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BOSTOTsI 
PUBLIC 
UBRARY 


DEPOSITORY  ^ 


AUG  i  4  1985 


UNITED  STATES  ARMY  IN  WORLD  WAR  II 

The  Technical  Services 

THE  CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS: 
THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


by 

Alfred  M.  Beck 

Abe  Bortz 

Charles  W.  Lynch 

Lida  Mayo 

and 

Ralph  F.  Weld 


CENTER  OF  MILITARY  HISTORY 

UNITED  STATES  ARMY 

WASHINGTON,  D.C.,  1985 


U.S.  Army  Center  of  Military  History 

Brig.  Gen.  Douglas  Kinnard,  USA  (Ret.),  Chief  of  Military  History 

Chief  Historian  David  F.  Trask 

Chief,  Histories  Division  Col.  James  W.  Dunn 

Editor  in  Chief  J"h"  W.  Elsberg 

Library  of  Congress  Cataloging  in  Publication  Data 

The  Corps  of  Engineers. 

(United  States  Army  in  World  War  II:  the  technical 
services) 

Bibliography:  p. 

Includes  index. 

1.  World  War,  1939- 1945— Regimental  histories- 
United  States.  2.  United  States.  Army.  Corps  of 
Engineers — History.  3.  World  War,  1939-  1945 — Campaigns — 
Europe.  4.  World  War,  1939-1945 — Campaigns — Africa, 
North.  I.  Beck,  Alfred  M.,  1939-  .  II.  Series: 

United  States  Army  in  World  War  II. 

D769.33.C67  1985  940.54'1273  84-11376 


First  Printing— CMH  Pub  10-22 


For  sale  by  the  Siiperinteiulent  ot  Documents,  U.S.  (loveinmenl  Piintiut^  Office 
Wasliington,  D.C.  20402 


to  Those  Who  Served 


History  of 
THE  CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS 


Troops  and  Equipment 

Construction  in  the  United  States 

The  War  Against  Germany 

The  War  Against  Japan 


IV 


Foreword 


In  this,  the  last  volume  dealing  with  the  performance  of  the  Corps  of 
Engineers  during  World  War  II,  the  Corps'  support  of  the  war  in  the 
European  and  North  African  theaters  is  recounted  in  detail. 

This  narrative  makes  clear  the  indispensible  role  of  the  military  engi- 
neer at  the  fighting  front  and  his  part  in  maintaining  Allied  armies  in  the 
field  against  European  Axis  powers.  American  engineers  carried  the 
fight  to  enemy  shores  by  their  mastery  of  amphibious  warfare.  In  build- 
ing and  repairing  road  and  rail  nets  for  the  fighting  forces,  they  wrote 
their  own  record  of  achievement.  In  supporting  combat  and  logistical 
forces  in  distant  lands,  these  technicians  of  war  transferred  to  active  thea- 
ters many  of  the  construction  and  administrative  functions  of  the  peace- 
time Corps,  so  heavily  committed  to  public  works  at  home. 

The  authors  of  this  volume  have  reduced  a  highly  complex  story  to  a 
comprehensive  yet  concise  account  of  American  military  engineers  in  the 
two  theaters  of  operations  where  the  declared  main  enemy  of  the  war  was 
brought  to  unconditional  surrender.  The  addition  of  this  account  to  the 
official  U.S.  Army  in  World  War  II  series  closes  the  last  remaining  gaps 
in  the  history  of  the  technical  services  in  that  conflict. 

Washington,  D.C.  DOUGLAS  KINNARD 

2 1  June  1 984  Brigadier  General,  USA  (Ret.) 

Chief  of  Military  History 


The  Authors 


Alfred  M.  Beck  received  his  M.A.  and  Ph.D.  degrees  from  George- 
town University.  He  has  held  several  research  and  supervisory  positions 
in  the  U.S.  Army  Center  of  Military  History  and  the  Historical  Division, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers. 

Abe  Bortz  received  his  Ph.D.  degree  from  Harvard  University  in 
1951.  After  working  for  twelve  years  for  the  Historical  Division,  Office 
of  the  Chief  of  Engineers,  he  has  served  since  1963  as  the  historian  of  the 
Social  Security  Administration,  Baltimore,  Maryland.  He  is  the  author  of 
Social  Security  Sources  in  Federal  Records. 

Charles  W.  Lynch  received  his  M.A.  degree  from  the  University  of 
West  Virginia  in  1948.  He  worked  for  the  Historical  Division,  Office  of 
the  Chief  of  Engineers,  from  1951  to  1963  before  transferring  to  the  U.S. 
Army  Materiel  Command,  the  predecessor  of  the  U.S.  Army  Materiel 
Development  and  Readiness  Command.  He  retired  from  the  federal  ser- 
vice in  1980. 

Lida  Mayo  was  a  graduate  of  Randolph-Macon  Woman's  College.  She 
served  as  a  historian  at  the  Military  Air  Transport  Service  from  1946  to 
1950  and  from  1950  to  1962  at  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance, 
where  she  was  the  chief  historian  until  that  office  merged  with  the  Office, 
Chief  of  Military  History,  the  predecessor  of  the  U.S.  Army  Center  of 
Military  History.  She  is  the  author  of  The  Ordnance  Department:  On  Beach- 
head and  Battlefront  and  coauthor  of  The  Ordnance  Department:  Planning 
Munitions  for  War,  both  in  the  U.S.  Army  in  World  War  II  series.  Her 
commercially  published  works  include  Henry  Clay,  Rustics  in  Rebellion, 
Bloody  Buna,  and  a  number  of  journal  articles.  She  retired  from  federal 
service  in  1971  and  died  in  1978. 

Ralph  F.  Weld  received  his  Ph.D.  degree  from  Columbia  University 
in  1938.  He  worked  as  a  historian  with  the  Historical  Division,  Office  of 
the  Chief  of  Engineers,  from  1951  to  1958,  when  he  retired  from  the 
federal  service.  He  continued  to  serve  the  Historical  Division  on  short 
assignments  until  1964.  He  is  the  author  of  Brooklyn  Is  America  and  was  on 
the  editorial  staff  of  the  Columbia  Encyclopedia. 


VI 


Preface 


This  volume  is  the  fourth  in  the  series  dealing  with  the  activities  of 
the  U.S.  Army  Corps  of  Engineers  during  World  War  II.  As  a  companion 
to  an  earlier  history  of  American  military  engineering  in  the  war  against 
Japan,  this  book  recounts  the  engineer  role  in  the  campaigns  in  North 
Africa,  Italy,  and  western  and  central  Europe  that  wrested  those  areas 
from  German  and  Italian  control. 

Because  of  the  thin  neutrality  to  which  the  United  States  government 
clung  in  1941,  the  first  introduction  of  American  engineer  elements  into 
England  was  clandestine,  but  even  with  the  earliest  American  theater 
command  existing  only  in  embryo,  the  need  for  engineers  was  implicit  in 
Allied  strategy.  The  Anglo-American  decision  in  March  1941  to  deal  first 
with  Germany  as  the  most  dangerous  enemy  required  the  construction  of 
strategic  bomber  bases  and  huge  troop  cantonments  in  England,  all  with 
the  object  of  bringing  Allied  might  to  bear  against  Germany  from  the 
west.  The  story  of  how  this  was  accomplished  necessarily  concerns  itself 
with  organizational  structures,  operating  procedures,  statistical  data,  and 
descriptions  of  vast  logistical  effort.  The  redirection  of  the  entire  strategy 
in  1942  to  a  second  theater  in  the  Mediterranean  brought  American  engi- 
neer troops  to  their  first  encounters  with  a  determined  and  skilled  ad- 
versary in  that  part  of  the  world  and  to  a  sober  realization  of  their  own 
strengths  and  weaknesses  in  combat.  In  sustained  operations  across  two 
continents  and  through  two  and  a  half  years  of  war,  these  engineers  car- 
ried out  the  basic  mission  of  the  military  engineer  in  the  field. 

With  the  measured  assurance  of  doctrinal  literature,  the  1943  edition 
of  the  engineer  Field  Manual  5  —  6,  Operations  of  Field  Engineer  Units,  de- 
fined the  engineer's  task  as  support  of  other  Army  combat  and  supply 
elements,  increasing  the  power  of  forces  by  construction  or  destruction 
to  facilitate  the  movement  of  friendly  troops  and  to  impede  that  of  the 
enemy.  To  assert,  however,  that  American  engineers  handily  fulfilled 
this  mandate  in  Europe  and  North  Africa  is  to  overlook  constant  trial  and 
error  and  relearning  from  past  experience.  By  the  end  of  the  war  engi- 
neer officers  and  men  well  understood  the  meaning  of  the  ancient  poet 
who  declared  that  the  immortals  had  put  sweat  and  a  long,  steep  way 
before  excellence. 


vn 


Many  hands  have  shaped  the  mass  of  material  on  which  this  history  is 
based  into  a  comprehensive  whole.  The  first  half  of  the  manuscript, 
roughly  through  the  end  of  the  Italian  campaign,  was  completed  by  Abe 
Bortz,  William  Lynch,  and  Ralph  Weld,  all  of  whom  worked  for  the 
Corps  of  Engineers  Historical  Office.  Lida  Mayo  set  in  place  most  of  the 
draft  chapters  covering  operations  in  northwest  Europe  and  Germany.  I 
added  several  chapters  and  recast  virtually  the  entire  manuscript,  work- 
ing under  the  discerning  eye  of  Robert  W.  Coakley,  a  historian  of  sur- 
passing ability  and  a  guiding  spirit  in  the  process  of  transforming  a  rough 
product  into  a  viable  history  worthy  of  print. 

The  publication  of  a  work  of  even  such  cooperative  authorship  as  this 
one  would  be  impossible  without  the  able  assistance  of  a  number  of  fine 
editors  who  brought  this  book  from  manuscript  to  printed  page.  Joyce  W. 
Hardyman  and  Edith  M.  Boldan  began  this  labor,  but  the  heavier  burden 
fell  to  Catherine  A.  Heerin  and  Diane  L.  Sedore,  whose  respect  for  the 
English  language  and  attention  to  detail  made  this  account  consistently 
readable.  Their  patience  in  the  tedious  process  of  preparing  a  book  and 
their  good  humor  in  dealing  with  its  last  author  were  unfailing. 

The  maps  presented  in  the  volume  are  the  work  of  Charles  L.  Brittle, 
who  took  vague  requests  for  illustrations  and  created  a  series  of  visual 
aids  to  guide  the  reader  through  a  sometimes  complicated  text.  Howell  C. 
Brewer,  Jr.,  lent  his  hand  to  this  effort  by  producing  the  organization 
charts  shown  in  the  narrative.  Arthur  S.  Hardyman,  who  directed  the 
graphic  work,  also  gave  valuable  advice  on  the  choice  of  photographs 
that  complement  the  text. 

For  all  the  advice  and  support  rendered  by  this  willing  staff  of  assis- 
tants, the  final  responsibility  for  the  content  of  this  history  remains  that 
of  the  authors.  Collectively  they  bear  the  burden  of  errors  of  fact  or 
omission. 

Washington,  D.C.  ALFRED  M.  BECK 

5  January  1984 


vni 


Contents 


Chapter  Page 

I.  INTRODUCTION     3 

II.  THE  ENGINEERS  CROSS  THE  ATLANTIC,  1941-1942 7 

Reconnaissance    8 

Iceland 10 

Magnet  Force    16 

The  Bolero  Plan     22 

Creation  of  the  Services  of  Supply     24 

The  Engineer  Pyramid    26 

Roundup  Planning    31 

III.  THE  ENGINEER  MACHINE  IN  MOTION  IN  THE 

UNITED  KINGDOM,  1942 35 

Personnel    35 

Training     39 

Supply    41 

Intelligence    48 

Construction    50 

IV.  THE  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  INVASION  OF  NORTH 

AFRICA 59 

Engineer  Plans  and  Preparations 59 

Engineer  Amphibian  Brigades    64 

The  Landings    68 

The  Assessment     78 

V.  THE  TUNISIAN  CAMPAIGN    83 

Aviation  Engineer  Support    85 

Petroleum,  Oil,  and  Lubricants  Supply    91 

Ground  Support     94 

Mine  Clearing 100 

Water  Supply     107 

Camouflage     108 

Maps    .  .' 109 

Command  Reorganizations     110 


IX 


Chapter  Page 

Atlantic  Base  Section     Ill 

Mediterranean  Base  Section     112 

Eastern  Base  Section     113 

VI.  SICILY:  THE  BEACHHEAD    115 

Plans  and  Preparations     118 

Training     120 

D-day 125 

Joss  Beaches    127 

Dime  Beaches     129 

Cent  Beaches 132 

VII.  SICILY:  THE  DRIVE  TO  MESSINA    136 

Supply  Over  the  Beaches 137 

Corps  and  Army  Support  of  Combat  Engineers 1 39 

Maps  and  Camouflage    144 

Highway  120:  The  Road  to  Randazzo     145 

Highway  113:  The  Road  to  Messina     147 

Palermo    151 

VIII.  FROM  SALERNO  TO  THE  VOLTURNO    153 

The  Invasion 158 

A  Campaign  of  Bridges     165 

Naples    167 

Peninsular  Base     171 

Petroleum,  Oil,  and  Lubricants     173 

The  Volturno  Crossings     174 

IX.  THE  WINTER  LINE  AND  THE  ANZIO  BEACHHEAD 180 

Minefields  in  the  Mountains    181 

Bridge  Building  and  Road  Work    183 

Engineers  in  Combat     188 

At  Cassino:  20-29  January  1944 190 

Anzio 192 

X.  THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  ALPS    200 

Reorganization     200 

The  Offensive  Resumed     208 

The  Arno    211 

The  Winter  Stalemate 214 

The  Final  Drive     216 


Chapter  Page 

The  Shortage  of  Engineers     222 

Training     224 

Engineer  Supply     226 

Mapping  and  Intelligence 227 

Camouflage     230 

XI.  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  PENINSULAR  BASE  SECTION 232 

Port  Rehabilitation 234 

Petroleum:  From  Tanker  to  Truck     238 

Tasks  of  Base  Section  Engineers 242 

PBS  Supply  and  Maintenance 251 

XII.  REVIVING  BOLERO  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM     256 

The  Continuing  Problem  of  Organization     257 

New  Supply  Procedures     259 

Construction    261 

The  Manpower  Shortage 269 

Engineers  at  the  Depots     271 

XIII.  LOOKING  AHEAD  TO  THE  CONTINENT    277 

Engineer  PROCO  Projects     277 

Planning  for  Construction  on  the  Continent 280 

Refinements  in  Overlord's  Operation 286 

Joint  Stockpiling  With  the  British 288 

Training     289 

Maps  for  the  Invasion     293 

XIV.  PREPARING  FOR  D-DAY  LANDINGS     299 

The  American  Beaches    299 

Beach  Obstacle  Teams 304 

The  Engineer  Special  Brigades     308 

Assault  Training  and  Rehearsals    310 

Marshaling  the  Invasion  Force     313 

Embarkation    317 

XV.  THE  LANDINGS  ON  OMAHA  AND  UTAH 319 

Engineers  on  Omaha     319 

Opening  the  Exits     326 

Utah    \ 332 


XI 


Chapter  Page 

XVI.  DEVELOPING  BEACHES  AND  RECONSTRUCTING 

PORTS    340 

Small  Ports  Near  the  Beaches     344 

COMZ  on  the  Continent 349 

Cherbourg     352 

Granville  and  the  Minor  Brittany  Ports     358 

The  Seine  Ports:  Le  Havre  and  Rouen    360 

Antwerp  and  Ghent    363 

XVII.  COMBAT  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  BREAKOUT  AND 

PURSUIT    367 

The  Road  to  Coutances 368 

The  Road  to  Periers 370 

The  Road  to  St.  Lo     371 

VII  Corps  Engineers  in  the  Cobra  Breakthrough 376 

VIII  Corps  Engineers  Aid  the  War  of  Movement     377 

Siege  Operations  in  Brittany    381 

The  Seine  Crossings    385 

Beyond  the  Seine    389 

XVIII.  SUPPORTING   A    WAR   OF    MOVEMENT    IN    NORTHERN 

FRANCE    393 

Highways    393 

Railways     397 

The  ADSEC  Engineer  Groups 40 1 

Pipelines     405 

The  Minor  POL  System     406 

The  Major  POL  System     409 

The  New  POL  Organization    411 

XIX.  BREACHING  GERMANY'S  BARRIERS 414 

The  Siegfried  Line    414 

VII  Corps  South  of  Aachen    415 

XIX  Corps  North  of  Aachen     420 

The  Siege  of  Aachen 421 

From  the  Moselle  to  the  Saar 423 

The  Moselle  Crossings  at  Mailing  and  Cattenom     424 

The  Bridge  at  Thionville 426 

Advance  to  the  Saar 429 

The  Capture  of  the  Saarlautern  Bridge    430 

Assaulting  Pillboxes  on  the  Far  Bank    431 

The  Withdrawal     434 

xii 


Chapter  Page 

XX.  SOUTHERN  FRANCE    436 

The  Landings    439 

Base  Sections  and  SOLOC     448 

Railroads    451 

Map  Supply    454 

Engineer  Supply  for  the  First  French  Army    454 

POL  Operations     455 

Preparing  To  Cross  the  Rhine    469 

XXI.  THE  ARDENNES:  ENGINEERS  AS  INFANTRY 461 

The  Storm  Breaks  in  the  Schnee  Eifel    462 

Blocking  Sixth  Panzer  Army's  Drive  to  the  Meuse 467 

Delaying  Fifth  Panzer  Army  From  the  Our  to  the  Meuse    474 

Stopping  the  German  Seventh  Army    480 

Engineers  in  NORDWIND 484 

Seventh  Army  Through  the  Siegfried  Line    487 

After  the  Ardennes    488 

XXII.  THE  ROER  CROSSING  AND  THE  REMAGEN  BRIDGE- 
HEAD      489 

The  Roer  Crossings     490 

The  Ludendorff  Bridge 499 

The  Ferries    505 

The  Treadway  and  Ponton  Bridges 506 

Collapse  of  the  Ludendorff  Bridge     509 

The  III  Corps  Bailey  Bridge     513 

VII  Corps,  First  Army,  and  V  Corps  Crossijigs 514 

XXIII.  THE  ASSAULT  CROSSINGS  OF  THE  RHINE    517 

Ninth  Army  at  Rheinberg    517 

Over  the  Rhine    519 

The  XII  Corps  Crossing  at  Oppenheim     525 

The  VIII  Corps  Crossing  at  the  Rhine  Gorge    527 

The  XX  Corps  Crossing  at  Mainz 530 

The  Seventh  Army  Crossings    531 

The  Rhine  Crossings  in  Retrospect    535 

XXIV.  INTO  THE  HEART  OF  GERMANY    537 

Ninth  Army's  Dash  to  the  Elbe 538 

First  Army's  Drive  to  Leipzig  and  Beyond    541 

Third  Army  Reaches  Austria    546 


xiu 


Chapter  Page 

Seventh  Army  to  the  "Alpine  Fortress" 550 

Support  of  ALsos     556 

XXV.  CONCLUSION    560 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE    567 

GLOSSARY 570 

BASIC  MILITARY  MAP  SYMBOLS 576 

INDEX    583 


Charts 

No. 

1.  Office  of  the  Chief  Engineer,  ETOUSA,  1  July  1942 27 

2.  Theater  Structure,  AFHQ  and  NATOUSA,  8  February  1944     202 

3.  Office  of  the  Chief  Engineer,  MTOUSA,  28  January  1945     204 

4.  Office  of  the  Chief  Engineer,  ETOUSA,  1  August  1944     395 

5.  Office  of  the  Chief  Engineer,  ETOUSA,  1  October  1944 396 


Maps 


No.  PO'g^ 

1.  Iceland,  1943 16 

2.  Organization  of  SOS  in  the  United  Kingdom,  July  1942     30 

3.  North  African  Beachheads,  8  November  1942    70 

4.  Tunisia,  1943     95 

5.  Sicilian  Landing  Areas,  10  July  1943    126 

6.  Sicily,  1943     142 

7.  Italy  Invasion  Plans    155 

8.  Salerno  Beaches,  September  1943    160 

9.  Anzio  Beachhead,  22  January  1944    194 

10.  Italy:  Salerno  to  Rome 210 

11.  Northern  Italy 235 

12.  Peninsular  Base  Section    243 

13.  Engineer  Supply  Depots  in  the  United  Kingdom,  March  1944  ....  273 

14.  Major  Training  Sites  in  the  United  Kingdom 292 


XIV 


No.  Page 

15.  The  Final  OVERLORD  Plan 301 

16.  Omaha  Beach   321 

17.  Utah  Beach,  June  1944     335 

18.  Minor  Ports  in  the  OVERLORD  Plan    345 

19.  The  Engineers  in  France:  Normandy  to  the  Seine,  1944    378 

20.  Beyond  the  Seine,  1944    404 

21.  Railways  in  Use  and  Red  Ball  Express,  September  1944 406 

22.  POL  Pipelines,  September  1944 411 

23.  The  Siegfried  Line     416 

24.  Southern  France  Beachheads,  15  August  1944     440 

25.  Southern  France:  Supply  Operations,  August- 

November  1944    450 

26.  POL  Pipehne 456 

27.  The  Ardennes,  1944    468 

28.  Roer  River  Crossing,  23  February  1945    493 

29.  Crossing  the  Rhine,  March  1945    522 

30.  Engineers  in  Germany 543 

Illustrations 

Page 

Maj.  Gen.  Charles  H.  Bonesteel    12 

Construction  Supplies  at  Reykjavik  Harbor,  October  1941    13 

Engineer  Troops  Dumping  Fill  at  Meeks  Field,  Keflavik    14 

Maj.  Gen.  James  E.  Chaney,  Ambassador  John  G.  Winant,  and 

Maj.  Gen.  Russell  P.  Harde     18 

Maj.  Gen.  John  C.  H.  Lee    25 

Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  B.  Larkin     29 

Lt.  Col.  Herbert  Milwit     49 

Men  of  the  829th  Engineer  Aviation  Battalion  Erect  Nissen  Hutting    ...  53 

Paving  Train  at  an  American  Bomber  Field  in  England 54 

Hospital  Construction  Employing  Prefabricated  Concrete 

Roof  Trusses    57 

Maj.  Gen.  Daniel  Noce 67 

Wrecked  and  Broached  Landing  Craft  at  Fedala,  French  Morocco     ....  72 

Moroccan  Labor  Gang  at  Casablanca  Harbor 81 

Col.  Rudolph  E.  Smyser,  Jr 91 

Gasoline  Storage  at  Port-Lyautey    93 

German  S-Mine    102 

Italian  Bar  Mines 103 


XV 


Page 

The  SCR— 625  Mine  Detector  in  Action  on  a  Tunisian  Road    104 

Scorpion  Tank  Crew  Loading  Bangalore  Torpedoes    106 

Ponton  Causeway  Extending  From  an  LST  to  Shore    117 

Landing  Heavy  Equipment  Over  the  Causeway  at  Scoglitti     134 

Construction  Begins  at  Cape  Calava  To  Close  Gap  Blown  by 

Retreating  Germans    150 

Maj.  Gen.  Lucian  K.  Truscott,  Jr.,  Tests  the  Temporary  Span 

at  Cape  Calava    151 

DUKWs  Head  for  the  Salerno  Beaches    161 

LSTs  and  Auxiliary  Ships  Unload  Men  and  Supply  at  Salerno 162 

Decking  Placed  Over  Sunken  Vessels  in  Naples  Harbor 170 

Brig.  Gen.  Arthur  W.  Pence     171 

Engineer  Officer  Reads  Pressure  Gauges  at  Pumping  Station 

at  Foggia,  Italy    174 

Wrecked  M2  Floating  Treadway  on  the  Volturno     178 

Engineer  Rock  Quarry  Near  Mignano    189 

Removing  German  Charges  From  Buildings  in  Anzio     196 

Assembling  MlAl  Antitank  Mines  at  Anzio 198 

Brig.  Gen.  Dabney  O.  Elliott    207 

The  Rising  Arno  River  Threatens  a  Treadway  Bridge 213 

Bailey  Bridge  Construction  Over  the  Arno  Near  Florence    214 

Brig.  Gen.  Frank  O.  Bowman     217 

Engineers  Bridging  the  Po  River    219 

Raft  Ferries  a  Tank  Destroyer  Across  the  Po    222 

Blasting  Obstacles  at  Civitavecchia,  June  1944    236 

Maj.  Gen.  Cecil  R.  Moore     259 

Petroleum,  Oil,  and  Lubricants  Depot,  Lancashire 264 

Bulldozers  at  the  Engineer  Depot  at  Thatcham    280 

Engineer  Crane  Stacks  Lumber  at  Thatcham,  April  1944     281 

Models  of  Belgian  Gates     290 

Wire  Entanglements  and  Dragon's  Teeth  at  the  Assault 

Training  Center,  Woolacombe    291 

Engineer  Mapmaker  Uses  a  Multiplex    294 

Infantry  Troops  Leave  LST  During  Exercise  Fabius 311 

Col.  Eugene  M.  Caffey     313 

Tanks  and  Vehicles  Stalled  at  the  Shingle  Line  on  OMAHA  Beach    322 

Engineers  Anchor  Reinforced  Track  at  OMAHA 329 

Teller  Mine    336 

Roads  Leading  off  the  Beaches    338 

Tetrahedrons  at  Omaha  Beach    341 

Twisted  Sections  of  Lobnitz  Piers  at  Omaha  Beach    343 


XVI 


Page 

Coaster  With  a  Cargo  of  Gasoline  Unloads  at  Isigny     348 

Gasoline  Being  Pumped  Ashore  at  Cherbourg 358 

Clearing  the  Mouth  of  the  Locks  at  St.  Malo    361 

Engineers  Assemble  an  Explosive-Laden  "Snake" 380 

3d  Armored  Division  Vehicles  Cross  the  Seine  River    387 

French  Barges  Support  Bailey  Bridging  Over  the  Seine 388 

982d  Engineer  Maintenance  Company  Welds  Six-Inch  Pipeline 391 

Col.  Emerson  C.  Itschner     394 

Decanting  Area  on  the  Oil  Pipeline  in  Antwerp 412 

Rigging  Charges  to  Demolish  Dragon's  Teeth    417 

Bulldozer  Seals  Bunkers  Outside  Aachen 419 

Troops  Float  Footbridge  Sections  Into  Place  on  the  Moselle     426 

Heavy  Ponton  Bridge  at  Uckange     428 

Brig.  Gen.  Garrison  H.  Davidson 438 

Mine  Removal  at  Camel  Red    445 

Probing  for  Explosive  Charge  at  Marseille    448 

The  Aix  Bridge 453 

Engineers  Drop  Barbed-Wire  Rolls  To  Prepare  Defensive 

Positions 465 

Placing  Charges  To  Drop  Trees  Across  Roadways    475 

Road  Maintenance  Outside  Wiltz,  Belgium     477 

Installing  a  Bridge  on  the  111  River     486 

Engineers  Emplace  Mats  To  Stabilize  the  Banks  of  the  Roer    491 

2d  Armored  Division  Tanks  Cross  the  Roer  Into  Juelich    495 

Footbridge  on  the  Roer    498 

The  Ludendorff  Rail  Bridge  at  Remagen     501 

Pontons  Loaded  for  Transport  to  Remagen 508 

Wreckage  of  the  Ludendorff  Bridge  After  Its  Collapse    512 

89th  Division  Infantry  Cross  the  Rhine  at  Oberwesel 521 

Engineers  Slide  Bailey  Bridging  Into  Place  at  Wesel     524 

Men  Connect  Bridge  Sections  Near  St.  Goar    529 

M2  Treadway  Bridge  on  the  Rhine  at  Boppard 530 

Heavy  Ponton  Bridge  in  the  Seventh  Army  Area 534 

Hauling  a  Tank  Across  the  Saale  River    545 

Pontons  Headed  for  the  Danube    549 

All  illustrations  are  from  Department  of  Defense  files. 


xvii 


THE  CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS: 
THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


CHAPTER  I 


Introduction 


On  the  eve  of  American  involvemertt 
in  World  War  II,  the  U.S.  Army  Corps 
of  Engineers  had  150  years  of  experi- 
ence in  national  wars  and  in  statutory 
assignment  to  civil  works  projects  out- 
side the  Army.  Its  veteran  officers  could 
hark  back  to  an  unprecedented  perfor- 
mance in  World  War  I,  when  the  Corps 
had  expanded  from  2,454  officers  and 
enlisted  men  to  nearly  300,000 — 
174,000  in  France  alone  when  the  Armi- 
stice was  signed.' 

In  unexpected  measure  their  works 
on  the  Continent  from  1917  to  1919 
enlarged  upon  traditional  engineer 
functions,  especially  as  they  applied  to 
facilitating  troop  movement.  In  several 
ports  where  the  French  government 
turned  over  wharfage  to  incoming 
American  forces,  the  17th  and  18th 
Engineer  Regiments,  two  of  the  first 
nine  engineer  regiments  to  arrive,  con- 
structed additions  to  docks,  erected 
depots,  and  then  laid  new  rail  lines  link- 
ing the  facilities  to  the  French  national 
system  and  the  Zone  of  the  Advance 
that  included  the  front  line  itself.  An 


'  Historical  Report  of  the  Chief  Engineer,  American 
Expeditionary  Forces,  79/7-/9/9  (Washington,  1919), 
pp.  12-13.  The  report  excludes  from  the  engineer 
troop  strength  in  France  the  separate  Transportation 
Corps,  another  60,000  men  who  functioned  only  indi- 
rectly under  the  chief  engineer  of  the  American  Expe- 
ditionary Forces. 


entire  regiment  spent  the  war  in  for- 
estry operations,  providing  much  of  the 
lumber  for  rail  ties,  housing,  and  hospi- 
tals for  the  American  Expeditionary 
Forces.  In  forward  areas  engineers 
braved  the  same  fire  as  the  infantry  to 
build  narrow-gauge  rail  nets  for  sup- 
ply and  troop  movement,  to  dig  com- 
plex trench  systems,  to  string  wire,  to 
install  bridging,  and  even  to  engage  the 
enemy.  Engineer  flash-  and  sound- 
ranging  equipment  helped  direct  coun- 
terbattery  artillery  fire.  Chemical  engi- 
neers, the  forerunners  of  an  indepen- 
dent postwar  Chemical  Corps,  released 
gas  employed  against  the  Germans  in 
the  trenches  and  developed  protective 
devices  and  procedures  against  enemy 
gas  attacks.  Elaborate  camouflage 
screens  and  nets  manufactured  and 
painted  with  the  help  of  French  labor 
masked  American  equipment  and  con- 
cealed preparations  for  forthcoming 
operations. 

Falling  within  the  usual  definitions 
of  engineer  work  in  war,  these  activi- 
ties covered  a  far  wider  technical  range 
than  ever  before  in  American  military 
engineering  experience.  So  complex 
and  extensive  had  the  operations  be- 
come, in  fact,  that  one  regimental 
commander  declared  that  the  military 
engineer  had  died  and  his  close  rela- 
tive, the  civil  engineer,  had  taken  his 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


place.^  For  all  their  accomplishments 
in  forging  smooth  lines  of  communica- 
tions from  the  rear  to  the  front  and  in 
providing  invaluable  services  between, 
the  engineers  fought  in  a  war  distin- 
guished by  the  lack  of  forward  move- 
ment of  the  front  itself  until  the  final 
months  of  the  conflict. 

Events  in  Europe  in  the  spring  of 
1940  effectively  demonstrated  that  har- 
nessing the  internal  combustion  engine 
to  new  tactics  gave  much  more  range 
and  speed  to  military  operations.^  The 
German  defeat  of  France  in  six  weeks 
and  the  narrow  escape  of  the  British 
Expeditionary  Force  at  Dunkirk  proved 
the  superiority  of  the  Wehrmacht.  Coor- 
dinated with  aerial  attacks  that  de- 
stroyed ground  obstacles  and  threw 
enemy  rear  areas  into  confusion, 
massed  armor  assaults  on  narrow  fronts 
offered  the  antidote  to  static  trench 
warfare  and  allowed  rapid  decision  on 
the  battlefield. 

German  success  with  these  tactics  and 
the  subsequent  bombing  campaign 
against  Great  Britain  converted  a  fitful 
American  rearmament  into  a  real  mo- 
bilization. Congress  appropriated  more 
funds  for  national  defense  than  the 
Army  could  readily  absorb  with  its  lim- 
ited plans  to  defend  the  western  hemi- 
sphere from  Axis  infiltration  or  overt 
military  advances  in  1940.  Like  the  rest 
of  the  Army  under  this  largesse,  the  en- 
gineers accelerated  their  recovery  from 
twenty  years  of  impoverishment. 
Though  the  Corps  had  been  heavily 
committed  to  civil  works  through  the  two 


preceding  decades,  its  separate  military 
units  were  few  and  scattered  across  the 
continental  United  States  and  its  over- 
seas possessions.  Given  time  to  develop 
additional  combat  and  support  units 
along  older  organizational  lines,  the 
engineers  could  expand  as  they  had  in 
World  War  I  and  take  up  again  their 
recognized  general  functions  of  bridge, 
rail,  and  road  construction  or  main- 
tenance; port  rehabilitation;  and  more 
specialized  work  in  camouflage,  water 
supply,  map  production,  mine  warfare, 
forestry,  and  the  administrative  work 
necessary  to  support  combat  forces.  But 
even  if  engineer  elements  remained 
divided  into  general  and  special  units, 
the  engineers  could  not  simply  reacti- 
vate old  units  under  this  framework  in 
anticipation  of  a  new  conflict.  The  mod- 
ern method  of  war  generated  new  mis- 
sions and  demanded  new  organiza- 
tional structures,  new  units,  and  new 
types  of  equipment  to  accommodate  the 
revolution  in  tactics. 

A  reorganization  of  the  Army  was 
already  under  way.'*  Field  testing  of 
revisions  in  the  basic  organization  of 
the  infantry  division  began  in  1937  with 
a  reduction  of  infantry  regiments  from 
four  to  three  to  create  a  flexible  and 
more  easily  maneuvered  force.  The 
organic  engineer  unit  in  the  smaller 
division  was  a  battalion  rather  than  an 
engineer  combat  regiment.  Numerical 
strength  varied  in  the  experiments,  but 
three  companies  became  the  eventual 
standard  for  engineer  battalions  as- 
signed to  infantry  divisions.  Respond- 


^  William  B.  Parsons,  American  Engineers  in  France 
(New  York:  D.  Appleton  and  Company,  1920),  p.  5. 

'  Lt.  Col.  Paul  W.  Thompson,  What  You  Should  Know 
About  The  Army  Engineers  (New  York:  W.  W.  Norton  8c 
Company,  1942),  pp.  9-10. 


'  Blanche  D.  Coll,  Jean  E.  Keith,  and  Herbert  E. 
Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Engineers:  Troops  and  Equipment, 
United  States  Army  in  World  War  II  (Washington, 
1958),  pp.  1-63.  Unless  otherwise  noted,  the  follow- 
ing is  based  on  this  source. 


INTRODUCTION 


ing  to  events  in  Europe  in  1940,  the 
Army  also  developed  two  armored  divi- 
sions from  its  small,  scattered  and  ex- 
perimental, mechanized  and  armored 
elements  and  provided  each  division 
with  an  organic  engineer  battalion, 
eventually  numbering  712  men.  In  imi- 
tation of  the  German  organization  for 
panzer  divisions,  the  American  engi- 
neer armored  unit  had  four  companies, 
one  a  bridge  company  equipped  with  a 
large  variety  of  military  bridging.  A 
reconnaissance  platoon  of  the  bat- 
talion's headquarters  company  was  to 
scout  ahead  of  the  advancing  division 
to  determine  the  need  for  bridge  and 
demolition  work  or  the  best  detours 
around  obstacles. 

Engineer  regiments,  either  for  gen- 
eral service  or  for  combat  support,  sur- 
vived as  separate  entities  attached  to 
field  armies  or  to  corps  headquarters. 
Consisting  of  two  battalions  and  vari- 
ous supporting  companies,  these  larger 
units  assumed  many  of  the  rear-area 
tasks  formerly  left  to  divisional  units. 
The  more  heavily  equipped  general  ser- 
vice regiment  was  to  perform  general 
construction,  maintenance,  or  bridge 
work  on  main  routes  of  communi- 
cations, and  military  construction  once 
the  engineers  assumed  that  responsibil- 
ity from  the  Quartermaster  Corps.  The 
combat  regiment,  with  twenty-four 
machine  guns  in  its  normal  equipment, 
was  more  heavily  armed  for  work  in 
the  combat  zone  but  had  less  heavy 
machinery  than  the  general  service 
regiment.  It  was  particularly  suited  to 
support  divisional  units  in  forward 
areas  and  had  a  special  role  in  large- 
scale  assault  river  crossings.'' 


'  Thompson,  What  You  Should  Know  About  the  Army 
Engineers,  pp.  61—62. 


Experiments  produced  new  equip- 
ment for  the  revised  engineer  organiza- 
tions. In  the  search  for  easily  trans- 
ported and  rapidly  emplaced  bridging, 
the  armored  force  engineers  copied  the 
German  inflatable  ponton  system  and 
produced  a  25-ton  ponton  treadway 
bridge  for  tanks.  Other  tests  showed 
the  British-designed  Bailey  bridge  to 
be  lighter  and  more  adaptable  to  a  war 
of  movement  than  the  standard  Ameri- 
can H— 10  and  H  — 20  girder  bridges. 
Repeated  experience  with  construction 
equipment  convinced  the  engineers  of 
the  value  of  heavier  and  larger  bull- 
dozers, scrapers,  cranes,  and  trucks, 
though  the  conflicting  demands  of  the 
American  industrial  mobilization  often 
made  these  items  hard  to  procure  in 
the  desired  quantities.  As  a  result,  an 
engineer  unit  Table  of  Organization 
and  Equipment  (TOE)  immediately 
before  American  entry  into  the  war 
called  for  much  less  heavy  equipment 
than  eventually  proved  necessary.  De- 
mands for  additional  heavy  equipment 
of  new  design  arose  as  the  engineers 
encountered  conditions  that  overtaxed 
the  standard  machinery  they  brought 
with  them  to  the  theaters  of  war.  A  new 
battery-operated  magnetic  mine  detec- 
tor enabled  the  engineers  rapidly  to 
unearth  mines  that  impeded  the  ad- 
vance of  friendly  troops,  but  there  was 
little  advance  intelligence  on  the  nature 
of  Axis  mines  or  the  doctrine  govern- 
ing German  mine  warfare.  Engineer 
map  production  techniques  improved 
remarkably  with  the  use  of  aerial  pho- 
tography employing  specialized  multi- 
lens  cameras  and  multiplex  interpreta- 
tion systems. 

Given  the  heavy  use  of  tactical  avia- 
tion and  the  then-current  theories  of 
bombardment  aviation,  the  engineers 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


also  expected  to  support  the  Army  Air 
Forces  in  any  future  conflict.  Established 
immediately  after  the  spring  maneu- 
vers of  1940,  the  engineer  aviation  regi- 
ment (66  officers  and  2,200  enlisted 
men)  consisted  of  three  battalions  that 
could  be  employed  independently. 
Within  two  years  of  its  inception,  the 
unit  had  the  highly  specialized  mission 
of  constructing  large  rear-area  bomber 
bases  and  hasty  forward  fields  for  tacti- 
cal aircraft.  The  regiment  carried  with 
it  all  the  necessary  earth-moving,  pav- 
ing, and  construction  machinery  and 
was  adequately  armed  to  thwart  an 
enemy  airborne  attack  on  the  installa- 
tion under  construction.  The  unit  used 
another  idea  from  abroad — long,  nar- 
row steel  plank  sections,  perforated  to 
reduce  their  weight  and  linked  together 
to  form  temporary  runways  on  poor  or 
unstable  soil. 

The  motorization  and  mechanization 
of  modern  armies  and  the  addition  of 
aerial  components  dictated  increased 
consumption  of  gasoline  and  oil  in 
future  operations.  The  engineers  met 
this  likelihood  with  another  innovation 
that  eventually  proved  its  value  in  the 
theaters  of  war  in  North  Africa  and 
Europe.  The  Quartermaster  Corps  had 
distributed  petroleum  products  in  con- 
tainers transported  to  using  troops  by 
rail  and  truck.  Though  the  engineers 
did  not  displace  this  method  entirely, 
they  took  over  and  improved  pipelines 
to  lessen  the  load  on  vehicles  in  combat 
and  communications  zones.  A  highly 
specialized  unit,  the  engineer  petro- 


leum distribution  company,  came  into 
existence  to  build  and  operate  pipelines 
from  major  ports  to  the  immediate  rear 
areas  of  the  field  armies. 

An  engineer  role  in  amphibious  war- 
fare was  not  considered  until  shortly 
before  the  Japanese  attack  on  Pearl 
Harbor.  In  all  the  likely  arenas  of  the 
obviously  approaching  war,  an  advanc- 
ing army  would  have  to  move  across 
expanses  of  open  water.  In  the  Pacific, 
where  the  American  possessions  and 
the  Japanese  homeland  were  islands, 
the  ability  to  seize  objectives  depended 
upon  operations  across  beaches.  In 
Europe,  it  was  apparent  by  mid- 1940 
that  Axis  control  of  every  major  port 
would  make  similar  operations  nec- 
essary. Though  the  Army  began  am- 
phibious training  for  two  infantry  divi- 
sions in  June  1940  and  established  a 
research  committee  to  examine  possi- 
ble roles  for  amphibian  engineers,  spe- 
cial units  for  the  purpose  were  still  in 
the  future.^ 

By  mid- 1941,  the  Corps  of  Engineers 
had  embarked  upon  an  ambitious  pro- 
gram of  revising  its  military  units  and 
equipment.  Though  not  fully  ready  to 
fight  in  an  overseas  theater,  the  engi- 
neers had  done  much  to  adapt  to  the 
realities  of  modern  combat  and  combat 
support.  This  process  continued  as  a 
shadow  American  staff  structure  took 
shape  in  England. 


^  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Engineers: 
Troops  and  Equipment,  p.  357. 


CHAPTER  II 


The  Engineers  Cross  the  Atlantic 

1941-1942 


In  the  late  spring  of  1941  a  few 
American  officers  in  civilian  clothes 
slipped  into  London  and  established  a 
small  headquarters  in  a  building  near 
the  American  embassy  on  Grosvenor 
Square.  They  might  have  been  attaches 
of  the  embassy,  as  far  as  the  general 
public  could  tell.  Their  name,  Special 
Observer  Group  (SPOBS),  like  their 
attire,  concealed  rather  than  expressed 
their  functions,  for  they  had  much 
more  urgent  business  than  to  act  as  neu- 
tral observers  of  the  military  effort  of  a 
friendly  nation  at  war.  They  were  organ- 
ized as  a  military  staff  complete  with 
G— 1  (personnel),  G— 2  (intelligence), 
G— 3  (plans  and  operations),  and  G— 4 
(logistics  and  supply),  together  with  a 
full  complement  of  special  staff  officers. 
The  group  was  located  in  England  so 
that  close  liaison  with  the  British  High 
Command  would  be  in  effect  should 
American  quasi-neutrality  suddenly 
shift  into  active  belligerence.  The  group's 
mission  was  to  coordinate  plans,  so  far 
as  circumstances  permitted,  for  Ameri- 
can participation  in  the  war,  and  to 
receive,  house,  and  equip  American 
forces. 

The  engineer  officer  of  the  Special 
Observer  Group  was  Lt.  Col.  Donald 
A.  Davison,  who  had  been  the  General 


Headquarters  (GHQ)  Air  Force  staff 
engineer  in  Washington. '  Barely  a  year 
had  passed  since  Colonel  Davison  had 
organized  the  21st  Engineer  Aviation 
Regiment,  the  Army's  first  engineer  avi- 
ation unit.  He  was  an  obvious  choice 
for  the  SPOBS  staff,  for  the  group  was 
to  be  concerned  first  of  all  with  plan- 
ning facilities  for  future  air  operations 
and  air  defense.  The  emphasis  on  air 
power  was  apparent  also  in  the  choice 
of  Maj.  Gen.  James  E.  Chaney,  AC,  to 
head  the  group,  and  of  Brig.  Gen. 
Joseph  T.  McNarney,  AC,  as  General 
Chaney's  chief  of  staff. 

The  Special  Observer  Group  at  first 
numbered  eighteen  officers  and  eleven 
enlisted  men.  While  the  task  of  plan- 
ning the  transportation  of  U.S.  Army 
troops,  their  location  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  and  their  shelter  involved  the 
entire  SPOBS  staff  and  their  opposites 
in  the  British  Army,  much  of  the  work 
fell  to  the  engineer  officer.  Construc- 
tion planning  for  the  U.S.  Army  in  the 
British  Isles  was  the  responsibility  of 
five  officers:  General  McNarney;  Lt. 
Col.  George  W.  Griner,  Jr.,  ACofS, 
G-4;  Lt.  Col.  John  E.  Dahlquist,  ACofS, 


'  Promoted  to  colonel  26  June  1941  and  to  briga- 
dier general  on  16  April  1942. 


8 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


G-1;  Lt.  Col.  Charles  L.  Bolte,  ACofS 
for  Plans;  and  Colonel  Davison.  In 
November  1941  Colonel  Davison  also 
began  to  function  as  a  member  of  a 
new  technical  committee,  which  repre- 
sented an  expansion  of  the  duties  of 
the  Special  Observer  Group  and  a  step 
toward  closer  liaison  with  the  British. 

Reconnaissance 

For  many  weeks  in  1941,  Davison  and 
officers  of  the  group  toured  those  areas 
to  which  American  forces  would  be  sent 
if  the  United  States  entered  the  war. 
SPOBS  activities  were  guided  by  the 
basic  American  war  plan,  RAINBOW— 5, 
and  an  agreement  designated  ABC—  1, 
which  resulted  from  meetings  held 
early  in  1941  by  representatives  of  the 
British  Chiefs  of  Staff,  the  Chief  of  Staff 
of  the  U.S.  Army,  and  the  U.S.  Chief 
of  Naval  Operations.  Features  of 
ABC-1  relating  specifically  to  initial 
American  activities  in  the  European 
theater  included  provisions  for  the  de- 
fense of  bases  in  Scotland  and  Northern 
Ireland  to  be  used  by  U.S.  naval  forces, 
the  establishment  of  a  U.S.  bomber 
command  to  operate  from  England,  the 
dispatch  of  a  U.S.  token  force  for  the 
defense  of  Britain,  and  American  relief 
of  the  British  garrison  in  Iceland. 

Between  27  May  and  21  November 


'^  Capt  S.J.  Thurman  et  al.,  The  Special  Observer 
(iroup  Prior  to  the  Activation  of  the  European  The- 
ater of  Operations,  Oct  44,  OCE,  ETOUSA,  Hist  Sect; 
Henry  G.  Elliott,  The  Administrative  and  Logistical 
History  of  the  European  Theater  of  Operations,  vol. 
I,  "The  Predecessor  Commands:  The  Special  Observ- 
ers (SPOBS)  and  the  United  States  Army  Forces  in 
the  British  Isles  (USAFBI),"  Mar  46,  in  C:MH;  Roland 
(i.  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Annies.  Volume 
I:  May  1941-Septeviber  1944,  United  States  Army  in 
World  War  II  (Washington,  1953),  pp.  13-  113.  Unless 
otherwise  indicated,  this  chapter  is  based  on  these 
sources. 


1941,  representatives  of  the  Special 
Observer  Group  attended  eight  meet- 
ings of  the  Operational  Planning  Sec- 
tion of  the  British  Joint  Planning  Staff; 
the  group  had  its  first  meeting  with  the 
British  Air  Ministry  on  6  June.  These 
meetings  promoted  practical  coopera- 
tion between  the  SPOBS  staff  and  Brit- 
ish officers.  Soon  after  the  27  May 
meeting  the  British  War  Office  submit- 
ted a  list  of  questions  to  General  Chaney 
concerning  accommodations  for  U.S. 
troops.  This  questionnaire  brought  up 
many  points  considered  in  detail  by 
officers  who  in  the  summer  and  fall  of 
1941  inspected  areas  in  Northern  Ire- 
land, Scotland,  and  Kent  where  the 
token  force  probably  would  be  located. 
The  British  had  already  undertaken 
much  of  the  construction  necessary  for 
the  accommodation  of  American  troops 
in  those  areas,  but  much  more  needed 
to  be  done  to  extend  and  improve  roads 
and  to  provide  housing  and  other  nec- 
essary structures  for  the  troops. 

The  rush  of  events  following  Pearl 
Harbor  outdated  the  recommendations 
and  detailed  planning  that  resulted 
from  these  tours.  Colonel  Davison  and 
the  other  SPOBS  officers  nevertheless 
obtained  valuable  information  concern- 
ing resources,  equipment,  housing,  and 
British  methods.  Most  important,  the 
inspection  tours  promoted  the  practi- 
cal teamwork  with  the  British  that  was 
later  so  essential  to  the  war  effort.  After 
the  inspection  tour  of  Northern  Ire- 
land in  July  1941,  the  surveyers  reported 
to  the  War  Department  that  the  chief 
engineering  problem  in  Ulster  was  to 
provide  housing  for  the  approximately 
27,000  troops  envisaged  in  RAIN- 
BOW-5.  The  British  would  be  able  to 
supply  all  the  Nissen  huts  required,  and 
crushed    rock   and   cement   could   be 


THE  ENGINEERS  CROSS  THE  ATLANTIC,  1941-1942 


9 


obtained  in  England.^  Lumber  and 
quarrying  machinery  were  scarce,  how- 
ever, and  hardware  would  have  to  come 
from  the  United  States.  One  engineer 
aviation  battalion  and  a  general  service 
or  combat  engineer  regiment  would  be 
needed  to  do  general  construction  and 
airfield  maintenance.^ 

The  plans  for  Northern  Ireland  were 
eventually  carried  out  with  minor  de- 
viations, but  this  was  not  the  case  for 
most  of  the  other  areas  surveyed  in  the 
United  Kingdom.  After  American  entry 
into  the  war  the  bases  in  Northern  Ire- 
land became  more  important  than  those 
in  Scotland  as  a  new  war  strategy  gave 
less  relative  weight  to  air  defense  and 
offense  and  more  to  preparations  for 
invasion  of  the  Continent. 

The  SPOBS  officers  surveyed  three 
widely  separated  sites  for  prospective 
Army  installations  in  Scotland:  Gare 
Loch,  Loch  Ryan,  and  Ayr  Airdrome. 
SPOBS  estimated  that  new  construction 
would  be  necessary  to  support  some 
6,000  troops:  about  860  Nissens  for 
housing;  a  hospital  at  Ayr;  and  27  stor- 
age Nissens  distributed  among  the  three 
areas.  An  American  contractor  was  then 
at  work  on  U.S.  Navy  installations  at 
Gare  Loch  and  Loch  Ryan  at  opposite 
ends  of  the  Firth  of  Clyde.  In  view  of 
the  serious  labor  problem  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  the  officers  suggested  three 
alternatives:  concluding  an  agreement 
with  the  Navy  to  extend  its  contracts  to 
cover  the  Army  construction;  letting 
new  Army  contracts  with  the  same  com- 
panies; or  shipping  one  engineer  gen- 


eral service  regiment  to  Scotland  ahead 
of  the  first  convoy  to  put  up  the  hospi- 
tal and  troop  barracks  using  British 
Nissen  huts. ' 

The  proposed  token  force  area  in 
England  lay  southeast  of  London,  near 
Wrotham  in  Kent.  SPOBS  officers 
checked  the  site  during  late  August  and 
early  September,  recommending  that 
an  engineer  unit,  with  a  planned 
strength  of  543  men  of  the  7,600  in  the 
token  force,  bring  all  TOE  equipment. 
Engineers  in  this  district  would  support 
an  infantry  regiment  in  the  field,  build 
many  new  roads,  and  maintain  or  widen 
the  narrow,  winding  roads  in  the  area. 
The  SPOBS  report  pointed  out  that 
supplies  for  the  building  of  field  fortifi- 
cations and  obstacles  should  be  sent 
from  the  United  States.*' 

SPOBS  officers  also  inspected  a  con- 
templated supply  or  base  area  near  Bir- 
mingham and  a  proposed  bomber  com- 
mand site  in  Huntingdonshire,  both  in 
the  Midlands.  General  Chaney  sent  to 
the  War  Department  in  the  summer 
and  fall  of  1941  a  series  of  reports, 
based  largely  on  studies  and  estimates 
prepared  by  Colonel  Davison,  that  sum- 
med up  the  surveys  from  an  engineer- 
ing standpoint.  A  report  of  17  Decem- 
ber 1941  summarized  Colonel  Davison's 
recommendations  for  construction.  Al- 
though dated  ten  days  after  Pearl  Har- 
bor, the  report  was  based  on  the  earlier 
concept  of  air  strategy  that  had  gov- 
erned all  SPOBS  activity  in  the  United 
Kingdom  in  1941. 


'  The  Nissen  hut  was  a  prefabricated  half  cylinder 
of  corrugated  iron  with  a  cement  floor.  It  was  namecf 
after  its  designer,  Lt.  (^ol.  P.  N.  Nissen  (1871-1930). 

'  Annex  4  (Engr)  to  Rpt  on  Northern  Ireland,  Spe- 
cial Observer  (iroup,  3  Sep  41,  Hist  Sect,  Intel  Div, 
OCE  ETOUSA. 


■"  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  7,  Field  and  Service  Force 
Construction  (United  Kingdom),  1946,  pp.  16-18, 
Liaison  Sect,  Intel  Div,  ETOUSA  Adm  file  547.  This 
is  one  of  twenty  historical  reports  prepared  by  the 
OCE  Intelligence  Division  during  1945  —  46. 

'■  Summary  of  Annex  4  to  Rpt  on  Token  Force  Area, 
4  Sep  41,  AG  381 -Kent 'Area,  Token  Force,  OCE 
ETOUSA  Hist  Records. 


10 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Unlike  the  earlier  ones,  the  1 7  Decem- 
ber report  took  for  granted  the  arrival 
of  American  troops  in  Britain.  Britain's 
limited  material  and  labor  resources 
were  already  severely  strained,  and  it 
was  obvious  that  supplemental  Ameri- 
can labor  and  materials  would  be 
needed.  Starting  construction  before 
the  troops  arrived  was  essential,  but  the 
threat  of  enemy  submarines  and  a  ship- 
ping shortage  dictated  moving  only  a 
minimum  of  materials  from  the  United 
States.  Since  troop  labor  was  desirable 
only  if  civilian  labor  was  not  available, 
the  final  report  pointed  out  that  the 
War  Department  would  have  to  deter- 
mine policy,  proportions  of  skilled  and 
unskilled  civilian  and  troop  labor,  and 
many  details  relating  to  materials,  con- 
tracts, and  transportation.  Matters  relat- 
ing to  sites,  construction  details,  and 
utilities  would  have  to  be  handled  in 
the  United  Kingdom.^ 

The  report  provided  figures  on  hous- 
ing already  available  together  with  esti- 
mates of  housing  that  would  have  to  be 
built.  Somewhat  more  than  1 1 ,000  stan- 
dard 16-by-36-foot  quartering  huts  were 
needed,  as  well  as  nearly  500  40-by- 100- 
foot  storage  and  shop  buildings,  and 
442  ordnance  igloos.  Buildings  for 
10,000  hospital  beds  would  also  have 
to  be  built.  Hard-surface  paving  con- 
struction for  airfield  access  roads  and 
for  aircraft  hardstandings  added  up  to 
182  miles. 

Colonel  Davison  was  better  ac- 
quainted than  anyone  else  with  the 
engineering  problems  that  the  Army 
had  to  face  in  Britain  and  had  studied 
all  the  proposed  sites  in  detail.  He  knew 


the  views  of  the  SPOBS  staff  and  those 
of  the  British  War  Office.  Accordingly, 
on  General  Chaney's  recommendation, 
he  went  to  Washington  in  January  1942 
to  help  plan  the  movement  of  troops 
and  their  accommodation  in  Britain.^ 

Iceland 

In  June  1941  SPOBS  engineers  also 
undertook  a  survey  of  locations  in  Ice- 
land, where  an  American  occupation 
was  imminent.  Construction  of  facili- 
ties began  before  Pearl  Harbor  as  Am- 
ericans moved  in  July  1941  to  replace 
the  British  on  the  island.^ 

Iceland  had  great  strategic  impor- 
tance. The  British  occupied  the  island 
in  May  1940  to  prevent  its  seizure  by 
the  Germans,  in  whose  hands  it  would 
have  formed  a  base  for  attack  on  English 
soil  and  on  the  British  shipping  lifeline. 
Britain  had  acted  quickly  to  develop  air 
and  naval  bases  in  Iceland  to  protect 
the  North  Atlantic  convoy  routes.  Yet 
by  the  summer  of  1941  British  reverses 
in  the  western  Sahara  prompted  plans 
to  withdraw  the  Iceland  garrison  for 
use  in  the  desert  and  elsewhere.  Talks 
begun  in  February  1941  during  the 
British-American  ABC— 1  meeting  set 
the  stage  for  a  timely  invitation  from 
the  Icelandic  Althing  (Parliament)  for 
American  troops  to  replace  the  British. 
Thus,  belligerent  Britain  proposed  to 
leave  the  defense  of  neutral  Iceland  to 
the  quasi-neutral  United  States."* 


^  Summaries  of  SPOBS  Planning,  pp.  16-24;  Rpt, 
Chaney  to  TAG,  17  Dec  41,  A(;  381  ((ireat  Britain, 
U.S.  troops  in  UK),  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Records. 


**  Msg  24,  (Chaney  to  TA(;,  22  Jan  42,  Northern 
Ireland  Const  Prog,  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Records. 

'  On  the  planning  for  and  occupation  of  Iceland  in 
1941,  see  Stetson  Conn,  Rose  C.  Engelman,  and  Byron 
Fairchild,  GiMrding  the  United  States  and  Its  Outposts, 
United  States  Army  in  World  War  II  (Washington, 
1964),  pp.  459-531. 

'"'  Lt  Col  William  L.  Thorkelson,  "The  Occupation 
of  Iceland  During  World  War  II,  Including  the  Post 


THE  ENGINEERS  CROSS  THE  ATLANTIC,  1941-1942 


11 


On  11  June  1941,  Colonel  Davison 
and  seven  officers  arrived  on  the  island 
and  by  18  June  could  report  that  from 
an  engineering  standpoint  Iceland  had 
little  to  offer.  Without  trees  there  was 
no  lumber.  Practically  all  supplies  had 
to  move  through  the  poorly  equipped 
port  of  Reykjavik.  Ships  exceeding  470 
feet  in  length  and  2 1  feet  in  draft  could 
not  moor  alongside  the  two  quays  that 
served  the  harbor.  The  climate  offered 
a  mean  winter  temperature  of  30°F 
and  a  summer  mean  of  52°F,  but  rain- 
fall of  nearly  fifty  inches  a  year  and 
midwinter  winds  of  eighty  miles  per 
hour  made  working  and  living  condi- 
tions severe.  Only  volcanic  rock,  gravel, 
and  sand  were  abundant  on  the  bleak 
island.  Two  airdromes  built  by  the  Brit- 
ish were  usable  immediately  but  re- 
quired work  to  conform  to  American 
standards  and  expansion  to  accommo- 
date heavier  American  traffic.  Added 
to  Reykjavik  Field  in  the  city  itself  and 
the  Kaldadharnes  Airdrome,  some 
thirty-five  miles  southeast  of  the  capital, 
were  other  rudimentary  fields  such  as 
Keflavik,  on  a  windswept  point  of  land 
twenty-five  miles  southwest  of  Reykja- 
vik. A  grass  field  with  a  runway  1,000 
yards  long  and  50  yards  wide,  it  was 
suitable  for  emergency  use  only.  The 
SPOBS  officers  believed  that  another 

War  Economic  and  Social  Effects,"  M.A.  Thesis,  Syra- 
cuse University,  1949,  pp.  16-17,  in  CMH.  Iceland 
authorities,  doubtful  about  Britain's  staying  power  in 
the  war  with  Germany,  had  already  approached  the 
American  Consul  in  Iceland  in  December  1940  with 
suggestions  for  including  Iceland  within  the  "Monroe 
Doctrine  area."  Thurman,  The  Special  Observer 
Group  Prior  to  the  Activation  of  the  European  The- 
ater of  Operations,  p.  49;  The  Adm  and  Log  Hist  of 
the  ETO,  vol.  I,  "The  Predecessor  Commands,"  pp. 
36-37;  Wesley  F.  Craven  and  James  L.  Cate,  eds., 
"The  U.S.  Army  Air  Forces  in  World  War  II,"  vol.  I, 
Plans  and  Early  Operations:  January  1939  to  A  ugust  1 942 
(Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1948),  pp. 
122-23.  342-48. 


site  sixty  miles  southeast  of  the  capital, 
known  as  the  Oddi  Airdrome,  gave 
promise  of  immediate  development. 
Two  other  fields  were  too  remote  even 
to  be  visited  on  the  hasty  tour:  Melgerdhi 
in  the  north,  13  1/2  miles  from  Akureyri, 
and  another  emergency  field  at  Hoefn 
in  the  southeast. 

Voluminous,  if  spotty,  collections  of 
similar  data  reached  Washington  from 
military  and  naval  teams  scanning  the 
island's  facilities.  A  Navy  party  came 
over  from  Greenland  looking  for  likely 
naval  air  patrol  bases,  and  another 
Army-Marine  Corps  party  arrived  after 
Colonel  Davison's  departure.  General 
Chaney  sent  the  SPOBS  report  to  Wash- 
ington with  Lt.  Col.  George  W.  Griner, 
Jr.,  the  SPOBS  G-4  who  had  accompa- 
nied Davison.  War  Department  plan- 
ners compiled  the  information  for  the 
projected  occupation  of  Iceland  under 
the  code  name  iNDIGO." 

After  some  changes  in  planning  and 
a  revision  in  the  concept  of  the  opera- 
tion that  committed  American  troops 
to  the  reinforcement  and  not  to  the 
relief  of  the  British  49th  Infantry  Divi- 
sion on  the  island,  a  convoy  with  the 
4,400  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the 
1st  Provisional  Brigade  (Marines)  under 
Brig.  Gen.  John  Marston,  USMC,  ar- 
rived at  Reykjavik  on  7  July  1941.  Army 
engineer  troops  reached  that  port  on  6 
August  1941  as  part  of  the  first  eche- 
lon of  Task  Force  4  (92  officers  and 


"  Thorkelson,  "Occupation  of  Iceland,"  p.  5;  Rpt, 
Maj  Gen  James  E.  Chaney  to  CofEngrs,  HQ,  SPOBS, 
19  Jun  41,  partially  quoted  in  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist 
Rpt  17,  Engineering  in  Iceland,  Aug  45,  app.  2,  Liai- 
son Sect,  Intel  Div,  ETOUSA  Adm  file  547;  The  Adm 
and  Log  Hist  of  the  ETO,  vol.  I,  "The  Predecessor 
Commands,"  pp.  40—45.  An  emergency  field  was 
eventually  built  near  Oddi.  Rpt,  Oddi  Emergency 
Strip,  Construction  and  Installation,  Aug  42-45; 
Conn,  Engelman,  and  Fairchild,  Guarding  the  United 
States  and  Its  Outposts,  pp.  472  —  73. 


12 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


General  Bonesteel 

1,125  enlisted  men),  the  first  U.S.  Army 
contingent  to  reach  Iceland.  The  force 
consisted  of  the  33d  Pursuit  Squadron, 
which  flew  in  from  the  U.S.S.  Wasp 
offshore;  an  air  base  squadron;  and  a 
number  of  special  service  detachments 
to  contribute  to  the  air  defense  of  Ice- 
land. Engineer  elements  were  two  com- 
panies of  the  21st  Engineer  Aviation 
Regiment,  soon  to  be  redesignated  the 
824th  Engineer  Aviation  Battalion.  On 
16  September  1941,  the  2d  Battalion, 
5th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment,  arrived 
with  the  second  echelon  of  Task  Force 
4;  the  entire  American  force  in  Iceland 
became  the  Iceland  Base  Command  on 
the  same  day.  The  command,  under 
Maj.  Gen.  Charles  H.  Bonesteel,  re- 
mained directly  subordinate  to  the  field 
force  commander  in  Washington,  Gen- 
eral George  C.  Marshall.  Because  of 
British  strategic  responsibility  for  Ice- 
land, General  Chaney  continued  to 
argue  for  the  inclusion  of  the  Ameri- 


can garrison  in  Iceland  under  his  con- 
trol, but  his  viewpoint  did  not  prevail 
until  the  summer  of  the  following  year.'^ 

During  the  first  days  in  Iceland,  the 
engineer  troops  lived  in  tents  previously 
erected  by  the  Marines,  and  other  units 
moved  into  Nissen  huts  provided  by  the 
British.  For  a  few  days  after  the  land- 
ing of  the  2d  Battalion,  5th  Engineer 
Combat  Regiment,  there  was  consider- 
able confusion.  The  base  engineer,  Lt. 
Col.  Clarence  N.  Iry,  who  had  come 
with  the  Marine  brigade,  reported  much 
equipment  broken  by  careless  loading 
and  handling.  The  material  and  spe- 
cialized equipment  for  an  entire  refrig- 
erated warehouse  were  damaged  be- 
yond recovery.  Navy  pressure  for  quick 
unloading  did  not  improve  matters 
since  there  was  no  covered  storage 
space  in  Reykjavik  waterfront  areas  and 
too  little  dump  space  elsewhere.  In  the 
confusion  the  property  of  various  units 
went  widely  astray;  several  weeks  passed 
before  the  engineer  battalion  located 
all  its  belongings  and  assembled  them 
in  one  place. '^ 

The  engineers  took  up  a  building, 
repair,  and  maintenance  program  well 
begun  by  the  British.  At  first  their  work 
supplemented  that  of  the  Royal  En- 
gineers, and  not  until  late  in  1942  did 
they  replace  their  British  counterparts 

'■■^  Rpt,  Maj  Gen  C.  H.  Bonesteel  to  AG,  WD,  30  Apr 
43,  sub:  Report  on  Historical  Data,  Overseas  Bases, 
314.7  Hist,  1942-43;  The  Adm  and  Log  Hist  of  the 
ETO,  vol.  L  "The  Predecessor  Gomniands,"  pp. 
43-50;  Rpt,  Base  Engr  in  GHQ,  U.S.  Army,  Indigo, 
to  the  Engr,  1  Sep  41,  OCE  381  (Ini)Ic;<))  Gr  Pt;  IBC 
Record  of  Events,  14  Jul  41-20Jun  42,  p.  16;  OCE 
ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  17,  Engineering  in  Iceland,  pp. 
8-9;  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Vol- 
ume I,  p.  19. 

' '  Ltr,  Lt  Col  Iry  to  Col  George  Mayo,  CE,  10  Aug 
41,  E  381  (Indigo)  89,  WD,  OQMG;  Rpt,  Base  Engr 
in  GHQ,  U.S.  Army,  Indigo,  to  the  Engr,  1  Sep  41; 
1st  Lt  Walter  H.  Heldt  (commanding  21st  Engrs  [Avn]) 
to  CO,  HQ,  IBCAF,  314.7  Hist  Records,  1941-43. 


THE  ENGINEERS  CROSS  THE  ATLANTIC,  1941-1942 


13 


Construction  Supplies  at  Reykjavik  Harbor,  October  1941 


entirely.  But  the  main  construction 
activities  of  the  war  years  were  already 
evident:  building  airdromes,  improving 
communications  and  supply  facilities, 
and  constructing  adequate  camp  and 
hospital  accommodations.  The  pro- 
gram, originally  limited  to  the  more  set- 
tled part  of  Iceland  in  the  vicinity  of 
Reykjavik,  extended  gradually  to  re- 
mote regions  along  the  northern  and 
eastern  coasts. 

The  principal  problems  of  construc- 
tion lay  in  the  forbidding  terrain,  high 
winds,  poor  communications,  and  the 
consequent  difficulties  of  supply.  Out- 
side the  southwestern  corner  of  the 
country,  the  roads — or  the  lack  of 
them — made  long-distance  hauling  of 
bulk  supplies  impossible.  Iceland  had 
no  railroads.  Though  most  shipments 


funneled  through  Reykjavik  and  then 
moved  on  to  these  outposts  by  smaller 
craft,  vessels  from  the  United  States 
occasionally  touched  at  Akureyri, 
Seydhisfjordhur  and  Budhareyri,  ports 
that  had  remained  ice  free  year-round 
since  1918.  Other  than  the  rock,  sand, 
and  gravel  obtained  locally,  all  engineer 
supplies  came  from  the  United  States 
and  Britain.  Nissen  hutting,  coal,  and 
coke  were  the  principal  supplies  from 
Britain;  the  Boston  Port  of  Embarka- 
tion handled  the  remainder  of  the  Ice- 
land garrison's  needs  including  the  inte- 
rior fittings  for  the  huts  and  any  neces- 
sary equipment.'^ 


'^  Rad,  Navy  Dept  to  AG,  for  Gross  from  Consul 
Reykjavik,  21  Jul  41,  AG  320.2;  Unsigned  British  Rpt 
to  Dir  of  Movements,  War  Office,  18  Aug  41,  cited  in 


14 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Engineer  Troops  Dumping  Fill  at  Meeks  Field,  Keflavik 


For  storage  and  quarters  the  engi- 
neers followed  the  British  example  and 
used  Nissen  huts  that  could  withstand 
the  wind.  Standard  warehouse  and  bar- 
racks construction  could  not  stand  up 
to  the  elements,  and  even  the  huts  suf- 
fered when  gales  ripped  the  metal  sheet- 
ing from  the  frames.  The  men  banked 
earth  and  stone  against  the  sides  of  the 
structures  to  anchor  and  insulate  them 
and  slung  sandbags  on  cables  across  the 
arched  roofs  for  stability.  Any  loose 
material  outside  in  open  storage  had  to 
be  staked.'^ 

Adm  53,  IBC  Hist;  Msg,  Chaney  to  WD,  9  Aug  4L 
AG  320.2;  Msg,  Whitcomb  [Consul  in  Reykjavik]  to 
Scowden,  G— 4,  WD.  The  convoy  that  carried  the  first 
echelon  of  Task  Force  4  to  Iceland  deposited  1 1,000 
tons  of  stores  at  Reykjavik,  including  vehicles,  meats, 
vegetables,  dairy  products,  coal,  and  coke. 

^'^  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  17,  Engineering  in  Ice- 


During  the  first  weeks  after  Task 
Force  4  arrived,  the  engineers  rushed 
to  complete  troop  housing  and  covered 
storage  and  pushed  to  extend  the  docks 
in  Reykjavik  harbor.  Nearly  everywhere 
they  struggled  with  a  subsoil  of  soggy 
peat  covered  with  lava  rock.  As  autumn 
drew  on,  they  moved  ahead  with  ex- 
panding airdromes  on  the  island. 

By  late  1941  American  engineers  had 
gradually  taken  over  airfield  construc- 
tion from  the  British.  Reykjavik  Field 
was  under  development  by  a  force  of 
2,500  British  engineers  and  Icelandic 
workmen  when  the  21st  Engineer  Avia- 
tion Regiment  arrived  with  its  heavier 
construction  equipment.  The  Ameri- 


land,  app.  8,  G-4  Rpt,  IBC,  and  app.  10,  Unit  Hist, 
475th  Engr  Co. 


THE  ENGINEERS  CROSS  THE  ATLANTIC,  1941-1942 


15 


cans  took  over  the  western  side  of  the 
field,  their  first  responsibility  being  a 
foundation  for  a  British  prefabricated 
hangar.  In  November  the  British  pulled 
out  of  all  work  at  the  site  except  for 
some  road  work  on  their  side  of  the 
airdrome.  At  the  end  of  the  year,  the 
2 1st  was  in  full  control  of  the  operation 
and  supervised  the  contracted  Icelandic 
labor  on  the  perimeter  roads  surround- 
ing the  base.  The  departure  of  the 
Royal  Engineers  in  November  and  De- 
cember 1941  also  brought  the  21st  to 
the  Kaldadharnes  site,  and  survey  par- 
ties began  laying  out  what  became  the 
largest  airfield  in  Iceland  at  Keflavik.'*^ 
The  last  of  the  Marine  contingent  left 
Iceland  in  March,  and  by  mid- 1942  the 
Iceland  Base  Command  numbered 
35,000  Army  officers  and  enlisted  men, 
with  the  requirement  for  engineer  sup- 
port growing  steadily.  With  the  824th 
Engineer  Aviation  Battalion — an  off- 
shoot of  the  former  2 1st  Engineer  Avia- 
tion Regiment — engaged  in  airfield 
work,  the  5th  Engineer  Combat  Regi- 
ment built  most  of  the  troop  quarters, 
laundries,  kitchens,  refrigeration  and 
ice  plants,  and  hospitals  for  the  garri- 
son until  the  arrival  of  the  7th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  in  May  1942. 
Work  on  roads  to  connect  the  outposts 
established  by  or  taken  over  from  the 
British  on  the  northern  and  eastern 
coasts  developed  in  stride  with  housing 


'•^  Rpt,  Base  Engr,  IBC,  to  the  Engr,  GHQ,  U.S. 
Army,  Oct  41,  OCE  (12-  3-41),  381  (Inuigo)  225/2; 
Rpt,  Base  Engr,  IBC,  to  the  Engr,  GHQ,  U.S.  Army, 
6  Dec  41,  381  (Indk.o)  267/1;  Lt  Col  D.  A.  Morris, 
Notes  on  Aviation  Engineer  Operations  in  Iceland, 
July  1941  to  October  1942,  in  USAAF  pamphlet. 
Excerpts  From  Overseas  Letters  and  Memoranda, 
1943,  pp.  5-9,  Ft.  Belvoir,  Va.,  Engr  Sch  Lib;  Capt 
Reginald  J.  B.  Page  (21st  Engrs  [Avn])  to  CO,  HQ, 
IBCAF,  Camp  Tripoli,  Iceland,  314.7  Hist  Records, 
1941-43. 


and  airdrome  construction.  (Map  1)^^ 
The  limited  stretches  of  hard-topped 
roads  in  the  Reykjavik  area  remained 
serviceable,  but  the  gravel  tracks  else- 
where took  a  constant  beating  from 
heavy  Army  traffic.  The  5th  Engineer 
Combat  Regiment  regraded  and  metal- 
ized  surfaces  where  necessary  and  ap- 
plied a  top  course  of  red  lava  rock 
mixed  with  a  finer  crushed  grade  of  the 
lava,  a  composite  also  used  for  the 
hardstandings,  taxi  strips,  and  service 
access  roads  around  the  airfields.'^ 

The  824th  Engineer  Aviation  Battal- 
ion still  employed  hundreds  of  Iceland- 
ers on  the  perimeter  roads  and  hangar 
aprons  at  the  Reykjavik  Field  but  grad- 
ually centered  its  efforts  on  the  huge 
complex  at  Keflavik.  On  the  wind-swept 
peninsula,  two  separate  fields — Meeks 
Field  for  bombers  and  Patterson  Field 
for  fighter  aircraft — took  shape,  both 
ready  for  operation  in  early  1943.  Work 
here  was  carried  on  by  the  824th  in 
early  1942  and  then  taken  over  by  a 
U.S.  Navy  contractor.  Navy  Seabees  also 
arrived  to  work  under  Army  engineer 
supervision  after  the  civilian  contrac- 
tor returned  to  the  United  States.  Beset 
by  high  winds  that  scoured  the  feature- 
less landscape,  the  engineers  devised 
expedients  in  the  final  phases  of  run- 
way construction.  When  the  wind 
churned  the  powdery  top  surfaces  of 
newly  graded  runway  beds  into  dust 
storms,  they  laid  on  liquid  asphalt.  But 
with  September  frosts,  the  asphalt  cooled 


"  IBC,  ACofS,  G-2,  Record  of  Events,  14  Jun 
41-30  Jun  42,  pp.  12-19,  314.7  Hist,  1942-43; 
Rpt,  Analysis  of  Engineer  Activities  in  Various  The- 
aters of  Operations,  Based  on  Troop  Basis,  1  Mar  43, 
381  (Gen)  661/1,  Doc  77446,  Intel  files.  Ft.  Belvoir, 
Va.,  Engr  Sch  Lib. 

'"  Base  Engr,  Indigo,  to  CG,  SOS,  Monthly  Prog- 
ress Rpt  for  May  42,  OCE  (7-4-42),  381  (Indigo) 
431. 


16 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


REYKJA  VIK, 
Keflavik  Field 


ICELAND 

1943 

0  25  50  Miles 

^ ' 

0       25      50  Kilometers 


MAP  I 

and  coagulated  before  it  could  pene- 
trate the  lava  deeply  enough  to  stabi- 
lize it.  Later  experiments  with  a  porous- 
mix  base  produced  a  runway  rugged 
enough  to  take  heavy  Navy  patrol  craft 
and  Army  bombers  on  the  ferry  run  to 
England. 

The  Iceland  Base  Command  con- 
verted Iceland  into  a  great  protective 
bastion  for  the  convoy  routes  to  Europe. 
Engineer-constructed  facilities  on  the 
island  housed  American  defense  forces 
that  guaranteed  one  outpost  on  the  way 


'■'  Keflavik  Project  Report,  vol.  I,(xmstruction,  1943, 
pp.  7-10,  600.1;  Rpt,  Dir,  Atlantic  Div,  BuY&rD,  to 
Chf,  BuY&D,  18  jun  45,  Naval  Facilities  in  Iceland; 
Morris,  Notes  on  Aviation  Engineer  Operations  in 
Iceland,  p.  6;  Craven  and  Cate,  Plaits  and  Early  Opera- 
lions:  januan  1939  to  August  1942,  p.  346. 


to  the  embattled  United  Kingdom,  which 
became  the  principal  focus  of  Ameri- 
can interest  in  the  Atlantic  area  after 
Pearl  Harbor. 

Magnet  Force 

With  the  United  States  an  active  bel- 
ligerent, on  2  January  1942,  the  U.S. 
Army  replaced  SPOBS  with  U.S.  Army 
Forces,  British  Isles  (USAFBI),  a  more 
formal  headquarters  that  was  initially 
only  SPOBS  in  uniform.  But  creation 
of  the  headquarters  made  the  Ameri- 
can officers  full  partners  of  their  oppo- 
sites  on  the  British  staff. 

On  5  January  1942,  the  War  Depart- 
ment placed  the  engineers  in  charge  of 
all  overseas  construction,  but  it  was  Feb- 


THE  ENGINEERS  CROSS  THE  ATLANTIC,  1941-1942 


17 


ruary  before  Colonel  Davison,  still  in 
Washington,  got  Army  approval  for  a 
USAFBI  construction  program.  Pres- 
sures to  bolster  home  defenses  and  des- 
perate attempts  to  stop  the  Japanese  in 
the  Pacific  were  absorbing  the  energies 
of  Washington  officials,  and  still  another 
month  went  by  before  Colonel  Davison 
could  obtain  facts  and  figures  from  the 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers  (OCE) 
concerning  labor,  materials,  and  ship- 
ping requirements.  This  was  hardly 
accomplished  before  the  War  Depart- 
ment called  upon  USAFBI  to  reduce 
estimated  construction  to  the  minimum, 
despite  General  Chaney's  repeated 
warnings  that  more  construction,  espe- 
cially housing,  would  be  required  than 
had  been  planned  in  December. ^'^ 

ABC-1  and  Rainbow-5  provided 
for  sending  an  American  token  force 
to  England,  but  America's  new  belliger- 
ent status  and  British  needs  brought 
some  changes.  New  plans  called  for  the 
earliest  possible  dispatch  of  105,000 
men  (the  MAGNET  Force)  to  Northern 
Ireland.  For  tactical  purposes,  the  force 
was  to  be  organized  as  V  Corps,  made 
up  of  the  1st  Armored  and  the  32d, 
34th,  and  37th  Infantry  Divisions,  with 
supply  and  service  troops  as  well  as  air 
units.  Of  the  total,  13,310  were  to  be 
engineers.  Engineer  plans  for  MAGNET 
Force  gave  detailed  instructions  on 
landing,  administration,  depot  opera- 
tions, and  supply  levels,  with  heavy  reli- 
ance on  the  British  for  accommodations 
and  supplies.  From  January  to  June 
1942  engineers  in  the  United  Kingdom 


concentrated  on  installng  the  MAGNET 
Force  in  Northern  Ireland.'^' 

American  troops  and  aircraft  went 
to  Northern  Ireland  to  defend  Ulster 
from  air  raid  or  invasion,  to  lift  morale 
in  the  United  States  and  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  and  to  release  British  troops 
for  action  in  the  threatened  areas  of 
the  Near  East  and  Africa. ^'^  But  carry- 
ing out  deployments  to  Northern  Ire- 
land on  the  scale  envisaged  in  MAGNET 
Force  proved  inexpedient  because  of 
the  initial  deployments  of  shipping  to 
meet  the  Japanese  onslaught  in  the 
Pacific.  Decisions  concerning  the  size 
and  makeup  of  the  final  MAGNET  Force 
changed  from  time  to  time  during  the 
early  part  of  1942.  On  2  January  the 
War  Department  set  the  first  contin- 
gent at  14,000;  a  week  later  the  figure 
was  increased  to  17,300,  but  on  12  Jan- 
uary it  was  reduced  to  4,100  in  order 
to  speed  troop  movements  to  the  Pa- 
dhcP 

This  American  strategic  uncertainty 
after  Pearl  Harbor  led  to  contradictions 
in  events  in  the  British  Isles.  Though 
the  decision  to  defeat  Germany  first 
remained  unquestioned,  the  implied 
troop  buildup  in  Britain  did  not  neces- 
sarily flow  from  that  decision.  Rather, 
as  American  leaders  attempted  to  meet 
the  demands  of  a  two-front  global  war, 
engineer  work  in  Northern  Ireland  was 
determined  by  the  exigencies  of  the 
moment  and  not  by  a  comprehensive 


'^"  WD  Ltr,  sub:  War  Department  Construction  Pol- 
icy (Theaters  of  Operation),  5  Jan  42,  AG  600.12 
(1-3-42)  MO-D-M;  Cbl,  Chaney  to  TAG,  22 
Jan  42,  Northern  Ireland  Const  Prog,  OCE  ETOUSA 
Hist  Records. 


^'  Gen  Annex  9  (Engr)  to  Op>erational  Plan,  North- 
ern Ireland  Theater;  L,tr,  OCE  to  Engr,  GHQ,  2  Jan 
42,  sub:  Northern  Ireland  Base  Section  Supplies,  1004 
Engr  files,  NIBS. 

'-^^  ETO  Gen  Bd  Rpt  128,  Logistical  Build-up  in  the 
British  Isles,  1946,  p.  47. 

■^'^  Cbl  491,  Marshall  to  Milattache,  LDN,  7  Feb  42, 
Northern  Ireland  Const  Prog. 


18 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


General  Chaney,  Ambassador  John  G.  Winant,  and  General  Hartle 

inspect  American  installations  in  Ulster,  Northern  Ireland,  February  1942. 


construction  program  supporting  a  stra- 
tegic plan.^"* 

Magnet  Force  started  with  little  no- 
tice. An  advance  party  under  Col.  Ed- 
ward H.  Heavey  left  New  York  secretly 
on  6  January  1942;  with  it  was  Lt.  Col. 
Donald  B.  Adams,  the  V  Corps  engi- 
neer. The  party  sailed  from  Halifax  on 
a  Norwegian  ship  and  reached  Scotland 
on  the  nineteenth.  Colonel  Adams  and 
the  other  officers  went  to  London  for  a 
week  of  briefing,  and  the  rest  of  the 
party  moved  on  to  Belfast.  A  brigadier 
of  the  Royal  Engineers  guided  Adams 
almost  from  the  day  he  reached  North- 
ern Ireland,  acquainting  him  with  Brit- 


ish Army  methods  and  with  the  type  of 
work  demanded  of  him  in  Northern 
Ireland.2^ 

On  24  January  the  U.S.  Army  North- 
ern Ireland  Forces  formally  came  into 
existence.  The  first  troop  contingent, 
under  Maj.  Gen.  Russell  P.  Hartle  of 
the  34th  Infantry  Division,  arrived  on 
the  twenty-sixth.  The  troop  strength 
of  4,100  set  for  12  January  was  not 
reached;  a  USAFBI  report  of  15  Febru- 
ary showed  3,904  troops  and  12  civil- 
ians in  Ulster.  By  mid-March,  after  the 
second  increment  had  arrived,  U.S. 
Army  Northern  Ireland  Forces  totaled 
1 1,039  officers  and  enlisted  men.  This 
force  included  two  engineer  combat 


^^  Ltr,  Adams  to  Chaney,  15  May  42,  Engr  files 
NIBS.  7  8' 


'  Interv  with  Gen  Adams. 


THE  ENGINEERS  CROSS  THE  ATLANTIC,  1941-1942 


19 


battalions  and  three  separate  compa- 
nies of  engineers. 

The  third  and  fourth  increments 
arrived  on  12  and  18  May  respectively. 
The  fourth,  10,000  troops  aboard  the 
Queen  Mary,  had  to  go  ashore  in  light- 
ers, for  the  great  vessel  was  too  large 
for  Belfast  harbor.  Meanwhile,  the  32d 
and  37th  Infantry  Divisions  had  been 
diverted  to  the  Pacific,  and  at  the  end 
of  May  V  Corps  consisted  of  the  34th 
Infantry  Division,  the  1st  Armored 
Division,  and  some  corps  units.  No 
engineer  construction  units  were  in  the 
theater.  The  final  engineer  component 
consisted  of  a  combat  regiment,  two 
combat  battalions,  and  four  service 
companies.  During  May,  MAGNET  Force 
reached  its  peak  of  30,000  U.S.  Army 
troops  in  Northern  Ireland,  some  70,000 
fewer  than  called  for  originally. ^^ 

U.S.  Army  engineers  had  to  under- 
take relatively  little  construction,  for 
nearly  all  the  American  troops  brought 
to  Northern  Ireland  moved  into  camps 
British  units  had  vacated.  British  engi- 
neer officers  made  the  arrangements 
and  furnished  moveable  equipment 
and  supplies  such  as  furniture,  light 
bulbs,  and  coal.  Each  camp  commander 
appointed  an  American  utility  officer 
to  be  responsible  for  camp  maintenance 
and  to  provide  fuel,  equipment,  and 
waste  disposal  service.  Arrangements 
were  made  to  have  American  soldifers 
admitted  to  hospitals  serving  British 
and  Canadian  units. '^^ 

The  Americans  depended  on  the 
British  for  additional  construction  nec- 


essary to  house  U.S.  troops.  In  fact,  the 
British  did  most  of  the  planning  as  well 
as  the  building.  The  first  U.S.  Army 
engineer  organizations,  which  settled  in 
Walworth  Camp  in  County  London- 
derry on  Lough  Foyle,  did  not  receive 
their  organic  equipment,  including  ve- 
hicles, until  weeks  after  the  troops  ar- 
rived. With  the  "force  mark"  system, 
each  unit's  equipment  was  coded  before 
shipment  overseas;  men  and  supplies 
went  on  different  ships,  the  equipment 
usually  on  slower  moving  vessels.  This 
system  plagued  almost  all  engineer 
units  arriving  in  the  United  Kingdom 
during  1942.  Yet  almost  as  soon  as  the 
first  engineer  troops  landed,  the  War 
Department  called  for  a  complete  con- 
struction program  for  U.S.  Army  forces 
scheduled  to  arrive  in  Northern  Ire- 
land. March  was  over  before  Colonel 
Adams  could  submit  a  detailed  study, 
for  he  had  little  more  than  a  skeleton 
engineering  staff.^*^ 

At  first,  the  most  essential  projects 
were  building  and  enlarging  engineer 
depots.  The  V  Corps  commanders  estab- 
lished a  new  depot  at  Desertmartin  in 
the  southern  part  of  County  London- 
derry and  decided  to  enlarge  an  exist- 
ing depot  at  Ballyclare  in  Antrim  north 
of  Belfast,  adapting  it  to  American  use. 
Once  a  site  was  picked,  the  engineers 
were  to  design  the  depot — type  of  build- 
ing construction,  layout  of  buildings 
and  access  roads,  railroad  service,  and 


'■^•^  Ibid.;  ETO  Gen  Bd  Rpt  128,  Logistical  Build-up 
in  the  British  Isles,  p.  43;  Ltr,  Adams  to  Chaney,  15 
May  42. 

■^  Memo,  Bonesteel  for  G— 4,  9  Mar  42,  Northern 
Ireland  Const  Prog. 


-""  Cbl  410,  Marshall  to  USAFBI,  26  Jan  42,  North- 
ern Ireland  Const  Prog;  Mtg,  British  Ministry  of  Com- 
merce with  American  Reps,  1942-43,  1009  Sup  Cont, 
MofC,  Engr  files,  NIBS;  Rpt,  Force  Engr,  NIF,  to 
OCE,  9  May  42,  sub:  USANIF  Engr  Tech  Rpt  No.  5, 
Engr  files,  NIBS;  Rpt,  Force  Engr,  NIF,  to  OCE,  3 
Feb  42,  sub:  Periodic  Engr  Rpts  as  of  1  Feb  42;  ETO 
Gen  Bd  Rpt  128,  Logistical  Build-up  in  the  British 
Isles,  p.  47. 


20 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


concrete  hardstandings.  They  under- 
took litde  actual  construction,  however.^^ 

Work  on  enlarging  the  depot  at  Bally- 
clare  and  force  headquarters  near  Wil- 
mont,  south  of  Belfast,  began  early  in 
February.  After  the  Ballyclare  construc- 
tion was  finished,  a  company  of  the 
107th  Engineer  Battalion  (Combat)  re- 
mained there  to  operate  the  depot, 
aided  by  work  and  guard  details  from 
the  467th  Engineer  Maintenance  Com- 
pany. From  1  March  to  31  August  the 
112th  Engineers  (originally  a  combat 
battalion  and  in  June  enlarged  and  re- 
designated a  combat  regiment)  worked 
at  Desertmartin  except  for  three  weeks 
in  late  March  and  early  April  when  it 
furnished  troops  to  make  repairs  at 
force  headquarters.  Such  units  as  the 
112th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment, 
Company  A  of  the  109th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion,  the  467th  Engineer 
Shop  Company,  the  427th  Engineer 
Dump  Truck  Company,  and  the  397th 
Engineer  Depot  Company  chiefly  en- 
larged existing  facilities  to  meet  Ameri- 
can standards  and  needs. ^" 

By  May  the  supply  situation,  except 
for  organizational  equipment,  was  com- 
paratively satisfactory.  As  early  as  20 
February,  engineer  items  were  sixth  on 
the  shipping  priority  list  (below  post 
exchange  supplies)  and  using  units, 
upon  their  arrival  from  America,  re- 
quisitioned engineer  supplies  almost 
immediately.  Day-by-day  requirements 
determined  the  use  of  supplies,  for  the 


''^"  Ltrs,  Hartle  to  COC,  BFNI,  29  Jan  and  3  Feb  42, 
1001  Engr  Depot  E-510,  Engr  files,  NIBS;  Interv 
with  Gen  Adams. 

"'  Rpt,  Force  Engr,  NIF,  to  OCE,  17  Feb  42,  sub: 
Interim  Report,  O&T  Br  files,  OCE;  Ibid.,  3  Feb  42, 
sub:  Periodic  Engr  Rpts  as  of  1  Feb  42;  Ltr,  Adams  to 
Chaney,  15  May  42;  Engr  Tech  Rpt  9,  NIBS  to  OCE, 
SOS,  7  Sep  42,  IncI  3;  Rpt,  Engr,  NIBS,  26  Nov  42, 
Engr  files,  NIBS. 


engineers  had  no  experience  and  no 
directives  to  guide  them.  Yet  by  May, 
Colonel  Adams  could  report  that  engi- 
neer supplies  were  generally  adequate. 
Originally,  a  system  was  established  to 
maintain  a  sixty-  to  ninety-day  level  of 
supplies,  taking  into  account  not  only 
those  troops  already  in  Northern 
Ireland,  but  also  those  due  to  arrive 
within  the  next  sixty  days.  Some  of 
these  supplies  came  from  the  United 
States  without  requisition,  others  by 
specific  requisition,  still  others  by  requi- 
sition of  British  military  supplies,  and  a 
certain  amount  by  local  purchase.  In- 
coming supplies  went  to  the  engineer 
depots  at  Desertmartin  and  Ballyclare, 
and  some  equipment  went  to  Money- 
more  General  Depot,  a  British  deposi- 
tory taken  over  for  U.S.  Army  use  in 
County  Londonderry  west  of  Lough 
Neagh.'^' 

Shortages  of  organizational  equip- 
ment persisted,  in  part  because  of  the 
delays  caused  by  the  force  mark  system; 
at  the  end  of  March  organizations  in 
the  theater  had  only  25  percent  of  their 
equipment.  Five  months  later,  85  per- 
cent was  on  hand,  but  by  this  time 
Northern  Ireland  had  declined  in  sig- 
nificance. Some  of  the  equipment  was 
entirely  too  light  for  the  construction 
demands  made  on  it.^^ 

On  the  whole,  the  engineers  sent  to 
Northern  Ireland  had  had  scanty  train- 
ing in  the  United  States  except  in  basic 
military  subjects,  and  overseas  they  had 
little  chance  to  learn  their  jobs.  The 


"  Rpt,  Force  Engr,  NIF,  to  OCE,  9  May  42,  sub: 
USANIF  Engr  Tech  Rpt  No.  5;  Interv  with  Gen 
Adams;  Cbl,  Marshall  to  SPOBS,  20  Feb  42,  3.00 
USAFBI  Planning,  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Records;  Rpt, 
Engr,  NIBS,  26  Nov  42. 

'-  Rpt,  Force  Engr,  NIBS,  to  G-4,  NIF,  3  Apr  42, 
sub:  Monthly  Rpt  on  Engr  Equipment  and  Supplies, 
1004  Sup  Misc,  1942,  Engr  files,  NIBS. 


THE  ENGINEERS  CROSS  THE  ATLANTIC,  1941-1942 


21 


112th  Engineers,  a  combat  battalion 
redesignated  a  regiment  in  August  1942, 
was  constantly  engaged  in  construction 
and  was  able  to  give  only  10  percent  of 
its  time  to  training  outside  of  that  re- 
ceived on  the  job.  Though  valuable, 
such  work  did  not  train  the  unit  for  the 
many  other  missions  of  a  combat  regi- 
ment in  which  it  had  had  no  real  instruc- 
tion since  September  1941.  Thirty  per- 
cent of  the  men  in  one  battalion  had 
recendy  transferred  from  the  infantry, 
and  many  of  the  enlisted  men  in  the 
unit  had  never  learned  any  engineer 
specialties.^"*  The  men  of  the  107th 
Engineer  Battalion  (Combat)  at  Bally- 
clare  were  supposed  to  be  undergoing 
training,  but  they  were  called  on  so  often 
to  enlarge  force  headquarters  and  reha- 
bilitate the  Quartermaster  Depot  at 
Antrim  that  little  time  remained. ^^ 

Even  when  time  was  available,  the 
lack  of  space  hindered  training.  Agri- 
cultural land  could  not  easily  be  with- 
drawn from  production  to  provide  room 
for  military  training.  Engineer  organi- 
zations were  unfamiliar  with  British 
Army  procedures  even  though  after 
February  1942  Royal  Engineer  schools 
were  open  to  American  troops.  The 
first  attempt  to  teach  British  ways  was 
limited,  but  eventually  such  instruction 
became  an  essential  part  of  U.S.  Army 
engmeer  trammg. 


'■'  The  1 12th  Engineers  was  formed  in  August  1942 
on  a  nucleus  of  one  battalion  from  the  1 12th  Engi- 
neers, 37th  Division,  Ohio  National  Guard,  and  an- 
other from  the  107th  Engineers,  32d  Division,  Wis- 
consin National  Guard.  The  two  battalions  had  had 
little  or  no  training  for  the  type  of  construction 
required  in  Northern  Ireland. 

'^  Ltr,  Adams  to  Chaney,  15  May  42:  ETO  Gen  Bd 
Rpt  128,  Logistical  Build-up  in  the  British  Isles,  p.  47. 

'^■'  Hist  397th  Engr  Depot  Co;  Rpt,  Force  Engr,  NIF, 
to  OCE,  17  Feb  42,  sub:  Interim  Report;  Interv  with 
Col  Anson  D.  Marston. 


On  1  June  1942,  the  Northern  Ire- 
land Base  Command  (Provisional)  was 
formed  to  relieve  V  Corps  of  supply 
and  administrative  problems  so  that  it 
could,  as  the  highest  ground  force  com- 
mand in  the  United  Kingdom,  devote 
its  full  time  to  tactical  preparations.  The 
arrangement  was  short-lived;  the  com- 
mand soon  became  part  of  a  Services 
of  Supply  in  the  newly  formed  Euro- 
pean Theater  of  Operations  under  the 
more  normal  designation  of  a  base 
section.  The  decisions  that  led  to  the 
formation  of  the  theater  presaged  the 
decline  in  importance  of  Northern  Ire- 
land as  a  base.  By  the  summer  of  1942 
the  main  combat  forces  in  the  MAGNET 
Force  (the  1st  Armored  and  34th  Infan- 
try Divisions)  had  been  earmarked  for 
an  invasion  of  North  Africa,  and  U.S. 
construction  in  Ulster  ceased  com- 
pletely.^*^ 

Limited  though  they  were  in  scope, 
the  engineering  tasks  in  Northern  Ire- 
land were  often  difficult  to  accomplish. 
The  damp,  cold  weather  depressed 
troops  fresh  from  camps  in  the  south- 
ern states,  and  the  men  complained 
about  British  food.  Equally  telling  were 
the  insufficient,  inadequate,  and  fre- 
quently unfamiliar  tools.  The  early 
period  in  Northern  Ireland  was,  for  the 
engineers,  a  time  of  stumbling  forward. 
Yet  worthwhile  lessons  were  learned, 
especially  in  planning  construction  and 
in  establishing  a  supply  system.  As  valu- 


^•'On  21  October  1942  there  were  only  292  U.S. 
Army  engineer  personnel  left  in  Northern  Ireland. 
SOS  ETOUSA  Statistical  Summaries  XIV,  26  Oct  42, 
319.25;  Rpt,  Engr,  NIBS,  to  OCE,  9  Jul  42,  sub:  Engr 
Tech  Rpt  No.  7,  ETOUSA,  600  NI  Gen,  Engr  files, 
NIBS;  ETOUSA  GO  17,  17  Jul  42;  SOS  ETOUSA 
GO  79,  9  Dec  42:  Thore  Bengston,  Historical  Resume 
of  Engineer  Activities  in  the  British  Isles. 


22 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


able  as  anything  was  the  day-by-day 
cooperation  with  the  British.'^ 

The  Bolero  Plan 

Outside  of  Northern  Ireland,  the 
entire  engineer  force  in  the  British  Isles 
on  1  April  1942  consisted  of  Maj.  Char- 
les H.  Bonesteel  III,  the  officer  in 
charge;  a  lieutenant  detailed  from  the 
British  Army;  and  two  enlisted  men  on 
loan  from  the  American  embassy.  Colo- 
nel Davison  was  still  in  the  United 
States.  A  larger-  engineer  buildup  a- 
waited  fundamental  decisions  on  strat- 
egy that  would  determine  troop  and 
support  requirements.  In  April  these 
decisions  came,  though  they  were  to  be 
changed  again  in  August. 

In  mid-April  1942,  General  George 
C.  Marshall,  U.S.  Army  Chief  of  Staff, 
and  Harry  Hopkins,  President  Roose- 
velt's personal  representative,  on  a  spe- 
cial mission  in  London  won  British 
approval  of  an  American  plan  for  a 
cross-Channel  invasion  in  1943.  Under 
the  original  code  name  BOLERO,  the 
operation  was  to  have  three  phases — a 
preparatory  buildup  in  the  British  Isles, 
a  cross-Channel  movement  and  seizure 
of  beachheads,  and  finally  a  general 
advance  into  German-occupied  Europe. 
The  plan  also  provided  for  an  emer- 
gency invasion  of  Europe  in  1942  if  the 
Germans  were  critically  weakened  or  if 
a  Soviet  collapse  seemed  imminent.  By 
early  July  the  code  name  BOLERO  had 
come  to  designate  only  the  buildup 
or  preparatory  phase;  the  emergency 
operation  in  1942  was  designated 
Sledgehammer,  and  the  full-scale  1943 
invasion  was  designated  ROUNDUP. 


Bolero  envisaged  the  development 
of  the  United  Kingdom  as  a  massive 
American  base  for  a  future  invasion 
and  for  an  immediate  air  offensive.  It 
changed  the  dimensions  of  the  Ameri- 
can task  in  the  British  Isles  and  shifted 
emphasis  from  Northern  Ireland  to 
England.  Between  April  and  August 
1942  it  gave  the  American  buildup  pur- 
pose and  direction,  but  the  original 
Bolero  concept  did  not  last  long 
enough  to  permit  buildup  plans  to  take 
final  form.  In  the  end  neither  ROUND- 
UP nor  Sledgehammer  proved  fea- 
sible. In  late  July  a  new  strategic  deci- 
sion for  an  invasion  of  North  Africa 
(Torch)  made  any  cross-Channel  inva- 
sion in  1942  or  1943  all  but  impossible 
and  placed  the  BOLERO  buildup  in 
limbo.  The  engineer  story  in  England 
during  spring  and  summer  of  1942  is 
inextricably  tied  to  the  changes  in  direc- 
tion that  resulted  from  these  strategic 
decisions. 

At  the  very  least,  the  BOLERO  plan 
gave  impetus  to  the  development  of  an 
American  planning  and  support  orga- 
nization in  the  British  Isles  and  laid  the 
groundwork  for  the  massive  buildup 
for  an  invasion  in  1943—44.  As  a  first 
step,  combined  BOLERO  committees 
were  established  in  Washington  and 
London,  the  task  of  the  London  com- 
mittee being  to  "prepare  plans  and 
make  administrative  preparations  for 
the  reception,  accommodation  and 
maintenance  of  United  States  forces  in 
the  United  Kingdom  and  for  the  devel- 


^'  ETO  Gen  Bd  Rpt  428,  Logistical  Build-up  in  the 
British  Isles,  pp.  11-12. 


"^**  For  background  on  Roundup  planning,  see  Gor- 
don A.  Harrison,  Cross-Channel  Attack,  United  States 
Army  in  World  War  II  (Washington,  1951),  pp.  1-45. 
A  detailed  study  of  strategic  plans  is  in  Maurice  Matloff 
and  Edwin  M.  Snell,  Strategic  Planning  for  Coalition 
Warfare,  1941-1942,  United  States  Army  in  World 
War  II  (Washington,  1953),  pp.  32-62. 


THE  ENGINEERS  CROSS  THE  ATLANTIC,  1941-1942 


23 


opment  of  the  United  Kingdom  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  requirements  of  the 
'Roundup'  plan."  During  1942  the 
committee  produced  three  separate 
Bolero  troop  bases — referred  to  as  key 
plans — which  provided  general  guides 
for  the  buildup,  including  U.S.  Army 
engineers.  The  first  BOLERO  Key  Plan 
appeared  on  31  May  1942;  a  compre- 
hensive revision  based  on  much  more 
detailed  studies  followed  on  25  July; 
and  a  third  plan  was  published  in  late 
November  reflecting  the  adjustments 
required  by  the  TORCH  decision. ^^ 

Each  of  the  plans  was  based  on  fore- 
casts of  American  troops  to  be  sent  to 
the  United  Kingdom  and  included  esti- 
mates of  personnel  and  hospital  accom- 
modations, depot  storage,  and  special 
structures  they  would  require,  together 
with  British  advice  on  where  the  facili- 
ties would  be  found  or  built.  All  these 
plans  suffered  from  the  lack  of  a  firm 
invasion  troop  basis,  a  target  date,  or  a 
specific  landing  zone,  but  they  did  rep- 
resent tentative  bases  on  which  buildup 
operations  could  proceed.  The  origi- 
nal plan  brought  to  London  by  Gen- 
eral Marshall  called  for  thirty  U.S.  divi- 
sions included  within  a  total  of  about 
one  million  men,  all  to  be  in  the  United 
Kingdom  in  time  for  the  spring  1943 
invasion.  The  BOLERO  Key  Plan  of  31 
May  called  for  1,049,000  U.S.  troops  in 
Britain,  but  for  not  nearly  so  many  divi- 
sions on  account  of  the  need  for  air 
and  service  troops.  The  second  BOLERO 
Plan  of  July  provided  a  troop  basis  of 
1,147,000.  The  third  plan  in  Novem- 
ber, reflecting  the  abandonment  of 
hope  for  a  1943  invasion,  set  the  short- 


term  goal  for  April  1943  at  427,000 
men,  although  it  optimistically  retained 
the  long-term  goal  of  the  first  plan — 
1,049,000.  As  1942  ended,  however,  in 
the  face  of  a  continuing  drain  for  the 
operation  in  North  Africa  and  an  acute 
shipping  shortage,  neither  the  long-  nor 
the  short-term  goal  seemed  attainable. 
Bolero  thus  proceeded  with  uncer- 
tainty in  1942  and  was  subject  to  con- 
stant changes. ^^ 

As  the  central  planning  agency  in  the 
United  Kingdom,  the  BOLERO  Com- 
bined Committee  in  London  was  con- 
cerned with  high-level  policy  only.  Sub- 
committees took  care  of  intergovern- 
mental planning  for  specific  tasks  such 
as  troop  housing,  hospitals,  and  depots. 
Various  permanent  British  and  Ameri- 
can agencies  in  direct  cooperation  un- 
dertook the  day-to-day  work,  and  these 
agencies  set  up  special  machinery  that 
dealt  with  specific  problems.  To  the 
U.S.  Army  engineers,  the  most  impor- 
tant British  official  at  this  stage  of  the 
war  was  Maj.  Gen.  Richard  M.  Woo- 
ten.  Deputy  Quartermaster  General 
(Liaison)  of  the  War  Office.  Under  his 
command  were  two  sections:  a  planning 
group  concerned  with  receiving  and 
housing  troops  and  another  dealing 
with  entertainment  and  morale.^' 

Most  American  ground  troops  were 
to  be  stationed  in  southern  England  and 


'■'  DQMG(L)  Paper  1,  Administrative  Planning,  etc., 
for  Bolero  and  Roundup,  1943,  ETO  Adm  files. 
Bolero  Misc. 


*"  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Vol- 
ume /,  pp.  66,  106;  Bolero  Key  Plans,  Bolero  Publi- 
cations, ETO  Hist  Sect,  Adm  file  50,  Bolero; 
DQMG(L)  Paper  8,  2d  ed..  Key  Plan,  5  Jun  42,  Bolero 
Publications,  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Records. 

"  Maj.  Gen.  C.  R.  Moore,  Final  Report  of  Chief  Engi- 
neer European  Theater  of  Operations  1942  —  1945,  p.  231 
(cited  hereafter  as  Moore,  Final  Report);  Mtgs,  British 
War  Cabinet,  Bolero  Combined  Committee  (Lon- 
don), OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Records;  F.  M.  Albrecht, 
"Engineer  Aspects  of  Operation  Bolero,"  The  Mili- 
tary Engineer,  XLH,  no.  286  (March -April  1950),  1 16. 


24 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


were  assigned  positions  in  that  area  (the 
British  Southern  Command)  west  of  the 
principal  British  forces,  for  the  Conti- 
nental invasion  plan  provided  that  the 
Americans  were  to  be  on  the  right,  the 
British  on  the  left,  when  they  went 
ashore  in  France.  This  meant  that  thou- 
sands of  British  troops  already  on  the 
right  would  have  to  move  east  to  new 
areas.  Immediately  after  publication  of 
the  first  Bolero  Plan,  representatives 
of  the  two  armies  met  to  plan  the  neces- 
sary transfers. ^^ 

But  other  problems  were  not  so  eas- 
ily settled.  Housing  standards  included 
such  matters  as  the  size,  shape,  and 
equipment  of  structures,  materials  to 
be  used,  and  sewage  facilities.  These 
difficulties  were  the  product  of  two  dif- 
ferent standards  of  living;  Americans 
were  reluctant  to  accept  many  stan- 
dards that  seemed  to  the  British  entirely 
adequate.  Another  problem  concerned 
airfield  specifications  and  materials. 
These  differences  surfaced  when  the 
British  turned  over  their  own  accom- 
modations to  American  forces  and  drew 
up  plans  for  new  structures.  The  Brit- 
ish view  was  understandable,  for  one 
of  Bolero's  chief  aims  was  to  limit  new 
construction  and  expansion  to  the  bar- 
est minimum.  Moreover,  all  the  BOLERO 
installations  were  to  be  returned  to  the 
British  after  they  had  served  their  pur- 
pose for  the  Americans. 

Creation  of  the  Services  of  Supply 
BOLERO  required  a  large  American 


^■■^  Memo.  HQ,  USAFBI,  for  CofS,  USAFBI,  1 1  Jun 
42,  sub:  Conf  with  HQ,  Southern  Command,  10  Jun 
42.  Other  meetings  of  DQMG(L)  and  U.S.  Army  rep- 
resentatives took  place  on  2,  4,  and  24  July  1942.  See 
Ltr,  HQ,  Southern  Command,  sub:  Operational  Con- 
trol of  U.S.  Forces,  Adm  file  50,  Bolero,  ETOUSA 
Hist  Sect. 


military  organization  to  handle  the  pro- 
posed massive  buildup  in  the  United 
Kingdom.  On  2  May  General  Chaney 
cabled  the  War  Department  outlining 
his  own  ideas  on  a  Services  of  Supply 
(SOS)  to  be  organized  for  this  purpose 
and  requested  personnel  to  man  it.  He 
indicated  that  General  Davison  was  his 
choice  as  SOS  commander.  To  head  a 
construction  division  under  Davison,  he 
suggested  Col.  Thomas  B.  Larkin  or 
Col.  Stanley  L.  Scott,  and  his  choice  for 
Davison's  successor  as  chief  engineer 
was  Col.  William  F.  Tompkins.  But 
the  War  Department  had  its  own  ideas. 
General  Marshall  had  already  chosen 
another  engineer  officer,  Maj.  Gen. 
John  C.  H.  Lee,  to  head  the  theater 
SOS,  and  by  5  May  Lee  was  busily 
engaged  in  recruiting  an  SOS  staff  in 
Washington.  On  14  May  Marshall  sent 
a  directive  to  Chaney  stipulating  that 
the  organization  of  the  theater  SOS  was 
to  parallel  that  of  the  SOS  recently 
formed  under  Lt.  Gen.  Brehon  B. 
Somervell  in  the  United  States  and  was 
to  be  given  far  broader  powers  than 
Chaney  proposed.  The  theater  head- 
quarters was  to  retain  "a  minimum  of 
supply  and  administrative  services" 
under  the  SOS.^^ 

General  Lee,  a  strong-minded,  even 
controversial  man,  entered  the  theater 
on  24  May  like  a  whirlwind,  determined 
to  carry  out  the  Marshall  directive.  His 
approach  provoked  spirited  resistance 
among  General  Chaney's  staff,  most  of 
whom  believed  that  the  theater  chiefs 
of  technical  services  could  function 
properly  only  if  they  were  directly  un- 
der the  theater  commander.  Chaney 
had  already  established  an  SOS  com- 


^'  Ltr,  Marshall  to  CO,  USAFBI,  14  May  42,  OCE 
ETOUSA  Hist  Records. 


THE  ENGINEERS  CROSS  THE  ATLANTIC,  1941-1942 


25 


General  Lee 


mand  in  anticipation  of  General  Lee's 
arrival.  The  two  officers  appeared  to 
have  reached  agreement  on  the  com- 
mand during  transatlantic  telephone 
conversations  in  which  General  Davison 
took  part  as  well.  But  after  Lee  began 
operations  in  London  on  24  May,  it 
developed  that  his  conception  of  the 
scope  of  his  command  far  exceeded 
what  General  Chaney  had  vaguely 
staked  out  for  him.  As  dynamic  an  orga- 
nizer as  he  was  a  forceful  personality. 
General  Lee  eventually  acquired  a  spe- 
cial train,  which  he  called  "Alive,"  to 
enable  him  to  make  quick  trips  to  solve 
knotty  problems  and  to  hold  command- 
level  conferences  in  complete  privacy.^'* 


^^  USAFBI  GO  17,  24  May  42;  ETO  Adm  File  16, 
Alive-Special  Train. 


For  all  his  determination  and  dyna- 
mism. General  Lee  was  not  to  have  his 
way  entirely.  On  8  June  1942,  the  War 
Department  formally  established  the 
European  Theater  of  Operations,  U.S. 
Army  (ETOUSA),  to  succeed  the  USA- 
FBI  command.  General  Chaney  retained 
command  temporarily  but  on  24  June 
was  succeeded  by  Maj.  Gen.  Dwight  D. 
Eisenhower,  also  General  Marshall's 
personal  choice.  Before  Eisenhower's 
arrival  Chaney  had  already  tried  to 
resolve  the  jurisdiction  of  the  SOS  by  a 
compromise  arrangement  reflected  in 
ETOUSA  Circular  2  of  13  June  1942. 
Eleven  of  eighteen  theater  special  staff 
sections,  including  all  the  technical 
services,  were  placed  under  the  SOS 
commander,  but  he  was  to  carry  out 
his  functions  "under  directives  issued 


26 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


by  the  theater  commander,"  and  there 
were  other  clauses  to  assure  that  the 
theater  command  retained  control  of 
theater-wide  functions.  The  theater 
staff  sections  under  the  SOS  were  to 
maintain  liaison  offices  at  theater  head- 
quarters. The  broad  grant  of  authority 
to  General  Lee  was  thus  diluted  by  the 
dual  nature  of  the  relationship  of  his 
technical  service  chiefs  to  the  SOS  and 
to  the  theater  command.  The  result  was 
a  division  of  supply  and  administrative 
functions  between  the  SOS  and  Head- 
quarters, ETOI  ISA. 

On  assuming  command.  General 
Eisenhower  made  only  small  changes 
in  the  arrangement.  ETOUSA  General 
Order  19  of  20  July  1942  actually  re- 
duced the  number  of  staff  sections 
direcdy  under  SOS  control,  probably 
the  result  of  the  removal  of  SOS  head- 
quarters from  London  to  Cheltenham, 
physically  separating  it  from  ETOUSA 
headquarters.  The  engineers,  as  well 
as  the  other  technical  services,  remained 
under  the  SOS  with  their  headquarters, 
in  effect,  divided  between  London  and 
Cheltenham.  It  was,  in  the  words  of 
the  theater's  logistical  historian,  "a 
compromise  solution  which  .  .  .  resulted 
in  the  creation  of  overlapping  agencies 
and  much  duplication  of  effort."  If 
Eisenhower  had  an  impulse  to  change 
the  arrangement,  he  was  soon  ab- 
sorbed in  planning  for  TORCH,  an  op- 
eration of  which  he  was  to  be  Allied 
commander,  and  General  Order  19 
was  to  govern  SOS-ETOUSA  relation- 
ships for  another  year.'*^ 


The  Engineer  Pyramid 

Within  this  framework,  the  Engineer 
Service  in  the  ETOUSA  finally  took 
shape.  When  General  Lee  first  began 
assembling  his  SOS  staff  in  the  United 
States,  he  asked  General  Davison  to  be 
his  chief  engineer.  The  office  Davison 
was  to  head  really  had  had  its  start 
earlier.  In  March  1942,  while  Davison 
was  still  in  the  United  States,  eight  engi- 
neer officers  and  twenty-one  enlisted 
men  sailed  for  Britain  to  add  some  flesh 
to  the  skeleton  force  then  under  Major 
Bonesteel.  Additional  personnel  came 
with  General  Davison  when  he  returned 
to  England  in  April,  and  others  soon 
followed.  In  early  June  their  distribu- 
tion was  uncertain;  no  one  knew  how 
many  engineers  were  to  make  up  the 
total  force  in  the  chiefs  office,  nor, 
indeed,  whether  there  was  to  be  one 
chief  engineer.'*^' 

Officially,  the  Engineer  Service,  SOS, 
ETOUSA,  came  into  existence  on  1  July 
1942.  The  various  divisions  were  set  up 
the  next  day:  Supply,  Administration 
and  Personnel,  Construction,  Quar- 
tering, Intelligence,  and  Operations 
and  Training.  {Chart  1)  General  Dav- 
ison's tenure  as  head  of  the  service 
ended  late  in  July  when  General  Lee, 
carrying  out  a  plan  to  decentralize  his 
command,  organized  base  sections  in 
the  United  Kingdom  and  made  Davison 
commanding  officer  of  Western  Base 
Section.  Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  B.  Larkin 
(promoted  23  May  1942)  then  became 
chief  engineer,  but  was  called  away  in 
September  to  plan  for  TORCH  and  then 
to  command  the  SOS  to  be  established 
in  North  Africa.  Larkin  was  titular  chief 


^^  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Vol- 
ume I,  p.  44.  The  account  of  the  evolution  of  the 
ETOUSA  command  structure  is  drawn  from  pp. 
32-44. 


^''  Bengsten,  Hist  Resume;  Lee  Diary,  entries  7  and 
8  May  42,  Adm  files  102,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 


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CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


engineer  until  2  November,  but,  in  fact, 
he  was  replaced  on  15  September  by  Col. 
(later  Maj.  Gen.)  Cecil  R.  Moore  as 
acting  chief  engineer,  ETOUSA.  With 
the  landings  in  North  Africa,  Moore 
became  chief  engineer,  ETOUSA,  on 
9  November,  and  was  named  to  the 
same  job  for  SOS  on  23  November 
1942.^ 

Colonel  Moore,  widely  known  as 
"Dinty,"  served  as  chief  engineer  until 
the  end  of  the  war  in  Europe.  Born  3 
July  1894,  Moore  entered  the  Army 
from  Virginia  Polytechnic  Institute  in 
1917  and  served  overseas  in  World  War 
I.  The  period  between  the  two  wars 
found  him  active  on  various  dam  pro- 
jects, primarily  in  the  Pacific  Northwest 
where,  for  a  time,  he  served  as  the  Port- 
land district  engineer  under  General 
Lee,  then  chief  of  the  North  Pacific 
Engineer  Division.  In  1940  he  was  in 
charge  of  the  building  of  camps,  depots, 
and  hospitals  in  the  Pacific  Northwest, 
and  he  left  this  task  to  go  to  the  Euro- 
pean theater.  Arriving  in  the  United 
Kingdom  in  July  1942,  for  some  time 
he  did  double  duty  in  OCE  and  as  com- 
mander of  Eastern  Base  Section. ^^ 

During  its  hectic  first  months,  the 
Engineer  Service,  SOS,  ETOUSA,  was 
plagued  by  these  rapid  changes  in  lead- 
ership, uncertainties  about  its  functions, 
division  of  its  staff  between  London  and 
Cheltenham,  and  continuous  person- 
nel shortages.  When  General  Davison 
took  over,  he  found  that  an  SOS  direc- 
tive placed  the  engineers,  along  with 
the  other  technical  services,  under  the 


^^  ETOUSA  GO  19,  20  Jul  42;  SOS  ETOUSA  GO 
1,  20  Jul  42;  SOS  ETOUSA  Girs,  1,  1  Jul  42;  2,  2  Jul 
42;  and  3,  20  Jul  42;  OGE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  1, 
Organization,  Administration,  and  Personnel  (United 
Kingdom),  1946,  p.  6,  Liaison  Sect,  Intel  Div,  ETOUSA 
Adm  file  547. 

***  Moore,  Final  Report,  p.  13. 


supervision  of  G— 4,  SOS,  and  that  the 
Requirements  Branch  of  G— 4  had  re- 
sponsibility to  "prepare  policies,  plans 
and  directives  for  the  formulation  and 
execution  of  supply  and  construction 
projects  in  terms  of  type,  quantities,  and 
time  schedules."  This  function,  as  far 
as  construction  was  concerned,  seemed 
to  belong  rightfully  to  the  chief  engi- 
neer; but  only  in  December  was  it  offi- 
cially transferred,  although  the  engi- 
neers had  long  before  assumed  it  in 
practice. 

The  move  of  SOS  to  Cheltenham,  a 
famous  watering  spot  in  the  Gloucester- 
shire countryside  some  ninety  miles 
west  of  London,  accentuated  the  diffi- 
culties of  coordination  between  theater 
and  SOS  engineer  sections.  The  chief 
engineer  and  his  division  chiefs  were 
perforce  commuters  between  Chelten- 
ham and  London  in  their  efforts  to 
coordinate  work  between  the  two  com- 
plementary but  often  overlapping  engi- 
neer sections.  Maintaining  two  staffs 
worsened  the  manpower  shortages  of 
the  engineer  force  in  the  United  King- 
dom, a  force  that  did  not  have  all  its 
authorized  officers  until  15  May  1943 
and  enlisted  men  until  mid-September.''*^ 

The  shortages  affected  the  progress 
of  all  the  engineer  command's  work. 
Besides  construction,  for  which  Ameri- 
can engineers  relied  so  heavily  upon 
the  British,  the  SOS  command  as  of  13 
June  1942  was  responsible  for  railroad 
operations,  quartering  and  utilities,  and 


^■'  SOS,  Initial  Directive  tor  the  Organization  of  the 
SOS,  ETO,  23  Jun  42,  and  SOS  Gir  63,  14  Dec  42; 
both  in  Gompilation  of  Directives  Relating  to  Engi- 
neer Services,  OGE  ETOUSA  Hist  Records.  Com- 
ments by  Brig  (ien  F.  M.  Albrecht. 

'•"  OGE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  1,  Organization,  Admin- 
istration, and  Personnel,  p.  23.  For  more  details,  see 
ch.  III. 


THE  ENGINEERS  CROSS  THE  ATLANTIC,  1941-1942 


29 


for  all  the  boats  and  landing  craft  sched- 
uled to  arrive  with  incoming  amphib- 
ian engineer  units.  In  August  the  new 
Transportation  Corps  (TC)  took  over 
the  railroads,  but  the  engineers  still  had 
too  few  men  to  procure  fire-fighting 
equipment  for  the  transportation  ser- 
vice, acquire  cranes,  lumber,  and  real 
estate,  and  build  fuel  pumping  instal- 
lations. Col.  Arthur  W.  Pence,  who  had 
arrived  with  General  Lee  to  be  the  dep- 
uty chief  engineer  of  SOS  ETOUSA 
found  the  personnel  situation  highly 
confused.  He  could  only  commiserate 
for  the  moment  with  General  Davison 
that  the  twenty  officers  available  for  the 
Office  of  the  Chief  Engineer  in  the  Ser- 
vices of  Supply  command  were  not 
enough  to  do  the  job.'' 

Despite  personnel  and  organizational 
problems  during  1942  the  engineer 
parts  were  gradually  building  into  a 
working  machine,  as  the  development 
of  the  "static  force,"  or  regional  orga- 
nization, demonstrated.  The  need  for 
district  organization  such  as  existed  in 
the  United  States  was  appreciated  by 
engineer  officers — Colonel  Pence,  for 
example — even  before  General  Lee  had 
decided  to  set  up  such  a  system.  On  9 
June  General  Lee  asked  the  War  De- 
partment for  personnel  to  make  up 
twelve  engineer  district  offices,  and  the 
engineers  began  to  establish  such  an 
organization  on  3  July.  This  engineer 
machinery  was  absorbed  on  20  July  by 


'^'  ETOUSA  Cir  2,  1 3  Jun  42;  SOS  ETOUSA  Initial 
Directive  for  the  Organization  of  SOS,  ETO;  OCE 
ETOUSA  Cir  1,  1  Jul  42,  sub:  Responsibility  of  the 
Construction  and  Real  Estate  Activities;  SOS  ETOUSA 
Procurement  Directive  5,  17  Jul  42;  8,  19  Aug  42;  1 1, 
18  Sep  42;  and  14,  2  Nov  42;  OCE  ETOUSA  Cir  22 
(O&T),  16  Sep  42;  SOS  ETOUSA  Cir  13,  19  Aug  42; 
Ltr,  Pence  to  Col  J.  S.  Gorlinski,  OCE,  Wash  D.C.,  4 
Jun  42;  all  in  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Records. 


General  Larkin 

General  Lee's  reorganization  of  the 
entire  SOS.  He  established  four  base 
sections,  roughly  paralleling  a  British 
military  division  of  the  United  King- 
dom. (Map  2)  These  jurisdictions — the 
Northern  Ireland,  Eastern,  Western, 
and  Southern  Base  Sections — were  di- 
vided into  districts  which,  in  turn,  were 
divided  into  areas.  Each  organization, 
from  the  base  section  down,  had  its  own 
engineer. ^'^ 

General  Lee's  aim  was  to  employ  the 
base  sections  and  their  subdivisions  as 
instruments  of  the  parent  SOS  to  secure 
centralized  control  and  decentralized 
operation  of  the  whole  field  organiza- 
tion. The  base  sections  became  the 


^'■^  ETOUSA  GO  19,  20  Jul  42;  SOS  ETOUSA  Cirs 
1,  1  Jul  42;  2,  2  Jul  42;  and  3,  20  Jul  42;  SOS  GO  10, 
20  Jul  42;  Ltr,  Pence  to  Gorlinski,  4  Jun  42;  OCE 
ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  1,  Organization,  Administration, 
and  Personnel,  p.  4. 


ATLANTIC  OCEAN 


NORTH  SEA 


NORTHERN  IRELAND 
BASE  SECTION 


ORGANIZATION  OF  SOS 
IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 

July  1942 


Base  section  boundaries 
50  100  Miles 


100    Kilometers 


MAP  2 


THE  ENGINEERS  CROSS  THE  ATLANTIC,  1941-1942 


31 


offices  of  record,  while  the  districts 
were  primarily  offices  of  supervision. 
The  base  section,  district,  and  area 
staffs  were  known  as  the  static  force, 
and  each  worked  in  close  liaison  with 
its  local  counterpart  in  the  British  Ar- 
my. Two  of  the  four  base  section  com- 
manders first  appointed  by  General 
Lee  — General  Davison  and  Colonel 
Moore — were  engineers.''^ 

The  base  section  engineer  was  not 
only  a  member  of  the  base  section  com- 
mander's special  staff  but  was  also  the 
representative  with  the  base  section  of 
the  chief  engineer,  SOS.  This  created  a 
difficult  problem:  the  division  of  author- 
ity between  the  chief  engineer  and  the 
base  section  commander.  When  the 
field  system  came  into  being,  "technical 
control"  was  reserved  to  the  chief  of 
each  service,  but  the  concept  was  so 
vague  that  it  satisfied  no  one.  For 
months,  the  matter  troubled  the  entire 
SOS  organization,  and  it  was  never 
completely  settled.  In  August  Head- 
quarters, SOS,  attempted  to  clarify  the 
situation  for  the  engineers.  New  con- 
struction and  base  repair  shops  were 
removed  from  the  base  section  com- 
manders' jurisdiction,  and  Colonel 
Moore,  chief  engineer,  obtained  author- 
ity to  deal  directly  with  his  representa- 
tives in  the  base  sections  on  these  mat- 
ters. Nevertheless,  the  engineers  were 
told  to  keep  the  base  section  command- 
ers informed  concerning  progress.  Al- 
though on  paper  Colonel  Moore  had 
direct  authority  over  new  construction, 
in  practice  both  he  and  the  base  section 
commanders  expected  the  base  section 
engineers  to  assume  responsibility;  leav- 


ing a  large  measure  of  authority  to 
these  subordinate  officers  made  it  pos- 
sible to  avoid  controversy.^'* 

Roundup  Planning 

In  addition  to  organizing  a  base  in 
the  United  Kingdom  for  an  Allied  inva- 
sion of  the  Continent,  it  was  necessary 
to  plan  for  the  operation  itself.  A 
Roundup  Administrative  Planning 
Staff  was  set  up  for  joint  planning, 
holding  its  first  meeting  on  29  May 
1942.  Of  the  forty  original  sections,  sev- 
eral were  of  special  concern  to  the 
engineers:  port  salvage  and  repair, 
development  of  communication  lines, 
shops  and  utilities,  water  supply,  bridg- 
ing, and  construction  and  maintenance 
of  airfields.  A  U.S.  Joint  Staff  Planners 
decision  on  the  jurisdiction  over  land- 
ing craft  also  made  the  engineers  in 
the  theater  responsible  for  training  boat 
crews  for  amphibious  operations  in 
Europe.'' 

As  deputy  chief  engineer  at  Head- 
quarters, ETOUSA,  Col.  Elmer  E. 
Barnes  headed  the  engineer  planners 
for  ROUNDUP;  it  was  July  before  he 
obtained  even  a  limited  number  of  offi- 
cers for  his  staff.  While  chiefly  con- 
cerned with  Roundup  planning, 
Barnes'  organization  also  maintained 
contact  with  the  British  on  all  engineer 
matters,  prepared  studies  on  construc- 
tion requirements  for  the  Construction 
Division  of  OCE,  SOS,  and  maintained 


^"'  Memo,  Harwood  for  Moore,  30  Jul  42,  Min  of 
Mtgs  1942,  USFET,  Engr  Sect;  SOS  ETOUSA  Cir  3, 
20  Jul  42. 


^^  Comments  by  Gen  Moore  on  MS,  Engineer  Opera- 
tions in  Europe  and  Africa;  SOS  GO  10,  20  Jul  42; 
SOS  ETOUSA  Cirs  3,  20  Jul  42,  and  12,  17  Aug  42. 

■•'  Incl,  Appreciation  of  Roundup,  Adm  Ping  Situa- 
tion, 4  May  43,  w/  Memo,  OCE  for  Port,  Gen  Const, 
Communications,  Utilities  &  POL  Sections  of  the  Ping 
Br,  Const  and  Quartering  Div,  20  May  43,  OCE 
ETOUSA  Hist  Records;  Mins,  U.S.  Joint  Staff  Plan- 
ners, 20  Apr  42,  ABC  334,  JSP  Min,  sec.  1  (2-13-42). 


32 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


liaison  with  the  Operations  and  Train- 
ing and  Supply  Divisions  of  OCE,  SOS. 
Finally,  Barnes'  office  coordinated  engi- 
neer activities  with  other  arms  and  ser- 
vices represented  at  ETOUSA  head- 
quarters in  London. ^^ 

Colonel  Barnes  and  his  subordinates 
faced  a  chronic  shortage  of  officers  and 
the  lack  of  a  basic  operational  plan  for 
Roundup  in  1942.  The  engineer  sec- 
tion at  Headquarters,  ETOUSA,  una- 
voidably lost  time  and  wasted  effort 
because  everything  had  to  be  referred 
for  approval  to  OCE,  SOS,  at  Chelten- 
ham. For  example,  the  officer  dealing 
with  expected  construction  require- 
ments on  the  Continent  after  the  inva- 
sion would  have  to  send  his  plan  and 
estimates  to  Cheltenham  for  approval 
and  suggestions,  wait  for  the  revision, 
and  then  return  his  second  draft  for 
final  approval. ^^ 

When  Torch  preparations  went  into 
full  swing,  Roundup  planning  was  vir- 
tually shelved,  to  be  taken  up  again  as 
circumstances  permitted.  Key  person- 
nel were  assigned  to  the  North  African 
invasion,  and  a  Pentagon  directive  of 
18  November  that  prohibited  stockpil- 
ing of  supplies  and  equipment  for 
Roundup  beyond  that  required  for  the 
427,000-man  force  further  handi- 
capped Barnes.  The  British,  who  in- 
sisted on  going  on  with  their  ROUNDUP 


'•^  History  of  the  Engineer  Service,  p.  6,  ETO  Adm 
file  547,  Engrs;  Chron.  of  Events  (OCE  ETOUSA); 
Memo,  Barnes  for  Moore,  10  Jul  42,  Orgn  for  ETO 
Engr  Sect,  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Records;  Rpt,  OCE 
ETOUSA  CG  to  ETOUSA,  8  Aug  42,  319.1  OCE 
Rpts  to  CG,  EUCOM  Engr  files;  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist 
Rpt  1,  Organization,  Administration,  and  Personnel, 
app.  25;  Memo,  Harwood  for  Barnes,  15  Sep  42,  316 
Office  Methods,  EUCOM  Engr  files. 

^'  Memo,  Barnes  for  Moore,  10  Jul  42;  Incl,  Appre- 
ciation of  Roundup  w/Memo;  Memo,  Lord  for  Moore, 
2  Nov  42,  SOS  and  OCE  Organization,  OCE  ETOUSA 
Hist  Records. 


planning,  wanted  to  continue  stockpil- 
ing standardized  supplies  to  be  used  by 
British  and  American  forces.  In  one 
case  they  tried  to  obtain  a  particular 
item  of  petroleum,  oil,  and  lubricants 
(POL)  equipment  from  the  United 
States,  but  because  of  the  new  Ameri- 
can policy  they  had  to  continue  manu- 
facturing and  using  their  own  prod- 


uct 


58 


G— 4,  ETOUSA,  continued  a  sem- 
blance of  planning  by  requiring  from 
each  of  the  services  a  maintenance  pro- 
gram for  a  theoretical  Continental  op- 
eration. The  engineers  also  prepared 
their  part  of  an  invasion  plan,  an  exer- 
cise that  eventually  proved  its  value  in 
helping  to  determine  the  necessary 
engineer  nonstandard  heavy  construc- 
tion— Class  IV — supplies  and  the  ade- 
quacy of  the  engineer  troop  basis. ^^ 

As  important  as  any  aspect  of  this 
work  was  the  experience  gained  in 
working  with  the  British.  Estimating 
requirements,  for  example,  led  to  the 
establishment  of  a  joint  stockpile  which 
cut  down  duplication  and  made  supply 
facilities  more  flexible.  The  tremendous 
tonnages  involved  and  the  long  peri- 
ods required  for  production  made  the 
importance  of  the  joint  stockpile  ap- 
parent. Close  liaison  also  promoted  stan- 
dardization of  equipment.  For  example, 
the  U.S.  Army  in  December  1942  req- 
uisitioned from  the  British  ROUNDUP 
stocks  20,000  standard  IG-foot-wide 


^''Ltr,  Lee  to  Somervell,  17  Nov  42.  ETO  381 
Roundup,  Jul-Nov  42;  Weekly  Rpt,  London  Repr, 
OCE,  12  Oct  and  7  Dec  42,  319.1  Engr  Sect,  ETO 
London  Repr  Rpts,  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Records. 

'■*  Ltr,  18  Dec  42,  sub:  Engr  Operational  Plans  in 
Connection  with  (i-4  Directing  for  Roundup  Plan- 
ning, Engr  Sect,  ETOUSA;  Incl,  Appreciation  of 
Roundup  w/Memo;  Rpt,  A  Total  Tonnage  Schedule 
for  the  Nov  42  G-4  Problem,  etc..  Amphibious  Sect, 
Engr  Sect,  ETO,  Roundup,  OCE  ETOUSA. 


THE  ENGINEERS  CROSS  THE  ATLANTIC,  1941-1942 


33 


Nissen  huts,  6  million  square  feet  of 
24-foot-wide  Nissen  hutting,  2,000  Bai- 
ley bridges,  25  million  sandbags,  large 
quantities  of  barbed  wire,  and  other 
supplies.  These  requisitions  were  "on 
paper"  for  future  delivery  and  repre- 
sented a  part  of  planning  for  the  actual 
invasion.  In  road  and  general  construc- 
tion, where  the  problems  were  more  or 
less  peculiar  to  each  force,  joint  action 
extended  only  to  the  standardization 
of  materials.  In  addition  to  its  other 
benefits,  standardization  in  any  form 
tends  to  reduce  costs.  The  good  rela- 
tions established  at  planning  meetings 
were  of  incalculable  importance  for  the 
future.^" 

In  connection  with  POL  distribution, 
port  reconstruction,  and  beach  and  port 
operations,  the  engineers  in  the  vari- 
ous Roundup  administrative  planning 
sections  in  1942  accomplished  worth- 
while planning.  Less  was  achieved  in 
regard  to  water  supply  and  amphibi- 
ous operations,  little  on  bridging  prob- 
lems, and  almost  nothing  on  airfield 
construction  and  maintenance.*'' 

When  OCE,  ETOUSA,  conducted  a 
drastic  self-examination  in  the  fall  and 
winter  of  1942,  it  discovered  that  SOS 
personnel  concerned  themselves  too 
much  with  matters  in  which  they  should 
not  have  been  involved  beyond  coordi- 
nating details  after  receiving  broad 
operational  plans  from  London.  The 
ETOUSA  section  was  further  embar- 
rassed by  difficulty  in  securing  well- 


''"  Mtgs,  BoLKRO  Combined  Committee  (London); 
Moore,  Final  Report,  p.  38;  Daily  Jnl,  entry  12  Dec  42, 
Supply  Div,  OCE  ETOUSA,  EUCOM  Engr  files. 

"'  Rpt,  Engr  Sect,  ETOUSA,  22  Nov  42,  sub:  Sum- 
mary of  POL  Activities  { I  Jul-  1 5  Nov  42),  and  Folder, 
Total  Tonnage  Schedule  for  Nov  42  Problem  Round- 
up, both  in  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Records,  Apprecia- 
tion of  Roundup. 


qualified  personnel,  probably  because 
current  needs,  especially  for  construc- 
tion, seemed  much  more  important  than 
rather  indefinite  planning  for  ROUND- 
UP. These  were  not  the  criticisms  of 
Barnes  alone,  but  also  of  other  impor- 
tant officials  at  SOS  headquarters.  "^ 

In  the  meantime,  through  the  last 
few  months  of  1942,  Colonel  Barnes' 
group  broadened  its  field,  not  only  in 
planning  for  the  future,  but  also  in  pre- 
senting the  SOS  and  ETOUSA  engi- 
neer view  on  any  new  procedures  adopt- 
ed in  the  theater.  Finally,  in  November, 
Col.  Royal  B.  Lord,  then  chief  of  the 
Operations  and  Training  Division,  de- 
clared that  "the  time  has  arrived  to  put 
all  planning  under  Colonel  Barnes. "^^ 

Near  the  end  of  1942,  most  officers 
in  OCE  could  agree  that  the  rather  arti- 
ficial separation  of  ETOUSA  and  SOS 
headquarters  impeded  efficient  oper- 
ations.^^ Yet  despite  the  problem  of  the 
drain  that  TORCH  imposed  on  engineer 
personnel  and  resources  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  by  the  end  of  the  year  very 
real  progress  had  been  made  in  build- 
ing an  organization  that  would  play  an 
important  role  in  preparing  for  the 
cross-Channel  invasion  in  1943  and 
1944.  Although  many  problems  were 
left  unsolved,  the  machinery  for  the 
buildup  to  come  was  put  together  in 


'•■^  O&T  Informal  Memo,  23  Oct  42,  on  relations 
between  ETO  and  SOS,  file  Organization  Oct -Dec 
42,  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Records;  Memo,  Milwit  for 
Harwood,  5  Nov  42,  SOS  and  OCE  Organization,  OCE 
ETOUSA  Hist  Records;  Memo,  Moore  for  Reybold, 
30  Nov  42,  sub:  Engr  Problems  in  ETO,  381  War 
Plans  (Jun  42- Jul  43),  EUCOM  Engr  files. 

'^'  Memo,  Barnes  for  Moore,  12  Oct  42,  319.1  ETO 
(weekly),  Jul  42- Apr  43,  EUCOM  Engr  files;  Memo, 
Lord  for  Moore,  2  Nov  42. 

"^  Memo,  Col  Harwood  for  Div  Chfs,  OCE,  12  Nov 
42,  w/replies  and  related  material  in  file  Organization 
Oct- Dec  42,  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Records. 


34  CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 

the  spring  and  summer  of  1942.  Re-  in  a  strange  land  under  the  stress  of 
peated  changes  in  SOS  and  engineer  war,  worked  reasonably  well  in  carry- 
troop  allotments  upset  planning,  but  ing  out  a  quartering  and  construction 
the  organization,  hurriedly  assembled  program  across  the  British  Isles. 


CHAPTER  III 


The  Engineer  Machine  in  Motion  in 
the  United  Kingdom,  1942 


The  engineer  force  in  the  United 
Kingdom  spent  the  months  following 
the  formal  organization  of  the  theater 
command  struggling  to  fulfill  its  obliga- 
tions under  the  BOLERO  Plan,  which 
was  beset  by  problems  of  organization 
and  direction,  supply,  personnel, 
methodology,  weather,  and  geography. 
Efficient  management  was  difficult  if 
not  impossible  given  uncertain  goals, 
insufficient  personnel,  and  a  bifurcate 
theater  structure.  The  TORCH  decision 
disrupted  the  BOLERO  program  before 
it  could  build  up  any  momentum  and 
scattered  the  engineer  effort.  Never- 
theless, an  important  beginning  was 
made  in  1942  in  creating  a  base  in 
England  for  an  eventual  cross-Channel 
invasion,  and  the  engineer  effort  was 
no  small  part  of  that  accomplishment.' 

Personnel 
Engineers  formed  part  of  the  ground 


'  Unless  otherwise  indicated  this  chapter  is  based 
on  Min  of  Mtgs,  Jun-Dec  42,  USFET  Engr  337;  Rpts, 
1942-44,  EUCOM  Engr  file  319.1;  and  related  docu- 
ments in  the  following  EUCOM  Engr  files:  321  Engrs, 
381  Supply  1942-43,  381  Bolero,  381  War  Plans, 
400  Maintenance,  475  Engr  Equipment,  and  Daily  Jnl 
(Supply  and  Adm  Services),  jun  42-Jul  43.  Other 
sources  used  throughout,  but  not  always  separately 
cited,  are  Moore,  Final  Report,  and  Ruppenthal,  Logis- 
tical Support  of  the  Armies,  Volume  I. 


and  air  force  troop  bases  as  well  as  that 
of  the  Services  of  Supply,  but  the  ser- 
vice force  engineers  were  supposed  to 
do  most  of  the  static  force  construction 
work.  Service  engineers  in  the  force 
sent  to  Northern  Ireland  had  been 
outnumbered  by  combat  engineers, 
who  consequently  had  to  do  construc- 
tion work  for  which  they  had  not  been 
trained.  In  an  effort  to  avoid  such  a 
situation  in  the  whole  United  Kingdom 
buildup,  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of 
Engineers  (OCE)  in  Washington  asked 
the  War  Department  to  provide  16,000 
men  immediately  for  twelve  general 
service  regiments  and  ten  dump  truck 
companies.  They  were  to  be  sent  over- 
seas with  a  minimum  of  basic  military 
training.  Late  in  March  General  Chaney 
asked  for  three  general  service  regi- 
ments and  for  a  like  number  of  engi- 
neer aviation  battalions  to  assist  the 
British  in  building  those  airfields  to  be 
turned  over  to  the  American  air  force. 
Early  in  May  1942  the  Office  of  the 
Chief  of  Engineers  (OCE),  USAFBI, 
made  its  first  formal  requisition  for  ten 
general  service  regiments  (13,000  men) 
and  ten  engineer  aviation  battalions 
(7,000  men)  to  arrive  in  the  theater 
between  June  and  October.  Not  count- 
ing aviation  battalions,  USAFBI  then 
expected  there  would  be  some  40,330 


36 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


U.S.  Army  engineers  in  Britain  at  the 
time  of  the  Continental  invasion.  Of 
these,  the  two  largest  groups  would  be 
combat  units  ( 1 1 ,394  men)  and  general 
service  units  (17,626  men).'^ 

These  calculations  were  soon  out- 
dated by  those  surrounding  the  formal 
inception  of  the  BOLERO  program.  The 
first  tentative  BOLERO  troop  basis 
drawn  up  in  Washington  in  early  May 
contemplated  a  force  of  1,042,000  for 
Roundup,  about  25  percent  service 
troops.  Later  in  May  the  War  Depart- 
ment prescribed  priorities  for  ship- 
ment— first  air  units,  then  essential 
SOS  units,  then  ground  forces,  followed 
by  additional  service  units  to  prepare 
for  more  ground  force  troops.  Within 
these  general  lines,  the  theater  was 
expected  to  prescribe  priorities  for  par- 
ticular types  of  units.  The  scheme  was 
logical  enough,  but  it  broke  down  in 
practice  in  the  face  of  shipping  short- 
ages, lack  of  trained  service  troops,  and 
finally  the  midsummer  shift  in  strategy. 

Early  in  June  1942  (coincident  with 
the  first  Bolero  Key  Plan)  the  War 
Department  submitted  to  ETOUSA  a 
more  detailed  breakdown  of  a  troop 
basis  that  totaled  1,071,060  men.  The 
War  Department  allotted  just  over 
104,000  engineers  to  the  theater: 
31,648  in  a  total  of  279,145  troops  for 
the  Services  of  Supply;  54,380  in  a 
ground  force  troop  strength  of 
585,565;  and  18,909  aviation  engineers 
in  an  Air  Forces  strength  of  206,400. 
General  Davison  argued  for  increases 
in  all  categories  to  raise  the  total  engi- 


neer troop  strength  to  about  147,000, 
but  he  received  no  concessions.  Indeed, 
on  the  premise  that  the  command  could 
use  quartermaster  units  for  many  jobs, 
the  SOS  allocation  was  reduced  to 
29,500.'^ 

The  Operations  and  Training  Divi- 
sion of  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Engi- 
neers (OCE),  ETOUSA,  had  made 
Davison's  estimates,  using  the  capabili- 
ties of  engineer  units  against  the  tasks 
to  be  performed.  For  example,  depot 
troop  requirements  were  calculated 
from  the  number  of  depots  and  the  ton- 
nage to  be  handled,  and  maintenance 
companies  from  the  number  of  pieces 
of  equipment  to  be  kept  in  condition. 
But  calculations  depended  on  the  troop 
basis  figure,  which  constantly  changed. 
Not  until  the  fall  of  1943  could  a  defi- 
nite ETO  troop  basis  be  evolved  for 
either  SOS  or  combat  engineers.  Fur- 
thermore, the  value  of  these  tentative 
troop  bases  was  questionable  because 
the  number  of  trained  engineer  troops 
to  support  the  forces  involved  was  so 
limited.  Planning  for  aviation  engineer 
units  was  originally  based  on  one  air 
force,  the  Eighth,  which  included  inter- 
ceptor, bomber,  fighter,  and  service 
commands.  After  TORCH,  a  decision 
came  to  have  two  air  forces,  strategic 
and  tactical.  The  Air  Forces  estimated 
the  number  of  engineer  aviation  battal- 
ions required,  although  the  chief  engi- 
neer concurred  in  the  proposed  total."* 


'^  Memo,  O&T  Br,  Trp  Dir,  OCE,  for  CofEngrs,  1 1 
Mar  42;  Ltr,  CG,  USAFBI,  2  Apr  42;  Memo,  O&T 
Div  for  CofS,  USAFBI,  5  May  42;  and  Bolero  Move- 
ment Schedule,  9  May  42;  all  in  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist 
Records. 


^  Memo,  Davison  for  Baker,  25  Jun  42;  Memo, 
Davison  for  Pence,  1  Jul  42;  and  Memo,  SOS,  ETOUSA, 
14  Jul  42,  sub:  Troop  Requirements;  all  in  321  Engrs, 
1942  (Jun -Sep),  EUCOM  Engr  files. 

^  Moore,  Final  Report,  pp.  42-45;  OCE  ETOUSA 
Hist  Rpt  4,  Troops  (United  Kingdom),  1946,  p.  17, 
Liaison  Sect,  Intel  Div,  ETOUSA  Adm  file  547; 
Albrecht,  "Engineer  Aspects  of  Operation  Bolero," 
pp.  119-20. 


THE  ENGINEER  MACHINE  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM,  1942 


37 


The  problem  of  the  shifting  troop 
basis  was  compounded  by  that  of  find- 
ing units  to  fulfill  the  plan  of  the  mo- 
ment. Before  Pearl  Harbor  the  U.S. 
Army  had  few  trained  service  units,  and 
after  that  day  the  great  cry  was  for  com- 
bat forces.  The  War  Department  was 
slow  to  recognize  the  need  for  service 
forces  and  to  start  their  training.^  At  a 
May  SOS  conference  in  Washington 
Colonel  Larkin  said  that  a  half-trained 
man  in  the  theater  was  better  than  no 
man  at  all.  Accepting  this  philosophy, 
the  War  Department  authorized  the 
early  shipment  of  10,000  service  troops 
to  the  ETO,  many  of  whom  were  in- 
deed half  trained. 

Already  plagued  by  the  lack  of 
trained  units  and  an  acute  shipping 
shortage,  the  whole  BOLERO  schedule 
was  thrown  off  by  TORCH.  In  August 
word  came  from  the  War  Department 
that  no  more  SOS  engineers  were  to  be 
stationed  in  the  United  Kingdom,  while 
many  of  the  units  there  were  alerted 
for  movement  to  North  Africa.  In  Sep- 
tember a  new  tentative  troop  basis  was 
published  by  G-4,  ETO,  based  on  the 
adjustment  for  TORCH  and  the  427,000- 
man  force  reflected  in  the  third 
Bolero  Plan.  In  this  plan  engineers 
were  to  provide  45,000  men  or  10.5 
percent  of  the  total  force — 16,600  in 
an  SOS  force  of  106,000;  6,000  in  a 
ground  force  of  159,000;  and  23,000 
aviation  engineers  in  an  Air  Forces 
strength  of  157,000. 


''  On  the  overall  problem  of  service  troops  in  the 
troop  basis  in  1942,  see  Richard  M.  Leighton  and  Rob- 
ert W.  Cjoakley,  Global  Logistics  and  Strategy,  1940  —  43 
(Washington,  1956),  pp.  346-52,  and  Kent  Roberts 
Greenfield,  Robert  R.  Palmer,  and  Bell  I.  Wiley,  The 
Organization  of  Ground  Combat  Troops  (Washington, 
1947),  pp.  159-260;  both  in  the  United  States  Army 
in  World  War  II  series. 


The  actualities  were  somewhat  dif- 
ferent. On  1  July  1942,  of  58,845 
Americans  in  the  ETO,  then  chiefly  in 
Northern  Ireland,  only  2,150  were  en- 
gineers. By  November  the  ETO  total 
was  255,155  and  the  number  of  engi- 
neers had  risen  to  more  than  40,000, 
but  18,554  of  them  had  left  England 
for  North  Africa  by  January  1943.  The 
21,858  left  represented  20  percent  of 
the  remaining  ETOUSA  command,  a 
percentage  in  line  with  General  Lee's 
policy  to  deploy  engineers  to  the  United 
Kingdom  early  to  prepare  the  way  for 
air  and  ground  forces.  But  the  actual 
number  of  engineers  was  still  well  below 
the  45,000  authorized  to  be  there  in 
the  next  two  months  and  was  insuffi- 
cient to  perform  tasks  under  the 
427,000-man  plan,  much  less  the  long- 
range  plan  for  a  million-man  force. 
Moreover,  organizing  new  units  such 
as  pipeline  companies  and  separate 
water  supply  companies  for  TORCH,  as 
well  as  transfers  to  fill  units  alerted  for 
North  Africa,  left  the  remaining  engi- 
neer units  in  the  United  Kingdom  with 
a  shortage  of  3,000  men.*' 

The  problems  of  requisitioning  engi- 
neers and  of  supervising  assignment 
and  promotion  in  the  Office  of  the 
Chief  of  Engineers  (OCE),  SOS,  were 
the  concern  of  the  Personnel  and  Ad- 
ministration Division,  OCE,  organized 
in  July  1942.  The  division's  first  chief 


••  Folder,  Engr  Serv  in  UK;  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt 
4,  Troops,  app.  2;  SOS  ETOUSA  Statistical  Summary 
XII,  12  Oct;  XIV,  26  Oct;  and  XV,  2  Nov;  Statistical 
Summaries,  319.25,  EUCOM  Engr  files;  ETO  Gen 
Bd  Rpt  128,  Logistical  Build-up  in  the  British  Isles,  p. 
47;  RG  741,  Gen  Bd  401/13,  Logistical  Buildup  in  the 
UK,  EUCOM  Engr  files;  Ltr,  OCE,  SOS  ETOUSA,  to 
SOS  ETOUSA,  19  Dec  42,  sub:  New  Engineer  Troop 
Basis,  320.3,  EUCOM  Engr  files;  Memo,  Moore  for 
Reybold,  30  Nov  42,  sub:  Engr  Problems  in  ETO. 


38 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


was  Maj.  J.  M.  Franey,  soon  succeeded 
by  Maj.  Beryl  C.  Brooks.  The  division 
initially  edited  the  consolidated  per- 
sonnel requisitions  which  engineer  units 
submitted  and  then  transmitted  them 
to  G— 1,  SOS,  whence  they  went  to 
G- 1,  ETOUSA,  and  finally  to  the  War 
Department.  This  procedure  proved 
cumbersome  and  slow,  and  OCE,  SOS, 
ordered  engineer  units  to  submit 
monthly  requisitions  directly  to  G— 1, 
SOS,  with  OCE  assisting  in  a  staff  capac- 
ity to  process  the  requisitions  through 
G-1.^ 

The  division  had  difficulty  in  obtain- 
ing authorized  personnel.  Requisition- 
ing officers  and  enlisted  men  by  name 
took  too  long.  Early  in  1942  many  offi- 
cers assigned  to  OCE  and  to  base  sec- 
tions came  from  a  reserve  pool;  many 
others  were  former  engineer  division 
and  district  officers  from  the  Zone  of 
the  Interior  (ZI).  The  342d,  332d,  and 
341st  Engineer  General  Service  Regi- 
ments, among  the  earliest  engineer 
units  dispatched  to  Britain,  were  filled 
with  men  experienced  in  civilian  con- 
struction work,  obtained  under  special 
OCE  recruiting  authority.*^ 

In  July  1942  General  Larkin  had 
complained  of  a  lack  of  military  experi- 
ence among  engineer  officers,  and  in 
October  Colonel  Moore  found  that  84 
of  27 1  officers  in  the  base  sections  and 
in  OCE,  ETOUSA,  had  no  previous 
military   experience.   Among   the   re- 


'  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  1,  Organization,  Admin- 
istration, and  Personnel,  pp.  5,  17,  21—23  and  app.  2; 
Memo,  OCE,  SOS  ETOUSA  (Personnel  and  Adm 
Div),  for  Col  Harwood,  14  Nov  42,  Organization, 
Oct-Dec  42;  OCE,  SOS  ETOUSA,  Cir  2,  2  Jul  42, 
Orgn  Charts,  ETOUSA  SOS  Commands. 

*•  Ltr,  Col  Harwood  to  Col  William  W.  Bessell,  Jr., 
OCE,  WD,  321.02  Engr  Officers  (27  Jul-31  Oct  42), 
EUCOM  Engr  files;  Interv,  Dr.  John  S.  G.  Shotwell 
with  Col  William  W.  Bessell,  Jr.,  9  Sep  50. 


maining  187  officers,  170  were  from 
the  National  Guard  or  the  Officers 
Reserve  Corps  with  little  active  military 
experience.  Of  seventeen  Regular 
Army  officers,  four  were  quite  young 
and  six  were  tapped  for  the  impending 
Torch  operation.  Only  seven  experi- 
enced officers  remained  to  handle  the 
eleven  important  jobs  of  chief  engineer, 
chief  engineer's  deputy,  executive,  divi- 
sion chiefs,  supervisor  of  engineer 
schools,  and  three  base  section  engineer 
posts.  SOS  engineer  units  averaged  one 
regular  or  former  regular  per  regi- 
ment, and  sometimes  he  was  of  junior 
grade.  Most  of  the  remaining  officers 
were  commissioned  in  the  Army  of  the 
United  States  (AUS).^ 

Aviation  engineer  units  lacked  skilled 
construction  personnel.  The  total  con- 
struction experience  among  thirty-two 
officers  of  one  aviation  battalion  added 
up  to  two  years,  while  few  battalions 
had  an  experienced  unit  engineering 
officer.  Conditions  were  no  better  in 
the  lower  ranks,  and  inexperienced 
officers  had  to  do  much  of  the  work  of 
even  more  inexperienced  noncommis- 
sioned officers.  To  remedy  the  situa- 
tion Colonel  Moore  recommended  that 
the  post  of  engineering  officer  in  an 
engineer  aviation  battalion  be  raised 


"  Ltr,  Larkin  to  OCE,  WD,  30  Jul  42,  sub:  Engr 
Supplies,  Equipment,  Personnel,  and  Units,  381  War 
Plans  (Jul  42-Jul  43),  EUCOM  Engr  files;  Memo, 
OCE,  SOS  ETOUSA,  for  G-  1,  ETOUSA,  13  Oct  42, 
321  Engr  Officers,  EUCOM  Engr  files;  AUS,  Army 
of  the  United  States,  refers  to  the  temporary  military 
organization  established  in  wartime  encompassing  the 
Regular  Army,  the  National  Guard  while  in  federal 
service,  the  organized  reserves,  all  draftees,  and  offi- 
cers specially  appointed  in  the  wartime  establishment 
but  not  in  any  particular  component.  The  last  was  the 
category  in  which  civil  engineers  in  great  demand  for 
war  zone  or  domestic  projects  received  commissions 
and  rank  in  the  military  organizations  they  were  join- 
ing at  home  or  overseas. 


THE  ENGINEER  MACHINE  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM,  1942 


39 


from  the  rank  of  captain  to  that  of 

10 

major. 

Torch  drew  heavily  on  experienced 
units  and  key  officers  with  executive 
and  administrative  ability.  The  Offices 
of  the  Chief  of  Engineers,  SOS,  and 
ETOUSA,  and  the  base  sections  gave 
Torch  sixty-five  officers,  including 
Generals  Larkin  and  Davison  and  Colo- 
nel Pence  and  Lt.  Col.  Howard  H.  Reed 
of  the  Supply  Division.  Headquarters, 
ETOUSA,  alerted  four  battalions  of  avi- 
ation engineers  for  North  Africa.  To 
bring  these  units  to  full  strength,  SOS 
had  to  draw  on  the  remaining  twelve 
battalions  for  both  officers  and  enlisted 
men.  For  example,  the  830th  gave  30 
men  per  company  to  the  814th;  the 
809th,  also  bound  for  North  Africa, 
drew  105  men  from  the  832d  and  57 
from  the  825th.  Engineer  general  ser- 
vice regiments  and  combat  battalions 
also  helped  fill  out  alerted  units. 

Training 

The  problems  created  by  personnel 
shortages  and  transfers  were  com- 
pounded by  the  inadequate  training  of 
engineers  in  the  theater.  Many  engi- 
neer troops  lacked  not  only  specialist 
training  but  even  adequate  basic  train- 
ing. The  Corps  of  Engineers'  size  dou- 
bled in  the  first  six  months  of  U.S.  par- 
ticipation in  World  War  II,  and  train- 
ing new  personnel  for  urgent  demands 
was  impossible.*' 


'"  Memo,  Moore  for  Reybold,  30  Nov  42,  sub:  Reply 
to  Questionnaire,  381  War  Plans  (Jun  42-Jul  43), 
EUCOM  Engr  files;  Unit  Hist,  818th  Engr  Avn  Bn. 

"  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  4,  Troops,  pp.  2-3; 
Greenfield,  Palmer,  and  Wiley,  The  Organization  of 
Ground  Combat  Troops,  p.  203;  Ann  Rpt,  OCE,  WD, 
J  942,  p.  3;  See  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps 
of  Engineers:  Troops  and  Equipment,  chs.  5,  7,  11,  15,  16 
for  detailed  treatment  of  engineer  training  in  the  Zone 
of  the  Interior. 


Colonel  Lord,  deputy  chief  engineer, 
ETOUSA,  concluded  in  December 
1942  that  basic  training  had  to  be  com- 
pleted in  the  United  States.  He  did  not 
stand  alone  in  this  judgment,  although 
it  was  in  conflict  with  Colonel  Larkin's 
belief  that  a  half-trained  man  was  bet- 
ter than  no  man.''^  Many  half-trained 
engineer  troops  reached  the  ETO.  Six 
general  service  regiments  arrived  in  the 
Eastern  Base  Section  area  in  the  sum- 
mer of  1942;  they  had  received  an  aver- 
age of  ten  weeks'  basic  training  between 
their  organization  in  the  United  States 
and  their  departure  for  a  port  of  em- 
barkation. Losses  of  cadres  for  newly 
formed  units  weakened  many  engineer 
organizations  shordy  before  they  went 
overseas.  Some  engineer  unit  officers, 
even  commanders,  were  transferred  to 
other  units  after  reaching  the  port  of 
embarkation.  However  necessary  it  was 
to  build  up  a  large  force,  the  immedi- 
ate effect  on  particular  units  was  one 
of  incalculable  harm.'^^ 

Many  units  were  brought  up  to 
strength  only  at  the  port  of  embarka- 
tion. In  1942  the  397th  Engineer  Depot 
Company  arrived  at  Fort  Dix,  a  staging 
area  for  the  New  York  Port  of  Embar- 
kation (POE),  with  4  officers  and  68 
enlisted  men,  picking  up  an  additional 
104  enlisted  men  at  Dix.  In  another 
case  the  830th  Engineer  Aviation  Bat- 
talion received  82  percent  of  its  enlisted 


'■^  Ltr,  Col  R.  B.  Lord,  Dep  Chf  Engr,  ETOUSA,  to 
Col  J.  H.  Carruth,  G-3,  ETOUSA,  26  Dec  42;  Memo, 
Col  Albrecht,  Construction  Div,  for  Col  R.  B.  Lord, 
13  Jan  43,  325.51  Policies  and  Plans,  EUCOM  Engr 
files;  Lee  Diary,  entry  for  18  May  42. 

'^  Hists:  470th  Engr  Maint  Co;  98th,  344th,  346th 
Engr  OS  Rgts;  424th,  433d,  434th  Engr  Dump  Truck 
Cos;  397th,  450th  Engr  Depot  Cos;  817th,  818th, 
819th,  831st,  834th  Avn  Bns;  Ltr,  Lt  Col  James  E. 
Walsh  to  CofEngrs,  28  Dec  43,  sub:  Operation  of  OS 
Rgt,  D1784,  Engr  Sch  Lib;  Bennett  interv. 


40 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


men  and  50  percent  of  its  officers  be- 
tween 29  July  and  9  August  1942,  be- 
fore entraining  for  Fort  Dix  on  1 1 
August.  Units  manned  in  such  fashion 
could  hardly  be  characterized  as  cohe- 
sive. 

The  hope  persisted  that  basic  train- 
ing could  be  completed  in  the  United 
Kingdom  and  that  the  troops  could 
learn  their  special  skills  on  the  job. 
Good  construction  experience  could  be 
gained,  as  could  some  training  for  am- 
phibious operations,  but  not  for  such 
combat  skills  as  laying  and  removing 
mines,  booby  traps,  and  other  obstacles 
and  rapidly  building  and  reinforcing 
bridges.  Engineer  aviation  units,  which 
were  kept  busy  constructing  permanent 
bomber  bases,  could  not  be  trained  for 
building  hasty  airfields  in  forward 
areas.  Reports  on  North  African  opera- 
tions later  highlighted  such  deficien- 


cies 


14 


The  chief  of  engineers  in  Washing- 
ton formally  recognized  the  vital  need 
for  training,  but  practical  considera- 
tions prevented  rapid  solutions.  A  sup- 
ply plan  issued  in  September  1942  left 
a  loophole  for  tired  construction  units 
in  England,  then  working  seven  days  a 
week  on  day  and  night  shifts,  by  provid- 
ing that  training  be  carried  on  with 
minimum  interference  to  unit  duties 
and  tasks.  Thus  during  1942,  training 
was  overshadowed — first  by  the  buildup 
and  then  by  preparations  for  TORCH. 
In  practice,  the  time  spent  on  training 
varied  from  one  hour  in  eight  to  one  in 
ten.  Some  troops  took  one  hour  for  five 
days,  then  four  hours  on  the  sixth  day. 
Two  aviation  battalions,  the  818th  and 


the  825th,  worked  ten  hours  a  day  and 
set  aside  one  day  a  week  for  training. 
Later,  these  and  other  units  trained  on 
Sundays.  Some  general  service  regi- 
ments alerted  for  North  Africa  trained 
one  battalion  for  a  week  while  the  other 
battalion  continued  construction  work; 
but,  in  general,  training  schedules,  no 
matter  how  elaborate  on  paper,  had  lit- 
tle actual  meaning. 

The  chief  obstacle  was  the  buildup. 
Each  hour  spent  away  from  actual  work 
delayed  buildup  goals.  The  official 
viewpoint — that  training  was  a  diver- 
sion— affected  the  attitude  of  all  per- 
sonnel. Even  after  TORCH  started,  the 
engineer  troops  remaining  in  England 
had  construction  or  other  urgent  tasks 
to  perform,  and  realistic  training  was 
nearly  impossible. ''' 

There  were  other  obstacles.  Space 
was  limited  in  the  British  Isles;  lumber 
to  build  training  quarters  was  scarce 
and  equipment  hard  to  come  by.  Some 
units  fell  back  on  their  own  resources. 
The  434th  Engineer  Dump  Truck 
Company,  for  example,  set  up  its  own 
crane  operator  school,  while  other  units 
did  the  same  for  brickwork,  plumbing, 
steel  construction,  and  electrical  equip- 
ment installation.  Engineers  from  vari- 
ous units  received  valuable  military 
training  at  schools  for  enlisted  men  set 
up  at  Shrivenham,  Berkshire,  in  what 
became  known  as  the  American  School 
Center. 

Just  as  important  was  the  training 
offered  by  the  British.  Perhaps  the  best 


"  Memo,  Col  Albrecht  for  Col  Lord,  13  Jan  43; 
Interv,  Lt  Col  S.  A.  McMillion  with  Col  Albrecht,  1 1 
Dec  43. 


'^  Memo,  CofEngrs  and  CG,  SOS,  WD,  for  G-4, 
SOS  ETOUSA,  23  Sep  42,  sub:  Revision  of  Supply 
Plan,  ETO,  381  Supply  1942-43,  EUCOM  Engr  files; 
Blueprint,  343d  Engr  (iS  Rgt,  15  Sep  42  entry.  Col 
R.  M.  Edgar's  personal  files;  Memo,  OCE,  SBS,  SOS 
ETOUSA,  Lt  R.  A.  Cosgrove  for  Lt  Col  C.J.  Barker,  12 
Aug  42,  sub:  Field  Notes  From  Southern  Base  Section, 
600  Rpts,  20  Jun  42-29  Jul  43,  EUCOM  Engr  files. 


THE  ENGINEER  MACHINE  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM,  1942 


41 


British  school  open  to  American  engi- 
neers was  the  School  of  Military  Engi- 
neering at  Ripon,  Yorkshire,  which 
gave  instruction  in  field  work,  bridging, 
electrical  and  mechanical  work,  military 
duties,  and  bomb  disposal.  Here  U.S. 
Army  engineers  learned  the  value  of 
the  Bailey  bridge.  Courses  ranged  from 
two  to  five  weeks,  and  after  a  time 
American  instructors,  including  engi- 
neers, augmented  the  staff. '^'  Other 
British  institutions  open  to  U.S.  Army 
engineers  included  the  railroad  engi- 
neering school,  the  British  staff  college, 
a  school  that  devoted  special  attention 
to  camouflage,  a  fire-fighting  school,  a 
military  intelligence  school,  and  a  div- 
ing school.  By  the  end  of  1942,  47  engi- 
neer officers  and  1 85  enlisted  men  were 
attending  British  or  American  military 
training  schools  in  England. 

Supply 

The  engineers  in  the  United  King- 
dom during  1942  were  supplied  by  the 
United  States  and  by  local  procurement 
in  Britain,  from  which  came  the  largest 
tonnages.  Generals  Chaney  and  Davison 
recognized  the  need  for  extensive 
reciprocal  aid  from  the  British,  and  on 
25  May,  Headquarters,  USAFBI,  estab- 
lished a  General  Purchasing  Board  and 
a  Board  of  Contracts  and  Adjustments. 


"'  Ltr,  U  Col  James  E.  Walsh  to  CofEngrs,  28  Dec 
43,  sub:  Operations  GS  Rgts;  Rpt,  Engr  Office, 
USANIF,  to  Engr,  ETOUSA,  17  Feb  42,  sub:  Interim 
Rpt,  Engr  USANIF,  O&T  Br,  OCE,  Northern  Ire- 
land file;  Ltr,  Maj  H.  C.  Trask  to  Base  Sect  Engr, 
NIBS,  14  Sep  42,  sub:  SME  (Sch  of  Military  Engi- 
neering, Brit),  103-SME-Ripon  1942-43,  EUCOM 
Engr  files;  Memo,  OCE,  SOS  ETOUSA,  for  Col  D.  B. 
Adams,  Chf,  O&T  Div,  OCE,  SOS,  15  Aug  42,  sub: 
Officers  and  Enlisted  Men  Attending  British  Schools, 
321.02  Engr  Officers  (27  Jul  42-31  Oct  42),  EUCOM 
Engr  files. 


Made  up  of  representatives  of  the  chiefs 
of  each  American  service,  the  General 
Purchasing  Board  issued  procurement 
directives,  outlined  local  procurement 
procedure,  and  provided  information 
on  available  materials.  Before  submit- 
ting requisitions  for  materials  from  the 
United  States,  each  service  sent  copies 
to  the  general  purchasing  agent  (GPA), 
who  determined  if  British  materials 
were  available.'^ 

Local  procurement  took  one  of  three 
forms:  materials  that  came  direct  from 
British  resources,  articles  that  Britain 
manufactured  from  material  shipped 
from  the  United  States,  or  substitutes. 
This  third  form  of  procurement  took 
place  when  American  materials  went 
to  British  overseas  forces,  principally 
in  the  Pacific,  and  were  exchanged  for 
materials  produced  in  the  British  Isles. 
The  British  and  Americans  did  not 
work  out  a  final  procurement  system 
until  mid-October;  until  then  lack  of 
clearly  defined  procedures  inhibited 
procurement  under  reverse  lend-lease. 
The  engineers  frequently  found  it  im- 
possible to  obtain  needed  items  through 
the  seventeen  official  British  agencies 
involved  and  turned  to  local  British 
businessmen,  a  procedure  which  often 
led  to  disagreements  with  the  general 
purchasing  agent.  As  late  as  January 
1943  Col.  Douglas  C.  MacKeachie,  the 
GPA,  criticized  the  engineers  for  con- 
stantly ignoring  "most  of  the  policies 
established  for  procurement  in  the 
UK."  He  declared  that  there  had  been 
a  waste  of  "crucial  tonnage"  because  the 


'^HQ,  USAFBI,  25  May  42,  Establishment  of  a  Gen 
Purchasing  Bd  and  a  Bd  of  Contracts  and  Adjust- 
ments in  the  British  Isles  for  the  European  Area;  and 
HQ,  SOS  ETOUSA,  17  Jun  42,  Function  of  the  Gen 
Purchasing  Bd  and  the  Bd  of  Contracts  and  Adjust- 
ments; both  in  USFET,  Engr  008  Precedents,  1942. 


42 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


engineers  did  not  follow  up,  and  he 
felt  their  laxity  in  figuring  requirements 
for  reverse  lend-lease  items  had  made 
it  difficult  for  the  British  to  plan  pro- 
duction. The  engineer  defense  against 
this  criticism  was  that  procurement  pol- 
icy remained  ill-defined  until  mid- 
October.  In  any  case,  Colonel 
MacKeachie  admitted  that  Colonel 
Moore,  the  chief  engineer  of  SOS  and 
ETOUSA,  had  generally  worked  out 
satisfactory  procedures  by  January 
1943.'^ 

During  the  last  seven  months  of  1 942 
the  British  provided  the  engineers  with 
211,150  long  (2,240-pound)  tons  of 
supplies  under  reverse  lend-lease,  not 
including  large  quantities  of  construc- 
tion materials  for  sheltering  and  servic- 
ing American  troops.  Much  of  this 
material  was  shipped  to  North  Africa 
to  support  American  forces.  Among 
other  important  items  the  engineers 
received  or  requisitioned  were  Bailey 
bridges,  Sommerfeld  track  (a  matting 
made  of  wire  netting  reinforced  with 
steel),  lumber,  and  essential  tools  and 
spare  parts.  Thousands  of  British  civil- 
ian clerks  and  laborers  worked  on  con- 
struction, depot  supply,  storage,  and 
other  projects.  At  one  time,  more  than 
27,760  civilians  contributed  to  the 
Bolero  program  and  20,000  to  the 
separate  air  force  engineer  develop- 
ment.'^ Two  factors  inhibited  recipro- 


'**  HQ,SOS,MinofOrglMtgof  .  .  .  Gen  Purchasing 
Bd,  26  Jun  42,  USFET,  Engr  400.12  Procurement, 
1942;  HQ,  SOS,  Final  Rpt  of  Col  D.  C.  MacKeachie, 
GPA,  319.1  Rpts,  1943,  EUCOM  Engr  files;  Interv, 
Shotwell  with  Col  T.  D.  Rogers,  24  Sep  50;  Moore, 
Final  Report,  pp.  189-91. 

'"  App.  A  to  Memo,  HQ,  SOS  ETOUSA,  for  Chiefs, 
Staff  Sees  and  Servs,  20  Feb  43;  AMS  Min  of  Mtg, 
Bolero  Combined  Committee,  London,  18  Jul  42; 
Interv,  Shotwell  with  Col  George  W.  Bennett;  Memo, 
Moore  for  CG,  SOS  ETOUSA,  1 1  Jan  43,  325.5 1  Poli- 
cies and  Plans,  EUCOM  Engr  files. 


cal  aid;  the  first  was  the  limited  quan- 
tity of  raw  materials  available  in  the 
United  Kingdom  and  the  second  was 
that  U.S.  Army  equipment  was  stan- 
dardized to  American  specifications  so 
as  to  make  substitution  often  impossi- 
ble.2o 

During  1942  the  engineers  received 
from  the  United  States  some  75,400 
tons  of  supplies  representing  11,100 
items  in  the  Engineer  Supply  Catalog. 
The  second  half  of  the  year  saw  58,000 
tons  arrive,  the  peak  month  being  Au- 
gust, when  26,000  tons  reached  Britain, 
But  this  tonnage  fell  far  short  of  pro- 
jected figures  in  BOLERO  planning,  and 
again,  some  quantities  were  siphoned 
off  to  North  Africa.  From  the  start  and 
throughout  1942,  no  definite  priority 
or  allocation  system  existed.^' 

In  July  1942  the  Engineer  Service, 
SOS,  set  up  a  Supply  Division  headed 
by  Lt.  Col.  Thomas  DeF.  Rogers  to 
receive,  store,  and  distribute  engineer 
supplies  and  equipment.  The  division's 
early  days  were  marked  with  confusion, 
for  none  of  the  personnel  initially  as- 
signed had  any  experience  in  engineer 
supply  operations.  Ultimately  the  divi- 
sion established  a  depot  and  shop 
branch  as  well  as  planning,  procure- 
ment, requirements,  and  transportation 
branches.  Supply  Division  sent  a  repre- 
sentative to  London  to  maintain  liaison 
with  the  General  Purchasing  Board  and 
sundry  British  agencies;  this  office 
gradually  evolved  into  the  Procurement 
Branch.  Liaison  with  OCE  in  Washing- 
ton was  not  always  good,  as  evidenced 
by  Supply  Division's  lack  of  catalogs. 


^"  Interv,  Shotwell  with  Col  A.  W.  Pence. 

■■^'  SOS  ETOUSA  Statistical  Summary  XXI,  14  Dec 
42,  pp.  15ff;  Cbl,  Marshall  to  SPOBS,  20  Feb  42,  sub: 
Shipment  of  Supplies,  USAFBI  Planning  folder  3.00. 


THE  ENGINEER  MACHINE  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM,  1942 


43 


nomenclature  lists,  TOEs,  and  TBAs. 
Another  difficulty  was  the  failure  of  the 
Construction  and  Planning  Division  of 
OCE,  SOS,  to  recognize  that  it,  and  not 
Supply  Division,  was  responsible  for 
submitting  initial  lists  of  requirements. 
Supply  Division  worked  out  a  compre- 
hensive engineer  supply  plan  in  Octo- 
ber, but  by  December  the  North  Afri- 
can operation  had  rendered  it  obsolete 
and  had  robbed  the  division  of  some  of 
its  more  experienced  officers. ^"^ 

Not  until  December  did  SOS,  GPA, 
and  other  agencies  concerned  establish 
a  stable  system  for  securing  engineer 
supplies  from  the  United  States.  Under 
this  system  requisitions  went  from  the 
Supply  Division  to  the  deputy  chief 
engineer,  SOS,  and  then  to  G— 4,  SOS. 
The  general  purchasing  agent  received 
a  copy  of  each  requisition  to  determine 
whether  the  materials  were  available  in 
the  United  Kingdom.  If  not,  the  requi- 
sitions went  to  the  Overseas  Supply 
Division  in  the  New  York  port.  Supply 
Division,  OCE,  in  Washington  checked 
the  quantities  requisitioned  and  either 
approved  them  or  made  arbitrary  cuts 
depending  upon  available  stocks. 

In  the  normal  requisitioning  cycle  90 
to  120  days  passed  between  the  time 
Supply  Division,  OCE,  processed  a  req- 
uisition and  when  the  articles  were 
issued  at  a  depot.  This  length  of  time 
often  meant  that  requirements  could 
be  outdated  by  the  time  requisitions 


■■^'^  Moore,  Final  Report,  pp.  22ff;  Interv,  Shotwell 
with  Rogers,  24  Sep  50;  Ltr,  Moore  to  Col  C.  Rodney 
Smith,  OCE,  WD,  21  Dec  42,  sub:  Shortage  of  Supply 
Officers,  475  Engr  Equip,  Dec  42- Dec  43,  EUCOM 
Engr  files;  Ltr,  OCE,  SOS  ETOUSA,  13  Oct  42,  sub: 
Supply  Plan,  300  Supply  Plan,  EUCOM  Engr  files; 
OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  3,  Supply,  (United  Kingdom), 
1946,  Liaison  Sect,  Intel  Div,  ETOUSA  Adm  file  547, 
and  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  1,  Organization,  Ad- 
ministration, and  Personnel,  app.  2. 


were  filled.  In  July  1942  the  War  De- 
partment authorized  a  sixty-day  level 
for  Class  II  engineer  supplies  (organiza- 
tional equipment  to  fill  TOE  and  TBA 
allowances  of  units)  and  Class  IV  items 
(construction  supplies)  needed  for  spe- 
cial projects.  The  sixty-day  level  was 
prescribed  as  the  "minimum  amount 
to  be  held  as  a  reserve"  over  and  above 
quantities  required  for  normal  opera- 
tions, but  in  practice  this  level  could 
not  be  maintained  and  shortages  per- 
sisted throughout  1942. 

Even  the  calculation  of  requirements 
to  meet  that  level  was  disrupted  by 
Torch.  Requirements  for  Class  II  de- 
pended upon  numbers  and  types  of 
units,  and  the  North  African  invasion 
drained  units  from  the  United  King- 
dom and  left  the  future  troop  basis 
uncertain;  the  requirements  for  Class 
IV  supply  in  North  Africa  were  obvi- 
ously different  from  those  in  the  Brit- 
ish Isles.  Torch  seriously  depleted 
British  resources,  took  essential  mate- 
rial from  U.S.  Army  engineer  units 
remaining  in  the  United  Kingdom,  and 
practically  exhausted  depot  stocks  of 
Class  IV  supplies  in  the  theater. 

Realizing  that  the  lead  time  for  pro- 
duction and  delivery  of  most  special 
project  material  was  twelve  to  eighteen 
months.  Colonel  Moore,  in  December, 
sought  to  rebuild  Class  IV  stockpiles  in 
the  United  Kingdom  and  appointed  a 
board  to  estimate  future  requirements 
and  delivery  schedules.  The  move 
seemed  to  fly  in  the  face  of  a  Somervell 
directive  dated  18  November  1942,  stat- 
ing that  no  supplies  were  to  be  sent  to 
Britain  beyond  those  necessary  to  equip 
the  427,000  men  scheduled  to  be  in 
England  by  spring  1943.  But  General 
Somervell  hardly  intended  this  figure 
to  be  sacrosanct,  for  an  ultimate  cross- 


44 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Channel  invasion  was  still  the  principal 
tenet  of  American  strategy. ^^ 

One  of  the  most  frequent  complaints 
of  engineer  units  was  that  their  Class  II 
equipment  did  not  reach  them  until 
weeks  after  they  arrived  in  the  United 
Kingdom.  Most  troop  transports  car- 
ried little  or  no  equipment,  sending  it 
instead  by  slow-moving  freighters.  It 
was  almost  impossible  to  bring  men  and 
equipment  together  simultaneously  in 
the  United  Kingdom.  When  units  were 
still  in  camp  in  the  United  States  they 
needed  their  equipment  for  training. 
Taking  the  equipment  from  the  men 
at  least  a  month  before  departure 
would  have  been  necessary  for  it  to 
arrive  overseas  at  the  same  time  as  the 
troops,  and  even  then  there  would  have 
been  no  guarantee.  Some  equipment 
was  lost  in  ports  or  depots  or  sent  to 
the  bottom  by  German  submarines. 
The  817th  Engineer  Aviation  Battalion, 
on  its  arrival  in  July  1942,  had  1  transit, 
100  axes,  and  100  shovels  for  800  men, 
while  several  other  units  had  nothing 
but  jeeps.  Two  months  after  their  ar- 
rival in  late  summer,  four  engineer  avi- 
ation battalions  had  received  less  than 
one-third  of  their  heavy  equipment. 
Borrowing  British  equipment  alleviated 
problems  somewhat,  but  such  loans 


^•*  Ltr,  HQ,  SOS  ETOUSA,  to  CG,  ETOUSA,  13 
Dec  42,  sub:  Policy  in  ProcMrement  of  Engineer  Sup- 
plies to  Support  Future  Operations,  381  Supply 
1942-43,  EUCOM  Engr  files;  Interv,  Col  Barnes,  7 
Nov  50;  Memo,  OCE,  SOS  ETOUSA,  for  Col  Elmer 
E.  Barnes,  6  Nov  42,  sub:  Engineer  Class  IV  Supplies, 
400  General  (Nov  42-Feb  43),  EUCOM  Engr  files; 
Lt  Herbert  French,  The  Administrative  and  Logistical 
History  of  the  European  Theater  of  Of>erations,  vol. 
HI,  "Troop  and  Supply  Buildup  in  the  UK  Prior  to 
D-Day,"  p.  70,  in  CMH;  Leighton  and  Coakley,  Global 
Logistics  and  Strategy,  1940-43,  pp.  322—36  and  app. 
F. 


were  limited.  The  lack  of  tools  was  a 
major  factor  in  retarding  construction,^^ 

The  War  Department  or  Headquar- 
ters, ETOUSA,  regulated  the  supply 
and  issue  of  many  scarce  items.  Those 
under  War  Department  allocation  reg- 
ulation were  known  as  controlled  items; 
those  in  short  supply  in  ETO  were  des- 
ignated critical  items  by  the  theater 
command.  Throughout  1942  the  sup- 
ply of  items  in  both  categories  remained 
unsatisfactory,  and  as  late  as  mid- 
December  such  engineer  equipment  as 
air  compressors,  generators,  welding 
sets,  compasses,  mine  detectors,  gas 
cylinders,  gas  pipeline  supplies,  pumps, 
D  — 7  tractors  with  angledozers,  and 
truck-mounted  cranes  remained  in 
short  supply. ^^ 

Nevertheless,  by  the  end  of  1942  U.S. 
Army  engineer  units  in  England  had 
received  90  percent  of  their  heavy  con- 
struction equipment  from  the  United 
States  and  70  percent  of  their  general- 
purpose  vehicles.  But  few  additional 
engineer  troops  had  been  stationed  in 
the  United  Kingdom  since  1  Septem- 
ber, and  some  serious  shortages 
remained — a  result  of  the  unavoidable 
time  lag  in  manufacturing  heavy  equif>- 
ment  in  the  United  States  and  an  un- 
foreseen heavy  demand  for  it  in  all 
theaters.  Too  few  Class  II  items  were 
arriving,  and  only  about  27  percent  of 
items  not  under  special  controls  were 


-^  Unit  Hist,  470th  Engr  Maint  Co;  Interv,  Col  B.  D. 
Cassidy;  Adm  and  Log  Hist  of  the  ETO,  vol.  IH, 
"Troop  and  Supply  Buildup  in  the  UK  Prior  to 
D-Day,"  p.  155;  Ltr,  Moore  to  CE,  WD,  31  Oct  42, 
sub:  Equipment  for  Avn  Bns,  475  Engr  Equip,  Oct- 
Nov  42,  EUCOM  Engr  files. 

- '  Memo,  OCE,  SOS  ETOUSA,  for  G-4,  SOS  ETO- 
USA, 1 1  Dec  42,  sub:  Critical  Items,  atchd  to  Memo, 
sub:  G-4  Logistical  Book,  325.51  Policies  and  Plans, 
EUCOM  Engr  files. 


THE  ENGINEER  MACHINE  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM,  1942 


45 


available  for  initial  issue  requirements. 
With  shortages  already  prevalent,  SOS 
had  to  equip  units  alerted  for  TORCH 
by  stripping  equipment  from  units 
scheduled  to  remain  in  England.'^*' 

Many  other  supply  problems  arose. 
Poor  packing  in  the  United  States  often 
resulted  in  saltwater  damage.  Improper 
handling  caused  more  loss,  and  worn 
or  used  supplies  showed  up  all  too 
frequently.  Sometimes  various  parts  of 
equipment  arrived  in  separate  con- 
tainers, and  in  other  cases  some  parts 
never  arrived  at  all.  Vague  and  ambigu- 
ous ship  manifests  caused  countless 
hours  to  be  spent  in  sorting  equipment. 
Equipment  lost  for  long  periods  had  to 
be  requisitioned  again.  Spare  parts  in 
large  quantities  left  the  United  States, 
yet  months  later  some  units  had  not 
received  a  single  box.  In  July  a  machine 
training  detachment  (a  captain  and 
twelve  sergeants)  began  working  at 
Liverpool,  the  chief  freight  port,  super- 
vising the  unloading  and  loading  of  all 
engineer  equipment  and  greatly  re- 
duced the  confusion.  This  and  other 
steps  improved  matters  so  that  by 
November  engineer  equipment  reached 
the  proper  units  ten  days  after  it 
landed.2^ 


^*^  Rpt,  OCE,  SOS  ETOUSA,  7  Jan  43,  sub:  Status 
Rpt,  CE  3 19. 1,  Status  Rpts,  OCE,  Dec  42-Jul  43;  Unit 
Hist,  470th  Engr  Maint  Co;  Rpt,  HQ,  EBS,  12  Apr 
44,  sub:  Rpt  of  Activities  of  the  Eastern  Base  Section, 
Hist  of  the  Office  of  the  Base  Section  Engr,  EUCOM 
Engr  files;  Ltr,  OCE,  ETOUSA  (C.  Rodney  Smith),  to 
Engr,  SOS  ETOUSA,  22  Sep  42,  sub:  Maint  of  Engr 
319.1  (9-11-42),  QG14-1942-44,  USFET  Engr 
files. 

'^'  Entries  Aug— Oct  42  in  Quartering  Div,  OCE, 
ETOUSA,  Daily  Jnl  and  Supply  Div  Daily  Jnl,  EUCOM 
Engr  files;  Ltr,  OCE,  ETOUSA  (C.  Rodney  Smith),  to 
Engr,  SOS  ETOUSA,  22  Sep  42,  sub:  Maint  of  Engr 
Equipment  in  the  ETO,  Supplies  Misc  1942,  file  1004, 
NIBS  Engr  files;  Interv,  Col  A.  L.  Hartfield,  19  Sep 
50. 


The  depot  system  serving  American 
forces  in  the  United  Kingdom  ex- 
panded slowly,  laboring  under  the  same 
organizational,  geographic,  and  man- 
power restraints  that  hobbled  the  entire 
ETOUSA  operation  in  its  early  stages. 
The  engineers  had  specified  areas  for 
supply  in  general  depots,  or  they  set 
up  their  own  depots.  The  system  began 
to  take  shape  with  Desertmartin  in 
Northern  Ireland  and  eventually 
amounted  to  ten  installations  in  the  first 
year.  As  shipments  from  the  United 
States  increased,  American  planners  in 
the  theater  moved  depot  operations 
into  large  warehouses  in  Liverpool, 
Bristol,  and  other  smaller  ports  on 
Britain's  west  coast.  In  June  1942  the 
British  turned  over  to  U.S.  Army  con- 
trol, under  the  general  command  of 
Chief  Quartermaster  Brig,  Gen.  Rob- 
ert McG.  Littlejohn,  several  existing 
British  Army  depots,  among  them  a 
recently  constructed  facility  at  Ash- 
church,  just  south  of  Liverpool.  Engi- 
neer supply  in  the  summer  of  1942  was 
concentrated  at  this  general  depot  and 
at  a  former  Royal  Ordnance  depot  at 
Thatcham-Newbury,  sixty  miles  due 
west  of  London,  also  shared  with  other 
service  arms.  A  small,  exclusively  engi- 
neer depot  was  established  in  British 
quarters  at  Huntingdon,  sixty  miles 
north  of  London,  to  supply  airfield  con- 
struction units  in  the  Eastern  Base  Sec- 
tion with  building  materials.  But  the 
planned  storage  capacity  for  the  troop 
buildup  under  BOLERO  still  awaited 
construction.  If  the  consolidation  of 
supply  requests  was  the  province  of  the 
quartermaster,  providing  the  storage 
space  and  the  physical  fixtures  was  the 
responsibility  of  the  chief  engineer. ^^ 


'^^^  Moore,  Final  Report,  pp.   179-80;  Ruppenthal, 
Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Volume  I,  p.  152. 


46 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Decisions  on  the  location  of  new 
depots  were  complicated  by  the  neces- 
sity to  share  buildings  with  the  British 
and  by  the  lack  of  space  at  more  desir- 
able sites.  The  threat  of  German  air 
attack  induced  the  British  government 
to  disperse  depot  installations  in  un- 
likely spots.  American  engineers  fol- 
lowed this  principle  to  some  extent,  but, 
also  influenced  by  the  plan  for  a  large 
Bolero  static  force,  they  gave  some 
thought  to  locating  the  depots  so  as  to 
support  both  the  buildup  and  the  sub- 
sequent invasion  of  Europe. 

By  the  end  of  1942,  the  engineers 
had  constructed  additional  depots  in 
the  English  interior.  All  of  them  suf- 
fered problems  of  transport.  Inter- 
depot  shipments  were  made  impracti- 
cal by  circuitous  and  slow  rail  service 
and  by  an  inventory  system  that  failed 
to  show  changes  in  the  location  of  mate- 
rial; by  fall  of  1942,  theater  policy  for- 
bade movement  of  materiel  between  the 
depots.  In  September  the  Thatcham- 
Newbury  installation  had  85,000  tons 
of  engineer  supplies  on  hand  with  the 
450th  Engineer  Depot  Company  there 
handling  the  supply  needs  of  the  South- 
ern Base  Section.  The  Engineer  Sec- 
tion at  Ashchurch  not  only  became  a 
spare  parts  repository  but  also  took  care 
of  the  general  engineer  supply  for  west- 
ern and  northern  England.  Though 
limited  in  space,  another  general  depot 
associated  with  Cardiff  and  Newport 
on  the  Bristol  Channel  was  the  only 
port  depot  in  the  system  and  contrib- 
uted in  the  fall  of  1942  to  the  direct 
flow  of  materiel  into  the  Southern  Base 
Section  from  the  United  States. 

Shortages  in  trained  supply  techni- 
cians and  the  absence  of  a  standard 
nomenclature  list  for  items  of  supply 
posed  other  problems.  Through  the 


summer,  the  450th  Engineer  Depot 
Company  at  Thatcham-Newbury,  com- 
plemented by  British  civilians,  was  the 
only  unit  in  the  country  handling  engi- 
neer depot  supplies.  The  civilians  were 
largely  untrained  in  wholesale  stock 
management,  and  the  depot  company 
found  conditions  and  procedures  total- 
ly different.  The  demands  of  TORCH 
were  particularly  felt  here.  Six  depot 
companies  were  scheduled  to  arrive  in 
England  by  the  end  of  the  year;  of  the 
two  that  came,  one  shipped  out  imme- 
diately for  Africa,  and  the  experienced 
450th  found  itself  in  Algeria  in  late 
November  1942.  Stock  records  and 
daily  tally-in  and  -out  cards  were  unre- 
liable. Illegible  and  ambivalent  nota- 
tions made  some  records  useless,  and 
inventories  at  various  locations  differed 
in  the  description  of  identical  items 
until  the  ETOUSA  chief  engineer's 
office  produced  a  standard  depot  man- 
ual in  February  1943  and  a  combined 
British-American  nomenclature  list  the 
following  month.  Difficulties  in  stock 
and  depot  control  brought  the  direct 
attention  of  the  chief  engineer  to  the 
lowest  levels  of  the  command,  an  unde- 
sirable situation  since  directives  and  ver- 
bal instructions  then  bypassed  the  base 
section  commands  having  jurisdiction 
over  the  areas  in  which  individual 
depots  were  located. ^^ 

Another  serious  problem  in  1942  was 
equipment  maintenance.  Normally,  five 
echelons  of  repair  existed  for  heavy  engi- 
neer and  other  equipment.  The  using 


'^^  Moore,  Final  Report,  p.  180;  Ltr,  ColJ.  S.  Gorlinski, 
O&T  Br,  Trps  Div,  OCE,  WD,  to  Col  Chorpening, 
Supply  Div,  OCE,  WD,  2  Jul  42,  sub:  Depot  Compa- 
nies for  Bolero,  381  Bolero,  folio  I,  O&T  Div  (Rec- 
Ret),  OCE  files;  Supply  Div,  OCE,  SOS  ETOUSA,  1 
Sep  42,  Control  Folder,  and  SOS  ETOUSA  GO  7,  1 1 
Jul  42. 


THE  ENGINEER  MACHINE  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM,  1942 


47 


units  took  care  of  first  and  second 
echelons,  mainly  preventive  mainte- 
nance such  as  lubrication,  cleaning, 
tightening,  and  minor  replacements. 
Engineer  maintenance  companies  took 
care  of  third  and  fourth  echelon  work, 
which  involved  major  assembly  replace- 
ments and  technical  repairs;  engineer 
heavy  shop  companies  undertook  fifth 
echelon  maintenance — salvaging,  re- 
building, and  reconditioning.  This  was 
the  prescribed  procedure,  but  under 
conditions  existing  in  Britain  in  1942 
the  engineers  could  not  fully  implement 
it.  Maintenance  operations  were  slow 
in  getting  under  way  and  proved  unsat- 
isfactory throughout  the  period."'*^ 

The  467th  Engineer  Maintenance 
Company,  the  first  engineer  mainte- 
nance unit  to  arrive  in  the  theater, 
reached  Northern  Ireland  in  March 
1942  as  a  skeleton  organization  made 
up  of  company  headquarters  and  one 
maintenance  platoon.  In  early  Novem- 
ber the  unit  moved  to  the  Eastern  Base 
Section  where  it  performed  not  only 
third  and  fourth  echelon  maintenance 
for  which  it  was  trained  but  also  fifth 
echelon  work.  In  August,  after  only  a 
few  weeks  of  training,  the  470th  Engi- 
neer Maintenance  Company  arrived 
from  the  United  States  as  a  complete 
unit  and  set  up  at  Ashchurch.  With  only 
half  of  its  equipment,  the  company  had 
to  borrow  tools  and  parts  from  the 
47 1st  Engineer  Maintenance  Company, 
which  had  arrived  in  England  at  the 
same  time.  Moreover,  the  company 
repeatedly  had  to  provide  cadres  for 
new  units.  OCE,  SOS,  never  issued  any 
directives  defining  the  company's  func- 
tions, and  few  engineer  troops  outside 


the  immediate  Ashchurch  area  were 
aware  that  it  existed  and  that  it  could 
aid  them.  The  company  left  England 
for  North  Africa  late  in  November 
1942. 

The  October  supply  plan  had  called 
for  maintenance  shops  at  Ashchurch, 
Shrivenham  in  Berkshire,  and  Brain- 
tree  in  Essex.  For  lack  of  equipment, 
these  shops  were  not  close  to  operating 
at  full  capacity  by  the  year's  end.  Indi- 
vidual engineer  units  felt  shortages  in 
maintenance  equipment  just  as  acutely 
as  did  the  shops.  Aviation  and  other 
engineer  units  constantly  called  for 
mobile  shops,  tools,  and  tool  sets. 
Though  schedules  called  for  mainte- 
nance machinery  to  be  used  eight  to 
ten  hours  a  day,  shortages  compelled 
engineer  units  to  use  them  at  times  for 
more  than  twenty  hours. 

Despite  these  handicaps  the  engi- 
neers took  on  considerable  mainte- 
nance work  and  occasionally  the  duties 
of  the  Ordnance  Department.  In  the 
late  fall  of  1942,  engineers  in  the  South- 
ern Base  Section  were  responsible  not 
only  for  maintaining  engineer  equip- 
ment but  also  for  operating  most  of  the 
motor  vehicles.  Even  with  shortages  of 
repair  parts  and  operating  manuals, 
most  men  did  their  best  to  keep  their 
equipment  in  good  condition.  The 
dearth  of  facilities  and  tools  forced  men 
to  do  things  on  their  own,  to  employ 
expedients,  and  to  learn  the  intricacies 
of  each  tool,  machine,  or  vehicle.  On 
the  other  hand,  losses  and  damages 
inevitably  resulted  because  so  many 
operators  lacked  adequate  training.^' 


^"  Engr  Supply  Precedents,  Engr  Sch  Lib  text,  pp. 
222-26,  Engr  Sch  Lib. 


"  Ltr,  OCE,  SOS  ETOUSA,  13  Oct  42,  sub:  Supply 
Plan,  400  Supply  Plan,  EUCOM  Engr  files;  Ltr,  OCE, 
ETOUSA  (C.  Rodney  Smith),  to  Engr,  SOS  ETOUSA, 
22  Sep  42,  sub:  Maint  of  Engr  Equipment  in  the  ETO, 
Supplies  Misc  1942;  Ltr,  OCE,  SOS  ETOUSA,  to  OCE, 


48 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


A  critical  shortage  of  spare  parts  be- 
came apparent  early.  Although  in  June 
the  War  Department  had  authorized  a 
year's  automatic  supply  of  spare  parts 
for  overseas  operations,  OCE,  WD, 
reported  that  spare  parts  stock  for  the 
following  six  months  would  not  be  ready 
for  shipment  until  October  and  that  a 
balanced  twelve-month  depot  stock, 
then  being  assembled,  would  not  be 
ready  until  the  close  of  the  year.  Nor 
were  the  prospects  brighter  that  units 
overseas  would  soon  get  a  three-  to  six- 
month  supply  of  critical  spare  parts. 
The  situation  became  so  serious  in  the 
Eastern  Base  Section  that  depots  issued 
some  items  only  upon  presentation  of 
the  parts  to  be  replaced.  In  September, 
OCE,  SOS,  formed  a  spare  parts  depot 
on  the  nucleus  of  an  engineer  base 
equipment  company  at  Ashchurch,  with 
subdepots  at  Egginton  in  Derbyshire 
and  Huntingdon  in  Huntingdonshire. 
October  saw  some  improvement,  but 
stocks  were  far  from  balanced. ^^ 

The  quality  of  equipment  provided 
to  the  engineer  .units  was  good,  though 
some  was  unsuited  for  larger  tasks.  The 
earth  auger  and  the  medium  tractor 
with  angledozer  proved  too  light  for 
much  of  the  work  for  which  they  were 
used,  and  they  frequently  broke  down. 
The  1  1/2-ton  dump  truck  was  also 
inadequate  and  wore  out  much  sooner 
than  the  larger  and  more  rugged  2 


WD,   13  Jan  43,  sub:  Maint  of  Engr  Equipment  in 
ETO,  400,  402,  EUCOM  Engr  files. 

■^'^  Ltr,  AGO,  WD,  1 1  Jun  42,  sub:  Automotive  Parts 
Policy,  Engr  Cons,  EUCOM  Engr  files;  Ltr,  OCE, 
ETOUSA  (C.  Rodney  Smith),  to  Engr,  SOS  ETOUSA, 
22  Sep  42,  sub:  Maint  of  Engr  Equipment  in  the  ETO, 
Supplies  Misc  1942;  Interv,  Col  A.  L.  Hartfield,  19 
Sep  50;  Ltr,  Engr  Sect,  ETOUSA,  to  G-4,  SOS 
ETOUSA,  8  Oct  42,  sub:  Initial  GIV  Periodic  Rpt, 
319.1  GIV  Monthly  Rpt,  1942-43-44,  USFET  Engr 
files. 


1/2-ton  truck.  But  with  their  heavy 
graders,  bulldozers,  paving  machines, 
post-hole  diggers,  and  other  efficient 
machinery,  American  engineers  could 
usually  outperform  British  engineers, 
who  generally  had  lighter  equipment, 
although  the  British  machines  often 
excelled  in  muddy  conditions. ^^ 

Intelligence 

In  late  1942  engineer  intelligence  was 
still  unprepared  for  the  tasks  looming 
ahead.  Intelligence  functions  were  re- 
lated to  Roundup,  but  Continental 
operations  were  a  hope  for  the  future 
rather  than  an  imminent  reality.  To 
staff  officers  responsible  for  building 
up  engineer  forces  in  the  United  King- 
dom, intelligence  and  mapping  ap- 
peared less  urgent  than  construction. 
When  the  intelligence  organization  of 
OCE,  SOS,  became  an  independent 
division  in  midsummer  1942,  its  staff 
consisted  of  only  a  few  officers  and  even 
fewer  enlisted  men.  Lt.  Col.  Herbert 
Milwit,  formerly  with  the  30th  Engi- 
neer Topographic  Battalion  and  an 
expert  in  mapping  and  photogram- 
metry,  remained  division  chief  through- 
out the  war  in  Europe.  Not  until  Decem- 
ber 1942  did  sufficient  personnel  arrive 
in  Britain  to  make  possible  more  than 
extremely  limited  operations. "^^ 

In  spite  of  the  importance  of  map- 


' '  Memo,  SOS,  WD,  and  Ltr,  CofEngrs,  1 7  Aug  42, 
sub:  Recommended  Changes  in  Engr  Equipment, 
ETO  400.34,  OCE  C  and  R  files;  Rpt,  USANI  Base 
Command  (Prov),  Office  of  Base  Engr,  to  CofEngrs, 
USANIBC,  in  Engr  Tech  Rpt  No.  7,  600  NI  Gen 
(Current),  NIBS  Engr  files;  Albrecht,  "Engineer 
Aspects  of  Operation  Bolero,"  p.  119. 

•^^  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  5,  Intelligence  and  To- 
pography (United  Kingdom),  1946,  pp.  1  —  10,  Liaison 
Sect,  Intel  Div,  ETOUSA  Adm  file  547;  Intel  Div, 
OCE,  SOS  ETOUSA,  Status  Rpts  for  Sep,  Oct,  Nov, 
and  Dec  1942  and  Jan  1943.  EUCOM  Engr  files. 


THE  ENGINEER  MACHINE  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM,  1942 


49 


ping  as  a  branch  of  engineer  intelligence, 
Americans  in  the  European  theater  at 
first  assumed  little  responsibility  for  it. 
In  May  1942  the  British  and  Ameri- 
cans concluded  the  Loper-Hotine  Agree- 
ment to  divide  mapping  responsibility 
throughout  the  world.  The  British  a- 
greed  to  take  care  of  most  of  Western 
Europe  and  the  Middle  East,  leaving 
North  and  South  America,  the  Far  East, 
and  the  Pacific  to  the  Americans.  The 
Directorate  of  Military  Survey  of  the 
British  War  Office  provided  Americans 
with  maps,  equipment,  housing,  and 
storage  facilities.  This  British  agency 
also  aided  in  training  a  small  but  vital 
engineer  model  makers  detachment, 
whose  model  beaches  were  to  prove 
useful  in  planning  amphibious  opera- 
tions."^^ 

The  Loper-Hotine  Agreement  recog- 
nized that  the  British  would  require 
American  help  in  compiling  and  repro- 
ducing maps  for  American  forces  and 
in  providing  photomaps  for  those  parts 
of  northwest  Europe  not  covered  by 
reliable  large-scale  maps.  The  agree- 
ment also  specified  that  American  topo- 
graphic units  and  staffs  would  support 
major  American  forces.  Though  Ameri- 
can topographical  battalions  arrived  in 
Britain  in  the  latter  part  of  1942  with- 
out adequate  equipment,  by  the  close 
of  the  year  Colonel  Milwit's  units  were 
producing  maps  in  considerable  quanti- 
ties and  were  building  up  a  worthwhile 
map  library. ^^ 


Colonel  Milwit 


For  a  time,  relations  with  the  British 
were  better  than  with  the  Army  Air 
Forces.  OCE,  WD,  had  arranged  with 
the  Air  Forces  at  Wright  Field  outside 
Dayton,  Ohio,  to  train  a  B-I7  squad- 
ron to  carry  out  photomapping  in  coop- 
eration with  the  engineers.  After  months 
of  negotiating  over  the  type  of  plane, 
the  need  for  an  escort,  and  the  flying 
altitude,  the  scheme  failed.  Engineer 
mapmakers  thus  had  to  rely  upon  the 
slower,  less  accurate  methods  of  the 
Royal  Air  Force. ^^^ 


•'^  OCE,  SOS  ETOUSA,  Topo  Memo  No.  1,  15  Oct 
43,  Topographic  Experience  in  the  Theaters;  Intel 
Div,  OCE,  SOS  ETOUSA,  General  Mission  statement, 
4  Oct  44,  sub:  Model  Makers  Detachment,  Model  Mak- 
ers Detachment  folder;  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal, 
The  Corps  of  Engineers:  Troops  and  Equipment,  pp.  445ff. 

'**  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  5,  Intelligence  and  To- 
pography, pp.  3-5  and  app.  9;  Ltr,  Col  Loper  to 
Capt  G.  F.  Hahas,  Survey  Liaison  Office,  HQ,  WASC, 


i3Jan  44,  061.01  Mapping,  Intel  Div,  OCE,  SOS;  Ltr, 
Milwit,  14  Aug  53. 

"  Memo,  Milwit  for  Conrad,  G-2,  AAF,  ETOUSA, 
20  Dec  42,  sub:  Trimetrogen  Topographic  Mapping, 
and  Ltr,  Air  Ministry  (BR)  to  Milwit,  S  2898,  1/A.D. 
Maps;  both  General  061,  EUCOM  Engr  files.  OCE 
ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  5,  Intelligence  and  Topography, 
pp.  15- 19  and  apps.  5,  10.  II,  12. 


50 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Construction 

As  the  Bolero  plans  developed,  it 
became  apparent  that  without  consider- 
able assistance  the  British  would  not  be 
able  to  house  the  American  force  sched- 
uled to  arrive  in  the  United  Kingdom. 
General  Davison  pointed  out  in  June  of 
1942  that  the  difference  between  what 
the  Americans  would  need  and  what 
the  British  could  provide  in  new  and 
existing  facilities  would  constitute  the 
engineer  construction  program.  Deter- 
mining American  needs  was  difficult 
because  of  the  uncertainty  in  1942  as 
to  how  many  American  troops  would 
come,  when  they  would  come,  and  how 
they  would  be  used  in  the  invasion.  The 
orderly  development  of  the  quartering 
and  construction  programs — at  first  in 
separate  divisions  but  in  mid-October 
combined — suffered  because  of  these 
uncertainties.^^ 

Until  enough  American  "static  force" 
engineers  arrived,  the  British  handled 
everything  connected  with  quartering. 
British  Army  and  Air  Force  officers  met 
U.S.  Army  units  as  they  arrived,  directed 
them  to  assigned  areas,  and  arranged 
for  various  services,  including  utilities, 
medical  facilities,  and  the  Navy-Army- 
Air  Force  Institution  (NAAFI,  the  Brit- 
ish equivalent  of  the  post  exchange). 
In  at  least  one  instance  a  British  advance 
party  remained  with  the  U.S.  troops  to 
aid  in  maintaining  equipment  and  draw- 
ing supplies,  to  make  the  Americans 
familiar  with  British  military  procedure, 
and  to  provide  laundry,  shoe  repair, 
and  tailoring  services.  In  the  early  sum- 
mer of  1942,  when  the  SOS  was  too 


new  and  undermanned  to  handle  these 
matters,  such  British  assistance  was 
vital.  "^^ 

Americans  gradually  took  over  many 
of  these  functions,  though  the  British 
role  remained  great.  Aviation  engineer 
battalions  which  had  to  construct  sites 
on  grain  fields  or  pastureland  without 
facilities  (mostly  in  Eastern  Base  Sec- 
tion) put  up  tents  for  those  who  came 
next.  In  Southern  and  Western  Base 
Sections,  the  British  could  usually  turn 
over  existing  facilities,  at  least  for  the 
early  arrivals.  To  meet  U.S.  Army  re- 
quirements, however,  these  facilities 
often  had  to  be  altered  or  enlarged  by 
either  the  British  or  the  Engineer  Con- 
struction Division.  If  no  housing  existed, 
one  or  the  other  had  to  put  up  new 

4() 

Structures. 

The  Engineer  Construction  Division, 
a  subsidiary  of  the  chief  engineer's 
office  at  Cheltenham,  was  set  up  in  mid- 
June  with  two  officers  and  two  enlisted 
men  headed  by  Col.  Frank  M.  Albrecht. 
As  more  officers  arrived  in  the  ETO 
the  organization  grew,  and  in  October 
it  absorbed  the  Quartering  Division. 
Before  TORCH,  tasks  consisted  mainly 
of  planning  and  liaison.  In  designing 
and  constructing  buildings  the  British 
predominated  because  they  ultimately 
were  to  own  all  installations.  In  some 
cases,  especially  in  airfield  construction, 
Americans  attempted  to  lower  British 
specifications  in  the  interest  of  speed 
and  economy,  but,  in  general,  the  Brit- 
ish held  to  their  point  of  view. 


■'**  Memo,  Davison  for  Lee,  28  Jun  42,  400  General 
(May-Oct  42),  EUCOM  Engr  files;  OCE  ETOUSA 
Hist  Rpt  8,  Quartering  (United  Kingdom),  1946,  pp. 
6-6,  Liaison  Sect,  Intel  Div,  ETOUSA  Adm  file  547. 


'"  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  8,  Quartering,  pp.  13- 
17. 

'"  Ltr,  Henderson  to  Air  Ministry,  8  Aug  42,  sub: 
Advance  Parlies  for  Engr  Bn  (Avn)  and  Ltr,  Maj  T.  F. 
Bengston,  XO,  C&T  Div,  to  Base  Sect  Engr,  27  Aug 
42,  sub:  Transmittal  of  Orders  to  Arriving  Organiza- 
tions; both  in  321  Engrs,  EUCOM  Engr  files. 


THE  ENGINEER  MACHINE  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM,  1942 


51 


General  Lee's  policy  of  centralized 
control  and  decentralized  operations 
governed  administrative  procedures  in 
building  facilities  of  all  types.  Engineer 
officers  of  the  "static  force"  had  author- 
ity to  approve  or  disapprove  construc- 
tion projects  in  accordance  with  esti- 
mated costs.  Unit  utility  offices  could 
approve  maintenance  and  utility  pro- 
jects originating  within  such  units  as 
ground  force  battalions  if  the  projects 
cost  less  than  $825,  which  at  World  War 
II  exchange  rates  amounted  to  £100. 
American  district  engineers  could  auth- 
orize projects  involving  less  than 
$20,600,  while  base  section  engineers 
could  approve  new  construction  cost- 
ing under  $164,800.  For  projects  above 
$164,800  the  base  section  engineers  had 
to  secure  the  approval  of  the  chief 
engineer,  SOS,  ETOUSA. 

Since  all  installations  were  ultimately 
to  be  turned  over  to  the  British,  area, 
district,  or  base  section  engineers  had 
to  obtain  approval  for  each  project 
from  their  opposites  in  the  local  British 
military  hierarchy.  The  British  were 
reluctant  to  delegate  the  authority  to 
approve  even  minor  construction,  and 
some  projects  costing  as  little  as  $410 
had  to  go  to  the  War  Office  for  approval. 

General  Lee  constantly  pressed  the 
War  Office  to  modify  the  British  sys- 
tem, arguing  that  new  construction 
costing  less  than  $164,800  could  and 
should  be  disposed  of  at  a  much  lower 
level  than  the  War  Office.  Not  until  well 
into  the  fall  of  1942  did  the  War  Office 
acquiesce.  Thereafter,  British  comman- 
ders had  the  same  approval  powers  as 
American  base  section,  district,  and  area 
commanders.'*' 


^'  Memo,  Albrecht  for  Moore,  1  Oct  42,  600-A- 
Con.  EUCOM  Engr  files:  Jnl  entry  1430,  14  Oct  42, 


Under  the  new  arrangement,  if  a 
camp,  depot,  or  hospital  was  to  cost 
more  than  $164,800  the  chief  engineer 
asked  the  British  War  Office  to  recom- 
mend suitable  sites,  and  the  base  sec- 
tion engineer  then  selected  a  site  board. 
For  camp  and  hospital  sites,  such  boards 
included  an  engineer,  a  medical  officer, 
and  representatives  of  each  unit,  arm, 
or  service  concerned.  The  board  in- 
spected the  proposed  sites  and  reported 
their  selection  to  the  chief  engineer. 
Although  only  the  chief  engineer  or  his 
representative  had  authority  to  request 
sites  or  facilities  from  the  British,  OCE 
made  no  objection  to  informal  agree- 
ments, subject  to  the  chief  engineer's 
approval,  entered  into  by  other  arms 
and  services. ^^ 

Differences  between  American  and 
British  methods,  organization,  and  no- 
menclature posed  seemingly  endless 
problems.  A  requisition  was  an  "indent," 
a  monkey  wrench  was  a  "spanner";  nails 
were  designated  by  length  rather  than 
weight,  rope  by  circumference  rather 
than  diameter.  Large  American  trucks 
had  difficulty  traversing  the  narrow, 
sharply  curved  British  roads.  Ameri- 
can electrical  equipment  would  not 


C&Q  Div,  OCE,  SOS,  Oct -Dec  42;  Ltr,  Albrecht  to 
Base  Sect  Engr,  EBS,  30  Oct  42,  sub:  Requests  for 
Construction  Work,  337  (Min  of  Mtgs  1943),  USFET 
Engr  Serv  files;  SOS  ETOUSA  Cir  12,  17  Aug  42,  sub: 
Instructions  (]oncerning  Base  Sections;  MS,  Maj  Gen 
A.G.B.  Smyser,  Engineer  Eighth  Air  Force  History. 
For  the  general  construction  story,  see  OCE  ETOUSA 
Hist  Rpt  6,  Air  Force  Construction  (United  Kingdom), 
1946,  Liaison  Sect,  Intel  Div,  ETOUSA  Adm  file  547, 
and  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  7,  Field  and  Service  Force 
Construction.  These  two  reports  are  general  sources 
for  the  remainder  of  this  section. 

♦■■^  Ltr,  Larkin  to  CG,  AA  Comd,  ETOUSA,  30  Jul 
42,  sub:  Construction,  Utilities  Work,  and  Use  of 
Facilities,  600-N-(ieneral,  EUCOM  Engr  files.  These 
instructions  were  repeated  almost  verbatim  in  the  sub- 
sequent Ltr,  Moore  to  CG,  V  Corps,  1  Dec  42,  same 
sub,  600  General,  1-31  Dec  42,  EUCOM  Engr  files. 


52 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


operate  on  British  current;  the  USAAF 
required  more  hardstandings,  quarters, 
and  facilities  than  RAF  airdromes  pro- 
vided; and  American  commanders  found 
British  special  facilities  for  noncoms 
hard  to  reconcile  with  U.S.  Army  prac- 
tices.^^ 

A  problem  stemmed  from  the  fact 
that  the  Air  Ministry  was  a  separate  arm 
of  the  British  War  Office.  The  engi- 
neers wanted  to  separate  the  USAAF 
from  construction  channels — a  policy 
that  found  little  favor  with  either  the 
Air  Forces  or  the  British  Air  Ministry. 
With  ETOUSA  support  General  Lee 
finally  succeeded  in  his  efforts  to  coor- 
dinate all  U.S.  construction  under  one 
office,  gaining  by  fall  both  Air  Forces 
and  British  Air  Ministry  acquiescence. 
The  Air  Forces  stated  requirements; 
the  engineers  did  the  construction.  The 
Air  Ministry  agreed  not  only  to  deal 
directly  with  the  engineers  but  to  grant 
its  subordinate  commands  powers  of 
approval  paralleling  those  of  the  Ameri- 
can static  force. '^'^ 

Another  general  working  agreement 
was  that  American  engineer  units  would 
undertake  the  larger  construction  pro- 
jects to  make  better  use  of  their  heavy 
equipment.  ETOUSA  also  agreed  that 
U.S.  Army  camps  would  remain  as 
small  as  possible  so  that  local  municipal 
utility  systems  could  serve  them.  The 


British  and  Americans  prepared  stan- 
dard layouts  for  camps  for  600,  750, 
1,000,  and  1,250  men  and  hospitals  for 
750  and  1,000  beds.  The  need  for  con- 
serving shipping  space,  the  scarcity  of 
wood,  and  the  necessity  for  speed  in 
construction  all  dictated  the  choice  of 
16-foot-wide  Nissen  huts  for  housing 
and  35-foot-wide  Iris  huts  for  storage 
and  shop  space.  The  British  agreed  to 
manufacture  these  units  from  billet 
steel  imported  from  the  United  States. 
The  huts  provided  good  semiperma- 
nent quarters  that  could  be  erected  eas- 
ily and  quickly.'*'' 

As  the  machinery  for  construction 
and  quartering  evolved,  the  Engineer 
Construction  Division  and  engineer 
construction  units  turned  their  ener- 
gies toward  camps  and  depots  in  the 
Southern  Base  Section  and  air  installa- 
tions in  the  Eastern  Base  Section.  In 
March  1942  the  British  indicated  that 
they  would  need  help  in  providing 
fields  for  American  Air  Forces;  Gen- 
eral Davison  immediately  cabled  Wash- 
ington for  ten  aviation  engineer  battal- 
ions and  soon  afterwards  raised  the 
number  to  twenty.  The  first  of  these 
battalions  arrived  in  June.  Late  in  July 
Eighth  Air  Force  set  its  requirements 
at  98  airdromes,  of  which  the  British 
already  had  built  52;  they  would  build 
29  more  and  the  U.S.  aviation  engineers 


'^  MS,  Lt  Gen  J.C.H.  Lee,  Invasion  Prelude — The 
SOS  in  Britain,  10  Apr  44;  Hist  332d  Engr  GS  Rgt,  1 
Jan-31  Dec  44,  Supply  Sect;  Memo,  1st  Lt  E.  W. 
McCall  for  Chf,  Reqts  Br,  sub:  Trip  Rpt,  319.1  Rpts, 
EUCOM  Engr  Sect;  Moore,  Final  Report,  p.  238. 

^^  Ltr,  Larkin  to  CG,  AAF,  10  Aug  42,  sub:  Con- 
struction and  Utility  Work  w/lst  Ind,  25  Aug  42,  and 
Memo,  Albrecht  for  Moore,  10  Oct  42;  both  in  600- 
A-Gen,  EUCOM  Engr  files.  Ltr,  Albrecht  to  Wooten, 
18  Sep  42,  sub:  Command  Approval  of  Construction 
Projects,  600  Gen  43,  EUCOM  Engr  files. 


^^  Engr  817,  SU-RE,  Jun  42-5  Jul  45,  Air  Univ, 
Maxwell  Field,  Ala;  OCE  ETOUSA  Cir  6,  16  Jul  42, 
extracted  from  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  7,  Field  and 
Service  Force  Construction,  pp.  58-59.  This  direc- 
tive provided  the  working  basis  for  U.S.  and  British 
agencies  concerned  with  construction.  The  British 
counterpart  was  reproduced  in  OCE  ETOUSA  Cir 
10,  27  Jul  42;  Incl  3,  Scales  of  Accommodations,  1st 
Ind,  Albrecht  to  Col  G.  A.  Lincoln,  Chf,  Planning  Con- 
trol Br,  G-4,  10  Dec  42,  sub:  Construction  Program; 
OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  7,  Field  and  Service  Force 
Construction,  app.  7. 


THE  ENGINEER  MACHINE  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM,  1942 


53 


Men  of  the  829th  Engineer  Aviation  Battalion  Erec:t  Nissen  Hutting 


17.  By  1  September  the  U.S.  figure  had 
risen  unofficially  to  38.^^' 

Although  the  construction  program 
was  neither  formally  approved  nor 
coordinated,  by  1  September  unofficial 
figures  listed  new  camps  for  77,346 
men,  53  hospitals,  and  16  convertible 
camps,  in  addition  to  the  38  new  air- 
dromes. SOS  building  operations  were 
already  well  under  way.  Eight  general 


^^  Ltr,  Gen  Carl  Spaatz,  CG,  8th  AF,  8  AF  600. 1  to 
CG,  ETOUSA,  Jul  42,  sub:  Eighth  Air  Force  Air- 
drome Construction  Program;  Ltr,  Gen  Larkin  to 
CofEngrs,  Washington,  D.C.,  30  Jul  42,  sub:  Engi- 
neer Supplies,  Equipment,  Personnel,  and  Units,  381 
War  Plans  (Jun  42-Jul  43),  EUCOM  Engr  Sect; 
Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Volume  /, 
pp.  38,  95,  1 13;  MS,  Notes  on  Staff  and  Command 
Conference,  17  May  43,  p.  6,  Engr  Serv  in  the  ETO, 
Hist  Br  Liaison  Sect. 


service  regiments  had  arrived  and  were 
employed  on  thirty-one  projects.  Five 
of  these  regiments  were  in  Southern 
Base  Section,  one  building  railroad 
spurs  and  four  building  shelters.  By 
contrast,  little  had  been  done  in  West- 
ern Base  Section.  Although  three  gen- 
eral service  regiments  arrived  there  in 
August  and  began  shelter  construc- 
tion, in  September  all  were  diverted  to 
Torch. ^^  In  Eastern  Base  Section  the 
809th  Engineer  Aviation  Battalion,  the 
first  SOS  engineer  unit  to  do  construc- 


*'  Station  List,  Engr  Units,  9  Sep  42,  Disposition 
Lists;  Engr  Units  and  files,  and  OCE,  SOS,  Sitrep,  I 
Aug  42;  0C:E  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  7,  Field  and  Service 
Force  Construction,  p.  71;  His  Red  of  Engr  Serv, 
WBS,  20  Jul  42-15  Mar  44;  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt 
4,  Troops,  app.  22,  sheet  1. 


54 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Paving  Train  at  an  American  Bomber  Field  in  En(;land 


tion  in  England,  began  work  at  Glatton 
Airdrome  on  5  July.  By  September  six- 
teen aviation  battalions  were  at  work  in 
that  area,  although  only  six  had  been 
at  their  job  sites  more  than  a  few  days. 

The  British  heavy  bomber  airdrome 
was  accepted  as  the  standard  for  each 
field  to  be  constructed  by  the  Ameri- 
cans, with  few  modifications  and  a  rela- 
tively tight  clamp  on  local  adjustments. 
Three  runways,  each  150  feet  wide, 
were  set  in  a  generally  triangular  form 
with  intersecting  legs.  The  main  run- 
way was  6,000  feet  long,  the  other  two 
4,200  feet  each.  A  fifty-foot  perimeter 


^"  Status  Rpts,  Col  Moore  to  C(;,  ETOUSA,  31  Oct 
42  (dated  8  Nov  42)  and  30  Nov  42  (dated  6  Dec  42), 
both  319.1  Rpts,  OCE  Rpts  to  CG,  EUCOM  Engr 
files. 


track  encircling  the  runways  connected 
some  fifty  hardstandings.  In  addition, 
at  each  field  a  2,500-man  "village"  had 
to  be  built  complete  with  utilities  such 
as  sewage — no  small  problem  in  the  flat 
lands  of  East  Anglia.  At  Matching  Air- 
drome buildings  included  214  Nissen 
huts  (16  by  36  feet)  arranged  in  seven 
living  sites,  with  attendant  washhouses 
and  latrines.  The  technical  site  adjacent 
to  the  runways  included  some  forty-odd 
buildings  for  administration,  operations, 
and  maintenance.  Other  structures  in- 
cluded hospitals,  recreation  halls,  and 
messes.  Away  from  these  areas  was  a 
"danger  site,"  where  a  score  of  build- 
ings housed  bombs,  fuses,  and  other 
ordnance. 

Agreement  on  layouts  and  construc- 
tion standards  was  a  minor  issue  com- 


THE  ENGINEER  MACHINE  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM,  1942 


55 


pared  to  problems  in  the  actual  work. 
Though  the  Air  Ministry  provided  air- 
field and  village  construction  plans  and 
arranged  for  locally  supplied  materials, 
British  equipment  was  often  too  light 
and  too  little.  Other  considerations 
plagued  the  Americans — a  lack  of  expe- 
rienced construction  workers,  strange 
British  nomenclature  and  methods, 
rains  beginning  in  mid-October  that 
turned  fields  into  bogs  and  company 
areas  into  quagmires,  and  finally  the 
disruptions  of  TORCH.  Because  of  de- 
lays in  the  arrival  of  the  heavy  organiza- 
tional equipment,  aviation  battalions 
began  clearing  land  with  hand  tools; 
one  unit  had  only  a  small-scale  map  to 
locate  and  chart  the  runways  it  was  to 
construct.  AH  units  had  to  train  men 
on  the  job.  Even  those  with  some  con- 
struction training  were  at  a  loss  in  the 
United  Kingdom  where  virtually  no 
construction  was  of  wood — every  piece 
came  under  the  control  of  a  separate 
British  Timber  Control  Board.  One 
unit  traded  food  for  enough  lumber  to 
build  concrete  pouring  forms.  The  cor- 
rugated curved  steel  Nissen,  Iris,  and 
Romney  huts  were  enclosed  at  the  ends 
with  masonry,  and  a  number  of  struc- 
tures on  airdromes  were  entirely  of 
brick.  Engineer  units  had  to  train  large 
numbers  of  masons,  using  men  experi- 
enced in  the  trade  as  teachers. "^^ 
Even  when  heavy  equipment  arrived 


^''  Unit  histories  of  sixteen  engineer  aviation  battal- 
ions in  the  United  Kingdom  before  December  1942, 
especially  those  of  the  809th,  the  817th,  the  818th, 
and  the  826th  and  histories  of  the  833d  and  834th; 
Memo,  Lt  Col  H.  H.  Reed,  Actg  Chf,  Supply  Div,  SOS, 
for  XO,  Engr  Serv,  4  Sep  42,  sub:  Revision  of  Supply 
Plan,  ETO;  Unit  Hist,  332d  Engr  GS  Rgt,  1  Jan  44-31 
Oct  44,  Supply  Sect;  Ltr,  Albrecht  to  Base  Engr,  EBS, 
20  Oct  42;  Memo,  Moore  for  Reybold,  30  Nov  42, 
sub:  Engr  Problems  in  ETO;  Memo,  Moore  for  Lee 
12  Nov  42. 


more  regularly  in  late  1942,  aviation 
engineer  battalions  had  few  men  famil- 
iar with  it.  Operators  needed  intensive 
training.  One  method  divided  the  labor 
into  specialized  tasks:  one  company 
handled  the  runway  preparation  and 
paving;  another  roads  and  taxiways; 
and  the  third  the  huts,  drainage  sys- 
tems, and  ancillary  tasks.  Methods  and 
schedules  varied  from  battalion  to  battal- 
ion, but  nearly  all  worked  double  shifts 
to  take  advantage  of  the  long  summer 
days.  As  daylight  hours  shortened  in 
the  fall,  units  worked  under  lights;  two, 
and  sometimes  three,  shifts  kept  the 
vital  heavy  equipment  running  day  and 
night. 

Engineer  aviation  units  were  armed 
and  organized  to  defend  their  airfields 
should  the  need  arise.  In  the  early  days 
men  marched  to  work  with  their  rifles, 
stacking  them  at  the  job  site.  Alerts  and 
blackouts  punctuated  the  nighttime 
work  as  German  bombers  passed  over 
on  their  way  to  metropolitan  areas,  but 
airdrome  construction  proceeded  with 
little  interference.  Some  attempt  was 
made  to  disguise  the  characteristic  out- 
line of  runways  with  a  wood  chip  cover- 
ing and  that  of  buildings  with  paint, 
but  camouflage  did  not  become  an 
important  consideration. 

In  the  end,  the  progress  demanded 
of  the  engineer  aviation  battalions  in 
the  first  year  of  construction  work  in 
England  proved  beyond  those  partially 
trained,  underequipped,  and  often  un- 
dermanned units.  Airfields  that  OCE, 
SOS,  originally  estimated  would  take 
one  battalion  six  months  to  build  took 
a  year  or  more.^^ 


^'"  Moore,  Final  Report,  pp.  259-61;  Work  Like  Hell, 
Play  Like  Hell,  p.  1 1,  Engr  825-Hi,  Apr  42-Aug  45; 
Engr  833-Hi,  10  Aug  42-25  Sep  45,  Air  Univ. 


56 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


The  decision  to  invade  North  Africa 
dealt  a  blow  to  BOLERO  construction 
from  which  it  did  not  recover  until  well 
into  the  spring  of  1943.  In  September, 
just  when  the  arrival  of  more  engineer 
construction  units  made  possible  an 
increase  in  building  activity,  many  of 
the  engineer  units  were  alerted  for 
TORCH;  others  had  to  support  the  of- 
fensive, mainly  in  depot  operations, 
because  TORCH  called  for  a  greatly 
increased  volume  of  supplies  from  the 
United  Kingdom.^' 

The  diversion  of  supplies  and  troops 
for  North  Africa  dictated  new  means 
for  tapping  the  labor  supply.  Early  in 
October  SOS,  ETOUSA,  provided  for 
labor  pools  in  each  of  the  base  sections, 
with  a  general  service  regiment  or  equiv- 
alent serving  as  a  nucleus  on  which  to 
form  organizations  for  freight  handling 
and  various  other  tasks  at  depots  and 
similar  installations.  Aviation  engineers 
also  performed  these  duties.  On  1  Octo- 
ber Colonel  Adams  of  the  Operations 
and  Training  Division,  OCE,  SOS,  re- 
ported  that  three  aviation  battalions  had 
just  arrived  but  had  only  20  percent  of 
their  heavy  construction  equipment. 
General  Littlejohn,  General  Lee's  de- 
puty, pointed  to  this  as  a  justification 
for  adding  these  units  to  the  labor 
pools,  emphasizing  that  5,000  SOS  engi- 
neers had  already  been  diverted  from 


construction. 


52 


■''  Ltr,  Albrecht,  4  Nov  53;  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt 
7,  Field  and  Service  Force  Construction,  p.  73;  Memo, 
Moore  for  Brig  Gen  E.  S.  Hughes,  17  Nov  42,  BC  1, 
Bolero  Combined  Committee. 

■''^  Ltr,  SOS  ETOUSA  to  Chfs  of  Supply  Services, 
Base  Sect  COs,  and  Depot  (>Os,  9  Oct  42,  sub:  Labor 
Pools  for  Depot  Opns,  319.1  Rpts  (Labor),  Sep- Nov 
42,  EUCOM  Engr  files;  Ltr,  OCE,  SOS  ETOUSA, 
Col  Donald  B.  Adams,  Chf,  O&T  Div,  to  Col  E.  E. 
Barnes,  London  OC^E  Rep,  1  Oct  42,  sub:  Rpt  on 
Engr  Bns  (Avn)  and  Airport  Cons,  322.030;  Ltr,  SOS 
ETOUSA,  Littlejohn,  to  CO,  Eighth  Air  Force,  4  Oct 


In  November  the  British,  who  were 
scraping  the  bottom  of  their  own  con- 
struction labor  barrel,  removed  2,843 
pioneer  troops  from  depot  work.  Colo- 
nel Albrecht  of  the  Construction  Divi- 
sion, OCE,  SOS,  argued  to  no  avail  that 
it  was  ridiculous  to  transfer  unskilled 
pioneer  labor  to  construction  if  this 
forced  more  skilled  American  units  to 
perform  unskilled  work.  At  the  end  of 
November,  a  peak  of  4,000  SOS,  1,160 
aviation,  and  1,100  ground  forces  engi- 
neers were  in  labor  pools.  Large  num- 
bers continued  at  depot  work  through 
March  1943.  In  spite  of  repeated 
requests  from  the  chief  engineer, 
ETOUSA,  for  more  civilian  aid,  the 
British  could  do  little.  And,  with  apolo- 
gies. Colonel  Moore  had  to  explain  to 
the  Eighth  Air  Force  that  the  success  of 
Torch  depended  upon  keeping  avia- 
tion engineers  on  unskilled  depot 
work.'''^ 

General  Lee  recognized  that  return- 
ing engineers  to  construction  or  build- 
up tasks  should  have  high  priority,  with 
aviation  engineers  heading  the  list,  as 
soon  as  the  TORCH  emergency  passed. 
In  the  meantime,  as  the  labor  pool  sys- 
tem functioned,  engineers  had  to  do  the 
work  of  other  services.  They  carried 
on  the  entire  operations  of  many  ord- 


42,  sub:  Use  of  Avn  Bns;  both  in  321  Avn  Units, 
EUCOM  Engr  files.  Ltr,  SOS  ETOUSA  to  CG,  ETO- 
USA, 6  Oct  42,  sub:  SOS  Troop  and  Labor  Situation, 
Bolero  SOS  Overall  Plan. 

■''■'■  Ltr,  SOS  ETOUSA  to  CC),  ETOUSA,  6  Oct  42, 
sub:  SOS  Troop  and  Labor  Situation;  Memo,  Albrecht 
for  Chf  Engr,  1  Nov  42,  and  Memo,  Cons  Div  for  CE, 
14  Nov  42;  both  in  231 .4  Custodian  (Labor),  EUCOM 
Engr  files.  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  4,  Troops,  app.  2, 
sheets  4-8;  Memo,  OCE  ETOUSA  for  G-4,  SOS 
ETOUSA,  24  Oct  42,  sub:  SOS  Troops  and  Labor 
Situation,  321  Aviation  Units,  EUCOM  Engr  files;  Ltr, 
HQ,  Vni  Bomber  Command,  to  CG,  Eighth  Air 
Force,  sub:  Proposed  Status  List,  w/4th  Ind,  OCE, 
SOS,  to  CG,  Eighth  Air  Force,  10  Oct  42. 


THE  ENGINEER  MACHINE  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM,  1942 


57 


HospitalConstruction  Employing  Prefabricated  Concrete  RoofTrusses 


nance  depots,  and  they  supplied  a  large 
part  of  the  personnel  for  quartermas- 
ter depots.  The  labor  pool  system  origi- 
nally established  for  the  TORCH  emer- 
gency aided  materially  in  getting  the 
North  African  invasion  on  its  way  in 
time.  But  the  system  seemed  to  have 
expanded  beyond  reason.  With  only 
105,000  troops  in  the  entire  theater, 
Colonel  Moore  could  not  understand 
why  it  was  necessary  to  have  15,500 
men  (not  all  of  them  engineers)  carry- 
ing on  supply  functions.  '"* 

In  the  spring  of  1943,  SOS  abolished 


^^  Ltr,  Lee  to  CG,  Eighth  Air  Force,  12  Nov  42,  sub: 
Engr  Avn  Bns,  and  1st  Ind,  Eighth  Air  Force  to  CG, 
SOS,  4  Jan  43;  both  in  320.2  General,  EUCOM  Engr 
files.  Memo,  Moore  for  Reybold,  30  Nov  42,  sub:  Engr 
Problems  in  the  ETO. 


the  labor  pool  system  and  engineer 
units  returned  to  their  normal  jobs. 
Although  necessary,  labor  pools  had 
markedly  affected  ETO  construction 
progress.  ROUNDUP  plans  had  to  be 
thrust  aside,  and  work  on  airfields, 
depots,  troop  accommodations,  and 
hospitals  was  thrown  off  schedule.  Some 
construction  had  continued,  but  on  a 
greatly  reduced  scale.  Morale  dropped 
and  disciplinary  problems  increased, 
because  men  were  doing  jobs  with  which 
they  were  not  familiar  and  for  which 
they  had  no  training.  Moreover,  many 
units  had  to  be  divided  into  small  groups, 
with  a  resulting  loss  of  unit  integrity 
and  pride. ^^ 


^^  Memo,  OCE,  SOS  ETOUSA,  for  Col  W.  G.  Wea- 
ver, Actg  CofS,  SOS,  ETOUSA,    17  Dec  42,  sub: 


58 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


The  British  continued  to  execute 
their  part  of  BOLERO  construction, 
largely  by  contract,  but  the  future  of 
the  American  program  hung  in  the 
balance.  Many  doubted  that  construc- 
tion on  the  scale  of  the  long-range 
Bolero  Plan  would  ever  be  needed. 
The  general  agreement  was  that  addi- 
tional camp  construction  would  not  be 
necessary  during  the  winter,  but  depot 
and  airfield  programs  were  not  substan- 
tially decreased.  The  engineers  could 
not  cope  with  this  construction  program 
so  they  sought  a  clear  statement  of 
responsibilities.  Lacking  such  a  state- 


ment, they  used  General  Somervell's 
order  of  17  November,  which  sharply 
limited  materials  and  supplies  to  the 
new,  short-term  427,000-man  troop 
basis.  But  this  order  did  not  look  beyond 
the  spring  of  1943  and  placed  the  Amer- 
icans in  the  awkward  position  of  seem- 
ing to  block  preparations  in  the  United 
Kingdom  for  a  cross-Channel  attack. 
The  ETOUSA  publication  in  mid- 
January  1943  of  a  modified  construc- 
tion program  left  this  situation  basically 
unchanged.  The  unqualified  revival  of 
the  buildup  had  to  await  agreement  on 
a  strategic  program  for  1943—44.^^ 


Attachment  of  Engr  Troops  to  Other  Services,  321 
Engrs,  EUCOM  Engr  files;  Ltr,  Office  of  the  Engr, 
Southern  Base  Sect,  to  Chf  Engr,  ETOUSA,  20  Oct 
42,  sub:  Progress  on  Construction;  Memo,  Col  R.  B. 
Lord  for  Chf  Engr,  24  Jan  43,  231.4  Custodian 
(Labor),  EUCOM  Engr  files. 


''•^  Ltr,  Albrecht,  4  Nov  53;  Ltr,  Moore  to  Base  Sect 
Engrs,  13  Jan  43,  sub:  Modifying  Plan  for  Bolero 
Construction  Program  w/related  papers,  600  Gen,  1 
Jun  43-31  Aug  43,  and  600-A-Gen;  Memo,  Moore 
for  Reybold,  30  Nov  42,  sub:  Engr  Problems  in  ETO, 
w/related  papers;  Ltr,  Lee  to  Somervell,  17  Nov  42. 


CHAPTER  IV 


The  Engineers  in  the  Invasion  of 

North  Africa 


While  the  BOLERO  program  in  the 
United  Kingdom  took  second  place, 
Allied  planners  turned  their  attention 
to  an  assault  on  the  periphery  of  Ger- 
man power  and  began  detailed  consid- 
eration of  landings  in  North  Africa. 
The  hurried  planning  for  TORCH  of- 
fered an  object  lesson  in  disorderly 
preparation  and  brilliant  improvisation. 
Though  the  timetable  called  for  land- 
ings before  the  end  of  the  year,  the 
force  envisaged  did  not  have  an  overall 
command  until  the  Combined  Chiefs 
of  Staff  named  General  Eisenhower 
Commander  in  Chief,  Allied  Expedi- 
tionary Force,  on  13  August  1942.  The 
Allied  Force  Headquarters  (AFHQ) 
that  Eisenhower  headed  came  into  exis- 
tence officially  only  on  12  September 
but  was  already  a  closely  integrated 
organization.  General  Sir  Kenneth  A.  N. 
Anderson  commanded  the  British 
ground  forces  and  Admiral  Sir  Andrew 
B.  Cunningham  the  naval  forces.  The 
various  general  and  special  staff  sec- 
tions were  Allied  organizations,  with 
American  and  British  officers  inter- 
spersed throughout  in  various  positions 
of  command  and  subordination.  Maj. 
Gen.  Humfrey  Gale  (British)  became 
the  chief  administrative  officer  at  AF- 
HQ. Of  three  task  forces,  Western  Task 


Force  (WTF),  which  was  to  sail  directly 
from  the  United  States  to  Casablanca, 
was  under  Maj.  Gen.  George  S.  Patton, 
Jr.  Center  Task  Force  (CTF),  with  the 
primary  mission  of  capturing  the  port 
of  Oran,  was  under  Maj.  Gen.  Lloyd  R. 
Fredendall.  Eastern  Task  Force  (ETF), 
with  responsibility  for  seizing  Algiers 
and  the  Blida  and  Maison  Blanche 
Airfields,  was  largely  British  but  re- 
tained an  American  commander,  Maj. 
Gen.  Charles  W.  Ryder,  to  confuse  the 
French  defenders  of  North  Africa  as  to 
the  nationality  of  the  invading  force.' 

Engineer  Plans  and  Preparations 

The  Engineer  Section  of  AFHQ  came 
into  being  when  Col.  Frank  O.  Bow- 
man arrived  in  London  toward  the  end 
of  August  1942.  This  small  section 
worked  closely  with  the  Engineer  Sec- 
tion of  Center  Task  Force,  headed  by 
Col.  Mark  M.  Boatner,  Jr.,  of  the  591st 
Engineer  Boat  Regiment,  in  preparing 
plans  for  the  CTF  landing  at  Oran. 
AFHQ's  G— 4  section  was  responsible 


'  Leighton  and  Coakley,  Global  Logistics  and  Strategy, 
1940-43,  p.  455;  George  F.  Howe,  Northwest  Africa: 
Seizing  the  Initiative  in  the  West,  United  States  Army  in 
World  War  II  (Washington,  1957),  pp.  15,  32-35. 


60 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


for  planning  engineer  supply,  and  un- 
der G— 4  were  SOS  groups  attached  to 
the  two  U.S.  task  forces.  The  Center 
Task  Force  (II  Corps),  SOS,  assembled 
in  England  under  Brig.  Gen.  Thomas 
B.  Larkin,  former  ETOUSA  chief  en- 
gineer. After  the  landings,  Larkin's 
organization  was  to  become  the  Medi- 
terranean Base  Section. 

Western  Task  Force  planning  took 
place  in  the  United  States.  Its  Engineer 
Section,  headed  by  Col.  John  F.  Con- 
klin,  developed  along  the  lines  of  an 
augmented  corps-level  engineer  orga- 
nization. The  section  received  valuable 
assistance  from  OCE  (which  was  just 
one  block  away),  particularly  the  Sup- 
ply Division,  and  from  the  Army  Map 
Service.^ 

Early  in  the  fall  the  first  elements  of 
the  future  Atlantic  Base  Section  (initially 
designated  SOS  Task  Force  A)  assem- 
bled in  the  United  States  under  Brig. 
Gen.  Arthur  R.  Wilson  as  the  SOS  for 
the  Western  Task  Force.  The  Engineer 
Section,  SOS,  WTF,  under  Col.  Francis 
H.  Oxx,  obtained  considerable  aid  from 
the  Plans  and  Distribution  Division, 
OCE,  WD,  as  well  as  from  engineers  of 
WTF  themselves.  OCE,  WD,  was  respon- 
sible for  engineer  supply  for  the  first 
four  WTF  convoys,  the  engineer  alloca- 
tion being  2,000  tons  per  convoy.  The 
engineers  planned  that  requisitions 
would  be  submitted  first  to  the  New 
York  Port  of  Embarkation  (NYPOE); 
in  case  of  losses  at  sea,  NYPOE  would 
determine  priority  of  replacement  and 
shipment.^ 

The  fact  that  Allied  forces  were  to 
undertake  the  landings  complicated 


■-^Ltr,  Col  John  A.  Chambers  to  EHD,  5  Apr  56. 
■^  History  of  Atlantic  Base  Section  to  June  1,  1943 
vol.  I,  p.  5,  in  CMH. 


supply  planning  for  TORCH  in  the  Unit- 
ed Kingdom.  Most  of  the  engineer  Class 
IV  items  (heavy  construction  equipment) 
would  come  from  the  British,  while  the 
remainder  of  Class  IV  and  all  Class  II 
and  V  items  would  come  from  American 
sources.  A  joint  stockpile  established  in 
England  helped  to  avoid  confusion  and 
duplication.  British  elements  would  han- 
dle logistics  for  WTF,  while  SOS, 
ETOUSA,  would  supply  the  CTF  and 
the  American  components  of  the  ETF. 
After  late  December  (about  D  plus  40) 
supplies  for  all  American  elements  of 
Torch  were  to  come  directly  from  the 
United  States.  Planners  expected  to 
build  up  supplies  in  North  Africa  to  a 
14-day  level  by  D  plus  30,  a  30-day  level 
by  D  plus  60,  and  a  45-day  level  by  D 
plus  90.  Classes  II,  IV,  and  V  items 
were  to  be  resupplied  automatically  for 
the  first  two  months  because  the  task 
forces  could  not  be  expected  to  estab- 
lish adequate  inventory  control  and  req- 
uisition procedures  until  base  sections 
became  operational.  Estimates  by  the 
chiefs  of  the  technical  services  at  ASF, 
WD,  were  to  form  the  basis  for  the  auto- 
matic resupply  program,  but  the  plan 
also  permitted  limited  requisitioning 
from  the  NYPOE. 

From  the  engineers'  point  of  view, 
one  of  the  most  disturbing  events  dur- 
ing the  planning  was  a  high-level  deci- 
sion to  cut  authorized  vehicle  alloca- 
tions. Cutting  the  number  of  vehicles 
by  50  percent  freed  the  drivers  and 
crews  for  duties  in  fighting  formations. 
The  cut  applied  not  only  to  the  engi- 
neers' trucks  but  also  to  special  engineer 
vehicles  of  all  types.  Maj.  Gen.  Mark 
W.  Clark,  deputy  commander  in  chief 
for  Torch,  believed  the  decision  would 
not  seriously  affect  the  WTF,  whose  pri- 
mary mission  was  to  establish  and  de- 


THE  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  INVASION  OF  NORTH  AFRICA 


61 


fend  a  line  of  communications,  but  the 
50  percent  cut  meant  a  reduction  of 
10,000  vehicles  for  Center  Task  Force 
alone.  Afterwards,  Brig.  Gen.  Donald 
A.  Davison,  Colonel  Bowman's  succes- 
sor as  AFHQ  engineer,  observed  that 
engineers  without  vehicles  became  mere- 
ly underarmed  and  improperly  trained 
infantry,  unable  to  perform  their  tech- 
nical missions.'* 

Supply  plans  had  to  be  made  before 
information  concerning  important 
phases  of  the  invasion  was  available. 
Arriving  at  a  fixed  troop  basis  was 
fundamental,  but  the  Allies  could  not 
come  to  an  agreement  on  one  until 
planning  was  well  along.  Even  after  a 
figure  for  the  total  invasion  force  was 
at  hand  the  allocations  among  service, 
ground,  and  air  forces  changed  contin- 
ually. Furthermore,  no  outline  plan  of 
attack  became  available  until  long  after 
supply  preparations  were  under  way. 

Requirements  for  special  engineer 
equipment  included  such  diverse  items 
as  bulldozers,  tractors  with  detachable 
angledozers,  amphibious  tractors,  mines 
and  mine  detectors,  beach  and  airfield 
landing  mats,  camouflage  equipment 
and  supplies,  lighting  plants,  well-dig- 
ging machinery,  water  trucks,  water 
cans  (by  the  thousands),  hand  carts, 
portable  air  compressors,  fumigation 
vaults,  asphalt,  magnifying  glasses,  un- 
bleached cotton  sheeting,  cotton  sack, 
cord,  rope,  insect  repellent,  cable  cut- 
ters, and  grappling  hooks.  As  it  turned 
out,  the  engineers  managed  to  satisfy 
most  of  their  supply  demands  except 
for  vehicles.  On  17  October  engineer 
units  of  CTF  reported  that  they  had 


secured  80  percent  of  their  supply 
requirements,  and  on  22  October  the 
1st  Engineer  Amphibian  Brigade  re- 
ported 99  percent  of  its  engineer  equip- 
ment on  hand.  However,  many  of  the 
missing  items  were  important  ones. 

The  engineers  of  both  task  forces 
understood  in  general,  but  not  in  detail, 
what  clearing  obstacles  from  the  beach- 
es would  involve.  They  were,  for  exam- 
ple, unable  to  obtain  sea-level,  offshore 
photographs  of  the  Barbary  coastline.^ 
British  photo  reconnaissance  of  some 
of  the  beaches  proved  helpful,  and 
plans  were  adjusted  after  submarines 
went  in  close  for  a  final  investigation. 

The  engineers  knew  that  the  rainy 
season  would  begin  about  the  time  of 
D-day  and  that  mud  would  limit  the 
use  of  roads  and  airfields.  They  also 
knew  there  were  few  rivers  to  cross,  so 
they  would  need  little  bridgmg  equip- 
ment. However,  they  would  need  much 
machinery  to  maintain  and  repair  roads, 
airfields,  and  railroads.  The  meager 
natural  resources  of  North  Africa  would 
not  aid  construction,  and  the  engineers 
would  have  to  maintain  water  supply, 
sewage,  gas,  electricity,  and  transit  sys- 
tems? 

Requirements  for  certain  items  of 
supply  had  to  be  studied  in  collabora- 
tion with  other  services.  The  Engineer 
Section,  SOS,  WTF,  worked  with  the 
Transportation  Section  in  requisition- 
ing railway  equipment  and  petroleum 
pipeline  and  negotiated  the  procure- 
ment of  the  pipeline.  Many  unknowns 
remained.  The  engineers  had  to  esti- 


^Memo,  D.  A.  Davison,  3  Jan  43,  sub:  Lessons  of 
Opn  Torch  (hereafter  cited  as  Davison  Memo),  381 
War  Plans  (Jun  42-Jul  43),  300. 162  AFHQ  Engr  Sect. 


''Samuel  Eliot  Morison,  "History  of  the  United  States 
Naval  Operations  in  World  War  II,"  vol.  II,  Operations 
in  North  African  Waters  (Boston:  Little,  Brown  and 
Company,  1950),  p.  26. 

•'AFHQ  (U.S.)  Engr  Sect  (Sept-Oct  42);  Ltr,  Brig 
Gen  W.  A.  Carter  to  EHD,  8  Feb  56. 


62 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


mate  the  amount  of  pipe  that  would  be 
needed  to  transport  petroleum  prod- 
ucts to  storage  tanks  in  cities  and  at 
airfields  in  North  Africa.  They  had  to 
consider,  among  other  things,  the  prob- 
able amount  of  petroleum  that  would 
have  to  be  moved  by  rail  or  truck  as 
well  as  the  probable  storage  facilities, 
and  their  estimate  had  to  be  based  on 
intelligent  guesswork  rather  than  on 
specific  knowledge.^ 

The  American  high  command  had 
barely  begun  to  appreciate  the  practica- 
bility and  utility  of  a  military  pipeline 
system  when  the  United  States  became 
.involved  in  the  war.^  Well  before  TORCH 
began,  the  Army  had  placed  orders 
with  American  industry  for  equipment 
needed  to  build  military  pipelines.  Mili- 
tary requirements  called  for  materials 
that  could  be  easily  transported  and 
readily  erected  in  the  field,  and  during 
the  year  of  peace  the  petroleum  indus- 
try had  produced  such  equipment.  From 
the  military  standpoint,  the  important 
development  was  the  "victaulic"  coup- 
ling, named  for  one  of  the  fabricators, 
the  Victaulic  Company  of  America. 
This  coupling  consisted  of  a  gas-resis- 
tant gasket  of  synthetic  rubber  and  a 
metal  clamp.  The  gasket  fit  into  grooves 
cut  around  the  ends  of  two  lengths  of 
piping  and  was  held  in  place  by  the 
clamp,  a  two-piece  steel  collar  bolted 
tight  to  hold  the  gasket.  This  type  of 
coupling  could  be  fitted  more  quickly 
and  was  less  rigid  than  either  threaded 
or  welded  joints.  The  steel  welded-seam 


pipe  came  in  twenty-foot  lengths.  Early 
in  the  war  this  standard  length  was  four 
inches  in  inside  diameter  and  weighed 
168  pounds.  American  industry  later 
developed  a  four-inch  pipe — "invasion 
tubing" — which  weighed  only  sixty- 
eight  pounds  per  length. 

The  engineers  adapted  other  items 
of  military  pipeline  equipment  from  the 
most  portable  items  in  commercial  oil 
fields — pumps,  engines,  ship  discharge 
hoses,  fittings,  and  storage  tanks.  The 
Army  used  six  sizes  (ranging  from  100- 
barrel  to  10,000-barrel  capacity)  of 
bolted  steel  tanks  for  semiportable  stor- 
age. These  tanks,  consisting  of  shaped 
steel  plates  fitted  together  with  bolts, 
could  be  shipped  "knocked  down"  as 
sets — complete  with  valves  and  fittings — 
for  onsite  assembly.^ 

Maps  were  essential  to  the  success  of 
the  North  Africa  invasion.  The  British 
Geographical  Section,  General  Staff, 
supplied  most  of  the  maps  CTF  and 
ETF  used.  The  Intelligence  Division, 
OCE,  SOS,  ETOUSA,  helped  distrib- 
ute the  maps — some  500,000  items 
weighing  approximately  forty  tons. 
Twenty  tons  were  sorted,  wrapped,  and 
bundled  in  coded  rolls  for  distribution 
aboard  ships.  Some  400,000  additional 
photomaps  required  careful  handling 
and  packing. 


10 


'  History  of  Atlantic  Base  Section  to  June  1,  1943, 
vol.  II,  ch.  XIV,  p.  4. 

*  Ltr,  C.  W.  Karstens  to  Maj  Gen  A.  C.  Smith,  29  Jan 
54.  with  attached  comments  signed  by  Karstens;  see 
Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Engineers: 
Troops  and  Equipment,  pp.  418ff. 


"Many  factors  could  vary  the  amount  of  gasoline 
actually  pumped  through  a  pipeline;  six-inch  pipe  had 
a  rated  capacity  of  400  gallons  a  minute,  or  480,000 
gallons  in  a  normal  (20-hour)  operating  day.  Engi- 
neer School  Special  Text  (ST-5-350- 1),  Military 
Pipeline  Systems  (Fort  Belvoir,  Va.,  1950),  pp.  23,  32, 
198. 

"*Ltr,  Col  Martin  Hotine,  Geographical  Sect,  Gen- 
eral Staff,  to  Col  Herbert  Milwit,  27  Nov  42,  319  Chf 
Engr,  EUCOM  Engr  files;  Status  Rpt,  4  Nov  42,  Intel 
Div,  319.1  Rpts,  EUCOM  Engr  files;  Coll,  Keith,  and 
Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Engineers:  Troops  and  Equip- 
ment, pp.  445-46;  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  5,  Intelli- 
gence and  Tojjography,  pp.  31—32. 


THE  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  INVASION  OF  NORTH  AFRICA 


63 


The  engineers  in  WTF  did  not  have 
enough  maps,  and  on  short  notice  re- 
production alone  posed  serious  prob- 
lems, not  the  least  of  which  was  security. 
The  Army  Map  Service  reproduced 
maps  for  WTF  at  its  plant  just  outside 
Washington,  D.C.,  but  even  there  secu- 
rity risks  existed,  for  only  a  few  of  the 
800  workers  could  be  screened  in  time. 
The  maps  were  then  taken  to  Hamp- 
ton Roads  by  a  detachment  from  the 
66th  Engineer  Topographic  Company, 
which  kept  them  under  constant  sur- 
veillance. The  l:25,000-scale  maps  of 
the  beachheads,  issued  to  the  troops 
before  they  sailed,  had  place  names 
blacked  out  and  carried  a  false  north. 
Only  the  commanding  generals  of  the 
individual  subtask  forces  received  true 
maps  before  departure  from  the  United 
States.  Each  of  the  subtask  forces  mak- 
ing up  the  WTF  had  an  attached  mobile 
mapmaking  detachment  from  the  66th 
Engineer  Topographic  Company,  and 
each  detachment  carried  a  250-pound 
reserve  stock  of  maps.  WTF  sailed  with 
some  sixty  tons  of  maps  of  many  differ- 
ent types — ground  force  maps  on  a 
scale  of  six  inches  to  the  mile,  air  corps 
target  maps,  colored  mosaics  of  such 
harbors  as  Port-Lyautey  and  Casablanca 
and  the  airdrome  of  Safi — and  hun- 
dreds of  photographs. ' ' 

The  hurried  attempt  to  produce  maps 
for  Torch  had  poor  results.  On  both 
sides  of  the  Atlantic,  maps  of  the  target 
areas  had  to  be  printed  from  available 
sources,  and  little  opportunity  existed 


'  'OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  5,  Intelligence  and  Top- 
ography, app.  5;  "The  North  African  Campaign," 
Reader's  Digest  (February  1943),  98-99;  Hist  66th  Engr 
Topo  Co;  Engr  Comment  on  Map  Supply  Opn  T()Rc:n, 
TF  3-0.3  (47844),  8-  1 1  Nov  42,  apps.  8  and  2;  Maj 
William  C.  Frierson,  Preparations  for  Torch,  pp.  1-3, 
63. 


to  bring  them  up  to  date  or  to  produce 
them  at  the  scales  required  for  ground 
and  close  air  support  operations.  In 
some  cases  major  military  operations 
had  to  be  based  on  1:200, 000-scale 
maps  with  ground  configuration  shown 
by  spot  elevations  and  hachures.  Low- 
grade  photomaps,  neither  rectified  for 
tilt  nor  matched  for  tone,  substituted 
for  large-scale  maps  of  limited  areas. 
The  lack  of  good  base  maps  of  the  tar- 
get area,  coupled  with  too  little  lead 
time,  ruled  out  satisfactory  maps  for 
the  North  Africa  invasion,  while  the 
secrecy  that  enveloped  invasion  plans 
severely  limited  the  amount  of  map 
work  that  could  be  undertaken  in  time. 

British  and  American  agencies  aided 
each  other  in  preparing  intelligence 
material  vital  to  TORCH;  one  example 
was  a  bulky  work  that  the  Strategic 
Engineer  Studies  Section  in  the  Strate- 
gic Intelligence  Branch,  OCE,  WD, 
compiled  in  September  1942.  Material 
came  from  the  British  as  well  as  from 
American  construction  companies,  con- 
sular agents,  geologists,  even  people 
who  sent  postcards  depicting  scenes  in 
North  Africa.  The  volumes  contained 
a  wealth  of  information  on  North  Africa, 
including  descriptions  of  roads  and 
railroads,  port  facilities,  bridge  capac- 
ities, water  supply,  construction  ma- 
terials, forests,  airfields,  electric  power, 
and  the  layout  of  known  minefields.''^ 

Engineer  beach  models  were  in  great 
demand  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic. 
Large  plaster  of  paris  models  were 
made  at  Fort  Belvoir,  Virginia,  and 
models  of  Moroccan  beaches  came  to 
the  United  States  from  England.  The 
British  model  beaches  originated  from 


'"^Ltr,  Col  Herbert  Milwit  to  EHD,  31  Jan  56. 
'  ^Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Engineers: 
Troops  (uid  Equipment,  p.  450. 


64 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


information  the  British  Inter-Service 
Information  Series  (ISIS)  gleaned  from 
reports  by  the  British  miHtary  staff. 
Two  American  engineer  officers  who, 
posing  as  airline  officials,  had  visited 
Bathurst  on  the  western  coast  of  Africa 
early  in  1942  furnished  useful  informa- 
tion, particularly  on  coastal  surf.  Other 
information  came  from  tourist  guide- 
books and  from  recent  visitors  to  North 
Africa.  Some  of  the  model  beaches 
depicted  the  terrain  a  mile  or  more 
inland.'^ 

Engineer  Amphibian  Brigades 

Engineer  training  for  the  invasion  of 
North  Africa  concentrated  heavily  on 
methods  of  landing  on  hostile  shores. 
Japanese  occupation  of  Pacific  islands 
and  German  control  of  nearly  all  the 
worthwhile  harbors  on  the  European 
continent  forced  the  War  Department's 
attention  to  the  possibility  of  Army 
beach  crossings  and  to  means  of  inva- 
sion and  logistical  support  that  did  not 
rely  entirely  on  seizing  strongly  de- 
fended ports  at  the  outset.  Amphibi- 
ous warfare  had  been  the  preserve  of 
the  Navy  for  two  decades  before  Ameri- 
can entry  into  the  new  conflict,  and,  in 
fact,  had  become  the  raison  d'etre  of  the 
U.S.  Marine  Corps.  An  agreement  in 
1935  defined  the  responsibilities  of  each 
service  in  landing  operations  and  lim- 
ited the  Army  to  stevedoring  at  estab- 
lished f)orts.  Clearly  based  on  the  exp)eri- 
ence  of  World  War  I,  in  which  the  Navy 
could  deliver  goods  to  French  ports  that 
were  intact  and  secure  from  enemy 


'''  H.  H.  Dunham,  U.S.  Army  Transportation  and 
the  Conquest  of  North  Africa,  Jan  45,  pp.  42,  80,  in 
CMH;  Ltr,  Milwit  to  EHD,  31  Jan  56,  and  Interv,  Maj 
Gen  Frank  O.  Bowman,  9  Feb  56. 


interdiction,  the  arrangement  was  now 
passe.  Though  the  issue  remained  open 
throughout  the  war,  the  Navy  contin- 
ued to  lobby  for  the  exclusive  right  to 
operate  across  beaches.  However,  the 
Army  did  take  over  a  large  share  of 
this  function  in  the  spring  of  1942 
because  the  Navy  could  not  supply 
smaller  landing  craft  or  provide  enough 
men  to  operate  boats  or  train  other  cox- 
swains and  crews.  Out  of  the  necessity 
to  prepare  for  Army  amphibious  oper- 
ations grew  the  engineer  amphibian 
brigades. 

The  Army's  earliest  conceptions  for 
the  brigades  in  1942  reemphasized  an 
ancient  method  of  moving  troops  onto 
a  hostile  shore.  The  Navy's  prewar 
experimentation  with  amphibious  oper- 
ations relied  almost  entirely  upon  a 
ship-to-shore  method  of  deployment  to 
the  beach  in  which  combat  troops  and 
cargo  were  unloaded  offshore  into  smal- 
ler craft  that  made  the  run  from  deeper 
water  to  the  shore.  Hazardous  under 
any  circumstances,  the  ship-to-shore 
system  was  a  near  impossibility  at  night 
and  in  heavy  seas.  With  the  introduc- 
tion of  larger,  shallow-draft  vessels  that 
could  plow  up  to  the  beach  and  dis- 
gorge men  and  equipment  dry-shod. 
Army  and  Navy  planners  could  readily 
see  the  advantage  of  the  shore-to-shore 
amphibious  operations.  The  shore-to- 
shore  alternative  treated  each  opera- 
tion as  a  major  river  crossing  and  pre- 
supposed that  landing  craft  making  the 
assault  would  embark  units  and  equip- 
ment on  the  near,  or  friendly,  shore 
and  transport  them  directly,  without 
the  confusion  of  a  deepwater  transfer, 
to  the  far,  or  hostile,  shore.  Unsaddled 
with  earlier  doctrine  in  the  field,  the 
Army  favored  the  latter  method  as  the 
means  of  crossing  the  Channel  to  the 


THE  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  INVASION  OF  NORTH  AFRICA 


65 


Continent.  Though  the  major  landings 
of  the  war  employed  combinations  of 
both  methods,  Army  engineer  training, 
organization,  and  equipment  in  the 
amphibian  brigades  created  in  1942  fol- 
lowed shore-to-shore  doctrine.'^ 

The  Army  started  relatively  late  to 
form  amphibian  units.  Formally  estab- 
lished on  10  June  1942  under  Col.  Dan- 
iel Noce,  the  Engineer  Amphibian  Com- 
mand as  an  SOS  organization  paralleled 
an  Army  Ground  Forces  command,  the 
Amphibious  Training  Command,  at 
Camp  Edwards,  Massachusetts.  The 
Engineer  Amphibian  Command  speci- 
fied the  organizational  shape  of  the  first 
units,  the  1st  and  2d  Engineer  Amphib- 
ian Brigades,  activated  on  15  and  20 
June,  respectively.  Each  consisted  of  a 
boat  regiment,  a  shore  regiment,  and 
support  units.  Later  additions  to  the 
standard  TOE  included  signal  units  and 
a  quartermaster  battalion.  Each  shore 
regiment  consisted  of  three  battalions; 
each  battalion  included  two  far-shore 
companies  responsible  for  marking  and 
organizing  hostile  beaches  and  moving 
supplies  across  them  to  invading  forces 
and  one  near-shore  company  charged 
with  loading  combat  troops  and  mater- 
iel. The  Army  made  constant  changes 
in  the  standard  unit  composition  in  an 
attempt  to  perfect  the  concept  and  to 
provide  the  brigades  with  a  flexible 
structure  to  meet  the  conditions  of  the 
assault.  The  2d,  3d,  and  4th  Brigades, 
eventually  known  as  engineer  special 
brigades,  each  had  three  boat  and  shore 
regiments.  Because  no  larger  craft  were 
available  when  Colonel  Noce  took  over 
the  Engineer  Amphibian  Command, 


the  engineers  had  as  standard  equip- 
ment 36-foot  LCVPs  and  50-foot  LCM- 
3s.  Though  experimentation  with  the 
50-foot  boat  produced  the  LCM-6,  a 
longer,  more  commodious,  and  slightly 
faster  boat  using  the  originally  designed 
engines,  the  command  knew  that  none 
of  its  models  was  a  match  for  the  chop- 
py waters  of  the  English  Channel  and 
none  could  negotiate  larger  expanses 
of  open  ocean.  Engineer  amphibian 
training  at  Camp  Edwards  and  later  at 
Camp  Carrabelle  on  the  Florida  Gulf 
Coast  centered  on  the  36-  and  50-foot 
craft  as  they  became  available  from 
Navy  stocks  or  from  factories.  But  even 
before  the  105-foot  LCT-5  became 
available,  the  Navy  reemphasized  its 
prerogatives  on  amphibious  warfare 
units  and  on  training  responsibilities  in 
that  field. '^ 

In  July  1942  the  Navy  reaffirmed  the 
validity  of  the  1935  agreement,  arguing 
for  control  of  amphibious  operations. 
Though  it  could  not  prevail  every- 
where— the  Army  retained  command 
and  control  of  the  brigades  for  the  most 
part  in  the  Southwest  Pacific — the  Navy 
officially  took  over  all  boats  and  main- 
tained its  responsibility  for  training  boat 
crews  elsewhere  outside  the  United 
States.  Thus,  the  Army's  Amphibious 
Corps,  Atlantic  Fleet,  consisting  of  the 
3d  and  9th  Infantry  Divisions  and  the 
2d  Armored  Division. under  Maj.  Gen. 
Jonathan  W.  Anderson,  was  subordi- 
nate for  training  to  Rear  Adm.  H.  Kent 
Hewitt,  though  it  was  a  part  of  General 
Patton's  Western  Task  Force.  A  King- 
Marshall  agreement  then  delineated  the 


'^  Morison,  Operations  in  North  African  Waters,  pp. 
270-71;  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of 
Engineers:  Troops  qnd  Equipment,  p.  362. 


"'Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Engineers: 
Troops  and  Equipment,  pp.  364—65;  Brig.  Cen.  William 
F.  Heavey,  Down  Ramp!  The  Story  of  the  Army  Amphibian 
fngrW^ri  (Washington:  Infantry  Journal  Press,  1947), 
p.  12. 


66 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Navy's  responsibility  for  operating  and 
maintaining  all  landing  boats  in  the 
European  Theater  of  Operations.  The 
agreement  worked  to  the  detriment  of 
the  ist  Engineer  Amphibian  Brigade 
when  it  arrived  in  the  theater  on  17 
August  1942,  only  six  weeks  after  its 
formation,  to  complete  its  training  with 
the  1st  Infantry  Division.  It  interfered 
further  with  the  assault  training  sched- 
ule for  the  Center  Task  Force  laid  out 
in  a  meeting  on  25  August  among  Brit- 
ish Lt.  Gen.  K.  A.  N.  Anderson,  Vice 
Adm.  J.  Hughes-Hallett,  and  Maj.  Gen. 
J.  C.  Hayden  and  American  Maj.  Gen. 
Mark  W.  Clark. 

The  engineer  brigade,  under  Col. 
Henry  C.  Wolfe,  operated  in  England 
under  a  number  of  constraints,  much 
as  the  engineer  units  that  had  preceded 
it  into  the  theater.  Most  obvious  as  a 
source  of  grief  was  the  command  struc- 
ture resulting  from  the  Army-Navy 
agreements.  ETOUSA  headquarters, 
following  the  lead  from  home,  estab- 
lished the  Maritime  Command  under 
Rear  Adm.  Andrew  C.  Bennett  to  pro- 
vide naval  supervision  for  the  brigade's 
activity.  The  Maritime  Command,  hast- 
ily put  together  on  1 1  August  while  the 
brigade  was  still  at  sea,  had  virtually  no 
personnel  experienced  in  amphibious 
warfare  and  no  equipment  to  carry  out 
training  exercises.  Admiral  Bennett, 
acting  with  no  clear  statement  of  the 
scope  of  his  command,  was  forced  to 
ask  Colonel  Wolfe  for  several  of  his  boat 
crews  to  train  junior  naval  officers  in 
small  boat  handling  so  that  they,  in 
turn,  could  teach  future  Navy  crews. 
Bennett's  command  also  resorted  to 
splitting  up  the  brigade  elements.  The 
unit,  designed  as  an  integral  organiza- 
tion of  366  officers,  2 1  warrant  officers, 
and  7,013  enlisted  men  to  support  an 


entire  division,  found  itself  spread  on 
both  sides  of  Britain's  North  Channel. 
Though  later  designated  principal  mili- 
tary landing  officer  for  Center  Task 
Force,  Colonel  Wolfe  served  on  Ben- 
nett's staff  once  the  Maritime  Com- 
mand headquarters  had  moved  from 
London  to  Rosneath,  Scotland.  His  own 
headquarters  company  and  the  531st 
Engineer  Shore  Regiment  went  to  Lon- 
donderry while  two  battalions  of  the 
591st  Engineer  Boat  Regiment  settled 
in  Belfast  with  the  brigade  medical 
battalion.  The  brigade  managed  to  se- 
cure some  basic  training  and  shake 
down  its  organization,  but  it  received 
no  training  in  far-shore  unloading,  and 
much  of  its  equipment  arrived  after 
delays  at  six  widely  scattered  ports 
aboard  sixty-five  different  ships. 

When  Brig.  Gen.  Daniel  Noce  toured 
the  amphibian  training  centers  in  the 
United  Kingdom  in  September,  he 
found  them  all  inadequate.  Constant 
rain  reduced  training  time;  the  terrain 
behind  the  available  beaches  was  not 
suited  to  the  brigade's  needs;  landing 
beaches  were  too  constricted,  windswept, 
and  rocky.  Noce  saw  boat  crews  cau- 
tiously approach  the  beach  for  fear  of 
damaging  their  craft  instead  of  coming 
in  rapidly  as  they  would  have  to  do 
under  enemy  fire.  A  lack  of  tools, 
equipment,  and  personnel  hampered 
the  training  program,  and  campsites  for 
the  men  were  poor.  Large  unit  train- 
ing was  infeasible  with  the  small  facili- 
ties available.  A  reserve  of  boats  had  to 


'^ETOUSA  (;0  27,  1 1  Aug  42;  Heavey,  Doum  Ramp! 
The  Story  of  the  Arrny  Amphibian  Engineers,  pp.  10—  19; 
Memo,  Engr  Sect,  ETOUSA,  for  Brig  Gen  T.  B. 
Larkin,  Chf  Engr,  24  Aug  42,  sub:  Weekly  Rpt  of 
Activities.  319.1  ETOUSA,  EUCOM  files;  1st  Engr 
Amphib  Bde,  Rpt  of  Opns  with  Center  Task  Force, 
29  Nov  42. 


THE  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  INVASION  OF  NORTH  AFRICA 


67 


General  NOCE  (Photograph  taken  in  1944.) 

be  overhauled  and  carefully  protected 
against  damage  in  preparation  for 
Torch,  which  took  the  craft  temporar- 
ily from  training  use.  The  brigade's 
engineers  spent  considerable  time  as- 
sembling new  craft  shipped  in  crates 
from  the  United  States.  Much  of  this 
production  went  to  equip  British  units 
before  American  engineer  organiza- 
tions received  their  standard  equip- 
ment. Between  22  September  and  5 
October,  all  landing  craft  were  with- 
drawn from  training  units  to  be  pre- 
pared for  the  invasion.'^ 

In  various  parts  of  the  United  King- 
dom the  brigade's  591st  Engineer  Boat 
Regiment  received  some  infantry  train- 
ing and  considerable  stevedore  and 


hatch  crew  experience.  Because  of  Brit- 
ish manpower  shortages,  one  battalion 
was  to  supply  35-man  hatch  crews  for 
ten  of  the  twenty-three  cargo  vessels  in 
the  assault  wave  to  the  CTF.  Two  offi- 
cers and  fifteen  enlisted  men  of  the 
maintenance  company  of  the  591st  En- 
gineer Boat  Regiment  received  some 
excellent  training  in  repairing  landing 
craft  when  they  were  attached  to  Brit- 
ish naval  contingents  of  the  ETF  at 
Inverary  on  Loch  Fyne,  Scotland.  The 
men  of  the  brigade's  56 1  st  Boat  Mainte- 
nance Company  had  earlier  repaired 
approximately  one  hundred  landing 
craft  at  the  U.S.  naval  base  at  Rosneath, 
in  the  Glasgow  area.  The  company  was 
fortunate  in  having  the  necessary  equip- 
ment to  do  the  job. '^ 

For  units  other  than  boat  mainte- 
nance and  stevedore  crews,  training  in 
the  United  Kingdom  consisted  chiefly 
of  physical  conditioning  and  instruction 
in  infantry  fundamentals.  Only  eight 
weeks  were  available  between  the  time 
units  were  alerted  for  TORCH  and 
moved  to  the  port  area  for  final  re- 
hearsal, and  for  some  engineer  units 
construction  work  interrupted  even 
that  short  period. 

Training  in  the  19th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Regiment  and  the  1 6th  Armored 
Engineer  Battalion  (the  1st  Armored 
Division's  organic  engineer  unit)  may 
be  taken  as  an  example.  The  1 9th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Regiment  had  sufficient 
physical  hardening  but  received  no 
ammunition  or  mines  for  training  and 
no  instruction  in  the  use  of  the  Bailey 
bridge,  British  explosives,  or  antitank 


'^  Memo,  AFHQ  for  Gen  Clark.  26  Sep  42,  sub: 
Observation  at  Amphibian  Training  Centers  in  Scot- 
land by  Brig  Gen  Daniel  Noce,  EAC  353  (Training); 
Ltr,  Lt  Col  John  B.  Webb  to  EHD,  23  Apr  56. 


'■'Ltr,  Col  Kenneth  W.  Kennedy  to  EHD,  9  Apr  56; 
Heavey,  Down  Ramp!  The  Story  of  the  Army  Amphibian 
Engineers,  pp.  20—21. 


68 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


mines. '^^  The  16th  Armored  Engineer 
Battalion  fared  somewhat  better.  While 
stationed  in  Northern  Ireland,  the  16th 
received  some  comprehensive  bridge 
and  ferry  training.  The  unit  used  the 
British  Bailey  bridge,  its  value  having 
been  recognized  by  officers  who  at- 
tended the  British  military  engineer- 
ing school.  The  16th,  likewise,  became 
familiar  with  other  British  equipment, 
including  Sommerfeld  track,  mines, 
booby  traps,  and  demolitions.  The  bat- 
talion also  launched  a  treadway  bridge 
from  a  modified  maracaibo  boat  off 
Newcastle.^' 

During  the  summer  and  fall  of  1942, 
engineer  units  went  through  invasion 
rehearsal  drills  in  both  the  United  States 
and  the  United  Kingdom.  In  the  Zone 
of  the  Interior  the  WTF  split  into  three 
subtask  forces,  X,  Y,  and  Z,  and  car- 
ried out  amphibious  drills.  Since  load- 
ing went  slowly,  supplies  were  delayed, 
and  because  beach  capacity  was  limited, 
one  subtask  force  began  rehearsals  while 
the  others  continued  loading.  From  the 
start  there  were  mixups  because  loads 
were  stowed  aboard  wrong  ships  and 
ammunition  and  gasoline  were  not  un- 
loaded for  fear  of  explosions  and  fire. 
The  result  was  a  landing  exercise  lim- 
ited to  the  loading  and  unloading  of 
vehicles  and  other  bulky  items.  While 
Y  was  loading,  X  and  Z  forces  partici- 
pated in  the  same  type  of  exercise. 
Another  serious  deficiency  was  a  lack 
of  rigorous  night  training,  which  was 
to  prove  costly  during  the  landings.  The 
value  of  all  WTF  exercises  also  was  lim- 
ited by  the  fact  that  they  took  place  dur- 

2"  Hist  19th  Engr  C  Rgt;  AFHQ,  compilation  Rpts 
Opn  Torch,  CTF,  Incl  1,  29  Dec  42,  Lesson  from 
Opn  Torch,  HQ,  19th  Engr  Rgt. 

Hist  16th  Armd  Engr  Bn.  The  forerimner  of  the 
LST,  the  maracaibo  was  converted  from  shallow-draft 
oil  tankers  used  on  Lake  Maracaibo  in  Venezuela. 


ing  near  ideal  conditions — a  tide  that 
varied  little  and  a  relatively  calm  sea — 
hardly  the  situation  to  be  expected 
along  the  Atlantic  coast  of  North  Af- 
rica. 

CTF  and  ETF  held  rehearsals  like 
those  of  the  WTF  on  19-20  October 
near  Loch  Linnhe  on  the  northwest 
coast  of  Scotland.  Their  objectives  were 
to  practice  landing-craft  techniques  at 
night,  rehearse  the  seizure  of  objectives 
up  to  ten  miles  inland,  test  communica- 
tion among  groups  landing  on  a  wide 
front,  and  promote  cooperation  among 
carrier-borne  aircraft,  naval  bombard- 
ment vessels,  and  ground  troops.  The 
engineers  gained  some  experience  in 
laying  out  shore  installations  and  com- 
munications but  learned  almost  noth- 
ing about  unloading  vehicles  and  sup- 
plies. The  rehearsals  were  final;  no 
opportunity  existed  to  correct  errors. ^'^ 
Only  the  experience  of  an  actual  inva- 
sion could  provide  an  understanding 
of  the  problems  involved,  and  only  then 
would  it  be  clear  that  a  close-knit  beach 
organization  was  required  to  coordinate 
the  work  of  engineer  shore  regiments 
and  of  the  Navy."^"* 

The  Landings 
Western  Task  Force 

WTF  had  the  mission  of  taking  the 


■^"^Leighton  and  Coakley,  CAohal  Logistics  and  Strategy, 
1940-43,  p.  444;  Dunham,  U.S.  Army  Transporta- 
tion and  the  (Conquest,  pp.  35-37,  73-78;  Interv, 
Shotwell  and  (iardes  with  (>habbock,  4  Nov  50;  U.S. 
Atlantic  Fleet  Amphib  Force  to  (>ofS  Amphib  Force, 
18  Nov  42,  sub:  Observation  of  Landing  Opns  at  Port 
Lyautey,  EAC  folder  African  campaign. 

"^'^Ltr,  Brig  (ien  John  F.  Conklin,  25  Jan  56;  The 
Administrative  and  Logistical  History  of  the  Euro- 
pean Theater  of  Operations,  vol.  IV,  "Operations 
Torch  and  the  ETO,"  pp.  61-62,  in  C]MH;  1st  Engr 
Amphib  Bde,  Rpt  of  Opns  with  Center  Task  Force. 

•^'Ltr,  Col  John  A.  Chambers  to  EHD,  5  Apr  56. 


THE  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  INVASION  OF  NORTH  AFRICA 


69 


port  and  adjacent  airfield  at  Casablanca 
and  then  establishing  communication 
with  CTF  at  Oran.  If  Spain  should 
intercede,  the  WTF  was  to  join  with 
Center  Task  Force  and  secure  Spanish 
Morocco.  Casablanca  itself  was  too 
strongly  defended  to  be  taken  by  direct 
frontal  assault.  Instead,  it  was  to  be  cap- 
tured from  the  rear  with  three  subtask 
forces  landing  close  enough  to  the  city 
to  take  it  before  reinforcements  could 
arrive.  This  plan  required  the  early  use 
of  medium  or  heavy  tanks,  for  which  a 
port  was  essential  since  landing  craft  to 
carry  such  heavy  loads  were  not  then 
available.  Also,  if  land-based  aircraft 
were  to  support  the  attack,  an  airfield 
had  to  be  captured  quickly. 

The  three  subtask  forces  were  called 
Brushwood,  Goalpost,  and  Black- 
stone.  The  first,  commanded  by  Maj. 
Gen.  Jonathan  W.  Anderson  and  made 
up  of  the  3d  Infantry  Division,  a  por- 
tion of  the  2d  Armored  Division,  and 
supporting  troops,  was  to  provide  the 
main  blow  by  capturing  Fedala,  a  resort 
thirteen  miles  north  of  Casablanca,  and 
then  moving  on  to  Casablanca.  Maj. 
Gen.  Lucian  K.  Truscott,  Jr.,  headed  the 
Goalpost  force,  which  was  made  up 
of  part  of  the  9th  Infantry  Division  and 
elements  of  the  2d  Armored  Division 
along  with  supporting  units.  Its  goals 
were  the  capture  of  Mehdia  (eighty 
miles  from  Casablanca)  and  the  Port- 
Lyautey  Airfield  with  its  hard-surfaced 
runways.  Blackstone,  the  third  sub- 
task  force,  was  under  Maj.  Gen.  Ernest 
N.  Harmon  and  had  parts  of  the  9th 
Infantry  and  2d  Armored  Divisions.  Its 
initial  mission  was  the  capture  of  Safi,  a 
small  port  about  150  miles  south  of 
Casablanca.  (Map  3) 

The  main  engineer  forces  of  the 
WTF  were  distributed  among  the  three 


task  forces.  The  1st  and  3d  Battalions 
of  the  36th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment 
were  with  BRUSHWOOD,  and  the  1st 
and  2d  Battalions  of  the  540th  Engi- 
neers were  with  GOALPOST  and  BLACK- 
STONE,  respectively.  All  were  to  act  as 
shore  parties.  The  15th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  (9th  Division)  with  GOAL- 
POST, the  10th  Battalion  (3d  Division) 
with  Brushwood,  and  elements  of  the 
17th  Armored  Engineer  Battalion  (2d 
Armored  Division)  with  BLACKSTONE 
were  to  carry  out  normal  combat  engi- 
neer duties.  The  2d  Battalion  of  the 
20th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment,  as- 
signed to  Brushwood,  was  to  remain 
on  board  ship  as  a  reserve  force  to  be 
called  in  when  needed. ^^ 

The  main  objective  of  the  Western 
Task  Force  on  D-day  was  Fedala,  where 
landing  beaches  were  exposed  to  the 
double  hazard  of  enfilading  coastal 
defense  batteries  and  dangerously  high 
surf.  When  successive  waves  of  landing 
craft  approached  the  shore,  many  swept 
off  course  to  founder  on  reefs  or  rocks. 
Others,  only  partly  unloaded  and  stran- 
ded during  ebb  tide,  were  not  able  to 
retract  because  following  landing  craft 
were  too  close.  The  pounding  surf 
wrecked  many  stranded  craft.  The  in- 
adequacy of  the  shore  parties,  made  up 
chiefly  of  combat  engineers  of  the  36th 
Engineers  assisted  by  naval  beach  par- 
ties, also  created  dangerous  delays. 

The  toll  of  landing  craft  was  high  at 
the  Fedala  beachhead,  and  the  landing 
of  troops  and  supplies  became  badly 
disorganized.  Barely  more  than  1  per- 
cent of  the  supplies  was  ashore  as  late 
as  1700  on  D-day.  Engineer  officers, 
badly  needed  on  the  beaches  to  control 


■-^''HQ,  WTF,  Engr,  8  Jan  43,  sub:  Engr  Annex  to 
Final  Rpt  of  Opns  of  WTF,  8  Nov  42. 


ATLANTIC  OCEAN 


STRA'T 


Of  9^ 

Tangle^ 


pA^rAB 


TETUAN 


\^' 


# 


.^ 


^ 


/ 

Casablanca 


\ 


Sah 


Fed  ale 
'  Mediouna 


Port-Lyautey^ 
Mehdia 


^ RABAT 


# 
^ 


Safi 


Fas 


MOROCCO 


UkP  3 


.^\V  '^  f'  f    /Mostaganem) 

^^  Msrs-el-KBbir      r4^*  ^Renzane 

Andalouses^F^f^^^     Port^ux-Poules 

Lourmef  ^te-Barbe-du-Tlelat 

Tafaraoui 


ALGERIA 


NORTH  AFRICAN  BEACHHEADS 

8  November  1942 

X         Beachhead 


50 


100  Miles 


— 1 — I 

50  100  Kilometers 


72 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Wrecked  and  Broached  Landing  Craft  at  Fedala,  French  Morocco 


and  direct  the  engineers  of  the  shore 
parties,  could  not  get  ashore.  No  cen- 
tralized coordination  of  supply  activi- 
ties for  the  different  landing  operations 
existed.  The  G— 4  section  of  WTF  did 
not  get  ashore  at  Fedala  until  the  third 
morning,  and  the  G— 4  himself  was  not 
with  this  group  of  only  two  officers  and 
three  enlisted  men.  General  Patton, 
however,  was  at  the  beach  before  day- 
light on  D  plus  1  and  remained  there 
until  after  noon  because  of  his  disgust 
over  conditions.  He  condemned  what 
seemed  to  him  the  lack  of  enterprise  of 
the  Army  shore  parties  and  took  mea- 
sures to  divert  the  small  craft  from  the 
beaches,  where  they  had  to  fight  the 
menacing  surf,  to  the  port  of  Fedala. 
The  chaos  with  which  the  Western 


Task  Force  had  to  contend  drove  home 
the  lesson  that  trained  service  troops 
should  always  accompany  invasion  for- 
ces to  assume  the  burden  of  supply  and 
service  functions,  allowing  the  task  force 
commander  to  concentrate  on  tactical 
problems.  As  it  was,  Patton  had  held 
back  SOS  Task  Force  A,  and  the  SOS 
did  not  reach  Casablanca  until  24  De- 
cember.^^ 

The  employment  of  engineers  as  pro- 
visional assault  and  defensive  units  in 
the  Western  Task  Force  was  exempli- 
fied by  the  experience  of  Company  C, 
15th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  and 
1st  Battalion,  540th  Engineer  Shore 
Regiment,  supporting  a  regimental  com- 

^''History  of  Atlantic  Base  Section  to  June  I,  1943, 
vol.  I,  ch.  XIV,  p.  9. 


THE  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  INVASION  OF  NORTH  AFRICA 


73 


bat  team  of  the  9th  Infantry  Division  in 
Goalpost — the  attack  on  Mehdia  north 
of  Casablanca  and  on  Port-Lyautey 
Airfield.  In  addition  to  weapons  and 
hand  tools,  the  engineers  in  the  assault 
carried  mine  detectors,  bangalore  tor- 
pedoes, and  flame  throwers  to  enable 
them  to  push  through  minefields  and 
other  obstacles  and  to  reduce  pillboxes. 

A  provisional  assault  company  of 
engineers  made  up  of  detachments 
from  Company  C,  15th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion,  the  540th  Engineer  Shore 
Regiment,  and  the  87 1st  Engineer  Avi- 
ation Battalion  participated  in  an  attack 
on  10  November  on  the  Kasba,  an  old 
stone  fortress  that  stood  on  a  cliff  above 
the  mouth  of  the  Sebou  River  and 
blocked  the  approach  to  Mehdia  and 
the  airfield  upriver.  Shouting  French 
defenders  stood  on  the  walls  firing 
down  at  the  Americans  but  American 
infantry  attacks  along  the  ridge  and 
engineer  attacks  along  the  river  took  the 
Kasba.  Then  a  small  detachment  from 
Company  C  of  the  15th  Engineer  Bat- 
talion rendered  the  fort's  guns  useless. 
The  destroyer  Dallas,  with  a  special 
raiding  detachment  aboard  including 
part  of  a  Company  C  platoon,  then 
entered  the  Sebou,  and,  after  the  engi- 
neers had  removed  a  cable  net,  pro- 
ceeded upriver  and  captured  Port- 
Lyautey  Airfield.  After  the  destroyer's 
guns  had  silenced  enemy  artillery,  the 
engineers  began  repairs  on  the  airfield. 
That  afternoon,  the  888th  Airborne 
Engineer  Aviation  Company  relieved 
Company  C's  elements. 

After  the  occupation  of  Casablanca 
on  D  plus  4,  supply  operations  began 
to  center  there,  and  an  almost  hopeless 
tangle  quickly  developed.  The  first  task 
of  the  WTF  engineers  was  to  resolve 
this  problem,  and  the  175th  Engineer 


General  Service  Regiment  tackled  the 
job.  The  regiment  reached  Casablanca 
on  16  November  1942  in  the  D  plus  5 
convoy  and  found  a  dump  location  that 
was  eventually  to  be  expanded  to  160 
acres.  All  supplies  brought  ashore, 
whether  engineer,  quartermaster,  or 
ordnance,  went  into  this  dump,  where, 
before  any  systematic  attempt  could  be 
made  to  institute  depot  procedures, 
more  supplies  of  all  sorts  began  arriv- 
ing. Every  type  of  vehicle  that  could  be 
used  for  the  purpose,  including  jeeps, 
was  pressed  into  service  to  move  sup- 
plies from  the  ships.  The  rush  to  unload 
was  so  great  that  materials  were  cast 
off  railroad  cars  and  trucks  without  sys- 
tem or  order,  and  there  were  times 
after  the  December  rains  began  when 
supplies  stood  a  foot  deep  in  water. 

The  I75th  Engineer  General  Service 
Regiment  had  the  extraordinarily  diffi- 
cult task  of  operating  the  engineer 
depot  under  such  chaotic  conditions, 
and  it  had  to  undertake  an  around-the- 
clock  job  for  which  it  was  not  trained. 
For  days  the  regiment  had  no  opportu- 
nity to  rest  and  no  chance  to  consoli- 
date its  units.  The  engineer  depot  office 
force  was  housed  in  a  sixteen-foot  tent 
during  the  first  week.  For  more  than  a 
month  supplies  of  all  description  spread 
over  the  dump  area  without  adequate 
shelter,  while  guards  had  to  be  posted 
to  prevent  pilfering  by  natives.  The 
engineers  improvised  shelter  for  per- 
ishables by  turning  landing  barges  up- 
side down.  Late  in  December  ware- 
house construction  was  possible,  and 
the  engineer  dump,  which  the  175th 
operated  throughout  the  winter  months, 
gradually  began  to  assume  the  charac- 
teristics of  an  orderly  depot. ^^ 


'Hist  175th  Engr  GS  Rgt,  Feb  42-Oct  45. 


74 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Center  Task  Force 

The  mission  of  Center  Task  Force, 
consisting  of  the  1st  Infantry  Division, 
Combat  Command  B  of  the  1st  Ar- 
mored Division,  and  the  1  st  Ranger  Bat- 
talion, was  to  capture  Oran  and  its  adja- 
cent airfields,  to  establish  communica- 
tion with  the  WTF,  and,  in  the  event  of 
Spanish  intervention,  to  cooperate  with 
General  Patton  in  securing  Spanish 
Morocco.  Finally,  CTF  was  to  establish 
communications  with  ETF  at  Orleans- 
ville,  Algeria.  Around  Oran,  four  land- 
ings were  scheduled,  with  a  frontal 
assault  on  the  port  itself  as  the  key 
objective.  The  Ranger  battalion  was  to 
develop  the  smaller  port  of  Arzew, 
thirty  miles  east  of  Oran,  while  Combat 
Command  B,  designated  Task  Force 
Red,  and  the  16th  and  18th  Regimen- 
tal Combat  Teams  of  the  1st  Infantry 
Division  went  ashore  on  Beach  Z,  just 
east  of  Arzew.  Armored  forces  were  to 
slice  inland  to  seize  the  airfields  at 
Tafaraoui  and  La  Senia,  as  the  16th 
and  18th  Regimental  Combat  Teams 
closed  Oran  from  the  east.  The  26th 
Regimental  Combat  Team,  1st  Infan- 
try Division,  was  to  land  at  Les  Anda- 
louses  and  advance  on  Oran  from  the 
west.  The  fourth  group,  a  smaller  com- 
ponent of  Combat  Command  B,  was  to 
come  ashore  at  Mersa  Bou  Zedjar,  move 
inland  to  Lourmel,  seize  the  airstrip 
there,  and  then  advance  on  the  La  Senia 
Airfield  just  south  of  Oran.  Brig.  Gen. 
Henry  C.  Wolfe,  commanding  the 
much-dispersed  1st  Engineer  Amphib- 
ian Brigade,  was  to  operate  Arzew  as  a 
port  and  bring  suppHes  and  troops 
across  the  adjacent  Beach  Z.  He  gave 
the  responsibility  for  unloading  the 
D-day  convoy  to  the  531st  Engineer 
Shore    Regiment,    which    was    to   co- 


operate with  Royal  Navy  units  on  the 
beaches. ^^ 

The  531st  Engineer  Shore  Regiment, 
attached  to  the  1st  Infantry  Division, 
provided  one  battalion  at  Les  Anda- 
louses  and  two  battalions  at  Arzew.  The 
2d  Battalion  of  the  591st  Engineer  Boat 
Regiment  had  shore  engineer  support 
duty  for  Combat  Command  B  of  the 
1st  Armored  Division,  split  between  two 
beaches.  The  1st  Battalion  of  the  591st 
furnished  hatch  crews,  while  the  16th 
Armored  Engineer  Battalion  (1st  Ar- 
mored Division)  and  the  1st  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  (1st  Division)  were  to 
carry  out  normal  combat  engineer 
functions. ^^ 

The  experience  of  Company  F  of  the 
591st  Engineer  Boat  Regiment  illus- 
trated much  that  was  learned  about 
combat  engineer  support  at  Oran.  At- 
tached to  Force  GREEN  (Combat  Com- 
mand B  of  the  1st  Armored  Division), 
Company  F  supervised  the  landing  of 
men  and  supplies  at  Mersa  Bou  Zedjar 
(called  X-Ray  Beach),  some  twenty- 
eight  miles  west  of  Oran.  Its  9  officers 
and  186  enlisted  men,  commanded  by 
Capt.  Kenneth  W.  Kennedy,  were  to 
aid  in  landing  108  officers,  2,158  en- 
listed men,  409  wheeled  vehicles,  54 
tracked  vehicles,  and  430  tons  of  sup- 
plies. The  company  organized  into  a 
headquarters  platoon  of  2  officers  and 
30  enlisted  men;  a  defense  platoon  of  1 
officer  and  40  enlisted  men;  a  medical 
detachment  of  1  officer  and  6  aid  men; 
and  2  construction  and  unloading  pla- 
toons, each  composed  of  55  enlisted 


^"ist  Engr  Amphib  Bde,  Lessons  from  Opn  Torch, 
30  Dec  42,  IncI  1  to  Rptson  Opn  Torch,  CTF,  16  Jan 
43. 

■^'Ist  Engr  Amphib  Bde,  Rpt  of  Opns  with  Center 
Task  Force;  Hists,  1st  Engr  C  Bn  and  16th  Armd 
Engr  Bn. 


THE  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  INVASION  OF  NORTH  AFRICA 


75 


men,  one  with  3  officers  and  the  other 
with  2.  Available  landing  craft  consisted 
of  10  LCAs,  14  LCP(R)s,  4  LCM(I)s,  2 
LCM(III)s,  and  1  LST.'^*^ 

Plans  called  for  routing  all  vehicles 
off  the  LST  directly  onto  a  road  lead- 
ing to  the  village  of  Bou  Zadjar.  As  soon 
as  waterproofing  could  be  removed,  the 
vehicles  were  to  move  out  along  the 
road.  All  other  vehicles  coming  ashore 
were  to  gather  in  an  assembly  area  for 
removal  of  waterproofing,  and  this  ini- 
tial assembly  area  was  also  to  serve  as  a 
dump  to  keep  both  beaches  clear.  At 
night  wheeled  vehicles  were  to  be  guided 
across  the  beach  to  the  area  by  a  line  of 
shaded  green  lights  held  by  guides, 
while  tracked  vehicles  were  to  be  guided 
to  the  same  area  by  orange  lights  along 
another  route.  Personnel  could  follow 
either  color. 

A  high  rocky  point  divided  X-Ray 
Beach  into  two  sections.  Green  and 
White  beaches,  about  a  fifteen-minute 
walk  apart.  Company  F  had  to  be  split 
into  two  complete  units,  each  with  its 
own  defense  and  construction  sections, 
unloading  details,  and  even  medical 
detachments.  Green  Beach  was  100 
yards  long  and  almost  30  yards  deep 
and  rose  steeply  to  high  sand  dunes 
and  a  hill  of  500  feet.  The  only  possible 
exit  was  to  the  east,  a  climb  up  a  steep 
grade  over  deep  sand.  Because  of  sand- 
bars, landing  craft  had  to  be  halted  300 
yards  from  the  beach.  Much  of  White 
Beach  was  difficult  for  landings  because 
of  a  narrow  approach  and  dangerous 
rocks  in  the  water  along  the  shore. 

During  the  landings  little  went  accord- 


'"  This  account  for  Company  F  derives  from  Capt 
Kenneth  W.  Kennedy,  Rpt  on  Amphib  Opn  by  Co  F, 
591st  Engr  Boat  Rgt,  27  Feb  43,  in  Hist  591st  Engr 
Boat  Rgt,  1943-44;  Ltr,  Lt  Col  Kenneth  W.  Kennedy 
to  EHD,  9  Apr  56. 


ing  to  plan.  When  the  operation  started 
at  0145,  the  weather  was  clear  and  the 
surf  moderate.  Captain  Kennedy  and 
the  men  of  his  company  headquarters, 
who  were  supposed  to  land  on  Green 
Beach  at  H  plus  15  minutes,  were  ten 
minutes  late.  They  remained  alone  on 
the  beach  for  almost  an  hour,  because 
the  British  naval  beach  party,  which  was 
to  put  the  markers  in  place,  had  not  yet 
landed.  The  contingents  of  the  shore 
party  that  were  to  land  at  H-hour  dis- 
embarked on  Green  Beach  at  H  plus 
90  minutes  and  White  Beach  at  H  plus 
30  minutes. 

Captain  Kennedy  and  his  group  met 
no  French  opposition.  They  carried  out 
the  reconnaissance  which  was  to  have 
been  directed  by  the  missing  assistant 
shore  party  commanders  on  the  beach 
and  for  some  distance  inland.  When 
the  markers  were  finally  put  down,  the 
first  few  waves  of  landing  craft  failed 
to  land  between  them,  and  many  craft 
were  damaged  and  vehicles  mired.  Ear- 
ly in  the  operation  an  LCP(R)  caught 
fire  and  lit  up  the  area  for  miles  around, 
revealing  the  site  of  operations.  The 
vessel  finally  sank  under  the  fire  of  a 
.50-caliber  machine  gun  of  Company 
F,  but  for  some  time  thereafter  oil  con- 
tinued to  burn. 

At  approximately  H  plus  3  the  naval 
beach  party  notified  the  engineers  it 
wanted  to  land  its  maracaibo  on  Green 
Beach  according  to  plan.  To  unload  at 
this  spot  Company  A  of  the  16th  Ar- 
mored Engineer  Battalion  had  to  erect 
300  feet  of  treadway  bridging,  as  ex- 
pected. At  H  plus  4  the  maracaibo  was 
almost  ready  for  unloading,  but  no 
Sommerfeld  track  for  preparing  an  exit 
road  was  yet  on  hand.  Without  this 
flexible  mat  as  a  base,  trucks  would  sink 
to  their  axles  in  the  sand.  By  the  time 


76 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


the  track  arrived  from  White  Beach  and 
was  in  place,  it  was  H  plus  5,  four  hours 
behind  schedule. 

Landing  craft  continued  to  founder, 
and  at  noon  on  D-day  Captain  Ken- 
nedy had  to  close  the  beach.  From  that 
hour  all  landing  operations  took  place 
at  better  protected  White  Beach.  But 
White  Beach  had  only  two  narrow  exits, 
and  in  one  of  these,  seventy-five  yards 
from  the  landing  points,  only  tracked 
vehicles  could  be  used.  By  H  plus  6, 
1,500  barracks  bags  and  other  supplies 
had  been  dumped  on  the  sands,  and 
too  little  room  remained  to  put  down 
Sommerfeld  tracks;  as  a  result,  all  sup- 
plies had  to  be  carried  from  the  water's 
edge  on  sleds.  At  1300  the  first  combat 
unit  had  moved  out  with  its  equipment, 
but  an  hour  and  a  half  later  the  beach 
had  become  completely  blocked  by  gaso- 
line cans,  barracks  bags,  and  ammu- 
nition. 

By  1800,  with  the  aid  of  Arabs  and 
twenty-five  men  from  units  already 
ashore,  Kennedy  and  his  men  finally 
had  relieved  the  congestion.  It  was  then 
possible  to  lay  Sommerfeld  track  and 
get  two  trucks  on  the  beach  simultan- 
eously. Thereafter,  the  beach  remained 
clear,  and  by  1900  enough  equipment 
was  ashore  to  send  an  additional  com- 
bat unit  forward. 

Captain  Kennedy  called  for  thirty 
men  from  units  already  ashore  to  aid 
in  a  night  unloading  shift.  As  darkness 
fell,  with  serials  coming  in  more  slowly 
and  inexperienced  crews  contributing 
to  the  boat  casualties,  the  whole  opera- 
tion lagged  further  behind  schedule. 
Next  morning,  9  November,  unload- 
ing continued  at  a  still  slower  pace  as 
the  number  of  serviceable  landing  craft 
dwindled.  Naval  forces  tried  to  compen- 
sate for  the  small  craft  losses  by  load- 


ing an  LST  directly  from  the  cargo  ves- 
sels and  then  beaching  it.  As  another 
expedient,  a  ponton  bridge  served  as  a 
floating  lighter  to  bring  ashore  some 
twenty  light  tanks.  That  night  nearly 
all  the  LCMs  had  their  propellers  tan- 
gled with  landing  lines  or  had  broached. 
Broached  craft  lay  broadside  to  the  sea 
on  the  sand  and  open  to  the  pounding 
surf;  even  undamaged,  they  were  of 
no  use  until  they  could  be  pushed  off 
the  shore  and  put  back  into  action.  Not 
until  1900  on  10  November  was  the 
beach  closed  and  beach  operations  de- 
clared complete — twenty-three  hours 
behind  time. 

With  little  training  in  shore  opera- 
tions, with  only  three  vehicles  at  its 
disposal,  and  with  the  many  problems 
of  unloading.  Company  F  managed  to 
accomplish  its  task  by  dint  of  continu- 
ous hard  work  and  cooperation  with 
the  British  beach  party — the  fruit  of 
joint  exercises  in  the  United  Kingdom. 
Since  a  definite  line  of  responsibility 
between  the  two  had  not  been  drawn, 
each  could,  and  did,  perform  almost 
identical  tasks;  the  shore  party  aiding, 
for  instance,  in  retracting  the  boats 
from  the  beach  and  the  beach  party 
helping  to  unload  the  boats. 

While  the  Rangers  were  capturing 
the  French  fort  above  Arzew  and  silenc- 
ing Arzew's  harbor  defenses,  the  1st 
Infantry  Division  (less  the  26th  Regi- 
mental Combat  Team)  landed  on  the 
beaches  adjacent  to  Arzew,  the  531st 
Engineer  Shore  Regiment  (less  the  3d 
Battalion)  assisting.  Supplies  began  to 
come  ashore,  with  ammunition  given 
top  priority.  The  53 1st  Engineer  Shore 
Regiment  had  enough  trucks  to  clear 
the  beaches  initially  but  did  not  have 
the  manpower  to  keep  up  the  pace 
without  relief,  and  unloading  slowed 


THE  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  INVASION  OF  NORTH  AFRICA 


77 


perceptibly  after  D-day.  However,  ton- 
nage stacked  along  and  near  the  beaches 
was  never  in  danger  of  getting  wet  since 
the  tide  in  the  Mediterranean  varied 
only  about  a  foot.  The  1st  Division's 
capture  of  the  port  of  Arzew  decreased 
dependence  upon  the  beaches,  and  by 
D  plus  3  ships  were  at  dockside  being 
unloaded  rapidly.  The  beaches  then 
closed  and  531st  Engineer  Shore  Regi- 
ment personnel,  along  with  their  trucks, 
became  available  for  unloading  parties 
in  the  town.  . 

The  lack  of  trained  supply  person- 
nel was  a  serious  handicap  from  the 
beginning.  After  the  armistice  with  the 
French,  the  confusion  increased  with  a 
scramble  to  secure  sites  for  depots  and 
dumps.  By  D  plus  3  staff  officers  were 
"scurrying  in  all  directions"  to  find  loca- 
tions for  supplies  coming  in  from  "the 
tangled  mess  at  Arzew"  and  to  get  ready 
for  those  discharged  from  a  convoy 
arriving  that  day. 

The  first  echelon  of  the  Mediterra- 
nean Base  Section  (MBS)  organization 
came  ashore  near  Oran  on  1 1  Novem- 
ber. Within  a  month,  with  the  arrival 
of  later  echelons  and  service  troops 
from  the  United  States,  this  base  sec- 
tion was  operating  with  comparative 
smoothness.  Its  Engineer  Service  con- 
sisted of  three  groups  of  men  that  left 
England  on  12,  22,  and  27  November. 
During  November  the  first  two  groups, 
totaling  fifteen  officers  and  thirty-eight 
enlisted  men  detached  from  SOS,  ETO- 
USA,  served  as  part  of  the  II  Corps 
engineer's  staff.  Upon  landing  at  Oran 
their  most  immediate  jobs  were  acquir- 
ing real  estate,  establishing  water  points 


and  engineer  depots,  and  handling 
gasoline  and  oils  from  ship-to-shore 
storage  and  tank  cars. 

On  8  December,  two  days  after  the 
third  group  arrived,  and  the  day  MBS 
was  activated.  Headquarters,  Engineer 
Service,  MBS,  was  formally  set  up  to 
incorporate  all  three  groups.  During 
December  the  Engineer  Service  had  an 
average  strength  of  fifty-seven  officers, 
one  warrant  officer,  and  sixty-three 
enlisted  men  assigned  and  four  offi- 
cers and  enlisted  men  attached. '^^ 

Eastern  Task  Force 

Two  hundred  fifty  miles  to  the  east 
was  the  Eastern  Assault  Force  (EAF), 
at  first  under  the  command  of  General 
Ryder  of  the  34th  Division,  later  the 
nucleus  of  the  British  First  Army  under 
Lt.  Gen.  K.  A.  N.  Anderson.  This  attack 
force,  after  occupying  Algiers  and  adja- 
cent airfields,  was  to  establish  commu- 
nication with  CTF  at  Orleansville,  south- 
west of  Algiers,  and  to  advance  toward 
Tunis.  For  the  seizure  of  Algiers,  EAF 
devised  a  plan  like  that  CTF  employed. 
The  landings  were  to  take  place  out- 
side the  Bay  of  Algiers,  on  beaches  west 
and  east  of  the  city,  while  two  smaller 
groups  were  to  take  Maison  Blanche 
Airfield,  ten  miles  southeast  of  Algiers, 
and  Blida  Airfield,  twenty-nine  miles 
southwest  of  the  city.  A  special  landing 
party  (TERMINAL)  prepared  to  make  a 
direct  assault  on  the  port  itself  to  fore- 
stall sabotage  of  harbor  installations. 
EAF  was  about  one-half  American, 
chiefly  the  39th  Regimental  Combat 
Team  (9th  Division)  and  the  168th  Regi- 


■*'Ltr,  Brig  Gen  W.  A.  Carter,  Engr,  U.S.  Army 
Forces,  Far  East,  and  Eighth  U.S.  Army  (Rear),  to  Lt 
Col  David  M.  Matheson,  Chf,  8  Feb  56. 


■^2  Rpt,  HQ,  MBS,  Ofc  of  the  Engr,  to  ACofS,  G-2, 
17  Dec  42,  sub:  Organization  Hist,  Engr  Service, 
10-30  Nov  42,  314.7  History  1942-48,  Ofc  of  Engr, 
North  African  Service  Command. 


78 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


mental  Combat  Team  (34th  Division). 
Company  C  of  the  109th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  was  with  the  168th 
Regimental  Combat  Team;  Company 
A  of  the  15th  Engineers  (9th  Division) 
and  the  2d  Battalion  of  the  36th  Engi- 
neers were  with  the  39th  Regimental 
Combat  Team.^^  U.S.  engineers  partici- 
pated less  in  ETF  than  in  the  WTF  and 
CTF  landings,  nor  were  they  needed 
as  much,  for  Algiers  was  captured  on 
D-day. 

The  Assessment 

The  invasion  of  North  Africa,  by 
far  the  largest  amphibious  operation 
attempted  to  that  time,  developed  in  a 
very  brief  time,  and  from  the  very  be- 
ginning much  went  wrong.  In  a  number 
of  instances,  as  on  Green  Beach  at 
Oran,  unloading  fell  hours  behind 
schedule.  Engineer  units  landed  three, 
five,  even  ten  and  more  hours  behind 
schedule.  Not  only  were  inexperienced 
troops  late  in  disembarking  from  the 
transports,  but  equally  inexperienced 
Royal  Navy  crews,  approaching  the 
coast  in  darkness  from  points  far  off- 
shore, beached  their  craft  many  yards — 
even  miles — from  designated  landing 
spots.  In  one  extreme  case  a  landing 
craft  missed  its  mark  by  twelve  miles. 
Some  of  the  landings  were  so  scattered 
that  supplies  were  spread  out  all  along 
the  beaches,  and  the  small  engineer 
shore  parties  had  difficulty  governing 
the  flow  to  advancing  troops  inland. 

Another  delaying  factor  was  the  poor 
seamanship  of  Navy  crews  in  handling 
landing  craft  at  the  beaches.  All  three 
task  forces  had  high  losses:  WTF  lost 


34.3  percent  of  its  craft,  CTF  28  per- 
cent, and  EAF  94  percent.  So  many 
boats  broached  or  swamped  that  sched- 
ules for  following  boat  waves  fell  apart. 
The  Navy  claimed,  with  some  justice, 
that  help  from  those  on  shore,  includ- 
ing engineers,  might  have  reduced  the 
losses;  nevertheless,  one  of  the  chief 
causes  of  boat  losses  was  the  failure  of 
the  naval  beach  parties  to  place  mark- 
ers properly  or  in  time  to  guide  the 
boats.  In  some  cases  the  beach  parties 
emplaced  no  markers  at  all.^"* 

The  division  of  responsibility  between 
the  two  services  was  not  well  defined, 
especially  as  to  the  time  and  place  at 
which  the  beach  commander  was  to 
transfer  his  authority  to  the  shore  com- 
mander. Naval  officials  afterwards  com- 
plained that  the  engineers  refused  to 
aid  in  unloading  supplies  and  clearing 
boats  from  the  beaches;  the  engineers 
made  similar  criticisms  of  certain  naval 
personnel.  Both  accusations  had  some 
basis;  neither  service  clearly  understood 
the  other's  particular  problems  or  du- 
ties. 

A  better  preventive  measure  might 


•''^The  Adm  and  Log  Hist  of  the  ETO,  vol.  IV, 
"Operations  Torch  and  the  ETO,"  p.  86;  AFHQ, 
Outline  Opn  Torch,  an.  4,  ETF. 


"The  following  assessment  of  engineer  operations 
on  9—1 1  November  1942  is  based  on  Operation,  1st 
Prov  Bde  (WTF),  an.  3;  Rpts  of  1st  Engr  Amphib  Bde 
(CTF);  591st  Engr  Boat  Rgt;  Co  F,  36th  Engr  C  Bn; 
Co  A,  15th  Engr  C  Bn;  109th  Engr  C  Bn;  19th  Engr 
C  Bn;  3d  Inf  Div,  an.  2;  U.S.  Atlantic  Fleet  Amphib 
Force  (Port  Lyautey),  an.  8,  app.  1;  Rpts  bv  Lt  Col 
C.  F.  Tank,  CE  (WTF),  18  Jan  43;  A.  R.  Wilson 
(Atlantic  Base  Sect),  17  Jan  43;  Brig  Gen  S.  C.  God- 
frey (HQ,  USAAF,  Ofc  Dir  of  Base  Services,  Engr 
Sect),  4  Jan  43;  all  in  folder  African  Campaign,  FAC. 
Davison  Memo;  Hists,  1st  Engr  Spec  Bde,  Jan  42— Sep 
45;  591st  Engr  Boat  Rgt,  1943-44;  561st  Engr  Boat 
Maint  Co;  19th  Engr  C  Rgt;  Morison,  Operations  in 
North  African  Waters;  Intervs  with  Lt  Col  Houghton, 
30  May  50;  Lt  Col  Chubbock,  4  Nov  50;  Lt  Col  Philip 
Y.  Browning;  and  Col  William  Powers,  13  Feb  51; 
Ltrs,  Lt  Col  J.  B.  Chubbock,  12  Mar  56;  Col  A.T.W. 
Moore,  9  Mar  56;  Col  R.  C.  Brown,  20  Mar  56;  Col 
John  A.  Chambers,  5  Apr  56;  Lt  Col  Kenneth  W. 
Kennedy,  9  Apr  56. 


THE  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  INVASION  OF  NORTH  AFRICA 


79 


well  have  been  experience:  more  train- 
ing exercises  before  the  landing.  If  a 
strict  division  of  responsibility  was  in- 
deed essential,  it  should  have  been  clear 
to  all.  On  the  other  hand,  the  difficulty 
might  have  been  overcome  had  suffi- 
cient authority  been  given  one  indi- 
vidual. This  did  not  happen.  Engineer 
shore  party  commanders  were  uncer- 
tain of  their  authority  and  did  not  know 
how  to  meet  the  inevitable  unexpected 
developments.  The  WTF  task  force 
engineer,  who  might  have  directed  the 
landing  activities,  did  not  arrive  ashore 
until  the  emergency  had  passed.  At 
Fedala,  Safi,  and  Mehdia  experienced 
SOS  personnel,  who  might  have  made 
it  possible  to  use  the  ports  earlier,  also 
remained  aboard  ship. 

Worse  still  was  the  situation  at  the 
Bay  of  Arzew.  Units  involved  in  the 
operation  included  the  1st  Infantry 
Division;  a  port  battalion  operating  with 
shore,  boat,  and  combat  engineer  units; 
and  a  naval  unit,  all  with  no  clear  divi- 
sions of  responsibility  among  them. 
Communication  here  and  elsewhere 
between  the  men  at  the  port  and  the 
vessels  lying  offshore  was  far  from 
perfect.  Engineer  shore  parties 
depended  upon  the  naval  beach  par- 
ties for  communications  with  the  ships. 
This  may  explain  complaints  that  land- 
ing craft  appeared  to  be  idle,  lying  at 
anchor  or  merely  cruising  about,  when 
they  were  needed  to  land  men  and 
equipment.  Communication  was  also 
poor  among  elements  ashore.  Loud- 
speakers often  could  not  be  heard  above 
the  firing,  the  shouting,  and  the  din  of 
the  beaches.  In  such  an  intricate  opera- 
tion many  things  could  go  awry,  and 
many  did;  even  British  accents  over 
loudspeakers  confused  the  relatively 
few  Americans  on  EAF  beaches. 


At  all  the  beaches,  when  the  engi- 
neers were  ready  to  move  supplies  to 
more  permanent  dumps  they  faced  an 
acute  transportation  shortage,  one  that 
should  have  been  expected  after  the  50 
percent  cut  in  vehicles.  For  many  engi- 
neer units  (already  understrength  to 
perform  all  their  assigned  tasks  effi- 
ciently), this  cut  had  created  another 
handicap:  many  engineers  of  the  shore 
parties  were  specialists,  whereas  land- 
ing operations  with  little  transportation 
and  heavy  equipment  called  for  un- 
skilled labor.  General  Noce  of  the  Engi- 
neer Amphibian  Command  later  rec- 
ommended that  the  shore  parties  be 
enlarged  by  as  much  as  30  percent. 

The  bulldozer  was  the  most  valuable 
means  of  moving  supplies  and  equip- 
ment across  the  beaches;  too  few  were 
available  and  many  arrived  too  late  or 
not  at  all.  Some  vehicles  landed  with- 
out their  drivers,  or  drivers  landed  with- 
out their  vehicles.  The  whole  unload- 
ing process  lagged  when  a  great  deal 
more  than  anticipated  had  to  be  done 
by  hand. 

Some  of  the  blame  for  the  delay 
could  be  charged  to  loading  and  some 
to  unloading.  Often  combat,  shore, 
aviation,  and  service  engineers  found 
that  their  equipment  had  not  been  com- 
bat loaded  at  all,  especially  in  the  CTF 
shipping.  Combat  loading  meant  that 
troops  were  shipped  with  their  equip- 
ment and  were  ready  for  combat  when 
they  disembarked.  Though  not  econom- 
ical in  terms  of  ship  space,  the  practice 
was  all  important  in  saving  time  during 
operations  ashore.  Convoy-loaded  equip- 
ment had  to  be  assembled  for  use  after 
being  deposited  on  the  beach.  More- 
over, ship  unloading  plans  often  did 
not  coincide  with  actual  loadings,  while 
priority  lists  for  unloading  were  all  too 


80 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


often  ignored.  In  one  case  the  lighters 
unloading  the  U.S.S.  Leedstown  were 
ordered  to  report  to  the  U.S.S.  Chase 
when  only  half  the  prime  movers  loaded 
on  the  Leedstown — equipment  badly 
needed  to  clear  the  beaches — had  been 
landed.  One  battalion  of  the  36th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Regiment  lost  most  of  its 
equipment  and  tools  when  the  Leedstown 
was  torpedoed  on  D  plus  2.  Hatch  crews 
frequently  were  not  familiar  with  their 
ships.  (Later  criticism  pointed  out  that 
these  crews  should  have  had  60  per- 
cent more  men.)  Yet  there  were  instances 
of  rapid  and  efficient  work.  The  1st 
Battalion  of  the  591st  Boat  Regiment 
received  a  commendation  from  the 
commanding  general,  Communications 
Zone,  NATOUSA,  for  the  work  of  its 
hatch  crews  and  unloading  details  on 
ten  of  the  CTF's  twenty-three  trans- 
ports. 

Part  of  the  delay  in  unloading  un- 
doubtedly could  be  attributed  to  the 
inexperience  of  officers  and  men,  and 
sometimes  delays  had  serious  conse- 
quences. By  H  plus  96  the  1st  Engineer 
Amphibian  Brigade  should  have  landed 
80  percent  of  its  assigned  cargo  and  all 
of  its  assigned  personnel.  Actually,  only 
75  percent  of  the  vehicles  and  35  per- 
cent of  the  total  cargo  were  ashore  on 
schedule,  although  all  personnel  had 
landed.  In  this  instance,  and  in  several 
others,  the  forward  movement  of  com- 
bat troops  was  retarded. 

Engineers  made  many  errors  during 
the  early  phases  onshore.  Through 
ignorance  or  demands  for  speedy  un- 
loading, they  often  set  up  dumps  too 
close  to  the  water's  edge  and  then  had 
to  move  them  when  the  tides  came  in. 
Training  exercises  which  had  taken 
place  in  ideal  tide  conditions  and  calm 
seas  both  in  the  United  States  and  in 


the  United  Kingdom  did  little  to  pre- 
pare the  engineers  for  the  Moroccan 
tides,  rising  as  much  as  fourteen  feet, 
or  for  the  rough  seas  that  interrupted 
unloading  at  several  beaches.  Had  the 
engineers  been  more  familiar  with  con- 
ditions, they  could  have  closed  beaches 
sooner,  moved  on  to  the  captured  ports, 
and  saved  boats  and  equipment. 

Another  cause  for  delay  in  getting 
supplies  forward,  at  least  in  the  Casa- 
blanca area,  was  piling  all  items — eng- 
ineer, signal,  medical,  ordnance,  and 
the  five  different  classes — into  common 
dumps.  This  mingling  made  it  difficult 
to  find  certain  much-needed  supplies 
quickly,  and  the  engineers  claimed  that 
they  had  neither  the  time  nor  the  man- 
power to  sort  supplies  properly.  Even 
in  dumps  where  segregation  was  at- 
tempted, faded  package  markings  often 
hindered  distribution.  Frequently,  sup- 
plies belonging  to  combat  and  shore 
party  engineers  were  thrown  together 
with  those  belonging  to  aviation  engi- 
neers. The  shore  party  engineers  com- 
plained that  packaging  materials  and 
crates  were  often  too  flimsy;  corrugated 
paper  or  cardboard  containers  proved 
of  no  value  whatever.  Another  com- 
plaint was  that  too  often  equipment  was 
shipped  in  boxes  too  large  and  bulky 
for  easy  handling. 

Unloading  and  other  shore  opera- 
tions could  have  proceeded  with  much 
greater  dispatch  had  full  advantage 
been  taken  of  native  labor.  The  engi- 
neers made  some  effort  to  employ  local 
workers  on  the  beaches  and  at  the 
ports;  the  591st  Boat  Regiment,  by 
doing  so,  cut  discharge  time  in  half  at 
the  Arzew  quays.  But  the  Americans 
were  too  trustful  and  lax  in  supervision. 
At  Safi,  natives  thronged  the  beaches, 
unloading  landing  craft  for  a  cigarette. 


THE  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  INVASION  OF  NORTH  AFRICA 


81 


Moroccan  Labor  Ganc;  at  Casablanca  Harbor 


a  can  of  food,  a  piece  of  cloth.  Two 
days  later  tons  of  ammunition  and  ra- 
tions were  found  on  Arab  fishing  ves- 
sels. American  planning  and  prepara- 
tions had  made  too  little  provision  for 
using  this  vast  labor  pool  or  studying 
its  peculiarities.  Civilian  workers  wanted 
to  be  paid  in  goods,  not  in  local  cur- 
rency. Nor  did  they  look  with  favor 
upon  the  weekly  pay  system,  and  many 
quit  in  disgust  after  a  day's  work.  Once 
the  engineers  arranged  to  pay  in  cloth, 
sugar,  tea,  bread,  and  the  like,  willing 
workers  became  available. 

The  engineers'  slowness  to  begin  sal- 
vaging equipment  lost  or  damaged  on 
the  beaches,  in  turn,  slowed  unloading. 
The  engineers  were  not  trained  for  sal- 
vage work,  nor  had  they  been  assigned 
it  in  the  plans.  But.  they  did  help  to 
recover  a  considerable  amount  of  equip- 


ment and  supplies.  Some  tractors  used 
in  futile  attempts  to  salvage  equipment 
from  the  water  were  lost.  LCVPs  proved 
inadequate;  tank  lighters,  although  bet- 
ter adapted,  were  little  used.  Sleds  of 
wood  or  metal,  some  of  them  impro- 
vised, proved  most  useful  on  the 
beaches.  A  sled  designed  to  carry  larger 
loads  would  have  been  more  useful,  and 
a  reserve  of  sleds,  cables,  atid  chains 
would  have  improved  salvage  work  and 
general  movement  of  equipment  and 
supplies. 

A  further  impediment  to  rapid  prog- 
ress on  the  beaches  was  the  inadequacy 
of  the  maps  issued  to  the  shore  engi- 
neers. These  maps  indicated  the  con- 
tour of  the  terrain  only  a  short  distance 
behind  the  beaches,  and  the  informa- 
tion was  sometimes  inaccurate.  In  sev- 
eral areas  engineers  found  unexpect- 


82 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


edly  high  dunes  that  obstructed  egress 
to  the  inland  plateau  and  that  forced 
them  in  one  case  to  build  a  road  with  a 
hairpin  turn;  at  Blue  Beach  (Mehdia- 
Plage)  engineers  had  to  construct  a  road 
through  a  mile  of  deep,  soft  sand. 

Troops  and  equipment  moved  off 
the  various  beaches  on  quickly  impro- 
vised roads  and  bridges  substantial 
enough  to  withstand  heavy  military 
traffic  but  emplaced  in  a  constant  strug- 
gle with  poor  construction  material, 
equipment,  procedure,  and  inexper- 
ience. In  general,  engineers  concluded 
that  the  British  Sommerfeld  track, 
chicken  wire  netting,  and  cyclone  wire 
were  all  inadequate,  for  they  sank  into 
the  soft  sand  after  traffic  passed  over 
them.  They  found  cyclone  wire  of  some 
value,  provided  burlap  bags  were  used 
as  a  base.  The  bulldozer,  the  most  use- 
ful piece  of  equipment  landed,  was  put 
to  various  uses  such  as  clearing  exits 
through  sand  dunes  and  other  obsta- 
cles, pulling  equipment  from  lighters 
and  across  the  beaches,  and  afterwards 
building  and  repairing  roads  as  well  as 
runways  at  airfields.  Unfortunately, 
some  bulldozers  proved  mechanically 
defective.  Waterproofing  would  have  in- 
creased their  utility,  and  they  all  should 
have  been  equipped  with  winches,  so 
effective  in  pulling  out  mired  vehicles. 
Light  cranes,  had  they  been  present  to 
operate  with  the  bulldozers,  would  have 
made  unloading,  as  well  as  rescuing 
stranded  boats  and  vehicles,  more  effi- 
cient. A  lack  of  spare  parts  was  still 
another  factor  in  cutting  down  the 
effective  use  of  vehicles  and  other  engi- 
neer equipment,  even  some  weapons. 

Shore  party  engineers  complained  of 
the  heavy  individual  load  of  equipment 
they  had  to  carry,  a  problem  common 
to  all  troops  in  the  TORCH  operation. 


Much  might  have  been  left  behind  for 
later  shipment  or  left  on  board  ship  to 
be  distributed  at  a  more  convenient 
time.  Engineer  officers  and  noncom- 
missioned officers  complained  espe- 
cially of  the  heavy  submachine  gun.  On 
many  occasions  soldiers  were  forced  to 
jump  into  the  water  some  distance  out 
to  keep  boats  from  broaching.  Men  bur- 
dened with  their  heavy  loads  stumbled 
and  fell  in  the  surf  trying  to  wade 
ashore  through  water  that  was  in  some 
places  two  to  four  feet  deep. 

In  summing  up  his  observations  dur- 
ing Torch  somewhat  later,  an  experi- 
enced engineer  officer  entered  an  oft- 
repeated  plea  for  enough  service  troops, 
including  guard  units,  fire-fighting 
units,  bomb  disposal  companies,  depot 
companies,  and  labor  units,  especially 
in  the  early  waves  of  an  invasion  force. 
"When  this  is  not  done,  either  combat 
troops  must  be  diverted  to  service  tasks 
for  which  they  are  not  trained,  [thus 
reducing]  the  effective  combat  strength 
by  more  men  than  would  have  been 
necessary  if  trained  service  troops  had 
been  available;  or  the  combat  troops 
will  not  be  supplied,  in  which  case  they 
cease  to  be  effective. "'^^ 

The  dilemma  was  classic  and  contin- 
uing. The  experience  the  engineers 
gained  in  the  invasion  of  North  Africa 
stood  them  well  in  future  landings  in 
the  Mediterranean  and  European  the- 
aters and  made  superior  veterans  of 
them.  Lessons  derived  on  the  littered 
beaches  were  enlarged  upon  in  new 
procedures  and  organizations,  but  many 
had  to  be  learned  again  in  the  face  of 
far  stronger  resistance  than  the  French 
defenders  offered  in  Algeria  and  Mor- 
occo. 


'"'Rpt,  Col  Morris  W.  Gilland,  Dep  Engr,  MBS,  to 
CG,  MBS,  27  Dec  42,  sub:  Lessons  from  Opn  Torch, 
Pence  Papers,  Dec  42-Jan  43,  MBS. 


CHAPTER  V 


The  Tunisian  Campaign 


As  soon  as  the  Allies  concluded  an 
armistice  with  the  French,  British  units 
of  the  Eastern  Task  Force  struck  by  air, 
sea,  and  land  toward  Tunis.  With  this 
port  in  Allied  hands,  the  Axis  hold  on 
North  Africa  would  be  broken.  On  12 
November  1942,  British  commandos 
and  paratroopers  converged  on  Bone, 
135  miles  west  of  Tunis,  but  German 
units  had  begun  flying  into  Tunisia 
from  Sicily  and  the  mainland  of  Italy 
three  days  earlier;  by  the  twelfth  they 
were  arriving  by  sea. '  Before  the  month 
was  out  the  British  78th  Division  with 
its  Blade  Force  (which  resembled  a  U.S. 
armored  combat  command  and  includ- 
ed an  American  armored  battalion) 
drove  to  the  outskirts  of  Djedeida,  less 
than  sixteen  miles  from  Tunis.  But  five 
months  would  pass  before  the  Allies 
reached  Tunis.  The  rapid  Axis  buildup 
and  a  lack  of  air  support  (Allied  planes 
were  mired  in  the  mud  of  fair-weather 
fields)  brought  the  British  offensive  to 
a  halt.  By  Christmas  Day  AFHQ  had 
canceled  immediate  attack  plans,  for  a 
much  larger  push  was  in  prospect.  The 
Allies  were  faced  with  building  suffi- 


'  For  a  detailed  account  of  combat  operations  in 
Tunisia,  see  Howe,  Northwest  Africa,  pp.  277ff,  which 
provided  background  material  for  this  account.  For 
more  general  treatment,  see  Commander  in  Chiefs 
Dispatch,  North  African  Campaign,  1942-43  (here- 
after cited  as  Eisenhower  Dispatch). 


cient  strength  in  Tunisia  to  crush  the 
expanded  German  and  Italian  forces. 
The  British  First  Army,  moving  over 
the  long  land  route  east  from  Algiers, 
built  up  its  strength  in  the  hill  country 
around  Bedja.  Elements  of  the  Ameri- 
can II  Corps  arrived  from  faraway 
Oran  to  take  up  positions  east  of  Tebessa 
whence  they  could  threaten  central 
Tunisia;  poorly  equipped  French  forces 
were  deployed  along  the  Eastern  Dor- 
sal as  a  link  between  the  British  and  the 
Americans.  By  mid-January  II  Corps 
elements  had  concentrated  in  the  Teb- 
essa-Kasserine  region,  and  on  the  eigh- 
teenth the  enemy  began  exerting  pres- 
sure against  the  center  of  the  Allied 
line,  which  the  French  held.  These 
operations,  continuing  until  early  Feb- 
ruary, pulled  additional  American  units 
into  action  but  weakened  Allied  defen- 
sive positions  along  the  Eastern  Dorsal. 
The  stage  was  being  set  for  a  swift,  hard 
blow  by  enemy  armored  units,  and  the 
German-Italian  Panzer  Army  had  reached 
a  strong  defensive  position  (the  Mareth 
Line)  near  the  southeastern  Tunisian 
border.  Since  it  would  be  weeks  before 
the  British  Eighth  Army  under  Gen- 
eral Sir  Bernard  L.  Montgomery  could 
mount  an  offensive  against  this  posi- 
tion from  the  east,  German  panzer  units 
from  the  north  and  south  teamed  up 
for  an  assault  designed  to  overrun  II 


84 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Corps  and  force  the  British  First  Army 
into  a  general  withdrawal  westward. 

The  main  attack  poured  through 
Faid  Pass  on  14  February,  sweeping  ele- 
ments of  the  U.S.  1st  Armored  Divi- 
sion before  it  and  isolating  American 
troops  on  solitary  mountains;When  the 
assault  began,  three  U.S.  divisions  were 
in  Tunisia,  all  rather  fully  committed 
along  some  one  hundred  miles  of  front. 
Before  it  ended  eight  days  later,  enemy 
tanks  had  swept  through  Kasserine  Pass 
and  struck  some  seventy  miles  deep  into 
II  Corps  territory,  coming  dangerously 
close  to  a  large  Allied  supply  dump  at 
Tebessa  and  a  key  road  center  at 
Thala.  Allied  armored  reinforcements, 
along  with  increasing  support  from  the 
XII  Air  Support  Command  (U.S.)  and 
Montgomery's  buildup  against  the  Mar- 
eth  Line  in  southeastern  Tunisia,  com- 
bined to  compel  a  German  withdrawal, 
which  began  23  February. 

Two  more  phases  of  the  campaign, 
both  offensive,  followed  for  II  Corps 
in  Tunisia.  On  17  March  the  bulk  of  II 
Corps,  aided  by  air  strikes,  pushed 
through  Gafsa  toward  Maknassy  and 
Gabes.  This  limited  offensive  was  timed 
to  draw  off  German  reserves  from  the 
Mareth  Line  while  Montgomery  cracked 
through  from  the  south.  Montgomery's 
offensive  began  on  20  March  and  dur- 
ing the  next  three  weeks  drove  the 
enemy  back  into  a  small  bridgehead 
around  Tunis  and  Bizerte. 

Squeezed  out  of  the  action  by  Eighth 
Army's  advance,  II  Corps  moved  north 
across  the  British  First  Army  supply 
lines  to  take  over  British  5  Corps  posi- 
tions near  Bedja.  On  24  April  the  Amer- 
ican force  began  the  final  phase  of  the 
Tunisian  campaign,  an  attack  through 
the  hills  near  the  north  coast  of  Tuni- 


sia toward  Bizerte.  On  its  right,  the  Brit- 
ish First  Army,  also  driving  eastward, 
pressed  the  attack  on  Tunis  in  conjunc- 
tion with  Eighth  Army,  pushing  north 
from  positions  near  Enfidaville.  On  7 
May  American  units  first  entered  Bizer- 
te. Tunis  fell  to  the  British,  and  by  the 
thirteenth  organized  Axis  resistance  in 
Africa  had  ended. 

Engineer  support  of  air  and  ground 
operations  in  Tunisia  had  to  take  into 
account  the  terrain  and  the  weather. 
In  central  Tunisia,  where  the  main 
American  effort  took  place,  the  terrain 
was  quite  different  from  the  hilly  area 
around  Bizerte  and  Tunis  in  the  north, 
where  the  British  First  Army  began  its 
buildup.  From  a  wide,  semi-arid  pla- 
teau of  sandstone  and  clay  rose  two 
ridgelines,  the  Eastern  and  Western 
Dorsals,  which  came  together  at  a  point 
south  of  Pont-du-Fahs.  The  Eastern 
Dorsal  extended  almost  due  south  from 
Pont-du-Fahs  for  over  125  miles  to 
Maknassy;  the  bolder  Western  Dorsal 
angled  away  to  the  southwest  toward 
Feriana.  Clay  roads  snaked  through  at 
a  few  points  and  two  ribbons  of  as- 
phalt macadam  crossed  to  the  sea,  one 
through  Sbeitla  to  Sfax,  the  other 
through  Gafsa  to  Gabes.  Except  for  bits 
of  verdure,  the  landscape  offered  little 
color.  Central  Tunisia  had  no  peren- 
nial streams  and  few  trees  except  for  a 
pine  forest  that  hugged  the  hills  from 
Bou  Chebka  through  Kasserine  Pass 
and  north  toward  Thala. 

Control  of  the  passes  through  the  two 
ridgelines  was  the  key  to  hundreds  of 
square  miles  of  wadi-scarred  tableland 
that  lay  between.  Once  through  the 
passes,  armor  could  range  cross-country 
with  comparative  ease  during  dry  weath- 
er. During  the  winter  months  rainfall 


THE  TUNISIAN  CAMPAIGN 


85 


turned  the  flats  into  mud  and  made 
vehicular  movement  difficult  on  all  but 
a  few  hard-topped  roads. 

By  the  time  II  Corps  began  to  move 
into  Tunisia  early  in  January,  the  rainy 
season  was  more  than  a  month  old. 
Northern  Tunisia  and  Algeria  have  an 
annual  rainfall  of  about  twenty-five  to 
thirty  inches,  almost  all  between  late 
November  and  early  March.  These 
rains  were  instrumental  in  keeping 
Allied  planes  on  the  ground  and  halt- 
ing the  first  Allied  drive  on  Bizerte  and 
Tunis.  The  nearest  hard-surfaced  Al- 
lied airfield  was  a  small  one  near  Bone, 
in  Algeria.  Allied  planes  at  hastily  grad- 
ed airstrips  nearer  the  front  soon  be- 
came hopelessly  mired  in  mud,  whereas 
Axis  planes,  flying  from  hard-surfaced 
airfields  only  minutes  from  the  battle- 
ground, ranged  virtually  unopposed 
over  the  front.  Until  drier  fields  could 
be  found  or  all-weather  ones  built, 
Allied  airpower  could  do  little  toward 
winning  superiority  or  cutting  the  ene- 
my's air  and  sea  supply  routes  from 
Sicily.^ 

Aviation  Engineer  Support 

The  North  African  invasion  em- 
ployed American  aviation  engineer  units 
available  in  England  or  summarily  as- 
sembled in  the  United  States,  and  in 
the  days  after  the  successful  landings 
they  foundered  amid  a  number  of  un- 
controlled circumstances.  The  809th, 
814th,  815th,  and  817th  Engineer  Avia- 


'^  Eisenhowever  Dispatch;  General  Omar  N.  Bradley, 
A  Soldier's  Story  (New  York:  Hoit,  1951),  p.  22;  Ltr, 
Col  W.  A.  Carter,  8  Feb  56;  Wesley  Frank  Craven  and 
James  Lea  Cate,  eds.,  "The  U.S.  Army  Air  Forces  in 
World  War  II,"  vol.  II,  Europe:  TORCH  to  POINT- 
BLANK  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1949), 
pp.91,  116. 


tion  Battalions  landed  with  the  Center 
Task  Force.  From  the  United  States 
came  a  battalion  of  the  21st  Engineer 
Aviation  Regiment,  the  prototype  of  its 
kind,  and  the  887th  Engineer  Airborne 
Company  and  the  888th  Airborne  Engi- 
neer Aviation  Company.  With  the  ex- 
ception of  the  21st  Engineer  Aviation 
Regiment,  the  units  were  hastily  formed 
and  sketchily  trained.  The  809th,  though 
experienced  in  airfield  construction  in 
England,  had  to  draw  150  enlisted  men 
from  the  832d  and  157  from  the  825th 
in  the  United  Kingdom  to  achieve  its 
allotted  strength.  The  887th  and  the 
888th  were  thrown  together  in  the 
United  States  just  weeks  before  the  con- 
voy sailed,  and  none  of  the  units  had 
any  inkling  of  the  conditions  of  for- 
ward airfield  construction  in  a  fluid 
campaign. 

Charged  first  with  resurfacing  dam- 
aged runways  near  the  larger  cities 
within  the  landing  zones,  the  Ameri- 
can units  were  to  support  air  opera- 
tions including  patrols  over  Allied  lines 
of  communications  along  the  coast  west 
of  Algiers;  east  of  that  city,  according 
to  the  invasion  plan,  British  Airdrome 
Construction  Groups  were  responsible 
for  forward  fields  supporting  the  move 
toward  Tunisia.  Within  this  division  of 
labor,  the  American  aviation  engineers 
were  to  construct  six  fields  ringing  the 
borders  of  Spanish  Morocco  on  the  pos- 
sibility that  the  Axis  might  mount  an 
offensive  against  the  Allied  bridgehead 
through  the  Iberian  peninsula  and  into 
the  Spanish  dependency. 

Aside  from  training  deficiencies,  the 
aviation  engineers'  foremost  problem 
was  the  fate  of  their  equipment,  espe- 
cially that  coming  from  England.  Load- 
ed on  different  ships  from  the  units, 
with  some  ships  sailing  in  different 


86 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


convoys,  engineer  paraphernalia  from 
heavy  machinery  to  hand  tools  often 
failed  to  arrive  with  the  troops.  The 
815th's  equipment  was  lost  at  sea  off 
Oran  with  a  torpedoed  vessel,  and  the 
ship  transporting  part  of  the  809th's 
belongings  returned  to  England  with 
engine  trouble  two  days  after  sailing 
with  the  invasion  convoy.  Heavy  con- 
struction equipment  was  often  diverted 
to  other  use  or  to  other  engineer  units 
as  it  came  ashore.  Some  of  the  809th's 
materiel  arrived  intact  because  mem- 
bers of  the  battalion  traveled  on  the 
same  ship  and  supervised  its  unloading, 
but  the  unit's  trucks,  in  a  later  convoy, 
arrived  stripped  of  spare  tires,  all  can- 
vas supports,  and  the  tools  packed  a- 
board  them  for  embarkation.  As  late  as 
January  1943,  the  2d  Battalion  of  the 
2 1  St  Engineer  Aviation  Regiment,  work- 
ing at  Craw  Field  near  Port-Lyautey, 
had  to  use  secondhand  French  tools  or 
improvised  equipment.  All  the  neces- 
sary equipment  did  not  arrive  until 
March  1943.-' 

The  existing  airfields  in  North  Africa 
were  ill-suited  for  the  heavy  invasion 
traffic.  Of  the  French  fields  in  the  land- 
ing areas,  only  four  had  hard-surfaced 
runways:  those  at  Port-Lyautey  on  the 
Moroccan  coast  north  of  Rabat;  at  Taf- 
araoui  near  Oran;  at  Maison  Blanche, 
close  to  Algiers  in  the  Eastern  Task 
Force  zone;  and  at  Bone,  fifty  miles 
short  of  the  Tunisian  border.  With  its 
main  strip  and  a  crosswind  leg,  Ta- 
faraoui  became  the  focus  for  incoming 
American  aircraft  of  all  description 


'  Craven  and  Gate,  Europe:  TORCH  to  POINTBLANK, 
pp.  1 17-  18;  Hist  809th  Engr  Avn  Bn;  Rpt,  Brig  Gen 
S.  C.  Godfrey  to  CG,  AAF,  4  Jan  43,  sub:  Report  on 
Airdomes  and  Avn  Engrs  in  North  Africa,  OCE  370.2 
(MTO),  hereafter  cited  as  Godfrey  Rpt;  Hist  2d  Bn, 
21st  Engr  Avn  Rgt,  8  Nov  42-  1  Jul  43,  Engr  21  HI, 
Maxwell  AFB. 


belonging  to  Brig.  Gen.  James  H.  Doo- 
little's  Twelfth  Air  Force,  and  the  result- 
ing glut  of  planes  on  the  field  slowed 
operations  to  a  crawl.  When  the  sea- 
sonal rains  commenced  in  late  Novem- 
ber, everything  in  the  dispersal  areas 
off  the  runways  sank  into  mud  "like 
liquid  reinforced  concrete  of  bottom- 
less depth." 

In  an  attempt  to  give  maneuvering 
room  to  some  285  mired  planes,  the 
Twelfth  Air  Force  flew  its  B  — 26  medi- 
ums to  Maison  Blanche,  where  the 
809th  Engineer  Aviation  Battalion,  leav- 
ing two  detachments  behind  at  Taf- 
araoui  and  other  smaller  dirt  fields  in 
the  area,  began  work  on  29  November 
on  a  second  runway,  taking  up  where 
the  French  builders  of  an  intersecting 
runway  to  the  main  macadam  strip  had 
left  off.  The  same  insidious  mud  ham- 
pered operations;  however,  the  engi- 
neers were  able  to  lay  gravel-clay  taxi- 
ways  and  hardstands  in  a  large  dispersal 
area. 

German  air  resistance  to  further  Al- 
lied advances  into  Tunisia  also  brought 
a  radical  change  to  the  arrangement 
that  confined  American  aviation  con- 
struction to  the  area  west  of  Algiers. 
When  General  K.  A.  N.  Anderson  de- 
clared on  4  December  that  a  lack  of  air 
cover  had  cost  him  the  opportunity  to 
move  further  against  the  Germans, 
American  aviation  engineers  were  al- 
ready heading  eastward  in  an  attempt 
to  bring  Allied  air  power  closer  to  the 
front  lines. 

British  efforts  to  construct  airfields  be- 
hind their  advancing  lines  suffered  even 
more  from  inadequate  heavy  equip- 
ment than  did  the  American  efforts. 
Beginning  on  20  November,  detach- 
ments of  a  British  airdrome  construc- 
tion unit  attempted  to  build  a  fighter 


THE  TUNISIAN  CAMPAIGN 


87 


field  in  Tunisia  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Souk  el  Arba,  eighty  miles  west  of  Tunis, 
but  the  December  rains  defeated  them. 
Their  Sommerfeld  mat,  well-suited  to 
English  sod  fields,  sank  out  of  sight  in 
the  Tunisian  mud,  and  pierced  steel 
plank  was  in  short  supply  in  the  theater. 
They  had  better  success  with  the  sandy 
soil  nearby  at  Souk  el  Khemis,  but  the 
British  still  had  too  few  fields  to  sup- 
port a  concentrated  aerial  offensive 
against  German  strength  in  Tunisia.^ 
Early  December  marked  the  whole- 
sale departure  of  American  aviation 
engineers  from  northwest  Africa  for 
sites  in  eastern  Algeria.  On  2  Decem- 
ber, acting  on  French  advice  that  dry 
weather  prevailed  there,  Brig.  Gen. 
Donald  A.  Davison  flew  to  Telergma,  a 
village  by  a  large  bowl  on  a  3,500-foot- 
high  plateau  in  the  mountains  south- 
west of  Constantine.  On  the  field  guard- 
ed by  French  troops,  Davison  found  a 
platoon  of  the  809th  Engineer  Avia- 
tion Battalion  already  working,  having 
reached  the  prospective  field  by  forced 
march  from  Maison  Blanche.  Another 
company  of  the  battalion  moved  in  by 
plane  and  truck,  and,  assisted  by  sev- 
eral hundred  Algerians,  the  engineers 
scraped  out  a  compacted  earth  runway 
that  began  handling  B  — 26  traffic  just 
ten  days  after  Davison's  first  visit.  With 
this  single  runway,  a  well-drained  strip 
of  loam,  caliche,  and  gravel,  the  809th, 
the  first  American  unit  of  its  kind  to 
work  east  of  Algiers,  began  developing 
a  complex  of  medium  bomber  fields  in 
the  Telergma  area. ' 


Heavy  bombers  found  a  home  far- 
ther south  on  the  fringes  of  the  Sahara 
at  Biskra,  a  winter  resort.  Though  Bisk- 
ra and  Telergma  lay  close  to  rail  lines, 
the  disruption  in  French  train  control 
and  traffic  forced  most  supply  to  the 
bases,  especially  Biskra,  to  go  by  air. 
Accordingly,  the  engineer  unit  chosen 
to  develop  the  Biskra  base  was  the 
887th  Airborne  Engineer  Aviation 
Company,  its  troops  and  light,  air- 
transportable  equipment  carried  to  the 
site  from  Morocco,  a  thousand  miles 
away,  in  fifty-six  aircraft.  Landing  on 
13  December,  the  company  completed 
two  new  fields  of  compacted  earth  for 
B—  17s  and  B  — 24s  in  four  days  to  give 
the  heavies  a  dry  toehold  within  easy 
striking  range  of  the  enemy.  Appar- 
ently vindicating  the  faith  placed  in  the 
airborne  aviation  engineer  concept  by 
its  developers  in  Washington,  the  887th's 
performance  still  could  not  redeem  the 
failure  of  its  sister  company  flown  into 
Tebessa  from  Port-Lyautey  to  expand 
and  improve  advance  fields  at  what 
became  a  main  supply  base  in  the  drive 
into  Tunisia.  Here  the  888th  Airborne 
Engineer  Aviation  Company's  midget 
bulldozers  could  do  little  in  the  rough 
terrain,  and  the  company  took  two  long 
weeks  to  carve  out  a  single  runway, 
though  it  was  supposed  to  recondition 
dirt  fields  lying  as  far  away  as  Gafsa, 
across  the  Tunisian  border.  Eventually 
the  814th  Engineer  Aviation  Battalion 
took  over  the  job.^ 

The  aviation  engineers  shared  their 
problems  of  lost  and  inadequate  equip- 
ment with  other  engineer  units  but 


'  Interv,  A-2  with  Brig  Gen  Donald  A.  Davison,  1 
Jun  43,  142.052-38,  8  Jun  43,  USAF  Hist  Div  Ar- 
chives; Hist  Sect,  AAFC  MTO,  History  of  the  Avia- 
tion Engineers  in  the  MTO,  12  Jun  46,  Maxwell  AFB, 
hereafter  cited  as  Avn  Engrs  in  MTO;  (iodfrey  Rpt. 

'  Davison  interv,  1  Jun  43;  Avn  Engrs  in  MTO,  pp. 
12-14;  Hist  809th  Engr  Avn  Bn. 


"  Unit  Hists,  887th,  888th  Abn  Engr  Cos,  and  8 14th 
Engr  Avn  Bn;  Wesley  Frank  Craven  and  James  L. 
Cate,  eds.,  "The  U.S.  Army  Air  Forces  in  World  War 
II,"  vol.  VII,  Services  Around  the  World  (Chicago:  Univer- 
sity of  Chicago  Press,  1958),  pp.  249-50. 


88 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


wrestled  with  problems  of  command 
structure  peculiar  to  them.  From  the 
outset  it  was  not  clear  whether  the 
Corps  of  Engineers  or  the  Army  Air 
Forces  (AAF)  would  control  the  avia- 
tion engineers.  Field  service  regulations 
for  1942  did  not  fix  responsibility  for 
building  airfields  in  the  theater  of 
operations,  but  in  October  1942  AFHQ 
gave  the  job  to  the  engineer,  Twelfth 
Air  Force,  with  the  ruhng  that  the  avia- 
tion engineers  were  "an  organic  part  of 
the  air  force."  Following  the  invasion, 
the  Twelfth  Air  Force  engineer.  Col. 
John  O.  Colonna,  assumed  operational 
control  of  all  the  American  aviation 
engineers  in  North  Africa.  In  the  con- 
solidation after  the  invasion,  adminis- 
trative control  of  the  aviation  engineers 
passed  to  individual  commanders  of 
service  areas  established  at  Casablanca, 
Oran,  and  Constantine,  subordinate,  in 
turn,  to  the  new  XII  Air  Force  Service 
Command  (AFSC),  of  which  Colonel 
Colonna  was  also  the  engineer.  Chaf- 
ing under  the  division  of  control  over 
the  aviation  engineers,  Colonna  saw  to 
it  that  Twelfth  Air  Force  issued  orders 
for  airfield  construction  directly  to  the 
constructing  units  without  going  through 
the  service  command.  But  the  service 
command  area  commanders,  in  guard- 
ing their  own  prerogatives,  frequently 
countermanded  orders  from  Twelfth 
Air  Force.  The  divided  control  created 
obvious  and  serious  delays  in  construc- 
tion projects  for  the  aviation  engineers.^ 
On  30  December  1942,  Brig.  Gen. 
Thomas  B.  Larkin,  commanding  the 
newly  established  Mediterranean  Base 
Section,  proposed  that  all  requests  for 
new  airfield  construction  be  submitted 


to  base  section  commanders  through 
AFHQ  and  be  carried  out  by  base  sec- 
tion engineers,  arguing  that  logistical 
agencies  should  control  all  construction, 
including  that  of  airfields.  Colonna 
strongly  opposed  this  stand  and  recom- 
mended that  the  aviation  engineers  be 
removed  from  the  administrative  con- 
trol of  the  service  command  and  trans- 
ferred into  the  Twelfth  Air  Force.  While 
conceding  that  Services  of  Supply  (SOS) 
control  might  be  feasible  in  a  static 
situation,  Colonna  was  convinced  that 
base  section  control  would  not  work  in 
a  fluid  situation  like  that  in  North 
Africa.  He  also  opposed  a  proposal 
General  Davison  made  to  General  Eisen- 
hower on  13  February  1943  that  all 
engineer  troops,  including  aviation  en- 
gineers, be  placed  under  the  chief  en- 
gineer, AFHQ;  Colonna  pointed  out 
that  airfield  construction  was  "intimate- 
ly associated  with  shifting  strategic  and 
tactical  situations"  and  should  be  "di- 
rectly under  the  Air  Force  Comman- 
der."^ 

Davison's  plan  found  no  effective 
support.  The  activation  on  18  Febru- 
ary of  the  Northwest  African  Air  Forces 
(NAAF)  under  the  command  of  Maj. 
Gen.  Carl  W.  Spaatz  with  Colonna  as 
aviation  engineer  provided  an  opportu- 
nity to  keep  airfield  construction  under 
the  control  of  the  Air  Forces.  In  addi- 
tion, the  fast-moving  situation  after  the 
German  breakthrough  at  Kasserine 
converted  Davison  to  the  principle  of 
Air  Forces  control;  early  in  March  Davi- 
son joined  Spaatz's  staff  as  aviation 
engineer,  with  Colonna  as  his  deputy. 

A  growing  concern  in  Washington 
lest  the  AAF  should,  in  effect,  detach 


'  AFHQ  Opn  Memo  27,  as  quoted  in  Avn  Engrs  in 
MTO. 


Avn  Engrs  in  MTO,  p.  16. 


THE  TUNISIAN  CAMPAIGN 


89 


the  aviation  engineers  from  their  or- 
ganic connection  with  the  Corps  of 
Engineers  and  thus  from  their  adminis- 
trative subordination  to  Army  Service 
Forces  (ASF),  the  new  name  taken  by 
the  SOS  on  12  March  1943,  led  to  an 
ASF  proposal  in  the  spring  of  1943  to 
abolish  the  aviation  engineers  and  to 
reorganize  all  engineer  construction 
under  ASF.  But  the  AAF  was  firm  in 
opposing  any  such  solution.  Moreover, 
by  April  1943  the  AAF  had  become  too 
important  an  element  of  the  armed 
forces  and  its  performance  in  North 
Africa  too  impressive  a  demonstration 
of  its  potential  for  successful  opposi- 
tion on  a  matter  that  it  held  vital  to  its 
functions  in  a  theater  of  war.  The  hotly 
contested  argument  reached  a  firm 
solution  only  at  the  end  of  1943. 

In  the  closing  two  months  of  the  cam- 
paign in  North  Africa,  the  aviation 
engineers  improved  and  expanded  the 
rear  area  construction  and  provided 
new  fields,  especially  fighter  fields,  for 
swiftly  changing  tactical  situations.  For 
example,  five  fields  the  814th  Engineer 
Aviation  Battalion  built  in  the  Sbeitla 
area  were  usable  in  seventy-two  hours 
and  complete  in  four  days.  By  the  end 
of  March,  with  the  arrival  of  837th, 
838th,  and  845th  Engineer  Aviation 
Battalions  and  the  3d  Battalion  of  the 
21st  Engineer  Aviation  Regiment,  the 
American  construction  force  in  the  the- 
ater amounted  to  nearly  9,000  troops, 
three  times  the  number  in  the  British 
Airdrome  Construction  Groups  active 
around  the  Souk  el  Arba— Souk  el 
Khemis  area.  With  ten  American  battal- 
ions and  two  separate  companies  avail- 
able in  North  Africa,  engineers  estab- 
lished a  first  priority  for  fields  behind 
the  front,  a  secondary  importance  for 
the  bomber  fields  in  western  Algeria 


and  eastern  Morocco.  The  new  arrivals 
worked  in  the  rear  area  but  also  were 
involved  in  transferring  the  large  bomb- 
er base  at  Biskra,  an  untenable  site  in 
the  heat  and  dust  storms  of  the  spring, 
to  constantly  expanding  facilities  at 
Telergma.  The  814th  carried  most  of 
the  responsibility  for  forward  airfield 
construction,  though  British  engineers 
from  Souk  el  Arba  added  their  man- 
power to  the  projects,  and  in  late  April 
two  platoons  from  the  21st  Engineer 
Aviation  Regiment  scraped  out  a  dry 
weather  field  at  Djebel  Abiod,  on  the 
coast  north  of  Souk  el  Khemis  and 
eighty  miles  west  of  Tunis.'* 

The  arrival  in  Tunisia  in  the  spring 
of  heavy  machinery  necessary  for  air- 
field construction  over  and  above  the 
Table  of  Basic  Allowance  (TB  A)  of  the 
aviation  engineer  battalions  made  pos- 
sible such  accomplishments.  Another 
important  factor  was  a  Northwest  Afri- 
can Air  Forces  order  of  5  March  set- 
ting forth  new  and  realistic  specifica- 
tions for  airfield  construction.  The  new 
specifications  called  for  the  barest  es- 
sentials— in  the  forward  areas,  one 
earth  runway  per  field,  with  loop  taxi- 
ways  and  dispersed  hardstands.  The 
directive  also  assumed  that  no  build- 
ings would  be  required,  that  bomb  and 
gasoline  dump  areas  would  be  served 
by  existing  roads,  and  that  occupying 
troops  would  provide  dugouts  and 
trenches.  Construction  shortcuts  and 
heavy  machinery  used  on  a  scale  un- 
known in  any  other  Army  found  their 
first  combined  application  to  aerial  war- 
fare in  the  Tunisian  campaign.  Heavy 
bomber  and  fighter  airfield  construc- 
tion could  keep  pace  with  the  move- 

■'  Davison  Interv;  Hist  2d  Bn,  2 1st  Engr  Avn  Rgt,  8 
Nov  42-1  Jul  43. 


90 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


ment  of  the  ground  forces  in  a  rapidly 
developing  campaign.  In  May  General 
Spaatz  stressed  the  contribution  of  the 
aviation  engineers  to  the  impressive 
performance  of  the  AAF  in  North 
Africa.  He  termed  the  Air  Forces  and 
its  aviation  engineers  a  team  able  to 
"work  smoothly  and  efficiently  during 
the  stress  of  battle.""* 

The  heavy  equipment  set  the  Ameri- 
can engineers  apart  from  the  British 
Airdrome  Construction  Groups  in  their 
achievements;  even  with  3,000  British 
airdrome  engineers  in  Tunisia,  their 
efforts  remained  concentrated  around 
their  two  main  RAF  bases  at  Souk  el 
Khemis  and  Souk  el  Arba,  the  complex 
there  consisting  of  around  a  dozen 
fields.  This  compared  with  the  Ameri- 
can construction  of  over  a  hundred 
fields  throughout  the  theater." 

Their  efficiency  was  all  the  more 
remarkable  since  the  frustrating  divi- 
sion of  control  over  the  aviation  engi- 
neers continued  until  the  end  of  the 
campaign  in  North  Africa.  The  plan- 
ning, the  preparation  of  construction 
standards,  and  the  issuance  of  work 
directives  were  in  the  hands  of  the 
engineer,  NAAF,  but  the  execution  of 
all  engineer  work  for  the  Air  Forces 
and  the  administration  of  aviation  engi- 
neers was  the  responsibility  of  the  engi- 
neer of  the  North  African  Air  Service 
Command  (NAASC),  an  NAAF  subor- 
dinate command  that  came  into  being 
along  with  NAAF  in  February  1943. 
The  dual  command  hampered  the  pro- 


"*  AAF(^  MTO,  Hist  of  Policies  Affecting  Avn  Engrs 
in  the  Mediterranean  (>ampaign,  p.  22;  OjI.  A.  E. 
Harris,  "(>olonel  Harris  Reporting"  [feature  column]. 
The  Air  Force  Engineer,  no.  17  (November  1944),  15; 
Ltr,  Spaatz  to  (X;,  AAF,  6  May  43,  MTO  Comd-Engr 
638.129,  jan-Jun  43,  900.3,  EUCOM  Engr  files. 

' '  Craven  and  C:ate,  Euntpe:  TORCH  to  POINT- 
BLANK,  p.  1 70. 


curement  of  heavy  equipment  and 
spare  parts.  Orders  had  to  be  processed 
through  the  service  command  staff, 
causing  delay  and  confusion,  and  the 
divided  control  interfered  with  replace- 
ment and  rotation  of  personnel  and 
promotion  of  officers.  At  times  "the 
aviation  engineer  officers  and  men  con- 
sidered themselves  .  .  .  neglected  and 
forgotten  troops  not  belonging  to  any 
particular  command."'*"' 

The  unsatisfactory  command  ar- 
rangements in  North  Africa  were  an 
object  lesson  to  planners  in  England 
concerned  with  the  employment  of  avi- 
ation engineers  in  the  coming  invasion 
of  Europe.  During  the  spring  of  1943 
the  planners  undertook  studies  aimed 
at  resolving  problems  of  administration, 
discipline,  and  supply,  and  in  August 
1943  Col.  Rudolf  E.  Smyser,  Jr.,  engi- 
neer of  the  Eighth  Air  Force,  went  to 
North  Africa  to  study  the  command 
situation  in  the  Mediterranean  Theater 
of  Operations  (MTO).  His  observations 
confirmed  his  opinion  that  all  engineer 
aviation  units  should  be  under  the  com- 
plete administrative  as  well  as  opera- 
tional control  of  a  single  agency  subor- 
dinate only  to  the  Air  Forces,  a  conclu- 
sion that  played  an  important  part  in 
the  later  creation  of  the  IX  Engineer 
Command  in  England.  General  Davison 
convinced  Lt.  Gen.  Carl  W.  Spaatz  of 
the  necessity  of  setting  up  a  separate 
aviation  engineer  command,  and  the 
XII  Air  Force  Engineer  Command, 
MTO  (Provisional) — changed  1  Janu- 
ary 1944  to  Army  Air  Forces  Engineer 
Command,  MTO  (Provisional) — came 
into  being. '^ 


'"■^  Avn  Engrs  in  MTO,  p.  19. 

'■^  (x)l  R.  E.  Smyser,  Jr.,  Origin  of  the  IX  Engineer 
[Air  Force]  Command;  1st  Lt.  Lloyd  F.  Latendresse, 
"Narrative  History,"  The  History  of  IX  Engineer  Com- 
mand (Wiesbaden,  Germany,  1945),  pp.  1  Iff. 


THE  TUNISIAN  CAMPAIGN 


91 


Colon  Ki.  Smyskr 


Petroleum,  Oil,  and  Lubricants  Supply 

Engineer  construction  for  POL  sup- 
ply was  of  several  types:  pipelines  from 
ship  to  shore,  bulk  storage  tanks  and 
connecting  pipelines,  and  extensive 
lines  with  pumping  units  leading  to- 
ward the  front.  In  North  Africa  exist- 
ing port  facilities  had  to  be  improved, 
tank  farms  had  to  be  built  at  conve- 
nient points,  and  many  miles  of  pipe- 
line had  to  be  constructed.  Initially,  no 
centralized  control  for  the  distribution 
and  use  of  POL  projects  existed  in 
North  Africa,  for  each  task  force  of 
Torch  was  responsible  for  its  own  POL 
supply.  Confusion,  duplication  of  ef- 
fort, and  waste  resulted.  Gradually, 
early  chaos  gave  way  to  an  integrated 
system  of  control  and  the  establishment 
of  a  common  Allied  POL  pool  from 
which  products  could  be  released  to  the 


British  and  American  armed  forces  as 
well  as  to  the  French  military  and  civil- 
ian agencies.'^ 

The  26()2d  Engineer  Petroleum  Dis- 
tribution Company,  which  reached 
Oran  on  the  D  plus  3  convoy,  immedi- 
ately went  to  work  to  rehabilitate  and 
operate  existing  French  POL  facilities 
at  the  port.  Next,  the  company  installed 
a  seven-mile-long,  four-inch  victaulic 
pipeline  from  the  Victor  Hugo  Storage 
Depot  at  Oran  to  airfields  at  La  Senia 
and  Tafaraoui.  The  same  convoy  also 
brought  fifty  miles  of  four-inch  pipe 
that  had  reached  England  just  in  time 
to  be  loaded  for  TORCH.  Delayed  for 
weeks  by  heavy  rains,  the  engineers 
eventually  erected  bolted  steel  tanks  at 
the  airfields  for  aviation  gasoline;  they 
also  installed  feeder  lines  and  dispens- 
ing racks  to  service  Air  Forces  trucks. 
The  available  storage  at  La  Senia 
amounted  to  462,000  gallons,  at 
Tafaraoui  651,000  gallons.  Another 
four-inch  line,  from  Arzew  to  Perre- 
gaux,  furnished  a  truck  convoy  connec- 
tion with  the  airfields  in  the  latter  area. 
Such  construction  exemplified  what  was 
soon  to  be  undertaken  in  other  port 
areas  in  Algeria  and  Morocco.' ' 

On  24  December  1942,  a  conference 
on  petroleum  supply,  held  at  Algiers, 
determined  the  network  of  pipelines  in 
Algeria  and  Tunisia.  From  the  port  of 
Philippeville  a  six-inch  pipeline  was  to 
run  to  the  heart  of  the  airfield  region 
in  eastern  Algeria,  with  bulk  storage  at 


"  Rpt,  Capt  M.  D.  Altgelt  to  Lt  Col  S.  A.  Potter,  Jr., 
Chf,  C&A  Planning,  OCE,  SOS  ETOUSA,  covering 
trip  to  North  Africa  (POL  Inspection).  The  paragraphs 
relating  to  administration  in  this  section  are  largely 
based  on  this  report. 

' '  Ltr,  Lt  Col  Cabel  (iwathmey,  Engr,  MBS,  to  Engr, 
MTOUSA,  6  Dec  44;  Engr  MTOUSA  file  679.11, 
Pipeline  History,  1944  and  1945;  Engr  Sch  Spec  Text 
(ST-5-350-1),  Military  Pipeline  Systems,  1950. 


92 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Ouled  Rahmoun  and  lateral  four-inch 
lines  from  there  west  to  the  Telergma 
fields  and  east  to  Tebessa.  Eventually, 
the  planners  envisaged  extending  the 
Tebessa  pipeline  branch  east  to  the  port 
of  Sousse  and  southeast  to  the  port  of 
Sfax.  The  ports  of  Bizerte,  Tabarka, 
and  Tunis  would  also  be  used. 

Extensive  pipeline  construction  got 
under  way  in  earnest  in  February  1943, 
when  two  parallel  four-inch  lines  were 
built  from  Philippeville  tb  Ouled 
Rahmoun,  one  of  them  a  V-80  line 
for  motor  gasoline.'*'  This  project  in- 
cluded plans  for  erecting  bolted  steel 
tanks  for  bulk  storage  at  existing  air- 
fields and  for  building  a  tanker  unload- 
ing line  and  a  tank  farm  at  Philippeville. 
Execution  involved  coordinating  the 
activities  of  American  engineers, 
French  Army  contractors,  and  local 
labor,  and  assembling  extensive  and 
complicated  equipment  as  well  as  ob- 
taining rights-of-way.  The  pipeline  en- 
gineers had  to  supplement  materials  at 
Mediterranean  Base  Section  (MBS)  with 
additional  stocks  requisitioned  from  the 
Atlantic  Base  Section  (ABS)  and  the 
Royal  Engineers.'^ 

By  18  February  pipe  extended  more 
than  twenty  miles,  with  construction 
actually  complete  for  only  some  three 
miles.  Then  the  work  virtually  halted 
until  more  pipe  and  other  materials 
arrived  in  the  forward  area. The  fate  of 
the  project  hung  on  transporting  bulky 
and  easily  damaged  materials  from  the 
base  sections  in  spite  of  severely  lim- 


"'  History  of  the  Eastern  Base  Section,  J un- Sep  43. 

"  Memo,  Engr,  MBS,  for  Engr  Pipeline  Co  (Sep) 
(Prov),  10  Jan  43,  sub:  Movement  of  Troops;  Memo, 
Maj  C.  L.  Lockett  for  (]oi  Donald  B.  Adams,  Engr, 
MBS,  14  Jan  43;  Memo,  Col  Morris  W.  (lilland,  XO, 
MBS,  for  Pipeline  Co  (Sep)  (Prov),  10  jan  43;  all  in 
Oil-Pipeline  (Gen),  vol.  I,  679.11,  MBS  file. 


ited  cargo  space  and  enemy  air  and 
naval  interference.  To  complete  the 
system,  additional  materials  had  to  be 
shipped  by  risky  sea  routes  because  of 
the  bottlenecks  in  overland  transpor- 
tation. 

The  2004th  Engineer  Petroleum  Dis- 
tribution Company  completed  the  proj- 
ect in  mid-April,  and  on  the  sixteenth 
the  first  American  tanker  discharged  its 
64,000-barrel  cargo  into  storage  tanks 
at  Philippeville.  Pumps  took  the  aircraft 
fuel  fifty-five  miles  through  the  pipe- 
line to  Ouled  Rahmoun.  In  this  con- 
struction job  alone  the  engineers  could 
claim  a  solid  share  in  neutralizing  the 
enemy's  air  menace  and  hastening  his 
final  capitulation  in  North  Africa. 

On  the  same  day  that  gasoline  first 
flowed  to  Ouled  Rahmoun,  the  702d 
Engineer  Petroleum  Distribution  Com- 
pany began  work  on  a  second  impor- 
tant pipeline,  closer  to  the  front.  This 
line  ran  southeast  from  the  port  of 
Bone  in  Algeria  to  Souk  el  Arba,  Tunisia, 
with  a  branch  line  to  Souk  el  Khemis. 
The  whole  system,  involving  ninety 
miles  of  four-inch  pipe  and  nine  pump 
stations,  was  completed  in  a  month. 
During  construction,  petroleum  engi- 
neers had  the  help  of  the  144th  Native 
Labor  Company,  a  working  force  of 
uncertain  value,  which  furnished  an 
average  of  148  men  a  day. 

Neither  enemy  action  nor  hostile 
natives  impeded  construction.  The  only 
necessary  road  work  was  that  through 
mountains.  Ample  tools  and  supplies 
were  on  hand.  Pipe  had  to  be  hauled 
an  average  of  sixty-six  miles,  but  the 
702d  Engineer  Company  had  a  fleet  of 
forty-five  vehicles,  including  twenty-five 
2  1/2-ton  trucks  and  ten  pole  trailers. 
The  weather  was  cool,  rainfall  moder- 
ate. Enlisted  men  engaged  in  all  phases 


THE  TUNISIAN  CAMPAIGN 


93 


''>svif> 


Gasoline  Stora(;e  at  Port-Lyautey 


of  the  operation,  including  such  skilled 
engineering  jobs  as  coupling,  testing, 
tying-in  and  connecting,  and  working 
on  pump  stations.  Natives  did  work 
requiring  no  special  skill  or  training, 
such  as  clearing  and  grading  for  the 
main  line  to  Souk  el  Arba,  stringing 
pipes,  and  ditching  and  backfilling. 

At  the  other  extreme  of  the  commu- 
nication line,  in  French  Morocco,  the 
Army  Transport  Command  and  the 
North  African  Training  Comand  at 
Marrakech  in  March  1943  estimated 
their  combined  need  for  gasoline  to  be 
800,000  to  1,200,000  gallons  per 
month.  Rail  tank  cars  to  haul  this 
amount  were  urgently  needed  else- 
where, and  the  obvious  solution  to  the 
problem  was  a  pipeline  from  Casa- 


blanca to  Marrakech.  Since  materials 
were  locally  available  to  build  this  sys- 
tem, including  terminal  storage  at 
Marrakech,  the  engineers  laid  a  four- 
inch  line  160  miles  long.  Four-inch  lines 
from  Casablanca  and  Fedala  also  sup- 
plied airfields  at  Mediouna,  Sale,  and 
Port-Lyautey,  and  another  line  con- 
nected Casablanca  and  Fedala.  The 
345th  General  Service  Regiment,  a  unit 
that  had  no  previous  experience  in 
building  pipelines,  did  the  work.'^ 


"*  Rpt  on  Pipeline,  Bone  to  Souk  el  Arba,  AFHQ 
Engr  Sect,  21  Jul  43;  Ltr,  M.  F.  Grant.  AG,  ABS,  to 
G(;,  SOS,  NATOUSA,  13  Mar  43,  sub:  Pipeline  to 
Marrakech,  Oil-Pipeline  ((ien),  vol.  I,  679.11,  ABS 
file;  Rgtl  Jnl  and  Hist  345th  Engr  GS  Rgt. 


94 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Ground  Support 

Before  the  Kasserine  breakthrough, 
the  total  combat  engineer  force  with  II 
Corps  was  three  divisional  battalions 
serving  with  the  1st  and  34th  Infantry 
Divisions  and  the  1st  Armored  Division, 
and,  as  corps  troops,  the  1 9th  Engineer 
Combat  Regiment.  During  the  three 
weeks  between  the  German  withdrawal 
from  Kasserine  and  II  Corps'  attack  on 
Gafsa,  other  engineer  units  joined  II 
Corps:  Company  B  of  the  601st  Engi- 
neer Camouflage  Battalion,  the  15th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  (9th  Infan- 
try Division),  the  175th  Engineer  Gen- 
eral Service  Regiment,  the  518th  Engi- 
neer Water  Supply  Company,  and  the 
62d  Engineer  Topographic  Company. 
A  few  days  after  the  II  Corps'  attack  on 
Gafsa  started,  the  20th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Regiment  arrived  from  Casablanca, 
followed  late  in  March  by  a  platoon  of 
the  470th  Engineer  Maintenance  Com- 
pany. Shortly  before  the  Tunisian  cam- 
paign ended,  the  10th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  (3d  Infantry  Division)  also 
joined  II  Corps. '^ 

Since  the  Allied  forces  were  on  the 
offensive  during  most  of  the  Tunisian 
campaign,  the  most  important  engineer 
function  was  to  provide  and  maintain 
roads  over  which  motorized  ground 
troops  could  roll  and  to  keep  these 
roads  clear  of  enemy  mines.  This  func- 
tion turned  around  in  mid-February, 
when  the  Germans  struck  through  the 
Faid  and  Kasserine  Passes.  At  that  time 
the  engineers  worked  on  roads  leading 
to  the  rear,  sowed  mines  in  the  path  of 
the  enemy,  erected  roadblocks,  and 
fought  as  infantry.  On  the  north,  for 


'■'  Rpt  of  Engr  Opns,  Lt  Col  W.  A.  Carter,  II  Corps, 
15  Mar- 10  Apr,  dated  1  May  43. 


example,  the  109th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion  made  possible  the  withdrawal 
of  its  parent  34th  Infantry  Division  to 
Sbiba;  on  the  south,  the  19th  Engineer 
Combat  Regiment  fought  as  infantry 
at  Kasserine.  {Map  4) 

At  daylight  on  7  February  the  109th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  pulled  into 
a  bivouac  near  Maktar  after  a  six-day 
trip  through  the  mountains  from 
Tlemcen,  near  Oran.  A  cold  rain  had 
changed  intermittently  to  snow  at  night, 
and  the  lead  trucks  found  the  twisting 
clay  roads  into  the  bivouac  area  slip- 
pery with  mud  and  clogged  with  bro- 
ken-down French  vehicles.  German  air- 
craft strafed  the  end  of  the  convoy,  still 
on  the  road  at  daybreak. 

For  a  few  days  the  battalion  improved 
bivouac  area  roads  and  reconnoitered. 
The  first  task  was  to  improve  the  road- 
net  for  troops  holding  the  Pichon  — 
Fondouk  el  Aouareb  Pass  area,  a  criti- 
cal opening  where  many  thought  the 
impending  German  attack  would  come. 
Engineer  reconnaissance  found  a  35- 
mile  trail  across  semi-desert  flats,  rock- 
ribbed  ridges,  and  sand  dunes  from 
Sbiba  east  to  El  Ala  that  could  be  made 
passable  for  six-by-six  trucks  in  a  week. 
By  14  February  the  companies  of  the 
109th  had  spread  out  along  the  route. 
Men  of  Company  C,  responsible  for  the 
middle  section  of  the  road,  discovered 
warm  springs  near  their  bivouac,  and 
many  had  their  first  good  bath  in  more 
than  two  weeks. 

On  the  night  of  16  February,  Maj. 
Vernon  L.  Watkins,  the  battalion  exec- 
utive officer,  carried  alarming  news 
over  the  rough  route.  German  armor 
had  cut  the  main  road  forward  (Sbeitla— 
Hadjeb  el  Aioun)  and,  while  the  front 
could  bend  without  serious  loss,  a  break 
that  allowed  mobile  enemy  units  into 


MEDITERRANEAN     SEA 


\Bizerte 


%Philippeville 


Bone 


La  Callel 


Tabarka 


I  ^^•  1.    #  /n,„w  Mateur 
'  Djebel  Abiod  ., 


St-Charles , 


Jemmapes 


Constantine 

Ouled  Rahmoun 
Telergma 


t  Mondavi 


Souk 
Ahras 


^       Souk 
el  Khemls. 


Djedeida 


^Bedja 


1 


fSouk 
\el  Arba 


Le  Kef  J. 


% 


CO 


'  Pont-du-Fahs 


Enfidavill^ 


( 


Kalaa 


^  Maktar     ^ 


\ 


J, 


^        Pichon 
EIAIa\ 
1  Sbiba 

Fondouk 

^^   el  Aouareb 


\DJerda    ^ 

Thala\      ff  \ 
Youks-les-Bains4%^^       _J  _  ^        1' 

7-e6essa^£    ^      ^^    j'Kasserine         ^^Hadjeb  el  Aioun 
Bekkaria    ^s  -MP^P=4^Ae/r/a 

Bou  Chebl^a^^    yKasserine  ^  ^  =^j^^ 
Thelepte^^y  ^     Paid 

/«■»„.„=  ^      Pass 


SousseJi 


^Feriana 


\ 


\ 


\ 


^Maknassy 


,Gafsa  •^^"^'' 

^El  Guettar 


f 


Gabes 


30 


TUNISIA 

1943 

Mined    area 

60    Miles 

-1 ' 

60    Kilometers 


30 


MAP  4 


96 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


sensitive  rear  areas  could  be  disastrous. 
The  engineers  were  to  convert  the  trail 
leading  west  to  Sbiba  into  a  road  the 
34th  Infantry  Division  could  use  by 
noon  the  next  day. 

Promptly  at  noon  on  the  seventeenth 
the  last  large  fill  necessary  to  make  the 
rough  trail  passable  was  in  place,  and 
two  hours  later  the  first  divisional  vehi- 
cle passed  over  it.  Traffic  stretched  half 
the  length  of  the  road  when  rain  made 
the  fresh  grades  treacherous.  By  dark 
congestion  was  mounting.  At  trouble 
spots  all  along  the  road  small  parties  of 
engineers  waited  with  tractors,  half- 
tracks, and  winch-trucks,  and  through- 
out the  night  they  pulled  and  shoved 
vehicles.  Finally,  about  daybreak,  the 
division  reached  new  defensive  posi- 
tions near  Sbiba,  where  the  tired, 
drenched  engineers  found  many  other 
pressing  jobs  waiting  for  them:  digging 
gun  emplacements,  laying  mines,  erect- 
ing wire,  building  supply  and  access 
roads,  and  freeing  stuck  vehicles. ^^ 

At  Kasserine,  the  1,200  men  of  the 
19th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment 
formed  the  nucleus  of  a  force  defend- 
ing a  road  leading  northwest  to  Te- 
bessa.  The  force  included  an  infantry 
battalion,  three  artillery  batteries,  and 
a  tank  destroyer  battalion — about  2,000 
men.  The  1st  Battalion,  26th  Infantry, 
defended  the  road  leading  north  to 
Thala. 

Since  their  arrival  in  Tunisia  on  6 
January,  the  1 9th  Engineers  had 
worked  almost  exclusively  on  improv- 
ing and  maintaining  corps  supply  roads 
into  divisional  areas.  When  the  German 
attack  began,  one  company  was  still  in 
the  Gafsa  area  with  Task  Force  Raff, 


Hist  109th  Engr  Bn,  2  Jan-  15  May  43. 


paratroopers  with  whom  they  had  been 
operating  for  several  weeks.  Another 
company  tunneled  bombproof  shelters 
for  II  Corps  headquarters  into  a  hill- 
side near  Bekkaria.  The  rest  of  the 
regiment,  bivouacked  near  Bou  Cheb- 
ka,  maintained  II  Corps  roads  leading 
out  of  Tebessa  toward  the  front. 

On  16  February,  well  before  dawn, 
the  19th  Engineers  began  a  3  1/2-hour 
move  into  Kasserine  Pass.  Fog  and  rain 
slowed  the  column,  but  at  0530  the  regi- 
ment reached  an  assembly  point  one 
mile  west  of  the  pass,  where  the  regi- 
mental commander  selected  defensive 
positions.  The  men  spent  that  day  and 
the  next  digging  in  and  laying  mines 
across  their  front,  interrupting  work 
long  enough  on  the  seventeenth  to 
cover  the  withdrawal  of  1st  Armored 
Division  units.  Fog  and  intermittent 
rains  that  had  enveloped  the  battlefield 
for  several  days  continued. 

On  the  evening  of  17  February,  Lt. 
Edwin  C.  Dryden  of  the  19th  Engineers 
received  orders  to  supervise  the  instal- 
lation of  a  minefield  in  front  of  an 
infantry  battalion's  position.  Along  with 
two  noncoms,  he  loaded  a  truck  with 
mines  and  proceeded  to  Headquarters, 
Company  C,  26th  Infantry,  arriving 
after  midnight.  At  the  infantry  com- 
mand post  the  engineers  found  no 
work  detail  ready  to  emplace  the  mines, 
nor  anyone  who  knew  where  the  mines 
were  to  go  or  what  part  they  were  to 
play  in  the  defense.  In  the  end,  the 
engineer  lieutenant,  who  had  never 
seen  the  terrain  in  daylight,  had  to 
select  the  site  and  instruct  a  makeshift 
work  party  in  laying  and  arming  the 
mines.  Work  began  after  0330.  The 
light  entrenching  tools  of  the  infantry 
proved  useless  in  the  rocky  ground,  and 
in  order  to  finish  by  daylight  the  work 


THE  TUNISIAN  CAMPAIGN 


97 


party  had  to  leave  the  mines  unburied, 
strung  across  the  road  from  a  hill  on 
one  side  to  an  embankment  on  the 
other. 

Enemy  artillery  fire  started  to  fall  on 
the  American  positions  at  Kasserine  on 
18  February.  Engineers  from  Company 
A,  19th  Engineers,  had  begun  to  grade 
a  lateral  road  across  the  rear  of  the 
defenses,  but  the  enemy  took  the  bull- 
dozer under  fire  and  the  grading  had 
to  be  abandoned.  That  evening  the  II 
Corps  commander,  Maj.  Gen.  Lloyd  R. 
Fredendall,  instructed  Col.  Alexander 
N.  Stark,  Jr.,  corrimander  of  the  26th 
Infantry,  to  "Go  to  Kasserine  right  away 
and  pull  a  Stonewall  Jackson.  Take  over 
up  there."  Colonel  Stark  assumed  com- 
mand of  a  provisional  force  (Task  Force 
Stark)  early  on  19  February,  about  the 
time  the  first  German  probe  entered 
the  pass.  This  initial  thrust  turned  back, 
and  the  rest  of  the  morning  passed 
while  the  enemy  reinforced.  During  the 
early  afternoon  several  more  compa- 
nies of  American  infantry  and  a  few 
tanks  arrived  in  Kasserine,  some  of 
them  before  the  Germans  renewed 
their  attack  in  midafternoon. 

About  1600  the  enemy's  third  attack 
of  the  day  drove  Company  D,  19th 
Engineers,  from  its  positions.  A  coun- 
terattack failed  to  dislodge  the  enemy 
troops,  and  the  day  ended  with  the 
engineer  positions  seriously  weakened 
but  still  holding.  A  French  75-mm.  bat- 
tery was  in  position  to  support  the 
engineers,  but  no  heavier  American 
105s. 

The  Germans  attacked  again  before 
dawn,  falling  mainly  on  the  26th  In- 
fantry. When  the  infantry  positions 
collapsed,  the  engineers  used  reserves 
gathered  for  a  counterattack  to  protect 
an  exposed  left  flank,  but  the  leverage 


exerted  on  the  19th  Engineer's  exposed 
flank  soon  proved  too  great.  German 
infantry,  infiltrating  behind  well-directed 
artillery  fire,  took  over  the  rest  of  the 
Company  D  positions  and  then  drove 
back  Company  E.  The  regimental  com- 
mand post  had  to  move,  but  the  Ger- 
mans brought  the  new  position  under 
machine-gun  fire  and  the  defenses 
quickly  crumbled.  Company  F  man- 
aged to  keep  control  of  its  platoons  until 
late  afternoon,  but  the  rest  of  the  engi- 
neers made  their  way  to  the  rear  as  best 
they  could  as  platoons,  squads,  and 
individuals.  When  the  regiment  assem- 
bled again,  it  counted  its  losses  in  the 
three-day  battle  at  1 1  killed,  28 
wounded,  and  88  missing. 

As  the  members  of  the  provisional 
force,  beaten  and  bloodied,  found  their 
way  to  the  rear,  few  probably  knew 
what  they  had  accomplished.  Field  Mar- 
shal Erwin  Rommel  was  operating  on  a 
tight  time  schedule,  for  Montgomery 
would  soon  fall  on  German  positions  in 
southern  Tunisia.  The  rebuff  at  Sbiba 
and  the  delay  at  Kasserine  gave  II 
Corps  time  to  assemble  the  strength  to 
stop  the  German-Italian  Panzer  Army  a 
few  miles  north  along  the  road  to  Thala. 

Analyzing  the  preparation  and  con- 
duct of  the  defense  at  Kasserine,  Col. 
Anderson  T.  W.  Moore,  commanding 
the  19th  Engineers,  pointed  out  seri- 
ous defects.  Foxholes  and  gun  emplace- 
ments had  not  been  dug  deep  enough; 
few  alternate  positions  had  been  pre- 
pared; barbed  wire  was  delivered  late 
and  used  little;  and  leadership  and  con- 
trol left  much  to  be  desired.  But  the 
engineers  had  performed  creditably  for 
a  partially  trained  unit.  The  19th  Engi- 
neers had  not  even  completed  rifle 
training  before  going  overseas,  and 
only  one  man  in  the  regiment  was  known 


98 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


to  have  been  in  combat  before.  Their 
experience  at  Kasserine  underscored  a 
lesson  taught  repeatedly  in  Tunisia: 
engineer  units  sent  to  meet  German  vet- 
erans in  combat  required  hard,  realis- 
tic training.'^' 

One  of  the  most  persistent  irritations 
for  engineer  officers  was  the  use  of 
their  troops  in  other  than  engineer 
capacities.  Standard  doctrine  permitted 
the  use  of  engineers  as  fighting  men 
under  certain  conditions,  but  in  North 
Africa  the  procedure  and  the  criteria 
for  attaching  engineer  units  to  fighting 
units  were  hardly  consistent  or  uni- 
formly applied.  Engineer  units  fre- 
quently undertook  nonessential  jobs 
simply  because  they  were  at  hand.  As  a 
result,  essential  engineer  tasks  went 
undone.  Furthermore,  attachment  some- 
times tied  up  valuable  pieces  of  engi- 
neer equipment  where  they  were  not 
needed.  The  II  Corps  engineer,  Col. 
William  A.  Carter,  Jr.,  carried  on  his 
arguments  against  using  engineers  with- 
out weighing  the  disadvantages  in  tak- 
ing them  away  from  support  duties, 
especially  in  offensive  operations.  By 
the  end  of  the  campaign,  only  one  of 
the  four  American  divisions  resorted 
to  attaching  engineer  troops. ^^ 


''^'  Hist  Record  of  the  19th  Engr  Rgt,  20  Oct  42-1 
Oct  43;  Hist  19th  Engr  Rgt,  pt.  A,  Prior  to  Arrival  in 
Italy,  1944-45;  Memorandum  of  Combat  Operations 
of  Engineer  Troops  Under  Second  U.S.  Army  Corps, 
prepared  by  Lt  Col  Carter,  Corps  Engr,  and  given  to 
Gen  Noce  during  recent  trip  to  Africa,  dated  24  Mar 
43,  African  Campaign,  EAC  files;  Eisenhower  Dis- 
patch, pp.  24-36;  Erwin  Rommel,  The  Rommel  Papers, 
ed.,  B.  H.  Liddell  Hart  (London:  Collins,  1953),  pp. 
400,  404;  Opns  Rpts,  26th  Inf  Rgt,  11  Nov  42-14 
Apr  43. 

^^  Brig  Gen  D.  O.  Elliott  to  CofEngrs,  Washington, 
D.C.,  19  Jul  43,  Rpt  on  U.S.  Engrs  in  the  Tunisian 
Campaign,  Doc  1547,  hereafter  cited  as  Elliott  Rpt, 
19  Jul  43;  Annex  16,  Lt  Col  H.  C.  Rowland,  20  Apr 
43,  in  AAR,  1st  Engr  C  Bn,  8  Nov  42-  14  Mar  43;  5th 
Ind,  HQ,  NATOUSA,  30  Oct  45  to  AAR,  16th  Armd 


After  the  Germans  retired  from  Kas- 
serine, many  of  the  roads  in  the  II 
Corps  sector  were  virtually  impassable. 
The  clay  surfaces,  softened  by  frequent 
rains,  had  deteriorated  rapidly  under 
the  heavy  military  traffic.  The  enemy 
had  little  or  no  hope  of  regaining  this 
area  and  left  behind  scattered  mines, 
cratered  roads,  and  demolished  bridges. 
Fortunately,  there  was  little  of  value  to 
destroy.  New  roads  could  be  built  eas- 
ily across  the  central  Tunisian  plateau, 
and  ruined  bridges  could  be  bypassed 
by  fords  or  culverted  fills,  for  there 
were  not  perennial  rivers  to  cross.  The 
rains  had  done  more  damage  than  the 
enemy. 

Engineer  road  work  on  a  consider- 
able scale  was  necessary  before  II  Corps 
could  launch  its  attack  through  Gafsa. 
To  move  the  1st  Infantry  Division  and 
the  1st  Armored  Division  in  this  of- 
fensive, ninety-five  miles  of  trail  had  to 
be  made  into  two-way  dirt  roads.  Grad- 
ing these  roads  was  no  great  problem. 
Using  two  D  — 7  bulldozers,  two  R— 4 
bulldozers,  and  two  graders.  Company 
C,  19th  Engineers,  with  one  platoon  of 
Company  B  attached,  in  three  days 
improved  a  rough  fifteen-mile  road  to 
the  last  infantry  outpost  east  of  Thelepte 
and  graded  twenty-four  miles  of  new 
road  from  there  joining  the  Sbeitla- 
Gafsa  road.  Other  units  made  similar 
progress.  The  main  problem  was  keep- 
ing existing  roads  open  in  the  heavy 
rains. 

During  the  attack  through  Gafsa  ( 1 7 
March— 10  April)  corps  engineers  had 
341  miles  of  other  road  to  keep  open, 
including  a  140-mile  bituminous  mac- 
adam route  from  Ain  Beida  to  Gafsa 


Engr  Bn,  3  Sep  43;  Memo,  Lt  Col  W.  A.  Carter,  H 
Corps  Engr,  for  Engr,  AFHQ,  23  May  43. 


THE  TUNISIAN  CAMPAIGN 


99 


and  five  dirt  roads  that  required  con- 
stant maintenance.  As  divisional  com- 
bat engineers  became  involved  in  mine 
work,  they  had  little  time  left  for  road 
maintenance,  and  that  task  fell  to  the 
corps  engineers.  At  this  time  the  20th 
Engineer  Combat  Regiment  made  the 
long  trip  from  French  Morocco  to  aid 
the  19th  Engineers.  The  I75th  Gen- 
eral Service  Regiment  was  also  sent  in- 
to the  II  Corps  area  to  help.'^^ 

Again,  during  II  Corps'  attack  on 
Bizerte  in  late  April  and  early  May, 
road  work  was  vitally  important,  al- 
though once  the  rainy  season  was  past, 
maintenance  was  less  a  factor.  The 
corps  roadnet  consisted  of  about  100 
miles  of  rough,  water-bound  macadam 
and  about  260  miles  of  dirt  roads,  some 
little  more  than  cart  tracks.  Offsetting 
the  advantage  of  dry  weather  was  the 
hilly  terrain.  Here,  enemy  mines  and 
demolitions  were  more  effective  because 
the  avenues  of  approach  ran  through 
the  narrow  valleys,  and  the  bridges  in 
these  valleys  could  not  be  so  easily 
bypassed.  The  attack  in  the  north 
avoided  the  valleys  when  possible  and 
generally  followed  the  high  ground. 
Some  seventy-six  miles  of  new  roads 
were  built  from  the  main  supply  route 
to  pack  mule  trails  to  reach  infantry 
positions  on  the  hills.  Bypasses  around 
demolished  bridges  accounted  for  some 
of  this  mileage. 


"•^'^  Rpt  of  Engr  Opns,  Carter,  II  Corps,  15  Mar-  10 
Apr,  dated  1  May  43;  File,  ENGP- 19-0.3  (23568) 
Master  Historical  Record-  19th  Engr  C  Gp,  Oct  42- 
Jan  44,  HRS,  DRB,  AGO;  File,  301  -Eng-0.3  (22313) 
AAR,  1st  Engr  C  Bn.  8  Nov  42-14  Mar  43,  HRS, 
DRB,  AGO;  Rpt,  HQ,  II  Corps  (Patton)  to  AG,  USA, 
Washington,  D.C.  thru  18  Army  Gp,  15  Mar-  10  Apr 
43,  dated  10  Apr  43,  Bx  49768  KCRC;  Capt  George 
E.  Horn,  The  Twentieth  Engineers,  1  Jul  43. 

'^'*  Rpt,  Lt  Col  W.  A.  Carter,  II  Corps  Engr,  28  May 
43,  sub:  Rpt  of  Engr  Opns  II  Corps,  22  Apr-8  May. 


While  no  major,  radical  changes  in 
engineer  TBA  resulted  from  experi- 
ence in  Tunisia,  some  additions  ap- 
peared eminently  desirable.  For  ex- 
ample, a  definite  need  developed  that 
each  combat  engineer  battalion  have  at 
least  one  of  the  large  D-7  bulldozers. 
More  road  graders  and  dump  trucks 
would  have  proved  useful  in  certain 
situations,  but  it  was  debatable  whether 
this  was  a  matter  of  changing  the  Table 
of  Basic  Allowances  or  of  providing 
more  Class  IV  equipment.  One  of  the 
most  needed  Class  IV  items  was  the 
power  shovel,  for  there  was  little  point 
in  providing  a  combat  engineer  regi- 
ment fifty-four  dump  trucks  to  haul 
road  fill  unless  the  means  existed  for 
providing  crushed  rock  and  for  load- 
ing it  on  the  trucks.  Road  maintenance 
took  up  a  disproportionate  share  of  the 
combat  engineers'  time  in  Tunisia  be- 
cause mechanical  means  for  loading  fill 
were  lacking.  The  only  exception  was  a 
civilian-owned  steam  shovel  the  19th 
Engineer  Combat  Regiment  put  into 
service.  In  the  final  days  of  the  cam- 
paign the  20th  Engineer  Combat  Regi- 
ment also  made  good  use  of  a  shovel — 
probably  the  same  one.  If  so,  only  one 
shovel  was  available  to  the  combat  engi- 
neers in  all  Tunisia.^'' 

Central  and  southern  Tunisia  had 
wet-weather  wadis  aplenty  but  no  per- 
manent streams.  Except  after  very  heavy 
rains,  combat  unit  vehicles  could  cross 
wet-weather  streams  as  soon  as  engi- 
neers bulldozed  dry  fords  or  built  by- 
passes around  demolished  bridges.  In 
northern  Tunisia,  on  the  other  hand, 
there  were  permanent  streams,  and 
bridge  building  was  an  important  engi- 


■"^^  Ibid.;  Elliott  Rpt,  19  Jul  43;  AAR,  16th  Armd 
Engr  Bn,  3  Sep  43. 


100 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


neer  activity.  During  this  campaign  the 
British  Bailey  bridge  first  proved  its  tac- 
tical value  to  Americans. 

During  the  closing  days  of  the  cam- 
paign, the  9th  Infantry  Division  em- 
ployed a  compromise  plan  that  proved 
satisfactory.  Under  this  plan  the  regi- 
mental combat  teams  (RCTs)  had  the 
support  of  one  company  of  combat 
engineers  each,  with  each  company  sup- 
porting its  combat  team  in  three  eche- 
lons. In  the  vanguard,  a  small  group  of 
reconnaissance  engineers  accompanied 
forward  infantry  elements.  Not  far 
behind,  a  platoon  of  combat  engineers 
cleared  mines  and  prepared  paths  over 
which  mules  carried  rations  and  ammu- 
nition to  the  front.  The  rest  of  the  engi- 
neer company  helped  the  artillery  to 
displace  forward;  built  roads,  and 
cleared  minefields.  The  3d  Regimental 
Combat  Team  had  only  one  platoon  of 
combat  engineers  attached;  being  in 
reserve,  this  team  moved  less  than  the 
others.  The  rest  of  the  engineer  battal- 
ion remained  under  division  control, 
to  be  used  where  most  needed. '^^^ 

Engineer  combat  battalion  manpower 
increased  from  634  to  745  in  the  years 
before  1942.  In  1943  Army  Ground 
Forces  redesigned  the  American  infan- 
try division,  reducing  its  organic  engi- 
neer support  to  a  battalion  of  647  men, 
and  cut  the  armored  engineer  battal- 
ion by  40  percent.  North  African  expe- 
rience argued  for  substracting  the 
bridge  company  formerly  assigned  to 
engineer  battalions,  especially  in  ar- 
mored divisions.  Though  highly  enthu- 
siastic about  its  Bailey  bridge  sets,  the 
16th  Armored  Engineer  Battalion  car- 


ried the  equipment  for  three  months 
in  central  Tunisia  before  putting  it  to 
hard  use  in  the  closing  weeks  of  the 
campaign.  The  NATOUSA  engineer 
also  found  that  he  rarely  had  enough 
reconnaissance  forces  either  at  corps 
level  or  below.  The  new  organization 
gave  each  combat  battalion  a  22-man 
reconnaissance  section  equipped  with 
three  SCR— 511  portable  radios,  bino- 
culars, and  compasses. "^^ 

Mine  Clearing 

As  the  Germans  withdrew  through 
the  Kasserine  Pass  and  Sbeitla  to  the 
Eastern  Dorsal,  clear  skies  enabled  Al- 
lied planes  to  harry  their  retreat.  On 
the  ground  American  pressure  bogged 
down,  partly  because  at  Kasserine  Anier- 
ican  troops  encountered  "mines  and 
demolitions  on  such  a  scale  as  to  sug- 
gest a  new  weapon  in  warfare."  Behind 
a  covering  screen  of  thousands  of  mines, 
the  enemy  broke  contact  and  withdrew 
unmolested  by  ground  troops. '^^ 

The  engineers  were  as  ill  prepared 
as  the  infantry  for  mine  warfare,  al- 
though they  had  responsibility  for  mine 
laying  and  mine  clearing.  One  engineer 
combat  company  commander,  who  "had 
never  seen  a  German  mine,  picture,  or 
model  before  entering  combat  in  Tu- 
nisia" had  to  rely  on  one  noncom,  who 
had  attended  a  British  mine  school  in 
the  theater,  to  train  company  officers 
and  key  men  only  a  few  days  before  his 
unit  encountered  its  first  live  minefield. "^^ 


"^"^  Lt.  Col.  Frederick  A.  Henney,  "Combat  Engineers 
in  North  Africa,  Pt.  II,  Operations  in  Tunisia,"  The 
Military  Engineer,  XXXVI,  no.  220  (February  1944), 
40-42. 


*^^  Greenfield,  Palmer,  and  Wiley,  The  Organization 
of  Ground  Combat  Troops,  pp.  309,  331,  374,  446;  Elliott 
Rpt,  19  Jul  43;  AAR,  16th  Armd  Engr  Bn,  3  Sep  43; 
Ltr,  Brig  Gen  D.  O.  Elliott  to  AGF  Board  (G-3 
Training)  AFHQ,  8  Jul  43,  sub:  G— 4  Engr  Questions 
for  AGF  Observers,  071.01  A(;F  file,  Jul  43-Dec  44. 

*^"  Eisenhower  Dispatch,  p.  36. 

'^■'  Ltr,  Lt  Col  Webb  (190th  Engr  C  Bn),  23  Apr  56; 
Ltr,  Lt  Col  Wallace  (1 5th  Engr  C  Bn),  17  Jan  56. 


THE  TUNISIAN  CAMPAIGN 


101 


Antitank  mines  were  customarily 
placed  in  staggered  rows,  checkerboard 
fashion,  spaced  far  enough  apart  to 
avoid  sympathetic  detonation.  They 
were  laid  according  to  specific  pattern 
for  two  reasons:  an  enemy  tank  or  other 
vehicle  missing  mines  in  the  first  row 
would  stand  a  good  chance  of  coming 
to  grief  on  the  second,  third,  or  fourth 
row;  and,  when  necessary,  friendly 
troops  could  more  easily  locate  and  lift 
mines  laid  in  a  pattern.  This  second 
consideration  was  important,  for  armed 
mines  played  no  favorites.  Minefields 
had  to  be  charted  and  marked  with 
care. 

During  their  retreat  in  Tunisia  the 
Germans  were  hardly  concerned  with 
having  to  relocate  mines,  so  they  scat- 
tered them  indiscriminately  anywhere 
Allied  troops  and  vehicles  were  likely 
to  travel.  Since  Allied  trucks  and  motor- 
ized equipment  were  confined  mainly 
to  roads  or  to  occasional  stretches  off 
the  road,  the  Germans  mined  shoulders, 
particularly  where  the  roads  narrowed; 
they  also  mined  road  junctions,  likely 
turnouts,  probable  bivouac  areas,  and 
wadi  crossings.  The  Germans  used  many 
tricks  to  deceive  and  slow  down  mine 
detection  teams:  they  booby-trapped 
some  mines  and  buried  others  two  and 
three  deep;  around  some  they  scattered 
bits  of  metal  that  Allied  mine  detector 
operators  had  to  mark  for  investigation. 
One  of  the  enemy's  most  effective  tricks 
was  to  bury  mines  too  deep  to  be  de- 
tected. In  this  way  scores  of  trucks  could 
pass  safely  over  a  road  and  then,  when 
ruts  became  deep  enough,  a  mine  would 
explode.  Such  methods  had  a  heavy 
psychological  effect  on  attacking  troops 
and  delayed  the  advance  more  effec- 
tively than  pattern  mining  could  have. 
In  such  circumstances,  even  though 


only  a  few  mines  might  have  been  laid 
in  some  areas,  many  miles  of  roadway 
had  to  be  swept.  All  antitank  mines  had 
to  be  handled  as  if  booby-trapped,  even 
though  only  a  small  percentage  actu- 
ally were.  And  no  matter  how  slowly  or 
methodically  mine  clearance  teams 
worked,  they  could  never  guarantee  a 
clear  route. 

The  land  mines  that  the  engineers 
had  to  deal  with  fell  into  two  categories, 
antitank  (AT)  and  antipersonnel  (AP). 
AT  mines  were  generally  pressure- 
activated — a  man's  weight  would  not 
detonate  them,  but  that  of  any  military 
vehicle  would.  They  contained  several 
pounds  of  explosives  which  could  de- 
molish a  jeep  or  immobilize  a  tank  by 
breaking  a  track  and  damaging  bogie- 
wheels.  AP  mines  were  smaller  charges 
of  explosives  set  for  the  unwary.  Acti- 
vated by  sensitive  push-pull,  pressure, 
or  pressure-release  devices,  they  re- 
quired much  more  delicate  handling 
then  AT  mines.  Varieties  of  these  two 
types,  and  the  subterfuges  with  which 
they  could  be  employed,  were  endless. 

The  antitank  Teller  mine  ("plate"  in 
German)  was  the  mine  the  Germans 
used  most  in  Tunisia,  although  they 
also  employed  others  of  Italian,  French, 
and  Hungarian  manufacture  as  well  as 
captured  British  and  American  mines. 
Four  different  models  of  the  Teller 
mine  found  in  North  Africa  had  the 
same     general     characteristics:     disc 


'"  II  Corps  Intel  Info  Summary  2,  18  Jan  43;  Ltr,  Lt 
Col  Ellsworth  I.  Davis  to  XO,  The  Engr  Bd,  26  Apr 
43,  sub:  Report  of  Trip  to  UK  and  NA  with  Ref  to  AT 
Mines,  Demolitions  and  Airborne  Engrs;  Ltr,  Lt  Ralph 
M.  Ingersoll  to  CG,  Engr  Amphib  Cmd,  14  Apr  43, 
sub:  Memorandum  on  Opns  with  AT  &  AP  Mines  in 
the  Tunisian  Campaign,  African  Campaign  file,  EAC; 
Military  Attache  Rpt  59181,  MID  WDGS,  sub:  Battle 
of  Tunisia,  22  July  1943,  AFHQ  Engr  Intel  Summa- 
ries beginning  Jan  43. 


102 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


German  S-Mine.  The  activated  canister  burst  from  the  earth  and  fired  over  300  steel 
pellets  in  all  directions. 


shaped,  about  a  foot  in  diameter,  three 
to  four  inches  thick  with  a  zinc  or  steel 
jacket  encasing  eleven  pounds  of  TNT, 
and  a  total  weight  of  about  twenty 
pounds.  Teller  mines  had  three  igniter 
wells,  one  on  top  for  a  shear-pin  type 
pressure  igniter  and  others  on  the  side 
and  bottom  for  more  sensitive  and 
more  varied  booby-trap  igniters.  These 
extra  wells,  and  the  igniters  to  fit  them, 
gave  the  mines  a  built-in  antilifting  fea- 
ture that  no  American  mines  could 
match.  American  engineers  had  to  as- 
sume that  every  Teller  mine  was  booby- 
trapped. 

The  German  antipersonnel  "S"  mine 
was  a  particularly  clever  innovation. 
Nicknamed  "Bouncing  Betty"  by  Brit- 
ish troops,  the  mine's  activation  deto- 


nated a  small  black  powder  charge, 
throwing  a  grapeshot  canister  out  of 
the  earth.  Exploding  at  waist  or  chest 
level,  the  canister  discharged  a  murder- 
ous hail  of  steel  ball  bearings  in  all 
directions. 

The  Germans  made  widespread  use 
of  booby  traps  with  blocks  of  explosives 
rigged  to  houses,  equipment,  or  even 
bodies — anything  curious  or  unwary 
troops  were  likely  to  touch,  move,  or 
walk  on.  AFHQ  engineer  intelligence 
bulletins  promptly  circulated  informa- 
tion on  various  types  of  reported  booby 
traps,  sometimes  before  they  could  be 
confirmed.  For  example,  reports  of  a 
water  bottle  that  exploded  when  the 
cork  was  withdrawn,  a  German  whistle 
that  exploded  when  blown,  and  a  booby- 


THE  TUNISIAN  CAMPAIGN 


103 


Italian  Bar  Mines.  T/w  opened  easmg  shows  the  simple  pressure  detonating  device. 


trapped  cake  of  soap  were  published 
throughout  the  command;  how  many 
others — real  and  unreal — circulated  by 
word  of  mouth  can  only  be  conjec- 
tured.'^' 

In  Tunisia  a  large  part  of  the  combat 
engineers'  time  was  given  to  laying, 
lifting,  and  clearing  mines,  often  to  the 
neglect  of  other  work  such  as  road 
maintenance.  The  16th  Armored  Engi- 
neer Battalion,  for  example,  spent  vir- 
tually half  its  time  on  mine  work,  as  did 
combat  engineers  with  infantry  divi- 
sions. To  compensate,  corps-level  engi- 
neers had  to  push  their  road  mainte- 
nance and  minefield  clearance  work 
well  forward  into  divisional  areas.  Al- 


though the  engineers  were  better  pre- 
pared to  deal  with  mines  than  was  the 
infantry,  engineer  training  in  th^  sub- 
ject left  much  to  be  desired.  ^"^ 

While  the  engineers  often  had  to  use 
the  slow  and  tedious  method  of  prob- 
ing with  bayonets  for  mines,  they  gen- 
erally relied  on  the  magnetic  mine  detec- 
tor (SCR-625)  for  speed  on  long 
stretches  of  roads,  in  bivouac  areas,  and 
on  airfield  sites.  The  detector  was  a  7 
1/2-pound  instrument  consisting  of  a 
set  of  earphones  and  a  search  plate 


"^'  AFHQ  Engr  Intel  Summaries  I,  Jan  43,  to  14, 
May  43. 


'"^  Ltr,  Ingersoll,  14  Apr  43,  sub:  Memo  on  Opns 
with  AT  &  AP  Mines;  AAR,  16th  Armd  Engr  Bn,  3 
Sep  43;  U.S.  Engrs  in  Tunisian  Campaign,  Engr  Sect, 
AFHQ,  19  Jul  43;  Rpt,  Maj  Gen  W.  H.  Walker  to  CG, 
AGF,  12  Jun  43,  sub:  Report  of  Visit  to  North  African 
Theater  of  Opns,  319.1/84,  AGF  file  (F.O.),  binder  I, 
Observer  Rpts,  1  Jan-20  Jul  43. 


104 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


mounted  on  a  wooden  disc  at  the  end 
of  a  six-foot  handle.  Dry  cell  batteries 
induced  a  magnetic  field  around  the 
search  plate  and  produced  a  low  hum 
in  the  operator's  earphones.  The  sol- 
dier "swept"  a  wide  arc  before  him  with 
the  instrument.  In  the  presence  of 
metal  buried  less  than  a  foot  deep,  the 
hum  in  the  operator's  ears  continually 
increased  in  pitch  until  it  became  a 
near-shriek  when  the  detector  was  di- 
rectly above  a  mine.  Engineers  in  the 
mine-clearing  party  marked  the  spot, 
and  other  engineers,  following  behind, 
unearthed  and  deactivated  the  mines. 
They  dug  out  but  did  not  deactivate 
mines  unfamiliar  or  suspected  of  being 
booby-trapped.  They  sometimes  placed 
a  block  of  explosive  beside  these  mines 
and  relied  on  sympathetic  detonation; 
more  often  they  attached  a  length  of 
wire  and  pulled  the  mines  out  of  their 
holes  from  a  safe  distance. ^^ 

The  SCR— 625  was  a  valuable  piece 
of  equipment  when  it  worked  but  had 
two  serious  shortcomings:  it  was  not 
waterproof  and  was  quite  fragile.  The 
instrument  shorted  out  in  wet  weather 
and  required  such  careful  handling  and 
delicate  tuning  that  normally  about  20 
percent  were  broken  or  out  of  adjust- 
ment. In  spite  of  these  drawbacks,  after 
Kasserine  Pass  the  magnetic  detector 
became  one  of  the  most  sought-after 
pieces  of  equipment  in  the  Army.  The 
16th  Armored  Engineer  Battalion  urged 
that  the  allocation  be  increased  from 


^^  Ltr,  Ingersoll,  14  Apr  43,  sub:  Memo  on  Opns 
with  AT  8c  AP  Mines.  For  background  on  the  develop- 
ment of  this  detector,  see  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal, 
The  Corps  of  Engineers:  Troops  and  Equipment,  pp. 
54-55.  Rpt  of  Engr  Opns,  Carter,  II  Corps,  15 
Mar- 10  Apr,  dated  1  May  43;  Rpt,  Maj  Gen  C.  P. 
Hall  to  CG,  AGF,  24  Apr  43,  sub:  Report  of  Visit  to 
NATO,  3 19. 1/84,  AGF  file  (F.O),  binder  I,  Observer 
Rpts,  I  Jan-20Jul43. 


The  SCR-625  Mine  Detector  in  action 
on  a  Tunisian  road. 


eighteen  to  seventy-one.  Experience  in 
Tunisia  prompted  most  engineer  units 
to  ask  that  one  detector  be  provided 
per  squad,  with  some  provision  for  a 
battalion  reserve.^"* 

Experiments  conducted  in  the  Medi- 
terranean theater  as  well  as  in  the  United 
States  sought  to  find  a  faster  way  of 
detecting  or  eliminating  mines,  particu- 
larly under  fire.  The  demand  arose  for 
larger  magnetic  detectors,  mounted  on 
vehicles,  that  could  sweep  long  sections 


''*  Ltr,  Ingersoll,  14  Apr  43,  sub:  Memo  on  Opns 
with  AT  &  AP  Mines;  AAR,  16th  Armd  Engr  Bn,  3 
Sep  43;  U.S.  Engrs  in  Tunisian  Campaign,  Engr  Sect, 
AFHQ,  19  Jul  43. 


THE  TUNISIAN  CAMPAIGN 


105 


of  road  rapidly.  Engineers  of  I  Armored 
Corps  in  French  Morocco  experimented 
with  mechanical  means,  explosives,  and 
fire  to  make  gaps  in  pattern  minefields. 
They  found  that  tanks  could  push  long 
sections  of  explosive-filled  pipe  across 
a  minefield  and  that  when  detonated 
these  "snakes"  cleared  a  path  wide 
enough  for  a  tank  to  pass  through.  Ban- 
galore torpedoes  and  nets  made  of 
primacord  also  tested  well.  But  mine- 
clearing  explosions  alerted  the  enemy, 
and  bulky  devices  occupied  a  great  deal 
of  shipping  space.  Nearby  concussions 
also  made  more  sensitive  the  unex- 
ploded  mines  which  the  snakes  left 
alongside  their  path.  Engineer  units 
carried  snakes  in  Tunisia  but  did  not 
use  them  to  blow  gaps  in  minefields.'^'' 
Two  mechanical  means  of  detection 
and  detonation  offered  some  promise. 
The  British  Eighth  Army  developed  the 
Scorpion — lengths  of  chain  attached  to 
a  revolving  axle  suspended  well  in  front 
of  a  tank.  As  the  tank  moved  forward, 
the  chain  flailed  the  ground.  The  Scor- 
pion exerted  enough  ground  pressure 
to  explode  mines  and  could  absorb  at 
least  the  initial  concussions;  however,  it 
also  created  clouds  of  dust  and  destroyed 
the  chain  flails  quickly.  The  machine 
moved  about  one  thousand  yards  into 
an  active  minefield  before  the  blasts 
took  so  many  links  from  the  ends  of 
the  chains  that  they  no  longer  struck 
the  ground.  The  enemy  could  counter- 
act the  flails  with  wire  entanglements, 
and  the  whirling  chains  often  activated 
delayed-action  mines  that  destroyed  fol- 
lowing vehicles.  In  the  end,  the  only 
antimine  innovation  that  American  engi- 


neers employed  in  Tunisia  was  a  "pilot 
vehicle"  the  16th  Armored  Engineer 
Battalion  and  1st  Armored  Division 
ordnance  personnel  developed,  an  M-3 
tank  with  concrete-filled,  spiked  steel 
drums  mounted  in  front.  Its  purpose 
was  to  find  the  forward  edge  of  a  mine- 
field without  needless  searching.  Used 
twice  during  the  last  days  of  the  cam- 
paign, the  vehicle  revealed  a  serious 
defect — the  mines  demolished  the  rol- 
ler. The  first  time  the  engineers  em- 
ployed the  vehicle  they  replaced  the 
roller  under  fire,  but  the  second  time 
they  had  to  withdraw. ^^ 

American  engineer  officers  in  March 
and  April  1943  studied  British  mine- 
field clearing  techniques  and  other 
mine  warfare  methods.  Training  teams 
from  the  British  Eighth  Army,  made 
up  of  men  with  two  years  of  experi- 
ence in  mine  warfare,  provided  valu- 
able aid.  Before  the  major  attack  dur- 
ing the  third  week  of  April,  about  forty 
American  officers  and  more  than  a 
hundred  noncoms  attended  a  mine 
school  that  the  British  First  Army  con- 
ducted with  instructors  brought  to  Tuni- 
sia from  the  British  Eighth  Army.  Other 
mine  schools  sprang  up.  Experienced 
engineers  taught  the  less  experienced, 
and  they  trained  instructors  from  in- 
fantry, artillery,  and  other  units.  Fifth 
Army  established  a  Mine  Warfare  School 
at  Ain  Fritissa  that  drew  a  few  instruc- 
tors from  the  British  Eighth  Army. 


' '  Data  from  I  Armd  Corps,  26  Jun  43,  Engr  Sch 
Lib,  764 1 ;  see  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of 
Engineers:  Troops  and  Equipment,  pp.  476ff ,  for  efforts 
in  the  United  States  to  develop  mine-clearing  devices. 


'•'AFHQ  Engr  Intel  Summary  14,  May  43;  Rpt, 
Charter,  28  May  43,  sub:  Rpt  of  Engr  Opns  II  Corps, 
22  Apr-8  May;  Address  by  Col  Edwin  P.  Lock,  Staff 
and  Faculty,  Engr  Sch,  Ft.  Belvoir,  Va.,  31  May  43, 
"Reduction  of  Obstacles  and  Fortifications,"  ETOUSA 
MAS  file.  Assault  Trng  Ctr  Conf.  For  efforts  of  the 
Ordnance  Department  to  develop  a  satisfactory  mine 
exploder,  see  Constance  M.  Green,  Harry  C.  Thomson, 
and  Peter  C.  Roots,  The  Ordnance  Department:  Planning 
Munitions  for  War,  United  States  Army  in  World  War 
II  (Washington,  1955),  pp.  387-94. 


106 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Scorpion  Tank  Crew  Loadin(;  Bangalore  Torpedoes 


One  of  the  prime  difficulties  in  con- 
ducting mine  training  was  obtaining 
deactivated  enemy  mines.  Although 
thousands  of  German  and  Italian  mines 
were  deactivated  in  the  combat  zone, 
they  were  scarce  in  the  rear  areas. 
There  were  exceptions.  Some  mines 
were  sent  to  England  for  training  pur- 
poses, and  Lt.  Gen.  Mark  W.  Clark's 
private  plane  ferried  some  from  the 
front  to  the  Fifth  Army  mine  school. 
But  most  mine  training  had  to  be  car- 
ried out  without  enemy  mines.  The 
main  reason  was  the  danger  involved, 
which  the  theater  command  believed 
outweighed  the  advantages.  Besides 
the  normal  hazards  of  handling  un- 
familiar varieties  of  live  explosives,  ex- 
plosive sensitivity  increased  with  age.  In 


one  incident  on  30  March  1943,  a  109th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  truck 
loaded  with  450  neutralized  mines  ex- 
ploded, killing  an  entire  twelve-man 
squad. ''^ 

German  patterns  of  mining  contin- 
ued superior  to  American  in  most  re- 
spects, as  did  the  German  system  of 
charting  and  recording  minefields. 
Where  American  units  kept  sketchy 
records  or  none  at  all  in  local  unit  files, 
German  engineers  carefully  plotted 
each  mine  barrier  and  sent  records  to  a 
central  office  in  Germany. 


"  Ltr,  Ingersoll,  14  Apr  43,  sub:  Memo  on  Opns 
with  AT  &  AP  Mines;  Ltr,  Lt  Col  E.  L  Davis,  26  Apr 
43,  Rpt  of  Trip  to  UK  and  NA;  Ltr,  Lt  Col  John  A. 
Chambers,  5  Apr  56;  Hist  109th  Engr  C  Bn  Tunisian 
Campaign,  2  Jan— 15  May  43. 


THE  TUNISIAN  CAMPAIGN 


107 


The  SCR— 625's  noncollapsible  han- 
dle forced  the  operator  to  stand  upright, 
often  in  sight  of  an  enemy  covering  the 
minefield  with  small-arms  fire.  What- 
ever reliability  the  detector  promised 
for  the  future,  it  was  useless  in  finding 
the  German  nonmetallic  Schu  mines, 
encased  in  wooden  boxes,  that  appeared 
in  small  numbers  in  North  Africa  and 
would  become  more  plentiful  on  the 
Continent.  Out  of  their  experience  the 
engineers  also  demanded  a  new  anti- 
tank mine  that  would  do  real  damage 
to  enemy  armor;  the  German  Teller, 
with  twice  the  explosives  of  the  Ameri- 
can models,  usually  destroyed  the  hull 
and  undercarriage  of  any  tank  striking 
it,  while  the  American  mine  would  only 
damage  a  track,  leaving  a  salvageable 
vehicle. ^^ 

The  magnetic  mine  detector,  the 
bayonet,  and  a  sharp,  suspicious  eye 
were  the  antimine  measures  that  engi- 
neers relied  upon  most  in  Tunisia. 
From  late  February,  when  the  Germans 
fell  back  to  the  Eastern  Dorsal,  until  13 
April,  American  engineers  found  over 
39,000  mines.  In  the  area  from  Thala 
and  Bekkaria  through  Kasserine  to 
Sbeitla  and  along  the  road  from 
Thelepte  to  Gafsa  mine  detection  par- 
ties removed  10,750  enemy  mines,  and 
in  the  Gafsa  area  they  found  8,700 
more.  Around  El  Guettar  they  lifted 
12,450  and  found  7,300  more  in  the 
Maknassy-Sened  area.^^ 


"*  WD  Pub,  "Lessons  Learned  from  the  Tunisian 
Campaign,"  15  Oct  43;  AAR,  16th  Armd  Engr  Bn,  3 
Sep  43;  I  Armd  Corps,  Data  file,  26  Jun  43;  AFHQ 
Engr  Intel  Summary  7,  Mar  43;  Coll,  Keith,  and 
Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Engineers:  Troops  and  Equipment, 
pp.  479-80;  AFHQ  Engr  Intel  Summary  10,  Apr  43; 
Herchal  Ottinger,  Engineer  Agency  for  Resources 
Inventories,  "Landmine  and  (Countermine  Warfare," 
North  Africa,  1940-1943  (Washington:  Corps  of  Engi- 
neers, 1972),  pp.  255-62. 

'■'  Rpt  of  Engr  Opns,  Carter,  II  Corps,  15  Mar-  10 


Water  Supply 

Because  reliable  sources  were  scarce, 
the  provision  of  water  came  next  to 
road  work  and  mine  clearing  in  impor- 
tance to  combat  engineers  in  Tunisia. 
Water  supply  involved  three  principal 
jobs:  locating  sources,  testing  and  puri- 
fying, and  distributing  water  to  the 
troops.  The  engineers  were  concerned 
primarily  with  the  first  two;  the  arms 
and  services  usually  provided  their  own 
trucks  to  haul  water  from  engineer 
water  points. 

Each  combat  engineer  battalion  car- 
ried equipment  to  establish  four  water 
points  and  normally  set  up  two  forward 
and  one  or  two  back.  As  the  divisions 
moved  forward  the  rear  water  points 
leapfrogged  over  the  forward  ones. 
Combat  engineer  regiments  provided 
similar  service  to  corps  units,  as  did  gen- 
eral service  regiments  for  units  in  areas 
to  which  they  were  assigned,  although 
in  rear  areas  much  of  the  work  was 
done  by  engineer  units  specifically  or- 
ganized and  equipped  for  water  supply. 
When  II  Corps'  offensive  through  Gafsa 
was  impending,  the  518th  Engineer 
Water  Supply  Company  moved  for- 
ward to  supplement  the  work  combat 
engineers  had  done  to  establish  water 
points,  for  the  approaching  end  of  the 
rainy  season  promised  to  make  the  job 
more  difficult.^** 

The  first  step  in  activating  a  water 
point  was  to  locate  a  stream,  well,  pond, 
or  spring.  In  Tunisia  most  of  the  sources 
were  wells,  which  were  marked  in  the 


Apr,  dated  1  May  43;  Rpt,  Carter,  28  May  43,  sub: 
Rpt  of  Engr  Opns  II  Corps,  22  Apr-8  May. 

*"  Hist  109th  Engr  C  Bn,  Tunisian  Campaign;  Rpt 
of  Engr  Opns,  Carter,  II  Corps,  15  Mar- 10  Apr, 
dated  I  May  43;  Henney,  "Combat  Engineers  in  North 
Africa,  Pt.  II,"  pp.  40-42. 


108 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


central  and  southern  parts  of  the  coun- 
try by  clusters  of  trees.  The  next  step 
was  to  test  the  water  for  potability, 
turbidity,  and  poison.  An  engineer  tech- 
nician carried  a  kit  of  test  tubes  and 
chemicals  for  this  purpose.  If  he  ap- 
proved a  particular  source,  a  squad 
brought  in  a  truck  loaded  with  a  motor- 
ized pump,  a  sand  filter,  a  chlorinator, 
and  a  collapsible  3,000-gallon  canvas 
tank  which  when  erected  stood  about 
four  feet  high.  Within  about  thirty  min- 
utes the  squad  had  water  pumping 
through  the  filters.  The  engineers  used 
chemical  disinfectants,  principally  chlo- 
rine gas  or  sodium  hypochlorite.  The 
purification  equipment  proved  entirely 
adequate,  even  for  water  that  was  highly 
turbid  and  contaminated.^^ 

During  the  Tunisian  campaign  the 
engineers  continually  put  in  and  took 
out  water  points.  Some  sources  had  to 
be  abandoned  because  pumps  sucked 
them  dry,  others  because  the  units  they 
supplied  had  moved.  During  II  Corps' 
offensive  through  Gafsa  between  17 
March  and  11  April,  the  518th  Engi- 
neer Water  Supply  Company  had  tanker 
trucks  haul  over  three  million  gallons 
of  water  to  forward  distribution  points 
called  dry  points.  Trucks  from  the  arms 
and  services  came  to  these  dry  points, 
as  they  would  to  any  other  water  source, 
to  fill  five-gallon  cans  for  their  units. 
During  the  offensive  the  518th  also 
repaired  a  generator  and  a  diesel  well 
pump,  which  the  Germans  had  dam- 
aged, to  put  the  Gafsa  and  Station  de 
Sened  water  systems  back  into  oper- 
ation. 


In  mountainous  northern  Tunisia 
during  the  final  phase  of  the  campaign, 
hauling  water  was  less  a  problem  since 
sources  were  more  numerous.  Combat 
engineers  were  able  to  operate  several 
points  in  their  own  areas,  while  the 
5 1 8th  operated  sources  for  corps  troops 
and  hospitals.  The  large  number  of 
enemy  troops  captured  in  the  closing 
days  of  the  campaign  precipitated  some- 
thing of  a  water  crisis,  and  all  available 
tankers  were  needed  again  to  haul  water 
to  prisoner  of  war  enclosures.  On  its 
peak  day  during  this  period  the  518th 
distributed  72,840  gallons  of  water. '^^ 

Camouflage 

Engineer  performance  in  camouflage 
was  less  successful  than  in  water  supply. 
Before  the  invasion  AFHQ  had  speci- 
fied that  each  army,  corps*,  and  major 
air  force  headquarters  would  have  a 
qualified  camouflage  officer  and  that 
each  unit  down  to  the  battalion  and  sep- 
arate company  level  should  name  a  unit 
camouflage  officer.  These  officers  be- 
came so  burdened  with  additional  du- 
ties during  the  campaign  that  unit  cam- 
ouflage suffered.  To  remedy  this  situa- 
tion II  Corps  obtained  Company  B, 
601st  Engineer  Camouflage  Battalion, 
and  for  three  weeks  before  the  Gafsa 
attack  had  instruction  teams  teach  corps 
units  camouflage  techniques.  But,  in 
the  combat  zone,  more  than  teaching 
was  essential,  for  camouflage  was  proba- 
bly better  understood  than  enforced. "^"^ 


^'  Capt.  Ralph  Ingersoll,  The  Battle  Is  the  Payoff  (New 
York:  Harcourt,  Brace  8c  Co.,  1943),  pp.  48-49;  Lt. 
William  J.  Diamond,  "Water  Supply  in  North  Africa," 
The  Military  Engineer,  XXXV,  no.  217  (November 
1943),  565-66. 


'■'  Rpt  of  Engr  Opns,  Carter,  II  Corps,  15  Mar-  10 
Apr,  dated  1  May  43;  Rpt,  Carter,  28  May  43,  sub: 
Rpt  of  Engr  Opns  II  Corps,  22  Apr-8  May;  Henney, 
"Combat  Engineers  in  North  Africa,  Pt.  II." 

''AFHQ  Opns  Memo  20,  Camouflage  Policy,  17 
Oct  42;  Memo,  Maj  Fred  K.  Shirk,  U.S.  Camouflage 
Officer,  Engr  Sect,  AFHQ,  (x)mments  on  (vamouflage 
Operations  During  the  North  African  (Campaign  (8 


THE  TUNISIAN  CAMPAIGN 


109 


Camouflage  was  a  command  respon- 
sibility, and  many  commanders  tried  to 
enforce  it.  Covered  windshields  did  not 
glint,  and  dusty,  muddy  vehicles 
blended  with  the  terrain.  Some  units 
draped  camouflage  nets  over  their  ve- 
hicles, some  used  the  nets  for  bedding, 
and  some  did  not  use  them  at  all.  Units 
seldom  attempted  camouflaging  vehi- 
cle tracks,  for  the  barren  North  Afri- 
can landscape  made  it  virtually  impossi- 
ble to  conceal  the  army's  bulky  motor- 
ized equipment,  particularly  when  it 
was  in  motion.  The  best  hope  was  to 
mask  equipment  identity.  Toward  the 
end  of  the  campaign,  as  the  Allies 
gained  superiority  in  the  air,  camou- 
flage discipline  relaxed  almost  com- 
pletely.^"* 

Maps 

The  II  Corps  engineer  was  responsi- 
ble for  distributing  maps  to  American 
units  in  Tunisia,  with  British  First  Army 
providing  the  maps  according  to  stock 
levels  set  for  the  corps.  The  system 
worked  well.  Five  men  of  the  62d  Engi- 
neer Topographic  Company  issued  all 
maps,  using  a  2  1/2-ton,  6-by-6  that  the 
470th  Engineer  Maintenance  Company 
converted  into  a  mobile  map  depot. 

Old  French  maps  provided  the  base 
for  the  maps  II  Corps  used  in  Tunisia; 


the  corps'  engineer  topographic  com- 
pany overprinted  more  recent  infor- 
mation. The  maps  often  proved  inaccu- 
rate on  important  points.  Scales  varied 
from  the  1: 10,000  town  plan  of  Bizerte 
(useful  during  mine  clearing  and  recon- 
struction work)  to  1:200,000  road  maps. 
Those  most  in  use  were  1:200,000  for 
southern  Tunisia  and  1:100,000  for 
northern  Tunisia.  These  scales  were 
satisfactory  for  regimental  and  higher 
headquarters  but  not  for  lower  level 
units  and  artillery.  Two  days  before  the 
attack  got  under  way  in  the  north,  Brit- 
ish First  Army  furnished  II  Corps  1,000 
copies  of  a  1:25,000  edition  and  a  few 
days  later  2,000  more  copies  contain- 
ing revised  intelligence  data.  This  large- 
scale  map  proved  valuable,  as  did  a 
1:50,000  operational  series.^' 

Aerial  photographs  could  have  done 
much  to  correct  and  supplement  the 
maps,  but  those  available  in  Tunisia 
were  wholly  inadequate.  Enlarged 
small-scale  maps  were  poor  substitutes 
for  large-scale  tactical  maps.  Good  aerial 
photography  was  needed  for  intelli- 
gence and  high  altitude  photomapping 
for  map  substitutions.  The  British  First 
Army  furnished  some  aerial  photo- 
graphs, but  II  Corps  was  never  able  to 
get  enough.  Wide-angle,  high-altitude 
photomapping  was  not  available  at  all."*^ 


Nov  42-8  May  45);  Rpt,  6()lst  Engr  Camouflage  Bn 
to  CG,  II  Corps,  26  May  43,  sub:  Resume  of  Opns;  all 
in  file  Camouflage,  2  Jul  43,  Intnl  AFHQ,  A- 1434, 
Engr  Sch  Lib.  Rpt,  Engr  Sect,  AFHQ  to  CofEngrs, 
WD,  19  Jul  43,  U.S.  Engrs  in  the  Tunisian  Campaign. 
^'  AFHQ  Opn  Memo  20,  Camouflage  Policy,  17  Oct 
42;  Ltr,  Lt  Col  E.  I.  Davis,  26  Apr  43;  Rpt,  Hall  to  CG, 
AGF,  24  Apr  43,  sub:  Rpt  of  Visit  to  NATO;  Bradley, 
A  Soliders  Story,  pp.  37,  40;  Rpt,  Lt  Col  G.  E.  Lynch, 
Observer  from  HQ  AGF,  for  Period  30  Dec  42-6 
Feb  43,  ca.  5  Mar  43,  319.1/84,  AGF  file  (F.O.),  binder 
I,  Observer  Rpts,  1  J  an -20  Jul  43. 


^-'  Rpt,  Carter,  28  May  43,  sub:  Rpt  of  Engr  Opns  II 
Corps,  22  Apr— 8  May;  26th  Inf  Rpt,  Lessons  Learned 
in  the  Gafsa-El  Guettar  Opns,  13  Apr  43;  Memo,  Col 
Michael  Buckley,  Jr.,  for  CG,  AGF,  17  May  43,  sub: 
Observer  Rpt,  1 1  Corps,  Tunisia,  21-26  Apr43;  Rpt, 
Maj  Gen  William  H.  Simpson  to  CG,  ACIF,  7  May  43, 
sub:  Rpt  on  Visit  to  North  African  Theater  (hereafter 
cited  as  Simpson  Rpt);  both  in  319.1/84,  AGF  file 
(F.O.),  binder  1,  Observer  Rpts,  1  Jan-20  Jul  43. 

"^  Rpt,  Carter,  28  May  43,  sub:  Rpt  of  Engr  Opns  II 
Corps,  22  Apr-8  May;  Rpt,  Maj  Gen  Walker  to  CG, 
AGF,  12  Jun  43,  sub:  Rpt  of  Visit  to  North  African 
Theater;  Simpson  Rpt. 


110 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Command  Reorganizations 

With  the  Allies  moving  on  an  increas- 
ingly isolated  but  still  dangerous  enemy 
in  Tunisia,  the  chief  abiding  difficulty 
in  engineer  supply  in  North  Africa, 
apart  from  expected  delays  in  ship- 
ments from  the  United  States,  was  the 
tangled  command  structure  that  evolved 
in  the  area.  In  the  attempts  to  resolve 
the  awkward  relationships  between 
AFHQ  and  the  ETOUSA  headquarters 
in  London,  the  War  Department  pushed 
for  and  General  Eisenhower  accepted 
the  idea  of  a  theater  command  in  North 
Africa.  A  reorganization  on  30  Decem- 
ber 1942  centrahzed  control  of  the 
Atlantic  and  Mediterranean  Base  Sec- 
tions directly  under  AFHQ,  relieving 
Western  Task  Force  and  II  Corps  of 
port  and  supply  line  operation.  On  4 
February  1943,  taking  advantage  of  the 
momentary  lull  in  the  Tunisian  cam- 
paign, the  War  Department  directed 
the  establishment  of  the  North  African 
Theater  of  Operations,  U.S.  Army 
(NATOUSA),  to  consolidate  and  ad- 
minister all  American  affairs  in  North 
Africa.  General  Eisenhower  headed 
AFHQ  and  the  new  theater  but  acted 
on  all  theater  administrative  detail 
through  his  deputy  commander.  Brig. 
Gen.  Everett  S.  Hughes.  General 
Hughes,  attempting  to  clarify  his  posi- 
tion for  American  forces,  requested 
that  he  be  designated  commanding  gen- 
eral of  the  Communications  Zone, 
NATOUSA  (COMZ,  NATOUSA),  since 
no  American  doctrine  specified  the 
office  of  deputy  theater  commander 
that  Eisenhower  had  conferred  upon 
him.  Formally  instituted  on  9  February 
1943,  COMZ,  NATOUSA,  existed  as  a 
graft  onto  AFHQ,  with  senior  Ameri- 
can AFHQ  officers  doing  triple  duty  as 


the  staff  for  the  COMZ  command,  for 
the  NATOUSA  headquarters,  and  for 
AFHQ. 

Further  complicating  the  structure 
after  14  February  1943  was  the  SOS, 
NATOUSA,  command,  established 
over  arguments  against  maintaining  a 
headquarters  G— 4,  a  communications 
zone  command,  and  a  separate  services 
of  supply  organization  in  the  same 
theater.  Under  the  command  of  Brig. 
Gen.  Thomas  B.  Larkin,  former  head 
of  the  Mediterranean  Base  Section, 
SOS,  NATOUSA,  was  another  level  of 
command  between  the  theater  head- 
quarters and  the  base  sections;  how- 
ever, while  the  directive  establishing  his 
command  assigned  to  Larkin  all  U.S. 
Army  logistical  functions  except  high- 
level  planning  and  policy  making,  it 
failed  to  give  him  adequate  control  of 
the  base  sections.  Already  an  anomaly 
under  the  current  field  service  regula- 
tions, since  American  doctrine  did  not 
envisage  a  communications  zone  and  a 
services  of  supply  in  the  same  theater, 
Larkin's  command  entered  into  infor- 
mal agreements  with  the  base  section 
commanders  that  placed  overall  con- 
trol of  supply,  construction,  mainte- 
nance, and  transportation  with  SOS, 
NATOUSA.  But  COMZ,  NATOUSA, 
did  not  confirm  this  arrangement;  the 
agreements  existed  only  as  policy  guide- 
lines, which  base  section  commanders 
could  circumvent.  Since  SOS,  NATO- 
USA,  had  to  issue  all  directives  to  the 
base  sections  through  COMZ,  NATO- 
USA,  General  Larkin's  plans  were  al- 
tered or  delayed  in  accord  with  other 
plans  and  priorities.  Though  the  the- 
ater command  tried  to  untangle  the 
channels  of  command,  the  end  of  the 
Tunisian  campaign  found  the  lines  of 
responsibility  between  COMZ,  NATO- 


THE  TUNISIAN  CAMPAIGN 


ill 


USA,  and  SOS,  NATOUSA,  and  be- 
tween SOS,  NATOUSA,  and  AFHQ's 
G-4  still  unclear.  The  AFHQ  G-4, 
acting  as  planner  for  the  inter-Allied 
staff  and  also  in  his  NATOUSA  capa- 
city, frequently  operated  in  the  field  of 
supply  and  dealt  with  the  base  sections 
directly  where  SOS  authority  should 
have  prevailed.  This  command  chain 
persisted  for  another  year  until  the  dis- 
solution of  COMZ,  NATOUSA,  and 
the  consolidation  of  logistical  operations 
under  SOS,  NATOUSA,  on  20  Febru- 
ary 1944.  Within  that  chain.  Brig.  Gen. 
Donald  A.  Davison,  as  AFHQ  engineer, 
also  acted  as  chief  engineer  to  the 
NATOUSA  and  the  COMZ,  NATO- 
USA,  commands.  As  with  other  Ameri- 
can staff  officers  similarly  situated,  he 
had  to  remember  in  which  capacity  he 
was  acting  in  any  given  matter. 

Other  complications  continued  to 
plague  the  U.S.  Army  logistical  system 
in  North  Africa.  The  chiefs  of  U.S. 
Army  technical  services  remained  at 
AFHQ/NATOUSA  instead  of  transfer- 
ring to  SOS,  NATOUSA,  as  might  have 
been  expected.  This  arrangement  fur- 
ther circumscribed  Larkin's  span  of 
control  and  authority.  Finally,  SOS, 
NATOUSA,  had  to  set  up  its  headquar- 
ters at  Oran,  the  principal  American 
supply  base  in  North  Africa,  although 
AFHQ/NATOUSA  headquarters  in- 
stallations lay  at  Algiers,  over  200  miles 
to  the  east.  Communications  over  this 
distance  often  slowed  logistical  reaction 
time. 

The  establishment  of  SOS,  NATO- 
USA,  created  a  new  set  of  personnel 
problems  for  the  engineers.  The  Engi- 
neer Section  of  SOS,  NATOUSA,  in- 
formally came  into  being  in  February 
with  six  officers  and  seven  enlisted  men 
borrowed  from  the  1st  Engineer  Am- 


phibian Brigade.  Not  until  April  did 
the  section  receive  an  allotment  of  five 
officers  and  fourteen  enlisted  men  and 
return  the  borrowed  personnel  to  the 
brigade.  Initially,  the  principal  function 
of  the  small  SOS,  NATOUSA,  Engi- 
neer Section  was  to  control  and  edit 
requisitions  for  engineer  supplies  that 
the  base  section  engineers  drew  on  the 
United  States  or  the  United  Kingdom. 
In  turn,  the  main  tasks  of  the  base  sec- 
tion engineers  during  the  Tunisian 
campaign  were  to  construct  and  main- 
tain supply  routes  and  to  operate  engi- 
neer supply  depots.^^ 

Atlantic  Base  Section 

All  along  the  long  line  of  communica- 
tions from  Casablanca  east,  prepara- 
tions went  forward  with  all  possible 
speed  for  the  decisive  battles  in  Tunisia. 
Engineer  supplies  and  equipment  came 
into  Atlantic  Base  Section  (ABS)  at 
Casablanca  at  the  rate  of  2,000  tons 
per  convoy,  and  ABS  issued  large 
amounts  of  engineer  supplies  to  units 
staging  for  Tunisia.  The  depot  respon- 
sibilities taxed  the  ABS  engineer  sup- 
ply personnel  (built  around  the  451st 
Engineer  Depot  Company)  to  the  limit, 
and  local  labor  could  not  meet  the 
emergency.  In  April  the  arrival  of  an 
engineer  general  service  company  eased 
the  problem  at  the  ABS  engineer  depot. 


'^  Leo  J.  Meyer,  The  Strategy  and  Logistical  History: 
MTO.  chs.  Vl-Vn,  MS  in  CMH;  History  of  Allied 
Force  Headquarters,  pt.  I,  Aug-Dec  42,  pp.  61-62; 
and  pt.  n,  sec.  1,  p.  200;  G-4  Staff,  MTOUSA, 
Logistical  History  of  NATOUSA-MTOUSA  (Naples:  G. 
Montanio,  1945),  p.  24;  Memo,  Lt  Col  O.  B.  Beasley, 
XO,  Engr  Sect,  AFHQ,  for  CG,  NATOUSA,  27  Mar 
43,  sub:  Orgn  of  the  Engr  Sect,  AFHQ/NATOUSA, 
NATOUSA  Engr  Sect,  320.2  (2);  WD,  Field  Service 
Regulations,  Administration,  FM  100-10,  9  Dec  40, 
pp.  20-23. 


112 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Unit  demands  for  many  items  in 
excess  of  Table  of  Basic  Allowances, 
together  with  a  growing  need  for  vastly 
more  material  for  housing,  hospitals, 
and  sanitary  facilities  than  originally 
planned,  placed  most  items  in  ABS 
engineer  dumps  in  the  "critical"  cate- 
gory. Construction  supplies  from  the 
United  States  lagged  far  behind  requisi- 
tions and  procuring  locally  such  items 
as  cement,  lumber,  and  electrical  and 
plumbing  equipment  was  difficult.  A 
major  drop  in  imports  since  the  out- 
break of  war  in  Europe  in  1939  had 
created  a  serious  shortage  of  construc- 
tion supplies  of  all  types  throughout 
French  Morocco,  and  local  merchants 
and  manufacturers  tended  to  hold  back 
materials  that  might  later  bring  higher 
prices;  however,  centralized  purchas- 
ing for  engineer  supply  items  largely 
overcame  the  local  procurement  prob- 
lem. 

By  mid-May,  at  the  end  of  the  Tuni- 
sian campaign,  ABS  engineers  had  vir- 
tually completed  their  own  construction 
program  and  had  issued  tons  of  locally 
procured  construction  material.  At  the 
same  time,  less  than  half  the  construc- 
tion supplies  ABS  engineers  had  requi- 
sitioned from  the  United  States  had 
reached  Casablanca.  Much  of  the  miss- 
ing materiel  that  began  to  arrive  dur- 
ing succeeding  weeks  was  no  longer 
needed.  By  late  June  ABS  engineer 
dumps  contained  10  million  board  feet 
of  unwanted  lumber.'*^ 

Mediterranean  Base  Section 

At  Oran,  the  site  of  both  Mediterra- 
nean Base  Section  (MBS)  and  SOS, 


NATOUSA,  personnel  problems  were 
much  the  same  as  those  at  ABS.  Four 
engineer  supply  depots  were  in  the 
Oran  area  by  late  December  1942,  but 
only  the  450th  Engineer  Depot  Com- 
pany (less  one  platoon)  was  available  to 
operate  them.  As  early  as  December  an 
engineer  dump  truck  company  and  two 
companies  of  the  1st  Engineer  Amphib- 
ian Brigade  had  to  be  diverted  to  depot 
operations,  and  the  depots  also  em- 
ployed about  800  local  laborers.  In  mid- 
winter the  understrength  ( 1  officer  and 
80  enlisted  men)  715th  Engineer  Depot 
Company  joined  the  force.  By  March, 
when  the  460th  Engineer  Depot  Com- 
pany reached  Oran  from  the  Zone'of  the 
Interior  (ZI),  the  MBS  engineer  depots 
were  employing  approximately  1,500 
local  laborers.  In  April  the  462d  Engi- 
neer Depot  Company  arrived  from  the 
ZI.  Nevertheless,  the  MBS  engineer 
constantly  had  to  add  nonsupply  engi- 
neer detachments  to  the  depot  force. 
These  detachments  generally  had  no 
supply  training  and  had  to  learn  on  the 
job  to  unload,  handle,  store,  and  account 
for  engineer  supplies."*^ 

Shortages  of  equipment,  especially 
vehicles,  also  plagued  engineer  supply 
operations  within  MBS.  As  of  Febru- 
ary 1943  the  450th  Engineer  Depot 
Company,  the  first  such  unit  in  the 
Oran  area,  was  30  percent  short  of  its 
TBA  vehicles,  the  715th  Engineer  De- 
pot Company  60  percent  short,  and 
other  engineer  units  assigned  to  depot 
operations  an  average  of  31.5  percent 


^"  History  of  the  Atlantic  Base  Section  to  June  1, 
1943,  vol.  I,  pp.  29-32. 


'•'  Memo,  Col  George  D.  Pence,  G-  1 ,  MBS,  for  C(i, 
MBS,  24  Jan  43,  sub:  Status,  Shipments  of  U.S.  Units 
and  Casual  Personnel;  Rpt,  Col  Morris  W.  Gilland, 
Dep  Engr,  MBS  to  CG,  MBS,  27  Dec  42,  sub:  Lessons 
from  Operation  Torch,  HQ,  MBS;  Rpt,  Lt  Col  R.  W. 
Colglazier,  Jr.,  Asst  XO,  Engr  Sect,  to  CG,  MBS,  24 
Jan  43,  sub:  Current  Status  Rpt.  Engr  Serv,  MBS. 


THE  TUNISIAN  CAMPAIGN 


113 


short.  The  most  serious  need  was  dump 
trucks,  and  the  MBS  engineer  con- 
stantly tried  to  obtain  more  of  them.  In 
late  January  1943  he  requested  the 
highest  shipping  priority  for  dump 
trucks,  pointing  out  that  they  repre- 
sented a  very  small  percentage  of  engi- 
neer tonnage. ^'^  The  Tunisian  campaign 
ended,  however,  before  the  problem 
was  solved. 

During  January  1943  MBS  engineer 
depots  shipped  an  average  of  250  tons 
of  engineer  supplies  per  day  eastward 
to  support  operations  in  Tunisia.  The 
figure  rose  to  400  tons  in  February,  500 
tons  in  March,  and  900  tons  in  April; 
however,  the  end  of  the  Tunisian  cam- 
paign in  mid-May  brought  that  month's 
average  down  to  450.  While  the  MBS 
engineers  were  issuing  supplies,  they 
also  had  to  handle  increasingly  large 
receipts.  In  February,  for  example, 
MBS  engineer  depots  received  an  aver- 
age of  600  tons  of  supplies  and  equip- 
ment per  day,  and  at  the  end  of  the 
month  engineer  depot  stocks  approxi- 
mated 35,000  tons.  The  receipt  aver- 
age for  March  was  about  700  tons  a 
day,  for  April  approximately  1,400 
tons,  and  for  May  1,375  tons.  At  the 
end  of  May,  MBS  engineer  depots  held 
more  than  100,000  tons  of  engineer 
supplies  and  equipment.''' 

Eastern  Base  Section 

NATOUSA  established  the  Eastern 
Base  Section  (EBS)  on   13  February 


'•"  Rpt,  Colglazier  to  (Xi,  MBS,  24  Jan  43,  sub:  Cur- 
rent Status  Rpt;  Portfolio  entitled  Nov  42- Jan  43, 
MBS. 

''  Monthly  Rpts,  Engr  Serv,  MBS,  Mar,  Apr,  May, 
and  Jun  43,  314.7  Hist,  1942-44,  North  African  Ser- 
vice Comd  file;  History  of  the  Mediterranean  Base 
Section,  Sep  42-May  44,  in  CMH. 


1943  to  support  II  Corps  in  Tunisia. 
The  commander  was  Col.  Arthur  W. 
Pence,  and  the  chief  of  the  Engineer 
Section  was  Col.  Donald  B.  Adams.  The 
command  organized  and  undertook 
planning  at  Oran,  and  on  23  February 
began  moving  eastward  to  Constantine, 
in  Algeria,  about  100  miles  short  of  the 
Tunisian  border.  The  organization  of 
EBS  nearly  coincided  with  significant 
changes  in  tactical  command  within 
Allied  forces  in  North  Africa.  On  7 
March  Lt.  Gen.  George  S.  Patton,  Jr., 
took  over  command  of  II  Corps  from 
Maj.  Gen.  Lloyd  R.  Fredendall,  and  II 
Corps  passed  from  the  control  of  the 
British  First  Army  to  that  of  18  Army 
Group,  General  Sir  Harold  R.  L.  G. 
Alexander  commanding.  The  British 
First  and  Eighth  Armies  constituted  the 
other  major  components  of  18  Army 
Group. 

The  principal  problems  EBS  engi- 
neers faced  were  receiving,  storing,  and 
issuing  materiel;  repairing  and  main- 
taining supply  roads;  building  adequate 
depot  facilities  and  shops;  and  rehabili- 
tating ports  at  Philippeville  and  Bone, 
on  the  Mediterranean  coast  north  from 
Constantine.  The  necessity  of  quick 
reaction  to  changes  in  the  progress  of 
the  ground  campaign  differentiated 
EBS  from  ABS  and  MBS. 

In  March  the  principal  EBS  engineer 
depot  lay  at  Tebessa,  close  to  the  Tuni- 
sian border,  about  110  miles  southeast 
of  Constantine  and  within  relatively 
easy  supporting  distance  of  II  Corps. 
When  II  Corps  suddenly  moved  to 
northern  Tunisia  in  April,  EBS  engi- 
neers followed  suit.  They  concentrated 
at  a  partially  constructed  EBS  general 
depot  at  Mondovi,  about  twenty-five 
miles  south  of  Bone,  and  rapidly  set  up 
advance  engineer  dumps  at  La  Calle 


114 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


and  Tabarka,  on  the  coast  east  from 
Bone.  Employing  eight-ton  and  sixteen- 
ton  trailers,  among  other  vehicles,  engi- 
neers rushed  forward  engineer  supplies 
and  equipment  not  only  from  Tebessa 
and  Mondovi  but  also  from  EBS  depots 
at  St. -Charles  and  Ouled  Rahmoun. 
The  rapid,  24-hour-a-day  engineer  dis- 
placement played  a  large  part  in  mak- 
ing II  Corps'  swift  advance  toward 
Bizerte  possible.'''^ 

For  all  the  engineer  units  involved, 


'^  History  of  the  Eastern  Base  Section,  Feb-  1  Jun 
43,  in  CMH:  Rpt,  Engr,  EBS,  to  CofEngrs,  WD,  Activi- 
ties of  the  Engr  Serv,  EBS,  2  Nov  43;  Rpt,  Lt  Col 
Robert  B.  Oear,  AFHQ  Engr  Sect,  to  Chf  Engr, 
AFHQ,  Rpt  of  Supply  Inspection  Trip  to  Tunisia, 
333,  Rpts  on  Visits  and  Inspections,  NATOUSA  Engr 
flie. 


one  of  the  greatest  practical  drawbacks 
in  applying  the  experience  of  North 
Africa  was  the  short  period  in  which  to 
determine  required  changes  in  doc- 
trine, organization,  and  practice. 
Though  much  of  this  knowledge  was 
cumulative  and  was  absorbed  from  the 
first  in  the  theater,  the  process  of  learn- 
ing was  uneven.  Some  units,  the  engi- 
neer amphibian  brigade  in  particular, 
were  shunted  into  duty  in  rear  areas 
where  they  could  not  gain  experience 
in  a  unique  mission.  Nevertheless,  the 
lessons  of  past  shortcomings  were  ap- 
plied to  the  planning  for  the  invasion 
of  Sicily,  scheduled  for  mid-July  1943, 
only  seven  weeks  after  the  close  of  the 
Tunisian  battles  that  ended  German 
and  Italian  military  influence  in  Africa. 


CHAPTER  VI 


Sicily:  The  Beachhead 


The  British  and  American  Combined 
Chiefs  of  Staff  (CCS)  agreed  at  Casa- 
blanca in  January  1943  that  Sicily  would 
be  the  next  major  Allied  target  in  the 
Mediterranean  after  Tunisia.'  Soon 
afterward  AFHQ  named  several  offi- 
cers to  Allied  planning  staffs  for 
Husky,  the  code  name  of  the  Sicilian 
venture.  They  met  on  10  February 
1943  in  Room  141  of  the  St.  Ceorge 
Hotel  in  Algiers  and  took  the  cover 
name  Force  141.  The  group  operated 
as  a  subsection  of  G— 3,  AFHQ,  until 
15  May,  when  it  merged  with  the  deac- 
tivated headquarters  of  15th  Army 
Group  to  become  an  independent  oper- 
ational and  planning  headquarters.  On 
D-day  of  HUSKY,  the  merged  organiza- 
tion became  Headquarters,  15th  Army 
Group,  General  Sir  Harold  R.  L.  G. 
Alexander  commanding.  Force  141 
prepared  a  general  plan,  and  separate 
American  (Force  343)  and  British 
(Force  545)  task  forces  worked  out 
details.  Force  343  evolved  into  Head- 
quarters, Seventh  U.S.  Army,  under 
General  Patton,  and  Force  545  into 


'  The  general  sources  for  this  chapter  are:  Lt.  Col. 
Albert  N.  Garland  and  Howard  McGaw  Smyth,  Sicily 
and  the  Surrender  of  Italy,  United  Slates  Army  in  World 
War  II  (Washington,  1965);  History  of  Allied  Force 
Headquarters,  pt.  II,  Dec  42 -Dec  43,  sec.  1;  HQ, 
Force  141,  Planning  Instr  1,  in  Rpt  of  Opns,  Seventh 
U.S.  Army  in  the  Sicilian  Campaign,  10  Jul- 17  Aug 
43  (hereafter  cited  as  Seventh  Army  Rpt  Sicily). 


Headquarters,  British  Eighth  Army, 
under  General  Montgomery. 

The  engineer  adviser  to  Force  141 
during  the  early  planning  months  was 
Lt.  Col.  Charles  H.  Bonesteel  III,  who 
later  became  deputy  chief  engineer 
(U.S.)  at  Headquarters,  15th  Army 
Group.  Despite  the  limited  Force  141 
planning,  the  force  engineers  and  the 
Engineer  Section  at  AFHQ  from  the 
first  sought  to  line  up  the  engineer 
units,  equipment,  and  supplies  that 
would  be  required  once  detailed  prepa- 
rations got  under  way.  The  engineer 
planners  also  compiled  supply  lists  for 
the  elements  of  Forces  343  and  545  that 
would  be  mounted  in  North  Africa  and 
gave  them  to  SOS,  NATOUSA,  and  the 
British  Engineer  Stores  for  procure- 
ment. 

Supplies  not  available  in  the  theater 
had  to  come  from  the  United  States,  a 
process  that  would  take  ninety  days  for 
many  items.  Anticipating  a  mid-July 
target  date  for  HUSKY,  SOS,  NATO- 
USA,  asked  that  requisitions  be  in  by 
18  April.  Since  this  date  was  well  be- 
fore detailed  plans  for  the  assault  were 
completed,  the  requisitions  Force  141 
and  AFHQ  prepared  were  aimed  at 
providing  a  general  reserve  from  which 
the  task  forces  could  draw  later.  The 
original  supply  lists  were  predicated  on 
the  assumption  that  the  port  of  Paler- 
mo would  be  in  use  about  D  plus  8,  but 


116 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


in  May  tactical  planners  changed  the 
location  of  assault.  Earlier  planning  had 
to  be  revised  completely,  and,  for  the 
most  part,  supply  requirements  had  to 
be  increased.  The  result  was  oversup- 
ply  of  some  items  and  shortages  of 
others.  Supply  planners  made  up  the 
shortages  by  drawing  from  units  that 
would  temporarily  remain  in  North 
Africa.^ 

Force  141  and  the  AFHQ  Engineer 
Section  also  drew  up  a  troop  list  in  an 
effort  to  assure  that  the  necessary 
troops  reached  the  theater.  Engineer 
planners  were  able  to  get  approval  for 
an  engineer  allocation  of  about  1 5  per- 
cent of  the  total  HUSKY  ground  forces. 
They  asked  for  several  special  engineer 
organizations,  including  a  headquarters 
and  headquarters  company  of  a  port 
construction  and  repair  group,  an 
equipment  company,  a  utilities  com- 
pany, and  two  "Scorpion"  companies.^ 

In  the  meantime  engineers  labored 
under  two  major  unknowns — the  time 
and  the  place  of  the  assault.  Not  until 
13  April  did  the  Combined  Chiefs  of 
Staff  approve  a  target  date  of  10  July, 
and  the  decision  on  where  to  land  on 
Sicily  came  even  later.  Messina,  only 
three  miles  from  the  Italian  mainland, 
was  the  final  objective,  but  was  consid- 


'^  Seventh  Army  Engr  Rpt  Sicily;  Col  Garrison  H. 
Davidson,  Preliminary  Rpt  of  Seventh  Army  Engr  on 
the  Sicilian  Opn,  23  Aug  43;  Ltr,  Brig  Gen  D.  O.  Elliott 
to  AFHQ,  21  Sep  43,  sub:  Administrative  Lessons 
Learned  from  Opns  in  Sicily  from  the  Engr  Viewpoint; 
latter  two  in  370.212  Sicily,  Rpts  of  Opns,  Aug  43  to 
Oct  43,  AFHQ  files.  Ltr,  Lt  Col  Bonesteel  to  Brig  Gen 
C.  R.  Moore,  Chf  Engr,  ETOUSA,  22  Jul  43,  321 
Engr  Units  42-43,  AFHQ  files. 

^  Ltr,  Bonesteel  to  Moore,  22  Jul  43.  During  the 
campaign  engineer  troops,  including  aviation  engi- 
neers, made  up  10.5  [>ercent  of  Seventh  Army  strength 
in  Sicily.  See  Chf  Engr,  1 5th  Army  Gp,  Notes  on  Engr 
Opns  in  Italy,  no.  6,  1  Jan  44. 


ered  too  strong  for  direct  assault.  The 
Americans  and  British  would  have  to 
land  elsewhere  and  move  overland 
against  Messina.  Ground  forces  would 
need  ports  to  ensure  their  supply  lines, 
and  airfields  close  enough  to  provide 
fighter  cover. 

The  chief  ports  and  airfields  on  Sic- 
ily clustered  at  opposite  ends  of  the 
island.  In  the  northwest  lay  Palermo, 
the  largest  port,  and  nearby  were  sev- 
eral airfields,  while  another  group  of 
airfields  lay  along  the  southeastern 
coast.  The  assumption  that  Palermo 
had  to  be  seized  early  shaped  HUSKY 
planning  for  months,  but  General 
Montgomery,  commanding  the  British 
Eighth  Army,  insisted  that  the  landings 
be  concentrated  at  the  southeast  cor- 
ner of  the  island,  and  on  3  May  Gen- 
eral Eisenhower  approved  Mont- 
gomery's plan. 

The  new  plan  called  for  the  simulta- 
neous landing  of  eight  divisions  along 
a  100-mile  front  between  Licata  and 
Syracuse.  The  British  Eighth  Army, 
landing  on  the  east,  was  to  seize  Syra- 
cuse and  other  moderate-sized  ports 
nearby.  The  American  Seventh  Army, 
under  General  Patton,  was  to  land 
along  the  shores  of  the  Gulf  of  Gela, 
far  from  any  port  of  consequence.  Sev- 
enth Army  would  depend  upon  supply 
over  the  beach  for  as  much  as  thirty 
days,  a  prospect  that  would  have  been 
considered  impossible  only  a  few  weeks 
earlier. 

During  the  latter  part  of  1942  the 
production  of  landing  ships  and  craft 
accelerated,  reaching  a  peak  in  Febru- 
ary 1943.  Force  141  had  ordered  all  of 
these  vessels  it  could  get,  and  when  they 
became  available  in  some  numbers  sup- 
ply over  the  southern  beaches  began  to 


SICILY:  THE  BEACHHEAD 


117 


Ponton  Causeway  Extending  From  an  LST  to  Shore 


seem  feasible.^  The  new  amphibious 
equipment  included  DUKWs,  -naval 
pontons,  and  new  types  of  landing 
craft.  The  DUKW  was  a  2  1/2-ton  am- 
phibious truck  that  could  make  five 
knots  at  sea  and  normal  truck  speeds 
on  land.  It  offered  great  promise,  for  it 
could  bridge  the  critical  gap  between 
the  ships  offshore  and  the  supply 
dumps  behind  the  beach. 

New  types  of  shallow-draft  landing 
craft  featured  hinged  bows  and  ramps 
forward.  Flat-bottomed,  without  pro- 
jecting keels,  they  were  difficult  to 


*  Richard  M.  Leighton,  "Planning  for  Sicily,"  U.S. 
Naval  Institute  Proceedings,  LXXXVIII,  no.  5  (May 
1962),  90-101;  Seventh  Army  Rpt  Sicily,  pp.  A-5  to 
A-8;  Col  A.  H.  Head,  Notes  on  the  Planning,  Train- 
ing, and  Execution  of  Operation  Husky,  Misc  Papers 
NEin  UNE,  HQ,  ETOUSA,  files. 


maneuver  in  a  high  cross  wind  or  surf 
but  could  come  close  enough  to  shore 
to  put  men  and  vehicles  in  shallow 
water.  The  36-foot  LCVP,  which  could 
carry  thirty-six  combat-equipped  in- 
fantrymen or  four  tons  of  cargo,  swung 
into  the  water  off  an  invasion  beach 
from  a  larger  vessel  in  a  ship-to-shore 
operation.  Newer  LSTs  (Landing  Ship, 
Tank),  coming  into  production  in 
December  1942,  were  designed  for 
shore-to-shore  amphibious  assaults. 
The  American  model  was  328  feet  long, 
had  a  50-foot  beam,  and  on  ocean  voy- 
ages accommodated  up  to  1,900  tons 
of  cargo  or  20  medium  tanks;  163 
combat-ready  troops  could  find  ade- 
quate, if  sparse,  berthing  aboard. 
British-built  versions  were  slightly 
larger  and  drew  more  water  at  the  stern 


118 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


than  at  the  bow  and  so  tended  to  ground 
on  the  gradually  sloping  shelves  and 
shifting  sandbars  in  front  of  the  Medi- 
terranean beaches.  Navy  steel  pontons 
running  from  the  ship's  bow  to  shore 
would  serve  as  causeways  to  dry  land 
for  cargo  and  vehicles  aboard  the  LSTs. 
Two  intermediate-size  landing  craft 
that  served  as  lighters  for  the  LSTs  and 
for  larger  attack  transports  and  auxilia- 
ries were  the  50-foot  LCM  (Landing 
Craft,  Mechanized)  and  the  150-foot 
LCT  (Landing  Craft,  Tank).  Both  had 
a  speed  of  ten  knots  and  drew  little 
more  than  three  feet  of  water  fully 
loaded.  The  LCM  took  on  1  medium 
tank,  30  tons  of  cargo,  or  120  troops. 
The  invaluable  LCT  could  transport 
five  thirty-ton  tanks  or  a  comparable 
load  of  cargo  or  troops.^ 

Plans  and  Preparations 

Eisenhower  selected  Headquarters,  I 
Armored  Corps,  at  Rabat  as  the  head- 
quarters for  Force  343,  and  the  I 
Armored  Corps  engineer,  Col.  Garri- 
son H.  Davidson,  was  named  the  Force 
343  engineer.  On  25  March  he  began 
planning  for  HUSKY,  but  unlike  Force 
545  (the  British  task  force),  I  Armored 
Corps  still  had  some  operational  duties 
in  North  Africa.  Not  until  13  June  did 
Force  343  issue  a  complete  engineer 
plan  outlining  boundaries  and  setting 
general  policies.  Each  subtask  force 


^  Fifth  Army  Training  Center  History;  ONI  226,  7 
Apr  44,  Allied  Landing  Craft  and  Ships,  and  Supple- 
ment 1  to  ONI  226;  Robert  W.  Coakley  and  Rich- 
ard M.  Leighton,  Global  Logistics  and  Strategy,  1943  — 
1945,  United  States  Army  in  World  War  II  (Washing- 
ton, 1968),  apps.  B-1,  B-2,  pp.  827-29;  Samuel  E. 
Morison,  "History  of  United  States  Naval  Operations 
in  World  War  II,"  vol.  IX,  Sicily-Salemo-Anzio,  January 
1943 -June  1944  (Boston:  Little,  Brown  Company, 
1957),  pp.  30-32. 


commander,  who  was  to  control  his 
assault  area  for  the  first  few  days, 
worked  out  his  own  detailed  assault  and 
engineer  plans. ^ 

Planning  for  HUSKY  was  difficult. 
The  time  and  place  of  the  assault  were 
fixed  late.  AFHQ's  preoccupation  with 
the  Tunisian  campaign  meant  that  the 
list  of  major  combat  units  to  be  used  in 
Husky  could  be  determined  only  after 
Axis  forces  in  North  Africa  capitulated 
early  in  May.  Also,  AFHQ  wrapped 
heavy  security  around  the  coming 
operation.  Engineer  unit  commanders 
were  briefed  on  HUSKY  only  after  em- 
barking for  Sicily,  too  late  for  realistic 
preinvasion  training.  Even  in  the  higher 
engineer  echelons,  essential  informa- 
tion was  slow  in  coming.  Though  Head- 
quarters, I  Armored  Corps,  was  named 
the  task  force  headquarters  for  the 
invasion  in  early  March,  no  one  told 
the  corps  engineer  of  his  new  assign- 
ment for  another  three  weeks.  On  19 
March  Colonel  Davidson  also  belatedly 
learned  of  the  decision  to  redirect  the 
assault  to  the  southeastern  beaches  of 
Sicily  instead  of  the  town  of  Palermo 
on  the  north  shore. ^ 

Another  impediment  to  planning  was 
the  great  distances  that  separated  the 
several  staffs.  The  Force  141  (15th 
Army  Group)  plan  called  for  assault 
landings  by  three  American  divisions, 
with  a  strong  armored  and  infantry 
reserve  to  be  held  close  offshore  on  the 
left  flank  of  the  American  sector.  Four 
subtask  forces  were  set  up:  the  three 
reinforced  assault  divisions,  JOSS  (3d 


•^  Ltr,  AFHQ  to  Fifth  Army,  5  Mar  43,  sub:  Orgn  of 
Western  Task  Force,  320.2  Orgn  and  Tactical  Units 
(1942-43),  AFHQ  files;  Rpt  of  Seventh  Army  Engr 
Sicily. 

'  Rpt  of  Seventh  Army  Engr  Sicily;  Ltr,  Brig  Gen 
Dabney  O.  Elliott,  AFHQ  Engr,  to  AFHQ,  21  Sep  43. 


SICILY:  THE  BEACHHEAD 


119 


Infantry  Division),  DIME  (1st  Infantry 
Division),  and  CENT  (45th  Infantry 
Division)  and,  a  reserve  force,  KOOL 
(2d  Armored  Division  less  Combat 
Command  A,  plus  the  1st  Division's 
18th  Regimental  Combat  Team). 
Shark  (Headquarters,  II  Corps)  was 
to  coordinate  DIME  and  CENT.  During 
the  planning  stage,  these  and  higher 
headquarters  were  scattered  across  the 
breadth  of  North  Africa.  AFHQ  was  at 
Algiers,  the  British  task  force  headquar- 
ters (Force  545)  at  Cairo,  and  Force  343 
at  Rabat  in  Morocco  until  the  latter  part 
of  April  when  it  moved  to  Mostaganem 
in  Algeria.  JOSS  headquarters  was  at 
Jemmapes,  SHARK  at  Relizane,  and 
Dime  at  Oran.  Western  Naval  Task 
Force  headquarters  remained  at  Al- 
giers, which  seemed  to  Army  authori- 
ties too  far  from  Force  343,  but  the  two 
services  cooperated  well.^ 

According  to  the  instructions  Force 
141  issued  in  April,  U.S.  engineers  were 
responsible  for  breaching  beach  obsta- 
cles, clearing  and  laying  minefields, 
supplying  water  and  bulk  petroleum 
products,  repairing  ports  and  airfields, 
and  rebuilding  railways.  The  instruc- 
tions emphasized  the  importance  of 
repairing  airfields  as  soon  as  possible. 
The  Transportation  Corps  was  to  deter- 
mine requirements  for  railway  recon- 
struction and  request  the  engineers  to 
do  the  work,  but  the  Seventh  Army 
engineer  staff  worked  with  G— 4  of 
Force  141  in  actual  preparations.  Troop 
accommodations  were  to  be  an  "abso- 


^  II  Corps  Bull  Y/1,  Notes  on  the  Planning  and 
Assault  Phases  of  the  Sicilian  Campaign,  by  a  Military 
Observer,  Oct  43,  1st  ESB  files;  Seventh  Army  Rpt 
Sicily,  p.  A-2;  Rpt,  Vice  Adm  H.  K.  Hewitt,  WNTF 
in  Sicilian  Campaign;  Bradley,  A  Soldier's  Story,  p.  108; 
Hist  1st  Engr  C  Bn  Rpt,  Sicilian  Campaign,  10  Jul- 
Dec  43. 


lute  minimum,"  and  hospitals  were  to 
use  existing  buildings  or  tents.  Engi- 
neers were  to  provide  light,  water,  and 
latrines.^ 

While  all  the  subtask  forces  had  com- 
mon engineer  missions,  each  also  had 
special  missions.  SHARK  engineers  were 
to  prepare  a  landing  strip  at  Biscari  as 
soon  as  possible  after  the  assault,  have 
runways  ready  at  Comiso  and  Ponte 
Olivo  Airfields  by  D  plus  8,  repair  a 
jetty  at  Gela,  and  build  bulk  storage  and 
pipelines  to  the  airfields.  By  D  plus  4 
the  2602d  Engineer  Petroleum  Distri- 
bution Company  was  to  be  ashore  at 
Dime  beaches  and  ready  to  handle  over 
1,000  tons  of  gasoline  per  day.  JOSS 
engineers  were  to  repair  the  small  port 
of  Licata  and  a  landing  strip  at  a  nearby 
airfield.  KoOL  engineers  were  to  be 
ready  to  rehabilitate  Porto  Empedocle, 
a  small  harbor  thirty  miles  west  of  the 
Joss  beaches. 

The  engineers  were  to  rely  largely 
on  local  materials  for  repairing  railway 
and  electrical  installations  and  building 
troop  barracks.  Lumber  was  to  be  pro- 
vided for  hospital  flooring  and  for 
twenty  woodframe  tarpaulin-covered 
warehouses.  All  civilian  labor  was  to  be 
hired  and  paid  by  the  using  arm  or 
service.  Until  D  plus  3  real  estate  was  to 
be  obtained  either  by  "immediate  occu- 
pancy" or  by  informal  written  agree- 
ments between  unit  purchasing  and 
contracting  officers  and  owners.  An 
important  engineer  responsibility  was 
providing  water,  known  to  be  scarce  in 
Sicily  during  the  summer.  The  mini- 
mum water  requirement  was  set  at  one 
U.S.  gallon  per  man  per  day.  Water 
enough  for  five  days  was  to  be  carried 


"  HQ,  Force  141,  Planning  Instr  1 1,  Engr  Require- 
ments for  Husky,  12  Apr  43. 


120 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


in  five-gallon  cans  on  the  D-day  convoy 
or  in  Navy  bulk  storage.*^ 

In  accordance  with  the  Loper-Hotine 
Agreement,  the  Geographical  Section, 
General  Staff,  British  War  Office,  was 
responsible  for  revising  maps  for 
Husky,  but  AFHQ  was  responsible  for 
reproduction.  The  Engineer  Section, 
AFHQ,  established  a  large  field  map 
service  organization,  the  Survey  Direc- 
torate, in  a  suburb  of  Algiers.  The 
directorate  furnished  general  tactical 
maps  for  all  HUSKY  forces  except  CENT, 
which,  staging  in  the  United  States,  ob- 
tained its  maps  through  OCE  in  Wash- 
ington. 

In  February  the  66th  Engineer  Topo- 
graphic Company,  formerly  with  I  Ar- 
mored Corps,  joined  HUSKY.  While 
preparing  some  tactical  maps,  the  66th 
concentrated  on  such  secret  materials 
as  visual  aids,  naval  charts,  loading 
plans,  photo  mosaics,  city  plans,  har- 
bor layouts,  and  convoy  disposition 
charts.  The  bulk  of  the  company  re- 
mained in  North  Africa  under  the  Sur- 
vey Directorate  throughout  the  Sicily 
campaign,  with  only  its  survey  platoon, 
essentially  a  field  unit,  going  to  Sicily 
for  survey  and  control  work. 

In  addition  to  tactical  and  strategic 
maps,  the  topographic  engineers  pro- 
duced a  number  of  special  issues:  town 
plans,  an  air  map,  and  defense  and 
water  supply  overprints.  Combat  units 
got  valuable  information  from  the  de- 
fense overprints,  particularly  those 
marking  enemy  positions  covering  the 
beaches  and  issued  to  the  subtask  forces 
before  the  invasion  began,  as  did  engi- 
neers from  the  water  supply  overprints, 
which  pinpointed  probable  sources  of 


fresh  water.  The  HUSKY  maps  were 
considerably  better  than  those  for  the 
Tunisian  campaign. 

Husky  saw  continued  progress  in 
solving  map-handling  and  distribution 
problems  that  had  been  so  vexing  in 
Tunisia.  Two  new  thirteen-man  units, 
the  2657th  and  2658th  Engineer  Map 
Depot  Detachments,  were  responsible 
for  storing  maps  and  for  distributing 
them  in  bulk  at  division,  corps,  and 
army  levels.  The  two  units  set  up  a  map 
depot  at  Constantine  on  5  June  and 
immediately  began  to  receive  large 
stocks.  Security  considerations,  the  scat- 
tered deployment  of  assault  units  across 
North  Africa,  the  drastic  change  in  the 
basic  Husky  plan,  and  the  tardy  arrival 
of  maps  from  England  hampered  dis- 
tribution. AFHQ  and  Force  141  had  to 
help  the  depot  detachments  sort  map 
stocks,  and  truck  convoys  loaded  with 
maps  had  to  be  given  priority  along 
North  African  roads  to  get  the  maps 
out  in  time.  Final  deliveries  to  ships  and 
staging  areas  began  on  D  minus  1 1  and 
were  completed  to  assault  units  on  D 
minus  8,  but  last  minute  distribution 
continued  aboard  ship  until  D  minus 

Training 

The  subtask  forces  had  decentralized 
responsibility  for  training  their  own 
troops  for  the  assault.  The  Seventh 
Army  (Force  343)  Engineer  Section 
inspected  the  training  of  engineer  units 
assigned  to  the  subtask  forces,  gener- 


'"  Seventh  Army  Engr  Plan,  Sicilian  Opns,  Joss  Task 
Force  (8- 12  Jul). 


' '  Ltr,  Bonesteel  to  Moore,  22  Jul  43;  II  Corps  Engr 
Rpt,  10  Jul- 18  Aug  43,  particularly  an.  3,  Map  Sup- 
ply and  Distribution;  II  Corps  Bull  Y/1,  Notes  on  the 
Planning  and  Assault  Phases  of  the  Sicilian  Campaign, 
Oct  43;  HQ,  Force  141,  Planning  Instr  15,  Maps  and 
Charts. 


SICILY:  THE  BEACHHEAD 


121 


ally  supervised  that  of  shore  regiments, 
and  guided  that  of  SOS,  NATOUSA, 
engineer  units  scheduled  to  join  the 
task  force  later.  The  troops  underwent 
refresher  and  special  amphibious  train- 
ing. Refresher  training  emphasized 
physical  conditioning,  mines,  marks- 
manship, and  other  combat  techniques. 
Experience  in  Tunisia  had  demon- 
strated that  nearly  all  engineer  units 
needed  such  training;  but,  with  the 
exception  of  mines,  little  of  it  could  be 
geared  directly  to  the  coming  opera- 
tion. There  was  not  much  time  to  train 
units  for  HUSKY,  nor  could  what  time 
there  was  be  used  to  best  advantage.  In 
the  main,  engineers  in  the  subtask 
forces,  other  than  shore  engineers,  had 
to  get  by  with  general  engineer  instruc- 


tion 


12 


Early  in  March  AFHQ  decided  to  use 
the  1st  Engineer  Amphibian  Brigade 
in  the  invasion  of  Sicily.  The  early 
Husky  plan  had  given  the  brigade  a 
vital  role;  the  final  plan  made  it  even 
greater.  The  new  plan  called  for  the 
brigade  to  support  three  assault  divi- 
sions and  the  floating  reserve.  It  also 
called  for  the  supply  of  all  Seventh 
Army  forces  in  Sicily  for  as  long  as 
thirty  days  over  the  beaches  and 
through  such  tiny  ports  as  Licata  and 
Gela.  The  brigade  itself  was  to  func- 
tion as  the  sole  American  base  section 
in  Sicily  and  handle  all  supplies  for  the 
first  month  on  the  island. 

It  was  quite  apparent  that  the  tech- 
niques employed  during  the  TORCH 
operation  would  not  suffice  against  the 
determined  opposition  expected  on 


'"^  Ltr,  Bonesteel  to  Moore,  22  Jul  43;  Seventh  Army 
Engr  Rpt  Sicily. 

'^  1st  ESB  Rpt  of  Action  Against  the  Enemy,  10-13 
Jul  43,  Sicily;  Rpt,  Shore  Engineers  in  Sicily,  1st  ESB 
files;  Hist  1st  ESB,  Jun  42-Sep  45. 


Sicily.  New  techniques,  with  new  equip- 
ment especially  designed  for  amphibi- 
ous operations,  would  be  necessary. 
Army  and  Navy  efforts  had  to  be  coor- 
dinated, and  such  problems  as  offshore 
sandbars  and  man-made  underwater 
obstacles  had  to  be  overcome.  The  1st 
Engineer  Amphibian  Brigade  had 
much  to  do  to  prepare  for  its  role  on 
Sicily,  a  role  on  which  the  entire  under- 
taking could  well  depend.  But  AFHQ 
remained  preoccupied  with  the  Tuni- 
sian campaign. 

Brigade  participation  in  planning  for 
Husky  began  on  23  April  when  Brig. 
Gen.  H.  C.  Wolfe,  then  commander  of 
the  headquarters  unit  known  as  the  1st 
Engineer  Amphibian  Brigade,  attended 
a  conference  of  unit  commanders  at 
Rabat.  *^  At  the  time  the  brigade  con- 
sisted of  less  than  a  hundred  officers 
and  enlisted  men,  for  it  had  all  but 
passed  out  of  existence  after  TORCH, 
its  units  spread  out  in  support  roles  in 
North  Africa.  In  February  one  battal- 
ion of  the  531st  Engineer  Shore  Regi- 
ment and  another  of  the  591st  Engi- 
neer Boat  Regiment  assumed  identities 
as  provisional  trucking  units  and  oper- 
ated in  support  of  II  Corps  until  the 
end  of  the  Tunisian  campaign.  The 
36th  and  540th  Engineer  Combat  Regi- 
ments, which  had  participated  in  the 
Torch  landings,  had  construction  and 
labor  assignments  in  Morocco  through 
April.  Only  the  2d  Battalion  of  the 
531st,  attached  to  the  Fifth  Army's 
Invasion  Training  Center  at  Port-aux- 
Poules  in  Algeria,  remained  associated 
with  amphibious  warfare  in  the  early 
months  of  1943.  An  entirely  new  orga- 


'^  On  25  May  1943  General  Wolfe  became  deputy 
G-3,  NATOUSA,  and  Col  Eugene  Caffey  became 
the  brigade  commander. 


122 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


nization  had  to  be  formed  to  carry  out 
Army  responsibilities  in  support  of  the 
Husky  landings.*^ 

In  the  Pacific,  engineer  brigades  fol- 
lowed the  pattern  conceived  for  them 
at  the  Engineer  Amphibian  Command. 
They  operated  landing  craft  as  well  as 
handling  their  duties  on  the  beaches. 
These  brigades  had  a  unity  of  com- 
mand not  enjoyed  by  those  in  the  Medi- 
terranean and  European  theaters,  for 
on  the  Atlantic  side  landing  craft  be- 
longed to  the  Navy.  Thus,  naval  respon- 
sibility in  amphibious  operations  ex- 
tended to  the  shoreline,  whereas  Army 
engineer  responsibility  began  at  the 
waterline  and  extended  inland.  Both 
services  accepted  this  line  of  demarka- 
tion  in  principle,  but  many  specific 
questions  remained.  Army  and  Navy 
representatives  tried  to  spell  out  an- 
swers in  detail  during  HUSKY  planning, 
but  neither  in  North  Africa  nor  in  later 
amphibious  operations  were  they  com- 
pletely successful.  The  definition  of 
Army-Navy  amphibious  responsibilities 
continued  to  be  a  source  of  friction 
throughout  the  war  in  Europe.'^ 

In  the  end,  U.S.  Army  engineers 
developed  a  new  type  of  engineer  am- 


'^  Hist  1st  ESB,  Jun  42-Sep  45. 

"*  RG  110  A48-  139,  Notes  on  War  Council,  CofS 
files  1941-42;  AFHQ  Incoming  Msg,  Marshall  to 
Eisenhower  and  Andrews,  5  Mar  43;  Rpt,  ACofS  G-4, 
EAC,  to  CO,  EAC,  Rpt  on  Opn  and  Maint  of  Landing 
Craft  in  North  Africa  and  European  Theaters,  13 
Apr  43;  A  Memorandum  of  Agreement  between  the 
Chief  of  Staff,  U.S.  Army,  the  Commander  in  Chief, 
U.S.  Fleet,  and  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  dated  22 
March  1943,  defined  the  primary  responsibilities  of 
the  Army  and  the  Navy  for  amphibious  training.  For 
background  on  the  development  of  amphibious  doc- 
trine, see  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of 
Engineers:  Troops  and  Equipment,  ch.  XVI.  For  a  full 
account  of  amphibious  operations  in  the  Southwest 
Pacific,  see  "Engineers  of  the  Southwest  Pacific  1941  - 
45,"  vol.  IV,  Amphibian  Engineer  Operations  (Washing- 
ton, 1959). 


phibian  brigade  for  HUSKY.  With  no 
assignment  in  the  assault  waves,  the 
newly  designated  1st  Engineer  Special 
Brigade  consisted  of  four  shore  groups: 
one  for  each  of  the  three  infantry  divi- 
sions making  the  assault  and  the  fourth 
held  offshore  as  part  of  the  reserve 
force  (KOOL).  An  engineer  regiment 
formed  the  backbone  of  each  task- 
organized  shore  group,  and  each 
group's  other  assigned  or  attached  units 
included  such  organizations  as  a  medi- 
cal battalion,  a  quartermaster  DUKW 
battalion,  a  naval  beach  battalion,  a  sig- 
nal company,  and  an  ordnance  mainte- 
nance company.  A  number  of  smaller 
units,  such  as  dump-operating  details 
from  each  of  the  several  technical  ser- 
vices, were  attached  according  to  antici- 
pated need.  Still  other  attachments 
operated  local  facilities  such  as  railways, 
furnished  specialized  services  such  as 
water  supply  and  camouflage,  or  rein- 
forced the  brigade  in  some  area  such 
as  trucking.'^ 

The  organization  of  the  new  brigade 
started  toward  the  end  of  April,  when 
two  engineer  combat  regiments  (36th 
and  540th)  and  an  engineer  shore  regi- 
ment (531st)  assembled  at  Port-aux- 
Poules,  twelve  miles  east  of  Arzew.  The 
fourth  shore  group,  built  around  the 
40th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment,  re- 
ceived amphibious  training  in  the 
United  States  and  arrived  at  Oran  with 
the  45th  Infantry  Division  on  22  June. *^ 


"  The  1st  Engineer  Amphibian  Brigade  was  redes- 
ignated 1st  Engineer  Special  Brigade  on  10  May  1943 
and  reorganized  under  TOE  2-510— S,  21  April 
1943.  1st  ESB  Rpt  of  Action  Against  the  Enemy, 
10-13  Jul  43,  Sicily;  Memo,  HQ,  1st  ESB,  31  May 
43,  sub:  Beach  Group  Organization  and  Functions. 

'«  Hist  1st  ESB,  Jun  42-Sep  45.  The  591st  Engi- 
neer Boat  Regiment,  which  had  no  boats,  became  sur- 
plus to  the  needs  of  the  1st  Engineer  Special  Brigade 
(ESB),  and  during  the  remainder  of  its  stay  in  the 


SICILY:  THE  BEACHHEAD 


123 


The  36th  Engineer  Shore  Group  was 
the  largest  of  the  four  and  when  finally 
assembled  for  the  invasion  totaled  4,744 
officers  and  enlisted  men.  Its  nucleus 
was  the  2,088-man  36th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Regiment,  plus  the  2d  Battalion, 
540th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment  (623 
men).  A  naval  beach  battalion  (413 
men)  was  attached  to  make  hydro- 
graphic  surveys,  maintain  shore-to-ship 
communications,  and  coordinate  the 
beaching  of  landing  craft  and  LSTs.  A 
322-man  quartermaster  battalion  (am- 
phibious), to  operate  trucks  and 
DUKWs,  and  the  56th  Medical  Battal- 
ion (505  men)  were  added,  as  were  a 
number  of  smaller  units.  These  last 
included  a  signal  company  to  provide 
radio  and  wire  networks  on  the  beach, 
a  military  police  company  to  control 
motor  traffic  and  guard  prisoners,  a 
four-man  engineer  map  depot  detach- 
ment to  handle  reserve  map  stocks,  and 
a  detachment  from  an  ordnance  main- 
tenance company  to  repair  ordnance 
equipment.  An  ordnance  ammunition 
company,  detachments  from  two  quar- 
termaster units,  and  an  engineer  depot 
company  were  included  to  operate 
beach  dumps.  The  531st  Engineers' 
shore  group  consisted  of  3,803  troops, 
its  composition  similar  to  that  formed 
around  the  36th;  the  40th  Engineers' 
group  had  approximately  4,465  offi- 
cers and  men.  The  smallest  shore 
group,  from  the  540th,  was  with  KOOL 
Force  and  had  a  strength  of  about 
2,815.  The  total  strength  of  the  four 
shore  groups  was  approximately 
15,825,  including  1,270  naval  person- 
nel with  three  naval  beach  battalions. 


Mediterranean  worked  primarily  in  port  operations. 
The  unit  was  disbanded  at  Naples  on  1  November 
1944. 


U.S.  Army  engineer  troops  represented 
about  52  percent  of  the  1st  Engineer 
Special  Brigade  as  organized  for  the 
assault.  Later  accretions  on  Sicily  would 
bring  the  brigade's  strength  to  nearly 
20,000.'^ 

Some  differences  existed  between  the 
53 1st  Engineer  Shore  Regiment  and  the 
engineer  combat  regiment  that  formed 
the  nucleus  of  the  other  three  shore 
groups.  Although  the  total  strength  of 
the  shore  regiment  was  about  the  same 
as  that  of  a  combat  regiment,  the  for- 
mer had  more  officers,  more  specialists, 
^nd  more  specialized  engineering  equip- 
ment. The  shore  engineers  knew  all 
that  combat  engineers  did,  even  for 
combat  operations  inland,  but  not  vice 
versa.  The  combat  engineers  had  more 
organic  transportation,  but  they  also 
had  much  organizational  equipment 
not  needed  for  beach  operations.  If 
they  left  the  equipment  behind,  they 
also  had  to  leave  men  to  guard  and 
maintain  it,  thus  weakening  the  com- 
bat regiment.^^ 

In  accordance  with  an  AFHQ  direc- 
tive. Fifth  U.S.  Army  trained  Force  141 
units  in  amphibious  operations  at  its 
training  center  at  Port-aux-Poules.^' 
When  the"  1st  Engineer  Special  Brigade 
came  together  there,  less  than  2  1/2 
months  were  left  until  D-day.  The  shore 


'■*  Rpt,  Col  Eugene  Caffey,  Shore  Engineers  in  Sicily, 
app.  A.  This  and  a  number  of  other  valuable  reports 
on  Husky  are  contained  in  Rpt,  HQ,  ETOUSA,  to 
FUSAG  and  others,  3  Dec  43,  sub:  Notes  on  the  Sicil- 
ian Campaign  and  Extracts  from  Reports  on  Opera- 
tion Husky,  (cited  hereafter  as  Notes  and  Extracts, 
Husky);  Chf  Engr,  15th  Army  Gp,  Notes  on  Engr 
Opns  in  Sicily,  no.  3,  10  Sep  43,  and  Notes  on  Work- 
ing of  Sicilian  Beaches,  10  Jul  43;  Rpt  of  Seventh 
Army  Engr  Sicily,  apps.  to  an.  12. 

'^"  Rpt,  Shore  Engineers  in  Sicily,  1st  ESB  files. 

''^'  Ltr,  Lt  Col  Bonesteel  to  Brig  Gen  D.  O.  Elliott, 
Chf  Engr,  AFHQ,  17  Jul  43,  353-A  Training  Policy, 
AFHQ  files. 


124 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


groups  had  to  be  organized,  equipped, 
and  trained.  Experiments  had  to  deter- 
mine how  to  deal  with  a  number  of 
problems,  such  as  breaching  obstacles 
on  the  beaches.  Troops  had  to  become 
familiar  with  DUKWs  and  with  the  new 
types  of  landing  craft.  Combat  troops 
and  naval  units  had  to  train  together 
and  rehearse  landings.^^ 

The  1st  Engineer  Special  Brigade 
carried  out  extensive  experiments  to 
learn  the  characteristics  of  landing  craft 
just  being  introduced  into  the  theater 
and  to  establish  procedures  for  land- 
ing supplies  across  the  beaches.  All 
through  May  regular  training  took  a 
backseat  to  tests  and  experiments,  those 
with  landing  craft  and  others  geared  to 
such  problems  as  offshore  sandbars. ^^ 

The  discovery  of  sandbars  off  many 
of  the  beaches  on  Sicily  raised  serious 
doubts  about  the  whole  HUSKY  under- 
taking. The  typical  sandbar  lay  about 
150  feet  offshore  under  two  or  three 
feet  of  water;  only  the  most  shallow- 
draft  landing  craft  could  ride  over 
them.  Water  often  deepened  to  ten  feet 
shoreward  of  the  bars,  and  naval  pon- 
ton causeways  were  to  get  troops  and 
vehicles  aboard  LSTs  across  this  gap. 
Another  problem,  water  supply  for  the 
beaches,  was  solved  by  equipping  twenty 
LSTs  to  carry  10,000  gallons  of  water 
each.  Shore  parties  equipped  with  can- 
vas storage  tanks  and  hoses  were  to 
pump  this  water  ashore. ^^ 


^^  Davidson,  Preliminary  Rpt  of  Seventh  Army  Engr 
on  the  Sicilian  Opn,  23  Aug  43;  Rpt  of  Seventh  Army 
Ener  Sicily. 

'^'  Rpt  of  Seventh  Army  Engr  Sicily;  Seventh  Army 
Rpt  Sicily,  pp.  C-2  and  D-3;  Ltr,  Col  Eugene  M. 
Caffey,  CO,  1st  ESB,  to  CG,  First  U.S.  Army,  16  Jan 
44,  310.2  Opns,  1st  ESB  files;  Rpt,  Shore  Engineers 
in  Sicily,  1st  ESB  files;  Hist  1st  ESB,  Jun  42-Sep  45; 
Ltr,  Bonesteel  to  Moore,  22  Jul  43. 

"^^  Col  A.  H.  Head,  Notes  on  the  Planning,  Training, 
and    Execution   of  Operation    Husky,    25  Jul   43. 


On  3  June  Col.  Eugene  M.  Caffey, 
commanding  officer  of  the  1st  Engi- 
neer Special  Brigade,  became  responsi- 
ble for  organizing,  equipping,  and  train- 
ing the  shore  units,  and,  by  the  fif- 
teenth, engineer  regimental  shore 
groups  were  attached  to  the  subtask 
forces  for  combined  training  and  re- 
hearsals. As  during  TORCH,  the  brigade 
had  to  train  with  other  Army  organiza- 
tions and  with  the  Navy  before  it  could 
prepare  its  own  units  adequately. ^^ 

Rehearsal  landings  took  place  be- 
tween 22  June  and  4  July,  for  JOSS  in 
the  Bizerte-Tunis  area  and  for  DIME 
and  KOOL  in  the  Arzew  area.  CENT 
Force,  which  came  from  the  United 
States,  rehearsed  near  Oran.  To  Admi- 
ral Hewitt,  whose  Western  Naval  Task 
Force  was  to  land  the  Seventh  Army, 
these  hurriedly  conceived  exercises  were 
at  best  a  dry  run  on  a  reduced  scale. 
They  had  some  value  for  assault  troops 
but  virtually  none  for  the  engineer 
shore  groups.  The  CENT  rehearsals,  for 
instance,  ended  before  any  shore  party 
equipment  had  been  landed  or  any  sup- 
plies put  across  the  beach. ^^ 

Limited  time  and  opportunity  made 
the  training  of  many  other  engineer 
units  just  as  meager,  while  security  pre- 
vented specific  training  for  HUSKY. 
The  Fifth  Army  mine  school  and  the 
British  Eighth  Army  mine  school  at 


Nefiune,  HQ,  ETOUSA,  files;  Building  the  Navy's  Bases 
in  World  War  II,  2  vols.  (Washington,  1947),  vol.  II,  p. 
86;  Rpt  of  Seventh  Army  Engr  Sicily;  Brief  of  Engr 
Plan,  Incl  1  to  Rpt  of  Seventh  Army  Engr  Sicily;  Interv, 
Maj  Gen  Charles  H.  Bonesteel  III,  10  Feb  60. 

'^^  Rpt,  Shore  Engineers  in  Sicily,  1st  ESB  files;  Rpt 
of  Seventh  Army  Engr  Sicily;  Ltr,  Caffey  to  CG,  FUSA, 
16  Jan  44;  Hist  1st  ESB. 

•^^  Hewitt  Rpt,  WNTF  in  Sicilian  Campaign,  p.  31; 
Rpt,  Shore  Engineers  in  Sicily,  1st  ESB  files;  Ltr, 
Caffey  to  CG,  FUSA,  16  Jan  44;  40th  Engr  C  Rgt,  Rpt 
of  Engr  Opns,  10  Jul- 18  Aug  43. 


SICILY:  THE  BEACHHEAD 


125 


Tripoli  trained  instructors  who  could 
return  to  their  units  and  pass  on  their 
knowledge,  but  most  such  training  was 
without  the  benefit  of  enemy  mines. 
Warnings  from  the  U.S.  chief  ordnance 
officer  at  AFHQ  that  aging  explosives 
could  become  dangerously  sensitive 
proved  justified  in  a  British  attempt  to 
ship  enemy  mines  to  the  United  States; 
while  the  mines  were  being  loaded 
aboard  a  small  coaster  at  Algiers  the 
entire  lot  blew  up,  sinking  the  coaster 
and  firing  an  ammunition  ship  at  the 
next  berth. ^^ 

On  the  whole,  the  troops  scheduled 
for  Husky  were  far  better  prepared  to 
deal  with  mines  than  were  those  in 
Tunisia.  Concern  arose  in  some  quar- 
ters lest  overemphasis  on  mine  warfare 
damage  troop  morale,  but  engineers 
were  convinced  that  thorough  instruc- 
tion was  the  best  answer.  Nor  did  they 
concur  in  the  decision  to  restrict  the 
use  of  live  enemy  mines  in  training.  Col- 
onel Davidson  believed  that  "realism  in 
training  [was]  essential  regardless  of  the 
risk  to  personnel  and  equipment,"  a 
view  with  which  15th  Army  Croup 
agreed  and  which  AFHQ  accepted.^ 

Toward  the  end  of  June  assault  units 
began  moving  into  their  embarkation 
areas:  CENT  Force  (45th  Infantry  Di- 
vision) at  Oran,  DIME  (1st  Infantry 
Division)  at  Algiers,  and  JOSS  (3d  Infan- 
try Division)  at  Bizerte.  The  initial  as- 
sault— Seventh  Army  would  have  82,502 
men  ashore  in  Sicily  by  the  end  of 


D-day — included  approximately  11,000 
engineers  scheduled  to  land  with  the 
subtask  forces,  plus  nearly  1,200  more 
in  the  floating  reserve.  Engineers  with 
Dime  Force  numbered  nearly  3,200. 
Another  4,300,  plus  Company  A  of  the 
1 7th  Armored  Engineer  Battalion,  were 
with  Joss  Force  and  3,500  with  CENT 
Force.  About  1,350  engineer  vehicles 
accompanied  these  troops  on  D-day. 
Additional  engineer  troops  and  vehi- 
cles were  to  reach  the  JOSS  and  DIME 
areas  with  the  D  plus  4  and  D  plus  8 
convoys.  In  North  Africa  22  engineer 
units  totaling  7,388  men  stood  by,  ready 
to  be  called  forward  as  required. '^^ 

The  convoy  carrying  CENT  Force 
sailed  from  Oran  harbor  on  5  July,  and 
as  it  moved  along  the  North  African 
coast  Dime  and  JOSS  Force  convoys 
joined.  The  faster  ships  feinted  south 
along  Cape  Bon  peninsula,  while  the 
slower  vessels  proceeded  by  more  direct 
routes  to  a  rendezvous  area  off  the 
island  of  Gozo.  On  the  ninth  a  steady 
wind  began  to  blow  out  of  the  north 
and  increased  during  the  afternoon, 
piling  up  a  heavy  sea  and  raising  seri- 
ous doubts  that  the  invasion  could  pro- 
ceed. Then,  during  the  night,  the  wind 
dropped.  As  H-hour  approached  the 
seas  begain  to  settle  and  prospects  for  a 
successful  landing  brightened. ^^ 

D-day 
Before  dawn  on  10  July  1943,  the 


"^  Rpt  of  Seventh  Army  Engr  Sicily;  Seventh  Army 
Rpt  Sicily,  p.  A-4. 

'^^  Seventh  Army  Rpt  Sicily,  p.  C-4;  Davidson,  Pre- 
liminary Rpt  of  Seventh  Army  Engr  on  the  Sicilian 
Opn,  23  Aug  43,  and  1st  Ind,  HQ,  15th  Army  Gp,  6 
Sep  43;  Ltr,  AFHQ  to  AG,  WD,  2  Oct  43,  sub:  Prelimi- 
nary Rpt  of  Seventh  Army  Engr  on  the  Sicilian  Opn, 
370.2 1 2  Sicily,  Rpts  on  Opns,  Aug  43  to  Oct  43,  AFHQ 
files. 


-'■*  Seventh  Army  strength  on  Sicily  on  23  August 
totaled  165,230  men,  exclusive  of  11,900  USAAF 
troops  also  on  the  island.  Ltr,  HQ,  Seventh  Army,  to 
CG,  NATOUSA,  22  Nov  43,  sub:  Date  for  Logistical 
Planning;  Final  Engr  Troop  List,  Seventh  Army,  by 
Convoys,  Engr  Units  Only,  28  Jun  43,  G-3  Misc 
Papers,  1st  ESB  files. 

"  Morison,    Sicily-Salerno- Anzio,    pp.    62—63,    65, 
67-68. 


126 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Licata  Airfield 


^O. 


'Ss 


Gelal 


\^  Niscemi 
Ponte  Olivo  Airfield 

j        Biscari  Airfield  v 


; 


/ 


REACHES 


^/^ 


Biscari 


III 
E     36  Beach 


% 


'^ 


M 


Ei531  Shore       ^i 


'^^ 


GULF  OF  GELA 


% 


-ir 


Vittoriat 


SICILIAN  LANDING  AREAS 

10  July  1943 

0  5  10  Miles 


— I 

10  Kilometers 


E     40  Shore      xyk 
'^ 


Santa  Croce 
.Camerina 


MAP  5 


assault  waves  of  three  American  infan- 
try divisions  landed  along  a  forty-mile 
stretch  of  Sicilian  beach.  (Map  5)  On 
the  west  the  3d  Infantry  Division  (JOSS 
Force)  straddled  the  small  port  of  Licata, 
landing  on  five  separate  beaches.  In  the 
center,  about  seventeen  miles  east  of 
Licata,  the  1st  Infantry  Division  (DIME 
Force)  went  in  over  six  beaches  just  east 
of  Gela,  and  on  the  division's  left  a 
Ranger  force  landed  directly  at  Gela. 
The  45th  Infantry  Division  (CENT  Force) 
beached  at  eight  points  extending  from 
Scoglitti  halfway  to  Gela.  Farther  east, 
the  British  made  simultaneous  landings 
along  another  stretch  of  the  Sicilian 
coast  extending  from  Cape  Passero 
almost  to  Syracuse.  DIME  Force  went 
in  on  time  at  0245,  but  weather  slowed 
the  other  two  forces.  The  wind  had 
dropped  to  about  fifteen  miles  an  hour. 


but  a  2  1/2-foot  surf  still  ran  along  most 
beaches  and  a  considerably  higher  one 
at  Scoglitti.  The  initial  landings  on  some 
beaches  in  the  JOSS  and  CENT  areas 
came  Just  as  dawn  was  breaking  at 
0550.^ 

Enemy  strength  on  Sicily  consisted 
of  about  ten  divisions.  The  equivalent 
of  about  five  were  disposed  in  or  near 
coastal  defenses,  and  five  were  in  mobile 
reserve.  Most  of  the  troops  were  dispir- 
ited Italians;  only  two  divisions,  both 
in  reserve,  were  German. ^^ 


''  Seventh  Army  Rpt  Sicily,  p.  6—4;  Morison,  Sicily- 
Salerno- Anzio,  p.  78;  Combined  Operations  (Br),  Digest 
of  Some  Notes  and  Reports  from  Opn  Husky,  repro- 
duced Oct  43  by  Information  Sect,  Intel  Div,  OCE, 
SOS  ETOUSA. 

^^  Brig  Gen  A.  C.  Wedemeyer,  Extracts  from  Rpt 
on  Opn  Husky,  28  Dec  43,  Notes  and  Extracts,  Husky. 


SICILY:  THE  BEACHHEAD 


127 


American  assault  troops  swept 
through  enemy  shore  defenses  with  lit- 
tle trouble.  A  few  strands  of  barbed 
wire  stretched  across  most  of  the 
beaches,  and  on  some  a  few  bands  of 
antitank  mines,  but  there  were  no  man- 
made  underwater  obstacles  and  few 
antipersonnel  mines  or  booby  traps. 
Many  concrete  pillboxes,  cleverly  camou- 
flaged, well  supplied,  and  well  provided 
with  communication  trenches,  existed, 
some  so  new  that  wooden  forms  still 
encased  them.  None  proved  very  trou- 
blesome, mainly  because  the  Italians 
manning  them  had  little  disposition  to 
fight. 

Here  and  there  infantrymen  skir- 
mished briefly  along  the  shoreline  be- 
fore pushing  inland,  and  at  a  number 
of  points  shore  engineers  joined  in  to 
clean  out  scattered  pockets  of  resis- 
tance.^^ At  some  points  the  enemy  had 
sections  of  beach  under  small-arms  fire 
as  the  shore  engineers  came  in,  but  for 
the  most  part  only  intermittent  artil- 
lery fire  and  sporadic  enemy  air  action 
harassed  the  beaches.  No  enemy  strong- 
point  held  out  stubbornly,  and  shore 
engineers  were  soon  free  to  go  about 
organizing  their  beaches.  By  nightfall 
all  three  subtask  forces  had  beachheads 
that  stretched  two  to  four  miles  inland, 
and  they  had  taken  4,265  prisoners. 
The  cost  had  been  relatively  small:  58 
killed,  199  wounded,  and  700  missing.  ^^ 


On  Cen  1  beaches,  two  officers  and  two  enlisted 
men,  1st  Lt.  Keith  E.  Miller,  2d  Lt.  George  S.  Spohn, 
T/5  Robert  L.  Beall,  and  Sgt.  Warren  W.  Beanish  of 
the  40th  Engineers  won  Distinguished  Service  Crosses 
for  thei.  part  in  taking  pillboxes  that  had  the  beach 
under  fire. 

"  Seventh  Army  GO  3,  25  Jan  44;  1st  ESB  GO  8,  27 
Aug  43;  USMA  study,  Opns  in  Sicily  and  Italy — 
Invasion  of  Sicily. 


Joss  Beaches 

From  west  to  east  JOSS  beaches  were 
named  Red,  Green,  Yellow,  and  Blue. 
The  first  two  lay  west  of  Licata,  the 
other  two  east  of  it,  and  all  were  the 
responsibility  of  the  36th  Engineer 
Shore  Group.  Along  the  4,500-yard 
length  of  Red  Beach  ran  a  sandbar,  and 
between  the  sandbar  and  beach  was  a 
runnel  100  to  300  feet  wide  and,  in 
many  places,  more  than  6  feet  deep. 

About  0440,  nearly  two  hours  after 
the  first  wave  of  infantrymen  had 
splashed  ashore  from  LCVPs,  shore 
searchlights  that  had  been  playing  over 
the  water  off  Red  Beach  winked  out. 
At  0510  heavy  fire  broke  out  along  the 
beach  and  a  destroyer  began  shelling 
shore  positions.  An  LCT  carrying  engi- 
neers of  the  36th  Engineer  Shore  Group 
joined  five  others  carrying  medium 
tanks  to  make  the  run  in  to  the  beach, 
covered  by  two  destroyers  coursing  along 
the  shoreline  belching  out  a  smoke 
screen  as  dawn  broke.  The  six  LCTs 
grounded  successfully,  the  tanks  lum- 
bered off  into  3  1/2  feet  of  water  and 
waded  ashore.  The  engineers  discov- 
ered that  the  beach,  in  places  only 
twenty  feet  wide,  consisted  of  soft  sand 
strewn  with  large  boulders.  Behind  it 
rose  cliffs  fifteen  to  sixty  feet  high,  with 
only  one  exit  road  usable  for  wheeled 
vehicles,  a  steep,  sandy  wagon  track  that 
led  through  vineyards  and  fields  of 
ripening  tomatoes  and  melons  to  the 
coastal  highway  some  three  miles  away. 
The  first  six  LCTs  did  better  than  craft 
of  successive  waves.  Some  stuck  on  the 
offshore  bar  and  discharged  trucks  into 
water  that  drowned  them  out — thirty- 
two  of  the  sixty-five  vehicles  that  disem- 
barked for  Red  Beach  from  nine  LCTs 
failed  to  bridge  the  water  gap. 


128 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Ashore,  congestion  and  confusion 
mounted.  Tractors  had  to  drag  vehi- 
cles over  the  sandy  beach  exit  road 
while  recovery  of  stalled  vehicles  was 
slow  and  unorganized,  for  no  definite 
preparations  for  this  work  had  been 
made.  Some  sections  of  beach  became 
choked  off  completely.  T-2  recovery 
units,  tanks,  and  DUKWs  tried  to  un- 
ravel the  problem;  D-7  dozers,  well 
suited  to  the  task,  were  inland  working 
on  beach  exit  roads,  but  the  smaller 
R— 4s  proved  ineffective  in  the  soft 
sand.  Vehicles  stalled  or  awaiting  bet- 
ter exit  routes  soon  jammed  the  beaches 
with  supplies.  As  congestion  increased 
and  more  landing  craft  broached,  many 
men  stood  idle,  uncertain  what  to  do. 

Offshore  an  LST  tried  to  unload  its 
ponton  floats,  but  the  surf  was  too 
rough  and  the  floats  washed  ashore. 
The  craft  then  tried  to  get  nearer  the 
beach  to  discharge  without  the  cause- 
way but  grounded  fifty  to  sixty  feet  out 
in  about  four  feet  of  water.  The  first 
truck  off  stalled  ten  feet  from  the  LST's 
ramp.  Two  DUKWs  recovered  the  truck, 
but  a  motor  crane  stalled  in  about  the 
same  place.  When  DUKWs  could  not 
move  the  crane,  the  LST  pulled  off- 
shore for  the  night.  Next  morning  two 
D  — 7  tractors  spent  some  five  hours 
pulling  the  crane  ashore  and  then  suc- 
ceeded in  moving  the  naval  ponton 
causeway  into  position. 

Here,  as  at  other  beaches,  the  cause- 
ways proved  of  great  value  once  they 
were  in  use.  Vehicles  were  driven  ashore 
over  them,  and  an  LST  could  unload 
in  about  two  hours.  But  the  causeways 
did  not  always  hold  head  on  against 
the  shore.  As  one  LST  pulled  off,  the 
causeways  tended  to  broach  before 
another  LST  could  come  up.  After 
forty-eight  hours  broached  craft  and 


stalled  vehicles  still  choked  Red  Beach, 
and  on  D  plus  3  it  was  abandoned.  The 
only  enemy  opposition  had  been  Mes- 
serschmitt  109s,  each  carrying  a  single 
bomb,  that  made  eight  bombing  and 
strafing  raids  during  D-day.  The  air- 
craft had  caused  delays  but  no  casualties. 

Halfway  between  Red  Beach  and 
Licata  lay  Green  Beach,  also  difficult 
but  selected  because  it  could  take  assault 
units  within  close  striking  distance  of 
the  port  of  Licata.  Green  consisted  of 
two  half-moon  beaches,  each  about 
1 ,000  feet  long,  separated  by  a  point  of 
land  jutting  out  from  the  shore.  The 
coastal  highway  was  about  11/2  miles 
away.  Offshore  bars  were  no  problem 
but  exits  were,  for  behind  the  beaches 
towered  abrupt  bluffs  more  than  100 
feet  high.  One  platoon  of  Company  C, 
36th  Engineers,  along  with  a  naval 
beach  detachment  and  some  medical 
personnel,  supported  the  landing  of  the 
2d  Battalion,  15th  Infantry,  and  the  3d 
Ranger  Battalion.  As  expected,  exit 
difficulties  ruled  out  Green  Beach  for 
supply  operations,  and  twelve  hours 
after  the  initial  landings  the  beach  was 
closed.  The  small  engineer  shore  party 
there  rejoined  the  1st  Battalion,  36th 
Engineers,  on  Red  Beach,  taking  along 
twenty-six  captured  Italian  soldiers.  But 
Green  Beach  paid  off,  for  the  men 
landed,  took  Licata,  a  small  port  that 
offered  facilities  for  handling  five  LSTs 
simultaneously,  and  by  1600  on  D-day 
an  LST  was  unloading. 

At  Yellow  and  Blue  beaches  things 
went  much  better.  Yellow  Beach,  cen- 
tering about  six  miles  east  of  Licata, 
was  probably  the  best  American  beach. 
The  sand  there  had  no  troublesome 
boulders,  and  the  main  coastal  high- 
way lay  only  some  400  yards  away  across 
slightly  rising  sandy  loam  planted  in 


SICILY:  THE  BEACHHEAD 


129 


grapes  and  tomatoes.  Blue  Beach,  be- 
ginning about  a  mile  farther  east,  was 
aUnost  as  good.  After  the  initial  assault 
most  of  Joss  Force  landed  over  these 
two  beaches,  and  those  elements  of  the 
36th  Engineer  Shore  Group  that  sup- 
ported landings  on  the  other  JOSS 
beaches  soon  moved  to  Yellow  and 
Blue.  Some  LSTs  sent  vehicles  ashore 
over  a  naval  ponton  causeway,  but  most 
stood  one-half  to  three-quarters  of  a 
mile  out  and  unloaded  on  the  LCTs  or 
DUKWs.  DUKWs  were  the  workhorses 
on  the  beach,  invaluable  because  they 
could  eliminate  much  of  the  man-han- 
dling of  supplies.  Nearly  all  carried 
more  than  their  rated  2  1/2  tons,  and 
some  went  in  with  so  little  freeboard 
that  the  wake  of  a  passing  landing  craft 
could  have  swamped  them.  At  least  one, 
overloaded  with  105-mm.  shells,  sank 
as  soon  as  it  drove  off  a  ramp. 

The  36th  Engineer  Shore  Group 
headquarters  landed  at  0714  on  D-day 
and  established  itself  on  a  hill  overlook- 
ing both  Blue  and  Yellow  beaches.  By 
noon  the  shore  group  had  consolidated 
battalion  beach  dumps  into  regimental 
dumps  behind  the  two  beaches.  Shore 
engineers  worked  throughout  the  night 
and  into  D  plus  1  with  only  temporary 
halts  during  enemy  bombing  raids. 
During  the  afternoon  of  D-day,  the  2d 
Battalion,  540th  Engineers,  landed  along 
with  two  platoons  of  the  2d  Naval  Beach 
Battalion,  and  before  noon  on  1 1  July 
units  of  the  382d  Port  Battalion  (TC) 
entered  Licata  port  to  clear  LST  ber- 
things. As  order  emerged  and  supplies 
began  to  move  smoothly,  it  became  evi- 
dent that  Seventh  Army  could  be  sup- 
plied across  the  beaches  so  long  as  the 
seas  remained  calm.  During  the  first 
three  days  20,470  men,  6,614  tons  of 
supplies,  and  3,752  vehicles  landed  at 


Licata  or  across  the  JOSS  beaches.  In 
the  same  period,  more  than  200 
wounded  and  over  500  POWs  were 
evacuated  to  North  Africa. '^^ 

Dime  Beaches 

Seventeen  miles  east  of  Licata  a  wave 
of  Rangers  went  in  at  Gela  at  H-hour 
(0245),  a  second  wave  following  within 
a  few  minutes.  One-half  hour  later  two 
waves  of  the  39th  Engineer  Combat 
Regiment  were  ashore  preparing  to 
clear  away  beach  obstacles  and  demol- 
ish pillboxes.  Some  mortar  men,  pro- 
viding support  for  the  Rangers,  com- 
prised the  fifth  wave,  which  went  in 
about  H  plus  1,  while  shore  engineers 
from  the  1st  Battalion,  531st  Engineers, 
landed  in  the  sixth  wave.  By  dawn 
(0515)  Rangers  and  the  39th  Engineers 
were  digging  in  on  their  objective  on 
the  north  edge  of  Gela,  and  shore  engi- 
neers were  preparing  the  beaches  for 
an  influx  of  cargo. ^*' 

Just  to  the  east  the  16th  and  26th 
Regimental  Combat  Teams,  1st  Infan- 
try Division,  landed  simultaneously  with 
the  Rangers,  while  the  18th  Regimen- 
tal Combat  Team  and  elements  of  the 
2d  Armored  Division  lay  offshore  in 
floating  reserve.  In  these  landings  divi- 
sional engineers,  attached  by  platoons 
to  infantry  battalions,  went  in  with  the 
assault  waves.  The  1st  and  2d  Platoons, 
Company  A,  1st  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion, landed  with  the  16th  Regimen- 


'■'■'  Opns  Rpt,  36th  Engr  C  Gp,  10-  18  Jul  43,  1  Aug 
43;  Notes  and  Extracts,  Husky;  Maj  Roy  C.  Conner, 
First  Partial  Rpt,  Observations,  in  HuSKY^oss  Task 
Force  (8-  12  Jul) — Rpt  of  Observations,  EUCOM  Engr 
files;  Hiit  1st  ESB,Jun  42-Sep  45;  Hewitt  Rpt,  WNTF 
in  Sicilian  Campaign;  Seventh  Army  Rpt  Sicily,  pp. 
6-10. 

'"  Hist  39th  Engr  C  Rgt;  Hist  1st  Bn,  531st  Engr 
Shore  Rgt. 


130 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


tal  Combat  Team;  the  1st  and  2d  Pla- 
toons, Company  C,  were  with  the  26th 
Regimental  Combat  Team.  These  engi- 
neers were  to  clear  enemy  obstructions, 
but  they  found  little  wire,  few  antiper- 
sonnel mines,  and  no  artificial  under- 
water obstacles.  Enemy  resistance  was 
light,  and  combat  engineers  soon  disap- 
peared inland  with  the  infantry.  Some 
of  them  removed  demolition  charges 
on  bridges  leading  into  Gela.^^ 

Dime  beaches  were  much  like  Yel- 
low and  Blue  beaches  in  the  JOSS  sec- 
tor except  in  one  important  respect — 
the  main  coastal  highway  was  nearly  two 
miles  away.  Enemy  defenses  in  the  area 
were  somewhat  more  developed  than 
at  other  points  on  the  southern  shore, 
but  pillboxes  gave  little  trouble  to  in- 
fantry-engineer assault  teams,  and  the 
only  underwater  obstacles  were  off- 
shore sandbars. 

Mines  proved  somewhat  troublesome, 
largely  for  want  of  SCR— 625s.  Mine 
detectors  belonging  to  the  39th  Engi- 
neers were  on  trucks  or  other  vehicles 
that  did  not  land  until  D  plus  1,  while 
the  531st  Engineers  carried  a  number 
of  detectors  ashore  only  to  find  that 
salt  spray  had  short-circuited  many  of 
them.  Most  of  the  mines  lay  in  regular 
patterns  and  were  not  booby-trapped, 
but  some  were  buried  as  deep  as  five 
feet.  On  one  Gela  beach,  engineers 
found  six  rows  of  Teller  mines  spaced 
three  yards  apart;  five  Navy  bulldozers 
were  lost  in  this  mine  belt.  Mines  al- 
so destroyed  a  number  of  trucks  and 
DUKWs — some  because  operators  ig- 
nored the  warning  tapes  the  engineers 
had  put  down.  No  antipersonnel  mines 


were  found  on  the  beaches  themselves, 
where,  said  one  observer,  they  would 
have  been  "horribly  effective,"  but  some 
in  the  dunes  and  cover  just  back  of  the 
beaches  caused  casualties. ^^ 

While  the  1st  Battalion,  531st  Engi- 
neers, landed  at  Gela  in  support  of  the 
Rangers,  the  2d  and  3d  Battalions  fol- 
lowed the  assault  waves  of  the  16th  and 
26th  Regimental  Combat  Teams  ashore. 
The  infantry  moved  inland  as  rapidly 
as  possible,  while  the  shore  engineers 
remained  behind  to  organize  the 
beaches.  The  shore  engineers  landed 
before  dawn,  but  not  until  midmorn- 
ing  could  landing  craft  stop  ferrying 
men  ashore  and  start  bringing  in  cargo. 
In  the  interim  shore  engineers  cut  exit 
roads,  cleared  away  mines  and  other 
obstacles,  set  up  beach  markers  to  guide 
landing  craft,  established  beach  com- 
munications systems  and  traffic  control 
measures,  and  organized  work  parties.^^ 

As  at  Joss,  mishaps  caused  craft  to 
broach  and  vehicles  to  stall  in  the  water 
off  Dime  Beach,  but  the  primary  dis- 
ruption was  an  enemy  counterattack 
through  most  of  D  plus  1  .'*^  During  the 


^'  Hist  531st  Engr  Shore  Rgt,  11  Jun-16  Jul  43; 
Maj.  T.  T.  Crowley  and  Capt.  G.  C.  Burch,  Eight  Stan 
to  Victory,  Operations  of  1st  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  in 
World  War  II,  pp.  45,  47. 


"^**  Chf  Engr,  Combined  Opns  (Br),  Lessons  Learned 
from  Husky,  25  Aug  43,  app.  B,  Description  of  Cer- 
tain Beaches,  G— 3  Misc  Papers,  1st  ESB  files.  The 
foregoing  is  the  primary  source  for  all  beach  descrip- 
tions in  this  chapter.  Hist  1st  Bn,  531st  Engr  Shore 
Rgt;  Ltr,  Bonesteel  to  Moore,  22  Jul  43;  Davidson, 
Preliminary  Rpt  of  Seventh  Army  Engr  on  the  Sicil- 
ian Opn,  23  Aug  43;  Hist  39th  Engr  C  Rgt,  10  Jul-  18 
Aug  43;  HQ,  Seventh  Army,  Lessons  Learned  in  Sicil- 
ian Campaign;  Hewitt  Rpt,  WNTF  in  Sicilian  Cam- 
paign, p.  56. 

Brig  Gen  N.  D.  Cota,  Landing  Data,  Dime  Beach, 
app.  5  to  Observation  of  Opn  Husky,  4-31  Jul  43, 
G-3  Misc  Papers,  1st  ESB  files;  Hist  531st  Engr  Shore 
Rgt,  llJun-16Jul43;Hist  1st  Bn,  531st  Engr  Shore 
Rgt. 

■*"  Seventh  Army  Rpt  Sicily,  p.  6—4;  Crowley  and 
Burch,  Eight  Stars  to  Victory,  pp.  47-48;  Hist  531st 
Engr  Shore  Rgt;  Morison,  Sicily-Salerno- Anzio,  pp.  99, 
103ff;  Comments  on  HusKY^oss  Task  Force  (8- 12 
Jul) — Rpt  of  Observations. 


SICILY:  THE  BEACHHEAD 


131 


early  hours  of  D-day  Italian  guns  laid 
intermittent  artillery  fire  on  the  beaches, 
destroying  a  pier  at  Gela  that  planners 
had  counted  on  for  unloading  LSTs. 
Then  at  0830  enemy  armor  started 
moving  south  out  of  Niscemi  toward 
Gela.  One  column  drove  to  within  a 
mile  or  two  of  the  coastal  highway 
before  paratroopers,  elements  of  the 
16th  Infantry,  and  the  guns  of  the 
cruiser  Boise  and  the  destroyer  Jeffers 
stopped  it.  In  the  meantime,  a  second 
column  of  about  twenty-five  light  Ital- 
ian tanks  approached  Gela  from  Ponte 
Olivo.  The  destroyer  Shubrick  knocked 
out  three  but  others  came  on,  and  the 
defense  section  of  the  1st  Battalion, 
531st  Engineers,  moved  forward  to 
reinforce  the  Rangers  and  the  39th 
Engineers.  In  the  ensuing  fight  the 
shore  engineers  scored  several  hits  with 
bazookas,  and  when  nine  or  ten  Italian 
tanks  drove  into  Gela,  the  Rangers 
drove  them  off. 

With  enemy  armor  in  the  vicinity,  the 
greatest  need  ashore  was  for  tanks  and 
artillery,  most  of  which  were  still  aboard 
LSTs.  Early  on  D-day  LST-338  ran  a 
ponton  causeway  ashore.  The  cause- 
way's crew  rigged  it  amid  falling  shells, 
and  by  1030  the  LST  had  unloaded  and 
pulled  away.  But  before  another  LST 
could  take  its  place  the  causeway  began 
to  drift,  and  repositioning  it  cost  valu- 
able time.  The  lack  of  adequate  anchors 
for  the  seaward  ends  of  the  ponton 
causeways  was  especially  felt  on  DIME 
beaches,  where  plans  for  using  the  Gela 
pier  had  limited  the  number  of  cause- 
ways to  three.  Artillery  pieces  had  to  be 
ferried  ashore  by  DUKWs  while  tanks, 
too  heavy  for  DUKWs,  came  in  on 
LCTs  and  LCMs.  As  the  afternoon 
wore  on,  the  surf  became  littered  with 
abandoned  vehicles  and  broached  land- 


ing craft  and  the  beach  clogged  with 
stalled  vehicles  and  piles  of  materiel. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  of  D-day  Gen- 
eral Patton  ordered  ashore  KOOL  Force, 
the  floating  reserve  consisting  of  the 
18th  Regimental  Combat  Team  and 
two  combat  commands  of  the  2d  Ar- 
mored Division.  The  movement  did  not 
get  under  way  until  about  1800;  by 
0200  on  1 1  July  men  on  the  beach, 
exhausted  after  working  around  the 
clock,  began  to  drop  off  to  sleep,  stall- 
ing KOOL  landings  until  daylight.  In 
the  meantime  the  enemy,  now  rein- 
forced by  larger  German  tanks  of  the 
Hermann  Goering  Division,  prepared  to 
launch  a  new  attack  on  Gela. 

Few  antitank  guns  or  2d  Armored 
Division  tanks  were  ashore  when  the 
enemy  struck  on  the  morning  of  D  plus 
1,  and  the  only  American  tanks  engaged 
were  five  Shermans  an  LCT  had 
brought  ashore  about  1030.  The  Ger- 
man tanks  fanned  out  across  the  Gela 
plain,  overran  American  infantry  guard- 
ing the  beachhead  perimeter,  and  rol- 
led on  toward  the  beaches,  some  lob- 
bing shells  into  the  mass  of  vehicles, 
materiel,  and  men  assembled  there. 
Divisional  artillery,  an  infantry  cannon 
company,  the  five  Sherman  tanks,  and 
fire  from  cruisers  and  destroyers  halted 
the  Germans.  At  1130  two  causeways 
were  operating  and  tanks  rolled  ashore 
over  them.  The  enemy  attack  faltered 
shortly  after  noon,  but  sporadic  fight- 
ing continued  into  the  night. 

On  the  beaches  conditions  had  already 
begun  to  improve,  and  by  1600  on  D 
plus  2  the  D-day  convoy  had  completely 
unloaded.  By  D  plus  3  order  prevailed, 
and,  with  the  arrival  of  the  540th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Regiment  (less  one  bat- 
talion), the  shore  engineers  of  the  531st 
were  able  to  concentrate  on  keeping  the 


132 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


beaches  clear.  Casualties  in  the  531st 
were  somewhat  higher  than  in  any 
other  shore  regiment  during  the  land- 
ings: as  of  16  July  the  regiment  had 
losses  of  22  men  killed,  68  wounded, 
and  2  missing.^* 

The  540th  Engineers  took  over  re- 
sponsibility for  road  work,  mine  re- 
moval, beach  dump  operations,  and 
other  jobs  inland  from  the  beaches.  It 
also  operated  the  tiny  port  of  Gela, 
where  U.S.  Navy  engineers  had  an- 
chored two  ponton  causeway  sections 
alongside  the  damaged  pier  for  unload- 
ing LCTs  and  LSTs. 

The  531st  Engineers'  beach  opera- 
tions settled  down  to  routine:  clearing 
the  beaches,  operating  dumps,  guard- 
ing POWs,  removing  waterproofing 
from  vehicles,  and  protecting  the  beach 
area.  One  of  the  most  efficient  means 
of  moving  supplies  across  the  beaches 
was  cargo  nets  which  enabled  DUKWs 
to  be  unloaded  with  one  sweep  of  a 
crane.  DUKWs  equipped  with  A-frames, 
a  nonstandard  item  manufactured  and 
installed  in  the  theater,  proved  particu- 
larly valuable. "^^ 

After  1 1  July  enemy  strafing  and 
bombing  attacks  subsided,  and,  favored 
by  ideal  weather,  supply  across  JOSS 
and  Dime  beaches  could  have  contin- 
ued indefinitely  except  for  very  heavy 
equipment.  But  Palermo  fell  on  22  July, 
and  the  beaches  lost  their  importance 
rapidly.  They  continued  to  function 
during  the  first  week  in  August,  but 


"*'  Cota,  Landing  Data,  Dime  Beach;  Hist  531st  Engr 

'*'^  Rpt,  Shore  Engineers  in  Sicily,  1st  ESB  files;  Hist 
531st  Engr  C  Rgt;  Information  from  Capt  Napp,  S— 3, 
540th  Engr  Shore  Rgt,  contained  in  HusKV^ossTask 
Force  (8—12  Jul) — Rpt  of  Observations;  Rpt  of  Sev- 
enth Army  Engr  Sicily;  Seventh  Army  Rpt  Sicily,  pp. 
6-10. 


Dime  averaged  less  than  a  hundred  tons 
a  day.  On  7  August  DIME  beaches  closed 
down  in  favor  of  JOSS  beaches  and  cap- 
tured ports  on  the  north  coast.'*^ 

Cent  Beaches 

Two  groups  of  beaches  ten  miles 
apart  provided  the  landing  sites  for  the 
45th  Infantry  Division  in  the  CENT 
area.  One  group  of  beaches  (Red,  Green, 
and  Yellow)  north  of  Scoglitti  had  been 
chosen  for  proximity  to  Biscari  Airfield, 
about  eight  miles  inland;  the  group 
south  of  Scoglitti  (Green  2,  Yellow  2), 
for  proximity  to  Comiso  Airfield,  some 
fourteen  miles  away. 

The  120th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion, attached  by  platoons  to  infantry 
battalions,  began  landing  on  the  north- 
ern beaches  at  0345,  H-hour  having 
been  set  back  sixty  minutes  in  this  sec- 
tor because  of  heavy  seas.  The  engi- 
neers hastily  cleared  sections  of  the 
beaches,  reconnoitered  for  exit  routes, 
and  knocked  out  enemy  pillboxes.  By 
noon  two  companies  of  the  19th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Regiment  had  come  a- 
shore.  Though  earmarked  to  repair 
inland  airfields,  they  helped  on  the 
beaches  until  the  airfields  were  taken. 
The  men  of  the  19th  Engineers  were 
doubly  welcome  because  of  their  three 
rare  D  — 7  bulldozers  and  three  road 
graders,  but  most  of  this  equipment 
could  not  land  until  the  following  day 
because  of  high  seas  and  trouble  with 

44    ^ 

causeways. 

The  landings  on  CENT  beaches  were 
the  most  difficult  in  Sicily.  One  trouble 


^"^  Rate  of  Discharge  in  Long  Tons  from  Ports  and 
Beaches  in  Sicily,  app.  D  to  Seventh  Army  Adm  Sitrep, 
10  Jul  43-18  Aug  43;  Rpt,  Shore  Engineers  in  Sicily, 
1st  ESB  files;  Hist  531st  Engr  C  Rgt. 

^^  Hist  19th  Engr  C  Gp,  Oct  42 -Jan  44. 


SICILY:  THE  BEACHHEAD 


133 


was  the  loading  plan,  which  followed 
the  U.S.  amphibious  standing  operat- 
ing procedure,  calling  for  assault  battal- 
ions to  be  unit-loaded  aboard  a  single 
ship.  This  plan  did  not  apply  to  the 
120th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion, 
which  sailed  aboard  nineteen  different 
ships,  but  it  did  apply  to  the  assault 
units  to  which  the  combat  engineers 
were  attached."*^  The  system  had  obvi- 
ous theoretical  tactical  advantages,  but 
at  Sicily  practical  disadvantages  tended 
to  outweigh  them.  No  single  ship  car- 
ried enough  landing  craft  to  put  a  full 
assault  wave  in  the  water.  As  a  result, 
landing  craft  from  one  ship  had  to 
grope  about  in  the  predawn  darkness 
seeking  other  ships  or  the  landing  craft 
that  formed  the  rest  of  the  assault  wave. 

Waves  and  surf  higher  and  rougher 
than  in  the  JOSS  and  DIME  areas  made 
offshore  rendezvous  at  the  CENT 
beaches  more  difficult.  Well-trained 
landing  craft  crews  might  have  been 
equal  to  the  offshore  problems,  but  at 
least  half  the  45th  Infantry  Division's 
coxswains  had  been  replaced  just  as  the 
division  left  the  United  States.  The  high 
surf  took  a  fearful  toll  of  landing  craft. 
By  noon  on  D  plus  1,  in  one  sector  109 
LCVPs  and  LCMs  out  of  an  original 
175  were  damaged,  stranded,  sunk,  or 
missing.  Along  one  stretch  of  beach  one 
craft  was  stranded  an  average  of  every 
twenty-five  yards. "^^ 

Many  of  the  landing  craft  that  reached 
shore  missed  their  mark  because  of 


heavy  surf,  too  few  landmarks,  and  a 
strong  southeast  current;  part  of  one 
regimental  combat  team  (including  the 
commander)  landed  six  miles  northwest 
of  its  assigned  beach.  The  40th  En- 
gineers' shore  group,  mounted  in  the 
United  States,  had  not  instructed  its 
components  to  develop  whatever  beach 
they  landed  on.  When  men  of  the  40th 
found  themselves  on  the  wrong  beaches, 
many  searched  along  the  shoreline  for 
the  right  ones.  But  even  those  who 
stayed  where  they  landed  and  set  to 
work  on  exit  routes  could  not  build 
roads  fast  enough  to  handle  the  cargo 
coming  ashore.  Exits  had  to  cross  a  belt 
of  sand  dunes  up  to  a  thousand  yards 
wide,  and  the  main  coastal  highway  was 
several  miles  away. 

The  Cent  beaches  soon  became  heav- 
ily congested,  and  many  shore  engineer 
units  shifted  their  location — some  sev- 
eral times — to  find  better  exit  routes. 
Each  move  cost  the  shore  groups  time, 
control  over  their  organization,  discip- 
line, and  equipment.  Naval  beach  bat- 
talions, for  instance,  had  heavy  equip- 
ment that  could  not  be  shifted  about 
easily. ^^ 

D— 7  angledozers  had  to  build  most 
exit  roads  at  the  beaches,  for  the  smaller 
R— 4s  again  proved  too  weak  for  either 
road  construction  or  vehicle  salvage. 
The  engineer  regiments  working  the 
beaches  had  two  D  — 7s  per  lettered 
engineer  company  and  could  easily 
have  used  a  third.  Cyclone  wire  and 


^"^  Opns  Rpt,  1 20th  Engr  C  Bn,  1  May-31  Oct  43. 

^^  HQ,  Combined  Operations  (Br),  Bull  4/1,  Notes 
on  the  Planning  and  Assault  Phases  of  the  Sicilian 
Campaign;  Morison,  Sicily-Salerno- Anzio,  pp.  127-28, 
138,  140;  Hist  40th  Engr'C  Rgt,  1  Apr  42-  1 1  Feb  44; 
AFHQ,  Notes  on  Husky  Landings,  23  Jul  43,  G-3 
Misc  Papers,  1st  ESB  files;  Hewitt  Rpt,  WNTF  in  Sicil- 
ian Campaign,  pp.  39,  48. 


^'^  AFHQ,  Notes  on  Husky  Landings,  23  Jul  43; 
Memo,  Brig  Gen  A.  C.  Wedemeyer,  Chf,  Strategy  and 
Policy  Gp,  WDGS,  for  CofS,  24  Aug  43,  sub:  Ob- 
server's Rpt,  319.1,  binder,  AGF  files;  Hewitt  Rpt, 
WNTF  in  Sicilian  Campaign,  p.  59;  Hist  40th  Engr  C 
Rgt,  10  Jul- 18  Aug  43;  Memo,  HQ,  1st  ESB,  for  Unit 
Commanders,  2  Jun  43,  sub:  Remarks  on  Landing 
Opns. 


134 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Landing  Heavy  Equipment  Over  the  Causeway  at  Scoglitti 


Sommerfeld  mat  that  came  ashore  on 
sleds  were  used  to  surface  sandy  roads. 
Engineers  also  cut  and  laid  cane  to 
make  sandy  roads  passable. 

DUKWs  carried  most  supplies  inland. 
Bleeding  the  tires  to  ten  pounds  of 
pressure  enabled  the  craft  to  cross  the 
sandy  beaches  but  cut  tire  life  to  about 
3,500  miles.  Other  supplies  had  to  be 
manhandled,  mosdy  by  POW  volunteers, 
and  dragged  to  the  dumps  on  sleds 
hauled  by  bulldozers.  Not  much  went 
into  the  beach  dumps  on  D-day,  and 
before  D  plus  1  ended  CENT  beaches 
were  hopelessly  jammed.  That  night 
and  the  next  day  the  original  Green, 
Red,  and  Yellow  beaches  were  aban- 
doned, and  unloading  moved  some 
three  miles  to  the  southeast,  where  the 
inland  roadnet  was  more  accessible. 


Operations  continued  at  new  beaches 
in  the  Scoglitti  area  for  another  week 
before  events  inland  and  farther  west 
along  the  coast  closed  the  CENT  beaches 
permanently."^^ 

During  the  first  three  days  of  the 
invasion  66,235  men,  17,766  dead- 
weight tons  of  cargo,  and  7,416  vehi- 
cles went  ashore  over  Seventh  Army 
beaches,  while  666  U.S.  Army  troops 
and  614  POWs  were  evacuated.  By  the 
end  of  July  the  1st  Engineer  Special 
Brigade  had  put  ashore  111,824  men, 


*^  Hist  40th  Engr  C  Rgt,  10  Jul-18  Aug  43;  Cota, 
Landing  Data,  Dime  Beach;  AFHQ,  Notes  on  Husky 
Landings,  23  Jul  43;  Information  from  Capt  Kennedy, 
CO,  361st  QM  Co  (DUKW),  in  Husky— Joss  Task 
Force  (8-12  Jul) — Rpt  of  Observations;  Info  Sect, 
Intel  Div,  OCE,  SOS  ETOUSA,  Answers  to  Engrs 
Questionnaire,  15  Sep  43,  North  African  Opns. 


SICILY:  THE  BEACHHEAD 


135 


104,734  tons  of  cargo,  and  21,512 
vehicles,  and  had  shipped  out  to  North 
Africa  1,772  wounded  and  27,939 
POWs.  The  performance  quieted  fears 
that  the  beaches  would  be  unable  to 
support  the  Seventh  Army.^^  Around 
17  July  the  1st  Engineer  Special  Brigade, 
on  orders  from  General  Patton,  began 
to  gather  all  Seventh  Army  supply  activi- 
ties and  many  service  units  under  its 
command,  taking  over  all  unloading 
and  supply  at  DIME,  CENT,  and  JOSS 
beaches.  The  brigade's  beach  opera- 
tions on  Sicily  demonstrated  that  Allied 
planners  would  not  have  to  be  so  closely 
bound  by  requirements  for  ports  in  pre- 


^''  Rpt,  Shore  Engineers  in  Sicily,  app.  B,  1st  ESB 
files;  Seventh  Army  Rpt  Sicily,  p.  E-12. 


paring  for  future  moves  against  the 
Continent. 

Despite  the  generally  favorable  con- 
ditions for  amphibious  operations  in 
Sicily,  the  engineers  still  suffered  from 
their  own  inexperience.  The  frequent 
inability  to  adapt  existing  plans  and  pro- 
cedures to  new  conditions  in  the  midst 
of  a  developing  situation  led  to  contin- 
ued delays  in  supply  movement  off  the 
beaches.  The  haste  of  preparations  and 
the  curtain  of  security  for  the  Sicilian 
landings  also  brought  many  engineers 
their  first  glimpse  of  new  types  of  equip- 
ment on  the  busy  beaches.  They  soon 
would  have  to  apply  what  they  learned 
in  new  thrusts  onto  the  Italian  main- 
land against  a  still  determined  German 
enemy. 


CHAPTER  VII 


Sicily:  The  Drive  to  Messina 


By  15  July  the  Allies  held  a  beach- 
head stretching  from  Syracuse  to  Licata, 
and  Seventh  Army,  strengthened  by  the 
D  plus  4  convoy,  was  preparing  to  break 
out  of  its  beachhead.  General  Patton 
created  the  Provisional  Corps,  consist- 
ing of  the  3d  Infantry  Division,  the  3d 
Ranger  Battalion,  the  5th  Armored 
Field  Artillery  Group,  and  elements  of 
the  2d  Armored  and  82d  Airborne 
Divisions,  to  sweep  around  the  western 
coast  of  Sicily  and  to  move  against 
Palermo  from  the  south  and  southwest. 
The  II  Corps,  initially  consisting  of  the 
1st  and  45th  Infantry  Divisions,  was  to 
strike  across  central  Sicily  to  the  north 
coast  east  of  Palermo.  The  attacks  be- 
gan on  17  July.' 

During  Provisional  Corps'  drive  on 
Palermo,  which  met  little  opposition, 
combat  engineers  speedily  bypassed 
several  destroyed  bridges  and  removed 
explosives  from  others  captured  intact. 
Divisional  engineer  bulldozers  and  mine 
detectors  paced  the  corps'  advance,  for 
a  time  without  corps  engineer  support, 
because  Provisional  Corps  originally 
had  no  corps  engineer  organization. 
On  20  July  the  20th  Engineer  Combat 
Regiment  joined  Provisional  Corps;  one 


battalion  supported  3d  Division  engi- 
neers, the  other  2d  Armored  Division 
engineers.^ 

Palermo  fell  on  22  July.  Allied  bombs 
had  left  the  port  with  only  30  percent 
of  its  normal  capacity.  Forty-four  ves- 
sels— ships,  barges,  and  small  craft — lay 
sunk  in  the  harbor,  and  bomb  craters 
pitted  quays  and  railway  tracks.  On  23 
July  the  20th  Engineer  Combat  Regi- 
ment set  about  providing  berths  for 
thirty-six  LSTs  and  fourteen  Liberty 
ships,  and  naval  personnel  began  sal- 
vage work  in  the  roadstead  and  ship 
channels.  At  the  port  engineers  bull- 
dozed debris  from  pier  areas  and  exit 
routes,  filled  bomb  craters,  and  cut 
steps  into  the  masonry  piers  to  accom- 
modate LST  ramps;  they  also  cleared 
city  streets  of  debris,  leveled  badly  dam- 
aged buildings,  and  laid  water  lines  to 
the  piers.  They  cut  away  superstruc- 
tures of  some  ships  sunk  alongside  the 
quays  and  built  timber  ramps  across  the 
scuttled  hulks.  Eventually  Liberty  ships 
moored  alongside  the  derelicts  and 
unloaded.^ 


'  In  addition  to  Garland  and  Smyth,  Sicily  and  the 
Surrender  of  Italy,  the  general  sources  for  this  chapter 
are:  Seventh  Army  Rpt  Sicily;  Rpt  of  Seventh  Army 
Engr  Sicily;  II  Corps  Engr  Rpt,  10  Jul- 18  Aug  43. 


'^  Rpts,  20th  Engr  C  Rgt  to  CG,  3d  Div,  18,  22,  and 
28  Jul  43,  sub:  Action  of  20th  Engineer  Combat 
Regiment,  10-17  Jul  43,  3d  Inf  Div  files;  Hist  Reds, 
Prov  Corps,  Seventh  Army,  15  Jul-20  Aug  43. 

^  Hist  20th  Engr  C  Bn,  17  May-17  Jun  45.  (Orga- 
nized in  August  1942,  the  20th  Engineer  Combat  Regi- 
ment was  broken  up  on  15  January  1944,  with  the 
regiment's  1st  Battalion  being  redesignated  the  20th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion.)  Chf  Engr,  15th  Army 


SICILY:  THE  DRIVE  TO  MESSINA 


137 


On  the  morning  of  23  July,  the  day 
after  Provisional  Corps  captured  Paler- 
mo, elements  of  II  Corps  reached  the 
north  coast  of  Sicily.  A  regimental  com- 
bat team  of  the  45th  Infantry  Division 
entered  the  town  of  Termini  Imerese, 
thirty-one  miles  east  of  Palermo  on 
Highway  113,  the  coastal  road  between 
Palermo  and  Messina.  The  1st  Division 
reached  Petralia  on  Highway  120,  an 
inland  road  about  twenty  miles  south 
of  Highway  1 13. 

That  same  day.  General  Alexander 
changed  the  direction  of  American 
forces.  He  had  originally  ordered  Pat- 
ton's  Seventh  Army  to  Palermo  and  the 
north  coast  to  protect  the  left  flank  of 
Montgomery's  British  Eighth  Army 
drive  on  Messina.  On  23  July,  becom- 
ing aware  that  Montgomery's  forces 
were  not  strong  enough  to  overrun  the 
Germans  in  front  of  Eighth  Army, 
Alexander  directed  Patton  to  turn  his 
army  to  the  east  and  advance  on  Messina 
along  the  axis  of  Highways  113  and 
120.  Patton  lost  no  time.  The  two  divi- 
sions of  Lt.  Gen.  Omar  N.  Bradley's  II 
Corps,  already  in  position  athwart  the 
two  highways  and  soon  to  be  bolstered 
by  units  of  the  Provisional  Corps,  were 
in  motion  before  nightfall. 

Supply  Over  the  Beaches 

At  the  outset  supplies  for  the  Ameri- 
can drive  on  Messina  had  to  come  from 
dumps  at  small  ports  and  beaches  on  the 
south  coast — Porto  Empedocle,  Licata, 
and  Gela — because  the  first  coasters  did 
not  reach  Palermo  until  28  July.  The 
agency  responsible  for  logistical  support 


Gp,  Notes  on  Engr  Opns  in  Sicily,  no.  3,  10  Sep  43; 
Brig  Gen  C.  R.  Moore,  Rpt  of  Observations  in  North 
Africa  and  Sicily,  9  Sep  43. 


was  still  the  1st  Engineer  Special  Brigade, 
acting  as  SOS,  Seventh  Army,  under 
the  general  supervision  of  the  army's 
G-4.^ 

Once  the  attack  out  of  the  beachhead 
began,  the  most  critical  supply  prob- 
lem was  not  unloading  supplies  but  mov- 
ing them  forward  to  the  using  troops, 
a  problem  compounded  by  prearranged 
shipments  that  did  not  reflect  reality. 
The  1st  Engineer  Special  Brigade  soon 
was  burdened  with  unneeded  materiel. 

Trained  and  equipped  to  unload  sup- 
plies across  the  beaches  and  through 
the  small  ports  on  Sicily's  southern  shore, 
the  1st  Engineer  Special  Brigade  per- 
formed efficiently  after  overcoming 
earlier  problems  at  the  beaches.  But  the 
brigade  also  had  to  stock  and  operate 
Seventh  Army  depots  inland  at  points 
convenient  to  the  combat  forces,  and 
there  were  never  enough  trucks  on 
Sicily.^ 

Railroads  became  important  in  mov- 
ing supplies  inland  to  support  the  rapid 
advance.  Lines  from  Porto  Empedocle 
and  Licata  converged  not  far  from 
Caltanissetta,  a  town  near  the  center  of 
the  island  and  about  thirty  miles  inland. 
Seventh  Army  captured  the  lines  intact, 
and  Transportation  Corps  railway 
troops  had  supplies  rolling  over  them 
from  the  beaches  immediately.  The 
dumps  were  opened  at  Caltanissetta  on 
19  July.  Beyond  this  point  German 
demolitions  limited  the  use  of  railways, 
and  supplies  had  to  be  trucked  to  for- 
ward corps  dumps. 

The  using  services,  even  the  engi- 


'*  HQ,  Force  343,  FO  1,  18  Jun  43,  Engr  Annex; 
Rpt,  Caffey,  Shore  Engineers  in  Sicily;  Moore,  Rpt  of 
Observations,  9  Sep  43. 

^  Ltr,  HQ,  Seventh  Army,  to  CG,  NATOUSA,  22 
Nov  43,  sub:  Data  for  Logistical  Planning;  Bradley,  A 
Soldier's  Story,  p.  145. 


138 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


neers,  were  critical  of  the  1st  Engineer 
Special  Brigade's  inland  dumps,  com- 
plaining that  they  could  not  find  needed 
items.  The  1st  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion, supporting  the  1st  Infantry  Divi- 
sion, reported  sending  its  trucks  back 
to  the  beaches  for  needed  materiel  no 
less  than  four  times.  Ordnance  officers 
complained  that  forward  dumps  were 
overstocked  with  small-arms  ammuni- 
tion (which  the  brigade  moved  first 
because  it  was  easiest  to  handle),  while 
they  urgently  needed  artillery  ammuni- 
tion.*^ 

Whatever  the  deficiencies,  the 
beaches,  especially  at  Porto  Empedocle 
and  Licata,  carried  a  heavy  supply  re- 
sponsibility throughout  the  Sicilian 
campaign,  mainly  because  the  cam- 
paign was  short  and  the  rehabilitation 
of  Palermo  slow.  An  early  and  impor- 
tant activity  at  the  beaches  was  supply- 
ing aviation  gasoline  to  the  Ponte  Olivo 
and  Comiso  Airfields.  The  chief  engi- 
neer, 15th  Army  Group,  termed  the 
work  of  the  696th  Engineer  Petroleum 
Distribution  Company  in  building  fuel 
pipelines  and  tanks  at  Gela  "the  out- 
standing new  engineer  feature  of  the 
campaign."^ 

A  small  reconnaissance  party  of  pe- 
troleum engineers  landed  on  DIME 
beaches  on  D-day,  and  by  18  July  all 
the  men  and  equipment  of  the  696th 
were  ashore.  Engineers  used  the  dam- 
aged Gela  pier  to  berth  shallow-draft 
tankers  in  about  seventeen  feet  of  water. 
The  company  laid  discharge  lines  along 


the  pier,  erected  two  5,000-barrel  bolted- 
steel  storage  tanks  on  shore,  and  by  21 
July  completed  a  four-inch  pipeline  to 
Ponte  Olivo  Airfield,  about  seven  miles 
away.  The  first  tanker,  originally  sched- 
uled to  arrive  off  Gela  on  18  July,  did 
not  actually  begin  to  discharge  until  24 
July.  Two  days  later  a  22-mile  pipeline 
to  Comiso  Airfield  was  also  completed. 
About  the  same  time  a  detachment 
from  the  696th  erected  facilities  for 
receiving,  storing,  and  canning  gaso- 
line at  Porto  Empedocle. 

The  petroleum  engineers  had  wanted 
their  equipment  shipped  in  two  equal 
parts  on  two  coasters,  each  accompa- 
nied by  some  of  their  experts,  but  the 
equipment  arrived  in  seven  different 
ships  at  several  different  beaches — some 
as  far  afield  as  the  British  port  of  Syra- 
cuse. Workers  at  the  beach  dumps  were 
unfamiliar  with  the  POL  equipment 
and  had  so  much  difficulty  gathering  it 
that  the  696th  had  to  send  men  to 
search  for  items  along  the  beaches.  As 
late  as  21  July  the  company  had  found 
only  60  percent  of  its  materiel  and  had 
to  improvise  elbows  and  other  fittings 
to  complete  the  pipelines.^ 

Bailey  bridges  had  proven  their  worth 
in  the  final  days  of  the  Tunisian  cam- 
paign. Seventh  Army  brought  several 
sets  to  Sicily,  though  some  arrived  with 
vital  parts  missing.  The  main  advan- 
tage of  the  Bailey — one  of  the  most  val- 
ued pieces  of  equipment  in  World  War 
II — was  its  adaptability.  It  was  made  of 
welded  lattice  panels,  each  ten  feet 


*'  Seventh  Army  Rpt  Sicily,  p.  E— 7;  Hist  1st  Engr  C 
Bn,  Sicilian  Campaign,  10  Jul— Dec  43;  Lida  Mayo, 
The  Ordnance  Department:  On  Beachhead  and  Battlefront, 
United  States  Army  in  World  War  II  (Washington, 
1968),  p.  167. 

'  Chf  Engr,  15th  Army  Gp,  Notes  on  Engr  Opns  in 
Sicily,  no.  3,  Sep  43. 


"  Rpt,  Capt  M.  D.  Altgelt  to  Lt  Col  S.  A.  Potter,  Jr., 
Chf,  C&Q  Planning,  5  Oct  43,  sub:  Rep)ort  Covering 
Trip  to  North  Africa  (POL  Inspection)  with  extracts 
from  six  important  documents  f)ertaining  to 
Husky  POL;  Hist  696th  Engr  Pet  Dist  Co,  1  Sep  42- 
30  Apr  44. 


SICILY:  THE  DRIVE  TO  MESSINA 


139 


long,  joined  together  with  steel  pins  to 
form  girders  of  varying  length  and 
strength.  The  girders  could  be  up  to 
three  panels  wide  and  high.  The  Bailey 
could  accommodate  a  great  variety  of 
loads  and  spans;  it  could  be  erected  to 
carry  twenty-eight  tons  over  a  1 70-foot 
span,  or  as  much  as  seventy-eight  tons 
over  a  120-foot  span.  The  bridges  were 
designated  according  to  the  number  of 
parallel  panels  and  stories  in  each  girder. 
A  double-single  (DS)  Bailey  was  two 
panels  wide  and  one  story  high,  a  triple- 
double  (TD)  three  panels  wide  and  two 
stories  high.  Engineers  could  assemble 
and  launch  these  bridges  entirely  from 
the  near  shore.  A  light  falsework  of 
paneling  served  as  a  launching  nose  and 
the  bridge  itself  as  a  counterweight.^ 

The  Bailey  was  especially  valuable  in 
Sicily  because  of  the  terrain.  Along  the 
coast  from  Palermo  to  Messina  ran  a 
narrow  littoral  flanked  by  the  sea  on 
one  side  and  by  steep,  rocky  mountains 
on  the  other.  Here  and  there,  where 
the  mountains  crowded  all  the  way  to 
the  sea.  Highway  1 1 3  was  no  more  than 
a  winding,  shoulderless  road  chipped 
into  headlands.  For  the  most  part  ve- 
hicles— and  sometimes  even  foot 
troops — were  roadbound.  The  Ger- 
mans had  demolished  bridges  and  cul- 
verts across  the  numerous  ravines.  To 
the  south  and  inland.  Highway  120  ran 
through  rugged  mountain  ranges  nearly 
due  east  from  Petralia  through  Nicosia, 
Troina,  and  Randazzo  to  the  east  coast. 
Since  maneuvering  off  this  road  was 
difficult  at  best,  blown  bridges  could 
stop  forward  movement.  After  II  Corps 
engineers  established  their  dump  in 
Nicosia,  Baileys  accounted  for  over  90 


percent  of  the  298  tons  of  fortifications 
material,  bridging,  and  road  mainte- 
nance supplies  the  dump  issued  dur- 
ing the  campaign.'*' 

On  29  July  II  Corps  engineers  estab- 
lished a  bridge  dump  at  Nicosia  and 
organized  a  provisional  Bailey  bridge 
train.  The  19th  Engineer  Combat  Regi- 
ment outfitted  one  of  its  platoons  with 
nine  trucks  and  seven  four-wheeled 
German  trailers.  Each  of  the  cargo 
trucks  carried  all  the  components  for  a 
ten-foot,  double-single  bay  of  Bailey 
bridging.  The  bridge  train  carried  100 
feet  of  double-single  Bailey  plus  mate- 
rial for  a  seventy-foot  launching  nose, 
and  the  bridge  unit  had  enough  extra 
parts  for  two  eighty-foot  Class  40 
bridges. ' ' 

Corps  and  Army  Support  of 
Combat  Engineers 

At  the  time  II  Corps  began  slicing 
across  Sicily  to  the  north  coast  on  17 
July,  German  forces  were  falling  back 
to  stronger  defensive  positions,  using  a 
covering  screen  of  mines,  booby  traps, 
and  demolitions  to  delay  pursuit.  Ex- 
cept for  brief  stands  at  Caltanissetta  and 
Enna  to  gain  time  to  consolidate  new 
defenses  to  the  east,  the  enemy  aban- 
doned western  Sicily.  But  by  23  July, 
when  the  45th  Division  reached  the 


^  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Engineers: 
Troops  and  Equipment,  p.  5 1 . 


"•  II  Corps  Engr  Rpt,  10  Jul- 18  Aug  43. 

' '  Davidson,  Preliminary  Rpt  of  Seventh  Army  Engr 
6n  the  Sicilian  Opn,  23  Aug  43;  II  Corps  Engr  Rpt, 
18  Aug  43,  ans.  5  and  7;  Ltr,  Elliott  to  AFHQ,  21  Sep 
43,  sub:  Administrative  Lessons  Learned  from  Opns 
in  Sicily  from  the  Engr  Viewpoint;  Hist  19th  Engr  C 
Gp,  Oct  42-Jan  44.  (The  19th  Engineer  Combat  Regi- 
ment was  broken  up  on  1  March  1945;  Headquarters 
and  Headquarters  Company  became  Headquarters 
and  Headquarters  Company,  19th  Engineer  Combat 
Group;  the  1st  Battalion  became  the  401st  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion;  the  2d  Battalion  became  the  402d 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion.) 


140 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


north  coast,  evidence  was  mounting 
that  the  enemy  would  soon  make  a 
stand.  The  1st  Division,  on  the  right 
and  inland,  ran  into  sharp  fighting  and 
increasing  numbers  of  mines  and  demo- 
litions near  Alimena,  northwest  of  Enna. 
To  the  east  the  British  Eighth  Army 
stalled  before  powerful  German  de- 
fenses south  and  southwest  of  Mt.  Etna. 
(Map  6) 

Up  to  this  point  the  work  load  for 
divisional  engineer  battalions  had  not 
been  heavy.  Their  main  tasks  during 
the  establishment  of  the  beachhead  had 
been  to  help  build  exit  roads  and  to 
help  the  infantry  take  and  destroy  pill- 
boxes. There  had  been  mines  to  search 
out  and  a  few  roadblocks  to  clear,  but 
for  the  most  part  divisional  engineer 
formations  had  organized  and  occupied 
defensive  positions  alongside  the  infan- 
try units  to  which  they  were  attached. 
During  the  subsequent  advances  across 
Sicily,  divisional  engineers  spent  most 
of  their  time  probing  for  mines  and 
bypassing  blown  bridges  by  cutting 
roads  down  banks  and  across  dry  stream- 
beds. 

The  120th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion opened  the  way  for  the  45th  Divi- 
sion along  Highway  1 13,  the  1st  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  for  the  1st  Divi- 
sion along  Highway  120,  where  mines 
and  demolitions  were  somewhat  denser. 
By  the  end  of  July  the  1st  Engineer 
Battalion  had  repaired  or  bypassed 
twenty-three  bridges,  nineteen  large 
craters,  and  several  bomb  or  shell  holes. 
They  also  had  cleared  away  wrecked 
vehicles,  rubble,  and  roadblocks  and 
had  swept  the  route  for  mines. '^ 

Backing  up  the  divisional  engineers 


in  II  Corps  was  the  39th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Regiment,  one  battalion  behind  the 
120th  and  another  behind  the  1st.  Corps 
engineers  in  close  support  improved 
bypasses  and,  where  bypasses  were  im- 
practical, erected  Bailey  bridges.  They 
also  cleared  more  mines,  reduced 
grades,  and  eliminated  traffic  bottle- 
necks. A  battalion  of  the  19th  Engineers 
joined  II  Corps  to  handle  work  the  39th 
Engineers  could  not  do  because  much 
of  the  regiment's  equipment  and  many 
of  its  vehicles  had  not  yet  arrived.  This 
battalion  had  been  working  on  Comiso 
Airfield  and  had  with  it  several  road 
graders,  bulldozers,  six-ton  trucks,  and 
sixteen-ton  trailers. '^^ 

Behind  II  Corps,  the  20th  Engineer 
Combat  Regiment  on  Highway  113  and 
the  343d  Engineer  General  Service 
Regiment  on  Highway  120  shared  road 
maintenance  responsibility  within  the 
army  area.  Most  main  roads  were  in 
excellent  condition:  surfaced  with  black 
top  or  water-bound  macadam,  wide 
enough  for  two-way  traffic,  and  moder- 
ately graded  and  curved.  Towns,  with 
their  sharp  turns  and  narrow  streets, 
were  the -principal  bottlenecks.  Second- 
class  roads  were  usually  in  fair  condi- 
tion but  were  narrow  with  sharp  curves 
and  steep  grades;  Seventh  Army  made 
good  use  of  them  by  making  them  one- 
way and  by  controlling  traffic.  Dry 
weather  made  the  engineers' job  easier. 
Road  repair  machinery  such  as  rollers 
and  portable  rock  crushers  were  cap- 
tured in  many  localities,  while  stock- 
piles of  crushed  stone  and  asphalt 
enough  for  initial  repairs  were  found 
along  all  main  roads. 

By  the  time  army  engineers  took  over 


'■^  Hist  120th  Engr  C  Bn,  May  44;  Hist  1st  Engr  C 
Bn,  Sicilian  Campaign,  10  Jul-Dec  43. 


'"^  11  Corps  Engr  Rpt,  Sicilian  Campaign;  Hists,  39th 
Engr  C  Rgt,  10  Jul-  18  Aug  43,  and  19th  Engr  C  Gp, 
Oct  42 -Jan  44. 


SICILY:  THE  DRIVE  TO  MESSINA 


141 


main  supply  routes  from  corps  engi- 
neers, they  generally  found  the  roads 
in  excellent  condition.  After  removing 
roadblocks,  widening  bottlenecks,  and 
improving  some  bypasses,  they  built 
culverts,  paved  the  slopes  of  fills,  and 
built  wooden  trestle  bridges.  The  20th 
Engineers  improved  eighteen  bypasses 
on  Highway  113  between  Palermo  and 
Cape  Orlando,  and  the  343d  Engineers 
did  similar  work  on  twenty-one  bypasses 
on  roads  from  Cape  Orlando  to  Mes- 
sina and  Randazzo.  The  two  regiments 
also  cleared  minefields  and  rebuilt  six 
railroad  bridges. '"* 

Between  Highways  113  and  120  lay 
the  rugged  Madonie-Nebrodi  ranges, 
with  peaks  over  6,000  feet  high.  Few 
roads  crossed  these  mountains,  and  lat- 
eral roads  connecting  113  with  120 
were  some  fifteen  miles  apart.  At  the 
end  of  July  traffic  between  the  1st  and 
45th  Divisions  had  to  make  a  long  trip 
around  to  the  rear.  Engineers  of  the 
45th  Division  began  reopening  High- 
way 117,  running  south  out  of  Santo 
Stefano.  As  soon  as  Santo  Stefano  fell 
into  American  hands.  Company  B,  120th 
Engineer  Battalion,  went  to  work  at  a 
demolished  bridge  two  miles  north  of 
Mistretta.  Engineers  grading  a  bypass 
there  lost  two  bulldozers  to  enemy  mines, 
although  the  site  had  been  checked. 
Afterward,  engineers  spent  more  time 
on  mine  clearance  work  and  paid  par- 
ticular attention  to  areas  around  demo- 
litions, for  the  Germans,  impressed  by 
the  speed  with  which  American  bull- 
dozers cut  bypasses,  were  bent  on  mak- 
ing the  most  likely  bypass  routes  the 
deadliest  ones.' ' 


After  II  Corps  turned  east,  enemy 
mining  became  more  plentiful  and  more 
deliberate.  The  Germans  planted  mines 
in  potholes  and  covered  them  with  hot 
asphalt  to  resemble  patches.  They  also 
booby-trapped  antitank  mines,  as  many 
as  90  percent  of  them  in  places.  Before 
roads  and  trails  could  be  opened,  divi- 
sional engineers  had  to  sweep  traffic 
lanes  and  shoulders  thoroughly.  For 
this  job  they  needed  many  more  SCR- 
625  mine  detectors  than  the  fifteen  allo- 
cated to  each  of  the  engineer  combat 
regiments,  divisional  engineers,  sepa- 
rate combat  battalions,  and  armored 
engineer  battalions.  The  19th  Engi- 
neers carried  forty-two  detectors,  and 
after  the  campaign  both  Seventh  Army 
and  AFHQ  recommended  that  the  num- 
ber provided  as  organic  equipment  for 
infantry  and  armored  divisional  engi- 
neer battalions  be  raised  to  forty-two 
and  fifty-four,  respectively.*^ 

SCR— 625s  proved  as  valuable  in  Sic- 
ily as  in  Tunisia — and  less  troublesome. 
Since  rain  fell  only  once  in  the  II  Corps 
area,  the  only  trouble  with  moisture 
shorting  out  the  detectors  came  from 
sea  spray  during  the  initial  landings. 
The  detectors  were  fragile,  however, 
and  seldom  were  more  than  75  percent 
working.  Sweeping  with  the  SCR— 625 
was  slow  and  tedious,  but  neither  so 
slow  nor  so  tedious  as  probing.  Engi- 
neers relied  heavily  on  the  SCR— 625s, 
but  doubt  was  growing  as  to  how  long 
they  could  continue  to  do  so.  In  Sicily 
the  Germans  used  two  types  of  mines 
that  SCR— 625s  could  not  detect  under 
more  than  an  inch  of  soil.  One  was  a 


44. 


'^  Rpt  of  Seventh  Army  Engr  Sicily. 

"^  Hist  120th  Engr  C  Bn  in  Sicilian  Campaign,-May 


"'Opns  Rpt  and  S-2  Jnl,  120th  Engr  C  Bn,  10 
Jul-31  Oct43,  in  Hist  120th  Engr  C  Bn,  31  May-Nov 
43;  Ltr,  Engr  Sect,  AFHQ,  to  CofEngrs,  28  Nov  43, 
sub:  Changes  in  T/E,  370.212  Sicily,  Rpts  on  Opns, 
Aug  43  to  Oct  43,  AFHQ  files. 


7     \                             \(l^         JIPALERMO 

Trapani  \  y-^ 

=555^                                                                          , 1 ^^^^                                                                                           //                    ^ 

^v.           Termini        y'J^^^^ 

y 

f\ 

Marsa/a^ 

/                 SICILY             V^ 

li 

Porto  Empedode^^^ 

C)/ 

SICILY 

1943 

^H 

0 

1 

30  Miles 

1 

1 

i 

30  Kilometers 

MAP  6 


144 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


German  wooden  box  mine  that  had  a 
metal  detonator,  the  other  an  impro- 
vised mine  made  of  plastic  explosive 
wrapped  in  paf)er  or  doth  and  equipf)ed 
with  a  bakelite  detonator.  Around  Ran- 
dazzo,  where  enemy  mines  were  found 
in  great  numbers,  the  high  metallic  con- 
tent of  the  soil  made  SCR- 625s  useless. 
The  less  sensitive  British  mine  detector 
was  of  some  use,  but  the  only  sure  way 
to  find  mines  there  was  by  probing  for 
them  with  a  bayonet.'^ 

Before  the  invasion  the  17th  Armored 
Engineer  Battalion  obtained  four  Scor- 
pion mine  exploders  mounted  on  M— 4 
tanks  for  clearing  lanes  through  mine- 
fields protected  by  enemy  fire.  They 
landed  at  Licata  on  14  July.  Because  no 
trailers  or  prime  movers  were  available 
for  transporting  the  often  trouble-prone 
tanks,  they  had  to  be  walked  into  posi- 
tion over  mountainous  roads,  and  after 
twenty  miles  their  bogeys  wore  out. 
They  were  never  used  in  the  heavily 
mined  fields  along  the  north  coast  be- 
tween Cape  Orlando  and  Milazzo  on 
Highway  113  toward  the  close  of  the 
campaign  because  when  they  finally 
arrived  after  their  long  road  march,  all 
needed  major  repairs.  ^ 

The  arrival  in  early  August  of  the 
39th  Engineers'  vehicles  and  heavy 
equipment,  as  well  as  missing  elements 
of  the  19th  Engineers,  made  it  possible 
for  a  full  engineer  combat  regiment  to 


support  each  attacking  division.  The  II 
Corps  engineers  also  received  sixteen 
greatly  needed  D— 7  and  D— 8  heavy 
bulldozers  from  southern  beaches;  the 
19th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment  got 
five  to  go  with  its  three  organic  D— 7s, 
and  two  divisional  engineer  combat  bat- 
talions got  two  each. 

Only  three  sixteen-ton  trailers  were 
available  to  move  heavy  bulldozers,  and 
they  were  too  light,  breaking  down  so 
often  that  most  of  the  time  bulldozers 
had  to  be  driven  from  one  construc- 
tion site  to  another.  The  larger  bulldoz- 
ers proved  invaluable,  however,  for  the 
three  R— 4s  allotted  divisional  engineers 
were  too  light  for  many  jobs.  For  the 
engineers'  requirements  on  Sicily,  wrote 
one  engineer  battalion  commander,  his 
unit  needed  six  R— 4s,  three  D— 7s,  a 
prime  mover,  and  a  twenty-ton  trailer. 
After  the  campaign  Seventh  Army  rec- 
ommended that  divisional  engineer  bat- 
talions be  issued  one  D— 7  as  organiza- 
tional equipment  and  engineer  combat 
regiments  three.  D  — 7s  no  longer  ex- 
ceeded the  "division  load"  limitation, 
but  production  was  a  problem.  In  July 
1943  engineer  regiments  appeared  to 
be  at  least  nine  to  twelve  months  away 
from  getting  more  heavy  bulldozers.'^ 

Maps  and  Camouflage 
The  map  used  most  in  Sicily  was  a 


"II  Corps  Engr  Rpt,  10  Jul- 18  Aug  43;  Seventh 
Army  Rpt  Sicily,  pp.  1-3  and  C-42;  Hist  1st  Engr  C 
Bn,  Sicilian  Campaign.  (This  unit  reported  that  the 
American  detector  could,  with  accurate  tuning,  locate 
the  new  German  wooden  box  mines.)  Hist  19th  Engr 
C  Rgt,  20  Oct  42-1  Oct  43;  Comments  collected  by 
Capt  Alden  Colvocoresses,  24  Aug  43,  in  Husky — Joss 
Task  Force  (8—  12  Jul) — Rpt  of  Observations. 

"*  Rpt  of  Seventh  Army  Engr  Sicily;  Opns  of  CCA, 
2d  Armd  Div,  21  Apr-25  Jul  43;  Hist  I7th  Armd 
Engr  Bn. 


'^  Rpt  of  Seventh  Army  Engr  Sicily;  II  Corps  Engr 
Rpt,  10  Jul- 18  Aug  43;  Ltr,  Lt  Col  L.  L.  Bingham, 
CO,  10th  Engr  C  Bn,  to  CO,  3d  Div,  29  Jul  43,  sub: 
Engr  Recommendations  and  Lessons  Learned  from 
Sicilian  Campaign,  10th  Engr  C  Bn  files;  Hist  19th 
Engr  C  Gp;  Davidson,  Preliminary  Rpt  of  Seventh 
Army  Engr  on  the  Sicilian  Opn,  23  Aug  43,  and  in- 
dorsements by  HQ,  15th  Army  Gp,  6  Sep  43,  and 
AFHQ,  2  Oct  43;  IncI  to  Ltr,  C:ol  Robert  H.  Burrag, 
Actg  Chf  Opns  and  Trng  Br,  Troops  Div,  OCE,  WD, 
to  Col  Donald  P.  Adams,  HQ,  EBS,  9  Jul  43;  Hist  10th 
Engr  C  Bn  in  Sicilian  Opn,  31  Jul- 18  Aug  43. 


SICILY:  THE  DRIVE  TO  MESSINA 


145 


multicolored  one  in  the  1 : 1 00,000  series 
which  in  twenty-six  sheets  offered  com- 
plete coverage  of  the  island.  Such  cov- 
erage was  not  available  in  the  tactical 
1:50,000  and  1:25,000  series,  but  the 
1:50,000  maps  were  accurate,  and  artil- 
lery used  them  with  good  results  when 
no  1 :25,000  sheets  were  to  be  had.  The 
1 :  10,000  beach  mosaic  was  of  some  use 
during  the  initial  landings,  but  its  qual- 
ity was  poor  and  its  coverage  inade- 
quate. Photomaps  on  a  scale  of  1 : 25, 000, 
the  product  of  air  sorties  before  and 
during  the  campaign,  were  of  little  use 
because  many  areas  were  blank  and 
detail  and  contrast  were  frequently 
lacking. 

More  overprints  were  needed  dur- 
ing the  latter  stages  of  the  campaign 
when  enemy  resistance  stiffened.  Two 
photo  interpreters  from  the  62d  Engi- 
neer Topographic  Company  came  to 
Ponte  Olivo  Airfield  to  copy  informa- 
tion on  enemy  defenses  in  the  north- 
eastern areas  from  aerial  photographs. 
They  were  able  to  spot  routes  of  ad- 
vance, pick  bypass  routes,  evaluate  en- 
emy demolitions,  and  even  estimate 
lengths  of  bridging  that  would  be  needed 
at  certain  places.  The  aerial  informa- 
tion was  printed  on  base  maps  prepared 
in  advance,  and  copies  went  to  every 
interested  division  as  well  as  to  army 
headquarters,  corps  headquarters,  corps 
artillery,  and  the  Naval  Operations 
Board.  The  value  of  this  work  for  front- 
line units  in  Sicily  was  limited,  however, 
because  they  moved  so  rapidly  that 
ground  reconnaissance  often  was  possi- 
ble before  the  photo-interpreters'  re- 
ports reached  them.'^*^ 


The  only  camouflage  units  in  the 
Sicilian  campaign  were  Company  B, 
601st  Engineer  Camouflage  Battalion, 
and  a  platoon  of  the  904th  Engineer 
Air  Force  Headquarters  Company. 
Company  B  of  the  601st  reached  Sicily 
late  in  July  and  was  attached  by  pla- 
toons to  the  assault  divisions.  Its  only 
assignments  during  the  campaign  in- 
volved camouflaging  the  Seventh  Army 
command  post  and  building  a  dummy 
railhead.  However,  the  campaign  ended 
before  the  railhead  task  could  be  fin- 
ished. The  904th  Company's  platoon 
for  a  time  painted  deceptive  patterns 
on  planes  and  trucks  but  later  relied  on 
dispersal  to  reduce  losses  at  airfields. 

Apart  from  the  work  of  these  two 
units  the  engineers'  part  in  camouflage 
was  chiefly  supplying  materials  and  giv- 
ing instruction  in  their  use.  Before 
Husky  got  under  way,  engineers  fur- 
nished reversible  nets  for  each  TBA 
vehicle  scheduled  to  go  to  Sicily  and 
additional  oversize  nets  to  build  up  a 
reserve  of  250  on  each  of  the  three 
beachheads.  One  side  of  each  net  was 
sand-colored  to  blend  with  barren  land- 
scape; the  other  side  was  green-toned 
for  verdant  areas.  The  nets  were  put  to 
good  use,  notably  in  concealing  artil- 
lery from  Luftwaffe  attacks  during  the 
battle  for  Troina.*^' 

Highway  120:  The  Road  to  Randazzo 

Late  in  July  the  39th  Infantry,  9th 
Division,  which  was  to  replace  the  1st 
Infantry  Division  along  Highway  120, 
arrived  at  Nicosia.  Maj.  Gen.  Terry  de 
la  Mesa  Allen,  commanding  the  1st 


''^"  II  Corps  Engr  Rpt,  10  Jul-  18  Aug  43,  an.  3,  Map 
Supply  and  Distribution;  HQ,  Force  141,  Planning 
Instr  15,  Maps  and  Charts. 


•^'  Hist  601st  Engr  Camouflage  Bn,  1943;  Hist,  The 
Aviation  Engineers  in  the  MTO,  Hist  Sect,  AAF  Engr 
Cmd,  MTO  (P),  12  Jun  46,  p.  183,  Maxwell  AFB. 


146 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Division,  expected  relief  with  the  fall 
of  Troina,  the  next  main  objective. 
Leading  the  advance,  the  39th  Infan- 
try took  Cerami  on  31  July,  but  the  fol- 
lowing day  heavy  German  fire  stopped 
the  regiment  about  four  miles  short  of 
Troina. 

Though  the  Germans  were  with- 
drawing, they  had  determined  to  delay 
pursuit  at  Troina,  which  was  ideal  for 
their  purpose.  The  highest  town  in 
Sicily,  Troina  perched  atop  a  3,600-foot 
mountain  dominating  the  countryside, 
a  natural  strongpoint  and  "a  demoli- 
tion engineer's  dream"  because  ap- 
proaches could  be  blocked  by  blown 
bridges  and  mines. ^^  On  2  August  Gen- 
eral Allen  committed  his  26th  Infantry, 
but  its  attack  proved  fruitless.  Another 
push  by  the  reinforced  16th  Infantry, 
1st  Division,  also  made  little  progress. 

On  4  August,  the  fifth  day  of  the 
battle  for  Troina,  the  9th  Division's  60th 
Infantry  arrived  on  the  scene  and  began 
deploying  to  outflank  German  defenses 
well  north  of  Troina.  Farther  south,  the 
39th  Infantry,  9th  Division,  and  the 
26th  Infantry,  1st  Division,  were  to  con- 
tinue efforts  to  encircle  Troina  from 
the  northwest  and  north;  the  16th  In- 
fantry, 1st  Division,  was  to  drive  east- 
ward on  the  town  across  virtually  track- 
less hills;  the  18th  Infantry,  1st  Division, 
was  to  outflank  it  on  the  south.  Com- 
pany A,  1st  Engineer  Combat  Battalion, 
had  the  mission  of  bulldozing  a  road 
along  the  16th  Infantry's  axis  of  advance, 
while  the  9th  Division's  15th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  had  a  similar  mission 
in  support  of  the  60th  Infantry. 

Maj.  Gen.  Manton  S.  Eddy,  com- 
manding the  9th  Division,  intended  that 


the  60th  Infantry  push  generally  east 
from  Capizzi  across  Monte  Pelato  and 
Camolato  and  then,  striking  from  the 
north,  drive  toward  Cesaro,  on  High- 
way 120  east  of  Troina,  in  an  attempt 
to  cut  off  German  forces  withdrawing 
from  the  Troina  sector.  The  attack 
began  on  the  morning  of  5  August,  with 
three  light  R— 4  angledozers  of  the  15th 
Engineer  Battalion  soon  struggling  to 
build  a  new  road  along  the  infantry's 
axis  of  advance.  In  the  afternoon  two 
D— 7  heavy  bulldozers  arrived  from 
corps;  one  broke  down  almost  immedi- 
ately, but  the  other  did  yeoman  work. 

During  the  night  of  5  — 6  August  the 
Germans  abandoned  Troina  and  fell 
back  behind  a  cover  of  mines  and  de- 
molitions. The  next  day  the  9th  Divi- 
sion replaced  the  1st  along  Highway 
120,  and  the  15th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion  took  over  from  the  1st  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion.  Some  of  the 
heaviest  German  mining  and  demoli- 
tions were  along  Highway  120  between 
Troina  and  Randazzo,  the  next  main 
objective.  Nowhere  during  the  cam- 
paign was  mine  clearance  and  bypass 
construction  more  important,  because 
Randazzo  lay  high  on  the  slopes  of  Mt. 
Etna.  Just  as  important  was  building 
new  roads  through  the  mountains. ^^ 

On  8  August  Company  B,  15th  Engi- 
neer Battalion,  withdrew  from  the  new 
road  to  Mt.  Camolato  to  support  the 
47th  Infantry  on  Highway  120  east  of 
Troina.  By  this  time  the  new  road  was 
open  to  CoUe  Basso,  perhaps  two-thirds 
of  the  way  to  Mt.  Camolato,  but  the 


^^  Garland  and  Smyth,  Skily  and  the  Surrender  of  Italy, 
p.  329. 


^■'' This  account  is  drawn  from:  Hists  of  the  15th 
Engr  C  Bn,  Sicilian  Campaign,  23  Aug  43,  and  the  1st 
Engr  C  Bn,  Sicilian  Campaign,  10  Jul— Dec  43;  Sev- 
enth Army  Rpt  Sicily,  pp.  6-17;  ETOUSA  Engr 
Observers  Rpt  3,  18  Feb  44,  319.1,  binder  1,  1944, 
AFHQ  files. 


SICILY:  THE  DRIVE  TO  MESSINA 


147 


15th  faced  difficult  problems.  Company 
A's  R— 4  broke  down,  and  mist  and  rain 
began  to  hinder  the  work.  Company  C 
pushed  the  road  to  completion  at  1700 
on  9  August.  Earlier  that  day  Company 
A  moved  off  to  repair  the  Mt.  Camo- 
lato— Cesaro  road  and  to  build  a  north- 
south  bypass  around  Cesaro,  using  a 
D  — 8  bulldozer  that  had  just  arrived 
from  corps. 

After  joining  the  47th  Infantry  on  8 
August,  Company  B  cleared  mines  to 
within  a  mile  of  Cesaro,  where  enemy 
shell  fire  halted  the  work.  Next  morn- 
ing the  company  used  a  repaired  D  — 7 
to  build  a  four-mile-long  east-west  by- 
pass, which  for  11/2  miles  followed  the 
Troina  River  bed  and  detoured  around 
both  Cesaro  and  three  demolished  brid- 
ges east  of  Troina.  Company  C  ulti- 
mately extended  to  forty  miles  the  60th 
Infantry's  road  through  the  mountains 
north  of  Troina  and  Cesaro. 

Slowed  by  mines,  the  9th  Division  did 
not  enter  Randazzo  until  the  morning 
of  13  August;  shortly  thereafter  the 
British  78th  Division  entered  from  the 
south.  The  1st  Infantry  Division  came 
back  into  the  line  at  Randazzo,  and  the 
9th  Division  swung  north  and  north- 
east toward  the  north  coast.  In  anticipa- 
tion of  this  shift,  engineers  had  already 
scouted  a  narrow  road  that  ran  north 
from  Highway  120  at  a  point  a  few 
miles  west  of  Randazzo,  and  Company 
B,  15th  Engineer  Battalion,  began  open- 
ing the  road  on  1 3  August.  Two  demol- 
ished bridges  and  two  road  craters 
caused  little  trouble,  but  a  quarter  mile 
of  abatis  was  heavily  strewn  with  S-mines 
and  Teller  mines,  one  of  which  claimed 
a  D— 8  bulldozer.  Nevertheless,  Com- 
pany B  opened  the  road  to  one-way 
traffic  shortly  after  noon.  Elements  of 
the  battalion  then  moved  to  Floresta, 


and  the  next  day  Company  A  opened  a 
one-way  road  as  far  as  Montalbano.  At 
this  point  all  9th  Division  engineer  work 
halted — with  the  campaign  almost  over, 
the  9th  Division  came  out  of  the  line. 

The  15th  Engineer  Battalion  had 
been  in  action  fifteen  days.  During  that 
time  the  battalion  built  45  miles  of  new 
supply  roads  through  mountains,  re- 
paired 14  miles  of  existing  roads,  by- 
passed 15  demolished  bridges,  filled  4 
major  craters,  cleared  a  quarter  mile  of 
abatis,  and  searched  30  miles  of  road 
for  mines.  The  unit's  water  points  sup- 
plied over  1,500,000  gallons  of  puri- 
fied water.  There  had  been  twelve  cas- 
ualties, ten  (including  two  deaths)  caused 
by  two  S-mines  near  Cesaro  on  1 1 
August. 

On  13  August  the  1st  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  came  back  into  action  with 
the  rest  of  the  1st  Division.  Company 
B  and  a  platoon  of  Company  A  worked 
throughout  the  night  improving  the 
road  through  and  east  of  Randazzo  for 
the  18th  Infantry  to  use  the  next  morn- 
ing. The  engineers  found  nine  bridges 
destroyed  within  a  few  miles  and  worked 
continuously  until  15  August  bypass- 
ing them.  A<  one  site  a  forty-foot  bank 
rose  on  the  near  side — a  perfect  spot 
for  Bailey  bridging,  but  none  was  avail- 
able. During  its  thirty-one  days  in  the 
line,  the  1st  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion bypassed  thirty-nine  bridges,  filled 
twenty-eight  road  craters,  and  searched 
out  hundreds  of  mines.  The  battalion 
suffered  30  casualties:  4  killed,  3  missing, 
and  23  wounded. 

Highway  113:  The  Road  to  Messina 

After  fighting  its  way  into  the  north 
coastal  town  of  Santo  Stefano  on  31 
July,  the  45th  Division  went  into  reserve 


148 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


and  the  3d  Infantry  Division  took  over 
on  Highway  113.  As  the  3d  Division 
advanced  east  along  the  north  coast,  it 
was  confined  to  a  single  road  even  more 
than  was  the  9th  Division  along  High- 
way 120.  On  the  left  was  the  sea,  on  the 
right  mountainous  terrain  fit  only  for 
mules  and  men  on  foot.  Maj.  Gen. 
Lucian  K.  Truscott,  Jr.,  commanding 
the  division,  sent  one  element  forward 
astride  Highway  113  to  clear  spurs 
overlooking  the  road  and  to  protect  the 
engineers  who  were  making  a  path 
through  demolitions  and  minefields  so 
that  artillery  and  vehicles  could  move 
forward.  He  sent  other  elements  with 
pack  animals  (he  was  to  use  more  than 
400  mules  and  100  horses)  over  moun- 
tain trails  on  the  right  and  inland  to 
strike  the  enemy's  flank  and  rear.^"* 

An  advantage  Highway  113  had  over 
Highway  120  was  the  possibility  of  land- 
ing men  and  supplies  by  sea.  Supplies 
came  ashore  from  LSTs  at  Torremuzza 
beach  near  Santo  Stefano  at  an  unload- 
ing point  the  2d  Battalion,  540th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Regiment,  opened  on  3 
August.  This  same  battalion  also  fur- 
nished a  platoon  and  a  D  — 7  to  clear 
mines  and  wire  from  a  beach  at  Sant' 
Agata  when  Truscott  attempted  a  small 
amphibious  operation  to  outflank  the 
San  Fratello  position,  the  first  major 
German  strongpoint  east  of  Santo 
Stefano. ^^ 

At  Monte  San  Fratello,  a  2,200-foot 
peak  about  fifteen  miles  east  of  Santo 
Stefano,  the  3d  Division  was  stopped 
from  3  to  8  August,  as  effectively  as  the 
1st  Division  had  been  at  Troina  and 
for  the  same  reason — the  Germans  were 


buying  time  for  their  withdrawal.  When 
heavy  fire  and  dense  minefields  halted 
the  15th  Infantry,  two  battalions  of  the 
30th  and  the  entire  7th  had  to  be  com- 
mitted before  any  progress  could  be 
made,  and  that  progress  was  made 
partly  because  the  Germans  were  thin- 
ning out  their  defenses.  A  battalion 
leapfrogged  behind  the  San  Fratello 
position  at  Sant'  Agata  in  an  amphibious 
landing  before  dawn  on  8  August,  the 
battalion  landing  team  including  a  pla- 
toon of  the  3d  Division's  10th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  and  a  platoon  of  the 
540th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment.  The 
operation  failed  to  cut  off  the  Germans 
but  did  hasten  their  withdrawal. 

Resuming  the  advance,  which  heavy 
mining  and  considerable  demolition 
work  slowed,  the  3d  Division  encoun- 
tered a  second  strong  line  at  Naso  ridge 
near  Cape  Orlando  on  1 1  August.  A 
second  end  run,  attempted  early  on  the 
twelfth  near  Brolo,  twelve  miles  behind 
the  enemy's  lines,  almost  proved  disas- 
trous. The  enemy  boxed  in  the  landing 
force  and  inflicted  heavy  casualties 
before  relief  arrived  by  land.  Two  engi- 
neers of  the  10th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion were  killed  and  two  were 
wounded;  two  engineers  of  the  540th 
platoon  were  killed  and  three  were 
wounded. ^^ 

Five  or  six  miles  beyond  Brolo  along 
the  coastal  highway,  the  30th  Infantry, 
leading,  halted  on  12  August  before  the 
most  formidable  roadblock  German 
demolition  engineers  had  yet  put  up. 
Overcoming  it  was  to  be  "a  landmark 
of  American  engineer  support  in 
Sicily."'^^ 


'''*  Lt.  Gen.  L.  K.  Truscott,  Jr.,  Command  Missions 
(New  York:  Dutton,  1954),  pp.  230-31. 

^^  HQ,  Seventh  Army,  Adm  Sitreps,  Jul  and  Aug 
43,  app.  D;  Interv,  Capt  Napp,  S-3,  540th  Engr  C 
Rgt;  Hist  540th  Engr  C  Rgt,  1942-45. 


-"^  Hist  10th  Engr  C  Bn  in  Sicilian  Opn,  26  Aug  43; 

Rpt  of  Seventh  Army  Engr  Sicily;  Bradley,  A  Soldier's 

Story,  pp.  158-59;  Hist  540th  Engr  C  Rgt,  1942-45. 

Garland  and  Smyth,  Sicily  and  the  Surrender  of  Italy, 

p.  406. 


SICILY:  THE  DRIVE  TO  MESSINA 


149 


About  fifty  feet  beyond  a  tunnel  at 
Cape  Calava  the  Germans  had  blown 
out  1 50  feet  of  the  road  that  ran  along  a 
shelf  carved  out  of  a  sheer  rock  cliff 
rising  abruptly  from  the  sea.  Infantry- 
men could  pick  their  way  one  by  one 
across  the  steep  rock  face,  and  guns 
and  supplies  could  be  ferried  by  sea. 
But  the  division's  supply  trucks  and 
heavy  guns  had  to  use  the  road,  for 
landing  craft  were  in  short  supply. 
Grading  could  close  two-thirds  of  the 
gap,  but  any  fill  dumped  into  the  cen- 
ter would  roll  down  to  the  sea,  200  feet 
below.  This  section  had  to  be  bridged, 
but  no  Bailey  bridging  was  available. 
With  captured  timbers,  the  10th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  "hung  a  bridge 
in  the  sky" — and  did  it  in  twenty-four 
hours. 

Shortly  after  noon  on  13  August,  sev- 
eral engineer  officers  halted  their  jeep 
at  a  roadblock  on  Highway  113  four 
miles  west  of  Cape  Calava  and  hiked  to 
the  break  in  the  road.  They  computed 
what  would  be  needed  to  do  the  job, 
ordered  up  the  necessary  men  and' 
equipment,  and  estimated  they  could 
bridge  the  gap  by  noon  the  next  day. 
Within  an  hour  or  two,  men  from  Com- 
pany A,  10th  Engineer  Battalion,  were 
on  hand,  breaking  rock  with  jackham- 
mers.  Trucks  and  trailers  loaded  with 
heavy  timber  beams  and  flanks  began 
to  move  forward.  In  the  meantime  a 
bulldozer  was  needed  on  other  demoli- 
tions farther  east.  To  get  one  forward, 
engineers  built  a  raft  on  two  fishing 
smacks,  loaded  a  bulldozer  aboard,  and 
used  an  amphibious  jeep  to  tow  the 


'^'^  This  account  of  the  Cape  Calava  bridge  is  drawn 
from  Ernie  Pyle,  Brave  Men  (New  York:  Henry  Holt, 
1944),  pp.  65-71,  and  Hist  10th  Engr  C  Bn  in  Sicil- 
ian Opn,  26  Aug  43. 


makeshift  ferry  five  miles  around  Cape 
Calava.^^ 

At  the  constricted  bridge  site.  Com- 
pany A  could  put  only  one  platoon  at  a 
time  on  the  job.  All  night  the  unit 
labored  to  meet  the  deadline.  At  dawn 
the  gaping  hole  remained,  but  the  foun- 
dations for  a  bridge  had  been  laid. 
Engmeers  swung  a  heavy  timber  into 
the  gap  and  set  it  upright  on  a  seat  cut 
into  the  cliff.  They  laid  another  beam 
from  the  top  of  this  upright  to  another 
seat  chipped  out  of  the  rock  and  pinned 
the  two  timbers  together  to  form  a  bent. 
Then  they  looped  a  steel  cable  around 
the  upright  and  anchored  it  to  pins  set 
in  the  cliff.  The  cable  prevented  the 
bent  from  sliding  downhill  when  heavy, 
spliced-timber  girders  were  worked  into 
place.  Twenty-man  teams  picked  up  the 
girders  one  by  one  and  slid  them  into 
position. 

A  rickety  bridge  began  to  take  shape. 
As  the  last  floor  plank  was  spiked  down 
and  the  final  touches  added  to  the 
approaches,  General  Truscott  climbed 
aboard  his  jeep.  Promptly  at  noon  on 
14  August  men  of  Company  A  stepped 
back  and  watched  the  division  com- 
mander test  the  newly  completed  span. 
Other  light  vehicles  loaded  with  ammu- 
nition and  weapons  for  frontline  troops 
were  waiting  to  follow.  After  they  cross- 
ed, the  bridge  was  closed  so  that  engi- 
neers could  strengthen  it  to  take  2  1/2- 
ton  trucks.  At  1 700  the  bridge  was  re- 
opened and  cargo  trucks — even  a  bull- 
dozer— began  to  cross. 

Beyond  Cape  Calava  the  3d  Division's 
7th  Regimental  Combat  Team  advanced 
so  rapidly  that  an  amphibious  landing 
by  the  157th  Regimental  Combat  Team, 


'^■'  Merrill  Mueller,  NBC  War  Correspondent  Over- 
seas, Letter  to  the  Editor,  Look  Magazine,  March  20, 
1944. 


150 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


jr*^i^ 


^^'rsf 


Construction  Begins  at  Cape  Calava  to  dose  gap  blown  by  retreating  Germans. 


45th  Division,  during  the  night  of  15— 16 
August  at  Bivio  Salica  fell  miles  short 
of  the  advance  infantry  elements.  Dark- 
ness found  the  7th  Regimental  Combat 
Team  pushing  strong  patrols  into  Mes- 
sina. By  dawn,  organized  resistance  in 
Sicily  had  ended  and  American  artil- 
lery was  dueling  with  enemy  guns  across 
the  Strait  of  Messina. 

A  measure  of  the  German  demoli- 
tions in  the  mountains  rising  from  the 
sea  was  the  time  it  took  Truscott's  forces 
to  traverse  the  coastal  road.  The  3d 
Division  took  sixteen  laborious  days  to 
reach  Messina;  on  the  morning  of  20 
August  General  Truscott  made  the 
return  journey  from  Messina  to  Palermo 
in  just  three  hours. ^^ 


'  Truscott,  Command  Missions,  p.  244. 


In  the  drive  along  the  coast  the  10th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  took  casual- 
ties of  four  men  killed  and  twenty-three 
wounded;  most  of  the  casualties  were 
from  mines.  Lt.  Col.  Leonard  L.  Bing- 
ham, commanding  the  battalion,  thought 
the  unit  had  been  used  improperly  in 
the  later  stages  of  the  campaign.  At  the 
outset,  on  1  August,  its  three  line  com- 
panies were  strung  out  along  Highway 
113,  all  working  under  division  engi- 
neer control.  Two  companies  leapfrog- 
ged each  other  from  demolition  site  to 
demolition  site,  while  the  third  com- 
pany provided  mine  removal  parties  for 
divisional  units.  Headquarters,  Head- 
quarters and  Service  Company,  main- 
tained the  division  engineer  supply 
dump,  established  water  points,  ser- 
viced engineer  vehicles,  and  operated 


SICILY:  THE  DRIVE  TO  MESSINA 


General  Truscott  Tests  the  Temporary  Span  at  Cape  Calava 


the  battalion  aid  station.  But  this  ar- 
rangement did  not  last,  and  soon  many 
units  of  the  10th  Engineer  Battalion — 
frequently  whole  companies — were  at- 
tached to  infantry  units.  This  proce- 
dure had  officers  who  were  not  engi- 
neers directing  the  platoons  and  com- 
panies and  cost  the  engineers  their 
cohesiveness  within  the  division.^' 

Palermo 

After  the  capture  of  Palermo  on  22 
July,  Seventh  Army  had  no  sooner 


^'  Hist  10th  Engr  C  Bn  in  Sicilian  Opn,  26  Aug  43; 
Seventh  Army  Rpt  Sicily,  pp.  6-20  and  E-2;  Ltr, 
Bingham  to  CG,  3d  Div,  29  Jul  43,  sub:  Engr  Recom- 
mendations and  Lessons  Learned  from  Sicilian  Cam- 
paign. 


established  headquarters  and  main  sup- 
ply dumps  when  requests  for  work 
began  to  pour  in  to  Col.  Garrison  H. 
Davidson,  the  army  engineer.  No  for- 
mal construction  program  was  estab- 
lished, and  army  engineer  troops  han- 
dled mine  sweeping,  road  clearing,  and 
construction  requests  as  they  came  in. 
Space  was  urgently  needed  for  offices, 
billets,  storehouses,  laundries,  bakeries, 
and  maintenance  shops,  while  hospi- 
tals set  up  in  unoccupied  buildings  had 
to  have  window  screens  and  more  water 
and  sewage  facilities.  The  municipal 
water  and  sewage  systems  needed  re- 
pairs, and  generating  plants  at  Palermo 
and  Porto  Empedocle  had  been  bombed 
out  of  operation. 

Several  engineer  units  had  a  part  in 
rehabilitating  Palermo.  The  20th  Engi- 


152 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


neer  Combat  Regiment  began  work 
there  on  23  July  but  left  a  week  later  to 
extend  the  railroad  line  to  Santo  Stefano. 
On  this  job  the  regiment  rebuilt  four 
bridges  and  repaired  one  tunnel  and  a 
considerable  amount  of  track.  For  one 
bridge  the  20th  Engineers  used  prefab- 
ricated trestling  found  in  the  Palermo 
shipyards;  for  another,  Bailey  highway 
bridging  was  used,  with  planking  be- 
tween the  rails  so  trucks  as  well  as  trains 
could  use  the  bridge,  and  for  others, 
captured  timbers  were  used.  On  9 
August  the  railroad  was  open  to  a  for- 
ward railhead  at  the  junction  of  High- 
ways 117  and  1 20  near  Santo  Stefano. 
In  the  first  five  miles  beyond  this  rail- 
head were  four  demolished  bridges; 
therefore,  the  engineers  made  no  at- 
tempt to  extend  rail  service  east  of 
Santo  Stefano. ^^ 

The  540th  Engineer  Combat  Regi- 
ment (less  one  battalion)  worked  briefly 
at  Palermo,  then  moved  on  to  operate 
beaches  at  Termini  Imerese.  The  343d 
Engineer  General  Service  Regiment, 
whose  responsibility  for  Palermo  was 
also  brief,  replaced  the  540th  on  30 
July.  The  1051st  Engineer  Port  Con- 
struction and  Repair  Group,  organized 
especially  for  such  work,  took  over  the 
assignment  on  1 1  August.  The  group's 
equipment  did  not  arrive  for  some  time, 
and  in  the  interim  it  had  to  use  what- 
ever captured  equipment  it  could  find. 


Italian  POWs  did  most  of  the  work 
under  the  1051st's  supervision.^^ 

The  1090th  Engineer  Utilities  Com- 
pany, which  arrived  in  Palermo  on  7 
August,  handled  most  of  the  repairs 
on  utilities.  The  principal  project  was 
steam  power  plants.  The  unit  employed 
an  average  of  120  POWs  and  100  civil- 
ians and  used  borrowed  tools  and  cap- 
tured equipment,  including  two  5,000- 
kilowatt  turbines.  A  new  type  of  engi- 
neer unit,  the  1090th  had  been  hastily 
activated  for  HUSKY.  The  company  was 
in  Sicily  a  month  before  its  organiza- 
tional equipment  arrived,  and  one-third 
of  its  men  never  caught  up  with  the 
parent  unit  there. ^"^ 

After  its  surrender,  Sicily  became 
part  of  the  British  line  of  communica- 
tions in  the  Mediterranean.  The  U.S. 
6625th  Base  Area  Group  (Provisional) 
handled  American  interests  until  Sev- 
enth Army  units  could  be  shipped  out 
and  American  installations  closed.  On 
1  September  1943  the  6625th  Base 
Area  Group  was  redesignated  Island 
Base  Section  (IBS).  Operating  directly 
under  NATOUSA,  IBS  supervised  the 
steadily  diminishing  American  activities 
on  the  island.  The  principal  engineer 
task  after  the  campaign  ended  was 
replacing  bypasses  with  bridges  and  cul- 
verts in  preparation  for  the  fall  rains. ^^ 


^^  Seventh  Army  Rpt  Sicily,  p.  E-15;  1st  ESB  Rpt 
of  Action  Against  the  Enemy,  10-13  Jul  43;  Hist 
20th  Engr  C  Bn,  17  May-  17  Jun  45. 


^^  HQ.  Seventh  Army,  Adm  Sitreps  22,  1  Aug  43; 
23,  3  Aug  43;  and  25,  5  Aug  43;  Hist  343d  Engr  GS 
Rgt,  1942-45;  Interv,  Col  Dickerson,  XO,  1051st  Engr 
PC&R  Gp,  and  Capt  Napp,  S-3,  540th  Engr  Shore 
Rgt,  Husky— Joss  Task  Force  (8-12  Jul)  — Rpt  of 
Observations. 

'^  Hist  1090th  Engr  Utilities  Co,  7  Aug- 6  Oct  43. 

"'''  History  of  Island  Base  Section,  in  CMH. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

From  Salerno  to 
the  Volturno 


At  the  Trident  Conference  in  Wash- 
ington in  May  1943,  the  British  and 
Americans  agreed  that  after  Sicily  they 
should  undertake  further  operations  in 
the  Mediterranean  "calculated  to  elimi- 
nate Italy  from  the  war  and  to  contain 
maximum  German  forces."'  That  state- 
ment glossed  over  disagreements  be- 
tween British  and  Americans  about  the 
relative  emphasis  to  be  given  the  Medi- 
terranean, the  British  insisting  that 
resources  should  be  concentrated  there 
in  1943  while  the  Americans  wanted  to 
prepare  for  a  cross-Channel  attack  in 
1944.  As  the  Allies  swept  through  Sicily, 
however,  growing  signs  of  Italian  col- 
lapse produced  agreement  on  an  imme- 
diate invasion  of  Italy  to  follow  up  on 
the  victory  in  Sicily.  On  16  August  Gen- 
eral Eisenhower  decided  to  move  Brit- 
ish Eighth  Army  forces  across  the  Strait 
of  Messina  at  the  earliest  opportunity 
and  to  launch  Lt.  Gen.  Mark  W.  Clark's 
Fifth  Army  (with  a  British  corps  at- 
tached) on  a  major  invasion  of  the  Ital- 
ian mainland  on  9  September. 

Engineer  preparation  for  the  inva- 
sion began  with  the  establishment  of 
Fifth  Army  headquarters  on  5  January 


'  CCS  242/6,  25  May  43,  sub:  Final  Rpt  to  President 
and  Prime  Minister. 


1943  at  Oujda,  French  Morocco.  The 
army  engineer,  Col.  Frank  O.  Bowman, 
had  organized  his  section  on  paper  a 
month  earlier,  but  his  staff,  drawn 
largely  from  the  American  II  Corps 
engineers,  was  hardly  versed  in  engi- 
neer planning  at  the  army  level.  Bow- 
man provided  what  direction  he  could 
from  his  experience  as  the  AFHQ  engi- 
neer in  England  and  in  North  Africa, 
but  his  temporary  reassignment  from 
April  to  August  1943  as  SOS,  NATO- 
USA,  engineer  left  the  section  to  Col. 
Mark  M.  Boatner,  Jr.,  who  presided 
over  the  interim  work  on  other  pro- 
posed invasions  in  the  Mediterranean. 
Fifth  Army  headquarters  considered 
a  number  of  proposals,  and  the  engi- 
neers contributed  map  plans,  supply 
schemes,  and  terrain  studies  to  nearly 
all  of  them.  An  inherited  plan.  Opera- 
tion Backbone,  called  for  a  foray  into 
Spanish  Morocco  should  Spain  change 
its  nominally  neutral  stance  in  the  war. 
In  the  summer  of  1943  the  engineer 
staff  entered  the  planning  for  BRIM- 
STONE, the  invasion  and  occupation  of 
Sardinia.  Several  plans  involved  a  thrust 
into  Italy  itself,  and  many  of  the  accu- 
mulated concepts  coalesced  into  the 
final  assault  plan.  BARRACUDA  aimed 
direcdy  at  the  harbor  of  Naples,  GANG- 


154 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


WAY  at  the  beaches  immediately  north 
of  the  city.  MUSKET  would  have  brought 
Fifth  Army  into  Taranto  and  required 
a  much  longer  overland  campaign  to 
the  Italian  capital.  Operation  BAY- 
TOWN  was  the  British  move  across  the 
Strait  of  Messina  to  Reggio  di  Calabria. 
The  Combined  Chiefs  of  Staff  ruled 
out  Brimstone  on  20  July,  and  after 
the  twenty-seventh  the  main  features 
of  Barracuda  and  Gangway  were 
combined  into  planning  for  AVA- 
LANCHE. Through  August  the  Fifth 
Army  staff  wrestled  with  choosing  a  tar- 
get for  the  invasion.  General  Clark 
favored  the  Naples  operation  for  the 
leverage  it  would  provide  in  landing 
slighdy  farther  north  and  cutting  off 
German  forces  in  southern  Italy.  With 
the  cooperation  of  British  engineers 
from  10  Corps,  scheduled  to  make  the 
landing  as  part  of  Fifth  Army,  and  with 
reliance  upon  American  terrain  analy- 
ses and  British  Inter-Service  Informa- 
tion Series  (ISIS)  reports.  Colonel  Bow- 
man formulated  his  own  recommen- 
dations, leaving  room  for  the  attack 
near  either  Naples  or  Salerno,  1 50  miles 
southwest  of  Rome  on  the  Italian  coast. 
Since  Naples  lay  just  outside  the  ex- 
treme range  of  Allied  fighters  operat- 
ing from  Sicilian  airfields,  the  beaches 
at  Salerno,  just  within  range,  became 
the  primary  choice  for  the  assault.^ 

The  Salerno  beaches  had  advantages 
and  disadvantages  for  the  invaders. 
{Map  7)  Slightly  steeper  than  those  in 
the  Gulf  of  Naples,  they  afforded  trans- 
port craft  closer  access  to  the  shore. 
Sand  dunes  at  Salerno  were  low  and 
narrow  and  tended  to  run  easily  into 
beach-exit  routes.  The  topography  be- 


■  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  pp.  3—4. 


hind  the  beaches  was  suited  for  dis- 
persed supply  dumps,  and  a  roadnet 
close  to  shore  could  support  forward 
troop  and  supply  movement.  Though 
there  were  no  clearly  organized  defen- 
sive positions  in  the  area,  the  moun- 
tains behind  the  beaches  formed  a  nat- 
ural amphitheater  facing  the  sea.  Ene- 
my observation  posts  would  detect  any 
movement  below,  and  artillery  fire  from 
the  high  ground  could  reach  the  attack- 
ing forces  easily.  Once  ashore,  troops 
would  find  the  way  to  Naples  ob- 
structed by  the  rugged  Sorrento  ridge, 
which  sloped  out  into  the  sea  on  the 
northern  arm  of  the  Gulf  of  Salerno. 
The  actual  landing  zone  was  split  almost 
exactly  in  two  by  the  mouth  of  the  Sele 
River,  which  would  hinder  communica- 
tion between  the  two  halves  of  the 
beachhead  until  the  engineers  could 
bridge  the  stream. 

Enemy  strength  in  the  area  was  con- 
siderable. Under  the  command  of  Tenth 
Army,  German  forces  were  withdraw- 
ing from  the  southern  tier  of  the  Ital- 
ian boot  throughoiut  the  latter  part  of 
August  in  accordance  with  rough  plans 
to  concentrate  a  strong  defense  just 
south  of  Rome.  The  movement  acceler- 
ated after  the  British  jump  into  Italy 
early  in  September,  with  the  XIV  Pan- 
zer Corps,  composed  of  the  reconstitu- 
ted Hermann  Goering  Division,  the  16th 
Panzer  Division,  and  the  15th  Panzer 
Grenadier  Division,  strung  along  the  Ital- 
ian west  coast  from  Salerno  north  to 
Gaeta. 

Recognizing  that  the  Salerno  beaches 
were  suitable  for  an  Allied  incursion, 
the  16th  Panzer  Divisions  engineers  in 
the  area  emplaced  mines  and  beach 
obstacles  along  the  dunes  from  Salerno 
to  Agropoli,  at  the  southern  extent  of 
the  bay — but  not  so  extensively  as  might 


FROM  SALERNO  TO  THE  VOLTURNO 


155 


ITALY  INVASION  PLANS 

mU     Planned 

I      I     Planned  &  executed 

0  75  150  Miles 

150  Kilometers 


MAPI 


have  been  expected.  The  Germans, 
regarding  the  Italian  will  to  fight  as  neg- 
ligible amid  rumors  of  imminent  defec- 
tion, took  over  the  coastal  defenses  of 
the  Salerno  area,  executing  the  pro- 
testing commander  of  an  Italian  divi- 
sion in  the  process.  They  supplemented 
local  batteries  with  their  own  heavy 
pieces  in  the  mountains  behind  the 
beaches,  especially  on  the  imposing 
3,566-foot  Monte  Soprana.  They  also 
emplaced  a  series  of  strongf)oints  in  the 


foothills  fronting  the  sea,  with  a  partic- 
ularly heavy  concentration  back  of  the 
southern  complex  of  beaches  in  the 
area  eventually  chosen  for  the  VI  Corps 
attack.  Panzer  forces  were  expected  to 
support  these  points  with  mobile  coun- 
terassaults  and  supplementary  fire.  An 
Italian  minefield  offshore  completed 
the  defenses  of  the  beaches.^ 


^  Martin  Blumenson,  Salerno  to  Cassino,  United  States 
Army  in  World  War  II  (Washington,  1969),  p.  67; 
Morison,  Sicily-Salerno- Anzio,  p.  260. 


156 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Unit  assignments  for  the  invasion 
force  continued  all  summer.  In  the  final 
operation  plan  of  26  August,  the  Ameri- 
can VI  Corps,  with  five  divisions,  was 
to  seize  the  right-hand  half  of  the  land- 
ing zone  south  of  the  Sele  River  around 
the  Roman  ruin  of  Paestum  while  the 
British  10  Corps  assaulted  the  north- 
ern half  of  the  beachhead  closer  to  the 
town  of  Salerno.  All  veterans  of  the 
theater,  the  3d,  34th,  36th,  and  45th 
Infantry  Divisions  would  accompany  the 
1st  Armored  and  82d  Airborne  Divi- 
sions. Apart  from  the  support  provided 
for  the  invasion,  each  division  had  its 
assigned  organic  engineer  battalion,  the 
10th  Engineer  Battalion  with  the  3d 
Division,  the  109th  with  the  34th  Divi- 
sion, the  111th  with  the  36th,  and  the 
120th  with  the  45th;  the  1st  Armored 
Division  had  the  services  of  the  16th 
Armored  Engineer  Battalion,  and  the 
airborne  division  had  the  307th  Air- 
borne Engineer  Battalion.  As  one  of 
the  most  practiced  units  in  amphibi- 
ous attacks,  the  36th  Infantry  Division 
was  assigned  the  actual  beach  assault. 
The  division's  141st  Infantry  Regiment 
was  on  the  extreme  right,  landing  on 
Yellow  and  Blue  beaches,  where  a  medi- 
eval stone  tower  at  Paestum  afforded  a 
good  point  of  reference  for  incoming 
boats.  The  142d  Infantry,  to  land  on 
Red  and  Green  beaches  to  the  left  of 
the  141st,  covered  the  area  north  to  an 
artificial  waterway,  the  Fiumareilo 
Canal;  the  two  regiments  were  assault- 
ing an  expanse  of  3,740  yards  of  contig- 
uous beach  front. 

A  Navy  beachmaster  was  to  maintain 
all  communications  with  the  ships  and 
control  all  the  operational  landings.  A 
port  headquarters,  consisting  of  two 
Transportation  Corps  port  battalions, 
was  to  coordinate  all  unloading  into 


small  craft  offshore,  but  the  pivot  of 
beach  supply  operations  was  the  531st 
Engineer  Shore  Regiment  and  the 
540th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment,  the 
former  assuming  responsibility  during 
the  assault  phase.  The  531st,  a  compo- 
nent of  the  1st  Engineer  Special  Bri- 
gade for  the  invasion,  replaced  the 
343d  Engineer  General  Service  Regi- 
ment, which  was  trained  in  beach  sup- 
port operations  but  had  neither  the 
experience  nor  the  equipment  to  carry 
out  this  function.  Alerted  in  Sicily  only 
two  weeks  before  the  invasion,  the  53 1st 
traveled  to  Oran,  the  staging  area  for 
part  of  the  invasion  force,  while  the 
540th  reported  to  the  assembly  area  of 
the  45th  Infantry  Division  around 
Palermo.  Neither  regiment  participated 
in  the  planning  for  the  invasion,  nor 
did  their  officers  see  the  maps  for  the 
operation  or  the  stowage  plans  for  the 
vessels  to  be  unloaded  off  the  beaches; 
for  the  most  part,  they  saw  the  troops 
they  were  supporting  for  the  first  time 
on  the  sand  under  German  fire.^ 

In  other  respects  engineer  prepara- 
tions for  the  Salerno  invasion  were 
more  thorough.  Fifth  Army  and 
NATOUSA  engineers  requisitioned 
supplies,  trained  engineer  troops,  ana- 
lyzed terrain,  and  produced  detailed 
maps.  After  the  final  selection  of  the 
Salerno  site  the  engineer  mapping  sub- 
section, Fifth  Army,  studied  in  detail 
the  terrain  of  the  region,  its  ridge  and 
drainage  systems,  communications, 
water  supply,  ports,  and  beaches.  These 
studies  gave  the  engineers  vital  infor- 
mation for  annotating  maps. 


^Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  p.  5;  Hist  531st 
Engr  Shore  Rgt,  29  Nov  42-Apr  45;  AGF  Bd  Rpts, 
NATOUSA,  15  Nov  43;  Interv,  Brig  Gen  George  W. 
Gardes,  5  Nov  59. 


FROM  SALERNO  TO  THE  VOLTURNO 


157 


Planning  for  engineer  supply  at  Saler- 
no rested  ultimately  with  the  engineer 
of  SOS,  NATOUSA.  On  25  July  Maj. 
Irving  W.  Finberg,  chief  of  the  Fifth 
Army  Engineer  Supply  Section,  re- 
ported to  the  SOS  engineer  as  Fifth 
Army  liaison  officer  to  prepare  requisi- 
tions covering  the  estimated  needs  of 
Fifth  Army  engineers.  Within  two  weeks 
Finberg  submitted  the  basic  require- 
ments. Wherever  possible,  his  listing 
became  the  basis  for  freeze  orders  on 
SOS,  NATOUSA,  stocks  in  North 
Africa,  which  eventually  reserved 
10,545  long  tons  of  engineer  supply  for 
the  invasion.  Base  section  depots  re- 
ported items  not  available  in  the  the- 
ater pipeline,  and  units  in  the  theater 
not  scheduled  for  the  forthcoming  op- 
eration gave  supplies  and  equipment 
to  units  going  into  the  assault.  The  SOS, 
NATOUSA,  command  made  up  short- 
ages by  ordering  critical  items  directly 
from  the  New  York  Port  of  Embarka- 
tion, requisitions  amounting  to  3,638 
long  tons.  Confusion  still  reigned  in 
some  quarters,  especially  since  engi- 
neer, quartermaster,  and  ordnance  sup- 
ply was  intermixed  in  theater  stocks, 
and  inadequate  inventory  procedures 
frequently  led  to  ordering  materiel 
already  on  hand  but  unidentified.^ 

As  the  supply  planning  and  acquisi- 
tion proceeded.  Fifth  Army  operated 
eight  training  schools.  At  Port-aux- 
Poules,  near  Arzew  in  Algeria,  Brig. 
Gen.  John  W.  O'Daniel  opened  the 
Fifth  Army  Invasion  Training  Center 
on  14  January  1943,  Relieved  of  its 
function  in  Sicily  late  in  the  summer, 
the  1st  Engineer  Special  Brigade  prac- 
ticed combined  operations  with  naval 


Logistical  History  of  NATOUSA-MTOUSA,  p.  58. 


units  and  coordinated  air  cover  over 
beach  areas  serving  the  center.  The 
1 7th  Armored  Engineer  Battalion,  the 
334th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  the 
540th  and  39th  Engineer  Combat  Regi- 
ments, and  two  separate  engineer  battal- 
ions, the  378th  and  the  384th,  took  part 
in  training  exercises  with  live  fire,  the 
object  being  to  make  men  battle- wise  in 
the  shortest  possible  time.  Outside  the 
center,  elements  of  the  1 6th  Armored 
Engineer  Battalion,  the  109th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion,  and  the  1st  Engineer 
Special  Brigade  headquarters  had  joint 
and  combined  training  in  beach  opera- 
tions which  included  mine-clearing 
work.  The  16th  Armored  Engineer 
Battalion  also  ran  two  mine  schools  at 
Ste.-Barbe-du-Tlelat  for  the  men  of  the 
1st  Armored  Division  and  organized  its 
own  refreshers  in  infantry  tactics, 
bridging,  and  field  fortifications. 

A  separate  engineer  training  center 
opened  on  12  March  1943,  near  Ain 
Fritissa  in  French  Morocco  at  an  aban- 
doned French  Foreign  Legion  fort. 
Under  Lt.  Col.  Aaron  A.  Wyatt,  Jr.,  the 
school  concentrated  on  practical  work 
under  simulated  battle  conditions.  Brit- 
ish Eighth  Army  instructors  taught 
mine  and  countermine  warfare.  The 
final  problem,  usually  undertaken  at 
night,  split  the  students  into  two  groups, 
one  of  which  planted  mines  for  the  sec- 
ond to  unearth.  Though  the  mines 
employed  were  training  devices  with 
only  igniter  fuses  attached,  several  live 
and  armed  standard  charges  were  in- 
terspersed with  the  dummies.  As  the 
engineer  students  struggled  in  the  dark- 
ness, assembled  tanks  and  infantry  fired 
37-mm.  shells  and  automatic  and  small- 
arms  rounds  overhead,  and  instructors 
stationed  in  towers  detonated  buried 
artillery  shells  on  the  field.  By  the  time 


158 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


of  the  invasion  over  a  thousand  offi- 
cers and  noncoms  had  completed  the 
courses  at  the  engineer  center,  with 
twenty-seven  casualties  and  one  fatality 
during  the  exercises. 

An  adjunct  to  the  center  was  a  re- 
search and  development  staff  that  in- 
vestigated and  tested  new  mechanical 
mine-clearing  devices  such  as  the  Scor- 
pion flail  as  it  became  available  from 
British  sources.  As  soon  as  they  ap- 
peared in  the  theater,  the  German  Schu 
mines  were  also  the  object  of  the  staffs 
attention.  Though  the  center  operated 
with  unqualified  success,  it  labored  con- 
standy  under  the  disadvantages  of 
being  an  ad  hoc  organization  with  no 
standard  organization  tables.  Originally 
blessed  with  one  armored  engineer 
company  and  four  combat  engineer 
companies  as  demonstration  units.  Col- 
onel Wyatt  could  rarely  keep  on  hand 
enough  veteran  technicians  in  mine 
warfare  and  never  had  enough  trans- 
portation. 

The  engineers  produced  maps  and 
charts  by  the  thousands  for  the  Ameri- 
can invasion  force.  Originally  relying 
on  existing  small-scale  charts  on  hand, 
some  of  foreign  manufacture,  the  map- 
makers  found  their  enlargements  poor. 
Urgent  requisitions  for  new  maps  scaled 
at  the  standard  1:25,000,  1:50,000, 
1 :  100,000,  and  1 :250,000  soon  supplied 
adequate  coverage  for  nearly  the  whole 
of  the  south-central  Italian  peninsula 
from  the  latitude  of  Salerno  to  that  of 
Anzio.  Larger  scale  maps,  1:500,000 
and  1:1,000,000,  covered  the  area 
north  of  Rome.  Finally  the  engineers 
obtained  detailed  road  maps  of  the 
Naples  area  and  beach  defense  over- 
lays for  Salerno  which  gave  annotated 
legends  for  points  of  concealment,  lines 
of  communications,  water  supply,  and 


ridge  lines  in  the  immediate  area  of 
assault.  A  single  map  unit,  the  2699th 
Engineer  Map  Depot  Detachment  (Pro- 
visional), attached  to  the  531st  Engi- 
neer Shore  Regiment  for  the  operation, 
spent  most  of  the  time  before  the  inva- 
sion virtually  imprisoned  in  a  large 
garage  in  Oran  while  it  packed  1 : 50,000 
and  1:1,000,000  maps,  fifty  to  the 
sealed  roll.  The  map  depot  detachment 
carried  enough  maps  into  the  invasion 
to  resupply  each  combat  unit  with  100 
percent  of  its  original  issue. 

Amphibious  exercises  in  the  two 
weeks  before  the  invasion  suffered 
from  too  little  realism.  In  COW- 
PUNCHER,  run  from  26  to  29  August, 
the  36th  Infantry  Division  acted  as 
attacker  at  Port-aux-Poules  and  Arzew 
against  the  defending  34th  Infantry 
Division.  Loath  to  expose  vessels  to 
enemy  submarine  attacks  during  the 
exercise,  the  Navy  could  not  support 
the  rehearsal  in  detail,  and  only  a  token 
unloading  of  vehicles,  supply,  and  muni- 
tions over  the  beaches  was  possible.  On 
29  August  Company  I,  531st  Engineer 
Shore  Regiment,  demonstrated  beach 
organization  procedure  to  1,000  sailors; 
three  days  later  Company  H  partici- 
pated in  a  simulated  beach  exercise  with 
the  Navy,  but  no  small  boats  were  used. 
On  Sicily,  the  45th  Infantry  Division 
staged  one  rehearsal  for  the  coming 
landing. 

The  Invasion 

On  3  September  the  British  Eighth 
Army  struck  across  the  Strait  of  Mes- 
sina, and  the  long  and  bitter  Italian 
campaign  was  under  way.  On  5  Sep- 
tember the  first  of  the  invasion  con- 
voys for  Avalanche  left  Oran  and 
Mers-el-Kebir,  and  at  precisely  sched- 


FROM  SALERNO  TO  THE  VOLTURNO 


159 


uled  intervals  thereafter,  convoys  moved 
out  of  other  ports  in  North  Africa  and 
Sicily.  They  came  together  north  of 
Palermo  and  converged  on  the  Gulf  of 
Salerno  during  the  evening  of  8  Sep- 
tember. Aboard  were  the  U.S.  VI  Corps' 
36th  Division,  the  British  10  Corps' 
46th  and  56th  Divisions,  three  battal- 
ions of  American  Rangers  and  two  of 
British  commandos,  and  a  floating 
reserve,  the  American  45th  Division 
less  one  regimental  combat  team.  The 
141st  had  the  southern  Yellow  and  Blue 
beaches  as  assault  targets;  the  142d  was 
to  take  the  northern  Red  and  Green 
beaches  on  the  left,  closer  to  the  Fiu- 
marello  Canal.  (Map  8) 

Fortune  seemed  to  favor  the  land- 
ings. As  the  convoys  approached  the 
mainland  under  air  cover,  the  ships' 
radios  picked  up  the  voice  of  General 
Eisenhower  declaring  that  "hostilities 
between  .the  United  Nations  and  Italy 
have  terminated,  effective  at  once." 
When  the  assault  began  shortly  before 
0330  on  9  September,  the  weather  was 
good,  the  sea  was  calm,  and  the  moon 
had  set.  As  the  first  wave  of  LCVPs 
carrying  VI  Corps'  troops  grounded 
south  of  the  Sele  River,  the  men  saw 
flashes  of  gunfire  to  the  north  where 
the  British  were  landing,  but  their  own 
beaches  were  dark  and  silent.  Then,  as 
they  were  leaving  their  craft  and  mak- 
ing their  way  ashore  through  the  shal- 
lows, flares  suddenly  illuminated  the 
shoreline,  machine-gun  and  mortar  fire 
erupted  from  the  dunes,  and  from  the 
arc  of  hills  enclosing  the  coastal  plain 
artillery  shells  rained  down. 

The  heaviest  concentration  of  German 
fire  fell  on  the  southernmost  beaches. 
Yellow  and  Blue.  The  3d  Battalion  of 
the  531st  Engineer  Shore  Regiment, 
coming  in  on  the  second  wave  in  sup- 


port of  the  141st  Infantry,  was  unable 
to  land  on  Yellow  and  had  to  turn  to 
Blue,  where  things  were  not  much  bet- 
ter. No  boats  could  land  on  Blue  after 
daybreak,  and  for  most  of  the  day  the 
engineer  battalion's  Company  I  was 
pinned  down.  At  one  time  the  com- 
pany's command  post  was  only  300 
yards  from  a  point  where  the  infantry 
was  fending  off  a  German  attack. 

The  regiment's  2d  Battalion,  sup- 
porting the  142d  Infantry,  was  able  to 
land  on  Red  and  Green  beaches.  The 
unit  suffered  several  casualties  but  re- 
ported at  0530  that  Red  Beach  was 
ready  for  traffic.  Landing  craft  and 
DUKWs  floundering  offshore  con- 
verged on  Red,  but  the  concentration 
drew  heavy  artillery  fire  that  knocked 
many  of  them  out.  The  disruption  made 
it  impossible  to  open  any  of  the  beaches 
for  several  hours;  much  of  the  engi- 
neers' equipment  was  scattered  or  sunk, 
and  the  mine-clearing  and  construction 
crews  could  not  land  as  units.  The  delay 
in  opening  the  beaches,  as  well  as  en- 
emy fire  on  boat  lanes,  prevented  VI 
Corps  from  landing  tanks  and  artillery 
before  daylight,  as  had  been  planned. 

At  daylight  another  menace  appeared. 
A  German  tank  came  down  to  the  shore 
between  Yellow  and  Blue  beaches  and 
fired  on  each  landing  craft  that  ap- 
proached. More  enemy  tanks  began  fir- 
ing from  the  main  road  behind  the 
dunes.  The  landing  parties,  without 
tanks  and  heavy  artillery,  had  to  repel 
the  Germans  with  40-mm.  antiaircraft 
guns,  105-mm.  howitzers,  and  bazoo- 
kas, an  effort  in  which  the  engineers  of 
the  531st  played  an  important  part. 
When  five  Mark  IV  tanks  tried  to  break 
through  to  Blue  Beach,  seven  engineers 
of  Company  I  helped  to  repel  them 
with  bazookas.  At  Yellow  Beach,  where 


^^^^ 

V 

/ 

) 


/, 


SALERNO 


(18) 


R.d\ 

\ 

White 

XX               ^^rf 

|><^46Br^ 

^^ 

S 

56  Br    ^ 

Green 


XX  ^ 
Floating  Reserve 


36 


SALERNO  BEACHES 

September  1943 


5  Miles 


5  Kilometers 


\ 


^A 


Red-2  A^(:iO)^f"  \  ^  "^  _  Capaccio 

Redrx  ^  Paestum 

GreeiTr 
YellowX 


Blue' 


Agropoli  f^J 


^ 


ipe^ 


SO" 


Ogliastro 


MAP  8 


FROM  SALERNO  TO  THE  VOLTURNO 


161 


DUKWs  Head  for  the  Salerno  Beaches 


40-mm.  antiaircraft  guns  and  105-mm. 
howitzers  had  been  hastily  set  up  at  the 
water's  edge,  a  bulldozer  operator  of 
Company  H,  T/5  Charles  E.  Harris, 
pulled  the  guns  into  position  in  the 
dune  line.  He  was  wounded  by  machine- 
gun  fire  from  a  German  tank  but  con- 
tinued to  operate  his  bulldozer  until  it 
went  out  of  action.  On  all  the  beaches 
the  big  bulldozers  were  easy  targets, 
their  operators  working  under  constant 
fire. 

The  first  beaches  open  were  Red  and 
Green.  Not  until  shortly  after  noon 
were  landing  craft  discharging  at  Yel- 
low, while  Blue  remained  closed  most 
of  the  afternoon.  By  nightfall  all  were 
in  operation,  and  tanks,  tank  destroyers, 
and  heavy  artillery  were  landing  and 


moving  out  of  the  beachhead.  The  engi- 
neers cut  through  wire  obstructions, 
laid  steel  matting,  and  improved  exit 
roads,  while  the  36th  Division's  infan- 
try regiments  advanced  inland.  That 
night  two  companies  of  the  36th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Regiment,  landing  on 
D-day  as  part  of  36th  Division's  infan- 
try reserve,  served  as  a  screen  against 
armor  along  the  Sele  River. ^ 

Next  morning  German  planes  came 
over  Red  Beach  and  dropped  a  bomb 
squarely  on  the  command  post  of  the 
531st  Engineers'  2d  Battalion,  killing 


**  Hist  531st  Engr  Shore  Rgt,  29  Nov  42 -Apr  45; 
2d  Bn,  20  Aug-30  Sep  43;  3d  Bn,  20  Aug-30  Sep 
43;  Comments  of  Brig  Gen  George  W.  Gardes,  IncI  to 
Ltr,  Gardes  to  Jesse  A.  Remington,  8  Dec  59. 


162 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


LSTs  AND  Auxiliary  Ships  Unload  Men  and  Supply  at  Salerno 


two  officers  and  seriously  wounding 
two  others.  Artillery  shells  also  fell 
on  the  beachhead,  but  there  was  no 
ground  fighting  in  the  American  sec- 
tor near  Paestum  on  10  or  11  Septem- 
ber. The  Germans  were  concentrating 
their  forces  in  the  north  against  the 
British  10  Corps. 

General  Clark  became  concerned 
about  a  group  of  American  Rangers 
that  had  landed  on  the  west  flank  of  10 
Corps  on  the  Sorrento  peninsula  be- 
tween the  tiny  ports  of  Amalfi  and 
Maiori  to  help  the  British  secure  the 
mountain  passes  leading  to  Naples.  On 
Clark's  orders  a  task  force  built  around 
an  infantry  battalion  moved  by  sea  from 
the  VI  Corps'  beaches  to  support  the 
Rangers.  Aboard  the  eighteen  landing 


craft  that  started  north  on  1 1  Septem- 
ber were  two  companies  of  engineers, 
one  from  the  36th  Engineer  Combat 
Regiment  and  the  other  from  the  540th 
Engineer  Combat  Regiment,  the  latter 
having  landed  with  the  45th  Division 
on  D  plus  1.^ 

The  bulk  of  the  540th  pitched  in  to 
aid  the  531st  in  organizing  the  beaches. 
Goods  of  all  description  crowded  the 
shoreline,  barracks  bags  accumulated 
on  the  narrow  beachhead,  and  the  con- 
gestion finally  forced  the  closing  of  Red 
and  Green  beaches.  Unsorted  stacks  of 
ammunition,  gas,   food,  water,  and 


'  Gardes  comments,  8  Dec  59;  Hist  540th  Engr  C 
Rgt,  II  Sep  42-15  Feb  45. 


FROM  SALERNO  TO  THE  VOLTURNO 


163 


equipment  extended  seaward  into  sev- 
eral feet  of  water,  while  ships  offshore 
could  not  unload.  This  situation  im- 
proved somewhat  after  a  new  beach, 
Red  2,  opened  to  the  left  of  Red  Beach 
and  north  of  the  Fiumarello  Canal. ^ 

Naval  officers  criticized  engineer  op- 
eration of  the  beaches  and  attributed 
traffic  jams  to  poor  beach  exits  and  the 
failure  of  some  engineers  to  make  ade- 
quate arrangements  to  transfer  supplies 
from  the  beaches  to  dispersal  areas  far- 
ther inland.  A  major  Navy  complaint 
was  that  Navy  boat  crews  had  to  do 
most  of  the  unloading  with  little  assis- 
tance from  the  engineers,  whose  re- 
sponsibility it  was.  The  Navy  beach- 
master  estimated  that  during  the  assault 
phase  Navy  crews  unloaded  or  beached 
90  percent  of  the  supplies  and  equip- 
ment.^ 

In  fact,  the  beach  engineers  could  not 
possibly  have  handled  all  the  tonnage 
that  came  to  the  beaches  during  the 
assault  phase.  Combat  units  and  equip- 
ment grew  out  of  all  proportion  to  ser- 
vice troops.  The  53 1st  went  ashore  on 
the  morning  of  D-day  more  than  200 
men  understrength  and  soon  was  weak- 
ened further  by  casualties.  To  assist  the 
531st  in  unloading,  setting  up  dumps, 
maintaining  roads,  and  clearing  mine- 
fields, a  battalion  of  the  337th  Engi- 
neer General  Service  Regiment,  a  Fifth 
Army  unit,  landed  on  Red  Beach  at 
1630  but  could  accomplish  little  because 
its  equipment  did  not  come  in  for  sev- 
eral days.  Both  the  531st  and  the  540th 
Engineer  Regiments  arrived  short  of 


equipment,  notably  mine  detectors  and 
trucks.  Few  engineer  supplies  began 
arriving  before  D  plus  1 ,  and  most  of 
what  came  in  was  not  what  was  most 
wanted.  The  first  engineer  supply  item 
ashore  was  a  forty-gallon  fire  extin- 
guisher, while  other  items  landed  early 
were  sandbags,  lumber,  and  tools.  Later, 
a  few  cranes  came  in.  Once  ashore,  the 
two  regiments  felt  they  did  not  get 
enough  information  from  the  Navy 
beachmaster  as  to  what  LSTs  or  car- 
goes were  arriving  and  where  they 
would  land.  As  in  TORCH  and  HUSKY, 
the  line  between  Army  and  Navy  re- 
sponsibility remained  vague. '^ 

The  Fifth  Army  engineer.  Colonel 
Bowman,  came  ashore  on  D  plus  1  and 
set  out  in  a  jeep  to  find  a  suitable  place 
for  the  army  command  post.  He  turned 
north  from  the  congested  beachhead, 
and  near  the  juncture  of  the  Sele  and 
Calore  Rivers,  not  far  from  the  bound- 
ary between  VI  Corps  and  10  Corps, 
he  found  the  house  of  Baron  Roberto 
Ricciardi,  set  in  a  lovely  Italian  garden. 

In  the  next  three  days,  the  sound  of 
artillery  fire  in  the  north,  where  the 
Germans  were  concentrating  against  10 
Corps,  came  close;  and  it  was  in  this 
sectqr  between  the  two  corps  that  engi- 
neer troops  first  manned  frontline  posi- 
tions. On  a  warning  from  General  Clark 
that  a  German  counterattack  might  hit 
the  north  flank,  the  VI  Corps  com- 
mander, Maj.  Gen.  Ernest  J.  Dawley, 
reinforced  two  regiments  of  the  45th 
Division  with  the  3d  Battalion  of  the 
36th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment.  The 


^  VI  Corps  Hist  Record,  Sep  43;  WNTF  Action  Rpt 
of  Salerno  Landing,  Sep-Oct  43,  p.  152;  AGF  Bd 
Rpt  279,  MTO,  24  Jan  45. 

^  WNTF  Action  Rpt  of  Salerno  Landings,  pp.  151- 
52;  Morison,  Sicily-Salemo-Anzio,  pp.  264,  269. 


'"  Rpt  of  SOS  Observer  of  Opn  Avalanche,  9-21 
Sep  43,  SOS  NATOUSA;  Rpt,  HQ,  1st  ESB,  to  CG, 
NATOUSA,  29  Oct  43,  sub:  Operation  of  Shore 
Engineers,  Italy;  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  pp. 
18,  19. 


164 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


engineers  moved  into  the  line  a  few 
miles  north  of  the  Sele  River  shortly 
after  midnight  on  12  September,  along 
with  a  battery  of  105-mm.  howitzers; 
by  dawn  they  were  in  contact  with  Brit- 
ish 10  Corps  patrols.  At  1000  the  divi- 
sion launched  an  attack.  The  Germans 
counterattacked  with  tanks  and  artil- 
lery, killing  two  engineer  officers,  and 
by  dusk  had  infiltrated  and  cut  off  a 
forward  body  of  engineers  that  included 
the  battalion  commander.  The  engi- 
neer regimental  commander,  Lt.  Col. 
George  W.  Gardes,  took  over  the  bat- 
talion. Before  daybreak  on  13  Septem- 
ber the  battalion  attained  its  objective, 
which  turned  out  to  have  been  one  of 
the  strongpoints  of  the  German  defense 
system.'' 

During  12  September  German  fire 
increased  in  the  American  sector  and 
an  enemy  attack  dislodged  a  36th  Divi- 
sion battalion  from  its  position  on  hills 
near  Altavilla,  south  of  the  Galore  River. 
The  increased  German  pressure  resulted 
from  the  reinforcement  of  the  /  6th  Pan- 
zer Division,  which  had  borne  the  full 
force  of  the  invasion,  by  the  29th  Pan- 
zer Division,  moving  up  from  Calabria. 
Not  only  divisional  engineers  of  the 
111th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  but 
also  corps  and  even  army  engineers  bol- 
stered 36th  Division  defenses.  On  13 
September  two  battalions  of  the  531st 
Engineer  Shore  Regiment  were  called 
off  beach  work  for  combat.  One  went 
inland  to  act  as  reserve,  the  other  took 
up  defensive  positions  on  high  ground 
south  and  southeast  of  the  beachhead.'^ 

The  situation  worsened  during  the 
day,  indicating  that  the  Germans  were 


' '  Gardes  comments,  8  Dec  59. 

'2  Hist  531st  Engr  Shore  Rgt,  29  Nov  42 -Apr  45. 


trying  to  break  through  to  the  beach- 
head, and  the  36th  Engineer  Combat 
Regiment  had  to  furnish  another  bat- 
talion to  act  as  infantry.  Moving  out  at 
midnight,  the  regiment's  2d  Battalion 
occupied  high  ground  along  the  south 
bank  of  the  Galore  River  astride  a  road 
leading  into  the  beachhead  from  Alta- 
villa. This  position  came  under  heavy 
artillery  fire  throughout  14  and  15 
September,  and  tank  and  infantry  at- 
tacks also  menaced  it.  On  the  afternoon 
of  14  September  German  tanks  clanked 
over  a  stone  bridge  spanning  the  Galore 
and  began  to  move  up  a  narrow,  one- 
way road  winding  toward  the  engineers' 
position.  The  engineers  were  ready  for 
them.  From  a  quarry  recessed  into  the 
hillside,  they  fired  a  37-mm.  cannon 
and  a  .50-caliber  machine  gun  point- 
blank  at  the  lead  tank,  knocking  it  out 
to  form  a  roadblock  in  front  of  the  fol- 
lowing tanks,  which  then  withdrew  un- 
der American  artillery  fire.  The  next 
afternoon  the  engineers  saw  German 
infantrymen  getting  off  trucks  on  the 
north  side  of  the  river,  apparently 
readying  for  an  attack.  The  engineers 
brought  the  German  infantry  under 
fire,  inflicting  observed  losses. 

In  the  45th  Division  sector  north  of 
the  Sele  River,  a  tank-infantry  attack 
hit  the  3d  Battalion,  36th  Engineers, 
on  14  September.  German  tanks  over- 
ran part  of  one  company's  position,  but 
the  engineers  stayed  in  their  foxholes 
and  stopped  the  following  infantry 
while  U.S.  tank  destroyers  engaged  the 
tanks.  Another  company  of  the  3d  Bat- 
talion stopped  a  Mark  IV  tank  with 
bazookas  and  that  night  captured  a  Ger- 
man scout  car  and  took  three  prisoners. 
During  the  day  the  battalion  was  rein- 
forced by  part  of  the  45th  Division's 
120th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  all 


FROM  SALERNO  TO  THE  VOLTURNO 


165 


of  which  had  operated  as  infantry  since 
13  September.  ^ 

General  Clark,  who  had  hastily  moved 
Colonel  Bowman's  command  post  to 
the  rear,  was  so  concerned  about  a  Ger- 
man breakthrough  to  the  beachhead 
that  at  one  point  on  13  September  he 
contemplated  a  withdrawal  to  the  10 
Corps'  zone.  But  the  lines  held  long 
enough  for  reinforcements  to  come 
from  Sicily.  Parachute  troops  of  the  82d 
Airborne  Division,  dropped  on  the 
beachhead  in  the  early  hours  of  14  Sep- 
tember and  trucked  to  the  southern 
flank,  turned  the  tide.  When  the  3d 
Infantry  Division  began  landing  from 
LSTs  on  the  morning  of  18  September 
the  enemy  was  withdrawing. 

Plans  for  the  advance  beyond  Salerno 
were  determined  at  a  conference  Gen- 
eral Clark  called  on  18  September. 
Naples  on  the  west  coast,  one  of  the 
two  prime  objectives,  was  to  be  the  tar- 
get of  Fifth  Army;  the  other  objective, 
the  airfields  around  Foggia  near  the 
east  coast,  was  to  be  the  target  of  Gen- 
eral Montgomery's  Eighth  Army,  which 
by  18  September  was  in  a  position -to 
move  abreast  of  Fifth  Army  up  the  Ital- 
ian peninsula.  In  the  Fifth  Army  effort, 
10  Corps  was  to  move  north  along  the 
coast  to  capture  Naples  and  drive  to 
the  Volturno  River  twenty-five  miles 
beyond  while  VI  Corps  made  a  wide 
flanking  movement  through  the  moun- 
tains to  protect  the  10  Corps  advance. 

A  Campaign  of  Bridges 
In  addition  to  active  German  resis- 


'■^  Gardes  comments,  8  Dec  59;  Engineer  History, 
Mediterranean,  pp.  20,  22. 

'  *  Donald  G.  Taggart,  ed..  History  of  the  Third  Infan- 
try Division  in  World  War  II  (Washington:  Infantry  Jour- 
nal Press,  1947),  p.  80. 


tance,  terrain  was  a  principal  obstacle 
in  the  flank  march  that  opened  on  20 
September.  Maj.  Gen.  John  P.  Lucas 
took  over  the  VI  Corps  advance  just  as 
it  started,  arraying  the  3d  Division  on 
the  left  and  the  45th  on  the  right,  but 
found  his  troops  entirely  roadbound. 
Italian  terrain  was  far  worse  for  mili- 
tary maneuver  than  that  in  Sicily;  cross- 
country movement  was  next  to  impos- 
sible, not  only  over  mountain  heights 
but  even  in  the  valleys,  where  vehicles 
were  likely  to  be  stopped  by  stone  walls, 
irrigation  ditches,  or  German  mines. 
The  enemy  had  blown  all  the  bridges 
carrying  roadbeds  over  the  numerous 
gullies,  ravines,  and  streams.  Forward 
movement  in  Italy  became  for  the  engi- 
neers a  campaign  of  bridges. 

According  to  policies  Colonel  Bow- 
man laid  down,  divisional  engineers 
were  to  get  the  troops  across  streams 
any  way  they  could:  bypasses  when 
possible,  fills  when  culverts  had  been 
blown,  or  Bailey  bridging.  Corps  engi- 
neers were  to  follow  up,  replacing  the 
small  fills  with  culverts  and  the  bypasses 
with  Bailey  bridges.  Army  engineers 
were  to  replace  the  larger  culverts  and 
the  Baileys  with  fixed  pile  bridges.  All 
bridges  were  to  be  two-way,  Class  40 
structures. 

Even  veteran  units  had  rough  going. 
The  10th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion, 
supporting  the  3d  Division  in  the  ad- 
vance to  the  Volturno,  was  the  battal- 
ion that  had  built  the  "bridge  in  the 
sky"  in  Sicily.  The  divisional  engineers 
of  the  45th  Division,  the  120th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion,  had  also  had 
hard  service  in  the  mountains  during 
the  Sicily  campaign.  The  corps  engi- 
neers behind  them  came  from  the  36th 
Engineer  Combat  Regiment,  which  had 
distinguished  itself  in  the  defense  of 


166 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


the  beachhead.  Yet  it  took  these  exper- 
ienced, battle-hardened  engineers  ten 
days  to  get  the  troops  sixty  miles  over 
the  mountains  to  the  first  major  VI 
Corps  objective,  Avellino,  a  town  about 
twenty-five  miles  east  of  Naples  on  the 
Naples-Foggia  road. 

The  Germans  had  blown  nearly  every 
bridge  and  culvert,  made  abatis  of  tree 
trunks,  sown  mines,  and  emplaced  booby 
traps.  Demolitions,  shelling,  and  bomb- 
ing had  cratered  road  surfaces.  In  the 
towns,  rubble  from  destroyed  stone 
buildings  blocked  traffic.  But  the  weath- 
er was  still  good,  so  engineers  could 
bulldoze  bypasses  around  obstructions. 
"There  was  no  weapon  more  valuable 
than  the  engineer  bulldozer,"  General 
Truscott  attested,  "no  soldiers  more 
effective  than  the  engineers  who  moved 
us  forward."  Bypasses  around  blown 
bridges  saved  the  time  required  to  bring 
up  bridging.  In  the  advance  to  the 
Volturno  the  10th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion  constructed  sixty-nine  by- 
passes but  only  a  few  timber  and  Bailey 
bridges.*^ 

The  Bailey  seemed  made  for  the 
steep-banked,  swiftly  flowing  rivers  and 
the  narrow  gorges  of  the  Italian  coun- 
tryside. It  could  be  launched  from  one 
side  or  bank  without  intermediate  sup- 
ports. In  the  early  phase  of  the  Italian 
campaign  the  Germans  did  not  com- 
prehend its  p)otential,  so  they  were  satis- 
fied with  destroying  only  parts  of  long 
bridges  instead  of  all  the  spans  and 
piers.  The  engineers  quickly  used  those 
parts  left  standing  to  throw  a  Bailey 
over  a  stream  or  ravine  *^ 


'^  Engineer  History,  MedUerranean,  p.  25;  Truscott, 
Command  Missions,  p.  259. 

'^  VI  Ck)rps  Hist  Record,  Sep  43,  The  Mounting  of 
Avalanche,  p.  14;  Chf  Engr,  15th  Army  Gp,  Notes 
on  Engr  Opns  in  Italy,  no.  6,  1  Jan  44. 


The  Bailey  became  all  the  more  es- 
sential when  the  engineers  discovered 
that  timber  for  wooden  bridges  was 
scarce,  at  times  as  much  as  seventy-five 
miles  distant.  Yet  the  supply  of  Baileys 
was  woefully  inadequate.  The  36th 
Engineer  Combat  Regiment  built  more 
than  eighty  bridges  and  sizable  culverts 
between  the  breakout  at  Salerno  and 
the  end  of  December  but  during  that 
time  received  only  three  Baileys.'^  In 
the  first  month  after  the  landings,  the 
Fifth  Army  engineers  had  only  five  sets 
of  the  much  sought  after  120-foot  dou- 
ble-double Baileys. 

One  major  reason  for  the  shortage 
of  bridging  in  this  early  stage  of  the 
Italian  campaign  was  a  faulty  estimate 
by  planners  at  AFHQ.  They  had  fore- 
seen that  highway  destruction  would  be 
tremendous,  had  assumed  that  the  en- 
emy would  demolish  all  bridges,  and 
had  figured  that  an  average  of  thirty 
feet  of  bridging  per  mile  of  main  road 
would  be  required.  But  the  estimate  did 
not  take  into  account  the  secondary 
roads  that  had  to  be  used  to  support 
the  offensive.'^ 

A  shortage  of  bridge-building  mate- 
rial and  heavy  equipment  also  ham- 
pered the  work  of  engineers  building  a 
bridge  over  the  Sele  River  to  carry 
Highway  18  traffic  northward  from  the 
beachhead  to  Avellino.  This  bridge  was 
crucial  because  the  beaches  continued 
to  be  the  main  source  of  supplies  for 
Fifth  Army  for  a  considerable  time  after 
Naples  fell. 

A  company  of  the  16th  Armored  En- 
gineer Battalion  put  in  the  first  bridge 
over  the  Sele,  a  floating  treadway,  on 
10  September.  It  was  replaced  the  fol- 


"  Gardes  comments,  8  Dec  59. 

'*  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  p.  10. 


FROM  SALERNO  TO  THE  VOLTURNO 


167 


lowing  day  by  a  120-foot  trestle  tread- 
way  to  carry  forty-ton  loads.  During  12 
and  13  September  a  battalion  of  the 
36th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment  em- 
placed  two  more  floating  bridges,  and 
on  22  September  the  337th  Engineer 
General  Service  Regiment  began  build- 
ing the  first  fixed  bridge  the  U.S.  Army 
constructed  in  Italy  over  the  Sele.  It 
was  of  trestle  bent  construction,  16 
spans,  and  240  feet  long.  In  spite  of 
the  equipment  shortage,  the  job  was 
completed  by  28  September.'^ 

However,  the  bridge  was  undermined 
by  the  shifting  sands  of  the  river  bot- 
tom and  from  the  start  required  con- 
stant maintenance.  When  heavy  rains 
fell  early  in  October,  making  a  rushing 
torrent  of  the  normally  sluggish  Sele, 
the  bridge  went  out.  The  531st  Engi- 
neer Shore  Regiment  altered  the  rail- 
road bridge  over  the  Sele  to  take  trucks 
so  that  the  vital  supply  line  would  not 
be  interrupted.  Then  they  repaired  the 
road  bridge  by  driving  piling  through 
the  floor  and  jacking  the  bridge  up  and 
onto  the  new  pile  bents.  After  this 
experience,  engineers  abandoned  tres- 
tle construction  in  favor  of  pile  bridges. 
In  the  construction  of  a  100-foot  pile- 
bent  bridge  about  halfway  between 
Salerno  and  Avellino,  near  Fisciano,  the 
engineers  of  the  53 1st  improvised  a  pile 
driver,  using  the  barrel  of  a  German 
155-mm.  gun  and  a  D— 4  tractor.^^ 

Naples 
When  Naples  fell  on  1  October  1^43, 


Fifth  Army's  supply  situation  was  dete- 
riorating rapidly.  Truck  hauls  from  the 
Salerno  beaches  were  becoming  longer 
and  more  difficult.  Unloadings  over  the 
Salerno  beaches  were  at  the  mercy  of 
the  elements,  and  the  elements  had  just 
struck  a  blow  for  the  enemy.  A  violent 
storm  that  blew  up  on  28  September 
halted  unloading  for  2  1/2  days  and 
wrecked  a  large  number  of  landing 
craft  and  ponton  ramps.  Supplies  dwin- 
dled. On  6  October  the  army  had  only 
three  days'  supply  of  gasoline,  and  dur- 
ing the  first  half  of  October  issues  of 
Class  I  and  Class  III  supplies  from  army 
dumps  outstripped  receipts.  The  early 
reconstruction  of  Naples  and  of  trans- 
portation lines  was  of  prime  impor- 
tance.*^* 

Naples,  with  a  natural  deepwater 
harbor,  was  the  second  ranking  port  in 
Italy  and  had  a  normal  discharge  capac- 
ity of  8,000  tons  per  day.^^  The  water 
alongside  most  of  its  piers  and  quays 
was  thirty  feet  deep  or  more,  enough 
to  accommodate  fully  loaded  Liberty 
ships.  There  was  virtually  no  tide;  the 
water  level  varied  only  a  foot  or  two,  a 
result  of  wind  swell  as  much  as  tidal 
action. 

Naples  was  the  most  damaged  port 
U.S.  Army  engineers  had  yet  encoun- 
tered during  the  war.  Allied  aerial  bom- 
bardment had  probably  caused  one- 
third  to  one-half  the  destruction  in  the 
port  area  and  more  than  half  that  in 
the  POL  tank  farm  and  refinery  areas. 
Carefully  planned  German  demolition 
had  been  effective.  Damage  to  the  quays 


'^  Ibid.,  pp.  12,  13,  20,  22;  Hist  of  Activities  of  the 
337th  GS  Rgt  with  the  Fifth  Army  in  Italy,  9  Sep 
43-1  Nov  44. 

^"  Interv,  Shotwell  with  Brig  Gen  Frank  O.  Bowman, 
1 9  Jan  5 1 ;  Hist  53 1  St  Engr  Shore  Rgt,  29  Nov  42  -  Apr 
45. 


^'  Fifth  Army  History,  vol.  I,  p.  66. 

^^  Except  as  otherwise  noted,  this  section  on  Naples 
is  based  on  Rpt  on  Rehabilitation  of  Naples  and  Other 
Captured  Ports,  by  Col  Percival  A.  Wakeman  et  al.,  28 
Nov  43. 


168 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


and  piers  was  slight,  for  they  were  built 
of  huge  blocks  of  masonry  and  not  eas- 
ily demolished.  Most  of  the  damage  to 
them  came  incidentally  from  demoli- 
tions that  destroyed  pier  cranes  and 
other  port-operating  equipment.  The 
Germans  had  directed  their  destruction 
toward  cargo-handling  equipment,  and 
they  blocked  the  waters  with  every  piece 
of  once-floating  equipment  available. 
When  Fifth  Army  troops  entered  the 
city,  thirty-two  large  ships  and  several 
hundred  smaller  craft  lay  sunk  in  Na- 
ples harbor,  blocking  fifty-eight  of  the 
sixty-one  berths  available  and  cutting 
the  normal  capacity  of  the  port  by  90 
percent.^^ 

On  the  land  side,  a  wall  of  debris  iso- 
lated the  dock  area  from  the  rest  of  the 
city;  Allied  bombing  and  German  de- 
molitions had  destroyed  most  of  the 
buildings  near  the  docks.  Only  steel 
reinforced  buildings  stood,  and  most 
of  them  were  badly  damaged  and  lit- 
tered with  debris.  The  enemy  destroyed 
all  of  some  300  cranes  in  the  port  area; 
in  many  cases  the  demolition  charges 
were  placed  so  as  to  tip  the  structure 
into  the  waters  alongside  the  quays. 
Tons  of  rubble  from  nearby  buildings 
were  also  blown  into  the  water  to  block 
access  to  the  quays. ^'^ 

Despite  the  widespread  destruction, 
engineer  and  survey  parties  had  rea- 
sons for  optimism.  Sea  mines  were 
found  only  in  the  outer  harbor.  Also, 
the  enemy  had  sunk  ships  adjacent  to 
the  quays  or  randomly  about  the  har- 
bor, not  in  the  entrance  channels  where 


^^  PBS,  Public  Relations  Sect,  Tools  of  War:  An  Illus- 
trated History  of  the  Peninsular  Base  Section  (Leghorn, 
Italy,  1946);  Fifth  Army  History,  vol.  II,  p.  66. 

'"^^  History  of  Restoration  of  Port  of  Naples,  1051st 
Engr  Port  Construction  and  Repair  Gp,  10  Dec  43, 
Engr  Sch  Lib. 


they  could  have  denied  the  Allies  use 
of  the  port  for  weeks,  perhaps  months. 

Within  the  city  debris  blocked  sev- 
eral streets.  Rails  and  bridges  on  the 
main  lines  had  been  systematically  de- 
stroyed. Ties  and  ballast,  on  the  other 
hand,  were  generally  undisturbed  in 
Naples  itself.  Most  of  the  large  public 
buildings  were  either  demolished  or 
gutted  by  fire,  and  others  were  mined 
with  time-delay  charges.  Large  indus- 
trial buildings  and  manufacturing  plants 
generally  were  prepared  for  demoli- 
tions, but  most  charges  had  not  been 
fired.  No  booby  traps  were  found  in 
the  harbor  area  and  not  a  great  many 
throughout  the  city. 

Public  utilities — electricity,  water, 
sewage — were  all  disrupted.  With  the 
great  Serino  aqueducts  cut  in  several 
places,  the  city  had  been  without  water 
for  several  days,  for  most  of  the  wells 
within  the  city  had  long  since  been  con- 
demned and  plugged.  The  only  elec- 
tricity immediately  available  came  from 
generators  Allied  units  brought  in. 
Local  generating  stations  were  dam- 
aged, and  transmission  lines  from  the 
principal  source  of  power,  a  hydroelec- 
tric plant  fifty  miles  south  of  Naples, 
were  down.  The  distribution  system 
within  the  city  was  also  damaged,  and 
demolitions  had  blocked  much  of  the 
sewer  system. 

Fifth  Army  engineer  units  entering 
the  city  from  the  land  side  started  clear- 
ing debris  from  the  port.  Detachments 
of  the  1  llth  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion (divisional  engineers  of  the  36th 
Division)  went  to  work  clearing  a  road 
around  the  harbor.  The  540th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Regiment,  bivouacking  in 
a  city  park  overlooking  the  Bay  of  Na- 
ples, had  the  job  of  clearing  the  harbor. 
With  dynamite,  bulldozer,  torch,  crane. 


FROM  SALERNO  TO  THE  VOLTURNO 


169 


and  shovel,  the  men  of  the  540th  filled 
craters,  hacked  roads  through  debris, 
cleared  docks,  and  leveled  buildings. 
Within  twenty-four  hours  the  har- 
bor was  receiving  LSTs  and  LCTs,  and 
exit  roads  were  making  it  possible  for 
DUKWs  to  bring  cargoes  inland  from 
Liberty  ships  in  the  bay.'^^  The  1051st 
Engineer  Port  Construction  and  Repair 
Group,  attached  to  the  Fifth  Army  Base 
Section,  arrived  on  2  October  but  could 
do  little  more  than  survey  the  chaos 
until  base  engineer  troops  came  on  the 
scene. 

The  engineers  working  on  the  docks 
undertook  their  tasks  in  three  phases. 
The  first,  based  on  quick  estimates,  was 
the  clearing  of  debris  to  provide  access 
to  those  berths  not  blocked  by  sunken 
ships.  The  second  involved  expedient 
construction,  and  this  the  engineers 
undertook  after  a  reasonably  compre- 
hensive survey  made  it  feasible  to  plan 
for  future  activities.  The  third  phase, 
reconstruction,  involved  more  time- 
consuming  projects  that  started  only 
after  the  possibilities  of  providing  facili- 
ties by  expedient  construction  had  been 
exhausted. 

The  first  phase,  which  occurred  from 
3  to  5  October,  was  the  most  critical 
one.  Since  demands  for  berthing  and 
unloading  space  were  urgent,  there  was 
no  time  for  deliberate,  planned  activity. 
All  available  army  and  base  section 
engineers  and  equipment  had  to  be 
committed  against  obstacles  blocking 
the  initial  unloading  points.  Navy  sal- 
vage units,  equipped  with  small  naval 
salvage  vessels  and  aided  by  Royal  Navy 
salvage  units  with  heavy  lifting  equip- 
ment, entered  the  harbor  on  4  October 


Hist  540th  Engr  C  Rgt,  11  Sep  42-  15  Feb  45. 


to  locate  ships  and  craft  that  obstructed 
berthing  space.  Coordinating  with  the 
naval  units,  the  1051st  Engineer  Port 
Construction  and  Repair  Group  sur- 
veyed landward  obstructions. 

Although  only  3  1/2  Liberty  berths 
were  available  on  7  October,  berthing 
space  grew  rapidly  with  the  expedient 
construction.  On  16  October,  6,236  tons 
of  cargo  came  ashore,  a  figure  that 
included  263  vehicles.  By  the  end  of 
the  month  13  1/2  Liberty  berths  and  6 
coaster  berths  were  available  for  use 
(the  goal  set  early  in  October  was  15 
Liberty  berths  and  5  coaster  berths  by 
1  November).  The  most  urgent  require- 
ments had  been  met,  and  supplies  in 
the  dumps  amounted  to  3,049  tons. 

Ramps  of  standard  naval  pontons, 
laid  two  units  wide,  were  built  far 
enough  out  into  the  harbor  to  accom- 
modate Liberty  ships.  These  ramps 
were  easy  to  build  and  feasible  enough 
in  tideless  waters,  but  they  were  too  nar- 
row for  cargo  and  were  used  only  for 
unloading  vehicles.  More  widely  used 
were  steel  and  timber  ramps  which 
engineers  were  able  to  construct  across 
the  decks  of  sunken  ships  alongside  the 
piers.  These  ramps  became  the  trade- 
mark of  the  engineers  in  the  rehabilita- 
tion of  Naples. 

All  but  two  of  the  large  ships  block- 
ing the  piers  were  too  badly  damaged  to 
patch  and  float  aside  immediately;  but 
most  of  them  lay  alongside  the  quays, 
with  their  decks  above  or  just  below  the 
surface  of  the  water.  When  engineers 
cleared  away  the  superstructures  and 
built  timber  and  steel  ramps  across  the 
decks.  Liberty  ships  could  tie  up  along- 
side the  sunken  hulks  and  unload  di- 
rectly onto  trucks  on  the  ramps.  As  a 
rule  T-shaped  ramps  ten  to  fifteen  feet 
wide  were  built  at  each  berth  and  spaced 


170 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Decking  Plac:ed  Over  Sunken  Vessels  to  enable  loading  in  Naples  harbor. 


to  correspond  with  the  five  hatches  of 
a  Liberty  ship.  The  head  of  the  T  was 
twenty  to  twenty-five  feet  long,  allow- 
ing room  on  the  ramp  for  temporary 
cargo  storage  and  for  variations  in  the 
spacing  of  hatches  on  individual  ships. 
At  first  these  ramps  went  out  only  over 
ships  sunk  on  an  even  keel;  later  they 
were  built  on  ships  that  lay  on  their 
sides  or  at  an  angle  to  the  quay.  Eventu- 
ally engineers  filled  the  spaces  between 
the  ramps  with  decking  to  provide  more 
working  room. 

Another  improvisation  made  the 
larger  of  two  dry  docks  into  a  Liberty 
berth.  The  caisson-type  gates  had  been 
damaged  and  two  ships  lay  inside  the 
dock.  Leaks  in  the  gate  were  sealed 
with    tremie    concrete,    which    cures 


under  water,  and  the  ships  were  braced 
to  the  sides  of  the  dock.  The  basin  was 
then  emptied  so  the  ships  could  be 
patched.  Since  the  walls  of  the  docks 
were  not  perpendicular,  steel  scaffold- 
ing had  to  be  built  out  over  the  stepped 
masonry  walls  and  covered  with  timber 
decking.  After  the  ships  were  refloated 
and  pulled  away,  both  sides  of  a  Liberty 
ship  could  be  unloaded  at  the  same  time 
in  the  dry  dock.  The  smaller  dry  dock 
was  used  for  ship  repairs  once  a  sunken 
destroyer  had  been  patched  and  floated 
out. 

At  the  foot  of  one  pier  a  cargo  vessel 
lay  sunk  with  one  side  extending  eight 
to  ten  feet  above  water.  The  vessel  was 
flat  bottomed,  so  a  Liberty  ship  could 
come  in  close  alongside.  Engineers  built 


FROM  SALERNO  TO  THE  VOLTURNO 


171 


a  working  platform  on  the  ship  with  a 
bridge  connecting  to  the  pier.  At  an- 
other pier,  where  a  large  hospital  ship 
lay  sunk  with  its  masts  and  funnels  rest- 
ing against  the  quays,  walkways  and 
steps  leading  across  the  hulk  and  down 
to  the  pier  made  a  berth  for  discharg- 
ing personnel. 

Clearing  away  underwater  debris  also 
released  berthing  space.  Floating  and 
land-based  cranes  removed  debris 
along  the  piers  and  quays,  while  port 
construction  and  repair  group  divers 
went  down  to  cut  loose  sunken  cranes 
and  other  steel  equipment. 

Peninsular  Base 

With  the  arrival  of  more  service 
troops  from  North  Africa,  the  Fifth 
Army  Base  Section  assumed  more  re- 
sponsibility for  supply  in  the  army's 
rear.  Through  summer  1943,  Fifth 
Army's  support  organization  was  only 
a  skeleton,  designated  6665th  Base 
Area  Group  (Provisional)  and  modeled 
after  the  NATOUSA  Atlantic  Base  Sec- 
tion. It  changed  its  provisional  charac- 
ter and  its  name  to  the  full-fledged 
Fifth  Army  Base  Section  on  28  August. 
Under  Brig.  Gen.  Arthur  W.  Pence,  an 
advance  echelon  accompanied  Fifth 
Army  headquarters  to  Italy,  landing 
at  Salerno  on  D  plus  2.  General 
Pence  established  his  headquarters  at 
Naples  the  day  after  the  city  was 
captured,  and  on  25  October  his  com- 
mand became  the  Peninsular  Base  Sec- 
tion, with  its  Engineer  Service  under 
Col.  Donald  S.  Burns.^^ 

By  10  October  the  first  full-sized  con- 


General  Pence 

voy  brought  the  345th  Engineer  Gen- 
eral Service  Regiment  to  the  base  sec- 
tion. The  Base  Section  Engineer  Ser- 
vice also  had  at  its  disposal  the  540th 
Engineer  Combat  Regiment,  two  engi- 
neer general  service  regiments  (the 
345th  and  94th),  the  386th  Engineer 
Battalion  (Separate),  one  company  of  a 
water  supply  battalion  (attached  from 
Fifth  Army),  an  engineer  port  construc- 
tion and  repair  group,  an  engineer 
maintenance  company,  a  depot  com- 
pany, and  a  map  depot  detachment — in 
all,  about  6,000  engineers. ^^ 

Colonel  Burns  ran  all  engineer  func- 
tions in  the  base  section  area,  was  re- 


^^  History  of  the  Peninsular  Base  Section,  North 
African  Theater  of  Operations,  9  Jul  43- 1  May  44, 
vol.  I,  pp.  6-8. 


^'  Ltr,  Pence  to  Truesdell,  26  Nov  43,  sub:  Organi- 
zation of  PBS;  Hist  PBS,  28  May  44;  Hist  of  the  PBS, 
Phases  II  and  III,  28  Aug  43-3  Jan  44;  PBS  Engr 
Hist,  pt.  I,  1943-45,  sec.  I,  Chronological  Summary; 
Col.  Joseph  S.  Gorlinski,  "Naples:  Case  History  in 
Invasion,"  The  Military  Engineer,  XXXVI  (April  1944), 
109-14. 


172 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


sponsible  for  building  and  operating 
bulk  petroleum  installations,  and  was 
also  responsible  for  new  railroad  con- 
struction without  regard  to  the  army 
rear  boundary.  When  the  army's  ad- 
vance was  slow,  base  section  engineers 
were  able  to  carry  both  pipeline  and 
railroad  work  well  into  the  army  area. 
As  for  air  force  construction,  the  Engi- 
neer Service  was  responsible  not  only 
for  bulk  POL  systems  in  the  vicinity  of 
airfields,  but  it  also  was  to  provide  com- 
mon engineer  supplies  to  aviation  engi- 
neers operating  in  the  area.  All  engi- 
neer units  assigned  to  the  base  area, 
except  for  fire-fighting  detachments 
(under  the  base  section  provost  mar- 
shal), were  under  the  command  of  the 
base  section  engineer. ^^ 

The  Engineer  Service  had  six 
branches:  administration,  operations, 
construction,  supply,  real  estate,  and 
petroleum.  An  important  function  of 
the  administrative  branch  involved 
negotiating  with  the  Allied  Military 
Government  Labor  Office  (AMGLO) 
and  with  the  labor  administration  office 
of  the  base  purchasing  agent  for  civil- 
ians to  work  with  engineer  units  and 
for  office  personnel  to  work  at  engi- 
neer headquarters.  By  the  end  of  1943 
3,126  civilians  worked  directly  for  engi- 
neer units  or  on  contracts  the  base  sec- 
tion engineers  supervised.  Workers 
employed  by  individual  engineer  units 
were  paid  semi-monthly  by  specially 
appointed  agent  finance  officers  at 
wages  the  AMGLO  established. 

The  operations  branch  was  responsi- 
ble for  issuing  administrative  instruc- 
tions to  engineer  units,  coordinating 


engineer  troop  movements,  and  keep- 
ing strength,  disposition,  and  status 
reports  of  personnel  and  equipment. 
It  also  issued  orders  to  engineer  units 
for  minefield  clearance. 

The  construction  branch,  heart  of  the 
Engineer  Service  organization,  applied 
the  Engineer  Service's  resources  against 
the  mass  of  requests  for  construction 
that  poured  in.  It  provided  technical 
assistance  to  engineer  units,  allocated 
priorities  among  jobs,  and  established 
and  enforced  standards  of  construction. 
The  number  of  jobs  was  staggering: 
reconstructing  the  Naples  port  area; 
restoring  public  utility  services  in 
Naples  and  removing  public  dangers 
such  as  time  bombs  and  building  skele- 
tons; reopening  hnes  of  communica- 
tions; providing  troop  facilities  such  as 
hospitals,  rest  camps,  replacement 
camps,  quarters,  stockades  and  POW 
enclosures,  laundries,  and  bakeries; 
building  supply  depots  and  mainte- 
nance shops;  and  helping  local  indus- 
tries get  back  into  production. "^^ 

The  supply  branch  received  material 
requirements  estimates  from  the  Fifth 
Army  engineer,  the  III  Air  Service 
Area  Command,  the  petroleum  branch, 
and,  later,  from  the  various  branches 
of  the  Engineer  Service,  Peninsular 
Base  Section.  It  consolidated  these  req- 
uisitions for  submission  to  the  engineer, 
SOS,  NATOUSA,  through  the  base  sec- 
tion supply  office  (G— 4).  Fifth  Army 
had  requisitioned  supplies  for  a  thirty- 
day  maintenance  period  and  had  fore- 
cast its  needs  through  November. 
Thereafter,  responsibility  for  requisi- 
tioning engineer  supplies  rested  with 


'*^"  Extracts  from  Report  on  Peninsular  Base  Section, 
NATOUSA,  10  Feb  44,  sec.  VIII,  Engr  Service,  381 
NATOUSA,  EUCOM  Engr  files 


'-^"  PBS  Engr  Hist,  pt.  I;  Hist  of  the  PBS,  Phases  II 
and  III. 


FROM  SALERNO  TO  THE  VOLTURNO 


173 


the  base  section  engineer.  Except  for 
emergency  orders,  engineer  requisi- 
tions were  submitted  monthly  and  were 
filled  from  depots  in  North  Africa; 
items  not  available  there  were  requisi- 
tioned from  the  New  York  POE.  The 
supply  branch  also  coordinated  local 
procurement. 

Responsibility  for  requisitioning  real 
estate  for  all  military  purposes  in  con- 
nection with  U.S.  base  section  forces 
also  rested  with  the  engineer.  Ulti- 
mately, a  separate  real  estate  branch 
was  established. 

The  designation  of  a  petroleum 
branch  underscored  the  importance  of 
this  new  engineer  mission.  POL  prod- 
ucts represented  nearly  half  the  gross 
tonnage  of  supplies  shipped  into  Italy, 
and  engineer  pipelines  were  the  princi- 
pal means  for  moving  motor  and  avia- 
tion gasoline  once  it  was  discharged 
from  tankers  at  Italian  ports. "^^ 

Petroleum,  Oil,  and  Lubricants 

Petroleum  facilities  in  Naples  were 
heavily  damaged.  Allied  bombers  had 
hit  the  tank  farms  as  early  as  July  1942, 
and  many  tanks  and  connecting  pipe- 
lines had  been  pierced  by  bomb  frag- 
ments; others  had  buckled  or  had  been 
severed  by  concussion.  German  demoli- 
tionists  had  added  some  finishing 
touches  at  important  pipe  connections, 
discharge  lines,  and  tanker  berths.  How- 
ever, existing  petroleum  installations  in 
Naples  were  large  and  much  could  be 
salvaged.^' 

Sixteen  men  from  the  696th  Engi- 


neer Petroleum  Distribution  Company 
entered  Naples  on  2  October.  This 
advance  party  surveyed  existing  instal- 
lations, recruited  civilian  petroleum 
workers,  and  began  clearing  away 
debris  and  salvaging  materials.  The 
345th  Engineers  furnished  teams  of 
mine  sweepers.  After  the  main  body  of 
the  696th  arrived  two  weeks  later,  the 
connecting  pipelines  in  the  terminal 
area  were  traced,  patched,  cleaned,  and 
tested,  and  new  threaded  pipe  was  laid. 
One  after  another  the  huge  steel  stor- 
age tanks  were  patched  and  cleaned. 
This  work  often  involved  cutting  a  door 
in  the  bottom  of  a  tank,  shoveling  out 
accumulated  sludge,  and  scrubbing  the 
walls  with  a  mixture  of  diesel  oil  and 
kerosene. 

Some  of  this  early  work  proved  waste- 
ful. It  began  before  any  master  plan 
for  the  POL  terminal  was  available. 
Engineers  repaired  some  tanks  with 
floating  roofs  before  they  discovered 
that  the  tanks  were  warped.  The  696th 
had  no  training  or  experience  in  such 
work,  and  plates  welded  over  small 
holes  cracked  when  they  cooled  until 
the  company  learned  how  to  correct  the 
problem.  Other  practices,  such  as  the 
best  method  for  scrubbing  down  tanks, 
had  to  come  from  trial  and  error.^^ 

Not  until  24  October  did  the  696th 
company  have  the  terminal  ready  to 
receive  gasoline,  and  the  first  tanker, 
the  Empire  Emerald,  did  not  actually  dis- 


^"  PBS  Engr  Hist,  pt.  10,  sec.  1. 

'^  Extracts  from  Rpt  on  PBS,  NATOUSA,  10  Feb 
44,  sec.  VIII.  Engr  Service;  PBS  Engr  Hist,  West  Italy 
Pipelines,  pt.  I,  sec.  IV,  1943-45. 


■"•'^  Extracts  from  Rpt  on  PBS,  NATOUSA,  10  Feb 
44,  sec.  VIII,  Engr  Service;  Observers  Rpt  on  the 
Engr  Service,  SOS  NATOUSA,  Lt  Col  William  F.  Pow- 
ers (ca.  Mar  44),  370.2  (MTO-NA),  EUCOM  Engr 
files;  Ltr,  Col  C.  Kittrell,  SOS  NATOUSA  Engr,  to 
Chf  Engr,  AFHQ,  10  Aug  44,  sub:  Cleaning  of  Stor- 
age Tanks,  and  1st  IncI  by  Engr,  PBS,  9  Jun  44  to  Ltr, 
HQ,  SOS  NATOUSA,  8  May,  same  sub,  679.1 1,  Oil 
Pipelines,  MTOUSA  files. 


174 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Engineer  Officer  Reads  Pressure  Gau(;es  at  pumping  station,  Foggia,  Italy. 


charge  its  cargo  until  five  days  later.  In 
the  meantime  engineers  set  up  dispens- 
ing and  refueling  stations  in  the  termi- 
nal area,  and  once  the  Empire  Emerald 
discharged,  Fifth  Army  and  base  sec- 
tion units  were  able  to  draw  some  of 
their  fuel  supply  from  the  bulk  instal- 
lations. The  petroleum  engineers  did 
not  limit  their  operations  to  providing 
facilities  for  ground  force  units.  The 
696th  company  readied  separate  lines 
and  storage  tanks  to  receive  100-octane 
aviation  fuel,  as  well  as  storage  tanks, 
discharge  lines,  and  fueling  facilities  for 
naval  forces. 

The  engineer  work  to  make  possible 
the  discharge  of  POL  and  other  sup- 
plies at  Naples  became  increasingly 
urgent  as  October  advanced.  By  the  end 


of  the  first  week  in  October  advance 
elements  of  Fifth  Army  were  at  the 
Volturno  River,  and  a  week  later  the 
crossings  began. 

The  Volturno  Crossings 

To  the  engineers  involved  in  getting 
the  troops  across  the  river,  where  all 
bridges  were  down,  the  most  impor- 
tant feature  of  the  Volturno  was  that  it 
was  shallow.  From  1 50  to  220  feet  wide, 
the  river  was  normally  only  3  to  5  feet 
deep;  even  after  the  rains  of  early  Octo- 
ber began,  spots  existed  on  the  VI 
Corps  front  where  men  could  wade 
across  and  tanks  could  ford.  The  VI 
Corps  crossings  were  to  be  made  by  the 
3d  and  34th  Divisions  abreast  between 


FROM  SALERNO  TO  THE  VOLTURNO 


175 


Triflisco  (the  boundary  with  British  10 
Corps  on  the  west)  and  Amorosi,  where 
the  Volturno,  flowing  down  from  the 
northwest,  joins  the  Galore  and  turns 
west  toward  the  sea.  The  corps'  45th 
Division  was  east  of  Amorosi  in  a  sector 
adjoining  British  Eighth  Army  and 
would  not  be  involved  in  the  Volturno 
crossings. 

By  6  October  the  3d  Division  was  at 
the  river,  but  for  days  rains  and  stiffen- 
ing German  resistance  made  it  impossi- 
ble to  bring  up  the  34th  Division,  as 
well  as  10  Corps,  which  was  to  cross 
simultaneously  with  VI  Corps.  Flooded 
swamplands  and  enemy  demolitions 
held  the  British  back;  and  in  the  path 
of  the  34th  Division  the  fields  were  so 
deep  in  mud  that  cross-country  move- 
ment was  impossible.  Punishing  mili- 
tary traffic  deepened  the  mud  on  the 
few  roads  and  continually  ground  down 
and  destroyed  surfaces  already  cratered 
from  heavy  shelling.  Enormous  quanti- 
ties of  gravel  and  rock  had  to  be  used, 
even  timber  for  corduroy  cut  from  the 
banks  of  the  Volturno.^ 

The  3d  Division  made  good  use  of 
the  week's  delay.  Reconnoitering  the 
banks,  patrols  found  wheel  tracks  where 
the  Germans  had  crossed.  At  night 
patrols  waded  or  swam  the  Volturno 
and  marked  fording  spots.  The  troops 
were  to  cross  in  assault  boats  or  wade, 
in  either  case  holding  on  to  guide  ropes 
anchored  to  trees  on  the  opposite  bank. 
Heavy  weapons  were  to  be  carried  in 
assault  boats.  The  3d  Division's  10th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  rounded  up 
five  miles  of  guide  rope  and  found 
some  life  jackets  in  a  Naples  warehouse. 
Some  assault  boats  had  to  be  impro- 


vised. Naval  officers  in  Naples  provided 
some  life  rafts;  other  rafts  were  manu- 
factured and  floated  by  oil  or  water 
drums;  and  rubber  pontons  from  tread- 
way  bridges  came  in  handy. 

At  the  place  where  waterproofed 
tanks  were  to  ford,  the  engineers  built 
a  road  to  the  riverbank.  Bridges  would 
be  required  for  vehicles  unable  to  ford. 
A  railway  yard  in  the  neighborhood 
yielded  material  for  a  prefabricated 
cableway  and  some  narrow-gauge  rail- 
road track  which,  overlaid  with  Som- 
merfeld  matting  and  supported  by 
floats,  made  a  usable  bridge  for  jeeps. "^"^ 

Waiting  on  the  mountain  heights 
beyond  the  now  racing,  swollen  Vol- 
turno, the  Germans  were  prepared  to 
repel  the  crossings.  They  had  emplaced 
heavy  artillery,  laid  mines,  dug  gun  pits, 
and  sighted  machine  guns  to  cover  the 
riverbanks  with  interlocking  fields  of 
fire.  They  killed  many  men  probing  for 
crossing  sites,  but  still  did  not  know 
where  the  attack  would  come.  General 
Truscott  misled  them  into  thinking  the 
main  crossing  would  be  made  on  the 
American  left  at  Triflisco  Gap,  then 
crossed  the  river  in  the  center,  spear- 
heading the  advance  with  the  7th  In- 
fantry of  his  3d  Division. 

At  0200  on  13  October,  after  a  heavy 
preliminary  bombardment  of  German 
positions,  troops  of  the  7th  Infantry 
entered  the  river  under  a  smoke  screen, 
one  battalion  in  rafts  and  assault  boats. 


■"  Fifth  Army  History,  vol.  II,  7  Oct-  15  Nov  43,  pp. 
15-16,49. 


■  ^  Taggart,  History  of  the  Third  Infantry  Division  in 
World  War  II,  pp.  88-89;  Nathan  William  White,  War 
Department,  Military  Intel  Div,  From  Fedala  to  Berch- 
tesgaden,  (Brockton,  Mass.:  Keystone  Print,  Inc.,  1947), 
pp.  51—52.  Details  of  the  crossings  are  taken  from 
these  two  sources  as  well  as  Blumenson,  Salerno  to 
Cassino,  pp.  196-206;  and  War  Department,  Military 
Intel  Div,  From  the  Volturno  to  the  Winter  Line  (6  Octo- 
ber—15  November  1943),  American  Forces  in  Action 
Series  (Washington,  1944),  pp.  27-54. 


176 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


two  battalions  wading  the  icy  waters  and 
holding  their  rifles  above  their  heads. 
The  men  in  the  boats  had  the  worst  of 
it;  many  of  the  trees  anchoring  the 
guide  ropes  tore  away  from  sodden 
banks;  rafts  broke  up  in  the  swift  cur- 
rent; and  the  rubber  boats  tended  to 
drift  downstream  and  were  held  back 
only  with  great  difficulty  by  a  party 
from  the  39th  Engineer  Combat  Regi- 
ment. Despite  the  struggle  against  the 
river,  daylight  found  all  the  combat 
troops  of  the  initial  waves  on  the  far 
bank  picking  their  way  through  the 
minefields. 

By  0530  General  Truscott  had  word 
that  all  of  the  7th  Infantry  was  over  the 
river  and  that  two  battalions  of  the  15th 
Infantry  had  crossed  in  the  same  man- 
ner and  with  much  the  same  problems. 
On  the  right  of  the  3d  Division  two  bat- 
talions of  the  34th  Division  had  crossed 
the  Volturno  with  relative  ease. 

Truscott's  main  worry  was  a  delay  in 
getting  the  tanks  across.  At  the  ford  in 
the  7th  Infantry  sector,  bulldozer  oper- 
ators at  first  light  had  begun  trying  to 
break  down  the  riverbank  so  the  tanks 
could  get  to  the  water's  edge  without 
tipping  over;  but  the  bulldozers  were 
unarmored,  and  enemy  shelling  caused 
so  many  casualties  among  the  opera- 
tors that  the  work  stopped.  Around 
1000,  Truscott  learned  from  the  com- 
manding officer  of  the  7th  Infantry, 
Col.  Harry  B.  Sherman,  that  German 
tanks  were  advancing  toward  the  rifle- 
men on  the  far  bank  and  that  the  enemy 
was  probably  about  to  launch  a  coun- 
terattack. 

Leaving  Sherman's  command  post, 
Truscott  encountered  a  platoon  of  engi- 
neers from  Company  A  of  the  111th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  on  their 
way  to  the  site  where  work  was  starting 


on  the  division  bridge.  "In  a  few  brief 
words,"  Truscott  later  recalled,  "I 
painted  for  them  the  urgent  need  for 
courageous  engineers  who  could  level 
off  the  river  bank  even  under  fire  so 
that  tanks  could  cross  and  prevent  our 
infantry  battalions  being  overrun  by  the 
enemy.  Their  response  was  immediate 
and  inspiring.  I  left  them  double-timing 
toward  the  river  half  a  mile  away  to 
level  off  the  bank  with  picks  and 
shovels — which  they  did,  while  tanks 
and  tank  destroyers  neutralized  enemy 
fire  from  the  opposite  bank."'^^  By  1240 
fifteen  tanks  and  three  tank  destroyers 
had  reached  the  opposite  bank  and 
were  moving  to  the  aid  of  the  riflemen. 

By  that  time  the  jeep  bridge  in  the 
7th  Infantry  area,  being  built  by  Com- 
pany A  of  the  10th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion,  was  almost  finished.  But  work 
the  battalion's  Company  B  was  doing  on 
the  division  bridge  in  the  15th  Infan- 
try area  to  the  east  had  been  stopped 
by  German  artillery  fire,  which  caused 
casualties  among  the  engineers,  punc- 
tured pontons,  and  damaged  trucks. 
General  Truscott  hurried  to  the  site  and 
told  the  engineers  they  would  have  to 
disregard  the  shelling  and  finish  the 
bridge.  The  company  "returned  to  work 
as  nonchalantly  as  though  on  some  engi- 
neer demonstration"  and  completed  the 
bridge  that  afternoon,  although  shell- 
ing continued  to  cause  casualties. '^^ 

Sites  for  the  division  bridge  and  for 
a  thirty-ton  bridge  to  carry  tanks,  corps 
artillery,  and  heavy  engineer  equip- 
ment had  been  selected  entirely  from 
aerial  photographs.  Later,  ground  re- 


"^' Truscott,  Command  Missions,  pp.  271—72. 
'"'  Ibid.,  p.  43;  War  Dept,  Mil  Intel  Div,  From  the 
Volturno  to  the  Winter  Line,  pp.  3 1 ,  40. 


FROM  SALERNO  TO  THE  VOLTURNO 


177 


connaissance  justified  this  method  of 
selection. "^^ 

The  thirty-ton  corps  bridge  went  in 
near  Capua  about  500  yards  from  a 
blown  bridge  that  had  carried  High- 
way 87  across  the  river  at  Triflisco. 
Aware  that  this  site  was  the  only  one 
suitable  for  a  heavy  bridge,  the  Ger- 
mans stubbornly  dominated  the  heights 
all  through  the  day  on  13  October,  and 
not  until  the  next  day  could  work  begin. 
To  build  the  270-foot-long  tread  way  VI 
Corps  had  to  call  on  the  16th  Armored 
Engineer  Battalion,  which  had  tread- 
way  equipment  and  experienced  men. 
Engineers  from  the  10th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  and  the  39th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Regiment  prepared  the 
approaches  across  muddy  fields  con- 
necting the  bridge  with  Highway  87. 
Construction  began  under  a  blanket  of 
smoke  which  seemed  to  draw  artillery 
fire.  In  spite  of  casualties  and  damaged 
pontons  the  engineers  finished  the 
tread  way  early  in  the  afternoon,  in  only 
six  hours.  Later  that  same  afternoon 
General  Clark  changed  the  boundary 
between  VI  Corps  and  British  10-Corps, 
giving  the  British  responsibility  for  the 
3d  Division's  objective  on  the  left  flank. 
This  change  gave  the  bridge  to  the 
British.  In  its  first  five  days  the  tread- 
way  carried  7,200  vehicles  across  the 
Volturno.^^ 

In  the  34th  Division's  zone  to  the  east, 
south  of  Caiazzo,  the  task  of  building  a 
division  bridge  over  the  Volturno  fell 
to  Company  A  of  VI  Corps'  36th  Engi- 
neer. Combat  Regiment,  the  regiment 


"'^  Chf  Engr,  1 5th  Army  Gp,  Notes  on  Engr  Opns  in 
Italy,  no.  8,  1  Feb  44.  app.  A-1,  p.  4;  Hist  1554th 
Ener  Heavy  Ponton  Bn,  1  Jan  45-8  May  45. 

'  Truscott,  Command  Missions,  pp.  268,  274;  Engineer 
Histoty,  Mediterranemi,  p.  33. 


that  had  helped  repel  German  counter- 
attacks after  the  Salerno  landing  and 
had  contributed  its  Company  H  to  the 
Rangers  at  Amalfi.  Company  H  had 
marched  into  Naples  with  the  Rangers 
to  clear  mines  and  booby  traps.  At  the 
Italian  barracks  where  the  company  was 
billeted,  a  German  delayed-action  demo- 
lition charge  exploded  on  10  October, 
killing  twenty-three  men  and  wound- 
ing thirteen. 

Misfortune  also  dogged  the  efforts 
of  Company  A  to  build  the  division 
bridge  over  the  Volturno  at  Annunziata. 
According  to  plan,  infantrymen  on  the 
far  bank  were  to  have  taken  a  first 
phase  line,  including  heights  where 
German  artillery  was  emplaced,  before 
the  engineers  moved  forward  to  the 
river  from  their  assembly  area  three 
miles  to  the  rear.  On  orders,  the  engi- 
neer convoy  got  under  way  at  0700  on 
13  October,  with  trucks  carrying  floats 
already  inflated  to  save  time.  But  the 
high  ground  had  not  yet  been  taken, 
and  no  one  had  informed  the  engi- 
neers. 

At  Annunziata  an  enemy  barrage 
began,  and  by  the  time  the  first  three 
floats  were  launched  the  German  fire 
had  become  so  accurate  that  all  were 
destroyed.  During  the  day  engineer  cas- 
ualties amounted  to  3  men  killed,  8 
wounded,  and  2  missing.  Not  until  well 
after  dark  did  the  infantrymen  take  the 
first  phase  line.  By  that  time  the  engi- 
neers had  found  another  site  upstream. 
Working  under  a  smoke  screen  that  (as 
at  Triflisco)  attracted  enemy  fire,  they 
were  able  to  finish  the  bridge  by  mid- 
morning  on  14  October.  That  after- 
noon a  company  of  the  1 6th  Armored 


^"  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  p.  40. 


178 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Wrecked  M2  Floating  Treadway  on  the  Volturno 


Engineer  Battalion  began  building  near 
Caiazzo  a  255-foot,  30-ton  treadway 
bridge  and  finished  it  before  midnight. 
Next  morning,  although  German  planes 
made  several  passes  at  it,  the  bridge 
was  carrying  the  34th  Division's  heavy 
vehicles  over  the  Volturno.'*^ 

From  the  time  troops  crossed  the 
lower  Volturno  at  Capua  and  Caiazzo 
to  the  time  they  crossed  the  upper 
Volturno  a  few  weeks  later  at  Venafro 
and  Colli,  the  engineers  were  so  short 
of  bridging  material  that  they  had  tc 


^"  Hist  36th  Engr  C  Rgt,  1  Jun  41  -23  Jun  44,  includ- 
ing Ltr,  1st  Lt  Thomas  F.  Farrell,  Jr.,  to  CO,  36th 
Engr  C  Rgt,  28  Oct  43,  sub:  Volturno  River  Crossing; 
Hist  109th  Engr  C  Bn,  10  Feb  41-8  May  45,  app.  1, 
pt.  Ill;  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  pp.  32,  33,  40; 
Gardes  comments  in  Ltr,  5  Nov  59. 


resort  to  low-level  bridges,  sometimes 
constructed  of  any  material  they  could 
scrounge  from  the  countryside.  They 
speedily  slapped  temporary  bridges 
(largely  treadways)  across  the  river. 
Flash  floods  in  November  and  Decem- 
ber washed  them  out.  On  one  occasion 
when  the  Volturno  rose  eighteen  feet 
in  ten  hours,  all  the  bridges  but  one 
were  out  for  some  time.  Alternate 
routes — long,  difficult,  and  circuitous — 
slowed  supplies  and  added  to  traffic 
congestion.  The  one  bridge  sturdy 
enough  to  resist  the  torrent  was  a  semi- 
permanent structure  the  343d  Engineer 
General  Service  Regiment  built  at 
Capua  between  16  October  and  9 
November.  This  pile  bridge  was  for  six 
months  thereafter  a  major  link  in  the 


FROM  SALERNO  TO  THE  VOLTURNO 


179 


Fifth  Army  lifeline.  It  was  32  feet  high, 
some  370  feet  long,  and  was  classified 
as  a  two-way  Class  40,  one-way  Class  70 
bridge.  In  the  first  twenty-four  hours 
after  the  bridge  opened  to  traffic, 
10,000  vehicles  crossed;  during  the 
campaign,  a  million.'*' 

In  spite  of  this  experience  at  the 
Volturno  the  engineers  built  a  number 
of  temporary  bridges  too  low  to  with- 
stand the  swift  currents  of  Italian 
streams  and  lost  several  more  to  flash 
floods.  Any  floating  bridge  was  built  at 
the  existing  level  of  the  river  or  stream. 
As  the  rivers  rose  or  fell,  floating  or 
fixed  spans  had  to  be  added  or  re- 
moved. When  Italian  streams  rose  rap- 
idly the  engineers  could  not  always 
extend  the  bridge  fast  enough  to  save 
it.  The  height  of  the  bridge  also  de- 
pended upon  the  availability  of  con- 
struction materials,  hard  to  come  by  in 
Italy.   As   the   supply   of  Baileys   im- 


proved, longer  and  higher  structures 
were  built/* 

During  the  early  part  of  November 
the  enemy  reinforced  his  units  in  front 
of  the  Fifth  Army  in  an  attempt  to 
establish  and  hold  the  "Winter  Line," 
increasing  their  strength  from  three  to 
five  divisions.  By  15  November  the  Brit- 
ish 10  Corps  was  stopped  on  a  front 
approximately  sixteen  miles  from  the 
sea  to  Caspoli,  while  VI  Corps  was 
stalled  on  a  front  extending  through 
the  Mignano  Gap  past  Venafro  and 
north  to  the  Eighth  Army's  left  wing 
near  Castel  San  Vincenzo.  General  Alex- 
ander called  a  halt  and  General  Clark 
set  about  regrouping  Fifth  Army.  Allow- 
ing the  34th  and  45th  Divisions  time  to 
rest  and  refit,  he  sent  the  36th  Division 
into  the  line  and  withdrew  the  3d  Divi- 
sion, which,  slated  for  Anzio,  came  to 
the  end  (as  General  Truscott  remarked) 
of  "fifty-nine  days  of  mountains  and 
mud."^^ 


^'  Gardes  comments  in  Ltr,  5  Nov  59;  Engineer 
History,  Mediterranean,  p.  5 1 . 


^'^  Comments,  Brig  Gen  D.  O.  Elliott,  in  Ltr  to  Dr. 
Jesse  A.  Remington,  18  Mar  60. 

^ '  Truscott,  Command  Missions,  p.  285. 


CHAPTER  IX 


The  Winter  Line  and  the 
Anzio  Beachhead 


The  region  of  Fifth  Army  operations 
during  the  winter  of  1943—44  was 
admirably  suited  for  stubborn  defense. 
Its  topography  included  the  narrow  val- 
leys of  rivers  rising  in  the  Apennines 
and  emptying  into  the  Tyrrhenian  Sea, 
irregular  mountain  and  hill  systems, 
and  a  narrow  coastal  plain.  The  divide 
between  the  Volturno-Calore  and  the 
Garigliano-Rapido  valleys  consisted  of 
mountains  extending  from  the  crest  of 
the  Apennines  southward  about  forty 
miles,  averaging  some  3,000  feet  above 
sea  level  and  traversed  by  few  roads  or 
trails.  The  slopes  rising  from  the  river 
valleys  were  often  precipitous  and  for- 
ested, and  all  the  rivers  were  swollen 
by  winter  rains  and  melting  snow.  In 
these  mountains  and  valleys  north  and 
west  of  the  Volturno,  German  delaying 
tactics  slowed  and  finally  halted  Fifth 
Army's  progress.  The  engineers  had  to 
fight  enemy  mines  and  demolitions  as 
well  as  mountains  and  flooded  streams. 

Before  the  Allies  launched  an  attack 
on  the  Winter  Line  on  1  December 
1943,  the  U.S.  II  Corps  took  its  place 
in  the  Fifth  Army  center  near  Mignano. 
The  British  10  Corps  and  U.S.  VI  Corps 
occupied  the  left  and  right  flanks,  re- 
spectively. Early  in  January  VI  Corps 
withdrew  from  the  Fifth  Army  front  to 
prepare  for  the  Anzio  operation,  and 
the  French  Expeditionary  Corps  (FEC), 
initially  consisting  of  two  divisions  from 


North  Africa,  took  its  place.  A  number 
of  Italian  units,  including  engineers, 
also  joined  Fifth  Army.  But  these  addi- 
tions did  not  assure  rapid  progress. 
The  army  pushed  slowly  and  painfully 
through  the  mountains  until  it  came  to 
a  halt  in  mid-January  at  the  enemy's 
next  prepared  defenses,  the  Gustav 
Line,  which  followed  the  courses  of  the 
Rapido  and  Garigliano  Rivers  for  most 
of  its  length.  Opposing  Fifth  Army  and 
the  British  Eighth  Army  was  the  Ger- 
man Tenth  Army. ' 

In  January  Fifth  Army  attacked  on 
two  fronts.  VI  Corps'  surprise  flank 
attack  in  the  Anzio  landing  (SHINGLE) 
of  22  January  f)enetrated  inland  an  aver- 
age of  ten  miles,  but  then  the  German 
Fourteenth  Army  contained  the  beach- 
head, and  for  the  remainder  of  the  win- 
ter VI  Corps  was  on  the  defensive.  In 
the  mountains  to  the  south  Fifth  Army 
could  gain  little  ground.  When  an  at- 
tack began  on  17  January,  II  Corps  held 
the  Fifth  Army  center  along  the  Rapido 
and  tried  repeatedly  to  smash  through 
the  Gustav  Line.  By  the  thirty-first  II 
Corps  had  penetrated  some  German 
lines  but  failed  to  capture  Cassino,  key 
to  enemy  defenses.  The  opening  of  the 
second  front  at  Anzio  had  reduced  the 


'  For  terrain  and  tactical  details,  see  Blumenson, 
Salerno  to  Cassino,  chs.  \l\\  —  W ,  And  Fifth  Army  History, 
vol.  II,  pp.  2-3;  vol.  Ill,  p.  2  and  an.  5;  vol.  IV,  pp.  2, 

4,  187-88. 


THE  WINTER  LINE  AND  THE  ANZIO  BEACHHEAD 


181 


length  of  the  inland  front  Fifth  Army 
could  hold;  hence,  in  February  three 
divisions  moved  from  Eighth  Army  to 
take  over  the  Cassino-Rapido  front 
while  Fifth  Army  units  concentrated  in 
the  southern  half  of  the  line,  along  the 
Garigliano.  Despite  heavy  casualties,  the 
gains  in  the  winter  campaign  were  neg- 
ligible, and  a  stalemate  existed  until  the 
offensive  resumed  in  the  spring. 

Minefields  in  the  Mountains 

Approaching  the  Volturno,  the  Allies 
had  run  into  increasingly  dense  and  sys- 
tematic minefields  which  included  un- 
familiar varieties  of  mines  and  booby 
traps.  The  German  mine  arsenal  in 
Italy  contained  the  "S"  (or  "Bouncing 
Betty")  and  Teller  plus  many  new  types 
including  the  Schu  and  the  Stock,  mines 
with  detonations  delayed  up  to  twenty- 
one  days,  and  mines  with  improvised 
charges.  Nonmetallic  materials  such  as 
wood  and  concrete  in  many  of  the 
newer  mines  made  detection  more  dif- 
ficult and  more  dangerous. 

Allied  troops  dreaded  the  Schu  mine 
especially.  Approximately  6-by-4-by-2 
inches,  this  mine  consisted  of  a  1/2-  to 
2-pound  block  of  explosive  and  a  sim- 
ple detonating  device  enclosed  in  light- 
weight pressed  board  or  impregnated 
plywood.  It  could  be  carried  by  any  foot 
soldier  and  planted  easily  in  great  num- 
bers; it  was  most  effective  placed  flush 
with  the  ground  and  covered  with  a 
light  layer  of  dirt,  grass,  and  leaves.  The 
Schu  did  not  kill,  but  as  little  as  five 
pounds  of  pressure  would  set  it  off  to 
shatter  foot,  ankle,  and  shin  bones. 

At  the  Volturno  the  enemy  had  re- 
covered from  the  confusion  of  retreat, 
and  to  the  end  of  the  Italian  campaign 
each  successive  German  fortified  line 
had  its  elaborate  mine  defenses.  The 


Germans  frequently  sowed  mines  with- 
out pattern  and  used  many  confusing 
methods.  Distances,  depths,  and  types 
varied.  A  mine  might  be  planted  above 
another  of  the  same  or  different  type 
in  case  a  mine-lifting  party  cleared  only 
the  top  layer. 

The  scale  of  antipersonnel  mining 
increased  as  the  campaign  progressed. 
Booby  traps  were  planted  in  bunches 
of  grapes,  in  fruit  and  olive  trees,  in 
haystacks,  at  roadblocks,  among  felled 
trees,  along  hedges  and  walls,  in  ra- 
vines, valleys,  hillsides,  and  terraces, 
along  the  beds  and  banks  of  streams,  in 
tire  or  cart  tracks  along  any  likely  ave- 
nue of  approach,  in  possible  bivouac 
areas,  in  buildings  that  troops  might  be 
expected  to  enter,  and  in  shell  or  bomb 
craters  where  soldiers  might  take  ref- 
uge. The  Germans  placed  mines  in  bal- 
last under  railroad  tracks,  in  tunnels, 
at  fords,  on  bridges,  on  road  shoulders, 
in  pits,  in  repaired  pot  holes,  and  in 
debris.  Field  glasses,  Luger  pistols,  wal- 
lets, and  pencils  were  booby-trapped, 
as  were  chocolate  bars,  soap,  windows, 
doors,  furniture,  toilets,  demolished 
German  equipment,  even  bodies  of 
Allied  and  German  civilians  and  sol- 
diers.^ 

In  areas  sown  with  S-mines  bulldozer 
operators  wore  body  armor,  and  each 
combat  battalion  had  four  "flak"  suits. 
More  than  fifty  bulldozers  struck  mines 
during  the  campaign.  In  many  cases 
the  operators  were  thrown  from  their 
seats,  but  none  was  killed.  Some  had 
broken  legs,  but  had  they  been  in  cabs 
with  roofs  many  would  have  had  their 
necks  broken  or  skulls  fractured.^ 


■^  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  pp.  34,  36, 42;  Bow- 
man notes,  31  Mar  44,  Fifth  Army  Engr  files. 

'  Hist  10th  Engr  CBn,  1944;  Hist  313th  Engr  C  Bn, 
1944-45;  Interv,  Col  John  D.  Cole,  Jr.,  CO,  310th 
Engr  C  Bn,  1959. 


182 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Although  detecting  and  clearing 
mines  was  not  exclusively  an  engineer 
function,  the  engineers  were  primarily 
responsible.  But  they  were  not  ade- 
quately trained.  As  late  as  September 
1944  engineers  in  the  field  complained 
that  no  organization  or  procedure  had 
been  established  for  collecting  enemy 
mines  for  training.^ 

Infantrymen  retained  the  dread  of 
mines  that  had  been  so  marked  in  North 
Africa.  To  ease  that  dread  and  to  pass 
on  proper  procedures  for  lifting  mines, 
the  engineers  emphasized  that  mines 
were  one  of  the  normal  risks  of  war; 
only -one  man  should  deal  with  a  mine; 
skilled  help  should  be  called  in  when 
needed;  ground  should  be  checked 
carefully  in  a  mined  area;  all  roads  and 
shoulders  should  be  cleared  and  accu- 
rate records  made  of  such  work,  with 
roads  and  lanes  not  cleared  being 
blocked  off  and  so  reported;  and  large 
minefields  should  not  be  cleared  except 
on  direct  orders.^ 

The  engineers  often  found  that  in- 
fantrymen did  not  comprehend  the 
time  required  to  check  an  area.  Check- 
ing and  clearing  mines  were  slow  and 
careful  processes,  requiring  many  men 
and  involving  great  risks  even  when 
there  was  no  enemy  fire.  For  example, 
the  10th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  in 
the  Formia-Gaeta  area,  north  of  Naples, 
suffered  fifty-seven  casualties,  includ- 
ing fifteen  deaths,  in  clearing  20,000 
mines  of  all  types  during  a  period  of 
sixteen  days.  Often  a  large  area  con- 
tained only  a  few  mines,  but  the  num- 
ber found  bore  little  relation  to  the  time 
that  had  to  be  spent  checking  and  clear- 
ing. Furthermore,  much  of  the  work 


'*  AGF  Bd  Rpt,  Lessons  Learned  in  the  Battle  from 
Garigliano  to  North  of  Rome,  21  Sep  44. 
^  Ftfth  Army  History,  vol.  VIII,  p.  91. 


had  to  be  done  under  artillery,  machine 
gun,  and  mortar  fire.  Ordinarily  the 
infantry  attacked  with  engineers  in  sup- 
port to  clear  mine  paths,  and  engineer 
casualties  were  inevitable.^ 

New  problems  in  mine  detection  a- 
rose  during  the  Italian  campaign.  With 
the  increasing  number  of  nonmetallic 
enemy  mines,  the  SCR— 625  detector 
became  less  dependable  and  the  prod 
more  important.  Italian  soil  contained 
heavy  mineral  deposits  and  large  con- 
centrations of  artifacts  buried  over  the 
ages.^  A  detector  valuable  in  one  spot 
might  be  useless  a  mile  away,  where 
the  metallic  content  of  the  soil  itself  pro- 
duced in  the  instrument  a  hum  indistin- 
guishable from  that  caused  by  mines. 
Shell  fragments  and  other  scraps  of 
metal  scattered  in  many  areas  caused 
the  same  confusion. 

The  wooden  Schu  mine  was  difficult 
for  the  SCR— 625  to  spot.  Since  the  fuse 
was  the  only  metal  in  the  mine,  the 
detector  had  to  be  carefully  tuned  and 
the  operator  particularly  alert.  The 
prod  was  a  surer  instrument  than  the 
detector  in  this  work,  but  it  had  to  be 
held  carefully  at  a  thirty-degree  angle 
to  avoid  activating  the  mine.  The  Schu 
charges  were  too  small  to  damage  bull- 
dozers seriously,  but  ordinarily  the  Ger- 
mans placed  these  mines  in  areas  inac- 
cessible to  bulldozers.  However,  Schu 
mines  in  open  fields  or  along  paths 
were  often  interspersed  with  S-mines, 
which  could  be  costly  to  bulldozers  and 
operators.  One  solution  was  to  send 
sheep  or  goats  into  the  minefield  to  hit 
trip  wires  and  detonate  the  mines.^ 

•^  Hist  126th  Engr  C  Bn,  1944-45;  Hist  10th  Engr 
C  Bn.  1944. 

'  Comments,  Warren  E.  Graban,  geologist.  Water- 
ways Experimental  Station,  Vicksburg,  Miss.,  30  Apr 
59. 

^36th  Div  Opns  Rpt,  Jan  44,  an.  14;  Hist  111th 
Engr  C  Bn. 


THE  WINTER  LINE  AND  THE  ANZIO  BEACHHEAD 


183 


The  fact  that  the  SCR— 625s  were  not 
waterproof  continued  to  hmit  their 
usefulness.  They  had  difficulty  finding 
mines  buried  in  snow,  and  any  lengthy 
rain  usually  rendered  them  useless. 
However,  covering  the  detector  with  a 
gas  cape  protected  it  somewhat  against 
rain  and  snow.  The  10th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  (3d  Division)  had  as 
many  as  ninety  detectors  on  hand  at 
one  time,  but  at  times  most  were  unser- 
viceable. Its  use  was  limited  near  the 
front,  because  the  enemy  often  could 
hear  the  detector's  hum,  especially  at 
night  when  much  of  the  work  was  done 
and  when  the  front  lines  were  compara- 
tively quiet. ^ 

The  engineers  tried  out  new  types  of 
detectors  at  various  times.  The  Fifth 
Army  received  the  AN/PRS-  1  (Dinah) 
detector  in  August  1944.  It  was  less  sen- 
sitive than  the  SCR— 625  and  in  a  seven- 
day  test  proved  not  worthwhile.  A  ve- 
hicular detector,  the  AN/VRS-1, 
mounted  in  a  jeep,  was  also  tested  and 
rejected  as  undependable. 

Of  numerous  other  countermine  de- 
vices and  procedures  tried,  a  few  proved 
useful.  The  best  of  these  were  prima- 
cord  ropes  and  cables.  The  48th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  developed  a  sim- 
ple device  for  clearing  antipersonnel 
mines — a  rifle  grenade  that  propelled 
a  length  of  primacord  across  a  mine- 
field. The  exploded  primacord  left  a 
well-defined  path  about  eighteen  inches 
wide,  cutting  nearly  all  taut  trip  wires 
and  sometimes  detonating  Schu  mines. 
In  all  cases  the  engineers  cleared  the 
ground  of  any  growth  or  underbrush 
to  reveal  mines  or  trip  wires. 

On  the  Cisterna  front,  fifteen  miles 
northeast  of  Anzio,  the  16th  Armored 


Engineer  Battalion  used  six  Snakes  to 
advantage  when  the  Allies  broke  out  of 
their  perimeter.  Segments  of  explosive- 
filled  pipe  that  could  be  assembled  into 
lengths  up  to  400  feet,  the  Snakes  threw 
the  enemy  into  momentary  panic  and 
permitted  Combat  Command  A  (CCA), 
1st  Armored  Division  to  advance;  Com- 
bat Command  B,  which  did  not  use  the 
devices  lost  a  number  of  tanks  in  its 
breakout.  In  practice,  the  Snakes  were 
effective  only  over  flat,  heavily  mined 
ground.  They  were  susceptible  to  rain 
and  mud,  slow  to  build,  difficult  to 
transport  and  vulnerable  to  artillery  fire 
and  mine  detonations.'^ 

Other  devices  and  methods  for  find- 
ing and  removing  mines  in  Italy  in- 
cluded aerial  detection — especially  val- 
uable along  the  Garigliano  River  and 
at  Anzio — D— 7  bulldozers  with  rollers, 
bazooka  shells,  bangalore  torpedoes, 
and  grappling  hooks  that  activated  anti- 
personnel mine  trip  wires.  *' 

Bridge  Building  and  Road  Work 

In  the  winter  campaign,  the  steel 
treadway  and  the  Bailey  (fixed  and 
floating)  were  the  tactical  bridges  the 
engineers  used  most,  and  the  Bailey 
proved  the  more  valuable.  In  the  opin- 
ion of  the  Fifth  Army  engineer,  it  was 
"the  most  useful  all-purp)ose  fixed  bridge 
in  existence."  Its  capacity  and  length 
could  be  increased  speedily  by  adding 
trusses  and  piers.  It  could  be  used 
where  other  bridges  could  not,  particu- 
larly over  mountain  streams  where  flash 
floods  quickly  washed  out  other  tempo- 
rary bridges.  There  were  never  enough 


^  Hist  120th  Engr  C  Bn,  31  May-Nov43;  Hist  10th 
Engr  C  Bn,  1944. 


'"  Hist  48th  Engr  C  Bn,  1944-45;  Hist  16th  Armd 
Engr  Bn,  May  44. 

'^  Hist  337th  Engr  C  Bn;  Hist  1 1 1th  Engr  C  Bn,  an. 
14  to  II  Corps  Rpt,  Rapido  Crossing,  Jan -Feb  44. 


184 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Baileys.  An  early  attempt  to  supplement 
the  British  supply  with  Baileys  manu- 
factured in  America  failed.  The  engi- 
neering gauges  sent  from  England  to 
American  factories  were  improperly 
calibrated,  and  the  sections  that  came 
to  Italy  from  the  United  States  were 
incompatible  with  the  British-manufac- 
tured parts  in  use;  bridges  assembled 
from  American  parts  would  not  slide 
as  well  as  the  British  bridges.  Upon  dis- 
covering the  discrepancies,  General 
Bowman  outlawed  the  American  bridge 
sets  in  the  Fifth  Army  area.*^  Tread- 
ways,  both  floating  and  trestle,  were 
almost  as  well  suited  to  Italian  condi- 
tions as  Baileys,  but  the  constant  short- 
age of  Brockway  trucks  needed  to  haul 
them  limited  their  usefulness.  The  tread- 
ways  were  too  narrow  to  accommodate 
large  equipment  carriers  such  as  tank 
transporters  and  heavy  tanks.'' 

The  engineers  of  Fifth  Army  erected 
many  timber  bridges,  usually  as  replace- 
ments for  Baileys  or  treadways.  The 
timber  structures  could  carry  loads  of 
over  seventy  tons.  Made  not  to  stan- 
dard dimensions  but  to  the  needs  of 
the  moment,  they  consisted  ordinarily 
of  a  series  of  steel  or  timber  stringer 
spans  with  piers  of  single  or  double  pile 
bents.  The  acquisition  of  the  Ilva  Steel 
Works  at  Bagnoli,  after  Naples  fell, 
increased  the  use  of  steel  stringers. 
Timber  floor  beams  or  steel  channels 
rested  on  the  stringers  and  supported 
wood  decking  of  two  layers,  the  upper 
laid  diagonally  to  decrease  wear.  From 
the  Ilva  steel  mill  also  came  a  light,  steel- 
riveted  lattice-type  girder,  suitable  for 


semipermanent  bridges,  which  became 
standard  equipment.'^ 

When  Fifth  Army  engineers  had  to 
build  abutments,  they  usually  spiked 
logs  together  to  make  hollow  cribs  and 
then  filled  the  cribs  with  stone.  They 
had  learned  through  experience  that  a 
dirt-fiU  abutment  that  extended  into  the 
channel  restricted  normal  stream  flow, 
which,  in  turn,  scoured  the  abutment. 
Abutments  needed  to  be  well  cribbed, 
and  timber  was  the  best  expedient. 

During  the  winter  campaign  the  engi- 
neers devised  new  methods  and  new 
uses  for  equipment  in  bridge  building. 
The  16th  Armored  Engineer  Battalion 
claimed  credit  for  first  putting  cranes 
on  the  fronts  of  tanks  or  tank-recovery 
vehicles  to  get  various  types  of  treadway 
bridges  across  small  streams  or  dry 
creek  beds;  the  cranes  enabled  engi- 
neers to  install  bridges  under  heavy 
enemy  fire.  When  a  treadway  across  the 
Volturno  at  Dragoni  almost  washed 
away  in  November  1943,  a  company  of 
the  36th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment 
anchored  it  with  half-track  winches.  On 
the  night  of  15  November  the  48th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  used  the 
winches  of  Brockway  trucks  as  hold- 
fasts to  save  another  bridge  at  Dragoni. 
Engineers  saved  time  by  building  Bai- 
leys with  raised  ramps  on  each  end  to 
put  the  bridge  roadway  two  to  three 
feet  above  the  normal  elevation.  They 
could  then  build  a  more  permanent 
bridge  directly  under  the  Bailey  with- 
out closing  the  bridge  to  traffic  and 
could  quickly  lay  the  flooring  and  wear- 
ing surface  of  the  new  bridge  after  they 
removed  the  Bailey.'' 


'"^  Cvoll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Engineers: 
Troops  and  E(fuipment,  pp.  549,  55 1 . 

"  Fifth  Army  History,  Mediterranean,  app.  J;  Hist 
ll()8th  EngrCCip,  1944-45;  Hist  3l7th  Engr  C  Bn, 
Oct- Dec  44. 


'^  Hist  175th  Engr  GS  Rgt,  Feb  42-Oct  45;  AGF 
Bd  Rpt,  NATOUSA,  Second  Orientation  Conf  at  HQ, 
Fifth  Army,  15  Nov  43. 

' '  EngtJieer  History,  Mediterranean,  p.  4 1 ;  (Comments, 
Co!  K.  S.  Anderson  in  Llr,  8  Jiin  59. 


THE  WINTER  LINE  AND  THE  ANZIO  BEACHHEAD 


185 


Bridge  companies  were  in  short  sup- 
ply throughout  the  Italian  campaign, 
and  for  a  time  the  treadway  company 
of  the  16th  Armored  Engineer  Battal- 
ion was  the  only  bridge  company  in  Fifth 
Army.  The  companies  were  needed  not 
only  to  construct,  maintain,  and  dis- 
mantle bridges  but  also  to  carry  bridge 
components.  The  treadway  company  of 
the  16th  served  as  a  bridge  train  from 
the  first  but  could  not  meet  the  de- 
mand. As  a  stop-gap  measure  two  com- 
panies of  the  175th  Engineer  General 
Service  Regiment  were  equipped  with 
enough  trucks  (2  1/2-ton  and  Brock- 
way)  to  form  bridge  trains,  and  later 
two  more  bridge  train  companies  were 
organized  from  the  disbanded  bridge 
train  of  the  16th  Armored  Engineer 
Battalion.  In  addition.  Fifth  Army  from 
time  to  time  employed  bridge  compa- 
nies of  10  Corps  for  bridge  trains.  Ele- 
ments of  the  1554th  Engineer  Heavy 
Ponton  Battalion  and  Companies  A  and 
C  of  the  387th  Engineer  Battalion  (Sep- 
arate) also  served  as  bridge  train  units. 
The  main  problem  all  units  converting 
to  bridge  trains  faced  was  to  find  ex- 
perienced, reliable  drivers  for  their 
trucks. 

Such  was  not  the  case  for  the  85th 
Engineer  Heavy  Ponton  Battalion, 
which  could  unload  its  ponton  equip- 
ment and,  by  carefully  reloading,  han- 
dle Bailey  bridge  components.  One 
company  of  the  85th  could  carry  two 
standard  Baileys,  and  the  ponton  trail- 
ers also  hauled  piling  and  steel  beams 
to  engineer  units  replacing  temporary 
bridging.  One  problem  remained — the 
large,  ungainly  trailers  could  not  tra- 
verse many  Italian  roads. 

Since  the  speed  with  which  wrecked 
bridges  were  rebuilt  or  replaced  often 
determined  the  Fifth  Army's  rate  of 


advance,  much  of  the  bridge  equipment 
had  to  be  kept  on  wheels.  Some  equip- 
ment, such  as  Brockway  trucks,  was 
always  in  short  supply.  In  the  latter  part 
of  October  1943  the  85th  Engineer 
Heavy  Ponton  Battalion  established  a 
bridge  depot  near  Triflisco,  operating 
direcdy  under  the  Fifth  Army  engineer 
and  sending  bridging  to  the  corps  on 
bridge  trains.  It  was  a  tactical  depot, 
with  stocks  kept  to  a  minimum  for  quick 
movement.  The  depot  stocked  fixed 
and  floating  Baileys,  steel  treadways, 
infantry  support  and  heavy  ponton 
bridges,  and  other  stream-crossing 
equipment.  Tactical  Bailey  and  tread- 
way bridges  replaced  with  fixed  brid- 
ges were  returned  to  the  army  bridge 
depot,  where  they  were  reconditioned 
and  put  back  in  stock.  *^ 

In  reconnoitering  for  bridge  sites,  an 
important  engineer  function,  experi- 
enced photo  interpreters,  studying  aer- 
ial photographs  of  the  front  lines,  were 
able  to  save  much  time.  During  the 
stalemate  before  Cassino,  Lt.  Col.  John 
G.  Todd,  chief  of  the  Mapping  and 
Intelligence  Section;  Col.  Harry  O. 
Paxson,  deputy  Fifth  Army  engineer; 
and  Capt.  A.  Colvocoresses  worked  out 
a  plan  to  use  aerial  photos  for  engineer 
reconnaissance.  One  officer  and  one 
enlisted  man  specially  trained  in  photo 
interpretation  remained  at  the  airfield 
where  the  photos  were  processed,  and 
they  could  obtain  copies  of  all  aerial 
photos  taken  in  front  of  the  American 
lines.  Those  covering  the  front  to  a 
depth  of  ten  miles  went  forward  imme- 
diately to  the  Engineer  Section,  Fifth 
Army,  and  there  Captain  Colvocoresses 
recorded  on  a  map  everything  that 
might  help  or  hinder  Fifth  Army's  ad- 


Hist  85th  Engr  Heavy  Ponton  Bn,  Dec  44. 


186 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


vance:  locations,  characteristics,  and 
dimensions  of  all  bridges;  possible  bridge 
or  crossing  sites;  places  along  roads 
where  enemy  demolitions  could  cause 
serious  delays;  locations  of  enemy 
dumps;  and  marshy  ground  that  could 
prohibit  tanks.  This  information  Col- 
vocoresses  sent  to  the  army  G— 3  and 
the  army  engineer's  operations  and 
supply  sections.  Meanwhile,  the  officer 
and  the  enlisted  man  at  the  airfield  did 
the  same  type  of  work  for  the  area 
beyond  the  ten  miles  in  front  of  the 
lines,  though  in  much  less  detail.  As 
another  result  of  the  photo-interpreta- 
tion process,  Colonel  Paxson  repre- 
sented the  Fifth  Army  engineer  on  the 
target  selection  board  for  heavy  artil- 
lery. 

Aerial  photographs  helped  planners 
to  estimate  the  material,  equipment, 
and  troops  needed  for  bridge  work. 
Information  on  blown  bridges  went 
back  to  the  engineer  supply  section  at 
army  headquarters  and  forward  to  the 
frontline  troops,  who  could  prepare  for 
necessary  repairs.  Engineers  could  then 
have  the  bridging  on  hand  when  an 
attack  went  forward.  Aerial  photo- 
graphs were  especially  important  where 
enemy  fire  forestalled  close  ground 
reconnaissance. 

Building  bridges  under  fire  was  diffi- 
cult at  best — sometimes  impossible.  But 
engineers  did  build  bridges  under  with- 
ering fire.  In  December  1943  Company 
H,  36th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment, 
put  a  Bailey  across  a  tributary  of  the 
Volturno,  a  few  miles  to  the  west  of 
Colli  al  Volturno,  and  in  February  1944 
the  109th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion 
bridged  the  Rapido  in  two  hours. 

Some  engineers  built  bridges  at  night 
to  escape  enemy  fire.  Insofar  as  possi- 
ble they  put  material  together  some- 


what to  the  rear  and  brought  forward 
partially  prefabricated  bridges  in  the 
dark.  Others,  trusting  to  Allied  air 
superiority,  preferred  to  build  bridges 
by  daylight  under  the  protection  of 
counterbattery  fire  that  aerial  recon- 
naissance directed.  Another  protective 
device  was  a  dummy  bridge  to  draw 
fire  away  from  the  real  site.'^ 

Winds  and  floods  caused  havoc.  On 
30  December  a  company  of  the  344th 
Engineer  General  Service  Regiment  was 
building  a  Bailey  across  the  Volturno 
near  Raviscanina.  While  the  engineers 
were  putting  concrete  caps  on  the  stone 
piers  of  the  demolished  span,  a  high 
wall  of  water  plunged  down  the  river, 
quickly  washing  away  concrete  and 
equipment.  On  the  thirty-first  high 
winds  and  subfreezing  temperatures 
ended  all  work  for  several  days.  The 
gale  ripped  down  company  tents  and 
blew  away,  buried,  or  destroyed  per- 
sonal equipment.'^ 

During  the  winter  campaign  divi- 
sional engineers  worked  rapidly  to  clear 
rubble-clogged  village  streets,  remove 
roadblocks  and  abatis,  and  fill  cratered 
roadways  to  take  one-way  traffic.  Some- 
times they  built  roads  over  demolitions 
instead  of  clearing  them.  On  several 
occasions  they  used  railbeds  cleared  of 
ties  and  rails  as  emergency  roads.  In 
December  1943  the  48th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  built  one  such  road  at  the 
Cassino  front  under  artillery  fire.  The 
battalion  suffered  many  casualties  while 
extending  the  road  for  six  miles  from 
Mignano  to  the  flank  of  Monte  Lungo 
and  on  to  a  point  200  yards  in  advance 
of  infantry  outposts. 


"  Hist  334th  Engr  C  Bn,  21  Sep-31  Oct  43;  Hist 
109th  Engr  C  Bn,  21  Sep-31  Oct  43. 

'«  Hist  344th  Engr  GS  Rgt,  1942-45. 

'^  Hists,  344th  Engr  GS  Rgt  and  1 108th  Engr  C  Gp, 
1944-45. 


THE  WINTER  LINE  AND  THE  ANZIO  BEACHHEAD 


187 


Corps  engineers  normally  followed 
divisional  engineers  to  widen  one-lane 
roads  and  bypasses  for  a  freer  flow  of 
traffic,  finish  clearing  rubble,  remove 
debris  from  road  shoulders,  eliminate 
one-way  bottlenecks,  check  each  side  of 
the  road  for  mines,  post  caution  and 
directional  signs,  and  open  lateral  roads. 
Fifth  Army  engineers  finished  filling 
craters  and  resurfaced  and  widened 
roads  to  take  two-way  traffic. 

The  policy  was  for  divisional  engi- 
neers to  concentrate  on  the  immediate 
front;  they  could  ask  corps  engineers 
to  take  over  any  other  necessary  work 
in  the  division  area.  Similarly,  as  corps 
engineers  took  over  work  in  the  divi- 
sional areas  they  could  ask  army  engi- 
neers to  take  over  work  in  the  corps 
areas.  These  requests  were  never  turned 
down,  although  there  were  some  com- 
plaints of  work  unfinished  in  the  army 
area.  The  system  worked  better  than 
retaining  specified  boundaries  and  con- 
tinually shifting  engineer  units  among 
division,  corps,  and  army  as  the  work 
load  varied. 

Much  road  repair  and  construction — 
especially  that  undertaken  by  division 
and  corps  engineers — was  done  under 
heavy  enemy  artillery,  mortar,  and  small- 
arms  fire.  At  times,  engineer  troops 
had  to  slow  or  even  stop  work  because 
of  enemy  fire  or  had  to  abandon  one 
route  for  another.  Such  experiences 
gave  rise  to  engineer  complaints  of  lack 
of  infantry  support,  and  frequently  the 
engineers  provided  their  own  protec- 
tion, especially  for  dozer  operators. 
Avoiding  enemy  fire  by  working  at 
night  had  serious  drawbacks,  especially 
in  the  mountains.  Only  the  most  skilled 
graders  and  dozer  operators  could  feel 
their  way  in  the  dark.  Also,  the  noise  of 
the  equipment  often  drew  enemy  fire, 


even  through  the  smoke  screens  that 
provided  protection.  The  engineers  set 
smoke  screens  for  themselves,  with 
varying  success,  and  on  numerous  occa- 
sions Chemical  Warfare  Service  units 
furnished  excellent  screens. 

The  engineers  had  to  contend  not 
only  with  the  enemy  but  also  with  heavy 
snows,  mountain  streams  that  rains 
turned  into  raging  torrents,  water  pour- 
ing into  drainage  ditches  from  innu- 
merable gullies  and  gorges,  and  tons  of 
mud  clogging  ditches  and  covering 
road  surfaces.  At  times,  engineers 
worked  waist  deep  in  mud.  Army  vehi- 
cles hauled  huge  quantities  from  side 
roads  and  bivouacs.  The  only  answer 
was  "rock,  plenty  of  rock."^^ 

For  proper  drainage  crushed  rock  or 
gravel,  or  both,  had  to  cover  the  whole 
surface  of  a  road,  and  the  crown  had  to 
be  maintained.  When  engineer  units 
assumed  responsibility  for  a  new  area 
one  of  the  first  things  they  did  was  to 
find  a  ready  and  reliable  source  of  rock 
and  gravel.  In  most  parts  of  Italy  sup- 
plies were  plentiful.  Rubble  from  dem- 
olished stone  houses — even  Carrara 
marble  quarried  from  the  mountain- 
sides— supplemented  rock. 

Quarries  sometimes  operated  day 
and  night.  In  December  1943  a  235th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  quarry  on 
Highway  6  east  of  Cassino  worked  twen- 
ty-two hours  a  day,  lit  at  night  by  giant 
torches  "after  the  fashion  of  a  Roman 
festival  in  Caesar's  time,"  though  "the 
torcljes  attracted  a  not  inconsiderable 
amount  of  attention  from  German 
planes  and  artillery."^'  The  engineers 
dumped  and  roughly  spread  rock;  then 
Italian  laborers  used  sledges  or  small 


'  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  p.  43. 
Ibid. 


188 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


portable  rock  crushers  to  break  up  the 
larger  stones. 

Engineers  drained  water  from  the 
wide  shoulders  along  secondary  roads 
by  digging  ditches  across  the  shoulders 
at  intervals  or  by  using  various  types  of 
culverts.  Steel  pipe  culverts  of  twelve- 
inch  diameter  worked  effectively,  and 
the  engineers  had  little  difficulty  find- 
ing local  pipe  for  them.  Curved  sheets 
of  corrugated  iron  made  excellent  forms 
for  masonry  culverts.  During  the  fight- 
ing at  the  Winter  Line,  Lt.  Col.  Frank 
J.  Polich  of  the  235th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  designed  a  prefabricated 
hexagonal  culvert.  Sixteen  feet  long 
with  two-foot  sides  and  steel  reinforce- 
ments, it  was  intended  for  emergency 
jobs  but  proved  so  successful  that  Fifth 
Army  adopted  it  as  a  standard  engi- 
neer item.  The  culvert  could  be  thrown 
into  gaps  in  the  road  at  the  site  of  a 
blown  bridge,  over  a  bomb  crater,  or  at 
assault  stream  crossings  to  make  a  pass- 
able one-way  road.  The  culvert  sus- 
tained the  weight  of  32-ton  medium 
tanks  without  any  earth  covering  yet 
could  be  loaded  and  transported  com- 
paratively easily;  it  weighed  two  to  three 
thousand  pounds  depending  upon  the 
kind  of  wood  used  in  its  construction. 
Other  engineer  units  built  similar  cul- 
verts of  varying  lengths.'^"* 

Of  the  roads  leading  forward  to  the 
area  of  the  Winter  Line  campaign,  only 
three  were  first-class:  Highways  7,  6, 
and  85.  As  a  result,  Fifth  Army  had  to 
depend  on  unsurfaced  secondary  roads 
and  on  tracks  and  trails.  While  the 
engineers'  main  problem  during  this 
period  was  maintenance  (the  VI  Corps 
engineer,  for  instance,  reported  that  the 


36th  and  39th  Engineer  Combat  Regi- 
ments devoted  almost  all  their  time  in 
December  to  revetments  and  drainage 
control),  they  built  numerous  jeep  and 
foot  trails  through  the  mountains  to 
supplement  the  inadequate  road  sys- 


tem. 


24 


A  very  large  part  of  VI  Corps'  traffic 
passed  through  Venafro,  a  bottleneck 
through  which  an  average  of  4,000 
vehicles  moved  every  day  during  De- 
cember 1943.  To  lighten  the  load  on 
Highway  85  and  a  narrow  road  to  Poz- 
zilli,  the  120th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion, 45th  Division,  built  two  addi- 
tional roads  from  Venafro  to  Pozzilli. 
The  engineers  eventually  extended  these 
roads  beyond  Pozzilli  well  into  the  moun- 
tains, where  mules  or  men  with  pack- 
boards  had  to  take  over.^^ 

Engineers  in  Combat 

In  the  midst  of  helping  combat  troops 
move  over  difficult  terrain  in  winter 
weather,  engineers  sometimes  fought  as 
infantry  during  the  drive  on  Rome.  Per- 
haps the  most  spectacular  instance  was 
the  commitment  of  II  Corps'  48th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  at  Monte  Por- 
chia  during  the  first  week  of  January 
1944. 

Although  Monte  Porchia  was  not  a 
primary  objective  for  II  Corps,  it  was 
needed  to  protect  10  Corps'  right  flank 
in  a  projected  operation  to  cross  the 
Garigliano.  A  small  elevation  compared 
with  the  mountainous  terrain  generally 
typical  of  central  Italy,  Monte  Por- 
chia's  isolated  position  commanded  low 
ground  lying  between  the  Monte  Mag- 
giore— Camino  hill  mass  to  the  south 


2'-^  Ltr.  Col  William  P.  Jones,  Jr.,  1  Jun  59 
^■^  HQ,  34th  Inf  Div,  Lessons  Learned  in  Combat, 
1944. 


"^''  Fifth  Army  History,  vol.  Ill,  p.  4. 

^^  Hist  120th  Engr  C  Bn,  31  May- Nov  43. 


THE  WINTER  LINE  AND  THE  ANZIO  BEACHHEAD 


189 


En(;ineer  Rock  Quarry  Near  Micnano 


and  Monte  Trocchio  to  the  northwest. 
From  this  observation  point  the  enemy 
could  survey  the  AlHed  line  along  the 
Garigliano.  The  British  10  Corps  held 
the  Allied  left,  while  the  U.S.  34th  Divi- 
sion was  in  the  mountains  to  the  right. 
In  the  center,  astride  the  only  two  roads 
into  Cassino,  the  U.S.  1st  Armored  Divi- 
sion had  massed  Task  Force  Allen  and 
its  attached  units.  Enemy  observation 
posts  on  Monte  Porchia  were  able  to 
direct  punishing  fire  on  all  Allied  instal- 
lations in  the  valley.  It  was  vitally  impor- 
tant to  take  this  hill,  and  at  1930  on  4 
January  the  attack  began. 

The  weather  was  cold,  wet,  and  win- 
dy. The  6th  Armored  Infantry  Regi- 
ment led  off,  but  German  mortar  and 


artillery  fire  was  so  concentrated  that 
by  daylight  the  2d  Battalion  of  the  6th 
Armored  was  back  at  its  starting  point. 
More  wind-driven  snow  fell  on  5  Janu- 
ary as  the  48th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion was  attached  to  Task  Force  Allen, 
placed  in  reserve,  and  told  to  be  ready 
to  go  into  the  line.  During  7— 9  January, 
in  three  days  and  two  nights,  when  a 
gap  developed  on  the  left  flank  of  the 
task  force.  Companies  A,  B,  and  C  of 
the  48th  went  forward.  They  helped 
secure  the  flank  and  drive  the  enemy 
off.  For  its  work  in  this  action  the  48th 
received  a  Presidential  Unit  Citation, 
as  did  the  235th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion, which  also  took  part  in  the  en- 
gagement. Individual  awards  to  men 


190 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


of  the  48th  included  3  Distinguished 
Service  Crosses,  21  Silver  Stars,  and  2 
Bronze  Stars.  The  highest  award,  the 
Congressional  Medal  of  Honor,  was 
awarded  posthumously  to  Sgt.  Joseph 
C.  Specker,  Company  C,  for  his  brav- 
ery on  7  January  in  wiping  out  an 
enemy  machine-gun  nest  single  hand- 
edly  despite  severe  wounds.^ 

The  235th  Battalion  was  to  open  and 
maintain  axial  supply  routes  for  Task 
Force  Allen.  The  work  of  the  battalion, 
often  under  heavy  fire,  enabled  armor 
to  move  forward  in  support  of  the 
infantry.  The  235th  also  fought  as  in- 
fantry, twice  driving  the  enemy  from 
strongly  fortified  positions  to  clear 
routes  for  the  armor. ^^ 

At  Cassino:  20— 29  January  1944 

In  mid-January  Fifth  Army  reached 
the  enemy's  Rapido-Garigliano  defens- 
es. The  removal  of  VI  Corps  from  the 
Allied  line  left  II  Corps  as  the  only  U.S. 
Army  corps  on  this  front.  For  the  assault 
against  the  Gustav  Line,  II  Corps  was 
in  the  center,  opposite  the  Germans' 
strong  position  at  Cassino.  Plans  for  the 
attack  called  first  for  the  36th  Division 
to  cross  the  Rapido  south  of  Cassino. 

The  36th  began  the  operation  late 
on  20  January.  The  enemy's  defenses 
were  formidable  and  his  position  very 
strong.  Along  that  part  of  its  course  in 
the  division's  sector  the  Rapido  was  a 
narrow  stream  flowing  swiftly  between 
steep  banks,  in  places  no  more  than 
twenty-five  feet  wide  and  elsewhere 
about  fifty.  The  Sant'  Angelo  bluff  or 
promontory,  from  which  the  enemy 
could  survey  the  immediate  area,  rose 


forty  feet  above  the  river's  west  bank, 
but  there  were  no  comparable  vantage 
p)oints  east  of  the  river.  Between  20  and 
22  January  the  36th  Division  made  two 
attempts  to  establish  a  bridgehead  but 
suffered  a  costly  defeat.  The  36th  then 
went  on  the  defensive  while  the  34th 
Division  between  26  and  29  January 
pushed  across  the  Rapido  north  of  Cas- 
sino and  made  a  slight  but  important 
breach  in  the  Gustav  Line.^^ 

During  these  attacks  engineers  were 
to  clear  mines  at  crossing  sites,  build 
and  maintain  bridges  and  bridge  ap- 
proaches, and  find  and  maintain  tank 
routes.  They  also  were  to  maintain 
roads  and  clear  mines  in  seized  bridge- 
heads. The  36th  Division's  143d  Infan- 
try was  to  attack  south  of  Sant'  Angelo, 
and  its  141st  was  to  cross  north  of  the 
bluff.  The  111th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion,  reinforced  by  two  companies 
of  the  16th  Armored  Engineer  Battal- 
ion, was  to  clear  enemy  mines  before 
the  crossings.  During  the  night  of  19 
January  the  1st  and  2d  Battalions  of 
the  19th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment, 
a  II  Corps  unit,  were  to  spot  footbridge 
equipment  and  assault  boats  for  the 
attack.  The  1st  Battalion,  during  the 
night  of  20  January,  was  to  build  an 
eight-ton  infantry  support  bridge  in  the 
area  of  the  143d  and  the  2d  Battalion  a 
similar  structure  in  the  attack  zone  of 
the  141st.2^ 

The  Gustav  Line  was  heavily  mined, 
with  box  mines  notably  more  numerous. 
At  the  Rapido  the  Fifth  Army  encoun- 
tered a  mine  belt  a  mile  in  length, 
chiefly  of  the  S,  Teller,  and  wooden 
box  types.  German  patrols  interrupted 
mine  clearing,  and  they  crossed  the 


^  History  of  II  Ck)rp8',  Hist  48th  Engr  C  Bn,  7  Ap 
4S-Jun  44;  Hist  1 108th  Engr  C  Gp.  1944-45. 
*'  Hist  235th  Engr  C  Bn,  Jan -Dec  44. 


^F^th  Army  History,  vol.  IV,  pp.  39-48,  57;  Ltr, 
Jones,  1  Jun  59. 

^11  Corps  Rapido  Crossing,  Jan— Feb  44. 


THE  WINTER  LINE  AND  THE  ANZIO  BEACHHEAD 


191 


river  and  emplaced  more  mines  so  that 
markers  indicating  the  safe  passage 
meant  little.  Poor  reconnaissance  re- 
sulted partly  from  the  position  of  the 
infantry  which  was  500  yards  from  the 
river.  When  the  141st  began  to  advance, 
the  lanes  were  difficult  or  impossible  to 
follow  because  of  heavy  fog  or  because 
much  of  the  white  tape  had  been  de- 
stroyed, some  by  German  fire.'^^ 

The  enemy  met  the  several  attempted 
crossings  with  intense  and  continuous 
artillery,  mortar,  and  machine-gun  fire, 
which  destroyed  assault  boats  and  frus- 
trated the  engineers  in  their  attempts 
to  build  floating  footbridges.  The  engi- 
neers had  no  standard  floating  bridge 
equipment  and  had  to  improvise  all 
footbridges  over  the  Rapido.  In  the 
141st  Infantry  zone  artillery  fire  tore 
to  shreds  several  footbridges  made  from 
sections  of  catwalk  placed  over  pneu- 
matic boats,  while  floating  mines  de- 
stroyed another.  Most  of  Companies  A 
and  B  of  the  141st  got  across  on  one 
intact  footbridge  that  the  19th  Engi- 
neers had  managed  to  put  together  from 
the  remnants  of  others.  This  bridge, 
although  almost  totally  submerged,  re- 
mained usable  for  a  time  because  the 
engineers  strung  four  ropes  across  the 
Rapido  to  form  a  suspension  cable  that 
supported  the  punctured  boats. ^' 

Dense  fog  hampered  the  whole  oper- 
ation, but  the  1st  Battalion,  19th  En- 
gineers, was  able  to  guide  troops  of  the 
1st  Battalion  of  the  I43d  Infantry 
through  the  minefields.  By  0500  on  2 1 
January,  the  19th  Engineers  had  in- 
stalled two  footbridges  in  the  143d's 
area  south  of  Sant'  Angelo,  but  one  was 


"*"  Interv,  Col  J.  O.  Killian,  CO,  19th  Engr  C  Rgt, 
and  Ltr,  Jones,  1  Jun  59. 

■'"  Ltr,  Jones,  1  Jun  59;  Engineer  History,  Mediter- 
ranean, p.  39. 


soon  destroyed  and  the  other  damaged. 
The  infantry  battalion  nevertheless 
crossed  in  boats  or  over  the  bridges  but 
suffered  heavy  casualties,  and  its  rem- 
nants had  to  return  to  the  east  bank  to 
escape  annihilation.  Fog  confused  troops 
of  the  19th  Engineers  who  led  the  boat 
group  of  the  3d  Battalion  of  the  143d 
Infantry.  The  engineers  and  infantry 
stumbled  into  a  minefield,  where  their 
rubber  boats  were  destroyed.  Enemy 
fire  completed  the  disorganization  of 
the  infantry  battalion  and  defeated  its 
attempt  to  make  a  crossing. 

During  the  36th  Division's  second 
attempt  to  break  through  the  enemy 
line  the  19th  Engineers  succeeded  in 
installing  several  footbridges,  but  the 
16th  Armored  Engineer  Battalion,  in 
the  face  of  artillery  and  mortar  fire, 
could  make  no  headway  with  the  instal- 
lation of  a  Bailey.  The  action  ended  in 
defeat.^^ 

Reviewing  the  failure  to  build  the 
Rapido  bridges  as  planned.  Colonel 
Bowman  pointed  out  that  the  near 
shore  of  the  river  was  never  entirely 
under  Fifth  Army  control,  so  reconnais- 
sance, mine  clearance,  and  approach 
preparation  were  incomplete.  He  con- 
cluded that  the  attempt  to  build  and 
use  a  Bailey  as  an  assault  bridge  was 
unjustified.  Some  engineer  officers  on 
the  scene  blamed  a  shortage  in  bridge 
equipment,  bad  timing,  and  one  infan- 
try regiment's  lack  of  training  with  the 
engineers  supporting  it.  Others  claimed 
that  the  terrible  raking  fire  from  well- 
placed  artillery  and  small  arms  directly 
on  the  sites  made  bridge  construction 
all  but  impossible. 

The  success  of  the  34th  Division's 
Rapido  crossing  north  of  Cassino  de- 


'  Fifth  Army  History,  vol.  IV,  p.  45:  Killian  interv. 


192 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


pended  gready  on  getdng  tanks  over 
narrow  muddy  roads  and  then  across 
the  river.  The  crossing  itself  was  less  a 
problem  than  that  to  the  south  because 
terrain  and  other  factors  were  more 
favorable.  The  Germans  had  diverted 
the  Rapido  and  flooded  the  small  valley; 
now  the  American  engineers  prepared 
the  dry  riverbed  for  a  tank  crossing. 
On  the  morning  of  27  January,  after 
artillery  preparation,  tanks  of  the  756th 
Tank  Battalion  led  the  attack.  Some  of 
them  slipped  off  the  flooded  trail  and 
others  stuck  in  the  mud,  but  a  few  got 
across  the  river. "^^ 

Engineers  of  the  1108th  Engineer 
Combat  Group  and  two  companies  of 
the  16th  Armored  Engineer  Battalion 
started  building  a  corduroy  route  south 
of  the  tank  trail.  On  that  day  and  the 
twenty-eighth  the  infantry  was  able  to 
hold  some  ground  west  of  the  Rapido. 
Meanwhile,  the  engineers  worked  to 
improve  the  tank  routes.  The  attack 
against  enemy  strongpoints  resumed  on 
the  morning  of  the  twenty-ninth.  By 
that  time  the  engineers  had  tank  routes 
ready  for  the  advance,  and  the  infantry, 
aided  by  armor,  captured  two  strong- 
points  on  30  January.  Next  day  the 
infantrymen  took  Cairo  village,  head- 
quarters of  an  enemy  regiment.  After 
the  34th  Division  had  broken  through 
the  enemy's  outpost  line  and  occupied 
a  hill  mass  north  of  Cassino,  the  109th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  improved 
a  main  supply  route  by  constructing  two 
one-way  roads  that  led  across  the  Rapido 
from  San  Pietro  to  Cairo. ^"^ 

Anzio 
To  the  north,  the  landing  at  Anzio 


(Shingle)  was  under  way.  Planning  and 
training  were  compressed  into  little 
more  than  two  months.  In  mid-Novem- 
ber 1943  a  planning  group  with  three 
engineer  representatives  assembled  at 
Fifth  Army  headquarters  in  Caserta. 
Here  Colonel  Bowman,  having  reviewed 
the  findings  of  engineer  aerial  photo 
interpreters  and  having  studied  harbors 
from  Gaeta  to  Civitavecchia,  recom- 
mended Anzio  for  the  projected  land- 
ing of  an  Allied  flanking  force.  Col. 
Harry  O.  Paxson,  the  Fifth  Army  Engi- 
neer Section's  expert  on  evaluating 
topographic  intelligence,  also  had  a  part 
in  choosing  Anzio.  As  General  Eisen- 
hower's topographic  intelligence  offi- 
cer at  AFHQ  in  1942  he  had  learned 
from  the  British  a  method  of  analyzing 
offshore  terrain  that  enabled  him  and 
others  to  find  an  opening  in  the  sub- 
merged sandbars  off  the  coast  at  Anzio. 

AFHQ  based  the  final  decision  to 
land  at  Anzio  on  the  existence  of  suit- 
able beach  exits  and  good  roads  lead- 
ing twenty  miles  to  the  Alban  Hills,  a 
mountain  mass  rising  across  the  ap- 
proaches from  the  south  to  Rome  and 
affording  access  to  the  upper  end  of 
the  Liri  valley.  Here  was  a  possibility  of 
cutting  off  German  forces  concentrated 
on  the  Cassino  front.  At  the  very  least, 
AFHQ  hoped  that  a  flanking  opera- 
tion at  this  point,  as  part  of  a  great 
pincer  movement,  would  force  an  enemy 
withdrawal  northward  and  that  Rome 
would  fall  quickly  into  Allied  hands. ^' 

Beginning  on  4  January  near  Naples, 
VI  Corps  underwent  intensive  amphibi- 
ous training  which  culminated  in  a 
practice  landing  below  Salerno.  Early 
on  21  January  over  250  ships  carrying 
nearly  50,000  men  moved  out  of  Naples. 


"  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  p.  45. 
''Ibid,  pp.  45-46. 


'  *  Interv,  C>ol  Harry  O.  Paxson,  May  59;  Fifth  Army 
History,  vol.  IV,  pp.  21,  85. 


THE  WINTER  LINE  AND  THE  ANZIO  BEACHHEAD 


193 


To  keep  the  enemy  from  suspecting  its 
destination  and  to  avoid  minefields,  the 
convoy  veered  to  the  south  on  a  wide 
sweep  around  Capri.  After  dark  it  turned 
toward  Anzio  and  dropped  anchor  just 
past  midnight.  The  enemy  was  caught 
almost  completely  off  guard,  and  the 
Allies  met  only  token  coast  defenses. 
The  Germans  had  been  aware  of  Anzio's 
possibilities  as  a  landing  beach  but  had 
weakened  defenses  there  in  order  to 
hold  the  Cassino  front. ^^ 

Good  weather  and  a  calm  sea  favor- 
ed the  operation.  The  landings  began 
promptly  at  H-hour,  0200,  22  January, 
and  went  rapidly  and  efficiently.  (Map 
9)  U.S.  troops  (X-Ray  Force)  went  ashore 
over  beaches  south  of  Nettuno,  a  few 
miles  southeast  of  Anzio,  and  over  Yel- 
low Beach,  near  Anzio.  The  port  fell 
quickly.  Meanwhile,  the  British  (Peter 
Force)  landed  six  miles  north  of  Anzio. 
The  smoothness  and  dispatch  that 
marked  the  U.S.  3d  Division  landing 
and  the  rapid  organization  of  the 
beaches  was  helped  by  the  540th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Regiment's  experience  in 
beach  operations.  By  daylight  the 
beaches  were  ready  to  receive  vehicles. 
In  addition  to  the  540th,  beach  troops 
included  the  1st  Naval  Beach  Battalion, 
the  36th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment 
at  the  port,  and  the  British  3d  Beach 
Group  on  the  Peter  beaches.  All  were 
under  Col.  William  N.  Thomas,  Jr.,  VI 
Corps  engineer. ^^ 

All  assault  troops  from  LCVPs  and 
LCFs  debarked  on  the  beaches  on  sched- 
ule. The  port  of  Anzio  was  taken  almost 
intact,  and  by  early  afternoon  the  36th 
Engineers  had  cleared  it  sufficiently  to 
receive  landing  craft.  Except  for  a  brief 


period  on  D-day,  the  beaches  were 
never  congested.  Excellent  1:10,000 
scale  beach  maps,  distributed  at  the 
beachhead  by  the  1710th  Engineer  Map 
Depot  Detachment,  helped  avoid  confu- 
sion. Beach  crews  with  attached  service 
units  reported  direcdy  to  assigned  areas 
and  began  organizing  their  respective 
dumps.  After  midafternoon  American 
supplies  could  move  on  2  1/2-ton  trucks 
or  DUKWs  directly  to  corps  dumps, 
which  were  accessible  to  the  gravel- 
surfaced  roads  inland.  All  beach  dumps 
except  ammunition  were  "sold  out"  or 
moved  to  corps  dumps  inland..  On  D 
plus  1  the  540th  found  the  two  best 
beaching  channels  and  favorable  exit 
roads  and  consolidated  unloading  at 
two  American  beaches.  The  regiment 
eliminated  the  British  Peter  beaches  by 
D  plus  3,  and  British  supply  rolled  in 
over  the  American  beaches  as  well.^^ 

One  obstacle  to  hasty  unloading  was 
shallow  water,  which  made  it  necessary 
to  anchor  the  Liberty  ships  two  miles 
offshore.  Cargoes  therefore  came  in  on 
LCTs  or  DUKWs.  The  average  load  of 
all  LCTs  was  151  long  tons;  of  DUKWs, 
three  tons.  Cargo  from  Liberty  ships 
began  to  reach  the  beaches  on  the  after- 
noon of  D  plus  1,  and  the  VI  Corps 
dumps  (one  mile  beyond  the  beach) 
opened  at  2300  the  same  day.  All  the 
D-day  convoys  of  LCTs  and  LSTs  were 
completely  unloaded  by  0800  on  24 
January,  D  plus  2.  But  even  their  rapid 
discharge  could  not  obviate  the  fact  that 
the  scarce  LSTs  supplying  the  Anzio 
beachhead  had  to  remain  on  the  scene 
until  spring,  long  past  the  time  allotted. 
Their  continued  stay  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean to  serve  shcdlow-water  jxjrts  denied 


^^  Fifth  Army  History,  vol.  IV,  pp.  59-62;  Paxson 
interv. 

^'  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  pp.  85-86. 


***  Hist  36th  Engr  C  Rgt,  1  Jun  41-23  Jun  44; 
Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  p.  100;  Hist  540th  Engr 
C  Rgt,  1942-45;  Paxson  interv. 


Carroceto 


\ 


A 


NETTUNQ) 


Campomorto 


^e    Ferriere 
Conca, 


// 


f/ 


^ 


A 


ANZIO  BEACHHEAD 

22  January  1944 

r^;N|    Initial  beachhead 


3  Miles 

_i 


3  Kilometers 


ANZIO 


Yellow 


}C. 


^A: 


^o^, 


c^ 


Red 

Green^ 


MAP  9 


THE  WINTER  LINE  AND  THE  ANZIO  BEACHHEAD 


195 


them  to  the  BOLERO  planners  in  Eng- 
land, who  were  bent  on  accumulating 
at  least  half  the  assault  shipping  re- 
quired for  the  invasion  of  the  Conti- 
nent by  the  beginning  of  1944.^^ 

The  540th  owed  its  performance  at 
Anzio  to  several  factors.  The  men  of 
the  unit  had  been  able  to  plan  for 
Shingle  at  Caserta  with  the  3d  Division, 
and  they  had  practiced  landings  with 
the  division  and  its  attached  units.  Dur- 
ing 17— 19  January  the  final  exercise, 
WEBFOOT,  involved  the  3d  U.S.  and 
1st  British  Divisions,  a  Ranger  force, 
and  attached  supply  troops.  The  re- 
hearsal was  not  full  scale;  LSTs  did  not 
carry  vehicles  and  LCTs  were  only 
token  loaded,  but  the  assault  units  did 
get  some  training  in  passing  beach 
obstacles,  unloading  personnel  and 
equipment,  combat  firing,  and  general 
orientation.^*^ 

The  540th  had  been  able  to  obtain 
extra  1/4-  and  3/4-ton  trucks,  D-7 
angledozers,  sixteen-  and  six-ton  prime 
movers,  cranes,  mine  detectors,  beach 
markers,  and  lights.  The  D  — 7s  proved 
especially  valuable  on  D  plus  1  in  pull- 
ing out  100  vehicles  mired  down  in  the 
dewaterproofing  area.  Compared  with 
previous  landings,  the  540th  Engineers 
had  a  better  system  of  recording  the 
numbers  of  vehicles  and  personnel  and 
quantities  of  supplies  by  class.  These 
advantages  helped  to  nullify  mistakes 
in  planning  and  deficiencies  in  training. 
Not  until  the  540th  was  about  to  leave 
Naples  for  Anzio  did  its  attached  units 


■^^  Joseph  Bykofsky  and  Harold  Larson,  The  Trans- 
portation Corps:  Operations  Overseas,  United  States  Army 
in  World  War  II  (Washington,  1957),  p.  58;  Coakley 
and  Leighton,  Global  Logistics  and  Strategy,  1943-45, 
p.  233. 

^"  Mark  W.  Clark,  Calculated  Risk  (New  York:  Harper 
and  Brothers,  1950),  pp.  268-69. 


report — after  loading  plans  were  com- 
plete. Since  the  540th  had  to  plan  for 
the  embarkation  on  the  basis  of  TOEs 
rather  than  actual  unit  strengths,  it  was 
difficult  to  load  units  properly.  The 
loading  plan  was  faulty  in  that  beach 
groups  went  aboard  by  units  instead  of 
by  teams."** 

Supplies  landed  late  at  the  port  of 
Anzio  on  D-day,  when  LSTs  did  not 
enter  from  the  outer  harbor  until  eight 
hours  after  naval  units  had  signaled 
that  the  harbor  had  been  swept  for 
mines.  The  Navy  beachmaster  would 
not  take  the  responsibility  of  acting  on 
the  signal,  and  the  deadlock  was  bro- 
ken only  when  two  Army  officers  ap- 
pealed personally  to  Admiral  Hewitt. 

Officers  of  the  540th  Engineers  some- 
times found  working  with  the  British 
easier  than  working  with  the  U.S.  Navy, 
p>ossibly  because  there  were  more  oppor- 
tunities for  friction  with  the  U.S.  Navy. 
Its  responsibility  for  unloading  extend- 
ed to  the  beaches,  whereas  the  Royal 
Navy's  jurisdiction  ended  when  the 
craft  hit  the  beaches.  Teamwork  was 
often  poor  between  floating  and  shore 
U.S.  Navy  echelons.  Furthermore,  the 
commanding  officers  of  the  naval  beach 
battalion  had  been  reluctant  to  train 
and  live  with  the  Army.  The  naval 
beach  group  did  not  have  enough  bull- 
dozers and  needed  Army  help  for  sal- 
vage work.  The  Navy  also  needed  bull- 
dozer spare  parts,  but  these  the  Army 
could  not  provide  because  the  Navy 
used  AUis-Chalmers  bulldozers,  which 
the  Army  did  not  have.^^ 

At  the  beach  the  principal  engineer 
work  was  to  improve  exit  roads  over 
soft,  boggy  clay  soil.  Engineers  had  to 


'"  Hist  540th  Engr  C  Rgt,  1942-45. 
^2  Rpt,  Col  D.  A.  Newcomer,  28  Jun  44,  in  AGF  Bd 
Rpt  162,  NATOUSA. 


196 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


36th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment  Troops  Remove  German  Charges /rom 
buildings  in  Anzio. 


use  corduroy  because  they  did  not  have 
enough  rock,  even  after  taking  as  much 
as  f)ossible  from  the  rubble-strewn  towns 
of  Anzio  and  Nettuno.  They  used  Som- 
merfeld  matting,  which  the  540th  Engi- 
neers modified  for  beach  roads,  to  some 
extent.  They  made  the  rolls  lighter  and 
the  footing  better  by  removing  four  out 
of  every  five  lateral  rods  and  using 
the  extra  rods  as  pickets  to  hold  down 
the  matting.  The  engineers  tried  brush 
on  the  roads,  but  corduroy  proved  the 
best  substitute  for  rock.^^ 


'*^  Notes  on  Landings  in  Of)eration  Shingle,  8  Feb 
44,  in  Hist  1st  ESB,  Jan-Dec  44;  Maj  Gilbert  T. 
Phelps,  Observations  in  Amphibious  Landing,  Anzio, 
in  AGF  Bd  Rpt  120,  NATOUSA;  Hist  540th  Engr  G 
Rgt. 


On  7  February  the  enemy  began  a 
series  of  assaults  that  threatened  to  split 
the  bridgehead  within  a  fortnight.  Engi- 
neers went  into  the  line  as  infantry, 
holding  down  both  extreme  flanks  of 
the  Anzio  enclave,  the  39th  Engineer 
Combat  Regiment  on  the  right  and  the 
36th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment,  a 
corps  unit,  taking  over  the  British  56th 
Infantry  Division's  responsibility  in  a 
sector  about  nine  miles  northwest  of 
Anzio  on  the  extreme  left.  In  the  line 
for  forty-five  days  through  February 
and  March,  the  36th  held  5,600  yards 
of  front  along  the  Moletta  River  with 
2,150  men,  its  reserve  almost  constantly 
employed.  The  engineers  spent  1  1/2 
days  training  mortar  men  and  consider- 


THE  WINTER  LINE  AND  THE  ANZIO  BEACHHEAD 


197 


able  time  afterward  gathering  necessary 
sniper  rifles,  automatic  weapons,  and 
37-  and  57-mm.  antitank  guns.'*'^ 

Though  the  39th  performed  well,  the 
hard-pressed  36th  quickly  showed  its 
inadequate  infantry  training.  Conspicu- 
ous was  its  failure  to  seize  prisoners  dur- 
ing night  patrolling  in  the  early  com- 
mitment to  the  line.  Upon  a  corps  order 
to  send  out  one  patrol  each  night  from 
each  battalion  on  the  front,  the  engi- 
neers blackened  their  faces  and  reversed 
their  clothing  to  camouflage  themselves 
and  left  their  helmets  behind  to  avoid 
making  noise  in  the  shrubbery.  When 
they  sallied  out  into  the  darkness,  how- 
ever, they  lost  two  men  to  the  Germans 
and  captured  no  prisoners  in  return. 
One  observer  remembered  that  the 
men  were  not  "prepared  to  kill"  and 
seemed  afraid  to  flre  their  rifles  in  fear 
of  drawing  the  attention  of  the  whole 
German  Army  to  themselves.  The  reg- 
iment's inexperience  also  showed  in 
casualty  figures,  which  reached  16  per- 
cent. Seventy-four  men  were  killed  in 
action,  336  wounded,  and  277  hospita- 
lized.^^ 

During  the  fighting  at  Anzio  destroy- 
ing bridges  was  more  important  to  the 
engineers  than  building  them.  A  bridge 
VI  Corps  engineers  blew  up  at  Car- 
roceto  on  the  afternoon  of  8  February 
kept  twelve  German  tanks  from  break- 
ing through  to  the  sea.  On  the  tenth  the 
engineers  staved  off  a  possible  German 
breakthrough  by  destroying  a  bridge 
over  Spaccasassi  Creek."* 

When  the  Allies  were  forced  on  the 


^^  Hist  36th  Engr  C  Rgt,  1  Jun  41-23  Jun  44. 

^^  Ibid.;  Rpt,  Newcomer,  28  Jun  44.  in  AGF  Bd  Rpt 
162,  NATOUSA. 

'•*'  Dept  of  the  Army,  Historical  Div,  Anzio  Beachhead, 
(22  January  -25  May  1944),  American  Forces  in  Action 
Series  (Washington,  1947),  pp.  83-84,  97. 


defensive  at  Anzio  the  engineers  laid 
extensive  minefields  for  the  first  time 
in  the  Italian  campaign.  They  planted 
mines  haphazardly  and  made  inaccu- 
rate and  incomplete  records.  They  laid 
many  mines,  both  antipersonnel  and 
antitank,  at  night  in  places  with  no  dis- 
tinct natural  features.  Some  of  this  haste 
and  inefficiency  was  attributed  to  insuf- 
ficiently trained  men,  including  some 
who  were  not  engineers  and  who  were 
not  qualified  for  mine-sowing.  Troops 
disregarded  instructions  15th  Army 
Group  issued  early  in  the  campaign  on 
recording  friendly  minefields.  The  re- 
sult was  a  marked  increase  in  casualties. 

As  the  Anzio  beachhead  stabilized, 
haphazard  methods  became  more  delib- 
erate and  careful.  Fields  were  marked 
and  recorded  before  mines  were  actu- 
ally laid.  After  10  February  VI  Corps 
insisted  that  antipersonnel  mines  be 
placed  in  front  of  protective  wire  and 
that  antitank  mines  be  laid  behind  the 
final  protective  line,  both  in  order  to 
guard  against  night-lifting  by  the  en- 
emy. At  regular  intervals  the  VI  Corps 
engineers  issued  a  map  overlay  num- 
bering and  locating  each  antipersonnel 
and  antitank  minefield  on  the  beach- 
head.'*^ 

No  standard  method  of  planting  mines 
existed,  but  the  system  developed  by 
the  109th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion 
was  representative.  The  battalion  used 
four  men  to  a  row,  with  teams  made  up 
of  a  pacer  who  measured  the  distance, 
a  driver  who  placed  the  mines,  and  two 
armers  who  activated  the  mines.  At 
Anzio  in  April  1944  a  platoon  of  the 
109th  in  one  day  devoted  240  man- 
hours  to  planting  2,444  antitank  mines 


^'  AGF  Bd  Rpt  465,  MTO,  9  Jun  45;  Rpt,  Newcomer, 
28  Jun  44,  in  AGF  Bd  Rpt  162,  NATOUSA. 


198 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Soldier  From  the  39th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment  Assembles  MlAl 
Antitank  Mines  at  Anzio 


and  199  antipersonnel  mines.  A  sepa- 
rate squad  took  ninety-six  man-hours 
to  mark  these  minefields. 

One  of  the  most  serious  mistakes  in 
planting  mines  was  laying  them  too 
close  together.  For  example,  the  39th 
Engineer  Combat  Regiment  laid  a  large 
minefield  that  a  single  mortar  shell 
detonated.  The  experience  of  many 
units  proved  that  a  density  of  1  1/2  anti- 
tank mines  per  yard  of  front  was  the 
optimum  for  regularly  laid  out  fields 
to  avoid  sympathetic  detonation.  The 
engineers  obtained  this  density  by  lay- 
ing several  staggered  rows  of  mines,  an 
approximation  of  the  German  pattern. 
The  AFHQ  engineer  specified  wider 
spacing  for  antipersonnel  mines,  a  rule 


of  thumb  that  established  one  mine  per 
three  to  five  yards  of  front,  assuming 
the  use  of  trip  wires.'*^ 

Once  the  Germans  stopped  trying  to 
eliminate  VI  Corps'  beachhead,  the 
Anzio  front  settled  down  into  stalemate. 
The  39th  Engineers,  with  assistance 
from  the  540th,  then  had  an  opportu- 
nity to  improve  all  roads  within  the 
beachhead.  Good  macadam  roads  ran 
through  the  area  in  wagon-spoke  style, 
and  a  few  smaller  gravel  roads  branched 
off.  Engineers  bulldozed  additional  dirt 
roads  across  the  open  fields,  but  trucks 
using  them  had  to  drop  into  very  low 


^®  Hist  I09th  Engr  C  Bn,  1943-45;  AFHQ  Engr 
Technical  Bull  15,  10  Feb  44. 


THE  WINTER  LINE  AND  THE  ANZIO  BEACHHEAD 


199 


gear  to  plow  through  the  mud.  The 
engineers  maintained  only  about  thirty- 
one  miles  of  road  at  the  beachhead,  but 
constant  enemy  bombing  and  shelling 
compelled  continuous  inspections  and 
surface  repair.  Engineers  built  a  consid- 
erable number  of  bridges  in  the  beach- 
head area;  the  10th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion,  for  instance,  built  2  Baileys, 
9  treadways,  and  19  footbridges. "^^ 

During  the  breakout  from  the  Anzio 
beachhead,  the  34th  Division's  109th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  had  the  task 
of  opening  and  maintaining  roads  to 
the  front  lines,  clearing  lanes  through 
Allied  minefields  up  to  the  front,  and 
opening  gaps  in  Allied  wire  on  the  front 
to  ensure  the  safe  and  uninterrupted 
passage  of  another  infantry  division,  the 
1st  Armored  Division,  and  the  1st  Spe- 
cial Service  Force  through  the  34th 
Division's  sector.  Work  started  during 
the  night  of  14  May;  enemy  observa- 
tion forced  the  engineer  units  to  work 
only  after  dark.  Many  of  the  minefields 
had  been  under  heavy  enemy  fire  from 
small  arms,  machine  guns,  and  artillery. 
The  mines  became  extremely  sensitive 
and  were  likely  to  detonate  under  the 
slightest  pressure.  The  engineers  com- 
pleted most  of  the  mine  clearing  dur- 
ing the  night  of  20  May,  but  they  had 
to  wait  to  remove  wire  and  to  mark  gaps 
which  would  disclose  the  direction  of 
the  corps  attack.  On  the  night  of  22 
May  the  engineers  removed  the  wire 


from  the  gaps  and  marked  each  lane 
with  tracing  tape  and  luminous  mark- 
ers. The  breakout  was  a  complete  suc- 


cess. 


50 


On  31  May  Peninsular  Base  Section 
took  over  the  Anzio  port  after  four 
months  and  twenty-five  days  of  opera- 
tion by  the  540th  Engineer  Combat  Reg- 
iment. Supply  had  been  slow  through 
much  of  February  and  March  because 
of  bad  weather  and  enemy  air  raids. 
The  shallow  offshore  gradients  and  the 
small  beaches  hampered  the  use  of 
regular  cargo  ships  and  coasters.  Such 
vessels  were  excellent  targets  for  Ger- 
man aircraft,  so  shallow-draft  craft  were 
used  as  much  as  possible.  The  whole 
process  of  delivering  supplies  speeded 
up  in  March  with  the  use  of  preloaded 
trucks,  which  discharged  from  the  LSTs 
and  other  vessels  directly  onto  Anzio 
harbor's  seawalls  and  pier  and  moved 
directly  to  the  dumps.  Liberty  ships  car- 
rying supplies  unloaded  onto  LCTs  or 
DUKWs.  In  turn,  the  LCTs  unloaded 
onto  DUKWs  offshore  or  directly  onto 
wharves  in  Anzio  harbor;  the  DUKWs 
went  directly  to  the  dumps.  Between  6 
and  29  February,  73,251  tons  were  dis- 
charged at  Anzio;  between  1  and  31 
March,  158,274  tons.  The  7,828  tons 
that  came  in  on  29  March  made  Anzio 
port  the  "fourth  largest  in  the  world. "^' 


^■'  Hist  39th  Engr  C  Rgt,  Jan -Dec  44;  Hist  10th 
Engr  C  Bn,  1944. 


^^  Hist  109th  Engr  C  Bn,  1943-45. 

^'  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  p.  86;  Bykofsky 
and  Larson,  The  Transportation  Corps:  Operations  Over- 
seas, pp.  223-24. 


CHAPTER  X 


The  Advance  to  the  Alps 


By  the  time  the  Allied  armies  collided 
with  the  German  Winter  Line  defenses 
in  late  1943,  the  American  theater  com- 
mand had  changed  considerably.  In  the 
aftermath  of  the  North  African  inva- 
sion the  need  to  reorganize  had  been 
clear;  the  issue  of  new  command  ar- 
rangements was  a  lively  one  at  the 
American  headquarters,  but  the  de- 
mands of  combat  kept  it  pending  until 
the  downfall  of  Axis  forces  in  Tunisia 
and  Sicily. 

The  chief  defect  still  lay  in  the  over- 
lapping and  sometimes  contradictory 
authorities  in  the  administrative  and 
supply  chain.  A  new  theater  engineer. 
Brig.  Gen.  Dabney  O.  Elliott,  contin- 
ued to  exercise  his  advisory  and  staff 
functions  in  three  separate  com- 
mands—AFHQ;  NATOUSA;  and 
COMZ,  NATOUSA — an  arrangement 
that  bypassed  the  Services  of  Supply 
command.  No  formal  controls  of  the 
engineering  function  existed  between 
SOS,  NATOUSA,  and  the  chief  engi- 
neer of  the  theater  as  they  did  in  Gen- 
eral Lee's  SOS,  ETOUSA,  jurisdiction 
in  the  United  Kingdom.  Maj.  Gen. 
Thomas  B.  Larkin  as  chief  of  the  SOS, 
NATOUSA,  command  had  only  nomi- 
nal control  over  the  base  sections  then 
existing  in  the  theater  and  virtually  no 
say  in  the  flow  of  supply  once  materiel 
moved  out  of  the  bases  for  the  front 
lines.  Larkin's  relationship  with  the 
AFHQ  G— 4  was  unclear  and  in  many 


ways  duplicative  through  the  period  of 

operations  in  North  Africa;  it  improved 

only  after  his  concerted  efforts  to  revise 

the  command  situation  met  with  some 
1 


success. 


Reorganization 


In  March  1943,  one  month  after  the 
formation  of  the  theater.  General  Lar- 
kin began  a  campaign  to  eliminate  the 
anomalies  and  duplications  that  weak- 
ened or  destroyed  his  effectiveness  as 
supposed  chief  of  all  American  supply 
operations  in  the  theater.  He  made 
small  headway  against  the  resistance  of 
the  staff  officers  at  NATOUSA  and 
AFHQ  who  insisted  upon  retaining 
their  acquired  authority,  citing  in  their 
own  behalf  the  dangers  of  repeating 
the  bitter  disputes  over  the  SOS,  ETO- 
USA, empire  under  General  Lee.  In 
hopes  of  reducing  the  manpower  drains 
in  theater-level  headquarters,  the  War 
Department  sent  an  Inspector  General's 
survey  team  to  North  Africa  and  to 
England  in  late  spring  1943.  The  team's 
report,  in  effect,  recommended  a  50 
percent  reduction  in  the  number  of 
overhead  personnel  in  the  theater  staffs 
in  NATOUSA,  a  solid  impetus  for  reor- 
ganization and  economy  in  manpower. 


'  See  ch.  V.  This  section  is  based  upon  Meyer,  The 
Strategy  and  Logistical  History:  MTO,  ch.  VII,  except 
as  otherwise  noted.  General  Elliott  was  succeeded  as 
theater  engineer  on  1  September  1944  by  Maj.  Gen. 
David  J.  McCoach,  Jr. 


THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  ALPS 


201 


Various  plans  originating  at  AFHQ 
and  NATOUSA  undertook  to  eliminate 
the  command  discrepancies  and  to  re- 
duce the  manpower  surpluses  in  head- 
quarters' staffs.  Their  authors  usually 
proceeded  on  the  assumption  that  vast 
changes  were  necessary  in  any  staff  ele- 
ment but  their  own.  After  a  summer 
and  fall  of  conflicting  suggestions  in 
1943,  the  SOS,  NATOUSA,  command 
had  no  increased  authority  to  deal  with 
its  increased  responsibilities,  which  now 
spanned  the  Mediterranean  and  ex- 
tended to  a  new  base  section  in  Italy. 
Headquarters,  NATOUSA,  insisted 
upon  the  continued  control  of  person- 
nel in  the  base  sections,  denying  to 
Larkin  efficient  use  of  manpower  and 
timely  use  of  specialty  units  when  he 
needed  them. 

The  arrival  of  a  new  theater  com- 
mander broke  the  impasse  and  pre- 
saged the  decline  of  Headquarters, 
NATOUSA,  and  the  disappearance  of 
COMZ,  NATOUSA,  in  early  1944.  On 
31  December  1943,  Lt.  Gen.  Jacob  L. 
Devers  relieved  General  Eisenhower, 
who  returned  to  ETOUSA.  When  De- 
vers arrived  in  North  Africa  on  8  Janu- 
ary 1944,  the  War  Department  had 
imposed  a  deadline  of  1  March  for  the 
revision  of  the  NATOUSA  command 
structure.  Devers'  arrival  also  roughly 
coincided  with  another  exchange  be- 
tween SOS,  NATOUSA,  and  Head- 
quarters, NATOUSA,  about  more  men 
for  the  burgeoning  supply  responsibili- 
ties in  the  theater.  Within  a  week  in 
late  January  General  Larkin  received 
two  contradictory  orders  from  NATO- 
USA.  The  first  instructed  him  to  tap 
the  existing  base  sections  for  man- 
power, a  course  he  was  reluctant  to  take 
since  it  would  rob  already  shorthanded 
organizations  in  his  nominal  chain  of 


command;  the  second  canceled  the 
authority  to  secure  manpower  from 
even  that  source  and  removed  man- 
power allocations  authority  for  base  sec- 
tions entirely  to  the  NATOUSA  level. 

On  14  February  Devers  called  the  con- 
ference that  restructured  the  theaters. 
(Chart  2)  His  NATOUSA  General  Or- 
der Number  12,  effective  24  February, 
transferred  all  duties  and  responsibili- 
ties of  COMZ,  NATOUSA,  originally 
set  up  only  as  a  rationale  to  support  the 
position  of  deputy  theater  commander, 
to  SOS,  NATOUSA.  In  the  month  after 
the  meeting  the  NATOUSA  staff  took 
much  of  the  theater  reduction  in  man- 
power.^ While  the  staff  did  not  disap- 
pear altogether,  its  functions  became 
almost  entirely  identified  with  the 
American  side  of  AFHQ.  Headquarters, 
NATOUSA,  concerned  itself  with  mat- 
ters of  broad  policy  at  the  theater  level, 
and  General  Larkin  formally  assumed 
command  of  all  base  sections  in  the  the- 
ater and  the  service  and  supply  func- 
tions between  them  and  the  combat 
zones. 

Consistent  with  this  general  transfer 
and  with  a  subsequent  NATOUSA  staff 
memorandum,  the  AFHQ-NATOUSA 
engineer  retained  only  policy  and  plan- 
ning responsibility.  He  could  initiate 
broad  directives,  recommend  theater- 
wide  engineer  stock  levels,  write  train- 
ing directives  and  standards,  recom- 
mend troop  allocations  in  the  com- 
munications zone,  maintain  technical 
data  on  Allied  or  enemy  engineer  equip- 
ment or  doctrine,  and  provide  analyses 
of  operations  plans  and  American  engi- 
neer commitments  in  the  theater.  The 


-^  NATOUSA  GO  12,  20  Feb  44;  History  and  Com- 
position of  the  North  African/Mediterranean  Theater 
of  Operations,  12  Sep  42-2  Dec  47,  p.  67. 


-^ 

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THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  ALPS 


203 


broader  engineer  aspects  of  Allied 
military  eovernment  also  fell  within  his 
purview.' 

In  General  Larkin's  SOS,  NATO- 
USA,  executive  agency,  the  SOS  engi- 
neer had  unfettered  jurisdiction  over 
operational  engineer  matters  in  the  the- 
ater COMZ.  He  controlled  engineer 
units  assigned  to  that  command,  gov- 
erned the  issue  of  nonstandard  equip- 
ment to  all  American  engineer  troops, 
ruled  on  all  requests  to  exceed  accom- 
modation scales,  and  handled  all  Amer- 
ican real  estate  questions.  He  also  con- 
trolled the  issue  of  engineer  supply  to 
Allied  forces,  coordinating  with  AFHQ 
only  on  British  requests.  He  was  re- 
sponsible for  taking  general  operational 
directives  emanating  from  AFHQ  and 
preparing  supply  requisitions  and  bills 
of  materials  to  support  stated  theater 
programs  and  policies."* 

When  the  Fifth  Army  Base  Section 
at  Naples  became  the  Peninsular  Base 
Section  (PBS)  on  25  October  1943,  it 
passed  from  Fifth  Army  control  to  the 
still  divided  American  theater  com- 
mand in  North  Africa.  Until  February 
1944  the  base  section  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean came  under  NATOUSA  head- 
quarters for  command  and  administra- 
tion but  answered  to  General  Larkin's 
SOS,  NATOUSA,  organization  for  sup- 
ply. General  Pence's  PBS  command  also 
had  some  responsibilities  to  the  15th 
Army  Group  in  administrative  areas, 
especially  those  affecting  the  Italian 
population. 


'  NATOUSA  Adm  Memo  2,  20  Feb  44;  NATOUSA 
Staff  Memo  14,  21  Mar  44,  app.  B. 

^  NATOUSA  Staff  Memo  14,  21  Mar  44,  app.  B; 
History  of  Allied  Force  Headquarters  and  Headquar- 
ters NATOUSA,  pt.  HI,  Period  of  the  Italian  Cam- 
paign from  the  Winter  Line  to  Rome,  sec.  4,  pp. 
968-73. 


As  Fifth  Army  moved  north,  base  sec- 
tion jurisdiction  grew:  the  army  rear 
boundary  was  always  the  PBS  forward 
boundary.  The  base  section  engineer, 
Col.  Donald  S.  Burns,  submitted  his 
first  consolidated  estimates  for  the  sup- 
ply requirements  of  the  Fifth  Army 
engineers,  the  III  Air  Service  Area 
Command,  and  various  other  branches 
of  the  PBS  Engineer  Service  and  the 
Petroleum  Branch  on  15  October  1943, 
but  the  Fifth  Army  G— 4  continued  to 
prepare  engineer  requisitions  until  De- 
cember, when  the  responsibility  shifted 
entirely  to  PBS  for  Fifth  Army  and  base 
section  engineer  supply.  Requisitions 
then  went  directly  from  PBS  to  SOS, 
NATOUSA,  and  its  successor  com- 
mand, designated  Communications 
Zone,  NATOUSA,  on  1  October  1944. 
Exactly  one  month  later  the  theater 
command  changed  from  NATOUSA 
to  Mediterranean  Theater  of  Opera- 
tions (MTOUSA).  On  20  November  the 
COMZ  structure  was  eliminated  and  its 
functions  passed  to  the  G— 4  and  the 
special  staff  of  the  MTOUSA  head- 
quarters, which  then  handled  engineer 
requisitions  and  other  supply  for  the 
theater.  (Chart  3)'' 

While  the  theater  reorganization  was 
bringing  order  to  the  higher  echelons 
on  the  American  side  of  AFHQ  and  its 
immediately  subordinate  commands, 
several  important  changes  also  oc- 
curred in  Fifth  Army's  command  and 
administration  of  its  engineers  and 
other  service  troops.  Col.  Frank  O. 
Bowman,  the  Fifth  Army  engineer,  pro- 
moted to  brigadier  general  on  22  Feb- 
ruary, became  convinced  by  early  spring 


^  Ltr,  Brig  Gen  Arthur  W.  Pence,  CG,  PBS,  to  Maj 
Gen  Karl  Truesdell,  CG,  C&GSC,  26  Nov  43,  sub: 
Organization  of  PBS;  Periodic  Rpt,  SOS  NATOUSA, 
G-4,  31  Dec  43. 


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u 


THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  ALPS 


205 


of  1944  of  the  necessity  of  obtaining 
direct  command  of  all  Fifth  Army  engi- 
neer troops.  Other  technical  service 
staff  officers  shared  this  idea,  particu- 
larly General  Clark's  ordnance  officer, 
Col.  Urban  Niblo.^ 

On  26  March  1944,  all  corps  and 
army  engineer  units  were  assigned  to  a 
new  Fifth  Army  Engineer  Command. 
Corps  engineer  units,  however,  re- 
mained attached  to  their  respective 
corps.  Accordingly,  though  General 
Bowman  obtained  administrative  and 
supply  control  over  all  engineer  units 
except  those  organic  to  divisions,  he  did 
not  have  operational  control  over  those 
attached  to  corps.  His  headquarters, 
designated  a  major  command  of  the 
Fifth  Army,  had  an  operational  and 
administrative  status  similar  to  a  gen- 
eral staff  division,  and  he  had  the  au- 
thority he  considered  necessary  to  meet 
his  responsibilities.  He  could  move  ar- 
my engineer  troops  from  point  to  point 
on  his  own  authority  and  could  trans- 
fer Fifth  Army  engineers  from  Ameri- 
can to  British  sectors  and  back.^ 

Below  General  Bowman  in  the  Fifth 
Army  engineer  organization  were  corps 
engineer  sections,  each  with  a  TOE  call- 
ing for  only  six  officers  and  fourteen 
enlisted  men.  Some  attempt  was  made 
to  obtain  approval  for  corps-level  engi- 
neer commands  patterned  after  Gen- 
eral Bowman's,  but  the  corps  com- 
manders preferred  that  the  corps  en- 
gineer remain  a  staff  officer  only.^ 

The  engineer  combat  regiment  was 
the  fnainstay  of  corps-level  engineer 
strength  at  the  start  of  the  Italian  cam- 


paign, but  in  December  1942  War  De- 
partment planning  revised  the  formal 
and  rigid  structure  of  Army  units,  elimi- 
nating the  "type  army"  and  "type  corps" 
conceptions.  The  redivision  of  forces 
that  followed  placed  engineer  units  by 
functions,  under  Army  Ground  Forces 
control  if  they  supported  combat  units 
or  under  Army  Service  Forces  control 
if  they  had  primarily  service  support 
assignments  in  base  sections  or  the  com- 
munications zone.  Engineer  units  were 
frequently  hard  to  classify  since  the  na- 
ture of  their  assignments  and  training 
carried  them  across  the  boundaries 
established  in  Army  Ground  Forces 
Commander  Lt.  Gen.  Lesley  J.  McNair's 
reorganization. 

Further  revision  of  the  unit  classifica- 
tion continued  through  1944;  at  the 
end  of  the  year  only  divisional  engi- 
neers were  listed  as  combat  troops,  with 
nondivisional  engineers  supporting 
fighting  units  being  listed  as  combat 
support.  At  the  same  time  General 
McNair  pushed  for  economies  in  ser- 
vice forces  and  in  staff  overheads  in 
field  commands.  He  strove  to  separate 
nondivisional  service  regiments,  includ- 
ing engineers,  into  their  component 
battalions  and  to  impose  a  group  head- 
quarters capable  of  handling  four  bat- 
talions at  once  in  place  of  the  formal 
and  traditional  regimental  headquar- 
ters in  the  field. ^  The  group  headquar- 
ters had  no  units  assigned  organically 
but  controlled  the  movements  and  work 
assignments  of  each  battalion  as  an 
attached  unit. 

In  the  summer  of  1943,  McNair  out- 
lined his  new  organizational  precepts 


''  Mayo,  The  Ordnance  Department:  On  Beachhead  and 
Battlefront,  pp.  187-89,  218. 

^  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  p.  266. 

^  Hist  1 108th  Engr  C  Gp,  Feb-Oct  44;  Comments, 
Col  L.  B.  Gallagher,  II  Corps  Engr,  May  59. 


■'  WD  Memo  WDGCT  320  ( 1 7  Dec  42)  for  CG,  AGF, 
24  Dec  42,  sub:  Reorgn  of  Units  of  the  Army,  320.2/ 
5816;  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Eng- 
ineers: Troops  and  Equipment,  p.  222. 


206 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


in  a  letter  to  all  training  commands 
under  his  control.  He  recommended 
that  to  manage  troops  engaged  in  com- 
bat the  higher  level  headquarters  divide 
the  administrative  load,  making  the 
corps  solely  a  tactical  headquarters  and 
limiting  field  army  headquarters  to 
overall  tactical  supervision  with  re- 
sponsibility for  supply  and  all  other 
administrative  functions.  The  new  pro- 
gram did  make  for  marked  economies 
in  manpower,  and  at  the  end  of  the 
war  the  revisions  had  contributed  to  far 
more  efficient  combat  units.  But  Gen- 
eral McNair's  innovations  were  not 
received  with  favor  everywhere,  nor 
were  they  applied  consistently.  The 
technical  services,  notably  the  engi- 
neers, had  already  anticipated  some 
aspects  of  the  reform,  but  as  the  dis- 
tance from  Washington  increased  the 
revision  tended  to  become  watered 
down  or  compromised  with  proven 
local  practice. 

Resistance  to  the  group  concept  be- 
gan at  the  top  of  the  Fifth  Army  Engi- 
neer Command  in  Italy.  When  the  War 
Department  authorized  the  establish- 
ment of  group  headquarters  for  all  ser- 
vice units  in  October  1943,  the  rate  of 
conversion  was  left  to  the  theater  com- 
mand. General  Bowman,  with  the  con- 
currence of  General  Elliott,  the  AFHQ 
engineer,  slowed  down  the  adoption  of 
groups,  keeping  "the  correspondence 
about  the  change  bouncing  between 
Italy  and  Washington."  Bowman  be- 
lieved that  the  group  organization  hurt 
morale  because  the  attachment  of  sin- 
gle battalions  to  larger  units  lasted  for 
only  brief  periods.  Some  engineer  regi- 


ments continued  to  operate  as  such 
until  1945.  •' 

Even  after  all  the  combat  engineer 
regiments  had  converted,  arguments 
continued  over  the  value  of  the  change. 
General  Bowman  also  believed  that  the 
various  group  headquarters  added  to 
administrative  overhead  and  reduced 
even  further  the  amount  of  construc- 
tion equipment  available,  thereby  ag- 
gravating an  already  critical  problem. 
The  II  Corps  engineer.  Col.  Leonard 
B.  Gallagher,  held  that  the  group  oper- 
ated less  efficiently  than  the  regiment. 
Lt.  Col.  William  P.  Jones,  Jr.,  com- 
mander of  an  engineer  battalion  at- 
tached to  II  Corps'  1108th  Engineer 
Combat  Group,  contended  that  the 
group  wasted  scarce  trained  engineer 
officers  and  specialists.  There  were, 
however,  strong  defenders  of  group 
organization  who  stressed  the  gain  in 
flexibility  and  pointed  out  that  a  group 
headquarters  could  control  more  bat- 
talions than  could  a  regimental  head- 
quarters. The  1108th  Combat  Group 
in  1945,  for  example,  had  under  it  as 
many  as  seven  units  at  one  time  and 
for  a  period  supported  five  divisions. 
The  quality  of  the  group  or  regimental 
commander  and  the  experience  of  his 
men  were  the  keys  to  the  effectiveness 
of  both  organizations.  In  any  case,  the 
self-contained  battalion  became  a  work- 
able organization.'^ 

The  divisional  engineers  had  both 
staff  and  command  responsibilities. 
Unlike  the  G— 3,  who  thought  mainly 
in  terms  of  objectives,  a  division  engi- 
neer was  largely  concerned  with  such 
matters  as  routes  of  approach,  crossing 
sites,  and  covered  assembly  areas  for 


'"  Ltr,  Lt  Gen  L.J.  McNair  to  Comding  Generals, 
21  Jul  43,  sub:  Orientation  with  Reference  to  Revised 
Organization.  320.2/6031  (R)  (21  Jul  43),  GNGCT. 


"  WDCir256,  16  Oct  43. 
'^  Paxson  comments. 


THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  ALPS 


207 


equipment.  Since  building  and  main- 
taining roads  in  the  division  area  as  well 
as  supporting  three  regimental  combat 
teams  were  necessary,  the  three  compa- 
nies of  each  divisional  engineer  battal- 
ion had  to  be  divided  among  four  mis- 
sions. This  dispersion  made  the  battal- 
ion less  efficient  and  overburdened  the 
men.  Consequently,  from  the  very  be- 
ginning of  the  campaign,  corps  engi- 
neer units  answered  constant  requests 
to  move  forward  into  divisional  areas.  *^ 

General  Bowman  believed  that  those 
in  command  needed  convincing  that 
tactical  boundaries  between  divisions 
and  corps  could  not  apply  to  engineer 
work.  The  division  engineer  could — 
and  did — ask  the  corps  engineer  to  take 
over  work  in  division  areas  that  the  divi- 
sion could  not  do  with  its  own  forces. 
In  fact,  army  engineers  sometimes 
worked  well  into  divisional  sections. 
The  belief  was  quite  common  that  the 
divisional  combat  battalion  was  simply 
too  small  to  do  all  the  work  required  of 
it. 

Throughout  the  long  campaign  the 
engineers  of  Fifth  Army,  especially  those 
in  the  divisions,  resisted  attachment  to 
combat  teams.  In  the  313th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion,  88th  Division,  the 
line  companies  normally  supported  the 
same  infantry  regiment  all  the  time, 
with  the  engineer  company  commander 
becoming  practically  a  member  of  the 
regimental  staff.  The  companies  never 
waited  for  the  engineer  battalion  to 
direct  them  to  perform  their  normal 
mission,  so  infantry  regimental  com- 
manders rarely  insisted  on  having  the 
engineer  companies  attached  to  them. 
But  by  the  end  of  the  war  attachment 
was  rare  in  other  divisions  because  the 


General  Elliott 

infantry  commanders  finally  became 
convinced  that  engineer  support  would 
be  where  they  wanted  it  when  they 
needed  it.'"* 

Most  engineer  officers  favored  a  daily 
support  system  in  the  belief  that  once 
engineer  troops  became  attached  to  a 
forward  echelon  they  could  not  easily 
be  transferred  again.  They  believed  it 
impossible  to  forecast  accurately  the 
amount  of  engineer  work  required  in 
the  areas  that  lay  ahead;  any  specific 
number  of  engineers  attached  would 
be  either  too  large  or  too  small.  Addi- 
tionally, improvised  task  forces  and 


'"''  Comments,  Col  Hugh  K.  Burch,  16  Jun  59. 


'''  Summary  of  Opns,  19th  Engr  C  Rgt  with  II  Corps, 
1944—45;  Bowman  comments;  Comments,  Cole,  25 
Feb  59,  and  Armogida,  27  Apr  59. 


208 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


regimental  combat  teams  in  general  did 
not  have  the  staff  organization  to  con- 
trol engineer  work,  so  lost  motion  and 
confusion  became  common.  The  engi- 
neers also  maintained  that  subordinate 
commanders  retained  engineer  units 
after  their  specific  task  was  done. 

The  nature  of  engineer  tasks  often 
splintered  engineer  units^ — regiments, 
battalions,  and  detachments  alike.  De- 
pot, camouflage,  maintenance,  and 
dump  truck  companies  were  more  sus- 
ceptible than  others.  In  June  1944  the 
I6th  Armored  Engineer  Battalion  came 
together  for  the  first  time  in  more  than 
four  months.  Such  dispersion  inevitably 
affected  performance,  discipline,  and 
morale,  caused  duplication  of  effort, 
and  made  administration  more  diffi- 
cult.'^ 

The  Offensive  Resumed 

When  the  Allied  offensive  resumed 
in  May  1944,  the  main  Fifth  Army  line 
south  of  Anzio  was  to  drive  north  up 
the  coast  to  meet  VI  Corps  troops  break- 
ing out  of  the  static  bridgehead.  North 
of  Anzio,  other  VI  Corps  units  were  to 
strike  for  Rome.  Preparations  for  the 
renewed  offensive  began  in  March  with 
a  shift  of  British  Eighth  Army  units 
westward  to  take  over  the  Cassino  and 
Rapido  fronts,  leaving  in  their  place  a 
garrison  force  on  the  eastern  Italian 
coast.  Thus  relieved,  and  with  replace- 
ments arriving  to  bring  its  divisions  up 
to  strength.  Fifth  Army  consisted  of  the 
American  II  Corps  and  the  French 
Expeditionary  Corps  concentrated  on 


a  thirteen-mile  front  between  the  Ital- 
ian west  coast  and  the  Liri  River,  with 
II  Corps  holding  the  left  flank  of  the 
line.  Two  fresh  but  inexperienced 
American  divisions,  the  85th  and  the 
88th,  would  bear  the  brunt  of  the  drive 
along  Highway  7  to  effect  a  junction 
with  the  forces  at  Anzio,  now  reinforced 
to  a  strength  of  5  1/2  divisions.'^ 

A  devastating  artillery  bombardment 
commencing  at  2300  on  1 1  May  sparked 
the  offensive  on  the  southern  front,  and 
at  dawn  the  Mediterranean  Allied  Air 
Forces  rained  destruction  on  the  enemy 
rear.  The  Anzio  breakout  began  on  23 
May,  and  on  the  twenty-fifth  VI  Corps 
was  advancing  toward  the  Alban  Hills. 
The  same  day,  after  II  Corps  had  driv- 
en sixty  miles  through  the  mountains, 
the  beachhead  and  the  Fifth  Army 
main  line  were  linked  for  the  first  time 
when  men  of  the  48th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion,  II  Corps,  shook  hands 
with  the  engineers  of  the  36th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Regiment,  VI  Corps,  out- 
side the  demolished  village  of  Borgo 
Grappa.  The  linkup  was  part  of  the 
campaign  that  smashed  the  German 
Gustav  Line  and  the  less  formidable  Hit- 
ler Line,  which  the  enemy  had  thrown 
across  the  Liri  valley  and  the  mountain 
ranges  flanking  it. 

The  nature  of  the  terrain  and  the 
scarcity  of  roads  made  the  Fifth  Army's 
offensive  on  the  southern  front  largely 
mountain  warfare,  in  which  the  experi- 
enced French  corps  bore  a  major  share 
of  the  burden.  The  only  good  road 
available  to  Fifth  Army,  Highway  7, 
crossed  the  Garigliano  near  its  mouth 


' ^  Comments,  Armogida,  Bowman,  Cole,  Burch,  and 
Killian;  Hists,  423d  Engr  Dump  Truck  Co,  15  Apr 
42-1  Sep  45,  and  16th  Armd  Engr  Bn,  Jun  44.  Unit 
histories  of  separate,  specialized  engineer  units  bear 
out  these  conclusions. 


'*'  For  tactical  details  see  Ernest  F.  Fisher,  Jr.,  From 
Cassino  to  the  Alps,  United  States  Army  in  World  War 
II  (Washington,  1977),  pp.  29-38;  see  also  Lt.  Col. 
Chester  G.  Starr,  From  Salerno  to  the  Alps:  A  History  of 
the  Fifth  Army  (Washington:  Infantry  Journal  Press, 
1948),  pp.  176-77. 


THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  ALPS 


209 


and  followed  the  coast  to  Formia.  From 
there  it  bent  northwest  and  passed 
through  mountains  to  Itri  and  Fondi, 
then  along  the  coastal  marshes  to  Ter- 
racina,  where  it  turned  again  to  the 
northwest,  proceeding  on  a  level  and 
nearly  straight  course  through  the  Pon- 
tine marshes  to  Cisterna.  Beyond  Cis- 
terna  the  road  led  toward  Rome  by  way 
of  Velletri,  skirting  the  Alban  Hills  to 
the  south. 

Highway  7  lay  at  the  extreme  left  of 
the  line  of  advance,  but  it  was  H  Corps' 
sole  supply  route.  Apart  from  this  high- 
way Fifth  Army  had  the  use  of  two  or 
three  lateral  roads,  a  few  second-  and 
third-class  mountain  roads  in  the  French 
corps'  area,  and  some  mountain  trails. 
Insufficient  as  the  roadnet  was,  it  was 
spared  the  sort  of  destruction  that  the 
enemy  might  have  been  able  to  visit 
upon  it  in  a  less  hasty  withdrawal. 

After  the  breakout  began,  the  engi- 
neers labored  night  and  day  to  open 
the  roads  and  keep  them  in  shape  un- 
der the  heavy  pounding  of  military 
traffic.  At  first  the  engineers'  chief  con- 
cerns were  to  erect  three  additional 
Class  40  bridges  over  the  Garigliano, 
two  for  the  French  and  one  for  H 
Corps;  to  strengthen  to  Class  30  a  bridge 
in  the  French  Expeditionary  Corps 
zone;  and  to  build  several  assault  brid- 
ges for  troops  and  mules.  Then  engi- 
neers began  improving  trails  into  roads 
for  jeeps,  tanks,  and  2  1/2-ton  trucks, 
often  under  artillery  fire.  Starting  about 
the  middle  of  May  the  principal  engi- 
neer work  was  clearing  and  repairing 
Highway  7  and  a  road  leading  across 
the  northern  slopes  of  the  Aurunci 
Mountains  to  Pico  on  lateral  Highway 
82.  (Map  10)^'^ 


The  313th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion, 88th  Division,  undertook  swift  con- 
struction to  outflank  the  Formia  corri- 
dor on  Highway  7.  In  one  day  the  men 
of  this  battalion  opened  a  mountain 
road  that  the  Germans  had  spent  two 
weeks  preparing  for  demolition.  This 
road  connected  with  a  trail  two  miles 
long  that  the  313th  built  in  nine  hours 
over  steep  hills  that  vehicles  had  never 
before  traversed.  A  few  men  working 
angledozers  through  farmland  and  brick 
terraces  and  along  mountain  slopes  did 
the  work.  A  German  engineer  colonel, 
captured  a  few  hours  after  the  batde  and 
evacuated  over  the  road,  was  amazed, 
for  no  road  had  been  there  twenty-four 
hours  earlier.'^ 

At  Itri  on  Highway  7  a  platoon  of 
Company  A  of  the  310th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion,  85th  Division,  built 
a  100-foot  Bailey  and  turned  over  its 
maintenance  to  the  19th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Regiment.  The  235th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion,  a  II  Corps  unit  that 
normally  supported  the  310th,  followed 
up  the  310th's  repair  and  clearance 
work  along  Highway  7.  The  Germans 
had  destroyed  many  bridges  between 
Fondi  and  Terracina,  and  the  Ameri- 
can engineers  had  to  build  bypasses  and 
culverts.  At  a  narrow  pass  between  the 
mountains  and  the  sea  east  of  Terra- 
cina, tank  traps  and  roadblocks,  cov- 
ered by  German  fire  from  nearby  hills, 
slowed  the  advance  along  the  highway. 
When  a  blown  bridge  along  this  stretch 
halted  American  tanks,  armored  bull- 
dozers of  the  235th  and  310th  Engi- 
neer Battalions  and  the  19th  Engineer 
Regiment,  all  under  fire,  built  a  bypass 
that  made  it  possible  to  resume  the 
advance.  Lt.  Col.  Allen  F.  Clark,  Jr., 


'^  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  p.  82;  Fifth  Army 
History,  vol.  V,  pp.  6-8,  98-99. 


'**  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  p.  113;  Comments, 
Armogida,  27  Apr  59. 


'•x^ 


ITALY 

SALERNO  TO   ROME 

Gustav  Line 

0  25  50    Miles 

I 
50    Kilometers 


MAP  10 


THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  ALPS 


211 


commanding  the  235th,  operated  one 
of  the  bulldozers.'^ 

When  the  advance  slowed  at  Terra- 
cina  the  310th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion immediately  started  on  an  alternate 
route  to  connect  the  highway  with  Son- 
nino.  A  road  capable  of  carrying  the 
traffic  of  an  entire  division  had  to  be 
cut  into  the  rocky  slopes  of  the  Ausonia 
Mountains.  The  engineers'  road-build- 
ing machinery  had  done  remarkable 
things  in  the  mountain  chain  during 
the  drive  from  the  Garigliano,  but  this 
job  required  much  hand  work  and  many 
demolitions,  explosives  for  which  had 
to  be  carried  by  hand  up  rugged  moun- 
tain slopes.  The  engineers  had  cut  six 
miles  of  the  new  road,  with  only  one 
mile  left,  when  a  breakthrough  at  Ter- 
racina  made  it  unnecessary  to  finish  the 
alternate  route.  The  work  was  not  en- 
tirely lost,  for  the  road  reduced  the 
need  for  pack  mules  and  made  it  possi- 
ble to  move  division  artillery  farther 
forward  to  interdict  the  road  junction 
at  Sonnino.^^ 

Beyond  Terracina  the  highway  ran 
thirty  miles  straight  through  the  Pon- 
tine marshes  to  Cisterna.  All  the  engi- 
neers available  worked  around  the  clock 
repairing  and  maintaining  three  routes 
through  the  marshy  flats.  The  Germans 
had  attempted  to  flood  much  of  this 
region  but  were  only  partially  success- 
ful; the  water  was  low  in  the  streams 
and  canals.  Nevertheless,  the  engineers 
had  to  do  considerable  filling  along  the 
main  routes  as  well  as  some  bypassing 
and  bridging.  When  Highway  7  and  the 
supplementary  routes  were  open  to  the 
Anzio  beachhead,  troops  and  supplies 


'■*  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  p.  1 10'  Comments, 
Cole  and  Killian. 
^"  Comments,  Armogida,  27  Apr  59. 


came  up  from  the  southern  front  in  an 
uninterrupted  stream.  Fifth  Army's 
momentum  was  so  great  that  after  the 
capture  of  Rome  on  4  June  the  ad- 
vance proceeded  beyond  the  city  with- 
out pause. 

The  Arno 

During  the  summer  advance  to  the 
Arno,  about  150  miles,  the  Fifth  Army 
front  reached  inland  approximately  45 
miles.  Two  main  national  highways  ran 
northward  in  the  army  zone.  Highway 
1  ran  northwest  up  the  coast  through  a 
succession  of  important  towns,  includ- 
ing Civitavecchia  and  Leghorn,  to  Pisa, 
near  the  mouth  of  the  Arno.  For  most 
of  its  length  the  highway  ran  along  a 
comparatively  flat  coastal  plain,  no- 
where more  than  ten  miles  wide,  but 
between  Cecina  and  Leghorn,  Highway 
1  twisted  over  mountains  that  reached 
down  to  the  sea.  The  other  main  road. 
Highway  2,  wound  through  hills,  moun- 
tains, and  river  valleys  along  a  route 
that  led  from  Rome  through  Siena  to 
Florence.  There  were  five  good  two- 
way  lateral  roads  in  the  area  between 
Rome  and  the  Arno;  numerous  smaller 
roads  were,  for  the  most  part,  narrow 
and  unpaved. 

During  the  advance  to  the  Arno  the 
army  had  to  cross  only  two  rivers  of 
any  size,  the  Ombrone  and  the  Cecina, 
both  at  low  water.  The  port  of  Leg- 
horn fell  to  the  34th  Division,  II  Corps, 
on  19  July.  Beyond  Leghorn  lay  numer- 
ous canals,  but  engineers  quickly  brid- 
ged them.  Four  days  later  the  34th  Divi- 
sion reached  Pisa.  The  march  in  the 
dry  summer  weather  took  place  in  clouds 
of  dust  that  drew  artillery  fire  and 
choked  the  troops.  Soldiers  wore  gog- 
gles over  their  eyes  and  handkerchiefs 


212 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


across  their  noses  and  mouths.  Some 
of  the  roads,  surfaces  ground  through 
by  miUtary  traffic,  were  six  to  eight 
inches  deep  in  dust.  Sprinkhng  the 
roads  with  water  was  the  best  way  to  lay 
the  dust,  but  water  tanks  were  so  scarce 
that  only  the  most  important  roads 
could  be  sprinkled.  Sometimes  the  engi- 
neers applied  calcium  chloride,  but  it 
was  also  scarce  and  its  value  question- 
able. Engineers  had  some  success  with 
used  oil,  but  even  that  was  in  short 
supply.'"^' 

During  the  June  and  July  drive  to 
the  Arno  much  of  Fifth  Army's  forces 
departed  to  prepare  for  ANVIL,  the 
invasion  of  southern  France.  The  army 
lost  VI  Corps  and  the  French  Corps. 
That  loss  amounted  to  seven  full  divi- 
sions, and  the  loss  of  separate  combat 
units  amounted  to  another  division. 
The  nondivisional  engineer  units  split- 
ting away  at  that  time  included  the  36th 
and  540th  Engineer  Combat  Regi- 
ments, the  48th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion, and  the  343d  and  344th  Engi- 
neer General  Service  Regiments.  On  1 
June  Fifth  Army's  assigned  strength 
had  been  approximately  250,000;  on  1 
August  it  was  little  more  than  150,000. 
Making  up  the  losses  were  the  Japanese- 
American  442d  Regimental  Combat 
Team  (which  arrived  in  May  but  left 
for  France  in  late  September);  two  new 
and  inexperienced  U.S.  Army  infantry 
divisions,  the  91st  and  92d;  and  the  first 
elements,  about  a  regimental  combat 
team,  of  the  untried  Brazilian  Expedi- 
tionary Force,  which  was  to  grow  to  the 
size  of  a  division.  In  August  General 
Clark  gained  control  over  the  veteran 


^'  Hists,  313th  Engr  C  Bn,  387th  Engr  C  Bn,  1 1th 
Engr  C  Rgt,  1108th  Engr  C  Gp,  and  other  unit 
histories. 


British  13  Corps  consisting  of  four 
divisions. 

From  mid-July  to  mid- August  Fifth 
Army  made  little  forward  progress;  it 
paused  to  rest,  to  build  up  supplies,  and 
to  prepare  for  the  ordeal  ahead.  The 
II  and  IV  Corps  held  the  35-mile  sec- 
tor along  the  Arno,  IV  Corps  occupy- 
ing the  greater  part  of  the  line  while 
the  major  portion  of  II  Corps  was  in 
the  rear  preparing  for  the  coming  of- 
fensive. The  troops  received  special 
instruction  in  river  crossing  and  moun- 
tain warfare.  Engineer  detachments 
gave  instruction  in  handling  footbridges 
and  boats,  in  scaling  steep  banks  with 
grappling  hooks  and  ladders,  and  in 
detecting  and  clearing  mines. 

The  Italian  campaign  resumed  in 
earnest  on  24  August  with  an  Eighth 
Army  attack  on  the  Adriatic  front.  The 
Fifth  Army  crossed  the  Arno  on  1  Sep- 
tember, and  on  9  and  10  September  II 
Corps  launched  an  offensive  north  of 
Florence.  With  13  Corps  beside  it,  II 
Corps  battled  through  the  mountains, 
capturing  strongpoint  after  strong- 
point,  and  on  the  eighteenth  reached 
the  Santerno  valley  by  way  of  II  Giogo 
Pass.  The  88th  Division  outflanked 
Futa  Pass,  key  to  the  enemy's  Gothic 
Line  defenses,  and  on  the  twenty-second 
a  battalion  of  the  91st  Division  secured 
the  pass.  Fifth  Army  had  breached  one 
of  the  strongest  defense  lines  the  enemy 
had  constructed  in  Italy.  The  attack  had 
been  well  timed,  for  the  Germans  had 
diverted  part  of  their  strength  to  the 
Adriatic  front  to  ward  off  an  Eighth 
Army  blow.  With  Futa  Pass  in  the  hands 
of  Fifth  Army  troops,  the  way  was  clear 
to  send  supplies  forward  by  way  of 
Highway  65  and  to  prepare  for  an 
attack  northward  to  Bologna. 

Rain,  mud,  and  many  miles  of  moun- 


THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  ALPS 


213 


The  Rising  Arno  River  Threatens  a  Treadway  Bridge  in  the  1st  Armored 
Division  area,  September  1944. 


tain  terrain  combined  to  aid  the  enemy. 
Highway  65  was  the  only  completely 
paved  road  available  to  II  Corps,  and 
off  that  highway  2  1/2-ton  trucks  mired 
deep  in  mud.  Such  conditions  made  a 
mockery  of  mechanized  warfare.  Mules 
and  men  had  to  carry  food  and  ammu- 
nition to  the  front.  Nevertheless,  II 
Corps  troops  pushed  steadily  on  and 
brought  the  front  to  a  point  two  miles 
from  Bologna  by  mid-October.  By  23 
October  the  forward  troops  were  within 
nine  miles  of  Highway  9  and  could  look 
down  upon  their  objective  in  the  Po 
valley.  But  here  the  fall  offensive  fal- 
tered. Exhaustion  and  heavy  rains  forced 
a  halt,  and  II  Corps  dug  in. 


The  fall  rains  had  given  the  engineers 
an  enormous  task.  In  September  the 
Arno  west  of  Florence  in  IV  Corps' 
zone  flooded  its  banks  and  on  one  occa- 
sion rose  six  to  eight  feet  at  the  rate  of 
eighteen  inches  an  hour.  Late  in  the 
month  the  Serchio  also  overflowed  its 
banks  north  of  Lucca,  at  Lucca  itself,  and 
at  Vecchiano.  So  much  bridge  equip- 
ment was  lost  that  the  IV  Corps  engi- 
neer had  to  divert  engineers  from  bridge 
construction  and  road  work  to  salvage 
operations. ^^  Mountain  streams  that 
had  dwindled  to  a  trickle  in  the  sum- 


'■^^  IV  Corps  Engr  Rpt,  Sep-Oct  44;  Killian  com- 
ments. 


214 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Bailey  Bridge  Construction  over  the 
Arno  near  Florence. 


mer  changed  in  a  few  hours  to  raging 
torrents.  Through  most  of  October  the 
rain  continued  unabated,  becoming  a 
torrential  downpour  by  the  end  of  the 
month.  Cross-country  movement  virtu- 
ally ceased,  and  great  quantities  of  mud 
were  tracked  onto  the  main  roads  from 
secondary  roads  and  bivouac  areas.  Cul- 
verts and  fills  washed  out,  fords  were 
impassable,  and  roads  softened  until 
they  could  not  withstand  heavy  mili- 
tary traffic. 

Engineer  vehicles  and  equipment 
deteriorated  from  constant  hauling 
through  deep  mud  over  very  rough 
roads.  Breakdowns  were  so  numerous 
and  the  supply  of  spare  parts  so  low 
that  at  times  some  engineer  units  had 
to  operate  with  only  half  of  their  or- 
ganic equipment.  Because  divisional 
engineers  had  to  devote  all  their  efforts 


to  supporting  frontline  troops,  corps 
engineers  had  to  maintain  supply  routes 
in  the  divisional  zones. ^"^ 

More  floods  came  in  November,  and 
at  one  time  or  another  during  that 
month  all  the  principal  highways  were 
blocked  with  high  water.  The  39th 
Engineer  Combat  Regiment  reported 
fourteen  major  road  breaks  along  a  six- 
mile  stretch  of  Highway  6  northwest  of 
Florence,  making  necessary  the  con- 
struction of  four  Bailey  and  three  tim- 
ber trestle  bridges.  The  autostrada,  a 
four-lane  superhighway  that  carved  an 
arc  through  the  Arno  valley,  connect- 
ing Florence  with  Pistoia,  Lucca,  and 
the  coastal  road  north  from  Pisa,  was 
covered  for  miles  with  water  as  deep  as 
two  feet.  As  the  campaign  ground  to  a 
halt,  the  whole  Italian  front  settled 
down  into  mud.^"* 

The  Winter  Stalemate 

The  stalemate  continued  throughout 
the  winter  of  1944—45.  To  permit  sup- 
plies to  be  brought  forward,  the  engi- 
neers had  to  work  unceasingly  on  the 
roads.  On  Highway  65 — the  direct  road 
to  Bologna  from  the  south,  the  main 
supply  route  for  the  Fifth  Army's  cen- 
tral sector,  and  the  only  fully  paved 
road  in  the  II  Corps  zone — jeeps,  trucks 
tanks,  and  prime  movers  rolled  along 
almost  without  letup  day  and  night. 
Already  in  bad  condition  and  cut  in 
places  by  the  enemy.  Highway  65  suf- 
fered serious  damage  from  rain,  snow, 
and  the  constant  pounding  of  thou- 
sands of  vehicles,  many  of  them  equip- 
ped with  tire  chains.  Army,  corps,  and 


2'  IV  Corps  Engr  Rpt,  Sep -Oct  44;  Hist  II  Corps 
Engr  Activities,  10  Sep- Nov  44;  Burch  comments. 


"f 


Hist  39th  Engr  C  Rgt,  Jun-Dec  44. 


THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  ALPS 


215 


divisional  engineer  units  had  constandy 
to  maintain  the  whole  length  of  the 
road,  especially  north  of  Futa  Pass, 
where  the  pavement  virtually  disap- 
peared. The  main  inland  supply  route 
for  IV  Corps,  Highway  64,  running 
from  Pistoia  to  Bologna,  carried  less 
traffic  than  Highway  65  and  therefore 
remained  in  somewhat  better  con- 
dition.^''' 

In  preparation  for  winter,  the  engi- 
neers placed  snow  fences  and  stockpiled 
sand.  They  speeded  clearance  after 
snowfalls  to  prevent  ice  formation  and 
during  thaws  to  prevent  drainage  prob- 
lems. Foreseeing  that  the  greatest  dif- 
ficulty with  snow  would  come  in  the 
passes  leading  to  the  Po  valley,  AFHQ 
developed  a  plan  involving  joint  trans- 
portation and  engineer  operations  to 
clear  the  roads.  The  plan  included  con- 
trol posts,  road  patrols,  and  a  special 
communications  system  to  report  con- 
ditions throughout  each  day.  The  Engi- 
neer Section,  Fifth  Army,  prepared  a 
map  that  indicated  the  areas  where 
trouble  could  be  expected,  including 
areas  the  Germans  held.  The  engineer 
and  transportation  units  involved  piled 
sand  along  the  roads  where  the  most 
snow  could  be  expected  and  parked 
snow-removal  equipment  at  strategic 
points  along  the  roads. 

The  plan  worked  in  the  II  Corps 
area,  where  winter  conditions  were  the 
most  severe.  In  addition  to  American 
and  British  troops,  hundreds  of  Ital- 
ians, both  civilian  and  military,  worked 
to  keep  the  roads  open.  Large  rotary 
snowplows  augmented  jeeps,  graders, 
bulldozers,  and  wooden  and  conven- 
tional snowplow  attachments  fitted  to  2 


1/2-  and  4-ton  trucks.  Some  German 
and  Italian  equipment  the  enemy  had 
left  behind  also  proved  useful.  Unfor- 
tunately, the  plan  did  not  develop  suc- 
cessfully all  along  the  front.  IV  Corps 
was  not  able  to  set  up  a  system  compar- 
able to  the  one  II  Corps  employed 
because  IV  Corps  did  not  have  any- 
thing like  the  snow-removal  equipment 
of  II  Corps.  Instead,  IV  Corps  units 
had  to  drop  whatever  they  were  doing 
when  snow  began  to  fall  and  clear  the 
roads  with  whatever  equipment  was 
available.  Only  a  few  roads  in  IV  Corps' 
area  were  seriously  menaced  by  snow, 
however,  and  most  lay  in  the  coastal 
plain.'-^^ 

During  the  fall  and  winter  the  engi- 
neers were  able  to  open  mountain  trails. 
Soft  banks  and  shoulders  gave  way 
readily  before  bulldozers,  which  wid- 
ened roads,  provided  turnouts  on  one- 
lane  sections,  and  improved  sharp  curves 
and  turns.  Huge  quantities  of  rock  were 
required  to  keep  these  roads  open  to  a 
volume  of  traffic  never  before  contem- 
plated. The  19th  Engineers  used  25,000 
cubic  yards  of  rock  to  rebuild  a  10 
1/2-mile  stretch  of  secondary  road  adja- 
cent to  Highway  65  in  the  Idice  valley. 
Keeping  the  improved  trails  open  as 
roads  necessitated  unending  work,  in- 
cluding draining,  graveling,  revetting 
soft  shoulders,  removing  slides,  and 
building  rock  retaining  walls.  The  great- 
est problem  was  drainage  maintenance, 
for  the  mountain  creeks,  gullies,  gorges, 
and  cascades,  when  not  properly  chan- 
neled, poured  floods  upon  the  roads. 
Two  months  of  constant  work  by  thou- 
sands of  civilians  and  soldiers  using 


2^  Hist  185th  Engr  C  Bn,  1944-45;  Killian  com- 
ments; Jones  comments. 


'^•^  Engr  Tech  Bull  28,  28  Feb  45;  Chf  Engr,  15th 
Army  Gp,  Notes  on  Engr  Opns  in  Italy,  no.  26,  Mar 
45;  Hist  39th  Engr  C  Rgt,  1945;  Hist  I75th  Engr  GS 
Rgt,  Feb  42— Oct  45;  Comments,  Bowman  and  Jones. 


216 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


both  hand  labor  and  machinery  not 
only  kept  the  roads  open  but  improved 
them.  In  forward  areas  infantry  units 
took  over  the  maintenance  of  some  of 
the  lateral  roads  leading  to  their  dis- 
persed forces.^^ 

The  first  of  the  units  reorganized 
according  to  the  new  group  concept 
began  operations  in  December  1944. 
To  improve  control  over  miscellaneous 
engineer  units  operating  under  the 
Fifth  Army  engineer,  General  Bowman 
organized  the  1168th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Group,  with  Lt.  Col.  Salvatore  A. 
Armogida  in  command.  The  cadre  for 
the  new  command  came  from  an  anti- 
aircraft headquarters,  and  under  it  were 
such  engineer  units  as  a  map  detach- 
ment, dump  truck  companies,  a  heavy 
equipment  company,  a  maintenance 
company,  a  fire-fighting  detachment,  a 
camouflage  company,  a  topographic 
company,  and  a  water  supply  company. 
Also  attached  were  some  Italian  engi- 
neer battalions  and  a  number  of  other 
units  under  an  Italian  engineer  group. "^^ 

The  Final  Drive 

Exceptionally  mild  weather  begin- 
ning in  mid-February  enabled  engi- 
neers to  make  substantial  progress  in 
repairing  and  rehabilitating  the  road- 
nets  and  improving  and  extending 
bridges.  With  snow  rapidly  receding 
from  the  highlands,  a  company  of  the 
126th  Engineer  Mountain  Battalion, 
organic  to  the  10th  Mountain  Division, 
built  a  1,700-foot  aerial  tramway  over 
Monte  Serrasiccia  (located  18  miles 
northwest  of  Pistoia)  on  19  February. 


'^^  Hists,  1108th  Engr  C  (Jp,  Sep-Dec  44,  and 
1 138th  Engr  C  Gp,  1944-45;  Fifth  Army  History,  vol. 
VIII,  pp.  21-22,  26;  Bowman,  Burch,  and  Cole 
comments. 

'*^"  Bowman  comments. 


Built  at  an  average  slope  of  18  to  20 
degrees,  the  tramway  was  finished  in 
ten  hours  despite  enemy  fire.  Casual- 
ties could  come  down  the  mountain- 
side in  three  minutes  instead  of  six  to 
eight  hours.  The  tramway  hauled  blood 
plasma,  barbed  wire,  emergency  K 
rations,  water,  and  ammunition  up  the 
mountain.  Another  timesaver  the  bat- 
talion contributed  was  a  2,100-foot 
cableway  constructed  on  10  March, 
when  the  10th  Mountain  Division  was 
attacking  over  rugged  terrain.  Sup- 
ported by  two  A-frames  and  built  in  six 
hours,  the  cableway  saved  a  six-mile  trip 
for  ambulances  and  supply  trucks.^"* 

Lt.  Gen.  Lucian  K.  Truscott,  Jr., 
became  commander  of  the  Fifth  Army 
in  December  when  General  Clark 
moved  up  to  command  the  15th  Army 
Group.  Before  the  spring  offensive 
began,  the  Fifth  Army  received  rein- 
forcements of  infantry,  artillery,  and 
reserves.  Its  divisions  were  overstrength 
and  its  morale  high  as  the  troops  looked 
forward  to  a  quick  triumph  over  the 
sagging  enemy.  The  British  13  Corps 
had  returned  to  Eighth  Army,  but  Fifth 
Army's  reinforcements  helped  balance 
that  loss. 

In  April  the  two  Allied  armies,  care- 
fully guarding  the  secrecy  of  the  move- 
ment, went  forward  into  positions  from 
which  they  could  strike  a  sudden,  dev- 
astating blow  against  the  enemy.  The 
Fifth  Army  front  was  nearly  ninety 
miles  long,  reaching  from  the  Ligur- 
ian  Sea  to  Monte  Grande,  ten  miles 
southeast  of  Bologna.  The  IV  Corps 
held  the  left  of  this  line — indeed,  the 
greater  part  of  it — stretching  from  the 
sea  and  through  the  mountains  as  far 
as  the  Reno  River,  a  distance  of  about 
seventy  miles.  The  II  Corps  crowded 


^"  Ltr,  Col  Robert  P.  Boyd,  Jr.,  8  Jun  59. 


THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  ALPS 


217 


General  Bowman 


into  a  twenty-mile  sector,  and  to  its  right 
the  Eighth  Army,  with  four  corps,  ex- 
tended the  line  to  the  Adriatic. 

Formidable  mine  defenses  lay  ahead. 
Typical  was  a  minefield  just  west  of 
Highway  65  that  consisted  of  six  to 
eight  rows  of  antitank  mines  laid  in  an 
almost  continuous  band  for  two  miles. 
Before  the  final  Allied  offensive  could 
begin  it  was  necessary — after  passing 
through  the  Allies'  own  defensive  mine- 
fields—  to  cut  through  or  bypass  such 
defenses,  clearing  German  wooden  box, 
Schu,  and  other  mines  that  were  diffi- 
cult to  detect,  notably  the  Topf,  with  its 
glass-enclosed  chemical  igniter. ''^^ 


'^"  Fifth  Army  History,  vol.  VI,  pp.  84-85;  Clark, 
Calculated  Risk,  p.  385;  Jones  comments.  No  true  plas- 
tic mines  were  found  in  the  Mediterranean  theater, 
although  rumors  persisted  throughout  the  war  that 
the  Germans  were  using  them.  All  enemy  mines  had 
at  least  a  small  amount  of  metal  in  them.  The  rumor 
had  begun  in  Sicily  where  a  single  improvised  mine 


The  final  battle  of  the  campaigns  in 
Italy  began  early  in  April  with  a  92d 
Division  diversionary  attack  on  the  ex- 
treme left,  followed  by  an  Eighth  Army 
blow  on  the  extreme  right.  Reeling,  the 
enemy  began  to  fall  back,  and  troops 
of  the  Fifth  and  Eighth  Armies  cap- 
tured Bologna  on  21  April.  The  two 
armies  moved  into  the  Po  valley  behind 
armored  spearheads  and  once  across 
the  river  spread  out  swiftly  in  pursuit 
of  the  disorganized  enemy. 

In  the  broad  valley  the  roadnet  was 
good,  in  some  places  excellent,  with 
many  paved  highways  connecting  the 
cities,  towns,  and  villages  scattered  over 
the  plain,  a  rich  and  thriving  region  in 
normal  times.  Most  of  the  secondary 
roads  were  graveled  and  well  kept, 
affording  alternate  routes  to  almost  any 
point.  Roughly  parellel  main  arteries 
ran  from  east  to  west  across  the  valley, 
while  others  ran  north  and  south.  With 
such  a  large,  spreading  roadnet  and 
with  secondary  routes  sometimes  offer- 
ing shortcuts  for  the  pursuing  forces, 
the  fieeing  enemy  could  do  little  to 
impede  the  Allies'  progress.  As  the  cam- 
paign drew  swiftly  to  its  close,  little  road 
maintenance  was  necessary  and  was 
mostly  confined  to  primary  routes.  The 
prinicpal  engineer  task  was  crossing  the 
Po,  and  that  had  to  be  done  quickly  to 
keep  up  the  tempo  of  the  pursuit  and 
cut  off  enemy  escape  routes. "^^ 

The  Po  is  a  rather  slow  stream  with 
many  bars  and  islands  and  is  generally 
too  wide  for  footbridges.  In  front  of 
Fifth  Army  its  bed  varied  in  width  from 
330  to  1,315  yards,  the  actual  water  gap 


made  of  plastic  explosive  with  a  standard  detonator 
was  found.  The  nearest  approach  to  the  plastic  mine 
was  an  Italian  mine  resembling  the  German  Teller 
but  made  of  bakelite. 

^'  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  pp.  231—32. 


218 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


extending  from  130  to  490  yards.  Allied 
air  strikes  had  destroyed  the  perma- 
nent high-level  and  floating  highway 
bridges.  The  Germans  maintained  com- 
munication across  the  river  by  ferries 
and  by  floating  bridges,  many  of  which 
they  assembled  from  remnants  of  per- 
manent floating  bridges  after  dark  and 
dismantled  before  daylight. 

The  engineers  knew  that  a  huge 
amount  of  bridging  would  be  necessary 
to  cross  the  Po.  Treadway  bridging  was 
in  limited  supply.  The  25-ton  pontons 
of  the  1554th  Engineer  Heavy  Ponton 
Battalion  would  be  essential,  as  would 
many  floating  Baileys,  which  Fifth  Army 
could  borrow  from  the  British.  The 
width  of  the  Po  required  storm  boats  as 
well  as  assault  boats,  heavy  rafts,  infan- 
try-support rafts,  and  Quonset  barges 
assembled  from  naval  cubical  steel  pon- 
tons and  powered  by  marine  motors. 

Fifth  Army  engineers  were  confident 
that  they  could  build  bridges  on  piles 
eighty  feet  deep  or  more  despite  the 
soft  mud  of  considerable  depth  that 
formed  the  Po's  bed.  Such  piles  came 
from  U.S.  engineer  forestry  units  work- 
ing in  southern  Italy,  and  the  long  trail- 
ers of  the  1554th  Heavy  Ponton  Battal- 
ion brought  them  to  the  front. 

On  22  September  1944,  Fifth  Army 
engineers  distributed  a  special  engineer 
report  on  the  Po  throughout  the  army. 
The  report  consolidated  all  available 
information,  and  revised  editions  came 
out  from  then  until  the  actual  crossing. 
The  1168th  Engineer  Combat  Group 
controlled  camouflage,  maintenance, 
depot,  and  equipment  units  and  pro- 
vided administrative  service  for  some 
engineer  units  not  under  its  operational 
control.  The  46th  South  African  Sur- 
vey Company  carried  its  triangulation 
net  into  the  Po  valley,  while  early  in 


1945  the  66th  Engineer  Topographic 
Company  issued  1 :  12,500  photo-mosaic 
sheets  covering  the  area  and  special 
1:10,000  mosaics  of  possible  crossing 
sites.  The  1621st  Engineer  Model  Mak- 
ing Detachment  produced  a  number  of 
terrain    models    of   the    Po    valley. "^^ 

Special  river-crossing  training  concen- 
trated mainly  on  II  Corps  engineer 
units,  but  close  to  the  actual  crossing 
day  Fifth  Army  switched  bridging  to 
IV  Corps. ^^  The  engineer  units  had 
thoroughgoing  drills,  and  a  group  of 
II  Corps'  combat  engineers  got  special 
instruction  in  all  the  assault  and  bridg- 
ing equipment  the  army  stockpiled  dur- 
ing the  winter.  This  group  was  to  oper- 
ate with  the  troops  ready  to  make  the 
main  movement  across  the  Po,  whether 
of  II  or  IV  Corps.  Fifth  Army  had  esti- 
mated that  a  floating  Bailey  would  be 
required  in  both  II  Corps  and  IV  Corps 
areas;  the  1338th  Engineer  Combat 
Group's  169th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion was  to  build  the  II  Corps  bridge 
and  the  1108th  Engineer  Combat 
Group's  235th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion, the  IV  Corps  bridge.  During 
March  and  April  the  169th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  sent  several  of  its  men 
to  the  British  Floating  Bailey  Bridge 
School  at  Capua,  and  in  April  the  entire 
battalion  moved  to  a  site  on  the  Arno 
west  of  Pisa  for  training  in  building  the 
bridges.  The  235th  Combat  Battalion 
got  only  a  few  days  of  training — and 
even  that  for  only  part  of  the  battalion.^"* 

Estimating  that  the  Germans  would 
expect  II  Corps  to  make  the  main  attack 


•^'^  Jones  comments. 

■^^  Killian  comments. 

^^  Engr  Hist  II  Corps,  p.  248;  Hists,  39th  Engr  C 
Rgt,  Jun-Dec  44;  I69th  Engr  C  Bn,  1  Nov  44-8  May 
45;  and  235th  Engr  C  Bn,  Jan  — May  45;  Comments, 
Killian  and  Jones. 


THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  ALPS 


219 


Engineers  Bridging  the  Wide  but  Placid  Po  River 


along  the  axis  of  Highway  65,  Fifth 
Army  determined  to  surprise  them  by 
having  IV  Corps  deliver  the  first  heavy 
attack  along  Highway  64.  To  avoid 
warning  the  enemy  General  Bowman 
decided  to  keep  major  bridging  equip- 
ment at  Florence  and  Leghorn,  approxi- 
mately 125  miles  from  the  Po,  rather 
than  establish  a  forward  bridge  dump. 
Moreover,  no  suitable  areas  for  bridge 
dumps  existed  along  the  parts  of  High- 
ways 64  and  65  that  Fifth  Army  held. 
To  make  dumps  would  have  required 
a  great  deal  of  earth  moving  in  the  mid- 
dle of  winter,  would  have  diverted  engi- 
neers from  other  important  jobs,  and 
might  have  given  away  the  plans  for 
the  attack.  Because  he  expected  the 
Germans  to  make  a  stand  at  the  Po, 


Bowman  believed  he  would  have  plenty 
of  time  to  bring  bridging  to  a  place  in 
the  valley  where  it  would  be  available 
for  either  corps. '^^ 

The  German  retreat  was  so  precipi- 
tous that  much  of  the  planning  proved 
a  handicap  rather  than  an  advantage. 
The  three  leading  divisions  of  IV  Corps 
were  at  the  river  on  23  April,  in  advance 
of  any  II  Corps  units.  Enemy  resistance 
had  become  so  weak  that  each  division 
tried  to  get  across  the  Po  as  fast  as  possi- 
ble to  keep  up  the  chase  without  inter- 
ruption. Engineers  had  to  work  fever- 
ishly to  push  the  troops  across  by  all 
means  available. ^^ 


^^  Bowman  comments. 

'***  Hist  39th  Engr  C  Rgt,  Jun-Dec  44;  Comments, 
Bowman  and  Killian. 


220 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


The  II  Corps  engineers  diverted  to 
IV  Corps  during  the  crossing  opera- 
tion included  operators  for  storm  boats 
and  Quonset  barges,  a  company  of  the 
39th  Engineer  Combat  Group's  404th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  to  operate 
floating  equipment,  the  19th  Engineer 
Combat  Group's  401st  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion,  and  the  1554th  Heavy 
Ponton  Battalion. ^^  During  the  morn- 
ing of  the  twenty-third  all  II  Corps' 
bridging  that  was  readily  available,  in- 
cluding an  Ml  treadway  bridge,  60 
DUKWs,  4  infantry  support  rafts,  and 
24  storm  boats  with  motors,  moved  in 
convoy  to  IV  Corps.  At  Anzola  fifty 
assault  boats  belonging  to  IV  Corps 
joined  the  convoy,  which  went  forward 
to  the  10th  Mountain  Division  and 
arrived  at  San  Benedetto  on  the  morn- 
ing of  24  April.  On  the  night  of  the 
twenty-second,  fifty  other  IV  Corps 
assault  boats  had  also  reached  the  1 0th 
Mountain  Division.''^ 

The  crossing  began  at  noon  on  23 
April,  when  troops  of  the  10th  Moun- 
tain Division  ferried  over  the  Po  in  IV 
Corps  assault  boats  operated  by  divi- 
sional engineers  of  the  126th  Engineer 
Mountain  Battalion.  Some  of  the  men 
of  the  126th  made  as  many  as  twenty- 
three  trips  across  that  day.  Starting  at 
noon  the  engineers  used  the  only  equip- 
ment available  to  them — fifty  sixteen- 
man  wooden  assault  boats.  By  2000  the 
126th  had  ferried  across  the  86th  and 
87th  Mountain  Infantry  Regiments  plus 


"On  1  March  1945,  Headquarters  and  Headquar- 
ters Company  (HHC),  19th  Engineer  Combat  Regi- 
ment, became  HHC,  19th  Engineer  C^ombat  Ciroup. 
The  regiment's  1st  Battalion  was  redesignated  the 
401st  Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  and  the  2d  Battal- 
ion became  the  402d  Engineer  Combat  Battalion. 

■^^  II  Corps  Hist,  Gen  Suff  Confs,  23  Nov  44-5  May 
45;  Comments,  Burch  and  Jones. 


medical  detachments  and  two  battalions 
of  divisional  light  artillery  (75-mm. 
pack).  Only  twelve  boats  were  left,  most 
of  the  rest  having  been  destroyed  by 
heavy  German  fire.  The  engineers  suf- 
fered twenty-four  casualties,  including 
two  killed. ^^ 

The  85th  Division  followed  close  be- 
hind. All  assault  river-crossing  equip- 
ment the  divisional  engineers  (the  310th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion)  had  held 
had  been  turned  over  to  IV  Corps  engi- 
neers in  April  before  the  Po  crossing. 
When  the  division  reached  the  Po  its 
engineers  had  only  nine  two-man  rub- 
ber boats  and  had  to  use  local  materials 
to  build  four  infantry  support  rafts  and 
three  improvised  rafts.  On  these,  with 
the  help  of  the  255th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  of  the  1108th  Engineer 
Combat  Group,  the  310th  crossed  all 
reconnaissance  and  combat  units  of  the 
division  except  medium  artillery.  The 
crossing  took  forty-eight  hours,  but  in 
spite  of  enemy  artillery  fire  the  engi- 
neers suffered  no  casualties.^" 

The  IV  Corps  engineers  had  not 
expected  to  be  in  the  vanguard  cross- 
ing the  Po  and  had  to  cope  with  prob- 
lems for  which  they  were  not  prepared. 
During  the  afternoon  of  24  April  the 
401st  Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  a  II 
Corps  organization  on  loan  to  IV  Corps, 
started  building  a  treadway  bridge  near 
San  Benedetto.  Working  all  night,  with 
the  help  of  the  235th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion,  the  401st  completed  the 
950-foot  span  at  1030.^' 


* "  Ltr,  Col  Robert  P.  Boyd,  Jr.,  CO,  126th  Mtn  Engr 
Bn,  8  Jun  59;  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  p.  237. 

"'  Hists,  3 10th  kngr  C  Bn,  1  Nov  44-8  May  45,  and 
255th  Engr  C  Bn,  Apr— Jun  45;  Engineer  History,  Medi- 
terranean, p.  242;  Comments,  Jones,  Boyd,  and  Burch. 

"  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  pp.  244  —  45;  Hist 
401st  Engr  (>  Bn,  Jan  — Aug  45;  Killian  comments. 


THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  ALPS 


221 


Late  on  the  afternoon  of  24  April 
the  1554th  Heavy  Ponton  Battalion  (II 
Corps)  started  work  three  miles  up- 
stream on  a  heavy  ponton  bridge  even 
though  much  of  the  equipment  did  not 
arrive  until  after  the  bridge  had  been 
completed  with  improvised  equipment. 
When  finished  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
twenty-fifth  the  bridge  was  840  feet 
long  and  consisted  of  56  pontons,  49 
floats,  and  4  trestles.  A  ferry  of  Navy 
Quonset  barges,  which  could  haul  two 
2  1/2-ton  trucks,  had  operated  all  dur- 
ing the  night  of  24  April.  Day  and 
night,  for  forty-eight  hours  after  the 
completion  of  these  first  two  bridges 
over  the  Po,  two  IV  Corps  divisions  and 
part  of  a  II  Corps  division  went  over 
the  river;  within  the  first  twenty-four 
hours  some  3,400  vehicles  crossed  the 
bridges. "^^ 

Meanwhile,  II  Corps'  engineers  seri- 
ously felt  the  diversion  of  men  and 
equipment  to  IV  Corps,  which  left  them 
with  no  floating  bridges  or  assault  equip- 
ment. Much  equipment  supposedly  still 
available  to  II  Corps  was  lost,  misplaced, 
defective,  or  still  in  crates.  During  the 
night  of  the  twenty-third  bridging  equip- 
ment began  to  arrive,  but  treadway 
equipage  was  loaded  on  quartermaster 
semitrailers  instead  of  Brockway  trucks. 
On  the  morning  of  the  twenty-fourth 
the  II  Corps  engineer,  Col.  Joseph  O. 
Killian,  reported  to  General  Bowman 
that  he  had  no  bridging  available  and 
that  he  had  no  idea  when  it  would  be 
available  since  treadway  construction 
depended  upon  Brockways  with  their 
special  facilities  for  unloading.  The 
Brockways  had  gone  to  IV  Corps,  and 


Colonel  Killian  had  to  depend  upon 
Fifth  Army  engineers  for  other  equip- 
ment. Also,  many  motors  for  Quonset 
barges  that  reached  the  river  were  de- 
fective. These  conditions  held  up  opera- 
tions for  almost  a  day.  The  confusion 
appreciably  reduced  II  Corps  engineer 
support  to  division  engineers  and  led 
to  last-minute  changes  in  plans  and  hasty 
improvisations.  The  M2  treadway  and 
ferries  remained  the  chief  means  for 
crossing  the  Po  in  the  II  Corps  area 
until  missing  parts  for  the  Quonsets  ar- 
rived from  Leghorn. 

After  the  Po  the  hard-pressed  II 
Corps  engineers  had  two  more  major 
streams  to  cross,  the  Adige  and  the 
Brenta,  and  again  bridging  equipment 
was  late  getting  to  them.  An  almost 
intact  bridge  II  Corps  troops  seized 
near  Verona  proved  sufficient  until 
other  bridges  could  be  erected.  At  the 
Brenta  River  bridging  arrived  with  the 
advance  guard  of  the  91st  Division.  One 
of  the  first  elements  across  a  tempo- 
rary trestle  treadway  at  the  Brenta  was 
a  section  of  the  bridge  train  moving 
ahead  with  forward  elements  of  the  9 1  st 
Division  to  the  next  crossing.  In  the  IV 
Corps  sector  German  defenders  of  a 
bridge  across  the  Mincio  at  Governola 
held  up  the  forward  drive  on  the  twenty- 
fourth  only  momentarily.  Although 
damaged,  the  bridge  proved  usable, 
and  the  37th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion, which  for  more  than  two  days 
and  nights  had  been  working  with  little 
or  no  rest,  had  it  open  for  traffic  in  a 
few  hours.^^ 

The  drive  rolled  on,  led  by  the  88th 
Division.  The  10th  Mountain  Division 
and  the  85th  Infantry  Division  pushed 


^'^  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  p.  254;  II  Corps 
Hist,  Gen  Staff  Conf,  Apr- May  45;  Hist  40 1st  Engr 
C  Bn,  Jan— Aug  45;  Jones  comments. 


*^  II  Corps  Hist,  I  Apr-2  May  45,  an.  6;  Comments, 
Bowman  and  Killian. 


222 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Raft  Ferries  a  Tank  Destroyer  Across  the  Po 


on  to  Verona,  and  the  1st  Armored 
Division  helped  to  seal  off  all  escape 
routes  to  the  north  with  an  enveloping 
sweep  to  the  west.  These  moves,  in  con- 
junction with  those  of  the  Eighth  Army, 
brought  about  the  capitulation  of  the 
enemy  and  an  end  to  the  Italian  cam- 
paign. 

The  Shortage  of  Engineers 

From  the  landings  at  Salerno  to  the 
end  of  the  war  in  Italy,  a  shortage  of 
personnel  affected  practically  all  engi- 
neer work  in  Fifth  Army  and  Peninsu- 
lar Base  Section  areas.  Experienced 
men  were  constantly  drained  off  as  the 
war  progressed:  too  few  engineers  were 
allocated  to  the  theater  at  the  start;  War 


Department  policies  worked  to  the  det- 
riment of  engineer  strengths;  units 
went  to  Seventh  Army  and  the  inva- 
sion of  southern  France;  and  the  engi- 
neer contingent  in  Italy  suffered  cas- 
ualties. The  effect  showed  up  not  only 
in  numbers  but  also  in  fluctuating  train- 
ing levels,  varying  proficiency  in  stan- 
dard engineer  functions,  and  problems 
of  supply  common  to  the  theater.  Not 
the  least  important  for  the  engineers 
was  the  loss  of  experienced  leaders. 

In  its  search  for  skilled  manpower, 
the  War  Department  imposed  strictures 
on  the  theaters  in  addition  to  the  organi- 
zational one  of  the  group  concept.  To 
build  new  engineer  units  around  sound 
cadres  the  department  often  ordered 
experienced  engineer  officers  home  to 


THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  ALPS 


223 


form  a  reserve  pool  of  knowledgeable 
men  for  new  units  but  did  not  replace 
them  in  overseas  units  with  men  of 
equal  ability.  Replacements  in  Italy  were 
usually  deficient  in  engineer  back- 
grounds, and  some  had  no  technical 
knowledge  at  all.  Between  6  October 
1943  and  1 1  May  1944,  forty-eight  offi- 
cers of  company  and  field  grade  went 
back  to  the  United  States  as  cadre.  Gen- 
eral Bowman  agreeing  that  they  could 
be  replaced  by  first  and  second  lieuten- 
ants from  training  schools  at  home. 
Only  some  50  percent  arrived  during 
that  period,  and  the  replacement  sys- 
tem never  made  up  the  shortage.  In 
the  fall  of  1944  the  War  Department 
stopped  shipping  individual  engineer 
replacements,  and  the  engineers  turned 
to  hastily  trained  elements  such  as  anti- 
aircraft gun  crews  left  in  rear  areas, 
usually  ports,  to  protect  traffic  there 
from  nonexistent  Axis  air  raids.  From 
September  1944  to  April  1945,  new 
engineer  units  formed  from  nonengi- 
neer  organizations  included  three  com- 
bat battalions,  one  light  equipment 
company,  one  depot  company,  one 
maintenance  company,  two  engineer 
combat  group  headquarters,  and  two 
general  service  regiments.  One  general 
service  regiment  and  two  combat  engi- 
neer regiments  already  existing  became 
group  organizations,  and  another  two 
general  service  regiments  were  reorgan- 
ized under  new  tables  of  organization 
and  equipment.  But  with  the  exception 
of  some  separate  companies,  none  of 
the  new  units  ever  attained  its  author- 
ized strength.  The  constant  rotation  of 
officers  to  the  United  States  reduced 
some  of  the  existing  units  to  85  percent 
of  their  usual  strength. 

The  number  of  engineer  units  drawn 
off  by  the  Seventh  Army  in  the  spring 


of  1944  was  somewhat  counterbalanced 
by  the  reduction  of  Fifth  Army's  respon- 
sibilities when  the  British  Eighth  Army 
took  over  a  major  part  of  the  front. 
But  the  units  lost  at  the  time  were  what 
remained  of  the  best,  for  General  Clark 
allowed  Seventh  Army  to  take  any  engi- 
neer unit  it  wanted. 

Casualties  also  took  an  expected  toll. 
Of  the  peak  engineer  strength  of  27,000 
in  June  1944,  3,540  officers  and  men 
were  lost.  Of  the  831  who  died,  597 
were  killed  in  action,  140  died  from 
wounds  received  in  action,  and  94  died 
from  other  causes.  Of  the  2,646  wound- 
ed in  action,  786  were  wounded  seri- 
ously and  1,860  only  slightly.  Some 
thirty-six  were  taken  prisoner,  and  thir- 
ty remained  missing  in  action.  The 
numbers  varied  from  unit  to  unit  de- 
pending on  proximity  to  the  front  line 
and  the  type  of  work  performed.  In 
forty-five  days  of  combat  at  Anzio,  the 
36th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment  lost 
74  men  killed  and  336  wounded.  On 
the  same  front,  where  it  was  difficult  to 
distinguish  front  lines  from  rear,  the 
383d  Battalion  (Separate)  in  five  months 
sustained  casualties  of  four  officers  and 
eleven  enlisted  men  killed  and  three 
officers  and  fifty-eight  men  wounded. 
Enemy  artillery  brought  down  the  most 
engineers.  For  example,  the  109th  Com- 
bat Battalion  between  20  September 
1943  and  11  May  1944  had  seventy- 
one  battle  casualties,  90  percent  from 
artillery  blasts  or  shell  fragments,  and 
10  percent  from  mine  blasts  and  small- 
arms  fire.  At  other  times  the  losses  from 
artillery  were  fewer,  as  low  as  61  per- 
cent, but  artillery  always  remained  the 
chief  culprit. ^^ 


^^  Hist  185th  Engr  C  Bn,  Sep  44;  Fifth  Army  Rpt  of 
Army  Commanders  Weekly  Confs,  24  Mar- 14  Apr 
45;  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  p.  163;  Summary 


224 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Training 

To  offset  inexperience,  the  engineers 
concentrated  on  training  troops  coming 
into  the  North  African  theater.  Units 
had  no  choice  but  to  accept  troops  with- 
out engineer  training,  and  they  took 
men  with  only  basic  military  training. 
They  had  to  be  satisfied,  in  fact,  with 
only  a  small  percentage  of  Class  II  per- 
sonnel (categorized  as  rapid  learners  in 
induction  tests),  with  the  remainder 
Class  III  (average  learners)  and  Class 
IV  (slow  learners).  New  officers  were 
assigned  to  four  to  six  weeks  of  duty 
with  rear  area  general  service  engineer 
units  before  being  thrust  into  work  with 
combat  engineers. 

Each  engineer  unit  tried  to  maintain 
a  reserve  of  trained  specialists  to  fill 
any  vacancies  that  occurred  and  to  keep 
up  job  training.  Even  so,  engineer  units 
in  the  Fifth  Army  did  not  have  enough 
trained  operators  and  mechanics,  espe- 
cially for  heavy  equipment.  A  good 
operator  could  do  three  to  five  times 
the  work  of  a  poor  one. 

Training  in  bridging,  river  crossing, 
mine  techniques,  heavy  equipment, 
motor  maintenance,  surveying,  intelli- 
gence techniques,  mapping,  photog- 
raphy, scouting  and  patrolling,  moun- 
tain climbing,  driving,  marksmanship, 
and  the  use  of  flame  throwers  and  gre- 
nade launchers  went  on  throughout  the 
campaign,  most  of  it  within  the  engi- 
neer groups,  regiments,  battalions,  or 
companies.  Many  units  trained  at  night. 
For  example,  the  19th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Regiment,  before  the  spring  offen- 
sive of  May  1944,  spent  a  third  of  its 
training  time  on  night  practices.  One 


company  of  a  battalion  might  perform 
assigned  missions  while  the  rest  of  the 
battalion  trained."*^ 

When  the  time  was  available,  almost 
every  unit  practiced  bridge  construc- 
tion. The  235th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion spent  five  days  at  the  Arno  build- 
ing floating  treadways.  Experienced 
units  trained  the  inexperienced:  the 
16th  Armored  Engineer  Battalion  in- 
structed the  36th  and  39th  Engineer 
Combat  Regiments  and  the  10th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  in  building  steel 
treadways,  and  the  1755th  Treadway 
Bridge  Company  trained  a  number  of 
units,  including  the  19th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Regiment.  In  August  and  Septem- 
ber 1944  the  I75th  Engineer  General 
Service  Regiment  conducted  a  school 
for  the  British  in  building  timber 
bridges.  In  April  1944  each  company 
of  the  310th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion, 85th  Division,  built  and  disman- 
tled a  100-foot  double-single  Bailey. 

As  early  as  November  1943  Fifth 
Army  established  a  school  in  river  cross- 
ing at  Limatola,  near  the  Volturno,  and 
here  a  number  of  units  practiced  for 
the  Rapido  crossing.  During  a  fortnight 
in  January  1944  the  16th  Armored 
Engineer  Battalion  practiced  assault 
crossings  with  the  6th  Armored  Infan- 
try Regiment,  1st  Armored  Division. 
Four  companies  of  the  19th  Engineer 
Combat  Regiment  practiced  between  10 
and  15  January  1944  with  elements  of 
the  36th  Division  at  Pietravairano,  six- 
teen miles  north  of  Capua,  instructing 
the  infantry  in  the  use  of  river-crossing 
equipment  during  both  daylight  and 
darkness.  The  engineers  conducted 
similar  training  in  preparation  for  the 
Arno  and  Po  crossings. 


of  Activities  (Statistical)  Mediterranean  Theater,  vol. 
XV,  p.  18. 


^''  Hist  19th  Engr  C  Rgt,  1944.  The  following  is  based 
on  histories  of  the  units  mentioned. 


THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  ALPS 


225 


Engineers  also  learned  by  attach- 
ment. Units  just  arriving  in  the  Fifth 
Army  zone  sent  officers  and  enlisted 
men — or  whole  units — to  work  with, 
observe,  and  learn  from  engineers  who 
were  more  experienced.  Elements  of 
the  310th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion 
were  attached  to  the  313th  Combat 
Battalion,  elements  of  the  316th  Com- 
bat Battalion  to  the  10th  and  111th 
Combat  Battalions,  and  elements  of  the 
48th  Combat  Battalion  to  the  120th 
Combat  Battalion. 

The  engineers  also  instructed  non- 
engineer  units  in  a  number  of  other 
skills,  most  notably  recognizing,  laying, 
detecting,  and  removing  mines.  Two 
Fifth  Army  engineer  mine-training 
teams  supplemented  the  instruction 
that  divisional  engineer  battalions  gave 
to  the  infantry.  The  16th  Armored 
Engineer  Battalion  subjected  the  92d 
Division  to  rigorous  drill,  requiring  the 
whole  division  to  go  through  a  live 
minefield. 

Early  in  the  campaign  the  British 
established  a  Bailey  bridge  school,  open 
to  Americans,  at  Capua,  where  some 
units  felt  the  instruction  was  better  than 
that  provided  at  the  American  school.^*' 
Americans  gave  some  supplementary 
instruction  at  the  British  School  of  Mili- 
tary Engineering  at  Capua.  Most  of  the 
American  schools  in  the  theater  were 
subordinate  to  the  Replacement  and 
Training  Command,  MTOUSA.  In  the 
summer  of  1944  MTOUSA  established 
an  American  Engineer  Mines  and  Bridge 
School  along  the  Volturno  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  Maddaloni.  As  the  Fifth  Army 
moved  northward  and  out  of  touch,  the 
school  shifted  its  emphasis  to  convert- 
ing American  antiaircraft  artillery  (AAA) 


troops  into  engineers  and  to  training 
the  Brazilian  Expeditionary  Force  and 
the  92d  Division.^^ 

Lacking  engineer  troops.  Fifth  Army 
employed  thousands  of  Italians.  Some 
Italian  engineer  troops  participated  in 
the  campaign,  but  most  of  the  laborers 
were  civilians  who  bolstered  almost  all 
the  U.S.  Army  engineer  units,  especially 
those  at  army  and  corps  level.  Each  unit 
recruited  its  own  civilian  force  with  help 
from  Allied  military  government  detach- 
ments. At  one  time  the  3 10th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  had  more  than  three 
times  its  own  strength  in  civilian  labor- 
ers. The  work  of  the  Italians,  while  not 
always  up  to  the  standard  desired  by 
the  American  engineers,  released  thou- 
sands of  engineers  and  infantrymen  for 
other  tasks.  Some  three  thousand  man- 
ual laborers  worked  for  the  engineers 
during  the  winter  of  1944—45;  in  April 
1945  army  and  corps  engineer  units 
had  employed  4,437  Italian  civilians, 
most  of  them  on  road  work.  The  Ital- 
ians loaded,  broke,  and  spread  rock; 
worked  at  quarries;  cleared  ditches  and 
culverts  for  use  of  mule  pack  trains; 
and  hand-placed  rock  to  build  up  firm 
shoulders  and  form  gutters.  Those 
more  skilled  rebuilt  retaining  walls  and 
masonry  ditches  along  road  shoulders.'*^ 

A  specialized  Italian  civilian  group, 
the  Cantonieri,  was  the  equivalent  of 
U.S.  county  or  local  road  workers.  These 


'Jones  comments,  1  Jun  59. 


Engr  Service,  PBS,  Work  Accomplished,  2  Oct 
43-  1  Sep  44;  Comments,  Jones,  1  Jun  59;  Fifth  Army 
Rpt  of  Army  Commanders  Weekly  Confs,  24  Mar 
and  14  Apr  45;  Engineer  History,  Mediterranean,  p.  163; 
Summary  of  Activities  (Statistical)  Mediterranean 
Theater,  vol.  XV,  p.  18. 

"^  Comments,  Jones  and  Armogida;  Engineer  History, 
Mediterranean,  pp.  3 1 ,  164,  267;  Fifth  Army  History,  vol. 
VIII,  p.  26;  Fifth  Army  Rpt  of  Army  Commanders 
Weekly  Confs,  10,  24  Feb;  3,  10,  17,24,31  Mar;  7,  14, 
21  Apr;  and  14  May  45. 


226 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


workers  became  available  as  the  front 
lines  moved  forward  and  were  espe- 
cially valuable  in  rapidly  moving  situa- 
tions when  engineer  road  responsibili- 
ties increased  by  leaps  and  bounds.  The 
chief  of  the  Cantonieri  of  a  given  area 
did  the  same  tasks  on  his  section  of 
road  (about  twelve  miles)  that  he  had 
done  for  his  government.  Truckloads 
of  crushed  rock  and  asphalt  were  un- 
loaded along  the  road  as  required,  and 
the  Cantonieri  patched  pavements  and 
did  drainage  and  other  repair  jobs. ^^ 

Engineer  Supply 

Fifth  Army  was  not  in  Italy  long 
before  defects  in  the  engineer  supply 
system  became  evident.  The  engineers 
acted  rapidly  on  the  invasion  plans  that 
called  for  them  to  make  the  most  use 
possible  of  locally  procured  material. 
Soon  after  Naples  fell,  reconnaissance 
parties  scoured  the  area  for  supplies, 
making  detailed  inventories  of  plumb- 
ing and  electrical  fixtures,  hardware, 
nails,  glass,  and  other  small  standard 
items.  Italian  military  stocks,  especially 
those  at  the  Fontanelle  caves,  were  valu- 
able sources  of  needed  materiel,  and 
prefabricated  Italian  barracks  served  as 
hospital  wards  until  American  huts 
arrived.  Though  American  engineers 
sequestered  and  classified  over  a  hun- 
dred different  types  of  stock  and  placed 
orders  on  Italian  industry  through  the 
Allied  military  government  that  spurred 
the  local  economy  and  saved  critical 
shipping  space,  control  of  requisition 
and  issue  of  supply  suffered  from  too 
few  qualified  men.^^ 

The  strain  was  particularly  manifest 


closer  to  the  combat  elements.  No  orga- 
nization existed  at  Fifth  Army  corps  or 
division  levels  to  allocate  engineer  sup- 
ply, and  the  individual  units  drew 
directly  from  army  engineer  depots. 
Though  the  Fifth  Army  engineer  tried 
to  keep  the  dumps  as  far  forward  as 
possible,  the  using  units  had  to  send  their 
own  trucks  back  to  collect  supplies  since 
the  depots  frequently  did  not  have  the 
transportation  to  make  deliveries.  The 
time  needed  for  supply  runs  varied  with 
the  distances  involved,  the  road  condi- 
tions, and  the  frequent  necessity  for 
traveling  blacked  out.  The  average  was 
one  day,  but  the  313th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  reported  that  trips  of  up 
to  250  miles  required  two  days  for  the 
round  trip.^^ 

Many  engineer  units  could  ill  afford 
either  the  time  or  the  transportation 
required  for  frequent  trips  back  to 
army  dumps,  so  they  began  to  main- 
tain small  dumps  of  their  own,  stock- 
ing them  with  supplies  from  army  engi- 
neer dumps  and  with  material  captured 
or  procured  locally.  The  only  condi- 
tion Fifth  Army  imposed  on  these  dumps 
was  that  all  stocks  be  movable.  It  was 
common  practice  for  each  company  of 
a  divisional  engineer  combat  battalion 
to  set  up  a  forward  dump  in  the  infan- 
try regimental  sector,  and  such  dumps 
often  leapfrogged  forward  as  the  divi- 
sion moved.  In  the  45th  Division,  the 
120th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  in  a 
mobile  situation  always  kept  its  dump 
about  11/2  miles  behind  its  own  com- 
mand post.^^ 


''^  Bowman  comments. 

^"  Engr  Service,  PBS,  Work.  Accomplished,  p.  275; 
PBS,  Public  Relations  Sect,  Tools  of  War,  p.  22. 


^'  Bowman  comments;  Hists,  39th  Engr  Rgt,  Jun- 
Dec  44;  313th  Engr  C  Bn,  1944-45;  337th  Engr  GS 
Rgt,  9  Sep  43- 1  Nov  44;  and  120th  Engr  C  Bn,  9  Sep 
43-1  May  44. 

^^  Hists,  182d  Engr  C  Bn,  16  Sep  44-5  May  45,  and 
337th  Engr  GS  Rgt,  9- 15  Sep  43;  AGE  Bd  Rpt  162, 
NATOUSA,  28  Jun  44. 


THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  ALPS 


227 


There  were  never  enough  depot 
troops  to  operate  army  engineer  sup- 
ply dumps.  Before  the  breakout  in  May 
1944  Fifth  Army  had  only  one  platoon 
(one  officer  and  forty  enlisted  men)  of 
the  451st  Engineer  Depot  Company, 
while  the  rest  of  the  company  remained 
with  PBS.  The  platoon  had  to  move 
often  to  stay  close  to  the  front  but  still 
managed  to  fill  an  average  of  seventy- 
five  requisitions  every  twenty-four  hours. 
Frequently,  the  platoon  operated  more 
than  one  depot  simultaneously — three 
in  May  1944.  When  the  451st  concen- 
trated at  Civitavecchia  in  June,  it  took 
500  trucks,  enough  for  seven  full- 
strength  infantry  regiments,  to  move 
the  unit's  stock  and  equipment  north. 
Help  in  depot  operations  came  from 
other  engineers  as  well  as  from  British, 
French,  and  Italian  military  units.  Sev- 
eral companies  of  Italian  soldiers  were 
regularly  attached  to  the  1st  Platoon  as 
mechanics,  welders,  carpenters,  and 
laborers.  Italian  salvage  crews  repaired 
tools  and  equipment,  manufactured 
bridge  pins,  and  mended  rubber  boats. '"* 

The  shortage  of  engineer  depot  units 
made  it  impossible  to  open  new  engi- 
neer dumps  as  often  or  as  rapidly  as 
desirable,  particularly  after  the  May 
1944  breakout.  As  a  result  the  supply 
furnished  to  engineer  units  deteriora- 
ted, and  in  June  one  platoon  of  the 
450th  Engineer  Depot  Company  had 
to  be  made  available  to  Fifth  Army.  In 
August,  however,  the  platoon  reverted 
to  Seventh  Army,  and  for  the  next  few 
months  Fifth  Army  again  had  only  one 
platoon  for  engineer  depot  support. 
Finally,  in  December  1944,  MTOUSA 


formed  the  383d  Engineer  Depot  Com- 
pany from  the  1st  Platoon,  451st,  and 
men  from  disbanded  antiaircraft  units. 
Through  the  rest  of  the  campaign  Fifth 
Army  engineer  units  could  count  on 
supply  support  from  this  company, 
aided  by  Italian  Army  troops  trained 
in  engineer  supply  procedures.^"* 

Mapping  and  Intelligence 

Planners  had  estimated  that  Fifth 
Army  would  need  a  full  topographic 
battalion,  plus  one  topographic  com- 
pany per  corps,  to  reproduce  and  revise 
maps;  yet  there  were  never  more  than 
two  topographical  companies  available 
at  any  one  time.  The  66th  Engineer 
Topographic  Company  served  for  nine- 
teen months;  the  661st  served  only 
eight  months,  mainly  with  VI  Corps. 
Both,  from  time  to  time,  had  to  get  help 
from  South  African  and  British  survey 
companies. 

The  66th  Topographic  Company  was 
the  American  unit  on  which  Fifth  Army 
placed  its  chief  reliance.  Upon  arrival 
in  Italy  in  early  October  1943,  the  men 
of  this  unit  went  to  work  revising  mate- 
rial derived  chiefly  from  aerial  photo- 
graphs. Photo  mosaics  and  detailed 
defense  studies  covering  the  projected 
attacks  along  the  Volturno  and  Sacco- 
Liri  Rivers  were  made  and  reproduced. 

In  November  the  66th  was  assigned 
to  II  Corps  but  continued  to  revise  and 
reproduce  maps  for  the  Fifth  Army 
Engineer  Section.  This  company  con- 
sisted of  four  platoons:  a  headquarters 
or  service  platoon;  a  survey  platoon, 
which  as  a  field  unit  performed  the  sur- 


^^  Rpt,  Engr  Fifth  Army,  25  Jun  44,  Engineer  Les- 
sons from  the  Italian  Campaign;  Hist  451st  Engr 
Depot  Co,  May -Dec  44. 


^^  Hists,  450th  Engr  Depot  Co,  May— Aug  44,  and 
383d  Engr  Depot  Co,  1944-45. 
^^  Bowman  comments. 


228 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


vey  and  control  work;  a  photomapping 
platoon  responsible  for  drafting  as  well 
as  planning  and  revising  maps;  and  a 
reproduction  platoon  responsible  for 
the  lithographic  production  of  the  print- 
ed sheet.  In  January  1944  the  company 
furnished  men  for  two  provisional  engi- 
neer map  depot  detachments,  one  at 
Anzio  and  the  other  on  the  main  front. 
When  the  two  fronts  merged  in  May  it 
was  possible  to  establish  forward  and 
rear  map  depots,  and  NATOUSA  for- 
mally activated  the  1710th  and  1712th 
Engineer  Map  Depot  Detachments. 

The  66th  Topographic  Company 
moved  twelve  times  between  5  October 
1943  and  the  fall  of  Rome  in  June  1944. 
Between  those  dates  the  company  pro- 
cessed an  average  of  a  half  million 
impressions  a  month.  In  addition  to  866 
different  maps,  the  66th  printed  field 
orders,  overlays  showing  engineer  re- 
sponsibilities, road  network  overlays, 
defense  overprints,  German  plans  for 
Cassino  defense,  a  monthly  history  of 
II  Corps'  operations,  the  disposition  of 
German  troops  in  the  II  Corps  area, 
special  maps  for  the  commanding  gen- 
eral of  II  Corps,  special  terrain  studies, 
photomaps,  and  various  posters  and 
booklets.  It  produced  a  major  portion 
of  all  the  1:100,000,  1:50,000,  and 
1:25,000  maps  Fifth  Army  units  used. 
In  April  1945,  for  the  Po  operation, 
the  66th  produced  4,900,000  opera- 
tional maps,  working  around  the  clock 
and  using  cub  planes  to  speed  distribu- 
tion to  units. '*' 

After  the  fall  of  Rome  the  66th  Topo- 
graphic Company,  then  the  only  such 
unit  with  Fifth  Army,  could  not  pro- 


"'  Hist  66th  Engr  Topo  Clo,  1944-45;  AG¥  Bd  Rpt 
179,  NATOUSA,  Notes  on  Mapping  an  Army,  16 
Aug  44.  Unless  otherwise  cited,  this  section  is  based 
on  these  two  sources. 


duce  the  required  amount  of  work  with 
its  authorized  personnel  and  equip- 
ment. The  company  procured  addi- 
tional equipment  and  employed  Italian 
technicians  and  guards,  virtually  becom- 
ing a  topographic  battalion.  Using  the 
Italian  technicians,  the  company  was 
able  to  work  two  shifts  reproducing 
maps  but  could  not  get  enough  people 
for  two  shifts  on  other  jobs.  The  com- 
pany trained  its  men  for  several  differ- 
ent specialties,  but  the  multiple  responsi- 
bilities overtaxed  them. 

The  1712th  Detachment  issued 
1,331,000  maps  for  the  drive  against 
the  Gustav  Line  in  May  1944.  For  the 
entire  Italian  campaign  Fifth  Army 
handled  and  distributed  over  29,606,000 
maps.  Ordinarily  the  corps  maintained 
a  stock  of  500  each  of  all  1 :25,000  and 
1:50,000  sheets  of  an  area  and  fewer 
1:100,000  and  smaller  scale  sheets. 
When  new  units  arrived  or  large  orders 
came  in,  the  maps  were  drawn  from 
the  army  map  depot;  such  orders  could 
normally  be  filled  within  a  day.  Periods 
of  relatively  static  warfare  in  the  Italian 
campaign  called  for  large-scale  maps. 
Unfortunately,  not  enough  1:25,000- 
scale  maps  were  available  to  meet  the 
need,  and  some  of  those  in  stock  were 
of  dubious  quality.  The  l:50,000-scale 
maps  provided  complete  coverage,  but 
many  panels  were  considerably  out-of- 
date  and  in  some  cases  illegible. 

The  combined  sections  of  mapping 
and  intelligence  collected  data  on  weath- 
er, crossing  sites,  defense  works,  obser- 
vation points,  and  fields  of  fire.  When 
Lt.  Col.  William  L.  Jones  joined  Bow- 
man's staff  in  January  1944,  intelligence 
became  divorced  from  mapping,  and 
Jones  becamechief  of  the  Plans,  Intelli- 
gence, and  Training  Section.  This  ar- 
rangement continued  until  September 


THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  ALPS 


229 


1944  when  Colonel  Jones  left  to  take 
command  of  the  235th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion;  then  mapping  and  intelli- 
gence reconsolidated  under  Lt.  Col. 
John  G.  Ladd.^^ 

Information  came  to  the  section  from 
many  sources,  including  the  Army  Map 
Service  and  other  agencies  in  the  United 
States  and  Britain.  The  Intelligence 
Branch,  OCE,  WD,  supplied  a  ten- 
volume  work  on  Italy's  beaches  and 
ports  covering  such  subjects  as  meteo- 
rological conditions  and  water  supply. 
Many  studies  dealing  with  Italy's  high- 
way bridges,  railroad  bridges,  and  tun- 
nels originated  in  the  Research  Office, 
a  subdivision  of  the  Intelligence  Branch. 
A  valuable  source  from  which  the  engi- 
neers derived  information  was  a  sixteen- 
volume  Rockefeller  Foundation  work 
on  malaria  in  Italy  with  specific  infor- 
mation concerning  the  regions  where 
malaria  prevailed.  Lessons,  hints,  and 
tips  came  from  two  series  of  publica- 
tions issued  frequently  during  the  cam- 
paign: Fifth  Army  Engineer  Notes  and 
AFHQ  Intelligence  Summaries. ^^ 

Although  the  Fifth  Army  G— 2  was 
technically  the  agency  for  collecting  and 
disseminating  topographic  information, 
the  Fifth  Army  staff  relied  on  the  engi- 
neer to  evaluate  all  topographic  intelli- 
gence required  for  planning.  This  sys- 
tem worked  well,  for  by  the  nature  of 
his  work  and  training  the  engineer  was 
best  equipped  to  provide  advice  con- 
cerning terrain  and  communication 
routes.  Corps  and  division  staffs  gener- 
ally expected  less  terrain  information 
from  their  engineers  because  no  ade- 


quate photo-interpretation  organiza- 
tion existed  below  the  army  level.  Engi- 
neer intelligence  data  seldom  covered 
terrain  more  than  one  hundred  miles 
in  advance  of  the  front  lines.  On  the 
whole  intelligence  was  adequate,  for  the 
rate  of  advance  in  Italy  was  not  rapid 
enough  to  require  greater  coverage. 
The  timing  of  engineer  intelligence  was 
important;  information  conveyed  to  the 
lower  units  too  far  in  advance  might  be 
filed  away  and  forgotten. ^^ 

Skilled  interpretation  of  aerial  photo- 
graphs was  an  important  phase  of  engi- 
neer intelligence.  Use  of  such  photo- 
graphs, begun  in  the  stalemate  before 
Cassino,  proved  so  valuable  that  by  Feb- 
ruary 1944  a  squadron  of  USAAF  P— 
38s  made  four  to  ten  sorties  (about  350 
pictures)  daily.  Two  engineers  at  the 
photo  center  sent  all  photographs  with- 
in ten  miles  of  the  front  forward  and 
kept  the  rest  for  their  own  study.  Peri- 
odically they  also  sent  forward  reports 
on  roads,  bridges,  streams,  and  other 
features.^^ 

The  engineers  used  long-range  ter- 
rain reports  of  the  AFHQ  Engineer 
Intelligence  Section  to  plan  the  forward 
movement  of  engineer  bridge  supplies 
and  the  deployment  of  engineer  units. 
The  reports  were  rich  sources  of  infor- 
mation on  roads  and  rivers.  Road  infor- 
mation included  width,  nature  of  sur- 
face, embankments,  demolitions,  and 
suitability  for  mules,  jeeps,  or  other 
transportation.  River  information  in- 
cluded bed  width,  wet  gap,  width  mea- 
sured from  the  tops  of  banks,  nature 
and  height  of  banks,  levees,  potential 
crossing  places,  approaches,  needed 


^'^  Comments,  Jones,  1  Jun  59. 

^'^  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Engineers: 
Troops  ajid  Equipment,  pp.  457  —  58;  II  Corps  Hist,  an. 
A,  G-2  Rpt  612. 


'*  Comments,  Jones,  I  Jun  59,  and  Paxson,  May  59. 
''"Bowman   comments;    Hist   313th   Engr  C   Bn, 
1944-45;  II  Corps  Rapido  Crossing,  Jan -Feb  44. 


230 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


bridging  equipment,  fords,  and  practi- 
cability of  bypasses.  The  error  was  sel- 
dom more  than  ten  feet  for  estimated 
bridge  lengths  or  20  percent  for  bridge 
heights.  Sometimes  the  terrain  reports 
were  useful  in  selecting  bombing  tar- 
gets such  as  a  dam  in  the  Liri  valley. 
They  could  be  used  not  only  to  esti- 
mate long-range  bridging  requirements 
but  also  to  anticipate  floods,  pinpoint 
tank  obstacles  and  minefields,  and  lo- 
cate potential  main  supply  routes,  air- 
field sites,  strategic  points  for  demoli- 
tion, and  possible  traffic  blocks.  Gen- 
eral Bowman  was  so  impressed  by  the 
value  of  the  reports  that  he  tried  repeat- 
edly to  have  the  AFHQ  Engineer  Photo 
Interpretation  Section  made  part  of  his 
office,  but  AFHQ  retained  control  of 
the  section.^' 

Camouflage 

At  no  time  during  the  entire  Italian 
campaign  were  there  more  than  two 
companies  of  the  84th  Engineer  Cam- 
ouflage Battalion  available,  and  after  the 
middle  of  1944  only  one  company  re- 
mained with  Fifth  Army.  Moreover, 
since  in  the  United  States  camouflage 
troops  had  been  considered  noncom- 
batant,  the  unit,  responsible  for  camou- 
flage supervision  and  inspection,  con- 
sisted of  limited  service  and  older-than- 
average  personnel.  This  policy  impaired 
efficiency  in  view  of  the  fact  that  front- 
line units  had  the  greatest  need  for 
deception  and  disguise.  In  addition,  the 
camouflage  companies  had  neither 
enough  training  in  tactical  camouflage 
nor  enough  transportation  to  move  the 


large  amount  of  materials  and  equip- 
ment required. ^^ 

In  spite  of  these  handicaps  engineers 
did  some  excellent  work  with  dummies, 
paint,  nets,  and  other  materials.  Some- 
times road  screens  and  dummies  con- 
fused and  diverted  enemy  artillery  post- 
ed in  the  hills.  For  example,  early  in 
the  campaign,  troops  of  the  337th  Engi- 
neer General  Service  Regiment  erected 
a  series  of  structures  made  from  nine 
30-by-30-foot  nets,  along  a  220-foot 
stretch  of  road  near  the  Volturno.  This 
section  had  been  subject  to  observation 
and  shelling,  but  after  the  erection  of 
the  road  screen  the  shelling  stopped. ^^ 

Road  screens  were  the  main  device 
in  camouflage  operations.  As  a  rule  the 
engineers  used  a  double  thickness  of 
garnished  net,  but  the  best  type  of  net 
for  all  purposes  remained  an  unsettled 
question.  Engineers  of  the  84th  Battal- 
ion preferred  shrimp  nets  to  garnished 
twine,  yet  the  15th  Army  Group  engi- 
neer concluded  at  the  close  of  hostili- 
ties that  the  shrimp  nets  had  not  been 
dense  enough  to  obscure  properly. 
Pregarnished  fish  nets  had  the  same 
defect.  None  of  the  nets  was  sufficiently 
durable  or  fire  resistant.  And  as  snow 
fell  in  December  1944,  no  white  camou- 
flage materials  were  available.^'* 

The  most  ambitious  operational  cam- 
ouflage programs  of  the  Italian  cam- 
paign took  place  during  preparations 
to  attack  the  Gothic  Line.  Engineers 


'''  Comments,  Bowman,  Jones,  and  Armogida. 


*^^  Hists,  84th  Engr  Camouflage  Bn,  14  Apr  43-Jul 
44,  and  Co  A,  84th  Engr  Camouflage  Bn,  1944;  Coll, 
Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Engineers:  Troops 
and  Equipment,  p.  222;  Comments,  Elliott,  18  Mar  60. 

**"'  Engr  Tech  Bull  19,  Rpt  on  Volturno  River  Bridge 
at  Cancello,  17  May  44;  and  29,  Camouflage,  5  Apr 
45;  IV  Corps  Opns  Rpt,  Aug  44. 

•^  AGE  Bd  Rpt  279,  MTO,  24  Jan  45;  Killian  com- 
ments. 


THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  ALPS 


231 


made  every  effort  to  conceal  the  H 
Corps  buildup  in  the  Empoli-Florence 
area  and  to  simulate  strength  on  the 
left  flank  in  IV  Corps'  Pontedera  sector. 
Among  the  devices  employed  were  dum- 
my bridges  over  canals  and  streams  and 
smoke  to  make  the  enemy  believe  that 
heavy  traffic  was  moving  over  the  dum- 
my bridges.  One  dummy  bridge  at  a 
canal  southwest  of  Pisa  drew  heavy  fire 
for  two  hours. ^'^  In  October  1944  in  the 
IV  Corps  area,  engineers  raised  a  screen 
to  enable  them  to  build  a  1 20-foot  float- 
ing treadway  across  the  Serchio  during 
the  daytime.  During  the  same  month 
Company  D  of  the  84th  Camouflage 
Battalion  erected  a  screen  300  feet  long 
to  conceal  all  movement  across  a  pon- 
ton bridge  that  lay  under  direct  enemy 
observation.  The  engineers  put  up  a 
forty-foot  tripod  on  each  bank  of  the 
river,  used  holdfasts  to  secure  cables, 
and  raised  the  screen  with  a  3/4-ton 
weapons  carrier  winch  and  block  and 
tackle.  In  November  a  bridge  over  the 
Reno  River  at  Silla,  also  exposed  to 
enemy  observation,  was  screened  in  a 
similar  fashion.  Here  the  engineers 
used  houses  on  the  two  riverbanks  as 
holdfasts.*^*^ 

Engineers  set  up  dummy  targets  at 
bridge  sites,  river  crossings,  airstrips, 
and  at  various  other  locations,  building 
them  in  such  shapes  as  artillery  pieces, 
tanks,  bridges,  and  aircraft.  They  were 
used  to  draw  enemy  fire  to  evaluate  its 
volume  and  origin.  They  also  served  to 
conceal  weakness  at  certain  points,  to 
permit  the  withdrawal  of  strong  ele- 


ments, and  to  conceal  buildups.  When 
a  shortage  of  dummy  material  devel- 
oped in  January  1945,  planners  looked 
upon  it  as  a  serious  handicap  to  tactical 
operations.*''^ 

Dummies  and  disguises  took  many 
forms.  Large  oil  storage  tanks  became 
houses.  Company  D  used  spun  glass  to 
blend  corps  and  division  artillery  with 
surrounding  snow.  The  engineers  used 
painted  shelter  halfs  and  nets  with 
bleached  garlands  to  disguise  gun  posi- 
tions, ammunition  pits,  parapets,  and 
other  emplacements.  Camouflage  proved 
valuable  enough  in  many  instances  to 
indicate  that  its  wider  application  could 
have  resulted  in  lower  casualties  and 
easier  troop  movements.*'^ 

Behind  Fifth  Army  in  Italy,  a  mas- 
sive work  of  reconstruction  continued 
as  divisions  moved  forward  against  a 
slowly  retreating  enemy.  In  the  zones 
around  the  major  ports  on  the  western 
side  of  the  peninsula  and  on  the  routes 
of  supply  to  the  army's  rear  area,  the 
base  section  made  its  own  contribution 
to  the  war.  Suffering  many  of  the  same 
strictures  and  shortages  as  Fifth  Army 
engineers,  the  Peninsular  Base  Section 
Engineer  Service  carried  its  own  respon- 
sibilities, guaranteeing  the  smooth  trans- 
fer of  men  and  material  from  dockside 
to  fighting  front.  A  host  of  supporting 
functions  also  fell  to  the  engineer  in 
the  base  section,  often  taxing  strength 
and  ingenuity  to  the  same  degree  as 
among  the  combat  elements. 


''^  IV  Corps  Opns  Rpt,  Aug  44;  Killian  comments. 
*'*'  I V  Corps  Opns  Rpt,  Oct  44;  Engineer  History,  Medi- 
terranean, p.  211. 


•''  Hist  Co  A,  84th  Engr  Camouflage  Bn;  Comments, 
Bowman  and  Elliott,  18  Mar  60. 

''**  I V  Corps  Opns  Rpt,  Feb  45;  Engineer  History,  Medi- 
terranean, pp.  211  —  12. 


CHAPTER  XI 


Engineers  in  the  Peninsular 
Base  Section 


The  support  organization  behind 
Fifth  Army  grew  from  an  embryonic 
planning  group  before  the  invasion  of 
Italy  to  an  entity  of  corporate  size.  Its 
functions  were  more  varied  than  those 
in  the  combat  zones  and  as  important; 
it  had  management  responsibility  under 
Brig.  Gen.  Arthur  W.  Pence,  an  engi- 
neer officer,  for  combat  supply  and  for 
requisitioning  or  foraging  materiel  for 
its  own  wide-ranging  projects.  Specialty 
units  abounded  in  the  base  section 
enclaves.  Through  the  end  of  the  war, 
engineers  were  the  largest  single  seg- 
ment in  the  Peninsular  Base  Section 
(PBS)  command.' 

The  main  task  of  the  PBS  engineers 
in  late  1943  remained  the  rehabilita- 
tion of  the  port  of  Naples.  Their  work 
at  the  docks  helped  Naples  to  become 
one  of  the  busiest  ports  in  the  world. 


'  Except  where  otherwise  noted,  this  chapter  is  based 
on  the  following:  PBS  Engr  Hist,  pt.  I,  1943— 4.^5,  sec. 
I,  Chronological  Summary;  Meyer,  Strategy  and 
Logistical  History:  MTO,  ch.  XIX,  pp.  1  -44.  See  also: 
Ltr,  Pence  to  Truesdell,  26  Nov  43,  sub:  Organiza- 
tion of  PBS;  Periodic  Rpt,  SOS  NATOUSA,  G-4,  31 
Dec  43;  Brig.  C.J.C.  Molony,  "The  Campaign  in  Sicily 
1943  and  The  Campaign  in  Italy  3rd  September  1943 
to  31st  March  1944,"  vol.  V,  The  Mediterranean  and 
Middle  East,  in  the  series  "History  of  the  Second  World 
War"  (London:  HMSO,  1973),  pp.  398-413. 


They  provided  depots  for  receiving 
supplies  and  road,  railroad,  and  pipe- 
line facilities  for  moving  supplies.  They 
improved  highways  serving  PBS  depots 
and  Fifth  Army  supply  dumps  to  han- 
dle heavy  traffic,  built  pipelines  to  carry 
thousands  of  gallons  of  gasoline  from 
Naples  to  pipeheads  within  range  of 
enemy  artillery,  and  established  rail- 
heads in  Fifth  Army  territory  by  recon- 
structing some  of  the  worst  damaged 
lines  of  the  war.  Behind  the  army  boun- 
dary PBS  engineers  also  built  hospitals, 
rest  camps,  repair  shops,  and  other 
facilities. 

On  7  November  1943,  five  weeks 
after  Naples  fell,  one-third  of  the  3 1 ,629 
American  troops  assigned  or  attached 
to  PBS  were  engineers.  The  PBS  Engi- 
neer Service  had  at  its  disposal  19  engi- 
neer units:  2  combat  regiments,  2  gen- 
eral service  regiments,  2  separate  bat- 
talions, and  13  units  of  company  size 
or  less,  including  the  headquarters  of  a 
port  construction  and  repair  group,  a 
petroleum  distribution  company,  a  spe- 
cial utilities  company,  a  water  supply 
company,  2  fire-fighting  platoons,  2 
mobile  searchlight  maintenance  units, 
a  3-man  engineer  mobile  petroleum 
laboratory,  and  a  map  depot  detach- 
ment. By  early  January  1944  the  PBS 


ENGINEERS  IN  THE  PENINSULAR  BASE  SECTION 


233 


Engineer  Service  alone  had  twenty- 
eight  units  totaling  10,464  men.'^ 

When  preparations  for  the  invasion 
of  southern  France  (ANVIL)  got  un- 
der way  in  early  1944,  there  were  not 
enough  engineer  troops  to  support  the 
operation.  The  accompanying  French 
invasion  forces  would  need  American 
help.  A  Fifth  Army  breakout,  expected 
in  the  spring,  meant  that  ANVIL  would 
take  place  when  the  demand  for  engi- 
neer troops  in  Italy  was  at  a  peak.  Of 
eighteen  engineer  combat  battalions 
required  for  ANVIL,  the  French  could 
furnish  two  and  the  U.S.  Army  eight 
trained  in  shore  operations.  The  inva- 
sion would  also  need  eight  engineer 
general  service  regiments;  PBS  and 
Fifth  Army,  each  with  five,  would  both 
have  to  give  up  two.  Shortages  in  engi- 
neer map  depot  detachments  also  ex- 
isted. The  only  port  construction  and 
repair  group  in  the  theater,  the  105ist, 
would  be  needed  at  Marseille  and  was 
allocated  to  ANVIL;  this  meant  PBS 
would  have  to  reopen  Leghorn  with- 
out experienced  port  specialists.  ANVIL 
would  need  three  pipeline  companies, 
two  of  which  were  to  come  from  out- 
side the  theater.^ 

The  loss  of  engineers  to  ANVIL  forced 
the  PBS  engineer,  Col.  Donald  S.  Burns, 
to  use  more  Italian  troops  and  civilians. 
By  early  October  1944  he  was  employ- 
ing 10,000  men  from  Italian  military 
engineer  units  and  about  5,177  civil- 


-^  Station  List,  HQ,  PBS,  7  Nov  43;  Rpt,  HQ,  PBS,  to 
CG.  SOS  NATOUSA,  15  Jan  44,  sub:  Rpt  on  Disposi- 
tion of  Engr  Units,  app.  VIII  B  to  Rpt  of  the  Ener 
PBS. 

^  Estimate  of  Engr  Troop  Situation,  Engr  Sect  (U.S.) 
AFHQ,  14  Feb  44;  Ltr,  Chf  Engr,  PBS,  to  G-4, 
AFHQ,  3  Jun  44,  sub:  Engr  Troop  Requirements, 
NATOUSA;  PBS  Periodic  G-3  Rpt  8,  Jun  44;  10, 
Aug  44;  and  11,  Sep  44,  319.1  PBS  files. 


ians;  but  these  numbers  dropped  where 
new  base  section  installations  in  Leg- 
horn took  shape.  About  9,700  Ameri- 
can engineers  were  in  PBS  after  ANVIL, 
and  by  the  end  of  the  campaign  in  Italy 
PBS  engineer  strength  had  increased 
to  some  10,200.^ 

When  Fifth  Army  stalled  before  Ger- 
man defenses  along  the  Garigliano  and 
Rapido  Rivers  during  the  winter  of 
1943—44,  PBS  engineers  were  able  to 
provide  close  support  no  longer  feasi- 
ble when  the  army  broke  loose  in  May 
1944.  In  two  months  Fifth  Army  drove 
to  the  Arno,  a  distance  of  250  miles, 
and  PBS  support  deteriorated  steadily. 
The  Germans  blew  many  railroad  brid- 
ges and  culverts  as  they  retreated,  and 
PBS  engineers  could  not  repair  them 
at  the  pace  the  troops  were  moving. 
Nor  were  petroleum  engineers  able  to 
build  gasoline  pipelines  at  the  fifteen- 
mile-a-day  pace  the  army  sometimes 
achieved.  Thus  the  main  burden  of  sup- 
plying Fifth  Army  fell  to  motor  trans- 
port, which  soon  began  to  falter  under 
increasingly  longer  hauls,  bottlenecks 
in  hastily  repaired  roads,  and  break- 
downs. 

As  Fifth  Army  drew  up  to  the  Arno 
at  the  end  of  July  1944,  it  was  in  no 
condition  to  assail  the  Gothic  Line.  Men 
were  tired  and  equipment  worn  after 
the  long  sweep  from  the  Rapido.  The 
army's  strength  was  depleted  by  the 
withdrawal  of  units  for  ANVIL,  and  its 
supply  lines  were  stretched  thin.  Before 
it  could  drive  for  the  Po  valley.  Fifth 
Army  needed  time  to  rest,  to  repair  and 


*  PBS  Engr  Hist,  pt.  1,  1943-45,  sec.  II,  app.  II, 
showing  engineer  units  in  PBS  on  various  dates,  and 
their  strengths.  PBS  Periodic  G-3  Rpt  11,  Sep  44; 
Memo,  Engr  Service,  PBS  (Col  D.  S.  Burns),  for  Col 
Oxx,  3  Oct  44,  Procurement  Action  Rpts,  PBS  files. 


234 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


replenish  equipment,  and  to  establish  a 
firm  supply  base  in  northern  Italy. 

The  logical  place  was  Leghorn,  300 
miles  north  of  Naples,  a  port  with  a 
man-made  harbor  that  could  accommo- 
date ships  drawing  up  to  twenty-eight 
feet  of  water.  The  Germans  (with  con- 
siderable assistance  from  Allied  bomb- 
ers) had  so  wrecked  the  port  that  a 
month's  work  would  be  required  before 
deep  draft  vessels  could  enter,  but  as 
soon  as  the  harbor  was  open  to  ship- 
ping it  became  the  main  supply  base 
for  Fifth  Army.  To  oversee  the  work 
there  and  at  the  same  time  look  after 
American  installations  in  the  Naples 
area,  Headquarters,  PBS,  divided  into 
two  groups.  The  one  in  Leghorn  came 
to  be  known  as  PBS  (Main);  the  other 
in  Naples  was  designated  Pensouth  and 
operated  as  a  district  under  the  larger 
headquarters  at  Leghorn. 

Port  Rehabilitation 

Restoring  Italian  ports  after  Novem- 
ber 1943  was  a  battle  of  supply  and 
demand  complicated  by  the  fact  that 
supply  tonnages  for  combat  units  had 
higher  priority  than  those  for  rebuild- 
ing the  ports.  As  Naples  began  func- 
tioning again  it  imported  an  average  of 
10,700  tons  per  day,  well  above  its  pre- 
war capacity,  but  the  engineers  still  had 
to  forage  locally  for  materiel  to  expand 
facilities.  At  Bagnoli  they  located  sub- 
stantial stocks  of  steel  sections,  with- 
out which  they  could  never  have  built 
ramps  for  the  Liberty  ships.  Railroad 
track  and  torpedo  netting  also  came 
from  local  sources,  and  combat  engi- 
neers supplemented  the  American  for- 
estry units  in  cutting  and  milling  tim- 
ber at  Cosenza  for  the  quays  in  Naples 
harbor.  For  piling  the  engineers  welded 


together  locally  procured  ten-inch  di- 
ameter pipes  and  filled  them  with  con- 
crete. Wood  and  prefabricated  steel 
structural  members  were  always  in  short 
supply.^ 

Even  with  the  shortages  of  materiel, 
AFHQ  steadily  revised  upward  the 
planned  port  capacity  goals  for  the  city. 
In  the  beginning  of  January  1944  the 
1051st  Port  Construction  and  Repair 
Group  had  orders  to  build  twenty-six 
temporary  LST  berths,  but  the  demand 
increased  piecemeal  and  by  month's 
end  the  unit  had  constructed  thirty-five 
berths  with  still  more  to  come.  At  that 
time,  when  accumulated  unloading  at 
Naples  and  the  satellite  ports  to  the 
north  had  passed  the  million-ton  level, 
the  revised  program  called  for  over  35 
Liberty  berths,  3  troopship  spaces,  and 
4  smaller  berths  for  coasters.  Port  ca- 
pacity increased  through  the  spring, 
and  in  one  record  day  in  April  33,750 
tons  of  cargo  came  ashore.  With  the 
May  offensive.  Fifth  Army  was  draw- 
ing on  the  massed  stocks  that  had  piled 
up  in  beach  dumps  at  Anzio,  particu- 
larly during  the  breakout  offensive  of 
1944.  (Map  11  f 

With  Fifth  Army's  advance.  Peninsu- 
lar Base  Section  acquired  additional 
ports,  but  they  were  usually  damaged 
severely.  Rome  fell  on  4  June,  Civita- 
vecchia three  days  later,  Piombino  on 
25  June,  and  Leghorn  on  19  July.  At 
Civitavecchia,  the  first  seaport  north  of 
Anzio  potentially  useful  to  the  Allies, 


^  NATOUSA  Statistical  Summary  8,  319.1  (MTO) 
OCE  files;  Wakeman  et  al.,  Rpt  on  Rehabilitation  of 
Naples  and  Other  Captured  Ports,  28  Nov  43;  Col 
Ewart  G.  Plant  et  al.,  Rpt  on  Peninsular  Base  Section, 
10  Feb  44,  in  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  2,  Operational 
Planning. 

^  PBS,  Public  Relations  Sect,  Tools  of  War,  pp.  13-23; 
Plant,  Rpt  on  PBS,  10  Feb  44. 


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"o   p 


Piombino 

d 

TYRRHENIAN  SEA 

0 


0 


\^ 


^ 


GULF 

OF 

VENICE 


ADRIATIC  SEA 


^Rimini 


J^no 


NORTHERN  ITALY 

Winter  Line 
Gothic  Line 
Arno  Line 

0  25  50  Miles 

I , ^ ' 

0  25  50  Kilometers 


Civitavecchia 


o 


\OME 


(6^ 
/elletri 


MAP  11 


236 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Blasting  Obstacles  at  Civitavecchia,  June  1944 


the  540th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment 
forged  through  the  heavy  wreckage  to 
open  DUKW  and  landing  craft  hard- 
stands.  On  1 1  June  the  first  cargo  craft, 
an  LCT,  unloaded;  next  day  an  LST 
nosed  into  a  berth,  and  ferry  craft 
began  to  unload  Liberty  ships.  Cargo 
was  soon  coming  ashore  at  the  rate  of 
3,000  tons  a  day.  Later  the  1051st  Port 
Construction  and  Repair  Group  pro- 
vided Liberty  berths  by  building  ramps 
across  sunken  ships  as  at  Naples.^ 

Even  while  improvements  were  un- 
der way  at  Civitavecchia,  a  new  entry 

'  PBS  Engr  Hist,  pt.  I,  sec.  II,  app.  IV;  Fifth  Army 
Engr  Hist,  vol.  I,  pp.  130,  142;  War  Diary,  AFHQ 
Engr  Sect,  Entry  9  Aug  44;  Fifth  Army  History,  vol.  VI, 
pp.  7,9,  22,  115. 


for  Fifth  Army  supplies  opened  100 
miles  farther  north  at  Piombino,  a  small 
port  on  a  peninsula  opposite  the  island 
of  Elba.  Elements  of  both  the  39th  and 
540th  Engineer  Combat  Regiments  re- 
opened the  port,  which,  like  Civita- 
vecchia, had  suffered  heavy  bomb  dam- 
age. The  main  pier  lay  under  a  mass  of 
twisted  steel  from  demolished  gantry 
cranes  and  other  wreckage,  while  de- 
stroyed buildings  and  railroad  equip- 
ment cluttered  the  area.  But  the  engi- 
neers did  not  find  the  profusion  of 
mines  and  booby  traps  the  retreating 
Germans  usually  left  behind,  and  they 
were  able  to  remove  5,000  tons  of  scrap 
steel  and  pig  iron  from  the  main  piers 
during  the  first  two  days.  Pier  ribbing 


ENGINEERS  IN  THE  PENINSULAR  BASE  SECTION 


237 


and  flooring  repair  required  consider- 
able underwater  work.  After  three  days 
facilities  for  LCTs  to  dock  head  on  were 
available  and  one  alongside  berth  was 
ready  to  receive  a  coaster;  within  the 
next  few  days  hardstands  for  LCTs, 
LSTs,  and  DUKWs  were  available;  and 
at  the  end  of  the  third  week  the  engi- 
neers built  a  pier  over  a  sunken  ship  to 
provide  berths  for  two  Liberty  ships. 
Piombino  joined  Civitavecchia  as  a  main 
artery  of  supply  for  Fifth  Army  during 
July  and  August  1944.^ 

After  the  summer  offensive,  Fifth 
A'rmy  needed  Leghorn  to  support  an 
attack  against  prepared  defenses  in  the 
rugged  northern  Apennines.  Early  in 
July,  when  Fifth  Army  was  still  about 
18  miles  south  of  Leghorn,  PBS  selected 
the  338th  Engineer  General  Service 
Regiment  to  rehabilitate  the  port.  The 
338th,  which  had  been  working  on  hos- 
pitals in  Rome,  had  no  experience  in 
port  repair  but  received  planning  aid 
from  several  specialists  of  the  105 1st 
Group,  representatives  of  the  British 
Navy  charged  with  clearing  the  waters 
of  Leghorn  harbor,  and  shipowners 
and  contractors  who  knew  the  port. 
The  reinforced  engineer  regiment  was 
not  only  to  repair  ship  berths  but  also 
to  be  PBS's  engineer  task  force  in  the 
city.  The  1528th  Engineer  Dump  Truck 
Company  and  an  Italian  engineer  con- 
struction battalion  were  attached  to  the 
task  force,  and  PBS  made  preparations 
to  provide  the  force  with  a  large  amount 
of  angledozers,  cranes,  a  derrick,  and 
other,  heavy  construction  equipment. 
Much  of  this  equipment  was  to  move  to 
Leghorn  aboard  an  LST,  an  LCT,  and 


several  barges,  but  general  cargo  was 
to  be  discharged  directly  from  Liberty 
ships.^ 

Early  on  the  morning  of  19  July,  Leg- 
horn fell  to  elements  of  the  34th  Infan- 
try Division.  Twelve  men  from  the 
338th  Engineers  arrived  in  the  city  a 
few  hours  later  to  clear  mines  from  pre- 
determined routes  into  the  port  area. 
Leghorn  was  heavily  mined,  and  for 
the  first  few  days  little  other  than  mine 
clearing  could  be  accomplished.  As  the 
mine-clearing  teams  made  room,  more 
elements  of  the  338th  Engineers  ar- 
rived, set  up  quarters,  and  began  pre- 
paring a  berth  for  the  LST  and  the 
LCT  carrying  construction  equipment. 
By  26  July  both  craft  had  unloaded.  In 
the  meantime,  engineers  repaired  elec- 
trical lines  and  started  to  restore  the 
municipal  water  system. 

Not  until  28  July  were  engineer  and 
naval  officers  able  to  complete  a  survey 
of  conditions  in  Leghorn  harbor.  They 
were  soon  convinced  that  reopening 
Leghorn  would  be  a  much  more  formi- 
dable job  than  Naples  had  been.  At 
Naples  the  Germans  had  not  blocked 
the  harbor  entrances,  but  in  Leghorn 
sunken  ships  completely  blocked  en- 
trances to  all  but  shallow-draft  craft.  In 
each  channel  the  hulks  were  so  inter- 
locked that  no  single  ship  could  be 
floated  and  swung  aside  to  make  a 
passage.  Ultimately  the  engineers  had 
to  spend  nearly  a  month  blasting  a  pas- 
sage through  the  blockships. 

The  stone  quays  were  pocked  by 
craters,  some  forty  feet  in  diameter,  and 
not  one  of  the  eighty-two  berthing 
spaces  was  untouched.  Elsewhere  in  the 


"  Fifth  Army  History,  vol.  VI,  pp.  53,  1 15-  16;  Hists, 
540th  Engr  C  Rgt,  1942-45,  and  39th  Engr  C  Rgt, 
Jun-Dec  44. 


■'  This  account  of  the  rehabilitation  of  Leghorn  is 
based  on  Hist  338th  Engr  GS  Rgt,  Sep  42 -Nov  44,  as 
well  as  PBS  Engr  Hist,  pt.  I,  1943-45,  Chronological 
Summary. 


238 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


port  area  the  enemy's  work  was  almost 
as  devastating.  Port  equipment  and 
buildings  were  demolished;  roads,  rail- 
roads, and  open  spaces  between  roads 
were  cratered;  and  every  important 
bridge  leading  out  of  the  port  was 
destroyed. 

The  threat  of  sea  mines  in  the  har- 
bor delayed  the  unloading  of  engineer 
equipment  and  construction  materials. 
A  floating  pile  driver  and  three  barges 
loaded  with  piling,  timber,  and  deck- 
ing arrived  at  Leghorn  on  30  July  but 
could  not  enter  the  harbor  until  late  on 
2  August.  The  next  day  engineers  be- 
gan rigging  the  floating  pile  driver  and 
a  1  1/2-yard  crane,  also  to  be  used  as  a 
pile  driver.  Port  and  depot  traffic  pat- 
terns were  also  developing.  The  Ital- 
ians had  handled  freight  directly  from 
wharfside  to  rail,  so  few  of  their  piers 
were  hard  surfaced.  But  Allied  military 
cargo  had  to  be  moved  by  truck,  and  to 
provide  the  large  quantities  of  rock 
needed  for  surfacing  the  engineers  set 
up  a  rock  crusher  to  pulverize  rubble 
from  shell-torn  buildings  and  opened 
a  quarry  nearby.  By  November  the 
338th  Engineers  had  eight  quarries  in 
operation. 

While  the  2d  Battalion,  338th  Engi- 
neers, worked  on  roads  in  the  area,  the 
1st  Battalion  began  to  build  berths  for 
Liberty  ships  and  the  696th  Engineer 
Petroleum  Distribution  Company  re- 
stored pipelines  from  a  tanker  berth  to 
local  tank  farms.  Pile-driving  for  the 
first  Liberty  berths  started  on  5  August, 
and  four  were  ready  by  the  seventeenth. 
Three  days  later,  after  British  naval 
demolition  teams  had  forced  a  passage 
into  the  harbor,  the  Liberty  ship  Sedge- 
wick  came  into  the  port  with  piling  that 
enabled  the  engineers  to  complete  two 
additional    berths.    The    six    Liberty 


berths  then  available  gave  the  port  a 
daily  capacity  of  about  5,000  tons. 

The  goal  for  Leghorn  was  to  reach  a 
capacity  of  12,000  tons  a  day  by  the 
end  of  September.  The  port  achieved 
that  goal  on  the  twenty-fifth  after  a 
ramp  the  engineers  built  from  a  sunken 
tanker  to  the  shore  provided  additional 
Liberty  ship  berths  and  after  landing 
craft  returned  from  the  ANVIL  opera- 
tion. By  that  time  Leghorn  was  the  main 
supply  port  for  Fifth  Army,  and  Civita- 
vecchia and  Piombino  had  closed. 

Petroleum:  From  Tanker  to  Truck 

At  ports  along  the  Italian  coast,  PBS 
engineers  had  to  devote  considerable 
attention  to  unloading  and  distributing 
petroleum  products,  which  accounted 
for  nearly  half  the  tonnage  the  Allies 
shipped  into  the  Mediterranean  the- 
ater. The  engineers  were  responsible 
for  building,  and  in  most  cases  operat- 
ing, not  only  tanker  discharge  facilities 
and  port  terminal  storage  but  also  pipe- 
lines that  carried  the  POL  to  dispens- 
ing and  refueling  stations  in  the  Fifth 
Army  area.  At  the  dispensing  points 
quartermaster  units  operated  canning 
installations,  and  they  usually  took  over 
truck  refueling  points.  In  early  planning 
for  the  discharge  of  oil  tankers  the  PBS 
engineers  had  counted  on  using  Civi- 
tavecchia, the  first  port  north  of  Naples 
capable  of  receiving  tankers.  These 
plans  were  revised  after  the  capture  of 
San  Stefano,  forty  miles  north  of  Civi- 
tavecchia, where,  on  a  spit  of  land  con- 
nected to  the  mainland  by  a  causeway, 
were  located  a  tanker  berth  and  large 
underground  storage  facilities.'^  San 


'"  Ltr,  Capt  R.  H.  Wood,  Supply  and  Construction 
Sect,  to  AFHQ  Engr  Sect,  9  Aug  44,  sub:  Rpt  on  Trip 
to  Fifth  Army  Hqs;  PBS  Engr  Hist,  pt.  I,  pp.  49-50. 


ENGINEERS  IN  THE  PENINSULAR  BASE  SECTION 


239 


Stefano,  along  with  Naples  and  Leg- 
horn, became  a  major  terminal  for  POL 
supplies.  Three  of  the  six  pipeline  sys- 
tems built  in  Italy  emanated  from  Na- 
ples, two  from  San  Stefano,  and  one 
from  Leghorn." 

By  18  November  1943,  engineers  of 
the  696th  Petroleum  Distribution  Com- 
pany had  574,000  barrels  of  storage 
space  at  Naples  ready  for  motor  and 
aviation  gasoline  and  nearly  55,000  bar- 
rels for  diesel  oil.  Another  quarter  of  a 
million  barrels  of  underground  storage, 
found  relatively  undamaged  at  Pozzuoli, 
was  cleaned  and  used  to  store  Navy  fuel 
oil.''^  While  part  of  the  696th — along 
with  as  many  as  550  civilian  workers — 
was  rehabilitating  the  Naples  terminal, 
the  rest  of  the  unit  built  a  four-inch 
gasoline  pipeline  into  the  Fifth  Army 
area.  The  pipeline  originated  on  the 
outskirts  of  Naples  at  a  Socony  refin- 
ery arid  followed  Highway  6  northward. 
The  twelve-mile  section  to  Fertilia  be- 
came operational  on  12  November,  but 
thereafter  fall  rains  and  gusty  winds 
slowed  construction.  Since  it  was  appar- 
ent from  the  beginning  that  one  four- 
inch  pipeline  would  be  inadequate  for 
Fifth  Army's  needs,  petroleum  engi- 
neers had  to  prepare  to  construct  a  sec- 
ond pipeline  by  putting  double  cross- 
ings under  roads  and  over  streams  and 
canals.  The  most  difficult  crossing  was 
over  the  Volturno  River,  a  400-foot 
gap.  Petroleum  engineers  prepared  a 


"  Unless  otherwise  noted  this  section  is  based  on 
Operational  Rpt,  Receipt,  Storage  and  Distribution  of 
Bulk  Petroleum  in  West  Italy,  3  Oct  43-15  Oct  45, 
prepared  for  PBS  by  407th  Engr  Service,  15  Oct  45, 
670.11,  Pipeline  History  1944-45,  NATOUSA  files. 
See  also  Pipeline  Rpt,  Petroleum  Branch,  Engr  Service, 
PBS,  1  Mar  44,  670.11,  Pipeline  History  1944-45, 
NATOUSA  files. 

'■•^  Seech.  VIII. 


suspension  crossing  over  the  Volturno, 
using  two  existing  high  tension  electric 
line  towers  for  supports,  but  flood 
waters  knocked  the  line  out  soon  after 
it  was  finished.  Engineers  repaired  the 
break  and  also  prepared  another  emer- 
gency line  on  an  old  railroad  bridge  2 
1/2  miles  upstream.''' 

Early  in  December  1943  the  705th 
Engineer  Petroleum  Distribution  Com- 
pany joined  the  696th  on  pipeline  work 
in  the  Naples  area,  taking  over  opera- 
tion of  the  port  terminal  and  of  pipe- 
lines as  far  as  the  Volturno.  By  22 
December  two  four-inch  pipelines  with 
a  daily  capacity  of  260,000  gallons  were 
in  operation  to  Calvi  Risorta,  twenty- 
eight  miles  north  of  Naples.  In  Janu- 
ary engineers  extended  these  lines  to 
San  Felice,  nearly  forty-one  miles  from 
Naples,  then  on  to  San  Vittore  where  a 
dispensing  point  was  set  up  only  2  1/2 
miles  from  embattled  Cassino.  A  third 
four-inch  pipeline  followed  as  far  as 
Calvi  Risorta,  then  turned  east  along 
Highway  7  for  over  twelve  miles.  On 
27  March  1944,  the  696th,  with  the  help 
of  a  French  POL  unit,  opened  a  for- 
ward fueling  point  on  this  line  at  Sessa, 
Both  forward  fueling  points  were  with- 
in range  of  enemy  artillery,  but  engi- 
neers of  the  396th  Engineer  Camou- 
flage Company  concealed  them  and 
they  were  never  shelled.'^ 

Before  the  spring  offensive  began  in 
late  May  1944,  petroleum  engineers 
assembled  more  than  one  hundred 
miles  of  six-inch  pipe  (which  could 


' '  PBS  Engr  Hist,  pt.  I,  1943-45,  sec.  IV,  West  Italy 
Pipelines;  Hist  705th  Engr  Pet  Dist  Co,  Apr  45. 

^^  Hist  705th  Engr  Pet  Dist  Co,  Apr  45;  Fifth  Army 
History,  vol.  Ill,  pp.  69—70;  Distances  used  are  those 
given  in  Pipeline  Operations  Rpts,  PBS,  21  Jul  44-20 
Aug  44,  and  21  Apr  44-20  May  44;  and  Operational 
Rpt,  Pipeline  Dispensing,  1944—45. 


240 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


deliver  as  much  gasoline  as  two  four- 
inch  pipelines)  at  forward  points  on 
Highways  6  and  7,  to  be  used  between 
Calvi  Risorta  and  Rome.  A  third  engi- 
neer petroleum  distribution  company, 
the  785th,  arrived  from  the  United 
States  during  April  and  went  to  work 
on  a  four-inch  pipeline  along  Highway 
7  while  the  696th  was  laying  a  six-inch 
line  along  Highway  6.  The  705th  was 
to  operate  the  pipeline  system.'^ 

As  Fifth  Army  pressed  forward  dur- 
ing June  and  July,  sometimes  as  much 
as  fifteen  miles  a  day,  it  left  the  pipe- 
heads  ever  farther  behind.  By  the  time 
the  pipeline  reached  Rome  on  7  July, 
Fifth  Army  was  nearing  Leghorn  and 
San  Stefano  had  fallen.  The  785th  Engi- 
neer Petroleum  Distribution  Company 
reached  San  Stefano  on  24  June,  and 
five  days  later  a  tanker  was  discharging 
80,000  barrels  of  motor  gas  at  the  new 
terminal.  By  2  July  the  785th  had  built 
ten  miles  of  six-inch  pipehne  inland, 
for  only  fifty  miles  away  tanks  and 
trucks  were  running  dry.  The  785th 
expanded  the  San  Stefano  system  to 
cover  143  miles,  and  for  some  time  to 
come  it  was  the  main  source  of  motor 
fuel  for  Fifth  Army.'*' 

At  Leghorn,  captured  on  19  July,  the 
port  was  so  heavily  damaged  and  Ger- 
man shell  fire  so  persistent  that  no 
tanker  could  enter  until  18  September. 
The  696th  Engineer  Petroleum  Distri- 
bution Company,  which  set  up  bivouac 
at  a  Leghorn  refinery,  soon  found  that 
only  25  percent  of  the  tankage  in  the 
area  was  repairable.  At  the  port  all 


'■'  Hist  696th  Engr  Pel  Dist  Co,  May-Sep  44;  War 
Diary,  AFHQ  Engr  Sect,  Jun  44;  Hist  7()5th  Engr  Pet 
Dist  (x),  Apr  45. 

"'  Ltr,  Wood  to  AFHQ  Engr  Sect,  9  Aug  44,  sub: 
Rpt  on  Trip  to  Fifth  Army  Hqs;  PBS  Engr  Hist,  pt.  I, 
1943—45,  sec.  I,  Chronological  Summary,  pp.  49—50. 


tanker  discharge  lines  were  wrecked, 
but  a  tanker  berth  about  1  1/2  miles 
from  the  refinery  was  still  in  good 
condition.  The  696th,  recruiting  about 
one  hundred  civilian  workers,  set  about 
repairing  storage  tanks  at  the  refinery 
while  a  French  petroleum  unit  worked 
on  storage  facilities  at  a  nearby  tank 
farm.  By  10  August  the  696th  had 
restored  a  large  amount  of  storage  and 
had  completed  a  discharge  line  from 
the  tanker  berth.  When  the  first  tanker 
entered  the  port,  storage  was  ready  for 
nearly  275,000  barrels  of  gasoline.  Even- 
tually, the  Leghorn  POL  terminal  had 
facilities  for  62,000  barrels  of  100- 
octane  gasoline,  307,000  barrels  of  80- 
octane,  43,500  barrels  of  lower  octane 
for  civilian  use,  76,100  barrels  of  diesel 
oil,  and  34,500  barrels  of  kerosene.  In 
all,  the  engineers  rehabilitated  thirty- 
two  storage  tanks. 

Early  in  September  Fifth  Army  struck 
north  across  the  Arno,  coordinating 
its  attack  with  an  Eighth  Army  offen- 
sive along  the  Adriatic  coast,  and  by 
the  end  of  the  month  Fifth  Army  troops 
were  only  fourteen  miles  from  Bologna. 
October  found  forward  units  only  nine 
miles  from  the  Po  valley,  but  for  the 
next  few  months  the  army  had  to  use 
nearly  all  its  resources  just  to  survive 
the  northern  Apennine  winter.  Gaso- 
line issues  to  Fifth  Army  troops  contin- 
ued heavy  through  the  winter,  averag- 
ing 357,000  gallons  a  day  between  No- 
vember 1944  and  April  1945.  Much  of 
it  went  to  warm  troops  at  gasoline  stoves 
in  the  mountains  some  ninety  miles 
from  Leghorn. 

In  late  September  the  696th  left  for 
southern  France,  and  the  703d  Engi- 
neer Petroleum  Distribution  Company, 
relieved  from  a  Highway  2  project,  took 
over  both  the  operation  of  the  Leghorn 


ENGINEERS  IN  THE  PENINSULAR  BASE  SECTION 


241 


terminal  and  the  construction  of  pipe- 
lines in  the  wake  of  Fifth  Army.  As  soon 
as  Fifth  Army  began  to  move,  the  703d 
pushed  pipeline  construction  and  by 
the  end  of  October  had  a  double  four- 
inch  line  in  operation  to  Sesto,  thirty- 
six  miles  farther.  By  mid-December  the 
703d  had  carried  the  line  to  Loiano, 
over  eighty-one  miles  beyond  Leghorn. 
For  the  last  ten  miles  snow,  mud,  and 
water  got  into  the  line  and  froze  solid 
in  low  spots  before  the  line  could  be 
tested. 

In  mid-December  1944  engineer  pe- 
troleum companies  were  spread  over 
450  miles.  The  Petroleum  Section  of 
the  Engineer  Service,  PBS,  exercised 
direct  control  over  the  units  but  was 
finding  this  more  and  more  difficult. 
On  25  December  1944,  the  section  acti- 
vated the  407th  Engineer  Service  Bat- 
talion according  to  TOE  5  —  500,  draw- 
ing most  of  the  personnel  from  an 
engineer  utilities  detachment.  The  bat- 
talion was  a  skeleton  headquarters  that 
could  supervise  a  number  of  indepen- 
dently operating  units  and  coordinate 
operation  and  construction  activities. 
All  troops  on  POL  work  in  western  Italy 
(three  American  and  one  Italian  engi- 
neer petroleum  distribution  company 
and  two  battalions  of  other  Italian  troops 
for  security  and  labor  work)  came  under 
the  407th.  This  move  not  only  relieved 
the  Petroleum  Section  but  also  made 
for  better  supply,  planning,  and  main- 
tenance support  for  engineer  pipeline 
units.  The  battalion  set  up  a  major 
maintenance  shop  in  Leghorn  and,  in 
February  1945,  a  smaller  one  in  Naples 
for  third  echelon  and  higher  mainte- 
nance and  repair  of  POL  equipment.  '^ 


'^  AMO  (Lt  Col  Beddow)  1945,  Work  Sheets  of  Engr 
AMO  Survey  Team,  10  May  45;  Ltr,  Lt  Col  E.  P. 
Streck,  Actg  Engr  Ofcr,  PBS,  to  all  Branch  Chfs,  Engr 


When  the  spring  offensive  began  in 
1945,  the  785th  Petroleum  Distribution 
Company,  along  with  a  hundred  Ital- 
ian troops,  stood  ready  to  lay  a  double 
line  up  Highway  65  from  Loiano  to 
Bologna,  twenty-two  miles  away.  The 
work  got  under  way  on  24  April  1945, 
but,  plagued  with  traffic  congestion  on 
the  highway  and  the  multitude  of  mines 
in  the  area,  was  not  finished  until  7 
May. 

The  greatest  handicap  to  efficient 
pipeline  operations  was  the  telephone 
system.  Standard  issue  telephones  were 
totally  inadequate;  the  wire  was  of  such 
low  conductivity  that  messages  travel- 
ing farther  than  twelve  miles  had  to  be 
relayed,  a  process  that  caused  such 
delays  and  confusion  that  the  PBS  engi- 
neer asked  the  PBS  Signal  Section  to 
provide  a  communication  system  solely 
for  pipelines.  The  system  helped,  but 
did  not  solve  the  problems.  Conversa- 
tion between  Leghorn  and  Bologna  was 
impossible,  and  only  clear  weather  and 
shouting  permitted  Sesto  to  converse 
with  either  Leghorn  or  Bologna. 

Deliberate  sabotage  of  pipelines  was 
negligible,  but  civilian  theft  of  petro- 
leum products  was  a  constant  problem. 
In  one  thirty-day  period,  pipeline  losses 
near  Rome  averaged  three  hundred 
barrels  a  day.  Usually  thieves  loosened 
couplings,  though  in  some  cases  they 
knocked  holes  into  pipe.  Breaks  on  long 
downhill  stretches,  where  leaks  could 
not  be  detected  by  a  drop  in  pressure, 
were  especially  costly.  One  such  break 
occurred  a  few  miles  south  of  Bologna, 
at  the  bottom  of  a  32-mile  grade.  Some- 
one carelessly  lighted  a  cigarette  near 
the  spilled  gas.  Eight  civilians  died  in 


Service,  Pensouth,  10  Mar  45,  sub:  Deputy  Theater 
Commanders'  Conf  (6  Mar  45),  NATOUSA  file,  Conf, 
Deputy  Theater  Commander. 


242 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


the  ensuing  holocaust,  which  also  broke 
two  other  lines.  An  estimated  12,000 
gallons  of  gasoline  were  lost.  Leaks 
caused  by  tension  failures  on  couplings 
that  thieves  had  loosened  kept  repair 
crews  busy.  Patrolling  Italian  soldiers 
and  even  horse-mounted  GIs  did  not 
stop  the  tampering.  Italian  courts  treat- 
ed the  few  thieves  who  were  caught 
quite  leniently,  and  American  authori- 
ties sometimes  had  to  pressure  the  Ital- 
ians to  prosecute  such  cases.'" 

Tasks  of  Base  Section  Engineers 

Base  section  engineers  drew  a  multi- 
tude of  assignments.  {Map  12)  Many  of 
them  were  calls  for  a  few  men  to  sweep 
mines,  clear  away  debris,  or  repair 
plumbing.  Others'  tasks  were  larger. 
The  ninety-five  work  orders  the  345th 
Engineer  General  Service  Regiment 
handled  in  August  1944  ranged  from 
repairing  a  water  faucet  at  Villa  Maria 
(the  General  Officers  Rest  Camp  in 
Naples)  to  installing  225  pieces  of  equip- 
ment for  a  huge  quartermaster  laun- 
dry and  dry  cleaning  plant  at  Bagnoli. 
This  unit  was  the  first  base  section  engi- 
neer construction  organization  in  Na- 
ples. Its  early  assignments  included  set- 
ting up  an  engineer  and  a  quartermas- 
ter depot,  repairing  railroads,  building 
POW  camps,  and  working  on  the  Serino 
aqueduct.  The  345th  was  also  responsi- 
ble for  all  street  and  sewer  repair  in 
Naples,  although  civilians  did  the  actual 
work.'^ 


'**  Ltrs,  HQ,  705th  Engr  Pet  Dist  Co,  to  Engr,  Engr 
Service,  Pensouth,  various  dates,  sub:  Loss  of  Gaso- 
line on  the  Naples-Rome,  Italy,  Pipeline,  PBS  file. 
Loss  of  Gas  on  Naples-Rome  PPL  1944-45;  NATO- 
USA  Statistical  Summary  10,  1  Jan  44,  319.1  (MTO), 
OCE  file. 

''^  Unless  otherwise  cited  this  section  is  based  on  Engr 
Service,  PBS,  Work  Accomplished,  and  the  histories 
of  the  units  mentioned. 


Railway  repair  was  an  unexpected  task. 
In  Avalanche  planning  the  Transpor- 
tation Corps'  Military  Railway  Service 
(MRS),  with  help  from  the  Italians,  was 
expected  to  handle  railroad  rehabilita- 
tion and  engineers  were  to  be  responsi- 
ble only  for  new  rail  construction — 
mainly  spurs  into  dumps  and  depots. ^^ 
But  the  rail  net  was  so  badly  damaged 
and  the  Italian  railroad  agencies  so  dis- 
organized that  MRS  had  to  ask  the  engi- 
neers for  help.  Most  of  the  work  fell  to 
the  94th  Engineer  General  Service  Reg- 
iment, which  arrived  in  Naples  the  sec- 
ond week  of  October  1943  and  started 
rehabilitating  lines  to  the  Aversa  rail- 
head even  before  their  vehicles  and 
equipment  were  ashore.^' 

Supplies  for  track  reconstruction  had 
to  be  cannibalized.  For  example,  to 
repair  one  lane  of  double-track  lines 
the  engineers  used  rails,  ties,  and  fish 
plates  from  the  other  track.  They  also 
gathered  material,  as  well  as  frogs  and 
switches,  from  railway  yards  and  unes- 
sential spur  lines.  Sometimes  engineers 
could  stockpile  items,  but  because  the 
Germans  had  destroyed  many  of  the 
frogs  and  switches  they  were  scarce. 
Luckily,  a  large  stock  of  unused  rails 
turned  up  in  Naples.  For  bridging  the 
engineers  used  steel  salvaged  from  de- 
stroyed spans  and  from  a  steel  mill  at 
Bagnoli.  However,  they  also  needed 
timber.  Railroad  bridging  supplies  re- 
mained short,  and  in  many  instances 


^"  Wakeman  et  al.,  Rpt  on  Rehabilitation  of  Naples 
and  other  Captured  Ports,  28  Nov  43;  Extracts  from 
Rpt  on  Peninsular  Base  Section,  NATOUSA,  10  Feb 
44,  sec.  VIII,  Engr  Service. 

^'  Hist  of  PBS,  Phases  II  and  III,  28  Aug  43-3  Jan 
44;  Rpt,  Functions  of  the  Base  Engr,  prepared  by 
PBS  Engr,  25  Oct  43,  381  NATOUSA  file;  Extracts 
from  Rpt  on  PBS,  NATOUSA,  10  Feb  44,  sec.  VIII, 
Engr  Service. 


Piombino 


San  Stefano 


Civitavecchia 


%. 


PENINSULAR  BASE  SECTION 


Approximate  pipeline  route 

H 1 1 h  Major  rail  repairs 

"^If  Repaired  ports 

0  50  100  Miles 


Cisterna 

Station 

•  -    _ 

San     "  ^  ^      Cassino 
Biagio  \  l^San  Vittore 

Mignano, ' 
Mt  Orso  TunnerT^Vo/7<y/  o     "       \\San  Felice 

Sparanise  ^^Capua 

tertilia  J 

Bagnoli^     ^ 

Naples 


50 


100  Kilometers 


Pozzuoli 


MAP  12 


244 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


the  engineers  had  to  resort  to  culverts 
topped  by  huge  earth  fills. '^^ 

By  the  end  of  November  1943  the 
rail  reached  Capua  and  before  the  spring 
offensive  stretched  to  Mignano,  less 
than  ten  miles  south  of  Cassino.  The 
closest  yet  built  to  combat  lines,  the  rail- 
head was  within  range  of  German  270- 
mm.  artillery.  Early  in  June  1944  the 
94th  Engineers  began  the  largest  sin- 
gle railroad  repair  assignment  in  Italy, 
reopening  a  32-mile  stretch  from  Monte 
San  Biagio  station  to  Cisterna  station 
on  the  main  coastal  line  to  Rome.  The 
main  block  was  the  4  1/2-mile  Monte 
Orso  tunnel,  blown  in  three  places,  a 
few  miles  out  of  San  Biagio.  The  south 
portal  was  blocked  partially  and  the 
north  portal  completely,  but  the  main 
obstruction  was  deep  inside  the  moun- 
tain. These  engineers  worked  with  air 
hammers  and  explosives,  cutting  a  pas- 
sage by  breaking  up  large  rocks  and 
carting  off  the  debris  on  a  small  indus- 
trial railway  installed  for  the  purpose. 
The  work  was  slow  at  best,  but  toward 
the  end  of  June  a  front-end  loader 
mounted  on  a  D— 4  tractor  more  than 
doubled  the  removal  capacity. 

The  engineers  relied  on  a  natural 
draft  to  carry  off  fumes  from  genera- 
tor engines  that  supplied  power  for 
lighting  and  for  air  compressors,  but 
when  the  draft  occasionally  reversed, 
dangerous  fumes  soon  fouled  the  air. 
Large  exhaust  fans  did  not  solve  the 
problem,  and  ultimately  the  generators 
had  to  be  moved  outside  the  tunnel. 
The  engineers  then  installed  a  four- 


2'^  Ltr,  HQ,  AGF,  to  CG,  Second  Army  et  al.,  sub: 
Observer's  Notes  on  the  Italian  Campaign,  4  Oct 
43-29  Mar  44,  319.1,  AGF  file.  Binder  1,  Jan-Jun  44; 
PBS  Engr  Hist,  pt.  I,  1943-45,  sec.  I,  Chronological 
Summary,  p.  31;  Engr  Service,  PBS,  Work  Accom- 
plished, 2  Oct  43-1  Sep  44,  pp.  142-46. 


inch  pipeline  to  carry  compressed  air 
to  a  pressure  tank  near  the  main  block, 
whence  two  smaller  lines  carried  the 
compressed  air  to  the  work  forces. 

The  main  problem  was  to  cut  a  pas- 
sage through  the  mass  of  debris  with- 
out bringing  down  more  rock  and  dirt. 
The  engineers  first  built  a  broad-base 
masonry  wall  atop  the  debris  on  each 
side  of  the  passage  to  support  the  roof. 
Then  they  removed  the  material  be- 
tween the  two  walls,  tamped  crevices 
and  cracks  exposed  in  the  debris  sup- 
porting the  walls  with  mortar,  and  filled 
undermined  sections  with  stone  mason- 
ry. The  engineers  had  another  major 
difficulty  at  track  level,  where  the  debris 
was  composed  of  fine  material  that  had 
filtered  down  through  the  larger  rocks. 
This  material  tended  to  run  out  from 
under  the  new  walls,  and,  once  started, 
was  hard  to  stop.  In  one  instance  the 
fine  material  undermined  a  forty-foot 
section  of  new  wall  and  delayed  work 
for  four  days.  Only  by  making  under- 
mined sections  shorter  could  the  engi- 
neers alleviate  the  problem.  This  pro- 
cess slowed  all  work  on  the  tunnel,  and 
the  rail  line  to  Cisterna  did  not  open 
until  20  July. 

North  of  the  Monte  Orso  tunnel  the 
Germans  had  blown  overpasses  and 
bridges,  removed  whole  sections  of  rail 
to  help  build  defensive  works,  and  pre- 
pared culverts  for  demolition  but  had 
actually  blown  few.  The  main  job  north 
of  Monte  Orso  was  bridging  the  Musso- 
lini Canal,  where  two  of  three  concrete- 
arch  spans  were  down.  The  94th  Engi- 
neers restored  this  crossing  by  using  a 
68-foot  steel  girder  to  span  the  center 
section  of  the  bridge  and  an  earth  fill 
to  replace  the  northern  span. 

On  this  and  other  jobs  along  the  sec- 
tion of  railroad  north  of  Monte  Orso  a 


ENGINEERS  IN  THE  PENINSULAR  BASE  SECTION 


245 


major  problem  was  getting  supplies. 
Engineer  equipment  and  construction 
material  had  to  be  trucked  80  to  115 
miles  from  the  Naples  area;  cement  and 
bridge  steel  came  40  to  70  miles  from 
the  Minturno  railhead;  some  lumber 
came  50  miles  from  Anzio  (but  most  of 
it  by  truck  from  Naples);  and  sand  came 
from  beaches  5  to  15  miles  from  the 
railroad.  Until  it  closed,  the  Fifth  Army 
fuel  point  at  Fondi  supplied  gasoline. 
Later,  gas  and  oil  had  to  be  hauled  sixty 
to  ninety  miles  from  Sparanise. 

Once  Fifth  Army  reached  Leghorn 
on  20  July,  almost  all  rehabilitation  was 
centered  on  lines  well  north  of  Rome.  In 
PBS  (Main),  rehabilitation  included 
forty-eight  miles  of  mainline  track,  nine 
major  bridges,  and  six  railheads.  Much 
of  this  work  was  in  the  immediate  vicin- 
ity of  Leghorn,  but  the  largest  single 
assignment  was  a  twelve-mile  stretch  of 
track  between  Pisa  and  Florence,  where 
five  demolished  bridges  had  to  be  re- 
built. By  V-E  Day  3,000  miles  of  rail 
lines  were  in  use  in  western  Italy. 

Work  on  roads  accounted  for  nearly 
one-third  of  base  section  construction 
man-hours  from  July  1944  to  mid- 
March  1945.  In  northern  Italy,  Italian 
soldiers  and  contractors  working  under 
engineer  supervision  accounted  for 
over  75  percent  of  the  man-hours  that 
went  into  road  maintenance  and  repair. 
But  many  assignments — particularly 
building  and  maintaining  roads  in  base 
section  depots — were  either  too  diffi- 
cult or  too  urgent  for  local  authorities 
to  handle,  and  these  fell  to  American 
engineer  units. 

One  of  the  main  occupations  of  base 
section  engineers  was  general  hospital 
construction,  which  consisted  mostly  of 
expanding  existing  buildings  and  facili- 
ties. In  the  Naples  area,  the  unfinished 


exhibition  buildings  at  Bagnoli  fair- 
grounds housed  six  hospitals,  a  medi- 
cal laboratory,  and  a  medical  supply 
depot.  The  Army  took  over  modern 
civilian  hospitals  in  the  city  and  used 
schools  and  other  public  buildings  to 
house  nine  more  hospitals.  A  general 
hospital  operated  in  an  apartment  build- 
ing near  Pomigliano  Airfield,  and  an 
unfinished  apartment  building  at  Fuori- 
grotta,  near  the  Bagnoli  fairgrounds, 
was  home  to  the  37th  General  Hospital. 
Much  of  the  engineer  work  went  into 
increasing  the  water,  electric,  and  sani- 
tary systems.  At  most  hospitals  engi- 
neers had  to  black  out  windows,  clear 
away  debris,  put  up  or  take  out  parti- 
tions, install  equipment,  and  erect  pre- 
fabricated barracks  where  more  space 
was  needed. 

Using  existing  buildings  had  great 
advantages  over  putting  up  standard 
buildings,  but  from  the  engineer  stand- 
point it  also  had  certain  disadvantages. 
Since  the  scale  of  allowances  N ATOUSA 
established  was  barely  applicable,  each 
potential  site  had  different  construction 
and  alteration  requirements.  As  each 
site  was  selected,  the  Engineer  Service 
and  the  surgeon's  office  determined 
what  work  would  be  required.  In  most 
cases  engineers  were  able  to  move  hos- 
pital personnel  in  within  a  few  days  and 
then  continue  their  work. 

By  mid-March  1944,  twenty-three 
general  and  station  hospitals  were  open 
in  the  vicinity  of  Naples.  Five  more  were 
started  before  the  end  of  May,  but  find- 
ing large  buildings  to  convert  was  be- 
coming increasingly  difficult.  After  the 
spring  offensive  began  only  one  more 
was  built  south  of  Anzio,  and  it  con- 
sisted mainly  of  20-by-48-foot  prefabri- 
cated barracks.  The  offensive  opened 
up  a  new  supply  of  barracks,  schools, 


246 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


and  other  public  buildings  adaptable 
to  hospitals.  In  June  hospitals  started 
operating  in  Rome  and  in  smaller  towns 
to  the  north.  During  the  latter  months 
of  the  campaign,  hospital  construction 
centered  in  the  Leghorn-Florence  area; 
of  the  twenty-three  hospitals  built  north 
of  Anzio  by  mid-March  1945,  five  were 
in  Rome,  six  in  Leghorn,  and  four  in 
Florence. 

For  a  long  time  the  largest  general 
construction  assignment  was  hospitals, 
but  toward  the  close  of  1944,  with  the 
end  of  the  war  in  sight,  another  pro- 
gram loomed  for  PBS  engineers:  pre- 
paring training  and  staging  areas  for 
redeploying  troops  and  building  enclo- 
sures for  prisoners  of  war.  By  mid- 
February  1945  tentative  redeployment 
plans  called  for  eight  25,000-man  train- 
ing areas,  two  5,000-man  training  areas, 
and  two  20,000-man  staging  areas.  Also 
in  prospect  was  a  major  construction 
program  to  accommodate  liberated  Rus- 
sians and  another  for  Nazi  prisoners  of 
war.  The  two  20,000-man  staging  areas 
were  then  well  toward  completion,  but 
MTOUSA  and  the  War  Department 
delayed  the  POW  enclosures.  Repeated 
changes  in  instructions  for  the  Florence 
redeployment  training  area  also  made 
it  difficult  for  the  Engineer  Service  to 
allocate  construction  equipment,  per- 
sonnel, and  material.  By  mid-April  con- 
struction had  started  on  four  POW 
camps:  one  at  Aversa  for  10,000  men, 
another  at  Florence  for  13,000,  and  two 
at  Leghorn  for  60,000.  Construction  for 
redeployment  and  for  POWs  continued 
beyond  V  — E  Day.  When  Germany  sur- 
rendered, 20,000-man  redeployment 
training  areas  at  Francolise,  Monteca- 
tini,  and  Florence,  as  well  as  three 
30,000-man  POW  camps,  were  still 
under  construction. 


On  nearly  every  PBS  engineer  job, 
mine  clearing  had  first  priority — even 
in  areas  once  held  by  Fifth  Army  troops. 
To  remove  mines  in  areas  into  which 
Allied  troops  moved,  PBS  relied  on  base 
section  engineers,  British  as  well  as 
American,  who  got  some  help  from 
attached  Italian  engineer  troops  and  at 
the  end  of  the  war  from  volunteer  Ital- 
ian prisoners  of  war.  Mine  clearing  took 
considerable  time;  for  example,  in  June 
1944  at  Scauri  the  345th  Engineers 
spent  22,405  man-hours  during  an  eigh- 
teen-day period  searching  a  building 
to  be  used  by  the  49th  Quartermaster 
Group.  At  a  hospital  site  north  of  Naples 
the  same  unit  found  230  Teller  mines 
and  47  other  mines  and  booby  traps. 
At  Leghorn,  one  of  the  most  heavily 
mined  areas  in  Italy,  base  section  en- 
gineers, with  the  help  of  two  British 
bomb  disposal  units,  removed  25,000 
mines.  Other  mine  removal  was  a  re- 
sponsibility of  the  Allied  Military  Gov- 
ernment Labor  Office,  which  recruited 
and  trained  civilian  volunteers  for  the 
work.  By  mid-April  these  volunteers 
had  found  69,000  mines,  bombs,  and 
projectiles  in  and  around  Florence 
alone. 

In  addition  to  the  large  body  of  PBS 
engineers  working  on  construction — 
the  general  service  regiments,  combat 
battalions  and  regiments,  port  construc- 
tion companies,  separate  battalions, 
construction  battalions,  and  petroleum 
distribution  companies,  which  built 
ports,  roads,  bridges,  railroads,  camps, 
hospitals,  stockades,  depots,  and  other 
installations — were  a  number  of  the 
small  special  units  such  as  water  supply 
and  mapping.  In  August  1943  the  War 
Department  abolished  water  supply  bat- 
talions in  favor  of  separate  companies 
and  left  reorganizing  the  battalions  to 


ENGINEERS  IN  THE  PENINSULAR  BASE  SECTION 


247 


the  theaters'  discretion.  Fifth  Army 
chose  not  to  reorganize  its  405th  Engi- 
neer Water  Supply  Battalion  until  after 
V  — E  Day.  PBS  had  to  reorganize  the 
401st  Engineer  Water  Supply  Battal- 
ion in  August  1944  to  furnish  units  for 
Anvil  and  redesignated  Companies  A 
and  B  the  151 3th  and  the  1 5 1 4th  Engi- 
neer Supply  Companies,  respectively. 
The  former  took  over  water  supply 
work  in  PBS,  and  the  1514th  went  to 
southern  France. 

The  405th  Water  Supply  Battalion 
provided  74  percent  of  the  454,765,000 
gallons  of  water  the  army  drew  through 
the  campaign. "^^  When  the  rear  section 
of  Company  C  entered  Naples  from  the 
land  side  on  1  October,  the  city  had 
been  without  fresh  water  for  more  than 
a  week,  for  the  retreating  Germans  had 
destroyed  the  53-mile-long  aqueduct 
l^ringing  spring  water  from  Serino. 
Sewer  lines  were  clogged  and  over- 
flowing, and  the  danger  of  a  typhoid 
or  typhus  epidemic  threatened  a  half 
million  people.  At  first  the  rear  section 
could  accomplish  little,  for  all  purifica- 
tion equipment  was  out  in  the  harbor 
aboard  ship  with  the  main  section;  but 
the  following  morning  the  rear  section 
discovered  within  a  hundred  yards  of 
the  headquarters  they  had  established 
in  the  Poggioreale  area,  the  undamaged 
Bolla  aqueduct,  which  brought  indus- 
trial water  to  the  city.  With  meager 
equipment  the  section  pumped  this 
water  into  tankers,  purified  it,  and  set 
up  four  water  points  in  the  city.  Crowds 


'^•^  Capt.  William  J.  Diamond,  "Water  Supply  in 
Italy,"  The  Military  Engineer,  XXXIX  (August  1947), 
332;  Rpt,  Functions  of  the  Base  Engr,  prepared  by 
PBS  Engr,  25  Oct  43;  Extracts  from  Rpt  on  Peninsu- 
lar Base  Section,  NATOUSA,  10  Feb  44,  sec.  VIII, 
Engr  Service;  PBS  Engr  Hist,  pt.  I,  1943-45,  sec.  I, 
Chronological  Summary,  pp.  27-30;  Engineer  History, 
Mediterranean,  app.  K. 


of  civilians  with  containers  gathered, 
the  press  so  great  that  armed  guards 
had  to  keep  order.  By  curfew  the  same 
day,  60,000  gallons  of  water  had  been 
distributed.  After  the  arrival  of  the 
main  section  of  the  company  and  eleven 
days  and  nights  of  work,  fresh  water 
reached  Naples  by  13  October. 

Company  C  of  the  405th  remained 
in  the  Naples  area  until  the  401st  Water 
Supply  Battalion  arrived  in  mid-Nov- 
ember 1943  to  handle  water  supply  in 
the  PBS  area.  Thereafter  the  405th 
employed  a  company  for  supplying 
army  installations,  particularly  hospitals. 
During  the  winter  of  1943  —  44  not  all 
of  the  401st  was  needed  in  the  PBS 
area,  and  at  least  one  company  was  gen- 
erally available  for  well  drilling,  water 
hauling,  and  general  construction. 

In  the  north  at  Leghorn  the  main 
source  of  water  was  a  series  of  wells  at 
Filettole  pump  station,  some  fifteen 
miles  north  of  Pisa.  When  Leghorn  fell 
these  wells  were  still  in  German  hands, 
but  engineers  were  able  to  furnish  water 
from  other  sources.  When  the  Filettole 
station  was  captured,  engineers  found 
that  the  Germans  had  destroyed  all  the 
pumps,  and  restoring  the  facility  ap- 
peared hopeless.  Closer  inspection,  how- 
ever, showed  that  new  pumps  could 
make  the  station  operational.  This  job 
was  undertaken  by  Company  F  of  the 
338th  Engineer  General  Service  Regi- 
ment, aided  by  civilian  workers.  Also 
required  to  reopen  the  line  to  Leghorn 
were  repairs  to  a  twenty-mile-long, 
sixteen-inch  cast-iron  pipeline  that  had 
been  broken  in  many  places,  the  worst 
at  the  550-foot  Arno  River  crossing,  the 
300-foot  Serchio  River  crossing,  and  a 
100-foot  canal  crossing. 

The  most  difficult  repair  job  was  at 
the  Arno  River  crossing.  In  September 


248 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Company  F  tried  to  put  a  pipe  across 
the  Arno  on  bents  built  on  the  trusses 
of  a  demolished  bridge,  but  flood  waters 
washed  it  out  before  it  was  finished. 
Company  F  then  tried  to  put  a  welded 
pipe  across  the  river  bottom,  but  the 
pipe  broke  on  23  October.  In  the  mean- 
time a  new  Serchio  River  crossing  had 
to  be  raised  six  feet  to  get  it  above  flood 
stage.  In  November  a  third  attempt  to 
get  a  line  across  the  Arno  succeeded, 
and  water  began  to  flow  through  to 
Leghorn.  Many  leaks  showed  up  in  the 
pipeline,  and  repairs  and  improve- 
ments continued  well  into  1945.  Over 
96,000  man-hours,  divided  about  equally 
between  several  engineer  units  and  Ital- 
ian civilians,  ultimately  went  into  the 
restoration. 

At  both  Naples  and  Leghorn,  as  well 
as  in  other  cities,  the  municipal  water 
systems  were  badly  damaged,  but  not 
destroyed.  The  Germans  had  needed 
to  use  municipal  water  supplies  until 
the  last  minute,  and  civilians  had  frus- 
trated some  destruction.^"^  Engineers 
were  able  not  only  to  restore  water  for 
public  use  in  a  remarkably  short  time 
but  also  to  provide  railroad  engineers 
with  water  for  locomotives  and  to  send 
tank  trucks  to  engineer  fire-fighting 
platoons. ^^ 

The  War  Department  first  author- 
ized fire-fighting  units  for  the  Corps  of 
Engineers  in  August  1942,  and  by  the 
end  of  1943  six  platoons  of  thirty-eight 
men  each  were  in  Peninsular  Base  Sec- 
tion. Several  more  were  formed  in  June 
1944  from  the  6487th  Engineer  Con- 
struction Battalion,  and  five  Italian  fire- 
fighting  units  were  organized  and  equip- 


ped; just  before  ANVIL,  PBS  had  nine- 
teen fire-fighting  platoons.  The  new 
platoons  trained  at  a  fire-fighting  school 
in  Aversa,  each  equipped  and  organ- 
ized to  operate  in  four  sections.  The 
main  job  was  not  to  fight  fires  but  to 
prevent  them  by  inspecting  for  fire  haz- 
ards and  by  keeping  fire  extinguishers 
filled  and  in  good  working  order.  De- 
spite such  precautions  a  number  of  fires 
broke  out.  One  fire-fighting  platoon 
assigned  to  Fifth  Army  averaged  three 
fire  calls  a  week  for  several  months,  and 
at  the  Anzio  ammunition  depot  fifty 
fires  broke  out  during  April  1944  alone. 
Tankdozers  and  armored  bulldozers, 
used  to  scatter  burning  ammunition 
boxes  and  then  smother  them  with  dirt, 
were  effective  against  dangerous  ammu- 
nition dump  fires. '^^^ 

A  less  familiar  task  in  Italy  was  real 
estate  operations.  In  the  AVALANCHE 
plans  the  responsibility  for  procuring 
properties  for  American  agencies  went 
to  the  engineers.  The  Real  Estate  Branch 
of  the  PBS  Engineer  Service  processed 
all  requests  by  American  units  for  prop- 
erty in  the  base  section  area.  It  also  took 
control  of  real  estate  records  for  prop- 
erty that  Fifth  Army  released  to  Penin- 
sular Base  Section.  In  the  combat  area 
when  Fifth  Army  troops  damaged  prop- 
erty they  occupied  (and  their  occupancy 
was  a  matter  of  record)  the  owner  was 
entitled  to  compensation.  Damage  that 
occurred  before  occupancy  was  charged 
to  "fortunes-of-war,"  for  which  no  com- 
pensation was  paid.  Careful  records 
had  to  be  kept  to  separate  the  two 
categories.  For  these  purposes  photo- 
graphic records  showing  the  condition 


■"' '  Chf  Engr,  1 5th  Army  Gp,  Notes  on  Engr  Opns  in 
Ital^,  no.  8,  1  Feb  44. 
'^•'  Diamond,  "Water  Supply  in  Italy,"  p.  332. 


-''  Fred  K.  Shirk,  "Engineer  Fire  Fighters  in  the 
March  on  Rome,"  The  Military  Engineer,  XXXVII 
(April  1945),  147-48. 


ENGINEERS  IN  THE  PENINSULAR  BASE  SECTION 


249 


of  properties,  particularly  when  removal 
of  damaged  portions  was  necessary, 
proved  valuable,  as  did  detailed  inven- 
tories of  small,  movable  furnishings  and 
fixtures.  When  the  war  ended,  the  Real 
Estate  Branch  held  active  files  on  more 
than  3,900  properties  ranging  from 
open  fields  to  beautiful  villas.  Hundreds 
more  had  been  requisitioned,  used,  and 
returned  to  private  owners. 

Before  the  invasion  of  Italy  the  engi- 
neers had  made  few  preparations  to 
handle  real  estate  work.  The  field  was 
fairly  new,  and  few  officers  were  ex- 
perienced. For  the  most  part,  forms  and 
procedures  had  to  be  worked  out  by 
trial  and  error  in  Italy.  Under  the  terms 
of  the  armistice  the  Italian  government 
undertook  to  make  all  required  facil- 
ities, installations,  equipment,  and  sup- 
plies available  to  the  Allies  and  to  make 
all  payments  in  connection  with  them. 
Allied  military  agencies  made  only  emer- 
gency payments  required  to  keep  finan- 
cially alive  individual  workers  and  con- 
tractors employed  by  the  Allies. '^^ 

Procuring  real  estate  for  military  use 
and  keeping  the  necessary  records  were 
nevertheless  considerable  tasks.  One  of 
the  biggest  stumbling  blocks  for  the 
Real  Estate  Branch  was  the  lack  of  a 
central  agency  in  Fifth  Army  to  handle 
real  estate;  thus,  records  the  army  turned 
over  to  PBS  were  often  confused.  The 
establishment  of  a  real  estate  section  in 
the  Fifth  Army  engineer  command, 
after  nearly  a  year  in  Italy,  helped  mat- 
ters considerably.  Thereafter  this  sec- 
tion, together  with  G— 4,  Fifth  Army, 
was  able  to  plan  in  advance  for  real 
estate  needed  for  dumps,  bivouac  areas, 
and  other  installations.'^*^ 


"^  (iarland  and  Smyth,  Sicily  arid  the  Surrender  of  Italy, 
pp.  559-64. 

""  Extracts  from  Rpt  on  Peninsular  Base  Section, 


Engineers  in  PBS  were  to  handle, 
store,  and  issue  maps.  Under  the  Sup- 
ply Branch  of  the  PBS  Engineer  Service, 
two  thirteen-man  engineer  depot  de- 
tachments operated  a  map  depot  and 
made  bulk  issues  to  both  Fifth  and 
Eighth  Armies.  Peninsular  Base  Section 
had  no  topographic  units  for  survey, 
drafting,  or  reproduction.  The  map 
depot  detachments  had  reproduction 
sections  but  limited  their  operations  to 
copying  construction  drawings  and  pre- 
paring administrative  directives  and 
reports  for  the  PBS  engineer  and  engi- 
neer units. 

Soon  after  Naples  fell  the  2634th 
Engineer  Map  Depot  Detachment  set 
up  a  map  library  at  the  Engineer  Ser- 
vice headquarters  and  a  base  map  depot 
at  Miano.  The  map  library  filled  small 
orders  while  the  Miano  depot  made 
bulk  issues  to  Fifth  and  Eighth  Armies. 
A  second  map  depot  detachment  arrived 
in  the  base  section  in  November  1943 
and  a  third  in  April  1944.  NATOUSA 
activated  other  map  depot  detachments 
for  Anvil,  and,  of  the  final  total  of  six, 
three  went  to  southern  France. 

In  preparation  for  the  1944  offen- 
sives to  and  past  Rome,  PBS  engineers 
took  over  some  twenty  tons  of  maps 
from  Fifth  Army  depots  at  Paestum, 
but  these  sheets  covered  only  the  area 
south  of  the  Volturno.  Additional  maps 
covering  the  area  north  to  Leghorn 
arrived  later,  and  before  the  end  of 
1943  some  700  tons  of  maps  had 
reached  the  Miano  depot.  The  PBS 
map  depots  stocked  ground  maps  of 
Italy  in  four  scales  (1:25,000,  1:50,000, 
1 : 1 00,000,  and  1 :250,000)  as  well  as  air 
maps,  small-scale  coverages  of  Europe, 


NATOUSA,  10  Feb  44,  sec.  VIII,  Engr  Service;  PBS 
Engr  Hist,  pt.  I,  1943-45,  sec.  I,  Chronological 
Summary. 


250 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


town  plans,  and  road  maps.  The  num- 
ber of  map  sheets  ran  into  the  millions.""' 

For  the  first  time  in  the  European 
war,  engineer  lumber  operations  in 
Italy  assumed  importance.  Engineer 
training  was  based  largely  on  the  use  of 
locally  procured  lumber  for  all  aspects 
of  construction,  but  in  the  United  King- 
dom, North  Africa,  and  Sicily  the  sup- 
ply had  been  so  short  that  the  engi- 
neers had  come  to  rely  on  substitutes. 

Italv  offered  the  first  real  opportu- 
nity overseas  to  obtain  large  quantities 
of  lumber  from  local  sources.  In  two 
years,  PBS  forestry  operations  in  Italy 
produced  lumber  amounting  to  370,885 
ship  tons,  more  than  the  total  tonnage 
of  engineer  supplies  recovered  through 
Italian  ports  during  the  first  year  of 
the  campaign.  The  lumbering  opera- 
tions also  saved  money;  Italian  lumber 
cost  an  estimated  $25.00  per  1,000 
board  feet  delivered  to  the  using  unit; 
the  price  in  the  United  States  at  the 
time  was  $40.00  per  1,000  board  feet 
at  the  mill.'*' 

At  about  the  time  of  the  Salerno 
landing,  engineers  crossed  the  Strait  of 
Messina  to  investigate  timber  reserves 
and  lumbering  facilities  in  Cosenza 
Province  and  found  approximately  nine 
million  board  feet  of  milled  lumber,  a 
large  stockpile  of  unsawed  logs,  exten- 
sive timber  tracts,  and  scores  of  exist- 
ing sawmills.  With  the  capture  of  Naples, 
lumber  quickly  became  a  critical  item. 
The  engineers  needed  piles  for  port 
rehabilitation,  bridging,  and  power  line 
poles;  timbers  and  heavy  planking  for 
building  and  decking;  ties  for  railroads; 


-"AGF  Bd  Rpt  179,  NATOUSA.  Notes  on  Map- 
ping an  Army.  16  Aug  44;  PBS  Engr  Hist.  pt.  I, 
1943-45,  sec.  1,  Chronological  Summary. 

'"  PBS  Engr  Hist,  pt.  I,  1943-45,  sec.  II,  app.  V 
and  app.  VI;  Hist  800th  Engr  Forestry  Co,  13  Dec 
43-30  Jun  44. 


and  lumber  for  boxing,  building,  and 
dunnage.  The  only  American  forestry 
unit  in  the  theater,  the  800th  Engineer 
Forestry  Company,  was  then  operating 
a  sawmill  in  Tunisia,  but  this  unit  had  a 
relativelv  low  shipping  priority  and 
could  not  be  moved  promptly  to  Italy. 
Therefore,  during  the  latter  part  of 
November  PBS  sent  a  detachment  of 
about  fifty  men  from  the  40th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Regiment  to  the  Cosenza 
area  to  ship  stockpiled  lumber. '' 

Soon  after  the  800th  Engineer  For- 
estry Company  reached  Naples  in  mid- 
December  1943,  it  split  into  three  de- 
tachments. Twenty  men  went  to  Cosenza 
to  give  the  40th  Engineers  experienced 
mill  men  and  lumber  checkers,  while  a 
smaller  group  remained  in  Naples  to 
search  out  lumber  stocks.  The  rest  of 
the  company  moved  into  a  timber  stand 
at  Montesano,  about  120  miles  south- 
east of  Naples,  and  on  Christmas  Day 
began  milling  operations.  With  its  por- 
table sawmill  the  company  produced 
over  75,000  board  feet  of  lumber  at 
Montesano  and  then,  on  21  January 
1944,  moved  to  Cosenza.  There  it  took 
over  lumber  production  from  the  40th 
Engineers  and  by  June  1944  had  forty- 
three  civilian  sawmills  operating  in  the 
area,  producing  about  a  quarter  of  a 
million  board  feet  per  day. 

The  800th,  operating  over  a  wide 
area  250  miles  from  Headquarters, 
PBS,  virtually  took  over  operation  of 
the  Cosenza-Camigliatello  narrow-gauge 
railroad  relay  track  after  washouts  and 
landslides  and  cleared  away  deep  snow 
drifts  during  the  winter.  The  company 
also  performed  its  own  road  construc- 
tion and  maintenance,  including  build- 


"  Interv  with  Col  Smullen;  Engr  Service,  PBS,  Work 
Accomplished,  p.  275. 


ENGINEERS  IN  THE  PENINSULAR  BASE  SECTION 


251 


ing  culverts  and  bridges.  The  unit  oper- 
ated a  motor  pool  that  expanded  from 
an  original  fifteen  vehicles  to  a  fleet  of 
seventy-seven  trucks  and  performed  its 
own  maintenance.  It  operated  a  depot 
where  civilian  laborers  loaded  an  aver- 
age of  thirty-five  cars  of  lumber  piling  a 
day;  it  employed  400  civilians  directly 
and  supervised  nearly  3,000  others 
employed  at  civilian  sawmills. 

During  its  first  year  at  Cosenza  the 
SOOth's  sawmill,  working  two  shifts  a 
day  seven  days  a  week,  produced  ap- 
proximately 7,956,290  board  feet  of 
lumber.  Peak  production  came  during 
October  1944,  when  the  mill  produced 
an  average  of  37,245  board  feet  a  day. 
Total  lumber  shipments  from  the  Co- 
senza area  during  the  twelve  months 
ending  January  1945  amounted  to 
63,987,350  board  feet.'^'^^ 

Producing  the  lumber  was  one  thing; 
delivering  it  was  another.  At  times  breaks 
in  the  rail  lines,  heavy  snowfalls  in  the 
mountains,  and  shortages  of  railroad 
cars  cut  sharply  into  shipments  from 
Cosenza.  At  such  times  the  engineers 
had  to  pile  the  lumber  in  the  Cosenza 
railroad  yards,  and  on  one  occasion 
these  stockpiles  contained  approximately 
1,750,000  board  feet  of  lumber.  For 
seven  weeks,  from  February  to  April 
1944,  and  again  the  following  January, 
blizzards  in  the  mountains  curtailed 
shipments  by  300,000  to  400,000  board 
feet  a  week.  Mt.  Vesuvius  erupted  on 
18  March  1944,  burying  several  miles 
of  railroad  track  under  six  to  eight 
inches  of  cinders  and  tying  up  nearly 
seven  hundred  railroad  cars  for  sev- 
eral days."^^^ 

'-^  Hist  800th  Engr  Forestry  Co,  Monthly  Rpts,  13 
Dec  43 -May  45,  Personal  files,  M/Sgt  Robert  Kauf- 
man. 

^^  Hist  727th  Engr  Railway  Operating  Bn,  Trans- 
portation Corps,  p.  60. 


In  September  1944  four  members  of 
the  800th  went  to  Leghorn  to  teach 
men  of  the  338th  Engineer  General 
Service  Regiment  and  Italian  troops 
how  to  operate  sawmills.  This  reduced 
the  amount  of  lumber  that  had  to  be 
shipped  to  Leghorn  from  Cosenza,  650 
miles  away.  By  February  1945  two  mills 
in  northern  Italy  were  producing  40,000 
board  feet  a  day.  Though  many  logs 
and  trees  in  timber  stands  in  northern 
Italy  were  worthless  for  military  opera- 
tions because  of  imbedded  shrapnel, 
lumber  production  in  the  area  never- 
theless increased.  On  one  day  early  in 
May  1945  four  mills  there  achieved  a 
peak  production  of  108,639  board  feet.^^ 

PBS  Supply  and  Maintenance 

The  Peninsular  Base  Section  supply 
and  maintenance  units  came  under  a 
provisional  base  depot  group  headquar- 
ters command  in  Naples  as  soon  as  PBS 
became  operational.  Depot  companies 
directed  operations  and  supervised  Ital- 
ian laborers  in  the  supply  outlets;  main- 
tenance companies  handled  construc- 
tion equipment  pools  and  third,  fourth, 
and  fifth  echelon  maintenance  of  heavy 
equipment;  and  a  heavy  shop  company 
made  tools  and  spare  parts  for  the 
maintenance  units  and  did  some  re- 

35 

pairs. 

Engineer  depot  companies  operated 
two  main  depots  in  western  Italy.  One, 
near  Naples,  was  located  at  an  Italian 
Army  barracks,  and  the  other  at  an  Ital- 
ian movie  studio  at  Tirrenia,  a  few  miles 


■^^  Hist  800th  Engr  Forestry  Co,  Mthly  Rpts,  13  Dec 
43  — May  45,  with  annexes. 

■^-'  Engr  Service,  PBS,  Work  Accomplished,  pp. 
273-74.  Unless  otherwise  indicated  this  section  is 
based  on  this  source  and  the  histories  of  the  units 
mentioned. 


252 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


north  of  Leghorn.  In  the  Naples  area 
special  engineer  depots  were  also  set 
up  for  POL  construction  supplies, 
stream-crossing  equipment,  and  maps. 
PBS  engineers  also  took  over  Fifth 
Army  engineer  depots  at  Anzio,  Civita- 
vecchia, Piombino,  and  other  points  as 
the  army  moved  forward.  These  army 
depots  either  operated  where  they  were 
until  their  stocks  were  exhausted,  or 
they  closed  forthwith  to  move  stocks  to 
more  central  locations. 

Initially  the  458th  Engineer  Depot 
Company  handled  all  administrative 
duties  at  all  PBS  engineer  depots,  while 
the  386th  Engineer  Battalion  (Separate), 
aided  by  several  hundred  civilian 
workers,  received,  stored,  and  issued 
supplies.  The  386th  also  kept  several 
men  on  duty  day  and  night  in  the  port 
of  Naples  to  identify  engineer  supplies 
and  to  see  that  they  went  to  the  proper 
depots.  The  473d  Engineer  Mainte- 
nance Company  received  and  issued 
heavy  equipment  at  the  depots  and 
maintained  equipment  in  the  depots 
and  in  engineer  units.  A  second  engi- 
neer depot  company,  the  462d,  arrived 
in  Naples  toward  the  end  of  November 
1943  and  ultimately  took  over  the  engi- 
neer depots  Fifth  Army  left  behind  in 
its  drive  north  during  June  and  July 
1944. 

With  the  opening  of  the  engineer 
depot  near  Leghorn,  those  at  Civitavec- 
chia and  Piombino  were  closed  as  rap- 
idly as  transportation  permitted,  and 
elements  of  the  462d  moved  up  to  oper- 
ate the  Leghorn  depot.  There,  two  Ital- 
ian engineer  companies  joined  the  Am- 
erican unit  as  a  labor  force,  and  civil- 
ians from  as  far  off  as  Pisa  and  Lari 
were  hired  to  help.  As  many  as  a  thou- 
sand civilians  a  day — a  number  limited 
only  by  the  amount  of  transportation 


available — worked  at  the  Leghorn  de- 
pot. During  December  1944  a  total  of 
23,959  tons  of  engineer  supplies  reached 
the  depot,  which  issued  20,907  tons. 
With  Leghorn  the  focal  point  for  engi- 
neer supply  in  the  PBS  forward  area,  the 
Supply  Section  of  the  PBS  (Main)  Engi- 
neer Service  took  up  quarters  there  and 
kept  stock  records  of  all  engineer  depots 
in  the  PBS  forward  area. 

Two  types  of  engineer  units,  light 
equipment  and  base  equipment  com- 
panies, could  service,  issue,  and  when 
necessary,  operate  Class  IV  equipment — 
extra  and  special  equipment  such  as 
bulldozers  issued  temporarily  or  for 
specific  jobs.  In  July  1944  the  688th 
Engineer  Base  Equipment  Company 
reached  Naples  to  assemble  equipment 
coming  into  engineer  depots,  service  it, 
transport  it  to  requisitioning  units,  and 
provide  instructors  for  receiving  units. 
But  in  mid-September  the  688th  passed 
to  Seventh  Army  control,  and  thereaf- 
ter PBS  engineer  maintenance  compa- 
nies had  to  do  the  688th's  work  as  well 
as  their  own. 

In  August  1944  Brig.  Gen.  Dabney 
O.  Elliott,  NATOUSA  engineer,  put 
theater  requirements  for  maintenance 
companies  at  eleven  and  estimated  that 
the  theater  also  needed  at  least  one 
heavy  shop  and  three  maintenance  com- 
panies to  support  Army  Air  Forces 
units  properly.  At  the  time  only  three 
engineer  maintenance  companies  and 
two  engineer  heavy  shop  companies 
were  available  in  the  theater.  '^' 

The  469th  Engineer  Maintenance 
Company  went  to  Italy  with  Fifth  Army, 
and  the  473d,  a  PBS  unit,  reached 


■"'  Elliott  comments,  18  Mar  60;  G-3  Section,  HQ, 
15th  Army  Group,  y4  Military  Encyclopedia,  pp.  322-23. 


ENGINEERS  IN  THE  PENINSULAR  BASE  SECTION 


253 


Naples  on  10  October  1943.  The  473cl 
took  in  equipment  for  second,  third, 
fourth,  and  even  fifth  echelon  repairs 
and  also  functioned  as  a  base  equip- 
ment company,  hauling  heavy  engineer 
equipment  from  the  port  and  uncrating, 
assembling,  and  servicing  it  for  both 
PBS  and  Fifth  Army  units.  Roads  in 
the  shop  area  deteriorated  badly  dur- 
ing the  fall,  and  in  January  the  unit 
had  to  move  to  a  new  hard-surfaced 
area  near  the  port,  ten  miles  from  the 
engineer  depot.  In  mid-April,  with  the 
coming  of  dry  weather,  the  company 
returned  to  Naples.  Both  moves  cost 
the  unit  heavily,  for  it  took  eleven  days 
and  help  from  other  units  to  move  the 
5,200  tons  of  heavy  engineer  equip- 
ment back  to  the  depot. 

Engineer  maintenance  forces  in  PBS 
had  been  strengthened  in  February 
1944  by  the  arrival  of  the  496th  Engi- 
neer Heavy  Shop  Company,  but  a  month 
passed  before  all  of  the  496th's  equip- 
ment reached  Italy.  In  the  meantime 
the  unit  established  itself  at  a  civilian 
steel  jobbing  concern  in  Naples.  There 
it  set  up  and  operated  a  series  of  sepa- 
rate shops  for  engine  rebuilding,  carbu- 
retor and  injection  repair,  electrical 
repair,  salvage  and  reclamation  work, 
forging,  welding,  and  patternmaking. 

An  important  function  was  manufac- 
turing spare  parts  that  could  not  be 
obtained  through  normal  supply  chan- 
nels: piston  rings  and  cylinder  sleeves 
for  internal  combustion  engines,  air 
cornpressors,  and  reciprocating  pumps. 
The  496th  also  salvaged  and  recondi- 
tioned usable  parts  from  scrapped  equip- 
ment, did  fourth  and  fifth  echelon  engi- 
neer maintenance,  and  took  on  third 
echelon  maintenance  until  a  third  engi- 
neer maintenance  company,  the  470th, 
arrived  in  Italy  during  May  1944. 


Anvil  laid  a  heavy  hand  on  engi- 
neer maintenance  resources  in  Italy. 
Fifth  Army  gave  up  its  469th  Engineer 
Maintenance  Company;  PBS  lost  the 
470th  Engineer  Maintenance  Company 
and  the  688th  Engineer  Base  Equip-, 
ment  Company.  Italy  was  left  with  one 
maintenance  company  (split  among  the 
Army  Air  Forces,  Fifth  Army,  and  PBS), 
one  heavy  shop  company,  and  one  base 
shop  company.  PBS  had  to  turn  more 
and  more  to  Italian  sources.  The  1st 
Engineer  Maintenance  Company  (Ital- 
ian) was  activated  in  July  1944  and 
attached  to  the  473d  Engineer  Mainte- 
nance Company  at  the  Naples  engineer 
depot;  the  2d  Engineer  Maintenance 
Company  (Italian)  came  into  being  in 
mid-August  and  worked  with  the  496th 
Engineer  Heavy  Shop  Company  until 
ready  to  function  independently.  Al- 
though handicapped  in  personnel  and 
equipment,  both  units  were  soon  doing 
good  work.  Machinists,  blacksmiths, 
welders,  and  carpenters  were  easy 
enough  to  find  among  Italian  soldiers 
and  civilians,  but  skilled  mechanics, 
patternmakers,  and  foundry  workers 
were  not.  Moreover,  securing  adequate 
maintenance  equipment  for  the  Italian 
units  was  difficult.  U.S.  Army  tables  of 
basic  allowances  did  not  provide  for 
equipping  either  unauthorized  or  ex- 
panded units,  so  the  two  Italian  compa- 
nies never  had  more  than  half  the 
equipment  allotted  their  American 
counterparts. 

During  the  summer  of  1944  the  main- 
tenance of  engineer  equipment  became 
critical;  in  June,  when  daily  advances 
were  great,  the  19th  Engineer  Combat 
Regiment  had  to  haul  its  dozers  long 
distances  for  minor  repairs.  During  the 
next  month  and  into  September  as 
much  as  50  percent  of  the  unit's  heavy 


254 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


equipment  was  under  repair,  and  over 
the  last  half  of  1944  the  19th  Engineers 
had  an  average  of  fifty  pieces  of  equip- 
ment in  its  "waiting  line."  The  shortage 
of  engineer  maintenance  units  was  the 
main  reason,  but  there  were  others: 
poor  preventive  maintenance,  particu- 
larly during  the  rapid  advances  of  July 
and  August;  equipment  that  had  worn 
out  after  two  or  more  years  of  use; 
replacement  of  some  trained  mechan- 
ics with  untrained  limited-service  men; 
and  a  shortage  of  certain  critical  spare 
parts.  Another  important  factor  was 
extra  wear  and  tear  that  equipment  suf- 
fered at  the  hands  of  unskilled  operators. 
Multiple  shifts  and  heavy  use  of  Class 
IV  equipment  required  several  times 
the  number  of  operators  provided  by 
unit  TOEs. 

Toward  the  end  of  1944,  MTOUSA 
was  able  to  achieve  a  better  balance  of 
engineer  forces,  largely  with  men  from 
deactivated  antiaircraft  units.  The  engi- 
neers used  some  of  these  men  to  acti- 
vate two  new  engineer  maintenance 
companies.  In  Pensouth  the  5th  Engi- 
neer Maintenance  Company  was  acti- 
vated on  10  November  with  a  cadre  of 
a  few  men  from  both  the  473d  and 
496th  Engineer  Companies.  In  Fifth 
Army  the  40th  Engineer  Maintenance 
Company  came  into  being  on  1  Decem- 
ber with  a  cadre  from  the  473d  Engi- 
neer Company.  Neither  of  the  new 
engineer  maintenance  companies  came 
up  to  full  strength  until  the  end  of 
December  1944,  and  many  of  the  men 
had  had  no  experience  in  maintenance. 
Already  a  heavy  backlog  of  deadlined 
equipment  had  built  up,  while  hard 
winter  usage  and  age  kept  broken  ma- 
chines flowing  to  repair  shops.  Grad- 
ually, greater  attention  to  first  and  sec- 
ond  echelon   maintenance   reduced 


breakdowns,  and  in  March  five  inspec- 
tion teams,  made  up  of  men  from  the 
maintenance  and  heavy  shop  companies, 
began  to  make  frequent  trips  among 
units.  In  April  Fifth  Army  reported  the 
fewest  equipment  breakdowns  in  six 
months. 

Probably  the  most  challenging  sup- 
ply job  the  engineers  had  was  handling 
spare  parts — between  eighty  and  ninety 
thousand  different  items.  By  early  1944 
fast-moving  parts  were  noticeably  lack- 
ing throughout  the  engineer  shops  in 
the  theater,  whereas  slow-moving  items 
were  overstocked.  In  August  1944, 
inspection  teams  from  the  United  States 
found  that  about  one-fourth  of  the 
10,000  tons  of  spare  parts  in  MTOUSA 
was  excess  that  had  accumulated  as  a 
result  of  the  automatic  supply  policy. 
Some  of  the  heavy  parts  in  third  eche- 
lon maintenance  sets  had  been  stocked, 
unused,  for  two  years,  while  allowances 
for  certain  other  parts  needed  to  be 
doubled,  tripled,  or  increased  even 
tenfold. 

Efficient  handling  of  available  parts 
required  men  thoroughly  familiar  with 
engineer  equipment,  with  nomencla- 
ture and  cataloging,  with  interchange- 
able parts,  and  with  the  repair  history 
of  parts  and  equipment.  The  754th 
Engineer  Parts  Supply  Company,  the 
only  such  unit  in  MTOUSA,  furnished 
cadres  for  spare  parts  platoons  in  engi- 
neer depot  companies  and,  during  the 
latter  part  of  1944,  also  lost  men  for 
retraining  as  infantry.  By  early  1945, 
60  percent  of  the  company  was  new- 
comers, few  of  whom  had  any  qualifica- 
tions for  their  assignments. 

Italian  theater  shortages  came  from 
sacrifices  for  the  more  decisive  theater 
in  northern  Europe.  Beginning  in  early 
1944,  Fifth  Army  gave  up  support  and 


ENGINEERS  IN  THE  PENINSULAR  BASE  SECTION  255 

combat  units  of  all  types  to  the  ETOUSA  what  was  borrowed  in  1 942  for  commit- 

command  and  to  the  invasion  of  south-  ment  to  Operation  TORCH.  The  focus 

ern  France.  In  losing  some  of  the  best  of  the  war  shifted  again  to  the  Conti- 

of  its  engineer  units,  the  theater,  in  nent  opposite  England, 
small  measure,  replenished  some  of 


CHAPTER  XII 


Reviving  BOLERO  in  the 
United  Kingdom 


The  decisions  at  the  TRIDENT  Con- 
ference in  May  1943 — to  undertake  a 
strategic  bombing  campaign  leading  up 
to  a  cross-Channel  invasion  with  a  tar- 
get date  of  1  May  1944  while  continu- 
ing operations  in  the  Mediterranean — 
rescued  BOLERO  from  the  doldrums 
into  which  it  had  fallen  as  a  result  of 
the  diversions  to  North  Africa.  To  be 
sure,  the  drain  of  the  continuing  cam- 
paigns in  the  Mediterranean  and  the 
British  seeming  reluctance  to  sacrifice 
those  campaigns  to  a  cross-Channel 
operation  left  some  doubt  in  American 
minds  that  the  operations  would  be  exe- 
cuted in  a  timely  manner.  Accordingly, 
for  some  months  after  TRIDENT  the 
buildup  proceeded  haltingly  and  under 
relatively  low  priority.  The  appearance 
in  July  of  an  outline  plan  for  the  opera- 
tion, now  designated  OVERLORD,  and 
the  acceptance  of  that  plan  at  the  Que- 
bec Conference  (QUADRANT)  in  August 
produced  new  momentum  in  the  fall 
of  1943.  But  only  the  final  resolution 
of  all  doubts  at  the  meetings  at  Cairo- 
Tehran  (Sextant)  at  the  very  end  of 
the  year  gave  BOLERO  the  top  prior- 
ity that  would  reawaken  the  buildup  in 
the  United  Kingdom.' 


'  See  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Vol- 
umr  /,  pp.   114-71,  2;^l-(i8  tor  a  detailed  account. 


ETOUSA  engineers  were  essential  to 
the  buildup.  They  had  to  construct 
depots  and  camps  to  house  the  flood  of 
incoming  men  and  supplies,  build  the 
airfields  from  which  preinvasion  air 
strikes  would  be  launched,  and  prepare 
plans  and  stockpile  supplies  for  the 
engineer  role  in  the  invasion  itself.'^ 

The  bases  for  planning  the  construc- 
tion program  during  1943  remained  the 
Bolero  Key  Plans,  and  they  changed 
as  the  Overlord  concept  developed. 
Engineer  planning  late  in  1942  was 
based  on  the  third  BOLERO  Key  Plan, 
which  held  preparations  for  a  full-scale 
invasion  in  abeyance  although  it  pre- 
scribed a  vague  goal  of  1,049,000  men 
in  England  with  no  firm  target  date.  As 
early  as  January  1943  Col.  Cecil  R. 
Moore,  the  ETOUSA  chief  engineer, 
directed  base  section  engineers  to  re- 
turn to  the  second  BOLERO  Key  Plan  as 
a  guide  and  to  use  its  troop  basis  of 
1,1 18,000  men  with  a  completion  date 
of  31  December  1943.^  The  TRIDENT 
decisions  produced  firmer  data  to  work 

Except  where  otherwise  indicated  the  account  that 
follows  is  based  on  this  volume. 

■  On  this  aspect  of  the  engineer  effort  in  the  United 
Kingdom  and  for  other  engineer  support  to  the  AAF 
see  Craven  and  Gate,  Europe:  TORCH  to  POINT- 
BLANK,  pp.  599-664. 

'  Colonel  Moore  was  promoted  to  brigadier  general 
on  26  April  1943  and  to  major  general  on  1  March 


REVIVING  BOLERO  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 


257 


with,  and  on  12  July  1943,  a  fourth 
Bolero  Key  Plan  set  the  troop  basis  at 
1,340,000  men  to  be  in  Britain  by  1 
May  1944.  On  the  basis  of  decisions  at 
the  Quebec  Conference  in  August  the 
British  War  Office  (with  the  advice  of 
the  American  staff)  on  30  October  1943 
issued  an  amended  version  of  the  fourth 
plan,  setting  the  goal  at  1,446,000  U.S. 
officers  and  enlisted  men  to  be  in  the 
United  Kingdom  by  30  April  1944. 
This  was  the  last  of  the  key  plans  within 
which  the  engineer  supply  and  construc- 
tion programs  proceeded. 

The  Continuing  Problem  of  Organization 

The  organizational  framework  within 
which  the  engineers  operated — specifi- 
cally the  division  of  function  between 
the  theater  headquarters  and  the  SOS — 
continued  to  cause  problems  during 
1943.  As  Commanding  General,  SOS, 
Maj.  Gen.  John  C.  H.  Lee  continued 
the  drive  he  had  begun  in  1942  to  bring 
all  supply  and  administration  in  the  the- 
ater under  his  control.  He  continued 
to  meet  determined  resistance  from 
those  who  insisted  that  the  theater  staff 
must  remain  responsible  for  theater- 
wide  policy  and  planning  for  future 
operations  and  that  the  chiefs  of  ser- 
vices in  particular  must  serve  the  the- 
ater commander  directly  in  these  areas 
even  if  their  services  were  part  of  the 
SOS.  Until  the  very  end  of  the  year 
compromise  arrangements  prevailed, 
but  none  of  them  were  entirely  satisfac- 
tory for  the  performance  of  engineer 
functions. 

The  duplication  of  functions  created 
by  moving  SOS  headquarters  to  Chel- 
tenham in  May  1942  persisted  after  Lt. 


Gen.  Frank  M.  Andrews  replaced  Gen- 
eral Eisenhower  as  theater  commander 
on  6  February  1943,  and  to  a  lesser  de- 
gree after  Lt.  Gen.  Jacob  L.  Devers 
replaced  Andrews,  who  died  in  a  plane 
crash  on  3  May  1943.^  In  early  March 
of  that  year  Lee  proposed  to  Andrews 
that  he,  Lee,  be  designated  deputy 
theater  commander  for  supply  and  ad- 
ministration as  well  as  commanding 
general,  SOS,  with  the  theater  G-4  and 
all  the  chiefs  of  the  technical  and  ad- 
ministrative services  serving  under  him 
in  his  dual  capacity.  The  solution  was 
not  unlike  that  adopted  eventually,  but 
at  the  time  Andrews  rejected  the 
scheme.  He  insisted  that  planning  for 
future  operations,  a  function  of  the 
theater  headquarters,  should  remain 
separate  from  administration  and  sup- 
ply of  troops  in  the  British  Isles,  a 
function  of  the  SOS.  Although  he 
granted  Lee  more  control  over  the 
chiefs  of  services,  he  also  specified  that 
they  be  ready  to  serve  the  theater  com- 
mander immediately  if  needed.  At  the 
same  time,  he  moved  the  whole  SOS 
headquarters  back  to  London  close  to 
ETOUSA.'^  While  SOS  planning  came 
to  be  centered  in  London,  an  SOS  dep- 
uty commander  handled  operations  at 
Cheltenham.  The  operating  echelons  of 
the  technical  services  remained  at 
Cheltenham,  and  chiefs  still  had  to  spend 
some  time  there. 

General  Devers  lent  a  more  willing 
ear  to  Lee's  arguments  and  vested  the 
commanding  general,  SOS,  with  the 
office  of  the  G— 4  on  the  theater  staff. 
An  ETOUSA  order  of  27  May  1943 
gave  Lee  in  this  dual  role  jurisdiction 
over  all  supply  concerns  of  the  theater 
and  divided  his  SOS  command  between 


1944.  See  ch.  II;  Memo,  Moore  for  Lee,  II  Jan  43, 
325.21  Policies  and  Plans,  EUCOM  Engr  files. 


'  See  ch.  II. 

■'  ETOUSA  GO  16,  21  Mar  43. 


258 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


two  equal  chiefs  of  theater  service  func- 
tions, one  for  administration  and  one 
for  services.  The  seven  technical  ser- 
vices, including  the  engineers,  lumped 
together  with  a  purchasing  service  and 
a  new  theater  area  petroleum  service, 
then  had  a  chain  of  access  to  the  the- 
ater commander  running  through  Col. 
Royal  B.  Lord  as  chief  of  services,  SOS, 
and  General  Lee  himself  as  surrogate 
theater  G— 4.*^  Except  for  the  limited 
consolidation  involved  in  the  G— 4  posi- 
tion, ETOUSA  and  SOS  staffs  contin- 
ued as  separate  entities,  and  the  chiefs 
of  services  continued  in  dual  roles  in 
the  two  headquarters.  Even  this  lim- 
ited consolidation  suffered  a  setback 
when  the  G— 4  position  on  the  ETOUSA 
staff  was  removed  from  the  SOS  com- 
mander and  given  to  Maj.  Gen.  Robert 
W.  Crawford  between  8  October  and  1 
December  1943.^ 

On  1  December  General  Crawford 
moved  to  the  Chief  of  Staff  to  the  Su- 
preme Allied  Commander  (COSSAC), 
a  provisional  Allied  staff  planning  the 
invasion  pending  the  establishment  of 
a  command  for  that  purpose.  General 
Lee  then  assumed  the  position  of  G— 4, 
ETOUSA,  again.  Another  month 
brought  the  realization  of  his  propos- 
als of  early  1943.  The  expansion  of  the 
COSSAC  role  in  England  and  the  estab- 
lishment of  active  field,  army,  and  army 
group  commands  in  England  reduced 
the  ETOUSA  administrative  and  long- 
range  planning  function  to  little  more 
than  that  of  the  SOS,  ETOUSA,  com- 
mand. In  effect,  the  two  separate  head- 
quarters existed  for  the  same  reason 
and  shared  the  same  special  staff,  which 
included  the  engineers.  When  General 


•*  ETOUSA  GO  33,  27  May  43. 
'  SOS  ETOUSA  GO  79,  19  Aug  43;  ETOUSA  GO 
71,  8  Oct  43;  ETOUSA  GO  90,  1  Dec  43. 


Eisenhower  resumed  command  of  the 
American  theater  and  of  the  new  Su- 
preme Headquarters,  Allied  Expedi- 
tionary Force  (SHAEF),  which  suc- 
ceeded COSSAC  on  15  January  1944, 
the  ETOUSA  and  SOS  staffs  were  con- 
solidated. At  the  same  time,  General 
Lee  assumed  the  formal  title  of  deputy 
theater  commander,  in  which  capacity 
he  was  to  act  for  General  Eisenhower 
in  all  theater  administrative  and  ser- 
vice matters.^ 

The  consolidation  reduced  the  dupli- 
cation and  inconsistencies  and  relieved 
the  confusion  that  had  characterized 
supply  and  administrative  channels  in 
1943.  It  provided  the  basis  for  organiz- 
ing an  American  Communications  Zone 
command  for  operations  on  the  Con- 
tinent. But  the  organizational  picture 
was  still  complicated  and  command 
relationships  confusing.  Theoretically 
General  Lee's  ETOUSA-COMZ  staff 
served  General  Eisenhower  in  his  role 
as  American  theater  commander  while 
his  Allied  staff  served  him  in  his  role  as 
supreme  commander.  Allied  Expedi- 
tionary Force.  Senior  American  field 
commanders  tended  to  regard  Lee's 
headquarters  as  strictly  an  SOS  or  Com- 
munications Zone  headquarters,  equal 
to  but  not  above  their  own  headquar- 
ters and  equally  subject  to  Eisenhower's 
directions  as  supreme  Allied  command- 
er. They  never  accepted  Lee's  role  as 
deputy  theater  commander  and  suc- 
ceeded in  having  it  abolished  in  August 
1944. 

In  a  sense  the  ETOUSA-SOS  rela- 
tionship with  the  Allied  SHAEF  com- 
mand created  some  of  the  same  prob- 
lems that  had  characterized  the  relation- 
ship of  SOS  and  ETOUSA  because 


**  ETOUSA  GO  5,  17  Jan  44. 


REVIVING  BOLERO  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 


259 


General  Moore  (Photograph  taken  m  1945.) 

Eisenhower  sometimes  used  the  Ameri- 
can component  of  the  SHAEF  staff  as 
an  American  theater  staff.  General 
Moore's  misgivings  about  the  command 
on  the  eve  of  the  invasion  were  com- 
mon among  his  fellow  technical  service 
chiefs.  The  continued  assignment  of  the 
Engineer  Service  under  the  SOS  made 
the  other  elements  in  the  theater  regard 
the  chief  engineer  as  part  of  a  "co-ordi- 
nate command  and  not  one  that  had 
authority  or  supervision  over  their  com- 
mands. 

The  command  arrangements  in  the 
theater  thus  remained  unsatisfactory  to 


■'  Interv,  Lt  Col  Shelby  A.  McMillion,  Chf,  Liaison 
Sect,  OCE,  with  Maj  Gen  Moore,  10  May  44,  sub: 
Overall  Theater  Problems  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
app.  17  to  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  1,  Organization, 
Administration,  and  Personnel.  (Hereafter  cited  as 
Moore  Interv.) 


the  Engineer  Service  throughout  the 
buildup  and  preparation  for  the  inva- 
sion. In  manpower  problems  alone, 
Moore's  headaches  in  bidding  against 
other  services  for  skilled  men  and  in 
allocating  work  forces  increased  since 
he  could  not  always  exercise  the  weight 
and  the  rank  of  a  theater  commander's 
name  in  his  own  behalf.  Equally  diffi- 
cult was  engineer  supply  in  the  theater. 

New  Supply  Procedures 

When  the  buildup  in  England  was 
expressed  in  terms  of  troop  ceilings  in 
the  high-level  international  conferences 
of  spring  and  summer  1943,  the  fig- 
ures automatically  implied  demands  for 
increased  shipments  of  engineer  sup- 
ply and  equipment.  General  Moore's 
SOS  Engineer  Service  would  have  to 
plan  not  only  for  accommodations  for 
the  incoming  men  but  also  for  protec- 
tion and  depot  warehousing  for  both 
current  operating  supply  and  invasion 
materiel.  The  early  part  of  1943  saw 
the  influx  of  comparatively  small  num- 
bers of  troops,  primarily  Air  Corps 
reinforcements  for  the  stepped-up  aer- 
ial offensive.  Later  arrivals  would  re- 
quire coordination  of  construction  and 
supply  functions,  but  the  OCE  Con- 
struction and  Quartering  Division  had 
moved  back  to  London  in  General  An- 
drews' separation  of  planning  and  oper- 
ating staffs  in  March  1943,  leaving  the 
Supply  Division  at  SOS  headquarters, 
ninety  miles  away.  The  division  never- 
theless contributed  to  some  attempts  at 
improving  the  supply  flow  to  the  United 
Kingdom,  among  them  a  program  of 
preshipping  unit  equipment  and  new 
methods  of  marking  shipments  for  desti- 
nations in  England. 

Until  the  summer  of  1943,  engineer 


260 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


units  arriving  from  the  United  States 
brought  their  organic  equipment  with 
them.  After  1  July  they  turned  in  all 
their  equipment  except  necessary  house- 
keeping supplies  at  their  port  of  embar- 
kation and  upon  reaching  the  United 
Kingdom  drew  new  equipment,  includ- 
ing supplemental  maintenance  supplies, 
from  stocks  previously  shipped  from 
the  United  States.  The  preshipment 
program  took  into  account  the  prob- 
ability that  larger  numbers  of  troops 
would  arrive  in  England  in  late  1943 
and  early  1944  and  sought  to  avoid 
overtaxing  British  port  capacity  and 
inland  transportation  nets  with  both 
troops  and  cargo  by  shipping  the  cargo 
beforehand.  It  also  would  permit  Brit- 
ish and  American  dock  crews  to  take 
advantage  of  the  long  summer  days  for 
unloading. 

But  the  limitations  of  the  preship- 
ment program  immediately  made  them- 
selves felt.  Interpretations  of  the  sup- 
ply flow  differed  from  the  start.  The 
European  theater  command  perceived 
the  system  as  a  guarantee  that  bulk 
stocks  would  arrive  before  using  troops 
docked  in  Great  Britain,  where  they 
would  immediately  pick  up  TBA  mate- 
rial and  draw  other  needed  supply,  but 
not  necessarily  the  same  items  they  sur- 
rendered before  leaving  the  United 
States.  War  Department  interpretations 
relied  at  first  on  force-marking,  under 
which  units  were  to  recover  the  same 
equipment  they  had  turned  in  at  home. 
Begun  under  constraints  arising  from 
little  excess  supply  in  American  inven- 
tories and  training  schedules  that  pre- 
vented units  from  giving  up  equipment 
until  just  before  they  sailed,  preship- 
ment from  May  to  August  1943  was 
primarily  a  vain  struggle  to  fill  avail- 
able shipping  space. 


The  priority  system  established  for 
supplying  Army  Ground  Forces  in  En- 
gland also  hobbled  the  program,  with 
ETO  supply  occupying  eighth  place  in 
the  order  of  shipping  importance  in  the 
United  States.  Until  after  SEXTANT  the 
War  Department  was  reluctant  to  change 
the  priority  for  a  theater  that  had  no 
clear-cut  and  overriding  strategic  pre- 
cedence. By  the  time  Army  Service 
Forces  arguments  produced  a  higher 
priority  in  November  1943,  troop  sail- 
ings rivaled  those  of  preshipped  cargo 
and  shipping  space  went  to  troops  and 
their  personal  gear. 

The  advance  flow  of  heavier  equip- 
ment for  engineer  work  suffered  from 
the  uncertain  supply  policy  in  effect 
throughout  1943.  During  July  and 
August  of  that  year  General  Moore 
complained  that  bulk-shipped  TBA 
items  arrived  in  the  United  Kingdom 
long  after  engineer  units.  In  that  period 
75,000  engineer  troops  reached  the  the- 
ater to  find  that  only  5  percent  of  their 
organizational  equipment  was  waiting 
for  them.  As  a  result,  most  of  the  units 
could  not  contribute  to  the  general  con- 
struction program  or  even  train  effec- 
tively." Receipt  of  bulk  TBA  equip- 
ment improved  enough  in  September 
1943  to  take  care  of  the  units  arriving 
that  month  but  was  not  sufficient  to 
replenish  reserve  stocks  depleted  dur- 
ing the  two  previous  months.  Eventu- 
ally, engineer  troops  received  standard 
equipment  within  seven  to  ten  days 
after  they  arrived  instead  of  the  sixty 
to  ninety  days  common  under  the  old 
system.'"^ 

'"  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Vol- 
ume I,  pp.  133  —  39;  Leighton  and  C'-oakley,  Global  Logis- 
tics a  tut  Strategy,  19-i3-45,  pp.  51-52. 

"  OCE  ETOUSA  Hi.st  Rpt  4,  Troops. 

'-  Interv,  Maj.  J.  H.  Thetford,  OCE  Supply  Div,  22 
Sep  44,  OCE. 


REVIVING  BOLERO  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 


261 


Many  engineer  items  shipped  from 
the  United  States  were  poorly  marked; 
some  even  lacked  service  identification 
marks.  Of  3,920  items  of  prefabricated 
hutting  more  than  300  could  not  be 
used,  largely  because  so  many  parts  had 
been  mixed  together.'^  Supply  pro- 
cesses improved  for  the  engineers — and 
for  other  troops  in  the  ETO — when 
SOS  changed  the  UGLY  marking  system 
evolved  in  1942.  Under  that  system  the 
first  element  in  cargo  identification,  the 
code  word  UGLY,  indicated  the  ETO; 
the  second  element  indicated  the  supply 
service  making  the  shipment;  and  the 
third  indicated  the  class  of  supplies. 
Thus,  engineer  Class  II  supplied  going 
to  the  ETO  were  marked  Ugly- 
Engrsil 

Early  in  1943,  SOS  and  the  British 
refined  this  system  with  the  aim  of 
eliminating  long  rail  hauls  from  the 
ports.  They  divided  the  United  King- 
dom into  three  zones:  Zone  I,  North- 
ern England,  identified  by  the  code 
word  SOXO;  Zone  II,  Bristol  and  Lon- 
don, called  GLUE;  and  Zone  III,  North- 
ern Ireland,  called  BANG.  Thereafter, 
most  cargo  bore  the  shipping  destina- 
tion Soxo,  Glue,  or  Bang;  Ugly  indi- 
cated cargo  not  intended  for  any  partic- 
ular port  in  the  United  Kingdom.  This 
system  cut  down  reshipment  from  port 
to  port,  brought  supplies  to  the  correct 
depot  sooner,  relieved  pressure  on  the 
already  overloaded  British  rail  system, 
and  enabled  supplies  to  be  moved  out 
of  ports  sooner — a  necessity  with  Ger- 
man air  raids  an  ever  present  danger. 
Manifests  also  improved,  and  the  new 
ISS  (Identification  of  Separate  Ship- 
ments to  Overseas  Destinations)  forms 
completely  identified,  in  the  third  ele- 


ment of  the  Ugly  address,  separate 
shipments  made  against  particular  req- 
uisitions. 

No  amount  of  new  markings  could 
revise  the  shortages  in  large  items  of 
engineer  equipment  throughout  1943. 
One  of  the  most  important  items  was 
the  dump  truck;  at  late  as  September 
the  engineers  had  1,000  fewer  than  the 
standard  tables  of  allocations  called  for. 
Heavy  construction  equipment,  general- 
purpose  vehicles,  and  cranes  were  in 
critically  short  supply  well  into  1944. 
Augers,  semi-trailers,  graders,  shop 
equipment,  tractors  with  angledozers, 
generators,  various  hand  tools,  asphalt 
paving  equipment,  and  spare  parts  of 
all  types  fell  into  this  category.  On  30 
April  1943,  the  backlog  of  engineer 
supply  alone  due  in  from  the  United 
States  stood  at  79,832  ship  tons;  by 
the  end  of  August,  it  had  increased  to 
124,224  tons.'^ 

Construction 

At  the  beginning  of  1943  American 
engineers  in  the  United  Kingdom  could 
not  look  back  on  an  impressive  con- 
struction record.  They  had  built  no 
hospitals,  and  although  they  had  under- 
taken fourteen  camp  projects  they  had 
not  completed  any.  They  had  worked 
on  twelve  airfields  but  none  was  more 
than  25  percent  complete,  and  they  had 
begun  ten  depots  but  none  was  finished. 
In  one  respect,  however,  the  engineers 
had  made  considerable  progress — they 
had  learned,  of  necessity,  how  to  work 
closely  with  the  British. 


' '  Shipment  of  Supplies,  400.22,  EUCOM  Engr  files; 
OCE  ETOUSA  Monthly  Rpt  8,  Nov  43. 


' '  Moore  interv;  OCE  ETOUSA  Monthly  Rpts,  Apr 
43-)un  44;  Notes  on  Command  and  Staff  Conf,  3, 
10  Jan  44.  Adm  457,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect;  Rpt,  Lt  Col 
John  H.  Hassinger,  (^hf.  Tractor  and  Crane  Sect,  OCE 
WD,  to  Moore,  Nov  43,  319. 1  Rpts  (Ceneral),  EUCOM 


262 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Because  all  facilities  would  ultimately 
go  back  to  the  British,  many  plans  and 
specifications  the  engineers  used  were 
British,  and  the  British  had  to  approve 
deviations.  British  materials  also  had  to 
be  used.  Influencing  construction  stan- 
dards and  specifications  were  the  small 
area  available  for  military  use;  a  short- 
age of  lumber  and  a  consequent  reli- 
ance on  steel,  cement,  and  brick;  and 
wet  weather  that  produced  continuous 
mud.  Plans  and  procedures  were  af- 
fected by  differences  in  diction,  custom, 
and  nomenclature;  slow  delivery  of 
supplies;  red  tape  and  British  centrali- 
zation; and  heavy  reliance  on  civilians.' ' 

Every  project  the  engineers  worked 
on  had  to  be  approved  in  the  War 
Office  by  the  Directorate  of  Quartering, 
the  Directorate  of  Fortifications  and 
Works,  and  by  Works  Finance  which 
was  made  up  entirely  of  civilians.  The 
Construction  Division,  OCE,  ETOUSA, 
had  a  liaison  officer  from  the  Director- 
ate of  Fortifications  and  Works;  an- 
other, for  a  time,  from  the  Directorate 
of  Quartering;  and  a  third  from  the 
Air  Ministry  Works  Directorate.  In 
turn,  the  division  kept  a  liaison  officer 
on  duty  with  the  Directorate  of  Fortifi- 
cations and  Works  in  the  War  Office.  '^ 

Getting  standards  for  quarters  and 
airfields  approved  was  a  problem,  for 
in  many  cases  American  standards  were 
higher  than  British.  The  increased  cost 
per  capita  for  U.S.  forces  was  incom- 
prehensible to  the  British  Works  Fi- 
nance. Many  projects  were  delayed  fif- 
teen to  forty-five  days  while  the  British 
investigated  the  need  for  the  work. 


Engr  files;  Ltr,  Moore  to  Col  Joseph  S.  Gorlinski,  3 
May  43,  321  Gen,  Apr- Dec  43,  EUCOM  Engr  files. 

'    Moore  interv;  see  chs.  II  and  III. 

'*'  Interv,  McMillion  with  Col  Paul  D.  Berrigan,  8 
May  44. 


Another  cause  for  delay  was  failure  to 
receive  British  supplies  promptly.  That 
tardiness  and  shortages,  the  engineers 
estimated,  cut  the  effectiveness  of 
American  troop  labor  by  30  percent. 
Fortunately,  matters  improved  in  the 
later  stages  of  the  buildup.'^ 

When  General  Moore  directed  the 
base  section  engineers  to  go  back  to  the 
second  Key  Plan  in  February  1943,  the 
Bolero  construction  program  was  29 
percent  complete.  Priorities  were  air 
projects  and  depots,  shops,  and  special 
projects,  to  be  finished  by  I  August 
1943;  accommodations  previously 
planned,  to  be  finished  by  15  October 
1943;  and  the  hospital  program,  to  be 
finished  by  1  November  1943.  Any 
additional  accommodations  were  to  be 
completed  by  the  end  of  the  year.'^ 

The  more  rapid  buildup  under  the 
fourth  Bolero  Key  Plan  in  July  1943 
and  its  amendment  in  October  stepped 
up  all  types  of  construction  in  the 
United  Kingdom.  New  troop  ceilings 
set  at  the  international  conferences 
raised  the  demand  for  construction  far 
above  that  established  for  the  1,1 18,000- 
man  limit  in  the  second  Key  Plan  with- 
out changing  the  basic  construction  pri- 
orities favoring  airfields.  The  QUAD- 
RANT decisions,  in  anticipating  OVER- 
LORD, moved  the  staging  areas  for  much 
of  the  invasion  force  from  southern  to 
southwestern  England.  Compared  with 
the  earlier  construction  demands,  the 
work  described  in  the  fourth  Key  Plan 
expanded  upon  all  previous  work  loads. 


'  Interv,  Col  C.J.  Barker,  Chf,  Ground  Proj  Sect, 
C&Q  Div,  OCE,  12  May  44;  Intervs,  Moore  and 
Berrigan. 

"^  Ltr,  OCE  ETOUSA  to  Base  Sect  Engrs,  10  Feb 
43,  sub:  Bolero  Construction  Program,  600.1, 
EUCOM  Engr  files;  For  the  earlier  Boi.hro  Key 
Plans,  see  ch.  I. 


REVIVING  BOLERO  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 


263 


The  July  version  of  the  plan  specified 
970,000  accommodations  for  incoming 
ground  troops;  the  revised  plan  of 
October  considered  1,060,000.  Closed 
or  covered  storage  and  workshop  space 
expanded  from  15  million  square  feet 
in  the  third  Key  Plan  to  18  million  in 
the  fourth  plan  and  then  to  over  18 
million  in  the  amended  fourth  plan. 
Open  storage,  set  at  26  million  square 
feet  in  the  third  plan,  rose  to  34  million 
in  the  fourth  but  declined  to  29,736,000 
in  the  amended  version.  Petroleum 
products  requirements  rose  from 
130,000  tons  in  July  to  234,000  tons  in 
October;  ammunition  from  244,000 
tons  to  432,000  tons  and  then  to 
452,000  tons  in  the  amended  fourth 
plan,  all  requiring  special  handling  and 
storage. '■' 

To  meet  deadlines  under  the  new 
programs,  the  engineers  had  to  limit 
construction  to  the  bare  necessities. 
Safety  factors  were  at  the  minimum  for 
the  importance  of  the  structure,  while 
durability,  cost,  and  appearance  became 
minor  considerations."*'  The  new  con- 
struction largely  ignored  camouflage. 
Camps  frequently  went  up  in  parade 
ground  style,  in  open  spaces  and  straight 
lines,  adjacent  to  prominent  landmarks. 
Bulldozer  tracks  and  construction  ma- 
terials, supplies,  and  equipment  left  in 
open  fields  attracted  German 
bombers.^' 

The  English  winter  created  its  own 
set  of  construction  problems.  There 


'"The  Adm  and  Log  Hist  of  the  ETO,  vol.  Ill, 
"Troop  and  Supply  Buildup  in  the  UK  Prior  to 
D-Day,"  pp.  57-73. 

'^"  OCE  ETOUSA  Monthly  Rpt  5,  14  Sep  43,  p.  10. 

■'^'  Ltr,  WBS  Engr  to  CO,  368th  GS  Rgt,  1 1  Jan  44, 
sub:  Camouflage  Instructions,  and  Ltr,  OCE,  SOS 
ETOUSA,  to  SOS,  WBS,  EBS,  and  NIBS,  30  Nov  43, 
sub:  Camouflage  of .  .  .  Installations,  384.6,  EUCOM 
Engr  files. 


were  only  eight  hours  of  light  each  day, 
and  using  searchlights  at  night  risked 
drawing  German  aircraft.  Many  men 
were  stricken  with  colds,  respiratory 
diseases,  and  other  ailments  in  the 
damp  weather.  Every  site  had  to  be 
well  drained,  or  the  engineers  and 
their  equipment  soon  bogged  down  in 
mud.""-' 

Determining  when  a  construction 
project  was  finished  became  perplex- 
ing. Two  interpretations  were  possible — 
when  the  contract  was  fulfilled  or  when 
the  using  service  declared  the  job  com- 
plete. The  first  criterion  was  compli- 
cated by  extras  that  might  or  might  not 
affect  the  usefulness  of  the  particular 
facility.  Some  items  such  as  work  ramps, 
added  after  an  original  contract,  upset 
completion  schedules  yet  did  not  mate- 
rially delay  when  a  facility  could  be 
used.  At  the  insistence  of  the  chief 
engineer,  progress  reports  reflected 
physical  completion,  including  extra 
work  authorized  during  construction, 
rather  than  availability  of  facilities. '^'^ 

By  the  end  of  May  1944  the  construc- 
tion program  was  97.5  percent  com- 
plete except  for  hospitals  and  continu- 
ous maintenance  (especially  at  airfields). 
Depots  were  99.6  percent  complete; 
accommodations,  98  percent;  and  hos- 
pitals, 93.9  percent.  The  estimated 
value  of  installations  provided  by 
American  forces  in  the  United  King- 
dom as  of  31  May  was  $991,441,000. 
New  British  construction  cost  an  esti- 
mated   $668,000,000.    Of    this    total 


-2  Ltr,  OCE,  EBS,  to  SOS  ETOUSA,  5  Feb  44,  sub: 
Project  Study,  OCE;  Ltr,  SOS  ETOUSA  to  CG,  ASF, 
14  Jan  45,  sub:  Rpt  on  Overseas  Construction,  AG 
600. 1 ,  ASF  files. 

"  Ltr,  OCE,  SBS,  to  Chf  Engr,  13  Aug  43,  and  Ltr, 
P.  D.  Berrigan  to  Engr,  SBS,  20  Aug  43,  sub:  Con- 
struction Progress  Rpts,  both  in  600  Rpts,  EUCOM 
Engr  files. 


264 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Petroleum,  Oil,  and  Lubricants  Depot,  Lancashire 


$502,000,000  ($262,000,000  acquired, 
$240,000,000  constructed)  involved  air 
forces  installations;  $166,800,000  in- 
volved hospitals  ($151,200,000  for  new 
construction  and  $15,600,000  for  ac- 
quired). Some  $41,174,000  went  to 
depots,  all  but  $4,374,000  to  new  con- 
struction. The  entire  construction  pro- 
gram encompassed  150,000  buildings 
and  50,000  tents.'-^^ 

Depots 

In  November  and  December  1942 
and  January  1943  the  chief  engineer 


^^  OCE  ETOUSA  Monthly  Rpt  14,  May  44;  OCE 
ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  7,  Field  and  Seivice  Force  Con- 
struction, p.  1  15;  lierrigan  interv,  8  May  44. 


had  cut  back  the  depot  program  in 
ETOUSA  and  deferred  work  on  some 
depots  and  shops.  In  February  1943, 
after  the  Casablanca  Conference,  Gen- 
eral Moore  called  upon  the  base  sec- 
tion engineers  to  produce  firrti  build- 
ing plans.  The  fourth  Key  Plan  called 
for  the  completion  of  the  depot  pro- 
gram by  31  March  1944,  and  its  18  mil- 
lion square  feet  of  covered  storage 
space  was  20  percent  more  than  in  the 
second  Key  Plan.^'  By  the  time  the 
fourth  plan  was  announced  in  July 


'"  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  7,  Field  and  Service  Force 
Construction,  pp.  128,  135,  190;  Ltr.  OCE  ETOUSA 
to  Base  Section  Engrs,  13  Jan  43,  sub:  Modifying  Plan 
for  Bolero  Construction  Program,  600.1,  EUCOM 
Engr  files. 


REVIVING  BOLERO  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 


265 


1943,  13,398,000  square  feet  were 
ready.  Open  storage,  which  was  to  total 
34  million  square  feet,  then  amounted 
to  27  million.  In  addition,  space  was  to 
be  provided  for  432,000  long  tons  of 
ammunition  and  215,000  long  tons  of 
POL. 

Until  well  into  1943,  the  various  ser- 
vices requiring  depot  space  changed 
their  requests  from  day  to  day.  The 
British  might  move  out  of  a  selected 
depot  site  only  to  have  the  asking  ser- 
vice turn  down  the  site  after  all.  In  some 
such  instances  British  civilian  concerns 
had  been  put  out  of  business  in  order 
to  make  facilities  available."''  But  much 
of  the  work  and  storage  space  the  Brit- 
ish provided  was  hard  to  adapt  to  mod- 
ern American  methods.  Many  of  the 
depots  were  too  low  and  doors  too 
narrow;  many  multistoried  buildings 
had  either  very  small  elevators  or  none 
at  all.  Some  of  the  depots  were  far 
inland  and  had  only  tenuous  access  to 
the  ports  from  which  the  OVERLORD 
operation  was  to  be  mounted.  To  make 
requisitions  coming  from  other  techni- 
cal services  more  orderly  and  consistent, 
Colonel  Lord  required  them  to  desig- 
nate liaison  officers  to  the  engineers 
managing  the  depot  construction  and 
acquisition  program,  but  requirements 
continued  to  change  and  some  difficul- 
ties with  site  selection  persisted. '^'^ 

As  one  answer  to  the  time,  labor,  and 
construction  materials  problems,  the 
chief  engineer  planned  to  use  open 
fields  for  storage  space  whenever  prac- 
ticable. In  most  cases  roads  and  rail  lines 
had  to  be  brought  to  the  site  and  the 


'-"'  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  7,  Field  and  Service  Force 
Construction,  apps.  8  and  9. 

■^^  Memo,  Col  Lord  for  Liaison  Officers  of  Quarter- 
master Ordnance  et  al.,  10  Feb  43,  600.1,  EUCOM 
Engr  files. 


ground  conditioned  to  provide  rapid 
drainage.  The  damp  English  climate 
was  hard  on  the  poorly  packed  sup- 
plies coming  from  the  United  States. 
These  factors  and  difficulties  in  using 
British  facilities  made  it  necessary  to 
raise  estimates  for  covered  storage. 

The  depot  program  was  not  finished 
by  the  end  of  1943.  However,  by  1  May 
1944,  only  29,673  square  feet  of  cov- 
ered storage  in  Southern  Base  Section 
(SBS)  and  1,200,000  square  feet  of 
open  storage  in  Western  Base  Section 
(WBS)  were  lacking.  At  the  end  of  that 
month  all  but  7  percent  of  the  work 
had  been  completed. '^^ 

Within  the  depots  the  American 
forces  used  several  types  of  buildings. 
One  of  the  first  they  tried  was  the  Iris, 
a  35-foot-wide  Nissen  hut.  The  Nissen, 
a  British  development,  was  an  igloo- 
like half  cylinder  made  of  steel.  More 
successful  was  the  Romney  hut,  similar 
to  the  Nissen  but  with  a  heavier  frame. 
With  special  bolting  the  Romney  proved 
to  be  an  exceptionally  tight  structure. 
The  Romney  huts  often  had  set-in  win- 
dows, twelve  on  each  side.  The  end 
walls  were  of  brick,  concrete,  or,  prefer- 
ably, sheeting,  which  permitted  the  use 
of  sliding  doors  as  well  as  a  small  access 
door.  The  foundation  was  continuous 
plain  concrete  footing,  with  an  eight- 
inch  brick  foundation  extending  a  mini- 
mum of  four  inches  aboveground.  The 
floor  was  five  inches  of  concrete  on  four 
inches  of  gravel  fill.  The  concrete  apron 
that  joined  the  building  to  a  railroad 
siding  was  customarily  six  inches  thick. 

The  largest  warehouses  were  of  Mar- 
ston  shedding  which  could  provide  rec- 
tangular buildings  as  large  as  45-by- 


'■^"  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  .7,  Field  and  Service  Force 
Construction,  p.  128. 


266 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


250  feet.  These  consisted  of  structural 
steel  frames,  corrugated  iron  roofs,  cor- 
rugated asbestos  siding,  and  six-inch 
concrete  floors.  Large  sHding  doors 
were  at  each  end.  The  higher  ceiling  in 
the  Marstons  made  it  possible  to  install 
two  ten-ton  overhead  cranes.  A  railroad 
spur  ran  into  one  end  of  the  buildings. 
Sometimes  made  of  wood  from  pack- 
ing boxes  and  composite  board  panels, 
the  Marston  structures  were  ordinarily 
60  feet  long  with  an  18  1/2-foot  span. 
The  wooden  buildings  were  cheap  and 
easy  to  knock  down  and  transport  but 
were  so  light  that  they  had  to  be  re- 
paired frequently.  To  save  steel  and 
wood,  structures  of  curved  asbestos  and 
corrugated  cement  sheets  with  end 
walls  of  brick  were  also  built.  Some 
attempts  were  made  to  use  precast 
concrete. ^^ 

About  twenty-nine  depots  (each  with 
an  average  of  one  hundred  buildings) 
constituted  the  U.S.  Army  depot  pro- 
gram in  the  United  Kingdom.  The  con- 
struction of  new  covered  storage  and 
the  expansion  of  existing  facilities  ac- 
counted for  about  one-fourth  of  the 
total  space,  while  about  one-half  of  the 
open  storage  and  hardstandings  was 
derived  from  new  facilities  and  expan- 
sion. The  estimated  value  of  acquired 
depots  was  $4,374,000;  that  of  new 
depots  $36,800,000.  Of  covered  stor- 
age and  shop  space  the  British  turned 
over  67  percent  and  constructed  20 
percent;  American  engineers  built  13 
percent.  Of  open  storage  and  hard- 
standings  the  British  turned  over  51 
percent  and  built  13  percent  while  U.S. 
Army  engineers  provided  36  percent. 
For  storing  ammunition  the  British 


turned  over  facilities  to  handle  33  per- 
cent of  the  job  and  constructed  27 
percent;  American  engineers  con- 
structed 40  percent.  Providing  depot 
space  for  POL  was  largely  an  engineer 
job,  with  the  British  contributing  only 
5  percent  (3  percent  in  space  turned 
over  and  2  percent  in  new  construc- 
tion).^" 

Accommodations 

The  first  Key  Plan  did  not  provide 
for  camp  construction,  for  the  British 
were  to  make  available  the  necessary 
845,200  winterized  accommodations. 
The  second  Key  Plan  did  not  break 
down  the  number  of  hut  and  tent 
camps  that  would  have  to  be  erected 
but  mentioned  a  total  of  845,000.  In 
January  1943  ETOUSA  announced 
that  all  small  camp  expansions  that  were 
50  percent  or  more  complete  could  be 
finished;  work  on  all  others  was  to  stop, 
at  least  temporarily.^'  At  the  end  of  Jan- 
uary some  65,000  spaces  of  the  137,000 
to  be  provided  by  camp  expansions  and 
new  hutted  camps  were  ready  for  use. 
More  than  543,000  spaces  already  were 
available,  for  a  total  of  slightly  more 
than  600,000.  The  following  month 
ETOUSA  directed  that  accommoda- 
tions be  completed  by  15  October  1943, 
and  any  needed  thereafter  by  1  Decem- 
ber 1943."^^ 

In  January  1943  the  British  and 
Americans  designated  G— 3,  ETOUSA, 
to  supervise  the  preparation  of  a 
monthly  priority  list  showing  the  units 


^"  Waldo  G.  Bowman,  "Engineers  Overseas,"  Engi- 
neering News-Record,  26—27. 


'"  Adm  1 19,  Engr  Construction,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 

•'■  EUCOM  Engr  file  600.1. 

■^^  Unless  otherwise  cited  this  section  on  camp  con- 
struction is  based  on  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  8, 
Quartering;  Staff  Conf  Notes  1943,  Adm  454  and 
455,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 


REVIVING  BOLERO  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 


267 


to  arrive  in  the  ETO  within  the  next 
month  or  within  a  longer  period  if  such 
data  were  available.  Galled  long-term 
forecast,  the  lists  were  derived  from 
information  the  War  Department  pro- 
vided and  from  a  convoy  program  the 
British  quartermaster  general  pre- 
pared. At  the  same  time  the  Allies 
agreed  that  each  British  military  com- 
mand would  provide  holding  areas  for 
American  units  whose  final  locations 
had  not  been  determined  and  for  units 
that  arrived  unexpectedly.  The  Air 
Forces  did  not  have  to  determine  desti- 
nations for  units  in  these  long-term 
forecasts  but  coordinated  its  needs  with 
the  Air  Ministry,  not  with  the  Ameri- 
can base  sections  or  the  War  Office. 

Early  in  February  1943  the  Gonstruc- 
tion  and  Quartering  Division  of  the  the- 
ater engineer's  office  drew  up  plans  for 
quartering  U.S.  troops  expected  in  the 
United  Kingdom  by  the  end  of  the  year. 
These  forces  would  be  located  with  a 
view  to  their  future  operational  roles 
and  available  facilities  and  training 
areas.  They  would  be  quartered  in  tents 
between  15  March  and  15  October. 

The  quartering  program  did  not 
make  great  strides  in  early  1943. 
Though  the  engineers  were  using  over- 
all estimates  of  1,1 18,000  arrivals  listed 
in  the  second  Key  Plan,  they  were  still 
working  against  the  total  of  427,000 
men  established  in  the  third  Key  Plan 
of  November  1942  as  a  basis  for  calcu- 
lating accommodations.  Even  this  fig- 
ure caused  no  sense  of  urgency;  troops 
other  than  Air  Forces  were  not  arriv- 
ing in  any  great  numbers.  Of  the  5,244 
men  for  whom  quarters  were  found  in 
April  1943,  4,873  were  air  personnel. 
Southern  Base  Section  had  at  that  time 
380,000  covered  accommodations. 
Army  engineers  constructed  space  for 
60,000  and  expanded  existing  struc- 


tures to  take  60,000  more.  In  July  1943 
they  widened  the  program  to  provide 
82,000  spaces:  52,000  for  air  forces 
personnel,  27,000  for  SOS  troops,  and 
2,435  for  ground  forces  increments.  As 
of  March  1943,  no  troops  were  housed 
under  canvas. 

The  first  of  a  series  of  joint  monthly 
forecasts  concerning  the  arrival  of 
American  troops  in  the  United  King- 
dom appeared  on  14  July  1943.  From 
these  engineers  received  word  on  units 
alerted  in  the  United  States  for  ship- 
ment to  Europe  but  not  always  on  sizes 
of  convoys  or  timing  of  movements. 
News  of  a  unit's  scheduled  arrival  some- 
times reached  England  while  the  unit 
was  at  sea.  As  late  as  September  Gen- 
eral Moore  could  not  get  accurate  infor- 
mation on  unit  destinations.  In  mid- 
October,  when  the  amended  fourth 
Key  Plan  had  raised  estimates  for 
accommodations  to  1,060,000,  Moore 
finally  could  announce  that  he  had  a 
construction  program  for  the  phased 
arrival  of  the  growing  swell  of  ground 
force  units. 

By  April  1944  the  camp  construction 
program  had  provided  1,296,890  ac- 
commodations in  huts,  tents,  or  billets. 
Of  this  figure,  the  British  had  turned 
over  40  percent  and  constructed  for 
American  use  another  30  percent,  leav- 
ing the  remainder  for  American  mili- 
tary construction  crews.  At  the  end  of 
May  1944  the  camps  were  99.5  percent 
finished.  A  heavy  concentration  of  tent 
cities,  all  in  Southern  Base  Section, 
included  123,664  permanent  tent  ac- 
commodations and  49,302  temporary. ^^ 

Essential  to  providing  quarters  was 
determining  living  standards,  which 
dictated  space  requirements.  At  first, 


■^'^  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  7,  Field  and  Service  Force 
Construction,  pp.  115,  159,  193. 


268 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


the  U.S.  Army  accepted  for  its  ground 
and  air  forces  the  respective  British 
standards.  This  practice  made  for  two 
scales,  with  the  USAAF's  the  higher. ^"^ 
The  accommodations  provided  officers 
under  both  standards  were  about  the 
same,  but  the  British  provided  thirty 
square  feet  per  enlisted  man  and 
seventy-five  per  sergeant  while  the 
Americans  provided  thirty-five  square 
feet  per  enlisted  man  regardless  of 
grade.  Taking  over  facilities  from  the 
British  and  making  them  meet  U.S. 
Army  standards  usually  involved  reno- 
vations and  minor  alterations.  In  July 
1943  Lt.  Gen.  Jacob  L.  Devers,  ETO- 
USA  commander,  concluded  that  the 
scale  of  accommodations  for  U.S. 
forces  could  be  reduced  to  the  British 
scale  or  its  equivalent.  The  chief  engi- 
neer and  chief  surgeon  agreed  that  the 
best  scheme  was  sixteen  men  per  hut, 
or  thirty-five  square  feet  per  noncom 
or  enlisted  man,  and  seventy-two  square 
feet  per  officer.  This  "austerity  scale" 
lay  between  the  British  and  American 
standards. 

The  Construction  and  Quartering 
Division,  OCE,  ETOUSA,  had  a  num- 
ber of  problems  in  carrying  out  its 
assignment.  Frequently,  units  were  un- 
willing to  accept  facilities  the  British 
offered,  preferring  newly  constructed 
accommodations.  Occasionally  the  ser- 
vices failed  to  turn  in  complete  plans 
for  quartering  requirements,  tending 
instead  to  submit  their  needs  bit  by  bit. 
In  addition,  each  time  the  staff  of  the 
using  service  changed,  revised  require- 
ments arose,  for  each  new  section  chief 
had  his  own  ideas  on  the  subject.^' 


American  officers  added  to  the  confu- 
sion by  not  following  prescribed  chan- 
nels in  requesting  facilities. 

Two  varieties  of  billets  were  common 
outside  the  camps:  furnished  lodgings, 
which  included  the  use  of  toilet  facili- 
ties, water,  and  lighting;  and  furnished 
lodgings  in  which  the  U.S.  Army  pro- 
vided beds  and  the  British  water  and 
lights.  Although  a  British  law  required 
civilian  householders  to  provide  shel- 
ter for  troops  at  a  fixed  rate,  private 
billeting  was  on  an  entirely  voluntary 
basis  until  the  end  of  1943.  With  the 
fourth  Key  Plan  billeting  became  sys- 
tematized, and  some  forced  billeting 
occurred. 

Hospitals 

In  early  1942  the  American  forces 
used  British  and  Canadian  hospital  ser- 
vices and  operated  a  few  British  hospi- 
tals themselves.  Members  of  the  British 
Directorate  of  Fortifications  and  Works, 
the  Ministry  of  Works  and  Planning, 
the  U.S.  Medical  Department,  and  the 
Engineer  Service  drew  up  plans  for  new 
construction  as  well  as  for  alterations 
to  existing  buildings.  To  speed  matters 
the  engineers,  the  Medical  Department, 
and  the  British  agreed  on  certain  stan- 
dard designs  for  new  hospitals  and  for 
converting  existing  facilities,  subject  to 
changes  on  advice  of  the  chief  surgeon. 
He  frequently  made  adjustments  be- 
cause of  location,  terrain,  and  special 
needs.  ^^' 

Hospital  floors  gave  the  engineers 
trouble.  Because  concrete  floors  created 
considerable  dust,  they  were  covered 
with  pitch  mastic,  but  the  black  cover- 


'^  Moore  interv. 

'^'  Interv,  Col  C.J.  Barker,  Chf,  Ground  Projects, 
C&Q  Div,  12  May  44,  Adm  122,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 


■^•^  EUCOM  Engr  file  600  H  (Jen,  1  Jul-31  Dec  43; 
OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  7,  Field  and  Service  Force 
Construction,  p.  192. 


REVIVING  BOLERO  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 


269 


ing  showed  dust  and  always  looked 
dirty.  A  covering  of  oil  and  wax  solved 
the  problem  in  the  wards  but  not  in  the 
psychiatric  and  operating  wings,  where 
static  electricity  could  cause  anesthetic 
gases  to  explode.  Finally,  a  cement  fin- 
ish treated  with  sodium  silicate  was  sub- 
stituted for  pitch  mastic  in  operating 
rooms.  ^^ 

All  through  1943  and  early  1944, 
hospital  construction  lagged  consider- 
ably. Because  arable  land  was  at  a  pre- 
mium, the  British  Ministry  of  Agricul- 
ture refused  to  approve  many  sug- 
gested sites,  and  locations  became  lim- 
ited mostly  to  parks  and  estates  of  the 
"landed  gentry."  Inadequate  transpor- 
tation to  haul  materials  to  the  sites  also 
slowed  work.  Since  labor  and  materials 
came  through  different  agencies,  one 
or  the  other  often  was  not  available 
when  needed.  Labor  shortages  held  up 
all  construction,  especially  for  the  hos- 
pital program. ^^  The  lag  in  hospital  con- 
struction was  not  too  serious,  for  the 
full  capacity  of  hospitals  would  not  be 
needed  until  casualties  started  coming 
back  from  the  Continent.  On  31  May 
1944,  just  one  week  before  the  invasion, 
the  hospital  program  was  94  percent 
complete. 

The  Manpower  Shortage 

Personnel  became  General  Moore's 
most  abiding  concern  in  1943.  As  the 
year  began,  only  21,601  U.S.  Army 
engineers  were  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
with  jUst  9,727  allotted  to  the  Services 
of  Supply.  Many  SOS  engineer  troops 


were  still  in  the  labor  pool  that  manned 
depots  supporting  the  North  African 
invasion.  General  Moore  explored  all 
avenues  to  solve  manpower  problems. 
Some  aid  came  from  tactical  units,  in- 
cluding USAAF  organizations,  and,  on 
the  hospital  program,  from  Medical 
Department  personnel  and  even  conva- 
lescent patients.  Considerable  reliance 
also  had  to  be  placed  on  British  civilian 
labor."^^ 

British  Labor 

Civilian  labor  was  an  important  as- 
pect of  Reverse  Lend-Lease.  In  Decem- 
ber 1942  British  and  U.S.  Army  offi- 
cials established  procedures  for  employ- 
ing British  civilians.  Pooling  their 
limited  civilian  labor  force,  the  British 
allocated  civilians  according  to  priori- 
ties the  War  Cabinet  set,  while  contracts 
and  contractual  changes  were  made  to 
fit  existing  priorities.  For  ground  pro- 
jects the  order  of  priority  was  depots, 
camps,  and  hospitals."*^ 

In  April  1943  approximately  half  of 
the  120,000  British  civilians  assigned 
to  the  Bolero  program  were  working 
on  American  engineer  projects — 30,000 
on  air  force  and  28,000  on  ground 
force  projects.  Complaining  that  the 
shortage  of  British  labor  was  delaying 
completion  of  BOLERO,  engineers  at 
SOS,  ETOUSA,  constantly  demanded 
more  civilian  help.  The  British  govern- 
ment did  what  it  could,  but  the  supply 
was  limited;  indeed,  the  British  had  to 
cut  the  civilian  work  force  in  the  spring 
and  summer  of  1943  to  meet  domestic 
demands  for  agriculture  and  industry. 


"  Rpt  of  Inspection  Trip  of  CXi,  SOS,  and  Party  to 
DepChf  Engr,  ETOUSA,  18  Nov  43;  Adm  1 19,  Engr 
Construction,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 

*"  Interv,  Col  C.J.  Barker,  C^hf,  Ground  Projects, 
C&Q  Div,  12  May  44,  Adm  122. 


"'OCE  ETOUSA  Monthly  Rpt,  Sep  43  dated  15 
Oct  43,  p.  16;  Moore,  Final  Report,  p.  247. 

^"  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  6,  Air  Force  Construction, 
p.  2 1 ;  Moore,  Final  Report,  p."  247. 


270 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


By  1  September  1943,  more  American 
engineers  than  British  civilians  were 
working  on  U.S.  Army  projects,  and 
the  differential  grew  larger  as  more 
American  engineer  troops  arrived  in 
the  United  Kingdom."^' 

The  British  civilian  labor  force  was 
the  product  of  a  nation  already  drained 
by  three  years  of  war.  Consisting  of 
older  men  and  boys  below  draft  age, 
the  work  crews  were  neither  well  trained 
nor  effective  without  close  supervision. 
They  worked  an  average  of  seven  hours 
a  day,  less  than  troop  labor.  British 
habit  dictated  a  28-day  work  month, 
with  alternate  Sundays  off;  frequent 
holidays  cut  into  the  work  schedules. 
British  workers  also  had  many  absences 
due  to  colds  and  influenza. 

British  insistence  on  semipermanent 
rather  than  temporary  structures  slowed 
the  construction  program.  The  Minis- 
try of  Works  continued  to  justify  more 
sturdy  buildings  since  they  were  to  be 
used  after  the  war.  There  was  an  eight- 
month  difference  in  the  time  needed 
to  complete  contracted  airfield  construc- 
tion jobs.  U.S.  Army  engineers  took 
13  1/2  months  to  construct  a  heavy 
bomber  base  while  British  civilian  con- 
tractors needed  two  years  to  finish  the 
same  type  of  project  with  their  limited 
work  force  and  lighter  equipment.^^  On 
the  other  hand,  not  all  American  engi- 


^'  Ltr,  OCE  to  G-4,  27  Apr  43,  381,  Bolero, 
USFET  Key  Plan  H  1942-43;  Ltr,  Moore  to  G-4,  24 
Apr  43,  sub:  Labor  Requirements  for  U.S.  Construc- 
tion Program,  231.4,  Labor,  30  Oct  42-31  Oct  44, 
EUCOM  Engr  files. 

^"^  Interv,  Col  C.J.  Barker,  Chf,  Ground  Projects, 
C&Q  Div,  12  May  44,  Adm  122;  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist 
Rpt  6,  Air  Force  Construction,  p.  21;  Ltr,  OCE,  EBS, 
to  SOS  ETOUSA,  5  Feb  44,  sub:  Project  Study,  601 
P&Q  Gen,  Apr-Aug  43,  EUCOM  Engr  files;  OCE 
ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  7,  Field  and  Service  Force  Con- 
struction, p.  87;  Hist  359th  Engr  GS  Rgt. 


neer  units  coming  into  England  lived 
up  to  expectations. 

Field  Force  Units  on  Constructioii  Jobs 

Engineer  combat  battalions  were 
available  for  construction  work  from 
late  July  until  1 1  December  1943,  when 
they  were  to  be  released  for  invasion 
training.  By  the  end  of  July  the  num- 
ber of  field  force  engineers  on  construc- 
tion tasks  had  risen  to  11,233 — more 
than  twice  the  number  available  in 
June.^"^ 

Although  SOS,  ETOUSA,  which  for 
months  had  been  calling  for  the  high- 
est shipping  priority  for  its  units,  had 
succeeded  in  obtaining  a  very  high  pri- 
ority for  engineer  construction  units  in 
November  1943,  the  buildup  of  SOS 
engineer  units  was  slow,  complicated 
by  uncertainty  over  the  ultimate  size  of 
the  invasion  forces  and  changes  in  the 
troop  basis.  The  shipment  of  service 
units  began  to  improve  in  September 
1943,  but  not  enough  to  meet  the  dead- 
line for  the  release  of  field  force  engi- 
neers. In  October  engineer  combat  bat- 
talions were  extended  on  construction 
jobs  until  31  January  1944.  Combat 
group  headquarters  as  well  as  light 
equipment,  maintenance,  and  dump 
truck  companies  were  also  pressed  into 
service.  At  the  end  of  the  year  the  dead- 
line date  was  extended  again;  some 
units  were  assigned  to  construction 
indefinitely.  In  the  spring  of  1944  sev- 
eral engineer  camouflage  battalions 
were  added  to  the  construction  force. ^^ 


^ '  Ltr,  OCE  ETOUSA  to  the  Engrs,  SBS,  EBS,  WBS, 
etc.,  25  Jul  43,  sub:  Proposed  Allocation  of  Ground 
Construction  Units,  600  Gen;  EUCOM  Engr  files; 
OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  7,  Field  and  Service  Force 
Construction,  p.  85. 

^^  Staff  Conf  Notes,  1 1  Oct  43,  Adm  454,  ETOUSA 
Hist  Sect;  AGE  Bd  Rpt  162,  NATOUSA. 


REVIVING  BOLERO  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 


271 


In  December  1943  five  of  eight  non- 
divisional  engineer  combat  battalions, 
one  combat  regiment,  and  one  light 
equipment  company — all  from  the  field 
forces — were  still  attached  to  SOS  for 
construction.  Two  months  later  nine 
combat  battalions,  a  maintenance  com- 
pany, and  a  light  equipment  company 
were  still  assigned  to  construction  tasks. 
In  late  March  the  numbers  dropped 
sharply.  Only  a  few  field  force  engi- 
neers remained  on  construction  jobs, 
and  most  ground  force  engineer  units 
turned  to  training  for  the  invasion.^' 

U.S.  Army  engineers  on  construction 
jobs  numbered  40,436  on  1  September 
1943;  49,000  at  the  end  of  October 
(28,000  on  ground  projects,  21,000  on 
air  force  projects);  55,027  at  the  end  of 
the  following  month;  and  56,000  at  the 
close  of  the  year.  Peak  strength  came 
in  March  1944  with  61,000  engineers 
working  on  construction  projects 
(35,500  men  on  ground  and  25,500  on 
air  force  jobs).  At  the  end  of  May,  a 
week  before  the  invasion,  13,794  engi- 
neers were  still  engaged  in  construc- 


46 


tion. 

The  effectiveness  of  field  force,  SOS, 
and  aviation  engineers  on  construction 
jobs  decreased — and  motor  mainte- 
nance increased — because  units  were 
split  to  work  on  widely  scattered  jobs. 
The  1323d  Engineer  General  Service 
Regiment  at  one  time  was  scattered  over 
an  area  200  miles  long  and  80  miles 
wide.  Elements  of  the  346th  Engineer 
General  Service  Regiment  were  sepa- 
rated for  nineteen  months,  assembling 
as  a  complete  unit  only  in  April  1944. 
The  342d  Engineer  General  Service 


Regiment  had  no  unit  larger  than  a  bat- 
talion in  the  same  area  between  12  July 

1942  and  31  December  1943.^^ 

The  quality  of  engineer  units  work- 
ing at  construction  jobs  ranged  from 
very  good  to  marginally  effective.  The 
absence  of  planning  by  officers  and 
noncoms  caused  inefficiency.  Some 
engineer  units  on  construction  jobs 
lacked  specialists  in  steel,  brick,  and 
electrical  work,  and  men  had  to  be 
trained  in  these  skills.  Many  officers 
lacked  either  administrative  ability  or 
technical  knowledge. '^^ 

The  shortage  of  officers  with  con- 
struction and  engineering  experience 
persisted  throughout  the  war  in  almost 
every  type  of  unit.  In  the  summer  of 

1943  a  civilian  consultant  from  the 
United  States  found  a  greater  need  for 
training  among  officers  than  enlisted 
men.  "Civilian  experience  of  the  offi- 
cers," he  remarked,  "in  many  cases  does 
not  exist. '"^^  General  Moore  felt  that, 
considering  the  large  number  of  peo- 
ple who  had  engineering  education,  "a 
very  poor  job  was  done"  in  getting  the 
proper  personnel  into  the  engineers. ^^ 

Engineers  at  the  Depots 

In  January  1943  ETOUSA  had  only 
one  engineer  depot  company  split 
among  three  depots  to  process  engi- 
neer supplies  for  units  in  the  United 
Kingdom  and   for  TORCH   organiza- 


^^  OCE  ETOUSA  Monthly  Rpt  11 ,  Feb  44,  dated  1 5 
Mar  44. 
"'  Ibid.;  12,  Mar  44;  and  14,  May  44. 


^'  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  7,  Field  and  Service  Force 
Construction,  pp.  86-87;  Hist  1323d  Engr  GS  Rgt, 
Mar  44;  Hist  342d  Engr  GS  Rgt. 

^'^  Operation  of  GS  Rgts,  Dec  43,  Incl  to  Ltr,  Engr 
School  to  Chf  Engr,  28  Dec  43,  OCE;  OCE  ETOUSA 
Hist  Rpt  1,  Organization,  Administration,  and  Per- 
sonnel, p.  46. 

^■'  Rpt,  Paul  M.  King,  Engr  Training  Mission  in 
Endand,  26  May-24  Aug  43,  OCE  413.8  (ETO). 

'    Moore  interv. 


272 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


tions.  Three  companies  of  an  engineer 
aviation  battalion,  the  347th  Engineer 
General  Service  Regiment,  and  several 
separate  engineer  battalions  provided 
temporary  help  at  the  depots/  ^  As  the 
number  and  size  of  depots  grew,  decen- 
tralization became  necessary.  In  Febru- 
ary 1943  operational  control  of  the 
depots  passed  from  the  Supply  Division, 
OCE,  ETOUSA,  to  the  base  sections. 

Depot  operations  improved  mark- 
edly as  the  base  sections  assumed  more 
control  over  supply.  By  August  1943 
the  base  sections  were  exercising  inter- 
nal management  of  all  previously  ex- 
empted depot  activities  and  were  free 
of  the  limitations  of  Class  II  and  IV 
supply  levels  imposed  on  their  counter- 
parts in  the  United  States.  The  new 
authority  made  the  engineer  represen- 
tatives in  the  United  Kingdom  base  sec- 
tions responsible  to  their  base  section 
commanders  rather  than  to  General 
Moore,  though  he  still  retained  limited 
technical  supervision. '~ 

The  engineers  stocked  their  supplies 
in  three  types  of  depots.  (Map  13)  Re- 
serve depots  stocked  an  assortment  of 
items,  in  large  enough  quantities  for 
overseas  use,  that  were  issued  to  units 
in  the  United  Kingdom  only  when  the 
British  could  not  provide  them.  Key 
depots  stored  and  issued  selected  items 
for  specific  purposes.  Distribution 
depots  stored  and  issued  all  types  of 
supplies  and  equipment.  By  1944  twelve 
engineer  depots,  both  solely  engineer 
and  engineer  subdepots  at  general 
depots,  had  been  set  up — one  in  North- 


■'^  Memo,  Col  R.  B.  Lord  for  G-  1.  22  Jan  43,  600- 
A-Gen  ( 1  Ian-28  Feb  43).  EUCOM  Eiigr  files;  Draft. 
Talk  on  C^&Q  Div  based  on  second  and  third  Key 
Bolero  Plans,  325.5 1 ,  Policies  &  Plans,  EUCOM  Engr 
files. 

''-  Status  Rpts,  30  Nov  42 -3  Jul  43,  319.1.  EUCOM 
Engr  files;  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  3,  Supply. 


ern  Ireland  Base  Section,  three  in  East- 
ern Base  Section,  and  four  each  in 
Southern  Base  Section  and  Western 
Base  Section.  By  31  March  1944,  these 
twelve  had  provided  a  total  of 
17,143,914  square  feet  of  storage  space, 
of  which  1,161,452  was  covered  stor- 
age space,  15,909,694  square  feet  was 
open,  and  72,768  square  feet  was  shop 
space. '''^ 

The  number  and  type  of  units  per- 
forming engineer  supply  operations 
varied  from  depot  to  depot.  The  larg- 
est engineer  section  was  at  Newbury  in 
Sowthern  Base  Section.  With  little  cov- 
ered storage,  the  section  handled  mainly 
heavy  and  bulky  stores.  The  engineer 
section  at  Ashchurch  handled  a  variety 
of  heavy  and  bulky  supplies,  small  parts, 
tools,  and  spare  parts.  Another  depot 
held  Class  IV  supply,  most  of  it  re- 
served for  Continental  operations,  in 
open  storage.  This  practice  involved 
considerable  risk,  especially  in  winter, 
since  iron  and  steel  items  with  ma- 
chined or  unpainted  surfaces  left  in  the 
open  rusted.  ^ 

The  troops  at  engineer  depots  fell 
into  two  categories,  engineer  depot 
operating  units — companies  and  group 
headquarters — and  quartermaster  labor, 
referred  to  as  "touch  labor."  In  July 
1943,  with  only  two  depot  companies 
and  two  base  depot  companies  on  hand. 


""'  OCE  ETOUSA  Monthly  Rpt  5,  Aug  43,  and  10, 
Jan  44;  MS,  T/4  Russell  M.  Viets,  Construction  in  the 
United  Kingdom,  Oct  44,  p.  29. 

'^  Corresp  between  Quartermaster  Gen  and  Chf 
Engr,  ETOUSA,  8  Aug  43,  320.3,  Jun  42 -Jan  44, 
EUCOM  Engr  files;  Ltr,  Lt  Col  J.  H.  Pengilly,  Chf, 
Engr  Service,  NYPOE,  to  Overseas  Supply  Officer, 
NYPOE,  23  Apr  44,  sub:  Rpt  of  Liaison  Mission  to 
ETO,  519.1  (ETO),  OCE  (hereafter  cited  as  Pengilly 
Rpt);  Progress  Rpt  XCIX,  12  Jun  44,  Statistics  Sect, 
Sec  Gen  s\aff,  HQ,  ETOUSA;  Cir  18,  7  Nov  43,  sub: 
Rust  Prevention  at  Engr  Depots,  Adm  124,  ETOUSA 
Hist  Sect. 


■^^TS 


ENGINEER  SUPPLY  DEPOTS 
IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 

March  1944 


100  Miles 


MAP  13 


274 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


the  shortage  of  depot  personnel  was 
critical.  By  mid-September  the  U.S. 
engineers  were  running  seven  depots 
(soon  to  be  eight)  with  five  depot  and 
base  depot  companies.  Three  of  these 
units  had  been  in  the  theater  less  than 
eighty  days  and  were  of  limited  value — 
a  depot  company  needed  ninety  days 
of  experience  in  the  United  Kingdom 
before  it  could  be  expected  to  carry  its 
full  share  of  work.  Neither  officers  nor 
enlisted  men  had  had  much  practical 
experience  before  going  overseas  be- 
cause civilians  ran  U.S.  depots.  For 
many  of  the  engineers,  training  in  the 
United  States  consisted  of  only  six 
weeks  in  the  field  or  on  maneuvers, 
during  which  time  the  depot  units  had 
only  one  or  two  transactions  to  handle. 
Approximately  30  percent  of  the  engi- 
neer supplies  handled  in  the  United 
Kingdom  were  of  British  manufacture, 
and  their  nomenclature  could  be 
learned  only  in  the  United  Kingdom.^'' 
Since  only  a  small  portion  of  engi- 
neer supplies  could  be  manhandled,  a 
large  number  of  crane  operators  and 
riggers  was  needed.  Men  with  such 
skills  were  not  often  available  in  the 
small  quartermaster  labor  force  or  in 
the  engineer  depot  companies.  The 
445th  Engineer  Base  Depot  Company, 
as  an  example,  arrived  in  August  1943 
and  immediately  began  operating  the 
engineer  section  of  a  major  depot  at 
Sudbury.  The  men  often  spent  eigh- 


5^  OCE  ETOUSA  Monthly  Rpt  7,  Oct  43;  and  8, 
Nov  43;  Ltr,  Ofc  CW  to  Dep  Engr,  17  Sep  43,  sub: 
Depot  Personnel,  322,  Depots,  EUCOM  Engr  files; 
Rpt,  1st  Lt  Eugene  N.  Nelson,  sub:  Spare  Parts  for 
Engr  Equip  in  ETO,  475,  Engr  Equipment,  Dec 
42— Dec  43,  EUCOM  Engr  files  (hereafter  cited  as 
Nelson  Rpt);  Rpt,  Lt  Col  John  H.  Hassinger  for  the 
Chf,  Tractor  and  Crane  Sect,  OCE  WD,  to  Gen  Moore, 
Chf  Engr,  ETOUSA,  sub:  A  Rpt  of  Trip  to  ETO,  10 
Oct- 10  Nov  43,  319.1,  Rpts  <Gen),  EUCOM  Engr 
flies. 


teen  to  twenty  hours  at  a  stretch  trying 
to  learn  their  tasks.  The  unit  was  con- 
stantly short  of  labor  and  equipment, 
especially  of  material-handling  equip- 
ment, which  had  to  be  overworked  and 
ultimately  broke  down  completely.^*' 

The  engineers  employed  various  ex- 
pedients to  overcome  the  personnel 
shortage.  The  few  well-trained  depot 
companies  (such  as  the  397th)  were 
split,  usually  three  ways,  and  dispersed 
so  that  all  engineer  depots  would  have 
at  least  some  trained  personnel.  Depots 
used  men  from  dump  truck,  heavy 
equipment,  and  general  service  organi- 
zations, a  last-ditch  expedient  since  iden- 
tification of  various  items  of  engineer 
equipment  and  supplies  was  a  difficult 
job  requiring  alertness  and  training. 

The  number  of  engineers  at  depots 
increased  slowly  to  5,400  at  the  end  of 
January  1944,  6,200  by  the  end  of 
February,  6,500  the  next  month,  and 
7,500  by  the  end  of  April.  Then  non- 
divisional  engineer  field  units  had  to 
be  called  in  to  help.^^  The  shortage  of 
depot  personnel,  especially  crane  oper- 
ators, riggers,  and  trained  clerical  help, 
hindered  engineer  depot  work  all 
through  1943  and  well  into  1944. 
Trained  crane  operators  were  as  scarce 
as  cranes,  and  the  fumbling  efforts  of 
untrained  operators  added  to  spare 
part  and  repair  problems.^** 

Equipment  Maintenance 

Engineers  in  the  United  Kingdom 


^*^  Hist  445th  Engr  Base  Depot  Co. 

^'  Nelson  Rpt;  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  3,  Supply; 
OCE  ETOUSA  Monthly  Rpts  10- 14,  Jan-Jun  44. 

^^  IRS,  Capt  Dunbar  to  SD,  30  Dec  43,  sub:  Rpt  on 
G-4  Inspection,  29  Dec  43,  681,  Depots  General, 
EUCOM  Engr  files;  OCE  ETOUSA  Monthly  Rpt  4, 
Jul  43;  7,  Oct  43;  and  8,  Nov  43;  Mins  Depot  Mtg,  25 
Oct  43,  319.1,  Materiel  Rpts,  EUCOM  Engr  files. 


REVIVING  BOLERO  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 


275 


sorely  needed  more  third  echelon  main- 
tenance companies  equipped  with  mo- 
bile shop  trailers  to  make  field  repairs 
and  replace  major  unit  assemblies  at 
construction  sites,  depots,  or  wherever 
the  engineers  needed  more  extensive 
equipment  maintenance  than  they  could 
accomplish  with  their  own  second  eche- 
lon tools  and  parts.  In  his  first  monthly 
report  to  the  United  States  in  April 
1943  General  Moore  emphasized  this 
shortage.  In  May  10  percent  of  all  engi- 
neer equipment  was  deadlined  for  third 
echelon  maintenance  repairs  with  an 
additional  5  percent  deadlined  for 
fourth  echelon  repairs.  Fourth  and  fifth 
echelon  maintenance  repair  was  the 
responsibility  of  heavy  shop  companies 
which  provided  base  shop  facilities  and, 
when  necessary,  manufactured  equip- 
ment either  at  mobile  heavy  duty  shops 
or  at  large,  centrally  located  fixed  shops. 
Mobile  shops  provided  emergency  and 
general-purpose  repair  and  welding 
service.^ 

The  absence  of  heavy  shop  compa- 
nies at  some  base  sections  placed  an 
additional  burden  on  third  echelon 
companies,  and  their  efforts  to  under- 
take major  repairs  for  which  they  were 
not  equipped  often  resulted  in  delay  or 
unsatisfactory  work.  To  improve  mat- 
ters General  Moore  assigned  special 
maintenance  officers  to  each  base  sec- 
tion to  coordinate  the  work  of  the  main- 
tenance and  heavy  shop  companies  and 
the  spare  parts  depots.  But  the  short- 
age of  maintenance  companies  per- 
sisted, and  at  the  end  of  November 
1943  there  were  only  seven  such  units 


in  the  European  Theater  of  Operations. 
At  that  time  the  Supply  Division,  OCE, 
WD,  felt  that  maintenance  in  the  United 
Kingdom  was  not  more  than  75  per- 
cent adequate.*'^' 

When  preventive  maintenance  such 
as  lubrication  and  cleaning  by  equip- 
ment operators  was  inadequate,  the 
maintenance  companies'  work  load  in- 
creased. Often  the  equipment  opera- 
tor received  neither  proper  tools  nor 
supervision,  nor  were  sufficient  peri- 
odic inspections  made.  Careless  han- 
dling of  equipment  by  inexperienced 
operators  added  to  the  problem.  Fre- 
quently, equipment  was  turned  into  the 
engineer  maintenance  companies  for 
third  and  higher  echelon  repair  in  a 
"partially  dismantled  condition,"  short 
many  parts. ^' 

Spare  Parts 

Obtaining  first  echelon  spare  parts 
such  as  spark  plugs,  fan  belts,  bolts, 
nuts,  cotter  pins,  and  lock  washers  and 
second  echelon  carburetors,  fuel  oil  and 
water  pumps,  distributors,  gaskets,  and 
various  clutch,  brake,  and  chassis  parts 
was  a  constant  problem,  partly  because 
of  poor  procurement  procedures — too 
few  short-lived  parts  and  too  many 
long-lived  ones.  The  engineers'  prob- 
lem was  aggravated  by  the  large  num- 
ber of  nonstandard  pieces  of  equip- 


^"  OCE  ETOUSA  Monthly  Rpt,  Apr  43;  MS,  Eche- 
lon System  of  Engr  Maintenance;  Plan  for  SOS 
ETOIJSA,  vol.  II,  Supply,  Installations,  Transporta- 
tion, Maintenance,  1  Jan  44,  Adm  375,  ETOUSA  Hist 
Sect. 


•^^  Ltr,  Moore  to  Chf  of  Adm,  30  Nov  43,  app.  15  to 
OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  1,  Organization,  Administra- 
tion, and  Personnel;  Ltr,  OCE  ETOUSA  to  SBS,  WBS, 
and  EBS  Engrs,  1 5  May  43,  sub:  Maintenance  of  Engr 
Equipment,  475,  Engr  Equipment,  Dec  42- Dec  43, 
EUCOM  Engr  files;  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The 
Corps  of  Ejigineers:  Troops  and  Equipment,  p.  571. 

^^  Ltr,  Chf  Engr,  SOS  ETOUSA,  to  CG,  CBS  et  al.,  2 
Feb  44,  sub:  Maintenance  of  Engr  Equipment,  Engr 
Maint  Co,  1942-43,  EUCOM  Engr  files;  Staff  Conf 
Notes,  12  Apr  43,  Adm  455,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 


276 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


ment — British-made  or  U.S.  items  made 
to  British  specifications — for  which 
parts  were  often  unavailable.^^ 

The  first  engineer  spare  parts  depot 
began  operating  at  Ashchurch  in  the 
spring  of  1943.  In  June  the  first  of  the 
specialized  spare  parts  companies  to 
arrive  in  the  theater,  the  752d  Engi- 
neer Parts  Supply  Company,  took  over 
the  depot.  Several  similar  companies 
arrived  from  the  United  States  during 
the  summer  and  fall,  enabling  the  the- 
ater engineer  to  set  up  spare  parts  sub- 
depots  at  Conington,  Sudbury,  and 
Histon  and  to  establish  an  effective  daily 
courier  system  between  the  subdepots 
and  the  general  depot  at  Ashchurch.''^ 

The  spare  parts  companies  did  excel- 
lent work,  constructing  most  of  their 
own  bins  and,  despite  the  handicap 


''^  MS,  Echelon  System  of  Engr  Maintenance;  Ltr, 
Moore  to  CG,  NYPOE,  24  Apr  44,  sub:  Expeditious 
Shipment  of  Spare  Parts  for  Engr  Equipment,  ETO 
400,  OCE;  Hist  482d  Engr  Maint  Co. 

"■*  Hists,  49 1  St  Engr  Equip  Co  and  752d,  75 1  st,  756th 
Engr  Parts  Supply  Cos;  Memo  for  Capt  Austen,  16 
Nov  43,  file  J.A.T.  S-Miscel. 


imposed  by  a  lack  of  training  and  prop- 
er equipment,  reducing  substantially 
the  large  backlog.  In  conjunction  with 
the  engineer  heavy  shop  companies,  the 
parts  supply  units  salvaged  or  reclaimed 
many  parts  that  might  otherwise  have 
been  lost.  In  early  1944,  as  the  days 
grew  longer,  the  companies  worked  two 
and  even  three  shifts.  Despite  these 
efforts  the  shortage  of  spare  parts,  par- 
ticularly such  vital  items  as  cranes,  con- 
tinued to  be  a  serious  concern  to  engi- 
neer planners  as  preparations  acceler- 
ated for  the  invasion  of  Europe. ^'^ 

The  Continent  assumed  an  ever- 
larger  share  of  the  attention  of  the 
Allied  and  theater  planning  staffs  in 
England  in  the  latter  part  of  1943. 
Across  the  Channel  lay  a  host  of  engi- 
neering problems  associated  with  the 
projected  invasion  of  German-occupied 
territory  and  the  maintenance  of  armies 
there  for  the  final  phases  of  the  war. 


'''  Hist  756th  Engr  Parts  Supply  Co;  Wkly  Rpts,  Sup- 
ply Div,  OCE  ETOUSA,  12  May  43  and  24  Aug  43; 
Pengilly  Rpt. 


CHAPTER  XIII 


Looking  Ahead  to  the  Continent 


Detailed  engineer  planning  for  a 
Continental  invasion  continued  in  1943 
with  the  addition  of  a  forecasting  tech- 
nique imposed  upon  theater  planners 
by  ASF  headquarters  in  Washington. 
To  involve  theater  staffs  around  the 
world  in  procurement  planning  for 
major  operations  Army  Service  Forces 
had  devised  a  system  of  so-called  opera- 
tional or  keyed  projects.  Theater  plan- 
ners were  to  compile  lists  of  Class  IV 
and  Class  II  items  (in  excess  of  regular 
TOE  and  TBA  allotments)  and  to  key 
the  requested  items  to  specific  and  fore- 
seeable tasks  such  as  the  reconstruction 
of  an  individual  port. 

On  4  June  1943,  the  War  Depart- 
ment directed  ETOUSA  to  begin  study- 
ing what  equipment  would  be  needed 
for  an  invasion  of  the  Continent.  These 
studies  were  known  in  England  as  Pro- 
jects for  Continental  Operations,  or 
PROCO.  Their  objective  was  to  allow 
ASF  ample  time  to  procure  from  Ameri- 
can industry  major  items  of  machinery 
and  specialized  equipment  and  have 
them  on  hand  in  the  New  York  Port  of 
Embarkation  for  shipping  as  theater 
users  requested  them.  The  forecasting 
system  required  detailed  information 
on  numbers  of  items  needed,  intended 
use,  tonnage  estimates,  and  operational 
justification.  Not  intended  as  requisi- 
tions in  themselves,  the  project  require- 
ment statements  went  directly  to  the 


War  Department  for  action.  The 
PROCO  system  produced  some  suc- 
cesses but  in  many  ways  ran  afoul  of 
realities  and  practices  in  the  theater.' 

Engineer  PROCO  Projects 

Engineer  PROCO  studies  began  with 
some  confusion.  When  the  technical 
services  involved  in  PROCO  planning 
began  their  work,  formal  Allied  agree- 
ment to  the  Overlord  concept  was  still 
three  months  away.  Upon  receiving 
word  of  the  War  Department's  require- 
ments, General  Moore  protested  that 
he  needed  basic  data  on  eight  separate 
aspects  of  the  forthcoming  operation 
in  order  to  proceed  with  operational  or 
keyed  planning.  Specifically,  his  engi- 
neer staff  needed  to  know  the  maxi- 
mum size  of  the  assault  force,  the  ap- 
proximate size  of  forces  expected  to 
be  employed  on  the  Continent  on  D 
plus  90,  maximum  forces  to  be  employed 
in  active  operations,  the  number  of  lines 
of  communications,  the  number  of  ports 
to  be  built  or  rebuilt,  the  number  of 
airfields  required  in  each  calendar  quar- 
ter through  the  end  of  1944,  the  state 


'  Ku\>pcn\\i3\,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Volume 
I,  pp.  260—68;  Coakley  and  Leighton,  Global  Logistics 
and  Strategy,  1943-45,  pp.  129-30,  166-68; /I nnua/ 
Report  of  the  Army  Service  Forces  for  the  Fiscal  Year  1944 
(Washington,  1944),  pp.  11-12. 


278 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


of  repair  of  facilities  in  France,  and  an 
evaluation  of  areas  to  be  occupied  on 
the  Continent  as  of  the  end  of  1944. 
While  American  engineer  members  of 
COSSAC  gathered  some  of  the  data, 
General  Lee  provided  the  basis  of  engi- 
neer supply  planning  for  the  majority 
of  PROCO  projects  on  24  June.^ 

In  a  letter  of  instruction  to  his  subor- 
dinate SOS  elements  Lee  listed  the 
objectives  for  what  he  described  as  a 
ROUNDUP-type  operation.  American 
forces  ashore  in  France  by  D  plus  30 
would  number  480,000;  985,000  were 
expected  by  D  plus  90.  To  support  this 
strength,  two  one  hundred-mile-long 
lines  of  communications  were  to  be 
operating  by  D  plus  90,  and  by  D  plus 
240,  or  the  end  of  1944,  the  lines  were 
expected  to  be  two  hundred  miles  long. 
On  D  plus  90  two  additional  lines  of 
communications  were  to  open  to  receive 
supplies  shipped  directly  from  the  Unit- 
ed States  to  the  European  mainland. 
The  overall  plan  called  for  four  major 
and  eight  minor  ports  to  be  fully  opera- 
tional by  D  plus  240.  On  these  assump- 
tions the  engineers  worked  all  summer, 
with  each  division  of  the  theater  en- 
gineer's office  responsible  for  its  as- 
signed portion  of  the  thirty  categories 
of  engineer  functions  represented  in 
the  PROCO  statements.  They  divided 
delivery  schedules  according  to  the 
planning  timetable  General  Lee  had 
described,  earmarking  materiel  for  ship- 
ment in  the  first  ninety  days  after  the 
invasion  or  for  D  plus  9 1  to  D  plus  240. 
With  D-day  later  set  tentatively  for  1 
May  1944,  the  engineers  wanted  to  have 
75  percent  of  the  equipment  and  sup- 
ply for  the  first  ninety-day  phase  on 
hand  in  the  United  Kingdom  by  I  Janu- 


ary 1944.  Materiel  for  the  second  peri- 
od was  to  be  in  the  theater  ninety  days 
before  it  was  needed.  By  late  September, 
they  had  sent  to  Washington  twenty- 
eight  studies  with  tonnage  estimates 
totaling  1,136,713  long  tons.^ 

Differing  views  on  the  purpose  of 
PROCO  and  on  the  proper  content  of 
PROCO  studies  also  fueled  lively  corre- 
spondence between  the  theater  and  the 
War  Department  through  the  summer. 
In  late  June  1943  General  Lee  asserted 
that  requisitions  for  the  material  listed 
in  the  theater  PROCO  studies  would 
be  appended  to  those  studies.  Though 
this  was  not  the  original  scheme  for  the 
keyed  projects,  the  War  Department 
acquiesced  in  the  procedure  on  25  July. 
In  September  the  War  Department 
complained  about  the  content  of  some 
of  the  submitted  studies,  citing  espe- 
cially quartermaster  PROCO  submis- 
sions for  medals  and  decorations,  bread- 
sacks,  and  standard  two-inch  plugs  for 
gasoline  cans.  The  engineers'  submis- 
sions conformed  to  the  letter  and  the 
spirit  of  the  ASF  program,  but  engi- 
neer planners  often  neglected  to  iden- 
tify those  items  that  could  be  procured 
in  England  through  reverse  lend-lease. 
Though  these  items  were  to  be  in- 
cluded in  the  studies,  the  PROCO  pro- 
cedures called  for  flagging  them  with 
asterisks  in  the  material  lists.  Once 
the  British  had  supplied  the  items,  the 
theater  would  notify  the  War  Depart- 
ment to  cancel  them  in  the  PROCO 
studies."^ 

In  Washington,  engineer  PROCO 
projects  followed  a  tortuous  path.  From 


OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  3,  Supply,  p.  29. 


'  Ltr,  CG,  SOS,  24  Jun  43,  sub:  Projects  for  a  Conti- 
nental Operation,  as  cited  in  Ibid.,  p.  31. 

^  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  3,  Supply,  app.  2 1 ,  PROCO 
Procedures;  ETO  Gen  Bd  Rpt  128,  Logistical  Build-up 
in  the  British  Isles,  p.  20. 


LOOKING  AHEAD  TO  THE  CONTINENT 


279 


the  War  Department  adjutant  general 
they  went  to  the  director  of  plans  and 
operations,  ASF,  who  was  responsible 
for  control  until  the  projects  were  ap- 
proved. The  director  of  plans,  ASF, 
sent  the  studies  to  the  Logistics  Group, 
Operations  Division,  War  Department 
General  Staff,  which  determined  wheth- 
er the  projects  were  necessary.  The 
director  of  plans,  ASF,  next  forwarded 
the  studies  to  OCE,  WD.  OCE  decided 
whether  each  project  was  necessary  and 
adequate,  from  both  technical  and  tacti- 
cal standpoints.  OCE  then  edited  the 
bill  of  materials  based  on  availability 
and  corrected  all  nomenclature  and  cat- 
alogue numbers.  The  director  of  plans, 
ASF,  then  sent  the  projects  to  the  direc- 
tor of  the  Requirements  Division,  ASF, 
who  determined  whether  the  require- 
ments fitted  into  worldwide  plans  for 
each  item  or  whether  the  Army  Supply 
Program  would  have  to  be  changed. 
The  projects  again  went  through  the 
director  of  plans,  ASF,  to  the  Logistics 
Branch,  OPD,  for  approval  and  finally 
to  G— 4,  War  Department  General  Staff, 
for  concurrence.  The  approved  pro- 
jects then  became  the  basis  upon  which 
the  engineers  in  the  United  Kingdom 
requisitioned  Class  IV  items  from  the 
United  States.^ 

Confusion  existed  for  a  time  at  the 
New  York  Port  of  Embarkation  because 
ETOUSA  included  in  PROCO  tonnage 
figures  all  of  the  Class  IV  operational 
needs  estimated  before  PROCO  began. 
NYPOE,  on  the  other  hand,  had  ac- 
counted only  for  tonnages  submitted 
as  PROCO  projects.  Wide  discrepan- 
cies in  the  records  of  shipments  ASF, 


NYPOE,  and  ETOUSA  maintained  ad- 
ded to  the  confusion.  For  example,  ASF 
figures  included  items  released  for  ship- 
ment to  the  United  Kingdom.  ASF  con- 
sidered them  delivered,  but  these  fig- 
ures were  meaningless  to  the  engineers 
in  the  United  Kingdom  because  some 
time  elapsed  between  the  date  items 
were  released  in  the  United  States  and 
their  arrival  in  theater.  As  late  as  March 
1944  the  OCE  Supply  Division  esti- 
mated that  120  days  were  required  for 
delivery  of  supplies  from  the  United 
States  after  requisitions  had  been  placed, 
assuming  the  supplies  were  actually 
available  in  U.S.  Army  depots.  There- 
fore the  division  felt  it  was  necessary  to 
provide  the  United  States  with  estimates 
of  Class  IV  supplies  required  for  the 
next  fifteen  months.^ 

By  the  end  of  April  1944,  shipments 
of  engineer  supplies  from  the  United 
States,  particularly  materials  requested 
under  PROCO,  were  seriously  behind 
schedule — a  backlog  of  320,278  long 
tons  existed.  The  situation  improved 
only  somewhat  during  May,  with 
246,521  long  tons  still  overdue.  Mean- 
while, engineer  projects  had  been  placed 
in  a  common  pool  with  all  others.  Sup- 
plies and  equipment  were  issued  based 
on  established  priorities  to  organiza- 
tions having  approved  projects  whether 
or  not  the  specific  supplies  had  arrived. 
Along  with  other  services  and  com- 
mands the  engineers  were  given  a  credit 
and  a  priority  on  the  central  pool  based 
on  their  project  submissions  or  their 
project  supply  allocation.  This  system 


■'  Rpt,  Maj  John  A.  Thetford  to  CE,  20  Dec  43,  sub: 
Rpt  on  Trip  to  United  States,  333,  Inspections,  EUC^OM 
Engr  files;  Ltr,  Francis  H.  Oxx  to  Engr,  Third  Army, 
28  Mar  44,  sub:  Engr  Supply,  file  381  PROCO. 


•^  Ltr,  Lt  Col  J.  H.  Pengilly,  Chf,  Engr  Service, 
NYPOE,  to  Overseas  Supply  Ofc,  NYPOE,  23  Apr 
44,  sub:  Rpt  of  Liaison  Mission  to  ETO,  file  519T 
(ETO),  OCE;  Ltr,  Oxx  to  Engr,  First  Army  et  al.,  12 
Mar  44,  sub:  Time  Factor  in  Engr  Supply,  381  Supply, 
EUCOM  Engr  files. 


280 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Bulldozers  at  the  En(;ineer  Depot  at  Thatcham  Before  the  Invasion 


enabled  using  units  to  check  equipment 
issued  in  the  United  Kingdom  for  com- 
pleteness and  workability  before  they 
departed  for  the  Continent.^ 

Planning  for  Construction  on  the  Continent 

When  PROCO  projects  began  the 
ETOUSA  engineers  were  already  well 
aware  of  the  problems  involved  in  esti- 
mating materials  and  troop  labor  that 
would  be  needed  for  heavy  construc- 
tion on  the  Continent.  Such  activities 
normally  fell  into  seven  broad  cate- 
gories: ports,  railways,  roads,  pipelines, 
inland  waterways,  utility  systems,  and 


'  OCE  ETOUSA  Monthly  Rpt  13,  Apr  44,  and  14, 
May  44;  Pengilly  Rpt. 


general  construction  such  as  hospitals, 
shops,  depots,  and  troop  housing.*^ 

Lacking  firm  plans  for  specific  opera- 
tions, engineer  planners  at  COSSAC 
drew  up  a  comprehensive  list  of  all  the 
engineer  Class  IV  supplies  that  would 
be  needed  for  a  large  overseas  operation. 
The  planners  considered  every  activity 
that  would  need  engineer  Class  IV 
items  and  set  up  units  of  supply  corre- 
sponding to  each  activity.  The  set  of  staff 
tables  they  developed  could  be  used  to 
compute  supplies  for  regular  engineer 
operations  and  for  the  PROCO  studies. 
The  tables  also  proved  useful  to  plan- 

**  Lt.  Col.  S.  A.  Potter,  "Engineer  Construction  Plan- 
ning for  Operation  Overlord,"  Military  Review,  XXX 
(December  1950),  3.  Unless  otherwise  noted,  this  sec- 
tion on  construction  is  based  on  this  source. 


LOOKING  AHEAD  TO  THE  CONTINENT 


281 


Engineer  Crane  Stacks  Lumber  at  Thatcham,  April  1944 


ners  of  other  services  who  wanted  quick 
estimates  of  engineer  work.  The  esti- 
mates varied  greatly  in  kind — from 
requirements  for  a  mile  of  railroad 
track  to  complete  details  for  building 
and  equipping  a  1,000-bed  hospital. 

Even  after  more  definite  information 
on  Overlord  became  available  in  July 
1943,  engineer  planners  were  ham- 
pered— more  than  the  other  services — 
because  the  demand  for  the  utmost 
secrecy  deprived  them  of  information 
on  specific  terrain.  At  the  insistence  of 
the'  chief  engineer  security  was  relaxed, 
and  the  details  of  OVERLORD  were 
revealed  in  the  late  summer  of  1943. 
Theoretically,  planners  could  then  study 
the  specific  ports,  rail  lines,  and  high- 
ways involved,  but  the  need  for  long- 


range  procurement  action  and  for  time 
to  activate  and  train  engineer  units 
made  only  changing  estimates  possible. 
Ports  that  could  serve  the  Allied  in- 
vaders came  under  close  scrutiny  in  a 
series  of  PROCO  studies.  Prompted  by 
the  belief,  later  confirmed  at  Naples, 
that  the  Germans  would  destroy  any 
suitable  harbors  to  thwart  Allied  efforts 
to  seize  them,  the  engineers  tried  to 
forecast  the  reconstruction  job  expected 
in  each  port  covered  in  PROCO  plan- 
ning. They  continued  the  work  of  a 
port  committee  established  early  in 
1943  under  a  British  officer  to  chart 
the  capacities  of  ports  from  the  Nether- 
lands to  the  Spanish  border.  Eventu- 
ally planners  included  for  consideration 
only  eighteen  ports  in  the  Brittany  and 


282 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Normandy  peninsulas.  On  12  August 
1943,  the  ASF  received  an  exhaustive 
PROCO  study  covering  Class  II  and 
Class  IV  construction  material  and  spe- 
cial equipment  deemed  necessary  to 
reopen  Cherbourg,  an  important  objec- 
tive in  the  final  OVERLORD  plan.^ 

When  planning  for  specific  ports 
proved  virtually  impossible  without 
knowledge  of  port  conditions  and  facili- 
ties, the  engineers  turned  to  more  gen- 
eralized methods  of  construction  plan- 
ning. They  first  correlated  the  planning 
demands  to  a  fixed  length  of  quay. 
Then,  taking  the  OVERLORD  phased 
tonnage  requirements  for  the  invasion, 
they  tied  the  phased  capacity  to  the  fig- 
ures they  had  derived  for  the  fixed  pier 
length.  One  ton  of  cargo  per  linear  foot 
of  pier  per  day  became  the  standard 
engineer  planning  yardstick  for  port 
reconstruction.  These  data  were  com- 
bined with  others  to  produce  master 
lists  and  general  requirements  requisi- 
tions for  the  Continent. 

French  harbors  had  silted  up  during 
the  enforced  inactivity  under  German 
occupation,  and  it  would  take  exten- 
sive dredging  to  clear  them  for  the  sort 
of  supply  operations  envisioned  in  the 
invasion  plan.  The  Germans  were  also 
likely  to  sink  blockships  and  other  obsta- 
cles in  the  harbor  channels  and  along- 
side berthing  areas.  The  engineers  took 
into  account  the  amounts  of  explosives 
or  specialized  equipment  needed  to 
remove  the  blockaiges.  They  also  re- 
quested specially  designed  shallow-draft 
port  repair  ships,  to  remain  under 
Army  control,  that  would  provide  float- 
ing machine  shops  to  maintain  construc- 
tion equipment  in  use  or  to  make  re- 


'  Annual  Report  of  the  ASF,  1944,  p.  12. 


placement  parts  for  damaged  lock  gates 
and  power  plants. 

The  engineers  attempted  to  develop 
standard  repair  methods  and  bills  of 
materials  for  the  lines  of  communica- 
tions and  supply  leading  out  of  the  port 
areas.  They  tabulated  the  labor  and 
material  needed  to  repair  a  mile  of  rail- 
road track  or  of  oil  or  gasoline  pipeline 
and  to  provide  1,000  square  feet  of 
general-purpose  shop  or  depot  space. 
There  were  some  forty-one  contingency 
plans  for  dealing  with  unpredictable 
Channel  tides  and  weather,  which  could 
make  repairs  necessary  under  other 
than  normal  water  levels. 

Realizing  that  ports  would  not  be 
available  for  at  least  ninety  days  after 
the  invasion,  COSSAC  allocated  author- 
ity for  beach  operations  among  the 
Navy,  the  Army's  Transportation  Corps, 
and  the  Corps  of  Engineers,  which  car- 
ried the  heaviest  load.  At  this  stage  the 
main  problem  in  planning  beach  sup- 
ply operations  was  selection.  Beaches 
had  to  be  wide  and  sheltered  from  high 
winds  and  heavy  surf.  Terrain  and 
beach  outlets  were  of  prime  importance 
in  the  early  days  of  the  invasion,  and 
the  engineers  tried  to  locate  supply 
beaches  near  ports  that  would  serve  as 
supply  arteries  once  beach  operations 
closed  down.  Plans  also  included  opti- 
mum sites  for  beach  air  strip  construc- 
tion, for  inland  movement  and  com- 
munication, for  protection  by  Allied  air 
power,  and  for  limited  enemy  opposi- 
tion. 


Lines  of  Communications 

Influenced  by  the  widespread  rail 
and  road  demolition  they  had  met  in 
Italy,  ETOUSA  engineer  planners  at 
first  estiinated  that  destruction  of  traf- 


LOOKING  AHEAD  TO  THE  CONTINENT 


283 


fic  nets  on  the  Continent  would  reach 
75  percent.  Since  such  an  estimate  called 
for  staggering  tonnages  of  railroad 
equipment,  it  was  cut  to  25  percent  for 
main  line  tracks  and  to  35  to  50  per- 
cent for  yards  and  sidings.  U.S.  Army 
engineer  and  British  planners  provided 
the  following  revised  estimates  of  ex- 
pected damage:  railroads  in  the  port 
area,  75  percent;  railroads  up  to  thirty 
miles  inland,  50  percent;  those  beyond 
that  distance,  25  percent.  Railway  brid- 
ges in  ports  and  up  to  thirty  miles  away 
would  be  damaged  100  percent;  those 
beyond,  50  percent.  In  fact,  the  engi- 
neers overestimated  the  amount  of  new 
rail  and  wooden  ties  that  would  be 
needed  in  northern  France.  Though 
the  destruction  in  major  centers  was 
severe,  the  trackage  in  open  country- 
side escaped  extensive  damage,  often 
more  affected  by  Allied  air  attacks  than 
enemy  action,  and  cancellation  orders 
stopped  much  of  the  continued  move- 
ment of  rails  to  Europe  later  in  the  year. 

Thousands  of  aerial  photographs 
helped  engineer  planners  estimate  the 
amount  of  railroad  bridging  that  would 
be  required  on  the  Continent.  The 
engineers  studied  track  maintenance, 
railroad  grades,  the  number  and  length 
of  sidetracks  needed,  the  carrying  capac- 
ity of  various  lines,  bridge  capacities, 
water  and  commercial  facilities,  and 
available  materials. ''^ 

The  engineers'  chief  concern  in  road 


'"  Engr  Planning  Data  for  Operations  in  Northwest 
Europe,  Railway  Reconstruction,  Mar  44,  OCE;  Rpt 
of  Communications  Sect.  "Railroad  and  POL  Projects — 
Channel  Base,"  Estimates  for  Railroad  Reconstruction, 
C&Q  Div,  OCE,  Mar  44:  Daily  Jnl,  ETOUSA  G-4 
Opns,  3  Apr  44,  Adm  475,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect;  OCE 
ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  12,  Railroad  Reconstruction  and 
Bridging  (United  Kingdom),  1946,  Liaison  Sect,  Intel 
Div,  ETOUSA  Adm  file  547. 


planning  lay  with  maintenance  rather 
than  new  construction.  They  generally 
confined  estimates  to  maintenance  of 
one  mile  of  various  types  of  roads  for 
one  month.  By  studying  typical  roadnets 
in  other  theaters,  planners  could  obtain 
an  average  road  density  per  square  mile 
of  territory  occupied,  and  by  comput- 
ing the  total  area  under  occupation 
from  the  phase  lines  marked  out  for 
Overlord,  they  could  calculate  total 
road  mileage  during  successive  periods. 
The  engineers  doubted  that  the  Ger- 
mans would  systematically  destroy  road 
surfaces.  In  the  Mediterranean  the  Ger- 
mans had  limited  deliberate  destruction 
to  roads  in  difficult  terrain  where  repairs 
would  constitute  a  major  problem,  and 
little  such  terrain  existed  in  northern 
France." 

Tactical  and  highway  bridging  occu- 
pied much  of  the  planners'  attention. 
A  tactical  bridge  policy  developed  in 
ETOUSA  in  April  1943  remained  the 
basis  for  planning,  though  it  changed 
with  tactical  planning.  The  engineers 
computed  their  requirements  for  high- 
way bridges  by  using  aerial  photographs, 
expecting  to  use  standard  35-ton  capac- 
ity steel  treadway  to  bridge  the  thirty- 
to  sixty-foot  gaps  anticipated  on  the 
Continent.  In  the  theater,  the  engineers 
used  Bailey  bridging  for  everything 
from  tactical  floating  spans  to  lines  of 
communications  bridges  for  army  and 
division  use.  But  ongoing  theater  plan- 
ning coincided  with  a  search  for  new 
models  of  tactical  bridging  in  the  United 
States  necessitated  by  new,  wider  replace- 
ments for  the  M— 4  Sherman  tank  and 
by  Army  Ground  Forces  demands  on 


"  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  14,  Road  Maintenance 
and  Highway  Bridging  (United  Kingdom),  1946,  p. 
17,  Liaison  Sect,  Intel  Div,  ETOUSA  Adm  file  547. 


284 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


the  Engineer  Board  for  a  complete  revi- 
sion in  floating  bridge  equipage.  Test- 
ing of  new  prototypes  and  of  new  Bai- 
ley bridging  applications  continued  into 
early  1944.  Thus,  as  late  as  January 
1944,  many  engineers  in  the  United 
States  were  still  considering  the  Bailey 
strictly  as  a  line  of  communications 
bridge  while  engineers  in  the  ETO, 
remembering  the  Italian  campaign, 
favored  its  use  in  any  tactical  situation 
to  which  it  could  be  adapted.'^ 

Initial  estimates  on  the  consumption 
of  gasoline  in  the  ETO  were  indefinite; 
only  late  in  the  planning  stage  were 
engineer  planners  able  to  make  fairly 
accurate  calculations.  Except  for  bulk 
storage  installations,  which  were  usu- 
ally in  the  vicinity  of  ports,  existing  POL 
facilities  generally  lay  underground  and 
were  not  well  suited  to  military  needs. 
Pipelines  had  to  be  laid  along  existing 
roads  to  minimize  the  problems  of  trans- 
porting and  distributing  construction 
materials.  The  terrain  along  selected 
routes  was  an  important  factor,  for  it 
had  a  direct  bearing  on  the  number 
and  spacing  of  pumping  stations.  The 
tactical  plan  and  the  location  of  large 
supply  depots  generally  would  deter- 
mine both  the  location  and  capacity  of 
bulk  storage  installations.  Thus,  with 
every  major  change  in  the  tactical  plan 
(or  with  any  other  material  change  in 
plans)  a  new  pipeline  distribution  sys- 
tem had  to  be  designed. 

Ship-to-shore  pipelines  also  posed  a 
difficult  problem.  Assurance  was  needed 
that  pipeline  distribution  of  liquid  fuels 
could  be  undertaken  before  a  port  was 


available.  A  method  had  to  be  devised 
to  permit  tankers  anchored  one-half  to 
one  mile  off  the  beaches  to  discharge 
their  contents  directly  into  a  shore- 
based  distribution  system.  After  experi- 
menting, American  and  British  forces 
adopted  a  simple  British  solution.  A 
small  vessel  with  powerful  winches  such 
as  a  submarine-net  tender  could  pull 
successive  lengths  of  rigid  pipe  seaward 
from  a  beach.  A  flexible  buoyed  hose 
attached  to  the  seaward  end  of  the  pipe 
would  permit  direct  discharge  of  tank- 
ers into  the  system.'"' 

The  engineers  could  not  estimate  in 
advance  requirements  for  the  recon- 
struction of  the  inland  waterways  of 
northeast  France  and  Belgium,  which 
the  Germans  were  using  extensively,  for 
there  was  no  standardization  in  their 
dimensions  or  in  their  equipment.  Many 
were  the  product  of  centuries  of  devel- 
opment of  internal  communications. 
Except  for  lock  structures,  reconstruc- 
tion would  be  largely  an  earthmoving 
job  requiring  the  type  of  equipment 
organic  to  engineer  construction  units. 
The  repair  of  locks  and  lockgates,  the 
engineers  believed,  could  be  accom- 
plished by  improvisation  using  local 
materials. 

The  major  problem  the  engineers 
faced  with  utilities  systems  on  the  Con- 
tinent was  determining  civilian  needs — 
military  requirements  were  to  be  met 
by  self-contained  utilities  provided  for 
all  new  camps  and  hospitals.  Planners 
gathered  population  statistics  and  per 
capita  figures  on  water  consumption 
and  electric  power.  They  established 


'■^  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Engineers: 
Troops  and  Equipment,  pp.  490-97;  Dossier  of  Tactical 
Bridging,  18  Jan  44,  Supply  C;-4  Directives;  Rpt  on 
Observations  Made  During  Visit  to  the  ETO,  16 
Jun-17  Sep  43. 


"  "Railroad  and  POL  Projects — (channel  Base,"  in 
booklet,  Estimates  for  Railroad  Reconstruction,  C&Q  Div, 
OCE,  Mar  44. 

"  OCE  ETOUSA  Monthly  Rpt  12,  Mar  44,  and  13, 
Apr  44. 


LOOKING  AHEAD  TO  THE  CONTINENT 


285 


minimum  standards  for  civilian  use  and 
studied  existing  utilities  systems  and 
anticipated  damage. 

In  the  end  the  engineers  regarded 
the  PROCO  system  as  problematic, 
either  as  a  means  for  estimating  neces- 
sary theater  stocks  accurately  or  as  a 
supply  system.  Though  PROCO  stud- 
ies were  an  obvious  method  of  drawing 
up  broad  estimates  and  planning  re- 
quirements for  construction  on  the 
Continent,  there  was  no  possibility  of 
pinpointing  engineer  requirements 
under  PROCO  or  any  other  system. 
While  their  objectives  were  still  in  enemy 
hands  the  engineers  could  only  guess 
at  the  type  and  amount  of  materials 
they  would  need.  They  also  had  a  prob- 
lem in  estimating  the  requirements  of 
major  field  commands  that  had  not  yet 
arrived  in  England.  First  Army  head- 
quarters came  only  in  October  1943, 
and  the  engineer  planners  had  to  calcu- 
late the  field  army's  necessities  anew. 
Nor  did  PROCO  reduce  the  time  it  took 
for  material  to  move  through  the  sup- 
ply pipeline  to  the  theater.  Irt  the  opin- 
ion of  the  theater  engineer,  the  pro- 
jects "proved  to  be  a  poor  device  for 
obtaining  supply  action."'^ 

Responsibility  for  Civilian  Labor 

By  early  1944  theater  planners  had 
tentative  outlines  for  tapping  the  wealth 
of  civilian  labor  on  the  Continent. 
SHAEF  established  a  Combined  Mili- 
tary Procurement  Control  as  an  execu- 


'^  Ltr.  Col  J.  S.  Seybold,  Chf,  Supply  Div,  OCE 
ETOUSA,  to  Overseas  Supply  Div,  NYPOE,  5  Jul  44, 
sub:  Req  PROCO  Projects,  file  381  PROCO;  Memo, 
J.R.H.  [Col  John  R.  Hardin]  for  Chf,  Opns,  OCE,  20 
Sep  43,  sub:  Questions  of  Policy  Affecting  Engr 
Planning,  Key  Boi-ERO  Plans  folder;  _^ Moore,  Final 
Report,  p.  49. 


tive  agent  for  General  Eisenhower  in 
matters  of  local  supply  procurement 
and  civilian  hiring  for  both  British  and 
American  forces.  Overall  American 
theater-level  planning  for  employing 
civilians  abroad  was  the  job  of  the  the- 
ater general  purchasing  agent,  who 
delegated  his  authority  among  various 
levels  of  the  projected  Communications 
Zone  command  that  General  Lee  would 
head  on  the  Continent.  On  19  April 
1944,  Lee  formally  gave  responsibility 
for  managing  the  procurement  of  civil- 
ian labor  in  the  field  to  the  engineers 
since  they  would  be  the  first  to  need 
workers  for  beach  dumps,  ports,  stor- 
age areas,  and  roadnets.  Maj.  Gen.  Cecil 
R.  Moore's  staff  had  no  plans  for  this 
eventuality,  few  qualified  officers  or 
enlisted  men  to  run  a  personnel  clearing- 
house, and  no  understanding  of  the 
problems  of  pay  levels,  housing,  and 
welfare  of  civilian  workers.  Despite 
repeated  effort  to  get  engineer  officers 
who  could  handle  the  job,  the  civilian 
labor  responsibility  fell  to  the  theater 
engineer's  administrative  division.  Ac- 
tually, the  engineer-spawned  Civilian 
Labor  Procurement  Service  had  as- 
signed members  of  other  technical  ser- 
vices who  could  screen  prospective  em- 
ployees for  specialized  work.  The  gen- 
eral purchasing  agent,  privy  to  the 
highest  counsels  of  the  Allied  command 
on  the  subject  of  civilian  workers  in  the 
Combined  Military  Procurement  Con- 
trol, coordinated  activities  from  the  the- 
ater command  level.  SHAEF  retained 
the  final  say  in  matters  of  pay  and  set 
wage  tables  keyed  to  prewar  salary  lev- 
els in  given  geographic  areas. '^ 


^*'  Henry  G.  Elliott,  The  Administrative  and  Logistical 
History  of  the  European  Theater  of  Operations,  vol. 
X,  "Local  Procurement  of  Labor  and  Supplies,  United 
Kingdom  and  Continental,"  pp.  74—80,  in  CMH. 


286 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


The  engineers  set  broad  classifica- 
tions to  delineate  conditions  of  employ- 
ment and  skill  levels  for  workers.  Two 
general  categories  aligned  prospective 
employees  by  their  willingness  to  work 
in  mobile  or  static  detachments.  Static 
laborers  usually  worked  in  a  single 
location,  lived  nearby,  and  were  respon- 
sible for  their  own  quarters  and  food. 
Mobile  workers,  who  received  their  sus- 
tenance and  housing  from  the  Allied 
command  employing  them,  usually  per- 
formed as  part  of  a  transient  labor  com- 
pany organized  on  military  lines.  Both 
static  and  mobile  workers  served  under 
contract  and  were  considered  unskilled 
until  they  proved  otherwise.  Their  wages 
would  then  change  accordingly. 

The  foundation  for  regional  and 
local  management  of  labor  offices  also 
came  into  being  before  the  invasion. 
Each  base  section  was  to  have  a  pro- 
curement office,  and  in  each  French 
region  there  would  be  a  representative 
in  a  centrally  located  major  city.  The 
first  organization  was  scheduled  for  the 
immediate  invasion  area,  and  plans 
called  for  offices  in  Ste.  Mere-Eglise, 
Longueville,  Carentan,  Bricquebec, 
Cherbourg,  Isigny,  and  UTAH  Beach. '^ 

Refinements  in  Overlord's  Operation 

Tactical  command  for  the  invasion 
consisted  of  a  three-phased  allotment 
of  responsibilities  to  the  higher  head- 
quarters arriving  in  Normandy  to  con- 
trol the  incoming  combat  and  support 
units.  In  the  assault  phase,  the  U.S.  First 
Army  and  the  British  Second  Army 
operated  separately  to  consolidate  the 
beaches  under  the  remote  command  of 
the  British  21  Army  Group.  Phase  II 


would  begin  when  21  Army  Group 
came  ashore  and  assumed  tactical  con- 
trol of  both  field  armies.  Until  the  sec- 
ond stage  was  concluded  First  Army 
and  all  the  incoming  service  troops 
attached  to  it  were  under  21  Army 
Group  control.  The  last  invasion  phase 
foresaw  the  introduction  of  another 
American  field  army,  the  Third,  and 
of  the  American  1st  Army  Group  head- 
quarters. General  Sir  Bernard  L.  Mont- 
gomery, commanding  the  21  Army 
Group,  was  responsible  for  SHAEF 
tactical  planning,  but  he  relied  heavily 
on  American  contributions  to  the  NEP- 
TUNE plan  which  referred  to  actual 
operations  under  the  OVERLORD  inva- 
sion plan.  Though  the  1st  Army  Group 
headquarters  was  involved  in  this  pro- 
cess, Montgomery  also  delegated  the 
planning  for  the  actual  assaults  to  the 
First  Army  staff '*^ 

Detailed  planning  for  supply  and  for 
rehabilitation  of  Continental  ports  and 
rail  and  roadnets  fell  to  two  new  organi- 
zational echelons  established  to  smooth 
the  transfer  of  supply  and  administra- 
tive functions  across  the  English  Chan- 
nel. Fifth  Army  in  Italy  had  briefly  but 
successfully  experimented  with  an  ad- 
vance supply  section  at  Naples  to  elimi- 
nate the  long  and  uncontrollable  sup- 
ply lines  that  had  become  necessary  in 
North  Africa.  In  December  1943 
COSSAC  established  a  similar  section 
to  relieve  First  Army  of  supply  respon- 
sibilities immediately  behind  its  area  of 
operations  in  the  first  days  of  the  in- 
vasion. Formally  in  existence  after  7 
February  1944,  Headquarters,  Advance 
Section,  or  ADSEC,  was  under  the  com- 


Ibid.,  p.  87. 


'**  First  U.S.  Army,  Report  of  Operations,  20  October 
1943-1  August  1944,  p.  25;  12th  Army  Group,  Report 
of  Operations,  vol.  XII,  p.  51. 


LOOKING  AHEAD  TO  THE  CONTINENT 


287 


mand  of  Col.  Ewart  G.  Plank,  an  engi- 
neer officer  who  had  commanded  East- 
ern Base  Section.  The  ADSEC  engineer 
was  Col.  Emerson  C.  Itschner.  The  sec- 
tion was  to  remain  attached  to  First 
Army  in  the  American  chain  of  com- 
mand and  be  responsible  for  supply 
installations  behind  it  until  the  arrival 
on  the  Continent  of  a  second,  higher 
command,  Forward  Echelon,  Commu- 
nications Zone.  Forward  Echelon,  also 
in  existence  under  ETOUSA  since  7 
February,  was  formally  established  by 
SHAEF  directive  two  days  later.  De- 
signed as  an  extension  of  General  Lee's 
SOS  organization  and  equipped  to  run 
the  communications  zone  in  France 
until  the  entire  SOS  moved  across  the 
Channel,  the  command,  known  as 
FECOMZ,  would  become  ADSEC's  par- 
ent as  soon  as  General  Bradley  drew  a 
rear  boundary  for  First  Army.  Planning 
proceeded  under  Col.  Frank  M.  Al- 
brecht.  General  Moore's  former  plans 
officer,  as  chief  of  staff.  On  14  March 
1944,  Brig.  Gen.  Harry  B.  Vaughan, 
former  commander  of  Western  Base 
Section,  took  over  FECOMZ.'^ 

First  Army  was  to  estimate  the  ton- 
nage and  supply  needs  from  D-day  to 
D  plus  15  (Phase  I)  for  all  U.S.  forces, 
including  air  and  naval  forces  in  the 
assault,  and  have  ETOUSA  fill  the 
requisitions.  In  Phase  II,  D  plus  16  to 
D  plus  40,  1st  U.S.  Army  Group  was  to 
compile  the  required  tonnage  figures 
but  would  have  ETOUSA  fill  the  re- 
quirements through  ADSEC.  FECOMZ 
was  to  arrange  for  the  buildup  to  COMZ 
and  to  introduce  base  sections  at  the 


'*'  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Vol- 
ume I,  pp.  204-13;  ETO  Gen  Bd  Rpt  !27,  Organiza- 
tion and  Functions  of  the  Communications  Zone,  ch. 
4,  pp.  32-38. 


same  time  that  1st  Army  Group  was 
strengthening  the  combat  zone  with 
additional  armies.  Between  D  plus  41 
and  D  plus  90  (Phase  III),  1st  Army 
Group  would  continue  to  assemble  the 
overall  tonnage  requirements,  but  they 
would  be  implemented  through 
FECOMZ,  which  would  assume  active 
control  when  a  second  base  section 
arrived  on  the  Continent  and  ADSEC 
moved  forward  with  the  armies.  Not 
until  D  plus  90  was  COMZ  to  reach  the 
Continent  and  take  over  from  FECOMZ. 

Whereas  First  Army  issued  its  plans 
in  February  1944,  the  FECOMZ  plan 
was  not  complete  until  30  April  1944. 
The  detail  involved  in  some  aspects  of 
the  planning  was  enormous,  and  the 
ADSEC  engineer  plan  literally  out- 
weighed that  of  all  the  other  technical 
services  combined.  Two  thick  volumes 
of  data  on  the  Normandy  ports  included 
an  analysis  of  each  port's  facilities,  a 
schedule  of  reconstruction,  and  a  cata- 
logue of  equipment  and  materials  re- 
quired. 

Planning  for  post-OVERLORD  opera- 
tions (D  plus  90  to  D  plus  120)  forced 
Moore,  along  with  other  technical  ser- 
vice chiefs,  to  furnish  an  estimate — by 
month  and  class — of  the  tonnages  he 
would  need  for  the  entire  period  from 
D  plus  90  to  D  plus  360.  Planning  for 
this  period  continued  under  the  PROCO 
system  according  to  ETOUSA  SOS 
Series  H  directives.  Two  directives  be- 
fore D-day  established  progressive  phase 
lines  and  troop  counts  to  D  plus  360 
and  required  engineer  statements  on 
which  material  was  to  be  stored  in  the 
United  Kingdom  and  which  would  go 
directly  to  the  Continent. 

A  British  officer,  Maj.  Gen.  H.  B.  W. 
Hughes,  headed  the  SHAEF  engineer 
division,  but  he  had  an  American  dep- 


288 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


uty,  Brig.  Gen.  Beverly  C.  Dunn,  and 
the  four  branches  under  Hughes  were 
also  headed  by  Americans.  The  divi- 
sion's chief  task  was  to  coordinate  the 
work  of  the  army  group  engineers  and 
to  provide  terrain  and  engineer  intelli- 
gence studies;  recommendations  on 
new  techniques,  equipment,  and  tactics; 
and  engineer  estimates  of  the  situation. 
Perhaps  the  most  important  feature  of 
this  high-level  assistance  was  anticipat- 
ing what  engineer  supplies  the  army 
groups  would  need  and  helping  to 
obtain  them  from  Allied  supply  or- 
ganizations. 

Joint  Stockpiling  With  the  British 

Because  OVERLORD  was  an  Allied 
undertaking,  a  system  of  combined  sup- 
ply or  joint  stockage  was  desirable  to 
prevent  overprocurement  of  inter- 
changeable items;  to  ensure  sufficient 
supply  where  procurement  was  diffi- 
cult and  it  was  unclear  which  force 
would  employ  the  item;  and  to  provide 
items  that  would,  in  fact,  serve  British 
and  American  forces  simultaneously. 
Joint  stockpile  items  included  Bailey 
bridges  and  railroad  and  port  construc- 
tion equipment.  Some  parts  of  such 
items  were  manufactured  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  others  in  the  United  States. 
The  British  were  responsible  for  pro- 
curement of  some  items,  turning  over 
to  American  forces  their  share;  others 
the  Americans  procured  and  divided 
with  the  British.^' 


^"  Rpts,  Feb-Jun  44  in  file  Weekly  Rpts,  CE,  SHAEF, 
Dec  43 -Dec  45. 

^'  History  of  the  Office  of  the  General  Purchasing 
Agent,  May  42-Oct  45,  pp.  57-59,  Adm  556, 
ETOUSA  Hist  Sect;  Ltr,  Oxx  to  the  Engr,  ETOUSA, 
10  Dec  43,  sub:  Procedure  for  Supply  and  Allocation 
of  Joint  U.S. -British  Requirements  for  Operation  in 


Planning  for  the  joint  stockpiling  of 
railroad  items  began  in  the  summer  of 
1942  when  the  Transportation,  Plant, 
and  Personnel  (TPP)  Section  of  SOS, 
ETOUSA,  was  formed  with  both  U.S. 
and  British  members  under  a  central 
planning  staff.  This  group  included  a 
representative  from  the  Corps  of  En- 
gineers. At  the  time  railway  planning 
started  no  standard  U.S.  military  rail- 
road bridge  had  been  developed,  and 
it  became  necessary  to  adopt  those  the 
British  had.  Since  the  British  were  un- 
able to  produce  enough  bridges  for 
both  armies,  the  TPP  Section  arranged 
for  production  of  the  same  types  in  the 
United  States  and  ensured  that  they 
were  interchangable  with  those  manu- 
factured in  Britain.  Later  agreements 
provided  that  stockpiles  would  be  di- 
vided equally  between  American  and 
British  forces  and  that  any  reallocation 
would  be  the  responsibility  of  an  Allied 
headquarters.^^ 

During  the  summer  of  1943  the  Brit- 
ish repeatedly  tried  to  broaden  the  base 
for  joint  stock  items,  which  had  been 
limited  to  items  for  joint  use  or  for  pro- 
vision of  a  joint  service.  U.S.  engineers 
objected  strenuously  to  these  efforts 
and,  after  long  discussion,  won  their 
point.  The  British  had  argued  that  most 
engineer  requirements  should  be  calcu- 
lated jointly  and  the  supplies  handled 
in  joint  stockpile.  Some  British  agen- 
cies even  proposed  that  they  handle 
procurement  of  all  such  items,  whether 
they  came  from  the  United  States  or 
the  United  Kingdom.  These  proposals 
were  hardly  advantageous  to  the  U.S. 


Western  Europe,  381,  Planning  Northwest  Europe 
1944-45,  EUCOM  Engr  files. 

'^'  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  12,  Railroad  Reconstruc- 
tion and  Bridging. 


LOOKING  AHEAD  TO  THE  CONTINENT 


289 


Army,  for  if  pooling  American  and 
British  resources  meant  absorbing  Am- 
erican personnel  into  British  operations, 
American  engineers  would  be  deprived 
of  much-needed  experience  in  doing 
their  job  independently  according  to 
their  own  procedures."^ 

With  the  establishment  of  COSSAC, 
joint  policies  and  procedures  were  de- 
fined. A  COSSAC  circular  issued  on  25 
June  1943  required  written  provisions 
for  joint  stockpiles  and  COSSAC  ap- 
proval for  talks  between  American  and 
British  counterparts.  SOS,  ETOUSA, 
further  clarified  the  issues  in  August, 
September,  and  November  1943.  Allied 
commands  could  jointly  stockpile  items 
only  if  definite  economies  would  result 
during  the  period  when  forces  on  the 
Continent  would  be  supplied  princi- 
pally from  the  United  Kingdom.  Later, 
American  policy  required  that,  except 
for  agreements  already  made,  joint 
stockpiling  with  the  British  would  be 
discontinued;  no  further  agreements 
were  to  be  made  after  21  November 
1943.  This  decision  came  almost  simulta- 
neously with  a  PROCO  pronouncement 
calling  for  firm  plans  for  PROCO  sup- 
plies for  the  first  240  days  after  the 
invasion.  Since  the  PROCO  items  were 
in  addition  to  the  U.S.  share  of  joint 
requirements,  the  Americans  had  to 
order  them  independently. ^'* 

Training 
Most  engineer  units  arriving  in  the 


'-'  Ltr,  CE,  ETO,  to  CofEiigrs,  Washington,  DC,  2 
Jul  43,  sub:  Engr  Supply  in  ETO,  400,  (ieneral 
Supplies,  EUCOM  Engr  files. 

'"  Histot7  of  the  Office  of  (iPA,  p.  57;  OCE  ETOUSA 
Hist  Rpt  12,  Railroad  Reconstruction  and  Bridging, 
p.  8;  Memo,  OCE  for  Chf,  Opns,  17  Sep  43,  400,  Col 
Hardin — Supplies  and  Equipment  Procurement  of 
1943-44,  EUCOM  Engr  files. 


theater  in  1943  and  early  1944  needed 
considerable  training.  Camouflage  units 
arriving  in  the  United  Kingdom  were 
unfamiliar  with  the  most  important 
equipment  they  were  to  use  on  the 
Continent.  General  service  regiments 
needed  to  learn  about  mines  and  booby 
traps  and  the  uses  of  Bailey  bridges. 
Engineer  combat  battalions  lacked  train- 
ing in  recording  minefields  and  repair- 
ing roads.  Drivers  and  mechanics  of 
dump  truck  companies  had  trained 
with  non-TOE  vehicles.  Port  construc- 
tion and  repair  units  had  trained  in  the 
United  States  with  different  types  of 
equipment  than  those  they  received  in 
the  United  Kingdom.  The  one  notable 
exception  was  the  topographic  organi- 
zations, which  arrived  well  trained  for 
their  work  on  the  Continent."^ ' 

Training  SOS  engineers  in  the  United 
Kingdom  was  the  responsibility  of 
Troops  Division,  OCE,  ETOUSA,  which 
had  a  London  branch  planning  for 
future  operations  and  a  Cheltenham 
branch  providing  training  aids  to  SOS 
troops  and  supervising  SOS  engineer 
schools.  The  base  section  supervised 
training.  Theoretically  one  hour  a  day 
or  one  day  a  week  was  given  over  to 
training  for  future  operations,  but  con- 
struction priorities  often  made  it  impos- 
sible to  follow  any  training  schedule. 
Troops  might  be  working  on  day  and 
night  shifts,  or  bad  weather  would  inter- 
vene and  training  would  have  to  be 
canceled.  In  any  case,  the  alloted  one 
hour  a  day  was  of  little  use,  for  it  often 
took  that  long  to  reach  a  training  area. 


'•^^  1st  Ind  to  Ltr,  Brig  Gen  L.  D.  Wersham,  26  May 
44,  Construction  Div  files,  OCE;  Moore  interv;  AGE 
Bd  Rpt  599,  Training,  1  Feb  45.  For  training  prob-, 
lems  in  the  United  States,  see  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal, 

The  Corps  of  Engineers:  Troops  and  Equipment,   pp. 
241-59. 


290 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Models  of  BeL(;ian  Gates,  patterned  after  German  obstacles  on  Normandy  beaches. 


Limiting  the  training  time  to  an  hour 
also  meant  that  a  subject  had  to  treated 
completely  in  that  time,  for  it  often 
proved  impossible  to  continue  a  sub- 
ject during  the  next  training  period. 
When  longer  lapses  occurred  between 
sessions,  men  forgot  subject  matter  and 
continuity  was  destroyed.  (Map  14)^^ 

In  March  1944  when  extensive  train- 
ing opportunities  became  possible. 
Troops  Division,  OCE,  ETOUSA,  sug- 


■^•^Albrecht  interv,  Adm  122,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect; 
HQ,  USFET  Engr  Sect,  353  Training  Gen  (Current) 
1944;  History  of  Western  Base  Section,  Jul  43;  Hist 
833d  Engr  Avn  Bn,  10  Jul  42-25  Sep  45,  Maxwell 
AFB;  IncI  to  Ltr,  Engr  School  to  CofEngrs,  28  Dec 
43,  sub:  Opn  of  GS  Rgts,  OCE;  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist 
Rpt  6,  Air  Force  Construction. 


gested  one  to  two  months  for  many 
units.  Full-time  training  was  frequently 
more  arduous  than  construction  work. 
Often  the  day's  schedule  was  extended 
from  10  hours  to  12—15  hours  so  that 
the  troops  could  practice  techniques 
used  in  night  operations.  Considerable 
time  also  had  to  be  devoted  to  basic 
subjects  that  had  been  forgotten  or  only 
infrequently  put  to  use.^ 

Virtually  every  type  of  military  sub- 
ject was  available.  The  American  sec- 
tion of  the  British  School  of  Military 
Engineering  included  courses  in  mines, 
booby     traps,     demolitions,     Bailey 


Hists,  341st,  346th,  355th,  and  95th  Engr  GS  Rgts. 


LOOKING  AHEAD  TO  THE  CONTINENT 


291 


Wire  En  rAN(;LEMENTS  and  DrA(;oN'S  Teeth  at  the  Assault  Training  Center, 
Woolacombe. 


bridging,  camouflage,  waterproofing, 
and  airfield  engineering  and  reconnais- 
sance. A  port  construction  and  repair 
training  center  in  Wales  specialized  in 
construction  of  V-type  trestles,  Baileys, 
wooden  trestle  bridges,  Sommerfeld 
mats,  and  tubular  scaffolding.  On  the 
Isle  of  Wight  the  engineers  conducted 
marine  pipeline  training.  A  five-  to 
seven-week  course  at  the  Transporta- 
tion Training  Center  trained  general 
service  regiments  for  railroad  work, 
especially  railroad  bridging. ^^ 


'■^'^  USFET  Engr  files,  353  Training  (General),  1943; 
Specialist  Course  Theater  Engr  Trng  Ctr,  Ofc  of  The- 
ater Chf  Engr,  ETOUSA,  Aug  46;  OCE  ETOUSA 
Monthly  Rpt,  Apr- May  44. 


ETOUSA  conducted  courses  in  mess 
management,  fire  fighting,  cooking, 
motor  transport,  enemy  personnel  and 
equipment  identification,  basic  radio 
operation,  gas  warfare,  and  water- 
proofing. At  the  engineer  section  of  the 
American  School  Center,  run  by  G— 3, 
ETOUSA,  the  primary  objective  was 
developing  physical  stamina  and  endur- 
ance necessary  for  combat  while  pro- 
viding three  months  of  basic  technical 
and  tactical  training.  Officers  and  en- 
listed men  attended  a  two-week  course 
in  logistical  planning  at  the  British  Air 
Ministry's  Joint  British  and  American 
School.  Engineers  could  attend  schools 
offering  instruction  in  quartermaster 
transport,  bomb  reconnaissance,  field 


MAP  14 


LOOKING  AHEAD  TO  THE  CONTINENT 


293 


artillery  (for  antiaircraft  fire),  landing 
craft  loading,  bituminous  paving  and 
road  construction,  troop  leadership, 
enemy  document  evaluation,  and  order 
of  battle.^-' 

Engineers  took  a  leading  part  in  the 
well-known  Assault  Training  Center. 
Col.  Paul  W.  Thompson,  an  engineer 
officer,  commanded  the  school  from  2 
April  1943  until  early  March  1944. 
Thompson  and  his  staff  spent  April  and 
May  1943  studying  the  French  coastline. 
They  calculated  that  at  no  place  along 
the  coast  of  northwest  France  could  the 
Germans  use  more  than  one  platoon 
per  2,000—2,500  yards  to  protect  beach 
fortifications.  They  deduced  that  Ger- 
mans would  have  extremely  strong  field 
defenses  with  concrete  pillboxes,  em- 
placements, and  shelters,  and  thinly 
spread  defenders  providing  consider- 
able automatic  fire.  The  Assault  Train- 
ing Center  prepared  units  to  deal  with 
such  a  defensive  strategy.  Set  up  on  the 
northwest  coast  of  Devonshire  at  llfra- 
combe,  the  center  was  completed  in 
March  1944,  allowing  over  two  rnonths 
before  the  invasion  for  unit  training 
and  a  series  of  full-scale  exercises.  Engi- 
neer units  constructed  and  placed  beach 
and  underwater  obstacles  (modeled 
after  those  on  the  beaches  of  northern 
France)  and  gave  lectures  on  a  number 
of  subjects  connected  with  an  assault 
landing.'^" 


'^"  Hist  Trng  Div,  OCE  ETOUSA,  1  Apr  43-  1  Apr 
45;  Ltr;  Maj  H.  E.  Webster  to  Chf,  Troop  Div,  OCE, 
SOS  ETOUSA,  7  Apr  43,  sub:  Rpt  on  Visit  to  Ameri- 
can School  Center,  319.1,  EUCOM  Engr  files;  Hist 
51st  Engr  Bn. 

**'  Specialist  Course  Theater  Engr  Trng  Ctr,  OCE 
ETOUSA,  Aug  46;  First  U.S.  Army,  Report  of  Opera- 
tions, 20  Oct  43-1  Aug  44,  vol.  I,  p.  19;  1st.  Lt.  G.  W. 
Favalion,  1st.  Lt.  Alex  M.  Marsh,  and  Maj.  E.  R.  Kline, 
eds..  Potholes  and  Bullets  (Highland  Park,  Illinois:  Singer 
Printing  and  Pub.  Co,  1946),  a  pictorial  account  of  the 


The  British  contributed  in  many  ways 
to  training,  opening  their  schools  to 
American  engineers  and  offering  ideas 
and  equipment.  British  and  American 
units  exchanged  parties,  usually  com- 
posed of  one  officer  and  ten  enlisted 
men,  for  fifteen  days.  Each  group  learn- 
ed the  characteristics,  methods,  weap- 
ons, tools,  nomenclature,  problems,  and 
tactics  of  the  other.  The  practice  also 
increased  understanding  and  comrade- 
ship between  Allies."^' 

First  Army's  training  emphasized 
bridge  building,  road  maintenance  and 
construction,  mine  placement,  and 
enemy  mine  detection  and  removal. 
First  Army  also  recommended  that  all 
company  grade  engineer  officers  re- 
ceive instruction  in  adjusting  artillery 
fire  by  using  forward  observation  meth- 
ods. Engineer  units  used  schools,  lec- 
tures, and  demonstrations  to  train  their 
own  men  and  sent  enlisted  men  and 
officers  to  schools  in  higher  British  or 
American  echelons. ^^ 

American  corps  and  divisions  trained 
units  for  special  missions  in  the  assault. 
Engineers  practiced  the  rapid  construc- 
tion of  plywood  treadway  bridges 
mounted  on  pneumatic  floats  for  cross- 
ing flooded  areas  and  absorbed  what- 
ever they  could  on  terrain  problems  to 
be  expected  on  the  Continent. '^^ 

Maps  for  the  Invasion 
U.S.  and  British  military  forces  could 


5th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  in  World  War  II.  Hists, 
1 12th  and  204th  Engr  C  Bns. 

*'  USFET  Engr  files,  353  Training  (General)  1943; 
First  U.S.  Army,  Report  of  Operations,  20  Oct  43-1  Aug 
44,  vol.  I,  p.  22. 

'•^  First  U.S.  Army,  Report  of  Operations,  20  Oct  43-1 
Aug  44,  vol.  I,  p.  18,  and  vol.  V,  p.  209. 

"  Ibid.;  HQ,  ETOUSA,  WD  Observer  Bd,  22  Apr 
44,  sub:  Quarterly  Rpt  Engr  Section,  451.3,  OCE. 


294 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Engineer  Mapmaker  Uses  a  Multiplex  to  establish  accurate  contours  on  invasion  maps. 


be  proud  of  the  maps  they  prepared 
jointly  for  operations  on  the  Continent. 
In  1939  the  British  had  had  to  start 
almost  literally  from  scratch.  Only  for 
eastern  France  were  World  War  I  maps 
available  on  a  scale  as  large  as  1:25,000; 
few  of  them  had  been  revised  to  show 
roads,  bridges,  or  railroads  built  since 
that  time  or  changes  in  fields  and  woods. 
For  western  France  the  only  military 
maps  were  based  on  those  Napoleon 
had  used.  They  had  been  edited  and 
enlarged  to  a  scale  of  1:50,000  but  had 
not  been  made  more  accurate.  Few 
maps  had  had  any  terrain  corrections 
since  1900. 

Shortly  after  the  evacuation  of  Dun- 
kirk in  1940  the  British  Army  inaugu- 
rated the  Benson  project,  named  for  an 


airfield  in  Oxfordshire.  From  this  air- 
field Royal  Air  Force  (RAF)  planes  took 
off  to  map  the  French  coast  from  Cher- 
bourg to  Calais  and  an  area  extending 
inland  approximately  sixty  miles;  the 
British  succeeded  in  producing  1:25,000 
scale  maps.^"*  Early  in  1942,  in  accor- 
dance with  the  terms  of  the  Loper- 
Hotine  Agreement,  the  British  assumed 
general  mapping  responsibility  for  most 
of  western  Europe.  Americans  helped 
in  taking  aerial  photographs  for  map- 
making  and  reproducing  maps  for  use 
by  U.S.  forces. 


^^  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  5,  Intelligence  and  Top- 
ography, pp.  6—7. 
^^  See  ch.  III. 


LOOKING  AHEAD  TO  THE  CONTINENT 


295 


General  mapping  (as  distinguished 
from  "intelligence"  mapping  of  individ- 
ual spots)  began  with  aerial  photo- 
graphs showing  roads,  streams,  rail- 
roads, bridges,  buildings,  fields,  woods, 
and  flood  areas.  Using  the  aerial  photo- 
graph, mapmakers  drew  with  instru- 
ments a  topographic  contour,  or  "topo 
map,"  divided  into  small  military  grid 
squares  that  enabled  the  user  to  locate 
areas  exactly.  When  manpower  or  time 
did  not  permit  making  topo  maps,  the 
original  photograph  could  be  made  to 
serve  as  a  map  by  the  application  of 
grid  lines,  contours,  place  names,  and 
indications  of  scale  and  direction.  The 
poor  quality  of  many  photomaps  preju- 
diced the  users  against  them,  but  the 
chief  engineer  saw  their  value  in  allevi- 
ating the  burden  on  mapmakers  and 
aerial  photographers  and  planned  to  use 
photomaps  in  the  preinvasion  period. "^^ 

Topo  maps  of  1:25,000  scale  were 
produced  from  aerial  photographs  taken 
with  a  six-inch  metrogen  lens  with 
high-speed  multiplex  equipment  which 
registered  both  horizontal  and  vertical 
dimensions  of  terrain  features.  Produc- 
tion of  these  maps  was  the  primary  mis- 
sion of  the  base  topographic  battalion, 
the  most  important  element  in  the  ETO 
topographic  service.  Each  base  topo- 
graphic battalion  contained  a  photo- 
mapping  company  that  had  a  complete 
set  of  multiplex  equipment  including 
approximately  one  hundred  projectors, 
enough  to  put  fifty  operators  to  work 
after  the  aerial  triangulation  and  con- 
trol extensions  were  finished.  A  photo- 
mapping  company,  working  with  good 
quality  aerial  photography,  could  map 


approximately  one  hundred  square 
miles  a  day.'^^ 

Until  the  summer  of  1943  the  great- 
est hindrance  to  mapmaking  in  the 
European  theater  was  the  difficulty 
of  obtaining  good  aerial  photographs 
to  work  with — a  responsibility  of  the 
Army  Air  Forces.  After  four  special 
B— 17E  photographic  aircraft  sent  to 
the  ETO  in  the  fall  of  1942  were  di- 
verted to  North  Africa,  the  British  gave 
an  RAF  reconnaissance  squadron  the 
job  of  filling  U.S.  photographic  map- 
ping needs.  By  May  1943  this  squad- 
ron had  photographed  some  22,000 
square  miles  of  the  first-priority  area. 
But  because  the  RAF  used  a  type  of 
camera  not  suited  to  American  equip- 
ment, fewer  than  10,000  square  miles 
of  large-scale  topo  maps  had  been  pro- 
duced. The  U.S.  Army  Air  Forces  had 
not  helped,  mainly  because  the  AAF's 
Director  of  Photography,  Lt.  Col.  Min- 
ton  W.  Kaye,  then  in  the  ETO,  felt  that 
the  hazards  and  costs  of  securing  wide- 
angle  vertical  photography  over  heav- 
ily defended  areas  were  too  great.  He 
advocated  a  system  of  aerial  photogra- 
phy known  as  trimetrogen  photography. 
Developed  for  small-scale  aeronautical 
charts,  the  system  used  wide-angle  cam- 
eras that  tilted  in  divergent  directions 
to  produce  one  vertical  and  two  high 
oblique  photographs  which  made  a 
composite  picture  of  an  area  from  hori- 
zon to  horizon.  The  engineers  objected 
to  trimetrogen  pictures  because  oblique 
photography  multiplied  the  difficulties 
of  making  enlargements  and  produced 


Sect. 


Engrs  file  121,  General,  Adm  2 1 2,  ETOUSA  Hist 


^^  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  5,  Intelligence  and  Top- 
ography, p.  83;  Speech  (no  signature),  27  Jan  45,  sub: 
Aerial  Photographic  Mapping,  H-4  061  General, 
EUCOM  Engr  files. 


296 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


distortions  that  no  known  instrument 
could  correct. ^^ 

In  June  1943,  General  Moore,  Col. 
Herbert  Milwit,  head  of  Moore's  intelli- 
gence division,  and  Maj.  Gen.  Ira  C. 
Eaker,  commanding  officer  of  the 
Eighth  Air  Force,  discussed  the  prob- 
lem. General  Eaker  said  he  would  help 
the  engineers  get  more  accurate  photos. 
Beginning  on  22  June  1943,  the  13th 
Photo  Squadron,  using  K17  cameras  in 
F— 4  and  F— 5  aircraft — reconnaissance 
versions  of  the  P-38  Lightning — took 
wide-angle  photographs  covering  more 
than  10,000  square  miles  without  any 
loss  from  enemy  action.  The  success  of 
this  project  promoted  greater  Air 
Force— engineer  cooperation,  and  there 
was  no  serious  shortage  of  aerial  pho- 
tography during  the  invasion  and  for 
several  months  thereafter. 

U.S.  support  of  the  Benson  project 
began  early  in  1944.  Using  aerial  pho- 
tography sent  from  England,  the  U.S. 
Geological  Survey  and  the  Tennessee 
Valley  Authority,  on  assignment  from 
OCE,  prepared  200  sheets  at  the 
1:25,000  scale  covering  16,000  square 
miles  of  northern  France.  To  enable 
the  mapmakers  to  meet  deadlines  for 
the  Normandy  landings,  the  OCE  Intel- 
ligence Division  permitted  the  omission 
of  much  fine  detail  such  as  hedgerows 
but  backed  up  each  battle  map  with  a 
photomap  of  the  same  area.^^ 

In  assuming  responsibility  for  pro- 
viding engineer  intelligence  as  well  as 
topographic  service.  General  Moore  was 


'"  Maps  and  Mapping,  May  42-Apr  45,  L-(i  ()6(», 
EUCOM  Engr  files.  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The 
Corps  of  Engineers:  Troops  and  Equipment,  pp.  446  —  54. 
Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Engineers: 
Troops  and  Equipment,  pp.  457-58;  OCE  ETOUSA 
Hist  Rpt  5,  Intelligence  and  Topography,  pp.  28-30, 
49. 


treading  on  new  ground.  No  back- 
ground of  intelligence  experience  ex- 
isted in  the  Corps  of  Engineers  equiva- 
lent to  that  acquired  in  construction 
engineering  on  rivers  and  harbors  duty. 
Few  officers  were  competent  to  handle 
the  expanded  duties  in  engineer  intelli- 
gence and  topography,  nor  was  any 
precedent  available  upon  which  to  base 
an  effective  organization  or  plan.  By 
agreement  with  a  succession  of  theater 
G— 2s,  General  Moore  gave  the  Intelli- 
gence Division,  OCE,  ETOUSA,  respon- 
sibility for  all  problems  pertaining  to 
the  topographical  service,  including 
map  policy,  theater  map  library  opera- 
tion, and  planning  for  map  production, 
reproduction,  supply,  and  distribution. 

In  planning  map  production  the  In- 
telligence Division  had  to  consider  what 
map  series  should  be  completed,  which 
maps  the  forces  involved  would  need, 
how  much  time  was  available,  and  which 
cartographic  and  reproduction  facilities 
could  be  used  in  the  field.  Planners 
soon  realized  that  the  required  maps 
could  not  be  produced  with  the  avail- 
able facilities  in  the  time  remaining. 
They  decided  to  put  first  priority  on 
1 : 25,000  maps  and  photomaps  of  France 
north  of  the  Loire  and  west  of  the  lon- 
gitude of  Paris,  with  all  new  maps  of 
the  same  design;  second  priority  on 
1 : 50,000  maps  of  the  coastal  regions  in 
the  invasion  area;  third  priority  on 
1:100,000  series  covering  the  entire 
operational  area;  and  fourth  priority 
on  a  1:200,000  road  map.  A  more  satis- 
factory 1:250,000  map  suitable  for  both 
ground  and  air  use  was  also  required; 
the  1 : 1 ,000,000  series  needed  consider- 
able revision;  and  many  town  plans — 
several  thousand  sheets — had  to  be 
produced. 

The  expectation  that  the  British  War 


LOOKING  AHEAD  TO  THE  CONTINENT 


297 


Office's  Directorate  of  Military  Survey 
could  provide  most  of  the  maps  that 
U.S.  forces  in  Europe  would  need  soon 
had  to  be  abandoned.  Computations  in 
1943  indicated  that  the  four  U.S.  armies 
planned  for  European  operations  would 
need  7  million  maps  a  month,  more 
than  base  and  field  topographic  units 
and  local  civilian  facilities  could  provide. 
To  produce  that  many  maps,  35  mil- 
lion impressions  would  have  to  be  made, 
one  for  each  of  the  five  colors  needed 
for  the  average  map.  As  this  was  beyond 
British  capability,  in  mid-December 
1943  Col.  Herbert  B.  Loper  of  OCE, 
WD,  arranged  for  the  United  States  to 
assume  a  large  share  of  supplying  Amer- 
ican forces.  For  security  reasons  Brit- 
ish and  American  facilities  located  in 
England  would  provide  maps  needed 
from  D-day  to  D  plus  90.  After  D  plus 
90  all  maps  for  U.S.  forces  would  be 
produced  in  the  United  States  except 
those  required  for  special,  unanticipated, 
or  highly  classified  projects.  Army  Map 
Service  (AMS)  received  the  first  monthly 
requisition  in  April  1944  and  was  ready 
with  the  first  shipment  in  July.  Even- 
tually, out  of  every  ten  maps  used  in 
the  theater  Army  Map  Service  and  pri- 
vate contractors  in  the  United  States 
printed  four;  the  British,  the  overseas 
topographic  units,  and  the  French  Na- 
tional Geographic  Institute,  six.^" 

November  1943  plans  for  map  ser- 
vice in  support  of  the  tactical  forces  pro- 
vided one  topographic  battalion  for 
each  army  group  and  each  army  and 
one  company  for  each  corps  and  air 
force.  Realizing  the  need  to  strengthen 
staff  control  of  these  units.  General 
Moore    recommended    adding    topo- 


*"  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Engineers: 
Troops  and  Equipment,  p.  458. 


graphic  sections  to  the  engineer  head- 
quarters of  army  groups  and  armies. 
His  proposal  could  not  be  put  into 
effect  because  of  the  time  it  took  to 
obtain  theater  approval;  therefore,  he 
provided  each  of  the  four  armies 
planned  for  European  operations  with 
an  engineer  survey  liaison  detachment 
of  five  officers  and  ten  enlisted  men  to 
handle  the  topographic  service.  This 
improvisation  worked  well  and  in  his 
opinion  "probably  meant  the  difference 
between  outstanding  success  .  .  .  and  a 
rather  dismal  failure."  He  later  came 
to  feel  that  a  topographic  officer  should 
also  be  added  to  the  corps  engineer 
staff. ^' 

The  topographic  battalions  and  com- 
panies were  well  organized  and  well 
equipped,  except  for  map  distribution, 
a  problem  that  the  War  Department 
and  ETOUSA  had  neglected.  Experi- 
ence showed  that  maps  could  not  be 
handled  in  the  same  way  as  other  Class 
IV  items,  for  they  were  too  closely 
related  to  tactical  operations.  Distribu- 
tion had  to  respond  immediately  to 
changes  in  tactical  plans,  and  a  constant 
flow  had  to  be  maintained.  Maps  were 
so  bulky  that  stocks  to  cover  any  contin- 
gency for  a  ten-day  period  would  weigh 
at  least  sixty  pounds — too  much  for  an 
officer  to  carry  on  his  person.  Moreover, 
the  transportation  of  stocks  between 
depots  and  from  depots  to  troops  was 
to  cause  more  trouble  than  any  other 
aspect  of  map  distribution  on  the  Con- 
tment. 

Security  of  maps  was  all  important  in 
the  Overlord  planning  stage.  The 
maps  were  sealed  in  coded  bundles 
from  which  individual  maps  could  be 

"  Moore,  Final  Report,  pp.  107-08. 

^'  AGF  Bd  Rpt  552,  Map  Distribution,  7  Jan  45. 


298 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


drawn  without  revealing  much  about 
the  general  plan  for  any  given  area. 
On  1  September  1943,  the  British  Direc- 
torate of  Military  Survey  and  General 
Moore's  Intelligence  Division  agreed  to 
establish  four  special  simnel  depots, 
named  for  the  code  system  applied  to 
the  map  bundles.  The  depots,  located 
at  Aldershot,  Oxford,  Reading,  and 
Towchester,  had  identical  stocks,  the 
code  keys  for  the  maps  being  kept  by  a 
minimum  number  of  officers.  In  late 
1943,  only  the  Oxford  simnel  depot  had 
American  personnel,  but  as  the  Ameri- 
can invasion  forces  outnumbered  the 
British  in  May  1944  the  U.S.  Army  took 
over  a  second  facility  at  Lockerley. 

The  United  States  also  had  a  depot 
at  Witney,  set  up  in  March  1944  with 
bulk  stocks  for  the  Continent;  one  at 
Reading,  opened  in  January  1944  with 
reserves  for  the  Air  Force;  another  at 
Cheltenham,  organized  in  September 
1942  to  store  maps  for  use  in  the  United 
Kingdom;  and  a  fourth  at  Swindon, 
established  in  January  1943  with  bulk 
stocks  of  United  Kingdom  and  Air 
Force  maps.  From  Cheltenham  and 
Oxford  the  maps  went  to  the  marshal- 
ing area  mapping  depots,  then  to  camp 


commanders  who  undertook  detailed 
distribution.  Maps  for  troops  in  the 
marshaling  areas  were  under  guard  at 
all  times  before  they  were  issued  to  indi- 
vidual troop  units  and  during  move- 
ment from  depots  to  camps  had  a  guard 
detail  of  an  officer  and  several  armed 
enlisted  men.  When  any  coded  rolls 
(packages  of  twenty  and  fifty  maps) 
were  opened  in  a  depot,  all  persons 
handling  the  maps  were  locked  into  the 
storage  buildings  under  strict  security 
control. ^^ 

In  mid- 1943  as  forces  massed  in  the 
United  Kingdom  to  prepare  for  the 
invasion  of  France,  attention  also  turned 
to  specific  landing  places  for  the  assault 
force.  The  engineering  problems  asso- 
ciated with  getting  the  troops  across  the 
mined  and  defended  beaches  were  in 
themselves  immense;  organized  and 
rapid  supply  movement  across  the  same 
terrain  was  essential  to  the  success  of 
the  operation.  It  was  clear  that  engi- 
neers would  be  in  plentiful  evidence 
on  the  D-day  beaches. 


^^  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  5,  Intelligence  and  Top- 
ography, pp.  41,  49,  60,  65,  and  app.  26. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


Preparing  for  D-day  Landings 


By  early  spring  1944  tactical  plan- 
ning for  the  most  ambitious  amphibi- 
ous operation  ever  attempted  was  well 
under  way.  OVERLORD  represented  the 
fruits  of  two  years  of  strategic  thought, 
argument,  experiment,  and  improvisa- 
tion and  included  compromises  reflect- 
ing American  and  British  aims.  The 
beaches  at  Normandy  offered  the  best 
combination  of  advantages  as  a  foot- 
hold from  which  the  Allies  could  direct 
a  blow  at  the  Third  Reich  from  the 
West. 

After  1  February  1944,  the  general 
concept  of  an  invasion  of  the  Conti- 
nent in  1944  went  by  the  name  OVER- 
LORD. (The  increasingly  detailed  Ameri- 
can field  army  planning — proceeding 
under  tight  security  at  First  U.S.  Army 
headquarters — was  code  named  NEP- 
TUNE.) In  its  final  form  OVERLORD 
called  for  landing  two  field  armies 
abreast  in  the  Bay  of  the  Seine  west  of 
the  Orne  River,  a  water  barrier  that 
was  a  suitable  anchor  for  the  left  flank 
of  the  operation.  While  the  British  Sec- 
ond Army  occupied  the  easternmost  of 
the  chpsen  landing  areas  on  the  left  and 
took  the  key  town  of  Caen,  two  corps 
of  the  American  First  Army  under  Lt. 
Gen.  Omar  N.  Bradley  were  simulta- 
neously to  assault  two  beaches  west  of 
the  town  of  Port-en-Bessin.  Once  ashore 
the  American  forces  were  to  swing  west 
and  north  to  clear  the  Cotentin  penin- 


sula by  D  plus  15,  gaining  the  prize  of 
Cherbourg  with  its  harbor  for  invasion 
supply.' 

The  American  Beaches 

Invasion  planners  studied  carefully 
the  size,  location,  gradients,  and  ter- 
rain features  of  the  American  OMAHA 
and  Utah  beaches.  Within  easy  reach 
of  the  tactical  fighter  airfields  in  Eng- 
land, they  lay  separated  from  each 
other  by  the  mouths  of  the  Vire  and 
the  Douve  rivers.  The  current  in  the 
river  delta  area  where  the  two  streams 
emptied  into  the  sea  deposited  silt  to 
form  reefs  offshore,  making  landings 
in  the  immediate  neighborhood  infeasi- 
ble.  Protected  from  westerly  Channel 
swells  by  the  Cotentin  peninsula,  the 
waters  off  OMAHA  and  UTAH  normally 
had  waves  up  to  three  feet  in  the  late 
spring.  The  six-fathom  line  ran  close 
enough  to  shore  to  allow  deep-draft 
attack  transports  to  unload  reasonably 
near  the  beaches  and  naval  vessels  to 
bring  their  guns  closer  to  their  targets. 
Both  beaches  had  a  very  shallow  gradi- 
ent and  tides  that  receded  so  rapidly 


'  Unless  otherwise  noted,  detail  for  this  chapter  is 
derived  from  Harrison,  Cross-Channel  Attack,  and  from 
Samuel  E.  Morison,  "History  of  United  States  Naval 
Operations  in  World  War  II,"  vol.  XI,  The  Invasion  of 
France  and  Germany  (Boston:  Little,  Brown  and  Co., 
1957). 


300 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


that  a  boat  beached  for  even  a  few 
moments  at  ebb  stuck  fast  until  the  next 
incoming  water.  The  tidal  range  of 
eighteen  feet  uncovered  a  300-yard  flat 
at  low  tide.  An  invasion  attempt  at  low 
tide  would  thus  force  the  infantry  to 
walk  300  yards  under  enemy  fire  across 
the  undulating  tidal  flat,  crisscrossed 
with  runnels  and  ponds  two  to  four  feet 
deep.  {Map  15) 

The  assault  objective  of  V  Corps'  1st 
and  29th  Infantry  Divisions  was  the 
smaller  OMAHA  Beach,  a  gentle,  7,000- 
yard  curve  of  sand.  An  eight-foot  bank 
of  coarse  shingle  marked  the  seaward 
edge  of  the  western  part  of  the  beach. 
The  shingle  offered  some  meager  cover 
to  an  infantryman  but  barred  passage 
to  wheeled  vehicles.  Back  of  the  beach, 
and  some  two  hundred  yards  from  the 
shingle  line  at  the  center,  a  line  of  grass- 
covered  bluffs  rose  dramatically  100  to 
170  feet.  At  either  end  the  bluffs  ran 
down  to  merge  with  the  rocky  head- 
lands that  enclosed  OMAHA  and  made 
the  flanking  coastline  impractical  for 
amphibious  landings  of  any  conse- 
quence. A  bathing  resort  before  the 
war,  the  area  was  not  thickly  populated, 
but  four  farming  settlements  were  nes- 
tled 500  to  1,000  yards  inland  on  the 
bluffs  above  the  beaches.  A  single  main 
road,  part  of  a  predominantly  east-west 
network,  roughly  paralleled  the  coast 
from  Vierville-sur-Mer  at  the  western 
reaches  of  OMAHA  through  St.  Laurent- 
sur-Mer,  Colleville-sur-Mer,  and  finally 
Ste.  Honorine-des-Pertes  before  pass- 
ing into  the  British  Second  Army  sec- 
tor behind  the  beaches  to  the  east. 
Access  to  the  beaches  from  the  farm- 
ing communities  was  through  four  large 
and  several  smaller  gullies  or  draws. 
Through  one  of  these,  dropping  from 
Vierville  to  the  water,  a  gravel  second- 


ary road  ran  to  the  beach  and  turned 
to  the  east.  It  continued  beside  a  six-  to 
twelve-foot  timber  and  masonry  seawall 
to  Les  Moulins,  a  small  village  directly 
on  the  sea  in  the  draw  in  front  of  St. 
Laurent.  From  there  back  to  St.  Laurent 
and  in  the  draw  from  Colleville  to  the 
water,  roads  were  no  more  than  cart 
tracks  or  sandy  paths.  A  line  of  bathing 
cabanas  and  summer  cottages  had  nes- 
tled beneath  the  bluffs  west  of  Les  Mou- 
lins in  an  area  known  as  Hamel-au- 
Pretre,  but  the  Germans  had  razed  most 
of  thenj  as  they  erected  their  beach 
defenses  and  cleared  fields  of  fire.  There 
were  few  signs  of  habitation  east  of  Les 
Moulins,  and  the  foot  paths  at  that  end 
of  the  beach  ran  out  altogether  in  the 
marsh  grass  sand." 

The  Neptune  planners  divided  OMA- 
HA Beach  into  eight  contiguous  land- 
ing zones.  From  its  far  western  end  to 
the  draw  before  Vierville,  Charlie  Beach 
was  the  target  of  a  provisional  Ranger 
force.  Next  were  the  main  assault  areas, 
Dog  and  Easy  beaches.  Dog  Green,  970 
yards  long,  Dog  White,  700  yards,  and 
Dog  Red,  480  yards,  stretched  from  the 
Vierville  draw  to  the  one  at  Les  Moulins. 
Easy  Green  began  there,  running  830 
yards  east.  Easy  Red,  1,850  yards,  strad- 
dled the  draw  going  up  to  Colleville, 
and  Fox  Red,  3,015  yards  at  the  far  left 
of  the  beach,  had  a  smaller  draw  on  its 
right-hand  boundary.  The  five  draws, 
vital  beach  exits,  were  simply  named: 
the  Vierville  exit  became  D—  1,  the  one 
at  Les  Moulins  leading  to  St.  Laurent, 
D— 3;  E— 1  lay  in  the  middle  of  Easy 
Red  leading  up  between  St.  Laurent 
and  Colleville;  the  Colleville  draw  off 


'  War  Department,  Historical  Div,  Omaha  Beach- 
head, 6  June- 13  June  1944,  American  Forces  in  Action 
Series  (Washington,  1945)  pp.  8-16. 


PREPARING  FOR  D-DAY  LANDINGS 


301 


FIRST  US 


SECOND  BRITISH 


S« 


THE  FINAL  OVERLORD  PLAN 

Drop  zone 
0  5  10  Miles 


10  Kilometers 


MAP  15 


Fox  Green  became  E— 3,  and  the  smaller 
one  leading  off  Fox  Red,  F—  1.  . 

After  a  45-minute  air  and  naval  bom- 
bardment on  D-day,  the  reinforced 
116th  Regimental  Combat  Team,  as- 
signed to  the  29th  Infantry  Division 
(but  attached  to  the  1st  Division  for  the 
assault),  was  to  land  on  Dog  Green,  Dog 
White,  Dog  Red,  and  Easy  Green,  pre- 
ceded moments  earlier  by  four  compa- 
nies of  the  741st  Tank  Battalion  serv- 
ing as  assault  artillery.  The  16th  Regi- 
mental Combat  Team,  1st  Infantry 
Division,  was  to  touch  down  on  Easy 
Red  and  Fox  Green,  with  a  battalion 
landing  team  on  each  beach.  The  as- 
sault units  were  to  push  through  the 
German  defense  along  the  beaches, 
especially  in  the  draws  leading  inland, 
by  the  time  the  landing  was  three  hours 


old.  Reinforced  with  additional  forces 
coming  ashore,  V  Corps  would  then 
consolidate  an  area  of  hedgerow  coun- 
try bounded  on  the  south  by  the  line  of 
the  Aure  River  by  the  end  of  D-day. 

German  defenses  in  the  area  from 
Caen  west,  taking  in  the  Cotentin  and 
Brittany  peninsulas,  fell  under  the  Ger- 
man Seventh  Army.  In  the  OMAHA  area 
the  counterinvasion  force  on  the  coast 
consisted  of  two  divisions,  the  716th,  a 
static  or  defense  division  having  no 
equivalent  in  the  American  Army,  and 
the  352d,  a  conventional  infantry  divi- 
sion capable  of  counterattack  and  rapid 
movement.  In  general  the  Germans 
concentrated  on  emplacing  a  coastal 
shield,  following  Field  Marshal  Erwin 
Rommel's  strategy  of  defeating  an  inva- 
sion at  the  water's  edge.  The  demands 


302 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


of  the  war  in  the  east  denied  the  vaunted 
German  Atlantic  Wall  the  concrete,  the 
mines,  and  the  trained  men  Rommel 
wanted,  but  the  beach  defenses,  though 
incomplete,  were  formidable  enough 
for  any  assault  force. "^ 

Since  the  Germans  considered  a  low- 
tide  landing  impossible  because  of  the 
exposed  area  in  front  of  their  guns, 
they  littered  the  tidal  flat  with  obstacles 
to  catch  landing  craft  coming  ashore  at 
high  tide.  About  250  yards  from  the 
shingle  line  stood  a  row  of  complicated 
structures  called  Element  C,  nicknamed 
Belgian  gates  because  they  resembled 
the  ornamental  ironwork  of  a  European 
chateau.  Festooned  with  waterproofed 
mines,  they  covered  either  end  of  the 
beach  but  not  its  center.  Behind  them 
were  irregular  rows  of  single  upright 
or  slightly  canted  steel  stakes,  V-shaped 
channeled  rails  that  could  tear  out  the 
bottom  of  a  landing  craft;  roughly  every 
third  one  had  a  Teller  mine  fixed  atop 
it.  The  Germans  had  emplaced  and 
mined  logs  and  built  shallow,  mined 
ramps  with  one  upright  wooden  pole 
supported  by  two  longer  trailing  legs. 
Closest  to  the  high-water  mark  was  a 
row  of  hedgehogs,  constructed  by  bolt- 
ing or  welding  together  three  or  more 
channeled  rails  at  their  centers  so  as  to 
project  impaling  spokes  in  three  direc- 
tions. The  tidal  flat  contained  no  bur- 
ied mines,  since  the  sea  water  rapidly 
made  them  ineffective. "* 

On  shore,  twelve  fixed  gun  emplace- 
ments of  the  German  coastal  defense 
net  between  the  Vire  River  and  Port- 
en-Bessin  could  fire  directly  on  the 
beach.  The  defenders  concentrated 


^im.,  pp.  20-28. 

^  Operation  Rpt  Neki  UNE,  OMAHA  Beach,  26  Febru- 
ary-26  June  1944,  30  Sep  44,  pp.  62-66. 


their  pillboxes  at  the  all-important 
beach  exits  and  supplemented  the  artil- 
lery pieces  with  automatic-weapons  and 
small-arms  firing  pits.  They  dug  anti- 
tank ditches  ten  feet  deep  and  thirty 
feet  wide  across  the  mouths  of  the 
draws.  One  pillbox,  set  in  the  embank- 
ment of  the  Vierville  draw,  D—  1,  could 
enfilade  the  beach  eastward  as  far  as 
Les  Moulins.  On  the  landward  side  of 
the  shingle  bank  and  along  the  seawall 
they  erected  concertina  barbed  wire 
and  laced  the  sand  with  their  standard 
Schu  and  Teller  mines.  From  the  trench 
system  on  the  bluffs  above  they  could 
also  activate  an  assortment  of  explosive 
devices,  using  old  French  naval  shells 
and  stone  fougasses  (TNT  charges  that 
blew  out  rock  fragments)  against  any 
attackers  scaling  the  heights. 

In  January  1944  the  COSSAC  staff 
decided  to  strengthen  the  American 
attempt  to  seize  Cherbourg  by  revising 
Overlord  to  bring  another  corps 
ashore  closer  to  that  port.  Because  of 
the  river  lines  and  the  marshy  terrain 
to  the  west  of  OMAHA,  V  Corps  ran  the 
risk  of  being  stopped  around  the  town 
of  Carentan  before  wheeling  into  the 
Cotentin  peninsula.  The  revised  plan 
assigned  the  VII  Corps,  with  the  4th 
Infantry  Division  in  the  assault,  to  the 
second  American  D-day  beach. 

A  straight  9,000-yard  stretch  of  rath- 
er characterless  coastline,  UTAH  lay  on 
a  north-south  axis  west  of  the  mouth  of 
the  Douve  and  to  the  east  of  the  town 
of  Ste.  Mere-Eglise.  A  masonry  seawall 
eight  feet  high  ran  the  length  of  the 
beach,  protecting  the  dunes  behind  it 
from  storms.  At  intermittent  points 
along  this  barrier  sand  had  piled  up  to 
make  ramps  as  high  as  the  wall  itself; 
only  a  wire  fence  atop  the  wall  marked 
its  presence.  German  defenders  had 


PREPARING  FOR  D-DAY  LANDINGS 


303 


flooded  the  low-lying  pastureland  be- 
tween the  beach  and  Ste.  Mere-Eglise 
to  a  depth  of  four  feet.  A  series  of  east- 
west  causeways  carried  small  roads 
across  the  flood;  each  ended  at  a  break 
in  the  seawall  which  normally  gave  ac- 
cess to  the  beach,  but  which  the 
Germans  had  also  blocked  to  contain 
an  assault  force  from  the  sea. 

The  beach  assault  area  lay  between 
two  hamlets,  La  Madeleine  on  the  south 
and  Les  Dunes  de  Varreville  on  the 
north.  The  southerly  Uncle  Red  Beach, 
1,000  yards  long,  straddled  a  causeway 
road  named  Exit  No.  3;  it  led  directly 
to  the  village  of  Audouville-la-Hubert, 
due  east  of  Ste.  Mere-Eglise  and  three 
miles  behind  the  beach.  Tare  Green 
Beach,  occupying  the  1,000  yards  to  the 
right  of  Uncle  Red,  had  few  distinguish- 
ing natural  features.  At  UTAH,  the  8th 
Infantry  Regiment,  4th  Infantry  Divi- 
sion, was  to  go  ashore  two  battalion 
landing  teams  abreast,  closely  followed 
by  the  70th  Tank  Battalion  as  artillery 
support.^ 

Neptune  also  called  for  a  parachute 
and  glider  assault  into  the  area  behind 
Utah.  To  cut  the  Cotentin  peninsula 
at  its  base,  COSSAC  planners  originally 
scheduled  airdrops  south  and  east  of 
Ste.  Mere-Eglise  and  farther  west  in  the 
vicinity  of  St.  Sauveur-le-Vicomte.  But 
when  the  91st  Infantry  Division  rein- 
forced the  peninsula  in  May,  the  First 
Army  staff  had  to  consider  a  less  ambi- 
tious airborne  undertaking.  The  82d 
Airborne  Division  would  be  dropped 
astride  the  Merderet  River,  a  tributary 
of  the  Douve  running  two  miles  west  of 
Ste.  Mere-Eglise,  and  the  101st  Air- 
borne Division  in  the  area  south  of  the 


'  Dept  of  the  Army,  Historical  Div,  Utah  Beach  to 
Cherbourg,  6  June— 27  June  1944,  American  Forces  in 
Action  Series  (Washington,  1947),  pp.  4—7. 


town  early  on  D-day  before  the  4th 
Infantry  Division  landed  at  UTAH.  Glid- 
er trains  would  bring  in  reinforcements 
and  heavier  weapons  to  consolidate  a 
perimeter  enclosing  a  section  of  the 
Carentan-Cherbourg  highway  and  at 
least  the  inland  portions  of  the  cause- 
ways that  would  serve  as  beach  exits.*' 
A  lack  of  high  ground  made  the  Ger- 
man defenses  at  UTAH  somewhat  less 
imposing  than  at  OMAHA.  The  defend- 
ers relied  heavily  on  the  inundated  low- 
lands behind  the  beach  to  channel  an 
attack  and  on  a  series  of  small  infantry 
strongpoints  to  pin  down  a  larger  force 
trying  to  leave  the  beach  over  the  cause- 
ways. Consistent  with  their  strategic 
conception,  the  German  works  were 
well  forward.  Two  German  divisions, 
the  709th  Infantry,  manned  with  east- 
ern Europeans,  mainly  Georgians,  and 
the  243d  Infantry,  had  constructed  nu- 
merous resistance  points  along  the  high- 
water  mark.  On  the  tidal  flat  they  had 
placed  the  obstacles  encountered  at 
Omaha  and  another  antitank  device 
called  a  tetrahedron,  a  small  pyramid 
of  steel  or  concrete.  Barbed-wire  entan- 
glements and  minefields,  covered  by 
rifle,  automatic,  and  mortar  fire  from 
the  infantry  trenches,  began  at  the 
water's  edge.  Concrete  pillboxes,  some 
with  tank  turrets  set  into  them,  swept 
the  beaches  with  arcs  of  fire.  The  vil- 
lages at  the  edges  of  UTAH  were  con- 
verted into  fortified  areas  command- 
ing both  the  beach  and  sectors  of  the 
inundated  land  to  the  rear.  Just  right 
of  center  on  Tare  Green,  the  Germans 
dug  a  deep  antitank  ditch  to  hinder 
vehicles  and  tanks  coming  in  from  the 
sea.  At  Utah  the  enemy  also  intro- 
duced the  Goliath,  a  miniature,  radio- 
controlled  tank  loaded  with  explosives 

♦*  Ibid.,  p.  9. 


304 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


and  designed  to  engage  incoming  land- 
ing craft  and  armor.  The  arrival  in  late 
May  of  the  91st  Division,  with  a  battal- 
ion of  tanks,  gave  considerable  depth 
to  the  defense  between  Carentan  and 
Valognes,  but  the  defenders  of  the 
beaches  themselves  could  hardly  ma- 
neuver, since  their  own  flooding  con- 
fined them  to  positions  in  the  narrow 
coastal  strip  where  there  was  little  room 
for  regrouping  and  counterattack. 

Despite  the  serious  German  aggrega- 
tion of  firepower  along  the  coastline, 
Neptune  planners  in  the  months  be- 
fore the  invasion  worried  most  about 
obstacles.  In  early  1944  as  aerial  photo- 
graphs of  the  German-held  coastal  areas 
showed  a  proliferation  of  obstacles  on 
the  invasion  beaches,  the  Allies  grew 
more  and  more  alarmed.  A  month 
before  D-day,  General  Eisenhower 
listed  the  devices  as  among  the  "worst 
problems  of  these  days."^ 

Beach  Obstacle  Teams 

In  deriving  plans  and  strategems  to 
overcome  the  obstacle  problem  the 
Allies  drew  on  their  experience,  though 
the  new  situation  exceeded  in  size  and 
complexity  anything  they  had  previous- 
ly encountered.  In  the  ill-fated  Dieppe 
raid  of  August  1942,  British  and  Cana- 
dian forces  had  met  concrete  walls  and 
blocks  set  with  steel  spikes  designed  to 
impale  landing  craft.  The  British  had 
then  established  an  Underwater  Obsta- 
cle Training  Center,  but  its  elaborate 
training  courses  were  chiefly  geared  for 
Mediterranean  beach  landings.  The 
British  experience  prompted  the  chief 
of  engineers  to  propose  a  similar  Army 
center  in  the  United  States,  but  in  the 


spring  of  1943  the  Navy  took  over  all 
amphibious  training.  The  engineers 
then  selected  a  site  for  a  beach  obstacle 
course  close  to  the  Navy's  Amphibious 
Training  Base  at  Fort  Pierce,  Florida. 

The  course  began  in  July  1943,  and 
throughout  the  fall  a  company  of  com- 
bat engineers  conducted  experiments 
in  coordination  with  the  Navy.  The  tests 
indicated  that  the  obstacles  that  re- 
mained after  a  thorough  bombing  of 
the  beaches  could  probably  be  blown  to 
bits  by  such  devices  as  the  "Apex,"  a 
remote-controlled  drone  boat,  and  the 
"Reddy  Fox,"  an  explosive-laden  pipe 
that  could  be  towed  into  the  area  and 
sunk.  The  engineers  could  also  destroy 
obstacles  with  rocket  fire,  preferably 
from  rocket  launchers  mounted  on  a 
tank;  at  low  tide  heavy  mechanized 
equipment  such  as  the  tankdozer  could 
push  most  obstacles  out  of  the  way.^ 

Although  the  engineers  were  testing 
these  methods,  ETOUSA  planners 
hoped  that  such  removal  work  would 
prove  unnecessary,  for  during  1943 
reconnaissance  had  uncovered  no  ob- 
stacles along  the  Normandy  coast.  In- 
deed, an  early  engineer  plan  assumed 
that  there  would  be  no  obstacles  or  that, 
if  the  Germans  attempted  to  install  any 
at  the  last  minute,  naval  gunfire  and 
aerial  bombardment  would  take  care 
of  them.  As  a  last  resort,  alternative 
beaches  might  be  chosen.^ 

This  optimism  waned  in  late  January 
1944,  when  aerial  reconnaissance  dis- 
closed hedgehogs  on  the  beach  at  Quine- 
ville,  just  north  of  the  UTAH  section  of 


^  Ltr,  Eisenhower  to  Marshall,  6  May  44,  Eisenhower 
personal  files. 


**  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Engineers: 
Troops  and  Equipment,  pp.  472—76;  Ltr,  Senior  Member, 
Joint  Army-Navy  Experiment  and  Testing  Board,  to 
CinC,  U.S.  Fleet,  18  Dec  43. 

'*  Col  E.  G.  Paules,  Notes  on  Breaching  Under- Water 
and  Shore  Obstacles  and  Land  Mine  Fields,  Mar- Apr 
44,  IncI  1. 


PREPARING  FOR  D-DAY  LANDINGS 


305 


the  Cotendn  coast.  Disturbed  at  this 
turn  of  events,  General  Eisenhower  sent 
Lt.  Gol.  Arthur  H.  Davidson,  Jr.,  of  Gen- 
eral Moore's  staff  and  Lt.  Col.  John  T. 
O'Neill,  commander  of  V  Corps'  1 12th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  to  attend 
an  obstacle  demonstration  at  Fort  Pierce 
in  Florida  between  9  and  1 1  February.'^ 

Returning  to  the  theater  about  two 
weeks  later,  Davidson  and  O'Neill 
found  D-day  planners  studying  aerial 
photographs  that  showed  the  Germans 
were  planting  obstacles  on  the  tidal  flats 
below  the  high-water  mark — a  great 
hazard  to  landing  craft.  Subsequent 
photographs  revealed  that  obstacles, 
usually  planted  in  three  rows,  were  mul- 
tiplying rapidly  not  only  in  the  UTAH 
area  but  also,  beginning  late  in  March, 
at  Omaha.  Planners  assumed  that  they 
were  all  strengthened  with  barbed  wire 
and  mines.  That  assumption  proved 
correct  on  23  April  when  an  Allied 
bomb  intended  for  a  coastal  battery  fell 
on  the  beach,  producing  fourteen  sec- 
ondary explosions.  Aerial  photographs 
showed  the  obstacles  proliferating  on 
all  beaches  right  up  to  D-day." " 

Detailed  planning  for  breaching  the 
obstacles  on  D-day  began  in  the  United 
Kingdom  in  mid-March  1944  when 
General  Bradley  directed  V  and  VII 
Corps  to  submit  clearing  plans  for 
Omaha  and  Utah  beaches  by  1  April. 
Because  time  was  short,  Bradley  told 
planners  to  depend  on  only  the  troops. 


"*  Engineer  Operations  by  the  VII  Corps  in  the 
European  Theater,  vol.  II,  "Normandy,"  p.  2;  Rpt,  Lt 
Col  J.  T.  O'Neill,  Summary  of  Activities  of  the  Provi- 
sional Engr  Gp,  8  Jul  44  (hereafter  cited  as  O'Neill 
Rpt),  in  AGF  Bd  Rpt  253,  ETO,  Engr  Rpt  on  Land- 
ings in  Normandy,  5  Oct  44. 

' '  O'Neill  Rpt;  AAR,  Omaha  Beach  Provisional  Engr 
Spec  Bde  Gp,  Operation  Rpt  Nekiune,  pp.  62-66; 
Engr  Opns  VII  Corps,  vol.  II,  "Normandy,"  p.  3. 


materials,  equipment,  and  techniques 
then  available  in  the  theater. 

Available  troops  included  the  corps' 
combat  engineers,  engineer  special  bri- 
gades, and  sixteen  naval  combat  demo- 
lition units  (NCDUs).  Each  NCDU  con- 
sisted of  five  enlisted  men  and  an  of- 
ficer— the  capacity  of  the  black  rubber 
boats  NCDUs  used  in  their  work.  They 
had  been  trained  to  paddle  to  shallow 
water  and  then  go  overboard,  wading 
to  shore  and  dragging  the  explosive- 
filled  boat  behind  them.  The  first  unit, 
members  of  the  earliest  Fort  Pierce 
graduating  class,  arrived  in  the  theater 
at  the  end  of  October  1943.  By  March 
1944  all  sixteen  units  had  arrived  and 
had  been  assigned  to  naval  beach  battal- 
ions training  at  Salcombe,  Swansea,  and 
Fowey.  The  demolition  units  had  little 
idea  of  precisely  what  their  role  on 
D-day  would  be.  They  had  no  training 
aids  other  than  those  they  could  impro- 
vise, nor  were  they  told  until  mid-April 
(because  of  strict  security  regulations) 
the  type  of  obstacles  being  discovered 
along  the  Normandy  beaches.*^ 

On  1  April  1944,  V  Corps  submitted 
to  First  Army  a  plan  for  breaching 
obstacles,  prepared  jointly  with  the  XI 
Amphibious  Force,  U.S.  Navy.  The 
plan  recommended  that  an  engineer 
group  consisting  of  two  engineer  com- 
bat battalions  and  twenty  NCDUs  be 
organized  and  specially  trained  for  the 
Omaha  assault;  VII  Corps  submitted  a 
similar  smaller  scale  plan  for  Utah.'^ 


'"^  Cdr.  Francis  Douglas  Fane,  USNR,  and  Don 
Moore,  The  Naked  Warriors  (New  York:  Appleton, 
Century,  and  Crofts,  1 956),  p.  2 1 ;  Rpt  on  the  Work  of 
U.S.  Naval  Combat  Demolitions  Units,  Naval  and  Air 
Support  folder,  Adm  493,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect.  Unless 
otherwise  cited  the  section  on  underwater  obstacles  is 
based  on  these  two  sources  and  on  O'Neill  Rpt  and 
Engr  Opns  VII  Corps,  vol.  II,  "Normandy." 

HQ,  V  Corps,  Prefacing  Plan,  Underwater  and 
Beach  Obstacles,  Omaha  Beach,  in  Engineer  Special 


306 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


The  V  Corps  commander,  Maj.  Gen. 
Leonard  T.  Gerow,  was  disturbed  to 
learn  on  9  April  that  First  Army  still 
had  adopted  no  definite  obstacle  plan 
and  that  training  had  barely  started. 
That  same  day  First  Army  asked  V 
Corps  to  send  two  engineer  companies 
and  a  tank  company  with  tankdozers  to 
the  Assault  Training  Center  at  Woola- 
combe.  The  299th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion,  with  personnel  specially 
trained  at  Fort  Pierce,  was  to  arrive  in 
the  United  Kingdom  on  16  April,  but 
only  about  one-third  of  the  battalion 
had  been  trained  in  the  removal  of 
underwater  obstacles.  Another  cause 
for  worry  was  a  scarcity  of  tankdozer 
blades.  To  speed  the  adoption  of  a  spe- 
cific plan  and  undertake  vital  training, 
Gerow  enlisted  the  support  of  Brig. 
Gen.  William  B.  Kean,  First  Army  chief 
of  staff.  Kean  had  to  admit  that  "this 
whole  subject  had  been  worked  out  far 
too  late."  Gerow  sent  two  engineer  com- 
panies with  four  tankdozers  and  six 
NCDUs  to  begin  training  at  Woola- 
combe  on  12  April.  *^ 

Army  and  Navy  representatives  for- 
mulated detailed  plans  beginning  15 
April,  when  for  the  first  time  demoli- 
tion men  obtained  precise  information 
on  the  tidal-flat  obstacles  they  could 
expect  to  encounter.  Because  of  the 
number  and  density  of  the  obstacles, 
the  conferees  decided  to  attack  them 
"dry  shod,"  ahead  of  the  incoming  tide. 

Brigades  on  Omaha  Beach,  Notes  and  Data  Used  in 
Connection  with  Operation  Neki  UNE,  Omaha  Beach, 
Prov  Engr  Spec  Bde  Gp  (hereafter  cited  as  Notes  and 
Data  Nefiune). 

*'*  Ltrs,  Gerow  to  Kean,  10  Apr  44,  and  Kean  to 
Gerow,  13  Apr  44,  copies  in  Notes  and  Data  Nekiune; 
O'Neill  participated  in  the  planning  for  Omaha  along 
with  Colonel  McDonough,  commanding  officer  of  the 
1 12th  Engineer  Combat  Group,  and  Lt.  Col.  Patillo,  V 
Corps  representative  at  the  Obstacle  Training  Center 
to  study  British  methods  and  techniques.  O'Neill  Rpt. 


This  decision  helped  fix  the  invasion 
date — only  on  5,  6,  or  7  June  would  the 
engineers  have  enough  daylight  after 
H-hour  to  destroy  the  obstacles  before 
the  onrushing  Channel  tide  covered 
them.  The  decision  to  attack  dry  shod 
also  obviated  the  need  for  Apex  boats — 
luckily,  for  the  freighters  bringing  them 
from  the  United  States  did  not  arrive 
in  England  until  mid-May,  too  late  to 
prepare  the  boats  for  use.  The  first 
Reddy  Foxes,  which  might  have  helped, 
came  in  the  same  shipment  and  had  to 
be  put  in  storage  along  with  the  Apexes 
because  there  was  no  time  to  train  men 
in  their  use.  Under  such  circumstances, 
the  most  practicable  method  of  breach- 
ing the  obstacles  seemed  that  of  plac- 
ing explosive  charges  by  hand,  although 
NCDU  officers  continued  to  warn  that 
this  course  would  be  possible  only  if 
enemy  fire  could  be  neutralized.'^ 

On  Omaha,  gaps  fifty  yards  wide 
were  to  be  blown  through  the  obstacles, 
two  in  each  beach  subsector.  The 
broader  Easy  Red  would  be  breached 
in  six  places.  Combined  Army-Navy 
boat  teams  of  thirty-five  to  forty  men 
carried  in  LCMs  were  to  undertake  the 
task.  The  sailors  were  to  destroy  the 
seaward  obstacles,  the  soldiers  to  han- 
dle those  landward  and  to  clear  mines 
from  the  tidal  flat.  First  on  the  scene 
would  be  the  assault  gapping  team  (one 
to  each  gap),  composed  of  twenty-seven 
men  from  an  Army  engineer  combat 
battalion  (including  one  officer  and  one 
medic)  and  an  NCDU  augmented  to 
thirteen  men  by  the  attachment  of  five 
Army  engineers  to  help  with  demoli- 
tions and  two  seamen  to  handle  the 
explosives  and  tend  the  rubber  boats. 

The  assault  teams  were  to  be  followed 
by  eight  support  teams,  one  to  every 

'^  Bradley,  A  Soldiers  Story,  pp.  260-61. 


PREPARING  FOR  D-DAY  LANDINGS 


307 


two  assault  teams,  of  about  the  same 
composition.  Two  command  boats  com- 
pleted the  flotilla.  Command  was  to  be 
an  Army  responsibility  because  the 
obstacles  would  presumably  be  dry  at 
the  time  of  clearing  operations.  Each 
assault  team  was  to  be  supported  by  a 
tankdozer  to  clear  obstacles.  All  boats 
were  to  carry  some  1,000  pounds  of 
explosives,  demolition  accessories,  mine 
detectors,  and  mine  gap  markers.  The 
command  boats  were  to  carry  a  ton  of 
extra  explosive.'*^ 

At  Utah  Beach  eight  fifty-yard  gaps 
were  planned,  four  in  each  of  the  two 
landing  sectors.  Boat  teams  were  to  be 
employed  in  a  somewhat  different  man- 
ner. Twelve  NCDUs,  each  consisting  of 
an  officer  and  fifteen  men  (including 
five  Army  engineers)  carried  in  twelve 
LCVPs,  were  to  attack  the  seaward 
band  of  obstacles.  Simultaneously,  eight 
Army  demolition  teams,  each  consist- 
ing of  an  officer  and  twenty-five  en- 
listed men  carried  in  eight  LCMs,  were 
to  attack  the  landward  obstacles.  Four 
Army  reserve  teams  of  the  same  size, 
also  in  LCMs,  were  to  follow  the  eight 
leading  Army  teams  shoreward.  As  at 
Omaha,  the  attackers  would  rely  heav- 
ily on  standard  engineer  explosives  and 
tankdozers,  and  the  Army  would  have 
command  responsibility  for  obstacle- 
clearing  operations. 

On  30  April,  V  Corps  organized  the 
V  Corps  Provisional  Engineer  Group 
for  the  Omaha  assault.  Under  Colonel 
O'Neill,  formerly  commander  of  the 
112th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  the 
provisional  group  consisted  of  the  146th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  the  299th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  (less  one 
company),  and  twenty-one  NCDUs. 


Ultimately,  150  demolition-trained  men 
of  the  2d  Infantry  Division  joined  the 
provisional  group  to  bring  its  strength 
to  1,050.  Upon  its  attachment  to  the 
1st  Infantry  Division  for  the  assault,  the 
provisional  group  was  redesignated  the 
Special  Engineer  Task  Force. 

For  Utah  obstacle-clearing  opera- 
tions VII  Corps  organized  the  Beach 
Obstacle  Demolition  Party  under  Maj. 
Herschel  E.  Linn,  commander  of  the 
237th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion. 
Smaller  than  the  OMAHA  organization, 
the  Utah  group  consisted  mainly  of 
one  company  of  the  237th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion,  another  from  the 
299th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  and 
twelve  NCDUs.  To  supply  the  remain- 
ing naval  support  to  the  UTAH  and 
Omaha  forces,  additional  NCDUs 
arrived  from  the  United  States  on  6 
May.'^ 

On  27  April,  when  direction  of  train- 
ing for  Omaha  passed  from  First  Army 
to  V  Corps  control,  two  engineer  com- 
bat battalions  (less  one  company)  and 
twenty-one  NCDUs  went  to  Woola- 
combe  for  training,  but  not  until  1  May 
were  aerial  photographs  of  OMAHA 
available  for  study.  Obstacles  of  the 
kind  shown  in  detail  in  low-level  photo- 
graphs were  then  erected  at  Woola- 
combe,  and  though  training  aids  were 
lacking  the  troops  practiced  debarking 
from  landing  craft  with  explosives  and 
equipment  and  experimented  with 
waterproofing  methods,  tankdozer  em- 
ployment, barbed-wire  breaching,  and 
other  techniques.'^ 

An  NCDU  officer,  Lt.  (jg.)  Carl  P. 
Hagensen,  developed  a  method  for  flat- 
tening the  big  Belgian  gate  obstacles 


"^Hist  146th  EngrCBn,Jun-Dec  44;  FO  1,299th 
Engr  C  Bn,  28  May  44,  in  Notes  and  Data  Nefi  une. 


'^  Hist  1 106th  Engr  C  Gp,  Jun-Dec  44. 
'*  Rpt,  T/5  Royce  L.  Thompson,  Sep  44,  in  folder, 
U.S.  Training  Center,  Adm  533,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 


308 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


with  the  least  danger  to  troops  and 
landing  craft  from  steel  fragments  and 
shards.  Tests  indicated  that  sixteen 
"Hagensen  packs" — small  sausage-like 
waterproof  canvas  bags  filled  with  two 
f)Ounds  of  a  new  plastic  explosive,  Com- 
position C— 2,  and  fitted  with  a  hook  at 
one  end  and  a  cord  at  the  other — could 
be  quickly  attached  to  the  gates'  steel 
girders.  When  a  connecting  "ring  main" 
of  primacord  exploded  the  packs  simul- 
taneously, the  gate  fell  over. 

Ten  thousand  Hagensen  packs — with 
canvas  bags  sewn  by  sailmakers  in  lofts 
throughout  England — were  produced 
during  an  eleventh-hour  roundup  of 
gear  and  equipment  that  began  when 
the  brief  training  period  ended  in  mid- 
May.  Some  improvisation  of  supplies 
proved  possible.  For  example,  mortar 
ammunition  bags  could  hold  water- 
proof fuses  and  the  twenty  Hagensen 
packs  each  demolition  man  would  carry. 
Nevertheless,  procurement  problems 
were  considerable.  The  OMAHA  obsta- 
cle teams  alone  required  twenty-eight 
tons  of  explosives  and  seventy-five  miles 
of  primacord.  Tankdozers,  D-8  ar- 
mored dozers,  special  minefield  gap 
markers,  special  towing  cables,  and  a 
multitude  of  miscellaneous  engineer 
items  also  had  to  be  procured.  The 
materiel  was  found  and  assembled  in  a 
remarkably  short  ten  days. 

There  was  also  little  time  for  train- 
ing the  demolition  teams.  Joint  train- 
ing for  most  of  the  Army-Navy  teams 
started  late  and  for  many  units  lasted 
no  more  than  two  weeks.  On  15  May 
the  NCDUs  moved  to  Salcombe,  a  Navy 
amphibious  training  center,  and  spent 
their  time  preparing  Hagensen  packs 
and  obtaining  final  items  of  gear.  Not 
until  the  end  of  May  did  they  rejoin 
the  Army  demolition  teams,  which  since 


mid-May  had  been  waiting  for  D-day 
in  their  marshaling  areas  farther  east. 

In  addition  to  the  obstacle  problem 
there  remained  a  second  engineer  re- 
sponsibility, equally  central  to  the  success 
of  the  operation:  the  organization  of 
the  supply  moving  on  an  unprecedented 
scale  across  a  complex  of  invasion 
beaches.  First  Army  planners  turned 
to  the  proven  engineer  special  brigades, 
but  then  devised  new  command  arrange- 
ments to  accommodate  the  sheer  mass 
of  the  invasion  traffic. 

The  Engineer  Special  Brigades 

At  this  stage  of  the  war,  the  engineer 
special  brigades  in  the  European  the- 
ater were  exclusively  shore  units  since 
the  Navy  had  taken  their  watercraft. 
The  brigades  now  had  additional  ser- 
vice units  to  accomplish  the  enormous 
cargo  transfers  necessary  for  assault 
operations.  Basic  units  included  three 
engineer  combat  battalions,  a  medical 
battalion,  a  joint  assault  signal  company, 
a  military  police  (MP)  company,  a 
DUKW  battalion,  an  ordnance  battal- 
ion, and  various  quartermaster  troops. 
Extra  equipment  included  jx)wer  cranes, 
angledozers,  motorized  road  graders, 
tractors,  and  six-ton  Athey  trailers. ^^ 


'■*  For  criticism  by  officers  of  the  299th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  demolition  teams  on  the  inadequacy 
of  the  Navy  briefings,  as  well  as  the  length  of  time 
spent  in  marshaling  areas  with  "nothing  to  do,"  see 
interviews  with  Capt.  William  J.  Bunting  and  Maj. 
Milton  Jewett,  in  Notes  and  Data  Nekiune. 

'^"  Lt  Clifford  L.  Jones,  The  Administrative  and 
Logistical  History  of  the  European  Theater  of  Opera- 
tions, vol.  VI,  "Neptune:  Training  for  Mounting  the 
Operation,  and  Artificial  Ports,"  March  1946,  in  CMH. 
Unless  otherwise  noted,  the  rest  of  this  chapter  is  based 
on  this  source  and  on  Heavey,  Dovm  Ramp!  The  Story  of 
the  Army  Amphibian  Engineers.  For  the  assumption  by 
the  Navy  early  in  1943  of  landing  craft  operation  and 
amphibious  training,  see  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal, 
The  Corps  of  Engineers:  Troops  and  Equipment,  pp. 
385-90. 


PREPARING  FOR  D-DAY  LANDINGS 


309 


The  1st  Engineer  Special  Brigade, 
which  had  reached  a  strength  of  some 
20,000  men  in  Sicily,  moved  to  England 
in  December  1943  with  only  a  nucleus 
of  its  old  organization — 3,346  men, 
including  a  medical  battalion,  a  quar- 
termaster DUKW  battalion,  a  signal 
company,  and  some  ordnance  troops. 
Unlike  the  other  two  engineer  brigades 
to  be  employed  in  NEPTUNE,  the  1st 
Engineer  Special  Brigade  had  an  expe- 
rienced unit  in  the  531st  Engineer  Shore 
Regiment,  which  had  served  in  the 
Northwest  Africa,  Sicily,  and  Salerno 
landings.  The  1st  Engineer  Special  Bri- 
gade expanded  in  England  to  some 
15,000  troops  by  D-day.'-^' 

The  5th  Engineer  Special  Brigade 
was  organized  in  the  United  Kingdom 
on  12  November  1943  from  the  1 1 19th 
Engineer  Combat  Group  with  three 
attached  engineer  combat  battalions 
(the  37th,  336th,  and  348th).  The  6th 
Engineer  Special  Brigade  was  formed 
in  January  1944  from  the  1 1 16th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Group  (147th,  149th,  and 
203d  Engineer  Combat  Battalions).  The 
staff  of  the  1116th  brought  with  it  a 
plan,  conceived  during  training  in  the 
United  States,  to  employ  battalion  beach 
groups,  each  composed  of  an  engineer 
combat  battalion  with  attached  troops. 
This  concept  was  similar  to  that  the  1st 
Engineer  Special  Brigade  had  devel- 
oped in  the  Mediterranean. 

The  6th  Engineer  Special  Brigade 
planned  to  deploy  two  battalion  beach 
groups  on  the  beach,  with  another  engi- 
neer combat  battalion  assuming  respon- 
sibility for  most  of  the  work  inland.  The 
beach  groups  were  to  unload  cargo 
from  ships  and  move  it  to  dumps.  They 
were  also  responsible  for  roads,  mine 


clearance,  and  similar  engineer  work; 
reinforced  quartermaster  and  ordnance 
battalions  would  operate  the  dumps.  In 
the  assault  phase  all  operations  of  the 
6th  Engineer  Special  Brigade  were  to 
be  controlled  by  the  reinforced  149th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  Beach 
Group.  As  operations  progressed  into 
the  beach  maintenance  phase,  the  vari- 
ous battalions  were  to  regain  control  of 
their  elements  initially  attached  to  the 
149th  and  to  assume  responsibility  for 
their  operations. ^'^ 

The  5th  Engineer  Special  Brigade 
divided  itself  into  three  battalion  beach 
groups.  Each  consisted  of  an  engineer 
combat  battalion,  a  naval  beach  com- 
pany, a  quartermaster  service  company, 
a  DUKW  company,  a  medical  collec- 
tion company,  a  quartermaster  railhead 
company,  a  platoon  of  a  quartermaster 
gasoline  supply  company,  a  platoon  of 
an  ordnance  ammunition  company,  a 
platoon  of  an  ordnance  medium  auto- 
motive maintenance  company,  military 
police,  chemical  decontamination  and 
joint  assault  signal  platoons,  and  two 
auxiliary  surgical  teams. ^'^ 

Headquarters,  First  Army,  the  Ameri- 
can tactical  planning  agency,  outlined 
the  responsibilities  of  the  engineer  spe- 
cial brigades  in  an  operations  memo- 
randum on  13  February  1944.  Each 
engineer  battalion  beach  group  would 
support  the  assault  of  a  regimental  com- 
bat team  and  each  engineer  company 
groupment  the  assault  landing  of  an 
infantry  battalion  landing  team.  First 
Army  also  authorized  the  grouping  of 


^'  Hist  1st  ESB,  Jun  42-Sep  45. 


'^'^  Rpt,  HQ,  6th  ESB,  to  TAG,  thru  CO,  Omaha 
Beach  Cmd,  20  Jul  44,  sub:  Operation  Rpt  Nekiune 
(hereafter  cited  6th  ESB  NEin  UNE  Rpt). 

'^'^  Col  Doswell  Gullatt,  Operation  Rpt  Nepiune, 
6-26  Jun  44,  inclusive,  HQ,  5th  Engr  Spec  Bde,  20 
Jul  44  (hereafter  cited  as  5th  ESB  Gullatt  Rpt  Neptune). 


310 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


the  5th  and  6th  Engineer  Special  Bri- 
gades under  a  headquarters  known  as 
the  Provisional  Engineer  Special  Bri- 
gade Group.  It  soon  became  evident 
that  the  two  brigades  would  not  be  suf- 
ficient to  handle  the  OMAHA  operation, 
which,  besides  the  beaches,  included  an 
artificial  port  and  the  minor  ports  of 
Grandcamp-les-Bains  and  Isigny.  The 
1 1th  Port  (TC),  which  had  been  operat- 
ing the  Bristol  Channel  ports,  then  aug- 
mented the  engineer  group  with  four 
port  battalions,  five  DUKW  companies, 
three  quartermaster  service  companies, 
three  quartermaster  truck  companies, 
an  ordnance  medium  automotive  main- 
tenance company,  and  a  utility  detach- 
ment— more  than  8,000  men  in  all.  Ear- 
marked to  operate  the  pierheads  and 
minor  ports,  the  1 1th  Port  required  no 
training  in  beach  operations. 

Assault  Training  and  Rehearsals 

The  combat  battalions  of  both  the  5  th 
and  6th  Engineer  Special  Brigades  had 
had  amphibious  training  on  the  Atlan- 
tic coast  at  Fort  Pierce,  Florida,  the  U.S. 
Navy's  Amphibious  Training  Base.  But 
some  units,  notably  quartermaster  units, 
had  had  no  amphibious  training  before 
joining  the  brigades,  and  the  training 
the  5th  Engineer  Special  Brigade's  com- 
bat battalions  received  in  the  United 
States  proved  "elementary"  in  the  light 
of  the  heavy  demands  soon  to  be  placed 
upon  the  units.  Brigade  units  received 
further  training  in  mine  work,  Bailey 
bridge  construction,  road  maintenance, 
and  demolitions  upon  arrival  at  Swansea 
on  the  south  coast  of  Wales  early  in 
November;  by  early  January  1944  they 
were  receiving  training  in  landing  oper- 
ations at  nearby  Oxwich  Beach.  The 
6th  Engineer  Special  Brigade,  stationed 


at  Paignton  in  Devon,  conducted  sim- 
ilar exercises  at  neighboring  Goodring- 
ton  Sands  during  February. ^^ 

The  first  of  a  series  of  major  exer- 
cises involving  assault  troops  and  shore 
engineers  began  in  early  January  1944 
at  Slapton  Sands  on  the  southern  coast 
of  England,  an  area  from  which  some 
6,000  persons  had  been  evacuated  from 
eight  villages  and  eighty  farms.  The 
exercise,  called  DuCK  I,  involved  10,000 
troops.  The  assault  forces  consisted  of 
the  inexperienced  29th  Infantry  Divi- 
sion of  V  Corps.  To  give  the  division 
some  training  with  shore  engineers,  the 
V  Corps  commander  called  on  Col. 
Eugene  M.  Caffey,  commanding  offi- 
cer of  the  1st  Engineer  Special  Brigade 
(stationed  at  Truro  in  Cornwall),  for 
support.  The  brigade  had  arrived  in 
England  from  the  Mediterranean  under- 
strength  and  with  no  equipment,  but, 
by  scouring  England  for  equipment  and 
borrowing  officers  and  units.  Colonel 
Caffey  was  able  to  furnish  elements  of 
his  brigade  for  the  exercise. 

Succeeding  exercises,  DuCK  II  and 
III,  were  held  in  February  to  train  ele- 
ments of  the  29th  Division  and  the  1st 
Engineer  Special  Brigade  that  had  not 
participated  in  DuCK  I.  The  beach  at 
Slapton  Sands  was  ideal  for  training, 
since  it  approximated  conditions  later 
found  at  UTAH.  But  one  purpose  of 
the  combined  exercise — accustoming 
assault  forces  to  the  beach  organization 
tasks  that  would  face  them  on  D-day — 
could  not  be  realized  because  OVER- 
LORD tactical  plans  were  not  firm  until 
late  in  February.  After  the  1st  Engi- 
neer Special  Brigade  learned  it  would 
not  be  with  the  29th  Division  but  with 


'■^^  6th  ESB  Neptune  Rpt;  5th  ESB  Gullatt  Rpt 
Nekiune;  De  Arman,  Hist  5th  ESB;  Hist  6th  ESB, 
1944. 


PREPARING  FOR  D-DAY  LANDINGS 


311 


Infantry  Troops  Leave  LST  During  Exercise  Fabius  at  Slapton  Sands, 
April  1944. 


the  4th,  the  brigade  participated  in  a 
series  of  seven  exercises  with  elements 
of  the  4th  Division  during  the  last  two 
weeks  of  March.  The  first  four  practice 
sessions  involved  engineer  detachments 
supporting  battalion  landing  teams;  the 
next  two  involved  regimental  combat 
teams.  VII  Corps  conducted  the  last 
exercise  on  a  scale  approaching  DuCK 
I.  Two  regimental  combat  teams  trained 
with  a  large  beach  party  from  the  1st 
Engineer  Special  Brigade  and  extra 
engineers,  parachute  troops,  and  air 
forces  elements. ^^ 

Exercise  FOX,  involving  17,000  troops 


25  -p/^  Clifford  L.Jones,  Notes  on  Utah  Beach  and 
1st  ESB,  Feb  45. 


scheduled  to  land  at  OMAHA,  took  place 
at  Slapton  Sands  9—10  March.  The 
37th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  Beach 
Group  of  the  5th  Engineer  Special  Bri- 
gade supported  the  16th  Regimental 
Combat  Team,  and  the  149th  Engineer 
Battalion  Beach  Group  of  the  6th  Engi- 
neer Special  Brigade  supported  the 
1 16th  Regimental  Combat  Team.  This 
exercise  had  been  delayed  so  that  it 
could  parallel  final  tactical  planning  for 
Overlord,  and  it  suffered  to  some 
extent  from  late  and  hurried  prepara- 
tions as  well  as  the  inexperience  of  the 
units  participating.  Neither  the  mount- 
ing nor  the  beach  operations  went  as 
well  as  hoped,  but  both  the  engineers 
and  the  assault  troops  learned  better 


312 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


use  of  DUKWs  and  more  efficient  water- 
proofing of  vehicles. ^^ 

The  major  exercises  led  to  the  two 
great  rehearsals  for  the  invasion:  TIGER 
and  Fabius.  Tiger,  the  rehearsal  for 
the  Utah  landings,  came  first.  Some 
25,000  men  including  the  4th  Infantry 
Division,  airborne  troops,  and  the  1st 
Engineer  Special  Brigade  participated 
under  the  direction  of  VII  Corps.  TiGER 
lasted  nine  days  (22-30  April)  with  the 
first  six  given  over  to  marshaling.  Land- 
ings in  the  Slapton  Sands  area  were  to 
begin  at  0630  on  28  April. 

At  0130  eight  LSTs,  proceeding  west- 
ward toward  the  assault  area  with  the 
1st  Engineer  Special  Brigade,  troops  of 
the  4th  Division,  and  VII  Corps  head- 
quarters aboard,  were  attacked  off  Port- 
land by  enemy  craft,  presumably  Ger- 
man E-boats.  Torpedoes  sank  two  LSTs 
and  damaged  a  third  so  badly  that  it 
had  to  be  towed  back  to  Dartmouth. 
The  German  craft  machine-gunned  the 
decks  of  the  LSTs  and  men  in  the 
water.  LST— 531,  with  1,026  soldiers 
and  sailors  aboard,  had  only  290  sur- 
vivors; total  U.S.  Army  casualties  were 
749  killed  and  more  than  300  wounded. 
The  1st  Engineer  Special  Brigade,  with 
413  dead  and  16  wounded,  suffered 
heavily  in  the  action.  Its  3206th  Quar- 
termaster Service  Company  was  virtu- 
ally wiped  out,  and  the  557th  Quarter- 
master Railhead  Company  also  sustained 
heavy  losses.  Both  had  to  be  replaced 
for  the  invasion. "^^ 

Shattered  by  the  disaster,  which  re- 
duced it  to  little  more  than  its  assault- 
phase  elements,  the  1st  Engineer  Spe- 
cial Brigade  made  a  poor  showing  in 


Tiger.  Observing  the  landings  from  an 
LCI  offshore.  General  Bradley  was 
disturbed.  For  some  "unexplained  rea- 
son" a  full  report  on  the  loss  of  the 
LSTs,  which  he  came  later  to  consider 
"one  of  the  major  tragedies  of  the  Euro- 
pean war,"  did  not  reach  him,  and  from 
the  sketchy  report  he  received  he  con- 
cluded that  the  damage  had  been  slight. 
Attributing  the  poor  performance  of 
the  brigade  to  a  breakdown  in  com- 
mand, he  suggested  to  Maj.  Gen.  J. 
Lawton  Collins,  commanding  VII 
Corps,  that  a  new  commander  be  as- 
signed. Collins  gave  the  job  to  Brig. 
Gen.  James  E.  Wharton.  Thus  by  a 
combination  of  misfortune  and  misun- 
derstanding, Col.  Eugene  M.  Caffey, 
who  had  led  the  1st  Engineer  Special 
Brigade  in  the  Sicily  landings,  was  not 
to  lead  it  on  D-day  in  Normandy. "^^ 

Fabius  consisted  of  six  exercises  car- 
ried out  under  the  direction  of  2 1  Army 
Group.  Fabius  I  was  the  rehearsal  for 
Force  O,  the  1st  Division  units  that  were 
to  assault  OMAHA  Beach.  Approxi- 
mately 25,000  troops  participated  in 
Fabius  I,  including  three  regimental 
combat  teams  and  various  attached  ser- 
vice troops.  Fabius  II,  III,  IV,  and  V 
were  British  rehearsals  carried  out  at 
the  same  time.  FABIUS  VI  was  a  mar- 
shaling exercise  for  follow-up  Force  B 
(the  29th  Division)  and  the  British  forces 
in  the  buildup.  It  ran  from  3  April  to  7 
May,  with  a  simulated  D-day  on  3  May. 

Every  effort  was  made  to  deploy  regi- 
mental combat  teams  from  the  1st  and 
29th  Divisions  plus  two  Ranger  and  two 
tank  battalions  supported  by  three  engi- 
neer combat  battalions  on  the  second 
tide  on  D-day  and  300  tons  of  supply 


'^''  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Vol- 
ume I,  pp.  348-49. 

"  Hist  1st  ESB,  6  Dec  43- 1  Nov  44;  1st  ESB  (Utah), 
pp.  22-24. 


'■^^  Bradley,  A  Soldier's  Story,  pp.  247-49. 


PREPARING  FOR  D-DAY  LANDINGS 


313 


on  D  plus  1 — including  treadway  bridg- 
ing, Sommerfeld  track,  coir  matting, 
and  other  material  for  building  and 
improving  beach  roads.  A  number  of 
faults  showed  up  in  beach  operations, 
but  since  D-day  was  only  a  month  away 
no  drastic  revisions  could  be  undertaken. 
The  most  important  result  of  the  exer- 
cise was  a  change  in  the  landing  sched- 
ules; elements  of  the  military  police 
company,  the  brigade  headquarters, 
and  the  signal  company  were  to  land 
considerably  earlier  than  originally  plan- 
ned. After  FABIUS  was  over,  most  of 
the  units  that  had  participated  went 
directly  to  their  marshaling  areas. 

Marshaling  the  Invasion  Force 

The  primary  responsibilities  for  mar- 
shaling engineer  personnel,  vehicles, 
and  supplies  for  shipment  to  Normandy 
fell  to  the  engineers  of  Western  Base 
Section  (WBS)  and  especially  Southern 
Base  Section  (SBS),  which  had  a  larger 
number  of  marshaling  areas.  U.S.  forces 
in  the  initial  assault  were  to  embark 
from  points  in  England  west  of  Poole, 
and  early  reinforcements  were  to  load 
at  ports  in  the  Bristol  Channel  in  ad- 
vance of  the  operation.  Later  reinforce- 
ments were  to  move  through  Southamp- 
ton, Portland,  and  Plymouth. 

Of  the  nine  major  marshaling  and 
embarkation  areas  in  SBS,  the  British 
operated  one.  The  British  and  Ameri- 
cans jointly  ran  two  areas  around  South- 
ampton; the  Americans  operated  the 
other  six  areas.  Each  marshaling  area 
was  to  be  used  to  75  percent  of  its 
capacity,  with  the  remaining  25  percent 
kept  in  reserve  to  accommodate  troops 
and  vehicles  that  might  not  be  able  to 
move  out  because  of  enemy  action, 
adverse  weather,  or  other  circumstance. 


Colonel  Caffey  (Photograph  taken  in  1952.) 

SBS  made  available  many  engineer 
troops,  including  general  service  regi- 
ments, camouflage  companies,  water 
supply  companies,  fire-fighting  pla- 
toons, and  various  smaller  detachments 
to  help  operate  the  marshaling  areas. ^^ 
In  the  marshaling  areas  the  first  step 
was  to  construct  necessary  additional 
installations.  Because  the  ports  did  not 
have  the  capacity  to  load  the  huge  inva- 
sion fleet  at  one  time,  base  section  engi- 
neers had  to  build,  either  within  the 
ports  or  along  riverbanks,  concrete 


'^■'  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  9,  Marshalling  for  Over- 
lord (United  Kingdom),  1946,  pp.  10-18,  and  fig.  1, 
Marshalling  Areas  for  Overlord,  Liaison  Sect,  Intel 
Div,  ETOUSA  Adm  file  547. 


314 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


aprons  trom  existing  roads  to  the  water's 
edge.  Known  as  "hards"  (for  hard- 
standings),  the  aprons  had  to  extend 
out  into  the  water.  They  consisted  of 
precast  concrete  units,  called  "chocolate 
bars"  because  of  their  scored  checker- 
board surfaces.  Averaging  ten  inches 
in  thickness,  each  section  measured 
about  2-by-3-feet,  which,  laid  end  to 
end,  formed  a  rough  road.  Both  sides 
of  the  slabs  were  scored — the  top  sur- 
face to  prevent  vehicles  from  slipping, 
the  bottom  surface  to  bite  into  the 
beach.  The  landing  craft  or  landing 
ships  anchored  at  the  foot  of  the  hard 
or  apron,  let  down  their  ramps,  and 
took  on  vehicles  and  personnel  dry 
shod;  no  piers  or  docks  were  necessary. 
Because  landing  craft  were  of  shallow 
draft,  flat-bottomed,  and  most  unsta- 
ble in  rough  seas  and  because  the  south 
coast  of  England  was  generally  unpro- 
tected, windswept,  and  subject  to  tides 
that  greatly  changed  water  depths,  care- 
ful reconnaissance  and  British  advice 
were  necessary  to  locate  loading  sites 
or  embarkation  points  in  sheltered  sec- 
tions, generally  in  a  port  or  a  river 
mouth?^ 

Next  came  the  selection  of  tempo- 
rary camp  sites  near  embarkation  points. 
The  capacity  for  out-loading  from  a 
certain  group  of  hards  determined  the 
size  and  number  of  camps  located  near- 
by. Each  marshaling  area  had  railheads 
for  storing  all  classes  of  supplies,  and 
every  camp  was  slipposed  to  maintain 
a  stock  of  food,  along  with  fast-moving 
items. 

The  marshaling  areas  were  of  two 
patterns,  large  camps  that  might  accom- 
modate as  many  as  9,000  men  and 


sausage-style  camps — fourteen  small 
camps,  each  with  a  capacity  of  230  men, 
ranged  along  five  to  ten  miles  of  road- 
way. These  small  camps  provided  bet- 
ter dispersal  and  the  possibility  of  good 
camouflage,  for  tentage  followed  hedge- 
rows. But  they  required  more  person- 
nel for  efficient  operation  because  some 
degree  of  control  was  lost.  Good  cam- 
ouflage practices  were  not  always  fol- 
lowed.'^' 

Most  of  the  camps  consisted  of  quar- 
ters for  200  enlisted  men  (often  in 
pyramidal  tents),  officers'  quarters, 
orderly  rooms,  supply  rooms,  cooks' 
quarters,  kitchen,  mess  halls,  and  la- 
trines. Special  briefing  tents  with  sand 
tables  were  also  available.  Where  neces- 
sary, engineers  erected  flattops  over 
open  areas  used  for  mess  lines. ^^  In 
both  the  Southern  and  Western  Base 
Sections  they  also  constructed  security 
enclosures  and  special  facilities.  Engi- 
neers had  to  maintain  and  waterproof 
engineer  task  force  vehicles.  Each  mar- 
shaling camp  had  either  a  concrete  tank 
or  a  dammed  stream  for  testing  water- 
proofing. Roads,  railroads,  bridges,  and 
dock  and  port  facilities  were  primarily 
British  responsibilities,  and  American 
engineers  performed  maintenance  in 
these  areas  only  on  request  or  in  case 
of  emergency.^ 

The  Western  Base  Section's  task  was 
easier  than  Southern  Base  Section's  for 
little  new  construction  was  required. 
Existing  troop  camps  were  big  enough 
and  close  enough  to  the  ports.  Camp 
capacities  were  increased  by  billeting 
eighteen  instead  of  sixteen  men  in  each 


^"  Southern  Base  Section  History,  Aug  43— Aug  44 
p.  4,  Adm  601,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 


'"  Hist  604th  Engr  Camouflage  Bn. 

^'^  Hist  1306th  Engr  GS  Rgt. 

■^^  Col  Fenton  S.  Jacobs,  Western  Base  Section,  vol. 
H,  p.  349,  Adm  603D,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect.  The 
account  of  WBS  activities  is  based  on  this  source. 


PREPARING  FOR  D-DAY  LANDINGS 


315 


16-by-36-foot  hut  and  by  adding  an 
extra  man  to  each  seven-man  16-by- 
1 6-foot  pyramidal  tent.  Additional  tents 
were  also  erected  with  construction 
materials  the  Royal  Engineers  contrib- 
uted. 

Providing  the  needed  accommoda- 
tions in  both  Western  and  Southern 
Base  Sections  entailed  much  more  than 
acquiring  buildings  and  erecting  tents. 
An  acute  shortage  of  base  section  engi- 
neer operating  personnel  which  arose 
in  the  spring  of  1944  promised  to  be- 
come worse  once  the  invasion- 
mounting  machinery  went  into  full 
swing.  SOS,  ETOUSA,  officials  recog- 
nized the  problem  as  early  as  February 
1944  and  saw  the  need  to  use  field 
forces  to  help  out.  General  Lee  esti- 
mated that  at  least  15,000  field  force 
troops  would  be  required,  along  with 
46,000  SOS  troops  who  would  have  to 
be  taken  off  other  work.  As  a  result, 
ETOUSA  permitted  an  entire  armored 
division  to  be  cannibalized  to  provide 
some  of  the  troops  needed  for  house- 
keeping in  the  marshaling  areas.  Of  the 
total,  4,500  were  assigned  as  cooks,  but 
many  of  these  men  were  not  qualified. 
General  Moore  thought  the  shortage 
in  mess  personnel  was  frequently  the 
weakest  part  of  the  engineer  phase  of 
marshaling. ^^ 

Briefings  began  in  the  marshaling 
areas  on  22  May  1944.  The  Provisional 
Engineer  Special  Brigade  Group's  com- 
mander. Brig.  Gen.  William  M.  Hoge, 
issued  a  simple  but  effective  order:  "It 
is  my  desire  that  every  individual  sol- 
dier in  this  command,  destined  for  the 
far  shore,  be  thoroughly  instructed  as 
to  the  general  mission  and  plan  of  his 


unit,  and  what  he  is  to  do."  The  men 
received  instruction  in  briefing  tents 
containing  models  of  the  Normandy 
beaches,  maps,  overprints,  charts,  aerial 
photographs,  and  mosaics. ^^ 

Battalion  beach  groups  formed  from 
the  5th  and  6th  Engineer  Brigade 
Groups,  the  latter  initially  under  the 
5th  Engineer  Special  Brigade,  were  to 
support  the  V  Corps  landings  on  the 
7,000-yard  stretch  of  beach  fronting  the 
Vierville-Colleville  area.  The  5th  Engi- 
neer Special  Brigade  was  to  operate  all 
shore  installations  in  sectors  Easy,  Fox, 
and  George  to  the  left  of  the  common 
brigade  boundary.  The  6th  Engineer 
Special  Brigade  was  to  operate  those  in 
sectors  Charlie,  Dog,  and  Easy  to  the 
right  of  the  brigade  boundary.  Head- 
quarters, Provisional  Engineer  Special 
Brigade  Group,  was  to  assume  control 
of  the  two  brigades  as  soon  as  its  com- 
mand post  was  established  ashore.  The 
1st  Division  (less  the  26th  Regimental 
Combat  Team),  with  the  29th  Division's 
116th  Regimental  Combat  Team  and 
other  troops  attached,  made  up  Force 
O,  the  initial  assault  force.  The  29th 
Division,  less  the  116th  Regimental 
Combat  Team  but  with  the  26th  Regi- 
mental Combat  Team  and  other  troops 
attached,  constituted  the  immediate 
follow-up  force.  Force  B.^^ 

Upon  landing,  engineer  special  bri- 
gade engineers  were  to  relieve  divi- 
sional engineers  on  the  beaches.  Then 
they  were  to  develop  and  expand  the 
roadway  system  and  open  additional 
exits  and  roads  within  the  established 
beach  maintenance  area,  with  the  goal 


■'^  Bradley,  A  Soldier's  Story,  p.  247;  OCE  ETOUSA 
Hist  Rpt  9,  Marshalling  for  Overlord,  p.  58. 


'^  Hist  5th  ESB,  p.  60,  Adm  120,  ETOUSA  Hist 
Sect. 

^^  De  Arman,  Hist  5th  ESB.  Unless  otherwise  noted, 
this  account  of  the  5th  Engineer  Special  Brigade  plans 
is  taken  from  this  source. 


316 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


of  having  that  area  fully  developed  by 
D  plus  3.  Initially  beach  dumps  were  to 
be  set  up  about  a  thousand  yards  inland; 
later  the  brigade  group  was  to  consoli- 
date these  dumps  up  to  five  miles  inland. 
Separate  areas  were  to  be  set  aside  for 
USAAF  dumps,  troop  transit  areas,  and 
vehicle  transit  areas. 

The  5th  Engineer  Special  Brigade 
undertook  a  number  of  tasks,  some  in 
support  of  or  in  coordination  with  the 
Navy.  The  men  marked  naval  hazards 
near  the  beach,  determined  the  best 
landing  areas,  and  then  marked  the 
beach  limits  and  debarkation  points. 
They  helped  remove  beach  obstacles 
and  developed  and  operated  assault 
landing  beaches.  They  controlled  boat 
traffic  near  the  beach  and  directed  the 
landing,  retraction,  and  salvage  of  craft 
as  well  as  unloading  all  craft  beaching 
within  their  sector.  Brigade  members 
also  developed  beach  exits  to  permit 
the  flow  of  120  vehicles  an  hour  by  H 
plus  3,  organized  and  operated  initial 
beach  dumps,  directed  traffic,  and  main- 
tained a  naval  ponton  causeway.  They 
operated  personnel  and  vehicle  transit 
areas,  set  up  and  operated  a  POW 
stockade,  kept  track  of  organizations 
and  supplies  that  landed,  and  estab- 
lished initial  ship-to-shore  communi- 
cations. Finally,  they  gave  first  aid  to 
beach  casualties  before  evacuating  them 
to  ships. 

The  general  plan  called  for  progres- 
sive development  of  the  OMAHA  beach- 
head in  three  phases.  The  assault  phase 
would  be  under  company  control,  the 
initial  dump  phase  under  battalion 
beach  group  control,  and  the  beach 
maintenance  dump  phase  under  bri- 
gade control.  During  the  first  two  phases 
at  Omaha  Beach,  groups  of  the  5th 
and  6th  Engineer  Special  Brigades  were 


to  support  the  landings  of  the  1st  Divi- 


sion. 


The  37th  Engineer  Battalion  Beach 
Group  (of  the  5th  Engineer  Special 
Brigade)  was  to  support  the  16th  Regi- 
mental Combat  Team;  the  149th  Beach 
Group,  with  the  147th  Beach  Group 
attached  (both  from  the  6th  Engineer 
Special  Brigade),  was  to  support  the 
116th  Regimental  Combat  Team;  and 
the  348th  Beach  Group  (of  the  5th 
Engineer  Special  Brigade)  was  to  sup- 
port the  18th  Regimental  Combat  Team. 
The  29th  Division's  lead  regimental 
combat  team,  the  26th,  was  to  be  sup- 
ported by  the  336th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion  Beach  Group  of  the  5th  Engi- 
neer Special  Brigade. 

The  duties  of  the  1st  Engineer  Spe- 
cial Brigade,  supporting  the  assault 
landings  of  the  4th  Infantry  Division 
of  VII  Corps  on  UTAH  Beach,  were 
similar  to  those  of  the  5th  Engineer 
Special  Brigade  on  OMAHA.  Uncle  Red 
Beach  on  the  left  and  Tare  Green  Beach 
on  the  right  were  each  to  be  operated 
by  a  battalion  beach  group  of  the  bri- 
gade's 531st  Engineer  Shore  Regiment; 
as  soon  as  a  third  beach  group  could 
land,  a  third  beach.  Sugar  Red,  was  to 
be  opened  at  the  right  of  Tare  Green. ^^ 

In  the  briefings  before  D-day,  the 
engineer  special  brigades  received  intel- 
ligence information  concerning  enemy 
forces,  the  progressive  development  of 
enemy  defenses,  detailed  geographic 
and  hydrographic  studies,  reports  on 
local  resources,  and  a  model  of  the 
beach  and  adjacent  areas.  Defense  over- 
prints provided  detailed  information 
about  gun  positions,  minefields,  beach 
obstacles,    roadblocks,    and    antitank 


"  FO  1 ,  HQ,  1st  ESB,  10  May  44,  Adm  493,  ETOUSA 
Hist  Sect. 


PREPARING  FOR  D-DAY  LANDINGS 


317 


ditches.  An  Admiralty  Tide  Chart  pre- 
pared at  scale  1:7,920  was  valuable,  as 
was  a  1:5,000  chart-map  that  the  Infor- 
mation Section,  Intelligence  Division, 
OCE,  published.  However,  the  over- 
prints of  land  defenses  and  underwa- 
ter obstacles  provided  with  these  charts 
arrived  too  late  to  be  of  maximum  ben- 
efit to  the  troops:  the  land  defense  over- 
print for  the  Admiralty  Tide  Chart  was 
distributed  after  D-day.  In  addition, 
enemy  defense  information  was  not  as 
recent  as  it  might  have  been.^^ 

Embarkation 

After  the  briefings  and  final  water- 
proofing of  their  vehicles  to  withstand 
4 '/2-foot  depths,  the  troops  split  into  ves- 
sel loads  and  moved  to  their  embarka- 
tion points  or  hards.  The  5th  Engineer 
Special  Brigade  embarked  at  Portland, 
Weymouth,  and  Falmouth  between  31 
May  and  3  June.  Elements  of  the  bri- 
gade scheduled  for  the  first  two  tides 
with  Force  O  loaded  aboard  troop  trans- 
ports (APs  and  LSIs),  landing  ships  and 
craft  (LSTs,  LCTs,  and  LCIs),  cargo 
freighters,  and  motor  transport  ships. 

Like  other  components  of  the  assault 
force,  the  engineers  were  to  go  ashore 
in  varied  craft  to  reduce  the  risk  of  los- 
ing an  entire  unit  in  the  sinking  of  a 
single  vessel.  Each  unit  of  the  brigade 
had  an  assigned  number  of  personnel 
and  vehicle  spaces,  and  the  total  was 
considerable — 4,188  men  and  327  ve- 
hicles, including  attached  nonengineer 
units.  Force  B,  scheduled  to  land  on 
the  third  tide  with  1,376  men  and  277 
vehicles,  loaded  on  a  single  wave  for 
better  control  on  the  assumption  that 
the  risk  of  losing  vessels  would  be  much 


less  by  the  time  of  its  landing.^^  The  1st 
Engineer  Special  Brigade  units  in  Force 
U  loaded  at  Plymouth,  Dartmouth, 
Torquay,  and  Brixham  beginning  on 
30  May.  The  assembly  of  Force  U  was 
somewhat  more  difficult  than  that  of 
Force  O  because  its  loading  points  were 
more  widely  scattered.^" 

Most  assault  demolition  teams  were 
jammed  aboard  100-foot  LCTs,  each 
already  carrying  two  tanks,  a  tankdozer, 
gear,  and  packs  of  explosives  in  addi- 
tion to  its  own  crew.  When  they  arrived 
at  the  transport  area,  the  teams  were  to 
transfer  to  fifty-foot  LCMs  to  make  the 
run  to  the  beach.  Because  insufficient 
lift  was  available  to  carry  the  LCMs. in 
the  customary  manner,  such  as  on  davits, 
LCTs  towed  them  to  the  transport  area."*' 

Before  midnight  of  3  June  the  engi- 
neers were  aboard  their  ships  and  on 
their  way  to  their  rendezvous  points 
beyond  the  harbors.  D-day  was  to  be  5 
June.  The  slow  landing  ships  and  craft 
of  Force  U  got  under  way  during  the 
afternoon  of  3  June  because  they  had 
the  greatest  distance  to  go;  those  of 
Force  O  sortied  later  in  the  evening. 
The  night  was  clear  but  the  wind  was 
rising  and  the  water  was  becoming 
choppy.  At  dawn,  after  a  rough  night 
at  sea,  the  vessels  were  ordered  to  turn 
back.  D-day  had  been  postponed.  Sun- 
day, 4  June,  was  a  miserable  day  for 
the  men  jammed  aboard  the  landing 
ships  and  craft  under  a  lashing  rain. 

At  dawn  next  morning  the  order 
went  out  from  the  supreme  com- 
mander that  D-day  would  be  Tuesday, 


'**  5th  ESB  GuUatt  Rpt  Nekiune;  Jones,  Notes  on 
U  lAH  Beach. 


'"  De  Arman,  Hist  5th  ESB. 

^"  1st  ESB,  Boat  Assignment  Table,  an.  2  to  FO  1, 
Adm  493,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect;  Ruppenthal,  Logistical 
Support  of  the  Armies,  Volume  I,  pp.  372  —  73. 

Fane  and  Moore,  The  Naked  Warriors,  p.  5 1 ;  O'Neill 
Rpt;  Engr  Opns  VII  Corps,  vol.  II,  "Normandy,"  p.  9. 


318 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


6  June.  The  word  came  to  many  of  the 
engineers  as  it  did  to  those  of  the  147th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  aboard 
LCI -92: 

Suddenly  a  hush  spread  above  the  din  and 
clamor  of  the  men.  .  .  .  And  then,  as  if  coin- 
ciding with  silence,  a  clear,  strong  voice 
extending  from  bow  to  stern,  and  reaching 
every  far  corner  of  the  ship,  announced 
the  Order  of  the  Day  issued  by  the  Supreme 


Commander.  The  men  strained  to  catch 
every  word,  "you  are  about  to  embark  on 

the  Great  Crusade Good  Luck!  And  let 

us  all  beseech  the  blessing  of  Almightv  God 
upon  this  great  and  noble  undertaking." 
For  the  next  few  moments,  heads  were 
bowed  as  if  in  silent  prayer.  This  was  the 
word.  Tomorrow  was  D-day. 


'•^  Hist  147th  Engr  C  Bn,  29  Jan  43-4  Mar  46. 


CHAPTER  XV 


The  Landings  on  OMAHA  and  UTAH 


Darkness  over  the  English  Channel 
on  the  night  of  5  June  1944  concealed 
five  thousand  ships,  spread  over  twenty 
miles  of  sea,  plowing  the  choppy  waters 
toward  Normandy.  Two  American  and 
three  British  task  forces  traveled  their 
separate  mine-swept  lanes  to  the  mid- 
point of  the  Channel.  Each  lane  divided 
there  into  two  sublanes,  one  for  the 
naval  fire  support  vessels  and  the  faster 
transports,  the  other  for  slower  craft 
jammed  with  tanks,  field  pieces,  and 
wheeled  vehicles. 

Force  O,  destined  for  OMAHA,  and 
Force  U,  headed  for  UTAH,  arrived  in 
designated  transport  areas  ten  miles  off 
the  French  coast  after  midnight,  and 
the  larger  ships  began  disgorging  men 
and  equipment  into  the  assault  LCVPs 
swinging  down  from  the  transports' 
davits  and  hovering  alongside.  Smaller 
landing  craft  churned  around  the  larger 
ships  with  their  own  loads  of  infantry, 
equipment,  and  armor  for  the  assault. 
LCTs  carried  the  duplex-drive  amphibi- 
ous Sherman  tanks  that  would  play  a 
vital  part  in  the  first  moments  of  the 
invasion.  The  spearhead  of  the  assault 
on  Omaha,  the  tanks  were  to  enter  the 
water  6,000  yards  offshore,  swim  to  the 
waterline  at  Dog  White  and  Dog  Green, 
and  engage  the  heavier  German  em- 
placements on  the  beaches  five  minutes 
ahead  of  the  first  wave  of  infantry. 


At  H-hour,  0630,  with  the  tide  just 
starting  to  rise  from  its  low  point, 
another  wave  of  Shermans  and  tank- 
dozers  was  to  land  on  Easy  Green  and 
Dog  Red,  followed  a  minute  later  by 
the  assault  infantry  in  LCVPs  and  Brit- 
ish-designed armored  landing  craft 
called  LCAs.  At  0633  the  sixteen  assault 
gapping  teams  were  due  on  OMAHA, 
and  their  support  craft  were  to  follow 
them  during  the  next  five  minutes.  The 
demolition  teams,  with  the  help  of  the 
tankdozers,  had  just  under  half  an  hour 
to  open  gaps  in  the  exposed  obstacle 
belts  before  the  main  body  of  the  infan- 
try hit  the  beaches.  The  later  waves  also 
had  combat  engineers  to  blow  addi- 
tional gaps,  clear  beach  exits,  aid  assault 
troops  in  moving  inland,  and  help  orga- 
nize the  beaches.  Off  UTAH  a  similar 
scene  unfolded,  with  the  duplex-drive 
tanks  scheduled  to  go  in  on  the  heels  of 
the  first  wave  of  the  8th  Infantry  assault, 
followed  in  five  minutes  by  the  Army- 
Navy  assault  gapping  teams  and  detach- 
ments from  two  combat  engineer  battal- 


ions. 


Engineers  on  Omaha 
The  eight  demolition  support  teams 


'  War  Dept,  Hist  Div,  Onuilui  BecMmid,  pp.  38-42; 
Dept  of  the  Army,  Hist  Div,  Utah  Beach  to  Cherbourg, 
pp.  43-44;  Operation  Rpt  NKnUNK,  p.  80. 


320 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


for  Omaha  and  the  three  command 
teams  aboard  a  British  transport  had 
had  a  chance  to  get  some  sleep  during 
the  night.  But  the  gapping  teams, 
crowded  aboard  LCTs  and  towed  LCMs, 
were  miserable.  One  of  the  LCTs  had 
broken  down  early  in  the  voyage,  and 
several  swamped  in  the  Channel  swell. 
Their  drenched  and  seasick  passengers 
transferred  to  the  bucking  LCMs  in  the 
blackness,  no  small  feat  considering  the 
amount  of  equipment  involved.  (Map 
16) 

The  engineers  were  overburdened 
for  their  trip  to  shore.  Each  man  car- 
ried a  forty-pound  bag  of  Hagensen 
packs,  wire  cutters,  a  gas  mask,  car- 
tridges, an  inflatable  life  belt,  a  canteen, 
rations,  and  a  first  aid  packet.  They  had 
either  carbines  or  Garand  rifles  and 
bangalore  torpedoes  to  tear  apart  the 
barbed  wire  on  the  beach.  Some  had 
mine  detectors,  others  heavy  wire  reels 
wound  with  800  feet  of  primacord,  and 
some  carried  bags  of  fuse  assemblies. 
Over  their  uniforms  all  wore  coveralls 
impregnated  against  gas,  and  over  them 
a  fur-lined  jacket.  Each  LCM  held  two 
rubber  boats,  each  containing  about  500 
pounds  of  explosives,  extra  bangalores, 
mine  detectors,  gap  markers,  buoys, 
and  from  75  to  100  cans  of  gasoline.^ 

Almost  from  the  beginning,  things 
began  to  go  wrong  for  the  sixteen  gap- 
ping teams.  They  managed  to  transfer 
from  the  LCTs  to  the  LCMs  on  schedule, 
around  0300.  At  0450,  twenty  minutes 
after  the  amphibious  tanks  and  the  first 
infantry  assault  wave  started  for  shore, 
the  demolition  teams  were  on  their  way 
to  the  line  of  departure,  some  two  miles 


offshore.  Behind  them,  their  support 
teams  were  delayed  when  their  LCMs 
failed  to  arrive  on  time,  and  they  en- 
countered difficulties  getting  into  smal- 
ler craft  from  the  attack  transports. 
Unable  to  load  completely  until  0500, 
the  support  elements  finally  got  under 
way  at  0600,  far  too  late  to  reach  the 
tidal  flat  in  time  to  help  the  gapping 
teams.  The  precisely  timed  schedules, 
conceived  for  fair  weather  and  calm 
seas,  were  breaking  down  even  before 
the  engineers  reached  the  shore. ^ 

The  assault  gapping  teams  headed 
landward  heartened  by  the  rain  of  metal 
descending  on  enemy  positions.  The 
eight  assault  teams  assigned  to  the  east- 
ern sector  of  OMAHA  with  the  16th 
Regimental  Combat  Team  reached  the 
line  of  departure  at  first  light;  Navy 
control  boats  herded  them  into  their 
correct  lanes  for  Easy  Red  and  Fox 
Green  beaches.  As  they  headed  for 
shore,  heavy  shells  of  the  naval  bom- 
bardment whistled  over  their  heads, 
and  at  0600  bombers  arrived  with  the 
first  of  some  1,300  tons  of  bombs  drop- 
ped on  the  invasion  area  on  D-day.  The 
sight  made  the  drenched,  shivering 
men  in  the  boats  momentarily  forget 
their  misery.  They  were  cheered  in 
their  certainty  that  the  Air  Forces  would 
saturate  the  beaches,  and  when  a  Brit- 
ish rocket  ship  loosed  the  first  of  a  bar- 
rage of  9,000  missiles  at  the  German 
positions,  hope  mounted  that  the  Ger- 
man artillery  and  machine-gun  nests 
would  be  silent  when  the  LCMs  came 
in.  Optimists  recalled  a  statement  from 
a  briefing  aboard  one  of  the  transports: 
"There  will  be  nothing  alive  on  the 


-  Fane  and  Moore,  The  Naked  Warriors,  pp.  51  -52;  '  Interv,  Maj  Milton  Jewett,  (X),  299lh  Engr  C  Bn, 

Interv,  Capt  William  ).  Bunting,  Jni,  and  FO  I,  299th        in  Notes  and  Data,  Nf.I'I  link;  Hist  I46th  Engr  C  Bn; 
Engr  C  Bn,  in  Notes  and  Data,  NF.n  link.  O'Neill  Rpt. 


THE  LANDINGS  ON  OMAHA  AND  UTAH 


321 


MAP  16 


beach  when  you  land.'"* 

The  illusion  did  not  sustain  them 
long,  for  the  bombers  had  flown  through 
cloud  cover  that  forced  their  crews  to 
rely  on  imperfect  blind  bombing  tech- 
niques. Only  two  sticks  of  bombs  fell 
within  four  miles  of  the  shore  defenses, 
though  the  area  behind  the  beaches 
took  a  thorough  pounding.  The  Brit- 
ish rockets  made  a  fine  display,  but  dis- 
appeared over  the  cliffs  to  dig  up  the 
landscape  behind  the  German  coastal 
works.  The  naval  barrage  beginning  at 
H  minus  45  minutes  was  also  more 
effective  inland,  contributing  to  the  dis- 
ruption of  German  communications. 
The  combined  power  of  the  air  and 
naval  bombardment  did  much  to  iso- 
late the  battle  area.  But  the  German 
shore  batteries  on  OMAHA,  located  in 
bunkers  and  enfilading  the  beach  so 


that  they  could  fire  no  more  than  a  few 
hundred  yards  out  to  sea,  remained 
mute  during  the  opening  moments  of 
the  action.  Offering  no  muzzle  flashes 
to  give  away  their  positions  to  the  Navy 
gunners  and  invite  their  own  destruc- 
tion, they  were  largely  intact  when  the 
first  wave  of  engineers,  tanks,  and  infan- 
try hit  the  tidal  flat.^ 

For  the  first  troops  in,  OMAHA  was 
"an  epic  human  tragedy  which  in  the 
early  hours  bordered  on  total  disaster."^ 
The  morning  mists  and  the  smoke  raised 
in  the  bombardment  concealed  land- 
marks in  some  sectors,  and  a  strong 
tidal  crosscurrent  carried  the  boats  as 


'  Fane  and  Moore,  The  Naked  Warriors,  p.  50;  Intervs, 
Bunting  and  Jewelt,  Notes  and  Data,  Nki'ILink. 


'"The  Adm  and  Log  Hist  of  the  ETC),  vol.  VI. 
"Neptune:  Training  for  Mounting  the  Operation,  and 
Artificial  Ports, "  pp.  14-15;  Operation  Rpt  Nkfi  link, 
p.  82;  Col.  Paul  W.  Thompson,  "D-day  on  Omaha 
Qedch"  Infantry  Journal,  LVI  (June  1945),  40. 

"  S.  L.  A.  Marshall,  "First  Wave  at  Omaha  Beach," 
in  Battle  at  Best  (New  York:  William  Morrow  and  (Jo., 
196.*^),  p.  52. 


322 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


',<vUT»Ui\ 


Tanks  and  Vehicxes  Stalled  at  the  Shin(;le  Line  on  Omaha  Beach 


much  as  two  thousand  yards  east  of 
their  intended  landfalls.  The  741st 
Tank  Battalion  launched  twenty-nine 
of  its  thirty-two  duplex-drive  tanks  off- 
shore and  immediately  lost  twenty- 
seven  when  they  foundered  or  plunged 
directly  to  the  bottom  of  the  Channel 
upon  leaving  their  LCTs.  Two  swam 
ashore,  and  the  remaining  three  landed 
from  beached  LCTs,  only  to  fall  prey 
at  the  waterline  to  German  gunners. 
Machine-gun  fire  whipped  among  the 
engineer  and  infantry  landing  craft, 
intermingled  now,  and  followed  them 
to  the  beach.  As  the  ramps  dropped,  a 
storm  of  artillery  and  mortar  rounds 
joined  the  automatic  and  small-arms 
fire,  ripping  apart  the  first  wave.  Dead 
men  dotted  the  flat;  the  wounded  lay 


in  the  path  of  the  onrushing  tide,  and 
many  drowned  as  the  surf  engulfed 
them.  An  infantry  line  formed  at  the 
shingle  bank  and,  swelled  by  fearful, 
dispirited,  and  often  leaderless  men, 
kept  up  a  weak  volume  of  fire  as  yet 
inadequate  to  protect  the  engineers.  In 
the  carnage,  the  gapping  teams,  suffer- 
ing their  own  losses,  fought  to  blow  the 
obstacles. 

On  the  left  of  Easy  Red,  one  team 
led  the  entire  invasion  by  at  least  five 
minutes.  The  commander  of  Team  14, 
2d  Lt.  Phill  C.  Wood,  Jr.,  was  under 
the  impression  that  H-hour  was  0620 
instead  of  0630.  Under  his  entreaties, 
the  Navy  coxswain  brought  the  LCM 
in  at  0625,  the  boat's  gun  crew  unsuc- 
cessfully trying  to  destroy  Teller  mines 


THE  LANDINGS  ON  OMAHA  AND  UTAH 


323 


on  the  upright  stakes.  Wood  and  his 
team  dragged  their  explosive-laden 
rubber  boat  into  waist-deep  water  under 
a  hail  of  machine-gun  fire.  No  one  was 
on  the  beach.  The  lieutenant  charged 
toward  a  row  of  obstacles,  glancing 
backward  as  he  ran.  In  that  moment  he 
saw  an  artillery  shell  land  squarely  in 
the  center  of  the  craft  he  had  just  left, 
detonating  the  contents  of  the  second 
rubber  boat  and  killing  most  of  the 
Navy  contingent  of  his  team.  The  LCM 
burned  fiercely.  Wood's  crew  dropped 
bangalore  torpedoes  and  mine  detec- 
tors and  abandoned  their  load  of  ex- 
plosives. Dodging  among  the  rows,  they 
managed  to  wire  a  line  of  obstacles  to 
produce  a  gap,  but  here  the  infantry 
landing  behind  them  frustrated  their 
attempt  to  complete  the  job.  Troops, 
wounded  or  hale,  huddled  among  the 
obstacles,  using  them  for  cover,  and 
Wood  finally  gave  up  trying  to  chase 
them  out  of  range  of  his  charges.  Leav- 
ing the  obstacles  as  they  were,  he  and 
his  team,  now  only  about  half  of  its 
original  strength,  rushed  forward  and 
took  up  firing  positions  with  the  infan- 
try concentrated  at  the  shingle.^ 

Other  teams  had  little  more  success. 
Team  13's  naval  detachment  also  fell 
when  an  artillery  shell  struck  its  boat- 
load of  explosives  just  after  it  landed 
on  Easy  Red.  The  Army  contingent  lost 
only  one  man  but  found  the  infantry 
discharging  from  the  landing  craft  seek- 
ing cover  among  the  obstacles,  thus  pre- 
venting the  team  from  setting  off 
charges.  Team  12  left  its  two  rubber 
boats  aboard  the  LCM,  yet  managed  to 
clear  a  thirty-yard  gap  on  Easy  Red, 


^  Interv,  Lt  Wood,  in  Notes  and  Data,  NKrruNE; 
Hist  146th  Engr  (]  Bn;  Fane  and  Moore,  The  Naked 
Warriors,  p.  53-64. 


but  at  a  fearful  cost.  A  German  mortar 
shell  struck  a  line  of  primacord,  prema- 
turely setting  off  the  charges  strung 
about  one  series  of  obstacles,  killing  six 
Army  and  four  Navy  demolitions  men 
and  wounding  nine  other  members  of 
the  team  and  a  number  of  infantrymen 
in  the  vicinity.  Team  11,  arriving  on 
the  far  left  flank  of  Easy  Red  ahead  of 
the  infantry,  lost  over  half  its  men.  A 
faulty  fuse  prevented  the  remainder 
from  blowing  a  passage  through  the 
beach  impediments. 

Only  two  teams,  9  and  10,  accom- 
plished their  missions  on  the  eastern 
sector  of  OMAHA.  Team  9,  landing  in 
the  middle  of  Easy  Red  well  ahead  of 
the  infantry  waves,  managed  to  open  a 
fifty-yard  path  for  the  main  assault. 
Team  lO's  performance  was  encourag- 
ing in  comparison  with  that  of  the 
others.  Clearing  the  infantry  aside  with- 
in twenty  minutes  of  hitting  the  beach, 
the  men  demolished  enough  obstacles 
in  spite  of  heavy  casualties  to  create  two 
gaps,  one  fifty  yards  wide  and  a  second 
a  hundred  yards  across.  They  were  the 
only  gaps  blown  on  the  eastern  half  of 
the  assault  beaches. 

The  remaining  teams  assigned  to  that 
area  had  much  the  same  dismal  experi- 
ence as  Lieutenant  Wood's  team,  and 
the  failure  of  the  assault  gapping  effort 
became  evident.  At  Fox  Green,  Teams 

15  and  16  came  in  later  than  those  on 
Easy  Red  but  met  the  same  heavy  artil- 
lery and  automatic  fire.  At  0633  Team 

16  plunged  off  its  LCM,  leaving  its  rub- 
ber boats  adrift  when  it  became  appar- 
ent that  they  drew  German  attention. 
Here  too  the  men  gave  up  trying  to 
blow  gaps  when  the  infantry  would  not 
leave  the  protection  of  the  German 
devices.  Team  15  touched  down  at 
0640,  just  as  the  tide  began  rising  rap- 


324 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


idly,  and  lost  several  men  to  machine- 
gun  fire  before  they  left  the  LCM.  In  a 
now  common  occurrence,  they  sustained 
more  casualties  when  a  shell  found  the 
rubber  boat  with  its  volatile  load.  The 
survivors  nevertheless  attacked  the  Bel- 
gian gates  farthest  from  shore  and  fixed 
charges  to  several.  The  fusillade  from 
shore  cut  away  fuses  as  rapidly  as  the 
engineers  could  rig  them.  One  burst  of 
fragments  carried  away  a  fuseman's 
carefully  set  mechanism — and  all  of  his 
fingers.  With  no  choice  but  to  make  for 
shore,  they  ran,  only  four  of  their  origi- 
nal forty  uninjured,  to  the  low  shingle 
bank  on  Fox  Green,  where  they  col- 
lapsed, "soaking  wet,  unable  to  move, 
and  suffering  from  cramps.  It  was  cold 
and  there  was  no  sun."^ 

Seven  teams  bound  for  the  116th 
Infantry's  beaches  on  the  western  half 
of  Omaha — Dog  Green,  Dog  White, 
Dog  Red,  and  Easy  Green — were  on 
schedule,  most  of  them,  in  fact,  coming 
in  ahead  of  the  infantry  companies  in 
the  first  waves.  The  eighth  team  landed 
more  than  an  hour  later;  its  LCT  had 
foundered  and  sunk  shortly  after  leav- 
ing England,  and  the  team  transferred 
to  other  craft.  When  it  finally  landed  at 
0745,  the  team  found  the  obstacles  cov- 
ered with  water.  The  duplex-drive  tank 
crews  on  the  western  half  of  the  beach 
came  in  all  the  way  on  their  landing 
craft  rather  than  attempting  the  swim 
ashore,  but  their  presence  was  only 
briefly  felt.  German  fire  disabled  many 
tanks  at  the  shingle  line  where  they  had 
halted,  unable  to  move  farther,  and 
those  remaining  could  not  silence  the 
heavier  enemy  guns.  The  men  of  Team 


"  Inlerv,  S/Sgl  James  M.  Redmond,  Team  15,  Notes 
and  Data,  Nkimiink. 


8,  landing  a  little  to  the  left  of  Dog 
Green,  saw  no  Americans  on  the  beach 
but  confronted  a  German  party  work- 
ing on  the  obstacles.  The  Germans  fled, 
and  the  team  was  able  to  blow  one  fifty- 
yard  gap  before  the  American  infantry 
arrived.  Teams  3  and  4,  badly  shot  up, 
achieved  little,  and  Teams  5  and  7  could 
do  no  blasting  after  the  incoming  infan- 
try took  cover  among  the  beach  obstruc- 
tions. The  only  positive  results  came 
when  Teams  1  and  6  each  opened  a 
fifty-yard  gap,  one  on  Dog  White  and 
one  on  Dog  Red.  Command  Boat  1,  on 
the  beach  flat  at  0645,  unloaded  a  crew 
that  made  an  equally  wide  hole  in  the 
obstacles  on  Easy  Green.  Where  the 
engineers  successfully  blew  lanes  open, 
they  had  first  to  cajole,  threaten,  and 
even  kick  the  infantry  out  of  the  way. 
Gapping  team  members  later  recalled 
that  the  teams  had  more  success  if  they 
came  in  without  firing  the  machine 
guns  on  the  LCMs,  since  their  distinc- 
tive muzzle  flashes  gave  their  range  to 
the  enemy. 

The  tardy  support  teams  appeared 
off  the  eastern  beaches,  all  carried  off 
course  and  landing  between  0640  and 
0745  on  or  around  Fox  Red.  The  Ger- 
man artillerymen  at  the  eastern  reaches 
of  Omaha  met  them  with  fearsomely 
accurate  fire.  One  88-mm.  piece  put 
two  rounds  into  Team  F's  LCM,  killing 
and  wounding  fifteen  men;  only  four 
men  of  the  original  team  got  to  shore. 
Team  D  got  a  partial  gap  opened,  mak- 
ing a  narrow,  thirty-yard  lane,  but  the 
other  teams  could  do  little.  The  men 
arriving  later  found  the  German  fire 
just  as  heavy,  and  the  incoming  tide 
forced  them  to  shore  before  they  could 
deploy  among  the  obstacles.  They  joined 
the  earlier  elements  that  had  found 


THE  LANDINGS  ON  OMAHA  AND  UTAH 


325 


shelter  under  the  cliffs  at  the  eastern 
end  of  the  beach. ^ 

Their  strength  reduced  to  a  single 
machine,  engineer  tankdozers  could 
offer  little  help.  Only  six  of  the  sixteen 
M— 4s  equipped  with  bulldozer  blades 
got  ashore,  and  the  enemy  picked  off 
five  of  them.  The  remaining  one  pro- 
vided the  engineers  an  alternative  to 
blowing  up  the  obstacles,  an  increas- 
ingly hazardous  undertaking  as  more 
troops  and  vehicles  crowded  onto  the 
beaches.  Instead  of  using  demolitions, 
which  sent  shards  of  metal  from  the 
obstacles  careening  around  the  area, 
the  teams  set  about  removing  the  mines 
from  stakes,  ramps,  hedgehogs,  and 
Belgian  gates,  and  let  the  tankdozers, 
joined  later  in  the  day  by  several  ar- 
mored bulldozers,  shove  the  obstacles 
out  of  the  way  as  long  as  the  tide  per- 
mitted. Pushed  ashore  after  0800  by 
the  inrushing  water,  the  gapping  teams 
helped  move  wounded  men  off  the 
tidal  flat  and  consolidated  equipment 
and  the  supply  of  explosives  to  await 
the  next  ebb. 

In  the  meantime  the  Navy  had  dis- 
covered that  the  obstacles  did  not  pose 
the  expected  problem  once  they  were 
stripped  of  their  mines.  Shortly  after 
1000,  several  destroyers  moved  to  with- 
in a  thousand  yards  of  the  beach.  Engag- 
ing the  German  emplacements  with 
devastating  5-inch  gunfire,  they  began 
to  accomplish  what  the  tanks  in  the  first 
assault  could  not.  Using  the  covering 
fire,  two  landing  craft,  LCT— 30  and 
LCI— 554,  simply  rammed  through  the 
obstacles  off  Fox  Green,  battering  a 
path  to  shore  with  all  automatic  weap- 


ons blazing.  Though  LCT- 30  was  lost 
to  fire  from  the  bluffs,  the  other  vessel 
retracted  from  the  beach  without  loss, 
and  dozens  of  other  craft  hovering  off- 
shore repeated  the  maneuver  with  the 
same  result.'^ 

When  the  first  morning  tide  inter- 
rupted the  work  of  the  gapping  teams, 
they  had  opened  just  five  holes,  and 
only  one  of  these,  Team  lO's  100-yard- 
wide  lane  on  Easy  Red,  was  usable. 
Their  ranks  virtually  decimated  in  their 
first  half-hour  ashore,  the  teams'  mem- 
bers were  often  bitter  when  they  dis- 
cussed their  experience  later.  Most  of 
the  equipment  the  LCMs  carried  had 
been  useless  or  worse;  the  rubber  boats 
with  their  explosives  had  drawn  heavy 
fire,  and  the  engineers  had  abandoned 
them  as  quickly  as  possible.  The  mine 
detectors  were  useless  since  the  enemy 
had  buried  no  mines  in  the  flat,  and 
German  snipers  made  special  targets 
of  men  carrying  them.  With  no  barbed 
wire  strung  among  the  obstacles,  the 
bangalore  torpedoes  the  engineers 
brought  in  were  only  an  extra  burden. 
Overloaded  and  dressed  in  impreg- 
nated coveralls,  the  engineers  found 
their  movement  impeded,  and  wounded 
and  uninjured  men  alike  drowned  un- 
der the  weight  of  their  packs  as  they 
left  the  landing  craft.  The  survivors  also 
criticized  the  close  timing  of  the  inva- 
sion waves  that  left  them  only  a  half 
hour  to  clear  lanes.  The  confusion  pro- 
duced when  the  engineers  landed  si- 
multaneously with  or  even  ahead  of  the 
infantry  led  to  the  opinion  that  there 
also  should  have  been  at  least  a  half 
hour  between  the  first  infantry  assault 


"'  (lorneliiis  Ryan,  The  Longest  Day,  June  6,  /  94^^  (New 
York:  Simon  and  Schuster,  1959),'pp.  190-91 ;  Oper- 
ation Rpt  Nh.n  LINK,  p.  85;  O'Neill  Rpt. 


141. 


Morison,  l^ie  InxKision  of  France  and  Germany,  p. 


326 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


and  the  arrival  of  the  gapping  teams. 
In  future  actions,  support  teams  should 
go  in  with  the  groups  they  were  back- 
ing up  rather  than  behind  them  in  the 
invasion  sequence.  Lastly,  as  a  tactical 
measure,  the  gapping  team  veterans 
recommended  that  the  first  concern 
should  be  to  strip  the  mines  from  any 
obstacles  encountered  so  as  to  render 
them  safe  for  tankdozers  or  landing 
craft  to  ram." 

The  human  cost  of  the  engineers' 
heroism  on  OMAHA  was  enormous. 
When  the  Army  elements  of  the  gap- 
ping teams  reverted  on  D  plus  5  to  con- 
trol of  the  146th  and  299th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalions,  then  attached  to  V 
Corps,  they  had  each  lost  between  34 
and  41  percent  of  their  original  strength. 
The  units  had  not  yet  accounted  for  all 
their  members,  and  the  Navy  set  losses 
among  the  naval  contingents  of  the 
teams  at  52  percent.  Fifteen  Distin- 
guished Service  Crosses  went  to  Army 
members  of  the  team;  Navy  demolitions 
men  received  seven  Navy  Crosses.  Each 
of  the  companies  of  the  146th  and 
299th  Engineer  Combat  Battalions  in- 
volved and  the  naval  demolition  unit 

received  unit  citations  for  the  action  on 
D-day. '2 

The  end  of  the  first  half  hour  on 
D-day  saw  approximately  3,000  Ameri- 
can assault  troops  on  OMAHA,  scattered 
in  small  clumps  along  the  sand.  Iso- 
lated from  each  other  and  firing  spo- 
radically at  the  enemy,  they  sought  to 
advance  up  the  small  defiles  leading  to 


' '  Operation  Rpt  Nepiune,  p.  92;  (^dr.  Kenneth 
Edwards,  RN,  Operation  Neptune  (London:  Collins, 
1946),  p.  149;  Inlervs,  Bunting  and  Jewett,  Notes  and 
Data,  Neitune. 

'■■^  O'Neill  Rpt;  War  Dept,  Hist  Div,  Oviaha  Beach- 
head, pp.  43,  165-66;  Fane  and  Moore,  The  Naked 
Warriors,  pp.  65  —  66. 


the  flanks  and  rear  of  German  positions, 
but  no  forward  motion  was  yet  evident. 
On  the  right,  or  western,  flank  of  the 
beach  in  front  of  Vierville  in  the  1 16th 
Infantry's  zone,  the  Germans  had  taken 
the  heaviest  toll  among  the  incoming 
men,  and  the  assault  of  Company  A, 
116th  Infantry,  crumbled  under  the 
withering  fire.  Reinforcements  were 
slow,  often  carried  off  course  to  the  east 
in  the  tidal  current.  A  thousand  yards 
east,  straddling  Dog  Red  and  Easy 
Green,  lay  elements  of  two  more  com- 
panies from  the  116th,  confused  by 
their  surroundings  but  less  punished 
by  German  fire  since  the  defensive  posi- 
tions above  were  wrapped  in  a  heavy 
smoke  from  grass  fires  that  obscured 
vision  seaward.  Sections  of  four  differ- 
ent companies  from  both  assault  regi- 
ments landed  on  the  Fox  beaches  and, 
huddled  with  engineers  from  the  gap- 
ping teams,  fired  at  opportune  targets 
or  contemplated  their  next  moves.  Only 
in  the  stretch  between  the  Colleville  and 
St.  Laurent  draws,  Exits  E— 1  and  E— 3, 
was  there  relative  safety.  The  German 
posts  in  the  bluffs  here  seemed  un- 
manned through  the  whole  invasion, 
which  also  permitted  the  more  success- 
ful performance  of  the  gapping  teams 
on  Easy  Red.  But  the  success  of  the 
invasion  on  OMAHA  now  depended 
upon  getting  the  troops  and  vehicles  off 
the  beaches  and  through  the  German 
coastal  defensive  shell. 

Opening  the  Exits 

While  the  ordeal  of  the  gapping  teams 
was  still  in  progress,  a  second  phase  of 


' '  C>ol.  Paul  W.  Thompson,  "D-day  on  Omaha  Beach," 
Infantry  Journal,  LXI,  no.  6  (June  1945),  34-48; 
Harrison,  Cross-Channel  Attack,  p.  315;  War  Dept,  Hist 
Div,  Oma/m  Beachhead,  pp.  45—47. 


THE  LANDINGS  ON  OMAHA  AND  UTAH 


327 


engineer  operations  on  OMAHA  began 
with  the  arrival  of  the  first  elements  of 
the  5th  Engineer  Special  Brigade.  These 
units  were  charged  with  bringing  some 
order  out  of  the  chaos  of  the  invasion 
beaches.  For  the  purpose  some  engi- 
neer combat  battalions  became  the  core 
units  for  beach  groups,  which  included 
a  DUKW  company,  quartermaster  units 
for  gasoline  and  other  supply,  a  medi- 
cal detachment,  ordnance  ammunition, 
maintenance,  and  bomb  disposal  units, 
and  an  assortment  of  signal,  chemical, 
and  military  police  companies.  A  com- 
pany from  a  naval  beach  battalion  com- 
pleted the  organization  to  assist  in  struc- 
turing the  beaches  for  supply  opera- 
tions. Four  groups  had  assignments  on 
Omaha  for  D-day.  The  37th  Engineer 
Battalion  Beach  Group  supported  the 
16th  Regimental  Combat  Team,  1st 
Division,  and  the  149th  was  behind  the 
1 16th  Infantry.  The  348th  was  to  facili- 
tate the  landing  of  the  18th  Infantry, 
following  the  16th  on  the  eastern  end 
of  the  beach.  The  336th  Engineer  Bat- 
talion Beach  Group  was  scheduled  to 
arrive  in  the  afternoon  to  organize  Fox 
Red.  All  the  groups  were  under  5th 
Engineer  Special  Brigade  control  until 
the  assault  phase  was  over;  the  149th 
Engineer  Battalion  Beach  Group  would 
then  revert  to  the  6th  Brigade.'^ 

The  earliest  elements  stepped  into 
the  same  fire  that  cut  up  the  gapping 
teams.  First  in  was  a  reconnaissance 
party  from  Company  A,  37th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion,  led  by  the  company 
commander;  it  landed  at  0700,  ten  min- 
utes ahead  of  schedule,  opposite  the 
E— 3  draw  on  Fox  Green.  Sections  of 
the  remainder  of  Company  A  and  a 


platoon  of  Company  C,  accompanying 
a  headquarters  group,  arrived  over  the 
next  several  minutes,  but  the  entire 
complement  of  the  battalion's  men 
wound  up  hugging  the  shingle  bank  and 
helping  to  build  up  the  fire  line.  Another 
engineer  section,  this  one  from  Com- 
pany C,  149th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion, scheduled  for  landing  on  Dog 
Red,  landed  on  Easy  Green.  They  set 
to  work  there,  and  a  small  detachment 
began  digging  a  path  through  the  dune 
line  to  the  road  paralleling  the  shore. 
A  second  detail  wormed  its  way  through 
gaps  cut  in  the  barbed  wire  and  ap- 
proached the  base  of  the  cliffs,  only  to 
be  halted  by  an  antitank  ditch.  Enemy 
fire  forced  the  group  back  to  the  shin- 
gle line.  Two  companies  from  the  147th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  suffered 
forty-five  men  lost  to  artillery  fire  even 
before  their  LCT  set  them  down  off 
Dog  White  at  0710.  In  the  five-foot  surf 
they  lost  or  jettisoned  their  equipment 
and  found  shelter  after  a  harrowing 
run  for  the  shingle.'^  An  LCI  put  Com- 
pany B,  37th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion, ashore  safely  at  0730  at  Exit 
E—  1,  leading  to  St.  Laurent,  which  the 
battalion  was  supposed  to  open  for  the 
2d  Battalion  of  the  16th  Infantry.  Com- 
pany A  was  to  open  Exit  E— 3  for  the 
3d  Battalion  but  did  not  arrive  until 
0930.  Landing  near  E— 1,  Company  A 
had  to  make  its  way  through  the  wreck- 
age on  the  beach  to  E— 3,  where  the 
unit  ran  into  such  withering  artillery, 
mortar,  and  small-arms  fire  that  it  could 
accomplish  little  all  day.  Unluckiest  of 
all  was  Company  C,  which  was  to  push 
inland  and  set  up  transit  areas.  A  direct 
hit  to  its  LCI  on  landing  at  Exit  E— 1 
killed  many  men.  In  the  same  area  one 


Operation  Rpt  Nfitune,  p.  37. 


'•'  Ibid.,  p.  87. 


328 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


of  two  LCIs  carrying  the  battalion  staff 
broached  on  a  stake;  the  men  had  to 
drop  off  into  neck-deep  water  and  wade 
ashore  under  machine-gun  fire.'^  Com- 
ing in  with  the  fifth  wave,  they  had 
expected  to  find  OMAHA  free  of  small- 
arms  fire.  Instead,  the  beach  was 
crowded  with  the  men  of  the  first  waves 
crouching  behind  the  shingle.  Deadly 
accurate  artillery  fire  was  still  hitting 
the  landing  craft,  tanks,  and  half-tracks 
lining  the  water's  edge;  one  mortar  shell 
killed  the  commander  of  the  37th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion,  Lt.  Col.  Lionel 
F.  Smith,  and  two  members  of  his  staff, 
Capts.  Paul  F.  Harkleroad  and  Allen 
H.  Cox,  Jr.,  as  soon  as  they  landed. 
Badly  shaken,  the  engineers  joined  the 
infantrymen  behind  the  shingle  bank. 

By  0930,  infantry  penetrations  of  the 
German  positions  above  the  beach  were 
beginning  to  have  some  effect,  though 
only  a  few  men  were  scaling  the  heights. 
Rangers  and  elements  of  the  116th 
Infantry  got  astride  the  high  ground 
between  Exits  D-1  and  D-3  around 
0800  and  slowly  eliminated  some  of  the 
automatic  weapons  trained  on  Ameri- 
can troops  below.  Between  St.  Laurent 
and  Colleville,  companies  from  both 
regiments  got  men  on  the  heights.  One 
company  raked  the  German  trenches 
in  the  E— 1  draw,  capturing  twenty-one 
Germans  before  moving  farther  inland. 
In  the  F—  1  draw  back  of  Fox  Red,  most 
coordinated  resistance  ended  by  0900, 
but  isolated  nests  of  Germans  remained. 
The  movement  continued  all  morning, 
and  the  engineers  either  joined  attempts 
to  scale  the  bluffs  or  made  it  possible 
for  others  to  climb. 

Beyond  the  shingle  on  Easy  Green 


and  Easy  Red  were  a  double-apron 
barbed-wire  fence  and  minefields  cov- 
ering the  sands  to  the  bluffs.  As  the 
infantry  advances  began  to  take  a  toll 
of  the  German  defenders  on  the  bluffs, 
Sgt.  Zolton  Simon,  a  squad  leader  in 
Company  C,  37th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion,  gathered  his  five-man  mine- 
detector  crew,  cut  a  gap  in  the  wire, 
and  led  his  men  into  the  minefield.  Dis- 
regarding the  fire,  they  methodically 
opened  and  marked  a  narrow  path 
across  the  mined  area,  into  a  small 
defile,  and  up  the  hill.  Simon  was 
wounded  once  while  helping  to  sweep 
mines  and  again  when  he  reached  the 
hilltop,  this  time  so  seriously  that  he 
was  out  of  action.  By  now,  infantry  was 
on  the  trail  behind  him,  urged  into  the 
gap  by  1st  Lt.  Charles  Peckham  of  Com- 
pany B,  who  stood  exposed  to  enemy 
fire  directing  men  across  the  mine- 
swept  corridor.'^ 

The  task  remained  of  getting  the 
tanks  inland.  A  platoon  of  the  20th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  landing  in 
support  of  the  1st  Battalion,  16th  In- 
fantry, began  blowing  a  larger  gap 
through  the  minefield  with  bangalore 
torpedoes.  Mine-detector  crews  of  Com- 
pany C  of  the  37th  Engineer  Battalion 
followed  to  widen  the  lanes  to  accom- 
modate vehicles.  But  the  tanks  could 
not  get  past  the  shingle,  where  they 
could  get  no  traction.  Behind  the  shin- 
gle lay  a  deep  antitank  ditch.  Pvt.  Vinton 
Dove,  a  bulldozer  operator  of  Company 
C,  made  the  first  efforts  to  overcome 
these  obstacles,  assisted  by  his  relief 
operator,  Pvt.  William  J.  Shoemaker, 
who  alternated  with  him  in  driving  and 
guiding  the  bulldozer.  Dove  cleared  a 


"'  Hist  37th  Engr  C  Bn,  Mar  43-Aug  44. 


' '  Ibid.  Simon  received  the  Silver  Star,  Peckham  the 
Bronze  Star. 


THE  LANDINGS  ON  OMAHA  AND  UTAH 


329 


Engineers  Anchor  Reinforced  Track /or  vehicles  coming  ashore  at  Omaha. 


road  through  the  shingle,  pulled  out 
roadblocks  at  Exit  E— 1,  and  began 
working  on  the  antitank  ditch,  which 
was  soon  filled  with  the  help  of  dozer 
operators  from  Company  B  and  a  com- 
pany of  the  149th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion  that  had  landed  near  E—  1  by 
mistake.  The  pioneer  efforts  of  Dove 
and  Shoemaker  in  the  face  of  severe 
enemy  fire,  which  singled  out  the  bull- 
dozer as  a  prime  target,  won  for  both 
men  the  Distinguished  Service  Cross. '^ 
Company  C's  1st  Lt.  Robert  P.  Ross 
won  the  third  of  the  three  Distinguished 
Service  Crosses  awarded  to  men  of  the 


37th  on  D-day  for  his  contribution  to 
silencing  the  heavy  fire  coming  from  a 
hill  overlooking  Exit  E— 1.  Assuming 
command  of  a  leaderless  infantry  com- 
pany, Ross  took  the  infantrymen,  along 
with  his  own  engineer  platoon,  up  the 
slopes  to  the  crest,  where  the  troops 
engaged  the  enemy,  killed  forty  Ger- 
mans, and  forced  the  surrender  of  two 
machine-gun  emplacements.  '^  Cleared 
fairly  early,  the  E-1  exit  became  the 
principal  egress  from  OMAHA  Beach 
on  D-day,  largely  due  to  the  exertions 
of  the  37th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion. 
The  unit  suffered  the  heaviest  casual- 
ties among  the  components  of  the  5th 


"*  Hist  2()th  Engr  C  Bn,  Jun  44;  Operation  Rpt 
NK.n  LINK,  pp.  87,  92;  Recommendations  for  Awards, 
5lh  ESB,  Aug-Oct  44. 


'"  Hist  37th  Engr  C  Bn. 


330 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Engineer  Special  Brigade — twenty- 
four  men  killed,  including  the  battal- 
ion commander. 

Exit  E— 3  yielded  only  slowly  to  the 
persistence  of  the  engineer  troops  in 
the  area,  including  Company  A,  37th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion.  Still  under 
accurate  if  intermittent  artillery  fire 
around  1630,  the  beach  remained  un- 
marked for  incoming  boat  traffic,  as 
the  shelling  tore  down  the  signposts  as 
soon  as  they  were  erected.  By  1700  the 
348th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  had 
cleared  the  lateral  road  along  the  beach 
of  mines,  and  the  members  of  both  bat- 
talions moved  to  the  base  of  the  uplands 
to  begin  work  in  the  draw,  already 
choked  with  wrecked  American  tanks 
and  half-tracks.  Night  drew  on  as  the 
men  opened  the  road  leading  up  from 
the  beach.  A  particularly  troublesome 
88-mm.  gun  interfered  with  their  work 
until  dark,  and  Capt.  Louis  J.  Drnovich, 
commanding  Company  A,  37th  Engi- 
neers, determined  that  he  "would  get 
that  gun  or  else."  Taking  only  his  car- 
bine and  a  few  grenades,  he  set  off  up 
the  hill.  His  body  was  found  three  days 
later  a  short  distance  from  where  he 
had  started.  The  exit  carried  its  first 
tank  traffic  over  the  hill  to  Colleville  at 
0100  on  D  plus  1,  but  trucks  could  not 
negotiate  the  road  until  morning.^" 

By  that  time,  tanks  were  moving  to 
Colleville  through  Exit  F— 1,  eastern- 
most in  the  16th  Infantry's  sector  and 
close  to  bluffs  dominating  Fox  Red. 
This  was  the  sector  where  many  troops 
of  the  first  assault  waves,  including 
some  of  the  1 16th  Regimental  Combat 
Team,  had  landed  as  a  result  of  the 
easterly  tidal  current.  The  task  of  open- 


ing Exit  F—  1  belonged  to  the  336th 
Engineer  Battalion  Beach  Group,  which 
was  scheduled  to  land  after  1200  on 
D-day  at  Easy  Red  near  E  — 3  and  then 
march  east  to  Fox  Red.  Some  of  the 
advance  elements  went  ashore  on  E  — 3 
at  1315  and  made  their  way  toward 
their  objective  through  wreckage  on  the 
beach,  falling  flat  when  enemy  fire 
came  in  and  running  during  the  lulls. '^' 

Heavy  enemy  fire  drove  away  two 
LCTs  carrying  three  platoons  of  Com- 
pany C,  and  the  platoons  landed  at  the 
end  of  Omaha  farthest  from  the  Fox 
beaches.  An  artillery  shell  hit  one  LCT; 
the  other  struck  a  sandbar.  Both  finally 
grounded  off  the  Dog  beaches  between 
Les  Moulins  and  Vierville — the  most 
strongly  fortified  part  of  OMAHA,  where 
stone-walled  summer  villas  afforded 
protection  to  German  machine  gunners 
and  snipers  and  the  cliffs  at  the  west- 
ward end  at  Pointe  de  la  Percee  pro- 
vided excellent  observation  points  for 
artillery  positions  behind  the  two  re- 
sorts. This  was  the  area  of  the  116th 
Regimental  Combat  Team,  whose  engi- 
neer combat  battalions — the  112th, 
121st,  and  147th — suffered  severely 
during  the  landings. 

Survivors  of  the  first  sections  of  the 
147th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  to 
come  in  on  Dog  White  at  0710  joined 
infantrymen  in  the  fight  for  Vierville 
or  climbed  the  cliffs  with  the  Rangers. 
At  midmorning  the  battalion  comman- 
der, concerned  about  a  growing  con- 
gestion of  tanks  and  vehicles  on  Dog 
Green,  ordered  all  his  units  to  concen- 
trate on  blowing  open  Exit  D—  1 ,  blocked 
by  a  concrete  revetment.  They  set  to 
work,  collecting  explosives  from  dead 
bodies  and  wrecked  yessels,  and  with 


'^"  Operation  Rpt  Neki  line,  p.  101 ;  De  Arman,  Hist 
5th  ESB.  Drnovich  was  awarded  the  Silver  Star  post- 
humously. 


Hist  336th  Engr  C  Bn,  25  Jul  42-31  Aug  44. 


THE  LANDINGS  ON  OMAHA  AND  UTAH 


331 


the  help  of  men  of  the  121st  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion,  who  had  mislanded 
on  Easy  Green  and  had  made  their  way 
to  Dog  Green,  were  able  to  open  the 
exit,  but  it  was  not  fully  usable  until 
2100.  At  Exit  D-3,  the  Les  Moulins 
draw  between  Dog  Red  and  Easy  Green, 
the  11 2th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion 
commander  was  killed  early  on  D-day, 
and  the  men  were  pinned  down  by 
enemy  fire  behind  a  seawall.  Even  with 
the  assistance  of  a  platoon  of  the  147th, 
which  came  in  with  most  of  its  equip- 
ment during  the  day,  the  1 12th  Battal- 
ion was  not  able  to  open  Exit  D— 3  until 
2000.'-^'-^ 

Wading  ashore  at  Dog  Green  about 
1500,  troops  of  the  336th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  assembled  at  the  shin- 
gle bank  and  began  a  hazardous  march 
toward  Fox  Red,  more  than  two  miles 
away.  The  unit  moved  in  a  long  irregu- 
lar column,  followed  by  a  D  — 7  tractor 
that  towed  an  Athey  trailer  loaded  with 
explosives.  As  the  battalion  made  its  way 
around  bodies  and  wreckage  through 
smoke  and  gunfire,  it  witnessed  the 
awful  panorama  of  D-day  on  OMAHA. 
Artillery  fire  had  decreased  at  Exit  D—  1 
after  destroyers  knocked  out  a  strong- 
point  on  Pointe  de  la  Percee  about 
noon.  It  grew  heavier  as  engineers 
approached  Exit  D  — 3,  several  times 
narrowly  missing  the  explosive-laden 
trailer.  At  E—  1  the  fire  let  up,  but  con- 
gestion on  the  beach  increased.  Bull- 
dozers were  clearing  a  road  through 
the  shingle  embankment,  and  the  beach 
flat  was  jammed  with  vehicles  waiting 
to  join  a  line  moving  up  the  hill  toward 
St.  Laurent.  DUKWs  with  105-mm. 
howitzers  were  beginning  to  come  in; 


'^'^  Hists,  147th  Engr  C  Bn,  29  Jan  43-4  Mar  46; 
121st,  1  Jun-31  Aug  44;  and  112th,  1944. 


the  first  (and  only)  artillery  mission  of 
the  day  from  the  beach  was  fired  at 
1615  against  a  machine-gun  nest  near 
Colleville. 

The  worst  spot  they  encountered  on 
the  beach  was  at  Exit  E-3,  still  under 
fire  as  they  passed.  There  the  336th 
Battalion's  column  ran  into  such  heavy 
machine-gun  fire  and  artillery  shelling 
that  the  unit  had  to  halt.  The  com- 
mander sent  the  men  forward  two  at  a 
time;  when  about  half  had  gone  through 
the  area,  a  shell  hit  a  bulldozer  working 
at  the  shingle  bank.  The  dozer  began 
to  burn,  sending  up  clouds  of  smoke 
that  covered  the  gap  and  enabled  the 
rest  of  the  men  to  dash  across.  As  the 
troops  proceeded  down  the  beach,  they 
saw  a  tank  nose  over  the  dune  line  and 
fire  about  twenty-five  rounds  at  a  Ger- 
man machine-gun  emplacement,  knock- 
ing it  out;  but  artillery  barrages  contin- 
ued hitting  the  beach  in  front  of  E  — 3 
every  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes. 

At  the  end  of  its  "memorable  and 
terrible"  march  across  OMAHA,  during 
which  two  men  were  killed  by  shell  frag- 
ments and  twenty-seven  were  injured, 
the  engineer  column  reached  the  com- 
parative safety  of  the  F—  1  area  at  1700. 
The  surrounding  hills  had  been  cleared 
of  machine-gUn  nests,  and  although 
enemy  artillery  was  able  to  reach  the 
tidal  flat,  it  could  not  hit  the  beach.  The 
first  job  was  mine  clearance:  the  area 
was  still  so  heavily  mined  that  several 
tanks,  one  of  them  equipped  with  a 
dozer  blade,  could  not  get  off  the  beach. 
The  men  had  only  one  mine  detector 
but  were  able  to  assemble  several  more 
from  damaged  detectors  the  infantry 
had  left  on  the  beach.  More  were  sal- 
vaged when  the  last  elements  of  the  bat- 
talion came  in  from  Dog  Green  around 
1730.  After  they  had  cleared  the  fields 


332 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


near  the  beach  of  mines  and  a  tank- 
dozer  had  filled  in  an  antitank  ditch, 
the  teams  began  to  work  up  a  hill  with 
a  tractor  following,  opening  the  F—  1 
exit.  Tanks  began  climbing  the  hill  at 
2000;  two  struck  mines,  halting  the 
movement  for  about  an  hour,  but  by 
2230  fifteen  tanks  had  passed  through 
the  exit  to  the  Colleville  area  to  help 
the  infantry  clear  the  town.*^^ 

Brig.  Gen.  William  M.  Hoge,  com- 
manding general  of  the  Provisional 
Engineer  Special  Brigade  Group,  had 
landed  at  Exit  E-1  shortly  after  1500 
and  had  set  up  a  command  post  in  a 
concrete  pillbox  just  west  of  the  exit; 
from  there  he  assumed  engineer  com- 
mand responsibility  from  the  5th  Engi- 
neer Special  Brigade  commander.  Col. 
Doswell  Gullatt.  As  units  of  the  6th 
Engineer  Special  Brigade  reverted  to 
that  unit,  additional  infantry  units  were 
landing  to  support  the  116th  and  the 
16th  Infantry.  The  115th,  ahead  of 
schedule  and  also  carried  eastward, 
landed  in  the  middle  of  the  18th  In- 
fantry, east  of  the  St.  Laurent  draw. 
This  produced  some  confusion,  but  the 
new  strength  swelled  the  advance  mov- 
ing slowly  off  the  beaches  by  evening. 
In  the  morning  of  D  plus  1  vehicular 
traffic,  infantry,  and  engineers  alike 
were  moving  through  the  exits,  off  the 
beaches,  and  over  the  hills.  By  that  time 
the  4th  Infantry  Division  of  Force  U 
had  penetrated  the  German  defenses 
some  ten  miles  to  the  west  at  UTAH 
Beach.'-^^ 

Utah 
As  the  first  assault  elements  transfer- 


'•^'  Hist  336ih  Engr  C  Bii,  25  Jul  42-31  Aug  44; 
Operation  Rpt  Nkim unk,  pp.  98-  lOO;  War  Dept,  Hist 
Div,  Omaha  Beachhead,  pp.  101—06. 

'•^^  Operation  Rpt  Neki  UNE,  pp.  96,  102-03. 


red  into  landing  craft  a  dozen  miles  off 
Utah,  alarmed  German  local  com- 
manders were  trying  to  fathom  the 
intentions  and  to  gauge  the  strength  of 
the  paratroopers  that  had  dropped  into 
their  midst  around  0130.  Separated  in 
the  cloud  cover  over  the  Cotentin  pen- 
insula while  evading  German  antiair- 
craft fire,  the  transport  aircraft  headed 
for  partially  marked  drop  zones  astride 
the  Merderet  River  and  the  area  be- 
tween Ste.  Mere-Eglise  and  UTAH  itself. 
Scattered  widely  in  the  drop,  the  troop- 
ers of  the  82d  and  101st  Airborne  Divi- 
sions struggled  to  concentrate  their 
strength  and  find  their  objectives.  The 
82d  had  one  regiment  fairly  consoli- 
dated from  the  start  east  of  the  Mer- 
deret. The  division  took  the  town  of 
Ste.  Mere-Eglise  with  mixed  contin- 
gents, some  troops  from  the  101st  work- 
ing with  the  82d  even  as  glider-borne 
reinforcements  came  in  shortly  before 
dawn.  The  101st  Airborne  Division, 
equally  dispersed,  managed  to  mass 
enough  of  its  own  men  and  troopers  of 
the  82d  who  fell  into  its  area  of  respon- 
sibility to  secure  the  western  edges  of 
the  inundated  land  behind  UTAH  and 
the  all-important  causeway  entrances 
on  that  side  of  the  German  beach  de- 
fenses. With  German  strength  threat- 
ening the  landing  zone  from  across  the 
Douve  River  to  the  south,  the  para- 
troopers could  not  muster  enough  men 
to  control  or  destroy  all  the  bridges 
across  the  river.  Engineers  of  Company 
C,  326th  Airborne  Engineer  Battalion, 
rigged  some  for  destruction,  and  small 
groups  held  out  nearly  all  of  D-day  in 
the  face  of  German  units  south  of  the 
stream,  awaiting  relief  by  other  air- 
borne units  or  by  the  main  body  of  the 
invasion.  Their  losses  and  their  disorga- 
nization notwithstanding,  the  para- 
troops had  thoroughly  confused  the 


THE  LANDINGS  ON  OMAHA  AND  UTAH 


333 


German  defenders  and  engaged  their 
reserves,  especially  the  veterans  of  the 
91st  Division,  far  from  the  beaches. ^^ 

Compared  with  OMAHA,  UTAH  was 
practically  a  walkover.  Owing  to  the 
smoke  of  the  prelanding  bombardment 
and  the  loss  of  two  small  Navy  control 
vessels  marking  the  line  of  departure 
off  the  beach,  the  entire  first  wave  of 
the  8th  Infantry's  assault  grounded 
2,000  yards  south  of  its  intended  land- 
fall. The  operation  of  UTAH  shifted  to 
the  left  of  the  original  beaches,  fortu- 
itously striking  a  shoreline  far  less  heav- 
ily defended  and  with  much  sparser 
obstacle  belts  than  expected.  {Map  17) 

Engineer  demolitions  were  to  begin 
at  0635,  five  minutes  after  the  infantry 
landing.  The  teams  involved  were  un- 
der an  ad  hoc  Beach  Obstacle  Demoli- 
tion Party  commanded  by  Maj.  Her- 
schel  E.  Linn,  also  the  commanding 
officer  of  the  237th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion.  Underwater  obstacles  above 
the  low  tide  line  were  the  targets  of  the 
first  demolition  units,  eight  sixteen-man 
naval  teams,  each  including  five  Army 
engineers.  Eight  of  the  twelve  available 
26-man  Army  demolition  teams  were 
to  land  ten  minutes  later,  directly  be- 
hind eight  LCTs  carrying  the  dozer 
tanks  to  be  used  on  the  beach.  Navy 
and  Army  teams  were  to  clear  eight 
fifty-yard  gaps  through  the  beach  ob- 
structions for  the  subsequent  waves, 
and  the  fourth  and  fifth  waves  of  the 
assault  would  bring  in  the  remainder 
of  the  engineers  to  help  clear  the  area 
as  necessary.  Linn  and  his  executive 
officer,  Capt.  Robert  P.  Tabb,  Jr.,  plan- 
ned to  supervise  the  beach  operations 
from  their  M  — 29  Weasels,  small  tracked 


cargo  vehicles  capable  of  negotiating 
sand  and  surf.^^ 

The  plan  came  apart  immediately. 
Army  and  Navy  teams  landed  almost 
simultaneously  between  0635  and  0645. 
On  the  run  to  the  beach.  Major  Linn's 
craft  was  sunk  off  Uncle  Red;  he  did 
not  arrive  ashore  until  the  following 
day.  Captain  Tabb,  now  in  command, 
drove  his  Weasel  off  the  LCT  on  Tare 
Green  and  felt  it  sink  beneath  him.  He 
salvaged  the  radio  after  getting  the  crew 
out  and  made  for  the  beach,  where  he 
encountered  Brig.  Gen.  Theodore  Roo- 
sevelt, Jr.,  assistant  commander  of  the 
4th  Infantry  Division,  walking  up  and 
down  the  seawall  back  of  UTAH  and 
directing  operations.  At  the  time  enemy 
fire  was  so  much  lighter  than  expected 
that  the  landing  seemed  to  Tabb  almost 
an  anticlimax.  Except  for  six  Army 
engineers,  who  were  killed  when  a  shell 
hit  their  LCM  just  as  the  ramp  dropped, 
all  the  demolition  men  got  ashore  safely 
and  immediately  began  to  blast  gaps  in 
the  obstacles.  About  half  were  steel  and 
concrete  stakes,  some  with  mines  at- 
tached to  the  top;  the  rest  were  mostly 
hedgehogs  and  steel  tetrahedrons, 
with  only  a  few  Belgian  gates. ^^ 

The  four  Army  gapping  support 
teams  landed  on  the  northern  part  of 
Tare  Green  Beach  at  0645  after  a  har- 
rowing trip  from  the  transport  area. 
They  had  been  aboard  an  attack  trans- 
port with  the  commanding  officer  of 
the  1106th  Engineer  Combat  Group, 
Col.  Thomas  DeF.  Rogers.  Rogers  dis- 
covered at  the  last  minute  that  no  provi- 


"' '  Depl  of  the  Army,  Hist  Div,  Utah  Beach  to  (Cher- 
bourg, pp.  14—42;  (Chester  Wilniot,  The  Struggle  for 
Europe  (New  York:  Harper,  19.52),  p.  245. 


-"•  Dept  of  the  Army,  Hist  Div,  Utah  Beach  to  Cher- 
bourg, p.  47;  Engr  Opns  VII  (jorps,  vol.  II,  "Nor- 
mandy," pp.  9- 10;  Hist  1  l()6th  Engr(;(ip,Jun-Dec 
44;  Jnl,  237th  Engr  C  Bn,  jun  44;  Interv,  Capt  Roland 
(i.  iiuppenthal  with  Maj  Robert  P.  Tabb,  Jr.,  6  Sep 
44,  ML  1032,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 

^'  Interv,  Tabb,  6  Sep  44. 


334 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


sion  had  been  made  for  getting  the 
reserve  teams  ashore,  and  he  arranged 
with  the  ship's  commander  to  load  the 
whole  party  of  ninety-three  men,  with 
explosives,  into  a  single  LCM.  Rogers 
went  along  in  the  dangerously  over- 
loaded craft,  proceeding  shoreward  at 
full  speed.  Landing  in  an  area  where 
no  gap  had  been  blown,  he  got  the  men 
to  work  and  then  walked  southward 
down  the  beach  to  inspect  the  work  the 
leading  teams  were  doing.  The  Army 
and  Navy  teams  had  partly  blown  fifty- 
yard  gaps,  which  Rogers  instructed 
them  to  widen  to  accommodate  the 
landing  craft  bunching  up  offshore.  He 
saw  two  tankdozers  in  use  but  observed 
that  gaps  were  cleared  mainly  by  hand- 
placed  charges  connected  with  prima- 
cord. 

The  work  went  on  under  artillery  fire 
that  increased  at  both  the  southern  and 
northern  gaps  after  H-hour.  Rogers 
and  others  were  deeply  impressed  by 
the  heroism  of  the  men,  but  casualties 
were  light  compared  to  those  on  OMA- 
HA. The  Army  teams  had  6  men  killed, 
39  wounded;  the  Navy  teams,  4  killed 
and  1 1  wounded.  The  initial  gaps  were 
cleared  by  0715.  Then  the  demolition- 
ists  worked  northward,  widening  cleared 
areas  and  helping  demolish  a  seawall. 
By  0930  Utah  Beach  was  free  of  all 
obstacles.  The  Navy  teams  went  out  on 
the  flat  with  the  second  ebb  tide  and 
worked  unfil  nightfall  on  the  flanks  of 
the  beaches,  while  by.  noon  the  Army 
teams  were  ready  to  assist  the  assault 
engineers  in  opening  exit  roads. ^^ 


'■^^  Ltr,  Col  Thomas  DeF.  Rogers  to  Engr,  VII  Corps, 
23  Jun  44,  sub:  Report  on  Demolition  of  U  lAH  Beach 
Obstacles,  237th  Engr  C  Bnjnl,  1944;  Commo.  James 
E.  Arnold,  "NOIC  Ui  ah,"  United  States  Naval  Institute 
Proceedings,  LXXIII  (June  1947),  675;  Hist  1st  ESB 
(Utah),  sec.  VII,  p.  67;  Interv,  Tabb,  6  Sep  44. 


While  the  demolitionists  were  blow- 
ing the  obstacles.  Companies  A  and  C 
of  the  237th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion, which  had  landed  with  the  8th 
Infantry  at  H-hour,  were  blowing  gaps 
in  the  seawall,  removing  wire,  and  clear- 
ing paths  through  sand  dunes  beyond. 
For  these  tasks  the  two  companies  had 
bangalore  torpedoes,  mine  detectors, 
explosives,  pioneer  tools,  and  markers. 
Later  in  the  morning  they  received 
equipment  to  bulldoze  roads  across  the 
dunes. "^^ 

Beyond  the  dunes  was  the  water  bar- 
rier, running  a  mile  or  so  inland  from 
Quineville  on  the  north  to  Pouppeville 
on  the  south,  which  the  Germans  had 
created  by  reversing  the  action  of  the 
locks  that  the  French  had  constructed 
to  convert  salt  marshes  into  pasture- 
land.  Seven  causeways  crossed  the  wet 
area  in  the  region  of  the  UTAH  landings 
to  connect  the  beach  with  a  north-south 
inland  road.  Not  all  the  causeways  were 
usable  on  D-day.  Most  were  under  water; 
the  northernmost,  although  dry,  was 
too  close  to  German  artillery.  The  best 
exits  were  at  or  near  the  area  where 
the  troops  had  landed — another  stroke 
of  good  fortune.  Exit  T— 5,  just  north 
of  Tare  Green  Beach,  was  flooded  but 
had  a  hard  surface  and  was  used  dur- 
ing the  night  of  D-day.  Exit  U  — 5  at 
Uncle  Red  was  above  water  for  its  entire 
length  and  became  the  first  route  in- 
land, leading  to  the  village  of  Ste. 
Marie-du-Mont.  South  of  U  — 5,  some 
distance  down  the  coast  near  Pouppe- 
ville and  the  Douve  River,  lay  the  third 
road  used  on  D-day,  Exit  V— 1.  Al- 
though in  poor  condition,  the  road  was 
almost  completely  dry.^° 


'^■'  Interv,  Tabb,  6  Sep  44. 

•^"  EngrOpns  VllCorps,  vol.  1 1,  "Normandy,"  p.  12; 
1st  ESB  (UiAH),  p.  52. 


^Crisbecq 

Taret  de  Ravenoville. 


UTAH  BEACH 

June  1944 


2  Miles 


0  1  2  Kilor 


Azeville 


Ravenoville^^ 

Ham  el  de  Cruttes" 

,  Foucarville  \  y'^O    « 

Exit  4^  -^^Y       ''^-'^^ 

Beuzeville-au-Plain  \       ^St  Martin-de-Varreville      % 


I?- 


Sfe  Mere-Eglise 


Turqueville 


La  Madeleine 


Exit  3 
Audouville-la-Hubert 


Les  Forges 


HIesville 


Pouppeville 


Ste  Marie-du-Mont 


Vierville 


St  Come-du-Mont 


0^ 


^■P 


,, CARENTAN 


Le  Port 


MAP  17 


336 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Teller  Mine  Atop  a  Stake  emplaced  to 
impale  landing  craft  on  Utah  Beach. 


At  the  entrance  to  Exit  U  — 5  the  Ger- 
mans had  emplaced  two  Belgian  gates. 
Company  A,  237th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion,  blew  them  and  also  picked 
up  several  prisoners  from  pillboxes 
along  the  seawall.  Then  the  engineers 
accompanied  the  3d  Battalion,  8th  In- 
fantry, inland  along  Exit  U  — 5.  Half- 
way across  the  causeway  they  found  that 
the  Germans  had  blown  a  concrete  cul- 
vert over  a  small  stream.  The  column 
forded  the  stream  and  proceeded,  leav- 
ing Captain  Tabb  to  deal  with  the 
culvert.  He  brought  up  a  bridge  truck 
and  a  platoon  of  Company  B  to  begin 
constructing  a  thirty-foot  treadway 
bridge — the  first  bridge  built  in  the 


Utah  bridgehead.  Men  of  the  238th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  who  had 
landed  around  1000  with  the  main 
body  of  the  1106th  Engineer  Combat 
Group,  helped.  By  1435,  Exit  U  — 5  was 
open  to  traffic. "*' 

Two  companies  of  the  49th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion,  also  landing  with  the 
1106th  in  midmorning,  accompanied 
the  2d  Battalion,  8th  Infantry,  on  its 
march  south  to  Pouppeville.  The  engi- 
neers were  to  work  on  Exit  V— 1  lead- 
ing from  the  beach  through  Pouppe- 
ville to  the  north-south  inland  road, 
while  infantry  was  to  make  contact  with 
the  101st  Airborne  Division,  protect- 
ing the  southern  flank  of  VII  Corps. 
Company  G  of  the  8th  Infantry  also 
had  the  mission  of  capturing  the  sluice 
gates  or  locks  southeast  of  Pouppe- 
ville that  the  Germans  had  manipulated 
to  flood  the  pastureland  behind  Tare 
Green  and  Uncle  Red  beaches.  An  en- 
emy strongpoint  still  farther  south  at 
Le  Grand  Vey  protected  the  locks. "'^ 

While  Company  E  of  the  8th  Infan- 
try moved  down  the  road  along  the 
eastern  edge  of  the  mundations,  Com- 
pany G  hugged  the  seawall.  All  the  way 
down  the  coast  the  two  companies  en- 
countered continuous  small-arms  fire, 
and  Company  G  met  artillery  fire  from 
a  strongpoint  on  the  seaward  side  about 
halfway  down.  At  a  road  junction  north- 
east of  Pouppeville,  the  infantry  battal- 
ion assembled  and  advanced  to  the 
village,  where  shortly  after  noon  occur- 
red the  first  meeting  of  seaborne  and 
airborne  troops  on  D-day. 


"  Inteiv, Tabb, 6 Sep44;Hist.s, 238th and 237th Engr 
C  Bns  and  1  l()6th  Engr  C  Gp. 

'■-  Hist  1  106th  Engr  C  (ip,  Jun-Dec  44;  Lst  ESB 
(U  lAM),  p.  65;  Dept  of  the  Army.  Hist  Div,  Utah  Beach 
to  Cherbourg,  map  8. 


THE  LANDINGS  ON  OMAHA  AND  UTAH 


337 


During  the  probe  to  Pouppeville  the 
infantrymen  bypassed  the  sluice  gates. 
But  Company  A  of  the  49th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  moved  south,  secured 
the  locks,  took  twenty-eight  prisoners, 
and  dug  in  to  protect  the  locks  from 
recapture.  Next  day  the  company  over- 
came the  German  strongpoint  at  Le 
Grand  Vey,  capturing  fifty-nine  pris- 
oners, seventeen  tons  of  ammunition, 
large  quantities  of  small  arms,  and  three 
artillery  pieces,  which  the  engineers 
used  to  reinforce  their  defenses.  Dur- 
ing the  next  few  days,  with  the  aid  of  a 
platoon  of  Company  B,  Company  A 
continued  to  hold  its  position,  protect- 
ing the  south  flank  of  the  beachhead 
and  operating  the  locks  to  drain  the 
water  barrier.  '^ 

Except  for  the  49th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion,  which  bivouacked  near 
Pouppeville,  all  elements  of  the  1 106th 
Engineer  Combat  Group  including  the 
beach  obstacle  demolitionists  went  into 
bivouac  on  the  night  of  D-day  at  Pont- 
Hebert,  a  village  on  the  north-south 
inland  road  about  halfway  between 
causeways  U  — 5  and  V—  1.  Total  D-day 
casualties  for  the  group  had  been  seven 
men  killed  and  fifty-four  wounded.  For 
a  few  days  work  on  the  exits  continued, 
but  the  next  major  task  for  the  group 
was  to  help  the  10 1st  Airborne  Divi- 
sion cross  the  Douve  River.  Improv- 
ing the  causeways,  clearing  and  devel- 
oping Tare  Green  and  Uncle  Red,  and 
opening  new  beaches  then  became  the 
responsibility  of  the  1st  Engineer  Spe- 
cial Brigade.'^ 

Wherl  Brig.  Gen.  James  E.  Wharton, 
commanding  the  1st  Engineer  Special 


Brigade,  landed  on  UTAH  at  0730  on 
D-day  he  found  his  deputy.  Col.  Eu- 
gene M.  Caffey,  already  on  the  beach. 
Not  scheduled  to  land  until  0900,  Caf- 
fey had  smuggled  himself,  with  no 
equipment  except  an  empty  rifle,  aboard 
an  8th  Infantry  landing  craft.  En  route 
he  managed  to  load  his  rifle  by  taking 
up  a  collection  of  one  bullet  each  from 
eight  infantrymen.  He  arrived  ashore 
very  early  in  the  assault  and  found  Gen- 
eral Roosevelt  in  a  huddle  with  infan- 
try battalion  commanders,  debating 
whether  to  bring  later  waves  in  on  the 
actual  place  of  landing  or  to  divert  them 
to  the  beaches  originally  planned.  Men 
of  the  8th  Infantry  were  already  mov- 
ing inland  on  Exit  U  — 5.  The  decision 
was  made.  "I'm  going  ahead  with  the 
troops,"  Roosevelt  told  Caffey.  "You  get 
word  to  the  Navy  to  bring  them  in. 
We're  sroine  to  start  the  war  from 
here."-^-^      ^ 

The  first  elements  of  the  1st  Engi- 
neer Special  Brigade  to  land  were  men 
of  the  1st  and  2d  Battalions,  531st  Engi- 
neer Shore  Regiment,  who  came  in 
about  the  same  time  as  Wharton.  They 
set  to  work  widening  gaps  the  combat 
engineers  had  blown  in  the  seawall, 
searching  out  mines,  improving  exits, 
and  undertaking  reconnaissance.  Be- 
cause one  of  the  main  tasks  of  the  engi- 
neer regiment  was  to  open  Sugar  Red, 
a  new  beach  to  the  north  of  Tare  Green, 
the  officers  reconnoitered  the  area,  and 
elements  of  the  2d  Battalion  partially 
cleared  it  in  preparation  for  its  com- 
plete clearance  and  operation  by  the 
3d  Battalion,  scheduled  to  arrive  on  the 
second  tide.  The  brigade  headquarters 


'■*  Hisls,  49th  Engl  C  Bn.  |un,  Jul,  Dec  44,  and 
1  KMith  Engr  (]  (ip,  Jun-Dec  44;  Depl  of  the  Army, 
Hist  Div,  Utah  Beach  to  Cherbourg,  p.  53. 

"  Hist  1  lOtith  Engl  C  (;p,  Jiin-Dec  44. 


'■''-'  1st  ESB  (UlAH),  p.  (i3;  Ryan,  The  Longest  Day,  pp. 
205,  233.  Ryan  based  his  account  on  an  interview  with 
Caffey. 


338 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Roads  LeaDINC;  off  the  Beaches  opened  by  engineers,  8  June  1944. 


was  ashore  by  noon,  and  at  1400  Whar- 
ton established  his  command  post  in  a 
German  pillbox  at  La  Grande  Dune,  a 
small  settlement  just  beyond  the  dune 
line  and  near  the  entrance  to  Exit  U  — 5. 
Less  than  half  of  the  road-building 
equipment  the  engineers  counted  on 
reached  shore  on  D-day.  Twelve  LCTs 
were  expected,  but  only  five  landed 
safely,  all  on  the  second  tide.  German 
shells  hit  three  of  the  remainder,  and 
the  other  four  were  delayed  until  D  plus 
1.  Many  engineer  vehicles  drowned  out 
when  they  dropped  into  water  too  deep; 
hauling  out  such  vehicles  of  all  services 
was  one  of  the  heaviest  engineer  tasks 
on  D-day,  and  a  good  deal  of  the  work 
had  to  be  done  under  artillery  fire. 


Artillery  accounted  for  most  of  the 
D-day  casualties  in  the  brigade — twenty- 
one  killed  and  ninety-six  wounded; 
strafing  by  enemy  planes,  which  came 
over  in  the  evening,  caused  most  of  the 
rest. 

By  nightfall  of  D-day  the  brigade 
engineers  had  opened  Sugar  Red,  and 
had  made  the  road  leading  inland  from 
it  (Exit  T  — 5)  passable  for  vehicles. 
They  had  cleared  beaches  of  wrecked 
vehicles  and  mines,  had  improved  the 
existing  lateral  beach  road  with  ches- 
paling  (wood  and  wire  matting),  and 
had  set  up  markers.  The  brigade's  mili- 
tary police  were  helping  traffic  move 
inland.  The  engineers  had  also  estab 
lished  dumps  for  ammunition  and  medi 


THE  LANDINGS  ON  OMAHA  AND  UTAH 


339 


cal  supplies  and  had  found  sites  for 
other  dumps  behind  the  beaches. '^'^ 

Despite  the  doubts  and  fears  of  the 
early  hours  on  OMAHA,  the  invasion 
was  successful.  To  be  sure,  the  troops 
were  nearly  everywhere  behind  sched- 
ule and  nowhere  near  their  objectives 
behind  OMAHA,  but  at  UTAH  the  entire 
4th  Division  got  ashore  within  fifteen 
hours  after  H-hour  with  20,000  men 
and  1,700  vehicles.  In  the  UTAH  area, 
the  fighting  remained  largely  concen- 
trated in  battalion-size  actions  and  scat- 
tered across  the  segments  of  French  ter- 
rain tenuously  held  by  American  air- 
borne units.  Nevertheless,  the  Allied 
forces  had  a  strong  grip  on  a  beach- 
head on  the  Continent,  and  German 


"'  1st  ESB  (Utah),  pp.  63-69;  Hist  531st  Engi 
Shore  Rgt,  6-17  jun  44. 


counterattacks  were  feeble  at  best.  The 
job  of  the  next  few  days  was  to  con- 
solidate the  flow  of  supply  across  the 
beaches  and  through  the  artificial  port 
complex  that  the  invasion  force  had 
brought  with  it  across  the  Channel. 
Despite  the  tragic  losses  among  the  gap- 
ping teams  and  the  collapse  of  their 
efforts  on  D-day,  the  Provisional  Engi- 
neer Special  Brigade  Group  by  D  plus 
1  had  provided  the  early  basis  for  the 
supply  organization  on  the  beaches  that 
would  operate  until  the  end  of  the  year. 
Backlogs  of  invasion  shipping  fed  by 
factors  beyond  the  engineers'  control  de- 
veloped immediately  off  both  beaches, 
and  the  limited  numbers  of  trucks  and 
DUKWs  available  affected  supply  move- 
ment just  behind  the  shore.  But  on 
balance,  the  engineers'  contribution  in 
ingenuity  and  blood  in  the  Normandy 
assault  was  immeasurable. 


CHAPTER  XVI 


Developing  Beaches  and 
Reconstructing  Ports 


Once  the  invasion  force  was  ashore 
the  engineers  of  the  Provisional  Engi- 
neer Special  Brigade  Group  entered 
upon  a  three-phased  schedule  for  or- 
ganizing beach  supply  operations.  The 
first  two  phases  were  tied  directly  to 
the  tactical  situation  since  they  involved 
setting  up  dumps  on  the  beaches  and 
later  moving  the  dumps  to  protected 
sites  as  much  as  four  miles  inland.  The 
last  phase  would  begin  with  the  comple- 
tion of  the  Mulberry,  an  artificial  har- 
bor to  be  made  of  sunken  blockships 
and  concrete  caissons  offshore,  provid- 
ing more  efficient  discharge  of  cargoes 
and  men  directly  from  pierhead  struc- 
tures to  the  beaches  at  OMAHA  via  float- 
ing roadways.  UTAH,  with  more  lim- 
ited constructed  facilities  serving  it, 
would  continue  to  receive  heavy  traffic 
in  men  and  materiel  from  lighters,  the 
various  landing  craft,  makeshift  Rhino 
ferries,  and  barges  plying  between  larger 
vessels  and  the  beach.  Gradually,  as  cap- 
tured ports  came  into  service,  the  logis- 
tic load  would  shift  there,  and  the  MUL- 
BERRY complex  would  close  down  before 
the  autumnal  storms  interfered  with  the 
operation.'  No  clear-cut  dividing  line 

'  Unless  otherwise  noted  the  following  is  based 
chiefly  on  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies. 
Volume  I,  pp.  3H9-426;  Operation  Rpt  Nkitlink;  and 
Morison,  The  Invasioti  of  France  and  (iermnny,  p.  I(i2. 


separated  these  activities,  and,  in  fact, 
they  tended  to  overlap  each  other  as 
shore  engineers  developed  the  supply 
system.  While  the  engineers  organized 
the  beaches  into  administrative  subdi- 
visions, providing  roads  to  the  water's 
edge  and  laying  out  supply  areas  just 
inland.  Transportation  Corps  troops 
would  help  unload  cargo,  move  sup- 
plies to  depots  or  using  units,  and  con- 
trol traffic  on  and  behind  the  beaches. 
The  Transportation  Corps  would  also 
operate  smaller  captured  ports  in  the 
area  once  the  engineers  had  cleared 
obstacles  and  mines  and  restored  dock- 
side  equipment  and  storage  space. 

The  initial  dump  phase  demanded  a 
clear  marking  scheme  for  all  the  beaches 
in  both  landing  areas.  The  Provisional 
Engineer  Special  Brigade  Group  fol- 
lowed the  so-called  British  World  Wide 
System,  extending  the  military  alpha- 
bet and  color  codes  already  in  use  on 
the  invasion  beaches.  By  1600  on  8  June 
the  engineers  had  subdivided  the  origi- 
nal Easy  Red  and  Fox  Red  beaches  on 
Omaha  into  two  more  beaches.  Easy 
White  and  Fox  White.  Each  sector  was 
marked  with  large,  color-coded  wooden 
panels.  For  night  identification  the 
Omaha  beaches  first  had  lights  blink- 
ing the  Morse  code  for  Dog,  Easy,  or 
Fox.  When  this  system  caused  confusion. 


DEVELOPING  BEACHES  AND  RECONSTRUCTING  PORTS 


341 


Tetrahedrons  at  Omaha  Beach 


the  brigades  erected  signboards  with 
nine-foot-high  lettering  outlined  in  col- 
ored lights  matching  the  beach  names. 
On  Utah,  the  1st  Brigade  resorted  to 
hanging  barrage  balloons  directly  over 
the  beaches,  painting  them  to  corre- 
spond to  the  coding  of  Uncle  Red  and 
Tare  Green.  They  added  a  second  red 
balloon  above  Sugar  Red,  opened  to 
the  right  of  Tare  Green  by  the  531st 
Engineer  Shore  Regiment. 

During  the  week  after  D-day  the 
engineers  also  cleared  the  OMAHA 
beaches  and  improved  the  roads  run- 
ning the  length  of  the  beach  and  up 


-The  Adm  and  Log  Hist  of  the  ETC),  vol.  VI, 
"Neptune:  Training  for  Mounting  the  Operation,  and 
Artificial  Ports,"  pp.  68-71. 


through  the  draws.  The  men  could  only 
cut  paths  through  the  debris  in  some 
spots.  The  gapping  team  survivors  from 
the  149th  and  the  299th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalions  joined  the  group  engi- 
neers in  clearing  junk  and  salvaging 
vehicles.  Bulldozer  crews  either  assisted 
in  this  work  or  leveled  the  shingle  bank, 
using  the  stones  and  wreckage  to  fill  in 
antitank  ditches.  At  UTAH  other  Ger- 
man forces  withdrawing  up  the  Cotentin 
peninsula  toward  Cherbourg  kept  the 
beaches  under  artillery  fire  for  a  week 
after  the  landings,  but  the  main  diffi- 
culty in  managing  supply  was  the  lack 
of  dump  space  in  the  low  fields  behind 
the  beach.  Though  drainage  operations 
began  on  D-day  in  the  Pouppeville  area 
when  1 106th  Engineer  Combat  Group 


342 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


units  reset  the  locks  there  to  draw  off 
the  flood  behind  the  southern  end  of 
the  beach,  the  terrain  was  still  too  marshy 
to  support  the  weight  of  large  amounts 
of  supplies  and  the  vehicles  necessary 
to  move  them. 

Confusion  offshore  and  unbending 
adherence  to  the  NEPTUNE  plan  added 
to  the  delay  in  unloading.  Until  D  plus 
4  First  Army  plans  called  for  the  dis- 
charge of  items  according  to  a  rigid  pri- 
ority system.  But  shipping  manifests 
identifying  priority  cargoes  and  vessels 
did  not  reach  the  proper  hands  among 
Transportation  Corps  crews  or  the  Navy 
officer  in  charge  of  beach  operations. 
Engineer  brigade  officers  at  first  joined 
naval  officers  and  transportation  troops 
in  small  launches  in  time-consuming 
searches  for  specific  ships  but  later  sim- 
ply took  the  nearest  vessels  ready  for 
discharge.  The  Navy  refused  to  beach 
LSTs  for  fear  of  German  artillery  fire 
at  Utah  and  in  the  belief  that  they 
would  break  their  keels  as  they  settled 
onto  the  uneven  tidal  flats.  Once  the 
latter  worry  proved  unfounded,  LSTs 
after  D  plus  2  "dried  out"  regularly — 
the  vessels  would  ground  just  after  high 
tide,  discharge  their  cargo  onto  the  dry 
flat  after  the  water  receded,  and  pull 
off  again  with  the  next  tide.  This  method 
slowed  the  shipping  shuttle  between  the 
beaches  and  the  mounting  out  ports  in 
southern  England  because  it  took  twelve 
hours  to  refloat  the  craft.  Nevertheless, 
it  did  more  than  any  other  single  expe- 
dient to  reduce  the  shipping  backlog 
off  Normandy  and  to  boost  the  lagging 
discharge  rates  of  troops,  supply,  and 
vehicles  before  segments  of  the  MUL- 
BERRY harbor  came  into  full  service. 

The  arrival  at  UTAH  on  10  June  of 
the  38th  Engineer  General  Service  Regi- 
ment, an  Advance  Section  (ADSEC) 


unit  attached  to  the  1st  Engineer  Spe- 
cial Brigade,  heralded  the  beginning  of 
the  beach  maintenance  phase  of  engi- 
neer operations.  The  regiment  was  to 
work  behind  the  beaches,  removing 
mines,  improving  roads  and  bridges, 
and  draining  flooded  areas.  One  battal- 
ion had  the  task  of  opening  a  fourth 
beach,  Roger  White,  to  the  north  of 
Sugar  Red.  Blasting  holes  in  the  sea- 
wall and  clearing  beach  obstacles  from 
the  tidal  flat,  the  battalion  had  the  new 
sector  ready  for  operation  two  days 
later  on  12  June,  but  shellfire  from  Ger- 
man batteries  to  the  north  postponed 
the  ojDening  of  Roger  White.  The  enemy 
opposition  there  also  stopped  work  on 
the  northernmost  sluice  gates  behind 
Utah  until  mid-June,  though  the  south- 
ernmost gates,  in  the  area  where  most 
of  the  landings  were  made,  were  already 
functioning  when  the  38th  arrived.  On 
13  June  the  regiment  could  report  that 
all  roads  in  its  area  were  open  and 
passable.^ 

Beach  maintenance  dumps  of  the  5th 
and  6th  Engineer  Special  Brigades, 
located  along  the  Isigny-Bayeux  road, 
were  ready  for  operation  on  13  and  14 
June.  By  then  the  fields  were  clear  of 
mines  and,  after  the  capture  of  Trevieres 
on  10  June,  of  enemy  resistance  except 
for  scattered  sniper  fire.  The  dumps 
were  located  in  a  series  of  relatively 
small  fields  divided  by  hedgerows,  small 
trees,  and  drainage  ditches.  The  engi- 
neers filled  the  trenches  and  cut  gaps 
through  the  hedgerows  to  allow  trucks 
to  move  from  field  to  field  and  to 
relieve  congestion  on  narrow  roads. 

As  combat  troops  inland  eliminated 
the  last  direct  German  fire  on  OMAHA 
on  D  plus  4,  the  buildup  on  shore  took 


'  Hist  38th  Engr  (iS  Rgt,  1944. 


DEVELOPING  BEACHES  AND  RECONSTRUCTING  PORTS 


343 


Twisted  Sections  of  Lobnitz  Piers  at  Omaha  Beach 


impetus  from  the  gradual  completion 
of  artificial  harbor  installations  and 
their  protective  breakwaters — a  line  of 
sunken  ships  known  as  a  GOOSEBERRY. 
Naval  construction  elements  opened 
two  2,450-foot  causeways  on  each  of 
the  major  invasion  beaches  by  10  June, 
the  spans  at  OMAHA  coming  in  at  Exits 
E— 1  and  F— 1.  Two  days  later,  when 
General  Bradley  stood  on  OMAHA,  the 
sight  of  the  massive  construction  off  the 
beaches  convinced  him  that  the  inva- 
sion area  had  become  the  major  port 
of  Europe. 

On  12  June  the  influx  of  men  and 
supply  still  lagged  behind  the  planned 
figures:  just  over  17,000  troops  landed 
with  22,869  called  for;  only  9,896  long 
tons  of  supply  arrived  ashore  compared 


to  the  12,700  tons  planned;  and  2,645 
of  the  more  than  4,000  vehicles  sched- 
uled for  the  day  arrived.  With  VII 
Corps  ready  to  begin  cutting  off  the 
Cotentin  peninsula  and  isolating  Cher- 
bourg, an  ammunition  shortage,  espe- 
cially in  artillery  shells,  was  already 
developing.  Cumulative  totals  among 
the  various  categories  of  discharge  were 
88  percent  of  the  planned  troops,  73 
percent  of  the  supply  tonnage,  and  66 
percent  of  the  vehicles.  But  on  16  June 
hopes  rose  for  meeting  unloading  sched- 
ules as  the  first  LST  nosed  up  to  the 
Lobnitz  pierhead  off  OMAHA  and  dis- 
charged its  load  of  vehicles  directly  to 
shore  via  a  3,000-foot  "v/hale,"  or  float- 
ing roadway,  in  just  under  two  hours. 
Not  the  least  elated  was  Col.  Richard 


344 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Whitcomb,  whose  11th  Port  organiza- 
tion was  manning  the  pierheads  while 
attached  to  the  Provisional  Engineer 
Special  Brigade  Group.  But  the  opti- 
mism died  on  the  eighteenth,  as  nature 
began  reducing  the  American  MUL- 
BERRY to  ruins. "* 

Unloading  slowed  to  a  crawl  from  19 
to  22  June  while  a  howling  Channel 
storm  tore  the  harbor  apart,  driving 
smaller  vessels  into  causeways,  pier- 
heads, and  whale  structures  and  cast- 
ing the  wreckage  ashore  in  tangled 
heaps  of  caissons,  coasters,  and  land- 
ing craft.  The  engineers  managed  to 
get  a  total  of  2,557  long  tons  of  cargo 
out  of  beached  craft  during  the  four 
days.  In  several  cases,  as  with  the  coaster 
Highware,  the  men  resorted  to  cutting 
holes  in  ships'  sides  to  get  at  the  holds. 
The  more  fortunate  British  MULBERRY, 
farther  east,  rode  out  the  storm  with- 
out extensive  damage.  The  debris  at 
Utah  was  not  heavy,  but  the  engineer 
brigades  at  OMAHA  faced  the  same 
beach  clearance  problem  on  22  June 
that  they  had  on  the  seventh. 

Clearance  and  salvage  now  vied  with 
the  rush  to  unload  necessary  men  and 
supply  in  the  days  after  the  storm.  All 
LSTs  dried  out  on  the  Fox  beaches  at 
Omaha,  where  there  was  less  wreckage. 
By  using  every  available  LCT,  LCM, 
and  DUKW  to  ferry  material  from  ship 
to  shore,  the  brigades  began  to  realize 
a  potential  for  moving  supply  and  troops 
across  an  open  beach  that  the  planners 
apparently  had  not  recognized.  DUKWs, 
which  had  all  escaped  the  storm's  effect 
by  hastening  ashore  to  wait  out  the 
weather,  were  invaluable  at  both  beach- 
es.   Tonnage    figures    exceeded    the 


'  Bradley,  A  Soldier's  Story,  p.  289:  Operation  Rpt 
Nkitlink,  pp.  12,  144;  Alfred  Slanlord,  Force  Mulberry 
(New  York:  William  Morrow,  1951),  pp.  KW,  171. 


planned  daily  tables  consistently  be- 
tween 24  and  30  June  although  the  dis- 
charge rate  never  caught  up  with  cumu- 
lative figures  expected.  By  the  end  of  the 
month  the  troop  buildup  had  reached 
452,460,  roughly  78  percent  of  the  esti- 
mated 579,000  that  should  have  been 
ashore  on  that  date.  Supplies  amounted 
to  80  percent  of  the  360,000  long  tons 
scheduled,  and  the  70,910  vehicles  un- 
loaded were  only  65  percent  of  the 
1 1 1 ,000  First  Army  expected  by  D  plus 
24.  Despite  the  lag,  the  engineers  had 
recovered  remarkably  well  from  the 
devastation  of  the  storm  and  had  sus- 
tained operations  on  the  beaches  as  the 
fighting  moved  toward  Cherbourg  and, 
south  of  the  beaches,  into  the  hedge- 
row country  of  Normandy.  In  the  mean- 
time some  measure  of  help  in  supple- 
menting the  over-the-beach  supply  op- 
erations came  with  the  rehabilitation  of 
several  minor  ports  in  the  area. 

Small  Ports  Near  the  Beaches 

Overlord  planning  had  taken  into 
consideration  six  minor  ports:  Grand- 
camp-les-Bains  and  Isigny  just  west  of 
OMAHA;  St.  Vaast-la-Hougue  and  Bar- 
fleur  north  of  UTAH;  Granville  on  the 
west  coast  of  the  Cotentin  peninsula; 
and  St.  Malo  in  Brittany.  All  these  ports 
were  tidal,  drying  out  at  low  water;  even 
at  high  tide  they  could  accommodate 
only  small  vessels.  Therefore,  their 
capacity  was  not  expected  to  be  great, 
and  they  were  to  be  developed  only  as 
a  stop-gap  measure  to  provide  some 
additional  discharge  facilities  until  the 
full  potential  of  larger  ports  could  be 
realized.  All  minor  ports  were  to  be 
open  by  6  July.  (Map  18) 

According  to  the  plan  of  the  ADSEC 
engineer,  Colonel  Itschner,  who  was 


MINOR  PORTS  IN 
THE  OVERLORD  PLAN 


20  Miles 


20  Kilometers 


MAP  18 


346 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


responsible  for  opening  the  ports,  the 
headquarters  of  the  1055th  Port  Con- 
struction and  Repair  Group  and  ad- 
vance elements  of  the  group's  342d 
Engineer  General  Service  Regiment 
were  to  tackle  the  repair  of  the  ports  in 
turn,  beginning  with  Grandcamp  and 
Isigny.  After  rehabilitation,  operation 
of  these  two  small  ports  near  OMAHA 
would  be  the  responsibility  of  the  11  th 
Port  (TC),  attached  to  the  Provisional 
Engineer  Special  Brigade  Group.  The 
11  th  Port  was  also  to  furnish  a  detach- 
ment to  the  1st  Engineer  Special  Bri- 
gade to  operate  St.  Vaast,  while  the  4th 
Port  (TC)  was  to  supervise  operations 
at  Barfleur,  Granville,  and  St.  Malo.^ 

Access  to  Grandcamp,  a  small  fish- 
ing port  and  summer  resort  about  five 
miles  west  of  OMAHA,  was  through  a 
fifty-foot-wide  channel  between  two 
jetties.  The  jetties  extended  from  the 
beach  for  about  350  feet  to  the  port 
proper,  a  rectangular  artificial  basin 
with  a  concrete  wharf  and  one  quay. 
From  the  information  available,  plan- 
ners had  estimated  the  minimum  high- 
tide  depth  of  channel  and  basin  at  eight 
feet,  making  it  possible  to  bring  in  LCTs 
and  small  coasters.  Because  the  little 
port  was  so  vulnerable  to  enemy  demo- 
litions the  engineers  were  not  sure  that 
it  could  be  used  at  all,  but  they  hoped  it 
could  be  opened  by  20  June,  with  a 
goal  of  500  tons  of  cargo  daily  there- 
after. A  TC  port  company,  a  quarter- 
master truck  platoon,  and  an  adminis- 
tration detachment  from  Headquarters, 
1 1  th  Port,  were  to  operate  Grandcamp 
port. 


Grandcamp  fell  on  9  June.  Next 
morning,  while  the  port  was  still  under 
sniper  fire,  Capt.  Andrew  F.  Klase  of 
1 1th  Port  headquarters  arrived  to  sur- 
vey conditions  and  was  agreeably  sur- 
prised to  find  that  the  Germans  had 
done  no  damage  beyond  sinking  two 
hulks  across  the  channel.  Five  wrecks 
lay  in  the  basin,  probably  victims  of 
Allied  aircraft.  Less  agreeable  was  the 
discovery  that  the  water  in  the  basin 
and  channel  was  only  4  1/2  feet  deep. 
The  estimate  of  eight  feet,  based  on 
old  charts,  proved  wrong  because  the 
port  had  not  been  dredged  in  six  years. 
Nevertheless,  Captain  Klase  began  the 
task  of  rehabilitation,  calling  in  units  of 
the  358th  Engineer  General  Service 
Regiment,  which  floated  and  beached 
two  of  the  wrecks  and  blasted  apart  and 
hauled  away  the  pieces  of  the  other  five. 
With  help  from  men  of  the  342d  Engi- 
neer General  Service  Regiment,  who 
cleared  the  port  of  mines,  underwater 
obstructions,  and  barbed-wire  entangle- 
ments, Grandcamp  was  ready  to  oper- 
ate on  17  June.  At  the  time  the  only 
men  available  to  operate  the  port  con- 
sisted of  an  administrative  staff  of  four 
officers  and  thirty-seven  enlisted  men 
from  1 1  th  Port.*' 

On  23  June  the  small  Dutch  coaster 
June  entered  the  basin — the  first  Allied 
ship  to  berth  in  a  French  port  in  the 
American  sector.  Ordered  to  Isigny,  she 
had  entered  Grandcamp  harbor  by 
mistake,  somehow  managing  without  a 
pilot  to  navigate  the  shallow  water  and 
treacherous  channel  and  tie  up  at  the 
quay.  As  no  labor  troops  had  yet  re- 
ported at  Grandcamp,  the  11th  Port 


'  Unless  otherwise  cited,  this  section  on  the  small 
ports  is  based  on:  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the 
Armies,  Volume  I,  pp.  62,  288-90^  310,  463-65,  and 
Volume  11,  pp.  61-62;  Operation  Rpt  Nkkiune,  pp. 
159-62,  166-69. 


''  Interv,  Capt  Andrew -F.  Klase,  1  Jul  44,  Adm  493 
B,  Minor  Ports,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect;  Hists,  342d  Engr 
(;S  Rgt,  15  Apr  42-31  Dec  45  and  358th  Engr  GS 
Rgt,  6Jan  43-30  Jun  45. 


DEVELOPING  BEACHES  AND  RECONSTRUCTING  PORTS 


347 


men  left  their  typewriters  and  pitched 
in  to  unload  her,  aided  by  civilians.  By 
the  end  of  the  day  the  ad  hoc  labor 
force  had  put  158  tons  of  cargo  aboard 
trucks  for  movement  to  inland  dumps. 
Despite  the  successful  berthing  of  the 
June,  coasters  could  not  be  handled  effi- 
ciently at  Grandcamp,  and  only  land- 
ing craft  could  be  used.  Because  the 
basin  was  too  small  to  permit  LCTs  to 
turn  around,  the  best  choice  was  the 
LBV,  a  fifty-ton,  self-propelled  barge 
able  to  carry  vehicles  and  supplies.  The 
first  came  in  on  24  June,  bringing  cargo 
from  vessels  anchored  off  OMAHA. 
That  day  the  4145th  Quartermaster 
Service  Company  arrived  to  take  over 
unloading,  with  some  continued  civil- 
ian help.  In  its  eighty-eight  days  of 
operations,  from  23  June  to  19  Septem- 
ber (it  was  the  first  of  the  small  ports  to 
close),  Grandcamp  took  in  58,382  tons 
of  cargo  for  an  average  daily  discharge 
rate  of  675  tons,  considerably  more 
than  the  500  tons  expected.^ 

Isigny,  a  somewhat  more  prepossess- 
ing port,  was  a  small  dairying  town  on 
the  Aure  River  near  where  the  river 
flowed  into  the  Vire  about  ten  miles 
west-southwest  of  OMAHA.  To  reach 
the  port  from  the  sea,  ships  entered 
the  mouth  of  the  Vire  and  after  about 
three  miles  turned  left  into  the  narrow 
Aure,  which  for  three-quarters  of  a  mile 
formed  the  port  channel.  Lined  on  the 
right  almost  continuously  with  stone 
quays  terminating  in  a  small  turning 
basin,  the  channel  contained  two  or 
three  feet  of  water  at  mean  low  tide 
and  about  thirteen  feet  at  high  tide,  a 
depth  adequate  for  coaster  operations. 

American  forces  took  Isigny  on  10 
June,  and  the  next  day  four  officers 


from  the  1 1th  Port  and  ADSEC  exam- 
ined the  port.  They  found  that  the  Ger- 
mans had  done  no  damage  but  that 
Allied  bombs  had  sunk  a  German  flak 
ship  and  a  barge  in  the  channel,  blown 
part  of  a  quay  wall,  and  put  the  quay- 
side railroad  out  of  commission.  The 
358th  and  342d  Engineer  General  Ser- 
vice Regiments  quickly  made  necessary 
repairs,  and  the  first  coaster  arrived  on 
24  June  with  486  tons  of  cargo,  mostly 
gasoline  unloaded  by  two  quartermas- 
ter service  companies.  In  its  1 14  days 
of  operation,  until  15  October,  Isigny's 
average  daily  discharge  was  740  tons.^ 
On  the  east  shoulder  of  the  Cotentin 
peninsula  the  ports  of  St.  Vaast  and 
Barfleur,  left  undefended  as  German 
forces  withdrew  toward  Cherbourg, 
were  in  American  hands  by  21  June. 
The  more  productive  was  St.  Vaast, 
which  had  an  inner  and  an  outer  har- 
bor. While  the  inner  harbor  dried  out 
at  mean  low  tide,  the  outer  one  could 
be  used  at  all  tides  and  boasted  a  break- 
water that  provided  an  excellent  berth- 
ing area  for  coasters  and  lighters.  The 
Germans  had  placed  mines  across  the 
harbor  entrance  and  had  sunk  fifteen 
ships  in  the  harbor.  ADSEC  engineers 
removed  the  major  obstacles,  and  the 
port  began  operations  on  9  July.  Be- 
tween that  date  and  the  closing  of  the 
port  on  16  October  St.  Vaast  averaged 
1,172  tons  a  day — by  far  the  best  record 
acheived  by  any  minor  port.  Barfleur 
was  found  virtually  undamaged,  with 
the  only  major  job  that  of  removing 
mines  across  the  harbor  entrance.  In 
three  days  the  engineers  had  Barfleur 


"^  Klase  interv. 


"  Interv.  Capt  Howard  E.  Bierkan,  HQ,  1 1th  Port,  1 
Jul  44,  Adm  493  B,  Minor  Ports,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect; 
Hists,  342d  Engr  GS  Rgt,  15  Apr  42-31  Dec  45,  and 
358th  Engr  GS  Rgt,  6  Jan  43-30  Jun  45. 


348 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Coaster  With  a  Cargo  of  Gasoline  Unloads  at  Isigny 


ready  for  operation;  the  port  opened 
on  26  July. 

In  late  July  delays  in  the  rehabilita- 
tion of  Cherbourg,  which  was  not  able 
to  receive  cargo  until  16  July,  brought 
about  renewed  interest  in  all  the  minor 
ports.  At  the  time,  two  of  the  six  ports 
included  in  the  OVERLORD  planning — 
Granville  and  St.  Malo — were  still  in 
enemy  hands.  ADSEC,  therefore,  con- 
centrated on  improving  Grandcamp, 
Isigny,  and  St.  Vaast  and  on  opening 
not  only  Barfleur  but  also  Carentan, 
which  had  not  been  included  in  OVER- 
LORD planning.   ADSEC   planners  ex- 


'  History  of  the  ADSEC]  Engineer  Section,  7  Sep 
44-30  |un  45,  pp.  46-  47;  Bykofsky  and  Larson,  The 
Transportation  dorps:  Operations  Overseas,  p.  238. 


pected  to  obtain  from  the  five  ports  a 
total  discharge  of  at  least  12,000  tons 
of  cargo  a  day  and  hoped  for  17,000 
tons  after  the  ports  expanded  to  their 
full  capacity.'" 

At  each  port  troops  of  the  2d  Battal- 
ion, 358th  Engineer  General  Service 
Regiment,  went  to  work  dredging,  re- 
surfacing, and  improving  quays  and 
repairing  roads  and  railroad  facilities 
in  the  port  area.  Of  these  efforts  the 
most  important  was  dredging,  and  for 
it  the  engineers  used  a  French  bucket 


'"  Llr,  HQ,  ASCZ,  to  (X;,  ASC;Z,  17  Jul  44,  sub: 
Recommendations  for  Minor  Ports;  Ltr,  IRS,  ADSO, 
to  ADSEC,  26  Jul  44;  Condition  Rpts,  Project  P-4  St. 
Vaast,  27  Sep  44,  and  2d  Project  P-3  Barfleur;  ail  in 
ADSEC  Engr  Sect,  file  Port  Hist  St.  Vaast. 


DEVELOPING  BEACHES  AND  RECONSTRUCTING  PORTS 


349 


dredge  discovered  in  the  British-con- 
trolled port  of  Courseulles.  After  re- 
pairs, the  dredge  was  put  to  work  at 
Isigny,  Grandcamp,  and  St.  Vaast.  At 
Barfleur,  a  rocky  bottom  forestalled 
dredging  and  restricted  the  harbor- to 
craft  drawing  no  more  than  ten  feet. 
Nevertheless,  Barfleur  did  well  in  its 
eighty-four  days  of  operation,  averag- 
ing 803  tons  a  day.  Carentan  was  disap- 
pointing. A  small-craft  harbor  on  the 
Taute  River  with  a  passageway  to  the 
sea  about  three  times  longer  than  that 
at  Isigny,  Carentan  opened  on  25  July. 
But  after  a  series  of  mishaps,  including 
the  sinking  or  grounding  of  three  ves- 
sels in  the  channel,  Carentan  closed  on 
31  July  having  averaged  not  more  than 
300  tons  a  day." 

At  no  time  did  the  small  ports,  com- 
bined, approach  the  12,000  tons  of 
cargo  per  day  the  logisticians  had  hoped 
for.  Such  a  total  might  have  been 
achieved  had  the  ports  been  developed 
more  fully,  but  this  step  was  not  neces- 
sary. Omaha  and  Utah  beaches  proved 
surprisingly  successful  in  delivering 
cargo,  and  by  early  October,  when  au- 
tumn storms  showed  the  need  for  phas- 
ing out  beach  operations,  the  engineer 
port  reconstruction  effort  had  concen- 
trated at  Cherbourg.  There,  during 
most  of  the  autumn  of  1944,  was  to  be 
discharged  the  bulk  of  the  supplies 
required  to  support  American  forces. 
By  16  October  1944,  Grandcamp,  Isig- 
ny, St.  Vaast,  and  Barfleur  had  closed 
down;  on  9  November  they  reverted  to 
French  control.  By  this  time  a  rear  area 
system  of  base  sections  was  in  place 
under  the  COMZ  command  of  Gen- 


eral Lee,  who  took  over  active  control 
of  the  rehabilitation  efforts  at  the  the- 
ater level. 

COMZ  on  the  Continent 

No  sooner  had  operations  on  the 
Continent  begun  than  the  prospect  of 
a  breakout  from  the  Allied  lodgment 
and  an  ensuing  war  of  maneuver  raised 
the  issue  of  control  of  the  communica- 
tions zone  behind  First  Army.  The 
eventual  command  structure  governing 
that  area  would  also  affect  the  ETOUSA 
chief  engineer.  Invasion  plans  provided 
for  the  introduction  of  two  interim  com- 
mands prior  to  the  transfer  to  France 
of  General  Lee's  SOS,  ETOUSA,  re- 
named COMZ  as  of  D-day.  On  16  June 
the  first  of  these.  Brig.  Gen.  Ewart  G. 
Plank's  ADSEC  organization,  went  into 
operation  as  planned,  running  supply 
affairs  for  First  Army  under  General 
Bradley's  direct  control.  At  the  same 
time  ADSEC's  parent  command.  For- 
ward Echelon,  Communications  Zone, 
or  FECOMZ,  began  phasing  its  advance 
parties  into  two  chateaus  near  Valognes, 
twenty  miles  southwest  of  Cherbourg. 
Here  Col.  Frank  M.  Albrecht  formally 
announced  the  existence  of  the  com- 
mand on  15  July  and  awaited  Bradley's 
dehneation  of  First  Army's  rear  bound- 
ary, the  event  that  would  fully  activate 
FECOMZ.'^' 

Bradley's  announcement  was  not  forth- 
coming. Under  NEPTUNE,  he  was  to 
establish  the  army  rear  boundary  around 


"  Hist  358th  Engr  (iS  Rgt.  (i  |an  43-30  jiin  45; 
(Completion  Rpt,  Engr  Sect,  ASCZ,  Project  F-3  Bar- 
fleur, ADSEC  Engr  Sect,  file  Pott  Hist  St.  Vaast;  His- 
tory ot  the  ADSEC  Engineer  Section,  p.  47. 


'-'  See  ch.  XHI;  Robert  W.  Coakley,  The  Adminis- 
trative and  Logistical  History  of  the  European  The- 
ater ofOperations,  vol.  H,  "Organization  and  (Com- 
mand in  the  European  Theater  of  Operations,"  p. 
139,  in  (;MH.  (ieneral  Vaughan,  the  former  com- 
mander of  FE(X)MZ,  had  Ijeen  reassigned  com- 
mander of  the  United  Kingdom  Base  Section  on  26 
June  1944. 


350 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


D  plus  20,  26  June.  The  introduction 
of  the  Third  U.S.  Army,  scheduled  for 
D  plus  41,  or  17  July,  would  necessitate 
the  activation  of  the  U.S.  1st  Army 
Group  headquarters  on  the  Continent. 
On  the  same  day  FECOMZ  would  take 
over  the  communications  zone  from 
ADSEC,  allowing  it  to  advance  behind 
1st  Army  Group  as  the  service  com- 
mand immediately  to  its  rear.  Dissatis- 
fied over  aspects  of  army  supply  on 
D-day  and  the  tactical  situation — First 
Army  was  entangled  in  the  hedgerows 
and  wetlands  of  Normandy — Bradley 
resolved  to  retain  direct  control  of 
ADSEC  as  long  as  possible.  On  20  June, 
under  pressure  from  the  COMZ  head- 
quarters still  in  London,  he  resorted  to 
a  legalism  in  which  he  drew  ^forward 
boundary  for  ADSEC  instead  of  a  rear 
boundary  for  the  army.  When  COMZ 
took  its  case  to  General  Eisenhower  for 
resolution,  SHAEF  decreed  the  separa- 
tion of  ADSEC  from  First  Army  con- 
trol on  14  July  but  did  nothing  about 
the  rear  army  boundary,  leaving  the 
final  say  in  troop  and  supply  matters  to 
General  Bradley.'^ 

FECOMZ  in  the  event  died  aborning. 
It  never  fulfilled  its  role  of  advance 
headquarters  for  Lee's  COMZ.  It  caused 
considerable  confusion  during  its  exis- 
tence and  actually  interfered  with  effi- 
cient supply  planning  although  its  staff 
left  extensive  drafts  on  the  continental 
system  of  base  sections  for  future  use. 
Its  demise  came  with  the  arrival  of  the 
entire  COMZ  at  Valognes  on  7  August, 
exactly  a  month  ahead  of  schedule;  Col- 
onel Albrecht's  short-lived  command 
simply  melded  into  General  Lee's  head- 


quarters even  as  the  Allied  breakout 
from  the  invasion  lodgment  reached 
full  stride.  General  Lee  rapidly  took 
over  560,000  square  feet  of  engineer- 
built  office  space  and  tent  quarters  for 
11,000  individuals  in  the  temporary 
headquarters  at  Valognes.  But  General 
Bradley  surrendered  his  control  of  sup- 
ply and  the  allocation  of  service  troops 
among  the  field  armies,  ADSEC,  and 
Lee's  burgeoning  Communications  Zone 
command  only  when  SHAEF  arrived 
on  the  Continent  on  1  September.  Brad- 
ley, now  the  commander  of  the  12th 
Army  Group  with  the  First  and  Third 
Armies  attached,  thereupon  became  the 
coequal  of  General  Lee  in  the  theater 
organization  under  General  Eisenhow- 
er. Though  Lee  dropped  his  earlier 
designation  of  deputy  theater  command- 
er, the  same  command  problems  that 
had  prevailed  for  the  theater  chief  engi- 
neer in  England  during  BOLERO  ob- 
tained on  the  Continent.  General 
Moore's  access  to  the  theater  com- 
mander still  ran  through  General  Lee, 
and  commanders  of  the  fighting  armies 
tended  to  regard  Moore  as  less  than  a 
key  member  of  the  theater  special  staff 
though  all  engineer  work  proceeded 
under  his  technical  supervision. '"* 

The  theater  engineer's  office  con- 
sisted for  the  duration  of  the  war  of 
seven  divisions  under  the  chief  engi- 
neer and  his  deputy.  The  Administra- 
tion and  Control  Divisions  performed 
internal  housekeeping  functions,  coor- 
dinating planning,  data  collection,  and 
personnel  affairs.  Intelligence  Division 
compiled  necessary  engineer  intelli- 
gence on  all  lines  of  communications, 


'  *  Bradley,  A  Soldier's  Story,  p.  305;  The  Adm  and 
Log  Hist  of  the  ETO,  vol.  IL  "Organization  and  (Com- 
mand in  the  European  Theater  of  Operations,"  pp. 
4-46. 


"  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Vol- 
ume I,  pp.  434-36;  ETO  (;en  Bd  Rpt  127,  Organiza- 
tion and  Functions  of  the  Communications  Zone,  ch 
4,  pp.  32-38;  Moore,  Final  Report,  p.  326. 


DEVELOPING  BEACHES  AND  RECONSTRUCTING  PORTS 


351 


ports,  and  inland  waterways  and  han- 
dled all  mapping  problems,  including 
liaison  on  maps  with  Allied  forces.  The 
division  also  kept  current  on  enemy 
engineering  methods,  mine  warfare, 
and  field  works  that  combat  engineers 
were  likely  to  encounter.  The  Real 
Estate  and  Labor  Division  dealt  with 
the  acquisition  of  property  for  military 
use  and  hired  civilian  labor.  Theater 
policies  on  engineer  troop  strengths, 
the  distribution  of  engineers  within  the 
theater,  and  revisions  to  standard  tables 
of  organization  fell  within  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  Troops  Division.  It  also  han- 
dled training  and  the  general  technical 
supervision  of  bridge  building,  demoli- 
tions, camouflage,  water  supply,  and 
fire  fighting.  The  Supply  Division  saw 
to  the  engineer  logistical  line  of  com- 
munications on  the  Continent  and  the 
management  of  the  entire  theater  depot 
system  and  the  inventory  and  stock  lev- 
els in  it.  The  Construction  Division  set 
engineer  construction  standards  and 
supervised  the  rehabilitation  or  build- 
ing of  roads,  installations  of  all  kinds, 
pipelines,  power  systems,  and  water- 
ways.'^ The  chief  engineer's  technical 
control  extended,  therefore,  to  the  base 
sections  on  the  Continent  and  in  the 
United  Kingdom,  where  all  of  the  for- 
mer base  sections  were  consolidated  into 
a  single  United  Kingdom  Base  with  sub- 
ordinate districts. 

The  base  sections  that  composed  the 
COMZ  empire  in  France  began  taking 
shape  in  July,  and  new  headquarters 
opened  as  the  need  arose  in  the  liber- 
ated territory.  As  ADSEC  began  the 
rehabilitation  of  Cherbourg,  on  21  July 
General  Plank  established  in  the  city 
the  Cherbourg  Command  with  all  the 


prerogatives  of  a  base  section.  On  16 
August  it  became  the  Normandy  Base 
Section,  encompassing  the  Cotentin 
peninsula.  Though  the  command's  exis- 
tence disrupted  the  OVERLORD  plan  to 
phase  into  the  city  one  of  the  existing 
base  section  commands  held  in  readi- 
ness in  England,  those  staffs  were  later 
assigned  to  other  section  commands. 
Brittany  Base  opened  on  16  August  to 
oversee  the  smaller  ports  of  that  penin- 
sula, and  a  short-lived  Loire  Base  existed 
from  5  September  until  Brittany  Base 
absorbed  it  on  1  December.  The  cap- 
ture of  Paris  triggered  the  installation 
of  the  Seine  Base  Section  in  the  city, 
where  Headquarters,  COMZ,  also  moved 
in  early  September  amid  considerable 
controversy  since  it  occupied  some  of 
the  best  hotel  accommodations  in  the 
city.  After  some  administrative  confu- 
sion over  their  missions,  the  last  two 
sections  evolved  as  Oise  Base  Section 
on  3  September  and  Channel  Base  Sec- 
tion a  week  later.  Oise  Base  was  respon- 
sible for  territory  east  of  Paris  and  up 
to  the  rear  boundary  of  ADSEC  as  it 
moved  forward  with  the  field  armies. 
Channel  Base  concerned  itself  with  the 
Channel  ports  from  the  D-day  beaches 
eastward  but  centered  its  attention  on 
Antwerp  once  that  city  was  wrested 
from  German  control. 

Essentially  complete  by  the  end  of 
October,  the  base  section  organization 
nevertheless  underwent  boundary  and 
organizational  modifications  and  major 
shifts  in  emphasis  through  the  end  of 
the  war.  Another  base  section  arrived 
in  southern  France  with  Operation 
Dragoon  to  handle  the  Rhone  valley 
main  supply  route. '^  As  the  war  drew 


"'  Moore,  Final  Report,  app.  I  — K  — I. 


"'  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Vol- 
ume II,  pp.  26—38. 
'^  See  ch.  XX. 


352 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


to  a  close,  Normandy  Base  Section  had 
progressively  absorbed  Brittany  Base 
and  taken  over  the  Channel  coast  from 
Brest  to  the  21  Army  Group  boundary. 
Channel  Base  remained  responsible  for 
American  supply  and  administration  in 
what  was  a  British  rear  area,  where  Brit- 
ish forces  retained  a  small  enclave  in 
Normandy  Base  Section  incorporating 
their  original  D-day  beaches.  The  port 
of  Cherbourg  in  the  meantime  had 
developed  into  one  of  the  principal 
points  of  entry  for  American  forces  and 
supply. 


Cherbourg 

Combat  troops  fought  their  way  into 
Cherbourg  on  26  June.  Next  day.  Col. 
James  B.  Cress  of  ADSEC  and  com- 
manding officer  of  the  1056th  Engi- 
neer Port  Construction  and  Repair 
Group  set  off  with  Navy  and  Transpor- 
tation Corps  officers  to  inspect  the  city's 
crescent-shaped  harbor.  It  was  divided 
by  a  breakwater  into  an  outer  harbor, 
or  Grande  Rade,  and  an  inner  harbor, 
or  Petite  Rade.  At  the  center  of  the 
inner  harbor  lay  the  Quai  de  France, 
jutting  out  into  the  roadstead  beside 
the  Darse  Transatlantique,  the  famous 
deepwater  basin  the  Germans  had  built 
between  1923  and  1935  as  a  World  War 
I  reparation.  Here,  in  peacetime,  the 
largest  ocean  liners  docked.  On  the 
Quai  de  France  was  a  huge  railway  sta- 
tion with  a  great  vaulted  roof,  the  Gare 
Maritime,  which  provided  transatlantic 
passengers  with  speedy  rail  service  to 
Paris.  (Few  travelers  lingered  in  Cher- 
bourg, for  it  was  primarily  a  naval  base 
of  little  interest  to  tourists.) 

A  naval  installation  occupied  most  of 
the  western  side  of  the  inner  harbor. 
Between  the  naval  base  and  the  Quai 


de  France  the  ADSEC  officers  saw  a 
small  seaplane  base,  a  bathing  beach 
(the  Nouvelle  Plage),  and  a  narrow 
channel  leading  inland  to  two  basins  in 
the  center  of  the  city,  the  Avant  Port 
de  Commerce  and  the  Bassin  a  Flot, 
where  in  peacetime  most  of  the  cargo 
handled  at  Cherbourg  came  ashore. 
The  eastern  side  of  the  harbor,  beyond 
the  Darse  Transatlantique,  was  the  least 
developed.  It  consisted  merely  of  open 
areas  known  as  the  Reclamation  and 
the  Terre  Plein,  bounded  by  a  long 
sloping  seawall  where  the  water  was 
quite  shallow  at  low  tide. 

Although  the  advance  party  found 
no  demolition  in  the  Terre  Plein  and 
Reclamation  areas,  the  great  transatlan- 
tic dock  area  was  a  shambles — the  most 
spectacular  evidence  of  the  "exemplary 
destruction  of  the  harbor  of  Cherbourg" 
for  which  the  German  commander  re- 
ceived the  Knight's  Cross  of  the  Iron 
Cross  from  Adolf  Hitler.  The  Gare 
Maritime  was  badly  damaged,  the  two 
quays  lay  in  ruins,  and  two  sunken  ships 
blocked  the  entrance  to  the  Darse.  The 
reconnaissance  party  also  found  wide- 
spread destruction  at  the  naval  base, 
some  of  it  from  Allied  air  attacks.  Sun- 
ken ships  and  barges  blocked  the  en- 
trances to  the  three  basins,  which  were 
filled  with  sunken  barges,  tugs,  trawlers, 
and  coasters.  In  the  base  area  two  tre- 
mendous craters  severed  the  western 
breakwater  of  the  Petite  Rade,  the  Digue 
du  Homet,  a  3,300-foot-long,  70-foot- 
wide  mole  quayed  on  the  south  side 
and  carrying  three  railroad  tracks  and 
several  oil  pipelines.  The  Quai  du  Hom- 
et, a  berth  for  coal  coasters  at  right 
angles  to  the  Digue  on  its  south  side, 
was  damaged  in  nine  places.'^ 


"*  Port  of  (Cherbourg,  Rpt,  l()5(nh  Engr  Port  (Con- 
struction and  Repair  (ip;  Rpt,  (>herbourg  Port  Recon- 
struction, OCE  ETOUSA,   1944,  p.    13;  Maj.  Gen. 


DEVELOPING  BEACHES  AND  RECONSTRUCTING  PORTS 


353 


The  destruction  of  Cherbourg,  while 
acknowledged  to  be  "a  masterful  job," 
was  no  greater  than  the  ADSEC  engi- 
neer had  expected.''*  The  engineers 
were  to  work  first  on  those  areas  where 
the  quickest  results  could  be  expected, 
so  that  construction  machinery  and 
equipment  waiting  off  UTAH  Beach 
could  land  as  soon  as  possible.  These 
areas  were  designated  in  a  four-point 
program  established  by  naval,  engineer, 
and  transportation  officers  on  28  June: 
first,  the  Nouvelle  Plage  bathing  beach 
for  DUKWs;  second,  the  Bassin  a  Flot 
in  the  commercial  port  for  barges; 
third,  the  Reclamation  and  Terre  Plein 
area  for  LSTs;  and,  fourth,  the  Digue 
du  Hornet  for  Liberty  ships  and  vessels 
carrying  locomotives  and  boxcars. 

The  332d  and  342d  Engineer  Gen- 
eral Service  and  the  333d  Engineer  Spe- 
cial Service  Regiments  were  assigned 
to  the  1056th  Port  Construction  and 
Repair  Group  to  begin  the  reconstruc- 
tion of  Cherbourg.  Details  entered  the 
port  with  the  advance  parties  to  clear 
debris,  remove  mines,  and  scour  the 
territory  for  construction  materials,  and 
by  the  first  week  in  July  all  three  regi- 
ments had  numbers  of  men  on  the 
scene.  They  found  huge  stores  of  Ger- 
man construction  materials  and  equip- 
ment, some  at  a  buzz-bomb  launching 
platform  west  of  Cherbourg.  French 
civilian  mechanics  helped  get  the  equip- 


[anies  B.  (iress,  "Reconstruction  of  C;herlK)urg,"  The 
Military  Engineer,  XLIV,  no.  300  (July- August  1952), 
248.  Unless  otherwise  noted,  this  section  is  based  on 
these  three  soinxes,  and  on  MS,  C>herbourg — (iateway 
to  France:  Rehabilitation  and  Operation  of  the  First 
Major  Port,  Hist  Sect,  ETOUSA,  1945.  See  also: 
Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Volume  II, 
pp.  62  —  89,  and  the  histories  ot  the  units  mentioned. 
'''  Ltr,  Col  E.  C;.  Itschner,  Engr,  ASCZ,  to  CE, 
ETOUSA,  5  Jul  44,  sub:  Port  and  Port  Area  Rehabili- 
tation Plan:  CHERBOURG,  Notes  on  Port  of  Cher- 
bo  lug. 


ment  in  working  order.  By  8  July  AD- 
SEC engineers  were  making  optimistic 
estimates  of  the  daily  tonnage  that  Cher- 
bourg could  receive — a  port  that  in 
peacetime  averaged  less  than  900  tons 
a  day.  Exclusive  of  POL,  vehicles,  and 
railroad  rolling  stock,  the  engineers  esti- 
mated that  after  rehabilitation  Cher- 
bourg would  have  a  capacity  of  17,900 
tons  daily. ^*' 

At  Nouvelle  Plage  the  engineers  blew 
gaps  in  the  seawall,  swept  away  barbed- 
wire  entanglements,  graded  the  beach, 
and  built  three  concrete  exit  roads  for 
DUKWs.  Work  started  early  on  ramps 
and  hards  for  vehicle-carrying  LCTs 
and  LSTs  at  the  seaplane  base  and  the 
north  side  of  the  Reclamation  area.  The 
engineers  quickly  constructed  timber 
wharves  for  unloading  barges  and  coast- 
ers along  the  Terre  Plein  and  at  the 
Bassin  a  Flot,  which  had  seventeen  feet 
of  water  controlled  by  locks  at  the  inner 
end  of  the  Avant  Port  de  Commerce.  A 
swing  bridge  over  these  locks,  which 
carried  traffic  from  one  side  of  the  city 
to  the  other,  was  down;  the  engineers 
replaced  it  with  an  ingenious  retract- 
able drawbridge — a  movable  Bailey  rest- 
ing on  dollies  that  ran  on  old  streetcar 
rails. 

Nouvelle  Plage  was  ready  to  receive 
DUKWs  on  6  July,  but  none  could  come 
in  for  ten  days  because  of  German 
underwater  mines.  Minesweepers  en- 
tered the  Petite  Rade  on  8  July,  and 
not  until  the  fourteenth  were  the  west- 
ern ends  of  the  Grande  and  Petite 
Rades  free  of  mines.  Ships  waiting  off 
the  Normandy  beaches  now  came  for- 
ward. The  first  four  Liberties  steaming 
up  the  Cotentin  coast  arrived  around 


-'"  Ibid.,  Incl  6,  sub:  (>herbourg,  Estimated  Port 
Clapacity  Based  on  Reconstruction  Plan,  8  Jul  44. 


354 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


noon  on  16  July  and  anchored  safely  in 
the  Grande  Rade.  By  1738  a  load  of 
signal  corps  wire  had  been  placed  into 
a  waiting  DUKW;  forty-five  minutes 
later,  it  was  on  its  way  by  truck  to  a 
signal  corps  dump  five  miles  south  of 
Cherbourg.  Port  operations  had  begun. 

The  first  cargo  was  not  typical,  for 
DUKWs  normally  handled  only  small 
packages  and  in  later  operations  were 
used  almost  exclusively  for  subsistence. 
Sixty-three  percent  of  all  supplies  and 
equipment  that  came  into  the  port  be- 
fore the  end  of  July  bore  the  castle 
marking  of  the  Corps  of  Engineers,  and 
much  of  that  cargo  consisted  of  con- 
struction materials  for  rebuilding  the 
port.  Barges  had  to  bring  in  heavy  engi- 
neer equipment  such  as  girders,  rail 
lengths,  and  bulldozers.  Thirty  18-by- 
1 6-foot  wooden  barges  arrived  shortly 
after  the  first  Liberties,  loaded  at  once, 
and  the  next  day,  17  July,  discharged 
in  the  Bassin  a  Plot,  the  wet  dock  at  the 
commercial  port. 

Meanwhile,  work  on  the  high-priority 
Digue  du  Hornet,  begun  the  week  after 
Cherbourg's  capture,  was  well  along. 
The  332d  Engineer  General  Service 
Regiment  and  other  engineers  filled  a 
crater  isolating  the  Digue  from  the 
naval  base,  repaired  road  and  railroad 
tracks  on  the  Digue,  and  constructed 
five  pile-and-timber  finger  piers  for 
Liberty  ships  because  the  quay  wall  had 
an  underwater  shelf.  At  the  shore  end 
of  the  Digue  the  engineers  provided 
two  berths  for  Twickenham  ferries, 
British  vessels  specially  built  to  carry 
locomotives  and  rolling  stock.  On  29 
July  a  Twickenham  made  its  first 
delivery — several  65-ton  diesel  electric 
locomotives  and  other  rolling  stock. 
The  first  Liberty  ship  docked  at  one  of 
the  Digue's  finger  piers  on  9  August. 


After  13  August,  when  the  332d 
Engineer  General  Service  Regiment 
moved  to  Mayenne  to  undertake  rail- 
road repair  in  support  of  First  Army's 
Falaise  Gap  operations,  the  342d  and 
398th  Engineer  General  Service  Regi- 
ments took  over  the  work  at  the  Quai 
du  Homet  and  Digue  du  Homet.  Efforts 
to  provide  more  deepwater  berths  in- 
creased when  it  became  obvious  that 
the  lighterage  operations — discharged 
into  DUKWs  or  barges  from  ships 
anchored  out  in  the  roadstead — were 
too  costly  in  labor,  equipment,  and 
time.  DUKWs  had  a  limited  capacity; 
barges  could  be  towed  into  basins  only 
during  a  few  hours  at  high  tide  and 
otherwise  had  to  be  moored  to  stake 
boats  in  the  harbor.  Moreover,  all  light- 
ers were  at  the  mercy  of  the  weather, 
and  storms  frequently  prevented  them 
from  venturing  out  into  the  harbor. 

The  first  area  to  benefit  from  the 
efforts  to  speed  ship-to-shore  opera- 
tions was  the  naval  base,  which  could 
accommodate  Liberty  ships.  The  342d 
Engineer  General  Service  Regiment, 
aided  by  men  from  the  398th,  began 
construction  in  mid-August,  replacing 
demolished  bridges  and  building  tim- 
ber wharves  to  provide  a  continuous 
surface  along  the  top  of  the  quays, 
which  boat  slips  and  entrance  channels 
to  dry  docks  indented  at  frequent  in- 
tervals. A  bridge  the  342d  Engineers 
built  across  a  passage  at  the  north  end 
of  Bassin  Charles  X  illustrates  the  inge- 
nious use  of  local  and  captured  mate- 
rials. For  girders  the  engineers  used  the 
main  beams  of  an  old  German  sub- 
marine-lifting craft  (turned  over  to  the 
French  with  other  reparations  after 
1918),  which  the  Navy  had  found  block- 
ing the  entrance  to  the  Avant  Port.  The 
floor  channels  for  the  bridge  came  from 


DEVELOPING  BEACHES  AND  RECONSTRUCTING  PORTS 


355 


captured  special  railroad  cars.  Eventu- 
ally the  naval  base  provided  berths  for 
eleven  Liberty  ships  and  five  coasters. 

The  last  area  to  benefit  from  the  pro- 
gram to  provide  more  deepwater  berths 
was  potentially  the  most  valuable  and 
therefore  the  most  thoroughly  sub- 
jected to  German  demolitions — the 
great  Darse  Transatlantique.  Early  in 
July  the  333d  Engineer  Special  Service 
Regiment  began  clearing  debris  from 
the  shattered  docks.  In  the  wreckage 
of  the  Gare  Maritime  the  engineers  dis- 
covered twenty-four  freight  cars  loaded 
with  unexploded  sea  mines,  rendered 
extremely  sensitive  by  tons  of  debris 
that  had  fallen  on  them.  The  ticklish 
task  of  removing  the  debris  and  then 
deactivating  the  mines  fell  to  the  mine 
and  booby-trap  team  of  the  333d  Engi- 
neer Special  Service  Regiment,  which 
undertook  most  of  the  mine  deactiva- 
tion on  the  land  side  of  the  harbor.  The 
team  found  unexploded  charges,  which 
the  Germans  had  apparently  not  had 
time  to  detonate,  in  underground  pass- 
ages, sewers,  bridges,  and  buildings 
throughout  the  port  area.^' 

After  the  debris  and  mines  were  re- 
moved from  the  quays  at  the  Darse 
Transatlantique,  the  333d  Engineer 
Special  Service  Regiment  began  con- 
struction. Operating  two  ten-hour  shifts 
and  employing  hundreds  of  French 
civilians  and  POWs,  the  regiment  first 
built  finger  piers  at  intervals  to  match 
the  hatches  of  Liberty  ships;  later  they 
filled  the  spaces  between  the  piers, 
using  timber  wharfing  to  provide  con- 
tinuous berthing  along  the  Quai  de 
France.  But  construction  in  the  Darse 


was  a  long-term  project.  Not  until  21 
August,  when  the  Navy  declared  the 
waters  free  of  mines,  could  a  survey  of 
underwater  debris  be  made.  An  access 
channel  was  not  open  until  18  Septem- 
ber, and  the  first  Liberty  did  not  berth 
in  the  Darse  until  8  October. 

On  10  August  the  engineers  work- 
ing on  the  Cherbourg  quays  saw  a  new 
kind  of  ship  steaming  into  the  harbor. 
She  was  the  Junior  N.  Van  Noy,  the  first 
engineer  port  repair  ship  sent  overseas. 
A  converted  Great  Lakes  steamer  dis- 
placing only  3,000  tons,  the  ship  had 
machine  shops,  storage  bins,  and  heavy 
salvage  equipment  aboard.  Her  decks 
bristled  with  derricks  and  booms  for 
lifting  sunken  ships  and  other  debris. 
Manning  the  ship  was  the  sixty-member 
1071st  Engineer  Port  Repair  Ship 
Crew.^"^ 

The  day  after  her  arrival  at  Cher- 
bourg the  ship  went  under  the  control 
of  the  1056th  Engineer  Port  Construc- 
tion and  Repair  Group  but  in  a  few 
days  passed  to  the  control  of  the  1055th 
Engineer  Port  Construction  and  Repair 
Group,  which  had  come  up  from  Gran- 
ville to  work  on  the  vital  Liberty  berths 
along  the  Digue  du  Homet.  The  repair 
ship  could  not  enter  the  wrecked  inner 
basins  because  she  drew  twenty  feet, 
but  out  in  the  harbor  the  vessel  accom- 
plished valuable  work.  Her  divers, 
welders,  and  mechanics  patched  and 
raised  several  hulks.  Divers  with  elec- 
tric torches  broke  up  a  dry  dock  that 
was  beyond  repair.  Another  important 


'-'  1st  Lt  S.  T.  Holden,  Asst  S-3,  Pertinent  Informa- 
tion on  the  333d  Mine  &  Booby  Trap  Team,  20  Sep 
44,  in  booklet.  Port  of  Cherbourg,  Rpt  of  Demolition 
and  Reconstruction,  333d  Engr  SS  Rgt. 


'^  For  the  conversion  and  equipping  of  such  ships 
sent  to  the  ETO,  and  crew  recruitment  and  training, 
see  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Engineers: 
Troops  and  Equipment,  pp.  339—411.  The  ship  was 
named  in  honor  of  an  enlisted  man  whose  heroic 
action  at  Finschhafen,  Southwest  Pacific  Area,  had 
earned  him  posthumously,  the  first  Medal  of  Honor 
awarded  an  Army  engineer  during  World  War  II. 


356 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


task  was  repair  of  a  large  rock  crusher 
found  in  a  quarry  just  outside  Cher- 
bourg, equipment  badly  needed  for 
road  building.  On  3  October  1944,  the 
Junior  N.  Van  Noy  left  Cherbourg, 
bound  for  Le  Havre  with  the  1055th 
Port  Construction  and  Repair  Group. '^^ 
In  the  Overlord  plan  Cherbourg 
originally  had  a  scheduled  daily  dis- 
charge capacity  of  8,000  to  9,000  tons — 
Brest  and  Quiberon  Bay  were  to  be- 
come the  major  ports  of  entry  for  Allied 
forces  and  supplies  entering  the  Conti- 
nent. But  as  the  bitter  German  defense 
of  some  Brittany  ports  increased  Cher- 
bourg's importance,  G— 4  planners 
raised  the  port's  projected  intake  capac- 
ity to  15,000  tons  daily  in  July.  Brig. 
Gen.  Royal  B.  Lord,  ETOUSA  G-4, 
expected  a  20,000-ton  capacity  in  the 
city  by  September,  but  in  the  middle  of 
that  month  only  12,000  tons  per  day 
were  moving  through  the  port,  then 
about  75  percent  rehabilitated.  The 
vital  berths  that  could  handle  Liberty 
ships  still  lay  in  the  inoperable  25  per- 
cent of  the  harbor,  and  their  repair  con- 
tinued even  as  the  utility  of  Cherbourg 
declined  later  in  the  year. 

Railway  Rehabilitation 

By  mid-August,  Liberties  at  deepwa- 
ter  quays  in  Cherbourg  were  unload- 
ing onto  barges  because  a  shortage  of 
trucks  and  rail  cars  had  crowded  the 
quays  and  the  marginal  wharves  at 
Terre  Plein  with  supplies  and  equip- 
ment awaiting  transportation  inland. 
Only  about  3,000  tons  of  cargo  a  day 


were  moving  out  by  rail  at  the  end  of 
August,  and  a  backlog  of  nearly  72,000 
tons    awaited    clearance    in    the    port 

24 

area. 

Efforts  to  expedite  rail  service  had 
started  before  the  fall  of  Cherbourg, 
when  the  1056th  Engineer  Port  Con- 
struction and  Repair  Group  began  to 
repair  demolished  railway  bridges  over 
the  Vire,  Taute,  Madeleine,  and  Jour- 
dan  Rivers.  By  7  July  the  two  main  line 
tracks  from  Paris  to  Cherbourg  were 
open.  One  company  of  the  347th  Engi- 
neer General  Service  Regiment  had 
cleared  a  "demolished  tunnel  just  south 
of  Cherbourg,  and  three  other  compa- 
nies had  repaired  blown  frogs  and 
switches  on  the  tracks  into  the  city's  rail- 
way station,  the  Care  de  I'Etat.  Fortu- 
nately damage  was  light  on  a  mile-long 
spur  from  the  Gare  de  I'Etat  to  the 
Digue  du  Homet,  and  less  than  five  of 
the  fifteen  miles  of  track  within  the  city 
needed  extensive  repairs.  Most  of  the 
damage  had  resulted  from  Allied  bombs 
and  artillery  fire. 

Railway  rehabilitation,  carried  on 
under  the  supervision  of  the  Transpor- 
tation Corps'  2d  Military  Railway  Ser- 
vice, accelerated  considerably  after  the 
late  July  decision  to  increase  Cher- 
bourg's tonnage  target  to  20,000  tons 
by  mid-September,  with  the  railroads 
carrying  the  main  burden  of  transpor- 
tation inland.  New  spurs  were  needed 
as  well  as  new  storage  and  marshaling 
yards  to  ensure  that  a  constant  supply 
of  railway  cars  could  be  fed  to  the 
docks.  Primarily  a  passenger  port, 
Cherbourg  had  storage  yards  for  only 


"'  Cherbourg  Port  Reconstruction,  p.  42.  A  similar 
engineer  port  repair  ship  came  into  C^herbourg  on  20 
August  and  remained  there  under  the  l()56th  Port 
Construction  and  Repair  (iroup. 


-'OCE  ETOUSA  Mouthy  Rpt  17,  Aug  44,  dated  15 
Sep  44;  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  11,  Port  Reconstruc- 
tion and  Repair  (United  Kingdom),  1946,  Liaison  Sect, 
Intel  Div,  ETOUSA  Adm  file  547. 


DEVELOPING  BEACHES  AND  RECONSTRUCTING  PORTS 


357 


350  cars  and  marshaling  yards  for  only 
400.  The  plan  to  move  20,000  tons  daily 
through  Cherbourg  required  2,000  rail- 
way cars  a  day,  and  since  a  two-day  sup- 
ply of  empty  cars  had  to  be  on  hand  at 
all  times,  storage  for  4,000  cars  as  well 
as  marshaling  yard  capacity  for  the 
daily  2,000  was  mandatory. 

The  first  major  railway  reconstruc- 
tion took  place  in  the  Terre  Plein  area, 
where  an  existing  yard  consisted  of 
three  tracks  with  a  capacity  of  only  165 
cars  and  a  spur  running  into  the  Amiot 
Aircraft  Plant.  The  347th  Engineer 
General  Service  Regiment  repaired  the 
tracks,  which  Allied  bombing  and  shell- 
fire  had  badly  damaged,  cleared  away 
dragon's  teeth  and  pillboxes  from  the 
area  behind  the  Terre  Plein,  and  laid 
6  1/2  miles  of  new  track  to  provide  a 
marshaling  yard  for  714  cars.  Unfortu- 
nately, the  unit  was  inexperienced  in 
railroad  work  and  laid  the  track  with- 
out ballast  on  filled-in  land.  As  the  track 
sank  into  the  soft  ground  the  rails 
spread,  causing  a  number  of  derail- 
ments before  the  engineers  stabilized 
the  area  by  placing  crushed  rock  bal- 
last under  the  tracks.*^ ' 

The  same  problem  occurred  in  the 
construction  of  new  yards  at  Couville 
and  Sottevast,  which  together  consti- 
tuted one  of  the  most  ambitious  con- 
struction projects  undertaken  on  the 
Cotentin.  Work  at  Couville  began  on  2 
August,  but  heavy  rains  turned  the  area 
into  a  sea  of  mud.  The  engineers  had 
to  open  a  rock  quarry  and  haul  hun- 
dreds of  carloads  of  rock  to  ballast  the 
tracks.  The  first  yard  at  Couville  opened 
on  18  September,  and  expansion  con- 
tinued until  3  November,  when  the 


"'  ETC)  (ieii  Bel  Rpt  12!^  Military  Railway  Service, 
p.  27. 


yard  had  sixteen  miles  of  track  with  a 
capacity  of  1 ,740  cars.  Construction  of 
the  Sottevast  yard,  begun  on  15  August, 
also  was  plagued  by  heavy  rains  that  at 
one  time  had  portions  of  the  area  under 
eighteen  inches  of  water.  Nevertheless, 
some  of  the  facilities  were  ready  by  mid- 
October,  and  when  construction 
stopped  in  mid-December  the  yard  had 
eighteen  miles  of  track  with  a  capacity 
of  2,280  cars. 

POL  Storage 

On  24  July  the  tanker  Empire  Travel- 
ler discharged  the  first  gasoline  at 
Cherbourg,  unloading  at  the  long  break- 
water in  the  outer  harbor — the  Digue 
de  Querqueville.  The  French  and  later 
the  Germans  had  discharged  gasoline 
and  other  POL  supplies  through  a  nine- 
inch  pipeline  running  along  the  Digue 
to  two  nearby  tank  farms  at  the  large 
Depot  Cotier  du  Petrole  and  the  some- 
what smaller  one  at  Sunic.  In  the  same 
neighborhood  was  a  tank  farm  at 
Hainneville,  which  the  French  Navy 
had  used  to  store  diesel  fuel.  The  fourth 
farm  the  Americans  discovered  was 
underground,  so  cleverly  concealed 
that  even  few  Frenchmen  knew  of  its 
existence.  The  French  had  built  the 
installation,  Les  Couplets,  in  1938  at 
the  time  of  the  Maginot  Line  construc- 
tion. Double  garage  doors  of  an 
innocent-looking  two  story  house  fac- 
ing the  Rue  de  la  Paix,  which  skirted 
the  harbor  between  Cherbourg  and 
Querqueville,  opened  on  a  600-yard 
tunnel  leading  to  four  huge  storage 
tanks  located  in  a  hollow  carved  out  of 
a  small  mountain;  thirty-eight  feet  of 
solid  granite  overhead  made  the  tanks 
impervious  to  air  attacks. 

The  engineers'  major  construction 


358 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Gasoline  Being  Pumped  Ashore 
at  Cherbourg. 


effort  was  at  the  tank  farm  at  the  Depot 
Cotier  du  Petrole,  where  the  Germans 
had  demolished  four  huge  tanks,  leav- 
ing one  small  tank  more  or  less  intact. 
The  engineers  built  three  new  tanks 
among  the  ruins  left  from  the  German 
demolitions  and  welded  patches  over 
holes  in  the  one  tank  that  had  escaped 
demolition.  The  nine-inch  pipeline 
from  the  Digue  de  Querqueville  proved 
to  be  corroded  beyond  repair.  Decid- 
ing to  scrap  it,  th^  engineers  installed 
seven  six-inch  lines  that  carried  diesel, 
motor  transport,  and  aviation  fuel  si- 
multaneously. Aviation  gasoline  went  to 
the  Sunic  tank  farm,  diesel  fuel  to  Les 
Couplets.'^*' 


-''  0C:E  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  13,  Petroleum,  Oil,  and 
Lubricants  (United  Kingdom),  1946,  pp.  67-80  and 
fig.  2,  Liaison  Sect,  Intel  Div,  ETOUSA  Adm  file  547. 


On  4  November  1944,  Cherbourg 
discharged  a  peak  19,955  tons  of  cargo; 
the  daily  average  for  that  month  was 
14,300  tons.  Thereafter,  the  port's  dis- 
charge rate  declined  rapidly  as  person- 
nel, equipment,  and  railroad  cars  trans- 
ferred to  Antwerp.  A  few  days  after 
supply  ships  entered  Antwerp  on  26 
November,  Cherbourg's  tonnage  target 
dropped  to  12,000  tons  a  day;  two 
weeks  later  it  went  down  to  7,000  tons. 
Cherbourg's  role  as  the  mainstay  of  the 
American  port  system  in  France  was 
over. 

Granville  and  the  Minor  Brittany  Ports 

Overlord  planners  concentrated 
their  attentions  on  the  Brittany  ports 
because  they  expected  the  peninsula  to 
serve  as  the  entryway  for  Allied  forces 
and  materiel  before  any  other  develop- 
ment on  the  Continent.  The  scheduled 
thrust  from  Normandy  into  Brittany 
after  D-day  was  to  be  the  prelude  to 
the  construction  of  a  sturdy  logistical 
base  to  support  attacks  to  the  Seine  that 
would  come  after  1  November.  Brest, 
Lorient,  Quiberon  Bay,  and  St.  Malo 
in  Brittany  were  expected  to  provide 
16,240  tons  of  daily  port  capacity  by  D 
plus  90;  with  the  opening  of  Nantes, 
the  Brittany  ports  were  to  receive  more 
than  27,000  tons  a  day  by  that  date. 
After  the  breakout  at  St.  Lo  in  late  July, 
G— 4,  COMZ,  was  planning  to  increase 
the  Brittany  capacity  to  provide  more 
than  half  of  the  port  discharge  require- 
ments as  of  D  plus  90.  But  the  major 
Brittany  ports  held  out  stubbornly,  and 
by  late  August  only  St.  Malo  was  in 
American  hands.  On  25  August  G— 4, 
COMZ,  called  for  the  speedy  develop- 
ment of  St.  Malo  and  three  small  Brit- 
tany ports  that  had  not  figured  in  OVER- 


DEVELOPING  BEACHES  AND  RECONSTRUCTING  PORTS 


359 


LORD  planning — Morlaix,  St.  Brieuc, 
and  Cancale — as  well  as  the  small  fish- 
ing port  of  Granville  on  the  west  coast 
of  Normandy.  At  the  time  COMZ  made 
this  decision  supplies  were  coming  in 
on  the  Brittany  coast  only  across  a  beach 
at  St.  Michel-en-Greve,  where  LSTs 
were  bringing  in  ammunition  for  the 
siege  of  Brest.  Morlaix,  St.  Brieuc,  and 
Cancale  were  to  be  ready  to  handle  a 
total  of  9,500  tons  a  day  by  5  Septem- 
ber, St.  Malo,  2,400  tons  by  1  October.'^^ 
The  goals  set  for  the  Brittany  ports 
were  never  realized  and  at  most  of  them 
the  engineer  effort  was  considered  "ut- 
terly wasted.""^  Despite  the  heavy  em- 
phasis on  those  ports  in  July,  the  break- 
out from  the  bridgehead  and  the  head- 
long drive  across  northern  France 
moved  the  action  far  from  Brittany  by 
September.  This  development  caused 
logistical  planners  at  SHAEF  to  regard 
Antwerp  as  the  major  prize;  engineers 
nevertheless  expended  considerable 
effort  in  Brittany  before  the  tactical  sit- 
uation changed  so  drastically.  The  1053d 
Port  Construction  and  Repair  Group 
and  the  360th  Engineer  General  Ser- 
vice Regiment  worked  on  St.  Malo, 
Cancale,  and  St.  Brieuc  before  moving 
into  captured  Brest.  The  St.  Malo  proj- 
ect halted  just  as  it  neared  completion, 
primarily  because  the  task  of  reopen- 


"^  Ruppentlial,  Losislirnl  Support  of  the  Armies,  Vol- 
ume II,  pp.  89-9'5;  T/5  Robert  L.  Davis,  The  Adminis- 
trative and  Logistical  History  of  the  European  The- 
ater of  Operations,  vol.  VII,  "Opening  and  Operating 
(Continental  Ports,"  pp.  66-67,  in  CMH;  Maj  CCharles 
K.  McDerot  and  1st  Lt  Adolph  P.  (iratiot,  Bringing 
Supplies  into  the  Theater,  vol.  I,  p.  40,  Hist  (i— 4, 
COMZ,  ETOUSA,  in  CMH.  Histories  oi  the  units 
mentioned.  Unless  otherwi.se  cited,  this  section  is 
taken  from  these  souices. 

-'"  Ltr,  Col  John  R.  Hardin  to  Maj  Cen  R.  W.  Craw- 
ford, 10  Oct  47,  Incl  to  Ltr,  Maj  (;en  R.  W.  Crawford 
to  Maj  R.  C.  Ruppenthal,  31  Oct  47,  sub:  Questions 
on  the  Logistics  of  the  War  in  the  European  Theater 


ing  waterways  south  and  inland  from 
St.  Malo  did  not  appear  worth  the  effort 
required.  Some  port-operating  person- 
nel went  to  Cancale,  but  tidal  condi- 
tions there  proved  so  difficult  that  the 
port  was  never  used.  St.  Brieuc  opened 
in  mid-September  but  operated  for  only 
a  month,  averaging  317  tons  a  day, 
mostly  coal  for  local  generating  plants 
and  railroads.  St.  Michel-en-Greve  did 
somewhat  better,  averaging  745  tons  a 
day;  but  it  closed  down  on  1  September, 
never  contributing  more  than  a  small 
amount  of  port  capacity  and  reverting 
to  French  control  in  mid-December. 
The  only  ports  in  Brittany  that  deliv- 
ered more  than  token  tonnaijes  were 
Granville  and  Morlaix. 

Granville,  captured  on  3  July,  was  the 
first  port  taken  after  the  breakout.  The 
1055th  Engineer  Port  Construction  and 
Repair  Group,  which  ADSEC  immedi- 
ately dispatched  there,  found  that  the 
Germans  had  undertaken  extensive 
demolition  work  similar  to  that  at  Cher- 
bourg— quays  cratered,  cranes  tipped 
into  the  water,  and  blockships  sunk. 
Worst  of  all,  they  had  destroyed  lock 
gates  between  the  outer  and  inner  ba- 
sins so  that,  at  each  change  of  the  tide, 
water  raced  into  the  inner,  main  basin. 
By  minesweeping,  clearing  debris,  and 
removing  sunken  craft,  the  engineers 
opened  the  outer  basin  to  coasters  able 
to  dry  out  alongside  the  jetties.  When 
the  tonnage  target  rose  on  25  August, 
the  1058th  Engineer  Port  Construction 
and  Repair  Group,  originally  destined 
for  Lorient,  went  to  Granville  to  pre- 
pare additional  coaster  berths.  Oper- 
ated entirely  as  a  coaling  port,  Gran- 
ville averaged  1 ,244  tons  a  day  between 


"'  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  II,  Port  Reconstruction 
and  Repair;  OCE  ETOUSA  Monthly  Rpt  19,  Sep  44. 
and  21,  Dec  44. 


360 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


its  opening  on  15  September  1944  and 
its  closing  on  21  April  1945.  Its  prosaic 
activities  were  violently  interrupted 
shortly  after  midnight  on  9  March  1945, 
when  a  German  task  force  of  about  1 50 
men  from  their  isolated  garrison  on  the 
Channel  Islands  raided  the  little  port, 
causing  about  eighty  casualties  and 
damaging  coasters  and  port  facilities. 

Morlaix  (situated  about  twelve  miles 
up  the  Dossen  River  estuary)  and  the 
small  neighboring  port  of  Roscoff  were 
the  westernmost  of  the  Brittany  ports. 
Consistently  linked  in  all  plans,  they 
were  operated  by  one  headquarters  and 
were  referred  to  as  one  port,  Morlaix- 
Roscoff.  Though  Roscoff  was  tidal, 
Morlaix,  like  Granville,  had  outer  and 
inner  basins.  Neither  port  was  badly 
damaged,  and  the  1057th  Engineer 
Port  Construction  and  Repair  Group 
quickly  restored  them.  The  two  pro- 
vided anchorage  for  six  Liberty  ships 
that  discharged  into  lighters.  Between 
the  opening  day,  5  September,  and  the 
closing  date  of  14  December  1944, 
Morlaix-Roscoff  turned  in  the  best  per- 
formance of  any  of  the  Brittany  group 
of  ports — 2,105  tons  a  day. 

The  Seine  Ports:  Le  Havre  and  Rouen 

Although  Rouen,  lying  seventy-five 
miles  up  the  Seine  River,  fell  on  30 
August  1944,  it  was  unusable  until  Le 
Havre,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Seine,  was 
in  Allied  hands.  The  Germans  held  out 
at  Le  Havre  until  12  September,  caus- 
ing the  big  port — the  second  largest  in 
France — to  be  subjected  to  intensive 
Allied  sea,  air,  and  land  bombardment 
that  destroyed  almost  two-thirds  of  the 
city.  The  Germans  had  also  damaged 
port  facilities  as  at  Cherbourg  and  Gran- 
ville. All  lock  gates  were  out,  an  espe- 


cially serious  matter  because  most  of 
the  port's  activities  had  centered  around 
numerous  wet  basins  and  every  deep- 
water  berth  had  been  destroyed.  Tre- 
mendous engineer  resources  would  be 
needed  to  restore  deepwater  berths. 
Moreover,  port  clearance  problems 
would  increase  at  Le  Havre  because  all 
American  traffic  inland  would  have  to 
cross  British  lines  of  communications. 
For  these  reasons,  and  bolstered  by  the 
expectation  that  Antwerp  (captured  on 
4  September)  would  provide  plenty  of 
port  capacity  closer  to  the  front,  COMZ 
decided  against  undertaking  a  major 
reconstruction  effort  at  Le  Havre. ^ 

An  engineer  task  force  under  Col. 
Frank  F.  Bell,  commanding  officer  of 
the  373d  Engineer  General  Service 
Regiment,  undertook  limited  rehabilita- 
tion of  both  Le  Havre  and  Rouen.  In 
addition  to  his  own  regiment,  Colonel 
Bell  ultimately  had  control  of  the  1055th 
and  1061st  Engineer  Port  Construction 
and  Repair  Groups,  the  392d  Engineer 
General  Service  Regiment,  the  1071st 
Engineer  Port  Repair  Ship  Crew,  the 
1044th  Engineer  Gas  Generating  Unit, 
the  971st  Engineer  Maintenance  Com- 
pany, and  the  577th  Engineer  Dump 
Truck  Company.  He  also  had  under 
his  operational  control  two  Royal  Navy 
parties,  each  equivalent  to  a  U.S.  Army 
engineer  port  construction  and  repair 
group. 

The  373d  Engineers,  moving  by  mo- 
tor convoy  from  the  outskirts  of  Brest, 


'"  Ruppentlial,  Lo^istifdl  Support  of  the  Armies,  Vol- 
ume II.  pp.  96-103,  IH7:  The  Adm  and  Log  Hist  of 
the  ETC),  vol.  VII,  "Opening  and  Operating  (lonti- 
nenlal  Ports,"  pp.  :M-36,  88-97;  History  of  the  (Chan- 
nel Base  Section,  Aitg  44- jim  4,5,  vol.  I,  Adm  588, 
ETOUSA  Hist  Sect;  Hist  Rpt,  Transportation  Corps 
in  the  Emopean  Theater  of  Operations,  Oct— Dec 
44,  vol.  V,  pt.  1,  Adm  582,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect.  Histo- 
ries of  units  mentioned. 


DEVELOPING  BEACHES  AND  RECONSTRUCTING  PORTS 


361 


Blast  Removes  Blockac.e  From  the  Mouth  of  the  Locks  at  St.  Malo 


arrived  in  Le  Havre  on  19  September. 
Road  and  mine  clearance  work  started 
the  next  day  while,  offshore,  naval  sal- 
vage crews  began  clearing  an  entrance 
into  the  harbor.  As  at  other  ports  the 
engineers  first  worked  to  provide  the 
earliest  possible  discharge  of  cargo, 
making  space  on  the  beaches  for  land- 
ing craft,  clearing  storage  areas,  and 
preparing  exits  through  rubble-filled 
streets. 

The  engineers  built  no  timber  pile 
wharves  but  instead  installed  a  number 
of  artificial  piers  to  provide  berths  for 
deep-draft  ships.  One  was  a  floating 
ponton  pier  the  Navy  built;  the  Army 
engineers  provided  the  connection  with 
the  shore — Bailey  bridges  130  feet  long 


that  moved  up  and  down  with  the  tide."^' 
Two  of  the  artificial  piers  used  four 
Phoenixes  originally  designed  for  the 
Mulberry  project.  Another  ingenious 
use  of  existing  materials  was  the  employ- 
ment of  Phion  ferries,  left  over  from 
operations  on  the  D-day  beaches,  to 
construct  floating  piers  in  the  port's  wet 
basins. 

Damage  to  tidal  lock  gates  seriously 
affected  the  wet  basins  at  Le  Havre.  As 
the  tides  rushed  in  and  out,  changes  in 
hydrostatic  pressure  soon  began  to  dam- 


"  Ltr,  Maj  Gen  C.  R.  Moore  to  Brig  (ien  L.  D. 
Worsham,  18  Apr  45,  IncI  2,  Project  Description  of 
Bailey  Bridge  Connection  Floating  Wharf  to  Shore, 
Le  Havre.  Nov  44,  312  (ien  Moore,  EUCOM  Engr 
files. 


362 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


age  quay  walls.  To  stop  this  deteriora- 
tion and  to  make  the  basins  usable  at 
all  stages  of  the  tide,  the  1055th  Engi- 
neer Port  Construction  and  Repair 
Group  repaired  the  Rochemont  lock 
gates,  one  of  the  outstanding  engineer- 
ing achievements  at  Le  Havre.  Failing 
in  several  attempts  to  repair  the  huge 
gates  where  they  hung,  the  engineers 
removed  them  and  repaired  them  in 
dry  dock.  The  rehanging  was  com- 
pleted on  30  November  1944,  and  there- 
after the  tidal  range  within  the  wet 
basins  fell  by  nearly  twenty  feet.  Later 
repairs  along  the  Tancarville  Canal, 
which  connected  with  the  Seine,  in- 
creased the  stabilization. 

The  first  vessels  entered  Le  Havre 
on  2  October,  but  mines  in  the  harbor 
limited  the  arrivals  to  LCTs  and  coast- 
ers until  1 3  October,  when  the  first  Lib- 
erties came  forward.  The  port  never 
developed  the  number  of  alongside  Lib- 
erty berths  that  logisticians  had  plan- 
ned; consequently,  lighters  and  DUKWs 
had  to  bring  ashore  a  large  percentage 
of  the  tonnage.  Nevertheless,  Le  Hav- 
re's cargo  capacity  continued  to  rise 
gratifyingly.  By  the  end  of  December 
more  than  9,500  tons  were  being  dis- 
charged per  day,  considerably  exceed- 
ing expectations.  By  that  time,  the  port 
was  also  making  another  important  con- 
tribution to  the  American  effort  in 
Europe.  Beginning  in  November  1944, 
when  COMZ  shifted  personnel  staging 
from  the  Cotentin  peninsula  to  the 
Seine,  Le  Havre  developed  into  the 
principal  troop  debarkation  point  in 
the  European  theater. ^^ 

Rouen,  the  third  major  port  Ameri- 
can forces  reconstructed  in  Europe,  was 
not  as  badly  damaged  as  Le  Havre. 

'^  Bykofsky  and  Larson,  The  Transportation  Corps: 
Operations  Overseas,  p.  318. 


Although  the  Germans  had  demolished 
cargo-handling  facilities  and  blocked 
the  river  channel  by  sinking  a  number 
of  ships,  the  quays  were  in  good  con- 
dition— some  14,000  feet  were  usable. 
On  the  land  side,  the  marshaling  yards 
adjacent  to  the  port  had  suffered  heavy 
bomb  damage.  This  presented  no  par- 
ticular problem  because  other  marshal- 
ing yards  twelve  miles  away  were  eas- 
ily accessible  over  a  four-lane  highway. 

In  peacetime,  two-thirds  of  the  traf- 
fic between  Rouen  and  Paris  moved  by 
inland  waterways  along  an  eight-foot- 
deep  channel  in  the  Seine  that  could 
handle  barges  up  to  twenty-one  feet 
wide.'^"^  The  largest  task  of  rehabilita- 
tion at  Rouen — the  removal  of  mines, 
sunken  cranes,  ships,  barges,  and  tugs 
from  this  river  channel — fell  mainly  to 
the  U.S.  Navy,  aided  by  French  author- 
ities. The  engineers  removed  debris 
and  filled  in  bomb  craters.  Elements  of 
the  engineer  task  force  in  Le  Havre, 
consisting  of  the  1061st  Engineer  Port 
Construction  and  Repair  Group,  a  Roy- 
al Navy  party,  and  a  platoon  of  the  37th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  undertook 
these  tasks. 

On  15  October  the  first  ships,  coast- 
ers with  POL  from  England,  berthed 
at  Rouen.  Because  the  channel  between 
Le  Havre  and  Rouen  was  shallow,  coast- 
ers were  the  mainstay  of  supply  opera- 
tions at  Rouen.  They  were  so  successful, 
discharging  an  average  of  more  than 
4,000  tons  daily  the  first  week  in  No- 
vember, that  COMZ  ordered  all  coast- 
ers except  those  carrying  coal  to  dis- 
charge at  Rouen.  Barge  operations 
inland,  undertaken  to  meet  civilian 
needs,  began  on  22  November.^"* 


''  Moore,  Final  Report,  p.  275. 

*^  Bykofsky  and  Larson,  The  Transportation  Corps: 
Operations  Overseas,  p.  318. 


DEVELOPING  BEACHES  AND  RECONSTRUCTING  PORTS 


363 


Liberty  ships  could  come  into  Rouen 
only  after  they  had  been  partially  un- 
loaded at  Le  Havre.  Before  neap  tide 
they  had  to  be  trimmed  to  as  little  as  16 
1/2  feet  of  draft,  for  otherwise  the  ships 
would  block  the  channel  for  ten  days 
until  a  spring  tide  came  in.  The  engi- 
neers dredged  channels  to  facilitate  the 
passage  of  deep-draft  ships  through  the 
shoal  water.  In  England  the  U.S.  Army 
engineers  held  four  seagoing,  light  hop- 
per dredges,  originally  dispatched  to 
the  ETO  to  support  canceled  logistical 
operations  along  the  Loire  River.  Only 
one,  which  the  1077th  Engineer  Dredge 
Crew  operated,  had  a  draft  shallow 
enough  to  be  employable  along  the 
Seine.  Although  not  ideally  suited  for 
the  purpose,  the  1077th's  dredge  helped 
facilitate  Liberty  ship  passage  to  Rouen. 
By  the  spring  of  1945  the  port  had  fif- 
teen Liberty  berths  as  compared  to 
twenty-six  for  coasters.^' 

Antwerp  and  Ghent 

A  visit  to  captured  Antwerp,  accord- 
ing to  a  British  engineer  who  had  viewed 
the  battered  ruins  of  other  harbors,  was 
"a  startling  experience."^*'  The  great 
port,  ranking  with  New  York,  Ham- 
burg, and  Rotterdam,  was  in  miracu- 
lously good  condition,  thanks  to  the 
speed  of  the  British  advance  and  Bel- 
gian success  in  forestalling  German 
attempts  at  demolition. 

Situated  on  the  Schelde  River  estu- 
ary fifty-five  miles  from  the  sea,  Ant- 
werp provided  fine  deepwater  quayage, 
75  percent  of  it  along  a  complex  of 
eighteen  wet  basins,  ample  for  the  dis- 


charge of  supplies  for  both  the  British 
and  American  forces.  During  October 
representatives  of  the  two  forces  work- 
ed out  an  agreement,  known  as  the 
"Treaty  of  Antwerp,"  by  which  the 
Americans  were  to  use  the  basins  north 
of  a  line  drawn  through  the  Bassin 
Albert,  the  British  those  to  the  south. 
River  berths  were  to  be  allocated  based 
on  need.  The  expected  tonnage  capac- 
ity was  40,000  tons  a  day  excluding 
POL — 22,500  for  the  Americans  and 
17,500  for  the  British.  Command  of  the 
port  was  the  responsibility  of  the  Brit- 
ish 21  Army  Group;  American  opera- 
tions were  under  Col.  Doswell  Gullatt, 
who  had  commanded  the  5th  Engineer 
Special  Brigade  at  OMAHA.  At  Antwerp 
Gullatt  commanded  the  1 3th  Port  (TC), 
which  had  reached  the  Continent  from 
England  in  October.  The  largest  single 
engineer  element  of  the  13th  Port  was 
the  358th  Engineer  General  Service 
Regiment;  other  engineer  support  in- 
cluded two  depot  and  two  petroleum 
distribution  companies  and  two  of  the 
five  engineer  port  repair  ships  in  the 
ETO.  By  early  December  Gullatt  also 
had  under  his  control  the  5th  Port  (TC), 
sent  forward  to  Antwerp  from  Morlaix- 
Roscoff  in  Brittany." 

Rehabilitation  of  the  port  was  under 
British  control,  with  as  much  Ameri- 
can assistance  as  necessary  to  meet  the 
target  opening  date  of  15  November. 
The  first  major  task  was  repair  of  a 


'"'  Ltr,  Moore  to  Worsham,  4  May  45;  Moore,  Final 
Report,  pp.  272,  404-05. 

^"  0C:E  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  11,  Port  Reconstruction 
and  Repair,  app.  22. 


"  Riippenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Vol- 
ume II,  pp.  105-10;  The  Adm  and  Log  Hist  of  the 
ETO,  vol.  VII,  "Opening  and  Operating  Continental 
Ports,"  p.  169;  Hist  Rpt,  Transportation  Corps  in  the 
European  Theater  of  Operations,  vols.  V  and  VI,  Adm 
582,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect;  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  1 1, 
Port  Reconstruction  and  Repair,  pp.  48-49,  83-90, 
and  apps.  24,  28.  Histories  of  the  units  mentioned. 
Unless  otherwise  cited,  this  section  is  based  on  these 


364 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


lock  controlling  the  Kruisschans  sluice, 
the  longest  of  four  sluices  connecting 
the  wet  basins  with  the  river  and  the 
only  one  leading  into  the  American 
area.  A  German  mine  had  damaged 
one  of  the  gates.  The  358th  Engineer 
General  Service  Regiment  began  work 
on  the  vital  sluice  on  6  November  in 
cooperation  with  the  British.  The  fact 
that  the  sluice  had  both  flood  and  ebb 
gates  made  repair  possible  in  plenty  of 
time  for  the  first  American  Liberty  ship 
to  enter  on  28  November. ^^  American 
engineers  also  removed  sand,  rubble, 
and  damaged  cranes  from  the  quays, 
improved  quays  and  roads,  constructed 
hardstandings  and  trackage,  and  rebuilt 
dockside  warehouses. 

The  V-1  and  V-2  rockets  that  the 
Germans  sent  over  Antwerp  beginning 
in  mid-October  1944  inflicted  surpris- 
ingly little  damage  at  first,  but  in  mid- 
December,  at  the  start  of  the  Battle  of 
the  Ardennes,  rocket  attacks  on  the  city 
intensified.  Between  1 1  and  29  Decem- 
ber thirty  men  of  the  358th  Engi- 
neer General  Service  Regiment  were 
wounded  by  V-bomb  attacks,  twenty- 
nine  seriously;  one  died  of  wounds.  On 
Saturday  afternoon,  16  December,  a 
V  — 2  bomb  scored  a  direct  hit  on  the 
Rex  movie  theater,  killing  567  soldiers 
and  civilians  and  seriously  injuring  29 1 . 
The  358th  Engineers  took  over  rescue 
and  demolition  operations  and  perse- 
vered until  the  last  body  was  recovered 
on  22  December.  For  this  extraordinary 
effort,  the  men  of  the  358th,  their 
commander.  Col.  Chester  L.  Landaker, 
and  the  commander  of  the  regiment's 
2d  Battalion,  Maj.  Roy  S.  Kelley,  were 


""  Lli,  Lt  Col  Floyd  E.  (lidinsky  to  C(.,  COMZ, 
ETOUSA,  1 1  Nov  44,  sub:  Status  Report— Port  ot 
Antwerp,  and  1st  lud.  800  Antwerp,  EUCOM  Engr 
files. 


warmly  thanked  by  the  British  briga- 
dier in  charge  of  the  area,  who  ex- 
pressed his  "highest  admiration  for  the 
manner  in  which  they  worked  under 
such  distressing  circumstances."^^ 

Antwerp  provided  three  means  of 
port  clearance — rail,  truck,  and  inland 
waterway.  Damage  to  tracks  was  minor; 
the  limiting  factor  for  railroad  supply 
movements  was  a  shortage  of  rolling 
stock.  Truck  transport  began  very  early, 
and  a  network  of  roads  to  the  principal 
American  depots  at  Liege-Namur  was 
operational  before  the  end  of  October. 
The  major  British-American  engineer 
effort  was  devoted  to  helping  Belgian 
agencies  open  the  Albert  Canal,  which 
ran  eighty  miles  from  Antwerp  to  Liege, 
The  British  were  responsible  for  clear- 
ing the  western  portion  of  the  canal — 
the  thirty  miles  from  Antwerp  to  Kwa- 
admechelen,  and  the  Americans  the 
remaining  fifty  miles  to  Liege.  The 
work  primarily  involved  repairing  locks 
and  removing  demolished  bridges  and 
sunken  barges.  The  headquarters  ele- 
ment of  the  1056th  Engineer  Port  Con- 
struction and  Repair  Group  supervised 
clearing  operations  in  the  American 
sector,  with  the  332d  and  355th  Engi- 
neer General  Service  Regiments  and 
Belgian  civilian  contractors  undertak- 
ing most  of  the  actual  work.  Although 
twenty-one  blown  bridges,  including 
five  railroad  bridges,  blocked  the  Amer- 
ican sector,  the  engineers  cleared  that 
stretch  for  600-ton  barges  by  the  target 
date  of  15  December  and  for  2,000-ton 
barges  by  9  March  1945.  During  the  win- 
ter ice  and  flooding  hampered  opera- 
tions, and  the  German  counteroffen- 
sive  for  a  time  forced  an  embargo  on 
barge  traffic.  Eventually  50  percent  of 


Hist  ;^58tli  Engr  (;S  Rgt,  1944. 


DEVELOPING  BEACHES  AND  RECONSTRUCTING  PORTS 


365 


all  U.S.  military  tonnage  discharged  at 
Antwerp  moved  inland  along  the  Albert 
Canal.^'* 

After  buzz-bomb  and  rocket  attacks 
and  German  successes  in  the  Ardennes 
raised  the  possibility  that  Antwerp  might 
be  wholly  or  partially  denied  to  the 
Allies,  British  and  American  planners 
decided  in  mid-January  to  open  the 
port  of  Ghent  as  a  standby,  making 
much  the  same  sort  of  agreement  on 
joint  use  as  at  Antwerp.  The  American 
allocation  was  7,500  tons  a  day,  to  be 
cleared  primarily  over  inland  waterways 
and  railroads;  the  British  quota  was  set 
at  5,000  tons. 

Accessible  from  the  sea  via  a  canal 
running  twenty  miles  south  of  Terneu- 
zen  on  the  Schelde  estuary  west  of 
Antwerp,  Ghent  was  in  peacetime  the 
second  port  of  Belgium,  although  its 
traffic  was  restricted  to  barges,  coasters, 
and  small  freighters.  The  war  had  de- 
stroyed locks  at  Terneuzen  and  brid- 
ges across  the  canal,  and  many  small 
craft  were  sunk  in  the  canal.  The  Ger- 
mans had  used  Ghent  only  for  barges, 
mainly  bringing  in  material  used  in  the 
construction  of  the  Atlantic  Wall,  and 
had  dismantled,  removed,  or  neglected 
cranes  on  quays  along  Ghent's  basin. 
The  quays  were  piled  high  with  sand, 
gravel,  scrap  iron,  and  rubbish;  some 
of  the  loading  berths,  undredged  for 
five  years,  had  become  silted.^ 

On  18  December  1944,  the  British 
began  repair  of  the  Terneuzen  locks 
and  removal  of  bridges  and  sunken  ves- 
sels from  the  canal.  American  assistance 
in  rehabilitation  did  not  begin  until 


'"  Moore.  Final  Report,  p.  278. 

"  Llr.  Lt  Col  Carl  H.  Irwin  to  CX),  Channel  Base 
Sect,  (]C)MZ,  3  Dec  44,  sub:  Report  of  Reconnaissance, 
Port  of  (Ihent;  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  II,  Port 
Reconstruction  atid  Repair,  app.  28. 


after  the  arrival  of  the  main  body  of 
the  17th  Port  (TC)  in  mid-January; 
their  immediate  task  was  the  removal 
of  approximately  450,000  tons  of  sand 
and  other  aggregate  from  the  quays. 
Most  of  this  material  the  17th  Port 
loaded  as  ballast  into  outgoing  deep- 
sea  vessels;  the  rest  went  to  Antwerp  to 
be  used  on  roads  and  other  facilities. 
The  American  forces  also  built  roads, 
repaired  cranes,  lifted  wrecks,  and 
dredged  loading  berths  at  the  Grand 
Bassin,  the  principal  dock.  The  U.S. 
Army  hopper  dredge  W.  L.  Marshall, 
with  the  1080th  Engineer  Dredge  Crew 
aboard,  undertook  the  dredging  early 
in  April.  Arriving  at  Antwerp  in  late 
January  to  replace  a  disabled  Army 
dredge,  the  W.  L.  Marshall  had  spent 
more  than  two  months  dredging  along 
the  Schelde  despite  near  misses  by  V^  1 
and  V  — 2  bombs,  which  blew  off  sev- 
eral doors  and  caused  "some  conster- 
nation" among  the  crew."*^ 

The  first  U.S.  vessel  to  pass  the  Ter- 
neuzen locks  and  enter  the  port  of 
Ghent  was  the  Hannis  Taylor,  a  Liberty 
ship  that  berthed  on  23  January  1945. 
She  was  the  first  ship  of  her  size  to  enter 
Ghent,  and  her  passage  through  the 
locks,  which  Belgian  and  Dutch  naval 
authorities  considered  impassable  for 
ships  of  such  beam,  was  a  triumph. 
After  the  Hannis  Taylors  entry,  Liber- 
ties went  through  regularly,  with  a 
clearance  of  only  one  foot  on  either 
side.  In  line  with  the  chief  of  trans- 
portation's policy  to  keep  Ghent  free 
of  cargo  so  that  the  port  would  be  avail- 
able in  case  the  Allies  had  to  abandon 
Antwerp,  unloadings  were  limited  to 
2,500  tons  a  day  during  the  first  month 


'-  Hist  I08()th  Engr  Dredge  Crew,  22  Nov  43-25 
Nov  45. 


366 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


of  operations.  This  rate  more  than  dou- 
bled in  March,  and  in  the  final  month 
before  V  — E  Day  an  average  of  9,500 
tons  a  day  was  discharging  at  Ghent. 

For  all  their  accomplishments  in  port 
reconstruction  in  Europe  following  D- 
day,  the  engineers  were  never  really 
able  to  keep  up  with  the  demands  of 
harbor  improvement  until  well  into  the 
spring  of  1945.  Statistics  on  discharges 
of  ships  showed  continual  increase,  but 
the  shortages  of  berthing  capacity  for 
vessels  on  the  Continent  and  the  inade- 
quate depot  system  for  bulk  supply  in 
the  theater  contributed  heavily  to  the 
supply  crises  during  the  latter  part  of 
the  year.  Basing  estimates  on  combat 


requirements  instead  of  on  port  capac- 
ities. General  Lee's  COMZ  headquar- 
ters consistently  overstated  the  number 
of  ships  the  logistical  structure  in  the 
ports  could  handle  in  a  single  month. 
The  excess  shipments  created  a  bottle- 
neck at  that  point  in  the  supply  chain. 
Without  unloading  capacity,  the  ships 
piled  up  offshore,  remaining  idle  as 
floating  warehouses  instead  of  return- 
ing to  more  efficient  use  in  the  ship- 
ping pool  on  the  high  seas.  Only  with 
the  capture  and  the  eventual  develop- 
ment of  Antwerp  and  Ghent  did  the 
backlog  clear  up  and  the  port  capacity 
grow  to  a  size  large  enough  to  support 
the  last  drive  into  Germany. 


CHAPTER  XVII 


Combat  Engineers  in  the  Breakout 

and  Pursuit 


While  engineers  at  Cherbourg  were 
beginning  the  task  of  port  reconstruc- 
tion late  in  June,  others  on  the  plain 
south  of  Carentan  were  preparing  to 
help  First  Army  combat  troops  advance 
to  a  point  from  which  they  could  break 
through  German  defenses  and  sweep 
south  toward  Brittany  and  east  toward 
the  Seine.  The  advance  was  to  follow 
three  main  roads,  one  leading  through 
La  Haye-du-Puits  down  the  west  coast 
of  the  Cotentin  to  Coutances,  another 
from  Carentan  southwest  to  Periers, 
and  the  third  south  from  Carentan  to 
St.  Lo.  The  VIII  Corps,  which  had 
become  operational  on  the  Continent 
on  15  June,  was  to  advance  on  Cou- 
tances; VII  Corps,  which  had  swiftly 
turned  around  after  the  capture  of 
Cherbourg,  was  to  head  for  Periers; 
and  part  of  XIX  Corps  was  to  drive 
toward  St.  Lo.  The  VIII  Corps,  on  the 
west  or  right  flank,  was  to  lead  off  on  3 

July.' 


'  Martin  Blumenson,  BKeakout  and  Pursuit,  United 
States  Army  in  World  War  II  (Washington,  1961),  p. 
40.  Unless  otherwise  cited,  tactical  information  in  this 
chapter  is  based  on  this  source.  Information  on  engi- 
neering activities  is  based  on  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt 
10,  Combat  Engineering  (United  Kingdom),  1946, 
Liaison  Sect,  Intel  Div,  ETOUSA  Adm  file  547,  and 
histories  of  the  engineer  units  mentioned. 


At  the  neck  of  the  Cotentin  penin- 
sula the  Germans  had  a  powerful  ally 
in  the  terrain.  About  half  of  the  Caren- 
tan plain  was  so  marshy  that  passage  by 
foot  was  difficult,  by  vehicle  impossible. 
The  other  half  consisted  of  small  fields 
separated  by  hedgerows — thick  para- 
pets of  dirt  from  three  to  twelve  feet 
high  topped  by  hedges  of  trees  and 
vines  that  grew  as  tall  as  fifteen  feet  in 
some  places.  Because  of  the  height  of 
the  hedgerows,  the  wagon  trails  that 
wound  among  them  seemed  to  be  sun- 
ken roads.  The  advantage  of  such  ter- 
rain to  the  defender  was  obvious.  Pro- 
viding concealment  for  riflemen,  ma- 
chine gunners,  and  artillery,  hedgerows 
were,  in  effect,  miniature  fortified  lines. 
Combat  forces  required  close  engineer 
support  to  open  gaps  through  which 
tanks  could  advance,  delivering  ma- 
chine-gun and  point-blank  artillery  fire. 
Ordnance  units  developed  a  hedgerow 
cutter  by  welding  prongs  to  the  front 
of  a  tank,  enabling  it  to  slice  through 
hedgerows  without  exposing  its  vulner- 
able underbelly  and  thus  to  cut  an 
opening  through  which  other  tanks 
could  follow.  Where  hedgerows  were 
so  thick  that  cutter  tanks  could  not 
break  through,  the  engineers  had  first 
to  blow  a  breach  with  a  heavy  satchel 
charge. 


368 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


The  Road  to  Coutances 

In  the  VIII  Corps  sector  the  Germans 
had  another  terrain  advantage,  a  horse- 
shoe-shaped ring  of  hills  around  La 
Haye-du-Puits.  So  commanding  were 
these  hills  that  from  their  crests  the  Ger- 
mans could  watch  the  shipping  off  the 
Allied  beaches.  Enemy  artillery  denied 
to  VIII  Corps  the  main  roads  leading 
to  the  town,  forcing  the  corps'  units  to 
use  lateral  one-way  roads  and  heavily 
mined  lanes.  Engineers  supporting  the 
three  divisions  moving  out  abreast  in  a 
drenching  rain  early  on  3  July  had  to 
clear  the  narrow  roads  of  mines  and 
then  to  widen  them  for  two-way  traffic.^ 

Each  division,  the  82d  Airborne  in 
the  center,  the  79th  on  the  west  (right), 
and  the  90th  on  the  east  (left),  had  its 
organic  engineer  combat  battalion.  In 
addition,  on  17  June  First  Army  attached 
to  VIII  Corps  the  1110th  Engineer 
Combat  Group,  which  had  supported 
VII  Corps  during  the  advance  to  Cher- 
bourg. The  group  commander  placed 
the  300th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion 
behind  the  79th  Division,  the  148th 
behind  the  82d  Airborne  Division,  and 
the  207th  behind  the  90th  Division.  The 
group  also  had  a  light  ponton  company 
and  a  treadway  bridge  company,  which, 
split  into  platoons,  could  provide  sup- 
port to  the  divisions  as  needed. 

The  VIII  Corps  advanced  to  La  Haye- 
du-Puits  in  a  flying  wedge  formation 
with  the  82d  Airborne  Division  at  the 
apex.  Squads  of  the  division's  307th 
Airborne  Engineer  Battalion  accom- 
panied battalions  of  parachute  infantry, 
clearing  roads  of  mines  to  enable  sup- 
porting tanks  to  advance.  The  mine 
detectors  and  tanks  drew  enemy  small- 
arms  and  artillery  fire  that  caused  heavy 

-  Hist  315th  Engr  C  Bn,  7  Mar  44- May  45. 


losses  among  mine  detector  crews.  Never- 
theless, the  crack  airborne  engineers 
who  had  dropped  with  the  82d  Air- 
borne Division  in  the  early  hours  of 
D-day  boasted  that  "the  enemy  pioneer 
obstacles  had  no  effect  on  the  tactical 
situation.  The  whole  thing  resolved 
itself  into  a  sort  of  game  between  the 
pioneers  and  the  engineers."^ 

The  82d  Airborne  Division  met  the 
weakest  resistance  during  the  VIII  Corps' 
advance,  encountering  mainly  Poles 
and  Georgians  whose  morale  was  poor 
and  who  seemed  happy  to  surrender. 
From  these  prisoners  the  engineers 
gained  considerable  information  about 
the  Germans'  use  of  land  mines.  They 
employed  the  flat,  antitank  Teller  mine 
with  considerable  ingenuity — some- 
times burying  them  three  deep  in  such 
a  way  that  the  two  bottom  mines  were 
not  visible  even  when  the  top  one  was 
removed;  sometimes  equipping  the 
mines  with  a  second  fuse  at  the  bottom, 
timed  to  go  off  after  the  demolitionists 
had  unscrewed  the  top  fuse;  sometimes 
burying  mines  upside  down  with  a  push 
igniter  that  converted  the  Teller  into 
an  antipersonnel  mine.  The  familiar 
antipersonnel  S-mine  was  now  equip- 
ped with  a  wire  that  would  set  off  a 
block  of  TNT  when  the  mine  was  lifted. 
The  engineers  also  discovered  a  new 
type  of  antipersonnel  mine  called  a 
"Mustard  Pot,"  which  consisted  of  a  50- 
mm.  mortar  shell  equipped  with  a  chem- 
ical igniter.^ 


'  Hist  307th  Abn  Engr  Bn,  Normandy  (Campaign, 
6  Jun-15  Jul  44. 

'  Hist  148th  Engr  C  Bn,  Jun  44,  Oct  44,  and  Dec 
44;  Hist  207th  Engr  C  Bn.Nov  43-Dec  44.  At  the 
end  of  June  the  paratroopers  had  discovered  a  (Ger- 
man artillery  shell  that  contained,  instead  of  explosives, 
notes  in  Polish  encouraging  the  Allies.  William  (i.  Lord 
III,  History  of  the  508th  Parachute  Infantry  (Washington: 
Infantry  journal  Press,  1948),  p.  32;  315th  Engr  C 


COMBAT  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  BREAKOUT  AND  PURSUIT 


369 


By  daybreak  on  7  July  the  82d  Air- 
borne Division  had  gained  its  objective, 
and  its  troops,  longest  in  combat  on  the 
Continent,  were  "lying  in  rain-filled  slit 
trenches"  beginning  "to  sweat  out  the 
much-rumored  trip  to  England."^  On 
the  right  the  79th  held  the  heights  west 
of  La  Haye-du-Puits  but  had  been  un- 
able to  take  the  town.  This  division, 
which  had  participated  in  the  conquest 
of  Cherbourg,  had  encountered  enemy 
troops  of  better  caliber,  including  a  bat- 
talion of  Waffen  SS  troops.  Ingenious 
mines  and  booby  traps  also  slowed  the 
79th.  When  an  infantry  battalion  at- 
tempted a  reconnaissance-in-force  of 
La  Haye-du-Puits  during  the  afternoon 
of  7  July,  the  troops  ran  into  "mine- 
studded  fields  strung  with  checker- 
board patterns  of  piano  wire  about  a 
foot  off  the  ground  and  the  booby  traps 
set  to  blow  off  a  leg  any  time  you  tripped 
the  strands."*^ 

On  the  east,  or  left,  flank  of  the 
V-shaped  advance,  the  inexperienced 
90th  Division  had  hard  going  from  the 
moment  it  jumped  off  on  3  July.  By  7 
July  the  division's  foothold  on  a  ridge 
east  of  La  Haye-du-Puits  known  as 
Mont  Castre  was  so  precarious  that  it 
had  to  call  on  its  organic  engineer  com- 
bat battalion,  the  3 15th,  for  combat  sup- 
port at  the  highest  point  of  the  ridge 
line,  Hill  122.  Companies  A,  B,  and  C, 
which  had  been  doing  mine  sweeping, 
road  clearing,  and  other  engineer  tasks 
in  support  of  the  357th,  358th,  and 
359th  Regimental  Combat  Teams,  were 
alerted  shortly  before  midnight  on  the 

Bp,  Mine  and  Booby  Trap  Bull  3,  Mine  Helpers,  20 
Jul  44,  in  Opns  Rpt,  315th  Engr  C  Bn,  90th  Inf  Div, 
Jul  44. 

■'  Lord,  Hist  of  the  508th  Parachute  Infantiy.  p.  37. 

''  Warren  A.  Robinson,  Through  Combat:  3 Nth  Infan- 
try Regiment  (Salt  Lake  City:  Lorraine  Press,  1948),  pp. 
21-22. 


seventh  to  move  out  as  infantry,  at- 
tached to  the  358th  Regimental  Com- 
bat Team.  Late  in  June  the  battalion 
had  trained  in  firing  bazookas  and 
heavy  machine  guns,  and  on  3  July  it 
had  contributed  a  bazooka  team  to  help 
rescue  men  trapped  under  German 
self-propelled  artillery  fire.  Moreover, 
the  battalion  had  a  mortar  section  made 
up  of  one  squad  from  each  line  com- 
pany, each  squad  being  armed  with  two 
captured  German  80-mm.  trench  mor- 
tars. 

The  mortar  section  occupied  a  posi- 
tion near  the  base  of  Hill  122,  protect- 
ing the  right  flank  of  the  90th  Division. 
The  lettered  companies  went  into  action 
on  the  hill  at  dawn  on  8  July.  Battalion 
headquarters  and  the  battalion  aid  sta- 
tion set  up  in  a  gravel  quarry  behind 
the  lines.  Between  8  and  1 1  July  the 
battalion  sustained  ten  casualties  from 
enemy  artillery,  which  reached  even 
headquarters  company's  position,  nor- 
mally out  of  range,  destroying  the  kit- 
chen truck. 

After  11  July  the  situation  on  VIII 
Corps'  front  began  to  improve.  That 
day  the  358th  Infantry  was  able  to 
descend  the  south  slope  of  Hill  122, 
and  the  division  commander  returned 
the  engineers  to  their  normal  tasks.  By 
noon  on  9  July,  the  79th  Division  had 
taken  La  Haye-du-Puits  and  turned  it 
over  to  the  8th  Division,  which  had 
come  foward  to  replace  the  82d  Air- 
borne Division,  soon  to  return  to  En- 
gland. Five  days  later  the  8th  and  79th 
Divisions  were  occupying  the  north 
bank  of  the  Ay  River  and  reconnoiter- 
ing  for  crossing  sites  to  Lessay,  still  in 
German  hands.  The  90th  Division  was 
at  the  Seves  River  near  Periers. 

Between  the  3  July  jump-off  and  14 
July,  VIII  Corps  had  advanced  only 


370 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


some  seven  miles  through  the  hedge- 
rows— about  one-third  of  the  distance 
to  Coutances — but  had  suffered  more 
than  10,000  casualties.  Lt.  Gen.  Omar 
N.  Bradley,  commanding  First  Army, 
changed  tactics,  planning  the  breakout 
not  across  the  Coutances  — St.  Lo  road, 
Route  172,  but  across  Route  800  from 
Lessay  through  Periers  to  St.  Lo.  The 
operation,  called  COBRA,  was  to  begin 
on  21  July.  In  the  interim,  the  VIII 
Corps'  divisional  combat  engineer  teams 
provided  demonstrations  to  infantry 
troops  on  clearing  mines  and  blowing 
hedgerows  and  benefited  from  a  gen- 
eral program  of  reequipping  and  re- 
habilitation. The  1 1 10th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Group  provided  hot  showers  for 
the  badly  crippled  90th  Division. 

The  Road  to  Periers 

There  was  little  room  to  maneuver. 
For  the  attack  south  from  Carentan  to 
Periers,  VII  Corps  had  the  4th  and  9th 
Infantry  Divisions,  which  had  partici- 
pated in  the  capture  of  Cherbourg,  and 
the  83d  Division,  which  had  arrived  in 
Normandy  late  in  June  to  relieve  the 
101st  Airborne  Division.  To  reach  its 
objective  the  corps  had  to  pass  down  a 
corridor  resembling  an  isthmus  two  to 
three  miles  wide,  with  marshes  on  either 
side.  This  restricted  the  advance  at  the 
outset  to  two  divisions;  the  83d  was  to 
lead  off  on  4  July,  followed  by  the  4th. 
The  9th  was  not  to  be  committed  until 
the  leading  divisions  had  taken  objec- 
tives on  the  Periers— St.  Lo  road. 

In  addition  to  their  organic  engineer 
combat  battalions,  the  divisions  had  the 
support  of  two  engineer  combat  groups: 
the  1 106th,  with  engineer  combat  bat- 
talions behind  the  83d  and  9th  Divi- 
sions, and  the  1120th,  supporting  the 


4th  Division  and  corps  troops.  The 
commander  of  the  1106th  Engineer 
Combat  Group,  Col.  Thomas  DeF.  Rog- 
ers, first  had  to  undo  previous  engi- 
neer efforts — drain  the  Douve  marshes 
that  had  been  flooded  to  protect  VII 
Corps'  rear  on  its  march  to  Cherbourg 
and  clear  a  huge  minefield  that  Ameri- 
can forces  had  planted  below  Carentan 
to  protect  the  101st  Airborne  Division 
from  a  frontal  attack.  Two  companies 
of  the  238th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion had  the  task  of  lifting  the  mines. 
Although  enemy  artillery  and  small- 
arms  fire  slowed  the  work,  they  re- 
moved 1 2,000  mines  in  two  days.  Mean- 
while, battalions  from  both  engineer 
combat  groups  drained  marshes  and 
maintained  and  guarded  bridges  over 
the  Douve  River. 

When  the  83d  Division  jumped  off 
on  the  Fourth  of  July  behind  a  ten- 
minute  artillery  preparation — "plenty 
of  fireworks,  but  of  a  deadlier  kind  than 
those  back  home" — its  308th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion,  backed  by  the  238th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  built  hasty 
bridges,  maintained  defensive  positions 
at  night,  and  blew  hedgerows  so  that 
tanks  could  advance.^  The  Germans, 
protected  behind  the  hedgerows,  re- 
acted strongly  with  artillery  and  ma- 
chine-gun fire.  The  advance  down  the 
narrow  isthmus  went  so  slowly  that  after 
two  days  the  VII  Corps  commander 
turned  the  83d  Division  east  toward  the 
Taute  River  to  make  room  to  commit 
the  4th  Division.  That  division,  with 
engineer  support  from  its  organic  4th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  and  the 
1 102d  Combat  Group's  298th  Engineer 


^  Thunderbolt  Across  Europe:  A  History  of  the  83d  Infan- 
try Division  1942-1945  (Munich:  F.  Bruckmann, 
1945),  p.  29. 


COMBAT  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  BREAKOUT  AND  PURSUIT 


371 


Combat  Battalion,  also  had  hard  going. 
Six  miles  northeast  of  Periers  the  nar- 
row neck  of  high  land  descended  into  a 
rain-swollen  bog.  Leading  elements 
reached  this  point  on  8  July.  A  week 
later,  still  four  miles  south  of  Periers, 
the  4th  Division  halted  and  went  into 
reserve.  In  ten  days  of  fighting  it  had 
sustained  2,500  casualties. 

Thus,  by  mid-July  the  advance  to 
Periers  along  the  narrow  isthmus  from 
Carentan  had  come  to  a  standstill.  First 
Army  reorganized  the  whole  front.  The 
83d  Division  (less  its  330th  Infantry), 
badly  crippled  by  5,000  casualties  in 
twelve  days  of  combat  and  stalled  at 
the  western  bank  of  the  Taute  River, 
began  to  relieve  the  4th  Division  and 
passed  to  the  control  of  VIII  Corps. 
The  main  VII  Corps  effort  then  focused 
on  high  ground  near  St.  Lo. 

The  Road  to  St.  Lo 

Two  infantry  divisions  were  to  spear- 
head the  XIX  Corps'  advance  toward 
St.  Lo,  the  30th  down  the  west  bank  of 
the  Vire  and  the  29th  down  the  east 
bank.  The  30th  Division  deployed  in 
an  arc  extending  from  the  north  bank 
of  the  Vire  and  Taute  Canal  (which  ran 
southeast  from  a  point  near  Carentan 
on  the  Taute  to  a  point  just  north  of 
Airel  on  the  Vire)  to  the  east  bank  of 
the  Vire  near  Airel.  The  division  had 
to  put  its  120th  Infantry  across  the 
canal  and  its  1 17th  and  1 19th  over  the 
river.  After  the  troops  assembled  near 
St.  Jean-de-Daye,  a  crossroads  village 
about  three  miles  from  the  canal  and 
from  the  river,  they  had  to  push  through 
hedgerow  country  for  nine  miles  to 
reach  their  objective  on  the  highway 
leading  west  from  St.  Lo  to  Coutances. 
The  29th  Division  would  presumably 


have  easier  going  down  the  high  ground 
east  of  the  Vire  to  its  objective,  St.  Lo. 
Therefore,  the  30th  Division  was  to  lead 
off  on  7  July,  with  the  29th  not  commit- 
ted until  the  30th  was  about  halfway  to 
its  objective.  A  third  XIX  Corps  infan- 
try division,  the  35th,  was  then  arriving 
in  France  and  was  to  be  committed 
either  east  or  west  of  the  Vire  as  cir- 
cumstances dictated.  The  XIX  Corps 
also  might  receive  an  armored  division 
for  use  west  of  the  Vire,  but  this  was 
not  certain  when  the  30th  Division 
jumped  off  on  7  July. 

The  30th  Division  had  the  support 
of  its  organic  105th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion,  backed  by  the  1104th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Group,  which  supplied 
the  247th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion 
at  the  Vire  River  crossing  and  the  246th 
Battalion  at  the  canal.  Both  were  to 
have  the  aid  of  platoons  of  the  group's 
992d  Engineer  Treadway  Bridge  Com- 
pany and  503d  Engineer  Light  Ponton 
Company.  Since  mid-June  the  105th 
Battalion's  companies  had  been  recon- 
noitering  for  crossing  sites,  readying 
equipment,  and  making  practice  cross- 
ings near  the  mouth  of  the  Vire  River. 

The  Vire  Crossings  at  Airel 

Before  dawn  on  7  July,  in  drizzling 
rain  and  fog.  Company  A  of  the  105th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  met  the 
117th  Infantry  at  the  site  selected  for 
the  first  Vire  River  crossing,  just  north 
of  Airel.  There  the  river  was  about  sixty 
feet  wide  and  from  nine  to  fourteen 
feet  deep.  Because  the  river  had  steep 
banks,  at  least  six  feet  high,  the  engi- 
neers and  infantrymen  carried  scaling 
ladders  with  grappling  hooks  in  addi- 
tion to  twelve-man  rubber  assault  boats. 
To  the  comforting  sound  of  a  heavy 


372 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


artillery  preparation  that  began  at  0330, 
the  first  wave  of  thirty-two  boats  got 
under  way  at  0420,  the  men  of  the 
weapons  platoons  dumping  their  mor- 
tars and  machine  guns  into  the  boats 
and  swimming  alongside  to  avoid  swamp- 
ing the  frail  craft.  The  1 17th  Infantry 
was  experienced,  having  demonstrated 
river  crossing  at  the  Infantry  School, 
Fort  Benning,  Georgia.  In  ten  minutes 
the  men  were  scrambling  up  the  scal- 
ing ladders  on  the  far  shore. 

Enemy  artillery  opened  up  just  as  the 
engineer  boats  were  returning  to  the 
near  shore,  and  the  second  and  third 
boat  waves  crossed  under  heavy  shel- 
ling. The  worst  victim  of  German  fire 
was  a  platoon  of  Company  B,  105th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  which  was 
attempting  to  build  a  footbridge.  The 
platoon  had  six  bays  in  the  water  when 
direct  artillery  hits  destroyed  them. 
Another  concentration  killed  four  men 
and  wounded  four  more.  Still  under 
fire,  the  engineers  had  scarcely  finished 
a  second  bridge  when  enemy  artillery 
tore  the  span  loose  from  its  moorings 
and  wounded  several  men.  Some  of  the 
engineers  swam  into  the  river  and  se- 
cured the  bridge,  and  by  0530  the 
troops  had  a  footbridge.  The  engineer 
platoon,  which  had  lost  half  its  men, 
was  awarded  a  Distinguished  Unit  Cita- 
tion for  its  heroic  action.^ 

While  the  infantry  was  streaming 
over  the  footbridge,  combat  engineers 
began  getting  the  division's  vehicles  and 
tanks  across  the  Vire.  A  seven-arch 
stone  bridge  spanned  the  river  at  Airel, 
but  it  was  badly  cratered.  The  247th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  began  work 


on  the  bridge  at  0700,  finding  on  it  a 
truck  that  a  German  shell  had  hit  a  few 
days  before.  At  the  steering  wheel  was 
the  body  of  the  driver  and  behind  the 
truck  two  other  bodies.  Removing  the 
corpses  and  winching  away  the  truck, 
the  engineers  first  cleared  mines  from 
the  bridge  and  then  set  to  work,  under 
concentrated  artillery  fire,  to  cover 
holes  and  gaps.  With  the  aid  of  a  pla- 
toon of  the  992d  Bridge  Company,  the 
247th  brought  up  a  108-foot  floating 
treadway  bridge  on  Brockway  trucks, 
which  had  hydraulic  booms  to  lift  the 
heavy  steel  treadways  and  emplace  them 
over  the  craters.  In  the  process  both 
engineer  units  suffered  heavy  casual- 
ties, mostly  burns  from  white  phospho- 
rus shells,  but  the  stone  bridge  was 
usable  by  0900.  After  a  bulldozer  had 
passed  over  the  treadway  and  cleared 
Airel  of  rubble,  and  after  a  battalion  of 
the  i  19th  Infantry  had  crossed  to  pro- 
tect the  bridgehead,  tanks  and  tank 
destroyers  began  rolling  over  the  bridge 
around  noon.^ 

By  this  time  the  engineers  had  con- 
structed additional  vehicular  bridges 
near  Airel.  One  was  an  84-foot  infan- 
try support  bridge,  which  the  503d 
Engineer  Light  Ponton  Company  began 
at  0730  and  finished  in  less  thap  an 
hour.  The  other  was  a  floating  tread- 
way just  south  of  the  stone  bridge,  built 
under  heavy  artillery  and  machine-gun 
fire  that  cost  Company  A  of  the  247th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  four  men 
killed  and  seven  wounded.  The  bridge 
was  in  by  1130.  Thus,  at  noon  on  7 
July,  the  30th  Division  had  the  three 
bridges  initially  planned,  the  stone 
bridge  and  the  treadway  for  one-way 


^  Robert  L.  Hewitt,  Work  Horse  of  the  Western  Front: 
The  Story  of  the  30th  Infantry  Division  (Washington: 
Infantry  journal  Press,  1946),  pp.  25-27. 


"Jnl,  Engr  Sect,  XIX  Corps,  1-31  Jul  44,  in  XIX 
Corps  (i-4  AAR,  ans.  A-(i. 


COMBAT  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  BREAKOUT  AND  PURSUIT 


373 


traffic  east  and  the  infantry  support 
bridge  for  casualties  and  traffic  mov- 
ing west. 

Before  the  day  was  over  events  placed 
additional  burdens  on  the  group  engi- 
neers. Early  in  the  afternoon  the  infan- 
try support  bridge,  weakened  from  shel- 
ling, was  put  out  of  action  when  a  half- 
track and  trailer  crashed  through  it, 
fouling  the  ponton  structure.  The  bridge 
had  not  yet  been  repaired  when  Com- 
bat Command  B  of  the  3d  Armored 
Division,  ordered  to  cross  the  Vire  at 
Airel  on  the  evening  of  7  July,  arrived. 
This  formidable  convoy  created  a  traf- 
fic jam  at  the  stone  bridge.  On  8  and  9 
July  group  engineers  repaired  the  infan- 
try support  bridge,  widened  the  stone 
bridge  to  take  two-way  traffic  includ- 
ing armor,  and  built  a  ninety-foot  triple- 
single  Bailey  to  supplement  it.'*^ 

The  Crossing  of  the  Vire  and  Taute  Canal 

The  120th  Infantry  was  to  cross  the 
twenty-foot-wide  Vire  and  Taute  Canal 
at  the  point  where  Route  174,  the  high- 
way from  Carentan  to  St.  Lo,  crossed 
the  canal,  but  the  bridge  there  was 
down.  Because  the  canal  was  quite  shal- 
low, the  plan  was  for  most  of  the  infan- 
trymen to  wade  over.  For  troops  of  the 
heavy  weapons  companies  and  for  the 
litter  bearers  evacuating  casualties, 
Company  C  of  the  105th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  fabricated  duck- 
boards  in  ten-foot  sections. 

The  crossing  was  to  begin  at  1330  on 
7  July.  At  midmorning  the  XIX  Corps 
engineer  received  a  message  from  the 
corps  G— 3  that  the  water  in  the  canal 
was  deeper  than  expected,  presumably 


because  the  Germans  had  opened  locks 
that  controlled  the  tidal  stream.  The 
corps  engineer  ordered  the  1104th 
Engineer  Combat  Group  to  close  the 
locks,  but  the  unit  could  not  do  so  in 
time  to  ease  the  crossing.  Finding  the 
canal  deeper  and  wider  than  they  had 
expected,  the  infantrymen  hesitated  to 
start  wading,  and  the  engineers  found 
their  duckboards  inadequate.  After 
some  confusion  and  a  fifteen-minute 
delay,  the  lead  troops  of  the  120th 
Infantry  finally  plunged  into  the  canal, 
and  the  men  of  the  105th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  erected  a  footbridge 
in  thirty-five  minutes.  Heavy  enemy 
artillery,  mortar,  and  small-arms  fire 
cost  the  engineers  five  men  killed  and 
twenty-six  wounded." 

Continuous  German  artillery  fire  at 
the  site  of  the  destroyed  Route  174 
bridge  delayed  for  several  hours  the 
emplacement  of  a  bridge  that  could 
accommodate  the  tanks  of  the  113th 
Cavalry  Group,  Mechanized.  In  a  rear 
area,  Company  A  of  the  1 104th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Group's  246th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  had  constructed  thirty- 
six  feet  of  treadway  bridge,  loaded  it 
on  Brockway  trucks,  and  was  waiting 
only  for  some  halt  in  the  artillery  fire 
to  emplace  the  treadway.  On  an  order 
at  1615  from  the  commanding  general 
of  the  30th  Division  to  disregard  enemy 
fire  and  erect  the  bridge,  the  engineers 
arranged  with  divisional  artillery  to  lay 
down  a  smoke  barrage.  The  emplace- 
ment required  split-second  timing.  As 
the  first  smoke  shells  landed,  men  of 
the  246th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion, 


'"  Ibid.;  Hist  XIX  Corps  Engrs,  p.  6,  ML  2220, 
ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 


"  Jni,  Engr  Sect.  XIX  Corps,  1-31  Jul  44:  War 
Department,  Historical  Div,  St.  Lo,  {7  July- 19  July 
19-44),  American  Forces  in  Action  Series  (Washington, 
1944),  p.  15. 


374 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


aided  by  the  992d  Treadway  Bridge 
Company,  brought  the  Brockways  up 
to  the  site;  they  had  the  treadways  in 
place  in  less  than  twenty  minutes,  just 
as  the  smoke  screen  lifted.  Traffic  start- 
ed flowing  across  immediately.  The 
120th  Infantry  commended  Company 
A  of  the  246th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion for  a  "fine  job. "'^ 

The  VII  Corps  in  the  Vire-Taute  Area 

To  protect  XIX  Corps'  right  flank 
and  to  help  VII  Corps  outflank  Ger- 
man resistance  on  the  Carentan-Periers 
corridor,  General  Bradley  decided  to 
commit  VII  Corps'  9th  Division  in  the 
area  between  the  Taute  and  Vire  Rivers. 
The  division  crossed  the  Vire  and  Taute 
Canal  on  9  July  and  next  day  attacked 
west  toward  the  Taute  River.  In  addi- 
tion to  its  own  15th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion,  the  9th  Division  had  the 
direct  support  of  the  237th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion,  1106th  Engineer 
Combat  Group,  a  battalion  that  had  dis- 
tinguished itself  in  the  D-day  landings 
at  Utah  Beach.  The  group  commander 
explained  the  meaning  of  "direct  sup- 
port" to  the  engineer  battalion  and 
company  commanders  at  a  conference 
on  the  evening  before  the  canal  cross- 
ing. He  defined  it  as  doing  "anything 
within  reason  to  assist  the  attacking 
divisions."'^ 

This  the  engineers  did.  While  the 
15th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  con- 
centrated on  furnishing  hedgerow-blast- 
ing teams  and  performing  road  work 
and  mine  clearance,  the  237th  made  a 


'■■^  Hist  XIX  Corps  Engrs,  p.  6,  ML  2220,  ETOUSA 
Hist  Sect;  History  of  the  120th  Infantry  Regiment  (Wash- 
ington: Infantry  Journal  Press,  1947),  p.  18. 

^^  Hist  1  I06th  Engr  C  Gp,  Jun-Dec  44. 


major  contribution  in  bridging,  build- 
ing bypasses,  widening  and  patching 
roads,  and  clearing  mines.  During  mine- 
field clearance  northwest  of  St.  Jean- 
de-Daye,  the  engineers  discovered  a 
new  type  of  German  mine — the  "bottle 
mine" — made  from  a  quart  v/ine  bottle, 
the  lower  half  filled  with  earth,  the 
upper  half  with  a  yellow  crystalline 
explosive  mixed  with  copper  wire,  nails, 
and  tin,  and  corked  with  an  igniter.  The 
engineers  worked  often  under  artillery 
fire  and  in  the  face  of  several  strong 
German  counterattacks. 

Vire  Crossings  from  Air  el  to  St.  Lo 

While  the  30th  Division  battered  its 
way  down  the  high  ridge  west  of  the 
Vire,  XIX  Corps'  35th  and  29th  Divi- 
sions advanced  down  the  east  bank.  The 
35th,  nearer  the  river,  had  the  support 
of  the  234th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion, attached  to  the  1115th  Engineer 
Combat  Group. 

The  next  bridge  was  to  be  erected 
near  Cavigny,  about  halfway  between 
Airel  and  Pont-Hebert,  about  four  miles 
to  the  south.  In  planning,  the  com- 
manding officer  of  the  1 1 15th  Group 
used  aerial  photographs  and  maps,  but 
according  to  group  policy  the  final  deci- 
sion on  the  type  of  bridge  to  be  used, 
treadway  or  Bailey  (both  types  were 
available),  depended  on  reconnaissance 
at  the  site.  To  get  exact  measurements 
the  site  selection  party  sometimes  had 
to  wade  and  swim  the  river  under  heavy 
enemy  artillery,  mortar,  and  small-arms 
fire.  Although  the  Germans  had  good 
observation  of  the  bridge  site  at  Cavig- 
ny, the  247th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion was  able  to  install  a  1 10-foot  triple- 
single  Bailey  bridge  there  on  12  July. 

Next  day  the  group  received  orders 


COMBAT  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  BREAKOUT  AND  PURSUIT 


375 


to  build  a  bridge  over  the  Vire  a  mile 
or  so  farther  south,  at  La  Meauffe. 
Moving  on  the  heels  of  the  infantry, 
the  234th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion 
reached  the  work  site  on  16  July  almost 
before  the  last  German  had  left.  By 
midnight  the  men  had  erected  a  Bailey 
similar  to  that  at  Cavigny,  a  treadway 
bridge,  and  a  bypass  to  route  heavy  traf- 
fic away  from  the  railroad  overpass, 
which  artillery  fire  had  seriously  weak- 
ened. The  503d  Engineer  Light  Pon- 
ton Company,  attached  to  the  1115th 
Group  on  15  July,  brought  up  the  Bai- 
ley bridging.  Following  a  pattern  estab- 
lished at  the  Vire  and  other  rivers  in 
Normandy,  the  engineers  replaced  Bai- 
ley bridges  as  soon  as  possible  with  tim- 
ber bridges  and  took  the  Baileys  for- 
ward for  use  in  later  crossings.  Likewise, 
whenever  possible — as  at  the  stone  bridge 
at  Airel — they  removed  treadway  so 
as  to  make  it  available  for  subsequent 
temporary  bridging. 

Information  the  1115th  Engineer 
Combat  Group  obtained  from  a  French 
citizen  who  had  been  the  government 
engineer  for  roads  and  bridges  in  the 
St.  Lo  area  considerably  eased  planning 
for  an  important  bridge  at  Pont-Hebert, 
where  Route  174  from  Carentan  to  St. 
Lo  crossed  the  Vire.  Of  particular  value 
was  the  civilian  engineer's  advice  on 
manipulating  the  locks  on  the  tidal  Vire 
River  at  Airel  and  La  Meauffe.  This 
information  enabled  American  engi- 
neers to  lower  the  water  level  when  a 
crossing  was  desired  and  to  raise  it,  as 
necessary,  to  protect  the  35th  Division's 
flanks.  After  reconnaissance  discovered 
an  underwater  bridge  the  Germans  had 
built  at  Rampan,  a  town  at  a  bend  of 
the  river  about  halfway  between  Pont- 
Hebert  and  St.  Lo,  the  engineers  sud- 
denly closed  the  lock  at  La  Meauffe  one 


night,  raising  the  level  of  the  water  at 
Rampan  more  than  seven  feet.  This  tac- 
tic denied  the  bridge  to  the  enemy  and 
drowned  some  Germans  leading  horse- 
drawn  artillery  across.'^ 

One  question  the  French  engineer 
could  not  answer  was  whether  a  rail- 
road overpass  immediately  east  of  Pont- 
Hebert  was  intact.  Here,  help  came 
from  artillery  observation  plane  crews 
who  bivouacked  in  the  same  hedgerow 
fields  as  the  group  engineers.  The  pilots 
reported  several  times  daily  not  only 
on  the  condition  of  the  overpass  (which 
the  Germans  never  demolished)  but 
also  on  the  bridge  itself.  The  task  of 
constructing  the  two  bridges,  a  tread- 
way and  a  Bailey,  went  to  the  234th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  largely  as 
a  result  of  its  excellent  work  at  Cavigny 
and  La  Meauffe.  The  unit  began  work 
late  on  18  July,  and  with  the  help  of 
two  officers  from  the  992d  Treadway 
Bridge  Company  had  a  156-foot  float- 
ing treadway  bridge  in  place  by  0630. 
At  1100  the  503d  Ponton  Company 
brought  up  a  130-foot  double-double 
Bailey  bridge,  which  was  ready  for  traf- 
fic by  1800. 

Several  hours  before  the  engineers 
began  bridge  operations  at  Pont-Hebert 
on  18  July,  a  29th  Division  task  force 
captured  the  battered,  bombed-out  city 
of  St.  Lo.  With  the  task  force  came  a 
platoon  of  Company  C  of  the  29th's 
organic  121st  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion to  clear  the  streets  of  rubble.  A  ser- 
geant of  the  engineer  platoon  claimed 
to  be  the  first  American  to  enter  St. 
Lo.'^ 


'^  Hist  XIX  Corps  Engrs,  pp.  9-10,  and  MS,  The 
XIX  Corps  History,  p.  8.  Both  in  ML  2220,  ETOUSA 
Hist  Sect. 

'^Joseph  H.  Ew'mg,  29  Let's  Go.':  A  History  of  the  29th 
Infantry    Division    in    World    War    II    (Washington: 


376 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


VII  Corps  Engineers  in 
the  Cobra  Breakthrough 

While  XIX  Corps  was  assuming  engi- 
neer responsibility  for  the  construction 
and  maintenance  of  bridges  and  roads, 
it  was  also  preparing  its  part  in  Opera- 
tion Cobra.  The  operation  called  for 
troops  to  break  out  of  the  bocage  and 
through  the  German  lines  to  the  south, 
then  to  liberate  more  ports  in  Brittany. 
To  open  the  offensive,  air  forces  were 
to  deluge  a  well-defined  area  south  of 
the  St.  Lo— Periers  road  with  light  anti- 
personnel bombs  designed  to  destroy 
enemy  troop  concentrations  without 
tearing  up  the  terrain  to  the  detriment 
of  attacking  American  armor  and  in- 
fantry. The  corps'  mission  was  to  seize 
and  hold  a  line  from  Coutances  to 
Marigny,  about  eight  miles  to  the  north- 
east, in  order  to  cut  off  and  destroy  the 
enemy  facing  VIII  Corps  in  the  Lessay- 
Periers  area  and  to  prevent  German 
reinforcements'  approach  from  the 
south  and  east.  Armor  to  support  the 
thrust  was  to  pass  through  gaps  the  9th 
and  30th  Infantry  Divisions  opened. 
The  VII  Corps  engineers  devoted  their 
efforts  to  opening  and  maintaining 
main  supply  routes  (MSRs)  to  support 
the  advance.'*' 

The  1 106th  Engineer  Combat  Group 
was  to  support  the  30th  Infantry  Divi- 
sion, advancing  along  high  ground  on 
the  Vire's  west  bank  with  the  2d  Ar- 
mored Division  following.  The  area  had 
two  main  supply  routes.  One  MSR  (D  — 
77),  a  two-way  road  for  Class  40  traffic, 
was  the  responsibility  of  the  group's 


Infantry  Journal  Press,  1948),  p.  102;  Hists,  121st 
Engr  C  Bn,  1  Jun-31  Aug  44,  and  1115th  Engr  C 
Gp,  29  Mar  43 -Dec  44. 

"•  VII  Corps  Engr  FO  3,  19  Jul  44. 


49th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion;  the 
other  (D  — 446),  a  one-way  Class  40 
road,  the  237th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion was  to  open  and  maintain.  A 
third  engineer  combat  battalion,  the 
238th,  would  support  the  2d  Armored 
Division.  On  VII  Corps'  right  flank  the 
1120th  Engineer  Combat  Group  was 
to  support  the  1st  and  9th  Infantry 
Divisions  and  the  3d  Armored  Division. 
The  1120th's  294th  and  297th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalions  were  respon- 
sible for  maintaining  the  two  main  sup- 
ply routes — from  Tribehou  to  Marigny — 
on  the  right  flank,  while  the  298th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  was  to  sup- 
port the  3d  Armored  Division.  Army 
engineer  support  in  the  VII  Corps  area 
was  the  responsibility  of  the  1111th 
Engineer  Combat  Group.  About  a  week 
before  COBRA,  Maj.  Gen.  Manton  S. 
Eddy,  commanding  the  9th  Division, 
complained  that  the  front  assigned  his 
division  was  too  wide.  General  Bradley 
then  gave  VII  Corps  the  4th  Infantry 
Division  to  attack  down  the  center  of 
the  breakthrough  area.  The  1 106th  and 
1120th  Groups  divided  the  engineer 
support  mission  for  the  4th  Division.''^ 
According  to  the  VII  Corps  plan,  the 
9th,  4th,  and  30th  Divisions  were  to  be 
near  the  St.  Lo  — Periers  road  on  20 
July,  ready  to  break  through  as  soon  as 
possible  after  a  massive  air  bombard- 
ment. But  pouring  rain  and  cloudy 
skies  forced  postponement  of  the  bom- 
bardment until  the  morningof  25  July. 
By  17  July  the  engineers  were  at  work 
on  the  main  supply  routes  down  which 
the  tanks  were  to  roll,  sweeping  the 
roads  from  shoulder  to  shoulder  for 
mines,  repairing  craters  and  potholes, 
and  clearing  away  rubble.  For  the  diffi- 


Ibid.;  Bradley,  A  Soldier's  Stoiy,  p.  332. 


COMBAT  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  BREAKOUT  AND  PURSUIT 


377 


cult  problem  of  removing  abandoned 
heavy  German  tanks,  the  1 106th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Group  supplied  heavy 
block  and  tackle  of  about  fifty-ton  ca- 
pacity, threaded  with  7/8-inch  cable  and 
operated  by  a  four-ton  wrecker.  The 
49th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  tested 
the  equipment  successfully  on  a  Tiger 
tank.  Later  the  battalion  used  a  simpler 
method  for  one  more  or  less  intact 
tank — the  battalion's  S  — 3  removed 
booby  traps  from  the  tank  and  drove  it 
off  the  road  under  its  own  power.  For 
"rush  crossings"  of  bomb  craters  the 
1106th  Engineer  Combat  Group  sup- 
plied the  2d  Armored  Division  with  sec- 
tions of  tread  way  bridging.'^ 

"It's  raining  very  hard,"  noted  the 
1106th  Group's  journal  on  21  July; 
next  day  it  was  "still  pouring."  Mud 
made  the  construction  of  bypasses  for 
infantry  troops  difficult,  and  gravel  had 
to  be  brought  up  and  stockpiled  at  stra- 
tegic points  to  keep  the  four  main  sup- 
ply routes  firm  enough  for  tanks.  The 
work  went  on  under  increasingly  heavy 
enemy  artilley  fire.  For  example,  on  the 
evening  of  21  July  at  an  engineer  biv- 
ouac near  Tribehou,  German  shells 
exploded  a  demolition  dump,  killing 
two  men  of  the  298th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  and  wounding  fourteen. 
On  23  July  the  weather  began  to  clear, 
and  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-fifth 
the  engineers  maintaining  the  roads  in 
the  VII  Corps  area  saw  the  sky  black- 
ened with  Allied  planes.  The  COBRA 
breakthrough  had  begun.  As  the  infan- 
try divisions  broke  across  the  Cou- 
tances-St.  Lo  highway  between  Marigny 
and  St.  Gilles,  the  engineers,  working 


night  and  day,  had  roads  ready  for  the 
tanks. '^ 


VIII  Corps  Engineers  Aid 
the  War  of  Movement 

For  VIII  Corps,  the  "direct  pressure 
force"  in  the  breakthrough,  H-hour  was 
0530  on  26  July.  The  commander,  Maj. 
Gen.  Troy  H.  Middleton,  had  four  divi- 
sions that  he  planned  to  move  abreast 
in  a  fifteen-mile  zone  between  the  west 
coast  of  the  Cotentin  peninsula  and  the 
Taute  River:  the  79th  Division  facing 
the  Ay  River  near  Lessay  on  the  ex- 
treme west,  the  8th  Division  facing 
hedgerow  country,  the  90th  Division 
along  the  Seves  River,  and  the  83d  Divi- 
sion on  the  extreme  left  along  the  Taute. 
(Map  19)  Two  armored  divisions,  the 
4th  and  the  6th,  were  to  roll  through 
gaps  on  the  Lessay-Periers  road.  Be- 
cause both  the  79th  and  the  90th  Divi- 
sions faced  flooded  regions  that  offered 
the  Germans  excellent  fields  of  fire,  the 
8th  was  chosen  to  spearhead  the  attack, 
opening  a  gap.  The  79th  was  to  follow 
through  the  gap,  turn  west,  outflank 
the  enemy  south  of  the  Ay,  and  seize 
Lessay.  Engineer  support  of  the  ad- 
vance was  the  responsibility  of  the 
1 1 10th  Engineer  Combat  Group,  with 
its  207th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion 
directly  behind  the  8th  Division  and  its 
148th  Battalion  behind  the  79th  Divi- 
sion. 

In  preparing  for  the  advance  the 
group  engineers  repaired  roads  and 
cleared  minefields.  By  midafternoon, 
26  July,  the  28th  Infantry  had  reached 


"^  Map,  Operation  C;()BRA  VII  (lorps  Plan,  in  Blu- 
menson,  Breakout  and  Pursuit,  map  10,  p.  2  Hi. 


'"  Hist  1 106th  Engr  C  (ip,  Jun-Dec  44;  Engineer 
Operations  by  the  VII  (Jorps  in  the  European  The- 
ater of  Operations,  vol.  Ill,  "Northern  France  and 
Belgium,"  pp.  1  —2. 


THE  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

NORMANDY    TO    THE    SEINE 
1944 

20  40  Miles 


t 


20 


40  Kilometers 


ENGLISH 


D 


BREST 


Morlaix\ 


St  Michel-en-Greve 

Guingamp 

St  Brieu^ 


Cancale 
StMato-- — '^ 


Quimper^ 


Rennes^ 


^ 


'•Vannes 


MAP  19 


CHANNEL 


^Cherbourg 


I  Barfleur 


-^St    Vaast 


[La    Hay e-du-PyJts  = 
Carentan 


L  essay 


Coutances 


(Aire  I 


St  Lo 


^Bayeux 


LE  HAVRE 


Saen 


Granville- 


Mortain 


'/Fougeres 


Ambriefes-le-Grand 
Mayenne 


^/ 


Laval\ 


Angers 


380 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Engineers  Assemble  an  Explosive-Laden  "Snake"  to  clear  a  path  in  a 
minefield. 


the  Lessay-Periers  road  and  had  made 
untenable  the  entire  enemy  position 
along  the  VIII  Corps  front;  by  the  eve- 
ning of  28  July,  the  Germans  were  in 
retreat,  leaving  behind  some  of  the 
most  extensive  minefields  encountered 
on  the  Continent.  The  same  evening 
the  VIII  Corps  engineer,  Col.  William 
R.  Winslow,  ordered  the  engineer  tech- 
nical intelligence  team  (ETIT)  attached 
to  VIII  Corps,  bolstered  by  hastily  or- 
ganized teams  from  engineer  combat 
battalions,  to  instruct  the  tankers  of  the 
4th  and  6th  Armored  Divisions  in  mine 
removal.  The  teams  worked  through- 
out the  night  giving  demonstrations  to 
the  armored  troops  with  actual  mus- 
tard pot,  Schu,  and  Bouncing  Betty 
mines.  Next  morning,  when  the  armor 


rolled  across  a  treadway  bridge  over  the 
Ay  River  near  Lessay  (completed  on  the 
morning  of  28  July  by  the  4th  Armored 
Division's  24th  Armored  Engineer  Bat- 
talion), the  commander  of  the  ETIT, 
1st  Lt.  James  Ball,  could  report  that  he 
saw  "men  from  4th  Armored  taking  out 
mines  they  had  never  heard  of  before 
like  veterans."  The  villages  were  also 
booby-trapped.  In  Lessay,  a  village  of 
only  2,000,  VIII  Corps  engineer  units 
removed  more  than  300  booby  traps 
during  the  afternoon  of  29  July.^** 

Engineers  of  the  24th  and  the  25th 
Armored  Engineer  Battalions,  organic 
to  the  4th  and  6th  Armored  Divisions, 


'  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  10,  Combat  Engineering, 


35. 


COMBAT  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  BREAKOUT  AND  PURSUIT 


381 


respectively,  also  removed  roadblocks 
and  constructed  bridges  as  they  passed 
through  Avranches  and  advanced  into 
Brittany.  Their  experience  illustrates 
operating  differences  between  the 
armored  engineer  battalions  and  those 
in  support  of  infantry.  The  armored 
engineer  battalion  was  broken  up  into 
platoons,  each  assigned  to  an  armored 
task  force  and  operating  under  the 
command  of  the  task  force  comman- 
der; the  engineer  battalion  commander 
and  the  division  engineer  could  thus 
exercise  only  the  remotest  degree  of 
control.  This  situation  became  ap- 
parent during  the  speedy  armored  ad- 
vance in  the  last  days  of  July  and  led 
the  24th  Armored  Engineer  Battalion's 
commanding  officer  to  recommend 
placing  the  "utmost  emphasis"  on  the 
training  of  platoon  and  company  com- 
manders.^* 

Speed  in  reducing  obstacles — wheth- 
er roadblock,  minefield,  blown  bridge, 
or  crater — was  the  essence  of  armored 
engineer  operations.  The  engineers 
usually  employed  demolitions  to  reduce 
roadblocks  and  tankdozers  to  push 
away  rubble.  Mines  were  lifted  by  hand. 
While  corps  engineers  generally  bridg- 
ed larger  streams,  the  armored  engi- 
neer platoon  or  battalion  (to  which  a 
bridge  company  was  attached)  per- 
formed bridging  whenever  possible. 
Engineers  of  the  24th  Armored  Engi- 
neer Battalion  considered  the  short, 
unsupported  span  treadway  their  most 
important  bridge  because  it  was  the 
quickest  to  emplace  when  crossing  anti- 
tank obstacles.  On  the  night  of  28  July, 
a  platoon  of  Company  B  used  a  24-foot 
fixed-span  treadway  to  move  4th  Ar- 
mored Division  tanks  over  a  road  crater; 
the  engineers  completed  the  operation, 

-'  Hist  24th  Armd  Engr  Bn,  Jul -Dec  44. 


including  mine  clearance,  in  twenty-five 
minutes. 

On  1  August  1944,  when  Third  Army 
became  operational  on  the  Continent, 
VIII  Corps  passed  to  its  control.  The 
army  headquarters  placed  the  1102d 
and  1107th  Engineer  Combat  Groups 
in  support  of  the  corps;  the  1110th 
Engineer  Combat  Group  reverted  to 
First  Army.  The  VIII  Corps  also  had 
the  support  of  the  1117th  Engineer 
Combat  Group  until  7  August,  when 
XV  Corps  became  operational  and  took 
over  the  1 1 17th.  Because  trained  engi- 
neer combat  battalions  were  in  short 
supply.  Third  Army  obtained  two  engi- 
neer general  service  regiments.  One  of 
them,  the  1303d,  the  army  attached  to 
VIII  Corps. "^"^ 

Siege  Operations  in  Brittany 

In  the  dash  toward  Brest — the  first 
priority  in  early  August  because  of  the 
need  for  a  large  port — the  6th  Armored 
Division  bypassed  St.  Malo  on  the  north 
shore  of  Brittany.  Maj.  Gen.  Troy  H. 
Middleton,  the  VIII  Corps  commander, 
gave  the  task  of  taking  St.  Malo  to  the 
83d  Division,  reinforced  by  the  121st 
Infantry  of  the  8th  Division,  a  medium 
tank  company,  and  corps  artillery.  The 
mission  included  the  reduction  of  Di- 
nard,  directly  across  the  mile-wide  Ranee 
River  estuary  from  St.  Malo.  At  Dinard 
(in  peacetime  a  popular  bathing  resort 
for  the  British),  the  Germans  had  em- 
placed  artillery  targeted  on  St.  Malo. 

The  first  task  for  the  83d  Division's 
organic  308th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion was  to  move  the  121st  Regimental 
Combat  Team  across  the  Ranee  River 


"  AAR  of  Third  U.S.  Army,  1  Aug  44-9  May  4.5 
(hereafter  cited  as  TUSA  Rpt),  vol.  II,  p.  Eng-3. 


382 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


for  the  advance  on  Dinard.  Upriver 
near  Dinan,  about  twelve  miles  south 
of  Dinard,  was  a  stone-arch  bridge  that 
the  Germans  had  destroyed.  There, 
Company  A  of  the  308th  began  build- 
ing two  bridges  on  the  afternoon  of  5 
August.  The  first  completed  was  a  Class 
9  expedient  floating  bridge  designed 
to  move  reconnaissance  elements  across 
the  river.  Company  A  had  some  diffi- 
culty with  the  second  bridge,  a  140-foot 
Class  40  double-double  Bailey  built 
across  two  spans  of  the  stone  bridge. 
Most  of  the  work  had  to  be  done  at 
night  and  because  the  roadway  was 
about  two  hundred  feet  above  the  water, 
placing  the  intermediate  and  far-shore 
rocking  rollers  was  extremely  hazard- 
ous. Nevertheless,  the  bridge  was  ready 
for  traffic  by  0645  on  6  August.  Before 
midnight,  Company  C  had  constructed 
a  sixty-foot  double-single  Bailey  bridge 
and  three  footbridges  under  such  in- 
tense small-arms  and  mortar  fire  that 
only  small  parties  could  work  at  one 
time.  Next  day  Company  B  made  an 
assault  river  crossing  for  two  infantry 
companies  near  La  Vicomte-sur-Rance, 
four  miles  northeast  of  Dinan,  against 
small-arms  fire  from  Germans  who  held 
commanding  ground  on  the  far  shore. 
Thereafter,  at  Dinard  and  St.  Malo, 
the  engineers  supporting  the  12 1st 
Regimental  Combat  Team  and  the  83d 
Division  played  an  important  part  in 
preliminary  siege  operations — destroy- 
ing barricades,  demolishing  pillboxes  to 
prevent  the  enemy  from  returning  to 
them,  gapping  minefields,  and  remov- 
ing booby  traps.  On  several  occasions 
engineers  joined  the  infantry  in  flame- 
throwing  teams.  By  9  August  the  troops 
of  the  83d  Division  had  fought  their 
way  through  the  suburbs  of  St.  Malo 
and,  after  bitter  street  fighting,  reached 


the  old  part  of  the  city  near  the  harbor. 
The  Citadel  de  St.  Servan,  a  concrete 
and  natural  rock  fortress  with  walls  up 
to  fifty-five  feet  thick,  dominated  the 
harbor.  German  shells  were  still  crash- 
ing down  from  Dinard  as  well  as  from 
the  tiny  offshore  island  of  Cezembre. 
Sending  a  combat  team  across  the  Ranee 
to  assist  the  121st  Regimental  Combat 
Team  in  reducing  Dinard,  the  main 
body  of  the  83d  Division  turned  to  bat- 
tering down  the  last  defenses  of  St. 
Malo. 

Colonel  Winslow,  the  VIII  Corps 
engineer,  maintained  close  personal 
liaison  with  the  division  engineers  dur- 
ing the  efforts  between  9  and  1 2  August 
to  breach  the  Citadel.  On  the  afternoon 
of  the  tenth  he  led  a  party  to  explore 
St.  Malo's  sewerage  system,  hoping  to 
locate  a  conduit  under  the  Citadel  where 
a  major  demolition  charge  might  be 
placed;  he  found  none.  Nor  did  the 
308th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  have 
any  luck  aboveground.  After  dark  on 
each  night  between  the  ninth  and  the 
twelfth  the  engineers  climbed  over  the 
fortifications,  dropping  pole  charges 
through  the  Citadel's  vents  and  ports. 
Neither  these  nor  demolitions  placed 
under  the  battlements  had  any  effect. 
As  soon  as  the  engineers'  explosives 
began  going  off,  German  artillery  from 
Cezembre  Island  would  come  in  so 
heavily  that  the  engineers  would  have 
to  withdraw.  The  siege  of  the  Citadel 
continued  until  17  August,  when  the 
Americans  forced  surrender  with  direct 
8-inch  fire,  using  white  phosphorus 
shells  on  vents  and  ports. 

The  VIII  Corps  then  concentrated 
all  its  efforts  on  taking  Brest.  By  mid- 
August  a  swift-moving  task  force,  com- 
posed principally  of  cavalry  and  tank- 
destroyer  units  with  the  159th  Engineer 


COMBAT  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  BREAKOUT  AND  PURSUIT 


383 


Combat  Battalion  in  support,  opened  a 
supply  line  to  the  vicinity  of  Brest,  an 
essential  preliminary  to  capturing  the 
city.  The  main  mission  was  to  secure 
vital  bridges  on  a  double-track  railway 
running  from  Rennes  to  Brest  before 
the  Germans  could  demolish  them. 
During  the  operation  the  engineers 
played  a  vital  role,  often  taking  the 
place  of  the  infantry  that  the  task  force 
had  fruitlessly  requested. 

The  first  railway  bridges  seized  lay  at 
St.  Brieuc,  on  the  coast  about  thirty- 
three  miles  west  of  Dinard.  The  task 
force  captured  the  spans  intact  on  7 
August;  Company  B  of  the  159th  Engi- 
neer Battalion  remained  behind  to  guard 
them  and  set  up  a  cage  for  prisoners  of 
war.  The  most  important  bridge  on  the 
line  was  at  the  port  of  Morlaix,  nearly 
fifty  miles  west  of  St.  Brieuc.  A  stone- 
arch  structure  about  a  thousand  feet 
long  and  two  hundred  feet  high,  the 
Morlaix  bridge  was  the  largest  railway 
viaduct  in  France.  Minefields  and  anti- 
tank obstacles  temporarily  slowed  part 
of  the  task  force,  but  Company  B  of 
the  159th  Engineer  Battalion  kept  going 
with  the  leading  tanks  and  helped  take 
Morlaix,  which  later  became  the  princi- 
pal port  of  entry  for  supplies  used  at 
Brest.  The  task  force  captured  the 
bridge  intact,  and  Company  B  stayed 
behind  to  guard  it. 

The  rest  of  the  battalion  then  re- 
ceived a  new  mission — to  remove  mines 
and  obstacles  from  the  beaches  at  St. 
Michel-en-Greve,  some  twenty-five  miles 
northeast  of  Morlaix  on  the  north  coast 
of  Brittany.  Supplies  for  Brest  came 
ashore  there  from  LSTs;  the  first  beach- 
ing was  on  12  August. *^^ 


•^  *  Capt.  William  W.  Baltz  et  al.,  The  159th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  (Antwerp:  De  Vos  Van  Kleef,  Ltd., 
1945),  pp.  11  —  15.  For  the  events  at  Morlaix- Roscoff, 
see  ch.  XVI. 


At  0300  on  25  August  the  attack  on 
Brest  began,  with  three  infantry  divi- 
sions side  by  side:  the  8th  in  the  center, 
the  29th  on  the  right  (west),  and  the  2d 
on  the  left.  The  city,  France's  second 
port  and  a  great  naval  base,  was  forti- 
fied in  depth.  Ten  miles  out  into  the 
countryside  the  Germans  had  set  up 
roadblocks,  dug  antitank  ditches,  planted 
huge  minefields  protected  by  machine- 
gun  nests,  and  built  concrete  pillboxes. 
These  provided  a  defensive  position  as 
strong  as  any  American  troops  encoun- 
tered on  the  Continent. 

On  the  morning  the  siege  began  the 
commander  of  the  8th  Division's  12th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  Lt.  Col. 
E.  M.  Fry,  Jr.,  was  captured  when  he 
left  his  jeep  to  reconnoiter  a  bridge; 
three  men  of  his  party  were  killed.  The 
battalion,  aided  by  a  company  of  the 
202d  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  of 
VIII  Corps'  1107th  Engineer  Combat 
Group,  kept  busy  on  road  work,  which 
enemy  fire  slowed,  until  I  September. 
Then  the  8th  Division,  having  just 
reached  the  city  limits,  stopped  in  front 
of  ramparts  up  to  seventy  feet  thick  and 
thirty  feet  high,  on  which  the  Germans 
had  emplaced  88-mm.  artillery  and 
machine  guns.  Because  of  this  formida- 
ble obstacle  the  task  of  taking  Brest  was 
turned  over  to  the  flank  divisions,  the 
29th  and  the  2d;  the  8th  Division  turned 
aside  to  clear  the  Crozon  peninsula, 
west  of  the  port.  A  few  days  after  its 
arrival  in  the  new  sector,  Colonel  Fry 
rejoined  his  battalion.  He  had  escaped 
from  Brest  in  a  rowboat. 

About  the  time  the  8th  Division  turned 
aside,  the  29th  Division  on  the  west  flank 
was  approaching  two  ancient  French 
forts.  Fort  Keranroux  and  Fort  Mont- 
barrey.  The  division  captured  Fort  Ke- 
ranroux on  the  afternoon  of  13  Sep- 
tember, mainly  with  the  aid  of  heavy 


384 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


bombardment  from  planes  and  artil- 
lery. The  reduction  of  Fort  Mont- 
barrey,  a  casemated  fort  with  walls 
about  twenty-five  feet  thick  and  sur- 
rounded by  a  fifty-foot  moat,  required 
intensive  effort  by  the  29th  Division's 
121st  Engineer  Combat  Battalion.  The 
engineers  first  had  to  get  close  enough 
to  the  fort,  in  the  face  of  withering  fire 
from  its  ports,  to  place  charges  under 
the  wall.  Colonel  Winslow,  the  VIII 
Corps  engineer,  planned  to  cover  the 
ports  with  flame  from  flame-throwing 
tanks.  He  was  able  to  obtain  twelve  such 
tanks — known  as  "Crocodiles" — from 
the  British,  but  to  get  them  close  enough 
for  their  fire  to  be  effective  the  engi- 
neers had  to  go  out  on  the  night  before 
the  attack  and  clear  a  path  through  a 
heavily  mined  and  shell-pitted  ap- 
proach to  the  fort.  This  task,  which 
Company  B  of  the  121st  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  accomplished,  was  the  first 
step  of  what  turned  out  to  be  a  classic 
siege  operation. 

The  first  attempt  to  get  the  tanks 
through  failed.  Of  four  Crocodiles  that 
started  out  on  14  September,  two  wan- 
dered from  the  safe  path  through  the 
mines;  enemy  fire  destroyed  another. 
The  engineers  again  widened  the  path 
at  night,  and  at  1500  on  16  September 
three  Crocodiles,  concealed  by  a  smoke 
screen,  were  able  to  cover  the  entire 
west  side  of  the  fort  with  flames.  Thus 
protected,  engineers  rushed  to  the  outer 
wall  and  placed  under  it  2,500  pounds 
of  TNT,  creating  a  breach  large  enough 
for  men  to  pass  through.  Then  they 
placed  1,200-pound  charge  of  TNT  in 
a  tunnel  leading  into  the  fort,  causing 
the  fort's  reduction.  Another  party  of 
engineers  preceded  the  infantry,  carry- 
ing scaling  ladders  that  they  set  up 
against  the  fort.  Scaling  the  roof,  the 


assault  party  then  used  the  ladders  to 
get  down  into  the  courtyard.  Within  ten 
minutes  the  garrison  surrendered. 

Engineers  of  the  2d  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion,  supporting  the  2d  Divi- 
sion approaching  Brest  from  the  east, 
also  supplied  scaling  ladders  as  well  as 
grappling  hooks  projected  by  rifle  gre- 
nades for  the  infantry.  But  when  the 
division  came  up  against  the  ancient 
wall  of  the  inner  city,  the  engineers 
were  unable  to  get  close  enough  to  blast 
a  gap  because  the  Germans  had  em- 
placed  on  the  wall  machine  guns  and  a 
number  of  88-mm.  guns.  The  combat 
coYnmanders  called  up  the  8-inch  guns 
that  had  been  so  successful  at  St.  Malo. 
Firing  from  ranges  as  close  as  5,000 
yards,  the  big  guns  blasted  a  breach 
large  enough  for  men  to  pass  through; 
the  engineers  then  widened  it  with 
explosives  so  that  the  hole  would  ac- 
commodate vehicles. 

During  the  bitter  house-to-house 
street  fighting  that  followed,  the  2d 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  made  its 
most  valuable  contribution.  The  engi- 
neers became  adept  at  blowing  holes  in 
the  walls  of  houses  at  points  where  the 
entering  infantrymen  would  not  have 
to  expose  themselves  to  enemy  fire  in 
the  streets.  On  the  eastern  side,  away 
from  the  enemy,  the  engineers  blew 
holes  through  inner  walls  to  enable  the 
troops  to  pass  safely  from  building  to 
building  and  in  ceilings  to  allow  the 
infantry  to  pass  from  floor  to  floor 
when  the  Germans  defended  stairways. 
The  engineers  also  developed  several 
methods  of  quickly  overcoming  obsta- 
cles in  the  way  of  the  advancing  troops. 
The  engineers  used  TNT  to  cut  steel- 
rail  roadblocks  and  learned  to  fill  cra- 
ters and  ditches  quickly  by  blowing 
debris  into  them  from  the  walls  of  adja- 


COMBAT  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  BREAKOUT  AND  PURSUIT 


385 


cent  buildings.  In  clearing  debris  from 
streets  where  sniper  fire  was  prevalent, 
the  engineers  developed  a  new  appre- 
ciation for  the  armored  cab  on  D  — 4 
angledozers.'^^ 

By  the  time  Brest  fell  on  18  Sep- 
tember, the  Allies  had  the  port  of  Ant- 
werp. Brest  was  no  longer  required, 
and  no  effort  was  made  to  undertake 
extensive  repair  of  the  port  facilities. 

The  Seine  Crossings 

At  the  beginning  of  the  third  week 
in  August,  even  before  the  siege  of 
Brest  had  begun,  U.S.  Army  engineers 
were  helping  American  divisions  to 
cross  the  Seine.  Bridging  operations 
began  on  20  August  when  the  151st 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  put  a  tread- 
way  over  the  Seine  at  Mantes-Gassi- 
court,  about  thirty  miles  northwest  (as 
the  crow  flies)  of  Paris.  By  the  time  they 
reached  the  Seine  the  engineers  of  both 
First  and  Third  Armies  had  become 
adept  at  getting  the  combat  troops 
across  rivers.  After  First  Army's  break- 
through at  Marigny  — St..  Gilles  and 
Third  Army's  advance  east  from  Fou- 
geres  (south  of  Avranches),  bridge  con- 
struction became  the  principal  engineer 
mission.  Roads  across  northern  France 
were  damaged  in  few  places,  and  these 
could  be  quickly  repaired  or  bypassed. 
The  very  speed  of  the  advance  pre- 
vented the  Germans  from  either  pre- 
paring extensive  road  demolitions  or 
planting  large  minefields.  Most  bridges, 
however,  were  down — demolished 
either  by  the  Germans  or  by  Allied 
bombers."' 

-*  Daily  Opns  Log,  2d  Engr  C  Bn,  Sep  44,  in  AAR, 
2d  Engr  Bn,  Jim-Dec  44. 

■-•  FUSA  Rpt  I,  hk.  V.  pp.  224-25;  TUSA  Rpt,  vol. 
II,  p.  Eng— 3;  Engr  Opns  VII  (]orps,  vol.  Ill,  "North- 
ern France  and  Belgium,"  p.  2. 


In  supporting  the  advance  of  First 
Army's  VII  Corps,  for  example,  corps 
and  division  engineers  built  twenty-nine 
bridges  across  the  Seine  between  31 
July  and  26  August.  At  several  impor- 
tant crossing  sites,  such  as  those  on  the 
Seine  immediately  after  the  breakout 
and  others  on  the  Mayenne  and  Va- 
renne  Rivers  during  the  closing  of  the 
Falaise  Gap,  the  ground  forces  required 
four  bridges  at  each  crossing  to  pro- 
vide adequate  roadnets.  Fortunately,  in 
most  cases  not  all  the  spans  of  existing 
stone  bridges  were  down  and  most 
abutments  were  intact,  permitting  the 
rapid  emplacement  of  treadway  and 
Bailey  bridging."^' 

Of  particular  interest  to  the  engineers 
was  a  dual  roadway  Bailey  built  over 
the  Varenne  on  7  and  8  August  at 
Ambrieres-le-Grand  (about  twenty  miles 
southeast  of  Mortain),  where  only  one 
arch  of  a  120-foot-long  stone  bridge 
remained  in  place.  On  the  remaining 
pier.  Company  B  of  the  297th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  began  construct- 
ing a  Class  40  Bailey  at  0800  and  by 
nightfall  had  completed  it.  That  after- 
noon the  23d  Armored  Engineer  Bat- 
talion quickly  emplaced  a  treadway 
alongside,  crossed  the  tanks  of  the  3d 
Armored  Division,  and  then  departed 
with  the  treadway.  Two-lane  traffic  was 
still  desired,  but  the  abutments  were 
not  wide  enough  to  carry  two  Bailey 
bridges  side  by  side.  The  297th  Battal- 
ion converted  the  Bailey  into  a  dual 
road  structure  by  adding  a  second  story 
to  the  central  girder,  building  and 
launching  a  third  girder,  and  then  plac- 
ing transoms  and  flooring  for  the  sec- 
ond roadway.  The  two-lane  bridge  was 


"'"  Engr  Opns  VII  C^orps,  vol.  Ill,  "Northern  France 
and  Belgium,"  p.  2,  and  app.  3,  Tabulation  of  Stream 
Oossing  Data. 


386 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


ready  by  2000  on  8  August  and  proved 
sturdy  enough  to  support  not  only  a 
1st  Infantry  Division  regimental  com- 
bat team  crossing  but  also  a  week's  con- 
tinuous supply  of  traffic. '^^ 

Engineers  with  the  convoys  rolling 
eastward  found  northern  France  "some- 
thing different  from  Normandy:  the 
streets  black  with  people,  who  seemed 
to  do  nothing  twenty-four  hours  a  day 
but  stand  there  and  cheer  us  and  wave, 
and  weep,  some  of  them,  and  throw  us 
flowers  and  fruits  and  vegetables,  and 
stare  wide-eyed  at  the  trucks  and  jeeps 
and  tanks.  What  always  got  them  most 
were  the  tank  retrievers  that  filled  the 
whole  road,  with  red  lights  blinking, 
and  all  armored  up  like  something  from 
Mars,  and  the  Long  Toms  and  8  inch 
hows.  They  loved  them!"'^^ 

While  moving  up  to  the  XIX  Corps' 
Seine  River  crossing  at  Meulan,  a  few 
miles  northwest  of  Paris,  the  1115th 
Engineer  Combat  Group's  long,  un- 
gainly Brockway  bridge  trucks,  carry- 
ing sections  of  steel  treadways  and  lift- 
ing equipment,  made  a  strong  impres- 
sion on  the  Germans.  During  the  night 
of  26  August  a  convoy  that  included 
the  295th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion 
ran  into  a  company  of  German  soliders. 
Uncertain  of  the  enemy  strength,  the 
convoy  held  its  fire.  So  did  the  Ger- 
mans— a  circumstance  that  mystified 
the  Americans  until  two  American  pris- 
oners of  war,  breaking  away  from  their 
captors  and  jumping  aboard  the  Ameri- 


■•^^  Ibid.,  p.  3  and  apps.  3  and  5;  AAR,  297th  Engr  C 
Bn,  Jun-Dec  44,  Incl  3,  Bridge  Construction  Rpt,  1 1 
Aug  44.  As  insurance  against  the  destruction  of  the 
Bailey  (two  enemy  shells  fell  near  the  bridge  on  7 
August,  though  they  did  no  damage),  the  297th  built 
a  Class  40  floating  treadway  on  pontons  to  the  east  of 
Ambrieres-le-Grand . 

'^'^  MS,  The  XIX  Corps  History,  p.  21,  XIX  Corps 
Engr,  ML  2220,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 


can  convoy,  supplied  the  reason.  The 
Germans  had  been  afraid  to  fire  be- 
cause they  thought  the  Brockway  truck 
was  a  new  secret  weapon — perhaps  a 
rocket  launcher. "^^ 

In  the  race  across  France  the  Seine 
River,  not  Paris,  became  the  main  ob- 
jective. By  mid-August  enemy  forces 
were  fleeing  the  Argentan-Falaise  pock- 
et and  concentrating  along  the  lower 
Seine  northwest  of  Paris.  In  the  fore- 
front of  the  pursuit,  Third  Army's  XV 
Corps  was  to  send  its  5th  Armored  Divi- 
sion down  the  west  bank  of  the  Seine 
and  put  its  79th  Infantry  Division  across 
the  river  to  establish  a  bridgehead  on 
the  east  bank  near  Mantes-Gassicourt. 

A  few  hours  before  midnight  on  19 
August,  receiving  the  order  to  cross, 
the  commander  of  the  79th  sent  one 
regiment  on  foot  across  a  dam  near 
Mantes.  A  torrential  rain  was  falling. 
In  the  blackness  and  rain  the  men 
walked  single  file,  each  man  touching 
the  one  ahead.  Another  regiment,  plus 
light  equipment,  crossed  in  engineer 
assault  boats  and  rafts.  The  crossing 
seemed  interminable — the  river  was 
from  500  to  800  feet  wide.  For  the  first 
bridge  the  79th  Division  commander 
borrowed  700  feet  of  treadway  from 
the  5th  Armored  Division.  By  the  after- 
noon of  20  August  the  treadway  was 
installed  on  rubber  pontons,  and  another 
infantry  regiment  was  crossing  in  trucks; 
by  nightfall  the  bulk  of  the  79th,  includ- 
ing tanks,  artillery,  and  tank  destroyers, 
was  across  the  river.  During  the  day 
enemy  aircraft  came  over  and  attacked 
the  treadway;  its  rubber  pontons  made 
the  bridge  vulnerable  to  bullets  and 
bomb  splinters.  Next  morning  the  divi- 
sion engineers  began  to  construct  a  less 


^■'  Hist  111 5th  Engr  C  Gp,  29  Mar  43 -Dec  44. 


COMBAT  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  BREAKOUT  AND  PURSUIT 


387 


3d  Armored  Division  Vehicles  Cross  the  Seine  River 


vulnerable  floating  Bailey,  supporting 
it  on  timber  laid  across  four  river  bar- 
ges. Finished  at  0130  on  23  August, 
the  improvised  Bailey  had  to  be  used 
carefully  because  loads  of  more  than 
forty  tons  caused  the  sides  of  the  barges 
to  spread  apart.  Nevertheless,  the  bridge 
served  the  division  well."^*' 

While  elements  of  XV  Corps,  which 
temporarily  passed  to  First  Army  con- 
trol on  24  August,  were  using  the  Bai- 
ley over  the  lower  Seine  at  Mantes- 
Gassicourt,  engineers  of  Third  Army's 
XII  and  XX  Corps  were  preparing 
crossings  south  of  Paris  on  the  upper 
Seine.  Typical  was  the  effort  by  XX 
Corps  engineers  to  cross  the  7th  Ar- 


*"TUSA  Rpt,  vol.  II,  p.  Eng-4. 


mored  Division  at  Melun,  twenty-five 
miles  southeast  of  Paris.  Hopes  that  the 
bridge  at  Melun  could  be  captured 
intact  were  dashed  on  the  morning  of 
23  August,  when  the  Germans  destroyed 
the  span  just  as  Combat  Command 
Reserve  (CCR)  of  the  7th  Armored 
Division  was  about  to  attack.  Because 
Combat  Command  Reserve  had  no 
assault  boats  and  was  receiving  heavy 
fire  from  the  opposite  bank,  the  divi- 
sion commander  brought  up  Combat 
Command  A  to  cross  downriver  from 
Melun  and  attack  the  city  from  the 
north.  Arriving  the  same  morning  at 
Ponthierry,  a  village  about  five  miles 
downstream  from  Melun,  Combat  Com- 
mand A,  with  the  I79th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  of  the  1139th  Engineer 


388 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


French  Barges  Support  Bailey  Bridging  Over  the  Seine  at  Mantes 


Combat  Group  in  support,  found  the 
bridge  at  Ponthierry  demolished.  Recon- 
naissance revealed  two  suitable  assault 
crossing  sites  near  Tilly,  a  hamlet  a  mile 
to  the  north.  After  a  heavy  artillery 
preparation  at  1615,  two  companies  of 
the  179th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion, 
using  seventy-six  assault  boats  the  509th 
Engineer  Light  Ponton  Company  sup- 
plied, began  crossing  the  armored  troops 
at  both  sites.  Initial  waves  went  across 
without  casualties,  but  succeeding  waves 
met  rifle  fire  that  killed  two  of  the 
engineers.  The  engineer  battalion  suf- 
fered even  more  heavily  later  in  the 
evening  when  a  German  artillery  shell 
hit  one  of  its  trucks,  killing  five  men. 
Meantime,  elements  of  the  I79th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  had  started 


construction  of  a  treadway  bridge  at  the 
northernmost  site,  aided  by  elements 
of  the  7th  Armored  Division's  organic 
33d  Armored  Engineer  Battalion.  (Dur- 
ing the  fast  pursuit  the  troops  of  the 
33d  had  been  riding  on  the  outside  of 
tanks  acting  as  riflemen  and  had  under- 
taken little  engineer  work.)  By  midnight 
the  bridge  was  ready.  Bulldozer  opera- 
tors, who  prepared  the  approaches  to 
the  bridge  as  well  as  landing  slips  for  a 
ferry  operated  at  the  south  site,  accom- 
plished a  particularly  hazardous  task 
under  mortar,  artillery,  and  rifle  fire. 
Engineers  of  V  Corps  had  the  envi- 
able mission  of  assisting  in  the  libera- 
tion of  Paris.  On  24  August  reconnais- 
sance parties  of  the  4th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion,  organic  to  the  4th  Infan- 


COMBAT  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  BREAKOUT  AND  PURSUIT 


389 


try  Division,  which  with  the  2d  French 
Armored  Division  formed  the  bulk  of 
V  Corps,  went  forward  to  contact  the 
French  Forces  of  the  Interior  (FFI)  and 
obtain  data  on  Seine  crossings.  On  the 
twenty-sixth,  the  combat  engineers  built 
a  treadway  bridge  south  of  Paris  and 
on  that  day  and  the  next  worked  on 
the  streets  of  Paris,  clearing  roadblocks 
and  removing  mines  and  booby  traps. 
But  the  engineers  had  only  two  days  to 
enjoy  the  riotous  welcome  given  the  lib- 
erators before  the  4th  Battalion  moved 
east  of  Paris  with  its  division.  For  the 
victory  parade  of  the  28th  Infantry 
Division  down  the  Champs-Elysees  on 
29  August,  engineers  of  V  Corps'  1 171st 
Engineer  Combat  Group  improvised  a 
reviewing  stand  for  senior  American 
and  French  officers,  using  a  Bailey 
bridge  turned  upside  down."'' 

Beyond  the  Seine 

After  crossing  the  Seine,  First  Army's 
XIX,  V,  and  VII  Corps  turned  north 
and  northeast  in  rapid  pursuit  of  the 
fleeing  and  disorganized  enemy.  Fast- 
est of  all — "pursuit  with  a  capital 
'P'  " — was  the  headlong  100-mile  dash  of 
XIX  Corps  to  the  Belgian  border  at 
Tournai  on  1  and  2  September. '"  Cross- 
ing the  Somme  on  bridges  the  British 
had  captured  intact  with  FFI  help,  the 
corps  encountered  no  major  water  ob- 
stacles until  it  reached  the  Albert  Canal 
and  the  Meuse  River  during  the  sec- 
ond week  in  September.  In  the  "rather 
strange  war"  that  developed,  large  pock- 
ets of  the  enemy  were  bypassed  and 
Germans  wandered  into  American  biv- 


ouac areas.  Two  engineer  task  forces 
organized  from  elements  of  the  1 104th 
Engineer  Combat  Group  had  the  mis- 
sion of  rapidly  clearing  and  maintain- 
ing roads  and  constructing  the  few  brid- 
ges required.  ■'•' 

In  the  center  of  the  First  Army  ad- 
vance, the  engineers  of  V  Corps,  sup- 
porting the  4th  and  28th  Infantry  Divi- 
sions and  the  U.S.  5th  Armored  and 
2d  French  Armored  Divisions,  con- 
structed a  series  of  floating  and  fixed 
bridges  over  the  Aisne  and  the  Oise 
and  various  small  canals  to  the  north  of 
those  rivers.  Near  Cambrai,  south  of 
the  Belgian  border,  the  corps  (less  the 
2d  French  Armored  Division)  on  4  Sep- 
tember turned  to  the  right  toward  Lux- 
embourg. During  its  march  east,  the 
corps  encountered  its  first  formidable 
water  obstacle — the  Meuse.  The  retreat- 
ing Germans  had  destroyed  all  bridges 
along  the  line  of  advance  from  Charle- 
ville  to  Sedan.  At  Charleville  on  6  Sep- 
tember the  1171st  Engineer  Combat 
Group  erected  V  Corps'  first  heavy 
ponton  bridge,  followed  two  days  later 
by  a  second  at  Sedan.  Because  of  the 
limited  availability  of  floating  equip- 
ment and  of  the  need  to  keep  treadway 
equipment  with  the  forward  elements, 
corps  engineers  rebuilt  damaged 
bridges,  including  railway  bridges, 
whenever  possible.  During  these  opera- 
tions French  civilians  and  members  of 
the  French  Forces  of  the  Interior  pro- 
vided helpful  information  concerning 
the  status  of  bridges  and  the  location 
of  minefields.  '^ 

In  the  course  of  VII  Corps'  rapid 


"  Hist  VC^orps  Engr  Sect,  Jun,  Aug-Dec44,  Jan-9 
May  45;  V  Corps  Operations  in  the  ETO,  6  Jan  1942-9 
May  1945,  p.  211,  in  CMH. 

'"  Hewitt,  Work  Horse  of  the  Western  Front,  p.  85. 


'■*  Hist  XIX  Corps  Engrs,  p.  1 1 ,  ML  2220,  ETOUSA 
Hist  Sect. 

"  V  Corps  Operations  in  the  ETO,  pp.  214-36,  in 
CMH;  AAR,  V  Corps  Engr  Sect,  Jun,  Aug-Dec  44, 
|an-9  May  45;  Hist  112th  Engr  C  Bn,  1944. 


390 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


march  northeast  from  the  Seine  the 
first  important  water  barrier  was  the 
Marne,  but  it  presented  few  problems 
to  the  corps  engineers.  The  3d  Armor- 
ed Division  captured  intact  bridges  at 
La  Ferte  and  Chateau-Thierry,  and  one 
at  Meaux,  only  partially  destroyed,  was 
quickly  repaired.  Elements  of  the  1 120th 
and  1106th  Engineer  Combat  Groups 
were  over  the  border  into  Belgium 
before  the  end  of  the  first  week  in  Sep- 
tember and  made  their  most  notewor- 
thy contribution  in  bridging  the  Meuse 
in  Belgium  at  Namur,  Liege,  and  Di- 
nant. 

On  the  night  of  6  September,  the 
1106th  Group's  238th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  constructed  a  record  564- 
foot  treadway  at  Namur  in  five  hours.  ^' 
The  next  day  the  battalion  spanned  the 
Meuse  with  a  150-foot  triple-double 
Bailey.  Several  shorter  Baileys  and  tread- 
ways  also  had  to  be  erected  in  the  same 
neighborhood.  The  work  went  on  un- 
der the  protection  of  a  corps  antiair- 
craft battery;  nevertheless,  the  battal- 
ion suffered  two  casualties.  Beginning 
on  9  September  the  group's  237th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  constructed  a 
550-foot  treadway  downriver  at  Liege 
and  repaired  a  partially  demolished 
bridge  with  Bailey  equipment.  Enemy 
bombing  at  the  sites  cost  the  battalion 
casualties  consisting  of  three  men  killed 
and  a  number  wounded.  The  most 
important  effort  of  the  1 120th  Group 
took  place  upriver  at  Dinant,  where  the 
297th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  spent 
more  than  twelve  hours  on  9  and  10 
September  constructing  a  287-foot, 
Class  40  floating  Bailey,  working  most 
of  the  time  in  heavy  fog.'^*' 


"  Hist  1 106th  Engr  C  Gp,  Jun-Dec  44. 

■^*'  Engr  Opns  VII  Corps,  vol.  Ill,  "Northern  France 
and  Belgium,"  p.  4.  See  also  histories  of  the  units 
mentioned. 


During  Third  Army's  rapid  dash  to 
the  Moselle  from  the  Seine,  where  Gen- 
eral Patton  relinquished  the  Melun 
bridgehead  to  First  Army,  the  princi- 
pal water  barriers  were  the  Marne  and 
the  Meuse.  On  28  August  tanks  of  the 
4th  Armored  Division,  spearheading 
the  advance  of  XII  Corps,  found  the 
main  bridge  at  Chalons-sur-Marne 
blown.  The  debris  blocking  the  river 
formed  a  temporary  dam,  enabling  the 
engineers  of  the  24th  Armored  Engi- 
neer Battalion  to  construct  a  hasty  ford 
by  which  the  entire  task  force  crossed 
in  1  1/2  hours.  As  the  water  rose,  the 
engineers  constructed  a  treadway  tres- 
tle bridge,  and  on  the  following  day 
the  248th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion 
of  the  1 1 17th  Engineer  Combat  Group 
camped  a  few  miles  upstream  at  Vitry- 
le-Francois.  By  31  August  the  4th  Ar- 
mored Division  was  crossing  the  Meuse 
at  Commercy  over  bridges  seized  intact. 
To  the  north  the  1 139th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Group,  supporting  the  advance  of 
XX  Corps,  found,  on  29  August,  two 
undamaged,  permanent  wooden  brid- 
ges of  unlimited  capacity  at  Chateau- 
Thierry  on  the  Marne.  Treadways  at 
other  points  were  all  completed  the 
same  day.  At  Verdun,  where  the  main 
highway  bridge  crossed  the  Meuse,  the 
Germans  had  installed  mines,  but  the 
FFI  was  able  to  prevent  demolition.  On 
31  August,  XX  Corps  was  over  the 
Meuse  in  strength. ^'^ 

Toward  the  end  of  August  ominous 
entries  had  begun  to  appear  in  the  jour- 
nals of  the  engineer  combat  groups  of 
First  and  Third  Armies.  Gasoline  was 
running  short,  as  were  certain  items  of 
bridge-building  equipment.  The  armies 
had  outrun  their  supply  depots,  which 


"  TUSA  Rpt,  vol.  II,  p.  Eng-6. 


COMBAT  ENGINEERS  IN  THE  BREAKOUT  AND  PURSUIT 


391 


^"^SiL. 


French  Children  Watch  the  982d  Engineer  Maintenance  Company  Welu 
Six-Inch  Pipeline 


were  far  to  the  rear,  most  of  them  at 
the  original  invasion  beaches.  The  prob- 
lem was  mainly  one  of  transportation. 
The  damage  to  railway  lines  and  brid- 
ges had  been  extensive,  principally  as  a 
result  of  Allied  bombing.  The  installa- 
tion of  pipelines  for  petroleum,  oil,  and 
lubricants,  an  engineer  responsibility, 
could  not  keep  pace  with  the  headlong 
advance  of  the  combat  forces,  and  trucks 
became  the  only  means  of  getting  sup- 
plies forward.^  A  particularly  trouble- 
some problem  for  the  combat  engineers 
was  map  supply — either  because  maps 


''*  Hist  1  i39th  Engr  C  Gp,  Aug  44;  MS,  The  XIX 
Corps  History,  p.  13,  XIX  Corps  Engrs,  ML  2220, 
ETOUSA  Hist  Sect;  Ruppenthai,  Logistical  Support  of 
the  Annies,  Volume  I,  pp.  500-16,  544-47. 


could  not  be  sent  forward  in  time  to  be 
of  use  or  because  the  combat  forces 
were  moving  into  areas  for  which  no 
maps  were  available.  Leading  elements 
of  the  4th  Armored  Division,  which 
during  August  traveled  more  than  a 
thousand  miles  in  less  than  thirty  days, 
normally  operated  with  road  maps  ob- 
tained from  the  FFI  or  captured  Ger- 
man stocks.  One  of  the  first  tasks  of  the 
engineers  entering  Verdun  was  to  scour 
the  city  for  German  maps."^^ 

For  both  U.S.  armies,  the  pursuit 
ended  the  second  week  in  September 


■*"  Hist  I  139th  Engr  C  Gp,  Aug  44;  Hist  V  Corps 
Engr  Sect,  Jun,  Aug- Dec  44,  Jan -9  May  45;  Hist 
24th  Armd  Engr  Bn,  Jul-Dec  44;  TUSA  Rpt,  vol.  II, 
p.  Eng-5. 


392 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


when  Third  Army  met  stiffening  Ger- 
man resistance  at  the  Moselle  and  First 
Army  slowed  down  at  the  Siegfried 
Line  in  Belgium.  By  that  time  troops 
were  exhausted,  equipment  was  badly 
worn,  and  disturbing  shortages  in  criti- 
cal supplies  had  begun  to  appear.  New 
offensives  by  both  armies  were  author- 


ized in  mid-September,  but  it  soon 
became  apparent  that  stronger  Com- 
munications Zone  support  was  impera- 


tive 


40 


^•'  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Vol- 
ume I,  p.  583. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 


Supporting  a  War  of  Movement  in 
Northern  France 


Progress  by  American  units  after 
D-day  depended  on  the  maintenance  of 
existing  lines  of  communications.  For- 
tunately, the  French  road  and  rail  nets 
were  highly  developed  and  for  the  most 
part  immediately  usable  by  combat  ele- 
ments. ADSEC  engineers  were  the  first 
to  tackle  the  damage  from  German 
demolitions  and  Allied  bombing,  turn- 
ing over  their  responsibilities  to  their 
brethren  in  the  COMZ  area  of  opera- 
tions as  the  front  lines  moved  across 
France.  Engineers  constructed  gasoline 
and  oil  pipelines  simultaneously  in  a 
constant  struggle  to  keep  pace  with  the 
racing  tactical  units  through  the  end  of 
September. 

Highways 

Immediately  following  the  D-day  land- 
ings in  northern  France,  corps  and  First 
Army  engineer  combat  battalions  were  to 
assume  responsibility  for  road  construc- 
tion— corps  engineers  making  emer- 
gency repairs  only,  and  army  engineers 
restoring  bituminous  surfaces.  Bridg- 
ing was  to  be  of  the  military  type,  Bai- 
ley "or  treadway,  to  be  replaced  by  tim- 
ber bridges  as  rapidly  as  possible.'  As 
soon  as  an  army  rear  boundary  became 


established,  road  construction  and  main- 
tenance were  to  be  turned  over  to  AD- 
SEC. From  D-day  to  D  plus  90  the 
ADSEC  engineer.  Col.  Emerson  C.  It- 
schner,  planned  to  use  four  general  ser- 
vice regiments,  adding  special  equip- 
ment such  as  asphalt  mixers  and  con- 
tainers to  their  tables  of  equipment. 

Road  maps  provided  encouraging 
information  about  French  roads  to  the 
engineers  planning  support  of  combat 
forces  in  northern  France.  The  Routes 
Nationales  were  the  French  equivalent 
of  numbered  U.S.  highways.  Seme  of 
them  dated  from  the  Napoleonic  era; 
all  had  a  solid  base  of  granite  block  sur- 
faced with  tarmac.  The  Chemins  Depart- 
mentaux,  comparable  to  numbered  state 
roads  in  the  United  States  were  also  of 
good  quality,  although  the  engineers 
knew  little  about  their  substructure. 
Both  types  seemed  suitable  for  military 
traffic  but  were  narrow  by  U.S.  stan- 
dards. The  width  of  the  national  high- 
ways varied  from  twenty  to  twenty-six 
feet,  that  of  the  departmental  roads 
from  ten  to  twenty  feet.^  Route  N—  13, 


FUSA  Rpt  I.  an.  9,  p.  201  and  an.  10,  p.  208. 


-OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  14,  Road  Maintenance 
and  Highway  Bridging,  pp.  13-14;  OCE  ETOUSA 
Hist  Rpt  12,  Railroad  Reconstruction  and  Bridging; 
OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  13.  Petroleum,  Oil,  and 
Lubricants,  Rpt  of  Activities,  Engr  Sect,  ADSEC, 
COMZ,  ETO,  7  Feb-30  Jun  44. 


394 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Colonel  Itschner 

which  ran  from  Cherbourg  southeast 
to  Carentan  and  thence  east  behind  the 
invasion  beaches  to  Bayeux  and  beyond, 
received  special  attention  in  the  plan- 
ning. Another  key  route,  N  — 800,  led 
south  from  Cherbourg  to  Periers,  where 
it  turned  southeast  to  St.  Lo.'^ 

The  ADSEC  general  service  regi- 
ments began  landing  on  the  Continent 
at  the  end  of  June,  but  because  of  the 
slow  advance  to  St.  Lo  during  the  hedge- 
row fighting  before  the  breakout  on  26 
July,  combat  engineers  undertook  most 
highway  repairs  inland  of  the  beaches. 
(Charts  4  and  5)  The  two  ADSEC  engi- 
neer general  service  regiments  landing 
at  Omaha  (the  355th  and  365th)  spent 
their  first  month  repairing  roads  lead- 
ing to  beach  dumps.  Those  landing  at 
Utah  (the  95th  and  341st)  undertook 


the  first  ADSEC  highway  repairs  per- 
formed on  the  Continent,  beginning 
their  work  south  of  Cherbourg  on  7 
July.  The  341st  General  Service  Regi- 
ment was  most  experienced  in  road  build- 
ing and  maintenance,  having  worked 
on  the  Alcan  highway.  To  it  went  the 
difficult  task  of  reconstructing  N— 13, 
running  southeast  from  Cherbourg 
about  fifteen  miles  to  Valognes,  and 
N  — 800,  running  south  about  the  same 
distance  to  Bricquebec.  These  roads 
were  sorely  needed  to  move  men,  equip- 
ment, and  supplies  to  the  new  battle- 
front  after  the  fall  of  Cherbourg.  Using 
crushed  rock  and  asphalt,  the  men 
filled  craters  made  by  Allied  bombs  and 
shells  and  shored  up  the  edges  of  pave- 
ment broken  down  under  the  pound- 
ing of  heavy  traffic.  The  work  went  on 
while  the  routes  were  carrying  nearly 
3,000  vehicles  in  a  24-hour  period.  To 
make  up  for  the  late  arrival  of  some  of 
its  equipment  the  341st  Engineers  im- 
provised, using  captured  German  equip- 
ment to  assemble  asphalt  batching  plants 
and  a  German  cook  wagon  to  heat  tar. 
Following  the  breakout  at  St.  Lo  and 
the  formation  of  Third  Army  on  1 
August,  the  341st  stayed  close  behind 
Third  Army,  repairing  roads  around 
Periers  and  maintaining  those  in  the 
vital,  narrow  bottlenecks  in  the  Cou- 
tances-Avranches  area.  In  one  ten-mile 
stretch  of  the  main  supply  route  run- 
ning south  from  Periers  to  Avranches, 
the  engineers  laid  more  than  5,000  tons 
of  stone  in  six  days,  working  in  shifts 
through  daylight  hours  so  intently  that 
they  "hardly  saw  armored  division  after 
division,  the  supply  columns  and  a  large 
part  of  the  First  Army  move  through 
the  gap  in  the  dust  or  mud.'"* 


'  Planned  Road  Net,  IncI  25  to  History  of  the 
ADSEC  Engineer  Section. 


^  Hist  341st  Engr  GS  Rgt,  1944. 


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SUPPORTING  A  WAR  OF  MOVEMENT  IN  NORTHERN  FRANCE        397 


Except  on  the  Cotentin  peninsula 
south  of  Cherbourg  to  Avranches,  high- 
way reconstruction  proved  less  difficult 
than  ADSEC  planners  had  expected. 
The  primary  roads  stood  up  well  under 
the  pounding  they  received,  and  the 
Germans  had  not  damaged  highways 
or  highway  bridges  to  the  extent  feared. 
After  the  breakout,  the  armies  moving 
across  northern  France  encountered 
good  roads  that  needed  little  work. 
Highway  repair  became  mainly  drain- 
age and  pothole  filling  on  the  Red  Ball 
supply  routes.  Because  of  lessening 
requirements  and  the  increased  avail- 
ability of  prisoner  of  war  and  civilian 
labor,  the  four  general  service  regi- 
ments earmarked  for  road  building 
could  be  diverted  to  other  work.  The 
365th  transferred  to  hospital  construc- 
tion during  most  of  the  summer,  and 
in  mid- August  the  mission  of  the  341st, 
355th,  and  95th  Engineer  General  Ser- 
vice Regiments  changed  from  highway 
to  railroad  repair,  which  had  by  then 
become  ADSEC's  highest  priority. ' 

Railways 

A  19  January  1944  agreement  be- 
tween the  chief  engineer,  ETOUSA, 
and  the  chief  of  transportation  made 
railroad  reconstruction  in  northern 
France  the  responsibility  of  Colonel 
Itschner,  the  ADSEC  engineer,  to  be 
performed  at  Transportation  Corps 
request.  Railroad  reconstruction  meant 
not  only  re-laying  track  but  also  recon- 
structing road  culverts,  bridges,  and 
watering  and  coaling  facilities.  In  south- 
ern France,  responsibility  for  the  con- 
struction and  rehabilitation  of  railroads 
belonged  not  to  the  engineers,  but  to 
the  1st  Military  Railway  Service  (TC), 


to  which  engineer  units  were  attached 
or  assigned. 

After  the  Normandy  landings,  prior- 
ity went  first  to  the  tracks  within  Cher- 
bourg and  second  to  lines  leading  from 
Cherbourg  to  Lison  junction  near  Isig- 
ny,  about  forty  miles  southeast.  A  line 
was  then  to  be  reconstructed  leading 
southwest  from  Lison  junction  via  Cou- 
tances,  Folligny,  Avranches,  and  Dol  (in 
Brittany)  to  Rennes,  the  first  major 
depot  area.  The  British  were  responsi- 
ble for  the  rail  line  running  east  from 
Lison  junction.^ 

Planners  estimated  that  75  percent 
of  the  track  and  all  the  bridges  would 
have  been  destroyed  and  that  neces- 
sary reconstruction  would  require  55 
percent  new  ties  and  90  percent  new 
bridging  material.  All  this  material  was 
to  be  of  British  origin,  not  only  for 
tracks  (standard  British  75-pound  flat- 
bottom  rail)  but  also  for  bridges,  because 
the  U.S.  Army  had  developed  no  mili- 
tary railway  bridges.  British  designs 
went  into  production  both  in  the  United 
States  and  in  the  United  Kingdom.  The 
types  included  in  American  planning 
were  rolled  steel  joist  (RSJ)  spans,  which 
came  in  lengths  of  17,  21,  27,  31,  and 
35  feet;  a  40-foot  sectional  girder  bridge; 
a  unit  construction  railway  bridge 
(UCRB),  in  lengths  from  about  50  to 
80  feet;  and  light  steel  trestling.^ 

The  units  earmarked  for  railroad 
construction  included  five  engineer 
general  service  regiments,  three  engi- 
neer dump  truck  companies,  and  one 
engineer  heavy  ponton  battalion  for 
hauling  materials  and  equipment.  First 


■''  Hists,  365th  and  341st  Engr  (iS  Rgts. 


'•  ETO  Gen  Bd  Rpt  123,  Military  Railway  Service, 
p  2. 

Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Volume 
I,  pp.  316-17,  map  9. 

*  Moore,  Final  Report,  p.  282. 


398 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Army  was  to  lend  the  ponton  battalion 
to  ADSEC.  The  training  and  equip- 
ment of  the  five  general  service  regi- 
ments left  something  to  be  desired. 
Only  the  332d  and  347th  had  attended 
the  U.S.-British  Railway  Bridging  School 
at  King's  Newton.  The  remaining  three 
had  to  rely  on  a  thirty-day  intensive 
training  program  which  was  provided 
to  several  types  of  specialized  units  dur- 
ing April  1944.  The  training  was  not 
very  effective,  for  railway  tools  and  spe- 
cial track  fixtures  were  scarce  and  much 
of  the  available  material  had  already 
been  packed  for  the  cross-Channel  at- 
tack.^ 

The  chief  of  Colonel  Itschner's  Rail- 
road Section,  Lt.  Col.  A.  D.  Harvey, 
landed  in  Normandy  on  1 1  June  and 
immediately  began  reconnoitering  rail- 
way lines  near  Isigny  and  Carentan, 
walking  tracks  when  it  was  safe  to  do 
so.  On  15  June  he  flew  in  a  Piper  Cub 
as  low  as  150  feet  over  the  main  line 
from  Lison  junction  at  Montebourg,  a 
little  more  than  halfway  up  the  penin- 
sula, to  Cherbourg.  He  found  that  dam- 
age to  tracks  and  yards,  usually  inflicted 
by  Allied  bombing,  was  much  less  than 
expected  and  that,  except  for  a  bridge 
over  the  Vire  River  near  the  Lison 
junction,  the  railway  bridges  would  not 
be  difficult  to  repair.'^  This  and  later 
reconnaissance  trips  showed  that  ear- 
lier estimates  on  the  amount  of  mate- 
rial required  could  be  revised  down- 
ward. Two  events  after  the  landing  also 
forced  Itschner  to  alter  the  engineers' 
railroad  reconstruction  plan — the  late 
capture  of  Cherbourg,  which  deferred 
railroad  work  there  from  mid-June  to 
the  end  of  the  month,  and  the  late 


"Ibid.,  pp.  154-55. 

'"  Diary,  Lt  Col  A.  D.  Harvey,  D  plus  5-D  plus  49, 
app.  6,  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  12. 


arrival  of  the  engineer  general  service 
regiments  earmarked  for  railroad  re- 
pair. 

Railroad  rehabilitation  on  the  Conti- 
nent began  at  the  Carentan  yards  on 
17  June,  with  the  1055th  Engineer  Port 
Construction  and  Repair  Group  in 
charge.  During  the  following  week  that 
group  also  furnished  a  detachment  to 
direct  a  crew  of  civilians  at  the  Lison 
junction  yards,  and  the  342d  Engineer 
General  Service  Regiment  went  to  work 
on  the  line  north  from  Carentan.  The 
group  also  began  repairing  the  Vire 
River  railroad  bridge.  On  26  June  the 
1055th  moved  three  locomotives  from 
Lison  to  Isigny — the  first  U.S.  railroad 
operation  on  the  Continent. 

The  332d  Engineer  General  Service 
Regiment,  scheduled  to  arrive  on  14 
June,  did  not  land  at  UTAH  Beach  until 
the  twenty-eighth.  The  regiment  worked 
at  Cherbourg  on  port  reconstruction, 
while  railroad  work  in  that  city  became 
the  responsibility  of  the  347th  Engineer 
General  Service  Regiment,  which  ar- 
rived on  the  Continent  about  the  same 
time.  Other  general  service  regiments 
earmarked  for  railroad  work  arrived 
soon  thereafter,  but  not  all  were  em- 
ployed as  planned.  The  390th  Engineer 
General  Service  Regiment  performed 
track  work  between  Cherbourg  and 
Lison  junction,  but  the  392d  largely 
undertook  engineer  supply  operations. 
The  354th  worked  on  construction  of 
the  Couville  railroad  yards  near  Cher- 
bourg, an  assignment  that  original  plans 
had  not  envisioned.  The  engineer  heavy 
ponton  battalion,  hauling  material  and 
equipment,  did  not  arrive  until  much 
later  than  planned,  and  when  the  unit 
reached  France  First  Army  assigned  it 
another  mission." 


For  the  railroad  work  at  Cherbourg,  see  ch.  XVII. 


SUPPORTING  A  WAR  OF  MOVEMENT  IN  NORTHERN  FRANCE 


399 


After  the  Breakout 

Until  the  breakout  at  St.  Lo  on  26 
July,  railroad  reconstruction  received 
relatively  low  priority,  for  distances 
were  short  and  trucks  could  do  the 
hauling  from  beaches  to  dumps  and 
from  dumps  to  forward  areas.  After 
the  breakout  the  tempo  accelerated. 
Within  a  few  days  the  general  service 
regiment  most  experienced  in  railroad 
work,  the  347th,  came  down  from  Cher- 
bourg and  took  on  the  task  of  opening 
lines  to  St.  Lo  and  beyond  to  Coutances. 
After  the  capture  of  Coutances  on  29 
July,  urgent  priority  went  to  rebuild- 
ing the  line  south  to  Third  Army's  rail- 
head at  Folligny.  In  the  fifty  days  fol- 
lowing the  St.  Lo  breakout,  railroad 
reconstruction  became  the  ADSEC  en- 
gineer's primary  mission. 

First  and  most  important  was  recon- 
struction of  the  yards  at  St.  Lo,  which 
Allied  bombing  had  almost  entirely 
destroyed.  So  complete  was  the  destruc- 
tion in  one  section  that  engineers  had 
to  obtain  plans  from  the  Societe  Nationale 
des  Chemins  de  Fer  before  they  could  start 
re-laying  track.  On  4  August  two  com- 
panies of  the  347th  began  work  at  St. 
Lo,  using  rail,  fittings,  and  ballast  either 
salvaged  from  unused  lines  or  hauled 
from  beach  dumps  in  trucks.  On  the 
same  day,  a  third  company  of  the  347th 
began  rebuilding  the  double-track,  three- 
span,  masonry-arch  railway  bridge  over 
the  Vire  River  on  the  Lison— St.  Lo  line. 
Bombing  had  demolished  the  center 
span  and  damaged  another.  The  en- 
gineers, who  had  not  yet  received  any 
military  bridging,  replaced  the  center 
span  with  a  timber  trestle  bridge — the 
first  timber  trestle  the  347th  Engineers 
built — and  repaired  the  damaged  span 


by  fitting  face  stone  and  keystones  and 
filling  in  with  concrete.'^ 

Simultaneously  with  the  jobs  in  the 
St.  Lo  area,  the  engineers  began  reha- 
bilitating two  single-track  lines,  one 
south  of  St.  Lo  and  the  other  west.  The 
track  running  to  Vire,  about  twenty 
miles  southeast  of  St.  Lo,  was  to  pro- 
vide an  alternate  route  behind  the  ar- 
mies. The  track  on  the  west,  from  La 
Haye-du-Puits  to  Coutances,  would  bring 
forward  supplies  from  Cherbourg.  But 
the  ADSEC  engineer  completed  neither 
of  these  efforts.  The  Vire  line,  which  a 
company  of  the  347th  Engineers  started 
to  repair,  was  turned  over  to  the  British. 
The  2d  Battalion,  390th  Engineers, 
began  work  on  the  line  to  Coutances 
with  engineers  from  the  Transporta- 
tion Corps'  Military  Railway  Service 
(MRS),  but  before  the  line  was  com- 
plete MRS  assumed  full  responsibility — 
ADSEC  units  were  needed  elsewhere, 
and  ADSEC  had  to  commit  all  its  scarce 
railway  troops  to  supplying  ammuni- 
tion and  gasoline  to  Third  Army. 

The  Third  Army  was  already  swing- 
ing east  toward  Paris  when  the  347th 
Engineer  General  Service  Regiment 
began  reconstruction  of  the  Coutances- 
Folligny  rail  line.  At  Coutances,  where 
Allied  bombers  had  done  considerable 
damage.  Company  D  of  the  347th  en- 
countered a  damaged  high  viaduct  rail- 
road bridge — the  first  of  many  found 
in  France.  A  six-span,  single-track,  ma- 
sonry-arch structure  with  one  span 
missing  eighty  feet  over  the  Soulle  River, 
the  bridge  provided  the  first  opportu- 
nity to  employ  the  British  unit  construc- 


'"^  Waldo  G.  Bowman,  "Railroad  Bridging  in  the 
E.T.O.,"  Engineering  News-Record  (July  12,  1945), 
36-37. 


400 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


tion  railway  bridge.  Using  the  special 
launching  nose,  the  engineers  launched 
a  fifty-foot  unit  to  span  the  arch  open- 
ing. Then  they  installed  a  timber  strut 
just  below  the  unit  to  resist  thrusts  from 
adjacent  arches  carrying  the  weight  of 
heavy  locomotives.  In  the  meantime, 
the  347th  Engineers  had  begun  to  re- 
pair a  demolished  concrete-arch  rail- 
way bridge  over  a  highway  just  south 
of  Coutances,  completing  the  work  on 
12  August.'  ^  On  the  same  day  General 
Patton  put  the  engineers  to  a  grueling 
test. 

Supporting  Patton  s  Thrust  Toward  Paris 

What  was  later  described  as  "perhaps 
the  most  dramatic  achievement  of  Engi- 
neers in  railroad  construction"  began 
after  sunset  on  12  August  when  Colo- 
nel Itschner  received  surprising  instruc- 
tions from  Third  Army:  "Gen  Patton 
has  broken  through  and  is  striking  rap- 
idly for  Paris.  He  says  his  men  can  get 
along  without  food,  but  his  tanks  and 
trucks  won't  run  without  gas.  There- 
fore the  railroad  must  be  constructed 
into  Le  Mans  by  Tuesday  midnight. 
Today  is  Saturday.  Use  one  man  per 
foot  to  make  the  repairs  if  necessary."'^ 
The  message  meant  that  a  railroad  135 
miles  long,  with  seven  bridges  down, 
three  railroad  yards  badly  bombed, 
track  damaged  in  many  places,  and  few, 
if  any,  watering  and  coaling  facilities 
available,  had  to  be  reconstructed  in 
seventy-five  hours.  Normally  the  job 
would  have  taken  months. 


"  Ibid.,  pp.  37-38. 

"  Maj.  Oen.  (vccil  R.  Moore,  "Engineer  Operations 
in  the  European  Theater,  Informal  Remarks  ...  to 
SHAEF  Correspondents,  Friday,  6  October  1944,"  The 
Military  Engineer,  XXXVI  (December  1944),  408;  Col. 
Emerson  C:.  Itschner,  "Reconstruction  of  Western 
European  Railroads,"  [July  194.5],  Bortz  files. 


Colonel  Itschner  had  on  hand  only 
2,000  men  working  on  the  line  run- 
ning from  Coutances  to  Folligny — the 
347th  Engineer  General  Service  Regi- 
ment and  the  2d  Battalion  of  the  390th. 
The  latter  had  just  begun  restoring  the 
yards  at  Formigny,  a  few  miles  south  of 
Omaha  Beach,  where  the  air  forces 
had  completely  destroyed  a  large  Ger- 
man troop  train  shortly  after  D-day.  An 
additional  8,500  men  were  available  to 
Itschner  for  his  formidable  task,  but 
they  were  scattered  widely,  some  as  far 
away  as  Cherbourg.  Moreover,  the  only 
means  of  communication  with  the  wide- 
ly separated  units  was  by  a  messenger 
in  a  jeep.'' 

The  first  step  was  to  fly  over  the  rail- 
road net  from  Folligny  to  Le  Mans  to 
select  the  lines  that  could  be  repaired 
in  the  shortest  time.  The  most  direct 
route  led  south  from  Folligny  via  Av- 
ranches,  Pontaubault,  and  Fougeres  to 
Vitre,  where  it  turned  east  via  Laval  to 
Le  Mans.  Itschner  had  to  rule  out  this 
route,  for  two  bridges  along  it  had  been 
so  badly  bombed,  piers  as  well  as  spans, 
that  they  could  never  be  reconstructed 
in  time.  One  was  a  forty-foot-high  bridge 
over  the  Selune  River  at  Pontaubault, 
the  other  a  ninety-foot-high  bridge  over 
the  Mayenne  at  Laval.  To  bypass  both, 
the  engineers  planned  to  open  a  single- 
track  line  turning  east  just  north  of 
Pontaubault  to  St.  Hilaire-du-Harcouet 
and  then  south  to  a  point  beyond  Fou- 
geres, from  there  east  to  Mayenne,  and 
on  south  to  La  Chapelle-Anthenaise 
(beyond  Laval).  Here  the  line  was  to 
connect  with  the  double-track  railroad 


' '  Itschner,  "Reconstruction  of  W  European  Rail- 
roads"; Moore,  "Engr  Opns  in  the  European  Theater," 
p.  408. 


SUPPORTING  A  WAR  OF  MOVEMENT  IN  NORTHERN  FRANCE        401 


to  Le  Mans.  Five  bridges  were  down 
along  the  planned  route.'*' 

Elements  of  eleven  different  engi- 
neer general  service  regiments  worked 
simultaneously  on  the  line.  The  experi- 
ence of  the  332d  Engineer  General  Ser- 
vice Regiment  illustrates  the  urgency 
with  which  the  engineers  moved  to  the 
scene.  The  332d,  then  at  Cherbourg, 
received  orders  at  0300  on  13  August 
to  proceed  to  Mayenne.  Two  compa- 
nies took  the  0700  train  to  Carentan, 
then  moved  to  Mayenne  by  truck.  Upon 
arrival,  the  unit  set  up  a  pup  tent  biv- 
ouac in  a  hayfield  nearby  and  quickly 
began  work  on  the  railroad.  Some  of 
the  9,000  engineer  troops  required  to 
open  the  line  did  not  arrive  on  the  proj- 
ect until  twenty-four  hours  before  the 
deadline,  and  equipment  moved  slowly 
on  the  congested  roads.  Yet  the  work 
proceeded  so  swiftly  that  as  the  dead- 
line approached  Colonel  Itschner  had 
only  one  serious  cause  for  concern — an 
eighty-foot  single-track  bridge  at  St. 
Hilaire-du-Harcouet.  '^ 

With  a  well-placed  charge  the  Ger- 
mans had  blown  the  south  end  of  the 
bridge  from  its  abutment,  dropping  it 
into  the  Selune  River.  The  347th  Engi- 
neer General  Service  Regiment  cut  off 
the  damaged  end,  jacked  up  the  bridge 
and  placed  it  onto  a  pier  built  of  ties  in 
the  form  of  a  crib.  This  the  unit  accom- 
plished in  three  days,  during  which 
many  of  the  men  had  no  sleep  at  all. 
When  General  Moore  and  Colonel  Its- 
chner flew  over  the  St.  Hilaire  bridge 
site  on  an  inspection  trip  six  hours 


before  the  deadline  of  midnight  15 
August,  they  saw  spelled  out  on  the 
ground  in  white  cement,  "Will  finish  at 
2000."  The  first  gasoline-loaded  train 
left  the  FoUigny  area  at  1900  on  15 
August,  passed  over  the  St.  Hilaire 
bridge  shortly  before  midnight,  and 
after  many  delays  was  at  Le  Mans  on 
17  August.  Thirty  trains  followed  at 
thirty-minute  intervals.'^ 

Even  while  the  emergency  single- 
track  line  was  being  opened,  engineers 
were  working  on  the  bridges  at  Pontau- 
bault  and  Laval  to  provide  a  more  per- 
manent and  serviceable  line  to  Le  Mans. 
These  major  bridges,  which  units  of  the 
332d  Engineer  General  Service  Regi- 
ment reconstructed,  were  the  most  am- 
bitious bridging  projects  yet  undertak- 
en. Each  bridge  had  one  badly  dam- 
aged concrete  pier  that  had  to  be  re- 
placed by  a  light  steel  trestling  pier,  and 
each  bridge  required  two  UCRB  spans. 
The  Pontaubault  bridge  was  ready  on 
22  August,  rebuilt  in  twelve  days;  that 
at  Laval,  where  work  continued  at  night 
under  floodlights,  was  ready  in  four- 
teen days,  and  the  first  train  crossed  on 
31  August.'^ 

The  ADSEC  Engineer  Groups 

About  the  time  the  rush  job  for  Gen- 
eral Patton  was  completed,  the  size  of 
the  ADSEC  area  and  the  increased  vol- 
ume of  railroad  reconstruction  made  it 
necessary  for  the  ADSEC  engineer's 
Railroad  Division,  which  up  to  that  time 
had  handled  all  reconnaissance,  plans. 


"'  History  of  the  ADSEC]  Engineer  Section,  figs.  23 
and  24;  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  12,  Railroad  Recon- 
struction and  Bridging,  fig.  8;  Ruppenthal,  Logistical 
Support  of  the  Armies,  Volume  I,  p.  316,  map  9. 

^  Itschner,  "Reconstruction  of  W  European  Rail- 
roads." 


'"  Interv,  (^ol  A.  H.  Davidson,  Jr.,  in  Memorandum 
to  Files,  7  Mar  50,  Bortz  notes;  Itschner,  "Reconstruc- 
tion of  W  European  Railroads";  History  of  the  ADSEC 
Engineer  Section,  fig.  21. 

'  '  History  of  the  ADSEC  Engineer  Section,  pp. 
66-67  and  figs.  23  and  24. 


402 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


procurement,  project  assignments,  and 
inspections,  to  delegate  many  of  these 
responsibilities  to  subordinate  units. 
Therefore,  on  23  August  ADSEC  cre- 
ated three  provisional  engineer  groups, 
ADSEC  Engineer  Groups  A,  B,  and  C. 
Each  had  an  experienced  general  ser- 
vice regiment  as  a  nucleus,  with  one  or 
more  additional  regiments  attached, 
and  each  was  commanded  by  the  senior 
regimental  commander.  Although  each 
unit  retained  its  identity  for  administra- 
tive functions,  the  group  commander, 
aided  by  the  staff  of  the  nucleus  regi- 
ment, handled  all  operational  matters, 
including  work  assignments,  supply, 
and  reconnaissance. 

The  nucleus  of  Group  A  was  the 
332d  Engineer  General  Service  Regi- 
ment, whose  commanding  officer.  Col. 
Helmer  Swenholt,  became  group  com- 
mander. Attached  were  the  392d,  375th, 
and  389th  Engineer  General  Service 
Regiments.  Group  B,  commanded  by 
Col.  Harry  Hulen,  had  the  347th  Engi- 
neer General  Service  Regiment  as  the 
nucleus,  with  the  377th  Engineer  Gen- 
eral Service  Regiment  attached.  Col. 
Edward  H.  Coe  commanded  Group  C, 
whose  nucleus  was  the  341st  General 
Service  Regiment,  with  the  355th  and 
95th  attached.  Of  the  nine  general  ser- 
vice regiments  in  the  three  groups,  five 
had  engineer  dump  truck  companies 
attached,  and  one  had  an  attached  engi- 
neer welding  detachment  (provisional). 

During  the  last  week  of  August,  ele- 
ments of  the  three  groups  were  work- 
ing on  almost  all  rail  lines  between 
Pontaubault  and  the  Seine.  Groups  A 
and  B  set  to  repairing  the  main  double- 
track  Vire-Argentan-Dreux-Versailles- 
Juvisy  line  and  a  bridge  crossing  the 
Seine  at  Juvisy.  Group  C  worked  far- 
ther south  in  support  of  Third  Army 


to  open  the  Chartres-Orleans-Montar- 
gis  line.  On  27  August  the  group  re- 
ceived an  urgent  mission  to  open  imme- 
diately a  single-track  line  between  Ram- 
bouillet  and  Versailles,  the  first  line  into 
Paris.  Two  companies  of  the  341st  Engi- 
neer General  Service  Regiment,  work- 
ing twenty  hours  straight,  completed 
the  job  the  following  day.  Lt.  Col.  E. 
Warren  Heilig  of  the  341st  Engineers 
and  his  driver,  Pvt.  Harry  Smith,  were 
hailed  by  great  crowds  as  the  first  Ameri- 
cans to  enter  Versailles  on  the  heels  of 
the  retreating  Germans.^*' 

During  the  period  of  fast  pursuit. 
Allied  bombing  and  artillery  fire  caused 
most  of  the  track  damage.  Until  the 
engineers  reached  the  area  east  of  Metz, 
where  German  track  destruction  was 
severe — some  of  it  occasioned  by  the 
"track  ripper,"  a  huge  hook  pulled  by 
locomotives — the  main  problem  was 
bridges. "^^  The  worst  destruction  Group 
A  encountered  was  at  a  bridge  over  the 
Eure  River  near  Dreux,  about  thirty 
miles  west  of  Paris.  All  that  remained 
of  a  five-span,  300-foot  masonry-arch 
structure  was  a  pile  of  splintered  wreck- 
age and  two  damaged  abutments  well 
over  200  feet  apart.  This  bridge  had  a 
strange  history.  According  to  a  story 
the  engineers  heard,  the  French  had 
destroyed  the  bridge  in  1939.  Later,  the 
Germans  repaired  it,  replacing  the  ma- 
sonry arches  with  steel  beams  and 
wooden  piers.  During  the  rush  to  the 
Seine,  Allied  bombers  attacked  the 
bridge  repeatedly.  Bombs  falling  wide 
of  the  mark  became  so  dangerous  to 
the  local  population  that  the  French 
Forces  of  the  Interior  put  demolition 
charges  on  the  bridge  and  blew  it  up. 

■'^"  Hist  341st  Engr  GS  Rgt.  1944. 
■^'  Itschner,  "Reconstruction  of  W  European  Rail- 
roads," p.  2. 


SUPPORTING  A  WAR  OF  MOVEMENT  IN  NORTHERN  FRANCE        403 


Company  F,  332d  Engineer  General 
Service  Regiment,  aided  by  elements  of 
Companies  C  and  D,  rebuilt  the  bridge 
between  25  August  and  9  September. 
The  engineers  placed  five  steel  deck- 
type  spans  on  four  light  steel  trestle 
piers — seventy-foot-long  unit  construc- 
tion railway  bridge  spans  at  each  end 
and  three  I-beams  in  the  center.  The 
steel  trestle  piers  in  the  center  rested 
on  existing  concrete  footings;  those  at 
the  end  of  the  bridge  sat  on  footings 
the  engineers  made  with  compacted 
rubble.  At  first  the  bridge  carried  only 
a  single  track,  but  the  engineers  later 
completed  a  double-track  bridge  by 
increasing  the  width  of  the  piers  and 
building  a  duplicate  superstructure  on 
the  widened  section.  The  engineers 
assembled  the  additional  spans  on  the 
ground  and  lifted  them  into  place  be- 
cause the  usual  nose-launching  method 
would  have  required  halting  traffic 
along  the  single-track  line.'^'^ 

For  the  first  crossing  of  the  Seine 
River  south  of  Paris  at  Juvisy,  the  engi- 
neers faced  the  widest  body  of  water 
they  had  yet  encountered.  {Map  20)  No 
unit  construction  launching  equipment 
was  available  for  the  four  sixty-foot 
UCRB  spans  required  to  cover  gaps  in 
the  existing  bridge,  gaps  created  when 
the  Germans  dropped  two  120-foot  lat- 
tice girder  spans  into  the  river.  Group 
B's  347th  Engineer  General  Service 
Regiment  solved  the  problem  by  assem- 
bling the  UCRB  spans  and  towers  for 
light  steel  trestling  piers  on  shore.  This 
procedure  saved  time  in  the  long  run, 
because  it  permitted  superstructure 
assembly  to  proceed  simultaneously 
with  wreckage  clearance  and  pier  foun- 


dation work.  When  the  piers  were  ready, 
the  engineers  put  the  spans  and  towers 
aboard  a  French  derrick  barge,  pushed 
it  out  to  the  site  with  tugs,  and  set  the 
equipment  in  place  in  a  matter  of  min- 
utes. Speed  was  essential  because  until 
the  bridge  was  in,  Third  Army  opera- 
tions east  of  Metz  could  not  be  supplied. 
The  engineers  completed  the  bridge  on 
6  September,  forty-eight  hours  ahead 
of  schedule. "^"^ 

Bridge  reconstruction  east  of  Paris 
posed  different  problems.  Bridges  were 
usually  longer  and  lower,  so  timber-pile 
trestles  frequently  could  be  erected  on 
the  debris  of  the  old  bridge,  a  distinct 
advantage.  On  the  other  hand,  supply 
became  more  difficult  because  the  long 
distance  from  the  beaches  made  it  im- 
practicable to  haul  forward  such  mate- 
rial as  UCRB  spans.  The  engineers  had 
to  depend  on  materials  obtained  locally 
or  captured  from  the  Germans.  The 
new  conditions  were  exemplified  in  the 
reconstruction  of  the  bridge  over  the 
Marne  River  Canal  at  Vitry.  Two  com- 
panies of  Group  C's  341st  Engineer 
General  Service  Regiment  repaired  it 
in  six  days  beginning  5  September, 
working  around  the  clock  and  using 
floodlights  at  night.  Two  ninety-foot 
spans  of  the  three-span  masonry-arch 
bridge  had  received  direct  hits  from 
Allied  bombers  as  two  German  freight 
trains  were  crossing  it  on  adjacent  tracks. 
Cars,  track,  and  stone  were  piled  in  the 
water.  Instead  of  attempting  to  remove 
or  build  through  the  rubble,  the  engi- 
neers used  the  debris  to  carry  wood  sills 
upon  which  bents  were  set  to  support  a 
stringer-type  bridge.  For  spans,  the 
engineers  employed  captured  German 


^•^  Bowman,  "Railroad  Bridging  in  the  E.T.O.,"  pp. 
40-41  and  figs.  11,  12a,  and  12b. 


Ibid.,  pp.  39-40  and  figs.  9  and  10. 


MAP  20 


SUPPORTING  A  WAR  OF  MOVEMENT  IN  NORTHERN  FRANCE        405 


I-beams  and  a  prefabricated  deck  gir- 
der span  found  in  a  railroad  yard. 

Fifty  days  after  the  breakthrough  at 
St.  Lo  the  rail  net  in  the  Third  Army 
sector  extended  to  Verdun  on  the  Metz 
line  and  to  Toul  on  the  line  to  Nancy. 
In  the  First  Army  sector,  the  line  was 
open  from  Paris  northeast  through 
Soissons,  Laon,  Hirson,  Marienbourg, 
Charleroi,  Gembloux,  and  Landen  to 
Liege.  {Map  21) 

The  first  train  to  cross  the  border 
into  Belgium  was  the  regimental  head- 
quarters train  of  the  332d  Engineer 
General  Service  Regiment.  On  25  Aug- 
ust Colonel  Swenholt,  the  regimental 
commander  (also  commander  of  Group 
A),  decided  to  move  his  headquarters 
and  the  administration  section  of  Head- 
quarters and  Service  Company  to  the 
La  Hutte— Coulombiers  area  near  Le 
Mans  by  train  to  save  precious  gasoline 
and  tires.  He  used  a  German  hospital 
train  augmented  with  a  few  French  cars 
and  drawn  by  Transportation  Corps 
locomotives.  Pulling  out  of  the  village 
in  some  style  after  the  townspeople  had 
decked  it  with  flowers,  the  train  rolled 
over  the  Eure  River  bridge  near  Dreux 
on  9  September  and  continued  to  Paris 
via  Versailles.  Beyond  Paris  the  engi- 
neers had  to  depend  upon  French  loco- 
motives and  crews.  Problems  with  the 
locomotives  soon  developed,  and  when 
the  train  reached  the  Belgian  border 
more  trouble  arose,  for  the  French 
crews  objected  to  going  into  Belgium. 
Acquiring  a  German  freight  locomo- 
tive and  recruiting  crews  from  his  own 
units.  Colonel  Swenholt  got  the  twenty 
steel  cars  and  five  boxcars  under  way 
from  Hirson  shortly  after  midnight  on 
12  September  and  reached  Charleroi, 


Belgium,  at  2000  the  same  day.  After  a 
stay  of  four  days  in  Charleroi,  during 
which  the  engineers  were  so  mobbed 
by  welcoming  Belgians  that  the  gen- 
darmes had  to  be  called  out,  the  head- 
quarters train  arrived  at  Liege  in  the 
early  morning  of  17  September  1944.^^ 

Pipelines 

By  12  August  1944,  the  day  General 
Patton  demanded  railroad  reconstruc- 
tion from  Folligny  to  Le  Mans  to  carry 
gasoline  in  the  dash  toward  Paris,  the 
pip)eline  designed  to  bring  bulk  POL  for- 
ward from  the  ports  ran  only  as  far  as 
St.  Lo.  ADSEC  engineer  units,  whose 
mission  was  to  construct  pipelines,  stor- 
age tanks,  and  pumping  stations  and 
then  to  operate  them,  began  landing 
on  Omaha  Beach  shortly  after  D-day. 
The  largest  unit  in  the  POL  organiza- 
tion was  the  359th  Engineer  General 
Service  Regiment,  with  Company  A  of 
the  358th  Engineer  General  Service 
Regiment  attached.  Other  components 
were  seven  engineer  petroleum  distri- 
bution companies — the  698th,  786th, 
787th,  788th,  790th,  1374th,  and 
1375th;  two  engineer  fire-fighting  pla- 
toons; and  a  squad  from  an  engineer 
camouflage  battalion.  The  358th  and 
359th  General  Service  Regiments  were 
not  assigned  to  bulk  POL  supply  on 
the  Continent  until  well  after  their 
arrival  in  England  in  late  1943.  The 
regiments  were  generally  inexperienced 
in  pipeline  operations  and  had  insuffi- 
cient time  and  equipment  for  adequate 
training.  On  the  other  hand,  the  petro- 
leum distribution  companies  had  been 


Ibid.,  pp.  42-43  and  fig.  13. 


-•  Hist  332d  Engr  (iS  Rgl,  1  jan-31  Dec  44. 

'■^''  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Vol- 
ume I,  p.  5 10.  For  early  POL  planning  in  the  ETO,  see 
Ibid.,  pp.  319-27. 


406 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


recruited  largely  from  oilfield  workers 
and  had  received  specialized  training 
in  the  United  States.  In  late  spring  of 
1944  the  787th  Engineer  Petroleum 
Distribution  Company  instructed  the 
two  general  service  regiments  in  pipe- 
line construction  and  operation. 

Most  engineer  POL  units  had  the 
mission  of  installing  and  operating  the 
Major  POL  System  at  Cherbourg,  con- 
structing or  rehabilitating  facilities  for 
receiving,  storing,  and  dispensing  fuel. 
Most  POL  was  to  be  delivered  dockside 
by  tankers,  but  some  was  to  come  in 
through  British  lines  laid  on  the  floor 
of  the  Channel  from  the  Isle  of  Wight 
to  the  Continent,  a  system  called  PLUTO 
(Pipeline  Under  the  Ocean).  From  Cher- 
bourg south  the  engineers  were  to  lay 
three  six-inch  pipelines,  two  for  motor 
gasoline  (MT  80)  and  one  for  aviation 
gasoline  (avgas),  with  pump  stations, 
tank  farms,  and  dispensing  facilities  at 
La  Haye-du-Puits,  Coutances,  Avran- 
ches,  Fougeres,  and  Laval.  Lines  for 
motor  fuel  were  to  extend  from  Fou- 
geres to  Rennes  and  from  Laval  to  Cha- 
teaubriant.  But  because  construction 
for  the  major  system  could  not  begin 
until  Cherbourg  was  captured,  the  engi- 
neers were  to  put  the  Minor  POL  Sys- 
tem into  operation  shortly  after  D-day 
at  two  points  east  of  OMAHA — Ste. 
Honorine-des-Pertes,  the  easternmost 
town  in  the  American  sector,  and  Port- 
en-Bessin,  at  the  edge  of  the  British 
beach  area.'^^ 

The  Minor  POL  System 
The  first  POL  engineers  ashore  at 


""^^  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Engineers: 
Troops  and  Equipment,  pp.  417-37.  See  also  Hists, 
359th  Engr  OS  Rgt,  1943-45,  and  787th  Engr  Pet 
Dist  Co,  22  Feb  44 -Dec  45. 


MAP  21 

Omaha  were  two  companies  of  the 
359th  General  Service  Regiment  and 
two  petroleum  distribution  companies, 
the  698th  and  786th.  An  advance  party 
of  officers  landed  early  in  the  evening 
of  9  June  and  proceeded  east  to  the 
assigned  bivouac  area — an  apple  orch- 
ard near  the  village  of  Huppain,  some- 
what inland  and  about  halfway  between 
Ste.  Honorine-des-Pertes  and  Port-en- 
Bessin.  In  the  next  two  days  a  convoy 
with  the  rest  of  the  first  elements  came 
in  over  the  narrow  cliffside  road  to 
Huppain.  As  the  last  men  of  the  786th 


SUPPORTING  A  WAR  OF  MOVEMENT  IN  NORTHERN  FRANCE        407 


Engineer  Petroleum  Distribution  Com- 
pany landed  at  OMAHA  on  1 1  June, 
they  saw  that  the  "wet,  flat  strip  of  sand 
was  littered  up  and  down  the  coast  as 
far  as  the  men  could  see.  Machinery, 
guns,  tools,  clothes,  and  the  innumera- 
ble odds  and  ends  that  came  ashore 
with  the  assault  were  scattered  and 
strewn  as  tho  by  some  incredible  wind. 
Broken  landing  boats  [were]  flung  be- 
side burnt-out  tanks  whose  tracks  were 
already  bright  with  rust.  [DUKWs,]  bent 
like  metal  toys,  spotted  the  foot  of  the 
sheer  cliffs  descending  from  the  forti- 
fied hills."  That  night  after  the  petro- 


leum engineers  had  settled  down  in  the 
bivouac  at  Huppain,  German  fighter- 
bombers  roared  low  over  them  but 
dropped  no  bombs. ^^ 

At  that  time,  the  engineers  had  a 
scant  ten  days  to  get  the  first  POL  sys- 
tem in  operation.  Bulk  deliveries  of 
POL,  which  had  been  handled  in  cans 
during  and  immediately  after  the  inva- 
sion, were  scheduled  to  begin  on  D  plus 

At  Ste.  Honorine-des-Pertes  the  engi- 


'^'^  Hist  786th  Engr  Pet  Dist  Co,  Feb- Dec  44. 
*^''  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Vol- 
ume I,  p.  322. 


408 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


neers  were  to  install  two  six-inch  ship- 
to-shore  submarine  pipelines  known  as 
Tombolas  to  receive  gasoline  and  die- 
sel  fuel  from  tankers  at  a  deepwater 
anchorage  and  carry  it  to  five  bolted 
steel  tanks  onshore.  One  tank,  holding 
10,000  barrels  of  gasoline,  was  for  Army 
use;  four  5,000-barrel  tanks,  one  for 
gasoline  and  three  for  diesel  fuel,  were 
for  the  Navy.  Pump  stations  and  four- 
inch  lines  would  carry  the  Army  gaso- 
line to  an  inland  tank  farm  at  Mt.  Cau- 
vin,  a  hill  about  two  miles  south  of 
Huppain  and  equidistant  from  Ste. 
Honorine-des-Pertes  and  Port-en-Bes- 
sin.  The  Navy  fuel  was  to  go  to  the 
Mulberry  at  Omaha. 

Port-en-Bessin  had  two  moles  where 
shallow-draft  tankers  could  tie  up.  While 
the  British  used  the  easternmost,  the 
engineers  were  to  install  two  six-inch 
discharge  lines  at  the  other — one  for 
motor  gasoline  and  one  for  aviation 
gasoline — and  to  erect  two  1 ,000-barrel 
tanks,  one  for  each  type.  Two  pump 
stations  were  required,  as  well  as  two 
six-inch  delivery  lines  running  to  the 
tank  farm  at  Mt.  Cauvin. 

Mt.  Cauvin  needed  considerable  work, 
including  tankage  for  30,000  barrels  of 
motor  gasoline,  a  six-inch  gravity  line 
and  six  tank  truck  filling  risers,  pump 
stations,  and  two  four-inch  lines  con- 
necting with  British  lines.  In  addition, 
one  four-inch  pipeline  was  to  be  con- 
structed south  to  Balleroy,  with  a  boost- 
er station  on  the  way  at  Crouay.  Balle- 
roy, an  important  filling  station,  would 
have  two  terminal  storage  tanks  (one 
holding  1,000  barrels  and  the  other 
5,000  barrels),  dispensing  lines  and  con- 
nections to  permit  loading  six  tank 
trucks  simultaneously,  and  decanting 
connections  where  quartermaster 
troops  could  fill  five-gallon  cans. 


Plans  for  expansion  of  the  Minor 
POL  System  were  partly  shaped  by  the 
fuel  needs  of  U.S.  aircraft  on  the  Conti- 
nent. For  aviation  fuel,  a  four-inch  line 
was  to  extend  from  Mt.  Cauvin  about 
twenty-eight  miles  west  to  Carentan, 
with  booster  stations  on  the  way.  At 
Carentan  French  fuel  tanks  with  a  capac- 
ity of  4,200  barrels  were  to  be  rehabili- 
tated and  dispensing  facilities  con- 
structed. A  similar  line  for  motor  vehi- 
cle gasoline  was  to  run  from  Mt.  Cauvin 
to  St.  Lo  and  Coutances,  where  the  Mi- 
nor and  Major  POL  Systems  would  con- 
nect. At  both  St.  Lo  and  Coutances, 
storage  tanks  and  facilities  to  serve  a 
quartermaster  decanting  station  were  to 
be  constructed.^** 

Lack  of  supplies  seriously  handi- 
capped the  POL  engineers  who  landed 
on  Omaha  beginning  9  June.  Construc- 
tion materials  expected  to  come  in 
aboard  a  commodity-loaded  coaster  on 
10  June  did  not  arrive.  By  scouring 
Omaha  and  Utah  beaches  the  engi- 
neers found  enough  scattered  material 
to  make  a  small  start  on  13  June.  Two 
days  later  the  first  of  eight  LCTs,  load- 
ed with  construction  materials  and  sent 
forward  when  it  became  evident  that 
the  capture  of  Cherbourg  would  be 
delayed,  arrived  at  Port-en-Bessin.  Un- 
fortunately, a  storm  that  raged  along 
the  coast  for  three  days  wrecked  two  of 
the  LCTs. 

Mines  the  Germans  had  sown  in  the 
area  also  handicapped  early  operations. 
They  had  not  been  cleared  because  the 
combat  engineers  charged  with  this  work 
had  landed  elsewhere.  From  one  field 


■'"  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  13,  Petroleum,  Oil,  and 
Lubricants,  app.  10c,  POL  Plan,  Overlord,  pp.  12- 
13;  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Volume 
/,  pp.  316-17,  map  9. 


SUPPORTING  A  WAR  OF  MOVEMENT  IN  NORTHERN  FRANCE        409 


behind  Ste.  Honorine-des-Pertes  the 
POL  engineers  removed  more  than  a 
thousand  mines,  suffering  six  casualties, 
one  fatal.  Casualties  would  undoubtedly 
have  been  higher  except  for  a  "kindly, 
sharp-sighted  little  Frenchman,"  Eu- 
gene Le  Carre,  who  had  a  summer 
home  near  the  beach  at  Ste.  Honorine- 
des-Pertes.  From  his  front  porch  he  had 
watched  the  Cermans  plant  their  mines 
and  had  noted  their  locations.  On  fish- 
ing trips  he  had  discovered  underwa- 
ter mines  near  the  beaches  and  fur- 
nished information  for  which  Allied 
engineers  were  grateful."^'  The  engi- 
neers also  faced  Cerman  snipers,  whose 
bullets  sometimes  punctured  pipelines. 
They  often  found  that  the  elevations 
marked  on  their  contour  maps  were 
incorrect,  forcing  drastic  changes  to  the 
plans  for  tank  sites.  Nevertheless,  by 
23  June,  the  day  the  first  tanker  arrived 
at  Port-en-Bessin,  the  POL  engineers 
had  their  transmission,  storage,  and  dis- 
pensing facilities  ready.  When  the  first 
Tombola  was  launched  at  Ste.  Hon- 
orine-des-Pertes three  days  later  the 
engineers  had  extended  a  pipeline  to 
the  Balleroy  storage  area,  where  the 
POL  troops  had  erected  one  tank  and 
were  installing  dispensing  facilities.  ^^ 

After  the  capture  of  Cherbourg  most 
POL  engineers  left  work  on  the  Minor 
POL  System  and  proceeded  toward 
Cherbourg  via  Bricquebec,  where  ele- 
ments of  the  POL  organization  were 
already  located.  Company  A  of  the 
358th  General  Service  Regiment  and 
the  787th  Engineer  Petroleum  Distri- 
bution Company,  for  example,  did  not 


="  Hist  359th  GS  Rgt,  pp.  145-46. 

■'■^  Col  A.  G.  Viney,  Dep  ADSEC  Engr,  Rpt  to  Engr 
Fwd  Echelon,  HQ,  COMZ,  26  Jim  44,  quoted  in  OCE 
ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  13,  Petroleum,  Oil,  and  Lubricants, 
pp.  65-66. 


reach  Huppain  until  22  June  and  stayed 
only  three  days  before  moving  west. 
After  1  July  responsibility  for  the  Minor 
POL  System  passed  entirely  to  the  786th 
Engineer  Petroleum  Distribution  Com- 
pany, the  only  engineer  POL  unit  re- 
maining in  the  area. 

As  the  transfer  to  Cherbourg  began, 
the  786th  was  pushing  pipelines  west- 
ward, following  a  railroad  bed  that  ran 
from  Bayeux  to  Carentan  via  St.  Jean- 
de-Daye.  Although  trucks  and  trailers 
negotiated  the  rough  railroad  bed  with 
difficulty,  it  was  the  most  direct  and 
level  route  west.  By  9  July  construction 
had  advanced  to  Govin,  within  five 
miles  of  St.  Jean-de-Daye,  but  there 
enemy  small-arms  fire  halted  the  work. 
St.  Jean-de-Daye  had  not  yet  been  cap- 
tured, and  the  line  that  was  to  run 
through  the  town  had  to  be  abandoned. 
After  a  temporary  suspension  of  all 
construction,  the  786th  Engineer  Petro- 
leum Distribution  Company  pushed  a 
line  for  aviation  fuel  north  from  Govin 
to  Carentan,  arriving  there  on  24  July. 
South  from  Govin  engineers  con- 
structed two  pipelines,  one  for  aviation 
fuel  and  another  for  motor  gasoline,  to 
tie  in  with  the  Major  POL  System  at  St. 
Lo.  Early  in  August  elements  of  the 
1 374th  Engineer  Petroleum  Distribu- 
tion Company,  which  had  reached  Hup- 
pain in  mid-July,  worked  at  Carentan 
repairing  civilian  gasoline  tanks  and  at 
St.  Lo  building  a  10,000-barrel  tank. 

The  Major  POL  System 

Gasoline  from  the  Cherbourg  area 
began  to  flow  into  St.  Lo  on  11  August. 
While  elements  of  the  359th  Engineer 
General  Service  Regiment,  with  the 
787th,  698th,  and  1375th  Engineer  Pe- 
troleum Distribution  Companies,  recon- 


410 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


structed  POL  facilities  at  Cherbourg, 
troops  of  the  359th  General  Service 
Regiment  surveyed  the  pipeline  route 
south. 

Work  on  the  pipelines  to  the  front, 
beginning  at  the  Hainneville  tank  farm 
in  Cherbourg  and  undertaken  mainly 
by  the  2d  Battalion  of  the  359th,  pro- 
ceeded expeditiously,  thanks  to  an  in- 
crease in  supplies  and  manpower.  Close 
behind  the  combat  troops,  the  engi- 
neers extended  the  lines  to  La  Haye- 
du-Puits  and  Lessay  by  the  beginning 
of  August.  The  route  of  the  pipelines 
changed  with  the  breakthrough.  In- 
stead of  swinging  south  via  Coutances 
and  Avranches  to  Laval,  the  pipelines 
were  to  run  southeast  to  St.  Lo,  Vire, 
and  Domfront,  and  then  east  to  Alen- 
con,  Chartres,  and  Dourdan,  to  cross 
the  Seine  near  Corbeil  and  go  to  Cou- 
bert  near  Paris. 

The  major  system  consisted  of  three 
pipelines,  two  for  80-octane  and  one 
for  100-octane  aviation  fuel.  Construc- 
tion of  the  80-octane  lines  got  priority 
because  of  the  greater  demand  for 
motor  fuel.  Except  at  highway  and  rail- 
road crossings,  where  welded  lines  went 
underground,  engineers  laid  the  pipe- 
lines on  the  ground  and  connected  each 
section  with  victaulic  couplings.  When- 
ever possible,  the  route  followed  a  hard- 
surfaced  road  along  which  POL  con- 
struction material  could  be  transported. 
In  the  early  days  in  Normandy  the  pipe- 
lines followed  road  shoulders  because 
the  engineers  did  not  have  time  to 
break  through  the  hedgerows  and  re- 
move mines  from  the  fields.  But  here 
the  lines  fell  victim  to  errant  drivers, 
and  traffic  accidents  nearly  always  in- 
volved a  section  of  the  pipe.  The  engi- 
neers soon  learned  to  lay  the  pipelines 
on  the  other  side  of  the  hedgerows, 


where  they  escaped  damage  and  still 
followed  the  line  of  communications.^'' 

Construction  from  St.  Lo  went  on 
simultaneously  along  three  segments  of 
the  route:  St.  Lo  to  Vire,  Vire  to  Dom- 
front, and  Domfront  to  Alencon.  By 
the  end  of  August  the  engineers  had 
pushed  one  80-octane  line,  the  "Pio- 
neer" six-inch  line,  as  far  as  Alencon, 
eighty-one  miles  from  St.  Lo;  a  second 
80-octane  line  had  reached  Domfront, 
and  the  aviation  gas  line  was  approach- 
ing Domfront.  The  need  for  speed  and 
the  inexperience  of  some  of  the  POL 
engineers  resulted,  at  times,  in  poor 
construction.  Breaks  occurred  when  the 
engineers  were  careless  with  couplings 
or  left  openings  through  which  small 
animals  entered  the  line  or  into  which 
other  troops  threw  such  objects  as 
C-ration  cans.  Breaks  in  the  line 
north  of  Domfront  on  29  August  made 
it  necessary  for  combat  forces  to  draw 
all  gasoline  at  St.  Lo  until  repairs  could 
be  made.  Interruptions  to  the  work 
were  inevitable  when  the  engineers  ran 
into  minefields  and  suffered  casualties 
or  encountered  pockets  of  enemy  resis- 
tance. Fuel  losses  from  holes  punched 
in  the  line  by  black  market  operators 
and  saboteurs  became  frequent  as  the 
lines  moved  east,  while  breaks  result- 
ing from  ramming  by  trucks  and  tanks 
increased  as  the  traffic  built  up.'''* 

When  the  advance  party  of  the  359th 
General  Service  Regiment  reached  the 
bombed-out  city  of  Alencon  on  20  Aug- 
ust, it  ran  into  clouds  of  dust  from  hun- 
dreds of  vehicles  rolling  over  the  rub- 
ble in  the  streets.  A  tremendous  acceler- 
ation of  traffic  came  a  week  later  with 


■^'  Moore,  Final  Report,  pp.  312-  13. 

^^  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Vol- 
ume I,  pp.  510-1  land  map  16;"  History  of  the  ADS  EC 
Engineer  Section,  Incl  13. 


SUPPORTING  A  WAR  OF  MOVEMENT  IN  NORTHERN  FRANCE        411 


o.    w  N.     .  Port-en 

Ste  Hdnonne-        g^^^,.^ 

des-Pertes 


MINOR  SYSTEM 


POL  PIPELINES 

September  1944 

—         Major  System,  6"  Lines 

0  20  40  Miles 

I , \ — . 1 


20 


40  Kilometers 


Chartres 
Nogent-le-Rotrou 


MAP  22 


the  inauguration  of  the  Red  Ball  Ex- 
press, an  around-the-clock  operation  to 
carry  supplies  (except  bulk  POL)  to  the 
front.  The  engineers  soon  felt  the  effect 
of  Red  Ball  on  pipeline  construction. 
Faced  with  the  urgent  needs  of  the 
advancing  armies,  COMZ  chose  to  di- 
vert to  Red  Ball  many  truck  units  needed 
to  carry  pipeline  construction  materi- 
als to  the  POL  engineers.  At  the  end  of 
August  COMZ  gave  high  priority  to  the 
rail  movement  of  POL  engineer  materi- 
als, and  within  ten  days  the  engineers 
received  enough  material  in  the  Alen- 
con-Chartres  area  to  permit  construc- 
tion to  continue.  But  by  then  the  slow- 
down of  pipeline  construction  had  al- 
ready contributed  to  the  critical  gaso- 
line shortages  that  developed  early  in 
September?^ 


^^'  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Vol- 
ume I,  p.  513;  Moore,  Final  Report,  p.  313. 


New  POL  Organization 

By  the  third  week  in  August  the  engi- 
neer force  working  on  the  major  and 
minor  pipeline  systems  included  three 
general  service  regiments,  the  358th, 
359th,  and  368th;  a  battalion  of  a  fourth, 
the  364th;  and  nine  petroleum  distribu- 
tion companies,  the  698th,  786th,  787th, 
788th,  790th,  1374th,  1375th,  1376th, 
and  1377th.  With  attached  truck  com- 
panies, welding  detachments,  and  fire- 
fighting  platoons,  the  force  numbered 
more  than  7,000  men.  On  23  August 
ADSEC  organized  this  engineer  force 
into  the  Military  Pipeline  Group  (Pro- 
visional) under  the  command  of  Col. 
John  L.  Person  of  the  359th.  {Map  22) 

Enough  troops  were  available  to  oper- 
ate the  systems,  but  by  mid-September, 
after  a  brief  spurt  of  moving  construc- 
tion materials  by  rail  had  ended,  trans- 
portation to  move  the  pipe  forward  was 


412 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Decanting  Area  on  the  Oil  Pipeline  in  Antwerp,  Belgium 


lacking.  The  Major  POL  System  had 
advanced  to  Chartres,  but  the  ADSEC 
engineer  estimated  that  available  trucks 
and  trailers  could  deliver  no  more  than 
seven  to  eight  miles  of  pipe  per  day.^^ 
The  lack  of  transportation  to  move 
POL  construction  supplies  made  it  in- 
creasingly difficult  for  the  pipelines  to 
keep  up  when  ADSEC  headquarters 
moved  forward.  This  posed  a  problem 
of  control.  For  a  time,  base  sections 
operated  parts  of  the  system  in  their 
respective  areas,  but  the  division  of 
responsibility  was  unworkable  because 
the  POL  system  was  essentially  an  entity 
unto  itself.  When  ADSEC  moved  to 


Reims  early  in  September,  the  entire 
POL  system  fell  outside  the  ADSEC 
area  and  was  likely  to  remain  so  for 
some  time.  Therefore,  on  23  Septem- 
ber 1944,  the  Military  Pipeline  Group 
(Provisional)  passed  to  the  control  of 
Headquarters,  Communications  Zone, 
and  was  renamed  the  Military  Pipeline 
Service  (MPLS).  Colonel  Person  contin- 
ued as  commander. "^^ 

COMZ  instituted  a  number  of  help- 
ful changes,  dividing  the  pipeline  area 
into  districts,  with  commanding  officers 
of  the  experienced  engineer  petroleum 
distribution  companies  in  charge.  COMZ 
also  set  up  schools  in  each  district  for 


■^''  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  13,  Petroleum,  Oil,  and 
Lubricants,  p.  88  and  fig.  5;  Hist  359th  GS  Rgt,  p.  195. 


History  of  the  ADSEC  Engineer  Section,  p.  56. 


SUPPORTING  A  WAR  OF  MOVEMENT  IN  NORTHERN  FRANCE        413 


the  less  experienced  engineers  of  the 
general  service  regiments,  took  steps  to 
reduce  pilferage,  and,  most  important, 
provided  first  a  courier  service  and  later 
a  telephone  service  for  better  commu- 
nications among  the  POL  engineers 
who  had  hitherto  been  operating,  as 
one  expressed  it,  "by  smoke  signals." 
In  addition,  an  airlift  from  the  United 
States  brought  in  a  number  of  sorely 
needed  spare  parts. '^^ 

The  problem  of  moving  the  construc- 
tion materials  forward  remained  vexing. 
By  6  October  1944,  the  Major  POL  Sys- 
tem was  in  operation  to  Coubert,  across 
the  Seine  about  twenty  miles  southeast 
of  Paris.  The  period  of  rapid  pursuit 
was  over,  and  other  supplies,  notably 


ammunition,  had  priority  over  POL. 
Planners  then  decided  to  terminate  the 
major  system  at  Coubert,  at  least  for 
some  time,  and  to  concentrate  on  shorter 
pipelines  based  at  Le  Havre  and  Ant- 
werp. Coubert  remained  the  end  of  the 
line  until  January  1945.^^ 

Farther  east  of  Paris,  Allied  armies 
were  approaching  the  German  border 
by  mid-September.  The  engineers  ex- 
pected formidable  obstacles  in  the  forti- 
fied belts  of  the  Siegfried  Line  and  in 
the  Rhine  River  to  say  nothing  of  the 
terrain  between  them,  heavily  criss- 
crossed with  watercourses  large  and 
small. 


'''  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  13,  Petroleum,  Oil,  and 
Lubricants,  app.  15,  Military  Pipeline  Service:  Individ- 
ual and  Unit  History. 


*''  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Vol- 
ume I,  pp.  514-15.  For  construction  of  pipelines  and 
supply  of  POL  after  January  1945,  see  Ibid.,  Volume 
II,  pp.  193-209,  434-40,  and  map  11. 


CHAPTER  XIX 


Breaching  Germany's  Barriers 


Rolling  into  Eupen  behind  tanks  on 
the  afternoon  of  1 1  September  1944, 
the  engineers  saw  that  "the  'fun'  the 
boys  had  had  in  liberating  all  those 
towns  and  cities  in  France  and  Belgium 
was  over."'  They  were  greeted  not  with 
wild  cheers  but  with  hostile  stares.  Eupen 
was  in  Belgium,  but  it  was  only  some 
five  miles  from  the  German  border.  All 
the  signs  were  in  German.  From  some 
windows  hung  Belgian  flags,  but  from 
others  were  suspended  white  bedsheets 
signifying  surrender.  The  engineers 
belonged  to  Company  B  of  the  23d 
Armored  Engineer  Battalion  and  were 
supporting  Combat  Command  B  of  VII 
Corps'  3d  Armored  Division,  the  spear- 
head tankers  who,  on  12  September, 
would  be  the  first  Americans  to  cap- 
ture a  German  town. 

General  Eisenhower  had  long  plan- 
ned that  as  soon  as  enemy  forces  in 
France  were  destroyed  the  American 
armies  would  advance  rapidly  to  the 
Rhine,  First  Army  through  the  Aachen 
Gap  on  the  north  to  Cologne  and  Third 
Army  through  the  Metz  Gap  south  of 
Koblenz.^  On  the  northern  battlefront 
in  France  artificial  and  natural  barriers 
blocked  the  routes  to  the  Rhine.  The 


attackers  would  have  to  clear  a  path 
through  the  concrete  fortifications  that 
formed  the  Siegfried  Line.  They  would 
also  have  to  penetrate  dense  woods  and 
forests,  overcome  fortifications  protect- 
ing Aachen  and  Metz,  and  cross  many 
rivers,  some  of  them  in  flood.  In  the  two 
months  between  the  first  breaching  of 
the  Siegfried  Line  and  the  start  of  the 
German  counteroffensive  in  mid-De- 
cember the  deepest  advance  into  Ger- 
many was  only  twenty-two  miles. ^ 

The  Siegfried  Line 

Begun  in  1938,  the  Siegfried  Line 
was  a  system  of  mutually  supporting 
pillboxes,  about  ten  per  mile,  extend- 
ing along  the  German  border  from  a 
point  above  Aachen  south  and  south- 
east to  the  Rhine  and  thence  along  the 
German  bank  of  the  Rhine  to  the  Swiss 
border.  North  of  Aachen  the  line  con- 
sisted of  a  single  belt  of  fortifications, 
while  south  of  that  city  it  split  into  two 
belts,  about  five  miles  apart,  known  as 
the  Scharnhorst  Line  and  the  Schill 
Line.  Farther  southeast,  in  the  rugged 
terrain  of  the  Eifel,  the  line  was  again 
one  belt  until  it  reached  the  region  of 


'  Hist  23d  Armd  Engr  Bn,  1944,  p.  8. 

^  Msg,  Eisenhower  to  Commanders,  4  Sep  44,  quoted 
in  Hugh  M.  Cole,  The  Lorraine  Campaign,  United  States 
Army  in  World  War  H  (Washington,  1950),  p.  53. 


^  Charles  B.  MacDonald,  The  Sie^ried  Line  Campaign, 
United  States  Army  in  World  War  II  (Washington, 
1963),  p.  616.  Unless  otherwise  cited,  tactical  details 
of  the  First  Army  penetration  are  from  this  source. 


BREACHING  GERMANY'S  BARRIERS 


415 


the  Saar,  where  it  split  once  more.  (Map 
23) 

The  pillboxes  were  set  at  least  half- 
way into  the  earth.  Walls  and  roofs  were 
of  reinforced  concrete  three  to  eight 
feet  thick,  sometimes  covered  with  earth, 
grass,  and  trees  and  sometimes  dis- 
guised as  farmhouses  or  barns.  Con- 
cealed steel  doors  led  to  rooms  for  quar- 
tering troops  and  storing  arms  and 
ammunition.  The  firing  ports  could 
usually  accommodate  only  light  machine 
guns  and  the  37-mm.  antitank  guns 
standard  in  1938.  Most  heavier  fire  had 
to  come  from  mobile  artillery  and  tanks 
stationed  near  the  fixed  fortifications. 

For  protection  against  tanks  the  pill- 
boxes often  depended  on  natural  barri- 
ers such  as  watercourses,  forests,  and 
defiles.  In  more  open  country  the  pill- 
boxes had  a  shield  of  45-foot- wide  bands 
of  "dragon's  teeth" — small  concrete 
pyramids,  usually  painted  green  to  blend 
in  with  the  fields.  The  pyramids  had 
been  cast  in  one  piece  on  a  concrete 
base,  with  steel  reinforcing  rods  tied 
into  the  base's  reinforcing  rods.  The 
teeth  in  the  first  two  rows  were  about  2 
1/2  feet  high,  those  in  the  following 
rows  successively  higher  until  the  last 
stood  almost  5  feet  tall.  Between  the 
rows  were  iron  pickets  imbedded  in  the 
bases,  designed  to  take  barbed  wire. 
Wherever  a  road  ran  through  the  bank, 
the  Germans  blocked  access  with  obsta- 
cles such  as  steel  gates. ^ 

In  late  August  1944  Hitler  rushed  in 
a  "people's"  labor  force  to  strengthen 
the  line.  This  effort  bore  fruit  in  the 
Saar,  where  the  Third  Army  did  not 
arrive  at  the  Siegfried  Line  until  early 


December;  but  in  the  First  Army's 
Aachen  and  Eifel  sectors,  where  VII 
Corps  and  V  Corps  reached  the  line 
almost  simultaneously  on  12  and  13 
September,  the  Germans  did  not  have 
time  to  accomplish  much.'  They  had 
begun  to  dig  antitank  ditches  in  front 
of  the  dragon's  teeth  but  had  to  aban- 
don them,  leaving  picks  and  shovels 
behind;  nor  had  they  had  time  to  string 
barbed  wire  on  the  iron  pickets.  In 
general,  second-rate  troops  manned  the 
pillboxes  and  other  defensive  works. 

VII  Corps  South  of  Aachen 

By  nightfall  on  1 1  September  two 
task  forces  of  CCB — Task  Force  1  com- 
manded by  Lt.  Col.  Wiliam  B.  Lovelady 
and  Task  Force  2  commanded  by  Lt. 
Col.  Roswell  H.  King — and  3d  Armored 
Division  had  passed  through  Eupen 
and  encamped  for  the  night  east  and 
northeast  of  the  town.  At  0800  next 
morning  a  reconnaissance  force  of  in- 
fantry, tanks,  and  engineers  of  Task 
Force  Lovelady  began  to  move  toward 
the  German  border,  but  the  tanks  bog- 
ged down  on  a  forest  trail.  A  second 
group  set  out  along  the  main  highway 
shortly  before  noon.  Capturing  some 
German  machine  gunners  who  surren- 
dered without  firing,  the  reconnais- 
sance elements  crossed  the  border 
shortly  before  1500;  the  main  body  of 
Task  Force  Lovelady  joined  them  about 
an  hour  later.  The  task  force  passed 
through  the  German  town  of  Roetgen 
without  opposition. 

Beyond  Roetgen,  on  a  highway  lead- 
ing north,  Task  Force  Lovelady  ran  into 


^  Engineer  Operations  by  the  VII  Corps  in  the  Euro-  ^  Cole,  The  Lorraine  Campaign,  pp.  548— 5 1 .  Unless 

pean  Theater,  vol.  IV,  "Pursuit  Into  Germany,"  app.       otherwise  cited,  Third  Army  tactical  details  are  from 
I,  Initial  Breaching  of  the  Siegfried  Line.  this  source. 


COLOGNE 


FRANCE 


THE  SIEGFRIED  LINE 


50  Miles 


50  Kilometers 


MAP  23 


BREACHING  GERMANY'S  BARRIERS 


417 


Men  of  the  23d  Armored  En(;ineer  Battalion  Rk;  CHAR(iES  to  demolish 
dragon's  teeth  in  the  Siegfried  Line. 


the  first  defenses  of  the  Siegfried  Line. 
Ahead  was  a  crater  the  Germans  had 
created  by  blowing  a  bridge  over  a  dry 
stream  bed,  and  behind  the  crater  was 
a  gate  made  of  steel  pipes.  Left  of  the 
gate  lay  a  band  of  dragon's  teeth,  ex- 
tending for  about  a  hundred  yards  and 
ending  at  a  hill  on  which  stood  a  pillbox. 
On  the  right  rose  a  steep,  almost  per- 
pendicular hill.  Embedded  in  slots  in 
this  hill,  just  behind  the  gate,  were  steel 
I-beams  that  protruded  across  the  road. 
This  hill  also  boasted  a  pillbox. 

Heavy  fire  from  the  two  pillboxes 
stopped  the  advance  about  1800.  Dark- 
ness was  falling,  and  the  task  force, 
whose  vehicles  stretched  back  beyond 
Roetgen,  camped  for  the  night.  Dur- 


ing the  night  the  infantry  began  work- 
ing its  way  behind  the  pillboxes,  and 
after  a  fire  fight  early  on  1 3  September 
both  pillboxes  surrendered.  Then  the 
engineers  went  to  work.  They  filled  in 
the  road  crater  using  a  tankdozer,  blew 
the  gate  with  ten  pounds  of  TNT,  and 
removed  the  I-beams  from  the  hill  by 
hand.  The  attack  columns  began  mov- 
ing forward.  After  about  three  hundred 
yards  they  ran  into  another  steel  gate, 
which  the  engineers  blew  out  about 
1000.  Task  Force  Lovelady  was  through 
the  Scharnhorst  Line.*' 


''  Engineers  in  the  Siegfried  Line  Penetration,  CCB, 
3d  Armd  Div,  12-22  Sep  44,  pp.  3-6,  in  folder, 
Penetration  of  the  Siegfried  Line,  12-25  Sep  44,  3d 
Armd  Div  files. 


418 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


During  the  afternoon  of  12  Septem- 
ber Task  Force  King  bypassed  Roetgen 
and  headed  toward  the  village  of 
Schmidthof,  about  four  miles  to  the 
north.  King's  unit  encountered  the  same 
types  of  obstacles  as  Task  Force  Lovelady 
had  faced.  A  crater,  steel  gates  and 
I-beams,  and  dominating  pillboxes  in 
hilly,  wooded  terrain  barred  Task  Force 
King's  way.  On  the  morning  of  13  Sep- 
tember tanks  nosed  out  the  first  steel 
gate.  A  second  gate  was  more  formi- 
dable. In  front  of  it  lay  a  huge  water- 
filled  crater;  behind  it  were  I-beams 
embedded  in  concrete  blocks.  More- 
over, the  roadblock  was  under  fire  from 
88-mm,  artillery  and  the  guns  of  tanks 
at  Schmidthof.  The  shelling  delayed 
the  attack  for  hours.  Unable  to  work 
on  the  roadblock  under  such  fire,  the 
engineers  constructed  bypasses  wide 
enough  to  accommodate  tanks.  Tanks 
and  artillery  ultimately  knocked  out  the 
guns  at  Schmidthof,  and  by  the  after- 
noon of  14  September  Combat  Com- 
mand B's  Task  Force  King  had  pene- 
trated the  line.^ 

Combat  Command  A  of  the  3d  Ar- 
mored Division,  advancing  on  the  north 
nearer  Aachen  where  the  countryside 
was  open  and  rolling,  ran  into  a  belt  of 
dragon's  teeth  extending  from  the  edge 
of  a  forest  on  the  Belgian  border  to  the 
German  town  of  Oberforstbach,  a  dis- 
tance of  about  a  thousand  yards.  Task 
Force  X,  commanded  by  Col.  Leander 
LaC.  Doan,  began  the  advance  about 
1000  on  13  September.  Doan  sent  infan- 
try through  the  dragon's  teeth;  engi- 
neers of  Company  C,  23d  Armored 
Engineer  Battalion,  followed  with  trip 
wires  and  demolition  materials.  Initially 
holding  at  the  line  of  departure,  the 


tanks  were  to  move  out  as  soon  as  the 
engineers  had  cleared  a  path  for  them. 
But  the  infantry  and  engineers  ran  into 
fire  from  a  pillbox  as  well  as  heavy 
machine-gun  and  mortar  fire  from 
open  emplacements  that  forced  the  for- 
ward troops  to  take  shelter  behind  the 
dragon's  teeth.  Some  way  had  to  be 
found  to  get  the  tanks  forward.  At  mid- 
afternoon  reconnaissance  discovered  a 
passageway  over  the  dragon's  teeth — 
apparently,  local  farmers  had  filled  in 
the  spaces  between  the  teeth  with  stones 
and  earth.  About  a  foot  of  each  tooth 
was  exposed,  but  engineers  cut  off  these 
obstacles  with  explosives,  and  the  tanks 
went  through,  neutralizing  pillboxes  at 
point-blank  range. ^ 

Having  broken  through  the  Scharn- 
horst  Line,  the  3d  Armored  Division 
pressed  north  toward  Eschweiler,  north- 
east of  Aachen,  and  by  15  September 
came  up  against  the  dragon's  teeth  and 
pillboxes  of  the  Schill  Line.  In  this  more 
thickly  settled  area  pillboxes  were  often 
disguised  as  houses,  ice  plants,  or  power 
stations. 

By  the  time  VII  Corps  reached  the 
Schill  Line,  the  corps'  units  had  learned 
that  the  best  way  to  take  out  the  pillboxes 
was  to  bring  up  tanks,  tank  destroyers, 
and  self-propelled  155-mm.  guns  for 
point-blank  fire.  Even  with  a  concrete- 
piercing  fuse,  high-explosive  (HE)  pro- 
jectiles could  seldom  penetrate  the  thick 
walls;  however,  penetration  was  usually 
not  necessary.  The  occupants  of  the 
pillboxes,  suffering  from  concussion 


Mbid.,  pp.  8-12. 


"^  Cracking  the  Siegfried  Line,  TF  Doan,  CCB,  3d 
Armd  Div,  13-19  Sep  44,  pp.  1  —3,  in  folder,  Penetra- 
tion of  the  Siegfried  Line,  12-25  Sep  44,  3d  Armd 
Div  files;  Engr  Opns  VII  Corps,  vol.  IV,  "Pursuit  Into 
Germany,"  app.  1,  Initial  Breaching  of  the  Siegfried 
Line.  The  remainder  of  this  section  is  taken  from  this 
latter  source. 


BREACHING  GERMANY'S  BARRIERS 


419 


Bulldozer  Seals  Bunkers  in  the  Forhfied  Line  Outside  Aachen 


shock  and  choking  on  powdered  con- 
crete, would  in  most  cases  readily  sur- 
render. 

Then  the  engineers'  task  began.  In 
the  VII  Corps  sector  and  farther  south 
in  the  Schnee  Eifel,  where  the  V  Corps 
had  broken  through  the  Siegfried  Line 
in  several  places  by  mid-September,  the 
Americans  had  learned  that  if  a  pillbox 
was  not  rendered  unusable  enemy  pa- 
trols were  likely  to  infiltrate  the  lines  at 
night  and  reoccupy  it.  Although  the 
simplest  method  was  to  blow  up  pill- 
boxes, in  many  cases  it  was  expensive — 
destruction  of  the  larger  pillboxes  in 
VII  Corps  area  required  up  to  1,000 
pounds  of  TNT.  In  forward  areas  the 
noise  and  smoke  of  the  explosions  also 
attracted  enemy  fire.  The  VII  Corps 


engineers  preferred  to  seal  the  pill- 
boxes. Using  a  bulldozer,  they  would 
cover  all  openings  with  eight  to  ten  feet 
of  earth.  In  places  where  a  bulldozer 
could  not  be  employed,  the  engineers 
welded  steel  doors  and  embrasures 
shut.  Between  11  September  and  16 
October  in  the  VII  Corps  area  only  36 
pillboxes  were  completely  destroyed 
with  explosives  as  compared  to  239  cov- 
ered with  earth  and  12  closed  by 
welding. 

Most  of  this  work  was  completed 
before  the  end  of  September.  By  Octo- 
ber First  Army  had  outrun  supply  lines, 
gas  and  ammunition  were  running  low, 
the  troops  were  exhausted,  and  their 
equipment  was  depleted.  Bad  weather 
prevented  close  air  support.  In  addition, 


420 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


German  tanks  and  antitank  guns,  well 
positioned  along  the  second  band  of 
the  Siegfried  Line,  were  inflicting  heavy 
losses  on  American  armor.  At  the  end 
of  September  the  advances  of  V  and 
VII  Corps  halted,  and  both  corps  went 
on  the  defensive. 

XIX  Corps  North  of  Aachen 

North  of  Aachen  the  Wurm  River 
protected  Siegfried  Line  pillboxes.  The 
river  rendered  dragon's  teeth  sup)erflu- 
ous  except  at  a  few  points,  and  XIX 
Corps  encountered  none  when  attack- 
ing across  a  mile-wide  front  about  nine 
mUes  north  of  Aachen.  There  the  Wurm 
was  about  thirty  feet  wide  and  only 
three  feet  deep.  The  infantry  could 
cross  the  stream  easily,  using  duckboard 
footbridges  or  even  logs  thrown  into 
the  stream.  But  the  Wurm  was  a  real 
obstacle  to  tanks,  for  its  banks  were 
steep  and  marshy.^ 

The  30th  Infantry  Division  was  to 
spearhead  the  attack,  followed  by  the 
2d  Armored  Division.  The  infantry  was 
in  position  on  19  September.  The  origi- 
nal plan  was  to  push  through  the  Sieg- 
fried Line  next  day  and  move  south  to 
relieve  pressure  on  VII  Corps  near 
Aachen.  But  the  weather  did  not  per- 
mit an  air  strike  deemed  essential  before 
the  jump-off.  To  allow  time  for  the 
bombing  and  for  the  arrival  of  supplies 
and  reinforcements,  the  attack  was  post- 
poned until  2  October. 

During  the  fortnight's  delay,  the  1 05th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  organic  to 
the  30th  Division,  reconnoitered  the 


■'  XIX  Corps  Special  Rpt,  Breaching  the  Siegfried 
Line;  Hewitt,  Work  Horse  of  the  Western  Front,  pp. 
107-17.  Unless  otherwise  cited,  this  section  is  based 
on  these  sources  and  the  histories  of  the  units  men- 
tioned. 


Wurm  River  for  the  best  crossing  sites, 
and  one  of  its  companies  constructed 
bridges  for  infantry  and  tanks.  The 
tank  bridges,  which  the  engineers  called 
culverts,  were  ingenious  contraptions 
made  of  thirty-inch  steel  pipe,  rein- 
forced on  the  inside  with  smaller  pipe 
and  on  the  outside  with  a  layer  of  six- 
inch  logs  bound  with  cable.  The  engi- 
neers constructed  ten,  to  be  divided 
equally  between  the  two  assault  regi- 
ments. The  method  of  emplacing  the 
bridges,  designed  to  protect  the  troops 
from  small-arms  fire,  was  also  inventive. 
The  culverts,  laid  lengthwise  on  impro- 
vised wood  and  steel  sleds,  were  to  be 
pulled  to  the  crossing  site  by  a  tank 
moving  parallel  to  the  stream  with  a 
tankdozer  following.  At  the  site  the 
tankdozer  was  to  push  the  culverts  into 
place  and  then  cover  them  with  dirt. 

Two  companies  of  the  105th  Engi- 
neer Battalion  were  in  direct  support 
of  the  division's  two  assault  regiments, 
with  an  engineer  platoon  attached  to 
each  infantry  assault  battalion  and  a 
three-man  engineer  demolition  team, 
armed  with  bangalore  torpedoes  and 
satchel  charges,  moving  out  with  each 
infantry  platoon.  The  engineers  super- 
vised training  of  the  infantry  in  the  use 
of  flame  throwers,  demolition  charges, 
bazookas,  and  other  weapons  to  be  used 
against  pillboxes. 

D-day  for  the  XIX  Corps'  attack  on 
the  Siegfried  Line  was  2  October.  An 
air  strike  preceded  the  jump-off  at  1 100 
but  did  little  good.  Nor  did  prepara- 
tory artillery  and  mortar  barrages  ac- 
complish much  beyond  driving  Ger- 
mans holding  outlying  emplacements 
into  pillboxes.  Tank  and  tank-destroyer 
support  was  lacking,  and  wet  weather 
proved  too  much  for  the  culvert  bridges. 
One  of  them  became  stuck  in  mud; 


BREACHING  GERMANY'S  BARRIERS 


421 


another  could  not  be  emplaced  because 
its  bulldozer  became  mired.  The  engi- 
neers abandoned  the  culverts  and  began 
constructing  treadway  bridges  with  the 
help  of  the  1104th  Engineer  Combat 
Group's  247th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion. This  work  went  forward  under 
heavy  enemy  artillery  fire,  and  after  a 
treadway  was  ready  at  one  regimental 
crossing  half  the  tanks,  as  well  as  their 
recovery  vehicles,  bogged  down  in  mud. 
In  the  other  regimental  sector  the  tread- 
way was  not  in  place  until  1830 — too 
late  to  permit  a  crossing. 

Thus,  the  first  day's  assault  on  the 
pillboxes  became  entirely  an  infantry 
and  engineer  undertaking.  The  infan- 
try had  considerable  success  firing  small 
arms  and  bazooka  shells  into  apertures. 
Little  use  was  made  of  flame  throwers, 
pole  charges,  or  satchel  charges.  When 
the  pillboxes  were  small,  located  on  flat 
or  gently  sloping  ground,  and  lightly 
defended,  the  engineers  preferred  to 
seal  them,  bringing  up  a  jeep-towed  arc 
welder  to  weld  shut  the  entrances  and 
then  bulldozing  earth  over  the  em- 
brasures. When  observed  enemy  fire 
was  present,  or  when  terrain  or  the  tac- 
tical situation  prevented  the  use  of 
dozers,  the  engineers  destroyed  the 
pillboxes,  placing  TNT  on  the  weaker 
portion  of  the  walls  and  firing  the 
charge  electrically.  The  engineers  found 
that  a  400-pound  TNT  charge  could 
destroy  the  average  pillbox  at  this  point 
in  the  line.  Learning  that  a  single  explo- 
sion in  the  forward  areas  would  bring 
down  an  accurate  German  artillery 
concentration,  the  engineers  blew  sev- 
eral pillboxes  simultaneously. 

When  tanks  arrived  at  the  fortifica- 
tions they  assisted  the  infantry  and  engi- 
neers with  covering  fire.  By  blasting 
pillbox  apertures  and  entrances  with 


armor-piercing  ammunition,  the  tanks 
sometimes  could  induce  the  occupants 
to  surrender,  but  tank  fire  was  effec- 
tive only  in  knocking  camouflage  from 
the  thick  concrete.  This  was  also  true 
of  most  artillery  fire.  The  only  weapon 
that  could  achieve  any  significant  pene- 
tration was  the  self-propelled  155-mm. 
gun. 

The  Siege  of  Aachen 

By  7  October  XIX  Corps  had 
breached  the  West  Wall  in  its  sector  and 
was  ready  to  join  VII  Corps  in  attack- 
ing Aachen.  As  the  two  corps  moved  to 
encircle  the  city,  engineers  served  as 
infantry  on  the  flanks,  and  when  the 
assault  commenced  on  8  October  both 
engineer  groups  sent  battalions  to  the 
front  lines.  The  XIX  Corps  wanted  to 
free  one  regiment  of  the  29th  Division 
to  help  the  30th  Division  in  a  drive 
south  on  1 3  October  to  close  the  Aachen 
Gap.  Thus,  three  days  before  the  attack 
the  1104th  Engineer  Combat  Group 
entered  the  line  to  contain  the  pillboxes 
near  Kerkrade,  west  of  the  Wurm  River. 
Corps  headquarters  attached  to  the 
group  a  company  of  tank  destroyers 
and  two  batteries  of  self-propelled  auto- 
matic weapons,  actually  half-tracks 
mounting  .50-caliber  machine  guns.  Lt. 
Col.  Hugh  W.  Colton,  commanding  the 
group,  combed  his  light  ponton,  light 
equipment,  and  treadway  bridge  com- 
panies to  form  an  infantry  reserve  for 
the  operation."* 

Stiffening  German  resistance  slowed 
the  XIX  Corps'  advance  south  down 
both  banks  of  the  Wurm  River.  Not 


'"  Hist  ll()4thEngr(:(;p,Iun- Dec  44.  Unless  oth- 
erwise cited,  this  section  is  taken  from  this  source  and 
the  histories  ot  the  units  mentioned. 


422 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


until  late  in  the  afternoon  of  16  Octo- 
ber was  the  corps  able  to  link  up  with 
VII  Corps  elements  north  of  Aachen. 
During  the  advance  the  1104th  Engi- 
neer Group  patrolled  its  flanks  and  dis- 
patched aggressive  reconnaissance  pa- 
trols in  front  of  its  position.  On  17 
October,  after  an  artillery  and  mortar 
concentration,  Colonel  Colton  sent  the 
I72d  and  247th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talions forward  toward  Aachen.  Destroy- 
ing pillboxes  that  blocked  the  way,  the 
engineers,  reinforced  by  a  platoon  of 
tanks,  fought  their  way  to  the  outskirts 
of  the  city  but  stopped  as  the  town  fell. ' ' 
Under  VII  Corps  the  1106th  Engi- 
neer Group  during  the  last  week  of  Sep- 
tember moved  to  relieve  the  18th  In- 
fantry, 1st  Infantry  Division,  in  posi- 
tions on  the  heights  south  of  Aachen  so 
that  the  infantry  could  move  north  to 
link  with  XIX  Corps.  The  group  com- 
mander, Col.  Thomas  DeF.  Rogers, 
began  training  his  two  combat  battalions, 
the  237th  and  the  238th,  in  the  use  of 
81 -mm.  mortars  and  organized  a  reserve 
of  150  men  drawn  from  his  light  pon- 
ton and  tread  way  bridge  companies.  As 
soon  as  the  attachment  to  the  18th 
Infantry  became  effective  on  29  Sep- 
tember, Colonel  Rogers  sent  his  two 
combat  battalions  to  occupy  positions 
with  the  infantry  battalions;  the  action 
proved  so  valuable  in  familiarizing  the 
engineers  with  the  operation  that  he 
strongly  recommended  an  overlap 
period  during  any  similar  mission  in 
the  future.'^ 


"  Hist  XIX  Corps  Engrs,  p.  15,  ML  2220,  ETOUSA 
Hist  Sect. 

'^  1 106th  Engr  C  Gp  Opns  Memo  9,  Lessons  Learned 
by  the  1106th  Engineer  Combat  Group  during  the 
Aachen  Operation,  1  Nov  44,  app.  9  to  Engr  Opns 
VII  Corps,  vol.  IV,  "Pursuit  into  Germany." 


After  the  infantry  began  withdraw- 
ing on  2  October,  the  1 106th  Engineer 
Group  "became  a  real  'doughboy'  out- 
fit standing  on  its  own  feet  in  a  front 
line  fight."  Supported  by  an  armed  field 
artillery  battalion,  the  engineers  laid 
booby  traps  and  antipersonnel  mines 
along  the  barbed  wire  protecting  their 
front  and  sent  out  combat  patrols  to 
maintain  contact  with  the  enemy.  Colo- 
nel Rogers  learned  that  his  group's  tac- 
tical operations  would  act  as  a  diver- 
sion for  the  1 8th  Infantry's  assault  on 
the  city  from  the  north. 

The  group's  238th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  made  an  ingenious  contri- 
bution to  this  mission  on  8  October. 
Discovering  several  streetcars  standing 
on  tracks  leading  down  a  grade  into 
Aachen,  they  loaded  one  of  the  cars 
with  captured  German  shells  and  am- 
munition, a  case  of  American  explo- 
sives, and  several  time  fuses.  On  its  side 
they  painted  "V— 13,"  inspired  by  a 
German  V-bomb  that  had  recently 
passed  over  the  area.  Then  they  sent 
their  missile  careening  downhill  toward 
Aachen.  About  200  yards  beyond  a  bat- 
talion outpost  the  car  struck  some  debris 
on  the  track  and  exploded  with  a  fine 
display  of  tracer  shells.  Next  day  the 
engineers  tried  again,  loading  a  second 
streetcar  with  enemy  shells  and  send- 
ing it  down  the  track,  but  it  hit  the 
wreckage  of  the  first  and  exploded. 
Clearing  the  wreckage  from  the  track, 
the  engineers  sent  a  third  car  downhill 
on  16  October.  It  reached  the  city,  but 
it  could  not  be  determined  whether  it 
did  any  damage.  In  any  case,  "Secret 
Weapon  V— 13"  attracted  swarms  of 
newspaper  correspondents.  Colonel 
Rogers  concluded  that  the  greatest  value 
of  the  V— 13  was  "in  giving  GI  Joe 


BREACHING  GERMANY'S  BARRIERS 


423 


something  amusing  and  bizarre  to  talk 
about." ''^ 

An  all-out  attack  on  Aachen  began 
1 1  October  after  the  Germans  refused 
to  surrender.  By  that  time,  the  26th 
Infantry  of  the  1st  Division  was  in  posi- 
tion to  attack  from  the  east,  its  left  wing 
tied  in  with  the  position  of  the  1 106th 
Engineer  Combat  Group.  The  infantry 
began  moving  into  the  city  in  small 
assault  teams  that  attacked  block  by 
block,  building  by  building,  even  room 
by  room;  the  engineers  also  sent  patrols 
into  the  city. 

Two  men  of  the  238th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  patrol,  S/Sgt.  Ewart  M. 
Padgett  and  Pfc.  James  B.  Haswell, 
were  to  play  an  important  role  in  the 
surrender  of  Aachen.  The  Germans 
captured  the  two  on  17  October  in  a 
clearing  outside  the  city.  After  passing 
through  several  command  posts  the  two 
Atnericans  arrived  on  the  third  day  at 
the  garrison  command  post,  a  pillbox 
where  the  Germans  held  about  thirty 
American  prisoners.  There,  on  the 
morning  of  21  October,  the  German 
intelligence  officer  informed  the  Ameri- 
can prisoners  that  the  fort  had  tried  to 
surrender  but  that  two  Germans  carry- 
ing a  white  flag  outside  had  been  killed. 
He  asked  for  a  volunteer  among  the 
Americans  to  carry  the  flag.  Haswell 
volunteered  and  Padgett  insisted  on 
going  along. 

Padgett  took  the  flag,  and  the  two 
men,  followed  by  two  German  officers, 
ran  out  into  the  middle  of  the  street 
and  began  waving  it.  Braving  small- 
arms  and  mortar  fire,  they  managed  to 
reach  an  American  officer  who  told 
them  to  bring  out  the  entire  German 


garrison.  The  two  led  out  the  Germans, 
including  the  commander  of  Aachen, 
Col.  Gerhard  Wilck.  Before  leaving  the 
pillbox,  the  engineers  asked  Wilck  for 
his  pistol.  He  laid  it  on  a  table,  smiled, 
and  left  the  room.  Thus  they  secured  a 
prize  souvenir  of  the  occasion.  Later, 
after  surrender  formalities  were  com- 
pleted, Wilck  shook  hands  with  the  two 
engineers,  saluted,  and  thanked  them 
for  their  "gallant  bravery"  in  carrying 
out  the  surrender  flag. 

From  the  Moselle  to  the  Saar 

On  22  September  General  Bradley 
had  stopped  the  Third  Army  advance 
to  give  priority  to  First  Army's  drive  to 
the  Ruhr  in  support  of  the  21  Army 
Group  effort  to  capture  Antwerp.  At 
that  time  General  Patton  had  been  pre- 
paring to  push  through  the  Metz  Gap 
to  the  Rhine.  When  Aachen  fell  on  21 
October,  Bradley  lifted  the  restrictions 
on  Third  Army. 

In  the  army's  path  lay  some  of  the 
most  formidable  fortifications  in 
Europe.  West  of  Metz  lay  a  chain  of  old 
forts,  some  dating  from  1870,  situated 
on  ridgetops  that  gave  every  advantage 
to  defenders.  Next  was  the  Moselle 
River,  on  whose  east  bank  most  of  the 
city  of  Metz  was  located.  The  river  had 
a  swift  current  and  steep  gradients  and 
was  subject  to  autumnal  flooding.  Be- 
yond the  Moselle  on  the  Lorraine  plain, 
a  region  extending  thirty  miles  to  the 
Saar  River,  was  the  Maginot  Line.  At 
the  Saar  around  Saarbruecken  the  main 
Lorraine  gateway  opened  to  the  Rhine 
There,  on  the  east  side  of  the  Saar,  was 


'■^  Ibid.;  Combat  Interv  4,  1 106th  EngrC  Gp,  South 
of  Aachen,  Battle  of  Aachen,  8-22  Oct  44,  1st  Inf 
Div  files. 


'^  Interv,  238th  Engr  C  Bn  S-2  with  Padgett, 
Experiences  of  Two  American  Prisoners  of  War  Held 
in  Aachen,  Germany,  Incl  to  Oct  44  Jnl,  AAR,  238th 
Engr  C  Bn,  Jun-Dec  44. 


424 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


the  strongest  portion  of  the  Siegfried 
Line.'^ 

The  plan  was  for  XII  Corps,  in  the 
area  of  Nancy  thirty  miles  south  of 
Metz,  to  start  pushing  north  on  8  No- 
vember. The  XX  Corps  would  follow 
the  next  day,  advancing  eastward  north 
and  south  of  Metz.  About  ten  miles  to 
the  south,  XX  Corps'  5th  Infantry 
Division  already  had  a  bridgehead  over 
the  Moselle  at  Arnaville.  While  that  divi- 
sion turned  north  for  a  close  envelop- 
ment of  Metz,  the  90th  Infantry  and 
10th  Armored  Divisions  were  to  make 
a  wider  encirclement,  bypassing  the 
forts  around  Metz  by  crossing  the 
Moselle  six  miles  northeast  of  the  vil- 
lage of  Thionville,  about  twenty  miles 
north  of  Metz.  At  the  same  time,  the 
95th  Infantry  Division  was  to  make  a 
limited-objective  crossing  as  a  feint  at  a 
point  about  three  miles  south  of  Thion- 
ville. 

The  Moselle  Crossings  at 
Mailing  and  Cattenom 

The  bulk  of  the  effort  to  get  Third 
Army  troops  over  the  Moselle  during 
the  November  attack  fell  to  the  engi- 
neers supporting  the  90th  Division.  In 
rubber  assault  boats  of  the  1 1 39th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Group,  troops  of  the  359th 
Infantry  were  to  cross  near  the  village 
of  Mailing  on  the  left  (north)  flank,  sup- 
ported by  the  206th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion.  On  the  right,  battalions  of 
the  358th  Infantry  were  to  cross  simul- 
taneously near  Cattenom,  with  the  I79th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  in  support. 
At  both  crossings,  where  the  water  gaps 
were  estimated  to  be  360  and  300  feet 


wide,  respectively,  the  engineers  also 
were  to  construct  an  infantry  support 
bridge,  a  treadway  bridge,  and  a  float- 
ing Bailey  bridge,  while  the  90th  Divi- 
sion's organic  315th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion  was  to  build  a  footbridge, 
operate  ferries,  and  undertake  far- 
shore  work.  As  soon  as  the  expanding 
bridgehead  had  cleared  the  far  shore 
of  Germans,  the  160th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  was  to  construct  a  double- 
triple  fixed  Bailey  bridge  at  Rettel, 
northeast  of  Mailing.'^ 

By  the  night  of  8  November  the  engi- 
neers had  trained  with  the  infantry  in 
preparation  for  the  crossing,  demon- 
strating the  proper  way  to  carry  and 
load  an  assault  boat.  For  each  boat  the 
crew  consisted  of  three  engineers,  one 
a  guide.  That  night  the  river  began  to 
rise,  and  by  the  time  the  boats  of  the 
attack  wave  shoved  off  in  drizzling  rain 
at  0330  on  9  November,  the  infantry 
had  to  load  in  waist-deep  water.  In  spite 
of  a  strong  current  the  two  leading 
infantry  battalions  were  on  the  east 
bank  of  the  Moselle  by  0500.  As  they 
reached  their  destination  the  troops 
found  that  the  high  water  had  actually 
helped  the  crossings:  extensive  mine- 
fields the  Germans  had  prepared  on 
the  far  shore  were  flooded,  and  the 
boats  passed  over  without  danger.  Also, 
the  enemy  had  abandoned  water-filled 
foxholes  and  rifle  pits  dug  into  the  east 
bank.^^ 

After  daybreak,  as  succeeding  infan- 
try battalions  crossed  the  racing  yellow 
Moselle,  enemy  artillery  fire  fell  so 
heavily  on  the  east  bank  that  many 


'^  Cole,  The  Lorraine  Campaign,  pp.  28,   124  —  29. 
Tactical  details  in  this  section  are  from  Cole. 


'•*  Combat  Interv  364,  Opns  of  1 139th  Engr  C  Gp 
(8-17  Nov),  Crossing  of  the  Moselle  River,  XX  Corps 
files. 

"  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  10,  Combat  Engineering 
pp.  116-17. 


BREACHING  GERMANY'S  BARRIERS 


425 


crews  abandoned  their  boats  after  de- 
barking the  troops,  allowing  the  craft 
to  swirl  downstream  to  be  lost.  But  the 
infantrymen  made  swift  progress.  At 
Mailing,  where  they  achieved  complete 
surprise,  troops  of  the  359th  Infantry 
captured  the  town  by  noon.  The  358th 
Infantry,  after  crossing  from  Cattenom, 
faced  a  more  formidable  objective — Fort 
Koenigsmacker,  which  had  to  be  re- 
duced before  further  progress  could  be 
made.  There  too  the  90th  Division 
achieved  surprise.  Assault  teams  of 
infantry  and  engineers  (from  the  3 1 5th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion)  ripped 
through  bands  of  barbed  wire  and 
reached  the  trenches  around  the  fort 
before  an  alarm  was  sounded.  Braving 
mortar  and  machine-gun  fire  from  the 
fort's  superstructure,  the  teams  reduced 
the  fort,  blowing  steel  doors  open  with 
satchel  charges  and  blasting  ventilating 
ports  with  thermite  grenades  or  TNT. 
By  the  end  of  November  the  90th 
Division  had  eight  battalions,  including 
reserves  from  the  357th  Infantry,  across 
the  Moselle.  The  division  had  advanced 
two  miles  beyond  the  river,  overrun 
seven  towns,  and  penetrated  Fort  Koe- 
nigsmacker.'^ Next  day,  as  German  re- 
sistance stiffened,  little  progress  was 
made,  but  by  midnight,  1 1  November, 
the  90th  Division's  leading  units  held 
a  defensible  position  on  a  ridge  topped 
with  the  Maginot  Line  fortifications. 
The  division  had  knocked  out  or  by- 
passed many  of  the  line's  weakly  held 
pillboxes  and  had  forced  the  surrender 
of  Fort  Koenigsmacker  with  hand-car- 
ried weapons  and  explosives,  a  few  57- 
mm.  antitank  guns  ferried  across  the 
Moselle,  and  artillery  fire  from  the  west 


'**  The  XX  Corps:  Its  History  and  Service  in  World  War 
II  (Osaka,  Japan),  p.  159. 


bank.  No  tanks  or  trucks  had  yet  been 
able  to  cross  the  river,  and  supply  par- 
ties had  to  use  rickety  farm  wagons  and 
even  abandoned  baby  buggies. 

Attempts  to  bridge  the  flooding  river, 
beginning  early  on  9  November,  came 
to  naught  for  two  days.  Before  Fort 
Koenigsmacker  surrendered,  shellfire 
from  the  bastion  had  made  the  bridge 
site  at  Cattenom  untenable  and  de- 
stroyed the  bridging  equipment.  At 
Mailing,  harassing  enemy  machine-gun 
and  mortar  fire  forced  the  206th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  to  abandon  its 
first  attempt  to  build  a  footbridge.  At 
0600  on  9  November  the  engineers 
began  constructing  another  and  simul- 
taneously put  two  ferries  into  operation. 
One,  using  boats  lashed  together  and 
powered  by  outboard  motors,  carried 
ammunition  and  rations  and  evacuated 
the  wounded  around  the  clock.  The 
other,  using  infantry  support  rafts  to 
carry  57-mm.  antitank  guns,  jeeps,  and 
weapons  carriers,  was  short-lived.  A  few 
antitank  guns  got  across,  but  at  1 100  a 
raft  carrying  a  jeep  ran  into  the  infan- 
try footbridge,  broke  its  cable,  and  put 
the  bridge  out  of  action.  The  infantry 
support  bridge,  then  about  three- 
quarters  finished,  was  carried  down- 
stream and  lost. 

Recovering  some  of  the  equipment, 
the  engineers  decided  to  build  a  tread- 
way  bridge  at  the  site,  and  the  991st 
Engineer  Treadway  Bridge  Company 
managed  to  complete  the  new  span  by 
dusk  on  10  November.  But  the  river's 
continued  rise  had  now  put  the  road 
leading  to  the  bridge  under  nearly  five 
feet  of  water.  No  vehicles  could  get 
through  until  the  following  afternoon 
when  the  floodwaters,  having  crested 
at  noon  on  1 1  November,  began  to 
recede.  At  1500  the  crossings  began 


426 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Troops  Float  Footbridge  Sections  Into  Place  on  the  flooded  Moselle  River 
in  the  90th  Division  area. 


again.  Ten  supply-laden  Brockway 
trucks,  some  jeeps,  and  a  few  light  tanks 
and  tank  destroyers  reached  the  far 
shore.  Shortly  after  dawn  next  morn- 
ing German  artillery  fire  repeatedly  hit 
the  treadway,  so  weakening  it  that  it 
could  no  longer  bear  the  weight  of  a 
tank  destroyer.  It  broke  loose  and  went 
off  downstream. 

While  waiting  for  more  equipment 
to  come  up  so  they  could  rebuild  the 
bridge,  the  men  of  the  991st  Engineer 
Treadway  Bridge  Company  used  bridge 
fragments  to  construct  a  tank  ferry. 
Employing  a  heavy  raft  made  of  pon- 
tons and  treads  and  tying  powerboats 
to  the  raft,  the  engineers  manned  the 
ferry,    crossing    a    company    each    of 


medium  tanks  and  tank  destroyers  by 
dark.  This  work  earned  the  991st  Engi- 
neer Treadway  Bridge  Company  the 
Distinguished  Unit  Citation.' 

Late  on  12  November  the  engineers 
were  repairing  the  Mailing  bridge  and 
building  a  bridge  at  the  Cattenom  site. 
But  by  now  the  XX  Corps  commander, 
Maj.  Gen.  Walton  H.  Walker,  had  de- 
cided on  another  site  for  heavy  bridg- 
ing to  move  his  armored  division  across 
the  Moselle. 

The  Bridge  at  Thionville 
The  place  was  Thionville,  where  high 


'"  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  10,  Combat  Engineering, 
pp.  117-21;  Cole,  The  Lorraine  Campaign,  p.  400. 


BREACHING  GERMANY'S  BARRIERS 


427 


retaining  walls  constricted  the  flood 
waters  of  the  Moselle  and  where  the 
Germans  had  built  a  timber  bridge, 
long  since  down.  On  the  near  side  two 
spans  of  the  German  bridge  were  usable, 
while  on  the  far  side  part  of  an  old 
stone-arch  bridge,  which  the  French 
had  blown  in  1940,  was  still  standing. 
Third  Army  held  the  part  of  Thionville 
west  of  the  river,  but  the  Germans  were 
on  the  other  side;  there,  a  canal  paral- 
leling the  riverbank  formed  a  second- 
ary obstacle.  Beyond  the  canal  lay  Fort 
Yutz,  an  old  star-shaped  stone  fortifi- 
cation. On  the  west  bank  the  1306th 
Engineer  General  Service  Regiment, 
which  had  been  acting  as  an  engineer 
combat  group  because  no  group  head- 
quarters was  available,  was  preparing 
on  9  November  to  build  a  Bailey  bridge 
as  soon  as  the  east  bank  was  clear  of 
enemy.  Meanwhile,  they  could  do  noth- 
ing, for  any  movement  near  the  river 
drew  rifle  and  machine-gun  fire  from 
Germans  on  the  far  bank.  In  his  press- 
ing need  to  get  his  armor  across  the 
Moselle,  General  Walker  gave  the  com- 
manding officer  of  the  1306th  Engi- 
neers, Col.  William  C.  Hall,  a  hard 
assignment,  changing  "the  routine  job 
of  constructing  a  support  bridge  into  a 
weird  operation  of  major  importance 
to  the  advance  of  an  entire  corps. "^^ 

The  first  tactical  task,  to  clear  the  east 
bank.  General  Walker  gave  to  the  95th 
Division,  which  on  8  and  9  November 
had  established  a  very  small  bridgehead 
across  the  Moselle  at  Uckange,  a  few 
miles  south  of  Thionville.  The  com- 
mander of  the  95th  Division  sent  to 
Thionville  two  companies  of  the  378th 


'•^"  William  CL  Hall,  "Bridging  at  Thionville, "  Military 
Engineer,  XL  (April  1948),  169.  Unless  otherwise 
noted,  this  account  of  the  bridge  at  Thionville  is  taken 
from  this  source. 


Infantry,  supported  by  two  companies 
of  the  135th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion. On  the  morning  of  1 1  November 
the  troops  began  to  cross  the  Moselle  at 
Thionville  in  powerboats.  Enemy  small- 
arms  and  mortar  fire  poured  down  on 
them.  The  engineer  captain  in  charge 
of  the  boats  was  killed,  as  were  a  num- 
ber of  the  crewmen,  and  all  but  one  of 
the  boats  were  lost.  Nevertheless,  by  the 
morning  of  12  November  two  platoons 
had  crossed  and  cleared  the  south  end 
of  the  island  and  had  begun  pushing 
north. 

At  1030  that  morning  General  Walker 
ordered  the  construction  of  the  bridge, 
emphasizing  that  the  success  of  the 
whole  Third  Army  attack  depended 
upon  it.  The  1306th  General  Service 
Regiment  had  already  begun  planning 
and  from  aerial  photographs  had  deter- 
mined that  the  gap  to  be  bridged  was 
about  165  feet  long.  The  regiment 
decided  upon  a  double-triple  Bailey 
bridge,  which  could  carry  tanks.  The 
1306th  had  never  built  such  a  bridge, 
but  one  of  its  companies.  Company  C 
of  the  1st  Battalion,  which  had  built  a 
100-foot  double-single  Bailey,  took  on 
the  job.  On  the  night  of  10—  1 1  Novem- 
ber the  regiment  brought  materials  and 
equipment  up  to  the  bridge  site  and 
unloaded  under  blackout. 

When  the  word  came  on  12  Novem- 
ber to  build  the  bridge,  the  engineers 
went  into  action.  A  party  crossed  the 
river  in  a  powerboat,  cleared  the  far 
span  of  mines,  and  prepared  the  far 
shore  abutment.  Then  they  discovered 
"a  shocking  fact" — the  span  to  be  bridged 
was  206  feet  long  instead  of  165.  The 
longest  double-triple  Bailey  was  180 
feet,  and  any  lighter  structure  could  not 
carry  tanks.  Engineers  solved  the  prob- 
lem by  extending  the  near  abutment 


428 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Heavy  Ponton  Brid(;e  at  Uckanoe,  Moselle  River 


about  ten  feet,  moving  the  far  bridge 
seat  almost  to  the  edge  of  the  stone 
arch,  and  building  a  double-triple  Bai- 
ley 190  feet  long.  It  was  a  calculated 
risk  that  had  to  be  taken. 

Cranes  began  lifting  the  panels  into 
place,  and  the  launching  nose  moved 
out  over  the  water.  Then,  at  1700,  the 
bridge  came  under  concentrated  mor- 
tar fire.  A  direct  hit  killed  one  engi- 
neer and  wounded  six;  within  two  min- 
utes the  Germans  inflicted  more  than 
twenty  casualties,  and  the  entire  com- 
pany had  to  take  cover.  After  dark  work 
resumed,  continuing  all  night  with  a 
second  company  relieving  Company  C. 
At  dawn  on  13  November  a  smoke  gen- 
erating company  gave  the  men  the  pro- 
tection of  a  smoke  screen.  Mortar  fire 


soon  ceased  as  the  infantry  cleared  the 
strip  between  the  riverbank  and  the 
canal  and  advanced  into  Fort  Yutz. 
Although  150-mm.  guns  began  firing, 
the  bridge  escaped  a  direct  hit,  and  no 
casualties  occurred  among  the  engineers 
climbing  the  superstructure  clad  in 
flak  suits.  Late  that  afternoon  the  en- 
gineers seated  the  far  end  of  the 
bridge  without  difficulty. 

About  that  time  the  near  end  ran  into 
trouble,  for  one  of  six  jacks  failed  to 
function.  The  bridge  swayed  and  fell  in- 
to the  cribbing,  and  jacking  up  the  near 
end  took  all  night.  A  fresh  company  of 
engineers  came  up  to  the  site.  Despite 
heavy  150-mm.  shelling  which  hit  one 
man  and  ignited  the  remains  of  the 
German  timber  bridge,  creating  a  glare 


BREACHING  GERMANY'S  BARRIERS 


429 


that  drew  further  artillery  fire,  they 
completed  the  bridge  at  0930  on  14 
November.  The  engineers  believed  it 
to  be  the  longest  single-span  bridge  ever 
launched  as  a  unit. 

On  the  afternoon  of  14  November 
the  tanks  of  Combat  Command  B,  10th 
Armored  Division,  began  to  roll  over 
the  Bailey  bridge  at  Thionville,  and  by 
daylight  next  day  all  had  crossed.  Com- 
bat Command  A  used  the  treadway 
bridge  at  Mailing  and  by  dark  on  15 
November  had  two  companies  across. 
General  Patton,  who  visited  both  sites, 
inspecting  the  Bailey  bridge  while  it  was 
still  under  enemy  fire  and  crossing  the 
treadway  under  a  protecting  smoke 
screen,  later  pronounced  the  90th  Divi- 
sion passage  of  the  Moselle  "an  epic 
river  crossing  done  under  terrific  diffi- 
culties."'^' 

Advance  to  the  Saar 

After  envelopment  to  the  north  and 
south,  coupled  with  a  containing  action 
west  of  the  Moselle,  Metz  fell  to  XX 
Corps  on  22  November.  The  lesser  Ger- 
man forts  in  the  area  were  left  to  "wither 
on  the  vine"  (the  last  surrendering  on 
13  December)  because  scarce  U.S.  artil- 
lery ammunition  had  to  be  conserved 
to  support  the  corps'  advance  to  the 
Saar  River. 

The  XX  Corps  was  to  make  the  main 
thrust,  heading  toward  a  crossing  at 
Saarlautern,  about  thirty  miles  north- 
east of  Metz  at  the  strongest  section  of 
the  Siegfried  Line.^'^  The  XII  Corps, 


'^'  George  S.  Patton,  Jr.,  War  As  I  Knew  It  (Boston: 
Houghton  Mifflin,  1947),  p.  172. 

"^■^  Patton  believed  attacking  the  line  where  it  was 
strongest  not  as  foolhardy  as  it  seemed,  because 
"people  are  inclined  not  to  occupy  strong  positions 
with  as  many  men  as  they  should."  Ibid.,  p.  176. 


coming  up  from  the  south,  was  to  drive 
with  the  bulk  of  its  forces  to  Sarregue- 
mines,  about  forty  miles  due  east  of 
Metz,  where  the  Saar  swung  south  out 
of  the  Siegfried  Line  and  into  the 
Maginot  Line.  One  of  the  corps'  two 
armored  divisions,  the  4th,  was  to  cross 
south  of  Sarreguemines  near  Sarre- 
Union.  The  XX  Corps'  95th  Division 
was  to  cross  the  Saar  at  Saarlautern, 
followed  by  the  90th.  Flank  protection 
on  the  north  would  be  provided  by 
Combat  Command  B  of  the  10th  Ar- 
mored Division,  which  was  to  move 
toward  Merzig,  about  ten  miles  north 
of  Saarlautern.  Ten  miles  north  of 
Merzig,  Combat  Command  A  of  the 
10th  Armored  Division  was  to  seize  a 
bridgehead  over  the  Saar  at  Sarre- 
bourg,  an  important  move  because  it 
pointed  toward  the  ultimate  axis  of  the 
Third  Army  effort — a  Rhine  crossing 
between  Worms  and  Mainz.  The  1 139th 
Engineer  Combat  Group  was  to  sup- 
port the  10th  Armored  and  90th  Infan- 
try Divisions;  the  95th  Division  was  to 
have  the  support  of  the  1103d  Engi- 
neer Combat  Group. 

In  the  path  of  XX  Corps  the  Ger- 
mans had  demolished  almost  all  the 
bridges  over  streams  and  culverts.  Abut- 
ments, however,  were  seldom  de- 
stroyed, making  the  use  of  fixed  Bailey 
bridges  or  short  fixed  treadway  sections 
both  feasible  and  relatively  easy.^^  Mud, 
rain,  fOg,  and  mines  slowed  the  infan- 
try more  than  did  the  Maginot  Line, 
which  was  not  very  formidable.  Cross- 
ing it.  General  Patton  was  "impressed 
by  its  lack  of  impressiveness."^"*  Only  in 
the  path  of  the  armor  moving  north 


■^ '  Combat  Interv  44,  Engineer  Participation  in  the 
Metz  Operation,  p.  11,  XX  Corps  files;  Hist  315th 
Engr  C  Bn,  7  Mar  44- May  45. 

'^^  Patton,  War  As  I  Knew  It,  p.  181. 


430 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


did  effective  field  fortifications  block 
the  way. 

On  the  night  of  21  November  Com- 
bat Command  A  of  the  10th  Armored 
Division  came  up  against  a  strong  line 
of  fieldworks — a  bank  of  antitank 
ditches,  dragon's  teeth,  concrete  pill- 
boxes, and  bunkers.  American  intelli- 
gence had  provided  little  or  no  informa- 
tion about  this  formidable  barrier.  It  was 
the  Orscholz  Switch  Line  (known  to  the 
Americans  as  the  "Siegfried  Switch"), 
constructed  at  right  angles  to  the  Sieg- 
fried Line  and  located  at  the  base  of 
the  triangle  formed  by  the  confluence 
of  the  Saar  and  Moselle  Rivers.  The 
nineteen-mile-long  triangle,  ten  miles 
wide  at  its  base,  was  of  vital  concern  to 
the  Germans  because  at  its  apex  lay  the 
city  of  Trier,  guarding  the  Moselle 
corridor,  an  important  pathway  to 
Koblenz  on  the  Rhine. '^''' 

The  Orscholz  Line  provided  a  bul- 
wark for  enemy  forces  withdrawing 
under  pressure  from  XX  Corps.  The 
Germans  manning  its  defenses  poured 
artillery  and  mortar  fire  on  the  tankers 
and  on  engineers  attempting  to  bridge 
the  line's  antitank  ditches  and  deep 
craters.  The  10th  Armored  Division  was 
unable  to  drive  through  the  fortifica- 
tions, and  an  infantry  regiment  of  the 
90th  Division  had  to  reinforce  the  at- 
tack. 

In  three  days  of  fighting  the  infan- 
try suffered  very  heavy  casualties,  not 
only  from  enemy  fire  but  also  from 
exposure  to  cold,  mud,  and  rain.  More- 
over, the  bad  weather  forestalled  Ameri- 
can bomber  support.  At  the  end  of 
November  General  Walker  abandoned 


the  attempt  to  penetrate  the  Orscholz 
Switch  Line  and  to  attack  toward  Sarre- 
bourg.  He  sent  the  infantry  regiment 
to  the  rear  and  directed  Combat  Com- 
mand A  of  the  10th  Armored  Division 
to  join  Combat  Command  B  near  Mer- 
zig  to  protect  the  north  flank  of  the  XX 
Corps'  drive  on  Saarlautern.  By  2  De- 
cember the  armor  had  overcome  all 
resistance  in  the  Merzig  sector. 

On  1  December  the  weather  had 
begun  to  clear — a  good  omen  for  the 
95th  Division's  attack  on  Saarlautern — 
and  on  the  morning  of  2  December 
bombers  blasted  in  and  around  the  city. 
Shortly  before  noon  the  bombing  lifted. 
The  2d  Battalion  of  the  379th  Infantry, 
the  95th  Division  regiment  chosen  to 
seize  a  bridgehead  across  the  Saar, 
advanced  into  the  city.  By  1500  the 
troops  had  captured  an  enemy  barracks 
on  the  western  edge  of  Saarlautern,  but 
as  they  converged  on  the  center  of  the 
city  they  met  heavy  resistance.  The  Ger- 
mans were  fighting  viciously,  house  by 
house  and  block  by  block.  To  break 
through  the  strongly  defended  city  and 
force  a  river  crossing  too  seemed  im- 
possible, but  fortune  favored  the  at- 
tackers. 

The  Capture  of  the  Saarlautern  Bridge 

That  evening  Col.  Robert  L.  Bacon, 
commanding  the  379th  Infantry,  was 
handed  a  photograph  taken  from  an 
artillery  observation  plane  late  in  the 
afternoon.  The  picture  showed  a  bridge, 
intact,  spanning  the  Saar  between  the 
center  of  the  city  and  a  northern  sub- 
urb. Colonel  Bacon  decided  on  a  dar- 
ing maneuver  to  capture  the  bridge 


"^ '  For  the  Orscholz  Switch  Line,  see  Cole,  The  Lor- 
raine Campaign,  pp.  487-88  and  map  43;  The XX  Corps: 
Its  History  and  Service  in  WW  II,  p.  238. 


^•^  AAR,  95th  Inf  Div,  2  Dec  44. 


BREACHING  GERMANY'S  BARRIERS 


431 


before  the  Germans  could  blow  it.  He 
planned  to  send  his  1st  Battalion  in 
boats  across  the  Saar  northwest  of  the 
city,  where  the  river  makes  a  loop,  to 
seize  the  far  end  of  the  bridge  while 
the  2d  Battalion  attacked  toward  the 
near  (south)  side. 

Under  cover  of  darkness,  rain,  and 
fog  and  with  all  sounds  drowned  out 
by  the  roar  of  American  artillery,  as- 
sault boats  moved  up  to  the  crossing 
site,  where  the  river  was  only  125  feet 
wide;  the  first  wave  of  the  commando- 
type  operation  was  across  at  0545.  Led 
by  an  infantry  battalion  commander, 
Lt.  Col.  Tobias  R.  Philbin,  the  assault 
wave  included  a  platoon  from  the  320th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  under  2d 
Lt.  Edward  Herbert.  On  the  far  bank 
the  column  hurried  down  the  road  to 
the  bridge,  encountering  only  one  Ger- 
man, an  unarmed  telephone  operator. 
At  the  bridge  was  an  armored  car  with 
a  radio  operator  in  it  and  a  German 
soldier  alongside.  A  company  com- 
mander bayonetted  the  radio  operator, 
and  Colonel  Philbin  shot  the  other 
when  he  made  a  dash  for  the  bridge  to 
trip  the  switch  that  would  blow  it.'^^ 

Philbin's  troops  first  cut  all  the  wires 
they  could  find.  Following  closely  be- 
hind the  infantrymen,  the  engineers 
checked  the  bridge  for  mines  and  explo- 
sives. About  halfway  across  they  found 
four  500-pound  American  bombs,  with- 
out fuses,  laid  end  to  end  across  the 
bridge.  Without  stopping,  Herbert  led 
his  men  to  check  the  south  end  of  the 
bridge.  There  they  encountered  a  Ger- 
man officer  and  four  enlisted  men  who 
refused  an  order  to  halt.  All  were  shot. 


A  few  minutes  later  the  engineers  saw 
a  second  party  of  several  Germans  com- 
ing toward  the  bridge  dragging  a  rub- 
ber boat.  They  also  refused  to  surren- 
der and  were  shot.  This  gunfire  brought 
on  such  a  heavy  concentration  of  Ger- 
man machine-gun  fire  that  the  engi- 
neers had  to  retreat  to  the  north  end  of 
the  bridge,  where  machine-gun  and 
artillery  fire  pinned  them  down  for 
hours.  Not  until  1600  were  they  able  to 
return  to  the  bridge  and  hoist  the  Amer- 
ican bombs  over  the  side  and  into  the 
river.  The  engineers  also  managed  to 
restore  enough  flooring  to  enable  some 
tank  destroyers  and  supply  trucks  to 
pass  over  the  north  side.  After  dark 
the  Germans  dispatched  to  the  bridge 
some  tanks  loaded  with  explosives,  but 
after  the  lead  tank  was  hit  they  aban- 
doned the  attempt. 

Next  day  the  enemy  resumed  shell- 
ing and  made  determined  efforts  to 
retake  or  destroy  the  bridge.  A  party 
of  German  engineers  came  forward  to 
blow  it  by  hand  because  the  95th  Divi- 
sion's artillery  had  knocked  out  the  gen- 
erators needed  to  blow  the  bridge  elec- 
trically. The  Germans  were  captured, 
and  under  questioning  one  of  them 
revealed  that  the  bridge  was  virtually  a 
powder  keg — channels  bored  in  the 
piers  were  filled  with  dynamite  and 
TNT.  Herbert's  platoon  eventually  re- 
moved three  tons  of  the  explosives. ^^ 

Assaulting  Pillboxes  on  the  Far  Bank 

While  the  engineers  were  still  trying 
to  clear  the  bridge,  fighting  was  already 
under  way  across  the  river  in  the  sub- 
urbs of  Saarlautern:  Saarlautern-Roden 
and  Fraulautern  to  the  north  and  Ens- 


"  Details  of  the  bridge  capture  are  from  interviews 
with  2d  Lt.  Edward  Herbert  et  al.,  (Combat  Interv  205, 
XX  Corps  files,  and  AAR,  95th  Inf  Div,  2  Dec  44. 


Cole,  The  Lorraine  Campaign,  p.  518. 


432 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


dorf  to  the  east.  Each  regiment  of  the 
95th  Division  had  the  support  of  a  com- 
pany of  the  320th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion.  These  suburbs  boasted  one 
of  the  strongest  sectors  of  the  entire 
Siegfried  Line.  Pillboxes  of  reinforced 
concrete  were  built  into  the  streets  and 
between  houses,  many  extending  two 
or  three  levels  below  ground,  some  with 
roofs  and  walls  ten  feet  thick  or  steel 
turrets  housing  88-mm.  guns.  The  Ger- 
mans had  cleverly  camouflaged  the 
pillboxes.  Some  resembled  manure  piles 
or  mounds  of  earth,  others  ordinary 
structures.  One  had  been  constructed 
inside  a  barn,  and  another  was  dis- 
guised as  a  suburban  railroad  station, 
complete  with  ticket  windows.  Ordinary 
buildings  had  been  fortified  with  sand- 
bags, wire,  and  concrete.  "Every  house 
was  a  fort,"  reported  an  officer  from 
Saarlautern-Roden."^ 

The  engineers  who  had  the  job  of 
assaulting  the  pillboxes  came  under  fire 
not  only  from  the  pillboxes  themselves 
but  from  heavy  German  artillery  em- 
placed  on  heights  behind  the  three 
suburbs,  outranging  American  artillery 
on  the  near  bank  of  the  river.  Rain  and 
overcast  prevented  air  support.  Ger- 
man tanks  roamed  the  streets,  and  pro- 
tection against  them  was  available  only 
in  the  two  northern  suburbs,  where  the 
Saarlautern  bridge  brought  across 
American  tanks  and  tank  destroyers. 
The  U.S.  position  in  the  southern  sub- 
urb, Ensdorf,  had  to  depend  on  brid- 
ges the  engineers  constructed,  and  Ger- 
man artillery  knocked  them  out  almost 
as  soon  as  they  were  built.  On  8  Decem- 
ber artillery  fire  cost  the  320th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  more  than 
$300,000  worth  of  bridging  equipment. 


^■'  AAR,  95th  Inf  Div,  2  Dec  44. 


To  add  to  the  hardships,  the  Saar  River 
was  rising  rapidly.  By  9  December, 
when  assault  boats  were  still  support- 
ing the  Ensdorf  attack,  the  river  had 
swollen  to  a  width  of  between  400  and 
500  feet. 

It  became  evident  very  early  that  the 
advance  through  the  suburbs  would  be 
slow.  Five  German  pillboxes,  mutually 
supporting  on  each  flank,  held  up  an 
infantry  battalion  for  two  days  at  Saar- 
lautern-Roden.  Tank  destroyers  came 
up  to  fire  directly  at  the  pillboxes  but 
without  effect.  On  the  afternoon  of  the 
third  day,  7  December,  T/5  Henry  E. 
Barth  of  the  320th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion's  C  Company  volunteered  to 
attack  the  first  pillbox.  Carrying  a  heavy 
beehive  charge,  he  was  unarmed  but 
had  the  covering  fire  of  eighteen  infan- 
trymen. Fifty  yards  from  the  target  the 
infantrymen,  who  had  suffered  several 
casualties  during  the  approach,  took 
cover  in  a  small  building  from  which 
they  kept  up  fire  on  the  pillbox's  ma- 
chine-gun ports  until  Barth  was  close 
enough  to  rush  forward,  place  his 
charge  on  a  gun  port,  and  detonate  it. 
The  Germans  surrendered  imme- 
diately. Another  engineer,  Pfc.  William 
E.  Farthing,  captured  a  second  pillbox 
singlehanded.  Slipping  out  alone.  Far- 
thing crawled  toward  the  pillbox  and 
shoved  an  explosive  charge  into  its  gun 
port  until  it  touched  the  gun  muzzle, 
then  detonated  it. 

Engineers  advancing  under  infantry 
covering  fire  became  the  general  pat- 
tern for  taking  out  the  pillboxes  in  the 
Saarlautern  suburbs.  Sometimes  after 
a  pillbox  had  fallen  and  the  engineers 
and  infantrymen  inside  were  waiting 
for  darkness  to  resume  their  advance, 
the  Germans  would  counterattack  and 
have  to  be  driven  off.  The  advance  was 


BREACHING  GERMANY'S  BARRIERS 


433 


costly  to  the  engineers.  During  Decem- 
ber the  320th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion had  ten  men  killed  in  action  and 
fifty-nine  wounded,  two  so  severely  that 
they  died  in  the  hospital.^**  The  pillbox- 
by-pillbox,  street-by-street,  house-by- 
house  fighting  in  early  December  was 
so  costly  to  the  already  depleted  95th 
Division  that  by  mid-December  XX 
Corps  began  withdrawing  the  unit  to 
the  west  bank  of  the  Saar,  replacing  it 
with  the  relatively  fresh  5th  Infantry 
Division. 

The  plan  was  for  the  5th  Division  to 
drive  north  and  ultimately  advance 
alongside  XX  Corps'  90th  Infantry 
Division.  The  latter  had  not  been  able 
to  follow  the  95th  Division  over  the 
river  but  had  had  to  cross  some  miles  to 
the  north.  Its  main  objective  was  Dil- 
lingen,  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Saar  and 
covering  the  right  flank  of  the  Saar- 
lautern  defenses.  Two  battalions  of  the 
1139th  Engineer  Combat  Group  were 
to  ferry  the  90th  Division  across  the 
Saar.  Since  no  bridge  existed,  the  divi- 
sion selected  two  sites  for  assault  boat 
crossings.  The  179th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion  was  to  ferry  the  357th 
Infantry  over  the  river  on  the  left 
(north)  flank;  the  206th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  was  to  cross  the  358th 
Infantry  on  the  right.  The  engineers 
were  to  operate  the  assault  boats  for 
the  infantry  and,  after  the  landings,  to 
bring  over  supplies  and  evacuate  the 
wounded.  The  179th  Battalion  also  had 
to  construct  an  infantry  support  bridge, 
an  M2  tread  way  for  tanks,  other  vehicles, 
or  both,  depending  on  the  outcome  of 


^"  Hist  320th  Engr  C  Bn,  1942- 1 1  Aug  45.  Barth, 
Farthing,  and  seven  other  members  of  the  320th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  were  awarded  the  Silver  Star 
for  action  in  reducing  pillboxes  at  Saarlautern-Roden 
from  4  to  7  December. 


the  assault.  Late  on  5  December  the 
engineers  brought  the  boats  down  to 
the  riverbank  as  a  ninety-minute  artillery 
barrage  drowned  the  noise  of  the  de- 
ployment. 

The  first  boats  shoved  off  at  0415. 
Darkness  protected  them  from  enemy 
fire,  but  they  had  to  buck  a  strong  cur- 
rent in  the  river,  which  had  begun  ris- 
ing the  day  before.  Almost  half  of  the 
boats  the  179th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion operated  swamped  on  the  way 
over  or  back  and  went  off  downstream, 
smashing  into  the  debris  of  a  blown  rail- 
road bridge.  Most  of  the  first  infantry 
wave  got  across  without  mishap,  but  for 
succeeding  waves  the  crossings  were 
progressively  more  difficult.  At  day- 
break the  enemy  spotted  the  boats,  and 
smoke  seemed  only  to  attract  heavier 
fire.  When  the  engineers  attempted  to 
put  down  footbridges  that  first  day,  the 
Germans  knocked  out  the  spans  almost 
as  soon  as  work  started.''' 

On  the  far  bank  of  the  Saar  a  strong 
band  of  pillboxes  barred  the  way  east- 
ward. The  357th  Infantry  made  some 
progress  on  the  north,  but  to  the  south 
the  358th  was  unable  to  cross  railroad 
tracks  separating  the  riverside  village 
of  Pachten  from  Dillingen.  At  Pachten 
one  of  the  engineers  of  the  3 1 5th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion,  Sgt.  Joseph  E. 
Williams,  won  the  Distinguished  Ser- 
vice Cross  for  gallantry  in  action.  Vol- 
unteering to  breach  a  pillbox,  he  was 
wounded  before  he  could  reach  it  but 
crawled  on  and  fired  his  charge.  He 
refused  to  be  evacuated,  advanced  on 
another  pillbox,  and  although  wounded 
for  the  second  time  succeeded  in  tak- 
ing sixteen  prisoners. ^^  However,  this 


"  Hists,  1 139th  Engr  C  Gp,  Dec  44;  179th  Engr  C  Bn, 
Aug,  Nov,  Dec  44;  and  206th  Engr  C  Bn,  Jun-Dec  44. 
•'^  AAR,  358th  Inf  Div,  6  Dec  44. 


434 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


and  other  acts  of  heroism  by  engineers 
and  infantry  were  not  enough  to  over- 
come the  pillboxes.  The  only  field  gun 
the  90th  Division  had  east  of  the  river 
was  a  captured  German  75-mm.  piece. 
Frantic  calls  went  back  to  the  near  bank 
for  tanks  and  antitank  guns. 

To  get  the  tanks  and  guns  across  the 
river  the  engineers  tried  to  build  M2 
treadway  bridges,  but  German  artillery 
knocked  them  out.  So  intense  was  the 
enemy  fire  that  the  powerboats  used  to 
ferry  supplies  and  evacuate  the 
wounded  could  be  employed  only  at 
night;  at  times  ferry  operations  had  to 
be  suspended  entirely.  Not  until  9  De- 
cember were  the  engineers  able  to  get 
heavy  rafts  into  operation.  That  day  the 
I79th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion 
crossed  tanks  and  antitank  guns  on  an 
M2  steel  treadway  raft,  and  the  206th 
Battalion  got  some  jeeps,  antitank  guns, 
and  tank  destroyers  across.  Later,  the 
206th  had  sole  charge  of  the  crossing 
operation. '^^ 

During  the  following  week,  despite 
chilling  rain  and  snow,  the  engineers 
kept  the  vehicular  ferry  running,  re- 
peatedly repairing  damage  from  heavy 
German  artillery  fire.  As  the  river  be- 
gan to  recede  the  engineers  also  built  a 
corduroy  road  of  logs  on  the  far  shore 
to  keep  the  tanks  from  miring  down 
when  they  rolled  off  the  rafts.  By  15 
December,  after  the  tanks  as  well  as  the 
359th  Infantry  had  crossed  the  Saar, 
the  90th  Division  was  penetrating  forti- 
fications protecting  Dillingen.  Then  the 
attack  halted  for  several  days  to  give 
the  5th  Division  time  to  relieve  the  95th 
in  the  Saarlautern  bridgehead  and  come 
abreast  of  the  90th.  The  advance  re- 


sumed on  18  December.  Resistance 
proved  surprisingly  light,  and  in  three 
hours  most  of  Dillingen  was  captured. 

The  Withdrawal 

Next  afternoon,  on  19  December, 
General  Patton  ordered  the  90th  Divi- 
sion to  give  up  its  hard-won  Dillingen 
bridgehead  and  withdraw  west  of  the 
Saar.  By  that  time  German  attacks  in 
the  Ardennes,  beginning  on  16  Decem- 
ber, had  been  recognized  as  a  full-scale 
offensive.  After  a  conference  with  Eisen- 
hower and  Bradley  at  Verdun  on  the 
morning  of  19  December,  Patton  com- 
mitted to  the  American  defenses  the 
bulk  of  Third  Army,  including  the  90th 
and  5th  Infantry  Divisions,  leaving  the 
95th  Division  to  hold  the  Saarlautern 
bridgehead — the  only  foothold  left  east 
of  the  Saar. 

For  the  withdrawal  the  engineers  had 
to  depend  on  assault  boats  and  the  M2 
treadway  ferries  because  a  heavy  pon- 
ton bridge  they  had  planned  to  erect 
was  not  yet  in  place.  The  first  tanks 
and  trucks  went  back  west  on  the  night 
of  19  December  After  artillery  fire 
knocked  out  one  of  the  ferries  during 
daylight  operations,  the  crossings  con- 
tinued only  at  night.  The  206th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  was  in  charge 
of  the  withdrawal.  By  noon  of  22  De- 
cember the  90th  Division  had  recrossed 
the  Saar  and  was  headed  north  to  take 
its  place  in  the  hasty  defense  against 
the  last  great  German  counteroffensive 
m  the  west.' 

South  of  Third  Army's  withdrawing 
elements,  American  and  French  forces 
also  steeled  themselves  for  the  German 


•"  Hists,  179th  and  206th  Engr  C  Bns. 
'*Hist  1139th  EngrCGp. 


•'-''  Hists,  1 139th  Engl  C  Gp  and  2()6th  Engr  C  Bn. 


BREACHING  GERMANY'S  BARRIERS 


435 


blow.  From  mid-September  on,  Patton 
had  been  fighting  with  a  new  Allied 
army  group  on  his  flank  in  the  south. 
Another  seaborne  thrust  into  German- 
occupied  France  on  1 5  August  had  rap- 
idly cleared  the  southern  tier  of  the 
country  and  linked  with  the  12th  Army 


Group  to  form  a  continuous  line  from 
the  Mediterranean  to  the  English  Chan- 
nel. Mounted  from  the  Mediterranean 
Theater  of  Operations,  the  assault  and 
the  subsequent  advance  north  relied 
heavily  on  engineer  elements  for  suc- 


cess. 


CHAPTER  XX 


Southern  France 


As  the  Allied  plans  for  the  cross- 
Channel  attack  matured  in  January 
1944,  another  staff  headquarters  in  the 
Mediterranean  began  preparing  for  the 
last  major  seaborne  thrust  onto  the 
European  continent  in  World  War  II. 
Under  the  U.S.  Seventh  Army  engineer, 
Brig.  Gen.  Garrison  H.  Davidson,  the 
newly  formed  Force  163  moved  into 
an  unused  French  girls'  school  outside 
Algiers.  Having  briefly  commanded  the 
Seventh  Army,  then  a  headquarters 
organization  with  few  troops  assigned. 
General  Davidson  retained  an  interest 
in  the  planning  of  the  invasion.  Opera- 
tion Anvil,  after  Maj.  Gen.  Alexander 
M.  Patch  took  over  the  army  command 
on  2  March  1944.  The  predominantly 
engineer  staff  developed  several  alter- 
nate plans  for  the  undertaking  in  south- 
ern France  but  at  General  Davidson's 
insistence  and  at  the  Navy  Intelligence 
Board's  recommendation,  the  planners 
concentrated  on  the  forty-five  mile 
coastline  between  Toulon  and  Cannes. 
There,  the  beaches  offered  a  good  gra- 
dient for  amphibious  operations  and 
rapid  access  to  the  major  port  of  Mar- 
seille and  the  naval  base  at  Toulon.  Two 
good  roads  into  the  French  interior  ran 
north  from  the  area.  One  led  up  the 
Rhone  River  valley  to  Lyon,  and  the 
other  through  the  Durance  River  val- 
ley to  Grenoble.  Having  served  as  Na- 
poleon's escape  route  from  Elba  in 


1815,  the  latter  was  known  as  the  Route 
Napoleon.' 

Anvil  lived  a  precarious  existence 
from  the  outset.  It  remained  subordi- 
nate to  the  material  demands  of  the 
projected  Normandy  invasion  and  the 
Italian  campaign  and  subject  to  the 
voluble  objections  of  Winston  Churchill. 
Nevertheless,  active  planning  continued 
at  Seventh  Army  headquarters  with  the 
explicit  endorsement  of  Lt.  Gen.  Jacob 
L.  Devers,  who  had  taken  command  of 
the  North  African  theater  at  the  turn 
of  the  year.  Devers  went  so  far  as  to 
freeze  theater  stocks  necessary  for  AN- 
VIL to  preserve  it  as  a  viable  operation. 
Not  until  2  July  did  the  Combined 
Chiefs  of  Staff  finally  direct  the  execu- 
tion of  Anvil  with  a  target  date  of  15 
August.  Churchill  made  a  last-minute 
attempt  to  divert  ANVIL  forces  to  the 
west  coast  of  France,  but,  because  of 
General  Devers'  commitment  to  the 
project,  planning  for  ANVIL  at  Seventh 
Army  was  uninterrupted.^ 

Planning  sessions  had  hardly  begun 
when  the  impetus  for  closer  coopera- 
tion between  Army  and  Navy  planners 


'  Seventh  U.S.  Army,  Report  of  Operations,  France  and 
Germany,  1944-1945,  vol.  I  (Heidelberg:  Aloys  Graef, 
1946),  pp.  1  —  10.  This  chapter  relies  on  this  source 
for  planning  and  tactical  details  pertaining  to  the  Sev- 
enth Army,  except  where  otherwise  noted.  It  is  cited 
hereafter  as  Seventh  Army  Report. 

^  Coakley  and  Leighton,  Global  Logistics  and  Strategy, 
1943-45,  pp.  365,  381-82. 


SOUTHERN  FRANCE 


437 


made  organizational  innovation  neces- 
sary. The  experiences  of  the  SiciHan 
and  Italian  landings  showed  the  need 
for  interservice  coordination  of  the 
operation,  while  the  near-debacle  at 
Anzio  provoked  a  reassessment  of  am- 
phibious warfare  practice.  In  March 
1944  General  Davidson  recommended 
that  General  Patch  establish  two  joint 
agencies,  a  Beach  Obstacle  Board  and  a 
Beach  Control  Board,  to  revise  proce- 
dures for  the  combined  operations  phase 
of  the  forthcoming  invasion. 

To  form  the  Beach  Obstacle  Board 
Seventh  Army  engineers  joined  Navy 
engineers  and  planners  working  under 
Vice  Adm.  H.  Kent  Hewitt,  commander 
of  the  Western  Naval  Task  Force,  which 
would  transport  Seventh  Army  to  the 
invasion  area.  Working  through  the 
summer  of  1944  at  the  Invasion  Train- 
ing Center  in  and  around  Salerno,  the 
board  tested  several  devices  that  had 
arrived  too  late  for  use  at  Normandy. 
The  Apex  drone  boats,  the  Reddy  Fox 
explosive  pipe,  and  the  Navy 
"Woofus" — a  rocket-firing  LCM — 
engendered  no  great  hopes  among  the 
board  members,  and  they  chose  to  rely 
primarily  on  demolition  teams,  each 
consisting  of  a  naval  officer  and  a  bal- 
anced contingent  of  sailors  and  Army 
engineers."* 

The  Beach  Control  Board  produced 
a  similar  new  organizational  element  in 
the  Beach  Control  Group,  combining 
an  Army  engineer  combat  regiment,  a 
naval  beach  battalion,  and  several  small- 
er service  units.  Trained  under  the 
supervision  of  the  Seventh  Army  G— 4, 
Col.  Oliver  C.  Harvey,  one  beach  group 
was  assigned  to  each  of  the  three  invad- 


ing divisions  with  the  job  of  moving 
supplies  ashore  in  the  assault,  clearing 
any  shore  obstacles  impeding  deliver- 
ies to  the  troops  moving  off  the  beaches, 
and  acting  as  an  embryonic  base  sec- 
tion until  the  consolidation  of  the  beach- 
head and  the  arrival  of  regular  services 
of  supply  on  shore. ^ 

Tank-gapping  teams  were  another 
successful  innovation  for  ANVIL.  An 
armored  unit  equipped  with  M4A4 
tanks  mounting  bulldozer  blades  or 
scarifiers,  the  team  was  to  breach  the 
enemy  beach  minefields  and  sea  walls 
serving  as  tank  obstacles  so  that  the 
armor  in  the  first  assault  wave  could 
move  quickly  off  the  open  beaches  in 
support  of  the  advancing  infantry.  The 
engineers  split  the  6617th  Mine  Clear- 
ance Company  to  provide  three  teams, 
one  attached  to  each  of  the  engineer 
beach  groups  for  the  assault.  Drivers 
from  the  regular  armored  forces  were 
trained  to  manipulate  the  dozer  blades 
to  unearth  buried  mines  as  rapidly  as 
possible. 

By  19  June  the  major  engineer  com- 
bat unit  assignments  for  the  invasion 
were  completed.  Supporting  the  3d 
Infantry  Division  as  the  nucleus  for  the 
36th  Engineer  Beach  Control  Group, 
the  36th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment 
operated  with  the  1st  Naval  Beach  Bat- 
talion and  various  chemical,  ordnance, 
signal,  and  military  police  units.  Assigned 
to  the  45th  Infantry  Division,  the  40th 
Engineer  Beach  Control  Group  em- 
ployed its  core  engineer  regiment,  the 
4th  Naval  Beach  Battalion,  two  quarter- 
master battalions,  two  port  battalions,  a 
medical  battalion,  and  several  smaller 


■^  See  ch.  XIV;  Morison,  The  Invasion  of  France  and 
Germany,  p.  241. 


^  Seventh  Army,  Engineer  Section  Reports,  Engi- 
neer Historical  Report,  1  Jan-30  Sep  44,  pp.  1-2 
(hereafter  cited  as  Seventh  Army,  Engr  Hist  Rpt). 


438 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


service  units.  With  the  36th  Infantry 
Division  was  the  540th  Engineer  Beach 
Control  Group,  comprised  of  the  48th 
Engineer  Battalion,  the  8th  Naval  Beach 
Battalion,  two  quartermaster  battalions, 
two  port  battalions,  a  medical  battalion, 
several  detachments  of  service  troops, 
and  the  three  battalions  of  the  540th 
Engineer  Combat  Regiment.^  Though 
the  same  mix  of  support  units  was 
employed  as  in  OVERLORD,  there  was 
no  provisional  brigade  headquarters 
such  as  the  one  that  controlled  activi- 
ties during  the  cross-Channel  attack. 

Attached  to  Maj.  Gen.  Lucian  K. 
Truscott's  VI  Corps,  these  units  were 
accomplished  veterans.  The  infantry 
divisions  and  engineers  chosen  for  the 
first  waves  had  all  seen  extensive  action 
in  the  invasions  of  North  Africa  and 
Sicily  and  in  the  Italian  campaign.  The 
36th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment  was 
preparing  its  fifth  amphibious  opera- 
tion, and  the  540th  had  had  a  distin- 
guished career  in  two  earlier  landings. 
At  the  Invasion  Training  Center  and 
around  the  Bay  of  Gaeta  after  the  Sev- 
enth Army  headquarters  moved  to  Na- 
ples in  early  July,  the  engineer  beach 
groups  demonstrated  demolitions,  mine 
warfare,  and  small  boat  handling  to 
infantry  units.  Since  the  engineers  were 
well  versed  in  tactics,  their  training  cen- 
tered on  equipment — variations  of  the 
tank  bulldozer  and  scarifiers,  a  new 
bridge-carrying  tank,  and  other  innova- 
tions.*^ 

Enemy  forces  in  the  target  area  for 
Operation  ANVIL  looked  formidable  on 
paper  but  had  major  weaknesses  in 
their  organization  and  shortages  in 
manpower  and  equipment.  The  local 


"^  Seventh  Army  Report,  vol.  I,  p.  81. 
*'  Seventh  Army,  Engr  Hist  Rpt,  p.  5. 


General  Davidson 

command.  Nineteenth  Army,  three  corps 
strong  under  Lt.  Gen.  Friedrich  Wiese, 
had  had  to  exchange  several  units  with 
German  commands  in  northern  France 
following  the  Normandy  invasion  and 
emerged  the  loser  in  these  transfers. 
Wiese's  relationship  with  his  senior 
command,  Army  Group  G,  was  uncertain. 
The  divisional  commanders  available  to 
him  were  competent,  but  at  least  two 
were  exhausted  from  their  experiences 
on  the  Russian  front.  German  strength 
in  southern  France,  counting  reserve 
aggregations,  amounted  to  over  285,000 
men,  including  weak  naval  and  air  sup- 
port. Wiese  had  somewhere  between 
85,000  and  100,000  men  in  the  imme- 
diate assault  area  to  thwart  an  invasion 
that  he  knew  was  coming.  German  aerial 
reconnaissance  over  the  Mediterranean 
had  detected  the  Allied  buildup  of 
shipping;  some  agent  reports  even  men- 


SOUTHERN  FRANCE 


439 


tioned  15  August  as  the  date  set  for  the 
assault.  The  242d  Infantry  Division,  de- 
fending nearly  the  exact  area  described 
in  the  Seventh  Army  assault  plan,  was 
one  of  the  two  best  Wiese  had.  But  like 
the  other  divisions  along  the  coast  from 
the  Italian  to  the  Spanish  borders,  it 
was  understrength  and  lacked  some 
equipment.  Though  relatively  better  off 
than  other  units  for  trained  soldiery, 
the  242d  had  unreliable  ethnic  German 
troops  from  eastern  Europe  reinforc- 
ing it,  and  its  least  effective  regiment 
included  a  battalion  of  Azerbaijanis.  To 
add  to  Wiese's  difficulties.  Hitler  had 
personally  decreed  that  the  242d  was 
to  defend  Toulon  as  a  fortress  and  had 
given  its  sister  division,  the  244th,  the 
same  assignment  in  Marseille.  Under 
these  conditions,  the  army  commander 
could  not  use  his  two  most  effective 
divisions  as  a  maneuver  force. ^ 

Obstacles  to  landing  craft  in  south- 
ern France  were  not  nearly  as  numer- 
ous as  those  sown  on  the  Normandy 
beaches,  but  the  Germans  had  not  to- 
tally neglected  their  defenses.  Beach 
sands  and  all  the  beach  exits  were  heav- 
ily mined  and  covered  with  barbed  wire. 
Heavy  artillery  pieces,  some  from  scut- 
tled French  warships  in  Toulon  harbor, 
commanded  all  the  likely  approaches 
to  shore.  Concrete  geometric  shapes  of 
all  kinds  barred  movement  on  major 
roads  and  intersections  along  the  coast. 
But,  lacking  manpower  and  necessary 
supplies,  the  German  defenders  could 
not  construct  positions  in  great  depth, 
though  their  orders  called  for  networks 
extending  eight  miles  inland.  At  Ger- 
man Navy  insistence  they  left  intact  the 


'  MS  R-  103,  Charles  V.  P.  von  Luttichau,  German 
Operations  in  Southern  France  and  Alsace,  1944: 
Army  Group  G  Prepares  to  Meet  the  Invasion,  1957, 
p.  11,  inCMH. 


larger  ports  of  Toulon  and  Marseille 
but  completely  wrecked  some  twenty 
smaller  harbors  in  the  invasion  areas, 
including  Ste.  Maxime  and  St.  Raphael. 
After  12  August,  German  forces  along 
the  coast  were  on  constant  alert.^ 

The  main  assault  force  assembled  to 
strike  this  defensive  shell  loaded  into 
attack  craft  with  its  contingents  of  engi- 
neers at  Naples  harbor  between  8  and 
12  August.  Some  of  the  slower  vessels 
left  the  crowded  anchorage  early  to 
coordinate  their  arrival  off  the  beaches. 
By  midnight  14  August,  in  calm  weather 
and  a  light  sea,  over  950  vessels  had 
gathered  in  assembly  areas  facing  the 
Bays  of  Cavalaire,  Pampelonne,  and 
Bougnon  and  the  shore  east  of  St. 
Raphael.  Before  daybreak  on  15  August 
commando  raiders  hit  the  suspected 
German  gun  emplacements  on  the  lies 
d'Hyeres  off  Cape  Benat,  and  the  Allied 
1st  Airborne  Task  Force  began  its  drop 
into  zones  around  the  towns  of  Le  Muy 
and  Le  Luc,  some  ten  miles  inland  from 
the  amphibious  landing  zones.  As  the 
sun  rose  at  0638  a  furious  naval  bom- 
bardment was  directed  at  the  larger 
German  guns  on  the  mainland,  now 
obscured  in  the  light  haze  hanging  over 
much  of  the  shoreline  in  the  early  dawn. 

The  Landings 

Facing  the  3d  Infantry  Division  on 
the  left  were  the  Alpha  beaches.  Alpha 
Red,  the  westernmost,  was  an  arc  of 
smooth  yellow  sand  on  the  Bay  of  Cava- 
laire, bordered  by  a  thin,  intermittent 
stand  of  pines  thirty  yards  from  the 
water.  Six  miles  due  east  across  the 
southern  tier  of  the  St.  Tropez  pen- 
insula. Alpha  Yellow  stretched  along 


Ibid.;  Seventh  Army  Report,  vol.  I,  pp.  37—40. 


SOUTHERN  FRANCE  BEACHHEADS 

15  August  1944 

5  10  Miles 


BEACH  LOCATION 

0  25         50  Miles 

6     25     ^0  Kilometers 


Cannes    J 

^MARSEILLE  AilK 

St  Tropezk       y 

tQuk>n\^/ 

7th  ARMY 
BEACHES 


MAP  24 


SOUTHERN  FRANCE 


441 


the  Bay  of  Pampelonne,  with  restricted 
exits  behind  it  leading  to  the  resort 
town  of  St.  Tropez  to  the  north  and 
over  rolling  farmland  and  rougher  ter- 
rain to  the  west.  (Map  24) 

After  0710  minesweepers  moved  in 
under  the  cover  of  naval  fire,  clearing 
boat  lanes  to  within  100  yards  of  the 
beaches.  In  the  shallow  water  stood  rows 
of  concrete  pyramids  and  tetrahedrons, 
most  equipped  with  Teller  mines.  At 
0730  eighteen  Apex  drones  rumbled 
shoreward  to  blast  clear  the  last  100 
yards  for  the  landing  craft.  Fifteen 
drones  destroyed  as  many  obstacles,  but 
two  circled  aimlessly,  and  one  roared 
back  into  the  fleet  area,  damaging  a 
sub-chaser  when  it  blew  up  amone  the 
ships. 

By  0758,  naval  fire  support  shifted 
to  the  flanks  of  the  beaches,  and  the 
first  waves  started  shoreward.  Three 
minutes  later,  the  7th  Regimental  Com- 
bat Team,  3d  Infantry  Division,  struck 
Alpha  Red,  and  the  15th  Infantry  drove 
onto  Alpha  Yellow.  The  tank-gapping 
team  at  Alpha  Red  immediately  fell  into 
five-foot  surf  off  the  beach,  nearly 
drowning  out  the  tank  engines.  Unde- 
terred, their  crews  gunned  the  two 
engineer  tanks  up  the  sand,  bulldozing 
a  passage  through  the  railroad  embank- 
ment behind  the  beach  and  clearing  a 
road  through  a  mined,  wooded  area, 
all  in  less  than  ten  minutes."*  Elements 


'*  Adm.  H.  Kent  Hewitt,  "Executing  Operation 
Anvii.-Dra(;oon,"  U.S.  Naval  Institute  Proceedings, 
LXXX  (August  1954),  903;  Morison,  The  Invasion  of 
France  and  Germany,  p.  256;  Seventh  Army  Report,  vol.  I, 
p.  199. 

'"  Summary  of  Accomplishments,  Tank-Gapping 
Teams,  app.  to  Memo,  Maj  Thomas  W.  Wood  for 
Joint  Army-Navy  Experimental  and  Testing  Board, 
Ft.  Pierce,  Fla.,  10  Sep  44,  sub:  Operation  Dragoon. 
AH  details  on  the  operations  of  the  tank-gapping  teams 
are  taken  from  this  source. 


of  the  1st  Battalion,  36th  Engineer 
Combat  Regiment,  came  in  with  the 
first  wave  on  Red,  and  immediately 
squads  began  probing  for  mines  with 
bayonets  and  detectors. 

The  gapping  team  at  Yellow  landed 
some  1 ,500  yards  to  the  left  of  its  as- 
signed point  and  had  to  wade  the  sin- 
gle tank  through  water  five  feet  deep. 
But  once  ashore,  the  vehicle  took  only 
a  quarter-hour  to  clear  a  1,500-yard 
path  through  antitank  and  antiperson- 
nel mines  to  a  highway,  silencing  a  Ger- 
man antitank  gun  in  the  process.  The 
tank's  dozer  arm,  partially  severed  by 
an  exploding  mine,  finally  buckled  com- 
pletely as  the  tank  forded  a  stream  to 
begin  preparing  a  crossing  site. 

The  3d  Battalion,  36th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Regiment,  hit  Yellow  and,  clearing 
paths  through  the  mines,  pushed  vehi- 
cle tracks  of  reinforced  matting  through 
the  serviceable  beach  exits.  By  0920  the 
36th  Engineer  Beach  Group's  com- 
mand post  was  set  up  in  the  Hotel 
Pardigon  in  Cavalaire,  off  the  left  flank 
of  Alpha  Red.  As  the  day  progressed 
the  1st  Battalion,  leaving  beach  opera- 
tions to  the  3d  Battalion,  advanced 
inland  with  the  infantry  to  clear  road- 
blocks and  minefields.  The  unit  laid  out 
dumps  behind  the  troops  moving  to  the 
beachhead  line,  leveled  an  airstrip  for 
reconnaissance  aircraft,  and  erected 
barbed-wire  barricades  for  a  prisoner 
enclosure. ' ' 

Alpha  Yellow  Beach  closed  down  on 
16  August;  poor  exits  and  a  sandbar 
just  off  shore  limited  its  supply  flow. 
The  3d  Battalion  moved  southwest 
across  the  St.  Tropez  peninsula  on  18 
August  to  relieve  the  crush  of  opera- 


"  Hist  Rpt,  36th  Engr  C  Rgt,   1944,  Report  for 
August  1944. 


442 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


tions  on  Alpha  Red  by  opening  Alpha 
Green  opposite  Red  on  the  Bay  of 
Cavalaire.  Engineers  quickly  discovered 
that  the  exits  off  Green  were  heavily 
mined,  and  clearing  them  occupied 
much  of  the  labor  force  until  the  end 
of  the  month.  With  these  hindrances, 
service  troops  on  the  Alpha  beaches  had 
continual  difficulty  responding  to  the 
supply  demands  of  the  combat  troops. 
Though  the  Alpha  complex  was  the 
least  efficient  of  the  ANVIL  beach  oper- 
ations, it  continued  to  receive  cargo 
until  Marseille  harbor  came  into  full 
use. 

Seven  miles  across  the  mouth  of  the 
Bay  of  St.  Tropez  from  Alpha  Yellow, 
beginning  just  east  of  rocky  Cape  Sar- 
dineau,  the  Delta  beaches  curved  from 
south  to  northeast  along  the  shores  of 
the  Bay  of  Bougnon.  Delta  Red  and 
Delta  Green  lay  contiguous,  giving  way 
to  flat  hinterlands.  Delta  Blue  was  sep- 
arate, broken  on  its  far  right  by  a  small 
river  mouth  and  marked  to  its  rear  by 
rising  slopes  of  the  Maures.  An  eight- 
foot-high,  three-foot-thick  concrete  wall 
stood  along  the  back  edge  of  Red  and 
Green;  behind  it  ran  a  paved  road  and 
a  narrow-gauge  coastal  railroad  atop  a 
masonry  embankment  that  also  paral- 
leled the  shore  behind  Yellow  and  Blue. 

No  underwater  obstacles  hindered 
the  Delta  force,  and  at  0802  the  40th 
Engineer  Beach  Control  Group,  under 
Lt.  Col.  Oscar  B.  Beasley,  touched 
down.  Finding  no  mines  on  the  beach, 
the  1st  Battalion  of  the  engineer  regi- 
ment reduced  concertina-wire  defenses 
of  Red  and  Green  and  set  to  work 
unloading  over  ponton  causeways  and 
landing  craft  that  grounded  several 
yards  out  on  the  steep  gradient. 

The  gapping  team  at  Delta  Green 
had  approached  the  beach  500  yards 


to  the  right  of  its  intended  landfall  and 
immediately  lost  all  three  of  its  engi- 
neer tanks  when  they  plunged  almost 
out  of  sight  into  the  water  on  leaving 
the  landing  craft.  The  crews  dove  to 
retrieve  the  wall-breaching  charges  in 
the  forward  racks  on  the  tank  hulls  and 
blew  out  a  sea-wall  section  large  enough 
for  troops,  tanks,  and  supplies  to  move 
through.  By  nightfall  the  1st  Battalion 
had  supply  dumps  laid  out  500  yards 
inland. 

At  Delta  Yellow  and  Blue,  the  3d  Bat- 
talion of  the  engineer  regiment  began 
limited  operations.  Landing  craft  nosed 
right  into  the  beach  here,  but  the  exits 
at  Blue  were  so  constricted  that  it  also 
closed  on  D  plus  1.  The  2d  Battalion, 
40th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment,  a 
later  arrival,  went  to  the  aid  of  the  36th 
Engineer  Beach  Group  on  short-lived 
Alpha  Yellow  late  in  the  afternoon  of 
D-day.  It  then  moved  through  St.  Tro- 
pez in  the  face  of  stiff  German  resis- 
tance to  clear  mines  and  open  over 
twenty  new  boat  ramps  on  beaches 
christened  Delta  Red  2,  at  the  head  of 
the  Gulf  of  St.  Tropez  and  west  of  the 
town.'^ 

Farther  east  the  road  and  the  rail- 
road tracks  that  skirted  the  Delta 
beaches  ran  through  the  ancient  Roman 
port  of  Frejus,  still  a  major  populated 
point  although  centuries-long  silting 
had  placed  it  a  mile  from  the  sea.  At 
the  head  of  the  gulf  that  once  led  to  its 
harbor  was  Camel  Red,  the  best  beach 
in  the  VI  Corps  assault  area  for  its 
gradient,  size,  and  access  to  the  valley 
of  the  sluggish  Argens  River  to  the  left. 
Its  advantages  as  a  lodgment  had  oc- 
curred to  the  Germans  too,  and  they 
erected  here  the  strongest  and  best- 

'"^  Seventh  Army  Report,  vol.  I,  pp.  133-34. 


SOUTHERN  FRANCE 


443 


organized  defenses  encountered  in 
Operation  ANVIL.  The  Navy  and  the 
Air  Forces  pounded  the  emplacements 
all  morning,  softening  the  defenses  for 
a  thrust  ashore  planned  at  1400  on 
D-day,  but  minesweepers  sent  in  at 
1100  drew  such  heavy  fire  that  they 
retreated.  An  air  attack  at  noon  rained 
187  tons  of  explosives  on  the  German 
positions. 

The  main  assault  in  the  Camel  area 
came  at  0803  on  Green,  a  narrow  500- 
yard-long  stretch  of  rocky  shingle 
backed  by  rising  cliffs  scarred  with 
quarries  11/2  miles  east  of  the  resort 
town  of  St.  Raphael.  Camel  Yellow,  to 
be  taken  indirectly  rather  than  by  imme- 
diate seaborne  frontal  attack,  lay  at  the 
head  of  the  Rade  d'Agay  across  the  base 
of  the  Drammont  promontory  from 
Green  and  was  defended  and  blocked 
by  obstacles  and  a  net  boom  across  the 
roadstead.  At  Antheor  Cove,  2,000 
yards  east  of  Yellow,  Camel  Blue,  a  thin 
eighty-yard  stretch,  was  the  landing 
point  of  the  troops  of  the  141st  Infan- 
try, 36th  Division,  who  were  to  secure 
the  easternmost  flank  of  the  beachhead 
line.  The  embankment  of  the  coastal 
motor  road  ran  thirty  feet  from  the 
water's  edge  at  Blue,  and  the  narrow- 
gauge  railroad  crossed  the  back  of  the 
diminutive  inlet  on  an  eight-span 
masonry  bridge  a  hundred  feet  above 
the  water. 

The  1st  Battalion  of  Col.  George  W. 
Marvin's  540th  Engineer  Combat  Regi- 
ment, leading  the  beach  group,  charged 
ashore  on  Green  with  two  battalions  of 
the  141st  Infantry.  Two  engineer  com- 
panies quickly  organized  the  beaches, 
cleared  mines,  and  set  up  dumps  for 
the  following  assault  waves.  Company 
B  crossed  the  Agay  River  with  the  2d 
Battalion,  141st  Infantry,  and  met  infan- 


try units  coming  from  Camel  Blue  to 
take  Yellow  from  behind  in  order  to 
start  supply  operations  there. ^^ 

The  first  wave  on  Camel  Green  went 
in  without  a  tank-gapping  team.  Equip- 
ped with  a  rocket  rack  atop  its  turret, 
the  tank  intended  for  the  first  wave  was 
aboard  an  LCT  that  broke  down  on 
the  way  to  the  invasion  area.  The  tank 
arrived  on  another  craft  in  a  later  infan- 
try assault  wave  and  moved  to  the  beach 
wall  to  blast  a  hole.  The  rockets  accom- 
plished their  purpose,  but  the  backblast 
spewed  a  scorching  sandstorm  into  the 
ranks  of  the  unwary  onlookers  to  the 
rear.  After  breaching  the  obstacle  the 
engineer  crew  of  the  tank  had  no  orders 
for  other  employment,  though  it  oc- 
curred to  them  that  they  could  have 
used  their  machine  to  help  the  regular 
engineer  squads  remove  mines.  Four 
D— 7  bulldozers  were  damaged  and  sev- 
eral men  wounded  on  Camel  Green 
digging  out  mines  by  traditional 
methods.'^ 

The  Apex  drones  had  their  worst 
hour  before  the  scheduled  landing  on 
Camel  Red.  Launched  under  a  furious 
naval  barrage  about  1300,  ten  of  the 
boats  churned  through  the  Gulf  of 
Frejus.  Three  wrecked  some  mined 
tetrahedrons,  one  exploded  on  the  far 
left  flank  of  the  beach,  two  ran  up  on 
the  sand,  and  one  made  tight  circles 
offshore.  A  destroyer  blew  another  out 
of  the  water  when  it  veered  seaward, 
and  sailors  gingerly  boarded  the  last 
two  wayward  robots  to  put  them  out  of 
action.  Navy  intelligence  later  specu- 
lated that  the  Germans  had  stolen  radio 


'■^  Ibid.,  p.  137;  Hist  540th  Engr  C  Rgt,  p.  14. 

'''  Summary  of  Accomplishments,  Tank-Gapping 
Teams.  The  engineer  tank  crews  on  other  beaches 
had  complaints  similar  to  those  expressed  in  the  afore- 
mentioned work  about  their  inactivity  after  the  assault. 


444 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


control  of  the  boats,  a  logical  explana- 
tion of  their  dismal  performance. 

The  volume  of  German  fire  during 
the  foray  of  the  drones  forced  a  change 
in  the  plan  to  land  the  142d  Infantry, 
36th  Division,  on  Camel  Red;  the  Navy 
placed  the  assault  wave  ashore  on  al- 
ready secured  Camel  Green  at  1515. 
Diverting  the  assault  force  doubtless 
saved  needless  casualties,  but  now  the 
540th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment's 
overworked  1st  Battalion,  having  moved 
the  141st  and  143d  Infantry  regiments 
ashore  at  Green,  received  the  men  and 
equipment  of  the  142d  as  well.  Work 
on  the  beach  continued  throughout  the 
night,  interrupted  briefly  at  2225,  when 
several  engineers  joined  rescuers  swim- 
ming to  the  aid  of  the  wounded  on  the 
striken  LST— 282  after  a  German  glider 
bomb  hit  the  craft.  The  vessel  grounded 
in  the  shoals  near  Cape  Drammont  and 
lay  smoldering  with  forty  casualties 
aboard  and  half  her  cargo  reduced  to 
junk.'^ 

The  540th's  2d  Battalion,  landing 
with  the  142d  Infantry,  swept  the  right 
flank  of  Camel  Green  and  then  struck 
overland  to  organize  Camel  Yellow, 
at  the  same  time  relieving  Company  B. 
Yellow  Beach  became  the  principal  sup- 
ply beach  in  the  Camel  net,  while  troop 
and  vehicular  traffic  moved  over  Green. 

The  36th  Division  troops  moving 
from  these  beaches  carried  the  town  of 
St.  Raphael,  lying  between  Red  and 
Green,  by  evening  of  D-day  and  moved 
to  reduce  the  formidable  defenses  of 
Red  from  the  rear.  After  its  relief  on 


'^  MorJson,  The  Invasion  of  France  and  Germany,  p. 
270;  Hist  Div,  WDSS,  Invasion  of  Southern  France, 
pp.  60-61,  typescript  copy  in  CMH.  This  source  is 
based  largely  on  the  Seventh  Army  Report  but  is  supple- 
mented with  additional  material  from  after-action 
interviews. 


Yellow,  Company  B  led  the  engineer 
elements  following  the  36th  Division 
into  St.  Raphael  shortly  after  daybreak 
on  16  August.  Scattered  German  sniper 
fire  greeted  the  company's  arrival  on 
the  outskirts  of  the  town,  but  a  short 
series  of  skirmishes  eliminated  the  de- 
fenders, and  the  540th  Beach  Group 
command  post  was  set  up  in  the  town 
by  noon.  Joined  later  by  Company  A, 
Company  B  began  the  clearance  of 
Camel  Red,  sweeping  the  western  end 
of  the  beach,  blasting  out  sections  of 
seawall,  and  demolishing  the  seven- 
foot-high,  three-foot-thick  reinforced- 
concrete  antitank  blocks  the  Germans 
had  strewn  about  the  beach.  The  1st 
Battalion  less  Company  C,  left  behind 
to  operate  Camel  Green,  had  Red  open 
to  traffic  late  in  the  afternoon  of  17 
August.  Supply  dumps  behind  the 
beaches  had  been  operating  for  four 
hours,  receiving  laden  trucks  from  the 
other  Camel  beaches. 

Company  F  left  Yellow  on  the  eigh- 
teenth to  begin  clearing  the  dockside 
area  and  the  quays  of  the  town.  Bull- 
dozers had  started  to  open  the  streets 
when  one  of  the  company  machines 
engaged  a  row  of  blocks,  concrete  obsta- 
cles with  hidden  Teller  mines.  The 
engineer  components  of  the  540th 
Beach  Group,  having  sustained  only 
one  fatality  since  D-day,  lost  nearly  a 
platoon  when  the  detonation  of  one 
booby-trapped  block  killed  four  and 
wounded  twenty-seven  men.  On  the  fol- 
lowing day  the  remainder  of  the  2d  Bat- 
talion abandoned  Yellow  Beach  and 
came  to  St.  Raphael  to  continue  the  har- 
bor reconstruction  that  Company  F  had 
begun,  and  the  little  port  began  receiv- 
ing incoming  cargo  on  the  twentieth. 

While  VI  Corps  consolidated  the 
invasion  beaches,  the  Seventh  Army 


SOUTHERN  FRANCE 


445 


Mine  Removal  at  Camel  Red.  Mines  were  used  to  blast  a  hole  in  the  seawall  at  rear. 


Engineer  Section,  operating  out  of  the 
Hotel  Latitude  Quarante-trois  in  St. 
Tropez,  kept  a  close  eye  on  the  devel- 
oping beach  supply  operations.  The 
unexpectedly  rapid  advance  off  the 
Anvil  beaches  soon  forced  the  engi- 
neers to  accelerate  work  schedules  in 
two  areas  intimately  connected  with  the 
forward  movement  of  Seventh  Army 
supply:  rehabilitation  of  ports  and  re- 
pair of  railroad  lines  and  bridges.  By 
27  August  General  Davidson  had  com- 
pleted personal  reconnaissance  of  Mar- 
seille and  Toulon  as  well  as  petroleum 
facilities  at  Port-de-Bouc.  He  was  al- 
ready revising  engineer  plans  to  speed 
up  the  influx  of  engineer  units  and  sup- 
plies of  all  kinds. 


The  choice  of  ports  for  major  cargo 
discharge  became  a  bone  of  Army-Navy 
contention  even  before  German  resis- 
tance in  Marseille  and  Toulon  col- 
lapsed. From  25  August,  General  David- 
son opposed  the  original  Navy  plan  to 
refurbish  both  ports  simultaneously. 
Spurred  by  the  desperate  need  to  get 
ahead  of  a  mounting  shipping  crisis  in 
the  European  theater,  where  two  major 
amphibious  invasions  had  taken  place 
within  two  months,  the  Navy  sought  all 
means  possible  to  turn  ships  around 
and  keep  a  constant  supply  of  empty 
vessels  available.  The  Army's  immedi- 
ate concern  was  the  movement  of  sup- 
plies; Toulon,  a  naval  base  with  narrow 
wharves,  constricted  access,  and  only 


446 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


single-track  rails  to  serve  it,  was  unsuit- 
able for  bulk  cargo  movement  except 
as  a  supplementary  port.  The  railroad 
net  in  and  out  of  Marseille  was  highly 
developed — capable  of  moving  more 
than  350  boxcars  a  day — and  followed 
the  natural  commercial  route  along  the 
axis  of  advance  of  the  Seventh  Army. 
General  Davidson  recommended  direct- 
ing all  salvage  and  clearance  efforts  at 
preparing  Marseille  for  the  twenty-five 
ships  of  the  D  plus  25  convoy.  A  confer- 
ence on  1  September,  chaired  by  Maj. 
Gen.  Arthur  A.  White,  Seventh  Army 
chief  of  staff,  resolved  the  impasse  in 
favor  of  the  Army's  view  but  gave  the 
Navy  permission  to  assign  Seabees  to 
develop  Toulon  as  a  secondary  port. 
After  1  September  the  French  Navy 
also  devoted  most  of  its  engineering 
efforts  to  the  reconstruction  of  its  for- 
mer base.'^ 

A  successful  French  assault  on  the 
two  cities,  concluded  on  28  August  after 
a  week-long  fight,  brought  the  head- 
quarters and  2d  Battalion,  36th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Regiment,  and  the  335th 
Engineer  General  Service  Regiment 
into  Marseille  to  prepare  it  for  large- 
scale  cargo  operations.  Assigned  for  the 
moment  to  Coastal  Base  Section  estab- 
lished at  Marseille,  the  troops  under- 
took preliminary  damage  estimates, 
started  mine  and  booby-trap  clearance, 
and  removed  rubble  in  the  dockside 
areas,  with  the  335th  at  first  doing  the 
mine  clearance  around  the  deepwater 
harbor  and  the  36th  handling  the  Vieux 
Port  area. 

Many  of  the  German  mines  were 


'*'  Mins  of  Mtg,  6th  Army  Group  Conference  file  7, 
25  Aug-  1  Sep;  Coakley  and  Leighton,  Global  Logistics 
and  Strategy,  1943-45,  p.  385;  Official  Diary  for  Com- 
manding General  Seventh  Army,  vol.  II,  15  August 
1944  to  31  January  1945,  pp.  222-23,  typescript  copy 
in  CMH. 


improvised,  though  the  standard  Schu 
antipersonnel  and  heavier  Teller  mines 
were  plentiful.  Larger  charges  meant 
to  demolish  entire  docks  and  storage 
facilities  were  made  locally  of  explosive- 
packed  wooden  barrels  and  300-pound 
drums,  casks  of  picric  acid,  and  detona- 
tors. Equipped  with  timing  mechanisms 
and  set  into  the  docks  or  warehouse 
walls,  they  blasted  twelve-foot  craters, 
making  whole  wharves  temporarily  im- 
passable. The  charges  had  flattened  all 
warehousing  in  the  dock  area.  The 
335th  dug  out  over  thirty  tons  of  explo- 
sives and  removed  2,000  Teller  mines, 
but  had  to  detonate  many  of  the  big 
charges  in  place  when  the  engineers  dis- 
covered that  the  fuses  had  so  decom- 
posed that  their  safe  deactivation  was 
impossible. 

Engineer  regiments  supervised  by  the 
headquarters  organization  known  after 
1  September  as  the  1051st  Engineer 
Port  Construction  and  Repair  Group 
set  about  restoring  enough  of  the  port 
to  serve  the  needs  of  the  Seventh  Army 
and  the  projected  requirements  of  the 
6th  Army  Group  headquarters  of  Lt. 
Gen.  Jacob  L.  Devers.  The  army  group 
was  scheduled  to  become  operational 
on  15  September.  On  the  landward  side 
the  engineers  removed  debris  and  re- 
paired quay  walls.  Where  German 
charges  had  blown  holes  in  the  tops  and 
sides  of  masonry  wharves,  the  engineers 
first  reconstructed  the  dock  walls.  Ger- 
man prisoners,  augmented  by  Italian 
labor  gangs,  did  all  of  the  heavy,  dis- 
agreeable manual  labor  to  clear  the 
breaks  and  then  to  fill  the  craters,  and 
they  repaired  wall  sections  with  the 
rubble  they  carried  from  other  parts  of 
the  city  and  the  harbor.'^ 


'^  GONAD  History,  vol.  I  (Heidelberg:  Aloys  Graef, 
1945),  p.  40. 


SOUTHERN  FRANCE 


447 


In  the  harbor  channels  the  Germans 
had  sunk  over  sixty-five  ships  in  pat- 
terns that  vitiated  the  methods  the  engi- 
neers had  used  at  Naples  harbor.  At 
Marseille  the  enemy  piled  ships  atop 
one  another  on  the  harbor  floor  at  such 
odd  angles  to  and  distances  from  the 
quays  that  bridging  over  them  was  not 
feasible.  Nearly  all  the  121  individual 
berthing  spaces  in  the  old  and  new  sec- 
tions of  the  550-acre  port  were  blocked; 
cranes  serving  the  cargo  wharves  were 
toppled  into  the  water  to  form  addi- 
tional blocks  or  were  otherwise  sabo- 
taged. The  Germans  also  had  scuttled 
seven  ocean-going  vessels  in  a  heap  to 
close  the  mouth  of  the  deepwater  sec- 
tion of  the  port. 

While  Navy  salvage  teams  attacked 
this  key  obstruction,  French  engineers 
and  the  1051st  tried  to  bypass  it  by 
blowing  a  passage  in  the  breakwater 
protecting  the  harbor.  The  engineers 
moved  in  a  well-drilling  crew  to  bore 
holes  in  the  jetty  for  charges.  But  then 
Navy  divers  managed  to  topple  one  of 
the  seven  hulks  off  the  pile,  allowing 
the  passage  of  laden  Liberty  ships  above 
the  remainder  of  the  wreckage.  Once 
this  blockage  was  eliminated,  the  Mar- 
seille port  slowly  came  to  life  again.  By 
8  September,  when  the  Coastal  Base 
Section  took  control  of  the  port,  eight 
Liberty  berths  were  operating  around 
the  clock;  by  month's  end  the  port  had 
received  188  ships  carrying  147,460 
men,  1 13,500  long  tons  of  cargo,  32,768 
vehicles,  and  10,000  barrels  of  petro- 
leum products  of  all  kinds. '^ 

In  the  area  of  Port-de-Bouc,  a  satel- 
lite port  some  twenty-five  miles  by  sea 
northwest  of  Marseille,  the  engineers 


encountered  similar,  though  much  less 
extensive,  destruction  and  harbor  block- 
age. The  center  of  the  southern  French 
petroleum  traffic  in  peacetime,  this  port 
also  had  a  daily  capacity  of  7,000  short 
tons  of  dry  cargo;  it  was  the  hub  of  a 
canal  system  that  funneled  barge  traf- 
fic between  Aries,  twenty-five  miles  up 
the  Rhone  River,  and  Marseille's  Barge- 
line  Harbor.  Port-de-Bouc's  dock  sys- 
tem on  the  Mediterranean  was  con- 
structed as  an  extension  of  a  continu- 
ous commercial  net  winding  along  a 
narrow,  3  1/2-mile  tidal  strait  passing 
through  the  town  of  Martigues,  which 
sat  astride  the  opening  into  a  wide  salt- 
water lake,  the  Etang  de  Berre.  Its 
shore  was  lined  with  smaller  wharves, 
canal  entrances,  and  petroleum 
refineries. 

Here  the  Germans  had  had  little  time 
for  methodical  destruction  of  facilities. 
They  blasted  loose  large  stones  from 
the  masonry  docks  to  ruin  them  and  to 
foul  the  berthing  areas  alongside.  Com- 
pany A,  335th  Engineer  General  Ser- 
vice Regiment,  arriving  in  the  area  on 
27  August,  replaced  these  stones  easily 
and  filled  craters  along  the  quays  with 
the  debris  of  the  scattered  German 
demolition  charges.  When  the  Navy  fin- 
ished sweeping  mines  from  the  ap- 
proaches later  in  August  and  removed 
the  single  blockship  in  the  harbor,  three 
berths  along  the  T-shaped  jetty  and  on 
the  quays  became  available  for  Liber- 
ties. The  end  of  September  saw  the  dis- 
charge of  36,837  long  tons  of  regular 
cargo  at  Port-de-Bouc,  little  when  com- 
pared to  the  tonnages  of  Marseille,  but 
consistent  with  the  port's  real  impor- 
tance as  the  chief  Allied  POL  entry 
point  in  southern  France.'^ 


'"Ibid.,  p.  41;  The  Adm  and  Log  Hist  of  the  ETO, 
vol.  VII,  "Opening  and  Operating  the  Continental 
Ports,"  p.  127. 


'•'The  Adm  and  Log  Hist  of  the  ETO,  vol.  VII, 
"Opening  and  Operating  the  Continental  Ports,"  p. 


448 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Engineer  Officer  Probes  for  Explosive  Char{;e  at  Marseille 


The  main  rail  service  through  the 
area  was  a  double-track  system  that  par- 
alleled the  coast  west  of  Marseille, 
crossed  the  narrow  ship  channel  be- 
tween Port-de-Bouc  and  Martigues  at 
its  center,  swung  east  through  Port-de- 
Bouc,  and  then  veered  north  after 
bridging  the  Aries  Canal.  The  Germans 
blocked  both  ship  movement  on  the 
waterways  and  rail  traffic  by  dumping 
the  turn  span  that  crossed  the  tidal  strait 
into  the  ship  channel  and  dropping  the 
second  rail  bridge  into  the  canal.  The 


134;  Morison,  The  Invasion  of  France  and  Germany,  p. 
286;  Unit  Hist,  335th  Engr  GS  Rgt,  Hist  Rpts  for 
Aug- Sep  44.  Company  A  was  active  around  Port-de- 
Bouc  until  27  September,  when  the  335th  moved 
north.  See  also  "POL  Operations"  below. 


1051st  finally  cleared  the  channel  ob- 
struction in  October,  blasting  away  the 
wreckage  to  allow  heavy  tanker  traffic 
access  to  the  Etang  de  Berre.  Recon- 
struction of  the  rail  overpass  over  the 
Aries  Canal  restored  traffic  on  the  line 
out  of  Port-de-Bouc  in  early  Decem- 
ber.2« 

Base  Sections  and  SOLOC 

In  the  two  weeks  following  the  inva- 
sion. General  Davidson  made  every 
effort  to  free  engineer  combat  regi- 
ments on  the  beaches  for  work  behind 


2"  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  1 1,  Port  Reconstruction 
and  Repair,  app.  50,  Port-de-Bouc. 


SOUTHERN  FRANCE 


449 


the  advancing  armies.  The  Coastal  Base 
Section,  with  an  advance  party  ashore 
on  16  August,  began  assuming  control 
of  operations  in  Marseille  and  was  in 
full  control  in  the  city  by  8  September, 
a  week  ahead  of  schedule.  The  Coastal 
Base  Section  engineer,  Lt.  Col. 
Chauncey  K.  Smullen,  agreed  to  release 
all  engineers  but  one  battalion  of  the 
40th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment  from 
the  beaches.  Renamed  Continental  Base 
Section  on  10  September,  Coastal  Base 
left  Marseille  to  become  the  mobile  sec- 
tion moving  behind  the  6th  Army 
Group.  On  26  September,  when  it  was 
rechristened  Continental  Advance  Sec- 
tion, the  logistical  command  was  at 
Dijon.  (Map  25) 

The  Advance  Section  left  behind  at 
the  port  city  a  new  support  command, 
Delta  Base  Section  (DBS),  which  ran 
the  southern  French  ports  until  after 
V— J  Day.  The  DBS  Engineer  Section, 
established  3  October  under  Lt.  Col. 
William  B.  Harmon  and  among  the 
largest  components  of  the  new  base 
section,  took  over  the  1051st  Engineer 
Port  Construction  and  Repair  Group 
and  the  activities  of  over  thirty  other 
units  providing  fire  protection,  con- 
struction, water  supply,  and  services  in 
the  port  areas.  By  war's  end  in  Europe 
the  engineers  had  restored  nearly  35 
percent  of  Marseille's  prewar  harbor 
facilities,  leaving  the  remainder  for 
postwar  reconstruction  by  the  French 
government.^' 

With  the  relief  of  the  engineers  on 
the  beaches,  the  over-shore  operations 
began  closing  down.  Supply-choked 
Alpha  Beach  closed  9  September,  fol- 
lowed by  the  Deltas  on  the  sixteenth 


^'  Seventh  Army,  Engr  Hist  Rpt,  pp.  8-9;  History, 
Delta  Base  Section,  pp.  155—60,  in  CMH. 


and  the  busy  Camel  Red  on  25  Septem- 
ber. By  the  end  of  the  month  the  flow 
of  supply  had  shifted  to  Marseille  where 
Delta  Base  Section  formed  the  south- 
ern end  of  6th  Army  Group's  line  of 
communications  in  France. 

Once  6th  Army  Group  had  met  12th 
Army  Group  in  east-central  France  to 
form  a  continuous  battle  line  facing  the 
Reich,  an  adjustment  in  the  administra- 
tion of  supply  functions  became  neces- 
sary. SHAEF  assumed  tactical  control 
of  the  6th  Army  Group  on  15  Septem- 
ber, the  day  it  began  operations  as  a 
headquarters  in  France,  but  resolution 
of  the  question  of  command  over  the 
supply  establishment  in  southern 
France  was  more  gradual  and  compli- 
cated. 

The  complexities  arose  from  the  fact 
that  two  separate  communications  zone 
commands  were  now  active  in  the 
ETOUSA  area,  an  advance  element  of 
SOS,  NATOUSA,  that  opened  at  Lyon 
on  1 1  September,  and  General  Lee's 
COMZ,  ETOUSA.  Though  the  6th 
Army  Group's  operational  area  was 
within  Lee's  preserve,  it  still  drew  its 
supply  from  massive  reserves  in  the 
North  African  theater,  which  lay  out- 
side Lee's  purview.  COMZ  was  momen- 
tarily unprepared  to  handle  requisitions 
and  establish  procedures  for  the  Rhone 
valley  supply  net,  but  any  accommoda- 
tion would  have  to  recognize  the  legal 
supremacy  of  COMZ  on  the  European 
mainland.  Conferences  between  the  two 
parties  proceeded  throughout  Septem- 
ber. SHAEF  was  willing  to  allow  Gen- 
eral Devers  as  commander  of  6th  Army 
Group  a  fair  degree  of  autonomy  in  his 
supply.  In  the  compromise  eventually 
worked  out,  ETOUSA  would  assume 
ultimate  control  of  the  Rhone  supply 
route  on  20  November  while  an  inter- 


450 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


SOUTHERN   FRANCE 

SUPPLY    OPERATIONS 
August-November    1944 

0  25  50  Miles 


mediate  command,  the  Southern  Line 
of  Communications  (SOLOC),  opened 
on  the  same  day  to  handle  supply  in 
the  south.  Although  a  subsidiary  of 
COMZ,  ETOUSA,  SOLOC  was  still 
authorized  direct  communication  with 
NATOUSA  on  the  matters  of  supply 
and  personnel  coming  from  Italy  or 
North  Africa.  On  3  November,  a 
COMZ  general  order  named  Maj.  Gen. 
Thomas  B.  Larkin,  former  NATOUSA 
SOS  commander,  commander  of 
SOLOC  and  deputy  commander  of 
COMZ,  ETOUSA.  This  uneasy  union 
of  the  two  supply  commands  func- 
tioned acceptably,  but  SOLOC  lasted 
only  through  the  winter;  on  6  Febru- 
ary 1945,  the  command  passed  out  of 
existence,  six  weeks  before  6th  Army 
Group  crossed  the  Rhine. ^'^ 

Engineer  operations  on  the  supply 
routes  in  southern  France  were  under 
the  SOLOC  engineer.  Col.  Clark  Kit- 
trell,  a  career  soldier  with  years  of  expe- 
rience in  civil  works  in  the  United  States. 
Kittrell's  Engineer  Section  was  always 
understaffed  and  constantly  working 
under  two  separate  sets  of  procedures 
and  policies,  depending  upon  which 
theater's  jurisdiction  applied  to  matters 
touching  on  engineer  operations.  He 
continued  to  wrestle  with  shortages  of 
spare  parts  and  inadequate  inventory 
methods  that  became  worse  as  the  de- 
mands of  the  sudden  advance  accumu- 
lated. Chief  among  the  engineer  con- 
cerns for  SOLOC,  however,  were  the 
functions  affecting  the  supply  of  the 
pursuing  army,  railroad  supply  routes, 
and  petroleum  pipeline  supply  sys- 
tems. "^ 


MAP  25 


^^  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Vol- 
unell,  pp.  41-45;  History  of  SOLOC-ETOUSA,  vol. 
I,  Adm  600A,  ETOUSA  Adm  files. 

2''  Hist  of  SOLOC-ETOUSA,  vol.  H,  Adm  600B, 
ETOUSA  Adm  files. 


SOUTHERN  FRANCE 


451 


Railroads 

Allied  rail  supply  operations  in  south- 
ern France  began  on  23  August  with 
short-haul  bulk  service  lines  out  of 
Frejus  to  points  less  than  thirty  miles 
inland.  The  40th  Engineer  Beach 
Group  had  begun  collecting  empty  rail 
cars  at  St.  Tropez  on  D  plus  2  and 
added  this  equipment  to  the  twelve 
locomotives  and  eighty  cars  found  intact 
at  Carnoules,  within  the  beachhead 
area.  As  Coastal  Base  Section  took  over 
Marseille,  the  Army  engineers  retained 
responsibility  for  roads  and  rail  mainte- 
nance out  of  the  city.  Damage  to  roads 
was  slight,  and  the  rails  were  usually 
only  blocked  by  fallen  debris.  Where 
Germans  had  torn  up  trackage,  French 
railroad  employees  replaced  rails  and 
ties  with  no  difficulty. 

From  a  point  above  Aix-en-Provence, 
twenty-five  miles  north  of  Marseille,  the 
French  rail  net  divided  into  two  routes 
traveling  north:  a  multiple  track  link 
running  up  the  Rhone  valley  on  both 
sides  of  the  river  and  a  single  track 
branching  east  and  then  north  to 
Grenoble.  More  steeply  graded,  negoti- 
ating mountain  terrain,  and  subject  to 
deep  snows  and  frequent  flooding  in 
the  upland  passes,  the  Grenoble  route 
nevertheless  had  priority  because  there 
seemed  to  be  far  less  damage  along  it 
than  along  the  heavier  duty  Rhone 
alternate.  The  major  breaks  encoun- 
tered in  the  southern  end  of  the  net 
were  just  southwest  of  Aix;  at  Meyrar- 
gues,  ten  miles  north  of  Aix;  and  north 
of  Sisteron  at  the  confluence  of  the 
Buech  and  Durance  Rivers. 

The  original  plan  for  railroad  repair 
left  the  entire  job  of  major  rehabilita- 
tion behind  the  armies  to  the  engineers 
of  the  1st  Military  Railway  Service, 
scheduled  for  phasing  into  southern 


France  on  D  plus  30.  When  the  advance 
up  the  Rhone  valley  got  much  ahead  of 
schedule,  bridge  repair  fell  to  the  Sev- 
enth Army  engineers,  now  forced  to 
rely  on  their  ingenuity  and  extensive 
stocks  of  locally  procured  materials. 
With  heavy  bridging  steel  sections  still 
on  convoys  sailing  from  the  United 
States  or  heading  for  Marseille  from 
stockpiles  within  the  Mediterranean, 
the  engineers  were  working  with  a  sup- 
ply allotment  adequate  for  D  plus  14 
operations  when  the  combat  elements 
had  already  taken  D  plus  60  objectives. 
General  Davidson's  construction  regi- 
ments picked  up  what  they  could  to 
improvise  structures  to  span  German 
demolitions  in  the  rail  supply  line. 

L— 5  Cub  planes  gave  the  engineers 
a  head  start  on  surveying  the  damage. 
Engineer  officers  with  Speed  Graphic 
cameras  flew  low-level  passes  over 
blown  bridges,  some  behind'  enemy 
lines,  shooting  oblique-angle  photo- 
graphs to  give  construction  troops  a 
means  of  computing  their  material  re- 
quirements.^^ 

The  343d  Engineer  General  Service 
Regiment  restored  service  to  Aix  in  ten 
days  by  a  strategem  that  saved  days  in 
repairing  a  104-foot  gap  in  the  rail 
bridge.  In  the  area  the  unit  found  a 
German  270-mm.  railway  gun.  Haul- 
ing it  to  the  site,  the  engineers  stripped 
the  gun  and  the  rail  trucks  from  the 
traverse  base  of  the  piece  and,  attach- 
ing a  ten-foot  steel  extension,  launched 
the  platform  as  the  stringers  for  the 
new  span  across  the  void,  Bailey  fash- 
ion. The  Aix  bridge  work  was  complete 
on  29  August.  At  the  same  time  engi- 
neers  were    restoring   the   bridge   at 


^^  A  Report  on  7th  Army  Railroad  Bridges  during  the 
Continental  Operations  15  August  1944  to  9  June  1945, 
pp.  5-8. 


452 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Meyrargues,  a  task  made  doubly  trou- 
blesome by  a  rise  in  flood  waters.  After 
closing  a  107-foot  gap  with  the  first  Bai- 
ley railroad  bridge  in  southern  France, 
a  quadruple-single  span  with  a  deck 
thirty-eight  feet  above  the  water's  sur- 
face, they  opened  the  bridge  to  traffic 
on  18  September. 

The  40th  Engineer  Combat  Regi- 
ment forged  the  last  link  in  the  rail 
chain  on  the  eastern  route.  A  Class  60 
span  covering  two  breaks  over  the 
Buech  River  north  of  Sisteron,  the 
bridge  used  stocks  of  local  lumber  and 
steel  sections.  The  engineers  replaced 
a  destroyed  91 -foot-high  central 
masonry  pier  with  a  vertically  emplaced 
triple-single  Bailey  panel.  Supply  traf- 
fic, moving  1 ,500  tons  per  day  over  this 
point  after  22  September,  could  travel 
to  railheads  in  the  Poligny-Mouchard 
area,  130  miles  north  of  Grenoble, 
relieving  some  transport  problems  as 
the  6th  Army  Group  crossed  the  Moselle 
River. ^^ 

When  the  director  general  of  the 
Military  Railway  Service,  Brig.  Gen. 
Carl  R.  Gray,  Jr.,  brought  his  headquar- 
ters from  Rome  to  Lyon  on  14  Septem- 
ber, he  immediately  began  a  more  com- 
plete reconnaissance  of  rail  damage.  He 
then  revised  original  priorities,  concen- 
trating on  the  double-track  system  up 
the  Rhone  valley  to  Lyon.  General  Gray 
told  General  Devers  four  days  later  that 
the  main  breaks  in  this  stretch  were  at 
Livron,  Avignon,  and  Valence;  two 
smaller  rail  bridges  outside  Lyon,  one 
over  the  Rhone  and  one  over  the  Saone 
River,  would  have  to  be  reconverted 
from  use  as  vehicular  bridges.  Save  for 


material  shortages,  the  breaks  at 
Valence  and  Avignon  posed  no  prob- 
lems.'^*' 

The  343d  Engineer  General  Service 
Regiment,  assigned  the  job  of  opening 
the  Marseille-to-Lyon  route,  began 
work  on  the  Livron  bridge  on  7  Sep- 
tember. Where  before  the  war  a 
masonry-arch  bridge  had  carried  a  sin- 
gle track  across  the  shallow,  muddy 
Drome,  there  was  now  a  310-foot  break 
with  all  the  masonry  piles  blown.  The 
low  height  of  the  original  structure  and 
the  river's  slow  current  lessened  engi- 
neering problems;  the  troops  emplaced 
scarce  steel  I-beam  stringers  atop  nine 
timber  bents  to  open  the  line  to  rail- 
borne  supply  on  20  September,  five 
days  ahead  of  General  Gray's  estimates. 
This  performance,  together  with  the 
343d's  operation  in  the  southern  Rhone 
valley,  earned  the  regiment  Lt.  Gen. 
Alexander  M.  Patch's  commendation. 

On  2  October,  the  344th  Engineer 
General  Service  Regiment  repaired  a 
410-foot  single-track  structure  over  the 
Doubs  River  at  Dole,  using  thirty-foot- 
high  timber  bents,  with  standard  Bai- 
ley forming  the  span.  Opening  the  Dole 
route  brought  the  railheads  north  to 
Vesoul  and  Besancon.'^^ 

At  that  point  in  the  restoration,  with 
railheads  moving  into  the  rear  of  the 
6th  Army  Group  area,  German  demoli- 
tions at  the  bridges  had  become  the 
smaller  supply  problem.  By  mid- 
September  General  Devers  found  that 
where  railroads  were  concerned,  the 
"bottleneck  now  is  cars  rather  than 
bridges."28 


25  Ibid.,  pp.  16-17;  40th  Engr  C  Rgt,  Opns  Rpt 
for  Eastern  France,  sec.  V,  Reconstruction  of  Rail- 
road Bridge,  Sisteron,  France,  6th  Army  Gp,  G-3, 
Final  Report,  WWII,  1  Jul  45,  p.  14. 


^^  Memo,  DO.  MRS.  for  CO,  6th  Army  Gp,  18  Sep 
44,  sub:  Resume  of  MRS  Activities  and  Conditions  of 
Railroads  in  Southern  France. 

'^^  A  Report  on  7th  Army  Railroad  Bridges,  pp.  18— 21 ; 
Hists,  343d  Engr  GS  Rgt  and  344th  Engr  GS  Rgt. 

2*  Lt  Gen  Jacob  L.  Devers,  Diary  entry  14  Sep  44. 


SOUTHERN  FRANCE 


453 


The  Aix  Bridge,  Which  Used  the  Carria(;e  of  a  German  Railway  Gun 


When  the  Allied  drive  slowed  against 
stiffening  German  resistance  at  the 
Vosges  Mountains  and  the  defenses 
before  the  Rhine  River,  supply  lines 
stopped  growing.  But  the  demand  for 
ammunition  rose  alarmingly,  and  short- 
ages persisted  until  the  winter  months. 
Trucks  remained  the  principal  means 
of  transport  until  well  into  October, 
when  new  railroad  rolling  stock  arrived 
at  Marseille;  in  September  trucks  car- 
ried forward  222,000  tons  of  supply 
compared  to  63,000  tons  moving  by 
rail.  Engineer  units  had  built  eighty- 
eight  highway  bridges  on  the  supply 
routes,  mostly  from  local  timber  and 
steel  stock. 

After  30  October  Seventh  Army  engi- 
neers divided  responsibility  for  rail 


rehabilitation  with  the  increasingly  capa- 
ble 1st  Military  Railway  Service,  whose 
units  and  equipment  were  now  arriv- 
ing more  regularly.  Army  engineers 
reopened  a  northern  loop  in  the  rail 
service  running  from  Epinal  to  Stras- 
bourg through  Blainville,  Luneville, 
and  Sarrebourg,  while  the  1st  Military 
Railway  Service  worked  on  a  southern 
leg  running  from  Epinal  through  St. 
Die  to  Strasbourg.  The  Military  Rail- 
way Service  refurbished  the  military  rail 
line  behind  the  First  French  Army  on 
an  axis  running  from  Vesoul  through 
Lure  and  Belfort  to  Mulhouse.  In  sup- 
porting the  drive  up  the  Rhone,  the  1st 
Military  Railway  Service  supervised  the 
construction  of  forty-two  rail  bridges 
and  the  repair  of  nine  between  Mar- 


454 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


seille  and  Dijon  by  early  1945.  At  vari- 
ous times,  the  work  continued  to  in- 
volve the  40th,  94th,  343d,  344th,  and 
540th  Engineer  Regiments  and  the 
1051st  Engineer  Port  Construction  and 
Repair  Group. 

With  the  winter  lull  in  the  advance, 
the  engineers  began  to  take  up  scarce 
Bailey  panels  laid  down  in  the  press  of 
the  rapid  assault,  replacing  them  with 
semipermanent  timber  bent,  steel,  and 
wood  deck  bridging  along  vital  roads 
and  rail  lines.  During  the  last  half  of 
October  the  engineers  consolidated  the 
hoarded  reserves  for  the  thrust  through 
the  Siegfried  Line,  over  the  Rhine  River 
and  into  Germany  itself.^^ 

Map  Supply 

The  rapidity  of  the  advance  carried 
the  assaulting  American  and  French 
divisions  into  areas  for  which  military 
maps  were  still  in  Italy.  The  two  engi- 
neer units  sent  in  with  the  invasion,  the 
1st  Mobile  Map  Depot  with  VI  Corps 
and  the  2d  Mobile  Map  Depot  with  the 
French,  were  merely  clearinghouses  for 
distribution.  Their  early  stocks  of 
1:100,000,  1:50,000,  and  1:25,000  maps 
reflected  an  invasion  plan  that  did  not 
project  an  Allied  advance  out  of 
Provence  until  much  later  in  the  year. 
Small-scale  maps  for  areas  far  up  the 
Rhone  valley  were  especially  scarce; 
French  units  were  even  relying  on  the 
standard  Michelin  road  maps  and  on 
information  from  local  natives.  By  1 


^^  Robert  R.  Smith,  "Riviera  to  the  Rhine,"  draft  MS 
in  the  United  States  Army  in  World  War  II  series, 
ch.  XVI,  passim;  Msg,  CG,  6th  Army  Gp,  to  CG, 
Seventh  Army,  CG,  FFA,  and  DGMRS,  30  Oct  44, 
sub:  Railway  Plan,  6th  Army  Gp  Transport  Sect,  Daily 
Rail  Sitreps  file,  15  Sep- 30  Nov  44;  Seventh  Army 
Report,  vol.  II,  p.  396. 


September  the  demand  for  maps  had 
inundated  the  two  units,  and  the  1709th 
Engineer  Map  Depot  Detachment  flew 
in  from  Naples  to  help.  In  little  more 
than  a  month  these  three  units  shipped 
over  eight  million  maps  to  combat 
troops. 

Map  production  in  southern  France 
began  on  14  September  with  the  arrival 
of  the  661st  Engineer  Topographic 
Company  and  the  649th  Engineer  Topo- 
graphic Battalion  and  reached  a  peak 
capacity  within  about  two  weeks.  The 
demand  for  l:25,000-scale  maps  also 
rose  rapidly  as  the  Allied  offensive 
encountered  the  prepared  German  de- 
fenses at  the  Vosges  Mountains  and 
slowed  down  in  late  October  and  early 
November.^^ 

Engineer  Supply  for  the  First  French  Army 

The  establishment  of  6th  Army  Group 
headquarters  at  Lyon  on  15  September 
marked  also  the  redesignation  of  the 
French  Armee  B  as  First  French  Army. 
Although  now  a  formally  organized 
field  army  operating  on  home  soil,  Lt. 
Gen.  Jean  de  Lattre  de  Tassigny's  com- 
mand continued  to  labor  under  a  nota- 
ble lack  of  service  forces,  including 
engineers.  French  supply  of  all  types 
funneled  in  part  through  Base  901, 
hastily  transferred  from  Naples  two 
weeks  before  the  invasion  to  support 
Armee  B.  The  organization  had  never 
functioned  in  its  intended  capacity  in 
Italy,  and  it  fared  only  slightly  better  in 
France.  Attached  to  Coastal  Base  Sec- 
tion for  the  assault  period,  the  com- 
mand, under  Brig.  Gen.  Jean  Gross, 
was  so  lacking  in  basic  equipment,  trucks, 


"^"  Seventh  Army,  Engr  Hist  Rpt,  p.  16. 


SOUTHERN  FRANCE 


455 


and  trained  staff  personnel  that  it  could 
not  meet  the  demands  made  upon  it. 
Divided  in  half  in  mid-October,  Base 
90 1  acquired  a  new  commanding  offi- 
cer in  Brig.  Gen.  Georges  Granier  as  its 
headquarters  moved  to  Dijon  to  work 
side  by  side  with  the  Continental  Ad- 
vance Section  in  the  city. 

The  establishment  of  the  First  French 
Army  also  occasioned  the  division  of 
Seventh  Army  engineer  stocks,  nearly 
half  of  which  were  to  go  to  the  French. 
Brig.  Gen.  Henry  C.  Wolfe,  6th  Army 
Group  engineer,  met  with  General 
Davidson  on  20  September  to  appor- 
tion the  materials,  and  Brig.  Gen.  Rob- 
ert Dromard,  First  French  Army  engi- 
neer, received  his  allotment  the  follow- 
ing day.  American  sources  supplied  the 
French  with  sparing  amounts  of  criti- 
cal bridging  parts  and  stream-crossing 
equipment  and  rationed  what  was  found 
on  the  battlefields  thereafter.  The 
French  also  received  maps  from  Ameri- 
can topographic  units  until  1  November, 
when  they  organized  their  own  print- 
ing operations.^' 

POL  Operations 

The  Seventh  Army  engineer  POL 
plan  for  DRAGOON,  formulated  in  early 
summer  1944  at  Naples  under  Lt.  Col. 
Charles  L.  Lockett,  drew  on  the  success- 
ful experience  with  pipelines  gained  in 
the  North  African  and  Italian  cam- 
paigns. The  engineers  envisioned  a 
pipeline  system  up  the  Rhone  River 
valley,  making  use  of  the  already  exist- 


ing refinery  installations  in  Toulon, 
Marseille,  and  smaller  ports  at  the  river 
mouth. ^^  Depending  on  the  damage 
done  by  the  retreating  Germans,  the 
engineers  could  easily  support  the  troops 
battling  in  the  beachhead  area  with  a 
gallon  of  gasoline  per  man  per  day,  the 
consumption  rate  established  in  earlier 
campaigns.  But  the  rapid  success  of  the 
invasion  altered  the  sequence  and  tim- 
ing of  fuel  depot  construction  and  accel- 
erated the  schedule  for  laying  of  the 
pipeline  north.  Demands  for  gasoline 
skyrocketed;  every  truck  moving  for- 
ward off  the  beaches  took  with  it  as 
many  jerry  cans  as  it  could  hold,  but 
advance  units  were  still  sending  con- 
voys on  300-mile  round  trips  back  to 
the  beach  dumps  for  resupply  as  the 
Seventh  Army  pursued  the  fleeing  Ger- 
man Nineteenth  Army  to  the  north.  (Map 
26) 

The  697th  Engineer  Petroleum  Dis- 
tribution Company  was  the  first  of  its 
kind  ashore,  landing  at  Camel  Green 
on  D-day.  Capt.  Carl  W.  Bills,  com- 
manding the  unit,  was  among  the  fore- 
most POL  experts  in  the  theater,  a  man 
of  wide  prewar  experience  in  the  Okla- 
homa oil  fields;  despite  his  relatively 
low  rank,  he  became  the  technical  suf)er- 
visor  of  the  whole  fuel  pipeline  system 
up  the  Rhone  valley.  The  company 
entered  St.  Raphael  as  soon  as  the  town 
was  cleared,  surveying  for  a  pipeline  in 
that  area.  Various  detachments  col- 
lected enough  petroleum  pumping 
equipment  to  begin  construction  and 
operations,  but  spent  several  days  re- 
trieving materiel  coming  to  the  inva- 
sion beaches  in  scattered  lots  on  small 


^'  Marcel  Vigneras,  Rearming  the  French,  United 
States  Army  in  World  War  II  (Washington,  1957),  pp. 
186-90;  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies, 
Volume  II,  p.  379. 


^2  GONAD  History,  vol.  I,  p.  234. 


456 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


POL  PIPELINE 

0  5,0  Miles 

■ 1 

50  Kilometers 


G    E\R    MANY 

Koenigswinter 

Mainz 
Sandhofen 


LUXEMBOURG   ^y^    Birkenfeld^  3  -  6"  Llnes^ 
~\  _^  \^i/-4C.    Frankenthal 


Thionvil/e»(  3  -  4"Lines  -^^  „n^o}^ 


Sarreguemines 
^Chalons      Verdun 
.Sezanne 


Etang  de  Bern      La  Mede            J^St  Tropaz 
tiffe      S  %Touton 


Marsaiffe 


landing  craft.  The  company  took  four 
days  to  construct  three  10,000-barrel 
tanks  in  the  town.  By  the  end  of  the 
month,  St.  Raphael  was  receiving  bulk 
tanker  discharge  through  one  four-inch 
and  one  six-inch  line  connecting  the 
facilities  to  the  docks.  Another  four- 
inch  aviation  gas  line  covered  the  six 
miles  from  the  larger  tanks  to  a  1 ,000- 
barrel  storage  container  at  the  airfield 
at  Frejus.  After  the  field  was  aban- 
doned, the  airfield  tank  served  as  a 
motor  fuel  storage  point. "^^^ 

Bypassing  the  embattled  petroleum 
facilities  at  Marseille  and  Toulon  for 
the  moment.  Captain  Bills  left  a  79-man 
detachment  in  St.  Raphael  to  run  affairs 
and  took  the  697th  to  the  next  logical 
point  for  pipeline  operations,  the  port 
area  around  Port-de-Bouc,  120  miles 
by  road  from  St.  Raphael.  Arriving  25 
August  in  Martigues,  held  only  by  FFI 
troops,  the  company  rested  for  a  day 
while  the  French  overcame  the  last  Ger- 
man sniper  resistance.  Rapid  surveys 
with  General  Davidson  at  the  scene 
revealed  that,  apart  from  a  few  bullet 
holes  punched  into  the  tanks  by  the 
U.S.  XII  Tactical  Air  Force,  the  pre- 
war storage  capacity  of  250,000  barrels 
in  the  area  was  undiminished. 

On  26  August  the  697th  began  the 
construction  of  a  nineteen-mile,  four- 
inch-diameter  victaulic  pipe  for  80-oc- 
tane  fuel  to  connect  the  refineries  of 
L'Avera  at  Port-de-Bouc;  La  Provence 
at  La  Mede,  three  miles  east  of  Martigues 
on  the  southern  edge  of  the  lake;  and 
the  large  Bruni  oil  refining  complex 
on  the  north  shore  of  the  Etang  de 
Berre.  A  second  four-inch  line  for  100- 
octane  gasoline  paralleled  the  first  be- 


MAP26 


^'  Ibid.,  p.  233n;  Hist  697th  Eingr  Pet  Dist  Co,  Sep 

44,  p.  2-5. 


SOUTHERN  FRANCE 


457 


tween  Port-de-Bouc  and  La  Mede, 
where  the  company  built  a  1,000- 
barrel  storage  tank. 

In  their  four-year  occupation  the 
Germans  had  depleted  the  supply  of 
couplingjoints  to  match  the  French  fit- 
tings within  the  refineries;  the  engi- 
neers were  able  to  maintain  an  adequate 
supply  only  after  the  establishment  of 
the  engineer  dump  at  Le  Pas-des- 
Lanciers.  The  occupiers  did  leave  be- 
hind a  valuable  source  of  expertise  in 
the  French  former  employees  of  the  oil 
plants  and  the  Vichy  government  fuel- 
rationing  authorities.  After  the  elimina- 
tion of  collaborators  among  them,  these 
Frenchmen  provided  a  ready  and  exper- 
ienced supplement  for  Allied  man- 
power and  facilitated  military  and  es- 
sential civilian  fuel  distribution. "^"^ 

With  the  discharge  areas  intact  and 
the  first  interterminal  line  wholly  oper- 
ational by  12  September,  the  company 
had  already  begun  the  pipeline  cover- 
ing the  thirty-five  miles  between  Berre 
and  the  Durance  River.  The  line  reached 
Salon,  eight  miles  north  of  Berre  and 
the  site  of  a  large  convoy  refueling  and 
jerry  can  refill  point,  in  the  first  week 
of  construction  and  by  25  September 
was  at  the  south  bank  of  the  Durance, 
five  miles  southeast  of  Avignon.  Here, 
pushing  the  pipe  across  on  a  1 ,480-foot 
timber  trestle,  the  697th  passed  the  line 
to  the  784th  Engineer  Petroleum  Distri- 
bution Company,  which  linked  it  to 
their  completed  section.  It  covered  the 
next  thirty-two  miles  north  to  the  French 
railroad  tank  car  installation  at  Le 
Pontet,  the  second  large  decanting  sta- 
tion for  refueling  of  truck  convoys. 
Accompanying  the  engineer  pipeline 
along  its  whole  length  was  a  Signal 


Corps  telephone  net  that  permitted 
prompt  reporting  of  pipeline  leaks. 

By  early  September,  the  press  of 
operations  forced  the  establishment  of 
a  provisional  battalion-level  supervisory 
headquarters  to  coordinate  and  control 
the  pipelaying  and  operating  activities 
of  eight  distribution  companies,  several 
attached  companies  from  engineer  com- 
bat regiments,  and  one  dump  truck 
company.  First  commanded  by  Maj. 
Charles  B.  Gholson,  the  unit  finally  was 
designated  408th  Engineer  Service  Bat- 
talion (Pipeline)  on  6  January  1945.  It 
allowed  the  rapid  transfer  of  supervi- 
sory talent  among  the  operating  battal- 
ion headquarters,  the  distribution  com- 
panies, the  Delta  Base  Section,  and 
Continental  Advance  Section  (CONAD) 
or  SOLOC  commands  as  the  construc- 
tion effort  demanded.  The  headquar- 
ters also  relieved  the  individual  compa- 
nies of  the  need  to  obtain  their  own 
supply  of  pipes,  couplings,  and  pump 
gear  from  the  harbors  in  southern 
France.  The  battalion  tied  its  wholesale 
supply  to  the  French  rail  net,  placing 
stocks  of  pipe  in  rail  sidings  close  to  the 
line  of  construction  at  roughly  twenty- 
mile  intervals. ^^ 

After  connecting  the  pipe  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  Durance,  the  784th 
took  responsibility  for  testing  and  oper- 
ating the  whole  line  from  Berre  to  Le 
Pontet.  Meanwhile,  the  697th  leap- 
frogged ahead  to  install  the  next  sec- 
tion of  pipe  into  the  rehabilitated  French 
storage  tanks  at  Lyon,  with  dispensing 
points  at  St.  Marcel,  Vienne,  and  Lyon 
itself.  By  9  November  the  pipe  was  mov- 
ing nearly  13,000  barrels  of  fuel  daily, 


Logistical  History  of  NATOUSA-MTOUSA,  p.  241. 


'^^  History  of  the  408th  Engineer  Service  Battalion 
in  the  Southern  Military  Pipeline  System  (Aug  44- Aug 
45),  typescript  [1947],  p.  3;  Adm  Hist,  408th  Engr 
Serv  Bn,  10  Feb  45,  p.  1. 


458 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


a  rate  maintained  until  the  end  of  the 
war  on  the  Rhone  River  valley  pipeline. ^^ 

Meanwhile,  other  petroleum  engi- 
neer units  arrived  at  Marseille  and  Port- 
de-Bouc  to  continue  refurbishing  and 
operating  the  bulk  ports  there.  The 
1379th  Engineer  Petroleum  Distribu- 
tion Company  entered  Marseille  on  29 
August  after  landing  six  days  earlier  at 
St.  Raphael.  The  fierce  battle  for  Mar- 
seille had  done  little  damage  to  the 
petroleum  facilities,  and  the  company 
had  pipelines  running  from  the  quays 
to  the  largest  refinery  at  the  Rue  de 
Lyon  within  a  week.  One  group  left 
behind  on  Corsica  to  train  French  petro- 
leum units  rejoined  the  company  on  17 
September,  With  detachments  in  Port- 
de-Bouc,  Marseille,  La  Mede,  and  Berre, 
the  1379th  took  over  the  whole  tanker 
discharge  operation  in  southern  France 
and  began  the  construction  of  a  six- 
inch  line  around  the  Etang  de  Berre  as 
the  beginning  of  a  new  system  to  paral- 
lel the  earlier  four-inch  pipe.  The  696th 
Engineer  Petroleum  Distribution  Com- 
pany arrived  at  Berre  on  the  twenty- 
first  to  carry  the  six-inch  pipe  to  just 
above  Avignon.^'  The  701st  Engineer 
Petroleum  Distribution  Company, 
another  highly  experienced  unit  from 
the  Italian  campaign,  arrived  at  Mar- 
seille on  9  October  and  moved  the  work 
ahead  from  Avignon  to  Piolenc;  there, 
the  696th  took  over  again  to  a  point 
above  Valence. 

In  late  October  the  Rhone  overflowed 
its  banks  after  heavy  rains.  The  two 
companies  constructing  the  hne  up  the 
riverbank  south  of  Lyon  had  to  float 
pipe  into  position  by  plugging  one  end 
of  it  and  moving  it  into  the  heavy  flood 

'***  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  13,  Petroleum.  Oil.  and 
Lubricants,  app.  16. 

"  Unit  Hist,  1379th  Engr  Pet  Dist  Co,  Dec  43 -Nov 
45,  pp.  3-4. 


waters.  A  detachment  of  the  701st  down- 
stream repaired  the  severed  four-inch 
line  at  Livron.  In  November,  progress 
on  both  lines  came  to  a  temporary  halt 
when  an  early  freeze  blocked  the  pipes 
and  burst  couplings  on  a  stretch  be- 
tween Lyon  and  Macon — water  used  to 
test  the  pipe  before  pumping  fuel 
through  it  had  been  left  in  the  pipe 
during  a  sudden  temperature  drop. 
The  697th  and  the  701st  backtracked, 
hastily  thawed  the  line,  and  replaced 
broken  sections,  allowing  operation  to 
resume  by  23  November. 

The  combined  work  of  the  696th  and 
the  697th  Engineer  Petroleum  Distri- 
bution Companies  and  Companies  E 
and  F  of  the  335th  Engineer  General 
Service  Regiment  brought  the  opera- 
tional four-inch  pipe  to  the  rear  of  the 
Seventh  Army  area  at  La  Forge,  near 
Sarrebourg,  on  12  February  1945, 
although  construction  was  slowed  by 
heavy  snow.  The  six-inch  pipe  lagged 
behind  north  of  Vesoul,  plagued  by  an 
inadequate  supply  of  parts  and  faulty 
construction  that  had  to  be  rechecked. 
The  six-inch  pipe  became  operational 
to  the  La  Forge  terminal  on  3  April, 
while  the  697th  was  overseeing  the 
last  leg  of  four-inch  pipe  construction 
in  three  parallel  lines  from  La  Forge 
through  Sarreguemines  and  Franken- 
thal,  Germany,  and  across  the  Rhine 
near  Mannheim  into  the  terminal  at 
Sandhofen,  a  Mannheim  suburb.  An- 
other seven  miles  of  six-inch  pipe, 
erected  by  the  1385th  Engineer  Petro- 
leum Distribution  Company  under  the 
supervision  of  the  697th  experts  and 
the  408th  Engineer  Service  Battalion, 
connected  the  Frankenthal  and  Mann- 
heim terminals. ^^ 

^^  Adm  Hist,  697th  Engr  Pet  Dist  Co,  Jan -May  45. 
Other  constructing  units  on  the  lines  between 
Sarreguemines    and    Sandhofen    were    the    1385th 


SOUTHERN  FRANCE 


459 


On  26  February  1945,  in  the  general 
consolidation  of  supply  operations 
under  ETOUSA,  Lt.  Gen.  John  C.  H. 
Lee,  commanding  the  Communications 
Zone  (COMZ),  ETOUSA,  took  under 
his  ultimate  authority  the  petroleum 
distribution  net  in  southern  France 
along  with  the  pipelines  constructed 
across  the  northern  tier  of  the  Continent. 
Operations  records  were  turned  over 
to  the  ETOUSA  Military  Pipeline  Ser- 
vice after  26  February,  and  the  408th 
Engineer  Service  Battalion  and  its  at- 
tached units  came  under  the  opera- 
tional control  of  the  ETOUSA  staff, 
though  still  attached  to  CONAD  for 
supply  and  administration.  The  con- 
struction companies  remained  relatively 
autonomous  through  all  of  the  central- 
izing and  remained  in  place  to  continue 
the  operation  of  the  875  miles  of  four- 
inch  and  532  miles  of  six-inch  pipeline 
they  had  emplaced  behind  the  6th  Army 
Group  in  the  advance  from  southern 
France. ^^ 

Preparing  To  Cross  the  Rhine 

As  the  Germans  fell  back  speedily 
upon  their  defenses  before  the  Rhine 
in  September  and  October  1944,  6th 
Army  Group  planners  began  to  enter- 
tain the  idea  of  crossing  the  river  before 
the  year  was  out.  This  possibility  led 
the  engineers  to  establish  Rhine  River 
crossing  schools  in  late  September.  Sev- 
enth Army  engineers,  who  would  carry 
the  brunt  of  the  assault  burden,  treated 


Engineer  Petroleum  Distribution  Company,  the  2814th, 
Companies  E  and  F  of  the  335th  Engineer  General 
Service  Regiment,  and  a  platoon  of  the  701st.  Hist 
of  the  408th  Engr  Serv  Bn  in  the  Southern  MPS, 
p2. 

'■•  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  13,  Petroleum,  Oil,  and 
Lubricants,  app.  1 1,  p.  3;  Hist  of  the  408th  Engr  Serv 
Bn  in  the  Southern  MPS,  p.  5. 


the  crossing  as  an  amphibious  opera- 
tion complicated  by  the  rapid  current 
of  the  river — eight  to  ten  miles  per  hour 
in  the  winter  months.  Once  again  Gen- 
eral Davidson  turned  to  his  experienced 
engineer  regiments,  the  40th,  the  540th, 
and  the  36th,  to  form  the  central  ele- 
ments of  combat  groups  capable  of 
transporting  assault  troops  and  of  or- 
ganizing beachheads  on  the  far  bank  as 
they  had  on  the  Riviera  beaches. 

On  26  September  one  battalion  from 
each  of  the  engineer  regiments  and  two 
French  engineer  battalions  began  train- 
ing in  two  crossing  schools.  The  basic 
course  was  held  near  Dole  on  the  Doubs 
River,  usually  slow  and  narrow  in  the 
autumn.  Under  the  supervision  of  the 
1553d  Engineer  Heavy  Ponton  Bat- 
talion, the  combat  engineers  practiced 
with  swift  fourteen-foot  storm  boats 
and  larger  assault  craft,  both  types  pow- 
ered with  outboard  motors.  After  four 
days  of  practice,  the  engineer  trainees 
moved  to  the  advanced-course  site  at 
Camp  de  Valbonne  near  Lyon  on  the 
Rhone  River  to  gain  experience  with 
the  same  equipment  in  faster  river 

40 

currents. 

At  Camp  de  Valbonne,  under  the 
direction  of  the  85th  Engineer  Heavy 
Ponton  Battalion,  the  engineers  also 
practiced  bridge  building  over  the  rapid 
stream  and  experimented  with  heavier 
cable  anchors  for  ponton  treadway 
bridging  and  antimine  nets  to  ward  off 
explosives  set  adrift  by  the  enemy  to 
eliminate  crossing  structures.  New 
means  of  launching  and  affixing  cross- 
river  cables  were  tested  in  efforts  to  pro- 
vide guy  wires  for  laden  DUKWs  nego- 
tiating the  current  with  barely  enough 


^"  A  Negro  unit,  the  1553d  Engineer  Heavy  Ponton 
Battalion  arrived  in  France  13  September  1944. 


460 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


power  to  make  headway  against  the 
river's  flow. 

As  winter  drew  on  and  chances  for 
crossing  the  last  major  water  obstacle 
before  the  German  heartland  dwindled, 
the  engineers  concentrated  on  main- 
taining their  equipment  for  the  post- 
poned operation.  The  equipment 
amassed  for  each  crossing  group 
counted  96  storm  boats,  188  assault 
craft,  6  rafts,  over  400  outboard  motors, 
1  heavy  ponton  bridge,  and  150  DUKWs 
assigned  to  transport  artillery  pieces. 
All  of  this  material  was  now  mounted 
on  wheels  to  take  immediate  advantage 
of  any  sudden  breakthrough  to  the 
Rhine's  edge.  By  early  December,  Gen- 
eral Davidson  decided  to  store  the  entire 


collection  for  the  winter,  and  Army 
engineers  moved  their  equipment  to 
covered  areas,  factories,  and  the  for- 
ests around  Luneville.^' 

As  the  year  ended,  the  engineers 
turned  to  face  a  different  ordeal.  In  a 
final  desperate  attempt  to  stem  the 
Allied  advance  to  the  Rhine,  German 
forces  along  the  western  front  launched 
a  massive  counteroffensive  out  of  the 
Ardennes  Forest.  In  the  middle  of  De- 
cember, the  surprise  blow  put  the  entire 
Allied  command  in  the  west  on  the 
defensive  for  over  a  month  and  stretched 
engineer  elements  to  their  utmost. 


^'  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  10,  Combat  Engineering, 
pp.  235-39;  Seventh  Army,  Engr  Hist  Rpt,  p.  8. 


CHAPTER  XXI 


The  Ardennes:   Engineers 
as  Infantry 


A  cold  rain  was  turning  to  snow  on 
the  afternoon  of  8  December  1944, 
when  the  lead  trucks  of  the  81st  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  pulled  into  the 
Schnee  Eifel,  a  wooded  ridge  just  inside 
the  German  border  east  of  the  Ardennes 
and  southeast  of  Liege.  The  81st  Battal- 
ion had  landed  in  France  only  a  few 
days  before  with  VIII  Corps'  106th 
Infantry  Division.  The  division,  the 
newest  on  the  Western  Front  and  the 
youngest  (the  first  containing  a  large 
number  of  eighteen-year-old  draftees), 
had  moved  forward  immediately  after 
landing  to  take  over  a  sector  from  the 
2d  Division,  which  was  redeploying 
northward  to  reinforce  a  First  Army 
attack  on  the  Roer  River  dam.' 

The  Schnee  Eifel  landscape  looked 
like  a  Christmas  card,  with  snow-tipped 
fir  trees  dark  against  white  hills.  In  the 
folds  of  the  hills  lay  small  villages  set  in 
hollows  for  protection  against  blizzards. 
Here  the  engineers  found  billets.  The 
81st  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  settled 
in  at  Heuem,  on  the  road  leading  east 
toward  the  German  border  from  St.- 


'  Hist  81st  Engr  C  Bn,  Dec  44;  Hugh  M.  Cole,  The 
Ardennes:  The  Battle  of  the  Bulge,  United  States  Army  in 
World  War  II  (Washington,  1968),  p.  139  and  map  1. 
Unless  otherwise  noted  tactical  information  in  this 
chapter  derives  from  Cole. 


Vith,  Belgium,  an  important  road  cen- 
ter and  site  of  division  headquarters. 
The  battalion's  Company  B,  support- 
ing the  423d  Infantry,  bivouacked  about 
1  1/2  miles  east  at  Schoenberg.  Cross- 
ing the  border  into  Germany,  Company 
A  found  billets  at  Auw,  only  three  miles 
as  the  crow  flies  behind  the  most  for- 
ward position  on  the  VIII  Corps  front, 
a  six-mile  stretch  of  the  Schnee  Eifel 
containing  Siegfried  Line  pillboxes. 

The  first  20  miles  of  the  85-mile-long 
Ardennes  front,  beginning  at  Monschau, 
were  held  by  V  Corps'  99th  Infantry 
Division.  Also  new  to  the  theater,  the 
division  had  arrived  on  the  Continent 
during  November  1944.  The  southern 
two  miles  of  its  portion  of  the  front  lay 
along  a  narrow,  seven-mile-long  valley 
known  as  the  Losheim  Gap.  There  the 
V  Corps  sector  ended  and  that  of  the 
VIII  Corps  began.  The  next  five  miles 
of  the  Losheim  Gap  were  held  by  the 
14th  Cavalry  Group,  a  light  reconnais- 
sance unit  that  the  106th  Division  had 
inherited  when  the  2d  Division  moved 
north. 

The  106th  Division  sector  ended  about 
five  miles  below  the  Schnee  Eifel  salient, 
at  the  village  of  Luetzkampen,  and 
there  the  28th  Infantry  Division  area 
began.  Near  this  point,  where  the  nar- 


462 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


row,  swift  Our  River  began  to  define 
the  border  between  Belgium  and  Ger- 
many, the  American  positions  swung 
southwest  to  the  Belgian  side  of  the 
river  along  a  high  bluff  carrying  a  road 
(Route  16)  known  as  the  "Skyline  Drive," 
which  continued  south  through  Luxem- 
bourg. Responsible  for  about  twenty- 
three  miles  of  the  front  in  Belgium  and 
Luxembourg,  the  veteran  28th  Division 
was  resting  and  training  replacements 
for  the  more  than  6,000  casualties  it 
had  suffered  during  the  battle  of  the 
Huertgen  Forest,  more  casualties  than 
any  other  division  in  that  action,^ 

Beginning  on  10  December,  elements 
of  the  9th  Armored  Division,  another 
newcomer  to  ETOUSA,  took  over  the 
next  six  miles  south  along  the  front. 
The  bulk  of  the  armored  division,  how- 
ever, was  in  reserve  fifty  miles  north. 
Near  the  point  where  the  Schwarz  Erntz 
River  flowed  into  the  Sauer  River  the 
4th  Infantry  Division  portion  of  the 
front  began.  This  division  had  also  been 
badly  battered  in  the  Huertgen  Forest, 
having  suffered  more  than  4,000  casual- 
ties, second  in  losses  only  to  the  28th. ^ 
The  4th  Division  held  the  VIII  Corps 
front  along  the  Sauer  and  the  Moselle 
to  the  border  between  Luxembourg 
and  France,  where  the  First  Army  sec- 
tor ended  and  that  of  Third  Army 
began. 

The  long  front,  manned  by  troops 
weary  from  combat  or  not  yet  tested  in 
battle,  was  very  lightly  held  in  some 
places.  Along  two  miles  of  the  Losheim 
Gap,  through  which  German  armies 
had  poured  westward  in  1870,  1914, 
and  1940,  the  Americans  patrolled  so 
lightly  that  Germans  on  leave  often 


walked  across  to  visit  friends  and  rela- 
tives behind  the  American  lines.  For 
two  months  the  front  had  been  quiet 
except  for  sporadic  mortar  and  artil- 
lery fire.  Across  the  narrow  rivers  or 
from  Siegfried  Line  positions  Ameri- 
can and  German  outposts  watched  each 
other.^ 

The  Storm  Breaks  in  the  Schnee  Eifel 

It  was  snowing  on  the  evening  of  1 1 
December  when  the  81st  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  relieved  the  2d  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  in  the  Schnee  Eifel. 
The  81st  Battalion's  foremost  task  was 
road  maintenance — removing  snow  and 
filling  shell  holes.  Behind  the  front  road 
maintenance  was  the  responsibility  of 
the  168th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion, 
attached  to  VIII  Corps.  Operating  quar- 
ries to  provide  crushed  rock  was  part 
of  the  road  repair  job,  but  engineers 
also  manned  sawmills  to  provide  lum- 
ber for  a  First  Army  winterization  pro- 
gram, which  called  for  wooden  huts  and 
shelters.^ 

The  crossroads  village  of  Auw  marked 
the  line  dividing  the  14th  Cavalry  Group 
sector  from  that  of  the  422d  Infantry, 
106th  Division.  There  Company  A  of 
the  81st  Engineer  Combat  Battalion 
had  comfortable  billets,  with  headquar- 
ters men  in  one  house  and  the  three 
platoons  in  three  others.  Before  dawn 
on  16  December  heavy  artillery  fire 
awakened  the  men.  They  found  to  their 
surprise   that   the   villagers   were   up. 


'^  MacDonald,  Siegfried  Line  Campaign,  pp.  374,  493. 
^  Ibid.,  pp.  374,  474. 


^John  Toland,  Battle:  The  Story  of  the  Bulge  (New 
York:  Random  House,  1959),  p.  4;  Col.  R.  Ernest 
Dupuy,  St.  Vith:  Lion  in  the  Way  (Washington:  Infantry 
Journal  Press,  1949),  pp.  17-18. 

^  Hist  81st  Engr  C  Bn,  Dec  44;  First  Army  Report  of 
Operations,  1  August  1944-22  February  1945,  ans.  4-8, 
p.  128. 


THE  ARDENNES:  ENGINEERS  AS  INFANTRY 


463 


dressed,  and  huddled  in  their  cellars. 
Then  they  remembered  that  the  eve- 
ning before  a  young  woman  had  been 
observed  going  from  house  to  house, 
evidently  carrying  a  warning.  But  there 
was  no  reason  to  suppose  that  this  was 
more  than  a  local  attack,  and  when  the 
artillery  fire  died  away  the  company 
commander,  Capt.  Harold  M.  Harmon, 
sent  out  his  platoons  on  road  work  as 
usual  at  0800.  The  1st  Platoon  under 
Lt.  William  J.  Coughlin  went  to  the 
422d  Infantry  headquarters  at  Schlau- 
senbach,  about  a  mile  away,  the  3d  Pla- 
toon under  Lt.  David  M.  Woerner  to 
the  422d's  3d  Battalion  in  the  pillbox 
area,  and  the  2d  Platoon  under  Lt.  Wil- 
liam E.  Purteil  to  work  in  and  near 
Auw.  Captain  Harmon  then  left  for 
Heuem  for  the  usual  morning  confer- 
ence of  company  commanders. ** 

The  engineers  at  Auw — the  only 
troops  in  the  town — heard  rifle  and 
machine-gun  fire  about  0930.  It  seemed 
close,  but  because  the  day  was  cloudy 
with  drizzle  and  patches  of  heavy  fog, 
nobody  could  find  out  what  was  hap- 
pening. As  soon  as  the  engineers  recog- 
nized the  white-clad  enemy,  the  2d  Pla- 
toon and  the  headquarters  men  took 
up  positions  in  two  buildings  and  began 
firing.  At  that  point,  the  1st  Platoon, 
having  heard  the  sound  of  battle  from 
the  direction  of  Auw,  returned  under 
heavy  fire,  dashed  into  the  house  where 
it  was  billeted,  and  began  returning 
enemy  fire  coming  from  a  barn  across 
the  road,  using  tracer  ammunition  to 
set  the  barn  afire.  Ten  German  infantry- 


*'  This  account  of  the  81st  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion is  taken  from  their  unit  citation,  25  May  1945,  and 
the  narrative,  Baptism  of  Fire,  both  in  Hist  81st  Engr 
C  Bn,  15  Mar  43-31  May  45;  and  Dupuy,  St.  Vith: 
Lion  in  the  Way,  pp.  32  —  34. 


men  ran  out  and  were  cut  down  by 
Company  A  cooks. 

About  1000  Captain  Harmon  re- 
turned from  Heuem,  where  he  had 
learned  that  Lt.  Col.  Thomas  J.  Riggs, 
Jr.,  the  battalion  commander,  had  orders 
to  employ  the  81st  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion  as  infantry.  The  plan  finally 
adopted  was  to  commit  the  engineers 
with  their  respective  regimental  com- 
bat teams.  Unable  to  find  his  men  in 
Auw,  Harmon  started  for  the  422d 
Infantry  area  to  locate  his  1st  Platoon. 
On  the  way  he  learned  that  the  enemy 
had  broken  through  the  cavalry  group 
defenses  in  the  Losheim  Gap  and  was 
attacking  in  great  force.  Returning  to 
Auw,  he  was  fired  on  by  an  enemy  col- 
umn but  made  a  dash  for  it;  although 
his  jeep  was  riddled  he  managed  to 
reach  his  2d  Platoon,  which  German 
tanks  were  about  to  encircle.  He  got 
the  men  on  trucks  and  on  the  road  back 
to  Heuem. 

Four  German  Tiger  tanks  came  up  the 
main  street  of  Auw.  Infantry  was  riding 
on  the  tanks,  and  most  of  the  turrets 
were  open;  the  tankers  evidently  ex- 
pected little  opposition.  The  engineers 
in  their  strongpoints  opened  up  with 
rifles  and  machine  guns,  claiming  "con- 
siderable" casualties  before  the  Ger- 
mans realized  what  was  happening.  The 
German  infantry  dropped  to  the 
ground,  the  tank  turrets  clattered  shut, 
and  the  tanks  opened  fire  with  88-mm. 
guns  on  the  two  houses  that  the  engi- 
neers occupied.  The  headquarters  men 
managed  to  escape,  but  then  the  full 
tank  attack  fell  on  Lieutenant  Coughlin 
and  his  1st  Platoon.  Eight  rounds  of 
point-blank  88-mm.  fire  burst  in  the 
building  but  miraculously  caused  no 
casualties,  though  small-arms  fire 
wounded     several     men.     Desperate, 


464 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Coughlin  decided  to  risk  a  dash  across 
an  open  field  behind  the  house.  At  1500 
he  gave  the  order  to  withdraw.  T/5 
Edward  S.  Withee  insisted  on  remain- 
ing behind  to  cover  the  withdrawal  with 
his  submachine  gun.  Captured  after  his 
heroic  stand,  Withee  later  was  awarded 
the  Distinguished  Service  Cross. 

That  afternoon  in  a  sudden  snow- 
storm Captain  Harmon  became  involved 
in  a  422d  Infantry  attempt  to  retake 
Auw.  He  moved  thirty  engineers  to  a 
point  about  a  mile  west  of  the  town, 
but  by  that  time  American  artillery  was 
falling  on  Auw.  Before  the  422d  could 
halt  the  American  fire  German  artil- 
lery fire  became  so  heavy  that  Harmon's 
party,  having  suffered  ten  casualties, 
had  to  withdraw  to  Heuem. 

By  the  evening  of  16  December  it 
had  become  plain  that  the  German 
attack,  which  the  106th  Division  had  at 
first  considered  only  an  attempt  to 
retake  Siegfried  Line  pillboxes,  was  in 
fact  an  offensive  on  a  grand  scale  all 
along  the  Ardennes  front  from  Mon- 
schau  to  the  Luxembourg  border.  In 
the  Schnee  Eifel  the  Germans  commit- 
ted the  entire  LXVI  Corps  of  General  der 
Panzertruppen  Hasso  von  Manteuffel's 
Fifth  Panzer  Army.  One  of  its  divisions 
was  to  encircle  and  cut  off  the  422d 
and  423d  Infantry  regiments  in  the  pill- 
box area  and  take  St.-Vith.  The  other 
was  to  attack  the  424th  Infantry  south 
of  the  pillbox  positions,  blocking  the 
western  and  southern  exits  from  St.- 
Vith. 

The  German  pincer  movement 
around  the  pillbox  positions,  success- 
fully begun  on  the  north  with  the  cap- 
ture of  Auw,  continued  during  the  early 
morning  hours  of  17  December  with 
the  taking  of  Bleialf  in  the  423d  Infan- 
try's area  to  the  south.  The  two  Ger- 


man divisions  rejoined  at  Schoenberg 
later  that  morning.  At  Heuem,  only  I 
1/2  miles  to  the  west,  the  engineers  on 
orders  from  the  106th  Division  with- 
drew at  0930  to  a  point  about  five  miles 
west  of  St.-Vith.  There  they  were  fed 
and  issued  cigarettes,  socks,  galoshes, 
and  ammunition.  But  they  were  to  have 
little  rest.  At  noon  Colonel  Riggs  re- 
ceived orders  to  round  up  all  the  avail- 
able men  of  the  81st  and  168th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalions  to  halt  a  Ger- 
man attack  on  St.-Vith. 

On  a  wooded  ridge  about  a  mile  east 
of  the  town,  astride  the  road  from 
Schoenberg,  Colonel  Riggs  assembled 
his  little  force,  which  had  only  a  few 
bazookas  and  machine  guns.  In  his  81st 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  Company 
A,  after  losses  on  16  December,  had  only 
sixty-five  men;  Headquarters  and  Ser- 
vice Company  had  only  fifty,  some  of 
them  clerks  and  cooks.  The  1 68th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  had  the  rem- 
nants of  two  companies  and  the  bulk  of 
a  third.  The  men,  with  few  tools,  had 
hardly  finished  digging  their  foxholes 
when  at  1600  three  German  self-pro- 
pelled 88-mm.  assault  guns,  supported 
by  infantry,  came  down  the  road  from 
Schoenberg.  The  Germans  knocked  out 
a  divisional  antitank  gun  in  their  path, 
forced  a  tank  destroyer  to  withdraw, 
then  turned  their  88-mm.  guns  on  engi- 
neers of  the  1 68th  Battalion  in  the  most 
forward  position,  inflicting  heavy  casu- 
alties. Meantime,  a  forward  divisional 
observer  directed  a  P— 47  fighter- 
bomber  to  the  spot.  After  a  number  of 
passes  the  plane  set  one  of  the  German 
gun  carriages  afire. 

The  defenders  succeeded  in  delay- 
ing the  enemy  until  dusk,  when  tanks 
of  the  U.S.  7th  Armored  Division  began 
coming  through  the  snow  and  mist 


THE  ARDENNES:  ENGINEERS  AS  INFANTRY 


465 


Engineers  Drop  Barbed-Wire  Rolls  To  Prepare  Defensive  Positions 


down  the  road  from  St.-Vith.  By  that 
time  one  of  the  German  assault  guns 
had  broken  through  the  168th  Battal- 
ion defenses  and  reached  the  81st  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion's  position.  Jump- 
ing out  of  their  foxholes,  the  engineers 
stopped  the  gun  by  pulling  a  chain  of 
mines  across  the  road.  One  of  the  7th 
Armored  Division  tanks  finally  knocked 
the  gun  out. 

Next  morning,  Company  A,  81st  En- 
gineer Combat  Battalion,  and  the  tank- 
ers continued  to  hold  against  strong  Ger- 
man attacks.  In  the  afternoon  a  group 
under  Colonel  Riggs  counterattacked, 
driving  some  German  infantrymen  out 
of  hillside  positions.  The  defenders 
could  then  consolidate  their  lines,  but 
shortly  after  dark  a  message  came  from 


division  headquarters  that  signaled  the 
beginning  of  the  end.  Threatened  by 
German  tanks  that  were  outflanking  the 
defenders  on  the  Schoenberg  road  to 
the  east,  the  106th  Division  headquar- 
ters was  withdrawing  from  St.-Vith  ten 
miles  west  to  Vielsalm. 

The  next  two  days,  19  and  20  De- 
cember, were  fairly  quiet  on  the  Schoen- 
berg road,  with  German  activity  lim- 
ited to  patrol  actions  and  intermittent 
shelling.  During  the  night  of  the  nine- 
teenth the  engineers  laid  hasty  mine- 
fields along  possible  avenues  of  tank 
approach  and  covered  foxholes  with 
logs  for  protection  from  tree  bursts. 
Patrols  went  into  St.-Vith  to  salvage  any- 
thing useful — food,  blankets,  clothing. 
From  their  foxholes  on  the  Schoenberg 


466 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


road  that  night  the  engineers  could  see 
flashes  in  the  distant  sky — to  the  north 
where  V  Corps  was  trying  to  hold  the 
Sixth  Panzer  Army;  to  the  east  beyond 
Schoenberg  where  the  422d  and  423d 
Infantry  regiments,  hopelessly  cut  off, 
were  making  their  last  stand;  to  the 
south  where  the  424th  Infantry,  bol- 
stered by  a  combat  command  of  the 
9th  Armored  Division,  was  successfully 
covering  its  withdrawal  to  Vielsalm.  Far 
to  the  southwest  flashes  showed  where 
the  battle  for  Bastogne  was  raging. 

By  the  morning  of  20  December  Ger- 
man successes  in  the  Bastogne  area  had 
isolated  the  St.-Vith  forces  from  the  rest 
of  VIII  Corps.  During  the  afternoon 
the  7th  Armored  Division  commander 
received  word  that  the  82d  Airborne 
Division  was  on  its  way  to  help,  but  it 
was  already  too  late.  The  Germans  were 
impressed  by  the  intensity  of  American 
artillery  fire  east  of  St.-Vith  and  by  the 
number  of  American  tanks — "tanks 
were  everywhere,"  reported  the  18th 
Volksgrenadier  Division  on  20  December — 
and  they  assumed  that  the  force  block- 
ing the  Schoenberg  road  was  stronger 
than  it  actually  was.  Nevertheless,  the 
Germans  were  determined  to  break 
through  the  defenses  as  soon  as  they 
could  extract  their  own  artillery  and 
tanks  from  a  traffic  jam  that  had  built 
up  around  Schoenberg. 

This  the  Germans  accomplished  by 
midafternoon  on  21  December.  Com- 
mencing at  1500  and  continuing  until 
well  after  dark,  the  enemy  directed  on 
the  tankers  and  engineers  a  concen- 
trated barrage  of  artillery,  rocket,  and 
mortar  fire,  inflicting  heavy  casualties. 
Company  A,  81st  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion,  for  example,  lost  forty  of  its 
sixty-five  men. 

The  engineers  had  not  mined  the 


road  because  of  a  promised  7th  Ar- 
mored Division  counterattack.  Without 
warning — the  German  barrage  had 
knocked  out  all  communications — 
shortly  before  midnight  four  Mark  VI 
(Tiger)  and  two  Mark  IV  tanks,  with 
supporting  infantry,  came  over  a  rise 
in  the  road,  close  to  where  some  Sher- 
man tanks  were  positioned  at  the  Ameri- 
can foxhole  line.  Firing  a  volley  of  illu- 
minating flares  that  silhouetted  the 
Shermans  and  blinded  their  crews,  the 
German  tanks  picked  off  three  of  the 
Shermans  and  overran  the  foxholes. 
Colonel  Riggs  attempted  to  organize  a 
defense  at  a  ridge  farther  back,  but  it 
was  hopeless.  The  Americans  broke  up 
into  small  parties.  Wandering  about  in 
the  heavy  snow  and  darkness,  most  of 
the  men,  including  Colonel  Riggs,  were 
captured.  Only  eight  officers  and  en- 
listed men  from  Company  A,  81st  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion,  and  thirty-three 
officers  and  men  from  the  Headquar- 
ters and  Service  Company  were  able  to 
reach  Vielsalm. 

Company  C,  with  the  424th  Infantry 
south  of  St.-Vith,  protected  the  ap- 
proaches to  the  town  by  guarding  and 
blowing  bridges;  when  9th  Armored 
Division  tanks  arrived  on  20  December 
the  company  acted  as  infantry  in  sup- 
port of  the  tanks.  The  bulk  of  Com- 
pany B  of  the  engineer  battalion  was 
lost  when  the  enemy  captured  most  of 
the  422d  and  423d  Infantry  regiments. 

For  its  first  engagement  the  81st 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  won  the 
Distinguished  Unit  Citation.  At  St.-Vith 
from  16  to  23  December  1944,  the  bat- 
talion "distinguished  itself  in  battle  with 
such  extraordinary  heroism,  gallantry, 
determination,  and  esprit  de  corps  in 
overcoming  unusually  difficult  and  haz- 
ardous conditions  in  the  face  of  a  nu- 


THE  ARDENNES:  ENGINEERS  AS  INFANTRY 


467 


merically  superior  enemy,  as  to  set  this 
battalion  apart  and  above  units  partici- 
pating in  the  same  engagements."'^ 

Blocking  Sixth  Panzer  Army's 
Drive  to  the  Meuse 

On  the  night  of  16  December  a  heavy 
concentration  of  enemy  artillery  fire 
pounded  and  shook  the  eastern  and 
southern  flanks  of  V  Corps'  99th  Divi- 
sion. {Map  27)  Under  cover  of  this 
barrage,  tanks  of  the  German  Sixth  Pan- 
zer Army  were  advancing  west  toward 
the  Meuse,  creating  the  major  threat  in 
the  northern  sector  of  the  Ardennes. 
At  the  extreme  north,  infantry  of  LXVII 
Corps  attacked  the  Siegfried  Line  towns 
of  Monschau  and  Hoefen  on  the  morn- 
ing of  16  December.  These  attacks 
failed,  but  in  the  Losheim  Gap  region 
(the  central  and  southern  portions  of 
the  northern  sector)  the  Germans  threw 
in  considerable  armor,  and  the  tank  col- 
umns broke  through.^ 

Around  midnight  on  16  December  a 
message  came  to  V  Corps'  254th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion,  which  was  re- 
pairing roads  in  support  of  the  2d  and 
99th  Divisions.  The  unit  was  bivou- 
acked in  the  woods  near  Buellingen  at 
the  southern  end  of  the  corridor  along 
which  the  2d  Division  was  attacking 
through  the  99th  toward  the  Roer  River. 
The  engineers  were  on  a  two-hour  alert 
to  act  as  infantry.  But  in  the  darkness 
the  roads  around  the  bivouac  became 
so  jammed  with  American  tanks  and 
other  traffic  that  the  battalion's  com- 
manding officer  was  not  able  to  reach 


^Citation  in  Hist  81st  Engr  C  Bn,  15  Mar  43-31 
May  45. 

"^  Maj.  Gen.  Walter  E.  Lauer,  Battle  Babies:  The  Story 
of  the  99th  Infantry  Division  in  World  War  II  (Baton 
Rouge:  Military  Press  of  Louisiana,  1951),  pp.  16-28. 


99th  Division  headquarters  and  return 
with  orders  until  0230.  Engineer  Com- 
panies A,  B,  and  C  were  to  form  a 
defensive  line  south  and  east  of  Buellin- 
gen to  protect  American  tanks  and  tank 
destroyers  withdrawing  under  pressure 
from  German  forces  coming  up  the 
road  from  Honsfeld,  three  miles  to  the 
southeast. 

At  0600  the  engineers  of  Company 
B,  stationed  on  the  road  to  Honsfeld, 
saw  white  and  red  flares  about  eight 
hundred  yards  away  and  heard  tracked 
vehicles  approaching.  When  they  heard 
shouts  in  German,  the  engineers  opened 
fire  with  rifles,  rifle  grenades,  and 
machine  guns.  The  German  infantry 
riding  on  the  lead  tank  and  in  six  half- 
tracks jumped  down  and  attacked,  but 
they  were  driven  back.  The  vehicles 
withdrew.  Twenty  minutes  later  the 
German  infantry  reappeared,  followed 
by  tanks.  The  tank  fire  was  ineffective 
against  the  dug-in  engineers,  and  the 
attackers  were  again  repulsed.  Ten 
minutes  later,  as  the  sky  was  getting 
light,  a  third  force  came  up  the  road. 
This  time  tanks  were  in  the  lead,  and 
they  overran  Company  B's  position, 
crushing  two  machine  guns.  They  also 
passed  over  foxholes  where  engineers 
were  crouching,  but  injured  only  three 
Americans. 

The  engineers  continued  to  fire  on 
the  German  infantry,  but  the  254th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion's  position 
was  now  hopeless.  The  men  were  or- 
dered to  fall  back  on  Butgenbach  while 
fighting  a  delaying  action  through  Buel- 
lingen. Many  of  the  men  were  cut  off, 
and  the  situation  at  Buellingen  was  so 
confusing  because  communications 
were  out  that  when  the  commanding 


"  Hist  254th  Engr  C  Bn,  Jul-Oct-Dec  44. 


THE  ARDENNES 


1944 


21. 


20  Miles 


10 


20  Kilometers 


d<HEBLANDSJ 


Dinant 


Marche 


.Rochefort 


[La  Roche 


jOrtheuville^ 


'iEupen 


Verviers    \  ^^^Monschau 

1    //  • 

//     Hoefen 

Lenbornf  \y)*^fhlerscheid 
1/  f  Rocherath 

(iMalmedy  /7o  .   •   ^   ^1' 

Vielsalm  Schoenberg0>f^ Auw  <^  \ 

,Heuem       ^ 
*'^        B/eia/f 


St-Vithl 


Luetzkampen 


J-uzery //  Drauffe/tM     \\  ^ 

%^    •//Wiltzy'  */     I    \\  ^     ^ 

^*=f  ^ r\^     Hosingen\     \\      /^       >• 


Jl 


Libramont 


Neffe    ^     _ 
/  X.    Wiltz 


\\ 


\y/anden 
SV^       V.        Diekirch         \v  - 

^====~.  yy  *y^~, — ^^    ^  \ 

Ette/bruck\   S*"    ^  ^     ^X      > 
l>  Echternacrr^ 

LUXEMBOURG       Breld^eiler 

.^  1  Scheidgen^^  ■  / 

S\\\  /^  Michelshof 


Bitburg 


Sedan 


Arlon] 


L 


^Luxembourg 


MAP  27 


THE  ARDENNES:  ENGINEERS  AS  INFANTRY 


469 


officer  of  the  254th  arrived  at  Butgen- 
bach  he  reported  to  Maj.  Gen.  Walter 
E.  Lauer,  commanding  the  99th  Divi- 
sion, that  his  battalion  had  been  de- 
stroyed. According  to  Lauer,  "It  was  a 
dramatic  moment  at  my  C.  P.  at  about 
noon  that  day  when  the  details  of  the 
action  were  reported.  I  awarded  the 
battalion  commander  then  and  there 
the  Bronze  Star  Medal,  and  gave  him 
my  lunch  to  eat."'**  Later  the  engineer 
officer  discovered  that  he  had  not  lost 
his  entire  battalion.  Although  many 
men  had  been  killed  or  captured,  others, 
in  groups  of  two  or  three,  made  their 
way  back  to  Butgenbach  or  Wirtzfeld. ' ' 

The  tanks  that  came  up  on  the  Hons- 
feld  road  early  on  17  December  be- 
longed to  Obersturmbannfuehrer 
Joachim  Peiper's  Kampfgruppe  Peiper, 
the  armored  spearhead  of  /  5S  Panzer 
Corps,  the  strongest  fighting  unit  of  Sixth 
Panzer  Army,  which  had  broken  through 
at  the  Losheim  Gap.  By  1030  on  17 
December  Peiper's  tanks  were  rolling 
into  Buellingen,  but  instead  of  continu- 
ing northwest  to  Butgenbach  as  the 
Americans  expected,  most  turned 
southwest  out  of  the  town.  Although 
Buellingen  was  a  target  of  the  12th  SS 
Panzer  Division,  Peiper  had  detoured 
through  the  town  to  avoid  a  stretch  of 
muddy  road  between  Honsfeld  and 
Schoppen,  his  next  objective  to  the  west. 
He  had  also  learned  that  there  were 
gasoline  dumps  in  Buellingen,  and  he 
filled  his  tanks  from  American  dumps, 
using  American  prisoners  as  labor. 

Buellingen  was  an  important  supply 
area,  with  dumps  and  service  troops. 


'"  Lauer,  Battle  Babies,  p.  34n. 
"  Hist  254th  Engr  C  Bn,  Jul-Oct-Dec  44. 
'^  Cole,  The  Ardennes:  The  Battle  of  the  Bulge,  pp. 
91-92.260-61. 


Headquarters  Company  and  Company 
B  of  the  2d  Engineer  Combat  Battalion, 
part  of  the  2d  Infantry  Division,  were 
billeted  there.  Ordered  to  hold  the  town 
at  all  costs.  Company  B  put  up  a  deter- 
mined defense,  but  once  in  the  town 
German  tanks  took  up  positions  at  inter- 
sections and  cut  all  traffic.  The  engi- 
neer company  split  into  platoons,  fought 
until  its  ammunition  was  gone,  and  then 
had  to  withdraw.  Four  officers  and 
fifty-seven  enlisted  men  of  Headquar- 
ters Company  were  surrounded.  From 
the  basement  of  their  billet  they  fired 
at  all  the  enemy  infantry  that  came  in 
view,  but  they  had  no  bazookas  to  use 
against  tanks.  Nevertheless  they  were 
still  reported  to  be  holding  out  on  the 
night  of  18  December,  when  advance 
elements  of  the  12th  SS  Panzer  Division 
began  arriving  in  the  town  to  direct  a 
coming  fight  at  Butgenbach.  After  that, 
nothing  more  was  heard  from  Head- 
quarters Company,  and  the  men  were 
assumed  to  be  either  killed  or  cap- 
tured.'^ 

The  arrival  of  Peiper's  tanks  at  Buel- 
lingen on  the  morning  of  17  December 
brought  the  first  realization  of  the  scale 
of  the  German  offensive,  because  com- 
munications had  gone  out  when  the 
Germans  hit  the  99th  Division  regi- 
ments stationed  along  the  West  Wall 
on  16  December.  On  the  morning  of 
the  seventeenth  Maj.  Gen.  Leonard  T. 
Gerow,  commanding  V  Corps,  decided 
to  pull  his  corps  back  to  a  defensive 
position  on  the  Elsenborn  ridge  north- 
west of  Buellingen.  Two  infantry  regi- 
ments of  his  2d  Division  were  attacking 
West  Wall  positions  about  five  miles  to 
the  northeast  near  Wahlerscheid,  sup- 


Hist  2d  Engr  C  Bn,  2d  Inf  Div,  Jun-Dec  44. 


470 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


ported  by  a  regimental  combat  team 
composed  mainly  of  the  99th  Division's 
395th  Infantry.  The  withdrawal  route 
of  these  forces  ran  south  from  Wahler- 
scheid  to  the  twin  villages  of  Krinkelt 
and  Rocherath,  then  northwest  of  Elsen- 
born  through  Wirtzfeld.  Infantry  of  the 
collapsing  99th  Division  was  also  pass- 
ing through  the  twin  villages  on  the  way 
to  Elsenborn.  The  Germans  had  made 
deep  penetrations  along  the  roads  lead- 
ing west  and  could  be  expected  to  attack 
Krinkelt  and  Rocherath. 

During  the  dangerous  withdrawal  the 
engineers  supporting  both  divisions 
played  an  important  part.  The  99th 
Division's  324th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion was  with  the  395th  Regimental 
Combat  Team  in  woods  east  of  Wahler- 
scheid.  When  the  combat  team  received 
the  task  of  covering  the  2d  Division's 
move  south,  the  engineers  assumed 
defensive  positions  as  infantry.  At  one 
time  on  1 7  December  the  battalion  was 
cut  off  and  surrounded  by  the  enemy, 
but  managed  to  escape  and  join  the 
forces  at  Elsenborn.'^ 

At  dusk  on  17  December  Company 
C  of  the  2d  Engineer  Combat  Battalion, 
organic  to  the  2d  Infantry  Division,  was- 
working  behind  the  infantry  to  block 
the  road  to  the  east.  The  infantry  felled 
trees  and  created  abatis,  which  the  engi- 
neers mined  and  booby-trapped.  By  the 
time  the  company  reached  the  twin  vil- 
lages enemy  riflemen  were  close  be- 
hind, but  thick  fog  that  lay  close  to  the 
snow-covered  ground  concealed  the 
unit.  When  Company  C  reached 
Rocherath  the  village  was  burning,  and 
traffic  on  the  road  was  completely 
blocked.  The  company  turned  off  the 
main  road  and  moved  west  along  for- 


est trails  to  Elsenborn,  on  the  way  clear- 
ing from  the  trails  abandoned  trucks 
and  guns  and  putting  down  matting, 
brush,  and  even  abandoned  bed  rolls 
to  get  the  unit's  vehicles  through  to 
Elsenborn.  Next  day,  18  December,  the 
engineers  worked  on  the  Elsenborn 
defenses,  placing  mines  and  wire,  but 
that  night  part  of  the  company  had  to 
return  to  Krinkelt.  Under  heavy  pres- 
sure the  last  U.S.  unit  in  the  town,  the 
38th  Infantry,  was  getting  ready  to  pull 
out,  and  engineers  were  needed  to  set 
up  roadblocks  behind  the  regiment  to 
protect  its  withdrawal. 

The  road  to  Krinkelt  was  under  heavy 
artillery  fire.  More  than  once  the  engi- 
neers had  to  jump  from  their  trucks 
and  run;  several  trucks  were  damaged. 
They  arrived  at  Krinkelt  in  the  black- 
ness, discovering  next  day,  19  Decem- 
ber, that  the  enemy  was  edging  closer, 
obviously  preparing  for  a  final  night 
attack.  At  1730,  in  darkness  and  fog, 
the  38th  Infantry  began  to  pull  out. 
The  engineers,  who  could  not  set  up 
their  roadblocks  until  all  the  tanks  of 
the  covering  force  had  withdrawn,  were 
the  last  Americans  left  in  the  town. 
"Under  the  very  noses  of  the  pressing 
SS  troopers,"  they  went  to  work  install- 
ing roadblocks  at  all  important  corners. 
Enemy  tank,  artillery,  and  small-arms 
fire  killed  a  number  of  men,  but  the 
survivors  managed  to  finish  the  job  and 
withdraw  to  Elsenborn.'^ 

By  20  December  a  regiment  of  the 
1st  Infantry  Division  had  reinforced  the 
2d  and  99th  Divisions  at  Elsenborn.  On 
the  north,  the  9th  Division  took  over 
the  Monschau-Hoefen  sector.  These 
two  positions  held.  At  the  Elsenborn 
ridge,  which  the  Germans  called  the 


Hist  324th  Engr  C  Bn,  9  Nov-31  Dec  44. 


Hist  2d  Engr  C  Bn,  2d  Inf  Div,  Jun-Dec  44. 


THE  ARDENNES:  ENGINEERS  AS  INFANTRY 


471 


"door  posts,"  the  12th  SS  Panzer  Divi- 
sion gave  up  the  fight  on  23  December 
when  the  unit  ran  into  a  fresh  1st  Divi- 
sion regiment. ''^  Thereafter  the  Ger- 
mans would  not  risk  at  Elsenborn  any- 
thing better  than  second-Hne  troops 
capable  only  of  defensive  action. 

About  the  time  the  12th  SS  Panzer 
Division  was  moving  against  Krinkelt 
and  Rocherath,  Peiper's  Kampfgruppe 
swung  west  toward  its  objective,  a  Meuse 
crossing  at  Huy,  about  fifteen  miles 
upriver  from  Liege.  At  dusk  on  17 
December  Peiper's  lead  tanks  were  ap- 
proaching Stavelqt,  on  the  northern 
bank  of  the  Ambleve  River  forty-two 
miles  short  of  Huy.  Peiper  was  already 
deep  into  the  area  where  First  Army's 
service  troops  were  working  behind  the 
combat  zone.  A  few  miles  west  of  Stavelot 
at  Trois  Ponts  on  N  — 23,  Peiper's  route 
to  the  Meuse,  was  the  headquarters  of 
the  1111th  Engineer  Combat  Group, 
whose  battalions  were  supporting  First 
Army's  winterization  program.  The 
291st  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  was 
operating  a  sawmill  just  west  of  Trois 
Ponts  and  a  company  of  the  202d  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  another  at  Stave- 
lot. 

The  first  news  of  the  enemy  break- 
through came  to  the  1111th  Group 
commander.  Col.  H.  W.  Anderson,  at 
1005  on  17  December,  when  he  learned 
that  the  Germans  were  near  Butgen- 
bach.  This  posed  a  serious  threat  to 
Malmedy,  five  miles  northeast  of  Stave- 
lot.  At  Malmedy  Anderson  had  about 
two  hundred  men  of  the  291st  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion,  aided  by  the 
962d  Engineer  Maintenance  Company, 
building  a  landing  strip  for  liaison  planes 


near  First  Army  headquarters  at  Spa. 
He  sent  the  commanding  officer  of  the 
291st,  Lt.  Col.  David  E.  Pergrin,  to 
Malmedy  to  take  charge  of  the  group's 
units  there.  Later  in  that  day  they  were 
augmented  by  the  629th  Engineer  Light 
Equipment  Company,  which  had  been 
doing  road  work  near  Butgenbach  but 
had  managed  to  extricate  itself  ahead 
of  the  German  advance. ^^ 

Anderson  ordered  his  engineers  at 
Malmedy  to  prepare  to  defend  the 
town.  Prospects  for  defense  looked 
bright  soon  after  Pergrin's  arrival,  espe- 
cially when  elements  of  the  7th  Ar- 
mored Division  rumbled  into  the  town. 
But  the  armor  was  only  passing  through 
on  its  way  to  St.-Vith,  and  as  the  vehi- 
cles disappeared  down  the  road  most 
of  the  First  Army  rear  units,  according 
to  an  engineer  account,  fled  in  panic, 
leaving  behind  food,  liquor,  documents, 
footlockers,  clothing,  and  all  sorts  of 
equipment.  The  engineers,  armed  only 
with  mines  and  a  few  bazookas,  stayed.'^ 
When  Colonel  Pergrin  was  asked  later 
why  his  men  did  not  leave  with  the 
other  units,  he  said  the  reason  was 
"psychology."  Combat  units  moving  up 
to  the  front  had  taunted  the  road  build- 
ers they  passed,  "You  engineer  so-and- 
sos!  Why  don't  you  come  on  up  there 
and  fight?" '^ 

By  noon  of  17  December  the  engi- 
neers had  set  up  roadblocks  on  the  edge 
of  town.  An  hour  later,  patrols  reported 
seeing  sixty-eight  enemy  armored  vehi- 
cles including  thirty  tanks  on  a  road  a 
few  miles  to  the  southeast.  About  1430 
Colonel  Pergrin  was  standing  on  a  hill 


'  Cole,  The  Ardennes:  The  Battle  of  the  Bulge,  p.  578. 


'^  Hist  1 1 1 1th  Engr  C  Gp,  Jun,  Nov,  Dec  44. 

'^  Hist  291st  Engr  C  Bn,  Dec  44. 

'^  Helena  Huntington  Smith,  "A  Few  Men  in  Sol- 
dier Suits,"  American  Heritage  (August  1957),  30  (ac- 
count from  interview  with  Pergrin). 


472 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


near  town  when  he  heard  "an  awful  lot 
of  noise"  in  the  valley  below;  then  four 
American  soldiers  ran  toward  him, 
screaming.'^^  They  were  survivors  of  the 
"Malmedy  massacre"  in  which  Peiper's 
men  shot  up  a  convoy  of  field  artillery 
observers  that  crossed  their  path,  then 
rounded  up  about  eighty-five  prisoners, 
marched  them  into  a  field,  and  at  a 
signal  shot  them  down  with  machine- 
gun  and  machine-pistol  fire.  Pergrin 
brought  the  four  survivors  back  to 
Malmedy  in  his  jeep.  Their  story  did 
not  shake  the  determination  of  his  engi- 
neers to  defend  Malmedy  "to  the  last 


man 


m21 


On  the  chance  that  Peiper  would 
bypass  Malmedy  (as  he  did)  and  head 
for  Stavelot,  Pergrin  sent  a  squad  of  his 
engineers  equipped  with  twenty  mines 
and  one  bazooka  south  to  set  up  a  road- 
block at  Stavelot.  They  emplaced  a 
hasty  minefield  at  the  approach  to  a 
stone  bridge  leading  into  the  town  and 
waited.  At  1900  three  Mark  IV  tanks 
came  toward  the  bridge.  The  first  struck 
a  mine  that  blew  off  its  treads;  the  oth- 
ers withdrew.  Two  of  the  engineers, 
Pfc.  Lorenzo  A.  Liparulo  and  Pvt.  Ber- 
nard Goldstein,  tried  to  follow  the  tanks 
in  a  jeep.  They  were  wounded  by  Ger- 
man fire,  Liparulo  fatally,  but  the  Ger- 
mans did  not  attack  again  until  early 
next  morning.  By  that  time  a  company 
of  the  526th  Armored  Infantry  Battal- 
ion, towing  3-inch  antitank  guns,  had 
reinforced  the  engineer  roadblock.  The 
armored  infantry  managed  to  repulse 
a  German  infantry  attack  but  was  no 
match  for  the  88-mm.  guns  on  Ger- 
man tanks  that  began  rumbling  over  the 
bridge  into  the  town  about  0800.'^"^ 


While  the  fighting  was  still  going  on 
inside  Stavelot,  Peiper  turned  some  of 
his  tanks  west  toward  Trois  Ponts,  the 
next  town  on  his  route  to  the  Meuse. 
In  his  own  words,  "We  proceeded  at 
top  speed  towards  Trois  Ponts  in  an 
effort  to  seize  the  bridge  there.  ...  If 
we  had  captured  the  bridge  at  Trois 
Ponts  intact  and  had  had  enough  fuel, 
it  would  have  been  a  simple  matter  to 
drive  through  to  the  Meuse  River  early 
that  day."^"^ 

Trois  Ponts,  as  its  name  suggests, 
boasted  three  bridges — one  over  the 
Ambleve  that  provided  entry  to  the 
town;  another  over  the  Salm  within  the 
town,  carrying  the  main  highway  west; 
and  a  third  over  the  Salm  southeast  of 
town.  By  the  time  Peiper  turned  his 
lead  tanks  toward  Trois  Ponts  the  1 1 1 1th 
Engineer  Combat  Group  had  prepared 
all  three  bridges  for  demolition.  Com- 
pany C  of  the  group's  51st  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion,  ordered  the  night 
before  to  defend  the  town,  had  placed 
charges  on  two  of  the  bridges,  and  a 
detachment  of  the  291st  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  had  prepared  the  third. 
The  engineers  were  armed  only  with 
bazookas  and  machine  guns,  but  dur- 
ing the  morning  a  57-mm.  antitank  gun 
with  its  crew,  somehow  separated  from 
the  526th  Armored  Infantry  Battalion, 
turned  up  in  the  town  and  was  used  to 
block  the  road  from  Stavelot. 

At  11 15  on  18  December,  when  the 
first  enemy  tank  came  into  sight,  the 
engineers  blew  the  bridge  over  the 
Ambleve.  Half  an  hour  later  the  lead 
tank  ran  into  the  roadblock.  The  57-mm. 
gun  immobilized  it,  but  fire  from  other 
tanks  knocked  out  the  gun  and  killed 
four  of  the  crew.  Finding  the  bridge 


2"  Ibid.,  p.  99. 

2'  Hist  291st  Engr  C  Bn,  Dec  44. 

^^  Hewitt,  Work  Horse  of  the  Western  Front,  p.  174. 


23  Cole.  Th"  Ardennes:  The  Battle  of  the  Bulge,  p.  267. 


THE  ARDENNES:  ENGINEERS  AS  INFANTRY 


473 


blown,  Peiper's  men  hesitated  for  about 
forty-five  minutes.  Though  the  tanks 
could  not  cross,  the  narrow,  shallow 
Ambleve  offered  no  obstacle  to  infan- 
try. The  defenders  expected  an  infan- 
try attack,  and  Company  C  spread  out 
for  500  yards  along  the  steep  far  bank. 
The  Germans  apparently  decided  not 
to  risk  an  infantry  crossing  at  that  point, 
but  they  did  attempt  to  cross  at  the 
bridge  southeast  of  town,  which  the 
291st  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  blew 
while  two  German  soldiers  were  on  the 
span. 

Peiper's  lead  tanks  then  turned  north, 
seemingly  probing  for  a  way  to  outflank 
the  town.  Colonel  Anderson  had  the 
bridge  over  the  Salm  within  Trois  Ponts 
destroyed.  In  midafternoon  he  de- 
parted for  First  Army  headquarters, 
leaving  the  defense  of  Trois  Ponts  in 
the  hands  of  a  new  arrival  on  the  scene, 
Maj.  Robert  B.  Yates,  the  51st  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion's  executive  of- 
ficer. 

As  darkness  fell  at  1700,  Major  Yates 
drew  his  men  back  to  the  center  of 
Trois  Ponts  where  they  could  hear  the 
sound  of  enemy  armor  and  vehicles  all 
night.  Yates  employed  several  ruses  to 
hide  his  weakness  in  men  and  weapons 
from  the  enemy.  He  moved  small  groups 
of  riflemen,  firing,  from  point  to  point; 
he  had  a  heavy  truck  driven  noisily 
around  the  streets  to  mimic  the  sound 
of  arriving  artillery;  and  to  create  the 
impression  that  reinforcements  were 
coming  in  from  the  west,  all  night  he 
ran  his  five  trucks  out  of  town  with 
lights  out  and  back  in  town  with  lights 
on.  Also,  he  received  an  unexpected 
assist  from  a  tank  destroyer  that  his 
men  had  set  afire  to  keep  it  out  of 
enemy  hands — the  105-mm.  shells  with- 
in the  burning  vehicle  continued  explod- 


ing for  some  time.  These  deceptions 
apparendy  worked,  for  the  Germans 
did  not  attack.  Just  before  midnight 
their  tanks  moved  north  up  the  road 
toward  Stoumont.^"^ 

That  day,  18  December,  infantry  of 
the  30th  Division  arrived  to  man  the 
defenses  at  Malmedy  and  Stavelot.  One 
of  the  division's  regimental  combat 
teams  went  into  position  to  interrupt 
Peiper's  tanks  at  Stoumont,  but  the 
engineers  were  the  sole  defenders  of 
Trois  Ponts  all  that  day  and  the  next."^^ 
Late  on  19  December  a  small  advance 
party  of  paratroopers  arrived  from  the 
west.  They  were  from  the  82d  Airborne 
Division,  elements  of  which  Maj.  Gen. 
Matthew  B.  Ridgway,  commanding  gen- 
eral of  the  XVIII  Airborne  Corps,  had 
rushed  forward  to  help  stop  Peiper. 
The  newcomers  did  not  know  that  the 
critical  bridgehead  of  Trois  Ponts  was 
in  friendly  hands,  much  less  that  it  was 
held  by  a  single  engineer  company. 
Greeting  the  paratroopers.  Major  Yates 
joked,  "I'll  bet  you  guys  are  glad  we're 
here."'-^^ 

Next  afternoon,  following  an  enemy 
artillery  barrage  that  killed  one  engi- 
neer and  wounded  another,  a  company 
of  the  505th  Parachute  Infantry  Regi- 
ment arrived  at  Trois  Ponts  with  a  pla- 
toon of  airborne  engineers.  But  when 
the  infantrymen  took  up  a  position  on 
a  hill  east  of  town  they  were  sur- 
rounded, and  troops  of  the  51st  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  had  to  provide 
covering  fire  to  extricate  the  airborne 


'■^^  Hist  51st  EngrC  Bn,Jun-Dec  44,  and  Jnl  entry, 
18  Dec  44;  Hists,  291st  Engr  C  Bn  and  1 1 1 1th  Engr  C 
Gp,  Dec  44. 

^^  Hewitt,  Work  Horse  of  the  Western  Front,  pp. 
174-77. 

'^^  Cole,  The  Ardennes:  The  Battle  of  the  Bulge,  p.  351. 


474 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


force.  Not  until  dusk  on  2 1  December 
were  Yates'  men  able  to  withdraw  from 
the  defensive  positions  they  had  held 
for  five  days  and  journey  to  their  battal- 
ion headquarters  at  Marche,  far  to  the 
west.  Exhausted  and  numb  from  the 
bitter  cold  (the  temperature  had 
dropped  to  20°  P.),  they  had  been 
"spurred  to  almost  superhuman  effort" 
by  the  "heroic  example  and  leadership 
of  Major  Yates."^^ 

Combined  elements  of  the  82d  Air- 
borne, 30th  Infantry,  and  3d  Armored 
Divisions  stopped  Peiper  on  the  Am- 
bleve  near  Stoumont.  The  deepest  pene- 
tration in  the  Batde  of  the  Bulge  was  to 
be  made  not  by  the  Sixth  Panzer  Army 
but  by  the  Fifth  Panzer  Army  to  the 
south. 

Delaying  Fifth  Panzer  Army 
from  the  Our  to  the  Meuse 

On  the  Skyline  Drive  in  Luxembourg 
it  had  been  snowing  or  raining  off  and 
on  throughout  the  first  two  weeks  in 
December.  Clearing  away  accumula- 
tions of  snow  and  icy  slush  was  the  prin- 
cipal task  of  Company  B  of  the  103d 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  quartered 
at  Hosingen.  The  company  was  sup- 
porting the  28th  Division's  1 10th  Infan- 
try, located  in  the  center  of  the  divi- 
sion's frontline  positions.  Other  compa- 
nies of  the  same  engineer  battalion  were 
supporting  the  112th  Infantry  on  the 
north  and  the  109th  Infantry  on  the 
south. 

Because  the  28th  Division  could  not 
hope  to  defend  every  mile  of  its  23-mile- 
long  front,  the  division  commander  had 
set  up  a  series  of  strongpoints;  Hosin- 


■^'  Hist  51st  Engr  C  Bn,  Oct,  Nov,  Dec  44,  and  Jnl 
entry,  20  Dec  44. 


gen  was  one.  Garrisoned  by  Company 
K  of  the  3d  Battalion,  1 1 0th  Infantry, 
Hosingen  overlooked  two  roads  from 
Germany  that  crossed  the  Our  River, 
wound  over  the  Skyline  Drive,  de- 
scended to  the  Clerf  River,  and  then 
continued  west  for  fourteen  miles  to 
the  important  road  center  of  Bastogne. 
One  road,  crossing  the  Skyline  Drive 
about  two  miles  north  of  Hosingen,  was 
a  paved  highway,  the  best  east-west 
route  in  the  sector.  About  two  miles 
west  of  the  drive  the  road  ran  through 
the  castle  town  of  Clerf  on  the  Clerf 
River,  where  the  1 10th  Infantry  had  its 
headquarters.  The  other  road,  muddy 
and  winding,  crossed  the  Skyline  Drive 
just  south  of  the  outskirts  of  Hosingen. 
The  engineers  knew  this  secondary 
road  well.  They  had  accompanied  in- 
fantry over  it  on  several  small  raids  into 
Germany,  using  rubber  boats  to  cross 
the  Our,  and  on  it  they  had  emplaced 
an  abatis  and  planted  a  minefield. 

At  0530  on  16  December,  a  German 
barrage  of  massed  guns  and  rockets 
reverberated  over  the  Skyline  Drive  for 
about  half  an  hour.  As  dawn  broke, 
cloudy  and  cold  with  patches  of  ground 
fog,  infantry  of  the  26th  Volksgrenadier 
Division  came  up  the  muddy  road.  Some 
troops  bypassed  Hosingen,  but  one  bat- 
talion entered  the  town.  Company  K, 
1 10th  Infantry,  and  Company  B,  103d 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  put  up  a 
strong  defense.  House-to-house  fight- 
ing continued  all  day,  but  no  German 
tanks  appeared  until  the  morning  of 
the  seventeenth — German  engineers 
had  failed  to  erect  heavy  bridging  at 
the  nearest  Our  River  crossing.  When 
the  tanks  reached  Hosingen  they  set 
the  town  afire,  but  the  defenders  held 
out  until  the  evening  of  the  seven- 
teenth, after  Clerf  had  surrendered. 


THE  ARDENNES:  ENGINEERS  AS  INFANTRY 


475 


Communications  had  been  out  since  the 
heavy  opening  barrage  on  the  sixteenth, 
so  the  headquarters  of  the  103d  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battahon  at  Eschdorf, 
twelve  miles  to  the  southwest,  had  no 
word  from  this  last  bastion  until  0050 
on  18  December.  Then  an  officer  got 
through  to  report  that  the  evening 
before,  the  troops  at  Hosingen  had  still 
been  fighting.  Out  of  ammunition  and 
beyond  the  range  of  American  artillery, 
they  were  withdrawing  from  house  to 
house,  using  hand  grenades.  After  that 
nothing  more  was  heard. ^^ 

During  the  night  of  1 7  December  the 
Germans,  having  secured  two  bridges 
over  the  Clerf  River  at  Clerf  and  far- 
ther south  at  Drauffelt,  moved  swiftly 
west  in  several  columns.  One  turned 
south  toward  the  28th  Division  com- 
mand post  at  Wiltz,  twelve  miles  east  of 
Bastogne. 

The  defenders  of  Wiltz  included  600 
men  of  the  44th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion. This  unit,  along  with  the  168th, 
the  159th,  and  the  35th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalions  and  Combat  Command 
Reserve  of  the  9th  Armored  Division, 
made  up  General  Middleton's  VIII 
Corps  reserve.  Until  noon  of  1 7  Decem- 
ber the  44th  Battalion  had  been  work- 
ing in  the  corps  area  as  part  of  the 
1 107th  Engineer  Combat  Group,  main- 
taining roads  and  operating  two  saw- 
mills, a  rock  quarry,  and  a  water  point. 
Then  General  Middleton  sent  the  bat- 
talion to  Wiltz  and  attached  it  to  the 
29th  Infantry  Division,  whose  com- 
mander, Maj.  Gen.  Norman  D.  Cota, 
gave  the  engineers  the  mission  of  de- 
fending the  town.  Cota's  plan  called  for 
securing  Wiltz  and  covering  all  ap- 
proaches to  the  town.  Supporting  the 


Hist  103d  Engr  C  Bn,  Dec  44. 


Placing  Charges  To  Drop  Trees 
across  roadways. 

engineers  were  remnants  of  the  707th 
Tank  Battalion  with  six  crippled  tanks 
and  five  assault  guns;  four  towed  3-inch 
guns  from  a  tank  destroyer  battalion;  a 
depleted  battalion  of  105-mm.  divi- 
sional artillery;  and  a  provisional  battal- 
ion of  infantry  organized  from  head- 
quarters troops.  The  105-mm.  howit- 
zers went  into  battery  along  a  road  lead- 
ing southeast  from  Wiltz,  while  the  rest 
of  the  defense  force  manned  a  perime- 
ter north  and  northeast  of  town,  north 
of  the  Wiltz  River. 

About  noon  on  18  December  tanks 
and  assault  guns  of  the  Panzer  Lehr 
Division's  Reconnaissance  Battalion  struck 
the  forward  outposts,  overrunning  a  sec- 
tion of  tank  destroyers.  The  engineers 
held  their  fire  until  the  German  infan- 
try arrived  behind  the  tanks  and  then 
cut  it  down.  But  the  weight  of  armor 


476 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


proved  too  strong,  and  the  engineers 
had  to  withdraw  to  a  second  line  of 
defense. 

During  the  night  activity  on  both 
sides  was  limited  to  intense  patrolling 
and  harassing  fire.  Next  morning  the 
defenders  were  able  to  dig  in  and  gen- 
erally improve  their  positions,  but  in 
the  middle  of  the  afternoon  the  Ger- 
mans attacked  strongly  from  the  north, 
northeast,  and  east  with  tanks  accompa- 
nied by  infantry  armed  with  machine 
pistols.  The  three-hour  attack  cut  the 
engineers'  Company  B  to  pieces.  At 
dusk  the  44th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion was  forced  to  withdraw  into  Wiltz, 
having  suffered  heavy  casualties. 

The  engineers  still  felt  confident, 
believing  that  the  attack  had  cost  the 
Germans  dearly  and  gained  them  little 
ground.  They  also  felt  safer  after  they 
blew  the  bridge  over  the  Wiltz.  But 
about  1800  a  new  German  column  was 
reported  approaching  from  the  south- 
east, on  the  same  side  of  the  river  as 
the  town.  A  few  hours  later  the  enemy 
had  cut  all  roads  to  Wiltz,  and  ammuni- 
tion was  running  low.  At  2130  the 
defense  force  received  orders  to  pull 
back  toward  American  lines  to  the  rear. 
It  was  a  grueling  and  bloody  withdrawal 
through  German  roadblocks  and  a 
gauntlet  of  fire.  The  44th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  suffered  heavily  dur- 
ing the  evacuation,  losing  18  officers 
and  160  enlisted  men.^^ 

While  the  44th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion  was  defending  Wiltz,  two  of 
the  VIII  Corps'  reserve  engineer  battal- 
ions were  engaged  elsewhere.  On  the 
north  the  168th,  supporting  the  106th 
Division,  was  astride  the  road  from 


Schoenberg  to  St.-Vith;  on  the  south 
the  159th,  attached  to  the  4th  Division, 
was  preparing  to  bar  the  way  to  Luxem- 
bourg City.  Thus,  by  1300  on  17  De- 
cember, General  Middleton  had  only 
one  reserve  engineer  battalion,  the 
35th.  Relieving  the  battalion  of  attach- 
ment to  the  1102d  Engineer  Combat 
Group,  he  assigned  it  to  the  defense  of 
Bastogne.'^^ 

By  then  Bastogne  was  in  great  dan- 
ger. In  midafternoon  the  commander 
of  Combat  Command  Reserve  of  the 
9th  Armored  Division  (spread  out  along 
the  paved  road  leading  into  the  city 
from  Clerf)  reported  that  the  Germans 
were  overrunning  his  most  advanced 
roadblock.  The  enemy  was  then  less 
than  nine  miles  from  Bastogne.  Gen- 
eral Middleton  was  expecting  reinforce- 
ments— the  101st  Airborne  Division 
from  SHAEF  reserve  and  Combat  Com- 
mand B  of  the  10th  Armored  Division 
from  Third  Army — but  these  units 
could  not  arrive  until  18  December.  In 
the  meantime,  the  engineers  would 
have  to  guard  the  approaches  to  Bas- 
togne. At  the  suggestion  of  the  VIII 
Corps  engineer,  a  second  engineer  com- 
bat battalion  was  committed.  It  was  the 
158th,  not  a  part  of  Middleton's  formal 
reserve  but  part  of  First  Army's  1 128th 
Engineer  Combat  Group,  which  was 
working  in  his  area  and  could  be  called 
upon  "in  dire  circumstances."^* 

The  158th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion received  orders  at  1730  on  17  De- 
cember to  take  over  the  35th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion's  3,900-yard  left  flank 
extending  from  Foy,  a  town  on  the 
main  paved  road  (N— 15)  leading  into 
Bastogne  from  the  north  to  Neffe,  a 


Hist  44th  Engr  C  Bn,  Oct.  Nov,  Dec  44. 


^"  Hist  35th  Engr  C  Bn,  Oct  44-Apr  45. 

^'  Cole,  The  Ardennes:  The  Battle  of  the  Bulge,  p.  310. 


THE  ARDENNES:  ENGINEERS  AS  INFANTRY 


477 


Road  Maintenance  Outside  Wiltz,  Belgium 


town  just  south  of  the  main  paved  road 
(N  — 28)  from  the  east — the  most  likely 
direction  of  the  German  advance.  The 
VIII  Corps  engineer  advised  that  a 
takeover  in  the  blackness  of  the  winter 
night  would  be  too  difficult,  and  the 
commander  of  the  158th,  Lt.  Col.  Sam 
Tabet,  postponed  the  arrival  of  his  bat- 
talion at  the  perimeter  until  daybreak 
at  18  December.  Company  A  began  to 
dig  in  on  the  left  near  Foy,  Company  B 
near  Neffe,  and  Company  C  near 
Luzery,  just  north  of  Bastogne.  To  help 
hold  his  line  of  defense  astride  the 
roads  along  which  the  Germans  were 
advancing,  Tabet  obtained  4  tank  de- 
stroyers mounting  105-mm.  howitzers, 
8  light  tanks,  and  2  Shermans,  all  taken 
from  ordnance  shops  and  manned  by 


ordnance  mechanics.  The  battalion  also 
managed  to  round  up  950  antitank 
mines.  ^ 

During  the  daylight  hours  of  18  De- 
cember the  engineers  sent  out  recon- 
naissance parties  and  set  up  roadblocks, 
using  chains  of  mines,  bazookas,  .50- 
caliber  machine  guns,  and  rifle  grenades. 
Late  that  evening  they  were  attached 
to  the  10th  Armored  Division,  whose 
Combat  Command  B  was  expected  to 
arrive  momentarily.  Around  midnight 
they  heard  rifle  and  automatic  weap- 
ons fire  to  the  east,  and  Germans  over- 
ran one  of  the  engineer  roadblocks  a 


^'^  Hist  158th  Engr  C  Bn,  17  Dec-20  Dec  44.  Unless 
otherwise  cited,  this  account  of  the  1 58th  is  taken 
from  this  source. 


478 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


few  miles  down  the  road  from  the  com- 
mand post. 

At  0600  next  morning  tanks  of  the 
Panzer  Lehr  Division  hit  the  engineer 
roadblock  at  Neffe,  manned  by  Com- 
pany B's  2d  Platoon  under  a  young 
lieutenant,  William  C.  Cochran.  Coch- 
ran could  not  tell  in  the  darkness  and 
fog  whether  the  approaching  tanks 
were  German  or  American,  so  he  went 
forward  to  get  a  better  look.  He  was 
quite  close  to  the  first  tank  when  he 
called  back  to  his  men,  "These  are 
Germans."  From  the  tank  someone 
replied  in  English,  "Yes,  we  are  super- 
men" and  fired.  Cochran  fired  back, 
killing  two  men  riding  on  the  tank.^^ 

Pvt.  Bernard  Michin,  waiting  at  the 
roadblock  with  a  bazooka,  peered  at  the 
advancing  tank.  Never  having  fired  the 
weapon  before,  he  let  the  vehicle  come 
within  ten  yards  of  him  to  be  sure  of 
his  target.  At  that  range  the  explosion 
seared  Michin's  face  and  totally  blinded 
him.  He  rolled  into  a  ditch,  stung  with 
pain.  A  German  machine  gun  stuttered 
nearby,  and  he  tossed  a  hand  grenade 
in  the  direction  of  the  firing,  which 
stopped  abruptly.  Still  blind,  he  ran 
toward  American  lines  where  willing 
hands  among  the  platoon  guided  him 
to  the  rear.  His  sight  returned  only  after 
another  eight  hours,  but  his  heroism 
had  earned  him  the  Distinguished  Ser- 
vice Cross. ^"^ 

By  the  evening  of  19  December,  in- 
fantry of  the  10 1st  Airborne  Division 
had  relieved  the  1 58th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion,  and  the  battalion  was  back 
in  a  bivouac  area  well  to  the  west.  But 
the  engineers  were  to  be  allowed  only 
the  briefest  respite.  Beginning  at  2200 


the  158th  was  alerted  to  defend  a  Bai- 
ley bridge  at  Ortheuville,  about  ten 
miles  west  of  Bastogne.  This  bridge, 
which  carried  the  VIII  Corps'  main 
supply  route  (N— 4,  from  Namur  via 
Marche)  over  the  western  branch  of  the 
Ourthe  River,  was  threatened  by  recon- 
naissance tanks  of  the  2d  Panzer  Division. 
Advancing  southwest  along  Route  N  — 
26,  which  intersected  N— 4  about  seven 
miles  west  of  Bastogne,  they  were  prob- 
ing for  a  route  west  to  bypass  that  city.^^ 

The  299th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion had  prepared  the  Bailey  bridge  at 
Ortheuville  for  demolition  and  with 
detachments  of  the  1278th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  had  been  setting  up 
roadblocks  and  mining  bridges  in  a 
wide  arc  behind  Bastogne  to  bar  the 
way  to  Germans  bypassing  the  city  to 
the  north  or  south.  Because  the  Ortheu- 
ville bridge  was  vital  to  the  supply  route 
the  engineers  had  not  yet  demolished 
it.  As  the  Germans  began  to  attack 
toward  the  bridge  during  the  early 
hours  of  20  December,  defenses  con- 
sisted of  not  more  than  a  platoon  of 
the  299th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion, 
reinforced  by  eight  tank  destroyers  the 
705th  Tank  Destroyer  Battalion  had 
left  behind  on  its  way  to  Bastogne. ^^ 

Arriving  in  Ortheuville  at  daybreak 
on  20  December,  the  2d  Platoon  of  the 
158th's  Company  B  found  that  German 
machine-gun  and  rifle  fire  had  driven 
the  299th  Battalion's  platoon  off  the 
Bailey  bridge  and  that  the  Germans  had 
seized  it.  The  158th's  platoon  separated 
into  squads,  crossed  the  Ourthe  on  a 


^'^  Smith,  "A  Few  Men  in  Soldier  Suits,"  p.  31. 
■^^  Ibid.;  see  also  Hist  J 58th  Engr  C  Bn. 


"'^  Cole,  The  Ardennes:  The  Battle  of  the  Bulge,  pp. 
319-20  and  map  VI. 

"^  Hists,  299th  Engr  C  Bn,  16-22  Dec  44,  and  5th 
Engr  C  Bn  (formerly  1278th  Engr  C  Bn),  16-24  Dec 
44. 


THE  ARDENNES:  ENGINEERS  AS  INFANTRY 


479 


small  wooden  bridge,  and  attacked  the 
Germans'  right  and  left  flanks.  The 
engineers  pushed  the  plunger  to  blow 
up  the  bridge,  but  nothing  happened; 
presumably  German  fire  had  cut  the 
wiring.  Tank  destroyers  stopped  an 
enemy  tank  column  attempting  to  cross 
the  bridge,  and  at  noon  the  Germans 
withdrew. ^^  With  the  arrival  of  the  1st 
and  3d  Platoons,  Company  B,  158th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  advanced 
down  Route  N  — 4  to  the  intersection 
with  N  — 26,  clearing  the  road  and  set- 
ting up  roadblocks.  Elements  of  Com- 
panies A  and  C  joined  later  in  the 
afternoon,  bringing  forward  four  105- 
mm.  tank  destroyers.  By  the  end  of  the 
day  the  158th  had  made  Route  N-4 
safe  for  convoys  of  gasoline  and  ammu- 
nition to  roll  into  Bastogne  from  depots 
at  Marche. 

At  1800,  Company  B,  which  had 
done  most  of  the  battalion's  fighting 
for  the  past  two  days,  withdrew  to  a 
bivouac  area,  but  an  hour  later  it  was 
alerted  again.  The  Bailey  bridge  at 
Ortheuville  was  under  heavy  artillery 
fire,  and  at  2000  German  armor  over- 
ran the  roadblock  at  the  intersection  of 
Routes  N  — 4  and  N  — 26,  continuing  up 
N  — 4.  As  soon  as  the  2d  Platoon  of 
Company  B  arrived  on  the  scene  some 
of  the  men  crossed  to  the  enemy  side 
of  the  bridge  and  planted  antitank  mines 
across  the  road,  but  they  failed  to  stop 
the  Germans  and  had  to  withdraw  across 
the  wooden  bridge. 

In  three  attacks,  one  involving  a  party 
of  four  Germans  dressed  as  civilians  or 
U.S.  soldiers,  the  enemy  tried  to  seize 
the  wooden  bridge  but  was  repulsed. 
Then,  after  a  second  attempt  to  blow 


the  bridge  failed,  a  fourth  German 
attack  was  successful.  The  enemy  infan- 
try forded  the  river  and  picked  off  the 
defenders  silhouetted  against  the  glare 
of  the  burning  houses  beyond.  At  mid- 
night German  armor  began  clanking 
across  the  Bailey  bridge.  After  a  part- 
ing shot  from  one  of  their  four  tank 
destroyers  caused  a  gratifying  (but  in- 
conclusive) explosion,  the  engineers 
withdrew  about  eight  miles  southwest 
to  St.  Hubert,  where  in  the  early  after- 
noon they  were  ordered  to  take  over 
the  defense  of  Libramont,  another  eight 
miles  to  the  south. 

The  German  armored  column  cross- 
ing the  Bailey  bridge  at  Ortheuville  ran 
into  roadblocks  established  by  the  51st 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  sent  down 
from  Marche.  This  was  the  battalion  that 
had  contributed  its  Company  C  to  the 
defense  of  Trois  Ponts.  On  21  Decem- 
ber the  other  two  companies  were  guard- 
ing a  barrier  line  along  the  eastern 
branch  of  the  Ourthe  River  from  Hot- 
ton,  about  six  miles  northeast  of  Marche, 
to  La  Roche,  nine  miles  southeast  of 
Hotton,  and  were  manning  roadblocks 
south  of  Marche  on  Route  N  — 4  and 
southwest  of  Marche  as  far  as  Roche- 
fort.^« 

The  defense  of  Hotton,  at  the  west- 
ern end  of  an  important  Class  70  bridge 
over  the  Ourthe,  was  in  the  hands  of  a 
squad  from  Company  B  and  half  a 
squad  from  Company  A.  The  1 16th 
Panzer  Division,  attacking  from  the  north- 
east in  an  attempt  to  get  to  the  Meuse 
north  of  Bastogne,  shelled  Hotton  at 
daybreak  on  21  December  and  then 
struck  with  about  five  tanks  and  some 
armored  infantry — the  spearhead  of  an 


"  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  10,  Combat  Engineering, 
pp.  24-25. 


'**  AAR,  51st  Engr  C  Bn,  Jun-Dec  44,  and  Hist  51st 
Engr  C  Bn,  Oct,  Nov,  Dec  44.  Unless  otherwise  cited, 
this  account  is  taken  from  these  two  sources. 


480 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


armored  brigade.  In  the  ensuing  fire- 
fight  the  American  defenders  included 
half  a  squad  of  Company  A,  the  squad 
of  Company  B,  ten  men  of  the  bat- 
talion's Headquarters  and  Service  Com- 
pany, and  two  40-mm.  gun  sections 
from  the  battalion's  attached  antiair- 
craft battery.  They  were  joined  by  sev- 
eral bazooka  teams,  a  few  3d  Armored 
Division  engineers  with  a  37-mm.  gun, 
and  a  Sherman  tank  with  a  76-mm.  gun 
that  the  engineers  discovered  in  an  ord- 
nance shop  on  the  edge  of  the  town 
and  had  commandeered  along  with  its 
crew.  This  scratch  force,  under  the 
command  of  Capt.  Preston  C.  Hodges 
of  Company  B,  managed  to  hold  the 
town  until  shortly  after  noon,  when  a 
platoon  of  tanks  of  the  84th  Infantry 
Division  arrived  from  Marche  and  a 
task  force  of  the  3d  Armored  Division 
came  in  from  the  east.^^ 

Stopping  the  German  Seventh  Army 

At  the  southernmost  portion  of  the 
VIII  Corps  front  the  Our  flowed  into 
the  Sauer  and  the  Sauer  formed  the 
boundary  between  Luxembourg  and 
Germany.  There  General  der  Panzer- 
truppen  Erich  Brandenberger's  Seventh 
Army,  composed  of  two  infantry  corps, 
attacked  on  16  December.  This  army 
was  the  "stepchild  of  the  Ardennes 
offensive,"  lacking  the  heavy  support 
accorded  the  two  powerful  panzer  ar- 
mies on  the  north. ^^  Its  mission  was  to 
guard  the  flank  of  the  Fifth  Panzer  Army. 
Its  northernmost  corps  (the  LXXXV), 
with  the  352d  Volksgrenadier  Division, 


^^  Theodore  Draper,  The  84th  Infantry  Division  in  the 
Battle  of  Germany  (New  York:  Viking  Press,  1946),  p. 
90;  Spearhead  in  the  West:  The  Third  Armored  Division,  p. 
111. 

''"  Cole,  The  Ardennes:  The  Battle  of  the  Bulge,  p.  258. 


was  to  cross  the  Our  north  of  its  junc- 
ture with  the  Sauer  and  advance  on  a 
westward  axis  parallel  to  the  Fifth  Pan- 
zer Army.  The  southernmost  corps,  the 
LXXX,  with  the  276th  and  2l2th  Volks- 
grenadier Divisions,  was  to  establish  a 
bridgehead  at  the  town  of  Echternach 
on  the  Sauer  and  make  a  limited  ad- 
vance to  the  southwest  in  the  direction 
of  Luxembourg  City. 

Guarding  the  line  of  the  Our  on  the 
north  was  the  28th  Division's  1 09th 
Infantry.  It  was  attacked  by  the  352d 
Volksgrenadier  Division  and  the  Fifth  Pan- 
zer Army  5th  Parachute  Division,  which 
was  driving  a  wedge  between  the  109th 
and  the  110th  Infantry  regiments  to 
the  north.  Most  of  the  28th  Division's 
meager  reserves  had  gone  to  the  hard- 
pressed  110th  Infantry,  in  the  path  of 
the  powerful  Fifth  Panzer  Army.  Among 
the  few  reserves  allotted  to  the  109th 
Infantry  was  Company  A  of  the  103d 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  which  was 
attached  to  the  109th  on  the  evening  of 
16  December.^' 

By  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  elements 
of  the  German  parachute  division  on 
the  extreme  north  had  crossed  the  Our 
at  Vianden  (about  thirteen  miles  south- 
east of  Wiltz)  on  a  prefabricated  bridge 
emplaced  in  about  an  hour,  broken 
through  to  the  Skyline  Drive,  and  cut 
off  several  109th  Infantry  outposts. 
The  rapidity  of  this  advance,  threaten- 
ing Wiltz,  caused  the  28th  Division  com- 
mander to  request  some  of  the  109th 
Infantry's  reserves.  A  platoon  of  tanks 
with  an  infantry  platoon  aboard  and  a 
few  engineers  started  north,  but  could 
neither  stop  nor  penetrate  the  north- 
ern wing  of  the  352d  Volksgrenadier 


"  Hist  103d  Engr  C  Bn,  Dec  44,  S-2  and  S-3  Jnis. 


THE  ARDENNES:  ENGINEERS  AS  INFANTRY 


481 


Division;  they  joined  the  withdrawal 
westward  toward  Wiltz.  The  southern 
wing  of  the  352d,  on  the  other  hand,  en- 
countered Americans  dug  in  on  heights 
in  a  triangle  formed  by  the  confluence 
of  the  Our  and  the  Sauer.  On  the  night 
of  1 7  December  the  Volksgrenadier  Divi- 
sion received  some  bridging  equipment 
and,  with  its  increasing  strength  in 
heavy  weapons  including  Tiger  tanks, 
was  able  to  break  through  the  defenders' 
roadblocks  and  take  Diekirch,  six  miles 
southwest  of  the  Our  crossing,  on  20 
December.  That  night  the  division  ad- 
vanced nearly  three  miles  farther  to 
take  Ettelbruck,  a  German  objective  for 
16  December.  By  delaying  the  German 
division  four  days,  the  outnumbered 
defenders  had  disrupted  enemy  plans. 
The  engineers  who  established  road- 
blocks and  manned  outposts  had  made 
a  considerable  contribution.  One  pla- 
toon patrolling  roads  in  the  forward 
area  captured  twelve  Germans  before 
it  was  forced  to  withdraw. ^"^ 

Just  to  the  south,  where  the  LXXX 
Corps  was  attacking,  the  60th  Armored 
Infantry  Battalion  of  the  9th  Armored 
Division,  an  untried  unit  sent  to  this 
quiet  sector  for  combat  indoctrination, 
held  about  six  miles  of  front.  When  the 
276th  Volksgrenadier  Division  attacked 
the  armored  battalion,  the  9th  Armored 
Division  commander  sent  forward  rein- 
forcements of  tanks,  tank  destroyers, 
and  artillery;  the  infantry  reinforce- 
ments consisted  of  a  company  of  divi- 
sional engineers.  The  new  strength  ena- 
bled the  armored  infantry  battalion  to 
fight  as  a  combat  command  and  to  put 
up  strong  resistance  to  the  276th.  Least 
effective  of  the  three  Seventh  Army  divi- 
sions committed  to  the  battle,  the  276th 


Hist  103d  Engr  C  Bn,  Dec  44. 


had  no  tanks,  and  American  shelling 
effectively  interfered  with  its  attempts 
to  get  heavy  weapons  over  the  Sauer. 
The  division  had  to  pay  heavily  for  the 
three  or  four  miles  it  was  able  to  ad- 
vance from  the  Sauer — a  more  limited 
penetration  than  that  of  any  other 
Seventh  Army  division. 

General  Brandenberger  sent  his  best 
division,  the  212th  Volksgrenadier,  across 
the  Sauer  about  twelve  miles  southeast 
of  Vianden  into  a  hilly  area  around  the 
town  of  Echternach  known  as  "Little 
Switzerland."  This  was  the  northern 
portion  of  the  35-mile-long  front,  bor- 
dered by  the  Sauer  and  the  Moselle, 
and  held  by  Maj.  Gen.  Raymond  O. 
Barton's  depleted  4th  Infantry  Division. 

Crossing  the  narrow,  swift  Sauer  at 
several  points  in  rubber  boats,  the  Ger- 
man troops  quickly  overcame  forward 
elements  of  the  12th  Infantry,  the  only 
troops  in  the  Echternach  area.  Here,  as 
in  other  sectors,  the  preliminary  Ger- 
man artillery  barrage  cut  wire  communi- 
cations; in  this  sector,  held  by  a  regi- 
ment battered  in  Huertgen  Forest,  ra- 
dios were  scarce  and  had  very  limited 
range  in  the  broken  terrain.  Thus,  it 
was  around  noon  before  General  Bar- 
ton, at  division  headquarters  near  Lux- 
embourg City  about  twenty  miles  south- 
west of  Echternach,  had  a  clear  picture 
of  what  was  happening.  From  the  mea- 
ger stocks  of  his  70th  Tank  Battalion 
he  allotted  the  12th  Infantry  eight  me- 
dium and  ten  light  tanks,  making  possi- 
ble the  formation  of  tank-infantry  teams 
to  aid  the  hard-pressed  infantry  compa- 
nies at  the  front.  With  one  of  these 
teams.  Task  Force  Luckett,  the  4th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  went  for- 
ward to  hold  high  ground  near  Breid- 
weiler,  about  five  miles  southwest  of 
Echternach,  but  when  no  enemy  ap- 


482 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


peared  part  of  the  battalion  returned 
to  engineer  work.^^ 

On  the  afternoon  of  16  December 
General  Barton  telephoned  General 
Middleton,  the  VIII  Corps  commander, 
to  ask  for  reinforcements.  All  Middle- 
ton  could  offer  was  the  159th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion,  which  was  working 
on  roads  throughout  the  corps  area  as 
far  north  as  Wiltz  and  Clerf.  Middle- 
ton  told  Barton  that  "if  he  could  find 
the  engineers  he  could  use  them.'"*"* 

Barton  found  the  headquarters  of 
the  159th  in  Luxembourg  City.  The 
engineers  were  ready  for  orders  to 
move  to  the  front,  for  two  of  their 
trucks  on  a  routine  run  to  pick  up  rock 
at  Diekirch  in  the  28th  Division  area 
had  returned  with  the  news  that  the 
rock  quarry  was  under  German  fire. 
On  17  December  the  battalion  was  at- 
tached to  Task  Force  Riley  from  Com- 
bat Command  A  of  the  10th  Armored 
Division,  whose  objective  was  the  vil- 
lage of  Scheidgen,  some  four  miles 
south  of  the  Sauer  on  the  Echternach— 
Luxembourg  City  road.  The  Germans 
had  already  overrun  Scheidgen,  bypass- 
ing roadbound  U.S.  tanks  by  going 
through  the  woods. ^^ 

On  the  morning  of  18  December,  wet 
and  cold  with  heavy,  low-hanging  clouds, 
the  engineer  battalion  drew  ammuni- 
tion and  grenades  and  moved  forward 
from  Luxembourg  City.  Company  B 
remained  in  reserve  several  miles  to  the 
rear.  Accompanied  by  light  tanks  and 
tank  destroyers,  Companies  A  and  C 
advanced  toward  Scheidgen,  the  engi- 


^•^  Hist  4th  Engr  C  Bn,  May -Dec  44. 

"•^  Cole,  The  Ardennes:  The  Battle  of  the  Bulge,  p.  243. 

^^  The  159th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  (Antwerp:  De 
Vos  van  Kleef,  Ltd.,  1945),  pp.  17-19.  The  account 
of  the  action  around  Scheidgen  is  taken  from  this 
source. 


neers  through  woods  south  of  the  town 
and  the  tanks  on  a  road  from  the  west. 
They  took  the  town  without  much  op- 
position, though  part  of  Company  C 
received  heavy  small-arms  fire  from 
Hill  313,  about  a  mile  north.  After  a 
night  in  Scheidgen  under  heavy  Ger- 
man shelling  the  two  engineer  compa- 
nies secured  Hill  313,  which  overlooked 
the  Echternach— Luxembourg  City  road. 
They  dug  foxholes  and  waited.  They 
could  see  Germans  moving  around  at 
the  foot  of  the  hill,  and  next  morning, 
20  December,  they  received  a  barrage 
of  enemy  artillery,  mortar,  and  rocket 
fire.  Then  two  parties  of  Germans  tried 
to  come  up  the  hill,  but  were  repulsed. 
That  day.  Company  B  (minus  one  pla- 
toon) came  up,  assuming  positions  on 
high  ground  about  800  yards  west  of 
Hill  313,  while  Companies  A  and  C 
took  turns  going  into  Scheidgen  for  hot 
food  and  a  little  rest.  The  engineers 
kept  hearing  reports  that  infantry  was 
coming  up  to  relieve  them,  but  none 
arrived. 

On  the  morning  of  2 1  December  the 
Germans  attacked  again.  Some  charged 
up  Hill  313  screaming  and  firing  auto- 
matic weapons,  but  the  main  force  hit 
Company  B  on  the  left,  drove  a  wedge 
between  two  platoons,  killed  the  com- 
pany commander,  and  occupied  the 
company's  positions.  The  tactical  value 
of  Hill  313  was  lost,  and  Scheidgen  had 
become  a  shambles  from  heavy  pound- 
ing by  German  artillery.  Companies  A 
and  C  withdrew  to  positions  slightly 
southeast  of  Scheidgen  toward  Michel- 
shof,  while  the  remnants  of  Company 
B  went  to  the  rear. 

Michelshof,  a  crossroads  town  on  the 
road  to  Luxembourg  City,  formed  part 
of  the  main  line  of  resistance.  The  two 
engineer  companies,  accompanied  by 


THE  ARDENNES:  ENGINEERS  AS  INFANTRY 


483 


two  medium  tanks  and  a  tank  destroyer 
and  commanded  by  Capt.  Arthur  T. 
Surkamp,  the  battalion  S  — 3,  dug  in 
there  on  22  December.  Nothing  lay 
between  them  and  the  enemy  on  the 
north  but  a  badly  mauled  company 
from  the  12th  Infantry,  a  patch  of 
woods,  and  some  open  fields.  During 
the  day  they  came  under  rocket  and 
artillery  fire,  but  supporting  artillery 
of  the  10th  Armored  Division  put  a  stop 
to  most  of  it. 

About  1700,  as  dusk  was  falling,  en- 
emy troops  moved  out  of  the  woods  in 
V  formation  and  advanced  across  the 
fields  toward  the  engineers.  Captain 
Surkamp,  alerting  the  artillery  to  "drop 
them  in  close"  when  signaled,  ordered 
the  engineers  to  hold  their  fire.  When 
the  leading  soldiers  were  150  yards 
away,  the  engineers,  the  tankers,  and 
the  artillery  opened  fire.  Most  of  the 
enemy  in  the  formation  were  killed  or 
wounded. 

On  the  morning  of  23  December  the 
engineers  woke  to  find  that  the  heavy 
clouds  were  gone.  Soon  they  heard  the 
drone  of  motors,  and  American  fighter 
and  bomber  planes  passed  over.  "This 
was  the  thing  we  had  sweated  out  for 
days  and  there  they  were,  you  then 
knew  that  the  jig  for  Herr  Hitler  was 

"46 

up. 

The  next  morning,  Christmas  Eve, 
Third  Army  infantry  relieved  the  men 
of  the  159th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion. General  Patton  was  swinging  the 
bulk  of  his  troops  north  to  pound  the 
German  southern  tlank,  relieve  Bas- 
togne,  and  help  end  the  Battle  of  the 
Ardennes. 

General  Middleton  credited  the  engi- 
neers with  doing  a  "magnificent  job"  as 


infantry  in  repulsing  the  Germans  in 
the  Ardennes.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
VIII  Corps  engineer  and  various  engi- 
neer group  commanders  believed  that 
the  engineer  combat  battalions  could 
have  done  more  to  impede  the  Ger- 
man advance  had  they  been  employed 
not  in  the  front  line  but  in  a  tactically 
unified  second  line  of  defense  in  the 
rear.  Going  a  step  further,  the  official 
Army  historian  of  the  Battle  of  the 
Ardennes  states  that  "the  use  of  engi- 
neers in  their  capacity  as  trained  techni- 
cians often  paid  greater  dividends  than 
their  use  as  infantry"  and  points  out 
that  Field  Marshal  Walter  Model  issued 
an  order  on  18  December  forbidding 
the  use  of  the  German  pioneer  troops 
as  infantry .^^ 

Yet  on  the  defensive  in  the  Ardennes 
General  Middleton  had  to  depend  on 
the  engineers.  At  crucial  points  on  the 
front,  such  as  Auw,  divisional  engineers 
were  the  only  troops  on  the  scene  when 
the  Germans  struck.  Because  there  was 
thought  to  be  little  danger  of  an  attack 
in  this  quiet  sector,  aside  from  a  single 
armored  combat  command  General 
Middleton's  only  reserves  consisted  of 
four  engineer  combat  battalions — the 
44th,  35th,  168th,  and  150th.  They 
fought  in  defense  of  Wiltz,  Bastogne, 
St.-Vith,  and  Michelshof.  Several  First 
Army  engineer  combat  battalions  which 
were  operating  sawmills  in  the  area — 
the  291st,  51st,  and  158th — distin- 
guished themselves  at  Malmedy,  at  Trois 
Fonts  and  Hotton,  and  at  Bastogne  and 
Ortheuville.  The  engineers  were  able 
to  upset  the  German  timetable,  delay- 
ing the  onrushing  columns  long  enough 
for  American  reinforcements  to  be 
brought  to  the  five  main  pillars  of 


The  159th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  p.  20. 


Cole,  The  Ardennes:  The  Battle  of  the  Bulge,  p.  329. 


484 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


resistance — Elsenborn  ridge,  the  forti- 
fied "goose  egg"  area  around  St.-Vith, 
Bastogne,  Echternach,  and  Marche.^^ 

Engineers  in  NORDWIND 

When  the  German  Ardennes  offen- 
sive fell  on  12th  Army  Group  in  full 
fury  in  mid-December  1944,  General 
Devers  estimated  that  it  was  only  a  mat- 
ter of  time  before  German  forces  would 
strike  6th  Army  Group  to  prevent  its 
advancing  to  aid  the  12th  Army  Group 
to  its  immediate  north.  At  the  end  of 
the  month  the  Seventh  Army  held  a 
broad  salient,  eighty-four  miles  of  front 
that  wound  into  the  northeastern  cor- 
ner of  Alsace  from  Saarbruecken  to  the 
Rhine  River,  with  limited  bridgeheads 
across  the  German  border.  The  right 
flank  of  the  Seventh  Army  line  ran 
south  along  the  Rhine  to  a  point  below 
Strasbourg.  There,  the  First  French 
Army  zone  began,  running  farther 
south  and  including  a  vise  closed  on 
the  pocket  of  German  divisions  pinned 
in  their  positions  around  Colmar.  A 
German  plan.  Operation  NORDWIND, 
developed  by  Christmas  Day,  called  for 
a  massive  double  envelopment  to  catch 
the  entire  Seventh  Army.  Converging 
German  attacks,  one  to  the  north  out 
of  the  Colmar  Pocket,  would  join  an- 
other arm  driving  south  near  the  Magi- 
not  Line  town  of  Bitche.  They  would 
meet  around  Sarrebourg,  twenty  to 
thirty  miles  behind  the  Seventh  Army 
lines.  The  offensive  was  set  for  31 
December  1944. 

By  28  December,  General  Devers  had 
ordered  a  phased  withdrawal  through 
three  defensive  lines,  the  first  along  the 


^^John  S.  D.  Eisenhower,  The  Bitter  Woods  (New 
York:  Putnam,  1969),  pp.  462-63. 


Maginot  Line  and  the  others  marking 
a  progressive  pullout  to  strong  positions 
in  the  Low  Vosges  Mountains.  These 
orders  changed  repeatedly  as  the  Ger- 
man thrusts  failed  and  as  French  pro- 
tests about  the  surrender  of  Alsatian 
territory  reached  SHAEF  headquarters, 
but  regardless  of  the  changes,  the  con- 
struction of  the  defenses  fell  to  the 
engineers. 

In  the  last  two  weeks  of  December 
the  three  veteran  engineer  combat 
regiments,  the  540th,  the  40th,  and  the 
36th,  began  extensive  work  in  the  VI 
Corps  area,  the  most  exposed  north- 
eastern corner  of  Alsace,  which  the  Ger- 
mans now  proposed  to  isolate.  Basing 
much  of  the  fortification  on  the  Magi- 
not structures  assigned  as  the  first  de- 
fense line,  the  engineers  supplemented 
their  construction  with  roadblocks,  usu- 
ally employing  concealed  57-mm.  anti- 
tank gun  positions.  Across  the  rear  of 
the  corps  and  the  army  area  they  pre- 
pared all  bridges  for  demolition. 

The  1st  Battalion,  540th  Engineer 
Combat  Regiment,  extracted  itself  from 
a  precarious  position  at  the  start  of  the 
German  drive.  Assigned  to  VI  Corps, 
the  regiment  was  alerted  as  early  as  18 
December  against  German  attacks  ex- 
pected over  the  Rhine,  but  no  serious 
threats  had  developed  by  Christmas 
Day  on  the  regimental  front,  and  the 
engineers  spent  a  peaceful  holiday.  The 
unit  was  busy  through  the  end  of  1944 
extending  Maginot  Line  positions,  lay- 
ing mines,  and  constructing  bridges 
around  Baerenthal,  fifteen  miles  south 
of  Bitche. 

In  the  early  morning  hours  of  New 
Year's  Day  1945,  the  1st  Battalion  of 
the  540th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment 
assembled  at  Baerenthal,  organizing  as 
infantry  to  help  meet  the  enemy  ad- 


THE  ARDENNES:  ENGINEERS  AS  INFANTRY 


485 


vance  into  the  unit's  general  area.  Small 
units  joined  counterattacks  or  rescue 
attempts  through  the  morning.  Com- 
pany B  stood  with  the  117th  Cavalry 
Reconnaissance  Squadron  in  the  line. 
Before  sunup,  two  platoons  of  Com- 
pany A  assaulted  German  positions  to 
open  a  path  for  isolated  elements  of 
the  125th  Armored  Engineer  Battalion. 
Two  platoons  of  Company  C  went  into 
the  main  line,  flanking  elements  of  the 
62d  Armored  Infantry  Battalion. 

By  midmorning  the  rescued  125th 
Armored  Engineer  Battalion  took  posi- 
tions in  the  main  line  with  Company  C, 
540th  Engineer  Regiment,  in  the  face 
of  the  rapidly  developing  German  on- 
slaught. The  hastily  collected  defenses 
of  widely  disparate  units  sagged  under 
the  weight  of  the  German  drive  and 
finally  broke  at  noon,  sending  Com- 
pany C  retreating  upon  the  1st  Battal- 
ion headquarters.  Just  as  the  headquar- 
ters detachment  finished  burning  its 
unit  records,  the  Germans  overran  the 
area,  and  the  engineers  joined  the  gen- 
eral withdrawal. 

By  mid-January,  the  1st  and  2d  Bat- 
talions, 540th  Engineer  Combat  Regi- 
ment, were  again  in  the  line  as  infantry 
in  45th  Division  positions  around 
Wimmenau  and  Wingen,  twenty-five 
miles  south  of  Bitche  and  twenty  miles 
southeast  of  1st  Battalion's  former 
positions  around  Baerenthal.  The 
regiment's  major  concern  other  than 
combat  was  the  construction  of  works 
near  the  towns  of  Haguenau  and 
Vosges,  a  defensive  line  intended  to 
contain  other  German  thrusts  across  the 
Rhine.^^ 

On  VI  Corps'  left  the  36th  Engineer 


Combat  Regiment  relieved  the  I79th 
Infantry,  45th  Division,  on  1  January 
1945  and  continued  to  operate  as  infan- 
try until  7  February.  The  regiment 
began  withdrawing  from  positions 
north  of  Wissembourg  on  the  Franco- 
German  border  to  the  main  line  of 
resistance  in  the  Maginot  bunkers  and 
trenches  and  sent  aggressive  patrols 
through  inhabited  points  well  forward 
of  this  line  to  prevent  a  solid  enemy 
front  from  taking  shape. ^^ 

When  the  German  drives  on  the 
whole  Seventh  Army  front  had  spent 
themselves  by  mid-January,  the  36th 
Engineer  Combat  Regiment  moved  to 
relieve  the  275th  Infantry.  The  engi- 
neers occupied  the  right  flank  position 
of  the  157th  Infantry  in  the  45th  Divi- 
sion line  while  the  infantry  regiment 
led  the  division's  counterattack  on  the 
enemy  salient  from  Bitche  toward  the 
south  on  14  January.  In  this  case  the 
36th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment  wit- 
nessed a  disaster. 

As  part  of  a  double  envelopment  to 
clear  the  enemy  from  the  Mouterhouse- 
Baerenthal  valley,  the  157th  Infantry 
had  advanced  one  battalion  against  the 
positions  of  the  6th  SS  Mountain  Divi- 
sion in  the  valley  and  the  woods  around 
it,  but  the  unit  was  pinned  down  and 
then  surrounded.  In  eight  days  of  heavy 
fighting,  the  regiment  attacked  with  its 
remaining  battalions  to  extricate  the 
surrounded  unit.  On  the  fifteenth  two 
more  companies  drove  their  way  into 
the  encirclement,  only  to  find  them- 
selves trapped  with  the  surrounded 
battalion.  After  five  concerted  assaults 
on  the  German  lines,  the  157th  had  to 
abandon  the  effort,  and  the  regiment 


*"Hist  540th  Engineer  Regiment  [11  Sep  42-14 
Feb  45],  pp.  21-24. 


5"  Hist  Rpt,  36th  Engr  C  Rgt,  Jan  45. 


486 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Seventh  Army  Engineers  Install  a  Bridge  on  the  III  River 


left  the  line  on  21  January;  breakout 
attempts  from  within  the  pocket  gained 
the  freedom  of  only  2  men  of  the  origi- 
nal 750  engulfed  in  the  German  net. 
Engineer  attacks  to  relieve  the  pressure 
on  the  I57th's  right  were  of  no  avail. 
The  five  companies  were  annihilated.^' 
The  beginning  of  January  found  the 
40th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment  spread 
out  on  VI  Corps'  right  flank,  support- 
ing the  three  infantry  divisions  facing  a 
German  thrust  across  the  Rhine  River 
in  the  vicinity  of  Gambsheim,  fifteen 
miles  north  of  Strasbourg.  The  bulk  of 
the  regiment  was  with  the  79th  Infan- 
try Division,  with  one  battalion  support- 
ing the  3d  Division.  By  early  February 

^'  Seventh  Army  Report,  vol.  II,  pp.  588-90;  Hist  Rpt, 
36th  Engr  C  Rgt,  Jan  45. 


the  40th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment, 
reinforced  with  the  111th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion,  fell  in  behind  the 
36th  Infantry  Division,  involved  in  clear- 
ing the  west  bank  of  the  Rhine. ^^ 

While  this  clearing  operation  was 
being  completed.  Seventh  Army  was 
already  moving  to  reverse  the  tide  of 
Operation  NORDWIND  and  to  straight- 
en its  front  in  preparation  for  its  own 
assault  on  the  Siegfried  Line  and  for 
crossing  the  Rhine.  The  first  of  these 
operations  was  the  elimination  of  the 
Colmar  Pocket,  which  had  held  out  all 
winter  despite  determined  French  as- 
saults. General  Devers  gave  the  XXI 
Corps,    under    Maj.    Gen.    Frank  W. 


Hist  Rpt,  40th  Engr  C  Rgt,  Jan  45. 


THE  ARDENNES:  ENGINEERS  AS  INFANTRY 


487 


Millburn,  to  the  operational  control  of 
the  First  French  Army  for  the  mop-up. 
The  3d,  the  28th,  and  the  75th  Infan- 
try Divisions,  the  12th  Armored,  and 
the  2d  French  Armored  Divisions  had 
their  own  organic  engineers,  supple- 
mented by  numerous  attached  special 
units  whose  services  were  needed  to 
keep  open  main  supply  routes  for  the 
troops  cleaning  out  the  remnants  of 
German  resistance  around  Colmar.  The 
1145th  Engineer  Combat  Group,  at- 
tached to  XXI  Corps,  was  the  parent 
organization  for  these  units.  The  lack 
of  treadway  bridge  units  in  the  6th 
Army  Group  area  was  partially  allevi- 
ated by  the  attachment  of  the  998th 
Treadway  Bridge  Company  from  12th 
Army  Group  and  a  detachment  of  the 
196th  Engineer  Dump  Truck  Company, 
converted  into  a  bridge  unit. 

American  engineers  repeatedly  went 
into  the  line  as  infantry  during  the 
Colmar  action.  The  290th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  spent  the  whole 
period  of  its  assignment  to  XXI  Corps 
in  direct  contact  with  the  enemy  and 
aggressively  pursued  retreating  Ger- 
man units  in  maneuvers  with  the  1 12th 
Infantry,  28th  Infantry  Divisiorf.^^ 

The  elimination  of  the  Colmar  Pocket 
in  mid-February  released  the  XXI  Corps 
for  action  on  the  left  flank  and  center 
of  the  Seventh  Army  line.  The  attached 


^^  Unit  Hists,  1 145th  Engr  C  Gp,  196th  Engr  Dump 
Truck  Co,  998th  Engr  Treadway  Bridge  Co,  and 
290th  Engr  C  Bn.  The  6th  Army  Group  attached 
seven  other  units  to  the  French  Army's  operational 
control  in  January  and  February  1945.  Among  them 
were  the  677th  Light  Maintenance  Company,  1271st 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  Company  B  of  the  1553d 
Engineer  Heavy  Ponton  Battalion,  the  25th  and  the 
286th  Engineer  Combat  Battalions,  and  the  3d  Battal- 
ion of  the  40th  Engineer  Combat  Regiment.  The  3d 
Armored  Engineer  Battalion  was  attached  to  the  2d 
French  Armored  Division.  6th  Army  Gp  Sitreps, 
Jan-May  45. 


engineer  units  reverted  to  Seventh 
Army  control  for  use  in  a  series  of  lim- 
ited objective  assaults  which  eventually 
brought  French  and  American  divisions 
to  the  Siegfried  Line.  After  crossing  the 
Saar  and  the  Blies  Rivers,  Allied  forces 
were  on  German  soil  and  in  front  of 
the  city  of  Saarbruecken.  The  6th  Army 
Group  troops  did  not  reach  the  Sieg- 
fried Line  until  mid-March,  long  after 
the  Allies  to  the  north  had  overcome 
that  obstacle  in  the  late  fall  of  1944. 

Seventh  Army  Through  the  Siegfried  Line 

The  6th  Army  Group  engineer.  Gen- 
eral Wolfe,  had  the  benefit  of  engineer 
intelligence  gathered  on  the  famous 
Siegfried  Line  defenses  farther  north 
in  the  12th  Army  Group  zones.  By  early 
December,  Seventh  Army  engineers 
had  detailed  studies  of  the  nature  of 
the  defenses  and  the  best  means  of 
breaching  them.  Farther  to  the  north, 
along  the  traditional  east-west  invasion 
corridors,  the  West  Wall  defenses  ran 
in  thicker  bands,  presenting  layers  of 
fortifications  sometimes  twelve  miles 
deep.  In  the  6th  Army  Group  sector 
the  line  was  formidable  but  generally 
less  deep  than  in  the  12th  Army  Group's 
zone.  The  6th  Army  Group  planners 
in  fact  developed  designs  to  break 
through  it  and  to  jump  the  Rhine  River, 
using  the  troops  that  had  trained  for 
that  eventuality  through  the  previous 
autumn.^'* 

General  Patch's  Seventh  Army  opened 
an  assault  on  the  line  on  15  March.  Cen- 
tral in  the  drive  was  the  XV  Corps 
which,  because  of  the  planned  ap- 
proach to  the  Rhine  behind  the  Ger- 


''^  AAR,  Seventh  Army  Engr,  Dec  44,  sub:  Breach- 
ing the  Siegfried  Line;  Seventh  Army  Report,  vol.  IH,  p. 
695. 


488 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


man  defenses,  had  the  540th  and  the 
40th  Engineer  Combat  Regiments  at- 
tached. Both  units  now  had  a  35-mile 
train  of  vehicles  and  trailers  with  river- 
crossing  equipment  retrieved  from  the 
forests  and  factories  of  Luneville.  To 
keep  the  main  arteries  clear  for  combat 
elements,  the  long  lines  of  laden  engi- 
neer vehicles  moved  mainly  on  second- 
ary roads,  a  feat  for  the  accompanying 
pile-driving  equipment  and  cranes. 

Engineer  troops  set  the  pace  of  the 
attack  in  many  places.  Each  regiment 
of  the  63d  Division,  whose  men  were 
the  first  to  reach  the  far  side  of  the 
Siegfried  defenses  in  the  XXI  Corps 
area,  had  one  company  of  the  263d 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  attached.  In 
a  performance  repeated  all  along  the 
assaulting  line,  these  engineers  used 
primacord  explosive  rope  and  the  heav- 
ier tank-launched  "Snake"  to  clear  paths 
through  minefields.  Hastily  erected 
treadway  bridges  carried  assaulting 
Shermans  over  the  antitank  trenches, 
while  engineer  satchel  charges  ex- 
tracted dragon's  teeth  to  make  paths 
for  vehicles.  Engineers  moved  with 
infantry  teams  to  demolish  concrete 
casemates,  forestalling  the  enemy's  at- 
tempts to  return  and  use  pillboxes 
again.  Many  of  the  bunker  entrances 
were  simply  sealed  with  bulldozed  earth. 
The  263d  Engineer  Combat  Battalion 
alone  used  fifty  tons  of  explosive  on 
the  German  fortifications.  The  Seventh 
Army  had  four  full  divisions  through 
the  vaunted  line  on  23  March. 


helping  the  combat  troops  to  move 
forward.  The  weather  turned  bitter 
cold,  and  snow  or  ice  covered  the  roads. 
Working  sometimes  in  blinding  snow- 
storms, the  engineers  scattered  cinders 
and  gravel  on  the  roads,  aided  in  some 
areas  by  German  civilian  laborers.  Fro- 
zen ground  and  deep  snow  made  mine 
removal  all  but  impossible.  At  one  time 
in  the  XIX  Corps  sector,  for  example, 
thirteen  bulldozers  were  lost  to  mines 
buried  deep  in  snow.  Since  normally 
fordable  streams  were  too  icy  for  wad- 
ing, the  engineers  had  to  build  foot- 
bridges or  use  assault  boats.  At  the  lit- 
tle Sure  River,  during  XII  Corps'  ad- 
vance in  late  January,  the  engineers 
turned  the  frozen  riverbank  to  advan- 
tage by  loading  men  into  assault  boats 
at  the  top  of  the  bank  and  shoving  the 
boats  downhill  like  toboggans.''^ 

A  thaw  during  the  first  week  of  Feb- 
ruary, far  more  extensive  than  usual, 
presented  worse  problems  than  the 
cold.  Roads  disintegrated  into  deep 
mud.  The  engineers  laid  down  crushed 
stone,  sometimes  on  a  bed  of  dry  hay, 
and  when  this  did  not  work  they  cordu- 
royed the  roads  with  logs,  using  pris- 
oner of  war  labor.  The  engineers  had 
to  build  highway  bridges  strong  enough 
to  withstand  the  rushing  streams 
flooded  by  melting  ice  and  snow.^^ 

By  mid-February  engineer  units  were 
again  being  drawn  from  their  normal 
duties  to  train  for  the  major  engineer 
effort  on  the  European  continent — the 
crossing  of  the  Rhine. 


After  the  Ardennes 

During  the  Allied  offensive  that  be- 
gan 3  January,  following  the  German 
repulse  in  the  Ardennes,  engineer  units 
were  generally  released  from  their  in- 
fantry role  and  reverted  to  the  task  of 


5^  Hist  XIX  Corps  Engrs,  p.  16,  ML  2220,  ETOUSA 
Hist  Sect;  Charles  B.  MacDonald,  The  Last  Offensive, 
United  States  Army  in  World  War  H  (Washington, 
1973),  p.  49. 

^•^OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  14,  Road  Maintenance 
and  Highway  Bridging,  pp.  39-40;  Engr  Opns  VII 
Corps,  vol.  VI,  "The  Roer  River  Crossings  and  Ad- 
vance to  the  Rhine,"  pp.  3-4. 


CHAPTER  XXII 


The  Roer  Crossing  and  the 
Remagen  Bridgehead 


The  ETOUSA  chief  engineer,  Maj. 
Gen.  Cecil  R.  Moore,  considered  the 
Rhine  crossing  nearly  as  important  as 
the  D-day  Channel  crossing.  Beginning 
early  in  October  1944  he  met  often  with 
SHAEF  engineers  from  all  British  and 
American  army  group  and  army  com- 
mand levels  and  with  members  of  the 
British  and  American  navies.  The  plan- 
ners decided  that  after  the  first  waves 
of  infantry  had  crossed  in  assault  boats, 
larger  LCVPs  and  LCM  landing  craft 
under  Navy  control  would  ferry  tanks, 
trucks,  and  supplies  and  enough  troops 
to  build  up  the  bridgehead  rapidly.  The 
engineers  would  then  string  stout  cable 
from  one  bank  to  the  other  to  guide 
DUKWs,  smaller  landing  craft,  and 
amphibious  tanks.  Once  established  on 
the  far  bank,  engineers  would  construct 
the  first  heavy  ponton  and  steel  tread- 
way  bridges.*  But  in  January  1945  no 
Allied  army  yet  stood  on  the  Rhine,  and 
the  force  most  likely  to  reach  it  still  had 
to  cover  difficult  terrain  and  cross  an- 
other river  that  provided  unexpected 
delays. 


'  Moore,  Final  Report,  p.  170;  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist 
Rpt  20,  Forced  Crossing  of  the  Rhine,  pp.  5—6,  and 
apps.  1—6. 


Sitting  tight  through  December  1944 
and  January  1945,  Lt.  Gen.  William  H. 
Simpson's  Ninth  Army  was  already 
perched  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Roer 
River  behind  Aachen,  holding  a  salient 
on  the  German  northern  flank.  Gen- 
eral Simpson  was  searching  for  the 
opportunity  to  act  on  plans  developed 
the  previous  October  to  sweep  from  the 
Roer  to  the  Rhine  and  past  it,  if  possi- 
ble. Ninth  Army  had  three  corps  ar- 
rayed on  a  thirty-mile  front  on  the 
Roer's  west  bank  from  Dueren  in  the 
south  to  Roermond  at  the  confluence 
of  the  Roer  and  the  Meuse.  There  the 
Germans  still  held  a  bridgehead  west 
of  the  Roer  in  the  first  week  of  Febru- 
ary 1945.  On  Ninth  Army's  right  was 
the  XIX  Corps  with  the  30th  and  29th 
Infantry  Divisions  in  the  assault  and  the 
83d  Infantry  and  2d  Armored  Divisions 
in  reserve;  in  the  center  was  XIII  Corps 
with  the  102d  and  84th  Infantry  Divi- 
sions on  the  line  and  the  5th  Armored 
in  reserve.  On  the  left,  occupying  a 
good  half  of  the  Army  front,  was  XVI 
Corps,  operational  only  since  7  Febru- 
ary. The  corps  consisted  of  the  35th 
and  79th  Infantry  Divisions  and  the  8th 
Armored  Division. 

In  Operation  GRENADE,  originally 
conceived  as  a  thrust  due  east  to  envel- 


490 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


op  Cologne  on  the  Rhine,  American 
forces  were  to  advance  northeast  to- 
ward Wesel,  converging  there  with  a 
First  Canadian  Army  attack,  Operation 
Veritable,  to  smash  the  weakened  ele- 
ments of  German  Army  Group  H.  Set 
for  10  February  1945,  the  Ninth  Army 
offensive  was  to  seal  the  northern  bor- 
der of  the  Ruhr  industrial  complex, 
while  the  British  Second  Army,  on 
Ninth  Army's  northern  flank,  struck 
out  northeast  across  the  northern  Ger- 
man plain.  On  the  very  eve  of  the 
attack,  the  Germans  hastily  played  one 
last  defensive  card  to  forestall  the  Ninth 
Army's  expected  assault.^ 

Already  the  subject  of  a  Ninth  Army 
engineer  study  in  January  1945  was  a 
complex  of  seven  dams  on  the  Roer 
River  and  its  tributaries.  Impounding 
a  flood  of  1 11  million  cubic  meters  of 
water,  the  two  largest  dams,  the  Urfttal- 
sperre  and  the  Schwammenauel,  repre- 
sented a  constant  threat  to  future  opera- 
tions. Air  attacks  on  the  Schwam- 
menauel had  failed  to  rupture  it,  and 
the  German  Ardennes  offensive  had 
interrupted  First  Army's  ground  attacks 
through  November  and  December 
1944.  On  4  February  1945,  First  Army 
troops  captured  the  Urft  Dam  with  no 
difficulty,  but  as  the  309th  Infantry, 
attached  to  the  9th  Infantry  Division, 
First  Army,  moved  in  late  on  the  ninth 
to  take  the  Schwammenauel  Dam,  the 
Germans,  leaving  the  face  intact,  blew 
out  all  the  dam's  discharge  valves.  No 
wall  of  water  sped  down  the  Roer  val- 
ley; rather,  the  cumulative  flow  caused 


'^  MacDonald,  The  Last  Offensive,  pp.  135-45;  Col. 
Theodore  W.  Parker  and  Col.  William  J.  Thompson, 
Conquer,  The  Story  of  the  Ninth  Army,  1944  —  1945 
(Washington:  Infantry  Journal  Press,  1947),  pp. 
1 14-60.  Tactical  detail  on  the  Grenade  operation  is 
taken  from  these  two  sources. 


a  slow,  steady  rise  in  the  Roer,  and  the 
stream  overflowed  its  banks  in  the  low- 
lying  areas  north  of  Dueren.  Usually 
averaging  ninety  feet  in  width,  the  river 
formed  lakes  twelve  hundred  feet  across 
in  places  and  achieved  velocities  that 
made  military  bridging  impossible. 
Based  on  the  observations  of  engineers 
posted  on  the  banks  and  aerial  photo- 
graphs that  recorded  the  slow  with- 
drawal of  the  waters.  Col.  Richard  U. 
Nicholas,  Ninth  Army  engineer,  finally 
predicted  that  operations  could  pro- 
ceed on  24  February.  The  inundation 
forced  the  impatient  Simpson  to  delay 
the  assault  for  the  better  part  of  two 
weeks,  time  spent  making  additional 
preparations  and  revising  plans. 

On  the  supposition  that  the  Germans 
would  not  expect  a  Roer  crossing  until 
after  24  February,  the  day  when  the 
dams  would  probably  empty  and  the 
river  return  to  normal.  General  Simp- 
son had  decided  to  achieve  surprise  by 
ordering  the  crossing  before  daylight 
on  23  February.  Colonel  Nicholas  ad- 
vised Simpson  that  the  river  by  that 
time  would  have  receded  enough  to 
make  a  crossing  possible  and  that  the 
Roer's  swift  current  would  have  sub- 
sided somewhat.  Preceded  by  a  tremen- 
dous 45-minute  artillery  preparation, 
the  Roer  crossings  of  XIX  Corps'  30th 
and  29th  Divisions  and  XIII  Corps' 
102d  and  84th  Divisions  (supported 
respectively  by  the  1115th,  1104th, 
1141st,  and  1149th  Engineer  Combat 
Groups)  began  at  0330  on  23  February 
from  Linnich  on  the  north  to  a  point 
below  Juelich  on  the  south. 

The  Roer  Crossings 

General  Simpson  later  called  the  Roer 
crossings  a  "rehearsal  for  the  Rhine," 


THE  ROER  CROSSING  AND  THE  REMAGEN  BRIDGEHEAD 


491 


Engineers  Emplace  Mats  To  Stabilize  the  Banks  of  the  Flooded  Roer 


but  actually  little  of  the  experience 
gained  at  the  Roer  would  prove  appli- 
cable to  the  Rhine. ^  The  rivers  were 
quite  different;  even  in  flood,  for  exam- 
ple, the  Roer  was  narrow.  For  such  a 
river,  engineer  doctrine  dictated  that 
after  the  assault  boat  crossings  prefabri- 
cated footbridges  would  be  used  to 
move  troops  to  the  far  bank  and  infan- 
try support,  heavy  ponton,  treadway, 
and  Bailey  bridges  quickly  thrown 
across.  In  the  Roer  crossings  no  naval 
landing  craft  of  the  type  so  important 
in  plans  for  the  Rhine  crossings  were 
required.'*  LVTs  were  available  from 


'  Lt.  Gen.  W.  H.  Simpson,  "Rehearsal  for  the  Rhine," 
Military  Review,  XXV,  no.  7  (October  1945),  20. 

-*  Interv,  Maj  Edward  L.  Waller,  S-2,  1 141st  Engr 
C  Gp,   12  Feb  45;  Folder,  Bridging  the  Roer:  The 


the  hundred  earmarked  for  the  Rhine 
crossings,  but  they  were  not  to  be  used 
except  in  special  circumstances,  where 
muddy  banks  or  unexpectedly  heavy 
enemy  fire  on  the  far  shore  were  en- 
countered.^ 

The  artillery  barrage  that  began  at 
0245  on  23  February  was  the  heaviest 
yet  laid  down  in  Europe.  The  engineers 
waiting  with  their  assault  boats  and  foot- 
bridge material  in  the  fields  along  the 
west  bank  of  the  Roer  or  in  cellars  saw 
in  the  pink  sky  to  the  rear  lightning- 


Contribution  of  the  Engineer  Combat  Groups  in  Ninth 
U.S.  Army,  23  Feb- 10  Mar  45,  CI  371,  ETOUSA 
Hist  Sect.  Subsequent  references  to  contents  of  this 
ETOUSA  Historical  Section  folder  will  be  cited  as: 
Bridging  the  Roer. 

^  Hewitt,  Work  Horse  of  the  Western  Front,  p.  218. 


492 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


like  flashes  from  the  big  guns.  In  the 
dark  sky  above  they  observed  long  red 
ribbons  of  tracer  rounds  from  machine 
guns,  and  on  the  east  bank  ahead  ex- 
ploding shells  illuminated  ruined  houses 
or  bare  tree  branches  and  sodden  fields. 
{Map  28) 

On  the  right,  about  three  miles  up- 
stream from  Juelich,  engineers  sup- 
porting the  30th  Division  crossed  some 
combat  troops  before  the  barrage  lifted. 
They  soon  found  that  they  were  to  suf- 
fer more  from  the  swift  current  than 
from  enemy  fire.  The  rushing  waters 
carried  assault  boats  downstream,  cap- 
sizing them  and  breaking  cables  when 
the  engineers  tried  to  anchor  foot- 
bridges. At  the  site  where  the  82d  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  was  trying  to  get 
the  1 20th  Infantry  across,  friendly  artil- 
lery fire  falling  on  the  far  bank  until 
0330  cut  a  footbridge.  Thereafter  the 
current,  as  strong  as  seven  miles  an 
hour  in  this  sector,  aborted  six  efforts 
to  replace  the  bridge.  Only  by  transfer- 
ring the  work  downstream  where  the 
current  was  slower  were  the  engineers 
able  to  build  a  footbridge  at  all,  and  it 
was  not  ready  for  use  until  1730.  In  the 
meantime,  the  234th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion,  assigned  to  the  1 1 15th  Group, 
carried  men  and  supplies  over  the  Roer 
in  ten  LVTs  that  made  a  total  of  fifty- 
four  trips  beginning  at  0330.  Other 
infantrymen  of  the  120th  Infantry 
crossed  via  a  footbridge  the  295th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  put  in  down- 
stream for  the  1 19th  Infantry.  The  cur- 
rent caused  trouble  for  treadway  bridges 
at  both  sites.  Delays  occurred  with  a 
treadway  the  295th  was  erecting  when 
boats  carrying  the  cable  to  the  far  bank 
overturned  or  swamped;  the  cable  was 
not  anchored  until  1400.  In  the  120th 
Infantry  sector  upstream,  the  82d  Engi- 


neer Combat  Battalion  anchored  its 
first  treadway  to  the  piles  of  a  demol- 
ished German  bridge. 

Elsewhere,  heavy  German  fire  added 
to  the  hazards  of  the  current.  On  the 
east  bank  at  Juelich,  an  old  Prussian 
garrison  town  where  XIX  Corps'  29th 
Infantry  Division  was  to  cross,  the  enemy 
held  commanding  positions  in  the  ruins 
of  the  town  and  at  an  ancient,  thick- 
walled  fortress,  the  Citadel.  Near  Lin- 
nich  on  the  west  bank,  two  XIII  Corps 
infantry  divisions,  the  102d  and  84th, 
had  to  cross  on  a  narrow  two-mile  front 
because  the  area  to  the  north  and  south 
was  flooded.  Crossing  at  Juelich  and 
Linnich,  which  the  Germans  would 
undoubtedly  expect,  had  obvious  dis- 
advantages. But  considering  the  prob- 
lems the  swampy  flats  elsewhere  posed, 
General  Simpson  decided  that  the  ad- 
vantage of  paved  roads  leading  into  and 
away  from  the  towns  justified  the  risk.^ 

The  paved  roads  leading  into  Juelich 
from  the  west  determined  the  location 
of  the  first  bridges  the  engineers  built. 
On  the  right,  where  the  road  from 
Aldenhoven  came  in,  the  narrowness 
of  the  river  and  the  height  of  the  far 
bank — offering  protection  against 
small-arms  fire — dictated  a  reversal  of 
the  usual  assault  procedure.  Rather 
than  crossing  in  boats,  most  assault 
troops  of  the  175th  Infantry  were  to 
cross  on  footbridges  built  by  the  1 104th 
Engineer  Combat  Group's  246th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion.  At  0430  on  23 
February  at  this  site  the  group's  247th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  was  to  start 
construction  of  two  tactical  bridges — 
one  heavy  ponton  and  one  treadway. 
About  the  same  time  the  246th,  having 
completed  three  footbridges,  was  to 


Simpson,  "Rehearsal  for  the  Rhine,"  p.  24. 


[Hilfarth 


ROER  RIVER  CROSSING 

23  February  1945 

0  2  4  Miles 

h- ^ ^ ^ ' 

0  2  4  Kilometers 


.Koerrenzig 


Linnich 


Roerdorf  ^    ^ 


3oslar 


\Broich 


Juelich 


u 


Aachen 


MAP  28 


^Aldenhoven 

Dueren 


^ 


494 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


move  downstream  to  build  an  infantry 
support  bridge  at  a  point  where  a  paved 
road  from  Boslar  entered  the  city.  This 
was  expected  to  be  the  first  vehicular 
bridge  into  Juelich,  although  the  site 
lay  under  the  guns  of  the  Citadel.  North 
of  Juelich,  where  the  river  was  wider, 
no  bridges  were  to  be  built  until  the 
floodwaters  subsided.  There,  where  a 
paved  road  ran  from  Boslar  to  the  riv- 
erbank  and  on  the  other  side  to  the 
village  of  Broich,  troops  of  the  115th 
Infantry  were  to  ferry  to  the  far  bank 
in  assault  boats  and  LVTs.^ 

Half  an  hour  before  the  opening  bar- 
rage lifted  on  23  February  three  assault 
boats  filled  with  divisional  engineers  of 
the  121st  Engineer  Combat  Battalion 
and  covering  troops  of  the  175th  Infan- 
try got  across  at  the  Aldenhoven  road 
site  against  scattered  German  machine- 
gun  fire.  These  troops  spread  out  along 
the  far  bank,  and  at  0330  the  246th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  began  work 
on  a  footbridge  under  a  smoke  screen. 
Although  making  it  difficult  for  the 
engineers  to  see  what  they  were  doing, 
the  smoke  protected  them  from  rifle, 
machine-pistol,  and  machine-gun  fire 
from  the  far  bank.  Again,  the  greatest 
problem  was  the  racing  current.  After 
some  difficulty  in  anchoring  the  cable, 
the  engineers  completed  the  first  foot- 
bridge on  schedule  at  0424.  But  a  few 
minutes  later  an  assault  boat,  swept 
downstream  by  the  current,  rammed 
into  the  bridge  and  buckled  it.  As  day 
broke,  cloudy,  damp,  and  chilly,  repairs 
to  this  bridge  went  on  simultaneously 
with  the  construction  of  two  additional 
footbridges.  The  engineers  completed 
one  footbridge  by  0600;  the  first  troops 
to  use  it  were  two  Germans  who  ran 


out  of  a  bunker  on  the  far  side  and 
surrendered  to  the  engineers.  By  0700 
all  three  footbridges  were  in  place,  and 
the  infantrymen  were  dashing  across 
to  clean  out  German  strongpoints  in 
houses  on  the  far  bank. 

Around  0900,  small-arms  fire  ceased 
to  harass  the  247th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion  which,  since  0430,  had  been 
constructing  the  heavy  ponton  and 
treadway  bridges  at  the  Aldenhoven 
site.  But  now  German  mortar  and  artil- 
lery fire  began  to  fall,  with  tragic  results 
at  the  treadway,  where  seven  rounds  of 
heavy  artillery  fire  killed  six  engineers 
and  wounded  eighteen.  The  fire  also 
destroyed  the  bridge.  Work  began  on  a 
new  bridge  twenty-five  yards  upstream 
at  1400,  but  observed  artillery  fire  and 
the  swift  current  delayed  completion 
until  late  the  following  morning.  The 
engineers  working  on  the  heavy  pon- 
ton bridge  were  luckier  and  had  the 
span  in  operation  by  1600  on  D-day. 
Before  darkness  fell  on  23  February 
tanks  and  bulldozers  were  clanking 
across.^ 

At  the  Boslar-Juelich  site  downstream 
the  beach  party  started  out  at  0300  in 
two  assault  boats.  One  capsized  and  the 
other  was  caught  by  the  current  and 
thrown  on  the  east  bank  near  a  mine- 
field, where  several  men  were  injured. 
These  two  incidents  cost  the  party  more 
than  half  its  strength.  The  246th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  suffered  a  series 
of  misfortunes  when  it  tried  to  build  an 
infantry  support  bridge  at  the  down- 
stream site.  The  engineers  had  swept 
the  approach  for  mines,  but  their  metal 
mine  detectors  were  ineffective  on  the 
plastic  Topf  mines  in  the  road  and  on 
the  shoulders.  After  the  Topf  mines 


'  Section  on  1 104th  Engineer  Combat  Group,  Bridg- 
ing the  Roer;  Ewing,  29  Let's  Go!,  pp.  225-27. 


^  Bridging   the    Roer;    Ewing,   29  Let's   Go!,    pp. 
228-31. 


THE  ROER  CROSSING  AND  THE  REMAGEN  BRIDGEHEAD 


495 


2d  Armored  Division  Tanks  Cross  the  Roer  Into  Juelich 


destroyed  a  wrecker,  two  tractors,  and 
two  dump  trucks,  the  engineers  spent 
six  hours  checking  the  road  by  probing. 
When  construction  finally  began,  heavy 
mortar  fire  from  the  Citadel  drove  off 
the  working  crews.  Some  crew  mem- 
bers infiltrated  to  the  bridge  from  a 
stadium  on  the  near  bank;  others  were 
guided  by  an  artillery  observation  plane 
that  flew  overhead,  signaling  to  the  men 
to  take  cover  when  the  observer  saw 
the  muzzle  flash  of  enemy  mortars.  The 
mortar  fire  stopped  when  the  Citadel 
fell  in  midafternoon,  but  when  the  engi- 
neers at  last  reached  the  site  the  swift 
current  made  it  impossible  to  stretch 
anchor  cables  across  the  river.  Not  until 
1000  on  24  February  were  the  engi- 
neers successful,  and  it  was  midafter- 


noon before  the  bridge  was  open  to 
traffic.^ 

By  that  time  the  current  downstream 
had  subsided  enough  to  enable  the 
engineers  to  build  bridges  for  the  1 15th 
Infantry.  In  spite  of  trouble  with  plas- 
tic mines  on  the  near  bank  and  the 
hampering  effect  of  heavy  smoke,  which 
blinded  and  sickened  the  engineers,  by 
daylight  they  had  most  of  two  infantry 
battalions  across  the  river  in  assault 
boats  and  LVTs.  On  the  east  bank 
minefields  held  up  the  infantry  for  a 
time,  and  although  one  infantry  battal- 
ion had  little  trouble  in  taking  and  clear- 
ing Broich,  heavy  fire  from  houses  and 
bunkers  on  high  ground  north  of  Juelich 


Bridging  the  Roer. 


496 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


held  the  second  from  its  objective  until 
late  in  the  evening.  The  third  infantry 
battalion,  routing  its  companies  through 
Broich,  reached  its  first-day  objective, 
a  hill  northeast  of  the  town.  There  it 
made  contact  with  the  102d  Infantry 
Division  on  the  left.'^ 

Troops  of  the  102d  Division,  which 
the  1141st  Engineer  Combat  Group 
supported,  crossed  the  Roer  down- 
stream at  two  sites  where  there  had 
once  been  bridges  (hence  paved  roads) 
— one  at  Roerdorf  (nearest  J uelich)  and 
another  at  Linnich.  At  Roerdorf  two 
companies  of  the  group's  1276th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  were  to  cross 
the  leading  waves  of  the  405th  Infan- 
try in  assault  boats,  then  emplace  an 
antimine  boom  and  build  a  treadway 
for  vehicles.  Simultaneously  with  the 
assault  boat  crossings  a  third  engineer 
company  was  to  build  two  footbridges 
upstream  from  the  treadway  site.  Stand- 
ing by  in  case  the  bridges  could  not  be 
built  or  were  knocked  out  were  some 
LVTs  manned  by  members  of  a  tank 
battalion.  As  the  American  artillery  bar- 
rage began,  the  engineers  carried  the 
assault  boats  and  footbridges  to  the 
riverbank,  a  hazardous  operation  be- 
cause German  artillery  had  all  roads 
leading  to  the  river  well  targeted. 

The  first  wave  of  assault  boats,  mov- 
ing off  at  H-hour  on  23  February, 
received  direct  hits  from  enemy  fire  on 
the  way  over;  several  boats  were  rid- 
dled by  shell  fragments  and  sank.  The 
swift  current  carried  many  empty  boats 
downstream  during  the  return  trip. 


'°  Ewing,  29  Let's  Go!,  pp.  223-31;  Joseph  Binkoski 
and  Arthur  Plaut,  The  115th  Infantry  Regiment  in  World 
War  II  (Washington:  Infantry  Journal  Press,  1948), 
pp.  282-83,  292-93. 


The  engineers  dragged  some  back,  but 
other  boats  were  swept  over  a  dam  and 
capsized.  By  the  time  the  second  wave 
had  reached  the  far  bank,  so  many  of 
the  original  twenty  assault  boats  had 
been  lost — most  hit  by  enemy  fire — that 
twenty  more  were  called  for.  German 
mortar  fire  knocked  out  the  second 
twenty  along  the  road  to  the  launching 
sites,  and  these,  too,  had  to  be  replaced. 
Of  the  total  of  sixty  boats  ultimately 
committed  only  two  were  still  usable 
when  ferrying  ended  about  0700.  By 
then  the  engineers  had  managed  to 
ferry  across  most  of  two  infantry  battal- 
ions. An  hour  later  several  LVTs  ar- 
rived on  the  scene,  but  they  were  in 
such  poor  shape  mechanically  that  they 
could  not  be  employed. 

The  engineers  had  bad  luck  with  the 
footbridges  from  the  start.  The  men 
carrying  them  down  to  the  river  came 
under  heavy  artillery  and  mortar  fire 
and  had  to  scatter.  When  the  engineers 
were  able  to  begin  working  they  had  to 
battle  the  current.  One  footbridge  over- 
turned and  could  not  be  rebuilt;  the 
other  parted  in  the  middle  when  its 
cable  lines  snapped.  The  engineers 
repaired  the  bridge,  only  to  see  it  col- 
lapse again  when  a  tree  fell  across  it;  it 
was  not  in  operation  until  1300.  In  the 
meantime,  divisional  engineers  had 
been  able  to  get  an  infantry  support 
bridge  across,  and  the  troops  used  this 
span  instead  of  the  footbridges.  Work 
on  a  treadway  began  at  0930  at  a  site 
immediately  upstream  from  the  demol- 
ished bridge  where  the  river  was  nar- 
rowest. That  site  was  relatively  free 
from  artillery  fire  because  the  enemy 
had  not  expected  a  crossing  there.  Nev- 
ertheless, the  swift  current  made  an- 
choring and  guying  difficult,  while 
marshiness  on  the  far  bank  caused  fur- 


THE  ROER  CROSSING  AND  THE  REMAGEN  BRIDGEHEAD 


497 


ther  delay.  The  bridge  was  not  open 
for  traffic  until  2200.^' 

At  the  Linnich  site  and  just  to  the 
south  the  1141st  Engineer  Combat 
Group's  279th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion was  to  cross  the  102d  Division's 
407th  Infantry.  There  the  same  haz- 
ards prevailed  as  at  the  Roerdorf  site — 
rapid  current  and  enemy  fire.  One 
treadway  was  in  place  at  1800,  but  low- 
flying  German  aircraft  bombed  it, 
wrecking  all  but  one  of  the  floats.  All 
traffic  during  the  night  of  23  —  24  Feb- 
ruary had  to  be  rerouted  over  the  Roer- 
dorf treadway,  which  for  a  time  was 
the  only  vehicular  bridge  in  the  XIII 
Corps  area.  This  bombing  raid  demon- 
strated the  importance  of  placing  high 
priority  on  getting  antiaircraft  weap- 
ons across  the  river. '^ 

German  bombs  also  fell  on  the  Lin- 
nich bridges  less  than  a  mile  north, 
whefe  troops  of  the  84th  Infantry  Divi- 
sion were  crossing  the  Roer  with  the 
support  of  the  1 149th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Group's  17 1st  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion.  In  this  narrowly  restricted 
area  plans  differed  from  those  the  30th 
and  102d  Divisions  followed — instead 
of  two  engineer  battalions  crossing  two 
infantry  regiments  abreast,  one  engi- 
neer battalion  was  to  cross  the  infantry 
regiments  in  succession.  ^^  After  getting 
the  first  wave — a  battalion  of  the  334th 
Infantry — over  in  assault  boats,  the 
17 1st  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  was 
to  build  at  Linnich  three  footbridges, 


' '  Section  on  1 141st  Engineer  Combat  Group,  and 
Interv  with  its  CO,  Col  William  L.  Rogers,  26  Feb.  45, 
both  in  Bridging  the  Roer;  Hist  1276th  Engr  C  Bn, 
Jan- May  45. 

'^  Section  on  1 141st  Engineer  Combat  Group,  Bridg- 
ing the  Roer;  Simpson,  "Rehearsal  for  the  Rhine,"  p. 
26. 

'•''  Draper,  The  84th  Infantry  Division  in  the  Battle  of 
Germany,  p.  141;  Hist  171st  Engr  C  Bn,  Jan -May  45. 


an  infantry  support  bridge,  and  two 
treadways.  Meantime  another  of  the 
1149th  Group's  battalions,  the  292d, 
was  to  build  a  Class  70  Bailey  bridge  at 
an  autobahn  crossing  about  four  miles 
north  of  Linnich  near  the  town  of  Koer- 

14 

renzig. 

The  334th  Infantry  characterized  the 
crossing  of  its  lead  battalion  as  smooth, 
marred  only  by  a  burst  of  enemy  ma- 
chine-gun fire  that  killed  five  men,  but 
attempts  to  build  footbridges  for  the 
succeeding  battalions  were  more  frus- 
trating here  than  anywhere  else  in  the 
entire  XIII  Corps  area.  The  current 
immediately  tore  out  the  first  foot- 
bridge, empty  assault  boats  racing  down- 
river from  the  102d  Division  crossings 
destroyed  the  second,  and  enemy  mor- 
tar fire  broke  the  cables  of  the  third. 
Not  until  1100  did  the  infantrymen 
have  a  footbridge  they  could  use.  In 
the  meantime  the  171st  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  had  suffered  a  number  of 
casualties  from  enemy  fire. 

All  84th  Division  bridging  was  de- 
layed. The  engineers  could  not  com- 
plete an  infantry  support  bridge  until 
1630,  and  the  treadway  bridge  was  not 
in  until  much  later.  At  daylight  a  pocket 
of  enemy  troops  that  the  334th  Infan- 
try had  bypassed  fired  on  anyone  who 
went  down  to  the  river  at  the  treadway 
site;  work  could  not  even  begin  until 
the  pocket  was  cleared  around  noon 
on  23  February.  The  engineers  then 
went  ahead  without  interference  and 
had  the  bridge  almost  ready  to  take 
traffic  at  2000  when  enemy  aircraft  flew 
over,  causing  casualties  and  damaging 
the  far  side  of  the  bridge.  This  was,  in 
the  words  of  the  84th  Infantry  Division 


'"*  Section  on  1149th  Engineer  Combat  Group, 
Bridging  the  Roer. 


498 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Footbrid(;e  on  the  Roer 


historian,  "perhaps  the  most  critical 
moment  of  the  first  day,"  because  it 
meant  that  no  tanks  or  tank  destroyers 
could  get  across  the  river  to  help  the 
infantry  on  D-day.  Using  material  in- 
tended for  the  second  treadway,  the 
engineers  were  able  to  replace  the  bridge 
by  noon  on  24  February,  At  dusk  the 
same  day  work  started  on  a  heavy  pon- 
ton bridge  at  the  site  originally  selected 
for  the  second  treadway,  and  the  pon- 
ton span  was  operational  before  dawn 
of  25  February.  Over  the  heavy  ponton 
and  treadway  crossed  the  entire  84th 
Infantry  Division,  elements  of  the  5th 
Armored  and  35th  Infantry  Divisions, 
and  corps  units,  including  artillery.''' 


'''  Cpl.  Perry  S.  Wolff,  A  History  of  the  334th  Infantry 
(Germany,  1945),  p.  81;  Hist  I71st  Engr  C  Bn,  Jan- 


The  most  ambitious  effort  in  the  XIII 
Corps  sector  was  the  construction  of  a 
Class  70  Bailey  bridge  across  the  Roer 
at  the  former  autobahn  crossing  north 
of  Linnich  near  Koerrenzig.  Having 
repaired  and  strengthened  an  existing 
120-foot  trestle  bridge  over  a  creek  west 
of  the  river  to  accommodate  Class  70 
loads,  the  292d  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion began  work  on  25  February  to 
bridge  the  220-foot  gap  over  the  Roer. 
This  involved  placing  a  pier  seventy  feet 
from  the  near  shore  and  then  closing  a 
150-foot  gap  with  a  triple-triple  Bailey 
and  the  last  70-foot  gap  with  a  triple- 
single.  Open  to  traffic  at  0830  on  26 


May  45;  Draper,  The  84th  Infantry  Division  in  the  Battle 
of  Germany,  pp.  151—52;  Section  on  1 149th  Engineer 
Combat  Group,  Bridging  the  Roer. 


THE  ROER  CROSSING  AND  THE  REMAGEN  BRIDGEHEAD 


499 


February,  this  bridge  became  the  main 
crossing  for  XIII  Corps."' 

Once  on  the  far  bank,  XIII  Corps' 
troops  made  such  good  progress  that 
General  Simpson  decided  not  to  hold 
them  back  to  provide  a  bridgehead  for 
XVI  Corps.  Instead,  he  directed  XVI 
Corps  to  seize  its  own  bridgehead  at 
Hilfarth,  about  five  miles  downstream 
from  Koerrenzig.  Spearheading  this 
crossing,  the  35th  Infantry  Division 
moved  out  in  the  evening  of  25  Feb- 
ruary. Next  morning  some  elements  of 
the  134th  Infantry  were  crossing  the 
Roer  on  two  footbridges  and  an  infan- 
try support  bridge  a  short  distance 
downstream  from  Hilfarth,  while  oth- 
ers were  attacking  the  town.  Many  in- 
fantrymen were  wounded  in  enemy 
minefields  that  the  Germans  covered 
with  small-arms  and  machine-gun  fire. 
Clearing  the  town,  the  troops  found 
that  although  the  highway  bridge  there 
was  somewhat  damaged,  it  was  still 
usable;  by  early  afternoon  the  bridge 
was  carrying  XVI  Corps  tanks  across 
the  Roer.  During  the  afternoon  corps 
engineers  built  two  treadway  bridges 
to  ease  traffic  problems.'^ 

The  Roer  crossings  had  consumed 
large  amounts  of  bridging  equipment 
and  numerous  assault  boats.  This  was 
the  price  General  Simpson  had  expected 
to  pay  for  the  surprise  he  achieved  by 
attacking  while  the  river  was  still  swollen, 
and  he  considered  "one  of  the  essential 
factors  in  our  success"  the  quick  replace- 
ment of  boats  and  bridging  materials 
from  engineer  parks  close  to  the  river. 


Initial  waves  of  combat  troops  had  gone 
across  the  Roer  with  small  loss  of  life; 
the  first  day's  casualties  throughout 
Ninth  Army  amounted  to  92  killed  and 
913  wounded.  In  proportion  to  the 
number  of  men  involved  the  casualties 
among  the  engineers,  who  had  been 
forced  to  go  on  working  at  the  bridge 
sites  after  the  Germans  recovered  from 
their  surprise,  were  high.  The  four 
engineer  groups  supporting  XIX  and 
XIII  Corps  during  the  Roer  crossings 
lost  31  men  killed  and  226  wounded. 

The  Ludendorff  Bridge 

Though  Ninth  Army  planners  had 
proceeded  on  the  assumption  that  the 
Germans  would  destroy  all  eight  of  the 
Rhine  bridges  in  their  area,  they  also 
made  determined  efforts  to  capture  at 
least  one  usable  span  intact.  On  2  March 
German-speaking  American  troops  in 
captured  German  tanks  failed  in  an 
attempt;  by  the  fifth  no  bridge  was  left 
standing.  Field  Marshal  Montgomery 
vetoed  a  Ninth  Army  proposal  for  a 
quick  assault  crossing  near  Wesel  while 
the  Germans  were  still  regrouping  across 
the  Rhine.  On  6  March  he  set  the  date 
for  the  2 1  Army  Group  crossing  at  24 
March.  Montgomery  could  not  foresee 
the  good  fortune  that  would  befall  First 
Army  troops  moving  south  of  the  Ruhr 
on  Ninth  Army's  right. 

First  Army  made  good  progress  on  6 
March,  with  VII  Corps  entering  Cologne 
and  III  Corps,  farther  south,  approach- 
ing Bonn  near  the  Ahr  River,  which 
flows  into  the  Rhine  just  upstream  of 


""Section  on  1149th  Engineer  Combat  Group 
Bridging  the  Roer. 

"  Parker  and  Thompson,  Conquer,  The  Story  of  the 
Ninth  Army,  pp.  174,  176;  History  of  the  XVI  Corps 
(Washington:  Infantry  Journal  Press,  1947),  pp. 
24-26. 


'^  Simpson,  "Rehearsal  for  the  Rhine,"  p.  26;  Par- 
ker and  Thompson,  Conquer,  The  Story  of  the  Ninth 
Army,  p.  171.  Figures  on  engineer  casualties  are  in 
Bridging  the  Roer  and  Hist  XIX  Corps  Engrs,  p.  18, 
ML  2220,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 


500 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


that  city.  This  crossing  would  block  the 
Ahr  River  valley,  the  main  escape  route 
of  the  enemy.  Cologne  had  several 
bridges,  but  by  the  time  the  city  was 
cleared  on  the  afternoon  of  7  March, 
the  Germans  had  destroyed  them  all.*^ 
In  the  III  Corps  zone  was  an  impor- 
tant highway  bridge  over  the  Rhine  at 
Bonn.  About  twelve  miles  upstream 
from  Bonn  lay  a  railway  bridge  at 
Remagen,  built  during  World  War  I 
and  named  for  one  of  the  German 
heroes  of  that  war,  General  Erich 
Ludendorff.  On  the  evening  of  6  March, 
Maj.  Gen.  John  Millikin,  the  III  Corps 
commander,  asked  the  First  Army  air 
officer  to  forbid  bombing  of  the  Bonn 
and  Remagen  bridges  on  the  very  slim 
chance  that  both  might  be  captured 
intact.  Neither  had  figured  seriously  in 
III  Corps  planning,  and  the  Bonn  high- 
way bridge  had  to  be  eliminated  entirely 
from  the  corps'  plans  early  on  7  March, 
when  First  Army  transferred  responsi- 
bility for  Bonn  to  VII  Corps.  The  III 
Corps  all  but  discounted  the  Ludendorff 
Bridge — it  had  been  under  AJlied  air 
attack  since  September  1944,  and  in  late 
December  the  air  forces  claimed  four 
direct  hits.  During  January  and  early 
February  the  bridge  strikes  had  in- 
tensified, but  the  Germans  had  proved 
adept  in  making  repairs.  In  mid-Feb- 
ruary American  air  reconnaissance  re- 
ported that  the  bridge  was  back  in 
service.  Thereafter  a  cloud  cover  had 
protected  the  span  from  attack.  It 
seemed  inconceivable  that  the  Germans 
would  not  destroy  the  bridge  before  it 
could  be  captured. ^° 


'"  Engineer  Operations  by  VII  Corps  in  the  Euro- 
pean Theater,  vol.  VII,  "Crossings  of  the  Rhine  River 
and  the  Advance  to  the  Elbe,"  p.  1,  and  app.  II. 

^"  Ken  Hechler,  The  Bridge  at  Remagen  (New  York: 
Ballantine  Books,  1957),  pp.  69-75.  Unless  other- 
wise cited,  this  section  is  based  on  this  source. 


When  III  Corps'  spearhead,  the  9th 
Armored  Division,  moved  east  on  7 
March,  its  main  effort  was  directed 
toward  the  Ahr  River  crossings.  Com- 
bat Command  A  to  cross  at  Bad 
Neuenahr  and  one  column  of  Combat 
Command  B  at  the  point  where  the  Ahr 
flows  into  the  Rhine,  a  little  more  than 
a  mile  upstream  from  Remagen. 
Another  column  of  Combat  Command 
B,  organized  as  a  task  force  under  Lt. 
Col.  Leonard  Engeman,  commanding 
the  14th  Tank  Battalion,  was  to  turn 
aside  and  take  the  towns  of  Remagen 
and  Kripp,  the  latter  near  the  Ahr- 
Rhine  confluence.  Orders  said  nothing 
about  capturing  a  bridge. ^^ 

Led  by  a  platoon  from  Company  A 
of  the  27th  Armored  Infantry  Battalion, 
riding  on  half-tracks,  and  a  platoon  of 
four  new  T— 26  90-mm.  tanks  from  the 
14th  Tank  Battalion,  Task  Force  Enge- 
man left  Meckenheim  at  0820  on  7 
March  for  Remagen,  ten  miles  away. 
With  it  was  the  2d  platoon  of  Company 
B,  9th  Armored  Engineer  Battalion, 
under  1st  Lt.  Hugh  Mott. 

The  column  moved  out  in  a  cold 
drizzle.  The  men,  having  pushed  from 
the  Roer  toward  the  Rhine  with  little 
rest  since  28  February,  were  groggy 
from  lack  of  sleep.  The  engineers  were 
particularly  weary.  On  the  march  they 
had  built  treadway  bridges  over  three 
rivers,  one  under  heavy  German  artil- 
lery fire.  The  bridging  work  was  more 
difficult  because  the  T— 26  tanks  had 
wider  treads  than  the  M— 4  Shermans. 
The  new  M2  treadway  bridge  could 
accommodate  the  T— 26s  but  was  not 
satisfactory  for  other  vehicles,  notably 
trucks.  The  engineers  had  found  a 
number  of  bridges  standing,  but  had 


2'  Combat  Interv  300,  9th  Armd  Div,  7-8  Mar  45. 


THE  ROER  CROSSING  AND  THE  REMAGEN  BRIDGEHEAD 


501 


The  Ludendorff  Rail  Bridge  a  r  Rema(;en 


to  search  carefully  for  explosives  and 
to  remove  mines  and  roadblocks  along 
the  roads. ^^ 

After  leaving  Meckenheim  the  col- 
umn made  good  time,  meeting  little 
resistance.  At  1300  the  leading  infan- 
try platoon  commander  was  standing 
on  a  bluff  at  Apollinarisberg,  overlook- 
ing Remagen  and  the  700-foot-wide 
Rhine  rushing  through  a  gorge.  About 
a  mile  upstream  the  Ludendorff  Bridge 
was  still  standing  and  the  infantry  offi- 


'^'^  Hist  9th  Armd  Engr  Bn,  1944-45  and  AAR  for 
Mar  45;  Memo,  for  6th  and  1 2th  Army  Gps,  15  Mar 
45,  sub:  Widened  Bridges  for  the  T-26  Tank,  OCE 
ETOUSA,  823-Bridges,  1944-45.  For  the  develop- 
ment of  the  widened  treadway,  see  Coll,  Keith,  and 
Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Engineers:  Troops  and  Equip- 
ment, pp.  490-95. 


cers  could  see  it  plainly  through  field 
glasses.  It  was  a  steel-arch  bridge  a  lit- 
tle more  than  a  thousand  feet  long  and 
wide  enough  to  carry  two  railroad  tracks. 
Two  castle-like  stone  towers  with  win- 
dows guarded  each  end.  Beyond  the 
towers  on  the  far  side  the  two  railroad 
tracks  entered  a  tunnel  cut  into  a  rock 
cliff.  By  the  morning  of  7  March  the 
last  train  had  gone  over.  One  of  the 
tracks  on  the  bridge  the  Germans  had 
covered  with  planking;  over  it  streamed 
a  procession  of  soldiers,  trucks,  horse- 
drawn  wagons  and  guns,  civilians,  and 
cattle. 

Colonel  Engeman  sent  infantrymen 
down  the  hill  to  take  Remagen  and 
ordered  the  leader  of  the  90-mm.  tank 
platoon  "to  barrel  down  the  hill  and  go 


502 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


through  and  cover  the  bridge  with  tank 
fire,  and  if  anybody  attempted  to  repair 
or  demoHsh  the  bridge  to  Hquidate 
them."^^  The  Combat  Command  B 
commander,  Brig.  Gen.  WiUiam  M. 
Hoge,  came  forward.  Although  Hoge 
had  no  specific  orders  to  take  the  bridge, 
he  had  an  informal  understanding  with 
the  commanding  general  of  the  9th 
Armored  Division  that  if  the  bridge  was 
intact  it  should  be  seized.  When  he 
arrived  on  the  scene,  Hoge  had  to 
weigh  the  chance  that  the  Germans 
would  blow  the  bridge  while  Americans 
were  on  it  or  trap  part  of  his  forces  by 
letting  some  units  get  across  before 
blowing  the  bridge. 

At  1515  a  courier  arrived  from  Com- 
bat Command  B's  other  column,  south 
of  Remagen  at  Sinzig,  with  informa- 
tion from  a  German  civilian  that  the 
Ludendorff  Bridge  was  to  be  blown  at 
1600.  The  story  later  proved  fictitious, 
but  the  prospect  of  forty-five  minutes' 
grace  made  up  General  Hoge's  mind. 
He  immediately  ordered  Colonel 
Engeman  to  emplace  tanks  and  machine 
guns  on  the  Remagen  approach  to  the 
bridge,  to  fire  smoke  and  white  phos- 
phorus, to  bring  up  engineers  to  pull 
firing  wires  and  fuses,  and  to  make  a 
dash  across  the  span.^^ 

Engeman's  tankers  were  already  at 
the  bridge.  His  messenger  found  the 
young  engineer  platoon  leader.  Lieu- 
tenant Mott,  at  a  hotel  near  the  river 
and  passed  on  Hoge's  orders  to  rip  out 
demolitions  and  to  find  out  whether 
the  bridge  would  support  tanks.  Mott 


^^  Interv,  Lt  Col  Leonard  Engeman,  14  Mar  45,  in 
The  Remagen  Bridgehead,  Seizure  and  Expansion, 
6- 1 1  Mar  45,  9th  Armd  Div,  ML  888,  ETOUSA  Hist 
Sect. 

^^  Interv,  Gen  Hoge,  14  Mar  45,  in  The  Remagen 
Bridgehead,  Seizure  and  Expansion. 


took  along  two  of  his  sergeants,  Eugene 
Dorland  and  John  A.  Reynolds.  As  they 
neared  the  bridge  the  three  were 
shocked  by  a  tremendous  explosion  that 
blew  a  thirty-foot  crater  into  the  Rema- 
gen approach.  This,  for  the  time  being 
at  least,  would  deny  the  bridge  to  any 
vehicles,  including  tanks. 

Mott  and  his  men  jumped  down  into 
the  crater  for  protection  against  a  sec- 
ond blast,  but  when  they  saw  the  com- 
mander of  the  27th  Armored  Infantry 
Battalion  talking  to  1st  Lt.  Karl  Tim- 
merman,  commanding  the  leading  in- 
fantry company  and  pointing  toward 
the  bridge,  the  engineers  climbed  out 
and  went  forward  to  join  the  infantry- 
men. Just  as  they  did  so  there  came  a 
second  explosion,  this  time  about  two- 
thirds  of  the  way  across  the  bridge.  The 
structure  groaned  and  seemed  to  raise 
itself  ponderously;  timbers  flew  and  a 
huge  cloud  of  dust  and  smoke  ascended. 
But  when  the  smoke  cleared  the  men 
saw  that  the  bridge  was  still  standing. 
Obviously  the  few  German  defenders 
moving  about  on  the  far  side  had  set 
off  only  one  charge  in  a  vain  attempt  to 
drop  the  span.  Mott  decided  that  his 
main  job  wOuld  be  to  locate  and  cut  the 
wires  to  other  charges  before  the  Ger- 
mans could  detonate  them.  The  three 
engineers  ran  out  on  the  bridge  just  as 
Timmerman  and  his  lead  scouts  were 
beginning  to  cross. 

Machine-gun  fire  came  from  the  far 
towers  and  from  a  barge  on  the  river, 
but  with  the  help  of  covering  fire  from 
the  tanks  on  the  Remagen  side  the 
infantrymen  made  their  way  cautiously 
along  a  catwalk  around  the  hole  in  the 
bridge.  The  engineers  searched  for 
demolition  charges  and  wires.  Finding 
four  thirty-pound  packages  of  explo- 
sives tied  to  I-beams  under  the  decking, 


THE  ROER  CROSSING  AND  THE  REMAGEN  BRIDGEHEAD 


503 


they  climbed  down  and  cut  the  wires, 
sending  the  packages  splashing  into  the 
Rhine.  Climbing  back  onto  the  bridge, 
Sergeant  Dorland  blasted  a  heavy  cable 
apart  with  his  carbine.  The  engineers 
apparently  did  not  locate  the  wiring 
fuse  that  would  have  set  off  all  the 
charges — the  Germans  had  enclosed  it 
in  a  thick  pipe  laid  underneath  the 
tracks  to  protect  it  from  American  shells. 
As  soon  as  the  infantry  had  cleared  the 
towers  on  the  far  side,  Dorland  found 
the  box  that  housed  the  master  switch 
and  shot  out  the  heavy  wires  leading 
from  it.  A  few  minutes  later  the  three 
engineers  came  upon  a  large  explosive 
charge  of  from  500  to  600  pounds  cor- 
rectly wired  and  prepared  for  detona- 
tion but  with  its  fuse  cap  blown. 

Fuse  damage  was  one  possible  solu- 
tion to  the  mystery  that  continued  to 
puzzle  historians,  American  and 
German,  for  years:  why  the  main  charge 
that  would  have  dropped  the  bridge 
had  failed  to  explode  when,  at  1530 
after  Americans  were  seen  approach- 
ing from  Remagen,  the  German  engi- 
neer at  the  bridge,  Capt.  Karl  Friesen- 
hahn,  turned  the  key  to  set  it  off.  One 
explanation  for  the  failure  was  sabotage, 
either  by  a  German  soldier  or  a  foreign 
worker,  but  this  theory  could  not  be 
substantiated  and  Captain  Friesenhahn 
and  the  German  commandant  at  the 
bridge,  Capt.  Willi  Bratge,  dismissed  it 
as  impossible  because  the  mechanism 
was  carefully  guarded  at  all  times.  Most 
German  officers  and  historians  believed 
that  the  wires  were  severed  by  a  lucky 
hit  from  an  American  tank  gun.  Jacob 
Klebach  of  Remagen,  a  sergeant-major 
working  with  the  German  engineers  on 
the  bridge  that  day,  offered  another 

'^^  Hechler,  The  Bridge  at  Remagen,  pp.  66-67. 


explanation.  Interviewed  twenty  years 
later,  Klebach  said,  "The  truth  is  that 
the  concussion  damage  of  all  the  months 
before  just  made  it  a  toss-up  whether 
the  fuses  would  function  when 
needed. "^^ 

Calling  up  the  rest  of  his  platoon  to 
help  remove  the  demolitions.  Lieuten- 
ant Mott  reported  to  Colonel  Engeman 
that  he  could  have  the  bridge  ready  to 
take  tanks  in  two  hours  if  he  could 
obtain  enough  timber  to  repair  the 
damaged  planking.  While  Engeman 
was  trying  to  find  the  timber,  the  armor, 
at  Mott's  request,  brought  up  a  tank- 
dozer  to  fill  the  crater  at  the  Remagen 
end  of  the  bridge.'^^  Fear  of  a  German 
counterattack  spurred  efforts  to  get 
tanks  across.  Lumber  for  the  planking 
was  difficult  to  locate,  but  General 
Hoge  rounded  up  enough,  instructing 
his  S-4  and  civil  affairs  officials  to  "tear 
down  houses  in  Remagen  if  necessary.  "^^ 

By  2000  that  evening  the  news  of  the 
capture  of  the  Ludendorff  Bridge  had 
traveled  from  combat  command  through 
division,  corps,  army,  and  army  group 
to  General  Eisenhower  at  SHAEF.  Maj. 
Gen.  Harold  R.  Bull,  Eisenhower's  G-3, 
could  not  see  the  value  of  the  bridge. 
The  terrain  on  the  other  side  was  mis- 
erable and,  he  told  General  Bradley, 
"You're  not  going  anywhere  down  there 
at  Remagen";  nor  did  the  effort  fit  into 
plans  to  cross  farther  north. ^^  But  Bull's 
opinion  was  the  exception.  Command- 


'^''  Interv  in  New  York  Times,  "Rhine  Crossing: 
Twenty  Years  Later,"  March  21,  1965.  Hechler  in  The 
Bridge  at  Remagen  discusses  the  probability  of  sabotage 
or  damage  from  a  tank  shell;  see  pp.  212-20. 

^^  Engeman  interv  in  The  Remagen  Bridgehead, 
Seizure  and  Expansion. 

"'^**  Hoge  interv  in  The  Remagen  Bridgehead,  Sei- 
zure and  Expansion. 

'^^  John  Toland,  The  Last  100  Days  (New  York:  Ran- 
dom House,  1966),  pp.  214-15 


504 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


ers  from  Eisenhower  down  were  elated 
and  enthusiastically  approved  rein- 
forcements. Lt.  Gen.  Courtney  H. 
Hodges  that  same  evening  relieved  III 
Corps  of  its  mission  to  drive  south 
across  the  Ahr  and  approved  exploit- 
ing the  Rhine  crossing.  General  Millikin 
made  plans  to  motorize  the  reserve  ele- 
ments of  his  9th  and  78th  Infantry  Divi- 
sions and  rush  them  to  Remagen. 

Col.  F.  Russel  Lyons,  the  III  Corps 
engineer,  followed  plans  First  Army 
had  already  worked  out  for  a  Rhine 
crossing  in  its  area,  based  on  topographi- 
cal and  terrain  studies.  Engineers  were 
to  erect  a  treadway  bridge  downstream 
from  the  Ludendorff  Bridge  and  a 
ponton  bridge  upstream.  While  they 
were  being  built,  ferries  were  to  carry 
men,  supplies,  and  vehicles  to  the  far 
bank  and  bring  back  the  wounded.  Nets 
and  booms  would  have  to  be  emplaced 
upstream  to  protect  the  bridges  from 
underwater  attack  by  small  submarines 
and  frogmen  carrying  explosives.  (In 
September  the  Germans  had  used  spe- 
cially trained  and  equipped  swimmers 
in  an  attempt  to  blow  up  the  Nijmegen 
bridge  in  the  British  area.)^^  Since  these 
preparations  required  resources  HI 
Corps  did  not  have.  First  Army  turned 
over  to  the  corps'  operational  control 
the  units  and  equipment  needed.  Two 
First  Army  engineer  combat  groups 
that  had  been  supporting  the  9th  and 
78th  Infantry  Divisions  were  to  be  em- 
ployed, the  1 1 1 1th  to  build  the  treadway 
and  landing  sites  for  three  ferries,  the 
1 1 59th  to  construct  the  ponton  bridge 
and  operate  the  ferries,  using  DUKWs 
and  Navy  LCVPs.  The  164th  Engineer 


Combat  Battalion  was  to  emplace  the 
nets  and  booms  to  protect  the  Luden- 
dorff Bridge  from  underwater  attack.^' 

While  these  engineers  stood  alert 
during  the  rainy  night  of  7  March,  9th 
Armored  Division  engineers  on  the 
scene  were  working  on  the  approaches 
and  the  planking  to  get  tanks  across 
the  bridge.  All  afternoon  infantry  had 
been  moving  across,  walking  very  fast 
or  running  to  escape  sniper  fire,  move- 
ment which  slowed  the  engineers'  work. 
Although  the  crater  at  the  approach 
was  filled  in  by  dusk,  not  until  2200 
was  Mott  able  to  tell  Engeman  that  the 
bridge  was  ready  to  take  tanks.  The 
engineers  had  laid  down  white  guide 
tapes  to  enable  the  tanks  to  bypass  dan- 
gerous places.  In  the  blackness  shortly 
after  midnight  nine  Shermans  started 
across,  their  passage  over  the  planking 
"accompanied  by  an  ominous  and  nerve- 
wracking  creaking."  They  got  across 
safely,  but  when  a  tank  destroyer,  fol- 
lowing them  at  a  slightly  faster  pace, 
came  to  the  point  at  which  the  Ger- 
mans had  blown  their  charge,  its  right 
tread  fell  into  the  hole.  For  the  rest  of 
the  night  the  engineers  worked  to  jack 
up  the  tank  destroyer,  which  was  block- 
ing the  passage  of  all  vehicles,  but  they 
were  not  successful  until  0530. ^^^ 

Among  the  nearly  8,000  men  who 
crossed  the  bridge  in  the  first  twenty- 
four  hours  after  its  capture  was  the 
remainder  of  the  9th  Armored  Engi- 
neer Battalion's  Company  B.  During 
the  early  hours  of  8  March  Company  C 


"^"  Brig.  Gen.  P.  H.  Timothy,  The  Rhine  Crossings; 
Twelfth  Army  Group  Engineer  Operations  (Fort  Belvoir, 
Va.,  1946),  pp.  11,24. 


•'"  Intervs,  Col  F.  Russel  Lyons,  21  Mar  45,  and  Lt 
Col  H.  F.  Cameron,  CO,  164th  Engr  C  Bn  et  al.,  26 
Mar  45,  in  The  Remagen  Bridgehead,  Seizure  and 
Expansion;  III  Corps  Hist,  314.7,  file  1;  Hists,  1111th 
and  1 1 59th  Engr  C  Ops,  Mar  45- 

^^  Intervs,  Engeman,  14  Mar  45,  and  Capt  George  P 
Soumas,  CO,  Co  A,  14th  Tank  Bn,  15  Mar  45,  both  in 
The  Remagen  Bridgehead,  Seizure  and  Expansion. 


THE  ROER  CROSSING  AND  THE  REMAGEN  BRIDGEHEAD 


505 


relieved  Company  B  on  the  bridge. 
After  making  an  intensive  search  for 
German  demolitions,  which  turned  up 
1,400  pounds  in  wells  of  the  piers,  the 
men  of  Company  C  assumed  the  job  of 
repair  and  traffic  control  just  as  enemy 
bombers  and  artillery  began  to  hit  the 
bridge.  The  Luftwaffe  was  relatively 
ineffective,  but  the  artillery  did  consid- 
erable damage.  Company  C  estimated 
that  during  the  forty-eight  hours  it 
worked  on  the  bridge,  the  Germans 
scored  at  least  twenty-four  direct  hits. 
At  times,  when  panic-stricken  drivers 
abandoned  their  vehicles,  the  engineers 
drove  the  vehicles  off  the  bridge,  and 
when  first-aid  men  refused  to  set  foot 
on  the  bridge  the  engineers  acted  as 
medics. 

Late  on  the  afternoon  of  the  ninth, 
shells  from  heavy  artillery  tore  a  fifteen- 
foot  hole  in  the  decking  and  set  fire  to 
an  ammunition  truck  on  the  far  bank, 
blocking  all  traffic.  Amid  exploding 
ammunition,  an  engineer  of  Company 
B  in  an  armored  bulldozer  safely  pushed 
the  blazing  truck  off  the  road.  But  when 
squads  of  Company  C  tried  to  repair 
the  hole  in  the  decking,  two  officers  and 
nine  enlisted  men  were  wounded  by  a 
shell  exploding  in  the  superstructure 
near  them.  Then  the  engineers  spread 
out  in  two-man  teams,  repairing  the 
hole  by  laying  steel  treadways  over 
planks.  On  the  morning  of  the  tenth 
the  276th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion, 
one  of  the  III  Corps  units  sent  to 
Remagen,  relieved  Company  C.  Before 
leaving.  Company  C  put  up  a  sign: 
"Cross  the  Rhine  With  Dry  Feet,  Cour- 
tesy of  the  9th  Armored  Division. "^^ 


The  Ferries 

The  III  Corps'  engineer  units  arrived 
late  because  of  traffic  jams  on  narrow 
winding  roads,  the  blackout  in  which 
they  had  to  feel  their  way  forward,  and 
enemy  shellfire  near  Remagen.  Thus, 
the  86th  Engineer  Heavy  Ponton  Bat- 
talion, which  was  to  operate  ferries 
while  tactical  bridges  were  being  built, 
did  not  arrive  until  around  0330  on  9 
March.  Under  intermittent  shelling,  the 
weary  men  immediately  began  to  con- 
struct the  first  raft  at  the  site  selected 
for  the  crossing,  downstream  from  the 
Ludendorff  Bridge.  The  engineers  low- 
ered five  boats  into  the  water  and  lay 
balk  and  planking  over  them.  Before 
noon  next  morning  three  five-boat  rafts 
had  been  built,  and  the  approaches  at 
Remagen  and  at  Erpel  on  the  east  bank 
were  ready.  At  1100  on  9  March  in  a 
cold  wind  and  lashing  rain,  without 
waiting  for  a  cable  to  be  emplaced,  the 
first  ferry  chugged  across  the  Rhine, 
propelled  by  two  outboard  motors  and 
two  powerboats — a  22-horsepower 
motor  fastened  to  each  of  the  end  engi- 
neer boats  and  a  powerboat  lashed  to 
the  second  and  fourth.  Headed  up- 
stream at  a  45-degree  angle  because  of 
the  swift  current,  the  ferry  took  less 
than  eight  minutes  to  reach  the  far 
shore. 

The  Remagen-Erpel  ferry,  the  only 
one  in  operation  on  9  and  10  March, 
became  a  vital  factor  in  support  of  the 
bridgehead  across  the  river.  At  noon 
on  the  tenth  a  gasoline  truck  on  the 
Ludendorff  Bridge  had  been  hit  and 
set  afire;  all  ammunition  and  gasoline 


"  Hist  9th  Armd  Engr  Bn,  1944-45;  Interv,  Capt 
Ellis  G.  Fee,  CO,  Co  C,  9th  Armd  Engr  Bn,  14  Mar 
45,  in  The  Remagen  Bridgehead,  Seizure  and  Expan- 
sion. 


'^  Interv,  Lt  Col  Robert  O.  Mass,  CO,  86th  Engr 
Heavy  Ponton  Bn,  25  Mar  45,  in  The  Remagen 
Bridgehead,  Seizure  and  Expansion. 


506 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


convoys  were  ordered  ferried  across  for 
two  days.  The  second  ferry  was  con- 
structed upstream  of  the  Ludendorff 
Bridge,  from  Kripp  to  Linz,  but  enemy 
opposition  near  Linz  caused  delays  and 
the  ferry  did  not  begin  operation  until 
late  on  the  afternoon  of  1 1  March. 
Work  on  the  third  ferry  (downstream 
of  the  treadway),  from  Unkelbach  to 
Unkel,  was  so  slowed  by  very  accurate 
(probably  observed)  artillery  fire  that  it 
could  not  be  finished  in  time  to  be  of 
much  use.  By  noon  on  12  March  the 
treadway  and  ponton  bridges  had  been 
completed.  Then  the  need  for  the  rafts 
diminished,  although  that  day  and  the 
next  the  ferries  made  a  further  impor- 
tant contribution  to  the  far  shore  bridge- 
head when  they  crossed  four  heavy  Per- 
shing tanks  to  Erpel  and  thirty-one 
Shermans  to  Linz. 

From  the  beginning,  plans  for  a  Rhine 
crossing  had  included  LCM,  LCVP,  and 
DUKW  ferry  operations  (the  DUKWs 
to  carry  ammunition,  gasoline,  and 
rations).  Early  during  the  Remagen 
operation  the  Transportation  Corps' 
819th  Amphibian  Truck  Company, 
which  had  distinguished  itself  at  OMAHA 
on  D-day,  came  forward  and  was  at- 
tached to  the  1 159th  Engineer  Combat 
Group.  The  company's  DUKWs  were 
late  getting  into  operation  because  it 
was  hard  to  find  a  suitable  site  to  launch 
the  trucks.  Then,  when  they  began  fer- 
rying at  a  site  near  Kripp,  the  DUKWs 
had  to  travel  some  twelve  miles  to  the 
rear  to  pick  up  their  loads  because  First 
Army  disapproved  of  setting  up  dumps 
for  them  closer  to  the  river.  Men  on 
the  scene  generally  believed  that  a  river 
crossing  under  conditions  like  those  at 


Remagen,  involving  a  long  land  haul 
and  short  water  haul,  was  uneconomi- 
cal for  DUKWs.^*^ 

No  LCMs  came  forward  because  First 
Army  considered  that  capture  of  the 
bridge  rendered  them  unnecessary,  but 
LCVPs  were  needed  to  ferry  troops  and 
evacuate  the  wounded.  The  LCVPs 
arrived  in  the  Remagen  area  at  mid- 
night on  10  March,  sent  forward  in  flat- 
bed trailers  together  with  cranes  for 
launching  them.  They  proved  highly 
useful — each  craft  could  ferry  thirty- 
six  soldiers  faster  and  more  efficiently 
than  the  troops  could  march  across  a 
footbridge.  This  speed  was  demon- 
strated on  15  March,  when  four  LCVPs 
transported  a  regimental  combat  team 
of  VII  Corps'  1st  Division  across  the 
Rhine  at  a  site  not  far  downstream  from 
the  Ludendorff  Bridge  and  leading  to 
Unkel  on  the  far  shore.  A  round  trip 
required  not  more  than  seven  minutes, 
enabling  the  LCVPs  to  put  ashore  2,200 
infantrymen  in  three  hours.  The  imme- 
diate job  of  the  first  boats  that  arrived, 
however,  was  to  aid  in  the  construction 
of  the  heavy  ponton  bridge. ^^ 

The  Treadway  and  Ponton  Bridges 

On  9  March  under  cold,  rainy,  and 
overcast  skies,  two  engineer  units  that 
had  distinguished  themselves  during 


'^^  Ibid.;  Folder,  Crossing  the  Rhine  Operation 
"Varsity,"  OCE  files. 


'*' Diary,  III  Corps  Engr,  25  Mar  45,  and  Interv, 
Capt  John  C.  Bray,  CO,  819th  Amphib  Truck  Co,  25 
Mar  45,  both  in  The  Remagen  Bridgehead,  Seizure 
and  Expansion. 

"  On  LCMs,  see  Ltr,  Cmdr,  TG,  122.5  to  CinC,  U.S. 
Fleet,  16  Apr  45,  sub:  Operations  Rpt,  copy  in  OCE 
files;  Opns  Rpt,  LCVP  Unit  No.  1,  12th  Army  Gp 
Naval  Opns  Rpt,  copy  in  OCE  files.  The  Navy's  LCVP 
Unit  No.  1,  with  twenty-four  boats,  was  assigned  to 
First  Army.  Sixteen  boats  were  in  the  first  contingent 
arriving  at  Remagen;  the  remaining  eight  came  up 
later. 


THE  ROER  CROSSING  AND  THE  REMAGEN  BRIDGEHEAD 


507 


the  Battle  of  the  Ardennes  in  the  Mal- 
medy— Trois  Fonts  area  began  arriv- 
ing at  Remagen,  the  291st  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  under  Lt.  Col.  David 
E.  Pergrin  to  work  on  a  treadway  bridge 
from  Remagen  to  Erpel  and  the  51st 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  under  Lt. 
Col.  Harvey  R.  Eraser  to  build  a  heavy 
ponton  bridge  upstream,  from  Kripp 
to  Linz.  Arriving  before  dawn,  the  291st 
had  to  wait  until  0830  for  the  998th 
Treadway  Bridge  Company  to  bring  up 
bridging  equipment.  This  company,  the 
only  unit  available,  had  been  working 
with  First  French  Army.  By  1030  Colo- 
nel Pergrin  had  a  platoon  clearing  the 
approach  on  the  near  bank. 

The  men  had  just  started  to  cut  away 
the  bank  when  an  enemy  artillery  shell 
hit  the  site,  injuring  seven.  There  were 
no  more  direct  hits  that  day,  and  by 
dusk  the  engineers  had  extended  the 
treadway  200  feet,  with  good  prospects 
of  reaching  the  far  shore  next  morning. 
Then,  shortly  after  midnight,  German 
tanks  on  high  ground  at  the  east  end  of 
the  bridge  began  to  rake  the  bridging 
with  direct  fire.  They  knocked  out  two 
cranes  and  twenty-six  rafts  assembled 
with  treadway  and  caused  a  five-hour 
delay.  Work  resumed  although  enemy 
shelling  continued,  intensifying  just 
after  noon  on  10  March,  when  the 
treadway  began  receiving  a  round  of 
heavy  artillery  every  five  minutes.  At 
1230  a  direct  hit  at  the  west  end  dam- 
aged fifteen  rafts.  The  treadway  held 
them  in  place,  enabling  the  engineers 
to  finish  the  bridge.  Reaching  the  far 
shore  at  1710  the  engineers  could  claim 
to  have  built  the  first  tactical  bridge  over 
the  Rhine  and,  at  1,032  feet,  the  long- 
est yet  constructed  in  Europe.  But  re- 
pairs to  the  rafts  delayed  the  opening 
of  the  bridge  to  traffic  until  0700  on  1 1 


March.  That  morning  the  988th  Engi- 
neer Treadway  Bridge  Company  re- 
placed the  998th,  which  had  run  out  of 
equipment.  The  building  of  the  tread- 
way bridge  had  been  costly,  with  one 
man  killed  and  twenty-four  wounded 
during  construction. 

By  the  time  the  bridge  was  finished, 
German  artillery  fire  was  letting  up.  A 
German  artillery  observer  with  a  radio 
had  been  captured  in  Remagen,  a  heavy 
concentration  of  U.S.  artillery  had  laid 
down  a  smoke  screen,  and  the  advance 
of  the  combat  forces  on  the  far  shore 
was  pushing  the  German  guns  back. 
During  its  first  two  days  of  operation, 
the  eastbound  traffic  count  for  the 
treadway  was  3,105  vehicles.  At  noon 
on  13  March  the  bridge  began  carrying 
a  heavy  volume  of  westbound  traffic  as 
eastbound  traffic  transferred  to  the 
ponton  bridge  located  upstream. ^^ 

Building  the  heavy  ponton  bridge 
from  Kripp  to  Linz  had  to  be  post- 
poned until  the  enemy  was  cleared 
from  a  high  hill  across  the  river.  When 
the  order  to  begin  construction  came 
at  1600  on  10  March,  the  executive  offi- 
cer of  the  5 1  St  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion, Maj.  Robert  B.  Yates  (who  had  dis- 
tinguished himself  at  Trois  Ponts  dur- 
ing the  Bulge),  had  everything  ready, 
including  six  smoke  pots  on  a  3/4-ton 
truck.  Despite  the  smoke  screen,  six 
rounds  of  heavy  artillery,  variously 
described  as  l70-mm.  and  88-mm., 
immediately  hit  the  near  shore  and 
bridge  site,  but  did  no  damage.  The 
equipment  for  the  bridge,  which  the 


'**  Interv,  Lt  Col  David  E.  Pergrin,  22  Mar  45,  and 
Col  F.  Russel  Lyons,  21  Mar  45,  and  Diary,  III  Corps 
Engr,  all  in  The  Remagen  Bridgehead,  Seizure  and 
Expansion;  Hists,  291st  Engr  C  Bn,  Jan— Apr  45,  May 
45,  and  1 1 1 1th  Engr  C  Gp,  Mar  45. 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


/   /  .^ 


Heavy  and  Pneumatic  Pontons  Loaded  for  Transport  to  Rema(;en 


181st  and  552d  Heavy  Ponton  Battal- 
ions provided,  consisted  of  fourteen 
four-boat  rafts  and  seventy-five  feet  of 
trestle,  reinforced  by  pneumatic  rub- 
ber floats  between  each  raft.  The  51st 
used  a  total  of  sixty  boats  and  fifty-seven 
rubber  floats.  Next  day,  1 1  March,  with 
the  current  at  the  site  swift  and  the  river 
rising,  the  engineers  had  such  trouble 
maneuvering  the  parts  into  position 
with  powerboats  that  they  called  for 
LCVPs.  Slipping  crossways  in  the  cur- 
rent, one  of  the  LCVPs  on  the  upstream 
side  rammed  into  a  section  of  the  bridge 
and  might  have  swept  it  into  the  tread- 
way  if  three  LCVPs  downstream  had 
not  held  the  section  in  place  until  the 
engineers  could  safely  anchor  it  to  a 
barge  on  the  far  shore. 


While  this  work  was  going  on,  Ger- 
man planes  came  over,  bombing  and 
strafing  in  pairs.  At  the  far  shore  abut- 
ment three  men  were  killed,  two  were 
seriously  wounded,  and  several  suf- 
fered light  wounds  from  bomb  frag- 
ments. An  hour  before  midnight  on  1 1 
March  the  bridge  was  open  for  traffic 
and  next  day  was  reinforced  to  carry 
24-ton  loads,  but  possibly  because  it  was 
easy  to  spot  from  the  air,  the  ponton 
bridge  continued  to  come  under  attack 
from  German  bombers  and  strafers.  On 
13  March  five  waves  flew  over;  one  in 
midafternoon  killed  Maj.  William  F. 
Tompkins,  Jr.,  commanding  officer  of 
the  552d  Heavy  Ponton  Battalion,  for 
whom  the  bridge  was  named.  When  the 
weather  cleared  on  14  March  the  Ger- 


THE  ROER  CROSSING  AND  THE  REMAGEN  BRIDGEHEAD 


509 


mans  stepped  up  air  attacks.  A  river 
barge  on  the  far  shore  near  the  anchor 
barge  received  a  direct  hit  from  a  500- 
pound  bomb  that  killed  two  of  its  engi- 
neer guards;  on  the  bridge  itself  five 
men  were  wounded  by  shell  and  bomb 
fragments.  This  marked  the  end  of  the 
low-level,  daylight  attempts  to  destroy 
the  Remagen  bridges  from  the  air.  With 
clearing  weather  American  fighters 
could  rise  to  meet  the  enemy,  and  by 
14  March  a  heavy  concentration  of 
American  antiaircraft  guns  on  both 
banks  of  the  river  rendered  daylight 
attacks  too  costly  to  the  dwindling  Luft- 

Collapse  of  the  Ludendorff  Bridge 

On  12  March,  after  the  treadway  and 
ponton  bridges  were  in  operation,  the 
engineers  closed  the  Ludendorff  Bridge 
for  repairs.  The  fixed  span  was  consid- 
ered worth  repairing  because  artillery 
could  not  knock  it  out  as  readily  as  the 
tactical  bridges — an  ordinary  shell 
would  not  damage  its  structure  but  only 
rip  the  flooring.  Moreover,  the  tactical 
bridges  could  not  as  easily  carry  heavy 
loads  such  as  the  new  Pershing  tanks. ^ 

The  Germans  had  certainly  tried  to 
knock  out  the  Ludendorff.  On  the 
night  of  10  March,  just  as  the  276th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  had  begun 
construction  of  a  140-foot  double- 
double  Bailey  at  the  near  shore  to  make 
possible  two-way  traffic,  a  direct  enemy 


'■'  Intervs,  Lt  Col  Harvey  R.  Fraser  and  Maj  Robert 
Yates,  20  Mar  45,  Col  F.  Russel  Lyons,  2 1  Mar  45,  and 
Diary,  III  Corps  Engr,  all  in  The  Remagen  Bridge- 
head, Seizure  and  Expansion;  Hists,  51st  Engr  C  Bn, 
Jan-Jun  45;  1 159th  Engr  C  Gp,  Mar  45  and  26  Jun 
44-20  Aug  45;  Opns  Rpt,  LCVP  Unit  No.  1. 

^"  Interv,  Gen  Hoge,  14  Mar  45,  in  The  Remagen 
Bridgehead,  Seizure  and  Expansion. 


artillery  hit  killed  Maj.  James  E.  Foley, 
the  battalion  executive  officer,  and 
wounded  nineteen  men.  On  the  days 
following,  enemy  shells  continued  to  fall 
as  the  276th  worked  on  the  approaches, 
completing  them  under  cover  of  dark- 
ness on  12  March.  A  team  from  the 
1058th  Port  Construction  and  Repair 
Group  undertook  the  heavy  steel  work 
on  the  bridge.^' 

In  the  meantime,  preparations  were 
under  way  to  protect  the  bridge  from 
waterborne  or  underwater  attack.  Five 
hundred  yards  upstream  the  engineers 
were  to  string  a  net  across  the  river  to 
catch  floating  mines,  boats  loaded  with 
explosives,  torpedoes  launched  from 
one-man  submarines,  and  frogmen. 
The  next  barrier  to  be  emplaced  was 
an  impact  boom  600  yards  from  the 
bridge,  the  third  a  log  boom  at  900 
yards.  Responsibility  for  installing  these 
devices  went  to  the  164th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion,  a  First  Army  unit 
that  reported  directly  to  the  corps  engi- 
neer. The  164th  arrived  on  the  eve- 
ning of  8  March  and  started  work  next 
morning,  but  it  soon  became  evident 
that  the  construction  site,  on  the  far 
shore  at  the  river's  edge,  was  in  the 
direct  line  of  enemy  artillery  fire.  That 
afternoon  enemy  shells  killed  three 
men  and  wounded  two,  and  on  the 
afternoon  of  10  March  four  men  were 
killed  when  German  artillery  hit  a  truck; 
three  others  were  wounded.  The  inten- 
sity of  enemy  artillery  fire  as  well  as  the 
lack  of  powerboats  delayed  the  place- 
ment of  floats.  Nevertheless,  at  2200 


^ '  Hist  1 159th  Engr  C  Bn,  Mar  45  and  26 Jun  44-20 
Aug  45;  Intervs,  Lt  Col  Kenneth  E.  Fields,  CO,  and 
Maj  Francis  E.  Goodwin,  S-4,  1 159th  Engr  C  Gp,  21 
Mar  45,  in  The  Remagen  Bridgehead,  Seizure  and 
Expansion;  Jnl,  276th  Engr  C  Bn,  Feb,  Mar,  Apr, 
May  45. 


510 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


on  1 1  March  the  impact  boom's  anchor- 
age of  angle  iron  and  railroad  bump- 
ers was  in  place,  as  were  four  sections 
of  the  boom. 

Then  orders  came  to  protect  the 
heavy  ponton  bridge  newly  installed  at 
Kripp.  Work  at  the  new  site  began  next 
day,  12  March,  but  was  hampered  by 
nighdy  air  raids,  which  two  days  later 
killed  three  and  wounded  two  engi- 
neers. The  difficulty  of  towing  over 
water  the  heavy  material  required  to 
erect  and  anchor  the  protective  booms 
also  slowed  progress,  for  powerboats 
and  LCVPs — both  of  which  had  been 
adequate  in  constructing  floating 
bridges — had  insufficient  power.  The 
most  satisfactory  work  boats  were  38- 
foot  Army  tugboats  known  as  Sea  Mules. 
With  a  detachment  of  the  329th  Har- 
bor Craft  Company  (TC)  to  operate 
them,  the  tugs  came  forward  on  flat- 
bed trailers  on  the  evening  of  14 
March. ^^ 

For  further  protection  against  water- 
borne  attacks,  guards  with  rifles  stood 
on  the  Ludendorff  Bridge  with  orders 
to  shoot  at  suspicious  objects.  Tanks  of 
the  738th  Tank  Battalion  with  brilliant 
searchlights  called  canal  defense  lights 
took  positions  on  the  banks  to  illumi- 
nate the  river,  the  first  use  of  such  tanks 
during  the  war.  Three  LCVPs  were 
launched  upstream  of  the  antimine 
boom  at  noon  on  14  March.  They  pa- 
trolled the  river  every  night,  dropping 
fifty-pound  depth  charges  at  five- 
minute  intervals,  with  good  effect.  Two 
German  swimmers  found  lying  ex- 
hausted on  the  far  bank  a  few  days  later 
said   they   had   been   stunned   by   the 


depth  charges,  as  well  as  numbed  by 
the  cold  water. '^^ 

On  16  March  the  Germans  began 
their  strongest  effort  yet  to  bring  down 
the  Ludendorff  Bridge.  That  morning 
shells  larger  than  88-mm.  came  over, 
and  on  17  March  several  rounds  of 
giant  projectiles  from  a  tank-mounted 
piece  called  the  Karl  howitzer  landed 
in  Remagen.  On  the  same  morning  a 
German  rocket  unit  in  the  Netherlands 
fired  eleven  V  — 2s  at  the  bridge — the 
only  tactical  use  of  V-weapons  during 
the  war.  About  1220  one  rocket  hit  a 
building  in  Remagen  serving  as  com- 
mand post  for  Company  B  of  the  284th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  (a  unit  the 
1159th  Engineer  Combat  Group  had 
brought  up  for  road  work  west  of  the 
Rhine),  killing  three  men  and  seriously 
injuring  thirty-one,  among  them  the 
company  commander."*"*  Another  rocket 
hit  a  house  east  of  the  bridge,  killing 
three  American  soldiers  and  wounding 
fifteen.  The  rest  of  the  rockets  landed 
harmlessly  in  the  river  or  open  coun- 
try."*^ 

Soon  the  rocket  barrage  and  the  shell- 
ing ended.  All  was  quiet  on  the  clear, 
windless  spring  day.  Capt.  Francis  E. 
Goodwin,  S— 4  of  the  1 159th  Engineer 
Combat  Group,  walked  out  onto  the 
bridge  from  the  Remagen  side  around 
1400  and  found  the  engineers  of  the 
276th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  and 


'^  First  U.S.  Army  Report  of  Rhine  River  Crossing, 
pp.  28,  31-32,  44;  Diary,  III  Corps  Engr,  in  The 
Remagen  Bridgehead,  Seizure  and  Expansion. 


^'  Hist  164th  Engr  C  Bn,  5  May  43-2  Sep  45;  Opns 
Rpt,  LCVP  Unit  No.  1,  p.  5;  Diary,  III  Corps  Engr, 
and  Interv,  Lt  Col  H.  F.  Cameron,  CO,  164th  Engr  C 
Bn  et  a!.,  p.  5,  in  The  Remagen  Bridgehead,  Seizure 
and  Expansion. 

^^  Hists,  284fh  Engr  C  Bn,  Feb,  Mar- May  45,  and 
1 159th  Engr  C  Gp,  26  Jun-20  Aug  45  and  Mar  45. 

^^  MacDonald,  The  Last  Offensive,  p.  228,  quoting 
SHAEF  Air  Defense  Div,  Summary  of  Casualties  and 
Damage  from  V-Weapon  Attack,  Rpt  for  the  Week 
Ending  19  Mar  45. 


THE  ROER  CROSSING  AND  THE  REMAGEN  BRIDGEHEAD 


511 


the  1058th  Engineer  Port  Construction 
and  Repair  Group  making  good  prog- 
ress.'**' The  276th  was  finishing  the  deck 
repair.  The  Germans  had  placed  deck- 
ing only  on  the  upstream  half  of  the 
bridge;  the  engineers  were  decking  the 
downstream  half,  as  well  as  repairing 
damage  from  the  enemy  shells  that  had 
fallen  almost  every  day.^^  The  new 
flooring  was  complete  except  for  a  gap 
at  the  Remagen  approach  and  another 
where  the  Germans  had  attempted  to 
blow  the  bridge.  Goodwin  passed  a 
squad  loading  pieces  of  lumber  on  a 
truck.  At  the  point  where  the  Germans 
had  tried  to  blow  the  bridge  he  found 
Maj.  William  S.  Carr  and  the  1058th 
Port  Construction  and  Repair  Group 
with  a  crane  and  steel  cable.  They  were 
preparing  to  repair  the  most  critical 
spot,  the  bottom  chord  on  the  upstream 
arch  truss,  which  the  German  demoli- 
tion charge  of  7  March  had  broken. 
Carr  said  he  expected  to  have  the  re- 
pairs completed  next  day.  Captain 
Goodwin  crossed  to  the  east  bank  of 
the  Rhine.  It  was  then  about  1445. 

A  few  minutes  before  1500  Lt.  Col. 
Clayton  A.  Rust,  commanding  the  276th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  was  walk- 
ing over  the  bridge  on  his  way  to  inspect 
the  new  approach  on  the  far  side,  ac- 
companied by  his  executive  officer. 
When  he  was  about  halfway  across,  he 


^*'  Goodwin  statement  in  Summary  of  Statements  of 
Witnesses,  Incl  2  to  Lt  Col  K.  E.  Fields,  CO,  1159th 
Engr  C  Gp,  Report  on  the  Collapse  of  the  Ludendorf 
[sic]  Bridge,  19  Mar  45,  in  Hist  I  159th  Engr  C:  (ip. 
Mar  45. 

'^  Waldo  G.  Bowman,  American  Military  Engineering 
in  Europe  from  Normandy  to  the  Rhine  (New  York: 
MacGraw-Hill,  1945),  p.  83.  Bowman,  editor  of  Engi- 
neering News-Record,  inspected  the  bridge  on  16  March 
1945.  Also  see  Jnl,  276th  Engr  C  Bn,  Mar  45,  entries 
for  151755  and  161830. 


heard  a  sharp  crack  like  the  report  of  a 
rifle.  It  was  a  rivethead  shearing.  He 
saw  a  vertical  hanger  ahead  of  him  break- 
ing loose  and  then  heard  another  sharp 
report  behind  him.  The  whole  deck 
trembled,  dust  rose,  and  he  knew  the 
bridge  was  collapsing.  Turning  around, 
he  ran  toward  Remagen  as  fast  as  he 
could,  but  found  himself  running  uphill 
because  the  far  side  of  the  bridge  was 
falling.  The  next  moment  he  was  in  the 
water. 

At  1 500  Captain  Goodwin  was  riding 
a  motorcycle  around  the  east  abutment 
of  the  bridge  on  his  way  to  cross  back 
over  the  treadway,  when  a  sound  he 
could  not  identify  made  him  look  up. 
To  his  horror  he  saw  that  the  arch  of 
the  Ludendorff  Bridge  had  crumbled. 
The  east  abutment  was  falling.  The 
assistant  S-3  of  the  1058th  Port  Con- 
struction Repair  Group,  1st  Lt.  F.  E. 
Csendes,  was  in  the  tunnel  on  the  far 
side,  where  he  had  gone  with  a  ser- 
geant to  pick  up  some  clamps,  when  he 
heard  someone  yell.  He  looked  out  and 
saw  the  center  span  of  the  bridge  twist- 
ing counterclockwise  and  buckling; 
then  it  fell  into  the  river  and  the  adja- 
cent spans  with  it. 

Captain  Goodwin  raced  his  motorcy- 
cle over  the  treadway  and  told  the  men 
on  the  west  bank  to  pick  up  the  survi- 
vors and  protect  the  treadway  from 
heavy  bridge  iron  and  timbers  that 
might  float  downstream.  From  Rema- 
gen he  sent  ambulances  to  the  scene, 
then  continued  to  the  forward  com- 
mand post  of  the  1159th  Engineer 
Combat  Group  at  Kripp,  arriving  there 
at  1512.  After  instructing  the  sergeant 
in  charge  to  round  up  all  the  medical 
aid  available,  he  rode  back  across  the 
ponton  bridge  to  the  east  bank  and  sent 


512 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Wrecka(;e  of  the  Ludendorff  Bridge  After  Its  Collapse 


powerboats    downstream    for    rescue 
work."^^ 

Colonel  Rust  and  his  companion  were 
pulled  out  of  the  river  at  the  treadway 
bridge,  both  shaken  but  not  badly  hurt. 
Few  of  the  men  working  on  the  bridge 
at  the  time  were  as  lucky.  Six  members 
of  the  276th  Engineer  Battalion  were 
killed  in  the  collapse  of  the  bridge,  1 1 
were  missing  (presumably  drowned), 
and  60  were  injured,  3  so  severely  that 
they  died.  The  commander  of  the 
1058th  Port  Construction  and  Repair 
Group,  Major  Carr,  was  killed;  seven 


'*^  Statements  of  Goodwin,  Rust,  and  others,  in  Sum- 
mary of  Statements  of  Witnesses,  Incl  2  to  Fields' 
Report  on  the  Collapse  of  the  Ludendorf  [izc]  Bridge; 
Operations  and  Reconnaissance  Journal,  Forward  CP 
Vic  Kripp;  both  in  Hist  1 159th  Engr  C  Gp,  Mar  45. 


of  his  men  were  missing  and  six  in- 
jured."^^ 

The  main  reason  for  the  collapse  of 
the  Ludendorff  Bridge,  most  engineers 
believed,  was  the  break  in  the  bottom 
chord  of  the  upstream  truss  from  the 
German  demolition  charge  of  7  March. 
This  forced  the  downstream  truss  to 
carry  the  whole  load  and  subjected  the 
entire  bridge  to  a  twisting  action.  The 
strain  on  the  truss  was  increased  by  the 
weight  of  the  timber  decking  Ameri- 
can engineers  had  added  to  the  flooring, 
by  continuous  bridge  traffic  between  7 
and  12  March,  and  by  engineer  repairs 
between     12    and     17    March — ham- 


^^  Fields  Rpt  and  Rust  statement  in  Hist  1 159th  Engr 
C  Gp,  Mar  45. 


THE  ROER  CROSSING  AND  THE  REMAGEN  BRIDGEHEAD 


513 


mering,  welding,  and  moving  heavy 
cranes  and  trucks. 

The  immediate  cause  of  the  collapse 
was  thought  to  be  vibration  from  artil- 
lery fire.  The  enemy  fired  very  heavy 
artillery  shells  beginning  on  15  March 
and  culminating  on  17  March  with  the 
Karl  howitzer  and  the  V  — 2  rockets. 
Some  of  the  shells  actually  hit  the  bridge. 
Perhaps  even  more  damaging  vibration 
came  from  American  artillery  fire.  Only 
2,000  yards  from  the  bridge  an  8-inch 
howitzer  battalion  had  fired  more  than 
a  thousand  rounds  in  the  previous  five 
days,  and  just  before  the  bridge  fell  a 
battalion  of  giant  8-inch  guns  and  an- 
other of  240-mm.  howitzers  were  fir- 
ing constantly. ^"^ 

The  III  Corps  Bailey  Bridge 

At  1800  on  17  March,  only  three 
hours  after  the  collapse  of  the  Luden- 
dorff  Bridge,  the  commanding  officer 
of  the  148th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion, Lt.  Col.  William  J.  Irby,  received 
orders  from  First  Army  to  build  a  Class 
40  floating  Bailey  bridge  at  Remagen. 
The  floating  Bailey  was  regarded  as  a 
"semitactical"  bridge,  normally  used  to 
replace  treadway  bridges  and  requir- 
ing considerably  more  time  to  construct 
than  either  treadways  or  pontons.  The 
battalion  was  one  of  three  operating  a 
Bailey  bridge  park  at  Weilerswist  about 
ten  miles  west  of  Bonn,  under  the 
1 1 10th  Engineer  Combat  Group,  First 
Army's  Bailey  bridge  and  mine  boom 
experts. 


'^"  Ibid.;  Interv,  Col  V.  F.  Burger,  XO,  III  Corps, 
FDC  et  al.,  10  Mar  45,  in  The  Remagen  Bridgehead, 
Seizure  and  Expansion;  Bowman,  American  Military 
Engineering  in  Europe  from  Normandy  to  the  Rhine  (quot- 
ing Capt.  James  B.  Cooke,  structural  expert  in  the 
OCE  ETOUSA),  pp.  84-87. 


Colonel  Irby  lost  no  time.  Ordering 
his  men  to  begin  loading  the  bridging 
equipment  on  about  one  hundred 
trucks,  most  of  them  borrowed  from 
quartermaster  units,  he  sent  two  of  his 
officers  to  reconnoiter  for  a  site  and 
instructed  his  company  commanders  to 
move  their  men  to  the  Remagen  area 
and  to  meet  him  at  this  advance  com- 
mand post  at  Remagen  at  0200  on  18 
March.  Then  he  hurried  to  group  head- 
quarters, where  he  was  told  that  he 
would  have  the  help  of  Company  C, 
291st  Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  and 
sixty  men  of  the  501st  Light  Ponton 
Company. 

Irby  had  not  expected  orders  to  build 
a  Bailey  bridge  over  the  Rhine  so  soon, 
and  his  planning  had  focused  on  a  25 
March  target  date.  Nevertheless  his 
men  were  ready,  having  practiced  on 
the  Meuse  near  Liege  for  months.  Most 
important,  the  equipment  was  ready, 
neatly  laid  out  along  the  roadnet  at 
Weilerswist  in  the  order  in  which  it 
would  be  used,  landing  bay  equipment 
in  one  stack,  floating  Baileys  in  another. 

Work  began  at  0730  on  18  March  at 
the  site  where  the  heavy  ponton  ferry 
had  operated  from  Remagen  to  Erpel 
(downstream  from  the  treadway  bridge). 
While  the  company  from  the  291st 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  prepared 
approach  roads  to  connect  with  the 
existing  roadnet,  the  148th  Battalion 
built  the  bridge.  Here,  as  with  the 
treadway  and  ponton  bridges,  the  swift 
river  current  made  it  difficult  to  tow 
components  into  position.  Repaired 
civilian  Rhine  tugboats  were  too  slow 
and  clumsy,  but  three  U.S.  Navy  LCVPs 
proved  excellent.  The  rushing  waters 
of  the  Rhine  also  complicated  anchor- 
age, but  the  engineers  solved  this  prob- 
lem by  dropping  five  1,500-pound  an- 


514 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


chors  upstream  and  sinking  two  rock- 
filled  barges  to  which  cables  were  at- 
tached. 

Artillery  fire  occasionally  landed  near 
the  bridge  but  did  no  damage.  Men 
worked  around  the  clock;  the  coxswain 
of  one  of  the  LCVPs,  for  example, 
remained  at  the  wheel  for  twenty-nine 
hours  without  a  halt.  By  0715  on  20 
March  the  1,258-foot  floating  Bailey 
was  ready  to  take  traffic — twenty-four 
hours  earlier  than  First  Army  had  ex- 
pected.^' 

VII  Corps,  First  Army,  and  V  Corps  Crossings 

By  16  March  VII  Corps'  1st  and  78th 
Infantry  Divisions  (the  latter  transfer- 
red from  III  Corps  on  16  March)  had 
crossed  the  Rhine  on  the  III  Corps' 
bridges  and  ferries  at  Remagen  and 
were  driving  north  and  northeast  to 
seize  the  line  of  the  Sieg  River,  which 
entered  the  Rhine  from  the  east  near 
Bonn.  The  time  had  come  to  build  tacti- 
cal bridges  in  the  VII  Corps  area,  and 
equipment  was  available  for  two  steel 
treadways  and  one  heavy  ponton. 

During  site  selection  the  roadnet  on 
the  opposite  bank  was  an  important 
consideration  but  not  the  only  one.  The 
best  of  four  good  roads  leading  to  the 
Cologne-Frankfurt  autobahn  lay  oppo- 
site Bonn,  but  sites  there  had  to  await 
the  clearing  of  the  area  by  the  78th 
Division,  headed  north  along  the  Rhine. 
Therefore,  the  first  tactical  bridges 
were  to  be  constructed  in  the  southern 
part  of  VII  Corps'  zone.  Not  far  down- 
stream from  the  site  of  III  Corps'  float- 


ing Bailey,  the  1120th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Group  was  to  build  an  M2  steel 
treadway  at  Rolandseck,  and  about  five 
miles  farther  downstream  at  Koenigs- 
winter  the  same  group  was  to  build  a 
heavy  ponton  bridge.  At  the  southern 
fringe  of  Bonn  the  1106th  Engineer 
Combat  Group  was  to  construct  an  M2 
treadway.  Corps  engineer  units  were 
to  build  bridges  and  operate  ferries, 
using  heavy  ponton  rafts  and  all  LCVPs 
not  required  as  powerboats  or  guard 
boats. ^ 

Special  security  precautions  were 
taken  as  a  result  of  the  enemy  harass- 
ment that  bridge  builders  in  the  Rema- 
gen area  had  suffered.  To  cover  both 
banks  at  each  site  the  80th  Chemical 
Smoke  Generating  Company  provided 
smoke,  thickened  as  necessary  by  boat- 
mounted  smoke  generators.  First  Army 
engineers  built  protective  booms,  and 
two  Navy  LCVPs  patrolled  the  river 
during  darkness.  At  each  site,  corps 
artillery  furnished  a  battery  of  155-mm. 
howitzers,  two  forward  observers,  and 
an  artillery  liaison  plane.  Corps  antiair- 
craft artillery,  in  addition  to  providing 
90-mm.  antiaircraft  protection,  turned 
searchlights  on  clouds  to  provide  artifi- 
cial moonlight  at  night. 

In  building  the  bridge  at  Rolandseck, 
the  297th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion 
had  the  help  of  a  company  from  the 
294th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  and 
two  treadway  bridge  companies,  the 
988th  and  990th.  Work  on  the  west 
bank  began  at  1930  on  16  March  at  a 
spot  where  a  civilian  ferry  had  operated. 
During  the  night  the  battalion  S  — 3, 


^'  Interv,  Lt  Col  William  J.  Irby,  23  Mar  45,  in  The 
Remagen  Bridgehead,  Seizure  and  Expansion;  Rptof 
Rhine  River  Crossings,  First  U.S.  Army,  pp.  14—16; 
Timothy,  The  Rhine  Crossing,  p.  10;  Hist  148th  Engr  C 
Bn,  Jan-Apr  45;  Opns  Rpt,  LCVP  Unit  No.  1,  p.  7. 


^^  Rpt  of  Rhine  River  Crossings,  First  U.S.  Army, 
pp.  16—20;  Engr  Opns  VII  Corps,  vol.  VII,  "Crossings 
of  the  Rhine  River  and  the  Advance  to  the  Elbe,"  pp. 
1  —6,  and  app.  8,  Engr  FO  6,  16  Mar  45.  Unless  other- 
wise cited  this  section  is  based  on  these  two  sources. 


THE  ROER  CROSSING  AND  THE  REMAGEN  BRIDGEHEAD 


515 


Maj.  Matthew  J.  Sweeney,  was  wounded 
by  artillery  fire  and  had  to  be  evacuated. 
On  the  east  bank  heavy  traffic  and  the 
slow  pace  of  blackout  driving  delayed 
the  arrival  of  bridge  equipment,  and 
construction  did  not  start  until  0745  on 
17  March.  That  afternoon  floating  de- 
bris from  the  Ludendorff  Bridge  halted 
work  at  Rolandseck  for  more  than  an 
hour.  All  these  factors  slowed  construc- 
tion time  to  23  1/2  hours. ^^ 

Work  on  the  ponton  bridge  at 
Koenigswinter,  which  the  294th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  built  with  the 
help  of  the  181st,  86th,  and  552d  Engi- 
neer Heavy  Ponton  Battalions,  began 
at  2210  on  18  March  and  was  com- 
pleted in  less  than  seventeen  hours.  The 
treadway  at  Bonn,  which  the  237th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  built  with 
the  help  of  a  company  each  from  the 
238th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  the 
23d  Armored  Engineer  Battalion,  and 
the  990th  Engineer  Treadway  Bridge 
Company,  went  even  more  rapidly.  At 
1,340  feet  the  longest  bridge  yet  built 
across  the  Rhine,  it  was  completed  in 
record  time.  For  one  thing,  construc- 
tion started  in  daylight.  Also,  the  men 
of  the  237th  had  a  powerful  incentive. 
The  VII  Corps  commander,  Maj.  Gen. 
J.  Lawton  Collins,  who  urgently  needed 
the  bridge  near  Bonn,  offered  to  buy 
beer  for  every  man  working  on  it  if  the 
total  construction  time  did  not  exceed 
ten  hours.  Work  began  at  0615  on  21 
March  and  the  first  vehicle  crossed  at 
1625 — ten  hours  and  ten  minutes  later. 
That  was  good  enough  for  General 
Collins.  The  following  day  he  hosted  a 
party  in  a  hall  at  Bonn  to  celebrate  with 


the  engineers  the  completion  of  the 
"Beer  Bridge."^^ 

The  VII  Corps  operated  three  heavy 
ponton  ferries,  one  upstream  of  the 
Rolandseck  bridge,  another  downstream 
of  the  Koenigswinter  bridge,  and  a 
third  at  Bonn.  These  ferries  carried  not 
only  vehicles  that  convoy  jams  at  the 
bridges  had  delayed  but  also  Pershing 
tanks,  each  ferried  on  a  Navy  LCVP- 
propelled,  six-ponton  raft.  First  Army 
had  long  planned  for  at  least  a  semi- 
fixed bridge  that  could  accommodate 
heavy  tanks.  Accordingly,  on  25  March 
the  engineers  began  work  at  Bad  Godes- 
berg,  about  five  miles  upstream  from 
Bonn,  on  a  bridge  designed  for  two- 
way  Class  40  or  one-way  Class  70  traffic. 
Vehicles  began  crossing  this  bridge  on 
5  April. ^^ 

At  a  conference  with  First  and  Third 
Army  commanders  at  Luxembourg  on 
19  March,  General  Omar  N.  Bradley 
told  General  Hodges,  First  Army  com- 
mander, to  be  prepared  by  23  March  to 
break  out  of  his  bridgehead,  drive 
southeast,  and  link  up  with  Third  Army 
in  the  Lahn  River  valley.  The  objective 
was  a  corridor  running  from  Frankfurt 
(across  the  Rhine  from  Mainz,  about 
100  miles  upstream  from  Remagen)  to 
Kassel,  about  160  miles  to  the  north- 
east. Patton  was  told  to  "take  the  Rhine 
on  the  run."^^ 

Hodges  ordered  his  V  Corps,  the 
southernmost  unit  which  shared  a 
boundary  with  Third  Army,  to  cross 
the  Rhine.  Early  on  2 1  March  the  corps 
commander,  Maj.  Gen.  Clarence  R. 
Huebner,  sent  elements  of  his  2d  and 


^"^  App.  1 ,  Summary  of  Data  on  Rhine  Bridges,  in 
Engr  Opns  VII  Corps,  vol.  VII,  "Crossings  of  the 
Rhine  River  and  the  Advance  to  the  Elbe." 


^^  Hist  1 106th  Engr  C  Gp,  Jan -May  45,  and  fig.  16, 
Engr  Opns  VII  Corps,  vol.  VII,  "Crossings  of  the 
Rhine  River  and  the  Advance  to  the  Elbe." 

''^  Timothy,  The  Rhine  Crossing,  p.  33. 

^•^  Bradley,  A  Soldier's  Story,  p.  519. 


516 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


69th  Infantry  Divisions  across  the  river 
on  III  Corps  bridges  and  ferries.  By 
the  evening  of  22  March,  V  Corps  had 
a  bridge  of  its  own.  Using  the  only 
bridge  equipment  available,  the  corps 
engineers  constructed  a  Class  40  M2 
steel  treadway  about  ten  miles  upstream 
from  the  III  Corps  bridges.  Victor 
Bridge  was  1,372  feet  long,  designated 
"the  longest  tactical  bridge  in  the  world" 
by  the  men  of  the  254th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion,  who  built  it  with  the  help 
of  the  994th  and  998th  Engineer  Tread- 
way  Bridge  Companies  and,  as  the  sign 
beside  the  bridge  proclaimed,  "U.S. 
Navy" — a  detachment  from  the  Navy's 
LCVPUnit  No.  1. 

Work  began  on  both  banks  at  0800 
on  22  March.  The  engineers  used  no 
smoke  screen,  nor  was  artillery  support 
deemed  necessary.  The  principal  pro- 
tective effort  was  directed  against  water 


attack,  to  which,  farthest  upstream,  the 
Victor  Bridge  was  especially  vulnerable. 
Infantry  and  cavalry  patrolled  the  banks; 
the  engineers  emplaced  three  protec- 
tive booms,  using  a  locally  procured 
steam  tug;  and  at  night  tanks  threw  the 
beams  of  their  canal  defense  lights  over 
the  rushing  waters  to  seek  out  enemy 
swimmers  and  floating  mines.  Though 
the  booms  were  not  ready  immediately, 
the  bridge  was  finished  in  twelve  hours 
and  was  opened  to  traffic  at  2000  on 
22  March.  The  V  Corps  used  the  bridge 
entirely  for  vehicles  and  crossed  the 
infantry  in  LCVPs.^^ 

In  the  meantime,  far  to  the  north 
and  south  of  the  V  Corps  crossing  site, 
the  Ninth,  Third,  and  Seventh  Armies 
were  in  position  for  their  own  assault 
crossings  of  the  Rhine. 


V  Corps  operations  m  ETO,  pp.  404,  406,  in  CMH. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 


The  Assault  Crossings  of  the  Rhine 


The  Remagen  bridgehead  had  made 
headlines  as  a  spectacular  and  fortu- 
itous jump  across  the  last  major  water 
barrier  in  the  western  Reich.  Once 
formed,  though,  it  received  only  sparse 
sustenance  from  SHAEF.  General  Eisen- 
hower still  focused  upon  the  larger 
preparations  of  21  Army  Group  and 
Ninth  Army  north  of  Remagen  to  cross 
the  Rhine  in  an  area  where  terrain 
favored  mutually  supporting  offensives 
into  the  heartland  of  Germany.  Much 
to  the  disgust  of  Lt.  Gen.  Courtney  H. 
Hodges,  First  Army  commander,  the 
supreme  commander  kept  the  nine 
divisions  in  the  bridgehead  on  a  short 
leash,  tying  down  weak  German  forces 
in  the  area  while  the  Ninth,  Third,  and 
Seventh  Armies  to  the  north  and  south 
crossed  the  Rhine. 

Ninth  Army  at  Rheinberg 

Ninth  Army  was  ready.  On  19  Feb- 
ruary, even  before  the  Roer  operation. 
General  Simpson  had  delegated  to  Maj. 
Gen.  John  B.  Anderson,  commanding 
the  XVI  Corps,  the  job  of  planning  a 
Rhine  crossing  at  Rheinberg,  some  fif- 
teen miles  south  of  Wesel,  under  the 
code  name  FLASHPOINT.  Though  the 
operation  did  not  begin  as  early  as  Gen- 
eral Simpson  had  hoped,  the  plans  gov- 
erned Ninth  Army's  move  across  the  ri- 
ver in  late  March.  Col.  John  W.  Wheeler, 


the  XVI  Corps  engineer,  had  already 
staged  a  general  planning  session  on 
12  February  with  the  commanders  and 
staffs  of  the  two  corps  engineer  combat 
groups,  the  1 153d  and  the  1 148th.  The 
engineers  discovered  that  they  had  on 
hand  only  150  storm  boats,  plywood 
craft  powered  by  a  55-horsepower  motor 
with  a  combat  load  of  seven  prone 
infantrymen.  Most  of  the  assault  force 
would  thus  have  to  move  in  slower, 
fifteen-man  single  assault  boats,  either 
paddled  across  or  propelled  by  22- 
horsepower  outboard  motors.  Of  the 
500  single  assault  craft  rounded  up, 
exactly  half  had  motors.  The  engineers 
planned  to  ferry  tanks  on  rafts  of  float- 
ing Bailey  bridge  sections.  To  guaran- 
tee the  rapid  transfer  of  heavier  wea- 
pons, vehicles,  and  supply,  they  availed 
themselves  of  the  services  of  Naval 
Landing  Unit  No.  3,  which  furnished 
twenty-four  LCVPs  and  twenty-four 
LCMs.  Another  hundred  LVTs  were 
available  to  handle  special  missions, 
especially  to  transfer  entire  beach  par- 
ties to  the  far  shore.  To  exploit  the 
assault,  the  engineer  groups  would  have 
ready  on  the  west  bank  one  heavy  pon- 
ton bridge  set  and  three  floating  tread- 
ways;  twelve  Sea  Mule  tugs  would  help 
emplace  the  bridge  components.  To 
counteract  German  air  attacks,  the  ar- 
my command  attached  to  the  engineers 


518 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


an  automatic  antiaircraft  weapons  bat- 
talion for  the  operation.' 

Training  for  the  operation  continued 
until  10  March  at  two  centers  on  the 
Meuse  River  in  the  Netherlands,  where 
conditions  approximated  those  at  the 
Rhine  crossing  site.  Col.  David  C.  Wal- 
lace, commanding  the  1 153d  Engineer 
Combat  Group,  established  his  school 
at  Echt,  about  twenty  miles  south  of 
Liege.  Col.  Ellsworth  I.  Davis  of  the 
1 148th  Engineer  Combat  Group  set  up 
a  second  training  site  at  Sittard,  farther 
south.  The  group  engineers  trained 
with  the  troops  of  two  relatively  fresh 
infantry  divisions  they  would  support 
in  the  assault,  the  30th  and  the  79th 
Divisions.  As  part  of  XIX  Corps,  the 
30th  had  crossed  the  Roer  against  only 
light  resistance  and  the  79th  against 
none  at  all.  Neither  engineer  group  had 
any  assault  experience,  though  several 
of  the  engineer  officers  had  seen  action. 
The  commanding  officer  of  the  1 104th 
Engineer  Combat  Group  took  up  a  tem- 
porary assignment  under  the  more 
experienced  Col.  John  W.  Wheeler,  the 
XVI  Corps  engineer.  Wheeler  also  tem- 
porarily assumed  direct  control  of  the 
intelligence  sections  of  the  two  engineer 
groups  in  the  assault.  They  remained 
in  positions  from  which  they  could  con- 
stantly reconnoiter  the  river  at  Lintfort, 
six  miles  southwest  of  Rheinberg, 
throughout  the  period  before  the  attack.^ 

Colonel  Wallace  assembled  the  river- 
crossing  equipment  and  operators  in 

'  Hist  1 153d  EngrCGp,  Mar-May  45;  Hist  1148th 
Engr  C  Gp,  Mar  45;  Timothy,  The  Rhine  Crossing,  pp. 
7-8;  Hewitt,  Woi-k  Horse  of  the  Western  Front,  p.  235. 

^  Conquer,  The  Story  of  the  Ninth  Army,  pp.  190  —  91; 
Hewitt,  Work  Horse  of  the  Western  Front,  pp.  231-33; 
Combat  Engineers'  Rhine-Ruhr-Elbe  Operation,  24 
Mar-1  May  45,  C;i  372,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect;  Hist 
XIX  Corps  Engrs,  p.  19,  ML  2220,  ETOUSA  Hist 
Sect;  Hists,  1153d  Engr  C  (ip,  Mar-  May  45,  and 
1148th  Engr  C  (;p.  Mar  45. 


the  training  area  and  organized  his 
1153d  Group  into  eight  task  forces. 
Task  Force  Assault,  consisting  of  the 
258th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  rein- 
forced by  200  powerboat  operators 
from  the  1153d  and  Ninth  Army,  was 
to  furnish  and  operate  all  storm  and 
double  assault  boats  for  the  initial  cros- 
sings. Task  Force  Heavy  Boats,  the 
202d  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  rein- 
forced by  U.S.  Navy  Task  Unit  122.5.3, 
was  in  charge  of  the  LCMs,  LCVPs,  Sea 
Mules,  and  rafts  to  be  used  in  ferrying 
operations.  Task  Force  Roads,  the  280th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  was  to  do 
road  work  up  to  the  Rhine.  The  remain- 
ing five  were  Task  Forces  M2  Tread- 
way,  Heavy  Ponton  Bridge,  Boom  (to 
construct  debris  and  antimine  booms), 
Ml  Treadway,  and  LVT. 

Colonel  Davis  of  the  1 148th  Engineer 
Combat  Group  organized  his  engineer 
troops  differently.  His  149th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  was  to  support  one 
infantry  regiment  of  the  79th  Division, 
controlling  and  operating  assault  and 
storm  boats  and  all  types  of  ferrying 
equipment.  The  187th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  was  to  provide  the  same 
support  to  the  other  assault  infantry 
regiment.  The  1276th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  was  to  support  the  two 
engineer  battalions  by  launching  Bai- 
ley rafts,  Sea  Mules,  LCMs,  and  LCVPs, 
erecting  an  M2  treadway  bridge,  and 
installing  mine  booms. 

One  of  the  most  difficult  problems 
was  moving  the  large,  cumbersome 
boats  to  be  used  in  the  ferrying  opera- 
tion over  the  roads  from  Echt  to  the 
Rhine,  especially  the  LCMs  and  Sea 
Mules,  which  had  to  be  carried  on  tank 
transporters.  The  202d  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion,  responsible  for  moving 
forward  all  the  heavy  equipment  of 


THE  ASSAULT  CROSSINGS  OF  THE  RHINE 


519 


both  groups,  sent  a  demolition  crew  and 
a  bulldozer  along  the  eighty-mile  route 
from  Echt  to  Lintfort,  the  initial  assem- 
bly area,  to  widen  roads  and  remove 
obstacles/^  At  Lintfort,  all  XVI  Corps' 
assault  craft  and  bridging  materials 
were  to  be  stored  in  the  large  railroad 
yard  of  a  coal  mine.  The  engineers 
made  elaborate  preparations  to  camou- 
flage the  equipment  with  garnished  fish 
nets,  chicken  wire,  and  cotton  duck 
blackened  with  coal  dust.  At  the  same 
time,  XIII  Corps  engineers  construc- 
ted a  dummy  depot  near  Krefeld  as 
part  of  Operation  EXPLOIT,  an  elabo- 
rate scheme  designed  to  trick  the  Ger- 
mans into  expecting  a  crossing  at  Uer- 
dingen,  some  fifteen  miles  south  of 
Rheinberg.^ 

By  20  March  both  engineer  combat 
groups,  having  completed  a  week  of 
training  along  the  Maas,  were  moving 
the  river-crossing  equipment  forward 
to  Lintfort.  From  there  to  the  crossing 
sites  at  Rheinberg  the  two  groups  had 
exclusive  use  of  one  road,  over  which 
the  LCMs,  LCVPs,  DUKWs,  and  Sea 
Mules  moved  at  night  to  conceal  them 
from  the  Germans.  By  nightfall  on  23 
March  the  engineers  had  reconnoitered 
their  crossing  areas,  paying  particular 
attention  to  unloading  sites  for  the 
heavy  craft.  The  bridging  equipment, 
loaded  on  vehicles  at  Lintfort,  was  ready 
to  go  forward  as  soon  as  the  engineers 
had  breached  a  twelve-  to  fifteen-foot 
winter  dike  along  the  riverbank.  Cam- 
ouflaged assault  and  storm  boats  were 
in  place  behind  the  dike,  their  motors 
warmed  for  the  early  morning  start  by 


■*  Hist  202d  Engr  C  Bn,  1  Jan-  1  Jun  45;  History  of 
the  XVI  Corps,  p.  39. 

^  Engineer  Operations  in  the  Rhine  Crossing,  Ninth 
U.S.  Army,  pp.  51,  55. 

^  Cover  Narrative,  79th  Div,  FLASHPOINT  Opera- 
tion, CI  159,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 


chemical  heating  pads  borrowed  from 
hospital  units. ^ 

The  1 153d  Engineer  Combat  Group 
had  made  thorough  arrangements  for 
an  orderly  crossing  of  the  30th  Division. 
There  were  to  be  three  beaches — Red, 
White,  and  Blue — one  for  each  of  the 
division's  infantry  regiments,  with  Red 
on  the  left,  or  north,  opposite  Buede- 
rich;  White  in  the  center;  and  Blue  on 
the  right,  or  south,  opposite  Rheinberg, 
The  first  boats  over,  guided  by  machine 
guns  firing  tracer  ammunition,  were  to 
mark  the  boundaries  of  their  beaches 
with  red,  white,  or  blue  aircraft  land- 
ing lamps.  Thereafter  the  assault  ele- 
ments would  show  the  heavy  boats  where 
to  land  by  emplacing  ten-foot  stakes  on 
which  were  wired  flashlights  with  a  red 
covering,  no  covering  (white),  or  a  blue 
covering  to  designate  the  beach.  Lights 
were  arranged  one  above  the  other  (two 
for  LCVPs,  three  for  LCMs,  four  for 
duplex-drive  tanks)  or  in  a  design  (three 
forming  a  triangle  for  Bailey  rafts).  The 
beachmaster  wore  a  white  helmet;  those 
of  the  engineer  guides,  boat  crews,  and 
others  were  marked  with  white  paint 
in  identifying  patterns. 

Over  the  Rhine 

The  night  was  clear  and  the  river- 
banks  almost  dry  at  0100  on  24  March 
when  the  Ninth  Army  artillery  prepara- 
tion erupted  into  the  sky.  An  hour  later 
the  30th  Division's  first  wave  of  storm 
boats,  each  carrying  two  engineers  and 
seven  infantrymen,  pushed  off.  The 
second  wave  consisted  of  storm  and 
double  assault  boats  constructed  by  bolt- 
ing together  two  single  craft,  stern  to 
stern;  the  third  of  LVTs  and  double 


**  Conquer,  The  Story  of  the  Ninth  Army,  p.  245. 


520 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


assault  boats;  and  the  fourth  of  LCVPs. 
Troops  of  the  first  wave  were  able  to 
rig  the  lights  on  the  far  shore  three 
minutes  after  hitting  the  beach.  (Map 
29) 

German  shells  killed  one  man, 
wounded  three  others,  and  knocked  out 
two  Red  Beach  storm  boats,  but  else- 
where the  Americans  encountered  lit- 
tle or  no  resistance.  The  artillery  bar- 
rage had  stunned  or  daunted  the  few 
Germans  on  the  far  shore,  and  the  artil- 
lery had  cut  enemy  telephone  wires, 
making  it  impossible  for  the  Germans 
to  call  up  artillery  fire  immediately.  By 
0243  the  engineer  of  the  30th  Infantry 
Division  could  report  that  all  the  assault 
battalions  were  across  and  that  resis- 
tance had  been  negligible;  by  0600  the 
bulk  of  the  30th  Division's  three  infan- 
try regiments  was  on  the  far  shore. 

Upstream,  around  a  bend  in  the 
Rhine,  the  first  wave  of  the  79th  Infan- 
try Division's  two  assault  regiments 
started  off  at  0300  in  storm  and  assault 
boats.  By  that  time  fog  and  smoke  had 
settled  on  the  water  and  on  both  banks 
of  the  river.  Here  the  width  of  the  steep 
banks  and  swampy  areas  on  the  far 
shore  restricted  the  crossing  sites.  Some 
of  the  assault  boats  failed  to  get  across. 
Three  swamped  because  the  engineers 
of  the  1 49th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion had  not  built  bow  extensions  high 
enough.  But  the  men  swam  to  shore, 
and  none  were  lost  in  the  assault  cros- 
sings. By  0600  at  the  upstream  or  south- 
ernmost site,  the  187th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  had  crossed  its  infantry 
regiment,  and  by  0730  the  149th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  had  put  ashore 
all  men  of  the  second  regiment  at  the 
northern  site.  The  remaining  infantry 
regiment  of  the  79th  Division  ferried 
across  next  day,  25  March,  the  two  engi- 


neer battalions  sharing  the  work.^ 

At  both  the  30th  and  79th  Infantry 
Division  sites  the  LVTs  were  in  action 
early  and  saw  extensive  service  through- 
out D-day.  The  LVTs,  victims  of  the 
current,  tended  to  drift  downstream 
and  could  not  manage  direct  crossings 
to  a  small,  defined  bridgehead  at  the 
outset  of  the  assault.  Later,  however, 
they  ferried  load  after  load  of  tanks, 
which  did  not  need  specially  prepared 
points  of  debarkation  on  the  far  bank. 
The  DUKWs  also  proved  excellent  both 
as  ferry  craft  and  as  general  utility  boats 
during  bridge  construction.  The  heav- 
ier ferry  craft  had  trouble  getting  for- 
ward over  the  congested  roadnet  in  the 
darkness,  the  LCVPs  on  flatbed  trailers, 
the  LCMs  and  Sea  Mules  on  tank  trans- 
porters. At  0130  these  cumbersome 
loads  caused  a  traffic  jam  that  was  not 
cleared  until  0300. 

In  the  30th  Infantry  Division  zone 
enemy  fire  hampered  construction  of 
hardstandings  at  the  launching  sites, 
and  the  LCVPs  and  LCMs  could  not 
begin  ferrying  operations  until  day- 
break. By  noon  eight  LCVPs  and  nine 
LCMs  were  hauling  men,  weapons, 
light  tanks,  and  tank  destroyers  across 
the  Rhine.  The  landing  craft  also  helped 
during  the  construction  of  the  three 
bridges — M2  treadway,  heavy  ponton, 
and  Ml  treadway.  By  afternoon  sev- 
eral treadway  rafts  and  two  Bailey  rafts, 
propelled  by  powered  storm  boats,  were 
carrying  Sherman  tanks  across. 

In  the  79th  Infantry  Division's  area 
ferrying  assumed  increasing  impor- 

'  Engineer  Operations  in  the  Rhine  Crossing,  Ninth 
U.S.  Army,  p.  19  and  map,  Incl  3.  Unless  otherwise 
cited,  this  section  is  based  on  this  source,  pp.  18—31, 
and  also  on  the  histories  of  the  1153d  and  1148th 
Engineer  Combat  Groups.  Engineer  Study  of  the 
Rhine  River  Crossing  made  by  the  79th  Inf  Div, 
Exhibit  D,  CI  160,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 


THE  ASSAULT  CROSSINGS  OF  THE  RHINE 


521 


89th  Division  Infantry  Cross  the  Rhine  at  Oberwesel 


tance  after  enemy  fire  slowed  work  on 
the  divisional  bridge.  The  1276th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion,  with  the  mis- 
sion of  launching  the  ferry  craft,  was 
also  responsible  for  the  M2  treadway 
bridge  and  the  mine  booms.  The  unit 
was  not  only  overburdened  with  work 
but  was  also  unlucky.  German  phospho- 
rous shells  set  the  battalion  command 
post  ablaze  at  0230,  and  a  few  minutes 
later  enemy  mortar  fire  added  to  the 
confusion.  No  one  was  hurt,  but  the 
unit  struggled  to  move  its  equipment 
through  the  congested  area.  Tractors 
had  to  pull  the  LCM-laden  transport- 
ers across  the  last  yards  of  soft  river- 
bank,  but  once  there  the  transporters 
could  back  into  the  water  and  float  their 


cargoes  off  with  the  assistance  of  craw- 
ler cranes  at  the  site.  By  0700  two  LCMs 
were  carrying  tanks  to  the  far  shore, 
but  German  fire  hit  one  and  seven 
more  craft  remained  on  the  west  bank 
until  1900.  The  engineers  launched 
the  LCVPs  more  easily,  and  nine  were 
in  operation  by  noon.  The  Sea  Mules 
bogged  down  on  their  transports  short 
of  the  bank  and  got  into  the  river  only 
after  the  men  finished  a  plank  road  to 
the  water  at  noon  on  25  March. ^ 

Engineers  supporting  both  the  30th 
and  79th  Infantry  Divisions  recognized 
that  ferry  sites  should  be  located  down- 
stream of  tactical  bridges  to  avoid  the 


AAR,  1276th  Engr  C  Bn,  Jan -May  45. 


CROSSING  THE  RHINE 

March  1945 


50  Miles 


50  Kilometers 


MAP  29 


THE  ASSAULT  CROSSINGS  OF  THE  RHINE 


523 


possibility  of  ramming,  but  in  several 
cases  the  best  ferry  sites — those  not 
requiring  extensive  preparation — were 
located  immediately  upstream.  So  they 
equipped  the  ferries  with  two  anchors 
each,  to  be  cast  overboard  if  the  power 
failed,  to  prevent  the  ferries  from  float- 
ing downstream  with  the  current. 

Another  deviation  from  planning  was 
the  timing  of  bridge  construction. 
Because  only  a  50  percent  reserve  of 
bridge  material  was  available,  planners 
had  not  intended  that  bridge  construc- 
tion start  before  bridgeheads  on  the  far 
shore  had  been  seized.  Firm,  substan- 
tial bridgeheads  would  forestall  observed 
enemy  fire  against  bridging  operations. 
But  enemy  resistance  seemed  to  be  so 
light  and  smoke  so  effective  for  con- 
cealment that  work  on  all  three  30th 
Division  bridges  began  by  0630  on  24 
March  and  on  the  79th  Division  bridge 
at  0800. 

However,  after  the  wind  changed 
and  the  smoke  lifted,  enemy  fire  hit 
the  treadway  bridges  in  both  zones. 
Moreover,  ferries  that  swept  dowrt- 
stream  when  anchors  failed  to  hold  (or 
crews  neglected  to  use  them)  rammed 
the  treadways.  Intermittent  artillery  fire 
hit  the  northernmost  bridge,  the  M2 
treadway  in  the  White  Beach  area,  sev- 
eral times.  Then  shortly  after  the  bridge 
opened  to  traffic  at  1600  a  Bailey  raft 
loaded  with  a  Sherman  tank  crashed 
into  it,  causing  so  much  damage  that 
the  bridge  could  not  be  reopened  until 
0200  on  25  March.  At  the  Ml  treadway 
in  the  Blue  Beach  area  enemy  fire 
interrupted  work  for  an  hour  in  the 
morning  and  knocked  out  144  feet  of 
the  bridge  during  the  afternoon.  The 
bridge  opened  for  traffic  at  0830  on  25 
March,  but  a  little  more  than  an  hour 
later  a  Sea  Mule  drifted  against  the 


treadway  and  buckled  it.  The  M2  tread- 
way built  in  the  northern  part  of  the 
79th  Division's  zone  was  the  southern- 
most of  the  three  treadways.  It  was  hit 
first  by  light  enemy  fire  and  then  at 
2330  by  three  LCMs  that  broke  the 
bridge  about  240  feet  from  shore;  it 
could  not  be  repaired  until  noon  on  D 
plus  1.  By  that  time  heavier  artil- 
lery fire  was  falling,  which  killed  the 
commander  of  the  engineer  treadway 
bridge  company,  wounded  several  men, 
and  knocked  out  seven  floats.  That  eve- 
ning the  XVI  Corps  engineer.  Colonel 
Wheeler,  turned  the  bridge  work  over 
to  the  1 153d  Engineer  Combat  Group, 
whose  208th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion completed  the  repairs  late  on  the 
afternoon  of  D  plus  2,  26  March.  In 
the  meantime,  the  79th  Division  was 
able  to  use  the  30th  Division's  M 1  tread- 
way. To  protect  the  bridges  against 
debris,  floating  mines,  barges,  explo- 
sive-filled motorboats,  submarines,  and 
underwater  swimmers,  five  booms  were 
to  be  installed  and  covered  by  tanks 
with  canal  defense  lights,  but  group 
engineers  could  not  complete  the  task 
primarily  because  powerboats  needed 
to  emplace  the  booms  were  not  avail- 
able. 

Far  to  the  south  (upstream)  of  the 
79th  Division's  area,  near  Homberg, 
75th  Infantry  Division  engineers  con- 
structed an  excellent  cable  boom  in 
darkness  on  the  morning  of  D-day. 
Then  a  direct  artillery  hit  severed  the 
cable,  setting  the  boom  adrift,  and  en- 
emy strafing  eliminated  a  rebuilt  boom 
next  morning.  Lacking  booms,  XVI 
Corps  depended  on  antitank  guns  and 
tank  destroyers  placed  in  dikes  along 
the  riverfront  and  on  patrol  boats 
equipped  with  an  underwater  listening 
device.  The  enemy  attempted  no  water- 


524 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


.l'<\^'-  ^ 


Engineers  Slide  Bailey  Brid(;in(;  Into  Place  at  Wesel 


borne  or  underwater  attacks. 

The  tactical  units  were  satisfied  with 
the  crossing.  The  30th  Infantry  Divi- 
sion considered  the  Rhine  "much  less 
of  a  problem  than  the  swollen,  racing 
Roer  had  been."^  Though  1,100  feet 
wide  in  the  30th  Division's  zone,  the 
Rhine  was  slow  moving  and  easy  to 
work  in.  Enemy  resistance  there  and  in 
the  79th  Division's  zone  was  negligible 
compared  with  that  at  Remagen,  and 
the  Germans  in  the  XVI  Corps'  area 
may  well  have  been  deceived  by  camou- 
flage and  the  diversionary  operations 
at  Krefeld  and  Uerdingen.  In  both  divi- 
sion zones  assault  troops  had  crossed 
quickly  and  with  very  few  casualties.  By 


Hewitt,  Work  Horse  of  the  Western  Front,  p.  235. 


0600  the  engineers  had  moved  eight 
infantry  battalions  of  the  30th  Division 
and  five  of  the  79th  over  the  Rhine;  by 
the  end  of  D-day  three  tank  battalions, 
two  field  artillery  battalions,  and  two 
tank-destroyer  battalions  were  also  on 
the  far  bank.  One  field  artillery  battal- 
ion managed  to  cross  the  treadway  at 
White  Beach  before  the  bridge  was 
rammed;  the  rest  of  the  heavy  weap- 
ons went  across  on  ferry  craft.  By  night- 
fall engineers  were  ferrying  one  Sher- 
man tank  over  the  Rhine  every  ten 
minutes.  The  crossing  had  cost  XVI 
Corps  38  men  killed,  426  wounded,  and 
3  missing.  Ninth  Army  considered  the 
operation  a  complete  success.'^ 

'"  Ibid.,  p.  242;  History  of  the  XVI  Corps,  pp.  42-46; 
Conquer,  The  Story  of  the  Ninth  Army,  p.  247. 


THE  ASSAULT  CROSSINGS  OF  THE  RHINE 


525 


Farther  south,  the  two  other  Ameri- 
can field  armies  in  the  line  jumped  the 
Rhine  between  23  and  26  March.  The 
techniques  employed  in  the  crossings 
of  Third  and  Seventh  Armies  varied. 
General  Patton  got  six  battalions  across 
with  a  fair  degree  of  surprise  by  restrict- 
ing artillery  and  air  bombardment  in 
his  assault  zones  around  Oppenheim 
and  the  Rhine  gorge.  Seventh  Army, 
on  Patton's  right  flank,  made  compara- 
tively heavier  use  of  artillery  in  its 
assault  near  Worms.  Common  to  all 
these  efforts,  however,  was  extensive 
engineer  preparation  beforehand. 

The  XII  Corps  Crossing  at  Oppenheim 

For  months  the  engineers  of  XII 
Corps,  scheduled  to  make  Patton's  first 
crossing,  had  considered  Oppenheim  a 
good  site.  Because  the  Third  Army 
operation  was  to  be  a  surprise,  a  cross- 
ing at  a  town  was  essential  to  conceal 
the  movement  of  the  assault  boats  to 
the  river's  edge.  The  engineers  favored 
Oppenheim  because  it  straddled  one 
of  the  main  roads  to  Frankfurt  am 
Main,  some  twenty  miles  to  the  north- 
east. The  bridge  carrying  the  road  over 
the  river  could  not  be  counted  on,  but 
at  that  spot  the  Rhine  was  not  more 
than  a  thousand  feet  wide  and  fairly 
slow,  while  its  sandy  banks  were  firm 
enough  to  support  amphibious  vehicles. 
For  building  rafts  and  launching  LCVPs 
the  protected  Oppenheim  boat  basin 
on  the  near  bank  was  ideal." 

As  planning  progressed  it  became 
evident  that  some  560  assault  boats 
would  be  available.  This  made  it  neces- 
sary to  expand  the  plans  to  include  a 
neighboring  town,  Nierstein,  1,500 
yards  downstream.  During  the  assault 


at  2200  on  22  March,  engineers  of  the 
1 135th  Engineer  Combat  Group's  204th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  were  to 
cross  two  battalions  of  the  5th  Division's 
Ilth  Infantry  in  column  at  Nierstein 
and  the  third  battalion  at  Oppenheim. 
As  soon  as  the  1 1th  Infantry  had  cleared 
the  far  bank,  the  group's  7th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  was  to  put  across  the 
5th  Division's  10th  Infantry  at  Oppen- 
heim.'"^ 

On  the  morning  of  22  March  Ger- 
man planes  bombed  and  strafed  Nier- 
stein, but  nothing  indicated  that  the 
enemy  expected  an  immediate  cross- 
ing there.  The  only  activity  the  Ameri- 
cans could  see  on  the  far  bank  was  a 
party  of  soldiers  digging  mine  holes  in 
the  dike  about  fifty  yards  from  the  river's 
edge.  After  dark  on  the  twenty-second 
the  204th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion 
brought  assault  boats  down  to  the  ri- 
ver's edge.  No  artillery  barrage  was 
fired,  nor  did  the  boats  use  their  mo- 
tors. Three  engineers  manned  each 
boat,  which  carried  twelve  infantrymen. 
As  silently  as  possible,  the  boats  pad- 
dled across  in  the  blackness.  The  first 
boat  from  Nierstein  drew  a  single  burst 
of  machine-gun  fire,  but  the  infantry 
replied  with  automatic  rifles  and  before 
the  boat  unloaded  five  Germans  came 
down  from  the  dike  and  surrendered. 
The  first  infantry  company  was  ashore 
in  eight  minutes,  and  by  0130  on  23 
March  all  three  battalions  of  the  Ilth 
Infantry  were  over  the  Rhine  with  only 
twenty  casualties.  Strongest  resistance 
had  occurred  in  the  Oppenheim  cros- 


' '  XII  Corps:  Spearhead  of  Patton's  Third  Army,  p.  360. 


'"^  Interviews  with  officers  of  the  150th,  204th,  and 
7th  Engineer  Combat  Battalions  and  88th  Engineer 
Heavy  Ponton  Battalion  on  25  and  31  March  and  5 
April  1945,  CI  44,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect.  Details  of  the 
crossing  are  from  this  source. 


526 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


sing,  during  which  one  engineer  was 
killed. 

At  0200  the  7th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion  began  crossing  the  10th  In- 
fantry in  a  column  of  battalions.  Just  at 
daylight,  as  the  last  wave  was  paddling 
across,  shells  from  a  German  self-pro- 
pelled 105-mm.  gun  hit  the  water, 
splashing  and  swamping  some  of  the 
boats  but  causing  no  casualties.  The  gun 
could  not  be  driven  off  or  silenced  until 
the  ferries  went  into  operation  to  carry 
across  heavy  weapons.  Meanwhile,  en- 
emy shelling,  bombing,  and  strafing 
interfered  with  the  work  at  the  Oppen- 
heim  boat  basin  where  the  88th  Engi- 
neer Heavy  Ponton  Battalion  was  con- 
structing four  Class  40  rafts.  The  first 
raft,  pushed  downstream  to  Ferry  Site 
1  near  Nierstein,  did  not  begin  operat- 
ing until  0700,  when  it  carried  a  bull- 
dozer to  the  far  shore;  it  was  0830 
before  tank  destroyers  could  raft  across 
to  attack  the  self-propelled  gun.  Dur- 
ing the  night  a  party  of  engineers  had 
marked  beaches  for  the  landing  of 
DUKWs,  LCVPs,  and  Weasels  using 
blinking  white,  red,  and  green  lights 
and  setting  up  vertical  panels  of  corres- 
ponding colors  for  daytime  use.  Some 
LCVPs  were  working  by  dawn  on  23 
March,  but  DUKWs  and  Weasels  did 
not  arrive  until  the  next  day. 

The  2d  Infantry  of  the  5th  Division 
crossed  to  the  east  bank  on  rafts  and 
LCVPs  next  morning,  and  by  midafter- 
noon  an  attached  battalion  of  the  90th 
Infantry  Division  had  also  crossed.  Two 
of  the  big  rafts  could  accommodate  six 
jeeps  at  a  time;  they  operated  continu- 
ously for  two  days  and  nights,  one 
pushed  by  an  LCVP,  the  other  by  two 
powerboats.  The  rafts  continued  sup- 
ply and  evacuation  operations  even 
after  bridges  were  in,  a  treadway  at 


1800  on  23  March  and  a  heavy  ponton 
bridge  at  0700  the  next  morning.  The 
raft  operations  permitted  the  4th  Ar- 
mored Division  to  employ  the  treadway 
as  a  one-way  crossing,  and  the  division 
used  the  bridge  continuously  for  twenty- 
four  hours  beginning  at  0900  on  the 
twenty-fourth. 

In  one  respect  the  engineers  of  the 
1 1 35th  Engineer  Combat  Group  showed 
more  foresight  than  had  their  col- 
leagues in  the  First  and  Ninth  Army 
crossings.  When  the  construction  of  the 
heavy  ponton  bridge  began,  all  ferries 
moved  to  Ferry  Site  2,  downstream  of 
all  bridges.  There,  the  U.S.  Navy  was 
operating  LCVPs,  and  DUKWs  began 
operations  on  the  twenty-fourth.  This 
movement  downstream  assured  that  the 
ferries  would  not  crash  into  the  bridges. 

The  150th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion began  bridge  work  at  0330,  but  Ger- 
man artillery  fire  at  dawn  and  strafing 
and  bombing  during  the  morning  inter- 
rupted the  work.  American  combat 
troops  on  the  east  bank  soon  silenced 
the  artillery  piece,  and  although  the 
bombing  and  strafing  wounded  one 
man,  the  air  attacks  did  little  damage 
to  the  bridge  material.'^ 

About  the  time  bridge  building  be- 
gan, a  detachment  of  the  1301st  Engi- 
neer General  Service  Regiment,  experi- 
enced in  boom  construction,  started 
emplacing  an  antimine  floating  log 
boom  and  an  antipersonnel  boom  made 
of  admiralty  netting,  both  upstream  of 
the  bridges.  The  engineer  detachment 
completed  the  log  boom  by  1400  on  23 
March.  The  more  troublesome  antiper- 
sonnel boom  was  only  half  completed 


'^  AAR,  5th  Inf  Div,  CI  43,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 
'^  Hist  150th  Engr  C  Bn,  16  Oct  44-12  May  45; 
Annex  E,  AAR,  1 135th  Engr  C  Gp,  Jan- Apr  45. 


THE  ASSAULT  CROSSINGS  OF  THE  RHINE 


527 


by  nightfall,  but  during  the  night  two 
German  frogmen  were  caught  in  its 
meshes.  Each  carried  two  disc-shaped 
magnetic  mines,  both  set  to  explode  at 
0600.  The  Germans  said  they  were  two 
of  a  party  of  five  frogmen  who  dropped 
into  the  river  about  eleven  kilometers 
upstream  with  orders  to  place  mines 
on  either  a  ferry  site  or  a  bridge.  They 
had  almost  immediately  lost  contact 
with  the  other  three,  who  were  never 
picked  up.  The  two  captives  were  sol- 
diers who  had  been  sentenced  to  three 
months'  service  in  a  naval  diving  school 
for  offenses  committed  in  Russia  and 
in  Greece.  On  this  penal  service,  they 
revealed,  they  could  not  handle  explo- 
sives and  received  their  mines  only 
when  they  were  actually  in  the  water 
upstream  of  Rheinberg.  The  officers 
had  also  told  them  that  they  had  little 
chance  of  returning  from  the  mission.^'' 

The  VIII  Corps  Crossing  at  the  Rhine  Gorge 

The  area  selected  for  the  VIII  Corps 
crossings,  between  Koblenz  on  the  north 
and  Bingen  on  the  south,  was  the  fam- 
ous Rhine  gorge,  where  the  river  runs 
swiftly  between  rock  cliffs.  There  had 
lived  the  river  barons,  who  from  their 
castles  on  the  heights  had  exacted  trib- 
ute from  passing  ships.  At  a  point  near 
St.  Goar  stands  the  Lorelei,  the  huge 
rock  formation  from  which  the  golden- 
haired  maiden  of  Heine's  poem  enticed 
sailors  to  their  deaths  on  the  shoal 
below.  This  stretch  of  the  Rhine  was 
the  worst  possible  for  an  assault  cros- 
sing. For  that  very  reason  Patton  had 
selected  it  in  the  belief  that  "the  impos- 
sible place  is  usually  the  least  well  de- 
fended."'^ He  was  wrong.  Boatmen  on 


the  river  were  at  the  mercy  of  those  on 
the  heights  above.  At  the  87th  Infantry 
Division's  crossing  site  near  Rhens,  a 
mile  or  so  upstream  from  Koblenz,  fire 
from  machine  guns,  mortars,  flak  guns, 
and  artillery  emplaced  on  the  rocky 
cliffs  above  fell  on  a  347th  Infantry 
launching  site  six  minutes  before  H- 
hour,  scheduled  for  0001  on  25  March. 
This  caused  such  disruption  that  an 
hour  passed  before  a  second  try  could 
be  made;  this  time  the  men  succeeded. 
At  another  site  a  few  hundred  yards 
downstream,  the  leading  assault  boats 
moved  out  on  time  but  had  scarcely 
touched  down  on  the  east  shore  when 
German  flares  lit  up  the  river.  Follow- 
ing boats  drew  heavy  fire.  After  day- 
light the  attack  battalions  tried  smoke 
cover,  but  damp  air  in  the  gorge  kept  it 
from  rising  much  above  the  surface  of 
the  river.  By  early  afternoon,  with  resis- 
tance continuing,  units  waiting  to  cross 
at  Rhens  moved  upriver  four  miles  to 
Boppard.  The  crossing  attempts  at 
Rhens  had  been  costly:  the  347th  Infan- 
try had  sustained  casualties  of  7  killed 
and  110  wounded.  In  proportion,  its 
supporting  35th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion had  suffered  even  more,  with  9 
men  killed,  6  missing,  and  19  wounded.  '^ 
The  I  I02d  Engineer  Combat  Group, 
supporting  the  87th  Division  crossings, 
had  set  up  headquarters  at  Boppard. 
There  the  assault  wave  achieved  a  mea- 
sure of  surprise,  pushing  out  into  the  riv- 
er shortly  after  midnight  on  25  March. 
The  159th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion, 
after  moving  the  345th  Infantry  across 
the  river,  considered  the  crossing  "not 
tough  at  all,  that  is,  not  like  we  expected 
it  to  be."'^  A  smoke  screen  laid  down 


'^  Merzweiler  interv,  25  Mar  45. 
'*^  Patton,  War  as  I  Knew  It,  p.  275. 


'^  Hist  35th  Engr  C  Bn,  Oct  44-Apr  45. 
'**  The  159th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  (Antwerp, 
1945),  p.  30. 


528 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


for  the  crossing  of  succeeding  waves 
proved  effective.  Although  artillery  and 
mortar  fire  continued  sporadically  dur- 
ing the  morning,  six  LCVPs  were  in 
the  water  transporting  infantry,  and 
rafting  soon  began,  the  first  tank  cross- 
ing at  noon.  Enemy  fire  slowed  the 
work  of  the  44th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion on  a  treadway  bridge  until  0930 
on  the  overcast,  rainy  morning  of  26 
March.  Shortly  before  the  bridge  opened, 
the  men  working  on  it  saw  evidence  of 
the  89th  Infantry  Division's  bloody 
crossing  upstream  at  St.  Goar  during 
the  night.  An  assault  boat  came  hur- 
tling downstream;  only  one  of  its  four 
passengers  had  escaped  injury — anoth- 
er was  dead  and  two  were  wounded.  ^^ 

The  night  before  the  89th  Division's 
crossing,  scheduled  for  0200  on  26 
March,  the  1107th  Engineer  Combat 
Group  set  up  headquarters  in  a  13th- 
century  castle  on  a  cliff  overlooking  St. 
Goar.  Three  sites  had  been  selected  for 
the  assault.  Five  companies  of  the  divi- 
sion's 354th  Infantry  were  to  be  divided 
between  St.  Goar  and  a  wooded  area 
downstream,  while  a  battalion  of  the 
353d  Infantry  was  to  cross  at  Ober- 
wesel,  upstream  of  St.  Goar.  The  168th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  was  to  sup- 
port all  assault  crossings,  the  188th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  to  construct 
rafts  and  take  charge  of  all  ferry  equip- 
ment, and  the  243d  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion  to  build  a  treadway  bridge  at 
St.  Goar.20 

The  troops  expected  trouble  at  St. 
Goar  because  the  day  before  the  Ger- 
mans had  announced  on  their  radio 


'^VIII  Corps  Intervs,  25-26  Mar  45,  CI  44, 
ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 

^"  Hist  1 107th  Engr  C  Gp,  Jan-May  45.  Unless  oth- 
erwise cited,  the  details  of  the  crossing  are  from  this 
source. 


that  the  Americans  had  tried  to  cross 
there.  The  opposition  proved  even 
stronger  than  anticipated.  In  fading 
moonlight  the  first  assault  boats  pulled 
away  from  the  shadowy  western  shore 
at  0200.  American  artillery  was  quiet 
because  a  surprise  operation  like  that 
at  Oppenheim  had  been  ordered,  but 
the  Germans  were  already  shelling  from 
St.  Goarshausen  across  the  Rhine.  A 
German  88-mm.  s^un  hit  three  of  the 
thirty-one  boats  taken  down  to  the  riv- 
erbank  at  St.  Goar  before  they  could  be 
launched.  One  shell  killed  three  motor- 
boat  operators,  injured  six  other  men 
of  the  168th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion, and  killed  the  89th  Division's 
chemical  officer.  The  rest  of  the  assault 
boats  had  gone  about  a  third  of  the 
way  across  the  river  when  heavy  enemy 
fire  came  down,  mostly  from  20-mm. 
antiaircraft  guns.  Then  a  shell  ignited 
a  gasoline  barge  anchored  in  midstream 
near  St.  Goar.  By  the  light  of  the  leap- 
ing flames  the  anxious  watchers  on  the 
near  bank  saw  boats  exploding  "in  a 
geyser  of  flying  wood  and  sprawling 
bodies."^' 

Two  hours  later,  at  0400,  none  of 
the  boats  had  returned.  Group  engi- 
neers considered  it  unlikely  that  many 
of  them  had  been  swept  downstream 
by  the  swift  current,  since  they  had  pro- 
vided some  of  the  boats  with  motors  to 
tow  those  that  had  none.  They  con- 
cluded that  all  the  boats  had  been  lost 
and  that  the  assault  engineers  who  had 
been  able  to  get  across  were  fighting 
alongside  the  infantry.  During  the  night 
small-arms  fire  could  be  heard  from 
St,  Goarshausen;  when  dawn  came  U.S. 
troops  could  be  seen  advancing  toward 
the  center  of  town,  cleaning  it  out  house 


Hist  1 107th  Engr  C  Gp,  Jan-May  45. 


THE  ASSAULT  CROSSINGS  OF  THE  RHINE 


529 


Men  Connect  Bridge  Sections  Near  St.  Goar 


by  house.  Daylight  also  revealed  shat- 
tered assault  boats  lining  the  far  bank. 
The  crossing  at  the  wooded  area 
downstream  from  St.  Goar  was  also 
bloody;  there  too  German  20-mm.  anti- 
aircraft guns  and  heavy  machine  guns 
played  a  leading  role.  Most  of  the  89th 
Division's  casualties — 29  killed,  146 
missing,  and  102  wounded — were  men 
of  the  354th  Infantry.  At  Oberwesel, 
although  the  Germans  used  a  castle  on 
an  island  in  midriver  as  a  strongpoint, 
firing  from  slits  in  the  walls,  the  cross- 
ing went  well.  During  the  morning 
DUKWs  went  into  service.  In  contrast 
to  the  forty-five  minutes  required  for 
assault  boats  to  get  to  the  far  bank  and 
return,  the  engineer-manned  DUKWs 


carried  eighteen  infantrymen  and  made 
the  round  trip  in  five  minutes. ^^  With 
reinforcements  and  help  from  artillery 
and  self-propelled  guns  brought  up  to 
the  near  bank,  by  noon  enemy  fire  was 
almost  eliminated  at  Oberwesel,  which 
then  became  the  main  crossing  site.  In 
the  afternoon  six  LCVPs  and  six  LCMs 
ferried  enough  troops  and  equipment 
over  to  clear  St.  Goarshausen  by  early 

23 

evening. 

Raft  construction  began  at  St.  Goar  at 
1800.  Work  on  a  tread  way  bridge  started 
there  at  1930,  but  the  swift  current 


'^'^The  89th  Infantry  Division,  1942-1943  (Wash- 
ington: Infantry  Journal  Press,  1947),  p.  107. 

^'  AAR,  Third  U.S.  Army,  1  Aug  44-9  May  45,  vol. 
II,  Staff  Sect  Rpts,  p.  Eng-32. 


530 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


M2   Treadway   Bridge  on   the  Rhine  at 
Boppard. 


washed  out  anchors.  A  cable  had  to  be 
strung  across  the  river,  and  the  tread- 
way  was  not  completed  until  early  on 
the  morning  of  28  March.  In  the  mean- 
time, two  89th  Division  task  forces  cros- 
sed the  Rhine  on  the  87th  Division's 
bridge  at  Boppard."^ 

General  Patton  could  have  used  the 
bridges  at  Boppard  and  Oppenheim  to 
send  Third  Army's  XX  Corps  across 
the  Rhine.  Instead  he  chose  to  make  an 
assault  crossing  at  Mainz,  between  Bop- 
pard and  Oppenheim,  on  28  March, 
probably  because  he  considered  Mainz, 
centrally  located  and  with  a  good  road 
and  rail  net,  the  best  place  for  perma- 
nent rail  and  highway  bridges. 


'^^  Hist  1 107th  Engr  C  Gpand  The  89th  Infantry  Divi- 
sion, p.  108. 


The  XX  Corps  Crossing  at  Mainz 

At  Mainz  the  Rhine  is  almost  2,000 
feet  wide — one  of  its  widest  points. 
Directly  opposite  the  city,  which  lies  on 
the  west  bank  of  the  Rhine,  the  nar- 
rower and  slower  Main  River  empties 
into  the  Rhine  from  the  east.  Parallel 
to  the  Main's  north  bank  an  excellent 
road  ran  to  Frankfurt  am  Main  and 
beyond,  into  the  heart  of  Germany.  Ele- 
ments of  the  4th  and  6th  Armored 
Divisions,  having  broken  out  of  the 
Oppenheim  bridgehead,  tried  to  cross 
the  Main  near  Frankfurt  between  25 
and  27  March.  At  three  places  railway 
bridges  were  found  still  standing,  but 
the  only  one  that  would  take  tanks  was 
at  Aschaffenburg,  fifteen  miles  up  the 
Main  from  Frankfurt.  Demolitions  had 
so  weakened  the  other  two  bridges  that 
only  foot  soldiers  could  get  across; 
heavy  shelling  from  Frankfurt  pre- 
vented engineers  from  repairing  the 
bridges. 

Although  the  width  of  the  Rhine  at 
Mainz  would  place  a  heavy  strain  on 
XX  Corps'  bridging  equipment,  the  city 
had  a  number  of  advantages  as  a  cross- 
ing site:  the  banks  were  flat,  the  enemy 
lacked  high  ground  for  observation, 
and  buildings  extending  to  the  water's 
edge  would  protect  the  attackers  from 
small-arms  fire  and  shell  splinters  as 
they  embarked  in  the  assault  boats.  As 
at  Oppenheim,  boat  basins  with  slips 
were  available  to  provide  concealment 
for  launching  naval  craft. 

The  XX  Corps  decided  on  two  assault 
crossings,  both  of  which  the  80th  Infan- 
try Division  was  to  undertake.  The 
division's  31 7th  Infantry  was  to  cross 
the  Rhine  at  Mainz,  where  engineers 
were  to  build  a  treadway  bridge;  the 
319th  Infantry,  using  the  Oppenheim 
bridge  over  the  Rhine,  was  to  cross  the 


THE  ASSAULT  CROSSINGS  OF  THE  RHINE 


531 


Main  from  Bischofsheim  to  Hochheim, 
three  miles  upstream  from  Mainz.  At 
Hochheim,  where  the  Main  was  less 
than  700  feet  wide — a  favorable  circum- 
stance in  view  of  an  increasing  short- 
age of  bridging  material — engineers 
were  to  build  a  second  treadway,  allow- 
ing more  tanks  to  cross  to  reinforce  the 
XII  Corps'  armor. 

In  the  early  hours  of  28  March  the 
1 139th  Engineer  Combat  Group's  135th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  paddled  the 
first  assault  wave  over  the  Rhine  at 
Mainz.  From  an  island  in  midriver  and 
from  the  far  bank  came  small-arms  and 
machine-gun  fire  and  some  20-mm. 
antiaircraft  shells.  The  second  wave, 
crossing  in  LCVPs  and  LCMs,  encoun- 
tered heavier  shelling.  During  the  as- 
sault crossing  10  men  were  killed,  18 
wounded,  and  some  55  reported  mis- 
sing. Small-arms  fire  falling  on  the 
bridge  site  delayed  a  start  on  the  tread- 
way.  Because  there  was  no  reserve  bridg- 
ing material,  the  160th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion,  which  had  the  treadway 
project,  was  reluctant  to  run  the  risk  of 
losing  what  equipment  it  had.  But  on 
orders  from  the  XX  Corps  commander, 
Maj.  Gen.  Walton  H.  Walker,  the  engi- 
neers began  work  at  0900. 

At  the  Main  River  site  there  was  little 
or  no  opposition  to  the  assault  crossings, 
which  the  1139th  Group's  I79th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  supported.  By 
0900  the  206th  Engineer  Combat 
Battalion's  heavy  rafts  were  ferrying 
tanks  to  help  clear  the  far  bank,  and  at 
1855  the  battalion  completed  a  624-foot 
bridge.  Next  day  around  noon,  the 
Mainz  bridge  over  the  Rhine  was  ready 
for  traffic.  The  XX  Corps  engineers 
were  especially  proud  because  they  be- 
lieved the  1,896-foot  span  to  be  the 
longest    tactical    bridge    built    under 


combat   conditions   in   the   European 
theater.'^^ 

The  Seventh  Army  Crossings 

About  fifteen  miles  south  of  Oppen- 
heim  lay  Worms,  where  the  Seventh 
Army  was  to  cross  the  Rhine.  The  fact 
that  operations  there  and  at  the  Oppen- 
heim  bridgehead  would  be  mutually 
supporting  outweighed  the  disadvan- 
tages of  the  terrain  at  Worms.  On  the 
far  bank,  some  eight  miles  east  of  the 
Rhine,  the  hills  of  the  Odenwald  rose 
sharply.  On  those  heights  the  Germans 
could  make  a  stand  and  contain  the 
bridgehead — if  they  had  men  and  weap- 
ons to  do  so.  Enemy  strength  was  diffi- 
cult to  estimate,  but  Seventh  Army 
intelligence  indicated  that  the  Germans 
had  not  more  than  fifty  men  per  river- 
front kilometer  and  no  large  guns  per- 
manendy  emplaced  east  of  the  Rhine. ^^ 

Early  Seventh  Army  plans  and  prep- 
arations, begun  in  September  1944,  had 
envisioned  a  Rhine  crossing  about  twen- 
ty miles  upstream  from  Worms  and 
south  of  Mannheim.  For  that  reason  a 
good  deal  of  the  engineer  planning  con- 
cerned the  possibility  that  the  Germans 
might  open  power  dams  upstream  from 
Basel  to  create  flood  waves  that  could 
wash  out  tactical  bridges  as  far  north  as 
Mannheim,  leaving  American  assault 
troops  stranded  on  the  far  shore.  To 
provide  warning  of  approaching  floods 
so  that  floating  bridges  could  be  safe- 
guarded, the  ETOUSA  chief  engineer 
established  a  flood  protection  service 
in  his  office;  engineers  at  the  headquar- 
ters of  the  various  armies  set  up  similar 


■^^  Hist  1 139th  Engr  C  Gp,  Mar  45;  Third  Army 
Rpt,  vol.  II,  pp.  Eng-32-33;  The  XX  Corps:  Its  History 
and  Service  in  World  War  II,  pp.  331—33. 

'^'^  Seventh  Army  Report,  vol.  Ill,  pp.  746—47.  Unless 
otherwise  cited,  this  section  is  based  on  that  source. 


532 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


organizations.  To  collect  planning  data, 
6th  Army  Group  engineers  experi- 
mented with  hydraulic  models  of  the 
dams  between  Basel  and  Lake  Con- 
stance.^^ This  effort  decreased  in 
importance  when  6th  Army  Group 
learned  that  the  Swiss  were  prepared 
to  protect  the  dams  along  their  bordei 
with  Germany.  Moreover,  Seventh  Army 
changed  its  crossing  site  to  Worms, 
north  of  Mannheim. 

The  40th  and  540th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Groups,  both  amphibious  veterans, 
were  available  to  put  Seventh  Army's 
XV  Corps  across  the  Rhine  on  a  nine- 
mile  front  extending  north  and  south 
from  Worms.  Training  had  begun  in 
September  1944,  when  Seventh  Army's 
rapid  advance  inland  through  south- 
ern France  made  a  November  or  De- 
cember Rhine  crossing  appear  likely. 
During  those  months  the  Rhine  cur- 
rent is  swift,  usually  from  eight  to  ten 
miles  per  hour.  Accordingly,  the  Sev- 
enth Army  engineer,  Brig.  Gen.  Garri- 
son H.  Davidson,  felt  that  hand- 
paddled  assault  boats  would  be  out  of 
the  question.  He  would  need  the  ser- 
vices of  boat  operators  who  had  trained 
at  sites  on  the  Rhine  and  Doubs  rivers 
to  pilot  motor-driven  boats.  To  prepare 
for  a  swift-current  crossing  the  engi- 
neers also  experimented  with  stringing 
cable  to  help  DUKWs  take  artillery 
across  promptly  and  with  anchoring 
ponton  bridges. ^^ 

In  the  event,  much  of  the  time  spent 
preparing  for  a  swift-current  crossing 


^'  Lt.  Col.  Stanley  W.  Dziuban,  "Rhine  River  Flood 
Prediction  Service,"  The  Military  Engineer,  XXXVII, 
no.  239  (September  1945),  348-53;  and  "Hydraulics 
Model  Experiments,"  in  Ibid.,  XXXVIII  (May  1946), 
189-93. 

^^  Brig  Gen  Garrison  H.  Davidson,  The  Crossing  of 
the  Rhine,  Incl  3  to  Hist  Rpt,  Mar- Apr  45,  Office  of 
the  Engr,  Seventh  Army. 


was  wasted.  By  the  26  March  crossing 
date,  the  current  was  only  three  or  four 
miles  per  hour,  slow  enough  to  use 
paddle-powered  assault  boats.  In  the 
sector  north  of  Worms,  where  XV  Corps' 
45th  Infantry  Division  supported  by  the 
40th  Engineer  Combat  Group  crossed 
the  river,  using  powered  boats  actually 
proved  detrimental  because  motor  noise 
alerted  the  enemy.  In  addition,  the 
engineers  found  that  DUKWs  and  du- 
plex-drive tanks  could  cross  without  the 
aid  of  cables. ^'■' 

Around  midnight  on  25  March  a 
four-man  patrol  of  the  180th  Infantry, 
45th  Division,  paddled  across  the  Rhine 
in  a  rubber  boat  to  reconnoiter  the  east 
bank.  The  patrol  saw  some  German  sol- 
diers but  was  not  fired  upon  and,  after 
searching  fruitlessly  for  gun  emplace- 
ments and  mines,  returned  safely  to  the 
near  bank  in  time  to  take  part  in  the 
assault  crossing  at  0230.^^*^  The  heavy 
storm  and  assault  boats,  brought  to  the 
riverbank  on  carts  borrowed  from  the 
Chemical  Warfare  Service,  were 
launched  on  schedule  from  stone-paved 
revetments.  Mist  rising  from  the  river 
hid  the  moon.  To  achieve  surprise  the 
attackers  used  neither  smoke  nor  any 
preliminary  artillery  barrage.  However, 
after  the  Germans  heard  the  roar  of 
the  motors,  small-arms,  20-mm.  antiair- 
craft, and  mortar  fire  hit  the  boats  as 
they  reached  the  far  bank.  This  fire 
was  heaviest  in  the  180th  Infantry's 
sector,  where  60  percent  of  the  boats 
were  damaged;  the  I79th  Infantry  lost 
only  10  percent  of  its  boats.  All  four- 
teen of  the  duplex-drive  tanks  in  the 
assault  went  across  safely.  With  the  help 
of  the  tanks  and  of  artillery  ferried  over 


''^■*  River  Crossing  Notes,  29  Mar  45,  in  Hist  40th 
Engr  C  Gp,  16  Feb- 31  Mar  45. 
™  Hist  180th  Inf  Rgt,  1-31  Mar  45. 


THE  ASSAULT  CROSSINGS  OF  THE  RHINE 


533 


in  DUKWs  or  on  infantry  support  rafts, 
the  infantry  overran  the  Germans  and 
made  good  progress  on  the  ground. 
During  the  crossing  the  2831st  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battahon,  piloting  the 
storm  and  assault  boats,  suffered  eigh- 
teen casualties;  the  2830th  Battalion, 
which  operated  rafts  and  ferries,  sus- 
tained none.^' 

Just  south  of  Worms,  the  3d  Division 
made  two  feints  across  the  Rhine  below 
Mannheim  on  the  evening  of  25  March 
which  alerted  the  enemy.  When  the 
540th  Engineer  Combat  Group's  2832d 
and  2833d  Engineer  Combat  Battalions 
began  moving  toward  their  assembly 
areas  at  2000  hours — the  former  to  sup- 
port the  7th  Infantry  on  the  south,  the 
latter  the  30th  Infantry — they  came 
under  German  artillery  and  mortar 
fire.  This  fire  continued  while  the  engi- 
neers, pulled  the  storm  and  assault  boats 
over  the  steep,  revetted  banks  and  into 
place  for  the  crossing.  In  the  7th  Infan- 
try zone  flames  from  a  barn  set  on  fire 
by  a  German  incendiary  shell  lit  up  the 
crossing  area,  silhouetting  the  men  and 
boats.  ^^ 

At  0152  friendly  artillery  began  a 
massive  barrage  that  continued  until 
H-hour,  0230.  Four  minutes  before  the 
barrage  lifted,  7th  Infantry  boats  began 
moving  across  the  river,  and  by  0340 
both  assault  infantry  battalions  were 
over.  In  the  30th  Infantry's  zone,  where 
opposition  was  lighter,  the  two  assault 
battalions  were  across  by  0330.  The 
artillery  barrage,  as  well  as  the  use  of 
smoke,  kept  the  loss  rate  of  storm  boats 
to  only  10  percent.  Ten  of  fourteen  du- 


^'  Hist  40th  Engr  C  Gp,  16  Feb- 31  Mar  45. 

^'^  Hist  540th  Engr  C  Gp,  Mar  45;  Taggart,  History 
of  the  Third  Infantry  Division,  p.  339.  Unless  otherwise 
cited,  the  story  of  the  3d  Division  crossing  is  from 
these  two  sources. 


plex-drive  tanks  reached  the  far  shore. 
About  H  plus  2  the  first  DUKW  crossed 
the  river  safely  without  cables.  The 
engineers  also  found  that  cables  were 
not  necessary  for  the  rafts,  which  by 
0700  were  ferrying  tanks  and  vehicles 
across  the  Rhine.  Nevertheless,  since 
the  ferrying  operations  lay  upstream 
from  where  floating  bridges  were  being 
built,  the  engineers  strung  cables  and 
used  them  to  keep  ferries  from  being 
swept  downstream  to  crash  into  the 
bridges. 

The  engineers  who  were  to  build  a 
mine  barrier  and  patrol  the  river  to  pro- 
tect the  bridges  from  floating  mines, 
frogmen,  and  other  menaces  reached 
their  assembly  area,  farthest  upstream 
of  all,  at  0300.  The  fire  from  German 
antiaircraft  guns,  ranging  in  caliber 
from  8-mm.  to  128-mm.  and  emplaced 
on  an  island  in  the  Rhine,  drove  the 
engineers  off.  Heavy  fire  from  the 
island,  a  fortress  that  had  apparently 
escaped  the  notice  of  Seventh  Army 
planners,  continued  throughout  much 
of  D-day,  harassing  the  7th  Infantry's 
crossing  site  and  holding  up  the  bar- 
rier work.  It  was  late  afternoon  when  a 
battalion  of  the  15th  Infantry  assaulted 
the  island  from  the  east  bank  of  the 
Rhine  and  silenced  the  guns.  On  D  plus 
1  the  engineers  erected  the  mine  bar- 
rier, and  the  river  patrol  went  into 
operation  with  searchlights,  artillery, 
and  DUKWs  mounting  quad-50  ma- 
chine guns.  The  patrol  sank  a  number 
of  barges  that  might  have  destroyed  the 
downstream  bridges. 

Fire  from  the  German  guns  on  the 
island  also  delayed  construction  of  the 
nearest  floating  bridge,  a  treadway 
south  of  Worms.  The  163d  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  began  work  at  0600 
on  D-day  but  did  not  complete  the 


534 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Heavy  Ponton  Bridge  in  the  Seventh  Army  Area 


treadway  until  1850.  The  first  usable 
bridge  was  a  heavy  ponton  span  at 
Worms,  about  two  hundred  feet  down- 
stream from  the  site  of  the  Ernst  Lud- 
wig  highway  bridge,  which  the  Germans 
had  demolished.  In  just  over  nine  hours 
the  85th  Engineer  Heavy  Ponton  Bat- 
talion built  the  1,047-foot  ponton;  open 
to  traffic  at  1512  on  D-day,  it  was  named 
the  Alexander  Patch  Bridge  for  the  Sev- 
enth Army  commander.  Although  the 
handsome  stone  tower  of  the  Ernst 
Ludwig  Bridge,  still  standing  on  the  far 
bank,  harbored  enemy  snipers,  ruins 
of  the  span  provided  good  anchorage 
for  the  bridge  builders.  The  Alexan- 
der Patch  Bridge  carried  3,040  vehi- 
cles eastward  during  its  first  twenty- 


four  hours  of  operation. ^"^  Because  of 
its  early  completion  and  excellent  loca- 
tion. Seventh  Army  preferred  the  Alex- 
ander Patch  Bridge  to  a  ponton  bridge 
the  1553d  Engineer  Heavy  Pqnton  Bat- 
talion erected  downstream  near  Rhein- 
duerkheim  in  the  45th  Division's  sector. 
As  a  result,  that  bridge  operated  at  only 
half  its  capacity. '^"^ 

On  29  March,  General  Davidson,  the 
Seventh  Army  engineer,  instructed  the 
85th  Engineer  Heavy  Ponton  Battalion 
to  build  a  bridge  to  take  tanks  and  vehi- 
cles over  the  Rhine  to  Mannheim.  With 
the  help  of  aerial  photographs  a  recon- 


'■*  Seventh  Anny  Report,  vol.  Ill,  p.  887. 

"  Hist  4()th  Engr  C  (Jp,  16  Feb- 3 1  Mar  45. 


THE  ASSAULT  CROSSINGS  OF  THE  RHINE 


535 


naissance  party  found  a  suitable  site  at 
Ludwigshafen,  on  the  west  bank  oppo- 
site Mannheim.  Eight  bulldozers  worked 
six  hours  clearing  rubble  from  the 
streets  and  preparing  the  site,  and  the 
1553d  Engineer  Heavy  Ponton  Battal- 
ion brought  pontons  down  from  the 
Worms  area  on  its  trailers.  Construc- 
tion started  at  daylight  on  30  March. 
The  bridge  opened  to  light  traffic  at 
1500,  but  tanks  and  heavy  vehicles  had 
to  wait  until  1900  because  of  a  delay  in 
obtaining  two-inch  decking.  The  engi- 
neers dubbed  the  span  the  Gar  David- 
son Bridge  to  honor  the  Seventh  Army 


engmeer 


35 


The  Rhine  Crossings  in  Retrospect 

No  two  assault  crossings  of  the  Rhine 
during  March  1945  were  exactly  alike. 
Conditions  ranged  from  the  haste  and 
improvisation  of  First  Army's  Remagen 
bridge  crossing  to  the  long,  careful 
planning  involved  in  Ninth  Army's 
crossing  near  Rheinberg.  Moreover, 
Ninth  Army's  massive  artillery  prepa- 
ration, which  eliminated  surprise  and 
necessitated  fast  assault  boats  and  speedy 
rafting  of  heavy  weapons,  contrasted 
sharply  with  Third  Army's  dispensing 
with  preliminary  bombardment  and 
achieving  surprise  with  a  night  cross- 
ing in  paddle  boats. 

Engineer  planning  had  allowed  for 
diversity.  Working  during  the  fall  of 
1944  before  the  Battle  of  the  Ardennes, 
planners  had  assumed  a  winter  cross- 
ing and  made  provisions  for  bad  weath- 
er and  excessive  flooding.  Such  condi- 
tions did  not  arise.  Crossings  were  also 
easier  than  expected  because  the  Ger- 
mans did  not  seriously  try  to  destroy 


bridges  with  mines,  midget  submarines, 
or  boats  laden  with  explosives. ^^ 

Looking  back,  corps  and  army  engi- 
neers saw  no  reason  to  revise  engineer 
doctrine.  Rather,  a  study  of  the  Rhine 
operations  provided  several  examples 
of  the  folly  of  deviating  from  doctrine. 
Perhaps  the  most  outstanding  instance 
was  disregard  of  the  rule  that  all  heavy 
boats  and  rafts  should  operate  down- 
stream of  bridges,  even  if  launching 
and  landing  sites  downstream  were 
inferior  to  those  upstream.  For  example, 
at  Wallach  the  1153d  Engineer  Com- 
bat Group's  achievement  in  installing  a 
treadway  bridge  by  1600  on  D-day  was 
nullified  when  a  Bailey  raft  crashed  into 
the  bridge,  knocking  it  out  for  more 
than  seven  hours. 

Almost  all  of  the  standard  stream- 
crossing  equipment  provided  for  the 
Rhine  crossing — assault  and  storm  boats, 
utility  powerboats,  outboard  motors, 
rafts,  and  bridging  material — had  al- 
ready been  used,  most  of  it  successfully. 
The  principal  criticisms  were  that  the 
infantry  support  rafts  tended  to  swamp 
in  the  Rhine's  swift  current  and  that 
utility  boats  were  not  powerful  enough 
to  serve  efficiently  as  general  work  boats 
for  building  bridges,  emplacing  heavy 
boom  material,  or  towing  heavy  rafts. 

The  engineers  also  obtained  mate- 
rial from  sources  other  than  standard 
engineer  stocks.  Two  of  the  most  im- 
portant types  of  equipment,  LCVPs  and 
LCMs,  the  U.S.  Navy  furnished  to  First, 
Ninth,  and  Third  Armies.  The  engi- 
neers generally  considered  the  LCVPs 
invaluable.  They  ferried  troops  at  a 
rapid  rate,  faster  than  the  men  could 
walk  over  footbridges,  and  returned  the 


'■^■'  Hist  85th  Engr  Heavy  Ponton  Bn,  Jan -May  45. 


■^•^  OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  20,  Forced  Crossing  of 
the  Rhine. 


536 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


wounded  quickly.  The  LCVPs  also  per- 
formed excellent  service  as  patrol  boats 
and  even  acted  as  work  boats  and  tug- 
boats, although  they  did  not  have 
enough  power  to  handle  the  heavy  rein- 
forced rafts  required  for  ferrying  tanks. 
Opinions  on  the  value  of  LCMs  varied. 
Ninth  Army  engineers  felt  that  the  craft 
did  not  contribute  enough  to  the  cross- 
ings to  warrant  the  effort  involved  in 
transporting  and  launching  it.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Third  Army  engineer 
found  LCMs  extremely  useful,  citing 
an  instance  during  which  six  LCVPs 
and  six  LCMs  crossed  an  entire  divi- 
sion with  all  its  vehicles  and  equipment 
in  forty-eight  hours. 

Other  special  nonengineer  equip- 
ment employed  during  the  Rhine  cross- 
ings included  DUKWs,  LVTs,  and  Sea 
Mules.  In  all  crossings  except  at  Rema- 
gen  (where  DUKWs  were  subjected  to 
an  excessively  long  land  haul)  they  per- 
formed valuable  service,  not  only  in  car- 
rying shore  parties  and  artillery  to  the 
far  bank  but  also  in  working  around 
bridges  and  dropping  bridge  anchors. 
LVTs  were  well  liked,  especially  LVT4s, 
which  could  load  jeeps  through  drop 


doors.  Although  a  good  work  boat,  the 
Sea  Mule  was  bulky  to  transport,  hard 
to  handle  in  a  rapid  current,  and  sus- 
ceptible to  damage  in  shallow  water 
because  of  exposed  propellers  and  rud- 
ders. For  these  reasons,  most  engineers 
thought  it  should  be  replaced  in  river 
crossings  by  a  new  and  more  powerful 
engineer  power  utility  boat.^ 

In  sustaining  surprise  during  the 
Rhine  crossings,  dummy  bridging  of 
wood  and  burlap  played  an  important 
part.  So  convincing  from  the  air  were 
Ninth  Army's  decoy  preparations  near 
Uerdingen  that  on  the  night  of  D  plus 
2  German  planes  strafed  the  area.  Dur- 
ing the  Seventh  Army  crossings  engi- 
neers threw  two  dummy  bridges  across 
the  Rhine  upstream  and  downstream 
of  real  bridges.  Made  of  wooden  frames 
resting  on  steel  drums,  the  spans  seemed 
so  real  even  at  ground  level  that  guards 
had  to  be  stationed  at  their  approaches 
to  prevent  crowds  of  refugees  from 
using  the  dummies  to  flee  over  the 
Rhine.-^^ 


"  Ibid. 
^«  Ibid. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 


Into  the  Heart  of  Germany 


"No  one  slept,  no  one  ate,  no  one  did 
anything  but  attack  and  push  on,  attack 
and  push  on."  So  the  tankers  of  XIII 
Corps'  5th  Armored  Division  described 
their  dash  from  the  Rhine  to  the  Elbe. 

Passing  to  Ninth  Army  control  on  the 
morning  of  3 1  March,  the  5th's  tankers 
crossed  the  Rhine  that  same  day  over  a 
ponton  bridge  at  Wesel,  where  the  Brit- 
ish Second  Army's  bridges  had  just 
been  turned  over  to  Ninth  Army  on 
orders  from  Field  Marshal  Montgomery. 
By  the  time  the  last  elements  of  the 
armored  division  reached  the  bridge 
night  had  fallen,  and  as  the  men  crossed 
the  river  they  entered  a  nearly  surreal 
atmosphere.  Floodlights  split  the  dark- 
ness and  shone  on  the  water;  antiair- 
craft guns  pointed  toward  the  sky.  In 
the  glare  of  the  lights  barge-mounted 
pile  drivers  were  pounding,  while 
plumes  of  smoke  from  busy  tugboats 
silhouetted  huge  cranes.'  Two  impor- 
tant bridges  were  under  construction. 
Ninth  Army  engineers  were  driving 
piles  for  a  fixed  highway  bridge,  and 
ADSEC  engineers  were  building  a  rail- 
road bridge.  All  were  working  around 
the  clock  so  that  the  combat  forces,  rac- 
ing across  tactical  bridges,  would  not 
run  out  of  supplies  before  they  could 
reach  the  heart  of  Germany. 


'  The  Victory  Division  in  Europe:  History  of  the  Fifth 
Armored  Division,  pp.  49,  63. 


Months  before.  Colonel  Itschner  and 
his  ADSEC  staff  had  established  dumps 
of  material  for  the  railroad  bridge, 
planned  as  a  single-track  span  on  steel 
girders  supported  by  light  steel  trestles 
and  timber-pile  piers.  The  planners  had 
intended  to  use  the  site  of  a  destroyed 
German  railroad  bridge  downstream 
from  where  the  Lippe  River  entered 
the  Rhine.  When  the  engineers  recon- 
noitered  the  far  bank,  however,  they 
found  the  damage  there  too  extensive 
for  quick  repair  and  had  to  settle  on  a 
site  upstream  near  a  wrecked  highway 
bridge  to  which  the  Germans  had  added 
a  single-track  rail  line.  This  substitu- 
tion meant  a  very  long  bridge  since  it 
added  to  the  Rhine  section  of  twenty- 
three  spans  (1,753  feet)  a  section  of  six 
spans  (463  feet)  over  the  Lippe.  Luckily, 
the  supply  of  meter-depth  I-beams 
needed  for  girders  had  been  assured 
when  the  Hadir  Steel  Mill  in  Luxem- 
bourg became  operational  in  October 
1944. 

On  29  March  a  large  force  under  Col. 
James  B.  Cress  began  work.  The  orga- 
nization consisted  of  the  1056th  Port 
Construction  and  Repair  Group;  ele- 
ments of  the  341st,  355th,  and  1317th 
Engineer  General  Service  Regiments; 
and  an  engineer  construction  battalion, 
a  dump  truck  company,  an  engineer 
maintenance  company,  and  a  welding 
detachment.  Several  nonengineer  units 


538 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


were  included — a  Signal  Corps  battal- 
ion to  provide  communications,  a  Trans- 
portation Corps  harbor  craft  company 
to  control  water  traffic,  and  a  U.S.  Navy 
detachment  to  assemble  barges.  The 
around-the-clock  work  was  hard  and 
dangerous,  and  the  construction  cost 
the  lives  of  three  men  of  the  355th 
Engineer  General  Service  Regiment. 
This  first  railroad  bridge  across  the 
Rhine  opened  to  traffic  at  0100  on  9 
April,  only  ten  days,  four  hours,  and 
forty-five  minutes  after  the  first  pile  was 
driven;  it  was  named  the  Major  Robe- 
rt A.  Gouldin  Bridge  for  an  officer  of 
the  355th  Engineer  General  Service 
Regiment  who  lost  his  life  during  the 
construction. "^ 

Ninth  Army's  fixed  timber-pile  high- 
way bridge  was  placed  about  seventy- 
five  yards  upstream  of  the  wrecked 
German  bridge  (the  railroad  bridge  was 
about  the  same  distance  downstream) 
to  take  advantage  of  existing  roadnets.'^ 
The  span  was  to  carry  three  lanes — two- 
way  Class  40  and  one-way  Class  70 
traffic.  The  builder  was  the  1146th 
Engineer  Combat  Group,  using  the 
250th,  252d,  and  1256th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalions,  aided  by  detachments 
from  ADSEC's  1053d  and  1058th  Port 
Construction  and  Repair  Groups  and  a 
U.S.  Navy  Seabee  maintenance  unit. 

The  first  step  was  to  construct  an 
embankment  on  the  near  side  of  Wesel 
to  carry  an  approach  road.  To  obtain 
the  needed  fill,  the  engineers  demol- 
ished old  Fort  Blucher  and  carted  the 
rubble  to  the  site.  Work  on  the  bridge 


^  ADSEC  History,  pp.  71  -73,  75-76;  Maj  (ien  C.  R. 
Moore,  "Rhine  River  Railroad  Bridges,"  app.  12  to 
OCE  ETOUSA  Hist  Rpt  12,  Railroad  Reconstruction 
and  Bridging;  Bndging  the  Way  to  Victory  with  the  355th 
Ejigineers  [355th  Engr  OS  Rgt,  1945]. 

See  photograph,  Timothy,  The  Rhine  Crossing,  p. 
43,  fig.  76. 


itself  began  on  31  March.  Like  the  rail- 
road bridge,  the  highway  bridge  was 
very  long,  spanning  the  Rhine  (1,813 
feet)  and  the  Lippe  (411  feet).  The 
western  and  eastern  approaches  to  the 
two  rivers  totaled  more  than  2,000  feet. 
Open  to  truck  traffic  during  the  early 
afternoon  of  18  April,  the  span  was 
called  the  Roosevelt  Bridge  in  memory 
of  President  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt  who 
had  died  less  than  a  week  before.^ 

Ninth  Army's  Dash  to  the  Elbe 

Rolling  over  the  ponton  bridge  at 
Wesel  with  the  5th  Armored  Division 
on  3 1  March  was  the  division's  organic 
22d  Armored  Engineer  Battalion.  To 
get  the  armor  over  streams  on  the  way 
to  the  Elbe,  the  engineers  carried  a 
truckload  of  lumber  to  refloor  bridges 
and  treadway  to  use  at  crossing  sites 
where  bridges  were  down. 

On  the  route  along  the  northern 
edge  of  the  Ruhr  Pocket,  the  first  water 
barrier  in  the  5th  Armored  Division's 
path  was  the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal. 
The  original  plan  had  been  to  bridge 
the  canal  at  Muenster,  from  which  good 
roads  led  eastward;  but  south  of  Muen- 
ster near  Senden,  on  the  right  flank  of 
the  advance.  Combat  Command  Reserve 
ran  into  fire  from  German  20-mm.  flak 
guns,  bazookas,  small  arms,  and  tanks. 
The  armored  division  commander,  Maj. 
Gen.  Lunsford  E.  Oliver,  decided  to 
cross  the  canal  at  Senden  and  move 
south,  skirting  the  pocket  of  resistance. 
The  task  of  getting  the  tanks  across  the 
canal  fell  to  CCR's  engineers,  Company 


'  Engineer  Operations  in  the  Rhine  Crossing,  Ninth 
U.S.  Army,  pp.  44-49;  Hist  1146th  Engr  C  (ip, 
Jan -May  45,  and  MS,  1  146th  Engr  C  (ip,  A  Report 
on  the  Roo.sevelt  Rhine  and  Lippe  River  Bridges  .  .  . 
April  1945,  OCE  files. 


INTO  THE  HEART  OF  GERMANY 


539 


C  of  the  22d  Armored  Engineer  Bat- 
talion. 

Orders  came  at  2100  on  31  March 
for  CCR's  armored  infantry  to  estab- 
lish a  bridgehead  on  the  far  bank  of 
the  canal  to  protect  the  engineers  work- 
ing on  the  bridge,  but  no  mention  was 
made  of  how  the  infantrymen  were  to 
get  across.  After  two  men  making  their 
way  down  the  bank  in  the  dark  found 
some  rowboats,  the  infantry  rowed  over 
the  canal  to  set  up  a  defensive  peri- 
meter. At  0400  on  Easter,  the  engineers 
began  installing  treadway.  Four  hours 
later  in  a  light  rain  the  tanks  started  to 
cross  the  canal,  and  by  the  morning  of 
2  April  all  Combat  Command  Reserve 
was  over.  The  bridge  also  carried  Com- 
bat Command  B  and  the  motorized 
84th  Infantry  Division,  which  was  fol- 
lowing the  armor.  Later  XIII  Corps 
engineers  came  up  and  repaired  a  Ger- 
man bridge  over  the  canal;  the  5th 
Armored  Division's  Combat  Command 
A  used  this  span  after  it  cleaned  out 
the  German  pocket  south  of  Muenster. 

Racing  northeast  in  the  rain  through 
the  spring-green  countryside  on  the 
morning  of  2  April,  the  tank  columns 
began  to  encounter  roadblocks.  Some 
were  merely  logs  stacked  on  the  road; 
others  consisted  of  two  emplaced  cylin- 
ders, one  on  either  side  of  the  road. 
These  the  Germans  made  by  driving  a 
circle  of  wooden  piles  in  the  ground, 
filling  the  center  with  dirt  or  crushed 
rock,  and  blocking  the  gap  between  the 
cylinders  with  a  truck  or  wagon.  There 
was  also  the  "rolling  roadblock" — a 
huge  drum  filled  with  gravel  or  dirt. 
None  of  the  roadblocks  delayed  the 
advance  for  very  long;  few  were  manned 
and  some  had  not  even  been  completed. 
When  the  Germans  did  man  the  blocks, 
the  Americans  could  normally  eliminate 


the  covering  fire,  and  then  the  engi- 
neers with  the  help  of  tanks  could  de- 
stroy all  but  the  most  elaborate  obsta- 
cles in  fifteen  to  twenty  minutes. 

On  3  April  the  engineers  became 
involved  in  an  attempt  to  seize  bridges 
across  the  Weser  River.  Small  assault 
teams  of  engineers,  tanks,  and  infantry 
were  organized  to  take  the  bridges  by 
surprise,  but  they  found  all  bridges 
blown.  There  followed  five  days  of 
effort  to  seize  bridges,  and  the  tankers, 
pounding  swiftly  down  the  autobahn, 
at  one  point  got  close  enough  to  see  a 
bridge  intact,  only  to  hear  a  dull  boom 
and  watch  the  girders  falling  into  the 
river.  All  efforts  failed.  On  8  April 
Combat  Command  Reserve  was  ordered 
to  cross  the  Weser  over  a  bridge  in  the 
XIX  Corps  zone  at  Hameln  of  Pied 
Piper  fame. 

Once  across  the  Weser  CCR's  tanks 
ran  into  increasing  enemy  resistance. 
Although  the  engineers  lost  some  of 
their  trucks  to  20-mm.  flak  fire,  they 
managed  to  keep  up  with  the  attack, 
filling  craters  in  the  roads  and  remov- 
ing mines  and  roadblocks  from  the  path 
of  the  fast-moving  armored  columns. 
The  attack  proceeded  so  swiftly  that 
soon  bridges  were  being  captured  in- 
tact. The  engineers'  main  tasks  then 
became  removing  bombs  (some  of  them 
American  500-pound  aerial  bombs) 
buried  in  bridge  abutments  and  em- 
placing  flooring  that  would  carry  tanks. 

On  12  April  Combat  Command  Re- 
serve reached  the  Elbe.  After  two  days 
of  searching  for  bridge  sites  the  engi- 
neers started  to  install  a  bridge  at  San- 
dau,  but  while  they  were  assembling 
bridge  equipment  orders  came  that  no 
bridge  would  be  built. ' 

'  The  Victory  Division  in  Europe,  pp.  50-58;  Interv, 
(^apl  Frank  Perlman,  (>0,  Co  C,  22d  Armd  Engr  Bn, 


540 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


South  of  XIII  Corps  in  the  dash  to 
the  Elbe  was  the  bulk  of  XIX  Corps, 
which  also  sent  some  elements  even  far- 
ther south  to  aid  in  reducing  the  Ruhr 
Pocket.  Its  rapid  sweep  to  the  Elbe  was 
spearheaded  by  the  2d  Armored  Divi- 
sion and  its  I7th  Armored  Engineer 
Battalion.  By  the  end  of  the  first  week 
of  April  the  2d  Armored  Division  had 
crossed  the  Weser  on  treadway  bridges 
its  engineers  had  built  and  the  Leine 
River  on  bridges  captured  intact.  On 
1 1  April,  after  taking  the  great  Her- 
mann Goering  Steel  Works  southwest 
of  Braunschweig,  the  tankers  made  a 
73-mile  march  in  a  single  day  to  reach 
the  Elbe  just  southeast  of  Magdeburg 
at  Schoenebeck.  There,  as  the  armor 
drew  within  a  few  feet  of  a  still  stand- 
ing bridge,  heavy  German  antiaircraft 
shelling  demolished  it. 

The  tankers  then  sent  for  DUKWs. 
After  nightfall  on  12  April  the  DUKWs 
carried  two  battalions  of  armored  infan- 
try across  the  river  just  south  of  Magde- 
burg and  before  daylight  next  morn- 
ing crossed  an  infantry  battalion  of  the 
30th  Division.  No  antitank  guns,  tanks, 
or  tank  destroyers  could  get  across 
because  the  water  on  the  near  side  was 
too  shallow  for  vehicular  ferries. 

After  dark  on  12  April  the  1 7th  Ar- 
mored Engineers  began  to  build  a  tread- 
way  bridge,  but  shelling  from  large 
guns  at  Magdeburg,  increasing  with 
daylight,  slowed  the  work.  The  engi- 
neers set  out  smoke  pots  and  by  noon 


3  May  45,  CI  43,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect;  Intervs,  Lt  Col 
Fred  E.  Ressegieu,  CO,  and  Maj  Albert  M.  Brown, 
XO,  22d  Armd  Engr  Bn,  4  May  45,  CI  278,  ETOUSA 
Hist  Sect;  Intervs,  Lt  Coi  John  H.  Morave,  85th  Div 
Engr;  Lt  Col  Marvin  L.Jacobs,  CO,  309th  Engr  C  Bn; 
and  Capt  Seymour  S.  Deutsch,  Asst  85th  Div  Engr,  9 
Apr  45,  CI  188,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 


on  13  April  had  advanced  their  bridge 
to  a  point  within  twenty-five  yards  of 
the  far  bank.  Two  hours  later  German 
shellfire  destroyed  it.  Enemy  fire  also 
defeated  an  effort  to  construct  a  ferry. 
The  engineers  deposited  rubble  in  the 
river  to  form  a  loading  ramp  and  man- 
aged to  anchor  a  guide  cable  to  the  east 
bank.  Then,  as  the  first  raft  carrying  a 
bulldozer  approached  the  far  bank, 
German  artillery  severed  the  cable,  and 
the  raft  careened  downstream. 

The  XIX  Corps  was  unable  to  get 
tanks  across  to  the  precarious  bridge- 
head, where  the  infantry  was  being 
attacked  by  tanks  and  assault  guns  of 
the  new  Twelfth  Army,  which  the  Ger- 
mans had  hastily  formed  of  young  men 
from  army  schools,  overaged  conscripts, 
and  other  remnants.  Accordingly,  the 
XIX  Corps  commander  ordered  the 
infantry  to  abandon  the  bridgehead 
and  withdraw.  Tanks  and  infantry  of 
the  2d  Armored  Division  then  moved 
south  to  use  a  XIX  Corps  crossing  over 
the  Elbe  at  Barby,  five  miles  upstream 
and  out  of  range  of  the  artillery  at 
Magdeburg.  There  the  83d  Division's 
295th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion,  sup- 
ported by  the  992d  Engineer  Treadway 
Bridge  Company,  had  built  the  first 
bridge  over  the  Elbe  on  13  April.  The 
engineers  named  the  span  the  Truman 
Bridge  in  honor  of  the  new  commander 
in  chief.  Two  days  later  the  234th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Battalion  built  another 
treadway  in  the  same  area.  The  Ger- 
mans tried  in  every  way,  including  the 
use  of  frogmen,  to  destroy  both  brid- 
ges but  were  unsuccessful. 

The  engineers  called  their  Truman 
Bridge  "Gateway  to  Berlin";  but  it  had 
hardly  been  built  when  they  learned 
that  it  was,  in  fact,  a  gateway  to  no- 
where. On  15  April  the  word  came  that 


INTO  THE  HEART  OF  GERMANY 


541 


there  was  to  be  no  drive  to  Berlin  and 
no  advance  beyond  the  Elbe.*' 

First  Army's  Drive  to  Leipzig  and  Beyond 

On  5  April,  after  the  attack  to  seal 
off  the  Ruhr  ended,  First  Army's  V  and 
VII  Corps  began  a  drive  east  to  the 
Leipzig  area,  where  most  of  the  remain- 
ing German  industrial  capacity  was  con- 
centrated and  where  General  Eisen- 
hower believed  the  German  govern- 
ment was  fleeing.^  The  3d  Armored 
Division,  leading  the  VII  Corps  advance, 
was  delayed  two  days  by  resistance  at 
numerous  roadblocks.  The  V  Corps' 
leading  infantry  division,  the  69th,  ran 
into  determined  resistance  at  Hann- 
Muenden  on  the  Weser  and  also  was 
stalled  for  two  days.  But  V  Corps'  other 
spearhead  unit,  the  2d  Infantry  Division, 
had  a  comparatively  clear  route  and  by 
nightfall  on  6  April  was  crossing  the 
Weser  in  assault  boats,  thus  gaining  a 
bridgehead  only  one  day  after  Ninth 
Army  had  crossed. 

On  7  April  V  Corps  engineers  built  a 
treadway  over  the  Weser  at  Hameln  for 
the  rest  of  the  2d  Infantry  Division  and 
next  day  helped  the  69th  Division  cross 
the  narrow  Werra  River  via  another 
treadway.  On  8  April  the  engineers 
built  a  second  treadway  over  the  Weser, 
this  time  for  the  9th  Armored  Division 
at  Hann-Muenden,  an  industrial  cen- 
ter where  the  engineers  uncovered  a 
Panzer  Pioneer  School  with  a  supply  of 
all  types  of  land  mines — including  Rus- 


''  MacDonald,  The  Last  Offensive,  ch.  XVII;  Hist  I7th 
Armd  Engr  Bn,  Jul  44-May  45;  Thunderbolt  Across 
Europe,  pp.  89-91 ;  Hist  XIX  Corps  Engrs,  pp.  19-20, 
ML  2220,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 

^  Dwight  D.  Eisenhower,  Crusade  in  Europe  (Garden 
City,  N.Y.:  Doubleday,  1948),  p.  400. 


sian  ones — as  well  as  German  building 
equipment  and  tools. 

On  10  April  (ieneral  Bradley  removed 
restrictions  on  eastward  movement. 
That  day  the  9th  Armored  Division, 
once  over  the  Weser,  passed  through 
the  2d  and  69th  Infantry  Divisions  and 
raced  ahead.  Its  leading  elements  were 
accompanied  by  V  Corps  engineers, 
who  undertook  reconnaissance  and 
erected  signs  with  the  distinctive,  pen- 
tagonal V  Corps  insignia.^ 

With  little  rest  during  the  long  drive 
after  the  Rhine  crossing  at  Hoennin- 
gen,  the  V  and  VII  Corps  engineers 
were  as  weary  as  the  tankers  and  infan- 
trymen who,  according  to  correspon- 
dent Hal  Boyle, 

threw  themselves  down  in  fields  for  a  nap 
whenever  the  columns  paused.  They  are 
moving  across  wide  rolling  farm  lands  along 
roads  blanketed  with  blinding  yellow  dust. 
Trucks  going  back  for  supplies  occasionally 
drive  with  their  lights  on  so  that  the  vehicles 
moving  forward  won't  crash  into  them  in 
the  yellow  fog.  Black  pillars  of  smoke  from 
enemy  vehicles  can  be  seen  on  the  horizon 
as  the  tanks  smash  slowly  forward  against 
stiffening  resistance  from  German  troops 
who  fight  until  surrounded  or  they  are  out 
of  ammunition  and  then  surrender  and 
say  amiably,  "The  war  will  be  over  in  two 
weeks. "^ 

Approaching  the  Saale  River  on  12 
April,  the  9th  Armored  Division  ran 
into  an  area  known  to  the  Allied  air- 
men as  "flak  alley" — one  of  the  heavi- 
est concentrations  of  antiaircraft  guns 
(mainly  88-mm.)  in  Europe.  Emplaced 
in  an  arc  around  Leipzig  to  protect 
neighboring  synthetic  oil  refineries  and 
related  industries,  including  Germany's 


"  AAR,  Engr  Sect,  V  Corps,  Jan -9  Mar  45. 
■'  As  quoteci  in  V  Corps  Operations  in  ETO,  p.  426,  in 
CMH. 


542 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


largest  synthetic  rubber  plant,  were 
about  a  thousand  antiaircraft  weapons, 
depressed  for  ground  fire.  The  armored 
division's  leading  task  force  on  the 
north  lost  nine  tanks  when  it  came  up 
against  the  first  German  position.  {Map 

m 

Because  of  the  flak  guns,  the  V  Corps 
commander,  Maj.  Gen.  Clarence  R. 
Huebner,  ordered  the  9th  Armored 
Division  to  bypass  Leipzig  and  push  on 
to  the  Mulde  River.  Coming  up  to  the 
Saale  River  at  Weissenfels  on  13  April, 
part  of  the  armor  crossed  on  a  bridge 
captured  intact,  the  rest  on  a  240-foot 
treadway  that  corps  engineers  con- 
structed the  next  day.  The  infantry  divi- 
sions following  in  the  wake  of  the  armor 
crossed  on  the  treadway  and  in  assault 
boats.  The  9th  Armored  Division  drove 
east  toward  the  Mulde,  crossing  the 
Weisse  Elster  near  Zeitz  on  bridges  the 
Germans  did  not  have  time  to  destroy. 
The  two  infantry  divisions  turned  north 
to  attack  Leipzig,  the  2d  moving  against 
the  city  from  the  west,  the  69th  from 
the  south.  On  15  April  leading  elements 
of  the  armor  reached  the  Mulde  at 
Colditz,  twenty  miles  southeast  of  Leip- 
zig. Combat  Command  Reserve  crossed 
the  river  on  a  railroad  bridge  and  re- 
leased 1 ,800  prisoners  of  war  at  a  camp 
there,  but  did  not  advance  much  beyond 
the  Mulde. 

The  two  infantry  divisions  moved 
cautiously  against  Leipzig,  hoping  at 
this  late  stage  of  the  war  to  keep  casual- 
ties down.  On  the  west  the  2d  Infantry 
Division  launched  night  attacks  to  sur- 
prise the  crews  of  the  flak  guns.  Be- 
cause these  crews  were  unaccustomed 
to  ground  combat  the  tactic  usually 
worked,  but  in  this  case  the  infantry 
suffered  heavy  casualties  before  break- 
ing into  Leipzig  from  the  west  and  the 


south  on  18  April.  Prolonged  negotia- 
tions for  surrender  ended  on  20  April, 
and  the  2d  and  69th  Infantry  Divisions 
moved  on  to  the  Mulde  to  relieve  the 
9th  Armored  Division. 

At  Leipzig  the  main  concern  of  V 
Corps  engineers  was  the  water  system, 
damaged  by  Allied  bombing  and  shel- 
ling. Although  the  water  supply  was 
low,  it  was  adequate  until  German  water 
works  employees  could  undertake  re- 
pairs, supervised  by  American  engineers. 
In  addition,  V  Corps  engineers  took 
on  a  job  that  was  normally  not  their 
function — repairing  a  railroad.  Recon- 
naissance showed  that  the  150-mile  rail- 
road line  from  Muehlhausen  to  Leip- 
zig could  be  opened  for  traffic  if  about 
2,000  feet  of  bomb-cratered  line  were 
refilled,  ballasted,  and  laid  with  track. 
The  1 121st  Engineer  Combat  Group's 
254th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  ac- 
complished the  work,  taking  great 
pride  in  naming  the  repaired  road  the 
"Snortin'  Bull  Express."  The  rail  ser- 
vice carried  to  Leipzig  gasoline  for  the 
spearhead  units,  thereby  freeing  for 
normal  engineer  duties  the  companies 
that  the  1121st  Engineer  Group  had 
furnished  to  haul  fuel  to  the  front.  On 
the  return  trip  to  Muehlhausen  the 
train  carried  to  the  rear  German  pris- 
oners of  war  and  Allied  soldiers  re- 
leased from  German  prison  camps. '^ 
Following  the  linkup  of  U.S.  and  Rus- 
sian forces  on  25  April,  V  Corps  engi- 
neers erected  a  Bailey  bridge  over  the 
Mulde  at  Eilenburg  so  that  the  Ameri- 
can commanders  could  cross  the  river 
and  meet  the  Russians  at  Torgau  on 
the  Elbe  River. 


'"  AAR,  Engr  Sect,  V  Corps,  Apr  45;  Dozer  Blade  (a 
weekly  newpaper  published  by  the  1121st  Engineer 
Combat  Group),  21  Apr  45,  copy  in  Hist  1 121st  Engr 
C  (ip.  Mar- Dec  45. 


ENGINEERS  IN  GERMANY 

German  autobahn 

50  100  Miles 


MAP  30 


544 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


The  men  of  VII  Corps'  3d  Armored 
Division,  swinging  eastward  in  early 
April  north  of  the  V  Corps  drive,  came 
to  feel  that  "there  was  always  one  more 
river."*'  Col.  Mason  J.  Young,  the  VII 
Corps  engineer,  had  long  since  learned 
that  he  could  not  count  on  finding  Ger- 
man bridges  still  intact.  Therefore, 
when  VII  Corps'  combat  units  ap- 
proached the  Weser  River  on  7  April, 
he  was  prepared  for  a  crossing.  The 
organic  divisional  engineers — the  1st 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  supporting 
the  1st  Infantry  Division  on  the  left  of 
the  3d  Armored  Division  and  the  329th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  supporting 
the  104th  Infantry  Division  on  the 
right — had  assault  boats,  storm  boats, 
infantry  support  rafts,  and  material  for 
footbridges  so  that  they  could  make  an 
assault  crossing  and  establish  a  bridge- 
head. Then  VII  Corps'  1106th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Group  was  to  build  the 
bridges  the  3d  Armored  and  1st  Infan- 
try Divisions  would  require  and  the 
1 120th  Engineer  Combat  Group  those 
needed  at  the  104th  Infantry  Division's 
crossing.'^ 

Reaching  the  Weser  at  Gieselwerder 
at  midafternoon  on  7  April,  the  lead- 
ing elements  of  the  104th  Division  saw 
an  arched  iron  bridge  still  standing.  As 
the  Americans  dashed  toward  it,  the 
Germans  blew  the  span.  A  German  tank 
and  about  fifty  infantrymen  left  in  the 
town  put  up  a  fight,  but  by  dark  resis- 
tance was  over.  All  night  trucks  carry- 
ing assault  boats  rolled  into  Giesel- 
werder, and  before  dawn  two  battalions 
were  crossing  in  the  boats  and  on  a  foot- 


' '  spearhead  in  the  West,  p.  145. 

''  Engr  Opns  VII  Corps,  vol.  VII,  "Crossings  of  the 
Rhine  River  and  the  Advance  to  the  Elbe,"  app.  10, 
Engineer  Plan  for  Weser  River  Crossing,  6  Apr  45. 


bridge  the  329th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion had  built.  By  noon  on  8  April 
the  combat  engineers  were  construct- 
ing treadways  and  infantry  support 
bridges  at  this  and  other  sites.  Late  that 
night  the  3d  Armored  Division's  tanks 
began  crossing;  before  sunset  on  9 
April  the  combat  commands  had  cross- 
ed the  river  and,  branching  out,  had 
captured  twenty-two  towns  beyond  the 
Weser. 

At  dusk  on  1 1  April  assault  elements 
of  two  task  forces  of  Combat  Command 
B,  3d  Armored  Division,  one  com- 
manded by  Col.  John  C.  Welborn,  the 
other  by  Lt.  Col.  William  B.  Lovelady, 
entered  Nordhausen.  Here,  on  the  east- 
ward route  nearest  to  the  Harz  Moun- 
tain area.  Hitler  was  attempting  to 
mount  a  counteroffensive  to  relieve  his 
forces  in  the  Ruhr  Pocket,  using  troops 
of  the  newly  formed  Twelfth  Army.  Gen- 
eral Huebner  ordered  the  3d  Armored 
Division  to  block  exits  from  the  Harz 
Mountains  and  sent  his  1st  Infantry 
Division  and  part  of  his  104th  Infantry 
Division  into  the  mountain  redoubt. 

Nordhausen  was  also  a  place  of  utter 
horror.  In  a  concentration  camp  with  a 
capacity  of  about  30,000,  the  tankers 
discovered  the  pathetic  remnants  of  a 
slave  labor  force  used  in  huge  under- 
ground factories,  one  for  manufactur- 
ing V  — 2  rockets.  Many  of  the  living,  in 
the  last  stages  of  starvation  and  too 
weak  to  move,  were  lying  alongside  the 
emaciated  dead.  The  tankers  of  the  3d, 
their  historian  recorded,  "were  in  a  sav- 
age mood  as  they  went  on  to  the  final 
battles."'^ 

The  armor  fought  the  last  battles 
between  the  Saale  and  the  Mulde  with- 
out infantry  support,  except  from  their 


'^  spearhead  in  the  West,  p.  150. 


INTO  THE  HEART  OF  GERMANY 


545 


Men  of  the  234th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  Haul  a  Tank  Across 
THE  Saale  River 


organic  armored  infantry  units.  The 
104th  Division  had  orders  to  stop  on 
the  way  and  capture  Halle,  the  tenth 
largest  city  of  Germany,  which  held  out 
until  19  April.  Meantime  most  of  Com- 
bat Command  B,  still  in  the  lead,  stalled 
in  front  of  strong  enemy  panzerfaust 
positions  and  antitank  fire.  Only  Task 
Force  Welborn,  which  hit  the  softest 
spot  in  the  German  defenses,  was  able 
to  keep  up  its  momentum.  This  task 
force  soon  reached  an  autobahn  lead- 
ing north,  and  by  the  evening  of  14 
April  one  of  Welborn's  infantry  patrols 
arrived  at  the  point  where  the  auto- 
bahn crossed  the  Mulde  on  a  steel- 
girder,  two-span  bridge  two  miles  south 
of  Dessau.  The  infantrymen  found  the 


autobahn  bridge  still  standing,  but  be- 
fore the  rest  of  the  task  force  could 
come  up,  the  Germans  destroyed  it. 
Colonel  Welborn  thereupon  ordered 
engineers  to  bring  up  boats  for  an 
assault  crossing.  The  294th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion  sent  forward  four- 
teen boats,  but  by  the  time  the  boats 
arrived  early  in  the  afternoon  Welborn 
had  decided  that  the  infantry  could 
cross  on  the  destroyed  autobahn  bridge. 
The  infantry  started  crossing  at  1600, 
protected  by  a  smoke  screen. 

Building  a  new  bridge  alongside  the 
autobahn  bridge  did  not  appear  too  dif- 
ficult at  first,  for  the  river  was  narrow 
and  required  not  more  than  150  feet 
of  treadway.  But  the  engineers  had 


546 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


hardly  be.sjun  to  inflate  pontons  when 
enemy  artillery  fire  fell  on  them,  kill- 
ing one  and  wounding  three.  This  fire 
was  so  accurate  that  it  stopped  the  work 
in  midafternoon.  Next  morning,  16 
April,  after  a  crane  had  put  a  power- 
boat into  the  water  to  tow  pontons  to 
the  far  bank,  German  artillery  fire  hit 
and  set  afire  a  truck  arriving  with  pon- 
tons. Two  engineers  dragged  from  the 
blazing  truck  were  seriously  burned.  All 
that  day  and  into  the  moonlit  night, 
enemy  shellfire  forestalled  all  bridging 
work. 

On  17  April  work  resumed  under  a 
smoke  screen.  By  afternoon  about  fif- 
teen pontons  were  in  the  water,  but 
then  enemy  artillery  scored  a  direct  hit, 
killing  one  engineer,  wounding  eight, 
and  knocking  many  more  into  the  water. 
Arriving  on  the  scene,  the  commander 
of  Combat  Command  B  suspended 
operations,  and  shortly  after  dark  or- 
ders came  to  pull  back  to  the  near  bank 
of  the  Mulde.'^ 

Third  Army  Reaches  Austria 

After  crossing  the  Rhine  at  Oppen- 
heim.  Third  Army's  spearheading  XII 
Corps  crossed  the  Main  on  battered 
bridges  still  standing  between  Aschaf- 
fenburg  and  Frankfurt  am  Main.  Then 
the  corps  left  the  Rhine-Main  plain  and 
headed  through  rolling  forested  hills 
and  open  farmlands,  using  the  Frank- 
furt-Dresden autobahn  toward  the 
corps'  next  objective,  Chemnitz,  south 
of  Leipzig  and  ten  miles  beyond  the 
Mulde. 

Leading  the  advance,  Combat  Com- 
mand A  of  the  4th  Armored  Division 


struck  its  first  obstacle  on  1  April  at  the 
Werra  River.  Bridges  were  down,  and 
next  morning  when  the  24th  Armored 
Engineer  Battalion  began  to  build  tread- 
ways  at  two  towns,  German  planes 
swooped  low  to  attack,  while  direct  fire 
came  from  the  east  bank.  The  armored 
infantry  finally  managed  to  cross  de- 
spite small-arms  fire;  next  day  the  tanks 
crossed  the  Werra  and  were  again  roll- 
ing east  along  the  autobahn.' ' 

At  Leina  the  tankers  came  to  a  blown 
overpass  that  forced  them  off  the  auto- 
bahn. In  any  case  the  4th  Armored 
Division  received  orders  to  backtrack, 
swing  north,  and  assist  in  an  attack  on 
Gotha.  After  the  town  fell,  the  armor 
moved  south  to  Ohrdruf,  finding  a 
small  but  gruesome  concentration  camp. 
There  Combat  Command  A  remained 
six  days.  Starting  east  on  12  April  the 
4th  Armored  Division  tankers — having 
by  then  come  under  the  command  of 
XX  Corps — found  that  demolitions 
made  using  the  autobahn  too  danger- 
ous and  took  to  the  fields  on  either 
side.'^ 

For  infantry  vehicles  the  Frankfurt- 
Dresden  autobahn  was  literally  the  back- 
bone of  Third  Army's  push  east  dur- 
ing the  first  half  of  April.  Engineers 
found  that  their  largest  task  was  not 
spanning  rivers  but  building  bridges 
over  or  around  the  autobahn's  dam- 
aged overpasses  and  underpasses.  At 
the  rivers  the  enemy  occasionally  de- 
layed construction,  not  only  at  the  Wer- 
ra but  also  at  the  Elster,  where  the 
bridge  site  was  dominated  for  a  time  by 
a  battery  of  88-mm.  guns.  Yet  the  Ful- 


' '  Inlerv,  Capt  (;.  E.  Conley,  CO,  C:o  B,  23d  Armd 
Engr  Bn,  2  May  45,  CI  270,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 


'^'  Hist  24th  Armd  Engr  Bn,  Kyll  River  to  Chemnitz, 
5  Mar-20  Apr  45,  CI  275,  ETOUSA  Hist  Sect. 

"'  Interv,  (^apt  Roland  (i.  Ruppenthal  with  Lt  Col 
Hal  C.  Pattison,  XO,  CCA,  4th  Armd  Div,  22  Apr  45, 
sub:  (XJA  from  the  (Crossing  of  the  Kyll  to  Chemnitz. 


INTO  THE  HEART  OF  GERMANY 


547 


da,  Werra,  Saale,  and  Elster  Rivers  pre- 
sented few  engineering  problems  be- 
cause they  were  low,  making  nearly  all 
fordable.'^ 

Bridges  on  the  autobahn  were  nor- 
mally quite  large.  Fortunately  the  Ger- 
mans usually  blew  only  one  span,  and 
when  a  Bailey  could  not  bridge  the  gap 
the  engineers  would  construct  a  tread- 
way  bypass.  But  so  many  bridges  were 
down  that  the  engineers  began  to  run 
out  of  material.  One  very  wide  gap  they 
simply  filled  with  earth;  at  another  site 
that  required  a  large  amount  of  Bailey 
bridging,  the  engineers  used  bents  to 
make  a  Class  40  double-single  Bailey. 
Elsewhere,  the  Germans  had  buckled 
two  center  stringers  of  a  four-stringer 
bridge  and  had  blown  holes  in  twenty- 
five  feet  of  the  roadbed.  Here,  build- 
ing piers  to  strengthen  the  buckled 
stringers  was  especially  difficult  because 
the  slope  beneath  was  so  steep.  Unable 
to  use  a  bulldozer,  the  engineers  had  to 
work  with  picks  and  shovels,  and  the 
bents  had  to  be  constructed  on  level 
ground  and  moved  into  position  with 
block  and  tackle.'*^ 

On  13  April  the  4th  Armored  Divi- 
sion, leading  the  XX  Corps,  reached 
the  Mulde  and  by  nightfall  had  seized 
four  bridges  intact.  During  the  sweep 
to  the  Mulde  the  engineers  of  the  1 1 54th 
Engineer  Combat  Group,  supporting 
the  XX  Corps  drive,  carried  out  recon- 
naissance of  roads  and  minor  road 
clearance  and  repairs.  The  Germans 
were  being  pushed  back  so  rapidly  that 
they  were  unable  to  do  enough  dam- 
age to  slow  the  advance. 

The  XX  Corps  expected  to  go  on  to 
Dresden,  but  a  directive  from  (General 


Eisenhower  on  15  April  brought  about 
a  radical  change  in  plans.  Having 
decided  not  to  go  to  Berlin,  Eisenhower 
directed  the  i2th  Army  Ciroup  to  hold 
along  the  Elbe-Mulde  line  with  the  First 
and  Ninth  Armies  and  sent  the  i  bird 
Army  southeast  down  the  Danube  val- 
ley into  Austria  for  eventual  linkup  with 
the  Russians.'"'** 

New  plans  required  the  reshuffling 
of  corps.  The  VIH  Corps  went  lo  First 
Army,  to  remain  along  the  Mulde;  HI 
Corps'  six  divisions,  having  completed 
operations  in  the  Ruhr,  turned  south 
to  take  over  the  right  flank  in  Patton's 
drive;  XX  Corps  was  to  move  forward 
in  the  center  and  XII  Corps  on  4  bird 
Army's  left.  I  bird  Army  was  to  l)e 
strengthened  to  fifteen  divisions,  many 
of  them  newcomers  to  battle.  Because 
the  regrouping  took  time,  the  drive  in 
force  could  not  begin  until  23  April 
although  XII  and  XX  Corps  actually 
started  to  advance  three  or  four  days 
earlier. 

By  22  April  forward  troops  of  XX 
Corps  were  southeast  of  Nuremberg, 
only  forty  miles  from  the  Danube.  Leav- 
ing the  Berlin-Munich  autobahn,  the 
corps  turned  southeast  toward  Regens- 
burg,  where  the  Danube  turns  almost 
at  a  right  angle  to  flow  southeast,  paral- 
leling the  CiZechoslovakian  border.  On 
24  April  a  task  force  of  the  3d  Cavalry 
Group  (Mechanized),  leading  the  XX 
Corps  advance,  reached  the  Danube 
southwest  of  Regensburg.  Supported  by 
a  company  of  the  245th  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion,  the  cavalry  task  force 
began  crossing  in  assault  boats  the  fol- 
lowing night. 


'^  Tkird  Army  Ri'fxnt,  vol.  II,  KiigrSt-ct,  p.  Va\^-'M\ 
Hist  I  154(11  Ktigi  C  (ip,  2(i  Mar-:<()  Apr  4.5. 
""  Hist  I  107th  Engr  C  Cp,  |an-May  45. 


45. 


'■'  Opns  Rpt,  1  1.54th  Kngi  C  (;p,  2«i  Mai     SO  Apr 


-'"'  MacDonald,  I'lic  Last  Offensive,  di.  XVMI.   ladi- 
cal  details  on  Third  Army's  drive  are  from  this  source. 


548 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


The  1 139th  Engineer  Combat  Group 
built  the  first  bridge  over  the  Danube 
to  support  XX  Corps'  71st  Infantry 
Division,  newly  arrived  at  the  front.  By 
2215  on  26  April  the  group's  160th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  had  com- 
pleted an  M2  treadway  at  Sulzbach,  just 
east  of  Regensburg.  While  the  bridge 
was  being  built,  group  engineers  also 
helped  the  71st  Division's  organic  271st 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  to  move 
infantry  across  in  assault  boats. ^' 

Three  Danube  tributaries — the  Isar, 
Inn,  and  Enns  Rivers — impeded  the 
drive  southeast  down  the  broad  Dan- 
ube valley.  At  the  Isar  the  engineers 
found  the  current  too  swift  for  pad- 
dled assault  boats.  Instead,  some  of  the 
infantry  crossed  in  motor-driven  storm 
boats,  while  other  troops  used  a  dam- 
aged railway  bridge,  at  one  place  climb- 
ing hand  over  hand. 

Arriving  on  2  May  at  the  Inn  River, 
which  marked  the  border  with  Austria, 
71st  Division  scouting  parties  found  all 
bridges  down  but  discovered  two  large 
dams  that  might  be  used  for  crossings. 
In  a  determined  effort  to  seize  the  dams 
before  the  Germans  could  blow  them, 
infantrymen  of  the  7 1  st  Division  fought 
their  way  across,  captured  German 
demolition  crews  just  in  time,  and  cut 
wires  that  would  have  set  off  explosions. 
By  midnight  the  71st  Division  had  two 
bridgeheads  across  the  dams,  thereby 
becoming  the  first  Allied  unit  to  enter 
Austria  from  the  west. 

Late  on  3  May  XX  Corps  gave  all 
units  the  mission  of  establishing  con- 
tact with  the  Russians  at  the  Enns  River. 
Moving  over  two  bridges  captured  in- 
tact beyond  Lambach,  motorized  pa- 
trols of  the  71st  Division  on  7  May 


encountered  the  headquarters  of  the 
Russian  5th  Guards  Airborne  Division 
near  St.  Peter,  Austria.  That  day  the 
American  patrols  withdrew  behind  the 
Enns  after  they  received  the  orders  that 
ended  hostilities  in  Europe. '^'^ 

Advancing  to  the  left  of  XX  Corps 
down  a  narrow  corridor  between  the 
Czechoslovakian  border  and  the  Dan- 
ube, XII  Corps  had  to  cross  the  Naab 
and  the  Regen,  both  tributaries  of  the 
Danube.  Engineers  of  the  1135th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Group,  supporting  XII 
Corps,  found  that  assault  crossings  were 
unnecessary,  for  resistance  was  light, 
mainly  scattered  small-arms  and  pan- 
zerfaust  attacks.  The  engineers  quickly 
installed  tactical  bridging  and  almost 
immediately  replaced  such  spans  with 
fixed  bridges.  On  the  extreme  left  of 
the  XII  Corps  advance,  in  rolling, 
pine-covered,  upland  country  near  the 
Czechoslovakian  border,  an  armored 
task  force  found  the  Naab  so  shallow 
that  tanks  and  other  armored  vehicles 
were  able  to  ford  it. 

On  30  April,  an  overcast  day  with 
some  snow,  the  1 135th  Group  received 
orders  to  plan  for  an  assault  crossing 
of  the  Danube  at  Passau;  it  was  can- 
celed when  orders  came  to  remain  north 
of  the  Danube.  On  4  May  the  group 
completed  a  ponton  bridge  at  Passau 
and  two  days  later  had  a  treadway  over 
the  Danube  at  Deggendorf.  The  XII 
Corps,  arriving  just  ahead  of  XX  Corps, 
captured  an  intact  highway  bridge  over 
the  Danube  at  Linz,  but  had  hardly 


^'  AAR.  1 139th  Engr  C  Gp,  Apr  45. 


""'■^  Fred  dinger,  Arthur  Johnston,  and  Vincent 
Masel,  The  History  of  the  7 1st  Infantry  Division  (Munich, 
1946),  pp.  83—98.  For  engineer  support  of  XX  Corps' 
13th  Armored  Division  and  80th  Infantry  Division  in 
the  drive  down  the  Danube  after  28  April,  see  Hist 
1154th  Engr  CGp. 


INTO  THE  HEART  OF  GERMANY 


549 


Pontons  Headed  for  the  Danube 


begun  to  press  southeast  when  word 
came  of  the  German  surrender.^^ 

On  Patton's  right  HI  Corps,  with  the 
86th  and  99th  Infantry  Divisions  and 
the  14th  Armored  Division,  drove  south 
through  a  corridor  between  the  XX 
Corps  zone  and  the  Berlin-Munich  auto- 
bahn. Here  as  in  the  other  zones,  the 
only  real  obstacles  were  rivers,  first  the 
Altmuehl,  then  the  Danube,  and  be- 
yond the  Danube  the  Isar  and  the  Inn. 
All  bridges  were  down. 

The  99th  Infantry  Division,  whose 
own  324th  Engineer  Combat  Battalion 


''■'  AAR,  1 135th  Engr  C  (;p,  Jan-Apr  45;  Lt.  Col. 
(ieorge  Dyer,  XII  Corps:  Spearhead  of  Patton's  Third 
Army  (Baton  Rouge:  Military  Press  of  Louisiana, 
[1947]),  p.  420;  Third  Army  Report,  vol.  II,  Engr  Sect, 
p.  Eng-43. 


had  the  support  of  the  1159th  Engi- 
neer Combat  Group's  291st  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion,  met  heavy  enemy 
opposition  at  the  Altmuehl.  The  divi- 
sion undertook  several  night  assault 
crossings  and  by  the  evening  of  26  April 
was  on  the  banks  of  the  Danube — not 
the  blue  Danube  the  men  had  imag- 
ined, but  "a  muddy,  dirty,  yellow  col- 
ored, fast  flowing,  smelly  river. "^^  The 
division's  heavy  equipment  and  supplies 
arrived  promptly,  thanks  to  a  treadway 
the  divisional  engineers  had  quickly 
built  over  the  Altmuehl. 

Shordy  before  noon  on  27  April  the 
troops  began  to  move  across  the  Dan- 
ube in  assault  boats  from  four  sites.  One 


'■^^  Lauer,  Battle  Babies,  p.  297. 


550 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


site  was  hit  by  heavy  small-arms  and 
artillery  fire  from  well  dug-in  and  con- 
cealed enemy  positions.  But  at  the  other 
three  the  troops  met  little  opposition, 
and  the  324th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion, with  the  help  of  the  291st,  began 
constructing  a  ponton  bridge  near  Kien- 
heim  at  an  old  boat  landing.  The  road 
seemed  to  the  division's  commanding 
general  "ideal  for  our  purpose. "^^ 

So  it  might  have  been  in  good  weath- 
er. But  it  rained  during  the  afternoon, 
and  when  heavy  engineer  trucks  began 
to  haul  bridging  equipment  down  to 
the  banks  of  the  Danube,  the  roadbed 
disintegrated  into  a  seemingly  bottom- 
less marsh.  By  putting  down  gravel  and 
stone  and  corduroying  the  road  with 
logs  cut  from  nearby  forests,  the  engi- 
neers were  able  to  move  pontons  down 
to  the  river.  Working  all  night  and  all 
the  next  day,  part  of  the  time  under 
German  artillery  fire,  the  engineers 
completed  the  bridge  before  dark  on 
28  April.  The  division's  trucks  and 
tanks  began  to  roll  toward  the  bridge, 
then  bogged  down  so  badly  that  the 
engineers  had  to  use  tractors  to  tow 
them  out  of  the  marsh  and  onto  the 
bridge  apron.  The  work  of  reinforcing 
the  road  resumed,  continuing  after 
dark  by  turning  on  truck  headlights. 
This  was  the  first  time  in  the  war  the 
engineers  supporting  the  99th  Infan- 
try Division  had  been  permitted  to  use 
lights  at  night.  No  hostile  fire  fell  be- 
cause infantry  had  crossed  the  bridge 
on  foot  and  had  driven  the  German 
artillery  out  of  range. 

By  nightfall  of  29  April  elements  of 
the  99th  Division  had  reached  the  Isar 
at  two  towns,  Moosburg  on  the  near 
bank  and  Landshut  astride  the  river. 


At  Landshut,  where  the  enemy  put  up 
a  stiff  fight,  the  99th  Division  infantry 
climbed  over  the  debris  of  a  blown 
bridge  at  Moosburg,  ran  across  on  a 
dam  nearby,  and  paddled  over  the  Isar 
in  assault  boats.  To  get  the  14th  Ar- 
mored Division  tanks  in  position  to  help 
in  the  fight  required  strenuous  engi- 
neer effort.  Working  under  artillery 
fire  the  engineers  built  a  short  treadway 
from  the  near  side  of  the  Isar  to  an 
island  in  the  river.  From  there  the  tanks 
fired  on  Landshut,  which  fell  early  on  1 
May.  By  dark  all  elements  of  the  99th 
Division  had  crossed  the  Isar. 

Advancing  toward  the  Inn  River  in  a 
light  snowfall,  the  infantry  soon  outdis- 
tanced the  armor,  roadbound  because 
of  soggy  fields  and  stopped  by  blown 
bridges.  The  99th  Infantry  Division  was 
the  first  III  Corps  element  to  reach  the 
Inn,  but  it  was  to  go  no  farther.  Just 
before  noon  on  2  May,  corps  ordered 
the  division  to  halt  and  await  new  or- 
ders. Within  sight  of  the  Bavarian  Alps, 
the  division  received  the  news  that  Ger- 
many had  surrendered.^^ 

Seventh  Army  to  the  ''Alpine  Fortress" 

Breaking  out  of  its  Rhine  bridgehead 
near  Worms  with  the  mission  of  pro- 
tecting 12th  Army  Group's  right  dur- 
ing its  drive  toward  Leipzig,  Seventh 
Army  advanced  on  a  120-mile-wide 
front — more  than  double  the  width  of 
the  army  sectors  within  12th  Army 
Group.  The  Seventh  Army  commander, 
General  Patch,  gave  XV  Corps  the  main 
role  on  the  left,  ordered  XXI  Corps  to 
drive  east  in  the  center,  and  sent  VI 


^■'  Ibid.,  p.  304. 


-"•  Ibid.,  pp.  297-318;  Hist  1 159th  Engr  C  Gp,  26 
Jun  44-20  Aug  45;  Hist  291st  Engr  C  Bn,  Jan-Apr 
45,  May  45. 


INTO  THE  HEART  OF  GERMANY 


551 


Corps  to  the  south  on  the  right.  When 
the  drive  began  early  in  April  the  6th 
Army  Group  commander,  Lt.  Gen. 
Jacob  L.  Devers,  restricted  the  VI  Corps 
drive  because  he  did  not  have  strength 
for  an  all-out  advance.  The  weak  link 
was  the  First  French  Army,  which  had 
to  keep  some  troops  on  the  west  bank 
of  the  Rhine  facing  the  Black  Forest, 
others  along  the  French-Italian  frontier, 
and  still  others  at  ports  along  the  French 
Atlantic  coast. '^'^ 

Making  the  main  thrust  on  the  north, 
XV  Corps  advanced  rapidly.  Although 
some  of  the  towns  in  the  corps'  path, 
notably  Aschaffenburg,  were  resolutely 
defended,  the  combat  units  met  only 
sporadic  resistance  while  marching  to 
their  objective,  the  Hohe  Rhoen  hill 
mass,  during  the  first  week  in  April. 
The  Germans  derisively  called  their 
own  roadblocks  61 -minute  blocks  be- 
cause, they  said,  "It  will  take  the  Ameri- 
cans sixty-one  minutes  to  get  past  them. 
They  will  look  at  them  and  laugh  sixty 
minutes  and  then  tear  them  down  in 
one."'-^^ 

More  troublesome  to  the  engineers 
was  debris  on  the  roads — German  vehi- 
cles that  American  tanks,  artillery,  and 
planes  had  destroyed. '^■*  Debris  also 
filled  the  streets  of  the  fire-scarred 
towns,  and  the  engineers  went  in  to 
clear  the  streets  while  fighting  was  still 
going  on.  The  14th  Armored  Division, 
leading  the  XV  Corps  advance,  met  its 
first  serious  resistance  at  Lohr.  The 
engineers  entered  the  town  at  nightfall 
to  find  it  "afire  from  the  shelling,  the 
flames  leaping  through  the  darkness 


'"^^  MacDonald,  The  Last  Off ensive ,  p.  430.  Unless  oth- 
erwise cited,  tactical  details  are  from  this  source. 

■^"  Taggart,  History  of  the  Third  Infantry  Division,  p. 
346. 

^"  Ibid.,  p.  350. 


and  crackling  through  the  madness  of 
the  firing;  the  smoke  was  in  your  eyes 
and  nose,  and  the  weird  shadows  of 
the  men  running,  and  of  the  tanks,  and 
of  nothing  at  all  (at  night,  in  a  burning 
town,  in  war)  leapt  and  jumped  along 
the  walls. ""^^^ 

Moving  along  with  the  combat  troops 
during  the  rapid  march,  the  engineers 
had  some  strange  encounters.  One  oc- 
curred near  Lohr.  Lt.  Melvin  O.  Robin- 
son of  the  125th  Armored  Engineer 
Battalion,  reconnoitering  in  his  jeep 
with  his  driver,  Pfc.  George  A.  Bartels, 
saw  a  Mark  VI  tank  by  the  road.  The 
two  men  were  approaching  it  cautiously 
to  see  whether  it  was  mined,  when  all 
at  once  they  were  surrounded  and  fired 
upon  by  a  party  of  twenty-one  German 
soldiers.  Neither  American  had  time  to 
fire,  and  both  were  wounded.  Then  the 
Germans  threw  down  their  weapons 
and  surrendered.  Toward  the  end  of 
the  week,  two  jeeploads  of  engineers 
starting  out  one  night  to  look  for  a  biv- 
ouac ran  into  an  ambush  at  a  roadblock. 
A  mortar  round  killed  one  man  and 
wounded  another.  The  rest  of  the  men 
were  taken  prisoner,  but  before  the 
night  was  over  tankers  of  the  14th 
Armored  Division  found  and  released 
them.''' 

Resistance  decreased  as  the  troops 
reached  the  narrow,  winding  roads  of 
the  Hohe  Rhoen.  On  8  April  Seventh 
Army's  armor  established  contact  with 
Third  Army,  and  the  time  had  come 
for  XV  Corps  to  turn  southeast. 

Through  the  zones  of  both  XV  and 
XXI  Corps  meandered  the  Main  River, 
making  so  many  loops  and  turns  that  it 
had  to  be  crossed  not  once  but  several 


'"' Capt.  Joseph  Carter,  History  of  the  14th  Armored 
Division,  ch.  XII. 
•"  Ibid. 


552 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


times — when  XV  Corps'  3cl  Infantry 
Division  turned  south  on  1 1  April  the 
division  crossed  the  Main  for  the  fourth 
time."'^  Most  of  the  bridges  over  the 
Main  were  down,  but  the  crossings  pre- 
sented no  special  engineer  problems. 
The  river  was  fordable  in  places,  and 
Seventh  Army  had  plenty  of  DUKWs 
to  help  in  the  crossings. 

In  the  XXI  Corps  sector  a  regiment 
of  the  42d  Infantry  Division  and  a  com- 
bat command  of  the  12th  Armored 
Division  reached  the  Main  opposite 
Wuerzburg  on  the  night  of  2  April  to 
find  the  three  bridges  across  the  river 
down.  Unwilling  to  wait  for  the  142d 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  to  arrive 
with  assault  boats,  a  party  of  Rangers 
crossed  just  before  dawn  in  a  rowboat 
they  had  found  along  the  bank.  They 
reached  the  far  bank  unobserved  and 
sent  the  boat  back  for  another  load.  The 
two  boatloads  of  Rangers  had  estab- 
lished a  small  bridgehead  by  the  time 
the  engineers  came  up. 

Daylight  revealed  a  surprising  scene. 
Across  the  river  rose  the  ramparts  of 
the  huge  Marienburg  Castle.  On  one 
of  the  retaining  walls  the  Germans  had 
painted  in  large  white  letters  "Heil 
Hitler!" 

As  the  first  engineer  assault  boat  of 
eleven  infantrymen  and  three  engi- 
neers reached  midstream,  the  Germans 
opened  fire  with  rifles  and  20-mm.  anti- 
aircraft guns.  The  guns  were  not  very 
accurate,  possibly  because  the  Germans 
were  unable  to  depress  the  barrels  suf- 
ficiently, but  throughout  the  day  shells 
fell  around  the  boats.  In  spite  of  enemy 
fire  and  a  swift  current,  the  engineers 
managed  to  get  an  entire  infantry  bat- 


talion across  before  the  day  was  over. 
While  the  infantry  enlarged  the  bridge- 
head the  engineers  built  a  ferry  for 
jeeps,  ambulances,  and  radio  equip- 
ment and  began  constructing  a  Bailey 
across  a  hole  the  Germans  had  blown 
in  a  substantial  stone  bridge  leading  into 
the  castle  area. 

Before  dawn  on  4  April  foot  troops 
(but  not  vehicles)  were  able  to  use  the 
Bailey  bridge.  To  bring  armored  aid  to 
the  infantry  the  engineers  erected  a 
treadway  bridge.  While  the  fight  was 
raging  in  the  city  early  next  morning,  a 
party  of  about  two  hundred  Germans 
made  a  desperate,  last-ditch  attempt  to 
reach  and  destroy  the  treadway  and  to 
demolish  the  Bailey,  which  was  still  not 
complete.  The  attack  stalled  a  hundred 
yards  short  of  the  Bailey  bridge,  and 
by  the  end  of  the  day  the  battle  for 
Wuerzburg  was  over.  ^ 

On  the  following  day,  6  April,  the  42d 
Infantry  Division  moved  northeast  to- 
ward the  corps'  next  objective,  Schwein- 
furt,  the  center  of  the  German  ball- 
bearing industry.  The  main  problem 
was  88-mm.  guns  ringing  the  city.  These 
weapons  had  made  Schweinfurt  one  of 
the  costliest  of  all  targets  for  Allied 
bombers  and,  because  the  guns  could 
be  depressed  for  ground  fire,  would 
very  likely  make  it  costly  for  ground 
troops  as  well.  The  plan  was  to  encircle 
the  city  with  the  42d's  three  regiments. 
No  assault  river  crossing  was  required, 
but  to  enable  a  combat  command  of 
the  12th  Armored  Division  to  swing 
south  of  Schweinfurt  and  cut  the  en- 
emy's escape  route  to  the  east,  the  142d 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  built  a  tread- 
way over  the  Main  at  Nordheim.  The 


351. 


Taggart,  History  of  the  Third  Infantry  Division,  p. 


'"^  42d  "Rainbow"  Infantry  Division:  A  Combat  History 
of  World  War  II  (1947),  pp.  58-70. 


INTO  THE  HEART  OF  GERMANY 


553 


encirclement  was  successful,  and  with 
the  close  support  of  medium  bombers 
most  of  the  88-mm.  guns  were  de- 
stroyed. By  13  April  XXI  Corps  was 
ready  to  turn  southeast  and  help  XV 
Corps  capture  Nuremberg  by  attack- 
ing the  suburb  Fuerth. 

Nuremberg  lay  in  a  broad  valley 
veined  by  three  rivers  with  confusing 
names.  The  Rednitz,  flowing  from  the 
south,  and  the  Pegnitz,  from  the  east, 
joined  at  the  northern  boundaries  of 
Fuerth  to  form  the  Regnitz.  The  river 
crossings  were  not  difficult.  For  ex- 
ample, in  the  XV  Corps'  zone,  under 
cover  of  darkness  the  3d  Infantry  Divi- 
sion made  unopposed  crossings  of  both 
the  Regnitz  and  a  man-made  stream 
paralleling  it,  Ludwigs  Canal;  the  45th 
Infantry  Division  crossed  the  Pegnitz 
over  a  bridge  captured  intact.  Within 
the  city,  through  which  the  Pegnitz  and 
the  panal  ran,  all  bridges  were  down, 
but  troops  could  cross  on  the  twisted 
girders  of  blown  bridges. 

The  engineers'  hardest  task  was  re- 
moving roadblocks,  which  were  numer- 
ous and  strong  and  included  streetcars 
derailed  and  placed  sideways,  barriers 
of  logs,  and  huge  chunks  of  scrap  iron 
and  steel.  Another  engineering  task 
that  was  to  prove  increasingly  impor- 
tant went  to  the  40th  Engineer  Combat 
Group's  2831st  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion, attached  to  the  3d  Division.  As 
the  infantry  progressed  through  the 
city  the  engineer  battalion  assumed  the 
guard  of  enemy  installations,  not  only 
the  usual  railroad  yards  and  factories 
but  also  important  Nazi  Party  offices  in 
Nuremberg.  Eighty-six  such  installa- 
tions had  been  discovered  by  the  time 
Nuremberg  fell  on  20  April.  '^ 


* '  Rpt  ofOpns,  The  Smeiith  United  States  Arrny  in  France 
and  Germany  19-^4-1945,  vol.  Ill,  pp.  792-96;  Tag- 


The  XV  Corps'  next  objective  was 
Munich.  Then  the  corps  was  to  plunge 
into  an  area  the  Germans  called  the 
Alpenfestung  ("Alpine  fortress")  and  the 
Americans  called  the  National  Redoubt, 
presumably  located  in  the  mountains 
of  southern  Bavaria,  western  Austria, 
and  northern  Italy.  General  Eisen- 
hower believed  that  the  Germans  in- 
tended to  withdraw  into  this  mountain 
fortress.  To  block  such  a  move,  he 
directed  6th  Army  Group  to  advance 
into  a  wide  area  containing  the  passes 
into  the  Italian  Alps,  including  the 
famous  Brenner  Pass.  The  Alpine  for- 
tress region  extended  from  Salzburg  on 
the  right,  in  the  XV  Corps  line  of  march, 
to  Lake  Constance  on  the  left,  where 
VI  Corps  was  heading."^^ 

While  XV  and  XXI  Corps  were  mak- 
ing grand  sweeps  to  Nuremburg,  VI 
Corps,  on  the  right  of  the  Seventh 
Army  sector,  halted  early  in  April  be- 
fore strong  German  resistance  at  the 
Neckar  and  Jagst  Rivers.  About  ten 
miles  north  of  Heilbronn,  an  impor- 
tant communications  center,  the  Neckar 
forks.  Its  right  fork,  the  Jagst,  flows 
northeast,  then  southeast  through  the 
town  of  Crailsheim.  Along  the  arc  of 
the  Jagst  between  Heilbronn  and  Crail- 
sheim, the  enemy  unexpectedly  delayed 
VI  Corps  for  about  ten  days. 

Combat  commands  of  the  10th  Ar- 
mored Division,  spearheading  the  63d 
and  100th  Infantry  Divisions,  found  the 
bridges  over  the  Neckar  and  Jagst  down. 
While  the  bulk  of  the  armor  waited  for 


gart.  History  of  the  Third  Infantry  Division,  p.  353;  42d 
"Rainbow"  Division,  p.  85;  Opns  Rpt,  40th  Engr  C  Gp, 
1  Apr- 25  Aug  45. 

''  Eisenhower,  Crusade  in  Europe,  p.  397;  Toland, 
The  Last  100  Days,  pp.  262-63.  For  a  map  of  the 
(ierman  National  Redoubt  area,  see  Seventh  Army 
Report,  vol.  Ill,  opposite  p.  807. 


554 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


bridging  at  the  most  important  objec- 
tive, Heilbronn,  the  63d  Division  crossed 
the  Neckar  on  a  treadway  downstream 
at  Mosbach  and  began  reconnoitering 
the  north  bank  of  the  Jagst. 

Considered  the  gateway  to  Bavaria 
and  the  Alps,  Heilbronn  was  strongly 
defended.  On  4  and  5  April  three  bat- 
talions of  the  100th  Division  managed 
to  cross  the  Neckar  and  establish  tenu- 
ous bridgeheads  in  a  factory  area  on 
the  far  bank,  but  German  artillery  on 
heights  above  the  city  prevented  the 
construction  of  a  treadway  bridge  and 
destroyed  ferries  that  might  have  taken 
tanks  across. 

The  10th  Armored  Division  had  to 
use  the  63d  Division's  bridge  down- 
stream at  Mosbach  and  so  was  unable 
to  help  in  the  attack  on  Heilbronn. 
Instead,  it  became  involved  in  a  battle 
for  Crailsheim.  The  town  fell  on  6 
April,  but  the  Germans  succeeded  in 
cutting  its  line  of  communications  and 
continued  to  counterattack  strongly. 
Crailsheim  became  "another  Bastogne." 
By  1 1  April  Maj.  Gen.  Edward  H. 
Brooks,  commanding  VI  Corps,  de- 
cided it  was  not  worth  the  effort  to  hold 
the  town;  that  night  the  armored  divi- 
sion withdrew.  The  tankers  turned 
west,  forded  the  shallow  headwaters  of 
the  Kocher  River,  and  headed  for  a 
meeting  with  the  infantry  east  of  Heil- 
bronn. 

In  the  meantime,  the  infantry  of  the 
1 00th  Division  was  putting  up  a  desper- 
ate fight  for  Heilbronn.  By  the  after- 
noon of  7  April  the  3 1st  Engineer  Com- 
bat Battalion  had  almost  completed  a 
treadway  when  German  artillery  scored 
a  direct  hit  on  it.  The  following  morn- 


ing the  engineers  emplaced  a  second 
treadway.  Some  tanks  and  tank  destroy- 
ers managed  to  cross  before  the  Ger- 
mans destroyed  the  span  at  noon,  but 
even  with  the  help  of  tanks  the  100th 
Division  was  unable  to  push  east  of 
Heilbronn  until  14  April. 

By  17  April  engineers  of  the  540th 
Engineer  Combat  Group,  in  close  sup- 
port of  VI  Corps,  were  building  brid- 
ges over  the  Neckar,  the  Jagst,  and  the 
Kocher  to  get  men  and  supplies  for- 
ward for  a  push  across  the  Danube  and 
into  the  Alpine  fortress.'^**  Leaving  Stutt- 
gart to  the  First  French  Army,  VI  Corps 
raced  toward  the  Danube.  The  first 
crossings  the  corps  made  came  around 
midnight  on  23  April.  The  10th  Ar- 
mored Division  used  three  bridges  cap- 
tured near  Ehingen,  while  the  44th 
Division  employed  a  treadway  south  of 
the  town.  Part  of  the  infantry  division 
turned  north  to  assist  in  the  capture  of 
the  medieval  city  of  Ulm,  astride  the 
Danube.  In  the  path  of  this  force  lay 
the  Iller  River,  flowing  into  the  Dan- 
ube near  Ulm.  In  the  swift  current  the 
infantry's  assault  boats  capsized,  forc- 
ing one  company  to  cross  on  cables, 
hand  over  hand,  while  engineers  placed 
heavy  logs  across  blown  bridges  for  cat- 
walk crossings. 

Two  combat  commands  of  the  1.0th 
Armored  Division,  racing  more  than 
twenty  miles  ahead,  reached  the  Iller 
during  the  night  of  24  April,  and  a  com- 
pany of  the  division's  55th  Armored 
Engineer  Battalion  built  a  treadway 
bridge  near  Dietenheim.  An  incident 
at  this  bridge  typified  the  fluidity  of 
pursuit  warfare.  A  trapped  German  col- 
umn attempted  to  escape  over  the  tread- 


^''  Lester  M.  Nichols,  Impact:  The  Battle  Story  of  the 
Tenth  Armored  Division  (1954),  pp.  221  —  70. 


*'  Seventh  Army  Report,  vol.  Ill,  pp.  782-89. 
'Mnl,  540th  Engr  C  Gp,  Jan -May  45. 


INTO  THE  HEART  OF  GERMANY 


555 


way  in  the  darkness,  using  a  captured 
American  truck  to  lead  it.  The  Germans 
almost  succeeded.  When  the  Americans 
discovered  that  the  column  was  Ger- 
man, a  wild  firefight  erupted,  during 
which  an  engineer  bulldozer  operator 
used  his  blade  to  bring  down  a  German 
officer. '^^ 

Although  disorganized,  the  enemy 
was  still  capable  of  placing  dangerous 
obstacles  in  the  path  of  tanks.  As  the 
10th  Armored  Division  moved  into  the 
Bavarian  Alps,  it  found  bridges  over 
deep  gorges  destroyed,  huge  craters 
blown  in  the  roads,  and  fields  mined. 
At  one  point  the  Germans  had  rolled 
down  the  hairpin  curve  of  a  mountain 
road  a  200-yard-wide  avalanche  of  boul- 
ders, gravel,  and  logs. 

On  30  April  the  armor  halted  at  the 
resort  town  of  Garmisch-Partenkir- 
chen;  infantrymen  of  the  44th  and 
103d  Divisions  took  up  the  advance 
through  the  Alpine  passes  to  the  Inn 
River  valley,  nestling  between  the  pre- 
cipitous mountain  ranges  of  the  Bavar- 
ian Alps  on  the  north  and  the  Tyrolean 
Alps  on  the  south,  along  the  border 
with  Italy.  The  44th  Division,  heading 
for  Resia  Pass  on  the  Austrian-Italian 
border,  slowed  early  at  a  point  where 
the  enemy  had  blasted  away  a  cliffside 
road.^"  A  bypass  had  to  be  found.  Then 
the  troops  were  hindered  by  snowbanks 
blocking  the  roads  and  falling  rain, 
mixed  with  snow.  On  5  May,  when  sur- 
render negotiations  began  and  all  ad- 
vances in  the  VI  Corps  sector  halted, 
the  division  was  still  more  than  twenty 
miles  short  of  its  goal. 


The  103d  Infantry  Division,  com- 
manded by  Maj.  Gen.  Anthony  C.  Mc- 
Auliffe  and  headed  for  Innsbruck  and 
the  Brenner  Pass,  had  better  luck.  By 
the  evening  of  3  May  the  division  was 
in  Innsbruck,  and  one  of  its  motorized 
regiments  was  on  its  way  to  the  Bren- 
ner Pass,  headlights  blazing;  at  0150,  4 
May,  McAuliffe's  men  took  the  pass. 
Later  in  the  morning  advance  parties 
sent  over  the  border  into  Italy  met 
Americans  from  the  U.S.  Fifth  Army, 
thus  fulfilling  a  prediction  made  by 
General  Eisenhower  when  he  left  the 
Mediterranean  for  the  European  the- 
ater late  in  1943  that  he  would  meet 
the  soldiers  of  the  Mediterranean  com- 
mand "in  the  heart  of  the  enemy  home- 
land."^' 

The  last  Alpine  pass  to  be  captured 
was  at  Salzburg,  important  because  the 
Germans  fleeing  from  Patton's  Third 
Army  might  attempt  to  use  it.  On  1 
May  XV  Corps,  in  position  to  move 
swiftly  down  the  Munich-Salzburg  auto- 
bahn, was  assigned  to  capture  Salzburg. 
After  assault  crossings  of  the  Danube 
and  Lech  Rivers  on  26  April,  XV  Corps 
took  Munich  by  nightfall  of  the  thir- 
tieth. Through  the  city  ran  the  Isar 
River,  which  might  have  delayed  the 
advance,  but  with  the  help  of  German 
anti-Nazi  resistance  forces  ten  bridges 
within  the  city  were  seized  intact.  Leav- 
ing the  45th  Infantry  Division  to  garri- 
son Munich,  Maj.  Gen.  Wade  H.  Hai- 
slip,  the  XV  Corps  commander,  assigned 
the  capture  of  Salzburg  to  the  3d  Infan- 
try Division  with  the  106th  Cavalry 
Group  attached  and  the  20th  Armored 
Division,  a  newly  arrived  unit  that  had 


'"'  Nichols,  Impact:  The  Battle  Story  of  the  Tenth  Armored 
Division,  p.  278. 

'"  See  photograph.  Seventh  Arviy  Report,  vol.  Ill,  p. 

842. 


' '  Eisenhower,  Crusade  in  Europe,  p.  4 1 8.  For  tactical 
details  of  the  drive  for  the  passes,  see  Seventh  Army 
Report,  vol.  Ill,  pp.  840-47. 


556 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


replaced  the  14th  Armored  Division. 
The  42d  Infantry  Division  was  to  secure 
crossings  for  armor  at  the  Inn  River, 
the  last  major  barrier  to  the  Alpine  for- 
tress area.  The  advance  was  to  begin 
on  2  May.^^ 

One  task  force  of  the  3d  Infantry 
Division  was  already  moving  on  1  May. 
In  an  unseasonable  May  Day  snow- 
storm, whipped  by  a  cold  wind  from 
the  Alps,  the  force  sped  down  the  auto- 
bahn to  cut  off  escaping  Germans  and 
secure  bridges  across  the  Inn.  At  Ro- 
senheim the  Americans  found  three 
bridges.  Two  they  captured  without 
difficulty,  but  the  third — the  most  stra- 
tegically located  and  the  only  one  capa- 
ble of  carrying  tanks — was  defended 
briefly  by  a  small  party  of  Germans. 
The  infantry  task  force  took  the  offen- 
sive, but  stopped  at  the  bridge,  which 
had  mines  strewn  along  its  flooring. 
Then  the  task  force  commander  noticed 
a  smoldering  fuse  beneath  the  bridge 
and  cut  the  primacord  just  in  time  to  pre- 
vent the  detonation  of  a  huge  amount 
of  explosives.  This  bridge  not  only  took 
the  divisional  tanks  over  the  Inn  but 
also  enabled  the  3d  Division  to  win  the 
race  for  Salzburg — the  advance  of  the 
20th  Armored  Division  had  slowed 
when  the  42d  Infantry  Division  was 
unable  to  find  an  intact  bridge  in  its 
area.  Not  until  late  on  3  May  did  tanks 
of  the  20th  Armored  cross  the  Inn, 
using  a  dam  near  Wasserburg. 

By  nightfall  on  3  May  elements  of 
the  3d  Infantry  Division,  racing  down 
the  autobahn,  had  reached  the  Saalach 
River,  only  five  or  six  miles  southwest 
of  Salzburg."*^  In  the  lead  was  the  2d 


^^  AAR,  XV  Corps,  31  Jul  44-31  May  45. 
^ '  Taggart,  History  of  Third  Infantry  Division,  pp.  369, 
371. 


Battalion  of  the  7th  Infantry.  The  regi- 
ment was  an  old  one  with  a  great  deal 
of  esprit  de  corps — its  crest  and  colors 
carried  a  cotton  bale,  symbolizing  ser- 
vice under  Andrew  Jackson  at  the  Bat- 
tle of  New  Orleans,  where  it  had  used 
such  bales  as  breastworks.  It  had  landed 
in  North  Africa  on  8  November  1942 
and  had  been  fighting  ever  since.  Find- 
ing all  three  bridges  over  the  Saalach 
down,  the  10th  Engineer  Combat  Bat- 
talion crossed  the  2d  Battalion,  7th 
Infantry,  in  assault  boats.  By  dawn  on 
4  May  the  infantry  was  entering  Salz- 
burg. The  city  quickly  capitulated.  By 
then  it  was  plain  that  German  resistance 
in  the  Alpine  fortress,  or  National  Re- 
doubt, was  no  more  than  a  mirage. 

Support  of  Alsos 

In  the  last  half  of  April,  with  Ger- 
man armies  collapsing.  Allied  technical 
teams  moved  into  Germany  in  the  VI 
Corps  area  to  capture  German  scien- 
tists, documents,  and  equipment  in 
order  to  assess  their  contributions  to 
the  German  war  effort.  Because  of  the 
progress  the  United  States  had  made 
in  achieving  nuclear  reactions  in  the 
Manhattan  Project,  the  most  urgent  of 
these  efforts  sought  intelligence  on  how 
close  the  German  scientists  were  to 
building  a  fission  bomb  that,  even  at 
that  late  hour,  might  change  the  course 
of  the  war.  An  investigation  team  of 
nuclear  scientists  had  already  been  ac- 
tive in  Alsace,  capturing  almost  1,000 
tons  of  uranium  ore  and  various  equip- 
ment in  the  6th  Army  Group  area. 
Associated  with  the  American  nuclear 
research  effort  in  the  United  States  and 
operating  under  the  code  name  ALSOS, 
the  team,  commanded  by  Col.  Boris  T. 
Pash,  now  sought  to  seize  the  remain- 


INTO  THE  HEART  OF  GERMANY 


557 


ing  uranium  supply,  the  research  docu- 
ments and  laboratories,  and  the  brains 
behind  German  nuclear  science. ^^ 

To  support  these  scientific  teams, 
SHAEF  assigned  each  army  group  com- 
mand a  so-called  T-Force  headquarters 
to  which  scientific  personnel  were  as- 
signed when  they  arrived  in  the  theater. 
The  technical  experts  and  theoretical 
scientists  usually  were  accompanied  by  a 
complement  of  combat  troops  to  pro- 
tect them  and  by  combat  engineers  who 
could  serve  that  purpose  but  whose 
main  task  was  to  dismantle  captured 
equipment  and  laboratories.  In  Gen- 
eral Devers'  headquarters,  the  1269th 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  provided 
combat  engineer  support  for  the  6th 
Army  Group  T-Force. 

Intelligence  gathered  in  AlSOS  opera- 
tions before  the  6th  Army  Group  crossed 
the  Rhine  pointed  to  the  existence  of  a 
dispersed  research  complex  centered 
on  the  villages  of  Hechingen,  Bisingen, 
and  Tailfmgen  nestled  at  the  eastern 
edge  of  the  Black  Forest. 

Colonel  Pash's  target  area  lay  in  a 
broad  valley  laced  with  the  tributaries 
of  the  Neckar  River,  a  region  of  charm 
and  natural  beauty.  At  the  western  end 
of  the  valley  lay  Freudenstadt,  some 
twenty-five  miles  east  of  the  Rhine  at 
the  same  latitude  as  Strasbourg  in  Al- 
sace. From  Freudenstadt  southeast  cur- 
ved a  rough  arc  of  small  towns  that 
marked  the  scientific  mission's  line  of 
advance  across  thirty-five  miles  of  Ger- 


'^  The  mission  was  called  Aii>os,  the  Greek  word  for 
"grove"  (as  in  olive  grove),  as  a  play  on  the  name  of 
then  Maj.  (ien.  Leslie  R.  Groves,  the  military  head  of 
the  U.S.  Manhattan  Project.  This  account  of  the  activi- 
ties of  the  investigation  team  in  Germany  relies  on 
the  unit  records  of  the  1269th  Engineer  Gombat  Bat- 
talion for  April  and  May  1945  and  on  Gol.  Boris  T. 
Pash's  The  Al.sos  Mi-ssioti  (New  York:  Award  Books, 
1969),  pp.  204-41. 


man  countryside.  Denied  an  airborne 
operation  to  secure  this  area,  Pash  de- 
cided instead  on  an  unsupported  thrust 
into  the  hills,  risky  as  it  was  in  the  face 
of  small  and  scattered,  but  still  combat 
ready,  groups  of  German  soldiers  and 
SS  troops. 

Colonel  Pash's  difficulties  were  com- 
pounded by  the  sudden  successes  of  the 
First  French  Army.  On  16  April  the  6th 
Army  Group  had  drawn  army  bound- 
aries in  the  area  to  leave  the  city  of 
Stuttgart  in  the  Seventh  Army  zone  of 
operations.  French  forces  had  cleared 
the  east  bank  of  the  Rhine  opposite 
Strasbourg  by  that  date  and  General 
Jean  de  Lattre  de  Tassigny,  ignoring 
General  Devers'  restrictions  on  his  move- 
ments, exploited  his  advantage  to  thrust 
north  and  seize  Stuttgart  by  22  April. 
This  forced  Colonel  Pash  to  move  his 
team  across  a  French  rear  area,  a  feat 
that  took  resolution,  considerable  bluff, 
and  occasional  strong  language  with 
French  soldiery.  The  French  Provi- 
sional Government  never  knew  the 
nature  of  the  search  missions,  but  sus- 
pected that  General  Devers  hoped  to 
capture  the  remnants  of  the  Vichy 
French  regime,  which  had  taken  ref- 
uge in  the  German  city  of  Sigmaringen, 
some  fifty  miles  south  of  Stuttgart. 

The  1 269th  Engineer  Combat  Battal- 
ion less  its  Company  B,  left  behind  with 
the  6th  Army  Group  T-Force,  joined 
the  Alsos  team  at  Freudenstadt  on  the 
morning  of  2 1  April;  the  engineer  con- 
tingent became  Task  Force  White,  after 
its  commander,  Lt.  Col.  Willard  White. 
The  entire  command  of  scientists,  engi- 
neers, and  British  technicians  was  known 
as  Task  Force  A.'*^ 


^''  Unit  Records,  1269th  Engr  C  Bn,  Jan-May  45. 
The    1269th    replaced    its   own    Gompany    B    with 


558 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


The  same  morning  Task  Force  A  set 
out  on  Colonel  Pash's  Operation  BIG 
from  Freudenstadt  through  the  quiet 
town  of  Horb  to  Haigerloch,  twenty 
miles  east  of  Freudenstadt.  Here  the 
elated  scientists  made  their  first  big 
discovery.  As  the  engineer  troops  con- 
solidated the  group's  position  in  the 
town,  the  Alsos  team  shot  open  a  bolt- 
ed door  sealing  the  entrance  to  a  cave 
in  the  side  of  a  cliff.  Inside,  the  team 
found  a  large  chamber  and  several 
smaller  rooms  crammed  with  instru- 
ments, control  boxes,  and  an  array  of 
cylinders  described  by  a  frightened 
German  technician  as  a  uranium  ma- 
chine. Though  missing  its  uranium 
element,  the  device  was  an  operating 
atomic  pile,  captured  undamaged. 

While  the  scientists,  with  engineer 
help,  spent  two  days  dismantling  the 
equipment.  Colonel  Pash  led  most  of 
the  engineers  to  the  Bisingen-Hechin- 
gen  area,  the  next  populated  complex. 
Spurred  by  statements  of  Germans  cap- 
tured at  Haigerloch,  the  force  went  in 
search  of  the  missing  uranium  and 
other  German  scientists  in  the  vicinity. 
Early  engineer  patrols  ran  into  increas- 
ing signs  of  enemy  small  unit  activity. 
Bisingen  itself  was  quiet  when  the  engi- 
neer column  snaked  into  the  town,  but 
as  the  scientists  left  to  explore  Hech- 
ingen  four  miles  to  the  north,  a  skir- 
mish between  engineers  remaining  in 
Bisingen  and  some  German  stragglers 
set  off  a  show  of  resistance  to  the  Ameri- 
can troops  by  the  hostile  inhabitants. 
Colonel  White  put  the  whole  battalion 
on  alert,  and  the  incident  passed  with- 
out further  development,  though  the 
men  advancing  into  the  last  town  occu- 

Company  B  of  the  163d  Engineer  Combat  Battalion  to 
fill  its  ranks.  Colonel  Pash  incorrectly  identifies 
Colonel  White  as  Wilbur  White. 


pied  during  Operation  BIG  were  con- 
siderably more  edgy  for  this  experi- 
ence. 

Early  on  24  April,  Company  A,  bayo- 
nets fixed,  moved  on  Tailfingen,  ten 
miles  by  road  southeast  of  Bisingen.  In 
Bisingen  and  Hechingen  some  twenty- 
five  noted  German  nuclear  physicists 
and  their  staffs  had  surrendered  and 
under  interrogation  had  revealed  the 
location  of  other  German  technical 
facilities  in  the  town  Task  Force  A  now 
approached.  Although  expecting  resis- 
tance, the  engineer  column  pulled  into 
Tailfingen  after  encountering  little  more 
than  a  roadblock  on  the  way.  By  noon 
the  troops  had  established  Task  Force 
A  in  Tailfingen  and  had  surveyed  the 
area  for  signs  of  German  military  activ- 
ity. The  atmosphere  here  contrasted 
sharply  with  that  in  Bisingen  the  day 
before.  The  laboratory  staff  of  nuclear 
physicist  Dr.  Otto  Hahn  was  coopera- 
tive as  was  the  burgermeister,  and  the 
task  force  soon  had  the  information  it 
needed. 

The  last  discoveries  of  Operation  BIG 
were  at  hand.  In  a  cesspool  in  the  town 
the  team  found  a  large  metal  container 
holding  the  valuable  secret  research 
papers  of  the  Hahn  laboratory.  The 
Allied  technicians  then  moved  to  a 
plowed  field  outside  the  town  to  super- 
vise a  hastily  impressed  German  exca- 
vation crew,  whose  digging  uncovered 
a  large  wooden  platform.  Drawing  back 
this  cover,  they  found  a  neat  stack  of 
dark  ingots — the  missing  uranium  from 
the  pile  at  Haigerloch.  A  nearby  grist- 
mill yielded  up  three  large  drums  of 
heavy  water,  used  to  control  the  re- 
action in  the  pile. 

The  engineers  loaded  this  treasure 
aboard  the  battalion's  trucks  with  some 
strain,  the  scientists  hardly  concealing 


INTO  THE  HEART  OF  GERMANY 


559 


their  amusement  at  the  surprise  of  the 
troops  as  they  loaded  the  trucks.  The 
deceptively  light-looking  stack  of  ingots, 
about  two  cubic  feet  in  size,  weighed 
over  two  tons,  uranium  being  among 
the  densest  elements. 

With  the  entire  supply  of  German 
uranium  in  Allied  hands,  Operation 
Big  ended,  as  did  the  1269th  Engineer 
Combat  Battalion's  association  with  the 
Alsos  team.  The  battalion  returned  to 
the  6th  Army  Group  T-Force  at  Mun- 
ich in  the  closing  days  of  the  war."*^' 


"'  Among  the  later  discoveries  made  by  the  men  of 
(lompany  A  of  the  battalion  around  Mimich  was  the 
cache  of  stolen  art  treasures  hidden  in  a  mine  outside 


Engineer  units  were  a  central  element 
in  the  last  six  weeks  of  the  war  against 
crumbling  German  forces  in  the  heart 
of  the  Reich.  In  the  war  of  pursuit  that 
eventually  cut  Hitler's  dwindling  terri- 
tory in  half,  the  race  to  the  Elbe  in  the 
north  and  into  Austria  and  Czechoslo- 
vakia in  the  south  was  a  matter  of  brid- 
ges and  open  roads.  Along  lines  of  com- 
munications from  French  and  Dutch 
ports  to  the  most  forward  fighting  front, 
engineers  supported  the  advance  that 
contributed  to  the  final  collapse  of  the 
Nazi  regime. 


the  city.  The  erstwhile  owner  of  this  collection  was 
Reichsniarschal  Hermann  (ioering. 


CHAPTER  XXV 


Conclusion 


U.S.  Army  engineers  unquestionably 
fulfilled  their  traditional  mission  in  the 
Mediterranean  and  European  theaters 
in  World  War  II.  In  their  massive  con- 
struction program  in  England,  they 
housed  the  Allied  armies  preparing  for 
the  main  thrust  against  German  forces 
in  the  west.  In  combat  zones  in  both 
theaters,  engineer  work  on  beaches  and 
in  bridging,  rail  and  road  construction, 
and  mine  clearance  permitted  the  tacti- 
cal advance  of  combat  elements.  Diverse 
specialty  units  from  water  purification 
to  engineer  pipeline  companies  also 
contributed  to  the  success.  In  the  com- 
munications zones,  constant  rehabilita- 
tion of  harbors  and  of  lines  of  commu- 
nications guaranteed  the  movement  of 
Army  supply  in  unprecedented  volume 
and  provided  facilities  for  other  ser- 
vice branches.  Of  course,  none  of  these 
accomplishments  was  without  drawback 
or  fault.  Like  the  rest  of  the  Army 
throughout  the  war,  the  engineers 
learned  and  relearned  lessons  con- 
stantly, often  in  the  face  of  enemy  fire. 

During  the  interwar  period  the  Corps 
of  Engineers  had  acquiesced  in  the 
almost  inevitable  allocation  of  limited 
funds  to  combat  arms  at  the  expense  of 
combat  support  elements.  In  the  small 
American  Army  of  the  1930s,  training 
had  consistently  favored  combat  engi- 
neering and  the  quick  engagement  of 


the  enemy  to  produce  a  decision  in  a 
short  time,  all  at  the  expense  of  a  thor- 
ough grounding  in  administrative  func- 
tions and  the  methods  of  building  and 
maintaining  a  rear  area  service  of  sup- 
ply. When  the  first  engineers  went 
overseas,  the  want  of  properly  schooled 
supply  personnel  and  of  a  comprehen- 
sive system  of  supply  management  com- 
pounded the  material  shortages  that 
plagued  them.  The  engineers  in  En- 
gland in  1941  wrestled  with  their  early 
logistical  problems  without  much  appli- 
cation of  one  of  the  chief  American  con- 
tributions to  warfare:  a  business  sense 
of  organization,  efficiency,  and  plan- 
ning foresight.  The  lack  of  trained 
depot  troops  and  of  an  adequate  and 
standardized  inventory  procedure  con- 
tinued on  the  Continent  later  in  the 
war  and  contributed  to  the  shipping  cri- 
sis of  the  fall  of  1944.  Improvement 
was  slow,  and  at  the  close  of  the  war 
the  ETO  chief  engineer  called  for  a 
revamping  of  engineer  supply  doctrine, 
policy,  and  operating  procedures. 

A  problem  as  basic  as  the  supply 
shortages  was  the  alarmingly  low  level 
of  engineering  and  construction  expe- 
rience among  new  engineer  officers 
and  troops  arriving  in  England  after 
1942.  Though  aviation  engineer  units 
could  learn  their  jobs  by  doing  them  in 
England,  combat  and  construction  engi- 


CONCLUSION 


561 


neers  had  barely  enough  time  during 
the  Bolero  buildup  to  learn  the  rudi- 
ments of  their  trade  as  they  would  prac- 
tice it  under  fire.  Officers  in  the  the- 
ater perforce  absorbed  an  education  in 
the  technical  side  of  their  work  and  at 
the  same  time  in  the  art  of  leadership. 
The  training  of  engineers  overseas  also 
suffered  from  the  uncertainties  of  stra- 
tegic direction  through  1942  and  1943; 
the  Torch  operation  committed  many 
of  the  most  accomplished  engineers  to 
the  war  in  North  Africa. 

The  ETOUSA  command  structure 
that  first  evolved  in  England  with  the 
theater  chief  engineer  subordinate  to 
the  theater  services  of  supply  echelon 
persisted  to  the  end  of  the  war  in  north- 
ern Europe.  Though  the  peculiarities 
of  that  arrangement  placed  General 
Moore  at  an  organizational  level  from 
which  he  could  advise  General  Eisen- 
hower on  engineer  affairs  only  through 
General  Lee,  he,  like  the  other  techni- 
cal chiefs  in  the  theater,  accommodated 
himself  to  this  system,  and  it  never  exer- 
cised an  untoward  effect  on  engineer 
operations.  Similarly,  the  sometimes 
tangled  lines  of  authority  for  the  engi- 
neers in  North  Africa  saw  resolution 
only  in  the  last  year  of  the  war,  but 
here  too  other  considerations  were  more 
important  to  engineer  performance 
than  the  top-level  organization. 

The  evolution  and  the  employment 
of  major  new  engineer  organizations 
and  units  in  the  theaters  met  with  mixed 
success.  With  the  enemy  in  possession 
of  ports  on  the  Continent  and  with 
North  African  harbors  of  any  conse- 
quence under  Vichy  control,  gaining  a 
foothold  in  either  area  involved  am- 
phibious operations.  The  amphibian 
brigades  the  engineers  developed  to 
meet  the  demands  of  seaborne  inva- 


sion were  original  in  concept,  but  only 
partially  realized  their  true  potential  in 
European  and  North  African  opera- 
tions. In  contrast  to  the  Pacific,  where 
engineers  retained  their  boat  regiments, 
the  truncation  of  the  brigades  in  Europe 
limited  their  performance;  when  the 
Navy  insisted  on  running  all  the  land- 
ing craft  to  be  employed  in  beach  oper- 
ations, the  Army  brigades  lost  their 
organic  boat  elements.  The  division  of 
labor  remained,  however;  all  activities 
on  the  seaward  side  of  a  landing  opera- 
tion were  the  responsibility  of  the  Navy 
and  everything  on  shore  remained  the 
province  of  the  Army.  No  single  author- 
ity controlled  the  entire  expanse  between 
the  ships  offshore  and  the  inland  sup- 
ply dumps.  The  history  of  amphibious 
operations  after  TORCH  saw  continu- 
ous efforts  to  provide  this  control  by 
placing  on  the  beach  an  organization 
whose  writ  would  extend  seaward  and 
landward  from  the  traditional  division 
point  of  Army  and  Navy  authority  dur- 
ing an  assault  landing — the  high-water 
mark  on  the  beach.  In  subsequent  inva- 
sions, joint  Army-Navy  organizations 
were  formed  to  manage  traffic  from 
offshore  and  to  move  supply  across  the 
beaches  quickly.  These  arrangements 
brought  ashore  not  only  naval  demoli- 
tions experts  with  Army  engineers,  but 
also  an  entire  self-contained  organiza- 
tion, the  engineer  special  brigade,  with 
the  functions  of  obstacle  demolition, 
fire  fighting,  ordnance  disposal,  medi- 
cal service,  quartermaster  duties,  vehi- 
cle maintenance,  signals,  and  traffic 
management.  Despite  the  loss  of  the 
boat  regiments,  the  engineers  adapted 
to  an  amphibious  doctrine  and  an  as- 
sault function  with  organizations  un- 
known in  the  Army  before  the  war. 
Through  the  war  in  Europe,  as  in 


562 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


other  theaters,  the  engineers  struggled 
with  demands  of  unprecedented  com- 
plexity on  their  unit  structure.  The  tri- 
angular division  with  its  assigned  engi- 
neer battalion  proved  itself  in  battle  in 
North  Africa,  Italy,  and  northern  Eu- 
rope. But  the  introduction  in  the  the- 
aters of  other  new  and  specialized  engi- 
neer functions  during  the  press  of  com- 
bat created  command  and  organiza- 
tional problems  that  began  to  see  some 
resolution  only  toward  the  conflict's 
end.  The  evolution  of  units  along  the 
group  concept  reflected  efforts  to  tai- 
lor engineer  commands  to  meet  the  exi- 
gencies of  modern  war.  The  direct  bor- 
rowing of  techniques  and  manpower 
from  the  national  industrial  base 
brought  the  latest  industrial  methods 
and  devices  into  military  use  rapidly, 
but  the  absorbing  of  these  features  into 
a  regular  military  organization  involved 
trial,  error,  and  time. 

The  engineer  group  concept  forsook 
the  traditional  regimental  structure  for 
one  based  on  function  and  extreme 
flexibility.  As  a  tactical  headquarters 
with  its  engineer  battalions  attached 
rather  than  assigned  to  it,  the  group 
was  a  loose  organization  that  allowed 
the  rapid  transfer  of  specialty  units  in 
and  out  of  the  command  for  specific 
tasks.  Heavy  equipment  belonging  to 
the  group's  battalions  was  generally 
concentrated  in  a  separate  supply  pool 
that  took  the  place  of  the  regiment's 
headquarters  and  service  company  so 
that  the  individual  battalions  could 
travel  light. 

The  pronounced  advantages  in  flexi- 
bility and  mobility  achieved  by  the  engi- 
neer battalions  in  this  fashion  were  not 
entirely  unqualified.  The  rapid  intro- 
duction of  the  group  concept  produced 
widely  disparate  ideas  as  to  the  com- 


mand arrangements  between  head- 
quarters and  subordinate  attached  units; 
doctrine  on  group  tactics  was  lacking, 
and  the  shifting  of  units  from  one 
group  to  another  frequently  caused 
more  administrative  confusion  and 
morale  problems  than  were  acceptable. 
The  burden  on  independent  battalion 
commanders  for  planning  and  carry- 
ing out  work  was  too  great  for  the  staffs 
they  had  available  to  them.  The  group 
concept  was  also  so  unevenly  applied 
in  the  field  that  widely  divergent  prac- 
tices held  sway  in  Italy  and  in  north- 
western Europe.  Though  this  did  not 
affect  the  performance  of  the  units  as 
much  as  other  factors  such  as  short- 
ages of  manpower,  engineers  in  the 
European  theater  who  gathered  after 
the  war  to  discuss  their  experiences 
decided  that  the  concept  had  been  over- 
used and  imperfectly  applied;  they 
voted  to  retain  the  desirable  features 
of  the  engineer  group  in  a  more  for- 
mal military  unit  with  a  regimental 
designation.' 

Quite  aside  from  the  problems  of 
new  engineer  functions  to  be  performed, 
some  lack  of  technical  experience  also 
surfaced  among  officers  as  the  war  pro- 
gressed despite  an  excellent  engineer 
reserve  establishment.  The  rapid  ex- 
pansion of  the  officer  corps  and  the 
often  hasty  training  of  candidates  at 
home  produced  situations  in  the  field 
in  which  engineer  troops  had  more 
technical  know-how  than  some  of  their 
officers.  Highly  specialized  organiza- 
tions such  as  port  construction  and 
repair  groups  and  petroleum  distribu- 
tion companies  at  first  benefited  from 


12. 


ETO  Gen  Bd  Rpt  71,  Engineer  Organization,  p. 


CONCLUSION 


563 


the  crash  recruiting  campaigns  among 
the  marine  technicians  and  wildcatters 
of  civilian  industry.  As  with  the  general 
service  regiments  first  sent  to  England, 
the  result  was  often  a  concentration  of 
scarce  talent  in  a  few  units.  Units  formed 
later  had  the  pick  of  the  draft  and  of 
qualified  officers,  but,  however  well 
motivated,  these  men  had  to  learn  much 
of  their  work  after  they  had  reached 
the  theaters  of  operations. 

Though  the  petroleum  distribution 
companies  also  suffered  this  disadvan- 
tage, the  reasons  for  their  sometimes 
slow  progress  lay  elsewhere.  Pipeline 
construction  could  never  keep  up  with 
the  tactical  units  in  their  race  across 
northern  France  after  the  breakout 
from  the  lodgment  area  of  Normandy. 
The  unexpectedly  rapid  advance  from 
southern  France  likewise  outran  the 
pipeline  that  was  to  carry  fuel  forward 
to  the  combat  elements.  Even  with  more 
manpower  and  a  surplus  of  pipeline 
material,  a  rapidly  changing  tactical  sit- 
uation imposed  impossible  construction 
demands  upon  the  petroleum  distribu- 
tion companies  in  the  field.  Gasoline- 
starved  armored  divisions  were  send- 
ing truck  convoys  on  250-mile  supply 
runs  to  the  closest  pipehead  through 
August  and  early  September  1944. 

The  systems  nevertheless  proved 
themselves.  Without  them,  POL  sup- 
ply lines  would  have  relied  on  truck 
and  road  capacity  that  was  equally  taxed 
during  the  pursuit  warfare  of  late  sum- 
mer 1944.  In  the  slower  moving  Italian 
campaign,  pipeline  troops  had  more 
success  in  keeping  pace  with  the  fight- 
ing units  they  were  supplying  despite 
the  rugged  terrain.  The  chief  engineer 
of  the  Mediterranean  theater  consid- 
ered them  among  the  best  special  engi- 


neer  troops   in    the    Peninsular   Base 

Section.  "^ 

The  engineers  in  Europe  and  North 
Africa  quickly  learned  the  value  of 
modern  heavy  equipment  in  combat 
suppart  and  in  rear  area  operations. 
The  versatile  engineer  bulldozer,  which 
became  the  symbol  of  the  American 
ability  to  tackle  seemingly  impossible 
jobs,  was  indispensable  in  all  aspects  of 
road  and  airfield  construction.  Supple- 
mented by  graders  and  rollers  that  lev- 
eled roads  and  fields  in  short  order  and 
by  huge  rock  crushers  to  provide  aggre- 
gate from  quarries,  the  dozer  consis- 
tendy  enabled  the  engineers  to  rehabili- 
tate older  lines  of  communications  or 
to  create  new  ones  at  great  speed.  With- 
out their  large  and  powerful  machinery, 
in  fact,  the  engineers  could  not  have 
coped  with  their  assignments.  Constant 
revision  of  the  standard  TOEs  for  equip- 
ment through  the  war  reflected  the 
trend  toward  ever  heavier  machinery. 
At  the  war's  end,  engineer  officers  rec- 
ommended that  the  D-7  Caterpillar 
dozer  be  standard  in  all  units,  replac- 
ing any  lighter  machines. 

Similar  sentiments  prevailed  on  the 
use  of  trucks,  which  grew  larger  and 
heavier  in  American  and  British  inven- 
tories as  the  war  went  on.  The  humble 
2  1/2-ton  dump  truck  was  always  in 
short  supply  for  the  engineers.  Adapt- 
able to  a  number  of  uses,  including  the 
easy  transport  of  oil  pipeline  sections, 
the  dump  trucks  were  valuable  enough 
to  prompt  demands  for  their  substitu- 
tion for  cargo  vehicles  of  the  same  size. 
The  Brockway  trucks  issued  to  engi- 
neer heavy  ponton  units  to  transport 
bridge  sets  and  floats  also  contributed 

-  Coll,  Keith,  and  Rosenthal,  The  Corps  of  Engineers: 
Troops  and  Equipment,  p.  437. 


564 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


to  the  trend  toward  larger  and  heavier 
vehicles. 

The  tactical  bridging  with  which  the 
American  Army  experimented  in  1940 
in  imitation  of  German  examples  proved 
itself  in  combat,  but  one  of  the  most 
rewarding  measures  of  the  war  was  the 
adoption  of  the  British  Bailey  bridge. 
Besides  providing  a  common  heavy 
bridge  for  both  British  and  U.S.  Ar- 
mies, the  Bailey  was  far  more  versatile 
than  any  American  design  and  proved 
itself  even  as  a  floating  ponton  struc- 
ture. In  another  application  of  modern 
technique  to  an  engineer  function,  the 
use  of  light  aircraft  for  observation  and 
photographic  surveillance  added  much 
to  the  process  of  estimating  bridging 
and  road-building  requirements  along 
projected  lines  of  advance  that  still  lay 
in  enemy  territory.  In  Europe,  the  engi- 
neers could  also  harness  a  steel  produc- 
tion capacity  to  their  own  use.  Contracts 
with  French  firms  supplemented  the 
American  supply,  especially  of  I-beam 
stringers  for  heavy  railway  bridging. 

In  one  area,  mine  warfare,  German 
practice  continued  to  excel  until  the  end 
of  the  war.  American  methods  were 
inferior  by  comparison;  standard  U.S. 
Army  mines  were  usually  smaller  and 
far  less  ingenious  in  design  than  the 
German  variety.  The  Teller  antitank 
mine  had  twice  the  explosive  charge  of 
the  American  M—  1  antitank  mine,  which 
did  little  damage  to  German  tank  hulls, 
though  it  could  wreck  tracks  that  struck 
it.  Smaller  American  antipersonnel 
mines  were  often  unstable  and  danger- 
ous to  the  engineers  implanting  them. 
Engineer  training  in  mine  warfare  the- 
ory was  more  than  adequate,  but  the 
men  lacked  the  experience  that  would 
have  made  them  experts.  Captured  or 
swept  ordnance  was  always  too  danger- 


ous to  transport  to  the  United  States, 
and  as  a  result  many  engineers  came  to 
the  battlefield  without  having  seen  the 
devices  they  were  to  unearth  and  dis- 
arm. The  engineers  established  coun- 
termine schools  in  the  theaters  and 
shared  their  own  experience  with  the 
troops  of  other  arms  in  an  attempt  to 
save  lives  and  to  establish  standards  for 
American  mine  warfare.  The  SCR— 625 
detector  and  such  innovations  as  the 
Snake  proved  of  more  value  than  de- 
vices like  the  Scorpion  flail,  but  the  war 
ended  with  the  engineers  still  relying 
on  the  one  method  of  mine  sweeping 
used  from  the  start:  a  sharp-eyed  vet- 
eran probing  with  a  bayonet  held  at  a 
thirty-degree  angle.  Units  emplacing 
minefields  were  also  notably  absent- 
minded  about  passing  along  specific 
detail  on  the  location  and  the  dimen- 
sion of  mined  areas,  leaving  enemy  and 
Allied  troops  to  negotiate  the  field  later. 
The  Germans  routinely  recorded  all 
minefields  in  minute  detail  and  col- 
lected this  information  at  the  field  army 
level  with  identical  records  going  to  a 
central  land  mine  office  in  Germany.  A 
postwar  engineer  investigating  board 
recommended  the  American  imitation 
of  the  German  system,  at  least  in  estab- 
lishing a  centralized  theater-level  mine 
information  network."^ 

Several  considerations  affected  map- 
ping throughout  the  operations  in  the 
Mediterranean  and  European  theaters. 
Map  quality  was  usually  sufficient  to 
satisfy  the  needs  of  the  using  combat 
elements  during  the  hostilities.  Maps 
obtained  from  British  sources  under 
wartime  agreements  and  from  French 
or  even  captured  German  stocks  sup- 


*  ETO  Gen  Bd  Rpt  73,  Engineer  Technical  Policies, 
p.  13;  Ottinger,  "Landmine  and  Countermine  War- 
fare," North  Afnca,  1940-1943,  p.  260. 


CONCLUSION 


565 


ported  planning  and  tactical  operations; 
these  sources  were  supplemented  by 
maps  derived  from  aerial  photographs 
by  American  air  forces.  All  of  these 
methods  had  drawbacks,  but  served  the 
purposes  of  Allied  armies  well  enough. 

Less  satisfactory,  although  never  an 
obstacle  to  operations,  was  the  prob- 
lem of  map  issue  to  using  units.  Each 
field  army  had  difficulty  in  moving  map 
stocks  to  the  forward  battalions,  but  the 
causes  of  the  problem  varied.  Inevit- 
ably, pursuit  warfare  led  to  situations 
in  which  troops  advanced  into  areas  not 
depicted  on  the  maps  they  carried  for 
immediate  operations.  Pursuit  opera- 
tions also  demanded  more  small-scale 
maps — those  above  1 :  50,000,  which  was 
the  preferred  tactical  map  in  Europe. 
Static  or  siege  operations  required  larger 
scale  renditions  of  1:25,000  or  even 
1:5,000. 

Distribution*  units  in  the  field  han- 
dled more  than  210  million  maps  of  all 
sizes  in  the  European  theater  alone, 
with  the  bulk  of  this  number  coming 
from  presses  in  the  United  States;  over 
28  million  maps  were  from  the  French 
Institut  Geographique  National.  Troops 
used  commercial  road  maps  where 
they  were  available,  and  the  theater 
sought  to  supply  each  vehicle  with  a 
local  road  map.  Engineer  authorities 
assembled  at  the  end  of  the  war  esti- 
mated, however,  that  had  the  demands 
for  any  category  of  maps  been  even 
minimally  higher,  the  strained  distribu- 
tion nets  would  not  have  met  require- 
ments. 

Though  highly  publicized  by  both 
enemy  and  Allied  sources,  fortifications 
in  Europe  proved  less  formidable  than 
anticipated.  In  the  cases  of  the  Atlantic 
Wall  and  the  Siegfried  Line,  engineers 
proceeded  with  infantry  teams  to  re- 


duce bunkers  or,  sometimes,  to  seal 
their  defenders  inside.  Assaults  on  for- 
tified positions  showed  that  aggressive, 
well-trained  engineer  and  infantry  par- 
ties supported  by  flat-trajectory  artil- 
lery fire  or  close  tactical  air  cover  could 
reduce  the  most  forbidding  German 
casemates.  Engineers  examining  coastal 
defenses  after  assault  landings  discov- 
ered that  naval  fire  was  effective  against 
concrete  emplacements,  but  only  direct 
hits  or  an  impact  close  enough  to  shower 
the  bunker  interior  with  fragments 
brought  decisive  results. 

Engineers  performed  well  when  they 
went  into  action  as  infantry.  General 
Moore  remarked  after  the  war  that  the 
use  of  engineers  in  combat  had  been 
more  frequent  than  he  had  anticipated. 
Although  their  celebrated  performance 
in  the  German  Ardennes  offensive  re- 
ceived considerable  public  attention, 
engineers  were  committed  as  infantry 
during  tactical  emergencies  everywhere 
in  Europe  and  North  Africa.  Their 
combat  doctrine  proved  sound  in  the 
heat  of  battle.  Engineers  established 
perimeter  defenses  around  bridgehead 
construction  sites  and  served  in  active 
combat  with  infantry  and  as  covering 
forces  at  roadblocks  and  minefields 
throughout  the  war. 

Engineer  strengths  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean and  in  northern  Europe  varied  as 
the  strategic  importance  of  the  north- 
ern European  campaigns  grew  and  that 
of  the  Italian  campaign  declined.  Nev- 
ertheless, the  proportion  of  engineer 
troops  to  combat  elements  at  the  end 
of  the  war  was  not  widely  divergent  in 
the  two  theaters.  In  the  European  the- 
ater there  were  323,677  engineers — 
some  10.5  percent  of  the  total  theater 
strength  of  3,065,505  on  30  April  1945. 
One  man  in  nine  in  the  ETO  was  an 


566 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


engineer.  In  the  Mediterranean  the 
ratio  was  one  in  eleven.  Engineers  there 
numbered  44,467,  or  about  9  percent 
of  the  theater  aggregate  of  493,876  in 
the  last  month  of  the  war.  These  fig- 
ures can  be  contrasted  with  those  for 
the  Southwest  Pacific,  where  one  man 
in  seven  was  an  Army  engineer.  Despite 
the  usual  shortages  in  their  numbers, 
the  engineers  were  the  largest  single 
component  of  the  divisional  slice  out- 
side of  regular  combat  troops."* 

'  Extracts,  Staff  Officers'  Field  Matmal  Plaruiing  Data, 
Draft  FM  101-10,  1  Sep  47,  pp.  406-07. 


Their  frequent  shortages  in  men  and 
equipment  notwithstanding,  the  engi- 
neers met  the  exacting  demands  of  the 
campaigns  against  German  and  Italian 
arms  in  North  Africa  and  Europe.  In  a 
war  calling  for  the  closest  integration 
of  all  combat  and  support  arms  for  suc- 
cess in  battle,  the  engineers  were  a  com- 
petent and  motivated  force.  They  facili- 
tated the  concentration  of  Allied  armies 
in  England,  helped  move  combat  forces 
and  their  supply  across  hostile  beaches, 
and  supported  the  final  decisive  drives 
into  the  very  heart  of  the  Reich. 


Bibliographical  Note 


Documentary  Sources 
Documentary  sources  for  the  history 
of  engineer  operations  in  Europe  and 
North  Africa  during  World  War  II  con- 
sist of  records  generated  in  the  various 
theater  command  headquarters,  in  staff 
sections,  and  in  active  combat,  general, 
or  special  service  engineer  units.  Now 
housed  in  the  General  Archives  Divi- 
sion of  the  Washington  National  Rec- 
ords Center,  Suitland,  Maryland,  they 
include  daily  journals,  memorandums, 
correspondence,  general  and  special 
orders,  and  periodic  reports  for  com- 
mands and  units  in  both  theaters.  The 
author  has  supplemented  information 
drawn  from  these  sources  by  soliciting 
comments  from  engineer  participants 
in  the  events  described  through  inter- 
views, correspondence,  and  submission 
to  them  of  early  drafts  of  the  manu- 
script for  elaboration  or  correction. 

Several  major  collections  were  of  spe- 
cial value  in  the  preparation  of  this 
account.  The  military  series  of  the  cen- 
tral files  of  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of 
Engineers,  War  Department,  contains 
materials  on  the  engineer  preparation 
for  war  and  the  later  broad  supervision 
of  engineer  technical  affairs  overseas. 
A  wartime  Historical  Branch  in  OCE 
gathered  a  separate  documentary  file 
during  the  war  and,  as  the  Engineer 
Historical  Division,  later  supplemented 
the  collection  with  additional  documen- 
tary and  interview  files.  Ancillary  col- 
lections include  the  Army  Map  Service 
wartime  records.  This  material  has  also 
been  retired  to  the  Washington  Nation- 
al Records  Center. 


The  files  of  the  European  Theater 
of  Operations,  U.S.  Army,  contain  the 
records  of  the  chief  engineer  and  the 
stated  theater  policies  and  procedures 
governing  engineer  activities  in  En- 
gland and  on  the  Continent.  The  ETO 
Historical  Division  files  also  deal  exten- 
sively with  the  history  of  engineers  in 
the  war  in  Europe.  The  files  of  the  base 
sections  and  the  advance  section  like- 
wise contain  material  central  to  the 
engineer  support  of  combat  operations. 

North  African — Mediterranean  the- 
ater files,  also  in  the  Washington  Na- 
tional Records  Center,  are  similarly 
organized  by  command  and  cover  engi- 
neer activities  in  North  Africa  and  Italy. 
Records  of  numerically  designated  units 
are  filed  individually  by  unit  number 
in  the  records  center. 

The  amount  of  unpublished  mate- 
rial on  engineer  units  in  the  two  the- 
aters is  also  voluminous,  though  it  is 
uneven  in  quality.  The  more  important 
works  are  the  following: 

1.  Twenty  Engineer  Historical  Re- 
ports were  prepared  by  the  Liaison  Sec- 
tion of  the  Intelligence  Division,  OCE, 
ETOUSA,  late  in  1945.  Each  report 
deals  exhaustively  with  a  single  broad 
aspect  of  engineer  endeavor  in  England 
and  on  the  Continent  and  includes 
extensive  appendixes  that  contain  some 
basic  documents,  detailed  drawings, 
technical  guidance,  and  occasional  inter- 
view transcripts.  This  series  is  filed 
under  the  heading  ETO  Administra- 
tive File  in  the  General  Archives  Div- 
ision, Washington  National  Records 
Center.  There  is  no  comparable  collec- 


568 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


tion  for  the  North  African  and  Medi- 
terranean theaters,  though  a  short  se- 
ries of  histories  of  base  sections  exists 
for  North  Africa  and  Italy,  the  latter 
on  file  at  the  Center  of  Military  History. 
Engineer  affairs  are  included  as  appro- 
priate in  these  volumes. 

2.  A  multi- volume  history  of  the  Med- 
iterranean theater's  Allied  headquarters. 
History  of  AFHQ,  also  has  numerous 
references  to  engineer  activities  and  to 
command  problems  involving  engi- 
neers. 

3.  Of  the  131  ETO  General  Board 
Reports,  the  results  of  investigations  by 
specially  appointed  teams  of  ETOUSA 
veterans,  four  deal  direcdy  with  engi- 
neer organizations,  technical  and  tacti- 
cal policies,  and  engineer  equipment. 
Others  deal  with  matters  affecting  engi- 
neer operations  such  as  theater  organi- 
zation, supply  policy,  maintenance,  and 
the  structure  of  SOS,  ETOUSA,  and 
COMZ,  ETOUSA.  A  complete  set  of 
the  reports  is  at  the  Center  of  Military 
History. 

4.  The  eleven-volume  Administra- 
tive and  Logistical  History  of  the  Euro- 
pean Theater  of  Operations  also  con- 
tains considerable  engineer  information. 
Intended  as  a  series  of  preliminary 
monographs  for  a  major  history  of 
ETOUSA,  the  works  were  completed 
in  the  theater  early  in  1946.  Of  impor- 
tance for  engineer  operations  are  the 
following:  The  Predecessor  Com- 
mands: The  Special  Observers  (SPOBS) 
and  United  States  Army  Forces  in  the 
British  Isles  (USAFBI)  by  Henry  G. 
Elliott;  Organization  and  Command  in 
the  European  Theater  of  Operations 
by  Robert  W.  Coakley;  Operations 
Torch  and  the  ETO;  Neptune:  Train- 
ing for  Mounting  the  Operation,  and 
Artificial  Ports  by  Clifford  Jones;  Open- 


ing and  Operating  the  Continental  Ports 
by  Elmer  Cutts  and  Robert  L.  Davis; 
Survey  of  Allied  Planning  for  Conti- 
nental Operations  by  Howard  L.  Oleck, 
Henry  J.  Webb,  and  Vernon  W.  Hoo- 
ver; The  Local  Procurement  of  Labor 
and  Supplies,  United  Kingdom  and 
Continental  by  Henry  G.  Elliott;  and 
Troop  and  Supply  Buildup  in  the  Uni- 
ted Kingdom  Prior  to  D-day  by  Her- 
bert French. 

Published  Sources 

Important  published  sources  include 
Maj.  Gen.  Cecil  R.  Moore's  comprehen- 
sive Final  Report  of  the  Chief  Engineer, 
European  Theater  of  Operations,  1942  — 
1945  and  the  published  histories  of  the 
First,  Third,  Fifth,  and  Seventh  Armies, 
and  of  the  12th  Army  Group.  A  gen- 
eral treatment  of  logistical — and  engi- 
neer— problems  in  North  Africa  and 
Italy  is  in  the  Logistical  History  ofNATO- 
USA-MTOUSA  (Naples,  1946).  Of  spe- 
cial value  were  the  following  volumes 
in  the  official  United  States  Army  in 
World  War  II  series:  Blanche  D.  Coll, 
Jean  E.  Keith,  and  Herbert  H.  Rosen- 
thal, The  Corps  of  Engineers:  Troops  and 
Equipment  (Washington,  1958);  Roland 
G.  Ruppenthal,  Logistical  Support  of 
the  Armies,  Volume  I  (Washington, 
1953)  and  Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies, 
Vo/wm^ // (Washington,  1959);  Richard 
M.  Leighton  and  Robert  W.  Coakley, 
Global  Logistics  and  Strategy,  1 940—1 943 
(Washington,  1955)  and  Robert  W. 
Coakley  and  Richard  M.  Leighton,  Glo- 
bal Logistics  and  Strategy,  1943  —  1945 
(Washington,  1968).  The  campaign  his- 
tories in  the  series  also  provided  a  com- 
prehensive background  for  this  account 
of  engineer  operations. 

The  chief  commercially  published 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 


569 


works  used  in  the  preparation  of  this 
book  were  General  of  the  Army  Omar 
Nelson  Bradley's  A  Soldiers  Story  (New 
York:  Henry  Holt  and  Co.,  1951),  Brig. 
Gen.  William  F.  Heavey's  Down  Ramp! 
The  Story  of  the  U.S.  Army  Amphibian 
Engineers  (Washington:  Infantry  Jour- 
nal Press,  1947),  General  of  the  Army 
Dwight  D.  Eisenhower's  Crusade  in  Eu- 
rope (Garden  City,  N.Y.:  Doubleday, 
1948),  General  George  S.  Patton,  Jr.'s 
War  as  I  Knew  It  (Boston:   Houghton 


Mifflin  Co.,  1947),  and  Wesley  F.  Cra- 
ven and  James  L.  Gate's  The  U.S.  Army 
Air  Forces  in  World  War  II  (Chicago:  Uni- 
versity of  Chicago  Press,  1948-  1958), 
7  volumes. 

Numerous  articles  on  engineer  opera- 
tions appeared  during  and  after  the  war 
in  service  journals.  Among  the  best  of 
these  were  those  in  Military  Review,  The 
Military  Engineer,  the  Engineering  News- 
Record,  and  the  Industry  Journal. 


Glossary 


AAA 
AAF 
ABC-1 

ABS 

ACofS 

ADSEC 

AEF 

AEF 

AFHQ 

AFSC 

AGF 

Alsos 


AMGLO 
Anvil 


AP 
AP 

Apex 

ASF 

AT 

AUS 

Avalanche 

Avgas 

Backbone 


Bang 

Barrac;uda 

Baytown 

Belgian  gates 

Big 

Blackstone 


Antiaircraft  artillery 

Army  Air  Forces 

Agreements  reached  at  Washington  Conference, 

January— March  1941 
Atlantic  Base  Section 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff 
Advance  Section 

Allied  Expeditionary  Force  (World  War  II) 
American  Expeditionary  Forces  (World  War  I) 
Allied  Force  Headquarters 
Air  Force  Service  Command 
Army  Ground  Forces 
Code  name  for  an  Allied  intelligence  mission  that 

sought  information  on  German  developments  in 

nuclear  fission 
Allied  Military  Government  Labor  Office 
The  planned    1944  Allied   invasion  of  southern 

France    in    the    Toulon-Marseille    area    (later 

Dragoon) 
Troop  transport 
Antipersonnel  mine 
A  remote-controlled  drone  boat 
Army  Service  Forces 
Antitank  mine 
Army  of  the  United  States 
Code  name  for  the  invasion  of  Italy  at  Salerno 
Aviation  gasoline 

An  assault  plan  which  called  for  a  foray,  into 
Spanish  Morocco  should  Spain  change  its  nom- 
inally neutral  position 

Shipping  code  name  for  Zone  III,  Northern  Ireland 

Assault  plan  aimed  directly  at  the  harbor  of  Naples 

Assault  plan  that  called  for  the  British  to  move 
across  the  Strait  of  Messina  to  Reggio  di  Calabria 

Nickname  of  Element  C,  a  beach  obstacle  emplaced 
on  northern  French  beaches 

Assault  plan  to  move  nuclear  intelligence  teams 
from  Freudenstadt  through  Horb  to  Haigerloch 
in  southwest  Germany 

A  subtask  force  of  Western  Task  Force  whose 
mission  was  to  capture  Safi,  a  small  port  150 
miles  south  of  Casablanca 


GLOSSARY 

Blade  Force 

Bolero 


Bouncing  Betty 

Brimstone 

Brushwood 


CCA 

CCB 

CCR 

CCS 

CE 

Cent 


CG 

Chocolate  bars 

Class  I 
Class  II 
Class  III 
Class  IV 
Class  V 
Class  30,  40,  70 

CO 
Cobra 


CofEngrs 
CofS 
COMZ 
CONAD 

COSSAC 

COWPUNCHER 

CTF 

D-1 
D-3 
DBS 
Dime 

DRACiOON 


571 


Belonging  to  the  British  78th  Division;  resembled 

a  U.S.  armored  combat  command  and  included 

an  American  armored  battalion 
Code  name  for  the  buildup  of  U.S.  forces  and 

supplies  in  United  Kingdom  for  cross-Channel 

attack 
German  antipersonnel  S-mine 
Plan  for  the  capture  of  Sardinia,  canceled 
Subtask  force  of  Western  Task  Force  for  the  attack 
on  Fedala,  Morocco 

Combat  Command  A 

Combat  Command  B 

Combat  Command  Reserve 

Combined  Chiefs  of  Staff 

Corps  of  Engineers 

Task  force  in  Sicily  assault  landing  (45th  Infantry 

Division);    also    the    code    name    for    beaches 

assaulted  by  this  force 
Commanding  general 
Precast  concrete  units  with  scored  checkerboard 

surface 
Rations 

Organizational  equipment 
Fuels  and  lubricants  such  as  gasoline  and  coal 
Construction  supplies 
Ammunition  and  explosives 
Designation   indicating   weight-bearing  capacities 

of  military  bridges  and  roads 
Commanding  officer 
Code  name  for  the  operation  launched  by  First 

Army  on  25  July  1944,  designed  to  break  out  of 

the  Normandy  lodgment 
Chief  of  Engineers 
Chief  of  Staff 
Communications  Zone 
Continental  Advance  Section,  Communications 

Zone 
Chief  of  Staff  to  the  Supreme  Allied  Commander 
Amphibious  exercises  before  invasion  of  Italy 
Center  Task  Force,  North  African  invasion 

Vierville  exit,  OMAHA  Beach,  Normandy 
Les  Moulins  leading  to  St.  Laurent,  OMAHA  Beach 
Delta  Base  Section 

Task  force  for  Sicily  assault  landing  (1st  Infantry 

Division);  the  beaches  assaulted  by  the  task  force 

Final  code  word  for  the  invasion  of  southern  France 


572 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


DUKW 

E-1 

E-3 

EAC 

EAF 

EBS 

ETF 

ETIT 

ETOUSA 

EUCOM 

Exploit 


F-1 
Fab  I  us 


FEC 

FECOMZ 
FFA 
FFI 

Flashpoint 


A  2 '/2-ton,  6-by-6  amphibian  truck 

Easy  Red,  leading  up  between  St.  Laurent  and 

Colleville,  OMAHA  Beach 
Colleville  draw,  OMAHA  Beach 
Engineer  Amphibian  Command 
Eastern  Assault  Force,  North  African  invasion 
Eastern  Base  Section 

Eastern  Task  Force,  North  African  invasion 
Engineer  technical  intelligence  team 
European  Theater  of  Operations,  U.S.  Army 
European  Command 
An  elaborate  deception  scheme  designed  to  trick 

the  Germans  into  expecting  a  crossing  of  the 

Rhine  River  at  Uerdingen,  some  fifteen  miles 

south  of  Rheinberg 

Draw  leading  off  Fox  Red,  OMAHA  Beach 
Amphibious  landing  exercises  of  all  assault  forces 

except    Force    U,    early    May    1944,    southern 

England 
French  Expeditionary  Corps 
Forward  Echelon,  Communications  Zone 
First  French  Army 
French  Forces  of  the  Interior 
A  plan  to  cross  the  Rhine  at  Rheinberg,  fifteen  miles 

south  of  Wesel 


G-1 

G-2 
G-3 
G-4 
Gangway 

GHQ 
Glue 
Goalpost 

Gooseberry 

GPA 
GPB 

Grenade 


Personnel  officer  of  division  or  higher  staff 

Intelligence  section 

Plans  and  operations  section 

Logistics  and  supply  section 

Assault  plan  aimed  at  the  beaches  immediately 

north  of  Naples 
General  Headquarters 

Mailing  code  name  for  Zone  II,  Bristol  and  London 
Task  force  for  assault  landing  in  Mehdia— Port- 

Lyautey  area.  North  Africa 
Partial    breakwater    formed    off   the    Normandy 

beaches  by  the  sinking  of  blockships 
General  Purchasing  Agent 
General  Purchasing  Board 
Code  word  for  a  Ninth  U.S.  Army  assault  crossing  of 

the  Roer  followed  by  a  northeastward  drive  to 

link  with  the  First  Canadian  Army  along  the 

Rhine,  February  1945 


Hards 


Short  for  hardstandings 


GLOSSARY 


573 


HE 

HHC 

Husky 


High-explosive 

Headquarters  and  Headquarters  Company 
Code  name  for  Allied  invasion  of  Sicily  in  July 
1943 


IBC 

IBCAF 

IBS 

lNDi(;() 

ISIS 

ISS 


Iceland  Base  Command 
Iceland  Base  Command,  Air  Force 
Island  Base  Section 
Code  name  for  occupation  of  Iceland 
Inter-Service  Information  Series  (British) 
Identification  of  Separate  Shipments  to  Overseas 
Destinations 


JOSS 


Task  force  for  Sicily  assault  landing  (3d  Infantry 
Division);  the  beaches  assaulted  by  the  task 
force 


KOOL 


LBV 

LCA 

LCI 

LCM(I) 

LCM(III) 

LCP 

LCT 

LCVP 

LSI 

LST 

LVT 

Magnet 

MAMD 

MBS 

MP 

MPLS 

MRS 

MSR 

MT80 

MTO 

Mulberry 

Musket 


Task  force  for  Sicily  assault  landing  (2d  Armored 
Division  less  Combat  Command  A);  the  beaches 
assaulted  by  the  task  force 

A  fifty-ton  self-propelled  barge 

Landing  craft,  assault 

Landing  craft,  infantry 

Landing  craft,  mechanized,  Mark  I 

Landing  craft,  mechanized,  Mark  III 

Landing  craft,  personnel 

Landing  craft,  tank 

Landing  craft,  vehicle  and  personnel 

Landing  ship,  infantry 

Landing  ship,  tank 

Landing  vehicle,  tracked 

Plan  for  shipment  of  American  forces  to  Northern 

Ireland 
Marshaling  area  mapping  depots 
Mediterranean  Base  Section 
Military  police 
Military  Pipeline  Service 
Military  Railway  Service 
Main  supply  route 
Motor  gasoline 

Mediterranean  Theater  of  Operations 
The  artificial  harbor  constructed  off  the  Normandy 

beaches 
Assault  plan  that  would  bring  Fifth  Army  into 

Taranto,  Italy 


NAAF 


Northwest  African  Air  Forces 


574 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


NAAFI 

NAASC 
NATOUSA 
NCDU 
Neptune 


NIBS 
NIF 

NORDWIND 


NYPOE 


Navy-Army-Air  Force  Institution  (British  equiva- 
lent to  post  exchange) 

North  African  Air  Service  Command 

North  African  Theater  of  Operations,  U.S.  Army 

Naval  combat  demolition  unit 

Actual  1944  operations  within  OVERLORD.  The 
code  name  was  used  for  security  reasons  after 
September  1943  on  all  Overlord  planning  papers 
which  referred  to  the  target  area  and  date. 

Northern  Ireland  Base  Section 

Northern  Ireland  Forces 

Code  word  for  a  German  counteroffensive  launched 
on  New  Year's  Eve  1944  near  the  southern  end 
of  the  Allied  line  in  Alsace 

New  York  Port  of  Embarkation 


OCE 

Omaha  Beach 
Overlord 


Office  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers 
Landing  beach  in  Normandy 

Plan  for  the  invasion  of  northwest  Europe,  June 
1944 


PBS 

PBS  (Main) 

Pensouth 

PLUTO 

POE 

POL 

PROCO 

Quadrant 

RAF 

Rainbow- 5 


RCT 

Roundup 

RSJ 

SBS 

SCR-625 

Sextant 

Shark 
SHAEF 
Shin(;le 
Sledgehammer 

SOLOC 


Peninsular  Base  Section 

Leghorn  half  of  Peninsular  Base  Section 

Naples  half  of  Peninsular  Base  Section 

Pipeline  Under  the  Ocean 

Port  of  Embarkation 

Petroleum,  Oil,  and  Lubricants 

Projects  for  Continental  Operations 

Quebec  Conference,  August  1943 

Royal  Air  Force 

A  U.S.  war  plan  designed  to  implement  that  por- 
tion of  ABC— 1  which  applied  to  the  United 
Kingdom  in  the  event  of  U.S.  entry  into  the  war 

Regimental  combat  team 

Plan  for  major  U.S.-British  attack  across  the  Channel 
in  1943 

Rolled  steel  joist 

Southern  Base  Section 

U.S.  mine  detector 

International  conference  at  Cairo,  November  and 

December  1943 
Task  force  (II  Corps),  Operation  HUSKY 
Supreme  Headquarters,  Allied  Expeditionary  Force 
Code  name  for  the  Anzio  landing,  22  January  1944 
Plan    for    a    limited-objective    attack    across    the 

Channel  in  1942 
Southern  Line  of  Communications  (Rhone 

Valley) 


GLOSSARY 


575 


SOS 

Soxo 

SPOBS 

TAG 

TBA 

TC 

Terminal 

Tiger 

TOE 
Tombola 


Torch 

TPP  Section 
Trident 

UCRB 

Ugly 

USAAF 

USAFBI 

USANIF 

USMC 

USFET 

Utah  Beach 

Veritable 


WBS 
Webfoot 

WNTF 

Woofus 
WTF 

XO 


Services  of  Supply 

Mailing  code  name  for  Zone  I,  northern  England 

Special  Observer  Group 

The  Adjutant  General 

Table  of  Basic  Allowance 

Transportation  Gorps 

A  special  landing  party 

Code    name    for    an    amphibious    rehearsal    for 

Overlord 
Table  of  Organization  and  Equipment 
A  flexible  six-inch  underwater  pipeline  designed 

to  discharge  POL  tankers  anchored  offshore  at 

Ste.  Honorine-des-Pertes 
Gode  name  for  the  Allied  invasion  of  Northwest 

Africa,  1942 
Transportation,  Plant,  and  Personnel  Section 
Washington  Conference,  1943 

Unit  Construction  Railway  Bridge  (British) 

Shipping  address  code  name  for  United  Kingdom 

U.S.  Army  Air  Forces 

U.S.  Army  Forces  British  Isles 

U.S.  Army  Northern  Ireland  Forces 

U.S.  Marine  Corps 

U.S.  Forces  in  the  European  Theater 

Landing  beach  in  Normandy 

A  21  Army  Group  plan  for  a  Canadian  attack 
between  the  Maas  and  the  Rhine,  January- 
February  1945 

Western  Base  Section  (England) 

Code  name  for  a  practice  landing  preparatory  to 

Anzio  landings 
Western  Naval  Task  Force 
A  rocket-firing  LCM 
Western  Task  Force  (North  African  invasion) 

Executive  officer 


ZA 
ZI 


Zone  of  the  Advance 
Zone  of  the  Interior 


Basic  Military  Map  Symbols 


* 


Symbols  within  a  rectangle  indicate  a  military  unit,  within 
a  triangle  an  observation  post,  and  within  a  circle  a  supply 
point. 


Military  Units — Identification 

Antiaircraft  Artillery ir—^ 

Armored  Command I  '•—'l 

Army  Air  Forces '        ' 

Artillery,  except  Antiaircraft  and  Coast  Artillery I I 

Cavalry,  Horse ^_J 

Cavalry,  Mechanized L*^  I 

Chemical  Warfare  Service L5LJ 

Coast  Artillery iVi 

Engineers I_~lJ 

Infantry L^^ 

Medical  Corps I    '    I 

Ordnance  Department I  O  I 

Quartermaster  Corps '  ^  ' 

Signal  Corps l_5_l 

Tank  Destroyer I  '  ^  I 

Transportation  Corps i3Sj 

Veterinary  Corps IN/ 1 

Airborne  units  are  designated  by  combining  a  gull  wing 
symbol  with  the  arm  or  service  symbol: 

Airborne  Artillery L^ssJ 


Airborne  Infantry . 


*For  complete  listing  of  symbols  in  use  during  the  World  War  II  period,  see 
FM  21-30,  dated  October  1943,  from  which  these  are  taken. 


Size  Symbols 


The  following  symbols  placed  either  in  boundary  lines  or 
above  the  rectangle,  triangle,  or  circle  inclosing  the  identifying 
arm  or  service  symbol  indicate  the  size  of  military  organization: 

Squad « 

Section «  « 

Platoon ••• 

Company,  troop,  battery.  Air  Force  flight I 

Battalion,  cavalry  squadron,  or  Air  Force  squadron II 

Regiment  or  group;  combat  team  (with  abbreviation  CT  fol- 
lowing identifying  numeral) Ill 

Brigade,  Combat  Command  of  Armored  Division,  or  Air  Force 
Wing X 

Division  or  Command  of  an  Air  Force XX 

Corps  or  Air  Force XXX 

Army XXXX 

Group  of  Armies XXXXX 

EXAMPLES 
The  letter  or  number  to  the  left  of  the  symbol  indicates  the 
unit  designation;  that  to  the  right,  the  designation  of  the  parent 
unit  to  which  it  belongs.  Letters  or  numbers  above  or  below 
boundary  lines  designate  the  units  separated  by  the  lines: 

Company  A,  137th  Infantry   A^^I37 

8th  Field  Artillery  Battalion I    *    1^ 

Combat  Command  A,  1st  Armored  Division I I' 

Observation  Post,  23d  Infantry ^^23 

Command  Post,  5th  Infantry  Division LiSJ 

Boundary  between  1 37th  and  1 38th  Infantry 1 1 1 

138 

Weapons 

Machine  gun • — ^ 

Gun 9 

Gun  battery ■■■■ 

Howitzer  or  Mortar ~w- 

Tank 'O 

Self-propelled  gun I — ^ 


UNITED  STATES  ARMY  IN  WORLD  WAR  II 


The  following  volumes  have  been  published  or  are  in  press: 

The  War  Department 

Chief  of  Staff:  Prewar  Plans  and  Preparations 

Washington  Command  Post:  The  Operations  Division 

Strategic  Planning  for  Coalition  Warfare:  1941  —  1942 

Strategic  Planning  for  Coalition  Warfare:  1943  —  1944 

Global  Logistics  and  Strategy:  1940—1943 

Global  Logistics  and  Strategy:  1943  —  1945 

The  Army  and  Economic  Mobilization 

The  Army  and  Industrial  Manpower 
The  Army  Ground  Forces 

The  Organization  of  Ground  Combat  Troops 

The  Procurement  and  Training  of  Ground  Combat  Troops 
The  Army  Service  Forces 

The  Organization  and  Role  of  the  Army  Service  Forces 
The  Western  Hemisphere 

The  Framework  of  Hemisphere  Defense 

Guarding  the  United  States  and  Its  Outposts 
The  War  in  the  Pacific 

The  Fall  of  the  Philippines 

Guadalcanal:  The  First  Offensive 

Victory  in  Papua 

CARTWHEEL:  The  Reduction  of  Rabaul 

Seizure  of  the  Gilberts  and  Marshalls 

Campaign  in  the  Marianas 

The  Approach  to  the  Philippines 

Leyte:  The  Return  to  the  Philippines 

Triumph  in  the  Philippines 

Okinawa:  The  Last  Battle 

Strategy  and  Command:  The  First  Two  Years 
The  Mediterranean  Theater  of  Operations 

Northwest  Africa:  Seizing  the  Initiative  in  the  West 

Sicily  and  the  Surrender  of  Italy 

Salerno  to  Cassino 

Cassino  to  the  Alps 
The  European  Theater  of  Operations 

Cross-Channel  Attack 

Breakout  and  Pursuit 

The  Lorraine  Campaign 

The  Siegfried  Line  Campaign 

The  Ardennes:  Battle  of  the  Bulge 

The  Last  Offensive 


The  Supreme  Command 

Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Volume  I 

Logistical  Support  of  the  Armies,  Volume  II 
The  Middle  East  Theater 

The  Persian  Corridor  and  Aid  to  Russia 
The  China-Burma-India  Theater 

StilweWs  Mission  to  China 

StilweWs  Command  Problems 

Time  Runs  Out  in  CBI 
The  Technical  Services 

The  Chemical  Warfare  Service:  Organizing  for  War 

The  Chemical  Warfare  Service:  From  Laboratory  to  Field 

The  Chemical  Warfare  Service:  Chemicals  in  Combat 

The  Corps  of  Engineers:  Troops  and  Equipment 

The  Corps  of  Engineers:  The  War  Against  Japan 

The  Corps  of  Engineers:  The  War  Against  Germany 

The  Corps  of  Engineers:  Construction  in  the  United  States 

The  Medical  Department:  Hospitalization  and  Evacuation,  Zone  of  Interior 

The  Medical  Department:  Medical  Service  in  the  Mediterranean  and  Minor 
Theaters 

The  Ordnance  Department:  Planning  Munitions  for  War 

The  Ordnance  Department:  Procurement  and  Supply 

The  Ordnance  Department:  On  Beachhead  and  Battlefront 

The  Quartermaster  Corps:  Organization,  Supply,  and  Services,  Volume  I 

The  Quartermaster  Corps:  Organization,  Supply,  and  Services,  Volume  II 

The  Quartermaster  Corps:  Operations  in  the  War  Against  Japan 

The  Quartermaster  Corps:  Operations  in  the  War  Against  Germany 

The  Signal  Corps:  The  Emergency 

The  Signal  Corps:  The  Test 

The  Signal  Corps:  The  Outcome 

The  Transportation  Corps:  Responsibilities,  Organization,  and  Operations 

The  Transportation  Corps:  Movements,  Training,  and  Supply 

The  Transportation  Corps:  Operations  Overseas 
Special  Studies 

Chronology:  1941-1945 

Military  Relations  Between  the  United  States  and  Canada:  1939—1945 

Rearming  the  French 

Three  Battles:  Arnaville,  Altuzzo,  and  Schmidt 

The  Women's  Army  Corps 

Civil  Affairs:  Soldiers  Become  Governors 

Buying  Aircraft:  Materiel  Procurement  for  the  Army  Air  Forces 

The  Employment  of  Negro  Troops 

Manhattan:  The  Army  and  the  Atomic  Bomb 
Pictorial  Record 

The  War  Against  Germany  and  Italy:  Mediterranean  and  Adjacent  Areas 

The  War  Against  Germany:  Europe  and  Adjacent  Areas 

The  War  Against  Japan 


The  U.S.  Army  Center  of  Military  History 


The  Center  of  Military  History  prepares  and  publishes  histories  as  required 
by  the  U.S.  Army.  It  coordinates  Army  historical  matters,  including  historical 
properties,  and  supervises  the  Army  museum  system.  It  also  maintains  liaison 
with  public  and  private  agencies  and  individuals  to  stimulate  interest  and  study 
in  the  field  of  military  history.  The  Center  is  located  at  20  Massachusetts  Ave- 
nue, N.W.,  Washington,  D.C.  20314. 


Department  of  the  Army  Historical  Advisory  Committee 

Roger  A.  Beaumont,  Texas  A&M  University 

Maj.  Gen.  Quinn  H.  Becker,  Deputy  Surgeon  General,  U.S.  Army 

Maj.  Gen.  John  B.  Blount,  U.S.  Army  Training  and  Doctrine  Command 

Brig.  Gen.  Dallas  C.  Brown,  Jr.,  U.S.  Army  War  College 

Richard  D.  Challener,  Princeton  University 

Col.  Roy  K.  Flint,  U.S.  Military  Academy 

John  H.  Hatcher,  The  Adjutant  General  Center 

Archer  Jones,  North  Dakota  State  University 

Jamie  W.  Moore,  The  Citadel 

James  C.  Olson,  University  of  Missouri 

James  O'Neill,  National  Archives  and  Records  Service 

Charles  P.  Roland,  University  of  Kentucky 

John  Shy,  University  of  Michigan 

Col.  William  A.  Stofft,  U.S.  Army  Command  and  General  Staff  College 


Index 


Aachen:  414-15,  418,  420-23,  489 

ABC-1:  8,  10,  17 

Adams,  Col.  Donald  B.:  18-20,  56,  113 

Adige  River:  221 

Advance  Section  (ADSEC):  286-87,  342,  344, 

347-53,  359.  393-94,  397-403,  405,  411-12, 
537-38 
Aerial  photography:  109,  145,  192,  227,  294-96, 
430,  565.  See  also  Maps  and  mapping;  Photo 
interpreters. 

K17  and  Speed  Graphic  cameras:  296,  451 

multiplex  equipment:  5,  295 

of  Normandy  beaches:  304-05,  307,  315 

trimetrogen  pictures:  295 

use  in  bridge  siting:  176,  185-86,  229-30,  283, 
374,  427,  451,  490,  534-35,  564 
Aerial  tramway:  216 
Agay  River:  443 
Agropoli:  154 
Ahr  River:  499-500,  504 
Ain  Beida:  98 
Ain  Fritissa:  105,  157 
Air  Force,  Eighth:  36,  52,  56,  90,  296 
Air  Force,  Twelfth:  86,  88 
Air  Force  Engineer  Command,  IX:  90 
Air  Force  Engineer  Command,  MTO  (Provisional): 

90 
Air  Force  Service  Command,  XII:  88 
Air  Service  Area  Command,  III:  172,  203 
Air  Support  Command,  XII:  84 
Airborne  Division,  82d:  136,  156,  165,  303,  332, 

368-69,  466,  473-74 
Airborne  Division,  101st:  303,  332,  336-37,  370,  476, 

478 
Airborne  Engineer  Aviation  Companies 

887th:  85,  87 

888th:  73,  85,  87 
Airborne  Engineer  Battalions 

307th:  156,  368 

326th:  332 
Airborne  Task  Force,  1st:  439 
Airborne  troops:  96,  131,  31 1- 12,  473 
Aircraft 

B-17E  photographic:  49,  295 

bomber:  87 

F-4  and  F-5:  296 

light  observation:  228,  375,  430,  451,  564 

P-38:  229 
Airel:  371-75 

Airfield  construction:  6,  9-11,  13-16,  31,  33,  40, 
45,  50,  52-55,  58,  61,  85-90,  1 19,  140,  256, 
261-64,270,277,282 
Aisne  River:  389 
Aix-en-Provence:  451-52 


Akureyri:  11,13 

Alban  Hills:  192,  208-09 

Albert  Canal:  365,  389 

Albrecht,  Col.  Frank  M.:  50,  56,  287,  349-50 

Aldenhoven:  492,  494 

Aldershot:  298 

Alencon:  410-11 

Alexander,  General  Sir  Harold  R.  L.  G.:  113,  115, 

137,  179 
Alexander  Patch  Bridge:  534 
Algeria:  85,  87,  89,  91-92,  113,  121 
Algiers:  59,  77-78,  83,  85,  91,  111,  115,  119-20, 

125,  436 
Alimena:  140 

Allen,  Maj.  Gen.  Terry  de  la  Mesa:  145-46 
Allied  Force  Headquarters  (AFHQ):  59-61,  83,  88, 
108,  110-11,  115,  118-21,  123,  125,  141,  166, 
192,  198,  200-201,  203,  229-30,  234.  See  also 
Command  structure  problems. 
Allied  Force  Headquarters  (AFHQ),  Engineer 
Section:  59,  61,  88,  102,  HI,  116,  120,  153, 
200-201,  206,215,  229-30 
Allied  Military  Government  (Italy):  172,  225-26,  246 
Alpine  fortress:  553-56 
Alps:  553-55 
Alsace:  484,  556 
Alsos  team:  556-59 
Altavilla:  164 
Altmuehl  River:  549 
Amalfi:  162,  177 
Ambleve  River:  471-74 
Ambrieres-le-Grand:  385,  386n 
American  School  Center:  40,  291 
Amorosi:  175 

Amphibian  engineers:  6,  561 
Amphibian  Truck  Company  (TC),  819th:  506 
Amphibious  operations:  33 
Army-Navy  assault  gapping  teams:  305—08,  317, 
319-20,  322-27,  333-34,  339,  341,  437, 
441-43 
Army-Navy  responsibility  division:  64-66,  78-79, 

121-22,  163,  195,  306-08,  436-37,  561 
doctrine  and  SOP:  64-65,  133 
leapfrogging  landings:  148,  162 
pre-World  War  II  planning:  6 
rehearsals  and  exercises:  68,  76,  80,  124,  157,  192, 

195,293,310-13 
training:  6,  31,  65-68,  76,  80,  121-24,  157-58, 
192,  195,  293,  304-07,  309-13,  437-38 
Amphibious  Training  Command,  AGF:  65 
Anderson,  Col.  H.  W.:  471,  473 
Anderson,  Maj.  Gen.  John  B.:  517 
Anderson,  Maj.  Gen.  Jonathan  W.:  65,  69 
Anderson,  Lt.  Gen.  Sir  Kenneth  A.  N.:  59,  66,  77,  86 


584 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Andrews,  Lt.  Gen.  Frank  M.:  257,  259 

Annunziata:  177 

Antheor  Cove:  443 

Antiaircraft  units  and  weapons:  223,  225,  227,  254, 

480,497,  509,  514,  518 
Antrim  Quartermaster  Depot:  21 
Antwerp:  351,  358-60,  363-66,  385,  413,  423 
Anvil  operation:  212,  233,  238,  247,  249,  253, 

436-38,  442-43,  445.  See  also  Southern  France 
operations. 
Anzio:  228 

landings  and  breakout:  179,  180,  183,  192-93, 
195-97,  208,  223,  434 

port  operations:  197,  211,  234,  245,  248,  252 
Anzola:  220 
Apennines:  180,  237 

Apex  drone  boats:  304,  306,  437,  441,  443-44 
ApoUinarisberg:  501 
Ardennes  counteroffensive:  364,  414,  434,  460, 

461-84,488,  507,  565 
Argens  River:  442 
Argentan:  402 

Argentan-Falaise  pocket:  386 
Aries:  447 
Aries  Canal:  448 

Armogida,  Lt.  Col.  Salvatore  A.:  216 
Armored  Divisions:  5 

1st:  17,  19,  21,  67,  74,  84,  94,  96,  98,  105,  156-57, 
183,  189,  199,  222,  224 

2d:  65,  69,  119,  129,  131,  136,  376-77,  420,  489, 
540 

3d:  373,  376,  385,  390,  414- 15,  417-18,  474,  480, 
541,  544-46 

4th:  377,  380-81,  390-91,  429,  526,  530,  546-47 

5th:  386,  389,  489,  498,  537-39 

6th:  377,  380-81,  530 

7th:  387-88,  464-66,  471 

8th:  489 

9th:  462,  466,  475-76,  481,  500,  502,  504-05, 
541-42 

10th:  424,  429-30,  476-77,  482-83,  553-55 

12th:  487,  552 

14th:  549-51,  556 

20th:  555-56 
Armored  Engineer  Battalions:  5,  100,  381 

3d:  487n 

9th:  500-505 

16th:  67-68,  74,  93,  100,  103-05,  156-57,  166, 
177-78,  183-85,  190-92,  208,  224-25 

17th:  69,  125,  144,  157,  540 

22d:  538-39 

23d:  385,414,  418,  515 

24th:  380-81,  390,  546 

25th:  380-81 

33d:  388 

55th:  554 

125th:  485,  551 
Armored  Field  Artillery  Group,  5th:  136 
Armored  Infantry  Battalions 

27th:  500,  502 


Armored  Infantry  Battalions — Continued 
60th:  481 
62d:  485 
526th:  472 
Armored  Infantry  Regiment,  6th:  189,  224 
Army,  First 
advance  to  the  Rhine:  414-15,  419,  423,  461-62, 

490 
Ardennes  counteroffensive:  471,  473,  476,  483, 490 
cross-Channel  preparations:  285-87,  293,  299, 

303,  305-09,  342,  344 
operations  in  France:  349—50,  354,  366-68, 

370-71,  381,  385,  387-92,  393,  398,  405 
Rhine  crossing  and  Elbe  advance:  499—500,  504, 

506,  513-15,  517,  526,  535,  541 
Army,  Third 
advance  to  the  Rhine:  414-15,  423-24,  427,  429, 

462 
Ardennes  counteroffensive:  434,  476,  483 
operations  in  France:  286,  350,  381,  385-87, 

390-92,  394,  399-400,  402-03,  405 
Rhine  crossing  to  Austria:  515—16,  517,  525,  530, 

535-36,546-47,551,555 
Army,  Fifth:  286 

Engineer  Command:  205—07 

Engineer  Section:  153-54,  156-57,  163,  165-66, 

172,  183-88,  191-92,  203,  205,  215-16, 

218-19,221-31,  249 
Invasion  Training  Center:  121,  123,  157,  437-38 
Italian  campaign:  153-54,  165-68,  171,  174,  179, 

180-81,  188,  190-91,  208-09,  211-12,  214, 

216-19,  223,  228-31,  232-34,  555 
Mine  Warfare  School:  105-06,  124-25 
Peninsular  Base  Section  support:  203,  232-34, 

236-40,  245-49,  252-54 
river  crossing  school:  224 
Army,  Seventh 

Rhine  crossing  and  advance:  459,  516,  517,  525, 

531-36,  550-52,  557 
Sicilian  operations:  115-16,  119-21,  124-25,  129, 

134-35',  136-37,  140-41,  145,  151-52 
southern  France  campaign:  222-23,  227,  252, 

436-39,  444-46,  451,  453,  455,  458,  484-88 
Army,  Ninth:  489-90,  499,  516,  517-19,  524, 

535-36,  537-38,541,  547 
Army  Air  Forces:  6,  7,  252 

aerial  photography  operations:  49,  229,  295—96 
aviation  engineers  control:  88—90 
support  of  ground  operations:  420,  430,  509 
support  of  landing  operations:  301,  304,  311, 

320-21,443 
in  the  United  Kingdom:  8,  16,  36-37,  52,  259, 

267-69,  298 
Army  Air  Forces  Engineer  Command,  MTO 

(Provisional):  90 
Army  Ground  Forces:  65,  100,  205,  260,  283 
Army  Groups 
1st:  286-87,  350 
6th:  435,  446,  449-50,  452,  454,  459,  484,  487,  532, 

551,  553,  556-57,  559 


INDEX 


585 


Army  Groups — Continued 

12th:  350,  435,  449,  484,  487,  547,  550 

15th:  115,  118,  125,  138,  197,  203,  216,  230 

18:  113 

21:  286,  312,  352,  363,  423,  499,  517 
Army  Map  Service:  60,  63,  229,  297 
Army  reorganizations  of  1937  and  1943:  4,  100,  205 
Army  Service  Forces:  60,  89,  205,  260,  277-79,  282 
Army  Transport  Command:  93 
Arnaville:  424 

Arno  River:  211-14,  218,  224,  233,  240,  247-48 
Arzew:  74,  76-77,  79-80,  91,  124,  158 
Aschaffenburg:  530,  546,  551 
Ashchurch  depot:  45-48,  272,  276 
Asphalt:  15,  140,  393-94 
Assault  Training  Center:  293,  306 
Atlantic  Base  Section:  60,  92,  110-13,  171 
Atlantic  Wall:  302,  365,  565 
Audouville-la-Hubert:  303 
Aure  River:  301,  347 
Aurunci  Mountains:  209 
Ausonia  Mountains:  21 1 
Austria:  547-48 
Auw:  461-64,  483 
Avalanche  operation:  154,  158,  242,  248.  See  also 

Salerno. 
Avellino:  166 
Aversa:  242,  246,  248 
Aviation  engineers:  37,  85-90,  560 
Avignon:  452,  457-58 

Avranches:  381,  385,  394,  397,  400,  406,  410 
Ay  River:  369,  377,  380 
Ayr:  9 

Backbone  operation:  153 

Bacon,  Col.  Robert  L.:  430-31 

Bad  Godesberg:  515 

Bad  Neuenahr:  500 

Baerenthal:  484-85 

Bagnoli:  184,  234,  242,  245 

Ball,  1st  Lt.  James:  380 

Baileroy:  408-09 

Ballyclare  depot:  19-21 

Barby:  540 

Barfleur:  344,  346-47 

Barnes,  Col.  Elmer  E.:  31-33 

Barracuda  operation:  153-54 

Bartels,  Pfc.  George  A.:  551 

Barth,  T/5  Henry  E.:  432,  433n 

Barton,  Maj.  Gen.  Raymond  O.:  481-82 

Base  901:  454-55 

Base  Area  Groups  (Provisional) 

6625th:  152 

6665th:  171 
Base  sections:  26,  29,  31,  38,  46,  51,  56,  60, 
110-11,  121,  200-201,  262,  264,  272,  275, 
287,  349—51.  See  also  by  name. 
Basel:  531-32 

Bastogne:  466,  474-79,  483-84 
Bathurst:  64 


Bay  of  Bougnon:  439,  442 
Bay  of  Cavalaire:  439,  442 
Bay  of  Gaeta:  438 
Bay  of  Pampelonne:  439-41 
Bay  of  the  Seine:  299 
Bayeux:  394,  409 
Baytown  operation:  154 
Beach  Control  Board:  437 
Beach  defenses  and  operations 

Anzio:  193,  195-96 

Normandy:  282,  300-308,  316-17,  319-20, 
322-34,  336-39 

Salerno:  154-55,  159,  161-63,  167 

Sicily:  118-35 

southern  France:  437,  439,  441-44 
Beach  models:  49,  63-64,  293,  315-16 
Beach  Obstacle  Board:  437 
Beall,  T/5  Robert  L.:  127 n 
Beanish,  Sgt.  Warren  W.:  127n 
Beasley,  Lt.  Col.  Oscar  B.:  442 
Bedja:  83-84 
"Beer  Bridge":  515 
Bekkaria:  96,  107 
Belfast:  19,  66 
Belfort:  454 

Belgium:  389-90,  392,  405,  414 
Bell,  Col.  Frank  F.:  360 
Bennett,  Rear  Adm.  Andrew  C:  66 
Benson  project:  294,  296 
Berlin:  541,  547 

Berlin-Munich  autobahn:  547,  549 
Berre:  457-58 
Besancon:  452 
Big  operation:  558  —  59 
Bills,  Capt.  Carl  W.:  455-56 
Bingen:  527 

Bingham,  Lt.  Col.  Leonard  L.:  150 
Birmingham:  9 
Biscari  Airfield:  119,  132 
Bischofsheim:  531 
Bisingen:  557-58 
Biskra:  87,  89 
Bitche:  484-85 
Bivio  Salica:  150 

Bizerte:  84-85,  92,  99,  109,  114,  124-25 
Black  Forest:  551,  557 
Blackstone  Task  Force:  69 
Blainville:  454 
Bleialf:  464 
Blida  Airfield:  59,  77 
Blies  River:  487 

Board  of  Contracts  and  Adjustments:  41 
Boatner,  Col.  Mark  M.,  Jr.:  59,  153 
Boats.  See  also  Powerboats;  Sea  Mules. 
Boats,  assault 

Italian  river  crossings:  175-76,  191,  218,  220 

northern  Europe  river  crossings:  371  —  72,  388,424, 
433-34,  488,  548,  552,  554 

Rhine  crossings:  460,  489,  517-20,  525,  528-29, 
532-33,  535 


586 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Boats,  assault — Continued 

Roer  crossings:  491-92,  494-96,  499 
Boats,  storm:  218,  220,  459-60,  517-20,  532-33, 

535,  548 
Body  armor:  181 
Bolero  plans:  22-24,  35-37,  42,  45-46,  50,  56,  58, 

59,  195,  256-57,  262-64,  266-69,  350,  561 
Bologna:  212-17,  240-41 
Bolte,  Lt.  Col.  Charles  L.:  8 
Bone:  83,85-86,92,  113 
Bonesteel,  Maj.  Gen.  Charles  H.:  12 
Bonesteel,  Lt.  Col.  Charles  H.  Ill:  22,  26,  115 
Bonn:  499-500,  513-15 
Booby  traps:  68,  101-04,  141,  181,  369,  380 
Booms  and  antimine  nets:  459,  496,  504,  509-10, 

513-14,  516,  518,  523,  526-27,  533,  535 
Boppard:  527,  530 
Borgo  Grappa:  208 
Boslar:  494 

Boston  Port  of  Embarkation:  13 
Bou  Chebka:  84,  96 
Bou  Zadjar:  75 

Bowman,  Brig.  Gen.  Frank  O.:  59,  61,  153-54,  163, 
165,  184,  191-92,  203,  205-07,  216,  219,  221, 
223,  228,  230 
Bowman,  Waldo  G.:  51  In 
Boyle,  Hal:  541 

Bradley,  General  Omar  N.:  137,  287,  299,  305,  312, 
343,  349-50,  370,  374,  376,  423,  434,  503,  515, 
541 
Braintree:  47 
Brandenberger,  General  der  Panzertruppen  Erich: 

480-81 
Bratge,  Capt.  Willi:  503 
Braunschweig:  540 

Brazilian  Expeditionary  Force:  212,  225 
Breidweiler:  481 
Brenner  Pass:  553,  555 
Brenta  River:  221 
Brest:  352,  356,  359-60,  381-85 
Bricquebec:  286,  394,  409 
"Bridge  in  the  sky":  149,  165 
Bridges.  See  also  Bridging  operations;  Railroad 
bridges  and  tunnels;  and  by  name. 
Bailey:  5,  33,  41-42,  68,  100,  138-40,  147, 

165-66,  179,  183-86,  191,  218,  224,  283-84, 
288-89,  291,  361,  373-75,  382,  385,  390, 
393,  427-28,  452,  454,  497-98,  513-14, 
547,  564 
British  Bailey  superior  to  U.S.  design:  5,  184,  564 
dummy:  186,  231,  536 
footbridges:  190-91,  212,  372-73,  382,  488, 

491-92,494,496-97 
girder  H- 10  and  H-20:  5 
heavy  ponton:  185,  218,  221,  389,  460,  492,  498, 

506-10,  514,  517-18,  520,  526,  534-35 
improvised:  175,  178,  191,  353-54,  382,  387, 

420-21 
infantry  support:  185,  190,  372-73,  497 
new  models  development:  283—84 


Bridges — Continued 

pile:  165,  167,  178-79,  218,  538 
ponton:  76.  185,  231.515,550 
steel  girder:  244 

timber:  166,  184,  214,  224,  375.  393.  399 
treadway:  5,  68,  75,  166-67,  176-78.  183-85, 
218,  220-21,  224,  231,  283,  293.  336.  372-75, 
381,  386,  390,  393,  459.  488.  492.  497-98, 
500,  506-07,  509,  514-18,  520-21,  523-24, 
526,  529-31,  533 
trestle  bent,  fixed:  167 
Bridging  operations:  31,  33 
demolition  in  Ardennes:  472-73,  476,  478-79, 

484 
equipment  and  bridge  trains:  139,  184-85,  218, 

221,  390,  499,  507,  513,  519.  531-32.  535 
Italy:  165-67.  175-79,  183-86,  190-91,  199, 

209,  211.  216.  218-19.  229,  231,  284 
North  Africa:  82.  99-100,  138 
northern  Europe:  283-84,  336,  372-75,  381-82, 
385-90,  393.  420-21.  424-29.  432-34, 
538-42,  544-50,  552.  554 
Rhine  River:  506-11.  513-16.  518,  520,  523,  526, 

528-31.533-36.  537-38 
Roer  River:  491-92,  494-500 
Sicily:  138-41,  146-47,  149,  152 
southern  France:  453  —  54 

training  for:  41,  67-68.  218,  224-25,  291,  293, 
310,  398 
Brimstone  operation:  153-54 
Bristol:  45.  261.  310,  313 
British  Air  Ministry:  8,  52,  55,  262,  267,  291 
British  Chiefs  of  Staff:  8 

British  Eighth  Army  mine  school:  124-25,  157 
British  Engineer  Stores:  1 15 
British  Floating  Bailey  Bridge  School:  218,  225 
British  Geographical  Section,  General  Staff:  62,  120, 

297,  564 
British  Inter-Service  Information  Series  (ISIS):  64, 

154 
British  Joint  Planning  Staff:  8 
British  Ministry  of  Agriculture:  269 
British  Ministry  of  Works  and  Planning:  268,  270 
British  quartermaster  general:  23,  267 
British  School  of  Military  Engineering  (Italy):  225 
British  School  of  Military  Engineering  (U.K.):  41,  68, 

290 
British  Timber  Control  Board:  55 
British  Underwater  Obstacle  Training  Center:  304, 

306n 
British  units.  See  also  Army  Groups,  18  and  21;  Royal 
Air  Force;  Royal  Engineers;  Royal  Navy. 
First  Army:  77.  83-84,  105,  109,  113 
Second  Army:  286,  299-300,  312,  490,  537 
Eighth  Army:  83-84,  105,  113,  115-16,  137,  140, 
153,  158,  165,  175,  179,  180-81,  208,  212, 
216-17,  222-23,  240,  249 
5  Corps:  84 

10  Corps:  154,  156,  159,  162-65,  175,  177,  179, 
180,  185,  188-89 


INDEX 


587 


British  units — Continued 

13  Corps:  212,  216 

1st  Division:  195 

46th  Division:  159 

49th  Division:  1 1 

56th  Division:  159,  196 

78th  Division:  83,  147 

Force  545:  115,  118-19 

Blade  Force:  83 

Peter  Force:  193 

3d  Beach  Group:  193 

Airdrome  Cons'truction  Groups:  85—87,  89—90 

Commandos:  83,  159 

Survey  companies:  227 
British-U.S.  cooperation  and  differences:  8,  19,  22, 
24,  32-33,  49-52,  55-56,  195,  261-62, 
265-70,  274-75,  278,  284,  288-89,  293-98, 
314-15,  363-65 
British  War  Office:  8,  10,  23,  49,  51-52,  257,  262, 

267-68,  296-98 
British  Works  Finance:  262 
British  World  Wide  System:  340 
Brittany  Base  Section:  351-52 
Brittany  peninsula:  301,  367,  381-85 
Brixham:  317 
Brockway  trucks:  184-85,  221,  372-74,  386,  426, 

563 
Broich:  494-96 
Brolo:  148 

Brooks,  Maj.  Beryl  C:  38 
Brooks,  Maj.  Gen.  Edward  H.:  554 
Bruni  oil  refining  complex:  456 
Brushwood  Task  Force:  69 
Budhareyri:  13 
Buech  River:  451-52 
Buellingen:  467,  469 
Bull,  Maj.  Gen.  Harold  R.:  503 
Bulldozers:  5,  48,  79,  82,  166,  215,  328-29,  331, 
341,  388,437-38,441-42 

AlHs-Chalmers:  195 

armored:  209,  248,  325,  385,  505 

D-7:  98-99,  128,  132-33,  144,  146,  183,  195, 
443,  563 

D-8:  144,  147,  308 

R-4:  98,  128,  133,  144,  146-47 

vulnerability:  130,  141,  145,  147,  161,  176,  181-82, 
488 
Burns,  Col.  Donald  S.:  171,  203,  233 
Butgenbach:  467,  469,  471 

Caen:  299,  301 

Caffey,  Col.  Eugene  M.:  121n,  124,  310,  312,  337 

Caiazzo:  177  —  78 

Cairo:  119 

Cairo  (Italy):  192 

Galore  River:  163-64,  175,  180 

Caltanissetta:  137,  139 

Calvi  Risorta:  239-40 

Cambrai:  389 

Camigliatello:  250 


Camouflage:  41,  55,  108-09,  122,  145,  230-31,  239, 

519,  524 
Camp  Carrabelle:  65 
Camp  Edwards:  65 
Camp  de  Valbonne:  459 
Canadian  Army,  First:  490 
Cancale:  359 
Cannes:  436 
Cape  Benat:  439 
Cape  Bon  peninsula:  125 
Cape  Calava:  149 
Cape  Drammont:  443-44 
Cape  Orlando:  141,  144,  148 
Cape  Passero:  126 
Capizzi:  146 
Capri:  193 

Capua:  177-78,  218,  224-25,  244 
Cardiff:  46 
Carentan:  286,  302,  304,  348-49,  367,  370-71,  374, 

394,398,401,408-09 
Carentan-Cherbourg  highway:  303 
Cargo  nets:  132 
Carnoules:  451 

Carr,  Maj.  William  S.:  511-12 
Carroceto:  197 

Carter,  Col.  William  A.,  Jr.:  98 
Casablanca:  59,  63,  69,  72-73,  80,  88,  93-94, 

111-12,  115 
Casablanca  Conference:  264 
Caserta:  192,  195 
Caspoli:  179 
Cassino:  180-81,  186-87,  189-93,  208,  228,  239, 

244 
Castel  San  Vincenzo:  179 
Cattenom:  424-26 
Causeways.  See  Piers. 
Cavalaire:  441 
Cavalry  Groups 

3d  (Mechanized):  547 

14th:  461-62 

106th:  555 

113th  (Mechanized):  373 
Cavalry  Reconnaissance  Squadron,  ll7th:  585 
Cavigny:  374-75 
Cecina:  211 

CENxForcp:  119-20,  122,  124-27,  132-35 
Center  Task  Force  (CTF):  59-62,  66-69,  74-80,  85 
Cerami:  146 
Cesaro:  146-47 
Cezembre  Island:  382 
Chalons-sur-Marne:  390 
Chaney,  Maj.  Gen.  James  E.:  7-12,  17,  24-25,  35, 

41 
Channel  Base  Section:  351—52 
Channel  Islands:  360 
Charleroi:  405 
Charleville:  389 
Chartres:  402,410-12 
Chateau-Thierry:  390 
Chateaubriant:  406 


588 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Cheltenham:  26,  28,  257,  259,  289,  298 
Chemical  Corps:  3 

Chemical  Smoke  Generating  Company,  80th:  514 
Chemical  Warfare  Service  units:  187,  532 
Chemnitz:  546 

Cherbourg:  282,  286,  299,  302,  341,  343-44,  347, 
369-70,  394,  397-401,  406,  408-10.  See  also 
Port  reconstruction. 
Chief  of  Staff  to  the  Supreme  Allied  Commander 

(COSSAC):  258,  278,  280,  282,  286,  289,  302-03 
Churchill,  Winston:  436 
Cisterna:  183,209,  211,  244 
Citadel  (Juelich):  492,  494-95 
Citadel  de  St.  Servan:  382 
Civilian  labor:  10 

on  the  Continent:  285-86,  347,  351,  353,  355, 
364,  397,  446,  457,  488 

Iceland:  14-15 

Italy:  172-73,  187,  215,  223-26,  228,  233, 
239-40,  242,  245-47,  251-53 

North  Africa:  80-81,  87,  92-93,  112 

Sicily:  119,  152 

United  Kingdom:  42,  46,  269-70 
Civilian  Labor  Procurement  Service,  ETOUSA:  285 
Civitavecchia:  192,  211,  227,  234,  236-38,  252 
Clark,  Lt.  Col.  Allen  F.,  Jr.:  209,  211 
Clark,  Lt.  Gen.  Mark  W.:  60,  66,  106,  153-54, 
162-63,  165,  177,  179,  205,  212,  216,  223 
Clerf:  474-75,  482 
Clerf  River:  474-75 

Coastal  Base  Section:  446-47,  449,  451,  454 
Cobra  operation:  370,  376-77 
Cochran,  Lt.  William  C:  478 
Coe,  Col.  Edward  H.:  402 
Colditz:  542 
Colle  Basso:  146 

Colleville:  300,  315,  326,  328,  330-32 
Colli:  178 

Colli  al  Volturno:  186 
Collins,  Maj.  Gen.  J.  Lawton:  312,  515 
Colmar  Pocket:  484,  486-87 
Cologne:  414,  490,  499-500 
Cologne-Frankfurt  autobahn:  514 
Colonna,  Col.  John  O.:  88 
Colton,  Lt.  Col.  Hugh  W.:  421-22 
Colvocoresses,  Capt.  A.:  185  —  86 
Combined  Chiefs  of  Staff:  59,  115-16,  154,  436 
Combined  Military  Procurement  Control,  SHAEF: 

285 
Comiso  Airfield:  119,  132,  138,  140 
Command  structure  problems 

Army-Navy  amphibious  operations  responsibility: 
64-66,  78-79,  121-22,  163,  195,  306-08, 
436-37,  561 

control  of  aviation  engineers:  88—90 

in  ETOUSA:  24-26,  28-29,  31-32,  200, 
257-59,  349-50,  561 

in  NATOUSA/MTOUSA:  110,  200-201,  203, 
561 

supply  authority  in  southern  France:  449—50 


Commercy:  390 

Communications  Zone  (COMZ),  ETOUSA:  258, 
285,  287,  349-51,  358-60,  362,  366,  392,  393, 
411-12,449-50,  459 
Communications  Zone,  NATOUSA:  80,  110-11, 

200-201,203 
Concentration  camp  liberations:  544,  546 
Congressional  Medal  of  Honor:  190,  355n 
Conington  depot:  276 
Conklin,  Col.  John  F.:  60 
Constantine:  87-88,  113,  120 
Construction:  16.  See  also  Airfield;  Hospital; 

Housing;  Supply  depots. 
Continental  Advance  Section  (GONAD):  449,  455, 

457,  459 
Continental  Base  Section:  449 
Corbeil:  410 
Corps 

I  Armored:  105,  118,  120 
II:  60,  77,  83-85,  94,  96,  98-99,  107-10, 
113-14,  119,  121,  136-37,  139-40,  144, 
153,  180,  188,  190,  206,  208-09,  211-16, 
218-21,  227-28,231 
III:  499-500,  504-05,  514^  516,  547,  549-50 
IV:  212-13,  215-16,  218-21,  231 
V:  17-19,  21,  300-302,  305-07,  310,  315,  326, 
388-89,  415,  419-20,  461,  466-67.  469, 
515-16,  541-42,  544 
VI:  155-56,  159,  162-63,  165-66,  174-75,  177, 
179,  180,  188,  190,  192,  197-98,  208,  212, 
227,  438,  442,  444,  454,  484-86,  550-51, 
553-56 
VII:  302,  305,  307,  311-12,  316,  336,  343,  367, 
370-71,  374,  376-77,  385,  389-90,  414-15, 
418-22,  499-500,  506,  514-15,  541,  544 
VIII:  367-71,  376-77,  380-84,  461-62,  466, 

475-78,  480,  482-83,  527,  547 
XII:  387,  390,  424,  429,  488,  525,  531,  546-48 
XIII:  489-90,.  492,  497-99,  519,  537,  539-40 
XV:  381,  386-87,  487,  532,  550-53,  555 
XVI:  489,  499.  517-19,  523-24 
XVIII  Airborne:  473 
XIX:  367,  371,  373-74,  376,  386,  389,  420-22, 

488,  489-90.  492,  499,  539-40 
XX:  387,  390,  424,  426.  429-30,  433,  530-31, 

546-49,  553 
XXI:  486-88.  550-52 
Provisional:  136-37 
Corps  of  Engineers:  3-6,  16.  88-89.  See  also  Office, 

Chief  of  Engineers.  War  Department. 
Corsica:  458 
Cosenza:  234.  250-51 
Cota.  Maj.  Gen.  Norman  D.:  475 
Cotentin  peninsula:  299,  302-03,  341,  343,  347, 

351.  367,  377,  397 
Coubert:  410,  413 
Coughlin,  Lt.  William  J.:  463-64 
Courseulles:  349 

Coutances:  367,  370,  376,  394,  397,  399-400, 
406-08,410 


INDEX 


589 


Coutances-St.  Lo  highway:  377 

Couville:  357,  398 

CowpuNCHER  exercise:  158 

Cox,  Capt.  Allen  H.,  Jr.:  328 

Crailsheim:  553-54 

Cranes:  5,  40,  44,  82.  128,  171,  184,  195,  238,  261, 

274,  276,  308,  488,  521 
Craw  Field:  86 

Crawford,  Maj.  Gen.  Robert  W.:  258 
Cress,  Col.  James  B.:  352,  537 
Crouay:  408 
Crozon  peninsula:  383 
Csendes,  1st  Lt.  F.  E.:  511 
Cunningham,  Admiral  Sir  Andrew  B.:  59 
Cyclone  wire:  82,  133 
Czechoslovakia:  547—48 

Dahlquist,  Lt.  Col.  John  E.:  7 

Danube  River:  547-50,  554-55 

Dartmouth:  312,  317 

Davidson,  Lt.  Col.  Arthur  H.,  Jr.:  305 

Davidson,  Brig.  Gen.  Garrison  H.:  118,  125,  151, 

436-37,  445-46,  448,  451,  455-56,  459-60, 

532,  534-35 
Davis,  Col.  Ellsworth  I.:  518 
Davison,  Brig.  Gen.  Donald  A.:  7-11,  17,  22, 

24-26,  28-29,  31,  36,  39,  41,  50,  52,  61, 

87-88,  90,  111 
Dawley,  Maj.  Gen.  Ernest  J.:  163 
Deception:  186,  230-31,  473,  519,  524.  536 
Deggendorf:  548 
Delta  Base  Section:  449,  457 
Depot  Cotier  du  Petrole:  357-58 
Desertmartin  depot:  19—20.  45 
Dessau:  545 
Devers,  Lt.  Gen.  Jacob  L.:  201.  257.  268,  436,  446, 

449,452,484,486,551,557 
Diekirch:  481-82 
Dieppe  raid:  304 
Dietenheim:  554 
Dijon:  449,  454-55 
Dillingen:  433-34 

Dime  Force:  119-20,  122.  124-27,  129-33,  135 
Dinan:  382 
Dinant:  390 
Dinard:  381-83 
Distinguished  Service  Cross:  127rj,  190,  326,  329, 

433,  464,  478 
Distinguished  Unit  Citation:  189,  326,  372,  426, 

466-67 
Djebel  Abiod:  89 
Djedeida:  83 

Doan,  Col.  Leander  LaC:  418 
Dol:  397 
Dole:  455,  459 
Domfront:  410 

Doolittle,  Brig.  Gen.  James  H.:  86 
Dorland,  Sgt.  Eugene:  502-03 
Dortmund-Ems  Canal:  538—39 
Dossen  River:  360 


Doubs  River:  452,  459,  532 

Dourdan:  410 

Douve  River:  299,  302-03,  332.  335.  337.  370 

Dove,  Pvt.  Vinton:  328-29 

Dragoni:  184 

Dragoon  operation:  351,  455.  See  also  Anvil 

operation. 
Drauffelt:  475 
Dresden:  547 
Dreux:  402,  405 
Drnovich,  Capt.  Louis  J.:  330 
Dromard,  Brig.  Gen.  Robert:  455 
Drome  River:  452 
Dryden,  Lt.  Edwin  C:  96 
Duck  I,  II,  III  exercises:  310-11 
Dueren:  489-90 
DUKWs 

Mediterranean  operations:  117,  123-24,  128-32, 
134.  159.  169.  193,  199.  220,  236-37 

Normandy  operations:  312.  331,  339,  344, 
353-54,  362 

river  crossings:  459-60.  489,  504,  506,  519-20, 
526,  529,  532-33.  536.  540 
Dunkirk:  294 

Dunn.  Brig.  Gen.  Beverly  C:  288 
Durance  River:  436.  451.  457 

Eaker,  Maj.  Gen.  Ira  C:  296 

Earth  auger:  48 

Eastern  Assault  Force  (EAF):  77-79 

Eastern  Base  Section  (NATOUSA):  1 13-14 

Eastern  Base  Section  (U.K.):  28-29.  39.  45,  47-48. 

50,  52-53,  272,  287 
Eastern  Task  Force  (ETF):  59-60,  62,  67-68,  74, 

77,  83,  86 
Echt:  518-19 
Echternach:  480-82,  484 
Eddy,  Maj.  Gen.  Manton  S.:  146,  376 
Egginton  subdepot:  48 
Ehingen:  554 
Eifel:  414-15 
Eilenburg:  542 

Eisenhower,  General  of  the  Army  Dwight  D. 
as  commander  AFHQ  and  NATOUSA:  59,  88, 

110,  192,201,  258 
as  commander  ETOUSA:  25-26,  201,  257-59, 

350, 561 
and  operations  on  the  Continent:  304-05, 
317-18,  414.  434,  503-04,  517,  541,  547. 
553.  555 
and  operations  in  the  Mediterranean:  116,  118, 

153,  159 
as  Supreme  Commander,  Allied  Expeditionary 
Force:  258-59,  285 
El  Ala:  94 
ElGuettar:  107 
Elbe  River:  537-42.  547 
Elliott,  Brig.  Gen.  Dabney  O.:  200,  206,  252 
Elsenborn:  470 
Elsenborn  ridge:  469-71,  484 


590 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Elster  River:  546-47 

Empire  Emerald:  1 73  -  74 

Empire  Traveller:  357 

Empoli:  231 

Enfidaville:  84 

Engeman,  Lt.  Col.  Leonard:  500-504 

Engineer  Air  Force  Headquarters  Company,  904th: 

145 
Engineer  Amphibian  Brigades:  64-66,  122 

1st:  61,65-66,  74,80,  111-12,  114,  121,  122n 
Engineer  Amphibian  Command:  65,  79,  122 
Engineer  Aviation  Battalions:  9,  35-36,  38-40,  50, 
52-56,  85-89,  271-72,  560 
809th:  39,  53,  85-87 
814th:  39,  85,  87,  89 
815th:  85-86 
817th:  44,  85 
818th:  40 
824th:  12,  15 
825th:  39-40,  85 
830th:  39 
832d:  39, 85 
837th:  89 
838th:  89 
845th:  89 
871st:  73 
Engineer  Aviation  Regiments:  6 
21st:  7,  12,  14-15,85-86,  89 
Engineer  Base  Depot  Companies:  272 

445th:  274 
Engineer  Base  Equipment  Company,  688th: 

252-53 
Engineer  Battalions  (Separate):  232,  272 
378th:  157 
383d:  223 
384th:  157 
386th:  171,  252 
387th:  185 
Engineer  Beach  Control  Groups 
36th:  437,441-42 
40th:  437,  442,  451 
540th:  438,  444 
Engineer  Board:  284 

Engineer  Boat  Maintenance  Company,  561st:  67 
Engineer  Boat  Regiments:  65,  561 

591st:  59,  66-67,  74-76,  80,  121,  122n 
Engineer  CamouOage  Batulions:  208,  216,  270,  289 
84th:  230-31 
601st:  94,  108,  145 
Engineer  Camouflage  Company,  396th:  239 
Engineer  Combat  Battalion  Beach  Groups:  309 
37th:  311,  314,327 
147th:  316 

149th:  309,311,  316,  327 
336th:  316,  327,  330 
348th:  316,  327 
Engineer  Combat  Battalions:  4,  99-100,  207,  223, 
233,  270-71,  289,  305-06,  381,  483,  562 
1st:  74,  94,  129-30.  138,  140,  146-47,  544 
2d:  384,  462,  469-70 


Engineer  Combat  Battalions — Continued 
4th:  370,  388-89,481-82 
7th:  15,  525-26 
10th:  69,  94,  148-51,  156,  165-66,  175-77, 

182-83,  199,  224-25,. 556 
12th:  383 

15th:  69,  72-73,  77,  94,  146-47,  374 
20th:  136n,  328 
25th:  487n 
31st:  554 

35th:  475-76,  483,  527 
37th:  221,309,327-30,  362 
44th:  475-76,  483,  528 

48th:  183-84,  186,  188-90,  208,  212,  225,  438 
49th:  336-37,  376-77 
51st:  472-73,  479,  483,  507 
81st:  461-67 
82d:  492 

103d:  474-75,  480 
105th:  371-73,420 
107th:  20-21 
109th:  78,  94,  96,  106,  156-57,  186,  192,  197, 

199,  223 
111th:  156,  164,  168,  176,  190,  225,  486 
112th:  20-21,  305,  307,  330-31 
120th:  132-33,  140-41,  156,  164-65,  188, 

225-26 
121st:  330-31,  375,  384,  494 
135th:  427,531 
142d:  552 
146th:  307,  326 
147th:  309,318,  327,  330-31 
148th:  368,  377,  513 
149th:  309,  327,  329,  341,  518,  520 
150th:  483,  526 
151st:  385 
158th:  476-79,  483 
159th:  382-83,  475-76,  482-83,  527 
160th:  424,531,548 
163d:  533,  558n 
164th:  504,  509 

168th:  462,  464-65,  475-76,  483,  528 
169th:  218 
171st:  497 
I72d:  422 

179th:  387-88,  424,  433-34,  531 
187th:  518,  520 
188th:  528 

202d:  383,471,518-19 
203d:  309 
204th:  525 

206th:  424-25,  433-34,  531 
207th:  368,  377 
208th:  523 

234th:  374-75,  492,  540 
235th:  187-90,  209,  211,  218,  220,  224,  229 
237th:  307,  333-34,  336,  374,  376,  390,  422,  515 
238th:  336,  370,  376,  390,  422-23,  515 
243d:  528 
245th:  547 


INDEX 


591 


Engineer  Combat  Battalions — Continued 

246th:  371,  373-74,  492,  494-95 

247th:  371-72,  374,  421-22,  492,  494 

248th:  390 

250th:  538 

252d:  538 

254th:  467,469,  516,542 

255th:  220 

258th:  518 

263d:  488 

271st:  548 

276th:  505,  509-12 

279th:  497 

280th:  518 

284th:  510 

286th:  487n 

290th:  487 

291st:  471-73,  483,  507,  513,  549-50 

292d:  497-98 

294th:  376,  514-15,  545-46 

295th:  386,  492,  540 

297th:  376,  385,  386n,  390,  514 

298th:  370-71,  376-77 

299th:  306-07,  308n,  326,  341,  478 

300th:  368 

308th:  370,381-82 

310th:  209,  211,  220,  224-25 

313th:  207,  209,  225-26 

315th:  369,  424-25,  433 

316th:  225 

320th:  431-33 

324th:  470,  549-50 

329th:  544 

334th:  157 

336th:  309,  331 

348th:  309,  330 

401st:  139n,  220 

402d:  139n,  220n 

404th:  220 

1256th:  538 

1269th:  557-59 

1271st:  487n 

1276th:  496,  518,521 

1278th:  478 

2830th:  533 

2831st:  533,  553 

2832d:  533 

2833d:  533 
Engineer  Combat  Groups:  205-06,  216,  222-23, 
270,  562 

19th:  139n,  220 

39th:  220 

40th:  532,  553 

112th:  306n 

540th:  532-33,  554 

1102d:  370,381,476,  527 

1103d:  429 

1104th:  371,  373,  389,  421-22,  490,  492,  499,  518 

1106th:  333,  336-37,  341-42,  370,  374,  376-77, 
390,  422-23,  514,  544 


Engineer  Combat  Groups — Continued 

1107th:  381,  383,475,  528 

1108th:  192,206,218,220 

1110th:  368,370,377.  381,  513 

1111th:  376,471-72,504 

1115th:  374-75,  386,  490,  492,  497 

1116th:  309 

1117th:  381,  390 

1119th:  309 

1120th:  370,  376,  390,  514,  544 

1121st:  542 

1128th:  476 

1135th:  525-26,548 

1139th:  387-88,  390,  424,  429,  433,  531,  548 

1141st:  490,496-97,499 

1145th:  487 

1146th:  538 

1148th:  517-19 

1149th:  490,497,499 

1153d:  517-19,523,535 

1154th:  547 

1159th:  504,  506,  510-11,  549 

1168th:  216,218 

1171st:  389 

1338th:  218 
Engineer  Combat  Regiments:  5,  122,  205-06,  223, 
232,271,562 

5th:  12,  15 

19th:  67,  94,  96-99,  132,  139-41,  144,  190-91, 
209,  215,  220n,  224,  253-54 

20th:  69,  94,  99,  136,  140-41,  151-52 

36th:  69,  78,  80,  121-23.  161-67,  177,  184,  186. 
188.  193.  196-97.  208,  212,  223-24. 
437-38,  441,  446,  459,  484-85 

39th:  129-31,  140,  144,  157,  176-77,  188. 
196-98  214.224.  236 

40th:  122,  127n,  250,  437,  449,  452,  454,  459, 
484,  486,  487n,  488 

112th:  20-21 

540th:  69,  121-23,  129,  131-32,  148,  152, 
156-57.  162-63.  168-69.  171.  193, 
195-96,  198-99,  212,  236,  438,  443-44, 
454.  459.  484-85.  488 
Engineer  Construction  Battalion,  6487th:  248 
Engineer  Depot  Companies:  46,  82,  208,  223,  251, 
272,  363 

383d:  227 

397th:  20,  39,  274 

450th:  46,-112,227 

451st:  111,227 

458th:  252 

460th:  112 

462d:  112.252 

715th:  112 
Engineer  Dredge  Crews 

1077th:  363 

1080th:  365-66 
Engineer  Dump  Truck  Companies:  35.  208,  270, 
274,  289 

196th:  487 


592 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Engineer  Dump  Truck  Companies — Continued 

427th:  20 

434th:  40 

577th:  360 

1528th:  237 
Engineer  fire-fighting  units:  172,  248 
Engineer  Forestry  Company,  800th:  250-51 
Engineer  Gas  Generating  Unit,  1044th:  360 
Engineer  General  Service  Regiments:  5,  9,  35, 
39-40,  53,  223,  232-33,  274,  289,  291,  393, 
398,  563 

38th:  342 

94th:  171,242,244,454 

95th:  394,  397,  402 

175th:  73,  94,  99,  185,  224 

332d:  38,  353-54,  364,  398,  401-03,  405 

335th:  446-47,  448n,  458,  459n 

337th:  163,  167,  230 

338th:  237-38,  247-48,  251 

341st:  38,  394,  397,  402-03,  537 

342d:  38,  271,  346-47,  353-54,  398 

343d:  140-41,  152,  156,  178,  212,  451-52,  454 

344th:  186,212,452,454 

345th:  93,  171,  173,  242,246 

346th:  271 

347th:  272,  356-57,  398-403 

354th:  398 

355th:  364,  394,  397,  402,  537-38 

358th:  346-48,  363-64,  405,  409,  411 

359th:  405,  406,  409-  1 1 

360th:  359 

364th:  411 

365th:  394,  397 

368th:  411 

373d:  360-61 

375th:  402 

377th:  402 

389th:  402 

390th:  398-400 

392d:  360,  398,  402 

398th:  354 

1301st:  526 

1303d:  381 

1306th:  427-29 
1317th:  537 
1323d:  271 
Engineer  Heavy  Ponton  Battalions:  397-98,  563 

85th:  185,  459,  534-35 

86th:  505,  515 

88th:  526 
181st:  508,  515 

552d:  508,  515 
1553d:  459,  487n,  534-35 
1554th:  185,218,220-21 
Engineer  Heavy  Shop  Companies:  47,  251-52, 
275-76 

496th:  253-54 
Engineer  Light  Equipment  Companies:  223,  252, 
270-71 
629th:  471 


Engineer  Light  Maintenance  Company,  677th:  487n 
Engineer  Light  Ponton  Companies 
501st:  513 
503d:  371-72,375 
509th:  388 
Engineer  Maintenance  Companies:  47,  208,  223, 
251-52,270-71,275 
5th:  254 
40th:  254 
467th:  20,  47 
469th:  252-53 
470th:  47,  94,  109,  253 
471st:  47 
473d:  252-54 
962d:  471 
971st:  360 
Engineer  Maintenance  Companies  (Italian),  1st  and 

2d: 253 
Engineer  Map  Depot  Detachments:  122,  233,  249 
1709th:  454 
1710th:  193,228 
1712th:  228 
2634th:  249 
2657th:  120 
2658th:  120 
2699th:  158 
Engineer  Mine  Clearance  Company,  6617th:  437 
Engineer  Mines  and  Bridge  School:  225 
Engineer  Mobile  Map  Depots,  1st  and  2d:  454 
Engineer  Mobile  Mapmaking  Detachments:  63 
Engineer  Model  Making  Detachments:  49 

1621st:  218 
Engineer  Mountain  Battalion,  126th:  216,  220 
Engineer  Parts  Supply  Companies 
752d:  276 
754th:  254 
Engineer  Petroleum  Distribution  Companies:  6,  37, 
233,  363,412,  457,  562-63 
696th:  138,  173-74,  238-40,  458 
697th:  455-58 
698th:  405-06,409,411 
701st:  458,  459n 
702d:  92 
703d:  240-41 
705th:  239-40 
784th:  457 
785th:  240-41 
786th:  405-07,  409,  411 
787th:  405-06,  409,  411 
788th:  405,411 
790th:  405,411 
1374th:  405,409,411 
1375th:  405,409,411 
1376th:  411 
1377th:  411 
1379th:  458 
1385th:  458 
2004th:  92 
2602d:  91,  119 
2814th:  459n 


INDEX 


593 


Engineer  Port  Construction  and  Repair  Groups: 
116,  289.562-63 

1051st:  152,  169,  233-34,  236-37,  446-49,  454 

1053d:  359,  538 

1055th:  346,  355-56,  359-60,  362,  398 

1056th:  352-53,  355-56,  364,  537 

1057th:  360 

1058th:  359-60,  509,  511-12,  538 

1061st:  360,  362 
Engineer  Port  Repair  Ship  Crew,  1071st:  355,  360 
Engineer  port  repair  ships:  282,  363 
Engineer  Regiments  (World  War  I),  I7th  and  18th: 

3 
Engineer  Service  Battalions 

407th:  241 

408th:  457-59 
Engineer  Shore  Groups:  121 

36th:  122-23,  126-29 

40th:  122-24,  133 

531st:  122-24 

540th:  122-24 
Engineer  Shore  Regiments:  65,  68 

531st:  66,  74,  76-77,  121-23,  129-32,  156, 
158-59,  161-64,  167,  309,  316,  337,  341 

540th:  72-73 
Engineer  Special  Brigades:  65,  122,  305,  308-10, 
561 

1st:  122-24,  134-35,  137-38,  156-57,  309-12, 
316-17,  337-38,  341-42,  346 

5th:  309-11,  315-17,  327,  329-30,  332,  342, 
363 

6th:  309-11,  315-16,  327,  332,  342 
Engineer  Special  Service  Regiment,  333d:  353,  355 
Engineer  survey  liaison  detachments:  297 
Engineer  Technical  Intelligence  Teams  (ETIT): 

380 
Engineer  Topographic  Battalions:  49,  289,  295, 
297 

30th:  48 

649th:  454 
Engineer  Topographic  Companies:  289,  297 

62d:  94,  109,  145 

66th:  63,  120,218,227-28 

661st:  227,  454 
Engineer  Treadway  Bridge  Companies 

988th:  507,  514 

990th:  514-15 

991st:  425-26 

992d:  371-72,374-75,540 

994th:  516 

998th:  487,  507,  516 

1755th:  224 
Engineer  Utilities  Company,  1090th:  152 
Engineer  Water  Supply  Battalions:  246 

401st:  247 

405th:  247 
Engineer  Water  Supply  Companies:  37,  246 

518lh:  94,  107-08 

1513th:  247 

1514th:  247 


Engineers 
army  organization  and  tasks:  187,  207,  393 
corps  organization  and  tasks:  187,  205,  207,  214, 

297,  393 
division  organization  and  tasks:  186—87,  205—07, 

214 
field  force  engineers  in  construction:  35,  270—71, 

315 
in  infantry  role:  72-73,  94-97,  159,  164, 

188-90,  196-97,  329,  369,  383,  421-22, 
462-67,  469-85,  487-88,  565 
labor  pool  system  in  U.K.:  56—57 
manpower  shortages:  28-29,  222-23,  259, 

269-71,  274,315,  381,  562 
officers  and  specialists:  32-33,  37-39,  43, 

222-23,  271,  274-75,  560,  562 
requisitioning  procedures:  37  —  38 
strength  in  European  Theater:  38,  269,  565—66 
strength  in  Mediterranean:  223,  232-33,  566 
Enna:  139-40 
Enns  River:  548 
Ensdorf:  431-32 
Epinal:  453 

Ernst  Ludwig  Bridge:  534 
Erpel:  505-07,  513 
Eschdorf:  475 
Eschweiler:  418 

Etang  de  Berre:  447-48,  456,  458 
Ettelbruck:  481 
Eupen:  414-15 
Eure  River:  402,  405 
European  Theater  of  Operations  (ETOUSA): 

25-26,  44-45,  58,  1 10,  277,  279,  287.  See  also 
Command  structure  problems;  Office,  Chief 
Engineer,  ETOUSA;  Services  of  Supply, 
ETOUSA. 
deputy  theater  commander:  257-58,  350 
G-1:  38 
G-3:  266,  291 
G-4:  32,  37,  257-58,  356 
Exploit  operation:  519 

Fabius  amphibious  exercises:  312-13 

Faid  Pass:  84,  94 

Falaise  Gap:  354,  385 

Falmouth:  317 

Farthing,  Pfc.  William  E.:  432,  433n 

Fedala:  69-70,  79,  93 

Feriana:  84 

Ferries.  See  also  Rafts  and  ferries. 

Phion:  361 

Rhino:  340 

Twickenham:  354 
Fertilia:  239 

Fifth  Army  Base  Section:  169,  171,  203 
Filettole  pump  station:  247 
Finberg,  Maj.  Irving  W.:  157 
Fisciano:  167 

Fiumarello  Canal:  156,  159,  163 
Flashpoint  operation:  517 


594 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Florence:  21 1-14,  219,  231,  245-46 

Floresta:  147 

Foggia  airfields:  165 

Foley,  Maj.  James  E.:  509 

Folligny:  397,  399-400,  405 

Fondi:  209,  245 

Fontanelle  caves:  226 

Force  141:  115-16,  118-20,  123 

Force  163:  436 

Force  343:  115,  118-20 

Formia:  182,  209 

Formigny:  400 

Fort  Belvoir:  63 

Fort  Benning:  372 

Fort  Blucher:  538 

Fort  Keranroux:  383-84 

Fort  Koenigsmacker:  425 

Fort  Montbarrey:  383-84 

Fort  Pierce:  304-05,  310 

Fort  Yutz:  427-28 

Fortifications  and  obstacle  reduction:  148-50,  166, 

186,  357,  367,  381-84,  413-15,  417-21,  424- 

25,  430,  432-44,  488,  539,  551,  553,  555,  565 
Forward  Echelon,  Communications  Zone  (FECOMZ): 

287,  349-50 
Fougeres:  385,  400,  406 
Fowey:  305 
Fox  exercise:  31 1 
Foy:  476-77 
Fracolise:  246 
Franey,  Maj.  J.  M.:  38 
Frankenthal:  458 
Frankfurt:  515,  525,  530,  546 
Frankfurt-Dresden  autobahn:  546 
Eraser,  Lt.  Col.  Harvey  R.:  507 
Fraulautern:  431 

Fredendall,  Maj.  Gen.  Lloyd  R.:  59,  97,  113 
Frejus:  442,  451,  456 
French  forces:  83,  87,  227,  233,  239-40,  434,  447, 

459.  See  also  French  units. 
French  Forces  of  the  Interior  (FFI):  389-91,  402, 

456 
French  Morocco:  87,  89,  91,  93,  99,  105,  112,  121, 

153,  157 
French  National  Geographic  Institute:  297,  564—65 
French  Navy:  446 
French  units 
Armee  B:  454 
First  Army:  453-55,  484,  486-87,  507,  551,  554, 

557 
Expeditionary  Corps  (EEC):  180,  208-09,  212 
2d  Armored  Division:  389,  487 
Freudenstadt:  557-58 
Friesenhahn,  Capt.  Karl:  503 
Fry,  Lt.  Col.  E.  M.,Jr.:  383 
Fuerth:  553 
Fulda  River:  546-47 
Fuorigrotta:  245 
Futa  Pass:  212,  215 

Gabes:  84 


Gaeta:  154,  182,  192 

Gafsa:  84,  87,  94,  96,  98,  107-08 

Gale,  Maj.  Gen.  Humfrey:  59 

Gallagher,  Col.  Leonard  B.:  206 

Gambsheim:  486 

Gangway  operation:  153-54 

Gar  Davidson  Bridge:  535 

Gardes,  Lt.  Col.  George  W.:  164 

Gare  Loch:  9 

Garigliano  River:  180-81,  183,  188-90,  208-09, 

211,233 
Garmisch-Partenkirchen:  555 
Gela:  119,  121,  126,  129-32,  137-38 
Gembloux:  405 
General  Hospital,  37th:  245 
General  purchasing  agent  (U.K.):  41-43,  285 
General  Purchasing  Board,  USAFBI:  41-42 
German  Army  units 

Army  Group  G:  438 

Army  Group  H:  490 

German-Italian  Panzer  ArmT.  83,  97 

Fifth  Panzer  Army:  464,  474,  480 

Sixth  Panzer  Army:  466-67,  469,  474 

Seventh  Army:  301,  480-81 

Tenth  Army.  154,  180 

Twelfth  Army:  540,  544 

Fourteenth  Army:  180 

Nineteenth  Army:  438,  455 

/  5S  Panzer  Corps:  469 

XIV  Panzer  Corps:  154 

LXVI  Corps:  464 

LXVII  Corps:  467 

LXXX  Corps:  480-81 

LXXXV  Corps:  480 

Hermann  Goering  Division:  131,  154 

Panzer  Lehr  Division:  475,  478 

2d  Panzer  Division:  478 

5th  Parachute  Division:  480 

6th  SS  Mountain  Division:  485 

12th  SS  Panzer  Division:  469,  471 

15th  Panzer  Grenadier  Division:  154 

16th  Panzer  Division:  154,  164 

18th  Volksgrenadier  Division:  466 

26th  Volksgrenadier  Division:  474 

29th  Panzer  Division:  164 

91st  Infantry  Division:  303—04,  333 

116th  Panzer  Division:  479 

212th  Volksgrenadier  Division:  480-81 

224th  Infantry  Division:  439 

242d  Infantry  Division:  439 

243d  Infantry  Division:  303 

276th  Volksgrenadier  Division:  480-81 

352d  Infantry  Division:  301 

352d  Volksgrenadier  Division:  480-81 

709th  Infantry  Division:  303 

716th  Division:  301 

Kampfgruppe  Peiper:  469,  471-73 

Waff  en  SS  troops:  369 
German  E-boats:  312 

German  frogmen:  504,  509-10,  516,  523,  527.  533, 
540 


INDEX 


595 


German  nuclear  research  laboratories:  556-59 

Gerow,  Maj.  Gen.  Leonard  T.:  306,  469 

Ghent:  365-66 

Gholson,  Maj.  Charles  B.:  457 

Gieselwerder:  544 

Glatton  Airdrome:  54 

Goalpost  task  force:  69,  73 

Goering,  Reichsmarschal  Hermann:  559n 

Goldstein,  Pvt.  Bernard:  472 

Goodrington  Sands:  310 

Goodwin,  Capt.  Francis  E.:  510—11 

Gooseberry  breakwaters:  343 

Gotha:  546 

Gothic  Line:  230,  233 

Gouldin,  Maj.  Robert  A.:  538 

Governola:  221 

Govin:  409 

Gozo  island:  125 

Graders  and  scrapers:  5,  48,  98-99,  132,  308,  563 

Grandcamp-les-Bains:  310,  344,  346-49 

Granier,  Brig.  Gen.  Georges:  455 

Granville:  344,  346,  348,  355,  359-60 

Grappling  hooks:  212,  371,  384 

Gray,  Brig.  Gen.  Carl  R.,  Jr.:  452 

Grenade  operation:  489-90 

Grenoble:  436,451-52 

Griner,  Lt.  Col.  George  W.,  Jr.:  7,  1 1 

Gross,  Brig.  Gen.  Jean:  454 

Groves,  Maj.  Gen.  Leslie  R.:  557n 

Guard  (installation)  operations:  553 

Gulf  of  Frejus:  442-43 

GulfofGela:  116 

Gulf  of  Naples:  154 

Gulf  of  Salerno:  154,  159 

Gullat,  Col.  Doswell:  332,  363 

Gustav  Line:  180,  190,  208,  228 

Hadir  Steel  Mill:  537 

Hagensen,  Lt.  (jg.)  Carl  P.:  307-08 

Hagensen  packs:  307-08,  320 

Haguenau:  485 

Hahn,  Otto:  558 

Haigerloch:  558 

Hainneville:  357,  410 

Haislip,  Maj.  Gen.  Wade  H.:  555 

Hall,  Col.  William  C:  427 

Halle:  545 

Hamel-au-Pretre:  300 

Hameln:  539,  541 

Hampton  Roads:  63 

Hann-Muenden:  541 

Hannis  Taylor:  365 

Harbor  Craft  Company  (TC),  329th:  510 

Hardstandings  construction:  10,  86,  266,  313-14, 

520 
Harkleroad,  Capt.  Paul  F.:  328 
Harmon,  Maj.  Gen.  Ernest  N.:  69 
Harmon,  Capt.  Harold  M.:  463—64 
Harmon,  Lt.  Col.  William  B.:  449 
Harris,  T/5  Charles  E.:  161 
Hartle,  Maj.  Gen.  Russell  P.:  18 


Harvey,  Lt.  Col.  A.  D.:  398 

Harvey,  Col.  Oliver  C:  437 

Harz  Mountains:  544 

Haswell,  Pfc.  James  B.:  423 

Hayden,  Maj.  Gen.  J.  C:  66 

Heavey,  Col.  Edward  H.:  18 

Hechingen:  557-58 

Hedgerow  blasting  operations:  367,  370,  374 

Heilbronn:  553-54 

Heilig,  Lt.  Col.  E.  Warren:  402 

Herbert,  2d  Lt.  Edward:  431 

Hermann  Goering  Steel  Works:  540 

Heuem:  461,  463-64 

Hewitt,  Vice  Adm.  H.  Kent:  65,  124,  195,  437 

Highware:  344 

Highway  1  (Italy):  211 

Highway  2  (Italy):  211,  240 

Highway  6  (Italy):  187-88,  214,  239-40 

Highway  7  (Italy):  188,  208-09,  211,  239-40 

Highway  9  (Italy):  213 

Highway  18  (Italy):  166 

Highway  64  (Italy):  215,  219 

Highway  65  (Italy):  212-15,  217,  219,  241 

Highway  82  (Italy):  209 

Highway  85  (Italy):  188 

Highway  87  (Italy):  177 

Highway  113  (Sicily):  137,  139-41,  144,  148-50 

Highway  117  (Sicily):  141,  152 

Highway  120  (Sicily):  137,  139-41,  145-48,  152 

Hilfarth:  499 

Hill  122:  369 

Hill  313:  482 

Hirson:  405 

Histon  depot:  276 

Hitler.  Adolf:  352,  415,  439,  544 

Hitler  Line:  208 

Hochheim:  531 

Hodges,  Lt.  Gen.  Courtney  H.:  504,  515,  517 

Hodges,  Capt.  Preston  C:  480 

Hoefen:  467,  470 

Hoefn  field:  1 1 

Hoenningen:  541 

Hoge,  Brig.  Gen.  William  M.:  315,  332,  502-03 

Hohe  Rhoen:  551 

Homberg:  523 

Honsfeld:  467,  469 

Hopkins,  Harry:  22 

Hopper  dredges:  363,  365 

Horb:  558 

Hosingen:  474-75 

Hospital  construction:  9,  51-53,  245-46,  261, 

263-64,  268-69,  280-81 
Hotton:  479-80,  483 

House-to-house  fighting:  384-85,  433,  474-75 
Housing  construction:  7-10,  13,  15,  17,  19,  24, 

50-58,  256,  259,  261-64,  266-68,  280 
Huebner,  Maj.  Gen.  Clarence  R.:  515,  542,  544 
Huertgen  Forest:  462,  481 
Hughes,  Brig.  Gen.  Everett  S.:  110 
Hughes,  Maj.  Gen.  H.  B.  W.:  287-88 
Hughes-Hallett,  Vice  Adm.  J.:  66 


596 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Hulen,  Col.  Harry:  402 

Huntingdon:  45,  48 

Huntingdonshire:  9 

Huppain:  406-09 

Husky  operation:  115-16,  118,  120-22,  124-25, 

152,  163.  See  also  Sicilian  operations. 
Huy:  471 

Iceland:  8,  11-16 

Iceland  Base  Command:  12,  15—16 

Idice  valley:  215 

II  Giogo  Pass:  212 

lies  d'Hyeres:  439 

Ilfracombe:  293 

Iller  River:  554 

Ilva  Steel  Works:  184 

Impregnated  clothing:  320,  325 

Indigo  operation:  1 1 

Infantry  Divisions 

1st:  66,  74,  76-77,  79,  94,  98,  119,  125-26,  129, 
136-38,  140-41,  145-48,  300-301,  307, 
312,315-16,327,376,386,422-23, 
470-71,  506,  514,  544 
2d:  307,  383-84,  461,  467,  469-70,  515,  541-42 
3d:  65,  69,  94,  118-19,  125-26,  136,  148-50, 
156,  165,  174-77,  179,  193,  195,  437,  439, 
441,  486-87,  533,  552-53,  555-56 
4th:  302-03,  311-12,  316,  332-33,  339, 
370-71,  376,  388-89,  462,  476,  481 
5th:  424,  433-34,  525-26 
8th:  369,  377,  381,  383 
9th:  65,  69,  73,  77-78,  94,  100,  145-48,  370, 

374,  376,  470,  490,  504 
28th:  389,  461-62,  474-75,  480,  482,  487 
29th:  300-301,  310,  312,  315-16,  371,  374-75, 

383-84,  421,  475,  489-90,  492 
30th:  371-74,  376,  420-21,  473-74,  489-90, 

492,  497,  518-21,  523-24,  540 
32d:  17,  19,  21n 
34th:  17-19,  21,  77-78,  94,  96,  156,  158, 

174-79,  189-92,  199,  211,  237 
35th:  371,  374-75,  489,  498-99 
36th:  156,  158-59,  161,  164,  168,  179,  190-91, 

224,  438,  443-44,  486 
37th:  17,  19,  21n 
42d:  552,  556 
44th:  554-55 

45th:  119,  122,  125-26,  132-33,  136-37, 
139-41,  147,  150,  156,  158-59,  162-65, 
175,  179,  188,  226,  437,  485,  532,  534,  553, 
555 
63d:  488,  553-54 
69th:  516,  541-42 
71st:  548 
75th:  487,  523 
78th:  504,  514 
79th:  368-69,  377,  386-87,  486,  489,  518, 

520-21,523-24 
80th:  530 
83d:  370-71,  377,  381-82,  489,  540 


Infantry  Divisions — Continued 
84th:  480,  489-90,  492,  497-98,  539 
85th:  208-09,  220-22,  224 
86th:  549 
87th:  527,  530 
88th:  207-09,  212,  221 
89th:  528-30 
90th:  368-70,  377,  424-25,  429-30,  433-34, 

526 
91st:  212,  221 
92d:  212,217,225 
95th:  424,  427,  429-34 
99th:  461,  467,  469-70,  549-50 
100th:  553-54 
102d:  489-90,  492,  496-97 
103d:  555 
104th:  544-45 
106th:  461-62,  464-65,  476 
Infantry  Regiments 
2d:  526 
3d:  100 

7th:  148-49,  175-76,  441,  533,  556 
8th:  303,  319,  333-34,  336-37 
10th:  525-26 
11th:  525 
12th:  481,483 

15th:  128,  148,  176,  441,  533 
16th:  74,  129-31,  146,  301,  311,  316,  320, 

327-28,  330,  332 
18th:  74,  119,  129,  131,  146-47,  316,  327, 

332,  422 
26th:  74,  76,  96-97,  129-30,  146,  315-16,  423 
28th:  377,  380 
30th:  148,  533 
38th:  470 

39th:  77-78,  145-46 
47th:  146-47 
60th:  146-47 
109th:  474,  480 
110th:  474,480 
112th:  474,487 
115th:  332,494-96 
116th:  301,  311,  315-16,  324,  326-28,  330, 

332 
117th:  371-72 
119th:  371-72,  492 
120th:  371,  373-74,492 
I21st:  381-82 
134th:  499 

141st:  156,  159,  161,  190-91,443-44 
142d:  156,  159,  161,444 
143d:  190-91,  444 
157th:  149-50,  485-86 
168th:  77-78 
175th:  492,  494 
179th:  485,532 
180th:  532 
275th:  485 
309th:  490 
317th:  530 


INDEX 


597 


Infantry  Regiments — Continued 

319th:  530-31 

330th:  371 

334th:  497 

345th:  527 

347th:  527 

353d:  528 

354th:  528-29 

357th:  369,  425,  433 

358th:  369,  424-25,  433 

359th:  369,  424-25,  434 

378th:  427 

379th:  430-31 

395th:  470 

405th:  496 

407th:  497 

422d:  462-64,  466 

423d:  461,464,466 

424th:  464,  466 

442d  RCT:  212 
Infantry-engineer  assault  teams:  130,  415,  417, 

420-21,432,488,565 
Infantry  School:  372 

Inland  waterways:  284,  362,  364-65,  447 
Inn  River:  548-50,  555-56 
Innsbruck:  555 
Inspector  General:  200 
Intelligence:  48-49,  62-64,  192,  227-30,  296, 

316-17,  350-51 
Inverary:  67 

Irby,  Lt.  Col.  William  J.:  513 
Iris  huts:  52,  55,  265 
Iry,  Lt.  Col.  Clarence  N.:  12 
Isar  River:  548-50,  555 
Isigny:  286,  310,  344,  346-49,  397-98 
Isigny-Bayeux  road:  342 
Island  Base  Section:  152 
Isle  of  Wight:  291,  406 
Italian  campaign:  153-59,  161-79,  180-93, 

195-99,  200,  203,  208-09,  211-31,  233-34, 
236-42,  244-55,  282,  286,  437-38,  562 
Italian  forces 

with  Allied  units:  227,  245,  248.  253 

Axis  defense  forces:  83,  126-27,  131,  155 

engineers:  180,  216,  225,  227,  233,  237,  241, 
246,  252-53 
Itri:  209 

Itschner,  Col.  Emerson  C:  287,  344,  393,  397-98, 
400-401,537 

Jagst  River:  553-54 

Jemmapes:  1 19 

Joint  staff  planners,  U.S.:  31 

Jones,  Lt.  Col.  William  L.:  228-29 

Jones,  Lt.  Col.  William  P.,  Jr.:  206 

Joss  force:  118-20,  122,  124-30,  132-33,  135 

Jourdan  River:  356 

Juelich:  490,  492,  494-97 

June:  246-47 

Junior  N.  Van  Noy:  355—56 


Juvisy:  402-03 

Kaldadharnes  Airdrome:  11,  15 

Kasba  fort:  73 

Kassel:  515 

Kasserine  Pass:  83-84,  88,  94,  96-98,  100,  104, 

107 
Kaye,  Lt.  Col.  Minton  W.:  295 
Kean,  Brig.  Gen.  William  B.:  306 
Keflavik  field:  11,  15 
Kelley,  Maj.  Roy  S.:  364 
Kennedy,  Capt.  Kenneth  W.:  74-76 
Kerkrade:  421 
Kienheim:  550 
Killian,  Col.  Joseph  O.:  221 
King,  Admiral  Ernest  J.:  65 
King,  Lt.  Col.  Roswell  H.:  415,  418 
King's  Newton:  398 
Kittrell,  Col.  Clark:  450 
Klase,  Capt.  Andrew  F.:  346 
Klebach,  Sergeant-Major  Jacob:  503 
Koblenz:  414,  430,  527 
Kocher  River:  554 
Koenigswinter:  514—15 
Koerrenzig:  497  —  99 
KooL  force:  119-20,  122-24,  131 
Krefeld:  519,524 
Krinkelt:  470-71 
Kripp:  500,  506-07,  510-11 
Kwaadmechelen:  364 

LaCalle:  113 

La  Chapelle-Anthenaise:  400 
La  Ferte:  391 
La  Forge:  358 
La  Grande  Dune:  338 
La  Haye-du-Puits:  367-69,  399,  406,  410 
La  Hutte-Coulombiers:  405 
La  Madeleine:  303 
La  Meauffe:  375 
La  Mede:  456-58 
La  Roche:  479 
La  Senia  Airfield:  74,  91 
La  Vicomte-sur-Rance:  382 
Ladd,  Lt.  Col.  John  G.:  229 
Lahn  River  valley:  515 
Lake  Constance:  532,  553 
Lambach:  548 

Landaker,  Col.  Chester  L.:  364 
Landen:  405 

Landing  ships  and  craft:  31,  64-66,  439,  491. 
See  also  River  crossings;  and  by  type  designation. 

Italian  campaign:  156,  159,  163,  169,  192-93,  195, 
199,  236-37 

Normandy  landings:  299,  314,  316-17,  319-25, 
327-28,  330-34,  338-39,  340 

North  Africa  landings:  67-69,  72,  75-76,  78-79 

Sicilian  landings:  116-18,  123-24,  127-29, 
132-33 

southern  France  landings:  439,  441-43 


598 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Landshut:  550 

Larkin,  Maj.  Gen.  Thomas  B.:  24,  26,  37-39,  60,  88, 

110-11,200-201,203,450 
Lauer,  Maj.  Gen.  Walter  E.:  469 
Laval:  400-401,406,410 
LBVs:  347 
LCAs:  75,319 
LCI-92:  318 
LCI-554:  325 

LCIs:  193,317,  325,  327-28 
LCMs:  65 

Mediterranean  operations:  75-76,  118,  131,  133, 

437 
Normandy  invasion:  306-07,  317,  320,  322-25, 

333-34,  344 
Rhine  crossing:  489,  506,  517-21,  523,  529,  531, 
535-36 
LCP(R)s:  75 
LCT-30:  325 
LCTs:  65 

Mediterranean  operations:  118,  127,  129,  131-32, 

169,  193,  195,  199,  236-37,  443 
Normandy  and  French  port  operations:  317, 
319-20,  322,  324-25,  327,  330,  333,  338, 
344,  346-47,  353,  362,  408 
LCVPs:  65 

Mediterranean  operations:  81,  117,  127,  133, 

159,  193 
Normandy  landings:  307,  319 
Rhine  crossing  operations:  489,  504,  506,  508,  510, 
513-16,  517-21,  525-26,  528-29,  531, 
535-36 
Le  Garre,  Eugene:  409 
Le  Grand  Vey:  336-37 
Le  Havre:  356,  360-63,  413 
Le  Luc:  439 

Le  Mans:  400-401,  405 
Le  Muy:  439 
Le  Pas-des-Lanciers:  457 
Le  Pontet:  457 
Lech  River:  555 
Lee,  Maj.  Gen.  John  C.  H.:  28 
as  COMZ  commander:  285,  349-50,  366,  449, 

459 
as  G— 4  and  deputy  commander,  ETOUSA: 

257-58,  350 
as  SOS,  ETOUSA,  commander:  24-26,  29, 

31,200,287,561 
and  U.K.  construction  and  supply  buildup:  37, 
51-52,56,  278,  315 
Leghorn:  211,  219,  221,  233-34,  237-41,  245-48, 

251-52 
Leina:  546 
Leine  River:  540 
Leipzig:  541-42,  546,  550 
Les  Andalouses:  74 
Les  Couplets  tank  farm:  357-58 
Les  Dunes  de  Varreville:  303 
Les  Moulins:  300,  302,  330-31 
Lessay:  369-70,  376-77,  380,  410 


Lessay-Periers  road:  377,  380 

Liberty  ships:  136,  167,  169-71,  199,  234,  236-38, 

353-56,  360,  362-65,  447 
Libramont:  479 

Licata:  116,  119,  121,  126-29,  136-38,  144 
Liege:  364,  390,  405,  461,  471,  513,  518 
Limatola:  224 
Lines  of  communication:  31,  152,  277-78,  282-83, 

350-51,  449,  563 
Linn,  Maj.  Herschel  E.:  307,  333 
Linnich:  490,  492,  496-98 
Lintfort:  518-19 
Linz:  506-07,  548 
Liparulo,  Pfc.  Lorenzo  A.:  472 
Lippe  River:  537-38 
Liri  River:  192,  208,  227,  230 
Lison:  397-99 

Littlejohn,  Brig.  Gen.  Robert  McG.:  45,  56 
Liverpool:  45 
Livron:  452,  458 
Loch  Linnhe:  68 
Loch  Ryan:  9 
Lockerley:  298 

Lockett,  Lt.  Col.  Charles  L.:  455 
Lohr:  551 
Loiano:  241 

Loire  Base  Section:  351 
Loire  River:  363 

London:  26,  28,  257,  259,  261,  289 
Londonderry:  19,  66 
Longueville:  286 
Loper,  Col.  Herbert  B.:  297 
Loper-Hotine  Agreement:  49,  120,  294,  564 
Lord,  Brig.  Gen.  Royal  B.:  33,  39,  258,  265,  356 
Lorelei:  527 
Lorient:  358-59 
Lorraine  plain:  423 
Losheim  Gap:  461-63,  467,  469 
Lourmel:  74 

Lovelady,  Lt.  Col.  William  B.:  415,  417-18,  544 
LSIs:  317 
LST-282:  444 
LST-338:  131 
LST-531:  312 
LSTs:  68n 

Mediterranean  operations:  75—76,  117—18,  124, 
128-29,  131-32,  136,  149,  163,  169,  193, 
195,  199,  234,  236-37,  444 

Normandy  and  French  port  operations:  312,  317, 
342-44,  353,  359,  383 
Lucas,  Maj.  Gen.  John  P.:  165 
Lucca:  213-14 

Ludendorff,  General  Erich:  500 
Ludendorff  Bridge:  500-506,  509-13,  515 
Ludwigs  Canal:  552 
Ludwigshafen:  535 
Luetzkampen:  461 
Lumber  supply:  9,  166,  175,  218,  234,  242,  245, 

250-51,  462,  471,  475,  483,  503 
Luneville:  454,  460,  488 


INDEX 


599 


Lure:  453 

Luxembourg:  389,  462,  464 

Luxembourg  City:  476,  480-82,  515 

Luzery:  477 

LVTs:  491-92,  494-96,  517-18,  520,  536 

Lyon:  436,  449,  452,  454-55,  457-59 

Lyons,  Col.  F.  Russel:  504 

Maas  River:  519 

McAuliffe,  Maj.  Gen.  Anthony  C:  555 

McCoach,  Maj.  Gen.  David  J,  Jr.:  200n 

McDonough,  Colonel:  306n 

MacKeachie,  Col.  Douglas  C:  41—42 

McNair,  Lt.  Gen.  Lesley  J.:  205-06 

McNarney,  Brig.  Gen.  Joseph  T.:  7 

Macon:  458 

Maddaloni:  225 

Madeleine  River:  356 

Madonie-Nebrodi  ranges:  141 

Magdeburg:  540 

Maginot  Line:  423,  425,  429,  484-85 

Magnet  force:  17-19,  21 

Main  River:  530-31,  546,  551-52 

Main  supply  routes  (MSRs):  351,  376-77,  394 

Maintenance  operations:  46-47,  214,  241,  252-54, 

274-76 
Mainz:  429,  515,530-31 
Maiori:  162 

Maison  Blanche  Airfield:  77,  86-87 
Major  Robert  A.  Gouldin  Bridge:  538 
Makrtassy-Sened  area:  84,  107 
Maktar:  94 

Mailing:  424-26,  429 
Malmedy:  471-73,  483,  507 
"Malmedy  massacre":  472 
Manhattan  Project:  556,  557n 
Mannheim:  458,  531-35 
Mantes-Gassicourt:  385—87 
Manteuffel,  General  der  Panzertruppen  Hasso  von: 

464 
Maps  and  mapping:  5,  48—49,  564.  See  also  Aerial 
photography. 

defense  overprints:  120,  145,  156,  158,  185, 
227-28,315-17 

Italian  campaign:  156,  158,  185,  218,  227-29, 
249-50,  252 

North  Africa  operations:  62-63,  81,  109,  120 

operations  in  northern  Europe:  293—98,  315—17, 
351,  391 

photomaps:  49,  62-63,  109,  145,  218,  227-28, 
295-96,  315,  565 

security  measures:  63,  120,  158,  297-98 

Sicilian  operations:  120,  144—45 

southern  France  operations:  454—55 

supply  and  distribution  problems:  120,  297,  391, 
454,  565 
Maracaibo  boats:  68,  75 
Marche:  474,  478-80 
Mareth  Line:  83-84 
Marienburg  Castle:  552 


Marigny:  376-77,  385 

Maritime  Command,  ETOUSA:  66 

Marne  River:  390 

Marne  River  Canal:  403 

Marrakech:  93 

Marseille:  233,  436,  439,  442,  445-49,  451-53, 

456,  458 
Marsh  draining:  370 

Marshall,  General  George  C:  8,  12,  22-25,  65 
Marston,  Brig.  Gen.  John:  11 
Marston  warehouses:  265—66 
Martigues:  447-48,  456 
Marvin,  Col.  George  W.:  443 
Matching  Airdrome:  54 
Maures:  442 
Mayenne:  354,  401 
Mayenne  River:  385,  400-401 
Meaux:  390 
Meckenheim:  500-501 
Medical  Battalion,  56th:  123 
Medical  Department:  268-69 
Mediouna  airfield:  93 
Mediterranean  Allied  Air  Forces:  208 
Mediterranean  Base  Section:  60,  77,  88,  92,  110, 

112-13 
Mediterranean  Theater  of  Operations  (MTOUSA): 

90,  203,  225,  227,  246,  254,  435,  563 
Meeks  Field:  15 
Mehdia:  69,  73,  79,  82 
Melgerdhi  field:  11 
Melun:  387,  390 
Merderet  River:  303,  332 
Mers-el-Kebir:  158 
Mersa  Bou  Zedjar:  74-75 
Merzig:  429-30 

Messina:  116,  137,  139,  141,  150 
Metz:  402-03,  405,  414,  423-24,  429 
MetzGap:  414,  423 
Meulan:  386 
Meuse  River:  389-90,  467,  471-72,  479,  489,  513, 

518 
Meyrargues:  451—52 
Miano:  249 
Michelshof:  482-83 
Michin,  Pvt.  Bernard:  478 
Middleton,  Maj.  Gen.  Troy  H.:  377,  381,  475-76, 

482-83 
Mignano:  179;  180,  186,  244 

Milazzo:  144 

Military  Pipeline  Group  (Provisional):  411-12 
Military  Pipeline  Service  (MPLS):  412 
Military  Railway  Service  (MRS),  Transportation 
Corps:  242,  399,  405,  452 

1st:  397,  451,  453 

2d:  356 
Millburn,  Maj.  Gen.  Frank  W.:  486-87 
MUler,  1st  Lt.  Keith  E.:  127n 
Millikin,  Maj.  Gen.  John:  500,  504 
Milwit,  Col.  Herbert:  48-49,  296 
Mincio  River:  221 


600 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Mine  clearance  methods:  103,  105,  107,  116,  140, 
144,  158,  182-83,  488,  564.  See  also  Mine 
detectors. 
Mine  detectors:  101,  307,  320,  325,  334,  368,  494 

AN/PRS-1  (Dinah):  183 

ANA^RS-1:  183 

British:  144 

SCR-625:  5,  103-04,  107,  130,  141,  144, 
182-83,  564 

vehicle-mounted:  104,  183 
Minefield  charting  and  recording:  101,  106,  182, 

197-98,  564 
Minefields  and  clearance  of)erations 

Italy:  168,  181-83,  190-91,  199,  217,  237,  246 

Normandy  and  northern  France:  328,  331-32, 
369,  380,  383-84,  408-09 

Sicily:  119,  130,  140-41,  144,  146-48 

southern  France:  437 

training:  67-68,  100,  103,  105-06,  124-25, 
157-58,  182,  212,  225,  370,  380,  564 

Tunisia:  96,  100-107,  141 
Mines,  German:  5,  100 

antipersonnel  (AP):  101-02,  368 

antitank  (AT):  101,  141,368 

"bottle  mine":  374 

improvised:  144,  446 

mustard  pot:  368,  380 

nonmetallic:  181 

plastic:  2l7n,  494 

S  ("Bouncing  Betty"):  102,  147,  181-82,  190,368, 
380 

Schu:  107,  158,  181-83,  217,  302,  380,  446 

Stock:  181 

Teller:  101-02,  107,  130,  147,  181,  190,  2l7n, 
302,  322,  368,  446,  564 

Topf:  217,494-95 

wooden  box:  107,  141,  144,  190,  217 
Mines,  Italian:  101,  155,  2l7n 
Mines  and  minelaying,  U.S.:  96-97,  102,  197-98, 

370,  465,  472,  474,  477,  564 
Minturno:  245 
Mistretta:  141 

Model,  Field  Marshal  Walter:  483 
Moletta  River:  196 
Mondovi:  113-14 
Moneymore  General  Depot:  20 
Monschau:  461,  464,  467,  470 
Mont  Castre  ridge:  369 
Montalbano:  147 
Montargis:  402 
Monte  Camino:  188 
Monte  Camolato:  146-47 
Monte  Grande:  216 
Monte  Lungo:  186 
Monte  Maggiore:  188 
Monte  Orso  railroad  tunnel:  244 
Monte  Pelato:  146 
Monte  Porchia:  188-89 
Monte  San  Biagio:  244 
Monte  San  Fratello:  148 


Monte  Serrasiccia:  216 

Monte  Soprana:  155 

Monte  Trocchio:  189 

Montebourg:  398 

Montecatini:  246 

Montesano:  250 

Montgomery,  General  Sir  Bernard  L.:  83—84,  97, 

115-16,  137,  165,  286,  499,  537 
Moore,  Col.  Anderson  T.  W.:  97 
Moore,  Maj.  Gen.  Cecil  R.:  31,  56,  285,  287,  401, 
489,  565 

and  dual  command,  ETOUSA  and  SOS:  28,  259, 
350,  561 

and  engineer  intelligence:  296-98 

and  engineer  manpower:  38,  56-57,  260,  271,  315 

and  U.K.  buildup:  42-43,  256,  260,  262,  264,  267, 
272,  275,  277 
Moosberg:  550 
Morlaix:  359-60,  364,  383 
Mortain:  385 
Mosbach:  554 

Moselle  River:  390,  392,  423-30,  452,  462,  481 
Mostaganem:  1 19 
Mott,  1st  Lt.  Hugh:  500-504 
Mt.  Cauvin  tank  farm:  408 
Mt.  Etna:  140,  146 
Mt.  Vesuvius:  251 

Mountain  Division,  10th:  216,  220-22 
Mountain  Infantry  Regiments,  86th  and  87th:  220 
Mouterhouse:  485 
Muehlhausen:  542 
Muenster:  538-39 

Mulberry  artificial  harbor:  340,  342-44,  361,  408 
Mulde  River:  542,  544-47 
Mulhouse:  454 
Munich:  553,  555,  559 
Munich-Salzburg  autobahn:  555 
Musket  operation:  154 
Mussolini  Canal:  244 

Naab  River:  548 
Namur:  364,  390,  478 
Nancy:  405,  424 
Nantes:  359 

Naples:  153-54,  158,  162,  165-67,  175,  184,  192, 
195,  203,  226,  234,  241-42,  249-53,  286,  438, 
454.  See  also  Port  reconstruction. 
Naso  ridge:  148 

National  Redoubt  (Alpine  Fortress):  553  —  56 
Native  Labor  Company,  144th:  92 
Naval  Beach  Battalions:  122-23,  133,  305 

1st:  193,  437 

2d:  129 

4th:  437 

8th:  438 
Naval  combat  demolition  units  (NCDUs):  305-08. 

See  also  Amphibious  operations. 
Naval  LCVP  Units: 

No.  1:  506n,  516 

No.  3:  517 


INDEX 


601 


Naval  Operations  Board:  145 
Navy,  U.S. 

Amphibious  Corps,  Atlantic  Fleet:  65 

Amphibious  Force,  XI:  305 

Amphibious  Training  Base:  304-06,  310 

bases  in  the  United  Kingdom:  9,  67 

in  Iceland:  11-12,  16 

Italian  campaign  support:  156,  158,  163,  169,  195 

Normandy  landings  support:  282,  299,  301, 
304-07,  316,  320-21,  325-26,  333,  337, 
342-43,  565 

North  Africa  landings  support:  68-69,  73,  78-79 

fKjrt  reconstruction  operations:  136,  237,  352  —  53, 
355,  361-62,  445-47 

Rhine  River  crossing  support:  489,  516,  526,  535, 
538 

Seabees:  15,  446,  538 

Sicilian  operations  support:  123-24,  127,  131-32 

southern  France  landings  support:  436—37, 
439-41,443 

Task  Unit  122.5.3:  518 
Navy  Cross:  326 
Navy  Intelligence  Board:  436 
Neckar  River:  553-54,  557 
Neffe:  476-78 

Neptune  plan:  286,  299-300,  303-04,  309,  342,  349 
Nettuno:  193,  196 
New  York  Port  of  Embarkation:  43,  60,  157,  173, 

277,  279 
Newbury  depot:  46,  272 
Newcastle:  68 
Newport:  46 
Niblo,  Col.  Urban:  205 
Nicholas,  Col.  Richard  U.:  490 
Nicosia:  139,  145 
Nierstein:  525-26 
Nijmegen  bridge:  504 
Niscemi:  131 

Nissen  huts:  8-9,  12-14,  33,  52,  54-55,  265 
Noce,  Brig.  Gen.  Daniel:  65  —  66,  79 
Nordhausen:  544 
Nordheim:  552 

NORDWIND  operation:  484,  486 
Normandy  Base  Section:  351-52 
Normandv  landings.  See  O.maha  Beach;  U lAH  Beach. 
North  Africa  invasion:  40,  59-69,  72,  74-82,  114, 

121-22,  438.  See  also  Torch  op>eration. 
North  African  Air  Service  Command  (NAASC):  90 
North  African  Theater  of  Operations,  U.S.  Armv 
(NATOUSA):  110-11,  113,  152,  156,200-201, 
203,  228,  245,  249,  252,  436,  450.  See  also 
Command  structure  problems;  Services  of 
Supply,  NATOUSA. 
North  African  Training  Command:  93 
Northern  Ireland:  8-9,  17-22.  35,  68,  261 
Northern  Ireland  Base  Command  (Provisional):  21 
Northern  Ireland  Base  Section:  29,  272 
Northwest  African  Air  Forces  (NAAF):  88-90 
Nuremberg:  547,  553 

Oberforstbach:  418 


Oberwesel:  528-29 
O'Daniel,  Brig.  Gen.  John  W.:  157 
Oddi  Airdrome:  II 
Odenwald:  531 

Office,  Chief  Engineer,  ETOUSA:  28,  42,  46, 
560-61.  See  also  Moore,  Maj.  Gen.  Cecil  R. 
administrative  divisions:  36,  262,  267-68,  272, 

285,  289-90,  296,  298,  317,  350-51 
cross-Channel  plans  and  operations:  31—33, 
256-57,  280,  282-85,  297,  304,  349,  397, 
489,  531 
and  Torch  operation:  38-39,  56 
Office,  Chief  of  Engineers,  War  Department:  17,  35, 
40,  42-43,  48-49,  51,  60,  63,  229,  279,  288, 
296-97 
Ohrdruf:  546 
Oise  Base  Section:  351 
Oise  River:  389 

Oliver,  Maj.  Gen.  Lunsford  E.:  538 
Omaha  Beach 
assault  plans:  299-303,  305-07,  310-12,  315-16 
landing  operations:  317,  319-34,  339,  506 
post  D-day  operations:  340-44,  346-47,  349,  394, 
400,  405-08 
Ombrone  River:  211 

O'Neill,  Lt.  Col.  John  T.:  305,  306n,  307 
Oppenheim:  525-26,  528,  530-31,  546 
Oran:  59,  69,  74,  77-78,  83,  86,  88,  91,  111-13, 

119,  122,  124-25,  156,  158 
Ordnance  Department:  47 
Orleans:  402 
Orleansville:  74,  77 
Orne  River:  299 
Orscholz  Switch  Line:  430 
OrtheuviUe:  478-79,  483 
Oujda:  153 

Ouled  Rahmoun:  92,  114 
Our  River:  462,  474,  480-81 
Ourthe  River:  478-79 

Overlord  operation:  256,  262,  265,  277,  281-83, 
286-88,  297,  299,  302,  310-11,  344,  348,  351, 
356,  358,  438 
Oxford:  298 
Oxwich  Beach:  310 
Oxx,  Col.  Francis  H.:  60 

Pachten:  433 

Pack  animals:  99-  100,  148,  188,  209,  211,213,  225, 

229 
Padgett,  S/Sgt.  Ewart  M.:  423 
Paestum:  156,  162,  249 
Paignton:  310 
Palermo:  118,  132,  136-37,  139,  141,  150,  156,  159. 

See  also  Port  reconstruction. 
Parachute  Infantry  Regiment,  505th:  473 
Paris:  351,  356,  362,  385-89,  399-400,  402-03, 

405,  410,413 
Pash,  Col.  Boris  T.:  556-58 

P3SS3L1"    ^48 

Patch,  Lt.  Gen.  Alexander  M.:  436-37,  452,  487, 
534,  550 


602 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Patillo,  Lt.  Col.:  306n 
Patterson  Field  (Iceland):  15 
Patton,  Lt.  Gen.  George  S.,  Jr. 
and  North  Africa  operations:  59,  72,  74,  113 
Seventh  Army  commander:  115-16,  131,  135, 

136-37 
Third  Army  commander:  390,  400-401,  405,  423, 
429,  434-35,  483,  515,  525,  527,  530,  547, 
549,  555 
Paxson,  Col.  Harry  O.:  185-86,  192 
PBS  (Main):  234,  245,  252.  See  also  Peninsular  Base 

Section. 
Peckham,  1st  Lt.  Charles:  328 
Pegnitz  River:  553 

Peiper,Obersturmbannfuehrer  Joachim:  469,47 1  —  74 
Pence,  Brig.  Gen.  Arthur  W.:  29,  39,  113,  171,  203, 

232 
Peninsular  Base  Section:  171-74,  199,  203,  222, 

227,  231,  232-34,  236-42,  244-55,  563 
Pensouth:  234,  254.  See  also  Peninsular  Base  Section. 
Pergrin,  Lt.  Col.  David  E.:  471-72,  507 
Periers:  367,  369-71,  374,  376,  394 
Perregaux:  91 

Person,  Col.  John  L.:  411-12 
Petralia:  137,  139 

Petroleum,  Oil,  and  Lubricants.  See  POL  supply. 
Philbin,  Lt.  Col.  Tobias  R.:  431 
Philippeville:  91-92,  113 
Photo  interpreters:  145,  185-86,  192,  229-30.  See 

also  Aerial  photography. 
Photo  Squadron,  13th:  296 
Pichon-Fondouk  el  Aouareb  Pass:  94 
Pico:  209 

Pierced  steel  plank:  6,  87 
Piers:  354-55 
causeways:  343—44 
Lobnitz  pierheads:  343—44 
naval  ponton:  117-18,  124,  128-29,  131-32, 

169-70,  316,361,442 
ramps:  136,  238 

"whale"  floating  roadway:  340,  343—44 
Pietravairano:  224 

Pile  driving  equipment:  167,  238,  488 
Piolenc:  458 

Piombino:  234,  236-38,  252 
Pipeline  construction:  6,  563 
Mediterranean:  61-62,  91-93,  119,  138,  172-73, 

232-33,  238-42,  252,  455-59 
northern  Europe:  280,  282,  284,  291,  358,  391, 

393,405,408-13 
ship-to-shore:  91,  284,  291,  408-09 
training:  406 

victaulic  coupling:  62,  92,  410 
Pisa:  211,  214,  218,  231,  245,  247 
Pistoia:  214-16 

Plank,  Brig.  Gen.  Ewart  G.:  287,  349,  351 
PLUTO  (Pipeline  Under  the  Ocean):  406 
Plymouth:  313,  317 
Po  River:  217-20,  224,  228 
Po  valley:  213,  215,  217- 18,  233,  240 


Pointe  de  la  Percee:  330-31 
POL  supply:  6,  32-33,  563 
Major  POL  System:  406-13 
Mediterranean  operations:  62,  91-92,  119,  138, 

167,  172-73,  174,  232,  238-41,  252,  447 
Minor  POL  System:  406-09,  411 
northern  Europe  operations:  284,  357,  405—13 
storage  tanks  and  pumping  stations:  62,  91—92, 
138,  173-74,  238,  240,  357-58,  405-06, 
408-09 
Polich,  Lt.  Col.  Frank  J.:  188 
Poligny-Mouchard:  452 
Pomigliano  Airfield:  245 
Pont-du-Fahs:  84 
Pont-Hebert:  337,  374-75 
Pontaubault:  400-402 
Ponte  Olivo  Airfield:  119,  131,  138,  145 
Pontedera:  231 
Ponthierry:  387-88 
Pontine  marshes:  209,  211 
Poole:  313 

Port-aux-Poules:  121-23,  157-58 
Port  Battalion  (TC),  382d:  129 
Port-de-Bouc:  445,  447-48,  456-58 
Port-en-Bessin:  299,  302,  406-09 
Port-Lyautey:  63,  69,  73,  86-87,  93 
Port  reconstruction,  Mediterranean:  113,  119,  129 
Leghorn:  233-34,  237-40 
Marseille:  233,  445-47,  456,  458 
minor  ports,  Italy:  234,  236-39 
minor  ports,  southern  France:  439,  444—45,  447, 

458 
Naples:  167-74,  177,  232,  234,  236-39,  245-48, 

281,  447 
Palermo:  115-16,  136,  138,  151-52 
Toulon:  445-46,  456 
Port  reconstruction,  northern  Europe:  31,  33, 
277-78,  280-83.  286-89,  291 
Antwerp:  351,  363-66 
Cherbourg:  282,  348-49,  351-57,  360,  367, 

406 
Le  Havre:  360-63 

minor  ports:  310,  340,  344,  346-49,  351,  356, 
358-60,  365-66 
Portland:  312-13,  317 
Porto  Empedocle:  119,  137-38,  151 
Ports,  artificial:  310,  339,  340,  343 
Ports  (TC) 
4th:  346 
5th:  363 

11th:  310,344,346-47 
13th:  363 
17th:  365 
Pouppeville:  335-37,  341 
Power  shovel:  99 
Powerboats:  427,  434,  459,  505,  508-10,  512,  526, 

532,  535-36 
Pozzilli:  188 
Pozzuoli:  239 
Prime  movers:  80,  144,  195 


INDEX 


603 


Projects  for  Continental  Operations  (PROCO): 

277-82,  285,  287,  289 
Provisional  Engineer  Group,  V  Corps:  307 
Provisional  Engineer  Special  Brigade  Group:  310, 

315,  332,  339,  340,  344,  346,  438 
Public  utilities  restoration:  61,  151-52,  168,  172, 

237,  242,  245,  247-48,  280,  284-85,  542 
Pursuit  Squadron,  33d:  12 
Purteil,  Lt.  William  E.:  463 

Quadrant  Conference  (Quebec):  256-57,  259,  262 
Quarries:  187,  225,  238,  356,  357,  462,  475 
Quartermaster  Corps:  5—6,  45,  278 
Quartermaster  Group,  49th:  246 
Quartermaster  Railhead  Company,  557th:  312 
Quartermaster  Service  Companies: 

3206th:  312 

4145th:  347 
Quartermaster  units:  36,  122-23,  238,  272,  274, 

309-10 
Queen  Mary:  19 
Querqueville:  357 
Quiberon  Bay:  356,  359 
Quineville:  304,  335 
Quonset  barges:  218,  220-21 

Rabat:  118-19,  121 
Rade  d'Agay:  443 

Rafts  and  ferries:  68,  175-76,218,220-21,425-26, 
434,  460,  505-06,  508,  514-15,  517-18,  521, 
523-24,  526,  528,  531,  533,  535-36 
Railroad  bridges  and  tunnels 

British  unit  construction  railway  bridge  (UCRB): 

288,  397,  399-401,403 
northern  Europe:  283,  288,  291,  356,  364,  383, 

397-403,  405 
Sicily  and  Italy:  141,  152,  229,  233,  242,  244-45 
southern  France:  451-53,  537-38,  564 
training:  398 
Railroad  reconstruction.  See  also  Railroad  bridges 
and  tunnels. 
cross-Channel  attack  plans:  280-83,  286,  288,  291 
Italy:  152,  172,  232-33,  242,  244-45 
North  Africa:  61 
northern  Europe:  282,  356-57,  364,  397-99,  403, 

405,  542 
Sicily:  119,  137,  152 
southern  France:  448,  451—53 
training:  41,  398 
Rainbow-5  plan:  8,  17 
Rambouillet:  402 
Rampan:  375 
Ramps.  See  Piers. 
Ranee  River:  381-82 
Randazzo:  139,  141,  144,  146-47 
Ranger  Battalions 
1st:  74,  76 
3d:  128,  136 
Rangers:  126,  129-31,  159,  162,  177,  195,  300, 
312,  328,  330,  552.  See  also  Ranger  Battalions. 


Rapido  River:  180-81,  186,  190-92,  208,  224,  233 

Raviscanina:  186 

Reading:  298 

Real  estate  operations:  119,  173,  203,  248-49,  351 

Recovery  unit,  T-2:  128,  184 

Red  Ball  Express:  397,411 

Reddy  Fox  explosive  pipe:  304,  306,  437 

Rednitz  River:  553 

Reed,  Lt.  Col.  Howard  H.:  39 

Regen  River:  548 

Regensburg:  547-48 

Reggio  di  Calabria:  154 

Regnitz  River:  553 

Reims:  412 

Relizane:  119 

Remagen:  500-503,  505,  507-11,  513-14 

Remagen  bridge.  See  Ludendorff  Bridge. 

Rennes:  383,  397,  407 

Reno  River:  216,  231 

Resia  Pass:  555 

Rettel:  424 

Reykjavik:  1 1-15 

Reynolds,  Sgt.  John  A.:  502 

Rheinberg:  517-19,  527,  535 

Rheinduerkheim:  534 

Rhens:  527 

Rhine  gorge:  525,  527 

Rhine  River:  413,  414,  423,  430,  454,  458,  484-86 

Rhine  River  crossings 

First  Army:  500-16,  517,  524,  526,  535-36,  541 

Third  Army:  517,  525-31,  535-36,  546 

Seventh  Army:  517,  525,  531-36,  550-51 

Ninth  Army:  517-21,  523-36,  537-38 

planning:  429,  459-60,  486-88,  489-91, 
499-500,  504,  517-18,  531 
Rhone  River  valley:  436,  447,  449,  451-55,  458-59 
Ricciardi,  Roberto:  163 
Ridgway,  Maj.  Gen.  Matthew  B.:  473 
Riggs,  Lt.  Col.  Thomas  J.,  Jr.:  463-66 
Ripon:  41 

River  crossings:  5,  229,  382.  See  also  Boats;  Bridging 
operations;  Rafts  and  ferries;  and  rivers  by  name. 

artillery  support:  371-72,  388,  431,  433,  490-92, 
519,  525,  532-33,  535 

cableways:  459,  489,  492,  495,  532-33,  540,  554 

doctrine:  535 

equipment:  455,  488,  518-21 

landing  craft:  459-60,  489,  491-92,  494-96, 
504,  506,  508,  510,  513-16,  517-21,  523, 
525-26,  528-29,  531-33,  535-36,  540 

training:  212,  218,  224,  424,  459,  518-19,  532 
Road  construction 

Iceland:  15 

Italy:  165,  186-87,  192,  195-96,  198-99,  209, 
211-12,  214-17,  226,  229,  245 

North  Africa:  61,  82,  94,  96-99 

northern  France:  280,  283,  286,  393-94,  397 

Sicily:  140-41,  146-47 
Robinson,  Lt.  Melvin  O.:  551 
Rochefort:  479 


604 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Rocherath:  470-71 

Rock  and  gravel  supply:  8,  13,  15,  99,  140,  175, 
187-88,  196,  215,  225-26,  238,  356-57,  377, 
394,  488.  563 
Roer  River  crossings:  467,  489-92,  494-500, 

517-18,524 
Roer  River  dams:  461,  490 
Roerdorf:  496-97 
Roermond:  489 
Roetgen:  415,  417-18 

Rogers,  Col.  Thomas  DeF.:  42,  333-34,  370,  422 
Rolandseck:  514-15 
Rome:  154,  188,  192,  208-09,  211,  234,  237,  240, 

244,  246 
Rommel,  Field  Marshal  Erwin:  97,  301-02 
Romney  huts:  55,  265 
Roosevelt,  Franklin  D.:  22,  538 
Roosevelt,  Brig.  Gen.  Theodore,  Jr.:  333,  337 
Roosevelt  Bridge:  538 
Roscoff:  360,  363 
Rosenheim:  556 
Rosneath:  66-67 
Ross,  1st  Lt.  Robert  P.:  329 
Rouen:  360-63 

Roundup  operation:  22-23,  31-32,  36,  48,  57,  278 
Route  Napoleon:  436 
Routes 
16:  462 
172:  370 
174:  373,  375 
N-4:  478-79 
N-13:  393-94 
N-15:  476 
N-23:  471 
N-26:  478-79 
N-28:  477 
N-800:  370,  394 
Royal  Air  Force:  49,  90,  294-95 
Royal  Engineers:  12,  15,  18,  21,  92,  315 
Royal  Navy:  74-76,  78,  169,  195,  237-38,  320-21, 

360,  363,  489 
Ruhr:  423,  490,  499 
Ruhr  Pocket:  538,  540-41,  544,  547 
Russian  5th  Guards  Airborne  Division:  548 
Russian  forces:  542,  547-48 
Rust,  Lt.  Col.  Clayton  A.:  511-12 
Ryder,  Maj.  Gen.  Charles  W.:  59,  77 

Saalach  River:  556 

Saale  River:  541-42,  544,  547 

Saar-Moselle  triangle:  430 

Saar  River:  423,  429-34,  487 

Saarbruecken:  423,  484,  487 

Saarlautern:  429-34 

Sacco  River:  227 

Safi:  63,  79-80 

St.  Brieuc:  359,  383 

St.-Charles:  114 

St.  Die:  454 

St.  Gilles:  377,  385 


St.  Goar:  527-30 

St.  Goarshausen:  528-29 

St.  Hilaire-du-Harcouet:  400-401 

St.  Hubert:  479 

St.  Jean-de-Daye:  371,  374,  409 

St.  Laurent:  300,  326-28,  331-32 

St.  Lo:  367,  370-71,  375,  394,  408-10 

St.  Lo  breakout:  359,  399,  405 

St.  Lo-Periers  road:  376 

St.  Malo:  344,  346,  348,  358-59,  381-82,  384 

St.  Marcel:  457 

St.  Michel-en-Greve:  359,  383 

St.  Peter:  548 

St.  Raphael:  439,  443-44,  456,  458 

St.  Sauveur-le-Vicomte:  303 

St.  Tropez:  439,  441-42,  445,  451 

St.  Vaast-la-Hougue:  344,  346-49 

St.-Vith:  461,  464-66,  471,  476,  483-84 

Ste.-Barbe-du-Tlelat:  157 

Ste.  Honorine-des-Pertes:  300,  407-09 

Ste.  Marie-du-Mont:  335 

Ste.  Maxime:  439 

Ste.  Mere-Eglise:  286,  302-03,  332 

Salcombe:  305,  308 

Sale  airfield:  93 

Salerno:  154-56,  158-59,  161-65,  167,  171,  177, 
192,  437 

Salm  River:  472-73 

Salon:  457 

Salzburg:  553,  555-56 

San  Benedetto:  220 

San  Biagio:  244 

San  Felice:  239 

San  Pietro:  192 

San  Stefano:  238-40 

San  Vittore:  239 

Sandau:  539 

Sandhofen:  458 

Sant'  Agata:  148 

Sant'  Angelo:  190-91 

Santerno  valley:  212 

Santo  Stefano:  141,  147-48,  152 

Saone  River:  452 

Sardinia:  153 

Sarre-Union:  429 

Sarrebourg:  429-30,  453,  458,  484 

Sarreguemines:  429,  458 

Sauer  River:  462,  480-82 

Sbeitla:  84,  89,  100,  107 

Sbeitla-Gafsa  road:  98 

Sbeitla- Hadjeb  el  Aioun  road:  94 

Sbiba:  94,  96-97 

Scaling  ladders:  371-72,  384 

Scauri:  246 

Scharnhorst  Line:  414,  417-18 

Scheidgen:  482 

Schelde  estuary:  363,  365 

Schill  Line:  414,418 

Schlausenbach:  463 

Schmidthof:  418 


INDEX 


605 


Schnee  Eifel:  419,  461-62,  464 

Schoenberg:  461,  464-66,  476 

Schoenebeck:  540 

Schoppen:  469 

Schwammenauel  dam:  490 

Schwarz  Erntz  River:  462 

Schweinfurt:  552 

Scoglitti:  126,  132,  134 

Scorpion  flails.  See  Tanks. 

Scotland:  8-9,  66-68 

Scott,  Col.  Stanley  L.:  24 

Sea  Mules  (tugboats):  510,  517-21,  523,  536 

Sebou  River:  73 

Sedan:  389 

Sedgewick:  238 

Seine  Base  Section:  351 

Seine  River:  360,  362-63,  367 

Seine  River  crossings:  385-87,  389-90,  402-03, 

410,413 
Sele  River:  154,  156,  159,  161,  163-64,  166-67 
Selune  River:  400-401 
Senden:  538 

Serchio  River:  213,  231,  247-48 
Serino  aqueducts:  168,  242,  247 
Services  of  Supply,  ETOUSA:  21,  24-26,  28-29, 

31,  33-34,  36-38,  43,  57,  60,  257-58,  261, 

270,  278,  287-89,  315,  349,  561.  See  also 

Command  structure  problems;  Communications 

Zone. 
Services  of  Supply,  ETOUSA,  Engineer  Service:  26, 

28-29,  31-33,  37-39,  42-43,  47-48,  51-53, 

55-56,  62,  77,  200,  256,  259,  269-71,  289 
Services  of  Supply,  NATOUSA:  26,  100,  110-12, 

115,  121,  153,  157,  172,  200-201,  203,  449-50 
Services  of  Supply,  War  Department:  24,  37,  65, 

88-89.  See  also  Army  Service  Forces. 
Sessa:  239 
Sesto:  241 

Seves  River:  369,  377 

Sextant  Conference  (Cairo-Tehran):  256,  260 
Seydhisfjordhur:  13 
Sfax:  84,  92 
Shark  force:  119-20 
Sherman,  Col.  Harry  B.:  176 
Shingle  operation:  180,  192,  195.  See  also  Anzio. 
Shoemaker,  Pvt.  William  J.:  328-29 
Shrivenham:  40,  47 
Sicilian  operations:  114,  115-35,  136-41,  144-52, 

153,  165,  437 
Sieg  River:  514 
Siege  operations:  382,  384 
Siegfried  Line:  392,  430,  454,  461-62,  464,  467, 

486 
breaching  operations:  414,  419,  429,  432,  488,  565 
fortifications:  413,  414- 15,  417,  420,  424,  432, 
487 
Siena:  211 
Sigrriaringen:  557 
Silla:  231 
Simon,  Sgt.  Zolton:  328 


Simpson,  Lt.  Gen.  William  H.:  489-90,  492,  499, 

517 
Sinzig:  502 
Sisteron:  451  —  52 
Sittard:  518 

Skyline  Drive:  462,  474,  480 
Slapton  Sands:  310-12 
Sledgehammer  operation:  22 
Smith,  Pvt.  Harry:  402 
Smith,  Lt.  Col.  Lionel  F.:  328 
Smoke  screening  operations:  127,  175,  177,  187,231, 

373-74,  384,  428-29,  494-95,  507,  514,  527, 

540,  546 
SmuUen,  Lt.  Col.  Chauncey  K.:  449 
Smyser,  Col.  Rudolf  E.,  Jr.:  90 
Snake  devices.  See  Tanks. 
"Snortin'  Bull  Express":  542 
Societe  Nationale  des  Chemins  de  Fer:  399 
jOissons*  40^ 

Somervell,  Lt.  Gen.  Brehon  B.:  24,  43,  58 
Somme  River:  389 
Sommerfeld  track:  42,  68,  75-76,  82,  87,  134,  175, 

196 
Sonnino:  21 1 
Sorrento:  154,  162 
SOS  Task  Force  A:  60,  72 
Sottevast  railroad  yard:  357 
Souk  el  Arba:  87,  89-90,  92-93 
Souk  el  Khemis:  87,  89-90,  92 
SouUe  River:  399 
Sousse:  92 
South  African  Survey  Companies:  227 

46th:  218 
Southampton:  313 
Southern  Base  Section:  29,  46-47,  50,  52-53,  265, 

267,  272,313-15 
Southern  France  operations:  222-23,  233,  255, 

436-60.  See  also  Anvil  operation. 
Southern  Line  of  Communications  (SOLOC):  450, 

457 
Spa:  471 

Spaatz,  Lt.  Gen.  Carl  W.:  88,  90 
Spaccasassi  Creek:  197 
Spain:  69,  74,  153 
Spanish  Morocco:  69,  74,  85,  153 
Sparanise:  245 

Special  Engineer  Task  Force,  Omaha  Beach:  307-08 
Special  Observer  Group  (SPOBS):  7-11,  16 
Special  Service  Force,  1st:  199 
Specker,  Sgt.  Joseph  C:  190 
Spohn,  2d  Lt.  George  S.:  127n 
Staging  and  marshaling  areas:  246,  262,  313—15 
Stark,  Col.  Alexander  N.,  Jr.:  97 
Station  de  Sened:  108 
Stavelot:  471-72 
Stoumont:  473-74 

Strait  of  Messina:  150,  153-54,  158,  250 
Strasbourg:  454,  484,  486,  557 
Stuttgart:  554,  557 
Submarines,  German  midget:  504,  509,  523,  535 


606 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Sudbury  depot:  274,  276 
Sulzbach:  548 
Sunk  tank  farm:  357—58 

Supply.  See  also  POL  supply;  Supply  depots;  Supply 
shortages, 
buildup  for  cross-Channel  attack:  32-33,  43-44, 

256,  259-61,  263,  265,  272,  278-79, 

285,  288-89 
Class  II:  43-44,  60,  272,  277,  282 
Class  IV:  32,  43,  60,  99,  252,  272,  277,  279-80, 

282,  297 
Class  V:  60 

controlled  and  critical  items:  44,  112,  157 
doctrine:  560 
heavy  equipment  need:  5,  20,  44,  48,  52,  55, 

86-87,  89-90,  166,  260-61,  354,  562-63 
to  Iceland:  12-14 

inventory  procedures:  46,  157,  450,  560 
ISS  manifest  system:  261 
for  Italian  campaign:  157,  167,  172-73,  193,  199, 

219,  226-27,  233-34,  236-37,  245,  251-52 
joint  U.S.-British  stockpiling:  288-89 
loading  and  handling  problems:  12,  45,  79—80, 

85-86,  133,  137-38,  163,  195,  265 
of  Normandy  beaches:  308-09,  312-13,  316, 

327,  338-39,  340-44,  349 
in  North  Africa:  42,  60-61,  72-74,  76-80,  82, 

111-14,  286 
operations  on  the  Continent:  366,  376—77, 

390-91,  394,419 
PROCO  forecasting  system:  277-82,  285,  287,  289 
reverse  lend-lease:  41-42,  269,  278 
shipment  marking  systems:  19-20,  259-61 
of  Sicilian  operations:  115-16,  121,  124,  129, 

132-35,  137-39,  148,  151 
of  southern  France  operations:  351,  441-42,  444, 

449-50 
unit  equipment  preshipping:  259—60 
from  U.S.  to  the  United  Kingdom:  19-20,  41-44, 

259-61,278-79 
Supply  depots 
on  the  Continent:  280,  282,  284,  286-88,  351, 

364,  366,  390-91 
lists  and  catalog  problems:  32-33,  42-43,  46-47, 

254,  274 
simnel  (map):  298 
in  the  United  Kingdom:  19-20,  45-46,  56,  58, 

261-66,  269,  271-72,  274-76,  560 
Supply  shortages:  20,  44-45,  47-48,  392,  411,  560 
bridging  equipment:  166-67,  184-85,  191,213, 

218,  390,  454-55,  507,  531-32 
heavy  equipment:  166,  224,  261 
railroad  rolling  stock:  356,  364,  452 
spare  parts:  45,  48,  82,  214,  253-54,  275-76, 

413,  450 
vehicles:  60-61,  79,  99,  112-13,  137,  261,  339, 

356,  563 
Supreme  Headquarters,  Allied  Expeditionary  Force 
(SHAEF):  258-59,  285,  287-88,  350,  359,  449, 
476,  484,  489,  517,  557 


Sure  River:  488 

Surkamp,  Capt.  Arthur  T.:  483 

Survey  Directorate,  AFHQ:  120 

Swansea:  305,  310 

Sweeney,  Maj.  Matthew  J.:  515 

Swenholt,  Col.  Helmer:  402,  405 

Swindon:  298 

Syracuse:  116,  126,  136,  138 

T-Force  headquarters:  557,  559 

Tabarka:  92,  114 

Tabb,  Capt.  Robert  P.,  Jr.:  333,  336 

Tabet,  Lt.  Col.  Sam:  477 

Table  of  Basic  Allowances  (TBA):  43,  89,  99,  1 12, 

253,261,277 
Tables  of  Organization  and  Equipment  (TOE):  4—6, 
38,  43,  100,  141,  223,  241,  254,  277,  351,  393, 
562-63 
Tactical  Air  Force,  XII:  456 
Tafaraoui:  74,  86,  91 
Tailfingen:  557—58 
Tancarville  Canal:  362 
Tank  Battalions 

14th:  500 

70th:  303,  481 

707th:  475 

738th:  510 

741st:  301,322 

756th:  192 
Tank  Destroyer  Battalion,  705th:  478 
Tankdozers:  248,  304,  306-08,  317,  319,  325-26, 

334,  381,  420 
Tanks 

with  canal  defense  searchlights:  510,  516,  523 

duplex-drive  amphibious:  319-20,  222,  324-25, 
489,  532-33 

flame-throwing  "Crocodile":  384 

hedgerow  cutter:  367 

M-4:  144,  283,  500,  504,  506,  520,  524 

M4A4  with  dozer  blade:  437-38,  441-42 

with  Scorpion  flail:  105,  116,  158,  564 

with  snake  devices:  105,  183,  488,  564 

T-26  (Pershing):  500,  506,  509,  515 

tank-gapping  teams:  437,  441—43 

use  in  bridging:  184,  438 
Taranto:  154 
Task  Forces 

4  (Iceland):  11-12,  14 

Allen:  189-90 

Engeman:  500-504 

Lovelady:  415,417-18 

King:  415,  418 

Luckett:  481 

Raff:  96 

Riley:  482 

Stark:  97 

Welborn:  545 

X  (3d  Armored  Division):  418 
Tassigny,  Lt.  Gen.  Jean  de  Lattre  de:  454,  557 
Taute  River:  349,  356,  370-71,  374,  377 


INDEX 


607 


Tebessa:  83-84,  87.  92,  96,  113-14 

Technical  intelligence  teams,  Allied:  556-59 

Telephone  communications:  241,  413,  457 

Telergma:  87,  89,  92 

Tennessee  Valley  Authority:  296 

Terminal  landing  party:  77 

Termini  Imerese:  137,  152 

Terneuzen:  365 

Terracina:  209,  211 

Terrain  models:  218,  532 

Thala:  84,  96-97,  107 

Thatcham-Newbury  dep)ot:  45—46 

Thelepte:  98,  107 

Thionville:  424,  426-29 

Thomas,  Col.  William  N.,  Jr.:  193 

Thompson,  Col.  Paul  W.:  293 

Tiger  amphibious  exercise:  312 

Tilly:  388 

Timmerman,  1st  Lt.  Karl:  502 

Tirrenia  def>ot:  251 

Tlemcen:  94 

Todd,  Lt.  Col.  John  G.:  185 

Tombolas:  408-09 

Tompkins,  Col.  William  F.:  24 

Tompkins,  Maj.  William  F.,  Jr.:  508 

Torch  operation:  22-23,  26,  32-33,  35,  37-40, 

43,  45-46,  53,  55-57,  59-60,  62-63,  67,  82, 

91,  121,  124,  163,  255,  271,  561 
Torgau:  542 
Torquay:  317 
Torremuzza:  148 
Toul:  405 

Toulon:  436,  439,  445-46,  456 
Tournai:  389 
Towchester:  298 

Tractors:  44,  48,  81,  128,  244,  308,  331,  521 
Trailers:  144,  185,  218,  308,  331 
Training.  See  also  Amphibious  operations;  Bridging 

operations;  Minefields;  River  crossings, 
in  NATOUSA/MTOUSA:  120-21,  123-25,  212, 

218,  224-25 
in  the  United  Kingdom:  20-21,  40-41,  55, 
66-68,  271,  274,  289-91,  293,  304,  398, 
560-61 
in  the  United  States:  6,  20,  39,  65,  68,  97-98,  122, 
274,  289,  304,  560 
Transportation  Corps:  29,  119,  137,  156,  215,  282, 

340,  342,  352-53,  365,  397,  538 
Transportation  Training  Center:  291 
"Treaty  of  Antwerp":  363 
Trevieres:  342 
Tribehou:  376-77 

Trident  Conference  (Washington):  153,  256,  259 
Trier:  430 

Triflisco:  175,  177,  185 
Tripoli:  125 
Troina:  139,  145-48 
Troina  River:  147 
Trois  Fonts:  471-73,  479,  483,  507 


Troop  basis:  23,  32,  35-37,  43,  58,  61,  1 16,  256-57, 

262-63,  267 
Trucks:  5,  48,  99,  1 13,  137,  185,  193,  213,  261,  563 
Truman  Bridge:  540 
Truro:  310 
Truscott,  Lt.  Gen.  Lucian  K,  Jr.:  69,  148-50,  166, 

175-76,  179,216,438 
Tunis:  77,  83-85,  92,  124 
Tunisian  campaign:  83-94,96-114,  118,  120-21, 

250 
Tunnels.  See  Railroad  bridges  and  tunnels. 
Tyrrhenian  Sea:  180 

Uckange:  427 

Uerdingen:  519,  524,  536 

Ulm:  554 

United  Kingdom  (U.K.)  Base  Section:  349n,  351 

Unkel:  506 

Unkelbach:  506 

Urft  dam:  490 

U.S.  Army  Forces,  British  Isles  (USAFBI):  16-18, 

25,  35,  41-42 
U.S.  Army,  Northern  Ireland  Forces:  18-19 
U.S.-British  Railway  Bridging  School:  398 
U.S.  Geological  Survey:  296 
U.S.  Marine  Corps:  11,  64 

1st  Provisional  Brigade:  11  —  12,  15 
\]. S.S.Boise:  131 
U.S.S.  Chase:  80 
U.S.S.  Dallas:  73 
U.S.S.  Jeffers:  131 
U.S.S.  Leedstown:  80 
U.S.S.  Shubrick:  131 
U.S.S.  Wasp:  12 
Utah  Beach 

assault  planning:  299,  302-05,  307,  310,  312,  316 

landing  operations:  317,  319,  332-34,  336-39, 
374 

post  D-day  operations:  286,  340-42,  344,  349, 
353,  394,  398,  408 

"V-13"  streetcar:  422 

V-weapons:  364-65,  422,  510,  513,  544 

Valence:  451-52,  458 

Valognes:  304,  349-50,  394 

Varenne  River:  385 

Vaughan,  Brig.  Gen.  Harry  B.:  287,  349n 

Vecchiano:  213 

Vehicle  recovery  and  salvage  operations:  81-82,  96, 

127-28,  133,  195,  213,  338,  341,  377 
Vehicle  waterproofing:  82,  175,  307,  312,  314,  317 
Velletri:  209 
Venafro:  178-79,  188 
Verdun:  390-91,  405,  434 
Veritable  operation:  490 
Verona:  221-22 
Versailles:  402,  405 
Vesoul:  452-53,  458 
Vianden:  480-81 


608 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS:  THE  WAR  AGAINST  GERMANY 


Victaulic  Company  of  America:  62 

Victor  Bridge:  516 

Victor  Hugo  Storage  Depot:  91 

Vielsalm:  465-66 

Vienne:  457 

Vierville:  300,  302,  315,  326,  330 

Vire:  402,  410 

Vire  and  Taute  Canal:  371,  373-74 

Vire  River:  299,  302,  347,  356,  371-76,  398-99 

Vitre:  400 

Vitry-le-Francois:  390,  403 

Volturno  River:  165-66,  174-79,  180-81,  184, 

186,  224-25,  227,  230,  239 
Vosges:  485 
Vosges  Mountains:  454—55,  484 

W.  L.  Marshall:  365 

Wahlerscheid:  469-70 

Walker,  Maj.  Gen.  Walton  H.:  426-27,  430,  531 

Wallace,  Col.  David  C:  518 

Wallach:  535 

Walworth  Camp:  19 

War  Department:  8,  10-11,  16,  24,  35-38, 

43-44,  205,  222,  277-79,  297.  See  also  Office, 

Chief  of  Engineers. 
Wasserburg:  556 
Water  supply  (in  the  field):  31,  33,  107-08, 

119-20,  124,  147 
Water  supply  (municipal).  See  Public  utilities 

restoration. 
Watkins,  Maj.  Vernon  L.:  94 
Weasels,  M-29:  333,  526 
Webkooi  exercise:  195 
Weilerswist:  513 
Weisse  Elster:  542 
Weissenfels:  542 
Welborn,  Col.  John  C:  544-45 
Werra  River:  541,  546-47 
Wesel:  490,  499,  517,  537-38 
Weser  River:  539-41,  544 

West  Wall:  421,  469,  487.  See  also  Siegfried  Line. 
Western  Base  Section:  26,  29,  50,  53,  265,  272,  287, 

313-15 


Western  Naval  Task  Force:  119,  124,  437 

Western  Task  Force  (WTF):  59-61,  63,  65,  68-69, 

72-73,  78-79,  110 
Weymouth:  317 

Wharton,  Brig.  Gen.  James  E.:  312,  337-38 
Wheeler,  Col.  John  W.:  517-18,  523 
Whitcomb,  Col.  Richard:  343-44 
White,  Maj.  Gen.  Arthur  A.:  446 
White,  Lt.  Col.  Willard:  557-58 
Wiese,  Lt.  Gen.  Friedrich:  438-39 
Wilck,  Col.  Gerhard:  423 
Williams,  Sgt.  Joseph  E.:  433 
Wilmont:  20 

Wilson,  Brig.  Gen.  Arthur  R.:  60 
Wiltz:  475-76,  480-83 
Wimmenau:  485 
Wingen:  485 

Winslow,  Col.  William  R.:  380,  382,  384 
Winter  Line:  179,  180,  188 
Winter  operations:  215,  240,  462,  471,  488 
Wirtzfeld:  469-70 
Wissembourg:  485 
Withee,  T/5  Edward  S.:  464 
Witney:  298 

Woerner,  Lt.  David  M.:  463 

Wolfe,  Brig.  Gen.  Henry  C:  66,  74,  121,  455,  487 
Wood,  2d  Lt.  Phill  C,  Jr.:  322-23 
Woofus  rocket-firing  LCM:  437 
Woolacombe:  306-07 
Wooten,  Maj.  Gen.  Richard  M.:  24 
Worms:  429,  525,  531-35,  550 
Wright  Field:  49 
Wrotham:  9 
Wuerzburg:  552 
Wurm  River:  420-21 
Wyatt,  Lt.  Col.  Aaron  A.,  Jr.:  157-58 

X-Ray  Force:  193 

Yates,  Maj.  Robert  B.:  473-74,  507 
Young,  Col.  Mason  J.:  544 

Zeitz:  542 


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