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Full text of "Control of explosives : administration and execution of the laws pertaining to the control of explosives : hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, second session, April 8 and 9, 1976"

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L  CONTROL  OF  EXPLOSIVES 

Administration  and  Execution  of  the  Laws  Pertaining  to 
the  Control  of  Explosives 


HEARINGS 

BEFORE  THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE  TO  INVESTIGATE  THE 

ADMINISTRATION  OF  THE  INTERNAL  SECURITY 

ACT  AND  OTHER  INTERNAL  SECURITY  LAWS 

OF  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

NINETY-FOURTH  CONGRESS 

SECOND  SESSION 


PART  1 
BUREAU  OF  ALCOHOL,  TOBACCO  AND  FIREARMS 


APRIL  8  AND  9,  1976 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary 


U.S.  GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
WASHINGTON   :    1976 


GOV  DOCS 
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Washington,  D.C.  20402  -  Price  90  cents 
pt.  1  There  Is  a  minimum  charge  of  $1.00  for  each  mall  order 


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CONTROL  OF  EXPLOSIVES 

Administration  and  Execution  of  the  Laws  Pertaining  to 
the  Control  of  Explosives 


HEARINGS 

BEFORE  THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE  TO  INVESTIGATE  THE 

ADMINISTRATION  OF  THE  INTERNAL  SECURITY 

ACT  AND  OTHER  INTERNAL  SECURITY  LAWS 

OF  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

NINETY-FOURTH  CONGRESS 

SECOND  SESSION 


PART  1 
BUREAU  OF  ALCOHOL,  TOBACCO  AND  FIREARMS 


APRIL  8  AND  9,  1976 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary 


U.S.  GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
WASHINGTON   :    1976 


GOV  DOCS 
KF 

3953 

.A25  

1  07^  V  ^*"^  ^^^®  ^^  ^^®  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Governnient  Printing  Office 

*"  '  "*  Washington,  D.C.  20402  -  Price  90  cents 

pt.l  There  Is  a  minimum  charge  of  $1.00  for  each  mail  order 

[esearchi  franklin  pierce  law  center 

I    iKrSir\#      i  Concord,   New    Hampshire   03301 

^  ON  DEPOSIT    Mir,  2etQ7fi 


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COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 

JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi,  Chairman 


JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas 
PHILIP  A.  HART,  Michigan 
EDWARD  M.  KENNEDY,  Massachusetts 
BIRCH  BAYH,  Indiana 
QUENTIN  N.  BURDICK,  North  Dalvota 
ROBERT  C.  BYRD,  West  Virginia 
JOHN  V.  TUNNEY,  California 
JAMES  ABOUREZK,  South  Dalcota 


ROMAN  L.  HRUSKA,  Nebraslca 
HIRAM  L.  PONG,  Hawaii 
HUGH  SCOTT,  Pennsylvania 
STROM  THURMOND,  South  Carolina 
CHARLES  McC.  MATHIAS,  Jr.,  Maryland 
WILLIAM  L.  SCOTT,  Virginia 


Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the  Administration  of  the  Internal 

Security  Act  and  Other  Internal  Security  Laws 

JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi,  Chairman 

JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas  STROM  THURMOND,  South  Carolina 

BIRCH  BAYH,  Indiana  WILLIAM  L.  SCOTT,  Virginia 

Richard  L.  Schultz,  Chief  Counsel 

Caroline  M.  Courbois,  Assistant  to  the  Chief  Counsel 

Alfonso  L.  Tarabochia,  Chief  In  vestigator 

Robert  J.  Short,  Senior  Investigator 

Mary  E.  Dooley,  Research  Director 

David  Martin,  Senior  Analyst 

(II) 


CONTENTS 


Page 

Thursday,  April  8,  1976 1 

Testimony  of  Rex  D.   Davis,  accompanied  by    Stephen  E.  Higgins, 

John  F.  Corbin,  Jr.,  A.  Atley  Peterson,  and  Marvin  J.  Dessler 

Friday,  April  9,  1976 27 

(Continuation  of  Thursday,  April  8.) 

(Ill) 


CONTROL  OF  EXPLOSIVES 

Administration  and  Execution  of  tlie  Laws  Pertaining  to  the 
Control  of  Explosives 


THURSDAY,  APRIL  8,   1976 

U.S.  Senate, 
Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the 
Administration  of  the  Internal  Security  Act 

AND  Other  Internal  Security  Laws 

OF  THE  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington^  D.C. 

The  subcommittee  met,  pursuant  to  notice,  at  3 :45  p.m.,  in  room  357, 
Russell  Senate  Office  Building,  Senator  William  L.  Scott  of  Virginia, 
presiding. 

Also  present :  Richard  L.  Schultz,  chief  counsel ;  Robert  J.  Short, 
senior  investigator ;  and  David  Martin,  senior  analyst. 

Senator  Scott.  The  subcommittee  will  come  to  order.  Chairman 
Eastland  has  asked  me  to  preside  on  his  behalf  this  afternoon  and  the 
Senate,  as  you  know,  is  in  session,  and  I  believe  that  we  will  have  a 
number  of  roll  calls.  So  I  ask  that  the  witnesses  be  as  concise  as  they 
can,  not  leaving  out  anything  that  they  would  want  to  come  before 
the  subcommittee. 

You  will,  I  hope,  understand  if  I  have  to  leave  and  go  vote  because 
we  are  considering  food  stamp  legislation  and  there  are  a  number  of 
amendments  and  one  half  an  hour  limitation  on  the  amendments,  so, 
it  is  likely  that  within  the  20  minutes  next  that  we  will  have  a  recess 
for  a  roll  call. 

The  Subcommittee  on  Internal  Security  meets  today  for  the  pur- 
pose of  receiving  testimony  and  evidence  relevant  to  the  adequacy  of 
the  laws  and  regulations  pertaining  to  the  control  of  explosives  and 
the  administration  thereof. 

This  oversight  inquiry  is  conducted  pursuant  to  a  resolution  adopted 
by  action  of  the  subcommittee  on  March  9,  1976.  In  considering  the 
adoption  of  this  resolution,  the  subcommittee  was  not  unmindful  of 
the  plethora  of  materials  and  statistical  data  which  is  compiled  periodi- 
cally for  the  purpose  of  cataloging  the  occurrence  and  extent  of  per- 
sonal injury,  property  damage,  and  loss  of  productive  man  hours  which 
result  from  the  criminal  use  of  explosives. 

Though  meaningful  and  relevant  for  the  purposes  of  assessing  the 
magnitude  of  the  criminal  use  of  explosives,  these  statistics  fail  to  pro- 
vide us  with  answers  to  questions  concerning  how  explosives  are 
acquired  by  those  bent  on  criminal  endeavor.  The  focus  of  our  inquiry 
then  will  be  on  the  illegal  acquisition  of  explosives.  The  subcommittee 
will  not  concern  itself  with  labels  or  characterizations,  whether  self- 
CD 


proclaimed  or  publicly  assigned,  by  which  individuals  or  groups  may 
attempt  to  cloud  the  true  criminal  nature  of  their  activities. 

Surely  no  one  ^YOuld  argue  that  there  is  comfort  to  be  taken  from 
knowing  that  a  loved  one  was  killed  by  a  political  activist,  or  argue 
that  the  absence  of  a  terrorist  label,  or  the  absence  of  a  characterization 
as  a  political  activist,  that  the  use  of  explosives  which  result  in  human 
suHering,  do  not  impinge  directly  on  the  internal  security  of  our 
comitry. 

Today's  hearing  is  the  first  of  a  series  of  hearings  which  we  hope  to 
complete  within  the  coming  months.  We  are  pleased  to  have  as  our 
initial  witness,  the  distinguished  director  of  the  Bureau  of  Alcohol, 
Tobacco  and  Firearms,  Mr.  Rex  D.  Davis. 

Mr.  Davis  has  provided  the  subcommittee  with  a  prepared  state- 
ment by  which  he  presents  an  overview  of  the  issues  relating  to  the 
control  and  handling  of  explosives. 

Mr.  Davis,  I  want  to  thank  you,  on  behalf  of  the  subcommittee,  for 
coming  here  toda3\  We  are  looking  forward  to  your  testimony. 

Would  you  please  stand  and  be  sworn  ? 

Mr.  ScHULTz.  Mr.  Chairman,  Mr.  Davis  may  call  upon  the  gentle- 
men with  him  and  I  was  wondering  if  they  could  be  sworn  also  'I 

[Whereupon,  the  witnesses  were  sworn  by  Senator  Scott.] 

Before  you  commence,  I  do  have  a  statement  that  Senator  Thurmond 
has  asked  me  to  submit  for  the  record  and  it  will  be  inserted  in  the 
record  at  this  point. 

[The  statement  referred  to  follows :] 

Statement  by  Senator  Strom  Thurmond 

If  I  may  be  permitted  to  add  a  few  words  to  the  Chairman's  remarl^s,  I  would 
lilte  to  say  that  I  have  a  major  personal  interest  in  this  entire  problem  because 
I  have  chaired  some  5  or  6  hearings  on  the  subject  of  terrorism  conducted  by 
the  Senate  Internal  Security  Subcommittee.  The  impression  I  have  from  these 
hearings  is  that  it  is  really  incredibly  easy  for  terrorists  to  acquire  large  quanti- 
ties of  explosives.  This  is  an  alarming  situation. 

The  question  naturally  arises :  Are  we  doing  everything  that  can  be  done  to 
control  and  monitor  the  production  and  distribution  of  explosives  of  all  kinds, 
so  that  anti-social  elements  will  find  it  more  difficult  to  acquire  them  for  criminal 
and  terrorist  use?  Although  I  don't  want  to  anticipate  the  testimony  of  our  dis- 
tinguished witness,  my  impression  is  that  the  machinery  of  control  can  be  im- 
proved in  a  number  of  ways  and  I  welcome  the  opportunity  to  explore  this  prob- 
lem with  someone  as  knowledgeable  as  the  Director  of  the  Bureau  of  Alcohol, 
Tobacco  and  Firearms,  Mr.  Rex  D.  Davis. 

TESTIMONY  OF  REX  D.  DAVIS,  DIRECTOR,  BUREAU  OF  ALCOHOL, 
TOBACCO,  AND  FIREARMS,  ACCOMPANIED  BY  STEPHEN  E.  HIG- 
GINS,  ACTING  DEPUTY  DIRECTOR;  JOHN  F.  CORBIN,  JR.,  ASSIST- 
ANT DIRECTOR  FOR  CRIMINAL  ENFORCEMENT;  A.  ATLEY 
PETERSON,  ACTING  ASSISTANT  DIRECTOR  FOR  TECHNICAL  AND 
SCIENTIFIC  SERVICES;  AND  MARVIN  J.  DESSLER,  CHIEF  COUNSEL 

Mr.  Davis.  Thank  you.  Mr.  Chairman,  it  is  a  pleasure  to  appear  lie- 
fore  this  distinguished  committee  to  report  on  our  administration  of 
the  Federal  laws  that  relate  to  explosive  materials  and  the  bombs  that 
are  sometimes  made  from  them. 

I  would  like  to  introduce  those  members  of  my  staff  who  are  here 
with  me  today:  Mr.  Stephen  E.  Higgins,  Acting  Deputy  Director; 


Mr.  John  F.  Corbin,  Jr.,  Assistant  Director  for  Criminal  Enforce- 
ment ;  INIr.  A.  Atley  Peterson,  Acting  Assistant  Director  for  Technical 
and  Scientific  Services;  and  Mr.  Marvin  J.  Dessler,  our  Chief  Coimsel. 

My  prepared  testimony  is  rather  lengthy,  and  with  your  permis- 
sion, I  will  simply  highlight  it  and  then  answer  any  questions  which 
the  subcommittee  may  have. 

Mr.  Scott.  Th(  entire  statement  will  be  received  for  the  record  and 
I  think  that  that  is  \'ery  kind  oi  you  to  give  us  the  highlights. 

[The  prepared  statement  of  Mr.  Davis  follows.] 

Prepared  Statement  of  Rex  D.  Davis,  Director 

Mr.  Chairman,  and  members  of  the  subcommittee,  I  am  Rex  D.  Davis,  Director, 
Bureau  of  Alcohol,  Tobacco  and  Firearms,  Department  of  the  Treasury.  I  am 
here  in  response  to  your  request  to  provide  information  on  the  Bureau's  adminis- 
tration and  enforcement  of  Title  XI,  Regulation  of  Explosives,  as  contained  in 
the  Organized  Crime  Control  Act  of  1970,  as  well  as  our  enforcement  of  the  Na- 
tional Firearms  Act  as  it  relates  to  destructive  devices. 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  appear  before  this  distinguished  subcommittee  to  report  on 
our  administration  of  the  Federal  laws  that  relate  to  explosive  materials  and 
the  bombs  that  are  sometimes  made  from  them.  With  the  subcommittee's  per- 
mission, I  would  like  to  first  summarize  the  events  leading  to  our  appearance 
here  today.  Following  that,  I  will  present  to  the  subcommittee  our  efforts  to 
regulate  the  explosives  industry  in  conjunction  with  other  Government  agencies, 
as  well  as  showing  the  current  trend  in  bombings  and  the  difficulty  which  our 
agents  encounter  when  trying  to  investigate  a  bombing,  which  includes  deter- 
mining how  the  bomber  acquired  the  explosives  used. 

In  1968,  Congress  enacted  the  Gun  Control  Act  of  1968.  Title  II  of  the  Act 
amended  the  National  Firearms  Act  and  required  that  destructive  devices  must 
be  registered  with  our  Bureau  in  order  to  be  legally  possessed.  The  term 
"destructive  device"  included  both  explosive  and  incendiary  bombs.  The  amended 
National  Firearms  Act  provided  for  a  30-day  amnesty  period  in  November  1968, 
during  which  time  destructive  devices,  as  well  as  unregistered  firearms,  could 
be  registered  with  immunity.  However,  there  were  no  "bombs,"  as  you  and  I  think 
of  them  in  terms  of  today's  misuse  of  explosiA'es,  registered  and  as  a  result,  each 
such  bomb  made  and  used  since  December  1968,  is  a  violation  of  the  National 
Firearms  Act.  It  was  at  this  point  in  time  that  we  became  involved  in  the  investi- 
gation of  bombings  of  all  types  in  the  United  States. 

The  growing  misuse  of  explosives  by  those  who  chose  bombs  as  their  means  of 
forcing  their  philosophy,  life  styles  or  politics  on  others  caused  Congress  to  enact 
Title  XI  of  the  Organized  Crime  Control  Act  of  1970.  Title  XI,  patterned  after 
Title  I  of  the  Gun  Control  Act  of  1968,  required  a  total  licensing  of  the  explosives 
industry,  including  distributors  and  dealers,  and  a  complete  recordkeeping  system 
to  cover  all  purchases  and  reports  of  thefts  of  explosive  materials.  It  also  called 
for  strict  storage  facilities  for  those  who  deal  in  or  use  explosives.  The  statute 
carried  with  it  a  number  of  unlawful  acts,  including  one  covering  bomb  threats. 

However,  the  statute  did  place  joint  responsibility  for  the  enforcement  of  six 
of  the  violation  sections  upon  both  the  FBI  and  our  Bureau.  We  have,  as  a  result, 
entered  into  an  agreement  with  the  FBI  over  which  of  those  sections  we  will  en- 
force and  which  are  their  responsibility. 

With  the  enactment  of  Title  XI  came  the  pressing  requirement  of  licensing 
of  the  manufacturers,  importers  and  dealers  of  explosive  materials,  as  well  as 
determining  the  type  of  storage  containers  for  explosive  materials  necessary  to 
meet  both  the  provisions  of  the  law  and  the  practical  needs  of  the  industry.  To 
accomplish  this,  we  asked  the  explosives  industry  ^  select  a  member  of  that 
profession  who  could  serve  as  a  consultant  to  us  as  we  prepared  the  regulations 
which  would  implement  the  law.  The  Institute  of  Makers  of  Explosives, 
which  we  shall  refer  to  as  IME  during  our  testimony,  gave  us  full  cooperation 
as  we  delved  into  the  complex  problem  of  storage  and  recordkeeping  of  an  in- 
dustry that  had  not  been  regulated  other  than  as  a  wartime  measure  during 
World  War  II. 

Because  the  law  so  closely  paralleled  the  Gun  Control  Act  of  1968,  we  called 
upon  our  special  agents  to  handle  the  bulk  of  the  w^ork  associated  with  the  issu- 
ance of  licenses  and  approval  of  storage  facilities,  which  was  a  prerequisite  to  li- 


censing.  In  Fiscal  Year  1971,  we  used  191  man-years  at  a  cost  of  $3.3  million  to 
get  the  program  rolling.  The  following  year,  that  figure  rose  to  397  man-years  and 
a  cost  of  $7.7  million.  It  then  decreased  and  our  budget  for  Fiscal  1976  identifies 
this  program  at  219  man-years  with  a  cost  of  $6  million. 

Today,  there  are  594  manufacturers,  76  importers  and  1411  dealers  of  explosives 
licensed  under  Title  XI.  The  licenses  are  issued  on  a  yearly  basis  and  are  subject 
to  non-renewal  or  revocation  if  we  have  reason  to  believe  that  the  applicant  for 
the  license  does  not  meet  the  requirements  of  the  law.  We  also  have,  at  this  time, 
2,618  users  of  explosives  who  have  obtained  a  permit  to  use  explosives  on  a  full 
time  basis.  There  were  also  26  limited  use  permits  issued  as  of  March  9,  1976.  The 
limited  use  permit  is  for  a  "one  time"  purchase  of  explosives. 

Complete  and  accurate  records  on  the  disposition  of  explosives  must  be  re- 
tained by  those  persons  or  firms  licen.sed  under  Title  XI,  and  these  records  are 
subject  to  our  inspection  at  any  time  during  the  regular  business  hours  of  the 
licensee.  In  addition,  those  licensees  who  store  explosives  must  also  have  proper 
storage  facilities,  and  these  are  open  to  our  inspection.  However,  because  a  large 
number  of  the  dealers  and  users  of  explosives  are  connected  with  the  mining  in- 
dustry, we  have  worked  out  an  agreement  with  the  Mining  Enforcement  and 
Safety  Administration  (MESA)  of  the  Bureau  of  Mines  for  their  personnel  to 
perform  inspections  of  the  storage  and  use  of  explosives  at  the  mines. 

In  Fiscal  1975,  there  were  a  total  of  6,320  licenses  and  permits  issued  under 
Title  XI.  During  that  year,  we  made  813  investigations  of  applications  for  license 
or  permit,  and  2,141  compliance  inspections  to  determine  whether  or  not  the 
licensee  or  permittee  was  complying  with  the  provisions  of  the  law.  At  the  same 
time,  MESA  made  approximately  7,200  in.spections  of  explosive  storage  facili- 
ties. It  is  our  understanding  that  they  inspect  all  coal  mines  quarterly,  while 
metal  and  non-metal  quarry  and  mine  operations  are  inspected  at  least  annually. 

Under  the  law,  the  licensee  is  prohibited  from  distributing  explosive  materials 
to  any  individual  who  (1)  is  under  twenty-one  years  of  age,  (2)  has  been  con- 
victed in  any  court  of  a  crime  punishable  by  imprisonment  for  a  term  exceeding 
one  year,  (3)  is  under  indictment  for  a  crime  punishable  by  imprisonment  for  a 
term  exceeding  one  year,  (4)  is  a  fugitive  from  justice,  (5)  is  an  unlawful  user  of 
narcotics,  or  (6)  has  been  adjudicated  a  mental  defective.  In  addition,  the  licensee 
cannot  knowingly  distribute  explosive  materials  to  any  person  except  (1)  a 
licensee,  (2)  a  permittee,  or  (3)  a  resident  of  the  State  where  distribution  is 
made  and  in  which  the  licensee  is  licensed  to  do  business.  Distribution  can  be  made 
to  the  resident  of  a  contiguous  State  if  permitted  by  the  law  of  the  State  of  the 
purchaser's  residence. 

At  the  same  time,  it  is  unlawful  for  those  persons  who  fall  within  any  one  of 
the  above  listed  six  categories  to  ship  or  transport  any  explosive  in  interstate  or 
foreign  commerce,  or  to  receive  any  explosive  which  has  been  shipped  or  trans- 
ported in  interstate  or  foreign  commerce. 

There  are  many  other  unlawful  acts  concerning  the  sale  or  possession  of  ex- 
plosives which  I  shall  not  try  to  enumerate  here.  These  range  from  the  furnishing 
of  false  information  to  the  licensed  dealer  by  the  person  buying  explosives  to  the 
possession  of  explosives  with  the  intent  to  kill,  injure  or  intimidate  an  individual. 

The  procedure  to  buy  explosives  from  a  licensee  depends  upon  whether  or  not 
the  purchaser  is  the  holder  of  a  user  permit.  The  user  permit  is  issued  to  those 
persons  or  firms  who  constantly  use  explosives  in  their  work,  such  as  construction 
firms  or  a  mining  operation,  and  the  purchase  involv<'s  interstate  commerce.  The 
permit  is  issued  annunlly  and  is  presented  to  the  dealer  when  buying  explosives. 
It  relieves  the  dealer  from  the  responsibility  of  extensive  recordkeeping  since  it  is 
only  necessary  to  enter  the  name  of  the  permittee  and  the  permit  number  in  the 
dealer's  disposition  records. 

However,  if  a  non-licensee  or  non-permittee  wants  to  buy  explosives  from  a 
licensee  within  the  State  where  the  buyer  resides,  it  is  necessary  that  a  Form 
4710,  Explosives  Transaction  Record,  be  completed  by  the  buyer  prior  to  the  act- 
ual sales  transaction.  Basically,  the  form  requires  the  buyer  to  give  a  physical 
description,  show  what  use  will  be  made  of  the  explosive  materials,  where  they 
will  l)e  stored,  and  a  certification  by  the  buyer  that  he  is  not  in  one  of  the  cate- 
gories of  persons  prohibited  b.v  law  from  obtainine  or  possessing  explosive  ma- 
terials. The  seller  or  licensee  completes  the  rest  of  the  form,  indicating  what  type 
of  identification  wns  used  by  the  liuyer,  what  materials  were  purchased  and 
where  delivery  was  made.  The  buyer  signs  the  form  and  it  becomes  a  permanent 
part  of  the  seller's  records,  and  as  such,  open  to  our  review  nnd  inspection.  A 
heavy  responsibility  rests  upon  the  dealer  to  make  sure  that  the  buver  presents 
proper  identification,  is  qualified  to  buy  the  materials,  and  that  the  purchase, 


possession  or  use  of  the  explosive  materials  by  the  buyer  would  not  be  in  viola- 
tion of  any  State  law  or  published  ordinance  applicable  at  the  place  of  distn- 

The  statute  further  requires  that  the  purchaser  of  explosive  materials  have 
proper  storage  facilities  for  the  materials,  and  that  he  may  only  receive  the 
materials  if  the  transportation,  shipment  or  receipt  is  permitted  by  the  law 
of  the  State  in  which  the  buyer  resides.  xt  •*.  ^ 

In  1974,  there  were  2.7  billion  pounds  of  explosive  materials  sold  in  the  United 
States  with  2.2  billion  pounds  being  used  in  the  mining  industry.  Construction 
work  used  a  little  over  362  million  pounds,  wliile  slightly  over  190  million  pounds 
went  for  all  other  purposes.  ^  ^^    ,     .^.       4. 

The  preceding,  in  a  nutshell,  generally  covers  the  regulation  of  the  legitimate 
explosives  industrv,  and  we  shall  now  turn  our  attention  to  what  we  feel  is  of 
greatest  concern  to  this  Committee,  and  that  is  the  misuse  of  explosives. 

The  number  of  bombing  incidents  across  the  nation  is  of  grave  concern  to  all 
persons  responsible  for  the  public  safety  of  life  and  property.  We  have  a  vital 
interest  in  preventing  the  illegal  acquisition  of  explosives  by  terrorists  and  other 
criminal  elements  employing  the  bomb  to  intimidate  society.  I  personally  think 
that  the  term  "terrorist"  should  apply  to  anyone  who  uses  or  attempts  to  use  a 
bomb,  but  for  the  purpose  of  this  Iiearing  the  term  will  be  attached  to  those 
persons  who  have  announced  their  intention  of  overthrowing  our  government 
or  disrupting  the  day-by-day  governmental  operations. 

Criminal  intelligence  indicates  that  terrorists  plan  to  disrupt  our  Nation  s 
Bicentennial  celebration,  and  if  the  recent  LaGuardia  Airport  bombing  incident 
in  New  York  City  is  indicative  of  what  may  lay  ahead,  it  becomes  increasingly 
imperative  that  we  utilize  all  of  our  resources  to  deny  terrorists,  criminals  and 
indiscriminate  bombers  access  to  explosive  materials. 

Our  special  agents  have  four  law  enforcement  areas  of  responsibility :  bomb- 
ings, firearms,  illicit  liquor  and  wagering.  We  have,  at  the  present  time,  approxi- 
mately 180()  special  agents  stationed  throughout  the  United  States.  All  of  our 
agent.s  are  trained  to  handle  any  type  of  an  investigation.  In  other  words,  we 
do  not  have  specialists  that  concentrate  their  efforts  on  one  particular  type  of 
crime.  The  agent  may  work  a  bomb  case  today,  an  undercover  sale  of  guns 
tonight,  and  raid  a  moonshine  still  tomorrow.  However,  explosives  investiga- 
tions have  first  priority  in  applying  resources  because  of  the  obvious  potential 
explosives  have  for  endangering  the  public  safety.  Bombings,  actual  or  attempted, 
are  given  primary  emphasis.  Other  mandatory  investigations  relating  to  ex- 
plosives are  (1)  theft  of  explosives,  (2)  threats  against  Treasury  facilities  or 
property,  (3)  bomb  factories  and  (4)  accidental  explosions  where  explosive 
materials  were  involved  or  suspected  of  being  involved. 

During  the  period  of  April  1,  1975,  through  March  31,  1976,  our  agents  were 
involved  in  the  investigation  of  1,587  incidents  involving  explosives.  Of  this 
number,  654  were  bombings  using  explosives.  38  were  bomb  threats  against 
Treasury  facilities,  129  were  incendiary  bombings.  185  were  where  the  bomb  did 
not  go  off,  276  covered  the  theft  of  explosives,  242  involved  the  recovery  of 
explosives,  and  12  were  considered  as  a  hoax  where  there  was  neither  a  bomb 
nor  a  threat. 

Because  of  a  lag  in  our  statistical  reporting,  we  cannot  correlate  the  above 
figures  with  those  concerning  our  manpower  application  on  investigation  of 
explosive  materials  in  terms  of  the  exact  reporting  period.  But  to  give  you  an 
idea  of  the  time  spent  by  special  agents  on  this  phase  of  their  work,  a  total  of 
18,437  mandays  were  expended  on  explosives  investigations  during  the  period 
of  February  1,  1975.  through  January  31,  1976.  There  were  1,734  explosives  in- 
vestigations made  during  tliis  time,  and  we  perfected  190  cases  where  we 
recommended  the  prosecution  of  one  or  more  persons  for  violation  of  tlie  provi- 
sions of  Title  XI,  Regulation  of  Explosives.  Tiiere  was  an  average  of  10.6  man- 
days  spent  on  each  investigation. 

Focusing  our  attention  on  the  654  bombings  where  explosive  materials  were 
used,  we  find  that  32  persons  were  killed  and  158  persons  injured  as  a  result  of 
those  bombings.  Ninety-eight  of  these  bombings  occurred  in  California,  followed 
by  65  in  Ohio.  Missouri  is  next  with  33  bombings,  followed  by  New  York  and 
Pennsylvania  with  31  each.  Tennessee  had  29  bombings,  as  did  New  Jersey  and 
Kentucky.  The  Chairman  will  be  interested  to  know  that  only  4  bombings  took 
place  in  Mississippi. 

The  129  incendiary  bombs,  which  can  be  as  simple  as  a  soft-drink  bottle  filled 
with  gasoline  and  ignited  by  a  cloth  wick  or  as  complex  as  a  combination  of 


72-947   O  -  76 


chemicals  which  ignite  when  mixed,  caused  one  death  and  fortunately  no 
injuries.  Again,  the  State  of  California  suffered  the  highest  number  of  such 
Itomhings  wirh  32.  followed  l).v  Ohio  with  13.  North  Carolina  had  9  incendiary 
bombings  while  Alabama  had  8. 

I  would  like  to  point  out  at  this  time  that  the  statistics  which  I  have  provided 
the  sul>committee  this  morning  may,  or  may  not,  corre.spond  with  those  of  the 
National  Bomb  Data  Center  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation.  Our  agents 
are  required  to  file  reports  with  u-s  of  those  incidents  involving  explosive  materials 
of  which  they  are  aware,  and  it  is  from  these  reports  that  our  statistics  are 
gleane<I. 

Installations  subjected  to  bombing  range  from  banks  and  business  premises 
to  Federal  buildings.  The  Federal  Protective  Service,  which  is  a  part  of  the 
General  Services  Administration,  has  advised  us  that  in  Fiscal  1975,  there  were 
11  reported  bombings  of  GSA  managed  buildings.  There  were  also  614  bomb 
threats  against  GSA  managed  facilities  which  disrupted  the  work  of  86,917 
Federal  employees  at  an  estimated  cost  of  $825,000.00.  While  GSA  does  not  have 
the  exact  value  of  the  Federal  property  destroyed  as  a  result  of  the  11  bombings, 
it  is  estimated  to  be  in  excess  of  $2,000,000.00. 

Figures  provided  by  the  National  Bomb  Data  Center  indicate  that  while 
there  has  been  a  slight  increase  in  total  bombings  in  Calendar  Year  1975  over 
1974,  there  has  been  a  large  increase  in  explosives  bombings  in  1975.  According 
to  their  figures,  there  were  89S  explosive  bombings  in  1974  as  compared  to  1,313 
such  bombings  in  1975.  The  death  and  injury  rate  has  also  risen.  In  1975,  there 
were  69  deaths  and  326  injuries  as  compared  to  24  deaths  and  207  injuries  in 
1974.  Their  initial  report  on  property  damage  for  1975  is  approximately  $27 
million  dollars  as  compared  to  $10  million  in  1974. 

There  is  little  doubt  that  bombings  constitute  a  serious  threat  to  our  com- 
munities. The  question  that  ari.ses  is  how  are  the  terrorists  and  criminals 
acquiring  the  needed  explosive  materials  when  we  have  Federal  laws  that 
restrict  and  regulate  the  sale  of  explosive  materials  as  well  as  State  laws  along 
the  same  lines  in  many  instances.  The  answer,  of  course,  is  not  always  attain- 
able. The  explosion  of  the  bomb  usually  destroys  most  of  the  components  of 
which  it  was  made  and  thus  presents  the  inve.stigating  officer  with  one  of  the 
most  difficult  of  tasks — ^that  of  determining  first  of  all  what  type  of  explosive 
material  was  used  and  then  where  did  it  come  from?  Sometimes  the  officers  are 
successful  in  gathering  enough  minute  pieces  of  debris  to  enable  them  to  identify 
that  the  explosive  was  dynamite,  or  some  other  type,  made  by  a  certain  manu- 
facturer. Other  times  they  are  not. 

Some  explosive  materials  are  traceable  by  means  of  lot  numbers  of  .similar 
markings,  but  others  do  not  carry  such  identification.  Even  when  we  can 
identify  the  manufacturer,  we  find  that  thousands  of  pounds  of  that  particular 
explosive  was  made  under  that  lot  number,  and  distributed  to  a  number  of 
dealers.  Sometimes  the  dealer's  records  will  indicate  the  same  lot  number  on  the 
sales  records,  hut  more  often  than  not,  this  information  is  not  recorded  by  the 
dealer. 

I  would  like,  at  this  time,  to  cite  six  out  of  the  hundreds  of  bombings  which 
we  have  investigated  to  illustrate  the  type  of  explosive  material  used,  how  it 
was  acquired,  and  that  the  bulk  of  the  bombings  are  not  committed  by  "terrorist 
groups." 

The  first  is  a  bombing  that  occurred  on  Thanksgiving  Day.  November  28,  1974, 
at  about  5  :00  A.M.  at  the  residence  of  William  Banks  in  McLean,  Virginia.  The 
initial  investigation  disclosed  that  a  powerful  explosive  had  been  detonated  on 
the  concrete  floor  of  the  rear  porch,  resulting  in  approximately  $100,000  damage  to 
the  residence.  At  the  time  of  the  explosion.  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Banks  and  their  three 
children  were  sleeping  in  rooms  located  on  the  second  floor  of  the  residence. 
Miraculously,  no  personal  injiiries  were  sustained.  Following  three  days  of 
on-the-scene  investigation,  during  which  time  ATF  agents  and  local  police 
.sorted  through  piles  of  debris  caused  by  the  bombing,  the  explosive  was  identified 
as  dynamite  and  the  investigating  officers,  working  with  our  explosives  tech- 
nicians and  .'scientists  from  our  laboratory,  were  able  to  reconstruct  the  bomb 
and  show  that  it  had  been  contained  in  an  attache  case.  Eventually,  the  investigat- 
ing officers  were  able  to  determine  that  the  dynamite  used  in  this  bombing  had 
been  smuggled  in  from  Canada.  The  motivation  was  extortion,  and  the  persons 
responsible  for  the  bombing  were  convicted  in  Federal  Court  and  given  long 
prison  sentences. 

The  second  incident  took  place  in  Connecticut  and  involves  the  placing  of  a 
dynamite  bomb  on  a  car  by  a  young  man  who  had  a  grudge  against  the  car's 


owner  who  happened  to  he  the  father  of  the  young  man's  girl  friend.  Investiga- 
tion revealed  that  the  man  had  an  acquaintance  who  was  a  blaster's  helper  with 
a  drilling  company.  While  visiting  this  acquaintance,  he  took  four  sticks  of 
dynamite  from  the  job  site  just  before  it  was  to  be  placed  in  bore  holes.  The 
drilling  firm  assumed  that  the  dynamite  had  been  detonated  and  did  not  notice 
the  theft.  This  firm,  which  has  a  user's  permit,  had  proper  storage  for  explosives 
on  the  jol)  site. 

The  third  incident  involving  dynamite  took  place  in  Illinois  where  a  48  year 
old  man  was  killed  wlien  he  stepped  on  a  dynamite-loaded  booby  trap  during 
a  hunting  trip.  Our  investigation  disclosed  that  the  bomb  was  made  up  of  seven 
sticks  of  dynamite,  and  two  unexploded  bombs  were  found  nearby.  The  man's 
son  became  a  suspect  when  it  was  learned  there  was  a  love  triangle  between 
father,  step-mother  and  the  son.  The  son  was  employed  at  a  coal  company  and 
had  access  to  explosives.  A  search  of  the  dead  man's  premises,  where  the  son 
also  lived,  revealed  96  sticks  of  dynamite,  blasting  caps  and  materials  of  the 
same  type  used  in  the  bombs.  The  son  admitted  stealing  the  explosives  from 
the  coal  company.  The  coal  company  did  not  know  of  the  loss,  even  though  they 
make  a  weekly  inventory  of  their  explo.sives.  They  assumed  that  the  mis.sing 
explosives  had  been  used  during  the  week.  The  company's  storage  facilities  met 
the  required  standards. 

I  would  like  to  turn  next  to  a  bombing  that  gets  close  to  home.  Our  regional 
offices  in  San  Francisco,  California,  were  subjected  to  a  bombing  on  July  21, 
1975,  at  about  10:00  P.:M.  Our  offices  were  on  the  34th  floor  of  the  building, 
and  the  bomb  was  of  such  force  that  it  did  well  in  excess  of  $100,000  damage  to 
that  floor,  as  well  as  fringe  damage  to  other  floors  in  the  building.  Apparently 
the  bomb  was  secreted  into  the  building  and  placed  in  the  container  for  waste 
paper  towels  in  the  ladies  rest  room.  The  package  containing  the  bomb  was 
discovered  by  a  janitor  cleaning  the  room,  and  it  had  a  note  on  it  identifying 
it  as  a  bomb  and  stating,  "Put  it  down  immediately,  call  the  police,  clear  the 
building."  The  janitor  did  this,  and  the  GSA  guard  called  the  San  Franci-sco  police. 
The  bomb  went  off  l)efore  the  police  arrived,  but  fortunately,  no  one  was  seriously 
injured.  An  analysis  of  the  bomb  debris  by  our  laboratory  showed  that  a  plastic 
high  explosive  had  been  used.  In  all  likelihood,  the  explosive  was  C-4  which 
is  made  expressly  for  u.se  by  the  military.  Our  investigation  is  continuing, 
and  we  are  working  closely  with  the  San  Francisco  police  and  the  Federal  Bureau 
of  Investigation  in  an  effort  to  identify  the  bombers. 

On  August  13,  1975,  the  Bmiliano  Zapata  Unit  of  the  New  World  Liberation 
Front  printed  and  distributed  a  "communique"  in  which  they  stated  that  they 
would  be  focusing  their  attention  first  on  the  Treasury  agents  stationed  in  the 
San  Francisco  area.  We  have  provided  the  subcommittee  with  copies  of  this  com- 
munique as  well  as  one  that  appeared  after  the  bombing  of  our  office  in  which  a 
group,  who  identify  themselves  as  the  Red  Guerrilla  Family,  claim  respon- 
sibility for  the  bombing. 

Bombings  are  also  caused  l)y  explosives  other  than  dynamite,  which  is  probably 
the  most  popular.  We  are  all  familiar  with  the  pipe  bombings  which  have  plagued 
the  country.  X'sually,  the  material  used  is  black  powder  which  is  available  in 
sporting  goods  stores  because  of  its  use  by  those  persons  who  have  an  interest  in 
the  muzzle-loading  firearms  used  in  the  early  settlement  of  this  country. 

However,  pipe  bombs  can  be  made  using  other  than  black  powder.  On 
May  31,  1975,  at  about  1 :30  A.M.,  a  bomb  exploded  on  the  second  floor  of  the 
Capital  Center  Building  in  Olympia,  Wa.sh..  in  an  office  area  occupied  by  the 
Washington  State  Department  of  Social  and  Health  Services.  The  local  police 
requested  our  assistance  in  the  blast  scene  search  and  the  follow-up  investigation. 
The  search  of  the  blast  area  uncovered  enough  fragments  to  reconstruct  the 
type  bomb  used — a  galvanized  pipe  bomb  6  inches  in  diameter,  14  inches  long 
and  capped  on  both  ends.  The  bomb  was  charged  by  douliled-base  smokeless 
powder,  which  is  also  available  in  sporting  goods  .stores  or  at  stores  dealing  in 
firearms  since  it  is  primarily  used  by  individuals  to  re-load  their  own  ammuni- 
tion. This  powder  is  not  covered  by  Title  XI.  Regiilation  of  Explosives,  and  can 
be  sold  without  restrictions  of  any  type.  As  a  matter  of  interest,  this  particular 
bombing  was  claimed  by  a  group  calling  themselves  the  "George  .Jackson 
Brigade."  and  which  has  been  identified  as  an  extremist  group.  For  the  sub- 
committee's information,  George  Jackson  is  one  of  the  persons  involved  with 
Angela  Davis  in  the  Marin  County.  Calif.,  courtroom  shoot-out  in  1970. 

Another  incident  involving  smokeless  powder  took  place  in  New  Jersey  where 
a  group  of  juveniles  were  responsible  for  three  bombings  in  a  community  in 


8 

Bergen  County,  N.J.  The  bombings  destroyed  a  high  .school  press  box  minutes 
after  300  .students  had  left  the  playing  field,  two  automobiles  in  the  driveway 
of  a  private  home,  and  a  liquor  store  situated  under  upstairs  living  quarters 
where  two  small  children  were  asleep  at  the  time  the  bomb  went  off.  Fortunately 
they  were  not  injured  although  the  blast  did  throw  them  from  their  beds. 
These  were  all  pipe  bombs  made  from  smokeless  powder.  Our  agents  were  able 
to  determine  during  their  inve.stigation  that  on  one  occasion,  the  prime  suspect 
l)Ought  smokeless  powder  from  a  Federally  licensed  firearms  dealer  in  New  York 
State.  Eventually,  the  investigating  ofiicers  were  able  to  identify  five  youths  as 
being  respon.sible  for  the  bombings.  All  five  were  convicted,  with  the  leader 
receiving  15  years  imprisonment  in  a  Federal  prison.  We  also  discovered  that 
these  youths  learned  how  to  make  the.se  bombs  by  reading  a  book  entitled,  "Steal 
this  Book,"  which  was  written  by  activist  Abbey  Hoffman,  and  that  the  motiva- 
tion behind  the  bombings  was  retaliation  for  alleged  wrongs  against  juvenile 
gang  members. 

Of  course,  the  bombing  that  comes  to  everyone's  mind  when  the  subject  is 
brought  up  is  the  one  at  LaGuardia  Airport  on  December  29,  1975,  where  11 
persons  were  killed  by  the  blast.  I  wi.sh  to  advi.se  the  subcommittee  that  our 
agents  are  actively  engaged  along  with  New  York  City  police  and  the  FBI 
in  that  investigation,  although  we  still  have  not  been  able  to  identify  the  explosive 
material  used  and  there  are  very  few  leads  to  follow. 

Although  we  have  been  unable  in  approximately  50%  of  the  bombings  we 
investigate  to  determine  the  type  of  explosive  used,  we  are  finding  that  dynamite 
is  the  primary  explosive  used  and  we  are,  at  this  point,  convinced  that  the  bulk 
of  explosives  used  in  bombings,  other  than  black  or  smokeless  powder,  is  stolen. 
There  have  been  isolated  instances  where  an  individual,  on  a  one-time  basis, 
purchased  explosives  from  a  licensed  dealer  under  the  guise  of  legitimate  use 
only  to  turn  around  and  sell  it  to  those  who  wanted  it  for  the  making  of  bombs. 

Becau.se  Title  XI  makes  it  mandatory  that  thefts  of  explosives  be  reported  to 
us  within  24  hours  of  the  time  of  the  theft,  we  have  from  the  very  beginning 
been  aware  of  this  problem.  Toward  this  end,  we  designed  a  poster  for  distribu- 
tion to  the  explosives  licensees  and  users  for  display  on  their  premises,  and 
which  reminded  them  to  report  all  thefts  immediately.  In  addition,  we  remind 
them  of  this  provision  of  the  law  when  we  make  an  in.spection  of  their  premi-ses 
and  review  their  compliance  witli  the  law.  However,  industry  members  have 
not  always  complied  with  this  requirement  and  we  are  instructing  them  to 
observe  all  requirements  of  law  which  attach  to  the  privilege  conferred  by  an 
explosives  license. 

We  have  already  initiated  action  which  shovild,  when  fullv  implemented,  have 
an  impact  on  the  theft  of  explosives.  We  found  that  we  did  not  have  as  firm  a 
grip  on  the  handle  of  this  problem  as  we  should  have,  and  a  new  procedure  has 
been  developed  which  will  require  the  immediate  and  thorough  investigation  of 
all  thefts  of  explosive  materials  from  any  source,  with  a  reporting  system  which 
will  provide  for  instantaneous  retrieval.  We  will  identify  licensees,  permitees 
and/or  individuals  whose  actions  endanger  public  safety,  either  through  partici- 
pation in  a  theft  of  explo.sive  materials  or  through  improper  or  luisafe  storage  of 
such  materials.  We  will  actively  assist  other  Federal.  State,  local  or  foreign 
enforcement  otficials  in  the  investigations  of  thefts  and/or  recoveries  of  explosive 
materials.  These  and  attendant  actions  will,  we  hope,  establi-sh  ATF  as  the  central 
clearing  house  for  all  information  regarding  thefts  and  recoveries  of  explosive 
materials. 

We  are  developing  plans  for  a  series  of  seminars  on  explosive  materials, 
stressing  safety  and  storage,  for  representatives  from  State  governments,  indus- 
try, otlier  Federal  agencies,  trade  associations  and  the  public.  We  are  hopeful 
that  funds  for  this  purpose  may  be  forthcoming  from  the  Law  Enforcement 
Assistance  Administration. 

We  are  requiring  our  field  personnel  to  step  up  their  visitations  to  licensed 
dealers  in  explosive  materials,  and  to  devote  more  of  their  time  to  the  problem 
of  theft.  Many  of  the  thefts  of  explosives  from  approved  storage  facilities  are  by 
means  of  forced  entry.  A  recent  report  submitted  to  us  by  IME  covering  157 
incidents  where  explosives  had  been  stolen  from  IME  members  showed  that 
84%  of  the  illegal  entries  were  through  the  door  of  the  storage  vault.  The  locks 
on  these  doors  have  to  be  of  a  certain  type  and  strong  enough  to  resist  the  usual 
assault  given  a  lock  when  someone  wants  to  bypass  it.  Y"et,  we  find  them  being 
cut  by  blow  torch  or  broken  by  sledge  hammer  in  spite  of  claims  by  the  lock 
manufacturer  of  resistance  to  such  efforts.   The  location  of  the  majority  of 


9 

storage  facilities  in  isolated  areas  for  safety  reasons  lends  itself  to  uninterrupted 
attempts  to  break-in.  We  liave  this  problem  under  study  to  determine  the  feasi- 
bility of  alternate  security  measures,  such  as  burglar  alarms  or  electronic  devices. 
One  of  the  weaknesses  in  the  Federal  law  is  the  accountability  for  explosives 
on  the  part  of  the  "users."  While  the  law  requires  them  to  obtain  a  permit  and 
have  proper  storage  facilities,  it  does  not  require  them  to  maintain  a  daily 
accounting  of  these  explosives.  We  are  currently  working  closely  with  State  gov- 
ernments, both  those  who  have  laws  governing  explosive  materials  and  those 
who  do  not,  to  assume  this  part  of  the  overall  task  of  keeping  explosives  out  of 
the  hands  of  those  who  would  misuse  them.  The  State  Fire  Marshal  has  en- 
forcement responsibility  over  explosive  materials  in  26  of  the  States.  In  the 
other  States,  the  responsibility  is  spread  through  police  departments,  Public 
Safety  offices,  or  in  some  instances,  totally  within  the  Federal  government,  as  in 
Wyoming  where  it  is  the  responsibility  of  the  Bureau  of  Mines  and  the  Depart- 
ment of  Labor.  Some  of  the  States,  like  Massachusetts,  have  very  stringent  laws 
on  the  sale  and  distribution  of  explosive  materials,  with  inspection  of  the  prem- 
ises by  State  employees.  But  without  State  help,  we  cannot  hope  to  stretch  our 
resources  to  the  point  where  we  can  check  on  the  users  of  explosives.  We  have 
prepared  for  the  Committee  a  listing  of  the  States  and  their  explosives  control 
measures. 

While  on  the  subject  of  State  involvement  in  the  problem  of  misuse  of  explosives, 
I  cannot  praise  highly  enough  the  law  enforcement  efforts  of  the  State  and  local 
police  departments,  as  well  as  the  offices  of  the  Fire  Marshals,  where  involved, 
in  the  investigation  of  bombings.  We  work  very  c'osely  with  them,  and  depend 
entirely  uiwn  them  or  the  military  for  "render  safe"  capabilities  where  a  bomb 
is  found  before  it  goes  off.  They  are  extremely  professional  in  their  investigative 
procedures  and  a  valued  member  of  the  law  enforcement  team. 

Before  I  close  my  testimony,  I  want  to  brief  the  Committee  on  our  Explosives 
Tagging  program  which  I  think  will  solve  the  problem  of  being  unable  to  deter- 
mine the  type  and  source  of  explosives  in  50%  of  the  bomb  cases.  Approximately 
three  years  ago,  we  formed  a  Federal  Advisory  Committee  made  up  of  experts 
in  the  fie'd  of  explosives  from  government  agencies,  the  industry  and  the  private 
segment  of  the  community.  Tliis  group,  chaired  by  a  member  of  the  ATF  Head- 
quarters staff,  undertook  the  task  of  developing  a  means  by  which  explosive  mate- 
rials could  be  tagged  through  the  addition  of  an  ingredient  at  the  time  of  manu- 
facture that  would  enable  a  bomb  to  be  detected  before  it  went  off,  or  if  detona- 
tion did  occur,  enable  the  investigating  officers  to  quickly  identify  the  type  of  ex- 
plosive and  trace  it  from  the  manufacturer  to  the  last  known  purchaser.  Foreign 
governments  also  expressed  an  interest  in  the  results  being  achieved  by  this 
group.  At  this  point,  the  group  has  proven  the  feasibility  of  tagging  explosives 
and  shown  that  it  will  work.  Private  industry  has  developed  a  prototyi>e  machine 
for  detecting  the  presence  of  a  bomb,  and  ingredients  which  can  be  added  to  the 
manufacturing  process  at  a  minimal  cost.  The  explosives  industry  has  supported 
the  project  from  its  inception,  and  are  willing  to  move  ahead  with  it  once  it  has 
been  finalized.  The  only  thing  that  remains  to  be  done  is  the  refinement  of  proc- 
ess and  final  identification  of  the  ingredients.  This  will  require  an  expenditure 
in  the  area  of  $1.2  million  and  would  take  about  another  year.  Once  funds  are 
approved,  we  will  move  toward  the  completion  of  this  vital  project  which  should 
provide  our  agents  and  police  officers  everywhere  with  information  that  could 
lead  to  the  identification  of  those  responsible  for  many  of  the  bombings  which 
today  go  unsolved. 

In  summation,  it  is  my  opinion  that  Title  XI,  Regulation  of  Explosives,  does 
provide  sufficient  means  by  which  to  control  the  manufacture  and  disposition  of 
explosive  materials.  The  explosives  industry,  as  well  as  the  mining  and  construc- 
tion industry,  needs  to  give  greater  attention  to  the  security  of  those  explosive  ma- 
terials under  their  control.  Swift  and  severe  punishment  for  those  convicted  of 
a  bombing  or  bomb  threat  is  a  must  if  our  society  has  any  hopes  of  ridding  itself 
of  tho.se  persons  who,  through  their  warped  thinking,  are  inflicting  death  and  in- 
jury without  regard  to  their  victims  in  terms  of  age  or  involvement. 

Mr.  Chairman,  that  concludes  my  prepared  statement.  I  will  be  happy  to  answer 
any  questions  which  the  subcommittee  may  wish  to  ask. 

Mr.  Davis.  In  1968  Congress  enacted  the  Gun  Control  Act  of  1968. 
Title  TT  of  the  act  amended  the  T^ational  Firearms  Act  and  required 
that  destructive  devices  must  be  registered  with  our  Bureau  in  order 
to  be  legally  possessed. 


10 

The  term  "destructive  device"  included  both  explosive  and  incen- 
diary bombs.  The  amended  National  Firearms  Act  provided  for  a  30- 
day  amnesty  period  in  November  1968,  during  which  time  destructive 
devices,  as  well  as  unregistered  firearms,  could  be  registered  with 
immunity. 

However,  there  were  no  bombs,  as  you  think  of  them  in  terms  of 
today's  misuse  of  explosives,  registered  and  as  a  result,  each  such  bomb 
made  and  used  since  December  1968,  is  a  violation  of  the  National  Fire- 
arms Act.  It  was  at  this  point  in  time  that  we  became  involved  in  the 
investigation  of  bombincr  of  all  types  in  the  United  States. 

The  growing  misuse  of  explosives  bv  those  who  chose  bombs  as  their 
means  of  forcing  their  philosophv,  life  styles,  or  politics  on  others 
caused  Congress  to  enact  title  I  of  the  Organized  Crime  Control  Act 
of  1970. 

Title  XI,  patterned  after  title  I  of  the  Gun  Control  Act  of  1968, 
required  a  total  licensing  of  the  explosives  industry,  including  dis- 
tributors and  dealers,  and  a  complete  recordkeeping  system  to  cover 
all  purchases  and  reports  of  thefts  of  explosives  materials.  It  also 
called  for  strict  storage  facilities  for  those  who  deal  in  or  use  explo- 
sives. The  statute  carried  with  it  a  number  of  unlawful  acts,  including 
one  very  definitely  covering  bomb  threats. 

However,  the  statute  did  place  joint  responsibility  for  the  enforce- 
ment of  six  of  the  violation  sections  upon  both  the  FBI  and  our 
Bureau. 

We  have  as  a  result,  entered  into  an  agreement  with  the  FBI  over 
which  of  those  sections  we  will  enforce  and  which  are  their  responsi- 
bility. 

Because  the  law  so  closely  paralleled  the  Gun  Control  Act  of  1968, 
we  called  upon  our  special  ap^ents  to  handle  the  bulk  of  the  work  asso- 
ciated with  the  issuance  of  licenses  and  approval  of  storage  facilities, 
which  was  a  prereauisite  to  licensing. 

In  fiscal  year  1971,  we  used  191  man-years  at  a  cost  of  $3.3  million 
to  get  the  profrram  rolling.  The  following  vear,  that  figure  rose  to  397 
man-years  and  a  cost  of  $7.7  million.  It  then  decreased  and  our  budget 
for  fiscal  1976  identifies  this  program  at  219  man-years  with  a  cost  of 
$6  million. 

Today,  there  are  594  manufacturers.  76  importers,  and  1.411  dealers 
of  explosives  licensed  under  title  XI.  The  licenses  are  issued  on  a 
yearly  basis  and  are  subject  to  nonrenewal  or  revocation  if  we  have 
reason  to  believe  tliat  the  applicant  for  the  license  does  not  meet  the 
requirements  of  the  law. 

We  also  have,  at  this  time  2.618  users  of  explosives  who  have  ob- 
tained a  permit  to  use  explosives  on  a  full-time  liasis.  There  were  also 
26  limited-use  permits  issued  as  of  March  9,  1976.  The  limited-use 
permit  is  for  a  "one  time"  purchase  of  explosives. 

Comnlete  and  accurate  recoi'ds  on  the  disposition  of  exnlosives  must 
be  retained  by  those  ]iersons  or  firms  licensed  imder  title  XI.  and  these 
records  are  subiect  to  our  inspection  at  any  time  during  the  regular 
business  hours  of  the  licensee. 

In  addition,  those  licensees  who  store  explosives  must  also  have 
proner  storarre  facilities,  and  these  are  open  to  our  inspection. 

However,  because  a  larq-e  number  of  the  dealers  and  users  of  ex- 
plosives are  connected  with  the  mining  industry,  we  have  worked  out 
an  agreement  with  the  Mining  Enforcement  and  Safety  Administra- 


11 

tion  (MESA)  of  the  Bureau  of  Mines  for  their  personnel  to  perform 
inspections  of  the  storage  and  use  of  explosive  at  the  mines. 

In  fiscal  1075  there  were  a  total  of  6,320  licenses  and  permits  issued 
under  title  XI.  During:  that  year,  we  made  813  investigations  of  appli- 
cations for  license  or  permit,'and  2,141  compliance  inspections  to  deter- 
mine whether  or  not  the  licensee  or  permittee  was  complying  with  the 
provisions  of  the  law.  At  the  same  time,  MESA  made  approximately 
7,200  inspections  of  explosive  storage  facilities.  It  is  our  understanding 
that  they  inspect  all  coal  mines  quarterly,  while  metal  and  nonmetal 
quariy  and  mine  operations  are  inspected  at  least  annually. 

In  1974  there  were  2.7  billion  pounds  of  explosive  materials  sold 
in  the  United  States,  with  2.2  billion  pounds  being  used  in  the  mining 
industry,  construction  work  used  a  little  over  362  million  pounds,  while 
slightly  over  196  million  pounds  went  for  all  other  purposes. 

During  the  period  of  April  1,  1975,  through  March  31,  1976,  our 
agents  were  involved  in  the  investigation  of  1,586  incidents  involving 
explosives.  Of  this  number,  654  were  bombings  using  explosives,  38 
were  bomb  threats  against  Treasury  facilities,  129  were  incendiary 
bombings,  185  were  where  the  bomb  did  not  go  off,  276  covered  the 
theft  of  explosives,  242  involved  the  recovery  of  explosives,  and  12 
were  considered  a  hoax  where  there  was  neither  a  bomb  nor  a  threat. 
Because  of  a  lag  in  our  statistical  reporting,  we  cannot  correlate  the 
above  figures  with  those  concerning  our  manpower  application  on  in- 
vestigation of  explosive  materials  in  terms  of  the  exact  reporting 
period. 

But,  to  give  you  an  idea  of  the  time  spent  by  special  agents  on  this 
phase  of  our  work,  a  total  of  18,437  man-days  were  expended  on  ex- 
plosives investigations  during  the  period  of  February  1,  1975,  through 
January  31,  1976. 

There  were  1,734  explosives  investigations  made  during  this  time, 
and  we  perfected  190  cases  where  we  recommended  the  prosecution 
of  one  or  more  for  violation  of  the  provisions  of  Title  XI,  regulation  of 
Explosives.  There  was  an  average  of  10.6  man-days  spent  on  each 
investigation. 

There  is  little  doubt  that  bombings  constitute  a  serious  threat  to  our 
communities.  The  question  that  arises  is  how  are  the  terrorist  and 
criminals  acquiring  the  needed  explosive  materials  when  we  have 
Federal  laws  that  restrict  and  regulate  the  sale  of  explosive  materials 
as  well  as  State  laws  along  the  same  lines  in  many  instances. 

In  my  full  testimony.  I  cite  six  cases  of  bombings,  which  illustrate 
to  some  decree  how  the  bombers  acquired  the  explosive.  The  first,  in 
Mclvean,  Va..  involved  dvnamite  which  was  smuggled  in  from  Canada. 
In  the  second,  the  bomber  went  to  a  drilling  site  to  visit  a  friend  and 
stole  tlie  dvnamite  iust  l)ofore  a  clianre  was  set  off.  The  third  case 
took  place  in  Illinois  and  involved  dvnamite  which  the  bomber  stole 
from  a  coal  companv  where  he  was  emploved.  In  the  bombing  of  our 
office  in  San  Francisco,  we  suspect  the  explosive  was  C-4,  a  plastic  ex- 
plosive made  expresslv  for  the  Armed  Forces.  We  cannot  identify  the 
source  until  we  positivelv  identifv  the  explosive. 

The  other  two  cases  involved  pipe  bombs  made  from  smokeless 

powder  which  can  he  purchased  over  the  counter  without  restrictions. 

Although  we  have  been  unable  in  apnroximatelv  50  r)e7'cent  of  the 

bombings  we  investigate  to  determine  the  type  of  explosive  used  we 


12 

are  finding  that  dynamite  is  the  primary  explosive  used  and  we  are, 
at  this  point,  convinced  that  the  bulk  of  explosives  used  in  bombings, 
other  than  black  or  smokeless  powder,  is  stolen. 

We  have  already  initiated  action  which  should,  when  fully  imple- 
mented, have  an  impact  on  the  theft  of  explosives.  We  found  that  we 
did  not  have  as  firm  a  grip  on  the  handle  of  this  problem  as  we 
should  have  and  a  new  procedure  has  been  developed  which  will  require 
the  immediate  and  thorough  investigation  of  all  thefts  of  explosives 
materials  from  any  source,  with  a  reporting  system  which  will  provide 
for  instantaneous  recovery. 

We  will  identify  licensees,  permittees,  and/or  indixdduals  whose 
actions  endanger  public  safety,  either  through  improper  or  unsafe 
storage  of  such  materials.  We  will  actively  assist  other  Federal,  State, 
local,  or  foreign  enforcement  officials  in  the  investigation  of  thefts 
and/or  recoveries  of  explosive  materials.  These  and  attendant  actions 
will,  we  hope,  establish  ATF  as  the  central  clearing  house  for  all  in- 
formation regarding  thefts  and  recoveries  of  explosive  materials. 

In  summation,  it  is  my  opinion  that  Title  XI.  Eegulaticn  of  Explo- 
sives, does  provide  sufficient  means  by  which  to  control  the  manufacture 
and  disposition  of  explosive  materials.  The  explosives  industry,  as  well 
as  the  mining  and  construction  industries,  need  to  srive  greater  atten- 
tion to  the  security  of  those  explosive  materials  under  their  control. 

Swift,  and  severe  punishment  for  those  convicted  of  a  bombing  or  a 
bomb  threat  is  a  must  if  our  society  has  any  hopes  of  ridding  itself 
of  those  persons  who,  through  their  warped  thinking,  are  inflicting 
death  and  injury  with  no  regard  for  their  victims  in  terms  of  age  or 
involvement. 

Mr.  Chairman,  that  concludes  my  testimony.  I  will  be  happy  to 
answer  anv  questions. 

Senator  Scott.  We  appreciate  your  testimony  and,  as  indicated  in- 
itially, we  are  goins:  to  have  a  number  of  votes  and  the  bells  have  al- 
ready runof  and  they  tell  me  that  I  have  got  to  go  over  and  vote.  Let's 
take  about  5  minutes  before  having  a  recess  to  enable  me  to  vote. 

In  looking  at  vour  testimonv  I  noticed  that  the  explosives,  in  many 
instances,  are  obtained  other  than  by  purchase;  and  this  is  by  steal- 
ing from  one  place  or  another  or  even  makin.q-  somethinir  from  powder 
that  would  not  ordinarilv  be  used  for  bombs.  I  notice  that  you  are 
suggesting  that  security  is  most  important  and  the  conviction  of  the 
people  that  do — swift  and  severe  punishment  for  those  convicted  of 
a  bombing.  Isn't  this  true  of  law  enforcement  generallv,  crimes  cen- 
erallv?  Is  it  different  with  regard  to  these  terrorists,  to  these  bombers, 
to  the  people  who  make  these  explosives?  Or  would  you  say  that  the 
general  criminal  element  needs  to  be  treated  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
terrorist? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir,  INIr.  Chairman,  certainlv  I  think  that  it  is  true, 
generallv,  in  law  enforcement  that  the  swiftness  and  the  commen- 
surate qualitv  of  punishment  is  quite  important  as  a  deteri^ent. 

As  vou  are  aware,  we  enforce  the  Federal  firearms  laws  and  I  would 
certainly  say  that  the  same  thing  is  true  where  a  person  uses  a  fire- 
arm in  the  commission  of  a  crime,  certainly  the  swiftness  and  the 
severity  of  the  penalties  imposed  would  be  a  great  deterrent.  I  think 
that  the  reason  that  I  emphasized — perhaps  overemphasized — this 
with  respect  to  explosives,  is  the  fact  that,  as  you  are  well  aware, 


13 

the  use  of  a  bomb  is  so  indiscriminate  in  terms  of  the  damage  in- 
flicted to  persons  and  the  property  and  the  destniction  involved  that 
it  becomes  almost  a  mindless  act  of  terrorism. 

So,  I  think  that  certainly  a  particular  emphasis  should  be  placed 
in  this  area. 

Senator  Scott.  I  wasn't  suggesting  otherwise  at  all,  Mr.  Davis.  I 
noticed  that  you  work  in  conjunction  with  the  FBI.  Is  that  also  true 
with  the  local  and  the  State  agencies  that  deal  in  the  field  of  explosion? 
Do  you  have  any  problems  working  with  the  State  and  the  local 
people  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Xo  sir,  Mr.  Chairman,  in  fact,  we  have  shared  effort  in 
terms  of  both  the  regulation  of  explosives  where  we  work,  for  example, 
through  the  State  fire  marshal  or  other  authorities  that  are 
charged  with  that  responsibility.  In  the  case  of  criminal  violations,  we 
work  veiy  closely  with  the  State  authorities.  We  place  our  laboratory 
facilities  at  their  disposal,  we  conduct  training  in  the  techniques  of 
bomb  scene  searches  and  generally  cooperate  in  every  way  that  we  can. 

Senator  Scott.  Does  vour  Bureau  have  ongoing  programs  that  are 
designed  to  prevent  the  illegal  acquisition  of  explosives  ? 

Mv.  Davis.  Yes,  sir,  Mr.  Chairman.  And  we  have  most  recently,  if 
1  can  say,  "beefed  up"  that  program.  Following  the  LaGuardia  bomb- 
ing in  which  we  are  involved  along  with  the  FBI  and  the  police  de- 
partment, it  became  apparent  that  during  the  Bicentennial  year  that 
we  could  expect  an  increase  of  bombings  and  theft  of  explosives  for 
the  purpose  of  criminal  misuse. 

So,  I  have  established  a  task  force  to  study  this  problem  and  we  are 
taking  a  number  of  actions  which  Ave  hope  Avill  help  impress  the  people 
who  legitimately  use  explosives  to  be  more  careful  in  their  security 
and  in  preventing  them  from  being  stolen.  Of  course  there  is  a  Federal 
requirement  that  the  loss  of  explosives  or  their  theft  must  be  reported 
to  ATF  within  24  hours. 

Senator  Scott.  But  do  they  always  know?  How  could  they  know 
just  24  hours  after  or  is  that  after  thev  become  aware  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  It  must  be  reported  within  24  hours  of  the  discovery  of 
the  loss  or  the  theft.  We  have  posters  that  we  have  prepared  and  are  in 
the  process  of  distributing  that  we  hope  will  reemphasize  this  respon- 
sibility to  the  users  of  the  explosives. 

Senator  Scott.  We  will  have  to  recess. 

[A  brief  recess  was  taken.] 

Senator  Scott.  The  subcommittee  will  resume  its  session. 

Mr.  Davis,  I  am  going  to  ask  the  counsel  to  go  ahead  and  ask  some 
of  the  questions  while  I  catch  my  breath. 

Mr.  SciiuLTz.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  Mr.  Davis,  if  I  may,  I 
would  like  to  just  go  through  your  statement  asking  questions  for  the 
purpose  of  clarification. 

Directing  your  attention  to  page  4,  have  there  been  many  instances 
where  you  have  found  cause  to  revoke  or  to  refuse  the  renewal  of  a 
license  ? 

i\Ir.  Davis.  Well 

Mr.  SciiuLTZ.  On  page  4  in  the  last  paragraph  you  talk  about  revo- 
cation of  licenses. 

Mr.  Davis.  To  be  responsive  to  your  question,  we  have  had  very 
few  instances  where  we  have  revoked  a  license  because  by  and  large  we 


72-947   O  -  76 


14 

may  call  the  attention  of  the  licensee  to  any  discrepancies  he  may  have 
m  terms  of  storage  facilities,  recordkeeping.  We  may  correct,  and  then 
generally  when  we  do  take  action,  it  is  the"  form  of  nonrenewal  of  the 
license  when  it  comes  up  again.  It  is  a  process  that  is  generally  less  time 
consumnig  and  works  to  the  advantage  of  the  Government. 

Mr.  ScHULTz.  When  nonrenewal  comes  into  play,  is  it  generally  be- 
cause they  have  not  complied  with  the  requirements?  Can  you 'give 
some  basis  for  the  nonrenewals  that  you  are  referring  to  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes.  For  example,  if  "we  find  a  storage  facility  does  not 
meet  the  general  requirements,  we  would  give  them  a  reasonable 
period  of  time  in  which  to  bring  those  facilities  into  compliance.  And, 
of  course,  if  they  fail  to  do  so,  then  we  would  take  the  necessary  action. 

One,  for  example,  would  be  to  require  them  to  bring  all  the  explosive 
materials  from  the  storage  facilities  and  if  they  persist,  obviously,  we 
would  not  then  renew  their  license  on  an  annual  basis. 

Mr.  ScHULTz.  Taking  that  one  step  further,  could  vou  tell  us  what 
would  happen  to  the  explosives?  Are  they  confiscated  by  ATF? 

Mr.  Davis.  If  they  are  in  the  hands  of  a  legitimate  individual  in 
terms  of  a  licensee  or  a  permit  holder,  we  would  give  him  an  opportun- 
ity to  return  them  to  his  supplier  or  make  other  disposition  of  them. 

Again,  if  he  did  not  take  that  course  of  action,  then  we  would  seize 
them.  Then  if  the  explosives  are  in  the  hands  of  a  nonlicensee,  a  person 
who  obviously  should  not  have  them,  then  we  Avould  seize  them. 

Mv.  SciiULTz.  I  would  assume  that  ATF  would  make  some  disposi- 
tion of  them  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  that  is  correct,  we  would  make  some  sort  of  disposi- 
tion of  them. 

Mr.  SciiuLTz.  On  pae:e  5,  do  you  have  to  provide  notice  of  your 
intention  to  conduct  an  investigation  or  do  you  conduct  investigations 
without  there  being  any  advance  notice  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Advance  notice  is  not  required  as  long  as  it  is  during 
regular  business  hours.  As  lon^  as  it  is  really  within  regular  business 
hours  we  do  not  give  any  kind  of  notice  and  in  most  cases  we  would 
not. 

Mr.  Scnn.Tz.  Thank  you.  And,  again  on  pasfe  5,  are  all  investiga- 
tions conducted  on  a  routine  basis  in  the  case  of  all  applications  for 
license  ? 

Mr.  Daiis.  Yes,  that  is  correct.  All  applicants  for  a  license  are  in- 
spected to  determine,  for  example,  that  their  storage  facilities  are  in 
compliance  with  Federal  law  and  that  they  otherwise  understand  the 
requirements. 

Senator  Scott.  Let  me  ask  you.  ]\Ir.  Davis,  do  vou  find  the  licensees 
generally  cooperative  with  regard  to  reporting  their  losses  and  thefts 
and  also  wanting  to  comply  with  all  laws  and  regulations? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir.  Generally  we  find  them  to  be  cooperative  in  this 
respect.  And  I  am  sure  that  those  who  fail  to  report  a  loss  or  a  theft 
do  it  out  of  ignorance  of  the  law  rather  than  any  willful  intent  to  fail 
to  report  it. 

Senator  Scott.  Now  do  vou  have  a  wav  that  you  can  state  with  rea- 
sonable certainty  the  thefts  and  the  losses  or  unexplained  disappear- 
ances of  explosives  are  reported  ? 

How  is  that  that  you  know  whether  a  percenta^re — and  T  am  not 
speaking  of  statistics — but  how  do  you  know  if  there  is  substantial 
compliance? 


15 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir.  Obviously  it  is  a  fairly  difficult  task  to  be  cer- 
tain because  attain,  we  are  tryino-  to  establish  some  sort  of  a  negative 
fact.  Primarily  our  effort  is  directed  toward  informing  these  people 
of  their  responsibilities.  Of  course,  occasionally  we  recover  stolen  ex- 
plosives and  we  are  able  to  trace  them  back  to  the  licensee  or  the  per- 
mittee from  which  they  were  stolen.  In  that  case,  of  course,  if  they 
have  not  reported  them,  we  would  make  sure  that  they  would  in  the 
future. 

Senator  Scott.  How  many  reports  do  you  receive  annually  or  how 
many  have  you  received  over  the  past  3  years '? 

Mr.  Davis.  We  can  give  you  reports  for  the  period  covering  the  last 
12  months,  beginning  April  1,  1975,  through  INIarch  31.  1076. 

During  that  period  there  were  276  instances  involving  the  theft  of 
explosives. 

Senator  Scott.  Now  there  are  these  reports  and  are  they  made  to 
you  or  to  whom  are  the  reports  made  ? 

:\rr.  Davis.  Sir,  the  law  requires  that  they  be  made  to  us  and  to  the 
local  police. 

Senator  Scott.  Both? 
jNIr.  Davis.  Both. 

Senator  Scott.  I  understand  that  you  have  a  demonstration?  And 
that  this  is  of  the  explosion  that  happened  in  :McLean,  Va.  Are  you 
prepared  to  show  that  to  us  at  this  time  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir,  we  would  be-  very  happy  to  do  that.  I  think  I 
should  maybe  preface  the  demonstration  by  saying  that  coming  into 
the  building  that  the  security  guards  were' very  alert.  Since  it  is  ob- 
viously a  bomb,  a  simulated  bomb,  they  took  the  precaution  of  calling 
one  of  the  officers  and  having  them  accompany  me. 

In  other  words,  I  want  to  make  it  clear.  I  hope  to  anybody  here  who 
should  see  the  demonstration,  that  it  is  not  easy  to  bring  such  a  device 
into  this  Senate  office  building. 

Senator  Scott.  We  certainly  hope  not  and  we  appreciate  your  ex- 
planation. 

Xow,  we  have  another  vote.  How  long  will  it  take  you  to  perform 
this  demonstration? 

jNIr.  Davis.  Sir,  I  have  Robert  Dexter,  one  of  our  explosive  experts 
with  us  and  I  think  to  show  the  subcommittee  the  device  will  only  take 
about  5  minutes. 

Senator  Scott.  That  is  fine.  You  can  take  71/2- 
]Mr.  Davis.  Can  we  move  closer  to  the  Chair? 

Senator  Scott.  Yes,  sir;  that  would  be  fine.  Or  do  you  want  us  to 
have  our  seats  kept  here,  or  would  you  like  us  to  come  down  there  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  These  are  photographs,  ISIr.  Chairman,  of  the  damage 
that  was  done  at  the  ]\rcLean  bombing.  As  you  know,  I  might  advise 
you  that  the  principals  of  the  ^McLean  bombings  have  been  sentenced. 
I  think  it  was  35  vears. 

Senator  Scott.'  I  wonder.  Mr.  Davis,  counsel  suggests  that  maybe 
if  you  came  up  here,  not  only  would  we  be  able  to  see  you  but  those 
in  the  audience  would  be  able  to,  too.  So  whv  don't  you  do  that? 

Mr.  Dexter.  I  will  just  remove  the  whole  device.  This  device  was 
placed  on  a  board.  It  is  a  replica  of  the  device  that  was  used.  We  have 
the  dynamite,  the  simulated  blasting  caps,  and  this  is  the  power  source 
and  the  delaying  mechanism,  an  ordinary  alarm  clock 


16 

Senator  Scott.  Did  they  in  fact  have  a  battery  similar  to  this  ? 

Mr.  Dexter.  Yes,  sir,  this  is  the  replica  of  the  device  that  we  used  in 
the  courtroom.  This  is  a  mercury  trembler  switch.  This  alarm  clock  is 
running  and  it  is  set  to  go  off  in  about  2  minutes.  Here  we  have  a  switch 
mechanism  and  these  blasting  caps  were  inserted  into  these  sticks  of 
dynamite  and  here  we  have  two  photo  flashbulbs 

Senator  Scott.  You  are  sure  that  this  is  simulated  ? 

Mr.  Dexter.  Yes,  sir,  I  wouldn't  be  holding  it  if  it  was  not. 

But,  these  flashbulbs,  when  they  light  off,  they  simulate  the  explo- 
sives going  off.  In  the  case  here  the  alarm  clock  is  a  delay  mechanism 
that  permits  the  clock  to  wind  down  and  the  switch  here  causes  the 
hand  of  the  clock  to  reach  the  contact  here  and  sets  the  explosives  off. 

Now,  if  anyone  should  try  to  remove  this  device  before  the  time 
arrives  on  the  clock,  then  it  would  set  it  off.  However,  if  you  did  not 
and  when  this  hand  works  down  here,  let  us  see  if  we  can  hurry  it  up 
a  little  bit  by  pushing  it — there  she  went — and  that  would  set  the  de- 
vice off.  And  that  is  exactly  how  it  works. 

Senator  Scott.  Now  is  this  something — does  it  take  some  expertise 
to  do  this  ?  Could  most  anybody  do  this  or  do  they  have  to  be  an  ex- 
pert in  the  field  of  explosives  ? 

Mr.  Dexter.  Generally  we  find  that  the  manufacture  of  a  device 
of  this  type  or  any  type  of  device  is  limited  by  the  imagination  of  the 
bomber.  If  he  has  a  fundamental  understanding  of  electricity,  and  a 
circuit,  he  can  certainly  use  this  type  of  mechanism.  And  as  far  as 
any  relays  or  switching  devices,  he  is  only  limited  by  his  imagination. 

Mr.  Davis.  Mr.  Chairman,  if  I  may  interrupt,  there  are  at  least  two 
publications  that  I  know  of  that  very  explicitly  explain  how  to  con- 
struct these  kinds  of  bombs  that  have  been  published  for  the  general 
public. 

Senator  Scott.  And  this  publication  is  not  illegal,  to  tell  how  to  do 
this  sort  of  thing? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Scott.  Protected  by  the  first  amendment 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Scott.  Well,  Mr.  Davis,  in  your  opinion,  can  the  average 
citizen,  if  he  wants  to,  perpetrate  such  a  thing  as  this?  Can  he  find  a 
way  to  do  it  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir.  I  think  that  there  is  no  question  about  it.  In 
fact,  one  of  the  cases  that  I  have  included  for  the  edification  of  the 
subcommittee,  the  perpetrators  of  the  bombings  actually  used  one  of 
the  books,  one  of  the  publications  that  I  have  mentioned  in  order  to 
construct  bombs  for  this  purpose. 

Senator  Scott.  We  will  have  a  temporary  recess. 

fA  brief  recess  was  taken.] 

Senator  Scott.  The  subcommittee  will  resume.  I  will  ask  counsel,  if 
he  will,  to  resume  questions. 

Mr.  ScHULTz.  Again,  Director  Davis,  referring  to  your  statement 
submitted  for  the  record,  at  page  6.  Does  MESA  conduct  its  inspec- 
tions without  notification  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  It  is  my  understanding  that  they  do  conduct  investiga- 
tions without  notice. 

Mr.  ScHui.TZ.  You  mean  by  your  statement  that  they  conduct  them 
quarterly  but  not  on  a  regular  schedule? 


17 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  right,  sir,  and  they  are  conducted  quarterly  and 
without  reguhirity  as  far  as  previous  notice.  In  the  metal  and  non- 
metal  mines,  other  than  coal  mines,  they  are  conducted  at  least 
annually. 

Mr.  SciiuLTZ.  If  I  understand  your  statement  on  page  6,  individuals 
do  not  have  to  have  a  permit  to  buy  explosives  from  a  licensee  within 
his  own  State.  Is  that  correct  ? 

IMr.  Davis.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  ScHULTz.  If  he  fills  out  one  of  the  forms  that  you  have  de- 
scribed in  your  attending  paragraphs  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  correct. 

ISIr.  ScHULTz.  Presumably,  most  of  those  who  purchase  explosives 
without  permits  are  private  individuals  who  need  limited  quantities 
for  home  needs  out  in  the  country. 

Can  a  person  who  does  not  hold  a  permit  buy  any  quantity  of  ex- 
plosives if  he  fills  out  these  fonns,  or  is  there  a  limitation  of  the 
amount  ? 

Senator  Scott.  Let  me  supplement  this  question  if  I  may.  If  you  will, 
after  responding  to  the  counsel's  question,  Mr.  Davis,  tell  us  if  you 
know  if  there  is  generally  some  supplemental  State  law  that  would 
require  something  other  than  the  requirements  of  the  Federal  law. 
If  you  could,  answer  both. 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir.  To  the  latter  question,  Mr.  Chairman,  there  are 
State  laws  governing  the  acquisition  and  use  of  explosives,  in  many 
cases.  We  do  have,  for  the  subcommittee's  benefit,  if  they  would  so  de- 
sire, a  summary  of  all  the  State  laws  and  what  the  requirements  are. 

Senator  Scott.  I  think  that  would  be  good.  That  will  be  received 
for  the  record,  as  well  as  these  pictures  that  were  there,  I  think,  for  the 
record. 

[The  material  referred  to  was  marked  exhibits  Xos.  1  and  2  and  will 
be  found  in  the  appendix,  pp.  67  and  72. 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  They  do  vary  from  State 
to  State  and  locality  to  locality.  \Ye  will  provide  the  summary  for  the 
record. 

With  respect  to  the  first  question  by  counsel,  there  is  no  limit  on  the 
amount  of  the  explosives  that  can  be  purchased  on  either  the  amount 
of  the  nonpermittee  who  should  buy  in  his  own  State  for  example,  or 
for  that  matter  a  permittee  who  purchases  in  his  State  or  the  one  in 
which  he  resides. 

Mr.  SciiULTz.  Do  you  think  that  there  should  be  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  think  so. 

Mr.  SciiuLTz.  Let  me  tell  vou  why  I  asked  the  question.  Because  I 
know  your  firearms  jurisdiction  requires  notification  of  multiple  pur- 
chases I  was  thinking  the  same  requirement  might  apply  to  explosives : 
Could  the  individual  go  into  several  different  hardw£tre  stores  or  where- 
ever  explosives  are  sold  and  make  several  purchases  without  violating 
the  law  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  that  is  certainly  true.  Again,  here.  I  think  we  have 
to  weigh  the  advantages  to  society  in  terms  of  the  legitimate  use  of 
explosives  and  on  the  other  hand,  of  course,  the  acquisition  of  ex- 
plosives for  criminal  purposes.  Certainly,  we  could,  I  think,  by  regu- 
lation impose  some  kind  of  a  notice  by  the  licensee  when  a  purchase 


18 

was  more  than  a  certain  amount  of  dynamite,  if  he  bought,  more,  say 
than  100  pounds,  or  something  of  this  kind. 

These  forms,  4710,  once  they  are  filled  in  I  might  add,  are  a  record 
of  the  transaction  and  are  forwarded  to  ATF.  That  means  that  we 
could  determine  if  there  were  suspicious  sales  of  explosives. 

Mr,  SciiuLTz.  All  right.  Thank  you.  Do  you  know  what  the  aggre- 
gate figure  is  about  the  amount  of  explosives  sold  to,  say,  last  year's 
purchasers  without  pennits? 

Mr.  Davis.  Without  permits  ? 

Mr.  ScHULTz.  Yes. 

Mr.  Davis.  We  do  not  have  that  figure  available.  I  am  sure,  though, 
that  we  could  collect  it  for  the  subcommittee  and  supply  it  for  the 
record.  Each  of  the  sales  that  would  be  conducted  without  a  permit 
would  be  recorded  on  a  form  4710.  These  are  maintained  in  our  seven 
regional  offices  and  we  could  give  the  subcommittee  the  amount  of 
poundage  of  the  explosives  that  are  covered  by  those. 

Mr.  ScHULTz.  If  the  chairman  directs,  that  might  be  helpful  to  our 
inquiry  to  have  this  submitted. 

Senator  Scott.  Yes ;  I  think  we  would  like  to  have  that. 

[The  information  referred  to  follows :] 

A  review  of  ATF  field  operations  following  testimony  before  the  subcommittee 
revealed  that  the  forms  4710,  referred  to  in  the  testimony,  are  not  collected  in  the 
seven  ATF  regional  offices  but  are,  instead,  sent  directly  to  the  special  agents 
in  the  field  for  review  and  immediate  action  if  they  identify  a  suspicious  sale. 
The  forms  4710  are  retained  by  the  special  agents  only  for  such  a  period  of  time 
as  tbey  feel  it  is  necessary  to  complete  their  analysis  and  any  resultant  investiga- 
tion. After  that,  the  forms  4710  are  destroyed. 

In  an  effort  to  provide  the  subcommittee  with  some  perspective  of  the  number 
of  sales  of  explosives  to  non-permittees  and  the  amount  purchased  by  such  non- 
permittees,  three  widely  separated  posts  of  duty  were  asked  to  compile  these 
figures  for  the  period  of  June  13-19,  1976.  Those  figures  follow : 


Number  of  non-  Pounds  pur- 

Number  of  permittee       chased  by  non- 

Location  4710's  received  purchases  permittees 

Peoria,  III 14  14  1145,600 

Lexington,  Ky __., _ _.  50  12  9,303 

El  Paso,  Tex.. __ 20  15  225 

'  Mining  interests  in  Illinois  as  a  matter  of  practice  do  not  secure  licenses  or  permits.  They  generally  deal  with  "in  State" 
dealers  to  avoid  storage  problems,  thus  the  large  amount  of  explosives  shown.  Approximately  100,000  pounds  of  that 
shown  by  the  ATF  office  in  Peoria,  III.,  was  purchased  by  1  mining  interest. 

Mr.  ScHULTz.  Just  following  up,  you  say  it  is  maintained  in  the 
regional  offices ;  do  you  now  have  to  draw  from  them  to  get  this  infor- 
ma:tion  for  us?  Or  is  the  information  available  in  the  national  office? 

Mr.  Da\t:s.  We  would  in  this  case  have  to  ask  our  regional  offices  to 
compile  the  information  and  submit  it  to  us. 

Senator  Scott.  Let  me  ask  at  this  point  how  many  of  those  reports 
we  talked  a  few  minutes  about,  the  reports  that  you  received — and  I 
am  just  advised  by  staff  that  the  number  in  series  reaches  a  million 
here  and  each  original  form  4710  shall  be  retained  in  numerical  order 
by  transaction  serial  number  and  continuing  in  regular  sequence.  "WHien 
the  number  of  any  sequence  reaches  a  million,  the  licensee  or  permittee, 
they  recommence  the  series. 

Now,  I  believe  that  before  we  took  this  recess  we  asked  to  whom  the 
reports  were  made.  And  did  you  give  us  the  number.  We  were  talking 


19 

about  a  period  of  3  years  I  believe.  What  was  your  response  about  the 
number  of  reports  ?  Is  tliat  the  same  kind  of  report  ? 

]Mr.  Davis.  No,  sir,  ]\Ir.  Chairman,  the  report  that  we  referred  to 
before  the  recess  was  report  of  theft  or  loss  of  explosives.  The  form 
that  we  are  referrino-  to  now,  the  4710,  is  the  form  that  is  filled  out  any 
time  a  nonpermittee  purchases  explosives. 

Senator  Scott.  Hoav  many  of  those  do  you  receive  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Of  the  -iTlO's?  Ao;ain,  we  would  have  to — I  am  sure 
that  it  would  be  in  the  thousands.  "We  could,  however,  when  we  were 
supplying  the  information  as  to  the  amount  of  explosives,  we  could,  at 
the  same  time  supply  the  number  of  47l0's. 

Senator  Scott.  Well,  now  do  you  think  this  is  valuable  to  you  to  have 
this  form  as  it  is  prepared  and  forwarded  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir,  it  is  really  the  only  investigative  lead  that  we 
would  have  to  determine,  if  an  explosive  which  was  recovered  and 
used,  who  purchased  it  and  this  sort  of  thing.  Also  the  form  itself  is  a 
means  whereby  a  person  is  advised  that  if  he  is  a  convicted  felon,  under 
indictment  for  a  felony,  or  if  he  is  an  addict  of  narcotics  or  judged  as 
mentally  incomi:)etent,  he  is  not  allowed  to  acquire  explosives.  This  is 
the  means  by  which  they  are  prevented  from  doing  it  and  they  are 
informed  that  they  cannot  purchase  and  are  prevented  from  doing  so. 

Senator  Scott.  Do  you  consider  these  classifications  to  be  reasonable, 
or  do  you  have  any  quarrel  with  the  ones  that  Congress  has  designated, 
or  would  vou  want  to  reconunend  any  changes  or  does  this  seem  to  be 
a  reasonable  thing  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  sir,  I  think  that  this  is  reasonable.  It  seems  to  be 
reasonably  connected  with  a  likelihood  that  the  individual  might  mis- 
use the  explosives.  I  might  say  also,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  those  are  the 
same  standards  that  are  applied  to  the  purhcase  of  firearms  under 
Federal  law  and  they  appear  to  be  reasonable. 

Mr.  Schultz.  Mr.  Davis,  is  any  central  inventory  maintained  of 
the  sales  and  purchasers  that  do  not  have  licenses  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No;  no  central  record  is  made  of  that. 

Mr.  Schultz.  Directing  your  attention  now  to  page  8  of  the  state- 
ment. You  say  that  196  million  pounds  went  for  ''other  purposes." 
Would  you  identify  the  "other" — the  more  important  of  those  "other" 
purposes. 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes ;  I  think  that  manv  of  them  are  the  kind  of  thing  that 
counsel  has  probably  already  referred  to  :  such  things  as  clearing  land. 
They  are  used  for  such  things  as  constructing  ski  runs,  a  myriad  of 
purposes  that  I  would  describe  as  primarily  other  than  commercial 
or  large-scale  commercial.  Examples  are  mining  and  roadbuilding  and 
things  such  as  this. 

Mr.  Schultz.  Thank  you. 

On  page  10  you  say  that  your  agents  through  the  year  ending  this 
last  March  31  desiiinated  276  cases  that  involved  explosives. 

Do  you  have  a  figure  for  the  total  quantity  of  explosives? 

i\Ir.  Davis.  If  counsel  would  desire  we  have  the  breakout  of  the 
reported  thefts  of  explosives  to  us  in  the  12-month  period  beginning 
March  31.  It  is  a  computer  printout  and  we  do  have  it  computerized 
and  can  supply  it  to  the  subcommittee.  But  to  give  you  a  quick 
example:  ammonium  dynamite  in  pounds,  40,368;  electric  blasting 


20 

caps,  110,811;  detonation  cord  in  feet,  56,665;  ammonium  nitrate  in 
pounds,  26,000 ;  safety  fuse  in  feet,  8,541  feet.  These,  then,  are  some  of 
the  more  outstandino;  lists. 

We  have  a  list  here  of  about  15  items  as  reported  to  us  in  quantities. 
We  would  be  happy  to  supply  that  to  the  subcommittee. 

Mr.  ScHLTLTz.  I  would  ask  then,  the  chairman,  that  the  computer 
printout  referred  to  by  Mr.  Davis  be  accepted  into  the  record. 

Did  you  want  to  supply  it  to  us  later  or  do  you  have  a  copy  which 
you  can  give  us  right  now  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes;  well,  we  can  leave  this  comnlete  printed  computer 
printout  with  the  subcommittee  now,  if  you  like.  It  also  has  in  this 
the  amount  that  was  recovered. 
Senator  Scott.  It  will  be  received, 

[The  information  referred  to  may  be  found  in  the  files  of  the  sub- 
committee.] 

Mr.  Davis.  Mentioning  the  same  items  that  I  mentioned  previously 
over  the  same  12-montli  period :  Ammonium  dynamite,  20,268  pounds 
were  recovered.  In  the  case  of  ammonium  nitrate,  4.500  pounds  were 
recovered.  In  the  case  of  electric  blasting  caps,  38,500  were  recovered. 
In  the  case  of  detonation  cord,  53,584  feet  were  recovered.  To  relate  to 
the  other  items  I  mentioned  as  being  stolen. 

Mr.  SciiULTz.  The  chairman  raises  an  interesting  point;  you  have 
talked  about  the  total  amount  that  has  been  reported  co  you  and  I 
take  it  that  your  computer  print  out  means  no  more.  You  are  not  guar- 
anteeing that  there  are  no  more  thefts,  but  it  is  just  all  that  has  been 
reported. 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  very  correct.  In  other  words,  these  would  rep- 
resent, I  would  say,  the  minimum  figures  because  I  am  sure  that  there 
are  probably  thefts  that  are  not  reported  to  us  either  by  i-eason  of  the 
fact  that  they  are  not  discovered  or  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  the 
person  is  not  aware  of  his  legal  obligation  to  report  it. 

Mr.  ScHULTZ.  And  then  taking  it  one  step  further,  in  connection 
with  recoveries  or  the  investigations  involved,  could  you  give  us 
some  idea  of  the  number  of  convictions  that  you  obtained? 
Mr.  Davis.  Relating  only  to  stolen  explosives,  is  that  correct? 
Mr.  ScHULTz.  Yes. 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  the  figure  that  we  do  not  have,  unfortunately,  to 
provide  to  the  record. 

'Senator  Scott.  But  you  are  emphasizing  in  your  summation — ^you 
referred  to  the  deterrence  of  this  terrorist  explosion.  And  you  also 
referred  to  convictions.  People  were  convicted — they  were  and  they 
also  were  incarcerated.  Now,  I  am  just  wondering  how  many  convic- 
tions have  you  generally.  If  you  are  not  able  to  give  us  the  number, 
just  how  successful  have  you  been  in  achieving  the  aims  which  you 
say  are  desirable  to  stop  this?  How  successful  have  you  been  ?  Can  you 
give  us  some  idea  on  this  in  any  manner  that  you  see  fit  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  In  the  period  that  began 

February  1,  1975,  to  January  31,  1976,  we  have  perfected  190  cases. 

I  can  give  you  some  quick  rundowns.  For  example  in  the  fiscal  year 

1975  we  made  185  arrests  regarding  violations  of  explosives  laws. 

That  is  cases  and  arrests. 

Senator  Scott.  "Wliat  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  cases  and  arrests  involved  during  that  same 
period,  fiscal  year  1975,  we  recommended  for  prosecution  257  indi- 


21 

viduals.  We  had  indictments  returned  on  I7f),   106  of  those  plead 
guilty,  ;U  a  plea  of  guilty  and  so 

Senator  Scon\  How  many  were  acquitted  ? 

]\Ir.  Davis.  And  that  would  leave  ;^0  ? 

Senator  Scoti'.  Thirty,  they  were  acquitted  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Or  otherwise  not 

Senator  Scott.  Do  you  have  the  conviction  there  of  what  you 
charged  for  criminal  otfenses^ 

Mr.  Davis.  Between  70  and  80  percent. 

Senator  Scott.  Between  70  and  80  percent. 

OK,  now,  I  am  sort  of  asking  you  to  rate  your  own  agency  if  you 
can.  Do  you  feel  that  this  meets  the  criteria  that  you  have  said  is  neces- 
sary to  minimize  or  eliminate  these  bombings  ? 

I  heard  the  President  on  television,  and  I  have  great  admiration 
for  the  President,  who  was  saying  we  are  going  to  do  what  is  neces- 
sary to  stop  this.  And  I  remember  remarking  to  my  wife  at  the  time 
that  he  should  say  that  we  are  going  to  make  every  effort  to  stop  it 
because  none  of  us  know  whether  we  are  going  to  be  successful  in  our 
eiforts. 

But  do  you  feel  that  this  is  meeting  the  requirement,  the  criteria 
that  you  yourself  have  said  is  necessary  in  your  principal  testimony? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  sir,  I  think  that  all  of  us  would  like  100  percent,  but 
I  think  in  my  experience  in  law  enforcement,  that  generally  70-  to  80- 
percent  conviction  rate  is  quite  high.  And  certainly 

Senator  Scott.  You  think  it  is  a  deterrent? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir.  I  might  for  example  point  out  that  the  prin- 
cipal individual  who  was  found  guilty  for  the  McLean  bombing 
received  15  years. 

Senator  Scott.  Was  he  convicted  in  Federal  court  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes.  sir.  And  there  are  other  individuals  who  are  being 
convicted,  and  there  are  others  who  are  fugitives  in  that  particular 
case.  We  are  quite  pleased  with  that  case.  It  involved  cooperation  with 
the  Royal  Canadian  Mounted  Police,  in  Canada,  and  a  great  deal  of 
investigative  eifort. 

Senator  Scott.  But  let  me  ask,  may  I,  lest  I  digress  too  far  here : 
To  what  extent  do  you  see  these  type  of  bombings  as  being  from  people 
who  are  mentally  deranged  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Not  to  any  great  degree,  Mr.  Chairman.  The  motiva- 
tions that  we  have  principally,  the  principal  motivations  for  bomb- 
inirs  like  this  that  we  have  found  are  those  of  political  nature  in 
which  the  political  philosophy  or  something  of  this  kind  is  the  rnotive. 
We  have  found  that  there  are  a  number  of  them  that  are  motivated 
by  labor  management  disputes;  we  have  found  there  are  those  rather 
personal  kinds  of  things,  such  as  the  spouse  involved  or  something 
of  that  kind. 

Senator  Scott.  This  seems  like  vou  are  saying  that  you  are  finding 
substantially  all  of  them  of  a  vicious  nature,  intentionally  done  and 
planned ;  and  is  this  accurate  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir,  I  think  very  much  so  and  unfortunately,  where- 
as in  the  past,  particularly  those  groups  that  are  politically  motivated 
and  using  bombing  as  a  means  to  an  end,  have  tried  to  avoid  loss  of 
life. 


72-947    O  -  76 


22 

The  documents  that  we  have  from  them  indicate  that  they  are 
chan^injr  their  pliilosophv  and  in  order  to  direct  the  bombino«3  in  such 
a  way  that  they  would,  in  other  words,  the  documents  that  \ve  have 
that  we  will  make  available  to  the  committee  from  such  organizations 
as  the  Red  Guerrilla  Family  indicate  that  they  believe  that  they  are 
directing  their  bombings  at'  merely  property  no  longer  as  it  has  not 
produced  the  results  that  thev  have  desired. 

Senator  Scott.  Directing  it  against  what  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Property,  primarily. 

Senator  Scott.  You  say  that  to  be  effective  from  their  point  of  view 
they  have  to  direct  their  bombings  against  people  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Scott.  Well,  now,  this  is  an  open  hearing,  but  to  the  extent 
that  your  security  will  permit,  what  has  happened  to  this  bombing  in 
New  York  at  the  airport  ?  •     i  • 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  sir  if  I  can,  I  would  prefer  to  be  rather  limited  in 
my  statement.  It  is  an  open  investigation.  It  is  continuing.  The  Fed- 
eral Bureau  of  Investigation,  the  Bureau  of  Alcohol,  Tobacco  and 
Firearms,  and  the  New  York  Police  Department  are  working  on  the 
investigation  in  a  cooperative  effort  and  it  is  continuing. 

Senator  Scott.  New  York  City,  New  York  State,  and  the  Federal 
Government  ? 

Mr.  DA^^s.  Yes,  sir.  And  in  this  case,  of  course,  since  there  was  loss 
of  life,  would  be  a  State  murder  charge,  even  though  the  individual 
obviously  violated  Federal  law  as  well. 

That,  certainly,  would  be  the  principal  charge  in  this  case,  a  murder 
charge  in  the  laws  of  the  State  of  New  York. 

Senator  Scott.  What,  if  you  know,  and  I  don't  want  to  intrude  fur- 
ther into  this  case,  but  what  has  happened  there  at  the  airport  insofar 
as  the  prevention  of  future  bombings  are  concerned  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  sir,  I  am  probably  not  too  well  qualified  specifically 
in  this  area,  but  we  know  that  the  Federal  Aviation  Administration  is 
looking  into  various  aspects  of  security.  Our  representatives  have  at- 
tended some  of  the  meetings,  and  I  am  aware  that  they  are  preparing 
certain  test  procedures  at  selec<^ed  airports  to  determine  what  could  be 
effective  against  the  introduction  of  bombs  into  aircraft  or  into  the  air- 
port area. 

Senator  Scott.  Now,  with  regard  to  airports,  generally,  in  your 
statement  a  few  minutes  ago  with  regard  to  the  terrorist  point  of  view, 
the  Iwinbing  should  be  directed  toward  i^eople. 

I  had  heard  somewhere  privately,  or  from  the  media,  that  an  effort 
was  being  made  in  some  airports,  in  Los  An.ofeles  or  somewhere  in  Cali- 
fornia, to  put  the  places  where  ]ieople  could  store  their  luggage  in  a 
more  remote  area  where  there  wouVdn't  be  so  many  people. 

That  iust  seemed  to  a  lay  person  to  be  a  very  good  idea.  Is  that  being 
done,  or  is  that  helpful  or  desirable,  or  does  your  Bureau  have  any 
thoughts  on  this? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  sir,  we  are  generally  aware  ajiain  that  the  Federal 
Aviation  Administration  is  considering  a  number  of  various  things 
such  as  lockers  of  different  construction  where  the  heavier 
construction 

Senator  Scott.  You  are  saying  it  is  more  within  the  providence  of 
the  FA  A  than  it  is  within  the  providence  of  your  Bureau  ? 


23 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir.  Now,  I  may  say,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  we  have 
had  for  the  Last  2  years  a  Federal  advisory  committee  on  what  we  call 
explosives  ta^o;in^.  The  purpose  of  this  committee  is  to  determine — 
and  we  think  that  thev  have  successfully  determined  methods  whereby 
substances  could  be  introduced  into  explosives  that  would  make  them 
detectable  before  they  go  off,  or  if  they  should  go  oif  in  the  form  of  a 
bomb,  then  the  explosives  can  be  identified. 

And  to  this  extent,  of  course,  we  are  assisting  in  the  overall  effort  to 
prevent  bombings  or  if  they  should  occur  to  be  able  to  trace  them  more 
accurately.  For  example,  in  the  LaGuardia  bombing,  if  the  explosive 
used  there  had  been  tagged,  it  would  have  saved  thousands  of  man- 
hours  of  investigative  time  in  trying  to  locate  and  to  determine  what 
was  used  and  where  they  were  purchased  and  things  of  this  kind. 

Senator  Scott.  Mr.  Davis,  what  we  are  going  to  do,  if  agreeable  to 
everyone,  is  take  about  10  more  minutes  and  then  adjourn  with  the 
thought  we  will  meet  tomorrow  morning  about  10:30,  provided  the 
schedule  of  the  members  of  the  subcommittee  will  permit  and  your 
schedule  would  permit.  It  would  be  subject  to  the  call  of  the  chairman, 
but  counsel  will  confer  with  you  to  see  if  that  is  agreeable.  I  am  going 
to  ask  counsel  now  if  he  will  take  the  last  10  minutes,  and  if  you  liave 
something  that  you  would  want  to  convey  at  this  time  rather  than  to 
wait  till  tomorrow,  feel  free  to  do  so. 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir,  if  I  may,  I  will  just  follow  up  on  the  last  of  the 
train  of  thought  that  I  had — ^I  have  here  and  would  be  happy  to  pro- 
vide them  to  the  subcommittee,  if  they  so  desire,  that  communication 
from — for  example,  the  "Red  Guerrilla  Family  Bombs  ATF'' — when 
they  bombed  our  offices  in  San  Francisco  causing  $100,000  damage  to 
our  offices. 

[The  communication  referred  to  follows :] 

R.G.F.  Bombs  A.T.F. 

THE  RED  GUERRILLA  FAMILY  IS  RESPONSIBLE  FOR  THE  ATTACK  ON  THE  ALCOHOL,  TO- 
BACCO AND  FIREARMS  BUREAU  OF  THE  TREASURY  DEPARTMENT  AT  525  MARKET 
STREET  IN  SAN  FRANCISCO 

We  take  this  action  in  response  to  the  pig  murder  of  Popeye  .Taekson.  The  ATF, 
like  the  FBI  and  the  CIA,  is  a  federal  agency  charged  with  the  task  of  intimi- 
dating and  disrupting  revolutionary  organizations.  Popeye  Jackson  was  the 
leader  of  the  United  Prisoners  Union,  a  revolutionary  organization  of  prisoners- 
of-war  locked  down  in  Amerika's  San  Quentins  and  Soledads.  Popeye  was  a  revo- 
lutionary who  actively  sought  to  expose  to  the  people  the  fascism  of  the  pigs  and 
the  necessity  of  an  armed  struggle  to  overthrow  the  ruling  class.  Thus  it  was 
necessary  for  this  same  ruling  class  to  have  Popeye  murdered,  just  as  it  was 
necesfgary  to  kill  Martin  Luther  King.  Malcolm  X,  George  and  Jonathan  Jackson, 
Cinque  and  countless  other  hlack  leaders  and  revolutionaries. 

The  exact  role  of  the  ATF  in  Poi>eye's  murder  is  not  yet  known.  But  we  do 
know  that  at  the  lieginning  of  June,  Brenton  Thorne,  the  head  of  the  ATF  ofBce 
in  San  Francisco,  announced  plans  to  add  100  agents  to  ATF  offices  on  the  West 
Coast,  principally  in  the  Bay  Area  and  Los  Angeles,  in  order  to  beef  up  the 
ATF's  counter-insurgency  campaign.  Popeye,  a  well-known  comrade  who  publicly 
worked  for  unity  between  the  underground  and  the  aboveground,  was  an  obvious 
targrt  for  these  pigs.  Less  than  a  week  after  Thome's  announcement,  Popeye 
was  dead.  Two  days  later,  a  phony  communique,  clearly  written  by  the  pigs, 
attempted  to  lay  the  blame  for  this  murder  on  the  New  World  Liberation  Front. 

Despite  these  efforts,  the  people  of  California  have  not  been  divided  by  Pop- 
eye's  murder  or  deceived  by  the  pig  propaganda  that  surrounded  it.  The  unity 
of  the  people  and  of  our  guerrilla  organizations  is  stronger  than  ever.  For  all 
the  efforts  of  the  ATF  and  the  FBI,  these  pigs  are  themselves  more  vulnerable  to 


attack  than  are  the  i)eoples  clandestine  guerrilla  forces.  We  applaud  the  deaths 
of  two  FBI  pigs  on  the  Pine  Ridge  reservation,  knowing  that  they  were  the 
agents  of  one  of  the  most  vicious  ruling  classes  ever  known  to  humanity.  The 
struggle  continues — and  we  continue  to  build  a  strong  base  for  the  more  intense 
levels  of  struggle  to  come.  Poi>eye  was  impatient  with  trashing  buildings,  and 
wanted  the  underground  to  attack  the  pigs  themselves.  His  life's  work  of  unifying 
and  organizing  oppressed  peoples  has  helped  to  set  the  stage  for  the  intensifica- 
tion of  the  people's  struggle. 

The  RED  GUERRILLA  FAMILY  sends  greetings  of  solidarity  to  the  brave 
warriors  of  Pine  Ridge  and  Wounded  Knee,  and  to  all  the  guerrilla  organizations 
of  the  people,  in  and  out  of  Amerika's  political  prisons — ^to  the  Black  Liberation 
Army,  the  Symbionese  Liberation  Army,  the  Black  Guerrilla  Family,  the  Weather 
Underground  Organization,  the  New  World  Liberation  Front,  the  Frente  de 
Liberacion  Chicano,  and  the  Fuerzas  Armadas  de  Liberacion  Nacional  de  Puerto 
Rico. 

THE  PEOPLE  REMEMBER  POPEYE ! 

UNITY  IN  STRUGGLE! 
LIFE  AND  FREEDOM  TO  THE  PEOPLE! 

We  applaud  this  action  on  the  part  of  the  R.G.F.  as  it  clearly  targets  one  of  the 
more  oppressive  yet  least  knmvn  agencies  of  the  Amerikan  government.  The  day 
after  the  attack  on  June  21,  attorney  general  Edward  Levi  appeared  before  a 
congressional  juvenile  delinquency  subcommittee  to  confirm  the  existence  of  the 
AT&F  agents  made  known  by  the  S.L.A.  in  their  communique  of  June  12. 

We  also  support  the  R.G.F.  communique  in  both  its  basic  clarity  and  essential 
political  content.  We  do  think,  however,  that  there  should  have  been  some  expla- 
nation of  any  procedures  they  took  to  have  the  area  cleared  of  workers  before 
the  explosion. 

LONG  LIVE  THE  GUERRILLA! 
BAY  AREA  RESEARCH  COLLECTIVE     BOX  4344     BERKELEY,  CA.  94704 

7/23/75 

Senator  Scott.  One  of  your  branch  offices  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Regional.  Then  in  connection  with  this,  the  Emiliano 
Zapata  unit,  which  is  an  underground  unit,  makes  this  statement  in  a 
communique  dated  August  13,  1975:  "The  people  struggle  has  now 
reached  the  point  where  you  must  in  some  cases  depart  from  our  non- 
injury policy.  We  will  fully  explain  all  of  our  actions  objectively  in 
detail." 

[The  statement  referred  to  follows :] 

August  13, 1975. 

This  is  the  first  communique  to  the  people  issued  by  the  Emiliano  Zapata 
Unit,  an  underground  People's  Force  motivated  and  guided  by  the  political 
ideology  of  Marx,  Lenin,  Mao  Tsetung,  Marighela,  Cabral,  Che,  George  .  .   . 

We  are  a  multi-national  unit  determined  to  destroy  the  facist-imperialist 
insects  that  preys  on  the  lives  of  the  people.  We  have  devoted  our  lives  to  the 
destruction  of  the  reactionary  genocidal  forces  of  America,  which  oppress 
us  and  our  brothers  and  sisters  with  their  brutal  atrocities.  To  accomplish 
this  we  will  engage  in  political  kidnapping,  political  assassinations,  bank 
expropriations,  all  carried  out  by  commando  units.  We  will  also  use  very  high 
explosives  to  eliminate  certain  capitalist  agencies  and  institutions  which  are 
destroying  peoples  lives  here  and  abroad. 

We  will  be  focussing  first  of  all  on  the  treasury  agents  deployed  in  the 
Bay  Area ;  they  will  be  dealt  with  severely,  to  counteract  their  ruthless  attempts 
to  destroy  and  discredit  the  Left. 

The  people's  struggle  has  now  reached  the  point  where  we  must  in  some 
cases  depart  from  our  non-injury  policy.  We  will  fully  explain  all  our  actions 
objectively  and  in  detail.  We  will  employ  tactics  such  as  raiding  radio  stations 
and  taking  control  temporarily,  in  order  to  bring  the  real  political  informa- 
tion and  education  to  the  people.  Also  we  are  maintaining  safe  houses  from 
which  we  are  able  to  break  in  radio  frequencies  by  means  of  short  wave 
radios,  if  any  of  our  communications  are  distorted  by  the  pig  media — or 
even  the  people's  media. 


25 

"We  represent  the  true  interest  of  the  people,  and  will  deal  with  any  so- 
called  revolutionary  group,  collectives  or  individuals  who  are  motivated  by 
ego-gratification,  i.e. :  superstar  ix>sitions,  gangsterim,  adventurism,  etc. 

A  complete  political  statement  from  the  Emiliano  Zapata  Unit  will  appear 
soon.  Meanwhile,  all  messages  of  support  and  criticism  are  welcome  and  should 
be  channeled  to  the  people's  media.  AVe  are  deep  rooted  in  tlie  Bay  Area,  and 
will  be  able  to  respond  quickly  and  objectively. 

With  the  deep  respect  and  unfailing  love  born  of  struggle  we  embrace  each 
individual  and  organization  engaged  in  revolutionary  work.  Like  the  NWLF, 
WUO,  BLA,  SLA,  RGF,  ETC.— we  are  born  of  the  people,  and  our  only  pur- 
pose is  to  serve  the  people.  Dare  to  struggle.  Dare  to  Win. 

La  Luta  Continua, 

Zapata  Unit. 

Mr.  Davis.  And  so,  it  is  clearly  indicated  there  that  they  feel  that 
they  should  direct  their  activities  against  people  as  well  as  property. 

Senator  Scott.  Mr.  Davis,  there  is  no  need  for  us  to  try  to  stretch 
this  out  another  few  minutes  and  just  get  in  every  minute  that  we  can. 
We  do  have  another  vote.  Rather  than  have  counsel  attempt  to  de- 
velop another  theme,  I  think  we  will  adjourn,  subject  to  the  call  of 
the  Cliair. 

[Whereupon,  at  5  :30  p.m.,  the  meeting  adjourned,  subject  to  the 
call  of  the  Chair.] 


CONTROL  OF  EXPLOSIVES 

Administration  and  Execution  of  the  Laws  Pertaining  to  the 
Control  of  Explosives 


FRIDAY,  APRIL  9,    1976 

U.S.  Senate, 
Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the 
Administration  of  the  Internal  Security  Act 

AND  Other  Internal  Security  Laws 
OF  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington,  B.C. 

The  subcommittee  met,  pursuant  to  notice,  at  10 :45  a.m.,  in  room 
2228,  Dirksen  Senate  Office  Building,  Senator  William  L.  Scott  of 
Virginia,  presiding. 

Also  present:  Richard  L.  Schultz.  chief  counsel;  Eobert  J.  Short, 
senior  investigator,  and  David  Martin,  senior  analyst. 

Senator  Scott.  The  subcommittee  will  resume  its  sitting,  and  we 
will  ask  counsel  to  continue  the  examination.  We  welcome  you  and 
your  group  again  Mr.  Davis,  and  T  understand  we  will  attempt  to 
conclude  the  hearing  this  morning.  Thank  you  again. 

Mr.  Schultz.  Just  a  couple  of  questions,  ^Nlr.  Davis,  concerning 
your  testimony  of  yesterday. 

I  became  a  little  confused  when  we  started  talking  about  the  statis- 
tics and  convictions.  If  I  could  recap  my  notes  and  then  ask  you 
to  clarify  exactly  what  we  were  talking  about.  We  were  talking 
about  the  statistics  achieved  by  ATF  and,  if  my  notes  are  correct, 
you  had  mentioned  the  figures  257  recommended  for  prosecution, 
176  indictments.  107  found  guilty,  31  guilty  pleas,  approximately 
30  dismissed  or  some  other  disposition.  And,  then  we  talked  about  a 
70-  to  80-perc€nt  conviction  rate. 

Were  these  figures  related  to  investigations  resulting  from  a  report 
of  the  theft  of  explosives,  or  were  these  figures  related  to  the  total 
statistics  relatino:  to  explosives  violations,  a  broad  category? 

Mr.  Da\ts.  Yes,  Mr.  Schultz,  they  were  related  to  all  violations  of 
title  XI  relatine:  to  explosives  offenses.  .  . 

Mr.  Schultz.  Thank  you.  I  think  we  made  a  rather  fast  transition 
between  those  two  subject  matters,  and  I  just  wanted  to  clarify  your 
testimony. 

Mr.  Davis.  If  I  might  state  in  amplification,  we  reviewed  that  par- 
ticular question  and  can  give  you  just  a  little  better  or  more  detailed 
breakdown  of  those  persons  that  were  prosecuted.  This  is  the  way 
it  comes  out :  107  entered  a  plea  of  guilty,  28  were  convicted  by  a  ver- 
dict of  guilty.  30  were  dismissed  and  10  were  acquitted. 

Yesterday  I  indicated  that  our  conviction  rate  was  between  70  and 
80  percent,  and  it  turns  out  that  it  is  76  percent. 

(27) 


28 

Mr.  ScHULTz.  I  believe  when  we  concluded  yesterday  I  was  pur- 
suing some  questions  that  we  thought  might  need  amplification  in 
comiection  with  your  prepared  remarks.  1  would  like  to  return  to 
just  a  few  of  those  if  I  may. 

Referring  to  page  12  of  your  prepared  remarks,  would  you  say 
that  the  bombing  and  bomb  threats  against  Government  installations 
represents  an  increase  in  the  problem  ? 

Could  you  give  us  a  year-by-year  breakdown  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes;  in  other  words,  you  would  like  a  year-by-year 
breakdown  of  the  figures  that  are  reflected  on  page  12  for  1975. 

Mr.  ScHULTZ.  Would  those  be  available  for  the  last  5  years? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  there  has  been  an  increase  in  the  number  of  bomb- 
ings and  bomb  threats  against  government  installations.  Our  statistics 
on  the  number  of  such  actions  against  government  installations  are 
provided  to  us  by  the  Federal  Protective  Service,  which  is  part  of  the 
General  Services  Administration,  and  only  relate  to  facilities  under 
GSA  control.  The  figures  made  available 'by  the  Federal  Protective 
Service  begin  in  1973  and  show  that  ten  (10)  Federal  buildings  were 
bombed  in  that  year,  and  three  hundred  and  thirty-nine  (339)  were 
subjected  to  bomb  threats.  In  1974,  the  bombings  rose  to  eleven  (11)  and 
bomb  threats  to  three  hundred  and  forty-one  (341).  Last  year,  in  1975, 
eleven  (11)  Federal  buildings  were  bombed  and  six  hundred  and  four- 
teen (614)  received  bomb  threats.  Unfortunately,  figures  do  not  exist 
which  reflect  the  damage  to  these  government  buildings  in  terms  of 
dollars  and  cents,  or-  the  cost  to  the  government  because  of  disruption 
to  work  when  employees  were  evacuated  during  bomb  threats  prior 
to  1975.  The  figures  for  1975  are  reflected  in  my  prepared  remarks. 

Mr.  ScHULTz.  Would  you  describe  for  us  the  makeup  of  explo- 
sives ?  Are  they  uniform  in  size  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No ;  if  I  understand  your  question  correctly,  you  want 
to  know  how  they  are  commercially  packaged? 

Mr.  ScHULTz.  Yes;  right. 

Mr.  Davis  Well,  they  come  in  many  different  shapes  and  sizes.  For 
example,  dynamite,  probably  the  most  familiar  configuration  that  we 
come  in  contact  with,  or  the  public  comes  in  contact  with,  would  be 
the  1-pound  stick— the  ordinary  size.  Dynamite  also  is  made  for 
special  purposes  in  tremendous  packages  or  sticks.  Such  explosives 
as  ammonium  nitrate  fuel  oil  mixtures,  of  course,  are  in  bag  configura- 
tion. Ammonium  nitrate,  a  granular  substance,  with  fuel  oil  added  to 
it.  Then  you  have  such  things  as  your  water  gels  and  slurries  which 
come  in  liquid  form.  So,  there  is  a  vast  variety  of  shapes,  forms  and 
sizes  of  explosives. 

Mr.  ScHULTz.  Do  you  require  uniformity  within  each  of  those 
categories  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No;  we  do  not.  In  other  words,  the  dynamite  can  be 
manufactured,  for  example,  in  any  size  and  shape. 

Senator  Scott.  Mr.  Davis,  I  am  having  some  slight  difficulty  hear- 
ing you.  I  wonder  if  you  would  move  that  mike  in  front  of  your  mouth 
to  tile  extent  feasible.  I  have  heard  you,  but  there  has  been  a  little  bit 
of  strain  and,  thank  vou. 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir;  is  that  better?  Maybe  the  microphone  is  not 
on ;  it  looks  like  it  is  on. 

Mr.  ScHULTZ.  AVould  you  describe  briefly  for  us  the  labeling  re- 
quirements for  explosives  ? 


2^ 

Mr.  Davis.  Insofar  as  ATF  is  concerned,  we  do  require  the  explo- 
sives manufacturer  to  put  what  we  call  the  date  shift  code  on  the  ex- 
plosives container.  This  means  that  tlie  manufacturer  indicates  the 
date  it  was  manufactured,  and  also  the  shift  during  that  business  day. 
This  gives  us  an  opportunity,  if  explosives  are  recovered  intact,  to 
trace  tliem  to  the  point  wliere  they  were  stolen  or  otherwise  acquired. 

Now,  1  am  sure  that  there  are,  for  example,  other  agencies  that  re- 
quire certain  labeling  of  explosives  by  classihcation  and  things  of  this 
kind. 

Mr.  ScHULTz.  But  you  are  able  to  trace  them  to  the  last  legitimate 
receiver  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes;  that  is  correct.  If  we  recover  the  explosives  before 
they  are  detonated  and,  in  some  cases,  after  they  are  detonated,  we 
can  go  back  to  the  manufacturer's  records  and,  if  that  particular  lot 
of  explosives  were  distributed  to  five  different  sources,  then  we  can 
follow  up  there.  Eventually  we  can  narrow  it  down  to  either  the  fact 
that  this  was  purchased  legitimately,  or  was,  at  least,  purchased  or  it 
was  stolen. 

Mr.  kScHULTz.  While  we  are  on  this  point,  could  you  tell  us  if  there 
is  a  problem  with  the  illicit  manufacture  of  explosives?  What  is  the 
magnitude  of  the  problem  if  it  exists  'i 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  as  I  am  sure  the  subcommittee  is  aware,  there  are 
certain  substances — common  substances — that  can  be  combined  to 
make  explosives  material.  Very  frankly,  in  terms  of  bombings,  we 
have  not  found  this  to  be  very  prevalent,  where  the  bomber  would 
make  an  explosive  from  scratch,  so  to  speak. 

But  to  take  a  little  different  tack,  the  University  of  Wisconsin 
bombing  was  made  from  ammonium  nitrate  fuel  oil.  Ammonium 
nitrate  is  a  common  fertilizer.  Fuel  oil  can  be  added  to  it  to  create  an 
explosive  mixture  which  has  to  be  detonated  by  a  stick  of  dynamite, 
for  example.  In  other  words,  it  does  have  to  have  a  detonating  agent 
to  make  it  go  off.  But,  by  and  large,  it  has  been  our  experience  that 
explosives  are  so  obtainable  to  the  bomber  in  terms  of  theft  and  other 
means,  that  they  very  seldom  make  explosives  from  scratch. 

Senator  Scott.  Would  you  say,  Mr.  Davis,  that  the  amateur  might 
have  difiiculty  making  explosives?  He  could  steal  them  or  get  them 
in  another  way  easier  than  lie  could  make  them  i 

Mr.  Davis.  I  think  that  certainly  is  true,  Mr.  Chairman.  The  ama- 
teur— the  explosives  that  the  amateur  would  make  would  be  liighly 
unreliable.  They  probably  would  have  much  less  force  than  commer- 
cially manufactured  explosives. 

I  remember  when  I  was  young  and  I  had  a  chemistry  set,  I  made 
some  black  j)owder.  I  never  was  able  to  get  it  to  do  much  beyond  just 
burn  a  little  bit.  But  it  is  not  the  simplest  thing. 

Senator  Scott.  Just  clarifying  in  my  mind  something  Counsel 
asked  you,  the  standardization  of  these  various  types  of  explosives — 
do  the jmanufacturers  for  different  companies  attempt  to  have  their 
explosives  of  the  same  type  look  alike — a  stick  of  dynamite  made  by 
one  company  would  look  like  a  stick  of  dynamite  made  by  another  com- 
pany. Is  this  generally  true  ?  Is  this  a  trade  practice,  that  they  would 
want  to  (make  it  look  alike,  or  would  you  comment  briefly  on  that? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir;  I  will  be  very  happy  to.  They  do,  of  course, 
identify  their  explosive  by  trade  names  and  other  means.  I  think  the 
real  overriding  factor  here,  however,  is  the  predictability  of  the  explo- 
sive. In  other  words,  a  40-percent,  1-pound  stick  of  dynamite  has  a 
certain  amount  of  explosive  force  so  that  there  needs  to  be  uniformity 


72-C147    n  -  7fi 


30 

so  that,  if  an  explosive  expert  uses  five  sticks  of  40-percent  dynamite, 
then  he  knows  exactly  how  much  rock  this  will  remove,  or  whatever 
it  is. 

So,  from  that  standpoint,  there  is  uniformity  generally  in  these 
packages. 

Senator  Scott.  Well  now  the  thrust  of  the  question  is — is  that  some- 
thing that  the  manufacturers  desire  rather  than  doing  it  because  it  is 
the  law,  and  I  am  not  sure  that  it  is  the  law,  that  it  is  a  trade  practice 
then? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir,  there  is  nothing  in  the  law  in  title  XI  that  dic- 
tates to  the  manufacturers  the  shape  or  potency  of  the  manufactured 
product. 

Mr.  ScHULTz.  Referring  to  page  15  of  your  statement,  the  para- 
graph there  is  describing  one  of  the  incidents  that  you  presented  to 
the  subcommittee  for  consideration.  How  were  the  investigators  able 
to  determine  that  the  dynamite  used  in  the  situation  you  described 
there  was  smuggled  from  Canada  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Without  direct  knowledge  on  this  particular  aspect  of 
it,  I  am  sure  that  it  is  more  than  likely  that  there  were  statements 
obtained  from  participants  or  witnesses  that  led  to  the  information 
that  the  dynamite  had  been  smuggled  from  Canada. 

Mr.  ScHULTz.  My  question  was  prompted  by,  I  suppose,  the  further 
questions  of  whether  or  not  the  coal  company  in  question — I  believe 
it  was  a  coal  company — had  made  adequate  inventory  checks,  and 
whether  or  not  there  is  a  need  for  supervision  of  the  removal  of  ex- 
plosives from  storage  rooms  and  daily  logs,  and  this  kind  of  thing.  I 
wonder  if  you  could  comment  on  the  need  for  these  procedures,  or 
whether  they  are  actually  in  effect  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Actually,  we  are  talking  about  two  cases  here. 

The  case  where  the  smuggling  from  Canada  occurred  was  separate 
from  the  one  where  the  friend  went  to  the  blasting  site  and  removed 
the  dynamite  in  order  to  make  a  bomb.  Now,  this  certainly  is  a  wide- 
spread problem,  where  explosives  are  in  use  on  a  daily  basis,  for  the 
proprietor  or  the  owner  to  insure  that  all  of  the  explosive  material  is 
being  used  in  the  blasting  effort.  There  is  for  all  intents  and  purposes 
really  no  way  for  them  to  insure  that.  If  there  is  collusion  between  the 
blasting  expert  and  some  friend  or  something  of  that  kind,  then  it  is 
very  easy  to  divert  a  small  number  of  sticks  of  dynamite,  for  example, 
for  bombing  purposes.  And,  I  think  this  is  true  even  though  they  keep 
very  detailed  daily  records  of  withdrawals.  In  other  words,  the  ques- 
tion is  whether  20  sticks  or  15  sticks  of  dynamite  were  placed  in  the 
bore  hole  and  detonated.  And,  unless  you  have  an  almost  over-the- 
shoulder  supervision,  it  would  be  impossible  to  insure  this. 

Mr,  ScHrurz.  We  talked  about  the  date  shift  code. 

What  is  the  shelf  life  of  an  explosive,  say,  dynamite  ? 

Would  a  mining  operation  go  on  a  first-in,  first-out  basis ;  in  other 
words,  use  the  freshest  dynamite,  or  is  that  a  consideration,  if  you 
know? 

Mr.  Davis.  With  the  new  wrapping  techniques  that  they  have  on,  for 
example,  dynamite,  my  expert  tells  me  that  the  life  of  dynamite  is  al- 
most indefinite  if  they  store  it  under  good  conditions. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  the  past,  when  they  did  not  have  the  improved 
wrapping  techniques,  then  it  did  start  deteriorating  after  a  certain 
period  of  time. 


31 

Mr.  ScHULTz.  Well,  I  was  thinking  that  there  might  be  an  addi- 
tional reason  for  the  industry  to  check  so  that  they  would  use  up  the 
explosive  before  it  deteriorated.  But,  in  addition,  they  are  also  re- 
quired under  statute  to  make  a  regular  check  of  their  storage  facilities, 
are  they  not  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes;  that  is  correct.  For  example,  if  you  have  an  un- 
attended magazine,  then  the  law  requires  that  you  inspect  it  every  3 
days. 

Mr.  ScHULTz.  Now,  when  you  say  magazine,  are  you  talking  about 
storage  for  industry  or  manufacturer,  or  is  there  a  difference  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  For  this  purpose,  there  would  be  no  distinction  between 
a  magazine  for  a  user,  or  licensee,  or  a  manufacturer,  but  as  a  prac- 
tical matter,  most  manufacturers  would  probably  be  using  the  maga- 
zines almost  daily,  and  they  would  be  in  close  proximity  to  their 
operation. 

Mr.  ScHULTZ.  And  they  need  to  check  these  every  3  days  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes;  if  they  are  unattended  magazines. 

Mr.  ScHULTZ.  Are  they  required  to  make  an  inventory  every  3  days, 
or  is  it  a  running  log  on  a  day-to-day  basis  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes;  actually  every  time  they  put  explosives  in  the 
magazine  or  they  withdraw,  then  they  must  keep  a  magazine  inven- 
tory to  show  that  fact. 

Senator  Scott.  Now,  you  say,  Mr.  Davis,  they  must  do  this.  Do 
you  know  whether  it  is  actually  done  or  not,  and  how  do  }^ou  know  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  sir,  we  use  our  manpower  resources  insofar  as, 
possible  to  check  on  this  and,  as  I  think  was  indicated  yesterday,  there 
are  State  people  who  are  also  active  in  this  area.  We  have,  through- 
out the  country,  coordinated  our  efforts  with  State  agencies  and, 
where  we  feel  that  their  activities  are  adequate  to  insure  the  com- 
pliance with  Federal  law,  then  we  would 

Senator  Scott.  Well,  I  think  it  would  be  almost  an  impossible 
task  to  police  this  on  a  nationwide  basis  on  3  days.  Highway  depart- 
ments from  various  States  apparently  have  explosives,  people  in  the 
construction  business,  and  you  would  know  the  magnitude  of  the 
job  certainly  far  better  than  I.  But  I  just  wonder,  do  you  send  people 
around  to  every  job  everywhere  in  the  country?  I  cannot  conceive 
of  this  being  possible,  even  in  a  State.  My  State  of  Virginia,  for 
example,  I  doubt  that  they  have  the  staff  and  if  they  go  to  every 
place  where  there  is  dynamite  stored;  even  then,  it  would  be  pretty 
much  of  an  impossible  task.  And,  yet,  you  must  be  dependent  in  some 
manner  on  what  you  are  told  with  some  sort  of  periodic  inspection, 
but  could  you  amplify  that? 

How  do  you  know  whether  these  records  are  kept  in  compliance 
with  the  requirements  of  law,  every  3  days  they  check  on  them? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir.  Well,  as  you  have  indicated,  Mr.  Chairman, 
it  would  be  an  impossible  task  for  us  to  police  this  kind  of  require- 
ment. We  have,  for  example,  in  connection  with  this  particular  year, 
issued  instructions  to  our  field  personnel  that  every  storage  facility 
and  licensee  will  be  checked  before  July  1.  Now,  when  they  make 
these  checks,  they  look,  not  only  into  the  storage  facilities  to  see 
that  they  meet  requirements,  but  thev  also  examine  the  records  system 
to  make  sure  that  they  are  being  kept. 


32 

So  that,  yes,  we  do  depend  a  great  deal  on  the  voluntary  cooperation 
of  the  users,  and  industry  members  in  explosives. 

Senator  Scott.  And  they  have  to  file  a  form  saying  that  they  have 
done  this  every  3  days  'i 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  sir.  We  merely  have  advised  them  of  the  require- 
ments of  Federal  law.  I  do  want  to  emphasize,  however,  these  are 
unattended  magazines  where  there  is  nobody  there  full  time  or  there 
is  no  in  and  out  traffic  so  that  they  must  check  them  every  3  days 
to  determine  that  there  has  been  no  theft,  that  there  is  no  hazardous 
condition  existing,  and  this  kind  of  thing. 

When  we  do  make  our  compliance  visits,  we  do  try  to  ascertain 
that  they  are  following  this  procedure. 

Senator  Scott.  Well  now,  frankly  we  have  the  question  of  paper- 
work and  recordkeeping.  I  believe  the  P'ederal  Government  has  too 
much  of  this  and,  yet,  in  something  like  explosives,  it  is  important 
to  know  about  it. 

Do  you  feel  that  the  requirements  are  reasonable?  Are  they  too 
stringent,  or  too  lax,  or  are  you  generally  satisfied  with  the  require- 
ments in  the  existing  law  with  your  inspection  procedure,  with  the 
State  inspection  procedure?  Or,  would  you  say  that  you  had  dis- 
satisfaction with  any  phase  of  it  ?  Or,  could  you  comment  on  this  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  sir,  my  opinion  is  that  the  recordkeeping  require- 
ments are  adequate  under  the  existing  law.  I  think  one  of  the  problems, 
of  course,  that  we  face  is  due  to  the  nature  of  the  use  and  of  the 
character  of  explosives  themselves,  where,  if  you  have  an  employee 
who  wishes  to  divert  exj^losive  materials  while  it  is  being  used,  it  is 
not  too  difficult  for  him  to  do  so. 

We  are  quite  mindful  of  the  paperwork  burden  onto  members  of. 
this  legitimate  industry  and,  that  is  why  we  have  entered  into  a 
memorandum  of  understanding  with  the  mine  engineering  and  safety 
authority  of  the  Bureau  of  Mines  providing  that  wherever  we  can, 
we  will  work  with  the  State  to  avoid  duplication  and  in  order  to 
prevent  that.  Now,  one  thing,  of  course,  is  that  with  our  rather 
limited  manpower,  we  are  not  able  to  make  as  many  compliance- 
type  checks  as  I  think  would  be  desirable  under  the  law  for  this  par- 
ticular project. 

Senator  Scott.  Staff  tells  me  that  there  is  no  requirement  that 
forms  be  kept  by  the  person  who  has  the  explosives  and  it  is  required 
that  there  be  an  inspection  every  3  days,  but  the  law  does  not  require 
a  form  showing  that  there  has  been  an  inspection  every  3  days.  Is 
that  accurate  or  not  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes;  that  is  correct,  Mr.  Chairman.  In  other  words, 
they  do  not  have  to  keep  a  record  of  each  3-day  visit  that  they  make. 
To  further  amplify  that,  the  law  does  require  what  is  known  as  a 
daily  summary  of  maga:^ine  transactions.  Now,  if  there  is  any  ex- 
plosive placed  in  the  magazine  or  any  explosive  witlidrawn,  this  has 
to  be  entered  on  a  daily  summary  that  is  kept  at  the  magazine. 

Senator  Scott.  Now,  when  they  would  inspect,  would,  generally, 
if  they  have  their  explosives  in — I  am  a  novice  in  this  field,  so  I  may 
ask  questions  that  might  not  need  to  be  asked  by  somebody  with 
greater  expertise  but,  to  inspect,  might  they  just  go  to  the  door  and 
see  if  it  had  been  unlocked  or  has  been  tampered  with,  or  do  they 
go  back  and  count  every  stick  of  dynamite,  or  every  box  of  explo- 


33 

sives?  The  inspection  that  is  required  every  3  days,  how  thorough 
an  inspection,  might  that  need  be? 

Mr.  Davts.  Well,  sir.  if  I  can  just  road  you  this  particular  part  of 
the  law  which  is  very  brief  and  it  indicates,  "Any  person  storing 
explosives  material  shall  open  and  inspect  his  storage  facilities  at 
intervals  not  greater  than  8  days  to  determine  whether  the  explosives 
therein  are  intact  and,  to  determine  whetlier  there  has  been  any  unau- 
thorized entry,  or  attempted  entry,  into  the  storage  facilities,  or  the 
unauthorized  removal  of  facilities  or  their  contents." 

Senator  Scott.  Well,  that  would  mean  he  would  open  the  door,  not 
open  every  box  of  explosives,  or,  you  are  not  trying  to  put  him  in  a 
strait  jacket. 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir,  Mr.  Chairman.  In  my  view,  if  the  person  makmg 
the  inspection  unlocked  the  door  of  the  magazine,  walked  inside  and 
looked  around,  and  there  appeared  to  be  the  amount  of  explosives  that 
should  be  in  there,  and  if  there  was  no  evidence  of  any  forced  entry, 
then  he  would  satisfy  this  requirement. 

Senator  Scott.  A\\  right,  sir.  Now,  you  have  mentioned  the  various 
forms  that  are  filled  out  and,  I  am  just  wondering  and  this  question 
of  paperwork  is  something  that  bothers  many  people,  many  business- 
men, many  Members  of  Congress.  I  am  concerned  about  any  unneces- 
sary paperwork  and,  yet,  we  are  talking  about  attempting  to  prevent 
dangerous  explosives  from  getting  into  the  hands  of  the  improper 
persons. 

Do  you  feel  that  looking  at  all  of  the  forms  that  are  required  by 
your  agency  or  by  the  State,  do  you  feel  that  the  reporting  require- 
ments, both  by  the  States,  if  any  by  local  governments  and  by  the 
Federal  Government,  your  bureau  and  other  bureaus  with  regard  to 
explosives,  are  they  jiist  about  what  they  should  be  or  are  there  too 
many  or  too  few  ?  The  paperwork  burden  is  a  tremendous  burden  on 
the  business  community. 

I  am  not  suggesting  an  answer  here,  but  I  am  asking  you  for  your 
judgment  as  to  whether  the  paperwork  requirements.  State  and  na- 
tional, are  reasonable  requirements,  in  your  opinion. 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir,  Mr.  Chairman,  tn  my  opinion  they  are  reason- 
able. And,  looking  at  it  specifically  from  the  standpoint  of  ATF,  I 
do  not  think  that  we  really  require  any  records  except  one,  that  would 
not  be  considered  to  be  good  commercial  practice.  In  other  words,  if 
I  were  operating  a  business  in  the  use  of  explosives,  certainly  I  would 
want  to  know,  just  for  my  own  business  purposes,  when  explosives 
were  placed  in  and  withdrawn  from  a  magazine.  For  example,  that  is 
one  requirement. 

I  would  say  the  exception  to  that  is  what  we  call  the  transaction 
record,  the  4710,  where  there  is  certain  information  that  has  to  be 
filled  out  by  both  the  purchaser  and  the  seller.  But,  again,  this  form,  I 
think,  is  highly  essential  for  law  enforcement  purposes.  It  also  acts 
as  a  deterrent  to  prevent  people  who  are  proscribed  by  Federal  law 
from  acquiring  explosives.  It  provides  a  method  of  tracing,  should 
those  explosives  later  be  used  in  a  bombing  incident. 

I  might  say,  too,  that  it  is  roughly  equivalent  to  the  same  form  that 
has  to  be  filled  out  when  an  individual  buys  a  firearm,  under  the  Fed- 
eral firearms  laws. 


34 

But,  the  other  records  that  the  people  are  required  to  keep,  again 
indicate  just  primarily  good  commercial  practices  that  have  been 
placed  in  the  form  of  a  requirement  under  the  law. 

Mr.  SciiULTZ.  j\Iay  I  interrupt,  Mr.  Chairman.  Most  of  these  records 
are  kept  by  the  industries,  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  with  one  exception,  and  that  is  the  4710. 

Mr.  ScHULTz.  Is  that  a  problem  to  you?  Would  you  be  better 
equipped  to  conduct  your  inspection  and  investigation  of  problem 
areas  relating  to  the  control  of  explosives  if  ATF,  National  Office,  or 
a  computerized  repository — would  you  be  better  equipped  if  you  had 
direct  access  to  those  materials? 

Mr.  Davis.  Certainly,  if  we  had  the  computer  capacity  to  take  on 
this  mass  of  data  in  the  explosives  area,  I  think  it  certainly  would  help 
us  in  carrying  out  our  responsibilities.  Furthermore,  I  think  certainly 
it  would  generate  information  that  might  be  useful  to  the  Congress,  to 
the  administration  and  others,  in  determining  the  policy  that  would 
be  applied  to  explosives. 

Senator  Scott.  These  forms  that  are  maintained  by  the  manufacturer 
and  are  held  available  for  inspection — and  there  are  some  forms — how 
many  of  these  forms  are  actually  looked  at? 

Are  they  evaluated  to  determine  the  legitimacy  or  propriety  of  an 
individual  obtaining  explosives ! 

Do  you  have  inspectors  that  look  at  the  forms  and  evaluate  them  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Mr.  Chairman,  we  do  evaluate,  for  example,  the  4710's 
which  are  submitted  to  us,  and  we  do  make  a  limited  number  of  field 
investigations  based  on  those  findings. 

However,  I  would  have  to  admit  that  we  are  doing  far  from  the  job 
that  we  feel  is  adequate  in  terms  of  the  4710's  in  following  up  on  a  pur- 
chaser to  determine  if  he  is  storing  those  explosives  in  a  safe  manner,  or 
if  he  is  using  them  for  the  stated  purpose  when  he  purchased  them.  The 
forms  that  are  maintained  on  the  premises  of  either  a  licensed  dealer 
or  a  licensed  manufacturer,  are  examined  when  an  inspection  is  made 
of  those  facilities,  both  to  determine  if  there  are  any  trends  or  infor- 
mation of  value. 

And,  second,  of  course,  to  determine  that  he  is  in  fact,  complying 
with  Federal  law  by  keeping  records. 

Senator  Scott.  Staff  calls  to  my  attention  the  requirement  that  an 
inspection  be  made,  and  tells  me  that  in  the  past  fiscal  year,  1975, 
that  6,325  licenses  or  permits  were  issued,  that  the  average  licensee 
was  inspected  about  once  every  -3  years. 

Is  that  accurate,  or  reasonably  accurate  ?  And,  do  you  consider  this 
number  of  inspections  reasonably  adequate  ? 

If  you  would  care  to  have  another  member  of  your  staff  respond, 
we  would  be  glad  to  hear  from  either  you  or  any  member. 

Mr.  Davis.  All  right,  sir.  I  think  maybe  in  this  particular  instance 
I  will  ask  Mr.  Higgins  to  respond. 

Mr.  Higgins.  In  fiscal  1975,  there  are  two  figures  that  you  really  need 
to  look  at  to  determine  the  coverage  of  licensees  and  permittees. 

One  is  the  number  that  ATF  made,  which  is  a  figure  of  2,954.  Now, 
those  are  ones  that  our  inspectors  and  agents  made. 

In  addition  to  that,  we  have  somewhere  in  the  neighborhood  of 
6,000  or  7,000  investigations,  maybe  more  than  that,  that  are  made  by 
MESA  under  the  agreement  we  have  with  them  where  they  go  into 


35 

the  coal  mines  and  other  kinds  of  facilities,  ATF  does  not  inspect  those 
premises.  So,  that  would  be  in  addition  to  this.  Also,  in  that  figure 
of  6,000  plus,  licensees  and  permittees,  we  have  approximately  1,700 
or  1.800  of  those  people  who  have  one-time  user  permits  for  use  around 
the  Fourth  of  July.  We  do  not  have  a  regular  inspection  program  at 
this  point  on  them. 

And  then,  finally,  in  1976,  we  are  attempting  to  cover,  and  I  believe 
we  will,  100  percent  of  the  licensed  dealers  this  year  and  the  permittees 
that  we  have  coverage  of.  We  have  asked  MESA,  of  course,  to  cover 
100  percent  of  those  under  this  supervision  or  control.  And,  I  think, 
we  are  going  to  make  every  one  of  them  in  1976. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  think  it  m'ight  be  useful  for  the  subcommittee  to  know 
that  under  the  memorandum  of  understanding  we  have  with  MESA 
that  when  they  make  inspections  of  these  mining  facilities,  that  they 
not  only  enforce  their  regulations  and  carry  out  their  responsibilities, 
they  also  do  the  same  thing  with  respect  to  the  ATF  responsibilities. 

Senator  Scott.  Mr.  Davis,  Mr.  Short  of  our  staif  seems  to  believe 
there  may  be  a  discrepancy  here,  and  I  would  like  for  him  to  explain 
what  he  has  in  mind,  and  to  pose  a  question  to  you  or  Mr.  Higgins 
with  regard  to  it. 

Mr.  Short.  Yes,  sir.  You  had  the  2,141  compliance  inspections  that 
ATF  made.  Now  there  were  6,320  licenses  and  permits  issued  which 
we  average  out  to  indicate  that  a  licensee  can  expect  to  be  inspected 
once  every  3  years.  Now,  is  that  correct  ? 

Mr.  HiGGixs.  Yes,  if  you  just  took  them  strictly  like  that.  However, 
I  have  some  figures  here  that  show  in  1975,  for  example,  that  between 
the  original  application  for  license  investigations  that  we  made  and 
the  compliance  inspections,  the  total  would  be  2,954.  But,  actually, 
the  number  of  licensees  and  permittees  we  had  as  of  March  9,  was  only 
4,733.  Now,  you  have  a  figure  of  a  little  over  6,000  licenses  and  per- 
mits that  were  issued  in  1975  for  the  total  year.  There  are  about  1,500 
or  1.600  of  those  that  are  issued  as  one-time  user  permits  for  fire- 
works around  the  Fourth  of  July.  We  do  not  get  out  to  those  1,500 
or  1.600. 

Senator  Scott.  Now,  do  you  keep  your  records  on  a  fiscal  year  basis, 
rather  than  calendar  year,  so  we  are  talking  about  the  same  period  of 
time  ?  Go  ahead,  Mr.  Short. 

Mr.  Short.  You  mentioned  2,900.  Are  you  taking  the  813  investiga- 
tive figure,  adding  it  with  the  2.141  for  compliance  inspections  just 
combinins:  the  two  ? 

Mr.  HiCrOixs.  Right.  Some  of  those  initial  visits  were  to  set  the 
man  up  and,  you  know,  that  was  the  first  time  the  permittee  or  licen- 
see had  gone  into  business.  We  always  try  to  make  an  initial  visit  to 
him.  So.  you  can  either  add  the  two  together  or  not ;  it  does  not  make 
anv  difference. 

The  other  figure  is  that  MESA  may 

Mr.  Short.  Let  me  interrupt  you.  T  do  not  think  I  understand  that 
point.  It  is  my  undorstandin.qf.  there  were  813  investigations  made. 
Now,  actually,  then,  an  investigation  by  an  asfent  at  that  point  is 

Mr.  HiGGixs.  I  see  what  the  problem  is.  The  program  is  split — our 
inspectors  who  make  some  inspections  and  our  special  agents,  who 
make  some.  It  is  the  same  kind  of  visit,  whether  you  call  it  inspection 
or  investigation.  Some  regions  have  been  able  to  put  the  program  en- 


36 

tirely  in  the  hands  of  inspectors.  Some  are  midway  between  doing 
that,  and  still  use  special  agents  for  some  and  inspectors  for  others.  But, 
this  is  the  same  kind  of  compliance. 

Mr.  Short.  In  other  words,  when  you  use  an  agent,  you  call  it  an  in- 
vestigation and  when  you  use  an  inspector,  you  call  it  a  compliance  in- 
spection, though  it  is  the  same  type  of  overall  investigation. 

Mr.  HiGGiNS.  That  is  where  we  are  running  into  our  problems,  in 
terminology. 

Senator  Scott.  Let  me  ask  you,  these  inspectors  that  you  have,  or  the 
agents,  what  grades  are  they  generally  in  ?  Are  they  General  Service 
grades?  Are  their  grades  comparable  to  other  investigators  or  other 
inspectors  with  the  Government  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  Mr.  Chairman,  the  inspectors  are  what  we  call  GS- 
1854  series.  Their  grades  are  generally,  a  journeyman  at  grade  9  with 
the  senior  inspector  at  a  grade  11,  some  at  grade  12.  The  agents  or  the 
1811  series,  their  journeymen  grade  is  11  with  senior  agents  at  grade 
12,  and  it  is  not  easy  to  compare  the  inspectors  with  another  occu- 
pational group. 

Senator  Scott.  What  sort  of  a  training  do  they  receive  in  order  to 
become  inspectors?  Do  vou  have  some  sort  of  a  training  school  for 
them  ?  Just  briefly  describe  what  they  go  through  before  you  send  them 
out. 

Mr.  HiGGiNS.  We  have,  first  of  all,  a  basic  inspector  training  pro- 
gram which  is  now  a  4-week  centralized  program  in  which  we  require 
all  the  new  recruits  to  attend  4  weeks  of  classroom  training.  Then,  that 
is  followed  by  the  remainder  of  the  time  during,  really,  the  first  year 
when  they  are  serving  as  trainees  and  accompanying  experienced  in- 
spectors on  the  job  as  trainees.  So,  we  have  4  weeks  classroom,  and 
whatever  is  required  up  to  a  year  for  on-the-job  training. 

Senator  Scott.  Let  me  go  back  if  I  may,  Mr,  Davis.  T  think  that 
the  response  indicates  that  these  investigators,  inspectors  that  you  have 
do  have  a  low^er  grade,  say,  than  an  FBI  agent  or  some  of  the  Treas- 
ury agents,  and  it  may  be  that  this  is  a  reasonable  thing  for  them,  to 
have  a  lower  grade.  I  am  in  a  field  now  that  I  know  something  about 
because  I  haA^e  been  with  the  Government  probably  as  long  as  any- 
body in  this  room,  but  let  me  turn  to  another  field. 

Is  the  theft  of  explosives  listed  in  the  FBI  computer  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir.  The  FBI  operates  what  is  called  a  National 
Bomb  Data  Center. 

Senator  Scott.  Now,  I  am  told  that  there  is  sort  of  a  master  com- 
puter in  the  FBI  with  the  initials  NCIC.  What  does  that  mean, 
NCIC? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir.  That  is  the  National  Crime  Information  Cen- 
ter, and  there  are  a  number  of  what  you  would  call  general  law  en- 
forcement items  of  information  there. 

For  example,  all  stolen  firearms  are  listed  Avithin  the  Information 
Center  as  they  are  reported.  There  are  such  thin.fTS  as  information  on 
individuals  who  are  wanted  by  State  or  Federal  authorities,  or 
fuf^itives. 

Senator  Scott.  Now.  that  particular  computer,  if  there  is  a  theft 
of  explosives  at  a  particular  location,  that  is  inserted  in  this  com- 
puter in  part  of  the  general  information  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  sir.  If  T may, Mr.  Chairman? 


37 

Senator  Scott.  Please,  ask  any  assistant  that  you  have.  We  would 
like  to  have  as  accurate  information  as  possible. 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  sir.  The  theft  of  explosives  is  not  entered  into  the 
NCIC. 

Senator  Scott.  Would  that  be  a  good  idea  to  do  it  ?  Suppose  in  an 
overall  criminal  investigation  that  it  would  just  appear  on  the  surface 
to  a  lay  person,  not  a  criminal  investigator,  that  if  you  knew  that  a 
given  criminal  was  in  a  particular  area,  if  you  also  knew  that  explosives 
had  been  stolen  in  that  area,  there  might  be  a  connection.  It  would 
certainly  be  something  worthy  for  an  investigator  to  consider.  And  I 
am  just  wondering  why  they  would  not  be  put  in  that  computer,  or 
if  you  would  recommend  that  they  be  put  in.  Could  it  be  done  by  your 
agency  without  any  authorization  of  law  ?  Or,  could  it  be  done  by  the 
Department  of  Justice,  the  parent  agency  being  consulted  with  and 
then  agreeing  to  put  that  in  there  ?  Or,  is  there  any  legal  prohibition 
to  putting  something  like  that  in  the  computer  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Mr.  Chairman,  of  course  we  are  in  favor  of  the  widest 
possible  dissemination  of  information  to  be  of  assistance  in  a  criminal 
investigation. 

The  main  problem  is  that  stolen  explosives  are,  of  course,  somewhat 
diiferent  than  a  firearm  where  you  have  a  unique  serial  number  and 
it  is  easy  to  identify. 

If,  for  example,  ten  cases  of  dynamite  were  stolen  in,  say,  Virginia, 
while  it  is  true  that  there  is  a  date  shift  code  on  that,  and  it  might 
be  of  some  value,  my  understanding  is  that  the  somewhat  general 
nature  or  the  fact  that  it  cannot  be  identified  with  certainty  is  one 
of  the  reasons  why  this  information  is  not  included  in  the  National 
Crime  Information  Center.  Since  all  thefts  of  explosives  as  we  have 
indicated  yesterday,  are  required  to  be  reported  to  the  ATF  and,  since 
we  do  have  a  limited  computer  facility,  I  think  we  could  perform  this 
service  quite  easily.  It  also  ties  in  very  closely  to  the  tracing  of  ex- 
plosives wliich  we  are  now  doing  for  State  and  local  law  enforcement 
organizations. 

Senator  Scott.  Now,  you  say  you  have  your  own  computer  that  this 
will  be  put  in? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  sir,  we  have  access  to  the  Treasury  computer  which, 
I  must  say,  does  not  have  the  same  accessibility  to  law^  enforcement 
personnel  around  the  country  as  the  NCIC. 

Senator  Scott.  Now,  if  a  chief  of  police  wanted  to  get  information, 
would  ho  ordinarily  turn  to  the  FBI  and  to  their  computer  for  his 
information  ?  Would  he  be  as  apt  to  contact  the  Treasury  Department 
with  regard  to  information  ?  Again,  I  have  not  worked  in  the  criminal 
field,  but  I  would  iust  think  that  he  might  contact  the  FBI  and  have 
its  computer  searched  rather  than  contacting  the  Treasury  Depart- 
ment about  some  criminal  activity.  And.  I  do  not  know  the  capacity 
of  the  FBI  computer.  I  assume  it  is  a  rather  large  and  complex  thing. 

Would  it  tax  its  capacitv  to  list  something  like  this? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  sir,  I  would  not  think  so,  and  certainly  if  the 
details  of  procedures  could  be  worked  out,  we  would  be  very  happy  to 
supnlv  that  information  to  the  FBI  for  inclusion  in  their  computer. 
I  might  sav  that,  of  course,  the  State  and  local  law  enforcement  agen- 
cies do  look  to  ATF  for  assistance  in  the  fields  of  our  expertise. 


72-947    O  -  76 


38 

For  example,  just  to  give  you  a  sort  of  parallel  example,  we  are 
now  tracing  about  3,000  firearms  a  month,  wuth  about  60  percent  of 
them  for  State  and  local  law  enforcement  agencies  to  assist  them  in 
their  investigations. 

But,  in  any  event,  I  certainly  agree  with  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  that 
reports  on  the  theft  of  explosives,  and  where  they  occur,  and  what  kind 
should  be  made  available  to  law  enforcement  officials  throughout  the 
United  States. 

Senator  Scott.  Well,  actually,  I  had  not  thought  of  it  deeply  at 
all,  but  I  was  really  thinking  of  your  agency  as  being  a  part  of  the 
Department  of  Justice,  and  I  am  now  aware  that  it  is  not. 

Is  there  cooperation  with  the  Department  of  Justice  and  its  various 
agencies? 

Is  the  fact  that  your  agency  is  under  Treasury  Department — I  can 
understand  the  tax  aspects  with  the  alcohol  and  tobacco — I  have  some 
little  difficulty  with  the  firearms  and  with  the  explosives,  there  being  a 
separation.  Actually,  are  taxes  on  explosives  a  major  factor  that  would 
cause  this  to  be  within  the  Treasury  Department  rather  than  the 
Department  of  Justice  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  sir,  yes.  We  almost  have  to  look  at  the  historical 
events  that  led  up  to  this  situation.  The  first  gun  control  act  of  1934 
was  based  on  the  taxing  power  of  Congress.  Therefore,  it  was  decided 
that  that  law  should  be  administered  in  the  Department  of  the 
Treasury. 

The  second  law  in  1938  was  based  on  the  Interstate  Commerce  Clause, 
but  since  Treasury  was  administering  the  first  one,  they  felt  it  should 
all  be  in  one  place. 

Finally,  the  1968  Gun  Control  Act,  again,  was  a  combination  of  the 
two  powers.  And  then,  finally,  because  the  statutory  scheme  for  regu- 
lation of  explosives  was  in  fact  patterned  exactly  on  that  of  firearms 
and,  then,  because  there  was  certain  duplication — for  example,  under 
the  firearms  law  we  had  the  destructive  device  which,  in  fact,  is  a 
bomb — they  felt  that  x\TF  would  be  the  logical  place  to  carry  out  that 
responsibility.  Now,  we  do,  obviously,  cooperate  very  closely  with  the 
FBI  not  only  in  joint  investigations  but,  in  terms  of  an  exchange  of 
information  and  services.  We  do  explosive  tracing  for  the  FBI.  So,  I 
can  assure  you  that  there  is  no  barrier  to  cooperation  because  the  two 
agencies  are  located  in  two  different  departments. 

Senator  Scott.  It  does  raise  a  question  in  my  mind  and.  being  from 
Virginia,  I  believe  in  heritage  and  tradition  and  such  thinsfs  as  that, 
but,  sometimes  there  may  come  a  time  when  chansres  should  be  made 
on  the  basis  of  modern  day  facts.  And,  with  the  FBI  being  the  prin- 
cipal investigator  of  domestic  crimes  of  a  Federal  nature,  how  active 
are  they  in  this  field?  Are  you  the  exclusive  ae:ent  for  the  Govern- 
ment in  the  field  of  the  investigation  of  explosives? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir.  Ceitainly  when  vou  speak  about  regulation  of 
explosives  then  we  are  the  primary  Federal  agency  that  has  that 
general  responsibility. 

Senator  Scott.  Does  the  FBI  have  any  responsibility  in  this  field 
under  existing  la  w,  insofar  as  you  know  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Only  to  the  extent  of  criminal  violations.  There  are  six 
criminal  acts  included  in  the  title  XI  of  the  Orcranized  Crime  Control 
Act  of  1970.  where  both  the  Department  of  Justice  and  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  Treasury  are  given  concurrent  jurisdiction.  In  order  to 


39 

avoid,  again,  any  duplication  and  unnecessary  waste  of  the  taxpayer's 
money,  we  have  entered  into  a  memorandum  of  understanding  with 
the  FBI  in  which  we  have  separated  those  jurisdictions  and  both  of 
us  are  clearly  aware  of  the  area  in  which  we  are  involved  so  that  we 
will  not  have  any  duplication  of  effort.  But,  those  sections  are  the  only 
ones  in  which  they  are  involved. 

Senator  Scott.  I  cannot  help  but  think  of  the  professional  criniinal 
and  the  criminal  element  in  the  country  that  might  cross  State  lines, 
and  might  even  be  nationwide  in  its  effect  and  wonder  if,  actually, 
you  should  not  have  the  criminal  investigations  in  the  same  depart- 
ment. 

Now,  I  know  that  is  an  oversimplification,  and  I  am  going  to  ask 
staff,  if  they  will,  to  check  this  a  little  further  for  us  to  see  if  they 
would  want  to  recommend  to  the  subcommittee  any  change. 

This  explosive  that  you  showed  us  that  happened  out  in  McLean, 
Va. — was  the  FBI  involved  in  any  way  in  that,  or  was  that  investiga- 
tion carried  on  entirely  by  State  and  local  authorities  in  cooperation 
with  your  agency  ? 

Was  any  other  Federal  agency  involved  in  this  ? 

Mr.  DA\^s.  Yes,  sir.  The  ATF  and  the  FBI  both  responded  to  that 
incident.  And,  when  it  was  determined  that  it  was  within  our  juris- 
diction, because  it  was  an  interstate-type  bombing,  then  the  FBI 
withdrew  and  we  carried  the  investigation  out,  although  they  helped 
us  in  any  place  they  could.  For  example,  this  investigation,  as  I  indi- 
cated yesterday,  extended  up  into  Canada  where  we  worked  very 
closely  with  the  RCMP,  and  had  very  successful  results. 

Senator  Scott.  I  am  going  to  ask  you  in  a  moment  if  you  will  to 
explain  in  a  little  more  detail  this  memorandum  of  understanding 
that  you  spoke  of. 

But,  in  connection  with,  and  I  just  used  the  McLean  incident  be- 
cause that  is  the  one  that  was  illustrated  yesterday,  and  we  in  the 
"Washington  area  are  somewhat  familiar  with  that,  but,  when  these 
explosions  occur,  might  there  not  be  some  people  who  would  commit 
other  crimes  and  a  criminal  element  that  would  have  to  do  with  other 
than  explosives,  that  perhaps  would  be  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
FBI  ?  I  am  just  wondering  if  we  are  isolating  this  too  nriuch,  and  just 
saying  it  is  an  explosive — we  will  investigate  the  explosive.  And,  if  it 
is  a  general  criminal  element  and  this  is  a  part  of  their  operation.  I 
am  wondering  if  we  are  separating  things,  putting  them  into  a  com- 
partment and,  actually,  if  it  is  working  in  the  interest  or  toward  pre- 
venting criminal  activity  as  effectively  as  if  it  was  done  through  the 
same  agency. 

If  you  would  comment  on  that,  and  then  explain  to  us  a  little  bit 
more  in  detail  about  this  memorandum  of  understanding  with  the 
FBI  ?  You  go  ahead  in  your  own  way. 

Mr.  Davis.  All  right,  sir.  Thank  you.  Of  course,  explosives  and 
bombings  are  certainly  not  the  only  area  in  which  you  have  criminal 
activity  involving  one  y:>erson  or  group  of  persons  together.  For  ex- 
ample, in  our  enforcement  of  firearms  laws,  we  frequently  run  into 
narcotics.  This  presents  no  problem  whatsoever,  because  when  we  do, 
we  immediately  notify,  or  refer  as  we  call  it,  that  aspect  of  the  case  to 
the  druji  enforcement  people. 

Senator  Scott.  Now  you  are  talking  about  narcotics.  Could  it  not  be 
that  they  want  explosives  to  blow  up  a  bank  vault  ? 


40 

Mr.  Davis.  Certainly  it  could  be,  or  certainly  to  extort. 

Senator  Scott.  Or  to  do  a  number  of  things  not  under  your  jurisdic- 
tion. Now,  I  do  not  laiow — a  bank  robbery — who  investigates  that? 
Possibly  that  is  still  a  Treasury  agent.  It  is  FBI,  is  it  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  It  would  be  the  FBI. 

Senator  Scott.  I  am  just  thinking  of  whether  or  not  it  would  be 
more  effective  to  investigators  from  a  central  agency.  I  do  not  want  any 
agency  to  get  too  big,  but  at  the  same  time,  we  do  want — and  I  am 
sure  you  would  be  in  complete  agreement  on  this — we  want  the  maxi- 
mum effective  law  enforcement,  and  I  do  not  think  we  would  have  the 
slightest  quarrel  on  this.  But,  you  go  ahead,  sir. 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  sir,  the  question  obviously  is  much  larger  than  ATF 
and  explosives.  Obviously,  as  you  are  well  aware,  Mr.  Chairman,  the 
Secret  Service  in  the  Department  of  Treasury  investigates  counter- 
feiting. The  U.S.  Customs  Service  in  Treasury  "investigates  smuggling 
of  materials  into  the  United  States  as  we  do  firearms.  Certainly  the 
Drug  Enforcement  Administration  is  responsible  for  narcotics  and 
the  Immigration  and  Naturalization  Service,  for  the  illegal  entry  of 
aliens. 

Senator  Scott.  A  lot  of  those,  though,  would  not  tie  in  very  closely 
with  explosives,  but  blowing  up  a  bank  vault  might  very  well  tie  in — or 
other  crimes.  We  have  got  a  Subcommittee  on  Immigration  that  is 
considering  changing  the  law  with  regard  to  illegal  aliens.  I  do  not  see 
a  close  tie  in  between  that.  An  illegal  alien  could  get  hold  of  an  ex- 
plosive and  could  participate,  but  tliat  is  not  the  general  practice.  They 
come  over  here  for  the  purpose  of  having  a  higher  standard  of  living, 
and  becoming  involved  in  some  way  in  our  overall  American  life.  But, 
I  can  see  where  the  ])rofessional  criminal  would  use  explosives.  I  am 
just  wondering  if  it  is  in  the  national  interest  to  have  the  investigation 
of  the  use  of  explosives  by  a  tax-oriented  organization. 

You  are  talking  about  the  history  here,  and  that  it  started  with  taxes, 
and  that  it  has  gone  beyond  that,  but — I  do  not  want  to  interrupt. 
I  have  interrupted  you  and,  perhaps,  broken  your  chain  of  thought, 
but  it  is  something  that  just  came  to  mind  when  you  were  talking 
about  this  information  not  being  in  the  FBI  computer,  the  national 
crime  computer.  I  think,  at  least,  that  ought  to  be  in  there. 

I  have  interrupted  you,  and  I  will  try  to  let  you  finish  your  chain 
of  thought. 

Mr.  Davis.  All  right,  sir.  First,  Mr.  Chairman,  let  me  assure  you 
that  as  far  as  the  law  enforcement  part  of  ATF  is  concerned,  we  are 
not  tax-oriented.  We  have  been  a  law  enforcement  organization  longer 
than  the  FBI.  We  are  quite  proud  of  our  history  of  law  enforcement  in 
the  areas  that  we  have  been  given  responsibility.  I  would  rush  to  assure 
you  that  the  fact  that  we  do  have  different  Federal  law  enforcement 
agencies  does  not,  in  any  way,  in  my  opinion,  detract  from  the  Federal 
law  enforcement  effort."  In  fact,  I  think  it  probably  enhances  it.  There 
are,  of  course,  criminal  specialties  and.  I  thinlc,  probably  the  fact  that 
we  have  separate  law  enforcement  agencies  at  the  Federal  level  does 
allow  a  focus  on  particular  areas  such  as,  for  example,  narcotics,  which 
we  recognize  is  a  tT-emcndous  social  and  law  enforcement  problem  in 
the  United  States. 

In  the  case  that  you  have  used,  the  example  such  as  the  bombing  of  a 
bank  vault,  there  "would  be  no  question  in  anybody's  mind  that  that 
would  be  in  FBI  jurisdiction. 


41 

Senator  Scott.  Yes,  but  you  said  tliat  the — as  I  understood  you.  I 
may  have  misunderstood — but  you  said  that  if  explosives  are  stolen, 
that  that  is  not  something  that  gets  on  the  FBI  computer  and,  yet, 
if  the  explosives  are  stolen  for  the  purposes  of  blowing  up  some  sort 
of  safe  in  a  bank  or  some  crime,  some  general  crime  that  might  be 
under  the  investigation  of  another  bureau  other  than  your  own,  they 
might  not  have  information  with  regard  to  this,  and  it  looks  to  me  like 
it  is  a  weakness  in  the  law  enforcement  system  of  Federal  law 
enforcement. 

Mr.  DA^^s.  Well,  sir,  again  I  would  agree  with  you  and  certainly  if 
the  procedural  problems  could  be  overcome  we  certainly  would  be  very 
happy  to  introduce  that  information  into  the  NCIC. 

I  probably  spoke  a  little  too  hastily  a  minute  ago.  Mr.  Corbin  has 
informed  me  that  we  have  in  the  Treasury  the  Treasury  Enforcement 
Communication  System  or  TECS,  which  is  shared  by  Customs  and 
ATF  for  law  enforcement  purposes.  And  we  do  have  stored  in  that 
computer  all  of  the  explosive  theft  incidents  of  the  last  2  or  3  years. 
And,  obviously,  if  any  law  enforcement  organization  needed  informa- 
tion of  this  kind,  it  would  be  available  to  him. 

State  and  local  law  enforcement  organizations,  I  think,  are  mindful 
of  the  fact  because  we  work  very  closely  with  them  in  all  of  our  juris- 
dictional areas  that  ATF  does  have  responsibility  for  explosives,  gen- 
erally, at  the  Federal  level,  and,  as  I  say,  Ave  trace  explosives  for  them 
through  our  laboratories.  We  prepare  evidence  in  those  State  cases 
where  they  have  asked  for  our  laboratory  assistance  or  the  reconstruc- 
tion of  explosive  devices  or  ask  for  testimony  of  this  kind. 

Senator  Scott.  IMr.  Davis,  I  am  not  in  any  way  trying  to  talk  down 
your  organization.  From  your  presentation  and  my  limited  knowledge, 
you  have  a  very  fine  organization.  No  thought  of  any  criticism  of  your 
organization — ^and  yet  we  would  have  a  mutual  desire  to  track  down 
the  criminal,  and  that  is  really  the  thrust  of  what  I  am  getting  at. 
And  I  do  have  a  concern  that  you  have  what  we  might  call  a  master 
computer  to  get  information  with  regard  to  criminals. 

I  am  thinking  that  maybe  if  you  got  a  John  Dillinger  running 
around  the  country  or  maybe  a  "mad  dog"  type  of  person,  I  think  if 
explosives  were  stolen,  and,  somehow,  the  local,  Federal,  and  State  offi- 
cers were  trying  to  find  out  what  that  individual,  or  group  of  individ- 
uals were  doing,  that  they  would  need  all  of  the  information  they  could 
get.  And  if  the  explosives  had  been  stolen,  they  ought  to  know  that 
because  it  might  have  a  relationship  to  what  he  is  going  to  do  the  next 
day,  or  the  next  week.  And,  it  just  seems  to  me  that  it  ought  to  be  in 
that  computer. 

Now,  how  you  get  it  in  there  is  a  different  thins:,  and  again,  I  am 
goins:  to  ask  staff  to  look  into  this  matter  a  bit  if  they  will,  <and  we 
would  like  to  have  any  information  that  vou  are  prepared  to  give  now, 
or  that  you  would  later  want  to  submit  for  the  record. 

I  would  like,  also,  as  soon  as  you  complete  your  thoughts  that  you 
may  have  now  with  regard  to  this  overall  matter,  if  you  would  get 
back  and  tell  us  what  this  memorandum  of  understanding  is.  I  would 
like  to  understand  the  memorandum  of  understanding. 

Mr.  Davis.  Very  well.  sir.  I  think  if  T  can.  I  just  would  conclude  my 
train  of  thought  by  saying  that  I  can  understand  your  concern,  and  a 
very  legitimate  concern,  about  the  effectiveness  of  Federal  law  enforce- 


42 
ment.  But  my  opinion,  based  on  my  years  of  experience  in  the  law 
enforcement  field,  is  that  the  separation  of  responsibilities  amon^  the 
various  agencies  at  the  Federal  level,  does  not  inhibit  or  detract  from 
effective  law  enforcement  at  the  Federal  level,  and  I  think  we  have 
very  close,  cooperative  relationship  among  the  various  agencies.  I 
think,  certainly,  this  is  demonstrated  fully  by  our  joint  investigation 
of  the  LaGuardia  bombing,  for  example.  And,  this  is  only  one.  There 
have  been  many  cases  where  the  FBI  and  ourselves  and  others  have 
cooperated  very  fully. 

]Mr.  Chairman,  we  would  be  happy  to  put  the  full  memo  of  under- 
standing into  the  record  if  the  chairman  would  so  desire. 

Senator  Scott.  Yes ;  and  it  will  be  received,  but  could  you  just  briefly 
tell  us  what  is  this  memorandum  of  understanding? 

[The  material  referred  to  will  be  found  on  p.  73  of  the  appendix 
as  Exhibit  No.  3.] 

Mr.  Davis.  There  is  in  the  memorandum  of  understanding,  a  sum- 
mary, and  I  think  probably  if  I  can  just  run  down  through  that.  OK, 
sir.  first  I  will  refer  to  the  law  itself,  and  it  is  in  title  XI  of  the  Orga- 
nized Crime  Control  Act  of  1970.  The  final  sentence  of  section  846, 
Additional  Powers  of  the  Secretary,  reads  as  follows,  "In  addition  to 
any  other  investigatory  authority  they  have  with  respect  to  violations 
of  provisions  of  this  chapter,  the  Attorney  General  and  the  Federal 
Bureau  of  Investigation,  together  with  the  Secretary" — and  that  is  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury — "will  have  authority  to  conduct  investiga- 
tions with  respect  to  violations  of  subsections  D.  E,  F.  G.  H,  or  I  of 
section  844  of  this  title,  which  includes  six  specific  violations  of  the 
law." 

Now,  in  this  memo  of  understanding,  these  are  generally  the  things. 
I  will  not  necessarily  read  the  section,  but  it  is  included  on  the  left 
side.  For  example,  regulatory  provision  violations  are  the  jurisdiction 
of  ATF.  This  is  such  things  as  the  buildings  and  storage,  failure  to 
keep  records,  and  a  long  list  of  things  tliat  are  criminal  violations. 
Those  are  clearly  the  jurisdiction  of  ATF.  The  interstate  transporta- 
tion— except  by  mail,  which  is  the  Post  Office  Department's  responsi- 
bility— of  explosives  with  unlawful  intent  is  ATF  jurisdiction. 

Bomb  threats,  false  information  as  they  relate  to  Treasury  build- 
ings or  functions,  that  is  the  jurisdiction 

Senator  Scotf.  Now.  is  the  thrust  of  your  memorandum  of  under- 
standing of  who  investigates  a  particular  activity  ?  Is  that  the  thrust 
of  it? 

:Mr.  Davis.  That  is  it. 

Senator  Scott.  Well,  I  wonder  if  perhaps  you  should  not  go  further 
than  this  and  have  a  memorandum  of  understanding  on  how  you 
would  cooperate  with  one  another.  Now,  do  you  have  some  sort  of  a 
conference  among  Federal  law  enforcement  agencies  where  you  co- 
ordinate your  activity  to  determine  how  you  can  best  cooperate  ? 

I  can  understand — a  moment  ago.  I  noted  a  little  bit  of  pride  in 
your  organization  and  there  is  not  a  thing  wrong  with  that,  but  just 
like  rivalry  between  our  military  services  might  not  be  in  the  national 
interest.  I  think  undue  pride  in  any  branch  of  the  Government  might 
not  be  in  the  national  interest.  And  we  mention  the  question  of  this 
computer.  Now,  is  this  computer — the  FBI  has  it — but  is  this  con- 
sidered the  major  national  crime  computer,  and  the  storage  place  for 
crimes  of  various  types  other  than  those  that  are  investigated  by  the 


43 

FBI,  that  are  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  FBI?  Is  it  supplemented 
by  information  from  other  law  enforcement  agencies  ? 

"^Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir.  And  it  is  certainly  considered  to  be  the  national 
crime  computer.  As  I  have  indicated,  there  are  certain  kinds  of  infor- 
mation that  are  included  in  it.  And,  they  are  very  specifically  spelled 
out.  If  my  recollection  is  correct,  they  have  a  Board  of  Governors — 
or  a  Board  of  Trustees,  or  whatever  you  want  to  call  it — to  determine 
what  kind  of  information  can  be  reproduced. 

For  example,  we  routinely  place  in  the  National  Crime  Information 
Center  information  about  stolen  guns,  but  certainly  your  characteri- 
zation of  the  computer  is  accurate  in  that  it  is  the  national  crime 
computer. 

Senator  Scott.  I  remember  years  ago,  when  I  was  serving  in  the 
House,  we  had  it  demonstrated'to  us.  They  took  my  name.  They  said, 
we  can  determine  whether  you  have  a  criminal  record.  And  I  did  risk 
this,  and  they  told  me  that  within  10  seconds  they  would  have  a  report. 
And,  it  took  more  than  10  seconds :  it  took  a  full  minute  for  them  to 
come  back  and  say  that  I  had  no  criminal  record  according  to  the 
FBI's  computer. 

Frankly,  I  think  this  is  a  very  wonderful  thing  for  the  Federal 
Government  to  have  a  record  of  the  criminal  element,  but  I  believe  it 
is  deficient.  I  say  I  speak  as  a  lay  person  and,  yet,  I  was  with  the 
Department  of  Justice  21  years,  35  years  with  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment, and  do  have  some  knowledge  of  the  Government  bureaucracy 
and  the  empire  building  concept  that  we  have  in  the  Government. 

I  think  we  ought  to  find  a  way  to  see  that  the  theft  of  explosives — 
perhaps  we  could  have  an  amount,  maybe  every  time  one  stick  of 
dynamite  is  stolen — perhaps  that  need  not  be  reported,  but  certainly 
within  some  reasonable  limitation  it  seems  to  me  that  the  stealing  of 
anv  sizable  amount  should  be  in  that  computer. 

Do  you  feel  that  it  would  take  legislation  to  get  this  done,  or  what 
would  you  suggest  as  to  the  best  way  ? 

Could  your  office,  if  you  submitted  such  information,  would  it  be 
received  by  the  FBI  and  put  into  the  recorder  ? 

Or,  to  get  back  a  bit  to  the  question  I  asked  a  few  minutes  ago,  what 
sort  of  cooperation  do  you  have  among  these  various  investigative 
agencies  ? 

Do  you  meet  periodically  ?  Does  the  head  of  the  FBI  meet  with  the 
head  of  the  Secret  Service  ?  And,  do  they  meet  with  the  head  of  your 
bureau?  Do  you  have  a  joint  meeting  where  you  kick  around  some  of 
these  things  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir,  first  let  me  say,  to  give  you  a  complete  answer  to 
your  question,  we  do  have  daily  liaison  contact  with  the  FBI  on  what 
you  might  call  daily  operating  problems  and  things  of  this  kind,  Mr. 
Corbin,  the  Assistant  Director  of  Criminal  Enforcement,  meets  with 
the  officials  of  the  FBI,  and  particularly  as  they  relate  to  any  prob- 
lems that  may  come  up.  We  have  at  the  Director  level  a  bimonthly 
luncheon  meeting  at  which  myself  and  Director  Kelley,  Director 
Knight,  in  other  words,  all  of  the  Federal  law  enforcement  agencies 
every  2  months  have  a  luncheon  meeting  at  which  many  of  these  broad 
kinds  of  concepts  are  discussed. 

So,  I  think  we  have  a  considerable  amount  of  liaison  at  meetings  to 
address  ourselves  to  these  common  problems,  and  to  engender  a  spirit 
of  cooperation. 


44 

Mr.  ScHULTz.  I  am  wondering,  a  point  of  clarification,  Mr.  Davis. 
I  am  not  familiar  with  the  criteria  of  those  items  that  would  go  into 
NCIC,  but  I  would  think  that  whether  they  are  instrumentalities  of  a 
crime,  or  whether  they  are  items  of  stolen  property,  that  one  of  their 
requirements  would  be  a  serial  number  or  some  method  by  which 
they  could  be  identified  with  certainty.  You  mentioned  that  explosives 
have  a  date  shift  code,  but  I  think  you  indicated  that  they  do  not  have 
any  particular  serial  number  by  which  you  could  enter  them  and  with 
some  certainty  identify  the  same  identical  explosive  if  it  were  located. 

Perhaps  you  could  address  yourself  to  the  question  of  would  this  be 
feasible  ?  What  would  you  envision  would  be  required  to  be  able  to  do 
that? 

Mr.  Davis.  Certainly  this  is  one  of  the  basic  problems,  introducing 
explosive  theft  incidents  into  the  computer. 

You  have  to  have  some  key  to  pull  the  information  out  of  the 
computer  at  the  request  of  some  officer  in  some  part  of  the  country. 
Now,  obviously  by  the  model  or  serial  number,  guns  can  be  done  very 
readily  because  it  is  a  unique  identifier  of  that  particular  weapon.  It 
would  be  certainly  more  difficult  to  try  to  take  some  combination  of 
the  date  shift  code  or  information  of  this  kind  so  that  you  could  pull 
out  information  regarding  the  theft  of  explosives  around  the  country. 

Now,  I  am  certainly  not  suggesting  that  it  is  impossible ;  I  am  only 
suggesting  that  it  would  be  much  more  difficult.  I  will  have  to  admit 
that  in  terms  of,  and  I  think  the  chairman  asked  the  question  about 
legislation,  to  introduce  this  information.  I  think  there  is,  and  again 
I  am  speaking  from  recollection,  it  may  not  be  that  accurate,  I  think 
there  is  a  Board  of  Governors  or  a  Board  of  Trustees,  some  such  body 
at  the  NCIC  who  determine  the  policies  to  be  followed  for  the  infor- 
mation to  be  included. 

Senator  Scott.  This  policy  board  that  you  are  speaking  of,  is  that 
for  the  purpose,  primarily,  of  protecting  civil  rights  of  the  individuals 
or  is  that  for  the  purpose  of  not  trying  to  exceed  the  capacity  of  the 
computer?  Or,  is  that  just  information  that  would  be  of  sufficient 
importance  to  warrant  its  inclusion  for  the  benefit  of  the  law  enforce- 
ment community  generally?  Or  is  it  a  combination  of  these  or  other 
factors  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  am  sure  it  would  be  a  combination  to  establish  policy. 
I  am  sure  that  there  are,  from  time-to-time,  types  of  information  that 
people  feel  should  be  in  the  computer  that  this  Board  would  determine 
whether  or  not  there  is  sufficient  advantage  to  law  enforcement  in 
comparison  to  the  cost  and  things  to 

Senator  Scott.  Well,  I  would  think  now,  without  having  any  exper- 
tise in  regard  to  the  computer  technology,  that  if  you  had  somelxtdy 
on  a  rampage  committing  various  crimes  up  in  the  State  of  Washing- 
ton, or  in  the  northwestern  part  of  the  United  States,  and  there  were 
explosives  in  any  quantity  that  were  stolen  in  that  area,  that  it  would 
be  very  material  for  someone  trying  to  capture  an  individual  or  a 
group  to  know  about  this. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  it  happened  down  in  Puerto  Rico,  and  they 
were  up  in  the  northwestern  part  of  the  country,  it  might  be  an  en- 
tirely different  thing.  And,  I  think,  maybe  on  a  geographic  basis,  that 
that  might  be  one  way  of  putting  something  like  that  in  a  computer. 
But,  again,  I  have  no  knowledo-e  of  computer  technology,  but  if  the 
computer  is  of  any  value,  somebody  must  know  how  to  get  the  infor- 


45 

mation  in  it.  I  am  not  sno;o;estino;  that  the  Director  of  a  bureau  ought  to 
know  how  to  operate  a  computer  because  I  do  not  believe  that  that  is  a 
requirement  of  your  office,  but  somebody  that  is  working  on  that 
computer  should  know  how  to  catalog  it/how  to  get  it  in  there,  and 
how  to  get  the  necessary  information  out.  I  cannot  see  this  as  being 
insurmountable, 

Mr.  Davis.  Mr.  Chairman,  certainly,  again,  if  it  is  desired  by  the 
FBI  to  include  this  information  in  the^NCtC,  we  would  be  very  happy 
to  cooperate  in  every  way  possible. 

Senator  Scott.  Now,  we  do  have  some  questions  that  we  would  want 
to  submit  to  you  to  be  answered  later  on  for  the  record,  Mr.  Davis, 
and  counsel  will  get  those  to  you.  And  we  would  like,  within  a  reason- 
able time,  for  you  to  give  us  the  answers  for  the  record. 

[The  material  referred  to  appears  on  p.  48.] 

We  are  going  to  take  about  10  more  minutes  and  then  adjourn. 

Counsel,  do  you  have  any  more  questions  that  you  might  want  to  ask 
or  something  else  that  you  think  we  might  do  before  we  adjourn  the 
subcommittee? 

Mr.  ScHULTZ.  Yes ;  I  wonder  if 

Senator  Scott.  And  then,  after  counsel  poses  anything  that  he  has, 
then  we  would  want  to  give  you  the  opportunity,  Mr.  Davis,  or  your 
associates,  to  make  any  additional  statement  that  you  feel  would  be  of 
value  to  the  subcommittee. 

Mr.  SciiULTz.  Mr.  Davis,  in  connection  with  the  criminal  sanctions 
that  are  attached  to  the  reporting  procedures — the  storage  require- 
ments— you  did  list  a  few  when  you  were  going  through  the  memor- 
andum of  understanding.  I  wonder  if  you  will  be  able  to  give  us  some 
figures  relating  to  either  criminal  sanctions  imi:)Osed  against  the  indus- 
try, or  civil  penalties  imposed  for  violations  which  have  occurred  over 
the  last  3  years. 

Mr.  Davis.  We  do  not  have  any  record  of  criminal  sanctions  being 
imposed  against  a  member  of  tlie  explosives  industry  by  ATF  since 
the  effective  date  of  Title  XI,  Regulation  of  Explosives.  In  1975,  we 
did  revoke  one  dealer's  license.  Violations  of  the  regulations  uncovered 
during  our  inspections  of  licensed  premises  are  primarily  in  the  field  of 
storage,  and  every  opportunity  is  given  the  licensee  to  bring  the  storage 
facilities  and  procedures  into  compliance  before  we  resort  to  what 
might  be  considered  as  the  first  administrative  action  against  a 
licensee — the  denial  of  the  application  to  renew  a  license  or  steps  to 
revoke  a  license  already  in  existence.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in 
Fiscal  1972,  we  denied  150  applications  for  license.  That  figure  has 
dwindled  in  the  ensuinsr  years  to  34  denials  in  Fiscal  1973,  21  in  Fiscal 
1974  and  6  in  Fiscal  1975.  The  same  pattern  follows  in  the  application 
for  permits  under  Title  XT.  We  denied  230  in  Fiscal  1972,  with  43 
denials  in  Fiscal  1973,  29  in  Fiscal  1974  and  6  last  year.  These  figures, 
coupled  with  our  field  reports,  give  us  reason  to  believe  that  the  explo- 
sives industry  is  rapidly  taking  whatever  steps  are  necessary  to  con- 
form to  the  requirements  of  Title  XI. 

Mr.  ScTiULTZ.  Would  you  take  us  through  a  typical  example  of 
ATF  receiving  a  theft  or  a  loss  report,  and  how  this  is  handled  right 
from  the  beginning  of  who  receives  the  report?  "V^Hiat  investigation 
is  conducted  ? 

]\Ir,  CoRBiN.  Typically,  one  of  our  criminal  enforcement  officers — 
field  officers — posted  for  duty  in  Ix)uisville,  Ky.,  will  receive  a  report 


46 

from  a  storage  facility  that  upon  inspection  on  Monday  morning, 
April  7,  they  discovered  that  a  case  of  dynamite  was  missing.  Upon  re- 
ceiving that  information,  the  special  agents  from  ATF  would  contact 
the  owners,  very  likely  visit  the  facility,  record  what  information  was 
available,  when  was  the  last  time  the  facility  was  checked,  who  discov- 
ered the  missing  explosive,  was  there  evidence  of  forced  entry,  was  the 
lock  picked,  was  the  door  closed,  what  was  the  nature  of  the  explosive, 
what  was  the  amount — the  usual  criminal  investigation  routine — 
interview  the  owners  who  had  access,  or  suspicious  pereons. 

At  that  point,  it  is  a  matter  of  what  lead,  what  can  you  develop? 
Is  there  labor  difficulty?  Does  any  employee  who  has  access  have  a 
domestic  problem  ?  Is  there  a  group  in  the  general  area  who,  for  one 
reason  or  another,  might  be  suspect? 

From  that  point,  it  is  a  normal  investigative  routine. 
Mr.  ScHULTz.  All  right.  I  take  it  that  a  full  investigation  is  con- 
ducted, and  the  resolution  depends  upon  what  information  they  have 
to  work  with  ? 

Mr.  CoRBiN.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  ScHULTZ.  Is  there  a  case  report  written  on  each  investigation  ? 
Mr.  CoRBiN.  No,  sir.  Each  such  theft  would  result  in  what  I  would 
call  a  numbered  investigation  that  is  recorded.  The  theft  is  repoi-ted 
in  our  Treasuiy  computer  by  incident. 

If  I  could  add  here,  that  is  the  problem  between  NCIC  and  what 
we  do.  We  record  thefts  of  explosives  by  incident.  NCIC,  as  I  under- 
stand it,  is  set  up  to  record  property  or  individuals  by  some  number- 
ing system. 

Senator  Scott.  You  do  it  by  what  ? 

Mr.  CoRBiN.  By  incident.  A  theft  of  one  case  of  40  percent  DuPont 
dynamite,  April  7,  Louisville,  Ky.,  such  and  such. 

Senator  Scott.  Well,  that  might  be  all  that  w^oiild  be  needed  if  you 
have  Louisville,  Ky.,  and  there  is  a  criminal  element  operating  in  the 
I^uisville,  Ky.,  area.  You  are  saying  that  the  computer  in  the  FBI 
is  on  the  basis  of  what  ? 

Mr.  CoRBiN.  Number.  For  example,  you  have  a  social  security  num- 
ber. You  had  a  serial  number  in  the  service. 

Senator  Scott.  Are  you  talking  about  the  number  for  a  particular 
criminal  ? 

Mr.  CoRBiN.  For  a  criminal,  for  a  piece  of  property,  for  example. 
Senator  Scott.  It  must  be  more  than  that  and,  again,  I  do  not  have 
any  knowledge,  but  there  must  be  other  ways,  other  things,  that  they 
would  have  in  the  computer  rather  than  just  having  it  computed  under 
a  number  identifying  a  particular  criminal. 

You  are  not  suggesting  that  if  they  are  checking  on  a  bank  robbery 
that  they  check  to  see  whether  Dillinger  is  the  one  that  did  it.  They 
must  have  something  other  than  Dillinger  that  they  would  look  under. 
Is  that  what  you  are  telling  us? 

Mr.  CoRBiN.  How  bank  robberies  are  put  into  NCIC  I  do  not  know. 
It  is  my  understanding  that  the  decision  is  in  property  of  this  type 
which  is  stolen — only  that  property  w^iich  can  be  identified  specifically 
by  number  is  entered. 

Senator  Scott.  Well,  I  have  some  reservations,  with  all  the  exper- 
tise that  we  have  in  here  today,  whether  we  have  the  technological 
expertise  that  we  need  to  resolve  these  questions.  If  we  do  have,  and  it 
is  desired — I  am  assuming  that  your  job  is  not  that  of  a  computer  man. 


47 

that  you  have  much  broader  responsibilities  than  that.  So,  perhaps  as 
far  as  the  mechanics  is  concerned,  maybe  we  had  better  not  delve  into 
that  any  further  than  we  have  because  I  am  satisfied  if  the  computer 
is  worth  the  amount  of  money  that  is  paid  for  it,  that  there  is  a  way 
to  get  it  in  there.  And,  unless  we  have  people  that  operate  computers — 
and  I  am  not  sure  we  even  would  want  to  go  into  how  it  would  be  ac- 
complished, I  think  our  inquiry  is  much  broader  than  that — but  I  am 
willing  to  go  out  on  a  limb  and  say  there  is  a  way  to  do  it  if  there  is 
a  will  to  do  it.  I  think,  maybe,  we  do  not  even  need  to  inquire  further 
because  I  am  satisfied  that  there  is  a  way  that  it  can  be  accomplished 
if  we  want  to  do  it. 

Now,  Counsel,  perhaps  you  might  have  a  final  question,  and  then 
let  us  give  Mr.  Davis  an  opportunity  to  say  a  few  words  because  I 
think  he  has  been  here  with  us  2  days  and  we  ought  to  at  least  give  him 
5  minutes  to  say  something  that  we  have  not  asked  him. 

Mr.  ScHULTZ.  In  view  of  the  hour,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  defer  to  Mr. 
Davis,  and  we  will  submit  our  questions  by  letter  if  it  is  agreeable. 

Senator  Scxyrr.  All  right.  If  you  will  go  right  ahead,  sir,  anything 
that  you  feel  you  have  not  covered  that  you  believe  this  committee 
ought  to  know  about. 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir.  Thank  3^ou,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  do  appreciate  the 
opportunity.  I  will  be  very  brief. 

I  think,  together  with  the  material  that  we  have  gone  over  in  session 
and  combined  with  the  questions  that  will  be  posed  to  us  by  counsel 
and  staff  that  we  will  answer  in  the  future,  that  we  have  pretty  well, 
I  think,  covered  the  various  areas. 

I  think  there  is  one  important  area  that  I  would  just  like  to  mention 
to  the  chairman,  and  that  is,  our  efforts  in  the  explosives  tagging  area. 

Senator  Scott.  Now,  that  is  identification,  tagging? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes.  It  is  covered  briefly  in  my  prepared  statement  that 
we,  a  little  over  2  years  ago,  established  a  Federal  Advisory  Committee 
made  up  of  representatives  of  the  various  concerned  Federal  agencies, 
including  law  enforcement  agencies,  members  of  the  industry,  and 
members  of  scientific  institutions,  together  with  a  technical  subcom- 
mittee to  determine  the  feasibility  of  tagging  explosives  so  they  could 
be  detected  before  they  were  detonated,  in  other  words,  to  detect  a 
bomb  that  was  located  in  the  area. 

And,  second,  if  a  detonation  should  occur,  it  would  permit  us  to — 
and  wlion  I  say  us,  I  am  speaking  primarily  of  law  enforcement  organi- 
zations throuirhout  the  United  States — to  find  out  where  that  explosive 
was  made,  where  it  was  distributed  to,  which  would  give  a  valuable, 
I  think,  investigative  lead.  And,  we  do  feel  that  we  have  progressed  to 
a  point  where  we  have  established  the  technical  feasibility  of  these 
systems  and  we  are  very  hopeful  that  our  efforts  as  the  lead  agency 
here,  together  with  the  other  efforts  being  conducted  by  the  Govern- 
ment, will  result  in  a  svstem  that  will  hopefully  prevent  a  large  num- 
ber of  bombings,  and  in  those  cases  where  they  did  not  prevent  it,  at 
least  it  would  give  us  a  very  valuable  investigative  lead  toward  dis- 
covering who  is  responsible  for  a  violation. 

Well,  Mr.  Chairman,  my  colleague,  Mr.  Peterson,  just  reminded 
me  that  if  we  had  such  a  tagging  system,  which  w^ould  be  a  numeric 
system,  that  there  is  no  question  that  that  could  be  placed  in  the  NCIC, 
and  retrieved  from  this  system. 


48 

In  closing,  sir,  we  have  appreciated  the  opportunity  to  appear 
before  this  subcommittee  to  discuss  our  activities  in  this  area.  And, 
thank  you  very  much. 

Senator  Scott.  Mr.  Davis,  you  have  been  very  helpful  to  us,  and 
cooperative  in  responding  to  our  questions.  We  had  purposely  con- 
ducted the  hearing  on  somewhat  of  an  informal  basis  because  I  believe 
it  is  more  productive  that  way. 

We  appreciate  your  bringmg  your  associates  with  you,  and  having 
the  benefit  of  their  knowledge  on  this  important  matter.  Thank  you 
for  being  here. 

We  are  adjourned. 

[Whereupon,  at  12 :21  p.m.,  the  subcommittee  adjourned,  subject  to 
the  call  of  the  Chair.] 

Supplemental  Questions  and  Answers 

(Referred  to  on  p.  45) 

( 1 )     GENERAL 

Question.  It  is  accurate  that  criminal  and  terrorist  bombings  occur  far  more 
frequently  and  pose  much  more  of  a  problem  today  than  they  did,  let's  say,  ten 
years  ago? 

Answer.  ATF  does  not  have  accurate  data  dating  back  ten  years.  However, 
our  intelligence  sources  indicated  that  although  the  total  number  of  bombings 
have  increased,  bombings  by  terrorists  have  not  necessarily  done  so.  During 
1969-70,  the  anti-Viet  Nam  protest  was  at  its  peak.  Therefore,  there  were  a  large 
number  of  what  might  be  termed  terrorists  bombings.  Most  of  these  bombings 
were  incendiary  and  were  by  groups  in  protest  of  our  involvement  in  Viet  Nam. 
The  terrorists  bombings  today  are  more  sophisticated  and  are  doing  more 
damage  because  of  the  use  of  explosives,  but  the  numbers  have  not  appeared  to 
Increase. 

Former  Assistant  Secretary  Rossides  testified  before  the  Committee  on  Gov- 
ernment Operations,  U.S.  Senate  on  Wednesday,  July  15,  1970,  to  the  following 
statistics.  For  the  15-month  period  of  .January  1,  1969.  through  April  15,  1970, 
there  was  reported  to  ATF  a  total  of  4,330  bombings.  Of  this  number  975  were 
explosive  bombings  and  3.355  were  incendiary  bombings.  These  figures  were 
obtained  from  local  and  state  law  enforcement  agencies.  Accurate  data  was  not 
again  available  until  1972,  when  the  FBI  began  publishing  Bomb  Summaries  in 
their  Uniform  Crime  Reports.  Quoting  from  those  reports  are  the  following 
figures.  In  1972  there  were  1,507  total  bombings  reported  of  which  793  were 
incendiary  and  714  explosive.  1973  produced  1,529  total  bombings  reported  with 
787  being  incendiary  and  742  explosive.  In  1974  there  were  1,651  total  bombings 
reported  with  758  incendiary  and  893  explosive.  For  the  first  half  of  1975  there 
were  828  total  bombings  reported  with  268  incendiary  and  560  explosive.  As  you 
can  see,  the  incendiary  bombings  are  decreasing.  While  intelligence  sources  indi- 
cated that  terrorists  bombings  have  not  increased,  other  criminally  motivated 
have  and  are  continuing  to  increase. 

Question.  It  would,  therefore,  be  accurate  to  say  that  we  have  a  far  greater 
problem  today  than  we  had  when  the  Organized  Crime  Control  Act  of  1970  was 
passed,  wouldn't  you  agree? 

Answer.  Yes. 

Question.  Would  you  then  agree  that  in  the  light  of  this  situation,  we've  got 
to  have  substantially  more  rigorous  control  over  the  production  and  distribution 
and  use  of  explosives? 

Answer.  We  feel  that  there  is  no  requirement  for  additional  control  require- 
ments for  the  production  and  distribution  of  explosives.  However,  regarding  the 
use  of  explosives,  ATF  and  the  Institute  of  Makers  of  Explosives  have  intensi- 
fied efforts  to  continually  educate  the  user  in  the  importance  of  the  proper  stor- 
age, prompt  theft  and  loss  reporting,  proper  recordkeeping,  and  safety  of  ex- 
plosive materials. 

QuestiotK  On  the  basis  of  some  of  the  figures  you  have  presented  to  the  sub- 
committee, are  the  forces  at  your  command  adequate  to  cope  with  the  problem? 


49 

You  have  told  us  that  there  are  over  2,000  manufacturers,  importers  and  dealers 
licensed  under  Title  XI.  You  told  us,  further,  that  the  total  number  of  permits 
and  licenses  was  6,320.  Against  this  you  have  a  total  of  1,800  men  involved  in 
inspection  and  enforcement. 

Answer.  We  believe  that  our  current  manning  level,  supported  by  MESA  and 
State  cooperative  programs,  is  adequate  at  this  time  to  meet  our  statutory 
responsibilities.  Additionally,  our  program  in  voluntary  compliance  activities 
with  the  industry,  distributor  and  consumer  is  designed  to  supplement  our 
limited  manpower  resources. 

The  men  identified  in  your  question  are  the  total  number  of  ATF  special 
agents  available  for  criminal  enforcement  investigations.  In  addition,  we  have 
682  inspectors  engaged  in  application  and  compliance  inspections. 

(2)    ATF   JURISDICTION 

Question.  For  the  purpose  of  clarification,  does  the  Bureau  of  Alcohol,  Tobacco 
and  Firearms  have  exclusive  and  sole  jurisdiction  over  the  Federal  laws  govern- 
ing the  manufacture,  sale  and  use  of  exi^losivesV 

Answer.  The  Bureau  has  exclusive  jurisdiction  with  respect  to  the  regulatory 
provisions  of  Title  XI  of  the  Organized  Crime  Control  Act  of  1970  (18  U.S.C. 
Chapter  40),  which  among  other  things  regulates  the  manufacture,  storage, 
and  sale  of  explosive  materials  (see  18  U.S.C.  *  *  *  841-843).  Users  of  explosive 
materials  who  acquire,  transport,  or  ship  explosive  materials  in  interstate  or 
foreign  commerce  must  obtain  a  Federal  permit  and  comply  with  regulations 
under  Ohapt-er  40.  The  Bureau  does  not  regulate  the  actual  use  of  explosives. 
Those  Federal  agencies  regulating  the  use  of  explosives  are  the  Department  of 
Defense  through  the  Defense  Supply  Agency,  the  Department  of  the  Interior 
through  the  Mining  Enforcement  and  Safety  Administration  (MESA)  and  the 
Bureau  of  Mines,  and  the  Department  of  Labor  through  the  Occupational  Safety 
and  Health  Administration  (OSHA).  The  Department  of  Transportation  reg- 
ulates the  transportation  of  explosives. 

(3)     LICENSING 

Question.  What  basic  criteria  determine  whether  or  not  an  individual  is 
accei>table  and  may  be  granted  a  manufacturer's,  dealer's  or  importer's  license? 

Answer.  In  order  for  an  applicant  to  qualify  for  a  Federal  explosives  license  or 
permit,  the  person  making  such  application  must  be  21  years  of  age  or  over: 
must  not  be  a  person  to  whom  the  distribution  of  explosive  materials  would  be 
unlawful  under  18  U.S.C,  Chapter  40,  Section  842(d)  ;  must  not  have  wilfully 
violated  any  of  the  provisions  of  18  U.S.C,  Chapter  40  or  of  Part  181  of  Title  27 
of  the  Code  of  Federal  Regulations ;  must  have  premises  in  the  State  from  which 
he  intends  to  conduct  business ;  must  have  a  place  of  storage  for  explosive 
materials  which  meets  the  standards  of  the  Federal  regulations  regarding  public 
safety  and  security  against  theft ;  and  must  be  familiar  with  all  published  State 
laws  and  local  ordinances  relating  to  explosive  materials  for  the  location  in  which 
he  intends  to  do  business. 

IS  U.S.C,  Chapter  40,  Section  842 (d),  referred  to  above,  prohibits  the  distribu- 
tion of  explosive  materials  to  any  person  who:  (1)  is  under  21  years  of  age; 
(2)  has  been  convicted  of  a  crime  punishable  by  imprisonment  for  a  term  ex- 
ceeding one  year ;  (3)  is  under  indictment  for  a  crime  punishable  by  imprisonment 
for  a  term  exceeding  one  year ;  (4)  is  a  fugitive  from  justice  ;  (5)  is  an  unlawful 
user  of  marijuana  or  any  depressant  or  stimulant  drug  or  narcotic  drug;  or 
(6)  has  been  adjudicated  a  mental  defective. 

Qurstinn.  What  are  the  penalties  for  providing  false  information  on  an  appli- 
cation to  become  a  manufacturer  or  distributor  of  explosives? 

Answer.  A  fine  of  not  more  than  $10,000  or  imprisonment  for  not  more  than 
ten  years,  or  both. 

Question.  Y'ou  said  in  your  statement  that  there  are  594  manufacturers,  76 
importer?!  and  1411  dealers  of  explosives  licensed  under  Title  XI.  Are  all  appli- 
cants investigated  on  a  routine  basis  to  determine  the  propriety  and  legality  of 
their  application? 

Answer.  Before  any  applicant  for  a  Federal  explosives  manufacturer'.s  im- 
porter's or  dealer's  license  or  user's  permit  is  granted  such  license  or  permit, 
an  application  investigation  is  conducted.  The  manufacturer-limited  license, 
which  is  valid  for  30  days  from  the  date  of  issuance,  is  nonrenewable,  and  only 


50 

permits  the  holder  to  manufacture  explosive  materials  for  his  own  use,  and  the 
user-limited  permit,  which  is  only  valid  for  a  single  purchase  transaction,  is 
issued  without  an  inspection. 

The  scope  of  authority  of  the  Mining  Enforcement  and  Safety  Administration 
includes  regulation  of  the  storage  and  use  of  explosives  in  mining  operations. 
As  part  of  a  memorandum  of  understanding  with  ATF,  MESA  conducts  appli- 
cation aijd  compliance  inspections  of  those  explosives  licensees  and  permittees 
that  come  within  their  jurisdiction. 

Compliance  inspections  of  explosives  dealers,  manufacturers  and  users  are 
conducted  by  ATF  on  a  regular  basis.  The  average  frequency  of  these  inspec- 
tions, as  established  by  an  ATF  Order,  is  once  each  year.  The  primary  purpose 
of  the  annual  compliance  inspection  is  to  determine  if  the  licensee  or  permittee 
has  been  complying  with  applicable  laws  and  regulations.  Other  purposes  of 
these  inspections  may  be  to  instruct  a  licensee  or  permittee  of  legal  requirements, 
to  answer  his  questions  regarding  Federal  explosives  law  and  regulations,  and 
to  obtain  data  on  possible  willful  violations  for  further  investigation. 

Question.  Must  a  person  who  applies  for  a  license  to  deal  in  explosives  deal 
exclusively  in  explosives  and  have  no  other  business? 

Answer.  As  long  as  the  provisions  of  27  CFR  Part  181  are  met.  a  person  who 
applies  for  a  license  to  deal  in  explosive  materials  is  not  required  to  deal  ex- 
clusively in  explosive  materials  and  is  allowed  to  conduct  other  business  opera- 
tions. In  fact,  many  licensed  explosives  dealers  sell  explosive  materials  merely 
as  a  convenience  to  their  customers  and  in  addition  to  their  main  business  oper- 
ations, such  as  firearms  dealerships  or  hardware  stores. 

Qvrsfinn.  What  fees  are  imposed  for  becoming  a  licensed  manufacturer,  dealer, 
or  importer  of  explosives? 

Answer.  Section  8^,3 (a)  of  Title  18,  United  States  Code,  Chapter  41  pre- 
scribes a  maximum  fee  of  $200  for  each  original  licen.se  or  permit,  and  a  renewal 
fee  not  to  exceed  one-half  of  the  original  fee.  The  regulations  issued  under 
Chapter  -^0 — Title  27.  Code  of  Federal  Regulations,  part  181,  Sections  181.42 
and  181.43 — set  forth  the  actual  license  and  permit  fees  as  follows  : 

License  fees : 

(1)  Manufacturer  $50 

(2)  Manufacturer-limited    (nonrenewable) 5 

(3)  Importer 50 

(4)  Dealer 20 

Permit  fees: 

(1)  User 20 

(2)  User-limited  (nonrenewable) 2 

Note. — Each  renewal  fee  equals  one-half  the  original  fee. 

Quci^tion.  How  many  applications  for  Federal  licenses  have  been  acted  upon 
each  year  for  the  past  5  years? 


Licenses  acted  upon  1971  1972 


Oripinal 2,092  687 

Renewal - 1,  335 


Fiscal  year— 

1973           1974 

1975 

1976  > 

Total 

459             442 
1,758          1,831 

356 
2,004 

445 
1,649 

4,491 
8,577 

Total. .-_ _ 2,092  2,022  2,217  2,274  3,360  2,104  13,068 

1  Through  Mar.  31,  1976. 

Qvei^tinn.  How  many  applications  for  licenses  to  manufacture,  sell  or  import 
explosives  have  been  revoked  or  disapproved  on  a  year-by-year  basis  over  the 
past  5  years? 


Fiscal 

year— 

Licenses 

1971 

1972 

1973 

1974 

1975 

19761 

Total 

Denied 

Revoked. 

75 
0 

150 
0 

34 
0 

21 

0 

6 

1 

0 
0 

287 
1 

»  Through  Mar.  31,  1976. 


51 

Question.  You  said  in  your  testimony  that  double-base  smokeless  powder  could 
be  sold  without  restrictions  of  any  type.  Does  this  mean  to  say  that  any  person 
can  enter  a  sporting  goods  store  and  purchase  any  quantity  of  smolceless  powder 
without  a  license  or  pennit,  and  without  any  record  of  the  sale? 

Answer.  Yes,  insofar  as  Title  XI  is  concerned.  Small  arms  ammunition  and 
components  thereof  are  exempt  from  the  regulatory  provisions  of  Title  XI.  How- 
ever, the  Gun  Control  Act  of  1968  regulates  ammunition,  including  propellant 
powder  designed  for  use  in  any  firearm,  and  licensed  firearms  dealers  are  required 
to  keep  records  on  the  sale  of  smokeless  powder.  Smokeless  powder,  because  it  is 
defined  by  the  Act  as  ammunition,  cannot  be  sold  to  anyone  under  the  age  of  18. 
The  buyer  does  not  have  to  have  a  permit,  but  must  provide  the  dealer  with 
identification  before  the  sale  is  made.  The  buyer's  name  and  address,  along  with 
the  amount  of  powder  purchased,  is  entered  in  the  dealer's  permanent  firearms 
records. 

Question.  A  question  on  the  employment  of  user  permits — Assuming  that  a  user 
permit  is  given  to  a  construction  firm,  one  could  not  reasonably  expect  the  head 
of  the  construction  firm  to  drive  the  truck  that  picked  up  a  load  of  explosives  from 
the  distributor.  What  comliination  of  procedures  is  used  to  enable  the  distributor 
to  determine  first,  that  the  {permit  in  question  is  a  valid  one,  and  secondly,  that 
the  person  driving  the  pickup  vehicle  is  acting  with  the  authority  of  the  per- 
mittee? Can  a  manufacturer  or  distributor,  if  there  is  any  question  about  a  per- 
mit, put  in  a  call  to  an  office  in  ATF  for  the  purpose  of  double-checking?  Are 
manufacturers  and  distributors  encouraged,  where  any  question  exists,  to  use  the 
phone  for  the  purpose  of  confirming  the  bona  fides  of  the  person  driving  the 
pickup  vehicle? 

Answer.  In  the  example  you  have  given,  the  construction  firm  which  holds  an 
explosives  user  permit  would  be  required  by  regulations  to  furnish  to  the  dis- 
tributor a  certified  copy  (in  the  case  of  a  user-limited,  the  original)  of  their 
permit.  A  distribiitor  cannot  lawfully  make  an  explosives  transaction  with  an- 
other licensee  or  permittee  without  first  verifying  the  identity  and  status  of  that 
licensee  or  permittee. 

ATF  urges  all  explosives  dealers  to  require  whatever  information  they  deem 
necessary  and  within  reason  in  order  to  verify  the  identity  and  licensed  status 
of  distributee  licensees  or  permittees  with  whom  they  do  business.  After  the 
permittee  in  your  example  furnishes  a  certified  copy  of  their  permit  to  the  dis- 
tributor, they  would  not  be  required  to  again  furnish  such  certified  copy  to  that 
distributor  during  the  term  of  the  current  permit.  The  construction  firm  would 
also  be  required  to  furnish  the  licensed  distributor  with  a  current  certified  list 
of  representatives  or  agents  authorized  to  acquire  explosive  materials  on  behalf 
of  the  business,  ^^'^^en  the  possession  of  explosive  materials  is  transferred  at  the 
distributor's  premises,  the  distributor  is  required  to  verify  the  identity  of  the 
person  accepting  possession  on  behalf  of  the  distributee  before  relinquishing  such 
possession. 

If  the  construction  firm  sends  an  employee  who  is  not  an  authorized  agent  of 
the  business  on  the  current  certified  list  to  pick  up  explosives  from  the  distributor, 
for  example  a  truck  driver,  then  the  driver  will  be  required  to  identify  himself 
and  to  complete  and  sign  Section  A  of  Form  4721,  Explosives  Delivery  Record. 

ATF  encourages  explosives  licensees  and  permittees  to  call  the  nearest  ATF 
office  when  questions  or  problems  arise.  However,  although  ATF  can  cerify  to  a 
licensed  distributor  the  status  of  a  licensee  or  permittee  desiring  to  acquire  ex- 
plosives, we  would  be  unable  to  confirm  the  bona  fides  to  a  person  driving  a 
vehicle  to  pick  up  explosives.  We  would  suggest  that  the  distributor  contact  the 
distributee  if  any  problem  arises  in  such  circiunstances. 

Question.  The  sample  copies  you  gave  the  subcommittee  of  ATF  Form  4706. 
which  is  a  license  for  manufacturers,  importers  or  dealers  in  explosives,  and  ATF 
Form  4708,  which  is  a  permit  for  the  use  of  explosives,  appear  to  suffer  from  a 
number  of  weaknesses  from  the  standpoint  of  security. 

(a)  First,  they  are  not  printed  on  watermarked  paper,  or  other  special  paper, 
so  that  it  should  be  extremely  easy  liusiness  to  forge  printed  duplicates  ; 

(b)  Second,  neither  the  license  nor  the  permit  has  a  signature  line  for  the 
licensee  or  permittee.  This  is  rather  surprising,  because  drivers'  licenses,  social 
security  cards,  credit  cards,  and  virtually  every  other  form  of  identification  docu- 
ment does  not  require  the  signature  of  the  person  named. 

(c)  Finally,  there  is  no  serial  number  on  either  the  license  or  the  permit  form. 
Wouldn't  this  make  it  possible  for  a  dishonest  employee  to  remove  quantities  of 
either  form  from  the  ATF  offices,  without  the  theft  being  noticed?  Don't  you 


52 

think  it  would  make  sense  to  have  license  forms  and  permit  forms  as  secure  as 
such  forms  can  be  made?  Has  consideration  been  given  to  this? 

Answer.  It  is  true  that  permits  and  licenses  (ATF  Form  4708  and  4706,  re- 
spectively) are  not  printed  on  watermarked  or  other  special  paper.  This  would 
be  extremely  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  under  our  current  procedures  which  re- 
quire a  licensee  or  permittee  to  provide  certified  copies  of  his  license  or  permit 
to  all  licensees  from  whom  he  is  receiving  explosives.  Although  a  "purchasing 
copy"  of  the  license  or  permit  (Part  2  of  ATF  Form  4706  and  4708)  is  provided 
for  this  purpose  by  ATF  at  the  time  of  issuance,  a  licensee  or  permittee  is  auth- 
orized to  make  additional  certified  reproductions  of  his  license  or  permit  to  pro- 
vide to  each  explosives  distributor  with  whom  he  is  doing  business.  Since  these 
certified  copies  would  not  be  printed  on  special  paper,  we  believe  it  would  serve 
no  useful  purpose  to  print  the  original  license  on  watermarked  or  other  special 
paper. 

(b)  Part  2  (Purchasing  Copy)  of  the  license  and  of  the  permit  does  require 
the  signature  of  the  licensee  or  permittee  in  order  to  verify  that  the  copy  is  au- 
thentic. Any  additional  reproductions  must  be  made  from  either  the  original  li- 
cense or  permit  (Part  1)  or  from  the  Purchasing  Copy  (Part  2)  and  must  be  in- 
dividually signed  for  certification. 

Since  the  original  license  or  permit  must  be  displayed  at  the  business  premises 
and  cannot  be  used  for  transaction  purposes,  we  see  no  need  to  require  that  it  be 
signed  by  the  holder. 

(c)  We  have  considered  the  possibility  of  adding  serial  numbers  to  the  forms 
used  for  explosives  licenses  and  permits.  However,  for  the  following  reasons,  we 
decided  against  doing  so  : 

1.  Each  license  and  permit  is  numbered  at  the  time  of  issuance.  This  number 
indicates  the  type  of  license,  ATF  region.  Internal  Revenue  District  or  State, 
county,  expiration  number  and  the  sequence  number.  Each  license  number  is 
associated  with  a  specific  license  and  normally  the  number  remains  the  same 
throughout  license  renewals.  We  feel  that  the  appearance  of  a  serial  number  on 
the  form  in  addition  to  the  license  number  could  result  in  confusion  for  some 
licensees  and  permittees  since  they  may  mistakenly  use  the  serial  number  in 
lieu  of  the  license  number  in  correspondence  and  in  transaction  records.  This 
would  cause  problems  for  ATF  and  the  Internal  Revenue  Service  in  acting  on 
the  correspondence  and  would  result  in  difficulties  in  attempting  to  trace  the 
movement  of  explosives. 

2.  While  the  use  of  serial  numbers  would  increase  the  security  of  the  blank 
forms,  it  would  not  prevent  persons  from  obtaining  copies  of  licenses  that  have 
already  been  issued  in  order  to  illegally  obtain  explosives.  Since  photocopies  of 
licenses  and  permits  are  routinely  produced  and  forwarded  to  explosives  sup- 
pliers in  the  course  of  business,  a  photocopy  of  a  license  could  be  illegally  ob- 
tained by  a  dishonest  employee. 

3.  The  cost  of  printing  serial  numbers,  providing  accounting  procedures,  and  re- 
porting, recording  and  tracing  missing  forms  would  be  substantial  in  terms  of 
man-hours  and  money.  Since  a  photocopy  of  a  license  can  be  used  as  readily  as  an 
original  license,  we  do  not  feel  that  the  time  and  expense  involved  in  printing 
serial  numbers  on  blank  forms  could  be  justified. 

We  feel  we  should  emphasize  at  this  point  that  every  attempt  is  made  to  assure 
the  integrity  and  honesty  of  all  ATF  employees.  There  have  been  no  known  in- 
stances involving  the  illegal  use  of  these  forms  by  any  ATF  employee  since  the 
Bureau  was  given  the  responsibility  for  the  enforcement  of  the  Organized  Crime 
Control  Act  of  1970. 

(4)     BEQULATIONS 

Qnestion.  You  said  in  your  statement  that  manufacturers,  distributors  and 
users  are  required  to  keep  complete  and  accurate  records  on  the  disposition  of 
explosives.  Could  you  provide  us  with  a  detailed  summary  of  the  regulations  they 
must  respect  with  regard  to  the  manufacture,  storing  or  transportation  of  ex- 
plosives in  interstate  commerce? 

Answer.  Persons  engaged  in  the  business  of  manufacturing  explosive  materials 
must  be  licensed  under  Title  XI.  A  licensee  may  not  lawfully  distribute  explosive 
materials  to  any  person  except  a  licensee,  a  permittee,  or  a  resident  of  the  State 
where  distribution  is  made  and  in  which  the  licensee  is  licensed  to  do  business ; 
distribute  such  materials  to  any  person  where  the  purchase,  possession,  or  use  by 
such  penson  of  the  materials  would  violate  State  or  local  law;  or  distribute  ex- 
plosive materials  to  individuals  within  certain  proscribed  categories,  e.g.,  con- 
victed felons. 


53 

With  respect  to  recordkeeping  requirements,  a  licensed  manufacturer  must 
keep  accurate  records  of  the  manufacture,  acquisition,  and  disposition  of  ex- 
plosive materials.  Additionally,  the  manufacturer  must  identify  by  prescribed 
markings  the  materials  manufactured.  ,..,•„„ 

Licensed  manufacturers  are  required  to  store  their  explosive  materials  in  con- 
formity witb  prescribed  regulations,  27  C.F.R.  Part  181,  Subpart  J-  The  actual 
transportation  of  explosives  is  not  regulated  by  the  Bureau  under  Title  XI,  but 
rather  bv  the  Department  of  Transportation. 

Question.  What  records  are  required  to  be  kept  by  manufacturers,  dealers,  or 
importers  of  explosives?  Are  copies  of  these  records  sent  to  and  maintained 

^^ Answer.  The  records  and  reports  required  under  Title  27.  Code  of  Federal 
Regulations,  Part  181,  Subpart  G,  are  specifically  :  ^  .^     .- 

1  Manufacturer's  Records  of:  (a)  Physical  inventories;  (&)  marks  of  identi- 
fication (if  any),  the  quantity  and  class  of  explosive  materials  manufactured 
or  otherwise  acquired,  and  the  date  of  manufacture  or  acquisition ;  (c)  Explosive 
materials  distributed  to  other  licensees  and  permittees  reflecting  the  marks  of 
identification,  quantity  and  class,  name  of  manufacturer  or  importer  (as 
applicable),  the  license  or  permit  number  of  the  transferee,  means  of  identifying 
the  transferee  or  transferee'vS  agent,  and  the  date  of  the  transaction;  (d)  Explo- 
sive materials  manufactured  for  the  manufacturer's  own  use,  including  (in  a 
separate  permanent  record)  the  quantity  and  class  used  daily  and  the  date  of 
such  use;  and  (e)  A  daily  summary  of  magazine  transactions  showing,  by  class 
of  explosive  materials,  the  total  quantity  received  in  and  removed  from  each 
magazine  during  the  day,  and  the  total  remaining  on  hand  at  the  end  of  the  day 
(Discrepancies  indicating  theft  or  loss  of  explosive  materials  must  be  reported 
within  24  hours. ) 

2.  Dealer's  records  of:  (a)  Physical  inventories;  (ft)  each  purchase  or  other 
acquisition  of  explosive  materials  showing  the  date  of  receipt,  the  name,  address 
and  license  or  permit  number  of  the  person  from  whom  received,  the  name  of  the 
manufacturer  and  importer  (if  any),  and  the  quantity  and  class  of  explosive 
materials  received;  (c)  explosive  materials  sold  or  otherwise  distributed  to 
another  licensee  or  permittee  showing  the  quantity  and  class  of  explosive  mate- 
rials, the  name  of  the  manufacturer  and  importer  (if  any),  the  manufacturer's 
marks  of  identification  (if  any),  the  license  or  permit  number  of  the  transferee, 
the  date  of  the  transaction,  and  the  means  of  identifying  the  transferee  or  trans- 
feree's agent;  and  {d)  a  daily  summary  of  magazine  transactions  showing, 
by  class  of  explosive  materials,  the  total  quantity  received  in  and  removed  from 
each  magazine  during  the  day,  and  the  total  remaining  on  hand  at  the  end  of  the 
day  (Discrepancies  indicating  theft  or  loss  must  be  reported  within  24  hours.) 

3.  Importers  records  of:  (a)  Physical  inventories;  (b)  quantity  and  class  of 
explosive  materials,  name  of  manufacturer,  manufacturer's  marks  of  identifica- 
tion (if  any),  country  of  manufacture,  and  date  of  importation  or  acquisition 
of  explosive  materials:  (c)  explosive  materials  distributed  to  another  licensee 
or  permittee  showing  quantity,  class,  manufacturer,  manufacturer's  marks  of 
identification  (if  any),  country  of  manufacture,  license  or  permit  number  of 
transferee,  means  of  identifying  the  transferee  or  transferee's  agent,  and  the 
date  of  the  transaction;  and  (d)  a  daily  summary  of  magazine  transactions 
showing,  by  class  of  explosive  materials,  the  total  quantity  received  in  and 
removed  from  each  magazine  during  the  day,  and  the  total  quantity  remaining 
on  hand  at  the  end  of  the  day.  (Discrepancies  indicating  theft  or  loss  of  explosive 
materials   must   be   reported   within   24   hours.) 

All  manufacturers,  dealers,  and  importers  must,  in  addition  to  the  records 
listed  above,  maintain  a  separate  record  of  sales  or  other  distributions  of  explo- 
sive materials  to  nonlicensees  and  nonpermittees  on  Forms  4710  which  reflect 
the  intended  use  of  the  explosive  materials,  the  name,  date  and  place  of  birth, 
social  security  number  or  taxpayer  identification  number,  address  and  physical 
description  of  purchaser ;  the  date  of  the  transaction,  transaction  serial  number, 
required  certification  by  the  purchaser  that  he  is  not  prohibited  by  law  from 
purchasing  explosive  materials,  the  means  by  which  the  purchaser  identified 
himself,  and  the  quantity,  class  and  type  of  explosive  materials  transferred 
(including  name  of  manufacturer  and  manufacturer's  marks  of  identification, 
if  any.) 

The  records  pertaining  to  explosive  materials  prescribed  by  27  CFR,  Part  181, 
must  be  in  permanent  form  and  must  be  retained  on  the  licensed  or  permit 
premises  for  a  period  of  not  less  than  five  years. 


54 

Copies  of  these  records  are  not  required  to  be  sent  to  ATF  (except  for  Forms 
4710,  Explosive  Transaction  Record — Nonlicense  or  nonpermittee,  which  are 
discussed  in  response  to  another  question  in  tliis  text)  ;  however,  the  records 
must  be  made  available  to  ATF  officers  for  examination  or  inspection  during 
normal  business  hours. 

Question.  If  copies  of  these  records  are  not  sent  to  ATF,  are  they  reviewed 
periodically  by  ATF  inspectors? 

Answer.  The  records  required  under  27  CFR,  Part  181,  to  be  maintained  by 
manufacturers,  dealers  or  importers  of  explosives,  must  be  made  available  to 
ATF  officers  for  examination  or  inspection.  These  records  are  reviewed  periodi- 
cally by  ATF  officers.  Operating  procedures  within  ATF  have  been  established 
calling  for  inspection  of  explosives  manufacturer's,  dealer's,  and  importer's 
records  and  premises  at  least  once  per  year. 

Question.  Are  there  any  regulations  which  require  a  personnel  security  pro- 
gram to  be  implemented  for  those  individuals  who  have  access  to  and/or  control 
over  explosives? 

Answer.  No. 

(5)     SAFEGUARDS   AND    INSPECTION 

Question.  How  much  emphasis  does  the  Bureau  place  on  prevention  as  opposed 
to  after-the-fact  investigation? 

Answer.  The  Bureau's  explosive  control  program  is  predicated  on  reducing  the 
hazards  to  persons  and  property  arising  from  the  misuse  and  unsafe  or  insecure 
storage  of  explosive  materials.  The  regulations  promulgated  in  27  CFR.  Part  181, 
and  enforced  by  ATF,  support  the  standards  of  safety  and  security  recognized 
by  the  explosives  industry.  This  program  is  designed  to  place  emphasis  on  the 
prevention  of  the  illegal  acquisition  and  use  of  explosives  for  bomb  incidents. 

Question.  With  regard  to  safeguard  systems  at  the  place  of  manufacture  or 
storage,  do  the  systems  look  towards  the  weakest  link — is  there  a  single  failure 
criterion?  For  example,  you  mentioned  the  fact  that  84%  of  the  explosives  thefts 
you  investigated  showed  that  there  had  been  illegal  entries  through  the  door  of 
the  storage  vault.  Is  this  the  weakest  link? 

Answer.  ATF,  in  meetings  with  the  IME  Security  Committee,  has  established 
that  the  lock  and  door  of  the  storage  magazine  is  the  most  widely  used  method 
of  illegal  entry.  Means  to  strengthen  this  area  are  under  study  to  determine  if 
new  types  of  locks,  haps,  hinges,  and  door  construction  methods  can  increase 
storage  security. 

Question.  Are  your  safeguards  programs  monitor-controlled  and  directed  from 
the  national  headquarters? 

Answer.  National  headquarters  develops  the  policies  and  procedures  for  the 
explosive  compliance  inspection  program  which  is  implemented  and  controlled 
by  regional  headquarters.  This  program  is  monitored  by  the  Bureau  of  Regional 
headquarters  through  review  and  analysis  of  the  results  of  compliance  inspec- 
tions and  by  monitoring  the  issuance  of  variances  of  safety  and  security 
standards. 

Question.  Could  you  provide  us  with  a  critical  evaluation  of  the  effectiveness 
of  these  programs?  How  are  these  programs  evaluated? 

Answer.  These  programs  are  evaluated  on  the  basis  of  results  achieved  as  re- 
ported to  us  by  the  industry  members  and  our  field  inspection  reports.  The  num- 
ber of  thefts  or  attempted  thefts  and  the  amount  of  explosives  stolen  are  weighed 
against  the  number  of  storage  facilities  and  the  amount  of  explosives  available 
to  determine  not  only  the  success  rate  but  the  increase  or  decrease  in  incident 
level.  At  this  point,  we  feel  the  programs  are  effective. 

Question.  Can  you  describe  for  us  any  other  problems,  not  yet  covered  in  the 
testimony,  that  you  experience  in  carrying  out  your  day-to-day  responsibilities 
in  connection  with  the  control  of  explosives? 

Answer.  The  increased  sales  of  explosives  from  demilitarized  munitions  for 
industrial  and  commercial  use  has  created  a  proltlem  since  there  is  no  manufac- 
turer's mark  of  identification,  as  required  in  27  CFR  181.109,  on  containers  of 
explosives  sold  by  the  Defense  Supply  Agency  as  surplus.  ATF  is  conducting 
meetings  with  the  Department  of  Defense  for  the  purpose  of  determining  a  course 
of  action  to  resolve  this  problem. 

Question.  Obviously,  it  would  be  difficult  if  not  impossible  to  put  a  serial  number 
on  every  stick  of  dynamite.  But  would  it  not  he  feasible  to  require  that  every  box 
of  dynamite  or  every  container  of  explosives  have  a  serial  number  printed  on  it? 

Answer.  It  would  be  technically  feasible  to  require  that  each  box  of  explosive 
materials  be  serially  numbered.  However,  the  current  system  of  requiring  the 


55 

manufacturer's  marks  of  identification  and  the  date  and  shift  of  manufacture 
on  each  container,  including  individual  sticks  of  dynamite,  enables  us  to  trace  re- 
covered explosives  from  the  point  of  manufacture  to  the  point  of  the  last  legal 
sale.  The  addition  of  serial  numbers  on  boxes  of  explosive  materials  would  not 
significantly  improve  current  tracing  capability.  It  would  impose  a  significant 
increase  in  recordkeeping  requirements  on  the  industry  since  it  is  estimated 
that  the  industry  consumes  10,000,000  boxes  annually. 

The  Explosive  Tagging  Program  proposed  by  ATF  will  not  only  provide 
the  capability  to  trace  explosives  prior  to  detonation,  but  will  also  permit  trac- 
ing the  explosives  used  in  bombs  after  they  have  exploded. 

Question.  Are  containers  of  explosives  ordinarily  strapped  and  sealed  in  a  man- 
ner which  would  make  it  difficult  to  reseal  if  they  had  been  opened  and  the  con- 
tents had  been  removed? 

Answer.  Explosives  materials  are  packaged  at  the  manufacturing  plant  in 
accordance  with  Department  of  Transportation  requirements  in  49  CFR  Parts 
100-199.  They  are  required  to  be  sealed  and  an  opened  package  of  explosives 
would  normally  be  apparent  unless  the  thief  had  access  to  similar  packaging 
accessories. 

Question.  Are  manufacturers,  distributors  and  users  required  to  designate  an 
employee  or  employees  to  supervise  and  log  all  storage  or  magazine  transactions, 
in  or  out? 

Answer.  No.  However,  it  is  a  common  practice  to  have  a  person  or  persons  dele- 
gated this  responsibility  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  records  required  under 
both  Federal  and  State  laws  as  well  as  the  normal  business  records  required  for 
ordering  explosives  materials. 

Question.  In  the  case  of  major  users,  such  as  mines,  are  withdrawals  of  explo- 
sives from  the  magazines  limited  to  designated  employees?  Or  can  any  employee 
withdraw  explosives?  How  is  the  daily  record  of  withdrawals  maintained?  Does 
the  employee  who  withdraws  explosives  have  to  sign?  Are  there  any  require- 
ments for  other  identifying  details  such  as  employee  number,  time  of  withdrawal, 
quantity  withdrawn,  etc.? 

Answer.  The  method  of  withdrawal  of  explosives  from  a  magazine,  including 
the  designation  and  identification  of  employees  authorized  to  receive  the  explo- 
sives, is  determined  by  the  owner  in  accordance  with  his  judgment  and  good  busi- 
ness practice.  ATF  regulations  only  require  that  the  inventory  be  maintained. 
The  inventory  record  includes  the  quantity  and  description  of  each  receipt  in,  and 
withdrawal  from,  the  explosive  magazines,  in  chronological  order.  It  has  been 
our  experience  that  large  users  such  as  large  mines  and  construction  sites  gener- 
ally take  a  very  responsible  attitude  toward  the  storage  of  explosives  and  do  limit 
the  withdrawal  of  explosives  to  key  personnel. 

Question.  In  your  testimony,  you  told  us  that  any  person  storing  explosive 
materials  shall  open  and  inspect  the  storage  facilities  at  intervals  not  greater 
than  .3  days  to  determine  whether  the  explosives  are  intact  or  whether  there  has 
been  any  unauthorized  entry  or  removal.  Commenting  on  this,  you  said  that  in 
your  view,  if  the  person  making  the  inspection  unlocked  the  door  of  the  magazine, 
walked  inside  and  looked  around,  and  there  appeared  to  be  the  amoimt  of  explo- 
sives that  should  be  in  there,  and  if  there  was  no  evidence  of  any  forced  entry, 
then  he  would  satisfy  this  requirement.  ...  If  containers  of  explosives  bore 
serial  markings,  so  that  they  could  be  logged  in  as  they  arrived  and  logged  out  as 
they  were  used  up,  wouldn't  it  be  realistic  to  require  the  person  making  the  in- 
spection to  check  the  containers  in  the  magazine  by  serial  number  to  see  if  any 
were  missing?  After  all,  even  in  a  fairly  big  mine,  they  probably  wouldn't  have 
more  than  100  to  200  containers  of  explosives  in  their  magazines  or  magazine  at 
any  one  time. 

Answer.  It  is  our  opinion  that  requiring  manufacturers  and  importers  to  affix 
.serial  numbers  to  containers  of  explosive  materials,  and  further  requiring  all 
licensee  and  permittees  to  "log  in"  and  "log  out"  each  container  of  explosives  on 
the  basis  of  serial  number,  would  impose  an  undue  administrative  burden  on  those 
law-abiding  citizens  acquiring,  storing,  and  using  explosive  materials  for  indus- 
trial, mining,  or  other  lawful  purposes,  in  contravention  of  Section  1101  of  Title 
XI.  Regulations  of  Explosives. 

Requiring  serialization  of  containers  would  add  an  administrative  burden  to 
manufacturers  and  importers  of  explosives  due  to  the  large  volume  (10  million 
cases)  of  explosives  consumed  by  industry  annually.  Adding  the  requirement  for 
logging  in  and  logering  out  containers  of  explosives  by  serial  number  is  not  fea- 
sible for  the  following  reasons  : 


56 

1.  Licensees  and  permittes  usually  purchase  mixed  lots  of  various  types  and 
quantities  of  explosives,  thus  leading  to  nonconsecutive  serial  numbers  and  diflQ- 
culty  in  inventorying. 

2.  Licensees  and  permittees  may  buy  and  sell  or  use  partial  cases  of  various 
types  of  explosives,  thus  posing  another  problem  to  inventorying  on  the  basis  of 
container  serial  numbers.  The  present  system,  utilizing  case  markings  as  to  class 
and  type  of  explosives,  manufacturer's  date-shift  code,  total  numbers  of  cases, 
and  daily  summaries  of  magazine  transactions ;  coupled  with  the  licensee  or  per- 
mittee being  alert  for  evidence  of  forced  entry  is  deemed  sufl5cient  to  satisfy  the 
inspection  requirement  without  imposing  an  undue  administrative  burden  on  the 
industry  members  concerned. 

Question.  A  few  more  questions  about  the  procedures  followed  in  conducting 
an  insi)ection  of  a  manufacturer  or  dealer — (a)  Do  inspectors  make  a  physical 
inventory,  and  do  they  check  this  against  the  dealer's  or  manufacturer's 
inventory? 

Answer.  During  a  compliance  inspection  of  an  explosives  licensee  or  permittee, 
ATF  inspectors  check  an  appropriate  number  of  explosives  on  hand  with  the  rec- 
ord books  to  verify  that  they  have  been  properly  recorded.  Similarly,  the  in- 
spector checks  a  representative  number  of  entries  in  the  record  books  to 
determine  that  explosives  listed  as  being  on  hand  are  actually  in  inventory.  If 
these  spot  checks  disclose  significant  discrepancies,  the  inspector  may  deem  a 
complete  physical  inventory  to  be  necessary. 

Question  (6).  Do  they  make  a  critical  evaluation  of  the  procedures  followed 
by  the  manufacturers  or  dealers? 

Answer.  ATF  inspectors  make  a  critical  evaluation  of  the  procedures  followed 
by  the  manufacturers  or  dealers  to  determine  if  these  procedures  comply  with 
applicable  laws  and  regulations.  Particular  emphasis  is  given  to  the  examina- 
tion of  the  licensee's  records  and  storage  facilities  during  these  inspections. 

Question  (c).  Where  they  do  find  shortcomings,  do  they  submit  to  the  manu- 
facturers or  dealers  written  recommendations  for  improvements  in  their  .security 
procedures — and  do  they  let  them  know  that  the  renewal  of  their  license  or 
permit  will  be  contingent  on  the  prompt  implementation  of  these  recommenda- 
tions? 

Answer.  All  nonwillful  violations  disclosed  during  a  compliance  inspection 
are  documented  on  ATF  Form  5030.5,  Report  of  Violations,  the  original  of 
which  is  presented  to  the  licensee  or  permittee.  ATF  inspectors  discuss  the  vio- 
lations noted  with  the  licensee  or  permittee  and  suggest  methods  of  compliance 
to  avoid  any  recurrence.  Licensees  and  permittees  are  informed  that  failure 
to  correct  violations  can  lead  to  revocation  or  denial  of  the  license  or  permit. 
ATF  conducts  follow-up  or  recall  inspections  of  licensees  or  permittees  found  to 
be  in  violation  to  determine  if  areas  of  noncompliance  have  been  corrected. 

Question.  Is  MESA  provided  with  information  on  the  quantity  of  explosives 
obtained  by  the  various  mines? 

Answer.  ATF  does  not  receive  reports  from  manufacturers  of  the  quantity  of 
explosive  materials  shipped  to  licensees/permittees.  However,  licensees  and 
permittees  are  required  to  keep  invoices  of  all  explosive  materials  received  and 
licensees  are  further  required  to  maintain  complete  acquisition  and  disposition 
records,  showing  the  receipt  of  all  explosives  and  their  disposition.  MESA  in- 
spectors review  these  records  during  their  inspection  of  mining  operations  under 
their  jurisdiction.  Follow  up  action  on  suspected  false  entries  could  be  made 
by  ATF.  ATF  regulations  impose  penalties  for  false  entries  into  these  records. 
"  Question.  You  previou.sly  .stated  that  in  Fiscal  1975  MESA  made  approximately 
7,200  inspections  of  explosive  storage  facilities.  As  a  ballpark  figure,  would  this 
work  out  to  one  inspection  i^r  mine  per  year,  or  several  inspections  per  year, 
or  what? 

Answer.  First  we  wish  to  correct  the  figure  of  7,200  inspections  made  by  MESA 
to  approximately  10,000. 

The  Coal  Mine  Division  conducts  quarterly  inspections  of  all  mining  operations 
under  their  jurisdiction.  Some  mines  use  no  explosives  in  their  operations. 

The  Metal  and  Nonmetal  Division  conducts  inspections  of  all  mines  and 
quarries  under  their  Jurisdiction  at  least  annually.  Underground  mines  are  in- 
spected more  frequently,  up  to  three  times  a  year. 

Question.  How  many  thefts  or  mysterious  losses  of  explosives  has  MESA 
reported  to  ATF  on  a  year-by-year  basis  over  the  past  five  years? 

Answer.  The  respon.<^ibility  for  reporting  a  theft  or  loss  is  a  licensee/permittee 
requirement  under  Federal  law.  However,  MESA  is  involved  in  ATF's  theft  re- 


57 

porting  and  education  program  and  distributes  Industry  Circulars,  poster,  forms 
and  other  information  to  mine  and  quarry  operators  under  their  jurisdiction. 

If  MESA  is  apprised  of  a  theft  or  loss  by  a  mine  operator,  the  operator  is 
advised  to  notify  ATF  promptly.  MESA  district  managers  and  ATF  regional 
supervisory  personnel  have  worked  out  a  system  of  communications  which 
appear  to  be  operating  satisfactorily.  ATF  keeps  statistics  only  on  the  total 
reports  of  thefts  or  losses.  No  actual  figures  of  theft  reports  which  MESA  may 
have  reported  to  ATF  have  been  compiled. 

Question.  How  many  instances  of  noncompliance  has  it  reported  for  the  same 
period  of  time? 

Answer.  Copies  of  their  compliance  inspections  are  forwarded  to  each  ATF 
regional  office  for  review  and  corrective  action  if  required.  These  reports  are  then 
put  in  the  respective  licen.see  or  permittee  file. 

Based  on  information  received  from  Metal  and  Nonmetal  Division  of  MESA, 
558  reports  of  noncompliance  were  reported  during  1975.  Follow-up  inspections 
were  conducted  by  MESA  to  insure  that  corrective  actions  had  been  taken. 
We  do  not  have  information  for  prior  years  relating  to  instances  of  reported 
noncompliance. 

Question.  Does  MESA  make  reports  to  ATF  on  its  inspections,  especially  on 
those  inspections  which  result  in  critical  findings? 

Answer.  A  report  of  each  explosives  inspection  by  MESA  is  furnished  to  the 
ATF  regional  office. 

Question.  Does  MESA  make  any  follow-up  to  insure  that  the  faults  it  finds 
are  corrected? 

Answer.  Yes,  MESA  has  a  recall  program.  This  is  a  re-inspection  of  the  facility 
to  insure  that  appropriate  corrective  action  has  been  taken.  A  copy  of  the  recall 
inspection  report  is  furnished  to  ATF  regional  offices  as  well  as  the  report  of 
the  inspection  that  first  disclosed  the  violation. 

Question.  As  a  result  of  the  findings  of  MESA  inspectors,  have  any  civil  or 
criminal  charges  been  brought  against  companies,  and  have  any  fines'  been  im- 
posed, or  have  any  licenses  been  revoked  or  suspended? 

Answer.  As  a  result  of  MESA  inspection  and  their  recommendation,  license/ 
permit  applications  have  been  denied.  For  example  during  1975,  MESA  recom- 
mended that  eight  applicants  not  be  issued  a  permit  because  the  applicant  did 
not  have  adequate  storage  magazines.  Subsequent  visits  to  five  of  these  applicant 
premises  disclosed  adequate  storage  magazines  had  been  prepared  and  MESA 
inspectors  recommended  issuance  of  permit. 

We  find  that  licensees/permittees  take  prompt  corrective  action  to  comply 
with  regulations  when  violations  are  called  to  their  attention.  No  licenses  or  per- 
mits have  been  revoked  as  a  result  of  findings  by  MESA  inspectors.  ATF  does  not 
have  authority  to  suspend  licenses. 

Question.  We  would  like  to  have  your  comments  on  several  paragraphs  dealing 
with  commerce  in  explosives  taken  from  Part  181  of  Title  26  of  the  Code  of  Fed- 
eral Regulations.  Section  181.127  reads  : 

"In  taking  the  inventory  required  by  (stated  subsections)  the  inventory  shall 
be  entered  in  a  record  of  daily  transactions  to  be  maintained  at  each  magazine 
of  an  approved  storage  facility.  At  the  close  of  business  of  each  day  each  licensee 
and  permittee  shall  record  by  class  of  explosive  materials,  as  prescribed  in  the 
explosives  list,  the  total  quantity  received  in  and  removed  from  each  magazine 
during  the  day  and  the  total  remaining  on  hand  at  the  end  of  the  day.  Any  dis- 
crepancy which  might  indicate  a  theft  or  loss  of  explosive  materials  shall  be  re- 
ported in  accordance  with  the  provisions  (as  required.)" 

However,  when  you  go  back  to  the  wording  of  Sections  181.122  through  181.- 
125,  it  becomes  obvious  that  the  inventory  they  are  talking  about  is  not  a  daily 
physical  inventory.  All  of  these  sections  state  that  an  inventory  shall  be  taken, 
I  quote : 

"As  of  February  12,  1971,  or  at  the  time  of  commencing  business  subsequent 
thereto,  which  shall  be  the  effective  date  of  the  license  issued  . . . ;  at  the  time 
of  changing  the  location  of  premises  to  another  region  ;  at  the  time  of  discontinu- 
ing business,  and  at  such  other  times  as  the  A.ssistant  Regional  Commissioner 
may  in  writing  require." 

This  appears  to  mean  that  the  inventory  called  for  under  Section  181.127  is 
simply  a  bookkeeping  inventory — that  all  they  do  is  add  to  the  book  inventory  for 
the  previous  day  the  quantity  of  explosives  received  and  the  quantity  issued 
during  the  course  of  the  day.  Wouldn't  you  agree  that  such  a  hook  inventory  is 
not  sufficient,  that  there  has  to  be  a  physical  inventory? 


58 

Answer.  We  feel  that  requiring  a  daily  physical  inventory  of  all  explosive 
materials  on  hand  would  anaount  to  an  unreasonable  burden  on  the  licensee  or 
permittee.  Particularly  for  the  licensee  or  permittee  handling  large  quantities 
of  explosive  materials,  we  feel  that  the  time  and  manpower,  and  therefore  money, 
needed  to  conduct  such  an  inventory  would  outweigh  the  advantages.  As  ex- 
pressed in  the  introductory  language  to  Title  XI,  it  is  not  the  purpose  of  the  law 
to  impose  any  undue  or  unnecessary  requirements  other  than  those  reasonably 
necessary  to  carry  out  the  provisions  of  Title  XI. 

The  daily  inventories  prescribed  by  Section  181.127,  seem  to  be  adequate  for 
pointing  out  discrepancies  which  may  indicate  a  theft  or  loss  of  explosive  materi- 
als. Complete  physical  inventories  are  required  to  be  taken  at  the  time  of  com- 
mencing business,  which  shall  be  the  effective  date  of  the  license  issued  upon 
original  qualification  under  our  regulations ;  at  the  time  of  changing  the  location 
of  the  premises  to  another  ATF  region ;  at  the  time  of  discontinuing  business ; 
and  at  such  other  times  as  the  regional  director  may  in  writing  require.  In  addi- 
tion, during  routine  compliance  inspections,  ATF  inspectors  check  the  explosives 
on  hand  with  the  licensee's  or  permittee's  records  to  verify  that  records  are  being 
properly  maintained  and  that  the  explosives  recorded  are  actually  in  inventory. 

Question.  If  this  is  so,  wouldn't  this  almost  render  meaningless  a  requirement 
that  licensees  or  permittees  report  theft  of  loss  of  explosives  within  24  hours  of 
discovery?  It  might  take  them  months  or  more  to  discover  a  theft  or  loss — or, 
more  probably,  they  wouldn't  discover  it  at  all? 

Answer.  Regulations  require  that  magazines  be  checked  at  least  every  3  days 
to  insure  that  the  explosives  are  intact  and  that  there  has  been  no  unauthorized 
entry  into  the  magazine.  For  the  most  part,  a  theft  or  loss  is  discovered  when  a 
forced  entry  into  the  magazine  has  been  made.  Thus,  the  statutory  requirement  in 
Title  XI  that  thefts  or  losses  of  explosives  be  reported  within  24  hours  of  dis- 
covery is  not  a  meaningless  requirement.  The  thefts  or  losses  that  are  not  dis- 
covered are  mainly  internal.  Explosives  stolen  by  employees  can  remain  un- 
detected, since  the  required  records  of  disposition  can  be  adjusted  to  conceal 
the  theft  and  even  a  physical  inventory  would  not  reveal  any  discrepancy. 

Question.  Circumstances  will  obviously  vary  from  one  installation  to  another — 
but  wouldn't  it  be  reasonable  to  require  that  manufacturers,  distributors  and  in- 
dustrial users  conduct  physical  inventories  at  specified  intervals?  A  manufac- 
turer obviously  could  not  be  required  to  conduct  a  daily  inventory— in  this  case  it 
might  be  once  a  week  or  once  a  month.  But  it  does  seem  that  the  mines,  which 
use  the  bulk  of  explosives  produced  in  our  country,  and  which  generally  work 
with  limited  quantities  in  their  storerooms,  could  be  required  to  conduct  daily 
inventories  without  imposing  any  undue  economic  hardship  on  them? 

Answer.  As  discussed  in  the  previous  two  questions,  we  feel  it  would  be  un- 
reasonable to  require  explosives  licensees  and  permittees  to  conduct  frequent 
physical  inventories.  In  the  case  of  mines,  large  quantities  of  explosives  are 
used,  but  generally  operations  are  planned  so  that  only  those  limited  quantities 
required  for  one  or  two  days'  blasting  are  stored  on  hand.  Although  frequent 
inventories  under  such  conditions  might  possibly  be  conducted  with  less  of  a 
hardship,  there  would  be  little  purpose,  since  all  the  explosives  on  hand  would 
be  used  during  the  one  or  two  days  and  no  explosives  would  remain  to  be  ac- 
counted for.  Also,  the  Mining  Enforcement  and  Safety  Administration  (MESA) 
performs  inspections  of  the  storage  and  use  of  explosives  at  coal  mines  quar- 
terlv  and  at  metal  and  non-metal  quarries  and  mines  annually. 

Question.  Section  181.126  of  Title  27  of  the  Code  of  Federal  Regulations  says 
that  a  licensee  or  permittee  cannot  distribute  explosives  to  a  non-licensee  or  non- 
permittee  unless  he  records  the  transaction  on  a  Form  4710.  The  Section  said 
that  a  copy  of  the  Form  4710  is  to  be  retained  by  the  licensee  and  another  copy 
sent  to  ATF.  Each  Form  4710  is  required  to  be  maintained  in  numerical  order 
commencing  with  number  1.  When  the  number  reaches  one  million,  an  alphabet- 
ical prefix  or  sniffix  cnn  be  affixed.  A  few  questions  about  this  procedure — 

(a)  Form  4710  says  that  explosive  materials  shall  not  be  distributed  to 
anv  companv  unless  the  order  or  requisition  is  signed  by  a  person  whose  name  ap- 
pears on  the  certified  list  provided  by  this  company,  in  accordance  with  regula- 
tions In  nccepting  and  filing  Forms  4710,  is  the  seller  required  to  mnke  any  check 
of  the  signature  affixed  to  the  4710  against  the  signatures  certified  as  being 
authorized  to  acquire  explosive  materials  on  behalf  of  their  companies? 

Answer.  No.  The  certified  list  of  representatives  or  agents  authorized  to  acouire 
explosive  materials  must  contain  the  name,  address,  and  date  and  place  of  birth 
of  ench  representative  or  agent :  signatures  of  these  individuals  are  not  required 
by  the  regulations.  When  a  person  whose  name  appears  on  the  certified  list  pur- 


59 

chases  explosives  on  behalf  of  the  company  who  provided  the  list,  that  person 
must  present  proper  identification  to  the  distributor  and  execute  Form  4710.  An 
employee  not  on  the  certified  list  may  accept  custody  of  explosives  for  the  distrib- 
utee, if  the  distributee  has  executed  Form  4710  and  the  employee  identifies  him- 
self and  executes  Form  4721,  Explosives  Delivery  Record,  at  the  time  he  receives 
the  explosives  at  the  distributor's  premises.  In  all  cases,  the  distributor  is  re- 
quired to  verify  the  identity  of  the  person  acquiring  the  explosives. 

Question  (b).  Are  Forms  4710  maintained  by  each  regional  ATF  office?  Or  is 
some  provisions  made  for  centralizing  the  copies  of  all  Forms  4710  filed  with 
regional  ATF  offices? 

Answer.  ATF  Forms  4710  are  not  maintained  in  ATF  regional  offices.  These 
forms,  which  are  copies  of  originals  maintained  by  the  licensee  or  permittee, 
are  distributed  by  the  regional  office  to  the  appropriate  district  office.  The 
district  office  then  forwards  the  Form  4710  to  the  appropriate  post  of  duty 
where  it  is  retained  until  it  is  no  longer  needed  for  investigative  purposes.  The 
form  is  then  destroyed. 

Question  (c).  In  view  of  the  tremendous  quantity  of  Forms  4710  filed  with 
ATF  regional  offices,  wouldn't  it  be  essential  to  computerize  this  information  if 
the  records  are  to  be  used  in  a  meaningful  way  ? 

Answer.  At  present,  we  screen  the  names  of  purchasers  for  criminal  record 
name  checks  through  Federal,  state  and  local  law  enforcement  files.  We  also 
screen  for  unusual  quantities  and  types  of  explosives  being  bought  for  the 
stated  purposes.  We  have  not  computerized  this  information  for  two  reasons: 
(1)  Our  current  ADP  capability  is  inadequate;  (2)  The  propriety  of  main- 
taining computerized  files  on  large  numbers  of  legal  purchasers  of  explosives  is 
questionable. 

Question.  If  an  explosive  materials  business  is  discounted  and  there  is  no 
successor,  the  only  requirement  under  Title  26  appears  to  be  to  deliver  all 
required  records  to  appropriate  authorities  within  30  days.  What  followup,  if 
any,  is  made  to  determine  the  authenticity  of  these  records  and  to  verify  that 
any  explosives  on  hand  when  the  business  was  discontinued,  were  properly 
disposed  of? 

Answer.  As  of  now,  the  only  requirement  is  delivery  of  the  records  t-o  the 
appropriate  regional  director.  However,  we  are  studying  the  possibility  of 
conducting  final  inspections,  where  the  discontinuance  of  the  business  is  absolute, 
to  determine  the  accuracy  and  completeness  of  the  records.  In  addition.  Forms 
4710  would  be  spot  checked  for  proper  execution  and  disposition,  and  any  unusual 
or  suspicious  explosives  sales,  in  terms  of  numbers  or  types  of  explosives,  would 
be  further  investigated.  Also,  the  proper  disposition  of  all  explosives  on  hand  at 
the  time  the  business  was  discontinued  would  be  verified. 

Question.  As  you  pointed  out  in  your  testimony,  storage  facilities  are  required 
to  be  inspected  at  intervals  not  greater  than  3  days  in  order  to  determine 
unauthorized  entry,  attempted  entry,  removal,  etc.  What  records  are  required  to 
show  that  this  requirement  is  met? 

Answer.  There  are  no  recordkeeping  requirements  which  would  verify  that 
storage  facilities  are  being  inspected  at  intervals  not  greater  than  three  days. 
We  previously  considered  imposing  such  a  requirement;  however,  several 
difficulties  were  brought  to  light. 

First  of  all.  Title  XI,  Section  842(F),  authorized  the  Secretary  to  acquire 
recordkeeping  by  regulation.  However,  such  records  are  in  connection  with  the 
manufacture,  importation,  purchase,  distribution  or  receipt  of  explosive  materials. 
ATF's  legal  authority  to  require  the  keeping  of  records  relating  to  a  function 
not  involving  any  distribution  or  transaction  activity,  such  as  the  inspection 
of  a  storage  facility,  is,  therefore,  questionable. 

Secondly,  while  our  statutory  authority  with  respect  to  the  storage  of  explosive 
materials  applies  to  "any  person",  we  do  not  have  legal  authority  to  require 
records  to  be  kept  by  anyone  other  than  a  licensee  or  permittee.  Thus,  while 
the  requirement  to  inspect  storage  facilities  applies  to  "any  person  storing 
explosive  materials,"  any  recordkeeping  requirement  in  this  regard  would  only 
apply  to  licensees  and  permittees.  Many  explosives  users  in  this  country  do  not 
possess  either  a  licence  or  a  permit  since  they  obtain  their  explosives  intrastate. 

Finally,  even  if  records  were  required  to  be  maintained,  there  would  still  be  a 
question,  in  many  cases,  as  to  whether  the  entries  (and  in.spections)  were  actually 
made  on  the  dates  indicated.  Thus,  we  feel  that  the  extent  of  increased  com- 
pliance with  the  inspection  Teouireraent  that  would  result  from  the  imple- 
mentation of  such  a  recordkeeping  provision  would  probably  be  minimal. 


60 

Question.  Your  testimony  indicated  that  a  non-licensee  or  non-permittee 
is  permitted  to  buy  almost  unlimited — at  least  very  large — quantities  of  ex- 
plosives by  filling  out  a  Form  4710.  You  also  indicated  that  there  would  be 
nothing  to  prevent  a  i)erson,  using  a  series  of  4710's,  apparently  either  gen- 
uine or  fraudulent,  from  making  a  number  of  fairly  large  purchases  of  ex- 
plosives. At  another  point,  you  said  that  copies  of  the  Form  4710  are  for- 
warded to  ATF  and  that  by  this  means  you  would  be  able  to  determine 
if  there  were  suspicious  sales  of  explosives.  Are  the  Forms  4710  subjected 
to  a  prompt  and  regular  scrutiny?  Has  ATF,  in  fact,  ordered  investigations 
on  the  basis  of  Forms  4710  indicating  the  sale  of  any  suspicious  quantities 
of  explosives  ? 

Answer.  Yes.  ATF  Forms  4710  which  are  received  in  the  regional  and  dis- 
trict oflBces  are  handled  in  an  expeditious  manner  to  ensure  that  the  informa- 
tion on  the  form  will  be  timely  when  received  by  the  resident  agent  in  charge 
at  the  post  of  duty.  The  Bureau  requires  that  the  resident  agents  in  charge 
promptly  review  the  Form  4710  for  any  irregularities  and  initiate  such  action 
or  investigation  as  may  be  indicated.  Special  agents  of  the  Bureau  have 
initiated  numerous  investigations  as  a  direct  result  of  a  review  of  the  Form 
4710. 

Question.  You  suggested  that  you  could,  by  regulation,  impose  some  kind 
of  notice  on  the  licensee  when  a  purchase  was  more  than  a  certain  amount 
of  dynamite,  for  example.  100  pounds.  100  pounds  of  dynamite  is  an  awful 
lot  of  dynamite ;  it  could  kill  a  lot  of  people.  Would  it  not  be  in  the  public 
interest  to  require  that  anyone  purchasing  a  substantial  quantity  of  dyna- 
mite— say  25  pounds  or  more — even  on  a  one-time  basis,  be  required  to  obtain 
a  permit  rather  than  simply  filling  out  a  Form  4710? 

Answer.  Of  course,  any  such  requirement  would  necessitate  an  amendment 
to  Title  XI.  Presently,  permits  are  required  only  for  those  users  who  acquire, 
transport,  or  ship  explosive  materials  in  interstate  or  foreign  commerce.  In 
our  opinion,  the  proposal  would  be  impractical  from  a  law  enforcement  stand- 
point since  legitimate  users  would  obtain  the  permit  to  purchase  25  pounds  or 
more  of  explosive  materials  but  persons  other  than  law-abiding  citizens  could 
easily  circumvent  the  permit  requirement  by  obtaining  smaller  quantities  from 
several  sources.  Thus,  the  proposal  would  needlessly  burden  legitimate  users. 

Question.  In  your  testimony,  you  said  that  you  "would  have  to  admit  that 
we  are  doing  far  from  the  job  we  feel  is  adequate  in  terms  of  the  4710's.  in 
following  up  on  the  purchaser  to  determine  if  he  is  storing  those  explosives 
in  a  safe  manner,  or  if  he  is  using  them  for  the  stated  purpose  when  he 
purchased  them."  Would  you  be  prepared  to  suggest  any  regulations,  or  opera- 
tional improvements,  or  amendments  to  existing  legislation,  which  would  en- 
able you  to  do  an  adequate  job  in  following  up  on  purchasers? 

Answer.  We  do  not  feel  that  additional  legislation  or  regulations  are  needed 
in  this  area.  The  problem  is  that  ATF  does  not  have  the  resources  to  fol- 
low up  on  all  purchasers  of  explosives  to  ensure  that  the  explosives  are 
stored  in  a  safe  manner  and  used  for  the  purpose  for  which  they  were 
purchased.  We  do  investigate  suspicious  transactions,  complaints  and  intel- 
ligence leads.  In  this  regard  we  work  closely  with  other  Federal,  State 
and  local  officials  in  both  the  Regulatory  Enforcement  and  Criminal  Enforce- 
ment areas.  The  explosives  program  is  the  number  one  priority  of  ATF. 

Question.  Do  you  believe  that  the  effectiveness  of  ATF's  general  control 
over  the  manufacturer  and  distribution  of  explosives  could  be  improved  in 
any  way  by  remedial  legislation?  Can  you  offer  suggestions  for  any  legis- 
lation that  would  strengthen  ATF's  control? 

Answer.  We  feel  that  present  regulatory  control  over  the  manufacture 
of  explosive  materials  is  adequate. 

However,  Section  845(a)  of  Title  XI,  exempts  any  aspect  of  the  transporta- 
tion of  explosive  materials  via  railroad,  water,  highway  or  air  which  are 
regulated  by  the  Unitp^d  States  Department  of  Transportation  and  agencies 
thereof.  During  the  time  explosive  materials  are  in  transit,  or  being  distributed. 
ATF  has  no  control  or  jurisdiction.  We  have  learned  of  explosive  materials 
being  stolen  from  carriers  or  otherwise  lost  whi'e  in  transit.  This  is  an  area 
where  possible  legislation  may  be  promuleated  to  assure  the  safe  and  secure 
transportation  of  explosives  and  to  report  all  known  thefts. 

The  intrrnluction  of  legislation  to  reouire  a  taggant  to  identifv  explosives 
in  a  post-blast  situation,  and  the  identification  of  permissive  explosives,  used 
in  mines,  plus  a  taggant  for  the  detection  of  explosives,  could  be  a  Federal 


61 

requirement  that  would  materially  aid  in  the  detection  and  identification  of 
select  explosives  materials  for  public  safety  and  security  purposes. 

It  was  suggested  by  IME  and  the  International  Society  of  Explosive  Special- 
ists during  the  explosive  control  hearing  in  1970.  that  legislation  require, 
training,  testing,  and  licensing  of  all  users  of  explosives. 

(6)     THEFTS 

Question.  When  you  speak  about  "thefts,"  does  this  also  include  mysterious 
disiapi)ea ranees  where  there  is  no  evidence  of  forcetl  entry  and  no  other  hard 
evidence  that  a  theft  has  actually  occurred?  In  the  nuclear  industry  they  have 
a  category  of  disappearances  covered  by  the  words  "Massing — Unaccounted  for." 
Does  a  similar  category  exist  covering  mysterious  disappearances  of  explosives 
anywhere  along  the  line?  If  it  does  exist,  are  licensees  retiuired  to  submit  reports 
on  all  such  disappearances  as  soon  as  they  are  discovered? 

Answer.  In  ATF  terminology  the  term  "'theft"  does  not  include  "mysterious 
disappearances"  of  explosives.  Disappearances  of  explosives,  mysterious  or  other- 
wise, are  classified  as  losses  and  Fedei^al  regulations  require  the  reporting  of  ex- 
plosive losses  by  persons  or  licensee  within  24  hours  of  discovery.  To  ensure  the 
timely  de'tection  and  report  of  such  losses,  a  licensee  is  required  to  take  a  daily 
inventory  of  his  iStock. 

Question.  Are  the  thefts  of  explosives  growing?  Could  you  provide  the  sub- 
committee with  a  breakdo^'n  for  the  past  five  years,  covering  the  total  quantity 
of  the  explosives  lost  or  stolen,  their  value,  their  breakdown  by  class  and  tyjje? 
Could  you  also  let  us  know  whether  this  breakdown  indicates  the  existence  of 
regional  patterns,  or  whether  the  pattern  appears  pretty  uniform  nationwide? 

Answer.  ATF  has  been  collecting  and  Storing  data  in  a  retrievable  form  con- 
cerning thefts  since  1972.  Although  the  number  of  reports  received  have  fluctuated 
during  that  period,  the  number  reported  in  1975  was  the  highest  in  the  four  year 
period. 

1972  248 

1973  211 

1974  223 

1975   273 

Prior  to  1975  it  was  more  difficult  to  provide  meaningful  data  depicting  the 
quantity  and  type  of  stolen  explosive  materials.  Since  we  amended  our  data  col- 
lection procedures  during  1975,  more  detailed  and  accurate  information  is  avail- 
able. 

For  the  years  1972,  1973,  and  1974  our  figures  are  as  follows  : 


Year 


Number  of 
thefts 


Total  pounds  stolen 


High* 


Low" 


Average ' 


1972... 
1973... 
1974... 

1975  2. 


248 

172, 975 

211 

128, 752 

223 

113,350 

Explosives 

(pounds) 


58,  COO 


81,  844 
58,715 
56,  829 


Electric 

blasting 

caps 


Detonating 

cord 

(feet) 


111,700 


90,  000 


127, 409 
93,  733 
85,  089 


Nonelectric 

blasting 

caps 


7,500 


•  The  ADP  reporting  system  in  use  at  that  time,  allowed  for  a  variable  range  of  pounds  reported  stolen. 
2  With  our  amended  procedures,  these  ar  figures  fore  the  1975. 

Que.9tion.  Have  there  been  any  thefts  of  explosives  from  military  installations? 
If  so,  are  the  military  required  to  report  such  thefts  in  the  same  manner  as 
licensees?  Could  you  provide  the  Subcommittee  with  the  figures  for  the  past  five 
years  for  thefts  from  military  installations? 

Answer.  The  Army  has  reported  a  small  amount  of  explosives  stolen  on  sev- 
eral occasions.  We  have  received  no  such  reports  of  loss  from  the  other  branchesi 
of  the  Armed  Forces.  You  are  reminded  that  the  military  is  exempt  from  the  pro- 
visions of  the  law.  Therefore,  they  are  not  required  to  report  such  thefts  as  are 
licensees,  making  it  impossible  to  provide  the  amount  of  explosives  stolen  from 
military  installations. 


62 

Question.  You  told  the  Subcommittee  that  licensees  are  required  to  report  all 
thefts  within  a  24-hour  period.  Does  this  mean  24  hours  from  the  time  of  dis- 
covery or  24  hours  from  the  time  of  theft? 

Answer.  Section  842 (k),  Title  XI,  Chapter  40,  Organized  Crime  Control  Act 
of  1970  states :  "It  shall  be  unlawful  for  any  person  who  has  knowledge  of  the 
theft  or  loss  of  any  explosive  materials  from  his  stock,  to  fail  to  report  such 
theft  or  loss  within  twenty-four  hours  of  discovery  thereof,  to  the  Secretary  and 
to  appropriate  local  authorities." 

Question.  Does  it  not  sometimes  happen  that  thefts  are  not  discovered  until 
some  days  after  they  have  taken  place?  In  a  case  like  that,  might  there  not  be  a 
disposition  to  overlook  the  theft  in  order  to  avoid  the  possibility  of  a  charge 
that  they  had  delayed  excessively  in  reporting  the  theft,  or  that  they  had  been 
lax  in  discovering  it? 

Answer.  Although  actual  figures  are  not  available,  there  have  been  many  in- 
stances wherein  thefts  are  not  discovered  until  some  days  after  they  have  taken 
place.  Explosives  storage  facilities  are,  for  safety  reasons,  often  located  in  re- 
mote areas.  These  facilities  may  not  be  used  or  visited  for  several  days,  de- 
pendent upon  business  demands.  Upon  arrival  at  the  storage  facility  an  employee 
discovers  that  a  breaking  and  entering  has  occurred  and  that  explosives  have 
been  stolen.  After  the  discovery  the  licensee  or  permittee  usually  reports  the 
theft  promptly. 

It  would  be  contrary  to  the  best  interest  of  the  licensee  or  permittee  to  over- 
look the  theft  in  order  to  avoid  the  possibility  of  a  charge  that  they  had  delayed 
excessively  in  reporting  the  theft  or  that  they  had  been  lax  in  discovering  it. 
To  do  so  would  place  them  in  violation  of  Section  181.165,  Title  26,  C.F.R.,  which 
reads:  "Any  person  who  has  knowledge  of  the  theft  or  loss  of  any  explosive 
materials  from  his  stock  and  fails  to  report  such  theft  or  loss  within  24  hours  of 
discovery  thereof  in  accordance  with  §  181.30,  shall  be  fined  not  more  than  $1,000 
or  imprisoned  not  more  than  1  year,  or  both." 

Therefore,  it  is  unlikely  that  such  a  course  of  action  would  be  pursued  by 
licensees  and  permittees. 

Question.  In  what  segment  of  the  explosives  handling  process  have  most  of 
the  thefts  occurred — manufacturing,  distribution,  transportation,  or  use?  Could 
you  provide  any  estimate  of  how  thefts  break  down  between  the  four  basic  sectors 
in  the  explosives  handling  process? 

Answer.  From  a  review  of  the  types  of  incidents  reported  to  ATF,  thefts  occur 
most  frequently  at  the  distribution  and  user  level  and  are  less  common  during 
the  manufacturing  and  transportation  process.  It  should  be  emphasized  that 
thefts  occurring  during  transportation  are  not  required  to  be  reported  to  ATF. 

Question.  Could  you  provide  us  with  an  outline  of  the  various  programs — edu- 
cational, regulatory,  inspectional,  etc.— that  ATF  employs  to  deter  the  theft  of 
explosives? 

Answer:  ATF's  educational,  regulatory  and  inspectional  programs,  as  they 
relate  to  stolen  and  lost  explosives,  have  two  main  objectives;  (1)  to  aid  in 
detering  thefts,  and  (2)  to  maximize  prompt  reporting  of  explosives  thefts  and 
losses. 

In  regard  to  the  first  objective,  api>licants  for  explosives  licenses  and  permits 
are  required  to  describe  in  detail  on  their  applications  the  construction  materials 
used  in  their  storagp  facilities  and  security  measures  taken  to  protect  the  ex- 
plosives stored  therein,  including  physical  safeguards,  locks,  and  anti-theft 
measures.  The  inspector  or  special  agent  uses  this  information,  coupled  with  the 
on-site  inspection,  to  determine  whether  or  not  the  facilities  are  in  compliance 
with  Federal  requirements.  ATF  Industry  Circular  75-10,  of  September  22.  1975, 
amplifies  upon  the  requirements  for  physical  description  of  facilities  provided 
by  applicants  on  their  application  forms.  During  subsequent  compliance  inspec- 
tions the  inspector  or  special  agent  checks  to  assure  that  the  required  security 
measures  are  in  force.  ATF  is,  of  course,  available  at  any  time  to  offer  technical 
assistance  to  licensees  and  permittees  having  inquiries  or  problems  relating  to 
the  security  of  their  facilities. 

Question.  Does  ATF  investigate  each  and  every  report  of  theft,  loss,  or  unex- 
plained disappearance? 

Answer.  Every  theft,  loss,  or  unexplained  disappearance  which  comes  to  our 
attention  through  the  mandatory  reports  from  licensees  is  assigned  for  investi- 
gation and  is  investigated. 

Question.  How  are  the  investigations  of  thefts  of  explosives  handled?  On  a 
national  basis,  regional,  or  district  basis?  Are  records  of  all  such  investigations 
centralized? 


63 

Answer.  Regulations  imposed  on  licensees  require  them  to  report  thefts  to  their 
applicable  regional  director.  The  regional  director,  in  turn,  refers  the  theft  to 
the  district  office  wherein  the  licensee  is  located.  At  this  point  the  appropriate 
post  of  duty  is  assigned  the  investigation.  When  a  special  agent  acquires  an 
investigation  number,  it  is  coded  in  such  a  way  as  to  retrieve  that  and  all  similar 
investigations  from  our  computer  bank.  So,  therefore,  records  of  investigations 
are  centralized. 

Question.  Hijacking  and  cargo  thefts  are  major  national  phenomenons,  repre- 
senting $1.5  billion  per  year.  One  billion  dollars  of  this  figure  is  attributable  to 
the  trucking  industry ;  85  percent  of  non-rail  thefts  occur  at  terminals  during 
normal  working  hours,  and  involve  employees  or  personnel  of  carriers,  shippers, 
and/or  receivers  authorized  to  be  on  the  facility.  In  case  of  the  trucking  of 
explosives,  are  hijacking  and  cargo  thefts  also  critical  problems? 

Answer.  The  law.  Title  XI,  does  not  address  itself  to  the  transportation  indus- 
try. Therefore,  the  trucking  industry  is  not  required  to  report  thefts  or  losses 
to  ATF.  Consequently,  we  do  not  have  statistics  in  this  area.  However,  our 
investigations  of  explosives  incidents,  which  include  the  tracing  of  explosives, 
have  not  revealed  a  significant  problem  in  this  area. 

We  have  reviewed  reports  and  statistics  with  DOT  and  found  that  in  no  case 
did  explosives  appear  as  a  major  commodity  involved  in  hijacking  and  cargo 
thefts.  However,  the  statistics  maintained  by  DOT  are  based  on  economic  reports 
and  do  not  identify  explosives  except  as  a  general  commodity.  Since  a  few  dollars 
worth  of  explosives  are  sufficient  to  cause  death,  injury,  and  thousands  of  dollars 
of  property  damage,  we  have  continued  to  meet  with  DOT  to  determine  the  most 
practical  method  of  requiring  thefts  or  losses  of  explosives  while  in  transpor- 
tation to  be  reported  to  ATF.  Currently  18  U.S.C,  Chapter  40  and  the  imple- 
menting regulations  in  27  CFR  exempts  from  regulations  "any  aspect  of  the 
transportation  of  explosives  via  railroad,  water,  highway,  or  air  which  are  regu- 
lated by  the  United  States  Department  of  Transportation."  Legislation  may  be 
required  in  this  area. 

Question.  Have  there  been  instances  of  fraudulent  pickup  of  explosives,  and/or 
fraudulent  delivery  ? 

Answer.  Our  field  offices  report  a  total  of  25  instances  of  fraudulent  pickup 
and/or  delivery  of  explosives.  These  fraudulent  pickup  and/or  deliveries  are 
categorized  as  follows : 

Fraudulent  license  and/or  permit 5 

Incorrect  information  on  Form  4710 5 

Fraudulent  identification  by  purchaser 3 

Fraudulent  bookkeeping  by  distributor  or  others 3 

Interstate  sale  to  nonlicensee 3 

Resale  by  nonlicensee  or  permittee 2 

Sales  to  undercover  special  agent 2 

Employee  stole  explosive  and  sold  same  out  of  state 1 

Unlawful  manufacture  and  sale 1 

Question.  Have  invesstigations  shown  many  instances  of  collusion  or  collabora- 
tion between  employees  and  others  relating  to  explosives  thefts. 

Answer.  Investigations  have  revealed  86  instances  of  collusion  or  collabora- 
tion between  employees  and  others  relating  to  explosives  thefts. 

Question.  Studies  indicate  that  75  percent  of  hijacked  cargo  passes  through 
organized  crime  hands.  What  is  known  of  the  involvement  of  organized  crime 
on  the  flow  of  illicit  explosives?  Is  it  a  major  activity  on  the  part  of  organized 
crime,  or  is  it  a  fringe  operation? 

Answer.  Investigations  conducted  by  ATF  since  1970  indicate  that  elements  of 
organized  crime  have  frequently  been  the  users  of  illicit  explosives,  primarily 
in  labor  and  racketeering  related  incidents,  however,  there  have  been  no  indi- 
cations that  explosives  are  a  major  part  of  organized  crime's  hijacking  operations. 

Explosive  materials,  because  of  their  general  availability  and  inexpensive 
nature,  have  not  in  the  past  been  conducive  to  large  scale  cargo  hijacking  and 
black  market  activities. 

(7)    BOMBING 

Question.  You  said  in  your  statement  that  your  Bureau  has  joint  responsibility 
with  the  FBI,  for  enforcing  six  of  the  sections  of  Title  XI  of  the  Organized  Crime 
Control  Act  of  1970,  dealing  with  the  use  of  explosives  for  criminal  purposes. 
Doesn't  this  divided — or  joint  responsibility  sometimes  make  for  confusion? 
Haven't  there  been  instances  where  both  agencies  claimed  jurisdiction?  Wouldn't 


64 

there  be  an  advantage  to  having  one  agency  dealing  with  all  the  bombings, 
terrorist  and  criminal?  At  least  this  would  result  in  a  centralization  of  intel- 
ligence files  dealing  with  terrorist  bombings. 

Answer.  Both  the  Bureau  of  Alcohol,  Tobacco  and  Firearms  and  the  FBI 
recognized,  upon  passage  of  Title  XI  of  the  Organized  Crime  Control  Act  of  1970, 
that  the  joint  ATF/FBI  responsibility  imposed  by  the  act  over  the  six  violation 
areas  of  Section  844  could  occasion  some  confusion  and/or  duplication  of  effort 
at  the  field  level  in  responding  to  bombing  incidents.  Accordingly,  officials  of  the 
Department  of  the  Treasury  and  the  Department  of  Justice  met,  just  subsequent 
to  the  passage  of  the  act,  for  the  purpose  of  executing  mutually  acceptable 
jurisdictional  guidelines  relating  to  these  sections  of  the  law.  These  guidelines 
went  into  effect  on  May  11,  1971 ;  they  were  renegotiated  in  early  1973  primarily 
for  the  purpose  of  further  clarification.  Under  these  existing  guidelines,  juris- 
diction can — in  most  instances — be  readily  determined  at  the  field  level.  In  those 
relatively  few  instances  where  jurisdiction  is  not  clear  cut  under  the  guidelines, 
a  "mediator"  service  have  been  instituted  in  the  Department  of  Justice  General 
Crimes  Division  which,  telephonically,  assigns  jurisdiction  in  questionable  cases. 
In  adhering  to  these  guidelines,  jurisdictional  problems  have  been  minimal. 

As  a  matter  of  interest  in  this  same  vein,  we  have  executed  a  similar  juris- 
dictional agreement  with  the  United  States  Postal  Service  vtdth  relation  to 
bomb  and  explosive  incidents  involving  the  mails  or  postal  property. 

There  have  been  instances  where  both  agencies  claimed  jurisdiction  and, 
realistically,  we  anticipate  such  instances  will  continue  to  occur.  This  was,  of 
course,  the  very  purpose  for  the  institution  of  the  General  Crimes  "mediation" 
service.  When  such  instances  do  occur,  the  question  of  jurisdiction  is  most 
generally  raised  subsequent  to  the  on-scene  response. 

For  example,  a  bomb  may  detonate  at  a  privately  owned  place  of  business ; 
both  ATF  and  FBI  special  agents  may  respond  and  agree,  at  the  scene,  that  ATF 
had  jurisdiction.  Subsequent  to  this,  and  after  ATF  has  conducted  the  blast 
scene  search  and  submitted  potential  evidence  to  the  ATF  laboratory,  a  com- 
munique may  be  distributed  by  a  terrorist/revolutionary  group  claiming  credit 
for  the  bombing.  In  such  instances  the  function  of  the  "mediator"  is  to  weigh 
the  FBI  jurisdiction  over  terrorist/revolutionary  activities  against  the  fact 
that  ATF  is  already  well  into  the  investigation  and  has  collected,  is  analyzing, 
and  has  established  a  chain  of  custody  of  potential  evidence.  In  such  instances 
ATF  adheres  to  the  decision  of  the  mediator  as  to  jurisdiction. 

In  our  opinion  there  would  not  necessarily  be  an  advantage  to  having  one 
agency  dealing  with  all  bombings,  terrorist  and  criminal.  We  take  this  position 
for  several  reasons : 

1.  As  you  are  no  doubt  aware,  a  bombing  investigation  is  extremely  time  con- 
suming and  difficult.  It  is  not  at  all  unusual  to  have  a  team  of  20  special  agents 
working  at  the  blast  site  for  two  or  three  days  just  searching  for  evidence.  With 
the  increasing  number  of  bombing  incidents  we  are  experiencing  it  may  well  be 
advantageous  to  have  the  manpower  availability  of  several  agencies  to  conduct 
the  investigations. 

2.  Cooperative  liaison  between  ATF  and  FBI  creates  no  problem.  Whenever 
one  of  these  agencies — either  formally  or  informally — requests  assistance  from 
the  other  in  a  bombing  situation,  such  assistance  is  timely  and  adequately 
afforded. 

3.  Tliere  is  ample  precedent  for  overlapping  jurisdictions :  ATF/Customs  as 
to  certain  firearms  violations  involving  border  traffic ;  Customs/DEA  as  to  vari- 
ous drug  related  offenses ;  ATF/FBI  as  to  wagering  operations.  In  these  areas 
overlapping  jurisdictions  do  not  necessarily  entail  problems. 

4.  As  to  the  centralization  of  intelligence  files,  again,  we  have  experienced  no 
investigative  problems  in  this  area.  The  free  interchange  of  information  be- 
tween ATF  and  the  FBI  in  bombing  investigations  is  a  historic  fact,  and  these 
files  need  not,  in  my  opinion,  be  consolidated  to  afford  maximal  investigative 
effectiveness. 

Question.  In  each  instance!  where  an  explosion  occurs,  is  it  part  of  ATF's  juris- 
diction to  determine  the  source  of  the  explosive  material?  How  successful  has 
ATF  been  in  determining  the  sources? 

Answer.  Determining  the  source  of  an  explosive  material  is  within  ATF's  juris- 
diction and  is  an  investigative  tool  fully  utilized  in  all  ATF  bombing  investiga- 
tions. We  are  also  called  upon  to  trace  explosive  material  for  other  law  enforce- 
ment agencies  during  the  course  of  bombing  investigations  within  their  juris- 
diction. 


65 

In  order  to  trace  the  explosive  material  used  in  a  bombing  it  must  first  be 
identified  by  laboratory  analysis.  ATF  laboratory  experts  are  able  to  identify 
the  explosive  material  in  about  50%  of  the  cases  submitted.  At  the  present  time 
ATF  is  only  able  to  trace  the  explosives  recovered  in  predetonation  scenes  or 
where  an  explosion  has  not  entirely  destroyed  the  date-shift  code  or  other  manu- 
facturer's identification.  In  such  instances  we  have  been  about  90%  successful 
in  identifying  the  sources  of  explosives  materials.  Unsuccessful  traces  for  the 
most  part  involve  detonating  cord  and  blasting  caps,  both  electric  and  non- 
electric, which  are  recovered  after  being  removed  from  their  original  containers 
and  lack  suflScient  identification  for  tracing. 

The  initiation  of  our  explosive  tagging  program  should  enable  ATF  to  deter- 
mine the  source  of  all  explosives  or  explosives  residue  which  has  been  recovered 
and  undergone  explosives  tagging. 

Question.  How  many  of  the  explosions  which  have  occurred  in  the  past  five 
years  are  directly  related  to  the  activities  of  political  terrorist?  How  many 
have  had  a  simple  criminal  motivation? 

Answer.  ATF  has  not  collected  this  kind  of  data  for  the  period  requested. 
However,  quoting  from  the  FBI  Uniform  Crime  reports,  the  below  information 
is  available. 


11972 

1973 

1974 

1975 

Political /terrorists 

Criminal 

Unknown -. 

273 

1,539 

120 

156 

1,617 

139 

146 

1,764 

90 

186 

1,664 
130 

>  1st  year  statistics  were  gathered. 

Included  in  the  Political/Terrorists  figures  above  the  following  categories: 
anti-establishment,  extremist,  foreign  political,  political,  and  anti-war. 

Included  in  the  Criminal  figures  above  are  the  following  categories :  civil 
rights,  labor  disputes,  monetary  gain,  personal  animosity,  malicious  destruction, 
racketeering,  and  anti-religious. 

Question.  You  stated  in  your  testimony  that  explosives  come  in  many  con- 
figurations— dynamite,  black  powder,  ammonium  nitrate,  fuel  oil  mixtures, 
plastic,  water  gels  and  so  on.  If  I  understood  your  testimony  correctly,  dynamite 
was  by  far  the  most  common  explosive  used  for  criminal  and  terrorist  purposes, 
but  black  powder  and  plastic  also  play  a  role  in  such  attacks.  Would  it  be  pos- 
sible to  provide  the  Subcommittee  with  a  breakdown  of  the  type  of  explosives 
used  in  criminal  and  terrorist  bombings  in  recent  years? 

Answer.  For  the  most  recent  period  that  data  is  available,  April  1,  1975, 
through  March  31, 1976,  the  following  information  is  provided  : 

During  the  reporting  period  there  were  654  bombing  incidents  reported.  There 
were  also  185  non-detonation  incidents  reported  where  the  explosive  material 
was  recovered. 

Of  the  654  bombing  incidents,  we  were  able  to  positively  identify  dynamite  as 
being  the  explosive  material  in  137  cases.  Taking  into  consideration  that  we  are 
unable  to  determine  the  explosive  material  used  in  approximately  50  percent 
of  the  bombing  incidents,  this  is  a  large  percentage  of  the  identifiable  bombings. 
Further,  of  the  185  bombs  that  did  not  detonate,  dynamite  was  the  explosive  ma- 
terial in  59  cases. 

These  figures  are  based  upon  incidents  investigated  by  ATF  and  do  not  in- 
clude those  incidents  investigated  by  other  agencies.  ATF  is  not  charged  with 
investigating  terrorists  bombings,  therefore,  separate  statistics  are  not  avail- 
able. 

Question.  What  are  the  penalty  ranges  for  bombings  involving  property  dam 
age,  personal  injury,  and/or  the  threat  to  cause  an  explosion  to  occur? 

Answer.  In  the  case  of  property  damage,  the  penalties  prescribed  are  fines  of 
not  more  than  $10,000  or  imprisonment  for  not  more  than  ten  years,  or  both.  For 
personal  injuries,  the  penalties  are  fines  of  not  more  than  $20,000  or  imprisonment 
for  not  more  than  twenty  years,  or  both.  If  death  results  from  such  bombings, 
the  prescribed  penalties  are  any  term  of  years,  life  imprisonment,  or  death. 
Bomb  threats  are  punishable  by  fines  of  not  more  than  $5,000  or  imprisonment 
for  not  more  than  five  years,  or  both  (see  18  U.S.C.  §  844). 

Question.  You  said  in  your  testimony  that  the  bulk  of  explosives  used  in  bomb- 
ing, other  than  black  and  smokeless  powder,  is  stolen.  Would  you  be  able  to  give 


66 

us  any  kind  of  estimate  of  what  percentage  of  all  terrorist  bombings,  criminal 
and  political,  involves  stolen  explosives ;  what  percentage  of  the  bombs  involve 
black  and  smokeless  powder — and  what  percentage  involves  homemade  ex- 
plosives ? 

Answer.  We  assume  that  you  include  all  bombings  or  criminal  use  of  explosives 
in  your  term  "terrorist  bombings."  In  our  testimony,  we  expressed  our  conviction 
that  the  bulk  of  explosives  used  in  bombings,  other  than  black  or  smokeless 
powder,  was  stolen.  We  base  this  conviction  on  the  fact  that  in  approximately 
25%  of  the  bombing  cases  investigated  in  1975,  where  the  explosives  were  iden- 
tified, we  were  able  to  establish  that  the  explosive  had  been  stolen.  Further,  our 
sample  follow  up  on  purchases  of  explosives  by  licensees,  permittees,  and  individ- 
uals purchasing  explosives  on  Form  4710  indicate  that  only  in  isolated  cases 
were  explosives  used  for  other  than  lawful  purposes. 

The  percentage  of  smokeless  powder  and  black  powder  used  in  bomb  inci- 
dents as  reported  in  the  National  Bomb  Data  Center  Technical  Digest  for  1974 
and  the  first  half  of  1975  indicate  that  black  powder  was  identified  in  23%  of  the 
incidents  and  smokeless  powder  was  identified  in  25%  of  the  incidents  where  the 
type  of  explosives  was  determined.  There  are  no  available  statistics  on  the  use 
of  homemade  explosives  in  bombs. 


APPENDIX 

EXHIBIT    NO.    1 

(Referred  to  on  p.  17) 

The  following  photographs  are  scenes  of  a  bombing  which  occurred  in  McLean, 
Virginia. 

(67) 


68 


69 


70 


-c^r:^ 


[From  the  Washington  Post,  Nov.  29,  1974] 
5    ESCAPE   AS    BOMB   RIPS    $200,000    MCLEAN    HOME 

(By  Ron  Taylor  and  Margot  Hornblower) 

Federal  and  Fairfax  County  police  investigators  are  seeking  to  talk  to  business 
and  personal  associates  of  builder  William  F.  Banks  following  a  pre-dawn  blast 
that  ripped  through  his  $200,000  McLean  home  yesterday. 

Moments  before  the  explosion,  in  which  no  one  was  injured,  a  phone  call  was 
received  by  Banks'  brother,  Robert,  who  lives  in  Bethesda.  He  said  the  anonymous 
caller  told  him  :  "There  is  a  bomb  in  your  brother's  house",  and  then  hung  up.  It 
was  5  :15  a.m..  Banks  said  yesterday. 

Robert  Banks  called  his  brother's  house  at  753  Chain  Bridge  Rd.,  where  the 
telephone  rang  but  was  not  answered.  Police  said  the  explosion  occurred  at  5  :17 
a.m. 

The  blast,  described  by  police  as  being  caused  by  a  paraffin  explosive  device, 
occurred  under  a  corner  of  the  second  floor  bedroom  where  Banks  and  his  wife 
were  sleeping. 

A  spokesman  for  the  U.S.  Alcohol,  Tobacco  and  Firearms  Bureau  said  there  is 
"no  doubt  about  it  being  a  bomb.  To  do  as  much  damage  as  it  did,  it  looks  like 
it  might  be  a  dynamite  bomb,"  said  W.  H.  McConnell  of  the  bureau. 

It  could  be  heard  as  far  away  as  Cleveland  Park  in  Northwest  Washington, 
and  it  sheared  away  most  of  the  northern  face  of  the  two-story,  century -old 
refurbished  farmhouse,  shattered  the  building's  windows  and  tossed  debris  nearly 
100  yards  from  the  house. 

The  direction  of  the  blast — outward  and  away  from  the  house  instead  of  into 
the  bulk  of  the  structure— may  have  saved  the  lives  of  the  Banks  family,  said 
police  and  IT.S.  Treasury  agents  at  the  scene. 

Agents  from  the  Treasury  Department's  alcohol,  firearms  and  tobacco  division 
scoured  the  debris  for  evidence  while  county  police  investigators  nnd  FBI  agents 
collected  the  names  of  Banks'  personal  and  business  associates.  Banks  is  presi- 
dent of  the  prominent  Banks  and  Lee.  Inc.  building  firm. 

Banks  said  yesterday  that  he  could  not  single  out  who  may  have  planted  a 
bomb  or  why.  But  police  investigators  said  yesterday  they  have  singled  out  three 
names  from  the  several  given  them  by  the  family,  and  suspect  either  a  personal 
vendetta  or  reprisal  over  a  disputed  business  arrangement. 


71 

Robert  Banks  said  a  threat  was  made  on  his  brother's  life  and  that  an  attempt 
was  made  to  firebomb  his  home  at  the  beginning  of  October,  and  police  said  that 
incident  was  being  r'e-examined  in  the  wake  of  the  Thanksgiving  Day  explosion. 

The  federal  agents  were  brought  into  the  investigation  because  one  agent  said, 
"of  possible  federal  violations."  He  noted  that  "the  crimes  we're  interested  in 
include  interstate  transportation  of  explosives  and  extortion."  A  spokesman  for 
the  FBI  in  Alexandria  said,  "There  is  an  all'egation  of  extortion  and  the  matter 
is  under  investigation." 

Neither  Banks  nor  his  brother  would  elaborate  on  the  threats  but  Robert 
Banks  said  that  they  stemmed  from  "normal  disagreements.  I  don't  know  if 
they  (the  threats)  are  anything  different  from  what  happens  in  other  businesses." 

Robert  Banks  said  that  after  he  received  the  telephoned  tip  that  a  bomb  was 
planted  he  got  out  of  bed  to  look  for  his  brother's  telephone  number  and  dialed. 

"I  tried  to  reach  my  brother  but  I  didn't  get  an  answer.  It  was  ringing  on  my 
end  but  I  don't  know  whether  his  phone  was  out  of  ord'er  or  not,"  he  said. 

He  then  called  Montgomery  and  Fairfax  police,  he  said.  His  home  in  Bethesda 
later  was  searched  for  a  bomb  but  police  found  nothing. 

He  said  that  the  family's  business,  of  which  he  is  vice  president,  was  founded 
by  their  father,  William  S.  Bank.?,  37  years  ago.  The  firm's  activities  have  in- 
cluded apartment  and  home  construction  throughout  the  area.  The  firm  is  now 
working  on  Oak  Crest  Towers  in  Prince  George's  County  and  built  Th'e  Hamlets 
apartments  in  Alexandria. 

Robert  Banks  added  that  he  and  his  brother  ruled  out  the  possibility  of  a  link 
between  the  explosion  and  a  disgruntled  former  employee.  "We  have  no  sus- 
picions of  that.  We  just  don't  have  any  reason  to  think  that,"  he  said. 

He  said  that  he  reached  his  brother  after  the  family  evacuated  the  house  and 
had  been  taken  in  by  the  home  of  George  McCay  next  door. 

McCay  and  his  wife,  Evelyn,  were  asleep  on  the  enclosed  sun  porch  of  their 
home  at  the  time  of  the  blast.  McCay  said  he  did  not  h'ear  the  explosion  but  Mrs. 
McCay  said  that  when  the  blast  occurred  she  slipped  her  shoes  on,  grabbed  a 
flashlight,  and  went  looking  for  the  Banks  family. 

The  explosion  shattered  three  of  the  windows  in  the  McCay  house  and  caused 
the  door  locks  to  buckle. 

The  blast  ripped  out  the  first  frame  of  the  well-appointed  old  farmhouse. 

It  occurred  near  a  first  floor  utility  room  located  directly  under  the  bedroom 
where  William  and  Linda  Banks  were  sleeping. 

The  force  of  the  blast  collapsed  the  floor  of  the  bedroom  closet,  and  on  the 
front  of  the  house  what  was  left  of  the  plate  glass  windows  yawned  out  toward 
the  underbrush  that  faces  the  house. 

The  children  were  asleep  at  the  time  in  a  bedroom  on  the  southwest  corner  of 
the  three-bedroom  house.  They  were  separated  from  their  parents  by  another 
bedroom,  a  playroom  and  the  staircase  that  th'e  family  eventually  used  to  leave 
the  second  floor  of  the  house. 

The  driveway  leading  from  Chain  Bridge  Road  to  the  garage  on  the  property 
was  littered  with  shards  of  glass  and  splinters. 

Pieces  of  wood,  ranging  in  size  from  sl'ender  slats  to  ragged  chunks  from  the 
roof,  landed  on  the  McCay's  driveway,  front  lawn  and  property  150  yards  away. 

From  outside  the  house,  the  handsome  refurbishing  job  on  the  interior  could 
be  seen.  Banks  said  the  house  is  valued  at  .$200,000. 

The  rolling  backyard  of  the  Banks  home  overlooks  the  George  Washington 
Parkway.  Their  neighborhood  residents  include  Sen.  Edward  Kennedy  (D-Mass.) 
and  Washington  Redskins  head  coach  George  Allen. 

Police  said  the  blast  was  believed  to  be  the  first  of  its  kind  to  occur  in  Fairfax. 


72 

Exhibit  No.  2 
[Referred  to  on  p.  17] 
STATE  EXPLOSIVES  CONTROL 


State  explosive     Application  Compliance 

license  or  inspection  inspection 

State  Enforcement  responsibility  >         permit  program  program 


(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 


Alabama FM No No No. 

Alasl<a OSHA.._. Yes No. (»). 

Arizona. FM  and  M No No Mines  only. 

Arkansas FM  and  PD Yes» No No. 

California... FM,  PD  and  PS Yes  (local) Some (i). 

Colorado L  and  M Yes Yes Yes. 

Connecticut PD  and  PS Yes Yes' O). 

Delaware FM Yes Yes Yes. 

Washington,  D.C FM Yes Yes Yes. 

Florida Other Yes Yes Yes.« 

Georgia FM Yes No No. 

Hawaii.... PS Yes Yes Yes. 

Idaho L No No No.> 

Illinois FMandM Yes Yes Yes. 

Indiana FM Yes Yes ('). 

Iowa PS Yes Yes Yes. 

Kansas FM No No No. 

Kentucky M Yes No (»). 

Louisiana PS...    Yes Yes Yes. 

Maine FM Yes Yes Yes. 

Maryland FM... Yes Yes Yes. 

Massachusetts FM Yes  (local) Yes Yes. 

Michigan FM Yes Yes ('). 

Minnesota PD Yes... Yes Yes. 

Mississippi FM No No No. 

Missouri. PS Yes  (local) No No. 

Montana FM No No No. 

Nebraska FM Yes Yes Yes. 

Nevada OSHA  and  M Yes Yes Yes. 

New  Hampshire FM Yes  (local) No No. 

New  Jersey Other .' Yes Yes Yes. 

New  Mexico Other No No No. 

New  York L Yes Yes Yes. 

North  Carolina L Yes  (local) No No. 

North  Dakota FMandM No No No. 

Ohio Other Yes Yes Yes. 

Oklahoma FM No No O). 

Oregon FM Yes Yes Yes. 

Pennsylvania Other  and  M Yes Yes Yes. 

Puerto  Rico PD Yes Yes Yes. 

Rhode  Island FM Yes Yes Yes. 

South  Carolina PD No No No. 

South  Dakota FM No No Yes. 

Tennessee Other Yes No Yes.' 

Texas . FM No No No. 

Utah OSHA No No No. 

Vermont.. PS Yes No No. 

Virginia Other Yes Yes Yes. 

Washington PS  and  M Yes Yes Yes. 

West  Virginia FM Yes No No. 

Wisconsin M  and  L Yes No (')• 

Wyoming.... FM No No No. 


«  Key  to  symbols: 

FM— Fire  Marshal  or  Fire  Protection  Division. 

PD— Branch  or  Division  of  Police  Department. 

PS— Division  or  Department  of  Public  Safety. 

L— Department  of  Labor. 

OSHA— Occupational  Safety  and  Health  Administration. 

M— Bureau  of  Mines  or  Mine  Inspector. 
'  Infrequently  or  in  response  to  complaints  only. 
)  Not  being  implemented. 


73 

Exhibit  No.  3 
[Referred  to  on  p.  42] 

INVESTIGATIVE    GUIDELINES,    TITLE    XI,    ORGANIZED    CRIME    CONTROL    ACT    OF    1970 — 
REGULATION    OF   EXPLOSIVES 

1.  General 

Title  XI  of  the  captioned  law  amends  Title  18,  United  States  Code,  by  adding 
a  new  chapter  40  with  section  numbers  841  through  848  governing  the  importa- 
tion, manufacture,  distribution  and  storage  of  explosive  materials  and  creating 
certain  Federal  offenses  pertaining  to  the  unlawful  use  of  explosives.  Adminis- 
tration of  explosives  regulation  is  vested  in  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  as  is 
investigative  jurisdiction  over  the  unlawful  acts  proscribed  in  section  842.  Under 
authority  contained  in  section  846  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  (FBI) 
and  the  Bureau  of  Alcohol,  Tobacco  and  Firearms  (ATF)  have  concurrent  in- 
vestigative jurisdiction  as  to  the  remainder  of  chapter  40,  i.e.,  the  unlawful  acts 
proscribed  in  subsection  (d),  (c),  (f),  (g),  (h)  and  (i)  of  section  844.  Al- 
though not  specified  in  chapter  40,  the  Postal  Inspection  Service  shall  have  juris- 
diction to  investigate  all  incidents  involving  explosive  or  incendiary  devices  sent 
through  the  mails  or  directed  against  U.S.  Postal  Service  property. 

Title  XI  greatly  broadens  Federal  authority  pertaining  to  explosives-connected 
offenses.  At  the  same  time.  Congress  has  expressly  disclaimed  any  intent  to  oc- 
cupy the  field  to  the  exclusion  of  state  law  on  the  same  subject  matter.  To  effect 
both  Congressional  purposes  and  to  prevent  unnecessary  duplication  of  effort  it 
is  essential  that  the  limited  Federal  investigative  resources  be  carefully  allo- 
cated, particularly  in  cases  in  which  both  the  ATF  and  the  FBI  have  jurisdic- 
tion. 

2.  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  {FBI)  Jurisdiction  in  General 

(a)  Effect  on  prior  jurisdiction. — This  agreement  applies  only  to  those  inci- 
dents as  to  which  the  FBI  had  no  investigative  jurisdiction  prior  to  the  enact- 
ment of  the  captioned  law  and  to  incidents  previously  subject  to  FBI  investiga- 
tion by  reason  of  chapter  65,  Title  18,  United  States  Code  (malicious  mischief). 
Investigative  procedures  in  other  types  of  incidents  (e.g.,  train  wrecking,  damag- 
ing aircraft  and  motor  vehicles,  racketeering)  shall  remain  unchanged. 

(b)  Prhnary  jurdisdiction. — Subject  to  the  provision  hereof,  the  FBI  \Aill  exer- 
cise primary  jurisdiction  over  all  alleged  violations  of  section  844  which  are 
directed  at  foreign  diplomatic  facilities  or  at  activities,  such  as  transportation 
and  tourist  offices,  operating  under  the  aegis  of  a  foreign  government  although 
not  in  a  diplomatic  status,  over  all  alleged  violations  of  subsections  844(d) 
through  (i)  which  are  perpetrated  by  terrorist/revolutionary  groups  or  individ- 
uals and  all  other  violations  of  subsection  844(e)  through  (g)  which  are  not  di- 
rected at  Treasury  Department  or  Postal  Service  building  or  functions. 

(c)  Tiipe  of  investigation  to  he  conducted 

(1)  Offenses  perpetrated  by  terrorist /revolutionary  groups  or  individuals. — The 
FBI  will  immediately  initiate  a  full  investigation  of  all  alleged  violations  of 
section  844  which  appear  at  the  outset  to  have  been  perpetrated  by  terrorist/ 
revolutionary  groups  or  individuals  as  defined  in  advance  by  the  Internal  Se- 
curity Division  of  the  Department  of  Justice.  If  ATF  or  the  Postal  Inspection 
Service  has  properly  initiated  investigations  and  information  is  subsequently 
developed  indicating  apparent  involvement  of  terrorist/revolutionary  groups  or 
individuals,  responsibility  shall  be  relinquished  to  the  FBI  unless  a  determina- 
tion is  made  by  the  Department  of  Justice  that  a  transfer  of  responsibilities  will 
unduly  impair  further  investigative  efforts. 

(2)  Alleged  offenses  against  Colleges  and  Universities. — The  FBI  will  imme- 
diately initiate  a  full  investigation  of  any  alleged  violation  of  section  844  which 
involves  the  use  or  attempted  use  of  explosive  (as  distinguished  from  incen- 
diary) materials  against  the  facilities  of  a  coUege  or  university.  Investigation 
of  alleged  violations  involving  use  or  attempted  use  of  incendiary  materials  will 
be  limited  initially  to  the  development  of  background  information  as  prescribed 
in  paragraph  6  below. 

(3)  Alleged  offenses  directed  against  foreign  diplomatic  facilities  and  related 
activities. — The  FBI  will  immediately  initiate  a  full  investigation  of  all  alleged 
violations  of  section  844  which  are  directed  at  foreign  diplomatic  facilities  and  re- 
lated activities  as  described  in  paragraph  2(b)  above. 


74 

(4)  All  other  alleged  violations  of  subsection  8U(f) — offenses  involving  use 
of  explosives  against  United  States  property  or  federally  financed  organizations, 
and  {g) — offenses  involving  possession  of  explosives  in  buildings  owned,  leased, 
used,  etc.,  by  the  United  States — The  FBI  will  immediately  initiate  a  full  investi- 
gation of  all  violations  of  subsection  844(g)  over  which  it  has  primary  jurisdic- 
tion hereunder,  and  those  violations  of  844(f)  which  are  directed  at  federal 
property  (e.g.,  a  military  facility)  or  a  federal  function  (e.g,  a  Selective  Service 
or  ROTC  facility).  In  other  violations  of  844(f)  the  FBI  will  develop  and  dis- 
seminate background  information  as  indicated  in  paragraph  6  below. 

3.  Bureau  of  Alcohol,  Tobacco  and  Firearms  (ATF)  Jurisdiction  in  General 

(a)  Violations  ancillary  to  firearms  laics  violations  or  violation  of  section 
842. — The  Bureau  of  Alcohol,  Tobacco  and  Firearms  (ATF)  of  the  Department 
of  the  Treasury  will  exercise  investigative  jurisdiction  over  violations  of  sec- 
tion 844  which  are  ancillary  to  its  primary  jurisdiction  over  the  federal  firearms 
laws  or  over  section  842  of  Title  XI. 

(b)  Violations  of  subsection  844 (d) — interstate  transportation  of  explosives 
with  unlawful  intent  and  subsection  844(.i) — offenses  against  property  used  in 
or  affecting  commerce. — Subject  to  paragraph  2b,  above,  the  ATF  will  exercise 
primary  investigative  jurisdiction  over  violations  of  subsections  844(d)  and  (i) 
and  will  conduct  a  full  investigation  thereof  unless  notified  by  the  Criminal 
Division  that  pursuant  to  paragraph  2(c)  (1),  above,  the  Department  of  Justice 
has  requested  FBI  investigation  in  a  particular  matter. 

(c)  Violations  directid  at  Treasury  Department  property  or  functions. — 
The  ATF  shall  have  primary  jurisdiction  to  investigate  all  violations  of  section 
844  which  are  directed  at  Treasury  Department  property  or  functions  and  will 
conduct  a  full  investigation  of  such  violations. 

4.  Postal  Inspection  Service  Jurisdiction 

The  Postal  Inspection  Service  shall  have  primary  jurisdiction  to  investigate 
all  violations  of  section  844  which  are  directed  at  U.S.  Postal  Service  property 
or  functions. 

5.  Special  considerations 

(a)  Bomb  Threats,  false  information  {section  844(.e)). — ^The  ATF  and  the 
Postal  Inspection  Service  shall  have  jurisdiction  over  violations  of  section 
844(e)  against  Treasury  Department  or  Postal  Service  property  or  functions, 
respectively.  The  FBI  shall  have  jurisdiction  over  all  other  violations  of  section 
S44(e).  Uix)n  receipt  of  information  alleging  or  suggesting  a  violation  of  subsec- 
tion 844(e),  the  investigative  agency  concerned  will  review  available  information 
to  determine  whether  the  identity  of  the  offender  is  kno^Ti  or  c^an  be  readily  ascer- 
tained and,  if  not,  whether  the  evidence  suggests  a  pattern  or  plan  of  such  of- 
fenses by  a  particular  offender  or  against  a  particular  victim.  If  such  a  pattern 
appears  or  if  the  offender  is  identified,  all  available  information  will  be  dis- 
seminated as  indicated  in  paragraph  6  below. 

(b)  Use/carrying  explosive  in  commission  of  a  felony  {section  844W)- — 
Violations  of  844(h)  should  be  handled  as  an  adjunct  of  the  felony  from  which 
they  arise  and  should  be  discussed  with  the  appropriate  United  States  Attorney 
or  Division  of  the  Department  handling  prosecution  of  the  underlying  felony 
offense.  The  agency  having  jurisdiction  over  the  underlying  felony  will  have 
investigative  jurisdiction  over  the  844(h)  violation  (e.g.,  bank  robbery  is  under 
FBI  jurisdiction). 

(c)  Violations  of  26  U.S.C.  5861  {destructive  devices).— In  incidents  in- 
volving alleged  violations  of  18  U.S.C.  844  (which  may  also  involve  a  violation 
of  26  U.S.C.  5861),  ATF  shall  not  exercise  its  primary  jurisdiction  under  26 
U.S.C.  5861  involving  destructive  devices,  but  the  incident  shall  be  treated  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  these  guidelines.  This  is  in  no  way  a  relin- 
quishment by  ATF  of  its  investigative  jurisdiction  under  Title  II  of  the  Gun 
Control  Act  of  1968. 


75 

6.  Development  of  background  information 

Some  incidents  such  as  those  directed  against  Federal  property  or  functions 
(paragraph  2(b)  above)  require  immediate  full  federal  investigation.  Others 
require  a  more  circumspect  approach  and  will  result  in  full  Federal  investiga- 
tion only  after  consideration  of  factors  pertinent  to  the  exercise  of  Federal 
jurisdiction.  Accordingly,  in  those  incidents  which  these  guidelines  do  not  pre- 
scribe immediate  full  investigation,  the  investigative  agency  having  jurisdic- 
tion will  develop  background  information  which  includes  (a)  facts  bearing  on 
motivation  such  as  involvement  of  the  suspected  perpetrators  in  terrorist/revol- 
lutionary  activities,  organized  crime,  labor-management  disputes,  or  racial- 
religious  hate  activities;  (b)  the  applicability  of  .state  and  local  laws  and  like- 
lihood of  state  or  local  investigative  and  prosecutive  actions;  and  (c)  any 
other  available  facts  indicating  whether  or  not  the  offense  warrants  Federal 
investigation  and  prosecution.  Such  background  information  will  be  submitted 
telephonically  (202-73»-27'15)  or  by  teletype  (710-822-0008)  to  the  General 
Crimes  Section  of  the  Criminal  Division  and  to  the  appropriate  United  States 
Attorney.  The  Criminal  Division  will  advise  the  investigative  agency  concerned 
whether  the  matter  warrants  submission  to  any  other  Division  or  Section  of 
the  Criminal  Division,  and  when  so  warranted  the  Criminal  Division  will  trans- 
mit the  information  to  such  other  Division  or  Section. 

7.  Full  investigation 

A  full  investigation  will  be  initiated  immediately  in  those  instances  wherein 
such  investigation  is  specified  herein.  In  other  instances  full  investigation  will 
be  initiated  only  upon  direction  of  the  Department  of  Justice  after  considera- 
tion by  the  Division  having  cognizance  over  the  matter  of  the  background 
information  developed  under  paragraph  6  above. 

8.  Reports 

Copies  of  ease  reports  prepared  in  matters  inves'tigated  under  these  guidelines 
vpill  he  furnished  directly  to  the  Department  of  Justice  and  the  appropriate 
United  Statas  Attorney.  All  investigative  agencies  shall  submit  initial  rexwrts  as 
soon  as  practicable  to  the  Department  of  Justice  and  shall  submit  progress  re- 
ports once  each  30  days  or  as  soon  thereafter  as  i)ossible.  The  Criminal  Division 
of  the  Department  of  Justice  will  be  informed  as  soon  as  i)ossible  in  each  instance 
wherein  an  investigative  agency  initiates  an  investigation  under  section  844.  Such 
notification  i.'j  of  critical  importance  to  the  avoidance  of  duplication  of  investiga- 
tive activities.  Also  each  agency  subscrihing  to  these  guidelines  shall,  upon  in- 
stituting investigation  regarding  possible  violations  of  section  844,  immediately 
notify  other  subscribing  agencies  having  a  logical  interest  therein.  Also,  a  suflB- 
cient  level  of  follow-up  liaison  and  dissemination  shall  be  maintained  to  avoid 
duplication  of  investig'ative  effort. 

Additionally,  each  such  agency  will  exchange  information  on  a  timely  basis 
and  in  a  manner  which  will  not  interfere  with  ongoing  investigations  relative 
to  types,  sources,  movement,  and  storage  of  explosives  which  are  the  subject  of 
its  investigations.  Information  reg'arding  significant  developments  in  investiga- 
tions being  conducted  under  these  guidelines  and  information  of  an  intelligence 
nature  developed  incidental  to  investigations  which  is  of  logical  interest  to  the 
Department  of  Justice  shall  be  furnished  promptly  to  the  Criminal  Division  of 
that  Department  which  will  be  responsible  for  any  necessary  further  dissemina- 
tion within  that  Department. 

9.  Review  of  guidelines 

These  guidelines  shall  be  reviewed  on  a  continuing  basis  by  the  parties  hereto 
to  determine  whether  problems  exist  in  their  administration  which  should  be 
alleviated  or  whether  modification  of  any  of  the  terms  of  the  agreement  are 
needed  in  the  interests  of  better  law  enforcement. 


76 


10.  Summary 


Section 


Type  violation 


Primary  jurisdiction 


842... 
844(d) 

844(e) 
844(0- 


844(g) 

844(h) 

844(i) 

All  sections 


Regulatory  provision  violations ATF. 

Interstate  transportation  (except  by  mail)  Do. 

of  explosives  with  unlawful  intent. 
Bomb  threats— false  information— Treasury  Do. 

buildings  or  functions. 

U.S.  Postal  Service  buildings  or  functions U.S.  Postal  Inspection  Service. 

Other FBI. 

Offenses  against  property  of  the  United 

States   or  federally   financed   organiza- 
tions- 
Treasury  buildings  or  functions ATF. 

U.S.  Postal  Service  buildings U.S.  Postal  Inspection  Service. 

Other  (including  colleges  and  universities). .  FBI. 
Possession  of  explosives  in  buildings  owned, 

leased,  used  by  the  United  States — 

Treasury  buildings  or  functions ATF. 

U.S.  Postal  Service  buildings  or  functions U.S.  Postal  Inspection  Service. 

Other FBI. 

Use/carrying  explosives  In  commission  of  a    Agency  having  jurisdisction  over  underlying 

felony.  felony. 

Offenses  against  property  used  In  or  affect-    ATF. 

Ing  commerce. 
All  offenses  perpetrated  by  terrorlst/revo-    FBI— Unless   another   agency    has   started 

lutlonary  groups  or  individuals.  investigation  before  receipt  of  information 

indicating  terrorist/revolutionary  involve- 
ment. In  this  event  see  paragraph  2c(l) 
above. 


APPROVED : 

By  Department  of   Justice, 
HENRY  E.  PETERSEN, 
Assistant   Attorney    General. 


Dated:  January  30,  1973. 


By  Department   of  Treasury, 
EDWARD    L.    MORGAN, 
Assistant     Secretary     for    Enforcement,     Tariff    and     Trade     Affairs     and 
Operations. 


By  Postal  Inspection  Service, 
WILLIAM   J.    COTTER, 
Assistant   Postmaster   General. 

Effective  March  1,  1973. 


Dated:  February  13,  1973. 


Dated:  January  19,  1973. 


INDEX 


(XoTE. — Tlie  Senate  Internal  Security  Snbcommittee  attaches  no  significance 

to  the  mere  fact  of  the  appearance  of  the  name  of  an  individual  or  organization 

in  this  index. ) 

A  Page 

Alabama   6 

Alexandria   71 

Allen,  Oeorcre 71 

ATF.  (Sire  Bureau  of  Alcohol.  Tobacco  and  Firearms.) 

Attorney  General 42 

B 

Banks,  Linda "1 

Banks.  Roliert 70.  71 

Banks.  William  F 6.  70,  71 

Banks,   William   S 71 

Banks  &  Lee,  Inc 70 

Bay  area 23,  24 

Bay  Area  Research  Collective 24 

Bersen  Couiitv.  X.J 8 

Berkeley.   Calif 24 

Bethesda 70,  71 

Bicentennial 5 

Black  Liberation  Army  (BLA) 24,25 

Bomb  summaries 48 

Bureau  of  Alcohol,  Toltacco  and  Firearms  (ATF) 2, 

3,  8,  9.  12-14,  IS,  22-24,  27,  29,  33-35,  37-42,  45,  46,  48-52.  54-65, 

70.  73,  74 
Bureau  of  Mines ^ 9,  11,  49 

C 
Cabral  24 

California 5,  6.  22,  23 

Canada    6,  11,  21,  30,  39 

Capital   (^enter   Building 7 

Central  Intelligence  Agency   (CIA) 23 

Cinque 23 

Code  of  Federal  Regulations 49,  50,  53,  57,  58 

Committee  on  Government  Operations 48 

Connecticut 6 

Continua,  La  Luta 25 

Corbin,  Jolm  F.,  Jr 2,  3,  45,  46 

Cotter,  William  J 76 

D 

Davis,   Angela 7 

Davis,  Rex  D.,  testimony  of . 2—48 

Defense  Supply  Agency 49,  54 

Department  of  Social  and  Health  Services,  Washington  State 7 

Dessler,  Marvin  J 2,  3 

Dexter,   Rol)ert 1.5,  16 

Dillinger,   John 41,  46 

Drug  Enforcement  Administration   (I)p]A) 1 40,64 

(I) 


II 

E  ^as« 

Eastland.  Senator  James  O 1 

Emiliano  Zapata  unit '^-  24.  2.^ 

Explosives  tagging  program 9-55 

F 

Fairfax   J^ 

Fairfax  County  police ''^ 

Federal  Advisory  Committee 9-  47 

Federal  Aviation  Administration 22 

Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation    (FBI) 3, 

6-8,  10,  13,  22-24.  36-43,  45.  46,  48,  64.  65.  70.  71.  73,  74 

Federal  Government 22.  32,  33.  43 

Federal  Protective  Service 6.28 

'•5  escape  as  bomb  rips  ,$200,000  McLean  home"  (article) 70 

Form  4710.  explosives  transaction  record 4,18,19,34,54,56-60,66 

Form  4721.  explosives  delivery  record 51,59 

Form  r)030.5.  report  of  violations 56 

Frente  de  Liberacion  Chicano 24 

Fuerzas  Armadas  de  Liberacion  Nacional  de  Puerto  Rico  (FALN) 24 

G 

General  Services  Administration  (GSA) 6,28 

George  .lackson  Brigade " 

Guevara.  Che 24 

Gun  Control  Act  of  1968 3.9,38.51,74 

H 
Higgins,  Stephen  E 2,34-36 

Hoffman,  Abbey _8 

Hornblower,  Margot 70 

I 

Illinois ",  11 

IME.  {Scr  Institute  of  Makers  of  Explosives.) 

Immigration  and  Naturalization  Service 40 

Institute  of  Makers  of  Explosives  (IME) 3,8,48,54,61 

Security  Committee 54 

Internal  Revenue  Service 52 

Interstate  Commerce  clause _ 38 

J 

Jackson.  George 7.  23 

Jackson,  Jonathan 23 

Jackson,  Popeye 23 

K 

Kelley,  FBI  Director  Clarence  M 43 

Kennedy.  Senator  Edward 71 

Kentucky    5 

King,  Martin  Luther 23 

Knight,  Director 43 

L 

LaGuardia  Airport 5,  8, 13,  23 

Law  Enforcement  Assistance  Administration  (LEAA) 8 

Lenin 24 

Levi,  Attorney  General  Edward 24 

Louisville,  Ky 45 

Los  Angeles 22,  23 

M 

Malcolm  X 23 

McCay,  I]velyn 71 

McCay,  George 71 


3  9999  05995  195  2 

Page 

McConnell.  W.  H '^^ 

McLean.  Va —  «•  H-  ^^-  3«-  «"•  l^^ 

MaoTsp-tiiiis ^2 

^[arisrhpla —  *"„ 

:Marln  County.  Calif ' 

Martin.  David ^-^^ 

Marx,  Karl "^ 

^lasi^aohnsetts J^ 

^Tpmliers  of  Congress : ^'^ 

MininiT  Enforcement  and  Safety  Administration  (MESA)__  10.  11.  16.  34.  So.  40,  50 

Mississippi    '^ 

Missouri    ^^ 

Morgan.  Edward  L '" 

N 

National  Bomb  Data  Center 6.36 

National  Bomb  Data  Center  Technical  Disc'^t  (publication) 66 

National  Crime  Information  Center   (XCIC) 36.37,41.43^7 

National  Firearms  Act 3.9.10 

New  Jersey ^-  ' 

New  World  Liberation  Eront    (NWLF) 7.23.24 

New  York 5,  S.  22 

New  York  City 5.8,22 

New  Y'ork  Police  Department 22 

North  Carolina 6 

NWLF.  (SVr  New  World  Liberation  Front.) 

O 

Occupational  Safety  and  Health  Administration  (OSHA) 49 

Ohio ^.  6 

Olvmpia.  Wash "J 

Organized  Crime  Control  Act  of  1970 3,  10.  3K  42.  4S,  49.  52.  62.  63,  73 

P 

Pine  Ridge  Reservation 24 

Pennsylvania  •' 

People's  Force 24 

Petersen.  Henry  E 76 

Peterson.  A.  Alley 2.3 

Post  Office  Deiiartment 42 

Postal   Inspection  Service 73,  74 

Puerto  Rico 44 

R 

Red  Guerrilla  Family  (RGF) 7,23-25 

-Red  Guerrilla  Family  Bombs  ATF"  (article) 23 

Rossides,  Assistant  Secretary 48 

Royal  Canadian  Mounted  Police 21,  39 

S 

San  Francisco 7, 11,  23 

Schultz,  Richard  L 1-48 

Scott.  Senator  William  L 1-48 

Secretary  of  the  Treasury 42,73 

Selective  Service 74 

Senate  1 

Short,  Robert  J 1-48 

SLA.  (*s'ec  Symbionese  Lil)eration  Army. ) 

State  explosives  control  (chart) 72 

State  fire  marshal 9 

"Steal  this  Book"   (book) 8 

Subcommittee  on  Immigration  (Senate) 40 

Supplemental  questions  and  answers 48-66 

Symbionese  Liberation  Army , 24,25 


IV 

T  Page 

Taylor.  Ron 70 

Tennessee 5 

Title  XI,  regulation  of  explosives 3,  5,  7-12,  27,  30,  45,  55,  74 

Treasury  enforcement  communication  system  (TECS) 41 

Thorne,  Brenton 23 

Thurmond,  Senator  Strom 2 

U 

T^niform  crime  reports 48,65 

Ignited  Prisoners  Union 23 

Ignited    States 5, 10,  11,  40,  44,  47,  63,  74 

Armed  Forces 11,  61 

Army   61 

Attorney 74,  75 

Code 50,  73 

Congress 10,  38 

Customs  Service 40,  41,  64 

Department  of  Defense 54 

Department  of  Justice 37,38,43,64,73,75 

Department  of  Labor 9,49 

Department  of  Transportation 49,53,55,63 

Department  of  the  Treasury 3,5,11,23,38,40,64,70,74 

Postal  Service 64,  73 

Secret  Service 40,  43 

University  of  Wisconsin 29 

V 
Virginia 31,  37 

W 

Washington.    D.C 39 

Washington  Post  (newspaper) 70 

Washington  Redskins 71 

Washington  State 44 

Weather  underground 24,  25 

West  Coast 93 

World  War  II ~_ "3 

Wounded  Knee 24 

o