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Digitized by the Internet Archive 

in 2007 with funding from 

IVIicrosoft Corporation 

luary 4, 1917 

Supplement to LAND & WATER 



The factors of successful 
breeches- making are — fine 
wear-resisting cloths, skilful 
cutting, and careful, thorough 
tailor work— and all these wc 

Abundant experience, too, 
contributes importantly in 
giving utmost satisfaction, for 
Grant and Cockburn have 
made breeches for ninety- 
five years. 

We keep on hand a number of pairs 
of breeches, and are therefore often 
ble to meet immediate requirements, 
or we can cut and try a pair on the 
same day, and complete the next day. 
If ur^entW wanted. 

Oar New All-Leather Puttees never tear or fray out. 

These most comfortable, good-looking puttees are made entirely of 
fine supple tan leather, and fasten simply with one buckle at bottom- 
They are extremely durable, even if subjected to the friction of 
riding, as the edges never tear or fray out. 

The price per pair is 16 6, post free inland, or postage abroad, 1/- 
:xtra, or »ent on approval on receipt of business (not banker's) 
reference and home address. 


ESTD. 1821 


Military and Civil Tailors, Legging Makers. 


'eu; Extracts from Letters received 



" There is not a better lamp in France." 
" Your lamp has boon in use two year.s and is still perfect." 
" There is not a lamp to touch yours for our job here." 
" I would not be without your lamp for anything." 
. "Your lamp is absolutely essential to me." 
" Your lamps are considered IT out here." 


'■ It is readily agreed out here that there is only 
one lamp — The Orilu.\." 


" I find the Orilux a wonderful lamp, and far 

ahead of all others." 
" The useful article in my kit." 


.ted with .switche.s for intermittent and for constant light. The 
; can be turned on without opening the case, which is fitted witli 
od to throw the light downwards. The case is provided with 
^ for attaching to the belt, and provision is made in it for 
carrying a spare bulb. 

'Price £,1 . 1 . o r.zrv'%.rA) 

Extra Battery in scaled tin, 2/. (Postage to the Froot, 1/. extra). 

Extra Bulb, 1/e, postag! 2d. 

H. STEWARD Ltd., ""iJr-" 

406 Strand, 457 Strand, London. 

The Original Cording'sj Estd. 1839 

There can be no getting wet in an 
" Equitor,'* the r eally waterproof coat 

which, with a snuf; fleece woollen 
lining buttoned in becomes 

an excellent great- coat in 
which to "travel light,'' 
heedless of cold or rain. 

The "Equitor " is fitted with a 
special riding apron, which abso- 
lutely shuts out any rain, and can 
be fastened conveniently, out of 
sight, but the coat serves just as 
well for ordinary wear afoot, 
whether the apron be fastened 
back or not. 

An " Ecjuitor " will keep a man 
bone dry through the heaviest 
and moj!t lasting <lownpour, and 
if fleece-lined will also warmly 
protect him in biting cold 

In our light-weight No. 31 material, 
the price of the "Etiuitor" is 92/6; 
of our No. 23 cashmere, a medium- 
weight cloth, 115/- ; without apron 
(either cloth), 17/e less, with belt, e/. 

The detachable fleece inner coat can 
be had in two qualities— No. 1 (fine 
wool), e2/6; No. 2, M/: 

When ordering an "Equitor" Coat 
please state height and chest measure 
and send remittance (which will be 
returned if the coat is not approved), 
or give home address and business 
(not banlter's) reference. 

Illustrated LUt at request. 



J. C. CORDING & C9i 

Only Addresses : 

19 PICCADILLY, W., & 35 st. jamess st., s.w. 



Every vacant piece of land must be 
cultivated, and crops fenced pro- 
perly. The best Fence for this 
purpose is the "Empire" Fence, and 
crops are always safe where it is 
used. The heaviest animal cannot 
break through. 






R.J.W., Montgomery, writes : 

Decetfiber gth, 1916, 
" / tike your ' Empire " Feiicr 
very muck, and u-as also much 
struck with the simplicity 0/ the 
Stretching Tools you lent lor 


A CHURCH. Limited, 


T= THE " Submarine " wrist watch 


Some wrist watches are 
dust proof. others are 
damp proof, but the 
"submarine" is the first 


Silver case, black dial, 
intensely luminous, non- 
magnetic, the really 
ideal watch for navy 
and army officers. 




DDAnV 9 COAI By Appointment to H.M. The King. 

DKUUn. & OUIN, 87 George Street West, Edinburgh. 

The PionccTS of Luminous IVafches, 

Supplement to LAND & WATER 

January 4, lyr 


p- "l )M 



Waring & Gillow's 



Specimen Bargains 

Tea Service. 

A hc.uitiful Queen Aiiiie Tea 
Sprvue and Kettle, very best 
Waring plato, consisting of kettle 
i.n stand with lamp, tea pot, sugar 
hasin and cream jug. 

Usual price £11 :0 :0 
Sale price £9:15:0 

Vacuum Sweeper. 

Varinim Pwccix-r, with brush ind 
regulntor to ra:se or lower brush 
acctirding to pile of carpet, and 
tiandle roniplete. 

Usual price 45/- 
Sale price 36/- 


Mahogany Inlaid Bureau, fitted 
with spacious pigeon holes and 
writing fall and three large drawers 

Usual price £5:5:0 
Sale price £4 : 12 : 6 

Dinner Cloth. 

I only handsome Dinner Table 
Cloth," with handmade lace inser- 
tion and fine English embroidery 
and Venetian lace. Size 2i yards 
by 3 yaixis. Slightly soiled. 
Usual price ?!6 guineas 
Sale price 16 gumeai 

Easy Chairs. 

6 Lounge Easy Chairs, upholstered 
hair and covered in cretonne. 
Usual price £4:4:0 
Sale price £3:10:0 each 
1 comfortable Wing Easy Chair, 
with loose cu.shion seat, covered in 
moquette rug. 

Usual pric-e £11:0:0 
Sale price £8:10:0 

Bath Sheets. 

Bath Sheets, manufactured 
finest Egyptian cotton. 54in. by 78in 
Usual price 13/9. 
Sale price 10/9 each 



THIS Sale affords an exceptional 
opportunity of obtaining first class 
articles from practically every department 
at genuine bargain prices. The specimen 
items illustrated above are merely 
examples of the value to be obtained. 



Vumisiers&Decoratois '^^^ U^^ 
to'H.M.tfKf'Knsf ^^^^m^ 

164-180, OXFORD street; LONDON. W 


with Seatlesi Shorts. 

Only Height and Cheil 
Measurement Required. 


Officers on Active Service who have had the opportunity of testing many different makes of Water- 
Dfoofs are unanimous in the opinion that the only coat that has proved thoroughly reliable is the 

B.E.F., October 30, 1916. 
Some months ago I ordered one of your Aquascutum Infantry waterproof 
coats; since then we have had some very wet weather and 1 have had 
ample opportunities of testing its quaHties. I cannot speak too highly of it 
and am absolutely satisfied that it is the best one can get. I have tried 
several other well-known makes, but none comes anywhere near the high 
standard of efficiency and quality of my Aquascutum and have conse- 
Quently recommended it to several of my brother officers. 
^ R. T. D. 

B.E.F., Oct, 23, 1916. 
I have received your Trench Coat and am very pleased with it as I have 
already three consecutive days running stayed out in six solid hours' rain 
and it has kept me perfectly dry. 

R. H. S, 

The originals may be seen by anyone interested. 

There is only one 


Do not ac c e p't 
inferior imitations. 

Waterproof Coal Specialist for oocr 50 years 


'Ijy Appoirjiment to His Majesty the King. 



Vol. LXVIII No. 2852 [v^I^l THURSDAY, JANUARY 4. 1917 [^■^^7;A?^i?,f^] i:'il'i'^1^"^'] ^S^ 

/i.'> Louis lifieiuQchers 

Drau-n e^ciusivaiy for "Ldtid c 'ti iCtr ' 

The Resurrection of the Dead 

The dead heroes of France rise to protect her from a treacherous peace 


January 4, Tqry. 


Mechanic : The wheels aren't running 
parallel, sir ! They're half-an-inch out 
of truth. 

Dunlop : Misalignment, you know, is, so to 
speak, "The Hidden Hand." Nothing 
causes so much mischief with tyres, 
and the average motorist can't locate 
the trouble till the mischief's done. 

Users of Dunlop — or any other — tyres can 
have the alignment of their wheels tested 
free of charge at any of the Company's 






January 4, 1917 




Telephone HOLBORN 2828. 




The Resurrection of the Dead. By Louis Raemaekers i 

A War MancEuvre. (Leader) 3 

Verdun and the Somme. By Hilaire Belloc 4 

Sea War of 1916. By Arthur Pollen 8 

The Roumanian Campaign. By Colonel Feylcr 10 

Coal and Iron Fields' of Lorraine. By Henry D. 

Davray ' 12 

A Letter to an American Friend. By Londoner 14 
McTavish on the English Genius. By Joseph Thorp 16 

Books to Read. By Lucian Oldershavv 17 

The Golden Triangle. By Maurice Leblanc 18 

The Wtet End 24 

Kit and Equipment xi. 


GERMANY to-day must be pondering the 
words of Bildad the Shuhite : " The hypocrite's 
hope shall perish." For the reply of the ten 
Allied Governments, " united for the defence of 
the freedom of the nations," can leave no illusion that her 
empty and insincere proposal Has failed in its object. 
So far from troubling public opinion and creating dis- 
sension, it has consolidated and hardened the sentiment 
of all the nations that the war must be fought out until 
the Allies are in a position to impose their will upon 
the Central Ivingdoms. Before this happens, obviously 
the Kaiser will have ceased from bombast. In his New 
Year message to his Army and Navy and indirectlj^ to 
the German peoples, he boasts that his forces were in 
1916 " victorious in all theatres of war on land and on 
sea," and adds " In the New Year also victory will remain 
with our banners." This does not represent a frame of 
mind that has any sincere desire for a discontinuance of 
hostilities, except on its own terms. Until events force 
upon German mentality an entirely different attitude, 
all talk of peace is illusory, and if it emanates from the 
enemy, it can only be described as a war manceuvre. 

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig (who has 'won his 
baton by splendid service) told us in his soldierly despatch 
issued on Saturday, that " the enemy's power has not 
yet been broken nor is it yet possible to form an estimate 
of the time the war may last before the objects for which 
the Allies are fighting have been attained. Bui the 
Somme battle has placed beyond doubt the ability of the 
Allies to gain those objects." The latter words, here 
italicised, must be steadily borne in mind in regarding all 
peace proposals. In this same despatch the curtain was 
lifted a little way, and we were permitted to behold the 
gigantic organisation which is nowadays a necessary 
prelude to a forward movement. The laying out of a 
great city involves no more complicated works of all 
kinds than the preparation of a modern battle. These 
preparations go forward steadily, and the Germans know- 
it. The German General Staff must recognise plainly 
that the defeat on the Somme is a sign that their 
mihtary power is broken, and that nothing can save them 
from { destruction unless the Allies can [be betrayed into 
weakness and led astray from their fixed resolution to 
secure complete military victory. We may look forward 
during the rest of the winter to constant endeavours. 

many of them astute, cunning and covert, to move the 
Allies from their purpose. The leopard does not change 
his spots, nor the Hun his methods, and we have to be 
on our guard against all suggestions that favour an early 
peace or even a peace conference on Germany's terms. 
The open letter which avc publish to-day addressed to an 
American friend, explains lucidly the cunning manner in 
which Germany imposes the impressions she desires to 
create on neutral minds. We may be sure she will not 
be content with breathing fire and slaughter in Berlin, 
but will contimie the campaign for peace on her own terms 
which she has initiated. No greater success will met her 
later efforts. The Allies are not to be turned from their 
purpose by the secret machinations of the enemy. 

A letter has recently appeared in a London newspaper 
criticising the Allies' reply and stating among other things, 
that " moderate men will ask why it is that we refuse 
to discuss our aims ; whether the neutral world will any 
longer believe that we are fighting for those defensive 
purposes which we put forward at the beginning of the 
war ; and whether the assumption that we can at some 
|future time exact better terms without disproportionate 
sacrifices is justified." The suggestions contained in 
these questions are wholly pernicious. The fact is 
entirely ignored that we are fighting for elementary 
principles on which not only the comity of nations is 
based, but the whole social fabric of civilised mankind. 
It is not a question of exacting better terms from the 
encrrly, but compelling the Prussian to recognise, in the 
future, that there is a higher law than the law of necessity, 
and that a document to which a signature has been 
appended has a value and sanction entirely apart from 
the paper on which it is inscribed. It is no exaggeration 
to say that this point of view involving the death and 
agony of millions of human beings, has shocked the soul 
of all sections of humanity, and if it be allowed to pass 
together with the abominations which were its logical 
result, without penalty or reparation, then the war would 
have been fought in vain and every life hitherto sacrificed 
in it utterly thrown away. 

There is a passage in Isaiah, which runs : " And the 
work of righteousness shall be peace, and the effect of 
righteousness quietness and assurance for ever." That is 
the righteousness for which the Allied nations have been 
and are fighting, and until it prevails, it is folly to 
talk of peace, for without the victory, there can be 
no quietness or assurance for eyer. Again we repeat 
that we are resolved to destroy, to wipe out the corporate 
tradition and the spiritual organism which has threatened 
us. We are determined to put into the hearts of those 
who had thought themselves our superiors —and who 
indeed still boast themselves our superiors, face the 
Kaiser's New Year's message— a conviction that they are 
our inferiors. It will take time to accomplish, but we 
are nearer its accomplishment than seemed possible a 
3'ear ago. Verdun and the Somme have established the 
inferiority ^of the German Army, both in offence and 
defence. We are confidently assured that complete 
military victory is within our reach if we persevere. 
And that we shall persevere, no one doubts. 

The Allies desire to treat with all respect the suscepti- 
bilities of neutral nations, but they cannot allow them- 
selves to be deflected from their purpose by sentiment. 
This stern quarrel has been fixed on them by wanton 
aggression'; the lesser nations have been s^^oiled and 
the life of the greater nations has been fused an-d moulded 
into the single purpose of war. At this hour when at 
last they realise that the past sacrifices have not been 
in \ain, that The Day— Their Day— will surely [dawn, 
can any reasonable being assume that the Allies -will lend 
an ear to temporising measures, instead of pressing for- 
ward with renewed determination to the victory which 
is already in sight. 


Januaiy 4, 1^17 

Verdun and the Somme 

By Hilaire Belloc 

THE publication of Sir Douglas Haig's despatch 
Numniarising the British half of the operations 
upon the Somme suggests a comparison between 
those operations and the corresponding opera- 
tions upon the sector of Verdun. 

. The parallel between the two has occurred to everybody, 
but it is the points in which they differ which afford 
the main interest of the war in the West during 1916. 

The tirst essentials in military study is detachment. 
The reason of this is that while war stirs emotion pro- 
foundh-. judgment on it is mainly a matter of calculation. 
We do not need to exercise our power of detachment 
\ny se\erely to form a good judgment of a chess pro- 
l?lem. We have to exercise it somewhat more severely to 
form a good historical judgment upon a debated point, 
especially if that point introduces the emotions of patriot- 
ism or any other religious emotion. But in the case of 
contemporary war our temptation to bias and at the 
same time our temptation to be unduly elated or unduly 
depressed, is far stronger than in any other field of 
study. And at the same time the real matter for our 
study in this field is figures : Figures of distance, of roads 
and of railways and their number, of munitionment, of 
wastage, of recruitment, of food supplies, total man- 
power and all the rest of it. In other words, the matter 
of our study is that with which emotional judgment is 
least concerned, and yet we have to be more on our 
guard against emotional judgment than in any other 
.kind of knowledge. 

The best corrective against this danger, the best 
aid to detachment, is to examine the enemy's case before 
we examine our own. 

The Enemy's Case 

What the enemy can say, and has said, about the 
two great operations is roughly thi^ : 

" We made from the early days of 1916 up to the 
middle of that year a prolonged and intensive effort 
against a particular sector of the Allied line in the West. 
Pray forget all the journalism and propaganda rubbish 
which we were compelled in our political interests to 
distribute upon the subject. We were not really con- 
.cerned with such nonsense as the ' taking of Verdun '— 
a phrase which never had any military sense. Our 
re[:)eatedly printed prophecies that our troops would 
enter the town at such and such a date (in the Western 
American press we put it at August jrd ! ) was of course 
nonsense. Instructed men need not waste a moment 
upon such tricks. Every Government must lie and boast 
in time of war, and if we do it a little more crudely than 
you, we do it with the same motives. 

" Our offensive against the Verdun sector was intended 
to break the French front. There are purists who object 
to the phrase ' breaking a line ' so we will not use the 
phrase. But we did intend to break the Allied front 
in the West to the same extent at least and in the same 
sense as we had broken the Russian front at the end 
of April, 1915. 

" Now we admit that we failed. We think we came 
. very near to success during the first four days, February 
2i-23th ; but you held us, and after the 26th "of February 
it was clear that you could compel us to a prolonged 
struggle. Nevertheless our intensive action was continued, 
and that with the object of wearing j-ou down. What we 
said to ounselves was this : 

" The French are, of all our opponents the most ex- 
hausted. They are not quite so exhausted as we are, but 
on the other hand they are numerically far inferior. At 
the same time they have of all our opponents the best 
ecjuipped and the best trained army with the longest 
traditions. If — at a great sacrifice to ourselves we admit 
— we can so bleed the French army as to prevent its 
taking the offensive afterwards, o\ir continued effort 
will not have been in vain. 

" Well, we went on for five months, and even at the 
end of those fi\'e months we were still obtaining, though 
at rare intervals, notable We carried the line 
up to Thiaumont. It was 'quite on the cards that wc 
should carry it in another month or two up to Souville. 
The French were unable to establish a permanent line, 
nor did our efforts relax in spite of our great losses and 
the length of time over which they hacl been spread. 

" But just then, after five months of such effort, came 
your own counter-offensive upon the Somme. You still 
apparently had among the French a sufficient elasticity 
and man-power to help in that offensive, and the English, 
of course, had greatly increased their numbers and their 
power of munitionment during a lull of nine months in 
which they had not been hea\ily engaged. 
■ " When you began your Somme offensive you naturally 
drew off energy from Verdun. And you, the Allies, began 
on the Somme exactly what we had done at Verdun. 
Your real object was to break our front. You failed to do 
it as you know. The southern half of your thirty mile 
offensive went excellently for you and dangerously for 
us, but the northern half lost very heavily, was checked 
in nearly a third of its effort and advanced but a short way 
in the rest. 

" After that you proceeded exactly as we had proceeded 
at Verdun, you began a mere wearing down of us by 
successive local advances at considerable intervals. You 
went on (just as we did) for five months. You continued 
on the Somme as we had' before Verdun, in much the 
same fashion, and with much the same results. And all 
your operjjtion did was to confirm what ours had proved : 
the immense strength of the modern defensive. Your opera- 
tion failed in the main just as ours failed in the main, 
but with this difference : That ours in front of Verdun 
was still \igorous, when the diversion of the Somme made 
u« cease ; while 3'ours petered out and came to a standstill 
of itself. 

" At any rate, the general lesson is quite clear. The 
strength of the modern defensive is such that of two 
opponents thoroughly equipped, equal in moral and num- 
erous enough to hold lines that cannot be turned, neither 
can break the front of the other." 

Falsity of Such a Statement 

That, I take it, is a fair statement of the German 
military thesis as it has been laid dow n for the benefit of 
instructed and professional neutrals, with some hope that 
it may also affect a considerable body of solid opinion 
even among the belligerents. 

Now are we to accept this statement as generally 
sound ? Is it something which could only be criticised 
in detail and by special pleading, or is it a fundamentally 
false comparison of the two great battles ? 

It is demonstrable that this German thesis is mili- 
tarily false. It does not describe the ' military conti-ast 
between the two great operations, and it presents a view 
of them which is as favourable to the enemy as it is un- 
historioal. I mean by " unhistorical " that the future 
of the war will certainly belie such a judgment. 

What, then, are the falsities .of concealment or omission 
in a statement apparently so simple and straightforward 
and apparently so well in agreement with what we have 
read in our newspapers of the two great battles ? 

When we have answered that question we shall have a 
true picture of the' contrast between Verdun and the 
Somme, and we shall find it to be almost the opposite of 
the description we have just read. 

Contrast in Phase 

The first and fundamental point which the German 
thesis ignores is this : that Verdun and the Somme be- 
long to two vcr\' different phases of develi)])mt'nt in the 

January 4, 1917 


Verdun was an offerfsive undertaken in view of an 
o])poncnt's relatively increasing strength and in the hope 
of forestalling a threatening future. The Somme was an 
offensive undertaken in view of the opponent's decreasing 
strength and with a view to initiating further and stronger 
offensive action in promising future : 

Wc must grasp that contrast before we can understand 
the rest at all. It conditions the whole war of 1916 in 
the West and produces all the other contrasts between 
the two battles which wc shall note later. 

Conditions of the Verdun Offensive 

Consider the state of the war when the Verdun offensive 
was begun and compare it with the state of the war when 
the Somme offensive was begun. 

The Verdun offensive was begun as soon as possible 
after the strategic failure of the Austro-German advance 
through Poland. 

Although that failure was followed by the accession 
of Bulgaria, which ])ermitted Serbia to be overrun, and 
which gave" through communication between the .\ustro- 
(ierman factories and the armies of their Turkish Ally, 
yet its main note was a check — the enemy had gone to 
a great expense for a certain object and had failed to 
obtain it. The five great successive attempts to envelop 
a Russian army had each ended in disappointment. 
The Austro-German line had been drawn eastward to 
cracking point. The enemy dared advance it no further. 
In the terse and most accurate phrase which Lord 
Kitchener used at that moment, he had " shot his bolt." 

What was he to do ? His advantage hitherto had been 
superiority in numbers everywhere, and in munitionment 
■ — -but in the latter an overwhelming superiority upon the 
East. His advantage in numbers was rapidly dis- 
appearing w ith the growth of the British army and with his 
own prodigal expenditure of men in the purs\iit of a 
decision which always escaped him. He would pass to 
a v'ery marked inferiority when the Russian reserve of 
man-power could be equipped, while his superiority in 
munitionment was still more threatened by the final 
establishment of plant in Britain. The British pro- 
duction for the munitionment, both, of Britain and her 
Allies, was already, early in 1916 — by the summer it 
would be formidable — rising. The enemy had only one 
card to play, and that was to seek a decision' in the West. 
He had, for that matter, proclaimed it openly in America 
where he had told his public through Bernhardi that 
from " his successes in the East," he was about to " come 
back westward and over-run F"rance." 

If we ehminate the very foolish rhetoric of such phrases 
they still mean obviously a determination to break the 
Western front, while some superiority for such an off en- / 
sive still remained, and a belief that it could be done. 

Even if we had not the enemy's repeated open pro- 
nouncements in the matter, what he did is glaring proof 
of what he meant to do. 

The divisions with which the first blow was to be de- 
li\ered were withdrawn from the line for special training 
the moment the Polish campaign was at an end. His 
new recruits of the 1916 class were pushed through their 
drills with the greatest, rapidity. The emplacement of 
the heavy guns began in the West immediately after 
the failure in the East was clear ; and despite the very 
great difficvilties of beginning an action upon so early a 
date, the bombardment opened upon the sector of Verdun 
in the third week of February. 

The whole thing speaks, as loudly as it can, of the 
necessity of obtaining a decision before the -summer of 
i()i6. And why ? Because if no decision were obtained 
bv then the increase in the number of the Allies in the 
\Vcstern field and the still more rapid increase (in geo- 
metrical progression*) of the Allied munitionment in the 
West would render the certain issue of the war fatal to the 
(Central Powers. 

Contrast of the Somme 

If such were-tfic conditions under which the Verdun . 

• " Ceomctrical Progression " because your plant once laid down — 
suljjcct to limitations in man-power- hcl])s you to niaUc further plant, , 
and the product therefore increases in geometrical progression, like 
Ihe breeding of stock. So would tlie enemy's munitionment increase 
Imt lor his liigher limitations in certain necessary materials and in 
man-power compared with the .\Uies. 

ofl'ensive was designed and undertaken, contrast the 
conditions under which the Somme offensive was designed 
and undertaken. 

First : Verdun had already eaten up upon that one 
sector alone and in five months alone, and for the German 
army alone, more than Germany can replace by new 
recruitment upon all her fronts during a whole year. 

In the second place, the Trentino offensive had failed 
and had failed at the cost of further vtry heavy Austrian 
losses upon the comparatively neglected Isonzo front. 

In the third place — and it was much the most im- 
portant thing of all— Brussiloff on the 4th of June had 
broken the Austrian front in the East, was sweeping up 
prisoners at such a rate that in a few weeks they reached 
nearly 400,000, and was eliminating the equivalent of at 
least forty Austro-Hungarian divisions. Germany had 
to fill the gap by the sudden depletion of her reserve pi 
man-power ; the reshuffling of units to create new and 
smaller divisions, and the maintenance of a most ex- 
pensive, slowly stiffening retreat. 

It was with the military situation in such a posture that 
the bombardment on the Somme opened in the last days 
of June. It opened with the British power of munition- 
ment still rising very rapidly and destined to rise more 
rapidly still ; and the offensive was delivered with forces 
which had behind them a very great reserve of man-power. 
Even upon the French side, "though the French were the 
more exhausted of the two Allies, Class 1917 had not 
yet appeared, while upon the German side the Somme 
drew into its vortex jroni the very first day the recruits of 
this class; and long before the operation was overall the 
available lads of 191 7 were either upon the active front 
or in the field depots. They had been drained from the 
main depots and Class 1918 had taken their place there 

Contrast in Rate of Loss 

The second point of contrast is conformable to this 
first and is what we should have expected to follow from 
the first. It will be found expressed, when the history 
of the war is written, in the curves of comparative losses 
which cannot be published to-day. 

At Verdun the French defensive grew stronger and 
stronger as the operations proceeded. The comparative 
losses upon the French side declined as the operation 
proceeded, and this was largely because the enemy's 
artillery was (1) more and more embarrassed in its 
efficacy by the rising power of the French in the air upon 
this sector ; (2) More and more equally met by the new 
French gun production and concentration. 

On the Somme it was just the other way. The AUied 
artillery, with the co-operation of the Allied superiority 
in the air, \vas master from the very beginning of the 
operation. The losses of the offensive grew on the 
average less and less in proportion to results as the 
operations proceeded. The losses of the defensive- grew 
greater and greater. The two curves (of the German 
loss and Allied loss) probably crossed somewhere towards 
the end of August. The distance between them was 
rapidly increasing and nothing prevented its increase to 
the point of completely demoralising the cnefny but the 
advent of winter and climatic conditions interrupting 
offensive power. In most of the later operations the losses 
of the offence, even upon the line of contact, were less 
than those of the defence ; while the losses behind the 
line through the efficacy of artillery was far greater 
upon the enemy's side than upon ours. 

One may estimate the thing, if one will, by the symptom 
— for it is" hardly a criterion — of prisoners. 

Roughly speaking, at Verdun in five months the enemy 
was taking one prisoner from the Allies (including 
colonial troops) for every ten casualties he received, 
and as the operations proceeded the cost in casualties per 
prisoner rose. 

Roughly speaking, upon the Somme. the Allies took 
prisoners in a much higher ratio to their casualties, and 
as the operations proceeded the cost in casualties for 
each prisoner fell very rapidly indeed. 

One may put the contrast between the Somme and 
Verdtm in the form of tactical experience. 
""■'The German attack at Verdun began with one tactical 
fticthod, which was pursued with slight modifications to 
the end, and as it proceeded gradually lost in value. 
The Allied offensive on the Somme perfected a new 



January 4, 1917 

The Sea War in 1916 

By Arthur Pollen 

AT the beginning of a new year it may be useful 
/\ to take stock of the naval position. From the 
/ ^ lirst clay of the war we have all taken it as 
_Z A-axiomatic that the superiority of the British 
fleet would give us command of the sea, and that this 
command alone would assure to the Allies an ultimate 
winning position over the enemy. Nor is it to be doubted 
lor an instant that botji expectations have been realized. 
But still less can it be denied that, considering the prompti- 
tude \sith which our conuuand asserted itself by the total 
suspension of the enemy's trade and, not less strikingly, 
b\- Great Britain's immediate freedom to conduct military 
f)perations oversea against the chief enemy, there arc two 
anomalies which seem to distinguish the present exercise 
of sea power from its exhibition in previous wars. The 
war has reached its culminating point without a single 
decisive engagement at sea — and after two years of 
almost absolute command of sea communications, we 
have, during the last five months, seen these connnunica- 
tions attacked with disconcerting success. 1 jjropose. 
therefore to discuss, very cursorily, why these abnor- 
malities exist. 

The advantages of superior sea power in war are familiar 
enough. They include the protection of the coast, sea 
supple, and colonies of the belligerent possessing it, and 
the capacity to inva'de the enemy, to crush his trade, and 
. blockade his ports, and to isolate and, therefore ensure 
the fall of his oversea possessions. Coast. protection and 
the assurance of the safety of our own sea supplies and 
colonies are, so to speak, the negative side of sea power, 
though positive enough in their results. To invade and 
besiege may be considered its direct military employment. 
Superiority at sea always has and always will be con- 
ditioned by the possession and right employment of the 
fleet of the most powerful units, and it may exist in 
either of the two states. It may be quite absolute. 
This is always the case when the sea forces of the enemy 
are cither totally destroyed in battle, or so crippled as to 
be powerless. But it takes two to make a battle, and 
sea war differs from land war in this, that one belligerent, 
if he possesses adequately protected harbours, may 
withdraw his forces from the field of war altogether. 
Hence winning of absolute superiority by battle is not to 
be attained by the will and resolution of one side only. 
Without battle, however, absolute superiority is ^ill 
virtually obtained if the side that is w illing to fight can so 
mask and confine the enemy's sea forces — either by irre- 
movable barriers such as mines, or by the threat of 
immediate destruction by the attack of greater numbers 
of ships of greater force — as to keep them idle and 
completely demobilised. But where the superior power 
can neither force the enemy to decisive battle, nor com- 
pletely neutralise his fleet, so that it is still open to him 
to face the risks involved in seeking the battle he has 
hitherto avoided, then the superiority of the seemingly 
stronger fleet may be called conditional. 

Qualified Command of the Sea 

Commonly speaking, command of the sea — a state of 
things in which the advantages set out above accrue to 
the lielligerent possessing it — follows from superiority, 
whether absolute or conditional. But that command in 
turn may be absolute or qualified, according to the nature 
and numbers of the lesser sea forces possessed by both 
sides, and the relation which their respective bases bear 
to the main lines of sea traffic of their opponents. Thus, 
Trafalgar established Britain's superiority at sea as 
absolute, and, once decisively won, carried with it as 
complete command as the nature of sea force at that 
time permitted. But it was a command that was always 
qualified, because the Atlantic and Mediterranean ports 
possessed by the enemy lay on our chief trade routes, and 
fast armed sailing vessels could not be prevented from 
taking a heavy toll of our ships. In this, the last ten 
years of the NapoJeonic war showed in sharp contrast 

with the first six months of this war. From 1806 to 
1815 our superiority was absolute and our command 
qualified, while, after the first few months of the present 
war — when the ten or dozen commerce raiders had all 
been run down, destroyed or neutralised — our superiority 
at sea was conditional — because it was still open for the 
German fleet to seek decisive action- while our com- 
mand was absolute, because our transports and shipping 
were safe from attack; invasion was impossible, the 
enemy's oversea trade has ceased to exist, and could not 
be revived, all our colonies were safe, and every German 
colony threatened without hope of help from another 

.Since then there has clearly been a very great change. 
The fleets have met, but without establishing the 
superiority of our battle fleets in an absolute and decisive 
manner. And two and a half years of war have not 
enabled us to make it quite impossible to neutralise the 
power and influence of the enemy's main forces. (In 
this connection, however, it is to be remembered that 
since the enemy's fleet was repaired, it has, so far as the 
})ublic know, only ventured outside its harbours three 
times, and on each occasion has had one or more vessels 
successfully attacked by British submarines. Some 
'progress at any rate, has been made towards the de- 
mobilisation of the enemy's fleet, though its complete 
neutralisation has not been achieved.) It remains then 
that our superiority is still conditional, as it has been 
from the beginning. And, meantime, the submarine 
attack on our sea supplies, as recently developed, has 
qualified our sea conmiand to a very unexpected extent. 
Are these two phenomena dependent one on the 
other ? It is, I take it, agreed that were the German 
Fleet destroyed, the problems involved in the use of mines, 
the close blockade of the submarine exits, etc., would be 
radically changed in our favour. .And if so, it is essential 
to ask : Is the continuance of this position due to the 
strategy which we have pursued, or does it arise simply 
from the determination of the enemy to avoid a decisive 
issue ? 

The Rival Strategics 

It would be natural to think that the Battle 
of Jutland, in which the whole German Fleet met 
the whole of ours, and was wTthin fighting range of 
for two hours, ought to afford us complete data for 
answering these questions. But as a matter of fact 
it does not, for the reason of the change in the weather 
conditions that took place. In the first phase, W'hen the 
battle cruisers only were engaged, the seeing conditions 
were as favourable as are likely to be obtained in normal 
conditions in the North Sea. During the second phase, 
when the British battle cruisers, reinforced by the Fifth 
Battle Squadron drew the united German fleet up to Sir 
John Jellicoe, and were continuously engaged with the lead- 
ing eight or ten ships, those conditions got steadily worse. 
And they continued to deteriorate from a quarter past 
six when the Grand Fleet deployed for action, until 8.20, 
when the last of the enemy was seen. This change in the 
seeing conditions robs Jutland of its value as an index to 
the supposed strategies for the following reasons. We 
simply do not know whether Admiral Scheer knew that 
the Grand Fleet was out. We therefore do not know 
if he sought action with it. It was not weather in which 
Zeppelins could scout effectively before mid-day, and 
after five o'clock, when the advance cruisers of the two 
sides might have got into visual contact had the at- 
mosphere been clear, all long range scouting from the 
sea level had become impossible. To say that Admiral 
Scheer, while he did not know that the Grand Fleet was 
out, showed, by continuing to follow up Sir David Beatty, 
a uillingness to risk an encounter with the Grand Fleet, 
does not answer the question, because it only showed 
that he was willing to risk an encounter when long range 
gunnery would be ineffective, and the risks of close action 

January 4. iQi? 


seemingly prohibitive. In ottier words, all that we can 
deduce for a certainty from the German sti'atcgy and 
tactics on the 31st May is that Admiral Scheer was./ 
willing to risk meeting the Grand Fleet because he could 
hold over it such a threat of torpedo attack as would 
make closing impossible. The German argument evidently 
was that if the weather conditions at five continued till 
seven, a decisive result could only be obtained if the 
British fleet brought about a short range melee— a thing 
on which no admiral who realised the enormous importance 
of the Ch-and Fleet to the Alliance would venture, for the 
simple reason that, in a melee, the losses of each side 
would not necessarily be proportional to the opposed 
numbers, but might be determined by pure chance. 
If this is all Jutland tells us about the German con- 
ceptions of strategy, it is almost all it tells us about 
British policy also. For it is clear from the known cir- 
cumstances and, indeed, from the quite frank state- 
ments in the despatch, that from the lirst moment of con- 
tact between the battle fleets, effective long range 
artillery duel was out of the question and that in the 
■prevailing condilions, the Commander-in-Chief could not 
seek close action. 

German writers have made a great deal of play during 
the last six months with the argument that their fleet 
was built on the " risk " principle. It was a force, that 
is to say, which the strongest sea power in the world 
would not dare to attack, not because it could not ex- 
pect victory, but because it could only expect victory 
at a price that would bring it to so low a level as to put 
it at the mercv of naval powers originally inferior and 
still neutral, the suggestion, therefore, is that the reason 
we did not fight Jutland to a finish was that, had we 
done so Great Britain would have been left with a battle- 
ship force inferior to that, say, of America, Japan, France 
or Italy. And, while these arguments have been doing 
duty in Germany, the British public has been told that 
the Grand Fleet was quite right not to seek decisive 
action because all the fruits of victory Ci3uldbe obtained 
without it ! But surely both groups of writers are 
altogether wrong. For the only conceivable explanation 
of the German fleet's escape is that, in the conditions 
that prevailed, the only tactics that would have made a 
decision possible would necessarily have been very far 
from making it certain. 

Why Defensive Theories Exist 

It is then nothing but a libel on the nerve and courage 
of the British Commander-in-Chief to suggest, as the 
Germans do, that close action was avoided because he 
was afraid of paying the price of victory. And it is 
nothing but a libel on his military intelligence to suggest, 
as Mr. Churchill did, that close action was avoided because 
victory, whatever its. costs, was both unnecessary and use- 
less. At the same time, there is some excuse to be made 
for those who maintain that the role of the Grand fleet 
should be purely defensive, who think, that is to say, 
that its first duty is to keep intact, that it should face no 
risks from torpedoes or mines and should engage only 
when it can bring its vastly more numerous battery 
to bear in the most favourable artillery conditions. 
But the excuse does not lie in any military principle, 
nor in the peculiar nature of modern weapons. The 
excuse is that the true character and right methods of 
use of these weapons had not been thoroughly mastered 
before war began. Take the matter of torpedo risk. 
Until the battle of Jutland all our experience went to 
show that a torpedo hit was almost necessarily fatal. 
Indeed only two ships, the Cicrman battle cruiser Moltke, 
and the British armoured cruLser Roxburgh, were known 
to have been hit and to have survived. But at Jutland 
twelve hits were made and only one ship sunk, and since 
tliat day three battleships and three cruisers have been 
torpedoed, and only two of the smallest cruisers ha\'e 
been sunk, and they needed seven torpedoes to do the 
business. The torpedo danger, then, has been ex- 
aggerated ; but it needed experience" to show that modern 
construction had so greatly lessened the danger ; and that 
experience was not available on the 31st of l\Iay. But 
once more it must be remembered that at Jutland it 
cannot have been primarily the risk of torpedoes, but 
the uncertainty of \ictory in the thick weather, that 
prevented closing. Still, there was reason for saying. 

in May ii)i6, that a fleet that got within torpedo range 
was risking the existence of some or many of its units. 

The Failure of Naval Gunnery 

The second excuse for those who argue for a defensive 
role is quite different. It is to be found in the really 
astonishing revelation, given by the three chief actions 
of the war, of the inefficiency of modern long range 
gunnery. At the Falkland Islands it took sixteen JZ- 
inch guns five hours to sink two armoured cruisers, 
neither of which, it would ordinarily have been supposed, 
could have survived more than a single hitting salvo at the 
mean range — ele\en thousand 3'ards — of that action. 
Again, at the affair of 'the Dogger Bank, Lion, Tiger, 
Princess Royal, New Zealand and Indomitable were in 
action for many hours against three battle cruisers and 
an armoured cruiser, and for perhaps half the time at 
ranges at which good hitting is made at battle practice, 
and although two of the enemy battle cruisers were hit 
and seen to be in flames they were able, after two and a 
half hours engagement, to continue their retreat at un- 
diminished speed, and only the armoured cruiser, whose 
resisting power to 13.5 projectiles must ha\e been very 
feeble, was sunk. 

The lesson of Jutland is still more striking, and it is 
possible to draw the moral with a little greater precision 
since it has been officially admitted in Germany tha,t 
Ltitzow, Admiral von Hipper's flagship, the most modern 
of Germany's battle cruisers, was destroyed after being 
hit by only fifteen projectiles from great guns. It iB not 
clear from the German statement whether this means 
fifteen 13.5's and omits to reckon 12-inch shells, or whether 
there were fifteen hits in all, some of the one nature and 
some of the other. The latter is probably the case. ■ F'or 
we know from Sir David Beatty's and the Gernian 
despatches that it was the Invincible s salvoes that finally 
incapacitated the ship and compelled von Hipper to 
shift his flag. Lutzow was always at the head of the 
German fine and so was exposed to the fire of our battle 
cruisers for nearly three hours. If we assume that she 
was hit by ten 13.5's and five 12-inch ; if we further 
assume that the effect of shells is proportionate to their 
weight; if we take the resisting power of British battle 
cruisers, German battle cruisers (which arc more heavily 
armed), and all battleships to compare as the figures 2, 3 
and 4 respectively ; if we further assume that the Fifth 
Battle Squadron did not come into effective action till 
the second phase began, and went out of action at 6.30, 
and that the battle cruisers were in action for three hours 
and omit Hood's squadron altogether, we get the following 

Five German battle cruisers were exposed to severtty- 
two hours of 13.5 gun fire and to twenty-four hours of 
12-inch gunfire, and five German battleships were ex- 
posed to forty-eight 15-inch gun hours. Similarly — 
omitting Queen Mary, Indefatigable and Invincible, 
seemingly destroyed by chance shots and not over- 
whelmed by gunfire — four British battle cruisers were 
exposed to thirty-seven 12-inch and sixty ii-inch gUn 
hours, and the Fifth Battle Squadron was exposed' to 
one hundred and eighty 12-inch gun hours. Had both 
sides been able to hit at the rate of one hit per hour per 
gun, the Germans, roughly speaking, should have sunk 
six British battle cruisers, and the four ships of the Fifth 
Battle Squadron nearly twice over ; the Fifth Battle 
Squadron should have sunk four German battle ships, 
and the British battle cruisers seven German battle 
cruisers ! The number of hits received by the British 
fleet has not been published, but it is probably safe to 
say that the Germans could not have made a quarter of 
this number of hits, nor the British ships more than a 
third. It would seem, then, that at most we made one 
hit per gun per three hours, and the Germans one hit 
per gun per four hours. 

Battle Practice contrasted with Battle 

At no time, throughout such parts of the action as wc 
are considering, did the range exceed 14,000 yards, and 
at some periods it was at 12,000 and at others at 8,000. 
In battle practice, not only in the British fleet but in 
all fleets, hits at the rate of one hit per gun per four 
minutes at 14,000 yards liave constantly been made. 



January 4, 1917 

How then are we to explain the extraordinary difference 
between battle practice and battle results ? In the former 
certain difficulties are artificially created, and methods of 
lire control are employed that can overcome these dilfi- 
cnltie^ successfully. But these methods evidently break 
down when it .comes to the quite different difficulties 
that battle presents. So far we are on indisputable 
ground. \\'hcther tire control can be so improved that 
the difficulties of battle can be overcome, just as the 
difficulties of battle practice have been overcome, is 
another matter. The difference between action and 
battle practice are broadly speaking twofold. First, 
you may have to fight in atmospheric conditions in which 
you woiild not attempt battle practice. AH long range 
gunnery, whether at sea or on land, def>ends for success 
upon range-finding and the observation of fire, and, as at 
sea the observations must be made from a point at which 
the gun is fired, the correction of fire becomes impossible 
if bad fight or mist prevents the emploxTnent of observing 
glasses and range-finders. In the Jutland despatch 
particular attention was directed to the disadvantges 
we were under in the matter of range-finding from these 
causes. It would appear then that those who, for many 
years, had maintained that the standard ser\'icc range- 
finder would be useless in a North Sea battle, have been 
proved to be right. 

The second great difference lies in the totally different 
problems wliich movement creates in battle. In battle 
practice, the only movement of the target is that which 
the towing ship can give to it. Its speed and manceuvring 
power are strictly limited, whereas a 30-knot battle cniiser 
can change speed and direction at will. The smallest 
change of course must alter the range, and the smallest 
miscalculation of speed or course must make accurate 
forecast of range impossible. But the movements of 
the target are only a part of the difficulty. Those that 
arise from the manoeuvres of the firing ship may be still 
greater and more confusing. And so obvious is this 
that, in peace time, it used to be almost an a.\iom that 
to put on helm during an engagement — even for the 
sake of keeping station — should be regarded almost as a 
crime. But the long range torpedo has long since made 
it clear that a firing squadron may have to put on helm. 
It must manceuNTre, that is to say, in self-defence — a thing 
it woidd ne\er have to do in battle practice. And when 
both target ship and firing ship are manceuNTring. it is 
small wonder if methods of fire control, designed pri- 

marily for steady courses by one ship and low speed and 
small turns by 'the other, break down altogether. But 
these contingencies had also been foreseen arid means 
developed for deaUng with them. It is certainly strange 
in view of what has happened in the war. that methods 
of fire control including range-finders and sights and 
instruments for observation, designed for dealing with 
bad light in the North Sea, and instruments for elimina- 
ting the difticulties caused by manoeuvres, should not 
have been insisted on. 

The Only Basis for the OflFensive 

It is germane to our main point to raise this question 
now because it is undoubtedly true that the mainspring 
of all defensive naval ideas is doubt as to the success of 
offensive action, and as the only offensive action that a 
battleship can take is by its guns, it would seem as if 
those who disbelieve in the offensive, have now far too 
much reason for their scepticism. We have now got 
a new Board of .\dmiralty and a new First Lord. We are 
all witness to the fact that war is a vast experiment. 
On sea and on land almost every method of using 
weapons has been revolutionised, and not once but again 
and again. Now, if it is a.xiomatic that sea command 
depends upon absolute superiority, and that absolute 
superiority at sea is conditioned by battle fleets, and 
that battle fleets have no weapons but the gun ; and if there 
is a disbelief in the value of that fleet's offensive because 
the proved performances of the gun are so indifferent — 
does it not seem elementary that a resolute effort should 
,at once be made to find out if science is equal to the task 
of reducing battle conditions to battle-practice conditions ? 

It is at any rate surely not very sanguine to say that 
science might eliminate 25 or even 50 per cent, of these 
obstacles to efficiency. If battle practice gives a rate of 
hitting of one per gun per four minutes and battle that 
of one per gun per three hours, ami if only 25 per cent, 
of the errors could be removed, tljt' rate of hitting in 
battle could be improved by more than eleven hundred 
per cent. And this is a standard which would have en- 
abled Sir David Beatty and Rear Admiral Evan Thomas 
to have destroyed half the German fleet before 6 o'clock. 
The matter is clearly worth investigation. 

I propose to complete the review of the lessons of 19 16 
in our next issue. 

Arthur Pollen 

The Roumanian Campaign 

By Colonel Feyler 

THE inter\-ention of Roumania in the European 
war has not brought about the beneficial results 
which were hoped for from it. It is a profitable 
enquiry to find out why this should have been so. 
E.xperience, in the case of mihtarj' men as. generally, of 
all other men, is the result of their mistakes and their 
enlightenment. And this being so, there are many 
lessons to be learned from the successive enterprises of 
which the Balkans and Turkey in Asia have been the 
venue in the course of the last "two years— the attack on 
the; Dardanelles, the Mesopotamian expedition, the 
landing at Salonika and the inter\ention of Roumania. 
When it becomes possible to study these enterprises in 
the light of official documents we shall probably discover 
that the mistakes originated either in plans which were 
not sufficiently reasoned out, or in plans which were 
felicitous but were carried out by means that were not 
adequate, either because they were not estimated correctly 
or because there was some defect in their combination 
and co-ordination. 

Take the first of these enterprise.^, i^i <..\ample, the 
Dardanelles expedition. Here the idea was certainly a 
good and sound one. Capture of the Straits would have 
di^iosed of the Turks and established the shortest 
j)<)ssible lines o^ communication and the most direct 
connection between the ^\■estern and the Eastern fronts. 
Properly supported by diplomacy it pa\ed the way for a 
convergent attack upon the Central Empires. And, 
further, it had immediate effect uuon German moral. 

inasmuch as it made an end of Germany's hopes for the 
future in the direction of Bagdad. Results so great 
as these were abundant justification for it. 

Thej' were not obtained, and the project had to be 
abandoned. After several months of fruitless effort a 
profit and loss account was taken, and there was no 
alternative but to acknowledge that although the idea 
was quite sound, the difficulties attending its execution 
had not been properly appreciated. 

The offensi\e against the European commvmications 
of the Ottoman army having thus proved aborti\e, two 
frontal attacks upon it were made, one by the Russians 
in Armenia, the other by the British in Mesopotamia. 
Were these two attacks made in accordance with a com- 
mon plan prepared beforehand, or did each army operate 
in its own field with only such means as were deemed 
necessary for its particular mission ? 

It is impossible to answer that question. As a matter 
of fact, the Russian attack, although it had some very 
important restilts, remained a purely local, or regional, 
of>eration, an extension of the gains of 1878 ; it was not 
driven right home. And although the English operation 
was not \\ithout some measure of success, it, too, failed 
to achieve its purpose. \\'hy ? Apparently because of 
inadequate muster of means. The enemy was siot 
estimated at his real worth. A colonial expedition was 
sent out against him, whereas what was needed was an 
operation in scale with the great war. 

The landing at Salonika proceeded from the same idea 

January 4, 1917 



as the Dardanelles enterprise, with the ditterencc that 
in this case it was sought to break the communications 
between Europe and Asia on the Bulgarian side. At 
the outset it produced an appreciable advantage, in that 
it more or less neutralised a large number of enemy 
troops. But its offensive import was not made manifest 
as anticipated. Either because the effectives were not 
sufficient or because political considerations fettered the 
military operations, or even perhaps because there was 
no intention, in the beginning, of pushing right home, 
the army at Salonika remained upon the defensive for an 
entire year and, voluntarily, or involuntarily, abandoned 
the advantage of a surprise attack upon an enemy who 
as yet was not properly entrenched. [ 

Now we come to the Roumanian campaign, and tliis 
is what we find : An army which docs not seem to have 
been of any very serious offensive , importance, and in 
which Russia was represented only by two infantry 
divisions and one cavalry division, advanced ■ in the 
Dobrudja, on the southern bank of the Danube, opposite 
Bulgaria. Another army which seems to have been 
much more considerable, invaded Transylvania through 
all its frontiers, thus marching against Austria-Hungary. 

This twofold operation would have suggested that the 
intention was to make a simultaneous attack upon two 
enemies, the Bulgarians and the Austrians. But two 
circumstances prove that this was not thQ real intention : 
One, that Roumania only declared war upon Austria-Hun- 
gary ; the other, that after the first encounter in the 
Dobrudja the Russo-Roumanian army was obliged to 
give ground to a great depth. We conclude, therefore, 
that Rouinania regarded the Balkan front as merely 
subsidiary, that the mission of the Dobrudja army was 
purely defensive, which explains its relative .weakness in 
effectives, and that the real strategic plan contemplated 
securing the initiative which was to be looked for on the 
Austro-Hungarian enemy front. 

Here arises the fust tjuestion : Was this plan good in 
conception and did it .correspond with the general situa- 
tion ? 

We may be permitted to doubt it. What did the 
general situation prescribe ? We have always said that 
the Eastern and Western Fronts were the principal fronts 
in the w^ar, because it was on them that victory would 
bring the greatest results to the victor and on them that 
defeat would be most perceptible and disastrous for the 
vanquished. But operations are long-dated on these 
two fronts. And therefore we acknowledged that they 
might be advantageously supported by successes on 
fronts which were not immediately decisive, but which 
might be used to relieve the others and perhaps permit 
of a successful turning movement. The Balkans formed 
a front of this nature, and the landing at Salonika was 
regarded as the primmg for a turning movement. 

The enterprise having thus been embarked upon, the 
question that next arose was which enemy the plan of 
campaign ought to regard as the most immediately 
dangerous and, therefore, the one who must be put out of 
action first. In Uie case of the Salocika army, to whom 
the turning movement against the Central Empires was 
assigned, there did not appear to be much doubt on the 
point : the principal enemy was Bulgaria, who was placed 
athwart the movement. Consequently it seems that the 
proper thing to do was to converge against the Bul- 
garians all available forces, and especially the Roumanian 
force which could operate from the north, and at once, 
while the Salonika army was operating from the south. 
Meanwhile, defensive tactics could be adopted on the 
mountainous Transylvanian front, which lent itself to 
fortifications and resistance. As soon as the Bulgarians 
were defeated the operation worJd follow its logical 
course : the turning movement would develop from the 
south northwards, and the forces rendered available 
by the defeat of the Bulgarians would permit of an offen- 
sive being begun upon the Transylvanian front. 

^Vhy was this plan, which seemed to conform to the 
logic of the general situation, rejected in favour of another 
which divided the forces and failed to provide anywhere 
a strength and solidity adequate to the battle fronts ? 
Probably, as so often happens where coalitions are con- 
cerned, itliere was failure of unity of control and political 
considerations perverted the military conception, or 
hampered its realization. 

There may ha\e been exclusively Roumanian interests 


The tilfb of the aeronautical paper to be 
pubUshed shortly by Land & Water is 


This paper is in no way connected with 
a recent publication called " Air " issued 
by "The Aeronautical Institute of Great 
Britain." The first number of Flying 
will be published on Wednesday, January 
24th, and it will contain a number 
of articles of exceptional importance. 

which launched the Roumanian troops upon Transylvania, 
while in the general military interest it would have been 
better to think less about the coveted territory and more 
about the enemy whom it was necessary to put out of 
action if definitive occupation of the territory was to be 
secured. What good could an invasion of Transylvania 
do to the Roumanians if, thanks to the Bulgarians, the 
Germans succeeded in maintaining or re-establisliing 
their operations in the Balkans ? 

The definite issue was that Bulgaria maintained her 
position and the Germans consolidated theirs, while the 
Roumanians, faiUng to concentrate against the principal 
enemy, were driven out of half of their territory. 

No doubt other factors must be taken into account to 
explain the Roumanian reverses. Their army was fresh, 
it is true, but on the other hand, its commanders had not 
the skilled craft which comes from experience of war. 
It is. probable, too, that, as other armies have discovered 
by experience, its commissioned ranks of peace times 
were not filled exclusively by men equally suitable for 
war conditions. All the belligerents agree that it is 
extremely difficult to judge by garrison duty of the value 
of the cadres, which is only discovered clearly in the 
succession of duties of active ser\-ice. Reverses are 
required to prove their quality. Battle is the sole arbiter 
of selection. 

Nevertheless, over and above all these defects, it is 
likely that the blunder in strategy played its part. It 
diverted the Roumanian intervention into an unfortunate 

It need not be concluded, however, that the result of 
the campaign has been all loss. One beneficial result 
was that it diverted Marshal Falkenhayn's army from 
a more important objective. That army was obliged to 
devote itself to an undertaking which could only result in' 
a \'ictory which may be called regional, that is to say 
over an enemy whose destruction could not have a vital 
influence upon the general result of the war. The 
Roumanian army could not be an essential factor in the 
resistance to the Germanic aggression. Even if it had 
been hit harder than it actually was, the disasters inflicted 
upon it could not have entailed disaster to the great 
armies of the Quadruple Entente. And the losses in 
effectives suffered by the Central Empires because of it 
are definite losses and consequently a diminution of 
strength. That stands to the credit side of Roumania's 
account in the, war. In spite of the check she is an 
appreciable piece in the game. 

A special article upon the brutal treatment of Russian 
prisoners by the Germans, on ivhich wc have received 
'particular inforinaiion, will appear next week. 

Meticulous attention to detail is the keynote of Their 
Lives, by Violet Hunt (Stanley Paul and Co., 6s.), the lives 
being those of the three daughters of Henry Radmall, artist, 
and of Victoria his wife — who, by the way, is the essence of 
Victorian propriety at its coldest. The petty squabbles of 
these three girls, their dislikes and discords, are etched in 
deeply and bitterly, and in tlie only approacli to real feeling 
that any of them" display — the scene between Christina and 
her sister on the eve of Christina's marriage— the gift of 
expression of feeling is absent from both girls. Brilliantly 
clever, this study of unlikeable people may rank with the 
temperance lecturer's " horrible example." as a story of how 
not to bring up children. - 



January 4, 1917 

Coal and Iron Fields of Lorraine 

By Henry D. Davray 

IV, up to the present moment, Germany has been 
able to resist the AUies' pressure ; if, after the 
smashing blow she received as early as September, 
i()i4, at the gigantic battle which raged for a fort- 
night from Nancy to the Aisne, she has managed to tight 
on and compelled the Allies to such terrifying sacrifices, 
it is entirely because she could rely on her inexhaustible 
resources in coal and iron. For the last two years, with 
the guns and munitions her workshops produce, and the 
explosives she extracts from her coal, she could make up , 
for the attrition and decrease of her effectives — and was 
able, when the moral of her population abated, to point 
proudly to the map of Europe and show a fighting line 
pushed deep into her neighbours' land, a long line that 
sometimes bends but never breaks, lip to the present. 

Moreover, concurrently with her enormous war effort, 
her industrial power made possible for her the building of 
merchant ships which, as soon as peace is signed, will 
carry all over the world the stock of -goods she has been 
accumulating. She has even been in a position to sell 
coal and iron to her neutral neighbours in exchange for 
food. It has been said o\-er and over again that war is 
Germany's national industry ; we see now that that 
criminal industry has been built upon the iron ore de- 
posits of Lorraine, and that Lorraine's coal and iron 
mines have up to the present saved Germany from bank- 
ruptcy and collapse. 

Wealth of the Rhine Valley 

The mineral wealth of Germany is to be found, for the 
largest part, along the I^hine. Nature has ominously 
hidden at the door of the Prussian Niebelung a treasure 
which is the main spring of (lerman power. Up to 1814 
this treasure belonged to France ; but in 1815 the treaty 
of Vienna permitted Prussia to cross the Rhine, and she 
seized the country between the Rhine and Moselle with 
its enormous masses of mineral wealth. But, though 
she then appropriated the considerable coal deposits of 
the Sarre, she was still lacking in iron ore. Those she got 
in 1871, when she captured that part of Lorraine which 
she thought contained the whole of the industrial wealth 
of these parts. The frontiers she clutched at since then 
gave her the means to develop her industrial power, upon 
which she built up her political hegemony. 

The few square miles extending over the valleys of 
the Moselle and the Sarre which Prussia wrung from 
France in 1815 and 1871 are the foundations of the whole 
industrial strength of modern Germany, but the most 
important asset consists in the huge iron-ore deposits 
south-west of the Sarre valley, in Lorraine. If she had 
not annexed that part of Lorraine, Germany would not 
have dared to go to war at all ; she would never ha\e been 
able to supply her munition factories with an unUmited 
quantity of raw material ; she could not ha\e stood the 
terrific strain of a war like this. 

Last year, a member of the French Chamber of De- 
puties, M. Fernand Engerand, who is also a distinguished 
economist, discovered in the Archives Nationales certain 
documents that prove that the coalfields owned by the 
Prussian State, in the Sarre mining area, were first worked 
by French engineers, and that the canal which is their 
main outlet was built with the help of I'Vench money. 
It cannot thus be argued that those who were in pos- 
session of the country did not know the treasure it con- 
cealed. When the Prussians stole it, it was already worked 
by F-rench enterprise and capital. France knew very well 
the value of the Lorraine deposits. As far back as 1867, 
she had begun to canalise the !\Ioselle for the purpose of 
developing the mineral wealth of the region. In fact, 
she had so much regard for it that she secured in the 
Treaty of Frankfort a clause by which the Germans 
boimd themseKes to proceed with the canalisation in the 
new German territories. But, although (iermany has for 
the last forty years displayed an obstinate energy in 
developing a wonderful system of waterways, she displayed 
an unflinching opposition to the deepening of the Moselle 
and Sarre rivers. She devoted enormous labour and 

money to make the Rhine, up to Strasburg, a magnificent ' 
waterway ; she connected the Rhine and the Wcser with 
a whole network of deep and broad canals, through 
which F2mdcn has become the maritime outlet of West- 
phalia ; and, on the Rhine, the famous port of Ruhrort 
I>rides itself on ha\-ing a bigger tonnage than the port of 

A Westphalian Monopoly 

Why then did Germany always refuse to improve the 
carrying capacity of the Moselle and the Sarre rivers ? 
German estimates reckoned the cost of the deepening of 
the rivers at 40 million marks (£2,000,000) for the 
Moselle, and 27 million marks (£1,330,000) for the Sarre. 
In comparison with the cost of the gigantic works carried 
out on the Rhine and on the Westphalian waterways, 
these sums are trifling and they support the view that the 
enterprise could have been carried out easily and quickly, 
if it had not been for the obdurate opposition of the 
Prussian Government. In i()05, after repeated efforts, 
the scheme was at last brought before -the Prussian 
Landtag, but it was promptly rejected. 

Then the manufacturers of Lorraine and Alsace, far 
from desisting, subscribed to a common fund, and 
succeeded in bringing the scheme before the Reichstag, 
offering to contribute to the canahsation of the Moselle 
nearly half the cost of the enterprise. They met with 
no better success. 

This extraordinary attitude seems to have been dictated 
by two very strong considerations. First, the Prussians 
feared lest a more complete development of metallurgy 
in Lorraine might compete disastrously with the West- 
phalian industry, which had plenty of coal near at hand, 
but only an inadequate supply of iron ore. The second 
consideration, very likely the strongest, had a political 
and a military importance. Lorraine was too. near the 
French border to become the centre of the main German 
industry, as it might be upset, destroyed or captured at 
the outbreak of a war. It is easy to realize that if, for 
instance, Krupp's works had been shifted from Essen 
right to the centre of the mining district of Lorraine, 
they would have been within daily reach of the Allied 
airmen, whose bombs would have soon made havoc of 

Just as the giant Fafnir, in Wagner's poem, put his 
gold in a 'cavern and lay on it, the Rhinegold was thus 
locked up in a ca\e where it was accessible only to the 
Westphalian manufacturers. The iron ore of Lorraine 
was made entirely dependent upon Westphalian coal, 
and so one of the richest mineral districts of the world 
could only develop its resources for the benefit of the 
German Empire, for the preparation of the future 

The importance of the Lorraine deposits, and also of 
the coal question connected with the ore problem, is 
set out in a secret petition sent on May 30th, 1913, to the 
German Chancellor by the six great industrial and agri- 
cultural associations of the Empire ; one could not wish 
for a more candid admission : 

The manufacture of shells requires a quantity of iron and 
steel such as nobody would iiavc thought of before the war. 
l''or the shells in grey cast-iron alone, which are being used 
in place of steel shells when no superior quality is needed, 
quantities of pig iron have been required for the last 
months which reach at least 4,000 tons a day. No precise 
figures are available on this point. But it is already 
certain that if the output in iron and steel had not been 
doubled since the month of August the prosecution of the 
war would have become impossible. 

As raw material for the manufacture of these quantities, 
the minctle (oolitic iron-ore) is assuming a more and more 
important place, as only this kind of iron ore can be ex- 
tracted in our country in quickly increasing quantities. 
The production in other areas is considerably reduced, 
and the importation by sea even of Swedish iron-ore has 
become so difficult, that in many regions, even outside 
J-uxembuurg and Lorraine, the minctic at the present 
moment covers from 60 to 60 per cent, of the maimfacture 

January 4, 1917 



of i)ig-iron and steel. If the output ot the minette were 
to be^disturbed, the war would be as good as lost. 
Tliis is the unveiled confession that/without the pos- 
session of Lorraine, the German Empire would have been 
unable to stand tlie industrial strain of the war, since 
Luxembourg yields only a small quantity of inine/te. 
It proves further that withotit Lorraine the gigantic 
and noxious growth of the metallurgic power of Germany 
would have been impossible even in peace time. The 
same secret petition contained this other admission : 

Already to-dav, as the prohibition of the exportation of 
coal made by" the English on May 15th proves it again, 
coal is one of the most decisive means for exerting political 
influence. The industrial neutral States are compelled 
to submit to those of the belligerents who can provide 
their supply of coal. We cannot do it sufficiently at 
present, and we are compelled even to-day to resort to 
the production of Belgian coal in order not to allow our 
neutral neighbours to fall completely under the de- 
^ pendency of England. 
Are not all these facts and words sufficient to demon- 
strate that the possession of the Rhinegold treasure, of 
the iron ore deposits of Lorraine, is vital for Germany ? 
And do not the following figures add to them a crushhig 
strength? Out oi 28,607,000 tons. of iron ore which Ger- 
many extracted from her soil -in 19IJ, 21,135,000 ions 
came from Lorraine. 

In the same year, from the same annexed part of Lor- 
raine, the coal mines yielded an output of 3,200,000 tons. 
The total value of the iron and coal output amounted to 
£4,000,000. The blast furnaces produced 3,800,000 
tons of pig iron, and the output of steel reached 2,300,000 
tons. A comparison of these iigiires with those published by 
France shows that the output of pig iron in Lorraine 
equalled the total output of the whole of France, while 
as to steel Lorraine only produced one-third less than all 
the French steel works together : 

Output of Pig Iro\ and Steel. 
Pig Irox : France in 1911 . . . . 4,000,000 tons 

Lorraine in 1913 . . . . 3,800,000 tons 

Steel : France in 1911 . . . . 3,800,000 tons 

Lorraine in 1913 . . . . 2,300,000 tons 

No wonder that the French industrial world has, since 
the beginning of the war, given a great deal of attention 
and thouglit to the problem of coal and iron in Lorraine. 
The iron deposits, as will be seen from the map 
published on this page, start from Longwy-St. Martin, on 
the border of Belgium, go broadening from west to 
cast in France, advance into Luxembourg to Differdange 
and Redange, then, expanding towards the east in 
annexed Lorraine, turn sharply from north to south, and 
follow down to Noveant on the Moselle river where the 
Rupt de Mad runs into it. In French Lorraine, the 
deposits stretch southwards down to Mars la Tour, and 
send three sharp points towards Ville en Montois, Landres 
and Conflans. 

In 1870, together with their German colleagues, the 
French geologists alleged that only the cropping out 
veins were workable, as at a depth of several hundred 
feet the nature and quality of the iron ore quickly 
deteriorated. It was a mistake, but hardly ever was 
there a more lucky mistake. 

On that mistake the Prussians assigned the limits of 
their annexation, and the treaty of Frankfort wrung from 
France ig iron mines, 16 coal mines and 14 other mineral 
allotments, together with the most important metallurgic 
works of the Moselle valley and the famous de Wendel 
factories w'hich produced not less than a tenth part of 
the total French output. 

But the Briey area was left to France, as Moltke and 
Bismarck had no idea of its invaluable wealth. There 
France established and developed her most iinportant 
metallurgic works, ignoring the danger that threatened 
them in case of a war ; she concentrated on her eastern 
and northern frontiers eight-tenths of her metallurgic 
power ; whereas Germany developed her industrial 
strength far out of reach of a possible enemy. 

Let us repeat once more this fact which we must all 

keep in mind for the time when the Allies impose peace : 

In 1913, the Lorraine mines yielded o%ier 21 million 

ions of iron ore, out of a total German output of 28 


The annexation of this mineral wealth was the main 
foundation of that metallurgic power which brought 

about the monstrously unbalanced increase of German 
industry and commerce. Soon Germany developed such 
an ai)petite for iron that she exceeded quickly the enor- 
mous rcser\-es that she became possessed of by her robbery 
of 1870-71. In 1913, she bought abroad 14,019,000 tons 
of iron ore, and meanwhile the bloated German Fafmr 
was looking with greedy covetous eyes on the French 
mines, clo5e at hand, which yielded a yearly output ot 
nearly that amount. 

The resources of the Lorraine iron ore deposits are 
estimated at 3,000 million tons for French Lorraine, and at 
only 2,000 million tons for the Lorraine which we are to call 
German for a very short time more. The total estimates 
for France amount to 7,000 million tons without taking 
into account the deposits that may exist in her colonial 
empire. The total estimates for England, without her 
Dominions and Colonies, reach 3,000 million tons of iron 
ore of the first order, and o\-er 30,000 million tons for her 
total ferriferous resources. 

But if we exclude Lorraine, Germany is very poor in 
iron ore, only 710 million tons being supposed to exist in 
her very own territor3^ 

When Professor Hermann Schumacher, of Bonn, and 
with him the six great German industrial and agricultural 
associations, ask for " an improvement of the Franco- 
German frontier," it is easy to realise what kind of im- 
provement they have in mind. And, fortunately, they 
are very candid and gi\'e themselves away with an 
incredible artlessness. 

" Above all," they say, " we must secure for ourselves 
all the raw material needed for the war industries and 
deprive our enemies of them. Without the iron ore of 
Lorraine, we could not .supply the output of iron and 
steel required for the war. The treaty of Frankfort 
had given us the whole of Lorraine. A mistake was made 
by the geologists whose advice Bismarck sought. We 
know that, since 1880, contrary to Bismarck's anticipa- 
tions, the area of Briey, which is an extension of the 
Longwy area, has become one of the richest parts of 
France. We can now retrieve that mistake, since, from 
the outbreak of war, we have conquered and strongly 
held the second most important raw material in the 
industry of war : coal. Just as we could not prosecute 
the war if we did not possess the rich deposits of the 
Lorraine soil, so we could not secure victory if we had not 
a complete control of the abundant coalfields of Belgium • 
and the North of France. Now that we know what 
ammunition means in a war, we must be convinced of 
the fact that it is indispensable to the life of our people, 
in peace times as well as in war times, to command all 
these resources of warlike and commercial forces." 
These very unlikely " improvements " would bring the 
German industrial power to the level of the United 
States. But (Germany started on the wrong war path ; 
she invaded Belgium and roused the anger of the British ; 
then . . . there was the Marne. Yet, in spite ^of 
hei" \'ictor}', France has been deprived of 90 per cent, 
of 'her iron ore, 68 per cent, of her coal ; 66 per cent, of 
her pig iron ; 76 per cent, of her steel ; and 76 percent, of 



January 4, 19 17 

lier \vro\ight iron. Out of 127 blast hirnaccs workinj,' in 
I'l^i. '>5 liave been and still are in the power of the enemy. 
Herr Sclirodter, chairman of the Verein Deutschcr 
Kisenhilttcnleuk, could well boast that " the economic 
])ower of France was seriously damaged, and e\en 
partially annihilated." Still, there was some surprise 
in store for the o\'erweening Boche. As early as .-Xpril 
i()i5, the Minister of War could state in Parliament that 
'' the French output of munitions of every kind has been 
increased to 600 per cent, of what was believed to be 
suflicient at the outbreak of war, and it will soon be 900 
per cent." And now the proportion has increased to an 
enormous figure. State-factories and private establish- 
ments have worked at a tremendous pace since the 
beginning, and in their* report for 1915, the Council of 

Directors of the Comity des Forges de France write : — 
The day comes when, inquiring how it came about that 
certain provinces, and these among the richest and the 
most industrially important, fell into the hands ol the 
enemy, history is able to give, for the enliglitennu'ut of 
our sons, an account of everybody's responsibility, and it 
will say how it then became' possible to make up for the 
profound disturbance of the defence of the country through 
the plight of French industry. No more conclusive page 
has yet been written to the credit of private enteqirise. 
Once more we see not only liow the l'"rench nation always 
upsets the doleful predictions of the pessimists, but what 
astonishing reserves of ingenuity, adaptation and industry 
our race is i)ossessed of when iio impediment arises, and 
when her resource and patriotism are called upon for 
the safeguard of the country. 

A Letter to an American Friend 

MY DEAR FRIEND :-I received a few days 
ago your letter telling me that there was 
some danger of a false step being taken. It 
has just been taken. I sat down to answer 
you. I intended my answer to be private. But I am 
not sure now that I ought not to print it publicly. 

I think you understand (for you know England well) 
that the effect of your President's proposed intervention 
has affected people here very differently according to 
their different degiees in the knowledge of foreign countries, 
and especially according to their knowledge of the way the 
war has been presented to neutrals by the (Germans. 
The greater part of our people were frankly astounded. 
They could not conceive what the President meant by 
intervening at all— especially by intervening at this 
stage when the defeat of the enemy is no longer in doubt. 
They did not see what purpose the Note,served nor what 
conceivable motive it could have had. They knew that 
the President was not attached to the enemy's cause in 
any fashion whatever : no more than to our own ; and yet 
everyone in Europe— at any rate everyone with access 
to e\'en the most general information upon the war— 
could see that such intervention at this moment was 
wholly favourable to the defeated enemy and wholly 
imfa\-ourable to the victorious Allies. And this for the 
simple reason that the Allies have, until quite lately, been 
chmbmg up the hill. They have only quite recently 
reached the simimit, matched and surpassed the enormous 
initial superiority with which their enemy began his 

I say, then, that the mass of people were simplv and 
frankly astounded. The President's Note did not" seem 
" to make sense." It was like a letter of condolence 
received upon news of a wedding or a letter of congratu- 
lation upon news of a death. It had no relation to facts. 
Phrases describing " both parties " as having the good of 
the smaller countries at heart, read to an Englishman exact- 
ly as though Napoleon had written to Pitt saying his chief 
care was for the continued wealth of the City of London ; 
or as though George III. had written to Washington, 
after the winter of Valley Forge, wishing him all success. 

'I his, I say, is the way the Note struck the great mass 
of our opinion. 

But there is a smaller body with special opportunities 
for information which was less astonished. It regularly 
reads the American press. It was well acquainted with 
the United States in the past, and in constant corres- 
pondence with friends in that country during the present 
war. It could judge, therefore, not orily why the President 
saw things as he did, but why so many of yoiir most capable 
fellow citizens see the war in a distorting mirror. Men 
of the very best judgment can only act upon the evidence 
before them, and we know (for I count myself among that 
number) the strange nature of the evidence which has 
alone been presented to you. 

The chief fault, lies, of course, %vith the absence of a 
capable propaganda in the English tongue. It is a great 
pity, but it is not to be wondered at, for we have done 
nofching of the kind before. We not only had no ma- 
chinery for starting such a thing, but it was also un- 
congenial to our temperament. It was particularly 
congenial to the Prussian temperament because it was 
something which required little initia five, great patience, 

and mechanical preparation. At the same time pro- 
paganda work of this sort is the more effective if it is 
unscrupulous and, like s^n'ing, w^orks best where the agent 
is devoid of generosity and honour. The result is that your 
people have had a \'iew of the war, whifch is not indeed 
' the Prussian view, but is certainly what the Prussian 
authorities wanted them to have. 

This idea which the Prussian authorities wanted you 
to entertain was compounded of two falsehoods : one on 
the moral nature of the war, one on its actual progress. 

On the moral side you were to receive the impression 
that Germany was fighting for her life against aggressors. 
On the progress of the war you were to be told that the 
aggressors had been beaten off and that your informant 
had triumphed. 

As to the first of tliese falsehoods, its impression, in the 
absence of contradiction, was a comparatively easy task. 
There has never been a case where an onlooker to a furious 
struggle has not accepted the plea of one party if the other 
was not told him. Not one man in ten thousand will 
read the evidence contained in official' publications. 

Prussia has merely got to say that the Russian Empire 
mobilised against the German "Empire and Austria in the 
midst of a profound peace and threatened them both 
with invasion ; that France hesitated and then from 
desire for revenge foolishly allowed her Alliance with 
Russia to bring her into the conspiracy ; that Great 
Britain wantonly, out of jealousy and fear for the 
future, though not formally allied to France or Russia, 
came in. That story uncontrachcted would be accepted 
as any uncontradicted story is accepted. 

It is a lie of a perfectly crude typa. 

Prussia had prepared for this war during three years ; 
had raised a special levy of money for it ; had suddenly 
added enormously to her own army and that of her 
vassals; had specially overhauled allher military machin- 
ery ; had made special arrangements with Austria ; had 
drawn up a military plan not against Russia— (Russia 
was only to be held at first)— but against France. The 
moment chosen for t}ie war was that after the harvest 
had been gathered in 1914, The only thing the Prussian 
authorities can possibly say in their own favour is 
that they felt themselves suspected and feared that 
later they might be attacked, and therefore chose the 
moment of their greatest strength for aggression. As a 
fact they did not even say so moral a thing as that until 
they saw that defeat was ine\4table. In the first day.^ 
of the war — as for years before the war — tliey talked 
(juite simply and quite brutally of conquest, for they knew 
themselves to be enormously superior in men and material. 
What they did not know was that they were inferior in 

However, we can leave all that. In the matter^ of 
motives you have heard only the (ierman story, or 
you have only heard the later German story, and there 
IS no wonder that you believed it. 

When I come to the second part of their propaganda 
I feel a certain difficulty, because I am you may 
be annoyed by the truth. 

I say that it was important for the effect the Germans 
desired to be produced that your people should be kept 
ignorant of the military situation, and I can imagine 
your telling me with soms indienntion that 3'ou are just 

January 4, 1917 



as well able to judge the military situation as anybody 
else ; that it is evident from the map, and so forth. 

Now it is precisely here that I desire to join issue with 
you if you will bear with me. 

The character of the war ever since the Battle of the 
Yser has been such that it was increasingly easy for the 
military situation to be misrepresented by the enemy, 
and misunderstood even by men of first-rate judgment. 
A military situation is not an easy thing to understand. 
It is one of the most difficult. That is why a good 
military history is such a very rare thing. 

The reason this is so is that the mind naturally and 
perpetually compares the action of armies against one 
another to the action of individuals against one another, 
and the analogy is not only misleading, but actually 
contradictory. An individual does not " retreat." If 
you see him backing out it means that he is defca,tcd. An 
individual has no " communications." An individual is 
never compelled to " a siege " ; an individual has no 
calculable " wastage " or " recruitment." The false 
analogy and the false conclusions drawn from it .apply to 
all wars, but they apply particularly to this war because 
this war is eminently one of military calculation. It is a 
siege war of attrition and that upon the most gigantic 
scale conceivable, and therefore with all the known ma- 
terial elements in the problem present to the calculators. 

\Vliat do you think is nOiV the great dominating military 
feature of the whole thing? It is the fact that ovir 
enemies control most of the raw material of this 
continent, but tlu' Allies the last reserves of the men— 
that is it in a nutshell. Add to it that the British Fleet 
permits supply to the Allies from abroad and the whole 
affair is before you. 

Very well. These things being so the situation is surely 
clear enough. The enemy is beaten, and to save himself 
from all the disasters tiiat threaten he must ha\e inter- 
vention. When we find intervention proposed we con- 
clude, from our knowledge of .the field, that this 
iuterx'cntion is in his favour. The ignorant conclude 
that it is deliberately in his favour. The better instructed 
conclude that it is not consciously in favour of the enemy, 
but are somewhat indifferent to the motive when they 
consider how stupendous the result might be. 

Our ancient civihzation has been challenged. It 
despises as much as it loathes the Prussian bully. It was 
not prepared or organised to, meet that bully, simply 
because the rational and well-developed man treats arms 
as only part of life. But, once challenged by an inferior 
and murderous thing, having had the good fortune to 
stave otf the first treacherous attack, it bent itself to the 
novel task of executing an international criminal. With 
the most severe and bitter sacrifice civihzation has estab- 
lished its supremacy again. Surely you can understand 
how intolerable, on the eve of such events, is the proposal 
to interfere with the natural process of justice ! 

It is not pleasant to mention in connection with such 
work as this the great story of the Napoleonic Wars. It 
is like comparing a great and noble drama to the trial of 
a common murderer. But on the strictly military plane a 
parallel is possible. 

When was Na])oleon beaten ? When one \ving of his 
enormously extended front stood close to the frontiers 
of Portugal and the other was in Moscow ! 

Every step of his decline after i8o() — and all those 
steps can be exactly noted, and are now quite clear in 
history— was some act of the offensive, and even of the 
triumphant offensive. Yet opinion then as now— I mean 
general opinion, not his own, for he saw what had hap- 
pened — could not see the truth until they saw a retro- 
gression upon the map. And even then general opinion 
was in doubt. Even after the vast disaster in Russia it 
was in doubt. Even 181.5 did not convince it. There are 
perhaps educated men still going about who do not know 
that the final disaster was Leipsic. Even the Campaign 
of France in 1S14 did not prevent the enemies of Napoleon 
in the Hundred Days from thinking that all their successes 
might yet be reversed': So true is it that men will not be 
at the pains to dig to the roots of things. 

But if what is required among you before your second 
intervention (which I suppose will come hi due time) is a 
movement upon the map, you will have that without 
too much delay, and I suppose that when it comes we 
may discuss the matter upon easier terms. 


Imperial Problems 

REFERENCE was made in Land & Water 
last week to the increasing interest which the 
problems of Empire are attracting, in view of the 
Imperial Cabinet which has now been summoned. 
These problems, so obvious in their outlines, yet so compli- 
cated and delicate in their details, demand close and 
accurate study and all literature that tends to promote it 
is heartily welcome. Nothing could be more opportune 
than the publication of the addresses which were dehvered 
by Viscount Milner, Earl Grey, Lord Islington, Sir Ceorge 
Foster and Lord Sydenham at the Conferences between 
representatives of the Home and Dominion Parliaments 
held at the House of Commons last summer. It is not 
expected nor indeed is it desired that there shall be 
complete agreement with the various views, but they 
do tf^ow a flood of new light on the questions of high 
Imperial importance with which they deal. 

Lord Milner spoke on " The Constitutional Position " 
between the British Isles and the Dominions ; he sketched 
out a new Imperial Parliament which shall concern itself 
solely with aftairs aftecting the Empire as a whole, leaving 
local affairs to local Parliaments. No utterance has ever 
brought home more forcibly the enormous difficulties 
which surround the creation of a central Imperial admini- 
stration, and only when these difficulties are compre- 
liendcd can one look for measures to overcome them. 
The speaker thus depicts the present position : 

If we desire, as we all. desire, that the Empin; shall endure . 
as one State, and shall constitute, as it alone can, the greal 
biilwark of freedom and progress throughout the world, 
then we must see to it that the Empire has at its head an 
authority, which can deal for it with the rest i^f the world 
as the representative of all its self-governing peoples. 
Such a government cannot grow of itself out of the ground. 
It can Dnly be the result ot a great and deliberate effort 
of constitutional reconstruction. 

Earl Grey's address dealt with " Emigration after the 
War," a question which touches the homeland more 
nearly than many realize. He urged closer co-operation 
between England and the Dominions in the future and 
backed the suggestion of the Commission appointed by 
the Ontario Government that an Imperial Migration 
Board should be organised. While we desire to help the 
Dominions with our surplus peoples, we do not want our 
finest manhood drawn away beyond the seas. So this, 
too, is a big and difficult question. And so is " Trade 
and the Empire after the War " on which Sir George 
Foster, Canadian Minister of Trade and Commerce, spoke 
to the point. Lord Islington, Under- Secrctai-y of State 
for India, furnished striking facts and figures illustrating 
the extraordinary social and economic development of 
, our great Eastern dependency in recent years. Tha world 
seems to move so fast nowadays that even the East has 
to hustle. Finally, the most important subject of 
" Naval and Military Defence " was very ably and 
succinctly handled by Lord Sydenham. These addresses 
are issued in one \olume (2s. 6d.) by the Empire Parlia- 
mentary Association, 64, Victoria Street, Westminster. 

" Advertising," writes Mr. Charles Higham, in Scientific 
Distribution (Nisbet and Co., 12s. 6d.), "can so cheapen the 
cost of production that one-time luxuries become everyday 
necessities, with the result that a thousand refining influ 'nces 
are let loose upon society at large." This is a big statement, 
and the truth oi it turns on the author's idea of " refinmg 
influences." Champagne at luncheon is a luxury, but if 
through advertising a coarse-minded man were able to drink 
it most days of the week, would he bc'rcfined through its 
influence ? So long as Mr. Higham confines himself to 
concrete cases, liis book is interesting, but the attempt to 
prove that the advertising agent or expert, the term which 
he prefers, is the pivot of civiHsation does not succeed. 
Advertising as a matter of fact, is repugnant to the British 
temperament ; we have seen this over and over again through- 
out the war. The average Briton loathes "publicity" ; he 
has won a good manv things including freedom without its 
help, and lie still believes that a vital idea will live without 
being placarded on hoardings or boosted for a fee and at 
so much an inch in newspaper columns. In business it is 
possible to carry this objection to foolish extremes, and for 
business men of that state of mind, this volume is an excellent 
alterative, for it is advertising— scientific advertising wc 
-presume wc ought to call it— from cover to cover. _ ' 



January 4, 1917 

McTavish on the English Genius 

By Joseph Thorp 

MY friend McTavish is a lawyer by trade and 
has the profoundest contempt, if you are to 
judge by his talk, for the negative and 
strictly unnecessary work which it is his fate 
to do — and do so confoundedly well. On the rare 
occasions on which it is necessary for me to have business 
dealings with him the matter in hand is swiftly and com- 
petently handled and I am thereafter treated to some 
delightfully unexpected dissertation on any old thing 
that happens to be bubbling in McTavish's brain at the 
moment. For Mac is primarily a detached observer 
of the follies and fashions of mankind ; a ferocious cynic 
in speech and, of course, a genuinely kindly soul in fact. 
His idiom is the idiom of the scholar abruptly modified 
by the oaths of the ordinary man of action, 'soldier, 
cattleman, bus conductor, and what not ; his accent is 
the pure granite of his native Aberdeen — a fine hard gritty 
affair which easily takes pride of place in his Inn. 

The other day a propos nothing in particular McTavish 
delivered himself of the following imexpected opening : 
" Since the war, I'd have you know, I have come to have 
the most profound admiration of the geographical Eng- 
lishman." A profound admiration of the geographical 
Scotsman is much more in Mac's line, so I put down my 
hat and prepared to hear the unexpected thesis developed. 

" I mean the man of real English stock " — Mac is 
great on stock — " none of your half-breeds. I suppose 
you haven't observed that you English being an en- 
tirely unvocal people get most of your talking done for 
you by Scots and Irishmen. Your newspapers are almost 
entirely run by them ; and particularly by the half- 
breeds, a talkative and irresponsible lot. After the 
Jutland battle I happened to see the women, Belgravia 
women and Pimlico women, waiting outnde the Admiralty 
for news of their men, solid and calm " (here the cynic was 
side-tracked for the moment) " and splendid, the smart ones 
particularly cheering up the others. All the hysteria 
was supplied by the half-breeds in their papers. You 
understand that, don't you ? .A,nd it's typical. The 
English aren't a bit like English newspapers. There 
aren't any English newspapers. No wonder. the German 
fellows had a false estimate of English stav'ing power. 
Well, that's by the way." 

I suppress here the entirely inadequate replies I made 
to my friend. For Mac's authentic method is monologue. 
I am a bit of a monologist myself, and decent dog doesn't 
eat dog. It was Mac's innings, and he was in spate. So 
1 let him have his head. 

" You'll not have noticed " — 'tis my friend's way 
always to assume you haven't noticed — " that the Scots 
genius is alUed to the Continental — to both the French 
and the German. Baron von Hiigel confirms this in a 
recent theological paper, but confirmation is not necessary. 
The Irish and Welsh are in the same class. You can call 
it the logical genius. They all have ideas and they'll 
all logically foHow out these ideas whether they're right 
ideas or wrong ideas to the bitter end. Now 
the Englishman doesn't believe in ideas — in the abstract. 
There's nothing logical about him. He hasn't a logical 
Constitutioft. He hasn't a logical code of law. He has 
the most desperately illogical church. No one but an 
Englishman could, for instance, be an Anglican." 

" But — and here's the point — life's not a logical matter. 
Or put it another way, the factors are so numerous and 
elusive, that no one can get a complete survey of them 
all. Something essential is sure to be left out in the 
calculation. That's why. the Englishman doesn't cal- 
culate. He experiments. And life really is empirical, 
the true method is a method of trial and error. That's 
where the Englishman comes in." 

" Take the British Empire. It simply came together 
anyhow. Nobody planned it. The English genius — ■ 
for though, as I've often told you, it's we Scots do most of 
the work, I now come to see that the solid quiet Enghsh- 
nian is behind using us, manipulating us — would .rtever 
face the thought of a really organised Empire. It was 
(|uite content to let all thedaughter nations gooff and set 
up house-keeping elsewhere and disown their parentage. 
But somehow, having done the worst possible thing, as 

in the matter of the tea-chests, just at the appropriate 
moment it docs something which is essentially the best 
thing to do in the circumstances. You get Lord Durham 
and }'ou get the South African Constitution." 

" Your German sees the British Empiie. He sees 
that dull fellow the Englishman who doesn't know what 
he's got or how to use it ; says to himself, ' This is my job. 
I can make an Empire beside which the British will be 
merely a joke.' .A.nd he gets out some squared paper 
and works it all out to four places of decimals. All 
very logical and clever but — Empires aren't made that 
way. As Napoleon found." 

" I used to think we should win the war in spite of our 
muddling. I now think we shall win it because of muddl- 
ing. It's the English genius to muddle. But that's 
not the Englishman's loss— it's his gain. Life is a muddle. 
War is a muddle — a damned awkward muddle, much loo 
serious for logic to straighten out." 

" Every other serious nation in this war had a plan of 
campaign. It was to do this and this and all would be 
well. Germany had a time-table, and France pranced off 
into Alsace. The Englishman had no particular plan 
and no particular army. And he made some fatuous 
and appalling mistakes. And he learned from his mis- 
takes — more than the other fellows. And now our candid 
friend Sixt von .\rnim rejoices the heart of his exceedingly 
clever General Staff by telling them that the thing for them 
to do is to sit at the feet of asinine England and try to do 
as well as she is doing. Isn't it enough to make the largest 
wooden image of Hindenburg sweat out its nails ? " 

" You have recently got rid of your Enghsh Prime 
Minister. Well it mav be a right move — that is, the 
time may now be ripe for it. But he was the man for 
you when the bad time came. His brilliant successor 
has taken on a task of which the back has been broken 
by the less showy man. History will record that that 
solid middle-class" Yorkshireman, "English of the English, 
did more than keep a Government together. He held a 
difiicult country together,' and a Great Alliance. I doubt 
if the Celtic niould would have stood the long strain of 
this great war with the balance and imperturbability of 
that astute calm man. 

" The half-breeds said : ' Lo ! here is the Christ and 
(the next week) there ! ' And he couldn't see it. You 
couldn't make him mo\e in a hurry. And no doubt he 
.mo\-ed (as is the English nature) too slow. But that's 
better than moving too quick and moving wrong ; quite 
an easy thing to do as every nation involved in the great 
war has cause to know. "' Mistakes,' of course. But 
that's how the game's played. Have our mistakes been 
as great, as fundamental as Germany's — the wonderful, 
logical, organised Germany ? Not on your life ! " 

"The war's dealt a sad "blow to logic, I'm sore afraid. 
And I hate to admit it. Look how egregiously wrong the 
logical Professors of Political Economy were wrong. And 
the logical Internationalists." 

';I suppose you couldn't have had a more illogical way 
of making an army than the way you took. But it had 
the supreme practical advantage" that it trained the most 
willing man first, and because he was willing trained him 
fastest — and speed was the determining factor. And 
I'd like to see the logical nation that could have built 
the present British army out of next to nothing in next 
to no time ? An abominably disorderly method and a 
quite incomparable result." 

" And now do you understand why I have such an 
admiration for the geographical Englishman ? It's a 
bitter dav for me, I can tell you. My pride's sorely hum- 
bled. But I am a truthful man— though a lawyer— 
and I have to testify . . . Good morning. If I 
wasn't so dreadfully busy I'd have a long crack over this." 

And that briefiy was why I wore such a broad grin 
on my face when l" stepped into the Inn Gardens, though 
it was a day on which the pessimists were declaring that 
Koumania was done in absolutely. 

For my own heart told me thatMacTavish was right. 
Muddle is (he'only wear— which is to say, if you learn from 
your mistakes. 

Beside:^, T am a geographical Englishman myself. 

January 4, 1917 


Books to Read 

By Lucian Oldershaw 


THERE arc few people in this country who have 
not treated the great (ierinan peace trick with 
the contempt it deserves. A great deal of the 
derisive anger with which the news of the famous 
Note was receivecl was no doubt due to an intuitive 
distrust of a criminal that has been so thoroughly 
found out. This is a true feeling but, in such 
matters as this no man should trust simply to feeUng 
where knowledge is a\'ailable. As Lord Cromer says, in 
his introduction to an excellent English version of iVI. 
Andre Cheradame's The Pan German Plot Unmasked 
(John Murray, 2s. 6d. net) : " It is essential that, before 
the terms of peace are discussed, a clear idea should be 
formed of the reasons which led the German Government 
to provoke this war." For this purpose Lord Cromer, 
with good reason, recommends this popularly written 
and forcible little book. ;\1. Cheradame has proved a 
true prophet in the past and this book, which was written 
before recent events in the Balkans, shows that he still 
has the power of reasoned foresight. He dwells par- 
ticularly on German schemes in the East, and one of tlie 
best chapters is that which is explained in its somewhat 
cumbrous title : " Go-man inancvuvyes to play the A/lies 
the trick oj the 'Drawn Game,' that is, to secure the 
accomplishment of the ' Hamburg to the Persian Gulf ' 
scheme as the minimum result of the war." 

»>: ^ H^ ^ ^ 

Another brochure that is remarkably a fropos, par- 
ticularly in view of the prominence gi\'en t,o the subject 
in the Allies' reply to the German peace-note is Belgium 
and the Great Powers (Putnam, 3s. 6d.) It is written by 
the late Emile Waxweiler, who was Di^-ector of the 
Solyay Institute of Sociology at Brussels, and who is 
already known to many English and neutral readers as 
the author of Belgimn, Neutral and Loyal. In his latest 
book he answers, in a way that should convince the most 
obstinate unbeliever, the enemy's attempt to prove that 
Belgium had already violated her own neutraUty. He 
shows clearly, for example, that the Belgian conversation 
with England in 1913 had precisely the same object as 
similar conversations with (Germany in iqii — namely, to 
dispel her fears with regard to current rumours as to 
sending troops through Belgium. He also shows that the 
disposition of her troops in the fateful months of 1914 
clearly proves that she was prepared to defend her 
neutrality at every frontier. It is well to keep alive by 
such books as this the sacra indignatio that all right- 
minded people experienced when Germany violated, the 
neutrality of the courageous little State she had under- 
taken to protect in 1839. 

* * * :•: H! 

When on August 4th, 1914, England put an end to the 
fear that, according to M. Waxweiler, some Belgians had 
that she would not completely fulfil the obligations as a 
guarantee of the treaty of 11)14, lio^^" rapidly the Dominions 
threw in their lot with the Motherland ! One aspect of 
this is graphically described by Frederic C. Curry in 
Frorn St. Lawrence to the Ys'cr (Smith, Elder and Co., 
3s. 6d. net), in which the author, late Captain in the 
2nd Eastern Ontario Regiment, describes the adventures 
of the first Canadian Brigade from its mobilisation to the 
end of 1915. As the narrative includes the Canadian's 
terrible experiences at Ypres, and the subsequent fighting 
at h'estubert and Givenchy, it is sure to appeal to a wide 
circle of readers. What, however, interested me as much 
as anything else in the book, being familiar with most of 
the incidents of the great struggle in France, was the 
early chapters which described the organisation of the 
Canadian militia and its sudden improvisation into an 
overseas force. The story makes an interesting jmrallel 
with that of our own militia, and it is, as is indeed the 
whole book, which is written with in\incible good humour, 
most interesting reading. 


Two French books in translation are before me, the 
one a record of actual experiences, the other a romance. 
i\I. Gaston Riou had before the war achieved a consider- 

able reputation as a young writer who was helping to 
lead the reaction from the materialism of contemporary 
thought. In his Journal d'tm simple soldat, guerre- 
captivite 1914-15, he tells the story of his experiences in 
the war and as a prisoner in Germany. Those who have 
not read the original should at least get the translation 
The Diary of a French Private 1914-1915 ((ieorge Allen 
and Unwin, Ltd., 5s. net), for it is a very moving and 
enthralling piece of work. Moreover, M. Riou knew 
(lermany before the war, and his experiences and more 
especially his interpretation of them have therefore especial 
force and interest. The most \-i\-id episode in the book, 
perhaps, is that which describes the coming of Russian 
prisoners to Fort Orff and their fraternisation (to the 
disgust of the German authorities) with the original 
French inhabitants. My French romance is Marcel 
Prtnost's Benoit Castain (Macmillan and Co., 2s. net), 
most fluently translated by Mr. A. C. Richmond. It is 
what one would expect of its author, a drama of passion 
with the war as a background, an old theme with a 
new setting, an interesting' problem of ethics in war- 
time, but 

* ■ ;}s :(: * si; 

Among the volumes of verse this week I see William 
H. Davies's Collected Poems (A. C. Fifield, 6s. net). In 
this volume Mr. Davies gives us, " in response to a fre- 
quently expressed wish "from the press and public," what 
he believes to be his best pieces. The poetry of the 
" super-tramp " has so many genuine admirers that I 
have taken the opportunity this \olume has given me 
to try to convert myself to their way of thinking : I have 
not wholly succeeded. Mr. Davies's work has certainly 
qualities I like. He has the clear vision of a child and 
generally a complete lack of poetical self-consciousness. 
One or two of the lyrics are quite perfect expressions of 
the little they have to express and there are some vivid 
pictures painted in with a sense of wonder, notably the 
description of the sea-faring man which is the last and 
longest poem in the book. But for the most part I must 
confess that I find I am little interested in what he has to 
say and find his manner of saying a little too stark for 
me to take pleasure in. 


Of novels this week I have two, both imported goods, 
and the most violent contrasts to one another. The 
Man of Promise, by Willard Huntington Wright (John 
Lane, 6s.), is a bo^ of considerable power which makes 
the hardened reviewer smile at its naive attempt to be 
audacious. The idea that a man is betraying his 
better self unless he is continually combating all estab- 
lished ideas is so beautifully young that I have hopes of 
Mr. Wright, especially as many of his characters live 
in spite of (and often quite out of agreement with) his 
views about them. My other novel, also from America, 
is chaste and simple. Under the Country Sky,^ by Grace 
S. Richmond (J. Murray, 5s. net), is a really pretty story 
which healthily occupies the tired mind with other thoughts 
than of the war, " George " is a cc,mpanionable girl, 
and sufficiently attractive to keep one from being bored 
while hstening to the tale of her little woes. 

Union Jack Club Fund 

Tlie following is a list of subscribers to the Union Jack 
Club Extension Fund up to the end of 1916 : 

£ s. d. 

Previously acknowledged , . . . . . 2,849 ^^ ^ 
" Colony of Mauritius " pp. Mr. H. Henniker 

Heaton, Acting Colonial Secretary . . i/OOO o 

Barkly East Brancli of the Red Cross Guild . . 50 o o 

Ernest Garrett, Esq. . . . . . . . . 10 o o 

G.R.H * 500 

Lt;-Col. H. M. Cliff 500 

G. G. C. Honolulu . . . . . . . . 500 

The Rev. T. Moreton, S.C.F 300 

Mrs. Manlcy Hopkins . . . . . . . . 10 o 



January 4, 1917 

The Golden Triangle 

By Maurice Leblanc 

[Translated by Alexander Teixeira de Mattos) 

Symopsi? : Captain Patrice Belval, a wounded French 
officer, prevents in a Paris street the abduction of a nurse 
who is known to her patients as " Little Mother Coralie." 
Belval declares his love to Coralie only to be told by her 
that she is already married, and that he must make no further 
effort to retain her friendship. That night, after Coralie has 
left him, Belval has sent to him anonymously a box con- 
taining a large rusty key, by means of which he gains access 
to a house, in which he finds five men torturing another man, 
Essares, obviously with a view to extracting injormation 
from him. Essares manages to get hold of a revolver, with 
which he shoots Colonel Fakhi, one of the five men, dead. 
He buys off his other four assailants for a million francs 
apiece, with which they leave the house. From an altercation 
between Essares and Coralie Belval learns that Essares is 
Coralie's husband, and that he has betrayed State secrets 
to the enemies of his country, and then has attempted to 
betray his associates in treachery. The next day Belval, 
following Coralie to her house, finds that Essares, who had 
contemplated flight from Paris, has been brutally murdered. 
An examining magistrate, after interviewing Coralie, calls 
Belval in and explains to him that Essares ivas prime 
mover in a plot for exporting gold from France. In order 
to recover some 300 million francs which Essares had con- 
cealed, the authorities consider it necessary to hush up 
the circumstances 0/ the financier's death. This the magis- 
trate proceeds to explain to Belval, between whom and Coralie 
some mysterious links had been found at the time of Essares' 


CHAPTER V I ir .{continued) 

FEEL certain that my own onqnirios will reveal 
a series of weak concessions and unworthy bargains 
on the part of several more or less important banks and 
.credit houses, transactions on which I do not wish 
to insist, but which it would be the gravest of blunders to 
publish. TJierefore, silence." The Magistrate said, 

" But is silence possible ? " Belval asked. 

" \Miy not ? " 

" Bless my soul, there are a good few corpses to be ex- 
plained away ! Colonel Fakhi's, for instance ? " 

" Suicide." 

" Mustapha's, which you will discovigr or which you have 
already discovered in the Galliera garden ? " 

" Found dead." 

•• Essares Bey's ? " 

" An accident." 

" So that all these manifestations of the same power will 
remain separated ? '.' 

" There is nothing to show the link that connects them." 

" Perhaps the public will think otherwise." 

" The public will think what we wish it to think. This 
is war-time." 

" The press will speak." 

" Tiic press will do nothing of the kind. We have the 

" But, if some fact or, rather, a fresh crime . . . ? " 

" Why should there be a fresh crime ? The matter is 
finished, at least on its active and dramatic side. The chief 
actors are dead. The curtain falls on the murder of Es.sares 
Bey. As for the supernumeraries, Bournef and the others, 
we shall have them stowed away in an internment camp before 
a week is past. We therefore find ourselves in the presence 
of a certain number of millions, with no owner, with no one 
who dares to claim them, on which France is entitled to lay 
hands. I shall devote my acti\'ity to securing tint money 
for the Republic." 

Patrice Belval shook his head : 

" Mnie! Essares remains, sir. We must not forget her hus- 
band's threats." 

" He is dead." 

" No matter, the threats are there. Old Simeon tells you 
so in a striking fashion." 

" He's half mad." 

" Exactly, his brain retains the impression of great and 
innninent danger. No, the struggle is not ended. Perhaps 
indeed it is only beginning." 

" Well, captain, are we not here ? Make it your business 
to protect and defend Mme. Essares by all the means in your 
power and by all those which 1 jilace at your disposal. Our 
collaboration will be interrupted, because my task lies here 
and because, if the battle — which you expect and I do not— 
takes place, it will be within the walls of this house and 

" What makes you think that ? " 

" Some words which Mme. Essares overheard last night. 
The colonel repeated several times, ' The gold is here, Essares.' 
He added, ' For years past, your car brought to this house 
all that there was at your bank in the Kue Lafayette. Simeon, 
you and the chauffeur used to let the sacks down the last 
grating on the left. How you used to send it away I do not 
know. But of what was here on the day when the war broke 
out, of the seventeen or eighteen hundred bags which they 
were expecting out yonder, none has left your place. I sus- 
pected the trick ; and we kept watch night and day. TJie 
gold is here.' " 

" And have you no clue ? " 

" Not one. • Or this at most ; but I attach comparatively 
little value to it." 

He took a crumpled paper from his pocket, unfolded it 
and continued : 

" Besides the pendant, Essares Bey held in his hand this 
bit of blotted paper, on which you can see a few straggling 
hurriedly written words. The only ones that are more or 
less legible are these : ' Golden triangle.' What this golden 
triangle means, what it has to do with the case in hand, I 
can't for the present tell. The most that I am able to pre- 
sume is that, like the pendant, the scrap of paper was snatched 
by Essares Bey from the man who died at nineteen minutes 
past seven this morning and that, when he himself was 
killed at twenty-three minutes past twelve, he was occupied 
in examiniYig it." 

" And then there is the album," said Patrice, making his 
last point. " You see how all the details are linked together. 
You may safely believe that it is all one case." 

" Very well," said M. Masseron. " One case in two parts. 
You, captain, had better follow up the second. I grant you 
that nothing could be stranger than this discovery of photo- 
graphs of Mme. Essares and yourself in the same album and 
in the same pendant. It sets a problem the solution of which 
will no doubt bring us very near t^e truth. We shall meet 
again soon. Captain Belval, I hope. And, once more, make 
use of me and of my inen." 

He shook Patrice by the hand. Patrice held him back. 

" I shall make use of you, sir, as you suggest. But is this 
not the time to take necessary precautions ? " 

" They are taken, captain. We are in occupation of the 

" Yes ... yes ... I know ; but, all the same 
. . . I have a sort of presentiment that the day will not 
end without . . . Remember old Simeon^s strange 
words . . ." 

M. Masseron began to laugh. 

"Come, Captain Belval, we mustn't exaggerate things. If 
any enemies remain for us to fight, they must stand in great 
need, for the moment, of taking council with themselves. 
We'll talk about this to-morrow, shall we, captain ? " 

He shook hands with Patrice again, bowed to Mme. Essares 
and left the room. 

Belval at first made a discreet movement to go out with 
him. He stopped at the door and walked back again. Mme. 
Essares who seemed not to hear him, sat motionless, bent in 
two, with her head turned away from him. 

" Cofalie," he said. 

She did not reply ; and he uttered her name a second time, 
hoping that again she might not answer, for her silence sud- 
denly appeared to him to be the one thing in the world for 
him to desire. That silence no longer impUed either constraint 
or rebellion. Coralie accepted the fact that he was there, 
by her side, as a helpful friend. And Patrice no longer 
thought of all the problems that harassed him, nor of the 
murders that had mounted up, one after another, around them, 
nor of the dangers that might still encompass them. 
He thought only of Coralie's yielding gentleness. 

" Don't answer, Coralie, don't say a word. It is for me to 
speak. 1 must tell you what you do not know, the reasons 
[Continued on t^ase in) 

January 4, 1917 



'' " Allies " 


Medical Watches 


No more Watcli Glasses! 
No more Watch Glass 

I'rotectors ! 
is impossilile to break 
the front ! 





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By Appointment to H.M 
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Watch and Chronometer 

Makers to the Admiralty. 

Holders of 5 Royal Warrants. 


An Officer from the Front 
Recently said to Burberrys 

"/ came to you at the opening of the War 
in 1914, and then thought you the most 
expensive House in the world. After fight- 
ing in France and Gallipoli since then, I 
think you the cheapest House in the world. 
Your goods are marvellous in the Way they 
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The simple explana- 
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the best in every 

In the severity of 
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lives lost. What 
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Hour after hour 
spent thus \n the 
trenches, no shelter. 
Think of the im- 
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such conditions. 

Not the false heat of 
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You need a healthful 
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warmed by the 
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and the vital heat of 
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He experiences this 
to the full who wears 



Has no openings in front, S3 that it is 
impossible for wet, wind or cold to 
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Especially designed front keeps water 
clear of the legs when walking, and of 
legs and seat when sitting. 

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Fastens with two buttons only — one at 
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During the War BURBERRYS 

Officers' " Burberrys,*' Titlockens, 
Burfrons and IJurberry Trench- 



January 4, 1917 

{Conttnutd from page i8) 
that made you wish to keep me out ot this house , . . . out 
■ii this house and out of your very Ufe." 

He put his hand on the back of the chair in which she was 
sitting ; and his hand just touched CoralJe's hair. 

" CoraUe, you imagine that it is the shame of your hfe 
here that keeps you away from me. You blush at having 
been tiiat man's wife ; and this makes you feel troubled and 
anxious, as though you yourself had been guilty. But why 
should you ? It was not your fault. Surely you know that. 
I can guess the misery and hatred that must have passed 
between you and him and the constraint that was brought to 
bear upon you, by some machination, in order to force j-our 
consent to the marriage ! No, CoraUe, there is something 
else ; and I will tell you what it is. Tiiere is something 
else. ..." 

He was bending over her still more. He saw her beautiful 
profile ht up by the blazing logs and, speaking with increasing 
fervour and adopting the famihar tii and loi which, in his 
s_ eech, retained a note of affectionate respect, he cried : 

" Am I to speak. Little Mother CoraUe ? I needn't, need 
1 ? You have understood ; and you read yourself clearly. 
Ah, I feel you trembling from head' to foot ! Yes, yes, I tell 
you, I knew your secret from the very first day. From the 
very first day you loved your great beggar of a wounded man, 
all scarred and maimeJ though he was. Hush! Don't 
deny it ! . . . Yes, I vmderstand : you are rather 
sliocked to hear such words as these spoken to-day. I ought 
perhaps to have waited. And yet why should I ? I am asking 
you nothing. I know ; and that is enough for me. I shan't 
speak of it again for a long time to come, until the inevitab e 
hour arrives when you are forced to tell it me yourself. Till 
tlien 1 shall keep silence. But our love will always be between 
us ; and it wiU be exquisite, Little Mother CoraUe, it will be 
exquisite for me to know that you love me. CoraUe . 
There, now you're crying ! 'And you would still deny the 
tinith ? Why, when you cry — I know you, little mother — 
it means that your dear heart is overflowing with tenderness 
and love ! You are crying ? Ah, Little Mother, 1 never 
thought you loved me to that e.xtent ! " 

Patrice also had tears in his eyes. Coralic's were coursing 
down her pale cheeks ; and he would have given much to 
kiss that wet face. But the least outward sign of affection 
appeared to him an offence at such a moment. He was 
content to gaze at her passionately. 

And, as he did so, he received an impression that her 
thoughts were becoming detached from his own, that her 
eyes were being attracted by an unexpected sight and that, 
amid the great silence of their love, she was listening to 
something that he himself had not heard. 

And suddenly he too heard that thing, though it was almost 
imperceptible. It was not so much a sound as the sensation 
of a presence mingling with the distant rumble of the town. 
What could be happening ? 

The liglit had begun to fade, without his noticing it. Also 
unperceived by Patrice, Mme. Essares had opened the window 
a little way, for the boudoir was small and the heat of the fire 
was becoming oppressive. Nevertheless, the two casements 
were almost touching. It was at this that she was staring ; 
and it was from there that the danger threatened. 

Patrice's first impulse was. to run to the window, but he 
:estrained himself. The danger was becoming defined. 
t)utside, in the twilight, he distinguished through the slanting 
panes a human f )rm. Next, he saw between the two case- 
ments something which gleamed in the light of the fire and 
which IcMjked like the barrel of a revolver. 

" Coralie is done for," he thought, " if I allow it to be 
suspected for an instant that I am on my guard. 

She was in fact ojijxjsite the window, with no obstacle 
intervening. He therefore said aloud, in a careless tone : 

" Coralie, you must be a little tired. We will say good- 

.\t the same time, he went round her chair to protect 
her. , 

But he had not the time to complete his movement. She 
also no douV.t had seen the glint of the revolver, for she drew 
back abruptly, stammering : 

"Oh, Patrice! . . . Patrice! . . . 
Two shots rang out, followed by a moan. 
" You're wounied ! " cried Patrice, springing to her side. 
" No, no," she said, " but the fright. . . ." 
' Oh, if he's touched you, the scoundrel I " 
" No, he hasn't." 
" Are you quite sure ? " 

He thirty or forty seconds, switching on the electrir 
light, looking at Coralie for signs of a wound and waiting in 
an agony of suspense for her to regain full conscioiisn.'.ss. 
Only then did he rush to the window, opm it wide and climb 
over the balcony. The room was on the tirst floor. There was 

plenty of lattice-work on the wall. But, because of his leg. 
Patrice had some dilhculiy in making his way down. 

Below, on the terrace, he caught his foot in the rungs of an 
overturned ladder. Next, he knocked against some^poUce- 
inen who were coming from the ground-floor. One of thenv 

" I saw the figure of a man making off that way." 
" Which way ? " asked Patrice. 

The man was running in the direction of the lane. Patrice 
followed him. But, at that moment, from close beside the 
little door, there came shrill cries and the whimper of a 
choking voice : 

" Help ! . . . Help ! . 

When Patrice came up, tiie policeman was already flashing 
his electric lantern over the ground ; and they both saw a 
human form writhing in the shrubberv. 

" The door's open ! " shouted Patrice. " The assassia 
has escaped. Go after him ! " 

The policeman vanished down the lane ; and, Ya-Bon 
appearing on the scene, Patrice gave him his orders : 

" Quick as you can, Ya-Bon ! ... If the policeman 
IS going up the lane, you go down. Run ! 1 '11 look after 
the victim." 

AU this time, Patrice was stooping low, flinging the light 
of the policeman's lantern on the man who lay struggUng 
on the ground. He recognised old Simeon, nearly strangled, 
with a red silk cord round his neck. 

" How do you feel ? " he asked. " Can you understand 
what I'm saying ? " 

He unfastened the cord and repeated his question. Sim<5on 
stuttered out a series of incoherent syllables and then suddenly 
began to sing and laugh, a very low, jerkv laugh, alternating 
with hiccoughs. He had gone mad. 

Ulien M. Masseron arrived, Patrice told hiin what had 
happened : 

" Do you really beUeve it's all over .' " he asked. 
" No. You were right and I was wrong," said M. Masseron. 
" We must take every precaution to ensure Mme. Essares' 
safety. The house shall be guarded all night." 

A few minutes later, the policeman and Ya-Bon returned, 
after a vain search. The key that had served to open the 
door was found in the lane. It was exactly similar to the 
one in Patrice Belval's possession, equally old and equally 
rusty. The would-be murderer had thrown it away in the 
course of his flight. 


It was seven o'clock when Patrice, accompanied by Ya- 
Bon, left the housd in the Rue Raynouard and turned towards 
Neuilly. As usual, Patrice took Ya-Bon's arm and, leaning 
upon him for support as he walked, he said : 

" I can guess, what you're thinking, Ya-Bon." 

Ya-Bon grunted. 

" That's it," said Captain Bclval, in a tone of approval. 
" We are entirely in agreement all along the line. What 
strikes you first and foremost is the utter incapacity dis- 
played by the police. A pack of addle-pates, you say ? 
When you speak like that, Master Ya-Bon, you are talking 
impertinent nonsense, which, coming from you, does not 
astonish me and which might easily make me give you the 
puni.shment you deserve. -But we wiU overlook it this time. 
Whatever you may say, the police do what they Ccm, not 
to mention that, in war-time, they have other things to do 
than to occupy themselves with the mysterious relations 
"between Captain Belval and Mme. Essares. It is I there- 
fore who will have to act ; and I have hardly any one to 
reckon on but myself. Well, I wonder if I am a match for 
such adversaries. To think that here's one who has the 
cheek to come back to the house while it is being watched bv 
the poUce, to pat up a ladder, to listen no doubt to my con- 
versation with M. Masseron and afterwards to what I said 
to Little Mother Coralie and, lastly, to send a couple of 
bullets whizzing past our ears ! What do you say ? Am I 
the man for the job ? And could all the French police., 
overworked as they are, give me the indisponsabb as.sistance .■■ 
No, the man I need for clearing up a thing like this is ait 
exceptional sort of chap, one who unites every quality ii» 
himself, in short the typ? of man one never sees." 

Patrice leant more heavily on his companion's arm : 

" You who know so many good people, haven't j-ou the 
fellow I want concealed about your person .' A genius of 
sorts ? A demigod ? " 

Ya-Bon grunted again, merrily this time, and withdrew 
his arm. He always carried a little electric lamp. Switching 
on the light, he put the handle between his teeth. Then he- 
took a bit of chalk out of his jacket pocket. 

A grimy, weather-beaten plaster wall ran along the street. 
Ya-Bon took his stand in front of the wall and, turning the 
light upon it, began to write with an unskilful hand, as though 
'.Continued ott rage 22. 

January 4; 1917 





arc "TOP HOLE. 

A few packets of Gong Soups in his 
haversack, and a brisk little wood fire glowing 
in the shelter of a farm-house wall, mean much 
to the man who has just returned from arduous 
toil for his "rest" period. 

Water is quickly procured, the Gong Soup 
packet dissolved, and in fifteen minutes or so 
"the best meal for a week" is ready. 

The particular handiness of Gong Soups, 
together with their variety and economy, render 
them specially suitable for use in the home 
as well as at the Front. 

From one of the H.A.C. 

" You might send some more Gong Soups. They 
are ' top hole.' Everyone likes them out here, the 
vegetable part is so good." 

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Try it — any bath — any time — 
any day — why not to-day ? 


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January 4, 1917 

(Continued from page 20) 
each letter cost him a measureless effort and as though the 
sum total of these letters were the only one that he had ever 
succeeded in composing and remembering. In this way, he 
wrote two wo/ds which Patrice read out : 
Arskn'e Lupin. 

" Ars:-ne Lupin," said Patrice, under his breatli. And, 
L)oking at Va-Hon in amazement. " Are you m your right 
mind ? What do you mean by Arsene Lupin ? Are you 
suggesting Arsne Lupin to me?" 

Ya-Bon nodded his liead. 

"' Arsene Lupin ? Do you know him ? " 

'■ Yes," Ya-Bon signified. 

Patrice then remembered that the Senegalese used to 
spend his davs at the hospital getting his good-natured com- 
rades to read all the adventures of Arsene Lupm aloud to 
him : and he grinned : . . 1 

" Yes, you know him as one knows somebody whose 
history one has read. 

" No," protested Ya-Bon. 
' Do you know him personally ? 

" Yes." 

" Get out, vou sillv fool ! Arsene Lupin is dead. He 

threw himself into the:' sea from a rock ; (i) and you pretend 

that you know him ? " 

" Yes." ' , • • , 

" Do you mean to say that you have met liim since ne 

<lied? "■ 

" Yes.' . , . - 

■• By Jove ! And Master Ya-Bon's influence with Arsene 
Lupin" is enough to make him come to life again and put him- 
self out at a sign from Master Ya-Bon ? " 

" Yes." 

" I say ! I had a high opinion of you as it was, but now 
there is nothing for me but to make you my bow. A friend 
of the late Arsene Lupin ! We're going it ! . . ■ And 
how long will it take vou to place hi.s ghost at our disposal ? 
Six months ? Three months ? One month ? A fortnight .'' 

Ye-Bon made a gesture. 

" About a fortnight." Captain Belval translated. " N ery 
weU, evoke your friend's spirit ; I shall be deliglited to make 
his acquaintance. Only, upon my word, you must have a 
very poor idea of me to imagine that I need a collaborator ! 
What next ! Do you take me for a helpless dunderhead ? 


Patrice and Coralie. 

E\'ERYTHIXG happened as M. Masseron had fore- 
told. The press did not speak. The public did not 
become excited. The various deaths were casually 
paragraphed. The funeral of Fssares Bey, the 
wealthy banker, passed unnoticed. 

But," on the day foil )wing the funeral, after Captian Belval, 
with the support of the police, had made an application to 
the militarv- authorities, a new order of things was established 
in the house in the Rue Raynouard. It was recognised as 
Home No. 2 attached to the hospital in the Champs-Elysees ; 
Mine. Essar^s was appointed matron ; and it became the resi- 
dence of Captain Belval and his seven wounded men ex- 

Coralie, therefore, was the only woman remaining. The 
cook and housemaid were sent away. The seven cripples did 
all the work of the house. One acted as hall-porter, another 
as cook, a third as butler. Ya-Bon, promoted to parlour- 
maid, made it his business to wait on Little Mother Coralie. 
At night he slei>t in the passage outside her door. By day 
lie mounted guard outside her window. 

•■ Let no one near that door or that window ! " Patrice said 
to him. " Let no one in ! You'll catch it if so much as a 
mosquito succeeds in entering h^r room." 

Nevertheless, Patrice was not easy in his mind. The enemy 
had gi\en him too many proofs of" reckless daring to let him 
imagine that he could take any steps to ensure her perfect 
protection. Danger always creeps in where it is least ex- 
pected ; and it was all the more difficult to ward off in that 
no one knew whence it threatened. Now that Essares Bey 
was dead, who was continuing his work ? Who had inherited 
the task of revenge ujion Coralie announced in his last letter '. 
M. Masseron had at ouce begun his work of investigation, 
out the dramatic side of the case seemed to leave him in- 
different. Since he had not found the body of the man 
whose dying cries reached Patrice Belval's ears, since he had 
discovered no clue to the mysterious as-ailant who had fired 
at Patrice and Coralie later in the day, since he was not able 
to trace where the assailant had obtained his ladder, he dropp;;d 

11 813. 
de Mittos. 

By Mauri c I-eblanc. Tian lated by Alexander Teixcira 

these questions and confined his efforts entirely to the search 
for the eighteen hundred bags of gold. These were all that 
concerned him. 

" We have every reason to believe that they are here, he 
said, " between tlie four sides of the cpiadrilaleral foimcd by 
the garden and tlie house. Obviously, a bag of gold weighmg 
a hundredweight docs not take up as much room by a Ion 
way a-i a sackol coal of the same wei,'ht. But. for all that 
eighteen hundred bags represent a cubic content that is not 
easily' concealed." 

In two days, he had assured himself that the trea-ure was 
hidden neither in the house nor under the house. On the 
evenings when Essares Bey's car brought the gold out of the 
coffers of the Franco-Oriental Bank to the Kuc;^ Raynouard, 
Essaris, the chaufleur and the man known as Gn'goire used 
to pass a thick wire through the grating of whicli the accomp- 
lices spoke. This wire was found. .Along the wire ran hooks, 
which were also found ; and on these the bags, were slung 
and afterwards stacked in a large cellar situated exactly 
under tlie library. 

It is needless to say that M. Masseron and his detectives 
devoted all their ingenuity and ;U1 the painstaking 
patience of which they were capable to the task of 
searching every corner of this eel ar. Their efforts only 
established beyond doubt that it contained no secret, save that 
of a staircase which ran down from the library and which was 
closed at the top by a trap-door concealed by the carpet. 

In addition to the grating on the Rue Raynouard. there was 
another which overlooked the garden, on the levol of the first 
terrace. These two ojjonings were barricaded on the inside 
by very heavy shutters, so that it was an easy matter to stacl; 
thousands and thousands of rouleaux of gold in the cellai 
before sending them away. 

" But how were they sent away ? " M. Masseron won 
dered. " That's the mystery. And why this intermediate 
stage in the basement, in the Rue Raynouard? Another 
mystery. And now we have Fakhi, Bournef and Co., declar- 
ing that, this time, it was not sent away, that the gold is here 
and that it can be found for the searching. We have searched 
the house. There is still the garden. Let us look there." 

It was a beautiful old garden and had once formed part of 
the wide-stretching estate where people were in the habit, at 
the end of the eighteenth century, of going to drink the 
Pa.ssy waters. With a two-hundrcd-yard frontage, it ran 
from" the Rue Raynouard to the (juay of the river-side and 
led, by four successive terraces, to an expanse of lawn as old 
as the rest of the garden, fringed with thickets of evergreens 
and shaded by group.s of tall trees. 

But the beauty of the garden lay chiefly in its four terrart-^ 
and in the view which they afforded of the river, the low 
ground on the left ban'c and the distant hills. They were 
united by twenty sets of steps ; and twent\- paths climbetl 
from the one to the other, paths cut between tlie buttressing 
walls and sometimes hidden in the floods of ivy that dashed 
from top to bottom. 

Here and there a statue stood out, a broken column, or 
the fragments of a capital. The stone balcony that edged 
the upper terrace was still adorned with all its old terra -cott:'. 
vases. On this terrace also were the ruins of two little round 
temples where, in the old days, the springs bubbled to th'.- 

In front of the library windows was a circular basin. 
within the centre the figure of a child shooting a slender 
thread of water through the funnel of a shell. It was thu 
overflow from this basin, forming a little stream, that trickled 
over the rocks against which Patrice had stumbled on the 
first evening. 

" Ten acres to explore before we've done," said M. Mas eron 
to himself. - 

He employed upon this work, in addition to Belval's cripples 
a dozen of tiis own detectives. It was not a difficult business 
and was bound to lead to some definite result. As M. Masseron 
never ceased saying, eighteen hundred bags cannot remain 
invisible. An excavation leaves traces. You want a hole 
to go in and come out by. But neither the grass of the lawns 
nor the sand of the paths showed any signs of earth recently 
disturbed. The ivy ? The buttressing-walls ? The terraces ? 
Everything was inspected, but in vain. Here and there, in 
cutting up the ground, old conduit pipes were found, running 
towards the Seine, and remains of aque ucts that had once ser- 
ved to carry off the Passy waters. But there was no such 
thing as a cave, an underground chamber, a brick arch or 
anything that looked like a hiding place. 

Patrice and Coralie watched the progress of the search. 
And, yet, though they fully realized its importance and though 
on the other liand, they were still feeling the strain of the 
recent dramatic hours, in reality they were engrossed only in 
the inexplicable problem of their fate : and their conversation 
nearly always turned upon the mystery of the past. 

(To be continviei.) 

January 1 1, 1917 

Supplement to LAND & WATER 



The factors of successful 
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cutting, and careful, thorough 
tailor work— and all these we 

Abundant experience, also, 
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Grant and Cockburn have 
made breeches for ninety- 
five years. 

We keep on hand a number of pairs 
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These most comfortable, good-looking puttees are made entirely of 
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They are extremely durable, even if subjected to the friction of 
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The price per pair is 16 6, post free inland, or postage abroad, 1/- 
extra, or sent on approval on receipt of business (not banker's) 
reference and home address. 


ESTD. 1821 


Military and Civil Tailors, Legging Makers. 




This Vest has been 
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^:^^= The Original Cording' s, Estd. 1839 — 

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In our light-weight No. 31 material, 
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of our No. 23 cashmere, a medium- 
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The detachable fleece inner coat can 
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When ordering an "Equitor" Coat 
please state height and chest measure 
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Only Addr^nes : 

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Supplement to LAND & WATER 

January ii, 1917 




Waring & Gillow's 


Further Specimen Bargains. 

Lace Bedspreads. 

A charming design iu imitation 
filet lace Bedspreads. A very 
iiigeuious reproduction. Special 
price to clear. 

For siugle beds, 2 1 /- each. 

For double beds, 25/6 „ 

Vei-y choice reproduction of real 
filet lace Bedspread of an exception- 
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Size about 76in. by lOOin., 10/9 each. 
96in by H21n., I4'9 „ 

Coal Hod. 

I'olished brass helmet Coal Hod. 
Usual price 29/6. Sale price 25/- 

Madras Curtains 

8 pairs coloured Madras Curtains, 
fine Yochara design and colours, 
SOin. wide by 3^ yards long. 

Usual price 42/6 pair. 

Sale price 29/6 pair. 


170 yards SOiii. hand-printed Cre- 
tonne, large Queen Anne design nn 
pale gold ground. 

Usual price 5/11 per yard. 

Sale price 2/11^ per yard. 

290 yards 50in. Cretonne, rambler 

rose design with white or jaspe 

ground. Usual price 2/11 per yard. 

. Sala price 1/9^ per yard. 


Ardebil Wilton Carpets. 

The name " Ardebil " represent", 
one of the most beautiful carpets in 
the world, and it is for this reason 
that we call this specially fine grade 
of Wilton Carpet the " .'Vrdebil." 
All these carpets are faithful repro 
ductions of beautiful originals. 

Ctual prire. Sale price. 
ft. in. ft. in. 
7 « by 4 « 

10 6 


13 6 


THIS Sale affords an exceptional 
opportunity of obtaining first class 
articles from practically every department 
at genuine bargain prices. The specimen 
items illustrated above are merely 
e.xamples of the value to be obtained. 




SurnisAersC lAxxuators 








is a genuine damp and dust-proof watch, 

with special screw-in movement, unbreakable glass and 
luminous face. The movement is fully jewelled and is 
fitted with micrometer regulator to give fine adjustment. 
It is compensated for all positions and temperatures 
specially balanced and built to withstand shock, it is the 
finest quality Timekeeper obtainable and has been proved 
by practical tests in the trenches, equal in accuracy to a 
-O-Guinea Chronometer. For Naval and Military men it is 
the Ideal Watch and is being worn by numerous officers 
of both services. When writing please state whether 
black or white dial is preferred, mentioning reference 200. 
At llie side is illustrated the New 5TLVLL WRISTLtT as highly 
recommended in the editorial column of " LAND & WATE.R." 

sHf-ad)usUhU -fits any 
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be turned ovrr an i tiorn 
/aCf downwards thus 
doin^ away with dial 
protectors . 

SiUer Plated. - '-!'« 
Bv post, - S£/l> 


The •• Land & Water •' Wrist Watch, with 
nnbreakable Glass and Luminous Dial 

Obtainable only from — 

Messrs. BIRCH & GAYDON, Ltd., 

Waich aad Technical Instrument 

Makers to the Admiralty, 


West End Branch— \9 PICCADILLY ARCADE 

date J. Barwise). 

The Best Boots 

For Active Service are 

Norwegian Boots. 

The Easiest, Most 

Model Waterproof, Wear- 
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Stocked in all sizes. 

ATTACHMENTS, carrying 
Boots to thigh, S.\ 1 extra. 

No. 1 
£6 60 

Faulkners' Leggings 



Wrtte for Booklets and instructions for Self-Measurement. 

Uilh tvhich is incorporated the boot business o) Alan, Hebert & Greenin?. Ltd- 

51 & 52 South Molton St., Bond St., London, W. 

And 26 Trinity Street, Cambridge. 


Vol. LXVIII No. 2853 UTA] THURSDAY. JANUARY 11, 1917 [?'^^'^?^^,/^] ^^i^^^'iH^^]^^ 

By Louis Raemaekers 

Drawn ejccliisivety for "Land <t Waler" 

Germany Feeling the Pinch 

The War God . " In 1914, William, you rejected every suggestion of peace and 
insisted on the mailed fist ; now it will not let go its grip. Do you still like it ? 


January ii, 1917 


For Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen 

The men who are envied in training 
camps, on board H.M. Ships and on active 
service abroad are those who receive 
parcels of good things from home. Gong 
Soups are particularlysuitedto their needs. 
They give warmth, sustenance and energy 
to overcome the trials of winter in the 
open. They are easily prepared, and the 
twelve flavours afford a welcome change 
ft om Service Rations. 

From one of the Expeditionary Force: — 
"I have much pleasure in acknowledging receipt of a 
welcome parcel of Gong Soups. It is indeed surprising 
the large amount of nourishment derived from them. 
By the addition of boiling water several portions of the 
most delicious and most appetising soup one could ever 
wish to taste can be made from one of the small packets. 
At this time of year, when one is so exposed to the bad 
weather, a portion of these soups has wonderful sus- 
taining powers and one is able to 'carry on.' " 

From the Father of one of the London Scottish : — 
" A fortnight ago I sent several packets of your Gong 
Soups to my son in France, London Scottish, and to-day 
I heard from him. The following extract from his 
letter will I think interest you: — 

' Those Gong Soup tablets you sent are excellent, 
especially in this weather, and I hope you will not by 
any mischance forget to put a few of them in each time.' " 

Twelve Delicious 
Varieties : 

Scotch Broth 
Mock Turtle 

Ox Tail 
Thick Gravy 

Celery Cream 
Green Pea 

Made by 
0X0 Ltd., London, E.G. 



»■■ fl 

Look for ikt 
— LabH — 


has alone puilied up tLe Dexter 
Reputation to jt« dominant 
position at the Front. Ho-w- 
ever wet or muddy tlie outside 
of your Military Dexter, 
you are dry and cosy witkin. 
"As British as tke 
Weatkcr— but Reliatle." 
Supplied by Agents Everywhere 

70/- to 126/- 


WalUce. Scott & Co. Ltd. lwtiol«sal<), G)>««w. 

• • • 

Head Depot in London 








A Mustard Bath may make you 
sleep when all else fails. The 
potent oils of the mustard restore 
and equalize the functions of the 
body and bring a desire for healthy 
sleep at the right time. Try 
it — to-night. 


Two Pretty Garments at Rose-Annette's 

pLOWEREp Taffeia Underskirt, with corded hem. twist of picot 

ribbon tied into long ends an •■ Bnithed with a posy of satin A^/ 
rosci. Hand-made, to special measures - - - - .^i/" 

Crepe de CHine Camisole, with hemstitching, lace and ribbon. "I C /Q 
Made by hand to any measures liJf*J 

A DAINTY BOOKLET of designs in hand-made lingerie in alt the 
-^^ newest fabrics and a form tor self-measurement wilf be *^ni nnnn 
request from 

sent Qpon 

Rose-Annette, Canada House, Sidcup. 

January ii, 1917 





Telephone HOLBORN 2828. 




Germany Feeling the Pinch. By Louis Raemaekers i 

Tlie Right Policy. (Leader) \ " 3 

Retreat in Roumania. By Hilaire Belloc 4 

Sea War, 1916. By Arthur Pollen 8 
The People and the Duties of Empire. By The Master 

of Balliol 10 

Inhuman Treatment of Russian Prisoners 12 
Le Soliloque du Deporte (Poem), by Emile 

Cammaerts 13 

Germans in India. By Arthur Gordon 14 

Germany's Policy in the Balkans. By Frank Fox 15 

The New Raemaekers' Exhibition i6 

Books to ]^ead. By Lucian Oldershaw 17 

The Golden Triangle. By Maurice Leblanc 18 

The West End 22 

Kit and Equipment 25 


ON the eve of the issue of the great Loan which 
proves the resolution of the British Government 
and people to carry the war to a complete 
military victory, we shall do well to grasp why 
a determination of this kind is vital for the future 
security of Europe. 

The only conceivable policy for the Allies in the 
face of the German anxiety for peace is to meet it by 
refusing even to discuss terms, let alone to propose 
terms, until the enemy has suffered a complete military 
defeat. The future is veiled from nxan. Whether the 
enemy will suffer a complete military defeat or not we 
therefore cannot tell. All the known elements in the 
problem point to his certainly suffering such a defeat. 
That is all we can say. But the fixed point from which 
reason can never vary and from which statesmanship 
can only look aside at its peril, is the point that anything 
short of the full military defeat of the Central Empires is 
equivalent to their victory, and that their victory is 
equivalent to the -permanent degradation of our civili- 
. sation. But it means here, in this country, something 
especial, it means the absolutely certain decline of 
England and the British name. 

The reason that even the mention of terms is foolish 
resides simply in this : That when men are under a very 
great strain a check of any sort, moral or material, tends 
to break them down. If, in the last effort of a race 
when a man can just barely carry on, you divert his 
attention even by a second, you risk his collapse. If 
you bring means of rescue to a man hanging by his hand, 
over a height, the most difficult part of your job is getting 
him to stand the strain during the last few moments during 
which the means of rescue are being prepared. The mere 
presence of them reacts nervously against his power to 
endure. Everyone knows this in private cases where 
individuals are concerned. It is none the less true of 
pubUc cases where nations are concerned. 

It is true that the strain is not of this severity in the 
case of the Allies at least, though it is nearly of that 
severity in the case of the enemy. But it is a strain and 
necessarily an increasing strain, and the mere presence 
of "peace talk " frequently endangers men under such a 
strain. It is a consequence and corollary of this obvious 
truth that by refusing so much as to discuss matters with 

our opponent we put him into a very baci way indeedj 
He has made his subjects suffer the sudden prospect of 
rela.xation, and its disappointment. If we confirm that 
disappointment we have given him a mortal shock. 

Now for the reason that terms, however satisfactory — 
sliort of the military defeat of the enemy — have a 
special meaning for Great Britain. Let us suppose the 
impossible in terms so extreme that the enemy would 
not grant a tithe of them in his present state. Let us 
suppose his erection of an independent Poland, including 
the martyred Prussian provinces which have suffered 
more dreadfully than all the rest of that murdered 
kingdom. Let us suppose Danzig PoHsh and Posen 
Polish as well as Galicia, and independent. Let us 
suppose Russia in possession of the issues from the Black 
Sea : the promise of a money indemnity to irestore, so 
far. as they can be restored, the abominable material 
outrages of Belgium and Northern France, and a penalty 
paid for the still more abominable moral outrages 
of murder, torture and rape. Let us suppose great por- 
tions of shipping given up ; the original frontiers of 
France restored and even a scheme of disarmament 

What follows ? You are still in the face of Prussia 
controlling sufficient resources in materials and in 
subjects to renew the struggle when she wills. Any 
word of hers that she may give, any pledge un- 
sanctioned by force, we know to be worthless. Such a 
statement seemed exaggerated some years ago. It is now 
common knowledge and no one can deny it. No promise 
that the present methods of promiscuous murder at 
Sea shall cease will be worth the paper it is written 
on at the end of ten years or earlier. No promise of 
disarmament will be worth the. paper it is written on 
unless it be the disarmament of a defeated foe, guaranteed 
by the presence over against ,it of victorious armies ready 
at once to inflict punishment at the first sign of bad faith. 
That Prussia, after such a most unexpected experience 
as she has had, would or would not engage in another 
piece of Continental aggression may be debated by those 
who choose to debate it. 

Supposing her to remain an undefeated, or, at any rate, 
unbroken organism as she is to-day, under the dynasty 
that has wantonly forced this dreadful calamity upon 
Europe, a small part of her energies and material re- 
sources would be sufficient to render impossible the 
traditional life of this countr}^ the security of its supplies, 
and the communications of its Empii"e. That is the plain 
truth and it is a truth that no one can deny. No other 
Power would act as Prussia has acted in this matter of 
sea-murder, but she, if she is not broken and reduced to 
the fear of a policeman outside, will certainly act 
according to her traditions and her vile nature. Only 
when her military caste is defeated, her dynasty taken 
from her, and her power for evil subjected to immediate 
punishment the moment it attempts a new develop- 
ment, will this country be secure. Anything short of 
such a suecess means for the immediate future the 
permanent and increasing peril of sea power and supply. 

That is the whole of the problem. It is one of the 
simplest as it is one of the most awful problems that 
have ever been presented to stat-esmanship, and in its 
simplicity lies our salvation. All that we know as 
Europe begins to fail if Prussia is granted a truce. But 
quite apart from that general trutn. there is the par- 
ticular truth that in this particular ca,se the survival of 
Prussia under its military head, with tailitary resources 
open to it, is the certain doom of these islands, and their 
only prospect of security and pride is 121 the dissolution 
of such a military power. 

From those two simple contrasting issues there is no 
escape. It is life or death for one or t he other. And it 
is Prussia herself that has willed it so. 


January ii , 1917 

The Retreat in Roumania 

By Hilaire Belloc 


F the reader will look at the accompanying map he 

will see that tl^e Allied line now lies, not exactly 

traightencd, but still not very irregular, from the 

Oituz Pass (ttie issue from which is still securely 

/O 30 30 *> 

lield) to the Lower Sereth. A few da- ■ ago it covered 
Focsani and Braila. To-day both'Braila and Focsani 
are uncovered. The mountains to the north-west 
(summits of about 3,000 feet with easy contours), are 
being disputed : the enemy slowly advances in them. 
His ad\ance is least at the Oituz— where he is still 
\irtually immobilised, and grows broader and broader as 
one goes south. Now what does this mo\-ement mean ? 
What is the conception upon which the Russian Higher 
Command is operating in this very gradual retirement 
with its imimportant loss in prisoners, and its hitherto 
insignificant loss in guns ? 

What is the idea lying behind this deliberate fully 
co-ordinated and inexpensive retreat which has proceeded 
without interruption or serious hitch since, after the 
fall of Bucharest, the Russians formed in front of the 
Roumanian army and took over the opposition to the 
invasion while that army reformed behind the line ? 

A theory \udely held is a design to stand upon the 
line of the Sereth river. It is very doubtful. When we 
are told that the design is to relieve and hold the line 
of the Pruth, such a statement does not conform to the 
mere geography of the case, let aJone to the plan which 
the Russian Command is here ob\iously pursuing. 

Look at the angle which the existing line from the 
Oituz to the lower Sereth makes with the Pruth Vallej-, 
and ask yourself what would happen if at the present 
moment a general retirement' upon tlie Pruth was ordered? 
The line makes an angle with the Pruth Valley of more 
than 45 degrees. The troojK defending the CMtuz Pass 
ire 80 miles as the crow flies from the T,ower Pruth ! 
While the left wing of the long line (it is in its sinuosities 
more than 100 miles long) is in the innnediate neigh- 
bourhood of the Lower Pruth. To jn\ot round on the 
left and to swing back the distant right over those 80 
miles, would mean an operation of the most difficult 
sort possible — one would -almost have said fantastic. It 
would mean a gamble ui>on the certainty of being able to 
hold the left immobile for at least ten days and more 
likely a fortnight. It would mean a co-ordinated retirtv 
tnent more and morCTapid the further northward pne was 
along the line, without trans\'erse railways by which to 
carry it out, and it would mean very heavy losses even if 
the operation were ideally carried out, and a constant 
peril of disruption. Meanwhile, all the troops holding the 
further passes to the north of the Trotus Valley and 
beyond would have to be retired over even greater 

Again, the Pruth does not form a continuous defensive 

li ne for our Allies, even if it were what it is not, a com- 
plete obstacle under the conditions of modern war. For 
the Russians hold the Bukovina and the Allied forces 
hold, the passes to the south of the Bukovina. Again, 
the southern half lives by the two railways which 
run down Moldavia from north to south. The line 
of the Pruth runs far east of all these positions and of 
the railways. 

No such operation is conceivable. On the contrary, 
the Russian plan is clearly of another kind, and we appro- 
ciate it best precisely by considering this recent retiiWA*; „ 
over the Lower Sereth. 

It is upon the extreme right of the line in -.«:7i of the 
Oituz Pass that the line is being keo* lnunobile ; it is 
upon the extreme left that retirenj .at is permitted. The 
Allied Higher Command in thi^. region has retired behind 
the Sereth becatise Braila was outflanked once Machin, 
on the further side of the Danube marshes, was taken, and 
the Dobrudja evacuated. To have tried to halt between 
Braila and tne Sereth would have been to fight with a 
difficult obstacle behind one, and the retirement across 
the Sereth means that the Allied Higher Command here 
intends to give the defensive line an even sharper angle 
to the Prtith valley than it held before. 

For after all, \\hat is the object with which- the Russo- 
Roumanian forces are here acting ? It is to cause the 
enemy — since he has here concentrated a maximum 
of strength and can compel a retirement — a maximum 
of loss ; to hold him to continued efforts which forbid 
his releasing any men for work elsewhere ; to avoid the 
en\elopment of any chance projection in the line, and to 
maintain a constant unbroken front before him, though 
that front slowly falls back northward and eastward. 

No one can understand these Roumanian operations 
■ who does not keep in mind the cardinal fact that the 
Central Empires and their Allies have put into them all 
the men they have available and to spare at this moment ; 
and that they are doing this with the full knowledge that 
they do. not see a sufficient reserx'c of men to render their 
immediate future secure. They are doing it side by side 
with a most violently emphasised demand for peace. 

A sound way of regarding the whole affair is to compare 
it with what is almost its exact parallel, the Russian 
retirement through Poland last year. The contrast 
between the two operations gi\-es a sort of working model 
whereby we may compare the present phase of the war to 
the phase of 1915. 

In 1915 the Austro-C.ermans operated with a vast 
reserve behind them : drafts available for the whole • 
remaining time they thought the campaign at all likely 
to last. They operated with divisions at full strength 
and with a mobile force which covered many hundreds 
of miles. To-day they are operating with reduced di\i- 
sions upon a line which, where it is continuous, is but a 
hundred miles long, and with forces about one-fifth of 
those which advanced through Poland. 

In 1915 the great retreat cost not far short of two 
million permanent and temporary losses to both sides, 
and the losses to the retreating Russians were enormously 
severe, because great numbers of their wounded fell as 
jjrisoners to the invaders, and in so falling rapidly 
depleted the already gra\ely insufffcient Russian equip- 
ment. To-day in the same interval of time the losses 
on both sides are somewhat imder 100,000, perhaps, 
for the invaders all told, somewhat over for the defensive. 
But that includes the considerable enemy success north 
of Bucharest' before the fall of that capital. The Allied 
losses in all the fighting since then, during which the 
retirement has been not only methodical but exceedingly 
slow, are insignificant compared with those of the great 
campaign of last year. 

In 1915 three months saw the Austro-German offensive 
sweep over the whole of Russian Poland up to and 
including Warsaw ; the fourth month saw the occupation 
of the whole of Poland ; before the fifth month was- 

January ii, 1917 


over the Russian armies, though they had escaped envelop- 
ment, had lost moie than a million men, and had evacuated 
territory 100 miles and more in breadth by four or five 
hundred from north to. south. In the loss of guns also — 
though the field artillery was very well preserved — one 
could note the strength and rapidity of the offensive. 
It was impossible, for instance, to sa\e the heavy arma- 
ment of Novo (ieorge\icsk or of Kovno. 

A corresponding period in this Roumanian offensi\'e 
has seen the loss of very few guns since the first retreat 
and latterly of next to none — the operations around 
l-'ocsani account for exactly three ! The hea\y artillery 
has been withdrawn from permanent emplacements with 
success, and places such as Braila containing the stores 
of wheat which were among the chief of the enemy's 
objects, have been covered long enough to permit an 
almost leisurely withdrawal of all their supplies. 

Take anv point you will in the contrast between the 
two operations, and you may read in that point the 
immense change that has come over the war in the 
interval. Whether in the number of men the enemy has 
available for his operation, or in its territorial results, or 
in the losses inflicted upon the retreat, or in the number 
of prisoners, or in the rate of advance, you find the same 
opposition between. an operation upon the largest scale, 
caiTied out with the greatest energy, and up to the very 
end — up to the formation of the salient of Vilna — per- 
petually within an ace of success, and an operation upon 
a vastly diminished scale, with energy depleted, reserves 
lacking, captures insignificant, a pace reduced to some- 
thing like marking time, and no approach to success as 
yet in any phase. 

In this connection it is very well worth remarking 
that the Roumanian offensive into which the eneifiy has 
put all his remaining stock of offensive power for the 
moment, has never once produced a dangerous salient 
in the defensive line. To those who have followed 
the Prussian method throughout the whole campaign 
(audit has never changed), this is the most significant 
point of all. In the great Polish operation of last year 
live capital salients were produced one after the other 
at the enemy's will by the enemy's immense superiority 
in offensi\e power. He could produce them almost at 
his own time and place. A month after his first advance 
began he so pressed the Russians north and soutlv of 
Premyzsl that the neck of the salient was, by the be- 
ginning of June, not more than eleven miles across. In 
other words, he could mass men and guns in superiority 
to his opponent with such rapidity and in such force upon 
two separate points chosen at will upon his lines as would 
make a bulge between, and though he failed time after 
time to cut the neck of the salient so produced, and 
therefore failed to reach a decision,' yet he could count 
right up until the autumn upon the making of these 
salients against the will of the defensive, and in conformity 
with his own will. And the last which he formed, that 
round Vilna, was the greatest and for the Russians the 
most perilous of all. 

But throughout this Roumanian retirement, no salient 
has been formed.. Every effort was made to create one 
round Bucharest, but e^•en at the most anxious moment 

the curve of the defensi\e line did not project by an 
amount equi\-alent to a third of its I ength, and save on 
that occasion there has been no appre ciable bulge formed 
anywhere on the retiring hue. The ]3attleof Bucharest 
was a Sadowa manque. 

Meanwhile the enemy's task and object are clear enough. 
He must continue to attempt to tu rn one or the other 
wing of that line which now runs fro m in front of Galatz 
to the Oituz Pass. If he could force the Oituz he would 
have a very much more iminediate and decisive result 
than he can hope to get by action 'upon the other wing 
near the Danube. He would compt^l a rapid and perhaps 
disastrous retirement, a swinging ba(.;k of the line where it 
has the greatest distance to fall bad : before it can be safe 
again, and that through bad hill country without roads. 

To turn the line by his right, the: Russian. leff that is, 
through the country between the Fruth and ,the Sereth, 
woulcl not prevent a retirement over country tliat is pro- 
\ided with two parallel railways for a retirement, .with 
two tolerable roads, and one good one. The only thing 
that would profit him in this re^^ioTi would be a really 
decisive success breaking the Russian left' here altogether. 

He has not hitherto shown anything like a sufficiency 
in offensive force for such a c'lecision. 

Meanwhile, the defensi\e Ime behind that just aban- 
doned clearly follows the line of the lower Sereth to the 
Marshes of Suraia, and thence- runs either along or behind 
the valley of the Putna till the foothills of the Carpathians 
are reached. Thence a clearly defined ridge (marked 
A.-^A on Map I.) averaging two thou.sand feet above the 
plain, broken in only two places by narrow valleys, 
wooded, carries one to those positions just east of 
the Gituz . Pass summit, which have hitherto proved 
impassable to the Austrian force under Arz, reinforced 
though it probably, has been during the last fortnight. 

. From such a line a continued slow retirement, inflicting . 
a maximum of loss on the assailant and occupying ajil his 
spare forces could still proceed, still pivoting on its right 
from the Oituz till well north of Lake Bratesul.,,, It 
would rely on the marshy Lower Pruth for a secure, left 
flank — but that would not be holding the Pruth as a line. 

There are two policies now open to the enemy. It is 
obvious that the Russians, thus retiring by pivoting on 
their right near the Oituz, are " forming a flank " : their 
line from the mountains to the Sereth and Pruth gets at 
a sharper and sharper angle to their main line from the 
north down the Carpathian ridge. Such a " square 
end " is risky — for if the enemy breaks it he turns all the 
rest of the line. The attempt to break it directly is 
ftne policy open to him therefore ; but it is a pohcy 
which he has been trying for two months, and in which' 
he has hitherto failed. 

'There remains an alternative. He can attempt a 
passage of the Lower Danube below Galatz and so come 
in behind the Russo-Roumanian flank, turning its right 
at once and ruining it. The thing is possible — we do 
not know the conditions of armament, but it is im- 
probable, because the Danube is here a very broad river in 
its sea reaches and bearing seagoing ships, and is lined 
along its southern bank by bad marshes of varying 

The Idea of Exhaustion 

One of the novel ideas which the enemy is trying to 
spread in connection with his desperate peace movement 
is the idea that the war cannot fail to end as a stalemate 
through mutual exhaustion. 

The idea is " novel " only in the sense that it has not 
been put forward yet even by the stupidest Pacifist or 
Alarmist on our side, during all these two years of war. 
We have waited for it, as we have waited for all these 
nonsensical diversions, until the enemy made us a present 
of it. Until quite lately the corresponding formuhe 
was that the war would end in a stalemate through the 
unpossibility of a modern offensive breaking a modern 
defensive ; and before that we had the only slightly less 
ridiculous theory of the war map. Before that again we 
liad the " huge hidden reserve array of the enemy," 
" the hidden two milUons all trained and ready," which 
was going to give the coup dc grace, and so forth. 

In one way this last diversion is consoling, because it 
will not be easy for the enemy to find another one. He 

has pretty^ well exhausted the category of bogies with 
which *o delude those who do not apj:)roach war as a 
study, but as third-rate and ephenieral literature. 

Let us examine this theory of exhaustion. 

The termination of hostihties through exhaustion docs 
hot mean that they come to an end " because you cannot 
go on.'' That vague idea, like so many of the erroneous 
and misleading phrases applied to war, is based upon the 
false analogy of individuals. You can put up two men to 
fight, both of them keen on fighting, and you may get 
them after a certain time into a condition in which neither 
cares tio go on fighting both are too tired. 

There may be something of this sort on the political side 
of war, but in strategics it does not exist. Strategicaliv, 
»xhaustion means " the incapacity to fulfil a gi\-en task 
through lack of men or of material or both." .Vnd every- 
thing depends upon the conditioning word " a given 

That is why a well-chosen retreat or a well-chosen 


January ii, 191 7 

shortening of a line is often a factor of victoiv. and is 
always designjed for victory. The C'arthaginian effort 
against Rome perished of exhaustion .because the task it 
had assigned to itsolf was no less than the occupation and 
raising of Ital}-. Bat before it began to perish of ex- 
haustion it came within a hair's breadth of succeeding. 

Paris capitulated m 1S71 through exhaustion. The 
wastage of her armed forces, material and food was going 
on at a rate, and liad reachx'd a point which made the 
further support of a population of known and irreducible 
size and the further anihtary defence of a line necessarily 
extended to a certain periinker, impossible. 

Now what does " exhaustion " mean in tHe light of this' 
definition as applied to the present stage of the present 
great ^ries of camjiaigns ? What is the " given task " 
which lies before eitner combatant ? 

The definition of that task is very sirriple. On the part 
of the enemy it is a ta^ k of holding certain extended fronts: 
on the part of the .\lUcs of provoking a rupture in those 
fronts. The enemy <:annot provoke a rupture in the 
fronts opposed to him- because he is out-matched in the 
West, and in the East he is working against indefinitely 
large spaces over which indefinite retreat can (normally) 
be effected. The war is. -therefore, and will continue to 
be, what it has been for now more than two years, a siege. 
Let us repeat, then, the conditions of the problem. 
The enemy must maintain his fron.ts. that is his task. 
The AUies must provoke a rupture in those fronts. That 
is their task. And the word " exhaaistion " relating to 
either side has no meaning save with these tasks implies. 
There is one modification that will occur to everyone, 
which is that the enemy has a theoretical alternative to 
holding Iris existing fronts, and that alternative is a 
retirement to shorter fronts. But I have not included 
this modification because the time for it is past. 

There are a number of converging ref.sons against such 
a shortening of fronts, which make it improbable in the 
extreme on certain sectors, and impossible on others. I 
will lav these reasons before the reader that he may judge, 
(i) Retirement does not shorten the front in the East. 
Given Roumanian belligerency the enemy stretched along 
the line of the Sereth and the Pruth and so northward past 
the Bukovina, through Galicia and Volhynia, the Pripet 
Marshes and the line of the Dvina, is on pretty well the 
shortest front he can hold — and it is a front nearly 50 
per cent, longer (by the way) than it would have been 
had not Roumania come in. 

On the Southern Balkan front retirement north of the 
few valley gates increases his liabilities instead of diminish- 
ing them, and the same is true of the Itahan front. * 

(2) Upon the Western front he has a choice of shorter 
lines upon which he could retire, but he would have to 
do so now after the terrible punishments his forces have 
received —the two great battles of 1916, Verdun and the 
Somme —with the mass of his forces much lower in 
average now than they were ever before, and therefore 
less fitted for the strain and complexity of a retirement. 
Such a retirement would necessarily involve enormous 
loss in material and particularly in heavy artillery — 
which is life and death in the present war. 

Even were it successful in the ordinary military sense 
of that term —that is, even did it result in the new and 
shorter line being taken up and held, the losses in men 
suffered during such an operation could hardly fail to 
cancel the saving in men effected by the taking up of the 
shorter line. Further, this operation would be under- 
taken in the face of an opponent now superior in con- 
dition and arms, and possessed of far greater fresh reserve 
numerical power. It is true that tliis Western sector 
is the one point on which such an operation is conceivable, 
but I think it is admittedly highly improbable. More 
than that^ne cannot say. 

(3) Any drastic retirement in the East cuts the com- 
munications through Constantinople with the Turkish 
army, and therefore dooms it. For that army lives by 
its supplies from the Central Powers. 

(4) The fourth point is, under present circumstances, 
the one of most practical importance. The enemy, even 
if he had immediate and obvious strategical advantages 
offered him by retirement, has every political motive for 
avoiding it. .\nd towards the end of a losing war, 
especially of a losing war which follows on previous 
advance, which is being fought on invaded alien soil, and 
which is accompanied by tactical successes, and the 

occupation of fresh territory, retirement is something 
which hardly any military command has ever been per- 
mitted by its government to effect —even when the mili- 
tary command and the Government were in the hands 
of the same man. Witness Napoleon. In the particular 
case of our present enemies there are a host of political 
considerations all working the safne way. They dare 
not abandon Bulgaria and Turkey and they cannot take 
the Bulgarian and Turkish armies with them. They 
dare not give to their domestic opinion what would look 
like the military j)roof of defeat— it is the price they 
ha\e to pay for having so long called out victory when 
their Command knew that it was losing every day. They 
have deliberately chosen to .stretch their fronts and to 
enjoy the \ery great political asset of an untouclied 
home territory. They cannot reverse such a plan at will. 
Their naval strategy compels them to retain to the end all 
they can of the coast of the North Sea. Their economic 
basis demands the retention of Belgian machinery and 
coal and of Lorraine coal and iron. 

Let us return, then, without fear of modification, to the 
fundamental formula. It is the enemy's given task at 
least to hold his existing fronts. It is the task of the 
Allies to provoke a rupture therein. For those who 
object to the too simple phrase " the breaking of a line " 
(and there is a great deal to be said for their objection) 
we will define as the rupture of one of their fronts, the 
creation by the Allies of two new fianks, or, alternatively, 
local infiltration at several points, where each success 
would mean very large captures in men and materials — 
e\en though after each such success and for some time 
to come the enemy organisation should remain intact. • 

Now if these two tasks be what we have defined them 
to be, how does the word " exhaustion " apply to them ? 

Men and Material 

The point of exhaustion may be reached in men or in 
material, or both. 

In men the situation has been exposed and analysed 
on all sides by all those competent to expose and analyse 
it, until I am sure the readers are as weary of the task as 
the writers — which is saying a good deal ! 

We all know by this time what the enemy's command 
has known in the most precise detail for many months : 
That, failing political changes in the situation, the effec- 
tives required for the holding of the present fronts in men 
are within sight of exhaustion upon the enemy's side. 
He had, imless he could get a Polish army, at the most, 
at the end of last autumn, 20 men for drafts \rith which 
to fill coming gaps in every 65 men actively engaged. 
Supposing Polish recruitment (which has hitherto failed) to 
give him its very maximum, he would still have onty 27 men 
for drafts. That was the draft power he had in .sight for the 
whole of the actions of next spring and of most of next 
summer. It is a proportion obviously insufficient, and 
every one of the Allied Powers has a larger margin. 
France has a somewhat larger margin, England, Italy 
and Russia a very much larger margin. 

We may take this limb of the problem as constant and, 
as we shall see in a moment, it is the determining point. 

What of material ? In material we include finance, 
which is only material under another name ? You may 
borrow your material at interest, and that is sound or 
traditional finance to the advantage of the owners. Or 
you may take it without promising to give back the 
equivalent, let alone to give back interest as well, and 
that is revolutionary finance. But by whatever names 
you call it, if you are determined to win, finance merely 
means material. 

Material for the pmposes of this campaign — where 
. whole nations are mobilist^d, and where inexitably one 
group or the other will, in the political sense, be destroyed, 
and must therefore consider absolutely all available 
resources (.ynce each is fighting for its life)— may be 
divided into subsistence and arms. The division is not a 
logical one and it is rough. There is obvious overlapping 
and obvious broad debateablc ground in which much is at 
the same time arms and subsistence. But the peculiar 
circumstances of the war in its present i)hase do justify 
this division. For the strain upon the population as a 
whole in each belligerent country — that is the strain upon 
mere subsistence — is coming to be a more and more pro- 
minent factor of \ictory or defeat. In this category of 

Januaiy ii, 1917 



material the enemy's] position as contrasted with the 
AlHes is as follows : 

(a) In the mere requisites for arms and for the transport 
of troops the four main requisites are coal, steel, nitrates 
and some fuel for the internal combustion engine — ^taking 
for granted, of course, the skilled labour required for the 
production of the \'arious instruments. 

In the matter of such skilled labour, the enemy, when 
he had reached the present extension of his hues, more 
than a year ago, had a very great superiority over the 
Allies. But it is a superiority which the Allies have 
gradually caught up, for such labour is created by training. 
Further, the less skilled labour, which lies behind the 
skilled labour and is essential to it, is not available in 
superior quantities with the enemy. It is now actually 
a little inferior numerically to what the Allies can spare, 
and is becoming . more and more inferior numerically 
every day. It is, by the way, worth remarking in passing 
that the enemy's slave raids do not largely affect the 
numerical factor of labour. They are undertaken as 
pieces of bullying for what he believes to be pohtical 
effect. A Belgian is as useful turning shell in Belgium as 
he is turning shell within the old frontiers- of the German 
or Austrian Powers. 

In the plant for creating steel from iron, in his 
supplies of iron ore and in his, supplies of coal, the 
enemy enjoyed and will continue through the war 
to enjoy a very great superiority over the Allies in 
Europe, and this superiority is highly important because 
the war has shown that a successful modern offensive 
demands the very maximum output even of a highly 
industrialised country. Russia is not really industrialised. 
Italy is only partially industrialised. France is only 
partially industrialised, and it is precisely her industrial 
districts which have suffered most from the war ; a large 
proportion of her resources in this department lying in 
territory actually occupied by the enemy. England is 
very highly industrialised, but she cannot supply the full 
requirements of the Allies in surplus of their own pro- 
duction. The plant for converting iron into steel takes 
a long time to erect, and, regarding the 'Alhance as a 
whole, is still insufficient for the purposes of the war. 
Here, then, in this most important point the Alliance is 
under a cle^,r handicap. It must obtain much ore and 
steel from the world outside Europe. Its communications 
in the conveyance of these are maritime and therefore 
\ulnerable, as we saw the week before last, while the 
corresponding communications of the enemy are short, 
internal, terrestrial and absolutely secure. In this con- 
nection we must note that the Allies suffer a further 
handicap from the strain upon tonnage caused by distant 
operations of which the communications are also maritime 
and lengthy. The obtaining of the surplus raw material, 
and especially steel, from the world outside Europe' is 
secure, however, under two conditions ; 

(i) That there is no political interference with its 

(2) That the exchange against which purchase is made 
shall be available. 

This exchange is of four kinds. First, we receive such 
material, especially steel, against exports. The normal 
process, of course, in time of peace and still working, 
though working rather lamely, in time of war. Russia 
Avith her enormous produce for export is unfortunately 
blockaded. France is exporting httle, because of the 
dram upon her labour power produced by the necessities 
of war. England is exporting the most of the Allies, 
but far less, of course, than in normal times. Export 
alone will not suffice for exchange. 

(2) Material needed can be obtained as against stock 
owned in countries outside Europe, without export : 
Say a locomotive to pay for such, and such goods for the 
Argentine. You can obtain them by handing over to the 
Argentine a locomotive which you once owned in the 
Argentine itself, and it is by this process that the pawning 
of Transatlantic securities" has been going on. 

(3) You can pay in gold, but it is a Umited resource, 
because gold is normally only the current medium of 
exchange, or rather the 'basis of that current medium. 
When a nation takes payment in gold for goods beyond a 
certain extent, thte only effect is to raise prices and not to 
make it really richer. 

(4) (This is really the crux of the business at the 
Di-e^ent stage). You may go on credit. That is, you 

may say to the foreign nation : " Send me the goods, 
and though I cannot send you other goods in exchange 
for them now, I will bind myself to send you them when 
I begin producing again after the war." 

This fourth method of obtaining the necessary surplus 
niaterial is capable of almost indehnite expansion, but 
it depends upon a psychological factor : To wit, whether 
your customer believes that your future after the war 
will stand the strain. This consideration plays no little 
part in the elaborate German propaganda by falsehoods 
and suggestion ; much of the object of which is to con- 
vince neutrals that the AlUes cannot win and will therefore 
come out of the struggle hopelessly maimed, while the 
Central Powers will come out with all their resources 
intact. At the same time, this consideration helps us to 
understand the folly and iniquity of those who for private 
purposes have spread panic and doubt on the Allied 
side. This question of credit is the great question of the 
immediate future. 


If we turn to subsistence we see the same factors at 
work, but in very different proportions. The squeeze 
in tonnage, which is the effect of the new submarine, 
coupled with the complete disregard on the part of the 
enemy of all moral contentions "in maritime war, and 
enormously emphasised by the tonnage required for dis^ 
tant expeditions, puts the Allies to grave inconvebience 
—but as yet to no more — and the greater part of the 
Alliance not even to that. But, on the other hand, the 
blockade, perpetually increasing in strictness, has reduced 
the Central Empires in this category to what are cer- 
tainly very grave straits indeed. It is not a matt^ oir 
which exhaustive statistics are procurable. At a piere 
personal guess, based on what most rehabie witnesses 
have told us, one would doubt whether this factor could 
of itself decide the war. But there is no doubt that it 
embarrasses, in a fashion to which the Alhed Nations 
show no parallel, the action of the enemy's command, 
and that it will embarrass it more and more as the year 
goes on. 


Now if we balance and weigh all these various factors 
in the problem of exhaustion, what we come to is this : 

Supposing the present access to neutral markets- to 
remain unimpaired, we match the enemy in war material,' 
though, unfortunately, in an unequal manner, increasingly 
surpassing him iii-the West, but not permanently re- 
dressing the balance in the East. 

The squeeze for tonnage progresses (even under present 
conditions, with most ships imarmed and the new sub- 
marine action not yet curbed) much less fast than the 
squeeze for subsistence in the Central Empires. And 
canceUing out all these factors, one against the other, 
which one can roughly do, at any rate for several months 
to come, there remains the dominant constant difference 
of effectives. It is the enemy's exhaustion in men, com- 
pared with the corresponding condition of the Allies 
which is, under existing conditions, the main point of 
difference, and it is that which should decide the war ; 
and decide it in a briefer period than opinion is prepared, 
perhaps, just now to believe. 

I have purposely repeated nothing here concerning 
the new tactical method in the West lest it should confuse 
the issue,. but it must not be forgotten the AlHes in the 
West have created a tactical method which makes their 
opponent waste at a greater rate than they themselves 
waste, and that at a time when the remaining store of 
men is far more important to him than to them. 

H. Belloc 


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January ii, 1917 

The Sea War, 1916 

By Arthur Pollen 

IN revif !\ving the lessons of 1916, we saw last week 
that th ie most significant of these were : 
I-'irsH That eight modern ships, carn'ing guns 
capabl t of sinking any enemy with two, three, or at 
most four salvoes —according as the enemy might be 
lightly or ' heavily armoured, and the salvoes were those 
of 15-inch , 13-5 or 12-inch guns — did not, as a simple 
matter of fact, succeed in sinking more than one in the 
course of three hours. The reader does not have to be 
reminded that this failure of modern gunnery is not at all 
the failu re of the personnel, but of the system, the 
unanticij )ated difficulties of action having been demon- 
strated, in e\-ery engagement of the war, to be such that 
results c »btained in battle practice in a few minuttni, arc 
not obt ained in actual lighting conditions in less than 
scNcral hours. 

Secoi idlv. That, as a result of the German fleet having 
escapee 1 at Jutland, while it might be so deterred from 
sortie, by the fear both of submarines and fleet attack, 
if it V entured once more upon the North Sea, as to be 
^■irtua•ily demobilized that nevertheless that fleet could 
not b 3 said to be ventralised. 

Till irdly, That the reason it was not so neutralised was 
that • hntil the German fleet was destroyed, the blockade 
of tl le submarine exits could not be effected with the 
force s now a\ailable to us. 

Strategic Analysis 

r iome of my readers have questioned the accuracy of 

m\ ■ strategic "analysis and my use of terms. I stated, 

for • instance, " It "takes two to make a battle and sea 

w: ir differs from land war in this that one belligerent, 

if he possesses adequately protected harbours, may 

w K.hdraw his forces from "the field of war altogether. 

I Iftnce the winning of absolute superiority by battle is 

' io t to be attained by the will and resolution of one side" And I went on to add that where the superior 

P' jwer can " neither force the enemy to decisi\e battle 

I? or completely neutraUse his fleet," the superiority of the 

f .tronger fleet must still be termed conditional. Is this 

' distinction between land and sea war scientific ? Is the 

German army on the Western front neutralised by General 

Nivelle and Field-Marshal Haig's forces in any sense 

different from that in which Admiral Scheer's conmiand 

is neutraUsed by Sir Da\id Beatty's ? 

I submit that there are two points of difference of the 
most \-ital character. To begin with, the Allied forces in 
the West are engaged in a constant and direct attack, 
upon the armed forces opposed to them. From July 
to No\-embcr, combined forces of massed artillery, air- 
craft and infantry enabled the Allies to destroy and 
capture section after section of the enemy's fortifications, 
and in these operations to kill, wound, and capture 
many hundreds of thousands of the enemy, thus bringing 
about there that diminution of his numbers, and 
demoralisation of the survivors which, if applied con- 
tinuously, must result in the complete overthrow of his 
organised forces. It is this overthrow tliat is the con- 
dition of final and absolute victory. The nature of the 
organisation necessary for overwhelming an en- 
trenched army makes it impossible to continue these 
processes during tlie winter. But night raids over the 
trenches, day and night raids by aircraft, and the con- 
tinuous and systematic employment of long range, 
heavy artillery maintain, during the winter months, 
a strain on the enemy. These minor, but incessarit, 
attacks, cause constant losses and serve not only 'io 
embarrass his efforts to im])rove his defences against the 
ne.xt period of sustained attack on the grand scale, but 
perpetuate the demoralisation and discoiitagemeiit 
already effected. 

Now it is obvious that no such direct attacli can be 
made on the German fleet in harbour as was made, during 
tlie battle of the Somme, on the enemy land forces. 
Nor can the results of an attack which cannot be de- 

livered, be enhanced and continued by any naval equiva- 
lent to trencli raids, nor the artillery bombardment on 
communication trenches, depots and \ital posts in his 
rear. Nor can his fleet be subjected to the continuous 
and galling espionage of aircraft. Nor can that espionage 
be varied by bombing. At the best we can say this : 
If the pressure of sea force, from which the German 
Admiral would like to. bvit cannot relieve, his country, 
is made intolerable, the (ierman fleet may be goaded 
into occasional sorties, either in full strength or by light 
cruisers and destroyers, in the hope of inflicting some 
injury u])on their sea oppressors which, if it does not 
improve the internal situation materially, may restore 
to some extent the country's moral. But, on the broad 
fact there surely can be no dispute. By relentlessly 
pushing the principles of artillery attack to their furthest 
logical conclusion, an entrenched army tO'day is, essen- 
tially, no more secure against a superior enemy than the 
same army would be were it engaged in open manoeuvre 
fighting. The acti\e engines of attack arc superior to 
the passi\<' resources of defence in the long run. What 
is gained by entrenchment is not the avoidance of the 
final issue, but only its postponement. But sea power 
has developed no equivalent to the modern use of siege 
artillery on land. \\'hile, therefore, it is in one sense 
perfectly true to say the German fleet is neutralised and 
also that the (ierman army is neutrahsed, yet that there 
is this difference between'the two: the first force can, 
if our resources remain unaltered, easily maintain itself 
intact until the war is over, whereas it is certain that the 
war will be ended by the defeat and destruction of the 
(ierman army by processes already pro\ed to be adapted, 
and equal to the clesired end. 

But this is not the only sense in which the balancing 
of the two forces differs" according as those forces are 
military or naval. It is broadly true to say that from 
the battle of the Aisne until the beginning of the battle 
of the Somme, the opposed armies in France did, in fact, 
neutralise each other. 'Neu\e Chapelle, the Champagne 
and Artois attacks, and the attempt at Verdun, so far 
from disturbing this theory, seemingly only confirmed it. 
for they apparently proved that every effort to substitute 
the policy of attack for the policy of being content with 
neutralisation was doomed to failure. I am aware, of 
course, that this conclusion was fallacious, and that the 
• doctrine of " stalemate," was a heresy. But the pause 
that occurred while the means of attack were being 
produced looked like an equilibrium which the ignorant 
assumed must be constant. And in this sense the 
present positions of the fleets is comparable to the then 
position of the armies. It is here that the great dis- 
tinction introduced by the development of the submarine 
comes in. While the German army was still demobilised 
from direct attack, on the Western front, it was not 
able, by its mere existence, to make a second form of 
indirect attack upon the Allied forces possible. But the 
military stalemate at sea — brought about, of course, by 
the withdrawal by the enemy of his fighting ships from 
the field — ^^leaves the enemy main fleet with one enor- 
mously important function which it can discharge un- 
disturbed. It can and does protect the submarine 
exits. It is, in other words, the German High Seas 
Meet that is the real force behind the submarine attack 
on trade, so that the, steamers that have been sent to 
the bottom since the beginning of August are just as 
much trophies of .Adfniral Scheer and 'Vice-Admiral von 
Hipper as were Queen Mary, Indefatigable and Invin- 
cible. They are all the spoils of the Battle of Jutland. 

This is so for very obvious reasons. The chief of them 
is that the close blockade of an acti\-e and well-balanced 
naval force— that is' of the battle fleet equipped with 
powerful cruisers, fast scouts, and destroyers, and \yith 
the approaches of its harbours protected by submarines 
or blocked by its own mines — has become virtually ini- 
possible. Several elements have comliincd to bring this 
result about, the principal being the incrosed speed at 

January ii, 1917 


which all kinds of craft can work, the astounding develop- 
ments of marine mining, and finally .the extraordinary 
advance made in the use of the torpedo by increases of; 
its range and size — the size resulting in a vast enhance-' 
ment of its destructi\-e power when it hits — and finally 
its use from submarines. But as long range blockade 
was found impossible in the Japanese war, when torpedoes 
were still short-ranged weapons and submarines did not 
exist, it should be realized that the difficulties of close 
blockade were held to be insuperable even before all these 
modern de\elopments of undcr-water attack. 

Blockade of Naval Forces 

A certain kind of comparatively close blockade would be 
quite feasible if the force to be shut in consisted of weak 
<■ units only. And especially would thi^ be the case where 
the enemy's coast was so formed as to leave but \ery 
few channels for exit and entry. The kind of blockade 
to which I allude is primarily, of course, a blockade by 
mines. Given a country of (ireat Britain's engineering 
and explosive-producing capacity, there is no theoretical 
reason why every exit by which German submarines 
could reach the North Sea should not be made absolutely 
impassable by mines.. In the deeper channels, of course, 
the mines would have to be laid at several depths. Part 
of the barrier then would be doubled, part trebled, part 
even quadrupled. The barrier itself might have to be 
of great length. It might invohe the employment of 
£10,000,000 or £20,000,000 worth of mines. The point 
is that theoretically such a barrier could be made. 

To be effective for its purpose it would kave to be laid 
as near to the German coast as possible. For every 
mile that you come away, the longer the barrier would 
be, and consequently, the greater the strain on the 
country's resources in supplying the material, and the 
more protracted the operation of establishing it. In 
theory then the distance at which it should be laid should 
be outside, but only just outside the range of the coast 
defence guns. So ,vast an operation as the creation of a 
barrier exceeding a hundred miles in length could not be 
carried out, save by the employment of a very numerous 
force of especial craft for a "very considerable period. 
Such a force could not perform its functions under 
attack. And the minefield once laid, it can, of course, 
only be a barrier so long as it exists, and it will exist only so 
long as it is protected. Now if the enemy's force were 
intact, he would naturally send out fighting ships — 
destroyers, light cruisers and larger cruisers — to attack 
and drive off the mine-laying craft and the ships that 
protected them. In the last resort, if the mine-layers 
were protected by vessels more powerful than these 
cruisers, he would have to bring out his battleships 
to effect this purpose. And unless the mine-layers were 
in turn protected by battleships the enemy's battle 
force would necessarily achieve its object. Now the 
objection to the use of our own battle fleet in the support 
of mine-laying operations on this scale is, that . it would 
involve using them in waters better knowTi to the enemy 
than to oursehes, in which navigation would be difficult, 
and the consequences of errors in navigation possibly 
disastrous, and where, abo\-e everything else, the enemy's 
under- water craft could so harass battleships as to make 
their employment unthinkably hazardous, and their 
effective employment likely enough impossible. If we 
suppose the barrier laid, the same considerations hold good' 
for its defence. There is then no way out of the argument 
that, so long as the enemy's battle fleet is intact, or 
virtually intAct, so long is the most obviously effective 
counter-measure to his submarine activities made im- 
possible to us. 

The enemy obtains then in modern conditions an un- 
anticipated benefit from his possession of a fleet in 
being. In the old wars a battle fleet, tied to its harbours 
by fear of action with a superior enemy, was, in the 
literal sense of the word neuimlised. It coiild not and did 
not affect the course of^ the sea war. Trans-ocean 
traftic, overseas miUtary operations, all were carried on 
exactly as if that battle fleet did not exist. The inferior 
force might all take the quota' of merchant prizes which 
would fall to liis cruising craft and privateers, but these 
owed nothing or almost nothing, to the protection which 
the bii.ttle fleet aflforded them. Tlieir operations were 
prin'ip;illv m.ul- possible by the enemy's possession of 

so many ports on the direct trade routes that the closed 
blockade of all of them was impossible. But Germany 
■ 'has no ports except on the little piece of coast line on 
the {North Sea coast and those on to the Baltic. And 
for various reasons it is from the North Sea ports that 
all the submarines issue. The nature of this class of ship 
■ — once grant that it can clear its own harbours and get to 
sea — enables it to get upon the trade routes with even 
greater ease, and operate there with even grc^ater security 
than could French and American vessels engage in the 
guerre de course of the last of the great wars! An intact 
battle fleet to-day, is, therefore, worth as much to Ger- 
many as the possession of the Atlantic ports of France 
and Spain. It relieves her of one of the maip handicaps 
of the geographical position. 

It becomes an urgent matter therefore to enquire 
whether it is possible at sea to produce any such form 
of attack as will either parallel that \vhichthe Allies have 
made on the Western Front, or alternatively block the 
enemy's battle fleet solidly into its inner harbours, and 
so rob it of this function of protecting the egress 
of submarines. The thing boils itself down to a 
simple proposition. Can sufficient artillery', of sufficient 
range and power, and suiSreptible of suflicieutly accurate 
aim be brought to bear upon the approaches to the 
German coast, for such a barrier to be set up and main- 
tained in being, that not only no surface craft, but no 
submarine can come in or out of the German ports? 
Unquestionably the gun power of the Grand Fleet is 
amply sufficient. Practically then, the question forms 
itself in this way. '' Can an existing fleet be made unsink- 
able, or an unsinkable fleet of the necessary gun-power 
be built ? " There is nothing novel about the problem. 
Cuniberti and others have often discussed the possibility 
of a shell, mine, and torpedo-proof ship, and during the 
last fourteen years I can remember not one, but fifty dis- 
cussions bearing on this point with men in the service. 
No doubt many of the things we proposed in conversation 
seemed as visionarj^ and fantastic as they could be, but 
if the problems involved were tackled seriously, I dqubt 
very muoh whether reasonable men would say that 
success was impossible, or even unlikely. 


When, some two j-ears ago. Mr. Churchill made Ijis 
famous speech about '' driving the rats out of their 
holes," and rumours were rife that the British Admiralty 
were building a vast fleet of monitors, I had hopes 
that some of the dreams of ten years ago were 
to come true. Some of my readers have taken me to 
task for a statement, in a recent article, in which I 
deplored the long inaction of the Admiralty in the matter 
of replacing the merchant shipping which the British 
Army and Navy, and not the German Navy, had withdrawn 
from our trading fleet, and I contrasted this inaction 
with the time and energy expended on the production of 
" useless monitors." But my point was not that all 
monitors were useless, but that, in the bulk, the par- 
ticular monitors built were useless. The value, or other- 
wise, of any particular craft depends upon its suitability 
for the purpose for which it is intended. If you build 
a, monitor to bombard German forts on shore, in which 
guns of equal power and range are mounted, you must 
take one of two courses, either of which will enable the 
monitor to achieve its purpose. If the monitor can only 
fire straight while stationary, it must be absolutely shell- 
proof, for, in a contest between guns mounted ashore 
and afloat, the advantages in attaining accuracy are so 
o\-erwhelmingly on the side of those used from a stable 
platform, and served by a system of fire-control that can 
use the long base which the coast affords, that they 
must be expected to make, at any range, at least six 
hits to the sea guns' one. Supposing, then, your 
monitor can only shoot when stationary, it must be 
designed to survive this fire to be useful. If you 
qannot make it shell proof, but can equip it with fire 
c(;>ntrol , which enables it to shoot just as accurately 
ijnder wf^y as when anchored, then you are obviously gi\'ing 
to the monitor as great an advantage over the shore 
guns a<s in the first case the shore guns possessed 
o\-er the n^onitor. For the only movement in- 
troduced into the problem is under the control of 
those at sea, and it would be easy therefore to adopt 



January ii, 1917 

such mo\-ements as the fire control party on shore could 
not anticipate. The monitor could only be hit by chance 
shots — but could make its proper total of hits on the 
fort. But if monitors are neither shell-proof nor endowed 
with a capacity to shoot under hehii then, clearly, they 
are useless. 

In theory there seems no reason why the monitor 
type should not be de\'eIoped along both of these lines, 
and a form of ship produced which would unquestionably 
make the barricading of the fleet exits effective, and hence 
the establishment and maintenance of an anti-submarine 
in the bamer possible. It would involve, of course, a 
temporary monopoly of a huge proportion of the \yhole 
of our shipbuilding "capacity. But in this matter it is as. 

well to keep one measurement in our minds. The Ger- 
mans have clahncd that they arc sinking our merchant 
tonnage at the rate of 3,600,000 tons per annum. This 
is a gross exaggeration. 

What would be the equivalent in merchant tonnage of 
the output required for making an unsinkablc fleet — 
making a sufiicient proportion of our present Jleet unsink- 
ablc, otherwise making the necessary material for effective 
blockade ? And how long would it^take to produce such . 
a fleet and other material ? If it took six months in 
time and the equivalent of a miUion tons in ship-building 
and engineering effort, it would be a cheap price to pay 
for putting an end to the submarine menace altogether. 

Arthuk Pollen 

The People and the Duties of Empire 

By the Master of Bailiol College 

THE question has often been asked, can a demo- 
cracy hold an Empire ? The question put in this 
form suggested that the answer should be. No. 
But we are rapidly coming to see that the truer 
form in which to put the question would be— can an 
Empire be built up out of a federation of kindred but 
separated democratic communities, or even out of a 
looser system of alliances between such communities ? 
In either case the answer depends, in the last resort, on 
the degree of intelligence and the moral character of the 
mass of citizens in those communities. Federation is an 
artificial and intricate machinery ; it requires much 
" give and take " and much political aptitude in those 
who live under it. A system of alliances is still more 
delicate to handle. Mere good will is not enough. If 
the British Empire, which is really a commonwealth of 
democratic states, is to continue in either form, it pre- 
supposes that these democracies shall consist of men who 
are in the main not only honest and fair-minded, but also 
intelhgent and fairly well instructed. 

Imperial and Anti-Imperial Sentiment 

Now we have been learning many things since July 
1914. We have learnt that what seemed a narrow anti- 
Imperialist sentiment in our working classes, was partly 
mere ignorance and partly a healthy disgust at things 
which seemed to be associated with the shoddy Empire 
of Napoleon III., reactionary Russia, mihtarist Germany, 
and our own Jingoes. We have learnt, on the other 
hand, that the supposed anti-Imperialist tendencies in 
the Dominions were partly a dying tradition and partly 
a healthy distrust of " Downing Street." All the while 
on this side of the oceans, as well as on that side, the 
hearts of the people held a deeper and truer Imperial 
sentiment than the ruling classes either di\'ined or de- 

When politicians and economists were talking of the 
desirability of " cutting the painter," were comparing 
colonies to " fruit which should fall off when ripe," were 
describing the severance of the United States from Eng- 
land in 1786 as " the best thing which ever happened," 
in the teeth of these theories our own people persisted in 
feeling the colonists to be our kinsmen, in holding blood 
to be thicker than water, and in not resenting colonial 
tariffs ; and, on the other side, the colonials persisted in 
speaking of going " Home," in refusing to provide for 
themselves as States on the brink of separation, and in 
regarding their Protection as quite compatible with our 
Free Trade, and regarding their patriotism as a part of, 
not a substitute for, wider Imperial patriotism. The 
instantaneous and spontaneous response of the Colonies 
in August 1914 was more of a surprise to the politicians 
and officials than to the man in the street. 

But we must not assume that it was all from love of 6ur 
beaux yeux. " We have not come to light for you," said 
an Australian, " but for what you and we have in 

Nor must we assume in dealing with our own people 
that they yet understand either the wonderful possi- 
bilities implied in a union of Dominions which embrace 

one-fourth of the earth's area and one-fourth of the 
human race, or the unprecedented difficulty of building 
this union into a permanent structure. It is true that 
the mere presence of Canadians and Anzacs, South 
Africans and Indians has powerfully appealed to their 
imagination. ,, 

" If we can only have one lecture, let it be one on the 
Empire " — this is often said in centres which even with 
overtime and munition work can supply eager audiences. 

Three years ago the word Empire had but an ill sound 
to the ordinary workman ; in August 1914, it suddenly 
acquired a new note, and already his attitude to it is 
transformed. Yet the whole meaning of it was there all 
the time, latent. The bond with the Dominions was 
growing ever closer ; few working-class families had not 
a close blood tic with them through some near relative ; 
few localities had not had an industrial ctisis at some 
time or other relieved by an overflow to homes oversea. 
That bond has suddenly proved itself of unsuspected 
strength ; half a million Canadians, 300,000 Australians 
— who could have imagined such figures three years ago ? 
That meaning latent in the term Empire is now made 
manifest as by a revelation. It is not merely the splen- 
did physique, the splendid courage and initiative of the 
men from overseas that impress our people, but still more 
the deep feehng for Britain and British ideals that brings 
these men across the oceans. There are recent signs ,of 
this feeling in the rejection by the Canadians of the idea 
of special Canadian hospitals ; in New Zealand's adop- 
tion of conscription ; in the common Austrahan remark 
that Mr. Hughes could have carried out conscription if 
he had not bothered about a referendum. 

It must be remembered that the characteristic spirit 
of democracy, at once its inspiration and its besetting 
danger, is idealism. The classical example i§ the be- 
haviour of the Lancashire cotton operatives in the 
American Civil War. As soon as Lincoln's proclamation 
made it clear that the real issue was slavery, the cotton 
operatives came out for him with a unanimity and a 
resoluteness that faced a cotton famine and prevented 
our Government from going in on the wrong side and so 
making the greatest blunder since George III. and Lord 
North. In the words of a recent American writer, this 
story of the men who, while being starved to death, 
could not be induced to desert the cause of the slaves 
is among the most moving stories in history : " These 
humble creatures saved us." 

This idealism comes out very markedly when an appeal 
is being made to a mass of men. An appeal to their 
material interests does not carry you far, for the simple 
reason that their material interests soon begin to diverge 
in all manner of ways ; whereas the one thing they have 
in common is their humaneness (so to speak), and the 
expression of that is the sense of justice and fair play. 
Again the masses are impatient of technical detail, of 
legal obstacles, and qii constitutional difticulties ; they 
take the broad view, that is an idealist view. For- 
tunately in most cases the broad ground is the moral 
ground. Thus at the outbreak of this war, what turned 
public opinion among the masses was the case of Bilgium, 
involving the faith of treaties and the existence of small 

January ii, 1917 



nations ; it left no other way in honour tlian to stand 
by her. It is not too much to say that what is now 
rapidly turning thoughtful working men to an en- 
thusiastic but sane Imperialism is the imaginative con- 
ception of the British Empire as a spiritual unity, as a 
step to a league of peace and the federation of mankind. 

But idealism has " its dangers ; a tendency to take 
dreams for realities and to believe in the efficacy of mere 
good intentions. Working men arc only too ready to 
talk of the equality of races, the common interest of 
industrialism, the brotherhood of man, the vision of a 
world-peace. This idealism requires to be balanced 
and sobered by knowledge of the facts such as the colour 
problem in South Africa!, the demand for a White Aus- 
tralia, the racial and religious position of the French 
Canadians, the clash of interests between the Dominions 
and the Mother Country in regard to tariffs and immigra- 
tion and labour. India by itself is a terra incognita to the 
ordinary Briton. He approaches it with a vague pre- 
sumption in fa\our of Indian " self-government," and 
it is a revelation to him to iind that there is no such 
thing as " India," but a complex of races and rehgions 
and stages of social and intellectual development. 

Indeed in the past one of the great causes of colonial 
irritation against Home opinion was that compound oi 
missionary zeal with insular ignorance which got a bad 
name as the Exeter Hall spirit. Another cause still at 
work, is the unconsciously patronising air assumed to- 
wards " Colonials " (" I thought New Zealanders were 
black ") a'nd the correspondingly resentful tone of bluff 
on their part (" vSt. Paul's ? Yes, but you should see 
the Presbyterian Church at Wagga Wagga "). On each 
side too there is a certain parochialism of mind which 
limits itself to the surface of any current questions. 
We did not realize the Australian feeling about New 
Guinea ; they do not realize the complications that en- 
viron Irish Home Rule. 

Create Sound Opinion 

The first thing then required for the creation of that 
sovmd public opinion on which alone can a democratic 
Empire be based, is knowledge. The ordinary working 
man is much more instructable on the Imperial question 
than he is on Foreign Policy where he is hampered by the 
old English prejudice that foreigners are incalculable and 
somewhat ridiculous and, by the abysmal English ignorance 
of foreign geography, international relations and con- 
tinental history. But a great voluntary Commonwealth 
based on the sea as the uniting, not now the estranging 
element, is more within the grasp of the mass of men ; 
it only needs putting before them ; and here a big aim 
is desirable, for, given goodwill and a practical .start, 
the genius of the race will work out the solution. But 
in foreign questions good will to have international- 
peace is not enough ; indeed, by itself is a danger, be- 
cause the good will is not on the other side too; whereas 
in Imperial questions there is the good will, or more, the 
deep detennination, of the Colonies to hold on to their 
Imperial citizenship. 

If the chief need is more knowledge, a number of prac- 
tical steps may be briefly suggested : 

Send out parties of working-class students to the 
Dominions, and from the Dominions to the Home 
Country, freely, regularly, as a recognised branch 
of education. 

Stir up local education authorities to this work and 
many other forms of education in the duties of 
Empire ; I say duties, that they may not dwell too 
much on the commercial side of such instruction. 

Establish a system of exchange professors with the 
Dominions, and especially exchange the teachers 
in working-class centres and tutorial classes. 

Make ample provision of books, books by the thousand, 
cheap, but the best writers and up-to-date ; " Our 
men pick up their authorities from the second- 
hand bookstall, and therefore think of Australia as 
a land of convicts and kangaroos." 

Deal frankly and boldly with the demands of India before 
working-class audiences. 

Let Universities make the Empire a leading feature 
in their Extension Lectures and Tutorial Classes; 
it will be popular. 

Let the Public Schools introduce courses on the Empire i 
it will be popular there too ; one school has already 
led the way. 

Let the same be done for the secondary and the ele- 
mentary schools by the aid of maps and pictures. 

Have Colonial exhibitions in the populous centres, and 
expositions given on the spot. 

Above all, enhst many voluntary helpers in this edu- 
cational work, this Crusade of Empire, helpers who 
must not be too academic, but must be prepared to 
learn as well as to teach, to study the mind and 
heart of the people beforehand. 

This is one of the things which will not wait even in 
war. For the Imperial problem is already upon us ; 
the Imperial conference which we were told could not 
possibly be called in war time, is now to meet " forth- 
with " ; the Imperial sentiment is growing under our 
very eyes, and the need and the opportunity to instruct 
and guide our people in it is urgent upon us. It is too 
late now for the comfortable old dpctrine of political 
laissez-faire, that '' institutions are not made but grow " ; 
for some institutions have got to be made, and made 
forthwith, -to suit the new situation that has arisen, 
and to reconcile the Dominions' new determination to 
be consulted in future on peace and war with their old 
determination, not the least weakened, to guard jealously 
their local independence. 

Our people are not spiritually dead as pessimist ob- 
servers thought before the war ; they are only unawakcned 
as yet. But war is a mighty awakener ; it is making 
even the ordinary Englishman think and think hard, a 
thing almost incredible. And there is plenty to think 
about : the stream of emigration to the Dominions that 
will set in, the vast regiment of superfluous women in 
this country, the claim of Indians to be allowed to settle 
in Africa or Queensland, the possibility of countering 
the alarming tendency of our home population to become 
stationary, the possibility of organized and co-operati\'e 
use of the natural resources of the Empire as a whole, 
the enviable and therefore dangerous position we shall 
occupy after this w,ar holding a large part of the world 
and all tTre oceans. 

This is a mighty trust of which we ha\'e to make 
ourselves worthy, and to help the masses of our popula- 
tion to make themselves worthy. On the potentialities 
of Empire, on its duties, on its dangers we have to 
educate' the people, to "educate our masters." 

Mr. Hartley Withers, Editor of "The Economist" 
will contribute an article to the next issue of 
Land & Water on the neiv War Loan. 

An opportunity for doing a good' turn to our gallant sailors 
has only to be pointed out, for many to be only too glad to 
avail themselves of it. Some little time ago Land & Water 
asked for pianos for certain Ward-room Messes. They were 
at once provided. On this occasion all that is required is a 
gramophone — for the Ward-room Mess of H.M.S. Sable. It 
will cheer many silent hours and give infinite pleasure to 
men who in this wintry, weather are keeping watch over 
England's safety. Anyone who is willing to provide either 
the instrument or the necessary money to purchase a good 
instrument is requested to communicate with the General 
Manager, Land & Water, 5, Chancery Lane. W,C. 

Professor Meinegke, of Freiberg University, the well-known 
historian, has written for the Franljfurler Zeitnng an article 
on the war which contains this remarkable admission : 
" Our first aim was to overthrow France quickly and force 
her to make peace. It is probable that such a peace would 
have been very favourable to France, for it was to oiu- interest 
to reduce the number of our foes. Had this plan succeeded 
we could have turned instantly and adopted the same tactics 
towards Russia with every prospect of success. We could 
then, in favourable conditions, have concluded the final 
peace with England, whose forces would have been left dis- 
armed on the Continent. As, however, we could not hope 
to overcome England's naval supremacy, this peace, like the 
first arranged with France, would have had to be in the nature 
'of a compromise. This entire programme, brilliantly as it 
was begun, collapsed before the gates of Paris at the Battle of 
the Marne, which was by no means a tactical victory but 
Vortainij, a gicat strategic success for the French.' No 
German writer has piexioi'sly made this admission. 



January ii, 1917 

Inhuman Treatment of Russian Prisoners 

ONE of the things missing in that unreal dis- 
cussion about the enemy's cry for Peace is the 
(■\-idence — which cannot yet be pubUshcd in 
any but a most fragmentary form — of the abomin- 
able cruelties he has practiced upon the helpless prisoners 
in his hands. 

■ We say only fragments of it can be published, though 
the time' will come "when the punishment proper to such 
crimes can be inflicted, for soon the testimony will need 
to be subjected to no such discretion as is at present 
unfortunately necessary. 

We know something in this country of what Prussian 
calculation can be in such matters. We know how 
British prisoners have been treated when the enemy 
believed his victory to be secure, and we shall not soon 
forget the lesson taiight us. It is well that we should also 
know what his actions have been in the case of our 
Allies; and though very little indeed of the whole terrible 
story can be told, examples which have been "specially 
put before Land & W.'^Tiiu and will be cited here, may 
be of service. 

A Studied Policy 

When the full story is known tliere will be no one left 
so fatuous or so blinded as still to talk of terms and 
accommodation with the brutes guilty of these things. 

Jf the special cases laid before us much the greater 
part deal with one branch of Prussiay policy, which has 
been consistent throughout in the case of the Russian 
prisoners. And that has been the attempt to compel 
them to commit treason and to act against their own 
country. Why the Russians should have been singled 
out for this particular form of vileness we may sur- 
mise, but \vc need not delay to describe. It is in part, 
perhaps, their greater numbers, in part the fact that the 
enemy seems to have believed that no reprisals would 
follow. At any rate, the evidence submitted is crowded 
with cases of this kind : The order to dig trenches under 
lire and against their own brethren in arms, ^nd torture, 
exposure, starvation and death, as the penalty' for refusal ; 
the evidence from all sides, of all kinds, and from all 
nationalities who were witnesses : From Neutrals, from 
Englishmen and from French prisoners and, what is very 
valuable, from Russian prisoners themselves who have 
escaped, and whose story is corroborated by independent 
witnesses of other nationalities. Jo recite all, even oi these 
selected indi\idual cases, would be a mere monotonj^ of 
horror ; It is always the same story, but here are some 
citations textualjy in the witness's words : 

.\n Englishman, an eye-witness, says : 

" They refused to go and dig trenches. A guard was 
put round them to starve them into submission. The 
]'-nglish tried to give them food, but the guard was too 
Strong and they could not manage it. At the end of a 
week they again refused, and the guard fired upon them, 
killing several and wounding many." 

A Russian prisoner who has escaped gives this en- 
dorsed evidence : 

" They were told that if they persisted in refusing they 
would be shot. The Commandant at the camp came to theni 
armed with a revolver and a sword and along with him 
200 soldiers and about 15 officers. The Commandant 
was the first to kill one of the prisoners, and then all 
began to use their bayonets. When it was ended eight 
men were found dead, and a great number of wounded. " 

There are — even in the few cases .selected for the 
purposes of this article — dozens of such examples ; and it is 
specially to be noted with what lack of the military 
spirit and of chivalry the Prussian Officer ha;^ delighted 
in personal violence and murder in the case of these 
unfortunate disarmed men. It is a characteristic of 
the Prussian Service we know well enough and of which 
Belgium and Northern France are full, but it is well to 
be reminded of it. As for instance this piece til exidence 
— again textually quoted : . 

" The Cieneral himself came out and began .1 ^^l>^ cch." 
(This was in the case of the men being marched off to 
do work the nature of which was concealed from them, 
and which ^vas, therefore, presumablv treasonable). 

" Then ordered his soldiers to beat them with the butts 
of the rifle, and stood looking on. Suddenly, as if seized 
by a lit of rage he began to shout. to his men to strike 
harder, to kill the defenceless men if they could. Seizing 
a piece of board himself he ga\'e a terrible blow on the 
head to one of tlie prisoners and then struck a second 
man and then a tliircl. \\'e prisoners had to bury one of 
the men and to send the others to the hospital. This 
is but one of the occasions, which were very frequent 
on which the General in Command struck prisoners 
with his own hands." 

That is the Prussian service all over, and its apologists 
tjiemseh-es know w ell that the terrible indictment is true. 
No other service in the world is guilty of these things. 

Another category of infamies is the starving of men 
to compel them to work against their own army, and 
to help in the destruction of their own comrades : 

" About thirty of us were stripped and left for two 
days in -the frost without food. Then they offered us 
beer and spirits and food, thinking that when we had 
satisfied our hunger we would go and work." 

That is one out of any number of Russian testimonies. 

Here is an English civilian medical witness, speaking 
of some himdreds of Russians exchanged against German 

" They hardly had the semblance of human beings. 
Anything more pathetic it is impossible to conceive. 
The}' came bent, dazed and limping. The less feeble 
4ielped the others to walk. Every man was emaciated 
to the last degree. Some had lost their wits and memories. 
They adx'anced slowly, \\-eakly and with their eyes on 
the ground, without a smile. No voice was raised in 
response to the cheers with w'hich they were greeted, 
and as the waiting people saw what they were like, the 
cheers died away and the awful procession went on in 

Remember that is the sober testimony of a British, 
subject, highly educated and trained in medical work, 
and contrast what he has to say about the German 
prisoners whom tlie Russians had held and who were e.\- 
changed at the same time : 

" The contrast was almost ir^describable. There was 
not one German prisoner who was not in his full uni- 
form, which had been taken from him on his arrival 
in hospital, and carefully kept and returned to him 
clean on his discharge. The lame were without exception 
furnished with proper crutches. They were well nourished : 
they laughed and joked with us and among themselves." 

The whole thing is characteristic of this war. Of 
the gulf there is between the executioners of Prussia and 
.the State which it is their duty and also their necessity 
to destroy. 

Here is another Englishman out of many score wit- 
nesses : 

" At one of tlie factories " (that is, munition factories 
where these unfortunate men are compelled to produce 
that which will kill their brothers) " a prisoner who 
refused to work was shot point blank through the head. 
The bullet went straight through his head and came out at 
the back, killing tlie man on the spot." 

Here is another from a neutral witness : 

" Russian non-commissioned officers were told off on to 
a numition factory. On their refusal to work against 
their country, one of them was singled out and made to 
stand for seven hours every day with the sun shining in 
his eyes, and forbidden to move. At the slightest move- 
ment on his part he w-as prodded with the bayonet and 

Here is a Russian giving testimony : 

" In these munition works those who objected to work 
had liot irons applied to their bodies." 

Here is another, also Russian, who w-as compelled to 
work in the lines : 

" Twenty men refused to work. They were made to 
stand upright for 26 hours and on the second day we 
stood up with nothing on but our shirts and no food 
and drink. They submitted then." 

This bestial practice of starving merf into submission 
and of humiliating them by nakedness is pcculiari\' 
Prussian, ^'ou liud it occurring oxer and o\('r as^aiu 

January ii, 1917 



throughout the evidence submitted : Here is the testi- 
mony of .an eye- witness -in the case , of one; nrjan out of 
many hundreds. 

" For the first 3 J days he was given nothing whatever 
to eat. On the fourth day one or two biscuits. The 
same the day after that. A German doctor came in every 
morning to see how much he could stand, and order 
exactly how much food he was to have, just enough to 
keep him alive." 

Here is another . 

" At this camp they hang prisoners up by their wrists. 
They become unconscious after two hours of it." 

Here is a third : 

" I have heard from many prisoners that another 
punishment was to scrub them with very hard brushes 
and sand. They say it was a torturo." 

Here is a fourth : 

" They were beaten until they were unconscious, 
and you heard their cries getting weaker and weaker until 
they subsided." 

Here is another English witness : 

" The Germans then starved them (certain Russian . 
prisoners) for a week to reduce them to submission " (that 
is, to dig trenches in aid of the enemy) "and forced them 
to go. Four were killed and twelve wounded before 
they could be got to go." 

Another English witness : 

" The Russians were made to dig trenches just behind 
the front. They stood it for some time and then refused, 
and several were killed." 

Another English witness : 

" Having refused to work at trench digging they were 
confined for three days without food, and when they 
mutinied one .was killed and seventeen wounded." 

And here is one last signed statement out of so hiany, 
also the statement of an Englishman, detailed, and deal- 
ing with what he saw with his own eyes : 

"On the Saturday the Russians in Company 3 were 
paraded and were told off for work, which turned out to be 
trench digging against their own army.' They refused, 
and said they would do any reasonable work, but not that. 
The Germans placed a number of them under close arrest 
without food or drink. Next day they were paraded 
again a number of times. They still refused and were still 
kept without food and drink. On the third day all the 
prisoners, English, French and Russians together were 
paraded ; the Russians still refused, whereupon the 
English and the French were locked in. The "Russians 
were then paraded again, and as they came out of their 
barracks the Germans clubbed them with their rifles, 
knocked them down, stabbed them with their bayonets, 
shot them in the arms, and to finish with they loosed 
savage dogs to worry them. Then they fetched carts 
and threw the dead and \vourided in together and took 
them away. After this things settled down again as 

Remember that this is something that an Englishman 
saw with his own eyes and repeats without violence or 
exaggeration. If is plain fact. 

Here is another English witness with regard to the 
Russians refusing to make munitions against the Allies : 

" On their refusing to do so they were made to stand 
at attention every day for seven days, without food of 
any kind." (That is without food during the whole 
of the days on which they were subjected to this torture). 
, " At the expiration of seven days what were left of them, 
75 out of 200, were brought back to the camp by a back 
entrance. Some of them died at once, and the rest were 
taken to the hospital where sixteen died that night. This 
awful spectacle was witnessed by English and French 

Here is another Englishman speaking : 

" On one occasion I saw a Russian who refused to work 
made to stand at attention before a sentry from about 
7 a.m. until 6.30 p.m., in bitter cold and snow with only 
thin clothing. He collapsed about 6.30." 

Here is another Englishman : 

" I saw the officer in charge step forward and address 
the Russians. A Russian stepped forward and was 
dragged by about half dozen German soldiers into a 
kitchen, and another man was then pulled out by a 
German officer who beat him with the flat of his sword 
over the head and shoulders until he fell down. The 

Le Soliloque du Deporte 

By Emii.e C,-vmm.\erts. 

A great number of Belgian deportees have been sent on 
the Western front and comfellcd to dig trenches, 

Le dos craque, le ventre gemit 

Je ne beche plus . . . tant pis ! 

Je n' eleverai pas un rempart protecteur 

Centre mes freres, 

Je ne souleverai pas le sol du pays 

Contre ses liberateurs. 

Je n' offenscrai plus notre commune Mere. 

Je ne lutterai plus contre moi-meme, 

^les mains ne trahiront plus mon cceur. 

Je m' affranchirai de cet anatheme 

l)e fange et de sueur ! 

All ! tu cognes, geolier, tu cries : 

Schwcinhund ! Vorwaerts ! ■ — tant pis 1 

Advienne que pourra, 

Je me croiserai les bras. 

Je ne blesserai plus ma Patrie 

Du tranchant dc ma pelle, 

Je ne pcrccrai plus son sein maternel 

De la pointe de ma pioche, 

Et je baiserai, a la barbc des Bodies, 

Cette terre qu' ils m' ont fait profaner, 

Et je la prierai, £t genoux 

Sous leurs coups, 

De me pardonner ma lachete. 

Des menaces, encore ? Arrete ! . . 

N' entends-tu pas les obus chanter ? 

Une main plus puissante que la tienne s' apprete 

A nous frapper. 

dare ft la casse ! C'est nous qui paierons. 

Toi et^noi, esclave et geolier, 

Unis enfin dans le memc danger. 

Mais ce tonncrre de fer et dc plomb 

Qui tc fait palir 

Exalte mon courage, 

Et j ' appelle a grands cris 1' oragc 

Qui finira mon martyre. 

Au diable le travail, jetez vos outils ! 

A genoux, 

A genoux, mes amis. 

Mains jointes, sous nos coups ! 

Trop long . . . trop court . . . nous y voilul 

Les tortionnaires sont au supplice. 

Vive la Belgique ! Vive le Roi ! 

La tranchee est rouge du sang du sacrifice ! 

^'[All Rights Reserved.] 

officer then stuck his sword into the Russian several times.'' 

Here is another piece of British evidence : 

" A Russian officer attempted to escape from a camp. 
As he reached the barbed wire a sentry came up to him. 
The officer seeing that he was caught (it was broad day- 
light) put up his hands. The sentry took no notice of 
this but got his riffe ready to fire, and the officer lay 
down in the ditch that was there and in the water of it, to 
save himself. The sentry then placed the rifle within a 
foot of the officer a;id fired, the bullet passing through the 
right arm and right side. The sentry then reloaded his 
rifle and resumed his patrol as though nothing had hap- 
pened. A German non-commissioned officer then came 
up, hearing the report, looked at the officer in the ditch, 
marked him out to the dogs, and made no effort for his 
removal. A French doctor who offered to, help was 
refused. When at last this French doctor's insistence 
was rewarded and he was allowed to help, the uniortunate 
man was beyond succour. He died at eight that evening. 
The case was reported to the Camp Commandant by the 
Russian officers. The Commandant inter\-iewcd the sentry 
and complimented him upon shooting the officer. 

"This cold blooded murder occurred about two yards 
to the left of the window, etc." 

It is one of the innumerable stories of eye-witnesses — 
and not the most repulsive. It shall be our last in this 
brief glimpse of what the Allies arc comliating to destroy. 



January ii, 1917 

Germans in India 

By Arthur Gordon 


/^|["^HERE is hardly any portion of the Britisli Empire 
over which the trail of the Teutonic serpent has 
not passed — to greater or less extent — with the 
determined, but carefully concealed object of 
strangling our commerce by keen trade competition ; 
discovering the natural resources of the country with a 
view to their future exploitation in German interests ; or of 
exciting feelings of discontent and sedition against British 
administration. India affords no exception to this rule, 
for a steady influx of the German element began shortly 
after the war of 1870, when the German Empire— as now 
constituted— was called into existence. The representa- 
tives of the Fatherland most commonly met with in India 
are merchants or missionaries, although a third section, 
composed of professional spies, sent forth by a splendidly 
organised Intelligence Department, has for years past 
been deputed to carry out the instructions from the 
Wilhelmstrassc and to collect ail kinds of useful in- 
formation regarding British affairs in India. 


Of the German spy system in India I shall remark 
later on, beginning my notice of the Teuton in Hindustan 
by mention of the German missionary. Some of these 
evangehsing agencies — such as the Moravian Brethren — 
may fairly be pronounced harmless and free from the slight- 
est suspicion of intrigue against Great Britain or her Allies. 
Situated for the most part in remote Hill States and un- 
frequented regions, amid a sparse population and with 
scanty means for communication with the outer world, 
the Herrenhutter missionary could do littleJiarm, even 
were he inclined to. Very different, however, is the case 
in Madras, with a large native Christian community, and 
among the jungle tribes of Chota Nagpur and the Central 
Indian plateau. Here Lutheran Missions obtained a 
strong footing and were able to exert influence of a danger- 
ous kind over their semi-civilised Converts. 

Loth to give credit to the reports which had been re- 
ceived from planters and even from British officials with 
first-hand knowledge of what was going on among the 
Santals, Oraons, and other aboriginal races, the Govern- 
ment displayed much reluctance at the outset in issuing 
orders for interning these missionaries and thus depriving 
the reverend gentlemen of power for mischief. But it 
was ascertained, from very reliable sources, that Native 
Christians had been warned to prepare for a change of 
rulers and so must cease to be loyal subjects of the British 
Sirkar as they and their fathers had always been. 
Coloured pictures of the Kaiser were placed in prominent 
grandeur on the walls of schoolrooms and other places 
wiicrc con\-erts were wont to assemble, and nothing omitted 
for disturbing the credulous Indian mind, ever prone to 
believe the most extraordinary tales and to act on the 
most unreasonable impulses. Several of the German 
missionaries now interned held orders in the Church 
Militant together with commissions in the German 
Lan:Jwchr ; a dual rank the respective duties of which 
must have been difficult to combine in practice. 

Coming to the German in commerce, it is surprising — 
and not a little mortifying to our national pride — to detect 
the case with which the Hun merchant had managed to 
secure so large a share of Indian trade and was gradually 
ousting British rivals from markets that — ^had ordinary 
foresight and business intelligence been employed— 
should have remained closed preserves to the manu- 
facturers bf the United Kingdom. Outside the Pre- 
sidency capitals of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, 
Germans usually figure as watchmakers, jewellers on a 
small scale, or as agents for an English firm ; which they 
leave as soon as they have acquired enough grasp of the 
business in question to be able to enter into competition 
with their late employers. 

The manager of one of the new industrial enterprises 
which are now being started in many parts of India 
(not before it was time) is, strange to say, a naturalised 
Cierman, whose services have been engaged in default 
of finding a Briton capable of performing the work re- 

quired — a statement one is unwilling to credit, preferring 
to hold the opposite theory that there are few men in 
this world whose place cannot be lilled by others. The 
Punjab Chamber of Commerce has set a good example 
by announcing its fixed resolve to have little or nothing to 
do with German goods or German traders in future, 
such declaration being no idle expression of hysterical 
anger at the conduct of these people, but a fixed resolve 
to prevent — as far as lies in its power— any attempt 
of Germany to recapture the Indian markets. On the 
other hand, a glance at the advertisement columns of 
newspapers in India show the existence in the chief towns 
of a number of companies and firms bearing Teutonic 
names ; possibly deserted by the original proprietors for a 
season, but still carrying on business under the old 
familiar titles. 

The professional spy remains to be described as I have 
known him in India, some years ago certainly, but the breed 
is not apt to vary in nature and methods of working. 
One German Intelligence Agent was running a small 
hotel in a station just outside Calcutta and must have 
been provided with necessary funds by his employers, 
since business done was of a very trifling description — ■ 
men spending the week-end there for the sake of snipe- 
shooting ; visitors to the monthly gymkhanas (there was 
a military cantonment that furnished most of the 
European population) and a few Calcutta merchants who 
chose to live away from their places of business, running 
in daily as do men in the city. Thanks to a smattering 
of German which the writer possessed, he was on 
rather intimate terms with mine host who used to relate 
— when copious draughts of Pilsener rendered him in 
communicative mood— stories of his adventures on 
espionage duty in France before the outbreak of the 1870 
war. Disguised as a traveller of wines he boasted of 
having collected much valuable information and was 
proud of having been given a task most honourable men 
avoid. He further stated that he was only one of hun- 
dreds of Germans always spying out military details in 
friendly countries. 

This' hotel-keeper could not have amassed in India 
much, news worth sending home, for his enquiries were 
usually directed to the subject of the native troops, con- 
cerning whom his usual sources of information — non- 
commissioned officers belonging to the Battery or the 
Infantry detachment quartered in that particular 
station— were unable to give any, or correct, tidings. 
Apart from his sp\ing profession, he was quite a decent 
specimen of the German Unter-Offizier of those days : 
he had been a Quartermaster-Sergeant in a regiment of 
Saxon hussars, so was free from the unpleasant bumptious- 
ness and inveterate bragging associated with Prussian 
soldiers of all ranks, nor— if one can judge from his manner 
of speaking about the French, both mihtary and civilians 
— would he have admired, far less committed, the acts 
which have rendered the modern Hun a byword and a 
reproach among civilised nations. He had an honest 
respect for the British Navy, but considered thC' British 
Army too small in numbers to be looked on as a serious 
factor where European warfare was in question. Ap- 
parently the same error as was manifested by the generals 
and statesmen of the Kaiser when they resolved to dis- 
regard Belgium neutrality. 

Of recent years, stricter supervision has been exercised 
by the Indian C.I.D. over visitors from foreign parts to our 
Eastern Empire, and a fairly strict watch has been 
maintained on cold weather tourists anxious to inspect 
the defences of Ouetta or to collect materials ioj a book 
on British rule in India. Despite these precautions, the 
German spy has managed to get in touch with the scditionist 
party_feu in numbers certainly, yet formidable on 
account of the immunitv from punishment enjoyed by its 
leaders so long as they' refrain, from murdering officials. 
Securely concealed in the background, the German agent- 
provocateur found little trouble in persuading the 
credulous Indian student, or the more dangerous 
Maratha Brahmin and his fellow conspirator of Bengal, 
to plot and plan for the overthrow of British rule. 

January ii, 1917 



Germany's Policy in the Balkans 

By Frank Fox 

THE Balkan Peninsula is a fashionable cemetery 
for Empires. Archaeologists trace the tomb- 
stones of Powers which fought their great fights 
there in the days before Homer : and history tells 
of Persian, Macedonian, Roman and Mohammedan 
dreams of world domination coming to a,n end on its 
plains. Now it is the turn of the Prussian Empire. 
\Vhen the Central Powers advanced dramatically from 
Belgrade to the Bosphorus, British opinion in some quar- 
ters was dismayed, in almost all quarters depressed. 
French opinion (the clear, cool logic of which for the last 
quarter of a century has proved more than all else the 
vitality of the French race) expressed itself in the phrase, 
" The tortoise has put his head out." It was not very long 
before the British took generally the same view. Our 
logical perception had been dimmed at first by sympath\- 
for the sufferings of the Serbs, by anger for treachery of 
the Bulgars. VVhen we, too, saw clearly, it was plain that 
the Prussian had exposed if not his neck at any rate a 
vital limb beyond his carapace and that the ending of the 
reptile was more certain, more easy. 

The discussion of the why and wherefore of the Prussian 
folly may be recalled. One school of thought in this 
country argued that inescapable necessity forced the 
Kaiser into this adventure. Certainly he had strong 
urgings to do something in the way of a break-through. 
There is nothing more dispiriting than to stand a siege 
without sallies. The cheaply purchased treachery of 
Ferdinand of Bulgaria promised on the surface a sally at 
little cost. To ovenVhelm Serbia whilst Bulgaria held 
her from behind ; to join hands with'Turkey ; to extend 
in a month the German line from the centre of Europe 
to the centre of Asia Minor — that had all the glitter of 
a great victor3\ But it was not only a great mistake ; it 
was an irreparable mistake, and a mistake which no nation 
of sound thinkers could have made. Whatever there was 
of sound thought in Germany must have recognised that 
thc'decision of the Great War was practically certain the 
day that England declared herself : certain beyond any 
human element of doubt when the rush to Paris failed : 
and that the only sensible Prussian policy . thereafter 
was to play for as good a peace as possible with what- 
ever military policy (of vigorous offensive in the East or 
the West) promised best to weary the Allies. Having 
failed to conquer Europe it was the wrong time to go 
out to conquer the world by way of the Balkans. 

But, pace all the talk of German efficiency, the Balkan 
adventure was a mistake natural to the Prussian mind 
M'hich in all its " kolossality " (one must really manu- 
facture German words for the attributes of these strange 
inhuman Huns) strongly suggests the Calculating Boy 
who could solve the most abstruse mathematical pro- 
blems without help of pen or paper but was practically 
an idiot in aU else. We have made humiliating mis- 
takes in the war and before the war. The Hun's mistakes 
^vere and continue to be abysmal. WhereA'er human life 
touches the spiritual plane he has failed completely to 
understand, and regarding those relations of life which are 
governed by intellectual perception he has been almost 
as ignorant. He gave defiance to the moral indignation 
of the world and at the same time to the logic of facts 
most clearly in this Balkan adventure. 

As a result the Hun in the last stage of his defensive, 
when his only chance of mitigating punishment was to 
out-weary his ioqa, finds himself committed to a line 
straggling all across Europe. The drama Avorks to its 
appointed end. On the Western front and on the Russian 
front will be the struggle of giant armies from out of 
which the Hun will totter to fall : but strong human 
interest will be absorbed in the developments at the 
Balkan heel where the picturesquely varied forces of 
civilisation bite at his tendon Achilles. 

To follow the drama Mith understanding the bystander 
needs to refresh his memory regarding Balkan history 
since the Treaty of Berlin, and regarding Balkan racial 
types and their origins. Modern Balkan history began 
with the " iiberation " of Bulgaria by Russia and 
Roumania. Before that time, however, Greece, a\ ith aid 

from the outside chieflj', and Serbia, by her own efforts 
chiefly, had won some kind of independence. Roumania 
had never been completely subjugated. After the War 
of Liberation, Russia designed to have Bulgaria as the 
greatest state of the Balkans. Europe, at the time sus- 
. picious of Russia, contrived otherwise. Still the Treaty 
of Berlin whilst generous to Bulgaria (who had done 
little or nothing in the War of Liberation) , was notably 
imjust to Roumania. The Treaty left Roumania with a 
distinct grievance against Russia ; Serbia with a 
jealousy and distrust of Bulgaria ; Bulgaria with an 
unsatisfied dream of greatness ; Turkey, defeated but 
unrepentant, hoping for a road to revenge through the 
mutual jealousies of the Christian states, which had been 
liberated from her yoke ; Greece filled with a heady 
ambition and dangerously confident that she could revive 
her ancient glories with the aid of other people's arms. 
There were ghosts of the Roman Empire, Greek Empire/ 
Bulga* Empire, Serb Empire walking of nights, and each 
little scrap of a nation saw visions of greatness. 

A Tom Tiddler's Ground 

The Balkan Peninsula became thus a Tom Tiddler's 
Ground where anybody might pick up a crown ; and you 
might get anybody stabbed in tlie back for half-a-crown. 
And it was a dominating point from which a Great Power 
might command Europe, Asia, and Africa, as Constantine 
the Great had seen when he built Constantinople. Natur- 
ally with the Prussian dream of world domination came 
an interest in the Balkans ; and Salonika was marked down 
as a future German port of entry into the Mediterranean. 

The German Powers, happy in their stock of poor and 
prolific princes, as an incidental step captured all the 
palaces of the Balkan States with the exception of Serbia 
(and its highland province of Montenegro) and began a 
policy of diplomatic intrigue and commercial penetration. 
The latter was very industrious but not very successful, 
for much the same reason as that which explains the 
paucity of Jews in Scotland. Where the Greek is trading 
competition is difficiilt. Roughly to generalise, in their 
dealings with the Balkan Governments the Germans 
found : 

(i.) Tire Serbs quite hopeless. They were obstinately 
Slav. During the Turkish occupation the" Serbian mother 
would strangle at birth the child which a Turkish father 
had inflicted upon her. That was a sign of the irrecon- 
cilable spirit of the race. The Serbs saw that the path 
of the German to the Mediterranean must be by the 
valley of the Vardar, and were determined to hold the 
path. The German Powers long ago recognised that 
Serbia was to be fought, not won over. 

(2.) Roumania. The legitimate grievances of Roumania 
after the Berlin Treaty were industriously exploited by Ger- 
many and for a time Roumania was drawn into the orbit 
of tlic Central Powers. She was saved by the fact that 
within her borders there had survived an aristocratic 
class which inherited great intellectual capacity and 
a tradition of statesman.ship. A small Power, Roumania 
had big men who led her on the lines of a Florentine 
diplomacy. Her leaders saw that the Prussian system 
was fatal to the growth or oven the existence of small 
States and, whatever may have been the outward attitude 
of Roumania, her secret policy was of late always anti- 

(3.) Bulgaria. In Bulgaria an industrious peasant 
population, partly Slav partly Turkish by blood, tills 
the soil and trades without any very serious political 
preoccupation. Under Turlcish rule the Bulgars were not 
nearly as miserable as some people imagined, and Bulgaria 
was the most prosperous and not at all the worst governed 
of the Turkish provinces- Since independence the very 
indifference of the Bulgars to politics has made them the 
unhappy victims of their politicians. Their attitude to 
public affairs is singularly like that of many citizens of 
the United States : that " politics " is a business to be 
left to the politicians. Bulgaria has naturally had some 
curious rascals among her politicians, and they naturally 



January ii, 1917 

have been oasv prey for Gormjin intriguefs. A 
clover man withii liirge bag of gold and an .indemnity 
bond against the loss of his Austrian estates for Knig 
Ferdinand might easily have brought Bulgaria mto the tield 
on our side in this war. But of course such thmgs are 
not done in our foreign policy. Bulgarian policy smce 
the accession of King Fefdinand has been usually pro- 
(lennan in intention whatever its public declarations. 
The peo[)le are pro-Russian, pro-British, pro-French so far 
as they have anv views on foreign policy. But the voice 
of the" people isstrangled by Ferdinand and his very 
capable secret police. 

(.(.) (ireece. The German cause in Greece has been 
handicapped by the trading genius of the people, which 
made difficult the German policy of commercial 
penetration ; and by the dependence of Greece on sea 
power. In view of the complete identity of Greek 
national interests with those of the Allies the degree of 
success uf German diplomacy at Athens (" Tino " is not 
the only pro-German) has been marvellous. 

(5.) "Turkey. Since the fall of Abdul— whose Glad- 
stoiiian title was modified by students of Balkan politics 

into "Abdul the d d clever "—Turkey has been 

an easy prey to German intrigues. She could never learn ' 
her Germany even at the price of bitter experience. 
The sacrifice of the Berlin Treaty, when Austria seized 
for good Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria repudiated 
Turkish suzerainty was a purely German move. Prussia 
pretended to regret the action of Austria and I remem- 
ber well the declarations of a Prussian diplomat (whose 
special mission was to hoodwink the " society " pro- 
Germans of Great Britain) that only the generous in- 
stincts of Prussia, compelling her to stand by a comrade 
in a difliculty, prevented the German Empire from re- 
pudiating the " precipitate and ill-judged action of 
Austria." But the position was clear to everybody 
except the voupg Turks. They have been content 
since to drift"with Germany to the present edge of final 
disaster though there was never on the face of it hope of a 
single advantage from the Prussian connection. 

That is an attempt to summarise the position of the 
(ierman Empire 5;/s-a-i7s the various Balkan States during 
the last two decades and to make clearer the reasons 
])rompting the decisions which followed upon the out- 
break of the Great \Va.T. One may conclude from various 
facts that the German Empire deliberately chose a 
Balkan pretext as the occasion for her attack on Europe. 
Agudir had taught that Italy was certainly not to be 
relied upon to join in the attack, and that Austria's 
resolution was very shaky. I have been told in high 
quarters that at the Agadir crisis Austria's attitude 

was to be one of, neutrality in case of war. The Great 
\\'ar had~ therefore to be engineered in some way so that 
.Austria was first committed deeply and her participation 
thus ensured. The war having begun, the German 
Powers relied with some confidence upon reaping big 
strategic advantages in the Balkans. Turkey ancl 
Bulgaria could be relied upon. Serbia would be crushed 
within the first three months, and Roumania and Greece: 
would then, either through fear or favour, come in on the 
side of the German Powers. 

But from the first things went wrong. The Hun had 
as usual miscalculated both the moral and the intel- 
lectual factors. He was profoundly certain that war on a 
Balkan pretext must not only bring Austria in but would 
keep England out. After the Balkan war we had refused 
to risk a general European conflict by supporting Serbia 
in her riglitful claim to keep what she had gained on the 
Adriatic. The attitude of Great Britain was supposed 
to be that no Balkan question was worth a soldier's 
life : and ISritisli stupidity' was supposed to be such that 
we would stand by and see the fate of civiUsation settled 
under the delusion that only .Serbia's fate was at stake. 
But Great Britain came in and came in on a direct issue, 
the outrage upon Belgium, which necessarily put in a 
liigli light before all the' small States of Europe the 
attitude of Prussia towards small nationalities. All who 
could think and were allowed to think in the Balkans once anti-Prussian. 

Turkey, of course, had, nationally speaking, gone into the 
lunatic asylum long before ; and her interest in small States 
was in any case a painful matter — partly indigestion, 
partly unsatisfied appetite. But Roumania's course was 
fixed at once. Her acute statesmen saw that the issue 
of the war was made certain by England's participation. 
The question that remained was how to stand out as a 
neutral until it was reasonably safe to become a com- 
batant. That cjuestion was handled with masterly 
linesse. Some sentimentalists will deplore the practical 
statesmanship which aimed to keep Roumania out of a 
martyr's crown and bring her on the stage as an avengur 
rather than a A'ictim. I'icasonable people will applaud 
the courage and skill with which she jilayed a very 
difficult game and will only regret the blunder whicji 
brought the Hun to Bucharest at a time when 'the 
Roumanians with happier management might have 
been in Belgrade. 

Now, despite the misfortunes of the moment, we can 
reasonably hope that soon some Herr Professor of Germany 
will be engaged in the sad task of estimating to what 
extent the ISalkan adventure contribuited to the shatter- 
ing of the Prussian dream of World Empire. 

The New Raemaekers' Exhibition 

THIRTEEN months ago Louis Raemaekers 
galvanized the civilized world with his exhibition 
of cartoons portraying German infamies in Bel- 
gium. It was a great achievement, and the more 
imtablc in that it was accomplished by a Neutral artist. 
Since then Raemaekers has never wavered in his\ duty 
as the recorder of German abominations, arid iij, his 
second exhibition now open at the Galleries of the Fine 
Arts' Society, 148, New Bond Street, he continues the 
tale of horror up to the deportations still in progress 
in Belgium. It seems almost a divine decree that this 
record should be depicted by tin; pencil and brush of 
a man who is not inspired by racial hatred, but is only 
concerned with the life and death struggle between 
modern civilization and medi;eval barbarism. 

This second exhibition in some respelrts excels the first. 
'1 he artist seems to have gained in strength and to have 
aciiuired greater confidence in his own exceptional 
powers. That sense of haunting beauty to which w'e n - 
terred at the time of the first exhibition is even more 
apparent, and again we are struck by his extraordinary 
])ower of awakening the emotions and unveiling with 
a few touches of the pencil the innermost qualities of 
humanity. The prodigality with which the German 
(ieneral Staff sacrifices its nien is portrayed for all time 
ill that famous cartoon drawn at the time of the great 
\ erdun offensive, when the Crown Prince says to the. 
Kaiser as the}' stand upon a mound of German dead : 
," Father, we must ha\e a hii:her pile to see \'eidun." 

There are, certain figures which it is obvious Rae- 
maekers delights in drawing, so full are they of natural 
humour. Ferdinand of Bulgaria is chief of these ; • he 
never ' appears here without evoking contemptuous 
laughter ; Bethmann-Hollweg runs him close, and then 
there is Tino. There is always a certain dignity about 
the Kaiser, but the German Crown Prince is the miserable 
specimen of humanity he is known to be in real life. But 
the one figure which stands out most prominently is 
Death. It would be an interesting study to ascertain 
tlie number of different characters in which the grisly 
skeleton has been drawn by Raemaekers. As a Pierrot 
he dances in the .streets of' Berlin in August 1914, when 
war is declared, and in December 1916, when peace is 
asked for and the people stand in the Berlin streets 
through a bitter winter night, Deat4i alone is the well- 
clad ])rosperous citizen. 

But it must not be thought that this second' exhibition 
is devoted only to the horrors of war. Among the 
beautiful cartoons to be seen here are the original illus- 
trations which Raemaekers drew for M. Itmilc Cammaerts' 
Natix-ity Play. There is a splendid picture of " l.e Vieux 
Poilu " and another "on an American hero who gave 
his life for humanity." A series of cartoons illustrate 
an Allegory of War and Peace, and a cartoon which oner 
seen will never be erased from the mind is entitled " Tin- 
Impassable Barrage "—the Kaiser held back by thi 
hosts of French heroes who rise from their graves. Thj^ 
i;.\presses the great truth which we all feel to-day. 

January ii, 1917 


Books to Read 

By Lucian Oldershaw 


LET us wander for a change in the peaceful heart 
of England and discuss the while some of her 
legends and traditions. Nottinghamshire is 
essentially a pleasant county, as old Fuller of 
" The Worthies," was the lirst to point out, and Mr. J. 
'^', Firth has written and Mr. Frederick L. Griggs has 
!-austrated a pleasant book about the count}^ of Robin 
Hood, the Byrons and the Dukeries. Their Highways 
and Byways in Nottinghamshire takes an honourable place 
in Messrs. Macmillan and Co.'s well-known " Highways 
and Bywaj'^s " Series (6s. net), Mr. Firth is the kind of 
guide one wants on such rambles as he takes \is. He 
does not stop to descant at length on beauties we can see 
for ourselves, but, from his vast store of information, gives 
us the historical and biographical associations of each 
place we pass. " To my way of thinking," he says in 
comparing Sherwood with the New Forest, " a place 
which has little recorded history is cold, whatever its 
charm, compared with those which are indirectly linked 
to our regard by a long chain of human associations." 
I am inclined to agree with him but, all the same, I think 
Mr. Griggs' admirable architectural drawings might 
have been supplemented with more pictures, giving the 
natural beauties of the county. His one study in Sher- 
wood Forest is an inadequate performance. 

As a chronicler of county history Mr. Firth is discreet 
and judicious. He takes perhaps more pleasure in 
dcstroj'ing .than in repeating legends. This is well 
enough when he is pointing out that Byron's orgies at 
Ncwstead Abbey wei^c probably not so red as they have 
been painted, or ^^•hen he is clispelling the myths that 
long surrounded the name of the fifth Uuke of Portland, 
but he need not, perhaps, have been so solemn and critical 
over the stories of Robin Hood. He might even have 
been despoiled by this " meditcval Socialist," he is so 
heavy-handed on the subject. However, apart from this 
and a somewhat annoying habit of alluding to a story as 
too familiar to tell, while T in my ignorance, know 
nothing of it, I have found great interest and entertainment 
in this learned guide-book. The studies of family history 
are particularly good, and the book is packed with little 
character-sketches, delightful in their variety and liveli- 
ness. One might well do worse than spend an hour or 
two in Mr. Firth's company, recalling cricketing days at 
Trent Bridge, or visiting at Bunny the pugilist philan- 
thropist Sir Thomas Parkyns, or discussing at Langar, 
where his father was rector, the unfortunate childhood of 
Samuel Butter, or making the acquaintance of the 
" Duchess Robin Hood." There is a short itinerary for 
the reader, but it might be extended to ten times its 
length and the whole ground of the book would yet 
remain untraversed. 

My war-books this week include two by women on their 
war-work, the one dealing with work "on the Western 
Front, the other with work chiefly on the Eastern Front. 
Miss Kate John Finzi's Eighteen Months in the War Zone 
(Cassell and Co., 6s. net.), is a record, in the form of a 
diary, of hospital and canteen work on the Western Front 
from October 1914, to February 1916. It tells, with 
good sense, a story that is fairly familiar now, and is 
best described in the words of Major-General Sir Alfred 
Turner, who writes an introduction : " Miss Finzi's 
book is quite unpretentious, and is a simple record of 
facts which bring home vividly to our minds the sickening 
horrors of war and the awful sufferings that our gallant 
defenders have had to undergo in doing their duty." 
It should also be added that it shows how those 
sufferings are alleviated. 


In The Flaming Sword\.i Serbia and Elsewhere (Hodder 
and Stoughton, 6s. net), Mrs. St. Clair Stobart nas written 
a far more ambitious book than Miss Finzi's. It is not 
merely that it deals with the sensational episodes of the 
Serbian retreat, in which Mrs. Stobart played so prominent 
a part, but because it. is wriUcn to prove something or 

rather to prove two things. The one is that the Woman's 
Movement is more than ever needed in the world for 
" militarism is maleness run riot." The other is that the 
Serbians are a great people. On both these subjects 
Mrs. Stobart is entitled to speak with authority, for 
she and the devoted band who have worked with her have 
shown what women can do " along the line of life," and 
she has come into contact with all classes of the Serbian 
people. Her book is naturally most interesting, though 
perhaps a little overcrowded with unilluminating details, 
introduced apparently for the sake of making the record 
as complete as possible. It is also unique, as being the 
work of the lust woman in history to take command of a 
field hospital in war-time. The most enthralling part of 
the book is Part III., which is a diary of the Serbian 
retreat, but I rather fancy that it is not the story it has 
to tell, wonderful as this is, so much as the intensity ol 
its author's personality and convictions that will attract 
some readers — perhaps repel others. 

•I* !(• ?J* ^ 9jfi 

I have just been reading to my great profit a little 
brochure by Mr. Norman R. Byers, entitled World 
Commerce in its Relation to the British Empire (P. S. 
King and Son. is. net). Mr. W. R. Lawson in introducing 
the work, is hardly guilty of hyperbole when he says : 
" It is a book for. the man in the street and the man at 
the m ichine, as well as for the man in business. It is so 
clear and simple even when treating of absolute economic 
subjects that it might almost be recommended for use 
in schools. The book is written to advocate the keeping 
of the British Empire economically self-contained — ^an 
excellent theme in itself, but it can be, and indeed often 
has been most ineffectually treated. Mr. Byers' treatment 
deserves the praise which Mr. Lawson gives it. Both the 
exposition of the resources of the Empire and the handling 
of such difficult subjects as the relation of Capital and 
Labour and the proper uses of the Surplus Profit Tax 
are admirable, not only in their freshness and clearness, 
but also in the spirit of sweet reasonableness with which 
they are presented. Mr. Byers' appeal for the proper 
attitude of disinterested enquiry at the present moment 
would disarm the bitterest economic controversialist and 
make him reopen several closed doors in his brain. 

3|C 3|C 3|% ^ ^ 

Fiction this week must be represented by Mrs. Hodgson 
Burnett's pretty little Miracle tale, The Little Hunchback 
Zia (Heinemann, is. net). This should have been bought 
at Christmas, for the story is of the Holy Birth. But it is 
equall}^ readable at any other time,' and is rendered by 
Mr. Charles Robinson's pictures an attractive gift book. 

Mr. Eden Phillpotts' story, The Girl and. the Faun has been 
published with coloured plates by Frank Brangwyn (Cecil 
Palmer and Hayward, 6s. net), and tlie combination of this 
author's and artist's work makes one of the best colour books 
of the season. The delicate fantasy of the story is well 
caught in Brangwyn's pictures, and both from the literary 
and artistic points of view, the book is admirable. 

That wonderful reference book Who's Who (Adam and 
Charles Black, 20s.), is now published for 1917. It gets 
bulkier and bulkier as the years go by and tlie wonder 
is when it will cease to grow. In another fifty years it 
promises to be a library in itself. Accompanying it is the 
Who's Who Year Book, only one shilling, and filled witli 
information about people generally which one finds nowhere 
else. Another of Messrs. Black's publications, The Writers' 
and Artists' Year Book 1917 is also issued. This is a directory 
for the use of writers, artists and photographers. 

The January issue of the Asiatic Review, which brings the 
review to its thirty-first year of publication, is, as usual, 
mainly devoted to Eastern questions and subjects. In addi- 
tion to a fairly exhausti\c study of the present position in 
India, there are a very interesting sketch — written with first- 
liand knowledge — of the President of the Chinese Re- 
public, a stud}' of Germany's methods of peaceful penetration 
as applied to the Near East, and a Russian section to which 
the present Consul-General for Russia contributes an article. 



Ja,nuary ii, 191 7 

The Golden Triangle 

By Maurice Leblanc 

[Translated by Alexander Teixeira de MattosI 

SvKOPSIS : Caftfain fatrice Bchal, a wounded French 
efficcr, prevents in a Paris street the abduction of a nurse 
'it'ho is knoivH to her patients as " Little Mother Coralie." 
Beival declares his love to Coralie only to be told by her 
that she is already married, and that he must take no further 
effort to retain her friendship. That night, after Coralie has 
left him, Beival has sent to him anonymously a box con- 
taining a rusty key, by means of which he gains access 
to a house, in uhich he finds five inen torturing another man, 
Essarcs, who turns out to he Coralie' s husband, obviously 
with a vieic to extracting information from him. Essarcs 
manages to gel hold of a revolver, with which he shools 
Colonel Faklii, one of the five men, dead. He buys off 
his other four assailatUs for a million francs apiece, xvith 
which they leave the house. The next day Beival, follow- 
ing Coralie to her house, finds that Essares, zcho had con- 
templated flight from Paris, has been brutally murdered. 
An examining, magistrate, after interviewing Coralie, calls 
Beival in and explains to him that Essares was prime 
mover in a plot for exporting gold from France. In order 
to recover some 300 million francs which Essares had con- 
cealed, the authorities consider it necessary to hush . up 
the circumstances of the financier's death.- The only possible 
clue to the whereabouts of the gold is a paper found in 
Essares dead hand, -bearing the words, " Golden Triangle." 
Ya-Bon, Bclval's Senegalese servant, promises to call in 
Arsene Lupin to unravel the mystery, and Beival, -with 
seven, wounded and convalescent soldiers, takes up resid- 
ence in Essares house to protect Coralie from a mysterious 
threatened vengeance on her. The police search unavailingly 
for the place where the gold is concealed. 

CHAPTER IX {continued) 

C0R.\L1E'S mother was the daughter of a French 
consul at Salonika, where she married a very rich 
man of a certain age, called Coimt Odoiavitch, the 
liead of an ancient Serbiari family. He died a year 
after Coralie was bom. The widow and child were at that 
time in France, at this same house in the Rue Raynouard, 
which Count Odola\-itch had purchased through a young 
Eg^'ptian called Essares, his secretary and factotum. 

Coralie here spent three j^ears of her childhood. Then she 
suddenl\- lost her mother and was left alone in the world. 
Essares took her to Salonika, to a surviving sister of her 
grandfather the Consul, a woman many years younger than 
her brother. This Tady took charge of Coralie. Unfor- 
tunately, she fell under Essares' influence, signed papers and 
made her little grand-niece sign papers, until the child's 
whole fortune, administered by the Egyptian, gradually 

At last, whon she was about seventeen, Coralie became 
the victim of an adventure which left the most hideous 
memory behinl, and which had a fatal effect on her life. 
She was kidnapped one morning by a band of Turks on the 
plains of Salonika, and spent a fortnight in the palace of the 
governor of the province, exposed t<i his desires. Essares 
released her. But the release was brought about in so 
fantastic a fashion that Coralie must have often wondered 
afterwards whether the Turk and the Egyptian were not in 

At any rate, sick in body and depressed in spirits, fearing 
a fresh assault upon her liberty and yielding to her aunt's 
wishes, a month later she married this Essares, who had 
already been paying her his addresses, and who now definitely 
assumed in her eyes the figure of a deliverer. It was a hope- 
less union, the horror of which tecame manifest to her on the 
very day on which it was cemented. Coralie was the wife 
of a man whom she hated and whoso love only grew with the 
hatred and contempt which she showed for it. 

Before the end of the year, they came and took up their 
residence at the house in the Rue RajTionard. Essares, 
who had long ago establislicd and was at that time managing 
the Salonika branch of tlie Franco-Oriental Bank, bought up 
almost all the shares of the liank itself, acquired the building 
in the Rue Laforette for tiic head oftice, became one of tlie 
financial magnates of Paris and received the title of Bey in 

This was the storj' which Coralie told Patrice one day in 
the beautiful garden at Passy ; and, in this unhapp>- past 
which they explored together and compared with Patrice 
Belval's owti, neither he nor Coralie was able to discover a 
single point that was common to both. The two of them had 
lived in different parts of the world. Not one name evoked 
the same recollection in their minds. There was not a detail 
that enabled them to understand why each should possess a 
piece of the same amethyst bead nor wiiy their joint images 
should be contained in the same medallion-pendant ur stuck 
in the pages of the same album. 

'■ Failing everything else," said Patrice, " we can explain 
that the pendant found in the hand of Essarcs Bey was 
snatched by him from the unknown friend who was watching 
over us and whom he murdered. But what about the album 
which he wore in a pocket sewn inside h:'j vest ? " 

Neither attempted to answer the question. Then Patrice 
asked : 

" Tell me about Simeon." 

" Sim^-on has always lived here." 

" I'lven in your mother's time ? " 

" No, it was one or two years after my mother's death and 
after I went to Salonika that Essares put him to look after 
this property and keep it in good condition." 

" Was he Essares' secretary ? " 

" I never knew what his exact functions were. But he , 
was not Essares' secretary, nor his confidant either. They 
never talked together intimately. He came to see us two 
or three times at Salonika. I remember one of his visits. I 
was quite a child and I heard him speaking to Essares in a 
\-ery angry tone, apparently threatening him." 

'• With what ? " 

" I don't know. I know nothing at all about Simeon. He 
kept himself very much to himself and was nearly always in 
the garden, smoking his pipe, dreaming, tending the trees 
and flowers, sometimes M'ith the assistance of two or three 
gardeners whom lie would send for." 

" How did he behave to you ? " 

" Here again I can't give ^ny definite impression. We 
never talked ; and his occupations very seldom brought him 
into contact with me. Nevertheless I sometimes thought 
that his e3'es used to seek me, through their j'ellow spectacles, 
with a certain persistency and perhaps even a certain interest. 
Moreover, lately, he likecl going with me to the hospital ; and 
he woidd then, either there or on the way, show himself 
more attentive, more eager to please ... so much so 
that I have been wondering this last day or two. . . ." 

She hesitated for a moment, undecided whether to speak, 
and then continued : 

" Yes, it's a very vague notion . . . but, all the 
same. . . . Look here, there's one thing I forgot to tell 
you. Do you know why I joined the hospital in the Champs- 
Elysees, the hospital where you were lying wounded and ill ? 
It was because Simt^on took me there. He knew that I 
wanted to become a nurse and he suggested this hospital. . . 
And then, if you think, later on, the photograpli in the 
pendant, the one sliowing you in uniform and me as a nurse, 
can only have been taken at the hospital. Well, of the people 
here, in this house, no one except Simeon ever went there. 
You will also remember that he used to come to Salonika, 
where he saw me as a child and afterwards as a girl, and that 
there also he may have taken the snapshots in the albums. 
So that, if we allow that he had some coirespondent who on 
his side followed your footsteps in life, it would not be im- 
possible to believe that the unknown friend whom you assume 
to hn,ve intervened between us, the one who sent you the kej- 
of the garden. ..." 

" Was old Simeon ? " Patrice interrupted. " .The theory 
won't hold water." 

" Why not ? " 

" Because this friend is dead. The man who. as you say, 
sought to intervene between us, who sent me the key of the 
garden, who called me to the telepiione to tell me the truth, 
that man was murdered. There is not the least doubt about 
it. I heard the cries of a man wlio was being killed, dying cries, 
the cries which a man utters at the moment of death." 
You can never be sure." 

_" 1 .am, absolutely. There is no shadow of doubt in my 
mind. The man whom I call our unknown friend died before 
(Continued on. page' 10) 

January i i, 1917 



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January ii, 1917 

{Continued from page i8) 
tinisliiag his work ; he died miiniered, whereas SiincDii is 
-thve. Besides," continued Patrice, " this man had a different 
\oice from Simeon, a voice which I had never heard before and 
wliicli I shall never hear again." 
CorAlic was convinced and did not insist. 
They were seated on one of the benches in the garden, en- 
joying the bright April sunshine. The buds of the chestnut- 
trees shone at the tips of the branches. The heavy scent of 
the wall-flowers rose from the borders ; and their brown and 
yellow blossoms, like a cluster of bees and wasps, pressed 
dose together, swayed to the light breeze. 

Suddenly Patrice felt a thrill. Coralie had placed her hand 
on his, witli engaging friendliness ; and, when he turned to 
look at her, he saw that she was in tears. 

" What's the matter, Little Mother Coralie ? " 
Coralie's head bent down and her cheek touched the 
officer's shoulder. He dared not move. She was treating 
him as a protecting elder brother ; and he shrank from 
showing any warmth of affection that might annoy her. 
" What is it, dear ? " he repeated. " What's the matter ? " 
" Oh, it is so strange ! " she murmured. " Look, Patrice, 
look at those flowers." 

They were on the third terrace, commanding a view of the 
fourth ; and this, the lowest of the terraces, was adorned not 
with borders of wall-flowers but with beds in which were 
mingled all manner of spring flowers ; tulips, silvery alyssums, 
hyacinths, with a great round plot of pansies in the middle. 
'" Look over there," she said, pointing to this plot with her 
outstretched arm. " Do you see ? . . . Letters. . 

Patrice looked and gradually perceived that the clumps of 
pansies were so arranged as to form on the ground some letters 
that stood out among the other flowers. It did not appear at 
the first glance, it took a certain time to see ; but, once seen, 
the letters grouped themselves of their own accord, lorming 
three words set down in a straight line. 

Patrice and Coralie. 
' Ah," he said, in a low voice, " I understand what you 
mean ! " 

It gave them a thrill of inexpressible excitement to read 
their two names, which a friendly hand had, so to speak, 
sown ; their two names united in pansy-flowers. It was 
inexpressibly exciting too that he and she should always find 
ti.emselves thus Unke 1 together, hnked together by events, 
linked together by their portraits, hnked together by an un- 
seen force of will, linked together now by the struggling effort 
of little flowers that spring up, waken into life and blossom 
in predetermined order. 
Coralie, sitting up, said : 
" It's Simeon who attends to the garden." 
" Yes," he said, wavering slightly. " But surely that does 
not affect my opinion. Our unknown friend is dead, 
but Simeon may have known him. Simeon perhaps was acting 
with him in certain matters and must know a good deal 
Oh, if he could only put us on the riglit road ' " 

An hour later, as the sun was sinking on the horizon, they 
climbed the terraces. On reaching the top they saw M. 
Masseron beckoning to them. 

I have something very curious to show you," he said, 
■ something I have found which will interest you both, 
madam, and you, captain, particularly." 

He led them to the end of the terrace, outside the occupied 
part of the house next to the library. Two detectives were 
standing mattock in hand. In the course of their searching, 
M. Masseron explained, they had begun by removing the ivy 
from the low wall adorned with terra-cotta vases. There- 
upon M. Masseron 's attention was attracted by the fact that 
this wall was covered, for a length of some yards, hy a layer 
of plaster which appeared to be more recent in date than the 

■' What did it mean ? " said M. Masseron. " I had to 
presuppose some motive. I therefore had this layer of plaster 
demolished ; and underneath it I found a second layer, not 
so thick as the first and mingled with the rough stone. Come 
closer ... or, rather, no, stand back a httle way ; you 
can see better like that." 

The second layer really served only to keep in place some 
small white pebbles, which constituted a sort of mosaic set 
in black pebliles and formed a series of large, written letters, 
sf>elling three words, .^nd these three words once apain were : 
Patrice and Corame. 
'_' What do yon say to that ? " asked M. Masseron. " Ob- 
serve that the inscription goes several years back, at least ten 
years, when we consider the condition of the ivy clinging to 
this part of tlie wall." 

" At least ten years," Patrice -repeated, when he was once 
more alone with Coralie. " Ten years ago was when you were 
not married, when you were still at Saloni a and when no 
body used to come to this garden . . . nobody except 

Sim<'on and such people as he chose to admit. And amonp, 
these," he concluded, " was our unknown friend who is now 
dead. And Simf on knows the truth. Coralie." 

They saw old Simt'on, late that afternoon, as they had seea 
him constantly since the tragedy, wandering in tia- i^ini.en ^r 
along the passages of the house, restless and distiaught, 
with his comforter always wound around his head and his 
spectacles on his nose, stammering words which no one could 
understand. At night his neig1il)our, one of the maimed 
soldiers, would often hear him humming to himself. 

Patrice twice tried to make him speak. He shook his head 
and did not answer, or else laughed like an idiot. 

The problem was ' becoming complicated ; and nothing 
pointed to a possible solution. Who was it that, since their 
childhood, had promised them to each other as a pair betrothed 
long beforehand by an inflexible ordinance ? Who was it 
that arranged the pansy-bed last autumn, when they did not 
know each other ? And who was it that had written their 
two names, ten years ago, in white pebbles, within the thick 
ness of a wall .' 

These were haunting cjuestions for two young people in 
whom love had awakened quite spontaneously and who 
suddenly saw stretching behind them a long past common to 
them both. Each step that they took in the garden seemed 
to them a pilgrimage amid forgotten memories ; and, at every 
turn in the path, they were preixired to discover some new 
proof of the bond that linked them together unknown to 

As a matter of fact, during those few days ; they saw their 
initials interlaced twice on the trunk of a tree, once on the 
back of a bench. And twice again their names appeared 
inscribed on old walls and concealed behind a layer of plaster 
overhung with ivy. On these two occasions, their names were 
accompanied by two separate dates : 

Patrice and Coralie, 190.1 

P.ATRiCE and Coralie, 1907. 

" Eleven years ago and eight jears ago," said the officer. 
" And always our two names : Patrice and Coralie." 

Their hands met and clasped each other. The great mvsterv 
of their past brought them as closely together as did the 
great love which filled them and of which they refrained from 

In spite of themselves, howe . er. they sought out solitude , 
and it was in this way that, a fortnight after the murder of 
Essares liey, as they passed the little door opening on the 
lane, they decided to go out by it and to stroll down to the 
river bank. No one saw them, for both the approach to the 
door, and the path leading to it were hidden by a screen of 
tall bushes and M. Masseron and his men were exploring the 
old gicenhouses, which stood at the other side of the garden, 
and the old furnace and chimney which had been used for 

But, when he was outside, Patrice stopped. Almost in 
front of him, in the opposite wall, was an exactly similar 
door. He called Coralie's attention to it, but she said : 

" There is nothing astonishing a"" out that. This wall is the 
boundary of another garden which at one time belonged to 
the one we have just left." 

" But who lives there ? " 

" Nobody. The little house which overlooks it and which 
comes before mine, in the Rue Kaynouard, is always shut 

" Same door, same key, perhaps, " Patrice murmured, half 
to him'^elf. 

He inserted in the lock the rusly key, which liad reachc ' 
him by messenger. The lock responded. 

" Well," he said, " the series ot miracles is continaii.;^'. 
Will this one be in our favour ? 

The vegetation had been allowed to run riot in the narrow 
strip of ground that faced them. However, in the middle 
of the exuberant grass, a well-trodden path, which looked as 
if it were often used, started from the door in the wall and rose 
obliquely to the single terrace, on which stood a dilapidated 
lodge with closed shutters. It was built cjn one floor, but 
was surmounted by a small lantern-shaped belvedere. It 
had its own entrance in the Rue Raynouard, from which it 
was separated by a yard and a very high wall. This entrance 
seemed to be barricaded with boards and posts nailed to- 

They walked rotmd the house and were surprised by the 
sight that awaited them on the right-hand side. The foliage 
had 1 een trained into rectangular cloisters, carefully kept, 
with regular arcades cut in yew and box-hedges. A miniature 
garden was laid out in this space, the very home of silence and 
trancjuilitv. Here al'=o were wallflowers and pansies and 
hyacinths. .And four paths, coming from four corners of the 
.cloisters, met round a central space where stood the live 

[Continued on paqe afe) 

January ii, 1917 



{Continued from page 20) 

columns of a small, open temple, rudely constructed of pebbles 
and unmortared building-stonos. 

Un:ler the dome of this little temple was a tombstone and, 
in front of it, an old wooden praying-chair, from the bars of 
which hung, on the left, an ivory crucifix and, on the right, 
a rosary composed of amethyst beads in a gold filigree setting. 
" Corahe, Coralie," whispered Patrice, in a voice trembling 
with emotion, " who can be buried here ? " 

They went nearer. There were bead wreaths laid in rows 
on the tombstone. They counted nineteen, each bearing the 
date of one of the last nineteen years. Pushing them aside, 
they read the following inscription in gilt letters worn and 
soiled by the rain : 

Here Lie 

Patrice and Coralib 

Both of whom were Murdered 

ON the 14TH OF April, 1895. 

Vengeance is Mine : I Will Repay. 


The Red Cord 

CORALIE, feeling her legs give way beneath her, had 
flung htrself on the prie-dieu and there knelt piaying 
(tivently and wildly. She could not tell on whcse 
behall, for the repcse of what unknown sotl hei prayers 
were offered ; but her whole being was afire with fever 
and exaltation and the very action of praying seemed able 
to assuage her. 

" What was your mother's name, Coralie ? " Patrice whis- 

" Louise," she replied. 

" And my father's name was Armand. It cannot be either of 
them, therefore; and yet . . ." 

Patrice also was displaying the greatest agitation. Stooping 
down, he examined the nineteen wreaths, renewed his inspection 
cf the tombstone and said : 

" All the same, Coralie, the coincidence is really too ex- 
traoidinary. My father died in 1895." 

" And rny mother died in that year too," she said, " though 
I do not know the exact date." 

"We shall find out, Coralie," he declared. "These things 
can all be verified. But meanwhile one truth becomes clear. 
The man who used to interlace the names of Patrice and Coralie 
was not thinking only of us and was not considering only the 
future. PerhajJS he even thought more of the past, of that 
Coralie and Patrice whom he knew to have suffered a violent 
death and whom he had undertaken to avenge. Come away, 
Coralie, No one must susjx^ct that we have been here." 

They went down the path and through the two doors on the 
lane. They were not seen going in. Patrice at once bi ought 
Coralie indoors, urged Ya-Bon and his comrades to increase their 
vigilance and left the house. 

He came back in the evening only to go out again early the 
next day ; and it was not until the day after, at three o'clock 
in the afternoon, that he asked to be shown up to Coralie. 

" Have you found out ? " she asked him at once. 

" I have found out a great many things which do not dispel 
the darkness of the present. I am almost tempted to say that 
they increase it. They do, however, throw a very vivid light 
on the fiast." 

" Do they explain what we saw two days ago ? " she asked, 

" Listen to me, Coralie." 

^He sat down opposite her and saidn: 

" I shall not tell you all the steps that I have taken. I will 
merely sum up the result of those which led to some result. 
I went, first of all, to the Mayor of Passy's office and from there 
to the Serbian Legation." 

" Then you persist in assuming that it was my mother ? 

" Yes. I took a copy of her death-certificate, Coralie. Your 
mother died on the fourteenth of April, 1895." 

" Oh ? " she said. " That is the date on the tomb ! " 

" The very date." 

" But the name ? Coralie ? My father used to call her 

" Your mother's name was Louise Coralie Countess Odola- 

" Oh, my mother ! " she murmured. " My poor darling 
mother ! Then it was she who was murdered. It was for her 
that I was praying over the way ? " 

" For her, Coralie, and for my father. I discovered his full 
name at the mayor's office in the Rue Drouot. My father was 
Armand Patrice Belval. He died on April 14th, 189=:." 

Patrice was right in saying that a singular light had been 
thrown upon the past. He had now ]iositively established that 
the inscription on the tombstone related to his father and 
Coralie 's mother, both cf whom were murdered on the same day. 

But by whom and for what reason, in consequence of what 
tragedies? This was what Coialie asked him to tell her. 

" I cannot answei your -questions yet," he replied. " But 
I addressed another to myself, one more easily solved ; and that 
I did solve. This also makes us certain of an essential point. 
I wanted to know to whom the lodge belonged. The outside, 
in the Rue Raynouard, affords no clue. You have seen the wall 
and the door of the yard ; they show nothing in particular. 
But the number of the property was sufficient for my j)urpose 
I went to the local receiver and learnt that the taxes were paid 
by a notary in the Avenue de I'Opera. 1 called on this notary 
who told me ..." 

He stopjied for a moment and then said : 
" The lodge was bought twenty one years ago by my father. 
Two years later, my iathei died ; and the lodge, which of couise 
formed part of his estate, was put up foi sale by the present 
notary's predecessor and bought by one Simeon Diodokis. a 
Greek subject." 

" It's he 1 " cried Coralie. " Simeon's name is Diodokis." 
" Well, Simeon Diodokis," Patrice continued, " was a friend 
of my father's, because my father appointed him the sole ex- 
ecutor of his will and because it was Simeon Diodokis who, 
through the notary in question and a London solicitor, paid my 
school-fees and, when I attained my majority, made over to 
me the sum of two hundred thousand francs, the balance of 
my inheritance." 

They maintained a long silence. Many things were becoming 
manifest, but indistinctly, as yet, and shaded, like things seen 
in the evening mist. And one thing stood in sharper outline 
than the rest, for Patrice murmured : 

" Your mother and my father loved each other, Coralie." 
The thought united them more closely and affected them 
profoundly. Their love was the counterpart of another love, 
bruised by trials, like theirs, but still more tragic and ending in 
bloodshed and death. 

" Your mother and my father loved each other," he repeated. 
" I should say they must have belonged to that class of rather 
enthusiastic lovers whose passion indulges in charming little 
childish ways, for they had a trick of calling each other, when 
alone, by names which nobody else used to them ; and they 
selected their second Christian names, which were also yours 
and mine. One day, your mother dropped her amethyst rosary. 
The largest of the two beads broke in two pieces. My father had 
one of the pieces mounted as a trinket which he hung on his 
watch chain. Both weie widowed. You were two years old 
and I was eight. In order to devote himsell altogether to the 
woman he loved, my father sent me to England and bought the 
lodge in which your mother, who lived in the big house next door, 
used to go and see him, crossing the lane and using the same key 
for both doors. It was no doubt in this lodge, or in the garelen 
round it, that they were murdered. We shall find that out, 
because there must be visible proofs of the murder, proofs which 
Sime'on Diodokis discovered, since he was not afraid to say 
so in the inscription on the tombstone." 

" And who was the murderer ? " Coralie asked. 
" You suspect it, Corahe. as I do."' 
" Essares ! " she cried, in anguish. 
" Most probably." 
She hid her face in her hands : 

" No, no, it is impossible. It is impossible that I should have 
been the wife of the man who killed my mother." 

" You bore his name, but you were never his wife. You 
told him so the evening before his death, in my presence. 
Let us say nothing that we are unable to say positively : but 
all the same let us remember that he was your evil genius. 
Remember also that Simeon, my father's friend and executor, 
the man who bought the lovers' lodge, the man who swore 
upon their tomb to avenge them : remember that Simeon, 
a few months after your mother's death, persuaded Essares 
to engage him as caretaker of the estate, became his secretary 
and gradually made his way into Essares' life. His only 
object must have be.en to carry out a plan of revenge." 
" There has been no revenge." 

" What do we know about it ? Do we know how Essares 
met his death ? Certainly it was not Sime'on who killed him, 
as Sime'on was at the hospital. But he may have caused 
him to be killed. Lastly, Simeon was most likely obeying 
instructions that came from my father. There is little doubt 
that he wanted first to achieve an aim which my f.ither and 
your mother had at heart : the union of our destinies, Coralie. 
And it was this aim that ruled his life. It was he evidently 
who placed among the knick-knacks which 1 collected as a 
child this amethyst of which the other half formed a bead in 
your rosary. It was he who collected our photographs. He 
lastly was our unknown friend and protector, the one who 
sent me the key, accompanied by a letter which I ne\cr 
received, unfortunately." 

" Then Patrice, you no longer believe that he is dead, this 
unknown friend, or that you heard his dying cries ? " 



January ii, 1917 


Bij '^Passe-Partoiit 

The aim of these notes is to brin« articles 0/ preseiu-day use and interest to the knowledge ot our readers. All articles described 

have been carefully chosen for mention, and tn every instance can be recommended from personal knowledge. Names and addresses 

»t shot>s. where the articles mentioned can be obtained, will be forwarded on recetbt of a postcard addressed to Passe-Partout, 

" Land &■ Water," Old Serjeant's Inn, 5 Chancery Lane. W.C. Any other information will be given on request 

The pick of the 

Reductions are rife at a certain shop 
now the month of January is with us. 
Foremost amongst the sale bargains is 
the glace silk 
petticoat pic- 
tured. There 
are any amount 
of petticoats of 
the kind i n 
white, black, 
navy blue, and 
a great number 
of dark shot 
silks in blues, 
reds and greens 
and other colour- 
ings unusually 

These petti- 
coats during the 
season were 
1 8s. 9d.,and in 
some cases even 
a guinea. Now 
they are a 1 1 
being sold at 
I2S. gd., and at 
the price are 
without doubt one of the cheapest petticoats ever offered at 
sale or any other time. Thev are doubly worthy securing at 
this small sum, because the silk market at the moment is an 
uncertain factor and prices are not only rising, but con- 
tinuing to rise without any sign of abatement. 

Make, design, quality, are all good, while for the benefit of 
those preferring them, there are some black or navy blue 
satin petticoats of the same kind at the same price. IDuring 
the sale these underskirts carnot be sent on approval, a 
reservation which is understandable with present conditions. 


Great economy can be wrought through 
the buying of floating flowers. Though 
they represent an initial outlay, they will 
repay it over and over again. For these flowers are prac- 
tically everlasting. They are, as may perhaps be guessed, 
artificial, but nothing could be more natural or truer to life. 
They will float in the water indefinitely and being the result 
of a carefully-tested process, the colours will not run. 

At Christmas the demand for them was so immense that at 
one time every floating flower in the place had been sold and 
many orders were outstanding for busy fingers to fulfil. Just 
a few in a flat bowl make a fascinating table decoration, one 
worth considering now cut flowers daily grow dearer. 

Anemones cost from 2S. 6d., five or six different colours being 
given, then there are cameUias, roses, lotus and water lihes, 
each and all faithful replicas of nature and beautiful in 

English Violet 
Soap Leaves 

Such is the delightful name of a no less 
delightful production. Scented with the 
genuine perfume of the real English 
violet, they are made by two clever ladies who have scored a 
brilliant success with their violet nurseries and all manner of 
original productions. 

Soap leaves are a boon at all times when soap is not readily 
to hand. The ones in question are most cleanisng and 
efficacious, and for people obliged to do long night journeys 
or anything of the kind their value cannot be told. In a 
violet leather case they cost 2s. 5d. post free, refills at any time 
boinq available for an extra elevenpence. The little Looklet 
giving particulars of any amount of unique preparations makes 
most interesting reading. 

The ladies owning these violet nurseries are willing to take 
students at a reduced rate during the war, the course not 

dealing with violets alone, but with carnation growing, forcing 
of early strawberries and tomatoes, as well as any amount of 
useful commercial knowledge. 

The Torpedo 

Everybody seeing it falls in love with 
the torpedo envelope, the latest and 
daintiest handbag. There is something 
about its torpedo shape unusually attractive and smart, right 
for even the most fastidious woman. The envelope is ten 
inches long, and by no manner of means is it a bulky affair, 
though room is found inside it for purse, mirror and Treasury 
note case. These fitments are amongst its recommendations, 
every one of them being perfect in its way. 

The small glass, Uke a miniature hand-mirror, is attached 
to a gilt chain so that there is no likelihood of its falling out, 
getting lost or breaking. The bag is delightfully Uned inside, 
the soft shade of the lining contrasting well with the bright 
blackness of the grained patent leather of the bag. 

A novel swing handle at the back gives it security when 
carried, and it as well as a host of other attractions will be 
found illustrated in a unique catalogue well worth requesting. 

Sheepswool Hats 
and Scarves 

tweed scarves 

ago in these 

reinforced by 

The wide sheepswool 

mentioned some time 

columns have now been 
soft hats to match. 
Together they 
make a. most effec- 
tive alliance. The 
scarves stand by 
themselves as the 
cosiest neck wraps 
for wintry weather 
possible to im- 
agine. They are 
remarkably wide 
and long, and yet 
most amazingly 
hght in spite of 
their generous pro- 
portions. The 
actual size is two 
and a half yards by 
three quarters of a 
yard, and they 
can be wrapped 
round the figure in 
quite a number of 
pretty and effec- 
tive ways. 

Scotch wool 
tweed scarves and 
hats are a notion 
worth investiga- 
ting. Not only 
do they wear well, 
withstanding with 
triumph most in- 
clement weather, 
but they look well, 
the hats being 
bendable to any 
attractive angle, 
and adaptable to 
all faces. 

The colourings 
in which they are 

kept are nothing short of beautiful, and the whole effect 
is artistic in the extreme, much out of the ordinary, and a 
triumph on which the designer deserves congratulation. The 
trap into wliich many Englishwomen fall is that of dressing in 
too hard a style. Both these hats and scarves are the acme 
of softness, herein lying much of their charm. 

January i8, 1917 

Supplement to LAND & WATER 




For winter wear they are unmatched. 

These most comfortable, 
good-looking puttees are 
made entirely of fine supple 
tan leather, and fasten 
simply with one buckle at 
bottom. They are ex- 
tremely durable, even if 
subjected to the friction of 
riding, as the edges never 
tear or fray out. 

The puttees are speedily 
put on and taken off, 
readily mould to the shape 
of the leg, are as easily 
cleaned as a leather belt, 
an.l saddle soap soon 
makes them practically 

The price per pair is 16/6, post 
free inland, or postage abroad 
1/- extra, or sent on approval 
on receipt of business (not 
banker's) reference, and home 



ESTD. 1821 


Military and Civil Tailors, Legging Makers. 





'•Actioe Seroice" WRISTLET WATCH 
Fully Lnmineus Figgret & Handt. 
Warranted Timekeepers 

..I Silver Cases with Screw Bezel 

and Back. U.i Ss Gold. £6 IDs. 

. tti Hunter or Hall-Hunter cover. iii> Ts. «d. Gold. iiT lOs. 

Others in Silver from JUXi J.Os. 

Gold from iSo lOs. 

Military Badge Brooches. 

/?/iy Regimental ^adge Perfectly 



Sketches sent /or upprovnl. 

£6/10/- 25 OLD POND ST., W. 

and 62& 64 LUDOATE HILL, E.G. 


Manufacturers of Revolvers, Automatic 

Pistols, and all kinds of High-Class 

Sporting Guns and Rifles. 


?• ke obtained (rom all Qun Dealers, and Wholesale only at 

Head OKife and Showrooms : 


London Depot : 


The O'imnal Cording' s, Estd. 1839 




Equitor^* Coat 

On Active Service a man 
above all avoid that risk/ and 
utterly wretched experience — 
getting wet, and it is simply 
common-sense to urge that only 
a positively waterproof coat will 
ensure the essentia] protection. 

The " Equitor " is fitted with a 
special riding apron, which can 
be fastened conveniently, out of 
sight, but the coat serves just as 
well for ordinary wear afoot, 
Vifhether the apron be fastened 
back or not. 

An " Equitor," with the addi- 
tion of a fleece woollen lining 
(detachable), will not only keep 
a man bone dry through the 
heaviest and most lasting down- 
pour, but will also warmly pro- 
tect him in biting cold weather, 
and may therefore be relied upon 
to minimise the ill effects of 
enforced exposure at night. 

In our light-weight No. 31 material, 
the price o1 the "Equitor" is 85'.; 
ot our No. 23 cashmere, a medium- 
weight cloth, 105/-; without apron 
(either cloth), 15/. less, with belt, 6/- 

The detachable fleece inner coat can 
be had in two qualities— No. 1 (fine 
wool), 62/6; No. 2, 40/-. 

When ordering an "Equitor" Coat please state height ami chest measure 
and send remittance (which will be returned if the coat is not approved), 
or give home address and businoss (tn>t banker's) referenc). 

Illustrated List at request. 

•/. C» CORDING & CJiTD tohmI'thek^g 

Only Addresses : 

19 PICCADILLY, W., & 35 st. jamess st.. s.w. 


A few Extracts from Letters receioed 


" There is not a better lamp in France." 

Your lamp has been in use two years and is still perfect." 
■ There is not a lamp to touch yours for our job here." 
" I would not be without your lamp for anything." 
"Your lamp is absolutely essential to me." 
" Your lamps are considered IT out here." 


" It is readily agreed out here that there is only 
one lamp — The Orilux." 


" I find the Orilux a wonderful lamp, and tar 

ahead of all others." 
" The most useful article in my kit." 


is fitted with switches for intermittent and for constant light. The 
light can be turned on without opening the case, which is fitted with 
a hood to throw the light downwards. The case is prorided with 
loops for attaching to the belt, and provision is made in. it for 
carrying a spare bulb. 



£1 . 1 . o 

/ Postage t* the \ 
V Front, 1/. eitra ' 

Extra Battery in sealed tin, 2/. (Postage to the Front, 1/. extra). 
Extra Bulb, 1/6, poatag: id. 



J. H. STEWARD Ltd., """'i.Jr-' 

406 Strand, 457 Slrand, London. 


January 18, 1917 


Spare time at home, Art Training 


CHAS E. DAWSON, creator of the "Dawson Girl." 
needs no introduction to our readers. His art 
appeals to people of culture and retiuemeut. The 
beauty, dignity and distinction he has given to the aunouuee- 
ments of our greatest advertisers have exercised a marked 
intluence upon the artistic printing of the last ten years. 
And his success is reflected in the work of his students. 

TWELVE years ago he founded the first and most suc- 
eeasful Correspondence School of Art in Europe. 
THEllE'S nothing experimental 
about his System, its supreme 
value is proved by the ever-growing 
number of his students and their 
piiirttcal achievements. Prac- 
tical in the way they have been 
trained to make saleable draw- 
ings — and sell them! 

WITH Mr. Dawson's 

unique experience in 
fostering and developing the 
aims and needs of the ambi- 
tious artist, he has helped more 
men and women to earn money 
by art work than any other well- 
known artist. 

HE teaches the profitabJ- 
branehes of Art, in 
eluding Designing, Bool- 
and M a g a z i n 
Covers, Adver- 
t i s e m e nbs, 
S t e n- 
cillin g , 


1 should never have been able to design for reproduction 
if 1 had not had your tuition. C You opened my eyes to the 
possibilities of the profession, and no matter how good an 
artist one may be they couid not help but be benehted by 
your instruction. 1 have benefited most by confidence you 
have given me, and the tips as regards the arrangement 
of a design, and the possibilities and limitations of the 
various processes. — Birntiiujham. 

Your ways and means of doing certain designs have never 
been seen in any art book, or taught in any 
school. 1 have the work at my finpcr 
tips, and am now starting to 

ters, Mnral and Fabric Decora- 
tion, Silhouetting, Lithography," 
Lettering, etc. 

*' Dsar Mr. Dawson,— I consider your 
Art Course excellent in every way. 
The mass of Technical Instruction it contains, and its 
stimulat ng influence upon one's efforts make it indis- 
pensable. Even now I always have it by me for 
reference and find it an immense aid. 

"Yours very sincerely, 

Bruce Bairnsfather. 

" Somewhere in France." 

from Famous " Punch " Artist. {Contributed to •' Graphic," 

" Illustrated L;7ulon News," etc. 
Dear Mr. Dawson, — I am glad to add my tribute to those 
which I am sure you must receive from every student of 
yours who knows a good thing when he sees it. 1 am 
positive that anyone with average intelli- 
gence and a little natural ability who intends 
taking up Art as a profession— no matter 
how ignorant he may be at the beginning — 
cannot fail to lay a sound foundation for 
future success by carefully following your 
clever, practical and most interesting lessons. 
H this letter leads anyone who doiibts the 
value of postal instniction to take your 
Course, T shall feel that T have been the 
means of doing them a good turn. You are 
at I'berty to us" my name as an endorsement 
of my entire faith in your amazingly efficient, 
origmal, and inspiriting system. 
Yours faithfully, 

Captain Bairnsfather, 

One of the many who 

have sUidicd Chas. E. 

Dfiwsons^ St/Mem and 

heroine fnmott^. 

gam by 
your course. 
1' ho r n t o n 
I have re- 
ceived £10 for 
three sketches and a 
royalty of ^d. per 
copy for the first 5U0. 
I am sincerely indebted 
to your teaching, for it is 
entirely due to you that I 
have secured publication 
— Ealing. 

I won first prize (£25) in 
the "Studio" Competi- 
tion for a Sardine poster. 
This fully justified 
my taking your 
coui-se, which has 
been nnost useful. 
It is very comjilete, 
and I thank you for 
the satisfaction I have 
got from your first 
instruction, and the care 
taken in jgiving me in- 
formation on such a wide range of subjects. — 
Esbanh, N.B. 
I should like to tell you how much I admire your system. 
Even to one who, like myself, has tackled every branch of 
art, it contains many useful hints. The very language you 
employ bucks me up. I shall not fail to recommend it. — Bray. 
Y'our kindness and courtesy to the student does not end 
with the payment of fees.- — Exmmith. 

My first commission brought me three guineas. I have 
since designed other posters and now have twenty-four in 
hand, and orders for music covers. I cannot express fully 
how greatly I admire and appreciate your wonderful Course. 
It is all most int.'pnmg.— Sheffield. 


for " Land & Water " Readers without Entrance Fee. 

THE practical Correspondence College offers Mr. Dawson's 
Course at half fees (in small instalments) to the first 
25 who pass a postal examination to prove their aptitude 
Copy the Test Sketch and post it, and any 
other small specimen drawing in pen, pencil, 
or colours (with stamps for return), to:^ — 
Chas. P'. Dawson, 22 Thanet House, Strand, 
W.C. Competitors will receive from Mr. 
Dawson a letter of constructive criticism 
and advice on how to achieve the greatest 
possible success in the shortest possible 

Awards made in the order in which Test 
Sketches are received. 

V/ OU risk nothing, and commit yotirself to 
*■ nothing by entering this competition. 
You get a famous expert's opinion upon 
your work GRATIS, particninrs of the most 
successful system of Art Training in the 
world, and the chance of winning a Scholar- 

for the work. 


Vol. LXVIII No. 2854 [v^I-^J THURSDAY. JANUARY 18, 1917 [jJ'iJi^^^I^^] ^^"^'^^1^^^ 








% sM 

" \ 


\ " 



iT ^ 


I ( 








.v,.i . -v-C 


By L^uh Haemueken 

Drawn exclusively for 'Land i Wa'tt 

The Final Blow to Prussian Militarism 

(Hercules slaying the wild boar) 


January i8 1917. 

//' ■■ : 

^-T V 









> / 



Spokesman : To you, Mr. Dunlop, 
we tender our warmest thanks. 
On every Front on which the 
Allied Armies are fighting 
Dunlop tyres are giving fine 
service— service which is play- 
ing a big part in the success 
of the cause for which we one 
and all are fighting. 

The war has made for Dunlop 
tyres old friendships stauncher 
and new friendships have 
sprung up on every side. 

On behalf of our men in the 
field, we thank you. 

b^ ^^ B^S WWM^ ^^ ^s^ 


Fnadcn of tbe Pneumatic Trre InJottrr, 
Ptra Milli. Aito« Crou. BIRMINGHAM. 







/ V 







January iS, 1917 




Telephone HOLBORN 2828. 





The Final Blow. By Louis Racmaekers 
No Compromise. (Leader) j 

The Line of the Putna. By Hilaire Belloc 4 

Sir John Jellicoe's Statement. By Arthur Pollen 9 

Freedom and Finance. By H artley Withers 1 1 
A Study of King Constantine. By Sir William M. 

Ramsay ^3 

Opening of 1917 Campaign. By Colonel Feyler 14 

Alsace and The Rhine. By Henry D. Davray 15 

Books to Read. By Lucian Oldershaw 17 

The Golden Triangle. By Maurice Lcblanc 18 

The West End 24 

Kit and Equipment xi 


THE reply of the AUies to the American Note 
has produced precisely the effect which might 
have been anticipated. Admirable in tone, lucid 
in expression, lirm of purpose, merciless in 
condemnation, it has won the complete approval of 
the civilized world, and has provoked the hysterical 
indignation of the German Press. In the judgment 
of some people it may have been an error to speak 
of terms even in the most general form, and even at 
the request of a great Neutral Power. It was the whole 
object of our enemy to elicit a statement of terms, and 
any reply — however guarded and vague, — was an entry into 
discussion and a relaxation of energy at the critical 
moment. But we are not in possession of all the facts 
which must inevitably govern our diplomatic policy, 
and we are quite satisfied that the decision arrived at by 
our Foreign Office, and supported by our Allies, was a 
wise decision under the circumstances. If it were indeed 
necessary to send a reply, it would be. admitted that the 
document signed by the Allied authorities was dignified 
and appropriate. It certainly leaves the enemy in no 
doubt as to the intentions of the AUied Powers, and it 
gives to these intentions so clear a moral basis that no 
counter to it is possible. 

\Vith its general tenor everyone is now familiar. It 
will be sufiicient here to comment on its vital word — 
Reparation. There can be no reparation until there is 
admission of guilt ; and that is the one thing which 
Germany will not acknowledge. At first it seems 
amazing that there can be room for doubt as to the origin 
of the Avar. The invasion of Belgium was not only 
premeditated, but actually defended in a cynical speech 
of the German Chancellor, on the ground of military 
necessity. That is the secret of the immeasurable gulf 
which divides German from ordinary morality ; and for 
that reason all talk of peace before victory is won is 
vain and unprofitable. Reparation there must be, and 
will be, in fact : but voluntary reparation is impossible 
from a nation whose leaders continue to repeat the pre- 
posterous lie that they took up arms to defend their 

Germany's latest note to the Neutrals will doubtless 
become the classic example of national hypocrisy. It is 
merely farcical to read such statements as " those Powers 
have no right to protest against it (that is, the alleged 
violation of international rights) who from the beginning 
of the war trampled upon right and tore up the treaties 

on which it was based." This from the spoiler and ravager 
of Belgium 1 

What is the origin of Germany's desire for peace, and 
her fury at its reception ? If she can hold what she has 
gained, there is no need for her to consider, much less to 
propose terms. But it is the consciousness that she 
cannot keep what she has won which is the dominating 
factor of the situation. The stream of men is running 
dry : her output of munitions is increasingly outclassed by 
the Alhes : her economic position is undeniably serious 
if not desperate. Naturally, she wants peace, and 
would like to negotiate while in possession of the spoils. 
The death-knell of that hope is sounded in the Allies' 
Note to America. 

What are the aims of the ^\llies ? " These will only 
be set forth in detail with all the compensations and equitable 
indemnities for harm suffered at the moment of negotia- 
tions." Certain terms arc specifically mentioned — for 
example, ' ' the restoration of Belgium, of Serbia, and 
Montenegro with the compensations due to them ; the 
evacuation of the invaded territories in France, Russia, 
Roumania with just reparation ; the reorganisation of 
Europe on the principle of free nationality ; the ex- 
pulsion of the Ottoman Empire." 

It is premature to enquire how much of .the 
above Germany would be willing to concede in her 
present situation, but that she would very gladly make 
peace on the basis of the status quo, if that were all, 
many critics agree. What her rulers cannot swallow as 
yet is the ignominy of pleading guilty before the world : 
and we can imagine that it is difiicult after deluding their 
people with stories of perpetual conquest and promises 
of final victory, to turn round, and say, "We must have 
peace : we can hold out no longer." No sane man ex- 
pects that to be said yet : but we believe the day will come. 
It is the fear of that day which haunts the Kaiser and his 
advisers, military and political ; it is the determination 
of the Alhes to bring that day to pass. 

No student of character will easily believe that Ger- 
many asks for peace because her position is impregnable, 
in spite of the disingenuous statements of the German 
press. So long as the demand for reparation' is met by the 
answer. There is nothing to repair — in other words, by 
the blustering denial or justification of the crimes she has 
committed and is committing at this moment, there can 
be no peace between Germany and civilization. 

There is one practical way, however, by which Gemiany 
can prove her sincerity if that virtue still exists in the 
Fatherland. She can withdraw iiom the territory she 
has invaded : she can guarantee the restoration of Bel- 
gium ; she can restore ton for ton of merchant and 
neutral shipping ; she can agree to pay " equitable 
indemnities " for the harm she has inflicted. These are 
the necessary preliminaries to peace. But in essentials 
there can be no compromise. This is a war between 
opposite principles, and principles do not admit of 
compromise. Some foolish idealists imagine that Ger- 
many can be converted to our ideas of international 
morality ; but judging from her record, no conversion 
can be relied on unless it be the outcome of military 
defeat. Europe will require henceforth a more valid 
guarantee than a German signature to a treaty : she must 
be deprived of the means of aggression unless we are 
prepared to hand on the legacy of war to our children, 
and our children's children. That is what we mean by 
" reparation." If Germany is prepared to accept 
now the full consequences of defeat and thus anticipate 
the end for which we are fighting, and which we mean to 
attain, then there is a basis for negotiation. If, as is 
almost certain, she elects to fight on until there is no 
alternative but submission, it remains for us to make 
that supreme effort, which is needed to destroy the evil 
spirit of Prussianism, and to restore the blessings of a 
lasting peace to the world. 


January i8, 1917 

The Line of the Putna 

By Hilaire Belloc 

THE enemy's operations in Roumania ha\e reached 
a verj' interesting phase. In order to appreciate 
the character of those operations at the present 
moment we shall do well to mark the rate of 
enemy advance before discussing the principal feature of 
the present week, which is the struggle for the line of 
the Putna and the railway behind it. 

The enemy entered Bucharest on the 6th of December. 
He may be said upon the date to have accomplished his 
advance over the Wallachian plain. He had followed a 
rapidly retreating Roumanian army (turned through the 
Vulcan pass) that had not offered battle. Their losses 
had not hitherto been serious, but the pursuit had been 
rapid and it was the design of the enemy by con\erging 
a number of separate columns upon Bucharest to catch 
the Roumanian main body in a trap. The converging 
movement was excellently co-ordinated, it was a Uttle 
Sadowa, all drawn to scale, but it failed, because in this 
war^ after the first few weeks, Prussia has always been 
too slow. The trap shut upon empty space, and there 
was no decision c\'en in the local field and against the 
particular enemy in question. There was a partial 
breakdown on the northern side which cost the Rou- 
manians a considerable number of prisoners and a few 
guns, but the main army retired intact, and, what was 
very remarkable, the heavy guns of the fortress of 
Bucharest and its stores were saved. The Roumanian 
army fell back to refit and reorganise behind a screen of 
Russian forces which had come to the rescue, and which 
had already begun to enter into play ^^when Bucharest 
was entered. 

The Russian forces thus newly arri\ed made a com- 
plete line between the mountains and the Danube by the 
I2th of December. That is the date, Tuesday, the I2th 
of December, from which the present operations date. 
We can only judge their character and probable outcome 
by remembering that the Roumanian campaign is made 
up of two sharply divided chapters : the first the 
Roumanian retreat through all Wallachia, including the 
abandonment of the capital. The second the deliberate 
Russian defensive with its strict plan and slow methodical 
retirement, which thus originated five weeks ago, not 
more than a long day's walk from the Putna, and is 
btill in progress. 

From that moment onwards everything has been a 


series of rearguard actions, without anything approaching 
a dangerous sahent or any peril of" considerable loss. 
Hardly any guns have been taken, and the wounded 
picked up upon each enemy advance have formed but 
an insignificant fraction of the 200,000 to 250,000 men 
engaged. .All serious enemy criticism recognises this 
feature in the Roumanian campaign after the 12th of 
December, notably that of Major Moraht, whose M'ork 
continues to be the least political, the least rhetorical, 
and the best worth following on the enemy's side. 

From Buciiarest to Schumann's " Lines of the Sereth," 
of which Focsani is the principal point, is a matter of 
about 80 miles. When the Russians seriously came into 
play to e.xhaust the enemy's advance more than half that 
distance had been covered by the invader. 

E\^erything that has followed has been an increasing 
attrition of the offensive and an increasing friction and 
consequent retardation in the movement. Rimnicu, 
20 miles from Focsani, and some 60 from Bucharest, 
along the main road and railway which unite those two 
points, was reached just over a week after the new 
phase began. It was there that the first considerable 
rearguard action was fought. It did not open until the 
22nd December. The corps engaged on the critical 
point, that is astraddle of the high road, was one of the 
best in the German service : the Alpine corps which had 
for many months defended a sector in the West near 
Rheims. The action lasted five days, right over Christ- 
mas, and only terminated on the 27th, when the Russian 
rearguard fell back towards Focsani 20 miles away. 
Then came a minor rearguard action, four miles outside 
Focsani, and on the 8th January, the Monday, Focsani, 
was entered twelve days after the action at Rimnicu. 
The Russians fell back Ijchind the river Putna and have 
held its line from that moment for a full week, that is, 
up to last Monday, January 15th, news of which is the 
last received in London up to the moment of writing. 

Now let us see what interest the struggle presents 
at the present moment in connection with this Putna- 
Sereth line. 

First let us recapitulate the objects of either party. 

It is the object of the Allies to " hold " the enemy in 
this field. Holding does not mean keeping in one place, 
it means occupying and compelling to effort. It is the 
, object of the Allies to com])el Prussia and her dependents 
to keep in this field all the forces they have adventured 
there, to prevent their coming down south against 
^lacedonia, if possible, and above all to exhaust this 
offensive before the main Allied action elsewhere begins. 
The corresponding task of the enemy is not (strategically) 
to occupy towns and fields — whatever political value 
this may have in impressing neutral and civilian opinion 
— his main strategical object is to break the Russian 
front here and so ptit great numbers of his enemy out 
of action, or, alternatively, to envelop if he can the whole, 
or at least some large portion, of the forces opposed to 
him and so put them out of action. 

We ha\e seen in past articles how he might hope to do 
this if he could force the Oituz Pass. He would then 
get right round the right of the main Russo- Roumanian 
line and compel it to a very rapid and probably disastrous 
retreat. Hitherto he has "failed to get thus right round 
tlie right by the Oituz. That pi^•ot has been kept almost 
immobile for a month or more. At the moment of writing 
the enemy is still trying to get round the Oituz by the 
Parlea side valley, having failed to force the main pass 
directly. But he has not yet had any success even in 
this flank movement. 

The enemy might, as an alternative, get round by his 
right, the Russian left. If he broke the Russian front 
on the Lower Sereth he would be able to envelop aftcr 
a fashion, less decisive, but certainly productive of very 
considerable losses : the only third course is to try and 
pierce the centre near Focsani and along the road and 
'■aih\ay which cross the Putna north of Focsani, and 

January i8, 191, 


run along just under the mountains up the Moravian 
plain, or near Fundeni, or at both points. 

Prussian strategical concepts never vary. They 
always follow a book plan laicl down after some success 
in the past, even if the plan has already led them to 
disaster ; and they are doing here what the successes of 
more than a generation ago led them to do at the Marne ; 
of course, under conditions quite different from those of 
the Marne. They are acting upon a wing and they 
are trying to force a point in the centre. The wing 
upon which they arc acting is the Lower Sereth and 
tlie point of Galatz. The centre where not only the 
enemy is acting but where he musl act is the sector of 
Focsani, and meanwhile he is seeing whether he can 
achieve anything at an intervening point, that of Fundeni. 

Of these three points by far the most important is that 

of Focsani. The town of Galatz, on account of its size 

and commercial importance, has naturally attracted 

attention in our press, but strategically it only means the 

left wing of the Allies. The point of Fundeni has been 

hardly heard of, though, as we shall see in a moment, it 

is very important.' The point of Focsani, that is, the 

sector in front of the town of the line of the Putna.has 

not seemed as important to most people as the mere 

town itself ; it is far more important, for it it is forced 

the results would be considerable:. 

Let us consider the three efforts in the order of their 
importance, referred to the above Sketch IL 

\yhy must the enemy make a special effort in front of 
Focsani, where he still keeps the remnant of his fine 
Alpine corps ? Because he is there caught in a sort of 
buckle, between the bending course of the Purtna and the 
hills to the east, so that he is exposed to the chance of an 
offensive against the right flank of that particular sector. 
That is his negative reason for getting out of a restricted 
and, what would be against an enemy equally armed, a 
dangerous piece of the field. He must go fcrward or 
backward here, and obviously it is his opportunity and 
design to go forward. 

But there is also a positi\-e reason for making Focsani 
lus principal effort. At a range which at its minimum 
is less than 8,000 yards behind Putna, runs the only 
railway uniting the two main lines of comniimicatioii, which 
serve respectively the left and the right of the Russian 
forces. The railway dispositions of Moldavia are such 
that one main line running down the valley of the Sereth (i ) 
and another quite separate running down the valley' of 
■she Barladu, (2) are the only means of supplying the front 
r'.iong the Putna and the Sereth with shei I and supplies. 
At the narrowest point between these two railways there 
run a road and a railway. They leave the first railway 
at Mararestii, cross the Sereth and its marshy valley 


January i8, 1917 

meadows by a'good double bridge (the only one for several 
days' march) at Badtaretul and join the second line at 

It is true that the Russians and Roumanians couki 
design, in time achieve, and have probably already 
sketched out, another unison between the two main rail- 
way lines liigher up the Scrcth valley ; but probably to 
this moment, certainly till quite lately, this little local 
U no, not more than twelve miles long, with its bridges 
and viaducts and road causeways across the Sereth and 
its marshes, was vital to a holding of the Putna and 
Sereth hnes. 

Now to seize that railway, to hold its bridges, and 
without too much delay to reach its termini would be to 
hamper the communications between the Russian right 
and the Russian left, and that is why the enemy must 
attack again, heavy as his losses have already been here 
in front of Focsani. In the very first days of his efforts 
on this sector, a week ago, he got across the Putna 
(which is not a considerable stream), and was m striking 
distance of this vital little railway (3, on Map II.). The 
surprise was effected in a fog. The Russians promptly 
threw him back again and he was or still is — last 
Monday night — on the further bank. 

The reason he is also considering his chances of 
crossing at the point of Fundeni is this. That Itirge loop 
in the Lower Sereth which contains Fundeni is the last 
hard ground before you come to the extensive marshes 
which stretch all down to the last reaches of the river 
to the Danube. The enemy feels that even if he should fail 
to force the extreme right by Galatz (and he has been so 
long about it that he has already failed, for there would 
be ample time to retire before Galatz was occupied) he 
might make a stroke by Fundeni. He has, as a fact, 
pressed forward in a sort of peak right up to the southern 
end of the loop. The Russians are on his left at Manescii, 
and on his right Cragenii (M and C on the map), but the 
enemy is on the edge of the southern bank of the river 
in between and is trying to get across. He is here 
holding what must be a most expensive and unhealthy 
little «dient subject to cross fire at quite short range, 
and he must go forward across the river quickly or go 

As for the operations in front of Galatz, though they 
can no longer be decisive the enemy laboriously continues 
them and their conditions are as follows : 

Between Bi.-aila and the Sereth there is a large marsh 
on the eastem side of which is a shallow mere, sur- 
rounded by q uite impassable wet soil and the rest of which 
gets gradually drier as one gets further from this mere. 
There is ilo road across the marsh, though one could 


easily be constructed over the drier western part, but 
there is a railway embankment which makes a great 
elbow corresponding to the limit between the drier and 
the wetter part of the morass. It is along this embank- 
ment, aided probably by a new road to the west of it, 
that the enemy has painfully proceeded during the last 
ten days, and is now fighting for the hamlet of Vodeni, 
which stands on a sort of a spit of dry land within 3,009 
yards of the Sereth. 

Beyond the Sereth the ground is hard and there is a 
good road nearly parallel to the river and leading into 
Galatz. Meanwhile the town of Galatz itself is under 
fire from the other side of the Danube. 

The operations of advancing upon and occupying the 
town should be a mere matter of plan to the force which 
possesses superior artillery, and threatens it from two 
sides, but the chance of doing this with sufficient rapidity 
to break the Russian left flank and so tufn the whole 
line has gone long ago. 

The Macedonian Front 

There has been a great deal of injudicious writing 
in our press iipon the Macedonian front, criticism of the 
Salonika operations as a whole, and even the suggestion 
that they do. not now fulfil any strategical purpose. 

With regard to such criticism and suggestion it is 
sufficient to repeat that the conduct of this war is, happily, 
not 3'et fallen into the hands of newspapers or even 

The military reasons for and against the presence of 
such and such a number of men and materials in Mace- 
donia, and the line they shall hold at any moment are a 
product of very many factors, all of which have to be 
allowed for and balanced one against the other. So 
many Bulgarian and Turkish troops are held : such is 
the danger of their reinforcements within such a mini- 
mum period of time : such is the cost per man in tonnage : 
such and such are the most recently observed movements 
of the enemy's troops in the Balkans — and so forth. 

No judgment worth a rap could be formed by the 
best professional trained observer on the spot if he had 
not these factors before him. Even with all such factors 
available no one but men trained to the higher command 
can put them together usefully. 

But of their nature these things must be kept secret. 
The elements are therefore lacking for any civilian 
opinion — let alone newspaper opinion — upon the matter, 
and the less of it there is, the better. 

One thing is perfectly clear and it is astonishing that 

even general opinion has not seized it yet. No attack 
can be made upon the Macedonian front which shall pro- 
duce an effect of surprise. 

There are two reasons for this. First, the oppor- 
tunities the enemy has for massing upon that front are 
very much less than the opportunities of the Allies for 

Secondly, the exhaustion of the enemy is such that 
no offensive can be undertaken in Macedonia before the 
abandonment of the corresponding movement in Rou- 

For the massing against us upon the Macedonian 
front (which means much more the bringing up of heavy 
guns and the establishment of a head' of shell than it 
docs the movement of troops— though the latter would 
have to present a 50 per cent, increase at least before an 
attack could be made) the enemy has only one single 
line of railway and one mountain road : The railway 
down the Vardar valley and tlie road over the Babuna. 
\Ve remember what a number of weeks were required 
for the concentration of the Trentino, with large depots 
already established and with an international double 
line of railway feeding the enemy. Under such con- 
ditions as those of the Macedonian mountains in winter, 
a prolonged effort of this kifid would lie before the 
Intelligence of the AlHes, exposed in every detail. 

The alternative, a concentration upon the enemy left 
against the British troops in the Struma valley, which has 

January i8, 1917 


better though longer communications, would be equally 
discoverable, or perhaps even more easily discoverable. 
Surprise, with any normal vigilance upon the Allied side 
is, in the matter of concentration, virtually impossible. 

Further, as I have said above, even the chance of such 
an operation, let alone its imminence, would be condi- 
tioned by the cessation of the main effort in Roumania. 
So long as that effort continues it cannot be supple- 
mented by a large offensive in Macedonia. The enemy 
has neither the men nor the material for two such coin- 
cident operations. 

The Present Political Factor in the War 

The European war has entered a new phase since the 
rejection of Germany's offer foe peace. I say " Germany's 
offer," because, though the pressure came from all the 
Alliance against us indiscriminately, though Austria- 
Hungary is even in a worse case than the German Empire, 
Germany was the spokesman for that mass of 150 millions 
which has been harnessed under Prussia to challenge 
Europe and civilization. 

The phase into which it has now entered is, on the 
enemy's side, almost entirely political. 

The political element as distinguished from the purely 
strategic — by which one does not mean the ultimate 
political aims of a war which dominate all strategy, but 
the immediate striking for political effect upon neutrals 
and civilians which interferes with normal strategy — has 
been present ever since the Battle of the Marne. But it 
has been present in \'arying proportions. 

The lirst great military action after the Marne, the 
belated attempt to reach the Straits of Dover, had a little 
))oHtical element in it. There was the feeling that even if 
the Allied line were not turned by the north, at least a 
coast position would be taken which would embarrass 
Great Britain materially, but much more affect opinion in 
Great Britain. This political element, however, in the great 
Battle of Ypres, towards the end of i()i4, was quite sub- 
sidiary to the strategic element. The enemy, having 
lost all his original plan of campaign against the superior 
strategy of his opponents upon the Marne, and having 
taken such an extraordinarily long time to use his great 
superiority in numbers for action round the left or Northern 
Hank, having allowed the " Seagate " of the Western line 
to be closed against him (why he allowed it, by what 
error he allowed it, has never been explained), had no 
choice but to try and batter in that gate. There had 
as yet been no experience to guide him. No one knew 
how a great offensive would fare against the modern 
defensive, and though history will ridicule Prussian 
strategy for its cumbersome blunder in failing to turn the 
open Allied flank, it will not blame the Prussian effort to 
recover from that blunder by the great attack upon the 
north-eastern sector of Ypres which the French call the 
Battle of the Yser and the English the Battle of Ypres. 
. The attack upon the Russians during the winter was 
again in part political : it was concerned with the re- 
establishment of confidence in Germany by the driving 
of the Russians out of East Prussia. But \vhen the great 
advance of 1915 was undertaken by the Austro-Germans, 
once they had broken the Galician lines and had begun 
the only true pursuit they have enjoj^ed in this war (it 
lasted thirteen days), the political element in their 
military plans was almost eliminated. 

From the ist of May, 1915, to the beginning of October, 
that is for live full months, the enemy's command, now 
united, kept a distinctly military object in view : the 
destruction of the Russian Army. I need not repeat 
again the story of the five great salients and of the failure 
of each, the last and greatest failure, which also came 
nearest to success, being that which takes its name from 
the town of Vilna. 

! With the failure of the Pohsh campaign, the necessity 
for pohtical effect rose again. With the help of Bulgaria 
Serbia was overrun. It was an action which could not 
possibly lead to any military decision. It did not even 
give a base in the Mediterrai|ean. The Allies, by their 
prompt occupation of Salonika, saw to that. But it 
was not wholly political by any means. It greatly 
reinforced the Turkish powers of resistance. It increased 
the enemy hold upon the Adriatic. It prevented 
Bulgaria from breaking away at lier own moment. 

With the opening of 1916 the pohtical element sank 

again to the advantage of the military element, though 
the enemy's plans were now entirely Prussian in 
origin and direction. The great attack upon the sector 
of Verdun was, during all its first furious days, ancl I 
think as late as April gth, 1916 (with regard to which 
date I wrote in . these columns that the Battle of 
Verdun was won) in the main a military conception 
without political afterthought. It was hoped at first 
to break the French front as the Russian front in 
Galicia had been broken more than nine months before. 
Even when that chance was lost it was still hoped 
that some locally crushing defeat could be inflicted upon 
the French, which would exhaust their future powers 
and which would involve the destruction of a really con- 
siderable proportion of their armed forces and material. 
With the failure of this effort the political element entered 
again and all the later battles round Verdun, throughout 
April, May and June, were more and more designed to 
affect the civilian mind at home and abroad. 

We all know how the phrases : " The taking of Ver- 
dun," " The heart of France," " The gradual approach 
to the citadel," and so forth, which had no military 
meaning whatsoever, were made familiar to the reading 
public of botli hemispheres. We all know how in the 
German Press and in the American, blunt manly pro- 
phecies were issued sometimes, giving the exact date on 
which Verdun Mould be " taken." To some extent this 
political propaganda succeeded. I myself met not a few 
Frenchmen who talked of the " resistance of the town of 
Verdun," and who asked whether " the fortress would 
fall." What is more significant, I met very many men 
abroad who, knowing perfectly well that the phrasC was 
meaningless in any military sense, yet believed that it 
had taken such liold ujwn the public imagination that if 
German troops were to enter the town of Verdun, no 
matter how strong the French lines behind the town 
might be, no matter at what heavy cost the Germans 
should enter that town or at what slight expense the 
French should reform their line, the mere news of such an 
entry would affect opinion in a perilous degree. It may 
have been so. At any rate, to a large extent in thia 
country and almost universally in America, this purely 
political point was made the test. 

A Political Blunder 

Oddly enough, this foolery, which looked as though it 
could only be to the profit of the enemy if it spread, 
turned against him. He had told every body that there 
was a " Fortress of Verdun" for all the world like the 
old-fashioned fortresses that were surrounded, summoned, 
sapped up to and made to" fall" with the consequent eli- 
mination of an army therein contained. Therefore getting 
into the town of Verdun became the test of his own success 
or failure. That stupid lie had obtained currency. There- 
fore, his failure to get into the town of Verdun greatly 
exaggerated the public judgment of his defeat. So 
much the better. At any rate, he had immixed a political 
object with his strategy to the increasing chsadvantage 
of the latter, more and more, up to the outbreak of the 
great Allied offensive upon the Somme. 

During the progress of that offensive, that is, during 
the four open months of 1916, from the ist of July 
onwards, the political element in the German plans 
dwindled. A man who can barely parry violent blows 
on his face stops thinking about the figure he cuts before 
the neutral public and its chances of relieving him sooner 
or later. He bends his whole mind to defence ; and this was 
true, not only of the defence on the Somme, but of the 
defence against the victorious Russian pressure during the 
summer in Volhynia and Galicia. Until the autumn of 1916 
the Central Powers were concerned with the enormous 
losses upon the West, and the peril of the two critical 
railway junctions, Baranovitchi and Kovel upon the 
East. The political element in the enemy's plans there- 
fore dwindled. 

But at the close of that fight there occurred something 
exceedingly significant of what the future was to be. 
The enemy began privately to feel for peace. 

We shall not know perhaps during the lifetime of 
anyone who reads this — certainly not for many years — 
exactly what happened. One man can only tell one part of 
the story, one another. But this much is certain : That 
the enemy had already shown by the uutumu of 1916 



January i8, 1917 

an anxious desire to obtain a reprieve. Polish recruit- 
ment was getting more and more doubtful, and short uf 
Pohsh recruitment he had for drafts to rehcve his forces 
in action, right up to the middle of the next summer, 
numbers which were not equivalent to one-third of those 
forces in action. 

These first feelers for peace disappointed him. He then 
gambled upon the very doubtful experiment of anticipating 
reserves which might be absolutely necessary to his 
existence but a few months hence : he created the new 
divisions ; he sacriliced Monastir, and he staked every- 
thing upon the almost purely political experiment of the 
Roumanian campaign. He no longer had the strength 
to do the thing on any considerable scale. Of the forces at 
work not one half were German ; of the twelve moving 
divisions which Germany herself had just managed to 
j)rovide (out of thirty), all were severely tried ; two at least 
to our knowledge had to be withdrawn for re-formation. 
One, the nth iiavarian, was almost annihilated. Still, 
by this special concentration upon one small sector of his 
further extended fronts, the enemy achieved an 
advance across the whole of Wallachia. The pohtical 
effect which he had desired once more stood him in 
far better stead than it should have done. A nervous- 
ness exactly suiting the enemy's book spread throughout 
public opinion as a result of this Roumanian affair. The 
bpectacle of such nervousness reacted upon neutrals. 

Definite Peace Proposals 

Suddenly on Dec. 12th, the enemy openly proposed 
peace. He acted so clumsily that he missed fire even with 
those whom he had the best chance of entrapping, and he 
found himself about a month later certainly condemned 
to a continuation of the war. He knows what result 
that continuation will have. He cannot avoid it by 
any military action. He is therefore now about to con- 
centrate upon action almost purely political. 

What form this will take no one can say. He may 
solemnly erect in due form a free Polish State. He may 
gamble still further with his dwindling reserves and 
undertake a spectacular offensive even in the West, 
with the certainty of defeat if it be continued, but 
in the remaining hope that its delivery may even 
yet affect opinion. He may suggest a corresponding 
insufficient stroke against the treasures of Italy : 
an hypothesis demanding long preparation. He may, 
if he is guided by counsels even more foolish than 
those which led him to the blunders of last year, 
waste himself upon a diversion in Macedonia. 

But whatever he does now must necessarily ha\e 
for its object aja effect more entirely political than any 
movement he has yet undertaken. Strategic considera- 
tions in the large sense of that phrase form a less pro- 
portion of his plan than ever. 

If we consider the enemy's situation not only from 
that numerical standpoint which is at the bottom of 
argument and judgment in these matters, but also from 
the standpoint of quality and specific Use, the necessity 
he is now under of political effect will be still more clear. 
He cannot adopt a general defensive. 

Defensive Strategy 

In any case, a general defensive towards the end of a 
campaign is almost a contradiction in terms. The only 
])oint of any defensive in strategy as in tactics is to hang 
out until an offensive can be delivered. But supposing 
him merely concerned with the prolongation of action in 
time : supposing him merely saying to himself : "If I 
can draw it gut even by a month longer than would seem 
jKJSsible, something may tmn up in my favour during that 
month." ev'en then the policy of a mere defensive is 
forbidden him. 

It is forbidden him because he has deliberately sacrificed 
\vhat would have been such an ultimate defensive 
strength to hazardous and inconclusive offensive move- 
ments. He has reduced his defensive power to the last 
limits everywhere and has organised his surplus or margin 
i){ power to strike with, and has used it recklessly in the 
striking. Every such expenditure has been to the 
advantage of the Allies. Every occupation of territory 
which has not shortened a line or provided materials and 
men in excess of its cost, has advantaged the Allies, and 

none perhaps more than these last actions in Roumania, 
following upon the occupation of Bucharest. It is no 
Itinger possible for the enemy to change the texture either 
of his organisation or of his idea, either of his military 
dispositions or of his mental balance. He is no longer 
in a position to say " After such and such a date I will 
imdertakc no new offensive. I will spin out the defensi\e 
alone." It is too late for him to undertake even that 
policy of despair. He is condemned to a further offensive 
upon this sector or that until his line cracks. 

Intellectually it is our business to welcome each such 
renewed effort. Morally it is our business to forbid 
sensation and above all sensational fear during the 
progress of such efforts. H. Bhlloc 

The following extract from the Frankjiirlcr Zeilung gives 
a good idea of the military opinions still beirig promulgated 
in Germany : " We do not doubt that it will be possible for 
the Western Powers to begin a new gigantic battle in tlic 
West, and we also do not doubt that many of our enemies 
still belie\e that tiiis is capable of winning for the Entente 
the victory and the peace which it desires. But we are filled 
by the firm conviction that the solid facts which the war lias 
created in our favour are anchored so firmly in the bloody 
ground of the battlefields that no army in the world can dis- 
lodge them. What has been achieved is enough for a good 
peace, and a peace acceptable to the enemy also ; if they 
do not want it, we shall proceed to win for ourselves a still 
better peace." 

Afr. George Big\\ood's record Lancashire Terrilorials in 
CaUipoli (Country Life Library, is. (xL net), is rigiitly called 
" an epic of heroism." for, though in the eyes of most people 
the deeds of the Colonials have overshadowed the work of the 
Imperial units ser\ing in that campaign, yet there are stories 
to tell of the men of Blackburn, Wigan, J:5urnley, Manchester, 
and other Lancashire centres that the Colonials may equal, 
hut cannot excel. The author has been careful to emphasise 
the personal side of his narrative, by means of extracts from 
letters and individual accounts of the work in Gallipoli, and 
he lias made a book of wiiich Lancashire may well be proud. 

Simf^s, and Lyrics of Russia, translated by John Pollen, 
L.I,.D. (East and West, 3s. bd. net) is representative of the 
wcrk of leading Russian poets, including Tolstoi, Lermonteff, 
and others less well-known in this country, while there arc 
also included translations of Russian folk songs that are so 
old as to have passed beyond individual authorship. The 
translation has not only preserved the poetic feeling of the 
originals, but has also reproduced and made real the national 
characteristics that such a book should convey to its readers. 

.\ pamphlet based upon an experiment in village organisa- 
tion made by Mr. W. R. Boeltcr, entitled Parish War Socielies, 
How tlicv are Formed and Conducted is now published by 
Smallholders Union, 7, Queen Street Place. E.C. The author 
claims that the parish Ts the right unit of organisation, and 
he gives manv practical hints how a sound organisation can 
be created. It is a useful little work at this moment. 

Mr. Ernest Bergholt, the well-known authority on whist 
and bridge has now brought out (Routledgc and Son, is. 3d.) 
a small volume entitled Roval Anciion Bridge. It deals 
with the laws and principles of the game, under the English 
code of 1914, and is an invaluable handbook. 

The seventh exhibition of the Sencfelder Club for the 
advancement of artistic lithograjihy, of which Mr. Joseph 
I'enncll is President, opens on Saturday at the Leicester 
Gallieries, Leicester Square. A special feature will be the 
collection of lithographs bv distinguished French artists, 
which will be shown together with those of the best fiviiig 
ICnglish exponents. Daumier, Gavarni, Delacroix, Forain, 
Steinlen, Corot, Carriere, Leperc, Legros, Rops, Fantin- 
Latour, Puvis de Chavanncs. Renoir, Toulouse-Lautrec, and 
Willctte wiU all be well rejircsented. 

l-'or the benefit of' girls and young women with a taste for 
writing and a total lack of knowledge of how to turn it to 
account, the Society of Women Journalists is arranging -to 
take a few pupils in secretarial work and elementary journalism. 
The Society was recognised by the Queen and Queen Alex- 
andra as the official channel through which to reach women 
writers, as both Royal ladies gave generous donations to the 
War Emergency Fimd started by the Society in the first 
month of the war.^ The address of the Society is lo, St. 
Bride's .Avenue, Fleet Street, E.C. and enquiries should be 
sent to the Hon. Secretary. 

January i8, 1917 


Sir John Jellicoe's Statement 

By Arthur Pollen 

LAST week the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty 
was admitted to the Fishmongers' Compan\' 
and nsed this occasion for making a long and 
exceedingly important statement about the naval 
position. Three aspects of it occupied him principally. 
First, he dealt with the extraordinary contrast between 
the conditions of war to-day and those that prevailed 
when the greatest of his predecessors in office com- 
manded at the battle of St. Vincent. These changes, he 
pointed out, arose from the greater speed of ships, the 
longer range of guns, the menace of the torpedo when 
used from ships, destroyers or submarines, the menace 
of mines, air scouting and wireless telegi-aphy. In 
St. Vincent's time 800 yards was an e.xtrcme range for 
guns. To-day we open at 22,000 and at 18,000 gun- 
fire becomes " very effective." The range of the torpedo, 
however, is 10,006 yards and " this requires that a ship 
shall keep beyond this distance to fight her guns." But 
in the North Sea the conditions of light frequently make 
fighting at-this range or beyond it exceedingly difficult — 
a fact wliich explains why gun fire, which in some con- 
ditions can be very effective at 18,000 yards, may in 
others, at half that range, be altogether without result. 
A Commander-in-Chief therefore is in action subject 
to the greatest possible of anxieties because " as soon as 
destroyers tumble upon a fleet within torpedo range 
tlie situation becomes critical for the heavy ships." For 
" it is the main duty " of destroyers " to attack the 
heavy ships of the enemy with torpedoes." Further, 
mines and submarines make all cruising by fleets very 
anxious work, and in addition, these elements of under- 
water attack make close blockade impossible. So that, 
in spite of air scouting and wireless telegraphy, we are 
actually worse off, in procuring strategic information about 
the movements of the enemy's fleet, than were our 
ancestors; For they could keep their ships so close in 
to the enemy's ports, when the weather permitted, as 
actually to observe the movements of the ships within 
them. This should ha\e gi\en the (ier man fleet the great 
advantage in strategic initiative, but they have failed to 
use it. Apart from three raids on our sea coast towns 
and Von Hipper 's abortive excursion into the North 
Sea in January 1915, the German fleet has only once 
ventured far enough from its harbours to enable our 
forces to get contact with it. When the last sortie 
was made in August last, though the fleet got fairly 
near to the British coast, it retreated, probably because 
warned by its Zeppelins that the Clrand Fleet was on its 
way to meet it. As to the bombarding raids, these 
were probably undertaken with a view to " enticing 
us into the adoption of a false strategy by breaking 
up our forces to guard all vulnerable points." 

Sir John next passed on to remind his readers of the 
Collossal extension of duties the war had thrown upon the 
fleet. The mere number of vessels now included in the 
British Navy amounts to nearly 4,000. From the Arctic 
to the Pacific, and from the farthest East to the farthest 
West, the navy has had its share in every campaign in 
which we or our Allies have been engaged. The super- 
vision of the inter-neutral trade, and the blockade of our 
enemy, call for the visit and search of a minimum of eighty 
ships a week ! The administration of the supply of this 
' vast force is beyond the conception of anyone not actually 
familiar with it. But its most important aspect is the 
strain that it imposes upon the sea service previously 
devoted entirely to peace occupations. " Without the 
mercantile marine," said the First Sea Lord, " the navy 
and indeed the nation could not exist." It is not merely 
that the war has absorbed half of our merchant tonnage. 
■The drafts made on the ci\il personnel for war are extra- 
ordinary. Two thousand fi\c hundred skippers have been 
drafted into the R.N.R. for patrol and mine sweeping 
purposes alone. The executive officers in more im- 
portant ships drawn from this source have increased four- 
fold since the beginning of the war. In an eloquent 
passage the professional chief of the Royal Nav^' paid a 

due and proper tribute, not only to the efficiency, but 
to the entire devotion and unmatched herosim of the 
merchant seamen of all ranks. And this is a heroism 
not limited to those whose ships now fly the white ensign, 
it has been exhibited in every form of craft employed 
in the normal processes of trade. The submarine attack 
has made every man at sea a fighting man and most nobly 
has each emerged from the ordeal. 

The passage in Sir John's speech which has rightly 
attracted the greatest attention then followed. " The 
submarine menace," he said, " to the merchant service 
is far greater now than at any period of the war, and 
it required all our energy to combat it." He then added 
words which, coming from him, should be regarded as 
exceedingly significant. " It must and will be dealt with, 
of that I" am confident." He then went on to urge 
everyone engaged in the ship -building industry to regard 
the completion of merchant shipping as the first of all 
duties to the State, and closed with a characteristically 
generous tribute to the spirit of the officers and men 
of the fleet of which he has so recently given up command. 
However much the material of the navy had changed, 
the spirit of the personnel was as fine as it had been in 
our most heroic days, while in character and intelligence 
our men and officers surpassed their ancestors. No one 
could ask for a finer personnel than we now have in the 
navy. E\ery man was eager and prepared to do his 
duty, and a service so nobly and purely pledged to this 
great task has a right to ask the nation to work with an 
equally self-denying diligence for the provision of that 
great \-ariety and enormous \'olume of material that is 
required for the fighting forces. It has the right, too, to 
ask that the as^cetic self-denial of the men at sea should 
be copied by their brothers and sisters on shore, so that 
every possible financial aid shall be available for victory. 
" The nation can depend upon the navy being ready, 
resourceful and reliable." 

It was altogether a very striking address, and coming 
from so high an authority it will bring before a great 
many of Sir John Jellicoe's countrymen a realization 
of the nature of the navy's work, far keener and more 
^•ivid than they before possessed. It is natural enough 
that Sir John Jellicoe should have confined himself to 
generalities. It is not his business, having stated the 
clifficulties and problems of war, to publish how they 
are to be dealt with and surmounted. But it is to be 
noted that, in the matter of the most urgent problem of 
the day, to wit the submarine menace, he stated speci- 
fically that it -would be dealt with, and with regard to 
all the other problems, that we could count on the readi- 
ness and resourcefulness of the na\'y to deal with them. 

The Master Problem of Mine War 

Perhaps to readers of these weekly notes, the two topics 
of Sir John Jellicoe's speech which will pro\e most 
stimulating are his reference to the revolution which the 
long range torpedo has effected in battle tactics, and his 
definite promise that the submarine menace would be 
ended. As to the first of these, nothing could be clearer 
than the First Lord's statement. In favourable con- 
ditions modern naval guns can open fire mth the ex- 
pectation of hitting at eleven sea miles, at nine they 
become xcxy efficient, but at five they may lose all their 
value should the light be such that the rangefinders, 
spotting glasses, sights and telescopes, now in use, are 
inadequate. It is not that the enemy cannot be seen wth 
the naked eye. It is that he cannot be seen by the 
ranging eye, the aiming eye, or the fire control eye. A 
century ago, a fleet anxious to bring about a decisive 
issue and finding the game of long bowls fruitless, would 
have closed until the range was so short that missing 
became impossible. No captain " can go far wrong 
who lays his ship alongside that of an enemy." But 
this cannot be done within torpedo range, for at io,ooc 
yards " the situation becomes critical for the capital 



January iS, 1917 

ihips." Some critics have found this statement too 
sweeping. The experiences of 1916, they remind us. 
seem to show that the lieavy ships of modern construction 
arc not destroyed by a single torpedo hit. Even quite 
hght cruisers n'lay ha\-c to be struck three or four times 
before they succumb, and it issignificent that, of the five 
capital ships admitted by both sides to have been sunk at 
Jutland, three were destroyed by chance hits from gims, 
one was sliattcred b\- "fifteen hits of our shells, 
and only one seemingly by torpedo attack. And it is 
improbable that it was a single torpedo that did the trick 
in her case. But the speaker did not say a single hit 
could be fatal. Given torpedoes used in shoals, ships 
at short range might be struck by several. 

The actual words used by Sir John are not perhaps 
intended to be taken quite literally. Certainly not as 
an exhaustive statement of the strategical and tactical 
principles. They are a general indication of the character 
of the problem, and of its nature there can now be no 
doubt. It is, indeed, as I have suggested in our last two 
issues, one of the main lessons of the past year. In 
normal conditions in the North Sea, our arrangements 
for using heavy guns in action have proved to be alto- 
gether unsuitable. That they do not suffice to overcome 
the difficulties of low visibility is now once more officially 
admitted. But the evidence is pretty strong that they 
arc also unequal to the strain when a manoeuvring ship 
has to engage a manoeuvring target — a state of things 
that must be taken to be just as normal, when an artillery 
action is complicated by the torpedo's intervention, as 
bad seeing. There is no doubt, then, that it is the 
torpedo that by setting an outer limit to the range, and 
by enforcing conditions — namely manoeuvres — which 
fire control cannot overcome, has revolutionised the 
employment of fleets for their primary function — to wit , 
the destruction of the enemy's fleet by guns. And this 
gives rise to a very natural question. Are we to be con- 
tent with this state of things ? Are we really to resign 
ourselves to the Na\-y being able to do everything 
— but fight ? Is is possible to overcome bad seeing 
by better optical appliances ? Can the difficulties 
of change of range be eliminated by more scientific 
instrumental aids to fire control ? Clearly, if we cannot 
do these things, there is no third to the following alter- 
natives. Either all naval actions are doomed to be 
inconclusive, or victory can only be sought by deliber- 
ately jeopardising every unit of the fleet — subjecting 
them, that is to say, to a risk which will leave the decision, 
not with superior leadership, skill, or material power, 
but solely with chance. How can a fighting force possibly 
reconcile itself with such impotent conclusions ? 

The Need of Staff Methods 

It cannot be in the inherent nature of things that the 
weapon that has the longest reach, that can be used with 
the greatest rapidity and, theoretically, at any rate, be 
employed in almost all conditions with perfect accuracy, 
and so effect any fenemy's destruction in a few minutes 
only, should become absolutely powerless for its only 
purpose. It seems to me just as contrary to right reason 
to say that a modern battle fleet cannot win by its 
artillery in the North Sea, as to say that it is impossible 
to overcome and abolish the menace of submarine attack 
on our sea supplies. The mind revolts from the theory 
that any problem is insoluble. But it is equally con- 
trary to right reason to suppose that we can restore to the 
gun its proper pre-eminence in battle, or re-establish, 
for the protection of our sea supplies, the ascendancy of 
surface craft over under-water craft, unless both problems 
are engaged by the right intellectual instruments, 
working on the right method. Unless the elements of 
each problem are disentangled from a thousand confusing 
circumstances, so that eacli can be stated with precision : 
unless the action each element demands is ascertained by 
analysis and experiment : and. finally, unless a combined 
operation is so arrived at for dealing with the combined 
difficulties — which at present make either our gunnery 
ineffective or leave our merchantmen defenceless — ' 
we shall not reach the situation we desire — namely, that 
in which, if we get the chance, our fleet can win supremacy, 
in which our sea communications shall be reasonably 
secure; Neither of these problems can be met by slap- 
dash remedies. Both call for concerted action. It 

must be taken on the widest basis of observed facts. 
It must be directed by drawing as widely as possible on 
trained judgment and experience. If, in short, we arc 
to find a way of obtaining \ictory at sea or ensuring 
victory on land, we must, rather late in the day, it is 
true, seek a solution of the technical problems of sea 
power by staff methods. 

The greatest of our naval weaknesses in August, 1914, 
was that we were suddenly plunged into operations of 
war — that had been completely revolutionised, as the 
First Sea Lord reminds us — without having exhausted 
the possibilities of the new elements by experiment, 
without having analysed the capacities of the new weapons, 
without having studied how to employ them in offence, 
or to counter their use when the enemy so employed them. 

For practical purposes there are three naval weapons 
only — the gun, torpedo and mine. A new use for the 
torpedo was introduced by the invention of the sub- 
marine, and a new property had been given to it — as also 
to the gun — by the extension of range. But neither in 
August 1 914, nor at any period before that date, had the 
Admiralty instituted a staff for elucidating the technique 
of these three weapons. What has been done since the 
war we have not been told. But there are abundant 
evidences that in some departments at least, no changes 
were Inade in the right direction. Is it too late to put 
things on a proper basis now ? 

The Example of the Armies 

It is, at any rate, an encouraging precedent that the 
Allied armies on the Western front have found a way out 
of the tactical impasse that seemed to face them a year ago, 
by the method which I am now suggesting should be 
applied to the main naval problems. It is the combined 
staff work of the French and British forces that has dis- 
covered the formula of victory. It is a formula that 
takes into consideration a range of facts and a variety of 
weapons and of devices so vast as to constitute a problem 
seemingly infinitely complicated. Compared with it, 
each of the main naval problems should surely appear 
comparatively, simple. And if these problems were 
attacked as the military problem has been, is it not 
possible that the combined experience, knowledge, 
judgment and inventiveness of the navy could reduce 
all the elements to intelligible proportions and make 
practical solutions both obvious and easy ? Indeed, 
can we not almost say that the chief reason why the 
difficulties and anxieties of naval command are as 
poignant as the First Sea Lord has so eloquently stated 
them to be, is precisely because, in meeting them, the 
Commander-in-Chief has not at his disposal the picked 
brain power of the Navy working impersonally and un- 
ceasingly for his benefit ? 

I do not, of course, pretend, that however complete staff 
work might be, that modern sea war could be altogether 
relieved of certain elements of uncertaint}' from which 
our ancestors were free. The fact remains that there 
is one new clement in sea force to-day which has always 
seemed to me more^ striking than any of those which Sir 
Johh enumerated at Fishmongers' Hall. It is the fact 
that the stoutest ship in the world could be converted 
into a useless hulk, if not destroyed, by three hitting 
salvoes of her own guns. This was a thought that was 
familiar to us all before the war. It was, indeed, a 
commonplace of naval discussion that fleets would 
destroy each other with awe-inspiring rapidity. So 
few hits have, in fact, been made in the war, that this has 
ceased to be a source of anxiety. But there is no reason 
why the rate of hitting necessary for such destruction 
should not be attained, nor seemingly any means by 
which ships could be protected against it. But though 
— if it were ever realized — this would be a new element 
in sea war, would it not be all of a piece with the added 
pace that is the chief mark of all modern war ? A century 
ago, it took Europe twenty-three years of fighting to 
reach an issue with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. 
The issue with Gemiany should be settled in less than 
one-sixth of this time. The application of science and 
industry to transportation and weapons, by intensifying 
war, has necessarily abbreviated it. It is in many respects 
the most .striking of ward's transformations. A"d if this 
acceleration were developed at sea to the point of deciding 
fleet actions bv gunfire in a few minutes only, it would 

January i8, 1917 



only be an extreme exemplification of the general tendency. 
The issue of Tsushima was, after all, settled in twenty 

But, manifestly, no such results could be got at long 
range unless the art of using weapons were pushed to a 
point that has not been exemplified in any action of the 
war so far. I remember, in the summer of 1914, dis- 
cussing with a very shrewd officer of a neutral navy, how 
he thought modern tire control would stand the test of 

action. He replied that, so far as he could judge, the 
European navies \Vould come out of it worse than the 
-Vmerican and Spanish Navies did at Santiago. " You 
will have to light at long range," ho said, " and you have 
not the means of doing it. In action, range hnding and 
range keeping must be either perfectly accurate or per- 
fectly useless — -and, certainly, none of your methods are 
perfectly accurate." 

Arthur Pollen 

Finance and Freedom 

By Hartley Withers (Editor of 'Uhe Economist} 

IT has been said, over and over again, that demo- 
cracy is on its trial in this war. It has yet to be 
proved that free peoples, lighting for freedom, 
justice and respect for right, can organise themselves 
skilfully enough to master a foe who is lighting for 
tyranny, with all the advantages, in discipline and 
unity, that tyranny confers on its well-drilled slaves. 
Is this war going to show us that free States confer 
blessings on their citizens at the expense of their ability 
to defend themselves as States? If so, freedom is 

The answer has yet to be given to this terrible question, 
and the answer will seal the fate of civilization. In the 
matter of the supply of men for the fighting line. Freedom 
broke all records with a voluntary effort and then, when 
that did not suffice, made the great sacrifice and sub- 
mitted to force for freedom's sake. Will the same process 
have to be gone through in the matter of the supply of 
money ? The next few weeks will show, by the very 
practical test of the success or failure of the great War 
Loan now offered to subscribers. 

From one point of view, success is certain. It will 
show how great is the wealth of the country, and how 
ready is the patriotism of the great number of its citizens. 
But complete success can only be shown if We all do our 
duty. The standard required is so high that, as in the 
case of recruiting, a great success may not be great 
enough to be complete. Happily, we know from the 
Chancellor's plain statement at the Guildhall on January 
' nth ( of which more anon), that if the result of voluntary 
effort does not come up to the standard required, then 
we shall again be asked to submit to force for freedom's 
sake. From the cheers, from a rich capitalist audience, 
that greeted this plain threat, it is safe to infer that if 
the need is clearly shown, the country will be just as- 
ready to accept financial compulsion as, it was to take on 
itself the yoke of conscription, in order to master a 
worse tyranny. 

The official estimate of the total expenditure of the 
British Government during the current financial year — 
that is the year ending on March 31st next— is 1,976 
millions. When the late Chancellor of the Exchequer 
brought in his Budget last April, the estimate then 
put into his mouth was 1,826 millions, but this sum has 
since been increased owing to the rising claims of the cost 
of ammunition, and the growing drafts that our Allies 
are making upon us for advances. Before the war the 
annual Government expenditure was roughly ig8 
millions, so we see that the cost of the war, including 
loans to Allies, has multiplied our expenditure by almost 
exactly ten. When we look at our rate of spending, 
2,000 millions a year in round figures, it seems at first 
sight'too stupendous to be possible, especially when we 
remember that before the war the aggregate income of 
the whole nation was estimated, to take the highest 
figure, at about 2,400 millions. But two considerations 
brings the war cost within the bounds of possibility. 

In the first place, we have to allow for the great rise 
in the prices of commodities and of labour, which while 
increasing the cost of war, also increases the aggregate 
national income far above the peace level. In the 
second we have to remember that a large part of the 
2,000 millions that are being spent on the war, goes into 
feeding, clothing and otherwise providing for some six 
to eight millions of the population who are either serving- 
in the Army or Navy, or working for the Government 

and receiving wages and salaries tor so doing. Another 
consideration which shows clearly enough that the 
nation's financial task, if tackled in the right spirit 
by the nation, is not too great for its powers, is the huga 
margin that is made available by the great extent of our 
spending, in peace time, on pleasant amusements and 
frivolities that can well be dropped in time of war. 
listimates of the expenditure per head of the population 
in Great Britain and in Germany before the war, showed 
a difference of over £19 per head, by which ours exceeded 
our chief enemy's. Multiplied by the number of our 
population, this means a difference of no less than 900 
millions, so that we are in a position to save this sum by 
merely reducing our average spending per head to what 
Germany's was before the war. 

It is not safe to press these figures far, for thej' are 
necessarily based on estimates, and they are complicated 
by differences in the buying power of money in the two 
countries. But at least they serve to show how far a 
comparatively small effort in self-denial would carry us, 
since before the war the German population did not 
convey much appearance of stinting itself, and conse- 
quently how much further we could go if our civilian 
l^opulation really made that revolution in its standard 
of living which is the least sacrifice that it can make, in 
view of the far greater sacrifices that are being made in 
its defence, and in the defence of our cause, by the flower 
of our manhood at the front. 

The need for this revolution has long been preached, 
and though many have made a great patriotic effort in 
saving to support our soldiers, it must be admitted that 
many deaf adders have stopped their ears. Thought- 
lessness and ignorance are probably the cause of most of 
the extravagance that still preva,ils. The economic 
education of most of the population of these islands is 
a minus quantity, consisting of the cherishing of a few 
fallacies, the worst and commonest of which is the beliel 
that spending money, anyhow and on anything that we 
may happen to think we want, is " good for trade." 
With this ingrained. conviction, many people can only be 
persuaded with the utmost difficulty to see that it is now 
a crime to spend money on anything but health, efticiency 
and the victory of the great cause for which we have the 
honour to fight. 

It ought to be plain enough that at a time when 
the Government wants every possible shilling for the 
war, it is treason to spend one on our own amxisement ; 
and yet one still meets people who argue that when they 
buy frivolities, 'the money is "still there" — somebody 
else has got it, and it has not run away. They forget 
or will not see, that the somebody who has got it gave 
something in return for it, goods or labour or services ; 
that we cannot spend money without setting somebody 
to work for us ; and that it is wished to do this now 
only as far as is absolutely necessary, because there are 
not enough people to do all the work that is wanted for 
the army and navy, to provide us with the necessaries of 
life, and to turn out goods for export, to be sold abroad 
to produce funds for the purchase of the goods, for the 
war and for our sustenance, that have to be bought 
from foreign countries. 

If ever the terms of any loan are going to weigh with 
the mind .of the thoughtless spender, that time should 
be the present. The Government offers us a 5 per cent, 
loan at 95, redeemable at par (that is at /loo for each 
£95 that we put in) in thirty years at latest, and possibly 



Januarj'- i8, 1917 

in twolvc yoais. Tlii? Rives a total yield of over 5I per 
cent. If wo have our stock retjistcred, inromc-tax will 
not bo deducted at the source ; so that if wc are not 
liable to the full rate of 5s. in the pouted, we shall not 
have the trouble of recovering from the Inland Revenue's 
{inp the s>nn by which we have been overtaxed. Or, if 
we prefer it, we can have a 4 per cent, loan at par, on 
wliich the income-tax is compounded. This loan runs for 
twenty-five years at most, or for twelve years at least. 
As the tax fs compounded at the full rate of 5s., it is 
onlv attractive to those who are liable to the full rate, 
and believe that during the whole jx-riod during which 
they will hold it, income-tax will average at least 5s. 
Then it is arranged that the stock of (-ither of these loans 
will be taken at their issue price in payment of death 
duties as long as it has been in our possession at least six 
months before wc become liable to this ghoulish but 
most equitable impost. And finally, a very ingenious 
arrangement has been devised for maintaining the market 
price of the stocks, so that we may be able to sell out, 
if we are obliged to do so, on advantageous terms. 

Every month one-eighth per cent, of the total amount 
of the two loans will be set aside by the Treasury to be 
used for buying' these stocks in the market, if their 
])rices should fall below the issue price. This setting 
aside process will continue until ten milUons have been 
accumulated, and will then cease until the fund has again 
to be drawn on for the support of the market. The effect 
of this measure is, that whenever the price of our invest- 
ment falls to a level that would invoke us in loss if we 
had to sell it, there will be a strong buyer in the market 
to help to hoist it up again. Everything that ingenuity 
can devise has thus been done to make the loan attractive. 
The rate is handsome (too much so, some people think)' ; 
taxation is made as convenient as may be, and the steadi- 
ness of the market in the stock has been secured by a 
new and very cunning device. 

Such an array of attractions held out to us to persuade 

us to do our plain duty of financing the war, is a 
damning mirror held up before the patriotism, in money 
matters, of us civilians. It is not comfortable to 
reflect that, when our friends and brothers are light- 
ing for us and getting nothing but a soldier's pittance, 
wo have to be offered so much to induce us to go 
without some of the comforts or pleasures of life, so that 
our champions may bo equipped to fight on our behalf. 
The least we can do is to make the heartiest possible 
answer to the appeal. Every one of us who lias any 
control over money and spending has to put every 
available pound into the War Loan, that is every pound 
that we have now in hand or are likely to have in the 
next year. Special arrangements have been made with 
the banks, for them to make advances to their customers 
who want to invest in the War Loan, and it is our busi- 
ness to take full advantage of these facilities, borrowing 
as much as we can see our way to repaying, handing it 
over to the Government, and then setting to work to 
save as fast as we can to pay our bankers off. It is no 
use to borrow and then leave the loan to take care of 
itself. \\'e have to save and go without things, so that 
the labour thus set free may bt; put at the disposal of tlie 
Government. We need not hope to make more out of 
the nation's need by waiting for a later loan at a higher 
rate of interest. 

Mr. Bonar Law told his Guildhall audience that the 
terms he is offering are as high as lie thinks justifiod. 
and that as long as he is Chancellor no liigher terms will be 
offered ; that if these terms fail, whicli they will not, 
" the resources of civilization are not exhausted," and 
that if other measures are taken the rate alio wed will not 
be 5 1 per cent. After this plain hint of financial c^m- 
pulsion, which was cheered by the Guildhall audience 
till those historic rafters rang, we shall only have our- 
selves to thank if by neglecting the opportunity now 
given by patriotism and profit, we lay oqrsclves open 
to less comfortable treatment. 

IBlhtteiTRU. ^.'SB. 

g<^ ^ x^oCl^^SC 


January i8, 1917 



A Study of King Constantine 

By Sir William M. Ramsay 

IN Turkey German diplomacy has, so far, been success- 
ful. It is there seen in its best form— hard, 
cruel, and unscrupulous, but far-sighted and instinct 
with big ideas, \vhic*i it is working out^ with 
extraordinary skill and energy. Moreover, the Turks, 
even the most corrupt of the officials, are with few 
exceptions, brave, and (ierm&n methods had to adapt 
themselves to this character. The best way to dominate 
the Turk was to impress him with the immense superiority 
of German ideas and powers of organisation and manage- 
ment. A difierent method is needed ^\■hen German 
diplomacy has to deal with a man naturally timid. 
Here the Kaiser's personal power comes in most con- 
spicuously in a style that is most repellent to the \A'estern 
mind. Undoubtedly the best example of the success 
of this side of his diplomacy is seen in the case of the 
present King of the Hellenes. 

The present writer has watched King Constantine for 
a period of thirty-iivc years, and has seen him grow up 
from early childhood and develop. At the time of the 
first Greco-Turkish war, in i8c)6, he was a young man of 
little ability, inadequate education, empty and selfish, 
who had not been brouglit up to recognise and to make 
any sacrifice for the duties of his position. His father 
was good-natured, kindly, easy-going, but not well suited 
to impress great ideas on his son. The war against . 
Turkey came to test the Crown Prince, and he was 
shown to be not merely selfish, but cowardly 

I remember well the explosion of indignation against 
him personally which was roused then. A chorus, 
indeed, of the champions of royalty protested that the 
(ireek people was prejudiced and unfair in judging liim, 
because, as a race, the ^ Greeks could not forgive ill- 
success. The accounts of his conduct, however, as I 
read them and heard them, were given not only by im- 
jjassioned Greeks, but by cool neutral observers, and 
they were unanimous. It was a right instinct which 
led the Greek people to protest against their destiny 
being allowed to pass under the conti^ol of such an empty, 
incomjX'tent and selfish individual. It was necessary 
to send him away for a time into a sort of genteel exile ; 
and a. belief in the efiiciency of (ierman education and 
German training determined that he should go to Berlin. 
It may well be doubted whether it would have been of 
any advantage to send Constantine to be influenced by 
the tone of English education and society. He was 
already easy-going, devoted to enjoyment, unused to 
work, and apt to consider no requirements except his 
own amusement. 

In (Germany the Kaiser took him and breathed a 
spirit into him, but it was a German spirit. It made him 
able to work, to sacrifice the present to the future, to 
form plans for a distant time, to conceal his intentions 
under a mask of bonhomie, and to aim steadily at auto- 
cracy, as well as to know something about the movement 
of soldiers in the field and the principles of modern war. 
Tliis training left him as selfish as before. His ideas 
were bigger, his outlook on the world was immensely 
enlarged on the intellectual side, but on the moral side 
tlieie was no improvement. He was almost hypnotised 
by the German diplomacy and militarism. Previously 
he had shown extremely little power of thinking or 
])ianning, and all that which he now acquired was breathed 
into him by the German mind. And so he has remained 
— little more than a clever automaton, which could be 
guided and influenced at will by the master in Berlin. 

In a previous article in L.-vkd & W.\TiiK I pointed 
out that his one mihtary success, which evinced real 
insight, was inspired from Berlin. At the beginning of 
the Balkan war the repeated Greek successes did not 
imply any real military skill, because the Turks, being 
fully engaged with Bulgaria and Serbia, liad entirely 
abandoned the attempt to stem the Greek advance ; 
but when the second Balkan war broke out and the Bul- 
garian army made a sudden attack against their former 
allies at the weakest point, where the separate f^irces 
joined, they found the Greek army fully prepared in 
anticipation of that treacherous assault, the truth beinji 

that, while Berlin and Vienna had arranged the whole 
plan of the Bulgarian campaign, the Kaiser communicated 
e\-erything to Constantine, and instructed him how 
to counter the sudden attack. His success was complete. 
He got the whole credit for it from his people ; and his 
former unpopularity, which had been diminished by 
time and by the earlier successes of the Balkan war, was 
changed into thorough popularity. He now ranked as 
the heaven-born Emperor who was to lead the Greek 
army into Constantinople, and fulfil the prophecy, which 
had long been believed by almost every Greek, that this 
victorious army will be led by Constantine. 


Venizelos was' the only statesman who, as a personality, 
stood near Constantine in the estimation of the Greeks ; 
and even he could not for a moment compare in popu- 
larity and influence with the King. Constantine had 
been trained thoroughly to take advantage of this personal 
influence over the Greek mind. The lesson which he 
had learned from the Kaiser was exactly suited to the 
occasion. Just as he himself was a puppet directed 
from Berlin, so in- his turn he became the manipulator of 
the conduct of all the worst elements among the Greek 
people ; and he has shown the same cleverness in utihsing 
his opportunities which the Kaiser has possessed all 
along. His position as Commander-in-Chief of the army 
gave him great jjower. As soon as the army was mobilised, 
his orders became the law of life to all the soldiers ; and 
when this authoritative position was combined with the 
popular favour which he enjoyed as the heaven-sent 
general and leader, the advantages of his position were 
exactly of the kind which Berlin had taught him to use 
successfully and cle\'erly. And he has gradually brought 
it about that many of 'the (ireeks, and especially all the 
worst among the Greeks, belie\-e that the patriotic course 
is to resist demands imposed upon them by those whom 
they are taught to consider alien enemies. 

It is morally and psychologically impossible for the 
Greek King to act otherwise. The soul which was put 
into him was ti German soul. His thoughts and ideas 
and aspirations are wholly German. He knows that it 
is his German training which has made him a man ; and 
every word that issues from Berlin is to him sacred and 
all-powerful, as the full expression of the highest truth. 
He knows far better than we do how the Kaiser has 
succeeded in re-making the Turkish people. He. knows 
the fate of Serbia, and he is firmly convinced that Rou- 
mania will suffer equally. He believes that his only 
chance for salvation lies in declaring himself on the Ger- 
man side at the suitable moment. He sees how Ferdinand 
of Bulgaria succeeded in maintaining a pretended 
neutrality until the proper time came ; and he is imitating 
Ferdinand to the best of his ability. Finally, he under- 
stands , how he gained the reputation among his own 
people of a great and successful general ; and he trusts to 
a " plan of campaign," suggested by the Kaiser, to carry 
him safely through the next war. 

Why trouble about Greece ? Why all this talk about 
Greece ? Of what value is it ? To us it possesses in itself 
no value ; but to Clermany and her Asiatic plans, it is of 
enormous importance. "VVith Greece (iermany would 
command both sides of the .Egean Sea, and would stretch 
far into the Levant, and with those far-stretched fingers 
of the Morea touch the sea-path from Malta to Syria and 
to Egypt. It possesses a very long coast line, which 
is a great want in Germany, e\en in the greater Germany. 
It covers the Berlin-Bagdad Railway on the west, as 
Roumania with the Danube and Bulgaria protects that 
line on the east. In German hands Greece would im- 
mensely lengthen that' long sea-way which at present 
lies between Russia and the open Mediterranean. Those 
who ask about the value; of Greece to Germany can 
best answer their own (juestion by taking a map and 
indicating on it the railway artery that gives vitality 
to (ierman Asia, and then noticing how Greece 
protects that aa'tery. 



January i8, 1917 

Opening of the 1917 Campaign— I 

By Colonel Feyler 

In this and the succeeding article Colonel Feyler, the 
distinguished Swiss Military Critic, makes a very careful 
analysis of the present military positions of the Central 
Empires and of the Allies. 

IF wc are to form a correct idea of the war at the 
beginning of 1917 we must compare the present 
witli the past ; and even then we shall not be sure 
of getting to the truth, for everyone claims his own 
method of comparison. If wo listen to the Germans and 
to the Allies we soon discover that they differ as widely 
on this point as they do on every other. 

" The victory is ours," the Germans say. " The map 
proves it. In August, 1914, our army on peace footing 
occupied our national territory from the Oder on the 
east to the Rhine on the west. When winter came our 
army on a war footing was on the North Sea, on the 
Somme and on the Aisne. Belgium and Northern Franco 
were in our hands, with their rich industrial districts and 
thoir fertile country regions. On the east we had lost 
nothing, except Galicia, and that did not belong to us. 

" Besides, we drove the invader out from there. The 
campaign of 1915 led us from triumph to triumph east- 
ward as the campaign of 1914 had done westward. In 
the winter of that year we had not only reconquered 
(ialicia, but also were masters of Poland, Lithuania and 

" We dealt other great- blows. Diverging from our 
eastward course, we pushed down towards the Mediter- 
ranean and beyond. Serbia was conquered, Albania 
occupied, Salonika endangorod. Through our Ottoman 
.\llies we caused disturbance in Egypt, threatened 
Transcaucasia and consolidated our hopes to the south of 
Bagdad. In vain a new enemy, the Italians assailed us : 
wo held them among the Alps and on the Isonzo. 

" Here we are at the end of the 1916 campaign and 
the picture is modified only in insignificant details. We 
have announced our disposal to make peace. Our 
ad\ersaries prefer to continue the war. And yet all their 
efforts to recover what we have won are futile. The 
extent of our retirements can hardly be measured in 
fractions of an inch upon the map, and even then only 
in a few places. When the Roumanian army had the 
impudence to come to the assistance of our enemies, we 
hurled it back into its own territory and recouped our- 
selves for our trouble with the Dobrudja and Wallachia. 
We are holding our fronts firm and unshaken everywhere. 
And we shall continue to do so for another thirty years, 
if our enemies choose to continue to attack for so long." 
What have the Allies to say in reply to this ? 
" The war surprised us when we were not prepared. 
\\e had few machine guns and less heavy artillery ; we 
were short of munitions ; our air service was not so good 
as the enemy's. England had no arms, Russia had not 
enough rifies. 

" Since then these deficiencies have been made good. 
Arsenals and munition works are supplying us with all 
the material required for our ever-growing number of 
effectives. The balance has so far been restored between 
ourselves and our enemies that after having retired before 
them for two years, we stayed their attack in the course; 
of the third and even made counter-attacks. In i()i4 
and 1913 the Central Powers held the offensive every- 
where ; in 1916, they were almost everywhere on the 
defensive. The campaign of 1917 will finally upset the 
balance — in their disfavour." 

* * * * * 

There arc the two views and any one considering tliem 
would be inclined to say that both were right, for both 
have appearances in their favour. It is quite true 
that the German armies are on enemy territory and in 
occupation of important regions of them ; it is equally 
true that in i()i6 the extent of these regions was reduced, 
except, of course, in Roumania. 

But in war appearances count for very little ; to judge 
only by appearances would be to run the risk of making 
grave miscalculations. \\\y<x\. does matter is precisely 

that which one does not see, the realities which each 
belligerent does his best to conceal in order to keep his 
adversary in the uncertainty which is a weakness. Is 
there not a proverb which says that a man forewarned 
is as good as two ? 

A twofold enquiry is desirable to get at these realities : 

(1) To compare the military situation at the end of 1915 with 
that at the end of 1916 in the light of the strategical 
objects and the intentions of tlie belligerents. 

(2)- To ascertain how far the presumable forces of the two sides 
will allow them to rcaUze their strategical objects. 

In 1 914 the Germans grasped the initiative given by 
declaration of war and seized the offensive in the West. 
There was no doubt whatever as to what their intention 
was then. They wanted to destroy the French army 
before Great Britain could bring sufficient forces to its 
assistance, and so to put France out of action after the 
occupation of Paris. There is no doubt that this was the 
intention, not merely because the documentary evidence 
proving it is legion, but because it was of the very essence 
of strategy. The sole object of strategy, when the 
means at its disposal are still intact as the German 
lunpire's were in .\ugust 1914, is to destroy the adversary 
in order to compel his submission to the terms of peace 
desired to be iniposcd upon him. 

This being granted to begin with, can it be denied that 
the intention was not realized ? The French army was 
not destroyed ; • France was not put out of action ; Paiis 
was not occupied ; Great Britain did have time to form 
a relieving army. The intention was not realized despite 
efforts of the very greatest intensity. Three great 
armies tried : the first on the Marne, the second in 
Flanders, the third at Verdun ; the first retreated and 
the other two were shattered on the points which they 

In 1915 the Germans took the initiative in a second 
offensive. In accordance with the principles of strategy 
this ought to have destroyed the Russian army. The 
Germans assuredly hoped to destroy it, and when they 
halted on the Dwina, in the Pinsk marshes and on the 
eastern frontier of Galicia, they thought they had 
destroyed it, if not so completely as to shatter all re- 
sistance — since they were brought to a halt — ^at any 
rate completely enough to secure a long period of un- 
interrupted freedom of movement. And they accord- 
ingly suspended their second offensive in order to under- 
take the third. 

Yet on this occasion, too, their intention was not realized. 
Events proved that. Riga was not taken and the 
Russian army, returning to the charge, recovered her 
lost ground as far as the approaches to Koval and Lem- 
berg and the neck of the wooded Carpathians. 

The third offensive requires some distinctions to be 
made. What was the strategical object in the Balkans 
and in Turkey and Asia ? If it were destructive, there 
were three adversaries at whom it could be directed : 
the Serbians, a secondary force ; the Enghsh, an essential 
force ; and in the Dardanelles and afterwards at Salonika, 
the Allies, an important but not a decisive force. The 
secondary force was the only one destroyed. England 
was left 'unshaken and the Allies at Salonika were not 

But it is more likely that in these regions the strategical 
object was not the destruction of essential military forces, 
but merely the conquest of territory and the gaining of 
economic advantages. That intention was realized. 

To sum lip, at the beginning of the second winter of 
the war, the winter of 1915-1916, the situation from 
the point of view of the strategical objects was as follows : 
In the West the object was missed, since two-thirds of 
the German army were held up before an enemy still 
strong enough to compel the German army itself to assume 
the defensive. 

In the East, the object was supposed to have been 
achieved, but in reality was missed, since the enemy still 
preserved power of resistance and had even made a 
successful counter-offensive on the Sercth ; the German 

January i8, 1917 



army was still compelled to exercise prudence and could 
not lay aside its harness. 

In the Balkans the object was achieved, but the 
strategic results were nil since no essential hostile force 
had been destroyed or could be. 

To these three points a fourth was added by the Italian 
front which had been opened up in the spring. In this 
region the Central Empires had envisaged no enterprise 
destructive or bent on conquest. The intention was 
purely defensive, and it was achieved. The adversary 
did not achieve his object. Nevertheless, the Central 
Empires suffered a relative loss of strength since they 
were obliged to oppose to a force that was entirely 
fresh and not the least exhausted, a portion of their 
own resources, to the prejudice of their destructive cam- 
paigns on the original and principal fronts. 

What change clid the campaign of 1916 effect in this 
general situation ? 

In the West, the German army attempted to resume, 
at Verdun, the operations which it had abandoned after 
its defeat at the Marne and its further defeat in Flanders. 
Not only did its attempt come to nothing, but the Allies 
opened a counter-offensive in Picardy and the German 
army was obliged to retire. 

In the East, the Russians also coimtcr-attackcd and 
there, too, in Volhynia, Galicia and the Bukovina, the 
Central Empires were compelled to retire. 

On the ItaUan front the operations were similar to those 

on the Western front. The Austro-Hungarians delivered 
an offensive in the Northern Trentino, planned wth a 
\iew to an ultimate decision. It was not achieved, and 
the It'dUans, momentarily driven from their positions, 
recovered the gi^eater part of them. At the same time 
they, too, attacked upon the Isonzo where the enemy 
M'as forced to retire towards Trieste. 

In Turkey in Asia the Russians defeated the Turks at 
Erzcrum and got possession of Armenia ; the English drove 
their assailants from the Suez Canal ; the Arabs raised 
the standard of revolt against Constantinople and the 
Ottoman success at Kut-el-Amara failed to give the 
victor any decisive advantage over the essential 
Allied forces. As a result of all these contributory 
facts the Central Empires forsook this theatre of 
operations. The battle front was withdrawn to the 
Balkans. There, too, the Allies compelled the German- 
Bulgarian forces to retire a little in Serbian Mace- 
donia. In Roumania the German-Bulgarian forces 

To sum up, while at the end of 1915 the spectacle 
offered by the movements of all the armies was generally 
speaking, that of an Allied defensive against a Germanic 
offensive, the spectacle at the end of 1916, except on the 
Roumanian front, is that of a general Allied counter- 
offensive and a Germanic defensive with a compulsory, 
slow retirement in the regions of gi-eatest pressure. 
{To be coniitmed.) 

Alsace and the Rhine 

By Henry D. Davray 

FROM the industrial point of view, Alsace is 
by no means of less consequence than Lorraine, 
and it will be easily realized why Germany 
is no more wilHng to give it back to France than 
she is ready to relinquish the iron mines of the Moselle 
area. A short time before the Franco-Prussian War of 
1870, deposits of rock salt were discovered not far from 
Mulhouse, at a little place called Dornach, but a more 
important discovery was made furtlicr south, in the 
forest of Monncbruck, nearly at the foot oi the now famous 
Hartmansweilerkopf, when, in 1904, potash salts were 
found in layers that had a thickness of i6| feet. 
The proved deposits were estimated to an amount of 
over one million cubic yards, with a value of 
£2,400,000,000. With the abundant riches of potash 
salt at Stassfurt, near Magdeburg in Saxony, and of 
Leopoldshall in the Grand Duchy of Anhalt, Germany 
thus acquired an absolute monopoly for the production 
of ingi-edients which are the essential components 
in chemicals and above all in explosives. 

The entire potash area covers an expanse of 15 million 
square yards, and it has been estimated, on the basis of 
the average thickness of the layers, that the workable 
deposits amoimt to 1,300 million cubic yards. The 
available reserves represent a total of nearly 1,500 million 
tons containing 300 million tons of pure potash of a 
gross value of £2,400,000,000. All these estimates 
are only a rough minimum, as it may be that the deposits 
stretch out beyond the already proved area, and, on 
the basis of the present world consumption, the ex- 
traction of the potash salts might last for perhaps five 
centuries. These salts are an essential component 
part not only of explosives, but of all chemicals required 
for artificial fertilisers, for the manufacture of soap, 
matches, mirrors, potteries, for photographv, printing, 
pharmaceutics, etc. They are applicable to "a thousand 
uses in commerce. 

Lorraine with her coal and iron deposits and Alsace 
with her potash salts, have been powerfully helping 
Germany to rise to a leading position in the iron and 
chemical industries and to secure that industrial su- 
periority which fostered her faith in her power to attack 
her neighbours, to crush them quickly and to annex 
the new territories she had been coveting for years. 
In their secret petition to the Chancellor, on Mav 
20th, 1915, the six great industrial and agricultural 
associations of the German Empire lay stress on this fact : 
Coal is the most decisive means for exerting polit'cal 

influence. The industrial neutral States are compelled 

to submit to those of the belligerents who can provide . 

their supply of coal. 
Then after complaining that they cannot do it suffi- 
ciently at present, they add that even to-day they are 
obliged to resort to the production of Belgian coal " in 
order not to allow our neutral neighbours to fall com- 
pletely under the dependency of England." 

We have thus the irrefutable demonstration that the 
industrial, political and military strength of Germany 
is derived to an enormous extent from the possession 
of the territories extending from the left bank of tlie 
Rhine to the Belgian and French frontiers. The 
annexation of these territories has been the military 
goal pursued by the enemies of France for several cen- 
turies. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, 
Richelieu aimed at " closing the kingdom," by giving 
it its natural frontier, the Rhine. He succeeded in getting 
back Alsace and the Lorraine bishoprics : Metz, Toul and 
Verdun, whose people spoke French as they do to-day. 

Following the same policy, Louis 'XIV, pushed the 
French frontier forwards to the North and got a large 
part of Flanders and Hainault. In order to close the 
valleys of the Seine, the Marne and the Oise, which are 
the natural routes along which all invaders have come, 
the famous engineer Vauban built, from the Rhine 
to the North Sea, a formidable belt of fortresses which 
defended the valleys of the Moselle, the Meuse, the 
Sambre, the Lys and the Scheldt. Por a century, all 
attempts to break through this powerful rampart were 

When, at the time of the Revolution, France had to 
face the coalition of her Eastern neighbours, the Con- 
vention gave the Republican Generals these simple 
instructions : " Remain on the defensi\-e wlierevcr 
France possesses natural frontiers : take the offensive 
wherever she has none." So well were these orders 
obeyed that in a few weeks the armies of the Republic 
had reached the Rhine all along its course. The Prussians, 
checked at Valmy, had beaten a hasty retreat, and, within 
a fortnight. General Custine, with 13,000 foot, 4,000 
horse and 40 guns had swept down the Rhine to Mayence 
bringing freedom and the rights of man to the bewildered 
populations. Meanwhile General Dumouriez conquered 
Belgium and Holland. The Swiss cantons of Basle 
and Porrentruy claimed their reunion to France, who 
had then, from Basle to its mouth, the Rhine as a frontier. 
In 1794, the King of Prussia signed a separate ])cace 



January i8, 1917 

and roooqnizcd tho left bank of tlio Rhino as thu new 
J'renrli fmntier. 

Hut En^'land would not acquiesce in these arrange- 
ments, as she knew too well that her real continental 
frontier was the Rhine and that she could not tolerate 
too powerful a neighbour across the North Sea. To 
prevent the reunion of the Netherlands and I'rance she 
declared herself " ready to sell her last shirt." And 
she foufiht to the bitter end until she had reached her 
]>urpose and wrecked tho mad ambition of Napoleon. 

\\'hen it came to the discussion of peace terms, at tho 
Congress of Vienna, her diplomacy seems to have been 
circumvented by Prussia's plenipotentiaries who had a 
thorough knowledge of that most redoubtable of sciences 
military geography. The English agreed that the Rhine 
provinces should be assigned to Prussia. In thus giving 
Trance a dangerous neighbour, England surmised that 
she would be released from all anxiety, since Trance 
would have to turn all her attention towards her 
luistern frontier. But at the same time, the keys of 
the three great valleys leading to Paris were handed 
over to Prussia. That short-sighted policy began the 
ominous displacement of power which culminated in 
the creation of the (ierman Empire and the annexation 
of Alsace-Lorraine with their rich mineral deposits. 

There will be no lasting peace in Europe imtil the 
balance of power is restored ; and there is no other way to 
to do it than to return to the map of Europe as some 
far-seeing English statesmen wanted to retrace it a 
century ago. 

The best minds of Switzerland seem to be quite aware 
of this. They ask that when Alsace and Lorraine are 
restored to France the products cease to be a ^^'est- 
phalian monopoly and their mineral riches be opened 
to the whole world. They put forth that up to now 
Swiss industry has been entirely dependent on Germany 
for her iron and coal. The only way to put an end to this 
obligation is, they allege, to ensure free navigation on 
the i'fhine for the boats of all nations. Swiss economists 
assert that only the neutralization of the river will 
release their country from (ierman bondage. 

Before the war, for her metallurgic establishments 
of Lorraine, France bought as much as seven miUion 
tons of German coal. When the whole iron deposits of 
Lorraine are restored to her, she will want three times 
as much. No doubt the Germans will not lose sight of 
so obvious a consequence and miss the chance of exerting 
their so-called ." political influence." This scheme will 
be thwarted if English coal is brought up the Rhine and • 
adjoining rivers to compete with Westphalian coal, and 
if French iron ore can easily be shipped to British ports 
by the same way- 
One of the main features of British policy is to secure 
equal freedom in industrial and commercial competition 
with other nations, while first Prussia and then Germany 
have followed an exactly opposite jiolicy. England's 
interest seems to be that after the war the mineral riches, 
of Alsace and Lorraine shall be opened to her. To prompt 
her to act accordingly she has now more knowledge 
and better reasons than she had in 1815, when at the 
Congress of Vienna, on February i8th, the British delegate, 
Lord Clancarty, svibmitted to the special committee 
dealing with international rivers, the draft of an agree- 
ment which clearly expressed England's policy in that 
problem. It is all contained in this one clause : 

Tjie Rhine, from the point where it becomes navigable 
down to the sea and vice versa, will be free to the trade 
and navigation of all nations, .so that in all its course 
up or down, it cannot on any account, be forbidden 
to anybody, in compliance with the rules set down by 
common agreement, which will be alike for all and tlie 
most favourable to the trade of all nations. 

England was advocating equal treatment for all 
nations, and not for those nations only whose frontier 
came up to the Rhine, which was Prussia's secret aim. 
Nevertheless another text was accepted whose meaning 
was so equivocal that, as early as i8ig, Holland could 
claiTm that if the navigation on the Rhine was free down 
to the sea, it did not mean that the mouths of the river 
were open to the navigation and commerce of all nations, 
and in consequence she put on the \\'aal high customs 
duties, some of which were prohibitive. 

A diplomatic controversy arose, and on behalf of 
the British Go\ernment. the Duke of Wclhngton presented 

in 1822 a mcmorandiuu on tho question, at the Congress 
f)f Verona. Of course, tho Briti>h Government sub- 
mitted that the decisions arrived at, at Vienna, es- 
tablished the free navigation of the Rhine for all nations. 
The controversy went on for years. Apparently quarrel- 
ling, Holland and Prussia secretly chimed in and con- 
curred to exclude British shipping from the Rhine. 
On .August 20th, 1828, the Duke of WeUington WTote to 
Lord Aberdeen : 

I consider Bulow (Baron von Bulow, one of the repre- 
sentatives of Prussia) the most unfair and dangerous man 
wc could have to transact business with. He lias pretended 
to be very candid and open about this question. But 
the notice given to us that the stable door is open is always 
after the steed has been stolen. I'll lay a wager that the 
whole question is settled. 
The Iron Duke was not deceived by Prussian duplicity. 
But nothing resulted except that British vessels were 
never allowed to turn to use the .Vienna provisions 
regarding free shipping on the Rhine. 

Bismarck as "Moderator" 

It is not likely that, in the next negotiations for peace, 
British and French diplomats will let themselves be 
cheated by (ierman hypocrisy. Yet a knowledge of past 
history and of the present Gorman claims will help us 
to escape possible snares. We shall have to bo warned 
against the insidious formulas and the disguised claims 
which the (Germans will put forth : commercial freedom, 
equality of rights and co-operation between civilized 
nations. The most harmless looking clause may conceal 
\evy dangerous consequences. We must not forgot either 
that Bismarck delighted to assume the part of moderator. 
In 1866, he was careful not to dismember Austria- Hungary 
but he cunningly arranged for her falling under Prussian 
influence amounting to a real protectorate. In 187 1 
he did not wring from France as much territory as his 
friend Roon, tho ^Minister of War, wanted him to extort, 
but he secured the insertion in the Treaty of Frankfort 
of the most-favourod-nation clause which worked prac- 
tically all in favour of Germany, and by rebound not a 
little against England. Gorman commerce and in- 
dustry deri\ed from it incalculable profits, while French 
commercial and industrial enterprise was sorely 

The problem of the Rhine and the mineral wealth of 
Alsace-Lorraine has been thoroughly investigated by 
German economists, as well as by politicians and military 
writers. The\- are prepared for any emergency and 
they doubtless keep in store some apparently harmless 
suggestions and offers which will require the most 
careful scrutiny on the part of the Allies. 

Herr Jachk ^vrote in the Deutsche Politik, for last 
November, that " at certain junctures, less means more." 
Behind the copious scribbling of these Herr Professors, 
it is easy to guess the suppressions and reservations, and 
we shall bo wise not to take as mere bluff the speeches 
of German industrial magnates. Early last December, 
three days before Bethmann-Hollweg let off his peace 
proposals, Herr Emil Rathenau, Director of the Algcmeine 
Elektricitats Geselschaft, said at a shareholders' meeting: 

The experiments we have made of late, as well as our 
new methods of work, will help us, when peace is 
restored, to bear the burden which has been accumulating 
during the war. Together with the energetic endeavours 
of our people and the resources of our land, they will 
make us stronger than ever. 

" Stronger than ever," that is their dream. The 
question of Alsace-Lorraine and the Rhine is there to 
remind us that the peace negotiators wiU not only 
have to discuss problems of frontiers, of restoration of 
the small nations, sanctions and reparations, of 
guarantees and of a lasting peace, but also to settle the 
basis on which economic development will unfold without 
giving to one single nation, led by a mischievous gang, 
the temptation to break all pledges and treaties, and the 
power to assail their neighbours, to devastate their coun- 
try, to enslave the inhabitants, to bring desolation, ruin 
and shame to millions of peaceful citizens. 

Not only must Germany be taught that it does not pay 
to make war, but she must be reduced to such circum- 
stance as will debar her from preparing for it. This 
is the only means of securing a lasting peace. 

January i8, 1917 


Books to Read 

By Lucian Oldershavv 


NOT being a philosopher, in anything but the 
purely etymological sense of the word — as 
readers of this page may before now have dis- 
covered for themselves — I do not feel competent 
to pass serious judgment on such an important work as 
The World as I magination (Macmillan and Co., 15s. net), 
in which Mr. E. D. Fawcett develops the philosophical 
system which he has adumbrated from time to time in 
the pages of Mind, and, I believe, in a previous volume, 
The Individual and Reality. I propose, therefore, to 
make such few remarks as I can here make about the 
book almost wholly on the subject of its relation to the 
war. The author himself brings to the first this topical 
importance of his work in his brief preface : " The crisis 
through which Europe is passing is, above all, the fruit 
of false ideas ; false conceptions of the standing of the 
individual, of the State, and of the meaning of the World- 
System regarded as a whole. Sooner or later a recon- 
struction of philosophical, religious, ethical, etc., belief, 
in the interests of ourselves and our successors, will be 
imperative. The World as Imagination is simply an 
experiment in this direction." 

I like to beh&ve that Mr. Fawcett has captured a trade 
—that of metaphysics — of which the Germans have 
long had in our schools a virtual monopoly (although 
even before the war we had shown some signs of " pre- 
paredness " in this direction and our native philosophers 
had called in as Allies a Bergson and a James). I cer- 
tainly see him in this volume vigorously combating a 
whole enemy host, and hke a skilful general making for 
and destroying their main armies of arguments. The 
Kantian Categories yield in a skirmish of outposts. 
Schopenhauer's Will falls to his heavy artillery, and 
Hegel's Reason, harried throughout the book, is even- 
tually surrounded and overthrown. In the end the Idea 
with which Mr. Fawcett advances to the attack, the 
Cosmic Imagination, somewhat flippantly referred to 
throughout the book as the C.I. (perhaps owing to the 
prevaihng influence of the W.O.), emerges triumphant, 
providing at the least a working hypothesis in which 
many of the knotty points of the philosophers, such as 
the existence of evil, are, if not finally resolved, at least 
suggestively unravelled. Here, as it seems to me (knowing 
as I premised, nothing about the subject), is Pragmatism 
rightly used as a method and not as a system, and here 
is a system or Ground or whatever it be called, more com- 
prehensive and explanatory than any previously set forth. 

«!■ ^ ^ S|C jfi 

It is interesting to note, by the way, that, in his brief 
history of the hypothesis of the C.I., Mr. Fawcett finds 
the poet Blake as "the sole champion of imagination as 
adequate Ground of phenomena in general." Shake- 
speare, " perhaps glimpsed " the idea. It has thus an 
English ancestry. I wish it were expressed in the 
English language. The jargon of philosophy, which we 
seem to owe almost entirely to the Germans, has always 
appeared to me an affectation, and, even if we have, for 
the sake of historical continuity in the science of meta- 
physics, to retain many of the special terms that writers 
have coined to express themselves clearly, we need not let 
the habit of jargon grow upon us. Is, for example, such 
a sentence as this really necessary, for the sake of 
lucidity of expression ? " Thus, if I aware a patch of 
red against the darkness, there is imaginal supplementa- 
tion of this, and I am said to perceive a fire." Or does 
this definition of beauty gain anything by its laborious 
attempt to be precise ? " Any content or content- 
complex is ' beautiful ' if I can Rest in it with a joy 
satisfied within the limits of the complex." I ask these 
questions in all humility, for Mr. Fawcett is clearly a 
master of words and he has a sense of humour. He may 
be able to justify as a necessity what I have a suspicion 
is a pernicious habit of modern schools. Anyway, 
he has written this book for the philosophers, and it 
will be interesting to hear their judgment on what seems 
to be, in reviewers' jargon, an epoch-making work. 

To get back to a more direct connection with the war ; 
I have found considerable value in Pros and Cons in 
the Great War (Kegan Paul, 3s. 6d. net). In this volume 
^Ir. Leonard Magnus has compiled with considerable 
judgment and what must have been infinite patience, a 
most valuable work of reference dealing with almost all 
the controversial aspects of the war. (I say " almost 
all " advisedly, for there are, particularly in the religious 
sections, some noticeable omissions). The book is 
dedicated to the enemy with the apposite quotation 
from " Samuel," " Thy mouth has testified against 
thee," and the plan of the book is to state briefly under 
every subject the enemy view and then to summarise 
the counter-arguments. It is certainly a reference book 
which at any rate every modern publicist should have 
for his shelves. In these special appendices on " The 
Balkan States," " A Settlement on Racial Lines," and 
" How Italy and Austria went to war," Mi". Magnus 
shows that he can handle his material in a connected 
form as well as in the note-book form of the body of his 
book and makes us look forward to further useful work 
from so well-informed a writer. 

* • * !)C if if 

Another book from which the controversialist can draw 
on for arguments with which to impress neutral opinion 
is The Mark of the Beast (John Murray, 5s. net). Readers 
of The Field know the service which its editor has done 
for humanity in the vigour and unremitting presentation 
of the moral case against the enemy, and will be glad 
to have Sir Theodore Cook's articles in this amplified 
and more permanent form. Recent events have shown 
that English people as a whole are not to be tempted by 
the German peace-bait, but if you know anyone who 
is wavering in opinion and thinking that perhaps, after 
all, things have gone just far enough, just send him a 
copy of The Mark of the Beast, and let Sir Theodore's 
righteous indignation, based as it is on a sound standpoint 
of morality and a knowledge of facts, recall him to the 
state of mind which will not leave half undone a work 
that is necessary, however unpleasant it may be. 

if if if if if ' 

" The Style is the Man " can certainly be predicted of 
Sir Herbert Beerbohm Tree's art, both on and off the 
stage. In Nothing Matters (Cassell and Co., 6s.), which 
is published on behalf of a fund for actors disabled in the 
war, Sir Herbert collects together a number of short 
stories told with those inimitable airs and graces which 
distinguished his previous volume Thoughts and After- 
thoughts. The book also contains a characteristic lecture 
by the author on " Humour in Tragedy," which is a 
feast of good things served up with the sauce of wisdom. 
When Sir Herbert finishes his stories, the fear strikes him 
that some of them may have been told before. He has, 
he says, no means of knowing, for he never reads. So 
far as I can see the only person he plagiarises on at all 
is himself, when he repeats a situation in his tragic first 
tale in a remarkable study in the macabre. The Stout 
Gentleman, a story suggested by a famous picture by 
Velasquez. A most characteristic tale is that of the 
vain actor who up his mind to " commit suicide or 
perish in the attempt." ^^■hether Sir Herbert's plots 
have been used before or no, the setting of them is all his 
own, and that is all that really matters — a mean you 
will see between the extremes of his first tale. " Nothing 
matters ! The pity of it ! Everything matters." 

Mr. Frank Debenham, who died in his eightieth year at the 
Fitzjohn's Avenue, Hampstead, was the true founder of the 
present great firm o£ Debenham and Frcebody, though he 
actually inherited the business from his father. lie was a 
man of ideas, very progressive in all liis methods, and he 
not only occupied a leading ])osition in the drapery business, 
but interested himself in local government and for six years 
was an Alderman of West Marylcbone. He also sat on the 
board of management of the Middlesex Hospital. His son, 
Mr. Ernest Debenham, who has succeeded liis father as chair- 
man of the business, lias been Mayor of Marylcbone, and 
sits on the County Council for East Marylcbone. 



January iS, 1917 

The Golden Triangle 

By Maurice Leblanc 

[Translated by Alexander Teixeira dc MattosI 

Synopsis; Captain Patrice Bdval, a wounded French 
officer, prevents in a Paris street the abduction of a nurse 
who is known to her patients as " Little Mother Coralie." 
Bclval declares his love to Coralie only to he told by her 
that she is already married, and that he must make no further 
c§ort to retain her friendship. Belval has sent to him anony- 
mously a box containing a rusty key, by means of which 
he gains access to a house, in which he finds five men torturing 
another man, Essares, who turns out to be Coralie' s husband, 
Essares shoots one man, Fakhi, and buys off his other four 
assailants for a million francs a piece, with zt'hich they 
leave the house. The next day Belval, following Coralie 
to her house, finds that Essares, who had contemplated 
flight from Paris, has been brutally murdered. An 
examining magistrate explains to Belval that Essares 
was prime mover in a plot for exporting gold from France. 
In order to recover some 300 million francs which Essares 
had concealed, the authorities consider it necessary 
to hush up the circumstances of Uic financier's death. 
The only possible clue to the whereabouts of the gold 
is a paper found in Essares dead hand, bearing the words, 
"Golden Triangle." Ya-Bon, Belval' s Senegalese servant, 
promises to call in Arsene Lupin to unravel the mystery, 
and Belval, with seven wounded and convalescent soldiers. 
takes up residence in Essares' house to protect Coralie from 
a mysterious threatened vengeance on her. Belval ascertains 
that Simeon, Essares attendant, has mysteriously befriended 
both himself and Coralie, and also obtains evidence that 
twenty years before, Essares had been responsible for the 
murder of Coralie's mother and his{Belval's) father and that 
an unknown friend had tried to protect Coralie and himself 


CHAPTER X {continued) 

iHEN, Patrice, Coralie said, you no longer believe 
he is dead, this unknown friend, or that you heard 
his dying cries ? " 

I cannot sa\'," Belval answered, " Simeon was 
not necessarily acting alone. He may have had a confidant, 
an assistant in the work which he undertook. Perhaps 
it was this other man who died at nineteen minutes 
past seven. I cannot say. Everything that happened 
on that ill-fated morning remains involved in the deepest 
mystery. The only conviction that we are able to hold 
is that for twenty years Simeon Diodokis has worked 
unobtrusively and patiently on our behalf, doing his utmost 
to defeat the murderer, and that Simeon Diodokis is alive. 
Alive, but mad ! " Patrice added. " So that we can neither 
thank him nor question him about the grim story which he 
knows or about the dangers that threaten you." 
« * * * * 

Patrice resolved once more to make the attempt, though 
he felt sure of a fresh disappointment. Simeon had a bed- 
room next to that occupied by two of the wounded soldiers 
in the wing which formerly contained the servants' quarters. 
Here Patrice found him. 

He was sitting half-asleep in a chair turned towards the 
garden. His pipe was in his mouth ; he had allowed it to 
go out. The room was small, sparsely furnished, but clean 
and light. Hidden from view, the best part of the old man's 
life was spent here. M. Masseron had often visited the room, 
in Simeon's absence ; and so had Patrice, each from his own 
point of view. 

The only discovery worthy of note consisted of a crude 
diagram iii pencil, on the white wall-paper behind a chest of 
drawers : three lines intersecting to form a large equilateral 
triangle. In the middle of this geometrical figure were three 
words clumsily inscribed in adhesive gold-leaf : 
The GoldeS Triangle. 

There was nothing more, not another clue of any kind, to 
further M. Masseron's search. 

Patrice walked straight up to the old man and tapped him 
on the shoulder : 

"Simeon ! " he said. 

The other lifted his yellow spectacles to him; and Patrice 
felt a sudden wish to snatch away this glass obstacle which 
concealed the old fellow's eyes and prevented him from 

looking into his soul and his distant memories. Simeon 
began to laugh foolishly. 

" So this," thought Patrice, " is my friend and my father's 
friend. He loved my father, respected his wishes, was faith- 
ful to his memory, raised a tomb to him, prayed for him, and 
swore to avenge him. And now his mind has gone." 

Patrice felt that speech was useless. But, though the sound 
of his voice roused no echo in that wandering brain, it was 
possible that the eyes were susceptible to a reminder. He 
wrote on a clean sheet of paper the words that Simeon had 
gazed upon so often : 

P.\TRicE .\ND Coralie. 14 April 1895. 
The old man looked, shook his head and repeated his 
melancholy, foolish chuckle. 
The officer added a new line : 

Armand Belv.\l 
The old man displayed the same torpor. Patrice con- 
tinued the test. He wrote down the names of Essares Bey 
and Colonel Fakhi. He drew a triangle. The old ma n failed 
to understand and went on chuckling. 

But suddenly his laughter lost iomc of its childishness. 
Patrice had written the name of Bournef, the accomplice ; 
and this time the old secretary appeared to be stirred by a 
recollection. He tried to get up, fell back in his chair, then 
rose to his feet again and took his hat from a peg on the wall. 

Pie left his room and, followed by Patrice, marched out of 
the house and turned to the left, in the direction of Auteuil. 
He moved like a man in a trance who is hypnotised into 
walking without knowing where he is going. He led the way 
along the Rue de Bou ,'ainvilliers, crossed the Seine and turned 
down the Ouai de Crenelle with an unhesitating step. Then 
when he reached the boulevard, he stopped, putting out his 
arm, made a sign to Patrice to do likewise. A kiosk hid them 
from view. He put his head round it. Patrice followed his 

Opposite, at the corner of the boulevard and side-street, 
was a cafe, witii a portion of the pavement in front of it 
marked out by dwarf shrubs in tubs. Behind these tubs 
four men sat drinking. Three oi them had their backs turned 
to Patrice. He saw the only one that faced him ; and he at 
once recognised Bournef. 

By this time Simeon was some distance away, like a man 
whose part is played and who leaves it to others to complete 
the work. Patrice looked round, caught sight of a post- 
office and went in briskly. He knew that M. Masseron was 
at the Rue Raynouard. He telephoned and told him where 
Bournef was. M. Masseron replied that he would come at 

Since the murder of Essares Bey, M. Masseron's enquiry 
had made no progress in so far as Colonel Fakhi's four accom- 
plices were concerned. True, they discovered the man 
Gregoire's sanctuary and the bedrooms with the wall-cup- 
boards ; but the whole place was enipty. The accomplices 
had disappeared. 

" Old Simeon," said Patrice to himself, " was acquainted 
with their habits. • He must have known that they were 
accustomed to meet at this cafe on a certain day of the week, 
at a fixed hour, and he suddenly remembered it all at the sight 
of Bournef's name." 

.\ few minutes later, M. Masseron alighted from his car 
with his men. The business did not take long. The open 
front of the cafe was surrounded. The accomphces offered 
no resistance. M. Masseron sent three of them under a strong 
guard to the Depot and hustled Bournef into a private room. 

" Come along," he said to Patrice. " We'll question 

" Mmc. Essares is alone at the house," Patrice objected. 
" Alone ? No. There arc all your soldier-men." 
" Yes, but I would rather go back, if you don't mind. 
It's the first time that I have left her and I'm justified in 
feeling anxious." 

" It's only a matter of a few minutes," M. Masseron in- 
sisted. " One should always take advantage of the fluster 
caused by the arrest." 

Patrice followed him, but they soon saw that Bournef was 
not one of those men who are easily put out. He simply 
shrugged his shoulders at their threats. 

'' It's no use, sir," he said, " to try and frighten me. I 
{Continued on -bage 20) 

January i8, 1917 



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January i8, 1917 

(Continued from page i8) 
risk nothing. Shot, do you say ? Nonsense ! You don't 
shoot people in France for the least thing ; and we are all four 
subjects of a neutral country. Tried ? Sentenced ? Iin- 
piisoned' Never! You forget that you have kept every- 
thing dark so far ; and, when you hush-^d up the murder of 
Mustapha, of Fakhi and of Essares, it was not done with the 
object of reviving the case for no valid reason. No, sir, I am 
quite easy. The mternment camp is the worst that can 
await me." 

" Then you refuse to answer ? " said M. Masseron. 

" Not a bit of it ! I accept internment. But there are 
twenty different ways of treating a man in these camps ; 
and I should like to earn your favour and, in so doing, make 
sure of reasonable comfort till the end of the war. But 
first of all, what do you know ? " 

" Pretty well e\-crything." 

" That's a pity : it "decreases my value. Do you know about 
Essqrcs' last night ? " 

" Yes, with the bargain of the four millions. What's 
become of the money ? ' 

Bournef made a furious gesture . 

" Taken from us ! Stolen ! It was a trap ! " 

" Who took it ? '■ 

" One Grc'goire." 
■ Who was he ? " 

" His familiar, as we have since learnt. We discovered 
that this Gi^'goire was no other tlian a fellow who used to 
serve as his chauffeur on occasion." 

" And who therefore helped him to convey the bags of 
gold from the bank to his house." 

" Yes. And, we also think, we know . . . Look here, 
you may as well call it a certainty. Gr^goire ... is a 

" A woman ? " 

" F.xactly. His mistress. We have several proofs of it, 
But she's a trustworthy, capable woman, strong as a man and 
afrnid of nothing." 

■' Do you know her address ? " 
• No." 

" As to the gold ; have you no clue to its whereabouts, no 
suspicion ? " 

" No. The gold is in the garden or in the house in the 
Rue Raynouard. We saw it being taken in every day for a 
week. It has not been taken out since. We kept watch 
every night. The bags are there." 

" No clue either to Essares' murderer ? " 

" No, none." 

" Are you quite sure ? " 

" Why should I tell a lie ? " 

" Supose it was yourself or one of your friends ? " 

" We thought that you would suspect us. Fortunately, 
we happen to have an alibi." 

" Easy to prove ? " 

" Impossible to upset." 

" We'll look into it. So you have nothing more to reveal ? " 

■' No. But I have an idea ... or rather a question 
which you will answer or not, as you please. Who betrayed 
us ? Your reply may throw some useful light, for one person 
only knew of our weekly meetings here from four to five o'clock, 
one person only, Essares Bey ; and he himself often came here 
to confer with us, Essares is dead. Then who gave us away.? " 

" Old Simeon," 

Bournef started with astonishment : 

" What ! Simeon, Simeon Diodokis ? " 

" Yes, Simeon Diodokis, Essares Bey's secretary." 

" He? Oh, I'll make him pay for this, the blackguard! 
But no, it's impossible." 

" What makes you say that it's impossible." 

" Why, because . . ." 

He stopped and thought for some time, no doubt to con- 
vince himself that there was no harm in speaking. Then 
he finished his sentence : 

" Because old Simeon was on our side." 

■' What's that you say ? " exclaimed Patrice, whose turn 
It was to be surprised. 

" I say that 1 swear that Simeon Diodokis was on our side. 
He was our man. It was he who kept us informed of Essares 
Bey's shady tricks ft was ho who rang us up at nine o'clock 
in the evening to tell us that lissarcs had lit the furnace of the 
old hot-house and that the sicnal of the sparks was going to 
work. It was he who opened the door to us, pretending to 
resist, of course, and allowed us to tie him up in the porter's 
lodge. It was he, lastly, who paid and dismissed tha men- 

" But why ? Why this treachery ? For the sake of 
money ? " 

■' No. from hatred. He bore Essares Bey a hatred that 
often gave us the shudders." 

" WTiat orompted it ? " 

" I don't know. Simeon keeps his own council. But it 
dated a long way back." 

' ' Did he know where the gold was hidden ? " asked M. 

" No, And it was not for want of 1 unting to find out ! 
He never knew how the bags got out of the cellar, which was 
only a temporary hiding place." 

" And yet they used to leave the grounds. If so, how are 
we to know that the same thing didn't happen this time ? 

" This time we were keeping watch the whole way round 
outside, a thing which Simeon could not do by himself." 

Patrice now jiut the question : 

" Can you tell us nothing more about him ? " 

" No. I can't. Wait, though : there was one rather curious 
thing. On the afternoon of the great day, I received a letter 
in which Simr'on gave me certain particulars. In the same 
envelope was another envelope, which had evidently got there 
by some incredible mistake, for it appeared to be highly im- 

" What did it say ? " asked Patrice, anxiously. 

" It was all about a key." 

" Don't you remember the details ? " 

" Here is the letter. I kept it in order to give it back to 
him and warn him what he had done. Here, it's certainly 
his writing . . ." 

Patrice took the sheet of notepaper ; and the first thing that 
he saw was his own name. The letter was addressed to him : 

" Patrice," 

" You will this evening receive a key. The door opens to 
doors midway down a lane leading to the river : one, on the 
right, is that of the garden of the woman you love ; the other, 
on the left, that of a garden where I want you to meet me at 
nine o'clock in the morning on the i4tli of April. She will 
be there also. You shall learn who I am and the object which 
I intend to attain. You shall both hear things about the 
past that will bring you still closer together. 

" From now until the 14th, the struggle which begins to- 
night will be a terrible one. If- anything happens to me, 
it is certain that the woman you love will run the greatest 
dangers. Watch o\er her, Patrice ; do not leave her for an 
instant unprotected. But I do not intend to let any- 
thing liappen to me ; and you shall both know the happiness 
which I have been preparing for you so long. 

" My best love to you." 

" It's not signed," said Bournef, " but I repeat, it's in 
Simeon's handwriting. As for the lady, she is obviously 
Mme. Essares." 

" But what danger can she be running ? " exclaimed Patrice, 
uneasily. " Essares is dead, so there is nothing to fear." 

" I wouldn't say that. He would take some killing." 

" Whom can he have instructed to avenge him ? Who 
would continue his work ? " 

" I can't say, but I should take no risks." 

Patrice waited to hear no more. He thrust the letter into 
M. Masseron's hand and made his escape. 

" Riie Raynouard, fast as you can," he said, springing into 
a taxi. 

He was eager to reach his destination. The dangers of 
which old Simeon spoke seemed suddenly to hang over Coralie's 
head. Already the enemy, taking advantage of Patrice's 
absence might be attacking his beloved. And who could 
defend her ? 

" If anything happens to me, Simeon had said." 

And the suppposition was partly realized, since he had 
^ lost his wits. 

" Come, come," muttered Patrice, " this is sheer idiocy 
. . . . I am fancying things . . . There is no 
reason . . ." 

But his mental anguish increased every minute. He 
reminded himself that old Simeon was still in full possession 
of his faculties 'at the time when he wrote that letter and gave 
the advice which it contained. He reminded himself that 
old Simeon had purposely informed him that the key opened 
the door of Coralie's garden, so that he, Patrice, might keep 
an effective watch by coming to her in case of need. 

He saw Simeon some way ahead of him. It was growing 
late ; and the old fellow was going home. Patrice passed 
him just outside the porter's lodge and heard him iiumming 
to himself. 

" Any news ? " Patrice asked the soldier on duty. 

" No, sir." 

" Where's Little Mother Coralie ? " 

" She had a walk in the garden and went upstairs half an 
hour ago." 

" Ya-Bon ? " 

" Ya-Bon went up with Little Mother Coralie. He should 
be at her door." 

[Continued on page 23) 

January t8, 1917 




Ski Boots 

(With or without Straps). 

The Ski Boot Idea is the pro- 
duct of a Country accustomed to 
cold and snow. The high double 
sides of this type of boot permit of 
an extra pair of socks being worn, 
which affords warmth and 

The " Five Guinea " Ski 
Boot has the patent Fortmason 
Waterproof Leather throughout, 
the soles are extra strong, and the 
whole boot is as supple as a slipper 
and lasts (or years. 


S zes tOJ upwards, 
10/- per pair extra. 



Bright black, 6ts close to breeches. 
Per 21/- Pair. 


Heavy Rubber Soles— sole and 

bottom c( boot acid proof. 

Per 39/6 Pair 


Close, fctting leg, strong rubber soles, 

khaki colour. 

Per 25/- Pair. 


Wide lealhf^r soles, nai ed. Botlom 

01 boot acid proof. 

Per 39/6 Pair. 

lUuilrated Catalo gue sent on atiplicatton , 


182 Piccadilly, London. W. 





A magnificent fold-up plate, showing all 
medals from I 793 to the present day. 
reproducing in actual colours The Victoria 
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A complete record in two fold-up sheets 
(1 and 2) reproducing the colours of 
every Infantry Regiment in the British 
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1 1 6 Dosii^ns in Colour, reproducinji the 
Silk Ribbons and Crested buttons. 



A Splendid shof>l in'' full colours. A X f 
complete record of Banners hiltierto ' 



The mi/st popular book of Nicknames 
^nd Traditions of the tiritish Army, illus- 
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a reliable book for everyone. 


BOOKS OF THE MOMENT, previously unobtainable 

Now on Sale at all Booksel'ers ard Book Deplt. of all St'^res. 
Pub.ished by Qale & Polden. Ltd., 2, Amen Corner, E.C. 

Citalrgue on Application. 




THREE 111 Pl^y^ 



Trench Coat definitely guaranteed 
absolutely and permanently 

CALL and SEE the Coat in 
the process of making. 

Proof of our assertion readily and 
instantly apparent. 

As supplied to Officers of — 

The Royal Naval Air Service, 
The Royal Naval Division, 
The Royal Plying Corps, 
and to practically every 
Regiment [Cavalry and In- 
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Price ... £4 14 6 

42 inches long. 

Price ... i5 5 O 

48 iiiuUea long. 

Detachable Fleece Lining, ^1 118 
DetachableSheepskin.extra £3 136 
Detachable Wallaby, extra, £6 1 6 6 
Detachable FurCollar,extra,t I 1 O 

All sizes in stock. Send Chest Measurement 
(over Tunic) and approximate height. 



Field House, 1 52 New Bond Street. London, W. 

Tflpirranis: " Wpstc.iiiafl. \V(- do.. LoniioTi 

TeVphoiiei MnyTair S76 [2 lin^sV 


with or without back curtain. 

Fitted with waterproof lining and greaseproof shields, 


The accepted design for both home and active service wear 
grips the head without pressure, and will neither blow nor fall off. 




iKiimKSii-ms!!i;imifiiiWK!iiimi<iiKTmii\iimBSfSi mt. 

There's no luxury quite equal to a 
Mustard Balh after a strenuou.s day's 
work in the munition lactory! 
Muscles and nerves get back their 
tone— the skin reacts to a f,lorious 
glow — and fatif;ue simply disappears. 
Just a tablespoonfulor so of mustard 
in the hot water. Any bath— any lime 
— any day — why not to-day ? 

I Colman's 
f MustardBath 






January 18, 1917 

{Conlinued from page 20) 

Patrice climbed the stairs, feeling a good deal calmed. 
Rut when he came to the first floor, he was astonished to lind 
that the electric light was not on. He turned on the s\\itch. 
Then he saw, at the end of the passage, Ya-Bon on iiis knees 
outside Coralie's room, with his head leaning against the 
wall. The door was open. 

" W'liat are you doing there ? " he shouted, running up. 

Ya-Bon made no reply. Patrice saw that there was blood 
on the shoulder of his jacket. At that moment the 
Senegalese sank to the floor. 

" Damn it ! He's wounded 1 Dead perhaps ! " 

He leapt over the body and rushed into the room, switching 
•n the light at once. 

Coralie was lying at full length on a sofa. Round her neck 
was the terrible little red-silk cord. And yet Patrice did 
mot experience that awful, numbing despair which we feel 
in the presence of irretrievable misfortune. It seemed to him 
that Coralie's face had not the pallor of death. 

He found that she was in fact breathing : 

■' She's not dead. She's not dead," said Patrice to himself. 
" And she's not going to die, I'm sure of it . . . nor 
Ya-Bon either . . . They've failed this time." 

He loosened the cord. In a few seconds, Coralie heaved 
a deep breath and recovered consciousness. A smile lit 
up her eyes at the sight of him. But, suddenly remembering, 
she threw her arms, still so weak, around him : 

" Oh, Patrice," she said, in a trembling voice, " I'm 
frightened . . . frightened for you ! " 

" What are you frightened of, Coralie ? Who is the scound- 
rel .' " 

" I didn't see him ... He put out the light, caught 
sue by the throat and whispered, ' You first . . . To- 
light it will be your lover's turn 1 ' . . . Oh, Patrice, 
I'm frightened for you ! ..." 


On the Brink 

PATRICE at once made up his mind what to do. 
He hfted Coralie to her bed and asked her not to 
move or call out. Then he made sure that Ya-Bon 
was not seriously wounded. Lastly, he rang violent- 
ly, sounding all the bells that communicated with the posts 
which he had placed in different parts of the house. \ 

The men came hurrying up. 

" You're a pack of nincompoops," he said. " Some ones 
Ween here. Little Mother Corahe and Ya-Bon have had a 
■arrow escape of being Idlled." 

They began to protest loudly. 

" Silence ! " he commanded. " You deserve a good hiding, 
every one of you. I'll forgive you on one condition, which 
is that, all this evening and all to-night, you speak of Little 
Motlier Coralie as though she were dead." 

" But whom are we to speak to, sir ? " one of them objected. 
".There's nobody here." 

' Yes, there is, you silly fool, since Little Mother CoraUe 
and Ya-Bon have been attacked. Unless it was yourselves 
who did it ! . . It wasn't ? Very well then . . . 

And let me have no more nonsense. It's not a question of 
bstening to others, but of talking among yourselves . . . 
and of thinking, even, without speaking. There are people 
speaking to you, spying on you, people who hoar wh-it you say 
and who guess what you don't say." 

" And old Sinv'on, sir ? " 

" Lock him up in his room. He's dangerous because he's 
mad. They may have taken advantage of his madness to 
make him open the door to them. Lock him up ! " 

Patrice's plan was a simple one. As the enemy, beheving 
Coralie to be on the point of death, had revealed to her his 
intention, which was to kill Patrice as well, it was necessary 
that he should think himself free to act, with nobody to suspect 
his schemes or to be on his guard agaiAst him. He woul 1 
enter upon the struggle and then would be caught in a trap. 

Pending this struggle, for which he longed with all his might, 
Patrice saw to Ya-Bon's wound, which proved to be only 
slight, and questioned him and Coralie. Their answers 
talHed at all points. Coralie, feeling a little tired, was lying 
down reading. Ya-Bon remained in the passage, outside the 
open door, squatting on the floor, Arab-fashion. Neither 
of them heard anything suspicious. And suddenly Ya-Bon 
saw a shadow between himself and the light in the passage. 
Ya-Bon, already half erect, felt a violent blow in the back 
of the neck and lost consciousness. CoraUe tried to escape 
by the dopr of her boudoir, but was unable to open it. began 
to cry out and was at once seized and thrown down. .Ml 
this had happened within thr ?pace of a few seconds. 

The only lunt that Pal ie succccdid in obtaiiin g was 
that the man came not from the staircase but from tlie ser- 

vants' wing. This had a smaller staircase .of its own, com- 
municating with the kitchen through a pantry 'oy which the 
tradesmen entered from the Rue Raynouard. The door 
leading to the street was locked. But someone might easily 
possess a key. 

After dinner, Patrice went in to see Coralie for a moment 
and then, at riine o'clock, retired to his bedroom, which was 
situated a little lower down, on the same side. It had been 
used, in Essares Bey's lifetime, as a smoking-room. ' 

As the attack from which he expected such good results 
was not likely to take place before the middle of the night 
Patrice sat down at a roll-top desk standing against the wall 
and took out the diary in which he had begun his detailed 
record of recent events. He wrote on for half an hour or 
forty minutes and was about to close the book when he seemed 
to here a \ague rustic, which he would certainly not have 
noticed if his nerves had not been stretched to their utmost 
state of tension. And he remembered the day when he and 
Coralie had once before been shot at. This time, however, 
the window was not open nor even ajar. 

He therefore went on writing without turning bis head or 
doing anything to suggest that his attention had been aroused 
and he set down, almost unconsciously, the actual phases 
of his anxiety : 

" He is here. He is watching me. I wonder what he means 
to do. I doubt if he will smash a pane of glass and hre a 
bullet at me. He has tried that method before and found 
it uncertain and a failure. No, his plan is thought out. 
I expect, in a different and more intelligent fashion. He is 
more hkely to wait for me to go to bed, when he can watch 
me sleeping and effect his entrance by some means which 
I can't guess. 

" Meanwhlile it's extraordinarily exhilarating to kui'w 
that his eyes are upon me. He hates me ; and his hatred . 
is coming nearer and nearer to mine, like one sword feeling 
its way towards another before clashing. He is watching 
me as a wild animal, lurking in the dark, watches its prey 
and selects the spot on which to fasten its fangs. But no, 
I am certain that it's he who is the prey, doomed before- 
hand to defeat and destruction. He is preparing his knife 
or his red-silk cord. And it's these two hands of mine that 
will finish the battle. They are strong and powerful and are 
already enjoying their victory. They will be victorious." 

Patrice shut down the desk, lit a cigarette and smoked 
it quietly, as his habit was before going to bed. Then he 
undressed, folded his clothes carefully, wound up his watch, 
got into bed and switched off the light. 

" At last," he said to himself, " I shall know the truth. 
I shall know who this man is. Some friend of Essares', 
continuing his work ? But why this hatred of Ccjralie ? 
Is he in love with her, as he is trying to finish me off too ? 
I shall know ... I shall soon know . . ." . 

An hour passed, however, and another hour, during which 
nothing happened on the side of the window. .\ single 
creaking came from somewhere beside the desk. But this 
no doubt was one of those sounds of creaking tuiiiitiue 
which we often hear in the silence of the night. 

Patrice began to lose the buoyant hope that had sustan.ed 
him so far. He perceived that his elaborate sham regard- 
ing Coralie's death was a poor thing after all and that a man 
of his enemy's stamp might well refuse to be taken in by it. 
Feeling rather put out, he was on the point of going to sleep, 
when he heard the same creaking sound at the same spot. 
The need to do something made him jump out of bed. 
He turned on the light. Everything seemed to be as he !iad 
left it. There was no trace of a strange presence. 

" Well," said Patrice, " one thing's certain : I'm no good. 
The enemy must have smelt a rat and guessed the trap 1 laid 
for him. Let's go to sleep. There will be nothing happening 
There was in lact no zl irm. 

Next morning, on examining the window, he observed that 
a stone ledge ran above the ground-floor all along the garden 
front of the house, wide enough for a man to walk upon by 
holding on to the balconies and rain-pipes. He inspected 
all the rooms to which the ledge gave access. None of them 
was old Simeon's room. 

• " He hasn't stirred out, I suppose? " he asked the two 
soldiers posted on guard. 

" Don't think so, sir. In any case, we haven't imlocked 
the door. " 

Patrice went in and, paying no attention to the old lollow, 
who was still sucking at his cold pipe, he searchpd tlieroom' 
having it at the back of his mind that the enemy might take 
refuge there. He found nobody. But what he did dis- 
cover, in a press in the wall, was a number of things which he 
had not seen during his investigations in M. Masserons 
company. These consisted of a rope ladder, a coil of 
lead pipes, apparently gas-pipes, and a small soldering- lamp. 

(To bt continued) 

January 25, 1917 

Supplement to LAND & WATER 






i These most comfortable, ~ 

i good-looking puttees are 

I made entirely of fin ^supple 

I tnn leather, and fasten 

I simply with one buckle at 

i bottom. They are ex- 

i tremely durable, even if 

i subjected to the friction of 

I riding, as the edges never 

I tear or fray out, and for 

I winter wear they are iin- 

I matched. 

= Thi puttees are speedilv put on or 

I taken off, readily mould to the 

s shape of the leg, are as easily 

I cleaned as a leather belt, and 

I saddle soap soon mikes tbem 

R priotic illy water roof. 

I Thi price per pair is 16/6, post 

I free inland, or postage a^iroad 

I 1/- exlrj, or sent on approval on 

I receipt of business (not banke s 

I reference, and home address. 


The fac'ors of successful breeches-makin i are — 6ne wear-resist- = 

ing c oths, skilful cutting, and careful, thorough tailor-w irk — and s 

all ihese we giarantee. Abundant experience aUo con ri'~utes '= 

importantly n giving utmost satisfaction, for Grant & o kburn ^ 

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a num er of pairs o' breeches, and are therefore olten able to ^ 

meet immediate requirements, or we can cut and try a pair = 

on the same day, and complete the next day. if urgently wanted" = 


LTD = 

Miiittr"a"d Cttii'Tiiior,. 25 mICCADIELi, Vv. g 

^-iM'.'iniiii'iiniiii'iiiriiii !iiriiiiiiii!iiiiiiii:'iii'iiii mi mi !iii wiiiiiiihiijiii mriiiriiii mi iiiniii iiiiiiiii'iin nm 

The Original Cording's, Estd. 1839 

There can be no getting wet in an 
** Equitor/' the really waterproof coat 


Daily we re<:eive evidence from 
those who hiive puid for their 
knowledge in ino;ie.v and serious 
dtsc-omtcrt. th;it a semi-proof 
(weatlierproof) t-oat fails to Iveep 
ont the wet. that liie outer $hell 
becomes water-logged, and that 
even if lined with oilskin or the 
like the damp still strikus 
through the seams at the luckless 

\ctive Serviee entails many In- 
evitable hardshps but eettine 
wet — a risky and uiturly wretched 
experience — is not one of Ihein, 
for that trustworthy waterproof, 
the "Kquitor," «ill keep a nmu 
bone dry through the lieavieat 
and most lasting downpour, and 
with a snug fleece wool. en lining 
huttoncd in wil. also warmly pro- 
tect him in biting cold uvutiier. 
The "ISquitor" is lilted with a 
s|)ecial riding apron, but the loat 
kcrves just as well for ordinary 
wear afoot, whether tlie apron oe 
fastened back or not. 

in our lisht weight No. 31 
material, the price ol tho 
"Etiuitor" is 92/6; i,t our No. 23 
castimere a meoium weight cloth, 
115/-; witiiout apron (either 
cloth), 17/6 less, wilh belt, S/- 

The detachable fleece inner coat 
can be had m twa qua.ilies— No. 1 
(fine wool), 62/6; No. 2, ao;- 
When ordering an "Etiuilor" Coat 
please state height and chest 
measure and send remittance 
(which will be returned if the 
coat is not approved), or give 
home address and business (not 
banker's) reference. 

lilastrated List at request. 

»/. O. L^\Jl\LJII\(jl & O'TO TOHM.THEKING 

Only A(f(frftit»s 

19 PICCADIT LY, VV., & 35 ST. JAMES'S ST., s.w. 

The "19th" Hole 

Per 54/- doz. \ Packages return,ble. / Sample bottle 

Carnage paid, j Carriage forward. \ 5/- post fiee. 


Send for Price List of High CIms Wines and SplWts. 


Supplement to LAND & WATER 

January 25, 1917 

War-time Economy 


Waterman s Ideal 

— the great time saver. 


WATERMAN'S IDE'AL has for two 
gnerations bt-en the foremost tool of 
writinu eflic encv and dispatch. In 
the p 'ckets and on the desks of those 
who do things it is an everpresent 
and ever-ready companion to progress. 

WATERMAN'S IDEAL is first and 
last the Fountain Pen of Service. It 
is the one that has life-lone durability 
and reliabilitv, the fountain pen that 
has Ihe fam 'US spoon feed and other 
exclusive features of merit. It is the 
pen which gives that kind of SERVICE 
which has resulted in its world-wide 
endorsement and use. 


The Headmaster of a large 
SCHOOL, who lost his Waterman's 
Ideal, writes — 

" / w^s *lost' without it, and at the end of a 
u/cfk d adtd that it was a war time economy to 
replace tt," 

Better Filing 
Methods for 
the New Year 

If you cannot find any re- 
quired letter or paper the 
instant it is required, why 
not adopt a better method 
of filing.' Prominent houses 
throughout the country 
use the 

8lol>c^\v^rt)ickc Vertical Filing System. 

Disks, Chairs, "Elastic" Bookcases, Card InJex Cabin' ts. 
Tables, etc. Write tor Catal'^eiie no V.F. 

Packing Free. Orders ol il carriagt Paid to any Goods Station in Iht British ItUt. 

The Slok^^micltc CasA 

Oljtce and Ltbiary funmheti. 
44 Holborn Viaduct, EC: 98 Bi hopsirate, E.G.; 82 Vicforia St., S.W 

Tbree Types: Regular. lOi. 6d. and 
■pwards, Lever Pocket Self-filling 
and Safety Types. 158. and upwards. 
Special pens d-r pre'ent.'itinn. Of 
Statiooen and Jewellers everywhere. 

1 Ahralute saWe^factlon guaranteed. 
Nirw exchnnseable if not suitable. 
Call or eend to "The Pen Comer." 
Full range of pens oa view for in- 
speoUoo and trial. Booklet Free 

J from— 

L, G. Sloan Ltd. ClyslJca Correcr Kingsway, London 

War— Worry— Headache. 

Worrying about the war, bad news, overwork, 
uncertainty about the future — all tend to bring 
on Headaches. To banish your Headaches, 
whether the cause be the war or something eIs^, 
you need a supply of 

Zox is the safe remedy. Thousands of men 
and women escape much needless pain by 
taking Zox. Sufferers say "it acts like magic." 
1/- and 2/6 a box, of Chemists, Stores, etc. 

F R e: s. 

Send a stamped addressed 
envelope for two Free Powders. 

ZOX Co., 11 Ha'ton Garden, 

Will you give a little to help those who 
gave so much for you? 

more Workshops and Machinery at 

The Lord Roberts Memorial Workshops 



Permanently disabled on Active Service — Soldiers and Sailors 
find immediate work at our Workshops. A man starts at 
£1 per week and earns standard rate of wages quickly. 
No red tape. No delay. The National way and the 
only practical way to find work for our disabled men. 

We find work NOW -and after the War 

Major-Gen. Ihe Lord Cheylesmore, K.C.V.O. 
122 Brompton Road, London, S.W. 

The Soldiers' and Sailors' Help Society. Patrons: H.M. The King, H.M. The Queen. 


Vol. LXVllI No. 2855 vif'!: THURSD.AY, JANUARY 25 1917 [a nkwspapi r J i> ,n c f. . mo^knc^^ 

L_|2-L>-"-^! \at oici.rix^', ' "■■ - - 

ill iiitiMMiii iri 

iT''-"'"'°''1iiiiii'tfii'i" liilliTiilliif fiiii Hill III mil' 

iiiiiiiiiMitfiiririif r 

Us /.a/.-iA Racmnekert 

Drawn exctunively for " Land it- Water " 

The Crucifixion of Belgium 

We are willing now to make peace so that you may enjoy still more the blessings of our kultur " 


January 25, 1917 


WAR'S a rough game, anyhow — a grim, 
dour game, with the stark savagery 
of the weather as background to its 
wild variety of minor miseries. No job for 
women or weaklings — a Man's Game. 

And the Thresher's a Man's Coat — a fighting 
man's fighting coat. The rawest, bleakest 
job that the General Staff could invent, 
cannot frighten the man who tackles it 

The coat that will stand the hardest-slogging 
I rain as long as it hkes to keep on slogging 
and never ship a drop, is a useful sort of 
billet-mate. No exaggeration in that— no 
\yater can pass the special inner lining 
(inner because the outside shell of khaki 
drill takes the rough wear and tear — and 
takes it " standing up "). And when your 
nose and ears are shouting to you how blis- 
teringly cold it is, while from neck to knees 
you're enjoying Henley weather, you think 
very kindly of the man who thought out 
the Thresher and put that snug innermost 
warmth-lining there, making it detachable 
moreover, for days and occasions when you 
don't want to carry winter-weight. 

And all the dear little draughts and rain- 
trickles that used to wrigglQ in at neck and 
wrists when your coat wasn't a Thresher — 
where are they ? 

Ask the clever little Thresher comfort- dodges, 
the neat little collar-and-cuff-contrivances 
which give the finishing touch to the 
Thresher's fighting qualities. 

W.O. recommended the Thresher to O.C's 
first year of the war. Over 12,000 officers 
have taken the official tip — and been glad 
of it since, on many a raw, soaking day. 



After wearing one of your Trench Coats f«r 
almost a year out here, it was yesterday 
destroyed by a shell. Please send me another, 
etc. . . . This order will conArm my 
pleasure with your Coat, etc. 

Capt., Oxford and Bucks. Lt. fnf. 
t might tell you that no other toat can take 
the place of your Trench Coot for comfort and 
protection. As for 'wear, there is nothing M 
be said; after nine months of daily use and 
rough treatment my coat is just as serviceabtr 
as when it was new. 

Lieut.-Col. Commanding, M.M.G. Bde. 



■■"^S^kJ^tc^Sr""""'- £8.8.0 THRESHER &GLENNY 

" Military Tailort tince the Crimean War, 

As above. w..h detachable Kamelcott £6 6 152 & 153 Strand, LONDON, W.C. 

Cavalry type, with knee flaps and saddle gusset, 15/6 extra WM. ANDERSON & SON, 14 Gtorgt St., E<li„hnrgl., & 106 Hop* St., GUq»w. 

All tlzei in slock- Send size of chest and approximate 
height, and to aoold any delay enclose cheque when ordering. 

By Appatntm^nf to 

M. the King. 

January 35, 1917 




Telephone HOLBORN 2828. 


The Proprietors of " Land & Water" beg to announce 
that, owing to the considerable increase in ihe cost of 
production, the price of this journal has been raised 
to 7d. This increase will beg'n with the next issue, 
Thursday, February 1st, and will be maintained for the 
duration of the War. Any readers who may experience 
difficulty in obtaining their weekly copy should 
apply direct to the Publisher of "Land & Water," 
5, Chancery Lane, London, E.G. 



The Crucifixion of Belgium. By Louis Raemaekers i 

Peace after Victory (Leader) 3 

Neutral Opinion. By Hilaire Belloc . 4 

Mr. Wilson and the War. By Arthur Pollen lo 
Opening of the 1917 Campaign : IL By Colonel Feyler 13 

Rail Power versus Sea Power. By Harold Cox 15 

A Birth of III Omen. By John Trevena ' 16 

The Golden Triangle, by Jlaiiricc Lcblanc 18 

The West End 22 

Kit and Equipment 25' 


THROUGH all the bloodshed, fury and misery 
of the Great War, civilization has striven to 
discern a dawn of imiversal peace once the fight- 
ing is at an end. It has been buoyed in this hope 
by the knowledge that war is no longer the pro- 
fession of a single class and caste, but embraces whole 
nations, men and women and cWldren ; from the highest 
to the lowest all in Europe have learnt its full meaning 
in the last three years ; there can be no deceiving free 
peoples in the future with big words and fine phrases 
about glory and honour. When, therefore, the President 
of the United States addresses his Senate on the theme 
of universal peace, he is certain of a respectful hearing 
throughout the bounds of civilization and of a sincere 
endeavour to arrive at the exact meaning which his 
words are intended to convey. But the subject is such 
a large one that misconception and misunderstanding 
are bound to ensue. So when we find the person who 
exercises the highest authority on the American Con- 
tinent stating that " only a tranquil Europe can be a 
stable Europe," the question inevitably arises whether 
the same principle does not apply with equal force on his 
side of the Atlantic and that the first step towards the 
larger programme ought not to be the assured tranquility 
of Mexico ? 

President Wilson is an idealist ; he would use liis high 
power to obtain for posterity a happier and more secure 
world than has hitherto been possible. But he must not 
allow himself to be carried aloft by the vision beautiful 
and to lose sight of the common ground on which his 
feet stand. Has there ever been in the history of the 
human race such a thing as " peace without victory." 
Whene\-er hostilities have terminated, one or other side 
has gained definite advantage, which it has claimed 
rightly as " victory." Much the most thorougli example 
of this in our time was the victory of the Northern over 
the^ Southern States of America. 'Indeed no other 
military decision of modern times is comparable to it 
for finality, nor has any been followed by such drastic 

and political consequences. It was an utterly crushing 
and complete defeat, due to the determination of the 
successful party to achieve an equally crushing and 
complete victory. The defeated party was bereft of all 
political power whatsoever, and of all power of expres- 
sion. It was ruined economically for more than a 
generation, its territory was systematically garrisoned 
by the \ictors, and down to the smallest details of its 
local administration it was entirely subject to them, and 
entirely in their' hjhids. For yeai's it lived only as a 
conquered territory ; and all this was because the belli- . 
gerents in that great struggle knew very well that with- 
out victory there could be no peace. 

It was only last week that the Kaiser in his letter 
to the King of Wurtemberg appealed to the German 
people " to hold on with blood and treasure until the 
arrogance of our enemies is shattered by the unshakable 
Knll lo victory of the Fatherland and. of its Loyal Allies." 
But one answer is possible to such a challenge-rcomplete 
military defeat. There can be no peace worth the paper 
it is written on until the spirit that finds expression in 
these menacing words is ovirthrown and destroyed. It 
is the spirit which began the war and which is responsible 
for the needless death and agony caused to the unarmed 
populations of the regions occupied by the Gennan armies. 
There is nothing new in its manifestation, humanity has 
suffered cruelly under it from the dawn of time, but the 
Allies assert it to be out of consonance with civilization 
and it must perish utterly, for, to quote Mr. Wilson's 
own words, " there can be no stability where the will is 
in rebellion, where there is not tranquility of spirit and a 
sense of justice, of freedom and of right." The will to 
victory has been the dominating Prussian influence -for 
fifty years and to it may be directly traced all, or almost 
all, the disturbances of European peace which haA'e 
occuiTcd throughout that period. 

The Allies arc at one in their resolute determination 
that peace can only follow after victory. This aspect 
was well defined in the Times on Tuesday. Our contem- 
porary wrote : " The AlHes believe victory peace to be 
as essential as Mr. Lincoln believed it to be essential in the 
Civil War. They believe it to be essential for the attain- 
ment of those very aims of a moral and ideal kind whicli 
Mr. Wilson regards as indispensable foundations of a 
solid and abiding peace such as America might help to 
guarantee. There can be no ' drawn war ' between 
the spirit of Prussian militarism and the spirit of real 
peace which the AlUes, the Americans, and indeed all 
neutrals, desire. ' Militarism ' cannot be exorcised 
except by defeat in the field, and therefore the Allies 
can hear of no peace which is not a victory peace." 
To this end every effort in the Allied countries is now 
bent. Our enemies are fully awai;e of the fact, which is 
one reason why there have been so many peace rumours 
in the air apart from Mr. Wilson's pronouncements. 

In this issue we conclude the analysis of the coming 
campaign which has been made by Colonel Feyler, a Swiss / 
military writer of a European reputation, whose opinions 
are studied as closely by military students in Germany 
as in England. The conclusion Colonel Feyler arrives at 
is " that the campaign of 1917 is opening under auspices 
more favourable to the champions of a Europe that de- 
sires the development of the democratic rights of nations 
than to the champions of a reactionary Eiu-ope that 
claims to be reviving a kind of Holy Alliance, inspired 
by Jehovah." So the Allies fight on in good spirit and 
in complete concord among themselves about the end to be 
gained. They realise intensely that they are warring for 
the very principles and high qualities forwhich the great 
American democracy has stood and if when the victory 
is won, this democracy, putting aside its fear of entangling 
alliances, will join in policing the international world, 
its offer will be cordially accepted. 


January 25, 1917 

The Present State of Neutral Opinion 

By Hilaire Belloc 

THE message delivered by tlie President of the 
United States this week to the Senate of that 
Power, renders it imperative for every belligerent 
to consider the present state of neutral opinion. 
Among the moral factors that support or weaken an 
anny at war, the most important, after the spirit of its 
own people at home, is this attitude of neutral opinion 
and particularly of gieat neutral powers. 

This is particularly tnie in the case of the present 
great war for two reasons. First because the mass 
of the white races are involved in it, and yet one 
great section of them,- that of the New World, stands 
(juite apart in distance as in mind. 

Secondly, because the war being one of Ufe and death 
and compelling each nation to use all sources of supply 
available, has made the industry and material of the 
New World, the procuring of their products, the con- 
veying of them to Europe, a vital factor in the whole 

The enormous German accumulation of propellant 
explosive, for instance, and the immense continued pro- 
duction of it. in the first months of the war -in Ger\nany. 
were, economically, nothing more than a transformation of 
American cotton. 

That is only one example, but the whole war teems with 
them. Indeed the main function of the opposed naval 
instruments has been so far, for more than two years, not 
to tight, but to convey, and to hinder the conveyance 
of material from the New World to either belligerent. 

Now when we use the words " neutral opinion " we 
must distinguish between two moral factors in the matter 
which, tliough closely interdependent, are not identical. 
There is first the judgment passed by a neutral upon 
the ethical nature of the struggle, and that, of course, 
is -the foundation of the whole thing. 

There is, secondly, the intellectual judgment as to 
which of the two parties is preponderant and likeliest 
to reach his end in the war. 
To consider the first : 

A very strong conviction that either party to an issue 
is morally wrong and that his opponent is coiTespond- 
ingly justified in seeking a complete solution, determines 
the whole of an external judgment upon the dispute. 

We are apt to forget this now-a-days from the absence 
of common religious standards and from the admitted 
prevalence of non-moral commercial motives, which of 
themselves are, of course, indifferent to the moral char- 
acter of parties to an economic exchange. But a little 
reflection will show us that we should be wrong to think 
of the purely ethical judgment as having less importance 
now than it had in the past. For if we examine our own 
lives we shall find that the real spring of action lies in some 
kind of violent affection or indignation, and that the mo- 
ment this emotion arises all other action is coloured and 
determined by it, whether it be present in an intense 
degree or no. It makes the balancing difference and 
turns the scale wherever there is doubt. It determines, 
to use another and perhaps better metaphor, the direction 
of the current, whether that current be sluggish or 
To consider the second factor : 

If the opinion of a neutral closelv, though indi- 
rectly, concerned with a great struggle inclines to the belief 
in the victory of the one or the other party, it also affects 
all his action. He may regret the defeat of that one 
with whom morally he sympathises ; but the more pro- 
bable he thinks that defeat the less will his sympathies 
be operative, and that for two reasons : 

First, a growing conviction that such sympathy is 
jjractically useless and is therefore an expense of energy 
that may be spared. Secondly, because according to 
the result of the war will the future be shaped. 

Let us suppose an individual neutral merchant, for 
instance, watching the struggle between France and 
Germany in 1870. Let us suppose his sympathies to bo- 

French : his desire to be that the French should win 
the war and his moral judgment that Prussia was the 
aggressor and lier methods treacherous and vile. ' The 
action of such a man in his practical affairs would have 
been very different in August 1870 from what it would 
have been in the December of the same year. Upon 
the first date matters were not decided nor even apparently 
approaching a decision. But already by the middle of 
September all the French regular army was out of action. 
tMther contained in Metz or destroyed at Sedan. By 
November the army in Metz, already long out of action, 
had ceased to exist. By December it was clear that the 
resistance of Paris was coming to an end. Of the two 
belligerents one was certainly coming out of the 
struggle impoverished, weakened in the action of its 
national will, and perhaps condemned to dechne. The 
other was as certainly coming out enriched, 
strengthened in its national will and probably thereby 
destined to a rapid economic growth. The \actor would 
almost certainly impose an economic treaty which would 
give him the advantage. Our business m"an, concerned 
say, with establishing relations in the steel industry and 
knowing the value of the Lorraine beds of iron ore, 
might still in August have been negotiating for the 
estabhshment of new plant in Eastern France. By 
December he would have preferred a German connection"; 
for he would so be more certain of his future and its ex- 
pansion. He would rightly guess that the enterprise 
upon the French side of the new frontier would be handi- 
capped, and on the German side of the new frontier 
immensely advantaged. 

It is the judgment of a great number of such individuals 
which makes up the judgment of the neutral nation com- 
posed of them, and when that judgment is supported by 
the judgment of its Government as well, it is conclusive. 

Now in the light of these considerations let us consider 
soberly the present attitude of neutrals and particularly 
of the neutral most important to us morally and economic- 
ally, the United States. Let us consider that attitude in 
its present phase and ask ourselves first what validity it 
has, morally and intellectually, that is, what reasons in- 
form it and next, if we believe that judgment to be 
erroneous, by what arguments we should attempt to 
convert it. 

It is the foundation of any such work (and that work 
to be of practical value must consider the mentaUty, 
not of ourselves who are already con\inced, but of the 
neutral only— and that with the respect due to his 
abilities and his position)— that in both of the great 
iactors of which we have spoken the opinion of the 
United States has arrived as nearly as may be at an 
exact balance between the two belligerents in this awful 

American opinion cannot be said — it cannot be said 
at this moment, at any rate— to support the ethical 
thesis of the one side or of the other. It does not —at any 
rate, at the present moment, and as a whole— tliink of 
the war as a struggle between two parties, one of which 
it desires to win because it believes its cause to be just. 
It regards it ethically as a mere disaster, terrible beyond 
precedent, and continuing only through the action of 
unreason. We may judge this attitude from any one 
of innumerable indications, from the American press, 
from the most stable and best relations obtainable from 
individuals, from private correspondence, from all the 
evidence at our disposal. 

As to the second factor, it is remarkable (I speak of 
the present moment alone) that we discover a similar 
balance. There is not only no con\iction in America 
that either party will issue victorious from this mortal 
conflict, there is actually a positive conviction that 
neither party cam issue victorious, but that each will 
face the other at its close unsatisfied and as nearly as 
possible equally matched. In other words there is a 
positive conviction of an approaching draw, and 

January 25, 1917 



something like a certilude that the war can end in no 

other fashion. . ^ i_ r 

We mnst clearly en\-isage both those points before we 
can proceed a step in the work before us. 

I propose first to show how each of these judgments 
have -been arrived at ; secondly, to show (directing my 
arguments only to neutrals) that they are both of them 
erroneous : Of the two belligerents one has a clear moral 
claim -of enormous importance to the future of the whole 
world, and therefore to that of neutrals. 

The confusion or indifference now undoubtedly existing 
ill the mind of neutrals, and especially in the United 
States with regard to the moral issue of the war, is due 
to three things : The length of time through which the 
war has dragged on ; the active propaganda of the enemy 
contrasting with our \-erv sluggish one ; and, lastly, the 
patent fact that Germany is now fighting for her life. 

Of these three the first has the most weight. Great 
length of time has alwavs, of course, the effect of 
modifying indignation ; so has to some extent great 
di'^tances' in space ; but in the case of this war with its 
ra}Mdly succeeding and tremendous events even two years 
has had a modifving effect. 

The surprise with which the world, including the 
neutrals (and especiallv the United States) obser\-ed the 
llr'^t crimes and atrocities of the enemy has long ceased. 
Things at first thought impossible have now come 
to be taken for granted— it is the way with all evil until 
it is punished— the details ha\c become blurred and 
overlaid and many of the most salient points have 
actually been forgotten. 

There are two ways, however, in which any neutral 
who honestly examines the question can recover a just 

Prussian Doctrine 

The lirst is the reading, if he has leisure, of the typical 
North German speaking and writing in the period, before 
the war. It was one mass of assertion that the old 
international morality of Europe was negligible, and 
a nation having the-power to offend and even to destroy 
should exercise that power if the exercise led to its own 
aggrandisement. It is no more possible to question this 
attitude of Prussia than it is possible to question 
the democratic theory of the French Revolution. When 
the French Revolut'ionary armies and later those of 
Napoleon set out to conquer they acted upon a political 
theory which some hate, and which others love, but which 
is at "any rate perfectly clear. Everywhere they went 
they destroyed the old institutions and as best they could 
the old inequality. They gloried in this and regarded 
their victories as not only their own victories, but as the 
victories of the new democratic ideas. That the North 
German philosophy was narrower than this and more 
muddled is no dim'inishment of its existence. It existed 
and was proclaimed openly to the whole world over and 
over again in books of history,, in lectures, in speeches, in 
books of philosophy, and it showed itself in every form of 
what passes in North German}- for art. 

Now either one has a creed and doctrine of inter- 
national morality (in which case this North-German 
attitude was the "negation of it), or one has not. If one 
has, one cannot possibly deny that this anarchist attitude 
on the part of one nation is not only wrong but 
necessarily is warred down by those whose liberty it 
threatens and whose ancient comity it denies. For 
cither such a claimant destroys the commonwealth of 
nations in which he Imds himself, by destroying its 
public law: or he is broken to a respect for that law. 
But the second test is more practical and can be 
applied by a much larger number of people. Let any 
neutral watching the increasing cruelty of this great 
war as it proceeds, ask himself who first introduced its 
various steps. I can well imagine the horror of a neutral 
who reads from German sources the terrible details of an 
air raid over a German town. But who compelled the 
Allies to such methods ? Who first broke this elementary 
rule in our European code ? It was the German : and he 
did it in the very first hours of the 'war when he believed 
himself to be certain of victory. Within a yard 
of the Belgian frontier he already began massacring 
innocent men, women and children in order to create 
terror. Such a thing was quite unknown in modern 

Europe with all its long and usually splendid military 
record. There have been massacres indeed, the results 
of exasperation, and especially strongholds stormed have 
suffered abominable things at the hands of the soldiery. 
But no one has defended these things. Still less has 
anyone undertaken them in cold blood until the modern 
Prussian deliberately undertook them as a policy and 
openly defined them as his own private and succfessful 
receipt for victory and his own way of attaining the 
military character. It is exactly the same (to mcntiori 
them in their order) with the deliberate destruction of 
\-enerable and beautiful monuments; with the use of 
burning oil against men's flesh ; with the introduction of 
poisonous gases ; and with the murder of non-com- 
batants upon the high seas. The matter is simply one 
of plain arithmetic in dates and of amdenied because 
undeniable truth. Every step in the public story of the 
degradation of war has been deliberately taken first 
by Prussia— down to the poisoning of water supphes. 

" The neutral should also note that in at least two very 
important departments the AUies have disdained to 
follow the Prussian model. They have refused to enslave 
and they have refused to torture prisoners. The Germans 
have done both those things openly and have argued in 
fa\-our of both as part of the spirit of modern war. A 
man has only to refresh his memory upon these things 
to recover that indignation which, at the beginning of 
the war, was uni\-ersal among neutrals and ought still 
to be uni\-ersal to-day. 

It would be waste of time to linger upon the second 
case : Contrast between the German propaganda in the 
United States and our own. We had the enormous 
advantage of a common language and of many common 
institutions. We lost that advantage through the 
inability of politicians to grasp things as a whole and 
through their wretched habit of personal quarrels and 
personal ad\ancements. It is too late to recover the 
lost ground. But, at any rate, every intelligent neutral 
can at least ask himself the sources from which his_ in- 
formation proceeds and can guard himself against 
swallowing whole the story of the only party he hears. 

The third cause I have said to be the obivous fact that 
the Germanic Powers, and particularly Prussia, are now 
fighting for their lives. When a man or a nation is iii 
that situation it is very natural, if we do not recall the 
circumstances of their original crime, to desu-e their 
salvation, and to regard their suffering as a tragedy with 
which we ought to interfere. 

We have examples of this when a criminal is in peri] . 
of his life or liberty. The immediate drama moves men 
so strongly that they often forget its original cause 
Some years ago a man who murdered and mutilated a 
little child under the most shocking circumstances, was 
reprieved on account of a pubhc agitation, supported 
by an immense number of signatures to a petition. Not 
one of those signatories perhaps would have put down 
his name if, just before doing so, the horrible crime had 
been presented to him pictorially so that it should be 
fixed in his imagination. The criminal deserved, indeed, 
something far worse than death ; but when his crime was 
half forgotten the horror of his agony prevailed and . 
was alone impressive. 

Here the remedy against misjudgmcnt is again to go 
back to the original sources of the affair. 

Civilised Europe is occupied in the execution of Prussia. 
You may give the criminal abstract names such as 
" Prussian "Militarism " or the " Frederician tradition," 
but it all comes to the same thing. Civilised Europe is 
getting rid of a criminal with whom it cannot live. It is 
puerile to translate this process into a general process of 
extermination. It is a process of exterminating not a 
people (there is no such thing as a distinct Prussian 
people — not even as a separate German tribe), but a 
hitherto unbroken, successful and abominable tradition : 
that of the dynasty and army called " Prussian." 

When the thugs were put down in India, or when the 
Romans put down piracy in the Mediterranean, the 
thing was not done by killing all the pirates. It was 
sufticiont to break the organisation and to make examples 
of a few. We shall break the Prussian organisation, and 
we shall certainly make examples, and we shall do so 
because civilised" Eirrope cannot live with a poison ot 
that kind in its midst. If a member of the European 
community will not observe treaties ; proclaims hif 


January 23. 1917 

right of domination over other mcnit>crs ; defends .uul 
practises actions abominable to the European con- 
science, then Eurojx; has no choice but to elimii^ate the 
{)oi^on. The altcrnati\c is its own ixrnuinent degrada- 
tion and rapid decline. 

But neutrals not only tend just now to forget the moral 
issue or to confuse it. They also — and this is perhaps the 
worst practical featiuc of the situation — tend to believe 
that the victor\- of cither party is now impossible, and 
that the prolongation of tlie war has becovne a mere and 
hideous waste of youth and huinan achievement. The 
causes of this jtidgment arc clear to everyone, because, 
not only neutrals, but the greater part of people, even in 
belligerent countries — have tended in the same direction. 
Indeed, any man, however thoroughlj' he may have 
studied the wars of the }>ast, has such a tendency in 
him the moment he stops the intellectual process and 
yields to an emotion or mood. It i? in realitj' exactly 
the same emotion or mood which makes you say dmnng 
* a night of insomnia that " morning will never come," 
tir tliat some slow jom-ney you are undertaking is " simply 
endless." 'As intelligent statements they are meaningless ; 
as expressions of an emotion they arc natural enough. 

War has .ihvays been and must always be decided by 
the superior power of endurance, in one form or another, 
of one party to it. The only difference between circum- 
stances which produce this despair of a conclusion and 
circumstances which on the contrary produce exaltation 
and confidence, is a difference in scale. Ihc two lines 
in the West, for instance, have faced each other on much 
tlie same ground for now 27 months. Had it been 27 
liours or 27 days the mood of which I sj>eak would not 
have been produced. Twenty-seven months produces 
it — and that is aU one can say upon the matter. If, 
instead of yielding to an emotion you marshal the factors 
of the military situation and handle them with the in- 
tellect, you not only foi^et this mood of stalemate, but 
jrou wonder perhaps how anyone could have fallen into it, 

" Stalemate" 

The factors of the situation are susceptible 01 a 
calculus ; that calculus has elements of uncertainty in 
it and those elements permit of judgment inclining to 
one side or the other. They do not permit of such an 
idea as " stalemate." Here I can imagine the best 
read and the most intelligent neutral observer saying : 

" Other wars have ended in a stalemate ; for instance, 
. the series of wars between the Allies and Louis XIV. 
It certainly looked, two years before the end, as if Louis 
XIV. was going to be decisively beaten. But at the end 
of the two years his situation was sufficiently recovered 
for the result to be called a draw. There are many other 
such examples in history." 

This is perfectly true ; and it is similarly true that this 
war may perfectly well end in a stalemate if the Allies 
are so foolish as to allorw it. We all know that if it did it 
would be but the beginning of a series of wars ; for 
the issues are far too great to be left thvis in suspense for 
more than quite a short time. We all know on this 
side of the Atlantic ^nd no one better than the Eiiropean 
nations still neutra^ that the short intervening period 
between the present disaster and the next would be one 
even more intensely abnormal, more full of necessary 
despotism, regulation and preparation for struggle than 
is the present moment. It has been so and must be so 
with every primal struggle, from the " peace " after the 
first inconclusive Pimic war to the lull after the First 
Crusade, and the Peace of Amiens. But putting this on 
one side it still remains true that the first bout of even 
so gi'cat a war as this might end inconclusively by the 
simple process of those who have victory in their grasp 
foregoing their opportunity. Moreover eveiy war which 
lias ended in a .stalemate has ended so, because the 
Party which was gradually winning chose to stop. 
The Allies in the case of Louis XIV. could certainly 
have crushed the French Monarchy if they had gone 
on. They did not go on because they thought the 
results they had obtained were commensiuatc with 
the efforts they liad made, and because they did 
lot think that further expense wotild be commensurate 
vith further results. They were not out to destroy 
lie French Mon.irchy. They were out for certain definite 
csults, many of them of a small political character, and 

iiii-.^v ill iJic main tliLj .-uliuci,! , iiuiabls, lioUaud. 

But the present war is being fought about some- 
thing much more intimate and fundamental : nothing ' 
more nor less than tlio ancient imity of Europe. And it 
is not conceivable that the group of belligerents which is 
now at last ascendant will forego its victory through 
fatigue, intemal dissension, or misjudgmcnt. 

But here we come to the last and most important part 
of- such a discussion. How do we know, why can we 
certainly say that one party is now clearly winning, 
that victory by all the known factors of the situation 
lies with the Allies ? Because of two things which 
any neutral may test for himself if he will marshal 
the facts and deal with them intellectually instead of 
yielding to a mere mood. 

The enemy had upon both fronts two years ago a vei-y 
great superiority- in men and a still more striking super- 
iority in mnnitionment, preparation and equipment. 
He failed to make good while he possessed that superiority. 
He has lost his superiority in men ; and to-day the con- 
trast between the reserves of man -power that can bo 
established and used within a given time on the two 
sides is very striking, and is very rapidly increasing, 
lie still has, and will continue " to have, probably 
throughout the campaign, a superiority in material upon 
his Eastern Front. He has better observ-ation there than 
his opponent through a larger air service ; he has more 
guns and heavier guns and far more shell, and he can 
sup])ly himself more regularly, and much more quickly 
through the possession of an at least {enfold railway 
power. But on the otlicr hand there is upon that 
1^-astern front a counterbalancing facton, which is space. 
He compelled a great retreat in 1915. He has compelled 
a small one at the end of 1916. Both have the same 
end ; the reaching of a limit beyond which he cannot 
further strain himself and that without any decision. 

^leanwhile his rate of wastage steadily goes on at more 
than three times but less than four times fiis rate of recruit- 

Upon the West he is outclassed in every single depart- 
..icnt of war. That sounds a bold thing to say, but it 
is jx-rfectly true. His observation is hopelessly outclassed, 
his pieces are neither so ntmnerous nor their delivery so 
accurate nor their supply of shell so large as those of his 
opponents, and his tactical methods are clearly less 
successful. He has not 3'et achieved and he certainly 
never will, anything like the two great conclusive ex- 
periments of the French in October and December upon 
the Verdun sector. He will not, on the offensive^ in- 
flict losses more than double those whicli he has hims^if 
suffered. On the contrary he will suffer far greater losses 
than he inflicts. He has not the new French tactical 
method, and from the very nature of his army with its 
incapacity for initiative below the commissioned ranks 
and its mechanical distinction between these and the 
mass he is incapable of attaining it. He will hold until 
he retires or breaks. But that there is a limit to his 
Iiolding under existing conditions is as clear as the 
mathematical truth that two lines not parallel and 
lying in the same plane will cross each other. For not 
only is his exhaustion in men and in material far more 
advanced than that of his Western opponents but the 
distance between the two is increasing very rapidly 

I have said " existing conditions." No one can foresee 
the future and we do not know what future factors, 
]X)sitive or negative, will be introduced into the problem. 
\\'hat we do know and what we can each of us discover 
for ourselves by a little examination, is that the factors 
as they now stand weigh more and more heavily in favour 
of our ci\ilisation and against that power which chal- 
lenged it. 

I think it should be added in conclusion that the tone 
of all men's minds, belligerent as well as neutral, is 
very different before a decision from what it is after- 
wards. If history is any guide the moment of a tnie 
military decision is revolutionary in its effect on the 
mind. All the doubts and misjudgments of the present 
phase will not only disappear when our victory is won, 
but men will forget they ever had them ; and it is as well 
that neutrals should hold themselves in readiness for 
this revolution of the mind. 

If one reads the private correspondence proceeding 
during any lengthy campaign of ^hc past, one is always 

January 25, 1917 


astonished at the apparent incapacity of contemporaries 
to judge the event. That is because we knew what the 
end was to be and they did not. The victory achieved - 
is, for us, a matter of history ; for them it was hidden in 
a doubtful future. Reading of that soil is highly illumi- 
nating in the present stages of the great European war. 
Victory when it comes does something morally which 
may be compared to an explosion in the physical world. 

Nothing is the same again ; and whether it be the petty 
matter of desiring oneself to have judged rightly or the 
larger matter of diplomatic action, everyone to-day should 
try (and no one more than the neutrals) to stand in the 
shoes of a futiu'e — perhaps not a very distant future — 
in which we shall not be considerring terms or objects so 
much as the last movements of completely successful 

The Fundeni Bridge-Head 

IT is clear that the enemy is not marking time in 
Roumania. He is really held up for the moment 
by the Putna-Sereth line. What makes this 
clfeai" is the fact that he is making such vigorous 
efforts to force that line at the point of Inmdeni. 

He may have been compelled in the last few weeks to 
relax the \iolence of his efforts from a difiiciilty in finding 


11' I 'I 

1 3 * s t r e 


drafts. His losses from sickness alone must have been 
\ery hea\-y in such weather antl under such a strain. 
He may have been compelled to relax some\vhat on 
account of the calls made by other sectors of the front, or 
even because some plan for an otfensi\e elsewhere has 
been laid down and the preparations for it already begun, 
But he is not standing on this his shortest Roumanian line. 
If he were he would be wasting men, and those his ^■ery 
best troops, at the one point on the Allied defensive line 
where he has a chance of success. The line of tlie Putna- 
Sereth is still, as it has been for now seventeen days, that 
sector of the P2astern front upon which the main interest 
turns, and the point of Fundeni upon that line has become 
in the last few days the capital point. 

We shall do well, therefore, to study in more detail 
the nature of the Putna-Sereth line as a whole and the 
character of the Fundeni Bridge-head. 

'i"he Putna is a small river issuing from the Carpatluans 
and falling into the Sereth after a course which is, as the 
crow flies from source to mouth, about c,o miles long. 
The upper portions of it, where it is but a torrent in the 
steep,- densely wooded mountains, have no defensi\e 
\alue and may be neglected. The present Russo- 
Roumanian defensi\e line crosses these upper ravmes 
almost perpendicularly. The Putna continues to be a 
mountain torrent of this sort witii a wide gra\clly l)cd 
and (at this season) no more than a trickk'. of water mider 
broken ice in the midst of it, overlooked upon either side 
of its gorge by steep wooded hills, inrtil it passes under 
the last of these, the summits of the Magm-a 
Obodesti (nearly 3,000 feet above its bed) aard so comes 
out through the rapidly falling foothills on to the Mol- 
davian plain. 

It is from this point that the Putna-Sereth line proper 
begins, and it may be conveniently divided into five 
distinct sections. 

(i) There is the section north of Focsani, say, from the 
mountains to the Paripani ferry. This I have marked on 
the accompanying Map I as Sector A. It is this sector 
which covers that important side railway line and road of 
which we spoke in these columns a week ago, and which 
imitc the two great main railway lines of Moldavia, being 
thus vital (until thev are -supplemented by new work to 
the north) for the" supply of the Allied froat. The 
position of this railway and the way in which the hrst 
sector of the Putna line covers it is apparent upon the 
following Sketch Map II., which I reproduce from the 
week before last. I have marked the two main com- 
nuinication lines (i) and (2) on Map II.. and the vital 
coimecting line (3). 

This tirst "A" Sector of the Putna line is about 
15 miles long if we carry it right into the beginning of the 
mountains, or 13 miles if we only count the full plain. 
During the whole of this sector the Putna is quite a little 
stream, often 'not a hmidred feet across, but rendered 
appreciable as a military obstacle by the marshy lands 
which flank it upon either side. This marshy land I have 
indicated upon Sketch Map I. It is, at the very narrowest 
]jlace, a full 500 yards in breadth. Its average is over a 
thousand yards, and there are places where it reaches 
nearly 2,000. 

The only permrmnt works bridging this marshy belt are 
the railway bridge and entrenchnients and the road bridge 
and causewav, which take their names from the little 
A illage of Faurei, lying between them just to the south 
of the Putna. The bridges have, of course, been de- 
stroyed. But the causeways presumably remain more 
(ir less intact, and it is in the neighbom-hood of the 
Faurei bridges that anv effort to force this important 
sector of the Putna line "must be made, if the effort be to 
disengage the Austro-Gcrmau troops now cooped uj) iu 



January 25, 1917 

the loop of Focsani and to get at the literal railway 
(3, on Map II.) beyond the river, and so interrupt our 
Allies' communications. 

The next sector of the Putna line, which I have called 
sector B on Map I., runs from the ferry at Paripani to 
the \-illage of Rastoca, and is in length rather over seven 
miles. Its characteristic is an immense mass of marsh, 
through which the little stream of the Putna winds, 
mostly towards the southern edge. There is only one 
practicable way across this mass of bad going, and that 
is along the causeway used by the north-eastern road 
from Focsani, which crosses the Putna at the Zamfirei 

We have seen in a former article how the Austro-German 
forces cooped up in the plain of Focsani would be 
threatened from this formation of the river by an enemy 
possessed of superior artillery, for the river coming thus 
suddenly down south makes a flank and exposes (in 
theory at least) the troops within the loop of Focsani 
to fire from both sides, from the north as from the east. 
But in practice, the ground being wliat it is and the 
enemy's remaining suj^eriority in artillery on this front 
what it is, the shape of the Putna's course does not really 
imperil the Austro-German troops in the belt of Focsani, 
though it embarrasses them for movement. The marshes 
are so very wide and the lack of roads across them so 
conspicuous that onl}? a considerable apparatus of heavy 
long range pieces would enable our Allies to use their 
adNantage here. Conversely, the enemy can hardly 
cross here. He can hardly hope to effect a forcing of the 
defensive line across this great belt of bad land. 

When the Putna issues from these marshes in the 
neighbourhood of Rastoca we get a third sector, which 

I have marked on Sketch I. by the letter C. It is some 

II miles in length or slightly less. The Putna here, 
somewhat swollen in size, but stiU quite a small river of 
not more than 200 feet across or so, runs between hard 
banks and through a cultivated plain. But an attack 
upon this sector would not yield the results that can be 
found elsewhere. 

There is a narrow peninsula between the Putna and 
the Sereth, and if the Putna line here were carried or even 
threatened, a stronger main obstacle upon which the 
defensive could immediately fall back would be the 
Sereth just behind. In other words, a really serious 
Austro-German effort here would compel the abandon- 
ment of the Putna, of course, but would achieve nothing, 
because it would simply create a new defensive line, 
much stronger, just beyond the Sereth, or rather, allow 
our Allies to fall back to such a line, which undoubtedly 
has been prepared and which is identical in \alue to the 
])resent line. 

The remaining sectors are two. The shorter sector I 
have marked D on Map I., it may be called the Sector of 
I'undeni. The last sector, the beginning of which 
is indicated by the letter E (and which stretches right 
down to Galatz where the Sereth falls into the Danube) 
is a mass of very broad and most difficult marshes which 

are the characteristic of the Lower Sereth in its entirety. 
Right beyond the Sereth- Putna line a crossing of the 
Danube delta below Galatz is possible — as has previciusly 
been mentioned in these columns, but its results doubt- 
ful. So far as the Putna-Sereth line is alone concerned 
the only place where the offensive tffort could be usefully 
made would be that upon which the enemy concen- 
trated a small Turkish force the other day, to wit, the 
extremity at Galatz. If he were to get a footing on the 
further side of the Sereth at Galatz it would indeed 
give him political possession of the town and a further 
control of the Danube, but it would not effectually turn 
the Putna-Sereth line, because of the defensive oppor- 
tunities immediately behind Galatz. Moreover, the 
enemy has hitherto failed at the Galatz point and there-, 
fore, both as a consequence of this failure and from the 
nature of the opportunity, he is concentrating upon the 
Fundeni sector, and on the point of Fundcni itself, in 
his effort to break the Putna-Sereth line. 

What are the special advantages for him in this point 
of Fundeni ? 

We have already shown in previous issues what the 
main advantages to him are. Fundeni stands in a loop 
of the river Sereth upon which he can bring a converging 
fue if he manages to occupy both sides of the loop, and 
Fundeni is the last dry crossing place before the huge 
marshes of the Lower Sereth begin. 

Let us see what his fortunes have been in this neigh- 
bourhood bv examining the details of the locality upon 
Sketch Map III. 

The river Sereth in this region is about 250 yards 
broad : that is more than half the breadth of the Thames 
through London. It is not fordable, and immediately 
below the large village of Fundeni it begins to form upon 
either side of its stream very wide marshes in which stand 
stagnant serpentines, old backwaters which have been 
cut off by alluvial deposits in the past. In tliis marsh 
there are strips of drier land, notably one on the right 
bank at the point marked A in Map III., but though the 
marshes are now partially frozen, they make, as a whole, a 
very difficult approach to the Sereth banks. 

Above Fundeni the ground is hard upon either bank, 
with occasional beaches of gravel, especially that marked 
B just opposite the village. 

To the west of this gravel bank B is the large scattered 
village of Nanesci, which is somewhat protected from 
attack by two narrow stretches of water, the remains 
of an old course of the Sereth. The houses of Nanesci 
stand separate from one another in gardens, and ai-e 
connected by narrow rambling lanes, the whole 
agglomeration being something like a mile across. 

The High Street of Nanesci, or main road, goes up 
northward across the Sereth by the bridge at C, which 
has. of course, been 'broken since the Russians re- 
oossed it. Southward it makes for the point of the Icop 

January 25, 1917 


in which Fundeni stands, crossing the Rimnik river by a 
bridge called the Mora bridge. Thence one goes on by a 
very indifferent earth road to Garlesci and Crangeni. 
The latter tiny hamlet stands just on the edge of the 
great marsh ; Garlesci, which is not ninch bigger, is a 
little further in on to the dry land. When we add the 
fact that the whole district is an absolutely fiat plain 
about 70 feet above the sea with no accidents except the 
bluff banks of the Sereth, and also the fact that thei'e is 
very little wood or cover of any kind in sight, and that 
the whole is to-day deep in snow but the rivers not 
frozen, we have before us the topographical elements of 
the problem which has been set to the enemy in his 
attempt to cross at this point. 

The enemy reached the Putna-Sereth line, and was 
' held up there, on the Sunday and the Monday, the 7th 
and 8th of January. His efforts to force it have so far 
occupied some seventeen days. It is remarkable that 
he concentrated upon this vulnerable point of Fundeni 
what he regards as his best troops, the Prussian regiments 
from the original Prussian districts of Brandenburg and 
of the old Mark. With these forces and with his pre- 
poAkrance of heavy artillery he came to a line roughly 
indicated by the crosses upon Sketch III. 

He did indeed lose in the midst of this period for a 
moment the hamlet of Garlesci, but he recovered it 
again rapidly, by the bringing up of reinforcements, and 
he stood upon this line of crosses for some days while 
bringing up still more troops and making a heavy head 
of shell. 

Meanwhile the Russians, appreciating the importance 
of the Fundeni loop, put out two considerable rearguards 
or advanced posts. (One may look at it either way. They 
were the rearguards of the retreat, they were the ad- 
vanced posts of the defence). The one group was round 
and in Nanesci, the other at the hamlet of Crangeni. 
The latter still holds ; but the former was forced back in 
the course of last Friday and during Saturday morning. 
It lost so little in men (and nothing in guns) that we 
might almost regard it as a voluntary retirement "had 
not the Russians themselves told us they had yielded 
ground. We may take it that the Austro-German line 
now stands north Of the Rimnik somewhat after the line 
of large dots on Sketch Map III. ^ 

The alignment thus formed is not, it will be apparent, 
yet able to make full use of the loop of the Sereth. 

The value of a narrow loop such as this to ah assailant 
trying to cross a river obstacle is, of course, that such a 
loop is a salient, and that small salients are very difficult 
to liold against converging fire from either side. But the 
one side of this salient is in the present case marshy 
ground and further protected by the Russian advanced 
posts at Crangeni. The latter are in danger of isolation 
from their main body and may not be able to hold. 
Should Crangeni be abandoned everything really depends 
upon the condition of the marshy district on the right 
bank of the Sereth below the mouth of the Rimnik. 
We do not know how far it is frozen and practicable at 
the present moment, nor what the opportunities are for 
throwing a causeway across it if it is not practicable. 
If either from the frost or in any other fashion the passage 
of this marshy belt is practicable and the eastern half 
of the loop below the mouth of the, Rimnik is reached, 
it is clear that the district of Fundeni within the loop 
will be lost and that the Sereth will be' crossed. Where 
a loop is as narrow as that there is no reason why works 
.with sufficient time for their preparation, crossing the 
neck, should not afford just as good an obstacle as the 
river itself. But there again we cannot decide on the 
value of such works until we know the condition of the 
marshes on the north of the Sereth— that is, on the left 
bank. For if these be practicable at the present moment 
it would be extremely difficult to form a defensive Hne 
behind Fundeni which would hold. 

We are, after this examination, in a. position to under- 
stand why the enemj' has chosen Fundeni for his chief 
effort ; why he has massed there his best troops, and 
what he hopes to gain from his attack at this point. And 
we are also in a position to affirm once more that such 
an effort, so directed and using such picked regiments, 
clearly pro\-es that he is both unwilling and unable to 
abandon his Roumanian adventure — late as the season 
is getting to be, and necessary as it is for him to make 

preparations for the offensive to vvlilcli he is condemned' 
at some other unknown sector of his many fronts. 


A good deal of ink has been wasted in the last few days 
in discussing the point mhere the enemy will make that 
hew offensive, which is absolutely imposed upon him 
by the straits in which he finds himself. 

One would have thought that by this time everyone 
knew that enemy concentrations are only discovered upon 
our side by the Intelligence Department of the various 
commands, and that their first and most elementary duty 
is to conceal the knowledge they have acquired. Is there 
really anyone left so simple as to believe that the Germans 
provide news agencies and neutral journalists with infor- 
mation upon their movements, begging them to pubhsh 
the same ? The plain truth is that no one except the small 
handful of professional soldiers* whose t>usiness it is to 
collect and collate all available evidence and to keep it 
secret has the least idea of where the last cnemj'' concen- 
tration may be taking place. They may attempt an 
offensive upon any part whatsoever of three thousand 
miles of front, and when one lias said that one has said 
all that any mere student of the campaign can possibly 
say upon the situation, so far as locality is concerned. 
^Vhat we do know- is that an offensive is necessary to 
them, simply because the energy accumulating against 
them in the West threatens their destruction. They 
tniist, if they possibly can, be the first to attack, even 
though they have not the .weight sufficient for any liope 
of decision left. 

Of the numerous points upon which the enemy can 
choose to concentrate, there is one that particularly 
concerns opii-.ion in this country : it is the coast of the 
North Sea. For among the many forms which the last 
effort of the enemy is able to take, one may be a raid 
upon these islands. 

What the opportunities are for such a raid, even upon 
a small scale, I am quite incompetent to discuss. It is a 
matter falling wholly within the province of those who 
have studied the naval side of war, of which I know 
nothing. But that (if it were thought feasible) the 
enemy would be tempted as a military polic5^ to some 
such raid when he has grown really desperate and finds 
himself at the end of his tether, is a military thesis which 
has been several times put forward in these columns. 
The nearer an exhausted military machine gets to im- 
pending and calculable disaster, the more is it not only 
condemned to such offensives, but the more it tends to 
aim at a political effect. And that is right ; because 
when you know that you cannot win on the purely 
strategic side, you have only the political side on which 
to gamble. Such an effort would, if it failed to reach 
these shores at all, be no more than one disaster, like 
any other disaster which in the actual number of men 
sacrificed, would not be compai'able to the sacrifice 
already made in Roumania without result. While if 
it succeeded in landing and maintaining a force for a 
sufficient time to do some serious damage, the political 
effect would be altogether out of proportion to an\?thing 
else that could be achieved by the dwindling resources at 
the enemy's disposal. H. Belloc 

Of all the many good enterprises on behalf of our gallant 
fighting-men now before the public, there is not one which 
appeals with more peculiar force than the Lord Roberts 
Memorial Workshops. It is well known that " Bobs 
Bahadur " from his earliest days did everything in his power 
to improve the life and surroundings of the private soldier, 
and his method was always to appeal to the better self and 
to provide facilities which would enable a man to cultivate 
and develop self-esteem. This scheme is run on the same 
principle and is therefore a most fitting memorial to the 
great General. Money is badly wanted to place on a sound 
financial basis workshops where a man, however grievously 
maimed, can yet with industry secure a livelihood which 
with his pension will place him above all thought of charity. 
The svstem is already working well on a small scale, but 
requires to be largely extended. Lord Cheylesmore is at 
the liead of it, a fact that in itself is eloquent testimony to its 
practical wisdom: contributions sliould be forwarded to him at 
" The I,ord Roberts Memorial Worksliops Ikadquarters, 
122, Brompton Road, S.W " 



January 25^1917 

Mr. Wilson and the War 

By Arthur Pollen 

NO thoughtful reader of the public press can fail 
to liave been struck by two remarkable mani- 
festations of opinion during the last few weeks. 
First, there has been a steadily growing appre- 
ciation of the fact that the enemy's attack upon our seii 
supplies is a factor of grave importance. From the 
middle of August until to-day the submarine campaign 
has maintained a consistency in its success that is entirely 
without parallel, and while there liave no doubt been 
occasional very obvious breaches of the undertaking 
given by Germany last May to \\'ashington— and in 
the Mediterranean these breaches have been almost the 
rule since May last— yet on the whole the German sub- 
marine policy has not been conducted as it would have 
Ix^en liad that undertaking not been given. Ships have 
not, as a general rtile. been sunk on sight, and liners, 
both neutral and belligerent, have practicallv been spared 
altogether. It seems to follow then, that even with the 
lorces at present available, the submarine campaign 
could be made more ruthless than it has been. 

\A'c are not to lose sight of the fact that every resolu- 
tion passed by public bodies, in response to the Kaiser's 
appeal to his subjects to harden their resolution to win, 
has included a strong recommendation that tlie sub- 
marine campaign should be pushed to the utmost. And 
while these loud calls that Germany should no longer be 
hand tied in this matter, are being sent up to the higher 
]iowers, the AUied peoples are being informed, from 
twenty different sources in Germany, that large as is 
the present number of submarines at work, many more 
are under construction. The means and methods of 
attack, then, may both be greatly multiplied. If these 
boasts are true — and it is idle to say that they cannot 
be true — then the effort to reduce "us literally to the 
jjosition of a beleagured citj- may be reinforcecl in two 
directions. It may be enhanced by the adding of a new 
terror to the attack by the total disregard of warning. 
All ships hitherto sunk with some regard to saving 
crews, may be sunk on sight, and liners, hitherto generally 
immune, may be included universally as victims. And 
the whole scheme of submarine operations may be ex- 
tended by the multiplication of submarines. 

These inferences, which seem natural and obvious from 
known facts and public statements, have gained in 
cogency by the First Sea Lord's recent statement that 
the submarine menace is of far greater gravity now than 
it has ever been since the war began. On the top of 
what the submarine may do, we have also had a sudden 
and dramatic re\elation of Germany's capacity to get 
raiders on to the ocean and to revive, in the third year 
of the war, the startling performances of the Karlsruhe 
and Emdcn. For the second time, a war ship disguised 
as a neutral trading vessel has passed llirough our patrol 
on to the high seas and, for the first time, a captured 
British prize has been taken back, again through our 
patrol, in triumph to a Gennan harbour. These things 
added to the sustained, though not increasing, toll taken 
by the submarines, have naturally added to the appre- 
ciation of the fact that our command of the Allied sea 
communications is subjected to a very clear qualification. 

Neglect of Naval Counsel 

Next, side by side with this general awakening to a 
most disagreeable development, there has been mani- 
fested a somewhat wide discontent with the spectacle of 
the Allied premiers, foreign ministers, war ininisters and 
the commanders-in-chief conferring together and con- 
certing national and strategic policies, without any 
'Spokesman or represent ati^'c either of the British or any 
other navy taking part in these consultations. S'et frorn 
ihe lirst day of the war until now, no speaker or writer 
rm the Allied side has failed to include as first and fore- 
most of our assets, the sea predominance of Great Britain. 
That tliis country could assert, and defend, and so in- 
variably exercise an almost absolute command of the 

sea, has throughout .seemed to be the one self-evident 
factor in the war. There is not one of the fighting Allies 
that does not either owe its national sustenance, or the 
fuel, or the raw material from which its munitions aie 
derived, to the sea supplies which Great Britain defends. 
And, conversely, the most powerful of all the factors that 
must abbreviate the enemy's capacity to carry on the 
war— namely, the exhaustion of the food supplies of tlic 
Central Powers, is, as obviously, the direct result of the 
blockade eflc<;ti\-ely commenced a little more than a year 
ago. How, then, while the Allies are leaning wholly 
on sea power, and our enemies are being chiefly exhausted 
by it,, are we to explain the fact that when the Allied 
statesmen and soldiers confer together, they ignore naval 
counsel altogether ? 

Premises and Disillusionment 

The explanation seems unquestionably to lie in this. 
We all used to suppose that the great developments in 
sea force that dated from the year 1905— when the main 
armament of the battleship was increased by two and a 
half, when there began that progress in the growth of 
artillery which has culminated during this war in ships 
being sent into action armed with guiis firing projectiles 
exceeding those of the previous decades by three times 
in range, penetration and destructive force ; when the 
turbine opened up the possibilities of a speed develop- 
ment that has given us destroyers, criiisers and battle 
cruisers that can attain nearly forty miles an hour ; when 
torpedoes so grew in speed and endurance as to 
outrange 300 per cent, the biggest guns of the Russians 
and Japanese ; when the submarine developed from 
an ingenious weapon for harbour defence, to a vessel of 
high sea-keeping powers, intensely formidable and effec- 
tive for almost every purpose of sea war, a threat in 
battle, a standing menace to all fleets at sea, and an 
unprecedented scourge to every trader on the ocean- 
all these, we thought seemed destined in 1914 to add 
incalculably to the fighting powers of fleets. It seemed 
inevitable that when sea forces met, the destruction of 
one would be terribly swift and victory come with awe- 
inspiring rapidity. 

The facts of this war have disillusioned us. Such 
actions as there have been were each and all of 
them incredibly prolonged. The fight between Sydncv 
and Emdcn, between Admiral Sturdee's 12-inch gunned 
battle cruisers and von Spec's 8-inch gunned armoured 
cruisers, the pursuit and destruction on the same day of 
Letpzic and Nurnh;rg, unprotected ships witli 4-inch 
guns engaging faster— and in some cases armoured- 
ships, in all cases ships lising weapons the shells of 
which were incalculably more effective, the action of the 
Dogger Bank of January 1015. all of these showed that, 
whatever the superiority in gun-powTr might be, it might 
take anything from one to five hours for a ship to make 
that number of hits which should be the Equivalent of 
the two salvoes that can be fired in a minute and a 
half. Finally, at Jutland, when, to the other troubless 
that imposed such unexpected limits to the employment 
of sea force, there was added the difficulty of bad seeing, 
an unprecedented spectacle was witnessed. The entire 
naval forces of Germany, after being attacked and kept 
m play, \rith perfect ner\'e and masterly skill, for three 
and a half hours, were brought at six "o'clock to within 
12,000 yards of the British Battle Fleet. They were 
kept in contact between twelve thousand yards and nine 
till 7.30. The latter fleet was neariy twice as strong in 
numbers, and as some authorities would have it, four 
times as strong in gun power— so that, had it been possible 
to bring about an effective artiller\' engagement, the 
total destruction of the enemy slio'ukl liave l>cen effected 
in five or ten minutes. Yet "the difticulties of the situa- 
tion were found to be insuperable, and the German fleet 
escaped, damaged indeed but integral. Sir John Jellicoe, 
m his recent statement, as indeed in his disnatch. has 

Jannaiy 25, 191) 



explained this escape with perfect candour. The long 
range torpedo has defeated the long range gun, and, ni 
poor light, decisive action can only be sought at a risk 
which is prohibitive. , 

Victory, or Subordination. 

Now war is primarily a matter of fighting, and enormous 
and indeed incalculable as arc the benefits we all deri^■e 
from such use of the sea as we can enforce, the day it 
was admitted that we are not to expect the navy to seek 
or to achieve a conclusive military victory over the 
enemy's sea forces, from that day, obviously, naval 
advice and naval plans must fall into a second place, 
when operations of war are considered in Council. The 
sea war falls into the same category, in relation to the 
main operations, as do questions of transport and com- 
missariat. Tire llect is no longer a primary weapon, 
although it discharges a vital role in the protection and 
the defence of our primary sources of supply. And unless 
it is a primary weapon, unless it has a primary military 
objective, we cannot expect those that speak for it to 
occupy that place in the ^^'ar Cabinet which in other 
circumstances would unquestionably be theirs. Whether 
this subordination of sea power is, in the essence of things, 
really inevitable ; whether even now it can be restored 
to what, on a priori reasoning, most of us would consider 
its proper place, are matters that can be discussed on a 
futm-c occasion. For the moment we must, it seems to 
me, recognise both the fact and the most obvious explana- 
tion of it. And having done so pass on to note certain 

The facts of the position are that we are not to expect 
a naval victor}? except in conditions that must be of the 
enemy's own choosing, and as he is most milikely to 
select those favourable to our wishes, we must face the 
situation that sea war has to be conducted withoiit the 
advantages that would accrue to us from sea 
victory. At the moment the greatest of all the benefits 
that the enemy reaps from his fleet being intact and 
intangible is his command of his harbour exits to the 
North Sea and to the Baltic. It is this command that 
enables him to put his submarines and his occasional 
raiders into the Atlantic. .And if we in turn are unable 
to dispute the command of these exits, the attack which 
submarines and raiders make on our sea communications 
imposes three secondary duties, one on the navy, the 
second upon such civil departments as have the control 
of our ship-building industry, the third on the Govern- 
ment as a whole. It is for the navy to mitigate as far as 
it can the submarine scourge, by direct attack upon the 
boats themselves, by arming the merchantmen, by 
patrolling trade routes, where such patrol is possible, by 
controlling the movements of ships so as to warn them 
from all areas proved to be infested. It is the Admiralty 
alone that can assist merchantmen by equipping them 
with the means' and instructing them in the arts of self- 
defence. And the importance of self-defence all ex- 
perience has showni to be overwhelming. There is no 
need for this to be linrited to equipping ships with 
gims and supplying them with trained crews — enormous 
as is this task. Something, at any rate, can be done in 
developing means to assist merchantmen to evade sub- 
marine attack, and instructing those very resourceful 
persons, the sea captains, as to the best methods of em- 
plo\ring them. 

Value of Armamsnt 

That much has been done in this direction seems 
to be borne out by the not unsatisfactory fact 
that, in the last two months, the ratio of British 
ships to the total number of ships destroyed by sub- 
marines and mines is far lower than it was in the first 
part of the renewed submarine campaign. And it is 
not to be doubted that the new Board and the new 
personnel in charge of this important branch of naval 
activity, are tackling these problems with the utmost 
vigour and resource. Nor again does it seem to me 
doubtful that, ul/iniakly, we shall restore the ascendancy 
of the attack on the submarines themselves that we 
enjoyed in the summer of 1915 and in the spring of last 
year. Since August undoubtedly this ascendancy has 
been lost. But in theory it obviously can be restored 
— intricate and formidable as the practicable obstacles 

to its restoration may now appear. And pending its 
restoration, which would can'y with it the \-irtual collapse 
of the whole campaign, we have to rely on mitigating our 
losses by bucli occasional successes as we can get against 
the submarines by replacing them by fresh ship-building. 
There are many indications that every effort is being 
made to replace our losses by new shipping as fast as 
the resources of our shipyards in material and labour 
will permit. Finally, we must trust, above all, in 
organised national economy in the consumption of the 
things that the ships bring us. If we are indeed, as the 
rhetoricians tell us, a beleaguered city, there should be 
no delay in putting the whole garrison, but particularly 
the useless mouths on half rations. . 

America's Notes 

A year ago one would ha\'e said that even if there 
were no other reason why the present dimensions of the 
submarine campaign must be unthinkable, the opposition 
of neutral powers to such a development would in- 
evitably suffice to stop it. With the brave words of the 
Lusiiania Notes still ringing in our cars it seemed utterly , 
unreasonable to suppose that America could tolerate 
any considerable prolongation of the interval before 
that outrage y\as disowned and atoned for, quite un- 
thinkable that fresh outrages of the same sort could 
tamely be submitted to. And the Sussex Note of April 
last seemed a final confirmation of these opinions. But 
American feelings about the war have been in a strange 
tangle in the interval. And the last stage of bewilder- 
ment seems to have been reached by Mr. Wilson's 
idealistic speech to the Senate on Monday last. When 
the December Note was published, Mr. Lansing 
hastened to explain that the motive behind it was Mr. 
Wilson's fear that unless the war soon ceased, the United 
States must inevitably be drawn into it. But this 
explanation had to be withdrawn even more hastily 
than it was made. Yet, strange to say, in the debate 
which arose in the Senate, when Mr. Wilson, through 
Senator Hitchcock, tried to persuade that august body 
to endorse his action, it was precisely this fear that carried 
the day against this endorsement being given. 

This fear and another ; What would happen to America's 
traditional aloofness from European entanglements if 
the President's Peace Note were endorsed by the Senate, 
as it stood ? For the Note, it will be remembered, not 
only asked the belligerents to state the terms on which 
they were willing to make peace, but went on to say that, 
once peace was made, America would be willing to join 
in seeing that it was never broken again. Add to 
this that it was published just when Germany was de- 
manding peace with threats, and it was easy enough to 
see why the Senate refused that unqualified support that 
the President was most anxious to obtain. The chief 
spokesmen of the opposition were the two Republican 
Senators, Cabot Lodge and Borah. The first took his 
stand on the fact that the Gennans had interpreted Dr, 
Wilson's intervention to be an action entirely favourable 
to themselves. " If this is so," said Senator Lodge, 
" however far this may be from the President's intention, 
here is reason enough why we should not endorse it." 
ThcWUics were fighting for the reign of law and justice, 
America must not side with those whose whole conduct 
is their negation. Senator Borah took a wider ground. 
The President's Note held out the prospect of America 
being prepared to maintain the rights of the smallest 
nation in Europe, by ever}- influence and ever resource 
at America's command. Was it really meant that the 
army and navy of the United States should be at the 
command of any European power for the protection of 
the smaller nations ? This was a large enough order. 
But clearly a still more startling departure from American 
tradition would easily be possible, ^^'hen once all the 
nations were leagued together for peace, suppose Argen- 
tina to quarrel with some European power and then tc 
refuse arbitration ? Were tlie United States to stand 
by, and not only \\-atch Europe make war on Argentina, 
but join in hostilities against a fellow American republic 
themselves ? It was really this argument that finished 
off the Hitchcock resolution, so that all the Senate 
ultimately committed itself to was to support the 
President in requesting the warring nations to state the 
terms of peace which they desired. There was thus no 



January 23, 1917 

endorsement of the President's action, no support for the 
wider implications of the Note, not even an approval 
l)y the Senate of the mere sending of this request. 

A carefiil study of the debate shows the thoughts that 
■tre uppermost." First, if the effort to get peace did not 
•^imediately succeed, the danger of America being forced 
mto war was clearly greater at the present stage than it 
Mver had been. Senator Lewis, amongst others, gave 
this point great emphasis. Though less explicitly stated, 
another thought is throughout very clearly visible. 
However the purposes of the League to enforce peace 
are defined, it is clear that it is those purposes, and no 
others, that the Allies are now fighting to attain. In 
spite of outrageous injuries, .\mcrica, bound by tradition 
to stand ck%r of Eiu-opean entanglements, has refused 
to join this effort. How can she consistently bind 
herself to indefinite future obligations to fight, if she is 
so reluctant to fight now ? The Senate, in other words, 
refused to shut its eyes to the fact that Dr. Wilson's 
December Note offered to commit the United States to 
a policy inconsistent with their past traditions— wildly 
inconsistent with their present policy. It was for these 
reasons that the Senate deliberately dissociated itself, 
by a vote of 48 to 17, from every part of the President's 
action except the bare request that both sides should 
state their terms of peace. And it is significant that 
:^q out of 48 who constitute the majority, were Democrats, 
and that the 17 who voted against the resolution, did 
so because they thought that even this very moderate 
support of the President was more than the Senate 
ought to give. In other words, the Assembly of America's 
elder statesmen went so far as it possibly could in re- 
pudiating the President'<i action in toto 

Resolute Inaction 

If we are to understand his speech of Monday last, 
we must bear this fact in mind. It is the President's 
effort to defend andJimit his personal committal to the 
ideals of the League of Peace. His speech is not made 
in the hope that it will give a new direction to European 
policy. It is made in the effort to discover a common 
ground amongst the American parties for an American 
policy. It does not follow on any endorsement by 
congress of a plan of action in Europe proposed by the 
President. It is the necessary result of the repudiation, 
by an important part of Congress, of action actually 
taken by him. This being the situation, let us note 
certain e.Ktremely significant statements. America 
neither claims, nor expects to have, any hand whatever 
in settling the peace terms of Europe. This is surely 
fxtremely significant, for it means that except under 
the direst compulsion, America will maintain her hardly 
maintained neutrahty to- the end. Next, the President 
lias laid down the only kind of peace with which any 
American pledge to join in the future keeping of peace 
would be compatible. It is a peace that follows from 
agreement, and not from victory. Now, clearly, no man 
of sense looking at the conflict as it is in Europe to-day. 
can conceive such a peace to be possible. Writing in our 
issue of December 28th — the first that appeared after 
the pubhcation of Mr. Wilson's December Note— I 
stated that the " forces that made this war are not forces 
with which the world can compromise." It is inconceiv- 
able that the junta that has Germany in the hollow of its 
hand, can suddenly express contrition for its crimes, can 
offer to repair the evil it has done, or pledge itself never 
to offend again. 

It is just because this is inconceivable that we 
have all long since realized that the only peace which 
can be a real peace, must follow on our victory. Note 
also that the ideals set out by Dr. Wilson are in 
absolute contradiction to the whole of Germany's policy 
in declaring and carrying on the war. 

The President records that .he has received an 
explicit statement from the Allies of the kind of peace 
they want, and that the Central Powers have declined 
any similar candour. But he does not say that he 
approves the Allies^ terms. He almost cries " a 
plague on both your houses." For he rules out 
victory as a road to peace, yet he must know that with- 
out victory the Allies cannot get any tolerable terms at 
all, and that victory was Germany's only object from the 
first. So far, then, from President Wilson's speech being 

an equivalent of an American programme, it looks 
rather as if he were purposely la^-ing down as conditions 
precedent to any American action, a set of principles 
that never coulcl be realized. For, if American co- 
operation in maintaining the law of truth and justice in 
the future is dependent upon that law being voluntarily 
accepted by all Europe first, then we may be assured 
that the risk of Washington being called upon to commit 
the American people in this matter is so slender as to be 
negligible. In explaining his programme then, President 
Wilson has explained it all awUy. This being 'SO we 
need not alarm ourselves over " the freedom of the 
seas," or any other of his phrases. 

I am writing this without having seen one single word 
of comment in any American paper. But I venture to 
prophesy that this speech will be received as an anti- 
climax. So far as American policy is concerned, things 
stand therefore to-day exactly as they stood in May 
last, with this important difference : that the belligerents 
have put their cards upon the table. Germany, it is 
true, has refused to state her peace terms, but as no part 
of the world has the least doubt about her war aims, 
this is an immaterial detail. If, then, Washington has 
to face the question once again of taking any active part 
in the defence of American interests before peace arrives, 
there can be no question as to what objects she will 
indirectly assist by so doing. 

Nor can there be any doubt that Washington may 
have to choose in this matter sooner than many people 
think. The German undertaking of May last contained 
the proviso that circumstances might compel the German 
Higher Command to withdraw from it. It is as clear as 
anything can be that the time for this denunciation has 
now come. I have alluded above to the pressure now 
being brought to bear on the Berlin authorities by public 
bodies throughout Germany. This pressure will cer- 
tainly supply the excuse for a form of action for which 
the desperate case of Germany is the real cause. We 
may see the May Note denounced at any time now. 

Arthur PotLEX 

P.S. — News of the destroyer action off the Dutch 
Coast comes just as we are going to press. The enemy 
seems to have been roughly treated. If he lost, as 
some accounts say, seven boats, it is an extraordinary 
victory. It is remarkable that our only loss was a 
destroyer torpedoed. Is there another case on record ? 
It is evident that our forces were directed and led with 
great skill and dash. 

A Fine Character Study 

In Elliott Limited, by D. S. Mann (Sidgwick and Jackson. 
6s.), we have a story of an individual's progress and develop- 
ment, which whenever treated with distinction as in this 
case, arrests attention. Elliott started life as tlie son of an 
East Anglian farmer wlio had many good qualities, but 
lacKing business ability made a failure of his life. His son 
began life at fifteen, driving the plough, milking cows, etc., 
and in his spare time educating himself. From this he 
passed on to office work, and got his really first start by a 
little skilful embezzlement which, wlien times improved, 
he made good. He joined the army, fought in South .^f^ica, 
did a period of service in India, returned to South Africa, 
and finally bought himself out. Then he took to journaHsm, 
had more downs than ups, loved and was loved, finally made 
good and at last married a woman wlio provided him with 
the material comforts of life, but not with that good com- 
radesliip which a happy marriage should contain. And so 
comes tlic end — a bullet in the Great War, 

The verj' title of the book imphes that it is the record of 
limitations, and from that point of view must bo warmly 
praised. We never lose our interest in the chief figure, 
though at times feel inclined to kick him and tell him to 
liustle up and take a broader and brighter conception both 
of himself and of life generally. His abiding affection for 
his parents, through good and bad times, is the brightest 
trait, and on reading the epilogue, we can but hope that the 
wife made good the husband's fine self-sacrifice. 

.Mr. Mann has the gift of narrative ; he would do well to 
shake himself free of the Wells manner, and mannerisms, but 
the book is one very much above the ordinary and its perusal 
will well repay all those who read in order to obtain a more 
intimate knowledge of human nature. It is sincere through- 
out, and sliould prove a success, and be the prelude to o'her 
\olumcs in whicli luiman life and endeavour are dealt witl 
in a discerning and sympathetic mannc;,. 


January 25, 1917 

Opening of the 1917 Campaign— II 


By Colonel Feyler 

Colonel Feyler, the well-known Swiss military writer, 
reviewed rapidly last tvcek the ■progress of the War 
until the end of 1916. In this concluding article he 
sums up the pros and cons of the 1917 campaign. 

THE question of the immediate future is whether 
the Central Empires will be in a position to 
resume their original intentions and destroy their 
essential enemies, which would secure their con- 
cjuests ; or whether on the contrary, the Allies will be 
able to push their attacks until the Germanic forces are 
destroyed, in which case they would dictate their terms 
uf peace ; or lastly, supposing the present situation w-ere 
preserved for a long time, whether the Central Em- 
pires, who are virtually a beleaguered city, will be able 
to protract their resistance long enough to wrest from 
the exhaustion of their opponents recognition of all or 
part of the territorial results which they have achieved. 

The answer depends entirely upon the remaining re- 
sources employed by the most skilful command, supported 
by the most obstinate determination on the part of 
tire army and the people to endure and win. 

Enquiry into the matter of the remaining resources 
shows that the Allies have a larger margin than the 
Central Empires. The Allies have all their avenues 
open to them the whole world over ; each of the great 
Powers among them can supply its own needs or make them 
good by means of exchange with the others ; and the 
small States among them also provide an appreciable part 
of what is required. The Central Empires are reduced 
to their own exclusive resources, and their two Balkan 
allies exact from them more than they contribute. The 
margin of the Allies warrants extensions, whereas that 
of the Central Empires is impaired by reductions. 

Resources in Personnel 

This difference is especially noticeable in the matter 
of the constitution of the armies. Proportionately 
to populations and despite the losses suffered, the reserve 
man-power of France is in a position to supply the 
diminishing line committed to her with greater ease 
than the reserve man-power of Germany can supply 
the line which she has to hold. The Allies of France arc 
reducing her task, while Germany's task is increased by 
her allies. 

At the present time, without reckoning the colonies, 
any one class of recruits of the Powers of the Quadruple 
Entente comprises twice the n-umber of men in the 
corresponding class of the Central Empire Alliance. 

The situation with regard to the effectives of the 
Gei'man army is that on December 31st, the entire 1917 ■ 
class was at the front, either in the firing line or in the 
depots of units immediately behind the front. No men 
of that class remained in the depots in the interior. In 
order to increase the number of her soldiers Germany 
is obliged to resort to all manner of expedients, compell- 
ing the Poles to form regiments, deporting the Belgians 
so as to release men from the land and the workshops, 
and proclaiming a levy en iriasse in order to utilise for 
war purposes everything it is humanly possible to utilise. 
Whatever losses the Allies may have endured, things 
are not so black with them, thanks always to the more 
advantageous proportion of their fronts. Thus for one 
German on the German front, one Austro-Hungarian on 
the Austrian front and one Bulgarian at the front with 
his army, the Allies will not require more than half a 
F"renchman on the French front, two-thirds of an English- 
man on the English front, and half an Italian and a third 
A a Russian on the ItaUan and Russian fronts. These 
aroportions are not advanced as exact ; the remaining 
['ractions constitute reserves. 

The Mass of Manoeuvre 

Scrutiny of the army formations .shows that after the 
■vastage of i(ji4 and 1015 tlv Cntral Empires were 

able to form three masses of nanceuvre in 1916 and the 
Allies iive. 

The tirst Austro-German mass was exhausted before 
Verdun ; that was demonstrated by the cessation of all 
attacks directly the battle of the Somme began and by 
the necessity of remaining on the defensive during that 
battle. The second was exhausted in the Trentino ; that 
was demonstrated by the cessation of its efforts when the 
defeats in Galicia and Volhynia compelled the sus- 
pension of its operations. The third is in action in 
Roumania and is in process of natural diminution of 

Now this last mass was composed for the most part of 
good elements, battahons of infantry and the fourth 
regiments drawn from divisions of four regiments at the 
beginning of the war. The possibility of these drafts 
is now exhausted, or almost exhausted, unless they are 
earned further and taken from the third regiments of 
divisions. But there is a limit to expedients of this kind, 
and the limit is fixed by the minimum force required for 
the stabihty of a front even purely defensive. In this 
connection it must be remembered that Germany has never 
ventured upon appreciable denudation of a front, even 
in periods of greatest calm. In the autumn of 1916, 
when the Eastern fronts, including the Roumanian 
theatre of operations, accounted for seventy-nine German 
divisions, the Western front absorbed a hundred and 
twenty-nine although the Germans were purely on the 

Another thing which must not be lost sight of is the 
losses caused by the operations in these divisions from 
w^hich the Germans w'ould like to draw reserves. I may 
refer on this point to Mr. Hilairc Belloc's always clear 
articles. He has elucidated the whole question. I will 
only recall to mind a few figures based upon the 
admitted German losses on the Somme. 

Before the British front 330 battahons, engaged once, 
lost 45 per cent, of their effectives, or 148,722 men ; 
fourteen divisions, also engaged once, lost 50 per cent, 
of their effectives ; four divisions, engaged twice, lost 
more than 60 per cent, of their initial effectives. Before 
the French front, 326 battalions lost 45 per cent, of their 
effectives, or 139,388 men ; ten divisions, engaged once, 
lost 50 per cent ; three divisions, engaged twice, lost more 
than 60 per cent. Some units were almost annihilated. 
In three weeks, from August 20th to September 7th, 
the i8th Division lost 8,445 men. In one month from 
September 6th to October 9th, the nth Division lost 
8,498 men. In two engagements the 26th regiment of 
the 7th Division lost almost the whole of its effectives, 
2,975 men. 

The repairmg of such wastage as this is possible as 
long as the reserve of men in the interior can make tliem 
good. But it is a contradiction to make them good on 
one side, and on the other to weaken units by excessive 
drafts from regiments and battalions destined to con- 
stitute new masses of manoeuvre. 

So, in 1917 these formations will have to be drawn 
chiefly from the elements which may still be available 
in the interior, that is to say from those raised by the 
expedients referred to above, the Belgian deportations 
and so forth, elements whose quality will necessarily 
be mediocre. 

During the year 1916 the Allies formed five masses of 
mancjeuvre. The first appeared upon the Somme. It effected 
nothing more than a purely local driving back of the 
enemy front, and it suffered heavy losses. It does not 
seem to have been exhausted, however, for the English 
extended their line in order to relieve the French, and in 
spite of this extension of their own front maintained 
army reserves, while the French were forming reserves 
with the help of their imits which had been relieved. 

The second mass was the Italian one which continued 
active after the enemy offensive had been broken in tjie 
Trentino. It was indeed after that withdrawal that 
the Italians won their most notable successes on the Carso. 

The third mass of shock was Brussiloff's army, which 



January 25, 1917 

was exhausted and now Idrnis part of the new Kouinaman 
front, to occupy wliich it had to abandon its projected 
attack upon HaHcz. 

The fourth was the Roumanian array, This was ex- 
hausted but not linally destroyed since its cadre still 
exists. A new, smaliei- mass can be formed from the 
forces that still remain. 

The liftl). mass was composed of the reconstituted 
Serbian army. Its strength has been diminished by 
its last successes. 

The campaign of 1917 will be bound up with the 
possibilities of forming new masses of shock. AU the 
foregoing explanation shows how much greater this 
possibility is for the Allies. With regard to the Central 
Empires "it is conceivable that the Turks may still be 
able to supply a few regiments withdrawn from the 
requirements of t!.eir own defence. The Bulgarians 
and the Austriaus are no longer wholly suClicient for 
the operations on their fronts. The Germans have 
at their disposal some balance of troops from Roumania 
who will not be required in the front line in that theatre 
of the war. For the rest they are reduced to expedients. 

The Alhes still have two "normal sources from \yhich 
to draw their masses in reserve : better proportioned 
distribution of their respective units over their fronts, 
and continued supply of recruits from the mother countries 
and their colonies. 

Resources in Material and Command 

Of course the full utilisation of all tiicbc iesuiuiu> 
in personnel is subject to the collocation of the material 
resources and to the organisation of the High Command. 

Examination of the material resources and their dis- 
tribution would require knowledge of numerous and 
detailed statistics which at present are known to no one 
outside the (Jeneral Staffs. What may be asserted, 
however, is that if the employment of these resources 
is as perfected in the Central Empires as it is among 
the Allies and their distribution even easier there be- 
cause of greater facilities of intercommunication, the 
resources themselves, are more limited. 

With equal (jualitics of organisation, the AlHes have 
one superiority over their enemies ; they can last longer 
>vhile yet consuming more freely at such times as a large 
consumption becomes necessary. Their only inferiority — 
N^ich may be largely put right by the adoption of pro- 
per measures — lies in their imperfect communications 
and in the difficulty of haison between the various 
Sectors of their vast converging front. 

\^'lth regard to the quaUties of the command, all the 
measures taken at the end of 1916 showed the intention 
of the Alhes to guard against defects and to improve 
agreement of effort. They all tend to more complete 
unity of control, ft is very difficult to obtain absolute 
unity, desirable though that is in military operations. 
It is very difiicult to suppress entirely the self-love of 
nations and certain individual interests which act like 
forces diverting energy, but these can be reduced to a 

In the case of the Central Empires there is not absolute 
unity of control. It is true that the (iennan Head- 
((uarter Staff took the high hand in undeniable fashion 
and assumed the conduct of the war. But that was be- 
cause her Allies perceived it to be a condition of victory 
imposed by the relati\^3 weakness of three out of four. 
These three bowed to the will of the strongest believing 
that such submission was indispensable to their own success. 
If circumstances underwent a change and their assurance 
of victory were replaced by fear of possible defeat, their 
idea woiild be not to share any longer the risks of the 
strongest among them, which will then become the 
greatest, but to reduce their own risks as much as possible. 
That will be the time to watch the unity of control of thc^ 
Central Empires at work, and to see whether it will 
resist the forces of disruption. Nothing succeeds like 
success, they say. That is true, but it is also true that 
nothing is so unsuccessful as a reverse ! 

The Moral >{alancc 

This piopuMiioii ii_atlb Us naturally to the last point 
tlial we need contemplate, the one which more than 

evci dominates all military operations : the relative 
moral reserve of the two opponents. NN'hich of the two, 
at the beginning of 1917, seems to be the possessor of 
the last moral reserve ? 

It need hardly be said that on the day when the sup- 
position, mentioned above, is seen to be an actual reality, 
the blow would be a heavy one to the Central Empires 
whose peoples and whose armies would perceive that 
cohesion had ceased to reign among those in Irigh places 
because there was no complete confidence in the futiue. 

For confidence in a final victory is the actual moral 
foundation of the activity of tl\e belUgerents. The 
Germans saj' : " You will never compel us to retire ; 
you will get tired of making attacks without any hope 
of success ; the simplest thing is for you to negotiate." 
The Allies say : " You have begun to retire ; you will 
get tired of retreating without any hope of victory ; the 
simplest thing is for you to evacuate our territory and to 
acknowledge that your success is worth nothing." 

The most obstinate in maintaining one of these opposite 
opinions will certainly be the one who feels liimseli 
most able to hold out because of the means at his dis- 
posal. If to these is added mihtary successes his resolu- 
tion will be conlirmed ; if on the contrary he suffers 
reverses he will get over them or will yield to their de- 
pressing influence according io the degree in which his 
remaining means are affected. 

The Roumanian campaign has made this mental 
condition evident. The Germans tried to use their victory 
to convince their adversary of his inferiority. The ad- 
versary replied : " What is the good of talking to me like 
that ? Do you really suggest that you have beaten 
us E^nglish, us French, us Italians, us Russians, because 
you have beaten the Roumanians ? The real truth is 
that you are going to have much more trouble to beat us, 
and we are going 'to have much greater chance to beat 
you because you are weaker after this fight by all tin; 
losses the Roumanians have cost you." 

A Pyrrhic Victory 

The moral effect is thus turned to the disadvantage 
of the victorious Germans. It always happens so when an 
attempt is made to magnify an effect of this kind beyond 
natural limits, when one wants it to go beyond the 
justification that it has in actual fact. Of all the 
victories won in the course of the war by the Germans 
this one over Roumania probably most deserves to be 
styled a Pyrrhic victory. 

Successes and reverses in the future will have to be 
tested by the same criterion. This will involve no change 
in the method followed heretofore. • We must judge, 
not by the sum of the gains realized, but by the residue of 
means available. Where there is a difference from what 
has gone before is the extent of the moral wear and tear 
which beguiles the van-iuishcd into exaggerating the 
effects of a reverse. 

When we put the case like that one point seems to 
become quite clear. The moral wear and tear being 
equal, the means which yet are left to the Allies enable 
them to get over the depression caused by a reverse more 
easily than the Central Empires, and idso to feel more 
firmly consolidated by success. 

If to these considerations we add a few truths taught 
by experience — among them this, that the victim of an 
injustice generally is stronger in his resolution than its 
author ; and this, that a people whose land is invaded 
fight with greater fury to recover it than the despoilers 
do to keep it ; and this third truth, of historic import, 
that of all the animals with which national heraldry 
loves to decorarte itself, the British hon has ever shown 
itself the most obstinate in its pursuit ; and this fourth 
truth, that Christian civilization countenances the en- 
couraging sympathy of Neutrals with outraged people 
who are defending themselves rather than with the 
aggressors who commit the outrages: if wc gather to- 
gether all these moral factors and add them'to the super- 
iority in means and resources left to the Allies, we shall 
vome to this general conclusion, that the campaign of 
If)! 7 is opening under auspices more favoiirah'e io the 
(hantpions 0/ a Europe that desires the dn'elopmevt of 
the democratic rights of nations than to the champions of a 
reactionary Europe thai claims to be reviving a Jdnd of 
Holy Alliance, inspired bv Jehovah- 

January 25, 1917 LAND & WATER 

Rail Power versus Sea Power 

By Harold Cox 


IN the issue for January nth of Messrs. Constable's 
well-informed and suggestive magazine The Kcxv 
Europe, there is printed a map (by Messrs. Con- 
stable's courtesy it is reproduced here) which 
perhaps more than any other single document yet pub- 
lished brings into clear light the final issue between 
England and Germany 

The map defines the German Empire, with its Austrian, 
Balkan and Turkish dependencies, stretching right across 
Asia Minor to Bagdad and including in its embrace 
iMesopotamia and Si^Tia and a lai-ge slice of Arabia. 
But that is not all. It shows a great black line 
representing a railway sj^stem which only requires the 
completion of a few links to bring Berlin into direct 
communication not only with Bagdad and the Persian 
GvM, but wi h Damascus, Jerusalem and Port Said, 
with IS'ecMna Mecca and the outposts of Aden. If 

peace were concluded, leavmg Germany in control of this 
great arterial railway, it is no exaggeration to say that 
the British Empire would be doomed. 

Our Empire is, and always has been, a sea Empire. 
It had its origin in the sea-faring instincts of the English 
people and in the resulting sea commerce of the British 
Isles. English captains sailed the sea in search of 
adventure or in search of gain, and planted the English 
flag and the English name on the coasts of every continent. 
Erom these maritime beginnings the whole Empire was 
developed ; by maritime connections it is still held 
together. From the point of view of the British Empire 
the sea does not separate, it unites. Long stretches of 
land — mountain and marsh and desert — that can only 
be crossed wath difficulty separate India from continental 
Europe ; the open sea joins India to England. 

South Africa is an equally striking example of the way 
in which the land can separate and the sea can unite. 
The same consideration applies to all our African pos- 
sessions ; they are all approached from the sea, and at 
present there is no other method of approach. In the 
case of Canada and Newfoundland, Australia and New 
Zealand, the West Indian Islands and British Guiana, 
Mauritius and Ceylon and Hongkong, no question of 
rivalry between the land and the sea arises ; the sea is 
the only link. Thus the British Empire is essentially 
a sea Empire, and it is because Englishmen always 
known this in their hearts, even when they had half 
forgotten it in their heads, that we have ever placed in 
the forefront of our poHcy the necessity for maintaining 
a supreme navy. 

We knew that as long as we commanded the sea our 
island home was secure, and that the sea roads of our 
Empire could be protected. And knowing this wc were 
able deliberately to reject the continental ideal of great 
armies because we realized that our command of the sea 
would give us time to make the necessary military pre- 
oarations if ever we should be compelled to join in a 

great land war. By this policy we not only husbanded 
our financial resources, but what is even niore important 
wc secured the acquiescence of most of our neighbours 
in our sea dominion. Had we aspired — as Germany 
aspires— to rule on land as well as on sea, it is certain 
that the present European grouping of Powers could 
never have been called into being to oppose Germany s 
ambitions. Indeed, it is probable that there would 
instead have been formed a league of European nations 
to destroy the British Empire. 

But to-day we arc forced to take accomat of the fact 
that sea power is faced with a dangerous rival — rail 
power. This fact was beginning to be visible long before 
the war. Our mails to India, to Australasia, and to the 
Far East, have for years been sent by the rail route 
from Calais to Brindisi instead of the sea route through 
the Bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean. There has 
been a gain of a clear week, both outwards and home- 
'wards. If peace had been continued it is certain that 
there would have been further developments of rail 
competition with sea carnage. Projects had long been 
discussed for a railway to India, cither through Russia, 
or across Asia ]\Iinor and Persia, and as soon as these 
projects had been completed there would have been a 
further development of railway conununication via 
Burma, Siam and Singapore, with a steamboat scr\'ice 
to Port Darwin bringing Sydney and Melbourne within 
three weeks' journey of London. But it is the war 
itself that has conclusively demonstrated the superiority 
of rail power over sea power in certain geographical 

We have seen month by month during the war how 
the Germans, with their well-planned system of railways, 
arc able to move their armies first to one front and then 
to the other. Those armies with all their equipment 
move in perfect security. They need no escort, they 
fear no submarines. The railway truck which is to 
carry the munitions can be loaded up in the very factory 
where the munitions are made, and vnW run right 
through without further handling to the front 
where the munitions are wanted. In a few days, with 
a minimum of handling, guns and shells can be sent from 
Essen to Riga or from Essen to Roumania or to Con- 
stantinople, to the Trentino or to the Somme. Mean- 
while, our own munitions have to be placed on rail in 
tlie factory, transferred from truck to ship at some Eng- 
lish port, thence to be carried to a port in France or 
Egypt, in Greece or East Africa or the Persian Gulf, as 
the case may be. There the goods have to be got on 
shore by the best methods locally available, with much 
expenditure of time and labour, and with ^eat risk 
of loss. These are facts which form a very serious offset 
to the advantages which our sea power gives lis. 

\Miat is the lesson of these facts as applied to the new 
map of Europe and Asia planned hy Germany and 
already partly made by her ? Suppose that Germany 
retains her present conquests, she will then have a clear 
right of way from Berlin through Mesopotamia to Bagdad, 
and through S^Tia to the frontiers of Eg\'pt and to the 
boimdary posts of our military and naval station at 
Aden. The rail power which she now commands over 
the whole of Central Europe and the whole of the Balkans 
will be extended over Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Syria 
and the coast of Arabia. Is it likely to end even there ? 
The advantage that the German Headquarters Staff now 
possesses in shifting troops from one Eiiropcan front to 
the other will be extended to Asia and to Africa. 

Take first the case of Egypt. In actual mileage 
Cairo is considerably nearer to Berlin by way of Syria 
and Constantinople than it is to London by way of the 
Mediterranean and the Atlantic. But normal rail speed 
may be set down as double the normal sea speed. 
Consequent^ if the Germano-Turkish railway system is 
extended to the Eg^'ptian frontier, German troops could 
be sent through for an attack on Egypt in less than hal f 
the time that England could send reinforcements to the 
Egyptian garrison. Nor is that all. ' The German 
troops travelling by rail through German or Germanised 



January 25, 1917 

territory would travel in fibsolnte security ; our own 
troop* crossing the open sea would travel under the ever 
imminent risk of submarine attack. In such conditions 
it would be easy for Germany to organise a coup de main 
and capture Egvpt. That "this is not an exaggerated 
hypothesis will be realized bv those who reflect on the 
difficulties which we encountered in the earlier stages of 
the war in repelling a purely Turkish attack on the Suez 
Canal, an attack unaided by rail power. Once in pos- 
session of the Egyptian ports Germany could prevent us 
from landing troops, and her control of the Suez Canal 
would cut the most important link between the British 
Isles and our Eastern and Australasian dominions. 

But having conquered Egypt, why should the Germans 
limit their advance ? One of the most striking of all the 
schemes planned by Cecil Rhodes was the creation of 
the Cape to Cairo "railway. That line is not yet com- 
plete ; but if the Germans had securely established them- 
selves in Cairo there would be little indeed to prevent 
them from filling in the missing links and creating a 
through route from Cairo to the Cape — not for purposes 
of peaceful commerce, \^'e have seen how a South 
African force, with the aid of British sea power, has 
gradually cleared the Germans eut of nearly the whole 
of East Africa. But the Germans in possession of Egypt, 
and in the possession of rail power untouchable from the 
sea, would be able to organise their revenge and to in\-adc 
South Africa with a well-equipped army. 

In exactly the same way, when the German railhead 
reaches Bagdad the Pan-Germans will certainly demand 
that the railway shall be extended through Persia till 
(iermany is able to threaten India with a landward 
attack. German agents have already taken some steps 
towards preparing the ground for this contingency. I 
was myself startled four or fi\-e years ago at the frank 
wa\' in which an Indian lawyer with revolutionary 
tendencies spoke of the possibility of the co-operation of 
Indians with Gei-many. Since the war began the Indian 
Government has been engaged in running to earth a 
number of Indian conspiracies largely financed with 

German money. We may regard the prospect of a 
German conquest of India as too absurd to be worth 
consideration, but we may, be sure that it is not so re- 
garded by the Pan-Germans whose ambitions are only 
limited by the confines of the globe. 

Once established at Bagdad, with through rail com- 
munication except for the narrow gap of the Bosphorus, 
the Germans would speedily be able to get down to the 
Perisan Gulf and to establish there a naval station which 
would greatly imperil our sea route to India via the Cape. 
Our route through the Suez Canafwould already have been 
closed, and probably Aden would ha\e been annexed 
by Germany. A German conquest of India under such 
conditions would not be an impossibility. That con- 
quest completed, the Germans would extend their rail 
power across Burma to China, and there organise a new 
Empire for themselves free from any risk of interference 
from the sea power of Great Britain or Japan. ~ 

These illustrations are sufficient to show the enormous 
possibilities of rail power controlled bj? a military 
despotism in command of the interior geographical lines. 
If Germany retains those interior lines the ultimate 
defeat of British sea power by German rail power is 
inevitable. The conclusion is clear that at any cost we 
must prevent the extension of the German dominions 
across the Bosphorus. 

There is no longer any doubt that the original cause of 
the quarrel which Austria picked with Serbia was the 
determination of Germany to get a right of way to Con- 
stantinople, with a view to securing the Bcrhii-Bagdad 
route. To checkmate this design now and in the future 
it is essential that we should insist on the liberation of 
the southern Slavs from Austrian rule, so that they 
may establish an independent Jugo-Slav kingdom. 
Secondly, we must insist that Constantinople is transferred 
to a Power which \\\\\ ha\-e both the will and the strength 
to oppose Germany's Asiatic ambitions. We have to 
realize that the freedom of the Balkans from German 
control is as vital to the security of the British Empire as 
the freedom of Belgium is to the British Isles. 

A Birth of 111 Omen 

By John Trevena 

William II., ninth King of Prussia, third German 
Emperor, was born in Berlin on January 2ylh, 1859. 

A MILDER January no one could remember. 
Indeed during the entire winter of 1858-59 hunt- 
ing went on unchecked by frost. The New 
Year smiled upon a nation well-employed and 
prosperous in spite of the late commercial crisis. Our 
parents, or may be, we ourselves, were being taken to the 
pantomime of Robin Hood at Drury Lane, or to hear 
Mr. Balfe's new opera, " Satanella," at Covent Garden ; 
when the joys of the Christmas holidays became heightened 
by news from Prussia, " The accouchement of the Princess 
Frederick William is daily expected." 

Some few of us may remember how our grandparents 
rejoiced at the assurance that English doctors and nurses 
had set out for Berlin by royal command, because 
Prussia was the sole country of Europe regarded with 
affection by London opinion ; and the birth of a prince, 
or princess, to Queen Victoria's eldest daughter must 
assuredly bring the two peoples yet more closely to- 
gether. Heaven send a prince, said whiskered merchants 
and traders, as they jolted towards their counting- 
hoases upon the knife-board, frowning beneath enormous 
beavers at the daily-increasing crowd and pressure 
upon London Bridge. ' ' An England-loving Prince of peace 
, . . King of Prussia some day . . . perhaps dur- 
ing the century ahead old England may need an ally.' ' 

In those days the towns of En^and were permeated 
with German thought and customs : volksmurchen were 
told by every British fireside ; the music of the father- 
land sounded from every piano ; the popular Mr. Dickens 
had undoubtedly served the public and himself uncom- 
monly well bjf preaching the German Christmas ; a 
favourite hero of romance was the young Prussian officer, 
although a few critics objected in a mild and brQtherlv 

fashion to the ever-increasing supplies demanded by the 
Prince Regent of Prussia, "for the maintenance of the 
royal dignity, for augmenting the army forces, and for 
the support" of the navy." But even Sourfacc drew 
no serious comparison between these warlike prepara- 
tions, and the restless military despotism practised 
by the Third Napoleon. John Bull looked out upon the 
Continent, seeing little except darkness, with figures 
masked and cloaked moving through it. robbing and 
murdering each other; and he was terribly anxious to 
disassociate himself from such brigands. He had long 
searched for a gleam of sunlight from the States of 
Europe ; and it came in the form of an announcement : 

The Princess Frederick Willi ant n'as safely delivered 
of a Prince shortly after ^ p.m. on Thursday afternoon. 

That set the joy bells ringing ! City Fathers in pomp 
set forth to Buckingham Palace to congratulate the 
young grandmother and her Consort. The Count 
Bcrnstorff of that day, Prussian Minister to the Court 
of St. James, gave a grand dinner at which three mem- 
bers of the British Royal Family were present, in cele- 
bration of this happy event. By special command of 
Her Majesty, the tenantry on the Highland estates 
were summoned to an entertainment and ball at Balmoral 
Castle. Great Britain and Prussia were united in a 
fervent hope this child might live to reign. 

A bright-faced boy, travelling as Baron Renfrew, was 
informed in Rome— ^where to the indignation of Exeter 
Hall he visited the Sovereign Pontiff, and went through 
St. Peter's with his hat off— of his nephew's birth. This 
young Baron had been born during a time of profound 
peace, therefore it was not inappropriate he should be 
known in advanced life as a peacemaking King. The 
babe of Berlin opened his eyes upon the eve of five 
great struggles: the war between Franrc and Austria, 

January 25, 1917 



the American Civil war, the insurrection of Poland, the 
attack ofJFrance upon Mexico, and of the Central Empires « 
upon Denmark. He came into a world echoing with the 
coldly polite words addressed by the Emperor of France 
to the Austrian Ambassador upon New Year's Day : 
while wishing His Excellency personally the compli- 
ments of the season, he regretted Austria and France were 
not so friendly as formerly. 

Such words from the leader of the chief military power 
in the world set Courts trembling. Louis Napoleon had 
but to raijje a linger and beckon the King of Sardinia 
for Naples to rise against the imscrupulous Ferdinand, 
Romans against the sovereignty of the Pope, and above 
all, the Lombardo- Venetians, hating the yoke of .\ustria 
with lierce Latin passion, to defy the occupjing forces 
of Germans and Hungarians. 

Model of a Submarine ^ 

The city of Berlin was illuminated, every house hang- 
ing out the national flag in honour of a new-born prince. 
Tlie whole country gave itself up to gas and fireworks, 
torchlight processions, and fetes ; and for the time being 
politics were abandoned. No such rejoicing had ever 
been" known before in Prussia. ' It was as if a prophet 
had been born into the world. While students in their 
thousands promenaded Unter den Linden, bearing torches 
which, according to an eye witness, " resembled the 
reflection of a mighty conflagration," an American 
arrived in London with the model of his invention, a 
submarine boat in which, he claimed, a crew of twenty 
men could remain under water any length of time, pass 
imder the wooden keels of a hostile fleets fix torpedoes 
to go off by clockwork, or bore holes, and come away un- 
seen. They could also make a survey by showing above 
the surface a sight-tube no more than half-an-inch in 
diameter ; they could see their way imder the water by 
means of lights placed behind glass bulls' -eyes ; and should 
the vessel run into anything, it could be extracted with- 
out injury, having on its sharply pointed bow an outer 
case so constructed that, by reversing the screw, the 
boat could be backed, leaving the thimble fastened in 
the obstacle. 

While the British Government followed the example 

of the French, in refusing to purchase so dangerous an 

innovation, Prince Frederick William was replying to the 

congratulations of the Prussian Upper House thus : 

1 thank you most lieartily for the interest which you 

take in an event which is so important and so fortunate 

lor my family and for the country. If God shall spare 

the life of my son, my great object will be to instil into 

his mind those sentiments which attach me to my country. 

JMay God bless my efforts to make my son worthy of the 

affectionate interest with which he has been greeted. 

Concord prevailed between England and all Germany, 
but the rest of Europe smelt of gunpowder. Petty monarchs 
and two great Emperors were running to and fro, setting 
the blazing torch to war-beacons. His Holiness required 
the evacuation of the" papal states by the armies of Francis 
Joseph and Louis Nrpoleon. At the Opera House of 
Milan, when the- waiUkj chorus from " Norma " was 
rendered, the ItaHan audience rose and shouted for war. 
Immediately the Austrian officers rose in their turn, and 
answered, " Yes, gentlemen, it is war." England, strongly 
and sincerely supported by the Government of the Kaiser, 
pressed for a Congress, at which Austria no doubt would 
resign her Italian provinces in exchange for an equivalent, 
such as Moldavia and Wallachia, the Sultan being sole 
loser by tliis arrangement ; and he might regard him- 
self amply compensated by the unusual discovery of 
a few millions in his Treasury. This war, if inevitable, 
must be at all events the last to scar the face of Europe. 

Such was English opinion freely stated, and at a sitting 
of the Pmssian Chamber of Deputies the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs remarked. " The Prussian Govern- 
ment does not for one moment doubt that it will be 
able, in concert with England, to procure due respect 
to existing treaties." The Chamber manifested its 
approval by loud and 'ong applause.- 

The storm grew nearer. Francis Joseph, lamb of Austria, 
sorrowfully mouthing such platitudes as, " War is the 
scourge of mankind," moved his troops towards Turin, 
hoping to crush Victor Emmanuel, wolf of Sardinia, 
before the despot of France should cross Mont Cenis. 

Count Cavour deli\'ered to Baron Kcllersberg the defiant 
answer of Piedmont to this typically Austrian ulti- 
matum, and his Excellency was immediately accompanied 
to the frontier by a Sardinian officer. A royal threat in 
January, and Europe at war a few weeks later. Yet 
people put their confidence in princes ! An Austrian army 
marching upon the seat of Sardinian monarchy ; French 
forces disembarking at Genoa, the transports floating 
among roses and laurels ; a Russian corps threatening 
the Austrian frontier, thus publishing to the world the 
existence of a Franco-Russian understanding, with'the guns 
of the Crimea hardly rusty ; Prussia, " on account of the 
increasing uncertainty in political affairs," placing every 
army corps she possessed upon a war-footing, while de- 
manding a credit for improving the defences of the 
Baltic and fortifying her North Sea Coasts. And Eng- 
land at the civil war of politics, with a General Election 
dragging slowly on. Yet, since completing her great 
work of securing the Dardanelles to Turkey, it had been 
the boast of Britain that in future no war would find her 

The Baptism 

Let us turn, during an otherwise brawling March, 
to a peaceful and domestic scene, the baptism of an 
illustrious infant in the Palace Chapel of BerUn. Not 
one monarch graced the ceremony, the belligerent 
rulers of France, Austria, and Sardinia, receiving ap- 
parently no invitation ; but among the " witnesses absent" 
let us notice, in the light of events long afterwards, 
the Queen of Great Britain, the Prince of Wales, the 
Emperor of Russia, and the King of the Belgians. Even 
tlie royal mother did not enter the chapel, but witnessed 
the reception of her son into the church from a room 
adjoining. Again the streets were dressed with flags, 
and at night the entire city was illuminated for the third 
time, the town-hall being lighted up by more than 
fifty thousand jets of gas. And the royal parents 
addressed to the public a grateful letter in these words ; 

We do not tliink we could choose a better day than that 

of the baptism of our child for addressing to the whole 

country our warmest thanks for the joy it has displayed. 

May we, with the help of God, raise up our son for the 

honour and happiness of our dear country. 
Journals recording these pious words announced also, 
without noticing an omen, how during a March gale the 
fine Channel steamer Prince Frederick William, after a 
stormy passage from England, was flung against Calais 
pier to be tossed aside, a broken vessel with dead aboard, 
the sport of wind and water. Like ships, human hopes 
may be wrecked and cast away. 

We have noticed the arrival of the ingenious American 
with his model of the first subrnarine. Mark yet a further 
coincidence ! That Saturday, when the Prussian grand- 
son of Queen Victoria became also her godson, one Captain 
Norton was, engaged in making experiments at Chatham 
with an invention for destroying battleships, to which 
he had given the name of liquid fire. A shell, charged 
with no more than a teaspoonful of his preparation, 
was fired from a large grooved rifle at pieces of thick 
planking which, a few minutes after recei\ing the charge, 
burst into flames. This composition was perhaps the same 
thing as Greek fire, under a new name, which was to be 
ignored for many years, but not for ever. 

The young child, destined by hope and belief to be a 
bringer of peace and goodwill wherever the English and 
German languages were heard in the streets ; who was 
prepared, not for glory, but, according to the promise of 
his father when addressing the thousands congregated 
beneath the glare of torchlight along Unter den Linden, 
" so that he might be fit for his future task, and worthy 
of the nation's love " ; this worshipped child, later to be 
known as William the Second, King of Prussia and Ger- 
man Emperor, slept in unconsciousness, hearing no 
sound of conflict raging round his protected cradle. 

A well loved child in truth ! And how after many 
years he loved children, and how he sympathised with 
fathers, and grieved at the suffering of mothers : are not 
these things written upon the soil of Europe for men to 
read, and marked upon the ooze of the Atlantic for 
God and his parents to consider ? 

The usual literary article "Books io Read," by Mr. 
Lncian Oldersliaw, has becu unavoidably hddover this uech 



January 35, 1917 

The Golden Triangle 

By Maurice Leblanc 

[Translated by Alexander Teixeira de Mattosl 

Synopsis; Captain Patrice Belval, a wounded French 
officer, prevents in a Paris street the abduction of a nurse 
ic'ho is hnoTJin to her patients as " Little Mother Curalic." 
Belval declares his love to Coralie only to be told by her 
that she is already married, and that fie must make no 
further effort to retain her friendship. Belval gains access 
to a house, in which he finds five men torturing another 
mail, Essares, who turns out to be Coralie's husband, 
Essares shoots one man, Fakhi, and buys off his other four 
assailants for a million francs a piece, with which they 
leave the house. The next day Belval, following Coralie 
to her house, finds that Essares, who had contemplated 
flight from Paris, has been brutally murdered. An 
examining magistrate explains to Belval that Essares 
'uus prime mover in a plot for exporting gold from France. 
In order to recover some 300 million francs which Essares 
had concealed, the authorities consider it necessary 
to hush tip the circumstances of the financier's death. 
The only possible clue to the whereabouts of the gold 
is a paper found in Essares dead hand, bearing the words, 
"Golden Triangle." Ya-Bon, Belval's Soiegalese servant, 
promises to call in Arsenc Lupin to unravel the mystery, 
and Belval, with seven wounded and convalescent soldiers, 
takes up residence in Essares' house to protect Coralie from 
a mysterious threatened vengeance on her. Belval ascertains 
that Simeon, Essares' attendant, has mysteriously befriended 
both himself and Coralie, and also obtains evidence that 
twenty years before, Essares had been responsible for the 
murder of Coralie's mother and his{Belval' s) father and that 
an unknown friend had tried to protect Coralie and himself. 
Through Bournef, one of Essares' accomplices, the authorities 
ascertain definitely that the gold is concealed either in 
Essares' house or in the grounds. Belval saves Coralie from 
strangling, and sets a trap for her would-be assassin which 
fails in its object. Later, searching the Jiouse, he finds a 
rope ladder and some lead pipes and a soldering lamp in 
Simeon's room 



CHAPTER XI (continued) 

IHIS all seems devilish odd," Patrice said to him- 
self. " How did the things get in there ? Did 
Simeon collect them without any definite object, 
mechanically ? Or am I to assume that Simeon 
is merely an instrument of the enemy's ? He used to know 
the enemy before he lost his reason ; and he may be under his 
influence at present." 

Simi^on was sitting at the window, with his back to the 
room. Patrice went up to him and gave a start. In his 
hands the old man held a funeral-wreath made of black artd 
wliite beads. It bore a date, " 14th April, 1915," and made 
the twentieth, the one which Simeon was preparing to lay 
on the grave of his dead friends. 

" He will lay it there," said Patrice, aloud. " His instinct 
as an avenging friend, which has guided his steps through 
life, continues in spite of his insanity. He will lay it on the 
grave. That's so, Simeon, isn't it : you will take it there 
to-morrow ? For to-morrow is the fourteenth of April, the 
sacred anniversary . . 

He leant over the incomprehensible being who held the 
key to all the plots and counterplots, to all the treachery 
;ind benevolence that constituted the inextricable drama. 
Simeon thought that Patrice wanted to take the wreath from 
liini and pressed it to his chest with a startled gesture. 

" Don't be afraid," said Patrice. " You can keep it. To- 
morrow, Simeon, to-morrow, Coralie and I will be faithful to 
the appointment which you gave us. And to-morrow per- 
haps the memory of the horrible past will unseal your brain." 

The day seemed long to Patrice, who was eager for sonu- 
tliing that would provide a glinuner in the surrounding dark- 
ness. And now this glimmer seemed about to be kindled 
by the arrival of this twentieth anniversary of the fourteenth 
of April. 

At a late hour in the afternoon, M. Masseron called at the 
Rue Raynouard. 

'■ Look what I've just received," he said to Patrice. " It's 
rather curious : an anonymous letter in a disguised hand. 
Listen • V 

' Sir, Be warned. They're going away. Take care. 
To-morrow evening the 1,800 bags will be on their way 
out of the coimtry. — A Friend or Ficvnce.' " 

" And to-morrow is the fourteenth of April," said Patrice, 
at once connecting the two trains of thought in his mind. 

" Yes. What makes you say that ? " 

" Nothing . . . Something has just occurred to 
me ..." 

He was nearly telling M. Masseron all the facts associated 
with the fourteenth of April and all those concerning the 
strange personality of old Simeon. If he did not speak, it 
was for obscure reasons, perhaps because he wished to work 
out this part of the case alone, perhaps also because of a 
sort of shyness which prevented liim from admitting M. 
Masseron into all the secrets of the past. He said nothing 
about it, therefore, and asked : 

" What do you think of the letter ? " 

" Upon my word, I don't know what to think. It may 
be a warning with something to back it, or it may be a trick 
to make us adopt one course of conduct rather than another. 
I'll talk about it to Bournef.'' 

" Nothing fresh on his side ? " 

"No; and I don't expect anything in particular, llie 
alibi which he has submitted is genuine. His friends and he 
arc so many supers. Their parts are played." 

The coincidence of dates was all that stuck in Patrice's 
mind. The two roads which M. Masseron and he were follow- 
ing suddenly met on this day so long since marked out by 
fate. The past and the present were about to unite. Thi- 
catastrophe was at hiuid. The fourteenth of April was the 
day on w'.iicli the gold was to disappear for good and also 
the day on which an unknown voice had simmioned Patrice 
and CoraUe to the same tryst which his father and her motlicr 
had kept twenty years ago. 

.:\iid the next day was the fourteenth of April. 

» * « 

At nine o'clock in the morning, Patrice asked after old 

" Gone out" sir. You had countermanded your orders." 

Patrice entered the room and looked for the wreath. It 
was not there. Moreover, the three things in the cupboard, 
the rope-ladder, the coil of lead and the glazier's lamp were 
not there either. 

" Did Simeon take any tiling with liim ? " 

" Yes, sir, a wreath." 

" Nothing else ? " 

■' No, sir." 

The window was open. Patrice came to the conclusion 
that the things had gone by this way, thus confirming his 
theory that the old fellow was an unconscious confederate. 

Shortly before ten o'clock, Coralie joined him in the garden. 
Patrice had told her the latest events. She looked pale and 

They went round the lawns, and, without' being seen, 
reached the clumps of dwarf shrubs which hid the door on the 
lane. Patrice opened the door. As he started to open the 
other, his hand hesitated. He felt sony that he had not told 
M. Masseron and that he and Coralie were performing by 
themselves a pilgrimage which certain signs warned him to be 
dangerous. He shook off the obsession, however. He had 
two revolvers with him. Wiat had he to fear ? 

" You're coming in, aren't you, Coralie ? " 

" Yes," she said. 

" I somehow thought you seemed undecided, anxious . . ." 

" It's quite true," said Coralie. " I feel a sort of nervous- 

" Why ? Are you afraid ? " 

" No. Or rather yes. I'm not afraid for to-day, but in 
some way for the past. I think of my poor mother, who went 
through this door, as I am doing, one .\pril morning. She 
was perfectly happy, she was going to meet her love . . . 
.And then I feel as if I wanted to hold, her back and cry, 
' Don't go on . . . Death is lying in wait for you . . . 
Don't go on . . .' And it's I who hear those words of 
terror, they ring in my ears ; it's I who hear them and J 
dare not go on. I'm afraid." 

" Let's go back, Coralie." 

She only took his arm : 

{Continued on -bage 20> 

Tuiaary 25, 1917 




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Proof to rain, sleet or snow — secure against winter winds — luxu- 
riously wanning— free from rubber or oiled-silk— it enables the 
soldier to face the rigorous conditions inevitable in campaigning with 
an assurance of immunity from discomfort or risk to health. 
The outer part is made in the Burberry material worn by Sir Ernest 
Shackleton and the members of his expedition, as a protection 
against the intense cold and fierce gales of the Antarctic regions. 
The inside of the luxuriously soft, thick Camel Fleece — the most 
sumptuous material available for generating snug warmth in the 
bitterest weather. 

THE BURBERRY TRENCH- WARM is designed so that these 
two parts can be worn separately or together, thus supplying the 
services of three coats in one garment. 

The outside alone, a Weatherproof that will keep out any rain 
that oilskin will ; the Camel Fleece lining, a smart British Warm 
for fine but chilly days ; and the two together the staunchest 
defence possible against the hardships and incessant exposure that 
trench warfare involves. 

Every Burberry garment is labelled " Burberrys " 


8 & 10 Boul. Malesherbes PARIS and Provincial Agenti 



January 25, 1917 

(Continued from page t8) 
•' No," she said, in a firm voice. ■ VVeU walk on. I want 
to pray. It will do me good." . . . • v. 

Boldly she stepped along the little slanting path which 
her mother had followed and climbed the slope amid the 
tangled weeds and the straggling branches. They passed 
the lodge on their left and reached the leafy cloisters where 
each had a parent lying buried. And at once, at the first 
glance, they saw that the twentieth wreath was there 

• Simeon has come," said Patrice. " An aU-powerful 
nstinct obliged him to come. He must be somewhere near 

While Coralie knelt down beside the tombstone, he hunted 
iround the cloisters and went as far as the middle of the garden. 
There was nothing left but to go to the lodge ; and this was 

• vidently a dread act which they put off performing, if not 
!rom fear, at least from the reverent awe which checks a man 

• •n entering a place of death and crime. 

It was Coralie once again who gave the signal for action : 

' Come," she said. . 

Patrice did not know how they would make their way 
nto the lodge, for all its doors and windows had appeared to 
them to be shut. But, as they approached, they saw that 
the back door opening on the yard was wide open ; and they at 
once thought that Simoon was waiting for them inside^ 

It was exactly ten o'clock when they crossed the threshold 
of the lodge. A Httle hall led to a kitchen on one side and 
a bedroom on the other. The principal room must be that 
opposite. The door stood ajar. 

^' That's where it must have happened . • • long 
ago," said Coralie, in a frightened whisper. 

" Yes," said Patrice, " we shall find Simoon there. But, 
if your courage fails you, Coralie, we had better give it up. 

An unquestioning force of will supported her. Nothing 
now would have induced her to stop. She walked on. 

Though large, the room gave an impression of cosiness, 
oving to the way in which it was furnished. The sofas, 
armchairs, carpet and hangings all tended to add to Us com- 
fort ; and its appearance might well have remained un- 
changed since the tragic death of the two who used to occupy 
it This appearance was rather that of a studio, because of a 
skylight which filled the middle of the high ceiling, where the 
belvedere was. The light came from here. There were 
two other windows, but these were hidden by curtains. 

" Simf'on is not here," said Patrice. 

Coralie did not reply. She was examining the things 
around her with an emotion which was reflected m every 
feature. There were books, all of them going back to the 
last century. Some of them were signed " Coralie" in pencil 
on their blue or yellow wrappers. There were pieces of un- 
ftnished needlework, an embroidery-frame, a piece of tapestry 
with a needle hanging to it by a thread of wool. And ^here 
were also books signed " Patrice " and a box of cigars and 
a blotting-pad and an inkstand and penholders. And there 
were two small framed photographs, those of two children, 
Patrice and Coralie. And thus the life of long ago went on, 
not only the life of two lovers who loved each other wit'i a 
violent and fleeting passion, but of two beings who dwell 
together in the calm assurance of a long existence spent in 

common. „ ,. , • . 

"Oh, my darling, darling mother! ' Coralie whispered. 

Her emotion increased with each new memory. She leant 
trembling on Patrice's shoulder. 

" Let's go," he said. 

' Yes, dear, ys, we had better. We will come back again 
. We will come back to them ... We will 
revive the life of love that was cut short by their death. Let 
MS go for to-day ; I have no strength left." 

But they had only taken a few steps when they stopped 

Tly* '^'wr was clos*»<l 

rturrr eves met, filled with uneasiness. 
■ vYe didn't close it, did we? " he asked. . 
No," she said, " we didn't close it." 

i le went to open it and perceived that it had neither handle 

nor lock. , , j 1. j j 

It was a single door of massive wood that looked hard and 
substantial. It might well have been made of one piece, 
taken from the very heart of an oak. There was no paint or 
varnish on it. Here and there were scratches, as if some one 
had been rapping at it with a tool. And then . . . and 
then, on the right, were these few words in pencil : 
Patrice and Coralie, 14TH April, 1895. 
Gon Will Avenge Us. 
Bel&w this was a cross and, below the cross, another date, 
but in a different and more recent handwriting : 
14TH April, 1915. 
•• This is terrible, this is terrible," said Patrice. " To- 
day's date I Who can have written that ? It has only just 
been written. Oh, it's terrible ! . . . Come, come, after 

all, we can't ..." , 1 * • 

He rushed to one of the windows, tore back the curtain 
that veiled it and pulled open the casement. A cry escaped 
him. The window was walled up, walled up with building- 
stones that filled the space between the glass and the shutters. 

He ran to the other window and found the same obstacle. 

There were two doors, leading prol)ably to the bedroorn 
on the right and to a room next to the kitchen on the left. 
He opened them quickly. Both doors were walled up. 

He ran in every direction, during the first moment of 
terror, and tlien hurled liimself against the first of the three 
doors and tried to break it down, ft did not move. It might 
have been an immovable block. 

Then, once again, they looked at each other with eyes 
of fear ; and the same terrible thought came over them both. 
The thing that had happuned before was being repeated! 
The tragedy was being played a second time. After the 
mother and the father, it was the turn of the daughter and 
the son. Like the lovers of yesteryear, thoso of to-day were 
prisoners. The enemy held them in his powerful grip , 
and they would doubtless soon know how their parents had 
died by seeing how thev themselves would die . . • 14th 
April, "1895 . . . 14th April, 1915 • • • 


In the Abyss 

'0, no, no!" cried Patrice. "I won't stand 
this!" He flung himself against the wmdows 
and doors took up an iron dog from the fender 
and banged it against the wooden doors, and the 
stone walls. Barren efforts ! They were the same which 
his father had made before him ; and they could only result 
in the same mockery of impotent scratches on the wood 
and the stone. . ,, 

"Oh, Coralie, Coralie!" he cried in his despair. Its 
I who have brought you to this ! What an ab\ss I've dragged 
you into ! It was madness to trv and figlit tins out by my- 
self ' I ought to have called in those who understand, who 
are accustomed to it ! . . . No, I was going to be so 
clever ! . . . Forgive me, Coralie." 

She had sunk into a chair. He, almost on his knees beside 
her, threw his arms around her, imploring her pardon. 

She smiled, to calm him : 

" Come, dear," she said, gently, " don't lose courage. 
Perhaps we are mistaken . . . After all, there's nothing 
to show that it is not all an accident." • 

" The date ! " he said. " The date of this year, of this 
day written in another hand ! It was your mother and my 
father who wrote the first ... but this one, Coralie. 
this one proves premeditation and an implacable determina- 
tion to do away with us." . . 

She sbuddered. Still she persisted in trying to comfort 

Viim ■ 

" it may be. But yet it is not so bad as all that. We have 
enemies, but we have friends also. They will look for us. 

" They will look for us, but how can they ever find us 
Coralie ? We took steps to prevent them from guessing 
where we were going to ; and not one of them knows this 

" Old Simeon does." 

" Sim'on came and placed his wreath, but some one else 
came with him, some one who rules him and who has perhaps 
already get rid of him. now that Sim-' on has played his part. 

" And what then, Patrice ? " ,. > j < 

He felt that she was overcome and began to be ashamed ot 
his own weakness. . 

•■ Well " he said, mastering himself, " we must just wait_ 
After all the attack may not materialise. The fact of 
our being locked in docs not mean that we are lost And_ 
even so, we shall make a fight for it, shall we not ? You need 
not think that I am at the end of my strength or my resources. 
Let us wait, Coralie, and act." 

The main thing was to find out whether there was anv 
entrance to the house which could allow of an unforeseen 
attack After an hour's search, they took up the carpet 
and found tiles which showed nothing unusual. There was 
certainly nothing except the door; and, as they could not 
prevent this from being opened, since it opened outwards, 
they heap"d most of th'- furniture in front of it, thus forming 
a barricade which would protect them against a surprise 

Then Patrice cocked his two revolvers and placed them 
beside him, in full sight. _ • , .. . 

" This will make us easy in our_minds, he said. Am- 
enemy who appears is a dead man." ■ , ,, 

But the memory of the pist bore down upon them wii 1; nil 
its awful weight. All their words ami all their actio'T^ 
others before them had spiken and performed, under sinnl:ir 
conditions, with the same thouglits and the s.ime forebodings. 



Patrice's father must have prepared his weapons. Coralie's 
mother must have folded her hands and prayed, fogether 
tTev had barricaded the door and together sounded the walls 
and^aken up the carpet. What an anguish was this, doubled 

"to dtpd'th^e ho^roTSte idea, they tunned the pages of 
the book's works of faction and others, which the- P-ent 
had read. On certain pages, at the ^.f , "^ ^, •'I'^fPSher 
volume, were lines constitutmg notes which Patrice s tattler 
and Coralie's mother used to write each other. 

" Darling Patrice, — , ,mc.fprfiav 

" I ran in this morning to recreate our life of YfffJ 

and to dream of our life this afternoon. As you will arrive 

before me, you will read these lines. You will read that I 

love you . . ." 

And, in another book: 

" My Own Cora'Lie, — . ... ,„ 

" You have this minute gone, I shall not see you until to- 
morrow and I do not want to leave this haven where our 
love has tasted such delights without ' once more teUmg . 
you ..." 

They looked through most of the books in this way, findmg 
however, instead of the clues for which they hoped, nothing 
but expressions of love and affection. And they spent more 
than two hours waiting and dreading what might happen. 

Words were powerless to comfort them. If the/ were 
not to die of hunger, then the enemy must have contrived 
another form of torture. Their inability to do anythmg kept 
them on the rack. Patrice began his investigations again. 
A curious accident turned them in a new direction On 
opening one of the books through which they had not yet 
l<k)ked a book published in 1895, Patrice saw two pages 
turned down together. He separated them and read a 
letter addressed to him by his father : 

" Patrice, My Dear Son, .. 

" If ever chance places this note before your eyes, it will 
prove that I have met with a violent death which has pre- 
vented my dostroving it. In that case, Patrice look for 
the truth concerning my death on the wall of the stud o 
between the two windows. I shaU perhaps have time to 

write it down." , , ^- 1 i.i. 

The two victims had therefore at that time foreseen the 
tragic fate in store for them ; and Patrice's father and Coralie s 
mother knew the danger which they ran m coming to the 
lodge. It remained to be seen whether Patnce s father 
had been able to carry out his intention. 

Between the two windows, as all around the room, vras a 
wainscoting of varnished wood, topped at a height of six 
feet by a cornice. Above the cornice was the plain plastered 
waU. Patrice and Coralie had already observed, without 
paving particular attention to it, that the wainscoting seemed 
to have been renewed in this part, because the varnish of the 
boards did not have the same uniform colour. Using one ot 
the iron dogs as a chisel, Patrice broke down the cornice 
and lifted the first board. It broke easily. Under this plank 
on the plaster of the wall, were hues of writing. ^ 

" It's the same method," he said, " as that which old bimeon 
has since employed. First write on the walls, then cover it 
up with wood or plaster." 

He broke off the top of the other boards and in this way 
brought several complete lines into view, hurried hues, 
written in pencil and slightly worn by time. Patnce 
deciphered them with the greatest emotion. His father 
had written them at a moment when death was stalking at 
hand A few hours later, he had ceased to live. They were 
the evidence of his death agony and perhaps too an im- 
precation against the enemy who was kiUing him and the 
woman he loved. 

Patrice read, in an undertone : ,, , 

" I am writing this in order that the scoundrels plot 
may not be achieved to the end and in order to ensure his 
punishment. Coralie and I are no doubt going to pensh 
but at least we shaU not die without revealing the cause of 
our death. ,^ , 

" A few days ago. he said to Coralie. You spurn my love, 
yo« load me with your hatred. So be it. But I shall kill 
you both, your lover and you. in such a manner that I can 
never be accused of the death, which wiU look Uke suicide. 
Everything is ready. Beware. Coralie.' 

" Everything was. in fact, ready. He did not know me, 
but he must have known that Coralie used to meet somebody 
here daily ; and it was in this lodge that he prepared our 


" What manner of death ours will be we do not know. 
Lack of food, no doubt. It is four hours since we were im- 
prisoned The door closed upon us. a heavy door which he 
must have placed there last night. All the other openings, 
doors and windows alike, are stopped up with blocks of stone 

January 25, 1917 

laid and cemented since our last meeting. Escape is im 
possible. What is to become of us ? " 

The uncovered portion stopped here. Patrice said : 
" You see, Coralie, they went through the same horrors 
as ourselves. They too dreaded starvation. They too passed 
through long hours of waiting, when inaction is so painful ; 
and it was more or less to distract their thoughts that they 
wrote those hnes." 

He went on, after examining the spot : , ^u ^ *u 

" They counted, most likely, on what happened, that the 
man who was killing them would not read this docuinent. 
Look, one long curtain was hung over these two windows 
and the wall between them, one curtain, as is proved by the 
single rod covering the whole distance. After our parents 
death, no one thought of drawing it ; and the truth remained 
concealed until the day when Simeon discovered it and, by 
wav of precaution, hid it again under a wooden panel and 
hung up two curtains in the place of one. In this way, every- 
thing seemed normal." . 
Patrice set to work again. A few more lines made their 

appearance^ .^^^^ the only one to suffer, the on y one to die. 
But the horror of it al is that 1 am dragging mv dear Corahe 
with me. She fainted and is lying down now, prostrated 
by the fears which she tries so hard to overcome. My poor 
darting I I seem aheady to see the pallor of death on her 
sweet face. Forgive me, dearest, forgive me ! 

Patrice and Coralie exchanged glances. Here were the 
same sentiments which they themselves felt, the same scruples, 
the same delicacy, the same effacement of self in the presence 
of the other's grief. ' , 

" He loved your mother." Patrice murmured, as I love 
you I also am not afraid of death. I have faced it too 
often, with a smile ! l>at you, Coralie, you for whose sake I 
would undergo any sort of torture. . . . ! 

He began to walk up and down, once more yielding to his 

^^1 shaU save you, Coralie, I swear it. And what a delight 
it will then be to take our revenge ! He shall have the same 
fate which he was devising for us. 

He tore down more pieces of boarding, m the hope of learn- 
ing something that might be useful to him, since the struggle 
was being renewed under exactly similar conditions. But 
the sentences that followed, like those which Patrice had just 
uttered, were oaths Of *a«^eance : k - tK« 

" Coralie, he shaU be punished, if not by us, then by the 
hand of God. No, his infernal scheme wiM not succeed. 
No it will never be beUeved that we had recourse to suicide 
to 'relieve ourselves of an existence that was built up of 
happiness and joy. No, his crime will be known. Hour _by 
hour I shall here set down the undeniable proofs. . . . 

" Words words ! " cried Patrice, in a tone of exasperation. 
" Words of vengeance and sorrow, but never a fact to guide > 
us Father, will you tell us nothing to save your Cora le s 
dauehter ' If your Coralie succumbed, let mine escape the 
disaster, thanks to your aid, father ! Help me! Counsel me! 
But the father answered the son with nothing but more 

words of chaUenge and despair : 

" Who can rescue us ? We are walled up m this totnb, 
buried alive and condemned to torture without being able 
to defend ourselves. My revolver hes ther.', upon the table. 
What is the use of it ? The enemy does not attack us He has 
time on his side, unrelenting time which kills of its own 
strength, by the mere fact that it is time. Who can rescue 
us ? Who wiU save my darUng CoraUe ? " 

The position was terrible; and they felt all its tragic 
horror It seemed to them as though they were already dead 
once they were enduring the same trial endured by others and 
enduring it under the same conditions. There was nothing 
to enable them to escape any of the phases through which the 
other two. his father and her mother, had passed. The 
similarity be ween their own and their pa-ents fate was so 
striking that they seemed to be suffering two deaths ; and 
. the second agony was now commencing. , , - . 

CoraUe gave way and began to cry. Moved by Tier tears, 
Patrice attacked the wainscoting with new fury but its 
boards, strengthened by cross-laths, resisted his efforts : 

At last he read : . • ^i. i. 

" What is happening ? We had an impression that some- 
one was walking outside, in the garden^ Yes. when we put 
our ears fo the stone wall built in the embrasure of the window 
we thought we heard footsteps. Is it possible ? Oh. if it 
onlywerll It would mean the struggle, at last. Any hmg 
rather than the maddening silence and endless uncertainty ! 

"That's it' . ■ That's it! . . • The sound is 

becoming more distinct. . . -.Itf^ different sound like 
that which you make when you dig the ground with a pick^ 
axe. Some one is digging the ground, not in front of the 
house, but on the right, near the kitchen. . . • 

{To be continued) 



January 25, 1917 


'Bij "Tiisse-Partout 

The aim o/ these notes is to ftrinj articles of presenl-aay use and interest to the knowledge o/ our readers. All articles aescttbet- 

have been care/uUy chosen /or mention, and tn every tnslanca can be recommended from personcU knowledge. Names and addresses 

of shops, where the articles mentioned can be obtained, wilt be lonuarded on receipt of a postcard addressed to Passe-Parioot, 

" Land &■ Water." Old Serjeant's Inn, 5 Chancery Lane. W.C. Any other information will be git;«n on request 

Soft and Serviceable 

Improved Hot 
Water Botlles 

Soft felt hats become the majority of 
Englishwomen, and at the moment are 
little short of a necessity with war work 
the order of the day. A 
famous ladies' hatter has had 
phenomenal success with a 
special model which adds a 
moderate price to all its 
other qualifications. 

It is of -exceptionally good 
quality felt, will stand prac- 
tically any weather, and can 
be bent into any shape b:st 
suiting its wearer. An oat- 
standing point is the con- 
venient way in which it can 
be rolled up for packing. It 
can be folded so tight that 
it takes up hardly any room 
in a box at all, yet on un- 
packing it goes back to its 
original shape in the most 
adapta le manner. 

It is stocked in two shades 
of grey, a delightfully be- 
coming shade of fawn, as y/ell 
as black, has a ribbon tie 
and bow, and, costing but 
8s. 6d., is a hat of remark- 
able value. 

Every penny now spent is being ex- 
pended to fullest advantage by all wise 
in their generation. Improvements in 
even the most ordinary every day articles are being eagerly 
sought, and without doubt this is one of the reasons why 
the Improved Hot Water Bottle has met with its immense 
success. It gives splendid service, outlasting two of the old 
type, because of the clever construction of the neck. 

In the usual kind of rubber bottle the metal socket is a 
separate affair, fixed through tying and likely in time to become 
detached owing to the water always sliding down between the 
crevices. The pressure given each time the stopper is screwed 
tight is another drawback to hard wear. With the new kind 
the neck and stopper are in one piece, the socket being fixed 
in such a way that it cannot be separated. A bottle Uke this 
can be filled far more quickly than the old kind, there being 
no hidden deposit of water bound to be spilt once the bottle 
is filled. For hospitals and private use alike these hot water 
bottles are nothing short of perfection and should be used in 
preference to all other kinds. 

A descriptive leaflet showing both by illustration and 
letterpress the difterence between the ordinary hot water 
bottle and this brilliant invention will be forwarded any- 
where on request. 

., , . . _ ^ Everybody loves a new tooth powder, 
" PoVder especially when it hapix^ns precisely to 

meet their own requirements. A famous 
firm have just brought out no fewer than six new preparations. 
Among:st them is the Dex Tooth Paste, a specially soothing, 
refreshing preparation enormously used in both France and 
America. This is flavoured with peppermint, but for the 
benefit of people dishking the odour, Menthilla Dental Cream 
has been prepared with the flavour of Menthol instead. 
Another fragrant dentifrice is perfumed with the finest eau 
de Cologne, and most satisfactory it is. 

Mothers of a family knowing the difficulty it sometimes 
is to get the small fry to clean their teeth will be delighted 
with Perlysia Tooth Paste. It is so pleasant that children 
like u^^ing it and their teeth benefit in consequence. 

Frozo Tooth Paste is an unsweetened preparation and it, 
hke all the aforementioned preparations, costs a shilling a 

tube. Gly-Tynol Tooth Paste is of the strongly antiseptic 
type, including Wild Thyme and Wintergreen. This costs 
loid. a tube, or a specimen case of the whole six kinds will 
be forwarded free for 5s. 6d. 

A Campaittninf 

A really reliable knife is a good friend 
to a man on active service, and realising 
this a well known firm have brought 
forward just the thing needed. It is made of nickel and 
though strong and containing any number of articles is at 
the same time wonderfully hght. The large blade when open 
locks itself so that it can by no possibility shut down on the 
user's hand. 

There is a big loop at the top, so a man can fix it on to a 
belt or pocket chain. Besides the big blade the knife con- 
tains a smaller blade, trace screws, a cartridge extractor, 
a corkscrew, a screw driver, a hoof pick and — most useful 
of all — a tin opener, so that he can take prompt advantage ol 
many good things from home. 

Two Sale 

A small amount of money goes a long 
way where the two pretty garments 
pictured are concerned. In the first 
place the satin 
knickers are now 
being sold at the 
astonishingly small 
sum of 5s. I id. in- 
stead of los. iid., 
the usual price. 
These satin knickers 
are worth buying 
because amongst 
their many virtues 
is the sterhng one 
of hard wear. They 
are well made ; at 
the side of either 
knee is a jaunty 
little rosette and 
the available colour- 
ings are pink, saxe 
or navy blue, purple, 
ivory, mauve, black 
and green. 

noteworthy is 
the fascinat- 
ing camisole. 
It is maae of 
crepe d e 
Chine and is 7s. iid., 
instead of the cus- 
tomary IIS. gd. It 
is a dehghtful little 
garment, reaching 
the highest level of 
lingerie. Besides a 
lace edged top, floral 
ribbon circlets aid 
in the decoration 
scheme both at the 
back and the front. 
The waist is mounted 
on elastic so the fit 
of the pretty little 
garment is assured, 
and it can be bought 
in pink, white, or 
blue. A special fea- 
ture are the sleeves, 
these making it capital to wear beneath diaphanous bloose* 
and useful consequently from two points of view. 

February i, 1917 

Supplement to LAND & WATER 





These most comfortable, 
good-looking puttees are 
made entirely of fine supple 
tan leather, and fasten 
simply with one buckle at 
bottom. They are ex- 
tremely durable, even if 
subjected to the friction of 
riding, as the edges never 
tear or fray out, and for 
winter wear they are un- 

The puttees are speedilvput on or 
taken off, readily mould to (he 
shape of the leg, are Bs easily 
cleaned as a leather belt, and 
saddle soap soon makes them 
practically waterproof. 

The price per pair is 16/6, post 
free inland, or postaf;e abroad 
!/• extra, or »ent on approval on 
receipt »f business (not banker's) 
refertnce, and home address. 


The factors of successful breeches-making are — 6ne wear-resist- 
ing e'othsi skil ul cutting, and careful, thorough tailor-work_ — and 
all these we guarantee. Abundant experience aUo conirihutes 
importantly n giving utmost satisfaction, for Grant & LOckburn 
have made breeches for ninety-five years. We keep on hand 
a numher of pairs of breeches, and are therefore otten able to 
meet immediate reqoirements, or we can cut and try a pair 
on the same day. and complete the next day. if urgently wanted. 


ESTD, 1821 — 

Legg'nv Makert, 
Milita-y aid Civil T&Uor» 




••Active Service" WRISTLET WATCH 
fully Luminous Fig ures & Hands 
Warranted Timekeepers 

»■ Silver Cases with Screw Bezel 

and Back. t. . Ui Gold, tT lOs. 

With Hunter or Hali-Hunter cover 

Silver, t,.> 7«. «id. Gold, 4;S10s! 

Others in Silver from Al%i lUa. 

Gold (rom ^(V 

Military Badge Brooches. 

^ny Regimental Qiadge Perfectly 

Sketches sent /or approval. 

£7/10/ 25 OLD BOND ST, W. 

and 62& 64 LUDOATE H!LL. EX. 

=^ The Original Cording's, Estd. 1839 = 

In the wettesty coldest weather a fleece- 
lined '^EquitoVy ** {the really waterproof coat) 
ensures dry^ warm comfort. 

An "liquitor," with snug fleece 
woollen Itnin;^ hutLoned in, in.ii.ea 
an exL-encnt yreat-tcat in whk-U 
to "travel ln;ut." aixl will not 
only keep a man bone lirj 
tiirutigh tli« heav.est and nio*t 
liistiny downpour, but will aUo 
warmly protect him in bitinf 
cold weatber, and may therefrre 
be relied upon to minimise the 
illelfects of enfcrct^d exposure at 
At^Jit. Such a coat, as the ex- 
perleni.-ed fauipaiyner well know*. 
is all-itiiportaiit to his health 
and conifurt. 

The 'Equitor'* Co«t ii guaran- 
teed to be positively and tlnr- 
ably impermeable by a firm 
whose businoh^g for nenrly <ightj 
years has been the making of 

!ho "Eiiuitor" is Btted with a 
apetial ridiiiR apron which abso- 
lutely shuts out any ruin and 
can be fastened convenien!!ly, out 
of sight, but tile coat serves Just 
as well for ordinary wear afoot, 
whether tiie apron be faiten<^d 
back Of not. 

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Wl RE 


R.J.W., Montgomery, writes; 
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Vol. LXVIII No. 2856 ,r™: THURSDAY FEBRUARY i. iqiy [;;'m^w'^,^^^|:,^,;] '^^^^^"^J^^i^^li^ 

Bji Loaii RaematlctiTf 

tt PWtWMJWWWIM.i J M M t'^mFT^ 

Dratin sjrclusively lor "Land I; Wattr' 

The Road to Victory 

' England expects this day that every man will do his duty " 


February I, 1917. 


Mechanic : The wheels aren't running 
parallel, sir I They're half-an-inch out 
of truth. 

Dunlop : Misalignment, you know, is, so to 
speak, "The Hidden Hand." Nothing 
causes so much mischief with tyres, 
and the average motorist can't locate 
the trouble till the mischief's done. 

Users of T>unlop — or any other—tyres can 
have the alignment of their wheels tested 
free of charge at any of the Company's 



FebiLUiiy i, nji; 




Telephone HOLBORN 2828. 







The Road to Victory. By Louis Kaeniaekers 

Waiting for Plans. (Leader) 

The Carpathian Defence. By Hilaire Belloc 

Creating a Panic. By Arthur Pollen 

Value of the Mark. By T. H. Penson 

Psychology of the Workshop. By Arthur Kitson 12 

E.xpulsion of Turkey from Europe. By Sir WiUiani 

1^3 msay 14 

Joffre and Nivelle. By Charles Dawbarn 15 

Books to Read. By Lucian Oldershaw 17 

The Ciolden Triangle. Bv Maurice Leblanc 18 

riie West End " 24 

Ivit and Equipment xi 


EVERY household in the realm must be familiar 
by now with the vital necessity of strict economy 
ill food. It is in a sense an economy not difficult 
to practise, for the British style of living gener- 
ally has been wasteful- in the extreme. This has been 
mainly due to the ease with which all kinds of food were 
available in the past, provided thoie was money. Now, 
by a parado.x, while money is more plentiful than before 
among the working classes, food is more difficult to obtain. 
A new system of economy is being widely practised, 
sometimes no doubt foolishly through iguorance, but we 
fail to perc■ei^■e what good ])urpose can be ser\-ed by 
I'ri'uuiture annoimcemcuts of " Rations AH Round," 
>uch as was made at Leicester the other day. War or 
no war, selfishness abounds ; among the baser sort at 
once a rush takes place to lay in stocks, dislocating local 
markets and causing needless distress to level-headed 
folk ; and doubtless too among firms there arc Josephs 
iu the land who, by means of those modern storehouses 
— cold storage sheds — prepare themselves for the lean 
months. For the lean months are coming ; of that we 
are well assured, and how lean they may prove to be 
depends upon the actions of to-day. 

When the present Go\'ernment entered on its labours, 
we were told that henceforth tiie country would be ruled 
\\ ith a firm hand, and a single voice. Everyone rejoiced. 
But the firm hand has yet to make itself felt, and many 
conflicting voices are in the air. The Agricultural 
Department and the Food Ministry seem to be at purposes. A genius in the former department, 
to give a lead to Lord Devonport, prepares a monograph 
on sprats and how to cook them and j)ublishes it in the 
M'ry week they go out of season. It may have been 
intended for a joke, but its exactly the sort of jest that 
shakes confidence in the very department that at this ' 
juncture requires all the public support and sympathy 
which it can enlist. Has anything yet been definitely 
arranged about the forthcoming price of farm produce ? 
^\■hen are farmers to be given a fixed guarantee over a 
period of years that the price of wheat shall not fall below 
a certain minimum ? Fanners are human ; they have 
their weaknesses like other llesh, and they cannot be 
expected to provide the extra food which is urgently 
re(juired, at their own expense. Agriculture has been 
deliberately neglected and bullied in the past, so that 
even now it is difficult for the public mind to grasp tlu; 
Iruth Uiiil it is a skilled industry, and that the fanner and 

the farm labourer who are ot service, liave to keep in con- 
stant use technical know^ledge, the finer part of which 
is only acquired through experience. 

People arc beginning to grow restive imder the ^•a^ying 
!ei)orts and rumours that are current. It had been 
thought that- authoritative statements would be issued 
before this, telling in the jjlainest language what steps 
are to be taken to assure the increase of produce of all 
kinds which before the summer is out will be badly wanted. 
But nothing definite is announced. No doubt there is 
an immensity of detail to be handled, but that does not 
explain the confiict of opinions and views between one 
Department and another. Officials have to bear in 
mind that never in the history of the nation have the 
people broken so completely with tradition ; they have 
without murmur, nay gladly, given up cherished 
principles behcving that thereby they are doing their 
best in this great struggle for freedom and humanity ; 
wherefore they are not in a mood to accept conventional 
apologies for delay from Government servants, that is, 
their own servants, and they do expect that this Govern- 
ment on wfiich they have bestowed the most plenary 
powers shall act with promptness and decision, and shall 
at least take the trouble to put its plans and schemes into 
lucid language. 

Mr. Neville Chamberlain's lirst manifesto is a dejilor- 
able example of bad draughtsmanship, giving rise to 
needless iiiisunderstandings, the worst being due to 
the omission of all reference to women. If the voluntary 
principle promises not to ^vork, the country will accept 
conscription without demur, but what is first wanted is 
a clean cut scheme, showing exactly the amount of male 
and female labour required, and in what lields of life. 
At present, so far as one can discern, there is practically 
no organisation in this direction. Men are to be shovelled 
in and shovelled out haphazard — just as they may chance 
to comi'. One cause of all this confusion is no doubt duo 
to the multiplication of sub-departments. Many new 
Departnients have been called into existence during the 
war, but the name of the sub-departments is legion. 
Had it been a little more difficult to provide comfortable 
quarters for all these new staffs, we believe this in itself 
would have acted as a salutary check in keeping down the 
size of establishments, but as private mansions, clubs, 
hotels, blocks of offices can be commandeered by a 
stroke of the pen, to say nothing of buildings springing 
up like mushrooms over lawns, gardens and lakes, the 
inducement has been all the other wa\', and tlie more 
numerically important ^ sub-departmental manager can 
make his section appear to be, the better chance he has of 
comfortable cjuarters. It is to be hoped that the appoint- 
ment of a committee to look into this question of housing 
means that before any more clubs, hotels, etc., are com- 
mandeered, the Cabinet will assure itself that the build- 
ings already seized are properly occupied. 

On Saturday the Prime Minister is to address his own 
constituents, and much interest is ttiken in his speech. 
It is to be hoped he will speak plainly on the food ques- 
tion and on tlie steps taken to increase food production. 
For many months it was a common saying that the 
people of this countr^y did not understand what war really 
means. They do imderstand it now, and in every class 
of life, and are willing to endmie hardship provided they 
realize it is part of the price of victory they are called 
upon to pav'. But the impression must not be permitted 
to grow that tlxis hardship is in the main due Ic 
dilatoriness or muddling on the part of the responsible 
members of the Administration. Time moves on : 
no well-defined plan or scheme ensues, and men are be- 
ginning to wearj' of asking, "When is it to appear." 
This sharp spell of winter has given agriculture a little 
leisure, but when it breaks, is I\Ir. Prothcro ready t^ -.ind 
to the fields all Hands that are wanted ? 


February i, 1917 

The Carpathian Defence 

By Hiliare Belloc 

WE arc -at this moment pa^sing tlirougli that 
pause in the. great war which immediately 
precedes final action and its most critical 
phase. Dm-ing so tense (and short) a silence 
it is of little profit to speculate upon the date and manper 
of its conclusion. We shall do better to use the slight 
leisure for an examination and summary of the strategical 
work accomplished under Russian direction in the East, 
and in mastering the character— now that this character 
can be seen as a whole — of the defence in Roumania.- 

The enemy's Romnanian advance has now" been 
checked for 25 days. It is presumed by most observers 
that it is exhausted, and that as many as possible of his ' 
divisions and of his heavy batteries independent of these, 
are in process of withdrawal. However that may be 
land it is probable) the whole storv of the campaign is 
dominated bv the so-called " Putna-Screth Line." which 
is in full the' line of the middle Carpathians (or Vtaiicii -^ 
hills), the Putna and the Sereth. and Mhich rougliUy 
corresponds to the frontiers of Moldavia. • .'. 

It is now clear that this I'utna-.Sereth line marks one of 
Die cliief episodes of this great war and that the history 
of the great war will include among its chapters " The 
actions of the Putna- Sereth line." as it will include those 
upon the Xarew, upon the Bzura, the Aisne, and the 
other river obstacles where the successiA-e exhaustion 
of the enemy has been accomplished. For whether 
it is the intention of the Austro-German command still 
tjo atteiiipt a. forcing of the present line and \\hciher,, 
if this ' be . their intention, they should find it possible / 
or- no. it. is , this oKstacle, used as the Russians have 
used it, which stands out as the principal military 
episode in the Roumanian campaign. The time is grow- 
ing short. The Roumanian adventure cannot occupy 
t he stage very' mucl^ longer. In the nature of things 
the Roumanian corner will eventually be cjuite pver^ 

It is generally conjectured, as I have just said, that 
the enemy have already begun to withdraw certain 
divisions from Roumania. It may well be so. He had 
in fidl use at one moment over thirty between the 
Black Sea and the Buko\ina. The existing line would 
not demand at the most (if it were held upon the de- 
fensive) more than twenty divisions. Whether, how- 
ever, he has actually withdrawn these divisions or -no 
we cannot tell until they are icTentified in some fashion 

or other elsewhere, and of this we liave, as yet. no evi- 
dence. But he probably has begun moving them. 

It is advisable; then, to cany with us, in order that 
we may imderstand the future actions, not only in this 
field but elsewhere, a summary of the efforts which the 
enemy has been now making for over a month in some 
places, ovei" three weeks in others, to restore a war o I 
movement in the Roumanian held and to see in what 
fashion he has becn'exhausted and checked by our Allies 
in this effort. 

The reader is already acquainted with the Putna- 
.Sereth line through the plain and the recent efforts to 
force that hue. hrst before Focsani, then before (ialatz, 
and lastly before Fundeni. 1 propose this week ti> 
survey, very » briefly, the determining movements which 
blocked him on his left in the Carpathians and so pre- 
vented the Sereth-Putna line from being turned. 

The first thing we have to grasp is the sharpness of 
this division in the hue between its mountainous 
Carpathian portion and its sector through the plains. 
,The line, through the plain is faced by the enemy IXth 
Army, the bodies holding the Carpathian valleys are 
checking the two mountain armies of Gerok and Ruiz. 
Next Me must see how the enemy disposed his forces 
in the attempt to turn that line where such an out- 
Hanking would have been ■ decisive, in the Carpathian 
sector, and how he failed. 

The Carpatliian sector is discontinuous. It does not 
consist in a long line' of trenches manned from one end 
to the other, nor even of troops completely linked up. 
It is concerned with the issues from certain valleys, 
the mouths of which stand far apart andthe blocking of 
which occupies somewhat less disjointed groups of men on 
the Russo-Roumanian side. 

There are three bodies here concerned. One on the 
far north, which need not long detain us. The other 
two on the Oituz and the Susita, which were the main 
bodies. Upon the extreme north next to the Bukovina 
frontier you have a pass with a good road from liungary 
over into Roumania, but no railway beyond Piatra. 
The summit of this pass is well within Hungarian terri- 
tory. The defence of it is being maintained at this 
moment close to the frontier. Compaiatively small 
forces are here engaged because no great strategical 
result could follow an advance through this region. It 
is a fuU'forty miles away from the next moimtain road. 
There is nothing but a mass of tangled wooded hills anil 
steep ravines between. The real business begins with 
that group of Carpathian "V^alleys. the northernmost of 
which is watered by the Trotus and the southernmost b\' 
the Casinu. It is here that you find the first serious 
group of t"lie invaders. I have included it in one bracket on 
Map II., and numbered its separate sections A, B, C, 
and D. 

If the reader will look at Map H. he will see that ail 
these valleys converge at the point of Onesti and, that 
the arrival of an enemy force at Onesti would, as has been 
pointed out several times in past articles, compel the 
abandonment of everything above it in the mountains. 
It would turn the main Putna-Sereth line which our Allies 
hold. It would immediately threaten one of their 
main avenues of supply, the Sereth ^'alley Railwax', 
and it might even cut the .Mlied body in Central Roumania 
from the main Russian forces to the north. The attempt 
to reach Onesti has been going on for exactly a month. 
It is under the command of General Vt)n Gerok, and is 
dependent on the co-operation of four separate fragments, 
(•acli acting in its own valley ; A in that of the Trotus, 
B in tliat of the I'z, C in that of the Oituz pass, and 1> 
in that of the Casinu torrent. The method is that 
which geographical circumstance has imposed. 0\m- 
enemy column, supplied by the railway and a tolerablf 
though not very good road, had come down the Trotus 
\alley to about the point marked on the sketch map, a 

rebniar\- T, lOlT' 

Land &• water 

1 5k 

month ago. A second had come down to the Uz valley 
just up to the frontier point also marked on the map. A 
third following the road over the Oituz Pass had got 
just beyond the frontier, and the fourth coming down 
the Casinu was the nearest to its object when the check 
was imposed. 

The reader will perceive that this effort in the middle 
Carpathians of the Oituz and Trotus Passes is an exact 
repetition of the stragtegy imposed by Berlin throughout 
the whole of the Roumanian campaign : Once again 
ronverging cohmms have the mission of enveloping, if 
they can, an enerr.y force. Trusting to a superiority 
in lire power to com^ el a gradual retirement upon each of 
the radii which_ diverge from Oncsti, they hope to reach 
that point by their right (that is by column D), cut off 
everything in the valleys above and achieve a local 
decision. The advantage of such a plan, of course, 
if it comes off, is that you capture great numbers of 
your opponent and mucli rtf his material. If you arc 
perfdctly successful you may annihilate his whole army. 
The disadvantage is that it requires the most exact 
co-ordination, and that is \-ery clifiicult to maintain 
in a tangled mountain country with only two tolerable 
roads upon a total front of forty miles. It is a clock- 
work plan and so far the clockwork has been stopped. 

The nearest the enemy has hitherto come to success was 
about January loth, when the marching right column 
of Gerok had got down the ^asinu to well past the 
Monastery which takes" its' nafne fmm that ri\-er and 

seemed in a fair way to reach Onesti before the 15th. 
But the opportunities for reinforcing are not bad on oiir 
Ally's side, a main railway and a good road lay. just 
behind him. They reinforced, and on the next daj', 
Thursday the nth, not only checked this advance of 
(lerok's 4th, or right-hand column T>, but threw it back 
for more than a mile. The two opponents liave sinc'e 
lain, I think, opposite each other, . entrenched upon 
jiositions which each occupied at the end of that day. 

The next group of the enemy in the Carpathians li^s 
,to the south of this Onesti attempt, is separate froni it 
and even divergent. It is concerned with the debouching 
from the Upper Valley of the Susita and of tlie Pntria 
itself. Here the ground has sharpty separated the two 
groups of the enemy. They are not only acting inde- 
pendently, but ai-tually face in different directions and 
each undertaking its individual task as though it were.-a 
small sejiarate campaign of its own. 

ihe ri\-ers that How down into the Trotus Valley 
run, on the whole, north-cast. The Susita, tbc-Putna 
and their tributaries run south or south-east. Group 
I., therefore (acting under Gerok), had for its four 
converging columns an average direction just north 
'of east. (Jroup II. has for its three columns an average 
direction well south of east. This .group II. -is -under 
(rcheral Von Ruiz. Its left is in the hills to the north of. 
its: centre occupies, the narrow and diffiicult, but dry 
Upper Susita Valley. Its right is stretched out in a 
cordon somewhere, south •- of thc_'Putrja, " afi'd' in the 


Frbniarv i, 1017 

noifiliboiiihoud ot (MobosU links ui> in tourli witii tlu 
left uf tiic main IXtli (.•ncniv army whi'h occupies all 
I lie ])lain. 

It is ckiu- tluit tlu-^iuuiJ ul (jiiKual von Rwiz mn^t. m 
tlu'ory, try to pivot on its right and march by its left 
just iis the group of C.orok to thi- north must pivot on its 
left and march by its right, for only so could oven a lofal 
d(ci>ion bo arri\ed at. f.erok's businc>s, as wo saw, 
was to cut off as manv guns and men as possible from tlu- 
main bodv by reaching Oncsti. and so to get iii between 
i\vo main" fra"ctions of our Allies. Ruiz's business is to 
. I feet the same thing conversely and to open the breach 
upon his side by pushing more and more down towards 
the south-east. " The \allevs lend tliomselves to this and 
ihe whole thing may be expressed in a diagram thus : 



7)ij>ec&icn. of 

To break White's line of forces at C, Black (in two ((roups) thrusts 

«Jiveri5ently with the riiJht of feroup I at A, pivoting on D and with the 

leit of group II at B pivoting on E. 

Where it is clearlj' the business of the commanders 
A and B to force a breach at C by pushing each at right 
angles to the other against his opponent's line at this 
jioint. But the theoretical working of such a plan, 
although the direction of the watercourses lend thcm- 
•hos to it, is marred by certain topographical accidents 
of the regirai. 

liie first and most important of these accidents is the 
ridge which runs from the Susita Valley to the Casinu 
Valley, which was remarked three weeks ago in these 
( f)lumns as forming one of the main standbys of the 
line upon which the Allies hoped to check the Austro- 
(ierman advance, and which I will call from a village on 
its slopes the (rampirle Kidge. This Ridge is fairly 
uniform ; nearly 2.000 feet above the plain and some 
1,500 above the water level of the valleys. It has for 
;ili this month held up Ruiz's left-hand column. The 
main attack upon it was contemporaneous with the 
main attack of Gcrok to the north upon January loth 
and 1 ith. the two movements being obviously con- 
< orted in cormnon. But this attack of Ruiz's upon the 
lidgc was defeated as was his colleague's simultaneous 
.ittack down the Cisinu Valley on the .same day. The 
ridge still holds and so long as it holds the enemy cannot 
hope to turn his op])onent in this region. 

Ruiz's central column has indeed got further down the 
>usita Valley by nearly a day's march, while his right 
liand column (he is acting, I think, with three) is now 
stretclicd out in cofdon, that is in detached small bodies 
to the point whcTc the Putna leaves the mountains on the 
slopes f)f the Odobesti foothills ; it is there that Ruiz links 
u|) with the Irft of the main enemy IXth army in the plain. 
It miust.lx: oonfc,"ssed that Ruiz, though he has so far failed. 

ii.iN fulfilled ail iMUHuiv iliiiK nil i.i-~k. lie lias marched 
with A considerable force in the depth of winter across 
summits of from j.uoii to j,5oo feet through denseh- 
wooded territory and badly ravined and cul-uj) ground, 
and that entirely by woodland paths or rough tracks, which 
he must have had to consolidate as he went along. On 
liis left that one of his columns which is nearest any 
iKise of regular supply is more than twenty miles from 
a good road. B\' this time, liovvevcr, his right has been 
amply supplied from the main Focsani railway and its 
Odobesti branch. 

So much for the two groups that have been acting in 
the mountains and have now been held up during the 
whole of this month. They have failed because their 
main combined effort, deli\-ere(l as we have seen on the 
lotli and nth of Ihe month, was defeated by the Russians 
and Roumanians: That of (ierok in the Casinu Vnlliy 
just beyond the .Monastery and that of Ruiz north of the 
Susita Valley upon the Campirle ridge. Their failure 
has been effected by what I have called " The Carpathian 
Defence," and has forbidden the turning of the Russo- 
Roumanian line, and has so decided its security. 

The positions in tlie i)lain we have no need to study in 
detail for we have been dealing with them during the last 
two weeks. What wc have chiefly to note is that the 
mass of the enemy's forces have been dei)loyed here over 
a space between the Braila marshes and the Odobesti 
range (where Ruiz's group ends) of rather more than sixty 
miles. All that space is under the one command of the 
<)th army. Its left in the region of iMicsani is nnd(>r tlio 
command of Dehnensingen. Its right appears to be of 
mixed character and to include two Turkish divisions. 
It has now foV three weeks stood in front of the obstacle 
])resented to it, and remains almost exactly where it 
was after the enemy's entry into Focsani late upon 
January 7th or early on the 8th. 

The enemy's efforts as a whole will be the better under- 
stood if wc note the dates upon which he has put forth 
a special weight of offensive action, beginning with the 
occupation of F^ocsani and the final establishment of the 
lines upon which our Allies still rest. 

It was, as we have seen, upon January loth and nth 
that the main effort was being made by the \\\o 
mountain groups to turn that line by their right. That 
is, it was upon those two days that tfie enemy's left was 
thrown into play with a special \-igour. The knowledge 
that this had failed was probably conveyed to Mackensen ' s 
licadquarters in the plain by the night of Thursday the 
nth and, at any rate, not later than the morning of 
I'Viday the 12th. There immediately follows upon the 
13th and 14th the attempt to force the centre in front of 
Focsani. That in its turn fails, and you get immediately 
afterwards, obviously by an order transmitted almost 
contemporaneously with the knowledge of this failure, 
the attack upon the extreme right in front of Galatz. 
This group in front of (ialatz does not form part of the 
IXth Army proper, but it is in touch with and supported 
by the troops on the extreme right of the IXth arm\'. 
The attack on (lalatz was planned contemporaneously 
with the movement in front of F'ocsani. But the last 
supreme effort which ended in the Russian recapture of 
Vadeni, came after the failure in front of Focsani. Hardly 
had the attempt upon the Galatz end of the line failed 
in its turn when the big fighting for the Fundeni lo5)p 
began which was the subject of this article last week 
and the week before. The Germans reached the right 
bank of the river four days after they had failed in front 
of Galatz. 

What is the meaning of this very rapid succession of 
thrusts, none of which have yet succeeded ? It means 
two things quite clearly. First, that the enemy has not 
in this held a remaining mass of manceuvre. There 
arc those who ha\-c thought he was ti.sing one because 
they noticed the chosen character of the troops who 
attacked at Fundeni (regiments for the most part from 
the 2nd Army Corps Pomeranian), and also because the 
separation ofthe points of attack looked like the use of 
an independent mass of manceuvre alternately at one 
point and another. But when one carefully compares 
the dates and marks the distances one sees that such a thing 
is impossible. The troops that attacked in front ot 
Focsani were those already present upon that sector ; 
the troops that failed at Galatz we know were the same 
as had been on the Danube under Korsch for weeks. 

February i, 191 7 


The only doubtful point is wliethcr the eittiick on Fundeni 
was not lielped by some reinforcement. But even that 
is improbable. The (ierman Press, more than a week 
before the attack on the Fundeni loop, spoke of it as the 
A'ulnerable spot where the greatest weight would be 
concentrated, and we have little reason to doubt that the 
Prussian troops towards the right of the IXth amiy here 
were occupying their original stations. 

The next thing shown by this series of offensives is 
haste : The determination, and j)erhaps the necessity, 
to effect the enemy's object in Roumania and to throw the 
Russians behind the Sercth before the end of the month. 

It is possible, as 1 have said, that the shortening of 
the time now available for separate action in this one 
held has already led to the withdrawal of certain units. 
Anyhow, the enemy remains, at the moment of writing, 
that is, at the end of the month, where he found himself 
in the hrst w(.»ek of it. For the actions of January 
5th, 6th, and 7th, which] brought him- to the Putna and 
the Sereth lines were the end of his advance across 
W'allachia, and have so far had no sequel. 


.Vmid the complaints that are levelled against the 
defects of the English propaganda — and they are well 
deserved — ^we must not forget certain crudities in the 
enemy's very laborious efforts. 1 hu\e before me tliis 
week (piite a number of s])ecimens sent me from the 
I'nited States, all of them appearing within a few days 
I if the time when the mail left and one or two (in French) 
from Switzerland as well. 

One of these covers in large type the wholt' of one 
l)age of an important i)aper un the Pacilic Slu])e. It is, 
iiki- nearly all tilings, ostensibly written Iw an 
American for Americans, but it clearly proceeds from 
the Cierinan Bureau in the Fast. This whole page turns 
upon exactly the same sort of perfectly irresponsible 
])ropliesy as were those others which 1 have 
quoted here in the past. My reacers will remember 
the gratuitous folly of the enemy in fixing an exact date 
for his entry into the town of X'erdun, which he called 
" the fall of that fortress." He tixed it for August 3rd, 
I'lXb, and he seems to be contident that ineptitudes of 
this sort can be repeated indelinitely without of 
ci^nhdcnce. For he is sayiiii^ novj with equal detail ami 
insistence that he will be in Odessa bv next' May. 

Whether he will be in Odessa by next May or behind 
the Carpathians at that date, or where he will be, 
clearly no mortal can tell, "liut apparently he thinks 
that "this sort of highly jjarticular and really senseless 
])rophesy raises him in the eyes of neutrals. " To me, as 
T supj)ose to most students of the campaign, the thing 
is bewildering— but there it is. He must have some 
object, and at any rate that is the way he is going about it. 
-Anyone who has the leisure might do worse than 
niake a list of these pronouncements for the advantage of 
history. There was the detailed description, ai)pearing over 
the signature of Bernhardt himself, of the w ay in which the 
line in France was ifo be broken and the whole of France 
over-run in the earl\- summer of i(»i6. There was the 
almost ecpially detailed description of the overrunning 
of Lombard\-. There has further ai)peared in the last 
few weeks the simple statement that all Russian offen- 
sive power \vould be broken before this summer. J':\'en 
as I write there comes a telegram (wliich I suppose is 
a( curate) that the Prussian :\Iinister of War— who is a 
public personage and ought to weigh his words— has 
told an American interxiewer that " he is in no anxiety 
abuiit reserves of man-power, for the Central Powers 
ha\e ample to make up any wastage." 

Although this last statement is vaguer than the manv 
hundred other pieces of nonsense which have appeared 
in the last two years with the same object, it is, to people 
who care to reason, more astonishing than any. 

.\tter ail. you can projjhesy, if you like, about a 
future; w liich is still uncertain, and you mav hope that 
by the time your prophesy falls due and" is fal.silied, 
people will have forgotten it. But the rate of wastage 
and the corresponcHng reserve of man-]iow er are things 
known not only to every Government in ICurope. but to 
thousands of men who arc following thi.s war, pro- 
fessioml soldiers and laymen. The whole world knows 
pei-fectlv Weil thai f]i(> rate of real wastage is, with all 

the belligerents, between tliree and four (and nearer 
four times than three times) the rate of annual recruitment. 
There is nothing mysterious or secret about such figures. 
They are the commonplaces of the whole war. 

It is equally conmion knowledge that while the rate 
of wastage is mucii the same on a.U sides, the annual 
power of recruitment among the Allies as a whole, is, 
in round figures, double that which it is for the Central 
Powers and their dependents. When a man of Stein's 
position allows a thing like that to be printed under his 
authority, it is just as absurd as though the British 
First Lord were to tell an American interviewer that the 
efl'ect of the submarines upon tonnage was insignificant ; 
or as though the French Premier were to say tliat the 
French domestic ])roduction of steel was so large as 
amply to meet that of the enemy. 

If I am asked why the enemy does this kind of thing I 
confess I am at a loss for a reply. 


I have received so many letters with regard to the 
speculation in which the newspapers are indulging 
about the reopening of hostilities on a large scale in 
the West that I can hardly neglect them ; at the same time 
I must repeat what I said last week, wliich was that no 
one but the few men responsible for the conduct of the 
war have any evidence before them at all upon this 
matter, and it is further their first duty to conceal all 
tile facts they ha\'e. All newspaper .speculation ami 
prophecy, is either a repetition of deliberately projjagated 
enemy rumours or futile nonsense. 

What reserve t^ie enemy has and how gravely inferior 
that reserve is to the Allied reserxe in man-power, is 
as I have just said, common knowledge. 

The Polish recruitment has failed. That is now 
quite ceitain. If the (ierman Fmjjire chooses to call 
Class 191Q, it can, of valid boys of that class, scrape 
together perhaps 250,000 or even 300,000 for its depots, 
but as a fact it has not called iqiq, and even if it j)ro- 
l)oses to call that class to-morrow it will jiot be able to use 
any of it for at least three or four months. 

The large lines of the problem, therefore, arc per- 
fectly clear. If the enemy cannot achieve success by 
sea whether negatively by gradually strangling maritime 
communications by submarines, or ])ositively by winning 
a great naval action, his only other alternative is to 
gamble on an early offensive in the West. He cannot 
possibly get a superiority of numbers there. He take 
the odds. By taking the odds, of course, he shortens 
the war against himself badly if he loses. In other 
words, the enemy is bound to one of two things, and 
cpiite possibly may attempt both of these things (for 
they are compatible as simultaneous actions) a stroke 
by sea and a stroke in the west by land. 

I repeat, that the first, a naval operation, I am in- 
competent to analyse. It is perfectly clear on the purely 
militar\' side (as a correspondent has well said) that a 
mere raid could do nothing decisive because of the 
necessity of providing considerable artillery, and that 
therefore the only decisive maritime work which couid 
at the last gasp pre\ent the enemy going under would 
be a full \ictory over the larger units of the British lleet, 
and thereby a free hand for real invasion. 

As to the other limb of the hypothesis, the attack 
on the West, if he used pretty well all he has in the depots 
and launched it o;i a new offensive, he would still neces- 
sarily meet a numerically superior foe. He would fight 
his last light with very httle chance of success and if Ik; 
failed he would hasten the decision against him. He 
cannot concentrate anywhere in the West without our 
knowing it. He cannot concentrate anywhere in forces 
superior to the resisting j^owcr he will meet. 

'Where he will choose to concentrate, whether it be the 
Allied game to let him attack first or no, (it is entirely 
for the Allied command to choose, for it has complete 
initiati\e in the matter) , where will come the Allied c(junt( r 
strokes in case he is so allowed to break his head first, 
neither I nor any other mere student in these affairs can 
})ossibly tell, and the few who are in a position to guess 
at the unknown part of the probiem (for they know the 
rest) have it as their chief business in life to prevent 
other people hearing about it. We shall know soon 
enoush, H. Belloc 



Februuiy i, i<jij 

Creating a Panic 

By Arthur Pollen 

IX times like these it is extraordinarily difficult to 
see J;hings in their right proportions, and to main- 
tain any balanced and steady view of the progress 
of the war as a whole. There are two reasons why 
tills is so. Few of tis have the mental equipment that 
gives a firm grasp of all the principles involved ; no 
one of us has any complete knowledge (jf e%en the most 
material facts of the case. It must then be almost 
normal to oscillate between too great confidence and too 
great alarm, according as our hopes or our fears are fed 
by sudden and more or less unexpected information. 
^Vhen war began there can have been no country in 
Europe so little prepared for thinking rightly about -war 
as Great Britain. And. as there was no country to which 
the war set such complicated problems, it would not have 
been surprising had the last two and a half years pro- 
duced succassi\e phases of popular opinion running from 
extremes of confidence to extremes of panic. 

These commonplaces are excellently illustrated for us 
bv the recent development of interest in the submarine 
campaign. For the last six months or more the 
authorities have forbidden the publication of exact 
statistics either of the niunber or of the tonnage of the 
ships destroved by the enemy's .submarines. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the campaign that began in 
August grew to very large proportions before we at all 
realized what was going forward. As there was no steady 
and regular information gi\en to the public as to what 
was happening, as no precise interpretation of it was per- 
mitted, it inevitably happened that the realisation of the 
facts was partial and sporadic, and that there arose that 
least desirable of all public conditions during war, a 
situation in which a comparatively small number of 
people were obsessed with the notion that a desperate 
public danger was threatening us and were irritated and 
alarmed to find that the great majority of their fellow 
countrymen, if they could be judged by their actions, 
seemed i:> be quite unaware of an\- new development 
having taken place-. There followed, then, what we 
have seen so often : violent efforts to agitate the public 
conscience and the pubJic will into appreciating the gravity 
of the facts and the insisting on Govenmient action to 
meet them. The submarine campaign was undoubtedly 
one of the factors that contributed to the fall of Mr. 
Asquith's cabinet. .\nd as it has continued unchecked 
ever since, it is possible that unless some measures are 
taken to inform and therefore steady public opinion, 
an effort may be made to stampede us into further and 
more \iolent changes in the machinery of government. 
How is this danger to be averted ? 

As it arises very largely from the pxiblic having been 
kept too long in 'ignorance of what was happening, I 
cannot myself doubt that the first step should be to 
remove once and for all the veil of mystery that shrouds 
the submarine campaign. There have been two stages 
in concealing the facts from us. When the war began 
the .\dmiralty issued weekly statements of the numbers 
of ships entering and leaving British ports, and the number 
of casualties, and it attributed these casualties to their 
several causes, action bv enemy ships, action by enemy 
submarines, and loss by mines. When the .submarine 
campaign proper ojjened in February iqi.T, this infor- 
mation was supplemented by ;i pretty exact indication 
(tf the point at which each submarine attack had been 
delivered. Up to July 1915, then, our information about 
the giuvi'c dc to?f/'SC was reasonably complete. We knew 
exactly u.'liat ships were being lost, we knew how they were 
being lost, and we knew whci-c they were being lost. The 
first cut was made in tht: last item. After July, we were 
no longer told where ships were sunk. Sometimes it 
would be said that the survivors had reached this or that 
port in boats, or had been brought in by some passing 
ship that had picked up the boats at .sea, and from this 
it was possible to gather whether the sinking had taken 
place in the \orth Sea, the Atlantic or the ^lediterranean. 
It was still possible, then, to indicate the general lields of 
activity, and to note the periodic increases and decreases 

in the intensity of the campaign as they occurred. But 
last June a second cut was made. \\'hile the bare fact 
of each loss as it occurred might, in most cases, still be 
recorded, the press was forbidden to tabulate the infor- 
mation so given, or to interpret events to their rcadei-s, 
.Vnd it should be added that from the beginning of the 
submarine information has been given, of 
liie success of the counter-campaign, save in about half a 
(I'izen instances. 

Results of Secrecy 

li i.> not difticult tu see the military and national argu- 
ment for a certain reserve and a ccridin .secrecy in these 
matters. It would have been obvious folly to have told 
the enemy of e\cry submarine of his that we have cap- 
tured or sunk, or believed we had sunk. It would ha\o 
been still greater folly if we had told him where the boat 
was when we attacked it. Similarly we can see excellent 
reasons why, when merchant ships are sunk by submarines, 
we should not let the enemy know, immediately, the 
t^xact area in which this success has been won. Again, we 
can fully appreciate the fact that as the credit of all and 
each of the Allies is founded upon the judgment that 
neutrals form as to the ultimate issue of the war and, as 
it is upon merchant .shipping— and nothing else — that 
the possibility of our victory rests, it is an obvious allied 
interest to minimise news of this character. All these 
considerations are obvious enough and, if in obedience 
to them there Imd been a total denial of some form of 
information — as, for instance, as to the number of German 
submarines sunk, and a certain delay in the publication 
of other — as, for instance, uhcrc our .ships Avere sunk — • 
and a careful supervision of the accuracy of all tabulated, 
statistical or general statements about the campaign, then, 
it seems to me, there could have been no cause for com- 
plaint. But these are not the things that were done. 
The Admiralty quite rightly has stuck to its policy of 
not publishing any list of German submarines sunk and 
captured. But tlie authorities are, 1 submit, wrong in > 
concealing for eighteen months tht; locality of each sink- 
ing, and have completeh' defeated their own ends in 
stifling the publication of accurate statistics. By doing 
• so they have indeed prevented any intelUgent inter- 
pretation of the campaign to the British public — which 
is bad enough. What is worse, a fair field has been left 
for enemy fabrication. It need not be said that this was 
an opportunity that he has not hesitated to use. He has 
put forward his own statistics of the campaign, and these 
have not only gone uncontradicted and uncorrected to 
neutral countries, but have been rejieated. and actually 
been exaggerated in some of the most wideh' read organs 
of British opinion. Thus German exaggeration got a 
British authority and so gained circulation in America 
ev<.Mt our friends, with a maximum danger to otir 
credit abroad, and a threat to stable judgment at home. 

By a curious coincidence an extreme example of 
this perversion has occurred, just when our third War 
I o n is in issue — a time at which, if ever, both the 
importance of impressing the neutral world with the 
certainty of our ultimate victory and of strengthening 
further confidence at home is at its highest. In the 
survey of the position, which The Observer issues each 
Sunday to its readers, the subject chosen for its last 
number was Great Britain's fcapacity to thwart and miti- 
gate the submarine campaign. To establish his case the 
writer had to explain how formidable was the attack on 
merchant tonnage. 

"Nothing ' he tells us. " but mischief was done, 
in our opinion, when the late (ioverument stopped pub- 
lishing the weekly returns of shipping losses. That resort 
only helped to lull and deceive ourselves, but concealed 
no information from the enemy. When the chiinge of 
Government occurred the tierman submarines were sinking 
daily an average of jroin 10,000 to i.i.000 tona of British 
merchant shipping. The destruction of neutral vessels 
•trti> far hizhcr, and this last factor counts fully, of course. 

February i, 1917 


in the reduction of the total carrying power available 
for these island'^ and for all British" and Allied purposes 
in the war. There is no reason to think that the amount 
of daily ilama^e has been at all decreased during the 
present month." 

Never, it seems to ]ne, has the truth of the first two 
sentences in any xmragraph, been so amply and dedsively 
proved by those which followed. We have indeed lost 
sc\erelv bv the refusal to publish exact and accurate 
statistics, if the result is the publication of statements 
s)uh as these. Obser\e what they . arc. The average 
daily loss of British shipping from November till the 
end of January is 12,000 tons, while that of neutral 
shipping is far higher. Neutral shipping then must have 
been going at the rate of, say. 18.000 tons a day ! Tliis 
gives a total of 30,000 tons a day for the last three months. 
In one quarter then, we must have lost two and ihrec 
quarter million tons, and before November the ist, next, 
imless the enemy's activities are stopped altogether, 
we must look forward to losing oyer eight million 
tons more. This is really a very alarming prospect, 
because. a«. a matter of fact, it is doubtful if there is as 
much as twenty million tons of British and Neutral 
shipping available for ovir purposes. By the time a 
third of this has gone, the situation, both of our Allies 
and of ourselves will be desperate. The object of the 
writer is to urge the (iovernment to appoint an official 
Controller of Shipping, who shall see that we not only 
produce more merchant tonnage than we have ever pro- 
duced before — even in times of peace, when the supply 
of labour was ample and of steel practically limitless — but 
to go far beyond it. We are not to be content to produce 
half a million tons of shipping a quarter fortliwitli, but 
are to pass this as soon — and as greatly — as possible. But 
if we are losing over a million tons of British shipping 
a quarter, the substitution of half a million tons will not 
meet the case. And if we are as dependent — as we are 
reminded — on neutral shipping as on our own, and 
neutrals are losing over a million and a lialf tons a quarter, 
it almost looks as if it is not worth while stniggling on 
against fate ! 

l-'ortunately, however, our condition — disagreeable 
enough in all conscience — is hardly so parlous as this writer 
would have us believe. I cannot pretend to any better 
knowledge of the statistics of our shipping losses than 
are available to any other member of the public who has 
taken the trouble to keep the requisite press cuttings 
since the first of August, and has added to the information 
daily given by the papers, such further details of the ton- 
nage of the particular ships as he can gather from Lloyd's 
List. These authorities arc of course incomplete. Not 
all losses are printed daily ; and it is not easy for a layman 
to identify each ship and get its tonnage right. 1 cannot, 
therefore, pretend that my figures are correct — but 1 
guarantee that they are a great deal nearer correct 
than those which I have just quoted. Now, according 
to the results obtained in this perfectly simple and 
straightforward way, I find that the .oss of British merchant 
steamer tonnage engaged in overseas trade — and this, 
of course, is the only tonnage that matters for the pur- 
pose of the argvnnent — was about 4,000 tons a day during 
the months of November and December. So that if the 
losses for January had remained aboiit constant, o\u' loss 
would be not 1,080,000 tons, but 360,000 tons. 

Next, on the daily a\erage of the last three months, 
it would look as if roughly, two neutrals and Allied ships 
were sunk to one British. If the average tonnage of these 
ships were the same as the average British tonnage, the 
total loss of shipping would be 1,080,000 tons for the 
three months, instead of over three milHon and a half. 
I have not succeeded in working out the exact tonnage of 
the neutral and Allied ships. But so far as I have been 
able to go, it is quite clear that they average ver\- * 
much less than do the British ships, so tliat the estimated 
loss of tonnage, other than British, instead of double 
is probably little if at all more than three-quarters of the 
British loss — say 3,000 tons a day and not the portentous 
figure that"jwe first supposed. So far as we can get at 
the facts, then, the rate of loss of all shipping is less 
than three-quarters of what, on Sunday- last, we were 
told, was the rate of loss for British shipping alone ! 

Now I am very far from saying that this loss is not 
exceedingly formidable. I ani, on the contrary, weary 
of reiterating the fact that it is precisely this form 01 

loss and the jiossibility of its increase that is, from the 
point of \-ieu- of the Allies, quite the most serious question 
qf, the day; but precisely because it is the most serious 
question, it is of the very first serious importance that the 
nature and scale of the thing should be clearly and correctly 
•stated. ]f it is not so stated, if the thing is dealt with 
in terms of gross exaggeration, we shall not only entirely 
misrepresent oiu- capacity to carry on the wtir to Allies 
and .Neutrals, but we shall be in danger of embarking 
on chanj?es.of policies and persons because of threats and 
dangers that ha\e mi existence except in somebody's 


Lord Fisher 

Curiously enough, the same writer who multiples the 
merchant shipping losses from 7,000 to 30,000 tons a day, 
implies that all these dangers might be kept away if only 
,we had followed his advice nine months ago, and given 
Lord Fisher the chance and the power of thwarting the 
rise of the enemy's submarine campaign and replacing 
its victims, if such replacement should —in spite of Lord 
Fisher's efforts— have become necessary. He quite 
realizes that the enemy's present effort is a great one. 
Indeed, his first campaign " totally suppressed by Lord 
Fisher" was a mere bagatelle compared, with it. The 
implication seems to be that, as we ha\e failed to employ 
this distinguished seaman to stop the U boats from show- 
ing their noses outside Cuxha\en and Zeebriigge, the 
least we can do is to entrust him no\\- with the rebuilding 
of the merchant fleet M'hich they destroy. If the disease 
were indeed as hopeless as this writer would have ris 
believe ; if the world's shipping were . vanishing at a 
rate that would doom these islands to hopeless famine in 
six months, then, honestly, it would not very much 
matter who was put in charge of the counter-campaign 
or of the shipbuilding programme. If, on the other 
hand, the situation is one that can be dealt with if right 
methods are taken, then the importance of adopting those 
right methods can hardly be exaggerated. Let 
us, on this subject, face the issue perfectly frankly. 

It is quite untrue that Lord Fisher " totally sup- 
pressed " the first German submarine campaign. The 
first submarine campaign did not become formidable until 
a month after Lord Fisher had left office. It was not sup- 
pressed until more than five montlis after that much 
discussed event, is it really necessary to perpetuate the 
fiction that the destruction of the (iermaif submarines in 
July, August and September iqi5, was the sole work of 
Lord Fisher who left office in May of that year ? There 
is really no ground for supposing that tlie anti-submarine 
campaign has lost anything of its efficiency by Lord 
Fisher's withdrawal. Next, it is quite impossible that Lord 
Fisher should be made a dictator oi shipbuilding without, 
at the same time, making him for all practical purposes. 
Lord High Admiral. Lord Fisher is an Admiral of the 
Fleet, a peer of the realm, and one of the most 
forceful and remarkable personalities in this kingdom. 
He is, in addition, consiclerably over sevcntj' years of 
age. He camwt noiv be cast for subordinate parts. And 
no one can be cast for the part of organising the building 
of transport and supply ships except in strict sub- 
ordination to the requirements of the Navy. I think a 
mistake was probably made, on the formation of tlie new 
Government, in not placing Sir Joseph Maclay directly 
under the Board of Admiralty, instead of giving him an 
independent department. But if Lord Fisher took his 
place, it is the Board of Admiralty that would become the 
subordinate department. This is obvious. And it is 
still more obvious that all the Navy, still on the 
active list, would view such a subordination of the 
constituted authorities, both with resentment and alarm. 
Their resentment would be due to no personal dislike or 
distrust of Lord Fisher, but to the spectacle of having a 
naval leadership forced \ipon the Service by public opinion, 
ignorant of naval sentiment in this matter. And they 
would view his appointment with alarm, because 
what the Navy needs to-day is the closest possible co- 
operation of men practically acquainted with the work 
of the units- and implements now employed in war, and 
no officer, however old or distinguished, who is imfamiliar 
with the practical requirements of the sitiiation, can 
possibly take sole cjiarge— without disaster. 

Arthur Pollen 



Fcln-uaiy i, iqij 

The Value of the Mark 

By T. H. Penson 

TTTltRF, scorns to be a vcrv Ronoral desire at the 
l>r.scnl time to ascertain so far as possible what 
( ".einiaiiy's economir )X)sition really is. E\iden(e 
of a kind there is in abundance, biit a great deal 
of it can liardh' be regarded as trustworthy. There is 
no doubt that Germanj- is verv badly in need of many 
fonimodities either for the feeding of her people or for the 
carrying on of the war. 

Neutral tra\-ellers describe wliat they have seen 
or experienced in the way of food restrictions, and 
letters taken from prisoners" often speak of great priva- 
tion at home. Frequent reference, too, is made iii 
our dail\- papers to the efforts that arc being 
made in Cermany to keep down prices and to 
secure a more even distribution of food and clothing. 
J-Voin information of this kind inferences may be 
drawn ])ointing to the fact that the economic pressure 
exerted bv the Allies is achieving very definite 
results. There is, however, one form of evidence 
a^ to Cermanv's (Economic position which attracts 
(■omparati\-ely little attention, and yet which is more 
dclrnite and more suggestive than many of those 
referred to abo\e. I refer to what may for convenience 
be described as the value of the mark, and it must be 
understood that the opinions here expressed arc those 
of the writer only. 

An Economic Gauge 

The value of the mark, as expressed in the currencies 
of the various neutral countries, is an external factor of 
great importance in gauging (iermany's internal con- 
dition. But the study of the foreign exchanges, as they 
arc called, is an extremely technical subject, and man>- 
will no doubt regard it also as an extremely dull one. 
It is possible, however, without going too far into 
technicalities, to extract a good deal that is really helpful 
in one's attempt to estimate how (jermany really stands 

The first fact that it is necessary to emphasise is that 
in neutral countries the mark is worth very much less 
than it was at the beginning of the war — very much 
less in fact than it was six months ago. The countries 
in which this fact is of the greatest importance are 
those immediately bordering on Germany and the United 
States of America. The extent of the depreciation of 
the German currency in these countries is seen at a 
glance in the following table : 

Xonnal value . oj Present value of 
Cniinin'- i'^f> Marks. loo Mar/,'s. 

Sweden.. .. SK.SS kr. 56.50 kr. 

Norwa\' .. 88. 8S kr. ()o kr. 

]X-nniarU .. SS.88 kr. (n kr. 

Holland .. r)<)-^*'> f- 41-25 fl. 

Switzerland .. i-',j.44lr. 85.45 fr. 

U.S. .A. .. .. .2.5-81 dollars 16.81 dollar?. 

This serves to show that the \-aluc of German money has 
as a consequence of the war fallen about ;^y per cent, 
in Sweden ; 32 per cent, in Norway ; 32 per cent, in 
Denmark; 31 per cent, in Holland; []^, per cent, in 
Switzerland ; 30 per cent, in U.S.A. 

With her currency so depreciated it is evident that 
(.ermany is paying \cry dearly for what she buys from 
neutral traders. For example, whereas in normal times 
for a Swedish article costing 80 kroner Germany would 
]>ay 100 marks, now she must jjay about 161 marks, 
and when it is remembered that the prices of the goods 
( lermany wants are in many cases some two or three 
hundred per cent., or even more, in excess of what they 
vvere before the war, it will easily be understood how- 
serious a drain on her resources is caused by the mere 
fact that in foreign centres of trade the value of the mark 
has fallen to such an extent. 

The second fact worth noticing is that not only does 
this depreciation exist, but that it is steadily increasing, 
in spite of the tremendous efforts being made by the 
German Go\ernment to check the downward movement. 
The fuUowint: tables will illustrate this decline, and will 

liclp to bring home the fact that G ermanv's financial 
jxisition is not only bad, but is steadilv getting worse. 
J.— The regular and continuous decline in the value of 
the mark during the ))ast two years is well sci n in the 
case of the American Exchange : 

January 1915 depreciation of Mark in .\ew York 8",o 
April " „ „ „ 13':,, 

Jxl.v „ ,. 15".. 

October ., „ , ,. ij",. 

J,Tnn;ir\- i()i() 

December ,, 



n. — The steady decline during the few months 
which, as illustrating present tendencies is of even greater 
interest, may be conveniently traced in the exchanges 
as quoted in the countries surrounding Germany. During 
the months of August, September and October of iQib 
there was very little change to be noted, but then set 
in a steady downward movement which reached its lowest 
})oint in December just before the Kaiser produied his 
first " Peace Note." The possibility of an early peace 
led to a rather sharp rebound, but the effect soon passed 
off and by the middle of January the value of the mark 
had fallen again almost to the low level it had reached 

Value nf 100 Marks in Sici/zer. 

1016. Sweden. Xorway. Denmark. Holland. land. 


Oct. 25 61.35 

Nov. I 61 

,, 8 61 

,, 15 60.85 

,. 22 59.50 

.. 20 57-75 

Dec. 8 56 

.. 9 .54'.')0 

kr. kr. fl. fr. 

62.75 64.20 42.80 91.80 

62.75 64.10 42.42 90.40 

62.75 64 42.32 90.25 

62.50 63.85 41.77 87.60 

61.40 62.50 40.47 85.75 

61 60.20 .40.42 84. (>o 

58.20 59-50 39-10 80 

57.40 58 39.10 79 

Representing in a little over "^ix weeks a fall per cent* 
of about : 

Sweden. Norwav. Denmark. Holland. Switzerland. 
8 67 6 10 

Without going too deeply into the question, it seems 
desirable to get some idea of the main reasons for the 
depreciation. Nations, like individuals, have to pay 
for what they buy. They may have to pay in cash, 
or they may be able to postpone the date of payment by 
getting credit, the latter naturallv depending on th(> 
amount of confidence felt in the financial stability and 
integrity of the buyer. The goods which one nation 
obtains from another are jiaid for in various ways, l-'or 
the most part they are jiaid for by other goods, but 
j)a3-ment may be made in (Jther ways also as, for example, 
in gold or in securities. This is another way of stating 
the familiar economic tag that imports are paid for by 
exports, taking " exports " to include, of course, the 
precious metals, securities, and the many forms of sei-vicc 
which one country may render to another, and for which 
a return may be expected. 

The foreign exchanges - that is the value of a country's 
currency expressed in tcnns of the currency of other 
countries —afford a very fair idea as to the nation's balance 
sheet. The depreciation in the value of the mark at the 
present time shows that the balance is decidedly against 
Germany. She cannot pay in goods ; she is unwilling 
to pay in gold ; she has parted with most of her foreign 
securities ; she finds it difficult to get credit. 

In the early days of the war it was by no means un- 
common to hear people seriously putting forward the 
argument that it was a mistake to interfere with Ger- 
many's imports ; that she should be allowed, or even 
encouraged, to import as much as she would, hwX that the 
exports wherever possible should be cut off. In this 
way it was said she would be obliged to pay in gold ; she 
would be drained of her metallic reserve ; she would 
become bankrupt, and financial ruin would be the pre- 
cursor of her complete downfall. This rather illustrates 
the danger of rel\-ing too much on theory and not paying 

February t, tqt/ 



sufticient attention to practical considerations. Fallacious 
as the argument is, it contains a certain amount of truth. 
<~.ermany has herself realized the position in which she 
would be placed if her imports were entiiely unrestricted, 
and she has consequently prohibited the importation of 
various articles, mainly those that would be classed as 
" luxuries." The more the balance of trade is against 
her, the lower would be the value of the mark in the 
countries from which she is obtaining the goods, and the 
\alue of the mark is at once the external sign of an adverse 
balance and of declining credit. 

It is interesting to notice in this connection some of the 
measures which she has taken to try and redress this 
balance in her favour. Only in the last few days all 
imports into ( Germany of goods from neutral countries 
have been placed mider the control of a special govern- 
ment department, and it maybe assumed that the object of 
this new department is to raise the value of the mark 
in the adjoining countries. (Germany has besides tried to 
reduce the cost to herself of what, if her people are to 
live and she is to have the means of carrying on the war, 
she is bound to import. With this in view she lias in 
the various countries adjoining her establislied as buying- 
a,gencies branches of the Zeutrale ICinkauf (iesellschaft 
(more generally known as the Z.K.(i.). Bv means nf 
these agencies she is able to restrict the conijietition of 
one buyer against another, and by creating what may b(^ 
<'.alled a buyer's monopoly, she is able not onlvto organise 
the purchase of the foodstuffs and other desirable goods 
that the market can proxide, but also to depress the 
prices of what she buys and so diminish the amount of 
iier indebtedness. 

Germany has also taken steps to enhance the value of 
the goods exported in exchange. Exporters have been 
comj)elled to_ raise very considerably the prices of the 
goods they are offering, and they have besides been 
obliged to quote the prices of their goods not in marks, 
but in kroner, florins or francs, as the case may be, thus ' 
avoiding the loss resulting from payment in their own 
depreciated currency. 

So far then as the value of the mark is dependent upon 
the balance which Germany is able to maintain between 
the value of \vhat she imports and the value of what she 
exports, it has been shown that on the debit side of the 
account must be entered all that Germany can persuade 
her neighbours to supply her with in the way of food, 
feeding-stuffs for cattle,, fertilisers for her "soil, raw 
materials of every kind for her manufactures, and articles 
partly or completely finished. ]Vluch as she would like 
to reduce this debit to the smallest possible dimensions, 
her needs are so great and so urgent that she is boimd to 
strain every nerve, to exert various forms of pressure 
on her neighbours, and to resort to everv possible 
stratagem in order to increase her imports', with the 
result of ever increasing her indebtedness to the various 
neutral States from which she can draw supplies. The 
only way apparently in whi(ii she can diminish the debit 
side of the account is by rigidly excluding all luxuries 
and by reducing in every possible way the cost of the 
imported goods. That the debit side of the account is 
not larger is due, not to Germany's moderation or self- 
denial in the matter of imports, 'but to the pressure of 
our blockade. .Month by month the amount that Ger- 
many is able to import diminishes, diminishing it is true 
at the same time her indebtedness, but depriving her of 
the supplies without which she is sorely crippled. 

The Credit Side 

It will thus be readily seen that if Germany could 
mamtam licr exports to the countries surrounding her, 
the adverse trade balance against her would by degrees 
be wiped out and the exchanges tend more and more to 
return to normal conditions. But such has not proved 
to be the case, and the explanation will be found in the 
credit side of the account to which our attention must 
now be directed. On the credit side must be entered the 
goods she exports, the securities she is able to sell in 
neutral countries, the gold she can from time to time part 
with, and even the jewels which the Gcrm.ui people have 
sent abroad for realisation. 

The ntost striking feature at the present moment on 
this credit side of the account is the reduction in the 
amount or, r,orman\''< exports wliirli ma\- be regarded 

as one of the main causes of the continued depreciation 
of the mark, and at the same time as a valuable means 
of gauging Germany's economic position as a whole. It 
is only natural that she should try to conceal or to explain 
away as far as possible this diminution of her exports. 
She would like it to be supposed that it is due entirely 
to the stringency of the blockade wliicll prevents her 
supplying her usual markets overseas. " We cannht 
pay for om* imports with our exports," she would sa\', 
" because the blockade has cut us off from oiu" many 
customers in Asia and America." But th(^ blockade has 
been effecti\-e in this direction practically since the 
beginning of the war, so that an explanation must be 
found elsewhere for the falling off of her exports in the 
last few montlis. The real cause is to be found in the 
rapid decay of Germany's productive capacity. 
The production of goods for export in\ol\es : 

(a) An adequate supply of raw material, much of wliich 
has to be. imported, but, which owing to 'the blockade 
cannot now be imported. 

(b) Labour for the production of sncli raw material as 
riprmany lierself can ])rovifl('. 

(i:) Lnbour for the extractifiu of (1m> conl which iu 
the past two years helped to swell considerably the vfihune 
of hor exports, and wl)ich besides is necessary for Iceeping 
Iter factoricii and her railways going, 
(d) l.ahonr for the jiroduction of manufactured articles. 

The maintenance of her exports, therefore, may bo 
said to be depr'udent on two main factors — raw material 
and labom-. The latter of these is perhaps the one that 
it is most important to enlarge upon here. The man- 
power a\-ailable for maintaining exports .is limited by two 
main considerations : 

(i) The total man-power existing in the country. 

(2) The amount ol' man-powor licing utilised for other 

Roiighly speaking, the ]nan-power of Germany is being 
utilised in four ways : 

fa) In meeting the requirements of her navv and in main- 
taining at fullest jiossiblc strength lier arnues distributed 
on the various fronts, in depots, on lines of communication, 
on neutral frontiers. 

(h) In su]>plying the needs of army and navy in'thc maltcr 
of munitions, food, and clothing. 

(c) In supplj'ing the needs of the civil population. 

(d) In the production of goods for export. 

It is e\ident then that the labour power available for 
maintaining the balance of Germany's foreign trade must 
be regarded as a residue left over when the three first 
needs have been satisfied. Losses in the field must be 
made good, and more than made good as new- campaigns 
have to be undertaken. The demand for munitions is 
an ever-increasing one. For both of these purposes man- 
power must be withdrawn from the only possible sources 
-the men engaged in supplying the needs of civilians 
and those occupied in manufacturing for customers in 
the adjoining neutral countries. That this withdrawal 
of men is in fact taking place, and that exports are iu 
consequence falling off, can easily be demonstrated. 
By a recent law all the labour power' of the country, both 
male and female, was conscripted. ^Vomen ha\c taken 
the place ol men in e\-ery held of labour, and e\-en in its 
most arduous forms. The shortage of men has seriously 
affected the coal supply. The amount available for 
export has been veiy much reduced. The coal from the 
("rerman and Belgian coalfields which was exported frc^ely 
at earlier stages of the war, has now diminished in supply 
and the export cannot be maintained. Railway transport 
also is seriously hampered by lack of coal. 

All this tends to point to one very definite conclusion — 
the fall of the mark is largely due to the falling off of 
Germany's exports. This falling off of exports is itself 
a consequence of the shortage of man-power. Military 
losses and requirements are telling on industrial capacity, 
and it can only be a question of time before the point 
will be reached at which industrj' cannot be squeezed 
any longer, and the armies will be unable to maintain 
their present strength. 

Thcr(^ is another aspect of the case which if: is important 
not to overlook. The value of an\-thing is' very largely 
affected by the extent to which it is in demand. As tlio 
demand for anything, the value lend-^ to rise; 
as the demand fliminishes the value tends to fall. Thi'* 



l-ebruary i, 1<)V/ 

I?, a mere crononiic rommnnplarc, but it lias a special 
application with regard to the \alHe of the mark. The 
\villinphr=;scif people in neutral countries to receive marks 
in payment for tlieir goods dejx^nds very larj^jely on the 
ronlidence placed in the financial stability of the country 
in which marks are current —namely, Germany. The 
low value of »he mark is an indication that there is but 
little demand for marks ; that there is sjeat miw illin.tiness 
to purchase (ierman currency, and this points ine\itably 
to the conclusion that the confidence of neutrals in Or- 
many's ability to pay is dimini-hint;, that in the eyes of 
neutrals her credit is seriously iin{)aired. 

It should be pointed out that the problem has been 
.'iimplified by the omission of all reference to the effects 
on the international exchanges of the large German 
issues of paper money, and of the speculative buj'ing <>f 

<.ierman currency on foreign bourses. A study of these 
would lnj'lp to explain thcquotiations at any particular 
time or the fluctuations during any particular period, 
but the omission does not seriously affect the general 
line of the arg\mient or the general conclusions arrived at. 
In conclusion, the \alue of the mark is one of the most 
striking indications of (k-rmany's economic position. Its 
contimious decline emphasises her inability to maintain 
her exports, her shortage of man-power, the dwindling of 
that reserve from which alone the gaps in her ranks can 
be filled. There may be occasional small rises due to some 
exceptional exertion on (jermany's part, or to tin- 
circulation of peace rumours, but the general course is 
steadily downward, and this downward movement may 
be regarded as a clear sign of the exhaustion which pre- 
cedes collapse. 

Psychology of the Workshop 

By Arthur Kitson 

-IT -m" 7-HEX the late Frederick Taylor of Philadelphia 

^ ^L I was deep in his study of workshop efliciency, 

^U^^ he occasionally favoured me with the results 

y T of his labours. He mentioned the tons of 
metal he had uSed in ascertaining the conditions mider 
which the higliest speed efficiency was obtainable with 
\arious machines, lathes, drilling, slotting and screw 
cutting machines, etc. He worked out the speed 
efficiency for every form and \ariety of workshop tool 
and machine, including labour itself. From the purely 
mechanical standpoint Taylor's work is the last word in 
efficiency. In one of otir munerous conversations, I 
asked if he had given any consideration to the 
psychology of the labour factor. He admitted that up 
to that time — sixteen years ago— he had not. ^' He 
acknowledged that great \ariations in the quality of 
labour existed, but his endea\our was to elimingite as far 
iis possible the personal equation. 

Taylor's work was entirely confined to the material 
side. Increased output, reduced costs, greater profits — 
these were the sole objective results he aimed at — and 
attained— to an extraordinarily high degree. It is a 
curious commentary on the human mind to witness how 
often in our pursuit of certain objects the means for 
securing them are regarded as the objects themselves. 
Workshop efliciency should be merely a means for pro- 
viding us with those ntaterial things necessary to fife, 
its de\-elopment and enjoyment, with the least expendi- 
ture of energy. F>ut supposing this pursuit ends in 
debasing the human factors into itiere pieces of mechanism ? 
Supposing our mechanical efficiency turns out to be a 
Frankenstein ? Supposing efficiency ends in crushing the 
\ery object for whose advantage it is created ? 

One of the many salutary lessons taught by the war is 
the need for improving the conditions of labour. The 
introduction of female labour into thousands of work- 
shops, and the acquaintance which manv of our educated 
classes ha\-c made with factory conditions, have led to a 
demand for " humanising " labour conditions. Pro- 
bably the most debasing feature of these conditions is the 
terrible monotony of repetition work. A man who 
performs the same operation, the making of the same 
article day after day and week after week, month after 
month, becomes a mere automaton. Xot only does it 
affect him during the hours of labour, btit e\entually 
he becomes machine-like in all his movements, with 
disastrous results to his mental and moral stamina. 

The great labour problem is how to make workshop 
life attractive, interesting, ennobling. The solution of 
this problem will not only prove of great moral and 
physical benefit, but economically advantageous. The 
operator who is interested in his work, will do more and 
b(?tter work than the one who is " fed up " with the 
monotony of his daily task. Moral is as important a 
factor in the -workshop as in the army. The knowledge 
that their product is to be one of the deciding factors in 
waning the war has braced thottsands of machinists to 
do their lc\'el best, and to-day many, engineering establish- 

ments are turning out better and more woik per man 
than at any period in their history. 

I am now speaking from experience. I have several 
men employed on munition work, whose weekly output 
is one-third more than the maximum quantity which the 
makers of the macliines believed it was possible to pro- 
duce ! Employees who, prior to the war, grumbled when 
requested to work overtime, now willingly put in an 
average of tweUe hours a day. And this is not entirely 
due to the extra wages paid them. It is the same spirit ■ 
that caused hundreds of thousands of all to rush 
to their nearest recruiting station as soon as war was 
declared. Is it not possible to cultivate this spirit and 
organise it for the production of the munitions of life — 
when peace is declared ? Such a result would absolutely 
revolutionise industrial life. 

One method for rendering the operator's task less 
monotonous is to explain fully to him the functions 
fulfilled bj- each particular article he makes In my 
young days of apprenticeship I remember how dull and 
stupid certain repetition work appeared. To make the 
first few screws was interesting, but after several days 
the same task became monotonous. One day my father 
took me to Strood, and we boarded the Great Eastern 
Steamship— then the greatest and most famous vessel 
. afloat. T was there shown the purpose of the screws I 
was making, which were to be used on the \-essel. From 
that time the work assumed a totally different aspect. 
The thought that my product was of some impoitance 
in connection with the greatest ocean Leviathan, dis- 
persed all feelings of monotony, and I felt myself of really 
some importance in the industrial world. During thirty 
years of business experience 1 have found that this 
practice of explaining the tise of the articles the machinist 
is engaged in making, greatly adds to his interest. 

During a recent visit to the Whitehead Aircraft works 
at Richmond, Surrey, Mr. Whitehead said that he 
made it a rule to call his workpeople together two or 
three times a week during working hours, and address 
them on the nature and importance of their work. 
When flying tests and experiments are carried out, 
occasionally he in\'ites the entire works to visit them. 
" By these and : similar meaiis the interest of every 
employee is maintained at the highest level," he added. 
" Every one works with the same diligence and zeal as 
if the business belonged to him or her." 

The key to success will be found in satisfying the natural 
longing and hope of everyone to be of sonui recognised 
value in the world. The great incentive which causes 
men joj^fully to spend days and nights in working out 
inventions, in making discoveries, in writing books, is 
not the mere hope of pecuniary gain, but the determination 
to obtain recognition among their fellows as having done 
" their bit " in life. Indeed, the way to lighten toil and 
humanise labour, conditions is to adopt such means as will 
engender the spirit of a victorious army, where every 
man shares the^ glory of sucx~ess. There is the excellent 
story of the organ blower, wlio \\lien the organist was 

Februar>- i, 1917 



bowing profusely in ackaowledgmoat of the plaudits of 
his audience after a famous recital, insisted on. sharing 
the honours by standing beside the performer and 
making his bows. For had he not also contributed 
his share to the performance? .- • 

Distinctions for Industry 

The entire industrial spirit would be changed cuu:- 
pletely if every factory employee from the humblest 
labourer to the manager was made to feel that eacli is an 
important and necessary link in the chain of produc- 
tion. AccompauN'ing this should be a system of badging 
for good conduct and special achie\cment. The Ministry 
of Munitions did a wise thing when it adopted the 
liadge system. It ga\-e a tone and standing to those so 
badged "which has done not a little in stimulating output. 

Soon after the Ijeginning of the war, when my works 
recei\'ed its first contract for mimitions, nothing was 
said at first to the operators as to their being employed 
on munition Mork. -There Avas a tendency on the part of 
several to dawdle. :As 'soon' as "it was explained that 
rapidit\- of output meant the saving of men's lives at the 
front, all signs of malingering disappeared. There arc in- . 
numerable opportmiities for the display of heroism in the 
workshop as well as on the field of battle. Could not the 
Government extend the distinguished service orders to 
include every departm':'nt of life, and give munition 
workers an equal chance with th? soldier for gaining the 
equivalent of the V.C. or the D.C.M. ? 

Another method for alleviating the natural feeling of 
monotony is to transpose operators from time to time 
by putting them on different operations. My experience 
proves that the mechanic who is generally skilled — 
that is, skilled in several operations — is usually better 
in each tlian the mere specialist. Change of occupation 
periodically is beneficial to both the employer and em- 
ployee. In large works where gymnasia, cricket grounds, 
lawn tennis courts and e\en libraries are provided, occa- 
sional breaks in the working hours to enable employees 
to enjoy a few minutes' recreation, will be found of 
immense ^■alue. 

riie excessive use of stimulants, spirits, beer and tobacco 
amongst the working classes ma\' often be traced to the 
desire to get rid of the monotony of existence. Tem- 
perance advocates, asa rule, fail to get to the root of the 
evils of intemperance^ They blame the peoplt who 
manufactiue the intoxicants and sell tiiem, as well as 
I the Government that permits the traffic. But they do 
not seem to realize that the existence of the evil arises 
from the persistence of the demand, for which some good 
reason exists. To get rid of drunkenness we must first 
ascertain its -cause — by studying the motives and con- 
ditions of tliose who insist upon getting drunk. Whilst 
intemperance may be due to mere habit, or hereditary 
desires, I believe a vast amount, especially among the 
working classes, is directly due to the desire to escape 
for a time from the dreariness and the monotony of their 
fives. And the surest cure is to find some healthy means 
of making their lives brioht and interesting. 

Two modern inventions proxide a method for assisting 
in this task. The enormous success which has attended 
the cinema and the gramophone prove the public appre- 
ciation of the need for these diversions. If the Ministry 
of Munitions could have employed 200 or 300 lecturers 
provided with films giving views from the battle fields, 
taken on all the various fronts, etc., to visit the various 
engineering works, and exhibit them ^o the munition 
workers— accompanied by appropiiate descriptions of 
\vhat our men were doing and the part played by muni- 
tions it would have done much to increase output. The 
psychological effect of music is known too well to require 
more than a passing reference. Gramophones in factories 
might afford as powerful a stimulus to labour as a military 
brass band gives to an aruiy marching to battle. 

The greatest factor iiv maintaining the moral of factories, 
however, will be found in the personal relations existing 
between the masters and their men, between the managers 
and foremen and those under them. An American friend, 
employing over 700 people, requires but one overseer. 
The relations of himself and his manager to his people 
are of such a nature that his employees never require 
watching. They are so satisfied with their treatment 

hat their one "fear is lest they should get discharged. 

Naturally there are scores of people, like the Huns, who 
are insensible to kind treatment — to whoin a kick or an 
oath is more effective than ad\ice. Such people are 
either half-human or seldom worth employing at any 
price. J3ut to the average Briton, a kind word is every- 
thing, whilst an unjust act or a harsh word stmgs like a 
scorpion, and seriously reduces his efficiency as a pro- 
ducer. I ha\e often marvelled at the utter stupidity of 
many managers who imagine kindness or sympathy 
displayed to a workman to be a sign of weakness, and 
tends to spoil him. I have known workmen rendered 
incapable of work for several days by some censure 
given tliem in brutal terms. I have always regarded 
such conduct as stupid as a man ^•enting his rage upon 
a machine by striking it with a sledge hammer ! The 
human being is the most delicate, the most scnsitixc 
machine, and needs the most intelligent treatment. 

The psychology of the factory is a comparatively new 
study, but it presents a most fruitful field for experiment 
and investigation. Remarkable as the results of recent 
mechanical efficiency methods ha^■e proved, far greater 
* econonuc results remain to be achieved in the domain of 
psychology — in knowing the conditions under which the 
human factor is capable of the highest achie\-ements. / 
venture to say that the highest degree of efficiency wiU 
be found where labour conditions are the mcst healthful, 
and the welfare and happiness of the workers is the chief 
consideration. Some day the world's statesmen will 
awaken to the fact that any economic system ^vhich 
breeds poverty and misery among the masses is neither 
moral nor econonuc. and that the surest plan for making 
a nation, rich and prosperous, is to ensure first the well- 
being of the working classes. The true science of 
economics must harmonise with the laws of ethics. 

A Question of Status 

THE war as it develops has raised a problein 
present to the minds of all those taking part in 
active service and even of many civilians at 
home ; it is the problem of recognising as act- 
ive the forces hitherto regarded as auxiliary. The trench 
fighting, the extraordinary growth of artillery, and 
especially of heavy artillery and munitions, the methods 
and new perils of liaison (the life of a modern despatch 
rider, for instance), the ])cril of all the branches of the 
service whatsoever within a zone much wider than was 
the case before artillery had acquired its present range — • 
all these causes combined have changed the old balance 
of peril, and therefore the lionour. 

There is a particular example of this which is especially 
striking. We refer to the motor transport which 
" feeds " the heavy guns. This transport was at first 
regarded as purely auxiliary. But in practice it has 
already become, under the conditions of the present war, 
part and parcer of the active functions on the front. 
It runs all the risks of the battery, but its members do 
not rank as the gunners rank, nor count as the peril they 
undergo and the casualties they suffer seem to warrant. 
It is perfectly true, of course, that only a certain pro- 
portion of the transport is at any moment under the 
same conditions of service as the batteries themselves ; 
though, for that matter, the gunners and their jiicces 
are not always in action ; the test would rather seem to be 
whether under the changed conditions of war, the motor 
transport, especially that serving the Ireavy artillery, 
should not be regarded as part of the armj^ 

It will be remembered that long after the introduction 
of artillery, most services continued to regard the drivers 
as something of less dignity than those who served the 
guns. Indeed for a very long time the drivers in most 
services were ci\ilians taken haphazard, and very often 
the teams as well. The full definition of the driver as 
forming a part of the artillery army in the normal 
European organisation is as late as the French Revolution, 
and there are examples even after that date of confusion 
or belated habit in the matter. 

Something of the same sort may be seen in the case 
of the motor transport of munitions in this war, and it is 
at any rate well worth considering whether the time has 
not come for the recognition of this transport as parjL of 
the sunners' army. 



I'Ybruary i, 1917 

Expulsion of Turkey from Europe 

By Sir William Ramsay 

IN regard to the Turkish people and their fate, I 
write as one who has known thousands of them in 
the course of the last thirty-five years, and is on 
\cry friendly terms with many. 1 am indebted 
\o I hem" for much kindness. I have eaten the bread and 
salt of very many individuals and villages; and there 
are few, if any, even among the Turks themselves, whose 
face used to be sq familiar or so welcome in hundreds of 
liirkish \illaf;es as mine. 1 claim to speak on behalf of 
the people of Turkey, both when I have denounced the 
Armenian massacres, and now when I maintain that 
Turkish domination on the great international waterway 
whicli is commanded by Constantinople, is an outrage 
that ought to be ended 

ivN-ery plan for miproving Turkish administration has 
failed ; "and the conclusion must be drawn. The streets 
uf Stamboul must be swept clear of blood. The Young 
'lurks swept them clear of filth and of dogs, but the 
stain of innocent blood shed throughout the Empire 
is deeper than ever at the centre of government. No 
true friend of the Turks would keep them where they 
lia\-e U> perfurm a gra\e international duty. It is a 
work l<n- which thev are not suited : no one that knows 
and lo\es their good qualities from intimate knowledge 
can lie ignorant of the faults which unfit them to rule 
at Constantinople. They cannot use. but only misuse, 
tlie resources of civiHsation. Anything may happen m 
'fnrkey except what is reasonable and natural 'and 
possible ; and the results are often comic, but sometimes 
tragic. Moreover, the jxjople who suffer most from the 
goxeming class have been the Turks tliemsehes. 
Tins sounds a paradox, but it is the plain truth 

Where the Best Turks Dwell 

The best part of the Turkish people and the mainstay 
of the Turkish army has always been the population of the 
Central Plateau and the mountains of Asia Minor. They 
rank in general estimation as the truest Osmanli and the 
best of^the Turks. The C.overnment of this people, 
however, has never lain in their own hands. It is about 
3,500 years since tHe governing centre of Asia Minor, as a 
wiiole," ceased to he within its own bounds : the Seldjuk 
lunpire of Kum or Konia was hardly an exception to this 
stateuK'nt. During all that period the country has been 
under foreign domination ; and the capital has sometimes 
been at Susa or Bagdad, sometimes at Rome or Con- 

We are accustomed to think of Constantinople almost as 
if it were part of Asia IMinor, but it is a city of Europe ; 
and the spirit of its inhfibitants is very different from 
that of the true Turks of Asia Minor. The high-class 
Turks of Constantinople, who supply most of the oificials 
and exercise the power of the Empire, often have great 
difficulty in understanding what an Asia Minor peasant 
sajs, as" their educated Turkish is so unlike the popular 
language. 1 have known an Englishman act as inter- 
preter between a Turkish Pasha and an Anatolian peasant. 
In blood also there is much difterence. The ruHng class 
in Stamboul, from the Sultan downwards, spring from a 
mixed race. ]'"or many generations the mothers of this 
class ha\e been almost invariably non-Turkish — Cir- 
cassian or some other alien race : and all have been 
brought up in an atmosphere which is unlike that in 
which the true Turks live. Many years ago the President 
of Robert College in Constantinople said to me that his 
predecessor, who spoke from a \'ast knowledge of Turkey, 
had always looked forward to the future influx of Turkish 
Ijoys into the College as the greatest danger whi( h it 
would ha\e to face, on the ground that the IiirkisJi 
bovs of the class which would hereafter come to the 
College are either accomplished and irredeemable black- 
guards, or soft, helpless molly-coddles, brought uji in 
the harem with loving and ignorant care by Turkish 
women, and unfit to face the most ordinary difliculties 
of college life. While the former kind of boy was far 
tlie more numerous, the latter often pro\ e unfit to stand 

the moral tests and trials of life. Vet in the hands of this 
class, helped by Phanariotc Greeks or by Armenians, 
the administration of tlie country used to lie. 

Question of Education 

Formerly, these Turks were so uiieducaied tliat writing 
was a difiicnlt art, \ery little practised by them. The 
official governing a Turkish district used, as a rule, to 
keep a secretary (almost always Christian), who read to 
him all documents and .showed him where to imjjiess his 
seal. In the earUer years of my acquaintance with the 
country! was on two occasions told, as quite an extra- 
ordinary thing, that the governor of a large proxince 
was actually able to read any document ])resented to him. 
In recent years writing has become inunensely more 
familiar to the official class, and they have some smatter- 
ing of acquaintance with books on economics, gained, 
in most cases, not through reading the books, but through 
synopses and reports of their contents. 

There is so much good in the common peasainrv, 
totally uneducated as they used to be and mostly >till 
are, that English visitors, who saw Turkey largely from 
the point of view of the tourist or the diplomatist, were 
always buoyed up with hope that Turkey could r<form 
itself from inside, through its own natural rc-sources, 
with some help from wi'll-meaning external powi-rs. 1 
speak as one who cherished such hopes to the end. All 
schemes of reform, howe\'er, ha\e been framed by alien 
diplonratists with little know;ledge of the people or the 
practical possibilities of the case, and sometimes not 
free from the suspicion of dreading a reformed Turki'y. 
J-?iit, further, the reforms have been wrecked by the 
liniversal principle of European diphjinacy — that the 
existing government must be supported at all costs. 

There is in Asia a natural self-righting power, which 
does away with a certain amount of the evil of despotism 
by destroying every dynasty as soon as jt loses \'igour and 
becomes effete ; but some disorder is inevitable in the 
j)rocess. Wrong ])roduces wrong. 'The supporters of 
the dynasty have to be defeated or terrorised. A good 
deal of fighting goes on ; the streets of the metrojwlis 
sometimes run with blood ; the blood is of important 
jjeople, and persons familiar in diplomatic circles suffer. 
This sort of massacre is inconvenient to the. diplomatists ; 
it is ugly ; it takes, place at their doors. T'or a few 
days they are hardly able to go out into the streets with 
safety. Hence European Embassies have always re- 
sisted any such exercise of the natural self-regulating 
strength of the nation. Moreo\er, the example might 
spread to other lands. 

Whether it was possible for Turkey to reform itself 
ill favourable circumstances has never been actually 
tested ; and the opportunity so often missed can nevei 
he gi\en again in Europe. The one fixed jmnciple of Ok; 
Turkish administration was to leave subjects moderately 
free to live according to their own principles, until there 
arose any suspicion that they were likely to jMove 
dangerous to the (io\ernment ; then a massacre, carried 
to tlie extent wiiich thi: (iovernment thought useful 
to discourage flu; dreaded movement, was brought into 
elfect. 'The "S'omig Turk>' jirinciple is the same ; but 
they have made it more thorough, learning in this respect 
from (ierman teaching. 'The metiiod (jf massacre is too 
deeply ingrained in the 'Turkish official mind. 

'The ill-success of the latest reform movement which 
be.gan in July ic)o8 by overthrowing the power of the 
Sultan and completed its Avork in April ii)0() by deposing 
lum, is a striking lesson. It is, of course, quite ])ossible. 
for those who beheved in the "\'oung 'Turks, ami hirped 
for great things from them (among whom I number 
myself), to argue that such difficulties were thrown in 
their way by European Powers as to destroy any chanc(^ 
of their success. Jiuf, making every allowance for tin- 
external troubles which iinpedefl them, beginning with 
the seizing by Auslria-in i<)0<S of the ])rovinces of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in defiance of treaty obligations, no 

r('bniai\ I, Jt)!/ 



rational being can maintain, after tlie losson of tiicir 
latest histor\', that they werr not infected with the Old 
Turks' disease. 

But set this case aside, lake the previous attempt at 
reform which was carried out by a group during 1875 
and the following years. That movement also promised 
well. Tlie leading spirit was Midhat Pasha, and all who 
hoped that liukey might be able to regenerate itself 
})iaced great trust in .Midhat ; but I must confess that a 
few years ago my views about him recei\'ed a serious 
shock through what I heard from one \\ho had known 
him well. My authority did not tell the story either in 
blame or in praise ; he was simply narrating his own 
recoliertions, and they carried conviction. 

.Midhat, who was (ioveriuir of the ]Movincc of Bulgaria 
about 1874, said in private con\'ersation thai, if hv. were 
free to do as he thought best, he would j>rohibit all 
teaching or writing or reading of the l^ulgarian language, 
which is a Slav dialect. His reason was that a child 
takes only three years to learn to read and write Bulgarian, 
but it needs six years to learn to read and write Turkish ; 
it was therefore unsafe to give such an ad\'antage to the 
Bulgarians. The point of view is so essentially 'J'urkish, 
and morally so wrong, as to imply tliat the mind of the 
speaker, leading reformer as he was, had been iadicall\- 
distort(xl about the principles of governing. There is 
nothing to be hoped for except mere superficial impro\e- 
ments from such reform. 

Acting on the same principle the Young Turk govern- 
ment in 1000 alienated the Albanians by compelling them 
to adopt the Turkish alphabet ; the official mind always 
judges after the same fashion in Turkey, and the reformers 
are worse than the despots. 

It is understood that the Allies ha\-e agreed to put 

l-iussia in authority at Stamboul : and the only other 
method— namely, internationalisation, need not be dis- 
cussed. It must be acknowledged that free use of the 
great waterway is absolutely necessary for the develop- 
ment of Russia ; and that no other country, not even 
Roumania, is so dependent on the free navigation of the 
l^osphorus ; but l^oumania has an innnense stake in the; 
waterway, and many other nations ha\-e large interests 
in it : and it surely is within the power even of modern, 
diplomacy to conciliate the \'arious claims under the 
supreme authority of Russia. The prohibition of all 
fortilication along the line of the waterway together with 
proper supervision to insure that this condition is fully 
carried out, seems to be necessary and to be possible. 
This supervision ought to be exercised by a Scientifu" 
("onnnission to regulate and improve the navigation of 
the waterway and the use to which it can be put : the 
powers of the commission to extend over the entire 
channel from the ]^Iack Sea to the yligean, and to a 
distance of about ten miles on eacli side. Tlie com- 
mission should not consist of diplomatists and lawyers, 
but of scientihc and practical men. , 

Jt is time to begin to put Turkish affairs under the 
control of knowledge and skill. The Allies should learn 
in this respect from the (lermans in Turkey. The fruit- 
k'ssness of all the many attempts to reform Turkey, or to 
inrhice the 'furks to reform themselves, has been largely 
due to wrong methods : diplomatists dealt with a gox'ern- 
ment, and never appreciated that they ought to be dealing 
with a jx'.ople. That government has been the greatest 
enemy of the Turks as a nation ; and it is as much in 
the interests of the Turks as of European nations, that 
the Turkish administration should be brought to an 
end in Europe, and should be radically' modified in Asia. 

Joffre and Nivelle 

By Charles Dawbarn 

JOFERE has Ixen made Marshal, Nivelle, who 
was in London the other day, commands the North 
and North-Eastern Fronts in France. Few English 
readers probably appreciated the signihcan.ce of 
the change. Joffn^ stands for a special sort of efticicncy, 
Nivelle for another. The two men are perfect products 
of their own environments. None can dispute the com- 
manding character of each, and vet each commands 

Joffre's amazing popularity is based on a peculiar 
appreciation of his temix-rament. He is the highest 
expression of the jjcasant commanding a peasant army. 
For it is not always realized that the great majority of 
the tighting men of France spring from the soil, and 
therefore are its natural and most tenacious guardians. 

The French light with the indomitable ^■alour that we 
know, because they are fighting to defend their homes 
and their acre of ground. It is the instinct of possession, 
the fierce protective ^ensc of the farmer and cultivator, 
who sees his life-work jeopardised and undone, his farm 
and fields at the mercy of a barban^us foe. That is the 
Joftre spirit too. Joffre is representative of France 
because lie has sprung from a pure stock, which, for 
generations, has tilled the ground. His mother was a 
inodel housewife, orderly and economical, and Joffre 
inherits her order and her economy. 

His forte is forethought ! He thinks things out steadily, 
along certain lines ; he is master of his own destinj-, the 
captain of his fate. He disdains flashes of inspiration,- 
the sudden insight by which some great leaders have 
established reputations— at least according to' popular 
biography. Such narrowing of the impulse down'fo the 
hard and fast rules of calculation and research is par- 
ticularly useful in adversity, for it stiffens the soul, makes 
It face realitj-, steels it against the dreadful discourage- 
ments of defeat, and engenders a spirit of calmness and 

Yes, the knock-down blow is terrific to-dav. but will not 
:hc striker be himself fatigued ? It is as if one calculated 
the stress and strain of a bridge, subjected to severe 
pressure. Will it bear it ? Joffre knew that it would 

bear it. That knowledge gave Ihm confidence ancT 
strength in the darkest hour, when the Germans Were 
hard upon the heels oi defeated France and Britain. 
He ne\er faltered. He went about his work as calmly 
as if mathematics could not lie, and the exact sciences 
were always exact. He had deeply considered, he 
had slowly examined all the chances of things turning out 
differently from reasonable expectation, and he had 
taken the risk inseparable from enterprise. And he 
triumphed as he knew he would. ^ 

Somehow he was able to communicate this serene 
confidence to his troops. Perhaps it was not very 
difticult, for his peculiar reputation with the armies was 
of a man of groat wisdom and ponderation. He was 
CraiK/pci'C Joffre, and the grandfather is always astonish- 
ingly wise to his grandchildren. Moreover, he was kind, 
and at the same time, just : great cpialitics in a leader, 
that always inspire the affectionate esteem of the led. 

Joffre, removed to the more rarified atmosphere of 
technical a^dviser to the Inner Cabinet, has left behind 
him an enviabk^ record. " If after the war," wrote a 
Socialist and Professor in L'llumanitc, the organ of the 
late lamented Jaures, " a monument is erected to him, as 
assuredly it will be, no mother need turn away from it." 
And Joffre, tender-hearted beneath the coat of mail 
forged for th(^ circumstance of this war, derived particular 
pleasure from this panegyric. He has known how to 
make war humanely, with a jealous eye for the lives of 
the pawns. " Too many dead," he said, when Paris 
asked whether it should celebrate the victorj' of the Marnc. 
And, again, " I can break through, but it will cost a 
hundred thousand. Do you want that ? " Xotre Joffre 
is as parsimonious of his troops as if each poilu were his 
own son. 

He stands for the defensive, whilst his successor is 
the advocate of the offensive. The two systems are as 
wide apart as that. Joffre holds, " nibbles," wears down, 
wages a "war of attrition," the other hews his way to 
\ictory, but wins scientilically, by superior preparation. 
Nivelle is the sou and grandson of a soldier. He belongs 
therefore to the haute hoitrgeoisic. His mother is English, 



February i, iot? 

«;o thai ho has hall Iho qnahtics of our race. Joftrc is 
Calalan • that proiul-and inrtepcndont people inhabitinp; 
lioth sides of the Pvrcnccs ; with it goes a strain of 
Picardy— a great-grandfather, probably endowed with 
cold northern shrewdness. 

And yet, strange as it mav appear, both are from the 
South:" ]offre from the eastern edge of the P\Tenees, 
Xivellc from the Correze— not the extreme ^outh, 
but south enough to make him count with the groiip ot 
Hicessful generals who hail from th-- Midi, such as 
C.aliic'ni, Pan, Castelnau, Fodi, Sarrail. and Roques. 

A Daring Achievement 

The Marshal, whose experience is now at the service of 
the War Board, was, of course, alreadv in command of the 
army when war broke out. Differently placed, however, 
wasNi\elle, who won his promotion on the Hold of battle. 
Before N'erdun came to crown his reputation as a 
tactician and as a strategist, his finest feat proved his 
daring and his contempt of danger : the true spirit of the 
offensi\e. It was on the Aisne. The Inench were 
heavily attacked at the moment of crossing the river, 
and were driven back in some disorder. Nuelle, who 
Avas at the head of the Fifth I^egiment of Artillery, whicli 
was operating with the 7th Armv Corps, flung himself 
with his guns in front of the retreating infantry and 
stopped the rout. 

His success at Verdun on three different occasions 
re\-eals the same ardent temper. Rumour says that the 
Commander-in-Chief was awav from duty, suffering from 
the effects of a motor mishap. Nivelle, in .something 
of the Nelson spirit when he failed to read the unfavour- 
able signal, considered the moment good for trymg 
something new. He broke through the (lerman hues 
with startling speed. Mr. L. ]. Maxse in the ^c^llonal 
Review calls Verdun "a portent." It is. Moreover, 
I am not wrong in saving that General Xivellc believes 
he can drive the Germans from France. Such con- 
viction is of immense importance, because it is notorious 
that many of the old counsellors of Joffre were pessi- 
mistic on this subject. 

Again, the French arc an impressionable people, 
strung and strained bv the terrific experiences of, nearl\ 
thirtv months of war. just as Nivelle electrified the 
Sevcntli Armv Corps at tjie Aisne battle by his reckless 
disregard of danger in using his " seventy-fives " as it 
they were " mitrailleuses," so he has electrified the 
nation by the ease with which he has won back all that 
the Gennans struggled so hard and so ponderously to 
obtain during eight months. The army has forgotten 
its weariness" and the deadly ding-dong of the daily sacri- 
fice in this new flush of victory. A whisper, telling the 
secret of a new resolution, has circulated through France, 
heartening the population, rbcreating the blood and sinews 
of tired men, sending a new thrill of expectancy into 
hearts made sick with waiting or desolated with mourning. 
And so the dawn of ior7 is tinged with a golden hop(> 
for our Allies. 

They have taken the measure of the Germans ; they 
no longer fear them. " You know you are better than 
the Germans," .said General Nivelle to his troops, after 
one of his successes ; " those who say the contrary tell 
a lie." That is so palpably true that the whole countr\- 
^•ibrates with it. , ^ 

Thus Nivelle's appeal differs from that of Joffre s. 
He is the apostle of a divine discontent against the slow 
. snakiness of the war, a synthesis of energy ancl action, 
whilst Joffre represents the rock-like personality, un- 
moved by storm, the man who, by his calmness and 
])rescicnce, sa\-ed France from irretrievable disaster. 
Both men are the outcome of their epoch. 

^•erdun is more than a militarv portent ; it has changed 
the policy of France. Not unnaturally Parliament 
reflected on the effects of sharp action as against 
corro.sion. It saw how successful action was, and how 
inexpensive when conducted by such masters of scienti- 
fic war as Generals Nivelle and Mangin. And so deputies 
were all for the forward policy. And with that quickness 
ot thought and decision which is sometimes the seed 
of violent mistakes, but at others the most precious 
of virtues, public opinion insisted on a change of methods 
all round. The old headquarters at Chantilly were 
given up- Parliamenf took n riiore difccf hand in the 

game, and to G'enVral Nivelle, young for his sixty years 
was given) tliM f^porliinity of redeeming his promise, 
made in effect at Verdun, of liberating the soil from the 

Nivelle's appeal, 1 liave said, is of a different order 
from Joffre's ; so is his record. lie has all the accomplish- 
ments of his metier. A perfect horseman, he won prizes 
at the Paris horse show. His love of thoroughness led 
him to Saumur, tlie cavalry school, as well as to St. Cyr, 
the 1-Yencli Sandhurst, and the Pol\-technique was his 
.Vhna Mater, a> it was Joffre's and Petain's and CasteJ- 

Some day, there will be written an article to bring out 
tlie \alue of education in war. ^^ ar is a great searcher of 
the soul, a test of personal aims and culture. It is 
significant that every leader who has distinguished him- 
self during this incredible struggle has exceptional 
intellectual " baggage." Castelnau and Foch are par- 
ticularly known for their predominance in military theory, 
and the latter is a learned writer on tactics. The super- 
iority of the French staff springs from the same cause ; 
intensive preparation at the receptive age, continuous 
and strenuous application to nullify the harmful effects 
of routine and a set system. 

If Joffre stands for the friendliness of French disciphne, 
nicely adjusted to the French conceptions of liberty 
and equality, Nivelle rules by virtue of his prestige. 
His rapid rise to fame fascinates his countrymen who have 
never lost their love of a gallant and, purely military 
figure. He appeals to their romantic side. If they look 
affectionately towards the paternal Marshal who stootL 
them in supreme stead at the critical hour, they 
acknowledge that they arc " epnleii." bv tlic new 

T!ie C<>mmittee of the National Kgg Collection for the 
Wounded iia\-c received j)crmission to hold a street collection 
in London on Wednesday, 14th instant, to assist the funds. 
The support of all classes is invited to makV- tlic day a great 
success. All who can possibly help are earnestly requested 
to give their services and should immediately get in touch 
with the Organiser at 154, Meet Street, E.C. " 

The soldier's journal, which devotes itself to some par- 
ticular unit or maybe to a military hospital, has become a 
recognised feature of the war and has re\'caled an extra- 
ordinary amount of talent, literary and artistic. No better 
illustration.of this truth can be cited than the Christmas number 
of The Vic's Patrol, the active service journal of the Victoria 
Rifles of Canada. The Trench edition would make its readers 
belie^'e that war is a blithe and gladsome thing, were it 
not that on the cover appears this verse of Kipling:—. 

] have written a tale of our life 
I'or a sheltered people's mirtli, 

In jesting guise- but ye are vise 

Anrl ye know what the jest is worth. , 

But the sheltered people also know nowadays and they 
bow the head in reverence to those brave souls who can jest 
so lightly and happily in the face of death and perils without 
number. "' Thank Allah for a sense of Imniour," writes one 
contributor, and we do thank Allah, for the humour that 
can produce a delightful journal of this nature with such 
subject-matter to draw on, seeing that this fine spirit exalts 
a man \ery near to the everlasting gates. 



" l> it Peace, Jehu " IKBIU ARY, 

<1) No Peace without Victory. By Cihrles E. MALLEr (formerly Financial 

,«;-<Tit,irv t., \\:t Wiir Oflisfl). 
(2) Some Perils ot Peace. By Hie Kight Itcv. the Lor.D EienDP OP 
f »i;ri--i.i:. 
The Great Naval Blockade. - By .Tons I.ctland. 

Tile Passing of the Cabinet. Bv Sir Fn ixeis PlfiGori (late Chief Jnstice of 

France and the Rhine Frontier. Dj ,T. HO'UXD ROSE, T.itt.P. 

Oan/ig: Poland's Outlet to the Sea. Ity I,. I!. Namirk. 

"Sons Camaradee " in a War Zone Cantins. tiv Sir l'K\NK llESSOv. 

Diet .nnd Debt. )!v the Kigtlt Hon. tlio 'Eai-.I, of DrsluVES, K.P. 

The Liquor Traffic in War. Cy Dr. ARTHI R SlIADWti.r.. 

inilia's Eltort : is .1 sulTioisntly under>to«d? ' By ■^, VCSI F .\i.I. 

Life affer Death : 

(t) Communication with th'! Dead: a Reply to Sir Herbert Stephen. Hy 

Ml- (IMVI K!ir,l , 1 ,l;.S. 

(2) Future Life and Lives, r,v A. I'. Sl.svcTT. 
The Nr.tional Gallery Bill, and Sir Hugh Lane's Beauest; Bv. D. 3. MACCoi.r.. 
Towards Industrial Efficiency. Hv i:. Sehbohm ROWNTREE. 

Industrial Fa'igue. ' llv e. K. OGBUX. 

The War Poetry of Women. 75y LiLIAS RowLAN'O BROWN (Rowland Grey). 
Migration and tile Dominions: Suggestions for the Imperial War Conference, 

Compulsory Service in Australia. I'.y liic Uon. C. C. Wade. ICC. M.L.A. 

ii>rm<il> I'riino Minirter <:i Xcw .S( utli W.ilesi. 

T/inilon: Spottiswcrd'^. B.ill.intyne & Co.. Ltd., 1, Xcw-.^trfft ,°nniire. 

February i, 19 17 


Books to Read 

By Lucian Oldersha.w 


BORNEO, with its English Rajah and its gruesome. 
Head-hunters, has long had a romantic attraction 
for Englishmen. Its romantic interest is ex- 
tended from the human to the animal kingdom 
in the late Robert W. C. Shelford's fascinating \olume, 
A Natumlist in Borneo (T. Fisher Umvin, 15s. net). This 
volume, carefully edited by his sometime chief. Professor 
E. B. Poulton, who has had the assistance of a number 
of friends and fellow- workers in the same field, may be 
regarded in one aspect as a nronument to the pious 
memory of the distinguished young scientist who wrote 
it during his last illness and had not completed it at the 
time of his death in January, 1912. Mr. Shelford's 
career as a naturalist began in the East, hke the late 
Professor Minchin's, and in a somewhat similar manner, 
both having turned their attention to " bug-hunting," 
owing to an inabihty, through illness, to join in the 
ordinary outdoor pursuits of boj-hood. After graduating 
at Cambridge, Shelford went to the East again in iSq; 
to become Curator of Rajah Brooke's museum at Sarawak. 
There lie remained se\en years, the last seven years 
of his life being for the most part spent as Assistant- 
Curator of the Hope Department at Oxford, with fruitful 
results in an exhaustive studv of the cockroach. 

What wide knowledge atid what powers of observation 
Shelford brought to his study of the O.xford collection of 
cockroaches are revealed in A Naturalist in Borneo. 
He does not here conhne himself to the insect life of the 
island, there are chapters on mammals, birds and reptiles, 
and more than that, there are interesting descriptions of 
the country and its inhabitants. He is the complete 
naturalist who, is explorer as well as collector and 
classifier. " If now," . he says, after describing an 
expedition to Penrisen, " settled quietly at home, I 
ever hear the ' East a-calling,' it is not the life in the 
towns that calls mc, not the freedom of social inter- 
course, not the boundless hospitality of friends and neigh- 
bours, nor the luxuries of a tropical home, but the dark, 
mysterious forest with its teeming life, the nights dn the 
river-bank, with the rushing stream beside me, the 
starry sky above, the camp-fue with the nati\es huddled 
round telling tales in murmuring tones, the shrill clamour 
of the insects filling the whole air — these are the things 
that call. . . . One was in closest contact with 
Nature then — Nature almost savagely triumphant, 
riotously luxuriant, and whosoe\er has learnt to know 
her in this mood can never altogether forget his lesson." 
We are given an account of a successful head-hunting 
expedition, happily quickly punished, as late as the year 
1904. The strict and beneficent government of Rajah 
Brooke has, however, rendered the European traveller 
in his State immune from all human danger. 

* * * s;: * 

On the side of Natural History, Shelford's book is so 
rich in good things that H is difficult to select. I recom- 
mend his chapter on "'"^Jlimicry"' alike to the general 
reader apt to be confused on this subject and to tha 
scientist apt to be confusing.' For the rest let me open 
the book at random. I am sure to be able to call atten- 
tion to something interesting. Here is a li\ely description 
of a ghoulish little creature, the.Borncan lemur, which 
has never been seen in a European menagerie. Here 
is material for an article in a popular science journal on 
'' Do Snakes Fly ? " Here is an account of a familv of 
insects that not only look like flowers themselves, "but 
whose eggs ha\e the appearance of seeds.' It is from 
a branch of this same family, the Phasraids^; that the 
author gives a remarkable example of parthenogenesis 
in animal life. He reared some successfully for eight 
generations \v-ithout a male ever putting in an appear- 
ance. Here is an intcreiting disquisition on the arrow- 
shaped tongue of the bird of prey. Here —but . I must 
check my indination to re-read in detail a book which 
has already gi\en me so much pleasure. It only reirrains 
to be said that its value is increased bv illustrations. 

What first strikes me in reading Mr. Warwick Deeping's 
new novel, Martin Valliant (Cassell and Co., 6s.), is the 
progress he has made in the craft of story-telling since 
those rather laborious early no\-els of his some dozen or 
so \-oars ago. E\en then the roots of this matter of 
romance were in him and produced sonie sti-ange and 
beautiful flowers, but too often hidden in the mass of 
foliage in \\hich the reader was apt to lose his way — 
and his interest. In the numerous novels he has written 
since he has learnt to lop and prune, to get rid of 
redundancies of style and matter that impedes action, 
and, here, in Martin Valliant is a story of which it can 
truthfully be said that it goes with a swing from start 
to finish." Perhaps by the strict canons of the historical 
novel it goes too fast, for Jlr. Deeping has gone to the 
other extreme of literary gardening, and displays a 
landscape that is all flowers with no foliage by way of 
relief. However, I fancy the average reader will regard 
this as a venial fault, and will soon be engrossed in the 
adventures of the monk who was too proud and too 
spiritual for his grosser brother of the Abbey of Paradise, 
but who became a man-at-arms and a most redoubtable 
one at the urgent call of that most fascinating of heroines. 
Mellis Dale. There is in this book the spirit of the 
forest in which its scenes are laid. There are dasliing 
feats of arms. There is the Spring in it, and that perennial 
spring offensive. Love. 

;|: -i. if if it 

So much for sedati\-es. The war is with us again in 
Mr. Harry E. Brittain's To Verdun from the Somine 
(John Lane, 2s. 6d. net), a little collection of travel 
sketches in the midst of warlike operations. The 
travelling was apparently' undertaken to enable Mr. 
James M. Beck, the eminent New York citizen, to visit 
the chief places on the \\'estern Front, and Mr. Beck 
^^Titesa "Foreword," in which with an e\ident sincerity 
that moves one, he pays a tribute to the two Western 
AUies, and especially to the disinterestedness c)!^ Britain's 
effort. Mr. Harry Brittain's travel pictures well catch 
the movement and the mood of last summer on the 
Western Front. He is an astute observer and describes 
what he has seen with the discretion demanded 
by the subject and the Censor, but without the 
dullness that often accompanies such discretion. His 
book is eminently worth reading, especially by those who 
can- cross the " i " and dot the " fs." to say nothing of 
interpreting the asterisks. 

* * * * f 

In the Battle Silenees (Constable and Co., is.), is a 
little volume of poems written at the front by a Canadian 
soldier, Frederick George Scott. They show, if not any 
marked originality, at any rate the high courage and 
undaunted resolve that distinguish the work of all the 
soldier-poets. Its spirit may be gathered from one 
verse of A Grave in Flanders : — 

•• 'J1iis boy had visions while in life 
Of stars on distant skies ; 
So death came in the midst of strife, 
A sudden, glad surprise." 

* * * * * 

( iossip about the-grcat Napoleon always has fascination, 
and many English readers will therefore have a ready 
welcome for Constance Lady De La Warr's translation 
of Emile St."" Hilaire's reminiscences of his friend, now 
j)ublished under the title of Personal Recollcetions of tho 
Empire (Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent and Co., Os.). 
The book is full of interest, chiefly of a sentimental 
nature and concerns itself very largely with Napoleon's 
women-folk. In it may be learnt the simple story of 
his first love and the more complex tale of his affair in 
Egypt with the wife of one of his ofticers. The most 
attractive section of the book perhaps is that which deals 
with the Emperor's faithful barber, Hebert, and there 
are some good tales, of a familiar kuid, of incognito 
wanderings. A fitting epilogue is an interview with 
Napoleon's old mother in Rome, when ..she speaks, of 
her great son simply as he was to her wlicn a boy. 



February i, 1917 

The Golden Triangle 

By Maurice Leblanc 

[Translated by Alexander Tcixeira de MattosI 

Synopsis ; Captain Patrice Belval. a iiuounded French 
officer, is in love loith a nurse who is knovsn to her patients 
as "Little Mother Coralie." Belval. following Coralic 
to her house, finds that Essares, her husband, a leading 
financier, who had contemplated flight from Paris, has been 
brutally murdered. An examining magistrate explains 
to Belval that Essares was prime mover in a plot for ex- 
porting gold from France. In order to recover some 300 
million francs which Essares had concealed, the authorities 
consider it necessary to hush up the circumstances of the 
financier's death. The only possible clue to the where- 
abouts of the gold is a paper found in Essares' dead hand, 
bearing the words, ".Golden Triangle." Ya-Bon. Belval' s 
Senegalese servant, promises to call in Arsenc Lupin to 
unravel the mystery, which incliuies a mysterious threatened 
vengeance on Coralie. Belval ascertains that Simeon. 
Essares' attendant, has mysteriously befriended both him- 
self and Coralie. and also obtains evidence thai twenty 
years before, Essares had been responsible for the murder 
of Coralie' s mother aiul his (Belval' s) father and that an 
unknown friend -had tried to protect Coralie and himself. 
On the T..\ih of April an anonymous letter warns the authon- 
tics that an attempt is to be made to gel the hidden gold out 
of France, and on the same day Belval and Coralie. fol- 
lowing old Simeon lo the scene of their parents' murder. 
a disused lodge in the garden next to Essares' house, find 
themselves imprisoned -without possibility of escape. Behind 
the -wainscoting of the lodge a pencilled message tells how 
Bclval's father and Coralie s mother hud been similarly 
trapped twenty years before, and had heard sounds as of 
digging outside the lodge. 

CHAPTER XII [continued) 

PATRICE ivdoubkd his dioits. Coralk' cahu; and 
helix'd liim. 'Jhis time ho felt that a corner uf the 
\eil was bt'ing hfted. The writing went on. 
" Another hour, with alternate spells of sound and 
silence: the same sound of digging and the same 
silence which suggests work that is being continued. 

" And then someone entered the hall, one person : lie, 
evidently. We recognised his step ; . . He walks with- 
out attempting to deaden it . . . Then he went to the 
kitchen, where he worked the same way as before, with a 
pick-axe, but on the stones this time. We also hear the noise 
of a {xine of glass breaking. 

" And now he has gone cmtside again and there is a new 
sort' of sound, against the house, a sound that seems to travel 
up the liousc as though the wetch had to climb to a height 
in order to carrv out liis plan . . ." 
' I'atrice stopjx'd reading and looked at Coralie. Both of 
them were listening. 

" Hark! " he said, in a low voice. 

'■ Yes, yes," she answered, " I hear . . . Steps outside 
the house ... in the garden . . ." 

They went to one of the windows, where they had left the 
casement open behind the wall of building-stones, and listened. 
There was really someone walking ; and the knowledge that 
the enemy was approaching gave them the same sense of relief 
that their jiarents had e.\perienceil. 

Some I'lie walked thrice round the house. But they did 
not, like their ])arents, lecognise the sound of the lootstei>s. 
They were those of a stranger, or else steps that had changed 
their tread. Then, for a few minutes, they heard nothing 
more And suddenly another sound arose ; and, though 
in their innermost selves they were expecting it, they were 
nevertheless stupe lied at hearing it. And Patrice, in a hollow 
\-oice, la>'ing stress \ipon each syllable, uttered the sentence 
which his lather had written twenty years before. 

" Its the sound which you make when you dig the ground 
with a pick-axe." . 1 

Yes, it must l^e that. Someone was digging the ground, 
not in front of the house, but on the right, near the kitchen. 

And so the abominable miracle of the revived tragedy was 
continuing. Here again the former act was repeated, a 
siftiple enough act in itself, but one which became sinister 
bccauM- it was one of those which had already been performed 

and Ijecause it was announcing and preparing the death once 
before announced and i)rej)ared. 

An hour passed. The work went on, paused and went on 
again It was likp the sound of a sjxide at work in a court- 
yard, when the grave-digger is in no hiurry and takes a rest 
and then resumes his work. 

Patrice and CoraUe stood listening side by side, their 
eyes in each other's eyes, their hands in each other's hands. 
" He's stopping," whispered Patrice. 
" Yes," said Coralie, " only I think. . . " 
" Yes, Coralie, there's some one in the hall . . . Oh, 
we need not trouble to listen ! We have only to remember. 
There. ' He goes to the kitchen and digs as he did just now, 
but on the stones this time.' . . . And then . . . oh, 
Coralie, the same sound of broken glass ! " 

It was memories mingling with the gruesome reality. The 
])resent and the j^ast formed but one. They foresaw events 
at the \ery instant when these took place. 

The enemy went outside again ; and, forthwith the snund 
seemed " to travel up the house as though the wretch had to 
cUmb to a height in order to carry out his plans." 

.\nd then . . . and then what would happen next ? 
They no longer thought of consulting the inscription on the 
wall, or perhaps they did not dare. Their attention was 
concentrated on the invisible and sometimes imperceptible 
deeds that were being acc(jmplislied against them outsidi\ 
an uninterrupted stealthy effort, a nivsterious twenty-year-old 
plan whereof each slightest detail was settled as by clock work. 

The enemy entered the house and they heard a rustling 
at the b(jttom of the door, a rustling of soft things a])parently 
being heai>ed or pushed against the wood. Next came other 
vague noises in the two adjoining rooms, against the walled 
doors, and similar noises outside, between the stones of the 
windows and the open shutters. .\nd then they heard sonv;- 
one on the roof. 

They raised their eyes. This time they felt certain that 
the last act was at hand, or at least one of the scenes of the 
last act. The roof to them was the. framed skylight which 
occupied the centre of the ceiling and admitted the only day- 
liglit that entered the room. And still the same agonizing 
question arose to their minds. What was going to hapjien :' 
Would the enemy show his face outside the skylight and reveal 
himself at last ? 

This work on the rot)f contimied for a considerable time. 
Footsteps shook the zinc sheets that covered it, moving 
between the right-hand side of the house and the edge of the 
skylight. .Vnd suddenly this skylight, or rather a part of it. 
a square containing four ])anes, was lifted, a very little way, 
by a liand wliich inserted a stick to keep it open. 

And the enemy again walked across the roof and went down 
the side of the house. 

Thev were almost disappointed and felt such a craving 
to know the truth that Patrice once more fell to brealdng the 
boards of the Mainscotiug. removing the last pieces, which 
covered the end of tiie inscriijtion. And what they read made 
them li\-e the last few minutes all over again. The enemy's 
return, the. rustle against the walls and the walled windows, 
the noise on the roof, the opening of the skylight, the method 
of supporting it : all this had happened in the same order and 
so to speak, within the same limit of time. Patrice's father 
and Coralie's mother had undergone the same impressions, 
J)estiiiy seemed bent on following tlie suiue paths and making 
the same ino\ einents in seeking the same object. 

-Vnd the writing went on : , 

■■ lie is going u]) again, he is going up again. . . . There s 
his footstep on the roof. . . . He is near- the skylight. 

. . . Will he look through ? . ... Shall we see his 
hated face ? . . ." 

" He is going up again, he is going up again," gasped Coralie, 
nestling agauist Patrice. 

The enemy's footsteps were pounding over the zinc. 

" Yes," said Patrice, " he is going up as before, without 
departing from 1 he ))rocediire followed by the other. Only we 
do not know whose face will appear to us. Our parents knew 
their enemy." 

She shuddered nt her image of the man who had lulled 
her mother ; and she asked : 

" It was he, was it not ? " 

" Yi ■-, it was he. There is his name, wriK'H liv mv futlun-." 
{.Continued on page 20) 

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February' i, 1917 

(Continued from fiaqe tfi) 

Patrice had almost entirely uncovered the inscription 
BendiUK low. he pointed with his linger: 

Look. Read the name •. Essares. You can see it down 
there : it was one of the last words my tather wrote. 

^xLe'SJl^rtse higher, a hand lifted it and we saw 
. we saw. laughing as he looked down on us-oh 
the scounarel !— Essar.-s ! . . • Essares t . • • And 
hen he passed something through the opening, something 
that cami down, that unrolled itself m the middle of the room. 
over our heads : a ladder, a rope-ladder. . .. . „^ 

•• We did not understand. It was swinging in front of us 
\nd then, in the end, 1 saw a sheet of paper rolled round the 
button, rung and pinned to it. On the paper, in Essares . 
SiuluMUiig^are the words. ' Send CoreUie up by herse He 
Mv shall be saved. I give her ten minutes to accept. If 

'"-■ \U "'said Patrice, rising from his stooping posture, " will 
th.s'aiM, be repeated ? What about the ladder,__the rope- 
laddfi «liich I found in old Simeon s cupboard .■- 

ulrah- kept her eyes fi.xed on the skylight, f^^r the footsteps 
weVeinoving around it. Then they stopped. Patrice and 
^'rLeiiad not a doubt that the moment '^-l come and t^^ 
they also were about to see their enemy. And Patrice said 
huskilv in a choking voice: 

Who will it be ? Tliere are three men who could have 
..laved tins sinister part as it was played before, /jo are 
dead l-.^sares and mv father. And Simeon, the third, is 
mad K it he. in his madness, who has set the machine work- 
ine a am > But how are we to imagine that he could have 
done k with such precision ? No. no. it is the other one, the 
one who directs him and who till now has remained in tlie 

He leli Coralie's fingers clutching his arm. 

•■ Hush, she said, " here he is ! " 

" No. no." 

■' Yes. I m sure of it." . , . 

Her imagination had foretold what was preparing , and in 
lact. as once before, the skylight was raised higher. A hand 
Ufted it. And suddenly they saw a head slipping under the 
open framework. 

It was the head of old Simoon. _, 

" Th« madman ! " Patrice whispered, in dismay. ine 

°' " But"perhaps he isn't mad." she said. " He cant be mad." 
She could not check the trembling that shook her. 
The man overhead looked down upon them, hidden behind 

his spectacles, which allowed no expression of satished hatred 

or iov to show on his impassive features. 

•• Coralie, ' said Patrice, in a low voice, do what 1 say. . 

^'^He pushed her gently along, as though he were supporting 
her and leading her to a chair. In reality he had but one 
thought, to reach the table on which he had placed his re- 
volvers, take one of them and fire. 

Simoon remained motionless, Uke some evil genius come 
to unloose the tempest. . . . Corahe could not rid 
herself of that glance which weighed upon her. 

" No ■■ she murmured, resisting Patrice, as though she 
(eared that his intention would precipitate the dreaded 
catastrophe. " No. you mustn't. . . •" _ 

But Patrice, displaying greater determination, was near 
his object. One more eUort and his hand would hold the 

'^Ihc^ quickly made up liis mind, took rapid aim and fir6d a 


The head disappeared from sight. „ . . , „ :ii 

" Oh." said Coralie, " you were wrong. Patnce ! He will 

take his revenge on us. . . ■" , ,. , . 1 

" No perhaps not." said Patrice, still holding his revolver. 

■I may very well have hit him. The bullet struck the 

frame of the skylight. But it may have glanced off, in which 

*^*They waited hand in hand, with a gleam of hope, which 
did not last long, however. . , ,, u f .„ 

The noise on the roof began again. And then, as before— 
and this they reallv had the impression of not seeing for the 
hrst time— as before, something passed through the opening, 
something that came down, that unrolled itself in the middle 
of the room, a ladder, a rope-ladder, the very one which 
Patrice had seen in old Siim'on s cupboard. „ ^. , 

As before they looked at it ; and they knew so well that 
evervthing was being done over again, that the facts were 
inexorably, pitilessly Unked together, they were so certain 
of it that their e es at once sought the sheet of paper which 
mn^t inevitably be pinned to the bottom rung. 

h was therJ. forming a little scroll, dry and discoloured 
, , ,d torn at the edges. It was the sheet of twenty years ago, 
written by Essares and now serving, as before, to convey the 
sime temptation and the same threat: 

" Send Coralie up by herself. Her life shall be saved 
I give her ten minutes to accept. If not. . . • 


The Nails in the Coffin 

F not. ..." . „ 

Patrice repeated the words mechanically, severak 
times over, while their formidable significance becanu 

j»_ apparent to both him and Coralie. The words meant 
that if Coralie did not obey and did not deliver herself to the 
enemy if she did not flee from prison to go with the man who 
held tlie ke\-s of the prison, the alternative was death. 

At that moment, neitiier of them was thinking what end 
was in store for them, nor even of that death itself. They 
thought only of the command to separate winch the enemy 
had issued against them. One was to go and the other to die. 

Corahe was promised her life if she would sacnfice Patnce. 
But what was the price of the promise ? tor what would 
be the form of the sacrifice demanded ? , ■ l 

There was a long silence, full of uncertainty and anguish 
between the two lovers. They were cdming to grips with 
something ; and the drama was no longer taking place abso- 
lutely outside them, without their playing any other part 
than that of helpless victims. It was being enacted withm 
themselves ; and they had the power to alter its ending. 
It was a terrible problem. It had already been set to the 
earlier Coralie ; and she had solved it as a lover would, tor 
she was dead. And now it was being set again. 

Patrice read the inscription, and the rapidly scrawled 
words became less distinct : _ ,. cu 

" I have begged and entreated Corahe. . . . She 
flung herself on her knees before me. She wants to die with 

Patrice looked at Coralie. He had read the words in a very 
low voice ; and she had not heard them. Then, in a burst of 
passion, he drew her eageriy to him and exclaimed : 

" You must go, Coralie ! You can understand that my not 
saying so at once was not due to hesitation. No, only . . 
I was thinking of that man's offer . . . and I am 
frightened for your sake. . . . What he asks, Corahe, 
is terrible. His reason for promising to save your hfe is 
that he loves you. And so you understand. . . . But 
still, Coralie, you must obey . . . you must go on 
living Go ! It is no use waiting for the ten minutes 

to pass " He might change his mind and condemn you to 
death as well.— No, Corahe, you must go, you must go at 

once ! " ,. , • . 

■' I shall stay," she rephed, simply. 

He gave a start : , £ -> 

■' But this is madness ! Why make a useless sacnfice 
Are you afraid of what might happen if you obeyed him ? 

" No." 

" Then go." 

" I shall stay." . , , . 

" But why ? Why this obstinacy .-' It can do no good. 

Then why stay ? " 

" Because I love you, Patnce. , ^ , , . ■ 

He stood dumbfounded. He knew that she loved him 
and he had already told her so. But that she loved liim to 
the extent of preferring to die in his company this was an 
unexpected, exquisite and at the same timeternble delight. 
" And if I ordered you to go, Corahe ? 
" That is to say," she murmured, " if you ordered me to 
go to that man ? Is that wiiat you wish, Patnce ? " 
The thought was too much for him. . 

Neither he nor she pictured the man in the exact image 
of Simoon To both of them, notwithstanding the hideous 
vision perceived above, the enemy retained a mysterious 
character It was perhaps Sim' on. It was perhaps another 
of whom Simron was but the instrument. Assuredly it was 
the enemy, the evil genius crouching above their heads, 
preparin- their death-throes while he pursued Corahe. 
Patrice asked one more question : 

" Did vou ever notice that Simeon sought your company .' 
" No, never. If anything he rather avoided me." 
" Then it's because he's mad. ..." 
" 1 don't think he is mid : he is revenging himself. 
"Impossible. He was my father's friend. All his lite 
long he worked to bring us together : surely he would not 
kill us dehberately ? " , , . j 

" I don't know. Patrice. I don t understand. . . . 

Tiiey discussed it no further. It was of no importance 

whether their death was caused by this one or that one it 

was death itself that they had to fight, without troubling 

who had set it loose. against them. And what could they do 

to ward it olf ? ^ ,■ , 

" You agree, do you not ? " asked Coralie, in a low voice. 

He made no answer. 

{Contintted on page 22) 

February I, 10T7. 





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{Continued from page 22) 

" I shall not go," she went on, " but I want you to be of 
one mind with me. Tell me that you agree." 

" Yes," he said, " I agree." 

" What is it, Patrice ? You seem distraught again." 

He gave a hoarse cry : 

" Look ! . . . Look ! . . ." 

Tliis time he was certain of what he had seen. The ladder 
was going up. The ten minutes were over. 

He rushed forward and caught hold of one of the rungs. 
The ladder no longer moved. 

He did not know exactly what he intended to do. The 
ladder afforded CoraUe's only chance of safety. Could he 
abandon that hope and resign himself to the inevitable ? 

One or two minutes passed. The ladder must have been 
hooked fast again, for Patrice felt a firm resistance up above. 

Coralie was entreating him : 

" Patrice," she asked, " Patrice, what are you hoping for ? " 

He looked around and above him, as though seeking an 
idea, and he seemed also to look inside himself, as though he 
were seeking that idea amid all the memories which he had 
accumulated at the moment when his father also held the 
ladder, in a last effort of will. And suddenly, throwing up his 
leg, he placed his left foot on the fifth rung of the ladder and 
began to raise himself by the uprights. 

It was an absurd attempt to scale the ladder, to reach the 
skylight, to lay hold of the enemy and thus save himself and 
CoraUe. If his father had failed before him, how could he 
hofje to succeed ? 

It was all over in less than three seconds. The ladder was 
at once unfastened from the hook that kept it hanging from 
the skylight ; and Patrice and the ladder came to the ground 
together. At the same time, a strident laugh rang out above, 
followed the next moment by the sound of the skylight closing. 

Patrice picked himself up in a fury, hurled insults at the 
enemy and, as his rage increased, fired two revolver shots, 
which broke two of the panes. He next attacked the door 
and windows, banging at them with the iron dog which he 
had taken from the fender. He hit the walls, he hit the floor, 
he shook his fist at the invisible enemy who was mocking 
him. But suddenly, after a few blows struck at space, he 
was compelled to stop. Something like a tliick veil had glided 
overhead. They were in the dark. 

He understood what had happened. The enemy had 
lowered a shutter upon the skylight, covering it entirely, 
y Patrice ! Oh, Patrice ! Where are you ? " 

Their hands touched, Coralie's poor Uttle frozen fingers 
and Patrice's hands that burned with fever, and they pressed 
each other and twined together and clutched each other as 
though to assure themselves that they were still living. 

" Oh, don't leave me, Patrice ! " Coralie implored. 

" I am here," he replied. " Have no fear : they can't 
separate us." 

" You are right," she panted, " they can't separate us. , 
We are in our grave." 

The word was so terrible and Coralie uttered it so mourn- 
■fully that a reaction overtook Patrice. 

" No 1 What are you talking about," he exclaimed. " We 
must not despair. There is hope of safety until the last 

Releasing one of his hands, he took aim with his revolver. 
A few faint rays trickled through the chinks around the sky- 
light. He fired three times. They heard the crack of the 
wood-work and the chuckle of the enemy. But the shutter 
must have been lined with metal, for no split appeared. 

Besides, the chinks were forthwith stopped up ; and they 
became aware that the enemy was engaged in the same work 
that he had performed around the doors and windows. It 
was obviously very thorough and took a long time in the 
doing. Next came another work, completing the first. The 
enemy was naihng the shutter to the frame of the skyhght. 

It was an awful sound ! Swift and light as were the taps 
of the hammer, they seemed to drive deep into the brain of 
those who heard them. It was their coffin that was being 
nailed down, their great coffin with a lid hermetically sealed 
that now bore heavy upon them. Tliere was no hope l-ft, 
not a possible chance of escape. Each tap of the hammer 
■strengthened their dark prison, making yet more impregnable 
the walls that stood between them and the outer world and 
bade defiance to the most resolute assault : 

" Patrice," stammered Coralie, " I'm frightened. . . That 
tapping hurts me so ! " 

She sank back in liis arms. Patrice felt tears coursing 
down her cheeks. 

Meanwhile, the work overhead was being completed. 
They underwent the terrible experience which condemned 
men must feel on the morning of their last day, when from 
their cells they hear the preparations: the engine that is 
being set up, or the electric batteries that are being tested. 

" Don't leave me," sobbed Coralie, " don't leave me ! . . ." 

" Only for a second or two," he said, " We must be avenged 

" What is the use, Patrice ? What can it matter to us ? " 

He had a box containing a few matches. Lighting them one 
after the other, he led Coralie to the panel with the in- 

" Wliat are you going to do ? " she asked. 

" I will not have our death put down to suicide. T want 
to do what our parents did before us and to prepare for the 
future. Someone will read what I am going to write and will 
avenge us." 

He took a pencil from his pocket and bent down. There 
was a free space, right at the bottom of the panel. He wrote : 

" Patrice Belval and Coralie, his betrothed, die the same 
death, murdered by Simeon Diodokis, 14th April 1915." 

But, as he finished writing, he noticed a few words of 
the former inscription which he had not yet read, because 
they were placed outside it, so to speak, and did not appear 
to form part of it. 

" One more match," he said. " Did you see ? There 
are some words there, the last, no doubt, that my father wrote." 

She struck a match. By the flickering Ught they made 
out a certain number of misshapen letters, obviously written 
in a hurry and forming two words : ' 

"Asphyxiated . . ..Oxide . . ." 

The match went out. They rose in silence. Asphyxiated I 
They understood. That was how their parents had perished 
and how they themselves would perish. But they did not 
yet fuUy realize how the thing would happen. The lack 
of air would never be great enough to suffocate them in 
this large room which contained enough to last them for 
many days. 

" Unless," muttered Patrice, " imless the quaKty of the 
air can be impaired and therefore . . ." 

He stopped. Then told Coralie what he sospected, or 
rather what conformed so well with the reaUty as to leave no 
room for doubt. He had seen in old Simeon's cupboard 
not only the rope-ladder which the madman had brought 
with him, but also a coil of lead pipes. And now Simeon's 
behaviour from the moment when they were locked in, hii 
movements to and fro around the lodge, the care with which 
he had stopped up every crevice, his labours along the wall 
and on the roof all this was explained in the most 
definite fashion. 

Panic-stricken, they began to run aimlessly about the room, 
holding hands, while their disordered brains, bereft of thought 
or will, seemed Uke tiny things shaken by the fiercest gale. 
Coralie uttered incoherent words. Patrice, while imploring 
her to keep calm, was himself carried away by the storm and 
powerless to resist the terrible agony of the darkness wherein 
death lay waiting. 

They stopped, exhausted. A low hiss was heard some- 
where in the room, the faint hiss that issues from a badly- 
closed gas-jet. They hstened and perceived that it came 
from above. The torture was beginning. 

" It will last half an hour, or an hoiu" at most," Patrice 

Coralie had recovered her self-consciousness : 

" We shall be brave," she said. 

She suddenly appeared so placid that he on his side wa» 
filled with a great peace. Seated on a sofa, their fingers 
still entwined, they silently steeped themselves in the mighty 
calm which comes when we think that events have run theii 

They sat wrapped in an infinite silence. They perceived 
the first smell of gas descending but they felt no fear. 

" Everything will happen as it did before, Coralie," whis- 
pered Patrice, " down to the very last second. Your mother 
and my father, who loved each other as we do, also died in 
each other's arms, with their lips joined together. They had 
decided to unite us and they have united us." 

Our grave will be near theirs," she murmured. 

Little by little their ideas became confused and they began 
to think much as a man sees through a rising mist. The 
dread of the coming annihilation faded out of their thoughts. 

Coralie, the first to be affected, began to utter delirious 
words which astonished Patrice at first : 

" Dearest, there are flowers falling, roses all around us. 
How delightful ! " 

Presently he himself grew conscious of the same blissful 
exaltation, expressing itself in tenderness and joyful emotion. 
With no sort of dismay he felt her gradually yielding in his 
arms and abandoning herself ; and he had the impression that 
he was following her down a measureless abyss, all bathed 
with light, where they floated. 

And suddenly, worn out, his body shaking with fever, 
he pitched forward into a great black pit . . . 
('To be continued.) 

Fe bi- 



bupplement to LAND & WATER 




M Successful breeches-making 
M depends on the following 
g factors — fin^ wear-tesisting 
M cloths, skiUul cutting, care- 
s fal thorough tailor-work, 
g and adequate experience. 
J All these w guarantee, and 
g in particular the last, for 
= we have bean breeches-makers 
= since 1821, ninety-six years 
m ago. 

^ We keep on hand a number of pairs 

g of breeches, and are therefore often 

^ able to meet in mediate requirements, 

g or we can cut and try a pair on the 

= same day, and complete the next day, 

= if urgently wanted. 

The Original Cording' s, Estd. 1839 

the wettest, coldest weather 

a fleece • lined '* Equitorll 


^ Our New All-Leather Puttees never tear or fray out. 

^ For winter wear they are unmatched. 

^ Thpjip. fnost comfcTCahle. good-looking puttees hk made entirely of fine supple 

^ tan leather, and fasten simply with one buckle at bottom. They are ei- 

= tremely durable, even if subjected to the friction of ridinj;. as the edges never 

^ tear or fray out. The puttees are s^peorlily put on or taken off, read ly mould 

^ to the shape of the leg. are a'i easily cleaned as a leather belt, and saddle 

^ soap soon makes theii^ practically waterproof. The price per pair is JC >«. 

= post fre* inland or postage abroad I/- extra, or sent on approval on receipt of 

= bu«n<9» (not banker^) reference and home address. Please sive size of calf. 

ESTD. 1821- = 

j 25 PICCADILLY, W. | 

^ Military and Civil Tailors, . Legging Makers. ^ 

{the really waterproof coat}, 
ensurtiS d»y, watm comfort. 

Daily we rewiive evidt:n<.-e from 
those who have pah] lor their 
kiiowkdije ill iiioiity ana serious 
diisconilort. tliat a M:ini-proof 
(weatherproof) coat faiU to tet-p 
out the Wtit, that- the uUver bhell 
becomes watei-i(Jtiiii.a i.iiii Uiat 
even if lined wiUi oii^kiii or ihe 
like tile damp stili strikes 
through the s«uiu3 at the luckless 
Vt earer. 

The: "Equitor" Coat is guaran- 
teed to be po.-iitively and durably 
imiJermeable by a "Urm whose 
b-usine^s for nearly eighty years 
lias been the niaJiing of water- 

An "Equitor," with snug fleece 
»«oQlleti lining buttoned in, make* 
' an excellent great-*;oaL"in wliieh to 
"traver light," and will not only 
keep a man bone dry through the and most down- 
pour, but wi'.J also warmly pro- 
tect him in biting cold w cather, 
and may thereiore l>e«reiled upon 
■to minimise the ill-L'lt it^ of cii- 
Icreed exposure at nij^ht, 

the "Equitor" is fittc<I with a 

speciai riding apron, but the coat 

' trves ju>^t as well for ordinary 

Wear -afoot, whether the apron be 

j fastened hack or not. 

Incur light.we.ght No. 31 material, 
'the price of the "Equitor" is 92/6; 
of our No. 23 cashmere a medium- 
weight cloth, 115/ ; without aprcn (either 
cloth), 17/6 less, wtfith bet, 5/- extra. 
The detachable fleece inner coat can be had 
in two qualities- No. 1 Cfine wool), 62/6; 
No. 2, 40/-. 

When ordering an "Ecuitor" Coat please 
state height and chest measurt-t'.nd send re- 
mittance* (which will be returned promptly 
if the coat is not approved), or give home 
address and business (not banker's) 

Iiiv strafed List at reauest. 


J. C. CORDING & C9, 

Only Addretue* : 

19 PICCADILLY, W., & 35 st. jamess st, s.w. 

4/6-NOT 5/6 

The "19th" Hole 

Per 54/- aoz. 1 
Carriage paid. / 

Packages relurnable. 
Carriage (orward. 

/ Sample bottle 
( 5/- post tree. 

Send for Price List of High Cltts Wines and Spirits. 

The upplv o "DH-Ped'avnilable tn tlie pu'ili 's^reatyre- 
stritcd"-pecianj ofihe he ie weiKhts-theG -vt. rqm init 
tlicma orjjor io of (ur future out] ut- Wei v.te y ur Icin ' 
duig..iic uiuil thcliiie wh nn ..ij;aLondit onscaii herfs' 




Bless my heart and soul, why 
invite my indulgence? It's for 
Tommy, and he deserves the very 
hest, the very best. He'll march 
better, feel better, win sooner 
with "Dri-ped" to help. I don't 
mind waiting — not a bit of it. 
Not if I have to tramp the snowy 
streets in my tennis shoes . . . 


Looks bad, this Government de- 
mand for "Dri-ped." A straw 
tells the way the wind blows. 
Why are the Government using 
it ? Because it lasts long. Why 

do they want stuff that lasts 
long ? Because we're in for a long 
campaign. Now a cousin of mine 
who has a friend who knows 
sonjeone at the War Office, told 
me in confidence .... 


Perhaps it's a good job too. "Dri- 
ped" IS deceitful stuff. It wears 
well — I give it its due — it wears 
two or three times as long as 
ordinary leather, and keeps out 
the wet ... It wears too well 
— deludes you into the belief that 
it will last for ever. And it can't 
possibly last for ever . . . 

See this Trade Mark in purple 
evety few inches on each sole. 
Without it, the leather's a sub- 


Write for Free Bunklet "About the. Diamond Sign oj Douhle II ear," (• 

William Walker & Sons, Ltd., " DRI-PED" Adcertising Dept., 
County Buildings, Cannon St., Manchester. 


Supplement to LAND & WATER 

February 8, 1917 

Desiij:!! No, I.— An t-xrliisive 

fian)2etl sluipf in the WeJg- 

wooil Black Basalt Wiin-. 

12 in. 1J'6, H in. 16/6, 

\C in. iil: 

C»rvei) RIaikuc'd l!itan<] extra 

12/6, 14/6, 16/6. 

DesiKTi N'o. ^ — AlubasAer 
aiass, in tliroc <x)loiirs: Hose, 

pre*n. and Miir. 
Diameter in 1:' 14 ins. 

20/- 7S'- 30/* eacli. 
(Bl.iekwood S'.and extra.) 


DiHiiitcr 10 12 
14/6 17/6 

lllark carved wcknI 
10/6 1J/6 

TiiH Sundry 

Articles .^liowa 

are extra. 

Soane & Smith Ltd. 


462 Oxford Street, London, W. 

Telcphine: Pad ington 2634. Tilegranu : " Earthenwetdo, Londoa.'' 

Specialists in the Reproduction of China and Glass. 

Floating' Flower Bowls 

lo Original aq-l Excluaive Forma, 

in the following REPRODUCTIONS. 

C WEDGWOOD SOLID BLACK BASALT WARE, originated in the year 
1776 by Joslah Wedgwood. Its dullness throws forward the beauti- 
ful natural colours of the flowers. 

C GOLD PUCE. COLOUR GLASS, after continuous experiments, this 
colour is now absolutely perfect, and pioduces a most beautiful effect. 

C ALABASTER GLASS, diginated from a stone, known as alabaster. 
By a recent discovery, it has been made possible to blend this semi- 
opaque alabaster glass with a vaiiety of soft colours, producing a 
most beautiful effect, which is not only pleasing to the eye, but 
quite unique in character. 

C. ARTIFICIAL FLOATING WATER LILIES in progress at 1/3 each. 

Oreea Orass Hanging 
Fxogs, 2/- aacli. 

Gto£s 6wan&, 
2/9 each. 

14 ins. 
22/6 each, 
stand extra 
niac;. Carved Wood Stands. 
«S 7 "J f } ill. 

12/6 14/6 16/6 18/6 each. 

Design No. «.— English Plain 

White Crjrptal Class. 
Diameter 10 \1 M ins. 

10/- 14/6 18/6 
Tlus Is on a levelled mirror, 
T«hich reflects the flowers 

Round Bevelled riili.^hLMl Mirror. 

12 14 iO IS In. 3 

7/6 11/6 16/. 21/- each. 1/. 

SrtANF anH SMITH i ■ 

Flower Blocks. 

4 41 5 in. 

1/6 2/. l/-each. 

Dej..^.. .%u. :;. iiviirvid stiape 
In the Wediiviood Black 
Basalt Ware. The hirds «ro 
white china, and can lie flxed 
on in any position with plas- 
ticine modelling cla>. 
Incliidin!; I'lrd'. -l"? In.. 21/ ; 

Desicn \o. 7. — R^prodnction 
oJ the Old Xcl«on Goblet, in 
the solid old puce colour ela-tf. 
Effective for floral decoratico^ 
10 in. hish 17/6, 12 in. hish 25/- 
CBIack carved uood stand 
extra.) 12/6 and 14/6. 

Design No. 4.— 1 1 i olour 

Gla^.«. Mew imittv'd .ni^c. 

in in. 21/-, 12 in. 25'., M in. 32/6 ea. 

I Black carved vvood stand extra.) 

12/6 : 14/6 16/6 


Ski Boots 

(With or witboul Straps). 

The Ski Boot Idea is the pro- 
duct of a Country accustomed to 
cold and snow. The high double 
sides of this type of boot permit of 
an extra pair of socks being worn, 
which affords warmth and 

The *' Five Guinea " Ski 
Boot has the patent Fortmason 
Waterproof Leather throughout, 
the soles are extra strong, and the 
whole boot is as supple as a slipper 
and lasts lor years. 

iL5 : 5 : O 

S zes lOi upuards, 
£3 : 15 : per pair- 



Close Elling leg, strong rubber soles, 

khaki colour. 

Per 25/- Pair. 


Wide leather soles, nailed. Botlom 

ol boot acid proof. 

Per 39/6 Pair. 


Briijht black, fits close to breeches. 
Per 21/- Pair. 


Heavy Rubber Soles— sole and 

bottom of boot acid proof 

Per 39/6 Pair 

lllmtraud Calalogiu snt on applualio n 


182 Piccadilly, London, W. 


' Wincarnis ' is the ONE thing you need when yon are 

Weak, Anaemic, 
* Nervy ' * Run-down • 

Don't let your lile beclouded by indiftereni health— don't <!iifFer 
needlessly — don t remain Weak, Anseniic, 'Nervy," " Run- 
dovv'i." Let' Wincarnis' (the wine I'f life) give you new 
health, mtu strength, new bood, nevi nerves, and iieia life. 
' Wincarnis' is a tonic, a restorative, a blood-maker, and a 
nerve food — all combined in one cle.Mr, delicious beverapre. It 
■•trengthens the weak, gives new rich blood to the Anxmic. 
Hfiir nerves to the " Nervy,' sleep to the sleepless, nete vitality 
to t'le " Run-down," and new life to the Ailing. And it doet 
not cont iH drugs. Will you try .7us< o«f bottle? 

Begin to get well FREE. 

Send for :i liberal free tri:»I botf te of ' Wincai'nis '—not a mere taste, but 
(.■f>ovith to do you Rood- KncI >*-e hOUK penny stamps (to pay postage). 
COLhMAN & CO. Ltd.. W IM7. Wincarnis W.^rks, Norwich. 



The Wine of UU* 


Vol. LXVIII No. 2857 [vli'^IJ THURSDAY. FEBRUARY 8, 1917 [^'^^^i^i^Pif^] v^cr^^vv^cE 

fy Louit Haemaeken 

Drawn erclusively /or "Land c£ Water' 

The Insult to Humanity 

" Seems to be neutral ; send him down " 

We reproduce one of the most famous of Raemiekers' cartoons, which is specially 
appropriate to the situation created by Gsrmaiiy's latest chi'leti^e to the Neutrals. It 
originally appeared in Land & Water, March 30th, 1916, after the sinking of the "Sussex " 


February 8, 1917 

The Best Boots 


Active Service 


Faulkners' Norwegians 

fitted with 

The Graemar Wader 

£110 extra. 
No. 1 Model. £6 6 

Kept in stock. 


Smartest Boots 


Home Service 




Field Boots, 

No. 20 Model. £6 6 

Absolutely Waterproof. 


" Stitched Edge " 

N ew markets. 

Khaki Twill Legs, Brown Leather Feet. 
Fdges cannot come unstuck. 

To Knee - £4 10 per pair. 

To Thigh - £6 6 per pwr. 




The success of which is so great that all responsibility as to fit is accepted. 

SI & 52 South Molton Street, London, W. 

And 26 Trinity Street, Cambridge. 

By Ap/Kiitlmtnt lo 

II M. Ike King. 

14,000 British 

have gone to battle "Thresher "-clad— protected, that is, 
by the most practical campaign coat that skilled experi- 
ence can devise. 

To you, seeking the indubitable best in trench coats, they 
— as well as the War Office*— recommend a "Thresher." 

• To O.C.'s Corps B.E.F., Feb., 1915. 



•'Thresher" Trench Coat S4 . 14 . 6 

Detachable '* Kamelcott '* Lining £1 . 11 . 6 

Detachable Sheepskin Lining £3 . 13 . • 

Cavalry type, with knee fla^t and sad'le gusset, 15^6 extra. 

All sites in stock. Send size of chest and approximate height, and te 

avoid any delmy enclose cheque uhen ordertusi. 



OrU nators of 
the Trench Coat 

ScorriSH Acbnts : 
14 George Street, Edinburgh 
& to6 Hope Street, Glasgow. 

Send for Book — 

the Complete 






February 8, 191 7 




Telephone HOLBORN 2828. 



Tlio Insult to Humanity. By Louis Racmackers 
Time for I'rudcnce. (Leader) 

How the Enemv Stands, Bv Hilaire Belloc 

Tlic War Loan 

German t'n'.s«s ilic World. liy .Arthur Polle 

The Soldier who Sings. By Lewis K. Freeman 
Tlje Lieutenant. By Centurion 
Boar Hunting in France. By Geoffrey Ransome 
Young Anzac finds liis Heritage. By A. E. Mack 
Books to Read. Bj^ Lucian Oldershaw 
The (lolden Triangle. By Maurice Leblanc 
Kit and Equipment 



1 7 



THE sudden crisis which has arisen in the relations 
between the United States and the belligerent 
powers has, from the military point of view one 
supreme interest. It is that of tonnage. It is 
clear that if things should come to open war between the 
United States and the Central Powers two very im- 
portant additions would be made at once upon our 
side of the balance and against that of the enemy. In 
the first place something like half a million tons of in- 
terned German shipping now in North American harbours 
would be a\-ailable for the supply of the Allies. In the 
second place the building power of the United States 
(which is enormous and, for fast small craft, the special 
weapons against submarines, almost unlimited and 
extremely rapid) would be immediately at the disposal 
of the Alliance. 

If matters remain only in the stage of a diplomatic 
rupture and if the enemy forbear to precipitate affairs 
by causing loss of American life or sinking (without 
warning and search) American vessels, no direct and 
innnediate effect in favour of the Alliance will follow, 
though the moral effect has already been \ery great. It 
puts an end to all talk of an embargo upon the neutral 
export of material and equally puts an end to all talk of 
neutral negotiation. Whether the enenu' intends to 
risk actual war and balance the supposed advantges of 
sinking at sight against the certain disadvantage of 
adding this great mass of shipping and building power 
to the Alliance against him, it is 'idle to discuss. He 
may choose to draw in his horns (as he has over and over 
again in the past after some exhibition of \'iolence) or he 
may have settled upon what he now regards as his iinal 
and only pohcy. 

Meanwhile, it is urgently to be advised that public 
opinion in this country should keep its head. It 
is forgotten in some quarters that the war is not 
merely nor mainly a race between our b'lockade and Ger- 
many's It is much more a race between the slow effect of 
the enemy's submarine and the immoiiately impending 
effect of the Allied superiority by land in the West. Long 
before even the most ruthless and succe-ssful submarine 
action can seriously embarrass the Western Allies the 
great shock in the West will liave taken place, and it 
is upon the result of this that the chief issue of the war 

turns. There is some room for warning, not only against 
sensational writing in the Press, but also against any 
excess of political oratory at this moment. A war 
can only be won, and is best conducted, by soldiers and 
sailors. A certain amount of political speech-making is 
necessary, perhaps, because it is useful to keep the public 
in touch with the campaign, and the public has grown by a 
sort of routine to regard men in certain known political 
])o.sitions as guides to opinion. But there is always a 
danger that an e.xccss of addresses by Parliamentarians 
may produce a crop of imprudent remarks, ■ dangerous 
to that complete homogeneity of the Alliance and that 
resolute attitude towards the foe which is essential to 
this nation in the crisis of its' fate. 

The speech delivered by Mr. Asquith in Scotland was 
a model of what such addresses should be. Impersonal, 
clear and decisive, it contained not a vyord of reproach 
against domestic rival or foreign ally, nor any attempt, 
improper upon the part of a civilian, to estimate a military 
situation save in its broadest lines. LInfortunately, 
this has not been altogether true of other efforts on the 
part of the politicans. It is not true to say, for instance, 
that the enemy was ever our superior in the handling 
of railways. He has been always somewhat our in- 
ferior in this \-ital matter in France as in Italy, from 
the battle of the Marne to the Trentino and from the 
Yser to the Somme. The battle of the Marne was won, 
as Mr. Belloc points out in his article of this week, by 
the swinging of a great body of troops behind the lino 
of the armies parallel to it during the actual progress of 
the fighting, and the consequent springing of a surprise 
upon the German right. Nothing of the sort has 
been effected by the enemy on the rail from the first 
day of the war till now. Our readers will see in the 
same columns how superior was the movement of the 
troops which marked the Yser sector two years ago 
and how much slower the German movement was. The 
swinging of Italian troops from the Isonzo to the Asiago 
plateau last sunnner was a similarly perfect piece of 
modern transport ruining the Prussian plan imposed 
upon Austria in the Trentino. Throughout the war the 
greatest ability of the Western Allies, in spite of their 
disadvantage of exterior lines, has been amply demon- 
strated in this test matter of railways. It is an error 
of fact then to exaggerate the enemy's mechanical 
power, and surely no good purpose can be served at the 
present moment by criticising, even \-aguely, the Allied 
action in the Balkans. 

The prime fact about the Balkans is that the 
all-important occupation of Salonika took place in 
time, and with Salonika occupied the enemy is para- 
lysed in the East. The annoyance and difficulty sur- 
rounding this capital piece of strategy are wholly sub- 
sidiary to its essential and successful purpose And is it 
not luiwise to suggest that the enemy will obtain more 
fa^'ourable terms if he consents to an early peace ; that 
he will be better off by admitting defeat in 1917 than 
by admitting it next year ? Such a statement belies 
the feeUng of -this country and is iri-itating to the 
known temper of our great Allies. The enemy will obtain 
peace in spite of liimself when he has been defeated, 
and when he has been defeated the peace he will obtain 
will be one imposed upon him by the common progrannne 
and the common determination of France, England, 
Italy and Russia. 

He, at least, knows this, and it is a great pity that any 
weakness in the matter should be even suggested ; how- 
ever impossible it may be in face of the public temper 
and of the aimies for those who counsel such weakness to 
achic'.e their ends. It is .as well to speak quite clearly 
upon this point. No yielding will be tolerated by the 
peoples or by the armies, and it is surely imprudent 
to suggest it. 


February 8, 1917 

How the Enemy Stands 

By Hilairc Belloc 

AT our entry into the last phase of tlie war, in 

/% the midst of the ominous hill and silence which 

/ % precedes it upon both sides, let us take stock. 
JL JL. The one prime element in the calculation — 
wliich more and more rapidly is deciding;: all the rest — is the 
respecti\e weiiL^ht of numbers and material hv land. It 
is moditicd, but only modilied, b3- the enemy's last efforts 
upon our len!,lhly and perilous communications at sea. 

AS to the land, the general situation is now famihar. In 
the West the enemy is mastered. On the East he has 
a permanent and hea\v superiority in material countered 
only, by supply to our Allies by o\ersea routes. 

Ihe West is not only superior but is growing in 
superiority, ll has more guns, more shells, more rail- 
ways, more rolling stock, more men, more food. 

'ihough these calculable ad\antages are modified 
liy difficulties of conmumication which will be dealt 
with in a moment, there ought in fairness to be added 
a certain incalculable element without which judgment 
will always be at fault. The Western Powers are 
morally and intellectually superior to the enemy. They 
ha\e developed better tactical methods. They have 
shown themselves to be better strategists. Tlicy have 
handled their raihvays better and they have concealed their 
moiemenfs better. It is, after all, only what one would 
e.\pect of the heart of civilisation in action against 
outer men who have only acquired their culture as the 
pupils of the South and West and who have never been 
able to do more than imitate. 

It is \-ery important that we should grasp this in- 
calculable but ver\' real factor in the Western situation, 
because foolish writing and still more foolish speaking 
has produced in this countr\' an impression the con- 
trary of the truth. There has long been a general but 
false impression here that the enemy, and particularly 
the North Germans, had some advantage in tempera- 
ment over the Italians, the French and the British in 
mechanical affairs. The more ignorant kind of Mriting 
in the Press supported this error, and of course political 
speaking followed suit. Anyone who will take the trouble 
to consult e\-idence instead of \ielding to a mood will 
discover how false such a conception is. The enemy 
has ne\er produced or maintained for long a superiority 
in the machinery of the air. He has ne\-er moved troops 
by railwaj- with the same secrecy and the same rapidity as, 
in critical moments, the Western Allies ha\e proved them- 
selves capable of moving them. 

The Battle of the Marnc was won by the swinging of a 
great body of troops right behind the line of battle from 
east to west by train with a rapidity and secrecy of which 
the enemy has never been capable. This happened at 
the very beginning of the war in early September 1914. 
The whole of the British Expeditionary Force was moved 
with equal secrecy and rapidity from the Aisne a few- 
weeks later to the sector of Ypres. The enemy might, 
if lie had been able to do it, have moved his troops first, 
he might have done ■Ao more quickly, he had far greater 
numbers at his disposal. He had all the rolling stock and 
lines he wanted. If he had been prompt he would have 
turned our line. But he is by nature slow compared 
with us, and this rapid handling of railways in the early 
])art of the war closed the northern or sea gate against 
him, and completed the effect of the Marni;. We were 
still grossly inferior to him in numbers, but a better 
handling of railways saved us. 

The Italians moved an immense inass of men from the 
Isonzo to the \'icenza-Verona front ; they did it deftly, 
nicely, most rapidly, at a calculated moment, and ruined 
the enemy's Trentino offensive. The thing was done 
so secretly and so quickly, it went so smoothlj-, that it 
may justly be called the best of all the examples of 
railway work in any time or place of the great war. 1 
was mvself a witness of the end of this great operation. 
1 snw with my own eyes its astonishing success and the 
waj- in which those interior lines were used almost with- 

out disturbing the normal civilian life and movement 
upon the roads and railways. It was an unforgettable 

\\'hat is true of mechanical power in railway traction 
and road traction is true of weapons. The French and 
Italian lield piece is altogether the .superior of the enemy's. 
In the heavy pieces he had long and enormous advantage 
in number ; he has to-day, though in general our inferior 
here, some particular types which rival those of the 
Western AUies. But he has never been superior in the 
handling of the heavy piece or in the rapidity of delivery 
from it, after the supply of shell was sufficient. 

The enemy's superiority over the Western Allies con- 
sisted /irst in a very much more developed system of 
j)roduction (and far greater opportunities for further 
production) in the earlier part of the campaign. This 
could only be .slowly caught up by the transformation of 
civil life among his western opponents. Secondly, he 
had, to begin with, a great superiority in equipped 
numbers. Thirdly, he was the first in the field and for 
long mechanically superior to us in the digging of trenches 
and in the use of trench weapons and of the machine 
gun. In this we copied from him, and he was our 
superior. The same is true of the observation balloon, 
and of the various forms of nocturnal observation. 
Finally, he was, and he will remain, our superior in mere 
supply of coal and metal. So that with all our own 
superiority in mechanical power and general intelligence, 
aptitude and rapidity of work (Sheffield has a better 
co-efficient of labour "than Creusot, and Creusot a better 
co-efticient than Essen), we simply have not the stuff 
sufficient to meet him unless we can add to it from over- 
seas. The area tiow under control of the enemy produced 
before the war five tons of steel to the Allied three. 

So much, then, for the Western situation in its general 
lines. Subject to the enemy's superiority in steel, which 
niakes us partly dependent on neutral markets, we 
master him. We master him in men, in moral, in gun- 
power and gun handling, in tactical method. 

The Eastern situation we also know. There the enemy 
enjoys a superiority in every department except the 
ultimate supply of men. He can, within a given time, 
produce far more equipment and therefore arm, on a given 
sector (so long as he has them) more men. He has 
a railway system and an experience of railways wholly 
superior to that which faces him. He has a much larger 
body of instructed men on whom to draw for the wastage 
in the commissioned ranks ; lastly, he has a perfectly 
overwhelming superiority in material. He can make 
aircraft, guns and shells at a rate compared with whicli 
his opponents are simply out of the field. Those oppo- 
nents have, upon the zone of the aimies, a better supply 
of mere food— taken as a whole — but in other depart- 
ments of material they are so handicapped as to be in 
another category as it were, from their enemy. They 
have had one strategic factor Mith which to play at will, 
and that was the factor of .space. Given a proper 
handling of retreat and they could " play " the superior 
strength of the enemy up to the point of exhaustion. 
In this proper handling of a retreat they have in the 
main succeeded, and neither in the very great business of 
the Polish retreat, when the enemy was at the height of his 
power, nor in the pett}' business of the Wallachian 
retreat, were the Central Powers able to envelop^ any- 
where. The great enemy concentration failed. The 
armies retiring before them remained in being, and 
reached, in the first case, after a great advance, in the 
second case after a small one, the point of exhaustion. 

It is perfectly clear how such a situation can be sum- 
marised. The enemy's fronts for some 2,000 miles are a 
ring kept at Irigh tension, a ring which is perpetually 
wasting away. The matter by which the wastage is 
replaced, that is, the reserve of man-power within the 
ring, grows only at about a third or a fourth of the rate 
at which the wastatre proceeds. In the race between 

February 8, 1917 


wastage and recruitment, the former proceeding at a 
rate three and four times the latter, the enemy have 
reached a point in which they sec repairs possible for no 
more than the approaching spring and part of the 
approaching summer. As against tliis their opponents 
can keep the ring at tension indeiinitely and have, for a 
similar rate of monthly wastage, more than double the 
amount of monthly recruitment, while the Allied material 
supply is, upon one section of the ring, the ^^"estern, 
increasing the tension more and more with every day of 
production that passes. In the nature of things, the 
moment when the ring can no longer hold is approaching. 

But there is to this aspect of the matter — a purely 
Continental one — one profound modification. Allusion 
to it has latterly been l^lade continually in these columns. 
It is the nature of the Allied communications. It is 
because the communications of the Allies are maritime 
that the enemy finds one chance left upon which to gamble. 
JIaritime communications are always perilous, always 
cumbersome and slo\\', always exceedingly expensive in 
men and material. To-day these drawbacks are far 
greater than they were in the past for three reasons ; 
The necessity of maritime communication is greater than 
e\er before : their length is greater than ever before ; 
their peril is greater than ever before. 

Uirst. — Upon those maritime, cominunications the 
material superiority of the West depends, and the 
material existence of the East. The balance of the 
steel we need must come from oversea, and the supply 
of material needed by the Eastern Allies must, for the 
great bulk of it — not for mere balance — come from over 
sea, and that not only as steel or other raw material, 
bid in the form of the finished product. And not only 
must steel in our case, and finished products in that of 
our Eastern Allies, arrive from oversea, but a certain 
proportion of fuel also must so arrive. Fuel, whether 
supplied from Britain (and that is from one point only 
of the Allied outer ring) or from neutrals, must arrive 
from oversea. Even food must in part — -and the case 
of Britain largely — come by sea. There was never a 
campaign in the history of the war,, not even when 
maritime A"enice and Carthage were fighting for their 
historical position, when the dependeiice upon maritime 
communications was greater. As against this, the Allied 
power at sea does cut off from the enemy a very great 
'percentage of his necessary food, but not enough to 
reduci: him (as he himself once reduced his eneriiy in the 
past) by starvation. We embarrass him very gravely 
indeed, but we do not, bv this action alone, defeat him. 

Secondly, these maritime communications are abnor- 
mally long. They cross the Atlantic and the Pacific. 
They stretch round from Britain through the Straits of 
(Gibraltar and the whole length of the Mediterranean. 
They run again from Britain and from the Atlantic, 
right round through the Arctic Seas to the Northern 
Russian coast. Now great lengthy communications by 
sea have this treble drawback: 

(a) The efficiency of your tonnage is in inverse pro- 
l)ortion to the length of your communications : To supply 
so many tons of material to a distance of 1,000 miles 
ill a given time requires, even in theory, only half the 
tonnage necessary to supply the .same amount of material 
in the same time to a place 2,000 miles distant ; for the 
supply has to be continuous. 

(b) Very lengthy maritime communications involve 
to-day the upkeep of coaling points and further delavs in 
the taking in of coal as well as a further waste of tonnage 
in transporting the coal. 

(c) The longer the line of maritime communications ' 
the greater the peril, because every extra mile of journev ■ 
is an extra mile of danger, and also because the broader i 
the sea the less opportunity of finding the enemy— in 
this case the .submarine. 

Moreover, these maritime communications are to-day 
especially subject to a peril unknown before in the history ;, 
of shipping. This peril is the attack of the submarine, 
reverting to the old barbarous conception of war and 
sacrificing civilian life indiscriminatelv with militarv life. 
The new submarines have not been f ontrolled and domi- 
nated as the first fiight were from two\-earsto 18 months 
ago. These immensely long communications, therefore, 
may he compared to terrestrial communications which 
should be c:verywliere open upon their flanks to cneniv 
attack,, and no more detestable . nnlitary condition 

The War Loan 

A S the war proceeds, aiJd ;the difticulties and 

/% hardships inherent to \-1ctory increase, the 

/ — % resolution of the nation strengthens. To render 

scrAuce to one's country animates milUons of 

men and women to-day, but against this there too often 

arises the paralysing doubt of what use can a single 

person be in this gigantic struggle. It is of course a foolish 

fear. Armies are composed of units ; War 'Loans ^^oji- 

sist of single sovereigns. " -*- 

There is not a living soul to-day too humble to help 
in the financing of the war. The Great War Loan \vhich 
continues open until to-morrow week, is the most splendid 
opportunity that has yet been offered to the whole 
nation to be of help. It is the duty of eveiyone to 
subscribe what they can, whether it be a million pounds 
or less than a hundred shillings. The amount makfis 
no difference so far as the personal obligation is con- 
cerned. There may still be found those who' do not 
rightly understand the nature of the transaction, but 
they can find enlightenment at any Post Olticc or Bank. 

According to the success of this loan will the country's . 
endurance V)e judged by our enemies. Already they 
are comforting themselves with the false belief that the 
people are tiring of the war and will welcome peace on 
almost any terms. This delusion will be shattered, not 
so much by the total amount of the loan as by .the. 
total number of subscribers. Let it be shown to be a ,. 
people's offering to Na\-y and Army to carry on until ■ 
military victory is final and complete. 

As a matter of fact the lending of one's money to 
the country incurs no financial risk and brings in a 
A-ery handsome profit, especially for the smallest holders, 
who have never before been able to obtain such a return 
on their money, as over 5 per cent. One must not, 
however, regard subscribing to this War Loan as a 
mere question of finance or profit, but as a national duty 
which no man or woman wth any abiding sense of 
patriotism can afford to neglect. 

exists. ' There is the full position. The enemy is not,, 
only beaten on the West, but he is in danger of a complcto 
decision against himself upon the West in a very short 1 
time, because he is out-numbered, out-gunned and aut- 
generalled. His permanent superiority upon the East 
does not avail him towards a decision, because the factor 
of space baffles him. His reser\-c for preparing wastage, 
even if he joins no new di\'isions, is exhausted in the course 
of the coming summer. Every effort he makes to meet 
his foes by making new formations is so much borroM'ed 
from, anticipated ujion, the meagre resources of the imme- 
diate future. His one loo])hole is the weak character of 
our lengthy, vitally necessary, and e.xceedingly exposed- 
maritime communications. It is to stake all on that one 
chance that he has just .sacrificed neutrality to the oppor- . 
tunity of attacking communications. If he fails 
here he has failed altogether and soon. 

There are those who tell us that he dt-liberateh' desired 
to bring the United States into tiie war in order to em- 
barrass negotiations at the close of it. It ■ may be so. ■ 
There are those who tell us that the sudden determination 
to risk the hostility of the Uniteil States was undertaken 
by the HohenxoUern Dynasty so that, in the crash of 
the newly made and artificial North German natioj^>. 
they should seem to have yielded only to an overwhelming 
combination. It may be so. There are those who. tell 
us that the Prussians will shrink froin the last conse- 
quences of such a policy and will suggest compromises 
with nations still neutral upon the sea. It may be so. 
But all these affirmations and conjectures relate to some- 
thing subsidiary to the main military point, which is 
this ; That by land the enemy is in inuuediate and deadly 
peril. His only issue is a gamble by sea. 

It is not my pro^'incc to discuss wliat his chances upon 
the sea may be. But it is clear that, as part of the 
military problem, the unaided submarine weapon cannot.. 


February 8, 1917 

be decisive. The margin between luxury and necessity 
in imports, the ])o\ver of importing ultimately by sub- 
mersibles, the time still required to embarrass the supplies 
of this country at all seriously ; the incapacity to inter- 
fere with direct communications with France ; the 
potential addition of half a million tons of shipping from 
the other side of the Atlantic : the progress of methods for 
dealing with the new submarines— all these factors com- 
bined make it certain that s<'rious military pressure 
upon land (the preparation of which he may hope in 
vain to hasten or impose) will come long before the 
menace upon our maritime communication could be 
really decisive. 

Now there is with regard to the innncdiate and extreme 
peril which the enemy runs upon the Western front, a 
note of warning to be issued. The Press has done so 
little to make opinioa in this pountry seize the general 
situation that the \varying is necessary. 

There is no reason why the enemy should not form a 
considerable striking force to come into action before the 
end of the winter. He can do so, as I have said, by 
anticipating his future revenue in men. He had in his 
depots last December about 600,000 men. -He might 
.■xpect before the middle or end of next summer to get 
another 400,000 from the last of class iqi8 called up 
and from hospital relenscs. It is clear that if he chooses 
to leave hinrself ex}i;uisted of drafts before some date in 
August he can empUjy the human material in the imme- 
diate formation of 3iew divisions, even up to so high a 
number as 25 divisions (possibly) as a maximum. He 
could onlv do ri(j. of course, at the expense of certain ruin 
later on, if his attack fails, an earlier ruin than he would 
otherwise have haxl to face. But he can do so if he 
desires some great political effect early in the year, or 
thinks it will ha of ad\antage to liim. 

What we have to remember is that a new force so 
formed is quite insuihcient for its task. Twenty-five 
new divisions largely eomi^osed of his very worst and last 
material* can never obtain a decision in the West, and 
when they have been j)ounded (or have pounded them- 
selves) to pieces, the counter-attack of the Allies can 
be decisive. 

He knows all this just as well as we do. The danger 
is that opinion in this country might be disturbed by the 
appearance of such new forces in the iield. It is only a 
political danger, but it is one worth forestalling. 

'Last Effort in Neutral Opinion 

My readers will agree with me that it is of especial 
xalue at this moment to study th(; plan upon which the 
enemy was vv(jrking in America up to the week before 
the rupture which has taken place. I think one can show 
that the (ierman agents set aside for affecting opinion 
in the United States had concentrated upon creating the 
following opinion : J'hat the Central Powers could 
maintain a successful defensive for any length of. time ; 
that any military design conceix'cd to that effect — 
such as the Roumanian one — worked within set boundaries 
which were easily reached and maintained : that the 
Allied Governments had already recognised this and were 
beginning to Jiegotiate for peace secret!}', their sole 
remaining difficulty being that of explaining their failure 
to their own subjects. I have before me as I write two 
examples of this from whicii I can illustrate it. 

'J'he first concerns the Roumanian campaign, and its 
significance lies in its date. 

I hose mIio may have read my article of last week in 
these colunms will remember that the main effort io 
force the Carpathians — two actions undertaken simul- 
taneously bj' (ierok on thi; north and Ruiz on the south — 
were delivered upon Saturday, January loth. Each 
ended disastrously for the enemy in the course of Sunday 
the nth. (jcrok was thrown back in the Casinu Valley 
and Ruiz was thrown back from the Canii>irle Ridge. 

It must ha\e been cleai" on the spot after these reverses 
that the decisive stroke, that of turning tiie whole Russo- 
Roumanian line through the mountains, had failed for 
good. Indeed, the certitude of this is pro\ed by the 
fact that a .series of costly frontal actions began innne- 
diatelj' afterwards — the very next day — against the Putna 

"-Sonic liavc t.itked of liis callins out in ("lormany Class 1910. ;' f. 
Tlio bovs who an; y-iolhs of Ihcni — only 17. It would io the pliygiu- 
lc"ii.'iil\;on<litic'iis nf the norili, Iju (jiiiu- lulilc 

and Serelh \u\c acioss the plain, and were carried on 
fruitlessly to the point of exhaustion before Focsaii i, 
before Galatz and lastl}- at Fundeni. 

The news of the breakdown of the Carpathian part of 
tile plan— the attempt to turn the Russo-Rouiuaniau 
right by Cierok and Ruiz — must have been known in 
Berlin by the afternoon, or at the latest by the evening, 
of Sunday the nth. 

Note what followed. Upon Monday the izih Berlin 
sent out an exceptionally long notice to the American 
Press. These long and detailed statements officially 
cou;itersigned by the enemy's command have been fre- 
quently published in the United States dming the course 
of the war, and I have often thouglit it would be in- 
structive if such elaborate German despatches for the 
hifluencing of neutrals were regularly republish'jd in this 
country. This particular effort was of excaptional 
tinphasis and importance, and went into detail \\\k)i\ the 
Carpathian campaign. It described (with perfect justice) 
the magnitude of the task and the great difficulties which 
(jerok and Ruiz had to overcome in lighting their way 
through a hifih and difficult mountain range in the depth 
of winter with only one good road, and dejiL-ndent in most 
places upon mere tracks ; The guns often ha\ing to be 
lowered into the ravines by ropes, and pulled up again 
on the far side ; nearly all the supplies haxing to be 
carried on men's backs, etc., etc. 

We, of course, know (and rejoice in the fact) that 
military efforts of that sort, if they fail in their linal 
purpose, are the worse for the commander who accom- 
plishes them precisely in proportion to their difficulty 
and to his tenacity and endurance. They ai-e immensely 
costly in men. But that is by the way 

The enemy very naturally, and I repeat, \ery justly, 
emphasised the great difficulty of merely getting across 
the ridge, let alone of winning on the other side. 

Now after this legitimate piece of self-praise, which 
might influence neutrals by showing them of what stiitf 
the enemy's armies were comjxised, the note goes on in 
a totally different tone, and says that these movements 
have 11010 been, crowned with success ; that the general 
officers commanding them are now uninterruptedly ■ 
pushing forward down the Moldavian Valleys, are about 
to debouch upon the plain : in a word, that the object 
of this perilous and difficult and very expensive march 
has now been attained. 

That latter part of the Note — and the only really 
signi..*icant part of it, and in any military sense — is a flat 
contradiction of the truth, and it was sent from Berlin to 
America not in the hope that it might turn out true, but 
in the kno-*vledge that it was false. For it was despatched 
a few hours after the receipt of the news that the Car- 
pathian effort had failed. The whole episode is signifi- 
cant, coming as it did during the last efforts to obtain 
American intervention and before the sudden volie- 
facc and challenging of Mr. Wilson that took the form 
of the Note of January 31st. 

The second example is taken Irom the principal one 
of those papers which have hitherto supported the German 
cause in the United States in the West. It is signed by a 
neutral journalist, but the inspiration is so obviously the 
inspiration of the CJernian Government that we may take 
it as part of the general propagancUi of about a fortnight 
ago. Though no date of origin is given upon the tele- 
gram, it clearly proceeds from Europe, and i)resiimably 
from some neutral country whither the (ierman 
authorities could send matter which they desired pub- 
, lished. Moreover, the writer speaks of his having 
accompanied the German ariries in the ])ast. After a 
long but inconclusive series of dark hints about the weak- 
ness here or there of the Alliance, and any amount of 
assertion that he is in toucii with the very best authorities 
and is speaking for them, the author concludes with 
these words : 

"In my opinion though fighting may 'continue, 
the war is \irtually ended no\\'. It is more tli.m likely 
that the terms of peace ari' already under discussion. 
What the diplomats are waiting for now is the swing of 
public opinion. All the Governments (my italics) have 
fed up their people by promises of great victories. They 
cannot now suddenly announce that the thing has failed. 
It can be safely said thai every ^teat Government ui 
Europe (my italics) is ncjw anxiously planning to sa\e 
itself froin its own |h>o]i1c. .\i>| h(in»4 ins;ini' limli of llu' 

l''cl)i'iia!\' S, Kjij 


Alliances now sec that a final or real \ict0r3' for citlicr 
sidf has become impossible." 

1 think my readers will agree that such a statement 
so presented to readers in the United States is a document 
of great value to us. It maintains to the end the simil 
\vhicli has inspired all (jcrman ixjlicy between the end 
of last October and tlie now sudden mood of desperation 
])rovoked by the recent firmness of the Allies and their 
rejection of the enemy's proposals. 

fhe Prussian Government is careful to tell America 
that it can no more claim decisi\c victory than we can. 
It is magnanimous. It says : " Well, well, we both 
ihought that wc were going to win. Now we hnd that 
■neither of us can. We frankly admit that we are afraid 
of our own people finding out how they ha\'e been deceived 
- and so of course are you on your side. But it is qtiite 
i li ar that there can be no victory and only an insane 
jiian would think it possible after all that has happened." 

We know how that suggestion was met by the Allies. 
'file " sane man " who was at the same tiine instructed 
and had some knowledge of what he is talking about, had 
seen things quite differently, so had the Prussian Higher 
Command. Mr. Asquith in a perfectly plain and straight- 
forward speech in Scotland the other day ; General Ni\ell(' 
in an equally j^lain and straightforward order of the day be- 
fore Verdun, six weeks ago ; (leneral Brussiloff in yet an- 
other simple statement a few weeks earlier, had put the 
matter as it appears not only to high authorities such as 
they are, but to anyone who cares to read the history of war 
and to ffillow the course of the present great campaigns. So 

far from \ictor\' ha\ing got less and less possible and 
being now outside the field of practical consideration, 
it is just the otlier way. • The victory of the one side 
iind the defeat of the other ha^e been a matter more and 
more susceptible of calculation as the war has proceeded. 
Ihe event is at tlie present moment more certain than it 
was, say, last (Jctober ; last October, it was more certain 
than it was, say, last June. And this calculable victory 
is a victory for the .A.niance and a defeat for the Central 

That is why Prussia is desperate and has suddenly 
decided in her desperation to challenge the strongest of 
the neutrals after keeping up to the last moment a bluff 
of stalemate in all her presentation of the case to that 

The very best proof of this on the moral side (that is 
apart from the calculations of effectives and resources) 
that Prussia is defeated is the fact that .she should have 
thought it necessary during a full three months to abandon 
all her traditions and to declare herself incapable of victory 
in order that the world might be persuaded of our incapa- 
city as well. The bluff failed. Then and' only then she 
suddenly turned round and went savage. 

fhe combination and the succession of those two 
methods, a violent rage following upon a declaration of 
stalemate, the second as sincere and futile as the first 
was calculated and false, are perfectly convincing to any- 
one who has watched the workings of ill-balanced but 
cmiying men in the last stage of a hopeless resistance. 

H. Bei.I-OC 

Germany versus The World 

By Arthur Pollen 

SINCE our last issue there have occurred three 
portentous events, all arising out of the un- 
anticipated course of the war at sea. On Friday 
morning the world knew that Germany had 
denounced the pledge, given to America after the attack 
on the Sussex, and would Jienceforth hold herself free 
to sink, at sight , any sliip, belligerent or neutral, that came 
within a certain zone contiguous to these islands. On 
friday night the obvious consequences followed. Count 
Bcrnstorff was dismissed and Mr. Gerard was recalled 
by President Wilson. On Saturday morning Lord 
Devonport appealed to the nation to put itself volun- 
ta'-ily on rations. These things inaugurate a new, and 
})erhaps a final, development of the war. But it is pro- 
bably more correct to call them epoch marking, rather 
than epoch making, events. The distinction is perhaps 
academic. But it will add to our understanding of 
them to note that each arises naturally from what 
has gone before. Germany, seeing no other escape 
from luilitary defeat, has the choice of subduing (ireat 
Britain by famine or herself surrendering at discretion, 
'fhe United States, resolutely convinced that it is not 
their business to intervene in Europe for Europe's sake, 
arc faced b}' a threat which may compel them to inter- 
\ene for their own. The British Government, after si.x 
months of a submarine campaign which the Admiralty 
has been unable to prevent or materially to mitigate, 
at last realises that, being besieged, wc must act as all 
garrisons in such uncompromising conditions have to 
do. And, doubtless, we shall soon to be told that the 
Admiralty has taken on the building of supply ships. 

It is a convention in the world of journalists that the 
most significant events shall be reported as occasioning 
surprise, stupefaction, bewilderment, etc.— as if such 
events were always unexpected. And, in due course, 
we liave been told tliat Washington and New York were 
" thunderstruck " by Germany's Note of last week, 
and Berlin, in turn, " thunderstruck " at its reception 
by President Wilson and Congress. Even to Lord Devon- 
])ort's urgent warning, there has been attributed the 
pleasing merit of originality. It is no doubt possible 
that there were many people in America so ignorant of 
the military and civil situation in Germany that they 
failed to see that, in resuming the practice of indiscrimi- 
nate murder, the German Higher Command was acting, 
not from choice, but from compulsion. And there may 
have been many more in Berlin who, interpreting Presi- 

dent Wilson's action by a misreading of his words, 
supposed that the ultimatum of April last could be 
treated as the Lusitania Notes were treated, could be 
ignored just because the President's Christmas message 
and Senate speech had gi\'en passionate emphasis to 
America's love of peace and longing for neutrality. 
They may have failed to understand the difference be- 
tween the personal protest of the chief executive of the 
American nation and the national decision of the nation 
itself. Like many people here, they may have failed 
to see that Mr. Wilson was passionate in his appeal for 
peace and neutrality precisel}- because he knew that the 
knell of both had sounded. It could only have been a 
minority in this country to whom the only element of sur- 
prise, at ^our being rationed, \\as not wonder at its being 
so long delaj^ed. 

Reversal of the Roles 

We not bemuse ourselves by regarding these 
things as surprising and sensational events. It is in 
no spirit of boasting that I remind the reader that all 
of them have been discussed both recently and far back 
in these columns as ine\'itably resulting from things we 
knew. They are scenes in the strange transformations 
of war that we have seen. In August, 1914, people asked 
how Cicrmany's invincible land army coukl be balanced 
by Great Britain's invincible sea fleet. It is part of the 
topsy-turveydom in which we live, that the greatest land 
force and the greatest sea force in the world have achieved 
everything expected of them — except victory. The 
failure to achie\x; victory has given time to each side. 
Time, in which wc have been able to produce a new kind 
of army that Germany will not be able to resist, time for 
(iermany to produce a new kind of navy which we do not 
seem yet able to fight. The truth of the first of these 
propositions seems to be manifest from last year's ex- 
perience on the Western front. It is the plain and obvious 
message contained in Sir Douglas Haig's dispatch. That 
Germany has staked everything on the truth of the 
second, is evidence that she knows the first is true. It 
is the business of the British Admiralty and the British 
Government to prove that Germany's faith in her under- 
water na\'y is misplaced. 

The situation demands an answer, if it can be given, 
to some \-ery grave questions. What exactly do we 
know about the capacity of the enemy's new navy to 



February 8, 1917 

acliicvo its professed ends? Wliat difference in its 
capacity to achie\e th^esc ends will be introduced by 
the abrogation of those limitations of its activities 
that last wceiv's Note defines ? To what extent, should 
America beconi;^ a belli.£(erent, will her active adhesion to 
the Allies' side assist u> in thwarting the new campaign 
or in mitigating its results ? The difliculty in answer- 
ing the hrst of these two questions is obvious, for over 
no phase of the war have both sides thrown a denser 
\eil of mystery. We must limit oiuselves therefore 
to a bare re-statcment,of elements already known. 

The submarine navy, of \\hich (iennany now threatens 
the relentless use, is that laid down by Tirpitz in tlu; 
beginning of iyi5.' He is entitled to the credit of having 
foreseen, sa\r in December. 1014, that Ciermany's 
only chance "of victory lay in undoing the blunder by 
which (ireat Britain had been made a belligerent. It 
•was a blunder that could only be undone by bringing 
(ireat Britain to her knees. He therefore determined 
■to call a new Sea Power into existence to redress the 
balance of the old— the Sea Power that made us invulner- 
able. The submarine campaign of February to October 
' 1915 was undertaken with a small number oi boats, with 
boats of inferior capacity, with otticers and crews of small 
and restricted experience. It was an exi)eriment only. 
It was undertaken so as to evolve the principles and learn 
the elements of a new warfare. The materiel for this 
warfare was forthwith put in hand. A year would ha\e 
to elapse before an\- of its rmits would become 
a\ailable. Certain (pialilics they would ha^■e to possess 
had been made manifest as much by all previous guerres 
dc course as by the e\cnts of the fust four months of war. 
The nearer the submarine could approximate; to the 
cruiser, the better it could do its work. It would have to 
keep the sea for long j)eriods ; it would have to carry 
long range weapons ; it must be able to overhaul mei- 
chant ships ahd'do so rapidly ; it would, if possible, ha\-e 
to Irght the armed merchantman at least on equal, 
preferably on superior terms. Hence the boats laid 
down in the spring of lui^ were designed for a radius 
of action of 10,000 or 12,000 miles, to carry guns el"fecti\e 
at 5,000 or 6,000 yards, to have a surface speed of twenty- 
one knots, and a submerged speed of twelve, to have 
upper works tough enough to stand a few hits by three, 
six or twelve pounders, and to be double shelled and so 
compartmented as to endure a hit or two of even 
greater nature. The contrast between the February- 
October 1915 and th<» March-April 1916 cam])aigns lay 
principally in this, that the first was carried on with the 
odd forty to sixty submarines that Germany had ready 
or completing when the war began, whereas the latter 
was the work of the new boats, specially designed and 
built for the trade war. 

riie difference between the spring and autumn cam- 
T^aigns of 1916 is that, wlttTeas the first, which ended by 
Berlin's surrender to Washington, was carried out by 
such new boats as could be completed in the year, the 
August effort began with tliree months' further supply, 
and to these a six months' further product must now be 
added. It is with these resotirccs, less such boats as we 
ha\-e been able to sink, that Gemiany commences her 
final struggle for safet}-. 

The Enemy s Hopes 

We can safely assume that the number of Cicnnan 
submarines increases steadily month by month. We also 
know that the destrucli\eness of tJie campaign in the 
last live months does not show any ])rogressi\e increase. 
It has maintained approximately the toll of British and 
neutral shipping that I indicated last week. In fact, the 
tonnage taken in January is the lowest since August. 
But we may be deceiving ourselves if we extract consola- 
tion from this fact. For, we are ignorant of two \ital 
matters. We do not know what ta?l we are taking of the 
submarines ; neither do we know what reserve of sub- 
marines—hitherto unemploved — Germany has now in 
hand. The new campaign then ma;y have two new ele- 
ments of danger. It may employ far greater numbers 
as well as employing all on more ruthlass principles. How 
much docs the enemy stand to gain by each of these ? 
Past experiences and, to some extent, tVie nature of things, 
seem to shov<- that the number of successes will not be 

proportioned to an increase in the munbcr of submarines. 
It also seems highly prol)able that, for any gnven means 
of attacking submarjnes, the proportion of those caught 
will increase as the numbers grow. While, then, added 
numbers should undoubtedly lead to the sinking of more 
merchant ships, it is to the last degree improbable that 
they will be proportional. 

Next, what will the Germans gain by sinking at sight ? 
With the earher types of submarine — which either carried 
no guns at all, or only small guns, that had only a low 
surface speed, that were, in fact, submarines in the old 
sense, and not cruisers in the new — freedom to attack 
without warning meant a double advantage. The risk 
of encoimter with a ship more powerful than itself was 
avoided, and in many cases, a victim was secured that 
might otherwise, even if imarmcd, escape altogether. 
If the torpedo was the only weapon, short range and 
an imsusj)fcting victim were almost essential to success. 
But a submarine tjiat can come to the surface seven or 
eight thousand yards from a liner, that can open fire upon 
her and summon her to stop and surrender, that can over- 
haul her if she refuses, and is all the time safe from the 
merchantman's tire from the smallness of the mark that 
she presents, is clearly in a different case altogether. If 
the intended victim is unarmed, in nine cases out of ten 
she gains nothing by sinking at sight — except the 
gratification of killing the people on board. If the ship 
is armed and intends to resist, she can, in any event, 

, only attack from imderwater by waylaying her, and if she 
attempts to overliaul and the merchant fif^hts, no 
new situation is created by the new role. In other 
words, it seems to mc that improvements of the sub- 
marine hav-e really done away with four-fifths of the 
advantages Germany's present role would have con- 
ferred upon her two years ago. It must not be forgotten 
that attack from underwater is limited to attack by 
torpedo — ^by very .much the shortest ranged and least 
efficient of the weapons that the submarine carries. 

Only in one respect does the new role promise the Ger- 
mans a greater success in the direction of their necessity. 
This, be it remembered, being not the destruction of 
neutral and belligerent life, but the sinking of neutral 
and belligerent ships. It may lead to ships being 
attacked further from land than has generally been the 
case hitherto. But unless the submarines congregate 
where the trade routes converge— and that means near 
the land— they run the risk of going day after day with- 
<jut seeing any ships at all. On the whole, then, the 
indications are that in giving up the warning of ships, 
the number of murders will be more greatly increased 
than the number of sinkings. But putting the two 
elements together, a certain gradual, and a possible 

, sudden, increase in the number of submarines at work, 
and the renunciation of all warnings, some increase and 
};ossibly a considerable increase in the losses of merchant- 
mei^ must certainly be expected. 

But whatever the incr(}ase it is emphatically not to 
be expected that it will either become progressive or 
even continue. It is worth repeating that the theorj* of 
defeating the submarine is understood, but that the 
material necessary for putting the theoi-y into effect 
takes time. Yet much of it is nearing completion, and 
first a mitigation, then the defeat of this campaign 
may be expected. There is not the remotest prospect 
of it achieving its purpose, which is to starve- us before 
the western war reaches its predestined end. 


At the time of writing these lines America has had 
no formal proof of any more ov'crt act of war against 
her than this, that having committed many such acts 
in the past, and having promised for a season to desist — • 
but without any apology for her j^rcvious acts, or any 
compensation to atone for their consequences — Germany 
has now categorically declared her intention to def\' 
America's threats and to resume those outrages upon all 
neutrals which for some months she has practised — 
though only occasionally — upon the belligerents, and 
upon such neutrals as Norway and other States who are 
not in a j:>osition to wage war against her. President 
Wilson, faithful to his previously declared intention, has 
therefore limited his action to dismissing Cotml Birnslnrff 

February 8, 1917 


and recalling Mr. Gerraid. He has lor that matter no 
constitutional power to do more. He cannot declare 
war, which must be a formal act of Congress, and he will 
not ask this of the Federal legislature until Germany's 
threats are put into execution. (Tcrmany, too, has taken 
no official notice yet of the recall and dismissal. For 
the moment, then, America is not at War. 

But it would seem that the transition from a diplomatic 
breach to belligerency can only be rapid. Three cases 
of peculiarly heartless sinkings have already occurred. 
The steamships Euphrates, Hausatonic, and Lars Kruse, 
all de\oted, by agreement, to carrying the food which 
America sends for the relief of the starving Belgians, 
have b'jjn sunk. But the case of the Eavestunc appears 
to be crucial. She was sunk without warning, and the 
officers and crew fired upon both while they were taking 
to the boats and while in them. The master and three 
seamen lost their li\es, and one of them was a native of 
]3altimore. It is therefore possible that the name of 
Kichard Wallace may go down to history as the \-ictim 
that brought his great country into the war. This being 
so, it is perhaps not premature to glance briefly at what 
share his country can take. 

The U.S. Navy's Task 

America can do nothing to strengthen the armies of 
tlie Allies on the Western, or on any other front, for a 
very considerable time. Even with such excellent 
material as would certainly volunteer in the United 
States, it would be idle to expect any considerable number 
of trained and equipped units to be ready to fight in 
Europe in less than nine months or a year's time. A few 
divisions miglit be a\-ailable by midsunmier, but not 
more than a few. America possesses a well found and 
a well-trained fleet of battleships ; but she is entirely 
without light fast cruisers, and her destroyers, though 
fast, sea worthy, well armed and admirably led, com- 
manded and manned, are unfortunately not numerous. 
In \\hat the circumstances of the .sea war need most then, 
tlie United States could not help us very greatly— -even if 
they were willing to detach their flotillas from the main 
fleet, 'and send them to this side to join in the war on 
submarines. I say " even if she were willing," because ' 
clearly there arc two objections to her doing so. U5J 
lias shown the Americans that submarines can appear 
without a moment's notice off whatever point of the 
Atlantic coast they choose, and as U boats of the modern 
type are armed witli guns whicli, when imhanipered, 
can do a formidable amount of damage to .seaboard towns, 
it is quite possible that the demand, and forthat matter 
the necessity, for coast protection will be so great, that 
the^ Navy department will not find itself with any 
destroyers to spare for the European theatre. We may, 
indeed, take it for granted, should war between (iermany 
and the I'nited States result, that Germany would be very 
far from limiting her acts of war to sinking cargo boats 
at sight and in the war zone. The Admiralstab is at 
least as alive to our need of destroyers as we are our- 
selves, and will certainly percei\T the importance of 
terrorising the American coast towns into keeping all 
American light craft at home. I^urther, it will be as 
necessary to guard the western ends of the trade routes 
from submarines as our terminals on this side : and we 
must not forget that neither of the latest raiders 
are yet sunk. The Ignited States navy, therefore, may 
easily fmd that all the work her armoured cruisers and' 
destroyers, and indeed battleships, can do, will be found 
for them in American waters. 

The heavy craft, that is the battleships, would no 
doubt be made very welcome by the Grand Fleet. T£ 
tlicre comes a chance of another sea battle, and the 
opportunity has to be seized regardless of risk — if, that 
is to say, the only chance of lighting comes when bad 
light gives the choice of fighting at close range or not 
at all, we must face the fact that the attacking fleet may 
be subjected to very heavy loss! So heavy indeed that 
only a very great numerical superiority would ensure 
such an attack being successful, and therefore justified. 
That our present superiority is substantial and large 
enough to justify attacks \-ery much bolder than 
to whicii we were necessarily limited, when the margin 
was smaller, is now, it sei-ms, miiversallv admitted. But 

there is nothing lost by being too strong, and the presence 
of Admiral ;\Iayo's very formidable divisions might be 
greeted for more than sentimental reasons. But. for 
many reasons I should doubt this being offered or asked 
for. It is not a snnple thing to conduct naval manoemres 
with squadrons trained to separate systems of signalling, 
and accustomed each to its own e^•olutions only. Aiid 
their help is not necessary. 

Real Value of American Help 

After all, the problem of the day is not to get a fleet ' 
together strong enough to be sure of victory o^■er the 
Germans, should they again come out, for such a tleet 
we belie\-e we possess already. The problem is to prevent 
the German blockade from becoming effective, first by 
finding a means of figliting the submarines, ne.xt, by 
protecting supply shi])s exposed to their attacks ; thirdly, 
by replacing the loss that attack creates. We must note 
first, then, that of America's naval strength, those units 
which would be most useful for our purpose, namely, the 
destroyers, are the least likely to be spared in useful 
numbers, for the excellent reason that they will be wanted 
for the same purpose nearer home, and those that can 
most easil}' be spared are the least suited to assisting our 
immediate needs. For both attack and defence, therefore 
we must rely upon ourselves alone. But there are two 
other kinds of material help in which the United States 
can render services as a belligerent that it was 
impossible she could render as a neutral. She can 
first seize and put upon the ocean some scores of 
German steamers now interned upon the Atlantic 
and Pacific coasts and in her other possessions. 
Excluding the monster liners, this step would increase 
the Allied tonnage by between three and four hundred 
thousand tons. It would, in other words, almost 
jnake good the losses suffered in tlie last two months' 
submarine campaign. Next a great national effort might 
be made to push on with the construction of new tonnage. 
.\lready \ery encouraging accounts ha\e reached us of 
the progress mad<^ with the new standardised types, 
and it is said that qinte early in the summer deliveries 
of ships will begin which will add a million tons to 
America's shipping before many months are past. 
America has the vards, the men, the material and, above 
e\-erything, a genius for organising rapid production on a 
gigantic scale. It is not difficult to believe that when the 
stimulus of war adds a new energy to whatever forces 
are driving now very amazing results indeed will follow. 
These two factors, the seizure of interned German ships 
and the production of new American ships, may well 
prove decisi\e, if the U boat campaign, now that it is 
rid of humanitarian scruple, should gain very greatlj' in 
intensity and success. 

.•\nd, iinally, of course, America can relieve the belli- 
gerents of ' a considerable embarrassment in finance. 
Hitherto the negotiations of foreign loans in the ordinary 
course has been E^ltogether forbidden in the American 
markets, on the ground that such proceedings are un- 
neutral. A ^•ery limited amo«nt of borrowing has been 
pernutted for the sake of stcad3ing the exchange, and 
even this has been seriously hampered by the limitations 
that the Federal Reser\'e Board have imposed upon the 
bankers and financial in.stitutions, who were willing 
enough to finance the actual purchases that the .Allies 
are making from .;\merican farmers and manufacturers. 
At the present time, even without the active co-operation 
of the national government, the witlidrawal of all restric- 
tions would be a material help. If Congress thought fit 
to go further and make the national purse available to 
the Allies, all financial difficulties of the war would be 
at an end. 

But it will be noted that, in enumerating these 
possible chrect services that America may render, 1 ha\e 
not mentioned one that will be of direct assistance to 
us in our main business, which after all is fighting. And 
for some months, at any rate, the principal value of the 
breach, between Germany and the Great Neutral nmst 
be the enormous discouragement that it must inflict 
upon the Germans, the enormous satisfaction which the 
other ci\ilised people of the world feel in seeing the 
United States at last making common cause with them. - 

Arthuk Poli-E^ 



lebiiuuy y, 1917 

The Soldier who Sings. 

Bv Lewis R. Freeman 

THERE was soincthing just a bit omumur, 111 ihe 
brooding warmtli of tlu- suit iiir that was 
stirring at the base of the towering cHffs of the 
Marmolada where I took the " telcfcrica." and 
the tossing aigrettes of wind-driven snow at Ihe 
lip of the pass where the cable line ended in the lee of a 
rock just under the Italian hrst-linc trenches signalled 
the reasoft whv. The vanguard of one of those irres- 
ponsible mavericks of mountain storms that so delight 
to bustle about and take advantage of the fine weather 
to make surprise attacks on the Alpine sky-line out- 
posts was sneaking o\er from the Austrian side, and 
somewhere up there where the tenuous wire of the tele- 
ferica (as the wire ropeway is called), lined down and 
merged into the amorplious mass of the cliff behind my 
little car was going to lun into it. 

" A good ten minutes to snug-down in, anyhow." 
1 said to mvself. and after the fashion of the South Sea 
skipper who shortens sail and battens down the hatches 
with his weather on the squall loaring down from 
windward. I tucked in the loose ends of the rugs about 
my feet and rolled up the high fur collar of my Alpini coat 
and buttoned the tab across my nose. 

But things were developing faster tlian I liad cal- 
culated. As the little wire basket glided out of the cut 
in the fortv-foot rift that had encroached on its aerial 
right-of-way where the supporting cables cleared a 
jutting crag. I saw that it was not only an open-and- 
above board frontal attack that I had to reckon with, 
but also a craftily planned tfank movement quite in 
keeping with the "fact that the whole affair, lock, stock, 
and barrel, was a " Made in Austria " product. Even 
as I watched one driven shaft of blown snow came into 
position to strike, and straight out over the ice-cap 
covering the brow of a cliff shot a clean-hncd wedge 
of palpable, solid whiteness. 

One instant my face was laved in the moist, warm 
air current drawing uj) from the wooded lower valley 
\\here the warm lingers of the thaw were pressing close 
on the hair- poised triggers of the ready-cocked ava- 
lanches ; the next I was gasping in a blast of Arctic 
frigWity as the points of the blown ice needles tingled 
in my "protesting. lungs with the sting of hastily gulped 
champagne. Through frost-rimmed eye-lashes I had 
just time to see a score of similar shafts leap out and go 
charging down into the bottom of the valley before 
the main front of the storm came roaring along and 
heights and hollows were masked with whishing veils 
of translucent white. In the space of a few seconds an 
amphitheatre of soaring mountain peaks roofed with a 
vault of deep purple sky had resolved itself into a gusty 
gulf of spinning snow blasts. 

My little wire basket swung giddily to one side as the 
first gust drove into it. promptly to swing back again, 
after the manner of a pendulum, when the air buffer was 
undermined by a counter gust and fell away ; but the 
deeply grooved wheel was never near to jumping off 
the supporting cable, and the even throb of the distant 
engine coming down the pulling wire felt like a kindly 
hand-pat of reassurance. 

" (iood old teleferica ! " I said half aloud, raising 
myself on one elbow and looking over the side ; " you're 
as comfy and safe as a ])assenger lift and as thrilling as an 
aeroplane. But " — as the picture of a line of ant-like 
figures I had noted toiling up the snow slope a few 
moments before flashed to my mind — " what happens to 
a man on his feet — a man not being yanked along out 
of trouble by an engine on the end of a nice strong cable — 
\vhen caught in a maelstrom like that ? What must be 
happening to those poor Alpinis ? Whatever can they 
be doing ? " 

And even before the clinging insistence of the warm 
breeze from the lower valley liad checked the impet- 
uosity of the invader, and" diverted him, a cringing 
captive, to baiting avalanches with what was left of 
his strength, I hacl my answer : for it was while the 
ghostly draperies of tlie snow-charged wind gusts still 
masked the icy slope below that, through one of those 

weird tricks ui ai ousUcs .mj common among high niouutain 
peaks, the tlute-like notes of a man singing in a clear 
tenor lioated up to the ears I was just unmuffling : 

Fratelli d' Italia, V Italia s'e dcsta ; 

Dcir clmo di Scipio s'c cinta la testa.* 
It was the Inno di Mameh — the song of 1848, 
the Marseillaise of the Italians. I recognised it instantly 
because, an hour previously, my hosts at luncheon in the 
officers' mess below had been playing it on the gramo- 
phone. Clear and distinct, like freshly minted coins made 
vocal, the stirring words winged up through the pulsing 
air till the " sound chute " by which they had found their 
way was broken up by the milling currents of the dying 
storm. But I knew that the Alpini were still singing— 
that they had been singing all the time, indeed— and 
when the last of the snow flurries was finally lapped up by 
the warm wind, there they were, just as I expected to 
find them, pressing onwards and upwards under thi.'ir 
burdens of soup cans, wine bottles, stove-wood, blankets, 
munition and the thousand and one other things that 
must pass up the life-hne to a body of soldiers holding 
a mountain pass in midwinter. 

* if * if 

This befell, as it chanced, during one of my early days 
on the Alpine Front and the incident— men singing in a 
blizzard almost strong enough to sweep them from their 
feet — made no small impression on me at the moment, 
because it was my first experience of the kind. A week 
later I would have considered it just as astonishing 
to have encountered— under any conditions — an Alpini 
who was not singing ; for to him — to all Itahan soldiers, 
indeed — song furnishes the principal channel of out- 
ward expression for the spirit — and what a spirit it is !^ 
within him. He sings as he works, he sings as he plays, 
he sings as he fights, and — many a tale is told of how this 
or that comrade has been seen to go down with a song 
on his lips — he sings as he dies. He soothes himself 
with song, he beguiles himself with song, he steadies 
himself with song, he exalts himself' with song. It is 
not song as the German knows it, not the ponderous 
marching chorus that the Prussian Guard thunders to 
order in the same way that it thumps through its goose- 
step ; but rather a simple burst of song that is as natural 
and spontaneous as the soaring lark's greeting to the, 
rising sun. 

I was witness of a rather amusing incident illustrative 
of the difficulty that even the Alpini officer experiences 
in denying himself vocal expression, not only when it is 
strictly against regulations, but even on occasions when, 
both by instinct and experience, he knows that " break- 
ing into song " is really dangerous. It had to do with 
passing a certain exposed point in the Cadore at a 
time when there was every reason to fear the incidence 
of heavy avalanches. Your real Alpini has tremendous 
respect for the snow slide, but no fear. He has — and 
especially since the war — faced death in too many really 
disagreeable forms to have any dread of what must seem 
to him the grandest and most inspiring finish of the lot, 
the one end that the most of him could be depended upon 
to pick if ever the question of alternatives were in the 
balance. In the matter of the avalanche, as in most 
other things, he is quite fatahstic. If a certain yalan^a 
is meant for him, what use trying to avoid it ? If it 
is not meant for him, what "use taking precautions. 
All precautions will be vain against yoiiy avalanche ; all 
will be superfluous as regards the ones nol for you. 

It chances, however, that this comforting Oriental 
philosophy entered not into the reckoning of the Italian 
General Staff when it laid its plans for minimising un- 
necessary casualties, and so, among other precautionary 
admonitions, the order went out that soldiers passing 
certain exjioscd sections which should be (lesignatcd 
by boards bearing the warning " Pcricoloso di Valanga," 
should not raise the voice above a speaking lone. and. 
especially, that no singing should be indulged in. This 

* " Sons of Italy, Italy awakes, and wearing the helmet ol 
iil)li(ts her head." 

February 8, 1917 



is, of course, no more tliaii sensible, for a shout, or a 
high pitched note of song, may set going just the 
vibrations of air needed to start a movement on the 
npper slopes of a mountain side that will culminate 
in launching a miUion tons of snow all the way across 
ihc lower valley. 

On the occasion I have in mind it was necessary for 
us, in order to reach a position I especially desired to 
visit, to climb diagonally across something hke three- 
quarters of a mile of the swath of one of the largest and 
most treacherous slides on the whole Alpini Front. 
There had been a great avalanche here every year from 
■•ime out of memory, usually preceded by a smaller one 
early in the winter. The preliminary slide had already 
occurred at the time of my visit, and, as the early w inter 
storms had been the heaviest in years, the accmiiulated 
snows made the major avalanche almost inevitable on 
tlie first day of a warm wind. Such a day, unluckily, 
chanced to be the only one available for my visit to the 
position in question. Although it was in the first 
\\eck in January the eaves of the houses in the little 
.Mpine village where the Colonel quartered had been 
dripping all night, and even in the early morning the 
liard packed snow of the trail was turning soft and 
shishy when we left our sledge on the main road and 
set out on foot. 

We passed two or three sections marked off bj' the 
" Pericoloso " signs without taking any especial pre- 
cautions, and even when we came to the big slide the 
young Major responsible for seeing the venture througlx 
merely directed that we M'ere to proceed by twos (there 
were four of us), with a 200 yards interval between, 
walking as rapidly as possible and not doing any un- 
necessary talking. That was all. There were no 
" dramatics " about it ; only the few simple directions 
that were calculated to minimise the chances of " total 
loss " in case the slide did become restive. How little 
this young officer had to learn about the ways' of aval- 
anches I did not learn till that evening, when his Colonel 
told me that he had been buried, with a company or two 
of his Alpini, not long previously, and only escaped the 

fate of most of the men througli having been dug out by 
his dog. 

The Major, with the Captain from tlie Conunando 
Supremo wiio liad been taking me about the front, went 
on ahead, leaving me to follow after five minutes had 
gone by with a young Alpini Lieutenant, a boy so full 
of bubbling mountain spirits that lie had been dancing 
all along the way and warbling " Rigoletto " to the tree; 
tops. Even as we waited he would burst into quick 
snatches of song, each of which was ended witii a gulp 
as renewed recollection that the time had come to 
clamp on the safety-valve flashed across his mind. 

When the time for us to follow on was up by his wrists 
watch, the lad clapped his eagle-feather hat firmly on his 
head, set his jaw with a sharp click of resolution, fixed 
his eyes grimly on the trail in front of him, and strode 
off into the narrow passage that had been cut through the 
towering bulk of the slide. From the do-or-die expression 
on his handsome young face one might well have imagined 
that it was the menace of that engulfing mass of poised 
snow that was weighing him down, and such, I am sure, 
would have been my own impression had this been my 
first day among the Alpini. But by now I liad seen 
enough of Italy's mountain soldiers to know that this 
one was as disdainful of the valanga as the valanga was of 
him ; and that the crushing burden on his mind at that 
moment was only the problem of how to negotiate 
that distance of beautiful snow-wallpd trail without 
telhng the world in one glad burst of song after another 
how wonderful it was to be alive and young, and climbing 
up nearer at every step to those glistening snow- peaks 
from whence his comrades had driven the eneiny head- 
long but a few months before, and from whence, per- 
chance, they would soon move again to take the next 
valley and the peaks beyond it in their turn. If he had 
been alone, slide or no slide, orders or no orders, he would 
have shouted his gladness to the high heavens, come 
what might ; but as it was, with a more or less helpless 
foreigner on his hands, and within hearing of his superior 
officer, it was quite another matter. 
(io bo continued) 

The Lieutenant 

By Centurion 

ON the day he was born his father wrote two letters. 
One was addressed to the head of a certain school 
of ancient foundation in a southern county; the 
other to the Dean of a college at Oxford. For, 
like some London clubs, they took a good deal of getting 
into and his father, whose name was on the registers 
of both of them, determined to leave nothing to chance. 

The boy grew and waxed strong in spirit. He lay for 
hours on his back cooing to himself and doing mighty 
Swedish exercises, breasting the air like a strong swimmer 
with his arms and kicking lustily with his legs. " Isn't 
he sweet ? " said his mother to the doctor for the 
thousandth time. 

" Hum ! his patellar reflexes seem all right," said the 
doctor who was used to such maternal ecstasies. 

They called him Anthony — Tony for short. He began 
life with a face of extraordinary solemnity that was almost 
senile, but it grew younger as he grew older. His eyes, 
which were at first a neutral colour inclining to mouse- 
grey, gradually changed till the irises revealed the deep 
brown tint of his mother's, so that looking into them she 
seemed to be looking into a niirror. But his nondescript 
nose took on the clear-cut Grecian profile of his father. 
You could see just that nose, slightly defaced by time, 
on the stone efligies of chain-mail knights in the village 
church, where they lay under the trefoil arches with their 
feet crossed and their hands folded, resting from the last 
crusade. The first discovery that he made was that his 
toes, which seemed to remain with him, were his own. 
The next thing he discovered M-as that in the immensity 
around him some things were near and others distant, and 
that sometimes, as he put out an exploring hand to grasp 
her breast, his mother was within reach and sometimes 
not— whereby he arrived at a distinction whicli has 
\exed the metaphysicians for centuries ; the difference 
between self and not-self. But in Hie i-.i-^c nf lii>~ niotlicr, 

unlike other of the big people who hovered round him 
from time to time, he never succeeded in completely 
establishing this chstinction, and all through his life 
distance only brought her more near, till one day — but 
that comes later. \ 

One night, when he was about three years old, he was 
lying asleep in his cot in the nursery when a log fell 
from the untended fire, and sending up a spurt of llamo 
threw a gigantic shadow on the wall by Ins bed. He 
woke with a start and a cry, for the sliadow was now 
leaping, now crouching, as though it were going to pounce 
upon him. And he cried lustily. The next moment there 
was a light footfall of bare feet, two soft arms were clasp- 
ing his neck, and a showier of auburn hair, soft as silk, 
fell around his face. " What is the matter with Mummy's 
boy ? Is he frightened then ? Where's the little man 
who was going to kill ApoUyon ? What will poor Mummy 
do when she meets Apollyon if her little man is afraid ? 
" I'se not afraid," he said stoutly, his lips qiiivering. And 
after that, although he sometimes knew fear he was never 
afraid. For he always remembered in the nick of time 
that some day Mummy would want him to fight Apollyon. 
But he had made a great discovery — almost as portentous 
as the discovery of Self and Not-self. He had discovered 
that he had two selves, the self which said " I am afraid " 
and the self which said " Go to ! I am not afraid." And 
from that dav he learnt to despise the former and respect 
the latter. The first he called " Mr. Feeble-Mind," 
and the second " Mr. Great-Heart. " And when hir was 
sure he was alone he often talked with the former, hurling 
the most derisi\-e epithets at it and bidding it get be- 
hind him. for it had an alias which was " Temptation." 

His early \\orld was bounded by a yew hedge which 
marked the end of the bowling green. The house, 
which was visited on one occasion by a party of grave 
L'cntlfmen in spectacles — he learnt afterwards that they 



called thonisolves the County Archf ological Socicty-was 
shaped like the letter •' E " and had great {,'f 1^^^ ^ ^h 
niullioned windows whose leaden casements glo\xtd like 
fire in the westering sun. The oak-panel Ini? ^;•'^-. Wack 
Mith age, and on the plaster wall of one of the bed.ooms 
Moses and the patriarchs were frescoed m doublet a^ d 
hose, and Pharaoh's daughter stooped ON^r the bul- 
rushes in a farthingale. Tony loved it at fi;^^ ^ec^^e 
it seemed specially designed to enable Inm to pla> hide 
and seek in its oak closets, long corridors, and deep 
alcoves, and lie loved it to the end of his hfe because it wa. 
his home. He>-ond the yew hedge was the V^^^'^'J^^ 
beyond the paddock was the park, and above the to ^ 
of the beeches Tony could see the c^ge of the wok, 
which was a chalk down. Beyond that chak down 
he felt assured, was the Celestial City, although he had 
heard grown-ups cfill it " the howizon. 

He passed from the hands of a tutor to the public 
school for which his father had put his name down on 
the dav of his birth. He began as the lowliest of tags 
and the first thing he discovered was that for us name, 
which was illustrious, was rudely substituted another 
and a homelier-" Freckles." He came back after his 
first half with an immense stock of knowledge, not to be 
found in books, and a vocabulary which was unfamiliar 
to everyone at home except his father— a vocabulary in 
which '"• to thoke " is to slack " to brock. '^^ .to bully, 
in which " I.ongmeads " stands for a day off and Moab 
does duty for a lavatory. It is a vocabulary which once 
learnt is^iever forgotten ; men of his school speak it m 
the hill-stations of India, on the African veldt, in tlic 
back flats of Australia, and wherever two or three ot tlicm 
are gathered together. Also he exhibited a discoloured 
eve At all of which his father rejoiced, but his mother 
w-as sorrowful, feeling that he had passed without the 
cloister of her heart. But in this she was mistaken. 

In due time he reached the dizzv heights of the Sixth 
and became a prefect with the right to turn his trousers 
up and to wear brown boots, which is only permitted to 
the elect Also he won his cap as centre forward in the 
School riftcen. Small boys imitated lum. big boys 
envied him, and he had a retinue of clients like a I'Loman 
oatron. He put down bulking in his house with a strong 
iand— and other things. By this time he had learnt 
"^o turn out a good hexameter and a neat iambic ; also 
:o put Burke into a Latin prose that was stately without 
being pompous. . , 

rhencc he went to Oxford. His name was alreadv 
on the books of his father's old college but, as it turned 
out he needed no precedence, for he took a classical scholai - 
ship There he learned the same lesson that he had 
learnt at school— namelv, that the first thing to do is to 
live down an outside reputation : the greater the reputa- 
tion the more modest it behoves you to be. He found 
that a first vear man does not call on a second year man, 
but waits to be called on. No ! not though llic one be a 
scholar and the other a commoner. Also that one is 
never elected into the best clubs or college societies in 
one's first term'. But not being a pushful person he liad 
really no need to learn these things, for he knew them by 
instinct. But men sought him out and discovered his 
worth so that in his second term, when he lavishly re- 
turned the hospitalities of the lirst. the size of his battels 
drew a mild rebuke from the Uean. But be.yond 
occasionally getting gated, he managed to keep on good 
terms with" the Dons, who can rarely resist the man wiio 
is at once an athlete and a scholar. After tubbing in the 
Alorrison fours, he rowed seven in the Torpids, and hi^ 
boat did a bump every night near the " gut t.ieat 
faggots blazed in the quad the last night, and for (mce m 
his life Tonv got rather drunk and was with ditficultv 
restrained from mounting the pyre, having to be put to bed 
by his frieud>. loudlv protesting that he was Joan of Mc 
He cot ploughed in Divinity Mods for a character-sketch 
of St Peter which the Examiners voted learned but 
profane : vour Anglican don does not like to hear the 
disciple described as " the enfant terrible of the Twelve. 
Also he entertained a Socialist chimney-sweeper in. his 
moms like a man and a brother and (what was far worse 
in the eyes of Anglican dons), a Nonconformist draper 
with whom he insisted on discussing the right of entry 
in single-school areas. For it was his fa^hlon to try all 
thinsi- In long walks over Shotover and Cumnor, m 
high talks at night in the quad c*r in his rooms, he dis- 

Februafy b, 1917 

cussed in the manner of Plato's dialectics, the Nature of 
the State, the Responsibilities of the Empire towards 
Subject-races, the Meaning of Good, the Nature of Truth, 
and the Ornaments Rubric. For of such things do men 
talk at Oxford, plumbing the depths of speculation in a 
world where specuUition takes the place of experience 
and men sec Life, like the dwellers in the cave of Plato's 
myth, by the shadows that the outer world throws upon 
its enchanted walls. 

His first long vacation was less than half-way through 
\vhen a cloud no bigger than a man's hand rose upon the 
horizon. It first appeared when his father opened the 
newspaper at breakfast one morning and read out that 
an Archduke had been assassinated in a tiny satrapy of 
the Austrian liminre. " Another of those Balkan melo- 
dramas" he said lightly as he turned to the stock markets. 
But in a few days the cloud grew bigger. The bank-rate 
went up like a rocket, dark hints of " Mobihzation 
appeared, the word ultimatum was repeated in the papers, 
one read curiously of an encounter between patrols 
on the Franco-Gei-man frontier and noted with con- 
sternation that a man had been killed. And then the 
storm burst. The King called for men. 

The cornfields were brilliant with scarlet pimpernel 

and rest-harrow, and the wheat, changing from sea-green 

to gold and heavy in the ear, gave i)romise of an early 

harvest. But father and son ceased to talk of days 

among the stubble ; the boy was silent, until one day 

he announced his intention of " doing his bit." His 

mother turned pale but said nothing. That night she 

entered his room, according to her habit, to kiss him 

good-night. She went down on her knees beside him 

and with her arms round his neck said " Don't — you are 

all I have." He looked straight into her face and said 

reproachfully, " Mummy ! who was it told me— do 

vou remember ?— never 'to fear ApoUyon ? " And from 

that moment she knew it was useless, nor did she try 

to dissOtide him, for she would not have had it otherwise. 

They remained in long communion as he told her all 

the secrets of his heart, and when she rose to go her eyes 

were dry, for in that hour she knew, as she had not known 

since he was a httle child, that he and she were one. 

He joined the O.T.C. He learnt section drill, platoon 
drill, company driirand many other things. And then, 
one day he applied for a commission. He duly filled up 
nil the interrot;atorics on M.T. 392 and against " uni}; ' 
preferred" he'wrote the name of a well-known \\ est 
Country regiment in whose officers' mess his family 
name was a household word. And he sent it to his old 
Head for the usual certificate of moral character. He- 
blushed when it came back and was slightly annoyed, 
for the Head, not content with the words, " I certify, 
had added an after thought : " He is an excellent ivWow ; 
one of the best." 

At the School of Instruction he learnt the art of war, 
his tutor being a Major invalided home from the front 
Mho tauglit him all that can be learnt by oral instruction 
on rationing, patrols, relief by sections, and the making 
out of work-tables. And when all home-keeping folk 
were in bed he marched them out in column of fours to 
a lacerated field were they practised^' Night (3p," with 
the aid of a trip-wire, a flare pistol, and implements of 
husbandry. The Major was a wise man ; he had drilled 
with the" recruits of his own regiment on the square 
when he had been first gazetted from Sandhurst, and he 
held that the best training for an officer is to learn to do 
what you want done. Wherefore he made his cadets 
learn their job by the sweat of their brow, chg their own 
trenches, and throw out their own saps— always re- 
membering, when vou begin to dig a sap, to put up a sand- 
bag on the end" of a fork first, otherwise you may 
never live to finish it. 

The palms of their hands became as hard as a cobblers, 
but it was good schooling;, for it taught them the" most 
\-aluable of all lessons ; to know w-hen they were giving 
orders exactly how much thev were asking of their men 
to do. And" in dealing with men this is the beginning 
of wisdom. Also he gave them two pieces of advice, 
one of wliich was that at Mess you are practically on 
parade and should behave accordingly : the other that 
the first duty of a young officer is to place the comfort 
and well-being of- his men before his own. But Ix'ing a 
gentleman Ton\- 'M not need to learn the one ; and 
having been head of his house he had alr<'ady learnt 

February 8, 1917 



the other. So lliat wlicn llio O.C. sent in ]u> report npon 
liini, on lii^ '' pajHi-work." " boarin.;::," " pnnetnality " 
and" power o£ handlin.!;' men," he marked the hrst three 
•• good," bnt the fourth " excellent." 

The Major must, I think, have taken rather a fancy to 
him, for one day he asked him if he knew anything about 
revolver-shooting and, on being answered in the negative, 
he took him privilv aside and taught him a thing 
or two— hrst. that you mustn't grip the revolver too 
tight or it will throw vour wrist off, second that you really 
hrc with the whole "hand rather tljan with the trigger- 
iinger and should absorb the shock into your whole 
frame, and, last and. greatest of these, that in shooting 
a descending figure you should incline the whole body 
as you lower the arm and never make a series of elbo^\•- 
jerics. At the end of it all he plugged the target with six 
shots in an eight-inch circle and the Major gave him his 
blessing — and his revolver. He was to owe his life more 
than once to what the Major had taught him. 

Then he joined his battalion and was put in command 
of a platoon. 

" It's verv like being a prefect again with the Adjutant 
as the 'Head,' "he wrote to his mother of his first day's 
duty as orderlv officer, and so it was. To carry on as 
orderly officer" from re\eille to tattoo— and later— -re- 
quires tact. Froiii the time when he inspected the issue 
of rations in the early dawn to the hour when he tumgd 
out the quarter-guard just before midnight he was res- 
ponsible fur the ■■ tone " of that camp. He had to .see 
that evervthing from cook-house to guard-room was 
" clean and regular," to examine the rations with the eye 
of an Inspector of Food and Drugs and to smell the 
men's dinners with the nose of a chef, to see that the 
utensils were unspotted from the world and the ritfes 
of the guard, bfirring the safety-catch, ready to go off 
of themsehes. Also he had to hear and adjudicate 
upon " complaints " like a cadi under a palm-tree. 
To do this kind of thing properly you have to be 
vigilant, without being fussy and alert without being 
re:^tive — otherwise yoiu- orderly sergeant and sergeant of 
the guard get fussy and restive too, and that kind of 


IS catching and bad for the men. 

He completed 

his report to the ;\djutant next morning with the words, 
" Nothing unusual has occurred during my tour of 
duty with the exception of that noted overleaf." The 
Adjutant said nothing — and an .Adjutant's silence is 
golden. It means that you will do. 

The tirst thing he did was to get to know his men. He 
taught them that cleanliness was next to godliness 
and having commended their souls to the padre he 
devoted himself to their bodies. He made them taUe 
their caj^is off on parade to see if their hair was parted 
and hold out their hands like bishops at confirmation 
to see if their finger-nails were clean. Also he en- 
couraged them to play " footer," which keeps the pores 
open and is an infallible remedy for " grouse " disease. 
And one night he talked to them like a man and a 
brother in one of the hutments on the history of th(^ 
regiment. He told them of a certain glorious episode 
in the defence of the Residency in \-irtue of which they 
were entitled to call themseh-es " I^.I." and how th(" 
soup-tureen, now safely banked with the regimental 
mess-plate, got the hole in it. Also why they were en- 
titled to wear a red flash on their hats and a half-red 
pugaree on their helmets in virtue of their having shown 
the red feather by way of biting their thumbs at Mont- 
calm's men in Quebec. And other such things, till his 
men felt — and, as things turned out later, pro\-ed — that 
the honour of the regiment was dearer to them than their 
lives. They began to think better of the geometry of 
l^ilatoon drill after this, and to see that platoon, advanc- 
ing in column of fours, form forward into column of 
sections when he uttered the words " On the left, form 
sections," was as good as watching the rhythmical 
swing of a well-stroked eight. And by reason of all 
this, the O.C. commended him, the captain of his company 
cherished him, and his platoon-sergeant delighted to do 
his bidding. And when the battalion went route- 
marching over the downs, moving like a long cater- 
pillar as each section of fours rose and fell over the crest, 
and he marched at the head of his platoon, he felt it 
was good, very good, to be alive. 

He went out with his battalion to the front. His. 
letters home told his mother that he was having " a 

ripping time." He did not tell her that he wrote them 
in a cave of clay with his feet in water and his head m a 
cloud of smoke'from damp coke and damper wood. He 
endured without grousing rain and cold and frost arid 
mud and, w hat was far harder to bear, a sad deficiency in 
machine guns ^\K\ trench-mortars that were made out of 
stove-pipes. He went through the second battle of 
Ypres, and when his company officer and all his fellow^ 
ofiicers were knocked out he carried on with a handful of 
men in a hole about the size of a dewpond and saved the 
iwsition. The next thing he knew was that his name 
appeared in the Gazd/c with the Military Cross. The 
only comment he made was that other fellows had a 
better claim to it— which was untrue. And when he 
came home on seven days' leave his mother discovered 
that her bov had become a man. At tw^enty he was wise 
with the wisdom of thirtv-five— wiser, perhaps, for he 
had seen things such as come not once in a generation to 
the sons of men. His leave coincided with one of those 
recurrent interludes in which that elusive mirage " the 
end of the war " appears before the wistful eyes of men, 
and they talked of his future at Oxford. But he shook 
his head. 

" Xo," he said pensively. "I shall never go back, 
Munnny— I couldn't. ]\Iy year's scattered like the leaves 
of the forest," he went on "as, with his back to them, he 
gazed through the window at the dead leaves spinning 
under the beeches in the park. " And anyhow I'm 
too old." This at twenty. But they knew what he 
meant and talked of the Bar, a seat in Parliament. 
Ouarter Sessions. To all of which he returned no answer. 
'" He went back. Thev saw him off by the boat-train 
from Victoria. He held" his mother a long tinre and kissed 
the eyes into which his own had first looked when he 
opened them in wonder upon the world. And father and 
mother went home together to the big country-house 
which suddenly seemed to have grown still bigger- so 
forlorn and empty did it seem. 

One night he had to go out on patrol— a reconnoitring 
patrol, which is always a small affair and does not com- 
mand the full complement of a fighting patrol. He sat 
in his dug-out writing a letter home on the flimsy of a 
"Messages and Signals" form. The N.C.O. appeared 
at the dug-out and raised the screen of sacking. Tony 
folded up the letter, sealed it, addressed it, and marked 
the envelope, " To be forwarded only in the event of my 
death." Then he examined the chambers of his revolver 
and rose and went out into the night. 


Far away across a sodden land lit up by the flashes of 
guns like sheet-lightning, across a waste of waters where 
a chain of destrovers rose and fell with the Channel swell, 
beyond the rolling downs of the south country, a woman 
in "a great house a; woke with a cry out of a troubled sleep 
and 'put out her hand. " Jack," she said, " Tony's 

Her husband woke w4th a start and bent over her. 

" Nonsense, Marv," he said with faltering lips, " you've 
been dreaming." . "She was sitting up in bed, a shower of 
hair, still auburn, and still soft as silk, falling about her 
shoulders as she gazed at the window. She sank back 
and buried her head in the pillows. 

" No ! " she said. " I've seen him.'' 

Thre(! days later a boy came up the drive with an 
orange-coloured envelope in his hand. The father saw 
him approaching from the dining-room window, and 
something pierced, him like a two-edged sword. He 
learnt— but that was later— that Tony had gone out on 
patrol with a corporal ; they had been surprised by a 
party of the enemy and the "^ N.C.O. had got badly hit. 
He begged Tony to leave him. But the boy took hha 
up on his young shoulders and made his way back. 
Sometimes lie fell, for the man was heavy and the ground 
bad, but he laboured on. A star-shell went up behind 
them, and the earth was suddenly stricken with a pallid 
glare of light. Then a hail of bullets enveloped them 
and the boy fell- this time to rise no more. The corporal 
said afterwards— this to the boy's parents when they 
came to see the corporal in hospital— that the boy had 
said something at the last—" something I couldn't quite 
understand, ma'am, not being a scholar like him, some- 
thing that sounded like ' Apollyon.' But I fancy his 
mind was wandering-like. And he never said no more.'' 



February S, 1917 

Boar Hunting in France 

By GeoftVey Ransomc 

^Ok many \imi> \>d-i iiic wild Imi.iis, which breed 
in jirofnsioii in tlio forests in sonu" parts of iM'ancc, 

havo cuuscd scrions damago to the adjoininf,' 
crops and f,'ardons. In peace time the farmers 
;ind peasants manage to keep them within reasonable 
bonnds, but dnring two years of war, \\lH-n all the men 
of miHtars' ago have cither been called to the colours or 
mobilised for munition work, the pigs have been left 
comparati\('l\- (piiet and ha\'e, therefore, enormously 
increased in ntnnbers. f'or this reason battues are 
jK'riodicai!\ arranged by the landed proprietors and 
others with a new to keeping them down. 

While o\-er in falvados on munition business recently, 
I had the goo(l forttme of participating in the opening 
battue of the season, while waiting for a boat to take 
me back to iMigland. My host, who is a most ardent 
sportsman nnd an excellent shot, is the chief organiser 
of the battues in his district. He keeps for the purpose 
a pack of hounds, some being pure-bred English fox- 
liounds, which " go in " at the boars, while the others 
are a cross with the foxhound, named batards Poiicvins 
:ind Vciidkn. The latter are bred more for speed and 
much nscrnblc a foxhotmd, but stand a few inches higher, 
are less strongly built and not quite so ]>lucky. To the 
kennel are also attached a few hoimds, chosen for nose 
and intelligence and known as limicrs or detectives ; 
these arc kcjjt on leads and are utilised for locating the 
(|uarry. On the day in (piestion, however, pigs were so 
luunerous that these were hardly needed. 

It was a frosty morning when we motored out about 
eight miles to a little village not far from Trouvillc, 
where the kennels were situated, and at which the meet 
took place. Tiiore we found most of the chasseurs 
already assembled. We picked up the pack, consisting of 
seven foxhounds and nine hi'itards with two limiers. 
These were in the care of the piqiicurs, sinew3% active 
men, over military age, but game for anything. Another 
thkee miles brought us to the site of operations, a' forest 
composed mainly of young oaks, with here and there a 
giant, and with a rather dense undergrowth of hazel, 
young beech, holly and bramble, with narrow rides cut 
at very infrequent intervals. The guns, about eighteen 
all told, were chiefly men of over fifty years who, for 
the most part, used a 12-bore shot gun, with ball in one 
or both barrels, although some preferred' to use slugs in 
at least one barrel. The shooting is almost invariably 
close, as in thesi' woods you seldom can see to get a shot 
at further than about thirty yards. 

After a walk of about half a mile down a deer track, 
I was courteously allotted what was supposed to be one 
f)f the best jiositions, in a clearing about 30 feet in dia- 
meter. Owing, however, to the fortunes of the chase, 
alas ! I never got a shot. I asked the elderly sportsman 
who posted me — with .strict injmictions to shoot nothing 
but pig and foxes — from which direction the hounds 
would be working, as. I had rather lost my bearings. 
He waved his arms in a comprehensive gesture which 
embraced the imi\'cr»c, and he was right ! He told mc 
that nil I had to do, was to " turn round towards the 
direction in which they arc giving tongue." I obeyed, 
with the result that during the next hour I fullilled 
the fimction of a teetotum. 

What actually hap]>encd was that, directly hounds 
were loosed they split up into four or five packs, each 
following a different pig, and shots were soon heard. 
For the next three hours I waited, while an occasional 
deer or rabbit would come and look at me and vanish 
(juickly in the imdergrowth. Hounds could be heard at 
wo»k all over the wood and sometimes a shot, and from 
time to time a hound, off the scent, would race past mc 
or stop a second for a friendly greeting : but still no pig. 
But. ves ! at last my chance has come ! There is a faint 
crackling in the undergrowth and something dark is 
seen dimly, moving in the bushes ; simultaneously with 
my gun going up, however, the " pig " coughed and spat : 
it Was OTvly the black leggings of one of our company. 
He greeted me with a beaming smile and, when I enquired 
why he had left his allotted place, replied that he was 

'y\r-\. Jutving a look round. I >ul)sequently •learned that 
it was qiute usual for anyone who became at all bored, to 
leave his beat and wander about on- his own account 
in the thick woodlands— a rather risky proceeding. 

The Bag 

After a time I heard shouts and horns being blown 
some waj' off, so wended my way thither. When I 
joined the master I found that the result so far was three 
pigs, one a very fine old tusker weighing 295 lbs., the 
others being somewhat smaller, while a fourth, whicli 
had been badly wounded, was gathered in the next day ; 
not perhaps a large bag, but, considering the absence of 
beaters and the wildness of the hounds, not unsatis- 
factory. After helping to drag one of the slain to a ride 
some fjoo yards off (no light task, owing to the thick 
bushes) I joined two others with a limicr in tracking a 
wounded boar for some time, when, as we were about 
three miles from the car, and it was rapidly growing 
dark, I left them. Ten minutes later several shots rang 
out and I heard subsequently that they had run into a 
batch of about twelve or fifteen three-quarter grown pig, 
but had missed every time owing to the darkness. 

On regaining the road I found my friend the- master 
and the piqueurs, who had collected all the hounds 
except six ; later on four more turned up more or less 
mauled, and next day the remaining two were discovered, 
one \erv badly gashed in several places. 

While waiting for other members of our party to turn 
up, I listened to some incidents of the day. The juvenile 
chauffeur, who had himself bagged a pig of respectable 
size, recounted how he had been bowled over, but not 
hurt, by an old sow ; the sow, it appeared, was " larger 
than a donkey and roared even as a bull of Basan." 
Tire chauffeur also gave us lifelike imitations of the noises 
made by each member of the sow's family. It was in 
this mix up that one of the hounds received a nasty bite. 
Then there were, of course, those among the guns who 
had " mortally wounded " giants of the forest, which 
could not be found. " You have only to go into the 
wood, when you will assuredly find hira dead," and so 
forth. Again, the hounds having brought to bay a 
wounded boar, in a stream, one of the piqueurs. being 
unable to shoot on account of the hounds, had j)luckil\' 
gone in and cut the boar's throat — an operation necessi- 
tating no little nerve. 

The boars in this part of the world run to a big size and 
are said to be as game, when wounded, as the Indian 
boar, of which I have had some experience. I was told, 
however, that serious accidents seldom happen on this 
account, but what surprised me most is that no one ever 
seems to get shot ! 

After settling the destination of the bag, we motored- 
home in the evening, with a large dead boar and two 
bandaged hounds in the back of the car. Altogether it 
was a most interesting and enjoyable day, and was quite 
a new experience for me. I hope sincerely that, when 
the war is over, I shall have many another such a day in 
the same vicinity, but trust to get a shot at something 
more exciting than a Frenchman's leggings ! 

Princess Patricia of Connaught hopes to he jircsont at a 
v-aricty cntertainincnt arranged by Mr. P>ncst Thesigcr, 
which will take place at the Kitz Hotel to-morrow afternoon, 
in aid of the ^^■ar Hospital Supply Workers, a branch of 
Queen Mary's Needlework Guild. Tickets can be obtained 
from ^Irs. Remington l^obert and Miss Townshend-Wilson, 
4, Grosvcnor Square. A vety strong programme ha's been 
drawn up, those who will help include Fady ' ''ston, Mmc. 
Suggia, Miss Fay Compton, Miss Sybil Eatcju, Miss Beryl 
Freeman, Mr. Bertram Binyon, and Mr. Owen Nares. 

Jlr. Charles Dixon's fine painting The Landing of the 
I.ancashircs at Galipoli on April 25th. 1915, which attracted 
so much attention when it was exhit»itecl by the Pine Art 
Society at their New Bond Street galleries, has been now 
splendidly reproduced in colour, artist proofs signed by the 
urtist, £.3 3s., prints a guinea each. 

February 8, 19 17 



Young Anzac Finds his Heritage 

By Amy Eleanor Mack 

WHEN young Anzac heard that his new trainmg 
school would bq within reach of Winchester 
he was delighted ; for not even a year amongst 
the antiquities of the East had lessened his 
interest in the historical relics of the land of his fore- 
fathers. And when an English lady, surprised at his 
keen interest in the medi;eval buildings, said : " But you 
have seen much older things in Egypt ! " he replied 
simply : " Yes ; but somehow they are not tiie same. The 
Pyramids and the Sphinx belong to the niggers. These 
belong to us." 

Men in training camps do not have much time for 
sight-seeing, but all the- leisure that he had was spent 
by young Anzac in the lovely old cathedral city. Other 
men hired bicycles and went out into the coimtry : but 
he preferred to go afoot. " You can't see enough from 
a bicycle," was his comment. So he wandered about the 
winding by-ways of the town, swinging along with that 
easy Australian stride, which is now so familiar in Englisli 
streets. He did not poke and peer, after the manner of 
the ordinary tourist, but the deep-set grey eyes, which 
looked out so steadily from beneath the shady hat, missed 
^ ery httle that was to be seen. Of architectiu-e he knew 
])ractically nothing, and Perpendicular, Decorative, Early 
Enghsh, Norman, were terms wliich conveyed little 
meaning to him. But, born and bred in a land of 
natural beauty, his innate sense of asthetic values lielped 
him to understand the lo\eliness of the Cathedral's 
exquisite nave, and the rich warmtli of the mellow red 
tiles and great oak beams of the old cottages, ^^'ith a 
delightful lack of self-consciousness, he would stand in 
the Cathedral Close gazing with deep admiration at the 
beautiful thirteenth century deanery : or wander in and 
out of the city's ancient gateway, " Just to liave another 

l£very street of the old town was sacred ground to hinl. 
Product of an educational system which aims at fitting 
every child to get the best out of life, he knew enough 
history to appreciate the ancient capital of his race ; 
and as he .swung along by the walls of Wolvesly. 
or lieard his own spurs clang on the paved floor "of old 
Winchester Hall, he felt that he was heir to the ages. 
Alfred, Canute, Stephen, Edward, Henrj', Richard of 
the Lion Heart— all the fighters who in the brave days of 
old had clanged their way through the historic city, seemed 
to belong to him, this lad in khaki from the far Antipodes. 

In the cathedral he stood bareheaded before the monu- 
ments of soldiers of a later day — members of the Hamji- 
shircs and the King's Royal Rifles, whose deeds are 
commemorated in the home town. In places of honour 
on the Cathedral walls are the names of Hampshire 
men who fell at Waterloo, in the Crimea, in India, on the 
Nik', in South Africa ; and over some of the lists iiang,. 
faded and torn, the colours whicli once floated to the 
breeze and led their regiments into battle. 

Voung Anzac paid a silent tribute to these brothers- 
in-arms, who, in the antiquity of the Cathedral, seemed 
to be Iris own contemporaries. Hut later on, his thoiights 
lound expression : " The wonderful part about England 
is that its history seems to be going on all the time. In 
Ivgypt it all seemed to be past and over." 

thus, in his schoolboy fashion, he voiced that under- 
lying trutli which is beneatli all our belief in a Hving, 
growing Empu-e. And perhaps it was a.sudden realiza- 
tion that he himself was helping the history of our race 
" to be going on " that made Jiim straighten up and look 
at the great Cathedral and the peaceful Close, with a new 
air of pride. 

The old hospital of St. Cross M-as a jov and a rc\elation 
I0 him. Brought up in a land of social experiments, lie 
had believed as a matter of course that the awakening 
of a social conscience was a modern development. Now 
he was confronted by a charity that dated back to the. 
time of King Stephen, and showed him that even in the 
days of the bold, bad barons, there were men who worked 
and planned for tlie welfare of their less fortunate brethren . 
It was a bright autumn day when he walked across the 
water-meadows to St. Cross, and the old grey buildings 

were bathed in sunshine. It flooded the green lawns, the 
beds of brilliant asters, and the soft grey walls ; it shone 
on the old brothers in their gowns of black and mulberry 
red, strolling about the square, and on the young soldier 
in the gateway, making a peaceful picture into wliich the 
traveller from the new land seemed to fit as naturally as 
the old brothers themselves. He gazed at the scene 
silently,, as was his way. Then, in his slow voice : 
"I'd rather like to end my days in a place like this. 
It's very peaceful." 

Poor lad, the battlefields of France hold no such peace- 
ful halting place ! 

But it was the college that held the greatest fascination 
for him. His own schooldays were so short a space 
behind him that he had not begun to forget the feelings 
of a schoolboy. His own school in Australia was counted 
very old in that land of new things. It had been built 
nearly a century, and it had its traditions ; and its boys 
learned " to play the game," just as their forefathers 
had learned on the English playing fields. So there 
was a feeling of intimacy and fellowship, mingled with the 
reverence and interest with which young Anzac approached 
the great old college. 

He lo\-ed to stroll across College Mead and watch the 
boys at football. The clatter of his heavy boots on the 
cobblestones of the courts was music in his ears, for it 
seemed like the echo of boys who had clattered that way 
during the long centuries. It must be confessed that he 
took a mischievous pleasure in asking the boys cjuestions 
in order to hear them speak ; for used as he was to the 
deeper, drawling tones of his own countrymen, the high- 
pitched English voices amused him. They seemed 
girlish to his unaccustomed ear. But not for a moment 
did he make the mistake of thinking that the men who 
went forth from that old school were any less manly 
than the deeper-voiced m6n of his own land. He km-w 
too much English history to fall into that error, and, 
. besides, he had had personal experience of officers from 
public schools. " Tommy officers," he and his fellows 
irreverently call all the British ofiicers, but none tlu' less 
do they admire them for their courage, and respect them 
for their power to command, and their custom of gi\"ing 
the men a fair " deal." 

No doubt, in its turn, his drawl amused the schoolboys, 
and perhaps he seemed crude and rough to them. But 
crude as he might be, and newly arrived from the newest 
of all lands, there was something in him that responded 
to the call of the old school, and he felt strangely at home 
within its precincts. Then one day as he was being 
shown the famous " toys " the reason came to him in a 
flash. Amongst the numberless names on the walls 
his eye suddenly ix'sted on a most familiar, name — one 
he himself had signed a thousand times. It was a name 
glorious in history, and made immortal by a man who 
had lived long before the owner of the one on the wall, 
and it was young Anzac's own second name. But so 
little does the a\'orage Au.stralian bothcT about his 
ancestors that the boy had (piite forgotten that his own 
great-grandfather, and /u's father and grandfather before 
, him, had been Wykehamists. 

He did not speak of it to his guide — that would luue 
seemed too much' like "swank"— but his interest in 
and affection for the college deepened, and the joy of 
the possessor entered into his soul. Now, indeed, was he 
linked with the glorious past of the old Hampshire town. 

Later on, in London, he summed it up. It was the 
last night of his last lea\'e. Next day he wa's lea\ing for 
the front, and a serious mood had fallen on him. 

" I'm awfully glad I had those few weeks in \\ in- 
chestcr," he said. " London's all right, but it's toe 
cosmopolitan ; it seems to belong to anyone. Win- 
chester seems to be us. I think it is the England we're 
all fighting for. And when you think of all those old 
Johnnies, way back to the Britons, and those otherS: 
too. in the Cathedral —well, it makes n chap feel proud 
that he can carry on." 

.-\nd so the ancient capital had forged one more linl 
between the old world and the new. 



February 8, 1917 

"Vir>ft-:-.i:.'iic.^aaa£S'i;4 ^.» 

Books to Read 

By Lucian Oldershaw 

Al'lRST novel, that sliows any ability at all, lias 
a twofold interest for the critic. It has the 
intrinsic interest of what it achieves, and it has 
.the extrinsic interest of what it promises. One 
reads it with a note of interros,'ation. Has the author 
shot his bolt ? Has he described the one ad\enturc of 
which his imagination is capable ? Is he, in short, a mere 
recorder or a trufe creator ? For the most part such 
questions must remain but imperfectly answered till the 
second or even the third no\el, but o'ne is not for that 
reason debarred from taking an interest in the new 
personality and tiie new point of view with which a new 
novelist piques his curiosity. These remarks, of course, 
are not a propos dc bottes. ' They are due to my ha\-ini,' 
just read an e.\tremely able and iinaf,nnativc first no^■el by 
Miss Clcmence Dane, called Regiment of Women (Heine- 
mann, 5s. net) — a most appropriate title scein;,' that tlic 
chief dramatis pcrsoiuc are teachers at a ,i,'irls' school, 
and that it is round the school and its affairs that the 
story mostly centres. 


School-mistresses and schoo'-girls ! They do not sound 
^•ery promising material out of whicii to build a no\eI 
that makes us think seriously about its author's future 
and yet, in Clare Hartill, the capable and confident 

, teacher, Miss Dane has credited a character one can only 
compare toXady Macbeth. " wading through blood and 
murder " to a head-mistress's chair. The study is a 
somewhat morbid one, but it is none the less alive, and 
the figures that surround the central one. of Clare are as 
full of \-igour and reality as they are of variety and 
contrast. Miss Dane writes well too. Her dialogue is 
easy and natural, and her incidents \ i\id. Some ex- 
perience may ha\c j)roduced the odious central figure of 
this book, and a white heat of moral indignation lia\e 
quickened the author's power of vision, but this alone 

' does not seem likely to account for a piece of work that 

is written with such an easy sense of mastery. I rather 

fancy that we shall hear more of this author. 

* * * * * 

It is with a somewhat pleasant sense of relaxation that 

I turn from Miss Da;ne's novel to Mr. William Le Oiicux's 

, T/ic Breath of Snspieto)i {John Long, 6s.), and Miss V. M. 
Mills Young's TJic Bigamist (John Lane, 6s.) For oiie 
thing there is tlK> relief of passing from the unknown 

. to the known. With both of these latter authors one 

• kno\\s at least where one is. Their goods are all in the 
shoi>windows and the price is clearly marked. So I 
settle myself down to enjoy from Mr. Le Oueux's pen an 
ingenious talc in whicli I hope to be surprised by incidents, 
but never by character. He docs not disappoint me in 
The Breath of SKSpieiou. I have read more thrilling tales, 

. but there is a good surprise in it and all ends happily. 
From Miss Mills Young I expect a thrilling talc of passion 
with a background of the \cldt and some demand on the 

: emotions, but none on the intellect. I get something of 
that in The Bigamist, but frankly I was rather bored. 
There seemed no particular reason why the book should 
ha\e been written, except to attract an interest which 
it cannot hold in a particularly sordid career of crime. 

* * * jK * 

Malcolm and Noel Ross, pere el ftls. know how to 
" tell the tale." I say this in no disparaging sense, for 
Jlr. Malcolm Ross would not ha\-e been appointed corre- 
spondent with the New Zealand forces, and Mr. Noel 
Ross would not, after being wounded \\ith the New 
Zealand forces, ha\e joined the staff of the Times, unless 
they were competent journalists. ]^Iqreover, they have 
no need to make bricks witliout straw ; there arc no essays 
on " broomsticks," in Light and Shade in War (Arnold, 
5s. net.) Here arc things experimental and emotions felt 
bv men who saw the fighting in the Peninsula, and its 
wonderful c\-acuation, and were last summer with the 
armies on the Somme. Wonderful as are some of the 
narrati\c-s of facts (they include, for exampii-, the most 
\\\iA account that has been written of the landing 
on Gallipoli), I rather feel that the emotional studies. 

which show more originality, arc the more attractive, 
and among these I place first London Ghosts, and that 
charming Highland reverie, The Home of my Fathers, 


A ver}' interesting record of good work well done is 
contained in Friends of France (Smith, Elder and Co., 
7s. 6d. niet.). This is an account of the Field Service of 
the American Ambulance written by some of its members, 
of whom the best known, to English readers is probably 
Henry Sydnor Harrison, the author of V.V.'s Eyes 
and other novels. The book will appeal in \arious 
degrees ..f 6 three classes of readers. It will api)cal first 
and foremost to the members of the x'arious Corps of the 
Ser\ice Sanitaire .Americaine themselves, for it will form 
for them a permanent and valuable record of their own 
experience. In the second place to their friends at home 
it should pro\e, especially at the present juncture, a 
source of inspiration and encouragement. Finally, all 
who like to study the war from various angles, will 
welcome this episodic study of the fighting in the \\'est 
and especially the continual tributes contained in it to 
the unassuming gallantry of the French soldier. 

* * :;: 'i- !;! 

A completely different American point of \iew is set 
forth in \\"\\\ Le\-ington Comfort's new novel, Red Fleece 
(Hcinemann, 5s. net). Here we ha\-e the point of view 
of the pacifist who looks upon all war waged for \\'hatever 
reason its contrary to the higher instincts of humanity 
which he alone shares v\ith_a few kindred spirits, a demo- 
cTat with a complete distrust of democracy. I do not 
know whether ;\lr. Comfort has actually witnessed the 
scenes on the Eastern J-'ront whicli he' describes, but he 
has power and \ision, and his book is a spirited per- 
formance on behalf of the, peculiar views which he 
exidently holds with complete sincerity. It is jjrobably 
too late in the day to reason with him about these \-iews, 
but 1 suggest for the consideration of those who may be 
attracted by his persuasive exposition of them that there 
are occasions in the continual struggle of right against 
wrong when the appeal must be made not to Peace, but 
to the Sword. Kindness may prevent a dog from going 
mad, but when once mad it cannot be cured by kindness. 

Now that all eves are seaward this little book of .Mr. 
lulward y.ohh'>.' Outposts of the Fleet (Hcinemann, is. 
net), comes \-ery apropos. Mr. Noble has long been a 
redoubtable champion of the yierchant Service, and 
these " Stories of the Merchant Service in War and 
Peace," ring with the triumph of one whose cause has 
been successful. The .despised, or perhaps simply neg- 
lected, captain of the 'trading vessel has now come into 
his own, with a commission in the Na\-al Reserve and a 
good chance of medals and rewards, and if he is half as 
good a fellow and runs half as many risks as Mr. Noble 
depicts, full well does he dcscr\c"his status and his 
opportunities. Mr. Noble tells his yarns with vigour and 
spirit, and I recommend anyone who has to travel to 
slip this little book into his pocket next time he ..sets forth 
that liis way may be beguiled with tales of the " silly 
sailormen " on whom we so greatly rely and whom we 
wish so well. 


The success of this new paper, pubUshctl 
weekly at Id. by Land t^ Water, has 

been instantaneous. 
All reader^; of Land & Water should 
ask their newsagent to send them a copy 
of FLYISG ever\- \\'ednesday as there 
is diflkulty in meeting the demand unless 
orders arc eivon beforehand 

February 8, 1917 






The Last Day is Friday the 1 6th 
and Germany is watching us. 

If you have not already invested every 
shilling you can scrape together — do so now. 

IF you have £5 
or any amount up 
to £50 to lend 
go to the nearest 
Money Order Post 
Office and they will 
invest it for you 
in War Loan. You 
will get a receipt for 
your money and after- 
wards they will send 
you your stock. 



that you can help 

to end the War 






IF you have £50 
or over to lend to 
your country go to 
your Bank Manager. 
He will help you to 
increase your lending 
power. The Bank 
Managers have in- 
timated their desire 
to do everything in 
their power to make 
the Victory Loan 
an overwhelming 



The Bank will accept the 
War Loan it buys for you as 
security for what it lends to you. 





February S, 1917 

The Golden Triangle 

By Maurice Leblanc 

ITranslatcd by Alexander Teixeira dc MattosI 

Synoi'sis : Captain Palncc Bclval, a 'u'ouudai French 
officer, is in loir with a nurse itJto is known to her patients 
as " Little Mother Coralie." Bclval, following Coralic 
(0 her house, finds that Essares. her husband, a leading 
financier, ivho had' contemplated flight jrom Paris, has been 
brutally murdered. An examining magistrate explains 
to Bclval that Essares was prime mover in a plot for ex- 
porting gold from Erancc. In order to recover some 300 
■million francs 'ichich Essaris had concealed, the authorities 
consider it necessary to hush iip the circumstances of the 
financier's death. The only possible clue to the u^herc- 
abouts of the gold is a paper found in Essares' dead hand, 
bearing the icords. "Golden Triangle." Ya-Bon. Bclval's 
Senegalese ser.'ant, promises to call in Arshte Lupin to 
unravel the mystery, which includes a nivstcrious threatened 
vengeance on Coralie. Bclval ascertains that Simeon. 
Essare.s' attendant, has mysteriously befriended both him- 
self and Coralie, and also obtains evidence that twenty 
years before, Essares had been responsible for the murder 
of Coralie's mother and his {Bclval's) father and that an 
iinkno'dnt friend had tried to protect Coralie and himself. 
On the i^th of .April an anonymous letter -warns the authori- 
ties that an attempt is to be made to get the hidden gold out 
of France, and on the same day Bclval and Coralie, fol- 
lowing old Simeon to the scene of their parents' murder, 
a disused lodge in the garden next to Essares' house, find 
themselves imprisoned without possibility of escape. Behind 
the -wainscoting of the lodge a pencilled message tells how 
Bclval's father and Coralie's mother had been similarly 
trapped, and then asphyxiated, twenty years before. Shut 
in the lodge, Patrice and Coralie arc similarly subjected — 
apparently by Simeon — to asphyxiation bv gas, until 
Patrice loses consciousness. 


A Strange Character 

IT was not yet exactly death. In his present condition 
of agony, what lingered of Patrice's consciousness 
mingled, as in a nightmare, the life which he knew 
with tlie imaginary world in wjiich he now found him- 
self, the world which was that of death. 

In this world, Coralie no longer existed ; and her loss dis- 
tracted him with grief. But he seemed to hear and sec 
somebody whost> presence was rev(5aled by a shadow passing 
before his closed eyelids. This somebody he pictured to 
himself, though without reason, under the aspect of Simton, 
who came to verify the death of his victims, began by carry- 
ing Coralie away, then came back to Patrice and carried him 
away also and laid him down somewhere. And all this was 
.so well-defined that Patrice wondered whether he had not 
woke up. 

Next hours ]xissed ... or seconds. In the end, 
Patrice had a feeling that he was faUing asleep, but as a 
man sleeps in Hell, suffering the moral and physical tortmes 
of the damned. He was back at the bottom of the black 
pit, which be was making desperate efforts to leave, like a man 
who has fallen into the sea and is trying to reach the sur- 
face. In this way, with the greatest" difficultv, he passed 
through one waste of water after another, the weight of which 
stilled him. He had to scale them, gripping with his hands 
and feel things that slipped, to rope-ladders wliich, pos- 
sessing no points of support, gave way beneath him. 

.Meanwhile the darkness became less intense. ^ little 
muilled daylight mingled with it. Patrice felt less greatly 
opi^ressed. He half-opened his eyes, drew a breath or two 
and. looking round, beheld a sight that surprised him, the 
enibrasure of an open door, near which he was lying in the 
air, on a .sofa. Reside him he saw Coralie, on another sofa. 
She moved restlessly and seemcd-to be in great discomfort. 

" She is climbing out of the black pit," he thought to him- 
.■-tlf. " Like me, she is struggling. .My poor Coralie ! " 

There was a small table between tjiem, with two glasses 
f)f water on it. Parched with thirst, he took one of them in 
his hand. But he dared not drink. 

.\t that moment, someone came through tJie open door, 
which Patrice percei\ ed to be the door of the lodge ; and he 

obser\-ed that it was not old Simeon, as he liad thought, 
but a stranger whom he had never seen before. 

" 1 am not asleep," he said to himself. " I am sure 
that I am not asleep and that this stranger is a friend." 

And he tried to say it aloud, to make certainty doubly 
sure. But he had not the strength. 

The stranger, Inwever, came up to him and, in a gentle 
voice, said : 

" Don't tire yourself, captain. You're all right now. 
Allow me. Ha\-e some water." 

The stranger handed him one of the two glasses ; and Patrice 
emptied it at a draught, witiiout any feeling of distnist, and 
was glad to .see Coralie also drinking. 

" Yes, I'm all right now," he sairl. " Heavens, how good 
it is to be alive ! Coralie is really alive, isn't she ? "■ 

He did not hear the answer and dropped into a welcome 

When lie woke up, the crisis was over, though he still felt 
a buzzing in his head and a difficulty in drawing a deep dreath. 
He stood up, however, and realized that all these sensations 
were not fanciful, that he was really outside the door of the 
lodge and that Coralie had drunk the glass of water and was 
l)eacefully sleeping. 

" How good it is to be alive ! " he repeated. 

He now felt need for action, but dared not go into the 
lodge notwithstanding the open door. He moved away 
from it, skirting the cloisters containing the graves, and then, 
with no exact object, for he did not yet grasp the reason of 
his own actions, did not understand what had happened to 
him and was simply walking at random, he came back to- 
wards the lodge, on the other front, the one overlooking tiie 

Suddenly he stopped. A few yards from the house, at the 
foot of a tree standing beside the slanting path, a man lay 
back in a wicker long-chair, with his face in the shade and 
his legs in the sun. He was sleeping, with his head fallen 
forward and an open book upon his knees. 

Then and not till then did Patrice clearly understand 
that he and Coralie had escaped being killed, that they were 
lx)th really alive and that they owed tlieir safety to this man 
whose sleep -suggested a state of absolute security and satis- 
fled conscience. ' 

Patrice studied the stranger's appearance. He was slim 
of figure, but broad-shouldered, with a sallow complexion, a 
slight moustache on his lips and hair beginning to turn grey 
at the temples. His age was probably fifty at most. The cut 
of his clothes pointed to dandyism. Patrice leaned forward 
and read the title of the book : The Memoirs of Benjamin 
Franklin. He also read the initials inside a hat lying on 
the grass : " L. V." 

" It was he who saved me," .said Patrice to himself, " I 
recognise him. He carried us both out of the studio and 
looked after us. Rut how was the miracle brought gbout ? 
Who sent him ? " 

He tapped him on the shoulder. The man was on his feet 
at once, his face lit up with a smile : . 

" Pardon me, captain, but my life is so much taken up that, 
when I have a few minutes to myself, I use them for sleeping, 
wherever I may be . . . like Napoleon, eh? Well. 
I don't object to the comparison . . . But enough about 
myself. How arc you feeling now ? And madame— ' Little 
Mother Coralic ' — is she better ? I saw no use in waking you, 
after I had opened the doors and taken you outside. I had 
done what was necessary and felt quite easy. You were both 
breathing. So I left the rest to the good pure air." 

He ])roke oft at the sight of Patrice's disconcerted attitude ; 
and his smile made way for a merry laugh : 

" Oh, I was forgetting : you don't know me ! Of course, 
it's true, the letter I sent you was intercepted. Let me in- 
t rod lice myself : Don Luis Perenna,* a member of an' jkl 
Spanish family, genuine patent of nobility, papers all in 
order , . . Rut I can sec thit all this tejls you nothing," 
he went on, laughing still more gaily. " No doubt Ya-Bon 
described me differently when he wrote my name on that street 
wall one evening a fortnight ago. Aha, you're beginning to 
understand! . . . Yes, I'm the man you sent for to 
{ConttHued on page 20) 

'The Teeth 0/ the Tiger. By Maurice Leblanc. Translated by Alex- 
tuider Teixeira dc Mattos. " Luis Perenna," is one of several anagranH 
<il" ' .\rsenc Lnmii." 

February 8, 1917 





Fighting Bad Weather 

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The Burberry 


and Boul. Malesherbes PARIS 



February 5, 1917 

{Conttvued from pa^e t8) 
help you. Shall I mention the name, just bluntly ? Well, 
here poes. captain ! . . Arsene Lupin at your service." 

Patrice was stupefied. He had utterly forgotten Ya-Bon's 
proposal and the unthinking permission which he had given 
him to call in the famous adventurer. And here was Arsdne 
Lupin standing in front of him, Arsene Lupin who, by a 
si ear effort of will that resembled an incredible miracle, had 
dragged him and Coralie out of their hermetically-sealed 

He held out his Jiand and said : 

" Thank you ! " 

" Tut ! " said Don Luis, playfully. " No thanks ! Just a 
good hand-shake, that's all. And I'm a man you can shake 
hands with, captain, believe me. I may have a few peccadilloes 
0B my conscience, but, on the other hand, I have committed 
a certain number of good actions which should win me the 
esteem of decent folk . . . beginning with my own. 
And so. ..." 

He interrupted himself again, seemed to reflect and. taking 
Patrice by a button of his jacket, said : 

" Don't move. VVe are being watched." 

" By whom ? 

" Some one on the quay, right at the end of the garden. 
The wall is not high. There's a grating on the top of it. 
They're looking through the bars and trying to see us." 

"Ho A do ou kno.v ? You have your back turned to the 
quay ; and then there are the trees." 

" Listen." 

" I don't hear anything out of the way." 

" Yes, the sovmd of an engine . . . the engine of a 
stopping car. Now what would a car want to stop here for, 
oa the quay, opposite a wall with no house near it ' " 

" Then who do you think it is ? " 

" Why, old Simeon, of course ! " 

" Old' Simeon ! " 

" Certainly. He's looking to see whether I've really 
saved the two of you." 

" Then he's not mad ? " 

" Mad ? No more mad than you or I 1 " 

" And yet. . . ." 

" What you mean is that Simeon used to protect you ; that 
his object was to bring you two together ; that he sent you 
tbe key of the garden-door ; and so on and so on." 

" Do you know all that ? " 

" Well, of course ! If not, how could 1 have rescued you ? " 

" But," said Patrice, anxiously, " suppwse the scoundrel 
returns to the attack. Ought we not to take some pre- 
cautions ? Let's go back to the lodge : CoraUe is all alone." 

" There's no danger." 

" Why ? " 

" Because I'm here." 

Patrice was more astounded than ever : 

" Then Si neon knows you ? " he asked. " He knows 
that you are here ? " 

" Yes, thanks to a letter which I wrote you under cover to 
Ya-Bon, and which he intercepted. I told you that I was 
coming ; and he hurried to get to work. Only, as my habit 
is on these occasions, I hastened my arrival by a few hours, 
so that I caught him in the act." 

" At that moment, you did not know he was the enemy, 
you knew nothing ? 

" Nothing at all." 

" Was it this morning ? " 

" No, this afternoon, at a quarter to two." 

Patrice took out his v atch : 
' And it's now four. So in two hours. . . .'• 

" Not that. I've been here an hour." 

" Did you find out from Ya-Bon ? " 

" Do j'ou think I've no better use for my time ? Ya-Bon 
simply told me that you were not there, which was enough to 
astonish me." 

" After that ? " 

" I looked to see where you were." 

" How ? " 

" I first searched your room and, doing so in my own 
thorough fashion, ended by discovering tliat there was a 
erack at the back of your roll-top desk and tliat this crack 
faced a hole in the wall of the ne.\t room. I was able therefore 
to pull out the book m which you kept your diary and acquaint 
myself with what was going on. This, moreover, was how 
Simion became aware of your least intentions. This was 
how he knew of your plan to come here, on a pilgrimage, on 
tlie fourteenth of April. This was how, last night, seeing 
you write, he preferred, before attacking you, to know what 
you were writing. Knowing it and learning, from your own 
words, that you were on your guard, he refrained. You see 
how simple it all is. If M. Masseron had grown uneasy at 
your absence, he would have been just as successful. Only 
he would have been successful to-morrow." 

" That is to say, too late." 
Yes, too late. This really isn't his business, however, 
nor that of the police. So I would rather that they didn't 
meddle with'it. I asked your wounded soldiers to keep silent 
about anything that may strike them as queer. Therefore, 
if M. Masseron comes to-day, he will think that everything 
is in order. Well, having satisfied my mind in this respect, 
and possessing the necessary information from your diary,^ 
I took Ya-Bon with me and walked across the lane and into 
the garden. 

" Was the door open ? " 

"•No, but Sim 'on happened to be coming out at tliat 
moment. Bad luck for him, wasn't it ? I took advantage of 
it boldly. 1 put my hand on the latch and we went in. with- 
out his daring to protest. He certainly knew wlio I was." 

" But you didn't know at that time tliat he was the 
enemy ? " 

" I didn't know ? And what about your diary ? " 

" I had no notion. . . ." 

" But, captain, every p.iga is an indictment ^ the man. 
There's not an incident in which he did not take.pait, not a 
crime which he did not prepare." 

" In that case, you should have collared him." . 

" And if I had ? What good would it have done me ? 
Should I have compelled him to speak ? No, I shall hold 
him tightest by leaving him his liberty. That will give him 
rope, you know. You see already, he's prowling round the 
house instead of clearing out. Besides, I had something 
better to do : I had first to rescue vou two ... if there 
was still time. Ya-Bon and I therefore rushed to the ('oor 
of the lodge. It was open ; but the other, the door of the 
studio, was locked and bolted. I drew the bolts : and to 
force the lock was, for me, child's play. Then the smell of 
gas was enough to tell me what had happened. Sinvon 
must have fitted an old meter to some outside pipe, probably 
tJie one which supplied the lamps on tlie lane, and he was 
suffocating you. All that remained for us to do was to fetch 
the two of you out and give you the usual treatment : rubbing, 
artificial respiration and so on. You were saved." 

" I suppose he removed all his murderous appUances ? " 
asked Patrice. 

" No, he evidently contemplated coming back and putting 
everything to riglits, so that his share in the business could 
not be proyed, so too that [leople might believe in your 
suicide, a mysterious suicide, death without apparent cause 
in short, the same tragedy that happened to your father 
and Little Mother Coralie's mother." 

"Then you know? . . ." 

" Why, haven't I eyes to read with ? What about the 
inscription on the wall, your father's revelations ? I know 
as much as you do, caj/tain . and perhaps a bit 


Don Luis hesitated whether to go on : 

" No," he said, " it's better that I shouldn't speak. The 
mystery will be dispelled gradually. Let us wait. l'< r th • 
moment. . . ." 

He again stopped, this time to hsten : 

" There, he must have seen you. And now that he knows 
what he wants to, he's going away." 

Patrice grew excited : 

" He's going away ! You really ought to have collared him. 
Shall we ever find him again, the scoundrel ? Shall we eyer 
be able to take our revenge ? " 

Don Luis smiled : 

" There you go, calling him a scoundrel, the man who 
watched over you for twenty years, who brought you and 
Little Mother Coralie together, who was j'our benefactor ! " 

" Oh, 1 don't know ! All this is so bewildering ! I can't 
help hating him. . . . Tlie idea of his getting away 
maddens me. ... I should hke to torture him and 
yet. . . ." 

He yielded to a feeling of despair and took his head between 
his two hands. , Don Luis comforted him : 

" Have no fear," he said. " He was never nearer his 
downfall than at the present moment. I hold him in my 
hand as I hold this leaf ! " 

" But how ? " 

" The man who's driving him belongs to me." 

" What's that ? What do you mean ? " 

" I mean that I put one of my men on tlie driver's seat of a 
taxi, witii instructions to hang about at the bottom of the 
lane, and that Sim .on did not fail to take the taxi in question." 

" That is to say, you suppose so," Patrice corrected him, 
feeling more and more astounded. 

" I recognised the sound of the engine at the bottom of the 
garden, when I told you." 

" And are you sure of your man ? " 

" Certain." 

" What's the use ? Simeon can dri e far out of Paris, 

(Continued on pa^e 2i, 

February 8, 1917 








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February 8, 191 7 

{Continued from page 20) 
Stab the man in the back . . . and then when shaU we 

L'et to know ? " ' , ti • 1 

" Do you imagine that people can get out oi Pans and go 
nmning about the high-roads without a special permit ? 
Ko if Simeon leaves I'aris, he will have to drive to some 
railway-station or other and we shall know of it twenty 
minutes after. And then we'll be oil." 


" By motor." 

" Then you have a pass ? 

" Yes. valid for the whole of Fra;ice." 

" You don't mean it ? " . 

" I do • and a genuine pass at that ! Made out m the name 
«f Don Luis Perenna, signed by the Minister of the Interior 
and countersigned. . . ." 

" Bv whom ? 

" By the President of the Republic." 

Patrice felt his bewilderment change all at once into 
violent excitement. Hitherto, in the terrible adventure in 
^•hich he was engaged, he had undergone the enemy's im- 
placable will and had known little besides defeat and the 
horrors of ever-threatening death. But now a more power- 
ful will suddenly arose in his favour. And everything was 
abruptly altered. Fate seemed to be changing its course, 
like a ship which an unexpected fair wind brings back into 

harbour. ,. ■, j., u^ 

" Upon my word, captain," said Don Luis, I thought 
you were going to cry hke Little Mother Coralie. Your 
nerves are overstrung. And I daresay you're hungiy. We 
must find you something to eat. Come along." 

He led him slowly towards the lodge and, speaking in a 
rather serious voice : , , ,• 

" I must ask you," he said, " to be absolutely discreet in 
this whole matter. With the exception of a few old friends 
and of Ya-Bon, whom I met in Africa, where- he saved my 
life no one in France knows me by my real name. I caU 
myself Don Luis Perenna. In Morocco, where I was soldier- 
ing, I had occasion to do a service to the very gracious 
sovereign of a neighbouring neutral nation, who, though 
obliged to conceal his true feelings, is ardently on our side. 
He sent for me ; and, in return, I asked him to give me my 
credentials and to obtain a pass for me. Officially, therefore, 
I am on a secret mission, which expires in two days. 

They came to the settee on which Coralie lay sleeping. 
Don Luis laid his hand on Patrice's arm : 

" One word more, captain. I swore to myself and I gave 
my word of honour to him who trusted me that, while I 
was on this mission, my time should be devoted exclusively 
to defending the interests of my country to the best of my 
power. I must warn you, therefore, that, notwithstanding 
all my symapthy for vou, I shall not be able to prolong my 
stay for a single minute after I have discovered the eighteen 
hundred bags of gold. They were the one and only reason 
why I came in answer to Ya- Bon's appeal. When the bags of 
gold are in our possession, that is to say, to-morrow evening at 
latest, I shall go away. However, the two quests are joined. 
The clearing up of the one will mean the end of the other. 
And now enough of words. Introduce me to Little Mother 
Coralie and let's get to work ! Make no mystery with her, 
he added, laughing. " Tell her my real name. I have 
nothing to fear: Arsene Lupin has every woman on his side. 
* * * • * 

Forty minutes later, Coralie was back in her room, well- 
cared for and well watched. Patrice had taken a substantial 
meal, while Don Luis walked up and down the terrace smoking 

" Finished, captain ? Then we'll make a start. 

He looked at his watch : 

" Half-past five. We have more than an hour of daylight 
kft. That'll be enough." 

" Enough ? You surely don't pretend that you will achieve 
vour aim in an hour ? " 

" My definite aim, no, but the aim which I am setting 
mvself at the moment, yes . . . and even earlier. An 
hour ? What for ? To do what ? Why, you'll be a good deal 
wiser in a few minutes ! " ' , ,., 

Don Luis asked to be taken to the cellar under the hbrary, 
where Essares Bey used to keep the bags of gold until the 
time had come to send them off. 

" Was it through this ventilator that the bags were let 

d'Avn ? 
■ Yes." 

" Is there no other outlet ? " 

" None except the staircase leading to the library and the 
other ventilator." 

■' Op.-'iiing on the terrace ? " 
" Yes." 

" Tiien that's clear. The bags used to come in by the first 
and go out by the second." 

Tiicy returned to the terrace. Don Luis took up his 
positKm nuar the ventilator'and inspected the ground imme- 
diately around. It did not take long. Four yards away, 
outside the windows of the library, was the basin with the 
statue of a child spouting a jet of water through a shell. 

Don Luis went up, examined the basin and, leaning for- 
wards, reached the httle statue, which he turned upon its 
axis from riglit to left. At the same time the pedestal 
described a quarter of a circle. 

" That's it," he said, drawing himself up again. 

" What ? " 

" The basin will empty itself." 

He was rig'nt. Tlu water sank very quickly and the bottom 
of the fountain appeared. 

Don Luis stepped into it and squatted on his haunches. 
The inner wall was lined with a marble mosaic composing a 
wide red-and-white fretwork pattern. In the middle of 
one of the frets was a ring, which Don Luis lifted and pulled. 
All that portion of the wall which formed the pattern yielded 
to his effort and carrie down, leaving an opening of about 
twelve inches by ten. 

" That's where the bags of gold went," said Don Luis 
" It was the second stage. Tliey were dispatched in the 
same manner, on a hook sliding along a wire. Look, here is 
the wire, in this groove at the top." 

" By Jove ! " cried Captain Belval. " But you've un- 
ravelled this in a masterly fashion ! What about the wire ? 
Can't we follow it ? " 

" No, but it will serve our purpose if we know where it 
finishes. I say, captain, go to the end of the garden, by 
the wall, taking a line at right angles to the house. When 
you get there, cut off a branch of a tree, rather high up. 
Oh, I was forgetting ! I shall have to go out by the lane. 
Have you the key of the door ? Give it me, pleasje." 

Patrice handed him the key and then went down to the 
wall beside the quay. 

" A little farther to the right," Don Luis instructed hrm. 
" A little more still. That's better. Now wait." 

He left the garden by the lane, reached the quay and 
called out from the other side of the wall : 
■ " Fix your branch so that I can see it from here. Capital. 
Patrice now joined Don Luis, who was crossing the road. 

(To be continued.) 

Sir Edward Holden who presided at the annual general meeting of 
the London Ci,y and Midland Bank, Ltd., in the course of his address, 
said tliat as we stood to-day we were in the midst of great economic 
phenomena. Our country was overflowing with money and credit. 
Large prolits were bdng made, due greatly to increised prices and 
our working classes were earning larger wages than ever before ; some 
were spending freely, others were saving. The same conditions pre- 
vailed in Germany, and reviewing the position one was inclinod to ask 
how was this credit created, and where did the money come from ? 
He went on to show in detail how bankers were great manufacturers ol 
credit and explained how nearly all the loan transactions of banks 
created credit. There was no disorganisation of banks' reserves when 
the C.overnment borrowed on Treasury Bills, Exchequer Bonds and 
other short-term securities, because the amounts lent on them, although 
withdrawn from the banks, were not of sufficient weekly magtiitude 
to inconvenience the reserves of the banks before they were again rt- 
plenished by the return of the withdrawals. When bank depositors 
used their derosits to subscribe for loans, these deposits were merely 
transferred to ihe overnment, and. after disbursement by the ' overn- 
meat found their way back to the joint stock banks through the accounts 
of the overnment Contractors. There was here no creation of credit . 
but merely a transfer from the subscriber to the oovernraent, from th.- 
Government to the contractors, from the contractors to the banks. 

Mr Walter Leaf, Deputy Chairman, who presided at the annual 
general meeting of the London County and Westminster Bank, said 
tliat the state of affairs shown in the report was one of which the bank 
might be proud. So far as the internal affairs of the bank were 
concerned the year 1916 had been one of steady and v^ry profitable 
prosperity. The most striking change in the course of the 2 J years 
was the increase in investments in >, overnment Stock, these had 
risen from about loj millions to nearly 32* millions. This wa-s due 
to the part played by the banks in subscribing for the 4J per cent. War 
Loan eighteen months ago. Their gross profits for the y«ar we,« a 
record Peace -victorious peace— would bring with it fresh problems 
on every hand and for losses and difficulties which might then arise it 
behoved them to make preparation beforehand. The necessity of 
making the new Loan an entire success was patent to everyone. 
There was however, one serious obstacle in the way. That was the 
idea that seemed to have got about that success was already as.sured 
and that the small investor, therefore, need not trouble himself about 
what was sufficiently dealt with by the big men. Such an idea was 
completely baseless. The Loan was not already an assured success- 
far from it. It had got to be made so in t,,e next three weeks and every 
one in the Unite! Kingdom had got to put his back into the task or 
there would be no success at all. It was impossible not to feel some 
^■ense of rhame when thev saw the way in which the 1 erman nation had 
rcsponde.l to the a-p .als for loans made to them. If all their customer 
arcording to their means. wo)ild come to them ready to lend not only 
their savings in the past, but with the bank's assistance their savings 
in the future and above all determined to increase those future 
savings to their uttermost power, then woull the Loan be an assured 
success. It all lav in the hand; of the small man. 

February 15, 191 7 

Supplement to LAND & WATER" 




Successful breeches- 
making depends on the 
following factors — fine 
wear - resisting cloths, 
skilful cutting, careful 
thorough tailor - work 
and adequate experience 
All these we guarantee 
and in particular the last 
for we have been breeches 
makers since 1821 
ninety-six years ago. 

We keep on hand a number of 
pairs of breeches, and are there- 
fore often able to meet immediate 
requirements, or we can cut and 
try a pair on the same day, and 
complete the next day, if urgently 

GRANT .soCOCKBURNssro ... 



Military and Civil Tailors,. Legging Makers. 





Telephone : 
3238 MAYFAIR. 

Improved Elizabeth 
Smock in water- 
proof drill - - £1 19 6 

Do. in Gamekeeper 

brown corduory • £2 19 6 

In serge or tweed - £2 15 6 

Elizabeth Breeches 
with apron (ront 
fastening at sides 
i n waterproof 
drill - - - • SI 5 6 

Do. In corduroy - £1 11 6 

Do. In serge or 
tweed - - - - £1 15 6 

Hats and Caps to 
match from - 

12 6 


Estimates and suggestions will be 
sent to customers upon application. 

— The Original Cording' s, Estd. 1839 

In the wettest, coldest weather 

a fleece-lined " EquitorlLn., 

ithe really waterproof coat}, 
ensures dry, warm comfort. 

Daily we receive evidence from 
tlioM; who havu paid for thtiir 
knowletlge in money and serious 
rti.stomfort, that a semi-proof 
(weatherproof) coat fails to keep 
out the wet, that the outer shell 
becomes water-10}^ge<i ami that 
even if lined with oilskin or the 
like tile damp stili strikes 
through the t«eams at tile luckless 

An "Eqiiitor," with snug fleece 
woollen lining buttoned in, makes 
an excellent great-coat in which to 
"travel ligiit." and will not only 
keep a man bone dry through the 
hf-avlest and most lasting down- 
pour, but will also warmly pro- 
t*'ct him in biting cold weather, 
md may therefore be relied upon 
to minimise the ill-effects of en- 
torced exposure at night. 
The "E<|uitor" is flttwl with a 
spcciaJ riding apron, but the coat 
serves just a.3 well for ordinary 
wear afoot, whether the apron be 
fastened back or not. 
In our light-weight No. 31 material, 
the price of the "Equitor" is 92/6; 
of our No. 23 cashmere a medium, 
weight cloth, 115/-; without apron 
(either clcth), 17/6 less, with belt, 
Sf. .iXfra. 

The detachable fleece inner coat 
can be had in two qualities— No. 1 
(line wool), 62/6; No. 2, *)/-. 

When ordermg an "Equitor" Coat 
please state height and chest 
measure and send remittance 
(which will be returned promptly 
if the ooat is not approved), or 
give home address and business 
(not banker's) reference. 

Illustrated List at request. 



Only Addresses : 

19 PICCADILLY, W., & 35 st. jamess st., s.w. 


Ordinary puttees do 
not look neat, neither 
will they keep in posi- 
lion unless tigh ly put 
on, and this tightness 
is the cau5e of that 
sense of leg-tiredness 
and foot - heaviness 
from which so many 
men suffer. 

Boyd's Elastic Puttees 
entirely overcome this 
trouble, for, being elas- 
tic, they grip the leg 
gently but firmly, 
always look neat, and 
give sufficiently to 
allow the normal action 
of the veins and 
muscles. They also provide a comfortable support and 
increase the marching power of the wearer. 




Mode frojn the fine-'st Eijyptian Cotton and best Para Rubber. 
They are fery duralile, tuatrrprooferl, and are both reversible and 
interchnntjenble. Fastened by Patent Honks top and bottom, 
making them easy to put on and take off. 

Boyd's Elastic Puttees are claimed to be a 
preventative again<t, and cure for, varicose veins. 

Infantry 9/- per pair. Cavalry 10/- per pair. 

Each 'Pultee bears a metal tab. 

Of all leading Military Tailors and Outfitters. If any difficulty 

in procuring write to the Sole Makers. 


Quorn Mills, Near Loughborougb. 

Supplement to LAND & WATER 

February 15, 191 7 

The Coat for the Practical Soldier 

T ET the sleet slash its hardest, the wind shout its loudest, rain beat and 
pour, frost gnaw and mumble, clammy Flanders fog crawl and creep 
—they won't find a way through your " Thresher." 

The inner warmth-lining keeps you in the warm glow that means not only 
comhjrt, but fighting efficiency— a warm soldier's a better soldier than a cold 
soldier. But no warmth-lining will keep out cold if it gets damp— so 
outside It IS the special " Thresher " waterproof lining which gives the 
absolute uncompromising " na-poo " to wet in any form. Then to take 
the rough wear and tear of trench work you have the outside shell of hard 
kliaki dnll— Itself practically waterproof and with a smooth surface very 
disappointing to mud. Take all that with the freedom cut of the thin- 
and the cleverly simple fastenings at neck and wrists and you have the 
pnictiral soldiering coat which the War Office recommends, which 14,000 
officers wear and which is copied so copiously and so ineffectively. 

"Thresher" Trench Coal £4. 14. 6 

Detachable " Kamelcott " Lining ... £1 . 11 ! 6 

Detachable Slieepskin Lining £3 . 13 . 6 

Cavalry type wilh knee Baps and ladille guticl. 15/6 «tra. 

All sizts in stock. Send size of ckrst and approximate keight, and 
to avoid any delay enclose cheque when ordering. 

Send for Book(7) the Com- 
plete Guide to ExpeniJI- 
ture on Kit and Lquipment- 


Scottish Agents: 
14 George Street. tdiDburgh 
& 106 Hope Street, Glasgow. 

Bv Apf3oititm£}U to 
H.M. the King. 



Est. l7.S,i Military Tailojs since the Crimean War. Est. 17SS 

152 & 153 STRAND, LONDON. W.C- 

rUnder Two Fla^sl 

God for the Empire— the Empire for God 

— ^^ 

Born within the Empire, and now spread far beyond its remotest 
outposts, the Salvation Army, in its manifold activities for the 
material, moral, and spiritual welfare of mankind, is a corporate 
'■xample of Christian Patriotism. Under God, it has saved to 
the Empire thousands of men and women who otherwise 
would have rotted at the Nation's heart and threatened 
its undoing. It exists for one purpose only — to do 
good ; and' in its interpretation of that purpose it 
treats man as a spiritual being. From its low- 
liest soldier to its General it toils 


\^'hen War broke out it at once proved itself 


Its followers— soldier and civilian — sire servinij under 
two flags. Its Naval and Military League which has 
for many years ministered to Service men has now- 
been enormouslye.xtcndedtomeetthe greatdemnnds 

made upon it in connection with the present War. and assistance is urgently 

required to niainta'n its Hostels for Soldiers on Leave; its Huts at Work 

IN the niFiKKENT Ca.mps ; THE Amui LANCE Work carried on by its Fleet 

of Motor Cars on the Field of Battle ; the Visiting of SrcK and Wounded 
in the Military Hospitals, etc., etc. 

Cheques should be made payable to GENERAL BOOTH, and sent to him 


Vol. LXVIII No. 2858 [y%l\] THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 19^7 [a N^Ew^p'^AgE^^] PRfc" st 


Bj Louis Raemaeken 

Drawn e^clusinly lot " Land i Water ' 

Will they last long enough^ Father ? " 


February 15, 1917. 




A TIN 3/9 

a carter stables his team and proceeds to 
groom them before bedding them down for 
the night. He pays particular attention to 
his horses' feet. He knows that neglect 
means sickness, and sickness loss of time. 

In just the same way it will repay you to run 
over your tyres after a long day's run. If there 
are any flints embedded in the tread, pick them 
out with a Dunlop Tyre Pick and fill up any 
small cuts with Dunlop Cutcure Cement. 

©y K]L(Q)[p> 


Founders of the Pneumatic Tvre Industry, 
Para Mills, Aston Cross, BIRMINGHAM. 


February 15.' 19^7 




Telephone HOLBORN 2828. 




War's Hour Glass. By Louis Raemaekcrs i 

Winning the War. (Leader) 3 

Evacuation of Grandcourt. By Hilairc Belloc 4 

Le Credo du Soldat (Poem) By Emile Cammaerts 6 

German Failure. By Arthur Pollen 9 

Land Without Labour. By The Editor n 

The Soldier Who Sings.— I L By Lewis R. Freeman 1.5 

Memories of Many Waterfalls. ■ By William f. Palmer 15 

Prisoners of War in Germany. (Review) 10 

Books to Read. By Lucian Oldershaw 17 

The Golden Triangle. By Maurice Leblanc i« 

The West End -j 

Kit and Equipment *■ ^^ 


IF a stranger to these islands had strayed into 
the House of Commons on Monday afternoon when 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer spoke on the 
Expenditure and apphed for a vote of 550 millions 
sterling, he would have found it difficult to understand 
how it comes about that Parliament is often regarded with 
light esteem by the nation during these later years. 
Never has the assembly appeared to better advantage. 
Mr. Bonar Law's speech was admirable in its tone and in 
its phrasing ; he spoke with a full sense of the importance 
of the occasion ; there was no rhetoric ; it was the simple 
but resolute utterance of a business man, addressed to 
a business audience which thoroughly realised the 
significance of his figures. His statement was received 
in sympathetic silence which was only broken when 
he referred with quiet confidence to the time " after we 
have won the war." At the end of the current financial 
year he told the House that ths gross National Debt will be 
between £3,800,000,000 and £3,900,000,000— figures so 
stupendous that it is difficult for anyone to grasp their 
exact meaning, but he also mentioned how when Water- 
loo was won and the Napoleonic menace finally at an 
end, these islands— there was practically no Empire in 
those diys — found themselves saddled with a national 
debt of £800,000,000, which taking all circumstances 
into consideration was a heavier burden than the net 
3,000 millions which this generation has to face. 

As then, so now, the hberty and progress of Europe 
were in the balance. It was the sword of Britain and her 
gauntlets of gold that turned the scale. There was no 
ialtering in those distant days although the nation 
was never so united as now, and for twenty years victory 
remained doubtful. The heavy burden was manfully 
shouldered, and looking backward after three generations, 
we can see that the sacrifices of our fathers' fathers were 
well worth while. Again the_ call has come to Britain and 
again she has entered on a liercc struggle for freedom — 
a struggle that has been none of her seeking. Life and 
wealth she willingly surrenders, holding that the ideals 
for which she fights arc of infinitely higher value in the 
upward advance of humanity than national riches or 
personal length of days. Not yet has victory declared 
itself, bvit in the chill of these raw winter days, we seem 
almost to detect the first cold flutter of the dawn-wind. 
But there arc dark and difficult hours ahead of each one 
before peace is really here with us. " The success of the 
Wa.rLoan" said Mr. Bonar Law on Monday, " depends 

not only on the amount ot money wlncli comes in but 
on the wide-spread character of the apphcations." This 
is the way in which even the humblest citizen can assist. 
Before the Loan closes to-morrow evening, there should 
not be a household in these islands which has not sent 
in its application for a share in it, howf;ver small. . 

Turning to. the present work for the successful pro- 
secution of the war, Mr. McKenna's criticisms on the 
duties of Controllers were very much to the point. As 
he remarked, when a Controller is placed over a par- 
ticular business, you cannot cut off tliat business from 
the rest of the social organisation. The appointment of 
such Ministers entails the necessity of even greater 
co-ordination than in the past. This is becoming 
recognised, and the final success of these new Departments 
must largely depend on the steps which are now being 
taken to rectify the lack of cohesion on which the former 
Chancellor of the Exchequer rightly dwelt. Between 
the Board of Agriculture and the Food Ministry there 
is evidently a want of complete understanding which is 
puzzling to the people. At the same time one has to 
recognise that so complicated and obscure are the rami- 
fications of trade, more especially retail trade, that the 
simplest order cannot be promulgated which does not call 
into existence unforeseen conditions, no matter how 
closely the subject has been studied. 

It becomes more evident daily that wherever it is 
possible to rely on voluntary effort, the result is the 
best. It has been so with the War Loan which everyone 
believes will plainly estabhsh in the minds of neutrals 
and enemies Britain's unflinching determination to carry 
the war through to an absolute military victory. And it 
ought to be the same as regards all other orders and 
regulations which the Government considers neces- 
sary to issue for the same object. Offences against the 
present licensing laws, which are committed by a \cry 
small minority, should no longer be punishable with a 
fine, but with imprisonment and hard labour. Since the 
community at large is willingly foregoing personal libert\-, 
it is intolerable that a small minority should be allowed 
to defy necessary regulations for the sake of filthy lucre, 
and if detected receive only the comparatively small 
penalty of normal times. 

There was one point in Mr Bonar Law's speech to which 
we must revert for a moment. He mentioned that the 
increase of daily expenditure was due partly to the in. 
creased cost of food, and partly to the greater output 
of munitions. He said that if he were at liberty to give 
the House the figures showing the supply of munitions 
at one period and another, they would be astonished. 
It is an increase which is going on all the time and is a^ 
marked now as compared with six months ago as it was 
at any previous time. The nation has willingly organised 
and disciplined itself for this purpose in a way which was 
deemed impossible three years ago, and it is most satis- 
factory to know that the result is so excellent. Germany, 
with her forty years of preparation, thought it impcssible 
that any nation could ever beat her in the matter of big 
guns and plentiful ammunition, but already on the 
Somme she is learning her mistake. She has still a good 
deal more to learn of the character and industry of the 
British people in the coming months. The fiercer her 
submarine menace, the more resolute are wc to defeat it. 
We know now that this depends not only on the Nav>-. 
but on ourselves, and are ready for any self-denial which 
the C.overnment may declare to be necessary. The 
example which our splendid fighting-men have given 
during the last terrible thirty months is not thrown away. 
Whether it be in the matter of lending money to the State 
or of foregoing excess and luxury, we— the great majority 
of us that is— are only too glad of the occasion for proving 
our merit. The present call to National Service is 
another welcome opportunity. 


rebruary 15, 1917 

Evacuation of Grandcourt 

By Hilaire Belloc 

THE evacuation of Grandcourt by the enemy 
is. though it is but a detail, a very interesting 
piece of news. If I were to use the word 
" significant " that would be pretending to under- 
stand its consequences, which I cannot e\-en suggest. 
(Jnly Professional soldiers on the spot can judge of such 
matters, but what 1 can do is to put before the reader, so 
far as the ofticial despatches pennit it, the nature of the 
ground taken, the cause of the enemy's action, and the 
consequences, so far as mere ground is concerned, of the 

By the end of November last the British line upon 
either side of the Ancre ran more (^r less after the hnc of 
dots sketched upon the accompanying map. 

It ran across the spur between Beaumont Hamel and 
Beaucourt, without reaching the height of the hill B 
(Hill 143), which dominates Beaumont Hamel. It ran 
down the spur at the foot of which Beaucourt lies, included 
— that is, covered — Beaucourt, seems to have formed a 
little salient up to the square copse east of that ^'illage, 
and so reached the marshy and flooded