U.S. counterespionage agents to follow either of the two 
men. The witness said that Opatrny knew the route of his (Mrkva's) 
car pool and would intercept him either going to or coming from 
work by standing at an intersection, which in turn was a signal to 
drive to another interception point. 

When meetings were aborted for any reason, four alternate plans 
would be put into effect. In face-to-face interceptions, if either man 
suspected he was either being watched or followed, he would transfer a 
newspaper he was carrying from under his right arm to his left, or 
would take out a handkerchief as they approached and wipe his brow. 
These signals indicated that contact should be avoided. Another method 
was described as a system of phone booths and telephone books. Mr. 
Mrkva would, to signify cancellation of a meeting, travel to a pre- 
arranged telephone booth and draw a circle around the first name in 
the "M" section. Sometime later, Opatrny would stop by the booth, 
check the book, and know that the next meeting had been called off. 

The Honorable Edwin E. Willis, chairman of the full committee, at 
this point in the testimony, commended Mr. Mrkva for his excellent 
contribution to his country and to the committee. Mr. Willis stated, 
"I wish we had more Americans like you." Mr. Mrkva replied by 
saying that he, as an untrained person in counterintelligence, found 
the assignment a difficult one and that throughout the several yeai^s 
of contacts with the Czech officials he counted heavily on the advice 
and counsel of Mr. Robert Johnson, his superior officer in the State 
Department who, Mrkva stated, spent many hours with him on Sat- 
urdays, Sundays, and liolidays in preparation for his next meet- 
ing with the Czech espionage agent. Mr. Mrkva also noted for the 
record that throughout the years of contact his wife was unaware of 
the dangerous double life he was leading. 

Mr. Mrkva told the subcommittee about the idiosyncracies of the 
agent, Opatrny, who, he said, was extremely punctual (he suggested 
they synchronize their watches on radio time before a meeting.) and 
very cautious. The witness said that Opatrny always set up a meeting 
in a large open area where he could easily observe if they were being 
followed. In other cases he was instructed to meet at an observation 
point, leave without speaking to the agent, and drive around in a 
residential neighborhood for a half hour, then return to the observa- 
tion point. The witness surmised that in this fashion the agent could 



564 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

observe if he (Mrkva) was being followed. Mr, Mrkva noted that he 
had 37 meetings with Opatrny and 11 with Pisk for a total of 48 
meetings with the Czech agents. He mentioned that Opatrny became 
impatient with the fact that he was not getting any classified informa- 
tion and encouraged the witness to cultivate friendships with other 
employees in various sections of the State Department in order to 
elicit confidential information from them. The agent asked extensive 
questions into the backgrounds of the members of Mrkva's car pool 
and especially wanted to know which employees had obvious weak- 
nesses, such as excessive drinking habits. 

Mr. Mrkva stated that, on one occasion, Opatrny had given him an 
obvious test to determine if he was working with counterintelligence 
in their meetings. The assignment, for which Opatrny would pay 
him $100, was to drive to a secluded dead drop at the base of a road 
sign, place a cigarette packet into the drop and retrieve a cigarette 
pack (which Mrkva suspected might contain microfilm or microdot), 
and bring it back to Opatrny. The witness had debated with himself 
over whether to divert the pack to the FBI, but decided that the mis- 
sion had all the earmarks of a test and that it would be best to carry out 
the assignment, which he did. A second test, the witness thought, came 
about when Opatrny gave the witness money to buy a small walkie- 
talkie set and instructed him to carry it into the State Department, 
leaving it in the "transmit" position. The witness stated that the 
walkie-talkie malfunctioned in some fashion and the batteries burned 
out. Opatrny had hoped to check out State Department security prac- 
tices in this manner, according to the witness. 

It was May 29, 1965, when Opatrny told the witness of his plan 
to implant a listening device in the office of the chief of the Office of 
Eastern European Affairs at the State Department. Opatrny in- 
structed Mrkrv^a to obtain floor plans of the Eastern Europe division of 
the Stat^ Department. The two of them carefully went over the floor 
plan of the office which was eventually selected to be "bugged" and 
bantered about various concealed spots where the device would be hid- 
den from sight, but would pick up conversations in the room. Govern- 
ment furniture catalogues were obtained for Opatrny by Mrkva, and a 
bookcase was chosen as the most suitable place to install the listening 
device. Mrkva, at Opatmy's order, obtained a sample piece of wood 
from such a bookcase in the State Department. 

One year later, Opatrny gave Mr. Mrkva a transmitting microphone 
that could be placed under the front bottom lip of a bookcase, out of 
sight, but in a position to receive and transmit every sound in the 
office of the chief of the Eastern Europe division. The witness de- 
scribed the device as being about y^ inch thick and about 12 inches 
long, or roughly the size of a ruler and capable of being operated by 
remote control from a substantial distance away. A photograph of the 
bugging instrument was placed in the record of the hearings as an 
exhibit. 

If Mr. Mrkva's efforts in installing the device were successful, he 
was instructed to call the Communist agent and tell him that he "had 
made an excellent purchase." If unsuccessful he was to call and say 
he had "a bad headache." Likewise, if installation was unsuccessful, 
the witness was to drive to a predesignated theater and return the 
device to Opatrny in an alley next to the theater. If successful, he 
was to meet Opatrny a week later and receive $1,000 in $20 bills. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 565 

The witness told the subcommittee that lie received $100 for expenses 
prior to the installation. 

On the designated date in 1966, Mr. Mrkva transported the bugging 
device into the State Department and immediately handed it over to 
waiting FBI agents. The FBI agents, the witness related, transported 
the device to another section of the building and left it to transmit for 
approximately 20 minutes before removing it. 

The witness met with Opatrny sometime later and the two argued 
violently over the proposed payment for successful installation of the 
transmitter. Opatrny contended that the device was inoperative. The 
witness feigned surprise and demanded payment for the installation. 
At last the Czech official paid the witness $500 and promised an 
additional $1,000 if and when the device was retrieved and delivered 
to him. portly thereafter the operation was exposed and publicized. 

Throiighout his contacts with the two Czechoslovakian officials, 
Mr. Mrkva received a total of $3,440, the bulk of which came from Jiri 
Opatrny and all of which was turned over to the FBI. The witness 
disclosed that he was asked to sign a receipt for the cash received from 
Opatrny, but he always signed with the alias "Zobek." 

Jiri Opatrny was declared persona non ^ata by the Department of 
State in July 1966 and w^as given a time limit in which to gather his 
belongings and leave the country. 

In a closing statement to the subcommittee, Mr. Mrkva said that he 
believed "the American public should be made aware of the activities 
of some of these Communist agents, who are now serving in this coun- 
try, under the guise of diplomats." The witness saw how easily Amer- 
ican citizens could be duped into furnishing information to these for- 
eign agents "which in many cases could be very detrimental to the 
security of the United States." The witness was convinced that Com- 
munist agents — 

are on the prowl here * * * in Washington, and elsewhere in this country, keeping 
prearranged rendezvous, setting up arrangements for future meetings, familiariz- 
ing themselves with select areas that they plan to use for meeting places, and as 
drops, and it should be a matter of concern to all of us. 

The witness concluded w^ith these somber words: "When you start 
seeing them, and start meeting them practically in your own backyard, 
as it was in my case, it kind of jolts your complacency." 

At the end of the testimony, subcommittee chairman, the Honorable 
Mr. Tuck, placed a translation of an article which appeared in the 
May 5, 1967, publication of Izve.^tia, official organ of the Soviet Gov- 
ernment, entitled "The Painters." The article attempts to create the 
impression that in holding the current series of espionage hearings the 
Committee on Un-American Activities has been acting at the instiga- 
tion of the FBI and the CIA and that it has been receiving the testi- 
mony of witnesses who have not been telling the truth. The article 
goes on to falsely accuse various Americans of committing espionage 
against the Soviet Union. 

TESTIMONY OF NATALIE ANNA BIENSTOCK 
(NOVEMBER 15, 1967) 

Miss Natalie Anna Bienstock, 31, a native of Prague, Czechoslo- 
vakia, came to the U.S.A. with her parents when she was 3 years old 

79-422 O — 68 2 



566 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

and became a citizen of the U.S. through derivation in 1945. Miss 
Bienstock's parents were both Kussian bom and settled in Boulder, 
Colo., upon arrival in America. 

The witness attended grammar schools in New York City, Boulder, 
and Washington, D.C. She graduated from Bronx High School of 
Science in 1954, and from City College of New York in 1958 with a 
B.A. The witness accomplished her post graduate work at Columbia 
University, Teachers College in New York, and received her master's 
degree from Cornell University in 1964. 

The witness noted her ability to speak both Russian and French in 
addition to English. 

She worked part time during college as a department store sales 
clerk, camp counselor, and tour guide escort. Miss Bienstock also did 
typing and proofreading of Russian grammar texts. During the years 
1958 through 1962 she was a Russian interpreter on an assignment basis 
for Hurok Attractions, Inc., a company which books cultural ex- 
change programs in this country. 

Miss Bienstock also did occasional free-lance translation of Russian 
literary works for various publishing houses and NBC television dur- 
ing the years 1962 to 1967. 

From 1958 to 1962 the witness traveled to Canada, France, the Neth- 
erlands, Soviet Union, and Mexico. Most of the trips were taken as a 
tourist, but some were under the auspices of Hurok, where she was 
chiefly a "coordinator" for ballet troupes. 

In 1961, she met a "character dancer" for the Leningrad Ballet whose 
name was Congtantine Rassadin. Some months later, after much cor- 
respondence, she made a trip to Moscow and Leningrad, U.S.S.R., to 
visit Rassadin, spending 10 or 12 days in each city. She returned to 
Moscow to extend her visa, in hopes of spending more time with Ras- 
sadin. She checked into the Ukraine Hotel in Moscow and gave her 
passport to Intourist, requesting the extension. Later she received a 
call from Intourist. She supposed that the passport bureau had granted 
an extension of her visa. Instead, she was directed to a small adjoining 
room where a young man introduced himself as Viktor Sorin and 
stated plainly that he was an agent of the KGB ( Soviet Committee of 
State Security) , the Soviet intelligence agency. 

Sorin was very pleasant, according to the witness, and said "that he 
was not going to pull any of my nails out, because times have changed, 
and he just wanted to talk to me." 

The KGB man indicated to Miss Bienstock that she had been fol- 
lowed during the entire trip to Leningrad and Moscow and that the 
KGB had a complete dossier on her entire family. 

Sorin stated that Soviet members of cultural exchange groups to 
America had to be protected because American agents were "trying to 
recruit them while they were abroad." Despite her repeated denials, the 
KGB agent insisted that the witness must be an American agent to 
have worked with the Hurok staff for so long. Nevertheless, he told 
her that he thought she would be an ideal person to take care of these 
Soviet performers while they were in the U.S. 

Agent Sorin appeared to have limitless Icnowledj^e concerning the 
lineage and background of the witness. (She estimated that 90% 
of her relatives were either executed or died from other causes in 
Soviet concentration camps.) This first interrogation in the Ukraine 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHES THE UNITED STATES 567 

Hotel lasted for 6 or 7 hours, after which the agent advised the witness 
to think about their "conversation." Her passport, which was lying on 
the desk during her interrogation, was not returned to her. 

After returning to her room in the hotel, the KGB agent kept the 
pressure on the witness by making a number of nuisance calls. The 
following day, the 9th of March 1962, she was subjected to a second 
7-hour session of interrogation. 

She was instructed to go to another room in the Ukraine Hotel 
where Viktor Sorin was again waiting for her. He reiterated many of 
the facts known by the KGB regarding her personal and private life 
that had been disclosed to her the previous day. He continued to play 
on her emotions through various tactics and plyed her with vodka 
as well. 

She was, in this manner, induced to sign a statement which declared 
that she was, or would become, an agent for the KGB and report the 
names of American agents in the U.S. who attempted to contact any- 
one in the Russian cultural exchange groups. She was also told to 
report any suspicious actions by the Russian members of the groups, 
those who might appear disloyal to Russia. She was "recruited" into 
Moscow's employ through coercion by fear. 

Miss Bienstock was given two code names and was instructed to con- 
tact a Soviet citizen, Leo Sorokin, via secret writing at 680 Park 
Avenue, N.Y.C., then the Soviet United Nations mission address in 
New York. She was provided with chemically treated paper and was 
schooled in secret writing for sending messages to her contact — 
Sorokin — in the U.S. 

(One Alexander Sorokin was formerly an attache at the Russian 
Embassy in Mexico and was a member of the Soviet U.N. mission in 
this country from 1960 through August 1963. No Leo Sorokin was 
listed at that address at that time.) 

As soon as Miss Bienstock agreed to act as an informant for the 
KGB, her passport was returned to her. 

Upon arrival back in America, the witness, per instructions by 
Sorin, attempted to meet "an unspecified agent" 2 weeks later in the 
Bronx section of New York City. She kept the appointment, but did 
not make contact. She had been previously instructed to return to the 
same location 2 weeks later if for any reason the first meeting was 
aborted. She did not keep the second appointment. 

Miss Bienstxxik received a letter from Sorokin after missing the 
second meeting. He asked her for the names of any American agents 
who had been in touch with Russians (at the Hurok Agency) . She gave 
the agent the names of American agents who had been in touch with 
her — but did not have information concerning contacts between U.S. 
agents and Russian nationals. 

In repeated letters from Sorokin, the witness was told to get more 
names. She sent back — in the same secret fashion — the names of every- 
one on the Hurok Agency staff. 

Over a period of 11 months. Miss Bienstock sent a total of approxi- 
mately seven secret letters to her contact. The letters, for the most part, 
reiterated the same set of names. 

Sorokin, in return, would express his displeasure with the informa- 
tion and demand additional names, as well as those of disloyal Russians. 
The witness stated that it was her intent to give the contact as little in- 
formation as possible. 



568 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Miss Bienstock never received any remuneration from the KGB and 
finally ceased all correspondence and broke with the KGB in February 
1963. 

The witness testified that she did not contact authorities in the FBI 
until fully a year and a half later. During this period, she imagined 
that disclosure of her activities would have brought about her de- 
portation from the U.S. 

In her closing statement, the witness spoke of her own immaturity in 
allowing the KGB to coerce her into any dealing with them at all. She 
said that she had never been exposed to the "bad side" of the Russians 
and, despite warnings from her mother, placed herself in a precarious 
position of which the Soviet secret police were quick to take advantage. 

In conclusion, the witness agreed that the Soviets would take ad- 
vantage of every opportunity to try to recruit and enlist American 
citizens in espionage activities against their own country. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED 
STATES BY AGENTS OF FOREIGN COMMUNIST 
GOVERNMENTS 



THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1967 

United States House of Representatives, 

Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Un-Amerioan Activities, 

Washington^ D.C. 

PUBLIC hearing 

A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, 
pursuant to call, at 10:40 a.m., in Room 429, Cannon House Office 
Building, Washington, D.C, Hon. William M. Tuck (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding. 

(Subcommittee members: Representatives William M. Tuck, of 
Virginia, chairman; Edwin E. Willis, of Louisiana, chairman of the 
full committee; John C. Culver, of Iowa; Richard L. Roudebush, of 
Indiana ; and Albert W. Watson, of South Carolina. ) 

Subcommittee members present: Representatives Tuck, Willis, 
Culver, Roudebush, and Watson. 

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Chester 
D. Smith, general counsel ; and B. Ray McConnon, Jr., investigator. 

Mr. Tuck. The subcommittee will please come to order. 

The committee is now in session. IJnder the rules of the committee, 
no taking of pictures will be permitted. 

We have a quorum present. 

This subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Ac- 
tivities is convened to hold hearings pursuant to a resolution unani- 
mously adopted by the full committee on March 8, 1967. That resolu- 
tion reads as follows : 

BE IT RESOLVED, That hearings by the Committee on Un-American Activi- 
ties or a subcommittee thereof, be held in Washington, D.C, or at such other 
place or places as the Chairman may determine, on such date or dates as the 
Chairman may designate, relating to the extent, character, and objectives of 
activities within the United States of agents of foreign Communist governments 
or organizations affecting the internal security of the United States, with par- 
ticular reference to the conduct of espionage and other intelligence gathering 
activities, and techniques employed for recruitment of citizens of the United 
States in aid thereof ; the legislative purpose being to provide factual information 
to aid the Congress in the enactment of any necessary remedial legislation pur- 
suant to the mandate to the Committee by House Resolution 7 of January 10, 
1967, and Public Law 601 of the 79th Congress. 

Over the past 37 years, the House of Representatives, determining 
that th^ Communist world movement poses a serious threat to the 
security of our Nation and our treasured way of life, has appointed 
committees to investigate Communist activities and to report their 
findings to the House. 

569 



570 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

It has done this so that the House would be at all times informed 
about the nature and extent of threats to the security of our Nation 
and in a pK)sition to take appropriate and effective action to protect 
our country from those who would undermine and subvert it in the 
interests of a foreign power. 

The Congress of the United States has found, formally and officially, 
that there is a worldwide, revolutionary Communist movement which, 
to quote the Internal Security Act, has the aim of establishing a global 
totalitarian dictatorship by means of "treachery, deceit, infiltration 
into other groups (governmental and otherwise), espionage, sabotage, 
terrorism, and any other means deemed necessary * * *." 

Testifying before a House Appropriations Subcommittee last year, 
FBI Director J, Edgar Hoover stated : 

As a result of several decades of development, the coordinated espion&ge 
attack against this country by the intelligence services of the Communist bloc 
has now reached an intensity which makes it the most massive offensive of its 
kind ever mounted. 

He also testified that — 

the great bulk of the representatives of the Soviet bloc who are stationed in this 
country have some type of intelligence assignment and the number of these 
oflScial representatives has increased substantially over the years. 

Communist-bloc agents, Mr. Hoover said, are searching out informa- 
tion on every phase of our national life — to assist them in undermining 
the United States by propaganda or subversion. 

At the same time, they are particularly interested in acquiring "sci- 
entific, technological, military, and industrial data which will strength- 
en the Soviet bloc." 

Revelations concerning Communist espionage before this committee 
years ago — particularly those of Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth 
Bentley — shocked numerous Americans and served to alert them fully, 
for the first time in many cases, to a realization of the nature and aims 
of communism. 

What they revealed, basically, was that some Americans, including 
quite a number in Government service, had sold out their country and 
given themselves so completely to an alien, totalitarian ideology that 
they would act as spies against their country for it. 

To a great extent, these j>eople had been recruited into Soviet spy 
rings from the ranks of the Communist Party. 

Communist tactics are always changing, however — and always to 
serve Communist interests better. 

Last year, Wladyslaw Tykocinski testified before this committee 
that in 1952 Moscow had issued a directive that native Communist 
party members, except in most unusual circumstances, were not to be 
used for espionage purposes. Revelations about the utilization of Com- 
munist parties as recruiting grounds for Soviet spies had hurt these 
parties everywhere — not only in the United States. 

Tykocinski had been a Polish Communist diplomat for 20 years. 
For six of those years, his diplomatic position had been nothing but 
a cover for his operations as an agent of Communist Poland's military 
intelligence service. 

This hearing today — and others which will follow it — are being held 
to develop information for the Congress on current Communist-bloc 
intelligence operations : who their agents are, what kind of information 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 571 

they are seeking, who they are approaching for that information, and 
the techniques of their approach. 

I will now read for the record the order of appointment of the sub- 
committee conducting this hearing : 

Apeil 4, 1967. 
To : Mr. Francis J. McNamaka, 
Director, Committee on Un-American Activities. 

Pursuant to the provisions of the law and the Rules of this Committee, I 
hereby appoint a subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities, con- 
sisting of Honorable William M. Tuck, as Chairman, and myself, Honorable John 
C. Culver, Honorable Richard L. Roudebush and Honorable Albert W. Watson as 
associate members, to conduct hearings in Washington, D.C., commencing on or 
about Thursday, April 6, 1967, and/or at such other times thereafter and places 
as said subcommittee shall determine, as contemplated by the resolution adopted 
by the Committee on the 8th day of March, 1967, authorizing hearings concerning 
the extent, character, and objectives of activities within the United States of 
agents of foreign Communist governments or organizations affecting the internal 
security of the United States, and other matters under investigation by the 
Committee. 

Please make this action a matter of Committee record. 

If any member indicates his inability to serve, please notify me. 

Given under my hand this 4th day of April, 1967. 

/s/ Edwin E. Willis 
Edwin E, Willis, 
Chcmman, Committee on Un-American Activities. 

Are you ready to proceed. Counsel ? 

Mr. Smith. Yes, sir. 

Will the witness Mr. John Huminik, Jr., step forward, please. 

Be seated. 

Mr. Chairman, will you swear the witness. 

Mr. Tuck. Will the witness please stand and raise your right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to ^ive before 
the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Huminik. I do. 

Mr. Tuck. Take the witness chair. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN HUMINIK, JR. 

Mr. Smith. Mr. Huminik, will you please state your full name for 
the record? 

Mr. Huminik. John Huminik, Jr. 

Mr. Smith. What is your date and place of birth ? 

Mr. Huminik. I was born in Washington, D.C., on 25 Jime 1935. 

Mr. Smith. What is your current address? 

Mr. Huminik. 5906 John Adams Drive, Camp Springs, Maryland. 

Mr. Smith. Mr. Huminik, you are here today in response to a sub- 
pena served on you by Committee Investigator Ray McConnon on 
16 February 1967 ; isn't that correct? 

Mr. Huminik. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Mr. Smith. Now, Mr. Huminik, before we get into the reasons for 
your being here, I would like to establish briefly for the committee 
members some of your background. 

For instance, would you briefly summarize your educational back- 
ground for us? 

Mr. Huminik. Yes. I attended elementary and high school in Wash- 
ington. I graduated from Anacostia High School in Washington in 



572 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

June of 1953. Subsequently, I attended several schools and studied 
metallurgy and welding engineering, both civilian and military 
courses. I have the courses listed here if you care that I read them. 

Mr. Smith. All right. 

Mr. HuMiNiK. I graduated from the Columbia Technical Institute 
in 1957. The Metals Engineering Institute, a diploma in metallurgy in 
1958. International correspondence schools, diploma in industrial 
metallurgy in 1956. U.S. Air Force Metals Processing School, Chanute 
Air Force Base, in 1954 ; I graduated number one in the class. 

U.S. Air University extension courses, I have 84 credit hours. 

U.S. Naval Aircraft Structural Maintenance in Aircraft Materiels 
correspondence courses in 1954. 

Then I took numerous courses from the American Society for Metals 
and I took U.S. Army extension courses in 16 subjects related to 
chemical, biological, and radiological defense and a 2-year U.S. Army 
Chemical Officer Career Course at Fort Myer, Virginia. 

Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Huminik. 

Would you now relate briefly for the committee your occupational 
background ? 

Mr. Huminik. Yes. I am a scientist and a businessman, and I have 
been employed in and around the city of Washington in the defense 
industry in the capacity of engineering scientist and corporate officer. 

I presently am a consultant in welding and metallurgical technology. 

In addition, I am a board chairman of Chemprox Corporation, a 
small chemical manufacturing corporation. 

I have also published a technical book and 15 technical papers. I 
have the book here if you would care to examine it. 

Mr. Smith. Yes. 

Mr. Huminik. Also, I would like to point out I was chairman of 
two technical societies here. The American Society for Metals, I was 
chairman in 1965 and 1966 ; and in 1961 and 1962, I was chairman of 
the American Welding Society here in Washington. 

The companies that I have worked with, specifically I have worked 
for Mel par. Incorporated. I was head of the metallurgical engineer- 
ing group from July 1954 until August of 1959, and then I went back 
there between September 1965 and 1966. 

At Chemprox Corporation I was president and chief scientist from 
March 1963 to September 1965. 

At Value Engineering Company in Alexandria, Virginia, I was vice 
president and senior scientist between August 1959 and April 1963. 

Finally, I was at Fairchild Hiller Corporation as manager of the 
Materials Engineering Department between July 1966 and January 
1967. 

I might also add, I am married and the father of four children. 

Mr. Smith. Would you be good enough to tell us something of the 
book and the papers that you wrote which you have just mentioned ? 

Mr. Huminik. Yes. The book is about rocket reentry coatings and 
high temperature materials that relate to the space and rocketry 
programs. 

Some of the papers that I have written deal with subjects like micro- 
wave measurement of dielectric properties and high temperature and 
environments, highly technical papers, and papers also on welding of 
very rare materials. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHliS THE UNITED STATES 573 

Mr. Smith. Would you give us the title of your book ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. The title is High Temperaiure Inorganic Coatings^ 
published by the Reinhold Publishing Company. 

Mr. Smith. I would imagine, with that impressive background you 
have just given us, that you are most likely affiliated with some of the 
professional groups on a national basis ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes. I have been connected with several organiza- 
tions. I was, as I said before, the chairman of the American Society 
for Metals, which in Washington has 400 members in Government 
and industry. 

I was also chairman of the American Welding Society, which has 
approximately 100 engineers and scientists in that organization. Cur- 
rently, I am on the Inter-American Relations Committee of the Ameri- 
can Society for Metals. This is a national organization trying to work 
with Central and South American countries to promote exchange of 
metallurgical knowledge. 

I have also belonged to the American Ordnance Association and I 
received one award specifically for welding, which was the meritorious 
certificate from the American Welding Society in 1963. And I am 
listed in Who's Who in Commerce and Industry^ the 13th edition, and 
the latest edition in Who''s Who in the South and Southwest. 

Mr. Smith. Have you had any military experience? 

Mr. Huminik. Yes, I have been associated with the Reserves for 
12 years. I served also actively for 7 months at Chanute Air Force 
Base when I attended the Metal Processing Specialist Schools. I 
served first as an enlisted man in the Air National Guard, c>btaining 
the ralnk of staff sergeant. Then I applied for a commission and re- 
ceived a commission in September of I960 in the Army Chemical 
Corps Reserves. 

I subsequently commanded the 312th Chemical Company and the 
419th Chemical Biological and Radiological Center, which was located 
near Andrews Air Force Base. 

Mr. Smith. Are you still active in the military ? 

Mr. Huminik. No; I was discharged in December of 1966, 
honorably. 

Mr. Smith. Honorable discharge? 

Mr. Huminik. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. Now, Mr. Huminik, some months ago, in September 
1966 to be exact, you became the subject of a ra^ther startling news 
story involving Soviet diplomats in Washington carrying on espion- 
age operations out of the Russian Embassy and consulate; is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Huminik. That is correct. I became involved in the operation to 
thwart the Soviet agents and I worked under the guidance of the 
FBI. 

Mr. Smith. Mr. Huminik, I wonder at this point if you might not 
relate to the committee in your own words and in general terms just 
what this story involved, what part you played in it, and just how it 
all started. 

Mr. Huminik. Yes. It all started actually back in probably 1960, 
when I took a tour of the Soviet Embassy with some out-of-town 
relatives and met a Russian diplomat there who gave us the tour. His 
name was Aleksandr Izvekov. 



574 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Later, an associate of his, Dr. Sergei Stupar, who is a scientific coun- 
selor, applied for niembei'ship in the American Society for Met^als. 
At that time, I was secretary of that society, and he was admitted to 
membei'ship and brought with him Mr. Izvekov who had given me the 
tour previously, and they struck up a convei'sation. 

Immediately I contacted the FBI because I suspected that they were 
going to go further because they knew that I was of Russian ancestrj', 
my father having been born in Russia and coming over at the age of 
two. 

They proceeded to evaluate nie and to discuss bi^oad subjects of my 
background and my occupation over a period of yeai's. and then ask- 
ing me for simple reports that were difficult to obtain, but unclassified, 
until finally it proceeded to a full-scale clandestine operation, with 
dead drops and everything else. And the operation became deeply 
involved until September 1. 1966, when Valentin Revin, the assistant 
to the scientific counselor, was declared persona non grata by the 
St-ate Department. 

^Ir. Smith. Xow you have mentioned several Soviet consulate and 
Embassy pei-sonnel whom you came in contact with during this opera- 
tion. 

I wonder if you would comment on each of these, giving names and 
titles, if you know them. 

Mr. HuMixiK. Yes. The first is Aleksandr X. Izvekov, third secre- 
tary of the Soviet Embassy. 

As I mentioned before, he gave me the tour of the Embassy. He iden- 
tified himself as an economic engineer and he was not a member of 
these technical societies, but he accompanied another Soviet. He ap- 
peared more to be a bodyguard or watchdog over Dr. Stupar. He was 
of militarv bearing, and for this reason I think that he is part of the 
GRU. * 

Xow I might explain two terms that I will use. The GRU is the 
military intelligence arm of the Soviet Government, and the KGB 
is the Conunittee on State Security, which is their civilian intelligence 
agency. They ai^e not i-elatable to our FBI or CIA : they function 
ditferently. 

I had a number of contacts with him, all technical meetings. 

Another Soviet was Dr. Sergei X. Stupar. He was the scientific 
counselor and head of the Scientific Division of the Embassy. He is 
now back in the Soviet Union and. according to Is vest ia, he is a 
senior scientific stalT member of the Institute of Ferrous Metallurg;\' 
in Dne]:)ropetrovsk. 

My understanding of his job now is that he is the principal Soviet 
who reviews the metallurgical things that are i^robably brought into 
the Soviet Union by spies: in other words, in the field of metallurgy 
he is their top expert. 

He first attended an ASM meeting. American Society for ^fetals, 
in May 1961. and became a member. He gave a lecture, in fact, to our 
society in January of 1962, where he talked about Soviet metallurgy. 

I would like to point out now a couple of items that he gave to me. 
He gave me such things as a metallurgical handbook that was trans- 
lated into English and things like calendars, Soviet calendars, which 
have very nice pictures. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 575 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt ? I just wanted to in- 
quire as to how a citizen of the Soviet Union would qualify as a 
member of the American Society for Metallurgy ? 

Mr, HuMiNiK. The society is an open society and it is a society de- 
voted to metals and metallurgy. He was a Ph.D. metallurgist. 

Mr. Watson. And it is not restricted to American citizens? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. That is right. We have members from other coun- 
tries. We inquired at the State Department about whether he should 
be admitted, and they told us we could do what we wanted. 

We had many committee meetings on the subject before it was 
decided to allow him to come in. At this time, no one knew he was any- 
thing but a scientist. 

Mr. Watson. And there are other foreign national members of this 
society ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes. 

Mr. Watson. So there are no restrictions so far as your society 
regulations and bylaws and policies are concerned, so far as a for- 
eign national being a member of it? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes, sir. I would say there are at least 20 countries 
represented in the society; it is a large society with 35,000 members 
throughout the country. 

The Chairman. With respect to this Soviet national, you only knew 
him as a scientist and not in any other capacity? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes. 

The Chairman. And that is how the society treated him, as a 
scientist ? 

^Ir. HuMiNiK. Yes. 

Mr. Tuck. Do you wish to file those booklets? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. No; I just wish to show them. I do not wish to file 
any of these. They are available at any time for anybody to inspect, 
even days other than this hearing. 

Back to Dr. Sergei Stupar, whom I was discussing. He attended 
meetings of the ASM between May 1961 until September of 1964. He 
told me he was a scientist and not interested in politics. 

He appeared later to be the boss of another Soviet, Valentin Revin, 
who was thrown out persona non grata and I believe him to be a mem- 
ber of the KGB, which is the civilian intelligence agency. He was the 
prime mover in the evaluation of myself for recruitment into the So- 
viet spy apparatus. He showed interest in my Reserve activities, and 
we had a number of contacts. 

The next Soviet I would like to discuss would be Anatole Kuznetsov, 
who is a third secretary of the Soviet Embassy. I had only limited 
contact, perhaps one or two meetings; I don't recall. He impressed me 
as being a very intelligent and sharp Soviet diplomat. 

He seemed to be the big boss because Dr. Stupar, who accompanied 
him on one meeting, was terrified every time he spoke. In other words. 
Dr. Stupar, who was the scientific counselor on a much higher level in 
the diplomatic status of the Embassy, if he said anything out of line, 
Anatole Kuznetsov was quick to correct him. And he might have been 
the top KGB man in the Embassy ; I don't know. 

I think that this illustrates the fact that the title at the Embassy does 
not necessarily show the rank of the man in an intelligence organi- 
zation. 



576 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

The next man I would like to talk about is Vladimir Boutenko. He 
was the assistant commercial consular, and he operated out of the So- 
viet consulate, which is not far from the Embassy here. 

He appeared to be a military intelligence or GRU member. He at- 
tended ASM meetings and did in fact apply for membership and 
received membership, the same as Dr. Stupar. They presumably were 
from two different intelligence agencies, but both became members of 
this society. He took copious notes at all of our meetings and he made 
contact with as many ASM members as he could. 

He did not appear as polished as Dr. Stupar and he made a total of 
18 contacts with me over a period from March 9, 1964, until 10 January 
1966, including two visits to my home with his wife. 

On one of these occasions, he took a photo of my family, presumably 
to see if my wife was connected with counterintelligence. In other 
words, they have the feeling that families can be put together for intel- 
ligence or counterintelligence purposes. So they check every angle. 

Mr. RouDEBusH. Mr. Chairman. 

Is your wife also of Russian nationality ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. No. 

Mr. RouDEBusH. She is not ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. That is right. 

Vladimir Boutenko stated that he would play a key role in a trade 
agreement he would make with my small chemical company, Chemprox 
Corporation, a very small company which I founded. He was presum- 
ably instrumental in leading me along saying that if I cooperated with 
the diplomats they would get me some nice trade agreements with the 
Soviet Union. They said this would push my little company over the 
top and make it profitable, and everything else. This was the ploy that 
they used. 

At one time, Boutenko had the audacity to ask me to meet his boss 
out of the country because his boss was not welcome in this country 
or could not come into this country, so they could discuss the kind of 
relationship under which I could get such trade agreements. 

This proposed meeting was presumably to start off an espionage 
operation. 

Mr. Smith. Could he tell you why his boss could not come into this 
country ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. No, he did not tell me why. 

He disappeared after Valentin Revin — and this is a little bit com- 
plicated to state now — but Valentin Revin, the spy who was thrown out 
of the country, was told by me that Boutenko was trying to get me out 
of the country to meet with his boss, so Revin, being from the other 
intelligence agency, cut Boutenko off. 

In other words, the two agencies presumably were competing for 
my services. 

I would like to show you some other items I got from Boutenko. He 
gave my wife on one of his visits a perfume called Midnight in 
Moscow. 

Also, he gave me a diary, several diaries, which tliey like you to keep, 
I think, so that if they want to steal tliem later tliey can see what you 
were writing about. Also, an address book which also can be taken, 
phone numbers. In other words, they are always suspicious as to 
whether you are working for the U.S. Many of these things have double 
edges to them. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 577 

He also gave me a catalog of the chemicals that the Soviets wish to 
export. Now this catalog came out of the consulate. Since I was inter- 
ested in chemicals he gave me a used catalog. Usually they gave you 
new things ; presumably this time they didn't have a new catalog. 

He also gave me several calendars, here are several more. The pic- 
tures are quite magnificent if the committee might want to inspect 
these. They try to give a peaceful appearance. They give very high 
quality care to the photography that is in these calendars. 

Mr. Watson. I notice that the perfume appears to have been used. 
Has your wife used it ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. I don't think she has used it. I think it has evapo- 
rated. I have been trying to save it. 

Also, I have a bottle of vodka ; I received several of these. As you 
kn<»\v, they cannot be imported into the United States so the only way 
you get it is if a Soviet diplomat gives it to you. There is a bottle for 
exhibit. 

Mr. Smith. I see you have not opened it. 

Mr. HuMiNiK. No, it is not opened. 

The next Soviet I would like to talk about is Vladimir Zorov. He 
was third secretary of the Soviet Embassy and he attended an ASM 
meeting on 9 March 1964 with Vladimir Boutenko. 

He appeared to be the watchdog over Boutenko and he is a cruel, 
coldblooded type. He made a pitch to me in these words: He said, 
"Mr. Huminik, we would be glad to pay very good prices for any 
information that you could give to our government. 

This is the first meeting I had with him and this was in the Hot 
Shoppe on the 14th Street Bridge here in Washington. He intimated 
to me that, "We take care of our friends and we also take care of our 
enemies." 

He was a man used for the direct approach, a type of one-shot deal 
just to see what would happen, I would say. 

Mr. Smith. Did you understand what he meant by "take care of 
our enemies"? 

Mr. Huminik. I think he implied that if you crossed the Soviet 
Union while you are working with them it would not be very healthy. 

He came to my house with Mr. Boutenko on 20 March 1964 and 
had dinner at my house and discussed many things. This is part of 
their evaluation period. Later, Boutenko came along with his wife. 

Mr. Smith. Which one of these two groups do you think he was 
a member of? 

Mr. HiTMiNiK. It is hard to say, but he probably was a GRU man. 
Just by his military bearing, I surmised this. I have no way of know- 
ing, of course; these are just guesses from my knowledge of the 
Soviet operation. 

Mr. Smith. He did not exhibit any military training? 

Mr. Huminik. No. They operate as civilians and say they don't 
have any military training, but you know from general conversation 
they know something about the military. 

Aleksy R. Malinin, also assistant commercial consular at the Soviet 
consulate. He did not figure in the operation, but I met him at an 
American Welding Society meeting in Virginia on March 18, 1964. 
I had five meetings or contacts with liim— had dinner beside him at 
one of these meetings. He told me he was an expert in welding and 
that he had been in England selling welding equipment to the British. 



578 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Now Aleksy Malinin was declared persona non grata in Novem- 
ber 1966. He was involved with Sergeant Boeckenhaupt. This was 
covered in the newspapers. Boeckenliaupt was accused of conspiring 
to steal U.S. codes and communications data and he has been indicted. 
I think the trial has not been held yet. 

I also note that there was a William Mulvena from England who 
was arrested by Scotland Yard as being the go-between, in other 
words, presumably he contacted Malinin in England, who was here 
at the consulate as an assistant commercial consular. 

Mr. Smith. This is an assumption on your part ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes; just what I read from the newspapers. But I 
did know Aleksy Malinin, and he was declared persona no grata in 
November 1966. 

Now the other Soviet I wish to talk about was Valentin Revin, who 
was the assistant scientific consular of the Soviet Embassy. 

I had more contact with him of an intimate nature than any of the 
others; age 34, born in Moscow. He has a 3-year-old daughter, and 
his wife is a radio chemist. He attended the University of California 
at Berkeley as an exchange student and he studied nuclear physics 
there. He served as a guide at the Russian exhibition in the summer 
of 1959 in New York City. He is most likely a KGB or Committee on 
State Security member. 

He was Dr. Stupar's successor. He took over after Stupar left. He 
is very intelligent, sharp, cautious, quick, observant. He spoke English 
as well as I do, very slight accent; it would be hard to determine 
that he had an accent, even. 

He has a thorough knowledge of the metropolitan Washington area, 
maybe better than I do. I have a feeling that they have a course, it 
is probably called the City of Washington back in Moscow, before they 
come here. He knows every street. He knew how to dress in Western 
attire. This is a thing that the Soviets were accused of not doing in 
their earlier espionage days. He looked like a college student. You 
would say he was a college student if you saw him on the street. Well 
read in intelligence customs, familiar with techniques and equipment, 
in general a well-trained intelligence officer. 

I proposed the theory to the FBI that he and I were biologically 
matched; in other words, that he and I were about the same build, 
same temperament, both wear eyeglasses, same temper. This is, in my 
opinion, the way to match an intelligence agent who is trying to 
subvert someone. 

Mr. Smith. Do you feel there was any effort on the So^^et Embassy's 
part to match you up with him ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. I think definitely. I think that is right. 

I would like to show you a wristwatch that he gave me as a gift, it 
is worth about $180 ; it is an Omega wristwatch. He gave me a box that 
is an expensive wooden box, with a very fancy picture on it, that 
came from Dr. Stupar, he said. And later he wanted to get this back 
from me because he said that it is easily recognized as being a Russian 
product and he didn't want it to be around, you could not get it in this 
country. 

I told him I didn't go for this Indian-giving and I was not going to 
give it back to him, so I didn't. He gave me also a wallet, which I don't 
have any more, and he gave me vodka. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 579 

Mr. Smith. Now would you explain to the committee your per- 
sonal views as to why the Soviets chose you as a target ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Well, I think there are several reasons. One, that I 
Avas of Russian descent, my father coming here in 1918 at the age of 
2, and I was friendly. And being an officer of the society, they could 
get to me easily without any notice being taken of this. I was very ac- 
cessible through ASM; they could come and visit me every month 
openly. 

I had access to Government officials and to reports; I was doing 
Government research. I was vice president of an engineering com- 
pany at that time which was doing work in rocketry which they were 
very interested in. 

I was a member of the Army Reserve and I was an expert in chemical 
and biological warfare, and they were very interested in the fact that 
I had published a technical book dealing with reentry coatings for 
satellites and rockets, a subject they were very interested in. 

Mr. Smith. Do you feel they made any kind of an inquiry or in- 
vestigation of your background ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Well, I think they probably did this all along. They 
were asking me many personal questions — my hobbies, what I did, 
where I went, everything. 

Mr. Tuck. Are they in the country now ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. No ; they have either left or been thrown out, to my 
knowledge. 

Mr. Smith. How long did the Soviets develop an assessment of you 
before they really got down to business ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. I think between the spring of 1961 and March 2, 
1965, which was a 4-year period where they assessed me and asked 
for simple reports and asked for things that were not highly classi- 
fied. It was a 4-year period. 

Mr. Smith. Do you think this assessment period of 4 years unusual 
or an exception in your case ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. I don't know. I think they are going to take their 
time. I think they have been burnt before and they are going to be 
very careful about whom they pull into a spy operation. 

Mr. Smith. Would you describe some of the ways or the means 
by which they accomplished their assessment and development of you 
as an agent ? 

Mr. Huminik. They obtained all my biographical data, where T 
worked and schooling. They had photos of me from magazine articles. 
Tliey had photos of my family. They tried to develop a personal friend- 
ship where we talked about everything. We went to lunch and to 
dinner. And they gave me vodka and these other items that you see 
here. 

I gave a lecture at the Catholic University on high temperature coat- 
ings for rockets, and Dr. Stupar attended at least one of these lectures 
and appeared to be very interested in this topic. 

They doublechecked me. They would ask me one question, and 2 
years later they would repeat the same question to see if the answer 
was the same. 

They had, obviously, an elaborate dossier. 

Mr. Smith. In other words, they were testing you ? 

Mr. Huminik. Yes; that is right. They tested me by asking me to 
obtain documents and reports and other things from the U.S. Gov- 



580 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

ernment and they also promised trade agreements. They later offered 
money, and actually gave me money, and more or less promised a 
willingness to help — they promised an escape route out of this coun- 
try if I was to be caught by the FBI while I worked for them. 

They attempted at one time to control me by saying that I had rela- 
tives in Russia. Dr. Stupar at the Purple Tree cocktail lounge here 
in Washington one ni^ht said, "We found relatives of yours in the 
Georgian part of Russia." 

I said, "Get off of that," that "I don't have any relatives that mean 
anything to me, anyway, and just forget it." 

"If this is all you came to talk about, then we are going to sever our 
friendship right here," I told him. 

They asked me for handwritten reports which had my signature 
on them, which they could presumably use for blackmail. 

Mr. Smith. Did they request your signature to any receipts? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. No, they did not. 

Mr. Smith. Thank you for telling all of this detail regarding the 
testing and development period. It gives us a clear picture as to the 
lengths to which they went to develop you towards that service. 

Now I wonder, were there times when they went beyond this assess- 
ment? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes ; there were times when they asked me for what 
I considered important information. Vladimir Boutenko, on the 23d 
of June 1964, riding in my automobile, asked me to obtain for him 
the forms necessary to become employed in the United States Govern- 
ment. 

I asked him did he want a Government job, and he said, "No," but 
his boss was interested in this and he wanted all the data necessary 

Mr. Smith. Who was his boss ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. His boss was the unnamed man that I was to meet 
out of the country, some intelligence official. He said he wanted the 
forms necessary, including birth certificate, driver's license, anything 
that would be required if you applied for a Government job. 

In other words, not only the Form 57 but he wanted to know about 
the background data that you would also have to show to get a 
Government job. Presumably, this would be to bring an illegal Soviet 
in and set up the papers to get a Government job. This is what it 
implied to me. 

Mr. Smith. It seems the implication is clear as to why they desired 
these types of forms. 

Mr. Huminik. The next thing that was asked also by Boutenko was 
papers necessary to establish a corporation in the U.S. He asked, "How 
does a U.S. corporation work? What are all the details of starting a 
corporation, operating, and everything?" 

Dr. Stupar had at one time asked me if it was possible to bring 
a Soviet in and let him be employed in my corporation, if they paid 
the bills ; in other words, provide the front for an illegal Soviet in a 
U.S. corporation. 

They wanted to stay within the law if they established such a 
corporation, so they wanted to have all the data, everything necessary. 

Mr. Smith. Did they ever make a direct approach to you on the 
employment of an individual in the corporation ? 

Mr. Huminik. No; they asked if I would consent to it and whether 
this could be done and everything else. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 581 

Mr. Smith. So you did not employ anybody that they sent to you ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. That is correct. 

Then Dr. Stupar asked me for some data on industrial machines, 
on chemicals, on blueprints and other technical subjects. 

Mr. Smith. Is there any indication as to who would pay this bill 
that he was talking about ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. The Soviet Government would pay the bill. 

Mr. Smith. The Embassy here in Washington ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Presumably ; these people were diplomats and they 
came from the Embassy on 16th Street just a few miles from here, so 
I assume it comes out of the safe right there. 

Mr. Smith. Proceed. 

Mr. HuMiNiK. I think that is all I have on the examples. 

Mr. Smith. We can see from this, then, that some of their develop- 
ment of you served a twofold purpose; they tested your ability to per- 
form on their behalf while, at the same time, obtaining materials they 
wanted without their having to show their own hand ; is that correct? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. That is correct. I think that they were evaluating 
me as a prospective Soviet agent and they asked for simple things. 
They went through a development phase to see if I would really work 
for them, could I do them any good. 

Mr. Smith. Did you obtain these forms ? 

Mr. Huminik. Things that were obtained were cleared by the 
U.S. Government ; things that passed to them were possibly altered or 
changed or reduced in some way. This is all classified. 

Mr. Smith. Can you tell us more about the chemicals that you men- 
tioned a while ago, as well as the machine and the blueprints they 
wanted ? 

Mr. Huminik. Well, the machine was a piece of industrial equip- 
ment which I cannot identify and it was not available to the Soviet 
Government. They, at one time, asked me to see if I could buy one for 
them and I said I would try. 

Mr. Smith. In other words, it was restricted sale or proprietary? 

Mr. Huminik. It was not Government restricted, but the company 
would never sell them one if they knew it, that is for sure. When I 
told them they could not get such a machine, I told them there was 
one in Baltimore. They implied why not steal it or go over there and 
make drawings. 

They were prepared for me to commit a felony on their behalf. 

Mr. Smith. Did they ever actually ask you to do that ? 

Mr. Huminik. They implied it. They implied very strongly, "Why 
don't you get it any way you can, and we will be very generous with 
our payment." 

Mr. Smith. Can you tell us what the machine was used for ? 

Mr. Huminik. It was for applying a certain type of constructional 
material. It is a new type of machine, and I cannot really say any more 
about it. 

Mr. Smith. I see. 

Mr. Huminik. The chemicals he asked for were metallurgical types 
used in steelmaking. Again, I cannot identify what these are. They 
are used to make a high-grade steel and they are not, as far as I know, 
available in Russia, and they could not, again, have purchased these 
directly if they had gone to the company that I obtained them from. 



582 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. Smith. Would these chemicals that they had asked for be con- 
nected with rocketry by any chance ? 

Mr. Hfmixik. Xot those particular ones. They were, however, in- 
tei-esred in rocketry materials, very definitely. 

Mr. S^rrH. TMiat, particularly, in rocketry ? 

Mr. Hfmixik. I c^^nnot say. 

Mr. SMrrH. Is that for security reasons? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. That is for security reasons, yes; national security 
reasons. 

Mr. Smith. Before we leave this development and assessment phase 
of the operation, could you explain what means of control the Soviets 
wei-e tiwmg to establish over you ? 

Mr. HuMixiK. We had. of coui-se. a feeble attempt by Dr. Stupar 
to tell nie I had relatives in Russia: they had handwritten reports of 
mine: thev had the family photos. They had requested me to perform 
an operation getting documents, so this is another form of control. 

Tliey promised me forged passports to o^er out of tlie country should 
I get caught by the FBI. They promised trade agi-eements and they 
also gave me money. ^ 

Mr. Smith. Did they promise you any employment or any profes- 
sional position if you had to leave the country I 

Mr. HuMixiK. Yes. They said that a pei-son with my talents in many 
tields would be very well taken care of in Russia and that I would have 
eveiything I needed. 

Mr. Smith. Then you felt all along that this gathering of these ma- 
terials was to put you in a position of being controlled I 

Mr. HuMixiK. That is right. 

Mr. Smith. By the Soviets ? 

Mr. HrMixiK. By the Soviets: that is right. But, of coui-se, I would 
like to point out again, all along I was working with the FBI. They 
were not aware of this, naturally, and I was able to report all of these 
things to the FBI as it went along. 

Mr. Smith. You have indicated that they tested and developed you 
something like -t yeai*s as a potential agent. 

At what point do you feel that thev considered this to be a full- 
scale clandestine intelligence operation^ 

Mr. HrMiNiK. I think March 22. 1965 — now. this is just a very re- 
cent time, it is about 22 months ago. I think — Valentin Revin tele- 
phoned me at home and told me that he brought greetings from Mos- 
cow from Dr. Stupar who luid returned to the Soviet Union and that 
he would like to meet with me for lunch the next day. 

That was the beginning of the clandestine part of the operation. 

Mr. Smith. You feel they had made their decision ( 

Mr. HrMrsTK. Oh. yes. 

Mr. Smith. That they could use you I 

Mr. HuMixEK. Very definitely. 

Mr. Tx"CK. Mr. Smith, would you suspend for just a few minutes. 

(^ Brief recess.) 

]\ri'. TrcK. We have a quorum call, and the eommittee will take a 
recess until 12 Ab. 

(Wliereupon, at 11 :35 a.m.. Tuesday. April 6. 1967, the subcommit- 
tee recessed, to reconvene at 1 pju. the same day.) 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 5S.S 

AFTERNOON SESSION, THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1967 

(The subcommittee reconvened at 1 p.m., Hon. William M. Tuck, 
chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.) 

Subcommittee members present at the time of reconvening: Rep- 
resentatives Tuck, Culver, and Roudebush.) 

Mr. Tuck. The subcommittee will please come to order. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN HUMINIK, JR.— Resumed 

Mr. Smith. Mr. Huminik, at the time of recess you were telling us, 
or describing for us, at what point you believed the Soviet operation 
became a full-fledged clandestine intelligence operation. Can you tell 
the committee wliat else there was about the way Valentin Revin oper- 
ated that made you feel that the Soviet assessment and development 
period was concluded ? 

Mr. Huminik. I think the fact that he incorporated a number of 
things into this operation that were new, at least to me, indicated that 
this thing was going to get very deep. For instance, he incorporated 
danger signals and alternate plans in case we could not meet and he 
used a system of dead drops. This is when you put material into hiding 
places when no one is there and later someone will pick it up. He also 
used a system of live passes where you give classified information to 
a person, in person, rather than using a dead drop. 

He also talked about an escape plan and using telephone books for 
codes and using forged passports to get out of the United States and 
furnishing money and buying a Zeiss camera to photograph docu- 
ments. This indicates to me that he is a full-fledged intelligence agent. 

Mr. Smith. In other words, he exhibited all the classic character- 
istics of a well-trained intelligence agent ? 

Mr. Huminik. Yes, sir. This is the reason that I felt when Valentin 
Revin started that the other Soviets had given him the green light and 
had more or less accepted me into their operation. 

Mr. Smith. Now, Mr. Huminik, I wonder if we might not go into 
detail now on the manner in which Revin operated with you, taking 
those things you have just related one by one. First his method of 
contact with you, please elaborate a little more on that. 

Mr. Huminik. Well, we would either use the telephone — this is near 
the beginning. Later we didn't even use the telephone because they 
were distrustful of telephones because they claimed they could be 
bugged and tapped. Later we arranged to meet at our next meeting, 
during the existing meeting. In other words, we arranged our meetings 
in advance. We had meetings at varied places — drug stores, a motel 
lobby, in front of a movie house, in front of a restaurant, parking lot, 
street corners, gas stations, anywhere. 

Mr. Smith. What transportation was used ? Did the Soviets furnish 
transportation ? 

Mr. Huminik. No. They had diplomatic tags on their cars so they 
don't like to use theirs ; they used my car. When we were in my car the 
radio was played very loudly so it would drown out any microphone 
pickups. In other words, the sound bouncing around in the car would 
be garbled so that nothing could be recorded. They never trusted a car 
for sensitive discussions. This is just automatic with them, "turn the 
radio on." 



584 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. Smith. Were these places of meeting widely dispersed ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes. I will give you some examples of some of the 
restaurants we had lunch or dinner at, and these also served as meet- 
ings where I got instructions in espionage : 

The China Inn which is in the Shirlington Shopping Center in 
Arlington, Virginia. 

Blair Mansion Inn which is in Silver Spring, Maryland. 

The Steak House on Indianhead Highway in Fort Washington, 
Maryland. 

The Wagon Inn in Lanham, Maryland. 

Normandy Farms in Potomac, Maryland. 

Mosby Restaurant in Fairfax, Virginia. 

That gives you an idea. 

Mr. Smith. Did they change locations frequently ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Oh, yes. Sometimes we met in front of one place and 
would go to another because they were suspicious. 

Mr. Smith. Did they ever meet at the same place twice ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. I think over a period of years we hit some of the 
same places twice. 

Mr. Smith. I think this brings us now to the next point, and that is 
the use of these danger signals. Could you describe those for us? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes. We had some visual danger signals, which was 
the mere adjusting of the necktie if we were walking towards each 
other. If one of us did that, then the meeting was broken off and we 
used some alternate date. He was to speak first, not me, when we made 
contact. If I spoke first, it might be bad, there might be someone 
around and Revin wanted to talk first. 

Mr. Smith. Was there ever any occasion in which Revin felt it was 
not the proper time to meet ? 

Mr. Huminik. We had a couple of drops or passes that were unusual. 
One was at the Normandy Farms Restaurant. He aborted a nieeting, 
but later as I was driving home he picked me up — in other words, 
he overtook my car and passed me and I followed him and we had a 
meeting in another place. 

Mr. Smith. How was that made now, this passing you ? What kind 
of signals did he use to let you know ? 

Mr. Huminik. Well, he blinked his headlights. 

Mr. Smith. A certain number of times ? 

Mr. Huminik. No, just blinked them once. In other words, I knew 
his car and in fact I saw him hiding. And after I passed him he took 
off at high speed behind me in a no-passing zone. 

Mr. Smith. How did he effect the contact then ? 

Mr. Huminik. Well, he had me follow him and then he stopped in 
a residential area and we both got out of the car and I gave him the 
material. 

Mr. Smith. I see. Now you mentioned these danger signals employed 
when you were in visual contact. Were there other signals employed 
to denote danger when you were not in visual contact ? 

Mr. Huminik. Yes. Each of us had a mailbox assigned to us. This 
would be a public mailbox on a street corner, red and blue type you 
use every day. We were to use chewing gum to be placed on the line 
where the red and blue come togetlier. He had a mailoox on 14th Street 
near the Carter Barron Theater, and I had one near my home. If I saw 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 585 

some danger like the FBI closing in, I was to put a piece of chewing 
gum on his mailbox and we were to meet the next Wednesday or next 
Saturday in a prearranged place. Also, it was reversed. If he saw a 
danger, then he was to put it on my mailbox because I saw it every 
day and then I was to make the meeting with him. 

Mr. Smith. How often were they checked ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. These boxes were supposed to be checked every day. 
In other words, Revin was supposed to look at his every day, and I 
was to look at mine every day. 

Mr. Smith. I believe this would be an appropriate time for you to 
describe to the committee the use of these dead drops that you men- 
tioned a while ago. 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes. A dead drop is where you do not make personal 
contact. I think in this case I might first describe that the places we 
had the dead drops would be like the base of a tree, a sign post, a dump 
area where you had a "No Dumping" sign, or a wooded area. Now 
what Revin wanted me to do was to photograph material, classified 
documents, et cetera ; put the film in a beer can or a cola can ; take it to 
the predesignated spot at the predesignated time and place it there. 
Then I was to go to a telephone booth and mark a specific page on the 
telephone book with a number ending in three zeros, for example. 
Revin would then check the booth and he would know that the drop 
was "loaded." 

Revin would then himself, or have one of his associates, "unload" 
the drop. Then he would mark the book in the phone booth with num- 
bers that would t«ll me that he had "unloaded" the drop. Now the way 
this worked, for instance, if the drop was at 11 o'clock at night, I would 
go to the area, place the can with the film in the predesignated spot, 
and cover it with leaves. A half hour later or 15 minutes later, I would 
go into a specific phone booth, maybe miles away, and put the numbers 
on a certain page. Then I would go home. 

Revin would go check the book and he would see that the numbers 
were on the page. He would then unload the drop. Then he would drive 
all the way across town to the booth that was assigned to me and 
mark another number on a specific page, which told me the next morn- 
ing that the film had been picked up. If the numbers were not on my 
phone book, then I was to go back and get the material because this 
meant he could not get it for some reason. So it is very elaborate ; it 
protected him from being directly involved with me. Ii he saw some- 
thing suspicious in these areas, he could leave the material there, mak- 
ing it very difficult for the FBI to apprehend him in the act of getting 
the film, because they were always deserted areas. You could see clearly 
that there was no one there. 

Mr. Smith. What was the purpose of the half-hour wait between 
the drop and the time jou marked the phone book ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. It ]ust took that long for me to travel between the 
places. We operated all over the whole city. In other words, I possibly 
would have had to drive across town to mark a phone book. 

Mr. Smith. Could you tell me how these live or personal passes of 
information were made between you and Valentin Revin? 

Mr. Huminik. I think the easiest way again is to describe a couple 
of examples. One was at the Riggs Plaza shopping center in Northeast 
Washington. I went on December 2, 1965, to a phone booth and pre- 



586 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

tended like I was making a phone call. I then went back to my car and 
waited. Valentin Revin drives up in his car, goes into the phone booth, 
and pretends like he makes a call. He gets into his car, and I follow. 
He leads me on a chase for maybe 40 minutes through the city, going 
all over the city, I don't even remember. We were driving so fast we 
both should have gotten tickets ; it is a wonder the police didn't catch 
us. He wanted to go fast because nobody could follow. If you go fast, 
you can usually tell if somebody is following. 

We finally ended up in Silver Spring near the Sligo Creek Parkway. 
We pulled up to another stop sign, and a Volkswagen starts up about 
a block away — another Soviet vehicle. Then we go down along a 3- 
or 4-mile road that has no access roads. The Volkswagen goes 10 miles 
an hour, and we go 60. Pretty soon we leave the Volkswagen, which 
blocks up the road so if the FBI were following they could not get by. 
Where the stop sign is he opened his hood as though he were having 
car trouble, I walk up and throw the stuff in his front seat, and that 
was it. 

Mr. Smith. In your opinion did they have any arranged signals 
between these two cars ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes ; they blinked the lights. It was all prearranged. 
They work in pairs frequently ; it is not a lonely operation for Soviet 
spies. 

Mr. Smith. Do you think that was made by shortwave radio or 
signal of some kind or blinking of lights ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. It was blinking of lights in this case. 
Mr. Smith. He always stayed in sight then, the one that dropped 
behind ? 
Mr. HuMiNiK. He did in this case; yes. 

Another example of a live pass would be on February 10, 1966, 
just a little more than a year ago, I went to a People's Drug Store in 
Alexandria, Virginia, and waited at the magazine rack until Valentin 
Revin came in. I was to wait for 1 minute after he left. In other words, 
while I was there, he came in and made a little purchase. I waited 
60 seconds and then I was to walk a prearranged four-block pattern, 
and he was to meet me along the way, and then I was to give him the 
film. So I walk a block or two and then I see him looking in a store 
window, he is looking behind me. After I pass him, we walk in shadows 
and I give him the film. Then we walk away in different directions. 
Later, on March 31, 1966, at the Normandy Farms where I was to 
go in at 11 :30 at night, ^o into the bar and wait 20 minutes and 
then come out to the parking lot. He was to be walking up from the 
parking lot towards the restaurant, and as we passed I was supposed 
to hand him the material. He was scared that night, he told me later, 
because there was too much light in the parking lot. There was an 
electrical repair truck that looked suspicious, and there was a D.C. 
Transit bus parked next to my car. 

So I waited 10 minutes past the designated time. He didn't come so 
I started driving home. When I got to an intersection about a mile 
down the road, I saw him in a gas station pretending like he was mak- 
ing a plione call, buti didn't acknowledge that I saw him and just kept 
on going. I saw him jump into his car and take off at high speed and 
pass me and blink his lights and more or less signal me to follow. 
I followed for 10 or 15 minutes, and he led me through various roads 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 587 

I was not familiar with. This would be about midnight now, and in a 
residental area I gave him the material. 

Mr. Smith. Would you enlighten the committee in regard to the 
system of alternate plans that were employed in this operation that 
you mentioned a little earlier? I would like you to go into some detail 
about each one of the alternate type of plans. 

Mr. HuMiNiK. I think in the aspect of meetings, alternate dates 
were always selected. If we could not make a meeting or if we had 
to call it off for any reason, we were to have two or more alternate 
dates. Now frequently he would remind me not to wait more than 5 or 
10 minutes. In other words, if he didn't show up in 5 or 10 minutes, 
I was to call the meeting off. 

Now on dead drops, we would have alternate dates with alternate 
phone booths and alternate places, alternate bushes or trees or what- 
have-you, which would be used and we would set up dates. In other 
words, if I used a drop on this date, I was to use the one over in 
Fort Washington ; if it was another date, it would be the one in Clinton, 
Maryland. These were all rural areas, the dead drops were done in rela- 
tively uninhabited areas. 

Mr. Smith. What were the alternate plans for the live passes ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Well, we always had an alternate date 1 week to 10 
days later if that didn't work out. Of course that was early — in other 
words, we went to live passes and afterward we changed to dead drops. 
I don't know what we would have had next. I think that the live passes 
were relatively simple. 

Mr. Smith. For clarification of the record would you explain a little 
more about the chewing gum method and the telephone book method, 
describe those a little bit more ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes. The chewing gum method was a danger signal, 
where I placed chewing gum on a mailbox which would be his mail- 
box — we call it "his" and the other was "mine." "His" mailbox was 
near his house and "mine" is near mine. If I was in danger for any 
reason, like the FBI was closing in on me, I was to put cheAving gum on 
his mailbox and he and I were to meet the next Wednesday or the 
next Saturday, whichever came first, in a place in Lanham, Maryland, 
whicli was another drugstore, and I was to tell him about the problem. 
Now if he had a problem or he saw a danger, then he was to mark my 
mailbox and Ave would meet the next Wednesday or the next Saturday 
and discuss it. 

Mr. Smith. Was this chewing gum placed in such a way that it was 
visible to anyone ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes. It was placed right on the side of the mailbox 
between the red and the blue paint so a kid could have put it there. 
No one would really be able to explain Avhy it was there, but we knew 
M'hat it was for. 

Mr. Smith. Now what were the details of the telephone system used ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes. I assume you are referring to the codes in the 
telephone books. 

Mr. Smith. Yes. 

Mr. HuMiNiK. The details of this were that when I made a dead 
drop I was to then go to a telephone book in a predetermined booth 
which is on a street corner and mark on a specific page, let's say page 
100 of the yellow pages, at the bottom I would write a phone number, 
any phone number that ended with three zeros; on another day it: 



588 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

would have ended in three twos. If I had more than one container of 
film, I was to put an X through the number or a line through it. "We 
had different materials. When he picked up the material, he would 
put in a telephone number ending with three numbers in another 
telephone booth, maybe within a mile of my house. That told me he 
had retrieved the film. 

Mr. Smith. Can you describe for us the alternate plan for this tele- 
phone system ? 

JVIr. Hr:jnxiK. The alternate plan is just other telephone booths. 
In other words, if it didn't work, we would have another booth. 

Xow one night, specifically the night that Revin got photographed 
by the FBI in one of these phone booths — this was in the newspaper on 
December 3, 1966, 1 believe — if I was not able to use that drop T was 
to put an X through the number on that night and go to another 
alternate drop that verv' night. In other words, he was determined to 
get that material that night even if I had to stay up until dawn. This 
was already very late. So we had two alternates on the same night on 
opposite sides of the city. 

Mr. Smith. You mentioned an escape route earlier. Would you en- 
lighten us on that, please ? 

Mr. HuMixiK. Yes. I had told Valentin Re\*in that this was very 
dangerous business and I didn't like being associated with a Soviet 
diplomat ; that I could get caught and sent to prison and perhaps worse. 
I kept reminding him about famous cases like the Rosenbergs. When 
Colonel Whalen was arrested, I reminded him of that case. So he 
promised to get me an escape route. 

He said, "We are going to make two passports, an American pass- 
port and, since you have been down to the Dominican Republic, a 
Dominican Republic passport." Presumably the way it would work, 
should they decide it is too dangerous and 1 have to get out, I would 
go, for example — this is a supposition now because we never ran 
through the plan — from Washington to say Canada, fly from Canada 
down to the Dominican Republic, presumably to be picked up by 
submarine or some other method to escape from this hemisphere to 
Russia. 

Mr. Smith. Did they have any other plan if this one failed ? 

Mr. Hr>rixiK. Xo, I don't think so. I think the plan was to get out 
of the country. They said the big problem was getting out of the 
United States because the customs and immigration operation is so 
strict that it is hard to get out of the United States. 

Mr. Smith. By any chance, did you go to the Dominican Republic? 

Mr. HrMixiK. Yes, I went to the Dominican Republic three times. 

Mr. Smith. Why were you there ? 

Mr. Hu^iinik:. I was there on business basically. I was caught in the 
revolution in April of 1965, the Dominican revolution, and I was there 
before the troops landed. I was there 2 days before the revolution 
started and then I was there 5 days during the fighting and I was 
aboard naval vessels for another few days. 

Mr. Smith. For what purpose were you there ? 

Mr. Ht73iixik. I was there on business for my chemical company. 

Mr. Smith. To sell chemicals ? 

Mr. Hu^nxiK. We were trying to get a trade arrangement started 
with the Dominican Republic. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 589 

Mr. Smith. Were the Soviets aware of this ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Xo, they "vvere not aware that I was goin^ down there 
and they were upset when I came back because I hadn't told them. 
They read my name in the papers as being down there and they 
accused me of working for the CIA and grilled me extensively over 
several meetings. They wanted to see my passport and everything else ; 
they thought I had a diplomatic passport. They were very nervous 
about it. 

Mr. Smith. Did you show them the passport ? 

Mr. HuMixiK. I had it one time and threw it out on the table while 
we were eating. Revin was embarrassed and showed me his. He gleaned 
it for a half hour looking at each of the stamps and other markings. 
Later he asked would I go down and get a Dominician passport made 
with Dominician film and a Dominician photographer. This was in 
1966' 

Mr. Smith. This was to be forged ? 

Mr. Huminik. Yes; a forged Dominician passport and a forged 
U.S. passport. I delivered photos for each. 

Mr. Smith. Did they furnish you with the passports ? 

Mr. Huminik. Xo ; the case was broken a month before I got these. 
The State Department broke it up for reasons I don't know. 

Mr. Smith. You described a while ago they indicated they rewarded 
those who worked for them and took care of those who were their 
enemies. Did they promise you any suitable employment if you had 
to leave our country suddenly ? 

Mr. Huminik. Yes. I think I mentioned this morning that they said, 
with my talents in various fields, such as chemistry and metallurgy 
and other fields, there would be no problem in getting a suitable posi- 
tion in Russia and that they would take care of everything, that I had 
no problem. 

Mr. Smith. Did they furnish you any equipment other than what 
you have shown us here ? 

Mr. Huminik. Yes. They furnished me with money to buy a camera 
which I have here to show you. This camera cost nearly $300 and is 
used to photograph documents. With that and a tripod, which I have 
here, and closeup lenses and a shutter release you were able to set up 
the camera and hold it over a document — I will demonstrate this very 
quickly. You put your shutter release on and your closeup lens and 
you can put it over a document and focus, using the light from regu- 
lar table lamps, and you can photograph documents. When I passed 
films sometimes it would be six or seven rolls at a time, 36 shots on 
each roll. 

Mr. Smith. You stated they furnished you money to buy the 
camera? 

Mr. HuivriNiK. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. Did they specify the kind of camera ? 

Mr. Huminik. Yes. They told me what kind of camera to buy, 
what kind of settings to use, what film to buy, everything. Complete 
instructions. 

Mr. Smith. In other words, almost a course in photography? 

Mr. Huminik. Yes. Revin said, "You are an engineer, we don't 
have to talk to you about how to run it, you can figure it out yourself." 
But presumably if you didn't know, they would give you a course 



590 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

in person. Then they would criticize the photography and tell me what 
was wrong with it. For instance, I didn't buy the tripod, I wanted to 
appear amateurish. He said, "You need a tripod." I said, "Oh, a tri- 
pod?" Then I went and bought a tripod, and that still shook a little 
bit, and then he said, "Buy a cable release." So I kept doing this; 
I didn't want to appear too expert even though I know a good deal 
about photography. 

Mr. Smith. Did they give you money to buy other equipment? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. They gave me money to buy a tape recorder. This 
was to record summaries of my conversations with key scientists. For 
example, 'I was to go into the Pentagon and talk with officials, get 
information and put it on the recorder, and then pass it to them. They 
wanted information on opinions and statements and discussions with 
defense officials. 

Mr. Smith. Did they suggest or instruct you to go into the Penta- 
gon for this purpose of discussions ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes. They knew I knew officials in the new sciences 
and they wanted me to start putting the conversations on tape, as 
well as continuing to photograph documents, that is, put audio tape 
recordings together and give them even more information. 

Mr. Smith. Did they instruct you how you were to carry this into 
the Pentagon? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. No ; they told me what kind of recorder to buy and 
what speed to set it at. It was not necessarily to take the recorder 
into the Pentagon, but at least to go in and talk to the people and 
then go back home and talk into the recorder about the discussion. 
They didn't require that I obtain a specific conversation right on the 
recording, they wanted the information. They didn't care about the 
man's voice. 

Mr. Smith. Did they give you any indication as to what kind of 
information they wanted you to discuss with these people ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes, they did, but this information is classified. 

Mr. Smith. How many contacts did you have with Mr. Revin? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. At least 20 personal contacts, not counting telephone- 
type contacts, over a period of some 19 months. 

Mr. Smith. And ending when ? 

Mr. Huminik. When he was thrown out of the country persona 
non grata in the fall of 1966. That is approximately 8 months ago, 

Mr. Smith. What were your total contacts with the Soviets if you 
can remember ? 

Mr. Huminik. I think 65 or 75 personal contacts. 

Mr. Smith. Over what period of time? 

Mr, Huminik. Five and a half years approximately, 1961 to 1966. 

Mr. Smith. Could you tell us at this point, Mr. Huminik, what 
types of information and assistance the Soviets were requesting of 
you ? 

Mr. Huminik. Yes. They basically wanted scientific and engineer- 
ing reports. They consider, I think, that their technology is not up 
to what ours is, and I think this is what they really want. They don't 
need to know troop movements and things like this as the espionage 
people did during World War II. They want technology, new weapons, 
faster airplanes, rockets, things like this. They wanted proprietary 
industrial processes such as the oxygen steel process as installed in 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 591 

this country. They wanted details — what size pipe is used, the pres- 
sures, the operational details, so they could duplicate. 

They wanted this machine for applying constructional materials. 
They wanted records of classified technical meetings. There were sev- 
eral classified technical meetings or conferences during this period, 
and they asked me to go and get the proceedings or to order the pro- 
ceedings later and to pass it on to them. 

They wanted certain things on the Surveyor Moon Program. They 
were very interested in this and they had a high priority on it. They 
were saying in the public media they were not in any race to the moon, 
yet they were interested in the Surveyor Moon Program. 

Mr. Smith. These were defense contract meetings or defense pro- 
ceedings they asked you to attend ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. And secure classified information ? 

Mr. Htjminik. Yes ; weapons and other subjects. They also wanted 
background information on scientists, specific scientists, and they 
wanted proprietary chemicals also. 

Mr. Smith. And it would seem to indicate that they had a shortage 
in this type of materials ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Definitely. I would say they would not be asking for 
it unless they wanted it for some specific reason and they must not have 
had it. 

Mr. Smith. Do you feel that the Soviets are or were lacking infor- 
mation on all of these areas in which they requested you to get the 
information for them ? 

Mr. Huminik:. I can only guess. I would say, as I mentioned earlier, 
that they probably were lacking in it otherwise they would not be ask- 
ing. It just £eems to me that they would not take all these risks and go 
through these elaborate procedures and pay money to get the things 
they didn't need. I think somebody had deduced they needed this, and 
that is why I was to get it. 

Mr. Smith. Were they pleased with the results that you produced 
for them ? 

Mr. Huminik. Well, this is questionable. We don't really know, but 
we gave them incomplete reports frequently. For instance, if there was 
a series of five reports, we left out the most valuable one so without it, 
it does not mean anything. We would have handwritten reports that 
were incomplete, and I would promise them more later. I would string 
them along. 

Mr. Smith. This information was all cleared by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation and the agencies involved ? 

Mr. Hfminik. Yes ; the Government cleared all items passed to the 
Soviets. 

Mr. Smith. Eight. 

Mr. Huminik. Some of these items were altered; I altered some 
and the Government altered some. 

Mr. Smith. How much of this information that they requested you 
to produce did you actually produce ? In other words, was it in volume 
or limited? 

Mr. Huminik. We produced a lot of information for them, but 
it was not necessarily what they asked for. In other words, I would 
give them a lot of things that they would say are just interesting, 



592 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

not really valuable. In other words, I was giving them something so 
they would see I was working for them. They would see a lot of film 
with a lot of pages or a lot of documents, but it was merely interesting. 

Mr. Smith. They knew you had access to this type of information ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes, this type of information to keep it going, and 
certainly the Government wanted to keep it going for the purpose 
of learning how the Soviets operated. You have to be giving them 
something of some value to keep it going, you have to weigh this. Is 
it good to keep it going or is it better to cut it off? So all this was 
weighed carefully through the whole operation. 

Mr. Smith. By my count, you came into contact with six or seven 
Soviet Embassy and consulate personnel who were engaged in espio- 
nage in this country, or at least performing some intelligence function. 
In earlier statements you said that you believed some to have been 
members of the GRIT and others to have been members of the KGB. 
This would denote to me that there was some infighting going on 
between these two organizations in regard to your services. Would 
you care to clarify this for the committee and tell us why you feel 
that was the case ? 

Mr. HuanNTK. Well, this is again speculation on my part, but I 
would say that Izvekov, Boutenko, and Zorov were members of the 
GRU and Stupar, Kuznetsov, and Revin were members of the KGB. 
By the operation as it was going on, I could tell that one sometimes 
did not know what the other was doing. This showed they were dis- 
connected — the fact that Boutenko, the assistant commercial consu- 
lar, was working on me for one subject and Revin on another. When 
I told Revin about Boutenko's pursuing me, he was very surprised 
and he contacted Boutenko and cut him off ; in other words, I didn't 
see him any more. So there definitely were two intelligence agencies 
working on me at the same time. 

Mr. Smith. Wliich one in your opinion won out ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. The KGB which is the larger of the two. 

Mr. SsnTH. Wliy do you arrive at that conclusion ? 

Mr. HuMiNTK. Because I think Revin worked for the KGB and 
since he was the one I was working with last and the only one, it 
indicated that the KGB was it. 

Mr. Smith. In your feeling in that respect, was there any connec- 
tion between the militarj^ objectives and the KGB going beyond these 
objectives ? Would that make you arrive at that conclusion ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Not really. It is a hard question to answer because 
some of this is speculation — I can feel it, you know, because I was in 
it and I can't necessarily find proof that these people worked for 
different agencies. 

Mr. Smith. The information they requested of you did go beyond 
what would be the normal military objective ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes. It was very broad so you could not say that 
this grouj) was just military ; no, not at all. They were both interested. 
Military technology is technology that can be applied to any kind of 
industry. 

Mr. Smith. Yes. You were involved in this operation almost 5 years 
in almost constant contact with Soviet intelligence personnel. Would 
you care to comment on what you believe we as Americans can learn 
from this operation ? 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 593 

Mr. HuMiNiK. I have come here today at the request of this 
committee and have tried to relate accurately my exj^erience with the 
Soviet diplomats and consular officials during more than 5 years. This 
experience came to an end only 8 months ago — and I would hope indi- 
cates to this committee that the Soviet Union intends to continue their 
espionage activities in this country. It is obvious to me that the Soviet 
Union is using its embassy and consulate, located only a few miles 
from here, to conduct extensive espionage activities. I am sure that this 
is not news to this committee. J. Edgar Hoover, the eminent Director 
of the FBI, has testified many times to this effect. 

My personal lesson indicates to me that there is danger to the small 
businessman, the scientist, and the engineer. The Soviets want tech- 
nology more than anything else, and it is their plan to get it from 
technical people. In addition, they seek out technical people of Slavic 
descent — in other words, people that came from Czechoslovakia, Rus- 
sia, Poland, or any of the countries that are now the Iron Curtain 
countries — because they feel they can blackmail them, or they will be 
more receptive or susceptible to their requests. They will use money, 
promises of business, and many other ploys to entice Americans to 
work for them. They often strive to achieve such a firm grip on an 
individual that he would be afraid to go to the FBI for fear of what 
he already might have given them unwittingly. In my case, I went 
to the FBI immediately, but there are probably people who unknow- 
ingly get involved and then are afraid to go to the FBI and in some 
way continue to work for them. Some of these people, of course, are 
caught. 

The Soviets proved to me that they will penetrate our country as 
far as possible and by any means. They wanted data necessary to 
become employed in the U.S. Government — and they wanted to know 
how to start a corporation, presumably to operate an illegal apparatus 
in this country. 

The lesson I learned is deeper than I can put into words before this 
committee. Espionage is a complex business and sometimes hard to 
detect — but it is there, and I am sure that the Soviet Union will not 
slow down because I am speaking here today. They will continue with 
their efforts in spite of the FBI. The FBI is the guardian of this land, 
and through its vigil we are guaranteed a good measure of protection. 
The job they do is legend and known by almost every school boy. As 
citizens we have to give the FBI maximum support. They should be 
informed any time anything suspicious is around. I think diplomatic 
license plates in residential areas should be reported more frequently. 

Further, I want it to be known today that I came here as a citizen — 
a plain American citizen ; that I am not a representative of any group, 
I am not here as a Democrat or as a Republican. And I want it known 
that I have the highest respect for this committee which often times 
alone is battling elements that affect the internal security of America. 
This committee will always have my support and help, if it is requested, 

I think that we could say that the countiy at large should become 
more aware of the problems and that they should look closely at their 
elected officials, the ones that in some cases are naive to the problems 
that the Soviets are causing us and they should learn what the Soviet 
Union is trying to do here. And suitable legislation should be passed 
if it is inadequate now, I just don't know about that. The Soviets are 



594 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

doing nothing to reduce the cold war. Their espionage, terrorism, and 
blackmail operations are, if anything, more intense and more sophisti- 
cated than ever before. 

The Soviet Union has not changed its policy regarding espionage 
in this country for at least the last 20 yearSj and there is not a single 
indication to me or any other informed American that a different Soviet 
Union exists in 1967. 

Mr. Smith. 1 would like to ask you one more question in this respect. 
Did you gain any indication from your contacts with these Soviet 
officials, by the fact that they had asked you lor certain personnel 
forms and how background investigations are conducted, as to whether 
or not they have been successful in planting anyone within our 
Government ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Not to my knowledge. Of course, when we run an 
operation like this they don't tell me what else they are doing, but 
I think that evidently they are interested in planting people in the 
Government, so this shows that security checks have to be conducted 
carefully. 

Mr. Smith. When they were asking you how to create an organiza- 
tion or corporation in this country, did you get any impression that 
they had such corporations in this country ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. No, I didn't get any impression to that effect. 

Mr. Smith. I want to thank you, Mr. Huminik, for what you have 
done here today, for the inf omiation you have brought to us. On behalf 
of myself and the director and the investigative staff I think you have 
done a splendid job. I think your parents can be very proud of you 
for the patriotic job that you have done for this country. 

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. 

Mr. McCoNNON. Just a moment, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Smith. Just one more question, please. Can you tell us whether 
or not the Soviets have taken any action against you since the dis- 
closure of this case to the public press ? 

Mr. Huminik. Yes. I can say that the Soviets have written two 
articles in Izvestia that make strong reference to me and I have 
brought copies of these translated from the Russian. I would like to 
read from these two articles what they say about me in Moscow. I 
have copies here for the record. 

Mr. Smith. Without objection, Mr. Chairman. 

(Documents marked "Huminik Exhibits Nos. 1-A and 1-B," respec- 
tively. For full text of these articles see pp. 612-615.) 

(At this point Mr. Willis entered the hearing room.) 

Mr. Huminik. I would like to read first on October 30, 1966, from 
Izvestia portions of an article. Now the title of this article was "Made 
in the FBI" and it was written by V. Mazhorov. I will just read sec- 
tions. I will try to describe what they are talking about first. They 
are talking about a steel door with somebody behind it late at night 
making plans to corrupt their diplomats and to make false charges. 
Then they go on and say : 

Perhaps we have taken some liberties in describing the procedure of preparing 
anti-Soviet slander campaigns in the US ; but, there is no doubt at all that 
such campaigns are planned well in advance in the offices of the Central In- 
telligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. At certain regular 
intervals the special services of the United States unleash noisy anti-Soviet 
witches sabbaths, attempting to pollute the consciousness of the average Amcri 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 595 

can with the poison of distrust toward Soviet people. The press is also enlisted 
to help in these dirty provocations. 

Recently the American newspaper "Washington Post," which considers itself 
to be a solid press organ, published some sensational "revelations." It printed 
the photograph of an official of the Soviet Embassy in Washington speaking 
over the telephone at a pay station. Why does he use a pay telephone? He is a 
spy ! Thus, without even blushing in shame, did the "Washington Post" present 
the FBI's current clumsy absurdity to its readers. Once you have a "spy," you 
need an "agent." In this respect, too, there were no great difficulties. The same 
newspaper informs Americans of the existence of a certain John Huminik — a 
"scientist and metallurgist," who for a number of years, while hiding behind 
his activities in the "Chemprox Corporation" has been rendering special services 
to his bosses in the FBI. 

Huminik first visited the Soviet Embassy in Washington in 1961 in the guise 
of "Secretary of the Washington Section of the Society for Metals," who was 
ready to cooperate with Soviet representatives in the field of Soviet- American 
trade relations and scientific and technical exchanges. Naturally such a pro- 
posal was met without prejudice and it became easy for Huminili to enter into 
ordinary, generally accepted contacts with Embassy personnel. From that moment 
on, the Washington pai>er states with sensational emphasis, "Huminik acted 
constantly under the guidance of the FBI." On FBI instructions and without 
his Soviet acquaintances being aware of it Huminik imparted a "conspiratorial" 
and "secret" character to his meetings with them. For many months the FBI 
accumulated "comprising" materials concerning these meetings. As a result one 
of the Embassy officials who used to meet with Huminik was defamed and de- 
clared persona non grata. But that is not all. A noisy campaign to discredit other 
Soviet representatives was unleashed in the American press. And the prime 
prosecutor of this campaign was none other than Huminik. 

This 'scientist' did not want for resourcefulness. Thus, one of the Soviet spe- 
cialists, after having had dinner with the provocateur Huminik, found among 
various prospectuses of the Chemprox Corporation Huminik had given him a 
document bearing a "Secret" stamp. The document contains instructions on 
chemical and bacteriological weapons and the tactics of their use by the Army 
of the USA. 

Then they list some diseases. I will skip through some of this be- 
cause it gets too lengthy. It says : 

The war in Vietnam provides convincing confirmation of the fact that the 
American militarists faithfully follow the instructions worked out for them. 

In other words, they are saying we use germ warfare in Vietnam 
because that is what they are talking about here: 

Here would really be something for the "Washington Post" to tell its readers ! 
[referring to the germ warfare] But — that would be too much, the paper prefers 
to feed on the forgeries of the FBI. 

After this was printed I called Tass, the Russian news agency, and 
I said, "It was an interesting article you people published and I would 
like to hear more and get a little more detail." They got all upset and 
hung up on me. 

They published another article on November 5. This is a week after 
I talked to Tass. 

Mr. Smith. Would you give the dates of these? 

Mr. Huminik. The first article was October 30, and I would assume 
it would be probably November 1 that I called Tass. I don't have that 
date. 

Mr. Smith. Wliat year? 

Mr. Huminik. Excuse me; 1966. That was after the case broke. 

On November 5, 1966, Izvestia put out another article, and I might 
add both of these were on the front pages of Izvestia. It was called 
"Facelifting." Here it is. 

The US press lost no time in reacting to Izvestiya's article concerning the im- 
proper activities of certain American "scientists." 



596 CONDUCT OF ESPIOXAGE WITHIN" THE UNITED STATES 

Then they were referring to the article entitled "Made in the FBI" 
that I referred to — 

The FBI agents with scientific titles and degrees who were named by this news- 
paper were "interTiewed," and tlie provocateurs took the position : "I am not I, 
and this horse is not mine." In trying to shield these unmasked accomplices of the 
secret police the United Press International correspondent makes an effort to 
evade the issue, offering his readers a hackneyed formula : Izvestiya. he says, 
wants to cast asi)ersions upon the reputations of these most respected persons. 

Then they talked to Dr. Stiipar. who was at the Institute of Ferrous 
Metallurgy, and he gave them some other thmgs on me and other peo- 
ple. Then we go on and it says : 

Certain press organs of the US try with no lesser effort to prove the re- 
spectability of that rascal Huminik. Here again are the facts we gathered in 
conversations with many Soviet specialists who had met with Huminik, the 
President of the "Chemprox" Company, at different times. He first approached 
Soviet people in the humble role of a dealer in laundry powder. Things did not 
go too well, as far as sales of soap foam were concerned. Huminik decided to deal 
in merchandise of a different kind. In meeting with any Soviet citizen. Huminik 
offered him tlie .secrets of other firms, supposedly received by him from some of 
his friends. He tried to slip some reports of the "Melpar" firm about component 
materials to one of tlie Soviet specialists. In another instance, speaking with the 
tmdue familiarity of a vulgar person. Huminik tried to interest a Soviet special- 
ist in his tales about the dirty details of the lives of some of his acquaintances. 
Hnminik's relationship with Soviet people does not jell and he risks aU in an 
open act of provocation — he slips some instructions concerning chemical and 
bacteriological weapons to his Soviet acquaintance together with a number of 
other prospectuses of the firm. We have already told our readers about this fact. 
On October 31st Huminik phoned the TASS office in Washington and stated 
that he had been "slandered." We vi.sited the Soviet specialist with respect to 
whom this provocation had been committed. He showed us this document, too. 
We saw the heavy stamp '"Secret" on the papers. "Secret" at the top of each 
page and at the bottom, so that there be no doubt. We glanced at the long enumer- 
ation of gases, poisonous substances, both chemical and bacteriological, which 
are intended for purposes of annihilating people, crops and cattle. In parentheses 
the authors of the docrunent remind the reader once again : this here component 
of the poisonous substance belongs to the secret category, that one is merely 
confidental. Behind this document one can see the dirty figures, far more sinister 
than Huminik. who i)oi.son all around them in a c-alculating and con.scious man- 
ner, rejecting everything that is known as elementary morality. 

The last paragraph : 

Is not the reason for these American attempts to wash the dirt off the bear- 
ers of "decency" of the Huminik type to be fotmd in the fact that behind 
them stand men who bear a much greater resjwnsibility for the resumption 
of the Cold War? 

Some of the English is not exactly right, but I read it as it was 
^v^itten. and that shows you what they think. 

!Mr. SiirrH. That appears to be an effort to whitewash the fact that 
they were caught. 

^Ir. Hr^nxiK. Yes. Tliey gave me money and a camera, and it 
went on for many years. I understand on Radio Free Europe they 
talk about these things, they alert some of the Russian people. Rus- 
sian officials are giving their people these explanations. Tliis is what 
they are telling their people about their diplomats. 

Air. 5:MrrH. Have you any other indication to strike back at you ? 

'Sir. Hu^nxiK. I had phone calls, but I would not say they came 
from Soviets. But I don't take any of these seriously. 

Mr. Smith. Tliat is all the questions I have. 

Air. Tuck. Mr. Huminik, I want to commend you an l^ehalf of 
the committee. "We appreciate your coming in today. I suppose that 



J 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WiTHJLS" THE UNITED STATES 597 

some of the members of the committee might wish to ask you a few 
questions and if by any chance you think thev might elicit a response 
tliat would cause you to reveal classified iniormation, of course, we 
expect you to refrain from doing so. 

Mr. HuMiNTK. Yes^ sir. 

^Ir. TrcK. One thmg that interested me, in the early part of your 
testimony as I understood it, you said that Russians and others were 
LnWted to full membership into the American teclmical and scientific 
societies. I suppose they discuss science in Euidition to being just a 
social meeting ; is that right ? 

;Mr. HuiiixiK. That is right. We have technical speakers talk about 
some late technology that people are generally interested in. In other 
words, it is a technical program: we come to hear a speaker on some 
area of science or technology. So they not only meet people socially. 
but they also leam new things on technology. Tliese are unclassified 
meetings. 

The Chairman". You said a moment ago that these articles brushed 
over or glossed over the fact that you had been given money and 
cameras. I was not in when you brought that out, but let me a^k you 
this : Without going into detail, it is my understanding that you did 
not keep that money, but passed it on to some third {>arty: is that 
correct i 

Mr. HuMESTK. The monev I received from the Soviets went to the 
FBI. 

The Chairmax. I just wanted to be sure about that. 

^Ir. HuMixiK. I was not an employee of the FBI : I did this as a 
voluntary thing. 

Mr. Tuck. Any other questions? 

Mr. RouDEBusH. Yes, 

I would like to ask, did you have any cases on your dead drop or the 
sign drop wliere the sign had been obliterated or the chewing gum so 
you had to use alternate pickups ? 

Mr. HuMixEK. Xo. I think we had to pass up some dates and use 
alternate dates. On one occasion I planted the material intentionally 
in the wrong spot. For instance, there were two "Xo Dumping" signs, 
one was covered with a briar patch and the other was in the open. 
He wanted me to use the open one, but I used the other so he would get 
scratched up. 

^Ir. RouDEBusH. Were you instructed to do so? 

Mr, HuMES'iK, Xo; I ran many aspects of the operation as I saw 
fit. When you are on the front line, you have to use your wits and you 
just inform the FBI what happens, 

Mr. Watsox. Pursuing the question a little further that the chair- 
man asked you a moment ago about the apparent availability of 
membership for people of any nationality, at least m the American 
Society for Metallurgy', do you know whether or not that is a common 
practice ui other professional or scientific societies or associations, to 
open their membership to anyone of any particular nationality ? 

Mr. HrMixEs:. I think that most technical societies admit people 
from other countries, yes, but the meetings are supposed to be im- 
classified. 

Mr. Watsox. They are supposed to be unclassified? 

^Ir. HrMixTK. Yes, and they are unclassified. If they are classified, 
they will have special applications and security clearances to go with 

79-422 O — 6S i 



.59S coxDrcT of espionage wrrHrs- the fnited states 

it. These meetings are open subjects, we could say, but they are still 
very meaty, they get down to the point. 

Mr. Watsox. Then from your response I understand you do have 
some meetings of your society where classified material was discussed. 

Mjr. HuiTixiK. Xot in this particular society : I am speaking broadly. 
I know of many societies that the Soviets attend meetings of and some 
of them like the American Ordnance Association would have classified 
meetings. For instance, they go to the Xaval Research Laboratory 
and have a closed meeting. TVell. the Soviets could not go to that. 

Mr. '^ATSC'X. "Well. I should think in your particular society that 
your membership would be trying to discuss and get the benefit of the 
other members for any advanced developments in the particular field 
of metallurgy : is that not correct ? 

Mr. HiTfTSTK. That is correct. I see your point. I think many of 
our members opposed having the Russians in there and some didn't. 
The Government said. well, this is just a personal note, that one good 
thing about having Soviet diplomats there is, for those hours, we 
know -where they are, 

'Sir. Watsox. Yes: but at the same time you are giving them 
inform.arion. 

Mr. Hr^tirxiK. They are getting some information. 

;Mr. Watsox. Free information and making it readily accessible 
to them. 

Mr. Hr^nxiK. That is right. 

;Mr. TTatsox. I note that, in your recommendations as to what we 
might do. you said we could more carefully guard those in the technical 
field, but yet those lq the twrhnical field apparently open their doors 
to anyone. 

Mr. HrrMixiK. I think in general the scientists and engineers are 
more naive about this. At these meetings certain scientists and engi- 
neers would not talk to the Soviets because of their feelings, but some 
would. I think perhaps legislation should be considered about how 
broadly an Iron Curtain country can operate in a technical community 
because they want technology, that is what they want. The atomic 
bomb material that they wanted was technological, also. They can get 
more of this, and it makes it better for them for their weapon devel- 
opment. They save money and time. 

Mr. Watsox. I do not want to play on words here. You say that 
most of your technical discussions were of an unclassified nature, but 
I ^ould think that your membership woidd tri* to impress the others 
of their advance discovery or perhaps development in this particular 
field. You would not just sit there and rehash things that were well 
known or at least would be known to a man of my limited knowledge 
of metallurgy ( 

Mr. HiTMixTK. I think that you are correct except when a scientist 
in a public meeting like that gives some information it is not specific 
enough. See. the .Soviets over and over pointed out. '"We don't want to 
know the fact 30U built the rocket, we want the whole blueprint." In 
other words, general statements on new things were of no value except 
the fact that they knew about a new thing. Then they could pursue 
another method to get the details. 

Mr. TTatsox. Based on your experience, you would recommeinl 
that these professional societies, especially the technical sorieti*^. !• 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WHHLN' THE I::^'ITED STATES 599 

more guarded in opening their membership to anyone of Einy particular 
nationality ? 

Mr. HuMixiK. Yes, I think this is my feeling. I think we should be 
more guarded. 

^fr. Watsox. So that we might understand whether or not the inter- 
pretation of this material that you gave to the Soviet agents was made 
in this country or whether it was transmitted to the Soviet L nion for 
further interpretation, what was the lapse of time between your deliv- 
ery of these particular materials and the Soviets" response as to whether 
or not it made sense or whether or not you were giving them worth- 
while information ? 

Do you understand the question ? 

^Ir. HuMiNiK. Yes, I understand the question. 

They would respond at the next meeting which would be, say. 2 
weeks or a week later. My feeling is that they developed a film, when 
we talk about a film, because this is the bulk of the stuff that was 
passed — they developed it here in the Embassy and or consulate and 
then interpreted it here and then forwarded it to Moscow, you know, 
maybe weeks later. I thmk they made the initial interpretation here. 

Mr. TTatsox. So there is no doubt in your mind as to all of the re- 
sponsibility, officials knowing about this operation, and it was not just 
an operation between you and these five or six you have named ? 

'Sir. HuMTSTK. Xo. I am sure the Ambassador and everybody in 
there knows what is going on. 

^Ir. TVatsox. I believe all of the agents involved with you are no 
longer in this country : is that correct ? 

;Mr. HriiixiK. To my knowledge, they are not in this country : that 
is correct. 

Mr. "Watsox. Xow, as I recall, you said Dr. Stupar was your first 
leclmical man and he was succeeded by Boutenko. 

^Ir. Hu^itstb:. Dr. Stupar and Mr. Boutenko were working at the 
same period of time. Sometimes I would be working with two different 
Soviets. First it was Izvekov and Stupar. Then when Kevin took over 
in late 1964 it was Kevin and Boutenko operating separately and then 
just Kevin. 

Mr. TTatsox. The point I am trying to make is that, so far as your 
best judgment is concerned, this espionage was not confined to these 
five or six. but anyone coming into the Embassy would likewise pick 
up where his predecessor may have left off. 

'Sir. HrirrsTK. The FBI has publicly stated that SO or S5 percent 
of the Soviet diplomats are engaged in intelligence and espiona^ 
operations, and from my limited Imowledge I would say that this is 
correct, 

Mr. Watson. In your associations with these people over the period 
of 5 years, did they ever encourage you to recruit or to get to other 
people to assist in tliis espionage operation ? 

Mr. HuinxTK. They wanted to know about other scientists and the 
ones they could blackinail or that would be partial to them. I think 
they were getting at this. This is the phase we were entering with the 
recorder. 

Mr. "Watsox. Did you ever give them any names or recommenda- 
tions as to others who might be enlisted in such an operation ? 



600 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. HuMiNiK. This information is classified in a way, but I did not 
give them any recommendations to enlist anybody else. We talked 
about other scientists, but this is classified. 

Mr. Watson. I believe you touched upon this earlier, but did they 
have any particular group so far as age, economic status, or what-have- 
you, that they attempted primarily to recruit into the espionage opera- 
tion? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Well, I would say that they want to pick people 
that can get them something. In other words, I see they had an Air 
Force sergeant ; they had an Army colonel ; they had me, a scientist. 
I would say they would not recruit cab drivers, just to pick another 
group, because the man would not have access to anything. They 
wanted people that had access to military or technological informa- 
tion. 

Mr. Watson. I don't know, cab drivers might know more secrets 
than you know. 

(At this point Mr. Culver left the hearing room.) 

Mr. Tuck. Mr. Huminik, would you be willing to return for any 
further questioning at some time ? 

Mr. Huminik. I am under subpena, so any time. 

Mr. Smith. Just one question. 

Mr. Watson. I might say at this time, I do not want to prolong it, 
but I do have several other questions that I would like to propound to 
the witness this afternoon or tomorrow or later on. 

The Chairman. Why don't you fix a time to return ? 

Mr. Tuck. Return this afternoon. Suppose we adjourn here at say 
a quarter to 3. 

The Chairman. I don't know what the situation is. 

Mr. Smith. May I make one clarification on the record ? 

Mr. Tuck. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. In clarification of the record, Mr. Revin came into the 
picture on March 22, 1965 ; isn't that right ? 

Mr, Huminik. Yes. I think I had said 1964 erroneously. 

Mr. Tuck. The subcommittee will stand in recess until a quarter to 3. 

(Whereupon, at 2:05 p.m., the subcommittee recessed and recon- 
vened at 3 :05 p.m.) 

Mr. Tuck. The subcommittee will stand in recess until tomorrow 
morning at 10 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 3 :05 p.m., Thursday, April 6, 1967, the subcommit- 
tee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, April 7, 1967.) 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED 
STATES BY AGENTS OF FOREIGN COMMUNIST 
GOVERNMENTS 

FRIDAY, APRIL 7, 1967 

IJjaTED States House or Representatives, 

SuBCOMmTTEE OF THE 

Commtttee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington^ B.C. 

PUBLIC hearing 

A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, 
pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in Eoom 429, Cannon House Office Build- 
mg, Washington, D.C., Hon. William M. Tuck (chairman of the sub- 
committee) presiding. 

(Subcommittee members: Representatives William M. Tuck, of 
Virginia, chairman; John C. Culver, of Iowa; Richard L. Roudebush, 
of Indiana; and Albert W. Watson, of South Carolina.) 

Subcommittee members present : Representatives Tuck, Roudebush, 
and Watson. 

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Chester D. 
Smith, general counsel ; and B. Ray McConnon, Jr., investigator. 

Mr. Tuck. The subcommittee will please come to order. 

Let the record show that for purposes of continuing the testimony 
at this particular hearing, the Chair has established a new subcom- 
mittee composed of myself as chairman ; the gentleman from Indiana, 
Mr. Roudebush; the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. "Watson; 
and the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Culver. Mr. Roudebush and Mr. 
Watson and I are present. 

That constitutes a quorum of the subcommittee as it exists. I under- 
stood that the gentleman from South Carolina had a number of ques- 
tions he wished to expound to the witness. 

Mr. Watson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN HUMINIK, JH.— Resumed 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Huminik, yesterday you were discussing in some 
detail the various systems of dead drops and live drops that you prac- 
ticed with these Soviet agencies. Unfortunately I was not in the hear- 
ing room during your entire testimony. 

Since I think this is extremely important, I wonder if you would 
tell the subcommittee in some detail the system of telephonic and other 
communications that you had with the Soviet agents. 

Mr. Huminik. I think if we confine it fii-st to the system of live 
passes, there was a prearranged system of me giving tlie Soviet infor- 

601 



602 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

mation that he had asked for, either in the form of fihii, pictures that 
I had taken with this camera which they had provided money for 

Mr. Watson. Could you tell the committee about how many rolls of 
film you passed to the various Soviet agents ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. I would guess, and this is a guess, approximately 30 
or 40 rolls of film were passed to Valentin Kevin and each roll would 
have 36 pictures on it, so it was a goodly number of pictures. 

Mr. Watson. Thank you. You may continue. 

Mr. HuMiNiK. The live pass was always prearranged. I can give 
you an example again, if you like, of one of the most dramatic ones 
which is a time that I went to the Riggs Plaza shopping center — I don't 
recall the date now — we have it in the record. 

I went at approximately 9 o'clock at night to the Riggs Plaza shop- 
ping center in Northeast Washington, went to a telephone booth, pre- 
tended like I was making a telephone call, went back to my car and 
waited while the Russian came up, pretended to make a telephone call, 
and got into his car. 

He then proceeded to drive through Washington at a fairly high 
speed, with me following him. This was all prearranged. Then on 
Sligo Creek Parkway he stopped, blinked his brights. Another Soviet 
vehicle about a block away proceeded to come in behind me. 

We went at a high speed down a road approximately 3 miles long. 
The Volkswagen behind me going very slow and Valentin Revin go- 
ing fast so the Volkswagen blocked the road so if FBI agents were 
following, they could not be present when I gave him the documents. 

He stopped at this road, raised the hood of his car pretending he had 
trouble with his automobile, and the information was passed. That 
was a live pass. 

In Alexandria we met at a Peoples Drug Store. We more or less 
looked at each other to acknowledge we were there on time. 

He walked out. I followed him 1 minute later. I walked a prear- 
ranged route around four blocks of the city of Alexandria and he met 
me along the way, and as we walked through shadows I handed him 
a little package of film. That would be the live passes. 

The dead drops, which was using a system of telephone booths, were 
done without personal contact. I will describe how this is done. 

On a prearranged date, and we again had alternate dates if those 
dates were not suitable for any reason. In other words, if I saw it was 
dangerous to leave material or if there were people around, I could 
abort that date and either use another day or later that night, if we 
had arranged for a later drop. 

The way this is done, I photographed the documents with film, put 
rolls of film undeveloped into beer cans or cola cans, placed these 
cans at a predesignated point, which could be a lamppost, a tree, a sign- 
post, direction post, any telephone booth, at the predesignated time, 
then I was to go back and retrieve the material and then use still an- 
other alternate date at another alternate drop. 

Mr. Watson. These appear to be rather intricate and foolproof for 
various drops. Who formulated those drops? Did you or the Soviet 
agents ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. The Soviet agents provided me all the training to 
conduct myself during these drops. In other words, they gave me com- 
plete instructions, drew maps for me, which the FBI now has, and de- 
scribed completely how to do it. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 603 

Mr. Watson. In other words, they convinced you they were quite 
well versed in the various procedures for these intricate drops, both 
the live and the dead drops ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. There is no question in my mind but that they were 
trained and skilled intelligence agents. 
Mr. Watson. Wlio advised you of the drop plans ? 
Mr. HuMiNiK. Valentin Kevin was the only Soviet agent working 
with me during the last 19 months of this operation. He told me how 
to make the drops and where to make them and gave me information 
and instructions on how to photograph documents. 

Mr. Watson. When were those instructions given and under what 
circumstances? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. They were given during personal meetings I had 
with Valentin Revin at restaurants or in the automobile or walking 
down the street, prearranged meetings we had. 

Mr. Watson. I believe you testified earlier there had been some 65 
contacts that you personally had made with various Soviet agencies ? 
Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes, sir, more than 65 contacts. 

Mr. Watson. Other than these various drops, did you ever on any 
occasion take a Soviet agent to any Government establishment? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. There was only one occasion where Soviets came. I 
did not take them there, but they came to a meeting of the American 
Society for Metals which was held at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory 
in Silver Spring. 

This is a defense research and engineering establishment operated 
by the Navy. They were very surprised that they were even permitted 
in the gates. It was a social meeting. It was more or less a party to kick 
oflF the meeting year. 

This is the only meeting that we do not have a technical speaker at. 
It is a good fellowship type of thing where they have food and beer to 
encourage memberships throughout the year, more or less, and it was 
held on the grounds of the Naval Ordnance Lab. But the Soviet agents 
had no access to any areas where any work was going on. 

This was in a social facility that was provided on the station. 
Mr. Watson. So far as you know, they were admitted to the grounds 
of that facility without question simply because of their membership 
in this American Society of Metallurgy. 

Mr. HuMiNLK. That is correct. It is called the American Society for 
Metals. It is a society of metallurgists but it is just called the Society 
for Metals. 

Mr. Watson. Actually it would be more accurate to call it the In- 
ternational Society for Metals, in view of the fact that you have some 
24 various nationalities who are members of that society. 
Mr. HuMiNiK. This might be correct ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Watson. We don't want to get into the exact amount of money 
which you were paid by the Soviet agents in payment for your co- 
operation in supplying this data, but could you give us in generalities 
as to what amount you received — whether it was substantial, slight, or 
what? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. I think I received substantial money. It was more 
than $5,000 and it was all in cash and paid to me in large bundles of 
cash. This money was turned over to the FBI. 

Mr. Watson. In other words, every dollar that you received for your 
espionage activity with the Soviet agents was turned over to the FBI ? 



604 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. HuMiNiK. That is correct. For instance, when the Soviets asked 
me to buy this camera which cost, with attachments, nearly $300, the 
FBI would give me the money back, after they had inspected it and 
recorded serial numbers and whatever they needed, to purchase the 
camera. 

Mr. Watson. Were you ever paid by the FBI for your services ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. I received a small amount of expense money, which 
was insufficient to cover the expenses. I received no salary from any 
Government agency for this work. 

Mr. Watson. In other words, your role in this was as a citizen in- 
terested in his Government rather than the matter of pay from the 
FBI or any governmental agency? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. That is right. The FBI told me that I was acting 
as a citizen only and if I got into any trouble because of this, it was 
my problem and not theirs and I had to take the risks if I wanted to 
conduct this operation. 

Mr. Watson. May I ask you parenthetically now, in view of your 
service to your country, have you ever been commended by any gov- 
ernmental agency, the Department of Justice, for your role over the 
4 or 5 years you worked with them? 

Mr. HuMNiK. No, I never received any commendation or letter or 
any acknowledgement for this work. 

Mr. Watson. I see you still have the camera. 

Mr. HuMiNiK. The Government says since the camera and watch 
were more or less gifts from the Soviet Government I could keep them, 
including the vodka and everything else that the Soviets provided. 
I volunteered to give it to the Government if they wanted it, but they 
said they had no use for it. 

Mr. Watson. Wliile the camera was a gift to you personally, it was 
given you for the purpose of photographing various documents? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes. 

Mr. Watson. And transmitting them to the Soviet Embassy ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes ; and the watch was given to me to make sure I 
got to the meetings on time, the Soviets told me. 

Mr. Watson. Do you know of any other American citizen who ever 
met with you or with the Soviet agents with whom you were dealing 
over this period of 4 or 5 years ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. There were no other citizens in particular. The So- 
viets did meet other Americans at these meetings. When they went to 
any technical meetings they met 20 or 30 engineers, but they had no 
contact that I knew of outside of the technical meetings. 

Mr. Watson. Did you ever notice these Soviet agents at these tech- 
nical society meetings conversing at length with any other member 
of this society? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes. 

Mr. Watson. At length ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Wlien we say "at length," are we talking about 
discussions that last 20 minutes? 

Mr. Watson. In that connection do you know one Tlariy Bamett 
or Burnett? ^ 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes, I do. 



1 Correct spelling "Burnett." 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHEST THE UNITED STATES 605 

Mr. Watson. There was an article appearing in the November 5 
issue of Izvestia. which stated that one "Harry Barnett" was chairman 
of the Washington section of the American Society for Metals and 
deputy department chief of the National Bureau of Standards. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. Htjminik. Yes. The English in those articles is not quite right. 
It is American Society for Metals and he is assistant to the division 
chief of the Metallurgy Division of the Bureau of Standards, but 
essentially it is correct; yes. 

Mr. Watson. Do you know whether or not Burnett ever had any 
dealings with the Soviet agents? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. His only relationship as far as I know was during the 
meetings. Wlien they came to the American Society for Metals meet- 
ings he talked to them, and he did visit Russia on one occasion as a 
tourist. 

Mr. Watson. Did any of these Soviet agents ever discuss the possi- 
bility that Burnett might be of assistance to you in your espionage 
activity ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Never. They never discussed anyone else to be assist- 
ants to me. In other words, I was to be a lone operator. 

Mr. Watson. Did you ever discuss with Burnett yourself any aspects 
of Soviet technology ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. No. 

Mr. Watson. This article further alleges that Harry Burnett at- 
tempted to get one Dr. Stupar of the Soviet Embassy to cooperate with 
him for American intelligence. Did you ever have any discussion with 
Burnett with reference to that allegation ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. I talked to him after the article was printed, and 
he said it was preposterous and he didn't know what they were talking 
about. 

Mr. Watson. This article further alleges that Burnett made a trip 
to the Soviet Union with his wife, Elizabeth, in 1963. 

Mr. HuMiNiK. That is correct. 

Mr. Watson. Did you ever have any discussion with him in refer- 
ence to that trip, the purpose of it, and what he did while on that trip 
to the Soviet Union ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. I only discussed this with him many years after the 
trip. In other words, recently, after my case was broken and I read 
that article in Isrvestia^ I asked him about the trip. I knew before he 
had gone but I never discussed it with him, but he said he went as a 
tourist. 

Mr. Watson. This article attempts to discredit you — as naturally 
it would be expected to — so in an effort to give you an opportunity to 
vindicate yourself, I wonder whether or not you can explain this 
statement appearing in the article that you first approached the Soviet 
people in the humble role of "a dealer in laundry powder." 

Mr. HuMiNiK. I think that they have neglected to consider one 
part. They first came to the American Society for Metals in 1961. 
At that time I was working as vice president at Value Engineering 
Company. We were engaged in rocketry. We had nothing to do with 
any detergents. 

It was not until April of 1963 that I came into the chemicals busi- 
ness, and they promised a trade agreement in that relationship. We will 



606 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

note they said I first approached them in that field and this was 8 
years after they were already attending the meetings, so the dates 
don't even nest together. 

Mr. Watson. At any time, did any of these Soviet agents appeal to 
you to get more detailed information, alleging that they could get 
better or more sophisticated information from other sources? The pur- 
pose of that question is to see whether or not they ever indicated to 
you that some other American or Americans were involved in 
espionage. 

Mr. HuMiNiK. No, they thought I was very good for them. They 
were always praising me on all of the topics that I had knowledge in. 
During the early evaluation periods, they were asking me questions on 
many technological subjects which I would answer. 

They never talked about anybody else, or implied that there was 
anybody else. 

Mr. Watson. There was another article appearing^ an earlier one, 
October 30 in Izvestia., concerning your operation with these Soviet 
agents of the Embassy and the consulate. And in this article the writer 
alleges that this whole operation was designed "to compromise Sdviet 
citizens coming to the U.S. under the provisions of the Cultural Ex- 
change Program." 

Are you aware of any activities or any material change in the atti- 
tude of the United States toward treatment of Soviets coming to the 
U.S. under the cultural exchange program? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. As far as I know there were no discussions on cul- 
tural exchange. None of the people I dealt Avith were here as a cul- 
tural exchange student except the fact that Valentin Revin himself was 
an exchange student at Berkeley studying nuclear physics. 

He was later, as you know, expelled as a spy, so if anybody is mis- 
using the cultural exchange system, it is Valentin Revin himself. 

Mr. Watson. It was the Soviet agent and not you ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes. There was no involvement with any cultural 
exchange program during the whole activity. 

Mr. Watson. This article of October 30 further alleges that your 
venture with them was a cooperative one in which you sought scien- 
tific and technical exchanges with them. 

Did you ever receive any scientific or technical information from 
the Soviets with whom you dealt ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. They never gave me anything in the way of scien- 
tific or technical information except how to run this camera and how 
to make dead drops and to do things to pass information to them. In 
other words, they didn't give me anything. They didn't give me the 
time of day. 

Mr. Watson. So your whole operation was the gathering of infor- 
mation from American sources and supplying it to them ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. That is correct; to them. On one occasion I was 
preparing another book on welding of rare metals and I asked them 
to get me information, open literature information in the Soviet Union. 

This was very early m my relationship. They said, "Yes, we will 
provide it," and they never provided the first sentence. That was the 
only time this was ever mentioned. 

Mr. Watson. It would be quite early, in the early stages of such an 
association, that they would pretend that it be a cultural or .scientific 
exchange ? 



\ 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 607 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes, because Dr. Stupar told me, "We are not inter- 
ested in politics. We are only interested in science and engineering." 

Mr. Watson. You said earlier they were primarily interested in 
scientific and technical data ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes. But they wanted classified information. 

Mr. Watson. So far as this article alleging this was a technical ex- 
change between you and the Soviet agents, that is totally false? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. That is correct. 

Mr. Watson. This article further states that the Soviet Ambassador 
lodged an official protest with the Department of State here in Wash- 
ington relative to Harry Burnett, to whom we alluded earlier, and his 
attempt to get Dr. Stupar to collaborate with him for purposes of 
American intelligence. 

Do you know whether or not such a protest was made by the Soviet 
Embassy ? 

Mr. HuMiNEK. I have no knowledge of that at all. 

Mr. Watson. At the time you were contacted, or at least began your 
association with these Soviet agents, you were not a Government 
employee ; were you ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. That is correct; I have never been a Government 
employee except if you consider the Army Reserves as a Government 
employee. That is the only relationship I have had with the Govern- 
ment. 

Mr. Watson. In your Army Reserve capacity, I believe you were 
in the Ordnance Corps. 

Mr. HuMiNiK. No, Chemical Corps. 

Mr. Watson. Earlier cases of espionage, and so forth, have had 
Government employees involved. But I think the fact that they worked 
with you would be indicative that they are not only interested in 
getting Government employees, but civilian employees who have a 
particular background or professional experience that might be help- 
ful to them. Is that a fair statement ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. That would be fair ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Watson. You have already had two articles in Izvestia — and I 
believe you said they appeared on the front page — maligning you and 
attempting to discredit you. 

Do you anticipate further articles of such nature as a result of your 
testimony before this committee ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Kjiowing how they dislike me so at this time, I 
would assume as a result of this testimony they might write another 
article. 

Also in preparing — I have been preparing a book on my experience 
and I suspect they will write articles on that after it is out. 

Mr. Watson. Recently the Senate approved a treaty whereby we 
can establish additional consulates in this country. On the basis of 
your experience with the Soviet agencies both in the Embassy and 
in the present consulate, what would be your opinion as to whether 
or not the practices that have been followed in the past would no 
doubt be applied to any future consulates which may be established ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. As I said in my earlier testimony, it is well known 
to our Government that 80 or 90 percent of the Soviet nationals that 
are in this country are engaged in some type of intelligence operation. 
And my opinion is, by having additional consulates in other cities, 
you start a new zone of operation for each of these Soviet diplomats 



608 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

that will be there because the new consulate treaty provides the con- 
sulate officials now have diplomatic immunity, which is one thing they 
never had before. 

When you consider the Soviets are held within a 25-mile radius of 
Washington, this opens up a new zone. For instance, if a Soviet leaves 
Washington, he has to file, with the State Department, his itinerary. 
Now, if he establishes a consulate in Chicago or Gary, Indiana, or San 
Francisco, where there is an industrial complex, he can operate com- 
pletely within the complex. 

If there are Slavic people there, he has a good chance of subverting 
or threatening or blackmailing them. 

Mr. Watson. While I realize you would have no direct knowledge 
with which to answer this next question, I think in view of your ex- 
perience it might be helpful to get your opinion. 

Inasmuch as the Soviet agencies worked with you on this espionage 
operation, would it be fair to conclude that they have so attempted 
or either have worked with others in a similar capacity and may even 
be doing so at this time? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. I have some knowledge of this from just reading 
the newspapers and other hearing reports. They do and have worked 
with other Americans, some of these actually being traitors to the 
United States. 

The Colonel Whalen case was just unearthed and he got 15 years 
for his activities with the Soviets, and this case of Sergeant Boecken- 
haupt in November of 1966 indicates that the Soviet diplomats are 
working with other people. 

Mr. Watson. Based on your experience, you would conclude that 
the Soviet Embassy, as well as the consulate, is well staffed with mem- 
bers versed in the most intricate and sophisticated procedures of espio- 
nage and well trained in that particular operation? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. There is no question about it. They are well versed 
in it and this is their prime interest. 

Mr. Watson. Unless American citizens, particularly those young 
people and those in the scientific and technical areas, are extremely 
careful and cautious, then they could be implicated in such a procedure 
or operation as you were ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. That is right, and some of them may be trapped and 
embarrassed in such a way that they don't go to the FBI and they be- 
come entwined in an operation which is very illegal and harms the 
interests of this country. 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Chairman, I believe those are all the questions I 
have except I would like to thank Mr. Huminik. I think it has taken 
a great deal of courage on his part to participate in this operation. 
And while you have not been commended by any governmental agency 
heretofore, I, as an individual Member of Congress, certainly want to 
commend you and I feel that you have done your country a real service 
in coming before this committee and cooperating with the FBI in try- 
ing to find a modus operandi of the Soviet agents in this country. 

Mr. Huminik. Thank you. 

Mr. RouDEBUSH. Mr. Huminik, yesterday morning your testimony 
mentioned a project I am very close to, the Surveyor program in our 
space program. Could you amplify on that a bit, tlie interest they have 
expressed in Surveyor and what personal knowledge you have of this 
particular project ? 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 609 

Mr. HuMiNiK. The Surveyor program, our space shot to explore 
the surfaces of the moon, the first launcliing of it — I don't recall the 
date now — I believe it was in 1966 — at the time this launching was 
scheduled, and it was in the newspaper that it was going to be launched, 
Valentin Revin told me when we were in the Hospitality House res- 
taurant in Alexandria, Virginia, that he was highly interested in the 
Surveyor moon probe and his government wanted me to have this as 
my top priority. We were just a week from the launch. He wanted me 
to find specific data. I cannot relate to you what this classified data was 
now. 

Many people say the Surveyor moon program is unclassified and is 
published, but there are more things going on in the satellite than the 
public necessarily knows. 

There was classified information that even the subject of the classi- 
fication can't be revealed that he wanted. He knew what was classified 
and what he needed and he wanted me to get it and put it in a drop on 
a certain date, and that is all he wanted on that date. 

He didn't get anything from that. We blew that drop, we aborted 
it, we did not make that drop, and he got nothing on the classified 
aspect of the Surveyor program and he was very disappointed. 

Mr. RouDEBUSH. Did you have any personal knowledge of the Sur- 
veyor program ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. I have knowledge on many of these programs be- 
cause I have worked broadly in all of the scientific space and rocketry 
programs and I have some knowledge, yes, but this knowledge is of 
unclassified aspects. 

Mr. RouDEBUSH. You also mentioned that at one time during your 
conversation with one of the Soviet agents that they threatened rela- 
tives of yours who still lived in Russia. Have you had any indication 
or any word that any of these relatives have been molested in any 
way? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. No; so far as I know there are no relatives in Russia 
that I know of. My father came over in 1913 and he lived in Gary, 
Indiana, your State. And they had no contact except some mail con- 
tact when he was very young with uncles and aunts that are there, 
but as far as they know they would be all deceased or they would be 
over 100 years old. 

I told the Russians if you want to shoot somebody there, go ahead, 
because I don't know anybody there. They were hoping I would be 
interested and would want to start corresponding there and then they 
would use this person for blackmail, but they could have produced 
anybody and said he was a relative. 

Mr. RoTJDEBUSH. I think several times they mentioned about certain 
strategic goods that they needed. Did they give you any insight into 
where their shortages occurred ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. They were interested in my book in high temperature 
coatings, reenti^^, coatings for space vehicles. They generally were de- 
sirous of all technological information, and my other readings indi- 
cated to me that the Soviet Union lacks a lot of basic teclmology, that 
they put their efforts into building one type of rocket and they neglect 
a lot of other areas that have to be developed, so they lack the broad 
technological base that we have in this country. Their plan is to prove 
as much of this technology, which saves them the dollars you expend 
for the research and time. In the atomic bomb, for instance, there were 



610 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

three ways of refining the uranium. They wanted to know which it 
was the U.S. used so they did not have to pursue all three, which saved 
them time and money. 

Mr. EouDEBUSH. You have related these compoimds and I know you 
are familiar with them, but they did not mention specific chemicals or 
things of this type. It was technological information. 

Mr. HuMiNiK. They mentioned specific things. For instance they 
were interested in the oxygen process for making steel which is being 
installed in the steel plants in Gary, Indiana. At the time I talked 
about it, I think there were six or eight processes installed by the vari- 
ous steel companies. 

They wanted all the details. They said since you have contacts and 
relatives that work in the steel industry, why don't you see what you 
can do and get us the type of information we want, the size of pipes, 
pressure, and so on. 

They don't want to know it puts out so many tons a day. They want 
to know how they can duplicate the process in the Soviet Union so 
there were specific requests for things they wanted. 

Mr. RouDEBUSH. Again this was technical information? 

Mr. HuanxiK. They wanted background information on scientists 
for blackmail purposes, and things like this. 

Mr. RouDEBusH. I believe those are all the questions I had, Mr. 
Chairman. 

Mr. Tuck. Mr. Huminik, I gather from your testimony that these 
men are very dexterous in their operation. Do you have any informa- 
tion as to whether or not when you were not in contact with them 
they kept you under surveillance ? 

Mr. Huminik. I think in some cases I was followed by them and I 
know of at least two occasions I obser^-ed them watching me. They 
acknowledged to me that they have ways of observing and checking on 
me. 

So they run a fairly big operation, and I see them even today and 
in fact 2 days ago I saw some Soviets in my neighborhood and I report 
these facts to the FBI. In other words they are operating all through 
the city here. 

Mr. Tuck. Mention has been made of the fact that you have not 
received any commendation from any governmental agency. The facts 
are, however, that these men were declared persona non grata as a 
result of your findings? 

Mr. Huminik. That is correct. 

Mr. Tuck. I commended you yesterday on behalf of the chairman 
and members of the committee, t want to reiterate today what I said 
yesterday and associate myself with the remarks made by my col- 
league, the gentleman from South Carolina. 

Mr. RouDEBUSH. May I ask one additional question which slipped 
my mind. 

In carrying on Mr. Watson's line of questioning, at any time in your 
dealings with the Soviets, were there any other names mentioned? 
Was there any indication that they had other contacts here in Wash- 
ington? 

Mr. Huminik. No, they never mentioned specific names. I always 
had the feeling and genuine intimation that they had other things 
going on, that I was not the only person they were working with, but 
never anything specific. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 611 

Mr. RouDEBUSH. They never gave you any indication of the direc- 
tion of the-se other interesting surveys that were being conducted? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. No; but I would say it was always technical infor- 
mation. The FBI released a statement that these Soviets were working 
in the scientific division in an Embassy-based spy ring in the Embassy. 
This was published by the State Department and the FBI, so our Gov- 
ernment has knowledge which indicates scientific and technical espio- 
nage. Although to my knowledge I was the only person involved, there 
must have been others also. 

Mr. RouDEBusH. I also want to join with Governor Tuck and Con- 
gressman Watson in expressing my thanks and appreciation and my 
commendation for your forthright statements and your appearance 
before this committee. 

Mr. Tuck. Counsel has some questions. 

Mr. Smith. I have a matter I want to clarify. In connection with 
the live drops you mentioned a while ago, I believe you stated Sligo 
Creek was one of the areas and one of the drops occurred there which 
was about 12/2/65. 

Mr. HuMiNiK. That would be right. 

Mr. Smith. And Alexandria was another area of drop which oc- 
curred February 10, 1966. 

Mr. HuMFNiK. That would be approximately correct; yes. 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Chairman, earlier we discussed this and the chair- 
man expressed concern, and I share that concern, about the apparent 
ease with which these Soviet agents, especially those in the scientific 
field, can become a member of a professional society here in Washing- 
ton. I know the agents with whom you dealt have either gone back to 
Russia voluntarily or have been declared persona non grata. Do you 
still attend the meetings of this society ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. Yes ; I was chairman last year and I am ex officio and 
I still attend ; that is correct. 

]Mr. Watson. Are any Soviet nationals members of that society 
today? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. No, there are not any at this time. 

Mr. Watson. There are none at this time ? 

Mr. HuMiNiK. No. I might add that this committee might inspect 
and find out if our scientific diplomats and attaches are allowed to 
attend Soviet teclinical societies. I would recommend if our diplomats 
in Russia and the other Iron Curtain countries cannot attend their 
meetings then we should forbid this from occurring here. 

Mr. Watson. You stated practically every meeting is of a technical 
nature and you had the one meeting out at the Naval Ordnance 
Laboratory. 

Mr. HuMiNiK. That is true and that is generally true for all tech- 
nical societies, and there are hundreds of them in the United States, 
and I know the Soviets attended four or five different ones here. I know 
this from personal knowledge. 

Mr. Watson. It would be our belief that our professional societies 
would be much more free in their discourse and discussion, and even if 
our oflGlcials were allowed to become members of any such professional 
society in the Soviet Union, about all they would get would be a cup 
of pink tea or something like that. I am sure they would be more 
yarded in their discussions of a technical nature than we would be 
in this country. 



612 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. HuMiNiK. My understanding is that if a Soviet citizen talks 
to an American in Russia, this Russian comes under great suspicion 
if he was not authorized to talk to an American, so I think you are 
right in that they are more guarded in what they are going to pass to 
any of our people. 

Mr. Watson. I am not a great believer in governmental edicts, and 
all of that, but I should be hopeful that you, in view of your experience 
here, would be encouraging your society and other similar societies 
to be more guarded so far as the matter of permitting Soviet na- 
tionals to become members of their society. 

I would urge you to recommend that you and they be more guarded 
in that area. 

Mr. HuMiNiK. I think it is a good suggestion. 

Mr. Tuck. We thank you very much. 

If there is no further business to come before the committee at this 
time, we will stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair. 

(Whereupon, at 11 a.m., Friday, April 7, 1967, the subcommittee 
recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.) 

(Huminik Exhibits Nos. 1-A and 1-B referred to on p. 594, follow :) 

HuMiNiK Exhibit No. 1-A 

[From Izveatia, Oct. 30, 19«6.] 

(Translated from Russian) 

Made in the FBI 

An official of the secret agency sits behind a steel door, which bears the legend : 
"No access for unauthorized persons." He sits there from morning until late at 
night and prepares papers for his superiors. His pen fills sheet after sheet with 
plans, such as the following : 

Project : Measures to be taken to uncover the subversive activities of Russian 
agents (month), 196 — . 

Proposals : Scandalous revelations in the press — 4 ; Soviet citizens to be de- 
clared persona non grata — 2 ( one from among the employees of the Soviet Trade 
Mission, the other preferably from among their diplomatic personnel) ; 

Individual actions to compromise Soviet citizens coming to the US under the 
provisions of the Cultural Exchange Program — 30; (to be developed by )." 

When the document is finished it will be sent to higher officials through chan- 
nels. It will acquire corrections, amendments and resolutions. 

Perhaps we have taken some liberties in describing the procedure of preparing 
anti-Soviet slander campaigns in the US ; but, there is no doubt at all that such 
campaigns are planned well in advance in the offices of the Central Intelligence 
Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. At certain regular intervals the 
special services of the United States unleash noisy anti-Soviet witches sabbaths, 
attempting to pollute the consciousness of the average American with the poison 
of distrust toward Soviet people. The press is also enlisted to help in these dirty 
provocations. 

Recently the American newspaper "Washington Post," which considers itself 
to be a solid press organ, published some sensational "revelations." It printed 
the photograph of an official of the Soviet Embassy in Washington speaking over 
the telephone at a pay station. Why does he use a pay telephone? He is a spy ! 
Thus, without even blushing in shame, did the "Washington Post" present the 
FBI's current clumsy absurdity to its readers. Once you have a "spy," you need an 
"agent." In this respect, too, there were no great difficulties. The same newspaper 
informs Americans of the existence of a certain John Huminik — a "scientist and 
metallurgist," who for a number of years, while hiding behind his activities in the 
"Chemprox Corporation" has been rendering special services to his bosses in the 
FBI. 

Huminik first visited the Soviet Embassy in Washington in 1961 in the guise 
of "Secretary of the Washington Section of the Society for Metals," who was 
ready to cooperate with Soviet representatives in the field of Soviet-American 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 613 

trade relations and scientific and technical exchanges. Naturally such a proposal 
was met without prejudice and it became easy for Huminik to enter into ordinary, 
generally accepted contacts with Embassy personnel. From that moment on, 
the Washington paper states with sensational emphasis, "Huminik acted con- 
stantly under the guidance of the FBI." On FBI instructions and without his 
Soviet acquaintances being aware of it Huminik imparted a "conspiratorial" and 
"secret" character to his meetings with them. For many months the FBI accumu- 
lated "comprising" materials concerning these meetings. As a result one of the 
Embassy officials who used to meet with Huminik was defamed and declared 
persona non grata. But that is not all. A noisy campaign to discredit other Soviet 
representatives was unleashed in the American press. And the prime prosecutor 
of this campaign was none other than Huminik. 

This 'scientist' did not want for resourcefulness. Thus, one of the Soviet 
specialists, after having had dinner with the provocateur Huminik, found among 
various prospectuses of the Chemprox Corporation Huminik had given him a docu- 
ment bearing a "Secret" stamp. The document contains instructions on chemical 
and bacteriological weapons and the tactics of their use by the Army of the 
USA. The instructions enumerated chemical and bacteriological components and 
their code designations. Among the secret bacteriological components were poison- 
^ffas substances inducing brucellosis, fever, tularemia and other diseases. Among 
the chemical poisons were components for destroying crops of wheat, rye and rice, 
and components of a nerve gas known as "Sarene." The war in Vietnam provides 
convincing confirmation of the fact that the American militarists faithfully follow 
the instructions worked out for them. Here would really be something for the 
"Washington Post" to tell its readers! But — that would be too much, the paper 
prefers to feed on the forgeries of the FBI. 

The following facts also illustrate the manner in which the masters of inducing 
psychoses fabricate their materials for sensational incidents, in which the "all- 
seeing eye" of the FBI is praised to the heavens. 

Harry Barnett, Assistant Section Chief of the National Bureau of Standards, 
was unusually kind and courteous toward the Scientific and Technical Counselor 
of the USSR Embassy in Washington. In addition to questions relating to metal- 
lurgy Barnett tried to interest the Soviet worker in "secret" information as well, 
information far beyond the framework of competence of the "Chief of the Society 
for Metals," as he used to introduce himself. After determining that his readiness 
to supply such "information" was of no interest, Barnett revealed his true face, 
proposing no less than that the Soviet citizen "cooperate" with American intelli- 
gence. To prove his authority and his membership in the special agency Barnett 
produced Certificate No. 3848, issued by the Special Intelligence Group, which 
reports directly to the President. In doing so Barnett explained that his duties 
consisted in recruiting persons who are in a position to supply secret informa- 
tion to the Americans, and that he has been in this "business" .since 1948. The 
American special agencies clearly overestimated the talents of the "metallurgist" 
Barnett. This affair ended by the Soviet Ambassador's lodging an official protest 
with the Department of State of the USA. Neither the State Department nor 
the American press, however, mentioned even one work concerning this gross 
provocation. 

The American special agencies take a great interest in Soviet citizens who are 
temporarily abroad. They do not conceal their intention to dispose these Soviet 
people toward non-return to their homeland, or to obtain intelligence information 
from them. 

Soviet scientists interning at Harvard University under the terms of the 
Program for Cultural Exchanges between the USSR and the USA will long re- 
member the "hospitality" of one of the leaders of the "Russian Center" of that 
university — Professor Marshall Shulman. Acting as offical host of the University 
for the reception of Soviet citizens, Shulman interpreted his duties of being a 
"guardian" to the young scientists in a somewhat i)ecullar manner, subjecting 
their mail and telegraph communications with their relatives and their scien- 
tific institutes in the USSR to his personal censorship. 

Early in 1964 Shulman, together with Jerry Piatt, another "Professor," a "spe- 
cialist on Marxism," more precisely on anti-communism, participated directly in 
an attempt to persuade the Soviet intern A. not to return to his homeland. Being 
subjected to unceasing psychological processing, blackmail and threats on the 
part of Shulman and Piatt, A. became gravely ill. Shulman and Piatt placed him 
in the university's clinic and attempted in every possible way to prevent his 
getting in touch with the Soviet Embassy in Washington. At this so critical time 
for A. Shulman personally "corrected" A.'s letters to the Embassy requesting 

79-422 O — 68 5 



614 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

immediate recall from Harvard. Only the resolute intervention of the Soviet 
Embassy made it possible for A, to return to his homeland safely. 

In spite of this incident, so disgraceful for a man claiming the title of repre- 
sentative of American science, Shulman as heretofore contacts Soviet people and 
institutions in the guise of a man striving "to contribute to better understanding 
between the Soviet and American peoples." During this current year Shulman 
tried to get the Academy of Sciences of the USSR to grant him permission to 
visit the Soviet Union for a period of six months. Shulman asserted that his 
purpose was "to study the evolution of the approaches of the Soviet and the 
American sides to the problem of disarmament in the light of political and 
economic changes in the current international situation." Knowing Shulman's 
true personality, it was not difficult to guess at the true purpose of his visit. 
Shulman was refused. This did not, however, stop him. Shulman came to the 
Soviet Unioin just the same, as a tourist, and today he trie® to accomplish his 
"program" under such cover. 

One would like to tell the "evolution" researcher : your efforts are in vain, 
your true face is well known ! 

The Soviet press has already reported on the attempts of the American intel- 
ligence services to utilize scientific and technical exchanges for purposes of espi- 
onage against the Soviet Union. The CIA's well known Operation "Lincoln," 
which is a long term program, is primarily directed at obtaining espionage data 
from American scientists. Such espionage activities, it goes without saying, harm 
the development of exchanges between the USA and USSR in the fields of 
science and technology. They also degrade the dignity of those representatives 
of American science who permit themselves to become involved in the provoca- 
tive "Work" of the CIA and the FBI. The inspired statements in the Ameri- 
can press, which create a poisonous spy mania bear the imprint — "Made in the 
FBI." 



HUMINIK Exhibit No. 1-B 
[From Izveatia, November 5, 1966.] 

(Translated from Russian) 
Facelifting 



V. MAZHOROV. 



Replies. 



The US press lost no time in reacting to Izvestiya's article concerning the im- 
proper activities of certain American "scientists" (see No. 257, the article entitled 
"Made in the FBI"). The FBI agents with .scientific titles and degrees who were 
named by this newspaper were "interviewed," and the provocateurs took the po- 
sition : "I am not I, and this horse is not mine." In trying to shield the.se un- 
masked accomplices of the secret police the United Press International corre- 
spondent makes an effort to evade the issue, offering his readers a hackneyed 
formula : Izvestiya, he says, wants to cast aspersions upon the reputations of 
these most respected persons. 

Well, then, we could amplify their characteristics. We contacted the city of 
Dnepropetrovsk and talked to the Senior Scientific Staff Member of the Institute 
of Ferrous Metallurgy, S. N. Stupar. He related the following : 

Yes, I was well acquainted with this Harry Barnett. From 1960 until 1964 I was 
the Scientific and Technical Coun.selor of the Soviet Embassy in the United States. 
Bamett introduced himself to me as the Chairman of the Washington Section 
of the American Society for Metals and Deputy Department Chief of the National 
Bureau of Standards. About the middle of 1961 he telephoned me and asked me to 
give a talk about Soviet metallurgy at a meeting of the Society for Metals. I 
was happy to comply with his request. Had he not occupied .some kind of official 
position in that Society, he could hardly have spoken and acted in its name. I 
can truly say that at first I liked the man, and we quickly became friends. He 
frequently invited me to have dinner with him. Both he and his wife Elizabeth 
impres.sed me and my wife as being nice and likable people. Barnett took a lively 
interest in my opinion on many political and scientific questions. I did not see 
anything unnatural in this. He spoke of the need for contacts between the scien- 
tists of our countries, he emphasized that such contacts lead to an improvement 
of mutual understanding. In a word, he spoke in a manner which impresses any 
Soviet man. He frequently talked to me of his desire to visit the Soviet Union so 
as to become acquainted with our achievements in metallurgy and asked me to 
help him organize such a trip. He wanted me to arrange for him to be invited by 
our scientific institutes. He even composed the draft of such an invitation. I have 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 615 

the text somewhere among my papers. All of these requests and conversations 
appeared to me to be sincere, and as a specialist in metallurgy he also made a 
good impression. When he came to the Soviet Union together with hisi wife, dur- 
ing the summer of 1963, I tried to help him visit as many scientific institutes as 
possible. 

Barnett, however, interpreted my predisposition towards him in his own way 
and decided that he could show me his true colors. In December of 1963 we got 
together to have dinner in a restaurant. Barnett suddenly proposed that I work 
for American intelligence. In doing so he stated that he spoke in the name of the 
Special Intelligence Group of the President of the US. Unabashedly he explained 
to me that the purpose of this group was to recruit Soviet scientists and showed 
me a document to prove his membership in this "group." Upon being sharply re- 
buffed by me, Barnett tried to scare me. For purposes of blackmail he showed 
me a pile of photographs taken, he asserted, by FBI personnel. They depicted 
some of the moments of our meetings. Losing his composure, Barnett threatened 
to inform "the proper authorities" about some materials supposedly compromis- 
ing me. Evidently carried away, he declared that he knew absoutely all about me, 
even that the burglarizing of my apartment a short time earlier had been ar- 
ranged by the FBI. So that I not have any doubts in this respect, he even enumer- 
ated some of the minor things which had been stolen on that occasion. Need- 
less to say, I told this provocateur exactly what I thought of him, perhaps in not 
too diplomatic terms. His bosses, however, apparently did not have any great re- 
gard for his feelings, for even after this "important" conversation Barnett per- 
sistently continued to seek new meetings with me. 

This is how matters stand, gentlemen of the "Washington Evening Star!" 
You wanted us to name names, well, we have named them. In vain do you attempt 
to present this provocateur in an academic cap as an "innocent lamb." 

Oertain press organs of the US try with no lesiser effort to prove the re- 
spectability of that rascal Huminik. Here again are the facts we gathered in 
conversations with many Soviet specialists who had met with Huminik, the 
President of the "Chemprox" CJompany, at different times. He first approached 
Soviet people in the humhle role of a dealer in laundry ix>wder. Things did not 
go too well, as far as sales of soap foam were concerned. Huminik decided to 
deal in merchandise of a different kind. In meeting with any Soviet citizen, 
Huminik offered him the secrets of other firms, supposedly received by him 
from some of his friends. He tried to slip some reports of the "Melpar" firm 
about component materials to one of the Soviet specialists. In another instance, 
speaking with the undue familiarity of a vulgar i)erson, Huminik tried to in- 
terest a Soviet specialist in his tales about the dirty details of the lives of some 
of his acquaintances. Huminik's relationship with Soviet people does not jell 
and he risks all in an open act of provocation — he slips some instructions con- 
cerning chemical and bacteriological weapons to his Soviet acquaintance to- 
gether with a number of other prospectuses of the firm. We have already told 
our readers about this fact. On October 31st Huminik phoned the TASS oflice 
in Washington and stated that he had been "slandered." We visited the Soviet 
specialist with respect to whom this provocation had been committed. He 
showed us this document, too. We saw the heavy stamp "Secret" on the papers. 
"Secret" at the top of each page and at the bottom, so that there be no doubt. 
We glanced at the long enumeration of gases, ix>isonous substances, both chem- 
ical and bacteriological, which are intended for purposes of annihilating people, 
crops and cattle. In parentheses the authors of the document remind the reader 
once again : this here component of the poisonous substance belongs to the secret 
category, that one is merely confidential. Behind this document one can see the 
dirty figures, far more sinister than Huminik, who poison all around them in 
a calculating and conscious manner, rejecting everything that is known as ele- 
mentary morality. 

Is not the reason for these American attempts to wash the dirt off the bearers 
of "decency" of the Huminik type to be found in the fact that behind them 
stand men who bear a much greater responsibility for the resumption of the 
Cold War? 

V. LTAKHOV 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED 
STATES BY AGENTS OF FOREIGN COMMUNIST 
GOVERNMENTS 



WEDNESDAY, MAY 10, 1967 

United States House of Representatives, 

Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Un-American AcTmTiES, 

Washington. D.C. 
Public Hearing 

A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, 
pursuant to call, at 10 :20 a.m., in Room 429, Cannon House Office 
Building, Washington, D.C, Hon. William M. Tuck (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding. 

(Subcommittee members : Representatives William M. Tuck, of Vir- 
ginia, chairman ; Richard L. Roudebush, of Indiana ; and Albert W. 
Watson, of South Carolina.) 

Subcommittee members present : Representatives Tuck and Watson. 

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Chester D. 
Smith, general counsel : and B. Ray McConnon, Jr., investigator. 

Mr. Tuck. The subcommittee will please come to order. 

The hearing today is a continuation of a series of hearings initiated 
by the committee on April the 6th, pursuant to resolution adopted by 
the full committee on March 8, 1967, authorizing hearings concerning 
the current espionage and intelligence-gathering activities within the 
United States by Communist governments. 

The chairman has appointed a new subcommittee for the purpose 
of receiving the testimony of today's witness. 

I will read the order of appointment of the subcommittee as a part 
of the record : 

May 5, 1967. 
To : Mr. Francis J. McNamaba, 
Director. Committee on Un-American Activities. 

Pursuant to the provisions of the law and the Rules of this Committee, I 
hereby appoint a subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities 
consisting of William M. Tuck, as Chairman, and Honorable Richard L. Roude- 
bush and Honorable Albert W. Watson as associate members, to conduct hearings 
in Washington. D.C. for the purpose of receiving the testimony of Leonard I. 
Epstein, commencing on or about Wednesday, May 10. 1907. and/or at such other 
times thereafter as may be necessary, as contemplated by the resolution adopted 
by the Committee on the 8th day of March. 1967. authorizing hearings concern- 
ing the extent, character, and objectives of activities within the United States 
of agents of foreign Communist governments or organizations affecting the in- 

617 



618 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

ternal security of the United States, and other matters under investigation by 
the Committee. 

Please make this action a matter of Committee record. 

If any member indicates his inability to serve, please notify me. 

Given under my hand this 5th day of May, 1967. 

/s/ Edwin E. Willis 
Edwin E. Willis, 
Chairman, Committee on Vn-America/n Activities. 

Mr. Smith, please call the witness. 

Mr. Smith. Mr. Epstein, will you please come forward? Will you 
stand to be sworn, please, sir ? 

Mr. Tuck. Will you stand and raise your right hand? Do you 
solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give to this com- 
mittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God ? 

Mr. Epstein. I do. 

Mr. Smith. Be seated. 

TESTIMQNY OF LEONARD I. EPSTEIN 

Mr. Smith. Mr. Epstein, for the record, would you give us your 
full name ? 

Mr. Epstein. Leonard I. Epstein. 

Mr. Smith. Would you give us your home address ? 

Mr. Epstein. 314 Spencer Place, Paramus, New Jersey. 

Mr. Smith. And your date and place of birth ? 

Mr. Epstein. July 11, 1926, New York City. 

Mr. Smith. What is your occupation, Mr. Epstein? 

Mr. Epstein. I am vice president of Trans-American Machinery 
and Equipment Corporation. I am sales engineer, machinery builder, 
and we buy and sell machine tools. 

Mr. Smith. Mr. Epstein, you are here today in answer to a com- 
mittee subpena served upon you by Committee Investigator Ray Mc- 
Connon, on 28 April 1967. Is that correct? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. Prior to our getting into the reasons for your being 
here, Mr. Epstein, I should like to establish more of your background 
for the committee's benefit. First, could you briefly relate your educa- 
tional background for us ? 

Mr. Epstein. I am a graduate engineer of Case Institute of Tech- 
nology, of Cleveland, Ohio, and I have done some graduate work at 
Stevens Institute of Technology in Hoboken. 

Mr. Smith. Would you now relate your occupational background 
a little more ? 

Mr. Epstein. After graduation, I went into the armed services, and 
upon discharge from the Army, I worked for Chance Vought Air- 
craft in Stratford, Connecticut; then Stone and Webster Engineering 
in Baton Rouge, Louisiana ; the Fluor Corporation in Houston, Texas; 
then I worked for the Red River Arsenal, U.S. Army Arsenal at 
Texarkana, Texas. 

I left the Red River Arsenal; went back to school under the G.I. 
bill at Stevens ; and upon completion there at Stevens, I went to work 
for the U.S. Naval Research Laboratories at Bayonne, New Jersey. 

When I left the Research Labs and went into the machinerj^ busi- 
ness approximately 14 years ago, I worked for three firms in the 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 619 

machinery business, S and S Machinery, Johnson Machinery, and Jem 
Machinery, up until approximately 1956, when I left those people 
and went out and formed my own corporation, my own company, 
for the sale of machinery and equipment. And I bought out a Mj*. 
George Yohrling in 1956, approximately, a firm that he had at the 
time called K and Y Machinery Builders. 

Mr. Yohrling had to leave subsequently because of ill health, and 
when he got well, in 1964, we got together again and formed Trans- 
American Machinery, and that is my present position. I am vice 
president of that corporation. 

Mr. Smith. What is the address of your firm or corporation? 

Mr. Epstein. It is 27 East 23d Street, Paterson, New Jersey. 

Mr. Smith. And what is its official name or title? 

Mr. Epstein. Trans-American Machinery and Equipment Cor- 
poration. 

Mr. Smith. Are you now a member of any technical societies or 
other organizations? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. At the present time, I am a member of the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers. I have in the past belonged 
to the Society of Automotive Engineers and the American Society 
for Metals. 

I am also a vice president of Case Alumni Association, New York 
chapter. I am a past commander of the Jewish War Veterans of the 
United States in my hometown. 

Mr. Smith. You mentioned a moment ago that you had performed 
some military service. Would you give us a rundown on that, please? 

Mr. Epstein. I was inducted into the Army in 1944, and received the 
infantry training, but after being sent overseas, I was put in the 
engineers, a heavy shop company, heavy machine shop company, and 
later on, on Okinawa, when there was a mass transfer, I was transfer- 
red to the Air Force Weather Service, from which I received an hon- 
orable discharge in 1947 as a member of a weather squadron operat- 
ing radar equipment. 

Mr. Smith. I presume that you have a family. 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. Do you have any children ? 

Mr. Epstein. A boy and a girl. 

Mr. Smith. You mentioned some moments ago your partner, Mr. 
George Yohrling. Is Mr. Yohrling here with you today? 

Mr. Epstein. No, sir, he could not come. Somebody had to watch 
the store, so we left him back in Jersey. 

Mr. Smith. I see. Was Mr. Yohrling involved in any way in what 
we are about to discuss here today ? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir; Mr. Yohrling and I both were cognizant of 
all the details that went on and the contacts that were made with this 
Russian agent. 

Mr. Smith. Could you give us a little information, background 
information on Mr. Yohrling? 

Mr. Epstein. Mr. Yohrling is 49 years old. He just had a birthday 
the other day. He has been in the macliinery business a lot longer than 
I have, approximately 30 years. He is a tool and die maker, an ex-tool 
and die maker that got into rebuilding and finally into machinery 
purchases. 



620 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

He is also a former U.S. paratrooper, and he holds a Silver Star 
for gallantry. And as far as I know, he was discharged from the Army 
with a physical disability type of discharge in 1945. 

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook, a member of the full committee, 
entered the hearing room.) 

Mr. Epstein. He lives in Boonton, New Jersey. 

Mr. Smith. Do you have his street address ? 

Mr. Epstein. It is 33 Lorraine Terrace, Boonton, New Jersey. 

Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Epstein. I believe that established the 
gentleman's identity sufficiently. 

Could you now please tell the committee in some detail just what 
your company does and just what you are involved in? 

Mr. Epstein. Well, we buy and sell machine tools for rebuilding 
and retrofitting. We try to update machines, put on the latest numeri- 
cal controls or automatic positioning devices. 

We purchase machines, primarily from Government surplus sales 
a.nd private plants where they feel the machines are outdated or they 
are looking to update their equipment. We take these pieces of equip- 
ment in, we usually rework them, what we call rebuild or retrofit, and 
then turn around and resell. 

We sell across the country, a few pieces around the world, not too 
many. Our primary customers are in the United States, but we are 
not limited to the East Coast. We do sell quite a bit to California, 
occasional pieces to Canada. 

Mr. Smith. About what is the annual volume of your business? 

Mr. Epstein. Well, dollarwise? 

Mr. Smith. Approximately. 

Mr. Epstein. Dollarwise, about a half a million dollars a year. 

Mr. Smith. Do you make these purchases through sealed bids or 
open bidding, or just how? 

Mr. Epstein. Well, most of it is done through bidding. Whether it 
is a private firm or the Government, it is usually offered out, as a 
group or a lot, to interested parties. And so we have competition and 
we must bid against other people in the purchase of the equipment. 

Mr. Smith. Would any of this equipment that you buy be restricted 
or classified ? 

Mr. Epstein. Well, that is a little difficult for me to say, because I 
don't know what constitutes the exact classification on it. 

The equipment is put out by Atomic Energy, by the Navy Depart- 
ment, by private finns. Now we presume that the material has been 
screened. That is the terminology — that they screen it — so I really 
would not know if it is classified, to be perfectly honest, but I have 
seen submarines sold and I have seen Atomic Energy equipment sold, 
in which they mentioned that you must dismantle or you must in some 
way destroy the original intent or purpose of the object. 

Now if that constitutes classification. 

Mr. Smith. I believe they call that cannibalization? 

Mr. Epstein. Demilitarizing. If you buy a still, you also must say 
that you are not going to use it for manufacturing alcoholic beverages. 

Mr. Smith. To your knowledge, have you ever purchased any equip- 
ment that you subsequently learned was classified or still classified? 
And you had to handle it as such ? 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 621 

Mr. Epstein. We came fairly close, but to my knowledge, we never 
actually bought any classified material. It was either withdrawn at 
the last moment or something occurred to prevent us buying. 

Mr. Smith. Right. Would you say, Mr. Epstein, that it is possible 
for some of this material to get into the wrong hands, that is, into 
enemy hands? 

Mr. Epstein. I would say very definitely yes. There appears to be 
no restriction as to who can go in and buy the equipment, and the 
most that I have ever noticed was that there were certain clauses that 
said you could not ship it out of the country, but there was no restric- 
tion as to who could purchase this equipment, so I would say it was 
very possible it could get into the wrong hands. 

Mr. Smith. Is there any restriction on whom you can sell it to ? 

Mr. Epstein. Within the United States, there is no restriction. 
There are definite restrictions as to what you can ship overseas and to 
what nations. They supposedly must be friendly countries to whom 
you can ship the equipment. 

Mr. Smith. Right. Would any of the machinery that you purchased 
be useful to foreign nations? 

Mr. Epstein, Oh, definitely. I would say that the equipment we 
have is probably anywhere from 20 to 40 years ahead of the rest of the 
world, with very few exceptions, and I have a pretty good example. 

I just came back from a machine tool show in Chicago, in which there 
were two Russian machines exhibited for the first time, I believe, in 
the United States — two machines of Russian manufacture. And there 
was an American manufacturer of the similar machine at the show, 
and I asked him what he thought of this particular piece of equipment 
called a Bullard, and he said, "Well, it is a damned nice machine. We 
stopped making them like that 40 years ago." 

So that was his opinion of the particular Russian machine, and I 
kind of bear that out, so I would say that our equipment is of very 
definite interest to foreign countries, whether friendly or unfriendly. 

Mr. Smith. Did you ever know a person named Vadim Isakov ? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to reflect that 
Vadim Isakov came to this country in February 1962 as a Russian 
employee of the United Nations International Children's Emergency 
Fund, in the position of procurement officer. 

He resigned that post on 22 January 1966, due to a U.S. State 
Department protest, which stated that he was involved in activities 
not in keeping with his U.N. position. 

Mr. Epstein, when did you come into contact with Mr. Isakov ? 

Mr. Epstein. We met Mr. Isakov in July of 1965. 

Mr. Smith. Where did you meet him ? 

Mr. Epstein. Well, we met him at the U.N. at his invitation. The 
story is a little unusual. I have a neighbor, lives on Spencer Place, who 
sells hospital and laboratory equipment to UNICEF. 

Mr. Smith. Wlio is the neighbor, please ? 

Mr. Epstein. The gentleman's name is Arny Stiefel or Steifel. 

Mr. Smith. Will you spell that, please ? 

Mr. Epstein. S-t-i-e-f-e-1. It is Arndt, A-r-n-d-t. 

Mr. Stiefel, who apparently knew Mr. Isakov in his position as 
procurement officer for the UNICEF, was asked by Mr. Isakov would 



622 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

he know someone who could handle, that would have technological 
equipment, and Arndt gave him my name, and everything after that 
was Mr. Stiefel's fault. 

We received a call from this party Isakov, and at first, I will be 
honest with you, I thought it was a joke by a competitor, so I called 
back the U.N. to ask if there was such a party as Vadim Isakov, and 
they said "yes," he was a procurement officer. And I told my partner, 
I said, "Well," I says, "Have you ever been to the U.N.?" And he said 
"no," and I said, "Well, this might be a good opportunity to see what 
the place looks like, in all the years it has been up." 

So we made an appointment, Mr. Isakov asked us over, to come to 
the U.N. and see if we could help him in obtaining technological equip- 
ment for undeveloped countries. That was the way he put it, on the 
telephone. 

So on the. 15th of July we went over there, and he took us to lunch 
in the Delegate's Lounge there and proceeded to talk to us about 
the kind of equipment he wanted, and it was quite evident at this very 
first conversation that we did not really have the type of equipment 
he wanted. 

He wanted laboratory supplies, what you might say small tools, 
hand tools, wrenches, pliers, equipment of that sort, which we don't 
handle. He was not looking for large machine tools. He was looking 
for small equipment. He was looking again, as I say, for laboratory 
equipment, which we don't normally handle. 

And at this point, I was a little discouraged as far as any pos- 
sibility of sales; so he took us around on a tour of the entire U.N. 
territory there, and when it was all over I felt that I was going to 
be finished with, but he says no, he would like to come out and see 
what we had to offer. So in the meantime, in order to stimulate some 
interest on his part, we had an entire surplus plant for making watch 
parts that had become surplus, and I said, "This would be a type of 
an item for an undeveloped nation, and they might be interested in 
obtaining it through UNICEF. It would be good for an economy of 
an undeveloped nation, for the manufacture of watch parts." 

And I played that up, and he said well, he would like to come out 
and visit us. He made arrangements ; he came out the 27th of July. 
This was the first time he came to our plant in Paterson, and we showed 
him through the entire plant. 

Again, he did not seem to know anything about machine tools and 
he expressed no interest in the machine tools. But we did have at the 
time on the floor a surplus missile computer that we had purchased 
quite by accident in a Government sale, and, by accident, I will indicate 
that we bid $71 on an item that cost the Government something on the 
order of $10,000, and we were very surprised when we were awarded it. 

So it was sitting on our floor. We did not have the vagiiest notion 
of where to sell it or what to do, and as we walked by it, and I men- 
tioned that this was a missile computer, he expressed quite a lot of 
interest. 

He asked, could I give him the serial number, the model, and all 
the rest, and I said "yes," I would be glad to. 

Again, as far as the machinery went, there was no interest on his 
part. We went back into our office and sat down, and he said well, as 
far as the UNICEF items, he could see that we did not really have 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 623 

anything for him, but he had a customer in Europe for the following 
items, and he pulled out a list and proceeded to read off the four fol- 
lowing items, and I will say this at this point, my eyebrows went up, 
because the first thing he asked for is an underwater robot. 

Mr. Smith. Will you explain what an underwater robot is ? 

Mr. Epstein. Well, I did not know at the time what it was either, 
to be frank with you, but he pulled out a name. He said, there is an 
underwater robot being made in Jersey, by an outfit 

Mr. Smith. That is in New Jersey ? 

Mr. Epstein. Eight, by an outfit called Vare Industries. This is the 
interesting point. At this j>oint, he knew what he wanted and he 
knew w'ho wanted it and he knew where it was being made. 

I did not lead him on at all. I was unaware that this underwater 
robot was even being built, and he pulled out, as I say, the list, and 
subsequently we got a picture of it. 

I don't know if the committee gentlemen can see this, but this will 
give you an idea of what an underwater robot is. 

Mr. Smith. Would you say that was a classified item at that par- 
ticular time ? 

Mr. Epstein. No, the item is made for the Bell Telephone Labora- 
tories, to explore the bottom when they are laying a cable. 

Mr. Smith. I see. 

Mr. Epstein. It came into Government use subsequently, when Uncle 
Sam needed it to go searching for parts missing on the bottom of the 
ocean. The device is very complicated and very expensive. It runs over 
$300,000 for this one item. 

That was the first thing. And again, as I say, I was quite surprised, 
when he asked about it and knew who made it. 

Mr. Tuck. Would you like to offer this as an exhibit into the record? 

Mr. Smith. May we have this as an exhibit ? 

Mr. Epstein. Surely. It is quite all right. 

Mr. Smith. May I move to introduce this as an exhibit, Mr. Chair- 
man? 

Mr. Tuck. Unless there is objection, yes. 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir, I obtained that, sir, from Vare Industries, 
the people who actually manufacture that. 

Mr. Smith. Note this as Epstein Exhibit Number 1. 

(Document marked "Epstein Exhibit No. 1" and retained in com- 
mittee files.) 

Mr. Epstein. The next thing he asked for was an accelerometer. 
And again, at that point, very honestly, I did not know what he was 
talking about, but he wanted an accelerometer manufactured by 
American Bosch Arma Corporation, by Minneapolis-Honeywell, or 
by an outfit known as Kearfott, which today is a division of General 
Precision Aerospace, in Little Falls, New Jersey. He seemed to know 
what he wanted. He gave us model numbers, again, on this device. 

Now on the accelerometer ; I have one here. I have an accelerometer 
that I obtained afterwards from a friend of mine, and this accel- 
erometer is considered obsolete. It was also verified by Mr. Isakov, 
because when I offered it to him, and he did not instantaneously refuse 
it, but later on he came back and laughed and said, "That is a piece of 
junk." 

But it is an accelerometer. The accelerometer that he wanted is a 
device so small, as you can see here ; it is smaller than a cigarette pack- 



624 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

age, if you gentlemen would care to see this. This device is really 
sophisticated. 

Mr. Smith. What does an accelerometer do ? What is its purpose ? 

Mr. Epstein. An accelerometer measures the pull of gravity on any 
vehicle, on a missile, on a space orbiting device; as it approaches the 
earth or the moon or anywhere else, the pull of gravity starts to ac- 
celerate the object, making the missile speed up, and this device here 
will measure that to very fine amounts, very, very close amounts. 

It will detect a change in the gravitational pull in the acceleration 
of a body in feet per second or miles per hour. It will detect this very 
fast and very accurately. In fact, the whole trick in manufacture of 
this device, and what makes this a piece of junk, and that device worth 
$3,000, is the sensitivity of that device ; also, its ability to withstand 
heat and cold and tumbling and all types of motions. 

The device is very sophisticated, as I said, and it is a very critical 
device when you are trying to make a soft landing on a planet. 

Mr. Smith. In other words, it signals the guidance equipment within 
the vehicle of these changes in gravitation. 

Mr. Epstein. Right, and tells it to put on the brakes or speed up, 
slow down or go faster. It is a very critical device, because it will let 
you land hard or soft. 

Mr. Smith. May we have this as an exhibit ? 

Mr. Epstein. All right. 

Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman 

Mr. Epstein. Excuse me. 

Mr. Smith. I want to introduce that as an exhibit. 

Mr. EfpsTEiN. May I ask if the exhibits are returnable, or are they 
kept — that is the only book I have of that type. 

Mr. Smith. This will be Epstein Exhibit Number 2. 

(Document marked "Epstein Exhibit No. 2" and retained in com- 
mittee files.) 

Mr. Smith. Proceed. 

Mr. Epstein. That is the accelerometer. The next item he asked 
us for was a miniature computer, he called it, and he said Sperry 
Gyroscope made it. And we subsequently investigated that and found 
out that they never made any such device, but he was talking about a 
miniature, lightweight, compact, on-board computer, and that was all 
we could gather ; we never got anything further on that. 

And then the last item he asked for were some titanium pressure 
vessels. Now this I was a little nonplussed at, because he gave me the 
requirements for this in atmospheres, which is a typical European 
connotation, and I had to translate it into pounds per square inch. 

In other words, he wanted a bottle of some sort to hold the gas, and 
it turned out he wanted the bottle to hold the gas at 9,000 p.s.i., which 
is not very low pressure. It is a 

Mr. Smith. That is pounds per square inch ? 

Mr. Epstein. That is right, 9,000 pounds per square inch. It is a 
very high pressure, as pressure goes. Under those conditions, most 
thing, on board a ship or a missile, you are going to have to compress 
but if you want to carry a fuel supply or an oxygen supply, or some- 
thing, on board a ship or a missile, you are going to have to compress 
the gas under this very high pressure. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 625 

Now we called up the manufacturer. Again the manufacturer for 
this device was in Jersey, an outfit called Walter Kidde. They make 
fire extinguishers. 

You probably all are familiar with their fire extinguishers, and they 
also make pressure vessels, and when I called up and asked about a 9,000 
p.s.i. pressure vessel, they said, "Sure, we will be glad to make them." 
They have them in steel. Wlien he said "steel," Mr. Isakov said "No, 
no. It must be light, it is going to go up." 

So I said, "What do you want V And he said, "Titanium." 

Walter Kidde said, "We can make them, but they are very expensive, 
and we prefer to sell you something in steel or aluminum, but not 
titanium," but they said they were available. 

So that was the fourth item. That was the pressure vessel. 

Mr. Smith. Did this seem strange to you, that a procurement officer 
of UNICEF or United Nations International Children's Emergency 
Fund would be interested in this type of thing ? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes ; this struck us as quite unusual. He tried to pass 
it off that he was interested in making money. He had this customer 
in Europe and he saw the possibility of us making a lot of money 
and he could also make some money. 

This was the way he put it. 

Mr. Smith. Did he indicate that he wanted these items for UNICEF 
or for these people that you mentioned a while ago ? 

Mr. Epstein. He kept referring to his customer in Europe. He never 
said the Russian Government; he never said anything about Russia. 
He just kept talking about a customer in Europe and he definitely 
did not say it was for UNICEF. He did not pretend. At this point, 
he just had a customer in Europe, the way he put it. 

Mr. Smith. Did you tell Isakov that you would be able to get these 
items for him, Mr. Epstein? 

Mr. Epstein. Well, when he came in with these requirements, the 
day he came in, I picked up the telephone and I called Vare Indus- 
tries there in south Jersey, and they said "yes," they made them for 
sale, and I asked the price. 

I called up Walter Kidde, and the same story as I gave you ; in other 
words, right there in front of the man, I indicated that the material 
was available. As far as the accelerometers go, I could not do anything 
instantaneously, but I definitely showed him that it w^as possible for 
us to obtain these items for him. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question at that point ? 

Mr. Witness, he gave the indication that he held out the promise 
of large profits. Did he indicate in what amount or quantities he 
wanted any of these four or five items for which he said he liad a cus- 
tomer to purchase them ? 

Mr. Epstein. Well, with the exception of the accelerometers, he 
only wanted one. No; the bottles, he wanted two each of the bottles. 
The accelerometers, he wanted a half dozen. The underwater robot, 
he only wanted one ; the miniature computer, he only wanted one. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. With the exception of the underwater robot, most 
of these items were small enough that they could be taken out of the 
country in a person's clothing or baggage ; couldn't they ? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. 



626 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. Smith. Did the topic of payment arise on your initial contact 
as to how he would pay you ? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. We asked him that very question, well, how 
would we be paid, and he indicated, strictly cash. 

Mr. Smith. That is, U.S. dollars? 

Mr. Epstein. U.S. dollars, right on the line. He was not looking for 
any trade terms. 

Mr. Smith. Did the price of the items seem to set him back any at 
all? 

Mr. Epstein. No; I guess I was more surprised than he was when 
the underwater robot came in at $300,000. It did not seem to faze him 
at all. 

Mr. Smith. Did you know whether or not any of these items were 
classified at the time ? 

Mr. Epstein. No; I had a small suspicion that there was something 
about these accelerometers that might be, but that was just a suspicion. 
I had no indication. 

Mr. Smith. At what point did you contact the FBI in connection 
with this matter? 

Mr. Epstein. Well, the minute this gentleman left that day, I dis- 
cussed the matter with my partner and I said, "These four items he 
wants are not for UNICEF, as we both understand, and, also, I don't 
like the looks of this thing. It looks very fishy," at that point, that 
this fellow was selling it to any friendly customer in Europe and 
also the fact that he did not know what he wanted, but yet he knew 
Avhat they wanted, because he was reading from a list. 

This got me immediately suspicious. And that evening I contacted 
my neighbor, the gentleman who lived next door at the time, who was 
an FBI maUj and I told him just what happened, and he said, "All 
right, you will be hearing from us." And he apparently works in a 
division that he contacted, and then the following ISIonday morning, I 
believe it was a Monday morning, w^e were visited by FBI agents. 

Mr. AsHBRooK. Could I ask one more question at that point? In the 
case of the accelerometer, you said that he brought it back to you and 
said it was a piece of junk. Therefore^ you are gaining from that the 
impression that he was taking this equipment to someone else, who was 
looking at it, and he himself was not making a judgment on it? 

Mr. Epstein. In all cases, I would say that was true. In other words, 
if we gave him anything technical, if we threw up any technical road- 
block, he would say he would get an answer ; and then he would come 
back at us with the answer, a week later, 2 weeks later, the next time we 
met him. Any time there was any doubt, in fact, any time there was just 
even a question, he would have to refer back to somebody. We never 
gave him this device. We only gave him a serial number and a model 
number, and he came back, always with the answer a week later. 

Mr. AsHBRooK. Thank you. That was it. 

Mr. Epstein. Or a month later. 

Mr. Smith. What opinion or instructions did the FBI give you at 
that time ? 

Mr. Epstein. The FBI at this point told us to lead the man on, find 
out what he wanted. They told us that they knew this party had to 
surface, as they called it, at some pK>int and they were glad he had 
surfaced to someone that informed them. So, as far as they were con- 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 627 

cerned, we were just to continue negotiations with him and report on 
all movements and whereabouts and what this party wanted. 

Mr. Smith. And your bringing the FBI into the picture at this 
juncture was based on your suspicions of this man's activities as not 
being clearly within his UNICEF responsibilities ? 

Mr. Epstein. That is right. That is the reason. The FBI seemed to 
be aware of this man's position, because when they walked into our 
office on Monday, they had a picture of him and they said, "Is this the 
party ? Is this Vadim Isakov ? " 

And by golly, that was the party. They had a picture, a long distance 
telephoto of him. 

Mr. Smith. Before we go any further, I think we should make 
a note at this point. We have had testimony similar to yours in 
the past, where the person involved with Soviets or a member of one 
of the other satellite intelligence groups has counseled that the right 
time to contact the FBI is at the outset of the approach of these 
people. 

Do you agree with this ? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. Because they can get you pretty involved 
pretty fast, I would say. 

Mr. Smith. Would you care to comment at this point on what mi^ht 
be done to more fully alert people in our own or in your own or allied 
businesses in regard to this type of approach or situation ? 

Mr. Epstein. All I can really say is that the approach that they are 
going to use on you is one of monetary gain; and, apparently, they 
feel that all the American businessman or an American citizen is 
interested in is in what amounts in dollars for him. 

Apparently they don't understand that some of us feel that this 
country is first a,nd foremost, and the dollars be damned. But I would 
say that the peril is there. If a party is looking for monetary gain, 
these people will reach him, on a monetary basis. 

So I strongly feel, as a patriotic American, that the thing to do 
is to contact the FBI. If the party's request is a legitimate one and 
the FBI clears it, well, then, you could go ahead. If not, then the 
necessary steps will be taken by the Government to thwart these ac- 
tivities. 

Mr. Smith'. What was your next contact with Mr. Isakov ? Or when, 
rather ? 

Mr. Epstein. Well, he said right at that meeting, as we brought up 
certain problems in relation to the different items, he said he was 
going on vacation and he would not return until late September and, 
at the time, he would have more details for us. 

Because don't forget, this was the first contact where he asked for 
these specific items, and we immediately threw up these roadblocks, 
what size, what shape, what tolerances, what limits do you want on 
the particular material ? 

So he called us on the 30th of September and said he was back 
in the country, he would like to come out and see us on the 2d of 
October; and he did come back to our plant on the 2d of October. 

Mr. Smith. What transpired at this meeting? 

Mr. Epstein. Well, at this meeting, now, he was pretty specific. He 
knew what he wanted in relationship to the accelerometer. He had an- 
other name for the computer, since we could not at this point — ^we told 



628 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

him we could not find any such thing as a minicomputer, he came back 
at us with a different name, a "Red Man computer," manufactured by 
IBM. 

He also seemed to know what he wanted in the pressure vessel as 
regards the volume, the size of it. 

You see, when he first came, all he knew was that it had to with- 
stand this 9,000 p.s.i., but he did not know how big. But now he had the 
answers to the questions and he also hinted again that there was a lot 
more business, there w^ere a lot more items that his customer in Europe 
wanted. . 

Mr. Smith. He kept dangling the volume of business before you ? 

Mr. Epstein. Right. 

He next came back on the 22d of October and he started to push the 
accelerometers ; and if you will recall, at this time the Russians made 
about three hard landings on the moon in a row. 

They smashed them up, one after another, and it seemed to us, and 
it may be strictly coincidence, every time they smashed one on the 
moon, he would come running in for that accelerometer. 

This little gadget, that is, if it functions properly, would prevent a 
hard landing. So there was an awful lot of push on that. 

We, in the meantime, had gotten a hold of Kearfott's accelerometer, 
and they told us the price on that little unit had gone up, so we passed 
this price increase, which was from $3,000 to $6,000, right on to Isakov, 
told him that now it w^ould cost $6,000 ; and it did not seem to bother 
him in the least. The fact that the price had gone up, that made no 
matter, but he sure wanted one in a hurry. 

Mr. Smith. Did anything else take place at the meeting, this last 
meeting, the 22d of October ? 

Mr. Tuck. What year was this, the 22d of October? 

Mr. Epstein. 1965. 

Mr. Smith. 1965? 

Mr. Epstein. Right. No, the next thing, we had a meeting with him. 
He called us on the 29th, and w^e met him on the 3d of November and 
we met him on the 5th of November. He came to our plant, and while 
he was at the plant at that time, we had just received some missile site 
sales. 

The Government at the time was selling the Atlas "E" missile sites 
and then they switched, they sold the Atlas "F," and they finally sold 
the Titan "I" missile sites, and he spotted this sealed-bid sale and he 
was quite interested. 

We gave him one of these things. He requested, would we mind giv- 
ing him one of these brochures on the Government sale. 

Mr. Smith. May we introduce that as an exhibit ? 

Mr. Epstein. Surely. 

Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, we request permission to introduce this 
as an exhibit. 

Mr. Tuck. Unless there is objection, it will be offered as an exhibit. 

Mr. Smith. This will be Epstein Exhibit 3. 

(Document marked "Epstein Exhibit No. 3" and retained in com- 
mittee files.) 

Mr. Epstein. We just handed it to him, and he was quite interested. 
He did not say anything further. He took it with him. 

Now at this point 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 629 

Mr. Smith. Now that was the first run of missiles this country had ; 
was it not? The Atlas? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. The big one ? 

Mr. Epstein. That was our first hard-stand missile, hard site. 

Mr. Smith. Intercontinental missile ? 

Mr. Epstein. Right. And subsequently, they sold the "F's" and then 
the Titan "I's." 

Mr. Smith. How did you keep stalling Mr. Isakov in connection 
with this accelerometer ? 

Mr. Epstein. Well, in a way, it was simple and, in a way, it was 
difficult, at least keeping the credibility. These things are quite difficult 
to manufacture, and we told Isakov that the company had plumb run 
out of them. They had sold all their inventory and they would have 
to ^fit through another manufacturing run and that would take 30 
days or 60 days or 90 days to run them through the shops, which is 
a fairly plausible explanation because of the complexity of the manu- 
facture of the device. 

Mr. Smith. Would you know whether or not the accelerometer, 
particularly, \vas on the Department of Commerce prohibited list of 
equipment to be sold a foreign nation ? 

Mr. Epstein. No, I would not know that, and the one at Kearf otts 
was apparently free for anybody's asking. I mean, it was not free. If 
you paid the price, you could buy it . 

Mr. Smith. What about the other two items that were involved in 
this? 

Mr. Epstein. The other two types of accelerometers, the one manu- 
factured by Minneapolis-Honeywell and the one manufactured by 
American Bosch Arma were classified, and we found that out in a very 
strange way. Quite by accident. We actually almost purchased two 
American Bosch Arma accelerometers. They were gorgeous little 
things, in an almost silver container. I walked into a surplus electronics 
store and I asked them if he had any accelerometers, and he looked up 
and said, "Come in the back here," and there, sitting on the shelf, were 
these two gorgeous silvery gadgets, made by American Bosch Arma, ac- 
celerometers, labeled right on top of them, and just what this Russian 
had asked for. 

So I asked the party there, I said, "Would you be good enough to 
check American Bosch Arma and see if this is the particular accelerom- 
eter with the following characteristics?" And I gave him the char- 
acteristics that were required. 

He picked up the phone, called American Bosch Arma, and I heard 
the phone explode. Somebody on the other end said, "What in blazes 
are you doing with those accelerometers ? They are classified ! You are 
not supposed to have them ! " 

And he says, "We are sending a ^ard right over to pick them up." 

They were sending a plant security officer over to pick these things 

It turned out he had purchased the thing in a lot, in other words, 
he had been invited to go in and bid on a whole room of surplus, and 
this is what happened. 

Mr. Smith. You mean from the Government? 



79-422 O— 6? 



630 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. Epstein. From Arma. Arma was told to dispose of certain items. 

Mr. Smith. I see. 

Mr. Epstein. And these classified items had gotten into this lot, and 
quite by accident he had bought them. 

Mr. Smith. Do you suppose that these items had gotten into the lot 
by accident ? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. Or deliberately ? 

Mr. Epstein. No, I think by accident. Because, apparently, a lot 
more of them were made and destroyed and just these two happened 
to 

Mr. Smith. Did Mr. Isakov's interest continue in all of these items 
that you mentioned a while ago, or did it boil down to these later items, 
the robot boat and the accelerometers ? 

Mr. Epstein. It boiled down primarily to the accelerometer, and 
even the robot he sort of dropped. 

Mr. Smith. I see. Now that pretty much covers that contact. 

Could you tell us what took place after this last discussion that you 
mentioned ? 

Mr. Epstein. He now began to get very suspicious about meeting 
us at the plant. He did not want to meet us any longer at the plant. 
He said the employees were beginning to recognize hmi and he began 
to get into what we would call cloak-and-dagger or clandestine opera- 
tions. He arranged for us to meet him at shopping centers; he met Mr. 
Yohrling and myself one day and talked with us only in the car. He 
asked us to drop him off at a spot ; we could not take him anywhere. He 
began to get a little amusing in that sense. 

Mr. Smith. In other words, he was beginning to establish a clandes- 
tine operation, rather than an open commercial operation ? 

Mr. Epstein. Very definitely, yes. And at this point, he was so anx- 
ious about setting up the delivery of an accelerometer that we actually 
set up an appointment. I said we had finally gotten one — this is about 
the middle of November — we had gotten an accelerometer, or we were 
a;bout to get one, so we set up a meeting at a shopping center, and we 
have a large shopping center called Korvette's up there. And I was 
supposed to meet him in the early evening in a certain department 
and hand him the accelerometer, and he would hand me — and he patted 
his vest pocket very significantly — cash. He would hand me the $6,000 
cash. Now that was all set up. 

Mr. Smith. Did he indicate any interest in the Atlas missile equip- 
ment that you mentioned a while ago ? 

Mr. Epstein. No. Later on. This was much later on. 

Mr. Smith. I see. 

Mr. Epstein. But this meeting that we had, or were supposed to 
have, I told the FBI, "Now what do I do?" 

And they said, "Don't show. We will monitor the meeting." And, ap- 
parently, he did show up and he was quite disappointed that I did not 
show up at that meeting at Korvette's. 

We gave him an excuse that I was out of town on business, I had 
forgotten, and again we gave him the delay that we had not received tlie 
accelerometer, actually, and we are sorry. 

He was really pushing for that accelerometer and was willing to 
pass the cash at that time. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 631 

Mr. Smith. Did the fact that he was so intensely interested in the 
accelerometer indicate to you that they were possibly having trouble 
witli their outer space sihots ? 

Mr. Epstein. I really feel that that was quite evident, that they 
were having a lot of difficulty with this, trying to make this landing, 
that soft landing on the moon. 

Mr. Smith. I see. Now did you keep the appointment with him at 
this clandestine point meeting? 

Mr. Epstein. No, no ; the meeting at Korvette's, I never kept, but we 
did set up a meeting later on at — again he would not come to the plant, 
but I met him at a restaurant, the Crane House, which is around the 
corner from our plant. And at this meeting, over a few drinks, he 
started to discuss how was I going to cover up the purchase of this 
accelerometer. In other words, it was imminent that I was about to 
obtain the accelerometer, so what excuse could I use, and he proposed 
a number of peculiar covers, such as buying it in a phony name, telling 
them that I was going to use it for another purpose entirely. 

He began to be worried about the security. He also brought up at 
this meeting would I be willing to ship it for him, the accelerometer. 

Mr. Smith, Did he indicate how it was to be shipped? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes — no, you mean as to whom — he did not give me 
any address to ship it to ; no. 

Mr. Smith. I see. 

Mr. Epstein. But he did, when I flatly refused to ship the item, I 
flatly turned him down, so I said he would have to handle it, and he 
said, well, that would be no difficulty,* he would get it out in a diplo- 
matic pouch. 

And this question you brought up before, Mr. Ashbrook, about how 
would you get out an item, I asked him how would he get out the 
underwater robot, and he said under diplomatic pouch. 

Apparently, if they put the connotation "diplomatic pouch" on it, 
it does not matter if it is as big as an automobile, they can't stop it. 
The material will go out, with nobody from our Government or our 
country able to prevent its departure. I was quite surprised by that. 

Mr. Smith. That is true. There is no limitation on the size of the 
pouch under international law. 

Did you have to stall him any further in connection with the 
accelerometer ? 

Mr. Epstein. I was still going along with this stall. I requested the 
FBI to give me some directions as to what to do, and the only thing 
that kept coming back at me was that it was under consideration that 
they could let us, they would tell me what to do, but to just keep 
stalling him, ask him if he is interested in anything else. 

Mr. Smith. Did you have any further contacts with him? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes. He visited us on December 4, and apparently, as 
an outgrowth of this. This meeting on December 4 had to do with the 
missile site. They apparently had spotted something in the brochure 
that they wanted, because he came at me now and asked if I could 
obtain, not the entire site or not the missile itself, but a device called 
a Sylphon bellows. This is a flexible connector used to fuel the missile 
just prior to launch and, again, this was indicative of some troubles 
they must have been having, because this Sylphon bellows that was 
built for this for launching and fueling — in other words, the missile re- 



632 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

mains on the pad entirely unfiieled until the time is called for it to be 
launched, and just prior to launch it must be fueled by flexible connec- 
tions. 

You have probably all seen them down on the gantries, hanging off 
the gantries down at Cape Kennedy, all those hoses that drop away 
just before the missile is lifted off, and they must have been having 
difficulty, because he specifically wanted to buy flexible connectors, 
coupling, diaphragms, and these Sylphon bellows, from the missile 
sites, or if I could get them from any of these sites. 

Mr. Smith. Up to this point, can you give us an idea of how many 
contacts you have had with Isakov ? 

Mr. Epstein. Oh, I have a list here of phone contacts and all he 
made at the office. We keep a record, our secretary keeps a record of 
that, and I would say over 20 contacts by phone and in person. Prob- 
ably 10 conta,cts in person, and 10 by phone. 

Before we made personal contact, he would usually call us. In fact, 
he did not want us to call him at the U.N. ever since that first meeting. 
After that, he said he would contact us. 

"Don't call me, I will call you." That type of thing. 

Mr. Smith. Over what period of time did these contacts take place? 

Mr. Epstein. Well, I have brought you right up to December. In 
other words, from July of 1965 right up until December 1965. This one 
where he came and asked for the Sylphon bellows occurred on Decem- 
ber 4. 

Mr. Smith. What was the purpose of the Sylphon bellows? 

Mr. Epstein. Well, as I mentioned, it is a flexible connector for a 
missile, for fueling it, for charging it prior to launch. 

Mr. Smith. I see. 

Mr. Tuck. Did you ever deliver to him any of the technical equip- 
ment which he requested ? 

Mr. Epstein. No, sir. We never actually delivered a thing to him 
with the exception of that exhibit of the sealed bid. That was the only 
thing. And a bottle of whiskey. On December 30, he came in with a 
bottle of vodka, and I gave him a bottle of whiskey, and that was the 
only thing we ever passed. He brought in a bottle of Russian vodka 
wih no tax stamp on it. It was quite interesting. 

Mr. Tuck. What became of the cash ? I understood you to say that 
he had some cash. 

Mr. EpsteiK. He had cash, but we never delivered an accelerometer ; 
he never passed any cash to us. 

Mr. Smith. Did he establish any set of signals or anything like that 
for your meetings ? 

Mr. Epstein. Well, as I say, they were always preceded by a phone 
call. They were always preceded by a phone call. They were always at 
some public spot, a shopping center, or at a restaurant. 

Mr. Smith. Did he have a specific time and all the other elements 
involved with that? 

Mr. Epstein. Oh, yes. If we were late for a meeting, he was quite 
perturbed. He was quite upset. One or two occasions, we were a half 
hour late for a meeting ; he was quite upset about it. 

Mr. Smith. In other words, he became progressively clandestine in 
his operations? 

Mr. Epstein. Right, and he wished us to become so, too. He seemed 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 633 

to be fairly certain that any time we made an approach to an American 
manufacturer to buy one of these things that it would go on record. 

It must be their economic policy over there in Russia that a record 
is kept of every technical purchase, which of course we don't do here 
in the United States. 

Mr. Smith. Were you aware of the fact that Mr. Isakov as a 
UNICEF employee of the U.N. did not have diplomatic immunity 
and, theoretically, could not have access to the diplomatic pouch of 
his nation ? 

Mr. Epstein. No, sir, I really was not aware of that. 

Mr. Smith. He was a Russian national, employed by the U.N. but, 
as clearly demonstrated here, he was engaged in a clandestine opera- 
tine operation or purchase of equipment in this country which was 
beyond his duties and responsibilities. 

Did you have any further contacts with him after this last meeting 
that you mentioned ? 

Mr. Epstein.No ; after he gave us that bottle of vodka on December 
30, we had no further contact with Mr. Isakov because a story broke 
in the newspapers, of which you people are aware, and on January 12 
the newspaper article appeared, which, you might say, blew the whistle 
on his whole operation. 

Mr. Smith. May I go back just a moment ? 

Mr. Epstein. Surely. 

Mr. Smith. In connection with the Sylphon bellows, were you able 
to obtain it for him ? 

Mr. Epstein. No. 

Mr. Smith. I see. Did he raise any question about that, your in- 
ability to obtain it for him ? 

Mr. Epstein. No. We did not really have the opportunity or the 
time to get into that. That came very late in the meetings, so we never 
actually pursued it at all. 

Mr. Smith. Now when the matter broke in the newspaper, did that 
close his contstcts with you ? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir, very definitely. We heard no further from 
Mr. Isakov. 

Mr. Smith. You have told us a most interesting story here that 
once again demonstrates the need for all Americans to be alert to 
this type of happening. 

Would you, in view of your experience, tell us just what might be 
learned along these lines ? 

Mr. Epstein. I will say this : I feel that they are behind us, in their 
technology. I don't know how many years behind, but they definitely 
need the advanced technology that we have, and I feel that selling them 
this type of equipment, giving it to them, or in any way dealing with 
them in this type of item, is just endangering our own future positions 
with the people. 

I was very much upset on learning here, about a month ago — and 
you probably saw it in the newspaper — that General Dynamics was 
going to sell a submersible to the Russians — ^you probably saw it — 
for a million dollars. 

I don't feel that this country should give up our advances just to 
make dollars. What we have, I think we should keep. I think that 
we should not make the task any easier for them at all. 



634 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

I happen to feel that the increasing trade relations with them and 
the opening of consulates throughout the United States is just going 
to make it that much more difficult, and make that many more people 
susceptible to their approaches. 

That is my own opinion. But I definitely feel that the job is going 
to get difficult, more difficult for the FBI. More people will be ap- 
proached, strictly for this industrial espionage. 

I am not talking about military secrets, I am just talking about tech- 
nological secrets. The ones that we have, I don't feel we should share 
it with them, I don't feel we should sell it to them. 

Let them go develop their own, especially when it comes to missiles 
or satellite vehicles. 

Mr. Smith. Upon disclosure of this in the press, this closed out the 
operation you had in connection with Mr. Isakov and closed out your 
contacts with the Bureau ? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. The FBI at that time? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. I see. Mr. Chairman, that completes my questioning. 
Do you have any questions? 

Mr. Tuck. I have one or two. I understood you to say that opening 
up of these additional consulates will have a deleterious effect upon 
the country, in your opinion. As I underetand it, these people who 
work in the consulates would be granted diplomatic immmiity. 

I said tliose who are employed in these consulates in the country 
are granted diplomatic immunity; are they not? 

Mr. Smith. Yes, sir, they are. They would be. 

Mr. Epstein. I imagine so, sir. 

Mr. Smith, This is right. 

Mr. Tuck. This Mr. Isakov, or whatever his name was, he was 
granted diplomatic immunity. It was impossible for us to prosecute 
or punish him in any way for his conduct. Is that right ? 

Mr. Epstein. No, sir; I believe Mr. Isakov could have been grabbed ; 
I believe he could have been prosecuted. 

Mr. Smith. That is correct ; he was an employee of the IT.N. 

Mr. Tuck. Of the United Nations. 

Mr. Smith. And as an employee of the U.N., he does not have, nor 
can he get, diplomatic immunity. 

Mr. Tuck. Does not have. But ordinarily, those who are employed 
in consulates would have. 

Mr. Smith. In consulates, they Avould have. 

Mr. Tuck. Mr. Watson? 

Mr. Watson. Thank you, Mr. ChaiiTnan. 

Mr. Epstein, I am interested in the approach made by Mr. Isakov, 
and a})parently it was quite open when you visited him at tlie IT.N. 
Did you have any social contacts with him, or were all of your contacts 
of a business nature? 

Mr. Epstein. No; there were some social contacts of the type where 
we met at a i-estaurant, or in ])articular I mentioned the Crane House, 
and at the Garden State Plazii ; we met at a Cambridge Inn, where we 
discussed family and some other things, 

I never met his family socially, but let's put it this way, over a few 
drinks we discussed various things, and he tried to let me believe that 
he was interested in personal gain also in the sale of these items. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 635 

In other words, thiit it was strictly a business proposition with him 
and that he would pick up a certain commission on the sale of the 
items. 

Mr. Watson. I assume that you do not speak Russian, so naturally 
all of your conversations were carried on in English. 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Watson. What was the proficiency of Mr. Isakov so far as 
speaking English ? 

Mr. Epstein. It was very good. 

Mr. Watson. Very good. 

Mr. Epstein. He was not a technical man. He did not know tech- 
nology. 

Mr. Watson. I am speaking about general conversational English. 

Mr. Epstein. General conversational English, it was excellent. 

Mr. Watson. In other words, he could very well pass himself upon 
an innocent American as a fellow American, rather than a decidedly 
Russian individual ? 

Mr. Epstein. With the exception of that name. 

Mr. Watson. Well, with the exception of the name. But if he wanted 
to change the name, you could not easily detect that he was of Russian 
extraction through his conversation ? 

Mr. Epstein. That is rig'ht, sir. 

Mr. Watson. Approximately what age was this man Isakov ? 

Mr. Epstein. I would say he was about 40 — 38 or 40, somewhere in 
there. I believe at one time he mentioned he was 38 years old. 

Mr. Watson. Do you know his whereabouts now ? 

Mr, Epstein. No, sir. 

Mr. Watson. During your contacts with this individual, were any 
other parties involved, either Russian or Americans, other than you 
and your partner? 

Mr. Epstein. No, sir. No one else. 

Mr. Watson. Did lie ever mention the names of any other 
individuals? 

Mr. Epstein.No, sir; he just always referred to his customer. That 
is all. And he never gave a specific name at all. 

Mr. Watson. And you never inquired specifically as to who his cus- 
tomer was? 

Mr. Epstein. No, sir ; we joked about it a couple of times, knowingly, 
we joked about it, but there was no — we did not want to upset him. 
We sort of played ball. That was w'hat the FBI wanted us to do. 

Mr. Watson. Yes. And when you started meeting with him outside 
of the plant, you had already notified the FBI, and so you were going 
along with their instructions at that time ? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Watson. Of course, so far as you know, there would be no need 
for any of this technological equipment for the United Nations Inter- 
national Emergency Children's Fund ? 

Mr. Epstein. No, sir. Not of the type that he was looking to obtain. 

Mr. Watson. I believe initially, when you contacted him at the U.N., 
you stated that he inquired as to whether you had laboratory equip- 
ment? 

Mr. Epstein. That is right. That is what he wanted, or that was his 
procurement goal. That was what he was supposed to procure for 
IjNICEF, was laboratory equipment. 



636 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. Watson. Ordinarily, I would assume laboratory equipment in- 
volves things other than tools as you mentioned a moment ago. Could 
he not have been inquiring of you as to whether or not you had equip- 
ment which might be used in laboratories for health purposes, in mak- 
ing research and such? 

Mr. Epstein. That is right. That would be what he would normally 
purchase. 

Mr. Watson. But, immediately, he went into the other fields and 
made these specific requests of you ? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Watson. Now I think it is quite alarming that you relate here 
that you found one of these accelerometers in a supposedly surplus com- 
modity house. Is that it ? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Watson. Now I assume that these can be bought by anyone ? 

Mr. Epstein. That is right ; anyone who walks in could buy them. In 
fact, if the party is not very knowing who runs the commodity house, 
he does not really know what he is selling. He only knows that he 
bought an item, and somebody is coming in and willing to buy it at a 
price. 

Mr. Watson. How long have you been in the business yourself ? 

Mr. Epstein. I have been in the business 14 years, by myself. 

Mr. Watson. Fourteen years. And during the course of that ex- 
perience, have you encountered some purchases where you bought some 
equipment which was even beyond your knowledge, technological 
knowledge ? - 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. We sometimes take what we call a flyer, a bid 
on something that we know nothing about and it just looks like it might 
be a good speculation, as we call it. But frankly, I am not in the elec- 
tronic end of the surplus business. 

It is all by itself. The electronic specialty boys would be much more 
aware of highly complex and maybe classified equipment than I am. 

Mr. Watson. I believe you stated that you were first put in contact 
with Mr. Isakov by a Mr. Stief el, a neighbor of yours. 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Watson. Do you, of your own knowledge, know how long Mr. 
Stiefel knew Mr. Isakov and how he made that acquaintance ? 

Mr. Epstein. I don't know specifically. I only asked Amy after 
the whole thing had broken open what his relations were with him. 
And, apparently, Mr. Stiefel's employer, which is a supply house, has 
had business dealings with UNICEF for a nimiber of years. How 
many, I don't know. 

Mr. Watson. I understood that Mr. Stiefel was involved in phar- 
maceuticals and such as that. 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Watson. Do you know whether or not, from conversations you 
have had with Mr. Stiefel, Mr. Isakov made similar inquiries, beyond 
the pharmaceutical end, oip Mr. Stiefel ? 

Mr. Epstein. No, sir. Because apparently, the only inquiry he made 
of Mr. Stiefel was did he know somebody else. And the first thought, 
or Mr. Stiefel's first recommendation was our company, myself, and 
this was confirmed by the FBI, in the fact that they said they were 
wondering when this fellow was going to surface, and apparently 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 637 

we were the first contact he made. We were the first surfacing of Mr. 
Isakov. 

Mr. Watson. Do you know whether or not he contacted other 
people engaged in a similar business as yours? 

Mr. Epstein. No, sir, I don't know. 

Mr. Watson. Did he ever have any discussions with you concern- 
ing the possibility of obtaining or procuring this equipment from 
some other sources? 

Mr. Epstein. No, he never went that way. Apparently, he was as- 
signed to us and he stayed pretty much with us, which is what the FBI 
led me to believe was their method of operation. 

Mr. Tuck. I am not familiar with the provisions of the Internal 
Security Act. Was his conduct such as to bring him in violation of any 
of the existing provisions of that law ? 

Mr. Epstein. Mr. Chairman, I don't know the answer to that. 

Mr. Tuck. Do you know, Mr. Smith ? 

Mr. Smith. Yes, sir; if he was serving as an intelligence agent in 
procurement activities contrary to his U.N. assignment, he would be 
violating our laws. 

Mr. Tuck. Then if he was not acting under the protection of the 
cloak of immunity, I don't understand why the Department of Justice 
did not pursue him. 

Mr. Smith. He could have been prosecuted. 

Mr. Epstein. That was the same question I asked, sir. 

I don't know the answer to that one either. 

Mr. Watson. That led, Mr. Chairman, to the question I was going 
to ask you. Do you know whether or not the FBI ever made any at- 
tempt to arrest or apprehend this individual ? 

Mr. Epstein. If they wished to apprehend him, that meeting at 
Korvette's where we were supposed to pass an accelerometer, a sup- 
posedly classified piece of equipment, to him in return for cash, there 
was the time. 

Mr. Watson. Did I understand from your testimony that you did 
not attend that meeting, but the FBI said they could cover it for you? 

Mr. Epstein. They would monitor it. 

Mr. Watson. Monitor it. Now am I to understand that, subsequently, 
you learned from the FBI that they did monitor, as you say, that 
engagement ? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Watson. Did they find Mr. Isakov there? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Watson. So far as you know they had no conversation or con- 
tact in any way with Mr. Isakov, other than to observe him at that 
point? 

Mr. Epstein. That is right. 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Epstein, I notice that you are a member of the 
American Society for Metals, among other organizations. I find that, 
Mr. Chairman, rather interesting because the first witness that we 
had on this subject was also a member of that particular society, and 
we discovered that, apparently, there, their ranges and membership 
is open to anyone of any national origin. 

Do you know Mr. Huminik ? 

Mr. Epstein. No, sir. Sorry. 



638 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. Watson. The one who testified earlier? 

Mr. Epstein. No, sir, I do not know the gentleman. 

Mr. Watson. What is the policy in reference to the American Society 
for Mechanical Engineers? Is their membership open to anyone of 
any national origin, namely, a Russian ? 

Mr. Epstein. I am not that familiar, but I do believe it is restricted 
to American technical people. I don't believe it is a foreign — we have 
any foreign members, except if a party became a member here in the 
States and then moved out of the country. 

But I don't believe we have — it is open to foreign membership as 
such. 

Mr. Watson. Do you know whether or not the Society of Automotive 
Engineers, of which you were a member, I believe, whether or not they 
have restricted membership as to Russian nationals? 

Mr. Epstein. No, sir, I don't know that answer. I have never looked 
through the charter of any of the groups. 

Mr. Watson, I might state here that I think it would be helpful if 
you might check into that, because I know the chairman and the mem- 
bers of the committee were astounded to learn that a technical society, 
such as this, was apparently open to Russian nationals, and I am sure 
that in the course of your meetings you have very technical and sophis- 
ticated discussions, and it would appear to me that it is an open door 
for them to gather the very technical information that you say now 
they are primarily interested in. 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir ; I say that they probably can obtain it very 
easily by subscribing to some of our publications, which are open to 
anyone to purchase. 

The only thing I feel is this : While you can't censor or in some way 
hold back this information, this publication, the very fact that we 
have them confined to two spots at the present time in the United States 
is restrictive on their ability to get around to these meetings. 

The fact that they are confined to New York and Washington would 
make them quite limited in their ability to branch out, that if this other 
thing happens, with the consulates scattered all around the United 
States, then they have got this spreadout ability, which they don't have 
now. 

Sure, they can attend the meeting in New York, of any of the 
societies, the Automotive Engineers or the Metals or ASME, but all 
they will hear is what is going on at that particular meeting. We are 
holding meetings all around the country at all times, and the mobility 
is limited for these Russian nationals now. 

What it is going to be like under this consulate thing is another 
story. 

Mr. Watson. Well, I happen to agree with you in your feeling about 
the new consulates, but as I understand from your testimony, you said 
that they could attend the meetings of these technological societies 
now, in New York and in Washington. 

Mr. Epstein. That is right. They could do that. 

Mr. Watson. Well, I am sure that you discuss things other than 
social matters at these particular meetings; don't you? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir. If it is a classified meeting, though, in which 
some classified material is supposed to be divulged, they will have a 
security check at the meeting. That, they will have. There have been 
a number of meetings of that type. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 639 

Mr. Watson. Since your experiences with Mr. Isakov, I assume 
that you have discussed this matter with other members of your 
industry ? 

Mr. Epstein. A number of them. Not too many, sir. 

Mr. Watson. Have any of them indicated to you that they have had 
similar contracts? 

Mr. Epstein. No, sir. 

Mr. Watson. None of them indicated that ? 

Mr. Epstein. No. There is only one party in the industry that we 
know of that actually did make a contact where he sold some diesel 
locomotive parts to a blind in Mexico, and the material ended up in 
Cuba. And to my knowledge, this party regrets the day he ever did 
it, because he was brought to justice, and they prosecuted him, and he 
did a stretch in jail. 

That was the only party, and it was a party I knew personally. 
So I would say that anyone else in my industry who has ever had 
contacts with — of this nature certainly is not disclosing them, to my 
knowledge. 

Mr. Watson. I see. A final question or two, and I don't know whether 
it is directly related to the question under discussion or inquiry here. 
You stated that you had bought a missile computer for $71, which 
had cost the Government approximately $10,000 to construct it or 
purchase it. 

Is that true? 

Mr. Epstein. That is true. 

Mr. Watson. Have you disposed of that missile computer ? 

Mr. Epstein. Yes, sir; we sold it finally. Somebody came in and 
offered us a hundred dollars, and we took it. The party, I assure you, 
was going to dismantle it, tear it apart for electrical components, 
tubes, and wiring, and things of that sort. I am pretty certain that is 
about all they intended. 

Mr. Watson. Do you personally believe that the procedures for dis- 
posal of U.S. Government surplus commodities are rather loose and 
that there should be some tightening of these procedures so as to 
prevent, as you indicated here, accelerometers and other sophisticated 
technological equipment from getting into the hands of people that 
in turn it might be given or sold to the Communists ? 

Mr. Epstein. That is a very difficult question to answer. Congress- 
man. The problem is so vast, our Government has got this equipment 
from one end of the earth to the other, in quantities that are really 
unimaginable, and how you could have anything screened by intel- 
ligent people at all times, without some point along the line slipping 
up, is beyond me. 

It really, the task is Herculean in scope. I believe the people who 
dispose of equipment are doing the best job they can, at the present 
time, with the manpower available. I will say this: I don't know if 
they have the technological people in the organization that could really 
say, "This you can sell, and that you can't sell." They do the best they 
can. They try to screen out any such mistakes such as occurred. 

Mr. Watson. Well, now, the contact you made, and you found an 
accelerometer there, that was so impressive in the silver container, and 
so forth, was that a large surplus operator, or what size would you 
consider it ? 

Mr. Epstein. I guess in electronics he was considered fairly large. 



6iO CJOXBrcT of is?::yA~ ■■•• ..^^.x the r>-:Tzr ?ta7z? 

Mr. Watsox. Wei", — :' . :: r. - > ^ ■ le that, if 

he had picked up r'--^ : luisizi i ::-:i_. : :_; : i _:. z i _ ._- : — e thing ? 
Mr. Epg rrrv . Yes. sr. I rh -j r - k so. 

Mr. Watsox. And yc - ■ ' - -b, shnply beoanse of the enonnitT of 
tlie probleni. that it wo„ ^ rless for ns to trv to tighten down the 

sal^ pr»:cedTires a lir: " - . : 

Mr. Epsttetv V?. I : - say it is Tiseless. I sav it •wotdd be posiblv 
a g:- i . - ■ " ^ _ ■ : ? screening unit, I don't know 

if * - _ .. : r. or an intelligeQce screening 

- this. It : i.L T izr 
- . _ -V , - _ - , - - . -g IS dc-ne, I gather, if the Xavy has a 

- to sell, it is onered around to the Armv. 
-..;:„- L'^pannkQU of Commerce, and they are sup- 

I ^ e there is an oviCTall intelligence screening unit in 

Mr. WjLi^jx. WeiL would yoa not agree with me that there diotdd 
he ?r.zh a 111- -is that t 

Mr. Zpstxts". Yes. sr. that might be of great valne. 
-T ^" .: Tou called "Walter Kidde, and I 

Mr. Isakov was in Totir prraeace ? 

Mr. TTiTs: >'. Az i . - qniry about these paiticalar itons. 

Mr. E??m>*. Yes. sir. 

Mr ^^a7^: v. A:id ill of the otHnpanies said that they were available 

Mr. ZpiTT^-. Yes. sir. 

Mr, Watstx Did thev make inquiry as to the purpose for which 
- - ■ -~ . as to your prospectiTe customer, or matters 

' -^ ^ho my prospectire customer was. 

- -- -^^ -^- ^^ ^^^ ^ order to better per- 

:..^-\j. ■■■ s.- .. -nded ro do. And. 

. Kearfc-t rec/:: _-o out and buy a 

■ - i for sale. I could 

-- rir mind, was that 

Eome money oy buymg a much les expen- 

1'- y restriction so fiu" as companies or re- 

' " '^ might be. as to who can buy these surplus 

-:em= ? 

:---:'-' 7. — -^ms to be that you carinot be 

- -: r .: i-i purchase any of these items. 

. --tire clause in all of this. If you are 

--L-- . '- - PHI her of any Government organiza- 

tic«L.y 1 to buy this equipment- 

i^r- ' ise, if you have the money, you can buy it, if 

'. But there is no clearance at all so far as who 

- you are a security ri^ or for what 

You brin^ to mind. Congresgnan. 

„• The classification on this, as to being 

o do with who put up t?ie money for developing it. 



COXDrCT OF ESPIOXAGZ WITHZJr 7HZ T^TTZI iliTZS 641 

If Uncle Sam laid ont the money for ine deTekyraneiit of the defvice. 
it was automaticallr classified restricted- If it wasderdoped by prirate 
indtistrv, using their own funds, there was no restrictkm placed en the 
item- 
That was 5omj«iiing that came out. I mfiant to bring it up, in. partic- 
ular in the development of the aocelercianeter. I was very surprised to 
find that out. 

Mr. "Watsox. I believe that is all the questiOTis I have. Mr. ChairmuL 

Mr. AsHBEOOK. I only have <Hie question, Mr. Chairman. 

It seefns that the evidaice has be^ ^«7 complecdy elicited, and I 
would only add one point. 

Mr. Chairman and ^fr. Epstein, at any time during the course of 
events when you were communicating with- and dealing with, so to 
speak, ilr. Isakov. or since the time that you have stopped dealing with 
Mr. Isakov. did any other Government agency than the FBI contact 
you, or ^^presentative of any other Government ag^Knr! 

Mr. Epstein- . Xo. sir. 

Mr. AsHBEc<OK. At no time ? 

!Mr. EpsTEtx. Xo. sir. 

Mr. AsHBEOOK- CommeD:?e, Jiisri'?e, no one ? 

Thank you. 

Mr. Tttck:. Thank you very much. Mr. Epstein, for your i»eseiioe 
here and for the information which ycm have broogiit us. Too hare 
rendered a valuable service to your country. 

Mr. EpsTEtx. Thank yoiL 

!Mr. Smith. Thank you. Mr. Epstein. 

Mr. Tttck. Unless there is further business, the committee wiQ recess 
un til th e call of the Chair. 

OIVTiereupon, at 11 :-i2 ajn., Wednesday, May 10, 1967, the sdbean- 
mittee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair. ) 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED 
STATES BY AGENTS OF FOREIGN COMMUNIST 
GOVERNMENTS 

THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 1967 

United States House of Representatives, 

Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Un-American Acttvittes, 

Washington. D.C. 

PUBLIC hearing 

The subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities 
(appointed April 4, 1967) met, pursuant to call, at 10 :10 a.m. in Room 
429, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C, Hon. William 
M. Tuck (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

(Subcommittee members : Representatives William M. Tuck, of Vir- 
ginia, chairman ; Edwin E. Willis, of Louisiana, chairman of the full 
committee; John C. Culver, of Iowa; Richard L. Roudebush, of In- 
diana ; and Albert W. Watson, of South Carolina. ) 

Subcommittee members present : Representatives Tuck, Roudebush, 
and Watson. 

Staff members present : Francis J. McNamara, director: Chester D. 
Smith, general counsel; Alfred M. Nittle, counsel: and B. Ray Mc- 
Connon, Jr., investigator. 

Mr. Tuck. The subcommittee will come to order. A quorum is 
present. 

The hearing today is a continuation of a series of hearings initiated 
by the committee on April 6, pursuant to a resolution adopted by the 
full committee on March 8, 1967, authorizing hearings concerning cur- 
rent espionage and intelligence-gathering activities within the United 
States by foreign governments. 

Before calling the first witness this morning, I would like to state 
for the record that these hearings have apparently upset the Soviet 
Union to some extent. 

On May 5, I^vestia published an article concerning them entitled 
"The Painters." ^ Generally this article tries to create the impression 
that in holding these hearings the committee has been acting at the 
instigation of the FBI and the CIA and that it has been receiving the 
testimony of witnesses who have not been telling the truth. 

Going further in its attempt to discredit the committee and the 
hearings, the Izvestia article falsely accuses certain Americans of com- 
mitting espionage against the Soviet Union. 

The article has been translated by the Library of Congress at the 
committee's request, and copies of it were sent to all members by the 



1 See pp. 681-689. 

643 



644 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

staff director last week. If there is no objection, I would like to offer 
the translation of this article, along with a mechanical reproduction 
of the original, for inclusion in the hearing record. 

The Chair hears no objection. It will be inserted in the record at the 
conclusion of the testimony of the witness the committee is about to 
hear. 

The witness for the day is Mr. Frank John Mrkva, who is head of 
the Field Service Branch, Domestic Operations Division, Passport 
Office of the Department of State. 

Will you come forwardj please, Mr. Mrkva ? 

Will you stand and raise your right hand ? Do you solemnly swear 
the testimony you are about to give before this committee will be the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I do. 

Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mrkva is accompanied by Mr. 
Kobert D. Johnson, deputy director of the Passport Office. 

Mr. Tuck. I should have made that announcement. We are glad to 
have you, Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. Johnson. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Tuck. Under the rules of the House of Representatives, there 
will be no further pictures or photographs while the witness is 
testifying. 

Go ahead. Counsel. 

TESTIMONY OF FRANK JOHN MRKVA, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT 
D. JOHNSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PASSPORT OTTICE, DEPART- 
MENT or STATE 

Mr. Smith. Mr. Mrkva, would you please state your name for the 
record, your full name ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Frank John Mrkva. 

Mr. Smith. What is your date and place of birth ? 

Mr. Mrkva. April 22, 1928. 1 was bom in Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania. 

Mr. Smith. May we have your current address, please? 

Mr. Mrkva. 5623 Gregory Drive, Lanham, Maryland. 

Mr. Smith. Where are you currently employed, Mr. Mrkva? 

Mr. Mrkva. Currently employed with the Passport Office ; that is, 
in the Department of State. 

Mr. Smith. And what position do you hold there ? 

Mr. Mrkva. My current position is that of chief of the Field Services 
Branch, within the Passport Office. 

Mr. Smith. All right. Now, Mr. Mrkva, would you please relate 
briefly for the committee your educational background ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Graduated from high school in Beaver Falls, Pennsyl- 
vania, in 1947. 1 am also a graduate of Garfield Business Institute, also 
of Beaver Falls. 

Mr. Smith. Right. In what year ? 

Mr. Mrkva. 1949, 1 believe. 

Mr. Smith. Would you please in like manner relate your occupa- 
tional background for the committee ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Very briefly, I had worked prior to coming to the State 
Department in the Babcock and Wilcox Tube Company of Beaver 
Falls; the Jones and Laughlin Steel Company of Aliquippa, Penn- 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 645 

sylvania; and for Michael Baker, Jr., who is a land surveyor consult- 
ing engineer in Eochester, Pennsylvania; Wilco Builders — that was 
on the Ohio Turnpike — as assistant demolitions man ; and, ultimately, 
with the State Department, in 1955. 

Mr. Smith. You came to the Department of State in 1955 ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. Would you tell us nc,, the various positions you have 
held within the State Department prior to the one you now hold as 
chief of the Field Services Branch ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Within the State Department itself, I started out as 
a research clerk, worked into a position of control clerk, and time and 
attendance clerk. 

At the time I met Mr. Pisk I worked as visa courier in the Diplo- 
matic Section of the Passport Office; later as general services officer; 
and in my current position as chief of the Field Services. 

(At this point Mr. Pool, a member of the full committee, entered 
the hearing room.) 

Mr. Smith. Have you had any military service, Mr. Mrkva? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. Would you please describe that for us ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I entered into the United States Army in December of 
1950, served in Korea, and was discharged in 1952. I was with the 
809th Engineering Battalion. 

Mr. Smith. How long were you in the Reserves? Are you still in 
the Reserves ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I had 5 years of Inactive Reserve. 

Mr. Smith. That is after you were discharged and returned to 
inactive service? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Mr. Smith. Are you a member of any veterans' organization ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes ; I belong to the American Legion, within the State 
Department, and I also belong to the World War II Vets of West 
Mayfield, Pennsylvania. 

Mr. Smith. What is your marital status, Mr. Mrkva ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I am married and have three children. 

Mr. Smith. You are here today in answer to a subpena served upon 
you by this committee by Investigator Ray McConnon on June 8, 1967. 
Is that correct ? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Smith. I should like to ask you at this point, Mr. Mrkva, if you 
know, or have you known, two Czechoslovakians named Zdenek Pisk 
and Jiri Opatrny ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. I knew both these gentlemen at the time that 
I was performing the duties as a visa courier. 

Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, I would like to state for the record that 
Zdenek Pisk came to this country in 1961. He served as third secretary, 
later as second secretary of the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Wash- 
ington until 1963. 

Jiri Opatrny served as an attache of that Embassy from 1963 to 
1966, when he was declared persona non grata by our State 
Department. 

Now, Mr. Mrkva, could you tell us just how you came into contact 
with these two men, and for what purpose ? 

79-422 O — 68 7 



646 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. Mrkva. I came into contact with Zdenek Pisk in 1961 through 
'63. As I stated before, I met Mr. Pisk when I called at the Embassy m 
connection with my normal duties. 

Mr. SMrrn. In connection with your duties ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. When did you meet Opatmy ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I met him in December of 1963. This was quite a few 
months after Pisk left the country. 

Mr. Smith. Right. Your initial contact, then, was with Zdenek 
Pisk, and that was in the course of your normal duties at the Depart- 
ment of State ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. Did your relationship or association with Mr. Pisk go 
beyond that stage ? That is, did it go beyond routine business visits or 
duties? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, very definitely. 

Mr. Smith. Would you relate, please, to the committee just what 
did take place ? 

Mr. Mrkva. In addition to dealing with Mr. Pisk in connection with 
visa work, I had received an invitation to attend a Czech reception. 
This was a routine thing, actually. We had a very pleasant social dis- 
cussion, and during the reception he suggested that we should get to- 
gether at a later date and become a little more acquainted and perhaps 
have dinner together, and so forth. 

Mr. Smith. I assume that a part of your duties with the Depart- 
ment of State was to visit the Czechoslovakian Embassy on business. 
State Department passport business ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. This was usual, not only with the Czech Embassy, 
but with every embassy in Washington. 

Mr. Smith. Right. And it was during one of these visits that you 
were invited to attend a reception at the Embassy ? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct; yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. Was it a little strange to you that Pisk would invite 
you to the reception ? Or was this usual ? 

Mr. Mrkva. This would be considered normal and natural. 

Mr. Smith. There wasn't anything out of the ordinary ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No,* there was nothing out of line with this. 

Mr. Smith. Did he in fact invite you to dinner at a later date? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes; in November of 1961, I believe it was. Here 
again, while I was at the Czech Embassy, Mr. Pisk suggested that 
we have dinner together, and he said he would like to talk to me about 
social things, you know, just to get together and get to know each 
other. He suggested we have dinner at the Old Europe restaurant. 

Mr. Smith. What was your reaction to all of his questioning and 
eliciting of background information on you ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Well, at our first dinner engagement at the Old Europe 
restaurant Dr. Pisk generated some interest in my background, where 
my folks came from, what type of work I did at the Passport Office. 
We got into a conversation about my folks. 

He was very interested in my father's illness, or he appeared to be 
very interested in my father's illness, relatives in Czechoslovakia, and 
we talked generally about passport matters and processing of pass- 
ports. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 647 

Mr. Smith. These were nonclassified matters that would be of gen- 
eral topical conversation ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, that is correct, sir. He went quite a bit into my 
background, where I came from, where my folks came from, and 

Mr. Smith. He did pinpoint this aspect of it, I assume. 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. What was your reaction to it ? Did you have any thoughts 
on the subject ? Was this peculiar to you ? 

Mr. Mrkva. This, the evening was really — it was a pleasant evening. 
There was nothing clandestine about it. I held nothing back. 

Mr. Smith. Did he seem to know that you had relatives in Czecho- 
slovakia prior to his questioning on the subject ? 

Mr. Mrkva, No, I don't think — he didn't give that indication. 

Mr. Smith. Did he get names and addresses of these relatives from 
you? 

Mr. Mrkva. No ; we just talked generally, general areas of Czecho- 
slovakia. 

Mr. Smith. In other words, general conversation ? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct ; yes. 

Mr. Smith. Were your superiors aware of this contact ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, indeed. Eight from the beginning I kept Mr. 
Johnson and Miss Knight apprised of my activities at all times. 

I would like to embellish here just a bit, if you will bear with me. 

Mr. Smith. Go right ahead. 

Mr. Mrkva. When Miss Knight took over the Passport Office in 
1955 as director, she had quite a reorganization of the entire office. 
As part of this reorganization, she emphasized the need for greater 
security and housekeeping and these types of activities. 

This is about the point when I became acquainted with Mr. John- 
son. Mr. Johnson at the time was chief of our Legal Division and also 
he was the security officer of the Passport Office itself. 

Mr. Smith. Right. 

Mr. Mrkva. In 1956, '57, Mr. Johnson and I worked very closely on 
internal security, details, housekeeping inspections, and so forth. And 
it was through him that I was made aware of some of the ramifications 
of security and what — I was sort of new in the Government at this 
time, but he taught me the ins and outs of security. 

Mr. Smith. And you were security conscious? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes ; that is what I was trying to bring out. 

So actually, when I was invited to have dinner with Dr. Pisk, I 
thought this was a little bit unusual. 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Counselor, may we interrupt at this point ? I am 
going to honor your request, and I appreciate the reasoning behind 
)t, in not going into the background so far as your relatives are con- 
cerned. 

However, you stated earlier that this Dr. Pisk asked you about your 
relatives, a sick father, or something to that effect ? 

Mr. MjiKVA. Yes. It was in the course of conversation during din- 
ner. 

Mr. Watson. The question that I have is. Did you relate to him 
the names of your relatives and their locations and their well-being? 

Mr. Mrkva. Generally, yes. I didn't pinpoint addresses or anything. 
I did tell him a bit about— well, let us go back just a bit. 



648 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

I used to like to practice my Czech at the Embassy. I could speak 
the Czech language, not fluently, but enough to get by on. He com- 
mented on this and asked about my parents, if they were in fact Czech, 
Czechoslovakian. And I said "yes," and we got into where they came 
from, and this type of questioning. 

Mr. Watson. Were you not aware of the fact that the revelation of 
such information to this agent of Czechoslovakia would subject you 
to most undue pressure ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I might add 

Mr. Watsox. Or were you that naive at the time ? 

Mr. Mrkva. At this point, sir, there was nothing clandestine about 
the operation. We were out for a social evening. We were out for din- 
ner. 

Mr. Watson". Of course, you were aware of the fact that the feeling 
of the Czechoslovakian Government was not necessarily one of friend- 
liness to the United States ; weren't you ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr. Watson. And yet you voluntarily told this agent about your 
family and their location, and so forth, in Czechoslovakia ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I had nothing to hide. 

Mr. Watson. Well, I should think under the circumstances 

Mr. Mrkva. I didn't know he was an agent. As far as I knew — at the 
time, I believe, he wa^ second secretary. I was as much interested in 
him as he was in me. 

Mr. Watson. I am not being argumentative. I appreciate your posi- 
tion. But, frankly, under the circumstances, I think it would be very 
unwise, and I would caution other people about that, because it would 
be difficult, indeed, to ascertain in view of earlier hearings that we 
have had, Mr. Counsel, as who is or is not an agent of either the Czech- 
oslovakian or the Russian Embassies, so 

It is water over the dam now, but I don't believe I would volun- 
tarily give information about my relatives over in Czechoslovakia, 
because I think it would subject you to most undue pressure in regard 
to matters such as this. 

Mr. Mrkva. I was suspicious of the question, yes, but like I say, 
I didn't embellish on it. 

We didn't go into detail. I merely acknowledged the fact that I 
had relatives there. Of course, I have no close connection with these 
people, so 

Mr. Watson. But they are relatives, and I am sure you are con- 
cerned about their welfare. 

Mr. Mrkva. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Watson. Excuse me, Mr. Counsel. I just wanted to develop 
that point. 

Mr. Smith. At this point, Mr. Mrkva, could you describe Dr. Pisk 
to the committee, that is, his physical makeup, his mannerisms, and 
how he behaved himself ? 

Mr. Mrkva. He was somewhat stocky, of medium height. I would 
^ess he was in his late 30's or early 40's. He was a very pleasant 
individual. 

Mr. Smtth. Easy to meet, I assume. 

Mr. Mrkva. Very pleasant, easy to talk to. I was completely at 
ease with him. He was a very mild-mannered, scholarly type. He was 
married, with no children. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 649 

Mr. Smith. When was ^our next contact with Dr. Pisk ? 

Mr. Mrkva. After the initial reception and the first dinner meeting, 
I had no contact for approximately 5 months. 

(At this point Mr. Pool left the hearing room. ) 

Mr. Smith. Did you see him at any time subsequent to that ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes; during this time I had continued to call at the 
Embassy, two, sometimes three, times a week — and I talked to him 
occasionally. 

Mr. Smith, Did he make any contact with you during those calls? 

Mr. Mrkva. Oh, yes. As a matter of fact, he took me within the 
Embassy to a different reception room, especially if I was waiting 
for an urgent or rush case. And at that time he would point out certain 
displays that they had at the Embassy, and we'd talk a bit about 
Czechoslovakia. 

At times he furnished me with magazines. We talked about their 
free schools, free hospitalization, and, in general, it was almost a pleas- 
ant social get-together every time I called at the Embassy. 

Mr. Smith. In other words, he was talking about Czechoslovakia ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. And describing to you the things that they had in 
Czechoslovakia, I assume. 

Mr. Mrkva. Conditions. This was picking up what we talked about 
at our dinner engagement. 

Mr. Smith. You said that he took you to another room within the 
Embassy. Was this different from the room that you had been going 
to in the Embassy in connection with your business? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes ; generally when I had called at the Embassy, they 
had a few chairs right in the immediate entryway of the chancery, 
and this was a little more on the plush side. It was a little reception 
room they had off to the side that they used for, perhaps, distinguished 
visitors or guests. 

Mr. Smith. This is where you would wait for the results of your 
business. Is that correct? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. And usually I would get excellent treatment, and 
the visa would be at times issued on the spot, while I waited. 

Mr. Smith. I see. When was your next outside contact with Mr. Pisk ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I believe our next meeting was again at the Old Europe 
restaurant. 

Mr. Smith. Can you give us a date on that? 

Mr. Mrkva. It was on May 25, 1962. 

Mr. Smith. 1962? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. Now you say this was about 5 months after the first din- 
ner engagement. Is that right? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. Before you had this second meeting outside the Em- 
bassy ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. During your contacts at the Embassy, he did not raise 
business questions or any questions about getting you to serve them? 

Mr. Mrkva. No, sir. 

Mr. Smith. Just strictly business? 

Mr. Mrkva. No ; strictly business and strictly day-to-day conversa- 
tion. He remarked at times how hot the weather was and suggested 



650 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHEST THE UNITED STATES 

we should get together and go to the beach sometimes. He was very 
affable and very friendly. 

Mr. Smith. To the best of your knowledge, was there any reason for 
this long delay between the first meeting outside of the Embassy and 
the second meeting that we have just mentioned? 

Mr. Mrkva. To tell you the truth, I was a little surprised that he 
again extended an invitation for the second dinner meeting, and Mr. 
Joluison and I talked about it. 

The Bureau, of course, was interested, and 1 can only speculate that 
they were perhaps checking into my background. 

Mr. Smith. You mentioned the "Bureau." The FBI, I assume, is 
what you mean by the "Bureau." 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. When were they cut in on this operation? 

Mr. Mrkva. Ri^ht at the beginning. 

Mr. Smith. That is the first contact you had with Pisk outside the 
Embassy, or at the Embassy? 

Mr. IVIrkva. Outside"'the Embassy. As a matter of fact, I believe the 
invitation to the reception was — ^they were made aware of that. 

Mr. Smith. I see. 

Mr. Mrkva. And, of course, they were certainly made aware of the 
first dinner engagement we had. 

Mr. Smith. During this second meeting, you began to speculate that 
maybe there was a little more to this than just friendship, or social? 

Mr. Mrkva. Well, yes, especially at the second meeting. I was pretty 
well convinced myself. 

Mr. Smith. I see. What would lead you to this sort of speculation? 
Differences in position ? 

Mr. Mrkva. One would — it was unusual that a second secretary 
would want to be seen with, or offer dinner invitations to, a visa courier 
or, in fact, a messenger. 

Mr. Smith. Could you tell us in your own words, Mr. Mrkva, just 
what transpired between you and Mr. Pisk from this second meeting 
on? 

Mr. Mrkva. Again we went to the Old Europe restaurant and we 
picked up — the conversation picked was much the same as it was be- 
fore, his concern about my father's health. 

My father, incidentally, had a couple of strokes and he was in 
pretty — he was in ill health. 

Most of all, I think we talked about — we had common ground in 
that we talked about passports, methods of processing passports, and 
this type of conversation. 

Mr. Smith. His interest seemed to be in the operations of the Pass- 
port Office? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. In what respect ? How you issued passports 

Mr. Mrkva. More in the paperhandling. We at the time had just 
streamlined our operation. We had introduced certain new equipment 
to help process some of the paper, the books, through the office, and 
he was very interested. 

I think he commented that he was doing a paper for his own govern- 
ment, ways of improving their passport office, and he was very inter- 
ested in what types of equipment we used, for example. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 651 

All this was, of course, not classified, so we talked about it for quite 
a bit. And 

Mr. Smith. Did he make any suggestions of future meetings and 
future activities between you and his family ? 

Mr. Mrkva, I think he mentioned that it would be nice if we could 
get together and go to the beach sometime, some Sunday afternoon, 

Mr. Smith. Yes. In other words, he suggested a continuation of 
the social phase of it ? 

Mr. Mrkva, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. When did you have, or did you have any other meetings 
with him, dinner engagements ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Let us see. We did have the outing at Mayo Beach. 

He drove to our residence one Sunday afternoon. It was June 17, 
1962, to be exact. We drove to the beach and we had an outing. We 
really didn't discuss anything about the office; he didn't question me 
with regard to anything about tlie job or anything. It was purely a 
social outing. 

Mr. Smith. Let us get the chronology straight now. 

Your second dinner engagement was 25 May 1962, I believe you 
told us? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr, Smith. And now comes this Mayo Beach outing in June ? 

Mr. Mrkva. June 17, 1962. 

Mr. Smith. In other words, a little less than a month later ? 

Mr. IVIrkva. Yes. 

Mr, Smith. Were there any other meetings ? 

Mr. Mrkva, Yes; we had another meeting at the Old Europe restau- 
rant in September, September 6, 1962, 

Mr. Smith. What transpired at this meeting? 

Mr. Mrkva. We continued to talk about the Passport Office and his 
interest in some of the equipment. For example, we talked about the 
Frieden Flexowriter that we had introduced. We had talked about 

Mr. Smith. Was this a classified item ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No, sir. 

And along with the Flexowriter we had a byproduct tape, one that 
was used to write the passport. We talked about snap-out forms that 
we used that were simultaneously typed as the tape was being punched. 
It is a little complex to explain, but he was very interested in this 
machine and other machines, like the cash registers that we used to 
apply the fee to the application, and certain other equipment. 

Mr. Smith. Did he ask you for anything during this visit? 

Mr. Mrkva. He asked me to supply him with as much information as 
I could and I think cautioned me at this point. He said, "I don't want 
you to get into trouble, but I would be interested in getting as much 
information as I can on the processing of the paperwork," I agreed to 
do this. 

Mr. Smith. Did he ask you for actual samples of the papers that 
were used in your processing? 

Mr. Mrkva. I tliink he asked — he asked for anything unclassified. 

Mr, Smith, Was this furnished to him? 

Mr, Mrkva, Again after consulting with Mr, Johnson and the 
Bureau, and since there was nothing readily available at the time, I sat 
down and wrote in my own handwriting several pages of the steps and 



652 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

what happened to the application when it initially arrived, how it 
was processed through the office, and named some of the machines and 
some of the companies that supplied us with certain paper stock, and 
so forth. 

Mr. Smith. Did you pass the data to him at the Embassy, or out- 
side? 

Mr. Mrkva. I never passed anything to him at the Embassy. We had 
made an arrangement where I was to meet him at Hains Point. This 
is when I wrote all the information down in longhand. 

Mr. Smith. Yes. 

Mr. Mrkva. And I met him at Hains Point on a Saturday morning. 
We talked briefly. I gave him the information, and that is about all 
there was to it. 

Mr. Smith. Did he give any reason why he wanted you to meet him 
at Hains Point rather than the Embassy ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I think he told me he was going to be fishing. 

Mr. Smith. Was he fishing when you arrived ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. As a matter of fact, he was decked out in his 
sports shirt, had his fishing tackle with him. 

Mr. Smith. Did he give any reason for choosing Hains Point, other 
than the one you just mentioned, fishing? Did he give any hint as to 
why that would raise any suspicions on your part ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Not really. We were getting into a little area here whertj 
it was out of the ordinary. I think that other than the fact that he was 
anxious to get, perhaps anxious to get, this information in connection 
with what he said he was doing a paper on. 

Mr. Smith. You did give him a handwritten statement of the 
processing in your office with regard to passports? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. At Hains Point? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. You transmitted it to him. 

What other contacts did you have with Mr. Pisk ? Outside contacts, 
that is. 

Mr. Mrkva. I believe I had several other contacts with Mr. Pisk. I 
think we had five additional meetings, and these were at various loca- 
tions, restaurants in Maryland, restaurants that were in the close 
proximity of where I lived at the time. There were 

Mr. Smith. Were they restaurants, or taverns? 

Mr. Mrkva. They were restaurants. Wlien I would see Dr. Pisk at 
the Embassy, we would agree to meet near my place, near our home. 
This was generally at Route 1 and Queensbury Drive, and I would 
drive to this point. 

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook, a member of the full committee, en- 
tered the hearing room.) 

Mr. Mrkva. There is a bank right at the intersection, and I would 
generally meet liim about 7 or 7 :30 in the evening. And from there 
we would go to one of the restaurants close by in the area. 

Mr. Smith. Was this in front of the bank, or where? 

Mr. Mrkva. No ; this was behind the bank, 

Mr. Smith. Behind the bank in a parking area ? 

Mr. Mrkva. In a parking area. It was dimly lit. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 653 

Could I break just a minute? I want to check a few dates, if you 
don't mind. 

Mr. Smith. Go ahead. 

Mr. Mrkva. Here they are. All right. 

Mr. Smith. You stated that when you made this contact at the bank 
that we were speaking of a moment ago that you would go somewhere 
else. How would you go? 

Mr. Mrkva. Generally I drove my car to the area, to the parking 
lot behind the bank. That seemed to be his favorite — it was a handy 
spot to meet him. 

He would usually be waiting for me behind the bank in a dark 
corner, or he would just round the corner as I pulled in. We would drive 
to one of the restaurants in the near vicinity. 

One of them was Jimmy Comber's Kestaurant. This was on Novem- 
ber 27, 1962. We had two meetings at the Calvert House Inn. 

Mr. Smith. AVhose car would you use, his or yours? 

Mr, Mrkva. I would always use my car. 

Mr. Smith. In other words, did you ever see his manner of trans- 
portation? 

Mr. Mrkva. No. As a matter of fact, I never observed him arriving 
or leaving in, for example, an automobile. He always seemed to be in 
the area, waiting for me, or he would suddenly appear around the 
corner. I never had a chance to observe how he arrived at these meet- 
ings or how he departed. 

Mr. Smith. Was he on time, punctual, that is? 

Mr. Mrkva. He was very punctual; yes. 

Mr. Smith. Was he cautious? 

Mr. Mrkva. Extremely cautious. And, as a matter of fact, at this 
point he cautioned me that he preferred not to talk in the car. I think 
he may have suspected that the car was bugged. He preferred to talk 
outside the car. There was very little conversation in the car itself. 

Mr. Smith. Did he ever ask you a question as to whether or not 
the car was so-called bugged? 

Mr. Mrkva. No. At this point, I think, he cautioned me. He said, 
"We shouldn't talk in the car." 

Mr. Smith. In other words, the association between you and Pisk 
was changing from one of strictly friendship to one of a semiclandes- 
tine arrangement, would you say? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SmTH. Your suspicions became more firm, I assume at this 
time, that there was something more than social activity on his part. 

Mr. Mrkva. Very definitely, yes. As our meetings progressed, al- 
though they were still on a friendly basis, he wasn't demanding. He 
didn't give the appearance of wanting classified information at this 
point, although towards the end of the last couple of meetings we had, 
of course, he brought this out in the open more. But at this point we 
generally talked about passports and the processing of passports. 

In 1961 the Passport Office introduced a new series, a new type of 
passport. He was very interested in the new book and he asked many 
questions about the book itself. 

Mr. Smith. In order to get our chronology a little bit more accurate, 
could you give us specifically the places where these last five contacts 
took place ? 



654 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHEST THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. Mrkva, Mainly in Riverdale, Maryland, specifically Jimmy 
Comber's Restaurant on 

Mr. Smith. Wliat date, please ? 

Mr. IVIrkva. November 27, 1962. There were two at the Calvert 
House Inn, on December 13, 1962, and January 20, 1963. There was 
one at the Ledo Restaurant on March 6, 1963. Our last meeting was 
held at a Hot Shoppe in Hyattsville on March 27, 1963. 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Counselor, to interrupt at this point, before we 
leave the social aspects of this, I am curious about this. Does the State 
Department have any regulations relative to private social contacts 
between the employees of the Department and employees of Commu- 
nist Embassies in Washington ? 

Mr, Mrkva. At that time, I was not aware of any such regulations. 

Mr. Watson. Do they have some now, or are you aware of them ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I believe we did — there was a circular issued subsequent 
to this time. 

. Mr. Watson. Prohibiting private social contacts with employees of 
Communist embassies ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Not necessarily prohibiting these contacts, but I believe 
the Department would like to be aware of such contacts. 

Mr. Watson. In other words, they are not prohibited, but the De- 
partment must be made aware of such contacts if they are made ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes ; I believe they requested this. 

Mr. Watson. Do you not agree personally that that appears to be 
the introduction to the later espionage activities, that all of these 
originate through private social contacts ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Absolutely. 

Mr. Watson. Would it not be advisable then, to obviate or preclude 
possible later slips, to prohibit the private social contacts ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I would prefer to let an expert answer that question, but 
if you want my opinion, this is a necessary thing with the Foreign 
Service. I mean, I imagine our Foreign Service people have a great 
deal of personal contact with the locals, wherever they are stationed. 
I imagine they have much the same interest, and generate an interest 
in talking to the citizens of this country. 

Insofar as prohibiting it, no, I think it is necessary. But insofar as 
reporting it personally, I feel it should be reported. I tliink the Depart- 
ment is doing the right thing. 

Mr. Watson. Of course, various employees might differ in the gravity 
or the potential of gravity of such social contacts, and some might re- 
port it, and others might not. Do you not have that very real possibility ? 

Mr. Mrkva. There is a possibility ; yes. 

Mr. Watson. And you feel that the private social contacts, although 
they lead to the apparent experience that you had and the experiences 
that others have had here, you still feel that there should be no prohibi- 
tion against these private social contacts ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. But I feel that a — I strongly feel that they should 
be reported. 

Mr. Watson. Thank you. 

Mr. Tuck. But for these private social contacts, there would be no 
other way by which you could engage in any form of counterespionage ; 
would there ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Sir? 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 655 

Mr. Tuck. I say, unless you have these social contacts, there would be 
no way of discovering what these foreign agents are doing? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct. And in my case I would like to inject in 
here that going back to the start that, personally, I did have a decided 
interest in talking to Pisk. For example, I was curious about condi- 
tions in Czechoslovakia from a personal standpoint. 

My parents were from there. Before we got into this operation I 
was genuinely interested in what that guy had to say. I thmk it was 
very interesting to me. 

Mr. Watson. No doubt, it would be, Mr. Mrkva, but would you agree 
with me that you are a perfect natural for any potential espionage 
activity in view of your background ? Do you not agree with that ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr. Watson. And I agree with the Governor over here that it is 
necessary to have these private contacts in order to get counterintelli- 
gence. But the thing that disturbs me, Governor, is that we always 
seem to end up on the short end of the tail. They seem to be getting 
from us, and we get little from them. 

They are well trained in espionage. They know how to shut up, but 
our peoiple are so friendly and kind and long suffering, and we have 
faith in everybody. So we end up on the short end of the stick. That 
is my only concern here. 

I am not directing this towards you, because 

Mr. Mrkva. That is very true, and I agree with you. 

Mr. Watson. I am sure you are doing a good job. 

Excuse me, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. Smith. In these restaurant meetings that we just mentioned, 
were they always preceded by a meeting at the parking lot behind the 
bank or some other area before you proceeded to the restaurant? 

Mr. Mrkva. Generally, yes ; we met behind the bank. 

Mr. Smith. Who made the choice of the restaurant? 

Mr. Mrkva. He would generally make the choice. He always made 
the choice, in this case. 

Mr. Smith. And it was rarely the same one? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. Each time? 

Mr. Mrkva. He chose a different location. 

Mr. Smith. During these contacts, did Pisk levy any more require- 
ments on you ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Generally, not anj^hing other than the passports. We 
seemed to center around the passport itself, requests for additional 
information on the workflow. 

He did ask for certain publications, like the State Department tele- 
phone directory, catalogues, and items of this nature. 

Mr. Smith. Wliat type of catalogues were they ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Frieden catalogues. 

Mr. Smith. Business machine catalogues? 

Mr. Mrkva. Business machine catalogues, generally, yes. 

Mr. Smith. Did you furnish these items to him ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Smith. I assume it had the concurrence of State Department 
and the Bureau ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes; the material was examined by the Bureau before it 
was passed to him. 



656 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHTST THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. Smith. I see. Did he make any reference to the handwritten 
document you had previously furnished them, or did it appear that he 
was following this procedure that you had set forth in the handwritten 
document ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No, he made very little reference to it after I passed it 
to him, sir. 

Mr. Smith. Did any money change hands at any of these contacts? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, just before he left the country, and after I passed 
on this information, the handwritten information, to him at one of our 
meetings, he was very sympathetic. He said, "Well, I know you don't 
make an awful lot of money and I certainly appreciate your taking 
the time to write this report forme." 

I believe he gave me an envelope containing a hundred-dollar bill. 

Mr. Smith. Can you pinpoint the time that he gave you this ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, I believe I can. 

I gave him the handwritten report at Hains Point — just a minute, 
please. 

That was on Saturday, October 6, 1962. 

Mr. Smith. That was after these other meetings that we have been 
talking about ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. During that time ? 

Mr. Mrkva. And I think he passed the hundred-dollar bill to me in 
March of 1963. 

Mr. Smith. Did he give you anything else ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. As a matter of fact, he gave me a bottle of Czech 
brandy and he also gave me several gifts from time to time. One was 
this glass vase, and an ash tray. 

Mr. Smith. I assume that was Czechoslovakian production ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

And he also brought on several occasions Czech magazines, which 
he — I expressed an interest in, and he said my father would be inter- 
ested in the magazines, Czech cigarettes, small items of this nature. 

Mr. Smith. Wliat became of the money that he gave you ? 

Mr. Mrkva. The money was turned over to Mr. Johnson and to the 
Bureau, I should say, to the FBI. 

Mr. Smith. How much money did you receive in all in this oper- 
ation ? 

Mr. Mrkva. A total of $3,440. 

Mr. Smith. Now, where did the bulk of this come from ? 

Mr. Mrkva. The bulk of this money came from the — from Jiri 
Opatrny. 

Mr. Smith. Did you have to sign any receipts for this money that 
was given you ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. With Mr. Opatrny, he did ask for a receipt. 

When I was involved with Opatrny, at this point, the chips were 
down. We knew we weren't kidding each other like Pisk and I were. 
He did ask for a receipt. I was reluctant to sign my name, so we con- 
cocted an alias. We used the name "Zobek." 

Mr. Smith. I see. But it was in your handwriting? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. Can you explain the procedure a little bit more of the 
receipt that they requested ? What was the nature of it ? What did it 
say, or can you remember ? 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 657 

Mr. Mrkva. Generally, when he asked for a receipt, I would in a 
notebook or on a piece of paper, I would write "received" and such and 
such a date, "$100," and sign it merely "Zobek." 

Mr. Smith. From whom? Did it indicate from where it was being 
received ? 

Mr. Mrkva, No, sir. It was a very simple receipt. 

Mr. Smith. I should say it was. 

Did Pisk incorporate any other techniques into this operation, such 
as a contact plan or system of commmiication ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Not until at a later date, prior to his departure from the 
United States. 

He told me that his friend was going to replace him very shortly. As 
a, matter of fact, he told me that it would be beneficial for me to agree 
to meet him and to talk to him and that 

Mr. Smith. Agree to meet Pisk or Opatrny ? 

Mr. Mrkva. To meet Opatrny when he came into this country. 

Mr. Smith. I see. Did he indicate it would be beneficial to you? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, very definitely, that we would mutually benefit by 
this association. 

Mr. Smith. He didn't indicate how you would benefit ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Financially. 

Mr. Smith. You assumed it would be financially, then ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. And that is what he meant? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. In retrospect, Mr. Mrkva, what do you believe Pisk's 
role to have been in the operation ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I believe his role in this was to make the initial contact 
with me and to develop and partially assess me. 

We didn't really go into an operation ; it was generally social. But he 
was leading into it gradually. I think he was doing a background check 
on me. 

There was a degree of control, perhaps, since I passed over the hand- 
written information to him, and he more or less set the stage for 
Opatrny. 

As a matter of fact, he told me at one point that Opatrny is a pro- 
fessional. He asked me to pay attention to what he had to say and I 
would learn a lot of things, and we would get into this thing full- 
swing, and it would be financially beneficial for both of us. 

Mr. Smith. Do you believe he was assessing your potentiality as 
an agent ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. Do you think he was a trained agent? 

Mr. Mrkva. Perhaps not a full agent, but I feel he has had training 
along these lines. 

Mr. Smith. How was Jiri Opatrny brought into the operation? 

Mr. Mrkva, Before Pisk left, I agreed to meet — I more or less in- 
dicated I would be agreeable to meeting, to setting a meeting with 
him. He didn't specify any date or time or place. He did establish a 
recognition signal. 

He said that when he was established in Washington, he would come 
to me and say, "I bring greetings from Zdenek." That was the recog- 
nition signal. 



658 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. Smith. Your last meeting with Pisk — could you give us a time 
and date on that ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. When he mentioned Opatrny, 

Mr. Mrkva. He left for Czechoslovakia on May 8, 1963. 

Mr. Smith. Did you have a meeting with him just prior to his leav- 
ing for Czechoslovakia ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. Where was this meeting ? 

Mr. Mrkva. The last meeting we had was at the Hot Shoppe. 

Mr. Smith. And in what period of time ? 

Mr. Mrkva. In Hyattsville. Just a minute, sir. March 27, 1963. 

Mr. Smith. And this was at the Hot Shoppe where ? 

Mr. Mrkva. In Hyatts^dlle, Maryland. 

Mr. Smith. In Hyattsville, Maryland. And at this place he told 
you that Opatrny would be coming to the States ? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct. 

Mr. Smith. You mentioned a moment ago that he also made the 
statement that Opatrny was a professional ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. Did he indicate in what profession ? 

Mr. Mrkva. He really didn't come out and say that he was an espio- 
nage agent, in those words, but he did, by his references to — he urged 
me to meet with him and said that our relationship would be mutually 
beneficial. 

Mr. Smith. When did Jiri Opatrny initiate his contact with you? 
Upon his arrival ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Not until December 20, 1963. 

Mr. Smith. I believe you said that he arrived in this country in May 
of 1963. Is that right? Or was it at a later date? 

Mr. Mrkva. Opatrny ? 

Mr. Smith. Opatrny. 

Mr. Mrkva. Pisk left in May. I believe I stated that Dr. Pisk left 
in May. 

Mr. Smith. Oh, Dr. Pisk left in May. You don't know exactly when 
Opatrny arrived ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No, I don't, but it was about 8 or 9 months after Pisk's 
departure that I met Opatrny. 

Mr. Smith. I see. But Opatrny has his first contact with you on 
20 December 1963 ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes ; that is correct. 

Mr. Smith. In his first contact with you ? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct. 

Mr. Smith. Would you describe that meeting for us ? 

Mr. Mrkva. As I recall, my wife and I were just returning from 
shopping. It was a few days before Christmas. We were loaded down 
with packages and we just pulled in front of the house. We noticed 
that there was somebody standing at the door, talking to our daughter. 

We thought it was a salesman at first. And as we approached the 
door, he kind of brushed past my wife and came out and shook hands 
with me. He said, "I bring greetings from Zdenek." And I knew im- 
mediately who it was. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 659 

Mr. Smith. In other words, "Zdenek," I believe, was Pisk's first 
name? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. And he brought you greetings from Pisk ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. And along with the greetings he had an envelope 
that contained another hundred-dollar bill and, I believe it was, the 
ash tray. 

Mr. Smith. I see. Now, did he set up any date for future contact, 
or did he discuss anything at this particular contact with you? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes; we talked briefly in front of the house and, as I 
recall, we sat in my car for just a moment. We did establish the fact 
that we would meet later. 

Mr. Smith. You mentioned that he brushed past your wife. What 
were her thoughts about it ? 

Mr. Mrkva. She was extremely annoyed with his rudeness. As I 
walked into the house she remarked, "These salesmen are getting worse 
and worse every day." 

Mr. Smith. In other words, she thought he was a salesman ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. Did she know of the operation that you were involved 
in? 

Mr. Mrkva. No, she did not. As a matter of fact, when I went into 
the house, I had the ash tray. Of course, I put the money in my pocket. 
And I brought the ash tray'in and I told her it was a friend of mine 
that had dropped this off as a Christmas present. 

Mr. Smith. I see. And she asked no further questions, I assume. 

Mr. Mrkva. She was irritated with him. 

Mr. Smith. The changeover from Pisk to Opatmy, then, as you have 
described it to us, was a verbal arrangement. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. Just to repeat this, Pisk had set up this recogni- 
tion signal, and 

Mr. Smith. Gave you the gifts? 

Mr. Mrkva. Gave me the gifts, and so forth. It was a verbal- 



Mr. Smith. Did he set up any future meetings at this first meeting 
you had with him ? 

Mr. Mrvka. Yes, definitely. I don't believe I have the date, but it 
was somewhat later. I think I have the date elsewhere. 

Mr. Smith, What were your thoughts when he greeted you on this 
first meeting, bringing you greetings from Pisk? What were your 
thoughts in connection with whether or not they had accepted you ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I think Pisk had laid the groundwork for this meeting, 
of course, I think Jiri Opatrny had confidence that I had been culti- 
vated and the track was open. We had a line of communication open, 

Mr. Smith. Did he appear to accept you without any further ex- 
amination? 

Mr. Mrkva, Yes. 

Mr. Smith. In other words, the assessment of Pisk had been ac- 
cepted as far as you were aware ? 

]Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. Do you think they believed you to be fully recruited 
at this point ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No ; I think Opatmy had some spadework to do. Not 



660 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE L:NriTED STATES 

initially. That came a little bit later with him. This was our first meet- 
ing, and 

Mr. Smith. Would you ^ve us a description of Opatmy ? What did 
he look like? "VMiat were his mamiers, and so foith ? How old was he ? 

Mr. Mrkva. He was about 30 to 35. He told me he was married and 
that his children were in Czechoslovakia. He was of medium build, 
somewhat stocky. He was a cocky individual, aggressive, demanding at 
times. 

(At this point Mr. Willis entered the hearing room.) 

Mr. Mrkva. Xervous. He drank quite heavily. He later told me, 
several yeai-s later, he had developed an ulcer. 

Mr. SMrrH. I see. How would you say he compared with Pisk? 

Mr. Mrkva. Where Pisk was somewhat scholarly and calm, maybe 
a little bit slow and deliberate, Opatrny was a little — he seemed anxious 
to get on with it. He was nervous and he was more aggressive than 
Pisk. Pisk was mild and friendly, where Jiri Opatrny was all business. 

Mr. Smith. Did either of these two men attempt to indoctrinate 
you in communism ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. As a matter of fact, Opatrny did at our first meet- 
ing. The first meeting he tried to indoctrinate me into the Communist 
philosophy. 

I made it clear to him that my only motivation at this point was the 
money and that I had no interest in his ideology and thinking. We 
made that clear right from the beginning. 

Mr. Smith. Wliat was his reaction to that statement? 

Mr. Mrkva. I think he seemed a little relieved. 

Mr. Smith. And what led you to that belief ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I think it seemed to tie in with perhaps Pisk's assessment 
of me. Pisk seemed to — except probing into the fact of my father's 
illness, for example, the mortgage, and so forth, on my house. I think 
he pretty well knew what course he was going to take with me. 

Mr. Smith. Yes. And he was satisfied or appeared to be satisfied 
with your explanation that you were interested in money? 

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook left the hearing room.) 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct. 

Mr. Smith. Did you have any contact with Opatmy at the Czech 
Embassy ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Xo. All my contacts with Opatrny were made away 
from the Embassy. They were at prearranged meeting places. 

Mr. Smith. He set up the contacts for the future, I assume, at each 
meeting you had with him ? 

Mr. Mjikva. Yes : that is correct. 

Mr. Smith. Would you describe the setup that he gave you, the 
plans for meetings, and so forth? Or did he give you any signals, 
plans, whatnot ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Generally, with Opatmy, we went into a different type 
of arrangement. Most of our meetings were held, for example, on a 
Friday evening. Wlien we set up an appointment, it would be. for 
example, it would be "on next Friday at 7 :30.** 

Xow, if something went wrong and we couldn't make that meeting, 
we would move it up to the following Friday, same time, same place. 
And if that meeting — we had an alternative the third, same time, same 
place. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 661 

Mr. Smith. What kind of a signal system did he give you to indicate 
when things were wrong or right ? 

Mr. Mrkva. When we met at these prearranged meeting places — for 
example, we had one in District Heights, Maryland, at a Hot Shoppe — 
we agreed, for example, if we met on a Friday, if something went 
wrong, if I suspected something was wrong and I couldn't make the 
meeting, we had a plan devised where I would go into the men's 
room in the Hot Shoppe, and I would take along a magic-marker, and 
in a specific area inside the men's room I would put an "X" on the 
wall. Apparently he would come through the previous Thursday 
evening and, if he noticed the "X," he would postpone the meeting until 
the following week. 

Mr. Smith. Was this "X" placed in any specific area within the men's 
room ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. Any particular wall usually designated ? 

Mr. Mrkva. In this particular case, it was on a — right in the entry- 
way they had a section of wall, and I would put the "X" right on the 
wall to the right as you entered. 

Mr. Smith. Any particular color of the magic-pencil that you men- 
tioned a moment ago ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I believe it was red. 

Mr. Smith. In these meetings at which you used these signals, you 
mentioned the "X" that you placed on the wall in red. Were there any 
other types of signals that you used or correspondence or anything, 
telephone calls, whatnot ? 

Mr. Mrkva. For example, if I had a classified document which I — he 
was always after me to pick up classified documents. If I had a classified 
document and I wanted to make contact with him, he instructed me 
to send a post card to the Embassy, and it would just be addressed to the 
Czechoslovakian Embassy, and I was to write on the card something 
like, "Thank you very much for the information that you supplied 
concerning the Visa requirements," and I would sign the card "Charles." 
And this was an indication that he would meet me on the following day 
at a specified area agreed on. 

Mr. Smith. And was this specific area previously named, where you 
would meet? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, this was previously established. 

Mr. Smith. Previously arranged, it would be a specific point where 
you would meet ? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct, and a specific time. 

Mr. Smith. Right. Were there any other signals used, other than the 
t wo you have ment ioned ? 

Mr. Mrkva. If he in turn wanted to get in touch with me in a hurry, 
he asked me about the times that I left for work and the times I 
returned. He had a schedule of our car pool, and he would intercept me 
on my way to work or coming back home from work. 

Mr. Smith. How would he make the interception ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Well, for example, one evening as I was returning from 
work about 6 :30, he met me in front of — two blocks away from our 
home. He would stand in an interse-ction where he knew I had to take 
this route to get home and, generally, I don't suspect he waited more 
than 15 minutes. 

79-422 O — 68 8 



662 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. Smith. How many were in your car pool? 

Mr. Mrkva. I believe there were five of us at the time. 

Mr. Smith. And you used different cai"s on different days? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct. 

Mr. Smith. The individuals'? 

Mr. Mrivva. That is right. 

Mr. Smith. And you said that he met you a couple of blocks away 
from your house. I assume that you dismounted from the car at that 
point ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Well, in this case, I would drive my car to another 
location to meet the car pool, so he knew where I met the car pool and 
he knew the route I took to get to my residence. 

Mr. Smith. Did this indicate to you, or raise any question in your 
mind, that you were being watched? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. By these individuals? 

Mr. Mrkva. I got that feeling; yes. 

Mr. Smith. They had your routine down pretty well, I assume. 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, they did. 

Mr. Smith. Your habits. Did you iiave any alternate plan set up 
between you? 

Mr. Mrkva. Of course, there was always the second or third alter- 
nate. This was established, right at the beginning. If any of the 
alternate plans that we had set up, for example, we used to go about 
three of them, and we wouldn't go beyond the fourth alternate plan. 
If it went that far, he would intercept me on my way to or from 
work. 

Mr. Smith. I see. Can you describe these alternate plans that you 
had? What were the signals arranged? How were they arranged? 

Mr. Mrkva. All right. For example, if at any time I had reason 
to believe I was being followed, we devised a plan, I would carry a 
newspaper, for example, under my left arm, and when he saw me he 
would immediately recognize this as perhaps a dangerous — something 
is wrong, to go to the next alternate. Or another occasion, I would, for 
example, wipe my brow with a handkorcliief as I approached him. 
This would also be 

Mr. Smith. Which would be the signal to him, not to make intercept, 
not to contact you? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. That is correct. 

Mr. S:mith. ^Ir. ^IcConnon tells me that you had a system of phone 
booths and telephone numbers as an alternate system, too. Can you 
describe that for us? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. We had, as I said before, we had this prearra^nged 
spot in Hyattsville; at the intersection of Koute 1 and Queensbury 
Eoad, there is a telephone booth right on the corner. In this instance, 
if I couldn't make the meeting, assuming it was on a Friday, I would 
go into the telephone booth and turn the telephone book to the M's, 
for example, and I would draw a circle around the first name under 
the M's. And here again he would check the telephone booth on the 
previous Thursday, and that would indicate to him that we should 
postpone the meeting and pick it up the next week. 

Mr. Smith. Was there any place in the booth that you left the signal 
in the telephone book, did you say ? 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 663 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. For example, under the M's, I would turn the 
telephone book to the Maryland section, for example, to the "M" por- 
tion, and I would circle the first name that was under the M's. 

Mr. Smith. In the Maryland section ? 

Mr. Mrkva. In the Maryland section. 

Mr. Smith. And he knew that you would circle that first name? 

Mr. Mrkva. If I couldn't make a meeting. 

Mr. Smith. That is how he knew. You had turned to that particular 
portion of the telephone book ? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is right. 

Mr. Smith. Was there any particular color of marking ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No ; this was just with a pencil or a pen. 

Mr. Watson. Mr, Counselor, may I interrupt at that point ? 

Where was this telephone booth ? 

Mr. Mrkva. It was across the street from the Citizen's National 
Bank of Maryland. 

Mr. Watson. In other words, you had established a definite tele- 
phone booth ? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct. 

Mr. Watson. Now, as I understand, earlier you said that if you 
could not make a Friday meeting, then you would put an "X" in the 
restroom at some specific location. Now does that mean that Mr. 
Opatrny had to check both places ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No; we didn't hold our meetings in one — we weren't 
confined to one area. For example, generally we met once a month, 
maybe twice a month. We agreed, for example, like that next month 
we would meet at the Prince Georges Plaza. Before he went to the 
Prince Georges Plaza, we would use the telephone booth. The following 
month we agreed to meet in District Heights. Then we utilized the rest- 
room of the Hot Shoppe to put the "X" on the prearranged spot, and 
so forth. 

Mr. Watson. And all plans for subsequent meetings were made at 
the previous meeting ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes ; that is correct. 

The Chairman. Mr. Mrkva, I don't want to anticipate what might 
be called the climax of your testimony which you will reach, but I want 
for the record to ask one or two questions. 

At this time, tell me, how long did you have these meetings and 
contacts with him ? Roughly ? 

Mr. Mrkva. It was over 4 years, sir. 

The Chairman. Now I understand, but again to make it plain for 
the record, it is obvious to me that while you were playing the part of 
the possible dupe, as I understand it, you were at all times reporting to 
your superiors, the State Department and/or the FBI. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. In other words, you were permitting yourself to be 
played as a ruse by this man, but all along you saw through it and you 
were reporting these facts to the State Department and to your 
Government ? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct. 

The Chairman. Again, it is too early to do it, we will do it at the 
close, but I wish we had more Americans like you, really. 

Mr. Mrkva. Thank you, sir. 



664 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

The Chairman. This is very important information you are giving 
us; not only that, but it shows the length to which these operators, 
so-called people in the diplomatic cprps, will go. We have had testi- 
mony along this line involving all sorts of espionage ; for instance, by 
a man by the name of Huminik in April of this year, and he painted a 
story not unlike — on the contrary, quite like yours. We need very 
badly the loyalty of people like you particularly. As I understand, 
you are of foreign extraction. What is your extraction ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Both my parents are Czechoslovakian. 

The Chairman. Czechoslovakian. And this, by the way, had to do 
with the Czech Embassy, so there, there is the point. Despite the 
lineage and your dedication, which is a noble thing, to your ancestors, 
that is one more point which brings out nobility of the performance 
that you gave this Government, and I congratulate you. 

Mr. Mrkva. Thank you very much, sir. I would like to also state 
it was a difficult assignment. I am not an espionage agent. I have never 
had any training along these lines. And, as a matter of fact, during 
the course of the operation, I was still holding down my job as general 
services officer at the time and I had one man to confide in, really, 
who was very close to me, and that was Mr. Johnson. It was a difficult 
thing to keep inside and not to talk about it, and 

The Chairman. Will you for the record — he is here, you point to 
him, describe him. 

Mr. Mrkva. Mr. Johnson was during the beginning of this, in 1960 
01 when the operation started, the general counsel of the Passport 
Office. He is at this time the deputy director. 

The Chairman. Yes. I know of him, very well. 

Mr. Mrkva. Mr. Johnson and I spent more time in that State De- 
partment on Saturdays and Sundays, I think every holiday, as a mat- 
ter of fact. My wife was getting after me about, "When are we going 
to take our vacation?" or "Why can't we be like normal people and go 
to the beach over the Fourth of July holiday ?" 

The Chairman. I know the usual thing. I don't know whether it 
obtains in your case. That very frequently we have had witness after 
witness doing what you have done for your country, and that a man 
or the double agent, or whatever you want to call him, didn't have the 
comfort of being able to confer and advise and discuss with his wife. 
Did you have that problem ? 

^ Mr. Mrkva. No, sir, my wife was completely unaware of this ac- 
tivity. 

The Chairman. In other words, you could not — you went to Mr. 
Johnson, but not your wife, because it was too delicate a thing to do ? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct. 

The Chairman. This is a common experience, and it is such a won- 
derful thing to see people who, because of their dedication to Amer- 
icanism, will forego the comfort of homeeide or fireside heart-to-heart 
discussions with even their wives and dear ones because of the perilous 
nature of what they are doing, 

Mr, Mrkva, Thank you. 

Mr. Watson. Judge, will you yield at that point ? 

The Chairman. Surely. 

Mr. Watson. I might say this parenthetically, that that is one of 
the most remarkable things that has been brought out thus far in this 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 665 

testimony, that you could carry on this clandestine arrangement for 
about 4 years and your wife not pick up anything about it, because 
my wife, I believe [laughter] would have at least been suspicious. 

Mr. Mrkva. Well, I nad an excellent ally with Mr. Johnson. When- 
ever my wife did get suspicious, as she had on many occasions, and 
on one occasion my daughter had observed me going into Jimmy Com- 
ber's Restaurant, and as I drove home my wife said, "Did you work 
hard this evening?" I said, "Yes, you know, it was kind of rough." 
And she said, "Well, what were you doing at Jimmy Comber's Res- 
taurant?" 

Mr. RoTJDEBusH. And your answer ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I said, "Well, we finished up early and decided to have 
dinner." 

But Mr. Johnson used to provide me with most of my alibis. 

Mr. Watson. Off the record, 

( Discussion off the record. ) 

The Chairman. Proceed, Counsel. 

Mr. Smtth. Mr. Mrkva, what other things were you able to note 
about Opatrny's manner of operation ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Well, generally, he was extremely punctual. And he 
requested that — prior to our meetings, that we synchronize our 
watches. He suggested we use radio time. He also set up meetings in a 
little different fashion than with Pisk. I noticed he always set up the 
meeting places in an area where he can observe large areas to see 
whether any of us were followed. 

Mr. Smtth. In other words, he was very cautious ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes ; as a matter of fact, when I used to meet him at 
some of these meetings, I was not to recognize him. For example, when 
we met at the Prince Georges Shopping Center, we would meet in a 
designated area and we wouldn't recognize each other. We wouldn't 
talk, or anything, and I was merely to follow behind him, and until 
he more or less — was more or less satisfied that I wasn't being fol- 
lowed, and he would use several ways of doing this. I suspected that 
he had his coimtersurveillance, his people, countersurveilling the 
meetings. He used to look in the store windows, look at the reflections 
in store windows, and we would always walk a couple of blocks away 
from the area, and when he felt it was safe, we would stop, and then 
we would go on from there. 

(At this point Mr. Willis left the hearing room.) 

Mr. Smtth. What position did he hold at the Embassy, or were 
you aware of it, his outward title ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I believe he was an j^ttache to the Embassy. 

Mr. Smith. Attache. Do you know whether he was military* attache 
or cultural attache or commercial attache, or what? 

Mr. Mrkva. I am not sure, sir, but whatever it was, it was a front. 
I am convinced of that. 

Mr. Smith. You mentioned how Opatmy set up countersurveil- 
lance possibilities for these meetings that we have been talking about. 
Could you give us a few examples to illustrate the point ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Getting back to Prince Georges County, we would 
always meet next to Murphy's Five & Ten, in a sort of a passageway 
there — towards the back of the building. There is a staircase that takes 
you down to the parking area behind the store, and from this vantage 



666 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

point he could observe when I drove into the parking area. This is one 
of the — one of his techniques. 

Another time, we used the restaurant across from the Plaza. He 
would stand on the sort, of a balcony near the entrance to this building 
and he had an excellent — he could observe a large area there. He could 
see me coming and going. 

On one occasion, we went into a very elaborate system. In this par- 
ticular case, I was to drive to 42d and Queensbury Road, which is 
located in Hyattsville. On the corner there's a little grocery store, with 
a telephone booth on the outside. My instructions were to drive to this 
telephone booth, or to the store, park the car, get out and walk into 
the store, and purchase a package of cigarettes. In the meantime, as I 
followed his instructions, and did this, he was inside the telephone 
booth, observing me as I drove in, as I went into the store, and drove 
away from the area. After I left the area, my instructions were to drive 
into the residential area of Hyattsville and kind of wind around and 
kill about a half an hour's time, just driving and stopping, making U 
turns, at the same time looking into my rearview mirror to see if 
anybody was following me. 

After a half an hour of this, I then drove behind the Prince 
Georges Plaza into the parking area, where again he was standing 
at the top of the steps, where he could observe any automobiles that 
perhaps 

Mr. Smith. When you drove into these places, did he make imme- 
diate contact with you when you stopped your car ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No. 

Mr. Smith. He surveilled the situation before he ever contacted 
you? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes ; as a matter of fact, he asked me to follow behind 
him, at a good 50 yards or so, until he was sure that he had a chance 
to 

Mr. Smith. Until he was satisfied in his own mind ? 

Mr. Mrvka. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. Who would make the contact, or the recognition? 

Mr. Mrkva. He would always make the recognition signal. 

Mr. Smith. If he did not make a recognition, you knew something 
was wrong? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct. 

Mr. Smith. Or he suspected something? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr. Smith, Were there any such occasions as that, when he did 
not recognize you ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No. We did have a very peculiar incident happened 
once in Hyattsville. We were behind Dick & Gary's Restaurant in 
Queenstown. We were in the parking lot behind the restaurant. It 
was a dark area, and we were having some conversation behind the 
restaurant when all of a sudden there was a tremendous flash. The 
outdoor theater is located right in the vicinity, and he commented 
something, "It looked like a flashbulb," and I said, "Well, we had 
better get the hell out of here," which we did, and drove up and 
down a couple of side streets until we were satisfied that it must have 
been something else. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 667 

Mr. Tuck. What method of transporta/tion would this man use? 
Particularly did he use a diplomatic car ? 

Mr, Mrkva. I never saw whether Pisk or Opatrny arrived at these 
meeting places in an automobile. They were always, like I said before, 
they were always there prior to the meeting or they would suddenly 
appear around the corner. I never observed what method of trans- 
portation they used to get to these meetings or depart from the 
meeting areas. I think at one time I noticed he got on a bus after he 
left one of the meetings. 

Mr. Smfih. How many meetings did you have with Opatrny? 

Mr. Mrkva, I had a total of 37 meetings with Opatrny and I believe 
11 with Pisk. 

Mr. Smith. For a total of 

Mr, Mrkva. Forty-ei^ht meetings, 

Mr, Smith. Forty-eight meetings altogether over this period of 
time? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct. 

Mr, Smith. Now, obviously, the purpose of the meetings with 
Opatrny was to further the operation, develop it into a full-scale 
espionage case. Is that your opinion, too ? 

Mr. Mrkva, Yes. This is corredt. 

Mr. Smith, At what point do you feel they believed you were a 
fully recruited agent, working for them ? 

Mr. Mrkva, It wasn't too long after Opatrny took over the opera- 
tion. I think when Opatrny picked up, where we — we started again 
following up on Dr. Pisk's requests. As a matter of fact, we initially 
started out with additional brochures about the equipment. He wanted 
a blank new series passport. He indicated that any classified infor- 
mation I can get my hands on would be worth something. 

Mr. Smith. Did he tell you to try to get information from any other 
area of the State Department, other than your own office? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. As a matter of fact, he encouraged me to cultivate 
friendships away from the Passport Office. This came later. Initially, 
of course, we weren't giving him anything, and he must have assumed 
that the Passport Office didn't have much ; there were slim pickings in 
the Passport Office. So he encouraged me to make friendships else- 
where in the Department, and 

Mr. SivnTH. Did he specify where, within the Department ? 

Mr. Mrkva. At first, no. I think he was a little upset after the first 
five or six meetings that we weren't giving him very much information, 
and he mentioned at one point that we were going off in too many 
directions. We were after a new series passport ; we were trying to get 
any classified information, any place within the State Department. 
He encouraged me to engage in convei"sations with officials of the State 
Department, pick up any information I could, for example, the war 
in Vietnam, "TSHiat is the scuttlebutt?" he used to ask. He was very 
interested in the 1964 elections. What the consensus of opinion was 
about the elections. 

He was very interested in the members of the car pool. He encour- 
aged me to engage them in conversations, dealing with perhaps any 
classified information that they might have. 

Mr. Smith. These car pool members, I assume, worked in other 
areas of the building, the State Department ? 



668 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHEST THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. Mrkva. All the members of the car pool at the time worked for 
the Passport Office, except one. The exception was a girl that worked 
in the Procurement Office of the State Department. 

Mr. Smith. Did he seem to know anything about your car pool 
members ? 

Mr. Mrkva. He asked me to identify them ; yes. 

Mr. Smith. Did you report any conversations or opinions to him as 
requested ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No. Well, I may have — we talked about the elections 
and what I thought. Who I thought would win the elections, but he 
seemed to get — at this point, well, this didn't get too far off the ground, 
really. He was dissatisfied with this type of information. I think he was 
anxious to get into a — he was trying to pinpoint me and to see where 
he could best utilize me. Here they had me more or less cultivated, and 
we weren't giving them any classified information. I imagine this was 
driving him crazy, because the best we were giving him were press 
releases. Some of them were marked "Not for dissemination until," 
such and sucih a date. We were giving him notifications of certain con- 
ferences that would be held and who was going to participate. This type 
of information. 

Mr. Smith. This was all under the supervision of Mr. Johnson and 
the FBI, what he was getting ? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct. 

Mr. Smith. Did he ever seem to test you in any other way ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Getting back to tlie members of the car pool, he asked 
me to identify them. He also asked me to come up with names of in- 
dividuals who I thought could be cultivated into this type of operation. 

Mr. Smith. Did you get the impression you were being used as a 
spotter ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir, definitely. 

Mr. Smith. And he miglit be interested in recruiting your car pool 
members ? At least some of them ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes; he asked for the names of individuals who had 
obvious weaknesses, perhaps, such as excessive drinking, and this type. 

Mr. Smith. He didn't want their reputation information ? 

Mr. Mrkva. What hobbies they had, what clubs they belonged to, 
and so forth. 

Mr. Smith. Did he test you in any other way to determine your 
loyalty ? Any mission ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes; we had a very interesting — there was one classic 
test that he put me through just before he gave them the device. It was 
on a Saturday morning, as I recall. We met in District Heights at 
a shopping center. We got into the car, and he asked me to drive down 
towards the Mayo Beach area. Just when we got to the Anne Arundel 
County line, he asked me to stop and suggested we go into a local 
tavern. As he didn't want to talk in the car, we went in, sat down, 
and had a conversation. He asked me if I would like to make a fast 
hundred dollars, and I, of course, agreed to this. Tlie gimmick was 
that I was to take a plastic cigarette box, I think it was a Philip Mor- 
ris box, and drive toward the Mayo Beach area until I got to the 
intersection of 468. That is the road to Shady Side. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 669 

As I approaxjhed this intersection, I was to drive just a short dis- 
tance beyond this point, and he indicated a road sign, a reflector sign 
along the road. I was to pull alongside the sign and reach down to the 
base of the sign, and concealed under a rock was a similar type cig- 
arette package. I was just to make the switch and drive back to the 
original spot and give him the box. 

Mr. Smith. In other words, you took one box and brought back one 
box? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct. 

Mr. Smith. And gave this second box that you took from under the 
rock to him ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. Did you have any idea what it contained ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Well, at the time I really wasn't sure it was a test. I was 
warned that he would try to spring these surprise-type questions at 
me, or tests. As I drove down to the area, the box was sitting alongside 
me on the seat, and I popped open the top and looked at it. It had what 
appeared to be something wrapped in a wad of kleenex. I removed 
this, and there was a rubber band around the kleenex, and I took this 
apart and ultimately got down to a piece of paper that was Scotch 
taped. It was about an inch square, and I suspected that this could 
have been microfilm or microdot, and I said, "Well, what do I do now ? 
Should I continue with this thing, or should I call the Bureau?" And 
I elected to — I made a decision, and decided to go through with the 
tiling and not to stop and phone the Bureau for advice. As it turned 
out, I believe it was a test. 

Mr. Smith. Now at this point where he sent you on this mission, 
did he get out of the car and wait for you there, or was there another 
car anywhere ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No ; he stayed in the tavern while I got out and drove 
down the road and came back. I met him at the same place. 

Mr. Smith. In other words, there is no indication that he followed 
you? 

Mr. Mrkva. No, I don't believe he followed me, but I did observe a 
gentleman standing alongside the road — about a mile down — who was 
dressed in a business suit. You don't find very many of those out in 
that neck of the woods, so I suspected that this would have been one 
of his agents. 

Mr. Smith. He did not approach you, though ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No, sir. 

Mr. Smith, In recognition ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No. 

Mr. Smith. Did he appear to be watching? 

Mr. Mrkva. Opatmy, or ? 

Mr. Smith. No ; the man that you saw. 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, he did appear to be watching traffic. 
• Mr. Smith. How far away was he ? 

Mr. Mrkva. This was about a mile away from tlie intersection where 
I dropped him [Opatmy] off. 

Mr. Smith. Did he appear to hare glasses, or field glasses ? 

Mr. Mrkva, No. 



670 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES . 

Mr. Smith. He was watching the drop, I assume, this drop point 
that you were visiting ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No. There wasn't anybody at the drop point. However, 
the reflector sign was in a sort of a wooded area, and there were several 
houses in the nearby area. 

Mr. Smith. Nearby ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Where I suspect they had somebody, perhaps, observ- 
ing the operation from that vantage point. 

Mr. Smith. I see. 

Mr. Mrkva. Another test was made prior to the installation of the 
device. Again he gave me some money to purchase a walkie-talkie set. 
This was again right at Christmas time, and what I was supposed to 
do was to leave one of the sets turned on as I entered the State Depart- 
ment. This was another interesting test that he had. 

Mr. Smith ^We will cover this a little later. 

Mr. Mrkva'. All right. 

Mr. Smith. You said a moment ago, Mr. Mrkva, that Opatmy began 
to appear as though he was uncertain how to utilize you and your 
services. Would you explain this a little bit further ? What led you to 
this? 

Mr. Mrkva. Well, he got after me. Like I said before, we weren't 
giving him any classified information. He seemed to be very anxious 
to get into it. He called me down a couple of times. He said, "We are 
going off in too many directions. We are not ending up with anything." 

He himself seemed to be in a hurry, and I think he was a bit frus- 
trated at this point. He had a ticket to the State Department, or he 
thought he had a ticket to get into the State Department, but since we 
weren't coming up with any classified information for him, or some- 
thing that he could really sink his teeth into, I think he was a bit 
frustrated. 

Mr. Watson. Excuse me again. I don't know whether it is going to 
be established later on or not, but the container that you picked up at 
the base of the highway sign — did you examine its contents ? Are vou 
going to develop that later, Mr. Co msel ? 

Mr. Smith. No,^ir. 

Mr. Watson. Did you examine its contents ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. I didn't go into the entire package. 

Mr. Watson. You do not know what was in it ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No, sir. 

Mr. Watson. So, very well, it is pure conjecture on your part about 
this being a test ? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct. 

Mr. Watson. There could have been another involved, and you 
were going over for this dead-drop pickup information for Opatrny ? 

Mr. Mrkva, Yes ; that is correct. It could have been, yes. 

Mr. Smith. Now in order that it might be straight 

Mr. Mrkva, On the way down, with the first box, I was curious to 
know what was inside the box. I did open this box, and I came to the 
part that had the one square inch of paper concealed in it, and all 
these wrappings, but however that was Scotch taped. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHEST THE UNITED STATES 671 

Mr. Watson. Of course, as I understood you 

Mr. Mrkva. I couldn't open that one. 

Mr. Watson. As I understood, you don't know whether that was 
microfilm or what-have-you. You did not know about it. 

Mr. Mrkva. No ; at the time I didn't know what it was. 

Mr. Watson. The curiosity didn't get the best of you coming back 
with the other container that you picked up at the base of the highway 
sign? 

Mr. Mrkva. Wellj I did — the first one was a Philip Morris box ; the 
second one that I picked up was a Marlboro flip box. It was damp, it 
felt like it had been in the ground tor several days. I opened up the top 
of that one and I shook out the same type of wadding, with a rubber 
band around it, but I didn't go any further than that, having made up 
my mind at this point to go along with it, and assuming it was a test. 
But insofar as what the thing contained, I don't know. 

Mr. Watson. You do not know, and you returned that to Mr. 
Opatrny at the tavern ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr. Watson. Excuse me for interrupting, but I thought we should 
establish that. 

Mr. Mrkva. I admitted to him at the following meeting — I told 
George that I did open the box and looked at it. 

Mr. Watson. Did he tell you he knew that you had opened it ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No, no, he didn't. 

Mr. Watson. If it had been a test, would it not be a logical assump- 
tion that he would have so wrapped it or arranged it as to be able to 
ascertain whether or not you had opened it and examined its contents ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I would suspect so, but I was extremely careful. 

Mr. Watson. In the absence of that, very well, we could conclude 
or conjecture the very opposite from yourself, and that is that there 
was some information of value and you were a party to picking up a 
dead drop and bringing it back to him. 

Mr. Mrkva. True. 

Mr. Watson. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Smith. How did Mr. Opatrny rectify his anxiety with respect 
to how to use you ? 

Mr. Mrvka. I believe that was about the time when he introduced 
the thought that we could conceivably install a listening device in the 
State Department building. He was very interested in the Eastern 
European Affairs area. He asked me to familiarize myself with the 
floor plan in this area. 

Mr. Smtth. Now the Eastern European division, I believe you 
mentioned, what did that encompass, what countries would that cover ? 
Would that cover Czechoslovakia and other countries? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes; I believe most of the Iron Curtain countries are 
located on this floor. 

After familiarizing myself with the floor itself and the location 
of the various offices, for example, the Soviet office and Czech office, 
he did narrow it down to Raymond Lisle's office. Mr. Lisle is the chief 
of the Eastern European division. 



672 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. Smith. Now when was this done ? When did he make the contact 
with you for this purpose ? 

Mr. Mrkva. The 29th of May 1965. 

Mr. Smith. 1965? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. And I believe 

Mr. Smith. Is this the first time that he brought up the matter of a 
device ? 

Mr. Mrkva. That's correct. 

Mr. Smith. The planting of a device ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. The verj first time it was mentioned to you ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes; like I said before, we had been stringing him 
along for a number of years at this point, and our meetings were not 
frequent at this point. We met perhaps once a month, and sometimes 
I would deliberately miss a meeting, tliough, and it would stretch out 
to sometimes once every 2 months. Prior to this time I believe he was 
completely frustrated as to how he could utilize my services, and this 
was the first time that he came up with the idea of installing a listening 
device. 

Mr. Smith. When he mentioned the possibility of planting such a 
device, did you give him any indication that you would be amenable to 
doing so ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Well, when he initially introduced the idea, he also 
stated that there would be — it would be worth a thousand dollars or 
perhaps more. I didn't jump at it right off the bat, but I told him I 
would like to think about it and perhaps let him know at the next 
meeting. This gave me an opportunity to go back and consult with 
Mr. Jonnson and the FBI for directions. 

Mr. Smith. Now had he been back to Czechoslovakia in the interim 
period of time before he mentioned this device to you ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No, sir, I don't believe so. Not at this point. 

Mr. Smith. Did you agree to go along, subsequently, Avith the idea ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. What transpired after you reached an agreement to go 
along ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Well, we got into — here again we started locating of- 
fices, esj)ecially Lisle's, in relation to the rest of the State Depart- 
ment building. In other words, we ascertained that his office did face 
the street, it wasn't in an inner court, for example. 

Mr. Smith. Did he explain to you why he wanted it to face the 
street, or the matter of inner court, as compared with facing the street ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Well, less interference with the transmission of the 
device. 

Mr. Smith. I see. 

Mr. Mrkva. We measured the office. I took a rough measurement of 
Mr. Lisle's office. We pinpointed the location of furniture within his 
office, pictures on the Avail, types of heating systems, and air ducts; 
we went into great detail on this. 

Mr. Smith. I was about to ask you, did he ask for specific detailed 
descriptions of the furniture and the air ducts, and so forth? 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 673 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. As a matter of fact, I furnished him with a cata- 
logue of the executive Class A type furniture that was in Lisle's office. 
I looked at the heating system and determined the manufacturer of 
certain component parts. 

In Mr. Lisle's office, the radiator was located behind his chair, and 
from the control knob, I was able to get the manufacturer's name, I 
described the type of ventilation system. 

Mr. Tuck. Let me interrupt just a minute, Mr. Counsel. 

The chairman of the full committee has issued a directive recon- 
stituting the composition of the committee composed of the gentleman 
from South Carolina, the gentleman from Indiana, and myself. Let 
the record so show. 

Proceed. 

Mr. Smith. Did he ask for colors or chips from the furniture, or 
anything that would help him identify the coloring of the furniture? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. Wlien we first started talking about the device, 
they were exploring places where we could install it. One of the 
thoughts he had was to drop the device behind the radiator, which 
was located right behind Mr. Lisle's chair. 

(At this point Mr. Watson left the hearing room.) 

Mr. Mrkva. I picked up a piece of plaster to show him what type 
of composition was used. His original thought was to conceal the 
device in a piece of plaster, qpen the door where the control knob was 
located, and drop this plaster behind the radiator. We also explored — 
we took measurements of Mr. Lisle's desk, thinking that perhaps we 
could conceal the device in the bottom portion of the desk — you know, 
where the center drawer is located on a desk. 

Mr. Smith. Yes. 

Mr. Mrkva. Well, there is a vacant spot towards the front of the 
desk. We took the measurements of that. We took the measurements 
of the bookcase and, as a matter of fact, we used a chip from one of Mr. 
Johnson's bookcases to show him the type of wood composition of the 
bookcase. 

Mr. Smith. Now, what type of testing did he desire, other than the 
descriptions of the furniture ? Did he ask you to run any kind of test ? 

Mr. Mrkva. He was very interested in whether or not any of the 
security people ever stopped me in the building to search me, for 
example. I told him they didn't. He was interested in concealed cam- 
eras within the State Department building. He was extremely curious 
as to why they had all those antennas on top of the building and asked 
me to see if I could find out what they were used for. 

I mentioned he previously asked me to buy this walkie-talkie set. 
Thi^, again, was right before Christmas, and what I was supposed 
to do is to buy this particular model, turn the one unit "on" and go into 
the State Department building with it, and leave it on all day, assum- 
ing, perhaps, that they had devices that would pick up the transmission. 

Mr. Smith. That is. State would have devices that would pick up 
these emanations ? 

Mr. Mrkva. He was curious to see whether the State Department 
had a scanner, perhaps. As it turned out, nothing happened. The bat- 
tery went dead, and that's about the extent of it. 



674 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. Smith. What other testing did he give you ? 

Mr. Mrkva. He had described the device to me. When we finally 
narrowed it down to the bookcase in Mr. Lisle's office, he was — we 
were checking out the dimensions underneath the lower panel of the 
bookcase. In order to make sure that the device would fit, he furnished 
me with a dummy of the device at one of our meetings at Silver 
Spring. There is an old abandoned woodshed that runs adjacent to 
the park in Silver Spring. He asked me to drive to this woodshed, 
where he jumped out of the car, and he picked up a base that he got 
some place 

Mr. Smith. Base of what? 

Mr. Mrkva. A base of a bookcase. The lower section. 

Mr. Smith. Yes. 

Mr. Mrkva. He brought this into the car with him and asked me 
to drive to a secluded area beyond the park. It was right near the 
park. We drove to this secluded area and parked. He gave me this 
dummy device and he said, "I want you to get the feel of it." So I did. 
The device had two sharp tacks on either end. I got the feel of it and 
installed it a couple of times. 

Mr. Smith. About what were the dimensions of the dummy device? 

Mr. Mrkva. It was about the approximate size of a ruler. It was 
approximately a half inch to three-quarters inch thick, and about 
12 inches long. 

Mr. Smith. This would be a facsimile of a base of 

Mr. Mrkva. The bookcase ; yes. 

Mr. Smith. In Mr. Lisle's office ? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct. 

Mr. Smith. Or in the type of furniture used by the State Depart- 
ment ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. Now after we finished playing with the installa- 
tion, we drove away from the area. He took the bookcase base and, as 
we drove it around, he tore it apart and threw it out the car window 
into a wooded area. 

Mr. Smith. Asking you to practice attaching this, what were you 
to attach it to? 

Mr. Mrkva. To the base itself. 

Mr. Smith. Of the bookcase that was there in the shed ? 

Mr. Mrkva. That he had pulled from the woodshed, yes. 

Mr. Smith. He was carrying this along in the car ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. And you were practicing attaching the item of equip- 
ment? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. Would it be hidden behind the base, or look like part 
of the base ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, if you can visualize a bookcase base as it was fac- 
ing you. It stands, you know, it is on a pedestal or legs. You would 
reach underneath the front panel and merely squeeze the device into 
position. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 675 

Mr, Smith. And to be discovered, somebody would have to get 
down and go behind that particular section ? 

Mr. Mrkva. The only way you can really see it is if you would re- 
move the top sections, and 

Mr. SMrPH. Down to the bottom or to the base. 

Mr. Mrkva. And turn it upside down. 

Mr. Tuck. Do you have a photograph of that device ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Pardon ? 

Mr. Tuck. Do you have a photograph of that device? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, I believe we have one here. 

Mr. Smfth. I will introduce that in a moment, sir. 

Did Opatrny ever furnish you with the real device ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Exactly 1 year to the day that he had introduced this 
idea to me. 

Mr. Smith. In other words, from the date he mentioned the thing 
to you, 1 year later ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. I believe it was to the day that Mr. McConnon and 
I determined that. 

Mr. Smith. What was the specific date, if you recall? 

Mr. Mrkva. Pardon ? 

Mr. Smith. What was the specific date that he furnished you the 
device ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I believe it was the 29th of May. 

Mr. Smith. What year ? 

Mr. Mrkva. 1966. 

Mr. Smith. 1966. 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Smith. Would you describe it for us, please? How he gave it 
to you, how he passed it to you ? 

Mr. Mrkva. We had a prior meeting. We had made prior arrange- 
ments, the previous meeting. We drove from the Prince Georges Plaza 
to the Baronet Theater in Bethesda. There is a passageway between 
the Baronet Theater and the post office, sort of a walkway. 

Mr. Smith. How wide ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Oh, it is approximately — about 4 feet, perhaps. He ar- 
ranged to give me the device the following morning, in the men's 
room — ^here we go in the men's room again — in the Hot Shoppe, in 
Silver Spring. I was to take a prescribed route through Rock Creek 
Park to the State Department building, spend approximately 15 — well, 
I believe 20, 25 minutes installing the device, and after which time, I 
would leave the State Department building and drive to a Drug Fair 
in downtown Washington. He furnished me with a telephone number, 
and I was to call him at this number. 

If I had successfully installed the device, I was to tell him that I 
had made an excellent purchase, for example, and everything is fine. 
If I was unsuccessful in installing the device, I was to say something 
like, "I have a bad headache and I think I will knock off and go home 
for the rest of the day." 

If I was unsuccessful in installing the device, I was to drive directly 
to the Baronet Theater and meet him in the passageway and return 



676 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

the device to him. If my efforts were successful, I was to meet him a 
week later, on a Sunday morning, in this same passageway, and pick 
up my thousand dollars in $20 bills. 

Mr. Smit:^. Did you actually get any pay? Did he give you any 
money in advance for this operation ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I believe he gave me a hundred dollars for expenses 
prior to this installation. 

Mr. Smith. But you were to be paid after the installation ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Tliat is correct. 

Mr. Smith. Did the device operate successfully ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes; I understand, I was told this subsequently, that 
the device — that the Bureau had left the device on for approximately 
20 minutes. 

When I entered the State Department building, I immediately 
turned over the device to the FBI, who were waiting there. I think I 
went back to my office and waited for aproximately 20 minutes and 
then left the building and made my telephone call and went on home. I 
had no further contact, I don't believe, from Opatrny until a much 
later date. 

However, the following week, the following Sunday, I went back to 
the passageway to pick up my money, and of course he wasn't there. 

Mr. Smith. Wliat kind of a device was this that you mentioned? 

Mr. Mrkva. I was told that it was a very sophisticated device. As a 
matter of fact, one of the most sophisticated devices they had un- 
earthed. It was a remote-controlled device. 

Mr. Smith. A transmitter? 

Mr. Mrkva. Transmitter type. That's about all I know about it. 

Mr. Smith. Right. This operation, this 20-minute operation of the 
device was under the supervision of the Bureau and you were not pres- 
ent during that operation ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes. It gets — the times here kind of run together at this 
point. But, like I said, I went back to the Baronet Theater to pick up 
my money the following Sunday, and he was not there. I believe I had 
four subsequent contacts with Opatrny after that. These were when he 
intercepted me en route home from work. Most of the four, these four 
meetings, we engaged in heated discussions. I appeared to be shocked 
that the device was not working. I was disgusted with him because he 
didn't have the money. I speculated that perhaps the device had 
been discovered and expressed my reluctance to go back to retrieve the 
device. We had several heated arguments. At one point, he suspected 
that perhaps I didn't install the device, and I told him, "Well, if you 
don't feel that I did, you go in and check." 

Mr. Smith. May I interrupt? 

Mr. Chairman, at this pomt I would like to introduce photographs 
of the device in question as Mrkva Exhibit No. 1. 

Mr. Tuck. Unless there is objection, and the Chair hears none, it is 
so ordered. 

(Photographs marked "Mrkva Exhibit No. 1" follow :) 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 677 
Mrkva Exhibit No. 1 






.n^,x,,^^lJ:J,,l^l.Jux^lr;«l^|■,;:l■,•,;l^l,,.l,,,l,,,l^J,,,l.,,l,,,l<?! 



Mr. Tuck. Proceed. 

Mr. Smith. From what you have told us, I presume that Mr. Opatrny 
was very upset about the failure of the operation and was reluctant to 
pay you the money he had agreed to? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct; we got into a very heated discussion. 
As a matter of fact, I told him to just get the heck out of the area; 
that I wanted nothing further to do with him, and suggested that 
perhaps if we were to continue working together that he would have 



79-422 O — 68- 



678 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

lo come up with $1,500 cash before I would consider anything further. 

Mr. Smith, Did he ever produce any of the money in question? 

Mr. Mrkva, At our last meeting he did come up with $500 in cash 
and with a promise of an additional — I believe it was a thousand dol- 
lars after I retrieved the device. 

Mr. Smith. Did you ever collect the thousand dollars ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No. This was when the thing was publicized and exposed. 

Mr. Smith. How were you supposed to cover this sudden wealth? 

Mr. Mrkva. Well, we had — for approximately 2 years he kept urg- 
ing me to familiarize myself with the betting at the local race tracks. 
As a matter of fact, he gave me money to buy a pair of binoculars. 
He gave me a hundred dollars to spend at the track, which I turned 
in to the Bureau, and they furnished me with clean money. Inci- 
dentally, I lost that. 

Mr. Smith. Not the same amount, I assume ? 

Mr. Mrkva. That's the first and last time I went to play the horses. 

Mr. Smith. Were you lucky ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No; I lost every cent of it, plus a few dollars of my own. 

Mr. RouDEBUSH. Counsel, may I ask a question here ? 

Mr. Smith. Yes. 

Mr. Roudebush. Mr. Mrkva, what was the date that you received the 
$500 payment ? I don't believe you gave that for the record. 

Mr. Mrkva. On July 6, 1966. 

Mr. RoTJDEBUSH. Was that your last contact with Opatrny ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RouDEBUSH. One other question : Have you ever visited Czecho- 
slovakia as a tourist ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No, sir. I certainly would like to. 

Mr. RouDEBUSH. You have never gone. I don't think you had better 
go right now. 

But now one other question : You still continue with the Passport 
Division. What is your status — do you have to visit the Czechoslo- 
vakian Embassy at present ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No ; I have a different position at this time, sir. I have 
nothing to do 

Mr. RouDEBUSH. You don't have occasion to go over there now? 

Mr. Mrkva. No, sir. 

Mr. RouDEBUSH. I say, you don't have occasion to go over there now ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No, sir. Not in my present position. 

Mr. RouDEBUSH. Since you blew the whistle on these boys, have you 
had any occasion to visit the Czech Embassy ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No. Never have. 

Mr. RouDEBusH. I just wondered about that. Thank you. 

Mr. Mrkva. I have driven past there several times, but I liaven't 
stopped. 

Mr. Tuck. What was the method employed by which this man was 
declared persona non grata? Are you familiar with that? 

Mr. Mrkva. I beg your pardon, sir ? 

Mr. Tuck. What were the procedures or the methods employed by 
which this man was declared persona non grata ? 

Mr. Mrkva. The way it was handled? Of course — I wouldn't know 
that. I understand that the Embassy was asked, or they asked for the 
Ambassador, and he was out, and one of their representatives came to 
the State Department, and he was asked that Jiri Opatrny be instructed 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 679 

to leave the country. I believe at the time Opatmy was on vacation, 
and they did extend the time, they gave him an extra day or so, to return 
to Washington and leave the country. 

Mr. Smith. In other words, they set a time for him to leave the 
country ? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tuck. Do you know whether or not the head of the Embassy, or 
whoever was responsible there for the activities, was ever rebuked or 
reproached by the State Department or did they have 

Mr. Mrkva. I was never informed of this, sir. I don't know. 

Mr. Smith. That is handled in another office ? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is right. 

Mr. Tuck. It would seem to me that when you are dealing with a 
menace 

Mr; Mrkva. I went back to my former position as general service 
officer at the time, and I don't know how they handled the other end 
of it. 

Mr. Tuck. Proceed. Excuse me. 

Mr. Smith. Was 6 July 1966 your last contact with Opatrny ? 

Mr. Mrkva. That is correct. I believe Opatmy was declared persona 
non grata and left the country on July 17, 1966. 

Mr. Smith. You were engaged in this operation for a total period of 
about 4 years and Y months ; was it not ? 

Mr. Mrkva. I believe that's correct. 

Mr. Smith. Quite a long time. I, too, Mr. Mrkva, would like to 
congratulate you on the fine performance that you gave for an un- 
trained agent. You gave an excellent performance. 

Mr. Mrkva. Well, I had some pretty good coaching from the 
sidelines. 

Mr. Smith. I imagine you taught the Czechoslovakians a few things. 

Thai is all the questions I have. 

Mr. Tuck. On behalf of the committee, I would like to join in those 
expres^ons. We deeply appreciate your cooperation and that of Mr. 
Johnson and of those who were associated with you in the development 
of this information which I hope will be of great value. 

I would like to know whether or not you at this time have any state- 
ment of your own which you would like to make, elaborating in any 
way on your testimony or any other information that you may have 
about which you have not been questioned. 

Mr. RouDEBusH. Mr. Chairman, before Mr. Mrkva makes his own 
statement, I would like to add this, and maybe you would want to 
comment. 

At any time were you threatened physically by the Czech agents, and 
secondly, did they use the old ruse of saying that they would take it out 
on your relatives in Czechoslovakia should you doublecross them in any 
way ? Did you ever have these points ? 

Mr, Mrkva. No, sir; I was never physically threatened, although 
there were times when I had hQped he would make some effort towards 
this, along those lines. I was never threatened. I was never — ^he never 
brought up in subsequent conversation about the relatives, only that 
he was interested initially in them. 

Mr. RouDEBusH. I understand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is 
all I have. 

Mr. Tuck. Yes, sir. 



680 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Do you have any statement you wish to make? 

Mr. Mrkva. Yes, sir ; it is very brief. 

In reflecting on the activities, I have had a great deal of time to 
think about this, and I believe the American public should be made 
aware of the activities of some of these Communist agents, who are 
now serving in this country, under the guise of diplomats. I also be- 
lieve the American public should know how easily and innocently 
they can be duped by these people into furnishing them information 
which in many cases could be very detrimental to the security of the 
United States. 

I am convinced that even at this moment. Communist agents are on 
the prowl here, right here in Washington, and elsewhere in this coun- 
try, keeping prearranged rendezvous, setting up arrangements for 
future meetings, familiarizing themselves with select areas that they 
plan to use for meeting places, and as drops, and it should be a matter 
of concern to all of us. 

When you start seeing them, and start meeting them practically in 
your own backyard, as it was in my case, it kind of jolts your com- 
placency. 

I was very pleased to be here this afternoon and morning and have 
the opportunity to meet with the committee, and I hope the informa- 
tion I gave to you will be of some value to the committee. 

Mr. Tuck. Thank you, sir. I certainly on my part share your anxiety 
and concern with reference to this matter, and we again thank you 
and Mr. Johnson for being here with us. 

Mr. RouDEBUSH. Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate the thanks 
of the other members of the committee for your appearance, Mr. 
Mrkva. 

In your closing statement you raise another question in my mind, 
and I know the hour is late, but you stated that you feel that there 
are other agents operating and other Government employees being con- 
tacted, and so forth and so on. 

At any time, with all your dealing with the Czech agents, did they 
give you any indication that they had other people on the string, so 
to speak, or that there were other agents involved or other Govern- 
ment employees involved? 

Mr. Mrkva. No. 

Mr. RouDEBusH. No names were mentioned or anything of that type ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No, sir; they were very careful about this, but I suspect, 
I had the impression that there were. 

Mr. RouDEBUSH. But no places or times or names or agencies were 
mentioned ? 

Mr. Mrkva. No, sir. 

Mr. Tuck. The committee will now adjourn, to meet again upon 
the call of the chairman of the full committee. 

(Members of the subcommittee present at time of recess : Represent- 
atives Tuck and Roudebush.) 

(Whereupon, at 12 :25 p.m., Thursday, June 15, 1967, the subcom 
mittee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.) 

(The article from IzveMin and the translation referred to by Mr. 
Tuck on p. 643 follow :) 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 681 




THE UBRARY OF CONGRESS 

WASHtNOTON. D. C XOiO 

TBiMSLATION (Riuialan) 



Legislativz R£nR£NCB Service 
[House Un-Aflterlcan iotlvlties CosBittee] 
f SOURCE : IZVB3TIA . Mo. 105, of May 5, 1967, p,4] 

THE PAINTERS 
An Intamatlonal feullleton 

The Coonittee "on the investigation of un-iaerican activities" 
^ich enjoys anoag the Aasrioans the reputation of the organizer 
of "witch hunting" has apparently sultohed to the "preparation" 
for the fiftieth anniversary of the Country of the Soviets. It 
engaged with a swing and managed to get more than half a million 
dollars from the Federal Treasury. We remember other ooflmdttees 
and ooBmissions of the U.S.A. which had established themselves 
back in those days vhem the revolutionary proletariat of Russia 
declared: "We are going to build our own, new world i" Oh no, it 
won't work, you will not last even a year, the American Committees 
declared at that time, - we have evidence, the cards (obviously, 
military ones ["Cards" mean also "maps" in Russian, Translator]) 
tell us this, we do not want it and that's it. 

Years passed, the anniversaries of the country that threw 
down the rule of capital, resounded in working glory and military 
triu]iq>hs. The faces of the American comittees grew long with 



682 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

disapprorliig amazeiasnt. To o scape ahame, they changed names and 
attire, but would not depart from their position. "If we cannot 
destroy It, we can smear you" - they maliciously whispered In the 
direction of towering structure of rising Socialism. Apparently, 
this Is what the "freedom of the press", "free word" (radio stations 
which feel free to broadcast any kind of "canard", and, naturally, 
"free conscience* (of anti-Communist, anti-Soviet organizations, 
free from any moral re qponsi bill ties) are for. But their attire 
is rather transparent; behind them clearly appears the dark shadow 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigations. 

One shoiild think that it was not without their suggestion 
that the magazine "U.S. News and World Report" took part in the 
anti-Soviet races and set out on a propaganda ride on a much used 
mare of history, [old plug]. The magazine resolved to settle for 
nothing less than wiping out, in one stroke, the attractive power 
of Communist ideas and published an interview with the "ridiculous 
premier" - Kerenskli. He was ridiculous with his hysterical invoca- 
tions even during the swiftly passed days of his government. From 
the moment of his "legendary" escape firom his dear fatherland in 
a woman's dress, Kerenskli has been progressing as a clown of 
bourgeois propaganda. The stagnant maniacal idea would not leave 
the "premier". Threatening Communism with anathema, he predicts 
(for the nth time) its colle^se in the very near future. The 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 683 

"caretaker" of the Russian people sheds a tear: it is apparent 
that the Soviet people do not eat bread and do not wear pants. 
If he, Kerenskli, did not make two or three mistakes in his time, 
everything wotild have looked differently (How blind vas humanity 
to turn away from such a giant of thought] Were it not for the 
editors of the American magazine, people vould not know what they 
have lost.') 

However, we diverted our atcention froa the main "hero" of 
our report, the one that heads the anti-Soviet crowd - the "House 
of Representatives Comaittee to investigate Un-American activities" 
which does not hesitate to use the services of daubers with less 
known names. 

This year, in the United States Congress, those who are more 
perspicacious (there are 13 people of this kind) started talking: 
"Its time to abolish the Committee. For how many years have we 
worked for no purpose, have we spit agednst the wind?" Congressman 
H. Ryan (Democrat from New York) stated without beating about the 
bush: "The Committee to investigate Un-Araerican Activities dis- 
credits the House of Representatives". Congressman Don Kdwards 
(Democrat from the State of California) who supported him, tore 
the mask from the face of the Committee and pointed out that its 
main work consists in "violating Constitutional rights.... and 



684 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

conducting Congressional hearings ^Ich in essence are legislative 
court trials". 

Why not listen to vilse counsel? But 343 members of the House 
would not listen: "It Is a Jubilee year, the Soviet Union has 
been in existence for fifty years now, and many other thijiigs have 
come up. The Connlttee Is needed. Lets not spare money for black 
color." So the Committee was given ^350,000.- for the new "heeirings" 
and ^62,000.- for salaries of the staff. 

The Contlttee got busy. After all, even American workers 
and American progressive society has been preparing for this Soviet 
celebration. One shoxild not be latel Thus, vats with black color 
UKB supplied from the vaults of Central Intelligence Agency and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations of the U.S.A. On the first vat 
there was an inscription: "The problem of spying activities in 
the U.S.A. of representatives of certain Comonmlst Governments, 
including the technique of recruiting of U.S. citizens". Well, 
but who would smear? The Director of the Committee, Francis J. 
McNamara asserted that the "painter" wovild be available and that 
this "technical" detail was settled. 

On April 7th, there appeared before the Committee in the 
capacity of the first "witness" a secret FBI Informer, whom the 
readers of "Izvestla", going back to its issues of October 29, 
and November 4., 1966, can easily recognize as the "provoker" John 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 685 

Huminik, Yes, he ia the same "expert on soapy matters" laic] 
who liked to wash dirty linens of his acquaintances, or plant, 
with provacative purposes, documents on Soviet citizens working 
in the U.S.A. Nov, the expoaed "painter** again "testifies" 
that Soviet citizens tried to get from him secret information* 
But there is no detergent powder,' even of his own production, 
that can cleanse him of this dirt ^ich he drew in handfvils and 
continues to draw from the falsehoods of the FBI. 

Apparently, the "technique of recruiting U.S. citizens" 
as prepared in the rooms of the CIA disappoints the organizers 
of the "investigations", so that they are forced to resort to 
the services of such a dirty individual. 

We are ready to help the leaders of the Committee to set up 
a complete team of "witnesses" ^o would be ready to engage in 
any dirty Job. Of course, Mr. Francis McNanara knows them well, 
but perhaps he is preparing a "surprise" for the Congressmen who 
spent so much money on him. Thus, ve are going to name the 
"painters". 

The traitor, Vaasilii Vassilievich Lukianov stayed in the 
US Zone of Germany till 1951, where, after the war, he kept 
company with the rabble from the "National Worker's Union" 
[Russian emigree political organizatioi^ Sometimes he was i*ewarded 
when he succeeded In convincing some of his terrified coimtrymen 



686 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

vho voiild not return hoae, to oooperato with the western intelli- 
gence. In 1951> he moyed to the U.S.A. and becane a giilde- 
-translator for the Department of State. Luklanov is an eager 
and insolent provoker and will surely not disappoint Mr. Francis 
McNamara. As a translator, he was in touch with the visiting 
performing aseembilies» and Soviet toiurists, eagerly trying to 
tenpt them the "American way of life". 

Luklanov is afr&ld to go to the Soviet Union. But Diana 
Hayes [?] likes to visit us. She works with soother "key" 
[agency?]. She persistently wants to make "friends" and wishes 
to enrich the Soviet Union with "any information". In 1963 » she 
attempted, in New York, to hand over to Soviet citizens plans of 
new airplanes. She would oome to your country as the owner of the 
"Anco Industrial Coopany". She otafviously did not understand much 
about the business, but she saw its purpose in distributing, 
secretely or otherwise, the FBI questionnaries. In general, she 
fully qualifies to be a "witness". 

Rolloh or Rolikh, Alexander Ivanovlch, confuses his occupa- 
tions equally as his name. In one ease, he presents himself as 
an interpreter for the "Columbia" Company, in another case as 
assistant professor of Slavisties at the University of Wisconsin 
in the City of Madison. In his provocative Job, he gained the 
nickname of Don Juan (perhaps invented bjr himself) . To all Soviet 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 687 

women with yihovt ha gats acqucdnted, he proposes his hand, his 
heart and - the imsrican citizenship. He is also fit to be a 
"witness**. But care shoiild be taken that he does not get confused. 

And hez*e is a master of ''behind the back" jobs. If necessary, 
he wovild also undertake a *'wet'* deed. We advise putting him on 
a specicd account. A bourgeois nationalist, Michael Mikhailovich 
Bon, being active during the war on the territory temporarily 
occTipied by the Hitlerites, gave way to his malice in dealing 
with partisans and peaceful population, taking part in bloody 
executions. Saving himself from revenge, he went west. He is 
not a translator for the American tourist office "American rlxpress". 
Serving the ''reliability'* of the Company, he attempted to persuade 
Soviet tourists not to return home. He woxild be particularly 
happy to wipe off his memory the village of Gorlnchevo in the 
District of Khust, Transcatpathlan Oblast (province) , where he 
committed atrocities. 

kad there is another one with a Fascist past. He is Victor 
Alexeevlch fedlay. Before the war, he was an active member of the 
"Russian- Fascist Union" , In Varsaw. He is also regarded as a 
translator in the scientific Library of Congress. Obviously, 
[he is] a "scientist". He does not have to be taught to smear. 
He also has quite an experience in observing things not supposed 



688 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

to be obearvad. H« was already oaught in the Soviet Union engaged 
In this ocoupatlMi, when he cajw there as a manber of the American 
delegation of [autoaioblle] highway experts. For the second time, 
being in our country, he attended the "school" of military intelli- 
gence under the assistant Naval Attache in Moscow, Bebbit. 

Although the forasr adnlnistrator of the oonpany "Hxirok 
Attractions", Oscar Berlin, was also a provoker, he remained 
"faithfxa" to art. He stayed close to Soviet artists. In 19^, 
he atteiq>ted to "treat" to a nightly bohemian punch the artists 
of the Leningrad Acadaoy Opera Theater and Ballet, who were per- 
forming as guests in the U.S.A., azul, in 1962, he attempted to 
persuade an actress of the Okralnlan Dancing Ensemble, to betray 
her home oountrjr. 

So why shouldn't be be a "witness"? In addition, Berlin has 
theatrically trained gestures and this fact could yield additional 
effect to his testimony. 

Well, is this not enough for the first time? After all, 
we might unl ntemtloaally harm the Washington Committee and her 
appropriations might be cut. There is plenty of time till 
November. Many thincs can still be "investigated". \h understand: 
the asmbers of the ComKittee need "food". Yet we still cannot 
help making one aore rammriCi It is a pity that high government 
officials let themselves mingle with that company of people who 
are to prepaz*e an anti-S6vlet Vraae-xxp according to police prescrip- 
tion. 



V. Uakhov 



Translated by 
George Starosolslgr 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 



689 



LfOMHCCMH «na 

piCCIIFAOiaHIID 

JHTnaxepmniic ■ o * 

At«TtllbHOCTW», CHll- 
CKMUM . yo-MtpM. 

tti^uit dnnnr oprj- 

■eAbMCMMM, nppe- 

K/iosBiiack, noxome, ni «in«roronn x 
nuTHaecnTMiieTiifMy t>6miien Cjptnt Co- 
ten: BKinDMHnick c p>9na><m, ypiai 
«j rocyaapcTicHHOtI miiru eoaee no»y- 
MKn/iHOHj flojinapoi. Mm rohhiim r «p¥- 
r»e noMKTtTM a romhccrh CUIA, hto y^- 
peaaaa ce6a eme a t« ahn, aoraa peio- 
"iouMOHHki« npojifTap«aT Pocca« npoaoj- 
r/iacH»: .Mm Ham, mi HoauA mp no- 
CTpo.nl.. Ah, net — He aw«aei, ii ro- 
aa He npoTaneTe,— jaynpanHanct Toraa 
axepHHaacHHe romhcchh,— y Mac ca««e- 
»"a, nan raa aapni (aoeNaue, ameiNo) 
roaopar, He iotmh mm, m 6acra. 

^eieaa roaw, rpei««H a Tpyaocoll caa- 
•e a paTHwa nooawaa a>eHjm CTpaau, 
onpoaHKyaojell inacTk aanarajia. BuTara- 
aa/iHcv a Heroayomen Njynaemia amia 
aiiepMKaHC«H« rohmcchH. H ana ■ 
oaeauy nrHaaN ohh, ^to6u cp*Hy aiSe- 
mtn, ho ot caoero OTCTynarkca He ao- 
reaa. «He c»a»HM, tan rpa9ka> o6oaun», 
— mo6ho oianena om a cropoay ycrpe- 
>i»auieroc« aaiicb aenHHecTaewraro saama 
couHanHjwa. Beak Ha to cymecTayioT 
•cao6oaNaa neiaTb*, •caofioaHue roao- 
'a» (piaaocTaHUHH, cwiaDiiuie ce6a 
:ao6oaHUHa sanycrnTi a 3<;>Rp aio6yn 
'yTKy») a, HOHetHo, «cao6oaHaa coaecn 



MEJKflyHAPOflHblH OEilbETOH ■ ■ 



aaaoHOUTUkRwrni cyae6HWHii npouecca- 

nocaynuTkca 6u Myaporo coaera, ro 
M9 laeHOi naaaTu npeacTaaNTeael) 
aMepmUHCHoro aonrpetca nh a aa- 
ayio: .roa-io «)€Hae«Hbi«, naT»aecaT 
aeT yaie ctoht CoaercKHS Coaij, aa Te- 
nep» N ate oaho a tony ate. HywHa ao- 
HHCcua flsHer aa lepHyn apacay He »<»- 
aeT». H oTaaaxaa hohhcchh 350 Tiicat 
Aoaaapoa Ha npoaeacHne Hoaui «pacc»e- 
aoaaHHAx aa u coaepmaHHe nrraia co- 
rpyaHHaoa 162 rwcaia. 

SaToponaaack aonaccHa. Beat n coaer- 
caoHy npaaaHHHy roToaaTca h anepHKan- 
caae rpyaamHeca, nporpeccManaa o6uie- 
CTtemiocTk CUIA. He onoaaaTk 6ul H 
•or n noaaaaoa UeHTpaaiHoro pasaeaw- 
MTeamoro ynpaaacHHa a *eaepaabHoro 
6»po paccjieaoaaHH* CUIA noaaan laau 
c -lepHoA apacaod. Ha nepaoM naiepia- 
Ho: .Bonpoc o innHpHcaoil paSoTe a 
LUJA npeacTaaHToaeil neaoTopm aoHny- 
"acmecHHa npaanTeakcra, aaaniaa ie«- 
""«y aepBoaaa rpsMaaH CU1A». fla, ho 
«a3aTk-T0 Ko«y? flapearop homhcchh 
vpeBCMc Rm. MaaHanapa ycnoKona, mto 



HHsero He cnwcaana, ho noHHMana Ton« ■ 
TOH, aro ceapcTHO, a iro Hex, noacoau- 
aaa aKaeiM *BP. B o6meM, • .caHaere- 
aa» anoaHe roaarol 

Poain, OH me Poana AncKcaHap Mb»- 
Hoaas. nyraeica a caoHx npo<t>eccHaa raa 
"t, aaa a ipanHaHai. B oaiion caysae 
awaaer ce6a aa nepeaoaiHaa (papnw «Ko. 
nyneHa., a apyrai — aa accHCTCHta npo. 
ipeccopa cnaaHCTHaa a Bhckohchhckom yHM- 
aepcHTere ropoaa MeaacoH. D npoaoKa- 
TopcKOH peMecflc a36paa ce6e a«nnya 
flOH Wyaaa (Heya<Ta can aoayManca?). 
toaercKHM meHuiMHaM, c aoropwHH cwy 
yaaeTca noaaaKOMHTkca, npea^araeT acci 
noapaa pyay. cepaue m... aMcpHaaHCKOe 
rpaamancTao. ToMe roaHTca a ocaaaere- 
""», loflbao oeaHTb Haao: ae Hanyiaa 
Obi lero. 

A 3T0T aoT — aanaeMHbix aea nacicp, 
tcaa Haao, oh m na «HOHpoe» acno noS- 
fleT. CoaeTyen asaib aa o<ro6biit yscT. 
Eypaiya3Hb.a HauHoaaaMCT, Boh Maxaiia 
HMxaHaoBMi BO apcMa BoOMbt Ha apcMcH- 
HO oaKynMpoBaHHoti raraepoBuana cobst- 
cao9 TeppHTopHH BUMcaia/i cbow snoSy 
napTH3aHax h mhphwi whtcjibx 



(aHTHKOMMyHHCTH-iecaHX, aHTHcoaeTCKax ""P"*"""- ' anpeaa nepea aoMaccHeil a 
opraHa3auHil, cBo6oaHbi, ot aaaax-aaeo "l'^' "'"''"' «<:'«""«» awcTynaa 
MpaabHbix o6a3aTe«bCTa). Ho caaawoMUir^A.^u ^""^^ *^''- ' ""P"" 
- ipospasHbi Hx oaeaHHa - 3, HHMH aacnea- !^"" t*^"""*"- »'P"y«n'«Cb a ho- 
" HO npocTynaer sepHaa Teab UeKTpaavHoro 722 J!!^ ' " ""'^P* « < »oa6pa 
pe3aeabiBaTeabHoro ynpaaaeHHa » «>eae- IzTz ."• -' 'P>"" r>n"n npoaoaa- 



pe3aeabiBaTeabHoro ynpaaaeHHa k *eae- 
panbHoro 6«)po paccaeaoaanal. 

flyMaeTca, hc 6ej rx noacaasaa atyp- 
Haa .lOHaJTea CTedrc Rbcc inn Vopaj 
panopia npaHaa ytacrae a aHTHCoaer- 
caax caaiaax h auexaa Ra nponaraa- 
aacTcaya) aopoaiay hi aaeaaieRHoA aaaie 
acTopaK. WypHaa pemHa rr eoaboe m 
HeHboie aaa oaaaM Maion neptMepaHyn 
npHTaraxeabHyaj caay aoMHyHRcnnecaRi 
aaell, onyfiaaaoaaa RHiepBbai c anoren- 
RWM npenbepoMK — KepeacaaH. Or 6ua 
CMemoH CO caoaHR MCTcpRMKbinM laaaa- 
HaHHaHH aame a 6bicTpo nponeabaayaame 
aHR caoero npaaaeHaa. C nofWHTa 
•aereaaapHoro* no6era hi «poA»oro OTe- 
lecraa. a MeHcaoA K>6ae KepcRCKR* npo- 
rpeccapoaaa aaa naau 6ypaiya3Ho« npo- 
naranaki. 3acT0«Haa HaHnaaaabaaa nucak 
He floaaaacT «npeMbepa». Fposa aonny- 
Ra3iay aaaipenoa, oh npeapeaaei (a ao- 
TopuS paa yaiel) ero raSeab • canon 
aeaaaeaopi Byaymen. xPaaeTeab* pyc- 
caoro Hapoaa npoiHaaeT caeay: oaaiu- 
aaeTca, aa xae6a ae eaat, aa uiTaHoa He 



«.». n — ' •;' 'P'"" r>'<"'f npoaoaa- 
TOpj RmoHt ry«RHRaa. fla, roro caMoro 
aMuaunix aea cneuaaaRCTa., aoropb.* 
"ofiRa BopofURTb Seabe caoHX jHaaonux 
noAcoauaaTk a npoaoaauHORHbix ueaai ao' 
ITm?' ■=""•=""• ""W. pa60Ta«,uiHM 
• CUIA. Tenepb pa3o6«aieRHbi« «Ma- 
•«p» oiMTk «caRaeTeabcTayeT», sio y aero 
"joa, cotercaao rpamaaae nuTaaac* no^ 
»r<><T» ceapeTRyio RH^wpMauna). Ho hm- 
"nm CTwpaabHwn nopomaoH, aaaie co6- 
CTiewtora npoRsaoacTaa, le OTHUTbca 
eny or Toi rpaia, aoropyn or npRropui- 
«a>w <Kpnu a Bpoaoamaet eiue leo- 
n»Tv R] qjaabmnaoa OBP. 

A». noaaoART opraHRjiTopoa .paccae- 
w>aaR»a» OTpaeoraHHaa a crenax UPy 
.TexRRR. aepeoaaa rpaauuH CUIA». ecan 
•m npRioaRTca npaeeraTb a ycayran croab 
umaraRRoro cyfiMaxal 

Mu roToau noMoib pyaoaoiaaTeaaia ao- 
MRCCRR cocT»a«Tb qeayo aonaaay .caa- 
Aereaeia, roTo»bix asarbca sa. a«>eya> 
nwJaya) pa6oTy. A, anpoHCM, rocnoAHi 
»peacac MaaHanapa a caH rx anacT, ho 
Aoaaiito 5wTk, roroaaT (icajpnpaa 



"ocar coaeTcane aoaa. He coaepma or f^rj!^.'"''' '"<>•" «CiopnpH3» no 

Kepeacaa*, a caoe apena aayx-Tpex oaa- MtV. -H!,^ " "'^ "'"'" «»"'•»«" 

6oa, ace .biraaaeao 6bi aaa 'e. (flo Vj^ l^l.~l"n ""'"'«'•'■ 

mt caeno Sbiao -""oaeHecTao oTaep. ,«, iTTM, r.""°'.°''"'"" ^"'"" 

r'":.?,.'!:^:'"™ "-"" """-l -t^- 'a^^oJe"oa;;n":„»"J'?^e':raH'HH"'rr"no: 



He peaaauHa aHepnaaHcaoro mypHaaa 

Taa a ae y3Haaa 6u aioaa, aro oaa no- 

Tcpaaa). 

Oaaaao nu oraaeaaH aHanaHHe ot 

aBHoro arepoaK nauiero noaecTaoaaaRa, 

aosreaBnaowero cohm aHTacoaenaaoa — 

aonaccHH naaaiu npeacTaBHreae* no 

pacoieaoaaHHa) aHTHa«epHKaHCao« aea- 

TenbHocTK», HOTopaa hc rnyujaeTca ycay- 

raiia a «na'<KyH0B» Mcnee HMeHarbix. 

B aoHrpecce CoeaHHeanbix UlTaToa a 
3To« roay re, ato nonpo3opaHaee (copoa 
Tpa leaoaeaa raaax Ha6paaocb), noroaa- 
PHaarb Haiana: .Ropa 6bi npHapbir* ao- 
nHccH«)-To. CaoabRo aet spa naeMca, npo- 
THB aerpa nnioiH». KoarpeccMeH y. Paflea 
(acHoapar ot lUTara Hbn-Bopa) 6e3 o6r- 
Haaoa aaaaui: "Konaccaa no paccaeaoaa- 
i«) aHTManepHaaHCKoa acarenbHOCTH aac- 
apeaHTHpyeT nanary npeaciaaHTeae*.. 
noaaepaiaaim.* ero aoHrpecCHea floR 
Jaaapac (aeMoapai or mTaTa KaaaHwp- 
) caepaya nacay c aiiua aoHaccHR, 
yaasaa. hto raaanoe 3aHaTRe ee cioaaTca 
- •HapymeHHio aoHCTHTyuHOHHwi npaa.. 
npoaeaeaaa) MaoHoaareabHui cayna- 
aa«, aoTopwe aa canoH neat aaaanTCa 



"oa «Haaan» mlaV^^. '"""""""• ""ro. "'P^^anax h mhphwi WHrenax, npaHHMaa 
K- n.. anpeaa nepea aoHaccni-iJ . ot B03«e3aaa, noaaaca na Sanaa CeS-iac 
nepeaoaina aMepHaaHcaoil TypHCTCKod 
(JiapMbi .AMepHKjH 3Kcnpe«». 3a6oT«cb 
o «conHaHOCTH. (pHpMbi, nwTancB cuno- 
a«Tb coaeTCHHx TypacToa a HCBOSBpamcH- 
aecTty. Oco6eHno xoien 6bi awTpaaHtb hi 
nanaxH ceao PopRHHeao XycTcaoro paBo- 
Ha 3aaapnaTcaoli o6aacTH, rae itetn 
CTaoaaa. ^ 

M erne OBRH, c (pauiHcrcaHN npouiawH. 
"PeaaH BHHTop AneKceesa-i. flo aoiiHbi — 
aaTHBHbiH HatH "pyccao-(paujHcTCKoro co- 
a)3a» a Bapuiaae. Towe a nepeBoasHasa 
HacaHTca — a HayxHoil 6H6aaoTeKe hoh- 
rpecca CUJA. .yseawS., ciiao 6biTb. 
tro nasaxb He yiarb. M onwT aoe-aaaoit 
Rneer no sacTR pa3rnaai.iaaHHa Toro, wto 
He noaomeao. Ero ya<e jaaraaa 3a sthh 
JaHaraeM a CoaeTcaoH Cow3e, aoraa oh 
npaeamaa a cocTaae aMepHKancaoS ac- 
aerauHH cneuaa«HCTOB-aBToaopoWH»Koa B 
»pyTO« pa3, Haioaacb a Hame« crpane 
OH npouiea «iURony» aoeHHoro paaaeanH- 
'^'.J. """""I''""" "ocHHO-MopcKoro aTTaiue 
CUIA a Mocaae B366HTTa. 

BbiaiuaU aAMHHHCTpaTop TearpanbHoa 
aoMnaHHH «IOpoa ATpaameH.. Ocaap 
BepnaH xoTa a 6wa npoBoKatopoM, ho 
ocrasaaca «BepeH» ncayccTBy. Oh apy- 
THnca aoapyr coaeTcaaj apTacroa. B 1961 - 
roay oh nbiranca «yrocTHTb.> hoihuh 6o. 
re«Hbi« nyauieM apractoa flenHHrpaacKo- 
ro aaaaeMHvecKoro Tearpa onepw h 6a- 
aera. HaioaaBuiHxca a CUIA aa racTpo- 
«ax, a a nae 1962 roaa canoHaa a nnc- 
He Poaane oaay as apracroa yapaHHcao- 
ro aHcan6aa taaua. 

Hy scM He «cBHaeteab>.7 K Tony ace 

bepaaaa OTpa6oTaHa icaTpaabHOctb 

MecToa. a 3to npa aane noKa3aHKM no- 

aiei naib aonoaHMTenbHbiil D(t>$eKT. 

Ho Be xjaiM; aa aaa nepaoro p33a7 

ro, '.ero aoriporo, aeHapoHOH nooae- 

" aaujHHrroHfayaj rommccmk) — accar- 

HoaaHHa ypewyr, flo Hoa6pa apcMCHH 

nopaaoHHo. mowho «Horoe eme «paccae- 

noHHMacM MaeaaM aoMHCcaa 

"CCTb-nHTb Haao.>. Oaaaao oi oaaoro 

.jMeHdHHa He Howeia 

yacpaiarbca. flocioiiHo co»<aneHHa. sro a 
aaMnaHHio no H3roTOB/ieMaio aHTHcoBet- 
caoii crpanHH no nonaueMcaMii peueniaM 
no3BoaaoT araayrb ce6a abicoaae npaaa- 
reabCTaeHHbie opranu. 

B. JinxoB. 



cae aollHbi aamaaca c orpeSbeM as aniH- 
coaercaoro Taa aasbnaeworo «HapoaHoro 
Tpyaowro conji: Haoraa eny nepena- 

Mao, aofai yaaaaaocb caaoaarb aoro-a»- 

6o R) sHcaa 3anyr»HHMX conneneHHHaoB- 

aeaoaapaaeRuea a corpy«H«,ecTBy c 

naAHbina paiaeaa^na. B 1951 roay 

nepe6»paeica a CUIA a craHoaaTca ra- 

itm ■ nepeaoanaaoia rocaenapiaMSHTa 

/lyabBHOt — npoaoaaTop CTapaieabHwIl i 

Harabi«, or npa apaccieaoaaHaa. hc noa 

aeacT, r-n ♦peHCHc MaanaHapa. Kaa ne- 

peaoAsRK, OR apyTRTCa aoapyr racipona- | "CCTb-nHTb Haao». 

pyxMnax aacaHeaell, coaercaax Typacroa, lononHaTeabHoro san 

TOieTRO nuTaacb co6aa3HRT» hi «aiiepa- ' """"■-"■'- " 

aaacaHH o6pa30M m»im». 
B Coaercaal Co«)9 Dyabaaoa exarb no- 

SaHaacTca, a aai Aaaaa XeSec aoear aa- 
(eaoaarbca a aan. Paeoraer oHa > aaon 
•ioia)«». Oaa ynopHo aejer a aapysbau 
R ace loaer o6orat«Tb Coaercaaa Co«>3 
«a«)6ol aH«>opMauaea.. B 1963 roay oaa 
nuraaacb t Hbio-Bopae nepeaarb coasT- 
caan rpaaiAaH»« aepreaia hobmi canoae- 
Toa. K Han a crpaay oaa npaesaiaaa aaa 
•aaaeaaua nocpeaRRaecaoll ^apHM aAaao 
RRAiCTpHaa aonniKRa. B roproaae aaao 




N8 105 (15499) 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED 
STATES BY AGENTS OF FOREIGN COMMUNIST 
GOVERNMENTS 



WEDNESDAY. NOVEMBER 15, 1967 

United States House of Representatives, 

Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington^ D.C. 

PUBLIC hearing 

A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, 
pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office 
Building, Washington, D.C, Hon. William M. Tuck (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding. 

(Subcommittee members : Representatives William M. Tuck, of Vir- 
ginia ; Richard L. Roudebush, of Indiana ; and Albert W. Watson, of 
South Carolina.) 

Subcommittee members present : Representatives Tuck and Roude- 
bush. 

Staff members present: Chester D. Smith, general counsel, and 
B. Ray McConnon, Jr., investigator. 

Mr. Tuck. The committee will come to order. 

This is a continuation of the hearings begun earlier this year pur- 
suant to a resolution adopted by the committee on March 8, 1967. 

This resolution authorizes hearings on Communist espionage and 
intelligence operations and techniques used to induce U.S. citizens to 
collaborate with Communist intelligence operatives. I have here an 
appointment by the distinguished chairman of the committee, the 
gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Willis, in which he appointed the 
gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Roudebush ; the gentleman from South 
Carolina, Mr. Watson ; and myself as chairman, to serve as members 
of this subcommittee. 

(The order of appointment of the subcommittee follows:) 

November 13, 1967. 
To : Mr. Fbancis J. McNamara, 
Director, Committee on Un-American Activities. 

Pursuant to the provisions of the law and the Rules of this Committee, I 
hereby appoint a subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities, 
consisting of Honorable William M. Tuck, as Chairman, and Honorable Richard 
L. Roudebush and Honorable Albert W. Watson as associate members, to conduct 
hearings in Washington, D.C. for the purpose of receiving the testimony of 
Natalie Bienstock, commencing on or about Wednesday, November 15, 1967, 
and/or at such other times thereafter as may be necessary, as contemplated by 
the resolution adopted by the Committee on the 8th day of March, 1967, author- 
izing hearings concerning the extent, character, and objectives of activities 
within the United States of agents of foreign Communist governments or organi- 

691 



692 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

zations affecting the internal security of the United States, and other matters 
under investigation by the Committee. 

Please make this action a matter of Committee record. 

If any member indicates his inability to serve, please notify me. 

Given under my hand this 13th day of November, 1967. 

/s/ Edwin E. Willis 
Edwin E. Willis, 
Chairman, Committee on Un-American Activities. 

Mr. Tuck. A quorum being present, we will now proceed. Will you 
call your witness? 

I may say that we have a very important meeting of the House of 
Representatives at 11 o'clock, and we would like to expedite this hear- 
ing and the testimony as much as is practicable. 

Counsel, call your witness. 

Mr. Smith. Will the witness come forward, please ? 

Mr. Tuck. Will you stand and raise your right hand ? 

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give to this 
subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, so help you God? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. I do. 

Mr, Tuck. Be seated. 

TESTIMONY OP NATALIE ANNA BIENSTOCK, ACCOMPANIED BY 
COUNSEL, GERALD BERLIN 

Mr. Smith. Would you state your full name for the record, please? 

Miss BiExsTOCK. Natalie Anna Bienstock. 

Mr. Smith. You will have to speak directly into the mike, because 
the acoustics in here are ver}' bad. 

Miss Bienstock. Xatalie Anna Bienstock. 

Mr. Smith. Are you represented by counsel ? 

Miss Bienstock. Yes, I am. 

Mr. Smith. Will counsel please identify himself ? 

Mr. Berlin. Gerald Berlin, of Boston, 73 Tremont Street. 

Mr. Smith. What is your date and place of birth, Miss Bienstock ? 

Miss Bienstock. I was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, on Novem- 
ber 1, 1936. 

Mr. Smith. Are you now a citizen of this country ? 

Miss Bienstock. Yes, I am. 

Mr. Smith. And when did you come to the United States? 

Miss Bienstock. We came here April 1, 1940. 

Mr. Smith. How old were you at that time? 

Miss Bienstock. Three. 

Mr. Smith. When and how did you derive your citizenship, please? 

Miss Bienstock. Through my parents, in 1945, at Boulder, Colo- 
rado, in June. 

Mr. Smith. Did your parents also become citizens of this country ? 

Miss Bienstock. Yes, they did. 

Mr. Smith. And where were they born ? 

Miss Bienstock. My father was born in St. Petersburg, and my 
mother was born in Moscow. Russia, both. 

Mr. Smith. Although you were born in Czechoslovakia, your par- 
ents were both from Russia, and all of vou came to this countrv in 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 693 

1940, and all of you became citizens of this country in 1945. Is that 
correct ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. That is right ; yes. 

Mr. Smith. Miss Bienstock, you are here today in answer to a sub- 
pena served upon you through the mail by the committee at 9 a.m., the 
31st of October 1967. Is that correct ? 

Miss Bienstock. Yes. that is correct. 

Mr. Smith. Now, Miss Bienstock, would you please relate briefly 
your educational background for the committee ? 

Miss Bienstock. I would like to look at my notes. I went to grade 
school in various parts of the country, grammar school, from 1942 to 
1949, in New York City ; Boulder, Colorado ; and Washington, D. C. 

From 1950 to 1954, I went to Bronx High [School of] Science in 
New York, from which I graduated. 

From 1954 to 1958, 1 went to City College of New York, from which 
I graduated with a B.A. in 1958. In the summers of 1956 and 1957, I 
attended the Russian School at Middlebury College in Vermont. 

I went to Columbia University for the spring semester of 1959, as a 
graduate student, and to Teachers College in the spring semester of 
1960, where I got 12 education credits. 

In 1962 to 1965, I was at Cornell, working for my master's degree 
and doctorate, and again in 1966 at Cornell, in the spring. And I got 
my master's from Cornell in 1964. 

Mr. Smith. Thank you. 

In view of your background, do you possess ability in any languages ? 

Miss Bienstock. Yes, I have. 

Mr. Smith. Russian ? 

Miss Bienstock. Russian and French. 

Mr. Smith. French. Would you now. Miss Bienstock, relate your 
employment history for the committee ? 

Miss Bienstock. Yes. Well, diuing college, I was a salesgirl in vari- 
ous stores in New York, department stores : one summer, when I was 
16, in 1953, 1 went to a Quaker work camp in Richmond, Indiana, and 
one summer, in 1965, 1 was camp counselor in Poyntelle, Pennsylvania. 

In 1957, during an intersession between semesters at City College, I 
was a guide escort to a Soviet delegation of physicists. They were at- 
tending a conference at NYU on nuclear physics — New York 
University. 

Mr. Smith. Who hired you for that ? 

Miss Bienstock. New York University did. 

Mr. Smith. And they paid you ? 

Miss Bienstock. They paid me; right. 

Mr. Smith. Thank you. Go ahead. 

Miss Bienstock. In 1958, from June to September, I did typing 
on offsets, and proofreading of a Russian grammar book, called Basic 
Russian,, by Rebecca Domar of Columbia University. 

(At this point Mr. Watson entered the hearing room.) 

Miss Bienstock. In 1958, from somewhere around October or 
November, perhaps later, through September 1962, I worked on an 
assignment basis for Hurok Attractions. Inc., as an interpreter — a 
Russian interpreter — coordinator, company manager's secretary. And 
I traveled with the Russian companies here on cultural exchange; 

79^22 O — 68 10 



694 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

namely, Beryozka, the Bolshoi Ballet, the Moiseyev, the Russian 
Festival, Sviatoslav Richter, the pianist, the Leningrad Ballet, and 
the Ukrainian Dance Company, and my duties were very varied, but 
I handled press interviews for them. 

(At this point Mr. Watson left the hearing room.) 

Miss BiENSTOCK. I was also a coordinator for KTLA television 
studios in Los Angeles, during video taping sessions of the Bolshoi 
Ballet, and I did general interpreting; assisted the stage manager; 
and helped to arrange transportation, hotel accommodations, and 
schedules. This was all on a freelance basis. 

From October to January 1960, 1 did research for Botanical Garden 
in Sterling Forest for the City Investing Company in New York City. 

In 1960 from June to September, I did work for Columbia Uni- 
versity, and Ginn, G-i-n-n, I think it is Ginn and Company — it is a 
publishing house in Boston — where I typed another Russian gram- 
mar, by William Harkins and Galina Stillman of Columbia Uni- 
versity. 

In 1962 through 1965, and also the summers of 1963 and 1964, I 
was a teaching assistant in the Russian language department or, 
actually, the Modern Language Department of Cornell University, 
teaching Russian. 

(At this point Mr. Watson returned to the hearing room.) 

Miss BiENSTOCK. In 1965 from March to September, I worked for 
the Copylab Publishing Counsel in New York City, where I was the 
staff editor for the Audubon Nature Encyclopedia. 

From October 1965 through January of 1966, I worked for 
McGraw-Hill Publishing Company in New York as a researcher, 
proofreader, editor, and layout worker for their Nature Library. 

In 1967, September to the present, I teach in a private school in 
Boston, Massachusetts. 

Then I have miscellaneous employments. I have translated various 
texts — scientific, literary, journalistic — from Russian into English 
and have done private tutoring in the Russian language. 

My published translations are the collection called the Great Soviet 
Short Stories., edited by Franklin D. Reeve for Dell Publishing Com- 
pany. I did three short stories in that book. 

And for NBC television, I ghost translated "He Who Gets Slapped," 
which is the name of the play by Leonid Andreyev, for "Play of the 
Week." 

And I also have had published in the Odyssey Review selected poems 
of Andrei Voznesensky and a short story. That is it. 

Mr. Smith. Thank you. 

Miss Bienstock, you mentioned moments ago that you did some 
traveling while employed by Hurok Attractions, Inc. 

Would you tell us, please, the extent of this, and any other travel 
you have engaged in, the countries you visited and purposes of the 
travel in each case ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, when I was a child, we made several trips 
to Canada. I don't know the dates. My father used to go there, and I 
also; Hurok Attractions takes trips from the States to Canada, so on 
a number of occasions, I went with the Hurok Company to Canada, 
again, over the period from 1958 to 1962. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHEST THE UNITED STATES 695 

Mr. Smith. Yes, at this point, was Hurok Attractions engaged in 
bringing Russian cultural exchange groups to this country? 

Miss BrENSTocK. Yes, they did. 

Mr. Smith. Proceed. 

Miss BiENSTocK. And via this cultural exchange, he also does the 
contracts for Canada, so we went to Canada. 

Mr. Smith. Right. 

Miss Bienstock. But more specific travels, on the 24th of August 
through the 22d of September 1959, I went to Canada for Hurok 
and then I went on to Denmark and France as a tourist. And I met 
my mother in France and spent the summer there and then came back 
to the United States. 

From the 26th of December 1959 through the 14th of January 1960, 
I was in the Netherlands, Soviet Union, and France. 

You want the purpose of these trips ? 

Mr. Smith. Yes. 

Miss Bienstock. I went to the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and 
France as a tourist, with a female friend, and we just went to sightsee 
over the vacation. And I visited some Russian people that I knew from 
working with Hurok, and I stopped in Paris to visit my family in 
France and then I went home. 

From the 11th of July through the 2d of August 1961, I was in 
Mexico, purely as a tourist. Do you want me to elaborate ? 

Mr. Smith. Yes, just capsule it. 

Miss Bienstock. Okay. Well, I went to Mexico ; I had finished work- 
ing for Hurok and I went to Mexico with the Moiseyev Dance Com- 
pany, but not in any way as an employee for Hurok. I went with them 
because it facilitated my traveling cheaply — I went on the same 
chartered plane and I could stay at the hotel for theatrical rates — but 
that is the only reason I went with them. 

I was in Mexico City only at that time, with small side trips to out- 
lying villages. 

From the 7th of February to the 18th of March 1962, I was in 
England, the Soviet Union, and France as a tourist. And I went to 
visit a male friend in Leningrad. That is why I went to the Soviet 
Union. 

Mr. Smith. Would you tell us, please, this man's name and some- 
thing of his background and just how you came to know him ? 

Miss Bienstock. His name is Constantine Rassadin, and he was 
a character dancer for the Leningrad Ballet, and I met him in 1961 
in my work for Hurok. He was a dancer with the company with 
which I traveled. 

Mr. Smith. Yes. 

What were your duties with Hurok ? As interpreter ? 

Miss Bienstock. I was an interpreter and I assisted the company 
manager. I think the official title was "coordinator." 

Mr. Smith. Now, Miss Bienstock, that brings us to our purpose for 
inviting you here today. It was during this trip that you made to 
visit Mr. Rassadin in Leningrad that you came in contact with Soviet 
intell igence, specifically the KGB. Is that correct ? 

Miss Bienstock. Yes, it is. 

Mr. Smith. Had you had any previous contact with Soviet intelli- 



696 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

gence or any other foreign intelligence operations on any of your 
earlier trips ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. No; never before. 

Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, before going any further, I should like 
to state that our reason for inviting Miss Beinstock here today is to 
illustrate once again how Soviet and satellite intelligence organiza- 
tions attempt to recruit American citizens into their ranks for the 
purpose of cari-ying out illicit operations against this country. 

In Miss Bienstock's case, we believe we can show a case of recruit- 
ment by coercion through fear. 

Now, Miss Bienstock, I believe you stated that this last trip you 
mentioned began on 7 February 1962. Would you describe the initial 
phase of this trip ? 

Miss Bienstock. Well, I left this country on the 7th of February 
and I arrived in London on the 8th, in the morning. And from Lon- 
don, I believe it was a Soviet airplane I caught to Moscow, so I arrived 
in Moscow the 8th of February, where I was registered in the Hotel 
Ukraine by Intourist, who through an American travel agency here 
handle all the, you know, reservations; they do everything. And I 
spent about, as best I can remember, around 10 days in Moscow, sight- 
seeing, visiting kids that I had met while working for Hurok. 

And then, my next itinerary was, next item on my itinerary was 
to go to Leningrad, and also I had about 10 or 12 days there, where 
I saw Rassadin and also visited other ballet dancers that I knew and 
sightsaw and went to concerts and theater, and everywhere, all over 
the city. 

Mr. Smith. Where did you stay in Leningrad ? 

Miss Bienstock. I stayed at the Hotel Astoria. And after the 10 
or so days, maybe longer, 12 days in Leningrad, I returned to Moscow, 
and my visa was expiring, I believe, on the 7th of March, and I had 
a 28- day visa for the Soviet Union and I wanted to extend it, be- 
cause I wanted to see Rassadin some more. 

But I had to go back to Moscow, again according to the itinerary, 
which I did, and there — do you want me to go on ? 

Mr. Smith. Yes. 

Miss Bienstock. There I handed my visa in to the Intourist desk. 

Mr. Smith. At what hotel ? 

Miss Bienstock. Again, the same hotel, the Ukraine. And I handed 
my visa to the Intourist desk and asked them for an extension, and 
that was all I heard. And I believe it was probably the day that I 
was supposed to leave, the 7th, I got a telephone call, ostensibly to go 
to the passport desk, but it was not the passport desk. 

Mr. Smith. Would you describe just how that telephone call came 
about ? 

Miss Bienstock. Well, I was in my room, and someone just called 
and said, "Would you come down to the Intourist desk?" — which is 
on the mezzanine, or whatever it is, in the Ukraine — which I did, and 
they said, would you then please go to some room that was off of there, 
and I thought it was a passport bureau, having to do with visas, but 
it was not. 

Mr. Smith. Well, whom did you meet in the room ? 

Miss Bienstock. Well, I met a young man, a medium young man, 
who very quickly introduced himself and said that his name was 
Viktor Serin and that he was a member of the KGB. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 697 

Mr. Smith. Did you have any prior knowledge of the KGB ? Did 
you attach any significance to the fact that Mr. Sorin introduced him- 
self as a member of that organization ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes, I knew what the KGB was. And the signif- 
icance of the KGB, to me, is quite clear. It is the secret police and a 
repressive organ in the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Smith. Had your parents had any experience with the KGB ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes. My father — it was then not called the KGB, 
they changed their initials. But in the early part, after the revolution, 
he was imprisoned by what was then called CHEKA and finally 
exiled, in the twenties, but other relatives of mine also sat in prison. 
Some were able to leave the country ; others were executed in the Soviet 
Union. 

Mr. Smith. Would you describe the room where this meeting took 
place with Sorin ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, it was a small, totally empty room, with a — I 
^^ean, there was just nothing in it. No pictures, no nothing in it. And 
a desk and two chairs, and then this man in it, 

Mr. Smith. Did Sorin give any reason at the outset as to why you 
would be confronted by the KGB when this was only a matter of a visa 
extension ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, he said tliat they had heard a great deal 
about me in my work with Hurok and were taking this opportunity to 
meet me. You know, they wanted to see me, after having heard a lot 
about me. 

My passport, in the meantime, he did not say anything about that 
at all. It was lying on the desk. That was the only item in the whole 
room. 

Mr. Smith. Did he compliment you for your work with Hurok ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes, he said that he had heard a lot about me and 
that the Russian kids with whom I had worked, all these ballet people, 
and so forth, had liked me very much, and 

Mr. Smith. Were you frightened by the approach of the KGB in 
this instance ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Pretty much terrified. 

Mr. Smith. Can you describe what took place in the way of a con- 
versation ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, he saw that I was frightened of him. I mean, 
really sort of paralyzed, and he smiled. He was rather pleasant and 
said that he was not going to pull any of my nails out, because times 
have changed, and he just wanted to talk to me. 

And then, you know, he told me he knew about me, and then he 
began a whole— we talked about the ballet people and all the nice work 
I had done for them, and then we talked a little bit about, you know, 
"the ballet people tend to be rather brainless and they don't know how 
to take care of themselves," and did not I agree with this and did not 
I think the cultural exchange was a wonderful thing, and that it had 
to be protected at all costs. 

At some point during this, again he referred to the fact that he 
knew all about my family, told me, making it perfectly clear that I 
had been followed through all of Leningrad and through Moscow, 
not only followed in Russia and kept very close tabs on, but that they 
had a complete dossier on my family abroad. They knew when every- 



698 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

body had died and where they had died, abroad as well as in the 
country, and where we lived and when my father had passed away. 
They just knew absolutely everything there was to know about me. It 
was rather devastating. 

Mr. Smith. In other words, they had a complete dossier on you? 

Miss BiENSTocK. I would say so ; yes. 

Mr. Smith. Did he give you any idea as to what these people had 
to be protected from? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, he kept insisting that they were surrounded 
by American agents, or that American agents were trj'ing to recruit 
them while they were abroad. He also at one point began to insist that 
I must be one, since I could not possibly have worked with them for 
so long without being an American agent. 

And if I was not one, except that he kept insisting that I was and 
all of the Hurok staff had to be agents. 

Mr. Smith. Did vou have any idea as to the point of his conversa- 
tion? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. No. I really was not tliinking very much. He just 
kept badgering me with all this information. 

Mr. Smith. "Was his demeanor causing you concern at that point? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, he was not nasty, but he was extremely cool, 
and I felt rather helpless with him in this empty room. 

Mr. Smith, Were you becoming more disturbed as the conversation 
proceeded ? 

Miss BiENSTocK. Well, I would say yes, that I was. It was a very 
long, endless conversation, 

Mr, Smith. As a result of this, did you feel that he was beginning 
to have a hold on you? 

Miss BiENSTocK, Well, he had my passport to begin with, without 
which I could not get out of the country. He was also insisting that 
I was an American agent, and there was nothing I could do. I would 
deny it, and he would say, "You know that I know that you are," 

It was pointless to talk to this man, because he was insistent about 
everything, although very cool and calm and quiet, I mean, I was sort 
of in his hands, and he made it clear that he knew it, 

Mr. Smith, Did the fact that he seemed to know all about your 
family and what had happened to them frighten you in any way? 

Miss Bienstock, Well, yes. First of all, my family history is an 
extremely unpleasant one in the Soviet Union, Most of them, I would 
say 90 percent of these people, were executed or died in concentration 
camps, I had not met any of them, but I had heard about them, and 
I certainly knew of my family abroad. It was — to find out that some- 
body, when you think you are a small private person, is so fascinated 
and so interested and knows everything about you, is terrible. 

Mr. Smith. A rather frightening experience ? 

Miss Bienstock, Yes. 

Mr, Smith. Did Sorin imply in any way, through his statements 
or actions, that you might come by a fate similar to that of some of 
your relatives ? 

Miss Bienstock. Well, if not directly, I certainly myself felt that 
I was in his power, and I could not get out of the country without 
my passport. And he was self-assured and calm. 

Mr. Smith. What finally took place as a result of the discussion ? 



CONDUCT OF ESPIOXAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 699 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, this discussion went on for something like 
6 or 7 hours. Also, and I had had — I had not had breakfast that morn- 
ing, among other things, because I thought it was just a drop down 
to Intourist, so that I was very hungry, very tired, and thirsty. 

He also at one point, when talking about Russian ballerinas being 
surrounded by Russian agents, mentioned an incident that took place 
with one of these ballerinas, that I had known about and had com- 
pletely forgotten. I was taken completely aback, again, which he im- 
mediately picked up on. 

Mr. SMrTH. Did you have any impression that you were surveilled 
while in Russia ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Definitely. Well, I did not have an impression un- 
til I met this man. While I was there, I felt I was completely on my 
own, but it was very obvious that I had been watched and followed 
everywhere. 

Mr. Smith. I see. Did he know of your trip to Leningrad ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Oh, yes. It was, I think, in Leningrad in particu- 
lar that they had kept tabs on me. 

Mr. Smith. Did he discuss the details of your trip sufficiently that 
you knew that he knew it ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes. He mentioned restaurants I had gone to and 
concerts I had gone to and people I had seen. 

Mr. Smith. Had he arrived at his point of discussion of why he had 
you there at this stage ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Not at all. No. He did not make any points, spe- 
cifically at this first discussion. He simply said, when he finally dis- 
missed me, that I should think about everything that he had said, 
about cultural exchange, about being an American agent, about my 
relatives. I guess, to think about the whole day. 

He did not say what he wanted, and he let me go, without my 
passport. 

Mr. Smith. In retrospect, do you feel that Sorin was playing on 
your emotions with all of this conversation ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Oh, I think very cleverly so; yes. 

Mr. Smith. Did he offer any proposition, or relate any incident 
that took place here in the country ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, this ballerina whom he mentioned, which 
put me in an extremely awkward position vis-a-vis him, because, 
although I had not been an agent, I had helped an American agent do 
something and I had forgotten about it. I knew nothing about it, had 
put it out of my mind. Do you want to know what this was? 

Mr. Smith. Yes. 

Miss BiENSTOCK. It was in Chicago in 1961, when I was working 
with the Leningrad Ballet, and my second boss in command asked 
me to come to his hotel room, and there was another man there, who 
never identified himself. 

I mean, I never saw any papers, and this man told me that it was 
a matter of life and death that a certain letter be conveyed to this 
girl, this ballerina, and it was terribly important, and she had to be 
alone when she received it, so that no one would see the reactions on 
her face. And they wanted me to facilitate getting this letter to her, 
and so we did it in New York City, where I was better aware of their 
schedules and knew when she would be alone, and he called me in 



700 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

New York, the same man, and I arranged, I told him what room 
she was in, when she would be alone, and I assume that the letter 
was delivered to her. I don't know. 

Mr. Smith. Go ahead. 

Miss BiENSTOCK. He asked me one more thing, this man. He asked 
me to watch her at the airport to see if she scratched her nose, which 
I guess was a signal, and I watched her, as best I could, because there 
were 200 of them milling around. 

He called me again at midnight. I had not seen anything, and that 
was that. He said, "Please forget about it. Thank you very much." 

And that was it, and I did, forget about it. I put it out of my 
mind, because I knew nothing of what it was about, but this man in 
Russia mentioned this ballerina's name to me and obviously knew 
exactly what had taken place, which again set me back, because in a 
sense, then, of course I had acted if not as an agent, I had helped an 
agent, so that he had me there. I mean, in a sense, I had been lying 
to him, except that I was not. I was not an agent, but in his eyes, of 
course, this was a complicity. 

Mr. Smith. Did this increase your fright? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. The fact that he knew about it? Yes, absolutely. 

Mr. Smith. Was he insistent on the point that you were an agent 
of the United States Gbvernment ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, he kept returning to it. If I was not CIA 
then I was FBI, and if I was not FBI I was CIA, and maybe I was 
both. 

Mr. Smith. Did he indulge in any self-criticism during your con- 
ference ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, we sort of both did, or rather, he indulged 
in self-criticism, I think, as a release of tension. He mentioned to me 
that he knew very well that the Russians send, when they send these 
cultural groups abroad, they send watchdogs to watch these Russian 
dancers, or whatever, and these people can be extremely unpleasant 
and make life extremely difficult for the dancers, as well as for the 
Americans, the Hurok staff that has to deal with them. And, you know, 
he mentioned that, was not that too bad that they, you know, were so 
awkward about this, and I jumped on this and said, "Yes, you know, 
it is true, terrible guys that you send," and sort of took an oppor- 
tunity to then let off steam and berate these people, and I think, also, 
that I told him a few names of these particularly unpleasant Russians. 

I don't know why he did it, but he did. 

Mr. Smith. Did Sorin accept your statement that you were not a 
U.S. agent? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, he never said that he did. He iust, you know, 
"Well, I know, I really know better" was his attitude "but we will let 
it ride." 

Mr. Smith. What transpired after the close of this incident about 
the ballerina ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, I don't remember exactly in what order 
everything went, but this was again on the point that I obviously had 
been an agent. I think that in the first meeting we had here sort of 
covered everything that was discussed. I am not sure then in what 
order, but it was several hours later when he did let me out and said, 
"I want you to think about what we have been talking about." 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 701 

Mr. Smith. Had you taken any breaks, or eaten during this 8 to 10 
hours of interrogation ? 

Miss BiENSTocK. Not at this first meeting ; no. 

Mr. Smith. He still had not stated what his purpose was ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Not at the first meeting ; no. 

Mr. Smith. And he excused you, and 

Miss Beenstock. Let me go. 

Mr. Smith. Told you to do what ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. To think about all the things that we had talked 
about. 

Mr. Smith. Did he give you any idea why you were to think about 
those things? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, I don't think specifically, except that he still 
had my passport; I was still in torment; I could not get out of the 
country. And then he kept calling me on the phone. I saw him the 
day after that for a second time, for another 7-hour session. And in 
the interim, he would call and he would not say anything; he would 
just say, "Hello," you know, "here I am, how are you?" 

I guess I sort of knew all the time I was on his string, and he would 
just keep touch with me, but he did not really say what it was that he 
specifically wanted, this first time aroimd. 

Mr. Smith. When were you summoned again by Sorin ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, I believe it was uie day after the first meet- 
ing, which should be sometime around the 9th of March. I am pretty 
certain. 

Mr. Smith. Of what year ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Of '62. 

Mr. Smith. And what was the date of the first meeting ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. I think, as best I can remember, it must have been 
around the 7th of March. 

Mr. Smith. And 2 days later he called you again ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Right. 

Mr. Smith. Will you describe what took place at this second meet- 
ing? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, it was in a different room this time. It was 
in ostensibly a hotel suite in the same hotel, Ukraine, but it was also 
bare and sort of stark, with nothing in it except brown, you know, 
suite furniture. 

Mr. Smith. Did the fact of bareness of the rooms, and so forth, have 
any psychological effect on you ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, it is very creepy and peculiar to be in a room 
that has no sign of human life before yours. I have never been in a 
room like that oefore, and also you can't hear anything in these rooms, 
and Russia is not noted for being soundproof, but it was very quiet 
in these rooms. 

Mr. Smith. Would you tell us what transpired at the second meet- 

Miss BiENSTOCK. On the second meeting, he again reiterated and 
reviewed all we had talked about, and without asking me, or, you 
know, he had a briefcase with him this time, and he took out a piece 
of paper — on which I don't remember if it was typed or handwritten, 
to tell you the truth — and he read it aloud to me, anyway, but I signed 
it, so I saw it, in which it stated that I would be an agent for the 



702 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

KGB, or actually stated that I was an agent for the KGB. And he 
then proceeded to tell me that^he went through a whole thing about 
how it would make no harm to the United States, it would not be hurt- 
ing this country and, actually, it was totally apolitical and it would 
do wonders for the cultural exchange, and that I would let the Soviet 
Government know which American agents or if there were American 
agents keeping tabs or having contact with Kussians, to tell them all 
the Americans that surrounded the Russians, and, also, if I thought 
that there were some dubious Russian citizens that were, you know, a 
bad influence or an unreliable type, that I should tell them this. 

But this took place, again, after several hours of rehashing all this 
old stuff. And in the meantime, finally he had ordered something to 
eat, and I must confess that not only did I eat, but I drank a lot of 
vodka, and I was also, again, quite hungry by the time he got to the 
food. 

Mr. Smith. How long had the session been going on before he 
ordered food ? 

Miss BiENSTocK. About 3 or 4 hours. It was dark when I finally 
left. I came there in the afternoon, or before lunch — 10 :30, 11, some- 
thing like this. But, so we had eaten, and during this meal he com- 
pletely stopped all sort of business, it was just food and drink. And 
then immediately after this meal — and unfortunately I think I was 
quite high by this time — he brought out this paper, and I must say 
I signed it. 

Mr. Smith. Did he give the paper to you to read, or what — did you 
have any idea what was in the document ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. He read it aloud to me and then gave it to me to 
sign. I mean, I did not sit there and read it myself. I saw it, so to 
speak, but I did not read it. 

Mr. Smith. Can you recall what some of the elements in the docu- 
ment were ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, it said that I was, or am, an agent. I, so and 
so, am an agent for the KGB, and I think it also mentioned that I 
would be known under two code names, I think they were in this 
paper. Do you want the code names ? 

Mr. Smith. No. Did you sign the document? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. I did sign the document ; yes. 

Mr. Smith. You said earlier that Sorin had told you that what you 
were to do for them would be apolitical and of benefit to both the 
U.S. and Russia in regard to the cultural exchange program. 

It would seem to me, however, that having you sign a document 
swearing to work for the KGB and assigning you a code name for 
that purpose they considered your future tasks as something more 
than simple or innocuous. Wouldn't you think so ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. I guess so. Of course, they probably — I did not 
think about anything just then, but in retrospect, in thinking, well, 
thinking about it in retrospect, I imagine that, eventually, they were 
hoping that maybe they could use me for something more worthwhile 
than what they actually used me for. 

Mr. Smith. Why did you feel that it was necessary for you to sign 
the document ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, I felt I had absolutely no choice; that if I 
did not sign the document, I would never get out of the Hotel Ukraine, 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 703 

let alone the Soviet Union. I could not get my passport; you cannot 
leave the Soviet Union without an exit visa. It is impossible. 

Mr. Smith. I see. Did you believe the United States would render 
any help to you in the event 

Miss BiENSTocK. Not in the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Smith. — You failed to return ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. No, certainly not in Russia. I was born in Czecho- 
slovakia, and in that sense, a foreigner. I felt I was completely alone 
there, and without my papers, even more alone. No, I did not think 
that anybody would help me, at all. 

Mr. Smith. In other words, you felt you were in a trap ? 

Miss BiENSTocK. Yes. A closed door. 

Mr. Smith. What transpired after you signed this document? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. After I signed the document, he then taught me 
how — well, he also said — and again I don't remember if it was writ- 
ten in the document, or if he told me this verbally only — that I woul^ 
relay this information about American agents in touch with Soviet 
citizens here to a man in New York by the name of Leo Sorokin, 
who was at 680 Park Avenue, which was the United Nations mission. 

And he then proceeded to teach me how I would relay these mes- 
sages to this man. 

Mr. Smith. I see. Would you describe how this message writing 
was to take place? 

Miss BiENSTocK. Well, he provided me with a packet of sort of, it 
looked like it had been used, an open packet of stationery, medium 
quality paper, decent quality, and he gave me another completely 
ordinary looking piece of paper, but it had been chemically treated, 
but you could not tell that it was. And the way one does it is, as you 
type out or you write out the dummy message, whatever it is, you 
know, the false message, I guess, double spaced, and then you put 
this on a hard surface, either glass or metal, face up. And on top of 
this, you put this thing which is called a carbon, but does not — you 
know, it looks like an ordinary sheet of paper, put this on top of this, 
and on top of that, you put another ordinary piece of paper, and you 
can sec where you have written through these papers, and then with 
a pencil, not — ^you know, medium pencil, not too sharp a point, you 
print. 

When you press hard, you print between the lines of this dummy 
message, and then you throw away, you know, the scrap paper and 
you put away the carbon, and then you can't see what has been 
written between the lines, and I think I forgot to mention there, but 
I said in the Justice Department statement, you then fix it by passing 
it over steam from a kettle, and then you send it. 

And when you receive such a thing, you get a styptic pencil or 
silver nitrate — you can buy it in any drug store — and you take off a 
little piece and you dissolve it in a tablespoonful of hot water, and 
then you take cotton and you swab between the lines, in a not too 
bright light, and then the message comes out, in brown. You know, 
the message that has been written. That is how you do it. 

Mr. Smith. Now you were to use this paper in writing to your con- 
tact that he had given you in New York ? 

Miss Beenstock. Yes. 



704 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. Smith. And did you receive communications from the contact 
in the same type of writing ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes. He wrote, I presume, in the same way, but I 
was instructed to develop it. I guess he wrote with the same kind of 
stuff. 

Mr. Smith. In secret writing ? 

Miss BiENSTocK. In secret writing. 

Mr. Smith. How were these letters signed that you wrote ? 

Miss BiENSTocK. I think I must have used one of the two code 
names. 

Mr. Smith. What were the two code names ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, one was a Kussian one, and the name was 
Nadzehda. 

Mr. Smith. Would you spell that, please ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. N-a-d-e-z-h-d-a. And the other was an American 
name, Andrew Courtney. 

Mr. Smith. How were these names chosen ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, Nadezhda, ironically enough, means "hope" 
in Russian. I don't know why he chose it. He chose it. Maybe he was 
being sarcastic. It is a common name, extremely common. And Andrew 
Courtney is just a name, myself, he asked me to choose a name that 
I would recognize and I would not expect to see. It is a name I pulled 
out of the past, somebody I knew and somebody I would not hear 
from again anyway, so just random choice. 

Mr. Smith. How much instruction did he give you in this com- 
munications method ? How many hours ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, I don't know. I don't remember, really, how 
long. He made me do it a couple of times. It is not very difficult. 

Mr. Smith. Was this all in the room that you previously described ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. This was all in this same second room ; yes. 

Mr. Smith. This was chemically treated paper that he gave you? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. I don't think that the stationery was. I am not 
sure. But the one sheet that you use when you write this, the sheet 
that makes the impression, I assume is, has to be, chemically treated ; 
yes. 

Mr. Smith. Did he give you a supply of the paper? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. No, he gave me just one sheet, maybe two, of this 
chemically treate(i stuff, but no, no great supply ; no. 

Mr, Smith. In short, you were to become a spy, or an informant for 
the KGB, on Americans and on their own people as well ? 

To whom were you to send these messages that you were to write? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. To this man in New York, by the name of Leo 
Sorokin, at 680 Park Avenue, which is the address, was the address 
of the Soviet mission there, U.N. mission. 

Mr. Smith. Did Sorin give you any further instructions beyond 
this? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes, he did. He told me that he wanted me to meet 
an unspecified agent in the United States — well, do you want to know 
when? On the 27th of April 1962, at 10 :15 p.m., I was supposed to go 
to 169th Street and Morris Avenue in the Bronx, and if I did not— 
this man was to identify me. I did not know who it was, and if this 
did not take place, I was supposed to go exactly 2 weeks later. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 705 

' Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, at this point, I would like to introduce 
for the record the fact that an Alexander Sorokin, S-o-r-o-k-i-n, was 
formerly an attache at the Russian Embassy in Mexico and that he 
came to the United States Soviet U.N. mission in 1960 and was in this 
country through August 23, 1963. 

Mr. Tuck. Unless there is objection, and the Chair hears none, so 
ordered. 

Mr. SMrrH. Was this the extent of your last meeting with Sorin, 
when he had instructed you on secret writing ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes ; it was dark when I left, and I never saw him 
again. 

Mr. Smith. How long had this last session lasted ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Seven, eight hours. 

Mr. Smith. Did he order food this time ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. This is the second time ; yes. Someplace, midstream, 
he ordered food and vodka. 

Mr. Smith. How did, or did he return your passport to you at this 
time? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes ; at this time, he did. 

Mr. Smith. And you had no further contact with him, in person or 
by mail ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. No. 

Mr. Smith. What did you do then ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, my airplane, which I think was Air France, 
did not leave Moscow until early on the 13th of March, so I had these 
2 days, or what-have-you, left in the Soviet Union. And in the worst 
way, I did not want to be in Moscow, so I asked him if I could get an 
airline ticket and go to Leningrad, and he said, all right, you know, I 
could do that, and I did. 

I spent the — I left, I guess this was the evening of the 9th. I left 
sometime on the 10th and I went to Leningrad, and left Leningrad on 
the 12th ; and the 13th, very early in the morning, I left the country. 

Mr. Smith. Yes. Did you return to Moscow ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. I had to return to Moscow on the 12th. 

Mr. Smith. I see. When did you return to Moscow? You went to 
Leningrad over the weekend ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. On the 10th. 

Mr. Smith. And you returned to Moscow on the 11th ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. On the 12th. 

Mr. Smith. I see ; the 12th. Do you believe that Rassadin had any- 
thing to do with your being approached by the KGB ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. I honestly don't know. I really — it is possible, it is 
quite possible, but it is nothing that I could definitely swear to. I just 
don't know. 

Mr. Smith. Did anything significant occur on this second trip to 
Leningrad ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, I felt terribly lonely and frightened, ashamed 
of myself, all kinds of feelings. I tried to tell him about it, and he 
simply, absolutely, just refused to listen. He said "I don't want to hear 
about it. Don't tell me about it, don't tell anybody about it." You 
know, just "No. I don't want to hear about it." 

Mr. Smith. Did he give you any reason why he did not want to hear 
about it ? 



706 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Miss BiENSTOCK. No; he kept saying "no." You know, "My ears are 
closed, just shut up, I don't want to hear about it." And in a sense, 
this made it even worse, because it was like, well, it just made it much 
worse. 

Mr. Smith. Did you see Rassadin at any time after this second trip ? 

Miss BlENSTOCK. No. 

Mr. Smith. Now, Miss Bienstock, when you returned to the United 
States, did you follow through with Sorin's instructions to you ? 

Miss Bienstock. Yes, unfortunately. 

Mr. Smith. Were you successful ? 

Miss Bienstock. Successful in what ? 

Mr. Smith. In transmission of names and communications with the 
contact in New York ? 

Miss Bienstock. Yes ; but I would like to add that I did not write 
first. I wrote in answer to a request. 

Mr. Smith. Did you attempt to make contact 2 weeks later as in- 
structed by Sorin ? 

Miss Bienstock. Yes, I did. I did not stay there as long as I was 
supposed to, which I think was 10 minutes, but I went up there, and 
there was nobody there. It was a completely empty street, so I quickly 
left and never went back again. 

Mr. Smith. Where was the meeting to take place ? 

Miss Bienstock. It was in the Bronx, on 169th Street and Morris 
Avenue. 

Mr. Smith. In a building or on the street ? 

Miss Bienstock. Out in the street. 

Mr. Smith. Was there any — did he give you any indications as to 
how you would recognize the contact ? 

Miss Bienstock. No. I think that they were 

Mr. Smith. Was he to recognize you ? 

Miss Bienstock. Yes ; going to recognize me. 

Mr. Smith. Did you hear from Soviet intelligence in regard to this 
contact that you failed to make ? 

Miss Bienstock. Yes, I did. I got a letter saying that they were 
sorry they had missed me. He did not say who it was that missed me. 
It was irom this man, but he did not say it was him, and proceeded to 
ask me for the information, all the Americans connected with the Rus- 
sians and the names of American agents who had been in touch with 
Russians or myself, and I gave him the names of American agents who 
were in touch with myself. I don't know about any agents in touch 
with Russians. 

Mr. Smith. Then it was Sorokin who was to meet you there. 

Miss Bienstock. They did not really ever 

Mr. Smith. As far as you know. 

Miss Bienstock. They never specified. It could have been, it could 
have been someone else, but the man in Moscow never said it was going 
to be him, and Sorokin in his letters never said "I." He always used 
the plural "we." I don't know ; it could be. 

Mr. Smith. Did you ever meet Sorokin in person ? 

Miss Bienstock. Not to my knowledge, have I ever met him. 

Mr. Smith. You were residing in New York at this time ? 

Miss Bienstock. Yes ; uptown. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 707 

Mr. Smith, Was Sorokin angry at the fact that you did not make 
the second contact 2 weeks after the first one ? 

Miss BiENSTOGK. Well, I don't remember if he was specifically angry 
at that, but his letters became less and less pleasant with time, because 
they kept berating me for not giving them any information, and I 
really had no information to give them. 

Mr. Smith. Were his letters to you in this secret communications 
code? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes, they were. 

Mr. Smith. And how did he sign them ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, I don't really also exactly remember. I think 
that the dummy letters, you know, the dummy letters were signed 
"Andrew Courtney." I think this was the symbol or sign. I don't recall 
really that the secret writing were signed by anybody. 

They were in secret writing. He may have signed them "Leo." But 
maybe not. I mean 

Mr. Smith. How did you bring out the secret writing in the dummy 
letter? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, by this process of taking styptic pencil, silver 
nitrate, and dissolving it in hot water, a little bit, and then you swab 
in between the dummy lines; you know, the printed, whatever it is, 
message, you swab with cotton, in a dim light, and shortly thereafter, 
seconds, whatever, or minutes, this brown writing comes through; 
it is in brown, looks brown. 

Mr. Smith. Did Sorokin continue to correspond with you in spite 
of the fact you had not made this contact ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. Could you tell us what you did furnish to him and 
why it was not to his satisfaction ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, I could not help but keep repeating myself. 
I furnished him with the names of the Hurok staff as Americans who 
had, well, who were obviously with Russians, you know. I could not 
possibly say they were agents. They probably were not, and I don't 
know that they were. I also provided him with names which were also 
in the Hurok staff as public knowledge, the State Department, some 
of the State Department people who would be assigned to us, again, 
as cultural exchange people, public knowledge. 

Do you want their names ? 

Mr. Smith. Yes. - 

Miss BiENSTOCK. One man's name was Vladimir DeGrave, who was 
with the State Department, and Natalie Kushnir, also with the State 
Department, oflficially, openly. 

Mr. Smith. Were these people associated with the cultural exchange 
program ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. I believe they were. 

Mr. Smith. Of the State Department ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes. I think so. And then I supplied them with 
the names of all the Hurok staff, which — George and Edward Perper, 
and Oscar Berlin, Simon Semenoff, and Martin Feinstein, and I can't 
think of who else worked for Hurok, but whoever worked for Hurok. 

Mr. Smith. Anyone who came in contact with you or the exchange 
personnel ? 



708 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHEST THE UNITED STATES 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Who was in connection, right. People who traveled 
with us and worked with us. 

Mr. Smith. Yes. Then, as I understand it, you were not actually 
furnishing him with any background information, but merely names 
of persons who came in contact with these Russian people? 

Miss BiENSTocK. Right. Yes. 

Mr. Smith, How many of these letters were written between you 
and Sorokin? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, I don't remember exactly. I am pretty sure 
he wrote me more than I wrote him, but I would say that approxi- 
mately seven, in total. 

Mr. Smith. Seven, total. 

Miss BnJNSTOcK. Approximately ; yes. 

Mr. Smith. Over what period of time were they written ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, they were written from somewhere around 
April 1962 to somewhere — the last message could have been no later 
than February 1963. 

Mr. Smith. From where were they written ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, I think most of them were written from New 
York City. It is quite possible that I sent, well, I severed from Ithaca, 
New York, with them. I probably sent a letter from Chicago, maybe 
Vancouver, B.C., and maybe Los Angeles. 

Mr. Smith. You were traveling with Hurok Attractions at that 
time, and you wrote these letters from wherever you were ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes; I worked one more job for Hurok with the 
Ukrainian Dance Company, and then I quit. 

Mr. Smith. Were there additional names furnished to Sorokin over 
those you have mentioned ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes, there were. I have my notes here. Let's see. 
They kept asking me about disloyal Russians, and I don't know any 
disloyal Russians, offhand, so I repeated again the name of this bal- 
lerina. Do you want the name? 

Mr. Smith. Yes. 

Miss BiENSTOCK. It is a long one, it is Natalie Slavachevskaya 
Banoukhina. 

You know, I simply reiterated, you know, already, who. So that is 
one. I may have mentioned when I severed with them two Soviet 
exchange students at Cornell, who they certainly knew about anyway. 
Do you want their names ? 

Mr. Smith. Yes. 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Igor Tsymbal and Anatoli Kasharov. 

And I rnight have mentioned a Cornell student who again was pub- 
licly associated with them. Everybody knew about him, and I might 
have mentioned him. His name isLeon Kenman. 

And I also gave them the names of some FBI and some CIA or 
Defense Department people that had contact with me and I think 
there were about three or four of them. 

Mr. Smith. Thank you. Did he accept this information as satisfac- 
tory? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, he accepted it, but he did not think it was 
very satisfactory. They kept pushing me to give more names, to tell 
them who was recruiting, among the Americans, and I just, you know. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 709 

I could not furnish him with this information, and in general, I 
wanted to furnish him with as little as possible. 

Mr. Smith. And you furnished nothing more than their names and 
affiliations ? 

Miss BiENSTocK. That is right. Nothing else. 

Mr. Smith. From the fact that he was writing you these harsh let- 
ters, did you ^et the impression that he was pushing you into more 
and more espionage activity? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, maybe not espionage activity specifically, 
but he was obviously very irritated. I don't Know what he wanted, 
whether he wanted background information. He was asking me for 
things that I did not want to give and did not know anyway. 

Mr. Smith. Did you ever receive any remuneration from the KGB ? 

Miss BiENSTocK. Never. 

Mr. Smith. For your services? 

Miss BlENSTOGK. No. 

Mr. Smith. Have you had any further contact with Russian intel- 
ligence or any other intelligence organization ? 

Miss Bienstock. No. 

Mr. Smith. And when did you break off this relationship with 
Sorokin ? 

Miss Bienstock. No later than February 1963. 

Mr. Tuck. Did they pay you anything? 

Miss Bienstock. Pardon? 

Mr. Tuck. Were you on the payroll of the organization? 

Miss Bienstock. No. 

Mr. Tuck. Does the witness have with her any of the copies of the 
correspondence that she had with this man ? 

Miss Bienstock. No, I don't. I destroyed it. 

Mr. Tuck. Did you get expense money? 

Miss Bienstock. No. 

Mr. Smith. I believe you stated that you destroyed the letters that 
you received. 

Miss Bienstock. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. What did you do with the chemically treated paper 
that they gave you? 

Miss Bienstock. I destroyed it, too. 

Mr. Smith. Did you make this entire episode known to the proper 
American authorities? 

Miss Bienstock. I did, much later, in — when was it, 1964? 

Mr. Smith. Why did you not inform the FBI of your activities 
upon your return to the United States when you were out from under 
this coercive influence? 

Miss Bienstock. Well, frankly, I was very afraid that I would be 
deported if I did. I had signed a paper saying I was an agent and I 
had convinced myself that I was guilty and it was too late and that, 
if I told anybody about it, I would be put in jail or deported, and 
back to the Iron Curtain. 

Mr. Smith. You broke with the KGB in February 1963, but it 
was fully a year and a half later before you made your story known 
to the Bureau — the FBI. 

Miss Bienstock. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. Was that also due to fear? 

79-422 O — 68 11 



710 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Miss BiENSTOCK. That I made my story known to the Bureau ? 

Mr. Smith. This year and a half lapse before you made the story 
known. 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, since I never heard from them after I 
severed from them, I hoped, sort of in my own stupid way, that it 
would all go away and it would be forgotten. And I put it out of 
my mind and sort of put my head in the sand and, you know, hoped 
and prayed that it would have nothing to do with me ever again. 

Mr. Smith. Did any U.S. authorities contact you ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. The FBI first contacted me. 

Mr. Smith. This is after you had broken with Sorokin? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. And would you describe what took place? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, they came to Ithaca. I was at that time a 
student at Cornell and I had no idea that they had come about this, 
and they did not begin by asking questions about this at all, but they 
very quickly asked me if there was anything that I felt I wanted to 
tell them, and I sort of made up my mind right there that I would 
tell them, and so I think over a period of 2 days I made a very lengthy 
deposition to them about the whole matter. 

Mr. Smith, Did you get the impression they knew about your 
activities ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, I was not sure. At first I had no idea that 
they did, but then when they asked me "do you have anything to say?" 
I felt that they were giving me a chance, you know, to say it myself 
and I was relieved to do so. 

Mr. Smith. Were you aware that your activities with the KGB 
made it obligatory for you to file with the Justice Department as 
an agent of a foreign government? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. No, I did not know that. 

Mr. Smith. How did you learn of this ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, after speaking to the FBI, for that time, 
see, that was in the summer of 1964, I believe in September of 1964, 
I got a letter from the Justice Department, informing me that I had 
to register retroactively, which I did. 

Mr. Smith. Did you so register ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes, I did register. 

Mr. Smith. And that is a matter of record with the Department of 
Justice now ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. Miss Bienstock, I have no further questions to ask of 
you, but I wonder, in view of your experience, if you have a statement 
to make? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, the only statement I could make is sort of 
a very personal one, about myself rather than anything else. 

Mr. Smith. All right. 

Miss BiENSTOCK. I feel all of this has happened in my life, a long 
time ago, and I was then considerably younger, and still I feel 

Mr. Smith. Would you speak up, please? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, I was then considerably younger and still 
relatively immature. I was terribly frightened and felt completely 
lost and doomed. Never did I want to cooperate with the KGB and 
I wrote as little as I possibly could and tried in every way to make 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 711 

these letters to them as innocuous to the United States and the people 
named in these letters as I could. 

I believed then, as I do now, and hope now that I did no damage 
to this country, not to any persons. I sincerely regret my involvement 
with the KGB ; and if I knew then what I know today, if I were able 
to think clearly and without panic then, I would have gone imme- 
diately to the FBI on my return from Moscow in 1962. 

Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my interrogation. 

Mr. Tuck. As the chairman of the subcommittee, I wish to commend 
this lady for the information which she has brought us. The House 
of Representatives is now in session, a very important session, which 
will require us to go to the floor in a few minutes. 

I have no questions, but if any of the committee may have. 

Mr. Eoudebush. 

Mr. RouDEBUSH. Just one, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to ask Miss Bienstock did she ever withhold informa- 
tion from the Russians that she felt might have been of value to them ? 

Miss Bienstock. Well, if I did withhold things, they were things 
of a personal nature. I did know some things about these kids and how 
they felt about things, but I did not feel it was their business to know 
this. 

Mr. RouDEBUSH. Then you did withhold information from the 
Russians? 

Miss Bienstock. In that sense, yes. 

Mr. RouDEBUSH. Since your meeting with the FBI in 1964, 1 believe 
that was the date, have you ever been contacted, knowingly been under 
surveillance by the Russians? Have you been subject to any intimida- 
tion by the Russians? 

Miss Bienstock. No. 

Mr. RouDEBUSH. That is all I have. 

Mr. Tuck. The gentleman from South Carolina? 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Chairman, I will speak up. I don't think we need 
that mike. 

I want to thank Miss Bienstock for her assistance here. I have one 
question. In view of the fact that I believe you stated that most of 
your family had either been executed or imprisoned by the Soviets, 
what prompted you to expose yourself in tne first place to such a 
place as that ? To get yourself into this situation ? 

Miss Bienstock. My foolish and bad thinking. I guess because of 
working for Hurok and being so long among Soviets, and bein^ with 
Hurok m a cultural exchange, and again not being born myself in the 
Soviet Union, and all of this was in the past, and everything was— 
well, there was the cultural exchange, and jjeople were traveling and 
it was the thing to do, in that sense. I mean, it was all right to go. 

I just did not think. My mother, of course, would never have set 
foot in the place and has always told me to be careful, but I just did 
not think that they would bother me. I had never seen their bad side 
before, personally, anyway. 

Mr. Watson. Well, it is obvious that you were some 5 or 6 years 
younger that you are now. You are quite youn^ now. What was your 
age — and I don't want that to be an mcriminating statement — at that 
time? 

Miss Bienstock. I was 25. Not so young. 



712 CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. Watson. At that time. Well, frankly, you don't look older than 
that now, but anyway I can't quite understand; did you say it was 
Sorin or Sorokin that advised you to meet this agent on April the 
27th? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. The man in Moscow, Sorin, instructed me to meet 
this agent, so the instruction was from Moscow. But Sorokin wrote 
to me, saying that they had missed me at this meeting. 

Mr. Watson. And even a month and a half distant, I believe you 
said that you talked with Sorin at the Hotel Ukraine on March 7th or 
9th, or both days. 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes. 

Mr. Watson. And he had apparently outlined the plan sufficientij- 
in advance to advise you to meet someone a month and a half later, 
or almost 2 months, at 10:30 in the evening on April the 27th at a 
specific corner. 

Miss BiENSTooK. Yes. 

Mr. Watson. He had it pretty well outlined for you, didn't he? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes. 

Mr. Watson. And I was quite surprised. These people impress me 
as being masters of this game of espionage, and so forth. Did I under- 
stand you correctly that when he advised you about the code name and 
got you to sign this paper, admitting that you were a KGB agent, or 
what-have-you, that that was after you had had lunch and a session of 
drinking? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes. 

Mr. Watson. Did I recall further that you said at the time you 
were rather high ? Did you make that statement ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. I did. 

Mr. Watson. And you mean to tell me even under those circum- 
stances that such a man as Viktor Sorin, who apparently was a man 
well versed in this, with the secret police, that under those circum- 
stances, he would ask you to sign a statement and give you instruc- 
tions as to how to transmit secret codes ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. He did. 

Mr. Watson. He did, under those circumstances ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes. 

Mr. Watson. It is quite obvious that they would use any tjrpe per- 
son, or whether they were in their right minds or not in their right 
minds, but apparently you were sufficiently sober to retain the instruc- 
tions that he gave you, and so forth. 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes. 

Mr. Watson. Now you said you gave the names of two FBI agents, 
or some FBI agents. Were they in touch with you through Hurok or 
in touch with the ballet companies, or what ? 

How did you know these agents ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Well, I began to meet FBI agents when I had that 
job for NYU with the Soviet physicists, and I would be debriefed 
after almost every trip I ever took with the Russians. 

They would come and they would simply ask if any untoward things 
had happened, or if there was anything that, you know, was particu- 
larly interesting. Sometimes they would show me photographs of 
people not connected specifically with — well, not connected at all with 
the dance group, but you know, could I identify these people, did I 
know them. 



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 713 

Mr. Watson. I can understand the fear under which you were op- 
erating, but, still, you had contact with FBI agents long before you 
ever reported your activities to the Justice Department or the FBI. 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes, I had contacts. 

Mr. Watson. To what extent did the members of the State Depart- 
ment who were directly involved in the cultural exchange program — 
and the names that you gave sounded very Russian to me — were they 
Russian natives ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. I am not sure. I think that the girl was already 
born here. They were, I don't think they were actually constant State 
Department officials. 

I think that they were interpreters. I don't know what it is called. 
I once passed such an examination myself for the State Department. 

They are people whom the State Department uses as interpreters, 
and I think as liaison. Now the elder man, Vladimir DeGrave, I 
assume, might have been born in Russia ; yes. 

Mr. Watson. Did they have direct contacts with the Russian ballet 
companies ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. They traveled with us and lived in the same hotels 
with us. 

Mr. Watson. In other words, they were with you most of the time ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes. 

Mr. Watson. It was not just an intermittent contact, inquiring as 
to how the exchange program was going ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. No. 

Mr. Watson. Or how the performance was going? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. No. 

Mr. Watson. We certainly want to thank you again for the contri- 
bution you have made, and it is quite obvious, I think, from your 
experience that the Soviets are going to, take advantage of every op- 
portunity to try to recruit and enlist American citizens in the espio- 
nage activity. 

That is a fair statement, isn't it, young lady ? 

Miss BiENSTOCK. Yes, I think it is. 

Mr. Watson. Thank you. 

Mr. Tuck. Again I wish to thank the witness for her cooperation. 
The committee will adjourn, to meet again upon the call of the Chair. 

(Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., Wednesday, November 15, 1967, the 
subcommittee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.) 



INDEX 



INDIVIDUALS 

A P«»e 

Andreyev, Leonid 694 

B 

Banoukhina, Slavachevskaya Natalie 708 

Bebbit 688 

Bentley, Elizabeth (Terrill) 570 

Berlin, Gerald 692 

Berlin, Oscar 688, 707 

Beryozka 694 

Bienstock, Natalie Anna 565-568, 692-713 (testimony) 

Boeckenhaupt, Herbert W. (William) 555, 578, 608 

Bon, Mikhailovich Michael 687 

Boutenko, Vladimir 554, 555, 576, 577, 580, 592, 599 

Boutenko (Mrs. Vladimir) 576, 577 

Burnett, Elizabeth (Mrs. Harry Burnett) 605,614 

Burnett, Harry 604, 605, 607, 613-615 

Chambers, Whittaker 570 

Courtney, Andrew. (See Bienstock, Natalie Anna.) 

D 

DeGrave, Vladimir 707, 713 

Domar, Rebecca 693 

E 
Epstein, Leonard I 557-560, 618-641 (testimony) 

F 

Fediay, Victor Alexeevich 687 

Feinstein, Martin 707 

H 
Hayes, Diana 686 

Hoover, J. Edgar (John Edgar) 570, 593 

Huminik, John, Jr 553-557, 571-616 (testimony), 664, 685 

Huminik (Mrs. John, Jr.) 576 



Isakov, Vadim 558-560, 621-626, 627-637, 639, 640 

Izvekov, Aleksandr N 554,573,574,-592,599 

J 
Johnson, Robert D 563, 644, 647, 651, 656, 664, 665, 668, 672, 673 

K 

Kasharov, Anatoli 708 

Kenman, Leon _ 708 

Kerensky (Alexander Fedorovich) i 682, i 683 

Knight (Frances G.) 647 

Kushnir, Natalie 707 

Kuznetsov, Anatole 554, 575, 592 

> SpeUed "KerensMl." 

i 



ii INDEX 

L Page 

Liakhov (Lyakhov), V 615, 688 

Lisle, Ra3niiond 671-674 

Lukianov, Vassilii Vassilievich 685, 686 

Lyakhov, V. (See Liakhov, V.) 

M 

Malinin, Aleksy R 555, 577, 578 

Mazhorov, V 594, 614 

McNamara, Francis 685, 686 

Mrkva, Frank John 560-565, 644-680 (testimony) 

Mrkva (Mrs. Frank John) 562, 659, 665 

Miilvena, William 578 

N 

Nadzehda. (See Beinstock, Natalie Anna.) 

O 

Opatrny, Jiri 562-565, 645, 646, 656-660, 665, 667-671 , 673-679 

P 

Perper, Edward 707 

Perper, George 707 

Pisk, Zdenek 561-564, 645-650, 652, 653, 655, 657-660, 665, 667 

Piatt, Jerry 613 

R 

Rassadin, Constantine 566, 695, 696, 705, 706 

Reeve, Franklin D 694 

Revin, Valentin 555, 

556, 574-576, 578, 582-586, 588-590, 592, 599, 602, 603, 606, 609 

Richter, Sviatoslav 694 

Rolich or Rolikh, Alexander Ivanovich 686 

Rosenberg (Ethel, Mrs. Julius Rosenberg) 588 

Rosenberg (Julius) 588 

Ryan, W. (William F.) 683 

S 

Semenoflf, Simon 707 

Shtdman, Marshall..^ 613, 614 

Sorin, Viktor 566, 567, 696-698, 700-702, 705, 706, 7 1 2 

Sorokin, Alexander (see ako Sorokin, Leo) 567, 705 

Sorokin, Leo (see also Sorokin, Alexander) 567, 703, 704, 706, 707, 710, 712 

Stiefel, Amdt 621, 622, 636 

Stupar, Sergei N 554, 556, 574-576, 788-580, 582, 592, 596, 599, 605, 607, 614 

T 

Tsymbal, Igor 708 

Tykocinski, Wladyslaw 570 

V 
Voznesensky, Andrei 694 

W 
Whalen (WUliam Henry) 588, 608 

Y 
Yohrling, George 557,558,619,630 

Z 
Zorov, Vladimir 554, 577, 592 



INDEX iii 

ORGANIZATIONS 

A 

ASM. (See American Society for Metals.) 

AS ME. (See American Society for Mechanical Engineers.) Page 

American Bosch Arma Corporation 558, 559, 623, 629, 630 

American Ordnance Association 598 

American Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME) 638 

American Society for Metals (ASM) _ . 553-555, 574, 577, 579, 597, 603, 605, 638 
American Welding Society 555, 577 

C 

Chemprox Corporation 554, 576, 595, 596, 612, 613, 615 

Czechoslovakia, Government of 648 

Embassy, Washington, D.C- 561-563, 645, 646, 648-650, 652, 660, 665, 678 



GRU. (See entry under Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Government 
of, Defense (War), Ministry of. Army.) 

General Dynamics Corp 633 

General Precision Aerospace, Kearfott Division 623, 628, 629, 640 

H 
Hurok Attractions, Inc 566, 567, 688, 693-695, 700, 707, 708 

I 

IBM (Corporation) 559, 628 

Institute of Ferrous Metallurgy 574, 596 

Intourist, Inc 566 

K 

KGB. (See entry under Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Government 

of, Secret Police.) 
Kidde Manufacturing Company, The 625, 640 

M 
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co 623, 629 

N 
National Worker's Union - 685 

R 

Radio Free Europe 596 

Russian-Facist Union (Warsaw) 687 

S 

Society of Automotive Engineers 638 

Sperry Gyroscope 559 

T 

Tass News Agency (TASS) 595, 596, 615 

Trans- American Machinery and Equipment Corporation 619 



iv INDEX 



U 



UNICEF. (See United Nations, International Children's Emergency- 
Fund.) Page 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Government of 565 

Consulates : 

Washington, D.C 576 

Defense (War), Ministry of 
Army: 

GRU (Military Intelligence) 555, 676, 577, 592 

Embassies: 

Mexico 567, 570, 705 

Washington, D.C -. 554, 

555, 573-575, 577, 578, 581, 592, 595, 599, 604-607, 611-613 

Scientific Division 574 

Secret Police: 

KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti — Committee for 

State Security) 555, 

566-568, 575, 578, 592, 695-697, 702, 705, 709-712 

United Nations 560,621,622,632-635,637 

International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 558, 

560, 621, 622, 625-627, 633, 635, 636 

Soviet mission 567 

United States Government: 

Army, Department of the 595, 613 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 565, 

574, 589, 594, 612, 643, 684, 685, 700, 708 

Defense, Department of 708 

House of Representatives, United States: 

House Appropriations Subcommittee 570 

Justice Department: 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 554, 

556, 557, 559, 561, 565, 568, 573, 574, 578, 580, 582, 585-588, 
593-597, 599, 602-604, 608, 610-613, 615, 626, 627, 634r-637, 
641, 643, 650, 651, 655, 656, 663, 668, 669, 672, 676', 682, 684- 
686, 700, 708-713. 

State Department 560- 

565, 574, 575, 607, 608, 611, 613, 621, 645, 646, 654, 655, 663, 
667, 670, 671, 673, 674, 678, 679, 713. 
Bureau of European Afifairs: 

OflBce of Eastern European Affairs 564, 671 

Foreign Service 654 

Passport Office 646,651,653,667,678 

V 
Vare Industries 558, 623, 625 

PUBLICATIONS 

B 

Basic Russian (Rebecca Domar) (book) 693 

F 
Facelifting (article) 595, 614, 615 

H 
High Temperance Inorganic Coatings (John Huminik, Jr.) (book) 553,573 

I 
Izvestia 557, 574, 594, 595, 605-607, 612, 614, 643, 680, 684 

M 
Made in the FBI (article) 594, 596, 612-614 

P 
Painters, The (article) 565,643,681-689 

o 



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