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Full text of "Control of explosives : administration and execution of the laws pertaining to the control of explosives : hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, second session, April 8 and 9, 1976"

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Administration and Execution of the Laws Pertaining to 
the Control of Explosives 











APRIL 8 AND 9, 1976 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 




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earchi franklin pierce law center 

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ON DEPOSIT AUG 2 6 1976 


Administration and Execution of the Laws Pertaining to 
the Control of Explosives 











APRIL 8 AND 9, 1976 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 





1 07^ V ^*"^ ^^^® ^^ ^^® Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Governnient Printing Office 

*" ' "* Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 90 cents 

pt.l There Is a minimum charge of $1.00 for each mail order 

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JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan 
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana 
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, North Dalvota 
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 
JOHN V. TUNNEY, California 
JAMES ABOUREZK, South Dalcota 

ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraslca 
HIRAM L. PONG, Hawaii 
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania 
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina 
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland 

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal 

Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas STROM THURMOND, South Carolina 


Richard L. Schultz, Chief Counsel 

Caroline M. Courbois, Assistant to the Chief Counsel 

Alfonso L. Tarabochia, Chief In vestigator 

Robert J. Short, Senior Investigator 

Mary E. Dooley, Research Director 

David Martin, Senior Analyst 




Thursday, April 8, 1976 1 

Testimony of Rex D. Davis, accompanied by Stephen E. Higgins, 

John F. Corbin, Jr., A. Atley Peterson, and Marvin J. Dessler 

Friday, April 9, 1976 27 

(Continuation of Thursday, April 8.) 



Administration and Execution of tlie Laws Pertaining to the 
Control of Explosives 


U.S. Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act 

AND Other Internal Security Laws 

OF THE Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 :45 p.m., in room 357, 
Russell Senate Office Building, Senator William L. Scott of Virginia, 

Also present : Richard L. Schultz, chief counsel ; Robert J. Short, 
senior investigator ; and David Martin, senior analyst. 

Senator Scott. The subcommittee will come to order. Chairman 
Eastland has asked me to preside on his behalf this afternoon and the 
Senate, as you know, is in session, and I believe that we will have a 
number of roll calls. So I ask that the witnesses be as concise as they 
can, not leaving out anything that they would want to come before 
the subcommittee. 

You will, I hope, understand if I have to leave and go vote because 
we are considering food stamp legislation and there are a number of 
amendments and one half an hour limitation on the amendments, so, 
it is likely that within the 20 minutes next that we will have a recess 
for a roll call. 

The Subcommittee on Internal Security meets today for the pur- 
pose of receiving testimony and evidence relevant to the adequacy of 
the laws and regulations pertaining to the control of explosives and 
the administration thereof. 

This oversight inquiry is conducted pursuant to a resolution adopted 
by action of the subcommittee on March 9, 1976. In considering the 
adoption of this resolution, the subcommittee was not unmindful of 
the plethora of materials and statistical data which is compiled periodi- 
cally for the purpose of cataloging the occurrence and extent of per- 
sonal injury, property damage, and loss of productive man hours which 
result from the criminal use of explosives. 

Though meaningful and relevant for the purposes of assessing the 
magnitude of the criminal use of explosives, these statistics fail to pro- 
vide us with answers to questions concerning how explosives are 
acquired by those bent on criminal endeavor. The focus of our inquiry 
then will be on the illegal acquisition of explosives. The subcommittee 
will not concern itself with labels or characterizations, whether self- 

proclaimed or publicly assigned, by which individuals or groups may 
attempt to cloud the true criminal nature of their activities. 

Surely no one ^YOuld argue that there is comfort to be taken from 
knowing that a loved one was killed by a political activist, or argue 
that the absence of a terrorist label, or the absence of a characterization 
as a political activist, that the use of explosives which result in human 
suHering, do not impinge directly on the internal security of our 

Today's hearing is the first of a series of hearings which we hope to 
complete within the coming months. We are pleased to have as our 
initial witness, the distinguished director of the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms, Mr. Rex D. Davis. 

Mr. Davis has provided the subcommittee with a prepared state- 
ment by which he presents an overview of the issues relating to the 
control and handling of explosives. 

Mr. Davis, I want to thank you, on behalf of the subcommittee, for 
coming here toda3\ We are looking forward to your testimony. 

Would you please stand and be sworn ? 

Mr. ScHULTz. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Davis may call upon the gentle- 
men with him and I was wondering if they could be sworn also 'I 

[Whereupon, the witnesses were sworn by Senator Scott.] 

Before you commence, I do have a statement that Senator Thurmond 
has asked me to submit for the record and it will be inserted in the 
record at this point. 

[The statement referred to follows :] 

Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond 

If I may be permitted to add a few words to the Chairman's remarl^s, I would 
lilte to say that I have a major personal interest in this entire problem because 
I have chaired some 5 or 6 hearings on the subject of terrorism conducted by 
the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. The impression I have from these 
hearings is that it is really incredibly easy for terrorists to acquire large quanti- 
ties of explosives. This is an alarming situation. 

The question naturally arises : Are we doing everything that can be done to 
control and monitor the production and distribution of explosives of all kinds, 
so that anti-social elements will find it more difficult to acquire them for criminal 
and terrorist use? Although I don't want to anticipate the testimony of our dis- 
tinguished witness, my impression is that the machinery of control can be im- 
proved in a number of ways and I welcome the opportunity to explore this prob- 
lem with someone as knowledgeable as the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms, Mr. Rex D. Davis. 


Mr. Davis. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear lie- 
fore this distinguished committee to report on our administration of 
the Federal laws that relate to explosive materials and the bombs that 
are sometimes made from them. 

I would like to introduce those members of my staff who are here 
with me today: Mr. Stephen E. Higgins, Acting Deputy Director; 

Mr. John F. Corbin, Jr., Assistant Director for Criminal Enforce- 
ment ; INIr. A. Atley Peterson, Acting Assistant Director for Technical 
and Scientific Services; and Mr. Marvin J. Dessler, our Chief Coimsel. 

My prepared testimony is rather lengthy, and with your permis- 
sion, I will simply highlight it and then answer any questions which 
the subcommittee may have. 

Mr. Scott. Th( entire statement will be received for the record and 
I think that that is \'ery kind oi you to give us the highlights. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Davis follows.] 

Prepared Statement of Rex D. Davis, Director 

Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, I am Rex D. Davis, Director, 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Department of the Treasury. I am 
here in response to your request to provide information on the Bureau's adminis- 
tration and enforcement of Title XI, Regulation of Explosives, as contained in 
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, as well as our enforcement of the Na- 
tional Firearms Act as it relates to destructive devices. 

It is a pleasure to appear before this distinguished subcommittee to report on 
our administration of the Federal laws that relate to explosive materials and 
the bombs that are sometimes made from them. With the subcommittee's per- 
mission, I would like to first summarize the events leading to our appearance 
here today. Following that, I will present to the subcommittee our efforts to 
regulate the explosives industry in conjunction with other Government agencies, 
as well as showing the current trend in bombings and the difficulty which our 
agents encounter when trying to investigate a bombing, which includes deter- 
mining how the bomber acquired the explosives used. 

In 1968, Congress enacted the Gun Control Act of 1968. Title II of the Act 
amended the National Firearms Act and required that destructive devices must 
be registered with our Bureau in order to be legally possessed. The term 
"destructive device" included both explosive and incendiary bombs. The amended 
National Firearms Act provided for a 30-day amnesty period in November 1968, 
during which time destructive devices, as well as unregistered firearms, could 
be registered with immunity. However, there were no "bombs," as you and I think 
of them in terms of today's misuse of explosiA'es, registered and as a result, each 
such bomb made and used since December 1968, is a violation of the National 
Firearms Act. It was at this point in time that we became involved in the investi- 
gation of bombings of all types in the United States. 

The growing misuse of explosives by those who chose bombs as their means of 
forcing their philosophy, life styles or politics on others caused Congress to enact 
Title XI of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. Title XI, patterned after 
Title I of the Gun Control Act of 1968, required a total licensing of the explosives 
industry, including distributors and dealers, and a complete recordkeeping system 
to cover all purchases and reports of thefts of explosive materials. It also called 
for strict storage facilities for those who deal in or use explosives. The statute 
carried with it a number of unlawful acts, including one covering bomb threats. 

However, the statute did place joint responsibility for the enforcement of six 
of the violation sections upon both the FBI and our Bureau. We have, as a result, 
entered into an agreement with the FBI over which of those sections we will en- 
force and which are their responsibility. 

With the enactment of Title XI came the pressing requirement of licensing 
of the manufacturers, importers and dealers of explosive materials, as well as 
determining the type of storage containers for explosive materials necessary to 
meet both the provisions of the law and the practical needs of the industry. To 
accomplish this, we asked the explosives industry ^ select a member of that 
profession who could serve as a consultant to us as we prepared the regulations 
which would implement the law. The Institute of Makers of Explosives, 
which we shall refer to as IME during our testimony, gave us full cooperation 
as we delved into the complex problem of storage and recordkeeping of an in- 
dustry that had not been regulated other than as a wartime measure during 
World War II. 

Because the law so closely paralleled the Gun Control Act of 1968, we called 
upon our special agents to handle the bulk of the w^ork associated with the issu- 
ance of licenses and approval of storage facilities, which was a prerequisite to li- 

censing. In Fiscal Year 1971, we used 191 man-years at a cost of $3.3 million to 
get the program rolling. The following year, that figure rose to 397 man-years and 
a cost of $7.7 million. It then decreased and our budget for Fiscal 1976 identifies 
this program at 219 man-years with a cost of $6 million. 

Today, there are 594 manufacturers, 76 importers and 1411 dealers of explosives 
licensed under Title XI. The licenses are issued on a yearly basis and are subject 
to non-renewal or revocation if we have reason to believe that the applicant for 
the license does not meet the requirements of the law. We also have, at this time, 
2,618 users of explosives who have obtained a permit to use explosives on a full 
time basis. There were also 26 limited use permits issued as of March 9, 1976. The 
limited use permit is for a "one time" purchase of explosives. 

Complete and accurate records on the disposition of explosives must be re- 
tained by those persons or firms licen.sed under Title XI, and these records are 
subject to our inspection at any time during the regular business hours of the 
licensee. In addition, those licensees who store explosives must also have proper 
storage facilities, and these are open to our inspection. However, because a large 
number of the dealers and users of explosives are connected with the mining in- 
dustry, we have worked out an agreement with the Mining Enforcement and 
Safety Administration (MESA) of the Bureau of Mines for their personnel to 
perform inspections of the storage and use of explosives at the mines. 

In Fiscal 1975, there were a total of 6,320 licenses and permits issued under 
Title XI. During that year, we made 813 investigations of applications for license 
or permit, and 2,141 compliance inspections to determine whether or not the 
licensee or permittee was complying with the provisions of the law. At the same 
time, MESA made approximately 7,200 in.spections of explosive storage facili- 
ties. It is our understanding that they inspect all coal mines quarterly, while 
metal and non-metal quarry and mine operations are inspected at least annually. 

Under the law, the licensee is prohibited from distributing explosive materials 
to any individual who (1) is under twenty-one years of age, (2) has been con- 
victed in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year, (3) is under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year, (4) is a fugitive from justice, (5) is an unlawful user of 
narcotics, or (6) has been adjudicated a mental defective. In addition, the licensee 
cannot knowingly distribute explosive materials to any person except (1) a 
licensee, (2) a permittee, or (3) a resident of the State where distribution is 
made and in which the licensee is licensed to do business. Distribution can be made 
to the resident of a contiguous State if permitted by the law of the State of the 
purchaser's residence. 

At the same time, it is unlawful for those persons who fall within any one of 
the above listed six categories to ship or transport any explosive in interstate or 
foreign commerce, or to receive any explosive which has been shipped or trans- 
ported in interstate or foreign commerce. 

There are many other unlawful acts concerning the sale or possession of ex- 
plosives which I shall not try to enumerate here. These range from the furnishing 
of false information to the licensed dealer by the person buying explosives to the 
possession of explosives with the intent to kill, injure or intimidate an individual. 

The procedure to buy explosives from a licensee depends upon whether or not 
the purchaser is the holder of a user permit. The user permit is issued to those 
persons or firms who constantly use explosives in their work, such as construction 
firms or a mining operation, and the purchase involv<'s interstate commerce. The 
permit is issued annunlly and is presented to the dealer when buying explosives. 
It relieves the dealer from the responsibility of extensive recordkeeping since it is 
only necessary to enter the name of the permittee and the permit number in the 
dealer's disposition records. 

However, if a non-licensee or non-permittee wants to buy explosives from a 
licensee within the State where the buyer resides, it is necessary that a Form 
4710, Explosives Transaction Record, be completed by the buyer prior to the act- 
ual sales transaction. Basically, the form requires the buyer to give a physical 
description, show what use will be made of the explosive materials, where they 
will l)e stored, and a certification by the buyer that he is not in one of the cate- 
gories of persons prohibited b.v law from obtainine or possessing explosive ma- 
terials. The seller or licensee completes the rest of the form, indicating what type 
of identification wns used by the liuyer, what materials were purchased and 
where delivery was made. The buyer signs the form and it becomes a permanent 
part of the seller's records, and as such, open to our review nnd inspection. A 
heavy responsibility rests upon the dealer to make sure that the buver presents 
proper identification, is qualified to buy the materials, and that the purchase, 

possession or use of the explosive materials by the buyer would not be in viola- 
tion of any State law or published ordinance applicable at the place of distn- 

The statute further requires that the purchaser of explosive materials have 
proper storage facilities for the materials, and that he may only receive the 
materials if the transportation, shipment or receipt is permitted by the law 
of the State in which the buyer resides. xt •*. ^ 

In 1974, there were 2.7 billion pounds of explosive materials sold in the United 
States with 2.2 billion pounds being used in the mining industry. Construction 
work used a little over 362 million pounds, wliile slightly over 190 million pounds 
went for all other purposes. ^ ^^ , .^. 4. 

The preceding, in a nutshell, generally covers the regulation of the legitimate 
explosives industrv, and we shall now turn our attention to what we feel is of 
greatest concern to this Committee, and that is the misuse of explosives. 

The number of bombing incidents across the nation is of grave concern to all 
persons responsible for the public safety of life and property. We have a vital 
interest in preventing the illegal acquisition of explosives by terrorists and other 
criminal elements employing the bomb to intimidate society. I personally think 
that the term "terrorist" should apply to anyone who uses or attempts to use a 
bomb, but for the purpose of this Iiearing the term will be attached to those 
persons who have announced their intention of overthrowing our government 
or disrupting the day-by-day governmental operations. 

Criminal intelligence indicates that terrorists plan to disrupt our Nation s 
Bicentennial celebration, and if the recent LaGuardia Airport bombing incident 
in New York City is indicative of what may lay ahead, it becomes increasingly 
imperative that we utilize all of our resources to deny terrorists, criminals and 
indiscriminate bombers access to explosive materials. 

Our special agents have four law enforcement areas of responsibility : bomb- 
ings, firearms, illicit liquor and wagering. We have, at the present time, approxi- 
mately 180() special agents stationed throughout the United States. All of our 
agent.s are trained to handle any type of an investigation. In other words, we 
do not have specialists that concentrate their efforts on one particular type of 
crime. The agent may work a bomb case today, an undercover sale of guns 
tonight, and raid a moonshine still tomorrow. However, explosives investiga- 
tions have first priority in applying resources because of the obvious potential 
explosives have for endangering the public safety. Bombings, actual or attempted, 
are given primary emphasis. Other mandatory investigations relating to ex- 
plosives are (1) theft of explosives, (2) threats against Treasury facilities or 
property, (3) bomb factories and (4) accidental explosions where explosive 
materials were involved or suspected of being involved. 

During the period of April 1, 1975, through March 31, 1976, our agents were 
involved in the investigation of 1,587 incidents involving explosives. Of this 
number, 654 were bombings using explosives. 38 were bomb threats against 
Treasury facilities, 129 were incendiary bombings. 185 were where the bomb did 
not go off, 276 covered the theft of explosives, 242 involved the recovery of 
explosives, and 12 were considered as a hoax where there was neither a bomb 
nor a threat. 

Because of a lag in our statistical reporting, we cannot correlate the above 
figures with those concerning our manpower application on investigation of 
explosive materials in terms of the exact reporting period. But to give you an 
idea of the time spent by special agents on this phase of their work, a total of 
18,437 mandays were expended on explosives investigations during the period 
of February 1, 1975. through January 31, 1976. There were 1,734 explosives in- 
vestigations made during tliis time, and we perfected 190 cases where we 
recommended the prosecution of one or more persons for violation of tlie provi- 
sions of Title XI, Regulation of Explosives. Tiiere was an average of 10.6 man- 
days spent on each investigation. 

Focusing our attention on the 654 bombings where explosive materials were 
used, we find that 32 persons were killed and 158 persons injured as a result of 
those bombings. Ninety-eight of these bombings occurred in California, followed 
by 65 in Ohio. Missouri is next with 33 bombings, followed by New York and 
Pennsylvania with 31 each. Tennessee had 29 bombings, as did New Jersey and 
Kentucky. The Chairman will be interested to know that only 4 bombings took 
place in Mississippi. 

The 129 incendiary bombs, which can be as simple as a soft-drink bottle filled 
with gasoline and ignited by a cloth wick or as complex as a combination of 

72-947 O - 76 

chemicals which ignite when mixed, caused one death and fortunately no 
injuries. Again, the State of California suffered the highest number of such 
Itomhings wirh 32. followed l).v Ohio with 13. North Carolina had 9 incendiary 
bombings while Alabama had 8. 

I would like to point out at this time that the statistics which I have provided 
the sul>committee this morning may, or may not, corre.spond with those of the 
National Bomb Data Center of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Our agents 
are required to file reports with u-s of those incidents involving explosive materials 
of which they are aware, and it is from these reports that our statistics are 

Installations subjected to bombing range from banks and business premises 
to Federal buildings. The Federal Protective Service, which is a part of the 
General Services Administration, has advised us that in Fiscal 1975, there were 
11 reported bombings of GSA managed buildings. There were also 614 bomb 
threats against GSA managed facilities which disrupted the work of 86,917 
Federal employees at an estimated cost of $825,000.00. While GSA does not have 
the exact value of the Federal property destroyed as a result of the 11 bombings, 
it is estimated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00. 

Figures provided by the National Bomb Data Center indicate that while 
there has been a slight increase in total bombings in Calendar Year 1975 over 
1974, there has been a large increase in explosives bombings in 1975. According 
to their figures, there were 89S explosive bombings in 1974 as compared to 1,313 
such bombings in 1975. The death and injury rate has also risen. In 1975, there 
were 69 deaths and 326 injuries as compared to 24 deaths and 207 injuries in 
1974. Their initial report on property damage for 1975 is approximately $27 
million dollars as compared to $10 million in 1974. 

There is little doubt that bombings constitute a serious threat to our com- 
munities. The question that is how are the terrorists and criminals 
acquiring the needed explosive materials when we have Federal laws that 
restrict and regulate the sale of explosive materials as well as State laws along 
the same lines in many instances. The answer, of course, is not always attain- 
able. The explosion of the bomb usually destroys most of the components of 
which it was made and thus presents the inve.stigating officer with one of the 
most difficult of tasks — ^that of determining first of all what type of explosive 
material was used and then where did it come from? Sometimes the officers are 
successful in gathering enough minute pieces of debris to enable them to identify 
that the explosive was dynamite, or some other type, made by a certain manu- 
facturer. Other times they are not. 

Some explosive materials are traceable by means of lot numbers of .similar 
markings, but others do not carry such identification. Even when we can 
identify the manufacturer, we find that thousands of pounds of that particular 
explosive was made under that lot number, and distributed to a number of 
dealers. Sometimes the dealer's records will indicate the same lot number on the 
sales records, hut more often than not, this information is not recorded by the 

I would like, at this time, to cite six out of the hundreds of bombings which 
we have investigated to illustrate the type of explosive material used, how it 
was acquired, and that the bulk of the bombings are not committed by "terrorist 

The first is a bombing that occurred on Thanksgiving Day. November 28, 1974, 
at about 5 :00 A.M. at the residence of William Banks in McLean, Virginia. The 
initial investigation disclosed that a powerful explosive had been detonated on 
the concrete floor of the rear porch, resulting in approximately $100,000 damage to 
the residence. At the time of the explosion. Mr. and Mrs. Banks and their three 
children were sleeping in rooms located on the second floor of the residence. 
Miraculously, no personal injiiries were sustained. Following three days of 
on-the-scene investigation, during which time ATF agents and local police 
.sorted through piles of debris caused by the bombing, the explosive was identified 
as dynamite and the investigating officers, working with our explosives tech- 
nicians and .'scientists from our laboratory, were able to reconstruct the bomb 
and show that it had been contained in an attache case. Eventually, the investigat- 
ing officers were able to determine that the dynamite used in this bombing had 
been smuggled in from Canada. The motivation was extortion, and the persons 
responsible for the bombing were convicted in Federal Court and given long 
prison sentences. 

The second incident took place in Connecticut and involves the placing of a 
dynamite bomb on a car by a young man who had a grudge against the car's 

owner who happened to he the father of the young man's girl friend. Investiga- 
tion revealed that the man had an acquaintance who was a blaster's helper with 
a drilling company. While visiting this acquaintance, he took four sticks of 
dynamite from the job site just before it was to be placed in bore holes. The 
drilling firm assumed that the dynamite had been detonated and did not notice 
the theft. This firm, which has a user's permit, had proper storage for explosives 
on the jol) site. 

The third incident involving dynamite took place in Illinois where a 48 year 
old man was killed wlien he stepped on a dynamite-loaded booby trap during 
a hunting trip. Our investigation disclosed that the bomb was made up of seven 
sticks of dynamite, and two unexploded bombs were found nearby. The man's 
son became a suspect when it was learned there was a love triangle between 
father, step-mother and the son. The son was employed at a coal company and 
had access to explosives. A search of the dead man's premises, where the son 
also lived, revealed 96 sticks of dynamite, blasting caps and materials of the 
same type used in the bombs. The son admitted stealing the explosives from 
the coal company. The coal company did not know of the loss, even though they 
make a weekly inventory of their explo.sives. They assumed that the mis.sing 
explosives had been used during the week. The company's storage facilities met 
the required standards. 

I would like to turn next to a bombing that gets close to home. Our regional 
offices in San Francisco, California, were subjected to a bombing on July 21, 
1975, at about 10:00 P.:M. Our offices were on the 34th floor of the building, 
and the bomb was of such force that it did well in excess of $100,000 damage to 
that floor, as well as fringe damage to other floors in the building. Apparently 
the bomb was secreted into the building and placed in the container for waste 
paper towels in the ladies rest room. The package containing the bomb was 
discovered by a janitor cleaning the room, and it had a note on it identifying 
it as a bomb and stating, "Put it down immediately, call the police, clear the 
building." The janitor did this, and the GSA guard called the San Franci-sco police. 
The bomb went off l)efore the police arrived, but fortunately, no one was seriously 
injured. An analysis of the bomb debris by our laboratory showed that a plastic 
high explosive had been used. In all likelihood, the explosive was C-4 which 
is made expressly for by the military. Our investigation is continuing, 
and we are working closely with the San Francisco police and the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation in an effort to identify the bombers. 

On August 13, 1975, the Bmiliano Zapata Unit of the New World Liberation 
Front printed and distributed a "communique" in which they stated that they 
would be focusing their attention first on the Treasury agents stationed in the 
San Francisco area. We have provided the subcommittee with copies of this com- 
munique as well as one that appeared after the bombing of our office in which a 
group, who identify themselves as the Red Guerrilla Family, claim respon- 
sibility for the bombing. 

Bombings are also caused l)y explosives other than dynamite, which is probably 
the most popular. We are all familiar with the pipe bombings which have plagued 
the country. X'sually, the material used is black powder which is available in 
sporting goods stores because of its use by those persons who have an interest in 
the muzzle-loading firearms used in the early settlement of this country. 

However, pipe bombs can be made using other than black powder. On 
May 31, 1975, at about 1 :30 A.M., a bomb exploded on the second floor of the 
Capital Center Building in Olympia, in an office area occupied by the 
Washington State Department of Social and Health Services. The local police 
requested our assistance in the blast scene search and the follow-up investigation. 
The search of the blast area uncovered enough fragments to reconstruct the 
type bomb used — a galvanized pipe bomb 6 inches in diameter, 14 inches long 
and capped on both ends. The bomb was charged by douliled-base smokeless 
powder, which is also available in sporting goods .stores or at stores dealing in 
firearms since it is primarily used by individuals to re-load their own ammuni- 
tion. This powder is not covered by Title XI. Regiilation of Explosives, and can 
be sold without restrictions of any type. As a matter of interest, this particular 
bombing was claimed by a group calling themselves the "George .Jackson 
Brigade." and which has been identified as an extremist group. For the sub- 
committee's information, George Jackson is one of the persons involved with 
Angela Davis in the Marin County. Calif., courtroom shoot-out in 1970. 

Another incident involving smokeless powder took place in New Jersey where 
a group of juveniles were responsible for three bombings in a community in 


Bergen County, N.J. The bombings destroyed a high .school press box minutes 
after 300 .students had left the playing field, two automobiles in the driveway 
of a private home, and a liquor store situated under upstairs living quarters 
where two small children were asleep at the time the bomb went off. Fortunately 
they were not injured although the blast did throw them from their beds. 
These were all pipe bombs made from smokeless powder. Our agents were able 
to determine during their inve.stigation that on one occasion, the prime suspect 
l)Ought smokeless powder from a Federally licensed firearms dealer in New York 
State. Eventually, the investigating ofiicers were able to identify five youths as 
being respon.sible for the bombings. All five were convicted, with the leader 
receiving 15 years imprisonment in a Federal prison. We also discovered that 
these youths learned how to make bombs by reading a book entitled, "Steal 
this Book," which was written by activist Abbey Hoffman, and that the motiva- 
tion behind the bombings was retaliation for alleged wrongs against juvenile 
gang members. 

Of course, the bombing that comes to everyone's mind when the subject is 
brought up is the one at LaGuardia Airport on December 29, 1975, where 11 
persons were killed by the blast. I to the subcommittee that our 
agents are actively engaged along with New York City police and the FBI 
in that investigation, although we still have not been able to identify the explosive 
material used and there are very few leads to follow. 

Although we have been unable in approximately 50% of the bombings we 
investigate to determine the type of explosive used, we are finding that dynamite 
is the primary explosive used and we are, at this point, convinced that the bulk 
of explosives used in bombings, other than black or smokeless powder, is stolen. 
There have been isolated instances where an individual, on a one-time basis, 
purchased explosives from a licensed dealer under the guise of legitimate use 
only to turn around and sell it to those who wanted it for the making of bombs. Title XI makes it mandatory that thefts of explosives be reported to 
us within 24 hours of the time of the theft, we have from the very beginning 
been aware of this problem. Toward this end, we designed a poster for distribu- 
tion to the explosives licensees and users for display on their premises, and 
which reminded them to report all thefts immediately. In addition, we remind 
them of this provision of the law when we make an in.spection of their premi-ses 
and review their compliance witli the law. However, industry members have 
not always complied with this requirement and we are instructing them to 
observe all requirements of law which attach to the privilege conferred by an 
explosives license. 

We have already initiated action which shovild, when fullv implemented, have 
an impact on the theft of explosives. We found that we did not have as firm a 
grip on the handle of this problem as we should have, and a new procedure has 
been developed which will require the immediate and thorough investigation of 
all thefts of explosive materials from any source, with a reporting system which 
will provide for instantaneous retrieval. We will identify licensees, permitees 
and/or individuals whose actions endanger public safety, either through partici- 
pation in a theft of explo.sive materials or through improper or luisafe storage of 
such materials. We will actively assist other Federal. State, local or foreign 
enforcement otficials in the investigations of thefts and/or recoveries of explosive 
materials. These and attendant actions will, we hope, establi-sh ATF as the central 
clearing house for all information regarding thefts and recoveries of explosive 

We are developing plans for a series of seminars on explosive materials, 
stressing safety and storage, for representatives from State governments, indus- 
try, otlier Federal agencies, trade associations and the public. We are hopeful 
that funds for this purpose may be forthcoming from the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration. 

We are requiring our field personnel to step up their visitations to licensed 
dealers in explosive materials, and to devote more of their time to the problem 
of theft. Many of the thefts of explosives from approved storage facilities are by 
means of forced entry. A recent report submitted to us by IME covering 157 
incidents where explosives had been stolen from IME members showed that 
84% of the illegal entries were through the door of the storage vault. The locks 
on these doors have to be of a certain type and strong enough to resist the usual 
assault given a lock when someone wants to bypass it. Y"et, we find them being 
cut by blow torch or broken by sledge hammer in spite of claims by the lock 
manufacturer of resistance to such efforts. The location of the majority of 


storage facilities in isolated areas for safety reasons lends itself to uninterrupted 
attempts to break-in. We liave this problem under study to determine the feasi- 
bility of alternate security measures, such as burglar alarms or electronic devices. 
One of the weaknesses in the Federal law is the accountability for explosives 
on the part of the "users." While the law requires them to obtain a permit and 
have proper storage facilities, it does not require them to maintain a daily 
accounting of these explosives. We are currently working closely with State gov- 
ernments, both those who have laws governing explosive materials and those 
who do not, to assume this part of the overall task of keeping explosives out of 
the hands of those who would misuse them. The State Fire Marshal has en- 
forcement responsibility over explosive materials in 26 of the States. In the 
other States, the responsibility is spread through police departments, Public 
Safety offices, or in some instances, totally within the Federal government, as in 
Wyoming where it is the responsibility of the Bureau of Mines and the Depart- 
ment of Labor. Some of the States, like Massachusetts, have very stringent laws 
on the sale and distribution of explosive materials, with inspection of the prem- 
ises by State employees. But without State help, we cannot hope to stretch our 
resources to the point where we can check on the users of explosives. We have 
prepared for the Committee a listing of the States and their explosives control 

While on the subject of State involvement in the problem of misuse of explosives, 
I cannot praise highly enough the law enforcement efforts of the State and local 
police departments, as well as the offices of the Fire Marshals, where involved, 
in the investigation of bombings. We work very c'osely with them, and depend 
entirely uiwn them or the military for "render safe" capabilities where a bomb 
is found before it goes off. They are extremely professional in their investigative 
procedures and a valued member of the law enforcement team. 

Before I close my testimony, I want to brief the Committee on our Explosives 
Tagging program which I think will solve the problem of being unable to deter- 
mine the type and source of explosives in 50% of the bomb cases. Approximately 
three years ago, we formed a Federal Advisory Committee made up of experts 
in the fie'd of explosives from government agencies, the industry and the private 
segment of the community. Tliis group, chaired by a member of the ATF Head- 
quarters staff, undertook the task of developing a means by which explosive mate- 
rials could be tagged through the addition of an ingredient at the time of manu- 
facture that would enable a bomb to be detected before it went off, or if detona- 
tion did occur, enable the investigating officers to quickly identify the type of ex- 
plosive and trace it from the manufacturer to the last known purchaser. Foreign 
governments also expressed an interest in the results being achieved by this 
group. At this point, the group has proven the feasibility of tagging explosives 
and shown that it will work. Private industry has developed a prototyi>e machine 
for detecting the presence of a bomb, and ingredients which can be added to the 
manufacturing process at a minimal cost. The explosives industry has supported 
the project from its inception, and are willing to move ahead with it once it has 
been finalized. The only thing that remains to be done is the refinement of proc- 
ess and final identification of the ingredients. This will require an expenditure 
in the area of $1.2 million and would take about another year. Once funds are 
approved, we will move toward the completion of this vital project which should 
provide our agents and police officers everywhere with information that could 
lead to the identification of those responsible for many of the bombings which 
today go unsolved. 

In summation, it is my opinion that Title XI, Regulation of Explosives, does 
provide sufficient means by which to control the manufacture and disposition of 
explosive materials. The explosives industry, as well as the mining and construc- 
tion industry, needs to give greater attention to the security of those explosive ma- 
terials under their control. Swift and severe punishment for those convicted of 
a bombing or bomb threat is a must if our society has any hopes of ridding itself 
of persons who, through their warped thinking, are inflicting death and in- 
jury without regard to their victims in terms of age or involvement. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer 
any questions which the subcommittee may wish to ask. 

Mr. Davis. In 1968 Congress enacted the Gun Control Act of 1968. 
Title TT of the act amended the T^ational Firearms Act and required 
that destructive devices must be registered with our Bureau in order 
to be legally possessed. 


The term "destructive device" included both explosive and incen- 
diary bombs. The amended National Firearms Act provided for a 30- 
day amnesty period in November 1968, during which time destructive 
devices, as well as unregistered firearms, could be registered with 

However, there were no bombs, as you think of them in terms of 
today's misuse of explosives, registered and as a result, each such bomb 
made and used since December 1968, is a violation of the National Fire- 
arms Act. It was at this point in time that we became involved in the 
investigation of bombincr of all types in the United States. 

The growing misuse of explosives bv those who chose bombs as their 
means of forcing their philosophv, life styles, or politics on others 
caused Congress to enact title I of the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970. 

Title XI, patterned after title I of the Gun Control Act of 1968, 
required a total licensing of the explosives industry, including dis- 
tributors and dealers, and a complete recordkeeping system to cover 
all purchases and reports of thefts of explosives materials. It also 
called for strict storage facilities for those who deal in or use explo- 
sives. The statute carried with it a number of unlawful acts, including 
one very definitely covering bomb threats. 

However, the statute did place joint responsibility for the enforce- 
ment of six of the violation sections upon both the FBI and our 

We have as a result, entered into an agreement with the FBI over 
which of those sections we will enforce and which are their responsi- 

Because the law so closely paralleled the Gun Control Act of 1968, 
we called upon our special ap^ents to handle the bulk of the work asso- 
ciated with the issuance of licenses and approval of storage facilities, 
which was a prereauisite to licensing. 

In fiscal year 1971, we used 191 man-years at a cost of $3.3 million 
to get the profrram rolling. The following vear, that figure rose to 397 
man-years and a cost of $7.7 million. It then decreased and our budget 
for fiscal 1976 identifies this program at 219 man-years with a cost of 
$6 million. 

Today, there are 594 manufacturers. 76 importers, and 1.411 dealers 
of explosives licensed under title XI. The licenses are issued on a 
yearly basis and are subject to nonrenewal or revocation if we have 
reason to believe tliat the applicant for the license does not meet the 
requirements of the law. 

We also have, at this time 2.618 users of explosives who have ob- 
tained a permit to use explosives on a full-time liasis. There were also 
26 limited-use permits issued as of March 9, 1976. The limited-use 
permit is for a "one time" purchase of explosives. 

Comnlete and accurate recoi'ds on the disposition of exnlosives must 
be retained by those ]iersons or firms licensed imder title XI. and these 
records are subiect to our inspection at any time during the regular 
business hours of the licensee. 

In addition, those licensees who store explosives must also have 
proner storarre facilities, and these are open to our inspection. 

However, because a larq-e number of the dealers and users of ex- 
plosives are connected with the mining industry, we have worked out 
an agreement with the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administra- 


tion (MESA) of the Bureau of Mines for their personnel to perform 
inspections of the storage and use of explosive at the mines. 

In fiscal 1075 there were a total of 6,320 licenses and permits issued 
under title XI. During: that year, we made 813 investigations of appli- 
cations for license or permit,'and 2,141 compliance inspections to deter- 
mine whether or not the licensee or permittee was complying with the 
provisions of the law. At the same time, MESA made approximately 
7,200 inspections of explosive storage facilities. It is our understanding 
that they inspect all coal mines quarterly, while metal and nonmetal 
quariy and mine operations are inspected at least annually. 

In 1974 there were 2.7 billion pounds of explosive materials sold 
in the United States, with 2.2 billion pounds being used in the mining 
industry, construction work used a little over 362 million pounds, while 
slightly over 196 million pounds went for all other purposes. 

During the period of April 1, 1975, through March 31, 1976, our 
agents were involved in the investigation of 1,586 incidents involving 
explosives. Of this number, 654 were bombings using explosives, 38 
were bomb threats against Treasury facilities, 129 were incendiary 
bombings, 185 were where the bomb did not go off, 276 covered the 
theft of explosives, 242 involved the recovery of explosives, and 12 
were considered a hoax where there was neither a bomb nor a threat. 
Because of a lag in our statistical reporting, we cannot correlate the 
above figures with those concerning our manpower application on in- 
vestigation of explosive materials in terms of the exact reporting 

But, to give you an idea of the time spent by special agents on this 
phase of our work, a total of 18,437 man-days were expended on ex- 
plosives investigations during the period of February 1, 1975, through 
January 31, 1976. 

There were 1,734 explosives investigations made during this time, 
and we perfected 190 cases where we recommended the prosecution 
of one or more for violation of the provisions of Title XI, regulation of 
Explosives. There was an average of 10.6 man-days spent on each 

There is little doubt that bombings constitute a serious threat to our 
communities. The question that arises is how are the terrorist and 
criminals acquiring the needed explosive materials when we have 
Federal laws that restrict and regulate the sale of explosive materials 
as well as State laws along the same lines in many instances. 

In my full testimony. I cite six cases of bombings, which illustrate 
to some decree how the bombers acquired the explosive. The first, in 
Mclvean, Va.. involved dvnamite which was smuggled in from Canada. 
In the second, the bomber went to a drilling site to visit a friend and 
stole tlie dvnamite iust l)ofore a clianre was set off. The third case 
took place in Illinois and involved dvnamite which the bomber stole 
from a coal companv where he was emploved. In the bombing of our 
office in San Francisco, we suspect the explosive was C-4, a plastic ex- 
plosive made expresslv for the Armed Forces. We cannot identify the 
source until we positivelv identifv the explosive. 

The other two cases involved pipe bombs made from smokeless 

powder which can he purchased over the counter without restrictions. 

Although we have been unable in apnroximatelv 50 r)e7'cent of the 

bombings we investigate to determine the type of explosive used we 


are finding that dynamite is the primary explosive used and we are, 
at this point, convinced that the bulk of explosives used in bombings, 
other than black or smokeless powder, is stolen. 

We have already initiated action which should, when fully imple- 
mented, have an impact on the theft of explosives. We found that we 
did not have as firm a grip on the handle of this problem as we 
should have and a new procedure has been developed which will require 
the immediate and thorough investigation of all thefts of explosives 
materials from any source, with a reporting system which will provide 
for instantaneous recovery. 

We will identify licensees, permittees, and/or indixdduals whose 
actions endanger public safety, either through improper or unsafe 
storage of such materials. We will actively assist other Federal, State, 
local, or foreign enforcement officials in the investigation of thefts 
and/or recoveries of explosive materials. These and attendant actions 
will, we hope, establish ATF as the central clearing house for all in- 
formation regarding thefts and recoveries of explosive materials. 

In summation, it is my opinion that Title XI. Eegulaticn of Explo- 
sives, does provide sufficient means by which to control the manufacture 
and disposition of explosive materials. The explosives industry, as well 
as the mining and construction industries, need to srive greater atten- 
tion to the security of those explosive materials under their control. 

Swift, and severe punishment for those convicted of a bombing or a 
bomb threat is a must if our society has any hopes of ridding itself 
of those persons who, through their warped thinking, are inflicting 
death and injury with no regard for their victims in terms of age or 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my testimony. I will be happy to 
answer anv questions. 

Senator Scott. We appreciate your testimony and, as indicated in- 
itially, we are goins: to have a number of votes and the bells have al- 
ready runof and they tell me that I have got to go over and vote. Let's 
take about 5 minutes before having a recess to enable me to vote. 

In looking at vour testimonv I noticed that the explosives, in many 
instances, are obtained other than by purchase; and this is by steal- 
ing from one place or another or even makin.q- somethinir from powder 
that would not ordinarilv be used for bombs. I notice that you are 
suggesting that security is most important and the conviction of the 
people that do — swift and severe punishment for those convicted of 
a bombing. Isn't this true of law enforcement generallv, crimes cen- 
erallv? Is it different with regard to these terrorists, to these bombers, 
to the people who make these explosives? Or would you say that the 
general criminal element needs to be treated in the same manner as the 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir, INIr. Chairman, certainlv I think that it is true, 
generallv, in law enforcement that the swiftness and the commen- 
surate qualitv of punishment is quite important as a deteri^ent. 

As vou are aware, we enforce the Federal firearms laws and I would 
certainly say that the same thing is true where a person uses a fire- 
arm in the commission of a crime, certainly the swiftness and the 
severity of the penalties imposed would be a great deterrent. I think 
that the reason that I emphasized — perhaps overemphasized — this 
with respect to explosives, is the fact that, as you are well aware, 


the use of a bomb is so indiscriminate in terms of the damage in- 
flicted to persons and the property and the destniction involved that 
it becomes almost a mindless act of terrorism. 

So, I think that certainly a particular emphasis should be placed 
in this area. 

Senator Scott. I wasn't suggesting otherwise at all, Mr. Davis. I 
noticed that you work in conjunction with the FBI. Is that also true 
with the local and the State agencies that deal in the field of explosion? 
Do you have any problems working with the State and the local 
people ? 

Mr. Davis. Xo sir, Mr. Chairman, in fact, we have shared effort in 
terms of both the regulation of explosives where we work, for example, 
through the State fire marshal or other authorities that are 
charged with that responsibility. In the case of criminal violations, we 
work veiy closely with the State authorities. We place our laboratory 
facilities at their disposal, we conduct training in the techniques of 
bomb scene searches and generally cooperate in every way that we can. 

Senator Scott. Does vour Bureau have ongoing programs that are 
designed to prevent the illegal acquisition of explosives ? 

Mv. Davis. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. And we have most recently, if 
1 can say, "beefed up" that program. Following the LaGuardia bomb- 
ing in which we are involved along with the FBI and the police de- 
partment, it became apparent that during the Bicentennial year that 
we could expect an increase of bombings and theft of explosives for 
the purpose of criminal misuse. 

So, I have established a task force to study this problem and we are 
taking a number of actions which Ave hope Avill help impress the people 
who legitimately use explosives to be more careful in their security 
and in preventing them from being stolen. Of course there is a Federal 
requirement that the loss of explosives or their theft must be reported 
to ATF within 24 hours. 

Senator Scott. But do they always know? How could they know 
just 24 hours after or is that after thev become aware ? 

Mr. Davis. It must be reported within 24 hours of the discovery of 
the loss or the theft. We have posters that we have prepared and are in 
the process of distributing that we hope will reemphasize this respon- 
sibility to the users of the explosives. 

Senator Scott. We will have to recess. 

[A brief recess was taken.] 

Senator Scott. The subcommittee will resume its session. 

Mr. Davis, I am going to ask the counsel to go ahead and ask some 
of the questions while I catch my breath. 

Mr. SciiuLTz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Davis, if I may, I 
would like to just go through your statement asking questions for the 
purpose of clarification. 

Directing your attention to page 4, have there been many instances 
where you have found cause to revoke or to refuse the renewal of a 
license ? 

i\Ir. Davis. Well 

Mr. SciiuLTZ. On page 4 in the last paragraph you talk about revo- 
cation of licenses. 

Mr. Davis. To be responsive to your question, we have had very 
few instances where we have revoked a license because by and large we 

72-947 O - 76 


may call the attention of the licensee to any discrepancies he may have 
m terms of storage facilities, recordkeeping. We may correct, and then 
generally when we do take action, it is the" form of nonrenewal of the 
license when it comes up again. It is a process that is generally less time 
consumnig and works to the advantage of the Government. 

Mr. ScHULTz. When nonrenewal comes into play, is it generally be- 
cause they have not complied with the requirements? Can you 'give 
some basis for the nonrenewals that you are referring to ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes. For example, if "we find a storage facility does not 
meet the general requirements, we would give them a reasonable 
period of time in which to bring those facilities into compliance. And, 
of course, if they fail to do so, then we would take the necessary action. 

One, for example, would be to require them to bring all the explosive 
materials from the storage facilities and if they persist, obviously, we 
would not then renew their license on an annual basis. 

Mr. ScHULTz. Taking that one step further, could vou tell us what 
would happen to the explosives? Are they confiscated by ATF? 

Mr. Davis. If they are in the hands of a legitimate individual in 
terms of a licensee or a permit holder, we would give him an opportun- 
ity to return them to his supplier or make other disposition of them. 

Again, if he did not take that course of action, then we would seize 
them. Then if the explosives are in the hands of a nonlicensee, a person 
who obviously should not have them, then we Avould seize them. 

Mv. SciiULTz. I would assume that ATF would make some disposi- 
tion of them ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, that is correct, we would make some sort of disposi- 
tion of them. 

Mr. SciiuLTz. On pae:e 5, do you have to provide notice of your 
intention to conduct an investigation or do you conduct investigations 
without there being any advance notice ? 

Mr. Davis. Advance notice is not required as long as it is during 
regular business hours. As lon^ as it is really within regular business 
hours we do not give any kind of notice and in most cases we would 

Mr. Scnn.Tz. Thank you. And, again on pasfe 5, are all investiga- 
tions conducted on a routine basis in the case of all applications for 
license ? 

Mr. Daiis. Yes, that is correct. All applicants for a license are in- 
spected to determine, for example, that their storage facilities are in 
compliance with Federal law and that they otherwise understand the 

Senator Scott. Let me ask you. ]\Ir. Davis, do vou find the licensees 
generally cooperative with regard to reporting their losses and thefts 
and also wanting to comply with all laws and regulations? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. Generally we find them to be cooperative in this 
respect. And I am sure that those who fail to report a loss or a theft 
do it out of ignorance of the law rather than any willful intent to fail 
to report it. 

Senator Scott. Now do vou have a wav that you can state with rea- 
sonable certainty the thefts and the losses or unexplained disappear- 
ances of explosives are reported ? 

How is that that you know whether a percenta^re — and T am not 
speaking of statistics — but how do you know if there is substantial 


Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. Obviously it is a fairly difficult task to be cer- 
tain because attain, we are tryino- to establish some sort of a negative 
fact. Primarily our effort is directed toward informing these people 
of their responsibilities. Of course, occasionally we recover stolen ex- 
plosives and we are able to trace them back to the licensee or the per- 
mittee from which they were stolen. In that case, of course, if they 
have not reported them, we would make sure that they would in the 

Senator Scott. How many reports do you receive annually or how 
many have you received over the past 3 years '? 

Mr. Davis. We can give you reports for the period covering the last 
12 months, beginning April 1, 1975, through INIarch 31. 1076. 

During that period there were 276 instances involving the theft of 

Senator Scott. Now there are these reports and are they made to 
you or to whom are the reports made ? 

:\rr. Davis. Sir, the law requires that they be made to us and to the 
local police. 

Senator Scott. Both? 
jNIr. Davis. Both. 

Senator Scott. I understand that you have a demonstration? And 
that this is of the explosion that happened in :McLean, Va. Are you 
prepared to show that to us at this time ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir, we would be- very happy to do that. I think I 
should maybe preface the demonstration by saying that coming into 
the building that the security guards were' very alert. Since it is ob- 
viously a bomb, a simulated bomb, they took the precaution of calling 
one of the officers and having them accompany me. 

In other words, I want to make it clear. I hope to anybody here who 
should see the demonstration, that it is not easy to bring such a device 
into this Senate office building. 

Senator Scott. We certainly hope not and we appreciate your ex- 

Xow, we have another vote. How long will it take you to perform 
this demonstration? 

jNIr. Davis. Sir, I have Robert Dexter, one of our explosive experts 
with us and I think to show the subcommittee the device will only take 
about 5 minutes. 

Senator Scott. That is fine. You can take 71/2- 
]Mr. Davis. Can we move closer to the Chair? 

Senator Scott. Yes, sir; that would be fine. Or do you want us to 
have our seats kept here, or would you like us to come down there ? 

Mr. Davis. These are photographs, ISIr. Chairman, of the damage 
that was done at the ]\rcLean bombing. As you know, I might advise 
you that the principals of the ^McLean bombings have been sentenced. 
I think it was 35 vears. 

Senator Scott.' I wonder. Mr. Davis, counsel suggests that maybe 
if you came up here, not only would we be able to see you but those 
in the audience would be able to, too. So whv don't you do that? 

Mr. Dexter. I will just remove the whole device. This device was 
placed on a board. It is a replica of the device that was used. We have 
the dynamite, the simulated blasting caps, and this is the power source 
and the delaying mechanism, an ordinary alarm clock 


Senator Scott. Did they in fact have a battery similar to this ? 

Mr. Dexter. Yes, sir, this is the replica of the device that we used in 
the courtroom. This is a mercury trembler switch. This alarm clock is 
running and it is set to go off in about 2 minutes. Here we have a switch 
mechanism and these blasting caps were inserted into these sticks of 
dynamite and here we have two photo flashbulbs 

Senator Scott. You are sure that this is simulated ? 

Mr. Dexter. Yes, sir, I wouldn't be holding it if it was not. 

But, these flashbulbs, when they light off, they simulate the explo- 
sives going off. In the case here the alarm clock is a delay mechanism 
that permits the clock to wind down and the switch here causes the 
hand of the clock to reach the contact here and sets the explosives off. 

Now, if anyone should try to remove this device before the time 
arrives on the clock, then it would set it off. However, if you did not 
and when this hand works down here, let us see if we can hurry it up 
a little bit by pushing it — there she went — and that would set the de- 
vice off. And that is exactly how it works. 

Senator Scott. Now is this something — does it take some expertise 
to do this ? Could most anybody do this or do they have to be an ex- 
pert in the field of explosives ? 

Mr. Dexter. Generally we find that the manufacture of a device 
of this type or any type of device is limited by the imagination of the 
bomber. If he has a fundamental understanding of electricity, and a 
circuit, he can certainly use this type of mechanism. And as far as 
any relays or switching devices, he is only limited by his imagination. 

Mr. Davis. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt, there are at least two 
publications that I know of that very explicitly explain how to con- 
struct these kinds of bombs that have been published for the general 

Senator Scott. And this publication is not illegal, to tell how to do 
this sort of thing? 

Mr. Davis. No, sir. 

Senator Scott. Protected by the first amendment 

Mr. Davis. No, sir. 

Senator Scott. Well, Mr. Davis, in your opinion, can the average 
citizen, if he wants to, perpetrate such a thing as this? Can he find a 
way to do it ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. I think that there is no question about it. In 
fact, one of the cases that I have included for the edification of the 
subcommittee, the perpetrators of the bombings actually used one of 
the books, one of the publications that I have mentioned in order to 
construct bombs for this purpose. 

Senator Scott. We will have a temporary recess. 

fA brief recess was taken.] 

Senator Scott. The subcommittee will resume. I will ask counsel, if 
he will, to resume questions. 

Mr. ScHULTz. Again, Director Davis, referring to your statement 
submitted for the record, at page 6. Does MESA conduct its inspec- 
tions without notification ? 

Mr. Davis. It is my understanding that they do conduct investiga- 
tions without notice. 

Mr. ScHui.TZ. You mean by your statement that they conduct them 
quarterly but not on a regular schedule? 


Mr. Davis. That is right, sir, and they are conducted quarterly and 
without reguhirity as far as previous notice. In the metal and non- 
metal mines, other than coal mines, they are conducted at least 

Mr. SciiuLTZ. If I understand your statement on page 6, individuals 
do not have to have a permit to buy explosives from a licensee within 
his own State. Is that correct ? 

IMr. Davis. That is correct. 

Mr. ScHULTz. If he fills out one of the forms that you have de- 
scribed in your attending paragraphs ? 

Mr. Davis. That is correct. 

ISIr. ScHULTz. Presumably, most of those who purchase explosives 
without permits are private individuals who need limited quantities 
for home needs out in the country. 

Can a person who does not hold a permit buy any quantity of ex- 
plosives if he fills out these fonns, or is there a limitation of the 
amount ? 

Senator Scott. Let me supplement this question if I may. If you will, 
after responding to the counsel's question, Mr. Davis, tell us if you 
know if there is generally some supplemental State law that would 
require something other than the requirements of the Federal law. 
If you could, answer both. 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. To the latter question, Mr. Chairman, there are 
State laws governing the acquisition and use of explosives, in many 
cases. We do have, for the subcommittee's benefit, if they would so de- 
sire, a summary of all the State laws and what the requirements are. 

Senator Scott. I think that would be good. That will be received 
for the record, as well as these pictures that were there, I think, for the 

[The material referred to was marked exhibits Xos. 1 and 2 and will 
be found in the appendix, pp. 67 and 72. 

Mr. Davis. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. They do vary from State 
to State and locality to locality. \Ye will provide the summary for the 

With respect to the first question by counsel, there is no limit on the 
amount of the explosives that can be purchased on either the amount 
of the nonpermittee who should buy in his own State for example, or 
for that matter a permittee who purchases in his State or the one in 
which he resides. 

Mr. SciiULTz. Do you think that there should be ? 

Mr. Davis. I don't think so. 

Mr. SciiuLTz. Let me tell vou why I asked the question. Because I 
know your firearms jurisdiction requires notification of multiple pur- 
chases I was thinking the same requirement might apply to explosives : 
Could the individual go into several different hardw£tre stores or where- 
ever explosives are sold and make several purchases without violating 
the law ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, that is certainly true. Again, here. I think we have 
to weigh the advantages to society in terms of the legitimate use of 
explosives and on the other hand, of course, the acquisition of ex- 
plosives for criminal purposes. Certainly, we could, I think, by regu- 
lation impose some kind of a notice by the licensee when a purchase 


was more than a certain amount of dynamite, if he bought, more, say 
than 100 pounds, or something of this kind. 

These forms, 4710, once they are filled in I might add, are a record 
of the transaction and are forwarded to ATF. That means that we 
could determine if there were suspicious sales of explosives. 

Mr, SciiuLTz. All right. Thank you. Do you know what the aggre- 
gate figure is about the amount of explosives sold to, say, last year's 
purchasers without pennits? 

Mr. Davis. Without permits ? 

Mr. ScHULTz. Yes. 

Mr. Davis. We do not have that figure available. I am sure, though, 
that we could collect it for the subcommittee and supply it for the 
record. Each of the sales that would be conducted without a permit 
would be recorded on a form 4710. These are maintained in our seven 
regional offices and we could give the subcommittee the amount of 
poundage of the explosives that are covered by those. 

Mr. ScHULTz. If the chairman directs, that might be helpful to our 
inquiry to have this submitted. 

Senator Scott. Yes ; I think we would like to have that. 

[The information referred to follows :] 

A review of ATF field operations following testimony before the subcommittee 
revealed that the forms 4710, referred to in the testimony, are not collected in the 
seven ATF regional offices but are, instead, sent directly to the special agents 
in the field for review and immediate action if they identify a suspicious sale. 
The forms 4710 are retained by the special agents only for such a period of time 
as tbey feel it is necessary to complete their analysis and any resultant investiga- 
tion. After that, the forms 4710 are destroyed. 

In an effort to provide the subcommittee with some perspective of the number 
of sales of explosives to non-permittees and the amount purchased by such non- 
permittees, three widely separated posts of duty were asked to compile these 
figures for the period of June 13-19, 1976. Those figures follow : 

Number of non- Pounds pur- 

Number of permittee chased by non- 

Location 4710's received purchases permittees 

Peoria, III 14 14 1145,600 

Lexington, Ky __., _ _. 50 12 9,303 

El Paso, Tex.. __ 20 15 225 

' Mining interests in Illinois as a matter of practice do not secure licenses or permits. They generally deal with "in State" 
dealers to avoid storage problems, thus the large amount of explosives shown. Approximately 100,000 pounds of that 
shown by the ATF office in Peoria, III., was purchased by 1 mining interest. 

Mr. ScHULTz. Just following up, you say it is maintained in the 
regional offices ; do you now have to draw from them to get this infor- 
ma:tion for us? Or is the information available in the national office? 

Mr. Da\t:s. We would in this case have to ask our regional offices to 
compile the information and submit it to us. 

Senator Scott. Let me ask at this point how many of those reports 
we talked a few minutes about, the reports that you received — and I 
am just advised by staff that the number in series reaches a million 
here and each original form 4710 shall be retained in numerical order 
by transaction serial number and continuing in regular sequence. "WHien 
the number of any sequence reaches a million, the licensee or permittee, 
they recommence the series. 

Now, I believe that before we took this recess we asked to whom the 
reports were made. And did you give us the number. We were talking 


about a period of 3 years I believe. What was your response about the 
number of reports ? Is tliat the same kind of report ? 

]Mr. Davis. No, sir, ]\Ir. Chairman, the report that we referred to 
before the recess was report of theft or loss of explosives. The form 
that we are referrino- to now, the 4710, is the form that is filled out any 
time a nonpermittee purchases explosives. 

Senator Scott. Hoav many of those do you receive ? 

Mr. Davis. Of the -iTlO's? Ao;ain, we would have to — I am sure 
that it would be in the thousands. "We could, however, when we were 
supplying the information as to the amount of explosives, we could, at 
the same time supply the number of 47l0's. 

Senator Scott. Well, now do you think this is valuable to you to have 
this form as it is prepared and forwarded ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir, it is really the only investigative lead that we 
would have to determine, if an explosive which was recovered and 
used, who purchased it and this sort of thing. Also the form itself is a 
means whereby a person is advised that if he is a convicted felon, under 
indictment for a felony, or if he is an addict of narcotics or judged as 
mentally incomi:)etent, he is not allowed to acquire explosives. This is 
the means by which they are prevented from doing it and they are 
informed that they cannot purchase and are prevented from doing so. 

Senator Scott. Do you consider these classifications to be reasonable, 
or do you have any quarrel with the ones that Congress has designated, 
or would vou want to reconunend any changes or does this seem to be 
a reasonable thing ? 

Mr. Davis. No, sir, I think that this is reasonable. It seems to be 
reasonably connected with a likelihood that the individual might mis- 
use the explosives. I might say also, Mr. Chairman, that those are the 
same standards that are applied to the purhcase of firearms under 
Federal law and they appear to be reasonable. 

Mr. Schultz. Mr. Davis, is any central inventory maintained of 
the sales and purchasers that do not have licenses ? 

Mr. Davis. No; no central record is made of that. 

Mr. Schultz. Directing your attention now to page 8 of the state- 
ment. You say that 196 million pounds went for ''other purposes." 
Would you identify the "other" — the more important of those "other" 

Mr. Davis. Yes ; I think that manv of them are the kind of thing that 
counsel has probably already referred to : such things as clearing land. 
They are used for such things as constructing ski runs, a myriad of 
purposes that I would describe as primarily other than commercial 
or large-scale commercial. Examples are mining and roadbuilding and 
things such as this. 

Mr. Schultz. Thank you. 

On page 10 you say that your agents through the year ending this 
last March 31 desiiinated 276 cases that involved explosives. 

Do you have a figure for the total quantity of explosives? 

i\Ir. Davis. If counsel would desire we have the breakout of the 
reported thefts of explosives to us in the 12-month period beginning 
March 31. It is a computer printout and we do have it computerized 
and can supply it to the subcommittee. But to give you a quick 
example: ammonium dynamite in pounds, 40,368; electric blasting 


caps, 110,811; detonation cord in feet, 56,665; ammonium nitrate in 
pounds, 26,000 ; safety fuse in feet, 8,541 feet. These, then, are some of 
the more outstandino; lists. 

We have a list here of about 15 items as reported to us in quantities. 
We would be happy to supply that to the subcommittee. 

Mr. ScHLTLTz. I would ask then, the chairman, that the computer 
printout referred to by Mr. Davis be accepted into the record. 

Did you want to supply it to us later or do you have a copy which 
you can give us right now ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes; well, we can leave this comnlete printed computer 
printout with the subcommittee now, if you like. It also has in this 
the amount that was recovered. 
Senator Scott. It will be received, 

[The information referred to may be found in the files of the sub- 

Mr. Davis. Mentioning the same items that I mentioned previously 
over the same 12-montli period : Ammonium dynamite, 20,268 pounds 
were recovered. In the case of ammonium nitrate, 4.500 pounds were 
recovered. In the case of electric blasting caps, 38,500 were recovered. 
In the case of detonation cord, 53,584 feet were recovered. To relate to 
the other items I mentioned as being stolen. 

Mr. SciiULTz. The chairman raises an interesting point; you have 
talked about the total amount that has been reported co you and I 
take it that your computer print out means no more. You are not guar- 
anteeing that there are no more thefts, but it is just all that has been 

Mr. Davis. That is very correct. In other words, these would rep- 
resent, I would say, the minimum figures because I am sure that there 
are probably thefts that are not reported to us either by i-eason of the 
fact that they are not discovered or by reason of the fact that the 
person is not aware of his legal obligation to report it. 

Mr. ScHULTZ. And then taking it one step further, in connection 
with recoveries or the investigations involved, could you give us 
some idea of the number of convictions that you obtained? 
Mr. Davis. Relating only to stolen explosives, is that correct? 
Mr. ScHULTz. Yes. 

Mr. Davis. That is the figure that we do not have, unfortunately, to 
provide to the record. 

'Senator Scott. But you are emphasizing in your summation — ^you 
referred to the deterrence of this terrorist explosion. And you also 
referred to convictions. People were convicted — they were and they 
also were incarcerated. Now, I am just wondering how many convic- 
tions have you generally. If you are not able to give us the number, 
just how successful have you been in achieving the aims which you 
say are desirable to stop this? How successful have you been ? Can you 
give us some idea on this in any manner that you see fit ? 

Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the period that began 

February 1, 1975, to January 31, 1976, we have perfected 190 cases. 

I can give you some quick rundowns. For example in the fiscal year 

1975 we made 185 arrests regarding violations of explosives laws. 

That is cases and arrests. 

Senator Scott. "Wliat ? 

Mr. Davis. That is cases and arrests involved during that same 
period, fiscal year 1975, we recommended for prosecution 257 indi- 


viduals. We had indictments returned on I7f), 106 of those plead 
guilty, ;U a plea of guilty and so 

Senator Scon\ How many were acquitted ? 

]\Ir. Davis. And that would leave ;^0 ? 

Senator Scoti'. Thirty, they were acquitted ? 

Mr. Davis. Or otherwise not 

Senator Scott. Do you have the conviction there of what you 
charged for criminal otfenses^ 

Mr. Davis. Between 70 and 80 percent. 

Senator Scott. Between 70 and 80 percent. 

OK, now, I am sort of asking you to rate your own agency if you 
can. Do you feel that this meets the criteria that you have said is neces- 
sary to minimize or eliminate these bombings ? 

I heard the President on television, and I have great admiration 
for the President, who was saying we are going to do what is neces- 
sary to stop this. And I remember remarking to my wife at the time 
that he should say that we are going to make every effort to stop it 
because none of us know whether we are going to be successful in our 

But do you feel that this is meeting the requirement, the criteria 
that you yourself have said is necessary in your principal testimony? 

Mr. Davis. Well, sir, I think that all of us would like 100 percent, but 
I think in my experience in law enforcement, that generally 70- to 80- 
percent conviction rate is quite high. And certainly 

Senator Scott. You think it is a deterrent? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. I might for example point out that the prin- 
cipal individual who was found guilty for the McLean bombing 
received 15 years. 

Senator Scott. Was he convicted in Federal court ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes. sir. And there are other individuals who are being 
convicted, and there are others who are fugitives in that particular 
case. We are quite pleased with that case. It involved cooperation with 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, in Canada, and a great deal of 
investigative eifort. 

Senator Scott. But let me ask, may I, lest I digress too far here : 
To what extent do you see these type of bombings as being from people 
who are mentally deranged ? 

Mr. Davis. Not to any great degree, Mr. Chairman. The motiva- 
tions that we have principally, the principal motivations for bomb- 
inirs like this that we have found are those of political nature in 
which the political philosophy or something of this kind is the rnotive. 
We have found that there are a number of them that are motivated 
by labor management disputes; we have found there are those rather 
personal kinds of things, such as the spouse involved or something 
of that kind. 

Senator Scott. This seems like vou are saying that you are finding 
substantially all of them of a vicious nature, intentionally done and 
planned ; and is this accurate ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir, I think very much so and unfortunately, where- 
as in the past, particularly those groups that are politically motivated 
and using bombing as a means to an end, have tried to avoid loss of 

72-947 O - 76 


The documents that we have from them indicate that they are 
chan^injr their pliilosophv and in order to direct the bombino«3 in such 
a way that they would, in other words, the documents that \ve have 
that we will make available to the committee from such organizations 
as the Red Guerrilla Family indicate that they believe that they are 
directing their bombings at' merely property no longer as it has not 
produced the results that thev have desired. 

Senator Scott. Directing it against what ? 

Mr. Davis. Property, primarily. 

Senator Scott. You say that to be effective from their point of view 
they have to direct their bombings against people ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. 

Senator Scott. Well, now, this is an open hearing, but to the extent 
that your security will permit, what has happened to this bombing in 
New York at the airport ? • i • 

Mr. Davis. Well, sir if I can, I would prefer to be rather limited in 
my statement. It is an open investigation. It is continuing. The Fed- 
eral Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms, and the New York Police Department are working on the 
investigation in a cooperative effort and it is continuing. 

Senator Scott. New York City, New York State, and the Federal 
Government ? 

Mr. DA^^s. Yes, sir. And in this case, of course, since there was loss 
of life, would be a State murder charge, even though the individual 
obviously violated Federal law as well. 

That, certainly, would be the principal charge in this case, a murder 
charge in the laws of the State of New York. 

Senator Scott. What, if you know, and I don't want to intrude fur- 
ther into this case, but what has happened there at the airport insofar 
as the prevention of future bombings are concerned ? 

Mr. Davis. Well, sir, I am probably not too well qualified specifically 
in this area, but we know that the Federal Aviation Administration is 
looking into various aspects of security. Our representatives have at- 
tended some of the meetings, and I am aware that they are preparing 
certain test procedures at selec<^ed airports to determine what could be 
effective against the introduction of bombs into aircraft or into the air- 
port area. 

Senator Scott. Now, with regard to airports, generally, in your 
statement a few minutes ago with regard to the terrorist point of view, 
the Iwinbing should be directed toward i^eople. 

I had heard somewhere privately, or from the media, that an effort 
was being made in some airports, in Los An.ofeles or somewhere in Cali- 
fornia, to put the places where ]ieople could store their luggage in a 
more remote area where there wouVdn't be so many people. 

That iust seemed to a lay person to be a very good idea. Is that being 
done, or is that helpful or desirable, or does your Bureau have any 
thoughts on this? 

Mr. Davis. Well, sir, we are generally aware ajiain that the Federal 
Aviation Administration is considering a number of various things 
such as lockers of different construction where the heavier 

Senator Scott. You are saying it is more within the providence of 
the FA A than it is within the providence of your Bureau ? 


Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. Now, I may say, Mr. Chairman, that we have 
had for the Last 2 years a Federal advisory committee on what we call 
explosives ta^o;in^. The purpose of this committee is to determine — 
and we think that thev have successfully determined methods whereby 
substances could be introduced into explosives that would make them 
detectable before they go off, or if they should go oif in the form of a 
bomb, then the explosives can be identified. 

And to this extent, of course, we are assisting in the overall effort to 
prevent bombings or if they should occur to be able to trace them more 
accurately. For example, in the LaGuardia bombing, if the explosive 
used there had been tagged, it would have saved thousands of man- 
hours of investigative time in trying to locate and to determine what 
was used and where they were purchased and things of this kind. 

Senator Scott. Mr. Davis, what we are going to do, if agreeable to 
everyone, is take about 10 more minutes and then adjourn with the 
thought we will meet tomorrow morning about 10:30, provided the 
schedule of the members of the subcommittee will permit and your 
schedule would permit. It would be subject to the call of the chairman, 
but counsel will confer with you to see if that is agreeable. I am going 
to ask counsel now if he will take the last 10 minutes, and if you liave 
something that you would want to convey at this time rather than to 
wait till tomorrow, feel free to do so. 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir, if I may, I will just follow up on the last of the 
train of thought that I had — ^I have here and would be happy to pro- 
vide them to the subcommittee, if they so desire, that communication 
from — for example, the "Red Guerrilla Family Bombs ATF'' — when 
they bombed our offices in San Francisco causing $100,000 damage to 
our offices. 

[The communication referred to follows :] 

R.G.F. Bombs A.T.F. 


We take this action in response to the pig murder of Popeye .Taekson. The ATF, 
like the FBI and the CIA, is a federal agency charged with the task of intimi- 
dating and disrupting revolutionary organizations. Popeye Jackson was the 
leader of the United Prisoners Union, a revolutionary organization of prisoners- 
of-war locked down in Amerika's San Quentins and Soledads. Popeye was a revo- 
lutionary who actively sought to expose to the people the fascism of the pigs and 
the necessity of an armed struggle to overthrow the ruling class. Thus it was 
necessary for this same ruling class to have Popeye murdered, just as it was 
necesfgary to kill Martin Luther King. Malcolm X, George and Jonathan Jackson, 
Cinque and countless other hlack leaders and revolutionaries. 

The exact role of the ATF in Poi>eye's murder is not yet known. But we do 
know that at the lieginning of June, Brenton Thorne, the head of the ATF ofBce 
in San Francisco, announced plans to add 100 agents to ATF offices on the West 
Coast, principally in the Bay Area and Los Angeles, in order to beef up the 
ATF's counter-insurgency campaign. Popeye, a well-known comrade who publicly 
worked for unity between the underground and the aboveground, was an obvious 
targrt for these pigs. Less than a week after Thome's announcement, Popeye 
was dead. Two days later, a phony communique, clearly written by the pigs, 
attempted to lay the blame for this murder on the New World Liberation Front. 

Despite these efforts, the people of California have not been divided by Pop- 
eye's murder or deceived by the pig propaganda that surrounded it. The unity 
of the people and of our guerrilla organizations is stronger than ever. For all 
the efforts of the ATF and the FBI, these pigs are themselves more vulnerable to 

attack than are the i)eoples clandestine guerrilla forces. We applaud the deaths 
of two FBI pigs on the Pine Ridge reservation, knowing that they were the 
agents of one of the most vicious ruling classes ever known to humanity. The 
struggle continues — and we continue to build a strong base for the more intense 
levels of struggle to come. Poi>eye was impatient with trashing buildings, and 
wanted the underground to attack the pigs themselves. His life's work of unifying 
and organizing oppressed peoples has helped to set the stage for the intensifica- 
tion of the people's struggle. 

The RED GUERRILLA FAMILY sends greetings of solidarity to the brave 
warriors of Pine Ridge and Wounded Knee, and to all the guerrilla organizations 
of the people, in and out of Amerika's political prisons — ^to the Black Liberation 
Army, the Symbionese Liberation Army, the Black Guerrilla Family, the Weather 
Underground Organization, the New World Liberation Front, the Frente de 
Liberacion Chicano, and the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional de Puerto 



We applaud this action on the part of the R.G.F. as it clearly targets one of the 
more oppressive yet least knmvn agencies of the Amerikan government. The day 
after the attack on June 21, attorney general Edward Levi appeared before a 
congressional juvenile delinquency subcommittee to confirm the existence of the 
AT&F agents made known by the S.L.A. in their communique of June 12. 

We also support the R.G.F. communique in both its basic clarity and essential 
political content. We do think, however, that there should have been some expla- 
nation of any procedures they took to have the area cleared of workers before 
the explosion. 



Senator Scott. One of your branch offices ? 

Mr. Davis. Regional. Then in connection with this, the Emiliano 
Zapata unit, which is an underground unit, makes this statement in a 
communique dated August 13, 1975: "The people struggle has now 
reached the point where you must in some cases depart from our non- 
injury policy. We will fully explain all of our actions objectively in 

[The statement referred to follows :] 

August 13, 1975. 

This is the first communique to the people issued by the Emiliano Zapata 
Unit, an underground People's Force motivated and guided by the political 
ideology of Marx, Lenin, Mao Tsetung, Marighela, Cabral, Che, George . . . 

We are a multi-national unit determined to destroy the facist-imperialist 
insects that preys on the lives of the people. We have devoted our lives to the 
destruction of the reactionary genocidal forces of America, which oppress 
us and our brothers and sisters with their brutal atrocities. To accomplish 
this we will engage in political kidnapping, political assassinations, bank 
expropriations, all carried out by commando units. We will also use very high 
explosives to eliminate certain capitalist agencies and institutions which are 
destroying peoples lives here and abroad. 

We will be focussing first of all on the treasury agents deployed in the 
Bay Area ; they will be dealt with severely, to counteract their ruthless attempts 
to destroy and discredit the Left. 

The people's struggle has now reached the point where we must in some 
cases depart from our non-injury policy. We will fully explain all our actions 
objectively and in detail. We will employ tactics such as raiding radio stations 
and taking control temporarily, in order to bring the real political informa- 
tion and education to the people. Also we are maintaining safe houses from 
which we are able to break in radio frequencies by means of short wave 
radios, if any of our communications are distorted by the pig media — or 
even the people's media. 


"We represent the true interest of the people, and will deal with any so- 
called revolutionary group, collectives or individuals who are motivated by 
ego-gratification, i.e. : superstar ix>sitions, gangsterim, adventurism, etc. 

A complete political statement from the Emiliano Zapata Unit will appear 
soon. Meanwhile, all messages of support and criticism are welcome and should 
be channeled to the people's media. AVe are deep rooted in tlie Bay Area, and 
will be able to respond quickly and objectively. 

With the deep respect and unfailing love born of struggle we embrace each 
individual and organization engaged in revolutionary work. Like the NWLF, 
WUO, BLA, SLA, RGF, ETC.— we are born of the people, and our only pur- 
pose is to serve the people. Dare to struggle. Dare to Win. 

La Luta Continua, 

Zapata Unit. 

Mr. Davis. And so, it is clearly indicated there that they feel that 
they should direct their activities against people as well as property. 

Senator Scott. Mr. Davis, there is no need for us to try to stretch 
this out another few minutes and just get in every minute that we can. 
We do have another vote. Rather than have counsel attempt to de- 
velop another theme, I think we will adjourn, subject to the call of 
the Cliair. 

[Whereupon, at 5 :30 p.m., the meeting adjourned, subject to the 
call of the Chair.] 


Administration and Execution of the Laws Pertaining to the 
Control of Explosives 

FRIDAY, APRIL 9, 1976 

U.S. Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act 

AND Other Internal Security Laws 
OF the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, B.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 :45 a.m., in room 
2228, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator William L. Scott of 
Virginia, presiding. 

Also present: Richard L. Schultz. chief counsel; Eobert J. Short, 
senior investigator, and David Martin, senior analyst. 

Senator Scott. The subcommittee will resume its sitting, and we 
will ask counsel to continue the examination. We welcome you and 
your group again Mr. Davis, and T understand we will attempt to 
conclude the hearing this morning. Thank you again. 

Mr. Schultz. Just a couple of questions, ^Nlr. Davis, concerning 
your testimony of yesterday. 

I became a little confused when we started talking about the statis- 
tics and convictions. If I could recap my notes and then ask you 
to clarify exactly what we were talking about. We were talking 
about the statistics achieved by ATF and, if my notes are correct, 
you had mentioned the figures 257 recommended for prosecution, 
176 indictments. 107 found guilty, 31 guilty pleas, approximately 
30 dismissed or some other disposition. And, then we talked about a 
70- to 80-perc€nt conviction rate. 

Were these figures related to investigations resulting from a report 
of the theft of explosives, or were these figures related to the total 
statistics relatino: to explosives violations, a broad category? 

Mr. Da\ts. Yes, Mr. Schultz, they were related to all violations of 
title XI relatine: to explosives offenses. . . 

Mr. Schultz. Thank you. I think we made a rather fast transition 
between those two subject matters, and I just wanted to clarify your 

Mr. Davis. If I might state in amplification, we reviewed that par- 
ticular question and can give you just a little better or more detailed 
breakdown of those persons that were prosecuted. This is the way 
it comes out : 107 entered a plea of guilty, 28 were convicted by a ver- 
dict of guilty. 30 were dismissed and 10 were acquitted. 

Yesterday I indicated that our conviction rate was between 70 and 
80 percent, and it turns out that it is 76 percent. 



Mr. ScHULTz. I believe when we concluded yesterday I was pur- 
suing some questions that we thought might need amplification in 
comiection with your prepared remarks. 1 would like to return to 
just a few of those if I may. 

Referring to page 12 of your prepared remarks, would you say 
that the bombing and bomb threats against Government installations 
represents an increase in the problem ? 

Could you give us a year-by-year breakdown ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes; in other words, you would like a year-by-year 
breakdown of the figures that are reflected on page 12 for 1975. 

Mr. ScHULTZ. Would those be available for the last 5 years? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, there has been an increase in the number of bomb- 
ings and bomb threats against government installations. Our statistics 
on the number of such actions against government installations are 
provided to us by the Federal Protective Service, which is part of the 
General Services Administration, and only relate to facilities under 
GSA control. The figures made available 'by the Federal Protective 
Service begin in 1973 and show that ten (10) Federal buildings were 
bombed in that year, and three hundred and thirty-nine (339) were 
subjected to bomb threats. In 1974, the bombings rose to eleven (11) and 
bomb threats to three hundred and forty-one (341). Last year, in 1975, 
eleven (11) Federal buildings were bombed and six hundred and four- 
teen (614) received bomb threats. Unfortunately, figures do not exist 
which reflect the damage to these government buildings in terms of 
dollars and cents, or- the cost to the government because of disruption 
to work when employees were evacuated during bomb threats prior 
to 1975. The figures for 1975 are reflected in my prepared remarks. 

Mr. ScHULTz. Would you describe for us the makeup of explo- 
sives ? Are they uniform in size ? 

Mr. Davis. No ; if I understand your question correctly, you want 
to know how they are commercially packaged? 

Mr. ScHULTz. Yes; right. 

Mr. Davis Well, they come in many different shapes and sizes. For 
example, dynamite, probably the most familiar configuration that we 
come in contact with, or the public comes in contact with, would be 
the 1-pound stick— the ordinary size. Dynamite also is made for 
special purposes in tremendous packages or sticks. Such explosives 
as ammonium nitrate fuel oil mixtures, of course, are in bag configura- 
tion. Ammonium nitrate, a granular substance, with fuel oil added to 
it. Then you have such things as your water gels and slurries which 
come in liquid form. So, there is a vast variety of shapes, forms and 
sizes of explosives. 

Mr. ScHULTz. Do you require uniformity within each of those 
categories ? 

Mr. Davis. No; we do not. In other words, the dynamite can be 
manufactured, for example, in any size and shape. 

Senator Scott. Mr. Davis, I am having some slight difficulty hear- 
ing you. I wonder if you would move that mike in front of your mouth 
to tile extent feasible. I have heard you, but there has been a little bit 
of strain and, thank vou. 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir; is that better? Maybe the microphone is not 
on ; it looks like it is on. 

Mr. ScHULTZ. AVould you describe briefly for us the labeling re- 
quirements for explosives ? 


Mr. Davis. Insofar as ATF is concerned, we do require the explo- 
sives manufacturer to put what we call the date shift code on the ex- 
plosives container. This means that tlie manufacturer indicates the 
date it was manufactured, and also the shift during that business day. 
This gives us an opportunity, if explosives are recovered intact, to 
trace tliem to the point wliere they were stolen or otherwise acquired. 

Now, 1 am sure that there are, for example, other agencies that re- 
quire certain labeling of explosives by classihcation and things of this 

Mr. ScHULTz. But you are able to trace them to the last legitimate 
receiver ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes; that is correct. If we recover the explosives before 
they are detonated and, in some cases, after they are detonated, we 
can go back to the manufacturer's records and, if that particular lot 
of explosives were distributed to five different sources, then we can 
follow up there. Eventually we can narrow it down to either the fact 
that this was purchased legitimately, or was, at least, purchased or it 
was stolen. 

Mr. kScHULTz. While we are on this point, could you tell us if there 
is a problem with the illicit manufacture of explosives? What is the 
magnitude of the problem if it exists 'i 

Mr. Davis. Well, as I am sure the subcommittee is aware, there are 
certain substances — common substances — that can be combined to 
make explosives material. Very frankly, in terms of bombings, we 
have not found this to be very prevalent, where the bomber would 
make an explosive from scratch, so to speak. 

But to take a little different tack, the University of Wisconsin 
bombing was made from ammonium nitrate fuel oil. Ammonium 
nitrate is a common fertilizer. Fuel oil can be added to it to create an 
explosive mixture which has to be detonated by a stick of dynamite, 
for example. In other words, it does have to have a detonating agent 
to make it go off. But, by and large, it has been our experience that 
explosives are so obtainable to the bomber in terms of theft and other 
means, that they very seldom make explosives from scratch. 

Senator Scott. Would you say, Mr. Davis, that the amateur might 
have difiiculty making explosives? He could steal them or get them 
in another way easier than lie could make them i 

Mr. Davis. I think that certainly is true, Mr. Chairman. The ama- 
teur — the explosives that the amateur would make would be liighly 
unreliable. They probably would have much less force than commer- 
cially manufactured explosives. 

I remember when I was young and I had a chemistry set, I made 
some black j)owder. I never was able to get it to do much beyond just 
burn a little bit. But it is not the simplest thing. 

Senator Scott. Just clarifying in my mind something Counsel 
asked you, the standardization of these various types of explosives — 
do the jmanufacturers for different companies attempt to have their 
explosives of the same type look alike — a stick of dynamite made by 
one company would look like a stick of dynamite made by another com- 
pany. Is this generally true ? Is this a trade practice, that they would 
want to (make it look alike, or would you comment briefly on that? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir; I will be very happy to. They do, of course, 
identify their explosive by trade names and other means. I think the 
real overriding factor here, however, is the predictability of the explo- 
sive. In other words, a 40-percent, 1-pound stick of dynamite has a 
certain amount of explosive force so that there needs to be uniformity 

72-C147 n - 7fi 


so that, if an explosive expert uses five sticks of 40-percent dynamite, 
then he knows exactly how much rock this will remove, or whatever 
it is. 

So, from that standpoint, there is uniformity generally in these 

Senator Scott. Well now the thrust of the question is — is that some- 
thing that the manufacturers desire rather than doing it because it is 
the law, and I am not sure that it is the law, that it is a trade practice 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir, there is nothing in the law in title XI that dic- 
tates to the manufacturers the shape or potency of the manufactured 

Mr. ScHULTz. Referring to page 15 of your statement, the para- 
graph there is describing one of the incidents that you presented to 
the subcommittee for consideration. How were the investigators able 
to determine that the dynamite used in the situation you described 
there was smuggled from Canada ? 

Mr. Davis. Without direct knowledge on this particular aspect of 
it, I am sure that it is more than likely that there were statements 
obtained from participants or witnesses that led to the information 
that the dynamite had been smuggled from Canada. 

Mr. ScHULTz. My question was prompted by, I suppose, the further 
questions of whether or not the coal company in question — I believe 
it was a coal company — had made adequate inventory checks, and 
whether or not there is a need for supervision of the removal of ex- 
plosives from storage rooms and daily logs, and this kind of thing. I 
wonder if you could comment on the need for these procedures, or 
whether they are actually in effect ? 

Mr. Davis. Actually, we are talking about two cases here. 

The case where the smuggling from Canada occurred was separate 
from the one where the friend went to the blasting site and removed 
the dynamite in order to make a bomb. Now, this certainly is a wide- 
spread problem, where explosives are in use on a daily basis, for the 
proprietor or the owner to insure that all of the explosive material is 
being used in the blasting effort. There is for all intents and purposes 
really no way for them to insure that. If there is collusion between the 
blasting expert and some friend or something of that kind, then it is 
very easy to divert a small number of sticks of dynamite, for example, 
for bombing purposes. And, I think this is true even though they keep 
very detailed daily records of withdrawals. In other words, the ques- 
tion is whether 20 sticks or 15 sticks of dynamite were placed in the 
bore hole and detonated. And, unless you have an almost over-the- 
shoulder supervision, it would be impossible to insure this. 

Mr, ScHrurz. We talked about the date shift code. 

What is the shelf life of an explosive, say, dynamite ? 

Would a mining operation go on a first-in, first-out basis ; in other 
words, use the freshest dynamite, or is that a consideration, if you 

Mr. Davis. With the new wrapping techniques that they have on, for 
example, dynamite, my expert tells me that the life of dynamite is al- 
most indefinite if they store it under good conditions. 

On the other hand, in the past, when they did not have the improved 
wrapping techniques, then it did start deteriorating after a certain 
period of time. 


Mr. ScHULTz. Well, I was thinking that there might be an addi- 
tional reason for the industry to check so that they would use up the 
explosive before it deteriorated. But, in addition, they are also re- 
quired under statute to make a regular check of their storage facilities, 
are they not ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes; that is correct. For example, if you have an un- 
attended magazine, then the law requires that you inspect it every 3 

Mr. ScHULTz. Now, when you say magazine, are you talking about 
storage for industry or manufacturer, or is there a difference ? 

Mr. Davis. For this purpose, there would be no distinction between 
a magazine for a user, or licensee, or a manufacturer, but as a prac- 
tical matter, most manufacturers would probably be using the maga- 
zines almost daily, and they would be in close proximity to their 

Mr. ScHULTZ. And they need to check these every 3 days ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes; if they are unattended magazines. 

Mr. ScHULTZ. Are they required to make an inventory every 3 days, 
or is it a running log on a day-to-day basis ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes; actually every time they put explosives in the 
magazine or they withdraw, then they must keep a magazine inven- 
tory to show that fact. 

Senator Scott. Now, you say, Mr. Davis, they must do this. Do 
you know whether it is actually done or not, and how do }^ou know ? 

Mr. Davis. Well, sir, we use our manpower resources insofar as, 
possible to check on this and, as I think was indicated yesterday, there 
are State people who are also active in this area. We have, through- 
out the country, coordinated our efforts with State agencies and, 
where we feel that their activities are adequate to insure the com- 
pliance with Federal law, then we would 

Senator Scott. Well, I think it would be almost an impossible 
task to police this on a nationwide basis on 3 days. Highway depart- 
ments from various States apparently have explosives, people in the 
construction business, and you would know the magnitude of the 
job certainly far better than I. But I just wonder, do you send people 
around to every job everywhere in the country? I cannot conceive 
of this being possible, even in a State. My State of Virginia, for 
example, I doubt that they have the staff and if they go to every 
place where there is dynamite stored; even then, it would be pretty 
much of an impossible task. And, yet, you must be dependent in some 
manner on what you are told with some sort of periodic inspection, 
but could you amplify that? 

How do you know whether these records are kept in compliance 
with the requirements of law, every 3 days they check on them? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. Well, as you have indicated, Mr. Chairman, 
it would be an impossible task for us to police this kind of require- 
ment. We have, for example, in connection with this particular year, 
issued instructions to our field personnel that every storage facility 
and licensee will be checked before July 1. Now, when they make 
these checks, they look, not only into the storage facilities to see 
that they meet requirements, but thev also examine the records system 
to make sure that they are being kept. 


So that, yes, we do depend a great deal on the voluntary cooperation 
of the users, and industry members in explosives. 

Senator Scott. And they have to file a form saying that they have 
done this every 3 days 'i 

Mr. Davis. No, sir. We merely have advised them of the require- 
ments of Federal law. I do want to emphasize, however, these are 
unattended magazines where there is nobody there full time or there 
is no in and out traffic so that they must check them every 3 days 
to determine that there has been no theft, that there is no hazardous 
condition existing, and this kind of thing. 

When we do make our compliance visits, we do try to ascertain 
that they are following this procedure. 

Senator Scott. Well now, frankly we have the question of paper- 
work and recordkeeping. I believe the P'ederal Government has too 
much of this and, yet, in something like explosives, it is important 
to know about it. 

Do you feel that the requirements are reasonable? Are they too 
stringent, or too lax, or are you generally satisfied with the require- 
ments in the existing law with your inspection procedure, with the 
State inspection procedure? Or, would you say that you had dis- 
satisfaction with any phase of it ? Or, could you comment on this ? 

Mr. Davis. Well, sir, my opinion is that the recordkeeping require- 
ments are adequate under the existing law. I think one of the problems, 
of course, that we face is due to the nature of the use and of the 
character of explosives themselves, where, if you have an employee 
who wishes to divert exj^losive materials while it is being used, it is 
not too difficult for him to do so. 

We are quite mindful of the paperwork burden onto members of. 
this legitimate industry and, that is why we have entered into a 
memorandum of understanding with the mine engineering and safety 
authority of the Bureau of Mines providing that wherever we can, 
we will work with the State to avoid duplication and in order to 
prevent that. Now, one thing, of course, is that with our rather 
limited manpower, we are not able to make as many compliance- 
type checks as I think would be desirable under the law for this par- 
ticular project. 

Senator Scott. Staff tells me that there is no requirement that 
forms be kept by the person who has the explosives and it is required 
that there be an inspection every 3 days, but the law does not require 
a form showing that there has been an inspection every 3 days. Is 
that accurate or not ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes; that is correct, Mr. Chairman. In other words, 
they do not have to keep a record of each 3-day visit that they make. 
To further amplify that, the law does require what is known as a 
daily summary of maga:^ine transactions. Now, if there is any ex- 
plosive placed in the magazine or any explosive witlidrawn, this has 
to be entered on a daily summary that is kept at the magazine. 

Senator Scott. Now, when they would inspect, would, generally, 
if they have their explosives in — I am a novice in this field, so I may 
ask questions that might not need to be asked by somebody with 
greater expertise but, to inspect, might they just go to the door and 
see if it had been unlocked or has been tampered with, or do they 
go back and count every stick of dynamite, or every box of explo- 


sives? The inspection that is required every 3 days, how thorough 
an inspection, might that need be? 

Mr. Davts. Well, sir. if I can just road you this particular part of 
the law which is very brief and it indicates, "Any person storing 
explosives material shall open and inspect his storage facilities at 
intervals not greater than 8 days to determine whether the explosives 
therein are intact and, to determine whetlier there has been any unau- 
thorized entry, or attempted entry, into the storage facilities, or the 
unauthorized removal of facilities or their contents." 

Senator Scott. Well, that would mean he would open the door, not 
open every box of explosives, or, you are not trying to put him in a 
strait jacket. 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. In my view, if the person makmg 
the inspection unlocked the door of the magazine, walked inside and 
looked around, and there appeared to be the amount of explosives that 
should be in there, and if there was no evidence of any forced entry, 
then he would satisfy this requirement. 

Senator Scott. A\\ right, sir. Now, you have mentioned the various 
forms that are filled out and, I am just wondering and this question 
of paperwork is something that bothers many people, many business- 
men, many Members of Congress. I am concerned about any unneces- 
sary paperwork and, yet, we are talking about attempting to prevent 
dangerous explosives from getting into the hands of the improper 

Do you feel that looking at all of the forms that are required by 
your agency or by the State, do you feel that the reporting require- 
ments, both by the States, if any by local governments and by the 
Federal Government, your bureau and other bureaus with regard to 
explosives, are they jiist about what they should be or are there too 
many or too few ? The paperwork burden is a tremendous burden on 
the business community. 

I am not suggesting an answer here, but I am asking you for your 
judgment as to whether the paperwork requirements. State and na- 
tional, are reasonable requirements, in your opinion. 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, tn my opinion they are reason- 
able. And, looking at it specifically from the standpoint of ATF, I 
do not think that we really require any records except one, that would 
not be considered to be good commercial practice. In other words, if 
I were operating a business in the use of explosives, certainly I would 
want to know, just for my own business purposes, when explosives 
were placed in and withdrawn from a magazine. For example, that is 
one requirement. 

I would say the exception to that is what we call the transaction 
record, the 4710, where there is certain information that has to be 
filled out by both the purchaser and the seller. But, again, this form, I 
think, is highly essential for law enforcement purposes. It also acts 
as a deterrent to prevent people who are proscribed by Federal law 
from acquiring explosives. It provides a method of tracing, should 
those explosives later be used in a bombing incident. 

I might say, too, that it is roughly equivalent to the same form that 
has to be filled out when an individual buys a firearm, under the Fed- 
eral firearms laws. 


But, the other records that the people are required to keep, again 
indicate just primarily good commercial practices that have been 
placed in the form of a requirement under the law. 

Mr. SciiULTZ. j\Iay I interrupt, Mr. Chairman. Most of these records 
are kept by the industries, is that correct? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, with one exception, and that is the 4710. 

Mr. ScHULTz. Is that a problem to you? Would you be better 
equipped to conduct your inspection and investigation of problem 
areas relating to the control of explosives if ATF, National Office, or 
a computerized repository — would you be better equipped if you had 
direct access to those materials? 

Mr. Davis. Certainly, if we had the computer capacity to take on 
this mass of data in the explosives area, I think it certainly would help 
us in carrying out our responsibilities. Furthermore, I think certainly 
it would generate information that might be useful to the Congress, to 
the administration and others, in determining the policy that would 
be applied to explosives. 

Senator Scott. These forms that are maintained by the manufacturer 
and are held available for inspection — and there are some forms — how 
many of these forms are actually looked at? 

Are they evaluated to determine the legitimacy or propriety of an 
individual obtaining explosives ! 

Do you have inspectors that look at the forms and evaluate them ? 

Mr. Davis. Mr. Chairman, we do evaluate, for example, the 4710's 
which are submitted to us, and we do make a limited number of field 
investigations based on those findings. 

However, I would have to admit that we are doing far from the job 
that we feel is adequate in terms of the 4710's in following up on a pur- 
chaser to determine if he is storing those explosives in a safe manner, or 
if he is using them for the stated purpose when he purchased them. The 
forms that are maintained on the premises of either a licensed dealer 
or a licensed manufacturer, are examined when an inspection is made 
of those facilities, both to determine if there are any trends or infor- 
mation of value. 

And, second, of course, to determine that he is in fact, complying 
with Federal law by keeping records. 

Senator Scott. Staff calls to my attention the requirement that an 
inspection be made, and tells me that in the past fiscal year, 1975, 
that 6,325 licenses or permits were issued, that the average licensee 
was inspected about once every -3 years. 

Is that accurate, or reasonably accurate ? And, do you consider this 
number of inspections reasonably adequate ? 

If you would care to have another member of your staff respond, 
we would be glad to hear from either you or any member. 

Mr. Davis. All right, sir. I think maybe in this particular instance 
I will ask Mr. Higgins to respond. 

Mr. Higgins. In fiscal 1975, there are two figures that you really need 
to look at to determine the coverage of licensees and permittees. 

One is the number that ATF made, which is a figure of 2,954. Now, 
those are ones that our inspectors and agents made. 

In addition to that, we have somewhere in the neighborhood of 
6,000 or 7,000 investigations, maybe more than that, that are made by 
MESA under the agreement we have with them where they go into 


the coal mines and other kinds of facilities, ATF does not inspect those 
premises. So, that would be in addition to this. Also, in that figure 
of 6,000 plus, licensees and permittees, we have approximately 1,700 
or 1.800 of those people who have one-time user permits for use around 
the Fourth of July. We do not have a regular inspection program at 
this point on them. 

And then, finally, in 1976, we are attempting to cover, and I believe 
we will, 100 percent of the licensed dealers this year and the permittees 
that we have coverage of. We have asked MESA, of course, to cover 
100 percent of those under this supervision or control. And, I think, 
we are going to make every one of them in 1976. 

Mr. Davis. I think it m'ight be useful for the subcommittee to know 
that under the memorandum of understanding we have with MESA 
that when they make inspections of these mining facilities, that they 
not only enforce their regulations and carry out their responsibilities, 
they also do the same thing with respect to the ATF responsibilities. 

Senator Scott. Mr. Davis, Mr. Short of our staif seems to believe 
there may be a discrepancy here, and I would like for him to explain 
what he has in mind, and to pose a question to you or Mr. Higgins 
with regard to it. 

Mr. Short. Yes, sir. You had the 2,141 compliance inspections that 
ATF made. Now there were 6,320 licenses and permits issued which 
we average out to indicate that a licensee can expect to be inspected 
once every 3 years. Now, is that correct ? 

Mr. HiGGixs. Yes, if you just took them strictly like that. However, 
I have some figures here that show in 1975, for example, that between 
the original application for license investigations that we made and 
the compliance inspections, the total would be 2,954. But, actually, 
the number of licensees and permittees we had as of March 9, was only 
4,733. Now, you have a figure of a little over 6,000 licenses and per- 
mits that were issued in 1975 for the total year. There are about 1,500 
or 1.600 of those that are issued as one-time user permits for fire- 
works around the Fourth of July. We do not get out to those 1,500 
or 1.600. 

Senator Scott. Now, do you keep your records on a fiscal year basis, 
rather than calendar year, so we are talking about the same period of 
time ? Go ahead, Mr. Short. 

Mr. Short. You mentioned 2,900. Are you taking the 813 investiga- 
tive figure, adding it with the 2.141 for compliance inspections just 
combinins: the two ? 

Mr. HiCrOixs. Right. Some of those initial visits were to set the 
man up and, you know, that was the first time the permittee or licen- 
see had gone into business. We always try to make an initial visit to 
him. So. you can either add the two together or not ; it does not make 
anv difference. 

The other figure is that MESA may 

Mr. Short. Let me interrupt you. T do not think I understand that 
point. It is my undorstandin.qf. there were 813 investigations made. 
Now, actually, then, an investigation by an asfent at that point is 

Mr. HiGGixs. I see what the problem is. The program is split — our 
inspectors who make some inspections and our special agents, who 
make some. It is the same kind of visit, whether you call it inspection 
or investigation. Some regions have been able to put the program en- 


tirely in the hands of inspectors. Some are midway between doing 
that, and still use special agents for some and inspectors for others. But, 
this is the same kind of compliance. 

Mr. Short. In other words, when you use an agent, you call it an in- 
vestigation and when you use an inspector, you call it a compliance in- 
spection, though it is the same type of overall investigation. 

Mr. HiGGiNS. That is where we are running into our problems, in 

Senator Scott. Let me ask you, these inspectors that you have, or the 
agents, what grades are they generally in ? Are they General Service 
grades? Are their grades comparable to other investigators or other 
inspectors with the Government ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, Mr. Chairman, the inspectors are what we call GS- 
1854 series. Their grades are generally, a journeyman at grade 9 with 
the senior inspector at a grade 11, some at grade 12. The agents or the 
1811 series, their journeymen grade is 11 with senior agents at grade 
12, and it is not easy to compare the inspectors with another occu- 
pational group. 

Senator Scott. What sort of a training do they receive in order to 
become inspectors? Do vou have some sort of a training school for 
them ? Just briefly describe what they go through before you send them 

Mr. HiGGiNS. We have, first of all, a basic inspector training pro- 
gram which is now a 4-week centralized program in which we require 
all the new recruits to attend 4 weeks of classroom training. Then, that 
is followed by the remainder of the time during, really, the first year 
when they are serving as trainees and accompanying experienced in- 
spectors on the job as trainees. So, we have 4 weeks classroom, and 
whatever is required up to a year for on-the-job training. 

Senator Scott. Let me go back if I may, Mr, Davis. T think that 
the response indicates that these investigators, inspectors that you have 
do have a low^er grade, say, than an FBI agent or some of the Treas- 
ury agents, and it may be that this is a reasonable thing for them, to 
have a lower grade. I am in a field now that I know something about 
because I haA^e been with the Government probably as long as any- 
body in this room, but let me turn to another field. 

Is the theft of explosives listed in the FBI computer ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. The FBI operates what is called a National 
Bomb Data Center. 

Senator Scott. Now, I am told that there is sort of a master com- 
puter in the FBI with the initials NCIC. What does that mean, 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. That is the National Crime Information Cen- 
ter, and there are a number of what you would call general law en- 
forcement items of information there. 

For example, all stolen firearms are listed Avithin the Information 
Center as they are reported. There are such thin.fTS as information on 
individuals who are wanted by State or Federal authorities, or 

Senator Scott. Now. that particular computer, if there is a theft 
of explosives at a particular location, that is inserted in this com- 
puter in part of the general information ? 

Mr. Davis. No, sir. If T may, Mr. Chairman? 


Senator Scott. Please, ask any assistant that you have. We would 
like to have as accurate information as possible. 

Mr. Davis. No, sir. The theft of explosives is not entered into the 

Senator Scott. Would that be a good idea to do it ? Suppose in an 
overall criminal investigation that it would just appear on the surface 
to a lay person, not a criminal investigator, that if you knew that a 
given criminal was in a particular area, if you also knew that explosives 
had been stolen in that area, there might be a connection. It would 
certainly be something worthy for an investigator to consider. And I 
am just wondering why they would not be put in that computer, or 
if you would recommend that they be put in. Could it be done by your 
agency without any authorization of law ? Or, could it be done by the 
Department of Justice, the parent agency being consulted with and 
then agreeing to put that in there ? Or, is there any legal prohibition 
to putting something like that in the computer ? 

Mr. Davis. Mr. Chairman, of course we are in favor of the widest 
possible dissemination of information to be of assistance in a criminal 

The main problem is that stolen explosives are, of course, somewhat 
diiferent than a firearm where you have a unique serial number and 
it is easy to identify. 

If, for example, ten cases of dynamite were stolen in, say, Virginia, 
while it is true that there is a date shift code on that, and it might 
be of some value, my understanding is that the somewhat general 
nature or the fact that it cannot be identified with certainty is one 
of the reasons why this information is not included in the National 
Crime Information Center. Since all thefts of explosives as we have 
indicated yesterday, are required to be reported to the ATF and, since 
we do have a limited computer facility, I think we could perform this 
service quite easily. It also ties in very closely to the tracing of ex- 
plosives wliich we are now doing for State and local law enforcement 

Senator Scott. Now, you say you have your own computer that this 
will be put in? 

Mr. Davis. Well, sir, we have access to the Treasury computer which, 
I must say, does not have the same accessibility to law^ enforcement 
personnel around the country as the NCIC. 

Senator Scott. Now, if a chief of police wanted to get information, 
would ho ordinarily turn to the FBI and to their computer for his 
information ? Would he be as apt to contact the Treasury Department 
with regard to information ? Again, I have not worked in the criminal 
field, but I would iust think that he might contact the FBI and have 
its computer searched rather than contacting the Treasury Depart- 
ment about some criminal activity. And. I do not know the capacity 
of the FBI computer. I assume it is a rather large and complex thing. 

Would it tax its capacitv to list something like this? 

Mr. Davis. Well, sir, I would not think so, and certainly if the 
details of procedures could be worked out, we would be very happy to 
supnlv that information to the FBI for inclusion in their computer. 
I might sav that, of course, the State and local law enforcement agen- 
cies do look to ATF for assistance in the fields of our expertise. 

72-947 O - 76 


For example, just to give you a sort of parallel example, we are 
now tracing about 3,000 firearms a month, wuth about 60 percent of 
them for State and local law enforcement agencies to assist them in 
their investigations. 

But, in any event, I certainly agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that 
reports on the theft of explosives, and where they occur, and what kind 
should be made available to law enforcement officials throughout the 
United States. 

Senator Scott. Well, actually, I had not thought of it deeply at 
all, but I was really thinking of your agency as being a part of the 
Department of Justice, and I am now aware that it is not. 

Is there cooperation with the Department of Justice and its various 

Is the fact that your agency is under Treasury Department — I can 
understand the tax aspects with the alcohol and tobacco — I have some 
little difficulty with the firearms and with the explosives, there being a 
separation. Actually, are taxes on explosives a major factor that would 
cause this to be within the Treasury Department rather than the 
Department of Justice ? 

Mr. Davis. Well, sir, yes. We almost have to look at the historical 
events that led up to this situation. The first gun control act of 1934 
was based on the taxing power of Congress. Therefore, it was decided 
that that law should be administered in the Department of the 

The second law in 1938 was based on the Interstate Commerce Clause, 
but since Treasury was administering the first one, they felt it should 
all be in one place. 

Finally, the 1968 Gun Control Act, again, was a combination of the 
two powers. And then, finally, because the statutory scheme for regu- 
lation of explosives was in fact patterned exactly on that of firearms 
and, then, because there was certain duplication — for example, under 
the firearms law we had the destructive device which, in fact, is a 
bomb — they felt that x\TF would be the logical place to carry out that 
responsibility. Now, we do, obviously, cooperate very closely with the 
FBI not only in joint investigations but, in terms of an exchange of 
information and services. We do explosive tracing for the FBI. So, I 
can assure you that there is no barrier to cooperation because the two 
agencies are located in two different departments. 

Senator Scott. It does raise a question in my mind and. being from 
Virginia, I believe in heritage and tradition and such thinsfs as that, 
but, sometimes there may come a time when chansres should be made 
on the basis of modern day facts. And, with the FBI being the prin- 
cipal investigator of domestic crimes of a Federal nature, how active 
are they in this field? Are you the exclusive ae:ent for the Govern- 
ment in the field of the investigation of explosives? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. Ceitainly when vou speak about regulation of 
explosives then we are the primary Federal agency that has that 
general responsibility. 

Senator Scott. Does the FBI have any responsibility in this field 
under existing la w, insofar as you know ? 

Mr. Davis. Only to the extent of criminal violations. There are six 
criminal acts included in the title XI of the Orcranized Crime Control 
Act of 1970. where both the Department of Justice and the Depart- 
ment of the Treasury are given concurrent jurisdiction. In order to 


avoid, again, any duplication and unnecessary waste of the taxpayer's 
money, we have entered into a memorandum of understanding with 
the FBI in which we have separated those jurisdictions and both of 
us are clearly aware of the area in which we are involved so that we 
will not have any duplication of effort. But, those sections are the only 
ones in which they are involved. 

Senator Scott. I cannot help but think of the professional criniinal 
and the criminal element in the country that might cross State lines, 
and might even be nationwide in its effect and wonder if, actually, 
you should not have the criminal investigations in the same depart- 

Now, I know that is an oversimplification, and I am going to ask 
staff, if they will, to check this a little further for us to see if they 
would want to recommend to the subcommittee any change. 

This explosive that you showed us that happened out in McLean, 
Va. — was the FBI involved in any way in that, or was that investiga- 
tion carried on entirely by State and local authorities in cooperation 
with your agency ? 

Was any other Federal agency involved in this ? 

Mr. DA\^s. Yes, sir. The ATF and the FBI both responded to that 
incident. And, when it was determined that it was within our juris- 
diction, because it was an interstate-type bombing, then the FBI 
withdrew and we carried the investigation out, although they helped 
us in any place they could. For example, this investigation, as I indi- 
cated yesterday, extended up into Canada where we worked very 
closely with the RCMP, and had very successful results. 

Senator Scott. I am going to ask you in a moment if you will to 
explain in a little more detail this memorandum of understanding 
that you spoke of. 

But, in connection with, and I just used the McLean incident be- 
cause that is the one that was illustrated yesterday, and we in the 
"Washington area are somewhat familiar with that, but, when these 
explosions occur, might there not be some people who would commit 
other crimes and a criminal element that would have to do with other 
than explosives, that perhaps would be under the jurisdiction of the 
FBI ? I am just wondering if we are isolating this too nriuch, and just 
saying it is an explosive — we will investigate the explosive. And, if it 
is a general criminal element and this is a part of their operation. I 
am wondering if we are separating things, putting them into a com- 
partment and, actually, if it is working in the interest or toward pre- 
venting criminal activity as effectively as if it was done through the 
same agency. 

If you would comment on that, and then explain to us a little bit 
more in detail about this memorandum of understanding with the 
FBI ? You go ahead in your own way. 

Mr. Davis. All right, sir. Thank you. Of course, explosives and 
bombings are certainly not the only area in which you have criminal 
activity involving one y:>erson or group of persons together. For ex- 
ample, in our enforcement of firearms laws, we frequently run into 
narcotics. This presents no problem whatsoever, because when we do, 
we immediately notify, or refer as we call it, that aspect of the case to 
the druji enforcement people. 

Senator Scott. Now you are talking about narcotics. Could it not be 
that they want explosives to blow up a bank vault ? 


Mr. Davis. Certainly it could be, or certainly to extort. 

Senator Scott. Or to do a number of things not under your jurisdic- 
tion. Now, I do not laiow — a bank robbery — who investigates that? 
Possibly that is still a Treasury agent. It is FBI, is it ? 

Mr. Davis. It would be the FBI. 

Senator Scott. I am just thinking of whether or not it would be 
more effective to investigators from a central agency. I do not want any 
agency to get too big, but at the same time, we do want — and I am 
sure you would be in complete agreement on this — we want the maxi- 
mum effective law enforcement, and I do not think we would have the 
slightest quarrel on this. But, you go ahead, sir. 

Mr. Davis. Well, sir, the question obviously is much larger than ATF 
and explosives. Obviously, as you are well aware, Mr. Chairman, the 
Secret Service in the Department of Treasury investigates counter- 
feiting. The U.S. Customs Service in Treasury "investigates smuggling 
of materials into the United States as we do firearms. Certainly the 
Drug Enforcement Administration is responsible for narcotics and 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, for the illegal entry of 

Senator Scott. A lot of those, though, would not tie in very closely 
with explosives, but blowing up a bank vault might very well tie in — or 
other crimes. We have got a Subcommittee on Immigration that is 
considering changing the law with regard to illegal aliens. I do not see 
a close tie in between that. An illegal alien could get hold of an ex- 
plosive and could participate, but tliat is not the general practice. They 
come over here for the purpose of having a higher standard of living, 
and becoming involved in some way in our overall American life. But, 
I can see where the ])rofessional criminal would use explosives. I am 
just wondering if it is in the national interest to have the investigation 
of the use of explosives by a tax-oriented organization. 

You are talking about the history here, and that it started with taxes, 
and that it has gone beyond that, but — I do not want to interrupt. 
I have interrupted you and, perhaps, broken your chain of thought, 
but it is something that just came to mind when you were talking 
about this information not being in the FBI computer, the national 
crime computer. I think, at least, that ought to be in there. 

I have interrupted you, and I will try to let you finish your chain 
of thought. 

Mr. Davis. All right, sir. First, Mr. Chairman, let me assure you 
that as far as the law enforcement part of ATF is concerned, we are 
not tax-oriented. We have been a law enforcement organization longer 
than the FBI. We are quite proud of our history of law enforcement in 
the areas that we have been given responsibility. I would rush to assure 
you that the fact that we do have different Federal law enforcement 
agencies does not, in any way, in my opinion, detract from the Federal 
law enforcement effort." In fact, I think it probably enhances it. There 
are, of course, criminal specialties and. I thinlc, probably the fact that 
we have separate law enforcement agencies at the Federal level does 
allow a focus on particular areas such as, for example, narcotics, which 
we recognize is a tT-emcndous social and law enforcement problem in 
the United States. 

In the case that you have used, the example such as the bombing of a 
bank vault, there "would be no question in anybody's mind that that 
would be in FBI jurisdiction. 


Senator Scott. Yes, but you said tliat the — as I understood you. I 
may have misunderstood — but you said that if explosives are stolen, 
that that is not something that gets on the FBI computer and, yet, 
if the explosives are stolen for the purposes of blowing up some sort 
of safe in a bank or some crime, some general crime that might be 
under the investigation of another bureau other than your own, they 
might not have information with regard to this, and it looks to me like 
it is a weakness in the law enforcement system of Federal law 

Mr. DA^^s. Well, sir, again I would agree with you and certainly if 
the procedural problems could be overcome we certainly would be very 
happy to introduce that information into the NCIC. 

I probably spoke a little too hastily a minute ago. Mr. Corbin has 
informed me that we have in the Treasury the Treasury Enforcement 
Communication System or TECS, which is shared by Customs and 
ATF for law enforcement purposes. And we do have stored in that 
computer all of the explosive theft incidents of the last 2 or 3 years. 
And, obviously, if any law enforcement organization needed informa- 
tion of this kind, it would be available to him. 

State and local law enforcement organizations, I think, are mindful 
of the fact because we work very closely with them in all of our juris- 
dictional areas that ATF does have responsibility for explosives, gen- 
erally, at the Federal level, and, as I say, Ave trace explosives for them 
through our laboratories. We prepare evidence in those State cases 
where they have asked for our laboratory assistance or the reconstruc- 
tion of explosive devices or ask for testimony of this kind. 

Senator Scott. IMr. Davis, I am not in any way trying to talk down 
your organization. From your presentation and my limited knowledge, 
you have a very fine organization. No thought of any criticism of your 
organization — ^and yet we would have a mutual desire to track down 
the criminal, and that is really the thrust of what I am getting at. 
And I do have a concern that you have what we might call a master 
computer to get information with regard to criminals. 

I am thinking that maybe if you got a John Dillinger running 
around the country or maybe a "mad dog" type of person, I think if 
explosives were stolen, and, somehow, the local, Federal, and State offi- 
cers were trying to find out what that individual, or group of individ- 
uals were doing, that they would need all of the information they could 
get. And if the explosives had been stolen, they ought to know that 
because it might have a relationship to what he is going to do the next 
day, or the next week. And, it just seems to me that it ought to be in 
that computer. 

Now, how you get it in there is a different thins:, and again, I am 
goins: to ask staff to look into this matter a bit if they will, <and we 
would like to have any information that vou are prepared to give now, 
or that you would later want to submit for the record. 

I would like, also, as soon as you complete your thoughts that you 
may have now with regard to this overall matter, if you would get 
back and tell us what this memorandum of understanding is. I would 
like to understand the memorandum of understanding. 

Mr. Davis. Very well. sir. I think if T can. I just would conclude my 
train of thought by saying that I can understand your concern, and a 
very legitimate concern, about the effectiveness of Federal law enforce- 

ment. But my opinion, based on my years of experience in the law 
enforcement field, is that the separation of responsibilities amon^ the 
various agencies at the Federal level, does not inhibit or detract from 
effective law enforcement at the Federal level, and I think we have 
very close, cooperative relationship among the various agencies. I 
think, certainly, this is demonstrated fully by our joint investigation 
of the LaGuardia bombing, for example. And, this is only one. There 
have been many cases where the FBI and ourselves and others have 
cooperated very fully. 

]Mr. Chairman, we would be happy to put the full memo of under- 
standing into the record if the chairman would so desire. 

Senator Scott. Yes ; and it will be received, but could you just briefly 
tell us what is this memorandum of understanding? 

[The material referred to will be found on p. 73 of the appendix 
as Exhibit No. 3.] 

Mr. Davis. There is in the memorandum of understanding, a sum- 
mary, and I think probably if I can just run down through that. OK, 
sir. first I will refer to the law itself, and it is in title XI of the Orga- 
nized Crime Control Act of 1970. The final sentence of section 846, 
Additional Powers of the Secretary, reads as follows, "In addition to 
any other investigatory authority they have with respect to violations 
of provisions of this chapter, the Attorney General and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, together with the Secretary" — and that is the 
Secretary of the Treasury — "will have authority to conduct investiga- 
tions with respect to violations of subsections D. E, F. G. H, or I of 
section 844 of this title, which includes six specific violations of the 

Now, in this memo of understanding, these are generally the things. 
I will not necessarily read the section, but it is included on the left 
side. For example, regulatory provision violations are the jurisdiction 
of ATF. This is such things as the buildings and storage, failure to 
keep records, and a long list of things tliat are criminal violations. 
Those are clearly the jurisdiction of ATF. The interstate transporta- 
tion — except by mail, which is the Post Office Department's responsi- 
bility — of explosives with unlawful intent is ATF jurisdiction. 

Bomb threats, false information as they relate to Treasury build- 
ings or functions, that is the jurisdiction 

Senator Scotf. Now. is the thrust of your memorandum of under- 
standing of who investigates a particular activity ? Is that the thrust 
of it? 

:Mr. Davis. That is it. 

Senator Scott. Well, I wonder if perhaps you should not go further 
than this and have a memorandum of understanding on how you 
would cooperate with one another. Now, do you have some sort of a 
conference among Federal law enforcement agencies where you co- 
ordinate your activity to determine how you can best cooperate ? 

I can understand — a moment ago. I noted a little bit of pride in 
your organization and there is not a thing wrong with that, but just 
like rivalry between our military services might not be in the national 
interest. I think undue pride in any branch of the Government might 
not be in the national interest. And we mention the question of this 
computer. Now, is this computer — the FBI has it — but is this con- 
sidered the major national crime computer, and the storage place for 
crimes of various types other than those that are investigated by the 


FBI, that are under the jurisdiction of the FBI? Is it supplemented 
by information from other law enforcement agencies ? 

"^Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. And it is certainly considered to be the national 
crime computer. As I have indicated, there are certain kinds of infor- 
mation that are included in it. And, they are very specifically spelled 
out. If my recollection is correct, they have a Board of Governors — 
or a Board of Trustees, or whatever you want to call it — to determine 
what kind of information can be reproduced. 

For example, we routinely place in the National Crime Information 
Center information about stolen guns, but certainly your characteri- 
zation of the computer is accurate in that it is the national crime 

Senator Scott. I remember years ago, when I was serving in the 
House, we had it demonstrated'to us. They took my name. They said, 
we can determine whether you have a criminal record. And I did risk 
this, and they told me that within 10 seconds they would have a report. 
And, it took more than 10 seconds : it took a full minute for them to 
come back and say that I had no criminal record according to the 
FBI's computer. 

Frankly, I think this is a very wonderful thing for the Federal 
Government to have a record of the criminal element, but I believe it 
is deficient. I say I speak as a lay person and, yet, I was with the 
Department of Justice 21 years, 35 years with the Federal Govern- 
ment, and do have some knowledge of the Government bureaucracy 
and the empire building concept that we have in the Government. 

I think we ought to find a way to see that the theft of explosives — 
perhaps we could have an amount, maybe every time one stick of 
dynamite is stolen — perhaps that need not be reported, but certainly 
within some reasonable limitation it seems to me that the stealing of 
anv sizable amount should be in that computer. 

Do you feel that it would take legislation to get this done, or what 
would you suggest as to the best way ? 

Could your office, if you submitted such information, would it be 
received by the FBI and put into the recorder ? 

Or, to get back a bit to the question I asked a few minutes ago, what 
sort of cooperation do you have among these various investigative 
agencies ? 

Do you meet periodically ? Does the head of the FBI meet with the 
head of the Secret Service ? And, do they meet with the head of your 
bureau? Do you have a joint meeting where you kick around some of 
these things ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir, first let me say, to give you a complete answer to 
your question, we do have daily liaison contact with the FBI on what 
you might call daily operating problems and things of this kind, Mr. 
Corbin, the Assistant Director of Criminal Enforcement, meets with 
the officials of the FBI, and particularly as they relate to any prob- 
lems that may come up. We have at the Director level a bimonthly 
luncheon meeting at which myself and Director Kelley, Director 
Knight, in other words, all of the Federal law enforcement agencies 
every 2 months have a luncheon meeting at which many of these broad 
kinds of concepts are discussed. 

So, I think we have a considerable amount of liaison at meetings to 
address ourselves to these common problems, and to engender a spirit 
of cooperation. 


Mr. ScHULTz. I am wondering, a point of clarification, Mr. Davis. 
I am not familiar with the criteria of those items that would go into 
NCIC, but I would think that whether they are instrumentalities of a 
crime, or whether they are items of stolen property, that one of their 
requirements would be a serial number or some method by which 
they could be identified with certainty. You mentioned that explosives 
have a date shift code, but I think you indicated that they do not have 
any particular serial number by which you could enter them and with 
some certainty identify the same identical explosive if it were located. 

Perhaps you could address yourself to the question of would this be 
feasible ? What would you envision would be required to be able to do 

Mr. Davis. Certainly this is one of the basic problems, introducing 
explosive theft incidents into the computer. 

You have to have some key to pull the information out of the 
computer at the request of some officer in some part of the country. 
Now, obviously by the model or serial number, guns can be done very 
readily because it is a unique identifier of that particular weapon. It 
would be certainly more difficult to try to take some combination of 
the date shift code or information of this kind so that you could pull 
out information regarding the theft of explosives around the country. 

Now, I am certainly not suggesting that it is impossible ; I am only 
suggesting that it would be much more difficult. I will have to admit 
that in terms of, and I think the chairman asked the question about 
legislation, to introduce this information. I think there is, and again 
I am speaking from recollection, it may not be that accurate, I think 
there is a Board of Governors or a Board of Trustees, some such body 
at the NCIC who determine the policies to be followed for the infor- 
mation to be included. 

Senator Scott. This policy board that you are speaking of, is that 
for the purpose, primarily, of protecting civil rights of the individuals 
or is that for the purpose of not trying to exceed the capacity of the 
computer? Or, is that just information that would be of sufficient 
importance to warrant its inclusion for the benefit of the law enforce- 
ment community generally? Or is it a combination of these or other 
factors ? 

Mr. Davis. I am sure it would be a combination to establish policy. 
I am sure that there are, from time-to-time, types of information that 
people feel should be in the computer that this Board would determine 
whether or not there is sufficient advantage to law enforcement in 
comparison to the cost and things to 

Senator Scott. Well, I would think now, without having any exper- 
tise in regard to the computer technology, that if you had somelxtdy 
on a rampage committing various crimes up in the State of Washing- 
ton, or in the northwestern part of the United States, and there were 
explosives in any quantity that were stolen in that area, that it would 
be very material for someone trying to capture an individual or a 
group to know about this. 

On the other hand, if it happened down in Puerto Rico, and they 
were up in the northwestern part of the country, it might be an en- 
tirely different thing. And, I think, maybe on a geographic basis, that 
that might be one way of putting something like that in a computer. 
But, again, I have no knowledo-e of computer technology, but if the 
computer is of any value, somebody must know how to get the infor- 


mation in it. I am not sno;o;estino; that the Director of a bureau ought to 
know how to operate a computer because I do not believe that that is a 
requirement of your office, but somebody that is working on that 
computer should know how to catalog it/how to get it in there, and 
how to get the necessary information out. I cannot see this as being 

Mr. Davis. Mr. Chairman, certainly, again, if it is desired by the 
FBI to include this information in the^NCtC, we would be very happy 
to cooperate in every way possible. 

Senator Scott. Now, we do have some questions that we would want 
to submit to you to be answered later on for the record, Mr. Davis, 
and counsel will get those to you. And we would like, within a reason- 
able time, for you to give us the answers for the record. 

[The material referred to appears on p. 48.] 

We are going to take about 10 more minutes and then adjourn. 

Counsel, do you have any more questions that you might want to ask 
or something else that you think we might do before we adjourn the 

Mr. ScHULTZ. Yes ; I wonder if 

Senator Scott. And then, after counsel poses anything that he has, 
then we would want to give you the opportunity, Mr. Davis, or your 
associates, to make any additional statement that you feel would be of 
value to the subcommittee. 

Mr. SciiULTz. Mr. Davis, in connection with the criminal sanctions 
that are attached to the reporting procedures — the storage require- 
ments — you did list a few when you were going through the memor- 
andum of understanding. I wonder if you will be able to give us some 
figures relating to either criminal sanctions imi:)Osed against the indus- 
try, or civil penalties imposed for violations which have occurred over 
the last 3 years. 

Mr. Davis. We do not have any record of criminal sanctions being 
imposed against a member of tlie explosives industry by ATF since 
the effective date of Title XI, Regulation of Explosives. In 1975, we 
did revoke one dealer's license. Violations of the regulations uncovered 
during our inspections of licensed premises are primarily in the field of 
storage, and every opportunity is given the licensee to bring the storage 
facilities and procedures into compliance before we resort to what 
might be considered as the first administrative action against a 
licensee — the denial of the application to renew a license or steps to 
revoke a license already in existence. It is interesting to note that in 
Fiscal 1972, we denied 150 applications for license. That figure has 
dwindled in the ensuinsr years to 34 denials in Fiscal 1973, 21 in Fiscal 
1974 and 6 in Fiscal 1975. The same pattern follows in the application 
for permits under Title XT. We denied 230 in Fiscal 1972, with 43 
denials in Fiscal 1973, 29 in Fiscal 1974 and 6 last year. These figures, 
coupled with our field reports, give us reason to believe that the explo- 
sives industry is rapidly taking whatever steps are necessary to con- 
form to the requirements of Title XI. 

Mr. ScTiULTZ. Would you take us through a typical example of 
ATF receiving a theft or a loss report, and how this is handled right 
from the beginning of who receives the report? "V^Hiat investigation 
is conducted ? 

]\Ir, CoRBiN. Typically, one of our criminal enforcement officers — 
field officers — posted for duty in Ix)uisville, Ky., will receive a report 


from a storage facility that upon inspection on Monday morning, 
April 7, they discovered that a case of dynamite was missing. Upon re- 
ceiving that information, the special agents from ATF would contact 
the owners, very likely visit the facility, record what information was 
available, when was the last time the facility was checked, who discov- 
ered the missing explosive, was there evidence of forced entry, was the 
lock picked, was the door closed, what was the nature of the explosive, 
what was the amount — the usual criminal investigation routine — 
interview the owners who had access, or suspicious pereons. 

At that point, it is a matter of what lead, what can you develop? 
Is there labor difficulty? Does any employee who has access have a 
domestic problem ? Is there a group in the general area who, for one 
reason or another, might be suspect? 

From that point, it is a normal investigative routine. 
Mr. ScHULTz. All right. I take it that a full investigation is con- 
ducted, and the resolution depends upon what information they have 
to work with ? 

Mr. CoRBiN. That is correct. 

Mr. ScHULTZ. Is there a case report written on each investigation ? 
Mr. CoRBiN. No, sir. Each such theft would result in what I would 
call a numbered investigation that is recorded. The theft is repoi-ted 
in our Treasuiy computer by incident. 

If I could add here, that is the problem between NCIC and what 
we do. We record thefts of explosives by incident. NCIC, as I under- 
stand it, is set up to record property or individuals by some number- 
ing system. 

Senator Scott. You do it by what ? 

Mr. CoRBiN. By incident. A theft of one case of 40 percent DuPont 
dynamite, April 7, Louisville, Ky., such and such. 

Senator Scott. Well, that might be all that w^oiild be needed if you 
have Louisville, Ky., and there is a criminal element operating in the 
I^uisville, Ky., area. You are saying that the computer in the FBI 
is on the basis of what ? 

Mr. CoRBiN. Number. For example, you have a social security num- 
ber. You had a serial number in the service. 

Senator Scott. Are you talking about the number for a particular 
criminal ? 

Mr. CoRBiN. For a criminal, for a piece of property, for example. 
Senator Scott. It must be more than that and, again, I do not have 
any knowledge, but there must be other ways, other things, that they 
would have in the computer rather than just having it computed under 
a number identifying a particular criminal. 

You are not suggesting that if they are checking on a bank robbery 
that they check to see whether Dillinger is the one that did it. They 
must have something other than Dillinger that they would look under. 
Is that what you are telling us? 

Mr. CoRBiN. How bank robberies are put into NCIC I do not know. 
It is my understanding that the decision is in property of this type 
which is stolen — only that property w^iich can be identified specifically 
by number is entered. 

Senator Scott. Well, I have some reservations, with all the exper- 
tise that we have in here today, whether we have the technological 
expertise that we need to resolve these questions. If we do have, and it 
is desired — I am assuming that your job is not that of a computer man. 


that you have much broader responsibilities than that. So, perhaps as 
far as the mechanics is concerned, maybe we had better not delve into 
that any further than we have because I am satisfied if the computer 
is worth the amount of money that is paid for it, that there is a way 
to get it in there. And, unless we have people that operate computers — 
and I am not sure we even would want to go into how it would be ac- 
complished, I think our inquiry is much broader than that — but I am 
willing to go out on a limb and say there is a way to do it if there is 
a will to do it. I think, maybe, we do not even need to inquire further 
because I am satisfied that there is a way that it can be accomplished 
if we want to do it. 

Now, Counsel, perhaps you might have a final question, and then 
let us give Mr. Davis an opportunity to say a few words because I 
think he has been here with us 2 days and we ought to at least give him 
5 minutes to say something that we have not asked him. 

Mr. ScHULTZ. In view of the hour, Mr. Chairman, I defer to Mr. 
Davis, and we will submit our questions by letter if it is agreeable. 

Senator Scxyrr. All right. If you will go right ahead, sir, anything 
that you feel you have not covered that you believe this committee 
ought to know about. 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. Thank 3^ou, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate the 
opportunity. I will be very brief. 

I think, together with the material that we have gone over in session 
and combined with the questions that will be posed to us by counsel 
and staff that we will answer in the future, that we have pretty well, 
I think, covered the various areas. 

I think there is one important area that I would just like to mention 
to the chairman, and that is, our efforts in the explosives tagging area. 

Senator Scott. Now, that is identification, tagging? 

Mr. Davis. Yes. It is covered briefly in my prepared statement that 
we, a little over 2 years ago, established a Federal Advisory Committee 
made up of representatives of the various concerned Federal agencies, 
including law enforcement agencies, members of the industry, and 
members of scientific institutions, together with a technical subcom- 
mittee to determine the feasibility of tagging explosives so they could 
be detected before they were detonated, in other words, to detect a 
bomb that was located in the area. 

And, second, if a detonation should occur, it would permit us to — 
and wlion I say us, I am speaking primarily of law enforcement organi- 
zations throuirhout the United States — to find out where that explosive 
was made, where it was distributed to, which would give a valuable, 
I think, investigative lead. And, we do feel that we have progressed to 
a point where we have established the technical feasibility of these 
systems and we are very hopeful that our efforts as the lead agency 
here, together with the other efforts being conducted by the Govern- 
ment, will result in a svstem that will hopefully prevent a large num- 
ber of bombings, and in those cases where they did not prevent it, at 
least it would give us a very valuable investigative lead toward dis- 
covering who is responsible for a violation. 

Well, Mr. Chairman, my colleague, Mr. Peterson, just reminded 
me that if we had such a tagging system, which w^ould be a numeric 
system, that there is no question that that could be placed in the NCIC, 
and retrieved from this system. 


In closing, sir, we have appreciated the opportunity to appear 
before this subcommittee to discuss our activities in this area. And, 
thank you very much. 

Senator Scott. Mr. Davis, you have been very helpful to us, and 
cooperative in responding to our questions. We had purposely con- 
ducted the hearing on somewhat of an informal basis because I believe 
it is more productive that way. 

We appreciate your bringmg your associates with you, and having 
the benefit of their knowledge on this important matter. Thank you 
for being here. 

We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12 :21 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to 
the call of the Chair.] 

Supplemental Questions and Answers 

(Referred to on p. 45) 

( 1 ) GENERAL 

Question. It is accurate that criminal and terrorist bombings occur far more 
frequently and pose much more of a problem today than they did, let's say, ten 
years ago? 

Answer. ATF does not have accurate data dating back ten years. However, 
our intelligence sources indicated that although the total number of bombings 
have increased, bombings by terrorists have not necessarily done so. During 
1969-70, the anti-Viet Nam protest was at its peak. Therefore, there were a large 
number of what might be termed terrorists bombings. Most of these bombings 
were incendiary and were by groups in protest of our involvement in Viet Nam. 
The terrorists bombings today are more sophisticated and are doing more 
damage because of the use of explosives, but the numbers have not appeared to 

Former Assistant Secretary Rossides testified before the Committee on Gov- 
ernment Operations, U.S. Senate on Wednesday, July 15, 1970, to the following 
statistics. For the 15-month period of .January 1, 1969. through April 15, 1970, 
there was reported to ATF a total of 4,330 bombings. Of this number 975 were 
explosive bombings and 3.355 were incendiary bombings. These figures were 
obtained from local and state law enforcement agencies. Accurate data was not 
again available until 1972, when the FBI began publishing Bomb Summaries in 
their Uniform Crime Reports. Quoting from those reports are the following 
figures. In 1972 there were 1,507 total bombings reported of which 793 were 
incendiary and 714 explosive. 1973 produced 1,529 total bombings reported with 
787 being incendiary and 742 explosive. In 1974 there were 1,651 total bombings 
reported with 758 incendiary and 893 explosive. For the first half of 1975 there 
were 828 total bombings reported with 268 incendiary and 560 explosive. As you 
can see, the incendiary bombings are decreasing. While intelligence sources indi- 
cated that terrorists bombings have not increased, other criminally motivated 
have and are continuing to increase. 

Question. It would, therefore, be accurate to say that we have a far greater 
problem today than we had when the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was 
passed, wouldn't you agree? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Would you then agree that in the light of this situation, we've got 
to have substantially more rigorous control over the production and distribution 
and use of explosives? 

Answer. We feel that there is no requirement for additional control require- 
ments for the production and distribution of explosives. However, regarding the 
use of explosives, ATF and the Institute of Makers of Explosives have intensi- 
fied efforts to continually educate the user in the importance of the proper stor- 
age, prompt theft and loss reporting, proper recordkeeping, and safety of ex- 
plosive materials. 

QuestiotK On the basis of some of the figures you have presented to the sub- 
committee, are the forces at your command adequate to cope with the problem? 


You have told us that there are over 2,000 manufacturers, importers and dealers 
licensed under Title XI. You told us, further, that the total number of permits 
and licenses was 6,320. Against this you have a total of 1,800 men involved in 
inspection and enforcement. 

Answer. We believe that our current manning level, supported by MESA and 
State cooperative programs, is adequate at this time to meet our statutory 
responsibilities. Additionally, our program in voluntary compliance activities 
with the industry, distributor and consumer is designed to supplement our 
limited manpower resources. 

The men identified in your question are the total number of ATF special 
agents available for criminal enforcement investigations. In addition, we have 
682 inspectors engaged in application and compliance inspections. 


Question. For the purpose of clarification, does the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco 
and Firearms have exclusive and sole jurisdiction over the Federal laws govern- 
ing the manufacture, sale and use of exi^losivesV 

Answer. The Bureau has exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the regulatory 
provisions of Title XI of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (18 U.S.C. 
Chapter 40), which among other things regulates the manufacture, storage, 
and sale of explosive materials (see 18 U.S.C. * * * 841-843). Users of explosive 
materials who acquire, transport, or ship explosive materials in interstate or 
foreign commerce must obtain a Federal permit and comply with regulations 
under Ohapt-er 40. The Bureau does not regulate the actual use of explosives. 
Those Federal agencies regulating the use of explosives are the Department of 
Defense through the Defense Supply Agency, the Department of the Interior 
through the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA) and the 
Bureau of Mines, and the Department of Labor through the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA). The Department of Transportation reg- 
ulates the transportation of explosives. 


Question. What basic criteria determine whether or not an individual is 
accei>table and may be granted a manufacturer's, dealer's or importer's license? 

Answer. In order for an applicant to qualify for a Federal explosives license or 
permit, the person making such application must be 21 years of age or over: 
must not be a person to whom the distribution of explosive materials would be 
unlawful under 18 U.S.C, Chapter 40, Section 842(d) ; must not have wilfully 
violated any of the provisions of 18 U.S.C, Chapter 40 or of Part 181 of Title 27 
of the Code of Federal Regulations ; must have premises in the State from which 
he intends to conduct business ; must have a place of storage for explosive 
materials which meets the standards of the Federal regulations regarding public 
safety and security against theft ; and must be familiar with all published State 
laws and local ordinances relating to explosive materials for the location in which 
he intends to do business. 

IS U.S.C, Chapter 40, Section 842 (d), referred to above, prohibits the distribu- 
tion of explosive materials to any person who: (1) is under 21 years of age; 
(2) has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term ex- 
ceeding one year ; (3) is under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year ; (4) is a fugitive from justice ; (5) is an unlawful 
user of marijuana or any depressant or stimulant drug or narcotic drug; or 
(6) has been adjudicated a mental defective. 

Qurstinn. What are the penalties for providing false information on an appli- 
cation to become a manufacturer or distributor of explosives? 

Answer. A fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 
ten years, or both. 

Question. Y'ou said in your statement that there are 594 manufacturers, 76 
importer?! and 1411 dealers of explosives licensed under Title XI. Are all appli- 
cants investigated on a routine basis to determine the propriety and legality of 
their application? 

Answer. Before any applicant for a Federal explosives manufacturer'.s im- 
porter's or dealer's license or user's permit is granted such license or permit, 
an application investigation is conducted. The manufacturer-limited license, 
which is valid for 30 days from the date of issuance, is nonrenewable, and only 


permits the holder to manufacture explosive materials for his own use, and the 
user-limited permit, which is only valid for a single purchase transaction, is 
issued without an inspection. 

The scope of authority of the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration 
includes regulation of the storage and use of explosives in mining operations. 
As part of a memorandum of understanding with ATF, MESA conducts appli- 
cation aijd compliance inspections of those explosives licensees and permittees 
that come within their jurisdiction. 

Compliance inspections of explosives dealers, manufacturers and users are 
conducted by ATF on a regular basis. The average frequency of these inspec- 
tions, as established by an ATF Order, is once each year. The primary purpose 
of the annual compliance inspection is to determine if the licensee or permittee 
has been complying with applicable laws and regulations. Other purposes of 
these inspections may be to instruct a licensee or permittee of legal requirements, 
to answer his questions regarding Federal explosives law and regulations, and 
to obtain data on possible willful violations for further investigation. 

Question. Must a person who applies for a license to deal in explosives deal 
exclusively in explosives and have no other business? 

Answer. As long as the provisions of 27 CFR Part 181 are met. a person who 
applies for a license to deal in explosive materials is not required to deal ex- 
clusively in explosive materials and is allowed to conduct other business opera- 
tions. In fact, many licensed explosives dealers sell explosive materials merely 
as a convenience to their customers and in addition to their main business oper- 
ations, such as firearms dealerships or hardware stores. 

Qvrsfinn. What fees are imposed for becoming a licensed manufacturer, dealer, 
or importer of explosives? 

Answer. Section 8^,3 (a) of Title 18, United States Code, Chapter 41 pre- 
scribes a maximum fee of $200 for each original or permit, and a renewal 
fee not to exceed one-half of the original fee. The regulations issued under 
Chapter -^0 — Title 27. Code of Federal Regulations, part 181, Sections 181.42 
and 181.43 — set forth the actual license and permit fees as follows : 

License fees : 

(1) Manufacturer $50 

(2) Manufacturer-limited (nonrenewable) 5 

(3) Importer 50 

(4) Dealer 20 

Permit fees: 

(1) User 20 

(2) User-limited (nonrenewable) 2 

Note. — Each renewal fee equals one-half the original fee. 

Quci^tion. How many applications for Federal licenses have been acted upon 
each year for the past 5 years? 

Licenses acted upon 1971 1972 

Oripinal 2,092 687 

Renewal - 1, 335 

Fiscal year— 

1973 1974 


1976 > 


459 442 
1,758 1,831 




Total. .-_ _ 2,092 2,022 2,217 2,274 3,360 2,104 13,068 

1 Through Mar. 31, 1976. 

Qvei^tinn. How many applications for licenses to manufacture, sell or import 
explosives have been revoked or disapproved on a year-by-year basis over the 
past 5 years? 




















» Through Mar. 31, 1976. 


Question. You said in your testimony that double-base smokeless powder could 
be sold without restrictions of any type. Does this mean to say that any person 
can enter a sporting goods store and purchase any quantity of smolceless powder 
without a license or pennit, and without any record of the sale? 

Answer. Yes, insofar as Title XI is concerned. Small arms ammunition and 
components thereof are exempt from the regulatory provisions of Title XI. How- 
ever, the Gun Control Act of 1968 regulates ammunition, including propellant 
powder designed for use in any firearm, and licensed firearms dealers are required 
to keep records on the sale of smokeless powder. Smokeless powder, because it is 
defined by the Act as ammunition, cannot be sold to anyone under the age of 18. 
The buyer does not have to have a permit, but must provide the dealer with 
identification before the sale is made. The buyer's name and address, along with 
the amount of powder purchased, is entered in the dealer's permanent firearms 

Question. A question on the employment of user permits — Assuming that a user 
permit is given to a construction firm, one could not reasonably expect the head 
of the construction firm to drive the truck that picked up a load of explosives from 
the distributor. What comliination of procedures is used to enable the distributor 
to determine first, that the {permit in question is a valid one, and secondly, that 
the person driving the pickup vehicle is acting with the authority of the per- 
mittee? Can a manufacturer or distributor, if there is any question about a per- 
mit, put in a call to an office in ATF for the purpose of double-checking? Are 
manufacturers and distributors encouraged, where any question exists, to use the 
phone for the purpose of confirming the bona fides of the person driving the 
pickup vehicle? 

Answer. In the example you have given, the construction firm which holds an 
explosives user permit would be required by regulations to furnish to the dis- 
tributor a certified copy (in the case of a user-limited, the original) of their 
permit. A distribiitor cannot lawfully make an explosives transaction with an- 
other licensee or permittee without first verifying the identity and status of that 
licensee or permittee. 

ATF urges all explosives dealers to require whatever information they deem 
necessary and within reason in order to verify the identity and licensed status 
of distributee licensees or permittees with whom they do business. After the 
permittee in your example furnishes a certified copy of their permit to the dis- 
tributor, they would not be required to again furnish such certified copy to that 
distributor during the term of the current permit. The construction firm would 
also be required to furnish the licensed distributor with a current certified list 
of representatives or agents authorized to acquire explosive materials on behalf 
of the business, ^^'^^en the possession of explosive materials is transferred at the 
distributor's premises, the distributor is required to verify the identity of the 
person accepting possession on behalf of the distributee before relinquishing such 

If the construction firm sends an employee who is not an authorized agent of 
the business on the current certified list to pick up explosives from the distributor, 
for example a truck driver, then the driver will be required to identify himself 
and to complete and sign Section A of Form 4721, Explosives Delivery Record. 

ATF encourages explosives licensees and permittees to call the nearest ATF 
office when questions or problems arise. However, although ATF can cerify to a 
licensed distributor the status of a licensee or permittee desiring to acquire ex- 
plosives, we would be unable to confirm the bona fides to a person driving a 
vehicle to pick up explosives. We would suggest that the distributor contact the 
distributee if any problem arises in such circiunstances. 

Question. The sample copies you gave the subcommittee of ATF Form 4706. 
which is a license for manufacturers, importers or dealers in explosives, and ATF 
Form 4708, which is a permit for the use of explosives, appear to suffer from a 
number of weaknesses from the standpoint of security. 

(a) First, they are not printed on watermarked paper, or other special paper, 
so that it should be extremely easy liusiness to forge printed duplicates ; 

(b) Second, neither the license nor the permit has a signature line for the 
licensee or permittee. This is rather surprising, because drivers' licenses, social 
security cards, credit cards, and virtually every other form of identification docu- 
ment does not require the signature of the person named. 

(c) Finally, there is no serial number on either the license or the permit form. 
Wouldn't this make it possible for a dishonest employee to remove quantities of 
either form from the ATF offices, without the theft being noticed? Don't you 


think it would make sense to have license forms and permit forms as secure as 
such forms can be made? Has consideration been given to this? 

Answer. It is true that permits and licenses (ATF Form 4708 and 4706, re- 
spectively) are not printed on watermarked or other special paper. This would 
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, under our current procedures which re- 
quire a licensee or permittee to provide certified copies of his license or permit 
to all licensees from whom he is receiving explosives. Although a "purchasing 
copy" of the license or permit (Part 2 of ATF Form 4706 and 4708) is provided 
for this purpose by ATF at the time of issuance, a licensee or permittee is auth- 
orized to make additional certified reproductions of his license or permit to pro- 
vide to each explosives distributor with whom he is doing business. Since these 
certified copies would not be printed on special paper, we believe it would serve 
no useful purpose to print the original license on watermarked or other special 

(b) Part 2 (Purchasing Copy) of the license and of the permit does require 
the signature of the licensee or permittee in order to verify that the copy is au- 
thentic. Any additional reproductions must be made from either the original li- 
cense or permit (Part 1) or from the Purchasing Copy (Part 2) and must be in- 
dividually signed for certification. 

Since the original license or permit must be displayed at the business premises 
and cannot be used for transaction purposes, we see no need to require that it be 
signed by the holder. 

(c) We have considered the possibility of adding serial numbers to the forms 
used for explosives licenses and permits. However, for the following reasons, we 
decided against doing so : 

1. Each license and permit is numbered at the time of issuance. This number 
indicates the type of license, ATF region. Internal Revenue District or State, 
county, expiration number and the sequence number. Each license number is 
associated with a specific license and normally the number remains the same 
throughout license renewals. We feel that the appearance of a serial number on 
the form in addition to the license number could result in confusion for some 
licensees and permittees since they may mistakenly use the serial number in 
lieu of the license number in correspondence and in transaction records. This 
would cause problems for ATF and the Internal Revenue Service in acting on 
the correspondence and would result in difficulties in attempting to trace the 
movement of explosives. 

2. While the use of serial numbers would increase the security of the blank 
forms, it would not prevent persons from obtaining copies of licenses that have 
already been issued in order to illegally obtain explosives. Since photocopies of 
licenses and permits are routinely produced and forwarded to explosives sup- 
pliers in the course of business, a photocopy of a license could be illegally ob- 
tained by a dishonest employee. 

3. The cost of printing serial numbers, providing accounting procedures, and re- 
porting, recording and tracing missing forms would be substantial in terms of 
man-hours and money. Since a photocopy of a license can be used as readily as an 
original license, we do not feel that the time and expense involved in printing 
serial numbers on blank forms could be justified. 

We feel we should emphasize at this point that every attempt is made to assure 
the integrity and honesty of all ATF employees. There have been no known in- 
stances involving the illegal use of these forms by any ATF employee since the 
Bureau was given the responsibility for the enforcement of the Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970. 


Qnestion. You said in your statement that manufacturers, distributors and 
users are required to keep complete and accurate records on the disposition of 
explosives. Could you provide us with a detailed summary of the regulations they 
must respect with regard to the manufacture, storing or transportation of ex- 
plosives in interstate commerce? 

Answer. Persons engaged in the business of manufacturing explosive materials 
must be licensed under Title XI. A licensee may not lawfully distribute explosive 
materials to any person except a licensee, a permittee, or a resident of the State 
where distribution is made and in which the licensee is licensed to do business ; 
distribute such materials to any person where the purchase, possession, or use by 
such penson of the materials would violate State or local law; or distribute ex- 
plosive materials to individuals within certain proscribed categories, e.g., con- 
victed felons. 


With respect to recordkeeping requirements, a licensed manufacturer must 
keep accurate records of the manufacture, acquisition, and disposition of ex- 
plosive materials. Additionally, the manufacturer must identify by prescribed 
markings the materials manufactured. ,..,•„„ 

Licensed manufacturers are required to store their explosive materials in con- 
formity witb prescribed regulations, 27 C.F.R. Part 181, Subpart J- The actual 
transportation of explosives is not regulated by the Bureau under Title XI, but 
rather bv the Department of Transportation. 

Question. What records are required to be kept by manufacturers, dealers, or 
importers of explosives? Are copies of these records sent to and maintained 

^^ Answer. The records and reports required under Title 27. Code of Federal 
Regulations, Part 181, Subpart G, are specifically : ^ .^ .- 

1 Manufacturer's Records of: (a) Physical inventories; (&) marks of identi- 
fication (if any), the quantity and class of explosive materials manufactured 
or otherwise acquired, and the date of manufacture or acquisition ; (c) Explosive 
materials distributed to other licensees and permittees reflecting the marks of 
identification, quantity and class, name of manufacturer or importer (as 
applicable), the license or permit number of the transferee, means of identifying 
the transferee or transferee'vS agent, and the date of the transaction; (d) Explo- 
sive materials manufactured for the manufacturer's own use, including (in a 
separate permanent record) the quantity and class used daily and the date of 
such use; and (e) A daily summary of magazine transactions showing, by class 
of explosive materials, the total quantity received in and removed from each 
magazine during the day, and the total remaining on hand at the end of the day 
(Discrepancies indicating theft or loss of explosive materials must be reported 
within 24 hours. ) 

2. Dealer's records of: (a) Physical inventories; (ft) each purchase or other 
acquisition of explosive materials showing the date of receipt, the name, address 
and license or permit number of the person from whom received, the name of the 
manufacturer and importer (if any), and the quantity and class of explosive 
materials received; (c) explosive materials sold or otherwise distributed to 
another licensee or permittee showing the quantity and class of explosive mate- 
rials, the name of the manufacturer and importer (if any), the manufacturer's 
marks of identification (if any), the license or permit number of the transferee, 
the date of the transaction, and the means of identifying the transferee or trans- 
feree's agent; and {d) a daily summary of magazine transactions showing, 
by class of explosive materials, the total quantity received in and removed from 
each magazine during the day, and the total remaining on hand at the end of the 
day (Discrepancies indicating theft or loss must be reported within 24 hours.) 

3. Importers records of: (a) Physical inventories; (b) quantity and class of 
explosive materials, name of manufacturer, manufacturer's marks of identifica- 
tion (if any), country of manufacture, and date of importation or acquisition 
of explosive materials: (c) explosive materials distributed to another licensee 
or permittee showing quantity, class, manufacturer, manufacturer's marks of 
identification (if any), country of manufacture, license or permit number of 
transferee, means of identifying the transferee or transferee's agent, and the 
date of the transaction; and (d) a daily summary of magazine transactions 
showing, by class of explosive materials, the total quantity received in and 
removed from each magazine during the day, and the total quantity remaining 
on hand at the end of the day. (Discrepancies indicating theft or loss of explosive 
materials must be reported within 24 hours.) 

All manufacturers, dealers, and importers must, in addition to the records 
listed above, maintain a separate record of sales or other distributions of explo- 
sive materials to nonlicensees and nonpermittees on Forms 4710 which reflect 
the intended use of the explosive materials, the name, date and place of birth, 
social security number or taxpayer identification number, address and physical 
description of purchaser ; the date of the transaction, transaction serial number, 
required certification by the purchaser that he is not prohibited by law from 
purchasing explosive materials, the means by which the purchaser identified 
himself, and the quantity, class and type of explosive materials transferred 
(including name of manufacturer and manufacturer's marks of identification, 
if any.) 

The records pertaining to explosive materials prescribed by 27 CFR, Part 181, 
must be in permanent form and must be retained on the licensed or permit 
premises for a period of not less than five years. 


Copies of these records are not required to be sent to ATF (except for Forms 
4710, Explosive Transaction Record — Nonlicense or nonpermittee, which are 
discussed in response to another question in tliis text) ; however, the records 
must be made available to ATF officers for examination or inspection during 
normal business hours. 

Question. If copies of these records are not sent to ATF, are they reviewed 
periodically by ATF inspectors? 

Answer. The records required under 27 CFR, Part 181, to be maintained by 
manufacturers, dealers or importers of explosives, must be made available to 
ATF officers for examination or inspection. These records are reviewed periodi- 
cally by ATF officers. Operating procedures within ATF have been established 
calling for inspection of explosives manufacturer's, dealer's, and importer's 
records and premises at least once per year. 

Question. Are there any regulations which require a personnel security pro- 
gram to be implemented for those individuals who have access to and/or control 
over explosives? 

Answer. No. 


Question. How much emphasis does the Bureau place on prevention as opposed 
to after-the-fact investigation? 

Answer. The Bureau's explosive control program is predicated on reducing the 
hazards to persons and property arising from the misuse and unsafe or insecure 
storage of explosive materials. The regulations promulgated in 27 CFR. Part 181, 
and enforced by ATF, support the standards of safety and security recognized 
by the explosives industry. This program is designed to place emphasis on the 
prevention of the illegal acquisition and use of explosives for bomb incidents. 

Question. With regard to safeguard systems at the place of manufacture or 
storage, do the systems look towards the weakest link — is there a single failure 
criterion? For example, you mentioned the fact that 84% of the explosives thefts 
you investigated showed that there had been illegal entries through the door of 
the storage vault. Is this the weakest link? 

Answer. ATF, in meetings with the IME Security Committee, has established 
that the lock and door of the storage magazine is the most widely used method 
of illegal entry. Means to strengthen this area are under study to determine if 
new types of locks, haps, hinges, and door construction methods can increase 
storage security. 

Question. Are your safeguards programs monitor-controlled and directed from 
the national headquarters? 

Answer. National headquarters develops the policies and procedures for the 
explosive compliance inspection program which is implemented and controlled 
by regional headquarters. This program is monitored by the Bureau of Regional 
headquarters through review and analysis of the results of compliance inspec- 
tions and by monitoring the issuance of variances of safety and security 

Question. Could you provide us with a critical evaluation of the effectiveness 
of these programs? How are these programs evaluated? 

Answer. These programs are evaluated on the basis of results achieved as re- 
ported to us by the industry members and our field inspection reports. The num- 
ber of thefts or attempted thefts and the amount of explosives stolen are weighed 
against the number of storage facilities and the amount of explosives available 
to determine not only the success rate but the increase or decrease in incident 
level. At this point, we feel the programs are effective. 

Question. Can you describe for us any other problems, not yet covered in the 
testimony, that you experience in carrying out your day-to-day responsibilities 
in connection with the control of explosives? 

Answer. The increased sales of explosives from demilitarized munitions for 
industrial and commercial use has created a proltlem since there is no manufac- 
turer's mark of identification, as required in 27 CFR 181.109, on containers of 
explosives sold by the Defense Supply Agency as surplus. ATF is conducting 
meetings with the Department of Defense for the purpose of determining a course 
of action to resolve this problem. 

Question. Obviously, it would be difficult if not impossible to put a serial number 
on every stick of dynamite. But would it not he feasible to require that every box 
of dynamite or every container of explosives have a serial number printed on it? 

Answer. It would be technically feasible to require that each box of explosive 
materials be serially numbered. However, the current system of requiring the 


manufacturer's marks of identification and the date and shift of manufacture 
on each container, including individual sticks of dynamite, enables us to trace re- 
covered explosives from the point of manufacture to the point of the last legal 
sale. The addition of serial numbers on boxes of explosive materials would not 
significantly improve current tracing capability. It would impose a significant 
increase in recordkeeping requirements on the industry since it is estimated 
that the industry consumes 10,000,000 boxes annually. 

The Explosive Tagging Program proposed by ATF will not only provide 
the capability to trace explosives prior to detonation, but will also permit trac- 
ing the explosives used in bombs after they have exploded. 

Question. Are containers of explosives ordinarily strapped and sealed in a man- 
ner which would make it difficult to reseal if they had been opened and the con- 
tents had been removed? 

Answer. Explosives materials are packaged at the manufacturing plant in 
accordance with Department of Transportation requirements in 49 CFR Parts 
100-199. They are required to be sealed and an opened package of explosives 
would normally be apparent unless the thief had access to similar packaging 

Question. Are manufacturers, distributors and users required to designate an 
employee or employees to supervise and log all storage or magazine transactions, 
in or out? 

Answer. No. However, it is a common practice to have a person or persons dele- 
gated this responsibility for the purpose of maintaining records required under 
both Federal and State laws as well as the normal business records required for 
ordering explosives materials. 

Question. In the case of major users, such as mines, are withdrawals of explo- 
sives from the magazines limited to designated employees? Or can any employee 
withdraw explosives? How is the daily record of withdrawals maintained? Does 
the employee who withdraws explosives have to sign? Are there any require- 
ments for other identifying details such as employee number, time of withdrawal, 
quantity withdrawn, etc.? 

Answer. The method of withdrawal of explosives from a magazine, including 
the designation and identification of employees authorized to receive the explo- 
sives, is determined by the owner in accordance with his judgment and good busi- 
ness practice. ATF regulations only require that the inventory be maintained. 
The inventory record includes the quantity and description of each receipt in, and 
withdrawal from, the explosive magazines, in chronological order. It has been 
our experience that large users such as large mines and construction sites gener- 
ally take a very responsible attitude toward the storage of explosives and do limit 
the withdrawal of explosives to key personnel. 

Question. In your testimony, you told us that any person storing explosive 
materials shall open and inspect the storage facilities at intervals not greater 
than .3 days to determine whether the explosives are intact or whether there has 
been any unauthorized entry or removal. Commenting on this, you said that in 
your view, if the person making the inspection unlocked the door of the magazine, 
walked inside and looked around, and there appeared to be the amoimt of explo- 
sives that should be in there, and if there was no evidence of any forced entry, 
then he would satisfy this requirement. ... If containers of explosives bore 
serial markings, so that they could be logged in as they arrived and logged out as 
they were used up, wouldn't it be realistic to require the person making the in- 
spection to check the containers in the magazine by serial number to see if any 
were missing? After all, even in a fairly big mine, they probably wouldn't have 
more than 100 to 200 containers of explosives in their magazines or magazine at 
any one time. 

Answer. It is our opinion that requiring manufacturers and importers to affix 
.serial numbers to containers of explosive materials, and further requiring all 
licensee and permittees to "log in" and "log out" each container of explosives on 
the basis of serial number, would impose an undue administrative burden on those 
law-abiding citizens acquiring, storing, and using explosive materials for indus- 
trial, mining, or other lawful purposes, in contravention of Section 1101 of Title 
XI. Regulations of Explosives. 

Requiring serialization of containers would add an administrative burden to 
manufacturers and importers of explosives due to the large volume (10 million 
cases) of explosives consumed by industry annually. Adding the requirement for 
logging in and logering out containers of explosives by serial number is not fea- 
sible for the following reasons : 


1. Licensees and permittes usually purchase mixed lots of various types and 
quantities of explosives, thus leading to nonconsecutive serial numbers and diflQ- 
culty in inventorying. 

2. Licensees and permittees may buy and sell or use partial cases of various 
types of explosives, thus posing another problem to inventorying on the basis of 
container serial numbers. The present system, utilizing case markings as to class 
and type of explosives, manufacturer's date-shift code, total numbers of cases, 
and daily summaries of magazine transactions ; coupled with the licensee or per- 
mittee being alert for evidence of forced entry is deemed sufl5cient to satisfy the 
inspection requirement without imposing an undue administrative burden on the 
industry members concerned. 

Question. A few more questions about the procedures followed in conducting 
an insi)ection of a manufacturer or dealer — (a) Do inspectors make a physical 
inventory, and do they check this against the dealer's or manufacturer's 

Answer. During a compliance inspection of an explosives licensee or permittee, 
ATF inspectors check an appropriate number of explosives on hand with the rec- 
ord books to verify that they have been properly recorded. Similarly, the in- 
spector checks a representative number of entries in the record books to 
determine that explosives listed as being on hand are actually in inventory. If 
these spot checks disclose significant discrepancies, the inspector may deem a 
complete physical inventory to be necessary. 

Question (6). Do they make a critical evaluation of the procedures followed 
by the manufacturers or dealers? 

Answer. ATF inspectors make a critical evaluation of the procedures followed 
by the manufacturers or dealers to determine if these procedures comply with 
applicable laws and regulations. Particular emphasis is given to the examina- 
tion of the licensee's records and storage facilities during these inspections. 

Question (c). Where they do find shortcomings, do they submit to the manu- 
facturers or dealers written recommendations for improvements in their .security 
procedures — and do they let them know that the renewal of their license or 
permit will be contingent on the prompt implementation of these recommenda- 

Answer. All nonwillful violations disclosed during a compliance inspection 
are documented on ATF Form 5030.5, Report of Violations, the original of 
which is presented to the licensee or permittee. ATF inspectors discuss the vio- 
lations noted with the licensee or permittee and suggest methods of compliance 
to avoid any recurrence. Licensees and permittees are informed that failure 
to correct violations can lead to revocation or denial of the license or permit. 
ATF conducts follow-up or recall inspections of licensees or permittees found to 
be in violation to determine if areas of noncompliance have been corrected. 

Question. Is MESA provided with information on the quantity of explosives 
obtained by the various mines? 

Answer. ATF does not receive reports from manufacturers of the quantity of 
explosive materials shipped to licensees/permittees. However, licensees and 
permittees are required to keep invoices of all explosive materials received and 
licensees are further required to maintain complete acquisition and disposition 
records, showing the receipt of all explosives and their disposition. MESA in- 
spectors review these records during their inspection of mining operations under 
their jurisdiction. Follow up action on suspected false entries could be made 
by ATF. ATF regulations impose penalties for false entries into these records. 
" Question. You previou.sly .stated that in Fiscal 1975 MESA made approximately 
7,200 inspections of explosive storage facilities. As a ballpark figure, would this 
work out to one inspection i^r mine per year, or several inspections per year, 
or what? 

Answer. First we wish to correct the figure of 7,200 inspections made by MESA 
to approximately 10,000. 

The Coal Mine Division conducts quarterly inspections of all mining operations 
under their jurisdiction. Some mines use no explosives in their operations. 

The Metal and Nonmetal Division conducts inspections of all mines and 
quarries under their Jurisdiction at least annually. Underground mines are in- 
spected more frequently, up to three times a year. 

Question. How many thefts or mysterious losses of explosives has MESA 
reported to ATF on a year-by-year basis over the past five years? 

Answer. The respon.<^ibility for reporting a theft or loss is a licensee/permittee 
requirement under Federal law. However, MESA is involved in ATF's theft re- 


porting and education program and distributes Industry Circulars, poster, forms 
and other information to mine and quarry operators under their jurisdiction. 

If MESA is apprised of a theft or loss by a mine operator, the operator is 
advised to notify ATF promptly. MESA district managers and ATF regional 
supervisory personnel have worked out a system of communications which 
appear to be operating satisfactorily. ATF keeps statistics only on the total 
reports of thefts or losses. No actual figures of theft reports which MESA may 
have reported to ATF have been compiled. 

Question. How many instances of noncompliance has it reported for the same 
period of time? 

Answer. Copies of their compliance inspections are forwarded to each ATF 
regional office for review and corrective action if required. These reports are then 
put in the respective licen.see or permittee file. 

Based on information received from Metal and Nonmetal Division of MESA, 
558 reports of noncompliance were reported during 1975. Follow-up inspections 
were conducted by MESA to insure that corrective actions had been taken. 
We do not have information for prior years relating to instances of reported 

Question. Does MESA make reports to ATF on its inspections, especially on 
those inspections which result in critical findings? 

Answer. A report of each explosives inspection by MESA is furnished to the 
ATF regional office. 

Question. Does MESA make any follow-up to insure that the faults it finds 
are corrected? 

Answer. Yes, MESA has a recall program. This is a re-inspection of the facility 
to insure that appropriate corrective action has been taken. A copy of the recall 
inspection report is furnished to ATF regional offices as well as the report of 
the inspection that first disclosed the violation. 

Question. As a result of the findings of MESA inspectors, have any civil or 
criminal charges been brought against companies, and have any fines' been im- 
posed, or have any licenses been revoked or suspended? 

Answer. As a result of MESA inspection and their recommendation, license/ 
permit applications have been denied. For example during 1975, MESA recom- 
mended that eight applicants not be issued a permit because the applicant did 
not have adequate storage magazines. Subsequent visits to five of these applicant 
premises disclosed adequate storage magazines had been prepared and MESA 
inspectors recommended issuance of permit. 

We find that licensees/permittees take prompt corrective action to comply 
with regulations when violations are called to their attention. No licenses or per- 
mits have been revoked as a result of findings by MESA inspectors. ATF does not 
have authority to suspend licenses. 

Question. We would like to have your comments on several paragraphs dealing 
with commerce in explosives taken from Part 181 of Title 26 of the Code of Fed- 
eral Regulations. Section 181.127 reads : 

"In taking the inventory required by (stated subsections) the inventory shall 
be entered in a record of daily transactions to be maintained at each magazine 
of an approved storage facility. At the close of business of each day each licensee 
and permittee shall record by class of explosive materials, as prescribed in the 
explosives list, the total quantity received in and removed from each magazine 
during the day and the total remaining on hand at the end of the day. Any dis- 
crepancy which might indicate a theft or loss of explosive materials shall be re- 
ported in accordance with the provisions (as required.)" 

However, when you go back to the wording of Sections 181.122 through 181.- 
125, it becomes obvious that the inventory they are talking about is not a daily 
physical inventory. All of these sections state that an inventory shall be taken, 
I quote : 

"As of February 12, 1971, or at the time of commencing business subsequent 
thereto, which shall be the effective date of the license issued . . . ; at the time 
of changing the location of premises to another region ; at the time of discontinu- 
ing business, and at such other times as the A.ssistant Regional Commissioner 
may in writing require." 

This appears to mean that the inventory called for under Section 181.127 is 
simply a bookkeeping inventory — that all they do is add to the book inventory for 
the previous day the quantity of explosives received and the quantity issued 
during the course of the day. Wouldn't you agree that such a hook inventory is 
not sufficient, that there has to be a physical inventory? 


Answer. We feel that requiring a daily physical inventory of all explosive 
materials on hand would anaount to an unreasonable burden on the licensee or 
permittee. Particularly for the licensee or permittee handling large quantities 
of explosive materials, we feel that the time and manpower, and therefore money, 
needed to conduct such an inventory would outweigh the advantages. As ex- 
pressed in the introductory language to Title XI, it is not the purpose of the law 
to impose any undue or unnecessary requirements other than those reasonably 
necessary to carry out the provisions of Title XI. 

The daily inventories prescribed by Section 181.127, seem to be adequate for 
pointing out discrepancies which may indicate a theft or loss of explosive materi- 
als. Complete physical inventories are required to be taken at the time of com- 
mencing business, which shall be the effective date of the license issued upon 
original qualification under our regulations ; at the time of changing the location 
of the premises to another ATF region ; at the time of discontinuing business ; 
and at such other times as the regional director may in writing require. In addi- 
tion, during routine compliance inspections, ATF inspectors check the explosives 
on hand with the licensee's or permittee's records to verify that records are being 
properly maintained and that the explosives recorded are actually in inventory. 

Question. If this is so, wouldn't this almost render meaningless a requirement 
that licensees or permittees report theft of loss of explosives within 24 hours of 
discovery? It might take them months or more to discover a theft or loss — or, 
more probably, they wouldn't discover it at all? 

Answer. Regulations require that magazines be checked at least every 3 days 
to insure that the explosives are intact and that there has been no unauthorized 
entry into the magazine. For the most part, a theft or loss is discovered when a 
forced entry into the magazine has been made. Thus, the statutory requirement in 
Title XI that thefts or losses of explosives be reported within 24 hours of dis- 
covery is not a meaningless requirement. The thefts or losses that are not dis- 
covered are mainly internal. Explosives stolen by employees can remain un- 
detected, since the required records of disposition can be adjusted to conceal 
the theft and even a physical inventory would not reveal any discrepancy. 

Question. Circumstances will obviously vary from one installation to another — 
but wouldn't it be reasonable to require that manufacturers, distributors and in- 
dustrial users conduct physical inventories at specified intervals? A manufac- 
turer obviously could not be required to conduct a daily inventory— in this case it 
might be once a week or once a month. But it does seem that the mines, which 
use the bulk of explosives produced in our country, and which generally work 
with limited quantities in their storerooms, could be required to conduct daily 
inventories without imposing any undue economic hardship on them? 

Answer. As discussed in the previous two questions, we feel it would be un- 
reasonable to require explosives licensees and permittees to conduct frequent 
physical inventories. In the case of mines, large quantities of explosives are 
used, but generally operations are planned so that only those limited quantities 
required for one or two days' blasting are stored on hand. Although frequent 
inventories under such conditions might possibly be conducted with less of a 
hardship, there would be little purpose, since all the explosives on hand would 
be used during the one or two days and no explosives would remain to be ac- 
counted for. Also, the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA) 
performs inspections of the storage and use of explosives at coal mines quar- 
terlv and at metal and non-metal quarries and mines annually. 

Question. Section 181.126 of Title 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations says 
that a licensee or permittee cannot distribute explosives to a non-licensee or non- 
permittee unless he records the transaction on a Form 4710. The Section said 
that a copy of the Form 4710 is to be retained by the licensee and another copy 
sent to ATF. Each Form 4710 is required to be maintained in numerical order 
commencing with number 1. When the number reaches one million, an alphabet- 
ical prefix or sniffix cnn be affixed. A few questions about this procedure — 

(a) Form 4710 says that explosive materials shall not be distributed to 
anv companv unless the order or requisition is signed by a person whose name ap- 
pears on the certified list provided by this company, in accordance with regula- 
tions In nccepting and filing Forms 4710, is the seller required to mnke any check 
of the signature affixed to the 4710 against the signatures certified as being 
authorized to acquire explosive materials on behalf of their companies? 

Answer. No. The certified list of representatives or agents authorized to acouire 
explosive materials must contain the name, address, and date and place of birth 
of ench representative or agent : signatures of these individuals are not required 
by the regulations. When a person whose name appears on the certified list pur- 


chases explosives on behalf of the company who provided the list, that person 
must present proper identification to the distributor and execute Form 4710. An 
employee not on the certified list may accept custody of explosives for the distrib- 
utee, if the distributee has executed Form 4710 and the employee identifies him- 
self and executes Form 4721, Explosives Delivery Record, at the time he receives 
the explosives at the distributor's premises. In all cases, the distributor is re- 
quired to verify the identity of the person acquiring the explosives. 

Question (b). Are Forms 4710 maintained by each regional ATF office? Or is 
some provisions made for centralizing the copies of all Forms 4710 filed with 
regional ATF offices? 

Answer. ATF Forms 4710 are not maintained in ATF regional offices. These 
forms, which are copies of originals maintained by the licensee or permittee, 
are distributed by the regional office to the appropriate district office. The 
district office then forwards the Form 4710 to the appropriate post of duty 
where it is retained until it is no longer needed for investigative purposes. The 
form is then destroyed. 

Question (c). In view of the tremendous quantity of Forms 4710 filed with 
ATF regional offices, wouldn't it be essential to computerize this information if 
the records are to be used in a meaningful way ? 

Answer. At present, we screen the names of purchasers for criminal record 
name checks through Federal, state and local law enforcement files. We also 
screen for unusual quantities and types of explosives being bought for the 
stated purposes. We have not computerized this information for two reasons: 
(1) Our current ADP capability is inadequate; (2) The propriety of main- 
taining computerized files on large numbers of legal purchasers of explosives is 

Question. If an explosive materials business is discounted and there is no 
successor, the only requirement under Title 26 appears to be to deliver all 
required records to appropriate authorities within 30 days. What followup, if 
any, is made to determine the authenticity of these records and to verify that 
any explosives on hand when the business was discontinued, were properly 
disposed of? 

Answer. As of now, the only requirement is delivery of the records t-o the 
appropriate regional director. However, we are studying the possibility of 
conducting final inspections, where the discontinuance of the business is absolute, 
to determine the accuracy and completeness of the records. In addition. Forms 
4710 would be spot checked for proper execution and disposition, and any unusual 
or suspicious explosives sales, in terms of numbers or types of explosives, would 
be further investigated. Also, the proper disposition of all explosives on hand at 
the time the business was discontinued would be verified. 

Question. As you pointed out in your testimony, storage facilities are required 
to be inspected at intervals not greater than 3 days in order to determine 
unauthorized entry, attempted entry, removal, etc. What records are required to 
show that this requirement is met? 

Answer. There are no recordkeeping requirements which would verify that 
storage facilities are being inspected at intervals not greater than three days. 
We previously considered imposing such a requirement; however, several 
difficulties were brought to light. 

First of all. Title XI, Section 842(F), authorized the Secretary to acquire 
recordkeeping by regulation. However, such records are in connection with the 
manufacture, importation, purchase, distribution or receipt of explosive materials. 
ATF's legal authority to require the keeping of records relating to a function 
not involving any distribution or transaction activity, such as the inspection 
of a storage facility, is, therefore, questionable. 

Secondly, while our statutory authority with respect to the storage of explosive 
materials applies to "any person", we do not have legal authority to require 
records to be kept by anyone other than a licensee or permittee. Thus, while 
the requirement to inspect storage facilities applies to "any person storing 
explosive materials," any recordkeeping requirement in this regard would only 
apply to licensees and permittees. Many explosives users in this country do not 
possess either a licence or a permit since they obtain their explosives intrastate. 

Finally, even if records were required to be maintained, there would still be a 
question, in many cases, as to whether the entries (and in.spections) were actually 
made on the dates indicated. Thus, we feel that the extent of increased com- 
pliance with the inspection Teouireraent that would result from the imple- 
mentation of such a recordkeeping provision would probably be minimal. 


Question. Your testimony indicated that a non-licensee or non-permittee 
is permitted to buy almost unlimited — at least very large — quantities of ex- 
plosives by filling out a Form 4710. You also indicated that there would be 
nothing to prevent a i)erson, using a series of 4710's, apparently either gen- 
uine or fraudulent, from making a number of fairly large purchases of ex- 
plosives. At another point, you said that copies of the Form 4710 are for- 
warded to ATF and that by this means you would be able to determine 
if there were suspicious sales of explosives. Are the Forms 4710 subjected 
to a prompt and regular scrutiny? Has ATF, in fact, ordered investigations 
on the basis of Forms 4710 indicating the sale of any suspicious quantities 
of explosives ? 

Answer. Yes. ATF Forms 4710 which are received in the regional and dis- 
trict oflBces are handled in an expeditious manner to ensure that the informa- 
tion on the form will be timely when received by the resident agent in charge 
at the post of duty. The Bureau requires that the resident agents in charge 
promptly review the Form 4710 for any irregularities and initiate such action 
or investigation as may be indicated. Special agents of the Bureau have 
initiated numerous investigations as a direct result of a review of the Form 

Question. You suggested that you could, by regulation, impose some kind 
of notice on the licensee when a purchase was more than a certain amount 
of dynamite, for example. 100 pounds. 100 pounds of dynamite is an awful 
lot of dynamite ; it could kill a lot of people. Would it not be in the public 
interest to require that anyone purchasing a substantial quantity of dyna- 
mite — say 25 pounds or more — even on a one-time basis, be required to obtain 
a permit rather than simply filling out a Form 4710? 

Answer. Of course, any such requirement would necessitate an amendment 
to Title XI. Presently, permits are required only for those users who acquire, 
transport, or ship explosive materials in interstate or foreign commerce. In 
our opinion, the proposal would be impractical from a law enforcement stand- 
point since legitimate users would obtain the permit to purchase 25 pounds or 
more of explosive materials but persons other than law-abiding citizens could 
easily circumvent the permit requirement by obtaining smaller quantities from 
several sources. Thus, the proposal would needlessly burden legitimate users. 

Question. In your testimony, you said that you "would have to admit that 
we are doing far from the job we feel is adequate in terms of the 4710's. in 
following up on the purchaser to determine if he is storing those explosives 
in a safe manner, or if he is using them for the stated purpose when he 
purchased them." Would you be prepared to suggest any regulations, or opera- 
tional improvements, or amendments to existing legislation, which would en- 
able you to do an adequate job in following up on purchasers? 

Answer. We do not feel that additional legislation or regulations are needed 
in this area. The problem is that ATF does not have the resources to fol- 
low up on all purchasers of explosives to ensure that the explosives are 
stored in a safe manner and used for the purpose for which they were 
purchased. We do investigate suspicious transactions, complaints and intel- 
ligence leads. In this regard we work closely with other Federal, State 
and local officials in both the Regulatory Enforcement and Criminal Enforce- 
ment areas. The explosives program is the number one priority of ATF. 

Question. Do you believe that the effectiveness of ATF's general control 
over the manufacturer and distribution of explosives could be improved in 
any way by remedial legislation? Can you offer suggestions for any legis- 
lation that would strengthen ATF's control? 

Answer. We feel that present regulatory control over the manufacture 
of explosive materials is adequate. 

However, Section 845(a) of Title XI, exempts any aspect of the transporta- 
tion of explosive materials via railroad, water, highway or air which are 
regulated by the Unitp^d States Department of Transportation and agencies 
thereof. During the time explosive materials are in transit, or being distributed. 
ATF has no control or jurisdiction. We have learned of explosive materials 
being stolen from carriers or otherwise lost whi'e in transit. This is an area 
where possible legislation may be promuleated to assure the safe and secure 
transportation of explosives and to report all known thefts. 

The intrrnluction of legislation to reouire a taggant to identifv explosives 
in a post-blast situation, and the identification of permissive explosives, used 
in mines, plus a taggant for the detection of explosives, could be a Federal 


requirement that would materially aid in the detection and identification of 
select explosives materials for public safety and security purposes. 

It was suggested by IME and the International Society of Explosive Special- 
ists during the explosive control hearing in 1970. that legislation require, 
training, testing, and licensing of all users of explosives. 


Question. When you speak about "thefts," does this also include mysterious 
disiapi)ea ranees where there is no evidence of forcetl entry and no other hard 
evidence that a theft has actually occurred? In the nuclear industry they have 
a category of disappearances covered by the words "Massing — Unaccounted for." 
Does a similar category exist covering mysterious disappearances of explosives 
anywhere along the line? If it does exist, are licensees retiuired to submit reports 
on all such disappearances as soon as they are discovered? 

Answer. In ATF terminology the term "'theft" does not include "mysterious 
disappearances" of explosives. Disappearances of explosives, mysterious or other- 
wise, are classified as losses and Fedei^al regulations require the reporting of ex- 
plosive losses by persons or licensee within 24 hours of discovery. To ensure the 
timely de'tection and report of such losses, a licensee is required to take a daily 
inventory of his iStock. 

Question. Are the thefts of explosives growing? Could you provide the sub- 
committee with a breakdo^'n for the past five years, covering the total quantity 
of the explosives lost or stolen, their value, their breakdown by class and tyjje? 
Could you also let us know whether this breakdown indicates the existence of 
regional patterns, or whether the pattern appears pretty uniform nationwide? 

Answer. ATF has been collecting and Storing data in a retrievable form con- 
cerning thefts since 1972. Although the number of reports received have fluctuated 
during that period, the number reported in 1975 was the highest in the four year 

1972 248 

1973 211 

1974 223 

1975 273 

Prior to 1975 it was more difficult to provide meaningful data depicting the 
quantity and type of stolen explosive materials. Since we amended our data col- 
lection procedures during 1975, more detailed and accurate information is avail- 

For the years 1972, 1973, and 1974 our figures are as follows : 


Number of 

Total pounds stolen 



Average ' 


1975 2. 


172, 975 


128, 752 





58, COO 

81, 844 
56, 829 








90, 000 

127, 409 
93, 733 
85, 089 





• The ADP reporting system in use at that time, allowed for a variable range of pounds reported stolen. 
2 With our amended procedures, these ar figures fore the 1975. 

Que.9tion. Have there been any thefts of explosives from military installations? 
If so, are the military required to report such thefts in the same manner as 
licensees? Could you provide the Subcommittee with the figures for the past five 
years for thefts from military installations? 

Answer. The Army has reported a small amount of explosives stolen on sev- 
eral occasions. We have received no such reports of loss from the other branchesi 
of the Armed Forces. You are reminded that the military is exempt from the pro- 
visions of the law. Therefore, they are not required to report such thefts as are 
licensees, making it impossible to provide the amount of explosives stolen from 
military installations. 


Question. You told the Subcommittee that licensees are required to report all 
thefts within a 24-hour period. Does this mean 24 hours from the time of dis- 
covery or 24 hours from the time of theft? 

Answer. Section 842 (k), Title XI, Chapter 40, Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970 states : "It shall be unlawful for any person who has knowledge of the 
theft or loss of any explosive materials from his stock, to fail to report such 
theft or loss within twenty-four hours of discovery thereof, to the Secretary and 
to appropriate local authorities." 

Question. Does it not sometimes happen that thefts are not discovered until 
some days after they have taken place? In a case like that, might there not be a 
disposition to overlook the theft in order to avoid the possibility of a charge 
that they had delayed excessively in reporting the theft, or that they had been 
lax in discovering it? 

Answer. Although actual figures are not available, there have been many in- 
stances wherein thefts are not discovered until some days after they have taken 
place. Explosives storage facilities are, for safety reasons, often located in re- 
mote areas. These facilities may not be used or visited for several days, de- 
pendent upon business demands. Upon arrival at the storage facility an employee 
discovers that a breaking and entering has occurred and that explosives have 
been stolen. After the discovery the licensee or permittee usually reports the 
theft promptly. 

It would be contrary to the best interest of the licensee or permittee to over- 
look the theft in order to avoid the possibility of a charge that they had delayed 
excessively in reporting the theft or that they had been lax in discovering it. 
To do so would place them in violation of Section 181.165, Title 26, C.F.R., which 
reads: "Any person who has knowledge of the theft or loss of any explosive 
materials from his stock and fails to report such theft or loss within 24 hours of 
discovery thereof in accordance with § 181.30, shall be fined not more than $1,000 
or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both." 

Therefore, it is unlikely that such a course of action would be pursued by 
licensees and permittees. 

Question. In what segment of the explosives handling process have most of 
the thefts occurred — manufacturing, distribution, transportation, or use? Could 
you provide any estimate of how thefts break down between the four basic sectors 
in the explosives handling process? 

Answer. From a review of the types of incidents reported to ATF, thefts occur 
most frequently at the distribution and user level and are less common during 
the manufacturing and transportation process. It should be emphasized that 
thefts occurring during transportation are not required to be reported to ATF. 

Question. Could you provide us with an outline of the various programs — edu- 
cational, regulatory, inspectional, etc.— that ATF employs to deter the theft of 

Answer: ATF's educational, regulatory and inspectional programs, as they 
relate to stolen and lost explosives, have two main objectives; (1) to aid in 
detering thefts, and (2) to maximize prompt reporting of explosives thefts and 

In regard to the first objective, api>licants for explosives licenses and permits 
are required to describe in detail on their applications the construction materials 
used in their storagp facilities and security measures taken to protect the ex- 
plosives stored therein, including physical safeguards, locks, and anti-theft 
measures. The inspector or special agent uses this information, coupled with the 
on-site inspection, to determine whether or not the facilities are in compliance 
with Federal requirements. ATF Industry Circular 75-10, of September 22. 1975, 
amplifies upon the requirements for physical description of facilities provided 
by applicants on their application forms. During subsequent compliance inspec- 
tions the inspector or special agent checks to assure that the required security 
measures are in force. ATF is, of course, available at any time to offer technical 
assistance to licensees and permittees having inquiries or problems relating to 
the security of their facilities. 

Question. Does ATF investigate each and every report of theft, loss, or unex- 
plained disappearance? 

Answer. Every theft, loss, or unexplained disappearance which comes to our 
attention through the mandatory reports from licensees is assigned for investi- 
gation and is investigated. 

Question. How are the investigations of thefts of explosives handled? On a 
national basis, regional, or district basis? Are records of all such investigations 


Answer. Regulations imposed on licensees require them to report thefts to their 
applicable regional director. The regional director, in turn, refers the theft to 
the district office wherein the licensee is located. At this point the appropriate 
post of duty is assigned the investigation. When a special agent acquires an 
investigation number, it is coded in such a way as to retrieve that and all similar 
investigations from our computer bank. So, therefore, records of investigations 
are centralized. 

Question. Hijacking and cargo thefts are major national phenomenons, repre- 
senting $1.5 billion per year. One billion dollars of this figure is attributable to 
the trucking industry ; 85 percent of non-rail thefts occur at terminals during 
normal working hours, and involve employees or personnel of carriers, shippers, 
and/or receivers authorized to be on the facility. In case of the trucking of 
explosives, are hijacking and cargo thefts also critical problems? 

Answer. The law. Title XI, does not address itself to the transportation indus- 
try. Therefore, the trucking industry is not required to report thefts or losses 
to ATF. Consequently, we do not have statistics in this area. However, our 
investigations of explosives incidents, which include the tracing of explosives, 
have not revealed a significant problem in this area. 

We have reviewed reports and statistics with DOT and found that in no case 
did explosives appear as a major commodity involved in hijacking and cargo 
thefts. However, the statistics maintained by DOT are based on economic reports 
and do not identify explosives except as a general commodity. Since a few dollars 
worth of explosives are sufficient to cause death, injury, and thousands of dollars 
of property damage, we have continued to meet with DOT to determine the most 
practical method of requiring thefts or losses of explosives while in transpor- 
tation to be reported to ATF. Currently 18 U.S.C, Chapter 40 and the imple- 
menting regulations in 27 CFR exempts from regulations "any aspect of the 
transportation of explosives via railroad, water, highway, or air which are regu- 
lated by the United States Department of Transportation." Legislation may be 
required in this area. 

Question. Have there been instances of fraudulent pickup of explosives, and/or 
fraudulent delivery ? 

Answer. Our field offices report a total of 25 instances of fraudulent pickup 
and/or delivery of explosives. These fraudulent pickup and/or deliveries are 
categorized as follows : 

Fraudulent license and/or permit 5 

Incorrect information on Form 4710 5 

Fraudulent identification by purchaser 3 

Fraudulent bookkeeping by distributor or others 3 

Interstate sale to nonlicensee 3 

Resale by nonlicensee or permittee 2 

Sales to undercover special agent 2 

Employee stole explosive and sold same out of state 1 

Unlawful manufacture and sale 1 

Question. Have invesstigations shown many instances of collusion or collabora- 
tion between employees and others relating to explosives thefts. 

Answer. Investigations have revealed 86 instances of collusion or collabora- 
tion between employees and others relating to explosives thefts. 

Question. Studies indicate that 75 percent of hijacked cargo passes through 
organized crime hands. What is known of the involvement of organized crime 
on the flow of illicit explosives? Is it a major activity on the part of organized 
crime, or is it a fringe operation? 

Answer. Investigations conducted by ATF since 1970 indicate that elements of 
organized crime have frequently been the users of illicit explosives, primarily 
in labor and racketeering related incidents, however, there have been no indi- 
cations that explosives are a major part of organized crime's hijacking operations. 

Explosive materials, because of their general availability and inexpensive 
nature, have not in the past been conducive to large scale cargo hijacking and 
black market activities. 


Question. You said in your statement that your Bureau has joint responsibility 
with the FBI, for enforcing six of the sections of Title XI of the Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970, dealing with the use of explosives for criminal purposes. 
Doesn't this divided — or joint responsibility sometimes make for confusion? 
Haven't there been instances where both agencies claimed jurisdiction? Wouldn't 


there be an advantage to having one agency dealing with all the bombings, 
terrorist and criminal? At least this would result in a centralization of intel- 
ligence files dealing with terrorist bombings. 

Answer. Both the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the FBI 
recognized, upon passage of Title XI of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 
that the joint ATF/FBI responsibility imposed by the act over the six violation 
areas of Section 844 could occasion some confusion and/or duplication of effort 
at the field level in responding to bombing incidents. Accordingly, officials of the 
Department of the Treasury and the Department of Justice met, just subsequent 
to the passage of the act, for the purpose of executing mutually acceptable 
jurisdictional guidelines relating to these sections of the law. These guidelines 
went into effect on May 11, 1971 ; they were renegotiated in early 1973 primarily 
for the purpose of further clarification. Under these existing guidelines, juris- 
diction can — in most instances — be readily determined at the field level. In those 
relatively few instances where jurisdiction is not clear cut under the guidelines, 
a "mediator" service have been instituted in the Department of Justice General 
Crimes Division which, telephonically, assigns jurisdiction in questionable cases. 
In adhering to these guidelines, jurisdictional problems have been minimal. 

As a matter of interest in this same vein, we have executed a similar juris- 
dictional agreement with the United States Postal Service vtdth relation to 
bomb and explosive incidents involving the mails or postal property. 

There have been instances where both agencies claimed jurisdiction and, 
realistically, we anticipate such instances will continue to occur. This was, of 
course, the very purpose for the institution of the General Crimes "mediation" 
service. When such instances do occur, the question of jurisdiction is most 
generally raised subsequent to the on-scene response. 

For example, a bomb may detonate at a privately owned place of business ; 
both ATF and FBI special agents may respond and agree, at the scene, that ATF 
had jurisdiction. Subsequent to this, and after ATF has conducted the blast 
scene search and submitted potential evidence to the ATF laboratory, a com- 
munique may be distributed by a terrorist/revolutionary group claiming credit 
for the bombing. In such instances the function of the "mediator" is to weigh 
the FBI jurisdiction over terrorist/revolutionary activities against the fact 
that ATF is already well into the investigation and has collected, is analyzing, 
and has established a chain of custody of potential evidence. In such instances 
ATF adheres to the decision of the mediator as to jurisdiction. 

In our opinion there would not necessarily be an advantage to having one 
agency dealing with all bombings, terrorist and criminal. We take this position 
for several reasons : 

1. As you are no doubt aware, a bombing investigation is extremely time con- 
suming and difficult. It is not at all unusual to have a team of 20 special agents 
working at the blast site for two or three days just searching for evidence. With 
the increasing number of bombing incidents we are experiencing it may well be 
advantageous to have the manpower availability of several agencies to conduct 
the investigations. 

2. Cooperative liaison between ATF and FBI creates no problem. Whenever 
one of these agencies — either formally or informally — requests assistance from 
the other in a bombing situation, such assistance is timely and adequately 

3. Tliere is ample precedent for overlapping jurisdictions : ATF/Customs as 
to certain firearms violations involving border traffic ; Customs/DEA as to vari- 
ous drug related offenses ; ATF/FBI as to wagering operations. In these areas 
overlapping jurisdictions do not necessarily entail problems. 

4. As to the centralization of intelligence files, again, we have experienced no 
investigative problems in this area. The free interchange of information be- 
tween ATF and the FBI in bombing investigations is a historic fact, and these 
files need not, in my opinion, be consolidated to afford maximal investigative 

Question. In each instance! where an explosion occurs, is it part of ATF's juris- 
diction to determine the source of the explosive material? How successful has 
ATF been in determining the sources? 

Answer. Determining the source of an explosive material is within ATF's juris- 
diction and is an investigative tool fully utilized in all ATF bombing investiga- 
tions. We are also called upon to trace explosive material for other law enforce- 
ment agencies during the course of bombing investigations within their juris- 


In order to trace the explosive material used in a bombing it must first be 
identified by laboratory analysis. ATF laboratory experts are able to identify 
the explosive material in about 50% of the cases submitted. At the present time 
ATF is only able to trace the explosives recovered in predetonation scenes or 
where an explosion has not entirely destroyed the date-shift code or other manu- 
facturer's identification. In such instances we have been about 90% successful 
in identifying the sources of explosives materials. Unsuccessful traces for the 
most part involve detonating cord and blasting caps, both electric and non- 
electric, which are recovered after being removed from their original containers 
and lack suflScient identification for tracing. 

The initiation of our explosive tagging program should enable ATF to deter- 
mine the source of all explosives or explosives residue which has been recovered 
and undergone explosives tagging. 

Question. How many of the explosions which have occurred in the past five 
years are directly related to the activities of political terrorist? How many 
have had a simple criminal motivation? 

Answer. ATF has not collected this kind of data for the period requested. 
However, quoting from the FBI Uniform Crime reports, the below information 
is available. 





Political /terrorists 


Unknown -. 












> 1st year statistics were gathered. 

Included in the Political/Terrorists figures above the following categories: 
anti-establishment, extremist, foreign political, political, and anti-war. 

Included in the Criminal figures above are the following categories : civil 
rights, labor disputes, monetary gain, personal animosity, malicious destruction, 
racketeering, and anti-religious. 

Question. You stated in your testimony that explosives come in many con- 
figurations — dynamite, black powder, ammonium nitrate, fuel oil mixtures, 
plastic, water gels and so on. If I understood your testimony correctly, dynamite 
was by far the most common explosive used for criminal and terrorist purposes, 
but black powder and plastic also play a role in such attacks. Would it be pos- 
sible to provide the Subcommittee with a breakdown of the type of explosives 
used in criminal and terrorist bombings in recent years? 

Answer. For the most recent period that data is available, April 1, 1975, 
through March 31, 1976, the following information is provided : 

During the reporting period there were 654 bombing incidents reported. There 
were also 185 non-detonation incidents reported where the explosive material 
was recovered. 

Of the 654 bombing incidents, we were able to positively identify dynamite as 
being the explosive material in 137 cases. Taking into consideration that we are 
unable to determine the explosive material used in approximately 50 percent 
of the bombing incidents, this is a large percentage of the identifiable bombings. 
Further, of the 185 bombs that did not detonate, dynamite was the explosive ma- 
terial in 59 cases. 

These figures are based upon incidents investigated by ATF and do not in- 
clude those incidents investigated by other agencies. ATF is not charged with 
investigating terrorists bombings, therefore, separate statistics are not avail- 

Question. What are the penalty ranges for bombings involving property dam 
age, personal injury, and/or the threat to cause an explosion to occur? 

Answer. In the case of property damage, the penalties prescribed are fines of 
not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both. For 
personal injuries, the penalties are fines of not more than $20,000 or imprisonment 
for not more than twenty years, or both. If death results from such bombings, 
the prescribed penalties are any term of years, life imprisonment, or death. 
Bomb threats are punishable by fines of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment 
for not more than five years, or both (see 18 U.S.C. § 844). 

Question. You said in your testimony that the bulk of explosives used in bomb- 
ing, other than black and smokeless powder, is stolen. Would you be able to give 


us any kind of estimate of what percentage of all terrorist bombings, criminal 
and political, involves stolen explosives ; what percentage of the bombs involve 
black and smokeless powder — and what percentage involves homemade ex- 
plosives ? 

Answer. We assume that you include all bombings or criminal use of explosives 
in your term "terrorist bombings." In our testimony, we expressed our conviction 
that the bulk of explosives used in bombings, other than black or smokeless 
powder, was stolen. We base this conviction on the fact that in approximately 
25% of the bombing cases investigated in 1975, where the explosives were iden- 
tified, we were able to establish that the explosive had been stolen. Further, our 
sample follow up on purchases of explosives by licensees, permittees, and individ- 
uals purchasing explosives on Form 4710 indicate that only in isolated cases 
were explosives used for other than lawful purposes. 

The percentage of smokeless powder and black powder used in bomb inci- 
dents as reported in the National Bomb Data Center Technical Digest for 1974 
and the first half of 1975 indicate that black powder was identified in 23% of the 
incidents and smokeless powder was identified in 25% of the incidents where the 
type of explosives was determined. There are no available statistics on the use 
of homemade explosives in bombs. 



(Referred to on p. 17) 

The following photographs are scenes of a bombing which occurred in McLean, 






[From the Washington Post, Nov. 29, 1974] 

(By Ron Taylor and Margot Hornblower) 

Federal and Fairfax County police investigators are seeking to talk to business 
and personal associates of builder William F. Banks following a pre-dawn blast 
that ripped through his $200,000 McLean home yesterday. 

Moments before the explosion, in which no one was injured, a phone call was 
received by Banks' brother, Robert, who lives in Bethesda. He said the anonymous 
caller told him : "There is a bomb in your brother's house", and then hung up. It 
was 5 :15 a.m.. Banks said yesterday. 

Robert Banks called his brother's house at 753 Chain Bridge Rd., where the 
telephone rang but was not answered. Police said the explosion occurred at 5 :17 

The blast, described by police as being caused by a paraffin explosive device, 
occurred under a corner of the second floor bedroom where Banks and his wife 
were sleeping. 

A spokesman for the U.S. Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau said there is 
"no doubt about it being a bomb. To do as much damage as it did, it looks like 
it might be a dynamite bomb," said W. H. McConnell of the bureau. 

It could be heard as far away as Cleveland Park in Northwest Washington, 
and it sheared away most of the northern face of the two-story, century -old 
refurbished farmhouse, shattered the building's windows and tossed debris nearly 
100 yards from the house. 

The direction of the blast — outward and away from the house instead of into 
the bulk of the structure— may have saved the lives of the Banks family, said 
police and IT.S. Treasury agents at the scene. 

Agents from the Treasury Department's alcohol, firearms and tobacco division 
scoured the debris for evidence while county police investigators nnd FBI agents 
collected the names of Banks' personal and business associates. Banks is presi- 
dent of the prominent Banks and Lee. Inc. building firm. 

Banks said yesterday that he could not single out who may have planted a 
bomb or why. But police investigators said yesterday they have singled out three 
names from the several given them by the family, and suspect either a personal 
vendetta or reprisal over a disputed business arrangement. 


Robert Banks said a threat was made on his brother's life and that an attempt 
was made to firebomb his home at the beginning of October, and police said that 
incident was being r'e-examined in the wake of the Thanksgiving Day explosion. 

The federal agents were brought into the investigation because one agent said, 
"of possible federal violations." He noted that "the crimes we're interested in 
include interstate transportation of explosives and extortion." A spokesman for 
the FBI in Alexandria said, "There is an all'egation of extortion and the matter 
is under investigation." 

Neither Banks nor his brother would elaborate on the threats but Robert 
Banks said that they stemmed from "normal disagreements. I don't know if 
they (the threats) are anything different from what happens in other businesses." 

Robert Banks said that after he received the telephoned tip that a bomb was 
planted he got out of bed to look for his brother's telephone number and dialed. 

"I tried to reach my brother but I didn't get an answer. It was ringing on my 
end but I don't know whether his phone was out of ord'er or not," he said. 

He then called Montgomery and Fairfax police, he said. His home in Bethesda 
later was searched for a bomb but police found nothing. 

He said that the family's business, of which he is vice president, was founded 
by their father, William S. Bank.?, 37 years ago. The firm's activities have in- 
cluded apartment and home construction throughout the area. The firm is now 
working on Oak Crest Towers in Prince George's County and built Th'e Hamlets 
apartments in Alexandria. 

Robert Banks added that he and his brother ruled out the possibility of a link 
between the explosion and a disgruntled former employee. "We have no sus- 
picions of that. We just don't have any reason to think that," he said. 

He said that he reached his brother after the family evacuated the house and 
had been taken in by the home of George McCay next door. 

McCay and his wife, Evelyn, were asleep on the enclosed sun porch of their 
home at the time of the blast. McCay said he did not h'ear the explosion but Mrs. 
McCay said that when the blast occurred she slipped her shoes on, grabbed a 
flashlight, and went looking for the Banks family. 

The explosion shattered three of the windows in the McCay house and caused 
the door locks to buckle. 

The blast ripped out the first frame of the well-appointed old farmhouse. 

It occurred near a first floor utility room located directly under the bedroom 
where William and Linda Banks were sleeping. 

The force of the blast collapsed the floor of the bedroom closet, and on the 
front of the house what was left of the plate glass windows yawned out toward 
the underbrush that faces the house. 

The children were asleep at the time in a bedroom on the southwest corner of 
the three-bedroom house. They were separated from their parents by another 
bedroom, a playroom and the staircase that th'e family eventually used to leave 
the second floor of the house. 

The driveway leading from Chain Bridge Road to the garage on the property 
was littered with shards of glass and splinters. 

Pieces of wood, ranging in size from sl'ender slats to ragged chunks from the 
roof, landed on the McCay's driveway, front lawn and property 150 yards away. 

From outside the house, the handsome refurbishing job on the interior could 
be seen. Banks said the house is valued at .$200,000. 

The rolling backyard of the Banks home overlooks the George Washington 
Parkway. Their neighborhood residents include Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) 
and Washington Redskins head coach George Allen. 

Police said the blast was believed to be the first of its kind to occur in Fairfax. 


Exhibit No. 2 
[Referred to on p. 17] 

State explosive Application Compliance 

license or inspection inspection 

State Enforcement responsibility > permit program program 

(1) (2) (3) (4) 

Alabama FM No No No. 

Alasl<a OSHA.._. Yes No. (»). 

Arizona. FM and M No No Mines only. 

Arkansas FM and PD Yes» No No. 

California... FM, PD and PS Yes (local) Some (i). 

Colorado L and M Yes Yes Yes. 

Connecticut PD and PS Yes Yes' O). 

Delaware FM Yes Yes Yes. 

Washington, D.C FM Yes Yes Yes. 

Florida Other Yes Yes Yes.« 

Georgia FM Yes No No. 

Hawaii.... PS Yes Yes Yes. 

Idaho L No No No.> 

Illinois FMandM Yes Yes Yes. 

Indiana FM Yes Yes ('). 

Iowa PS Yes Yes Yes. 

Kansas FM No No No. 

Kentucky M Yes No (»). 

Louisiana PS... Yes Yes Yes. 

Maine FM Yes Yes Yes. 

Maryland FM... Yes Yes Yes. 

Massachusetts FM Yes (local) Yes Yes. 

Michigan FM Yes Yes ('). 

Minnesota PD Yes... Yes Yes. 

Mississippi FM No No No. 

Missouri. PS Yes (local) No No. 

Montana FM No No No. 

Nebraska FM Yes Yes Yes. 

Nevada OSHA and M Yes Yes Yes. 

New Hampshire FM Yes (local) No No. 

New Jersey Other .' Yes Yes Yes. 

New Mexico Other No No No. 

New York L Yes Yes Yes. 

North Carolina L Yes (local) No No. 

North Dakota FMandM No No No. 

Ohio Other Yes Yes Yes. 

Oklahoma FM No No O). 

Oregon FM Yes Yes Yes. 

Pennsylvania Other and M Yes Yes Yes. 

Puerto Rico PD Yes Yes Yes. 

Rhode Island FM Yes Yes Yes. 

South Carolina PD No No No. 

South Dakota FM No No Yes. 

Tennessee Other Yes No Yes.' 

Texas . FM No No No. 

Utah OSHA No No No. 

Vermont.. PS Yes No No. 

Virginia Other Yes Yes Yes. 

Washington PS and M Yes Yes Yes. 

West Virginia FM Yes No No. 

Wisconsin M and L Yes No (')• 

Wyoming.... FM No No No. 

« Key to symbols: 

FM— Fire Marshal or Fire Protection Division. 

PD— Branch or Division of Police Department. 

PS— Division or Department of Public Safety. 

L— Department of Labor. 

OSHA— Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 

M— Bureau of Mines or Mine Inspector. 
' Infrequently or in response to complaints only. 
) Not being implemented. 


Exhibit No. 3 
[Referred to on p. 42] 


1. General 

Title XI of the captioned law amends Title 18, United States Code, by adding 
a new chapter 40 with section numbers 841 through 848 governing the importa- 
tion, manufacture, distribution and storage of explosive materials and creating 
certain Federal offenses pertaining to the unlawful use of explosives. Adminis- 
tration of explosives regulation is vested in the Secretary of the Treasury as is 
investigative jurisdiction over the unlawful acts proscribed in section 842. Under 
authority contained in section 846 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) have concurrent in- 
vestigative jurisdiction as to the remainder of chapter 40, i.e., the unlawful acts 
proscribed in subsection (d), (c), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of section 844. Al- 
though not specified in chapter 40, the Postal Inspection Service shall have juris- 
diction to investigate all incidents involving explosive or incendiary devices sent 
through the mails or directed against U.S. Postal Service property. 

Title XI greatly broadens Federal authority pertaining to explosives-connected 
offenses. At the same time. Congress has expressly disclaimed any intent to oc- 
cupy the field to the exclusion of state law on the same subject matter. To effect 
both Congressional purposes and to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort it 
is essential that the limited Federal investigative resources be carefully allo- 
cated, particularly in cases in which both the ATF and the FBI have jurisdic- 

2. Federal Bureau of Investigation {FBI) Jurisdiction in General 

(a) Effect on prior jurisdiction. — This agreement applies only to those inci- 
dents as to which the FBI had no investigative jurisdiction prior to the enact- 
ment of the captioned law and to incidents previously subject to FBI investiga- 
tion by reason of chapter 65, Title 18, United States Code (malicious mischief). 
Investigative procedures in other types of incidents (e.g., train wrecking, damag- 
ing aircraft and motor vehicles, racketeering) shall remain unchanged. 

(b) Prhnary jurdisdiction. — Subject to the provision hereof, the FBI \Aill exer- 
cise primary jurisdiction over all alleged violations of section 844 which are 
directed at foreign diplomatic facilities or at activities, such as transportation 
and tourist offices, operating under the aegis of a foreign government although 
not in a diplomatic status, over all alleged violations of subsections 844(d) 
through (i) which are perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individ- 
uals and all other violations of subsection 844(e) through (g) which are not di- 
rected at Treasury Department or Postal Service building or functions. 

(c) Tiipe of investigation to he conducted 

(1) Offenses perpetrated by terrorist /revolutionary groups or individuals. — The 
FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all alleged violations of 
section 844 which appear at the outset to have been perpetrated by terrorist/ 
revolutionary groups or individuals as defined in advance by the Internal Se- 
curity Division of the Department of Justice. If ATF or the Postal Inspection 
Service has properly initiated investigations and information is subsequently 
developed indicating apparent involvement of terrorist/revolutionary groups or 
individuals, responsibility shall be relinquished to the FBI unless a determina- 
tion is made by the Department of Justice that a transfer of responsibilities will 
unduly impair further investigative efforts. 

(2) Alleged offenses against Colleges and Universities. — The FBI will imme- 
diately initiate a full investigation of any alleged violation of section 844 which 
involves the use or attempted use of explosive (as distinguished from incen- 
diary) materials against the facilities of a coUege or university. Investigation 
of alleged violations involving use or attempted use of incendiary materials will 
be limited initially to the development of background information as prescribed 
in paragraph 6 below. 

(3) Alleged offenses directed against foreign diplomatic facilities and related 
activities. — The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all alleged 
violations of section 844 which are directed at foreign diplomatic facilities and re- 
lated activities as described in paragraph 2(b) above. 


(4) All other alleged violations of subsection 8U(f) — offenses involving use 
of explosives against United States property or federally financed organizations, 
and {g) — offenses involving possession of explosives in buildings owned, leased, 
used, etc., by the United States — The FBI will immediately initiate a full investi- 
gation of all violations of subsection 844(g) over which it has primary jurisdic- 
tion hereunder, and those violations of 844(f) which are directed at federal 
property (e.g., a military facility) or a federal function (e.g, a Selective Service 
or ROTC facility). In other violations of 844(f) the FBI will develop and dis- 
seminate background information as indicated in paragraph 6 below. 

3. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) Jurisdiction in General 

(a) Violations ancillary to firearms laics violations or violation of section 
842. — The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) of the Department 
of the Treasury will exercise investigative jurisdiction over violations of sec- 
tion 844 which are ancillary to its primary jurisdiction over the federal firearms 
laws or over section 842 of Title XI. 

(b) Violations of subsection 844 (d) — interstate transportation of explosives 
with unlawful intent and subsection 844(.i) — offenses against property used in 
or affecting commerce. — Subject to paragraph 2b, above, the ATF will exercise 
primary investigative jurisdiction over violations of subsections 844(d) and (i) 
and will conduct a full investigation thereof unless notified by the Criminal 
Division that pursuant to paragraph 2(c) (1), above, the Department of Justice 
has requested FBI investigation in a particular matter. 

(c) Violations directid at Treasury Department property or functions. — 
The ATF shall have primary jurisdiction to investigate all violations of section 
844 which are directed at Treasury Department property or functions and will 
conduct a full investigation of such violations. 

4. Postal Inspection Service Jurisdiction 

The Postal Inspection Service shall have primary jurisdiction to investigate 
all violations of section 844 which are directed at U.S. Postal Service property 
or functions. 

5. Special considerations 

(a) Bomb Threats, false information {section 844(.e)). — ^The ATF and the 
Postal Inspection Service shall have jurisdiction over violations of section 
844(e) against Treasury Department or Postal Service property or functions, 
respectively. The FBI shall have jurisdiction over all other violations of section 
S44(e). Uix)n receipt of information alleging or suggesting a violation of subsec- 
tion 844(e), the investigative agency concerned will review available information 
to determine whether the identity of the offender is kno^Ti or c^an be readily ascer- 
tained and, if not, whether the evidence suggests a pattern or plan of such of- 
fenses by a particular offender or against a particular victim. If such a pattern 
appears or if the offender is identified, all available information will be dis- 
seminated as indicated in paragraph 6 below. 

(b) Use/carrying explosive in commission of a felony {section 844W)- — 
Violations of 844(h) should be handled as an adjunct of the felony from which 
they arise and should be discussed with the appropriate United States Attorney 
or Division of the Department handling prosecution of the underlying felony 
offense. The agency having jurisdiction over the underlying felony will have 
investigative jurisdiction over the 844(h) violation (e.g., bank robbery is under 
FBI jurisdiction). 

(c) Violations of 26 U.S.C. 5861 {destructive devices).— In incidents in- 
volving alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. 844 (which may also involve a violation 
of 26 U.S.C. 5861), ATF shall not exercise its primary jurisdiction under 26 
U.S.C. 5861 involving destructive devices, but the incident shall be treated in 
accordance with the provisions of these guidelines. This is in no way a relin- 
quishment by ATF of its investigative jurisdiction under Title II of the Gun 
Control Act of 1968. 


6. Development of background information 

Some incidents such as those directed against Federal property or functions 
(paragraph 2(b) above) require immediate full federal investigation. Others 
require a more circumspect approach and will result in full Federal investiga- 
tion only after consideration of factors pertinent to the exercise of Federal 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, in those incidents which these guidelines do not pre- 
scribe immediate full investigation, the investigative agency having jurisdic- 
tion will develop background information which includes (a) facts bearing on 
motivation such as involvement of the suspected perpetrators in terrorist/revol- 
lutionary activities, organized crime, labor-management disputes, or racial- 
religious hate activities; (b) the applicability of .state and local laws and like- 
lihood of state or local investigative and prosecutive actions; and (c) any 
other available facts indicating whether or not the offense warrants Federal 
investigation and prosecution. Such background information will be submitted 
telephonically (202-73»-27'15) or by teletype (710-822-0008) to the General 
Crimes Section of the Criminal Division and to the appropriate United States 
Attorney. The Criminal Division will advise the investigative agency concerned 
whether the matter warrants submission to any other Division or Section of 
the Criminal Division, and when so warranted the Criminal Division will trans- 
mit the information to such other Division or Section. 

7. Full investigation 

A full investigation will be initiated immediately in those instances wherein 
such investigation is specified herein. In other instances full investigation will 
be initiated only upon direction of the Department of Justice after considera- 
tion by the Division having cognizance over the matter of the background 
information developed under paragraph 6 above. 

8. Reports 

Copies of ease reports prepared in matters inves'tigated under these guidelines 
vpill he furnished directly to the Department of Justice and the appropriate 
United Statas Attorney. All investigative agencies shall submit initial rexwrts as 
soon as practicable to the Department of Justice and shall submit progress re- 
ports once each 30 days or as soon thereafter as i)ossible. The Criminal Division 
of the Department of Justice will be informed as soon as i)ossible in each instance 
wherein an investigative agency initiates an investigation under section 844. Such 
notification i.'j of critical importance to the avoidance of duplication of investiga- 
tive activities. Also each agency subscrihing to these guidelines shall, upon in- 
stituting investigation regarding possible violations of section 844, immediately 
notify other subscribing agencies having a logical interest therein. Also, a suflB- 
cient level of follow-up liaison and dissemination shall be maintained to avoid 
duplication of investig'ative effort. 

Additionally, each such agency will exchange information on a timely basis 
and in a manner which will not interfere with ongoing investigations relative 
to types, sources, movement, and storage of explosives which are the subject of 
its investigations. Information reg'arding significant developments in investiga- 
tions being conducted under these guidelines and information of an intelligence 
nature developed incidental to investigations which is of logical interest to the 
Department of Justice shall be furnished promptly to the Criminal Division of 
that Department which will be responsible for any necessary further dissemina- 
tion within that Department. 

9. Review of guidelines 

These guidelines shall be reviewed on a continuing basis by the parties hereto 
to determine whether problems exist in their administration which should be 
alleviated or whether modification of any of the terms of the agreement are 
needed in the interests of better law enforcement. 


10. Summary 


Type violation 

Primary jurisdiction 






All sections 

Regulatory provision violations ATF. 

Interstate transportation (except by mail) Do. 

of explosives with unlawful intent. 
Bomb threats— false information— Treasury Do. 

buildings or functions. 

U.S. Postal Service buildings or functions U.S. Postal Inspection Service. 

Other FBI. 

Offenses against property of the United 

States or federally financed organiza- 
Treasury buildings or functions ATF. 

U.S. Postal Service buildings U.S. Postal Inspection Service. 

Other (including colleges and universities). . FBI. 
Possession of explosives in buildings owned, 

leased, used by the United States — 

Treasury buildings or functions ATF. 

U.S. Postal Service buildings or functions U.S. Postal Inspection Service. 

Other FBI. 

Use/carrying explosives In commission of a Agency having jurisdisction over underlying 

felony. felony. 

Offenses against property used In or affect- ATF. 

Ing commerce. 
All offenses perpetrated by terrorlst/revo- FBI— Unless another agency has started 

lutlonary groups or individuals. investigation before receipt of information 

indicating terrorist/revolutionary involve- 
ment. In this event see paragraph 2c(l) 


By Department of Justice, 
Assistant Attorney General. 

Dated: January 30, 1973. 

By Department of Treasury, 
Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, Tariff and Trade Affairs and 

By Postal Inspection Service, 
Assistant Postmaster General. 

Effective March 1, 1973. 

Dated: February 13, 1973. 

Dated: January 19, 1973. 


(XoTE. — Tlie Senate Internal Security Snbcommittee attaches no significance 

to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or organization 

in this index. ) 

A Page 

Alabama 6 

Alexandria 71 

Allen, Oeorcre 71 

ATF. (Sire Bureau of Alcohol. Tobacco and Firearms.) 

Attorney General 42 


Banks, Linda "1 

Banks. Roliert 70. 71 

Banks. William F 6. 70, 71 

Banks, William S 71 

Banks & Lee, Inc 70 

Bay area 23, 24 

Bay Area Research Collective 24 

Bersen Couiitv. X.J 8 

Berkeley. Calif 24 

Bethesda 70, 71 

Bicentennial 5 

Black Liberation Army (BLA) 24,25 

Bomb summaries 48 

Bureau of Alcohol, Toltacco and Firearms (ATF) 2, 

3, 8, 9. 12-14, IS, 22-24, 27, 29, 33-35, 37-42, 45, 46, 48-52. 54-65, 

70. 73, 74 
Bureau of Mines ^ 9, 11, 49 

Cabral 24 

California 5, 6. 22, 23 

Canada 6, 11, 21, 30, 39 

Capital (^enter Building 7 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 23 

Cinque 23 

Code of Federal Regulations 49, 50, 53, 57, 58 

Committee on Government Operations 48 

Connecticut 6 

Continua, La Luta 25 

Corbin, Jolm F., Jr 2, 3, 45, 46 

Cotter, William J 76 


Davis, Angela 7 

Davis, Rex D., testimony of . 2—48 

Defense Supply Agency 49, 54 

Department of Social and Health Services, Washington State 7 

Dessler, Marvin J 2, 3 

Dexter, Rol)ert 1.5, 16 

Dillinger, John 41, 46 

Drug Enforcement Administration (I)p]A) 1 40,64 



E ^as« 

Eastland. Senator James O 1 

Emiliano Zapata unit '^- 24. 2.^ 

Explosives tagging program 9-55 


Fairfax J^ 

Fairfax County police ''^ 

Federal Advisory Committee 9- 47 

Federal Aviation Administration 22 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 3, 

6-8, 10, 13, 22-24. 36-43, 45. 46, 48, 64. 65. 70. 71. 73, 74 

Federal Government 22. 32, 33. 43 

Federal Protective Service 6.28 

'•5 escape as bomb rips ,$200,000 McLean home" (article) 70 

Form 4710. explosives transaction record 4,18,19,34,54,56-60,66 

Form 4721. explosives delivery record 51,59 

Form r)030.5. report of violations 56 

Frente de Liberacion Chicano 24 

Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional de Puerto Rico (FALN) 24 


General Services Administration (GSA) 6,28 

George .lackson Brigade " 

Guevara. Che 24 

Gun Control Act of 1968 3.9,38.51,74 

Higgins, Stephen E 2,34-36 

Hoffman, Abbey _8 

Hornblower, Margot 70 


Illinois ", 11 

IME. {Scr Institute of Makers of Explosives.) 

Immigration and Naturalization Service 40 

Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME) 3,8,48,54,61 

Security Committee 54 

Internal Revenue Service 52 

Interstate Commerce clause _ 38 


Jackson. George 7. 23 

Jackson, Jonathan 23 

Jackson, Popeye 23 


Kelley, FBI Director Clarence M 43 

Kennedy. Senator Edward 71 

Kentucky 5 

King, Martin Luther 23 

Knight, Director 43 


LaGuardia Airport 5, 8, 13, 23 

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) 8 

Lenin 24 

Levi, Attorney General Edward 24 

Louisville, Ky 45 

Los Angeles 22, 23 


Malcolm X 23 

McCay, I]velyn 71 

McCay, George 71 

3 9999 05995 195 2 


McConnell. W. H '^^ 

McLean. Va — «• H- ^^- 3«- «"• l^^ 

MaoTsp-tiiiis ^2 

^[arisrhpla — *"„ 

:Marln County. Calif ' 

Martin. David ^-^^ 

Marx, Karl "^ 

^lasi^aohnsetts J^ 

^Tpmliers of Congress : ^'^ 

MininiT Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA)__ 10. 11. 16. 34. So. 40, 50 

Mississippi '^ 

Missouri ^^ 

Morgan. Edward L '" 


National Bomb Data Center 6.36 

National Bomb Data Center Technical Disc'^t (publication) 66 

National Crime Information Center (XCIC) 36.37,41.43^7 

National Firearms Act 3.9.10 

New Jersey ^- ' 

New World Liberation Eront (NWLF) 7.23.24 

New York 5, S. 22 

New York City 5.8,22 

New Y'ork Police Department 22 

North Carolina 6 

NWLF. (SVr New World Liberation Front.) 


Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 49 

Ohio ^. 6 

Olvmpia. Wash "J 

Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 3, 10. 3K 42. 4S, 49. 52. 62. 63, 73 


Pine Ridge Reservation 24 

Pennsylvania •' 

People's Force 24 

Petersen. Henry E 76 

Peterson. A. Alley 2.3 

Post Office Deiiartment 42 

Postal Inspection Service 73, 74 

Puerto Rico 44 


Red Guerrilla Family (RGF) 7,23-25 

-Red Guerrilla Family Bombs ATF" (article) 23 

Rossides, Assistant Secretary 48 

Royal Canadian Mounted Police 21, 39 


San Francisco 7, 11, 23 

Schultz, Richard L 1-48 

Scott. Senator William L 1-48 

Secretary of the Treasury 42,73 

Selective Service 74 

Senate 1 

Short, Robert J 1-48 

SLA. (*s'ec Symbionese Lil)eration Army. ) 

State explosives control (chart) 72 

State fire marshal 9 

"Steal this Book" (book) 8 

Subcommittee on Immigration (Senate) 40 

Supplemental questions and answers 48-66 

Symbionese Liberation Army , 24,25 


T Page 

Taylor. Ron 70 

Tennessee 5 

Title XI, regulation of explosives 3, 5, 7-12, 27, 30, 45, 55, 74 

Treasury enforcement communication system (TECS) 41 

Thorne, Brenton 23 

Thurmond, Senator Strom 2 


T^niform crime reports 48,65 

Ignited Prisoners Union 23 

Ignited States 5, 10, 11, 40, 44, 47, 63, 74 

Armed Forces 11, 61 

Army 61 

Attorney 74, 75 

Code 50, 73 

Congress 10, 38 

Customs Service 40, 41, 64 

Department of Defense 54 

Department of Justice 37,38,43,64,73,75 

Department of Labor 9,49 

Department of Transportation 49,53,55,63 

Department of the Treasury 3,5,11,23,38,40,64,70,74 

Postal Service 64, 73 

Secret Service 40, 43 

University of Wisconsin 29 

Virginia 31, 37 


Washington. D.C 39 

Washington Post (newspaper) 70 

Washington Redskins 71 

Washington State 44 

Weather underground 24, 25 

West Coast 93 

World War II ~_ "3 

Wounded Knee 24