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The  County  Gentleman 


AND 


LAND  &WATER 

Vol.  LXIV.         No.  2740  SATURDAY.  NOVEMBER  14,  1914      [l^§k^i,^I>,A']     \^^^^iinll''^i,ll^ 


Copyright,  The  Cardinal  Publhhing  Co. 


GENERAL   JOFFRE 

_    Commander-in-Chief  of  the  French  Army 


LAND     AND     WATER 


November   14,   1914 


Alexander  &  Macdonald 

DISTILLERS  AND  f^   BLENDERS,  LEITH 


A  Blend  of 
Old  Highland 
Malt  Whiskies 


Guaranteed 
not  less  than 
10    years   old 

ALSO  15  AND  20  YEARS  OLD 


SANDY 
MACDONALD 

The  .deal  drmk,  both  for  refreshment  and  for  medicinal  purposes,  is,  it  is 

genera  ly  agreed    Scotch  Whisky.  And  that  "Sandy  Macdonald"  is  the 

.deal  Scotch  Whisky  is  a  widespread  belief  amongst  connoisseurs. 

le   purity    and    age   of  this  Whisky    ("Sandy  Mac- 
donald"   is    guaranteed     10    years    old)    have 
rendered    it   famous  in   ail  quarters  of  the 
globe,   and   wherever    Britishers   fore- 
gather   a    "wee    deoch-an'-doris" 
drunk  in  "Sandy  Macdonald" 
is    the    most    probable 
finale  tothemeeting 


) 


m 


76 


November  14,  1914 


LAIJD    AND    WATER 


THE    WAR    BY    LAND. 

By  HILAIRE    BELLOC. 

NOTE. — THIS   XBTICLa   HAS   BEIN   ECBITITTED  TO  THB  PRESS   BnHEAU,  'WniCH  DOBS  KOT  OBJECT  TO  THa  FTmLI01.TION  AS  CIHSOBSO 
AND  TAKES   SO  BESPONSIBILITT  FOB  THa  OOBEECTNESS  OF  THB  STATEMENTS. 

Ol  ACCOBSAKCa    'RITH     THE    EEQUIEEMENTS     OE     TBa    PEKSS    BXTEEAn,    TH»    POSITIONS     OF     TEOOrS    ON    PLANS     ILLUSTSATINQ    THIS 
AKTICLB   MUST  ONLT   BB  BEOABSES  AS  APPEOIIMATB,  AND  NO  OEFINITa  6TBENGTH  AT  ANY   POINT   IS  INDICATED. 


••  PRESSURE." 

WHEN  nations  conflict  in  war  they  bring 
armies  one  against  the  other,  and  the 
first  object  of  strategy  for  each  army 
is  to  disarm,  in  as  high  a  degree  as 
possible,  the  other. 
But  there  is  a  second,  subsidiary  object  always 
present  in  warfare  between  civilised  nations,  which 
indirectly  leads  to  the  same  result,  and  that  object  is 
the  putting  of  a  political  and  economic  "  pressure " 
upon  the  enemy. 

For  instance :  The  German  attack  in  1870  was 
directed  upon  Paris,  and  rightly :  not  because  Paris 
was  an  army,  but  because  with  Paris  taken  French 
resistance  was  almost  bound  to  cease. 

Now  there  is  in  modem  Gennany  no  centre 
corresponding  to  Paais,  and  therefore  no  corre- 
sponding political  objective. 

But  look  for  a  moment  at  the  accompanying 
sketch. 


^^  Main  Industrial  Regions 
-.^•w  Frontier  of  German  Bmpire 
A  A  Western  German  Battle  Line 
BB  Eastern      „         .,        „ 


Germany  is  a  nation  which  has  chosen  in  our 
own  generation  to  industrialise  itself ;  that  is,  to 
convert  the  main  part  of  its  energies  from  agriculture 
to  capitalistic  modem  manufactui-e  by  machinery, 
notably  of  metal  goods. 

There  has  accompanied  this  phenomenon  what 
always  accompanies  it :  the  nation's  reposing  upon  an 
urban  population  of  lower  physique  than  of  old; 
its  dependence  for  all  information  upon  a  centralised 
Press  in  the  hands  of  a  few  capitalists ;  a  vast 
proletarian  mass,  impotent  to  organise  itself  or  to 
act  with  civic  initiative — and  an  absolute  physical 
necessity  of  keeping  the  machinery  going. 


If  an  industrialised  country  be  suddenly  con- 
demned to  use  its  agricultural  resources  alone,  it  is 
wounded  to  death. 

In  an  extreme  case,  like  that  of  England,  it  will 
not  even  be  able  to  feed  itself  with  the  first  and  most 
necessary  forms  of  food.  It  will  not  have  enough 
bread  to  keep  alive.  Germany  is  not  yet  in  this  case ; 
yet  it  suffers  in  the  second  degree,  which  is,  that  a 
blow  at  its  industrial  districts  deprives  the  mass  of  its 
population  of  their  common  habit  of  life  and  cuts  all 
the  channels  whereby,  within  their  experience,  liveli- 
hood can  be  maintained.  You  may  feed  the  towns, 
if  industry  decays,  so  long  as  you  stQl  have  (as  Germany 
has)  a  remaining  sufficient  agricultural  population. 
But  even  the  mere  feeding  of  them  would  require 
suddenly  organised,  vastly  competent,  entirely  cen- 
tralised control — and  the  destruction,  of  course,  of  all 
the  old  bonds  of  property  and  credit.  Food  would  have 
to  be  taken  by  force  and  distributed  by  officials — to 
perform  the  task  fully  would  certainly  be  too  hard, 
even  for  the  most  humanly  perfect  organisation.  The 
striking  at  the  industrial  districts  would  hamstring 
the  whole  nation  in  the  matter  of  food  distribution 
alone :  e.g.,  Belgium  (in  spite  of  vast  emigration  and 
small  size)  to-day. 

But  there  is  more  than  this.  The  industrial 
districts  coUect  the  currency  (and  its  control)  in  great 
depots.  Outside  them,  only  the  capital  and  the  main 
seaports  have  gi*eat  depots  of  controlled  currency. 

Again,  the  industxial  districts  provide  the  opinion, 
spontaneous  or  manufactured,  upon  which  the  govern- 
ment of  such  countries  reposes. 

Again,  the  industrial  districts  make  a  mass  of 
things  which  the  nation  has  leamt  to  regard  as  neces- 
saries, and  which,  in  some  cases,  are  necessaries — 
especially  to  the  conduct  of  a  campaign.  They  make 
the  rails  and  the  locomotives  and  the  wagons,  the 
internal-combustion  engines,  the  electrical  apparatus, 
the  com  mills,  the  spinning  and  weaving  machinery, 
and  at  certain  few  spots  in  them  you  find  concentrated 
the  only  available  plant  for  making  the  guns  and 
explosives. 

Now  it  so  liappens  that  the  German  Empire  has  its 
two  main  industrial  districts  precisely  in  those  regions 
which  the  first  shock  of  an  invasion  will  strike.  Boughly 
speaking,  you  have  (1)  the  Westphalian  and  Western 
group — extending  into  Lorraine — and  (2)  the  Silesian 
Eastern  group.  There  is  much  intermediary;  but 
those  two  districts  are  the  two  nerve-centres,  the  dual 
poles,  of  modem  industrial  Germany, 

Defending  Westphalia  you  have,  when  the  tide 
shall  turn  against  the  Germans  in  the  West  and  the 
deadlock  there  shall  break,  successive  lines  of  defencb, 
natural  and  artificial.  It  may  bo  suggested  that  a 
first  obvious  line,  for  instance,  is  through  and  defend- 
ing Antwerp,  then  Bmssels,  to  Namur,  and  so  up  the 
Meuse.  iijiother  and  shorter  could  run  througb 
and  in  front  of  Liege  along  the  Belgian  Aisne  and 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


November  14,  1914 


across  the  Luxembourg  biglilands  down  to  tbe  Upper 
Moselle.  Another,  but  longer  one,  would  be  the 
Ehinc  Before  this  last  one  is  reached  one  outlier  ot 
the  western  industrial  field,  that  in  Lorraine,  would 
be  lost.  But  at  any  rate,  from  the  very  beginning  ot 
the  setback,  something  upon  which  modem  Germany 
immediately  depends  for  existence,  moral  and  physical, 
is  in  perU.  The  ruin  of  Westphaha  would  mean  a 
hundred  times  more  in  this  war  than  the  occupation 
of  Berlin  ;  and  it  is  possible  that  the  near  future  will 
see  Berlin  occupied  and  yet  the  war  not  at  its 
conclusion. 

But  if  this  "pressure"  threatens  ah-eady  upon 
the  West,  far  more  does  it  threaten  upon  the  East. 
Silesia  is  actually  adjacent  to,  coterminous  with,  the 
enemy's  frontier.  The  thickest  knot  of  manufactories 
lies  just  on  that  point  where  the  three  Empires  meet ; 
not  a  day's  march  from,  nor  half  a  day's  march  from, 
the  frontier  of  Eussian  Poland,  but  actually  on  that 
frontier.  And  behind  this  most  vulnerable  belt  lies 
belt  after  belt  back  on  to  the  mountains,  making  up 
the  whole  industrial  region  of  the  Upper  Oder  valley. 
It  is  true  that  a  blow  at  SUesia  would  not  be  the 
same  thing  as  a  blow  at  Westphaha.  To  take  but 
one  point ;  armament  is  manufactured  wholly  in  the 
western  field.  There  only  is  found  the  plant  required. 
Krupp  is  in  the  West,  and  so  is  Erhard  and  Sehmer 
(who,  by  the  way,  make  not  only  for  Germany,  but  for 
Austria,  and  forge  gun-baiTcls  for  Elrupp  as  well). 
The  Gennan  output  of  heavy  guns,  the  plant  for  wliich 
is  about  equal  to  that  of  France  and  England  combined, 
proceeds  from,  and  can  only  proceed  from,  this  vulner- 
able centre  in  the  West.  The  French  centres  of  such 
production  ai-e  very  far  removed  from  the  advance  of 
armies :  The  English  ones  are  defended  by  the  sea 
and  by  the  Fleet. 

To  sum  up  :  defeating  the  German  armies  in  the 
field,  disarming  them,  is  indeed  the  principal  business  of 
the  Allied  strategy  ;  but  a  secondary  and  allied  object  is 
the  destruction  of  the  manufacturing  provinces.  And 
these  centres  are  not  in  the  heart  of  Germany,  but  on 
its  borders,  so  far  as  this  war  is  concerned.  The  two 
German  battle-lines  in  East  and  West  are  di-awn  up  to 
cover  as  long  as  may  be — and  are  already  perilously 
close  to ! — the  vital  parts. 

This,  coupled  with  the  importance  to  the  German 
Government  of  keeping  the  war  off  Gennan  soil,  gives 
all  its  meaning  in  particular  to  the  present  Eussian 
advance  and  to  the  Eastern  campaign. 

As  the  Eussian  advance,  right  up  to  the  Silesian 
frontiers,  has  been  the  feature  of  the  past  week,  and 
as  the  Eastern  field  of  war  is  stiU  (as  I  have  constantly 
insisted  in  these  notes)  the  determining  field  of  the 
war,  I  will  deal  first  again  this  week  with  the  opera- 
tions in  Poland. 

II. 

THE    OPERATIONS    IN    POLAND. 

Three  things  are  requu-cd  for  an  appreciation  of 
the  operations  in  Poland  during  the  last  week.  First, 
some  clear  conception  of  the  rate  and  positions  of  the 
Eussian  advance.  Secondl}"-,  the  nature  and  extent  of 
the  Austro-German  reverse.  Thirdly,  some  estimate 
of  the  chances  the  Germans  have  of  entrenching  and 
standing  upon  this  side  of  their  frontier. 

As  to  the  first  of  these  points,  we  have  accurate 
information,  and  that  information  concerns,  as  througli- 
out  this  Eastern  campaign,  two  main  fields  of  war :  A, 
the  East  Prussian  frontier,  and  B,  the  basin  of  the 
Vistula ;  while  the  kitter  is  naturally  subdivided  into 
the  Eussian  effort  in  front  of  Warsaw  and  on  tlie 
middle   Vistula   (B-1)   where   it    luvs   prLucipally   to 


.^*^.  FRONTIER. 


n 


THE   BATTLE   FP.ONT   IN   THE  BiSTBEN  ABBA, 

meet  German  troops;  and  (B-2)  the  Eussian  effort 
in  front  of  Sandomir  and  on  the  Eiver  San,  where  it 
has  principally  to  meet  Austrian  troops. 

THE  OPERATIONS  IN  EAST  PRUSSIA. 


As  to  the  first  of  these,  the  East  Prussian 
frontier : 

The  struggle  between  the  comparatively  small 
bodies  engaged  (comparatively  small  in  relation  to 
such  a  war  as  this :  they  are  larger  than  anything 
that  Napoleon  met  in  any  one  field  before  1812)  is 
still  almost  coincident  with  the  frontier  between  the 
two  nations,  and  the  reason  of  this  coincidence  I 
explained  last  week.  It  lies  in  the  all-important 
political  necessity  under  which  the  Prussians  are  of 
keeping  the  war  as  long  as  possible  off  German  soil. 
Both  the  Eussian  communiqufes,  though  they  only 
give  one  side  of  the  story,  and  the  map  (which  is 
more  impartial),  show  some  slight  retrocession  in  the 
German   defensive    line.     When   Bakalarshewo   was 


a* 


November  14,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATEB 


taken  by  the  Eussians  at  the  beginning  of  last  week, 
that  point,  still  in  Russian  soil,  marked  but  a  slight 
advance.  But  since  then  the  frontier  has  been  crossed 
in  front  of  the  frontier  station  of  Wirballen,  and  the 
Russian  advance  guards  have  reached  Stalluponen.  It 
is  quite  a  short  distance — less  than  a  day's  march — 
and  we  have  yet  to  see  how  far  it  can  be  followed  up. 
But  it  is  significant  for  two  reasons.  First,  because  the 
German  communiques  have  for  some  weeks  past  insisted 
upon  the  Russian  attempt  to  take  Wirballen  -with  its  en- 
trenched positions,  and  upon  the  Russian  failure  in  this 
attempt  on  the  Gennan  left  flank.  Secondly,  because  the 
advance  is  along  that  main  line  of  railway  which  also 
marked  the  first  abortive  Russian  invasion  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war.  Another  two  days'  march  on 
is  Gumbiunen  on  the  same  line,  about  25  miles 
from  the  frontier.  Yet  another  two  days'  march 
forward  is  Insterburg — and  all  that  country  is  not 
Polish,  but  distinctively  German.  We  have  yet  to 
see  how  far  the  advance  along  this  main  fine  of 
railway  can  continue,  but  every  mile  of  it  turns  the 
general  German  line  on  this  frontier,  and  goes  thi-ough 
the  more  open  country  north  of  the  lakes,  avoiding 
that  danger  of  marsh  and  fortified  defiles  in  which 
the  Russians  suffered  their  great  defeat  of  the  end 
of  August  and  early  September.  All  along  the  rest 
of  this  frontier  there  appear  to  be  but  little  changes. 
There  is  the  usual  pressure  and  counter-pressure  in 
front  of  Lyck,  but  no  indication  of  any  permanent 
foothold  here  upon  German  soil.  The  same  is  true 
of  the  neighbom-hood  of  Bialla,  and  of  the  cavalry 
movement  to  the  north  of  Mlawa  along  the  second 
of  the  two  railway  lines  which  cut  the  south  frontier 
of  East  Prussia. 

As  to  the  short  phrase  about  the  forest  of 
Eominten  contained  in  the  Russian  communique  of 
last  Monday,  it  does  indicate  cavalry  raids,  perhaps, 
into  the  hunting  grounds  of  the  German  Emperor, 
but  as  yet  no  occupation.  In  general,  one  may  say 
that  all  along  the  horseshoe  of  this  frontier  there  is 
now  such  pressure  on  the  Germans  that  they  ai-e 
slowly  receding — but  very  slowly. 

B 

THE    OPERATIONS    AGAINST    THE 

MAIN    AUSTRO .  GERMAN    FORGES 

IN  THE  BASIN    OF    THE    VISTULA 

AND    THE  SAN. 


WARSAW 


SAUcUmur 


N. 


PRX£Mr5t 


Miles 


XV 


Upon  the  main  operations  on  a  much  larger 
Bcalc  in  South  Poland  we  have  equally  detailed  infor- 
mation. Tlie  Russian  advance  lias  throughout  the 
week  been  consistent  and  rapid ;  the  cavalry  following 


up  the  German  retirement  closely,  and  the  prolonged 
Austrian  resistance  upon  the  San  having  now  definitely 
broken  down.  There  seems  even  a  probability  that  a 
wedge  may  have  been  di-iven  not,  indeed,  into  the  two 
halves  of  the  main  Austro-German  force  A — A  (as  at 
D),  retiring  upon  the  Vistula  westward  through 
Russian  Poland — a  breach  which  was  thought  possible 
last  week  (I  said  at  the  time  we  had  no  real  evidence  of 
it),  but  at  C  between  these  forces,  as  a  whole,  and  the 
pm'ely  Austrian  group  in  Galicia.  For  while  the  mass 
of  the  retreating  invaders  is  pressed  along  the  lines 
marked  A — A  on  the  above  map,  the  Austrian  bodies, 
which  have  hung  on  rather  too  long  to  the  line  of  the 
San,  are  evidently  beliind  or  Eastward  of  the  line  of 
that  retreat,  in  a  position  more  like  B — B,  and 
advance  bodies  of  the  Russian  pursuit  have  already 
reached  C.  Whether  the  Austrian  bodies  at  B — B, 
which  are  falling  back  from  the  San,  wiU  be  cut  off — 
or  any  part  of  them — we  cannot  yet  tell.  They  have 
the  Carpathians  behind  them  with  roads  and  railways  for 
crossing  those  mountains ;  but  they  have  only  a  few 
such  opportunities  for  crossing  through  what  will  be,  for 
such  considerable  forces,  naiTow  and  congested  defiles. 
If  they  attempt  to  pursue  the  course  which  plain 
strategy  demands,  to  retire  upon  Cracow,  and  try  to 
keep  in  line  with  the  main  Austro-German  body  A — A 
north  of  the  Vistula,  then  their  extreme  Eastern 
contingents  will  have  a  very  hard  task  set  them  to  fall 
back  with  sufficient  rapidity.  The  main  Galiciau 
railway  from  Lemberg  to  Cracow  is  not  available  for 
this  Eastern  part  of  the  Austrian  host,  and  it  is 
difficult  to  see  how  it  can  escape  being  cut  off  if  it 
now,  so  late,  attempts  a  Westward  retu-ement  upon 
Cracow.  It  looks  as  though  the  chances  were  for  the 
following  situation  to  develop  : — 

For  one  extreme  of  the  line  B — ^B  (the  Western 
and  Northern  extreme)  to  fall  back  Westward,  in 
touch  with  A — A,  stand  at  Cracow  and  take  part  in 
the  coming  general  battle  which  the  Germans  must 
deliver  if  they  are  to  save  Silesia ;  while  the  other 
extreme,  the  Eastern  and  Southern  one,  will  get  back 
as  best  it  can  Southward  across  the  Carpathians.  In 
war  never  prophesy ;  but  that  seems  the  more  likely 
of  the  various  developments  open  to  the  situation  ;  the 
division  (at  last !)  of  one  of  the  enemy's  lines  and  a 
full  breach  therein  driven  through  Western  Galicia. 

Having  said  so  much  let  us  consider  in  rather 
more  detail  the  operations  against,  and  the  retirement 
of,  the  main  Austro-German  body  through  Russian 
Poland  towards  the  German  frontier. 

B  (1) 

THE     OPERATIONS    TOWARDS     THE 
FRONTIER     BETWEEN     RUSSIAN- 
POLAND    AND    SILESIA. 

When  the  German  invaders  were  defeated  in  front 
of  Warsaw  three  weeks  ago,  their  line,  which  wag 
attempting  to  cross  the  middle  Vistula  at  the  points 
marked  A  A  A  A  on  the  foUo-.ving  map,  was  obviously 
turned,  and  they  had  to  begin  to  fall  back.  The  Austro- 
German  forces  thus  falling  back  pivoted  at  first  upon 
Sandomir.  Their  colleagues,  indeed,  beyond  the  Vistula 
and  along  the  River  San,  hung  on  to  that  line  of  offence, 
but  tlicy  retreated  (to  the  number  of  at  least  800,000 
and  perhapsa  milHon)  in  a  great  sweeptowardsthe  West. 
The  marching  wing  of  this  swinging  line  successively 
abandoned  Skieniewice  and  Lodz,  and  the  country  to 
the  North  of  Lodz.  A  week  ago  the  middle  of  that 
wing  was  still  falling  back  from  and  evacuatmg 
Sdunskowola,  relying  everywhere  for  its  retreat  upon 
the  main  railway  which  passes  through  Kalisz  and 


8* 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


November  14,  1914 


THORN^-^L^  ^'  ^  e 


^cst^^ 


-9 


.WAR5AW 


<y      )J\Imn^orod 


"i^ 


\   \ 


I 


Zdanskawol 


^ 


r^ 


l^odoia 


O 


xf 


r*"y^ 


A 


'Czesfocliowa     ,>(7i      '  ^        ..^"^^"^ 


Frontiers^— '^-^    ^ 
Railways  ,  ,  i  >■  ^^ 

o  2/         5'^         ?3' 

I I 1 1 


CRACOW" 


xP 


-> 


so  enters  German  territorj.  The  extreme  nortli  of 
this  line  touched  the  Warta  near  Kolo.  The  south 
of  it  passed  tlu'ough  Czestochowa,  and  was  thence 
continued  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Cracow. 

The  southern  part  of  the  whole  line  thus  falling 
back  similarly  relied  upon  a  line  of  railway,  that 
running  from  Ivangorod  through  Eadom  and  Kielce 
to  the  placewhere  the  three  Empires  meet.  The  extreme 
south-eastern  end  of  it  still  hung  on  to  Sandomir. 
Apparently  the  order  for  the  Austrian  and  German 
forces  to  retii*e  as  a  whole  from  the  Vistida  and  the 
San  together  was  either  not  suggested,  or  not  given,  or 
if  given,  not  obeyed  ;  and  the  enemy  was  still  clinging 
to  Sandomir  at  the  junction  of  the  two  rivers  on  the 
same  day  (November  3rd)  which  saw  his  expulsion 
from  Kielce  (at  which  place  he  lost  a  certain  number 
of  prisoners  and  machine  guns). 

It  was  precisely  because  he  had  hung  on  to 
Sandomir  so  long  that  the  capture  of  this  place  by 
the  Eussians  became  of  such  great  importance. 

It  is  evident  from  the  sketch  map  above  that 
after  Sandomir  was  taken  last  Tuesday  week  the 
southernmost  bodies  of  the  Austro-German  forces  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  Sandomir  had  all  to  cross  the 
Vistula  southward  in  the  direction  of  the  arrows 
C  C  C,  with  the  exception  of  some  small  portion 
that  may  have  been  able  to  retu-e  directly  south- 
westward  in  the  direction  of  the  arrow  B  ;  while  the 
main  part  of  this  southern  group  near  Kielce  used 
the  railway  for  their  retirement.  The  Russian  cavahy 
pushed  forward  and,  on  November  Cth,  last  Friday, 
had  crossed  the  Eivcr  Nida,  and  the  next  day, 
Saturday,  the  Eivcr  Nidisca,  10  miles  further  on.  On 
that  day  the  Austro-German  line  north  of  the  Vistula 


had  been  pushed  back  to  some  such  front  as  ia 
indicated  upon  the  map  by  the  line  of  dashes, 
stretching  from  the  neighbourhood  of  Ploeschen  to  the 
positions  in  front  of  Cracow,  and  was  presumably 
continued  somewhat  south  of  the  Vistula  in  the 
direction  I  have  indicated  by  an  interrogation  mark. 
The  whole  Austro-German  retreat  v/as  now  back  upon 
an  average  more  than  a  hundred  miles  from  the 
line  of  the  Vistula,  which  it  had  attemped  to  force 
three  weeks  before. 

But  it  had  left,  dangerously  far  to  the  eastioard, 
along  the  River  San,  the  remainder  of  the  Austrian 
forces  tvhich  should  have  kept  in  line  with  this  retreat. 
With  the  effect  of  that  too  prolonged  delay  upon  the 
San  I  will  deal  in  a  moment.  But  before  leaving 
this  main  subject  of  the  German  retreat  from  the 
Vistula  we  have  to  ask  om-selves,  first,  how  far  the 
Austro-German  force  has  suffered  in  this  retreat,  and, 
secondly,  where  this  retreat  is  likely  to  end  and  a 
German  stand  to  be  made  against  the  Eussian 
tide,  v/ith  the  chances  of  success  that  stand  may 
have. 

As  to  the  first  of  these  questions  :  The  auswer 
must  be  that  the  German  retreat  has  been  orderly 
and  apparently  inexpensive.  What  losses  it  has 
involved  in  killed  and  wounded  we  do  not  know,  but 
there  is  no  Eussian  account  of  any  considerable 
capture  here  of  prisoners  or  of  guns.  It  is,  as  might 
be  expected,  the  southern  part  of  the  general  retirement 
— where  the  Austrian  were  the  principal  contingents — 
tliat  has  suffered  most  heavily.  But  even  there  the 
losses  of  the  enemy,  chiefly  in  front  of  Kielce — which 
was  defended  apparently  too  long — were  insignificant 
compared  with  their  total  forces. 


4* 


November  14,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


We  may  sum  up  and  say  that  the  German  retreat 
through  Eussian  Poland,  from  the  middle  Vistula — 
Warsaw — Sandomir,  has  been  conducted  by  the  enemy 
in  perfect  order  and  with  success. 

When  we  ask  ourselves  the  second  question, 
where  the  stand  wiU  we  made — and  a  stand  must  be 
made  if  industiial  Silesia  is  not  to  be  immediately 
invaded — we  are,  of  course,  on  more  doubtful  ground, 
and  we  can  only  put  the  matter  hypotheticaUy  and  in 
the  shape  of  alternatives. 

At  first  it  was  taken  for  granted  that  the  Germans 
would  stand,  where  they  had  entrenched,  on  the  line  of 
the  Eiver  Warta,  carrying  the  entrenchments  from 
Kolo  northward  to  the  Vistula  at  the  fortress  of  Thorn 
by  a  series  of  ditches  across  country.  We  know  from 
our  experience  in  the  West  that  it  is  the  German  habit 
in  this  w^ar  to  send  back  forces  behind  a  retirement  to 
prepare  a  position,  and  there  at  the  end  of  the  retire- 
ment to  stand.  This  is  what  they  did  upon  the  Aisne 
after  their  retreat  had  fallen  back  from  the  line  Paris- 
Verdun  to  its  present  line.  But  there  are  certain 
factors  in  this  case  which  might  modify  such  a 
scheme. 

In  the  first  place  there  is  no  series  of  heights 
dominating  the  Warta  (in  its  middle  part  at  least)  as 
there  is  a  series  dominating  the  course  of  the  Aisne. 
In  the  second  place  the  conditions  of  soil  and  of  season 
are  not  so  favourable  as  they  were  in  northern  France 
two  months  ago.  The  trenches  along  the  Aisne  and 
across  Champagne  were  made  through  chalky  soU. 
A  g^eat  part  of  western  Poland  is  marshy.  In  the 
third  place — and  this  is  much  the  most  important  point 
— the  Germans  have  before  them  in  western  Poland 
an  enemy  already  superior  in  numbers  and  growing 
more  numerous  witii  every  week. 

That  last  is  really  the  capital  difference  of  all. 
What  the  Germans  could  do  in  Champagne  against 
numbers  which  were  still  inferior  to  their  own,  they 
cannot  hope  to  do  in  Poland  against  superior  forces. 
To  stand  on  the  Warta — which  they  still  may  do, 
but  which  seems  increasingly  unlikely — would  mean 
the  holding  of  a  very  long  line  any  part  of  which  (and 
particularly  the  pai-t  north  of  Kolo)  might  be  pierced 
by  determined  Eussian  effort. 

Next  let  us  note  that  there  is  no  railway  facility 
just  behind  the  Warta.  Tliere  is  only  one  transverse 
line  leadmg  to  Kalisch,  whereas  there  is  a  strategic 
railway  running  all  along  behind  and  parallel  to  the 
frontier  from  the  fortress  of  Posen,  to  the  point 
where  the  three  Empires  meet.  This  line  could 
feed  aU  the  frontier  position.  Now  heavy  artillery 
needs  a  railway  for  its  constant  and  prolonged 
supply.  Further,  this  frontier  is  from  the  point 
marked  D  upon  the  map  to  the  point  marked  E, 
a  river  (the  Eiver  Prosna).  What  opportunities  it 
offers  for  defence  I  do  not  know,  for  I  have  neither 
seen  it  nor  read  any  work  upon  it,  but  it  is  at  any  rate 
a  continuous  water-course  suggesting  a  line  of  defence. 
And  I  now  cannot  but  believe  that  the  most  likely 
place  for  the  Germans  to  make  a  stand  wUl  rather  be 
near,  or  upon,  their  own  political  frontier  than  along 
the  Eiver  Warta. 

There  is  further  evidence  of  tliis  in  the  fact  that 
though  the  Germans  tell  us  that  the  Eussian  cavaliy 
attempting  to  cross  the  Warta  at  Kolo  was  thro^vn 
back  across  tlie  stream,  yet  tico  days  later  the  Eussian 
ofHcial  commnniqud  tells  us  that  a  body  of  their  cavaby 
was  another  forty  miles  on  raiding  across  the  Gcnnan 
frontier  as  far  as  the  railway  station  of  Ploeschcn, 
which  is  situated  upon  that  very  strategic  railway, 
iust  behind  and  along  the  frontier,  to  which  reference 
has  been  made. 


That  a  stand  will  be  made  somewhere  in  thia 
neighbourhood — if  not  along  the  Wai'ta,  then  at  any 
rate  somewhere  near  the  frontier — is,  as  I  have 
repeated,  a  certainty ;  because  it  is  absolutely  essential 
to  the  Prussian  scheme  to  save  Silesia. 

I  have  already  pointed  out  how  Prussian  strategy 
win  inevitably  be  fettered  in  the  later  phases  of  this 
campaign  by  the  poHtical  necessity  of  keeping  the  war, 
if  possible,  off  German  soil.  The  moment  you  interfere 
with  the  purely  strategic  elements  of  a  problem  by 
any  political  consideration,  to  that  extent  you  weaken 
yourself.  But  the  German  Government  has  here  no 
choice.  After  the  behaviour  of  the  German  armies  in 
the  West  the  reprisals  that  would  inevitably  begin 
upon  an  occupation  of  German  soil  by  an  enemy  would 
have  a  quite  incalculable  effect  upon  the  temper  of  the 
nation,  and  the  rich  industrial  district  of  Silesia  would 
offer  opportunities  as  great  for  the  exercising  of  this 
"  pressure  "  as  any  part  of  the  Empire. 

There  would  be  less  anxiety  at  first  for  the  non- 
German  districts  to  the  north.  Posen  and  aU  its 
province  are  Polish;  and  it  is  almost  certain  that, 
what  with  the  strength  of  the  fortress  of  Posen  itself 
and  with  the  all-importance  of  keeping  the  Eussians 
out  of  Silesia,  a  great  battle  must  be  fought  to  cover 
that  district  even  at  the  risk  of  abandoning  the  provinces 
of  Posen  to  the  north. 

It  is  on  this  account  that  we  should  be  very  chary 
of  accepting  stories  about  the  immediate  intention  of 
the  Germans  to  despatch  men  to  the  Western  field  of 
war  from  the  East.  If  they  weaken  their  Eastern 
frontier  and  if  Silesia  is  invaded  nothing  that  happens 
in  the  West  can  compensate  them  for  the  effects  that 
wiU  immediately  follow.  Let  it  be  further  remem- 
bered that  if  SUesia  is  once  invaded,  the  line  of  the 
Oder  (a  shallow  stream  in  any  case)  is  t\imed,  and  the 
Oder  runs  so  far  westward  that  in  its  low^er  reaches  it 
is  but  four  days'  march  from  Berlin.  It  is  true  to 
say  that  the  German  defensive  plan  has  never  allowed 
for  the  turning  from  the  South  of  the  Eastern  defen- 
sive river  lines  of  Germany,  and  it  is  now  precisely 
from  the  South  that  these  lines  are  in  danger  of 
being  turned. 

B  (2) 
THE  OPERATIONS    UPON    THE   SAN. 


_^.  _  .  .     .  .s-«^AR05LAV 

CRACOW  ^L.^+-H^^^*^^^^^ 


'*...*«»>"i,^ 


a    10    40    60  too     "'^'^"='"^9^:  '^^ 


Miles 


VI 


Meanwhile,  as  we  have  seen,  the  remaining 
Austrian  operations  in  the  valley  of  the  San  have 
great  importance  because  it  seems  certain  that  thq 
enemy  here  has  hung  on  too  long. 

In  the  above  sketch  map  the  position  wiU  be 
apparent.  The  Austrians  made  a  veiy  vigorous 
effort  to  carry  the  line  of  the  San,  to  relievo  Przemysl, 
and  to  advance  upon  Lemberg.     It  was  theii*  counter- 


LAND    AND    "WATER 


November  14,  1914 


offensive  folloi\'ing  upon  their  defeats  in  the  beginning 
of  September ;  and  that  counter-offensive  was  made 
possible  by  the  withdrawal  of  Russian  foi'ccs  noiih- 
ward  to  meet  the  great  main  German  attack  upon  the 
middle  Vistula.  At  first  it  looked  as  though  this 
effort  upon  the  San  was  going  to  be  successful.  It 
had  (supposing  the  German  plan  had  come  off,  suppos- 
ing Warsaw  had  been  tiiken  and  the  middle  Vistula 
held)  a  high  strategic  value.  The  forcing  of  the  line 
of  the  San,  the  relief  of  Przemysl,  and  the  threatening 
of  Lemberg  would  obviously  have  tui-ned  the  Russian 
south  end  or  left ;  and  this  Russian  left  was  at  first 
weak  from  the  withdi-awal  northward  of  the  forces  I 
have  named. 

But  Russian  reinforcements  were  perpetually  com- 
ing up  upon  the  San  from  the  interior,  and  at  the  same 
time  the  German  effort  upon  the  Vistula  broke  down. 
The  moment  it  broke  down  it  was  strategically  necessary 
for  the  Austrian  forces  that  had  been  trying  to  cross 
the  San  (and  had  in  some  places  succeeded),  and 
had  also  successfully  pushed  forward  across  the 
Carpathians  along  the  arrows  A — A  towards  Lemberg, 
to  fall  back  at  once  into  line  with  the  Austro-German 
retreat  to  the  north.  For  some  reason  or  other  this 
retirement  was  not  effected  ;  at  any  rate  it  was  not 
effected  with  suflBcient  rapidity.  There  were  Austrians 
still  at  Jaroslav  and  roughly  along  the  line  B — B  at  a 
moment  when  the  Russian  advance  beyond  the  Vistula 
had  already  reached  the  line  C — C,  which  is  that  of 
the  River  Nidisca.  It  is  here  that  the  capital 
importance  of  the  capture  of  Sandomir  by  the  Russians 
Last  Tuesday  week  is  apparent.  It  gave  them  a  chance 
of  cutting  off  a  portion  at  least  of  the  Austrian  forces. 
The  now  largely  increased  Russian  bodies  on  the  San 
made  good  their  crossings  at  Nisko  and  Rudnik  and 
before  Leheisk.  By  last  Sunday  they  had  got  into 
Jaroslav,  and  it  is  fairly  certain  that  they  have  already 
completely  reinvested  Przemysl.  Their  main  line  in 
Galicia  was  on  Monday  last  less  than  100  miles  from 
Cracow  and  their  cavalry  in  Russian  Poland  less  than 
30  miles  from  that  fortress. 

Fui-ther,  there  has  been  on  this  front  a  real 
success  in  the  way  of  harrying  the  Austrian  retreat. 
The  ofiicial  communique  gives  12,000  prisoners  taken 
along  the  San  and,  though  apparently  no  guns,  a 
certain  number  of  maxims. 

I  should  here  perhaps  explain  to  the  reader  why 
I  have  not  counted  either,  in  describing  the  retreat  of 
the  Austro-Germans  from  the  Vistula  as  orderly, 
Reuter's  report  of  nearly  19,000  men  taken  prisoners  by 
the  Russians,  with  forty  guns,  or  the  report  from  Rome 
of  200  guns  taken  on  the  San  with  25,000  prisoners. 
My  reason  is,  not  that  these  accounts  may  not 
be  tiTie  or  based  upon  truth,  but  simply  that  they  are 
no  part  of  the  official  communiques.  News  received 
from  any  other  source  than  the  official  communiques 
must,  for  the  purposes  of  an  accurate  judgment,  be 
closely  checked.  Sometimes  it  vividly  illustrates  some 
hypothesis  upon  which  there  are  other  converging 
lines  of  proof ;  sometimes,  by  some  accident,  it  betra}^ 
a  useful  and  unexpected  bit  of  knowledge.  But  mere 
rumours  of  losses  like  these  should  always  be  looked 
at  with  reserve  and  compared  with  the  declarations  of 
the  General  Staff.  And  all  that  we  have  from  the 
Russian  General  Staff  at  the  moment  of  writing  is 
the  announcement  of  12,000  Austrian  prisoners  upon 
the  San,  with  no  mention  of  field  pieces  or  howitzos. 


German  forces  there  are  strictly  on  the  defensive ; 
the  Russian  forces  are  evidently  increasing,  and  the 
frontier  has  been  just  crossed  at  the  point  where  the 
main  international  line  cuts  it. 

(B)  The  main  operations  in  the  South  have  gone 
steadily  in  favour  of  the  Russians,  and  while  there 
has  been,  apparently,  no  cutting  of  the  chief  German 
line  north  of  the  Vistula,  it  is  jjossible  that  certain 
of  the  Austrian  forces  in  Galicia  wiU  be  cut  off  from 
that  chief  line. 

Meanwhile  [B  (1)]  the  main  Austro-German  force, 
which  has  been  retreating  through  Russian-Poland, 
will  be  compelled  immediately  to  give  battle,  probably 
well  behind  the  line  of  the  Warta  and  nearer  the 
line  of  the  frontier,  on  peril  of  losing  Silesia.  This 
main  enemy  force  in  Poland  is  still  intact  and  has 
retreated  with  success,  though  with  rapidity. 

But  [B  (2)]  the  corresponding  Austrian  effort 
along  the  San,  which  was  the  prolongation  of  the  line 
through  Russian-Poland,  has  also  failed,  with  less 
order  in  its  retreat.  Many  prisoners  have  been  lost ; 
and  there  seems  a  probability  of  this  body  being  cut 
off  from  the  main  body  in  Russian- Poland  beyond 
the  Vistula,  or  at  the  least  of  the  eastern  portion 
being  cut  off  unless  it  can  escape  across  the 
Carpathians,  in  which  case  it  will  still  be  divided 
from  the  main  body. 

So  much  for  the  campaign  in  the  Eastern  field, 
which  is  still  the  decisive  one  in  the  campaign.  The 
Western  operations,  though  more  vitally  near  to 
oui-selves,  have,  for  the  moment,  less  interest,  and 
may  be  more  briefly  told. 

in. 

THE  CAMPAIGN   IN  THE  WEST. 


We  may  sum   up  and  say  that  so  far  as  the 

operations  in  the  Eastern  field  of  Avar  are  concerned  :— 

(A)  The  East  Prussian  frontier  is,  still  held  ;  the 


6* 


November  14,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATEB 


The  campaign  in  the  West  tas  proved  through- 
ont  all  the  last  few  days  so  complete  a  deadlock  that 
there  is  very  little  more  that  can  be  usefully  said  upon 
it  at  the  moment  of  writing  this,  Tuesday  evening. 
But  it  may  be  of  service  to  recall  the  general  features 
of  the  Allied  line  between  Arras  and  the  North  Sea, 
and  to  show  where  the  main  effort  is  now  falling. 

In  the  foregoing  map  that  line  is  approximately 
given.  It  runs  from  in  front  of  Nieuport,  cuts  the 
Yser  Canal,  recrosses  it  again  in  front  of  Dixmude, 
makes  a  bulge  round  Ypres,  with  another  bulge  round 
Armenti5res,  and  then  suffers  a  considerable  and 
significant  sag  between  La  Bassee  and  Bethune. 

It  has  sufficiently  been  explained  in  these  notes 
that  to  capture  the  whole  north  coast  of  France,  to 
uncover  Dunkii-k,  Calais,  Boulogne,  and  to  be  the  master 
of  the  Straits  opposite  Dover,  a  successful  "  bolt "  driven 
through  the  point  C  at  La  Bassee  would  have  had  all 
the  effect  required.  The  Allied  forces  to  the  north  of 
that  point  would  hardly  have  escaped  if  the  Germans 
had  broken  the  line  between  La  Bassee  and  Bdthune, 
Such  a  success  would  further  have  put  immediately 
into  Gennan  hands  the  two  junctions  of  Hazebi'ouck 
and  Bethune  (X — X)  fi*om  which  no  fewer  than  four 


lines  of  railway  were  available  for  the  advance  upon 
the  sea-coast  to  Dunkirk,  to  Calais,  and  to  Boulogne 
itself.  We  have  further  seen  ia  these  notes  how, 
instead  of  conceutratmg  all  their  strength  upon  this 
"  bolt "  at  La  Bassee,  a  furious  attempt,  lasting  for 
nearly  a  fortnight,  inviting  defeat  and  finally 
suffering  such  defeat,  was  made  by  the  Germans  upon 
the  front  between  Dixmude  and  Nieuport  at  A.  The 
line  of  the  Yser  Canal  was  ultimately  forced  by  the 
Germans,  at  an  expense  in  killed  and  wounded  of  the 
equivalent  at  least  of  an  anny  corps  ;  but  they  could 
do  nothing  upon  the  further  side,  and  were  flooded 
out.     This  attempt  has  now  been  abandoned. 

But  even  so,  the  enemy  has  not  concentrated, 
as  one  would  think  he  should  have,  upon  La 
Bassee.  He  has  again  divided  his  forces,  and  main- 
taining very  considerable  strength  at  La  Bassee, 
he  [has  poui-ed  masses  of  men  against  the  Ypres 
saKent  at  B. 

He  has  somewhat  pushed  in  this  salient,  but  he 
has  not  quite  flattened  it  out.  By  last  advices 
received,  he  was  not  in  Ypres,  though  he  was  shelling 
it,  and  the  Allied  forces  stiU  successfully  contained 
the  attack. 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


November  14,  1914 


The  nearest  point  which  tlie  enemy  seems  to  have 
seized  in  this  converging  attack  npon  Yprcs  is  the 
little  village  in  the  belt  of  woods  marked  upon  the 
accompanjdng  map  of  the  neighbourhood  of  Ypres, 
Klein  Zillebeke.  But  from  this  village  he  has  been 
driven  out  again.  The  line,  roughly  speaking, 
is  now  one  with  a  radius  of  about  4  mUes  from 
Ypres,  and  the  battle  still  presents  the  successive 
features  with  whicli  we  ai-e  so  farailiiir  upon  this 
front — of  a  violent  attack  by  the  enemy  in  numbers 
greatly  superior  to  the  local  defences,  of  his  initial 
success  over  a  belt  of  from  5  to  3  miles,  and  then  of  the 
pinning  of  him — after  losses  anything  between  two 
and  three  times  our  own.  Not  that  the  Allied  losses 
in  this  field  have  not  been  exceedingly  heavy — all  the 
official  communiques  insist  upon  that.  But,  from  the 
nature  of  the  attack  and  fi'om  the  vast  accumulation  of 
force  which  the  enemy  made  for  it,  we  can  be  quite 
certain  that  his  loss  was  far  superior  to  oui-s. 

Beyond  the  approximate  trace  of  the  allied  line 
contained  in  these  notes,  there  is  notliing  to  be  said 
upon  the  Western  field  of  war  at  the  moment  of 
writing — save  that  the  great  concentration  of  men 
which  the  enemy  were  reported  to  be  making  for  a 
further  attack  in  Flanders  has  apparently  been  halted 
by  news  from  the  eastern  field  of  war. 

There  has  been  so  much  wild  talk  about  the 
movement  of  men  from  east  to  west  and  firom  west  to 
east  by  the  Gei-mans  that  one  hesitates  to  believe  any 
of  it ;  but  in  this  case,  not  only  is  the  evidence  fairly 
good,  or  at  any  rate  voluminous,  but  there  is  for  once 
a  probability  in  favour  of  what  is  alleged. 

It  is  perfectly  possible  and  even  probable  that, 
when  the  Eussian  pressure  was  found  to  be  more 
severe  than  had  been  anticipated,  and  when, 
apparently,  it  was  no  longer  thought  possible  to 
hold  the  line  of  the  Warta,  the  Germans  felt  a  real 
danger  in  that  field  menacing  the  two  cardinal  points 
of  their  military  policy — the  keeping  of  the  war  off 
German  soil  and  the  saving  of  the  industrial  districts. 
And  it  is,  therefore,  credible  that  a  movement  of 
troops  from  west  to  east,  a  change  in  the  plan  of 
bringing  overwhelming  forces  to  the  west  (a  plan 
made  only  a  week  ago),  has  taken  place ;  in  which 
case  we  have  yet  another  confirmation  of  the  general 
truth  that  the  deciding  factor  of  the  whole  European 
campaign  is  still  to  be  found  in  Poland. 

I  would  conclude  with  two  notes  on  subjects 
equally  important  to  a  just  estimate  of  the  campaign. 
The  first  is  the  question  of  Gennan  supply  and  of  the 
effect  on  it  of  British  sea-power,  the  second  the  German 
statement  of  our  losses  by  capture. 

THE    QUESTION    OF    GERMAN 
SUPPLY. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  chief  effect  of  British  sea- 
power  in  this  war  and  its  chief  advantage  to  the  AUies 
has  been  the  viiiual  blockade  it  has  established  against 
the  enemy.  That  blockade  is  not  absolute,  because 
there  are  neutral  countries  through  which,  though 
with  difiiculty,  the  enemy  can  receive  supplies.  But 
when  the  amount  of  these  supplies  becomes  abnormal — 
that  is  when  the  neutral  country  is  importing  obviously 
far  more  than  it  can  possibly  want  for  itself — suspicion 
on  the  pai-t  of  the  blockaders  is  sufficiently  strong  to 
warrant  very  strict  search,  and  even  to  interfere  with 
such  supply.  It  is  this  conclusion,  for  instance,  which 
has  led  to  the  closing  of  the  North  Sea. 

On  the  other  hand,  no  sea  blockade  is  of  effect  in 
preventing  the  export  of  military  necessities  from 
adjacent  neutral  countries  into  the  enemy's  territory, 


when  these  products  are  to  be  discovered  in  the 
neutral  countries  themselves. 

Let  us  consider  what  it  is  that  Germany  most 
needs  m  the  way  of  foreign  supply,  and  discover  how 
far  the  blockade  affects  her. 

There  are  obviously  two  great  categories  into 
which  supply  from  abroad  wiU  fall:  (1)  material 
du-ectly  required  for  war,  (2)  material  only  indirectly 
necessaiy  for  a  nation  at  war. 

I. — Under  (1)  we  have  : — ■ 

(a)  Copper. 

(b)  Petrol. 

(c)  Eubber. 

(d)  Certain  chemicals  necessary  for 
the  manufacture  of  high  ex- 
plosives— notably  nitrates. 

(e)  A  certain  proportion  of  food  and 
of  fabrics  for  the  feeding  and 
clothing  of  the  troops. 

(f)  Horses. 

Now  of  these  six,  only  three,  (b)  (c)  and  (f),  are 
appreciably  affected  by  the  blockade.  The  chemicals 
(d),  which  the  enemy  needs  for  his  high  explosives,  the 
nitrates,  he  can  obtain  from  the  great  works  in  Norway 
(German  owned),  and  from  his  own  works.  Nitrogen 
is  universal. 

And  here  by  the  way  it  is  worth  remarking  that 
the  talk  about  the  Germans  having  some  special  new 
explosive,  more  powerful  than  that  of  the  French,  is 
great  nonsense.  If  anything  the  French  explosives 
have  a  superiority,  and  this  is  woiih  remembering 
when  we  consider  tliat  most  of  the  work  done  against 
permanent  fortifications  by  the  Germans  has  not  been 
done  with  howitzers  over  Sin.  calibre,  and  the  largest 
of  those  which  have  done  any  prolonged  and  effective 
work  have  been  the  11  in.     But  to  return  to  supply. 

The  small  amount  of  copper  (a)  required  for 
shells  can  probably  continue  to  be  smuggled  in.  It 
is  true  that  the  total  amount  available  from  ore  in  the 
enemy's  own  territory  and  in  adjacent  neutral  countries 
(such  as  Sweden)  is  not  15  per  cent,  of  the  normal 
supply  necessary  to  German  industry,  but  it  is  ample 
for  the  mere  manufacture  of  those  bands  which 
are  a  necessity  to  projectiles  used  in  modem  rifled 
cannon. 

Food  and  fabric  Germany  can  certainly  discover 
— or  rather,  Germany  and  Austria  combined — so  long 
as  German  territory/  itself  is  intact.  That  last  phrase 
is  of  course  essential. 

But  with  {b)  petrol,  (/)  horses,  and  (c)  rubber, 
the  case  is  different.     Let  us  take  them  separately. 

The  supply  of  Jiorses  for  German  armament 
depended  to  some  extent  upon  perpetual  purchase  in 
France  and  the  British  Isles— notably  Ireland. 
Nothing  is  wasted  more  lavishly  in  war  than  horse- 
flesh. Nothing  can  replace  horseflesh  for  traction, 
however  much  competent  critics  may  quarrel  as  to  the 
r61e  of  cavalry.  Petrol  will  replace  traction  upon, 
good  roads,  but  you  cannot  handle  an  army,  and 
especially  its  lighter  artilleiy,  without  a  constant 
supply  of  horses.  Nor  will  the  most  convinced  critic 
of  modem  cavalry  deny  its  role  altogether,  especially 
in  the  later  stages  of  the  war.  Now  it  is  true  that,  of 
the  two  Allies,  Austria  can  provide  some  reserve  of 
horses,  but  not  enough.  Geraiany  certainly  cannot. 
Eussia  wiU  not ;  France  and  England  will  not ;  nor 
will  they  be  imported.  The  Germans  happen  to  have 
been  pai-ticularly  lavish  in  their  expenditure  of  horse- 
flesh in  the  first  months  of  the  war;  and  it  is  as 
certain  as  anything  can  be  that  the  shortage  in  horses 
is  already  felt,  and  will  very  soon  be  severely  felt, 
by  the  enemy. 


«• 


NoTember  14,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


/ 


The  question  of  (6)  petrol  is  much  more  compli- 
cated. In  the  first  place,  large  stocks  have  already 
been  accumulated  through  import  by  way  of  neutral 
countries.  In  the  second  place,  there  is  a  supply  within 
the  enemy's  tenitorv,  from  the  middle  Carpathians— 
what  are  cidled  the  (ialician  oil-fields.  It  is  probable 
that  at  the  moment  of  writing,  a  part  of  these  are 
already  occupied  by  the  Eussian  invasion ;  but  they 
are  not  j^ct  all  occupied.  Further,  there  is  a  supply 
from  Eoumania,  the  firms  importing  the  petrol  from 
this  district  being  in  German  hands ;  and  as  the  supply 
lies  in  the  southern  part  of  the  frontier  between 
Hungary  and  Eoumania,  it  should  be  long  before 
Eussian  action  coidd  cut  it  off.  Of  the  political 
accidents  which  may  restrict  this  supply  in  the  f  utui-e, 
or  may  already  have  restricted  it,  I  say  nothing.  I 
take  the  thing  at  its  worst  and  conclude  that  the  enemy 
still  has  a  supply  from  the  Galician  field  (though  now 
restricted)  and  a  full  supply  from  the  Eoumanian  field. 
But  even  so,  the  shortage  of  petrol  is  already  felt  by  the 
enemy.  There  are  various  indications  of  this ;  some 
public,  such  as  the  sudden  and  rather  desperate 
expedients  used  for  foreign  import ;  some  private,  not 
to  bo  published,  and  in  my  opinion  even  more  con- 
clusive. It  must  be  remembered  that,  especially  in 
the  western  field  of  war,  the  Germans  have  been  utterly 
spendtlu-ift  of  this  necessity.  To  use  it  regardless  of 
the  future  was  aU  of  a  piece  with  that  original  claim 
or  plan  which  envisaged  an  overwhelming,  successful 
and  immediate  blow  against  France  before  autumn 
had  aiTived. 

But  there  is  a  material,  benzol,  a  by-product  of 
coke  and  of  the  smelting  work  in  Germany  which, 
though  not  always  with  the  same  type  of  engine, 
covld  in  part  i-eplace  petrol.  The  inexhaustible 
mining  industry  of  Germany  would  provide  it. 
Unless,  however,  coal  is  to  be  used  for  this  purpose 
alone,  there  is  a  restriction  in  the  supply  through  the 
shutting  down  of  so  much  of  the  metal  industry.  In 
August  only  30  per  cent,  of  the  normal  smelting  was 
going  on  in  the  German  Empire.  To-day  it  must  be 
very  much  less. 

One  may  sum  up  and  say  that  of  petrol,  and 
even  of  a  substitute  for  petrol,  there  is  abeady  a 
shortage,  and  that  before  next  April,  at  the  very  latest 
■ — on  condition  that  the  blockade  can  be  maintained 
strictly  to  that  date — the  shortage  will  be  so  severely 
felt  as  to  affect  the  whole  operation  of  the  war. 

Now  as  to  (c)  rudder.  Here  there  is  necessarily 
a  shortage  of  a  peculiarly  dangerous  sort.  Eubber 
does  not  keep.  The  wastage  is  enormous,  especially 
(1)  through  the  climatic  conditions  of  winter  (2) 
through  the  increasing  badness  of  the  roads  as  the 
campaign  proceeds  ;  and  the  shortage  is  ah-eady  very 
severely  felt.  No  rubber  will  •reach  the  enemy 
territory  so  long  as  the  British  blockade  is  maintained. 
There  is,  of  course,  a  large  supply  in  the  control  of  the 
Dutch,  from  their  colonies  (as  there  is  of  oil),  but  the 
normal  imports  and  exports  of  a  neutral  are  easily 
measured.  Of  all  necessities  in  modern  war  this 
one  of  rubber  is  that  which  will  perhaps  be  first  and 
most  seriously  curtailed,  and  it  is  that  lack  which 
the  enemy  will  first  severely  feel. 

2. — Now  for  the  second  categoiy,  the  materials 
■which  only  indirectly  subserve  an  anny.  They  fall 
into  two  categories  :  (a)  the  material  which  dnectly 
supports  a  population — its  food,  clothing,  building 
material,  &c. ;  (6)  the  material  which  is  necessary  to 
the  continued  industry  of  an  industrial  country  and 
lacking  which  you  create  a  gi-eat  strain  of  unemi)loy- 
BQcnt.     As  to  the  first : — • 


(a)  The  enemy's  population  can  feed  itself :  of 
that  there  is  little  doubt.  The  existing  stocks  are 
sufficient  for  a  year's  supply,  and,  though  the  areas  of 
supply  coidd  be  occupied  by  the  enemy,  the  population, 
even  urban,  inhabiting  those  areas,  will  still  be  fed. 

The  same  is  not  quite  so  true  of  fabrics,  for 
fabrics  are  confined  to  the  industrial  regions  of  the 
West  and  of  the  East,  and  it  is  precisely  these  that 
will  feel  the  first  shock  of  invasion,  as  we  have  seen  in 
discussing  the  threat  to  Silesia.  But  we  may  fairly 
say  that  economic  pressure  will  hardly  come  upon  the 
enemy  in  the  form  of  any  severe  restriction  of  his  food 
or  clothing,  and  his  mateiial  for  housing  is  of  course 
ample. 

{6)  But  when  we  come  to  materials  necessary  to 
his  industry  it  is  another  matter.  Here  you  have  a 
whole  host  of  things  besides  those  which  are  directly 
useful  as  material  to  an  armed  force.  And  of  those 
which  are  also  useful  to  an  anned  force,  many  are 
necessary  to  industry  as  well.  Take,  for  example,  copper. 
For  an  ounce  ©f  this  that  you  may  need  in  the  army, 
you  want  a  great  deal  more  than  a  pound  for  the  vast 
electrical  industry  of  Gennany.  Further  note  that 
this  electrical  industry  is  largely  centred  in  the  capital, 
Berlin,  upon  the  temper  of  which  so  very  much  depends. 
It  is  tme  that  Gennany  has  within  her  own  territory 
vast  stores  of  iron  and  of  coal :  but,  for  the  rest,  the 
mass  of  her  industry  is  supported,  as  is  that  of  all 
industrialised  Europe,  on  imports  of  material  from 
over  sea ;  and  when  those  imports  fail  Germany,  her 
manufactoiies  shut  dowTi.  Note  that  this  factor  of 
"  unemployment "  is  modified  first  by  the  fact  that 
the  great  bulk  of  those  employed  wiU  be  used  as 
soldiers,  and  secondly  by  the  fact  that  it  is  not  in  any 
absolute  economic  sense  necessary,  even  to  an  industrial 
nation  at  war,  that  it  should  continue  to  be  industrially 
producing,  unless,  indeed,  it  can  only  get  its  food 
(as  we  do)  by  exporting  the  manufactured  material. 
Germany  can  live,  though  haixUy,  without  exporting 
manufactured  material  to  pay  for  food. 

But  though  there  is  no  absolute  necessity  in  pure 
economic  theory  for  Germany  to  fail  through  unem- 
ployment, there  is  something  pretty  well  amounting 
to  a  necessity.  When  the  older  men  and  the  lads  and 
the  women  are  thrown  out  of  employment,  it  is,  as 
has  been  seen,  a  tremendous  piece  of  staff -work  in  an 
industrial  coimtry  to  organise  their  food  and  clotliing 
and  housing  during  a  campaign.  It  is  too  big  a  piece 
of  work  to  be  practicable.  And  the  pressure  which  the 
blockade  wUl  produce  in  this  fashion  is  perhaps  an 
even  more  important  thing  than  the  pressure  it  will 
produce  upon  the  supply  of  the  armies. 

THE    GERMAN    STATISTICS    OF  OUR 
LOSSES  IN    PRISONERS. 

I  gave  last  week  an  analysis  estimating  the 
minimum  of  what  seemed  to  be  the  total  losses  to 
date  of  the  Germanic  Powers.  I  said  at  the  same  time 
that  an  estimate  of  the  corresponding  losses  upon  the 
Allied  side  was  not  advisable  in  public  interest,  but 
that  anyone  who  chose  to  use  similar  methods  for 
making  a  comparison  of  his  own  in  private  would  not 
be  discouraged  by  the  result. 

As  the  Germans  have  since  then  given  official 
lists  of  the  total  number  oi  prisoners  yvhom  they  claim 
to  be  present  in  Germany,  taken  from  the  Allied 
forces,  one  element  in  the  problem  is  public  property, 
and  I  will,  with  my  readers'  leave,  closely  analyse 
these  figures.  They  have  for  us  a  two-fold  importance. 
First,  they  enable  us  to  gauge  something  of  the  state 
of  mind  of  official  Germany ;  secondly,  they  will  be 
useful  to  us  (especially  a  little  later  on)  in  the  contnist 


9* 


LAND    AND    WATER 


November  14,  1914 


that  may  have  to  bo  finally  established  between  our 
losses  aud  those  of  the  enemy. 

Here  I  would  again  emphasize  what  I  emphasized 
last  week — the  character  of  official  German  news. 
The  giving  of  such  news  is  not  more  controlled  by 
common  morals  than  is  any  other  part  of  Prussian 
effoi-t  in  this  war.  It  is  based  upon  a  calculation 
of  the  effect  to  be  produced  upon  the  enemy.  It  is 
part  of  such  a  calculation  that  exact  figures  in 
matters  which  the  General  Staffs  of  the  foreign 
army  can  check  for  themselves  will  have  great  moral 
effect.  It  is  thought,  with  justice,  that  if  a  certain 
tj'pe  of  official  German  news,  communicated  by  the 
German  Government,  con-esponds  to  what  the 
General  Staffs  opposing  Germany  already  knov/, 
then  such  other  statements  as  the  German  Govern- 
ment may  choose  to  make  later  for  purposes  of 
deception  will  probably  be  credited  also  by  the 
Genei-al  Staffs  of  the  Allies.  It  is  a  perfectly  simple 
method  and  a  very  good  one ;  and  accordmg  to  this 
idea  we  might  expect  tlie  official  lists  of  prisoners 
taken  from  the  Allies  to  correspond  fairly  accurately 
to  the  estimate  the  Allies  are  themselves  able  to  make 
of  their  own  "  missing." 

But  there  are  two  certain  considerations  which 
tempt  the  Germans  to  exaggerate  in  this  particular. 
The  total  number  of  missing,  with  which  any  General 
Staff  is  supplied  with  regard  to  its  own  side,  is  always 
■  viore  than  the  real  number  of  mere  prisoners.  There 
are  whole  categories  of  missing  that  do  not  coixespond 
to  prisoners  at  all ;  imdiscovered  wounded  and  dead ; 
stragglei-s  who  rejoin,  and,  in  some  cases,  of  troojjs 
upon  the  frontiers,  desertion.  This  last  category  is, 
however,  a  very  small  one  indeed  on  the  Allied  side, 
because  the  Allied  troops  do  not  include  unwilling 
recruits  as  the  German  troops  do.  Further,  it  is  of 
great  importance  to  the  German  Government  to  be 
able  to  emphasize  and  if  need  be  to  exaggerate  the 
number  of  the  prisoners  whom  it  holds.  Everything 
must  be  done  in  these  critical  weeks  to  maintain  the 
belief  of  the  German  population  at  home  that  victory 
can  yet  be  achieved.  This  population  is  able  to 
watch  the  great  numbers  coming  into  the  prisoners' 
camps;  it  is  not  able  to  distinguish  between  true 
prisoners  of  war  and  others,  and  therefore  an  exag- 
geration of  those  numbers  is  both  possible,  and  upon 
tlie  whole  worth  the  while  of  the  German  Staff.  To 
some  extent  they  weaken  their  moral  lever  of  accuracy 
in  the  eyes  of  the  enemy,  but  they  more  than  gain 
that  loss  by  their  raising  of  civilian  spiiits  in  Germany 
itself. 

AU  this  is  as  much  as  to  say  that  unlike  the 
statistics  of  German  dead  (but  like  the  statistics  of 
German  wounded),  the  official  German  statistics  of 
prisoners  are  likely  to  be  not  so  much  fantastic  as 
manipulated. 

Now  to  put  more  precisely  what  I  mean  let  me 
begin  the  analysis  of  these  figures. 

We  are  told  that  on  November  1st,  the  French 
pnsoners  in  German  hands  amounted  to  191,750  ;  the 
Kussjan  prisoners  to  191,900;  the  Belgian  prisoners 
to  3o,444;  and  the  British  prisoners  to  10,147. 

The  first  thing  we  note  about  these  figures  is  a 
very  large  increase  indeed  over  the  numbers  given 
not  much  more  than  three  weeks  ago.  The  Belgian 
increase,  indeed,  is  not  remarkable.  But  the  French 
figures  are  increased  by  thirty  per  cent. ;  the  Eussian 
figures  by  about  twenty  per  cent. ;  the  British  figures 
are  nearly  doubled. 

This  increiuse  should  be  carefully  noted.  Some- 
thmg  con-csponding  to  it  happened  after  the  German 
victory  at  Tannenberg  over  the  Eussitms.  "  At  first  a 


certain  figure  was  given.  Tlien  news  reached  the 
West  of  the  great  Eussian  victory  at  Lemberg  and 
the  Austrian  prisoners  captured  (to  the  total  number 
of  about  60,000)  in  that  disaster.  Immediately  after- 
wai'ds  the  German  figures  for  the  prisoners  at  Tannen- 
berg were  reissued  at  more  than  double  their  original 
amount. 

I  do  not  suggest  that  the  German  authorities 
simply  said,  "We  must  publish  a  larger  number  of 
prisoners  ;  just  set  down  double  the  original  amount." 
Nothing  so  enthusiastically  simple  would  occur  to  the 
careful  calciilators,  who  are  considering  not  only  the 
figures  before  them,  but  the  effect  those  figures  will 
hare  upon  Em-ope  and  the  power  the  enemy  has  of 
checking  them.  What  I  suggest  is  rather  that  some- 
one in  authority  saj^s : 

"  How  many  prisoners  did  you  take  at  Tannen- 
berg?" 

He  is  answered :  "About  thirty  thousand,  sir." 
The  jjerson  in  authority  then  says  :  "  Surely  there 
is  likely  to  be  a  considei-able  number  picked  up  during 
the  pursuit  of  which  we  have  not  yet  heard  ?  " 
And  then  he  is  answered :  "  Cfei-tainly." 
Whereupon,  in  the  most  honest  way  In  the  world, 
it  Is  an-Ived  at  that  one  may  faii-ly  add  another  twenty 
thousand  without  fear  of  facts  ultimately  belying  one. 
The  Eusslans  have  probably  far  more  than  that  number 
missing,  &c.,  &c. 

Then  the  person  in  authority  says :  "  You  have, 
of  coui-se,  counted  all  the  wounded  ?  " 

And  he  is  answered :  "  No,  sir,  we  did  not  count 
all  the  wounded  and  none  of  those  who  have  since 
died  of  wounds." 

But  the  person  in  authority  says  that  these 
figures  have  their  importance  because  the  enemy  can 
hardly  distinguish,  save  in  a  few  individual  cases, 
between  the  dead  and  wounded  whom  he  has  left 
behind  and  the  unwounded  prisoners.  So  in  all  fairness 
one  can  clap  on  another  twenty  thousand,  and  at  the 
end  of  the  process  a  figure  is  made  out  much  more 
satisfactory  than  the  first  figure. 

In  exactly  the  same  way  the  estimate  of  total 
prisoners — ^not  after  a  particular  action  the  effect  of 
which  it  is  desired  to  emphasise,  but  In  the  whole 
course  of  the  campaign — can  be  swelled  by  every 
conceivable  method  wliich  the  captor  regards  as  legiti- 
mate for  the  purpose  of  affecting  his  foes  adversely 
and  raising  the  spirits  of  his  friends.  He  will  include 
every  kind  of  enemy  he  has  laid  his  hands  upon ;  the 
gi-ievously  wounded  with  the  unwounded;  civilians 
taken  away  into  captivity,  according  to  the  remarkable 
method  developed  by  the  GeiTaans  since  the  first 
battles  in  Belgium;  enemy  civilians  detained  under 
suspicion,  and  so  forth.  In  other  words,  the  totals 
will  be  swelled,  not  to  figures  wliich  manifestly  war 
against  the  truth,  but  to  the  highest  possible  limits 
which  any  meaning  of  the  word  "  prisoner "  will 
admit. 

Now  in  order  to  discover  how  far  this  method 
has  been  pursued  we  have  certain  tests  which  can  be 
applied.  Let  us  take  the  number  of  French  prisonei-s 
and  deal  with  that  as  a  particular  case.  The  Germans 
announce  191,756  ;  that  is,  not  quite  double,  but  more 
than  seventy  per  cent,  over,  the  number  of  Gorman 
prisoners  said  to  be  held  in  France.  To  this  com- 
paiison  I  will  return  later,  but  for  the  moment  I  beg 
the  reader  to  fix  his  attention  upon  that  figure,  191,756. 
They  have  suddenly  increased  their  holding  of  French 
prisoners  by  a  thii-d  since  their  declarsLIon  of  some 
weeks  ago. 

But  In  the  interval  they  have  been  careful  to  give 
us  accounts  of  prisoners  picked  up  in  actions  where 


10» 


November  14,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


they  can  legitimately  claim  small  local  successes,  as 
for  instance  at  VaiUy  the  other  day.  Now  the  total 
of  these  small  captures,  though  all  wounded  are 
certainly  included  and  probably  a  good  many  civilians 
as  well,  does  not  amount  to  anything  like  the 
difference  between  the  old  figui-es  and  the  new.  It 
does  not  amount  to  a  quarter  of  the  difference.  It  is 
true  that  the  perpetual  swaying  back  and  forth  over  a 
few  hundred  yards  of  the  long  line  from  the  Vosges 
to  the  sea  gives  perpetual  opportunities  for  the  picking 
up  of  wounded  whenever  there  is  an  advance  by  the 
Gennans,  and  before  their  next  coiTesponding  and 
inevitable  retu-ement.  The  same  opportunities,  of 
course,  occur  to  the  French,  who  bag  certain 
numbers  of  the  enemy,  wounded  and  unwounded,  in  a 
similar  fashion  when  they  on  their  side  manage  to 
make  a  short  advance  followed  later  by  a  corresponding 
retirement. 

But  these  di-iblets  do  not,  at  the  most,  coupled 
with  the  larger  captures  already  mentioned,  account  in 
the  last  three  or  four  weeks  for  half  the  total  of  this 
sudden  German  increase. 

It  is  manifest,  "therefore,  that  some  great  effort 
has  been  made  to  swell  the  figxu'es  to  the  greatest 
possible  amount  credible  by  the  opposing  General 
Staff.  It  is  no  good  asking  the  French  General 
Staff  to  believe  in  miracles ;  to  give  in  a 
fantastic  figure  would  be  merely  to  defeat  the 
object  the  Germans  have  in  view.  But  it  is  exactly 
what  the  German  authorities  would  do  to  give 
the  very  largest  number  which  the  most  Credulous 
Frenchman  with  any  available  figures  before  him 
could  be  got  to  believe  ;  and  it  is  my  first  point  that 
the  nnmbere  conceivably  taken  in  the  field  duiing  the 
interval  between  the  date  of  the  first  statistics  issued 
and  that  of  these  last  statistics  come  to  much  less  than 
the  increase  in  the  German  figui-es  of  French  prisoners 
between  the  two. 

We  have  a  second  criterion  by  which  to  test  the 
validity  of  their  figures.  Of  these  191,756  nominal 
French  prisoners  only  3,138  are  officers.  That  is  to 
say,  of  every  sixty  men  taken  prisoner  (according  to 
this  definition  of  the  word  "  prisoner  ")  only  one  man 
is  of  commissioned  rank. 

Now  I  admit  that  the  proportion  of  officers  killed 
is  always  rather  higher  than  the  proportion  ^of  men 
killed,  and  that  therefore  in  picking  up  the  enemy's 
wounded  after  an  advance  you  will  probably  find  more 
men  wounded  than  officers  wounded  lying  on  the 
ground.  And  this  is  particularly  true  of  the  French 
and  English  services  where  the  officer  leads  in  a  fashion 
which  makes  him  very  conspicuous.  But  still,  so 
enormous  a  disproportion  as  one  out  of  sixty  is 
exceedingly  suspicious. 

Let  us  contrast  it  with  the  figures  given  of 
British  prisoners.  The  British  officer  is  not  more 
inclined  to  surrender  than  the  French,  nor  is  his  posi- 
tion during  a  sharp  advance  less  conspicuous.  Yet,  of 
a  total  of  British  prisoners  given  as  16,147,  417  are 
officers.  Tliat  makes  not  one  in  sixty,  but  one  in  38. 
And  one  in  38,  by  the  way,  is  just  about  a 
reasonable  proportion.  One  would  expect  that  there 
would  be  rather  more  than  thirty  private  soldiers 
and  non-commissioned  officers  taken,  wounded  and 
unwonndcd,  for  each  commissioned  officer,  but  rather 
less  than  forty.  If  the  proportion  fell  to  below  thirty 
one  would  conclude  that  the  men  were  not  being 
properly  led ;  but  above  forty  it  gets  very  suspicious 
and  begins  to  look  as  though  men  were  being  counted 
as  prisoners  who  were  not  soldiers  at  all. 

llemember  that  it  is  more  difficult  to  manipulate 
figures   about  officers  than  about  men;    their  social 


position  is  conspicuous ;  the  number  of  them  that  are 
missing  is  very  carefully  noted  upon  the  enemy's 
side ;  any  considerable  exaggeration  would  at  once 
betray  itself. 

We  have  already,  then,  the  following  facts  : — 

(1)  The  French  prisoners  claimed  by  Germany 

show  a  proportion  of  one  officer  to  about 
sixty  men. 

(2)  The  English  prisoners  claimed  by  Germany 

show  about  one  officer  to  thirty-eight  men. 

We  know  perfectly  well,  as  I  have  said,  that  the 
British  officer  does  not  surrender  with  greater  facility 
than  the  French,  and,  what  is  more,  the  British  have 
not  lost,  as  the  French  have,  whole  garrisons  and 
whole  bodies  of  men  in  fortified  positions  where  the 
loss  of  officers  taken  prisoners  is  strictly  in  proportion 
to  their  numbers  on  the  establishment. 

We  begin  to  see  at  once  that  the  numbers  of 
private  French  prisoners  claimed  by  Germany  has 
something  ill-proportioned  and  exaggerated  about  it. 
As  we  cannot  easily  believe,  knowing  the  Prussian 
temperament  and  the  object  of  these  figures,  that  they 
are  merely  fantastic,  we  must  conclude  some  category 
is  included  among  the  French  prisoners  which  could 
not  be  included  among  the  EngKsh  prisoners.  What 
such  category  is  there  ?  Obviously  the  civilian 
population.  There  is  no  British  civilian  population 
available  on  the  Continent  to  swell  the  German 
statistics  save  perhaps  a  handful  of  Englishmen  of 
military  age  present  in  Germany,  but  there  is  a  very 
large  French  population  which  can  be  pressed  into 
the  service  of  these  remarkable  figures.  In  other 
words  there  is  a  considerable  body  of  Frenchmen 
unfit  for  ser\'ice  or  use  on  railways,  etc.,  which 
the  Germans  may  carry  into  Germany  and  count 
as  prisoners  although  they  are  not  and  have  not 
been  soldiers. 

In  order  to  test  the  value  of  such  a  hypothesis 
let  us  take  a  third  criterion,  the  figure  of  Belgian 
prisoners. 

Here  we  have  no  less  than  35,444  in  prisoners 
claimed  by  the  Germans,  but  of  these  only  417  are 
officers ! 

This  is  frankly  monstrous.  It  is  one  officer  to 
more  than  84  men.  We  are  asked  to  believe  that  the 
Belgian  ai-my  is  quite  different  from  all  other  forces  in 
the  world;  that  its  officers  belong  to  some  fanatical  caste 
that  will  always  prefer  death  to  surrender,  even  after 
capitulation,  while  its  rank  and  file  surrender  eagerly 
and  upon  every  possible  occasion.  That  is  tomfoolery. 
The  facts  are  perfectly  well  known,  and  are  sufficient 
to  account  for  this  extraordinary  disproportion.  Bel- 
gium, even  more  than  Northern  France,  has  been  the 
prey  of  that  singular  system  whereby  the  Prussian 
commanders  seize  as  prisoners  those  whom  they  will 
of  the  male  civilian  population.  I  do  not  say  that  in 
so  doing  the  Gennans  are  not  playing  to  win.  I  do 
not  say  that  their  action  is,  in  a  military  sense,  useless. 
When  they  mop  up  the  men  who  are  necessary  in  a 
country,  even  during  the  hardest  strain  of  war,  to 
keep  the  machine  going — the  miners,  the  men  in 
arms  factories,  the  railway  men,  etc. — they  are  doing 
what  certainly  subserves  the  cause  of  their  victory. 
But  to  caU  these  men  "prisoners  of  war"  in  any 
ordinary  sense  is  nonsense.  And  by  the  fact  that 
they  are  called  prisoners  of  war  we  must  test  the 
figures  before  us. 

I  sum  up,  therefore,  and  I  say  that : — • 

(1)  Admitting  that  the  German  authorities  do 
not  publish  in  this  type  of  communicated  official 
statistic  merely  fantastic  figures,  but  rather  strain  the 
meaning  of  words,  and, 


11» 


LAND    AND    WATER 


November  14,  1914 


(2)  Admitting  that  the  Britisli  officer  does  not, 
as  the  whole  world  knows  he  does  not,  surrender  with 
facility,  and, 

(3)  Giving  the  British  standard  as  the  highest  to 
be  accepted  (and  it  is  surely  a  very  high  one),  we  may 
proceed  to  estimate  the  true  prisoners  of  war,  that  is, 
the  soldiers  wounded  and  unwounded  now  in  German 
hands  from  the  Western  field. 

A  multiple  by  which  we  find  from  the  number  of 
officers  the  total  number  of  prisoners  is,  in  the  case  of 
the  British,  38.  For  the  sake  of  round  numbers,  and 
in  order  not  to  make  our  conclusion  more  cheerful 
than  we  can  help,  let  us  say  for  the  French  not  38  but 
40,  and  see  what  we  get.  There  are,  of  French  officers 
wounded  and  unwounded  in  German  hands,  3,138. 
Multiply  that  by  40  and  you  get  125,520  French 
prisoners  in  Germany,  wounded  and  unwounded.  ii 
you  think  that  figure  too  low,  add  a  margin  to  save 
all  possible  contingencies,  and  call  it  150,000.  It 
cei-taiuly  is  not  150,000,  but  we  wiU  caU  it  that. 
Contrast  with  that  figure  about  100,000  German 
prisoners  captured  in  the  Western  field,  none  of  whom 
are  in  hospital  (for  the  hospital  figures  are  not 
included  by  the  French  or  the  English),  and  you  will 
perceive  tliat  the  balance  of  prisoners  upon  the  two 
sides  is  something  very  different  from  that  which  the 
first  German  figures  might  lead  one  to  suppose  and 
were  intended  to  lead  one  to  suppose. 

Remember,  further,  that  the  taking  of  prisoners 
from  the  Allies  in  the  Western  field  was  particularly 
a  feature  of  the  earlier  part  of  the  war  when  Belgium 
was  broken,  and  when  the  French  suffered  their 
heavy  defeat  in  front  of  Metz;  when  Maubeuge 
with  from  25,000  to  40,000  troops,  mainly  territorials. 


was  taken,  and  when  the  British  contingent  and  the 
Fi-ench  Fifth  Army  suffered  the  ten-ible  retreat  from 
Mons  and  the  Sambre.  Remember  that  since  the 
retreat  of  Von  Kluck,  though  the  invader  has  still 
been  in  superior  numbers,  his  counter-offensive  per- 
petually engaged,  has  as  perpetually  been  repulsed-- 
and  you  will  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  supposed 
balance  against  us  very  nearly  cancels  out. 

Of  the  numbers  of  Russian  prisoners  and  of  the 
corresponding  German  and  German-Austrian  prisoners 
in  Russian  hands  I  say  nothing,  because  the  elements 
on  which  to  form  a  judgment  are  lacking.     We  know 
that  the  Russians    suffered   heavily  at  Tannenberg. 
We   know   that    since   the   date   of   that  battle  the 
advantage  has   steadily  been  with  our  Allies.     But 
they  have  given  us  no  statistics  of   their  captures, 
save  in  the  Austrian  field  of  war,  nor  have  they  told 
us  the  number  of  the  wounded  picked  up  in  the  course 
of  a  general  advance,  not  even  the  numbers  wounded 
and  unwounded  which  have  fallen  into  their  hands 
since  their  great  success  before  Warsaw  of  now  three 
weeks  ago.     But  if  we  may  judge  on  the  analogy 
of  the  Western  field,  if  we  remember  that  civilians  from 
Russian-Poland  will  have  been  seized  and  sent  into 
Germany  and  counted  just  as  they  have  been  comman- 
deered and  counted  from  Belgium  and  Northern  France, 
we  may  perhaps  come  to  the  same  conclusion  about  the 
figures  in  the  Eastern  field  of  war  as  we  have  with 
regard  to  the  figures  in  the  Western  field  of  war. 
And  we  may  justly  conclude  that  so  far,  in  matters 
of  mere  numbers  of  armed  and  whole  prisoners  to  be 
deducted  from  either  force,  the  balance  strikes  fairly 
even.     The  least  advance  into  German  territory  will 
make  it  strike  heavily,  and  increasingly  heavily,  against 
the  enemy. 


THE   WAR  BY  WATER. 

By  FRED   T.    JAIME. 

KOTE.— THIS    XST1CI.B    HAS    BSBN   BUBMITrED   TO  THB  PEKSS  BXmKAn,  WHICH  DOBS  NOT  OBJECT  TO  THB  PUBLICATION  AS  MNSOESD 
AND  TAKBS  KO  BKSPONSIBLLITT  FOB,  THB  COBJUWrTNESS  OF  THB  STATEMENTS. 


THE    HIGH   SEAS    GENERALLY. 

TOWARDS  the  end  of  last  week  a  German  Squadron 
from  the  China  Station— consisting  of  the 
ScharnhoTst,  Gnekenau,  Leipzig,  and  Nurnherg — 
arrived  off  the  coast  of  Chile  and  was  reported  from 
Valparaiso. 
I  mentioned  last  week  that  the  taking  of  the  ofiensive  by 
the  Emden  in  sinking  the  Jemtchug  and  Mousquelon  indicated 
that  our  strategy  of  intercepting  their  supplies  and  "  stopping 
earths  "  was  apparently  having  effect.  The  circumstance  that 
the  ScharnkoTst  group  saw  fit  to  keep  together  suggests  the  same 
thing  again.  For  corsair  work  four  ships  together  are  no  more 
effective  than  one ;  and  anything  in  the  nature  of  battle — except 
as  a  last  extremity — is  madness,  because  very  little  damage  may 
render  the  corsair  useless  for  her  own  particular  work,  even  though 
the  battle  in  which  she  engages  ends  in  her  success. 

Therefore,  we  are  reasonably  entitled  to  assume  that  our 
pressure  was  such  that  the  Scharnhorst  group  was  compelled  to 
abandon  its  original  function. 

The  rest  is  mystery  pure  and  simple.  The  German  Admiral 
Spec  reported  that  he  had  met  and  engaged  off  Coronel  on  Sunday, 
November  Ist,  Admiral  Cradock,  that  he  had  sunk  the  Monmouth, 
set  the  Good  Hope  on  fire,  wlule  the  Glasgow  and  Olranto  (armed 
liiicr)  managed  to  escape.  .\11  that  he  actually  claimed  as  sunk 
was  the  Monmouth,  and  that  his  own  injuries  were  slight. 

The  British  Admiralty  first  of  all  issued  a  statement  to  the 
effect  that  it  was  unable  to  accept  the  German  report  as  accurate, 
because  the  Canojms,  which  had  been  sent  to  reinforce  Admiral 


Cradock,  was  not  mentioned  ;  also  that  only  three  German  ships 
came  into  Valparaiso  after  the  action. 

So  far,  so  good.  But  then  the  British  Admiralty  issued  a 
further  report  to  the  effect  that  it  had  now  received  "  trust- 
worthy information  "  that  the  Good  Hope  (flagship)  had  been 
Bimk  :  plus  a  very  clear  intimation  that  the  Monmouth  also  had 
gone  under.  Both  accounts  agreed  that  the  Glasgow  was  little 
damaged,  and  it  was  definitely  stated  by  oui  authorities  that 
neither  the  Olranto  nor  Canopus  was  engaged.  Also  for  the 
Nurnherg  the  Dresden  was  substituted.  Furthermore,  there 
were  reports  of  a  warship  ashore.  This  was  looked  for  by  a 
Chilean  vessel,  which  found  nothing.  Also  the  Chilians  failed  to 
find  any  wreckage  or  signs  of  any  battle  other  than  that  the  three 
Gel-mans  which  put  into  Valparaiso  appeared  to  have  been  in 
action. 

The  next  stage  of  the  mystery  is  that  telegrams  were  widely 
reported  in  Portsmouth  to  have  been  received  from  the  Good 
Hope—aU  of  them  to  the  effect  that  she  was  "  unhurt." 

Beyond  that  absolute  silence  so  far  as  official  reports  from 
either  side  are  concerned.  We  have,  however,  fairly  full  non- 
official  details  collected  by  American  correspondents  from  the 
crews  of  the  German  ships  which  put  into  Valparaiso. 

The  substance  of  these  various  narratives  pieced  together 
is — as  I  read  it — somewhat  as  follows  :— 

The  Monmouth,  Glasgow,  and  Otranto  were  met  with  off  the 
Chilian  coast  by  the  German  squadron,  in  a  gale.  They  were 
presumably  waiting  for  the  Good  Hope ;  as  about  then  she  arrived, 
and  succeeded  in  joining  up  with  them  at  the  cost  of  the  Germans 
securing  the  inshore  position — themselves  more  or  less  invisibla 


12» 


November  14,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATEK 


against  the  coast,  wliile  the  British  ships  were  silhouetted  against 
the  sunset.  Both  squadrons  then  steamed  south,  gradually- 
approaching  each  other.  The  Germans  fired  at  long  range  and 
missed.  The  Good  Hope  did  not  reply  till  the  range  was  about 
6,000  yards  (roughly  3J  land  miles). 

The  Scharnhorst  and  Gneisenau  (incidentally  the  Scharnhorst 
has  for  years  held  the  German  gunnery  record)  concentrated 
first  on  the  Good  Hope,  and  then  having  disabled  her,  on  tho 
Monmouth. 

Both  the  range  and  the  weather  conditions  were  such  that 
the  affair  was  necessarily  one  of  big  guns. 

The  forces  engaged  were  as  follows: — 


Bkitish. 

Good  Hope    2  9-2,  16  C-in. 

Monmouth 14  G-in. 

Glasgow     2  C-in,  10  4-m. 


GKSMAir. 

Scharnhorst 8  8-2,  6  C-in. 

Gneisenau     8  82,  6  C-io. 

Leipzig       10  41-in. 

Kurnberg  10  41-ia. 

The  respective  broadsides  work  out  as  follows  : — 

British.  German. 

2    9-2  12     8-2 

19    C-in.  6    C-in. 

6    4-in.  10    4-ia. 

Which  makes  twenty-six  British  against  twenty-eight  German 
guns.  Translated  into  approximate  terms  of  relative  value, 
whereby  (very  roughlj^)  each  4  in  =  1,  each  6  in.  ■=  2,  each  8.2  = 
4,  and  each  9.2  =  5,  we  get  a  paper  value  of  about  fifty -three 
British  to  seventy  German. 

But  this  paper  value  is  absolutely  worthless  for  comparative 
purposes,  because  owing  to  the  weather  conditions  only  upper 
deck  guns  could  be  fought. 

Consequently  the  effective  broadsides  work  out  as  follows  : — 


Big 

Medium 

SmaU 


Beitish. 


2    9-2-im 
9    G-io. 
6    4-in. 


Gkrmas. 
12  8-2-iii. 
None. 
10    4-ia. 


Six  inch  guns,  however,  are  practicallj-  useless  over  4,000 
yards,  and  4,500  is  understood  to  have  been  the  smallest  range. 
So,  only  the  big  gims  really  counted.  The  Monmouth  probably 
merely  represented  a  target.  Whether  she  did  or  did  not,  the 
relative  real  fighting  values  were  approximately  forty-eight 
German  to  ten  British,  or  if  we  take  it  in  weight  of  metal  per 
broadside,  really  effective  at  the  range,  2,904  lb.  German  to 
760  lb.  British — say,  4  to  1  instead  of  about  5  to  1. 

Therefore,  even  assuming  equal  skill  at  gunnery,  the  result 
was  a  foregone  conclusion.  As  things  were,  however,  it  was 
the  crack  gunnery  squadron  of  the  German  Navy  against  British 
ships  manned  mostly  by  reservists.  The  odds  against  Admiral 
Cradock  can,  therefore,  in  a  perfectly  sober  estimate,  be  put  at 
10  to  1  at  least ;  and  for  once  in  a  way  the  headlines  of  the  half- 
penny press  about  "  fearful  odds  "  are  literally  true  ! 

Pending  further  information  it  is  undesirable  to  inquire  as 
to  why  Admiral  Cradock  "  asked  for  trouble."  My  own  surmise 
is  tliat  he  did  not  ask  ;  that  the  Germans  caught  him,  not  he  the 
Germans,  and  that  questions  as  to  "  Why  was  the  Canopus 
absent  1  "  are  ill-timed. 

The  Germans  have  obtained  a  very  material  victory — it  is 
folly  to  deny  it.  They  have  obtained  it  by  precisely  the  same 
means  which  we  employed  in  the  Bight  of  Heligoland — by 
irresistible  odds.  Elsewhere  in  this  article  I  have  suggested  that 
just  as  the  moral  victory  of  Heligoland  was  German,  so  here  in 
this  Chilian  affair  the  ultimate  moral  result  may  be  in  our  favour. 

Hitherto  we  have  always  had  the  crushing  superiority  which 
long  ago  Admiral  Sir  Cloudeslcy  Shovell  described  as  the  only 
real  recipe  for  victory.  In  the  affair  off  Chile  the  tables  were 
turned.  Our  officers  and  men  proved  themselves  every  whit  as 
game— and  perhaps  a  little  more  so — than  did  the  Germans  in 
the  Bight  of  Heligoland  affair. 

I  do  not  wish  to  elaborate  my  peculiar  views  imduly,  so  here 
for  the  present  I  will  leave  the  matter,  save  to  reiterate  my 
opinion  that  the  battle  of  Coroncl  will  ultimately  prove  to  have 
been  a  result  in  our  favour. 

Modern  warfare  is  essentially  a  matter  of  moral  effect.  It 
has  nothing  to  do  with  the  sinking  of  ships,  but  only  with  the 
way  in  which  men  fight  in  those  ships.  That  is  the  essence  of 
"  new  conditions." 

THE   NORTH   SEA. 

On  November  the  3rd  a  German  squadron  made  a  raid  into 
the  North  Sea. 

Shots  were  fired  off  Yarmouth  and  Lowestoft,  aimed 
apparently  at  nothing  in  particular — at  any  rate,  no  damage 
was  done  to  anything  or  anj-body  by  this  "  bombardment  of  the 
coast  defences." 

In  the  course  of  these  operations  the  British  gunboat  Halcyon 
was  discovered  and  a  hundred  rounds  fired  at  her.  Only  two 
hits  were  registered,  and  the  damage  done  by  these  was  trivial. 
From  which,  seeing  that  the  Halcyon  was  at  anchor  we  can  in  the 
first  place  deduce  very  bad  shooting,  and  in  the  second  place 
gather  that  presumably  only  small  guns  were  fired  at  her. 


The  Halcryon  was  able  to  call  up  assistance,  but  the  Germans 
did  not  wait  for  any  action.  They  retreated,  dropping  mines 
astern,  and  our  submarine  Do,  striking  one,  was  destroyed. 

In  Germany  this  raid  has  been  received  with  extraordinary 
enthusiasm,  altogether  out  of  importance  with  the  results.  As 
to  why  the  raid  was  made,  there  is  some  obscurity.  Considerable 
risks  were  run  both  in  coming  and  returning,  and  in  connection 
with  the  return  the  armoured  cruiser  YorcJc  was  lost. 

According  to  the  German  official  statement  the  Yorch 
accidentally  struck  a  German  mine  at  the  mouth  of  the  Jahde, 
but  there  is  a  suspicion  that  the  mines  were  laid  by  us  or  that  she 
was  submarined.  Probably,  however,  the  German  official 
statement  is  correct];  they  would  hardly  attribute  to  their  own 
mismanagement  anything  which  could  be  put  down  to  the  enemy. 

Be  that  all  as  it  may,  however,  the  Yorck  has  been  sunk  with 
the  loss  of  about  half  her  crew,  and  the  loss  is  more  serious  than 
the  intrinsic  value  of  the  ship  as  a  fighting  unit.  As  a  unit  she 
was  somewhat  superior  to  our  Monmouth,  though  of  slightly  less 
displacement.  Her  armament  was  4  8.2,  10  6  inch  as  against  the 
14  6  inch  of  the  Monmouth.  The  armour  in  both  cases  was  the 
same — 4  inches.  Both  were  of  about  equal  date,  but  beyond 
that  differed  radically ;  the  Yorck  being  gunned  at  the  expense 
of  speed  (she  could  barely  do  21  knots),  while  the  Monmouth  was 
given  speed  (23  to  24  knots)  at  the  expense  of  guns. 

Where  the  blow  falls  Ijeaviest  on  Germany  is  that  she  has 
lost  another  cruiser  out  of  a  fleet  already  badly  depleted  by  the 
detaching  of  several  of  these  vessela  for  commerce  warfare  and 
the  losses  inflicted  by  our  ships  at  Heligoland.    A  fleet  without 


^ernxan^ 


fvcvt^^ 


MAP  TO   IKDICATI  TH«    APPROXIKATB    ABEA    Oy  THB   NOETH   SEA 
MOW  PaOHIBmD  BT  THE  ADMIBALTT, 

sufficient  cruisers  is  more  or  less  blind,  and  it  is  also  in  heavy 
danger  from  destroyer  attack.  Consequently  we  could  well  do 
with  many  more  German  "  raids  " — provided  they  reproduced 
the  one  in  question. 

Thus,  for  the  German  loss.  We  have  now  to  consider  the 
German  gain.  The  only  material  advantage  that  I  can  see  is 
that  they  have  learned  something  of  our  defensive  arrangements 
and  sunk  one  of  our  submarines.  But  as  this  was  purely  a 
matter  of  chance,  they  can  no  more  claim  it  as  a  result  secured 
than  we  can  put  in  a  similar  claim  for  the  Yorck.  The  damage 
done  to  the  Halcyon  is  trivial ;  for  that  matter,  had  they  sunk  her 
it  would  have  been  no  advantage  worth  mention. 

Matters,  therefore,  are  reduced  to  the  moral  advantage. 
Here  the  Germans  believe  that  they  have  scored  heavily ;  but 
between  belief  and  fact  there  is  occasionally  a  great  gulf  fixed. 
As  a  matter  of  fact — except  in  so  far  as  it  may  cheer  up  their 
own  men — this  raid  appears  to  me  as  a  bad  moral  defeat  for  tho 
Germans,  and  that  quite  outside  the  loss  of  the  Yorck. 

Their  moral  loss  is  three-fold.  In  the  first  place,  the  raid 
entirely  failed  to  create  any  panic,  which  was  obviously  what  it 
was  primarily  intended  to  accomplish. 


18» 


LAND    AND    WATER 


November  14,  1914 


In  the  second  place,  in  order  to  make  the  demonstration 
the  Germans  had  to  negotiate  a  mine  field  of  ours.  This  they 
did  without  the  least  difficulty,  conclusive  proofs  that  they  knew 
the  exact  road  through  the  mine  field,  knowledge  which  could 
only  have  been  arrived  at  Burreptitiously.  Forewarned  is 
forearmed  !  In  demonstrating  to  us  that  they  do  know,  they 
have  struck  themselves  a  far  heavier  blow  than  the  loss  of  the 
YoTcTc. 

Thirdly,  there  are  certain  important  psychological  features 
of  the  raid  which  are  of  the  utmost  moral  importance.  The  two 
per  cent,  of  hits  against  the  Halcyon  was  extremely  bad 
gunnery  as  compared  with  all  the  German  gunnery,  good,  bad, 
or  indificrent,  which  we  have  so  far  experienced.  Now, 
exceplionally  bad  gunnery  in  war  time  invariably  spells  one  thing — 
the  "  rattles."  The  gunners  in  the  great  raid  destined  to  put 
terror  into  the  heart  of  England,  were  obviously  in  a  good  deal 
of  terror  themselves. 

We  must  be  careful  how  we  take  it  as  a  view  of  the  morale 
of  the  German  Navy  as  a  whole.  But  we  can  take  it  that  the 
difference  between  the  enemy  we  met  at  Heligoland  and  the  men 
who  "  raided  "  our  East  Coast  is  so  great  that  something  has 
probably  happened  in  the  interim. 

Probably  it  means  that  the  effect  of  enforced  inaction  is 
making  itself  felt  just  as  it  made  itself  felt  on  the  enemy  confined 
to  harbour  in  the  days  of  the  Great  War  a  hundred  odd  years  ago. 
We  know  enough  of  German  gunnery  and  German  averages  to  be 
quite  certain  that  a  mere  two  per  cent,  of  hits  against  a  stationary 
target  must  have  a  meaning. 

There  is,  of  coxirse,  the  possibility  that  the  bad  shooting  was 
deliberately  platmed,  but  I  cannot  imagine  this  likely.  The 
sinking  of  any  British  warship  whatever,  right  off  the  English 
coast,  would  have  been  an  asset  of  high  moral  value  to  Germany. 
Nor  can  one  conceive  of  any  expected  advantage  from  such 
pretended  bad  shooting. 

I  may  seem  to  have  written  a  great  deal  about  an  incident 
which  has  generally  been  passed  over  as  trivial ;  but  when  the  war 
is  finished,  and  the  books  are  opened,  I  am  strongly  of  opinion 
that  this  seemingly  farcical  German  raid  on  the  East  Coast  will 
turn  out  to  have  been  of  considerable  value  to  us. 

I  understand  from  correspondence  received  that  I  have 
achieved  a  certain  amount  of  unpopularity  because  I  suggested 
that  the  Heligoland  affair  instead  of  being — as  popularly 
claimed — a  "  Great  British  victory  "  was  really  a  moral  victory 
for  Germany.  That  view  I  still  hold.  Along  precisely  the  same 
lines  I  thiiJi  that  the  German  East  Coast  Raid  is  a  "  British 
victory"  of  the  utmost  importance — something  beside  which 
Admiral  Cradock's  defeat  off  the  Coast  of  Chile  sinks  into 
complete  insignificance.  We  cannot  (if  we  want  to  know  where 
we  really  are)  consider  the  new  naval  warfare  along  the  lines  of 
the  old.    Everything  is  altered. 

For  the  public  to  attune  itself  to  the  new  conditions  & 
naturally  bound  to  take  time.  For  a  thousand  years  we  have 
been  trained  to  think  in  terms  of  losses — of  ships  sunk  and  men 
destroyed.  The  new  warfare,  however,  is  something  utterly 
different. 

Of  course,  if  the  German  High  Sea  Fleet  did  come  out  and 
give  battle  to  our  Dreadnoughts — victory  would  be  victory. 
But  even  so,  there  would  not  necessarily  be  a  moral  Trafalgar  on 
cither  side.  The  whole  matter  is  too  complex  to  be  put  into 
ordinary  words.  Only  in  the  crudest  possible  way  can  I  attempt 
to  explain  the  (to  most  readers)  abnormal  view  I  take  of  things. 
Bo  far  as  I  can  do  so — it  is  something  like  this. 

In  the  old  days  you  killed  the  enemy  or  else  he  killed  you. 
Who  killed  best  was  the  victor.  But  under  the  new  conditions 
which  have  arisen  some  new  condition  has  been  brought  into 
being.  The  thing  done  in  one  place  may  directly  cause  a  strong 
reaction  elsewhere.  For  example.  Spec's  defeat  of  Cradock  may 
put  a  terrible  stiffening  into  a  British  crew  faced  with  odds  in  some 
quite  other  part  of  the  world.  In  the  old  days  events  in  one 
quarter  remained  unknown  in  another — now  nous  avons  change 
tout  cela.  Every  combatant  in  the  naval  field  knows  almost  at 
once  everythmg  that  happens  elsewhere  and  takes  it  according  to 
his  calibre. 

I  have,  I  fear,  inadequately  expressed  my  meaning  and 
failed  to  explain  logically  my  theory  that  victory  may  really 
be  defeat,  and  defeat  victory  in  modem  conditions.  Words  fail. 
But  for  myself  I  am  absolutely  convinced  that,  despite  all  this 
jnbilation  in  Berlin,  the  two  worst  disasters  sustained  by  Gennany 
are  the  famous  raid  agamst  our  East  Coast  and  the  defeat  of 
Admiral  Cradock  off  the  coast  of  Chile. 

To  assert  a  thing  of  this  sort  is  giving  hostages  to  fortune 
with  a  vengeance.    However,  I  do  assert  it. 

THE  MEDITERRANEAN. 

Accounts  from  here  are  at  present  too  chaotic  to  count  for 
much.  It  is  apparently  established  that  the  German-led  Turks 
have  sunk  the  Prut,  a  Russian  mine-layer  of  5,000  tons  odd. 
They  have  also  probably  sunk  one  Russian  destroyer  (the  Turkish 
■ftory  runs  to  four),  and  since  November  3rd  one  of  the  Dardanelles 


forts  has  been  persistently  bombarded  with  the  usual  result — i.e., 
the  absolute  usclessness  of  fixed  defences  under  modern  conditions- 

For  the  rest,  Turkey's  action  appears  to  have  relieved  the 
pressure  on  Cattaro,  but  only  to  a  temporary  degree.  It  will 
not  save  Cattaro. 

The  temporary  result  is  that  the  Anstrians  were  enabled  to 
reoccupy  Lissa  and  re-erect  the  wireless  there.  This  has  now  been 
destroyed  once  more  by  the  Allies. 

Meanwhile,  the  British  cruiser  Minerva  has  made  her 
presence  felt  at  Akaba  on  the  Syrian  Coast.  On  the  importance 
of  Akaba  I  need  not  dilate  ;  Mr.  Belloc  explained  it  amply  in  his 
last  week's  notes.  Therefrom  the  assumption  is  permissible  that 
Sea  Power  has  already  negatived  the  expected  Turkish  advance 
on  Egypt  by  the  only  reasonably  feasible  route. 

It  may  safely  be  prophecied  that  Constantinople  will  be  in 
the  hands  of  the  Allies  long  before  any  Turkish  soldier  reaches 
the  Suez  Canal  and  takes  oa  the  problem  of  crossing  it  in  face  of 
a  hostile  fleet. 

Mr.  Belloc  has  indicated  the  land  difficulties  which  face  a 
Turkish  invasion.  But  these  difficulties  are  as  nothing  compared 
to  the  naval  obstacle.'  The  Turks  have  not  a  dog's  chance  of 
crossing  the  Suez  Canal.  Half  a  dozen  British  ships  of  no  actual 
fighting  value  whatever  are  ample  to  make  it  absolutely 
impossible,  unless  the  Germans  manage  to  scuttle  something  at 
a  lock  or  the  equivalent  thereof.  Even  so,  however,  crossing  an 
army  in  the  face  of  Sea  Power  seems  an  impossible  proposition. 
Think  it  out  as  one  will,  it  is  not  possible  to  envisage  Turkish 
troops  passing  the  Suez  Canal. 

THE   FAR   EAST. 

The  somewhat  unexpectedly  early  capture  of  Kiao-Chau 
has  an  importance  altogether  outside  and  beyond  the  intrinsic 
value  of  this  ex-German  outpost. 

In  the  first  place  it  releases  a  number  of  ships,  both  Japanese 
and  British  for  the  extremely  difficult  task  of  finding  and  destroy- 
ing the  enemy's  supply  sldps  and  colliers.  This — as  I  have 
explained  in  previous  articles — is  a  task  of  iniinitely  greater 
magnitude  than  the  general  public  has  any  conception  of.  But 
it  is  the  only  way. 

Actual  search  for  the  corsairs  themselves  is  blind  man's 
bluff  in  a  twenty  acre  field  :  the  correct  reply  (which  we  are 
making)  is  "  stopping  earths."  For  this  neither  speed  not  power 
matter  much^the  great  thing  is  numbers ;  and  an  efficient 
consular  service,  which  unfortunately  we  do  not  possess.  In 
this  direction,  at  least,  we  are  paying  heavily  for  our  past  peace 
economies,  an  alien  custodian  of  our  interests — no  matter  how 
honest — cannot  be  expected  to  worry  himself  undidy  as  to 
information  about  hostile  movements. 

However,  this  is  the  sort  of  difficulty  which  can  be  overcome 
by  numbers,  hence  the  importance  of  the  fall  of  Kiao-Chau. 

The  second  ^sset  is  merely  moral  and  psychological,  and 
due  mostly,  if  not  entirely,  to  one  of  those  inconsidered  telegrams 
which  so  appeal  to  the  Kaiser.  A  moment  or  so  of  consideration 
would  have  convinced  him  that  Kiao-Chau  was  bound  to  be 
captured.  Yet  he  had  the  folly  to  make  it  known  broadcast 
that  the  loss  of  Kiao-Chau  would  be  considered  as  worse  than  the 
fall  of  Berlin.  The  German  Press  Censors  did,  for  as  long  as 
possible,  suppress  the  news ;  but  it  was  bound  to  leak  out,  and 
its  moral  effect  will  be  all  the  heavier  accordingly.  The 
exaggerated  and  melodramatic  value  placed  on  Kiao-Chau  will 
utterly  negative  the  enormous  psychological  result  which  might 
otherwise  have  been  produced  by  the  German  naval  victory  off 
the  coast  of  Chile.  In  the  ordinary  way  the  two  things  might 
have  balanced.  As  things  are,  the  Kaiser  by  that  particular 
Kiao-Chau  telegram,  has  made  our  loss  intangible,  and  his  own 
very  tangible  indeed  ! 

Details  are  a  steady  bombardment  and  ultimate  bayonet 
charges ;  but  things  of  this  sort  do  not  matter.  What  does 
matter  La  that  the  Kaiser  was  foolish  enough  to  send  a  certain 
telegram  to  the  Kiao-Chau  Commander. 


Earl  Eoberts  has  advised  tu  of  the  result  of  his  appeal  for  glasses 
for  non-commissioned  officers  in  the  field.  Up  to  the  present  he  has 
received  over  14,000  pairs  of  field  anji  stalking  glasses.  Field-Marshal 
Sir  John  French  states  that  the  latter,  as  well  as  field  glasses,  are 
fonud  to  be  most  useful.  Many  people  who  had  nono  forwarded 
cheques,  which  were  utilised  for  the  pnrchasa  ot  suitable  glasses.  A 
largo  number  of  theso  very  useful  additions  to  equipment  are  etill 
wanted,  and  should  be  forwarded  to  the  National  Service  League,  72, 
Victoria-street,  London,  S.W,  In  the  absenca  of  glasses,  cheqnoa 
would  be  much  appreciated. 

Mt.  T.  Fisher  Unwin  has  just  published  From  the  TTtnchtt-~ 
Louvain  to  the  Aiene,  the  first  account  of  an  eye-witness  of  the  first 
phases  of  the  great  war  in  the  western  area.  The  work  is  vivid  and 
realistic ;  it  does  not  pretend  to  Btrat«gio  value  or  historical  detail.  The 
author,  Mr.  Geoffrey  Young,  relates  the  tilings  he  saw  and  the  impres- 
sions he  gathered  out  of  the  days  that  immediately  followed  the  out- 
break of  hostilities,  and  bis  story  is  a  very  dramatic  and  ijateresting 


14* 


November  14,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


SHIFTING    THE    ENEMY. 

SOME    FURTHER    EXPEDIENTS    FOR    MODERN    TRENCH    WARFARE. 

By  COL.   F.  N.  MAUDE,  G.B.,  late  R.E. 


I  SEE  from  the  reports  of  many  Belgian  correspondenta 
that  our  friend  the  enemy  is  preparing  (juite  gigantic 
positions  entrenched  and  hollowed  out  m  a  manner 
quite  new  in  field  warfare.  They  are  reported  as 
stretching  south  from  Brussels  across  the  field  of 
Waterloo  for  miles,  and  behind  them  are  yet  other  lines  of 
defence,  supported  by  the  reconstructed  works  of  Li6ge  and 
Namur,  and  continuing  along  the  courses  of  several  rivers 
running  in  deeply  eroded  channels  from  the  high  plateaux 
of  Luxemburg. 

In  fact,  wherever  we  turn  we  are  bound  to  encounter  months 
of  this  new  kind  of  abbreviated  siege  warfare,  in  which  all  kinds 
of  shifts  and  expedients  will  have  to  be  tried. 

I  gave  some  ideas  on  this  subject  in  my  last  article,  and 
^ill  now  continue  the  list,  endeavouring  to  profit  by  the  mistakes 
of  our  adversary. 

The  Germans  seem  to  Lave  gone  "big  howitzer  mad " ; 
setting  aside  the  quite  sensible  use  of  weapons  of  exceptional 
power  to  deal  with  such  steel  and  concrete  targets  as  the  Liege 
and  Namur  and  Antwerp  defences,  they  appear  to  have 
imagined    that    the    moral    efiect    of    a    shell  increases  quite 


nowadays,  be  done  by  wireless  transmission,  but  this  is  hardly  as 
yet  within  the  scope  of  practical  politics.  The  Congreve  rocket 
was  simply  the  ordinary  rocket  of  Crystal  Palace  displays 
especially  adapted  for  war  purposes.  It  answered  exceedingly 
well  as  far  as  it  went,  and  in  the  old  days  in  China  and  up  pirate 
rivers  in  the  East  it  was  frequently  used  with  great  success 
for  setting  fire  to  villages  from  boats  too  small  and  light  to 
carry  mortars  or  guns.  But  there  the  idea  ended,  and  it  has 
often  struck  me  that  it  might,  nowadays,  be  most  successfully 
revived  by  combining  the  idea  of  rocket  propulsion'  with  soma 
kind  of  elementary  machine  on  rollers  and  steering  it  by  cable 
from  the  trenches,  at  any  rate,  for  relatively  short  distances. 

There  would,  moreover,  be  a  kind  of  poetic  justice  aboub 
its  revival ;  for,  Lq  fact,  without  the  electric  attachments  it  is 
about  the  earliest  kind  of  self-propelling  vehicle  ever  devised, 
and  was  the  invention  of  an  old  German  inventor  about  1-545, 
who  published  a  weird  book  on  fireworks  and  fire  machines, 
with  illustrations,  I  think,  at  Nuremberg.  We  have  the  book  or  a 
later  edition  of  it  in  the  library  of  the  Royal  United  Service 
Institution. 

My  idea  would,  therefore,  work  out  something  like  this : — 


Langridge  Explosive  Asbestos  -  i  r 
te.  old  dolts  A  charge]  facking  -t^^^^" 
niits  etc 


Clxoke 
Veni: 


Rollers  Fixed  ftn.  rudder 


enormously  in  proportion  to  the  "  big  bang  "  it  makes,  and  for 
this  end  have  burdened  their  field  armies  with  a  number  of  big 
howitzers  which  have  been  many  times  more  powerful  than 
the  targets  they  have  recently  found  have  required. 

It  may  be  that  the  big  bang  "  idea  is  correct.  I  feel  pretty 
sure  that  as  against  the  Germans  it  would  prove  so,  but  I  submit 
that  it  is  sheer  foohshness  to  drop  "  Black  Marias  "  on  the 
ground  with  such  high  velocities  that  the  bang  only  ensues 
after  the  shell  has  buned  itself  10  feet  deep,  and  its  man-killing 
power  is  thus  enormously  diminished  by  the  smothering  effect 
of  the  surrounding  earth.  It  blows  out  a  big  hole  convenient 
enough  for  burying  dead  horses  in,  but  beyond  this  its  useful 
€fiect  is  comparatively  limited. 

Our  answer  should  be  the  propulsion  of  a  shell  bigger,  much 
bigger,  containing  a  weight  of  explosives  under  conditions  which 
•would  ensure  its  bursting  on  the  ground  level  at  the  right  time 
and  place,  and  without  the  disadvantage  of  requiring  twenty-six 
traction  engines  to  use  it.  Also,  it  must  bo  efficient  at  very 
short  ranges  if  desirable. 

The  solution  I  find  in  a  combination  of  an  old  naval  device, 
much  tried  and  tested,  some  forty  years  ago,  by  the  experts  of 
H.M.S.  Vernon — the  naval  torpedo  school  at  Portsmouth,  and 
a  revival  of  the  old  Congreve  war  rocket  idea  which  was 
abandoned,  to  my  mind  very  prematurely,  about  the  same 
date,  when  all  attention  was  focussed  on  the  development  of 
artillery. 

The  Vernon  idea  was  simple  and  was  intended  for  blowing 
up  harbour  booms,  caissons,  and  so  forth ;  very  much  the  same 
sort  of  work  as  we  now  require  on  land. 

It  consisted  of  an  old  steam  pinnace  heavily  freighted 
with  explosives,  which  was  set  going  with  a  head  of  steam 
flufficient  to  take  it  well  up  to  its  target,  and  steered  by  a 
light  electric  cable  from  a  parent  ship  following  some  consider- 
able distance  behind.     Of  course,  in  theory,  the  steering  could. 


A  heavy  iron  cylinder  with  knife-edge  bow  in  front,  mounted 
on  broad  rollers,  and  weighing  a  couple  of  tons,  would  contain  a 
rocket  in  an  inside  case,  packed  round  with  asbestos,  in  front  of 
which  wet  gun-cotton  would  be  packed,  as  much  as  desired,  until 
the  second  cyUnder  was  full,  and  then  round  the  second  cylinder 
the  empty  space  would  be  filled  with  bolts  and  nuts  or  any  other 
old  "  langridge  "  to  furnish  a  sufficient  supply  of  man-killing 
fragments. 

The  cylinder  would  have  a  sufficient  preponderance  aft  to 
ensure  that  a  fin  keel  should  bite  well  into  the  ground  when 
moving.  On  second  thoughts  I  would  dispense  with  steering- 
gear  altogether,  as  the  vehicle  has  only  to  go  straight,  but  keep 
the  electric  firing  cable  so  as  to  ensure  detonation  exactly  at  the 
right  time. 

As  for  the  calculations  required,  they  are  well  within  the 
scope  of  any  youngster  from  any  of  our  modern  universities. 

We  all  know  that  rocket  composition  consists  of  charcoal, 
sulphur,  and  saltpetre,  mixed  together,  which  when  set  alight 
burn  at  a  certain  temperature — about  3,000°  F.  if  I  remember 
rightly — and  give  o£E  so-and-so  many  cubic  feet  of  gas  which 
eiq)and3  Ln  proportion  to  the  heat  evolved. 

Having  determined  the  weight  of  your  machine,  say  about 
2  tons — and  the  rolling  friction  to  be  overcome — any  man 
fresh  from  the  workshops  can  work  out  the  amount  of  power 
required  to  drive  it  at  a  given  velocity — about  50  feet  a  second 
would  suffice. 

Imagine  this  crashing  through  wire  entanglements,  etc., 
and  tlien  bursting  exactly  over  one  of  the  modern  deep  dug- 
outs the  gunners  find  it  so  difficult  if  not  impossible  to  attain. 
If  I  know  my  Germans,  and  I  think  I  do,  I  will  wager  they 
will  be  a  good  deal  more  disconcerted  than  ever  our  lads  have 
been  by  any  "  Black  Maria  "  of  theirs,  and  we  shall  not  need 
twenty-six  traction  engines  to  haul  our  machine  either — wa 
can  extemporise  all  the  heavy  material  La  the  nearest  workshop. 


16» 


LAND    AND    AVATEB 


November  14,  1914 


CORRESPONDENCE. 

SiB^ — I  am  a  very  interested  reader  of  your  paper,  and 
particularly  those  articles  dealing  on  the  military,  naval,  and 
aeronautical  situation  as  developed  in  this  great  war  in  which 
this  country  is  embarked. 

We  have  read  a  great  deal  about  the  Zeppelins  that  are 
being  built,  and  that  are  in  existence,  and  in  the  pages  of  your 
paper  we  have  gathered  that  the  nxunber  of  these  is  limited, 
and  that  their  construction  is  very  slow,  while  as  they  are  useless 
without  their  sheds,  the  time  that  is  taken  in  constructing 
these  must  also  be  taken  into  account. 

I  tliink  that  I  am  not  mistaken  in  saying  that  the  shortest 
time  in  which  these  sheds  coiild  be  erected  was  seven  months, 
and  that  a  Zeppelin  could  not  be  turned  out  in  less  than  nine 
months.    This  on  the  authority  of  your  expert. 

In  this  morning's  paper  I  read  that  Zeppelins  are  being 
turned  out  "  every  three  weeks,  which  represents  a  record  time 
of  500  hours  per  airship." 

The  dbcrepancy  is  so  great  that  one  wonders  which  state- 
ment is  correct,  for  it  would  seem  not  impossible  to  approximately, 
at  any  rate,  arrive  at  the  probable  time  involved.  _    i 

With  regard  to  the  sheds,  I  recently  saw  at  the  Pavilion 
Cinematograph,  Marble  Arch,  sheds  in  course  of  erection, 
in  which  ready-made  girders  are  erected  and  covered^  with 
sheathing,  apparently  a  very  expeditious  way  of  arriving  at 
results. 

In  Doctor  Karl  Graves'  book  entitled,  "  The  Secrets  of  the 
German  War  Office,"  he  has  a  great  deal  to  say  about  Zeppelins, 
that  the  Germans  have  discovered  a  metal  much  lighter  than 
aluminium  for  the  making  of  the  girders,  and  a  gas  very  much 
lighter  than  hydrogen,  so  that  their  buoyancy  and  lifting  capacity 
is  enormously  increased,  while  he  speaks  of  the  latest  Zeppelins 
being  able  to  carry  a  crew  of  twenty-five  men,  as  well  as  over 
7  tons  of  explosives  if  needed.  He  speaks  further  of  their  sphere 
of  action  being  up  to  1,400  kilometres,  and  that  they  have  been 
known  to  stay  out  ninety-six  hours. 

There  are  statements  made  in  the  book  that  tend  to  discredit 
him,  however,  for  he  speaks  of  Zeppelms  being  capable  of  rising 
to  a  height  of  10,000  feet,  while  aeroplanes  that  are  generally 
supposed  to  be  our  arm  of  defence  against  these  aircraft  cannot 
exceed  6,000  feet. 

As  we  have  been  told  very  frequently  of  heights  of  over 
10,000  feet  being  attained  by  aeroplanes,  heights  indeed  up  to 
25,000  feet  at  which  the  record  is  supposed  to  stand,  and  I  have 
never  seen  a  height  of  over  6,000  feet  mentioned  in  connection 
with  Zeppelins,  I  am  led  to  wonder  whether  the  other  statements 
quoted  in  this  letter  are  equally  inaccurate. 

That  we  have  heard  little  about  Zeppelins  in  actual  warfare 
thus  far  leads  one  to  hope  that  they  have  not  been  found  as 
eflBcient  as  had  been  hoped  by  the  enemy,  but  if  your  expert  could 
answer  the  statements  made  in  Doctor  Graves'  book,  as  also 
the  length  of  time  taken  in  the  building  of  these  craft,  it  would 
be  of  much  interest  to  the  public  and  might  reassure  them  from 
a  meance  which  is  much  dreaded  by  many. 

If  you  could  find  time  to  take  up  this  subject  in  your  valued 
paper,  I  feel  sure  that  it  would  be  of  interest  to  many  of  youi 
readers.  Charles  I.  Thomson. 

GERMAN    LOSSES. 

To  the  Editor  of  Land  and  Water. 

Sir, — It  may  interest  your  readers  to  leam  that  the  losses 
estimated  by  Mr.  Belloc  are  fully  admitted  by  some  of  the  German 
War  Office  officials.  My  Dutch  correspondent  has  recently 
been  in  Berlin,  and  has  intimate  acquaintance  with  the  War 
Department  there.    He  writes  me  that  up  to  the  last  week  in 


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BACK  COPIES  of  "LAXD  AND  WATEE,"  containing  the 
series  of  Articles  by  HTLAIRE  BELLOC,  "THE  WAR  BY 
LAND"i  and  FEED.  T.  JANE,  "THE  WAR  BY  WATER," 
to<?etlior  with  a  valnablo  reference,  "THE  TOPOGEAPHICAL 
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application  to  the  Offices  of  "LAND  AND  WATEE,"  CBKTE.ii, 
Houaii,  KiNQswAT,  W.C.    , 


October  the  German  losses  were  admittedly  fully  2,000,000  I 
He  estimates  the  total  number  of  Germans  engaged  in  the  war 
from  the  beginning  at  nearly  7,000,000.  The  Germans  claim  to 
be  able  to  provide  another  3,000,000  men  ! 

Yours  faitlifully, 

Aethub  Kitson. 
National  Liberal  Club,  November  9th 


BUCKINGHAM    PALACE. 

October  15th,  1914. 

Far  many  weeks  we  hav«  all  been  greatly  concerned  for  the 
welfare  of  the  sailors  and  soldiers  who  are  so  gallantly  fighting  otir 
battles  by  sea  and  land.  Our  first  consideration  has  been  to  meet 
their  more  pressing  needs,  ajid  I  have  delayed  making  knovm  a  wisE 
that  has  long  been  in  my  heart  for  fear  of  encroaching  on  other  funds, 
the  claims  of  which  have  been  more  urgent. 

I  want  you  all  now  to  help  me  to  send  a  Christmas  present  from 
the  whole  nation  to  every  sailor  afloat  and  every  soldier  at  tlie  front. 
On  Christmas  Eve,  when,  like  the  shepherds  of  old,  they  keep  their 
watch,  doubtless  their  thoughts  wUl  turn  to  home  and  to  the  loved 
ones  left  behind,  and  perhaps,  too,  they  will  recall  the  days  when,  as 
children  themselves,  they  were  wont  to  hang  out  their  stockings, 
wondering  what  the  morrow  had  in  store. 

X  am  sure  that  we  should  all  be  the  happier  to  feel  that  w©  had 
helped  to  send  our  little  token  of  love  and  sympathy  on  Christmas 
morning,  something  tliat  would  be  useful  and  of  ^)ermanent  value,  and 
the  making  of  which  may  be  the  means  of  providing  employment  in 
trades  adversely  affected  by  the  war.  Could  there  be  anything  more 
likely  to  hearten  them  in  their  struiggle  than  a  present  received 
straight  from  home  on  Christmas  Day? 

Please,  will  you  help  me? 

MAET, 

To  H.E.H.    THE  PRINCESS   MABY, 

BUCKINGHAM  PALACE,  LONDON. 
I  be^  to  enclose  £  «.  d.    as  a  donation  to  your  Royal 

Highness  s  Fund. 

Name 

Address 


WAR    PUBLICATIONS. 

The  manual  published  by  tlie  Temple  Press  in  sixpenny  form  on 
How  to  use  a  Rifle  and  Pistol  has  already  run  through  two  editions, 
and  a  third  edition  has  now  been  issued  in  revised  and  considerably 
enlarged  form.  There  is  a  valuable  addition  of  matter  on  such  subjects 
as  trajectory,  aiming  practice,  and  common  errors  of  shooting,  with 
the  ways  of  correcting  and  avoiding  them.  Written  in  simple,  un- 
technical  language,  the  manual  forms  one  of  the  best  guides  to  practical 
rifle  shooting  on  the  market,  being  written  throughout  by  a  military 
man  fully  conversant   with  his  subject. 

The  first  translation  into  English  of  Treitschhe  t  His  Life  and 
Works  has  been  published  at  7s.  Sd.  by  Messrs.  Jarrold  and  Allen  & 
Unwin.  Various  extracts  from  the  doctrine  preached  by  Treitschke 
have  made  tlieir  appearance,  but  now  for  the  first  time  it  is  possible 
for  such  as  are  not  conversant  with  the  German  language  to  ascertain 
the  views  of  the  historian-profossor-war-advocate.  It  may  be  added 
that  the  book  is  a  revelation  as  to  the  German  view  point,  as  evident 
in  one  of  its  most  learned  and  distinguished  men,  who  endorses  "  blood 
and  iron  "  as  a  cardinal  necessity  to  the  welfare  of  his  country. 

Messrs.  Hodder  and  Stoughton  have  added  to  their  two-shilling 
series  of  war  books  The  German  Spy  System  from  WitMn,  by  "  ex- 
Intelligence  Ofiicer,"  who  deals  with  the  practical  work  of  the  spy 
system,  and  exhibits  a  commendable  avoidance  of  melodramatic  story 
telling.  The  book  is  circumstantial,  and  is  based  throughout  on 
provable  evidence;  the  chapter  on  agents  provocateurs  and  the  German 
infiuence  on  Syndicalism  is  especially  valuable,  and  the  book  as  a  whole 
IS  one  well  worthy  of  perusal. 

The  ofiScial  German  point  of  view  as  regards  war  is  admirably,  if 
rather  too  briefly,  stated  in  Germany's  War  Martia,  which  condenses  the 
utterances  of  the  Kaiser,  the  Crown  Prince,  Bulow,  Bernhardi,  von  der 
Goltz,  and  others.  The  object  of  the  book  is  to  shov/  that  Germany, 
as  represented  by  its  chief  men,  is  utterly  permeated  with  the  doctrine 
of  the  necessity  of  war  to  the  4^^elopment  of  a  nation,  and  the 
argument  is  well  enforced  out  of  German  mouths. 


LOOKING   BACKWARDS. 

ReacJers  of  the  special  articles  appearing  in  this  Journal 
on  "  The  World's  War  by  Land  and  Water  "  will  doubtless 
wish  to  retain  in  correct  rotation  these  remarkable  series 
of  articles  by  HILAIRE  BELLOC  and  FRED  T.  JANE. 
We  have,  therefore,  prepared  special  cloth  binders  to  hold 
the  first  thirteen  numbers,  at  a  cost  of  Is.  6d.  each. 

Or  we  will  supply  the  thirteen  numbers  complete,  in  the 
binder,  for  6s.  6d. 

Owing    to    the    big    demand    for    back    numbers    already 

received    we    have   had   to   reprint   some    of  tlie  earlier 

numbers.     Same  can  now  be  supplied  at  6d.  per  copy. 

Order    now    from   your  Newsagent,    Bookstall,   or  direct 
from  the  Publishers, 


LAND    AND    WATER," 

CENTRAL  HOUSE.  KINGSWAY,  LONDON. 


16* 


November   14,    1914 


LAND     AND     WATER 


-  *^tn  -sT" 


Beirs  _ 

THREE 

Tobacco 


His  pipe  is  the  active  man's  most  faithful  com- 
panion ;  it  is  liis  best  comforter  when  misfortune 
has  laid  him  by  the  heels.  But  let  it  in  either 
case  be  charged  with  "Three  Nuns"  tobacco, 
which  has  sovereign  qualities  of  delicate  flavour 
and  delightful  coolness  that  you  will  find  in  no 
other  smoking  mixture. 

A   Testing   Sample    will    be    forwarded    on    application    to 

Stephen  Mitchell  &  Son,  Branch  of  the    Imperial    Tobacco 

Co.  (of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland),  Ltd.,  Glasgow. 

"King's    Head"    is   similar  but  stronger. 

BOTH  ARE  OBTAINABLE 
EVERYWHERE. 


PER 


THREE  NUNS"  CIGARETTES.  S^, 

0.  370 


KNITTED 

CO  A  TS 


(Jur  reputation  for  Knitted 
Coats  is  quite  unique  and  our 
stock  is  exceptionally  large 
and  well  assorted. 

Heather  Glen  KniHed  Wool- 
len Coat  {as  sketch),  in  the 
latest  style,  made  from 
specially  selected  yarn,  in  a 
wonderful  variety  of  bramble 
mixtures  suitable  for  general 
outdoor  wear.  Very  stylish. 
Extra  large  sizes  in  stock. 


Price 


94/6 


Gir-'TS  FOR  OFFICERS. 

WATERPROOF 

KHAKI    ROLL-UP. 

Containing  Hair  Brusli,  Conih, 
Shaving  Brush,  Tooth  Brush, 
Space  tor  Razor,  Shaving  Soap, 
Knife,  I-'ork  and  Spoon,  Tin 
Openerand Corkscrew.  House- 
wife and  Spare  Pocket. 
Complete,  1  6/6. 


DebenKam 
&Freebod[v, 

SVigmoro  Street. 


^y  appointment  to 


H.M.  King  George  V, 


The  best  choice 

r^XCELLENCE  in  tyre  construction 
•*— '  depends  very  largely  on  attaining  per- 
fection in  a  thousand  details.  More 
accumulated  knowledge  of  how  to  do 
this  goes  to  the  making  of  the  Dunlop 
tyre  than  to  any  other. 

l_J  ENCE  the  superiority  of  the  Dunlop,  the  proof 
of   which    is  before  you  in  the  countless  in- 
stances of  splendid  service  that  have  made  the  word 

DUNLOP 

synonymous  with  satisfaction 


The  Dunlop    Rubber  Co.   Ltd.,    Founders  through- 
out   the    world    of     the  Pneumatic    Tyre    Industry, 

Alton  Cross.  Birmingham.  14  Reacnl  Street,  London,  S.W. 

Paris  :   4  Rue  du  Colonel  Moll. 


DUNLOP  SOLID  TYRES  FOR  HEAVY  COMIERCIAL  VEHICLES     Tr.de  m.rk. 


77 


LAND     AND     WATER 


November   14,    1914 


The  New 

SILK-SKIN  WAISTCOAT 


Impervious  to  wet  or 
searching  winds.  The 
special  slip  finish 
allows  the  Service 
tunic  to  be  worn 
comfortably  over  the 
waistcoat.  Weight 
20  oz. 


Pri^ 


ice 


27/6 


Special  Articles : 

Waterproof  Sleeping  Bags,  Fur-lined  Warmers, 
Leather  Waistcoats,  Oil-silk  Cap  Covers,  "Wolseley" 
Valises,  "Sam  Browne"  Belts  (finest  quality  37/6). 

Postage  to  the  front  1/-  extra. 

DunhlUs 

2,  CONDUIT  STREET,  LONDON,  W. 
359-36  1,    EUSTON    ROAD,    N.W. 


NORWICH  UNION  FIRE 

INSURANCE  SOCIETY,  LTD. 


iii_ 


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FOUNDED   1797. 

With  which  is  incTporattd  tht  Norwich  and 
London      Accidtnl      Insuramct      Association. 

HEAD  OFFICES: 

NORWICH  &  LONDON. 

FIRE.  ACCIDENT. 
MARINE. 

Sickness.  Employers'  Liability.  Tliird 
Party.  Fidelity.  Burglary.  Plate  Glass. 
Property  Owners.  Hailstorm.  Motor. 
Loss  of  Profits  following  Fire.  Livestock 


PROMPT  &  LIBERAL  SETTLEMENTS 

BRANCHES    AND    AGENCIES    THROUGIICUT    THE     WORLD. 


BARRS' 


AUTUMN.      U.1  TT     n^  C 
FLOWERING  Q  \J  JUOO 

Choice    Cpocub    Species,    GoiohicMma,    Hardy 

Cyciamen,    Nepinea,    Roman    Hyaolnths,   eto., 

for    present    planting. 

LIST      ON       A  f  PLICATION. 

BARRA  SONS.  11.12  &  13  King  Street,  Covent  Garden.  London 


NATIONAL     RELIEF     FUND. 

The  Prince  to  the  People. 
4« /«,„.-.,.,„., „.„„..  "Buckingham  Palace 

"At  such  a  moment  we  all  stand  by  one  another,  an)l  it  is  to  the  heart  of  the 
British  people  that  I  conlidentlymake  this  most  earnest  appeal.  EDWARD  P." 
Subscr).  Ions  must  be  addressed  to  ;  H.R.H.  Prince  ol  Wiles.  Buckingham  Palace,  London. 


For  Your  Friend 

AT   THE    FRONT. 


pOR  the  sum  of  a  Sovereign  Whiteley's  undertake 
to  dispatch  immediately  to  anyone  serving  with 
our  forces  at  the  Front  a  box  containing  the  following 
goods  : 

The  selection  has  been  made  by  an  old  cin:paigner, 
and  comprises  only  articles  ready  for  immediate  use. 


1    Tin  Tea  Tablets. 

1  Tin      Bivouac     Cocoa     and 

Milk. 

2  Tins  Sardines. 

2  Potted  Meats  and  Pastes. 
1   Tin  Brand's  Ess.  of  Chicken. 
1    Plum  Cake. 
1    Box  Chocolate. 


too  Cigarettes. 
Boracic   Powder. 
1   Tube  Vaseline. 
1^  lb.  Tobacco. 

1  Pipe. 

2  Pairs  Bootlaces. 

1   Steel  Tinder  Lighter. 


The  above  will  be  securely  packed  and  dispatched  imme- 
diately on  receipt  of  instructions  by  letter,  wire,  or  'phone. 

EVERYTHING   IS   INCLUDED  FOR  THE  SOVEREIGN. 


W"  WHITELEY,  Ltd 

QUEEN'S  ROAD,  LONDON,  W. 


SERVICE  BOOTS 

MARSHALL'S 
Handsewn    Boots 

For  the  FIELD  or  for  SERVICE. 
WELL  -  SEASONED     AND 


READY  FOR  WEAR 


Quagga    Hide    or    Brown 
Grain  Hi-'e. 

P"«        36/6 

Genuine  Porpoise, 


45/. 


W.  MARSHALL,  LIMITED  '^i 

10   FENCHURCH   STREET,   LONDON,   E.C. 


ESTABLISHED 

854)         :: 


WIRE    NIPPERS 

With  Insulated  Handles.      Complete   in    Leather   Case. 

12/6   and    17/6 


Send  for  Special  Price   List 
.    .    of  War  Equipment.    ■    . 


SWAINE  <S  ADENEY 

By  Appointment  to  H.M.  The  King. 

185    PICCADILLY,   W. 


78 


The  County  Gentleman 


AND 


LAND  &WATER 


Vol.  LXIV.        No.  2739 


SATURDAY,  NOVEMBER  7,  1914. 


rpubllshed  ast     price  sixpence 
La  newspapekJ      published  weekly 


CopyrigU,  Bassano 


THE    LATE    PRINCE    MAURICE    OF    BATTENBERG  • 

1 1  is  wilh  great  regret  that  we  record  the  death  of  the  Prince  as  the  result  of  wounds  received  near  Ypres.  Educated  at  Wellington  and 
liie  R.M.C.  (Sandhurst),  he  was  appointed  in  191  I  to  the  King's  Royal  Rifle  Corps.  He  was  recently  mentioned  in  despatches. 
He  was  an  ardent  sportsman  and  motorist  and  greatly  interested  in  Aviation,  making  frequent   flights  as  a   passenger  at    Hendon. 


.LAND     AND     WATER 


November   7,    1914 


/m     Ushers 


//  /CAREEN Stripe <ScO.VG 
/  '  /    Scotch  Whiskies. 


Safe  in  aiU  Waters 


H.M.S.   IRON   DUKE.     Super  Dreadnought  :  -Displacement,  25,000  tons;    length,  580  ft.;    horsepower,  30,000;  built  at  Portsmouth; 

launched   1912;   cost  £2,080,918;   guns,  10  of  13-5  in.,   12  of  6  in.,  and  smaller;    four  torpedo  tubes;    speed  22  knots;    crew  about  900. 

From  the  original  by  Montagua  Dawson.      Copyright  of  Mesara.  Andrew  Usher  &  Co.,  Ltd.,  OistiUers,  Edinburgh. 

64 


November  7,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


THE    WAR    BY    LAND. 

By  HILAIRE    BELLOG. 

NOTE. — ^THIS   UiTIOLS  HAS  BEEN  EUBKITTED  TO  THB  PBBSS  BUREAr,  TVHICH   DOES   KOT  OBJECT  TO   THB   PUBLICATION   AS   CEXSOEED 
A^■D    TAKES    XO   KESPOKSIHILI'IT    TOE   TH»   OOKllECTKKSS    OF   THB    STATEMENTS. 

m   ACCOBDAXCE     Wn'H     THE    EEQTTIEElIEi'TS      OP      TUB    PRESS     BtTREATT,     TE»    POSITIONS     Oy     TliOOPS    ON     FLAK3     ILHSTP.ATIXO     THia 
ABTICLI   JIUST   ONLY   HI  EBQABDED  AS  APPEOXIMATI,  AND  NO  DEFINITB   STBEKQTH  AT  ANT   POINT   IS   IJIDICATED. 


OPERATIONS    IN    POLAND. 

Tuesday  afternoon,  Noveviber  3rd,  1914. 


y 


RUSSIAN 
AUSTUO-GIRMAN 


TBS  EASTERN   FtELO  Or  WAS. 


WITH  the  great  battle  line  in  the  East  of 
Europe  the  readers  of  these  notes  are 
already  sufficiently  familiar.  Its  main 
tlieatre  is  the  basin  of  the  River  Vistula ; 
its  extent,  though  broken,  a  matter  of  nearly  400 
miles ;  and  the  territory  over  which  the  struggle  is 
taking  place  is  that  of  Poland. 

That  struggle  still  consists,  as  it  has  consisted  for 
now  over  eight  weeks,  in  two  groups  of  very  different 
importance.  The  main  group,  A-B-C,  involves  some- 
thing not  far  short  of  four  millions  of  men,  or  at  any 
rate  over  three  and  a  half  millions,  and  the  theatre  of 
their  action  is  the  Middle  Vistula  and  the  course  of  the 
lliver  San.  The  second  group,  in  which,  all  told,  less 
than  a  million  and  perhaps  not  more  than  half  a 
million  are  as  yet  engaged,  is  the  groiip  J),  which 
is  at  issue  upon  the  frontier  between  East  Prussia  and 
the  Eussian  Emphe,  a  week's  march  west  of  the 
Eiver  Niemen. 

While  the  whole  line  thus  divides  itself  into  two 
main  bodies  of  very  unequal  size,  the  larger  body, 
A-B-C,  should  again  be  divided,  for  reasons  which 
will  presently  appear,  into  two  limbs,  A-B  and  B-C, 


the  first  consisting  in  the  defence  by  the  Russians  of, 
and  the  retreat  by  the  Germans  from,  the  [Middle 
Vistula  ;  the  second,  the  fighting  along  and  across  the 
River  San. 

Further,  we  must  add  in  a  separate  and  distant 
comer  of  the  whole  field,, in  that  little  Austrian  pro- 
vince kno'svn  as  Bukoviua,  to  the  eastward  of  Galicia, 
a  distinct  Austrian  effort,  which  includes  the  approach 
to  and  perhaps  the  occupation  of  the  town  of 
CzemoTvitz. 

The  most  notable  feature  is  this  general  line, 
especially  in  its  present  disj^osition,  is  the  separation 
between  the  gi'oup  acting  in  the  north  at  D,  and 
the  group  acting  in  the  south  from  A  to  C  ;  and  before 
proceeding  to  the  main  actions  upon  the  Vistula  and 
the  San,  we  should  do  well  to  note  the  nature  of  the 
fighting  upon  the  frontier  of  East  Prussia,  for  it  con- 
veys an  important  political  lesson  upon  the  nature  of 
this  great  European  war. 

(A.)— THE    FIGHTING    UPON    THE 
EAST    PRUSSIAN    FRONTIER. 

In  spite  of  the  need  in  M'hich,  as  we  shall  see  later, 
the  Austro-German  forces  stand  in  the  south 
of  reinforcement,  a  strong  German  body  is  kept 
isolated  upon  the  frontier  between  East  Prussia 
and  the  Russian  Empire,  just  in  front  of  the  lino 
Suwalki-Augustowo.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
these  Gennan  armies,  after  their  considerable  success 
at  Tannenburg  in  the  early  part  of  September, 
following  upon  the  Russian  invasion  of  East  Prussia, 
advanced  rapidly  and  in  some  force  towards  the  line  of 
the  River  Niemen.  It  will  fm-ther  be  remembered  how 
they  tried  to  cross  this  river  and  failed,  were  pursued  to 
the  fi*ontier,  beaten  by  the  Russians  in  the  Battle  of 
Augustowo,  and  compelled  to  give  up  the  siege  of 
Osowiec,  which  they  had  undertaken.  There  was 
even  for  a  moment  a  ceiiain  penetration  of  East 
Prussia  by  the  Russian  columns ;  and  it  was  not 
until  the  German  forces  had  rallied  that  this  Russian 
counter-advance  was  checked.  Since  that  moment 
(now  nearly  a  month  ago)  the  two  enemies  have  faced 
each^^other  almost  exactly  upon  the  frontier  itself. 
How  closely  the  frontier  corresponds  with  this 
"block"  the  sketch  map  on  the  top  of  the  next 
page  will  show.  It  concerns  but  a  small  though 
the  more  important  southern  part  of  the  general 
line  in  this  region.  So  far  as  can  be  judged 
from  the  official  descnptions  upon  both  sides,  the 
forces  stand  very  much  as  they  are  given  in  this 
map.  The  railway  junction  at  Lyck,  which  was  for 
a  moment  threatened  by  the  Russians,  is  again  in 
GeiTnan  hands;  a  large  Russian  force  defends  the 
village  of  Bakalarshewo,  holding  a  strong  position 
upon  a  bluff  between  two  of  the' lakes  that  mark  this 
region.  Heavy  German  efforts  to  force  this  position 
have  failed.  The  line  goes  down  southward  in  a 
cordon  almost  exactly  corresponding  to  the  frontier, 
thougli  the  Russian  forces  arc  often  slightly  across  it, 
especially  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Lake  Rayi-od. 
Finally,  the  Russian  forces  are  astraddle  of  the  main 


LAND    AND    WATER 


November  7,  1914 


55 


I; 


r^  SlMALKl 


r*f 


o 


10 


Miles 
irzj  RussUms 


Lake 
^  Rafg^ovod 


Aastro 'Germans  o- 


THE   EAST   PKUSSIAN   FKONTIKB   AEEA. 

railway  which  runs  towards  Lyck  from  the  fortress  of 
Oso'i\iecs,  and  so  into  the  heart  of  Prussia. 

Why  do  we  find  such  a  disposition  so  far  east- 
ward and  to  the  north  of  the  South  Polish  field, 
in  which  Germany  has  need  of  every  man  she  can 
spare  ? 

The  question  needs  an  answer  the  more  from  the 
fact  that  a  fuU  retreat  of  the  Germans  in  the  south 
from  Eussian  Poland  must  inevitably,  sooner  or  later, 
involve  the  retirement  of  the  smaller  German  forces 
from  East  Prussia.  Not  only  must  it  inevitably 
involve  their  relu-ement,  but  as  Russia  continues  to 
call  up  its  reserves  of  men  (very  much  larger  than 
those  at  the  di.sposal  of  Germany)  there  is  a  certitude 
that  this  German  force,  if  it  remains  upon  the  Eussian 
frontier  in  front  of  Lyck  and  Magrabowa,  will  be 
taken  in  reverse  and  will  be  in  danger  of  isolation. 
It  is  trae  that  a  movement  thus  coming  from  the 
south  over  the  Eussian  frontier  into  East  Pmssia 
directly  is  hampered  by  the  long  region  of  lakes 
which  lies  along  that  frontier,  and  of  marshes,  the 
defiles  between  which  are  all  strongly  held  and 
foi-tified.  But  long  before  the  Vistula  is  reached  this 
region  ends ;  the  Eussians  can  cross  in  force  into  West 
Prussia,  and  a  Gennan  force  thus  isolated  on  the 
eastern  frontier  would  be  in  grave  peril. 

This  does  not  mean  that  we  should  look  to  the 
isolation  and  destruction  of  such  a  force.  What  it 
means  is  that  the  moment  the  peril  begins  to  threaten 
that  force  will  have  to  retire.  Why  then  does  it 
remain  fixed  at  such  a  distance  from  the  retirement  of 
its  miich  more  numerous  brethren  ?  There  is  no  such 
Eussian  force  in  front  of  it  as  could  join  the  main 
Eussian  forces  southward  with  much,  effect.  It  dis- 
poses of  every  facility  for  getting  round  to  reinforce 
the  main  German  bodies  in  the  south.  Yet  it  not 
only  remains  in  force  upon  this  frontier,  but  in 
sufticient  force  to  attempt  the  counter-offensive.  It 
has  indeed  made  that  attempt  with  violence  durinf» 
the  last  few  days.  '  ° 


The  ansv/er  to  that  question  is  a  political  one, 
and  iu  that  answer  we  may  discover  much  that  wiU. 
explain  the  next  phases  of  this  war  in  the  West  aa 
well  as  in  the  East. 

It  is  of  solid  and  serious  advantage  to  the 
Germans — an  advantage  which  perhaps  they  ex- 
aggerate but  which  is  of  very  high  moral  value — that 
the  Avar  has  hitherto  been  fought  ofE  German  soil. 
What  it  means  for  a  war  to  be  fought  upon  the 
enemy's  soil,  France  and  Belgium  well  know.  And 
for  a  few  moments  Germany  knew  it,  when  the 
Eussian  ii-ruption  into  East  Prussia,  though  pursued 
but  for  a  few  miles,  involved  £20,000,000  worth 
of  material  damage,  and  was  sufficient  to  throw 
such  alarm  into  Berlin  as  produced  the  heavy  rein- 
forcements of  two  months  ago,  and  the  German  victory 
at  Tannenburg.  That  the  enemy's  armies,  though 
only  occupying  a  comer  of  Prance,  can  yet  hold  and 
ruin  that  corner,  is  something;  and  the  whole  tone  of 
the  English  people  at  this  moment  depends  upon  the 
fact  that  English  soil  is  as  yet  irn'iolate.  The 
voluntary  system  depends  upon  that,  and  a  hundred 
other  things. 

But  even  more  important  than  the  effect  upon 
the  enemy  of  fighting  upon  his  soil,  is  the  effect  upon 
the  Gennan  population  of  the  German  armies  being 
able  to  maintain  this  boast.  It  is  the  whole  German 
theory  of  this  war,  that  it  must  be  fought  with  every 
available  man  and  gun  and  horse  in  this,  its  first 
phase ;  that  if  victory  is  not  now  assured  it  wUl  never 
be  recovered.  To  procure  that  effort — which,  as  we 
know  by  the  new  levies  attacking  us  in  Flanders,  is 
far  more  than  the  ordinary  effort  of  a  full  mobilisation ; 
it  is  the  staking  of  a  whole  nation  upon  the  cast — the 
immunity  of  German  soil  is  essential.  Nor  can  we 
yet  judge  of  what  a  revolution  there  will  be  in  the 
moral  condition  of  Germany  when  it  is  German  towns 
that  burn  and  are  destroyed,  German  civilians  that 
are  shot  in  batches  for  spying  or  for  informing  the 
enemy,  or  even  as  hostages,  and  German  goods  that 
are  sequestrated  to  the  advantage  of  the  invader. 
Meanwhile,  'We  may  be  certain  that  this  political 
consideration  will  fetter  German  strategy  more  and 
more  as  the  campaign  proceeds. 

Now,  it  is  to  maintain  German  soil  immune  that  this 
"  siegework  "  is  being  maintained  at  the  known  cost  of 
ultimate  peril  upon  the  frontier  between  East  Prussia 
and  Eussia.  The  labyrinth  of  lakes  and  marshes 
helps  the  effort ;  but  even  if  it  were  open  countr}"^  and 
needing  far  more  troops,  that  effort  would  still  be 
maintained.  And  it  is  worth  prophesjdng  that  the 
retirement  from  the  East  Prussian  frontier  wUl  not 
come  until  the  very  last  moment,  when  its  peril  of 
being  cut  off  is  extreme,  perhaps  not  even  then. 

We  may  prepare  to  hear,  then,  of  an  immovable 
situation  all  along  this  front,  until  the  main  German 
bodies  in  Southern  Poland  have  retreated  much 
further  than  they  have  already  done. 

B.— THE  OPERATIONS  IN  SOUTHERN 
POLAND. 

I  have  said  that  the  operations  in  Southern 
Poland  should  be  divided  for  purposes  of  analysis  into 
two  limbs ;  A — B,  the  limb  which  is  concerned  with 
the  middle  Vistula,  and  in  wliich  the  Germans  are 
retreating  from  that  stream,  pursued  by  the  Eussians, 
and  B— C,  the  limb  along  the  Eiver  San. 

Of  these  two  the  first  is  by  far  the  most  iuiportant. 
Upon  it  wiU  ultimately  depend,  for  reasons  which  I 
shall  proceed  to  show,  the  fate  of  the  whole  campaign 
in  the  East.  The  Austro-German  object  in  that 
cumpaiga,  so  far  as  the  main  operations  upon   the 


2» 


NovemW  7,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATEB 


Vistula  and  the  San  were  concerned,  may  be  re- 
membered. It  was  tlie  object  of  the  Germanic  allies, 
the  Austrian  half  of  which  had  already  been  badly 
mishandled  by  the  Eussians  in  Galicia  and  pushed 
back  half-way  between  Przemysl  and  Crakow  (see 
Map  1),  to  get  back  again  to  the  line  of  the  San  in 
the  south,  continued  by  the  middle  Vistula  to  the 
north,  to  cross  these  streams,  and  to  establish  them- 
selves firmly  in  a  defensive  offensive  upon  the  further 
bank.  The  capture  of  Warsaw,  on  the  extreme  north 
of  this  effort,  the  relief  of  Przemysl,  on  the  extreme 
south,  would  protect  the  two  ends  of  the  advance. 
Later  Lemberg  would  be  retaken,  and,  though  the 
allies  would  not  propose  to  penetrate  deeply  into  tho 
Russian  plain — with  the  winter  coming  on,  with  its 
poverty  of  communications  and  with  the  great  length 
of  the  line  of  supply  from  Germany  which  such 
further  penetration  would  involve — yet  it  was  essential 
to  their  plan  that  the  line  of  the  middle  Vistula  and 
the  San  should  be  firmly  held,  and  that  there  the 
Russians  should  be  indefinitely  checked,  in  spite  of 
their  increasing  numbers — making  of  Russian  Poland, 
as  it  wei'e,  a  larger  Belgium.  ^Vhile  the  Russians 
were  thus  held  in  the  East,  a  definite  victory  might 
be  expected  in  the  West,  to  which  further  reinforce- 
ments could  be  sent  when  it  was  apparent  that  the 
defensive  line  held  by  the  Germans  and  Austrians 
beyond  the  Vistula  was  secure. 

In  pursuance  of  this  plan  very  large  reinforce- 
ments were  provided  in  aid  of  the  defeated  Austrian 
armies,  and  these  reinforcements  came,  not  into 
Galicia,  but,  leaving  tho  reoccupation  of  that  field  to 
the  rcconsti-ucted  Austrian  bodies,  the  Germans,  to  tlie 
number  of  some  800,000  men  or  rather  more,  with 
Austrian  reinforcements  upon  their  right  along  the 


southern  frontier  of  Russian  Poland,  advanced  right 
across  that  province  towards  the  line  of  the  Vistula 
between  Sandomir  and  Warsaw.  Before  this  advance 
the  Russians  retreated,  concentrating  beyond  the 
Vistula  upon  reinforcements  reaching  them  from  the 
east.  No  effort  was  made  to  prevent  this  Gemian 
and  Austrian  advance  up  to  the  Vistula  itself,  and  a 
corresponding  Russian  retirement  to  take  place  in  the 
south  through  Galicia  up  to  the  line  of  the  San, 
Przemysl  was  still  partially  invested  by  the  Russians, 
but  only  partially.  The  western  sector  of  its  peri- 
meter was  open  to  the  Austrian  advance.  When  the 
shock  came,  the  most  important  part  of  this  whole 
line,  the  part  along  the  middle  Vistula,  stood  very 
much  as  the  dotted  line  upon  the  accompanying  map. 
It  had  everjrwhere  touched  the  stream,  and  was 
prepared  to  cross  it  at  the  points  indicated  by  tho 
arrows.  It  was  equally  prepared  to  occxipy  Warsaw, 
upon  which  essential  northern  point  of  support  more 
than  a  quarter  of  the  Austro-German  line  upon  the 
Vistula  Avas  marching. 

Though  the  Russians  allowed  the  enemy  to 
reach  the  Vistula  everywhere  above  Warsaw,  and  to 
attempt  the  crossing,  they  took  the  counter-offensive 
at  exactly  the  right  moment  in  front  of  Warsaw 
itself,  and  began  driving  this  wing  of  the  Germans 
back  westward  along  the  main  radroad.  Their 
success  in  this  field  we  know.  Ffoin  extreme 
positions  within  six  or  seven  miles  of  the  Polish 
capital,  the  Germans  were  beaten  back  at  the  rate  of 
nearly  ten  miles  a  day  for  three  days,  until  rather 
more  than  a  v/eek  figo  they  were  on  the  line  Skiernie- 
wicc-Rawa-New  Misslo-Radom,  and  so  to  the  river ; 
the  defeat  in  front  of  Warsaw  involving  the  abandon- 
ment of  all  attempts  to  pursue  the  crossing  of  tho 


8* 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


November  7,  1914 


stream,  altliougli    such   crossings   had  been  actually 
accomplished  in  more  than  one  pliice.  .     ,,     r,    l 

Since  this  throwing  back  of  the  line  in  the  tirst 
Eussian  successes,  the  Eussian  pursuit  has  been 
methodical  and  contmuous.  It  is  ridiculous  to  use 
the  word  "  rout "  of  the  German  retreat,  which  lias 
been  orderly,  and  in  which  everything  essential 
has  been  saved,  which  apparently  has  lost  no  very 
larsjo  body  in  prisoners  compared  with  its  size,  and 
wliich  still  maintains  a  perfectly  intact _  formation. 
But  though  it  is  an  orderly  i-ctreat,  it  is  a  retreat 
none  the  less,  and  one  which  renders  more  and  more 
certain  as  it   proceeds   the  fate  of  the  campaign  m 

the  East. 

It  is  here  that  the  importance  of  the  fighting 
upon,  and  afterwards  \\est  of,  the  middle  Vistula 
appears,  and  the  subordination  of  the  effort  further 
east  along  the  San  to  this  mam  effort  of  the  Austro- 
Germans.  For,  as  the  Austro-Germans  fall  back 
westward  and  south-westward,  it  becomes  clear  that 
the  eastern  effort  cannot  be  prolonged.  The  line  is 
still  intact,  and  beyond  Sandomir  is  continued  up  tlie 
San  Valley ;  but  all  the  north-wTstem  portion  of  it  is 
bending  backwards  and  farther  back  towards  the 
south,  and  the  prolongation  of  such  a  strain  upon  the 
main  forces  of  the  enemy  by  the  Eussians  must 
involve  the  withdrawal  of  the  Austrian  forces  opera- 
ting further  south  to  the  east.  If  these  were  to 
maintain  their  positions  (they  can  hardly  hope  to 
advance — and  even  advance  would  be  of  no  value)  the 
line  would  ultimately  find  itself  bent  into  a  bow  from 
Cracow,  along  the  Vistula,  and  then  up  the  San.  It 
would  not  even  be  covering  Silesia — the  keeping  of 
the  Eussians  out  of  which,  much  more  than  the 
keeping  .of  them  out  of  Galicia,  is  the  prime  object 
of  the  German  Empire  in  this  field.  One  may  put 
the  matter  diagi-amaticaUy  thus  : — 


If  the  shaded  portion  S  represents  Silesia,  then 
the  Eussian  pressure  has  already  bent  back  the 
northern  joi'^'on  of  the  Austro-German  line  and 
is  bending  it  back  further  still.  From  W  X  P 
(Warsaw,  Sandomu* — at  X — Przemysl),  which  was 
occupied  nearly  three  weeks  ago,  the  Austro-German 
line  is  bent  back  to  L  X  P  (Lodz,  Sandomir,  Przemysl). 
Should  it  be  bent  back  to  C  X  P  (Cracow,  Sandomir, 
Przemysl)  Silesia  would  be  uncovered,  and  any  Eussian 
success  between  X  and  P  (the  Eussians  can  throw 
their  perpetually  arriving  reinforcements  where  they 
choose)  would  be  not  only  the  r*in  of  Silesia  but  of 


the  whole  Austro-German  line.  It  seems  certain 
therefore  that  such  a  line  as  A  B,  falling  back  again 
to  A  D,  will  be  the  result  of  the  Eussian  pressure. 
But  in  order  to  maintain  such  a  line  the  Austrian 
eastern  advances  in  Galicia,  now  holding  X  P,  will 
have  to  fall  back  first  to  B,  and  then  to  D. 

It  is  therefore  upon  this  continual  advance  of  the 
Eussians  from  the  middle  Vistula  south-westward,  and 
the  as  continual  retreat  of  the  Germans  and  Austrians 
before  them  in  this  region,  that  the  fate  of  the 
campaign  depends  ;  for  it  involves  with  it  an  ultimate 
retii-ement  from  the  San  and  from  East  Galicia  as  well. 
How  far  this  retirement  has  proceeded  at  the 
moment  of  writing  (Tuesday  evening)  the  Eussian 
official  news  informs  us.  The  main  German  bodies 
are  out  of  Lodz,  though  we  have  no  news  as  yet  that 
this  town  is  occupied  by  the  cavalry  of  the  Eussian 
pursuit.  Piotrokow  is  apparently  entu-ely  abandoned 
by  the  enemy,  and  already  occupied  by  the  Eussian 
advanced  cavalry.  So  is  Opocsno.  So  is  Osowiecs, 
and  apparently  even  Opatow,  though  here  there  has 
been  strong  resistance.  Sandomir  is  still  the  pivot  of 
this  great  retreat. 

The  whole  thing  singularly  resembles  the  corres- 
ponding German  failure  in  the  West,  generally  called 
the  Battle  of  the  Marne — with  Lodz  to    stand   for 
Soissons  and  Sandomir  for  the  pivot  at  Verdun.     But 
there  is  this  difference  :  that  the  marching  wing  or 
extreme  of  the  retreating  enemy's  hue  has  had  to  go 
more  than  double  the  distance  it  had  to  go  in  France, 
and,  much  more  important,  with  the  inability  of  the 
enemy  so  far  to  make  a  stand.     For  there  is  this  great 
difference    between    the     German     retreat    through 
Eussian  Poland  from  in  front  of  Warsaw  and  the 
German  retreat   through  north-east  France  from  in 
front  of  Paris — that  the  pursuers  greatly  outnumber 
the  pursued,  and  that  the  numbers  of  the  pursuers  axe 
increasing  every  day.     Wlien  von  Kluck  turned  back 
from  in  front  of  Paris  on  the  discovery  of  Joffi-e's 
reserves,    he    carried    with    him    indeed   the    whole 
German  line  as  far  as  Verdun.    It  all  had  to  fall  back. 
But  the  troops  that  pressed  it  back  ^through  Chateau 
Thierry  and  Vitry  were  less   in   number    than   the 
troops  they  were  pursuing.     It  was  possible  for  the 
majority  that  was  retreating   to  spare  men  for  the 
preparation  of  a  position,  to  rally  there,  and  to  begin 
a   prolonged  resistance.     A  corresponding  resistance 
has  not  yet  taken  place  in  Poland,  and  it  is  the  whole 
object  of  this  methodical  Eussian  pursuit,  compara- 
tively small  as  its  results  in  men  and  material  captui-ed 
have  yet  been,  to  prevent  such  a  resistance.     Only  the 
future  will  show  whether  it  has  been  found  possible 
to  prevent  it  or  no. 

Meanwhile  an  exceedingly  important  point,  upon 
which  judgment  must  be  held  in  suspense,  is,  tcJiether 
i/i  tJiis pursuit  the  Russians  have  managed  to  divide  those 
v)hom  they  are  pursuing  into  two  separate  bodies.  ^If 
they  have,  a  very  great  deal  has  been  accomplished. 
Certain  unofficial  telegrams  maintain  that  they  have 
done  so ;  but  I  cannot,  from  a  study  of  the  map,  see 
that  the  trick  has  really  been  done.  VvTiat  that 
separation  would  mean,  and  how  it  might  be  effected, 
may  be  grasped  from  the  next  diagram. 

Here  is  an  army  in  two  portions,  A  and  B, 
retreating  in  front  of  another  army,  also  divided  into 
two  portions,  E  and  F.  It  has  right  across  its  retreat 
an  obstacle  M  N,  which  separates  its  two  portions 
A  and  B.  It  has  further  two  great  avenues  of  com- 
munication along  which  its  retreat  is  facilitated, 
(1)  and  (la),  both  leading  to  C.  But  from  (1)  a 
secondary  avenue  of  communication  (2)  diverges 
towards  K.     A — B  is  divided  by  the  natural  obstacle 


4* 


Kovember  7,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


M  N  into  two  portions,  and  so  for  that  matter  is  the 
victorious  pursuer  E — E.  But  this  obstacle  comes  to 
an  end  at  M.  Now,  if  both  portions  of  A — B — the 
A  portion  and  the  B  portion — stick  to  the  two  main 
lines  of  retreat  (1)  and  (la)  and  are  able  to  get  back 
behind  M  to  the  level  of  the  dotted  Hue  Q-  H  L,  they 
•wUl  join  hands  again,  and  from  that  point  onwards 
the  two  avenues  of  retreat  converging  towards  C  wiU 
serve  them  jointly.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  A 
portion  tends  to  slip  off  after  reaching  H  along  the 
secondary  avenue  of  retreat  too,  towards  K,  and  to 
take  up  a  position  such  as  that  at  Q,  and  to  continue 
its  retreat  thence  toward  K,  while  B  pursues  its 
original  following  of  the  main  avenue  of  retreat,  and 
stands  at  P  marching  towards  C,  Q  wiU  get  more  and 
more  separated  fi'om  the  southern  portion  P  as  the 
retreat  proceeds.  The  more  the  retreat  proceeds  the 
wider  the  gap  will  get,  until  at  last  the  pursuers  E  F 
will  be  able  to  step  in  between  through  the  gap, 
and  the  position  will  be  like  that  in  the   following 


diagram  with  Q  and  P  finally  broken  asunder  by 
E  F,  which  can  deal  with  each  of  them  in  detail. 
E  F  would  have  done  strategically  what  is  done 
tactically  in  a  battle  when  you  break  your  enemy's 
line. 

It  will  be  asked  why  should  the  A  portion  of 
the  retreating  enemy  be  so  foolish  as  to  go  along  the 
secondary  line  (la)  imtil  it  gets  to  Q  and  is  thus 
separated  from  its  southern  portion  B,  which  has  got 
to  P.  The  answer  is  that  it  may  either  have  been 
shepherded  or  edged  outwards  by  the  superior  mobility 
and  cleverness  of  E  pursuing  it,  and  have  been  got 
away  north  before  it  reached  the  end  of  the  obstacle  : 
or  that  a  political  desire  to  protect  some  piece  of 
tei-ritory,  such  as  the  sliadcd  portion  S  may  Lave  lured 
A  away  from  his  companion  B  in  the  middle  of  the 


retreat  when  both  bodies  were  approaching  the  enfl  of 
the  obstacle  that  separated  them.  Only  reasons  of 
this  sort,  strategic  or  political,  could  compel  A  to  be 
60  foolish  as  to  remain  out  of  touch  with  B  one 
moment  longer  than  the  obstacle  M  N  kept  him  so 
separate. 

Now,  apply  this  diagram  to  the  sketch  map 
No.  3.  The  two  separated  retreating  bodies  A  and  B 
are  the  Germans  north  and  south  of  the  marshy  lower 
course  of  the  Eiver  PiUca,  which  is  the  obstacle  M  N. 
A  is  the  Germans  lying  to  the  north  of  that  marshy 
stream  and  just  beaten  back  from  the  line  Warsaw- 
up-Vistula — mouth  of  Pilica  to  the  line.  Skierniewice 
— New  Misslo.  B  is  the  Germans  who  have  retreated 
from  the  Vistula  to  a  line  passing  through  Eadom  south 
of  the  PiUca :  that  is  the  position  of  rather  more  than 
a  week  ago.  The  Pilica  ceases  to  be  a  serious  obstacle 
at  about  the  point  marked  M  on  this  same  sketch 
map  3.  The  two  great  avenues  of  retreat  (1)  and  (la) 
ai'e  the  main  railway  lines  from  Eadom  to  Cracow 
and  from  Warsaw  to  Cracow.  The  subsidiary  diverg- 
ent avenue  of  retreat  is  the  railway  line  branching  off 
from  the  first  through  Lodz  to  Kalisz.  The  shaded 
area  S,  the  defence  of  which  might  lure  the  retreat 
into  dividing  into  two  bodies,  is  Silesia.  Another 
lure  which  might  tempt  the  northern  part  of  the 
German  line  to  go  directly  westward  while  the  rest 
went  southward,  would  be  the  opportunity  of  defend- 
ing the  line  of  the  Eiver  Warta,  on  which  a  good  deal 
of  labour  in  entrenching  has  already  been  spent.  It 
is  therefore  quite  on  the  cards  that  the  German  retreat 
might  get  split  into  two  bodies  such  as  are  repre- 
sented by  the  dotted  bodies  X  and  Y  on  map  3. 
These  bodies  would,  of  course,  try  to  keep  in  touch 
with  each  other;  but  it  would  be  the  object  of 
the  Eussian  pursuit,  as  the  angle  between  them 
approached  breaking  point,  to  push  in  and  separate 
them. 

Now  certain  unofficial  telegrams  from  the 
Eussians  claim  that  they,  in  their  pursuit,  have 
virtually  done  this,  and  that  while  one  body  is 
inevitably  pinned  to  the  two  great  railway  lines 
that  go  south-west  towards  Galicia  and  Cracow, 
the  other  is  already  depending  upon  the  line 
going  due  west  to  Kalisz  and  by  the  shortest 
road  into  German  Poland,  and  so  to  Berlin.  There 
is  even  in  the  official  Eussian  communique  the 
vague  phrase  that  the  retreat 
north  and  south  of  the  Pilica 
importance." 

But,  I  repeat,  we  have  not  yet  any  evidence 
that  the  separation  of  the  retreating  Austro- 
German  body  into  two  lias  really  taken  place ;  and 
such  a  separation  would  be  so  disastrous,  it  would  be 
so  much  the  object  of  the  German  commanders  to 
prevent  it  at  any  expense,  that  we  ought  not  to 
believe  it  has  taken  place  until  the  very  best  of  proof 
has  been  offered  us.  Of  that  as  yet  we  have  none. 
What  we  do  kno"iv  is  that  the  German  retreat  from 
the  Vistula,  following  upon  the  German  i-etreat  in  front 
of  Warsaw,  is  quite  definite  and  final,  and  that  the 
Germans  will  not  retrieve  it.  They  may  entrench 
again  and  fight  a  whole  defensive  position  as  they 
have  done  in  the  west ;  but  they  have  lost  their  first 
objective,  and  have  been  foiled  in  theii-  original  plan 
of  campaign.  They  can  no  longer  reinforce  the 
West  from  the  East  without  suffering  what 
they  most  dread — the  presence  of  the  enemy  upon 
their  ovra  soil.  As  that  enemy  continually  increases 
in  numbers,  his  presence  upon  their  soil  may  yet  be 
afflicting  them  before  the  full  whiter  sets  in  a  mouth, 
hence. 


of     the     enemy 
s   "of  enormous 


6* 


LAND    AND    WATER 


November  7,  1914 


(G)  -THE  OPERATIONS  UPON  THE 

SAN. 


SAND(mIR 
NISKO 


O     n    20    iO    iO    SO  .60    TO 

1.  I -1 >■, ' • 

A  weeks  fair  marcltin^  or 
TO  miles 


lEMBERC 
® 

^  TpRZEUYSL 


cv.~~-. 


^c 


^^^ 


V/^c 


-  V  ^-J 


.  .     STRYJ^ 
TXIRKA  'Va 


The  general  result,  tten,  of  the  operations  in  the 
Eastern  field  to  date  are  in  favour  of  our  Allies,  from 
the  "block"  that  holds  up  the  detached  and  now 
dangerously  isolated  Prussian  forces  in  the  north, 
through  the  great  German  retreat  from  tlie  Vistula, 
to  the  hitherto  successful  holding  of  the  Austrian 
effort  upon  the  San. 

THE    BATTLE    IN    FLANDERS. 


Meanwhile,  as  I  have  said,  this  main  defeat  of 
the  Germans  upon  the  middle  Vistula  will  ultimately 
involve  the  retreat  of  the  Austrians  of  the  southern 
or  second  limb  upon  the  San.     Wliat  these  Austrian 
forces  to  the  south  of  the  main  Vistula  line   have 
accomplished    is    not     inconsiderable.      They    have 
rallied ;    they   have   cleared   Hungary   of   the   small 
cavalry  forces  which  had  penetrated  across  the  Car- 
pathians ;    they    claim    to    have    partially    relieved 
Przemysl,  and  they  have  certainly  come  down   the 
eastern  slopes  of  the  Carpathians  through  the  foot- 
hills to  the  plain.     They  are  still  fighting,  however, 
in  those  mountains,  even  as  far  back  as  Turka,  which 
is  in  the  heart  of  the  hills ;  and  their  detached  bodies 
are  not  further  north  at  the  most  than  Sambor  and 
Stryj.     It  is  not  possible  that  any  large  turning  move- 
ment should  take  place  on  this  extreme  southern  flank 
of  the  Russsian  line.     The  Russian  reinforcement  there 
is,  compared  with  the  Austrian  reinforcement,  inex- 
haustible, and  the  Russians  have  Lemberg  as  their 
base  from  which  to  hold  up  any  such  effort.    But,  until 
the  Vistula  was  lost,  the  co-ordinate  attempt  to  force  the 
San  while  the  Vistula  itself  was  being  crossed,  looked 
pi'omising,  and  that  would  at  least  have  had  the  effect 
of  completely  relieving  Przemysl.     The  news  from  the 
valley  of  the  San  is  very  meagre,  but  such  as  it  is  it 
is  worth  noting  that  it  connotes  no  successful  Austrian 
crossing  of  the  stream.     AVe  have  one  Russian  tele- 
gram and  one  Austrian  one.     The  Russian  telegram 
tells  us  that  a   successful   effort  v/as   made   by  the 
Russian  troops  over  the  river  at  Nisco — the  point,  it 
will  be  remembered  from  past  notes,  about  which  the 
first  bridges  cross  the  San.     TTie  Austrian  telegram 
tells  us  that  the  Austrian  troops  successfully  repelled 
an  attack  on  Leheisk — a  town  which,  like  every  other 
in  Galicia,  has  its  name  spelt  in  three  separate  ways 
— I  adopt  that  of  the  telegram.     Now  the  significant 
thing  about  both  these  telegrams  is  that  Nisco  is  on 
the  left  or  Austrian  bank  of  the  San,  while  Leheisk  is 
not  only  on  the  left  bank  but  at  some  distance  in 
from  the  stream.     In   other  words,  the  line   of   the 
river  is  at  the  moment  of  writing  being  firmly  held 
by  the  Russians  and  dominated  by  them,  and  there 
has  been  no  crossing  of  that  stream  of  any  moment 
by  the  enemy,  or,  if  there  has  been,  sueh  a  crossing 
has  been  made  good  again  by  the  Russians. 


Up  to  the  end  of  last  week  the  main  interest  of 
the  great  battle  in  Flanders — apart  from  the  stupend- 
ous  fact   that   on   the   issue  hung   the  fates  of  the 
German  ai-mies  in  the  west — as  they  do  stiU — was 
the  division  of  the  German  effort  into  a  northern  and 
a  southern  struggle.     The  southern  effort  consisted  in 
the  attempt  to  push  south-westward  of  Lille  and  to 
break   the  AUied  line  in  front  of  La  Bass6e.     The 
northern  one  consisted  in  the  attempt  to  break,  or  at 
least  to   roU  back,  the  extreme   of  the   Allied   line 
where  it  reposed  upon  the  sea.      Of  these  two  efforts 
the  first,  that  in  front  of  La  Bassee,  was  slowly  and 
partially  successful,  in  so  far  as  a  certain  indentation 
was  there  made  in  the  general  line  which  the  Allies 
were   holding    from    the    sea   right   away    south    to 
Compicgne.     More  than  that  the  German  push  at  this 
point  did  not  achieve,  and  chief  among  the  causes  of 
its  failure  was  the  division  of  forces  consequent  upon 
that  second  effort  in  the  north,  which  has  completely 
failed.     For  this  second  effort,  which  may  be  called 
— though    somewhat    ironically — "  The    March    on 
Calais "    (undoubtedly    based    upon   political   rather 
than     strategic    considerations)     has     failed     at    an 
incredible    cost   of   human   lives,    of    which  loss   by 
far  the  greater  part  has  fallen,  of  course,  upon  the 
defeated  party.     The  mass  of  the  German  reinforce- 
ments were  brought  up  against  the  twelve  miles  front 
between  Dixmude  and  the  sea.     Tlie  canalised  river 
Yser  between  Nieuport  and  Dixmude  was  crossed  at 
last  by  the  Germans,  but  with  no  greater  result  than 
to  see  the  bodies  already  over  the  bridge  swamped  by 
the  opening  of  the  sluices,  and  unable   to    advance 


%• 


November  7,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


bcj'ond  tlie  railway  which  runs  from  Nicuport  through 
Eiimscapelle  and  Pervyse  to  Dixmude.  Even  had  the 
violent  effort  made  upon  this  front  succeeded,  the 
German  pursuit  of  the  Allies  through  the  wet  country 
eastward  to  Dimkii-k  would  have  been  an  appallingly 
difficult  business ;  and  behind  that  again,  in  front  of 
Calais,  the  Allies  had,  as  we  saw  last  week,  the  best 
defensive  position  of  all  that  coast,  the  line  of  the 
river  Aa,  prolonged  by  the  canal  to  Saint  Omer. 

At  any  rate,  this  effort  has  certainly  and  finally 
failed.  That  in  front  of  La  Bassee  is  still  being 
\-igorously  but  fruitlessly  continued  (with  no  ap])re- 
ciable  fui-ther  advance  at  this  moment  of  writing, 
Tuesday  evening)  towards  Bethune.  Nor  ai'e  the 
Germans  yet  in  possession  of  Lens,  the  other  railway 
centre  of  that  neighbourhood,  which  it  is  essential  for 
them  to  occupy  if  Lille  is  to  be  of  any  value  to  them. 

But  the  new  struggle  (which  bids  fair  to  be  as 
intense  as  that,  now  abandoned,  along  the  sea-coast  or 
"  Calais "  route)  is  directed  towards  the  position  of 
Tpres. 

To  obtain  possession  of  that  point  is  the  business 
the  German  commanders  have  set  for  themselves  as 
an  alternative  to  the  possession  of  that  sea  route 
•which  has  proved  impossible. 

This  attack  upon  Ypres  is  not  an  attack  upon  a 
junction  or  "  nodal  point "  of  importance  to  supply.  A 
single  line  of  railway  does  indeed  lead  west  from  Ypres 
to  Hazebrouck,  while,  of  com-se,  lines  run  from  Ypres 
to  the  south  and  Lille,  to  the  east  and  Brussels,  to  the 
north  and  the  sea  at  Nieupoi-t,  but  none  of  these  are 
essential  to  a  German  advance  westward,  as  Calais  and 
Boulogne.  Y'^pres  is  not,  as  Hazebrouck  is,  for 
instance,  or  even  as  Bethune,  a  "  nodal  "  point  where 
a  mass  of  communications  essential  to  the  enemy  for 
his  project  of  invasion  join.  The  reason  why  Ypres 
is  being  attacked  is  not,  either,  that  it  is  a  depot. 
The  reason  is  that  Ypres  Ls  the  heart  of  a  dangerous 
"  salient "  or  wedge  thrust  into  the  ten-itory  occupied 
by  German  armies,  which  salient  was  neglected  during 
tlie  Gei-raan  attack  upon  the  Yser  to  the  north. 

If  the  reader  will  glance  at  this  diagram  he  will 


ARMENHERES 


LA  BASSEE 


see   what  that  salient  meant  and  still  means  to  the 
enemy. 


Wlicn  the  furious  offensive  in  Flanders  succeeded 
to  the  furious  attacks  lower  down  the  line — especially 
before  Arras — which  had  been  successfully  beaten  off, 
the  country  already  occupied  by  the  German 
forces  might  be  represented  by  the  horizontal 
shading  "  A." 

As  the  concentration  of  the  superior  German 
numbers,  due  to  exceptional  reinforcement,  proceeded 
on  this  front  the  Allies  retired  from  Eoullers.  Lille 
was  occujjied  by  a  German  ai-my  corps,  the  Allies 
retired  sevei-al  miles,  and  the  next  line  to  be  held  by 
them  should  logically  have  been  Nieupoi-t-Dixmude- 
Yjjres-Lille-Ai-mentieres,  which  line  the  Germans 
would  again  have  proceeded  to  attack  at  various 
places,  notably  in  the  Calais  march  on  the  front 
Nieuport-Dixmude  and  south  of  Lille. 

I  say  "logically"  meaning,  supposing  for  each 
party  the  offensive  in  superior  numbers  and  inferior 
numbers  on  the  defensive,  had  acted  with  reason.  But 
the  Germans  did  not  act  with  reason.  They  divided 
their  forces.  And  in  this  waste  of  their  effort,  the 
too  violent,  ixnsuccessful  and  immensely  expensive 
attack  on  the  front  Nieuport-Dixmude  they  were 
compelled  to  take  men  from  their  centre.  This  left 
an  opportunity  for  the  Allies  to  press  forward  in. 
front  of  Y''pres,  with  the  result  that  at  the  end  of  a 
fortnight's  incredibly  violent  attempt  of  the  Germans, 
with  their  superior  numbers,  to  seize  the  strip  along 
the  sea-coast,  and  in  face  of  their  failure  in  that 
attempt,  they  found  themselves  in  the  presence  of  a 
gi-eat  wedge  tlirust  forward  by  the  Alhes  in  front  of 
Ypres  into  the  country  they  held.  All  that  they 
occupied  of  the  new  belt  was  that  represented  by  the 
diagram  shading  "  B  "  in  the  sketch,  and  it  is  then 
apparent  what  a  wedge  Ypres  commands.  Now  that 
the  Calais  attempt  is  abandoned,  the  reduction  of  this 
salient  or  wedge  in  front  of  Y^^pres  has  been  undertaken 
by  the  German  commanders.  Pressure  brought  there 
will,  it  is  hoped,  relieve  the  attack  below  Lille  from 
the  resistance  in  front  of  it ;  for  if  the  German  line 
can  be  pushed  f oi'W'ard  to  Ypres  itself,  and  can  include 
Armentieres  on  the  south,  there  will  be  no  fui-ther 
danger  from  the  north  flank  to  the  Gennan  effort  at 
La  Bassee,  and  all  available  forces  can  be  brought 
forward  by  the  enemy  on  to  that  point.  To  reduce 
the  Ypres  salient,  therefore,  is  the  chief  business  of 
the  GeiTuans  at  this  moment,  and  the  action  they 
have  developed  with  that  object,  regarded  as  a  part 
of  the  whole  battle  of  Elanders,  may  be  called  "  Tlie 
Battle  of  Ypres." 

It  is  a  singularly  belated  effort.  For  in  that 
failure  of  the  last  fortnight  between  Dixmude  and 
Nieuport,  Germany  has  thrown  away  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  prisoners,  at  the  very  least,  the 
equivalent  of  a  whole  army  corps. 

Should  the  Gennans  be  successful  and  reduce  the 
Ypres  salient,  nothing  very  enormous  will  have  been 
done  by  them,  but  their  line  will  at  least  have  been 
straightened  out ;  the  dangerous  wedge  pushed  into  it 
in  front  of  Ypres  will  have  been  thrust  back. 

To  appreciate  the  nature  of  the  work  round 
Ypres,  the  accompanying  detailed  sketch  may  be  of 
value.  Ypres  is  the  centre  of  a  great  half  circle  of 
positions,  with  a  radius  of,  roughly,  six  miles,  all  of 
which  positions  are,  at  the  moment  of  writing,  in  the 
hands  of  the  Allies,  and  all  of  which  are,  at  the 
moment  of  -RTiting,  or  have  been  immediately  before, 
the  subject  of  very  violent  attack  from  the  enemy. 

When  I  say  mthin  a  radius  of  six  miles,  I  am 
giving  an  extreme  measurement;  some  of  the  points 
most  seriously  attacked  are  barely  four  miles  from  the 
Cloth   Hall,    which    is   the   centre   of    Ypres   town. 


?• 


LAND    AND    WATES 


November  7,  1914 


Bixschotte  is  one  such  town,  and  north  of  it  the 
flooded  country  forbids  German  action.  Poelcapclle 
is    another    such    town ;    Paschendaele    is    another ; 


V.   ^ 


eBAlUtli:  "i 


Cm  J*  aA  M<;m 


Beccalaere  another ;  Zenwode  another ;  HoUebeke 
another,  and  Messines  the  last  of  this  series.  Beyond 
the  ideal  north-and-south  line  which  unites  Bixschotte, 
Ypres,  and  Messines — that  is,  to  the  west  of  such  an 
ideal  hne — there  are  no  German  forces.  Of  the 
viUases  mentioned  a  little  above,  Paschendaele  is 
the  most  eastern  point  of  the  salient  which  it  is 
the  Gennan  business  to  reduce  and  flatten  back  on 
to  Ypres. 

The  main  German  effort  in  the  pursuance  of  tliis 
task  (the  effort  on  to  which  they  have  put  their  best 
troops  and  no  reserves)  has  come  from  the  south. 
There  lies  here  a  belt  of  wooded  land.  The  wood  is 
not  continuous.  It  consists  in  a  number  of  separate 
plantations  and  parks,  many  private  houses  and 
gardens,  which  often  join,  or  nearly  join.  Special 
effort  has  been  made  by  the  enemy  upon  the  three 
points  Zenwode,  Hollebeke,  and  Messines  which  are 
on  the  line  of  these  woods  and  slight  rises.  These 
three  villages  were  all  at  one  moment — last  Friday  or 
Satiu'day — in  the  possession  of  the  enemy,  and  it  was 
at  this  moment  perhaps  that  Ypres  was  most  gravely 
threatened. 

Wliether  Zenwode  is  recovered  or  not  at  the 
moment  of  wi-iting  we  have  no  infonnation,  but 
HoUebeke  was  retaken  two  days  ago.  The  fate  of 
Messines  appears  to  have  been  this.  It  was  first  taken 
at  the  bayonet,  largely,  we  are  told,  through  the  efforts 
of  aTerritorial  unitr— the  London  Scottish — who  suffered 
very  heavily  and  very  gloriously.  It  was  next  partially 
lost,  and  appears  to  have  been  during  the  course  of 
Monday  a  scene  of  fierce  straggle.  For  the  final  news 
on  Sunday  from  both  sides— Gennan  and  French — 
give  us  that  impression,  the  French  telling  us  that 
"  part  of  the  village  "  is  occupied  by  the  enemy,  the 
Germans  claiming  the  capture  of  the  village. 

It  is  obvious  from  the  map  that  the  line  which 
the  Allies  will  make  for,  as  the  first  outpost  of  an 
advance  from  Ypres  when  the  counter-offensive  shall 
be  taken  against  the  enemy,  is  the  Hue  of  the  Ehcr 
Lys.  So  far  that  narrow,  sluggish  and  wiiidlng 
stream,  between  Messines  and  Lille,  is  in  German 
hands. 

There  is,  therefore,  a  double  importance  attaching 
to  this  struggle  for  Ypres,  and  for  the  projection  into 


the  enemy's  positions  held  by  the  Allies  all  round  the 
east  of  Ypres.  A  German  success  wUl  pave  the  way, 
if  it  is  not  achieved  at  too  great  an  expense  of  men, 
for  pressing  more  heavily  than  ever  the  attack  upon 
the  critical  point  of  La  Bassee.  But  if  the  JlHes 
maintain  a  successful  advance,  the  occupation  of  Lille 
by  the  enemy  wiU  be  near  its  end,  and  of  course,  as  a 
consequence,  a  retirement  of  the  Germans  from  all 
the  La  Bassee  country,  and  the  end  of  this  very 
critical  struggle. 

For  the  issue,  we  can,  at  the  moment  of  writmg 
(Tuesday  evening)  only  wait.  We  shall  have  in  this 
struggle  exactly  what  we  had  between  Dixmude  and 
Nieuport  ;  the  enemy  bringing  up  much  larger 
numbers  than  the  defensive  at  the  moment  commands, 
numbers  composed  in  part  of  first-rate  material,  in 
part  of  the  new  levies  which  are  formed  of  material 
less  and  less  excellent  as  the  slaughter  proceeds. 
There  wiU  be  a  much  larger  loss  on  the  side  of  this 
determined  attack  than  on  the  side  of  the  defence, 
and  if  the  attack  be  thrust  back  that  factor  of  final 
victory  upon  which  the  whole  French  strategy  of 
reserve  is  counting — the  exhaustion  of  the  enemy — • 
will  come  into  the  field  of  Europe  as  a  whole,  and 
bring  the  campaigns,  not  only  in  the  west  but  in  the 
east,  into  quite  another  phase. 

What  this  factor  of  exhaustion  may  be  at  the 
present  stage  of  the  war  I  will  attempt  to  estimate 
upon  a  later  page  ;  meanwhile  there  is  little  more  to 
be  said  of  the  campaign  in  France. 

There  has  been  a  little  progress  in  the  Vosges, 
and  the  passes  into  Alsace  are  now  commanded  by  the 
French.  In  the  old  line  of  trenches  of  the  Aisne, 
where  forces  very  much  thinned  face  each  other  across 
the  slopes  of  the  chalky  hills  on  the  right  bank  of 
that  river,  there  has  been  a  sharp  little  German 
success  carrying  a  local  advance  almost  down  to  the 
stream  near  Vailly,  while  the  French  have  got 
almost  abreast  of  Noyon  to  the  west,  and  are  occupy- 
ing or  standing  immediately  in  front  of  Trecy-le-Val. 
Both  matters  are  so  far  too  small  to  be  worthy  of 
special  comment  or  illustration.  Neither  is  the  dead- 
lock in  the  Argonne  appreciably  advanced  upon  either 
side  at  the  moment  of  writing.  It  is  still  through  the 
Wood  of  the  Storks  (La  Grurie)  that  the  German  attack 
on  the  French  troops  takes  place  north  of  the  Verdun 
road,  and  it  is  still  from  the  AVood  of  La  Chalade, 
south  of  it,  that  corresponding  French  counter-attacks 
are  made.  There  is  one  last  point  that  is  worthy  of 
attention  and  of  a  brief  analjsis,  and  this  is  the 
menace  to  the  Egyptian  frontier  if,  as  seems  now 
certain,  Turkey  shall  come  into  the  game. 

THE    EGYPTIAN    MARCH. 

An  attack  delivered  from  Syria  against  Egypt 
depends  upon  two  obvious  factors — the  desert  and  the 
Suez  Cimal.  Unless  transports  are  ready  to  convey 
troops  and  munitions  across  the  Mediterranean,  unless 
their  troops  and  munitions  have  been  long  prepared 
and  unless  the  eastern  Medlten-anean  is  at  the  same 
time  empty  of  French  and  English  men-of-war,  there 
is  only  the  land  route.  The  ability  or  inability  of  tjie 
eneiay  to  traverse  the  desert  and  to  overcome  the 
oljstacle  of  the  Suez  Canal  sum  up  the  whole 
business. 

It  is  perhaps  the  canal  which  should  be  first, 
remarked.  It  is  a  continuous  obstacle  from  sea  to  sea 
of  a  minimum  breadth  comparable  to  a  broad  inland 
river  such  as  the  Lower  Meuse ;  everywhere  deep,  of 
course,  equally  of  course  nowhere  bridged  and  nowliere 
affected  by  a  strong  current.     The  problem  of  crossing- 


8* 


ITovemW  7,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


oGaza 


I 

I  » 

Nakhl  t 


Tabab^AKABA 


it,  therefore,  is  the  commonplace  problem  of  crossing, 
under  the  protection  of  one's  artillery,  a  broad  but 
sluggish  unfordable  stream  over  pontoon  bridges. 
Unless  superior  artillery  is  present  upon  one's  own 
bank  to  dominate  the  artillery  of  the  enemy,  such  a 
crossing  cannot  be  effected.  If  it  is  present  the  cross- 
ing can  be  effected.  The  problem  is  further  simplified 
from  the  facts  that  there  are  no  heights  or  gun 
positions  upon  either  side.  It  is  simply  a  question  of 
having  the  larger  guns,  better  served,  and,  under  their 
protection,  effecting  a  crossing.  If  the  proposed  in- 
vasion has  not  that  superiority  the  obstacle  is  absolute ; 
if  it  has,  the  obstacle  is  cleai-ly  negotiable.  Save 
for  one  other  important  and  quite  exceptional 
factor. 

The  Suez  Canal — unlike  an  inland  water-w^ay — 
is  accessible  to  ships  carrying  heavy  guns.  That  is 
where  it  differs  from  your  broad  river  to  which  it  is 
the  parallel.  Similarly  it  is  bridgeable,  as  an  inland 
river  rarely  is,  from  the  presence  of  large  ships  within 
it ;  for  ships  can  be  slung  across  it. 

Much  more  important  however,  than  the  obstacle 
which  is  the  strategic  frontier  of  Egypt  is  the  Desert 
across  which  all  land  approach  to  that  country  must 
be  made.  This  desert  is  the  Isthmus  and  Peninsula 
called  after  the  group  of  mountains  which  contains, 
towards  the  south  of  the  Peninsula,  the  traditional 
peak  of  Sinai.  The  high  mountains,  I  say,  lie  in  the 
Peninsular  portion  of  this  bit  of  land,  between  the 
GuK  of  Akaba  and  the  Gulf  of  Suez.  The  northern, 
or  continental  portion,  though  crossed  (especially  at 
the  north-east)  by  ranges  of  hills  is  not  mountainous. 

The  whole  region  is  however  desert.  There  is 
hardly  any  water.  Such  water  as  there  is  confines  all 
travel  to  two  tracks  and  to  two  tracks  only,  and  the 
supply  of  water  is,  nowadays,  very  limited  upon  each. 

These  two  tracks  are  the  Sea  lioad — which  is  that 
taken  by  all  the  great  historical  invaders  of  Syria 
from  Egypt,  and  of  Egypt  from  Syria — and  the  lladj 
or  Pilgrim  H  Road  from  Suez  to  Akalia,  which  was  the 
road  followed  by  the  Mohammedan  pilgrims  (especially 


in  the  old  days  before  steam  traffic  came  to  change 
the  conditions  of  the  pilgrimage)  on  their  way  from 
Egypt  to  Mecca.  The  northern  or  sea  road  after 
going  down  the  coast  of  Palestine  through  country 
increasingly  dry,  crosses  the  conventional  frontier 
of  modern  Egypt  at  Eafa  and  is  already  under 
desert  conditions  at  El  Arish.  From  El  Arish 
to  the  town  of  El  Kantara  or  The  Bridge,  is  a 
matter  of  over  100  miles.  It  suffers  as  a  road 
of  invasion  towards  Egypt  from  two  disabilities. 
First,  the  earlier  or  eastern  part  of  the  march  is 
exposed  to  fire  from  tlie  sea. 

The  second  difficulty  is,  of  course,  the  difficulty 
attaching  to  all  this  district— the  difficulty  of  water. 
It  is  much  more  than  a  day's  march,  it  is  over  30 
miles,  from  El  Arish  to  the  next  supply  of  water — 
by  which  distance  all  danger  from  the  sea  has  dis- 
appeared, as  the  road  is  by  this  time  protected  by 
wide  shoal  lagoons  which  stretch  between  it  and  the 
Mediterranean.  This  water  (found  in  a  single  well 
with  no  great  depth  of  water)  is  at  the  point  of  El 
Maza  ;  another  equally  long  stretch — far  more  than  a 
day's  marching — takes  one  to  a  much  better  supply 
of  water  at  Bir-el-Abd.  A  long  day's  march  further 
west  again  is  Katieh  ;  and  from  this  point  the 
chief  difficulties  of  the  desert  march  are  overcome. 
There  is  a  sufficient  supply  of  water  at  Katieh  not  only 
in  existing  wells,  but  obtainable  by  digging.  The 
remaining  march  to  El  Kantara  is  indeed  much  more 
than  a  day's  going  :  but  the  supply  of  water  obtain- 
able at  Kateih  and  the  presence,  once  the  Suez  Canal  is 
reached,  of  the  fresh  water  from  the  Nile  Canal  along- 
side of  it,  disposes  of  the  main  difficulty.  If  a  force 
can  reach  Katieh  it  can  reach  the  Canal.  The  fresh 
water  supply  at  El  Kantara,  however,  is  controllable 
by  those  who  possess  the  further  bank  of  the  Canal. 
And  indeed  in  all  this  problem  of  the  march  through 
desert  on  to  Egypt  one  has  to  consider  the  fact  that 
the  obstacle,  when  one  reaches  it,  is  still  passing 
through  desert  land.  A  force  not  too  large  might 
supply  itself  with  water  at  the  various  points  (Napoleon 
did  so  with  a  force  indeed  much  smaller  than  should 
be  required  for  any  operation  against  Egypt  to-day, 
but  he  was  going  the  other  way  into  Syria,  and  in  his 
time  the  obstacle  of  the  Canal  did  not  exist).  But 
such  a  force,  though  it  had  managed  to  cross  the 
desert,  if  it  should  fail  at  the  obstacle  for  any 
appi-eciable  time  would  find  the  difficulty  of  continued 
water  supply  insuperable. 

The  march  on  Egypt  by  this  route  is,  therefore, 
if  feasible  at  aU,  a  matter  for  a  comparatively  small 
force,  especially  so  long  as  that  force  finds  the  sea 
under  the  control  of  its  enemies. 

The  southern  route  from  Akaba  to  Suez,  though 
eveiywhere  perfectly  good  going,  is  very  much  worse 
provided  with  water.  Opposite  Akaba,  from  the 
palm  grove  of  Tabah,  after  a  sharp  climb  for  some 
2,000  feet,  you  are  on  a  flat  hard  plateau  running 
directly  in  the  direction  of  Suez  between  low  hills, 
and  the  Pilgiim's  Eoad  is  marked  fairly  clearly 
upon  this  hard  plateau. 

At  what  is  very  nearly  the  central  point  between 
Akaba  and  Suez  you  get  the  first  reserve  of  water. 
A  modern  force  upon  the  march  would  not  reach  that 
reserve  until  the  end  of  the  third  day  at  the  very 
earliest.  There  are  cisterns  to  hold  a  great  provision 
of  water  ;  whether  these  are,  or  now  can  be,  kept  filled 
I  can  find  no  authority  to  tell  me.  The  remainder  of 
the  way  to  Suez  there  is  but  one  point  of  water,  the 
Well  of  Moses,  "  Ayun  Mousa,"  a  short  march 
before  Suez.  It  is  evident  that  this  second  marching 
route  is  much  harder  than  the  first,  and  I  believe  that 


9* 


LAND    AND    WATER 


November  7,  1914 


historically  no  great  force  has  ever  taken  it,  though 
there  may  have  been  Arab  movements  of  which  I  am 
ignoi-ant;  but  the  Roman,  the  Egyptian  of  Pagan 
iimes,  the  Assyrian,  the  Greek,  and  the  Frenchman 
have  all  chosen  the  sea  route. 

In  aU  this  analysis  of  the  difficulty  in  approach- 
ing Eoypt  from  Syria  (and  the  Akaba  route  has 
become  the  more  difficult  as  I  write  from  the  now 
reported  destruction  of  the  Akaba  stores  and  foi-t  by 
a  British  man-of-war),  it  must  be  remembered  that 
rapid  modem  transport  would,  for  small  numbers, 
have  no  such  problems  to  face  such  as  I  have 
mentioned.  On  either  route  right  up  to  the  neigh- 
bouriiood  of  the  canal  petrol  traffic  coidd  move  at  will, 
aaid  carry  such  armament  as  petrol  will  carry  within 


a  day  for  light  vehicles,  within  forty-eight  hours  for 
heavy  ones.  But  petrol  vehicles,  save  in  very  great 
numbers,  though  they  may  seize  important  pouits 
ahead  of  an  army,  will  not  convey  an  army. 

I  will  conclude  my  notes  this  week  by  a  thorough 
examination  of  a  subject  on  which  I  have  not  yet 
touched,  or  touched  but  superficially,  and  which  is  yet 
of  prime  importance  to  the  judgment  of  the  campaign. 
I  mean,  the  factor  of  wa&tage.  At  what  rate  is  the 
enemy  losmg  men  ?  The  reply  to  such  a  question  is  of 
vital  consequence  to  the  future— for  other  things  being 
equal,  numbers  are  the  deciding  factor  in  war,  and  to 
disarm  your  opponent — no  matter  how— in  greater 
numbers  than  he  disarms  you  is  the  ultimate  end  of 
strategy. 


ESTIMATE    OF    WASTAGE. 


This  factor  of  wastage  has  three  important 
bearings  upon  one's  judgment  of  a  military  situation. 
First,  a  comparison  between  the  wastage  of  one 
side  and  the  other  gives  us  a  record  of  relative  strength 
at  various  moments  in  the  campaign.  It  is  the  only 
way  of  estabhshing  such  a  record.  We  know  at  the 
beginning  of  a  campaign  how  the  numbers  stand. 
We  can  only  judge  by  some  estimate  of  comparative 
wastage  how  they  continue  to  stand  as  the  campaign 
progresses. 

Secondly,  the  rate  of  wastage  of  both  parties 
combined  give  one  some  power  to  judge  the  approach 
of  exhaustion.  Such  figures  are,  though  but  a  vague 
indication,  yet  some  indication  as  to  the  maximum 
possible  length  of  a  campaign,  or  at  any  i-ate  its 
maximum  possible  length  on  the  scale  to  which  it  was 
planned  and  begun.  After  a  certain  proportion  of 
waste  upon  both  sides,  though  the  campaign  may 
drift  on,  it  win  not  be  what  it  was  in  its  first  fury. 

Thirdly,  the  proportion  of  wastage  (and  this  is 
the  most  impoi-tant  point)  is  also  an  indication  of 
success  or  failure  according  to  the  type  of  campaign  or 
action  which  is  being  fought.  For  instance,  any  one 
taking  the  losses  by  wounds,  death,  and  capture  of 
Napoleon's  advance  into  Eussia  in  1812,  and  con- 
trasting it  with  the  corresponding  v/astage  upon  the 
Russian  side,  would  have  had  little  in  the  mere 
figures  to  guide  him  as  to  the  probable  result  of  the 
whole  movement.  But  when  those  figures  were  made 
alive  by  a  consideration  of  the  nature  of  the  cam- 
paign, when  one  remembered  the  steadily  increasing 
numerical  strength  of  the  Russians,  the  immense  and 
as  steadily  increasing  length  of  commmiications  upon 
which  the  French  depended,  the  bad  roads,  the  late- 
ness of  the  season,  &c.,  then  one  could  compare. 
One  could  say  that  if  the  wastage  had  been  nearly 
equal  upon  both  sides,  that  was  for  the  French  a  very 
bad  omen  indeed. 

Take  a  converse  case  :  The  immense  wastage  of 
the  German  armies  in  1870-71.  No  one  marking  those 
figures  with  any  judgment  would  have  thought  the  case 
of  Germany  any  the  worse,  at  any  rate  up  to  November, 
1870.  She  was  attacking  to  win  at  once.  She  was 
undergoing  a  very  heavy  strain  with  that  du-ect 
purpose.  She  had  undertaken  many  very  severe 
marches.  She  was  fighting  late  in  the  year.  She 
had,  after  the  first  few  weeks,  no  regulars  against 
her.  While  she  was  fighting  regulars  she  had 
sacrificed  men  without  couutijig  because  she  thought 
or  knew  that  the  blow  could  be  driven  home  at  once. 
But  if  the  French  had  succeeded,  as  they  so  nearly 


did,  in  pinning  the  German  effort  in  the  late  winter, 
then  the  later  figures  of  German  wastage  would  have 
been  very  significant  indeed. 

Beariag  these  three  points  in  mind  as  to  the  way 
in  which  wastage  is  an  indication  as  to  the  trend  of  a 
campaign,  let  us  try  to  get  at  approximate  figures. 

Our  basis  for  such  a  calculation  is  very  crude  and 
insufficient.  We  have  to  guide  us  nothing  but  the 
official  Prussian  lists  of  killed,  wounded,  and  missing, 
the  official  German  statements  of  the  prisoners  they 
hold,  a  rough — and  now  old — unofficial  estimate  of 
the  German  prisoners  in  France,  British  official  and 
miofficial  statements  of  loss  in  the  British  contingent, 
some  knowledge  of  the  type  of  fighting  upon  each 
side — and,  for  the  rest,  nothing  but  the  application 
of  common-sense  to  all  these  fragments.  Never- 
theless such  an  application  will  lead  to  appreciable 
results. 

Let  us  begin  with  the  German  accoimt  of  their 
own  wastage.  Tlie  lists  of  which  we  have  hitherto 
had  notice  inr  this  country  (1)  apply  to  Prussian  losses 
alone  and  (2)  cany  us  no  further  than  the  middle  of 
September. 

lliese  lists  give  36,000  kiUed,  160,000  wounded, 
and  55,000  missing. 

To  con-ect  these  official  figures  with  regard  to 
Prussia  vre  have  no  counter  check  save  the  unofficial 
IVench  estimate  of  65,000  German  prisoners  iu  France 
somewhat  earlier  in  September.  This  one  check, 
however,  is  not  without  its  value,  for  it  corroborates, 
roughly,  the  Prussian  figures  of  missing.  For  the 
difference  may  well  be  German  reticence  in  counting 
as  certainly  missing  many  who  may  yet  (it  is  hoped) 
appear,  and  captives  not  notified  at  the  moment  their 
lists  were  made.  But  though  we  have  no  counter 
statistics  with  which  to  check  these  Prussian  lists,  we 
cau  apply  to  them  a  general  criticism  which  should 
enable  us  to  arrive  at  tolerably  accurate  inferior  and 
superior  limits. 

For  the  principles  of  this  criticism  let  us  first 
remember  that  it  is  the  characteristic  of  German 
oficial  statements  in  this  war  at  once  to  suppress  news 
which  the  German  Government  happens  to  think 
weakening  to  its  cause,  and  to  be  singularly  accurate 
in  the  news  it  does  publish. 

It  is  very  important,  in  this  connection,  that  we 
should  not  confu.'^e  the  various  types  of  information 
furnished  by  German  agency  to  the  world.  There 
is  plenty  of  German  falsehood,  some  of  it  fantastic. 
But  the  falsehood  is  calculated  and  organised.  There 
aie,  as  it  were,  zones  of  information.     The  Germaa 


ia» 


Kovembcr  1,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


Gcfvemmcnt  permits  and  encourages  the  publication, 
in  German  provincial  newspapers,  of  cliildisli  stories 
against  the  Allies,  and  of  e<pally  childish  prophecies 
of  inevitable  German  victories.  It  presents  for  the 
consumption  of  neutral  countries  something  quite 
different,  not  fantastic  stories  but  special  pleading. 
America  is  full  of  this,  so  is  Scandinavia.  Finally, 
it  issues,  for  the  effect  it  may  have  upon  minute  and 
careful  criticism  in  Europe  (such,  for  instance,  as  that 
of  the  General  Staffs  of  the  Allies)  figures  the  known 
reliability  of  which  will  earn  respect. 

The  calculated  truth-teUing  and  lying  of  the 
Prussian  Government  may  be  compared  at  this 
moment  to  that  of  a  man  who  is  rigidly  accurate  with 
his  bank  book,  keeps  a  quantity  of  his  transactions  from 
passing  through  the  bank,  puts  forward  through  hired 
lawyers  a  totally  false  view  of  his  fortune  in  some  law 
case  in  which  he  is  involved,  and  finally  permits  and 
even  fosters  ridiculous  popular  legends  which  make 
him  out  ten  times  as  rich  as  he  is.  If  one  were  deal- 
ing with  the  evidence  of  such  a  man's  wealth  one 
would  respect  the  accuracy  of  the  counterfoils  in  his 
cheque  book,  though  one  would  doubt  the  rest  of  his 
reports  for  various  reasons  and  in  various  degrees. 

The  official  cjinmuniqms  of  statistics  are  of  the 
exact  category.  One  may  take  it,  therefore,  as  accurate 
that  the  Prussian  Government  was  {for  the  Frussian 
forces  alonr)  able  to  note  36,000  dead  by  the  middle 
of  September. 

But  the  Prussian  male  population  is  only  just 
over  sixty  per  cent,  of  the  total  male  population  of 
the  German  Empire.  It  contains,  with  the  capital,  a 
slightly  larger  proportion  of  men  for  various  reasons 
exempted.  Call  it  but  sixty  per  cent,  for  military 
purposes  and  you  are  within  the  truth.  So  to  get 
statistics  for  the  German  armies  as  a  whole  we  must 
add  to  any  Prussian  statistics  two-thirds  as  much 
again — forty  to  every  sixty  or  sixty-six  per  cent. 
Therefore  we  must  add  to  this  30,000  dead  another 
24,0C0  and  say  that  official  information  up  to  the 
middle  of  September  accounted  for  60,000  German 
dead.  There  is  our  first  item  in  the  process  of 
calculation. 

160,000  Prussian  wounded  would,  in  the  same 
proportions,  give  us  just  on  207,000  for  the  total 
number  known  upon  that  date  as  being  wounded  in 
the  whole  German  Army.  But  here  we  must  make 
oar  first  reservation  as  to  the  accuracy  of  the  Prussian 
figures.  The  proportion  of  wounded  to  killed  is 
altogether  too  low.  60,000  dead  is  to  267,000  would 
give  one  man  killed  out  of  less  than  5^  hit,  to  be 
accurate,  one  out  of  5-45.  We  know  from  numerous 
accounts,  as  well  as  from  accurate  statistics  (though 
these  apply  only  to  portions  or  samples  of  the  whole), 
that  the  proportion  of  dead  upon  the  side  of  the 
Allies  is  in  heavy  lists  more  like  one  in  eight,  and  in 
light  lists  one  in  fifteen  in  this  war.  It  is  indeed  but 
rare  that  a  particular  list  brings  it  up  to  as  high  as 
one  in  eight ;  and  indeed,  judging  upon  the  analogy 
of  other  modern  war,  one  in  ten  is  quite  high  enough 
a  proportion,  taking  a  canipaign  iis  a  whole.  The 
proportion  of  dead  to  all  casualtie.'?  by  wounds  and 
deaths  included  in  the  Prussian  lists  therefore,  at 
1  in  545,  a  great  deal  too  low.  There  are,  of  course, 
many  particular  cases  of  desperate  attack  in  which 
you — very  rarely — reach  such  proportions.  It  is 
further  truethat  the  Prussian  method  of  attack  lends 
itself  to  a  higli  proportion.  But  allowing  for  all  this, 
the  proportion  is  altogether  out  of  reason.  In  other 
words,  tliere  must  have  been,  at  the  date  mentioned, 
the  middle  of  September,  knowledge  of  a  great  many 
more  than  267,000  wounded  in    the  German  armies. 


We  should  probably  be  still  within  the  mark  if  we 
doubled  that  figure  :  we  are  quite  safe  if  we  add  just 
over  50  per  cent,  to  it  and  make  it  one  in  eu/ht. 

This  does  not  mean  that  the  Prussian  statistics 
are  fantastic  or  even  false.  It  simply  means  that 
tliey  have  only  chosen  to  count  as  wounded  those  who 
were  very  seriously  wounded,  those,  for  instance,  who 
had  no  prospect  at  all  of  ever  appearing  again  in  the 
field  and  that  they  did  not  choose  to  swell  their 
lists  with  any  less  serious  cases.  Such  a  method  of 
presenting  casualties  is  arguable.  But  we  who  are 
trying  to  get  at  a  just  estimate  of  the  total  wastage  at 
t/iis  one  moment,  and  who  ai'e  not  handicapped  by  any 
desire  to  keep  the  enemy  in  good  heart,  must  consider 
all  casualties,  and,  I  repeat,  the  adding  of  just  over 
half  to  the  admitted  proportion  of  wounded,  the  allow- 
ing of  at  least  eight  men  hit  more  or  less  grievously 
for  one  of  the  eight  to  be  killed  is  an  estimate  well 
within  the  probable  truth.  Such  a  low  estimate 
gives  us  60,000  killed  and  just  less  than  half  a  million 
Germans  killed  and  wounded — 480,000 — mentioned 
to  date  at  the  middle  of  September. 

In  the  case  of  the  third  category,  that  of  the 
missing,  we  are  on  surer  ground.  The  numbers  there 
ai-e  more  nearly  accurate.  They  have  but  one  doubt- 
ful factor  in  them  and  that  is  due  to  the  reluctance  of 
those  responsible  for  soldiers  to  admit  the  units  are 
really  lost  until  there  is  no  further  doubt.  But 
against  this  must  be  set  the  military  habit  of  estimating 
the  number  of  one's  missing  men  immediately  after  an 
action,  although  stragglers  coming  in,  wounded  picked 
up,  &c.,  may  later  reduce  that  number. 

To  be  well  within  the  mark  let  us  add  no  more 
than  ten  per  cent,  to  the  lists  of  missing,  that  is,  let 
us  suppose  that  the  reluctance  of  subordinates  to  admit 
losses  of  this  sort  in  their  commands  woidd  have  made 
no  greater  difference  than  adding  5,000  to  the  Prussian 
figures  of  55,000.  That  would  give  us  60,000  missing 
Prussians,  or  100,000  missing  men  for  the  whole 
German  Army.  And  such  an  estimate  is  very  fairly 
corroborated  by  comparing  it  with  the  French 
unofficial  statements,  nomewhat  earlier  in  date,  of 
65,000  unwounded  German  prisoners  ;  for,  in  the  first 
place,  among  the  Germans  merely  marked  missing 
there  must  have  been  a  number  of  wounded  abandoned 
wherever  a  Prussian  force  fell  back,  and,  in  the  second 
place,  men  marked  as  missing  in  the  campaign  often 
fail  to  appear  in  the  statistics  of  either  army.  They 
are  lost  for  good.  They  represent  desertions, 
people  killed  but  not  marked  as  killed,  &c.  For 
instance,  behind  the  Prussian  lines  after  the  great 
retreat  in  the  early  part  of  September,  Picardy  and 
the  edges  of  Normandy  were  full  of  half-starved  little 
groups  of  Gei-mans  that  had  lost  their  units — especially 
cavalry — and  that  often  took  to  brigandage  as  a 
desperate  resource,  and  very  many  of  whom  were 
summarily  shot  by  the  French.  Next  we  must  admit 
a  certain  number — not  yet  large — of  captures  by  the 
Russians. 

Put  all  this  together — ^your  100,000  missing, 
yom-  close  on  500,000  wounded  and  dead — and  you  get 
in  round  figures  more  than  600,000  men  for  the  killed, 
Avounded,  and  missing  of  all  the  German  forces  by  the 
middle  of  September. 

But  before  we  leave  that  particular  patch  of 
figures  we  may  note  yet  another  consideration  which 
is  of  great  value  to  our  estimate.  The  figures  of 
loss  given  by  an  army,  howe\Tr  accurate,  are  always 
for  a  particular  date  below  tlie  real  total  losses. 
For  to  the  list  of  a  given  day  there  are  always 
additions  to  come  in,  and  this  is  particularly  seen 
when  you  are  dealing  with  millions  over  two  widely 


11' 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


November  7,  1914 


separated  theatres  of  wars,  eacli  many  thousand  square 
miles  in  extent.  It  takes  some  time  for  the  reports 
of  units  to  come  to  the  Staffs  and  be  first  roughly 
co-ordinated.  The  further  news  which  reaches  sub- 
ordinate commanders  extends  the  first  lists.  If  a 
man  is  asked  for  his  losses  twenty -four  hours  after  an 
action,  he  will  invariably  send  in  a  smaller  amount 
than  the  total  amount  turns  out  to  be  after  lengthy 
and  complete  examination.  It  is  true  that  these 
Prussian  lists  are  not  issued  until  long  after  the  dates 
to  which  they  refer,  so  that  there  is  plenty  of  time  for 
adding  further  figures,  but  it  is  stUl  true  that  supple- 
mentary Lists  continue  to  be  issued  throughout  a 
campaign,  and  that  the  600,000  which  we  have  here 
got  are  therefore  certainly  less  than  a  quite  complete 
account  of  losses  to  the  exact  middle  of  September 
would  come  to.  They  are  less,  that  is,  than  the  total 
nunber  of  men  killed,  wounded,  taken  prisoners,  or 
lost  up  to  the  date  of  the  1 5th  of  September.  The 
last  few  days  before  that  date  are  sure  to  represent 
incomplete  returns.  But  to  this  consideration  must 
be  added  another  fact — that  the  date  happens  to  be  of 
peculiar  significance. 

Those  few  days  just  before  the  \hth  of  September, 
the  last  days  of  the  account  in  which  most  omissions  are 
necessarily  made,  happen  precisely  to  corres]}ond  with 
the  yr eat  German  Retreat  called  the  Battle  of  the  Mar ne. 
Some  of  the  worst  punishment  which  the  German 
army  ever  received  on  East  or  West  falls  upon  those 
very  days  with  regard  to  which  the  official  statistics  are 
likely  to  be  in  any  case  below  the  mark.  What 
difference  this  may  make  we  cannot  tell.  But  let  us 
again  put  a  very  small  estimate  for  the  sake  of  safety 
and  say  no  more  than  ten  per  cent.  Even  that  brings 
us  up  to  660,000. 

We  may  sum  up  and  say  that  in  the  case  of  the 
official  German  statistics  coupled  with  what  is 
certainly  knovim  of  modem  war  and  of  normal 
proportion  of  death  to  wounds,  you  have  by  the 
middle  of  September  more  than  660,000  but  less  than 
800,000  men  hit  or  taken  prisoners  upon  the  German 
side. 

Next  let  us  turn  to  the  losses  to  be  presumed 
since  that  date;  after  that  to  the  presumption  of 
losses  by  sickness  in  various  forms.  Only  when  some 
such  full  calculation  is  completed  shall  we  be  in  a 
position  to  draw  a  general  conclusion  as  to  the 
position  of  the  German  forces  and  their  chance, 
so  far  as  numerical  strength  alone  is  concerned,  for 
the  future. 

We  have  seen  that  more  tlian  060,000  and 
presumably  less  than  800,000  men  are  to  be  counted 
as  wastage  from  the  German  forces  in  killed,  wounded 
and  missing  up  to  the  end  of  the  retreat  from  Paris 
to  the  Aisne  in  the  West,  and  up  to  the  victorious 
advance  of  the  foui-  or  five  German  Army  Corps  from 
East  Prussia  over  the  Eussiau  frontier  at  the  same 
moment. 

What  proportion  to  these  losses  do  subsequent 
losses  bear  ? 

We    are   now  in  the  first  week  of   November 
Seven  weeks  have  elapsed  since  the  totals  iust  com- 
puted were  arrived  at.     But  these  totals  account  for 
less  tnan  four  weeks  of  active  warfare.     There  was  no 
heavy  and  serious  fighting  in  the  field  until  the  third 

rLr^A^.^r*'.'^^^''^^^  ^'^  ^°^^««  began  with  the 
Battle  of  Metz  (August  19-21)  and  the  Battle  of  the 
bambre  (August  22-24). 

If.  therefore,  the  fightbg  had  been  of  the  same 
charaeter  aU  through,  we  should  have  to  multiply 
these  first  estimates— our  660,000  to'  800  000— bv 
nearly  three  to  get  the  total  of  the  present  time ;  since 


the  first  estimates  refer  to  little  more  than  tliree  full 
weeks,  of  the  heavy  fighting,  and  we  are  ending  the 
eleventh  week  of  active  warfare  now. 

It  is  common  knowledge,  however,  that  the 
fighting  has  not  been  of  a  piece  throughout.  To  the 
very  heavy  work  of  the  rapid  German  advance  on 
Paris,  with  sharp  losses  in  infantry  and  no  losses  in 
prisoners,  followed  by  the  equally  heavy  work  of  ^le 
retreat  to  the  Aisne,  with  its  considerable  losses  in 
prisoners  and  large  losses  in  dead  and  wounded  of  all 
arms  (a  higher  proportion,  perhaps,  in  the  Artillery), 
there  succeeded,  after  this  middle  of  September,  a  long 
deadlock  in  which  the  only  fields  subject  to  heavy  loss 
were  those  fought  in  defence  of  the  German  com- 
munications to  the  west  of  the  Eiver  Oise,  and  north 
and  south  of  the  Upper  Somme. 

There  was  loss,  of  course,  the  whole  time  along 
the  line  of  trenches  from  Noyon  to  the  Argonne ;  and 
there  was  rather  greater  loss  beyond  the  "Argonne  and 
in  the  open  country  where  the  garrisons  of  Verdun 
and  Toul  were  in  contact  with  the  army  of  Metz. 
There  was  also  a  good  deal  of  sharp  work  in  the 
Vosges.  But  all  tliis  kind  of  fighting  meant  losses  on 
a  different  scale  from  those  which  had  been  incurred 
during  the  advance  on  Paris  and  the  few  days  of  the 
mam  retreat,  while  even  the  heavier  fighting  up  along 
the  west  front  in  defence  of  the  German  communica- 
tions was  upon  another  scale  from  the  original 
conflicts. 

It  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  estimate,  even  in  the 
roughest  manner,  what  proportion  v/e  should  allow  for 
the  German  losses  between  the  middle  of  September 
and  the  end  of  the  first  third  of  October  when  the 
great  battle  of  Flanders  opened.  It  is  a  period  almost 
as  long  as  the  first  period.  We  should  be  safe  enough, 
considering  the  repeated  and  dense  German  attacks,  if 
we  put  it  down  at  about  50  per  cent.,  but  we  are  at 
any  rate  perfectly  safe  and  well  within  the  mark  if  we 
put  it  down  at  rather  more  than  a  third,  say  250,000 
on  660,000  or  300,000  on  800,000.  When  we  consider 
that  this  same  period  saw  the  retreat  of  the  Germans 
from  the  Hne  of  the  Niemen  and  their  very  considerable 
losses  in  the  battle  of  Augustowo  as  well  as  their 
bad  quarter  of  an  hour  on  the  causeway  of  Suwalki, 
the  loss  of  their  heavy  guns  by  Osowiecs  and  their 
failure  in  an  attempt  to  cross  the  Nicmen  at  Druss- 
kiniki  (the  attempt  and  faUui-e  to  cross  a  broad 
stream  under  fire  is  always  an  extremely  expensive 
operation)  we  may  be  perfectly  certain  that  this 
estimate  of  just  over  an  extra  third  is  well  below 
the  mark,  although  of  course  the  German  forces  in 
East  Prussia  were  not  a  quarter  of  those  in  the 
Western  field. 

Let  us  add  then  for  the  period  between 
September  15  and  October  10  fi-om  250,000  to 
300,000  to  the  total  losses  already  computed,  and  you 
already  have  at  the  opening  of  the  battle  of  Flanders 
a  total  of  certainly  not  less  than  910,000,  nor  probably 
more  than  1,100,000. 

Now  the  battle  of  Flanders  has  by  every  account 
been  altogether  more  prodigal  of  German  fightint^ 
men  than  anything  that  has  gone  before.  It  has 
already  lasted  three  weeks.  AYe  are  just  at  the 
beginning  of  the  fourth  week  from  its  opening,  from 
the  opening  that  is  of  the  severe  phase  which 
distiiiguishes  the  struggle  on  the  Franco-Belgian 
frontier  from  the  prolonged  flanking  movements  which 
have  preceded  it.  The  full  despatches  from  the 
General  Officer  in  command  of  the  British  contingent, 
the  official  French  communiques,  the  Belgian  private  - 
letters  received  at  home,  and  the  public  corre- 
spondence   in    the    newspapers,    all    are   unanimous 


12* 


November  7,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


in  the  conclusion  that  the  losses  on  the  German 
side  have  been  on  a  scale  far  greater  and  the 
effort  correspondingly  more  intense  than  anything 
that  has  been  seen  before  in  this  v/ar.  It  is  true  that 
the  front  upon  which  the  fighting  has  occurred  is  little 
more  than  fifty  miles,  but  the  main  forces  massed 
there  must  account  for  nearly  half  the  whole  German 
forces  immediately  deployed  for  action  along  the 
Western  Front.  Of  the  total  number  of  prisoners 
taken  we  know  nothing,  save  one  French  estimate  of 
one  week,  and  even  that  estimate  only  refers  to  the 
interning  within  France  of  un wounded  prisoners  taken 
some  days  before.  If  we  multiply  that  estimate  by 
three  we  get  25,000  prisoners  taken  upon  this  front. 
Scale  that  down  to  20,000.  Estimate  the  killed  and 
wounded  in  such  a  struggle  by  the  known  results  in 
the  Belgian  contingent  opi)Osed  to  it,  and  by  the 
partly  known  and  partly  presumed  rate  of  loss  in 
certain  British  and  French  contingents  opposed  to  it. 
Remember  that  the  fight  consisted  in  a  perpetual  and 
reckless  offensive  on  the  part  of  the  enemy — and  you 
will  not  get  a  total  of  less  than  150,000  men  hit  and 
missing  in  this  field  alone.  History  (if  it  can  ever  get 
accurate  information  of  such  things — which  is 
doubtful)  wiU  probably  find  that  200,000  was 
nearer.  Meanwhile  the  regular  wastage  has  been 
going  on  at  the  old  rate  along  the  rest  of  the 
line.  Diminish  that  rate  because  the  line  has 
been  thinned  to  bring  up  masses  for  fighting  in 
Flanders  and  you  must  still  allow  100,000  casualties 
at  least,  counting  every  form  of  such  for  more  than 
three  weeks  over  nearly  200  miles  front  and  with 
continual  fighting. 

Here  again  I  think  that  estimate  would  be  too 
low  by  far,  but  at  any  rate  you  have  upon  the  whole 
Western  line  dui'ing  the  battle  in  Flanders  at  the  very 
least  another  quarter  of  a  million. 

Meanwhile,  you  are  having  your  regular  wastage 
in  East  Prussia,  and  in  the  German  defeat  upon  the 
Vistula,  with  its  rapid  though  orderly  retreat,  its 
necessaiy  loss  in  stragglers  and  parties  cut  off,  as  well 
as  its  loss  in  killed  and  wounded,  certainly  not  less 
than  150,000  men.  Prisoners  will  be  a  small  part  of 
that  total  in  Poland  as  yet.  The}-  are  almost  certainly 
not  a  third  of  it,  and  prol^ably  not  a  quarter  of  it,  but 
the  Gennan  reinforcements  sent  into  Poland  to  help 
Austria  were  not  far  short  of  a  million  men,  and 
another  third  of  a  million  had  been  fighting  con- 
tinuously on  the  borders  of  East  Prussia.  I  am  allow- 
ing, remember,  for  over  tlu-ce  weeks  of  action,  of 
which  a  fortnight  upon  the  middle  Vistula  has  been 
one  of  defeat  and  retreat,  only  12  per  cent,  of 
losses,  and  I  think  it  wiU  be  conceded  that  such 
an  estimate  is  quite  certainly  below  the  truth.  Add 
then,  your  150,000  here  to  the  quarter  of  a  million 
in  the  West :  that  makes  350,000 ;  add  this  to  the 
totals  of  910,000  minimum  to  1,100,000  maximum 
previously  obtained,  and  you  get  at  the  veri/  least,  and 
on  the  most  favourable  calculation,  over  a  million  and 
a  quarter  of  Germans  hit  or  caught  in  the  progress  of 
the  whole  campaign  to  date.  Sluch  more  probably 
the  true  figures  go  well  above  a  million  and  a  half, 
but  that  they  are  more  than  a  million  and  a  quarter 
we  can  affirm  with  absolute  certitude. 

I  know  that  the  figure  looks  startlingly  large, 
but  the  various  steps  by  which  it  is  arrived  at  are 
not,  I  think,  open  to  criticism.  It  would  be  easy  by 
a  little  manipulation  of  figures  to  make  out  very  much 
larger  totals.  I  have  attempted,  on  the  contrary,  to 
fix  the  lowest  conceivable  minimum,  and  I  arrive  at 
something  certainly  larger  than  a  million  and  a 
quarter  for  the  strict  German  losses  in  the  field. 


But  to  the  losses  of  men  caught  or  hit  you  have 
always  to  add  losses  from  sickness,  which  term  in 
military  history  signifies  not  only  actual  illness  but 
the  results  of  fatigue,  accidents  which  prevent  a  man's 
marching,  and  even  the  proportion,  such  as  it  may 
be,  of  men  foot-sore  at  any  one  moment  and  unable 
to  keep  up  with  their  units. 

The  estimate  of  an  enemy's  losses  under  this 
heading  are  exceedingly  diflficult  to  arrive  at,  for  three 
reasons.  Fu-st,  the  factors  of  such  loss  are  quite  in- 
determinate (they  range  from  a  few  stragglers  to  the 
myriad  victims  of  an  epidemic)  ;  secondly,  that  a 
proportion  of  sick  are  always  coming  back  on  to  the 
strength ;  and,  thirdly,  that  the  curve  of  such  losses 
varies  in  the  most  surprising  manner  with  {a)  the 
length  of  a  campaign ;  (5)  the  climatic  conditions 
under  which  it  is  fought ;  (c)  the  quality  of  troops 
upon  which  you  have  to  fall  back  ;  {d)  management. 

One  sometimes  hears  it  laid  down  as  a  sort  of 
rough  rule  that  for  one  man  hit  or  caught  you  must 
count  another  man  off  the  strength  from  sickness. 
But  that  rule  of  thumb  would  never  do  in  an  estimate 
of  a  particular  campaign  such  as  we  are  now  trying 
to  arrive  at.  It  may  work  in  all  campaigns  on  the 
average.  It  would  be  wildly  exaggerated  of,  say,  the 
Sadowa  Campaign,  and  as.  wildly  an  underestimate, 
for,  say,  1812.  The  campaign  began  in  the  very  best 
of  v/eather  (in  the  West  at  least).  That  weather  was 
prolonged  to  a  quite  exceptional  date.  We  have  had 
no  rumours  of  any  serious  epidemic  in  the  enemy's 
ranks,  and  such  an  accident  is  stiU  quite  unhkely. 
Losses  from  fatigue,  from  over-marching,  and  the 
rest  of  it  would  vary  very  much  with  the  different 
phases  of  the  camjiaign.  There  must  have  been  a 
great  deal  of  it  during  the  rapid  advance  on  Pai-is. 
Hardly  any  of  it  during  the  deadlock ;  little  vx  the 
German  service,  at  least,  upon  the  Eastern  front  of  the 
war.  Again,  a  considerable  amount  of  transport, 
even  of  men,  nowadays  is  mechanical.  There  must 
have  been  towards  the  end  of  the  work  on  the 
trenches  a  good  deal  of  loss  from  ordinary  causes  of 
sickness  and  fatigue ;  but  with  a  few  exceptional 
crises  to  interrupt  its  general  excellence  the  supply  of 
food  and  clothing  to  the  enemy  at  the  front  has  been 
constant  and  regidar.  I  propose — it  is  purely 
empirical,  but  it  has  the  advantage  of  being  an 
underestimate — to  cut  severely  the  old  rule  of  thumb 
and  to  add  only  35  per  cent,  for  these  causes  instead 
of  100  per  cent. ;  and  that  although  the  active  part 
of  the  war  has  already  been  going  on  for  nearly 
three  months.  Remember,  that  to  add  only  35  per 
cent,  is  to  pursue  the  method  that  has  been  pursued 
throughout  these  notes  ;  it  has  been  well  within  the 
mark.  Even  so,  you  get  little  less  than  one  million 
and  three-quarters  of  men  in  wastage  to  the  enemy 
at  this  moment.  It  is  quite  certainly  much  more, 
but  it  is  even  more  certainly  no  less. 

To  that  figure,  just  over  one  million  and  three- 
quarters,  then,  let  us  pin  our  fii-st  conclusion, 
These  losses  have  almost  up  to  the  present  day — up 
to  within  the  last  two  weeks  or  so^fallen  in  the  mam 
upon  the  trained  troops  of  the  enemy,  and  with  particular 
severity  upon  his  body  of  officers. 

The  German  Empne  had,  counting  lunatics,  bed- 
ridden men,  cripples,  old  men  over  SO,  and  boys 
between  17  and  20,  17,000,000  males  available  in  four 
categories.  A  quarter  were  the  trained  men  of  useful 
fighting  age,  21  to  45 — four-and-a-quarter  million  ;  a 
quarter — another  four-and-a-quarter  million — the  men 
of  the  same  age  left  untrained  or  but  partially  trained, 
never  having  formed  part  of  the  regular  army  or 
having   done   their   full    two   years — most   of  them 


13* 


LAND    AND    WATER 


November  7,  1914 


because  it  is  not  the  Geraian  system  to  take  every 
available  man,  but  rather  to  pick  and  choose  and  to 
leave  a  large  iinti-aiued  or  half-trdincd  reserve  to  be 
digested  into  the  army  in  the  course  of  a  -nar,  hut 
very  many  because  they  iccre  pliysically  unfit  for  service. 
Tlie  remaining  two  quarters — or  eight  and  a  half 
million — stiuid  for  the  bovs  who  are  not  :cally  fit  to 
bear  arms,  but  who  can  at  a  pinch  be  called  upon, 
even  from  the  ago  of  IC  (as  Napoleon  called  upon 
such  classes  in  his  last  desperation),  and  for  elderly, 
old,  and  very  old  men.  Nor  should  it  be  forgotten 
that  to  keep  a  nation  going  at  all  in  wartime,  you 
cannot  reckon  less  than  a  number  varying  Avith  varying 
circumstances,  but  in  the  case  of  Geraiany  at  least 
one  million  men — neither  boys  nor  too  old. 

Well,  this  loss  of  nearly  one-and-three-quarter 
millions  (at  the  very  least)  which  has  already  f idlen  for 
the  most  part  upon  the  two  first  quarters,  the  trained 
army,  and  the  equal  untrained  mass  behind  it — has 
fallen  most  heavily  on  the  first  and  best.  It  comes 
to  more  than  a  fifth  of  all  the  two  possible  categories 
combined :  more  than  a  fifth  of  those  who  can  ever 
make  real  soldiers,  and  of  these  more  than  a  quarter 
of  the  first  line. 


There  is  the  chief  militai-y  feature  of  the 
struggle  at  the  present  moment.  In  a  service 
peculiarly  dependent  upon  cadres  cei-tainly  a  third  of 
the  officers  have  by  this  time  disappeared.  It 
sounds  like  a  violent  statement,  but  the  lists  are 
there  to  prove  it. 

It  wOl  probably  be  found  when  fuller  records  are 
available  that  much  more  than  a  third  have  already 
gone.  Of  the  best  troops  called  up  for  the  first 
effort  one-fourth  have  certainly  gone  and  probably 
more.  Of  all  ti-oops,  trained  and  untramed,  so  far 
incorporated  by  Germany  one-fourth  have  gone,  for 
she  has  quite  certainly  not  yet  summoned  in  any 
shape  more  than  seven  million  men  since  the 
beginning  of  the  war— ifc  is  doubtful  if  she  has 
summoned  six.  Of  all  available  material  for  anything 
approaching  a  ti-ue  army  a  quarter  has  ab'eady  gone. 

At  this  point  my  calculation  ceases.  It  must 
as  yet  be  enough  to  suggest  that  uj^on  analogy  drawn, 
from  known  cases  of  loss  in  particular  actions,  every 
man  can,  by  such  methods  as  I  have  used  above,  come 
to  his  estimate  of  the  corresponding  wastage  upon  our 
side,  and,  for  the  whole  of  both  fields,  he  wUl  find 
that  estimate  a  reassuring  contrast. 


THE   WAR  BY   WATER. 

By   FRED    T.    JANE, 

NOTE. — TUB    ARTICM    HAS    BEEN   SUllMimD  TO   THE   PEESS   EUBEAU,   WHICH   DOES   NOT  OBJECT  TO  THE   PCELICATION   AS   CENSOEIH) 
AND  TAKK8  NO   EKSPONSIBILITT   FOB  THB  COEBSCTXESS   OF  THK   STATEMENTS. 


THE   NORTH   SEA. 

THE  discovery  of  a  Gennan  mine  field  of  unknown 
extent  twenty  miles  north  of  Tory  Island 
(Donegal,  Ireland)  is  a  serious  matter.  The  mines 
must  have  been  placed  there  quite  recently  or 
something  would  have  been  sunk  by  them  long  ago. 

Now,  it  is  impossible  that  any  German  mine-layer  can 
have  reached  the  spot  under  its  own  colours.  Therefore,  a 
neutral  flag  and  probably  a  neutral  vessel  was  employed.  Now 
tchcre  did  that  vessel  sail  from  ? 

Mines  are  not  things  that  are  easily  shipped  without  observa- 
tion, and  they  occupy  quite  a  lot  of  space.  Of  course,  they  can 
be  hidden  under  a  screen  of  harmless  cargo,  but  none  the  less  there 
must  be  some  very  carefully  organised  scheme. 

The  question  certainly  arises  as  to  whether  these  mines  have 
not  been  stored  in  harmless  looking  cases  somewhere  m  our  own 
territory  in  anticipation  of  Der  Tag,  and  the  question  is  how 
many  more  are  Ij-ing  "  in  bond  "  awaiting  use  ?  It  would  be 
quite  consonant  vfith  German  thoroughness. 

Some  years  ago — though  for  obvious  reasons  the  fact  did 
not  appear  in  the  Press — a  cache  of  arais  was  discovered  on  the 
East  Coast,  and  a  systematic  search  unearthed  others  at  various 
unexpected  places.  If  arms  and  explosives  were  imported  well 
beforehand,  why  not  mines  ? 

Another  point  in  connection  with  the  Tory  Island  mine 
field  is  that  it  is  very  improbable  that  the  mines  are  anchored. 
Anchored  or  not,  they  will  presently  break  adrift  and  so  are 
liable  to  be  met  with  anywhere  around  those  parts,  a  danger 
to  friend  and  foe  alike.  ° 

The  net  result  of  all  this  is  that  sooner  or  later — probably 
sooner — considerable  restrictions  will  have  to  be  placed  on  all 
neutral  shipping  in  or  near  British  waters.*  There  are  certain 
objections  to  imposing  a  systematic  search,  but  the  formation 
of  rogi'Jar  convoys  could  hardly  be  resented  by  any  innocent 
neutral,  for  any  delay  would  be  more  than  compensated  for  by 
the  risk  avoided. 

As  for  our  warships,  the  risks  which  they  run  from  this 
kind  of  waafare  is  immense,  and  it  also  comes  under  the  head 
of  tlu.ngs  which  cannot  be  provided  for,  except  hy  the  institution 

*tfir.co  tho?e  lines  were  written  the  Admiralty  have  imposed  certain 
Natnctiona.— £o.  ^ 


of  a  very  strict  convoy  system  for  all  neutrals  using  waters 
anywhere  contiguous  to  our  coasts. 

Next  in  import*ncQ  to  the  discovery  of  the  Tory  Island 
mine  field  is  that  on  October  31st  the  old  cruiser  Hermes  waa 
submarined  in  the  Straits  of  Dover. 

It  has  been  known  for  some  time  that  one  or  more  German 
submarines  have  been  hanging  about  in  the  Channel,  and  every 
effort  has  been  made  against  our  squadron  off  Ostend. 

The  disquieting  part  of  the  affair  is  how  and  in  what  way 
the  German  submarines  manage  to  maintain  themselves  without 
visible  means  of  support. 

In  "  the  Battle  of  the  Coast  "  matters  generally  remain  as 
heretofore.  We  learn  from  an  official  statement  that  the  old 
battleship  Venerable  is  engaged  in  the  bombardment.  She 
carries  12-inch  guns,  and  the  effect  of  these  on  the  German 
trenches  must  be  something  very  terrible.  One  of  the  famous 
German  howitzers  is  said  to  have  been  destroyed  by  well-aimed 
fire  from  the  6-inch  in  one  of  our  gunboats.  Now  that  12-inch 
guns  have  been  imported,  the  German  situation  anywhere  ncaj 
the  coast  must  be  distinctly  unpleasant. 

THE   MEDITERRANEAN. 

Turkey's  entry  into  the  war  has  been  no  surprise — the 
Gocben  and  Brcslau  subtevfugc  prepared  us  for  it  long  ago.  A 
fortnight  ago  I  suggested  that  tiie  flight  of  the  Goehen  before  out 
little  Gloucester  might  turn  out,  after  all,  to  be  an  item  of  high 
strategy.  In  the  Mediterranean  itself  the  Goehe^^i  had  no  chance  ; 
in  the  Black  Sea,  if  properly  handled,  she  will  neutralise  or  destroy 
the  whole  Eussian  Black  Sea  Fleet. 

Prom  the  German  point  of  view,  immediate  assets — beyond 
the  bombardment  of  unfortified  towns  are  not  likely  to  be  very 
great.  Whatever  the  Turco-Gcrman  Fleet  may  accomplish 
in  the  Black  Sea  it  is  abundantly  clear  that  in  some  way  or  other 
Russia  wUl  reach  Constantinople  and  hold  it. 

When  the  world  war  is  over,  it  is  well  on  the  cards  that 
Russia  and  Greece  may  dispute  as  to  who  shall  hold  Byzantium, 
and  Prussia  may  already  be  reckoning  on  some  Phoenix  resurrec- 
tion of  the  German  Empire  over  that  event.  But,  so  far  aa 
Turkey  is  concerned,  it  is  the  end  of  the  Tui-ks  in  Europe. 

This,  however,  is  neither  here  nor  there  at  present.  The 
central  point  is  that  thus  early  in  the  naval  game  the  enemy 


U* 


November  7,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


«hould  have  been  compelled  to  play  his  trump  card.  It  is  the 
first  real  confession  of  defeat  that  we  have  had. 

It  will  probably  be  many  a  "  Louvain  "  for  many  undefended 
villages  on  the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea.  Only  submarines, 
destroyers  and  luck,  especially  luck,  can  avail  the  Russians  here. 
For  a  while  at  least,  thanks  to  the  Goebcn,  Turkey  will  pull 
chestnuts  out  of  the  fire  for  Germany  in  the  Euxino.  But  it  is 
certainly  goinj?  to  be  at  the  expense  of  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
as  the  Turks'will  presently  learn.  They  have  given  Constantinople 
to  their  hereditary  foes ;  and  every  island  in  the  Levant  will 
presently  be  Greek. 

And  in  dragging  Turkey  into  the  fray  Germany  has  probably 
hit  herself  the  hardest  blow. 

These  things  will  not  be  apparent  at  first.  We  may 
probably  look  for  a  lisiug  in  Egypt  ere  long — followed  by  a  corre- 
sponding rising  in  Tripoli  against  the  Italians.  The  net  result 
will  be  a  forcing  of  Italy  into  the  camp  of  the  Allies.  But  these 
are  land  and  side  issues.  The  main  point  is  that  up  till  now 
the  Russian  Black  Sea  Fleet  has  been  "  out  of  the  war,"  because 
it  was  confined  to  the  Black  Sea  by  treaty.     Now  all  is  changed. 

As  a  fighting  machine  the  Turkish  Navy  is  quite  worthless. 
The  Black  Sea  issue  entirely  depends  upon  the  Gochen,  which 
is  probably  equal  in  actual  fighting  value  to  the  entire  Russian 
Euxine  Fleet,  unless  it  first  disables  her  by  torpedo  attack. 
But  if  the  Gochen  sank  every  Russian  ship  in  the  Black  Sea 
it  would  not  affect  main  naval  operations  in  the  least,  and  its 
effects  on  the  military  situation  would  be  more  inconclusive 
still.  The  Goeben  cannot  get  out  through  the  Dardanelles 
without  facing  a  fighting  force  of  the  Allies  more  than  able  to 
cope  with  her.  Her  utmost  capacity  is  a  certain  amount  of 
wanton  destruction  in  the  Black  Sea,  for  which  ultimately 
Germany  will  have  to  pay  heavily.  And,  further,  there  will 
arise  the  question  as  to  whether  both  she  and  the  Breslau  are 
not  now  of  pirate  status,  and  outside  all  that  International  Law 
which  they  have  so  flagrantly  ignored. 

The  bombardment  of  Cattaro  continues,  and,  so  far  as 
can  be  gathered  from  the  meagre  reports  which  come  in,  it  is 
being  slowly  destroyed.  On  sea  as  on  land  it  looks  as  though 
all  old  ideas  about  fixed  defences  must  be  modified  ;  before  this 
war  is  over  even  Heligoland  itself  may  be  bombarded  into 
insignificance.    At  any  rate,  it  is  within  the  region  of  possibilities. 

THE    HIGH   SEAS   GENERALLY. 

Last  week's  recrudescence  of  corsairs  is  marked  by  the 
temporary  retirement  of  the  Karlsruhe  and  the  reappearance 
of  the  Emden,  which  on  October  28th  suddenly  appeared  at 
Penang  with  a  dummy  fourth  funnel  and  flj'ing  (according  to 
Russian  accounts)  the  Japanese  flag  (according  to  the  French 
report)  a  Russian  flag.  This  divergence  of  opinion  is  instructive, 
since  by  no  "possibility  can  the  Russian  and  Japanese  flags  be 
mistaken  for  each  other. 

We  can,  therefore,  reconstruct  with  some  accuracy  what 
probably  happened.  The  Emden  approached  the  Russian 
cruiser  JenUchug  under  the  Japanese  flag  and  possibly  actually 
torpedoed  the  cruiser  under  it.  Being  in  some  way  possessed 
of  the  information  that  the  French  destroyer  Mousqueton  was 
also  at  Penang,  she  then  hoisted  the  Russian  ensign,  probably 
hoping  to  escape  in  the  confusion,  or  at  any  rate  to  obtain 
advantage  out  of  the  Mousqiicion's  expected  hesitation. 

The  whole  affair  is  mysterious,  because  it  is  a  fixed  canon  of 
coisair  warfare  never  to  fight  if  fight  can  possibly  be  avoided, 
as  a  very  little  damage  may  materially  impair  any  future  work. 

The  Jemtchug  was  not  a  powerful  ship,  but  she  had  a  broadside 
of  four  4'7  against 'the  Emden's  five  4  inch.  She  was  hampered 
by  being  at  anchor  and  also  by  being  surprised,  but,  even  so,  the 
Emden  took  enormous  risks  for  no  apparent  object,  since  one 
pursuer  more  or  less  could  make  no  difference. 

Consequently,  we  are  forced  to  one  of  two  conclusions. 
Either  Kapitan  von  Mullcr  has  got  swelled  head  and  is  bent  on 
being  in  the  limelight  at  all  costs,  or  else,  as  seems  more  probable, 
he  is  nearing  the  end  |of  his  tether,  and  now  only  intent  on 
damaging  as  m.any  warships  as  possible  before  going  under. 
We  know  that  the  Eniden  has  had  to  sacrifice  two  of  her  colliers — 
the  Markomania  and  the  Greek  steamer  Ponloporus — recently, 
in  order  to  save  herself,  and  from  this  we  may  presume  that  her 
"  communications "  have  very  possibly  been  cut  altogether. 
It  is  well  within  the  bounds  of  probability  that  she  will  be  next 
heard  of  as  interned  in  some  neutral  port — by  preference 
Siamese. 

Another  thing  which  must  hamper  the  Emden  is  that  her 
ammunition  must  be  growing  short,  and  her  favourite  trick 
of  using  the  British  or  other  Allied  flag  is  becoming  well  kno^vn. 
The  quarry  is  therefore  a  great  deal  more  shy  than  heretofore. 

The  Envlen  has  now  twenty-one  merchant  ships  and  two 
warships  to  her  credit,  but  the  indications  are  that  her  days  are 
numbered.  In  any  case,  it  is  dear  that  the  great  German 
Bchcrae  of  commerce  warfare  has  signally  failed  and  that  one 
way  and  another  the  cost  of  it  all  to  Germany  has  probably 


been  greater  than  the  loss  inflicted  on  us.  In  one  way  especially 
has  it  been  a  signal  failure — it  has  completely  failed  to  create 
a  British  commercial  p.inic.  Thoretically  ere  this  wo  should  all 
have  been  on  short  commons  with  food  at  famine  prices. 

It  is  ironical  that  this  German  failure  must  be  in  great  part 
due  to  Prince  Louis  of  Battcnberg  having  urged  the  early  niobi- 
lisation  of  the  British  Fleet  and  so  prevented  many  corsairs 
from  materialising.  It  is  curious  that  t\ie\Emden's  abandonment 
of  the  corsair  game  should  coincide  with  the  retirement  of 
"  L.B."  (as  the  Navy  has  always  called  him)  from  his  post  of 
First  Sea  Lord  on  account  of  a  public  agitation  directed  on  the 
fact  that  as  a  baby  he  was  a  German  ! 

THE    FAR    EAST. 

So  far  as  can  be  gathered  the  clouds  are  closing  round 
Kiao  Chau.  The  sea  bombardment  appears  to  bo  conducted 
mainly  by  British  warships,  while  the  Japanese  land  batteries 
are  doing  much  damage.  The  German  gunboats  inside  appear 
to  get  sunk  by  slow  degrees,  but  whether  they  do  or  do  not  it 
is  unlikely  to  affect  the  main  issue,  Kiao  Chau  is  doomed  to 
extinction. 

MATTERS    GENERALLY. 

DuRixa  the  last  week  or  so  the  destroyer  has  receded 
considerably  from  her  pre-war  status.  The  affair  off  the  Dutch 
Coast,  the  sinking  of  the  Mousqueton  at  Penang,  all  go  to  indicate 
that  6-iuch  and  even  4-inch  guns  are  far  more  deadly  against 
destroyers  than  was  anticipated.  Like  the  submarine,  the 
destroyer  also  seems  doomed  to  illustrate  the  old  saying  about 
the  impotence  of  the  lightweight  boxer  before  the  heavyweight. 

All  of  which  is  still  in  the  embryo  stage.  We  cannot  yet 
say  for  certain  that  the  "  Dreadnought  policy "  is  proved 
correct.  But,  whatever  happens,  it  has  so  far  shown  itself 
not  to  be  wrong,  despite  things  done  by  submarines. 


AN    IMPORTANT    WAR    MAP. 

One  of  the  most  useful  of  war  maps  yet  published  is  the  large 
relief  map  of  the  central  European  area  issued  by  Messrs.  Georga 
Pliilip  at  six  guineas.  It  forms  a  faithful  representation  of  the  con- 
figuration of  Europe — western  and  central  Europe,  that  is — and  gives  a 
clearer  idea  than  can  bo  obtained  in  any  other  way  of  the  difficulties 
that  face  the  Allies  in  the  Rhine  Valley,  the  region  of  the  Argonne, 
and  the  Ardennes  country — these  as  instanoes.  The  nature  of  the 
country  over  which  the  Russian  troops  are  also  advancing  is  clearly 
shown,  and  altogether  the  map  is  an  education  as  regards  the  diffi- 
culties attendant  on  the  conduct  of  this  war.  It  is  a  publication  that 
should  be  found  in  every  club,  at  every  war  lecture,  and  in  every 
country  house  in  which  an  interest  is  taken  in  the  progress  of  the  war. 

WAR  KIT. 

Inspection  of  the  materials  and  methods  of  Messrs.  White,  tailors, 
of  10,  Blenheim  Street,  W.,  demonstrates  that  the  firm  has  made  speci;il 
study  of  the  needs  of  officers  proceeding  to  the  war  area,  and  is 
prepared  to  give  the  ultimate  of  value  iu  conjunction  with  detailed 
personal  attention  to  each  customer.  The  prices  are  extremely  reason 
able,  for  a  cash  system  obviates  bad  debts  and  gives  opportunity  for 
smaller  profits  than  are  required  in  the  ca.'w  of  credit  firms.  There  is 
an  overcoat  of  rainproof  frieze  which  merits  special  attention,  and 
another  thing  worthy  of  note  is  the  "  British  warm  "  coat  of  military 
pattern — an  ideal  garment  for  winter  campaigning.  These  are  but 
instances ;  the  firm  is  making  a  speciality  of  military  kit,  but  equally 
good  value  is  given  in  the  matter  of  civilian  attire,  and  the  work  of  the 
firm  as  a  whole  is  well  worthy  of  recommendation. 

Charing  Cross  Hospital  appeals  for  funds  to  equip  five  wards  for 
the  wounded  soldiers.  The  sum  required  is  £3,000.  The  five  newly 
renovated  wards  were  reopened  at  the  end  of  last  year,  and  their  use 
by  our  soldiers  and  sailors  will  in  no  way  interfere  with  the  rights  of 
the  civil  population.  Cheques  crossed  should  be  made  payable  to  the 
Appeal  Secretary,  Cliaring  Cross  Hospital. 


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15* 


LAND    AND    WATER 


November  7,  1914 


THE    ENEMY'S    TRENCHES. 

By  COL.  F.  N.  MAUDE,  C.B.,  late  R.E. 


FROM  the  course  the  war  is  taking,  it  seems  most 
probable  that  our  attention  during  the  next  few 
months  will  be  directed  to  getting  the  Germans 
out  of  their  trenches  rather  than  to  diggmg  ourselves 
in.  Now,  the  best  way  of  getting  them  out— to 
use  an  Irishism— is  never  to  give  them  a  chance  of  making  any 

trenches  to  get  into.  j      iu  i.  v„. 

This  seems  a  counsel  of  perfection,  but  it  is  an  idea  that  Has 
lain  at  the  base  of  all  offensive  strategy  ever  smce  the  days  ol 
Napoleon.  His  immediate  predecessors  knew  aU  about  tield 
entrenchments  and  used  them  on  what,  in  proportion  to  their 
numbers,  was  an  even  greater  scale  than  their  descendants  m  tlio 
present  war.  Even  in  Marlborough's  time  the  French  and 
Austriana  faced  one  another  in  fortified  lines  stretching  right 
across  from  the  marshes  in  Flanders  to  the  Rhine  at  a  point  a 
little  east  of  the  town  of  W«issenburg,  and  the  lines  in  those  days 
were  far  more  difficult  to  assault  than  now,  because  they  were 
of  much  bigger  sections,  more  deliberately  traced,  and  there  was 
then  no  artillery  in  existence  capable  of  blowing  their  parapets 
and  breastworks  to  pieces. 

But  Napoleon  sacrificed  everything  to  speed  of  manoeuvre— 
marching  his  men  so  much  farther  and  faster  than  his  enemy,  that 
the  latter  found  his  lines  taken  up  on  one  day,  completely  out- 
flanked by  the  next  morning,  and  in  sheer  desperation  dropped 
the  game  of  entrenching  altogether,  and  tried  to  meet  his  enemy 
by  counter-manoeuvring.  Incidentally,  I  may  add,  both  sides 
practically  dropped  spying  altogether  as  a  game  hardly  worth 

the  candle.  „        ,  „      i       > 

It  seems  to  me  that  if  the  Germans  had  followed  Napoleon  s 
ideal  and  spent  all  the  money  they  had  on  increasing  the  mobility 
of  their  troops  by  all  modem  appliances,  instead  of  squandering 
their  resources  on  "  black  marias,"  spies,  concrete  foundations, 
and  so  forth,  they  would  have  come  much  nearer  to  success  than 
they  have  been  throughout  this  campaign,  and  presently  when 
we  have  begun  to  shift  them  out  of  their  trenches,  the  skill  of  our 
men  in  repairing  roads,  devising  means  even  to  do  without  them, 
may  prove  of  the  utmost  value  in  bringing  the  campaign  to  a 
more  speedy  conclusion. 

I  would  suggest  to  intending  inventors  that  they  might 
■  well  concentrate  on  some  sort  of  steel  barge  or  scow  which 
could  reduce  ita  own  weight  by  blowing  out  compressed 
air   on   exactly   the  same    principle   as   an   ordinary  rocket. 


It  seems  to  me  that  it  would  be  well  within  the  scope  of  any 
man  with  a  workshop  training  to  recreate  the  old-fashioned 
catapult  for  throvring  packets  or  bombs  of  high  explosives  out  o! 
improvised  material  to  be  found  at  almost  any  railway  station, 
garage,  or  even  a  wheelwright's. 

Here  ia  the  idea  : 


Projectile 


Motor  and 
Air  Conivressors 


y—i 


yioici 

"Ifo'dbie,  'BoitoiV 


Compressed  air  clLombers 


Something  of  this  description,  the  whole  resting  on  rollers,  the 
axles  of  which  could  be  raised  and  lowered  by  an  ordinary 
eccentric  axle,  such  as  is  still  in  use  on  the  old  garrison  gun 
carriage  for  running  the  gim  back  by  hand.  Our  fish  torpedoes 
carry  compressed  air  at  1,000  lb.  to  the  square  inch,  and  it  ia 
astonishing  what  a  lifting  power  air  at  this  pressure  will  develop. 

Meanwhile,  we  have  got  to  shift  the  enemy  out  of  his 
trenches  first ;  and  for  the  moment,  thanks  to  the  extraordinary 
manner  in  which  we  have  learnt  to  utilise  the  ground,  as  described 
in  my  last  article  but  one,  we  seem  to  have  got  back  into  the  old 
difficulty  which  beset  our  ancesters  in  the  old  days  when  "  they 
Bwore  terribly  in  Flanders."  They,  as  I  have  said  above,  had 
no  artillery  power  adequate  to  shift  their  enemy's  breastworks. 
We  have  learnt  to  get  so  close  up  to  our  enemy  that  neither  he 
nor  we  can  utilise  our  artillery  power  either  to  cover  or  to  attack 
each  other's  works,  for  you  cannot  drop  high  explosive  shells 
when  the  trenches  are  only  a  couple  of  hundred  of  yards  apart 
without  endangering  both  defenders  and  assailants  alike.  It  ia 
now  a  frontal  duel  between  rifles  and  machine  guns  on  either 
side,  and  neither  is  adapted  for  dropping  bullets  into  trenches  at 
such  short  ranges. 

For  the  moment  we  have  no  accepted  means  of  achieving 
this  end,  and  must  make  out  by  shifts  and  expedients  improvised 
on  the  spot. 

It  is  in  these  circumstances  that  intelligent  men  of  any  rank 
can  make  their  mark.  People  are  only  too  eager  to  jump  at  a 
cunning  device  in  such  predicaments. 


Radietwheel  W^^^^ 


'Wocd.est  bedplate 


A  stout  carriage  spring  with  a  cup  attachment,  fixed  at  A, 
is  bent  down  by  a  wheel  and  ratchet,  and  held  by  a  trigger  of  tha 
simplest  design.  Such  a  contraption  would  easily  throw  a 
twenty  pound  weight  three  or  four  hundred  yards,  or  for  any 
distance  that  might  be  needed,  using  more  or  less  compression,  and 
a  shower  of  such  bombs,  before  a  rush  with  the  bayonet,  would 
mai:e  all  the  difference  in  its  chances  of  success. 

Or  an  adaptation  of  the  old  "sap  roller"  might  be 
improvised  out  of  one  of  the  big  bobbins  or  reels  used  for  electiio 
piping,  so  often  seen  about  the  street,  and  certain  to  be  found 
in  any  of  the  manufacturing  towns  about  the  frontier. 


BtdUtproofdialth 
or  wire  from,  the 
nearest  coaZ-mine:. 
or  evexi  telegraph . 
Wlre^ 


•Explosive 


You  place  the  explosives  inside  with  an  electric  fuse  and 
field  cable.  Wind  enough  wire  or  chain  around  it  to  make  it 
buUet  proof,  then  taking  the  wire  from  the  fuse,  wind  it  outside, 
but  between  the  chains,  so  as  to  minimise  the  risk  of  getting  it 
cut  by  a  bullet,  and  let  the  whole  thing  roll  down  hill  upon  tha 
enemy,  paying  out  the  electric  cable  as  it  goes,  and  firing  it  v,ith 
the  service  dynamo  exploder  just  as  it  lobs  into  the  enemy's 
trenches.  One  hundred  pound  charge  fired  in  this  way  would 
create  a  most  disconcerting  explosion. 

If  the  ground  is  level  or  slopes  gently  upward,  another  ropa 
wound  round  it  from  above,  down,  and  round  thus,  would  make 
it  run  up  hill  when  pulled  upon,  as  in  the  well-known  experiment 
of  making  a  bobbin  of  cotton  run  away  from  you  by  pulling  the 
thread  towards  you. 


THI   DIBBCTION   OF   MOTION   OF  TBE   BOBBIK.      TOlm^^^ 

I  merely  throw  out  these  suggcstiona  to  induce  the  young 
men  joining  the  New  Armies  to  think,  for  these  things  must  be 
done  on  the  spot.  There  ia  no  time  for  Headquarters  to  go  into 
them,  and  settle  on  sealed  patterns.  The  whole  essence  of  this 
kind  of  warfare  is  to  "  get  there  "  without  asking  questions  or 
waiting  for  formal  authority.  If  a  man  makes  a  blunder,  of 
course  ho  must  take  the  consequences,  as  in  any  other  walk  of 
life,  but  "  initiative  "  is  nowadays  treasured  as  a  most  precious 
possession,  and  in  siege  work  it  has  always  found  its  best  chance. 


16* 


November   7,    1914 


LAND     AND     WATER 


65 


LAND     AND     WATER 


November  7,    19 14 


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■*-^  depends  very  largely  on  attaining  per- 
fection in  a  thousand  details.  More 
accumulated  knowledge  of  how^  to  do 
this  goes  to  the  making  of  the  Dunlop 
tyre  than  to  any  other. 

L_J  ENCE  the  superiority  of  the  Dunlop,  the  proof 
of   which    is  before  you  in  the  countless  in- 
stances of  splendid  service  that  have  made  the  word 

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synonymous  with  satisfaction 


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out  the    world    of    the    Pneumatic    Tyre    Industry 

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DUNLOP  SOLID  TYRES  FOR  HEAVY  COMIERCIAL  VEHICLES     Trade  m.rk 


66 


The  County  Gentleman 


AND 


LAND  &  WATER 

Vol.  LXIV.         No.  2738  SATURDAY,  OCTOBER  31.  1914.  [r^fl^'s^pi^PEli']     Fn^Y'isVKL^^EYKi? 


CopyriiM,  Hornet  W.  Nichottt 


THE    OLD    AND    THE    NEW 


An  interesting  Picture  recently  taken  at   Portsmouth  showing  a  modern  Waterplane  flying  over 

the  venerable  "  Victory  " 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  31,   19 14 


Sentry  :    "  Halt  !      Who  goes  there  ?   ' 

J(M^NNIK   Walker  :    "  Friend." 

Si.NTRY  :    "  Advance  and   give  the   countersign." 

JoHNNiK   Walker:    "  B')rn    1820;     still   going  strong." 

Sentry  :    "  Pass,  'Johnnie   Walker,'  you're  all   ritihr." 

JOHN    \V.\LKER    &    SONS,    LTD.,    Scotch    Whisky    Distillers,    KILMARNOCK, 


54 


October  31,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


KOTE.- 


THE    WAR    BY    LAND. 

By  HILAIRE    BELLOC. 

-THIS   ULTlChM   HAS   BEEN   SCBMITTZD    TO   THE   TOISS    BOBEAU,    WHICH    DOES    NOT   OBJBCT   TO    THB    rUELICATION    A3   CEKSOEKD 
AND   TAKES    NO    KESPOXSlBILITY    FOB   THB    COEEEOTNESS   OP    THE    STATEilENIS. 


IN   ACCOKDANCB     TTITH     TaB    KE<iUIKEME:;TS      OP     THE    TBESS     EUEEAU,     THB    P0EIT10K3     OF     TEOOPS    ON     PLANS     ILLUSTP.ATIXO    THIS 
ARTICLB    KUST    ONLT    BB    KBGAEDED    AS   APPROXIMATE,   AND   KO   DEFINITB    STKENQTH   AT   ANT    POINT   IS    INDICATED. 


THE    FIELD    IN    FLANDERS. 

Tuesday/  afternoon,    October  21t/i,  1914. 

I  WISH  this  week  to  concentrate  upon  that 
large  business — largest  as  it  serves  the  Allies 
though  large  it  serves  the  enemy — which 
is  acting  in  Flanders  as  I  write. 

Perpetually  in  the  course  of  this  great 
campaign,  and  especially  during  its  course  in  the 
West,  we  have  had  a  situation  which  looked  like  a 
decision  ;  and  yet  that  situation  has  not  matured. 

We  have  had  movements  that  not  only  might 
have  resulted  in  very  definite  success  to  one  side  or 
the  other,  but  which  seemed  necessaiily  to  point  to 
such  immediate  results. 

I  do  not  mean  that  we  have  had  situations 
which  could  make  one  certain  of  victory  or  defeat 
for  one  party  ;  I  mean  that  we  have  had  situations 
which  promised  as  allernatives  some  considerable 
success  on  one  side  or  the  other — just  as  you  may 
say  of  a  big  speculation  that  either  the  man  will 
make  a  fortune  or  will  lose  one.  Fx-ora  what  you 
know  of  the  state  of  the  mai'ket  he  wiU  be  made  or 
broken.  But  at  any  l^te  he  wiU  not  come  out  with 
a  sninll  loss  or  gain. 

Now  the  principal  characteristic  of  the  campaign 
up  to  the  present  moment — that  which  seems  to 
differentiate  it  from  every  other  great  campaign 
of  the  past,  and  a  characteristic  probably  pro- 
ceeding from  the  wholly  novel  conditions  of  modem 
wiiveisal  conscript  armies  and  modei-n  machines — is 
that  these  critical  situations  have  never  developed 
beyond  a  certain  limit.  They  have  never  matured. 
They  have  never  led  to  a  decision. 

Upon  the  analogy  of  the  immediate  past  of  the 
war  it  would  therefore  be  unwise  to  say  that  the 
present  situation  in  Flanders  points  to  an  approaching 
decision.  Nevertheless  one  is  tempted  to  say  that, 
what  with  (1)  the  violence  of  the  struggle,  (2)  the 
large  reinforcements  involved  (especially  upon  the 
German  side),  (3)  the  concentration  of  all  main 
interest  on  to  this  one  point — the  state  of  affairs  does 
look  more  like  a  decision  than  anything  we  have  had 
before. 

It  does  look  as  though  a  continuation  of  stalemate 
on  this  end  of  the  Franco-Belgian  frontier  was 
hardly  possible.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  enemy 
lias  here  concentrated  new  forces  which,  though  they 
certainly  do  not  exhaust  his  reserves,  prove  him  to 
be  making  a  gambling  effort.  Prisoners  are  captured, 
troops  ai'e  noted  upon  the  march,  which  make  this 
coi-tain.  He  has  masses  of  first-rate  material  in 
Flanders.  But  he  is,  among  other  better  troops, 
using  boys  much  younger  and  men  much  older  than 
the  Allies  choose  to  put  into  the  field  at  this  stage ; 
and  the  whole  of  his  action  during  the  last  ten  days, 
both  in  the  northern  part,  the  neighbourhood  of  the 
sea-coast,  and  in  tlie  southern  between  Lille  and 
La  Bassee,  proves  that  he  is  depending  upon  superior 
numhcra  in  this  region  acquired  at  some  expense  of 
quality.     He  is,  therefore,  lighting,  not  in  expectation 


of  falling  back  on  a  defensive  position,  but  to  win 
or  lose. 


«  Bruges 
o 


tT7xorout 

Dixmtbfe 
%®RDuiIers 

» 

Ypras     / 


Armeatieres  ,o- — ^ 

r     f?       '  */        •Lille 
La  Dossee* 


lo 


20        30 

Miles 


40       /(? 


We  may  make  perfectly  certain  that,  both  across 
the  canal  between  Ypres  and  the  sea  and  in  the  region 
of  La  Bassee  west  of  Lille,  far  to  the  south,  where  the 
enemy  is  making  his  greatest  efforts,  he  has  for  the 
moment  got  a  numerical  superiority,  and  we  may 
make  equally  certain  that  he  has  acquired  that 
superiority  at  a  quite  extraoi-dinarily  heavy  expense  of 
men.  Only  the  event  can  show  whether  he  is  wise  or 
unwise  in  making  this  extraoi-dlnary  effort,  but,  at  any 
rate,  if  he  proves  unwise  (that  is,  if  the  effort  fails)  he 
cannot,  after  it  has  failed,  fall  hack  xcith  the  same 
seciiriti/  tcilh  which  the  first-class  troops  of  Kluck  fell 
hack  in  their  admirable  retreat  from  Paris. 

Now  let  us  estimate  the  elements  which  may 
lead  us  to  expect  in  this  field  success  or  failure  upon 
either  side. 

The  first  of  these  elements  is  one  which  I  have 
insisted  upon  before  now  in  connection  with  this 
fighting,  and  which  is  particulai-ly  evident  in  the  crisis 
of  the  last  few  days.  It  is  the  separation  of  objectives 
which,  I  do  not  say  the  German  commanders,  but 
certainly  the  German  Government,  has  imposed  upon 
the  German  forces.  Someone,  clearly,  has  presented 
an  advance  along  the  coast  from  Ostend  towards 
Calais  as  owe  of  the  objects  to  be  obtained  by  the 
German  army.  As  clearly  some  other  person  has 
proposed  another  effort  (and  very  vigorously  maintained 
it)  south  and  west  of  the  town  of  Lille.  The  two 
may  be  co-ordinated  by  some  agreement ;  they  do 
not  come  from  one  head. 

Now  .see  what  this  duplication  of  objective  means. 

From  the  little  town  of  La  Bassee  to  the  sea  at 
Nicuport  (which  line  is  the  general  frontier  of   the 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  31,  1914 


Allied  resistance)  is  a  distance,  as  the  crow  flies  of  not 
less  than  45  miles;  foUowiug  the  sinuosities  of 
the  line,  as  it  actually  is,  the  front  must  mean 
something  a  good  deal  over  50  miles. 

Very  large  forces  striking  an  expectant,  defending 
but  inferior  body  deployed  ixlong  such  a  front  might 
attack  everywhere  in  the  general  effort  to  roll  back 
that  defensive,  or.  rather,  to  push  it  back.  Such  lines 
fully  deployed  one  against  the  other,  without  special 
points  of  concentration,  we  had  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war.  But  even  such  a  shock,  fully  developed 
alon<r  a  whole  week's  march  of  country,  will  almost 
certainly   have   to   turn   at  last  into  an  attempt  to 

outflank.  .it        a. 

In  a  struggle  of  a  line  of  ten  against  a  line  ot  ten 
there  is  not  likely  to  be  a  decision  unless  two  of  the 
ten  rush  at  one  point  to  get  through,  or  tm-n  round 
bv  one  side  to  catch  the  opponent  in  flank.  ^ 

*  You  do  not  tear  a  hole  in  your  opponent  s  line 
by  striking  it  everywhere  with  equal  force.  To  tear  a 
hole  you  must  concentrate  upon  some  supposedly  weak 
link  in  the  cham.  If  you  do  not  choose  to  attack  m 
this  method,  in  other  words,  if  you  do  not  choose  to 
try  to  tear  a  hole  through  his  line,  the  only  other 
thing  you  can  do  is  to  get  round  him— to  hold  him  on 
his  line  while  you  claw  round  him  with  unexpected 
men  to  the  right  or  the  left. 

Now,  in  this  case,  there  can  be  no  question  of 
"  clawing  round,"  that  is,  of  outflanking,  because  the 
effort  is  being  made  at  the  end  of  a  long  and  tenacious 
line  which  reposes  on  the  sea,  and  then  stretches 
away  indefinitely  southwards.  So  there  is  no  question 
of  the  Germans  outflanking  by  the  German  le/(,  that 
is  to  the  south  of  Lille.  The  other  end  of  the  line  — 
the  far  northern  end  on  the  German  rzy///— reposing 
on  the  sea,  there  is  no  outflanking  there ;  for  tlirough 
the  sea  no  troops  can  march. 

In  other  words,  what  the  Germans  musf  do  if  they 
are  to  succeed,  and  the  only  thing  they  can  possibly 
do,  is  to  tear  a  hole. 

But  when  you  want  to  tear  a  hole  through  a  line 
you  naturally  put  all  the  strength  you  have  upon 
one  supposedly  weak  spot.  You  must  of  course  have 
troops  all  along  the  line  to  "  hold  "  your  enemy,  but 
you  mass  a  "  bolt "  of  men  on  some  one  comparatively 
naiTOW  front,  and  you  launch  it  at  that  point  where 
you  think  the  opposing  line,  from  the  pressure  of  bad 
or  few  forces  on  difficult  ground,  can  be  broken. 
Napoleon,  for  instance,  at  Waterloo,  in  each  of  his 
great  efforts  to  break  the  Allied  line  tried  first  one 
place  and  then  another.  He  tore  at  Wellington's 
left  centre  with  his  great  battery  ;  at  that  left  centre 
he  launched  Erlon.  At  the  end  of  the  day  he  laimched 
the  Guard  at  the  right  centre.  But  what  would 
historians  have  said  of  him  if  he  had  launched  part  of 
the  Guard  at  the  right  centre  and  another  part  at  the 
left  centre  at  the  same  time  ? 

Napoleon  being  what  he  was,  historians  would 
have  had  to  try  to  find  some  explanation  other  than 
mere  folly  or  confusion.  And  the  German  Army 
being  what  it  is,  possessing  the  tradition,  doctrine, 
and  efficiency  in  practice  which  we  know,  we  are 
equally  bound  to  find  some  explanation  for  this 
divergence  of  objective  :  this  attack  of  the  enemy, 
not  along  the  coast  alone  or  in  front  of  LiUe  alone 
(four  days  off),  but  at  dof/i  these  distant  points.  If 
the  Germans  massed  all  the  men  they  could  spare  for 
their  "  bolt "  in  front  of  Lille  and  hurled  them 
against  the  point  of  La  Bassce,  and  if  by  so  doing 
they  tore  a  hole  through  the  Allied  line  there,  they 
would  achieve  a  result  large  in  proportion  to  their 
success.     If  their  success  was  overwhelming,  and  they 


poured  through  in  great  numbers  and  very  rapidly, 
they  would  probably  cut  off  that  great  body  of  their 
enemies  which  fills  up  the  remaining  fifty  mile  line 
between  Lille  and  the  sea.  But  even  if  they  failed  to 
cut  off  that  northern  group,  -\\ith  its  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  men,  even  if  they  failed  to  take  them 
prisoners  and  destroy  them  as  a  military  force,  they 
would,  even  in  case  of  that  incomplete  success, 
compel  this  advanced  northern  portion  to  fall  back 
very  quickly.  They  would  "  uncover,"  as  the  phrase 
goes,  all  the  sea-coast  well  past  Dunkirk  to  the 
neighbourhood  of  Calais.  To  win  in  the  Lille  region 
by  "using  there,  at  the  La  Bassee  point,  all  the  men 
they  have  free,  would  be.  in  itself,  to  win  Calais. 

The  thing  is  elementary.  If  I  have  here  a 
line  A— B  reposing  upon  the  sea,  and  C— D  my 
opponent  breaks  me  by  massing  superior  numbers  in 
a  "  bolt  "  at  E,  then  the  portion  E— B  will  have  to 


Sea 

H 

A    C 

D     1 

D    1 

:'<— - 

D    1 

G 

'""   D'l 

B     V 

K   a  1 

n        ■ 

%D   1, 

/ 

■>«    D 

a 

fall  back  as  fast  as  it  can  into  some  such  position  as 
P — B,  and  poor  A — E  can  only  escape  the  extreme 
probability  of  capture  by  pelting  away  backwards 
towards  some  such  line  as  H — G.  The  chances  are, 
indeed,  of  course  heavily  against  A — E  being  able 
to  get  away  at  all  after  the  whole  line  A — B  is  broken 
at  E.  When  a  line  is  broken  it  usually  suffers 
disaster  in  one  of  its  two  halves  and  sometimes  in 
both.  But  at  the  very  best,  and  in  an}'-  case,  the  only 
chance  of  safety  for  this  northern  half  would  be  to 
fall  back  and  "  uncover  "  all  that  district  H — A  along 
the  sea-coast  which  the  line  A — E  had  hitherto 
protected.  Even  if  the  enemy  with  his  "  bolt "  had 
not  broken  the  line  A — B  at  E,  but  had  pushed  it  in, 
the  same  would  be  true.  An  ugly  push  into  a  line, 
which  only  nearlt/  breaks  it,  compels  the  retreat  of 
one  half  or  the  other  above  or  below  the  bulge  ; 
because,  if  the  line  should  break,  one  half  or  the  other 
would  certainly  be  in  peril  of  disaster. 

Now  all  this  is  as  much  as  to  say  that,  while  we 
must  seek  some  strategic  object  in  the  Germans 
thus  dividing  their  forces,  that  object  is  hard  to  find. 

A  is  Nieuport,  II  is  Calais,  E  is  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Lille  and  the  point  of  La  Bassee. 

One  would  have  thought  that  the  heaviest  "  bolt " 
the  Germans  could  afford  to  gather  would  have  been 
shot  at  E  only,   because  success  there  would,   as  a 


2» 


OctoW  31,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATEK 


nccossaiy  consequence,  involve  the  aliandonment  of 
the  sea-coast  between  Nieuport  and  Calais.  Why, 
then,  has  this  diversion  of  forces  taken  place  ?  Why- 
have  the  Gei-mans  struck,  not  only  Avest  of  Lille 
against  La  Basseo — where  success  would  automatically 
liave  uncovered  the  sea-coast — but  also  along  that  sea- 
coast  itself  ? 

The  answer  must  be  political.  Tliere  is  no  other 
answer.  Someone  in  control  of  German  affairs  has 
said :  "  If  we  can  occupy  the  sea-coast  quicMi/  we  shall 
have  a  certain  political  effect  which  we  much  desire, 
and  which  an  ultimate  success  fm-ther  south  will  not 
subsei-ve."  Someone  else,  more  military,  has  said:  "I 
regret  this  waste  of  men  upon  a  political  object. 
Our  only  chance  of  breaking  the  enemy's  line  is  to  go 
for  the  main  point  west  of  LiUe.  I  insist  upon 
having,  at  any  rate,  great  masses  of  men  for  that  main 
point  (the  neighbourhood  of  Lille).  Use  what  you 
think  you  can  spare  to  the  north."  Whereupon  a 
compromise  has  been  effected  between  the  politician 
and  the  soldier.  The  fonner  first  took  large  reinforce- 
ments for  his  attempt  along  the  coast ;  the  latter  had 
reinforcements,  also  large,  not  as  large  as  he  could 
have  wished,  for  his  effort  in  front  of  LiUe.  But  as 
the  politician  Ls  master,  the  attack  along  the  sea-coast 
has  used  up  most  of  the  men,  and  is  attracting  to 
itself,  by  its  very  lack  of  success,  more  and  more 
forces  from  the  south. 

The  effect  of  this  division  of  power  has  been  to 
leave  a  large  body  of  the  Allies  well  advanced  between 
both  attacks,  threatening  at  Ypres  and  to  the  east  of 
Ypres,  the  flank  of  each  Gennan  push.  AU  those 
strong  bodies  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Ypres  and  to 
the  cast  of  that  town,  occupying  country  neai-ly  up  to 
Eoullers,  threaten  the  southern  German  advance  by 
Lille  somewhat  and  threaten  the  sea-coast  advance 
very  gravely  indeed. 

For  instance,  the  French  have  been  pushing 
eastward  from  Armentiferes  for  three  days  consecutively. 
They  certainly  would  not  have  been  able  to  do  that  if 
the  whole  of  the  German  attack  had  fallen  upon  La 
Bassde.  But  the  mass  of  that  attack  had  been  deflected, 
by  divided  counsels,  to  the  north  and  along  the  sea. 

Now  what  was  the  German  political  object  in 
this  march  along  the  sea-coast  ?  To  that  a  simple 
and  true  answer  can  be  given.  The  object  was  to 
frighten  England;  to  advance,  as  some  German 
political  authority  believed,  another  step  in  the 
process  of  weakening  the  Alliance.  Such  political 
objects  are  not  without  military  value  where  one  is 
certain  of  one's  psychology.  The  great  siege  of  Paris 
in  '70-'71  was  almost  entirely  political,  and  the 
Germans  rightly  judged  that  the  fall  of  Paris  would 
be  the  end  of  the  war.  They  therefore  risked  a  gi-eat 
deal  with  that  one  political  object  in  view,  and  thoy 
were  right.  But  it  is  an  exti*aordinaiy  misconception 
of  the  moral  condition  in  this  country  to  think  that 
the  occupation  of  the  French  coast  up  to  Cape  Grisnez 
would  appreciably  affect  either  the  Alliance  or  the 
domestic  balance  of  the  English  people. 

This  political  move  had,  indeed,  also  some  strategic 
value  :  though  quite  out  of  pi'oportion  to  the  strategic 
loss  it  involved. 

But  first  let  us  note  another  political  object 
which  may  have  been  held  in  view  by  the  enemy,  and 
that  is  the  complete  holding  of  Belgian  soil. 

The  power  to  say  that  they  were  technically  the 
masters  of  all  that  had  once  been  Belgium  may  have 
attracted  some  German  statesman  or  Prince.  At  any 
rate  neither  this  nor  any  larger  object  was  worth  the 
diversion  of  such  masses  of  men  from  the  critical 
point  by  Lille.     It  is  that  diversion   which  puzzles 


every  critic  and  student  of  the  campaign  in  its  present 
phase.  It  only  puzzles  him  if  he  forgets  how  often 
the  most  urgent  military  considerations  have  been 
sacrificed  in  the  clash  between  the  politician  and  the 
soldier. 

But  let  us  consider  in  detail  how  a  man  possessed 
of  political  power  miglit,  if  he  had  power  to  force  this 
false  plan  on  the  staff,  bring  forw'ard  militaiy  arguments 
for  thus  dividing  the  Gemian  army  and  attempting 
the  Calais  march. 

THE    STRATEGICAL    PROBLEM    OF 
THE    STRAITS. 

I  have  said  that  it  is  clear  that  someone  in 
authority  over  the  Germans  has  suggested  as  an 
impei'ative  necessity  of  the  moment  an  advance  by 
Dunku-k  to  Calais,  and  the  occupation  of  the  Fi-ench 
shore  of  the  Straits  of  Dover.  I  have  further  said  that 
a  soldier,  not  a  politician,  would  have  urged  the 
massing  of  all  forees  for  a  blow  that  should  break  the 
Allied  line — not  turn  it  on  the  coast. 

For  it  is  the  business  of  soldiers  to  decide  cam- 
paigns, while  it  is  the  business  of  politicians  to 
estimate  the  psychology  of  those  whom  they  happen 
to  govern  as  subjects,  or  as  foreigners  to  oppose. 

But  the  advance  along  the  sea-coast  to,  let  us 
say,  some  point  north  of  Boulogne,  the  occupation  of 
the  maritime  end  of  that  range  of  hills  which  bounds 
the  Artois  country,  and  runs  into  the  sea  at  Cape 
Grisnez,  at  the  naiTOwest  point  of  the  Straits,  the 
possession  of  Dunkirk  and  of  Calais,  and  of  the  cliffs 
that  look  at  England  from  the  west  of  Calais  (whence 
is  the  shortest  artillery  trajectory  across  the  naiTOW 
seas  toward  Britain),  has  certain  strategical  objects. 
The  politician  who  shall  have  ordered  this  move  did 
not  act,  and  could  not  only  have  acted,  with  a  vague 
intention  of  disturbing  the  English  temper.  There 
are  already  between  Ypres  and  the  mouth  of  the  Yser 
perhaps  10,000  German  dead,  perhaps  60,000  German 
casualties ;  and  the  purely  military  value  of  such 
a  move  must  have  been  weighed — even  though  it  Avere 
undertaken  against  the  highest  military  advice — before 
it  was  begun. 

What  is  that  militaiy  value  ? 

I  will  summai-ise  what  is  to  be  said  for  and 
against  the  march  upon  Calais;  or,  to  be  more  accurate, 
the  march  upon  the  heights  of  Grisnez  —  for  these 
are  the  true  strategical  objective. 

1.  Of  the  Allies  in  the  west  Great  Britain  alone 
is,  theoretically  at  least,  inexhaustible.  Slow  as  the 
training  of  new  levies  must  be ;  difficult  as  is  the 
finding  of  ofiicers  and  even  of  instructors  for  them ; 
untried  as  must  be  their  cadres  or  framework  (the 
oflicers  and  non-commissioned  officers  which  hold  an 
army  together,  as  the  honeycomb  of  solid  metal  holds 
the  paste  of  an  accumulator  plate) ;  diverse  as  the 
elements  of  British  recniitment  necessarily  are  (Colonial, 
Asiatic,  and  the  rest) :  it  remains  true  that  in  a  pro- 
longed Avar  the  poAvcr  of  Great  Britam  to  provide 
mere  numbers  should  be,  in  comparison  with  tlxe 
Germanic  peoples,  inexhaustible. 

NoAv,  to  create  such  a  state  of  mind  among  the 
British,  and  particularly  in  their  politicians,  as  Avoiild 
detain  upon  these  shores  reinforcements  otherwise 
destined  for  France  and  Belgium  would  have  an 
obvious  strategic  value. 

Tliis  I  think  the  principal,  and  certainly  the 
most  legitimate,  of  the  conclusions  draAvn  by  Avliat- 
ever  minds  conceived  this  quite  novel  move  of  the 
German  march  upon  the  Straits  of  Dover.  It  is 
believed  that  operations  of  a  certain  kind  (to  be 
described  in  a  moment),  undertaken  upon  the  French 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  31,  1914 


shore  of  the  Straits,  would  incliue  the  judgment  of 
Englishmen  and  their  political  directors  to  keep 
great  bodies  at  home  and  thus  to  check  the  supply  of 
reuiforcements  from  Britain  to  France.  That  supply 
Avould  be  interfered  with,  or  would  cease.  The  naval 
aid  afforded  by  Britain  to  France  would  also  be 
impaired. 

2.  It  is  believed  by  no  inconsiderable  body  of 
German  critics,  that  an  invasion  of  this  country  could 
be  arranged  from  the  coast  of  Flanders  and  Pouthieu 
(that  is  from  the  ports  of  Dunkirk  and  Calais,  and  so 
round  the  heights  of  Grisnez  Cape  to  Boulogne)  in  a 
fashion  more  direct  and  secure  than  from  further 
north.  The  arguments  in  favour  of  this  theory  must 
be  summarised  in  a  separate  category  of  their  own  as 
follows : — 

(a)  Heavy  artillery  could  command  the  major 
part  of  the  width  of  the  Straits  of  Dover, 
perhaps  three-quarters.  Once  let  it  be 
known  that  shells  could  be  accurately 
dropped  at  a  given  range  (and  the  range  of 
a  ship  in  fine  weather  can  be  found  from 
secui-e  positions  on  land  to  a  few  yards)  over 
the  most  part  of  the  Straits,  and  the  traffic 
through  them,  the  communications  between 
the  North  Sea  and  the  Channel,  the  main 
traffic  from  the  world  to  the  Port  of  London 
would  be  half  strangled. 

(b)  Under    protection   of    such   heavy   artillery 

mines  could  be  laid,  and  this  mine-field, 
with  passages  thi'ough  it  known  only  to  the 
enemy,  would  approacli  very  near  to  the 
shores  of  this  island.  The  mine-field  could 
be  pushed  forward  under  cover  of  any 
difficult  weather  or  of  darkness.  Once  it 
was  laid  the  last  dash  to  be  made  over 
the  very  few  miles  beyond  what  could  be 
mined  would  perhaps  be  negligible. 

(c)  The  element  of  distance  is  exceedingly 
important  in  connection  with  transports. 
Whether  you  are  going  to  be  a  day  at  sea 
or  an  hour  may  make  in  the  tonnage  required 
by  you  a  difference  of  doubling  or  halving  it. 
So  much  tonnage  which  will  take  horses  and 
guns  and  men  for  a  sea  journey  of  a  day 
or  two  would  take  certainly  twice  as  many 
men  and  horses  and  guns  and  perhaps 
three  times  as  many  for  a  journey  of  only 
an  hour  or  two.  Therefore,  to  secure  the 
short  passage  is  to  double  or  treble  yonr 
capacity  to  carry. 

(</)  The  short  passage  once  secured  could  be  (it 
is  argued,  not  proved),  at  least  intermit- 
tently maintained  for  the  further  passage 
over  to  England  of  supply.  An  ex- 
pedition which  had  foiight  off  and  partially 
crippled  an  opposing  fleet  through  the  wide 
northern  part  of  the  North  Sea  would  still 
have  to  take  with  it  all  its  munitions  and  aU 
its  provisions  for  a  raid.  But  one  which 
had  secured  the  passage  of  the  narrow  seas 
at  their  narrowest  point  might  depend  upon 
at  least  intermittent  replenishment  from  the 
further  shore.  The  invading  force  would  not 
be  burdened  with  the  necessity  of  having 
to  bring  with  it  the  supply  for  many  weeks. 

{e)  That  guardianship  of  the  (German  shore  by  a 
British  blockading  fleet  which  is  possible 
in  the  Bight  of  Heligoland  (where  the 
re-entrant  angle  of  the  coast  confines  an 
enemy  and  gives  to  ^the  blockader  the 
shortest  segment  to  watch  outside  the  gulf) 


is,  in  the  case  of  the  nan-ow  seas,  reversed. 
Here  the  bend  is  the  other  way ;  it  goes 
outward.     Outside  the  Bight  of  Heligoland 
the  British  sailors  watch  the  mouth  of  a 
purse.     On  the  bulging  and  shallow  lines  of 
the  shore   from   the   Scheldt   to  Boulogne 
they   would   be   like    men   dodging   round 
outside    an    enclosure :    a   park   wall.     To 
watch  what  was  going  on  all  the  way  from 
Boulogne  to  the   Scheldt   would,  like   any 
other   similar  task,    be   a    task    heavy    in 
proportion  to  the  thickness  of  the  weather 
or  the  darkness  of  the  night,  but  it  would 
also  be  a  task  dividing  the  existing  British 
naval  force ;    weakening   it   in   the   north. 
Upon   this    truth    de^jends    the    last    and 
perhaps  the  most  important  point. 
{f)  The  possession  of  the  Straits  of  Dover  on 
the   French  side  would  give  the  enemy  the 
choice  of  dcparttire. 
It  is  an  elementaiy  point  in  all  strategics  that 
if  you  are  about  to  take  the  offensive,  your  prime 
factor  towards  success  is  a  doubt  in  the  mind  of  the 
enemy  as  to  the  point  from  which  you  wiU  attack. 
Now,  so  long  as  the  transports  lined  up  in  the  Ems 
Eiver,  and  their  convoy  in   the   shape  of    German 
ships  both  in  that  river  and  in  and  beyond  the  Kiel 
Canal  and  in  the  harbours  adjacent  thereto,  repre- 
sented the  certain,  known,  and  only  opportunity  for  a 
raid  upon  this  country,  this  "  choice  of  departure " 
did  not  exist  for  the  Germans  nor  has  this  doubt  dwelt 
in  the  mind  of  our  commanders. 

The  sole  point  of  departure  was  known.      The 
great    disturbing    factor    which     is    imperative    for 
the  strategist  to  introduce  into  his  opponent's  mind, 
perplexity  as  to   the  next  move,  was  absent.      But 
let  it  be  conjectural  from  which  of  several  possible 
points  (the  Scheldt,  the  ports  of  Flanders,  Calais)  the 
attack   may  come,  and  from   which  of  two  distinct 
fields  (the  Bight  of  Heligoland  and  the  shore  of  the 
Netherlands)    the   attack   may   come,    and   that   all- 
important  element  of  douht  has  at  last  been  presented 
to  Great  Britain  by  the  Germans  just  as  it  was  pre- 
sented  by  them  to  the  French  before   they   hurled 
themselves  on  to  the  Sambre.     I  think  that  this  con- 
sideration weighed  as  heavily  as  any  other  with  those 
German  rulers  who  determined  upon  the  Calais  march. 
But  now  let  us  briefly  consider  what  there  is  to 
be  said  against  that  march  as  a  strategical  proposition, 
(a)  In  the  fii'st  place,  the  command  of  the  Straits 
by  heavy  artillery  is  not  complete.     If  the 
Straits  were    10  miles  instead  of  20  across, 
it  would  be  a  very  different  matter.     But 
it  so  happens  that  at  this  juncture  of  the 
world's  affairs  the  erosion  of  the  centuries 
has  produced  a   gap  of   20   miles  between 
Britain  and  the  Continent,  while  the  pro- 
gress of  artillery  has  produced  an  effective 
range  of  much  less  than  20  miles. 
(i)  Next,  let  it  be  noted  that  there  is  not  sufficient 
transport   on   the   French  and   Netherland 
shores  for  a  raid.     They  may  have  enough 
in  Antwerp — but   I  doubt  it.     They  have 
not  a  tenth  enough,  even  if  all  the  shipping 
were  left  undamaged  in  Calais  and  Dunkirk  ; 
and  they  cannot  get  transports  down  from 
the  German  ports  to  these  new  ports  should 
they    occupy   them :    whether    the    Calais 
march  should  succeed  or  not  I  shall  discus? 
later. 
Anyhow  this  lack  of  transport  would  seem  to  me 
to  settle  the  matter,  and  to  determine  what  I  have 


4» 


October  31,  1914 


LAXD    AND    WATER 


raaintuined  in  these  columns  before,  and  am  parfcicu- 
liirly  malntaimng  this  week — that  the  Calais  march  is 
not  well  thougrht  out :  that  the  desire  in  midertakinsr 
it  with  such  violence  was  rather  to  frighten  than  to 
hurt.  But  the  German  rulers  should  haye  remem- 
bared  that  we  have  arrived  at  a  stage  in  the  war  iu 
which  men  calculate  their  risks  closely  and  can  not  be 
disturbed  in  their  objects  bj  any  rhetoric  or  by 
any  wandering  desire  or  apprehension.  It  is  to 
be  hoped  that  there  has  been  some  such  vanity 
in  expectation  upon  the  German  side.  Such 
things  have  happened  often  to  men  disappomted  of 
victory. 

(c)  The  next  point  is  a  little  more  doubtfid,  for 
national  action  in  this  country  is  not — even 
in  war-time — subordinate  to  military  neces- 
sities.     It   is   rather  dejjendent   upon   the 
orders  of  a  few  rich  men.     But  I  will  make 
my  point  for  what  it  is  worth. 
Even   supposing    that    the    narrow    seas    were 
occupied  upon  the  French  shore  by  the  enemy,  the 
chances   for   and   against   invasion  would  still  in  a 
mihtary  sense  depend,  not  upon  what  we  did  in  this 
country,  but  upon  what  we  did  on  the   Continent. 
Though  England  herself  were  threatened,  the  defence 
of  England  would   still  be  centred — if  mililan/  con- 
siderations alone  had  tceiffhl — in  a  vigorous  effort  to 
push   back  the   enemy   into   Belgium   and   through 
Belgium  into  Germany. 

Now  England  would  be  phj-sically  able,  if 
morally  her  head  were  kept,  and  the  mere  military 
problem  alone  were  considered,  to  send  reinforcements 
as  easily  as  ever ;  even  after  the  French  shore  were 
in  the  enemy's  hands.  The  veiy  few  more  houi-s 
required  to  pass  men  across  lower  down  the  Channel 
would  be  the  only  strictly  strategic  disadvantage 
imposed  on  Great  Britain  and  her  Allies  by  a  German 
occupation  of  Calais  and  the  heights  of  Grisncz. 
It  is  true  that  submarines  could  come  down  the  coast 
and  make  of  Calais  or  of  Dunkirk  a  new  base,  but  not 
a  base  appreciably  advantageous  over  Ostend  or  the 
mouth  of  the  Scheldt.  Tlie  same  watch  which  is  kept 
for  submai-ines  in  the  Channel  now  could  be  kept 
then,  and  would,  probably,  be  as  successful  then  as, 
upon  the  whole,  it  is  now. 

But  when  I  say  that  the  true  defence  of 
Great  Britain  should  the  French  coast  near  Calais 
be  occupied  is  stUl  the  sending  of  reinforcements 
to  France,  that  involves  some  consideration  of  the 
strategical  problem  from  the  Continental  point  of 
view. 

How  does  this  sea-coast  march,  the  advance  on 
Calais,  look  from  the  point  of  view  of  strategics  upon 
the  Continent  ? 

From  that  point  of  view  it  is  wholly  unfavour- 
able to  the  Germans,  and  that  is  why  I  do  not  believe 
that  any  soldier,  undeterred  by  civilian  (or,  as  we  call 
them,  political)  considerations,  ever  proposed  it.  Note 
tlie  disadvantages  of  this  march  as  a  military  move- 
ment, quite  apai-t  from  its  supposed  p.sychological 
effect  upon  the  temper  of  the  British  and  of  their 
Government. 

{a)  It  is  no  way  to  outflank  the  French  line. 
To  be  more  accurate,  you  cannot  outflank 
the  French  line,  for  it  reposes  upon  the 
sea;  and  to  waste  masses  of  troops  in 
merely  pushing  back  the  end  of  a  line  when 
you  ought  to  be  using  them  to  tear  a  hole 
somewhere  in  the  line,  is  exactly  like  trying 
to  get  rid  of  a  young  tree  by  lx;nding 
back  the  top  of  it  in.stead  of  cutting  its 
stem. 


{b)  The  march  is  exposed  in  its  most  essential 
line  to  fii'e  from  the  sea.  It  is  not  only 
harassed  by  that  fire,  it  is  subject  to 
enormous  losses  by  that  fu-e ;  and,  what  is 
still  more  important,  the  one  great  road — 
the  coast  road — by  which  it  mu^t  move  its 
heaviest  transport  (for  there  is  no  other)  ia 
pai'ticidai'lj'  open  to  this  form  of  attack. 

(c)  The  ground  is  abominable.  It  is  a  mass  of 
small  brackish  watercourses,  hedged  fields, 
dykes,  brick  walls.  And  the  nearer  you  get 
to  the  coast  the  more  you  get  treacherous 
sand  as  well.  Further  (and  this  is  not  to 
be  despised),  there  is  trouble  about  the  snppli/ 
of  (]ood  water. 

(</)  But  more  important  by  far  than  any  other 
consideration  is  this  :  the  march  along  the 
sea-coast  is  undertaken — every  mile  of  it  as 
it  goes  forward — A\dth  a  greater  and  a 
gi'eater  peiil  to  communications. 

Here  I  must,  with  the  reader's  leave,  introduce 
yet  another  diagi-am  dealing  with  this  very  familiar 


ground.  You  have  upon  the  coast  going  from  west 
to  east  the  points  Calais,  Dunkirk,  Nieuport,  Ostend, 
representing  a  line  of  about  fifty  miles ;  and  you  have 
stretching  down  southward  from  Nieuport,  also  some 
fifty  mUes,  the  front  which  is  marked  upon  this 
sketch  by  a  shading  to  the  east  of  it,  which  shading 
gives  you  roughly  the  territory  now  occupied  by  the 
GeiTuan  forces. 

Next,  note  that  the  whole  weight  of  the  German 
attack  is  centred  upon  two  lines  of  advance — A,  the 
line  along  the  sea-coast,  and  B,  the  line  (at  least  four 
or  five  days'  march  away)  south  of  Lille.  Further 
note  that,  as  things  have  turned  out,  much  the  bigger 
effort  is  being  made  along  A.  Supposing  the  attack 
at  A  does  succeed  in  getting  as  far  as  Calais,  and  that 
to  theu'  occupation  of  the  hatched  area  the  Germans 
add  the  dotted  area.  Thej'  will  then  (I  am  puttmg 
the  matter  purely  hypotheticall}-,  for  such  a  strategic 
position  would  in  its  ultimate  form  be  impossible) 
have  their  communications — their  columns  of  convoy 
and  provisions,  their  evacuation  of  wounded,  and  all 
the  rest  of  it — along  some  such  line  as  C — D,  a  lino 
threatened  along  its  whole  flunk.  That,  I  say,  is  an 
impossible  position.  It  is  true  that  a  very  great  force 
coming  like  this  round  the  bulk  of  enemy  forces  to  the 
south  of  it,  coming  north  of  the  compact  mass  of  the 
Allied  troops  who  now  are  so  far  eastward  as  to  be 
well  beyond  the  line  Armenticres — Ypres,  can  in 
their  turn  threaten  those  Allied  advanced  positions 
and   cause  the  troops   in  them  to  retire.     But   the 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  31,  1914 


Germans  advancing  on  Calais  can  only  compel  the 
Allies  to  do  this  if  they  are  pressing  the  Allies  really 
badly  to  the  south  also.  If  the  line  B,  the  second 
Gennan  attack,  that  west  of  Lille,  could  also  be 
pushed  still  further  in,  then  the  Allied  line  lu  front 
of  Yprcs  and  Arraentiires  would  have  to  fall  back. 
But  of  any  such  necessity  there  is  little  sign.  W  e 
have  lost  Boulcrs,  but  we  have  gained  ground  in  front 
of  Arnicnti6res.  We  have  lost  La  Bassce  (at  the 
moment  of  writing  apparently),  but  the  Geman 
advance  beyond  it  is  extremely  slow  and  is  slackening 

It  would  seem  a  mathematical  certainty  that 
a  successful  Gennan  advance  along  the  sea-coast 
towards  Calais  was  impossible  until  or  if  the  Germans 
had,  by  sheer  weight,  along  the  main  front  before 
Yprcs  and  before  Ai-menticres,  pushed  back  the  great 
body  of  the  Allies  which  occupy  that  salient. 

Eeuiember  that  nearly  all  this  is  flat  country ; 
that  the  main  roads  lead  noiih  and  south,  not  east 
and  west;  that  the  same  is  true  of  the  mam 
railways,  steam  tramway  lines  and  even  main  water 
courses.  In  a  word,  every  artificial  advantage  for 
taking  the  sea  coast  in  flank  exists,  none  for 
defending  the  flank  of  an  advance  along  it,  and  I 
do  not  see  hoAV  it  is  possible  to  occupy  that  coast 
until  you  have  first  made  certain  that  the  whole 
country  to  the  south  is  clear  of  your  enemy.  Of  such 
a  clearance  there  is  not  even  a  beginning  to-day. 

There  is  the  strategic  argument  for  and  against 
the  German  march  on  Calais,  put  as  simply  as  the 
present  writer  can  put  it ;  and  I  repeat  what  I  said 
at  the  beginning  of  this  passage ;  it  is  not  a  soldier's 
move,  it  is  a  politician's  move.  There  are,  without 
doubt,  at  the  German  Headquarters  to-day,  men  still 
protesting  against  its  being  attempted  at  all,  and 
still  asking  for  reinforcements  to  be  sent  south  of 
Lille,  where  a  real  decision  is  still  conceivably 
possible.  Moreover,  it  seems  true  at  this  moment  of 
wi-iting  (Tuesday  evening)  that  the  German  push 
along  the  sea  coast  has  been  too  expensive;  that 
exhaustion  is  already  upon  it,  and  its  opponents  may 
at  any  moment  advance  and  reverse  the  whole  move- 
ment. 

THE  COUNTRY  BETWEEN  THE  YSER 
CANAL  AND  CALAIS. 

But  apart  from  this  presumption  that  a  confusion 
in  their  objective  and  too  great  an  expenditure  of  men 
has  compromised  this  advance,  the  ground  between 
Yser  and  Calais  is  bad  for  advance  in  general  and 
contains  in  particular  a  first  rate  line  to  hold  in  front 
of  Calais.     Let  us  consider  the  nature  of  this  ground. 

The  study  in  some  detail  of  this  portion  of  the 
field  will  repay  the  reader,  though  it  be  spared  from 
attack.  It  is  perhaps  the  most  important  piece  of 
ground  we  have  yet  had  to  deal  with ;  for  it  is  that 
upon  the  occupation  of  which  the  enemy  are  gambling 
very  high  and  the  occupation  of  which  is  directly 
intended  to  the  hurt  of  this  country.  Fu-st  of  all  let 
us  consider  the  line  which  sufiiced  for  ten  days' 
defence — the  line  of  the  Biver  Yser,  or  rather  of  the 
canal  lateral  to  it,  which  takes  most  of  its  water  and 
which  is  the  most  considerable  ditch  in  this  region. 
The  canal  runs  from  Yprcs  to  Nieuport. 

From  the  town  Ypres  to  the  sea  at  Nieuport  is 
nearly  twenty-one  miles.  It  is  almost  exactly  twenty 
miles  from  the  Cloth  Hall  at  Ypres  to  the  railway 
station  at  Nieuport.  But  the  town,  of  Nieuport  itself 
lies  somewhat  inland  and  the  mouth  of  tlie  canal  is 
more  than  a  mile  beyond  the  town  to  the  north.  All 
the  M-ay  from  Ypres  to  the  sea  runs  this  canal, 
ai'tlGcial  and  often  straight,  so  far  as  Dixmudc,  and 


after  Dixmude  following  the  contom-s  of  a  stream  which 
it  has  widened.  The  original  Yser  river  itself  or  "  little 
Yser  "  is  now  but  a  small  stream  lying  to  the  west  of  this 
canal ;  but  the  Avord  "  Yser  "  is  often  used  for  the  canal, 
even  by  local  people,  because  the  canal  has  become  the 
most  important  body  of  Avater  in  the  neighbourhood. 
It  is  nowhere  very  deep  ;  there  are  even  places 
where  it  is  just  fordable.  It  Avill  be  seen  that  about 
four  miles  north  of  Dixmude  and  about  six  miles 
south-east  of  Nieuport  the  caniil  makes  a  big  bend 


VOSTEND 
"MIODLEKERKS 


ST  PETERS 
CAPELlB 


YPRES 


eastward.     This  bend  is  the  most  obvious  point  upon 
which  the  Gemians  could  concentrate  for  a  crossing. 
They  had  of  course  to  be  attacking  everywhere  along 
that  line   in  order  to  occupy  their  enemies  and  to 
attack    other   passages  of   the  water,  but   the   reach 
which  bends  thus  eastAvard  in  a  loop  was  their  prime 
opportunity.        The    princiijle,     as     shoAvn     in    the 
diagram    opposite,  is  quite  clear.        If   an    obstacle 
0   0   0   has   to   be    crossed   by   a   force   A  in   the 
direction    of    the     arroAv     against    a    force    B,     A 
Avill  naturally  choose  some  part  in  the  line  of  the 
obstacle  AA'here  he  can  most  easily  beat  B  off  from  the 
other  side.     Noav  it  is  obvious  that  Avherever  there  is 
a   re-entrant  "angle   towards   A,    in  the   line    of   the 
obstacle,  there  A  has  his  best  opportunity  for  crossing  ; 
because  he  can,  from  either  side  of  the  re-entrant  (at  0 
and  C)  converge  fire  upon  the  force  Avhich  B  has  sent 
into  the  bend  to  prevent  the  A's  crossing.     The  forces 
of  B  inside  the  bend  are  in  a  much  Avorse  position 
than  the  forces  of  B  at  C  and  C  on  the  outside  of  it ; 
B's  fire  is  dispersed  outAvards ;  while  the  fire  from  C 
and  C  converges  iuAvards.     It  is  therefore  always  at  a 
point  of  this  kind  that  the  chief  crossing  of  an  obstacle 
is  attempted.     There  seem  to  have   been   two  such 
attempts,  the  first  unsuccessful,  the  second  successful. 
The  Germans  coming  by  the  roads  from  St.   Peter's 
Chapel   tried   to   rush,  both  the   bridges,  the  one  in 
front   of   St.    George's   and    the    other    in  front  of 
Schoobakke,  Avhile  a  much  larger  force  came  up  from 


6* 


October  31,  1914 


LAND    AND     WATER 


south  of  St.  Peter's  by  night  and  succeeded  in  getting 
across  the  re-entrant  angle  or  loop  o£  the  canal  we 
have  just  been  discussing. 

The  estimate  of  the  Germans  Avho  got  over  at 
various  places,  and  particularly  inside  the  bend  of  the 
loop,  in  the  darkness  of  Saturday,  is  not  more  than 
5,000  men;  of  those  5,000  hardly  any  got  back. 
They  were  either  killed  or  taken  wounded  and  un- 
wounded.  But  on  the  next  day,  the  Sunday — at 
what  hour  we  have  not  yet  been  told — the  water  was 
forced  again,  and  a  permanent  footing  established  by 


the  Grermans  upon  the  western  bank.  Thirty-six 
hours  passed,  and  the  advantage  produced  no  fruit. 
It  is  more  probable  that  the  effecfc  was  exhaustive  and 
that  the  defensive  holds  it  own  in  spite  of  this  cross- 
ing, expecting  to  take  the  counter-offensive  at 
any  moment.  Still  it  is  wise,  in  judging  any 
strategical  problem  in  action,  to  consider  all  possible 
developments. 

Supposing  that  the  line  of  the  canal  is  forced, 
and  that  the  Allies  evacuate  Dixmude  and  Nieuport, 
■nill  the  next  defensible  line  bo  one  that  covers 
Calais  ?  What  does  the  nature  of  the  ground 
offer  for  defence  between  the  Yser  and  that  line? 
What  ciiance  of  retardation  in  a  successful  enemy's 
advance  ? 

As  to  the  first  question,  what  line  beyond  the 
Yser  Canal  defends  Calais  ?  There  is  between  this 
frontier  country  and  Calais  one  first  rate  line,  and 
only  one.  It  is  the  line  of  the  Eiver  Aa  can-ied 
on  by  the  Canal  to  St.  Omer  (and  from  St. 
Oni:?r,  south-east  again,  out  of  the  map,  towards 
Bethune).  This  line  between  St.  Omer  and  the  sea  is 
strong  not  only  in  one  straight  line  of  water  running 
without  re-entrants  and  fairly  bi'oad  for  the  whole 
20  miles  between  St.  Omer  and  the  coast,  but  it  is 
further  strong  in  being  covered,  through  all  the 
lower  or  sea  coast  and  Calais  part  of  it,  by  a  network 
half  dried  marshes  and  draining  ditches,  which  make  a 
l)eit  miles  wide  upon  either  side  ;  while  immediately 
in  its  centre,  where  the  River  Aa  leaves  a  gap  before  the 
line  of  the  St.  Omer  canal  begins,  where  the  wet  country 
is  therefore  at  its  narrowest,  you  have  a  conspicuous 
group  of  heights  which  afford  excellent  defensive 
positions  all  round  the  village  of  Wattcu.  This 
position  is  fur  stronger  than  anything  which  the 
Germans  have  had  in  force  in  Flanders.  It  thoroughly 
covers  Calais ;  but  there  is  no  corresponding  position 
covering  Dunku'k. 


7* 


LAND    AXD    WATEE 


October  31,  1914 


The  real  strcugth  of  all  tliat  couiitr}'  between  tlio 
Ysor  canal  and  Dunkirk  is  tlie  mass  of  small  water- 
waj^s  and  the  nature  of  the  soil.  Th.e  Duke  of  York 
failed  before  Dunkirk  in  1793  principally  from  these 
two  obstacles.  The  great  mar.sh  south  of  Dunkirk 
called  the  Two  "  IMocrs,"  great  and  little,  is  indeed 
nearly  drained  by  this  time ;  but  great  parts  of  it  can  be 
Hooded.  Further,  if  it  were  intended  (which  I  doubt) 
that  troops  should  in  the  event  of  retreat  stand  along 
the  small  canal  that  runs  from  Loo  to  Furncs,  they 
would  have,  between  them  and  the  Yscr,  seven  or  eight 
miles  of  extremely  difficult  country  which  is  cut  up  by 
a  perfect  labyrinth  of  watenvays. 

1  think  one  may  sum  up  and  say  that  an  advance 
along  the  sea  coast,  even  if  the  Germans  should  be 
able  to  make  it  by  bringing  up  unexpectedly  largo 
nujnbers,  would  be  a  painfully  slow  business.  It  is 
not  country  the  full  difficulty  of  which  you  grasp  Ijy 
the  map,  though  the  map  tells  you  sometjiing ;  nor  is 
it  country,  which,  surveying  it  under  conditions  of  peace, 
30U  can  report  on  easily  for  conditions  of  war;  and  time 
andagain  under  tlie  conditions  of  war  it  has  disappointed 
those  who  would  occupy  it.  Most  of  it  is  as  "  blind  " 
as  any  country  in  the  ^vorld.  The  more  eastward  you 
get  the  more  difficult  your  advance  becomes  with  the 
increase  of  small  Avaterways  in  all  directions,  and, 
though  it  is  a  soil  too  light  to  impede  an  advance 
after  rain,  it  is  one  in  which,  especially  towards  the 
coast,  transport  sticks  through  the  peculiarly 
treacherous  nature  of  the  sand.  Tlicrc  is  only  one 
really  good  road,  that  along  the  sea  coast  behind  the 
^and  hills,  called  "dunes,"  and  this  road  is  com- 
manded from  the  sea. 

But  all  this  is  only  a  supposition  in  a  more  or 
less  abstract  strategical  jiroblem.     Before  any  step  of 


droojjs,  the  offensive  will  pass  to  the  Allies  :  Avith  the 
offensive  the  initiative  :  tlie  counter-stroke. 

Ko  more  can  be  said.  But  on  this  battle  very 
much  depends  the  immediate  futiu-e  of  the  Avar,  and  it 
has  all  the  marks  of  a  violent  effort  Avhich,  Avhen  it  is 
exhausted,  does  not  fail  stubbornly,  but  suddenly 
and  all  together. 

THE  NEWS  FROM  THE  ARGONNE. 

The  obscure  fights  Avhich  take  place  all  along  the 
old  line  from  tlie  Mouse  and  Moselle  to  the  Oise,  right 
across  north-eastern  France,  merit  more  attention 
than  they  receive  from  the  public.  It  is  natural  tliat 
tiie  A'ast  struggle  ujjon  the  line  to  the  Avest  of  all  this 
between  the  Oise  and  the  sea,  and  particularly  the 
conflict  (perhaps  decisiA'c)  going  on  in  Flanders  at  this 
moment,  should  absorb  the  gaze  of  Europe.  But  all 
that  old  series  of  positions,  100  miles  long,  in  Avhicli 
Germans  looking  south  face  Frenchmen  looking 
north,  have  this  intei-est,  that  they  show  in  Avhat 
fashion  the  German  line  is  being  "held" — that  is, 
pinned. 

\Vhen  the  history  of  the  Avar  comes  to  be 
Avritton,  not  the  least  of  its  lessons  will  prove  to  be 
the  power  of  resistance  Avhich  modern  small  arms 
and  entrenchment  give — even  to  a  short  service 
conscript  army,  with  its  masses  of  nearly  civilian 
reserves. 

As  an  example  of  this  poAver,  consider  the  state 
of  affairs  in  the  Argoune.  We  have  evidence  of  Avhat 
ha))pened  there,  fragmentarj^  indeed,  but  stretching 
over  almost  every  day  of  the  last  six  Aveeks ;  and  in  all 
those  six  Aveeks  there  has  been  no  retirement  upon 
either  sideybr  more  than  four  miles! 


c  ^^^^^^^  End  of  RailAva' 
.CVATEAU 


MONTFAUCON 


FORGES* 


srwMcc:  '-^-■-.  •MALANCOURT 
?ENriES  ,-^--9  . 

/Wood/  r. 


^^^HNY 


10 

■  ..I  _ 


lb 

I : 


;o 


25 


2v£iles. 


J^egLoiz  of  the  Arffonne 


VII I 


the  Calais  march  can  be  undertaken  the  initiative 
must  ^  be  assumed  by  the  Germans— their  huge 
offensive  Ijctwecn  Ypres  and  the  soa  must  succeed. 
It  Las  not  yet  succeeded;  it  seems,  at  tlie  moment 
of  AvritJng,  to  be  drooping,  and  as^  it  droops,  or  if  it 


Here  you  have  a  sketch  of  the  very  small  district 
Avhere  one  may  study  in  detail  the  kincl  of  thing  that 
is  going  on  along  all  this  chain  of  entrenched 
positions. 

The  main  Argonnc  Forest — a  clay  ridge  about 


8» 


October  31,  1914 


la:n"i>   and   water 


oOO  ft.  above  the  plain,  and  densely  ■wooded— is  cut 
into  tbree  sections :  that  south  of  the  Grand  Pro  Pass, 
with  its  road  and  railway ;  that  south  of  the  Vienne- 
Varennes  road  ;  and  that  south  of  the  Ste.  Monehould- 
Clermont  road. 

a^ow  when  the  whole  German  line  was  forced 
back  (by  numbers  smaller  than  its  own)  in  what  is 
called  "  The  Battle  of  the  Marno,"  the  Crown  Prince, 
Avho  had  had  his  headquarters  at  Ste.  Menehould, 
moved  them  rapidly  back  to  IMontfaucou.  The  line 
wliich  the  Germans  held,  after  September  14,  in  front 
of  these  new  headquarters  ran  north  of  Forges  (where 
it  reposed  upon  the  Meuse  just  out  of  range  of  the 
Charny  forts,  that  are  part  of  the  fortifications  of 
Verdun,  and  there  run  along  the  llidge  of  Charny). 
From  this  point  north  of  Forges,  the  line  passed  in 
front  of  Malancourt ;  then  in  front  of  Varennes ;  then 
in  front  of  the  road  from  Varennes  to  Vienne,  and  so 
proceeded  across  Champagne  to  the  hills  and  gun 
positions  in  front  of  Eheims  and  to  the  lower  Aisne 
and  Soissons. 

That  was  more  than  six  weeks  ago  ;  and  all 
the  efforts  on  both  sides  during  those  six  weeks, 
though  there  has  been  constant  fighting  and  ceaseless 
Avatching  for  an  opjjortunity  to  gain  any  yard  that 
could  be  gained,  has  not,  I  say,  altered  that  line  by 
fom-  miles  either  way. 

The  first  move  was  a  French  attack,  which 
carried  Varennes  and  the  town  of  Vienne.  The  next 
move  was  a  German  counter  attack  which  attempted 
to  seize  Vienne,  failed  in  doing  so,  but  succeeded  in 


Varcunos-Vienne  road  ;  they  were  beaten  back  from 
the  western  part  of  it,  but  kept  the  eastern.  Last 
week  they  advanced  from  the  eastern  part  of  this  line 
in  front  of  Varennes  into  the  woods  called  the  Bois 
de  Chaladc — which  ai"e  the  woods  through  which 
Dreuet  rode  to  intercept  the  flight  of  Louis  XVItli 
and  ]\rarie  Antoinette.  The  Germans  blundered  in 
this  attack  and  lost  very  heavily,  but  the  Freucli 
covdd  not  force  their  way  north  into  Varennes.  Mean- 
while Vauquois  close  by  was  held  by  the  French, 
though  the  German  line  was  still  in  front  of  Malan- 
court. All  the  southern  part  of  the  woods  betv^een 
that  vdlage  and  Varennes  was  held  by  the  French. 
Finally  this  week,  four  days  ago,  a  French  advance 
captured  Sezon-Melzicourt. 

From  this  brief  summary  may  be  judged  the 
extraordinarily  close  grip  of  two  modern  entrenched 
lines.  For  a  month "  and  a  half  you  have  two 
opposing  army  corps  (that  is  supposed  to  be  about  tlie 
strength  of  either  party  just  to  the  west  of  Verdun) 
doing  no  more  than  hold  the  one  the  other,  and 
each  counting  it  a  success  if  at  any  point  he  can 
advance  by  less  than  the  range  of  a  field  piece. 

^Meanwhile,  in  that  more  interesting  because  more 
critical  point,  the  gate  the  Gemians  have  opened  and 
kept  open  at  St.  Mihiel,  this  very  slow  shifting  of  the 
line  has  greater  significance,  for  the  corridor  held 
by  the  Gennans  here  is  so  narrow  that  the  least 
restriction  of  it  puts  their  positions  on  the  Meuse  in 
St.  Mihiel  in  peril.  One  may  see  in  this  sketch  map 
how  the  thing  lies.      The  valley  of  the  little  river 


O 


10 

I 


20 


MILES 


THfAUCOURT   , 

PONT  A  M0US5ON 


RAMBUCOURT 


COMMERCY 


^_^  Approximate  Franco- 

'   *  Gerinan  Front. 


YL 


capturing  Varennes.  Later  again,  in  about  the 
fourth  week  of  the  operations,  the  Gennans  made  a 
sharp  move  to  recover  if  they  could  the  whole  of  the 


Mad — a  tributary  of  the  Moselle  just  above  Metz — 
is  that  up  wliich  the  railway  comes  from  Metz  as  far 
as  Thiaucourt.    This  valley  is  almost  a  ravine  with  its 


9* 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  31.  1914 


steep  bauks.  and  bears  the  name  winch  aU  such  clefts 
have  in  western  Lorraine— the  word  "  Rupt,  which 
moans  the  "  breach  "  or  "  break  "  of  the  Miul.  It  is  con- 
tinued above  the  rail-head  to  the  high  plateau  country 
iust  underneath  the  extraordinarily  regular  hue  ot 
further  coveri.g   heights  called  "  The  Hills  of  the 

lileuse."  1   •     i.1       J 

Beyond  this  again  going  westward  is  the  deep 
trench  of  the  Meusc  in  which  St.  Mihiel  lies.  From 
^J'hiaucourt  the  shortest  road  to  St.  Mihiel  is  up 
alon-  the  north  edge  of  the  valley,  then  through  Woin- 
ville  and  so  straight  through  the  HiUs  of  the  Meuse  to 
St.  Mihiel.  There  is  an  alternative,  lower,  longer  and 
on  the  whole  better  road,  from  Thiaucourt  to  the  mam 
Coramercy-Pont-a-Mousson  road,  between  Flirey  and 
Eambucoui-t,  whence  a  branch  road  goes  through 
Apremont  to  St.  Mihiel. 

To  appreciate  how  naiTOW  the  German  "  conidor 
has  here  become,  it  is  enough  to  point  out  that  Apremont 
—in  the  south  road— was  taken  and  held  by  the  French 
weeks  ago,  lost,  retaken  again,  and  is  now  held.     One 
may  take  the  line  of  the  road  all  the  way  from  Pont- 
a-Mousson  to  St.  Mihiel  and  say  that  all  excejit  the 
last  three  or  four  miles  of  it  between  Apremont  and 
St.  Mihiel  marks  what  the  French  hold  from  the  south  ; 
that  is,  what  is  held  by  the  garrison  of  Toul  and  by 
the  forces  that  are  operating  northwaixi   from   that 
foi-tress.     On  the  north  the  corresponding  garrison  of 
Verdun  and  the  forces  operating  from  it  southwards 
have  got  within  long  range  of  the  other  road  from 
St.    Mihiel     through     Nonsard    and    Woinville    to 
Thiaucourt.      The    French    olHcial    communique  (of 
Tuesday)  jn-oves  that  even  taking  that  long  range  of 
heavy  guns  at  an  extreme  the  Germans  hardly  hold 
eight  miles  at  the  mouth  of  the  funnel :  not  five  miles 
at  the  extremity  of  the  funnel  where  they  touch  the 
Meuse  at  St.    Mihiel  itself.     The  situation  here  is 
extraordinary,  cannot  be   accidental  in   the   German 
plan,  must  be  intended  at  least  for  some  future  move. 
Meanwhile  the  whole  thing  is  just  like  the  fighting  in 
the  Argonne,  an  example  of  the  exceedingly  close  grips 
that  fairly  equal  forces  can  maintain  nowadays  with 
the  rifle,  the  machine  gun,  and  the  spade.     Nor  can 
anything  unlock  such  a  grip  save  very  considerable 
reinforcement  at  some  one  point. 

THE    EASTERN    THEATRE    OF    WAR. 

On  the  Vistula  what  has  happened  is  this : 
(1)  First,  and  much  the  most  important  point, 
the  German  plan  of  holding  the  Eussian  forces  (pre- 
sumably along  the  line  of  the  Vistula  Eiver  itself),  of 
crossing  that  river,  of  occupying  Warsaw  at  one  end  of 
the  line,  Przemysl  and  the  upper  reaches  of  the  San  at 
the  other  end,  and  by  the  success  of  such  an  offensive 
movement  of  pushing  off  theEussian  pressure,  hasfailed. 
The  Eussian  pressure  upon  Germany  and  Austria 
has  not  indeed  begun  or  nearly  begun.     It  is  a  long 
cry  from  the  checking  of  the  German  plan   to    an 
invasion  of  German  territory.     But  at  any  rate  the 
Gcnnan  plan  in  its  entirety  has  certainly  failed.     The 
occupation  of  Warsaw  was  absolutely  essential  to  it, 
and  so  far  from  occupying  Warsaw,  the  strong  German 
force  of  some  five  army  corps  advancing  upon  that 
town  has  been  beaten  right  back,  even  a  point  so  far 
west  as  Lodz  is  out  of  Gennan  occupation,  and  pretty 
well  all  the  country  north  of  the  Pllica  is  now  in 
Eussian  hands.     Our  first   point   is,  then,  that  the 
holding  of  the  slow  Eussian  advance  so  that  Germany 
should  be  free  to  send  large  reinforcements  to  the  west 
has  proved  impossible. 

(2)  But  the  Austro-Gennan  ^ine  as  a  whole  has 
not  fallen  back.     The  attempt  is  still  maintained  to 


cVS\^ 


SilVANGOROO 


''tin,    ','       .  Vu.-  ^Ar^-      .,, 


''Ill  IK- 


'III, 


VIU. 


Tua;   MiiN-  posITIO^•   in  tus  east. 


push  the  Eussians  eastward  at  the  southern  end  of 
their  position:  the  attack  goes  on  below  Sandomii-, 
along  the  San,  and  before  Przemysl. 

It  is  a  thing  worth  noting  in  these  great  modern 
actions  that  the  new  scale  upon  which  they  are  fought 
has  put  an  end  to  some  of  the  unquestioned  rules  of 
older  warfare.  In  an  action  upon  a  front  even  of 
eight  mUes  or  ten,  to  be  outflanked  meant  that  your 
whole  body  fell  back  if  it  could.  But  in  an  action— 
or,  rather,  a  series  of  actions — upon  a  front  of  over 
two  hundred  miles,  you  have  much  more  time  to 
consider  wdiether  it  is  really  necessary  for  all  your 
forces  to  fall  back  or  no  when  you  are  outflanked. 

Here  is  the  Austro-German   line  aU  alon^  the 
Vistula   threatening   Warsaw  and   Novo  Georgievsk 
on   the   north,    and   "sigorously   attacking    Przemysl 
upon  the   south.     Its   northern   extremity   is   badly 
beaten  in  front  of  Warsaw  and  the  whole  of  its  left 
outflanked.      Between  the  Pilica  Eiver  and  Warsaw 
it  is  turned  right  back  and  thrust  even  beyond  Lodz. 
The  attempt  of  the  Germans  to  cross  the  Vistula  at 
Ivangorod  is  also  beaten.     They  make  no  real  footing 
at  the  crossing  of  Jozefdw,  and'  the  Eussians  in  their 
turn  cross  in  force  at  Solec.     It  is  evident  that  the 
Avliole   original   Austro-Ger.nan    lino   A— B — C    has 
been  bent  back  on  its  left,  A  B,  to  a  position  D  B. 
That  is  an  attitude  which  would  have  meant,  in  the 
older  warfare,  the  retirement  of  the  remainder,  B  C. 
Because  in  the  older  warfare   the   people  who    had 
outflanked  you  could  be  down  upon  your  centre  and 
l)ehind  it  in  an  hour  or  two.     But  to-day  you  have 
days  to  decide  in,  and  of  that  retirement  from  the 
Vistula — of  the  Gennan  retirement  from  the  Upper 
Vistula   at   least    between  Jozefow  and  Sandomir — • 
there  is  as  yet  no  sufiicient  indication. 

Eemember  that  from  B  to  C  is  a  very  long  week's 
marching.  It  is  an  immense  distance  :  and  remember 
further  that  an  advance  on  the  south  whereby  the 
Germanic  allies  crossing  the  San  or  the  Upper 
Vistula  near  Sandomir  should  push  the  Eussians  well 


10* 


October  31,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


back  in  tlils  region,  would  straighten  the  line  again 
and  compensate  in  some  degree  for  the  bending  back 
of  it  in  the  north. 

In  other  words,  it  is  worth  while  in  these  very 
long  and  extended  modem  actions  for  your  centre 
and  unthreatened  wing  to  try,  even  through  some 
days,  to  retrieve  the  misfortunes  of  your  defeated 
wing. 

That  the  Germanic  allies  have  at  some  points 
upon  the  Upper  Vistula  near  Sandomir  and  upon  the 
river  San  crossed  these  two  streams,  I  take  to  be 
indubitable.  What  we  do  not  know  is  how  far  they 
have  really  established  themselves  upon  the  eastern 
bank.  The  chances  are  that  though  the  Austrians 
and  cei-tain  of  the  Germans  have  crossed  the  San  and 
the  Upper  Vistida,  the  movement  here  has  not  been 
anything  like  as  decisive  agaiast  the  Russians  as  has 
the  Russian  movement  again.st  the  Germans  in  the 
north.  And  one's  evidence  for  this  is  that  the  official 
communiqu6s  of  the  Austrians  and  the  Germans  do 
not  speak  of  any  real  success  upon  the  right  of  their 
line  (they  are  of  course  perfectly  silent  as  to  their 
reverses  on  the  left),  while  the  Russian  communiques, 
though  admitting  vigorous  attack  upon  the  line  of 
the  two  rivers,  admit  no  serious  reverse  south  of 
Jozefow.  Meanwhile  there  is  a  somewhat  detailed 
report  of  Austrians  recrossing  the  stream  below 
Sandoniu-,  proving  that  it  was  crossed  a  few  days  ago 
and  also  suggesting  that  now  the  whole  of  the  Vistula 
(though  not  yet  the  San)  is  being  slowly  given  up  by 
the  Gennanic  allies. 

It  is  indeed  certain  that  a  very  heavy  effort  is 
being  pushed  forward  by  the  Austrians  near  Przemysl. 
It  is  not  true  that  this  fortress  is  completely  disengaged. 
It  is  true  that  all  the  western  sectors  have  been  dis- 
engaged for  nearly  a  fortnight.  Fui-ther  we  must 
note  that  very  gi*eat  and  paiiially  successful  efforts 
have  been  made  by  the  Austrians  to  clear  the  passes 
of  the  Carpathians,  not  only  in  front  of  Przemysl,  but 
far  to  the  east  of  that  point. 

What  is  not  tenable  is  the  conjecture  that  any 
Austrian  movement  on  this  south  end  of  the  line  wiU 
really  turn  the  Russians  and  threaten  them.  That 
could  only  be  done  by  a  gi'eat  numerical  superiority. 
It  is  not  possible  that  Austria  should  discover  that 
numerical  superiority  either  now  or  later. 

We  may  sum  up  and  say  that  the  operations 
upon  the  Vistula  and  upon  the  San  are  on  the  whole 
in  our  favour,  and  that  they  have  (what  is  all-import- 
ant to  the  West)  prevented  the  Germans  from  releasing 
any  considerable  body  from  the  East  for  operations 
in  Flanders  or  in  Lon*aine. 

But  there  are  stiU  two  questions  of  great  interest 
to  be  asked  with  regard  to  tliis  field.  Tiie  first  is, 
with  what  rapidity  can  the  Russian  "  pressui'e "  in 
Germany  be  applied  ?  The  second  is,  upon  what 
line  will  the  GeiTnan  retii'cment  fall  if  the  present 
Russian  advance  is  maintained  ? 

As  to  the  first  of  these  questions,  the  early 
stages  of  the  war  in  the  ea.st,  the  known  operations 
of  the  two  opponents,  the  nature  of  the  country  over 
which  these  actions  are  fought,  and  the  typo  of 
Gennan  advance  which  the  war  in  the  west  has 
already  acquainted  us  with,  furnish  a  suftli.ient 
answer.  It  is  the  same  that  has  been  insisted  upon 
the  very  beginning  ;  a  warning 
Russian  "  pressure "  upon  the 
German  forces  in  the  east  to  bo  rapid — though  it 
may  be,  before  it  is  ended,  overwholiniiig.  The  nature 
of  the  actions  fought  and  to  be  fought,  the  type  of 
communications  in  AVostcrn  Poland,  the  fact  that  all 
the  armies  of  the  Gennanic  Allies  arc  in  being  there 


in  the.se  notes  from 
not   to   expect    the 


and  do  not  seem  to  have  lost  really  heavily  in  recent 
operations  (how  many  guns,  for  instance?)  the 
indeterminate  climate  between  the  mud  of  autumn 
and  the  frost  of  winter,  the  very  distances  involved — • 
all  point  to  a  movement  of  advance  on  the  part  of 
the  Russians  which  v.ill  only  be  slow  durmg  the  next 
few  weeks. 

As  to  the  second  question,  where  a  long  German 
resistance  is  likely  to  be  offered  to  such  an  advance,  it 
would  seem  that  the  line  of  the  River  Waita  affords 
the  best  opportunity  for  this.  That  river  does  not, 
indeed,  present  a  regular  and  parallel  front  to  the 
German  frontier,  but  the  front  it  does  present  is,  as 
the  accompanying  sketch  map  wiU  show,  a  sufficient 


DANTZIG 


^ARSAY/ 


"''o^l 


CR/ICOW 


THI  LINB  or  TUB   WABTA. 

protection  to  the  Gennan  frontier  to  make  it  an 
obvious  line  for  the  Germans  to  hold.  There  is  a 
gap  of  more  or  less  open  country  between  Koto  and 
the  fortress  of  Thorn,  a  gap  about  50  miles  wide, 
which  would  want  particular  .attention,  but  which 
would  be  defensible  with  entrenchments.  Southward, 
the  hilly  country  where  the  three  Empires  meet, 
should  be  a  sufficient  defence  for  even  a  sparse  body 
of  troops  to  continue  the  line  ;  and  it  may  well  be 
found  that  if  the  Russians  jjush  back  the  whole 
Austro  -  Gennan  line  westward,  after  these  first 
successes  of  theirs,  the  line  of  the  Warta,  continued 
through  the  hills  and  on  in  front  of  Cracow,  wiU 
be  the  holding  pomt  attempted  by  the  enemy  against 
our  eastern  Ally. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  German 
Government  attaches  the  greatest  importance — 
military  as  well  as  political — to  keeping  operations 
off  Germanic  soil.  It  is  probable  that  every  effort 
will  be  made,  if  the  Gennan  army  in  the  east  is  really 
forced  back,  to  hold  this  line  of  the  Warta  and  to 
continue  the  Gennan  administration  of  the  Polish 
])rovince  of  Kalisz.  This  would  have  the  advantage 
of  preventing  commvmications  between  the  Russian 
Poles  and  those  oppressed  by  Germany  to  the  west, 
of  keeping  the  war  off  Gennan  soil,  and  of  produci)ig 
— though    much    nearer     her    own    territory     than 


11* 


liAND    AND    WATEB 


October  31,  1914 


Germany  origmally  designed — the  "  deadlock  "  or 
"  stalemate  "  to  wliieh  her  policy  still  looks  forward 
in  the  cast  as  in  the  -west. 

The  real  argument  against  Gennauy's  being  able 
to  produce  that  deadloclc  is  ihe  numbers  that  Kussia 
will  now  in  continually  increasing  volume  bring 
forward,  llussia,  it  must  be  remciuberod,  is  in  this 
field  what  we  should  bo  in  the  western  field  if  we 
could  (which,  alas !  we  cannot)  put  forward  every 
month  another  batch  of,  sa}',  200,000. 

Germany  did  for  six  weeks  produce  a  deadlock  in 
France  between  the  North  Sea  and  the  Vosges.  She 
hoped  to  produce  a  deadlock  upon  the  Vistula,  and  to 
hold  that  eastern  line  while  she  sent  reinforcements 
back  west,  and  broke  down  the  deadlock  there  in  her 
favour.  She  has  not  been  able  to  do  that ;  but  Ave,  on 
our  side,  have  not  the  extra  numbers  which  woidd  be 


so  useful  at  this  moment  to  pour  in  again.st  the 
western  deadlock,  especially  in  Flandei-s.  Now, 
llussia  has  those  numbers,  and  it  is  perhaps  upon  those 
numbers  in  the  next  two  months,  more  than  upon  any 
other  element  in  the  general  problem,  that  wo  had 
best  rely.  In  other  words,  it  seems  as  though  the 
campaign  as  a  whole  turned,  from  the  point  of  view 
of  tlie  Allies,  uj)ou  their  power  to  hold  the  Germans 
in  the  west,  while  trusting  to  llusslan  nvmibers  to 
push  on,  though  slowly,  in  the  east. 

From  the  German  pomt  of  vievv-  it  seems  as 
though,  while  awaiting  and  dreading  tliis  increase  of 
Eussian  numerical  strength,  a  dc^^perate  attempt  to 
prevent  reinforcement  from  England,  and  a  tlireat 
upon,  or  even  a  blo\v  at,  England  itself,  was  the 
immediate  necessity.  Such  a  blow,  from  Calais  at 
least,  is  uot  promising. 


THE    PICCADILLY    RIFLE    RANGE 

Is  a  happy  inspiration  in  these  piping  times,  not  of  peace,  but 
of  war.  Just  now  London  is  populated  with  fighting  men, 
many  of  them  naval  and  military  officers  waiting  for  their 
marching  orders.  To  the  majority  of  these  it  will  be  welcome 
news  that  the  spare  hours  can  be  pleasantly  and  profitably 
occupied  by  keeping  up  their  rifle  practice.  At  67b,  Shaftesbury 
Avenue,  they  will  find  in  the  spacious  basement,  some  quarter 
of  an  acre  m  extent,  a  fine  rifle  range  with  a  dozen  targets  and 
all  modern  fittings.  The  committee  of  management  are  all 
military  men,  and  all  visitors  connected  with  the  two  services 
are  made  honorary  members.  For  the  novice  thers  are  two 
serg:eant  instructors,  one  of  whom  is  an  ex-sergeant  of  the  Eoyal 
Fusiliers.  A  minor  diversion  is  a  well-equipped  skittle  alley,  one 
of  the  finest  in  London.  Ladies  desirous  of  handling  a  rifle  are 
abo  welcome. 


WAR    PUBLICATIONS. 

The  November  number  of  Colour,  the  new  shilling  monthly,  fully 
maintains  the  standard  set  by  its  preceding  numbers,  both  in  the'quality 
of  the  reproductions  of  artists'  work  and  in  the  literary  contributions. 
As  already  noted,  Colour  is  the  only  British  publication  that  attempts 
the  reproduction  of  the  work  of  modern  artists  in  their  original 
colouring,  and  it  is  doing  for  British,  and  to  a  certain  extent  for  foreign 
art  in  Kngland  what  the  Uercnri  de  France  did  for  French  literature 
in  France.  It  Ukes  an  easy  first  place  among  artistic  publications  in 
this  country,  and  is  of  considerable  literary  value  as  well. 

A  new  map  of  N.E.  France,  Belgium,  and  the  Rhine  has  just 
been  issued  by  the  Edinburgh  Geographical  Institute  (John 
Bartholomew  and  Co.),  price  2s.  on  paper,  3s.  on  cloth.  The  map 
which  la  on  a  specially  large  scale— 16  miles  to  the  inch— shows  rail- 
ways, fortresses,  main,  secondary,  and  other  roads,  with  the  distances 
between  road  junctions  marlced.  Heights  are  given  in  metres  with 
their  equivalent  in  English  feet. 

Mr  H.  Q.  Wells'  new  book,  Tht  Wife  of  Sir  Isaac  Harman,  shows 
Its  author  111  yet  another  light.  It  is  detailed  and  intimate,  as  are 
allthe  worKS  of  this  author,  and  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that 
It  IS  interesting,  for  whatever  a  "  Wells'  "  book  mav  be  it  is  alwavs 
inUresting.  But  in  this  story  is  something  that  not  even  tke  most  rabid 
censor  of  public  morals  could  possibly  ban,  something  that  may  bo  read 
by  all,  a  concession,  it  appears,  to  the  libraries.  To  say  that  the  book  is 
worth  reading  is  mere  gUding  of  the  lily;  as  for  its  plot,  there  is  none, 
M  IS  the  way  of  a  WeUs'  novel-none,  that  is,  in  the  conventional  sense 
AS  for  Its  interest,  wa  recommend  it  without  fear  that  the  censor  will 
pubMierT       "^  ^   °'°'°°'     ^^''^"^   Macmillan    and   Co.    are   the 

,-^  J,*n7  fTi,  """""f  ^-^^  ''^^^'""  P"'-*"'^  °f  England  and  America  are 
.w/^  nl  -n^'i!:""?*  of  ;i/c67«re'.  Magazine,  and  the  majoritv  of 
these  people  wil    be  pleased  to  make  the  acquaintance  of  Mr    S    S 

M^aT'at'lS;  'h''"  /^"/<''-»^1P''2'.J»^t  Published  by  Mr.  John 
JMurraj,  at  lOs  6d.  net,  has  told  a  fine  storv  of  enercv  and  self- 
reliance.  Pedd  ing  for  a  livelihood,  doing  housework  t^^prov^e  for 
h«  own  education,  establishing  the  ^agn^ine  that  bears  hisTme  Mr 
McCiure  is   always   interesting.     His  look    deals  with   such   men   as 

o     liSure  "riY'  '•  r'tf"'-   ^f  '"^"''  °f  "'«^  ''-<^'  t^reTt  one 
?n    l«         ?'     t      "'"  ^  v,armly  welcome  bv  all  who  are   interested 

"r^ncer    '  °^  ^''''  '""="^'  °^="'   '""^  "'^"  ""^y  ^^  ^hich  thJi'ITe 


IrL^T""^  °r  Waterloo  so  far  dominates  the  mili  an^  historv  of  the 


and  execution,  is  yet  so  clearly  written  that  it  is  of  extreme  interest 
to  the  normal  reader,  and  forms  a  valuable  addition  to  existing  litera- 
ture on  the  Napoleonic  period. 

Messrs.  John  Lane  have  just  re-issued,  in  a  shilling  edition,  Lift 
in  a  Garrison  Town,  the  translation  of  ex-Lieutenant  Bilse's  book  whioh 
caused  a  national  scandal  in  Germany,  and  earned  for  its  author  a 
court  martial  and  subsequent  imprisonment.  In  its  recital  of  the 
defects  of  the  military  eystem,  the  book  is  comparable  with  Beyerling'a 
Jena  or  Sedan,  though,  of  course,  the  latt-er  was  written  by  a  master 
of  literature,  while  Bilee'e  book  is  merely  the  work  of  a  military  ofScer. 
Still,  Bilse's  book  bears  the  impress  of  reality,  and  affords  a  good  view 
of  the  under-workings  of  the  German  military  machine. 

Modern  Piq-Sticl.ing,  just  published  by  Mesers,  Macmillan, 
and  written  by  Major  A.  E.  Wardrop,  of  the  R.H.A.,  is  a  volume  of 
interest  not  only  to  thoee  familiar  with  this  form  of  sport,  but  to  all 
interested  in  mounted  sports  Chapters  by  Colonel  J.  Vaughan, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  F.  W.  Caton-Jones,  M.  M.  Crawford,  and  C-aptaia 
H.  E.  Medlicott  are  included  in  the  work,  which  includes  the  history 
of  the  sport,  the  natural  hietorj-  of  pig,  the  training  of  horses  for  the 
sport,  the  actual  riding  and  hunting,  and  details  of  clubs  and  cups. 
It  is,  on  the  whole,  a  veritable  encyclopaedia  of  the  sport,  and  is 
written  in  good  hunting  style,  so  that  the  pages  are  as  interesting  as 
they  are  instructive.  It  is  a  book  to  read  for  its  own  sake,  apart  from 
its  value  as  regards  tlie  sport,  and  deserves  a  wide  circulation  among 
all  interested  in  mounted  work  as  well  as  among  those  who  by  circum- 
stance and  locality  are  able  to  make  quarry  of  pig. 

Me.  Murray  has  just  published  Dr.  Stuart  Reid's  Life  of  the  Firtt 
Duke  of  Marlborough  and  of  Sarah,  his  Fornovs  Duchess.  No  work  of 
personal  or  military  biography  could  be  more  timely  than  this,  which 
reminds  readers  of  the  great  achievements  of  British  soldiers  on  a 
battleground  adjacent  to  that  on  which  tliey  are  now  winning  new 
and  imperishable  honours.  The  work  has  an  introduction  by  tlia 
present  Duke  of  Marlborough. 

A  valuable  map  has  just  been  issued  by  George  Philip  and  Son, 
Ltd.,  and  forms  an  admirable  guide  to  the  theatre  of  the  war  in  th9 
west.  The  scale  is  ten  miles  to  one  inch,  wliilst  inset  round  are  nine 
important  sections  enlarged  to  the  scale  of  three  miles  to  one  inch. 
Unlike  so  many  v/ar  maps,  it  has  been  special!  v  drawn  from  foreign 
ordnance  sheets  and  Continental  staff  maps  under  the  supervision  of 
a  military  expert.  An  index  accompanies  the  map,  which  contains 
5,500  names.  The  price  (on  paper)  is  2s.  6d.,  but  we  strongly  recom- 
mend it,  both  for  appearance  and  permanency,  mounted  on  cloth — 
either  to  fold,  or  with  a  roller  to  hang — at  63. 


THE    NEW    NOTE. 

Tire  new  £1  not«  will  shortly  be  in  the  hands  of  the  public,  and 
is  a  great  improvement  on  the  first  issue.  The  notes  have  been  pro- 
duced on  specially  prepared  paper  of  special  watermark  design,  and 
of  the  strength  and  thickness  of  the  Bank  of  England  notes.  The  intro- 
duction into  the  watermark  of  the  Rose,  Crown,  Thistle,  and  Daffodil 
(the  Emblem  of  Wales)  will  be  observed. 

The  notes  (size  6  inches  by  3|  inches)  are  b?ing  printed  in  black 
by  Thomas  De  Le  Rue  and  Co.,  Limited,  from  plates  engraved  by  the 
same  firm  from  a  design  supplied  by  Mr.  Eves. 

The  outstanding  features  of  the  design  are  the  King's  Head  en- 
circled in  a  garter,  abound  which  the  inscription  as  appearing  on  the  gold 
coinage  is  reproduced,  the  whole  being  surmounted  by  a  crown.  On 
the  top  right-hand  side  of  the  note  the  emblem  of  the  ler.scr  George 
and  Dragon  appears,  encircled  by  a  similar  garter,  on  which  the  Royal 
motto  is  engraved,  the  latter  also  surmounted  by  a  crown. 

Altogcthe/,    the    note   is   both    from    a   utilitarian   and    an    artistio 
point  of  view  an  immense  improvement  on  the  previous  issue. 

O.v  Wedneedays  Mr.  Charles  Frohman  will  present  "The  Little 
Minister  "  at  rmtinecs,  commencing  at  2.30,  whilst  the  evening  per- 
formanc^:  on  that  data  will  be  discontinued.  Matinees  Thursdays  an< 
Saturdaj's  as  usual.  . 

For  those  who  find  it  necessary  in  this  war  time  to  seek  an 
economical  food  there  is  the  new  production,  Plasmon  oat  cocoa,  put 
on  the  market  by  International  Plasmon,  Ltd.  Both  the  company  and 
the  goods  are  British.  It  is  claimed  that  Plasmon  oat  cocoa  provide* 
the  most  nourishment  at  least  cost.  The  flavour  is  like  that  of  th» 
finest  drinking  chocolate. 


u* 


October  31,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


THE   WAR  BY   WATER. 

By   FRED    T.    JANE. 

KOTE. — THIS    AKTICLX    HAS    BKKS   SUBMITTED  TO  THB  PBKSS  BUSaAU,  WHICH   DOBS  NOT  OBJBCT  TO   THa   Pa3LI0ATIO»   A.3  CIN30S1D 
AND  TAKES    NO   KESPONSIBILITT    FOB   THE   CORRECTNESS    OF    TaB    STATBMBNT3. 


fOMlLes 


iL^«N.waiii  .iN«>      S Fathom. line 
'-'//•DIXMUDE      2FathontCme 


MAP  TO  ILLVSTBATX  OPKBATIOHS   OV  USCD  A.TnA.CSa   ON   INSHORE   SQITADSON   OFF   OSTBND.      THB   SHADED   POSTION  SHOWS  THB   TWO-FATHOU 

ABBA  AND   THE   DOTTED   LINES  THE   FIYE-FATHOM. 


IN  THE  affair  known  as  "  The  Battle  of  the  Coast "  the 
German  Army  has  clearly  had  an  uncommonly  bad 
time  at  the  hands  of  our  inshore  gunboats.  In  this 
connection  it  is  curious  that  these  boats  were  built 
originally  for  Brazil  for  use  in  the  Amazon,  but  for  some 
•obscure  reason  the  Brazilians  tried  to  get  out  of  taking  them 
over.  They  were  hesitating  when  this  war  came  along,  else 
the  boats  had  left  for  Brazil.  The  boats  have  now  shown  them- 
selves of  incalculable  worth  to  us  and  incidentally  proved  how 
correct  Lord  Charles  Beresford  was,  when,  some  years  ago,  he 
agitated  for  an  "  inshore  squadron."  There  is  every  reason  to 
believe  that  the  entire  military  situation  at  the  sea-end  of  the  land 
campaign  was  entirely  governed  by  the  fire  of  the  inshore 
squadron  which,  owing  to  its  light  draught,  was  able  to  creep 
into  waters  normally  inaccessible  to  warships. 

These  \hree  boats — renamed  Ilumber,  Mersey,  and  Severn — 
displace  about  1,200  tons  with  a  draught  of  8^  feet.  Their 
principal  armament  is  two  6-inch  forward  and  a  couple  of  4.7 
inch  Howitzers  aft.  It  is  these  howitzers  which  rendered  the 
German  positions  untenable,  and  incidentally  proved  that — 
•whatever  may  happen  inland — no  Power  which  docs  not  command 
the  sea  can  accomplish  anytliing  on  the  sea  coast.  Hence  the 
persistent  efforts  of  the  German  submarines  to  attack.  At  the 
time  of  writing  no  success  has  attended  these  efforts,  nor  is 
much  success  to  be  expected. 

In  the  first  place  to  torpedo  a  vessel  drawing  only  SJ  feet 
needs  considerable  skill,  in  the  second  place,  no  submarine  can 
manncuvre  in  a  couple  of  fathoms  or  less.  Submerged  and  in 
fighting  trim  a  submarine  needs  nearly  as  much  water  as  a 
Dreadnought.  If  operating  within  the  five  fathom  line  she  runs 
grave  risks  of  nmning  into  the  mud  and  remaining  there ;  or 
else  slie  must  work  more  or  less  awash  and  chance  the  fate 
which  has  already  befallen  one  German  in  these  operations^ 
being  rammed  by  a  destroyer. 


This  destruction  of  a  submarine  by  our  torpedo-boat  destroyer 
Badger,  following  closely  upon  the  loss  of  our  £3  under  mora 
or  less  similar  conditions  would  seem  to  indicate  that  on  both 
sides  the  "  menace  of  the  submarine  "  is  no  longer  what  it  was. 
As  I  indicated  last  week,  "  every  bane  has  its  antidote,"  and  there 
is  now  very  fair  reason  to  believe  that  this  war  wUl  see  the 
submarine  relegated  to  a  position  of  less  importance  than  it 
occupied  before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  The  difficulty 
of  combating  the  submarine  has  lain  in  the  fact  that  it  is  a  new 
weapon,  equal — shall  we  say — to  the  introduction  of  some 
equivalent  to  the  card  "  joker  "  on  to  the  chess  board. 

As  yet,  of  course,  matters  are  merely  in  the  transition  stage, 
but  detailed  information  which  has  become  available  during 
the  past  week,  seems  to  demonstrate  very  clearly  that  both 
against  swift  moving  big  ships  and  against  light  draught  inshore 
squadrons  the  submarine  is,  relatively  speaking,  rather  impotent. 
This,  curiously  enough,  was  the  conclusion  theoretically  arrived 
at  by  the  Germans  some  years  ago,  when  they  refused  to  build 
submarines  at  all,  and  on  account  of  which  they  have  compara- 
tively few  to-day. 

INVASION    PROJECTS. 

Neutral  reports  continue  to  arrive  as  to  the  German 
"  pontoons  "  for  invasion.  They  are  now  represented  as  very 
large  submarines  designed  to  carry  invading  soldiers. 

I  am  inclined  to  attach  the  fullest  credence  to  this  latest 
story  of  the  pontoons — absurd  though  the  idea  may  at  fi*st  sight 
appear.  It  is  an  absolute  bringing  to  date  of  Napoleon's  "  flat- 
bottomed  boats."  There  is  nothing  at  all  impracticable  in  an 
unarmed  submarine  capable  of  carrying  a  hundred  men  or  so  for  a 
short  trip. 

To  build  enough  sufficient  to  carry  an  invading  army  or  even 
a  big  raiding  force  is  impracticable.  But  it  is  practicable  to 
land  by  submarine  a  hundred  men — motor  bicyclists  probably— 


13* 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


October  31,  1D14 


here  aixl  there,  or  a.^^erc,  Tfith  orders  to  do  as  much  destruction 

•^^'  I'id  nTrito  bet  on  the  nltima^  r-pects  of  their 
6UCCC8S  otler  than  psychologically,  but  I  do  thmk  that  thc-ro 
L  every  possibility  eitler  oi  the  attempt  being  made,  or  of  the 
rubmaTine  transports  being  used  as  a  menace  just  as  Napoleon 
us'd  those  "  Qat  bottoms?'  designed  to  row  across  in  a  calm 
when  the  British  warships  were  helpless. 

In  the  old  days  this  policy  led  us  into  a  vast  expenditure 
on  Martollo  towerJand  the  retaining  in  England  of  thousands 
of  troops  which  else  had  been  sent  to  the  Contment.  Tne  German 
General  Stafi  has  studied  history. 

THE   BALTIC. 

There  is  no  news  whatever  from  the  Baltic,  in  which  a 
species  of  stalemate  seems  to  obtain.  The  RuEsians  appear  to 
be  employing  against  the  Germans  exactly  the  same  tactics  as 
the  Gen/ans  a^e  using  against  us,  and  the  Germans  are  at  a 

loose  end  accordingly.  ,       .       ....         t,  vi ,  „f  *o. 

This  Russian  action  (or  rather,  inaction)  is  probably  of  far 
more  value  to  us  than  we  yet  realise.  So  long  as  the  Russians 
adhere  to  their  present  policy  so  long  will  it  be  impossible  for 
the  Germans  to  attempt  an  attack  on  ua— or  on  some  of  us— 

"to  attack  with  less  than  fuU  force  would  be  suicide  pure  and 
simple.  One  way  and  another  it  still  looks  as  though  the  Russian 
main  fleet  lyin"  inside  the  harbour  at  Libau  is  the  real  controlling 
aKcncy.  It  is'probably  no  exaggeration  (wild  as  it  may  seem 
to-day)  to  say  that  the  key  of  the  whole  situation  lies  m  the 
Baltic  and  with  the  Russian  fleet.  It  sounds  hke  mcohcreiit 
prophecy  :  but  if  anyone  considers  the  question  carefully,  it  must 
be  obvious  that  if  Germany  concentrates  against  us  she  must 
leave  the  bulk  of  her  sea  coast  (mostly  Baltic)  undefended 
against  an  unbeaten  Russian  force.  .,     •,  -    j  j 

Her  coastline  in  our  direction  is  small  and  heavily  defended. 
In  the  Baltic  it  is  large  and  very  lightly  defended. 

In  the  present  state  of  affairs  it  is  no  more  safe  for  Germany 
to  abandon  the  Baltic  than  it  would  be  for  us  to  desert  the  North 
Sea  Unless  Germany  is  prepared  to  take  abnormal  risks  she 
dare  not  attack  us  in  force  so  long  as  the  Russians  are  a  fleet 
in  being  "  in  the  Baltic.  Hence  the  presence  of  German  warships 
in  the  Aaland  Islands.  . 

It  is  dangerous  to  prophecy  where  Germany  is  concemeU, 
but  strategically  she  must  defeat  the  Russian  main  fleet  in  the 
Baltic  before  attempting  anything  serious  in  the  North  Sea. 

THE  MEDITERRANEAN. 

The  Adriatic  continues  to  be  the  theatre  of  vague  rumour 
and  little  fact  to  go  on.  So  far  as  can  be  gathered,  recent  events 
have  been  very  slightly  in  Austria's  favour  to  date  of  writing 
(October  26th).  We  hear  of  submarines  which  have  moved 
against  the  Franco-British  force  off  Cattaro ;  the  retreat  of  that 
force  and  the  sinking  of  two  or  more  submarines.  Little 
or  nothing  is  officially  confirmed,  and  I  ain  inclined  to  fancy 
that  in  the  matter  of  the  sunk  submarines  it  is  a  case  of  "  the 
wish  being  the  father  to  the  thought."  A  submarine  stands 
very  little  chance  of  injury  by  gunfire  from  a  big  ship. 

The  retirement  is  probable.  It  is  certainly  logical.  There 
is  no  hurry  about  Cattaro ;  no  object  in  risking  anything.  The 
Austrians  have  but  eleven  submarines  all  told,  and  some  of 
these  are  not  really  efiective.  Six  is  nearer  the  number  in  the 
fighting  line.  The  Allies  can  easily  afiord  to  delay  matters  for 
a  month  if  necessary  till  these  six  are  destroyed,  as  they  arc 
bound  to  be  if  they  have  to  continue  an  unsupported  campaign. 
Once  more  I  would  msist  that  as  the  weapon  of  the  weaker  pov.-cr 
the  submarine  is  merely  a  temporary  weapon.  It  is  really  the 
weapon  of  t/ic  stronger  power,  and  no  matter  what  losses  we 
may  sufier,  I,  for  one,  am  absolutely  convinced  that  long  before  the 
war  is  over  this  fact  will  be  demonstrated.  The  stronger  power 
has  always  a  numerical  superiority  In  every  kind  of  arm  ;  and  the 
real  or  problematical  advantage  of  any  given  weapon  is  discounted 
accordingly.  Austrian  submarines  may  delay  the  fate  of  Cattaro, 
but  that  is  the  utmost  which  they  can  efiect. 

THE   NORTH   SEA. 

Eclated  ofEcial  reports  of  the  Heligoland  afiair  of  August 
28th  have  now  been  issued.  They  add  little  to  what  we  already 
knew,  or  had  surmised.    That  little,  however,  is  very  important. 

At  the  time  of  the  aSair  I  stated  in  these  notes  that  in 
"  Act  II "  we  believed  that  we  were  getting  the  worst  of  it. 
This  is  very  apparent  from  Admiral  Bcatty's  report. 

For  the  rest,  the  feature  of  prime  importance  is  the  persistent 
reference  to  a  "  largo  four  funnelled  cruiser."  This  ship  was 
Bubsequently  reported  sunk  and  what  not ;  hut  none  of  the  ships 
rjiciallij  reported  hy  either  side  as  s"ank  had  jour  junnels.  From 
which  we  must  assume  that  either  the  R<>on  or  Yorck  was  out — 
in  any  case  that  the  Germans  were  out  in  strength — possibly 
their  battle-cruisers  were  not  far  o£E  and  their  battle  fleet  no 
very  great  distance  away. 


It  now  seems  absolutely  established  that  the  Germans 
were  in  stronger  force  than  was  to  have  been  anticipated  in 
the  ordinary  way,  and  that  the  entire  issue  rested  upon  the 
fact  that  Admiral  Beatty  took  risks  and  chanced  everything 
to  support  our  light  division,  and  that  on  this  and  this  alone 
our  success  rests. 


^^.5. 


i 


^retlzusa.  and. 


I''^  Flotilla. 

O   BRITISH 

W7\  GERMAN 


TO  ILLUSTEATB  TEBT   APPF.OXIMATELT  THB  POSITION   OF  AFFAIRS 
IN   THB  EAELIBB  STAGES   OF  THB   BIGHT  OF  HELIGOLAND  BATTLB. 

A  brief  summary  of  all  the  ofScial  reports  pieced  together 
is  as  follows  : — ■ 

About  seven  a.m.  some  of  our  destroyers,  led  by  the 
Areihusa,  sighted  and  chased  a  German  torpedo-boat  destroyer. 
An  hour  later  our  division  founi  that  it  had  been  led  into  a  trap, 
and  had  rather  a  bad  time  from  German  cruisers — the  Areihusa 
being  the  target  of  a  very  superior  force.  Coincident  with  this, 
our  first  flotilla  hammered  an  entirely  diGercnt  German  division, 
and  sank  one  German  (F  187). 

Subsequently,  all  our  torpedo-boat  destroyers  and  the 
Areihusa  seem  to  have  joined  up  and  nothing  in  particular 
happened  until  eleven  a.m.,  when  the  Germans  appeared  in 
superior  force — the  position  being  roughly  that  they  had  got 
far  the  better  of  the  affair.    So  far  as  I  can  read  things— their 


DJograirL  K 


ctv  Light    c^^^ 


-^^ 


J 


British  T.B.D.  anxLArethusa 


British. 
Light       V 
Cruxsers  \ 


I  Oeruiaji  suLniariitjes  , 


/ 


British  Battle  Cruisers 


□  BRITISH 


GERMAN 


TO    ILLUSTEATB    THB    APPEOXIMATB     FOSTTTONS   WHEN,   EUT    FOB 

ADMIRAL     BKATTT's     ADVANCB    THKOCGH     TUB     EDBMARINES,   THB 

BRITISH   rOKCB  WOULD   HATB  BEBN  ANNIHILATED. 

armoured  cruisers  entered  into  the  fray,   and  absolute  defeat 
was  assumed  to  be  our  portion. 

Our  position  at  that  time  appears  to  have  been  very  near 
"  defeat  accepted."  On  the  other  hand,  the  Germans  having 
lost  V  187  and  having  been  hammered  more  than  we  were  aware 
of,  were  ignorant  of  the  advantage  which  they  had  secured,  and 


11» 


October  31,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


consequently  they  did  not  press  their  attack  as  quickly  as  they 
should  have. 

This  enabled  us  to  reinforce ;  and  there  followed  a  mSUe  in 
which  each  side  considered  itself  "  vantage  out."  On  the  whole, 
I  think  that  the  Germans  were  really  "  vantage  in."  At  any 
rate,  that  seems  to  have  been  Admiral  Beatty's  reading  of  the 
situation. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  at  eleven-thirty  Admiral  Beatty  brought 
in  his  battle  cruisers  at  28  knots.  He  ran  great  risks  from 
submarines ;  but  he  annihilated  all  that  was  left  of  the  first 
German  line,  and  saved  the  day. 

I  am  inclined  to  credit  this  first  German  line  with  having 
taken  annihilation  in  order  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  second, 
and  of  possibly  the  thii'd  and  perhaps  even  the  fourth  (battle 
fleet)  line  behind. 

In  acting  as  he  did  Admiral  Beatty  turned  what  should 
have  been  a  British  defeat  into  a  British  victory,  or  rather  a 
semi- victory,  for  it  now  seems  abundantly  clear  that  the  Germans 
were  quite  ready  for  us  oS  Heligoland  on  August  28th. 

The  situation  as  I  read  it  is  that  the  Germans  were  ready 
for  us,  that  they  had  prepared  an  overwhelming  reception 
for  the  Arethusa  and  her  consorts,  that  they  had  won,  and  that 
everything  was  with  them  when  suddenly  Admiral  Beatty 
charged  out  of  the  mist  with  his  battle  cruisers. 

The  exact  German  plans  we  shall  probably  never  know, 
things  of  this  sort  are  never  unfolded  till  their  interest  is  merely 
a  matter  of  "  ancient  history." 

But,  in  a  way,  I  am  afraid  that  the  Germans  will — as  I 
suggested  at  the  time — translate  the  Heligoland  aftair  into  a 
moral  victory  for  themselves.  It  is  like  this  :  Their  presence  was 
such  that  our  battle  cruisers  had  to  come  in  earlier  than  was 
intended.  As  a  result  of  this  their  battle  cruisers  went  back 
to  the  Kiel  Canal  and  so  did  not  get  annihilated  as  we  had 
probably  arranged,  and  hoped  for. 

If  we  desire  to  keep  our  perspective  clear  we  must  view 
things  always  from  the  enemy's  standpoint  as  well  as  from  our 
own.  Well,  we  sank  four  units  of  the  enemy's  light  stufE,  but 
we  got  no  "  heavy  stuff."  And  where  psychology  is  concerned 
psychology  is  all  that  really  matters. 

To  describe  the  Heligoland  affair  as  a  German  victory — 
their  loss  four  units,  our  loss  none — sounds  very  ridiculous. 
But  psychologically  I  am  afraid  that  it  is  nearer  the  truth. 
The  "  rats  "  that  matter  evaded  the  trap. 

Our  popular  Press  feeds  us  on  apparent  results.  Such 
results  are  admirable  for  the  music  hall  stage.  But  from  the 
naval  war  standard,  the  fact  remains  that  if  Admiral  Beatty 
had  not  taken  abnormal  risks,  we  should  have  been  badly  beaten 
in  the  Bight  of  Heligoland  on  August  28th  last. 

My  reading  of  the  matter  is  :  We  tried  a  very  smart  thing. 
We  were  trapped  and  failed.    Admiral  Beatty  came  to  the 


rescue  and  transformed  defeat  into  victory  by  taking  atrocious 
risks.    And  he  saved  us  by  the  skin  of  the  teeth. 

The  task  before  us  is  no  light  one.  Not  only  are  we  faced 
against  men  able  to  fight  quite  as  well  as  we  can  ;  but  we  are 
also  faced  by  an  admiral  who  has  his  side  of  the  business  very 
much  in  hand.  The  British  Navy  ia  up  against  the  biggest 
proposition  that  it  ever  has  had  to  face.  I  hope  and  I  think  that 
it  will  win  through.  But  the  fight  is  going  to  be  a  very  hard 
one  ;  and  the  bombast  of  the  daUy  Press  about  the  "  skulking 
fleet "  etc.,  etc.,  is  very  ill-timed. 

THE    HIGH    SEAS    GENERALLY. 

During  the  period  since  these  notes  last  appeared  the  Emden 
and  Karlsruhe  have  both  been  heard  of  once  more — the  latter 
having  succeeded  in  capturing  several  colliers,  and  so  rendered 
herself  independent  of  German  Admiralty  arrangements  for  her 
coal  supply. 

As  the  Karlsruhe  has  sunk  some  of  the  captured  colliers,  we 
know  that  she  has  enough  at  disposal  to  last  her  for  a  prac- 
tically indefinite  period.  With  armed  guards  on  board,  these 
colliers  are  by  now  probably  distributed  all  over  the  ocean 
outside  the  trade  routes,  their  recapture  being  a  matter  of  blind 
chance  of  several  thousand  to  one  against,  for  now  there  are  no 
clues  whatever. 

In  connection  with  clues,  it  seems  to  have  escaped  notice  that 
German  corsairs  seldom,  ij  ever,  interfere  with  merchant  ships  fitted 
with  wireless. 

Although  we  have  had  stories  of  the  crews  of  ships  captured 
being  allowed  only  a  quarter  of  an  hour  to  get  off,  what  with  over- 
hauhng  and  what  not,  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  from  first  to  last — 
that  is  to  say,  from  the  beginning  of  the  chase  to  getting  clear  away 
— the  operation  of  capturing  can  take  much  less  than  six  hours. 

A  defending  cruiser  does  not  and  cannot  steam  about  at 
full  speed  all  the  time,  but  we  can  safely  allow  her  to  be  able 
to  cover  from  100  to  125  miles  in  six  hours,  so  that  attacks  on 
any  wireless  fitted  ship  would  be  attended  with  some  considerable 
risk,  seeing  that  about  seventy  cruisers  are  engaged  in  the  corsair 
hunt,  and  necessarily  mostly  along  the  trade  routes.  A  con- 
spicuous installation  is  therefore  quite  possibly  a  valuable  defence 
against  a  form  of  commerce  attack  so  cleverly  conceived  that 
it  may  well  continue  for  months. 

In  view  of  the  Karlsruhe's  captures  it  may  become  necessary 
to  make  colliers  travel  in  convoy.  A  recently  issued  Admiralty 
statement  places  our  High  Seas  losses  at  1  per  cent.  This  is  not 
high.  It  is,  however,  quite  high  enough  ;  also,  imless  we  can  cut 
off  the  hostile  fuel  supply,  it  is  bound  to  rise. 

The  corsairs  cannot,  of  course,  go  on  indefinitely.  Foid 
bottoms  and  machinery  defects  must  sooner  or  later  take  effect. 
But  they  will  not  do  so  for  many  months.  Hence  the  gravity 
of  the  problem  and  the  need  of  every  conceivable  "  reply ."^ 


ACCURATE    SHOOTING. 

By  COL.   F.  N.   MAUDE,  G.B.,  late  R.E. 


It  is  impossible  to  pass 
over  the  anniversary  of 
Agincourt  without  drawing 
a  lesson  for  immediate  appli- 
cation from  the  extraordinary 
accuracy  of  shooting  attained 
by  our  ancestors  in  those 
days.  Our  archers  carried 
about  thirty  arrows,  and 
never  seem  to  have  run  out 
of  them,  though  they  often 
killed  and  v/ounded  up  to  ten 
men  a  piece  in  a  single  action. 
We  carry  upwards  of  120 
rounds  and  more,  but  even 
the  best  of  our  recent  practice 
in  France  falls  very  far  behind 
the  standard  of  those  days. 
Yet  the  ojjeration  of  aiming 
over  sights  is  really  simpler 
than  getting  an  alignment  for 
an  arrow  drawn  up  to  the  ear 
— and  the  range  at  which  the 
archers  practised,  200  to  COO 
yards,  was  not  so  much  below 
modem  individual  practice  as  a  layman  might  suppose.  Sir 
Pvalph  Payne  Gallwey  is  the  chief  authority  on  these  subjects. 


and,  referring  to  Turkish  archery,  he  gives  instances  of  ranges 
of  over  1,000  yards  attained  by  Turkish  archers  as  late  as  the 
eighteenth  century — indeed,  some  of  the  shots  he  cites  were  made 
before  the  Royal  Toxophilite  Society  by  the  Turkish  Ambassador 
here  in  England  some  seventy  years  ago. 

Now  the  reason  why  the  archers  shot  so  much  straighter 
stares  one  in  the  face,  if  one  considers  the  man,  bow,  and  arrow 
as  part  of  a  single  mechanical  whole,  the  one  bracing  up  the 
other,  and  in  turn  being  braced  by  it. 

The  initial  sketch  explains  the  idea  : — 

In  order  to  draw  the  arrow  to  the  ear,  the  left  arm  has  to 
thrust  against  the  bow  with  all  its  strength.  The  tension  of  the 
cord  acting  through  the  bow  compels  the  arm  to  become  a 
rigid  strut  in  which  no  shaking  is  possible.  A  man  may  be 
excited,  or  blown  with  running,  it  does  not  matter,  for  the 
moment  he  draws  the  arrow  towards  the  ear  his  arm  becomes 
locked  into  position,  and  any  tendency  to  shake  b  mechanically 
suppressed. 

In  shooting  with  a  gun  no  action  of  this  kind  arises,  we  have 
never  looked  upon  gun  and  man  as  an  inseparable  unit,  but 
always  as  two  distinct  parts,  exercising  no  mutually  controlling 
effect  upon  one  another  at  all. 

In  the  old  days,  the  gun  or  musket  kicked  like  a  young 
horse,  and,  unless  the  fircr  pressed  the  butt  well  into  the  shoidder 
he  was  apt  to  suffer  very  severely.  But  the  more  you  try  to 
press  the  rifle  home  to  the  shoulder  the  more  unsteady  as  a 
support  does  the  left  forearm  become ;  also  after  excitement  or 


16» 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  31,  1914 


violent  exertion,  it  becomes  quit«  impossible  to  get  steady 
enough  to  hit  anything  at  even  a  moderate  range.  Eveiyone 
who  has  ever  stalked  game,  particularly  m  mountain  countries, 
wiU  recall  days  *hen  he  has  had  to  lie  stiU  for  ten  muuitea  or 
more,  till  his  breathing  and  pulses  had  become  normal  enough 
to  make  him  sure  of  his  shot.  On  one  such  occasion  when  1  had 
to  take  running  shots,  standing,  to  see  over  the  brushwood, 
it  struck  me  that  the  accepted  attitude  of  a  sportsman,  or  soldier, 


SHKTCn     OF     KAM 

WITH     BIFLH     AT 

TUB    FItESZNT   AS 

OFFICIALLT 

AUTBOBISED, 


there  appeared  to  be  nothing  to  choose  between  the  two  systems, 
and  as  a  few  days  afterwards  I  was  offered  the  opportumty  o! 
or'-anising  the  armv  of  the  new  Chinese  Republic,  where  I  could 
have  as  much  active  service  conditions  as  I  might  require, 
I  dropped  the  subject  for  the  time.  Unfortunately,  my 
opportunity  in  China  never  materialised,  but  other  mattei-s 
claimed  all  my  time,  and  it  is  only  within  the  last  few  days,  in 
comparing  the  extraordinary  parallelism  which  is  noticeable 
in  the  w!^  our  modern  tactics  in  France  are  evolving  with  the 
old  practice  of  our  Norman  ancestors,  that  its  immediate  impor- 
tance came  into  my  mind.  _  •  ,    ■■ 

It  is  now  too  lat«  to  erpect  official  inquiry  and  trial,  but 
the  matter  is  so  simple  and  practical,  than  anyone  in  the  ranks 
of  the  new  army  or  any  commanding  oflicer  can  satisfy  himself 
forthwith.  He  has  only  to  copy  the  position  in  the  accompanying 
sketch  to  apply  the  practice  at  once,  and  once  he  catches  the  idea, 
everyone  will  immediately  copy  him. 

Its  importance  can  hardly  be  exaggerated,  for  it  is  the 
fact  that  in  war  bullets  almost  invariably  fly  too  high  or  too 
low— men  generally  pick  up  the  line,  but  the  elevation  bothers 
them— and  now  that  our  rifles  give  a  practically  flat  trajectory 
for  800  yards,  or  nearly  so,  if  once  that  tendency  to  vertical 
jump,  due  to  the  mechanically  false  support  the  left  arm  gives 


was  about  the  most  unscientific  and  unmcchanical  idea  in  the 
world,  and,  moreover,  that  with  modern  sporting  or  military 
rifles  there  was  no  longer  the  slightest  reason  for  it,  for  the 
recoil  is  perfectly  controllable. 

So  I  tried  as  an  experiment  grasping  the  sling  of  my  rifle 
firmly  in  the  left  hand,  extending  the  arm  to  its  fuU  extent  and 
then  leaving  my  trigger  finger  free,  pulling  with  my  right  hand 
against  the  left  as  if  I  was  straining  a  bow.  The  result  was 
quite  startling.  The  left  arm  now  having  become  a  rigid  stmt 
all  tendency  to  wobble  vanished,  and  I  found  I  could  pump  out 
lead  with  an  accuracy  as  regards  vertical  error  that  I  had  not 
imagined  possible. 

Subsequently,  I  tried  the  experiment  with  some  of  my 
volunteers,  and  the  results  astounded  us  all ;  in  a  few  rounds 
they  had  caught  up  the  trick,  and  after  running  and  doubling 
about  till  their  hands  were  quite  jumpy  they  made  shooting 
which  would  have  won  any  field-firing  cup  in  the  kingdom. 

Unfortunately,  I  failed  altogether  to  get  the  authorities 
at  Hythe  to  give  the  idea  a  fair  trial  in  my  presence.  Instead  of 
trying  two  teams  against  each  other  under  the  closest  approxima- 
tion to  battlefield  conditions  practicable,  they  insisted  on  trying 
a  man  whom  I  had  not  instructed  against  some  of  their  crack 
mirksmcn  at  deliberate  target  practice  on  a  dead  calm  day. 
Ab  on  such  a  day  anybody  could  make  a  whole  possible  score. 


Fia  2. 


THS  POSmON  OT 
PBBSBNT  WITH 
LIFT  AKU  RIQID, 
AS  BUOOESTED  BT 
"  ,  TKB  WWTKB, 


to  the  rifle,  is'eliminated,  our'fire'would  sweep  the  ground  like  a 
very  scythe  of  death — there  could  be  no  escape  from  it. 

In  an  attack  resolutely  pushed  home,  men  must  fire  standing, 
there  is  no  time  to  lie  down,  and,  anyhow,  men  with  their  blood 
thoroughly  roused  and  out  to  kill,  don't  think  of  themselves. 
Even  the  Boers,  the  coolest  and  most  skilful  takers  of  cover  in 
the  world,  almost  invariably  stood  up  to  receive  a  rush.  Men 
don't  like  to  die  lying  down,  it  is  not  in  the  racial  strain. 


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16* 


October  31,    19 14 


LAND     AND     WATER 


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I  How  to  help  Tommy  Atkins  | 

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Tailor-mades 


We  have  just  made  up  about 
250  Smart  Winter  Tailor- 
madesin  four  designs, of  which 
the  garment  sketched  is  an 
example  These  Suits  are 
made  from  hit,'h-grade  Novelly 
Tweeds,  Vicunas,  Boucle 
Cloths  and  Striped  Velours, 
which  sell  in  the  ordmary  way 
at  from  7/6  to  10/6  per  yard. 
As  the  quantity  is  limited  the 
garments  cannot  be  sent  on 
approval,  or  made  specially 
to  order. 

Smart  Street  Suit  {as  sketch), 
in  high-grade  Novelty  Tweeds, 
Vicunas,  BoucleCloths.  jQ  A 
All  dark  shades.  oC^F 

Actual    value   5J    to  64  gns. 
CATALOGUE     POST    FflEE. 


KHAKI    ARMY    RUGS 

Very  warm  and  durable. 
Size  6o  in.  by  90  in. 

Each  I0f6 
100  Rugs  for  £50 


DebenViam 
&Freebody 

Wifjmopo  Street. 
lC»vrndi«h  Sqoarr)  London  W 


r*»  LANCET  lays :    "  Wi  /ounJ  that  Ikt  slalrmenis  madt 

in  rttard  Iq  Iht  mtritt  •/  tjiis  paptr  an  correct.       ike    ffr, 

at    any    rate,    it  free    from    injurious    or    irritating    substanc, 

smooth,    and,   while  firm,  becomes  soft    and  apparently  soluble  like  thin 

rice  paper  in  contact  with  water. ' ' 


THE  MOSTPERFECT TOILET  PAPER  EVER  PRODUCED 


t^/^^ 


II  you  are  not  uiio*  "NOVIO"  TOILET  PAPER         ^"^^Ci*] 
you    nre     not    uaing     the     BEST    AND     MOST  ECONOMICAL. 
Co«u    but    little    more    than    the    cheaper    nukes,     and    thr     ROLLS 
CONTAIN     MORE     THAN      DOUBLE      THE      QUANnTT. 


ANTISEPTIC-THINSOFT-STRONG  &  SILKY 


Uada  Is  ENQLANI)  bj  ElfSLiaH  FaH  amploriac  XNOLISH  LABOUR 

SOLO    BVERYWHBRB    in    Rolli,     Packeta,    Cartona,     by    all 

Chemiata,  Storea,  Grocera,  and  Stationera. 

Wholeaale    only   of  the  Sole   Makera.   Chadwick    Worka. 

26  Grove  Park,  S.E. 


NATIONAL   RELIEF   FUND 


THE     PRINCE     TO     THE     PEOPLE 


"Buckingham  Palace. 
"At  such  a  moment  we  all  stand  by  one  another, 
and  it  is  to  the  heart  of  the  British  people  that  I 
confidently   make    this    most    earnest  appeal. 

"EDWARD   P." 

Subscripltons  musi  be  addressed  to  : 

H.R.H.     THE     PRINCE    OF     WALES. 
BUCKINGHAM    PALACE.    LONDON. 

All  letters  may  be  sent  post  free. 


LAND    AND     WATER 


October  31,    19 14 


Ttr^T^ 


THROUGH   THE   EYES 
OF  A  WOMAN 

Some  Everyday  Impressions 


LONDON  streets'are  infinitely  interesting  these  days. 
There  is  always  something  to  hold  the  attention 
of   the   passer-by,    and    much    that    marks    this 
present  time  as  being  different  from  all  others. 
For  one  thing,  we  have  never  been  so  cosmopolitan 
as  we  are  now.     Nearly  every  other  person  to  be  seen  bears 
unmistakable  traces  of  French  or  Belgian  nationality,  and 
there  are  not  a  few  Russians  in  our  midst.     We  have  grown 
accustomed  to  the  sight  of  little  groups  of  people  struggling 
to  make  themselves  understood  in  a  strange  country.     We 
have  also  grown  accustomed  to  the  good  Samaritan   who 
almost  invariably  arrives  to  act  as  interpreter  and  earns  a 
genuine  gratitude.     One  of  the  most  cheering  signs  of  the 
times  indeed,  is  the  anxiety  shown  by  the  English  people  to 
help  in  all  possible  ways.     And  this  spirit  of  camaraderie 
grows  and  continues  to  flourish.     It  should  mean  the  breaking 
of  that  national  reserve  and  aloofness  upon  which,  though 
low  be  it  spoken,  we  have  undoubtedly  prided  ourselves. 
Circumstances  have  proved  too  strong,  and  even  such  a  long- 
established  tradition  as  this  vanishes  before  the  bonds  uniting 
the  Allies.     Another  point  worthy  of  note  is  the  vast  variety 
of  uniforms  to  be  seen.     Here  a  Belgian  officer  passes  swiftly 
on  foot,  receiving  and  returning  the  salute  of  an  officer  of  the 
Enghsh  army,  wearing  the  badges  of  major's  rank  and  a 
line  of  war  ribbons.     Further  along  are  two  Belgian  privates, 
one  of  whom  is  limping  rather  badly,  while  both  look  sorely 
in  need  of  care  and  rest.     Naval  officers  in  undress  uniform 
wend  their  way  along,  either  coming  from  or  going  to  the 
Admiralty.     Men  from  India,  still  wearing  their  sun-helmets 
and  burnt  brown  after  a  sojourn  in  the  tropics,  jostle  the 
elbow  of  some  pale-faced  Londoner  wearing  a  medallion  to 
show  he  has  joined  some  particular  branch  of  the  New  Army 
and  awaits  Service  dress.     Close  to  the  headquarters  of  their 
regiment  are  some  men  wearing  the  well-known  uniform  of 
the  London  Scottish,  with  its  unobtrusive  kilt.     Then  there 
are  the  dispatch  riders  on  motor  cycles,  with  the  blue  and 
white  band  of  their  calhng  round  their  arm,  and  proceeding 
in  recognised  disdain  of  speed  limits  and  their  requirements. 

The  Army  in  Making 

We  are  not  at  all  ashamed  of  the  impulse  which  makes 
us  stand  still  to  watch  the  passing  by  of  a  battalion  of 
Kitchener's  Army  as  it  marches  along,  singing  a  snatch  of 
some  well-known  song.  All  sorts  and  conditions  of  men  are 
numbered  in  the  ranks,  from  the  stable  lad  to  the  boy  who 
looks  as  if  he  had  not  left  public  school  days  very  far  behind. 
All  sorts  and  conditions  of  hats  and  suits  are  worn  also,  for 
the  recruit  and  his  uniform  are  long  parted.  Now  and  again 
some  enthusiast  creates  a  diversion  by  waving  his  hat  at 
these  citizens  who  have  answered  their  country's  call ;  but, 
apart  from  this,  it  must  be  admitted  that  it  is  our  trans- 
Atlantic  cousins  who  make  most  demonstration  as  the  steady 
tramp  goes  by.  One  attractive  Washingtonian,  waving  a 
minute  handkerchief  vigorously,  was  forcible  in  her  dis- 
approval of  English  methods.  "  You  watch  your  New 
Army,"   she  said,   indignantly,   "  but   why  don't   you  give 

them  a  cheer.     Now,  if  it  were  us !  "     And  no  j^mount 

of  excuse  of  the  true  Britisher  and  his  truly  British  habits 
would  satisfy  her.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  quite  likely 
that  the  Englishman,  being  such  as  he  is,  would  be  the  first 
to  deprecate  any  undue  notice  as  he  makes  his  way  through 
the  streets  on  route-marching  bent.  He  has  made  soldiering 
his  business,  like  he  makes  most  other  things  his  business 
that  he  takes  it  into  his  mind  to  do.  To  form  part  of  a 
spectacular  show  will  certainly  rasp  his  sense  of  fitness,  and 
even  if  attention  be  not  meant  in  this  way  he  will  probably 
get  it  into  his  head  that  it  is  As  a  nation  we  have  certainly 
brought  disguise  of  our  feelings  to  a  fine  art,  and  this  char- 
acteristic is  dear  to  the  heart  of  the  race.  The  dread  of 
anything  approaching  emotion,  or  what  we  are  pleased  to 
term  bad  form,  is  the  strongest  of  motives,  accounting  for 
much  that  is  quite  incomprehensible  to  people  of  other 
nationahties.  The  laconic  Englishman  has  been  a  butt  for 
much  good-natured  and  some  spiteful  ridicule,  but  this  very 


quality  makes  him  "  the  first-rate  fighting  man  "  of  whom 
we  are  so  justly  proud  to-day.  The  keynote  of  the  country's 
attitude  towards  this  crisis  of  its  fate  was  struck  by  the 
manner  in  which  the  c?mpaign  both  on  land  and  sea  opened 
Fleet  and  Army  arrived  at  their  allotted  posts  in  silence,  and 
nothing  could  have  been  more  impressive  than  the  grim 
quiet  with  which  they  handled  their  appointed  tasks  from 
that  time  forward. 

Every  Little  Helps 

Such  is  the  motto  of  the  entirely  fascinating  toyshop 
which  has  been  started  at  21  Old  Bond  Street  by  Mrs.  Duveen. 
It  is  known  as  "  The  Toy  Shop,"  and  is  thus  a  toy  shop  both 
by  name  and  by  nature.     Its  object  is  no  less  excellent  than 
the  helping  of  the  Belgian  Relief  Fund  in  Belgium.     All  the 
profits  are  going  to  be  devoted  to  the  succour  of  the  unfor- 
tunate people  left  behind  in  the  devastated  districts  of  this 
country.     With  such  an  aim  in  view  it  is  no  wonder  that 
"  The  Toy  Shop  "  has  the  support  of  Comte  de  Lalaing,  the 
Belgian  Minister  in  England,  and  that  he  opened  it  at  a  very 
attractive  little  ceremony  of  inauguration.     It  is  charming 
to  see  this  toy  shop,  both  inside  and  out.      A  carefully  limited 
number  of  toys  are  arranged  by  a  clever  hand  on  a  dark  back- 
ground in  either  window.     Inside,  also,  it  is  easy  to  realise 
that    here    may    be    found    toys  to   please  even   the  most 
sophisticated    of    children.      Some    of    these    toys    are    in- 
structive without  being  boring,  and  by  their   means   many 
a    child    will   be    coaxed    to    improve    his    httle    mind    as 
well   as  amuse  it.     We  all  know  how  many  children  resent 
instruction  presented  to  them  in  play-time  guise.     It  is  the 
old  story  of  the  powder  and  the  jam — an  unfair  combination, 
as  all  must  agree,   grown-up  people  as  well  as  the  nursery 
folk.     This    charge,    however,    cannot    be    made    against    a 
spelling  game  played  with  carved  letters,  which  can  be  made 
to   stand  upright   in   a   grooved  wooden  stand.     "  The  Toy 
Shop  "  is 'busy  now,  but  it  will  certainly  grow  busier  still  as 
Christmas  looms  nearer  and  nearer    and   toy-making  as  an 
English  industry  progresses.     To  this  end  and  in  connection 
with  this  particular  venture  a  toy  manufactory  has  just  been 
started  at  Reading,  and  from  this  a  great  number  of  the 
supplies  will  come.      Every  good  idea   is   welcomed   in  the 
region  of  toyland,  where  the  magic  word  "  novelty  "   spells 
"  Open  Sesame,"    when  it  is  such  as  will  appeal  to  the  rising 
generation  and  its  critical  standards. 

Gardens  Trim 

Lady  Catherine  Milnes  Gaskell  is  one  of  the  many  who 
are  doing  all  they  can  to  help  our  soldiers  and  sailors.  She 
has  been  selling  rock  and  herbaceous  plants  for  the  benefit  of 
the  sick  and  wounded,  and  a  few  days  ago  had  made  ^4  by 
this  means.  Lady  Catherine's  gardens  at  Wenlock  Abbey, 
in  Shropshire,  are  justly  famous,  and  of  late  years  she  has 

-  made  a  special  study  of  rock  gardens  and  their  suitable 
planting.  A  rock  garden,  indeed,  can  afford  many  hours  of 
pleasure  to  any  reasonable  individual.  The  collection  and 
rearing  of  suitable  rock  garden  plants  is  a  hobby  in  itself, 
and  when  two  rock  gardeners  meet  they  have,  as  a  general 

,  rule,  but  one  topic  of  conversation.  A  rock  garden, 
'indeed,  is  apt  to  become  so  absorbing  that  it  grows  into  a 
considerable  extravagance.  But  when  we  can  combine  our 
own  besetting  hobby  with  the  most  deserving  of  charities  our 
state   is  indeed  gracious.  _       Erica. 


The  French  Government  has  officially  recognised  the  Blue  Cross, 
and  Captain  Claremont  has  been  deputed  by  the  French  Minister  of 
War  to  immediately  instal  eight  base  hospitals  for  wounded  horses  at 
the  front.  Donations  immediately  required.  Arthur  •  J.  Coke. 
Secretary,  Our  Dumb  Friends'  League,  58  Victoria  Street,  London,  S.W. 

Horse  Sale  at  Leicester. — ^Messrs.  Warner,  Sheppard  and 
Wade  held  a  sale  of  horses  at  the  Repository  on  Saturday,  October 
17.  Good  prices  were  realised,  the  following  being  some  of  the 
principal : — 


Gns. 

Grey  mare 66 

Tojiper 55 

Polly 40 

Chestnut  mure  (cob)   49 


Gns. 

Defender  72 

Fortuna 81 

Badger  (cob)     44 

lirowu  Peter    44 


56 


The  County  Gentleman 


AND 


LAND  &WATER 

Vol.  LXIV.        No.  2737  SATURDAY,  OCTOBER  24,  1914.  [rNE^^pipEl']     pi'^'^'^^i-^i'i^nce 


PUBLISHED  WEEKLY 


Copyrii;kt,  West  &  Son,  Saitllnea 


LIEUT.-COMMANDER    MAX    K.     HORTON 

Whose  brilliant  exploits   with  Submarine  E9  have  done  much  to  satisfy  public  opinion  that  the 

vigilance  of  our   Navy  is  as  marked  as  its  silence. 


LAND    AND     WATER 


Octolicr  24,    191. 


Chiffon  Velvet 

FROCKS 


Uesiuiied  by  our  own  arlist 
and  made  by  liighly-skilleil 
workers  from  rich  soft  Lyons 
chilTon  velvet.  Some  idea  of 
the  value  of  these  frocks  will 
Iw  (,'athered  from  the  fact  that 
the  chiffon  velvet  from  which 
they  are  made  is  on  sale  in 
our  silk  department  at  12/6 
per  \ard. 

Smart  Afternoon  or  Rei- 
taurant  Frock  (as  sketch),  in 
best  quality  Lyons  silk  chiffon 
velvet.  Cleverly      draped 

bodice  with  sash  ends  at  back, 
giving  long-waisted  effect. 
Skirt  with  the  new  over-tunic. 
In  black  and  newest  colourings 

98/6 

Actual  value,  6i  gns. 


DebenKam 
&Freebpdly, 

Wigmorc  Street. 
tCovehdisU  Square)  London.^X' 


BURBERRY   WAR   KIT 

The  Burberry  Weatherproof 

Infantry    or    Cavalry    Patternt, 
lined     wool,     fleece,     or     fur. 

WHAT  THE  OFI^ICKK  NEEDS!  An 
Officer  at  the  front  writing  to  an  Officer  at 
home,  giving  hints  as  to  kit.  insists  on  the 
necessitv  of  "  A  BUKBEKRY." 

Vide  "  Times,"   i3-io-i4. 

LORD    KITCHENER    referring    to    THE 
BURBERRY  described  it  as  "a  most  va!u 
able  addition  to  his  campaigning  kit." 
Burberry   Coals   are  labelled   "  Burberry*." 
Be  sure   that    yours    is   Renuine,    otherwise 
at  sorest  need   the  imitation    may  fail   you. 

Burberry  Khaki  Uniforms 

]  )esigned  by  15urberrys  for  the  War  Office, 
and  proofed  by  their  process,  are  supplied  with 
the  greatest  expedition, 

British 
Warms 

Made  in  Burberry- 
proofed  Regulation  coat- 
ing, lined  Camel  Fleece 
or  Fur. 

Burberrys'WarKil 

includes,  besides  full 
Service  Dress,  Haver- 
sacks. Slings,  Puttees, 
Shirts,  Sam  Browne 
Belts,      Water     Bottles. 

Gabardine  Ground 
Sheets  and  Sleeping  Bags 

GABARDINE  DAWAC— a 
Bivouac  weiKhinK  only  3  \  lbs. 
inclusive  of  pess. 

Regiments  in  any  part  o) 
the  United  Kingdom  waited 
upon  by  apf-ointment. 


The   Burberry 


Burberry  Servicn  Drru 

OFFICERS  IN  FRANCE 
can  obtain  all  War  Kit 
from  Burberrys'  Paris 
House. 


BURBERRYS    Haymarket    s.w.    LONDON 

8   4   10  Boul  Malesherbej  PARIS;  Basingstoke  and  Provincial  Agents. 


IMPORTANT     PRIVATE     SALE 


OF 


HIGH-CLASS  SECOND-HAND  AND  ANTIQUE  FURNI- 
TURE,   CARPETS,    PLATE,    LINEN,    PICTURES,    PIANOS 


TO  THE  VALUE  OF  OVER  £500,000.         IHVST  BE  SOLD  EIMTIRELV   WITHOUT  RESERVE. 

ENTIRE  COMTEiyTS  OF  A  LARGE  WEST-END  CLUR 


Removed  from  St.  James's  St.» 
for  convenience  of  Sale. 


S.W. 


ANY  ARTICLE  MAY  BE  HAD  SEPARATELY,  and,  if  desired,  CAN  REMAIN  Stored  Free,  and  payment  made  when 
delivery  required,  or  will  be  PACKED  FREE  AND  DELIVERED  OK  SHIPPED  TO  ANY  PART  OF  THE  WORLD. 


98    COMPLETE    BEDROOMS. 

Comprising  i6  well-made  solid  oak  bedroom  suites  complete  £3  17».  6d. ;  solid  oak 
bedsteads  to  match,  complete  16t.  fid. ;  handsome  china  toilet  services,  from  St.  fid. ; 
large  b^-droom  and  other  carpets,  from  7».  fid.  ;  u  well-made  solid  walnut  bedroom 
suites  complete  at  5  ftt. ;  massive  black  and  brass-mounted  bedsteads,  full  size,  com- 
plete with  spring  mattresses,  at  25t. ;  three  very  handsome  design  white  enamel  bed- 
room suites  of  Louis  XIV.  style  at  £5  ISt. ;  four  well-made  large  solid  oak  bedroom 
suites  at  £fi  17».  fid. ;  four  very  artistic  Sheraton  design  inlaid  mahogany  bedroom  suites 
at  £7  ISt.  ;  three  artistic  large  solid  walnut  bedroom  suites  at  £9  17t.  fid.  ;  several  f\ne 
Oil!  F.nglish  gent's  wardrobes,  fitted  slidiiiit  trays  and  drawers,  from  £S  15t.  ;  several 
fine  bow-front  and  other  chests  of  drawers,  from  57t,  fid. ;  old  Queen  Anne  and  other 
tallboy  chests,  from  fi^;  six  very  choice  inlaid  mahouanv  bedroom  suites.  IS  St.  ; 
elaborate  all-brass  Sheraton  style  bedsteads  with  superior  sprinu  mattresses  complete, 
46t. ;  choice  Chippendale  design  bedroom  suites,  12  gt. .  Chippen.ialc  design  beiisteads 
to  match  ;  Queen  Anne  design  solid  mahogany  bedroom  suites.  £14  14s.;  all-brass  square 
tube  full-?tize  bedsteads  with  superior  spring  mattresses,  at  £3  17t.  fid.  ;  costly  Chippen 
dale  design  mahogany  bedroom  suite,  Ifigt, ;  costly  inlaid  satinwood  bedroom  suites 
£45  :  panelled  satinwood  bedstead  to  match,  9  gt. 

DINING-ROOMS,  SMOKING-ROOMS  AND   LIBRARIES 

Several  fine  quality  real  Turkey  carpets  about  g  ft.  by  12  ft.  from  £4  17«.  fid.  ; 
real  Turkey  rugs  at  17t.  fid. ;  massive  carved  oak  sideboard,  £5  15».  ;  overmantel 
himent  to  match,  £2  lOt.  ;  extending  dining  table  to  match,  £2  17t.  fid.;  two 
elegantly-carved  armchairs  and  six  small  ditto  to  match,  £fi  15s. ;  elegant  Queen  Anne 
design  sideboard,  fitted  drawers,  cupboards,  etc  .  £7  ISt.;    set  of  eight  Queen  Anne 


design  dining  room  chairs,  comprising  two  large  carved  chairs  and  six  smaller  ditto 
£7  ISt.  ;  oval  extending  Queen  Anne  design  dining  table  £4  lOt.  ;  Queen  Anne  design 
mantel  mirror  to  match,  4Jt. ;  18  luxurious  Chesterfield  settees,  £2  ISt.  ;  luxurious 
lounge  easy  chairs  to  match  at  £1  lOt. ;  magnificently  carved  grandfather  clocks; 
fine  tone  upright  piano,  £7  15t.  ;  a  magnificent  instrument  by  George  Hrinsnirad, 
12  gt. ;  and  an  exceptionally  fine  small  grand  piano,  £25,  equal  to  new.  Several  sets 
of  complete  Old  English  table  glass  from  £4  ISt.  i  set  of  four  oak  American  roll-top 
desks  at  £5  15t.  ;  and  many  other  items  too  numerous  to  mention  here. 

DRAWING-ROOMS    AND  ANTE-ROOMS. 

Nineteen  elegant  design  large  Axminster  bordered  carpets  from  3  gt.  :  elegant 
design  suite,  comprising  luxuriously  sprung  settee,  with  two  lounge  easy  chairs  and  four 
occasional  chairs,  covtred  rich  Paris  silk  tapestry,  £9  ISt.  ;  verv  elegant  Louis  XIV, 
desiijn  china  cabinet  to  umIcIi,  £fi  ISt.  ;  choice  centre  table,  21 1. ;  and  Louis  NIV, 
desit;n  ovt-rmantel,  35t.  "  elaborately  carved  and  gilt  Louis  Seize  design  suite  of  seven 
pieces,  including  settee,  12  gt.  complete;  white  enamelled  French  cabinets;  Vernis 
Marten  painted  tables,  escritoires,  etc  ;  the  satinwood  decorated  china  cabinet, 
4  ft.  6  in.  wide.  £14  14t.  -,  satinwood  decorated  centre  table,  £2  lOt.  ;  satinwood 
decorated  overmantel,  £3  lOt.  ;  costly  satinwood  decorated  suite,  covered  choice 
brocade  gobelin  blue  silk.  £16  IBs. 

Also  BED  and  TABLE  LINKN-.  Tarpels,  Curtains,  Draperies,  &c. 

SILVER  and  SHEFFIELD  PLATE,  itc.  &c. 

Five  full-sized  billiard  tnbles  from  SO  gt.  complete  with  all  accessories.  Billiard 
dinine  table,  three  iron  safes,  and  thousands  of  other  items  impossible  to  mention  here. 


including  two  nearly  new  motor  cars. 
Write  /or  Complete  Catalogue  {'*  Land  and   iVater").  Illustrated  bv  Photographs.       Now  Ready.        Settt  anyu'here  Post  Free. 

THE  FURNITURE  &  FINE  ART  DEPOSITORIES,  Ltd. 


Grand  Prix, 
Diploma  of  Honour,  and 


By  Royal  Appointment 


Gold  Medals, 
Paris  Exhibition,  1913. 


48   to   50   PARK   STREET,    UPPER   STREET,    ISLINGTON,    LONDON, 

IMPORTANT      NOTICE. - 

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44 


October  24,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


THE    WAR    BY    LAND. 

By  HILAIRE    BELLOG. 


THE  MAIN  ACTION  ON  THE  VISTULA. 

^  g  ^HE  Allies,  as  we  shall  see  iu  a  later  part  of 
these  notes,  have  in  the  last  week  pushed 
forward  a  strong  wedge  into  Belgium, 
threatening  and,  perhaps,  rendering  hope- 
less a  German  advance  alonsj  the  sea  coast  to  the  Straits 
of  Dover.  They  have  gained  gi-ound  to  the  south  of 
Lille  and  of  Arras,  and  have  advanced  further  towards 
their  goal,  the  main  line  of  German  communications 
into  France.     A  fresh    and  violent  German  counter- 


T 


still  turns  upon  the  results  of  that  yet  gi'eater  action 
engaged  at  this  moment  upon  the  Vistula  Eiver.  If  it 
go  against  the  Germans,  no  temporary  success  can  save 
them  in  the  west.  If  it  go  against  the  Russians,  nothing 
the  Allies  do  in  the  west  can  prevent  the  arrival  there 
of  strong  reinforcements  for  their  German  enemies-. 

It  will  be  important  for  our  judgment  of  this 
vast  action  on  the  Vistula  and  for  following  the  future 
chances  of  the  war  in  this  field  to  appreciate  the 
elements  of  the  ground  over  which  it  is  being  fought. 


THORfiU 


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( 

i 


i:.M  P  /  /?  ^ 


KALISCH\* 


NEWGEORCi^VSK 

PlETROKOwJpf^"''^ 

V.  <)  /  •  '    "^^JVANGOROD 

\      £^  ,-^ '  "X         ^^NEW  ALEXANDRIA 

\        :     KIELCE   \       ^ 


>M 


PRZEMYSL 


-y/ 


%m. 


attack  near  Chaulnes  has  been  thrown  back,     livery-  The  River"  Vistula,  rising    in  the   Carpathians, 

thing     in    the  we.st    points    to    some    considerable  runs  in  a  great  bend  eastward,  then  northward,  till  it 

nvodification  in  the  near  future  of  tlic  deivdlock  there,  falls  into  the  Baltic  near  Dantzig.     On  its  very  mid- 

But  it  remains  true  that  the  campaign  as  a  whole  course  stands  the  modem  Polish  capital  of  Wai'saw. 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


October  24,  1914 


Tlio  battle  is  joined  upon  aU  its  central  reaches  from 
Warsaw  southward  and  on  along  the  San  to  the 
Cai-patluans. 

The  Vistula  first  tumbles  as  a  mountain  torrent 
through  the  foothills  of  the  Carpathians,  then 
flowing  east  and  west  past  the  great  fortress  and 
ancient  Polish  capital  of  Cracow  it  begins  to  trend 
north,  and  reaches,  in  about  two  hundred  miles, 
the  little  town  of  Sandomir.  In  all  the  lower  part 
of  this  first  division  it  forms  the  artificial  frontier 
between  Austria  and  the  Eussian  Empire,  though,  of 
course,  both  banks  are  really  Polish,  and  the  whole 
territory  of  "Warsaw  and  Cracow  is  but  the  ancient 
sacred  south,  the  later  centre  and  heart  of  an  undying 
Poland. 

The  province  lying  to  the  south  of  this  artificial 
Austro-Eussian  frontier  and  stretching  up  to  the  crest 
of  the  Carpathians  is  called  Galicia.  To  the  north  of 
this  frontier  and  to  the  east  of  the  equally  artificial 
frontier  between  the  Eussian  and  the  German  Empires 
lies  the  western  part  of  Eussian  Poland  with  its  five 
main  GrOA^ernments  of  Kielce,  Eadom,  Petrokow, 
Warsaw,  and  Kalisch. 

About  four  and  a  half  miles  below  the  isolated 
castle-hiU  of  Sandomir  comes  in  from  the  south  and 
east  the  main  tributary  called  the  San,  upon  the 
upper  waters  of  which,  also  in  the  foothills  of  the 
Carpathians,  stands  the  great  fortress  of  Przemysl. 

After  the  two  rivers  have  joined,  the  Vistula 
runs  north  tlirough  a  trench  commanded  upon  either 
side  by  hills,  fii'st  fairly  high,  then  gradually  falling. 
It  turns  a  rather  sharp  bend  after  the  issue  from 
these  hills  at  the  place  now  called  "  New  Alexandria  " 
and  there  enters  the  plains  which  run  almost  un- 
inteimptedly  to  the  Baltic.  Twenty  miles  further  it 
passes  the  fortified  point  now  called  Ivangorod,  which 
town  (it  will  be  important  to  remember  this  in  the 
development  of  the  battle)  lies  on  the  eastern  or  right 
bank  of  the  stream.  Thence  another  sixty  miles  of 
course  now  trending  westward  brings  it  to  Warsaw 
upon  the  left  bank,  and  somewhat  lower  down  to  the 
fortress  of  New  Georgievsk,  beyond  which  it  does  not 
concern  us  in  the  matter  of  this  battle. 

In  all  this  stretch  of  the  river  between  Sandomir 
and  Warsaw  the  Vistula,  everywhere  broad  and  fairly 
deep,  is  of  course  increasing  in  depth  and  breadth. 
It  is  already  a  large  river  below  Ivangorod,  three 
to  four  hundred  yards  across  at  Sandomir,  quite  six 
hundred  at  Warsaw.  It  is  navigable  even  in  dry 
seasons  all  the  way,  and  all  the  way  there  is  no  ford. 
At  this  moment  the  water  is  high  and  the  current  con- 
siderable. Note,  for  further  consideration  in  the 
action,  the  tributary  known  as  the  PUica,  having  the 
town  of  Warka  upon  its  north  or  left  bank ;  it  is,  as  we 
shall  see,  of  high  strategical  importance.  Note 
further  the  town  of  Grojec,  the  junction  of  seven  roads 
and  a  point  which  gives  to  whoever  holds  it,  a  choice 
in  his  avenues  of  approach  from  the  west  and  from 
Germany  to  Warsaw  and  to  the  Lower  Eiver. 

After  a  continuous  German  advance  through 
Western  Poland  and  as  continuous  a  Eussian  retire- 
ment before  it,  the  invaders  reached  the  neighbourhood 
of  Warsaw  uj)on  the  north  and  touched  the  Vistula 
itself  in  all  its  middle  course  from  Ivangorod  to 
southward ;  while  southward  again,  the  Austrians,  after 
their  long  retreat,  turned  and  advanced  abreast  of 
their  Allies  through  Western  Galicia  till  they  reached 
the  San. 

At  the  end  of  all  this — about  a  week  ago — the 
whole  Eussian  force  had  concentrated  (meeting  its 
continual  reinforcement  front  the  east)  upon  positions 
which  ran  from  near  Warsaw  upon  the  north,  aU  along 


the  east  bank  of  the  middle  Vistula,  then  along  and  up 
the  east  bank  of  the  San  to  the  batteries  em  placed 
before  Przemysl  and  so  to  the  Carpathian  Mountains. 

This  great  position — the  Eussian  retention  of, 
retreat  beyond,  or  advance  from,  which  history  wiU 
probably  call  the  BaUle  of  the  Vistula — is  fully  as 
long  as  the  corresponding  great  position  in  the  west, 
that  is  more  than  250  but  less  than  300  miles.  As 
in  the  west,  two  nearly  equal  forces,  each  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  two  million  men,  are  struggling  each  to 
break  or  turn  the  opposing  line.  Again,  as  in  the 
west,  that  line  has  been  thrust  back  by  the  Germanic 
powers  upon  the  territory  of  Germany's  enemies.  As 
in  the  west,  the  main  du-ection  of  the  fronts  runs  from 
north-west  to  south-east.  There  is  a  remarkable 
parallelism  between  the  two  great  conflicts,  800  miles 
apart,  upon  whose  co-relative  fates  the  future  of 
Eui-ope  should  depend.  But  when  this  parallelism  of 
certain  main  elements — some  of  them  accidental — has 
been  noted,  the  comparison  fails. 

In  the  first  place,  the  line  of  battle  along  the 
Vistula  is  one  of  extreme  topographical  simplicity — as 
contrasted  with  that  in  the  west,  wliich  depends  now 
upon  a  range  of  mountains  like  the  Vosges,  now  upon  a 
forest  like  the  Argonne,  now  upon  a  small  river  like 
the  lower  Aisne,  now  again  upon  an  entrenched  but 
open  plain  like  the  Champagne.  The  Polish  position 
is  simply  the  line  of  the  Middle  Vistula  between 
Warsaw  and  Sandomir,  or,  more  accurately,  between 
Warsaw  and  the  mouth  of  the  San ;  it  is  then  con- 
tinued up  the  San  nearly  to  its  source  In  front  of 
Przemysl,  and  so  across  the  foot  hills  to  the  Car- 
pathian Mountains. 

No  more  elementary  strategic  thesis  could  ba 
conceived.  The  Eussians  are  holding  the  line  of  the 
San  and  the  middle  Vistula  ;  it  is  the  business  of  the 
Austrians  and  Gennans  to  pierce  them  upon  that  line, 
or  at  the  least  to  hold  them  there  in  check  and  to  forbid 
their  further  advance.  It  is  the  business  of  the 
Eussians  to  hold  the  continuous  line  of  the  two  rivera 
and  by  turning  or  breaking  the  Germanic  forces  facing 
them  to  compel  them  to  retire. 

There  is  another  contrast  in  the  nature  of  the  line. 
All  the  western  rivers  concerned  in  the  present  actions 
in  France  and  Belgium  are  comparatively  narrow  and 
slow ;  everywhere  bridged,  and  when  the  bridges  are 
destroyed  easily  to  be  bridged  again  by  the  engineers 
of  either  army.  Often  they  are  fordable.  But  tha 
Vistula  is  everywhere  deep  and  broad  and  swift  and, 
save  at  two  points —  Warsaw  and  Ivangorod,  unbridged. 
The  San,  save  in  quite  its  upper  part,  is  an  equally 
simple  and  absolute  obstacle  though  better  bridged. 

Again  there  is  a  great  contrast  between  the 
eastern  and  the  western  fields  in  the  matter  of  railway 
and  road  communications. 

There  is  here  of  course  the  main  point  that 
whereas  in  the  west  the  railways  are  very  numerous 
and  hard  macadamised  roads  universal  and  serving 
every  four  or  five  miles  of  country,  such  roads  are 
rare  in  Poland  and  railways  rarer  still.  But  there 
is  more. 

The  Vistula,  the  one  main  artery  of  the  country, 
is  not  even  served  as  are  all  the  great  rivers  of 
Westeni  Europe  by  a  railway  line  parallel  to  itself. 
There  is,  indeed,  such  a  railway  line  from  Warsaw 
past  Ivangorod  to  New  Alexandria,  but  beyond  that 
point  the  railway  trends  off  eastward  to  Lublin,  and 
between  that  point  and  Sandomir  there  is  no  railway 
following  either  bank  of  the  river.  There  is  no 
direct  and  continuous  facility  for  the  supply  of 
ammunition  and  food  by  rail  to  the  millions  lined 
up  on  the  opposing  sides  of  the  stream. 


2* 


October  24,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


Sucli  facilities  are  only  to  he  found  in  two  very 
simple  groups. 

There  is  from  the  east  and  to  supply  the 
Russians  that  line  which  comes  from  Kieff  up  to 
Lublin.  There  is  from  the  west  and  to  supply  the 
Germans  the  branch  line  with  its  rail  head  at 
Ostroviecs — a  good  deal  nearer  the  river  than  Lublin. 

In  the  last  section  of  the  line,  along  the  San, 
the  Austriiins  have  excellent  railway  supply  up 
from  the  main  line  at  Jaroslav,  and  through  Debitza 
junction,  with  the  railway  exactly  serving  aU  their 
bank  of  the  San.  While  the  Russians  have  nothing 
north  of  the  main  line  from  Kieff  and  Lemberg, 
which  serves  their  positions  in  front  of  Przemysl. 

We  see,  therefore,  that  the  Austro-German  line 


*rARSAV< 


^a' 


t>*' 


RwmAustrian 
*««  German        . 
Eases  of  Supply  ^^ 


west  of  the  Vistula  and  the  San  has  its  best  railway 
supply  just  opposite  the  points  where  the  Russian  railway 
supply  on  the  other  bank  is  lacking.  The  Germans  are 
better  served  on  the  Middle  Vistula  from  Ostroviecs 
than  the  Russians  can  be  from  Lublin.  They  are 
admirably  served  all  along  the  lower  San  where  the 
Russians  are  cot  sen'ed  at  all.  On  the  other  hand, 
between  the  Radom — Ivangorod  line  and  Warsaw, 
there  is  nothing  along  the  west  bank  to  supply  the 
Gennans  while  the  Russians  have  an  excellent  line 
parallel  to  the  river  along  their  eastern  bank  between 
Warsaw  and  Ivangorod  fed  by  lateral  lines  from  the 
East.  The  point  is  of  great  importance  because  the 
heavy  artillery  upon  which,  as  we  now  know,  the 
Germans  principally  depend,  is  useless  without  a 
sufficient  railway  supply,  and  the  general  scheme  of 
the  railways  leads  one  to  believe  that  the  principal 
effort  of  the  Gennans  will  be  made  at  the  points  where 
this  railway  system  serves  them,  that  is  in  the  middle  of 
tiie  line,  while  tlie  Russians  should  be  strongest — for 
advance,  at  least — to  the  north,  their  right.  The 
difference  of  gauge  should  not  hamper  the  Germans 
very  much,  for  they  have  provided  for  it  by  preparing 
axles  measured  to  the  Russian  gauge  and  convertible. 
A  worse  handicap  is  the  attitude  of  the  Polish 
population,  which  will  do  everything  to  interfere  with 
Gennan  supply  along  the  extended  lines  of  com- 
munication between  the  German  frontier  and  the 
Vistula.  Tliose  lines  of  communication  are  nowhere 
less  than  150  miles  long,  and  the  method  of  terror 
which  has  been  introduced  into  Western  Europe  by  the 
Prussians  in  densely  populated  and  wealthy  regions, 
and  has  there  in  the  main  failed,  Avill  be  of  even  less 
service  in  the  open  country  of  Western  Poland  with 


its  dispersed  population  and  its  few  and  not  valuable 
buildings.  When  the  history  of  the  war  comes  to  be 
Avritten,  it  will  probably  be  found  that  one  important 
element  working  against  German  victory  has  been 
the  hatred  every  Polo  has  come  to  feel  for  the 
Prussian  name,  a  hatred  due  to  the  incapacity  of  the 
Prussian  to  govern  and  to  his  crude  persecution  of 
such  Poles  as  have  the  misfortune  to  suffer  German 
rule. 

In  the  paucity  of  railways,  the  next  important 
factors  of  communication  are  the  weather  and  the 
roads. 

The  weather  we  can  only  estimate  by  tlie 
averages  of  tnany  years ;  but  it  is  worthy  of  remark 
that  the  rainfall  in  Southern  Poland  is  by  no  means 
at  its  heaviest  in  the  autumn.  The  hea\'iest  rainfall 
in  this  region  is  in  the  summer  :  and  this  is  particularly 
true  of  the  southern  pai-t  of  the  field  near  the 
Carpathian  mountains.  June  will  have  from  three 
to  four  inches  of  rain,  while  October  sometimes  has  as 
little  as  half  an  inch.  It  happens  to  have  been 
raining  heavily  during  the  last  week  over  the  northern 
part  at  least  of  the  field  of  battle,  but  the  weather 
would  be  altogether  exceptional  in  this  region  if  it 
were  to  remain  wet  for  a  long  time  on  end  in  the 
early  autumn.  If  then  the  roads  were  numerous  and 
good,  the  factor  of  the  weather  would  be  inconsiderable 
as  against  an  advance.  But  the  roads  north  of  Galicia 
for  the  most  part  are — in  Western  and  Russian 
Poland — impassable  to  heavy  traffic  aft«r  a  little  rain 
at  this  season ;  and  the  sort  of  traffic  involved  by  the 
passage  of  an  army,  particularly  the  movement  of 
heavy  field  guns  and  field  howitzers,  cuts  them  up 
altogether.  The  soil  in  all  the  middle  part  is  heavy, 
the  roads,  though  possessed  of  culverts  and  bridges 
over  sti-eams,  are  rarely  macadamised  and,  in  general, 
an  attempt  to  advance  with  the  sort  of  train  necessary 
to  what  we  now  know  to  be  the  Gennan  methods  will 
be  very  heavily  handicapped  indeed ;  for  though  the 
normal  rainfall  is  slight  the  soil  does  not  dry  as  it  did 
earlier  in  the  year. 

The  advent  of  winter  is  capricious,  the  coming  of 
hard  frost  differs  by  more  than  a  month  from  year  to 
year,  and  it  would  be  quite  an  exceptional  year  if  this 
facility  for  transport,  such  as  it  is,  was  felt  before  the 
middle  of  November.  It  is  true,  of  course,  that  all 
this  tells  just  as  much  in  theory  against  a  Russian 
counter-offensive  as  against  the  German  advance. 
But  there  is  this  difference  between  the  two. 

(a)  That  the  Germans   depend  much  more  for 

their  power  to  hold  a  position  upon  their 

heavy  artillery,  and  that  the  direct  contact 

which  this  arm  keeps  off  teUs  against  the 

German    as    compared    with    the   Russian 

soldier  :  using  the  term  "  direct  contact "  for 

all   short-range   field  operations  from    the 

field-gun  to  the  bayonet. 

(i)  When  an  advance  is  difficult  the  hostility  of 

a  population  makes  much  more  difference 

than  when  you  have  good  roads  and  plenty 

of  railways,  and  the  population  in  Russian 

Poland  at  least,  and  especially  immediately 

beyond  the  present  German  advance,  is,  for 

the  most  part,  exceedingly  hostile. 

Further,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Russians 

have  the  advantage  in  horses,  at  any  rate  in  the  quality 

of  endurance  in  their  horses,  and  that   is  one  of  tlie 

prime  factors  in  transport  everywhere,  but  particularly 

in  a  country  only  partly  developed,  especially  when 

the  roads  are  heavy. 

The  Battle  of  the  Vistula  is  marked  then  (in 
contrast  to  the  struggle  in  France,  whose  issue  is  so 


8» 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  24,  1914 


largely  dependent  on  it)  by  a  much  simpler  scheme, 
by  the  paucity  of  the  communications,  the  natural 
strength  of  the  defensive  line,  and  the  simple  (and 
inadequate)  distribution  of  its  railway  system. 

But  there  is  this  one  last  contrast  between  the 
Western  and  the  Eastern  positions,  more  important 
than  all  the  rest :  the  Eastern  position— the  struggle 
in  Poland — lends  itself  to  a  decision  much  more 
obviously  than  does  the  Western  conflict  in  France. 
In  other  words,  though  a  deadlock  is  a  possibility 
(and  has,  indeed,  obviously  been  envisaged  by  the 
German  General  Staff  as  a  conclusion  not  wholly 
unfavourable  to  their  cause),  yet  it  is  far  more  prob- 
able that  one  or  other  of  the  two  op|)onetits  will 
establish  a  decisive  superiority  after  the  first  few  days 
of  fighting. 

This  probability  (it  is  no  more)  is  a  capital  aid 
to  our  judgment  of  the  campaign.  It  means  that 
the  thesis  which  has  been  always  maintained  in  these 
comments — that  the  result  in  Poland  woiild  be  the 
prime  factor  in  the  general  result  of  the  whole  cam- 
j^aign  throughout  Europe — still  holds. 

But  why  does  one  say  that  the  Eastern  position 
lends  itself  to  a  rapid  decision  more  than  does  the 
Western  ? 

Because  (</)  there  is  room  for  outflanking ;  (6)  one 
party  at  least  can  count  upon  a  continual  arrival  of 
reserves ;  (c)  either  line,  if  broken  or  turned,  lacks  for 
a  long  distance  to  the  rear  any  prepared  defensive 
positions  :  either  pai-ty,  if  compelled  to  retirement, 
would  be  compelled  to  a  long  and  disastrous 
retirement. 

(a)  That  the  first  point  is  true — as  to  room  for 
outflanking — is  evident  fi'om  the  very  nature 
of  the  position  upon   the  map.      It   ends 
near  Warsaw ;   that  is,  only  at  the  begin- 
ning  of    the   vast    plain    which    stretches 
thence  to  the  Baltic.      True,  that  plain  is 
cut  by  a  whole  belt  of  marsh  and  lake  on 
the  boundaries  of  East  Prussia,  the  northern 
boundary  of  Eussian  Poland.      But   there 
is  ample  room  between  for  a  turning  move- 
ment round  Warsaw  to  be  undertaken  by 
whichever   party    shall   have   so   decided  a 
numerical  superiority  as  to  permit  of  such 
an  action. 
Of  any  considerable  turning  movement  upon  the 
other  flank,  the  southern,  which  is  the  extreme  right 
of  the  Austro-German  line  and  the  extreme  left  of 
the  Eussian,  there  can  be  no  question ;  for  here  the 
extremity  of  either  line  reposes  upon  the  "  tangle  of 
the  Carpathians." 

(5)  The  knowledge  that  Eussia  can,  at  not  too 
remote  a  date,  count  upon  the  arrival  of 
increasing  numbers  must  urge  the  Germanic 
Powers  to  attempt  a  decision  before  those 
reinforcements  arrive.  At  any  rate,  even  if 
a  full  result  cannot  be  hoped  for,  the  advent 
of  these  new  bodies  (though  they  should 
not  have  the  value  of  the  first  line)  must 
promi)t  the  enemies  of  Eussia  to  strike  a 
heavy  blow  at  the  Eussian  army  before  it 
is  further  strengthened, 
(c)  There  is  not  afforded  by  nature  any  good 
defensive  position  parallel  to  the  line  of  the 
Vistula  and  the  San  for  a  long  w^ay  on 
either  side.  If  the  Eussians  be  compelled 
to  fall  back,  the  rivers  behind  them  provide 
doubtful  positions.  If  it  is  the  Germans 
who  fall  back,  they  have  indeed  prepared  a 
line  within  the  immediate  proximity  of  their 
own  frontier,   but,   as    yet,   nothing    very 


serious  in  between.     We  shall  see,  if  they 
have    to   go   back   to   the  line   of   Kielce- 
Petrokow   whether   they    have    sufficiently 
entrenched  t/ia( ;  but  even  if  they  have,  it 
win  be  as  open  to  outflanking  upon  the  part 
of  the  Eussians,  as  is  the  present  German 
line  along  the  rivers.     Fiu'ther,  the  difficul- 
ties of  communication  w^ould  prevent  rapidity 
in  retirement,  and  though  that  handicaps  the 
pursuer  as  well,  it  handicaps  him  less,  for  it 
does  not  gravely  affect  his  cavalry  and  light 
artillery. 
We  may  sura  up  and  say,  first,  that  a  decision  is 
to  be  expected  upon  this  field  probably  before  there  is 
any  final  result  in  the  west,  and  that,  according  to  the 
nature  of   this  decision  (according  to  whether   it  is 
adverse  to  the  German  cause  or  not)  we  shall  either 
(1)  see  the  western  German  line  in  France  retreating 
in  despair  of  receiving  reinforcements  from  the  east ; 
or  (2)  see  such  reinforcements  arrive  in  great  numbers, 
and  the  campaign  in  France  enter  upon  a  new  and 
very  different  phase. 

This  is  by  no  means  certain,  it  is  only  conjecture. 
It  is  always  possible  that  a  decision  might  be  reached 
in  France  and  Belgium  before  the  first  undecided 
actions  upon  the  Vistula  and  the  San  had  begun  to 
show  which  way  the  tide  was  flowing.  But  it  is  far 
the  more  probable  event  that  an  appreciable  result  in 
Poland  will  in  a  short  time  release  men  for  the  west, 
or,  in  the  absence  of  such  reinforcements,  compel  the 
German  line  in  the  west  to  retire.  That  is  wdiy  it  is 
the  business  of  all  of  us  to  keep  our  eyes  fixed  upon 
this  unfamiliar  eastern  field. 

So  much  being  said,  it  is  fui-ther  evident  that  for 
the  Germans  to  achieve  a  decision  in  their  favour  they 
must  pierce  the  line  before  them.  Conversely  it  is 
evident  that  the  Eussians  must  attempt  to  tti7-?i  by  the 
northern  flank  (the  only  available  one)  the  position  of 
theii"  enemies  upon  the  further  bank  of  the  two 
streams.  The  Germans  do  indeed  attach  a  great 
importance  to  the  possession  of  Warsaw  upon  their 
extreme  northern  flank.  It  would  give  them  a  bridge 
across  the  Vistula  (there  is  but  one  other — at  Ivan- 
gorod),  and  it  would  give  them  depots,  a  great  accession 
of  that  moral  position  to  which  they  attach  so  gi'eat  a 
political  value  (even  at  this  advanced  stage  of  the 
campaign)  and  last,  and  most  important,  the  great 
town  with  its  fortifications  at  Memlin  (New 
Georgievsk)  just  below  AVarsaw,  which  would  cover 
and  protect  the  German  left  from  Eussian  assault  and 
from  Eussian  turning  movements  even  for  some  time 
after  the  perpetually  growing  additions  to  Eussian 
strength  begin  to  be  felt. 

While,  then,  the  Germans  must  naturally  attempt 
to  take  and  hold  Warsaw^  they  could  not  themselves 
attempt  a  turning  movement  there,  and  to  get  behind 
the  Eussian  line  in  the  Vistula,  because,  frsf,  they 
are  not  in  suflicieut  numbers  even  now  to  do  so,  and 
secondly  because  those  numbers  of  theirs  are  diminish- 
ing, in  proportion  to  the  enemy  s,  with  every  day  that 
passes.  The  principal  Austro-German  effort  must, 
therefore,  be  to  cross  the  rivers  Vistula  or  San  at 
certain  points,  there  to  break  the  Eussian  line,  destroy 
its  cohersion  and  its  unity  of  command,  and  leave  it 
for  a  long  time  to  come  permanently  inferior  to  its 
opponents.  Such  a  result  would  leave  Germany  free 
to  transfer  numbers  of  troops  to  the  Western  theatre 
of  war,  even  though  she  would  still  be  condemned 
to  preserving  a  very  large  force  in  Southern  Poland. 

On  the  side  of  the  Eussians  it  is  equally  obvious 
that  their  attempt  must  be  a  turning  movement 
round  by  the  north — by  Warsaw.     They  know  that 


4» 


October  24,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


this  is  largely  a  campaign  of  exhaustion.  They  know 
that  the  enemy  has  rendered  his  own  communications 
insecure  by  a  false  policy  of  cnielty  with  the  peasants. 
They  know  that  he  has  in  his  retirement  but  few 
roads  and  railways  to  depend  upon — roads  and 
railways  which  would  be  hopelessly  clogged  in  any 
pressed  retirement. 

Tlie  Germans  have  massed  (they  themselves  say 
it)  not  less  than  five  army  corps  in  front  of  Warsaw 
— a  third  of  aU  they  have  upon  the  Vistula.  They 
advanced  at  first  to  within  half  a  day's  march  of  the 
city.  But  the  Russians  gradually  affirmed  theii* 
superiority  at  this  point,  at  any  rate  in  the  first  days 
of  the  struggle.  The  furthest  point  of  German 
advance  before  the  Russian  coimter-offensive  was  here 
reached,  perhaps,  last  Wednesday  night.  Thursday 
things  lay  doubtful.  By  Saturday  and  Sunday,  if 
we  are  to  trust  the  official  Russian  communique,  the 
sujjeriority  of  the  Russians  upon  this  wing  had 
definitely  established  itself,  and  the  Austro-German 
line  was  already  in  some  peril  of  being  turned  from 
the  north. 

Meanwhile,  very  strong  and  at  first  partially 
successful,  attempts  to  force  the  line  of  the  rivers  and 
thus  to  break  the  Russian  cohesion  were  continuing 
in  the  middle  of  the  vast  field  and  to  the  south  of  it. 
How  far  these  have  been  or  wUl  be  repelled  we  cannot 
yet  say,  but  apparently  they  have  not  to  this  date 
made  any  considerable  progi'ess,  though  some  foothold 
may  have  been  obtained  upon  the  right  bank. 

How  difficult  such  a  crossing  must  be  and  how 
strong  the  position  is  as  a  defensive  one  a  more 
particidar  examination  of  the  line  will  prove. 

The  whole  position  from  the  Carpathians  to  the 
neighbourhood  of  Warsaw  falls  into  three  rather  clearly 
marked  divisions,  unless,  indeed,  we  add  a  fourth 
for  the  hiUy  countiy  round  Przemysl  and  the 
moimtains  at  the  back  of  it.  At  any  rate, 
immediately  to  the  north  of  this  first  short  mountain 
sector  you  have  the  course  of  the  River  San  up  to  the 
point  where  it  falls  into  the  Vistula ;  one  may  give 
to  this  line,  say,  from  the  main  Galician  railway 
northward,  a  distance  of  over  sixty  miles.  The  upper 
part  of  the  San  River  is  fordable.  Tlie  fords 
naturally  get  less  frequent  as  one  goes  down  stream ; 
all  the  lower  part  is  even  navigable.  Further,  a  main 
railway  line  leads  up  to  and  feeds  this  southern  wing 
of  the  enemy,  and  a  branch  line,  leading  northward 
along  the  left  bank  of  the  San  from  Jaroslav,  acts  as 
a  main  avenue  of  supply,  an  opportunity  for  concen- 
tration of  troops  upon  any  chosen  point  of  it.  If  the 
best  troops,  the  strictest  organisation,  and,  above 
all,  the  strongest  ai-tiUery  were  to  be  discovered  ia  this 
region,  one  might  predict  an  attempted  forcing  of  the 
line  here  rather  than  further  north.  The  obstacle  is 
less  formidable,  the  communications  are  much  more 
pei-fect.  But  it  is  precisely  here  that  you  have  no 
more  than  the  recomposed  fragments  of  the  defeated 
or  second  Austrian  ai-my  and  the  first,  which  though 
not  hitherto  defeated  has  suffered  from  weeks  of 
retreat  imder  considerable  loss  and  at  some  expense 
to  its  organisation. 

It  must  further  be  remembered  that  a  crossing  of 
the  water  and  a  breaking  of  the  line  so  far  south  as 
even  the  middle  San,  if  the  principal  operation  were 
here  undertaken,  would  not  be  decisive,  as  a  breach 
effected  nearer  the  centre  would  be.  It  is  a  universal 
truth  in  every  form  of  attack,  strategical  or  tactical, 
by  Lind  or  by  sea,  that,  other  things  being  equal, 
a  line  is  more  effectively  broken  in  proportion  as  the 
stroke  comes  nearer  its  middle  ;  for  thus  is  the  largest 
of  the  two  fragments  at  least  still  small.     But  the 


doctrine  particularly  holds  in  this  case,  because  the 
main  Russian  communications  lie  far  to  the  north 
of  any  threatened  point  upon  the  San.  There  •wUl  be 
attempts  to  cross  the  San ;  one  vigoroixs  one  has 
ah'eady  been  made  near  Nikso — just  below  the  first 
bridge  upon  the  junction  of  the  San  with  the  Vistula. 
Some  measure  of  success  was  claimed  by  Austria 
(but  unofficially,  I  tliink)  for  this  attempt. 

The  main  effort,  however,  to  break  the  Russian 
line  wUl  hardl}^  be  undertaken  in  this  section  upon 
the  San ;  it  wiU  fall  in  the  middle  section  between 
the  town  which  the  Russians  now  call  Ivangorod 
(a  site  known  in  Polish  history  as  Demblin)  and 
the  little,  ancient,  and  once  strong  borough  of 
Sandomii-,  which  lies  but  a  few  miles  above  the 
junction  of  the  Vistula  and  the  San. 

Tliere  are  several  reasons  why  the  main  attack 
should  be  delivered  in  this  central  of  the  three  sections. 
Here,  to  begin  with,  you  come  immediately  upon  the 
main  communications  of  the  Rus.sians  after  piercing 
their  Line  :  or  at  least  their  main  communications  as 
a  united  ai-my.  Get  through  there,  and  you  throw  the 
northern  half  of  their  line  back  on  to  the  main  road 
and  railway  Warsaw-Brest,  and  the  southern  half  of 
their  line  back  upon  the  other  railway  Lemberg-Kief. 
Further  you  bring  to  bear  (upon  whichever  of  the 
separated  halves  you  choose)  the  whole  weight  of  the 
invading  advance  through  Poland  upon  the  breach 
so  made. 

Again,  this  section  is  tackled  by  the  most 
efficient  portion  of  the  Allied  Germanic  Powers,  the 
German  troops  ;  it  is  presumably  better  supplied  with 
heavy  artillery,  under  the  action  of  which  alone  could 
the  crossing  of  a  deep,  broad,  and  rapid  stream  be 
attempted. 

These  reasons  alone  should  be  sufficient  for 
expecting  the  main  attack  to  be  delivered  in  the 
section  Ivangorod-Sandomir,  the  second  or  central 
section  of  the  line.     But  there  are  further  reasons. 

This  is  the  portion  of  the  Russian  line  which  is 
least  well  backed  by  railway  communication.  There 
is  here  no  railway  along  the  eastern  bank.  But  on 
the  western  bank,  where  the  Germans  lie,  the  main 
line  through  Radom  up  to  Warsaw  throws  out  an 
extension  towards  the  Vistula,  the  railhead  of  which 
is  at  Ostrowiecs,  a  depot  central  to  any  attempt  upon 
this  portion  of  the  stream.  There  is  no  other  railhead 
equally  well  situated  for  a*  concentration  anywhere 
between  Sandomir  and  Warsaw.     (See  Map  II.) 

To  the  north  of  Ivangorod  crossing  is  more 
difficult ;  apart  from  its  being  too  far  from  the  centre, 
you  have  considerable  belts  of  marsh  along  the  stream, 
a  crumbling  bank,  and  this  usually  steep  and  a  matter 
of  from  50-100  feet  in  places  above  the  normal 
water  level.  It  is  true  that  the  country  through 
which  this  central  section  (Sandomir-Ivangorod) 
passes  is  hilly,  the  hiUs  becoming  bolder  (especially 
upon  the  left  bank)  the  more  one  goes  southward  and 
upstream.  The  Great  Plain  does  not  begin  until 
after  New  Alexandria  (which  is  the  Russian  name 
for  the  site  more  congenially  known  in  Polish  history 
as  the  Palace  of  Palawy).  But  this  hilly  country  is 
not  so  confused  or  broken  as  seriously  to  intercept  an 
advance,  and  there  is  firmer  opportunity  for  landing 
upon  the  right  or  eastern  bank,  and  less  opportunity 
for  the  concentration  of  the  enemy. 

What  is  more,  two  considerable  obstacles 
separate  any  effort  undertaken  against  the  line 
Vistula-San  below  Ivangorod  or  above  Sandomu-  from 
any  effort  undei-taken  in  the  central  portion 
between  the  two  towns.  The  first  and  least  of  these 
obstacles  is  the  great  belt  of  forest  50   miles   by   at 


6» 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  24,  1914 


least  20,  wliicli  lies  rougWy  triangular  a  couple  of 
days'  march  south  of  Eadom.  This,  though  travers- 
able of  course  by  two  or  three  good  roads,  may  be 
rec^ardcd  as  the  soulJiern  boundary  of  the  belt  over 
winch  the  Gennaus  must  advance  towards  the  cross- 
iug  of  the  central  Vistula.  It  cuts  off  for  an 
advancing  body  the  columns  working  north  of 
Sandomir  from  those  working  south.  To  the  north 
is  the  very  serious  obstacle  of  the  PaHca.  Should  a 
Russian  turning  movement  by  the  north  be  even 
partially  successful,  then  the  obstacle  of  the  Paliea 
would  afford  delay  for  the  withdrawal  westward  of 
such  German  troops  as  might  have  already  passed 
successfully  to  the  further  bank  of  the  Vistula  between 
New  Alexandiia  and  Sandomir.  But  an  attempt  to 
put  the  main  Gennan  force  over  the  river  north  of 
that  obstacle  would  spell  disaister  «/ the  German  left 
in  the  neighoui'hood  of  Warsaw  were  seriously 
menaced ;  still  more  if  it  were  turned.  The  Paliea 
with  its  marshes  would  hem  in  the  retreating  army. 
There  would  hardly  be  time  to  withdraw  the  advanced 
bodies  that  might  have  approached  or  even  crossed 
the  Vistula ;  and  there  is  no  natural  obstacle  between 
Warsaw  and  the  Paliea  to  fend  off  the  Russians 
approaching  fi-om  the  north  to  cut  the  communi- 
cations of  the  bodies  that  had  just  crossed  or  were 
just  crossing. 

It  is  evident  that  the  Germans,  while  their 
numbers  may  not  be  sufficient  so  much  as  to  threaten 
a  turning  movement  here  against  the  Russians,  would, 
by  only  holding  Warsaw,  make  their  advance  across 
the  central  Vistula  (should  they  succeed  in  crossing 
the  stream)  secure.  They  must  of  course  not  only 
hold  Warsaw :  they  must  also  mask,  attack,  or  in  a 
paradoxical  way  repose  upon  the  enemy's  fortress  of 
Novo  Georgievsk  (the  true  name  of  which  is  the  old 
Polish  name  of  Memlin).  They  must  mask  also  the 
secondary  fortress  of  Ivangorod.  But  containing  the 
garrisons  of  these  two,  without  further  advance 
east  and  west  there,  if  they  cross  the  Vistula 
further  south  at  some  central  point  betw^een 
Ivangorod  and  Sandomir,  and  if  they  there  break 
the  Russian  line,  such  a  breach,  while  Warsaw 
■was  held,  would  decide  the  action  as  a  whole.  All 
this  means  that  an  attack  upon  and  an  occupation 
of  Warsaw  and  with  it  the  holding  of  the  line 
Warsaw-Ivangorod  while  a  crossing  is  effected  some- 
where further  up  aboVe  Ivangorod  is  the  obvious 
German  plan. 

When  we  look  then  at  the  three  sections  (1 )  the 
San,  (2)  the  Vistula  between  Sandomir  and  Ivangorod 
and  (3)  the  Vistula  from  Ivangorod  down  to  Warsaw, 
we  see,  as  I  have  said,  that  the  central  one  of  these 
is  the  mofe-t  favourable  for  the  chief  attempt  of  the 
Austro-German  allies  at  crossing  the  river ;  and  we 
know  that,  as  a  fact,  the  attempt  has  been  made 
(with  what  final  success  or  ill-success  we  do  not  yet 
know)  at  one  particular  point  especially  chosen  therein, 
the  point  near  Jozefdw. 

In  order  to  understand  why  this  particular  sjjot 
was  chosen  the  following  sketch  map  may  be  of 
interest.  The  Vistula  happens  at  this  point  to  be 
narrower  than  it  is  at  any  place  either  above  or  below. 
It  is  even  narrower  than  at  Sandomir.  Above,  there 
are  marshes  ;  below,  islands  and  the  entry  of  a  tribu- 
tary which  balks  an  advance. 

That  the  Vistula  is  here  correspondingly  deeper 
does  not  affect  the  problem,  because  it  is  not,  in  any 
case,  fordable.  That  it  runs  more  swiftly  is  an  adverse 
consideration  for  the  Germans  attempting  to  cross  it ; 
but  this  extra  current  is  not  sufficient  to  outweigh 
the  great  advantages  of  a  passage  which  can  be  gained 


0^    (J' 


.^ 


in 


more  rapidly  (if  it  is  gained  at  all)  than  at  any  other 
point  for  many  days  march  above  and  below. 

Nor  is  this  the  only  advantage  of  the  crossing 
place  of  Jozefow.  It  is  the  nearest  point  (by  road)  upon 
the  Vistula  from  the  railhead  at  Osowiec.  Further, 
there  are  two  roads  leading  from  that  railhead  to  the 
head  of  the  river  bank  opposite  Jozefdw.  The  one 
goes  north  of  a  bolt  of  wood  at  this  point,  the  other 
south  of  it ;  and  the  total  distance  from  the  railhead 
to  the  right  bank  is  but  twenty  miles  as  the  crow 
flies — less  than  thirty  by  either  road. 

The  Russians  upon  the  opposing  bank  have  no 
such  advantage.  Then*  railway  is  fuUy  half  as  much 
again,  even  as  the  crow  flies,  behiiid  them ;  and  they 
have  but  one  road  to  it— though  a  longer  road 
down  the  river  leads  to  New  Alexandria  and  a  more 
distant  point  upon  the  same  railway. 

If,  as  is  reported,  the  German  attempt  at  crossing 
the  Vistula  opposite  Jozefdw  has  failed,  the  check  to 
the  invaders,  though  not  decisive,  is  heavy.  No 
equally  good  opportunity  is  to  be  found  for  breaking 
the  middle  of  the  Russian  Hne. 

Upon  the  San,  of  course,  there  are  numerous 
opportunities  of  crossing.  That  river  is  not  more 
than  130  yards  broad  in  its  lower  courses,  it  naiTows 
rapidly  as  one  approaches  the  mountains,  the  bridges 
across  it  and  roads  leading  to  these  bridges  are 
numerous,  the  opportunities  for  gun  positions  to 
defend  the  crossings  are,  in  such  hilly  country,  also 
numerous.  But  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the 
effect  upon  the  Russian  line  here  Avould  be  but 
partial.  It  would  be  a  blow  delivered  too  near  the  end 
of  the  line,  which  can  hardly  be  turned,  as  it  reposes 
upon  the  mountains  ;  and  the  nearer  one  is  to  this 
extreme  end  of  the  line  the  better  are  the  Russians 
supplied  by  the  great  railway  from  Lemberg  and  Kicff. 

Again,  below  New  Alexandria  and  between 
Ivangorod  and  Warsaw,  the  opportunities  for 
crossing  grow  rarer  and  rarer  as  one  goes  down- 
stream. The  river  broadens  out,  is  marshy  upon 
one  bank  or  the  other  (sometimes  upon  both),  and  is 
not  served,  upon  the  German  or  western  side,  by  tlie 
railway. 

There  is  one  last  point  of  considerable  strategic 
importance  to  be  watched,  and  that  is  the  junction 
of  the  two  rivers,  Vistula  and  San.  This  point  is  not 
of  great  importance  to  the  attackers  at  the  present 
)noment.  for  there  is  no  particular  reason  Avhy  the 
Austro-German s  should  try  to  cross  near  here  more 
than  at  any  other  place.  But  if  the  tide  of  the 
battle  turns,  and  a  Russian  pursuit  of  a  German 
retirement  begins ;  if  the  main  Austro-Gennan  line 
is  turned  round  its  Warsaw  flank  and  has  to  retreat 
from  the  ri\ers,  (/ten  this  i-iver  junction  will  become 
of   the   very   greatest   importance   to    the   Russians. 


6* 


October  24,  1914 


LAND    AND     WATEE 


Width  ofrivermizch. 
exofffferaied.  Seed. , 
width  averages 
ZAW/C//OSrJ  \350to  400^ds. 


About  lO  Miles 


l^TBridffB 


To  JarosCav  andt 
jBa^e  roundLby 
DeSLcca. 


w 


SKETCH  OF  JIJHCTION   OF  SAN   AND   TISTULA   EITBES. 

Why?  Because  if  they  cross  here  in  any  force 
they  will  be  di-iving  a  wedge  between  the  Germans 
in  the  north  and  the  Austrians  in  the  south ;  they 
will  be,  to  use  a  metaphor,  "  enfilading "  the  line 
of  the  Upper  Vistula;  they  wiU  be  upon  the  north 
side  of  an  obstacle  which  separates  the  main  Austrian 
armies  in  Gahcia  (to  the  south  of  that  obstacle) 
from  their  allies  in  "Western  Poland ;  they  will  have 
but  to  defend  the  northern  banks  of  the  Upper 
Vistula  to  separate  the  two  tdlies.  And  we  may 
confidently  expect,  if  a  Eussian  advance  begins,  a 
particularly  strong  effort  to  seize  tliis  junction  of 
the  two  streams  and  to  obtain  a  bridgehead  at  that 
point.  Of  course  there  is  no  existing  bridge ;  the 
"tdte  de  pont "  the  Eussians  would  fight  for  here 
would  mean  the  possession  and  defence  of  a  point 
upon  the  left  or  western  bank  to  which  soldiers  could 
be  ferried  over,  or  to  which  they  might  cross  by  a 
pontoon  bridge. 

So  much  for  the  attempts  of  the  Austro-Germans 
to  force  the  Eussian  defensive  line  behind  the 
Vistula  and  the  San  (probably  somewhere  in  its 
centre),  and  for  the  Eussian  counter-offensive  if 
such  an  attempt  fails. 

But  the  main  Eussian  effort  will  not  consist  in 
merely  awaiting  the  Austro-Germans.  It  will  consist 
in  attempting  to  turn  their  north  flank  near  Warsaw. 
The  Germans  know  this,  and  to  reach  AVarsaw,  hold 
it^  and  prevent  such  a  turning  movement  is  essential 
to  their  success. 

To  hold  New  Georgievsk  is  essential  to  the 
German  plan,  for  it  is  the  northern  fortress,  the 
extremity  of  the  line.  Nor  should  we  be  blind  to  the 
undoubted  fact  that  political  considerations  (perhaps 
to  an  undue  extent  but  not  always  unwisely)  weigh 
upon  the  German  commanders.  The  capture,  or 
rather  the  occupation,  of  Warsaw  would  have  a 
great  effect  throughout  all  Eastern  Europe,  and  a 
corresponding  effect  in  Gennany  and  Austria.  It 
is  for  this  reason  that  the  greatest  mass  of  the 
Gennan  troops  is  not  concentrated  for  the  moment 
- — ^was  not  concentrated  a  week  ago — opposite  any 
one  crossing  place  of  the  Vistula,  such  as  Josefdw, 
but  was  concentrated  for  an  advance  upon  Warsaw. 
Grojec,  commanding  the  junction  of  so  many  road.s, 
as  we  have  seen,  and  the  very  ante-chamber  of 
Warsaw,  was  seized  more  than  a  fortnight  ago  in  the 
German     advance.      A     week    later     the     advanced 


cavalry  bodies  of  the  Prussians  were  almost  within 
sight  of  the  city — not  a  day's  march  away. 

But  the  same  considerations  which  have  made 
the  occupation  of  Warsaw  a  prime  object  in  the 
German  advance,  have  made  the  repulse  of  the 
Germans  in  this  part  of  the  field  essential  to  Eussian 
success.  The  political  importance  of  saving  Warsaw 
fi'om  even  a  temporary  German  occupation  must  have 
had  its  weight  with  the  Eussians ;  but  much  more 
than  that,  with  any  sane  commander,  must  be  the 
all-importance  of  turning  the  German  left  in  this 
region.  If  no  effort  were  ultimately  to  be 
undertaken  against  one  of  the  two  wings,  of  what 
purpose  would  be  the  occupation  of  this  immensely 
long  and  purely  defensive  position  along  the  Vistula 
and  the  San  ?  And  if  no  flanking  action  were  to  be 
attempted  upon  either  of  the  two  wings,  what  use 
would  it  be  to  the  Eussians  to  count,  perhaps  imme- 
diately, certainly  with  every  week  of  the  future,  upon 
increasing  numbers  superior  to  their  foes  ? 

We  may  take  it  as  certain  that  the  Eussian  plan 
has  for  its  principal  business  the  turning  of  this 
German  flank  in  the  north.  Of  a  corresponding 
movement  in  the  Cai-pathians  there  can  as  yet  be  no 
question.  And  it  is  trae  to  say  that  all  the  chance  of 
a  decision  in  favour  of  our  Allies  turns  upon  the 
success  of  this  pushing  back  of  the  Germans  from 
before  Warsaw,  eastward  and  southward.  With 
every  mile  that  the  Gennans  are  compelled  to  "  refuse 
then-  left,"  to  bend  back  their  Hne,  before  Warsaw, 
their  chance  of  a  successful  offensive  across  the 
Vistula  furtlier  south — and  indeed  their  chance  of 
deciding  the  whole  action  in  their  favour  at  all — gets 
less  and  less. 

By  the  Eussian  account,  up  to  the  news  which 
had  reached  London  at  the  time  of  writing  this, 
the  Germans  had  in  their  advance  on  Warsaw 
succeeded  up  to  about  the  morning  of  last  Thursday, 
October  15th.  With  the  16th  the  tide  turned,  and 
on  the  i7th  and  18th,  Saturday  and  Sunday  last, 
according  to  the  Eussian  version,  the  German  left, 
strong  as  it  was,  was  here  pushed  back  right  to  the 
line  Grojec-Skienewice — a  matter  of  twenty  miles  at 
one  end  of  the  bend  and  thirty  at  the  other. 

The  whole  battle  at  this  stage  stood  somewhat 
as  this  sketch  map  shows,  with  the  attempted  German 


Gcoralcvsk 


Cracow 


viria 


Vi 


crossing  of  the  Vistula  at  Josefow,  on  arrow  (1),  and 
the  attempted  Eussian  turning  of  the  German  lines 
before  Warsaw  on  arrow  (2).  Neither  effort  is  yet 
decided,  and  there  we  must  leave  it. 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  24,  1914 


II. 
THE    WESTERN    THEATRE  OF  WAR. 

In  the  Western  Theatre  of  War  the  week  has 
seen  (up  to  the  moment  of  writing)  one  fresh  and 
one  belated  piece  of  news. 

Nothing  noteworthy  save  in  the  extreme  north 
and  on  the  extreme  south— near  the  North  Sea  and 

in  the  Vosges. 

Upon  the  old  main  front  between  the  Oise  and 
the  Ai-gonne  there  have  been  but  slight  movements. 
It  is  obvious  that  the  forces  on  both  sides  must  have 
been  very  largely  depleted  for  the  sake  of  reinforcing 
the  great  effort  the  Allies  have  been  making  upon  the 
west  up  to  the  Belgian  frontier,  and  the  violent 
counter-offensive  attacks  which  the  Germans  have 
directed  against  that  line.  None  the  less,  in  some 
points  there  has  been  a  rather  noticeable  flexion  of  the 
line.  Thus,  all  the  advanced  trenches  of  the  Gennans 
above  the  Aisne  has  been  taken;  half  of  the  crest 
of  the  plateau  north  of  Soissons  is  ab-eady  reached 
by  the  Allies,  but  not  Craonne  nor  the  Noyon  end 
of  it. 

Below  Craonne,  again,  between  that  high  promon- 
tory hill  and  Rhcims,  and  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Berry-au-Bac,  there  has  been  some  advance,  and  a  part 
at  least  of  the  Nogent  Hills  to  the  east  of  Rheims  ai-e 
held  ;  but  whether  the  whole  lump  has  been  occupied 
by  the  French  or  not  neither  French  nor  German 
communiques  indicated. 

But  on  the  Belgian  frontier  near  the  North  Sea 
and  down  in  the  Vosges  there  are  two  points  of 
interest :  One  belated  piece  of  news,  as  I  have  said, 
and  one  notable  change. 

The  notable  change  concerns  the  situation  in  the 
Franco-Belgian  frontier.  The  belated  news  concerns 
the  recapture  by  the  French  of  the  Southern  Vosges 
overlooking  Upper  Alsace.  I  wiU  take  these  in  their 
order. 

A. — The  Belgian   Fkontier. 

It  is  important,  if  we   are   to   understand   the 
French  and  English  official  communiques  which  deal 
with  the  all-important  left  wing  or  northern  extreme 
of  the  Allied  line,  and  with  the  assault  that  is  presum- 
ably to  be  delivered  upon  it  by  the  enemy,  that  we 
should  grasp  the  nature  of  the  ground.     The  Allied 
line  ran  originally  nearly  north  and  south  from  the 
district  just  east  of  Arras  to  the  sea  near  Ostend.     We 
may  note  that  the  entire  stretch  of  these  two  fronts, 
from  the  Arras  district  to  the  North  Sea,  is  not  far 
from  eighty  miles.     Nearly  the  whole  of  this  line 
traverses  a  plain,  most  of  which  is  dead  level.     The 
exception  is  in  a  range  of  slight  heights  running  in 
a  dwindling  crescent   south  of  Ypres.     From   Lens 
northward  to  above  Amientieres  you  are  in  the  coal 
district — a  mass  of  dirty  lanes  and  a  gridiron  of  rail- 
ways and  canals.     But  from  the  north  of  this  to  the 
sea  the   complexity  of   such   country  ceases,  and   is 
replaced,  especially  as  the  sea-coast  is  approached,  by 
numerous  very  slow  watercourses,  both  canalised  and 
natural.     Almost  every  field  has  its  wet  ditch.     Of 
communications  it  is  not  worth  speaking,  for  both 
good,  hard  roads  and  railways  are  so  numerous  that 
transport  is   possible  for  almost  any  numbers   that 
might  be  concentrated  for  the  shock  in  this  region. 
It  is  worth  noting,  however,  that  neither  side  has  one 
long  natural  defensive  line  upon  which  to  fall  back  in 
CISC  it  is  pressed  by  the  other.     On  the  side  of  the 
Allies  there  is,  if  they  were,  unfortunately,  compelled 
to  pivot  far  round  eastward,  the  line  of  heights  all  the 
way  down  south  from  Cape  Gris-nez.     Tliat  is  three 
days'   march   behind  their  present  positions   in   the 


middle,  and  a  week's  march  behind  their  extreme 
positions  on  the  seacoast.  There  is  no  defensive 
position  immediately  behind  the  Allied  line  as  it  is 
now  held.  With  the  Germans  this  defect  is 
still  more  strikingly  apparent.  There  are  no 
heights  whatsoever  behind  them,  and  nearly  all 
the  watercourses  run  across  their  Une,  and  not 
parallel  with  it.  Entrenchment,  modern  entrench- 
ment, is  apparently  an  artifical  line  anywhere  pro- 
ducible :  we  have  yet  to  see  whether  it  can  "  hold  "  an 
advance  where  no  natural  aid  is  given  it  and  where 
time  has  been  lacking.  If  it  is  against  the  Germans 
that  the  balance  of  pressure  is  felt  this  next  week 
they  must  fall  back  thoroughly,  uncovering  LiUe,  and 
depending  at  the  best  upon  the  line  of  the  Scheldt,  con- 
tinued perhaps  by  the  canal  which  runs  from  the  Scheldt 
to  the  neighbourhood  of  Eecloo  ;  but  the  prospect  of 
any  long  stand  across  that  line  of  country  is  not  favoui-- 
abie.  A  retreat,  if  it  were  imposed  upon  them,  would 
be  a  retreat  which  would  uncover  not  only  Lille  but 
Douai,  and  would  come  perilously  near  to  theii-  main 
line  of  communications  behind  Valenciennes. 

This  is  as  much  as  to  say  that  the  Gennans 
count  upon  certain  advance.  It  is  not  an  exaggeration 
to  affirm  that  such  a  line  as  Lille-Ostend  would  not  be 
held  by  any  force  that  did  not  count  upon  an 
immediate  advance.  Difficult  and  cut  up  as  the 
country  is,  there  is  no  very  great  extent  of  wood. 
There  is  a  group  of  detached  woods  both  east  and 
west  of  Ypres  and  one  considerable  forest  noi-th  of 
Ypres  and  in  front  of  Eoullers,  and  there  are  numerous 
scattered  woods  south  of  Bruges  for  over  a  belt 
twenty  miles  by  seven  or  eight  miles.  But  there  is 
nowhere  continuous  wood  in  such  quantity  as  to  check 
an  advance  upon  either  side,  or  to  screen  any  large 
movements — so  far  as  these  can  be  screened  fi'om 
aeroplanes.  The  only  defiles — that  is  the  only  places 
where  troops  would  be  compelled  to  naiTOw  issues 
during  a  retreat  and  where  congestion  of  transport 
and  all  similar  difficulties  might  happen,  are,  of  course, 
in  a  country  of  this  sort,  through  bi-idges.  But  these 
bridges  are  sp  numerous,  and  the  streams  to  be  crossed 
so  sluggish,  for  the  most  part  so  narrow,  and  aU  so 
easily  dealt  with  by  pontoons  or  trestle  work,  that  a 
retirement  would  not  be  anywhere  subject  upon  either 
side  to  difficulties  from  this  cause. 

As  has  necessarily  been  the  case  throughout  the 
whole  of  this  western  campaign,  taking  place  as  it  has 
over  territory  where  the  Germans  and  the  French 
have  in  various  aspects  struggled  against  each  other 
for  two  thousand  years,  this  last  extreme  northern 
field  which  has  been  reached  by  the  extension  of  the 
Allied  line,  and  which  bids  fair  to  be  the  principal 
scene  of  the  next  heavy  work,  is  filled  with  the 
historical  memories  of  former  actions.  The  British 
force  stands  right  in  the  country  traversed  by  the 
Duke  of  York  on  his  march  to  the  siege  of  Dunkirk 
in  1793.  The  Germans  at  Werwicq  used  and  com- 
manded the  bridge  by  which  the  Austrians,  crossing 
too  late,  lost  the  Battle  of  Tourcoing  in  the  next 
year.  Fontenoy  is  but  a  few  miles  behind  their 
positions  at  Lille ;  Oudenarde  but  a  few  miles  behind 
their  positions  at  Courtrai.  Immediately  behind  the 
Allied  line  Hondschoote  marks  the  first  considerable 
victory  of  the  French  Eevolution  in  its  life-and-death 
struggle  of  the  Terror. 

It  is  clearly  evident  (and  this  is  of  first-rate 
importance)  that  the  Germans  are  here  upon  the 
Franco-Belgian  frontier  attempting  a  divided  thing. 

I  say  that  our  knowledge  of  this  diversion  in 
their  aims — which  knowledge  is  now  certainly  acquired 
— is  of    capital   importance.      And   for   this   reason. 


8« 


October  24,  1914 


LAK^D    AND    WATER 


That  no  more  important  test  of  possessing  the 
initiative — of  "  pinning  "  your  enemy  and  providing 
against  unexpected  action  upon  his  jjart — can  be 
looked  for  than  the  discovery  of  his  trying  to  do  two 
things  at  once. 

When  the  Germans  had  the  initiative — during 
that  amazingly  rapid  and  well-ordered  march  of  theirs 
upon  Paris — no  subsidiary  thing  was  attempted.  All 
was  on  one  idea.  But  to-day,  after  they  have  been  held 
in  the  western  field  for  six  weeks,  a  plain  diversity  of 
object,  already  slightly  apparent  on  more  than  one 
point  of  the  long  line  of  battle,  has  now  quite  clearly 
presented  itself  in  the  north. 

Tlie  German  commanders  have  been  tempted  (1) 
to  break  the  Allied  line  anywhere  between  LUle  and 
Noyon  :  that  was  not  only  a  principal  and  legitimate 
object,  but  one  in  which  they  have  often  nearly 
succeeded,  and  one  consonant  with  their  genei-al 
scheme  ;  (2)  to  move  along  the  sea-coast  and  occupy 
successively  Dunkirk,  Calais,  and  Boulogne :  to 
command  the  Straits  of  Dover. 

Now  such  a  double  scheme  would  have  a  plain 
sti'ategical  meaning  in  the  case  of  an  enemy  strong 
enough  by  his  advance  to  push  back  the  xohole  of  the 
Allied  forces  in  this  quarter.  If  he  had  so  great  a 
superiority  of  numbers  that  he  could  be  certain  of 
advancing  from  the  line  Lille-Valenciennes  on  to 
Arras,  and  at  the  same  time  of  advancing  from  the 
line  Lille-Ostend  to  the  line  St.  Omer-Boulogne,  then 


NOJITH  SEA- 


the  double  operation  would  really  be  a  single  opera- 
tion ;  and  an  Allied  force  attempting  to  hang  on  for 
a  short  time  to,  say,  Menin,  would  at  the  very  begin- 
ning of  such  an  advance  occupy  a  dangerous  salient 
from  which  it  would  have  to  retire.  It  would  be 
swept  back  en  masse. 

But  it  is  fairly  evident  that  Prussia  commands 
no  such  overwhelming  force  either  in  quality  or  in 
quantity  in  this  region.  It  is  the  Allies  who  have 
gone  forward.  It  is  they  who  have  taken  successively 
Estaires,  Annentiferes,  Frelinghien.  It  is  they  who 
have  made  progress  in  front  of  Arras.  It  is  they  who 
have  pushed  even  as  far  as  RouUers.  And  it  is  self- 
evident  that  not  both  of  the  plans  thus  undertaken  by 
the  Gennan  commanders  can  now  be  achieved. 

I  am  not  saying  that  they  have  not  unexpected 
reserves  which  may  yet  make  good  some  advance 
of  theirs  south  of  Lille,  as  along  the  arrow  (1). 
I  am  not  saying  that  they  have  not  the  power — 
though  it  socms  very  doubtful — to  advance  if  they 
choose  to  undertake  that  dangerous  enterprise  along 
the  an-ow  (2)  along  the  sea-coast.  Jiut,  T  do  say 
that  tliey  cannot  undertake  both  objects,  and  that 
their  objects  arc  here  clearly  divided. 


Now,  to  divide  your  force  is  to  put  both  parts  in 
peril.  And  in  this  ease  the  two  parts  in  no  way 
co-operate.  They  cannot  bring  down  south  from 
arrow  (2)  any  aid  in  flank  of  arrow  (1) — unless  they 
have  an  overwhehning  number.  The  country  between 
is  solidly,  successfully  and  progressively  occupied  by 
the  Allies.  Still  less  can  they  bring  up  to  the  north 
aid  to  arrow  (2)  from  arrow  (1).  That  would 
be  suicide ;  for  it  would  be  the  exposure  of 
their  main  communications  with  France  behind 
Valenciennes. 

There  is  no  doubt  at  all  that  the  two  efforts  are 
separated.  Difficult  and  usually  rash  as  it  is  to  say : 
"  This  known  situation  necessarily  produces  that  knovra. 
future  result,"  it  is  a  fair  estimate  of  the  present 
position  upon  the  Franco-Belgian  frontier  that  not 
both  of  these  two  separate  efforts  can  succeed ;  and 
the  chances  are  more  than  even  that  neither  of  them 
wiU  succeed. 

If  this  is  so,  it  may  w^ell  be  asked  for  what 
reason  this  effort  along  the  sea-coast  was  undertaken 
by  the  Germans  at  all  ?  One  might  begin  the  series 
of  questions  by  asking  of  what  strategical  use  was  the 
occupation  of  Antwerp?  Here  there  is  one  reply 
quite  satisfactory :  "  Antwerp  was  occupied  in  order 
to  remove  any  considerable  threat  against  the  main 
communications  through  Belgium,  because  the 
moment  had  come  for  moving  certain  German  rein- 
forcements— perhaps  not  very  large  nor  of  very  good 
quality — through  Belgium  into  France."  Even  so 
the  answer  does  not  cover  the  field.  Antwerp  could 
perfectly  well  have  been  masked,  and  was  fairly 
efficiently  masked  for  more  than  a  month.  But  any- 
how, let  it  go  at  that.  You  get  something  of  an 
answer  to  the  strategical  question  "  Why  did  the 
enemy  occupy  Antwerp  ?  "  It  cost  the  Germans  very 
little  in  men,  and  we  must  also  remember  that  it 
raised  the  spirits  of  the  civilians  behind,  which  spirit, 
though  an  ,  indeterminate  factor,  is  not  one  entirely 
to  be  despised — especially  in  a  country  which  has 
been  taught  to  expect  continuous  victory  and  which 
can  boast  that  the  gi'eat  war  has  been  hitherto  con- 
ducted beyond  its  own  frontiers. 

But  when  one  proceeds  to  ask  the  further 
strategical  question  "  Why  was  Ghent  occupied  ?  " 
one  gets  an  answer  less  satisfactory.  Some  reply: 
"  It  was  occupied  in  order  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of 
the  Belgian  forces  from  Antwerp  along  the  sea-coast." 
I  say  this  answer  is  stiU  less  satisfactory  than  the 
answer  to  the  occupation  of  Antwerp,  because  the . 
German  commanders  must  have  known  that  the 
Belgian  army  would  escape  them.  They  cannot  even 
have  thought  it  a  very  close  thing. 

It  is  not,  by  the  way,  one  of  the  least  achieve- 
ments of  the  last  few  days  in  a  strategical  sense,  that 
this  considerable  force  should  have  been  safely  with- 
drawn. Nor  is  it,  paradoxical  though  it  sounds,  a 
discouragement  to  know  that  the  20,000  of  them  who 
were  lost  by  crossing  the  Dutch  frontier,  were  only 
lost  through  a  blunder  and  not  by  the  German  pressure 
from  the  south. 

Even  let  it  be  admitted  that  the  occupation  of 
Ghent  had  some  strategical  meaning,  when  we  come 
to  the  last  question,  "  AVliy  were  Bruges  and  Ostend 
occupied?  "  no  good  strategical  answer  is  available  at 
all.  The  thing  was  political.  While  the  great  sweep 
on  Paris  was  taking  place  the  coast  could  have  been 
occupied  by  small  German  forces  at  any  moment.  It 
was  not  then  thought  worth  while.  Now  that  that 
sweep  has  failed,  the  occupation  of  the  coast  in  the 
ho])c  of  sonic  moral  effect  upon  England  has  been 
undertaken.    The  answer  is  not  strategically  sufficient. 


9« 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  24,  1914 


PLAN  SHOWINO  DANQEB  Or  0»BMAN  ADTANO    ALONa  THB   COAST  TO    THEIR    MAIN    LIX.    OF   COMmiNICATIONS. 


Nothing  but  a  similar  answer  can  be  given  to  the 
proposal  to  go  on  westward  along  the  coast  to  the 
Straits  of  Dover  in  the  face  of  such  large  forces  of 
the  Allies  pushed  forward  eastward  and  below  as  far 
as  Menin  and  Eoullers.  To  pursue  the  advance  by 
the  level  road  along  the  sands  to  Dunkirk,  to  Calais, 
and  ultimately  across  the  Grisnez  hills  to  Boulogne 
with  this  big  enemy-force  on  their  left  flank  is 
impossible  to  the  Germans.  It  is  a  march  which 
simply  cannot  be  undertaken  until  the  Allies  are 
pushed  back  from  that  flank.  And  to  attempt  it  at 
all  can  only  mean  that  the  occupation  of  the  coast 
immediately  opposite  Great  Britain  has  in  the  eyes  of 
the  German  Government  (not  of  the  German  General 
Staff)  some  particular  political  value.  Of  strategical 
value  it  has  none. 

The  occupation  of  Lille,  and  the  vigorous 
defence  of  the  German  positions  south  of  Lille  and  in 
front  of  Douai  (where  the  French  have  already 
reached  the  trenches),  has  a  very  real  strategical 
meaning,  as  have  had  all  the  Gennan  efforts  upon 
this  line  from  between  Douai  and  Arras  right  down 
south  to  the  corner  of  the  old  line  of  the  Aisne  near 
Compiegne.  The  strategical  meaning  of  it  is  the 
defence  of  the  main  Gennan  line  of  communications, 
and  even  a  pushing  back  of  the  Allies  from  these, 
until  the  Germans  shall  feel  perfectly  secure.  But 
the  isolated  Gennan  thrust  along  the  maritime  belt 
is  a  waste  of  effort  until  or  unless  very  much  larger 
forces  than  anything  hitherto  brought  to  bear  by  the 
enemy  should  appear.  Meanwhile,  the  advance  of  the 
wedge  thrust  by  the  Allies  between  these  two  German 
efforts,  east  and  west  of  Lille,  continues. 

It  maybe  of  service  here  to  give  in  some  detail 
a  sketch  map  of  the  district  in  which  this  double 
effort  is  being  made  by  the  enemy^  and  to  describe  the 
fortunes  of  the  fight  during  the  last  few  days  in 
detail;  for   quite   probably   in   this   field   something 


decisive  will  be  achieved  by  the  one  opponent  or  the 
other  in  the  next  few  days. 


In  possession   oF  Allies 
before  the  ^movement. 

Further  Belt  occupied  hy 
Allies  since  movement  began. 


The  change  of  dispositions  as  we  have  learnt 
them  from  the  official  communiques  of  the  French, 
the  English,  and  the  Germans  upon  this  decisive  area, 
the  Franco-Belgian  frontier,  during  the  last  few  days, 
are  as  follows  : — 

Following  upon  the  fall  of  Antwerp  it  was 
generally  expected  that  there  would  come  a  German. 


10* 


October  24,  1914 


LAND    AND    AVATER 


advance — in  Avliat  numbers,  of  course,  we  could  not 
discover.  The  Allied  forces  were  prepared  to  meet 
tliat  advance  wherever  the  stroke  might  fall,  and,  if 
necessary,  to  take  the  counter-oifensive.  The  Belgian 
Army  which  had  evacuated  Antwerp  marched  round 
in  proximity  to  the  frontier,  until  it  had  effected  its 
junction  with  the  French  forces  along  the  sea-coast, 
the  advanced  guard  remaining  at  Nieuport  and  the 
mass  extended  westward  towards  Dunkii-k,  through 
Fumes.  South  of  this  came  the  Allied  forces  holding 
all  the  country  southward  down  to  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Arras. 

Up  to  this  moment,  the  furthest  point  to  which 
tlie  German  cavalry  had  penetrated  in  its  great 
advance  as  a  screen,  rather  less  than  a  fortnight  ago, 
was  the  fi-ont  Hazebrouck-Cassel ;  Hazebrouck  in  the 
plain,  Cassel  on  its  splendid  single,  Roman,  hill.  From 
this  Hazebrouck-Cassel  line  the  Geraian  cavalry  had 
been  pushed  back  in  the  first  encounters.  The  main 
German  advance  (in  what  fuU  numbers  we  do  not  yet 
know— and  we  shall  never  be  able  to  do  more  than 
guess,  though  its  composition  will  gradually  appear 
through  prisoners  and  other  sources  of  information) 
appeared  last  Thui-sday  in  the  almost  simultaneous 
occupation  of  Ostend  and  Lille.  The  momentum,  so 
to  speak,  of  this  German  push  was  not  exhausted  by 
tlie  seizure  of  these  points.  The  ultimate  front — the 
extreme  westward  and  east  of  the  enemy  here  — 
wjis  a  line  occupied  a  week  ago  from  in  front  of 
An-as,  through  or  near  Lens,  in  front  of  La  Bassee, 
by  Merville,  to  the  heights  (base,  confused  and 
insignificant)  known  to  the  inhabitants  as  the  Hills 
of  the  Cat  (the  Monts  du  Chat)  ;  whence,  by  the  way, 
a  valiant  body  of  volunteei-s  marched  just  too  late 
to  be  of  any  use  at  the  Battle  of  Tourcoing  a  hundred 
years  ago.  In  the  local  patois,  which  is  Flemish, 
men  call  it  "  The  Catsberg." 

From  these  heights  the  German  line  bent  back 
slightly,  but  well  west  of  the  Ypres  Canal,  through 
Dixmude,  to  the  sea.  Ostend  lay  behind  this  line,  and 
was  occupied  as  a  matter  of  course. 

At  this  moment  it  was  not  certain  whether  the 
Germans  would  attempt  to  attack  along  the  sea-coast 
or  to  renew  their  violent  efforts  between  Lille  and 
Douai  against  Arras  ;  or  even  whether  they  would  not 
attempt  both  things  together. 

Meanwhile,  against  so  long  a  line  which  might 
for  all  we  knew  be  insufficiently  held  (from  in  front  of 
and  below  Arras  to  the  sea-coast  near  Ostend  is,  as  I 
have  said,  a  round  80  miles),  the  Allies  pushed 
vigorously  forward,  and  the  effect  of  that  advance 
was  to  strike  a  great  wedge  in  between  the  northern 
coastal  forces  of  the  Germans  and  their  forces  in  and 
to  the  south  of  Lille.  As  this  advance  proceeded  it 
looked  more  and  more  as  though  the  big  Gennan 
cavalry  movement  of  the  week  before  had  been  not 
so  much  a  screen  in  front  of  a  really  large  advance 
of  German  reinforcements,  as  a  blind — perhaps  an 
effort  to  get  the  Allies  to  put  too  many  men  up  north 
along  the  sea  and  so  to  weaken  the  front  by  Arras : 
perhaps  the  other  way  round :  to  make  more  progress 
along  the  coast  by  threatening  Lille  and  the  countiy 
south  thereof. 

At  any  rate  the  Allied  forces,  depending  largely 
upon  the  excellence  of  cavalry  work,  pushed 
eastward.  On  Friday  last  the  French,  who  had 
already  t.aken  Estaires,  were  at  Laventie,  and  the 
AUies  had  seized  the  isolated  group  of  these  hills 
named  after  the  Cat.  They  had  not  yet  reached 
Ypres  or  Armentiercs.  ]3ut  by  Saturday  they  were 
right  up  ngainst  Armentiercs,  in  Ypres,  and  alrciuly 
making  a  I>ond  in  the  German  line.     On  the  Monday 


after  the  captui*e  of  Fromellcs,  there  was  a  general 
advance  in  this  region  from  Laventie,  on  to  Armen- 
tiercs, which  was  captured  and  occupied ;  advanced 
guards  also  captured  the  town  of  Freliuglicn.  Tweuty- 
four  hours  later  more  advanced  bodies  of  the  Allies  had 
reached  Menin,  and  a  spcar-head  of  the  Allied  forces 
(how  composed  we  do  not  know)  v/as  in  RouUers. 

Now  if  the  Germans  on  the  sea-coast  had  fallen 
back  before  this  steady  and  rapid  push  of  the  Allies 
north  of  Lille,  we  should  have  less  to  record.  But  the 
interesting  thing  is  that  in  spite  of  this  big  wedge 
driven  in  between  the  coast  and  the  manufacturing 
region  south  of  the  River  Lys,  the  Germans  have 
clung  to  the  coast  and  were  still  attempting,  as  late 
as  last  Monday,  to  force  a  way  eastward  along  it. 
They  were  checked  by  a  mixed  force  in  which  the 
Belgians  had  the  good  fortune  to  take  some  revenge. 
This  force  was  posted  along  the  only  strong  nortli- 
and-south  defensive  position  in  this  flat  and  sandy 
district — the  canalised  course  of  tlie  Yser,  which 
waterway  is  also  known  as  the  "  Canal  of  Ypres  to 
the  Sea."  This  watercoui-se  comes  out  at  Nieuport, 
running  by  Dixmude,  and  appears  hitherto  to  have 
checked  any  further  German  advance  along  the  coast 
towards  Dunkirk. 

Meanwhile,  any  such  advance  would  now,  as  I 
have  said,  be  very  much  in  peril  from  the  occupation 
by  the  Allies  of  all  the  country  to  the  south  of  it ; 
and  until  or  if  that  country  is  cleared  by  the  Germans 
and  the  Allies  pushed  back  from  it  (of  which  there  is 
as  yet  no  sign),  it  is  not  credible  that  the  offensive 
undertaken  by  the  enemy  along  the  coast  of  the 
North  Sea  towards  the  Straits  of  Dover  can  be 
continued. 

It  is  equally  true  that  if  the  advance  from  Menin 
should  reach  Courtrai  the  German  position  at  Lille 
will  no  longer  be  possible. 

The  whole  story  of  these  days  is  one  of  a  fairly 
rapid  and  distinctly  successful  pressure  exercised  upon 
the  enemy,  pushing  him  back  across  a  belt  10  or  12 
miles  wide  in  the  neighbourhood  of  An-as,  30  miles 
wide  in  the  broadest  part  of  the  wedge  between  Haze- 
brouck and  Roullers.  But  much  more  important  than 
the  mere  advance  is  the  fact  that,  if  it  can  be  con- 
tinued, it  will  mean  a  gradual  envelopment  of  what 
lies  to  the  south  of  it,  and  must  surely  already  mean 
the  retirement  of  the  hazardous  Gennan  advance  to 
the  north  of  it  along  the  sea  coast. 

B. — The  News  from  Alsace. 

The  second  item,  the  belated  piece  of  French 
official  news  as  regards  Alsace,  is  interesting 
chiefly  in'  this :  That  it  is  the  first  indication 
we  have  had  for  many  weeks  of  any  improvement 
in  the  situation  there.  It  was  generally  taken  for 
granted  that,  with  the  exception  of  Belfort  and  its 
garrison  (and  perhaps  a  few  miles  of  the  plain 
east  of  Belfort)  all  Alsace  had  been  abandoned  to 
the  enemy  since  the  French  disaster  at  the  end 
of  August  in  front  of  Metz.  Indeed,  we  had  heard 
no  more  than  occasional  accounts  of  a  German 
offensive  in  front  of  St.  Die,  which  offensive 
had  been  time  and  again  repulsed.  But  it  was 
generally  believed  that  during  the  whole  of  this 
period  the  crests  of  the  Vosges  and  their  passes, 
from  that  mountain  in  the  south  called  the  Ballon 
d' Alsace  right  up  to  the  northern  height  of  the 
Donon,  had  been  occupied  by  the  enemy,  who  had 
also  seized  the  French,  or  western,  slope  of  those 
mountains.  It  now  appears  that  all  the  southern 
passes  have — after  what  struggles  we  are  not  told — 
come  again  into  French  hands,  and  that  the  eastern 


\\* 


I  AND    AND    WATEB 


October  24,  1914 


^v^!jflfi^"     - — ^ — 1 — : 


PLAIlSr  of 
LORRAINE 


J 


according  to  Last 
Commvuziqiie^ 

==^^  OccapLedL 
by  French  since  Icxst 
Comuiiinique  ccpoiz. 
the  Vbsges 


^       S I STRASBURG 

M^Doiion-     ^  J     .  / 

^^  if  N      (^ 

\^J    \P^LBoziIwrtw^ 
COlMARh 

MULHAUS£N 

Gap  ofBelfort 
betv/een.  Swiss 
moantains  aial 
the  Vosges 


'ifi'Msace 
Forhfied) 

BELFORT 


D 


or  Alsatian  slope  of  the  Vosges  is  held  up  to  a  point 
abreast  of  Colmar. 

The  forces  hitherto  engaged  on  this  extreme 
right  of  the  gi-eat  line  of  positions  through  France 
have  been  (comparatively)  so  small  during  the  last 
few  weets  that  the  strategic  value  of  an  advance 
or  retirement  in  this  district  is  not  great.  But  the 
news  does  at  least  mean  this — that  if  a  big  turning 
movement  is  attempted  on  this  right  wing  of  the 
French  at  any  time — as  by  the  release  of  troops 
from  the  East  after  some  Gennan  success  upon  the 
Vistula — that  tui-ning  movement  will  not  imme- 
diately approach,  or  without  warning,  the  gap  of 
Belfort.  It  means  that  the  attack,  should  it  come, 
is  more  likely  to  come  throiigh  Lorraine  and  upon 
that  "open  door"  of  which  I  have  spoken  so 
often  in  these  notes  upon  the  Mouse  at  St.  Mihiel. 
But   it   is   no   longer   certain   that   this    open    door 


is  as  open  as  it  was  three  weeks  ago.  St.  Mihiel, 
indeed,  is  still  occupied,  but  such  slight  change 
as  there  has  been  in  the  situation  has  been  to 
the  advantage  of  the  French.  They  may  now  hold 
Camp  des  Eomains.  They  are  back  over  the 
Meuse,  quite  near  St.  Mihiel.  The  news  is  very 
scanty,  but  a  little  startling.  It  speaks  of  the 
destruction  of  a  battery  of  heavy  German  guns  and  of  a 
recrossing  of  the  river — of  action  close  to  the  St.Mihiel 
point.  But  of  a  cutting  off  of  the  German  advanced 
post  patiently  waiting  there,  it  says  nothing.  Had 
the  French  occupied  the  whole  of  the  Eupt  du  Mad, 
had  the  advances  northward  from  Toul  and  south- 
ward from  Verdun  met,  the  German  door  into  France 
at  St.  Mihiel  would  have  been  shut  again.  It  has 
not  been  shut;  but  the  corridor  leading  to  it  has 
been  maintained  naiTOw,  and  has,  perhaps,  been  made 
a  little  narrower.     We  must  wait  for  more  news. 


KOTE. — THIS  ARTICLE   HAS   BEEN   8TTBMITTED  TO  THE   PRKSS   BnBKAn,  WHICH   DOES   NOT  OBJECT  TO  THE   PUBLICATION   AS  CEN80EED 
AND    TAKES    NO    EESPONSIBILITY    FOE   THE    00BBECTNES8    OF   THE    STATEMENTS. 

Ill    ACCOBDANCB     WITH     THE     REQUIREMENTS      OF     THE    PRESS    BUREAU,     THE    POSITIONS     OF     TROOPS    ON     PLANS     ILLUSTRATINQ    THW 
ARTICLH   MUST  ONLY   BE   BEQARDED  AS   APPROXIMATE,  AND   NO   DEFINITE   STEENSTK   AT  ANT   POINT   IS   INDICATED, 


12» 


October  24,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATEB 


THE   WAR   BY   WATER. 

By   FRED    T.    JANE. 

NOTE. — THIS    ABTICLB   HAS    BBEIf   SUBMITTED  TO  THE  PEJtSS   BtJEKAU,  WHICH   DOBS   NOT  OBJECT  TO   THE   PUBLICATION  A3  OBNSOaBD 
AND   TAKES    NO    RESPONSIBILITr    FOK    THE    COB2SCTKBSS    OP  THE    STATEMENTS. 


RIGA 


THE   BALTIC  ABEA   Or   CONFLICT  SHOWINO   THE    MOST   IMPOP.TANT   FOETIFIED   POINTS. 


THE    SUBMARINE    MENACE. 

yA  T  the  moment  of  writing  the  Gei-man  week's  bag — 

/^L  by  submarines — is  one  Russian  armoured  cruiser 

Z__m  and  one  old  British  protected  cruiser.     It  works 

/        ^       out  at  two  of  something  for  nothing !     And  it  is 

idle  to  deny  that  a  species  of  submarine  panic  is 

spreading. 

The  actual  asset  remains  small.  To  date  no  GermAn 
submarine  has  achieved  anything  whatever  likely  in  tho 
remotest  degree  to  ailect  final  issues.  But — the  Germans  have 
secured  enough  "  moral  effect "  to  make  everji-hing  else  seem 
possible.  Many  of  us  envisage  them,  out  of  the  way,  lying  in 
harbour  till  such  time  aa  they  have  sunk  by  submarines  enough 
of  our  Navy  to  make  a  fleet  action  a  "  toss  up,"  or  else  odds  in 
Germany's  favour. 

So  far  they  have — except  in  the  case  of  the  Pallada — 
merely  submarined  ships  which  "  don't  matter."  But  we  may 
take  it  that  they  will  pursue  this  policy  steadily  until  they  have 
sunk  various  capital  ships  of  ours  which  do  matter  very  much. 

And  it  is  just  about  here  that  German  calculations  seem 
likely  to  go  astray. 

Supposring  that  they  attain  their  object;  supposing  that  they 
sink  some  of  our  Dreadnoughts  until  battle  fleet  equality  or 
an  advantage  therein  is  obtained  ?  The  German  fleet  may  then 
come  out  at  the  "  selected  moment."  But — and  it  is  a  very 
big  "  but "  indeed — it  chances  that  we  have  more  than  twice 
as  many  submarines  as  they  have,  and,  as  I  described  in  a 
recent  article,  submarines  manned  on  those  democratic  lines 
which  alone  can  be  relied  on  for  ultimate  success  in  this  kind 
of  warfare.  Whatever  risks  we  may  have  run,  thenr  risks  will 
bo  twice  as  gpreat. 

That,  however,  is  overlooked.  German  agents  in  this 
•country  have  made  a  strong  but  so  far  only  partially  successful 
effort  to  raise  a  submarine  p<anic.  It  cannot  be  too  clearly 
understood  that  it  is  not  the  loss  of  ships  and  men  on  which 
the  enemy  relies  so  much  aa  "  the  paaic."  It  is  in  tho  chapter 
of  accidents  that  not  long  before  tho  war  Admiral  Sir  Percy 
Scott,  in  a  letter,  and  Sir  A.  Conan  Doyle,  in  a  story,  should 
have  invested  tho  submarine  with  a  very  high  potontiaJity.  Of 
these  entirely  extraneous  circumstances  capital  is  already 
teing  made. 


Presently  more  capital  will  be  made,  because  it  is  reason- 
ably certain  that,  sooner  or  later,  the  German  submarines  will 
secure  some  of  our  Dreadnoughts.  The  first  Dreadnought 
secured  we  may  be  certain  of  seeing  tho  "  panic  "  sequel  worked 
to  the  uttermost. 

Now,  this  is  one  of  those  few  troubles  which  are  best  met 
half  way.  As  I  suggested  some  v.-eeks  ago,  the  loss  of  a  dozen 
Dreadnoughts  by  submarines  is  among  the  things  that  are 
possible.  We  should  meet  it  by  thinking  of  it  as  a  probaible 
event.  Tho  more  we  anticipate  it  the  better,  for  by  so  doing 
we  shall  keep  our  heads. 

To  date,  the  losses  due  to  submarines  have  been  propor- 
tionately far  less  than  people  imagine.  For  example,  here  is 
a  list  of  all  losses  which  have  taken  place  in  what  may  be  called 
"  submarinable  waters  "  :  — 


Allies. 

Germans  and  AnsTKiANS. 

Submarines 

Pathfinder 

Cressy 

Ho'jiie 

Abonkir 

Hawke 

Pallada 

nela 
S  126 

• 

Mino3    

Amphion 
Speedy 

t.b.  10  (Austrian,  Accidental) 

Gunfire     

K.  Luise  (minelayer) 

Zenta 

U  15 

V  187 

Magdeburg 

Koln 

Mainz 

A  riiKiiie 

S  115 

S  117 

s  lis 

S  119 

1S» 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  24,  1914 


Now,  if  we  examine  the  list,  we  find  that,  at  the  time  of 
writing,  there  have  only  been  six  successful  submaiine  attacks 
in  seventy-seven  days  of  warfare.  Of  these  six  successful 
attrxka  two  weret  delivered  by  U3.  Consequently  our  loss 
wo:-lca  out  at  approximately  one  successful  attack  agaiiist 
us  every  nineteen  days.  There  have  been  six  gunnery  affairs 
in  the  same  period,  resulting  in  the  loss  of  twice  as  many  units, 
so  to  date  the  submarine  (counting  in  units)  has  been  only 
half  as  effective  as  the  gun.  As  yet,  therefore,  there  is  no 
occasion  for  alarm,  the  more  so  as  there  is  reason  to  believe 
that  the  Eussians  sank  some  of  their  submarine  attackers. 

In  any  case,  the  submarine  is  neither  invulnerable  nor 
invincible.  The  difficulty  with  it  is  mainly  that  it  is  a  new 
arm — this  is  the  first  time  that  it  has  been  effectively  tried  in 
warfare.  Means  of  defence  have  therefore  to  be  invented,  for 
only  in  actual  warfare  can  the  necessary  experience  be  gained. 
Of  itself  a  Bubmai-ine  is  a  species  of  intelligent  floating 
mine,  its  speed  and  visual  ability  both  of  a  low  order.  The 
real  danger  lies  in  the  German  habit  of  using  a  trawler  mother 
ship  flying  a  neutral  flag.  Each  German  success  has  been  thus 
secured — the  trawler  acting  as  the  brain. 

Obviously,  then,  the  first  thing  necessary  is  to  devise  ways 
aJid  means  of  dealing  with  the  brain. 

That  is  to  be  done  either  by  restricting  the  liberty  of  trawlers 
to  fish  or  cruise  in  submarinable  waters,  or  else  by  utilising 
trawlers  for  the  examination  service.  Further,  it  is  probably 
not  beyond  the  wit  of  man  to  devise  some  means  of  transform- 
ing small  steamei-s  into  tome  kind  of  submarine  destroyer. 
Take  the  harpooning  of  Nature's  submarine — the  whale — for 
example.  And,  finally,  we  should  be  well  within  our  rights 
if  we  gave  it  clearly  to  be  understood  that  the  crews  of  all 
vessels  assisting  enemy  submaa'ines  under  the  neutral  flag 
would  be  hanged  as  pirates.  The  percentage  of  men  who  will 
face  in  cold  blood  the  chance  of  being  hanged  is  small. 


THE   NORTH    SEA. 

The  process  of  destroying  the  British  Fleet  by  "  attrition  " 
has  decidedly  failed  in  ita  object  during  the  last  week.  On 
the  German  side  the  bag  is  one  old  cruiser,  the  Hawhe;  on  our 
side  four  German  destroyers,  old,  but  still  useful. 

None  of  these  losses  affect  the  main  issue,  save  in  so  far 
as  the  principle  explained  by  Bemhardi  is  concerned.  Our 
numerical  superiority  in  the  various  classes  of  ships  varies,  but 
it  can  be  roughly  generalised  at  from  33  per  cent,  to  50  per 
cent. 

This  makes  no  allowance  for  ships  on  foreign  service,  or 
for  what  the  Germans  have  to  detach  to  operate  against  the 


Generalised  broadly,  the  situation  is  approximately 
follows : — 


Type, 

British. 

German. 

British  Surplus. 

"  Dreadnoughts  " 

Pro-DreadnoughlB 

Cruisers    

Light  Cruisers    ....... 

Torpedo  Craft    

34 

40 
49 
72 

260 
84 

22 

30 
15 
36 
209 
30 

12 
10 
34 
36 
51 
64 

In  every  case  the  ships  concerned  are  of  widely  varying 
fighting  value  in  each  class.  But  where  numbers  are  at  stake 
the  fighting  values  of  units  are  apt  to  coalesce  in  the  general 
total.  Taking  an  arbitrary  100  against  seventy,  it  is  obvious 
that  if  the  lesser  Power  destroys  ten  of  the  cneany  with  a  loss 
to  itself  of  seven,  it  has  made  no  progress  whatever.  The 
situation  remains  unaffected ;  the  superiority  of  three  has  no 
meaning.  And  since  the  Germans  are  actually  up  against  a 
proposition  which  is  nearer  100  to  forty  (even  at  a  moderate 
computation),  it  is  easy  to  see  that  even  an  apparent  gain 
would  represent  an  actual  loss. 

The  following  is  a  list  of  losses  in  the  North  Sea  and 
Baltic  to  date.  These  two  areas  cannot  act  in  combination  so 
far  as  the  Allies  are  concerned;  but  so  far  as  the  Germans  ai-e 
concei-nod  they  are  more  or  less  one  and  the  same  thing :  — 


aass. 

Lost  by  Allies. 

Lost  by  Germans. 

Cruisers    

Light  Cruisers 

4 
2 
1 
0 
0 

0 
6 

Gunboats 

Toipedo  Craft 

Submarines 

1 

6 

1  to  4 

Total  of  all  sorts   

7 

13  to  16 

^German  Teetifcory 
H  ■  Dutch  Territory 


PLAN  SBOWUiO  BOEKOM,  OVY   WHICH   THB   OBSKAN   DBSTBOTXBS   WIBB   SOKK, 

Russians  in  the  Baltic  Nor  does  it  take  into  account  the 
considerable  force  of  small  craft  which. the  French  maintain 
in  the  Channel.  In  calculations  of  this  kind,  it  is  always 
bettor  to  allow  a  margin.  The  surplus  given  is  therefore  our 
minimum  superiority,  and  the  German  total,  correspondingly 
represents  a  maximum. 

Space  docs  not  permit  of  giving  the  whole  sum  in  exact 
percentages — nor  would  there  be  any  particular  advantage  in 
giving  it.  In  matters  of  this  sort  broad  generalities  ai-e  the 
things  that  count. 


Now,  working  in  units  this  means  that  it  has  cost  the 
Germans  about  double  value  for  evei-y  unit  which  they  have 
destroyed.  Translated  into  terms  of  ability  to  afford  it  in 
units  this  works  out  at  something  like  sixpence  expended  for 
every  penny  gained.  Translated  into  terms  of  fighting  value  it 
only  worlts  out  at  something  like  it  costing  twopence  to  make 
a  penny  against  adversaries  which  have  a  shilling  available  for 
every  German  sixpence.  "  Attrition  " 
is  hardly  to  be  achieved  on  these  lines. 

Turning  to  the  two  latest  actions; 
little  of  much  moment  is  to  be  extracted 
from  either.  The  Hawke  was  an  old 
cruiser  launched  in  1891,  in  the  days 
when  the  torpedo  counted  for  very  little. 
She  displaced  7,350  tons.  She  was 
armed  with  two  ancient  9'2's,  and  ten 
equally  ancient  6  inch.  Her  palmiest 
speed  was  195  knots. 

The  destroyer  action  is  in  a 
different  category.  It  must  be  left  to 
others  to  decide  whether  Mr.  Churchill 
was  quite  "  happy  "  in  his  rat-destroying 
simile.  But  whether  he  were  or 
whether  he  were  not,  this  paxticular 
action  comes  under  that  head. 

So  far  as  can  be  asceitained,  the 
four  old  German  destroyers,  S  115,  117, 
118,  and  119,  sunk  by  the  light  cruiser 
UndauiUed,     and     the     t.b.d.      Lancr, 
Lennox,  Legion,  and  Loyal,  were  patrol- 
ling   off    Borkum.     They    were    boats 
designed  for  the  destruction  of  battle- 
ships by  torpedoes,  without    the  least 
regard  to  conflict  with  others  of  their 
kind.     To  continue  the  Churchill  simile, 
they  were  rats  which  crept  out  of  their 
hole  and  found  a  man  with  a  shot  gun 
waiting  for  them. 
Directly  they  saw  the  Undaunted  they  must  have  known 
that  the  game  was  up.     To  my  mind,  the  disquieting  feature 
of  the  matter  is  that  they  did  not  surrender  right  off,  but 
instead    put   up    a   fight   with    their    popguns    against   over- 
whelming odds. 

The  Undaunted,  in  common  with  the  rest  of  her  class, 
carries  a  couple  of  6-inch  guns.  These  guns  mean  death  and 
destruction  on  the  first  hit,  whereas  an  old  German  destroyer 
might  fire  at  an  Undaunted  for  a  whole  day  without  damaging 
her  anything  to  speak  of. 


14* 


October  24,  1914 


LAND    AND     WATER 


I  may  be  wrong,  but  I  am  of  opinion  that  we  should  take 
vsry  careful  note  of  this  ailair  o£F  the  Dutch  coast.  It  indicates 
that  the  Germans  have  a  tenacity  fully  equal  to  our  own. 
They  are  playing  for  the  Empire  of  the  Seas,  and  they  are 
playing  to  win.  The  odds  against  them  are  stupendous,  but 
they  do  not  recognise  these  odda. 

The  guns  available  on  either  side  were  as  follows :  — 


BoITISH. 

Two  6-in.  (lOO-pdrs.) 
Fif;cca  4-ia.  (31-pdrj.) 


Germ  ASS. 
Twelve  l-odra. 


Little  wonder  that  our  losses  only  amounted  to  five 
wounded ! 

A  curious  feature  of  the  action  is  that  it  is  stated  to  have 
occupied  over  an  hour  altogether.  This  probably  included 
from  the  first  shot  fired  in  the  chase  to  the  sinking  of  the  last 
enemy  destroyer.  Shooting  from  a  destroyer  at  high  speed  is, 
however,  always  very  difficult. 

Sufficient  data  are  not  available  to  form  a  connected  story 
of  what  happened.  We  cannot  rely  much  on  the  Dutch  eye- 
witness who  "  knew  the  ships  wei-e  destroyers  because  they  had 
four  funnels."  None  of  the  British  boats  engaged  have  mora 
than  three  funnels,  while  all  the  Germans  had  but  two.  Hia 
other  observations  were  probably  equally  at  fault. 

The  precise  tactics,  however,  matter  little.  Of  far  more 
moment  is  the  circumstance  that  the  enemy  was  annihilated 
without  appreciable  loss.  He  had  not  a  dog's  chance — and 
that  is  the  correct  strategy  of  war.  On  each  occasion  that  wo 
have  met  the  enemy  this  has  happened. 

THE    BALTIC. 

News  from  the  Baltic  is  still  somewhat  vague — for  some 
reason  or  other  no  coherent  official  German  report  is  available. 

The  Kiel  Canal  has  been  closed  to  merchant  shipping ;  this 
probably  to  curtail  information  as  to  where  the  High  Sea 
Fleet  is. 

There  are  rumours  of  a  German  Fleet  cruising  near  the 
Aland  Islands,  but  it  may  possibly  turn  out  that  they  are 
Russians. 

The  ".ncident  of  most  moment  is  the  official  Russian  state- 
ment that  on  October  10th  the  Admiral  Makaroff,  while 
searching  a  suspicious  fishing  vessel  flying  the  Dutch  flag,  was 
unsuccessfully  attacked  by  submarines.  On  the  following  day 
her  sistor  cruisers,  the  Bay  an  and  Pallada,  were  again  attacked, 
the  latter  being  hit  and  sunk  with  all  her  crew.     The  Pcdlada 


was  a  modem  armoured  cruiser  of  7,775  tons,  armed  with 
two  8-inch,  eight  6-inch,  and  a  7-inch  belt.  Hex  speed  was 
about  21  knots.  She  is  the  first  modem  ship  (save  the  little 
Amphion)  to  be  lost  in  the  present  war.  A  feature  of  tha 
design  of  this  type  ia  a  very  complete  series  of  unpierced 
bulkheads  of  great  solidity.  Theoretically,  she  was  unsinkablo 
by  one  torpedo.  Either,  therefore,  she  was  hit  by  two  or 
more,  or  she  happened  to  be  struck  in  a  magazine. 

In  this  connection  German  torpedoes  appear  to  be  mora 
violent  in  their  action  than  do  ours.  A  special  new  secret 
explosive  has  consequently  been  suspected,  but  evidence  as  to 
this  is  yet  inconclusive — there  is  a  great  element  of  luck  iu 
where  a  toi'pedo  happens  to  hit. 

THE   MEDITERRANEAN. 

There  is  no  change  to  record.  The  bombardment  of 
Cattaro  continues.  Photographs  which  have  been  published 
suggest  that  only  old  ships  are  actively  engaged — which  is  also 
both  reasonable  and  probable.  It  seems  impi-obable  that  any- 
thing on  a  par  with  the  German  "  17-inch  howitzers  "  on  land 
is  being  attempted  by  thj  ships;  there  is  no  reason  why  it 
should  be. 

The  usual  Austrian  destroyer  is  reported  unofficially  as 
"  sunk,"  also  an  Austrian  submarine.  Stories  of  this  kind 
are  best  accepted  with  caution.  Indications  generally  are  thab 
the  Austrians  are  remaining  in  harbour. 

THE    HIGH   SEAS    GENERALLY. 

At  the  moment  of  writing  all  German  corsairs  have  dis- 
appeared. One  or  two  vessels  supposed  to  be  their  auxiliary 
colliers  have  been  captured  or  detained,  and  this  may  partly 
account  for  the  recent  lack  of  activity.  More  probably,  how- 
ever, it  is  part  of  the  general  plan  of  campaign  designed  to 
lull  us  into  a  temporary  security.  Possibly,  however,  our 
cruisers  are  too  active  to  make  commerce  warfare  alluring. 

In  any  case,  nothing  has  so  far  happemed  to  render  neces- 
saiy  any  consideration  of  the  adoption  of  convoy,  with  its 
attendant  inconvenience  and  expense. 

THE   FAR   EAST. 

The  old  Japanese  cruiser  TaJcachUio  has  been  sunk  by  a 
mine.  As  a  fighting  unit  she  was  quite  obsolete.  Operations 
otherwise  continue  much  as  usuaL 


FIELD  ENTRENCHMENTS  AND  THEIR 

DEFENCE. 

By  COL.   F.  N.  MAUDE,  C.B.,  late  R.E. 


IN  my  previous  article  I  gave  rough  illustrations  of  very 
simple  sections  of  trenches,  leaving  out  all  dimensions, 
and  I    did  this  for  a   reason    I  shall  now   explain. 
Nothing  in  my  experience  disheartens  the  would-be 
student  of  these  matters  more  than  the  diagrams  in 
text  books,  marked  minutely  4  feet  3  inches,  5  feofc 
6  inches,  and  so  forth,  many   dozens  of  them,  all  of  which 
he    is    told    he   must   commit   to    memory    for    examination 
purposes. 

The  whole  thing  seems  so  unpractical  to  him.  If  a  man 
■wants  breast-high  cover  when  bullets  are  flying,  or  are  likely 
to  fly,  he  will  dig  till  he  gets  it,  without  bothering  at  all  about 
inches.  But  even  in  war  bullets  are  not  always  flying;  in 
peace,  naturally,  they  never  are,  and  it  is  essentially  in  peace 
that  all  instructional  work  has  to  be  done.  There  will  be 
lots  of  it  in  the  new  armies  for  the  next  six  months.  Hence 
these  dimensions  have  to  be  fixed,  because  in  peace  what  the 
whole  squad  wants  is  to  get  back  early  to  their  dinners,  and 
unless  you  lay  down  distinct  and  definito  dimensions  of  depth, 
width  and  task  required  from  each  man  (which  must  be 
adhered  to)  the  instructor  has  no  irrefutable  argument  at 
hand  with  which  to  check  shirkers.  As  many  of  my  readers 
will  probably  be  instructors  in  a  very  short  time,  I  recom- 
mend these  hints  particularly  to  their  attention. 

Moreover,  where  places  have  to  be  entrenched  against  time 
it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  have  some  clear  idea  as  to  the 
amount  of  earth  a  man  can  throw  out  in  a  given  time,  before 
any  reliable  scheme  for  a  whole  position  can  be  evolved.  If 
the  general  gives  his  subordinates  oight,  twelve,  or  forty-eight 
hours  to  prepare  a  position,  he  must  at  least  bo  able  to  judge 
how  much  work  ho  can  reasonably  expect  to  find  done  upon  it 


in  the  time,  since  his  whole  plan  and  distribution  of  troops 
must  depend  the  duration  of  the  defence  which  an  allotted 
number  of  men  can  make  in  it. 

Generally,  after  a  long  peace,  the  tendency  is  to  underrate 
very  materially  the  amount  of  work  that  can  bo  done,  with 
the  result  that  works  are  not  attempted  at  all  for  fear  they 
should  not  be  finished  in  time,  or  far  more  men  than  would 
suffice  are  allotted  to  their  defence  whose  services,  as  a  mobile 
reserve,  may  be  badly  needed  elsewhere. 

I  remember  an  old  Ci'imean  instructor  telling  us  that  the 
best  guide  as  to  what  a  man  could  dig  out  under  fire  was  to 
back  the  champion  man  of  one  company  against  the  champion 
of  another  to  get  out  100  cubic  feet  for  drinks,  and  then  note 
the  result.  I  remember  also  one  such  competition  in  which 
the  two  men  almost  tied  in  one  quarter  of  the  time  which  tha 
book  allowed  for  the  job.  These  are  hints  not  to  be  found 
in  official  textbooks,  but  they  will  be  ecsceedingly  useful  none 
the  less. 

The  next  point  is  of  importance  to  all  ranlcs  alike,  whether 
they  have  to  dig  trenches,  or  defend  them,  or  both.  It  has 
been  brought  our  very  clearly  in  "  Ej'e-witness's  "  last  letter 
from  Hcadquai-ters  in  France.  The  writer  is  himself  an 
engineer  officer,  and  the  point  raised  is  one  around  which  a 
great  conflict  has  raged  for  many  years. 

Generally,  everybody  at  first  thinks  that  the  greater  the 
range  at  which  he  can  see  his  enemy  the  better  the  chance 
of  shooting  him  down  before  he  is  reached  by  the  enemy.  It 
seems  such  plain  commonsense  that  if  a  man  must  spend  thirty 
minutes  under  fire  in  trying  to  get  at  you,  you  will  have  thirty 
t.imcs  more  chances  of  hitting  him  than  if  the  distance  is  so 
short  that  ho  can  cover  it  in  only  one. 


I5« 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  24,  1941 


Curiously,  hoivever,  tte  exact  conyerse  is  the  case,  aa 
Plan  I.  ■will  siow. 

Let  tha  distance  bo  3000  yards,  taking  thirty  minutes 
roughly  to  cover.  Now,  at  3000  yards  long-range  infantry 
fire  ha^  never  yet  stopped  a  decent  battery  from  unlimbcring 
and  opening  fire,  and  never  will. 

The  enomjr's  infantry  comes  over  the  brow  of  the  hill  in 
Bucccssivo  lines,  and  your  men  begin  shooting,  thus  disclosing 
their  position  by  tbo  graze  of  their  bullets. 


It  was  argued  by  many  of  us  long  before  the  war  began 
that  to  place  trenches  on  the  top  of  a  long  slope  was  simply 
to  court  destruction  at  the  hands  of  tlie  gunners,  who  can 
always  outrange  infantry.  Wo  argued  that  a  man  could 
always  siioot  straighter  from  a  rest  than  when  standing  up 
from  the  shoulder.  Therefore,  the  essence  of  a  good  defence 
lay  in  so  tracing  the  trenchea  that  the  guns  could  not  got  at 
them  from  a  distance,  thus  compelling  the  infantiy  to  attack 
without  their  support.     Thus,  as  shown  in  Plan  II.,  B.'s  guns 


Batteries  promptly  appear  near  the  top  of  the  hill,  not 
necessarily  on  it,  and  in  three  minutes  or  so  a  rain  of 
shrapnel  begins  to  burst  over  your  heads,  smoke,  dust,  and 
bullets  fill  the  air,  and  it  ceases  to  be  possible  for  men  to  see 
the  approaching  enemy,  much  less  aim  at  him,  for  the  bullets 
come  so  thick  that  every  square  foot  of  vulnerable  surface, 
Bjeai's  heads,  and  shoulders,  must  be  hit  three  or  four  times 
a  minute.  At  last,  when  the  enemy's  infantry  is  about  300 
to  500  yards  off,  according  to  the  slope  of  the  ground,  his 


Plan  L 


now  cannot  come  forward  down  the  slope  towards  A.  without 
being  crushed  by  A.'s  artillery,  which  can  shell  the  wood  full 
of  B.'s  infajitry  as  it  pleases,  and  if  B.'s  infantry  try  to  break 
out  of  the  wood  down  the  hill,  A.'s  unshaken  infantry  can 
pump  out  magazine  fire  enough  in  a  minute  to  wipe  out  every 
living  thing  among  them.  This  is  exactly  what  we  have  now 
learnt  to  do  in  practice  on  the  Aisne. 

Of    course,    the    enemy's    aeroplanes    may    locate    A.'s 
trenches,  but   unless  the   gunners  can   see  where  the  aero- 


30  0  Oj£- 


pins  have  to  cease  their  fire  in  order  to  avoid  hitting  their 
own  men  in  the  back,  an  experience  no  men  will  stand.  But 
by  that  time  the  defenders  have  been  so  reduced  in  numbers 
and  so  harassed  by  shells  generally,  that  they  fire  high  and 
wild,  and  can  no  longer  stop  the  enemy's  final  rush.  That  is, 
and  always  has  been,  the  mechanism  of  every  successful 
attack,  but  hitherto,  in  actual  practice,  no  army  has  seen  that 
in  the  modem  breech-loader  they  possess  the  one  weapon 
which  can  defeat  this  design. 


Plan  II. 

plane's  signal  bomb  drops  their  fire  is  not  likely  to  be 
very  accurate,  and,  after  all,  you  must  take  som.e  chances 
in    war. 

When,  therefore,  in  the  near  future  any  of  my  readers  may 
find  themselves  in  a  trench  halfway  up  a  slope,  or  close  to 
a  wood,  at  first  sight  the  worst  kind  of  place  ho  can  imagine, 
let  him  take  heart-,  for  the  choice  of  such  a  position  only  shows 
that  his  leaders  know  their  work  and  have  full  confidence  in 
his  shooting. 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  FILM. 
Latest  pictures  at  the  Scala  Theatre. 
Thosi  who  have  not  yet  eeen  the  beautifnl  colour  pictures  of  the 
war  at  the  Scala  Theatre  will  do  well  to  take  an  early  opportunity  of 
doing  eo,  for  there  is  certainly  no  entertainment  of  equal  interest 
to  be  seen  in  London  at  the  present  time.  The  latest  additions  to  the 
colour  filma  comprising  scenes  of  interest  round  the  Belgian  coast,  and 
an  adnurablo  series  of  views  of  Paris  and  Parieian  life,  are  full  of 
animation,  and  are  alone  well  worthy  of  a  visit,  while  the  first  part 
of  the  programme,  which  shows  in  varied  detail  the  diflerent  unita  of 
the  military  and  naval  fighting  forces  of  Russia,  France,  Germany, 
Jtaly,  .servia  Denmark,  Switzerland,  the  United  States,  and  Japan, 
oonatitutea  a  feast  of  gorgeous  colouring  and  of  dramatic  incident  which 
can  never  fade  from  the  recoUectiou  of  the  spectator,  and  which  may, 
indeed,  be  enjoyed  again  and  again  with  undiminished  zest.  Among 
80  much  that  is  noteworthy,  it  is  difficult  to  particularise,  but  the 
strikingly  beautiful  aspect  of  the  foaming  sunlit  waters  in  some  of 
the  naval  pictures  is  a  veritable  triumph  for  the  kinemacolour  process. 
Another  remarkable  effect  is  th^t  produced  by  the  firing  of  the  field 
guns,  the  flashes  from  which  appear  at  times  Uko  an  actual  blaze  of  real 
fire  upon  the  screen.  Quite  a  fcafure  of  the  entertainment  is  the 
OTchestra,  which  is  excellently  handled  throughout,  and  adds  much  to 
the  general  enjoyment,  the  various  items  being  skilfully  chosen  to 
enhance  the  effect  of  the  pictures.  A  word  of  praise  is  aleo  due  to 
the  lecturer  whose  lucid  explanation  of  the  films  is  often  characterised 
by  touches  of  humour. 

WAR    PUBLICATIONS. 

Mcssre  Hodder  and  Stoughton  have  just  published  two  topical 
hooka,  The  BntisA  Army  from  Within,  by  E.  Charles  Vivian,  and 
rhe  Freiich  Army  frmn  Within,  by  ex-Trooper,  at  2s.  each 
Ihe  former  will  make  very  instructive  reading,  not  onlv  to 
those  who  have  eiJisted  or  are  about  \o  enlist,  but  to  all  those 
interested— and  at  the  preeent  moment  who  is  not?— in  the  welfare  of 
the  Jintish  Army.     AH  the  various  units  that  go  to  make  up  the  com- 


plete array  are  carefully  dealt  with.     The  chapter  on  the  "  New  Army  " 
will  be  read  with  considerable  appreciation. 

Although  not  specifically  stated,  it  is  not  difficult  to  im.igine  that 
both  these  books  are  from  the  pen  of  the  same  author,  and  the  French 
Army  from  Within  explains  the  various  branches  in  detail.  The 
chapter  dealing  with  the  great  garrison  towns  of  France  is  of  particular 
inteiest. 


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LAND     AND     WATER 


HJiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii| 

I  How  to  help  Tommy  Atkins  | 

^                 We  cannot  all  go  out  to  fight,  but  we  can  s: 

S                  all  do  something  to  help  our  soldiers  who  ^ 

S                  are  fighting  our  battles  and  defending  the  = 

S                  honour  of  our  native  land,  and  in  this  way  = 

=                  contribute  to  theirwell-being  and  efficiency  S 

I  SEND  HIM  A  FLASK  OF  I 

I  HORLICK  S  I 

i  MALTED  MILK  TABLETS  I 

uuHn                                             Invaluable  to  a  soldier  — 

in    the   field    and    most  ^ 

efficient      in      relieving  ^ 

hunger  and   thirst  ^ 

and  preventing  fatigue.  = 

We  will  send   post  free  to  any  = 

address  a  flask  of  thesedelicious  S 

and  sustaining  food  tablets  and  ^ 

a    neat   vest    pocket    case    on  ^ 

receipt  of  1/6,     If  the  man  is  at  S 

the  front,  be  particular  to  give  — 

his  name,  regimental  number,  = 

regiment,  brigade  and  division.  = 


Of  all  Chemists  and  stores,  in  con- 
venient pocket  flasks,  1/-  each. 
Larger  sires,  1  6.  2/6  and   11/- 

HORLICK'S  MALTED  MILK  Co., 
SLOUGH.  BUCKS. 


TTiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiimiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiMiin: 


Half  Price 

of  good-class   ordinary    cocoa. 

THREE  CUPS  A  PENNY 

The  wonderful  new  food  beverage 


OAT- 
COCOA 


PLASMDN 

_a  combination  of  the  celebrated  Plasmon  Oat-Food  and  Pure  Cocoa— 

LEAST  COST 

MOST  NOURISHMENT 

FINE  CHOCOLATE  FLAVOUR 

Procurable  through  all  chemists,  grocers  or  stores.  If  not,  send  P.O. 
or  stamps,  and  it  will  be  forwarded  post  free.  Manufactured  solely 
by    Plasmon,    Ltd.    (Dept.    25),    Farringdon    Street,    London,    E.C. 

WO  IIVCREaSC  fW  PKICE  OF  PLUSMON  FOODS. 

ALL  BRITISH 


PLASMON  CHOCOLATE 

is  supplied  as  an 
Emergency  Ration  to  the 

BRITISH    TROOPS 


LAND    AND     WATER 


THROUGH   THE   EYES 
OF  A  WOMAN 

Plans,  and  those  Who  plan  them 


■> 


THE  National  Relief  Fund  continues  to  accumulate 
like  the  proverbial  snowball,  each  day  witnessing 
a  further  growth  in  the  already  large  total.  The 
arm-chair  critic  has  never  been  more  carping 
than  during  the  course  of  the  last  ten  weeks, 
and,  needless  to  sav,  the  National  Relief  Fund  has  not  escaped 
his  attentions.  There  is  no  more  difficult  proceeding  than 
the  just  administration  of  a  charitable  fund,  and  it  must 
surely  be  allowed  that  the  e.\ecutive  committee  of  the  one  in 
question  has  made  every  effort  to  solve  the  problem.  The 
ideal  state  of  things  is  a  central  fund  and  its  local  distribution, 
and  this  has  been  recognised.  Mr.  Wedgwood  Benn,  as  chair- 
man of  the  committee,  has  issued  a  statement  making  this 
abundantly  plain.  In  each  district  a  central  register  of 
information  has  been  formed  and  agencies  already  in  exist- 
ence asked  to  contribute  to  this  end.  Foremost  amongst 
them  are  the  Soldiers'  and  Sailors'  Families  Association,  the 
Royal  Patriotic  Fund  Corporation,  and  the  Soldiers'  and 
Sailors'  Help  Society.  Then  there  is  the  Government  Com- 
mittee on  the  Prevention  and  Relief  of  Distress,  which  has 
been  collecting  information  for  some  time  past  and  is  now 
ready  with  its  report.  Through  these  channels  the  fund  is 
already  being  distributed  and  much  needed  relief  being  given. 
It  is,  however,  very  certain  that  some  very  deserving  cases 
have  not  come  to  the  notice  of  those  in  authority.  The  truth 
is  that  those  administering  the  fund  are  face  to  face  with  the 
problem  confronting  all  social  workers.  The  shiftless  poor 
are  only  too  ready  to  claim  all  the  relief  they  can  secure, 
whilst  others,  brought  to  misfortune  often  through  no  fault 
of  their  own,  are  too  proud  to  beg.  A  much-criticised  letter 
has  recently  appeared  in  the  Press  eulogising  the  social 
conditions  in  Berhn.  Only  one  of  the  points  it  made  was 
worthy  of  attention,  and  that  dealt  with  the  house-to-house 
visitation  carried  out  in  the  German  capital.  This  is  done 
through  the  medium  of  a  corps  of  German  girls  of  good 
family,  who  make  it  their  business  to  investigate  every 
genuine  case  of  distress.  Germany  has  learnt  and  copied  so 
much  from  us  that  we  in  our  turn  need  not  hesitate  over  the 
adoption  of  a  useful  hint  from  her.  Some  such  organisation 
started  over  here,  and  worked  tactfully  and  well,  could  not 
fail  to  be  helpful  in  directing  attention  to  cases  that  might 
otherwise  be  unavoidably  overlooked. 

Women  and  the  Fund 

Many  reports  have  been  circulated  as  to  the  practical 
working  of  this  fund,  some  of  which  have  been  accurate  and 
others  very  wide  of  the  truth.  Until  quite  recently  many 
people  believed  that  women  were  not  eligible  for  help  and 
that  men  alone  were  to  benefit.  This  has  been  proved  to  be 
wrong  upon  the  authority  of  Mr.  Balfour,  who  makes  a  very 
sympathetic  reference  to  the  working  woman  and  war  con- 
ditions It  must  regretfully  be  allowed  that  the  war  has 
caused  hundreds  of  women  to  lose  their  employment,  and  the 
difficulties  of  obtaining  fresh  work  are  very  great.  The 
demands  of  the  new  army  for  numbers  of  men  is  lessening  the 
male  ranks  of  the  unemployed,  but  women  have  no  such 
claim  upon  their  services.  Mr.  Balfour  says  that  in  his 
opinion  the  women  thrown  out  of  work  by  the  war  have  the 
strongest  claim  to  sympathy,  and  so,  he  believes,  think  the 
other  members  of  the  executive  committee.  Pew  will  quarrel 
with  this  opinion.  The  working  woman,  indeed,  would 
be  in  evil  case  at  present  if  strenuous  efforts  were  not  being 
made  on  her  behalf.  It  is  calculated  that  already  thirty-five 
thousand  women  are  out  of  work  in  London  alone.  The 
Queen's  Work  for  Women  Fund  is  striking  at  the  root  of  the 
matter,  and  has  successfully  provided  some  much  needed 
employment.  Many  private  individuals  also  are  providing 
all  the  work  they  can,  realising  that  the  truest  form  of  charity 
is  that  which  receives  as  well  as  gives.  The  briefest  survey 
of  recent  years  shows  that  women  come  more  prominentlv 
into  the  labour  market  with  every  day  that  passes.  Times 
change,  and  we  with  them,  but  amongst  the  many  points  of 
difference  between  this  present  conflagration  and  the  last 
which  set  Europe  in  a  blaze  is  the  position  of  women.    Woman, 


as  a  class,  is  affected  by  the  present  war  in  a  way  which  would 
not  have  been  possible  a  hundred,  fifty,  or  even  fifteen  years 
ago.  She  feels  the  rise  and  fall  of  trade  prosperity  directly 
instead  of  indirectly  as  heretofore,  because  in  many  instances 
she  is  personally  concerned.  Every  intelligent  scheme,  there- 
fore, to  cope  with  women's  employment  cieserves  very  warm 
approval.  The  National  Union  of  Women  Workers  is  fixing 
its  attention  upon  the  need  for  social  work  amongst  the 
women  and  girls  living  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  many 
large  camps  now  rapidly  being  formed.  They  suggest  that 
a  band  of  voluntary  workers  should  be  formed  under  the 
control  of  paid  organisers.  These  organisers  will  have  to  be 
carefully  selected,  as  the  work  will  be  difficult  and  responsible, 
and  adequate  salaries  must  be  forthcoming.  The  object  is  so 
excellent,  however,  that  these  will  probably  be  ensured  and 
this  important  work  maintained. 
A  Belgian  School  !n  London 

One  of  the  most  practical  schemes  for  helping  the  Belgian 
refugees  may  be  found  at  4  Challoner  Street,  West  Kensington. 
Here  Miss  Ruth  Holland  has  started  a  school  for  the  Belgian 
children  now  in  this  country.  Some  of  these  children  have 
already  attended  various  county  council  schools,  but  owing 
to  their  speaking  a  foreign  tongue  this  has  not  been  altogether 
successful.  Miss  Holland's  school  will  be  conducted  pre- 
cisely as  if  it  were  in  Belgium.  One  of  the  teachers  speaks 
Flemish,  but  practically  all  the  lessons  will  be  given  in  French. 
Lessons  in  English  are  to  be  given  as  a  foreign  language 
subject,  but  otherwise  English  will  be  rarely  spoken  One 
hundred  children  will  be  sent  as  boarders  to  this  school  by 
the  Belgian  Legation,  and  it  will  be  opened  on  the  first  of 
November,  when  all  arrangements  are  to  be  in  \\  orking  order. 
The  conduct  of  the  school  has  been  carefully  planned,  and  it 
should  prove  a  very  happy  venture. 

Erica. 


LOOKING    WESTWARD 

THE  subject  of  investments  and  profitable  re-investment  is  one 
that  is  occupying  the  attention  of  a  good  many  people  at  the 
present  time,  for,  in  the  state  in  which  all  Europe  is  now, 
securities  that  have  long  been  regarded  as  thoroughly  safe  and  capable 
of  paying  a  good  rate  of  interest  are  no  longer  to  be  considered  worth 
holding  even  ;  some  other  field  for  enterprise  must  be  sought,  and  the 
prospective  re-investor  naturally  turns  to  a  country  where  the  war 
and  its  effects  are  not  so  likely  to  be  felt  as  in  the  older  European 
states.  It  is  probable  that  European  stocks  will  fall  still  more  before 
they  rise,  and  since  investors  are  already  looking  westward  for  fresh 
enterprises  it  is  also  probable  that  the  available  stock  of  the  western 
countries  will  rise  steadily  in  value.  Interest  is  naturally  centred  to 
a  large  extent  on  Canada,  where  agricultural  and  commercial  prosperity 
is  assured,  capital  earns  a  high  rate  of  interest,  and  the  effects  of  the 
war  are  less  hkely  to  be  felt  than  in  most  countries,  since  geographical 
position,  combined  with  the  absolute  loyalty  of  the  Dominion,  render 
it  more  than  probable  that  European  disorganisation  and  cessation  of 
industry  will  prove  Canada's  opportunity. 

But  one  requires  the  assistance  of  those  thoroughly  familiar  with 
the  country  and  its  ways  in  selecting  investments  in  Canada  just  as 
much  as  elsewhere.  The  Alberta  Co-operative  Development  Agency, 
with  headquarters  at  Craven  House,  Kingsway,  has  been  established 
with  a  view  to  dealing  with  Canadian  stock  of  all  kinds.  Mr.  C. 
Copley  Singleton,  the  managing  director  of  the  company,  is  a  firm 
believer  in  personal  acquaintance  between  investor  and  agent,  and  is 
willing  to  place  his  experience  of  things  Canadian  at  the  disposal  of 
clients.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  agency  is  not  established  to 
work  at  a  profit,  but  the  method  of  business  is  such  that  the  investor 
reaps  benefit  from  consulting  the  agency,  just  as  the  agency  also  reaps 
a  reward  for  its  enterprise.  The  business  has  been  established  for  the 
purpose  of  dealing  in  Canadian  stocks,  enabling  members  to  secure 
investments  without  incurring  heavy  brokers'  commissions.  The 
managing  director  is  a  man  of  extensive  commercial  and  general 
business  experience,  and  may  be  ranked  among  experts  on  the  subject 
of  Canada  and  its  possibilities.  The  organisation  of  the  agency 
provides  for  the  thorough  investigation  of  any  commercial,  industrial, 
or  agricultural  undertaking.  An  interesting  feature  is  that  no  invest- 
ment is  recommended  unless  it  is  approved  by  the  agency's  Canadian 
representatives  ;  this  provides  investors  with  the  assurance  that  it 
has  the  support  of  local  men  living  on  the  .spot  and  knowing  conditions. 
The  prospective  investor  or  re-investor  is  thus  fully  safeguarded,  and 
it  may  be  added  that  the  safeguard  is  afforded  by  a  sound  business 
organisation  in  which  clients  and  members  can  have  full  confidence. 
Any  particulars  in  connection  with  the  business  will  be  gladly  afforded 
on  application  at  the  address  given  above. 


46 


The  County  Gentleman 


AND 


LAND  &WATER 


Vol.  LXIV.         No.  2736  SATURDAY,  OCTOBER  17,  1914.  [p^i 


PUBLISHED  AST 
EWSPAPER.J 


P  RICE  SIXPENCE 
PUBLISHED  WEEKLY 


Prom  a  Painting  by  Angela 
Photograph  by  William  H.  Grove 


FIELD-MARSHAL    EARL    KITCHENER 

The  appointment  of  our  most  prominent  General  on  the  Active  Service  List  as  Secretary  of 
Stale  for  War  has  given  general  satisfaction  throughout  the  whole  of  the  Empire.  His  magnificent 
organising    ability    has    already    made    itself    powerfully    felt    in    all    branches    of    the   War  Office. 


LAND     AND    WATER 


October   17,   19 14 


Mr.  LandoB  Roiiitld. 


Mr.  Ball  Cain*.        Mr.  Henry  Arthur  Jones.      Madam  Sarah  Crana.         Mr.  E.  F.  Benson. 


Sir  F.  Milner. 


Sir  Luke  White. 


What  do  you  find  best  to  keep  you  in  good  health  ? 

SOME   DISTINGUISHKD   PEOPLE   RELATE  THEIR   EXPERIENCE. 


Mr.  B.  W.  Ltadar,  B.A. 


"I 

I      Mv  exi>erience  con  firms  the  medical 

*     opitiion— there    is    no    longer    that 

{eelinR  o(  (atiRne  which   one  previonsly 

exiierienceil.  bnt  there  follows  from  its 

use  a  distinct  restorative  effect." 


"  QANATOGEN  seems  to  me  a  very 
^  valuable  food  and  nerve  tonic. 
^"^    1  have  several  times  taken  a  course 

of  it  wlieii   I  have  been  run  down,  and 

alwajs  with  jiood  results.' 


SIRJOHN 
BENN 
is  de- 
riving much 
benefit  from 
Sanatogeu." 


^  1 1' 


"  TV  yf  Y  experience  has  been  that  as  a 
I  yI  tonic  nerve  food.  Sanatc^eii  has 
"*■  on  more  than  one  occasion  done 

me  j-ood." 


XHJi  Ou/^ 


"  Q^AXATOGEX  has  done  everythinji 
1^  for  me  which  it  is  said  to  be  able 
to  do  for  cases  of  nervous  debility 
and  exhaustion.  I  bejian  to  take  it  after 
nearly  four  years'  enforced  idleness  from 
extreme  debility,  and  now  (after  only 
ft)ur  months)  I  find  m>self  able  to  enjoy 
both  work  and  play  again." 


I 


HAVE  for  two  months  been  sufTerinji 
from  a  rather  severe  attack  of  Con- 
gestion   of   the    I.unKs.      I   am   now 

recovering  and  rapidly  regaining  strength. 

which  I  attribute  in  a  ureal  measure  to 

my  having  taken  Sanatogeu  twice  daily 

for  some  weeks." 


FIND  Sauatogen  an  excellent  tonic." 


/s.^u^^ 


vwnf^ 


"  T   HAVE  been  taking   Sanatogeu.  and 

I     think  that  it  has  decidedly  helped 

me  to  get  through    the  extremely 

arduous  work    that   I    have    had  to   do 

during  the  past  few  mouths," 


SIR  EREDERICK  MH.NER  was 
much  run  down  from  overwork 
when  he  took  Sauatogen.  and  it 
certainly  did  good.  He  has  more  than 
once  sent  supplies  to  poor  people,  run 
down  from  illness  or  overwork,  and  it  has 
invariably  proved  successful.  It  seems 
both  to  nourish  and  give  strength." 


p  I  oni- 
ises,  when 
you  are   run 

down,  to  pick 
you  up.  It 
does  so." 


Rev.  FatKer  Bernard  Vaughaik 


/c 


/l^ 


Sir  John  Bean. 


V4  •  ^^*— •-^^-'txo.      J^'"»<T%g^<^,^ 


Sanatogen  will  give  you  back 
Health,  Strength  and  Nerve- 
power — not  visionary,  but  real. 


That  the  regular  daily  use  of  Sanatogen  does  actually  produce  a  remark- 
able improvemeut  in  many  conditions  of  ill-health  is  a  fact  which  has  been 
vouched  foi  by  no  fewer  than  twenty  thousand  physicians,  as  well  as  by 
many  celebrated  ])eople  who  have  used  it. 

A  True  Tonic  Food — Start  a  course   to-day  ! 


Anaemia,  Dyspepsia,  Lassitude,  and  other  symptoms 
of  nervous  disorders — all  disappear  rapidly  after  a  course 
of  Sauatogen.  It  restores  and  invigorates  the  system  after 
Influenza,  Operations,  and  illness  generally.      Sanatogen 


is,  therefore,  specially  prescribed  for  nursing  mothers  and 
weakly  children  of  all  ages,  for  in  no  case  can  it  do  harm, 
while  its  bland  composition  renders  it  easily  and  rapidly 
digestible. 

Sanatogen  is  sold  by  all  Chemists  from  is.  qd.  per  tin. 


SANATOGEN — a  Scientific  Health  Food  withTrue  Tonic  Properties. 


34 


October  17,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


THE    WAR    BY    LAND. 

By  HILAIRE   BELLOG. 

NOTE. — THIS  ABTICLI   HAS   BEEN  SCBMITTEB  TO  TH»  PB£S8  BUBBA.U,  WHICH   DOES   XOT  OBJECT  TO  THE   POBLICATION  AS   CENSOrilO) 
AND   TAKES    NO   BKiSPONSIBILITTv  FOK   THB   COBRECTNES3    OP    THE    STATEiLENTS. 

IN   ACCOKDAXCB     WITH    TBB    KEQVIEKSIISTS     OF     THE    PHKSS    BUBEAU,     THE    POSITIONS     OF     TE00P3    OM    PLAXS     ILLUSTKATINO    THIS 
AETICLB   MUST  ONLY   BB  KEOAP.BID   AS  APFSOXIMATB,  AND  KO  DBPIXITS  STRENGTH   AT  ANT  POIBT  IS  INDICATED. 


SUMMARY      OF      RESULTS      AND 
PROSPECTS  AT  THIS  MOMENT. 

THIS  Aveek  is  the  critical  week  in  the  first 
phase  of  the  European  War. 
Contact  is  established  upon  the 
Vistula,  the  lines  in  France  have  reached 
their  maximum  of  extension,  the 
Germanic  powers  (not  their  opponents)  have  put  the 
last  recruits  and  the  last  resei-ves  into  the  field. 
From  this  week  we  must  expect — from  this  week 
onward — some  decision. 

It  is  the  moment  for  taking  stock  not  only  of 
the  strategical  position  in  which  the  opposing  forces 
now  find  themselves  throughout  Em-ope,  but  also  of 
the  main  movements  which  have  led  to  these 
positions,  and  of  the  main  strategical  results  which 
may  or  should  proceed  fi-om  those  positions.  And  in 
connection  with  this  task  of  "  taking  stock  "  we  wiU 
do  well  to  note  in  passing  certain  novel  conditions  of 
warfare — such  as  the  weakness  of  the  fortress — 
emerging  from  the  two  months  of  struggle.  For,  it 
is  upon  our  appreciation  of  these  novel  conditions 
that  the  soundness  of  our  judgment  for  the  futm-c 
vnU.  largely  depend. 

In  appreciating  the  situation  as  a  whole,  we 
have  two  things  to  consider  which  appear  everywhere 
in  human  effort.  They  are  the  material  and  the 
moi-al  elements  in  that  effort. 

To  take  first  the  material : — Here  is  an  outline  map 
showing  in  the  roughest  possible  fashion  the  two  great 
material  factors  in  the  present  situation.      These  are  : 


(2)  The  opportunities  of  supply  and  of  communi- 
cation open  to  either  party. 

Opportunities  of  supply  for  petrol,  for  horses,  for 
copper,  and  the  rest,  and,  what  is  less  important  to 
the  Germanic  Powers,  for  food,  I  have  marked  with 
arrows;  and  the  numerous  aiTOws  which  I  have  indi- 
cated for  England,  for  France,  and  for  Eussia  signify, 
of  course,  the  perfectly  open  field  of  supply  in  such 
things  which  these  three  AUies  have  behind  them. 
Russia  has  behind  her  an  indefinitely  large  supply 
coming  over  her  Plains  from  the  East,  whether  of 
horses  or  of  petrol,  of  copper,  of  nitrates,  or  of  almost 
any  other  necessaiy.  France  and  England  have  an 
equally  immeasurable  field  behind  them  for  the  pro- 
vision of  such  supply  afforded  them  by  the  ocean,  so 
long  as  the  ocean  is  kept  open  by  the  superiority  of 
the  British  Fleet. 

The  opportunities  for  this  external  supply  which 
is  partially  afforded  thi'ough  neutral  countries  to  the 
Germanic  centiul  Powers  I  have  marked  by  broken 
arrows.  I  have  marked  it  thus  differently  because 
the  supply  is  doubtful,  and  with  increasing  difficulty 
obtained.  For  instance,  there  may  be  some  limited 
and  difficult  supply  of  petrol  to  be  obtained  in  this 
fashion  by  the  Germanic  Powers,  through  occasional 
cargoes  coming  by  Norway  ;  but  the  only  direct  supply 
(so  long  as  that  is  continued)  would  be  from  Eoumaniii. 

In  the  same  way  the  main  communications  by 
which  each  body  of  Allies  moves  or  can  move  its  men 
and  material  I  have  indicated  by  lines  of  dots, 
but  these,  of  com-se  are,  in  the  case  of  the  sea,  almost 


13' 


f    ^-^ 


(1)  The    position     of 
which   the    Germanic   are    in 
Allies  in  open  white). 


the    oppo.sing    lines    (of 
thick   black    and    the 


as  numerous  as  tho  ports  are,  while  a  whole  gridii'on 
of  railways  behind  the  Western  field  of  war  supplies 
tlie  Western  front  of  the  Allies  in  France.     These 


LAND     AND    WATER 


October  17,  1014 


main  lines,  therefore,  are  only  to  be  taken  as  a  very 
incomplete  and  elementary  indication  of  the  full 
opportunities  of  communication  which  the  Allies 
enjoy.  The  corresponding  main  communications  of 
the  German  Powers  I  have  marked  in  full  lines. 

Even  from  such  an  elementary  sketch  certain 
main  features  emerge.  In  the  first  jilace  the  Gennanic 
Powers  are  seen  to  possess  one  j.rime  advantage 
coupled  with  one  piime  disadvantage. 

The  prime  advantage  is  that  they  stand  united 
in  i)lace  and  time,  as  also,  largely,  in  spirit.  They 
are  each  well  served,  moreover,  by  railway  communi- 
cations pennitting  them  to  pass  troops  and  guns  from 
west  to  east  and  east  to  west  continually. 

Now  the  prime  material  disadvantage  which  the 
Gennanic  Powers,  our  enemies,  suffer  is  not  remotely 
connected  with  this  advantage  of  theirs.  This  dis- 
advantage is  a  more  or  less  complete  blockade. 

The  Germanic  Powers  can  pass  troops  and  guns 
from  frontier  to  frontier  speedily.  Why  ?  Because 
they  are  inland  powers  holding  the  centre  of  Euroi)e, 
the  one  the  Baltic  Plaiu,  the  other  the  Valley  of  the 
Danube.  And  both  the  Baltic  Plain  and  the  Valley 
of  the  Danube  run  east  and  Avest.  For  the  mountain 
ranjjes  which  mio^ht  interfei-e  with  communication  do 
not  run  across  these  main  lines,  but  parallel  to  them. 
But  this  same  fact  that  our  enemies  are  in  the  midst 
of  Europe  makes  possible  their  more  or  less  complete 
blockade  by  sea,  which  in  its  turn  is  due  to  the 
superiority  of  the  British  Fleet. 

"\^Tien  we  say  that  it  is  to  the  advantage  of  the 
Germanic  powers  to  be  thus  packed  together,  with 
main  communications  running  east  and  west,  we  mean 
something  like  what  is  meant  in  smaller  fields  of 
strategy  by  the  term  "interior  lines." 

Tor  instance,  supposing  Eussia,  with  her  great 
numbers,  could  send  troops  and  guns  to  Belgium  in 
three  or  four  days,  it  would  be  obviously  of  immense 
advantage  to  the  AUies  in  the  Western  field  of  war. 
But  Eussia  cannot  do  this.  Such  an  expedition 
woidd  mean  thousands  upon  thousands  of  mUes  of 
steam,  weeks  upon  weeks  of  time,  and  an  impossible 
calculation  of  organised  detail.  Gei'many,  on  the 
other  hand,  can  send  a  large  body  of  troops  from  the 
Eussian  field  of  operations  to  the  Belgian  field  of 
operations  in  a  less  number  of  days  than  the  number 
of  months  that  would  be  required  for  bringing  a 
Eussian  body  to  the  West.  And  this  power  of  acting 
upon  interior  lines  of  communication  has  a  further 
important  advantage  :  you  can  use  your  knowledge 
of  the  two  combined  fields.  Eastern  and  Western, 
ini  media  fell/.  A  big  Eussian  success  or  failure  upon 
the  Vistula  is  felt  and  acted  upon  immediately  in  the 
shape  of  reinforcements  or  withdrawal  of  Germanic 
troops  to  or  from  the  Eastern  and  from  or  to 
the  Western  field.  A  double  campaign  is  "felt" 
more  faithfully  and  acutely  by  the  people  sitting  in 
the  middle  than  it  can  be  by  the  people  pounding  at 
the  two  outside  edges.  The  knowledge  of  what  is 
going  on  at  a  circumference  can  be  more  thoroughly 
co-ordinated  from  a  centre  than  from  a  periphery. 
The  Allies  have  indeed  to-day  the  telegi-aph,  which 
eliminates  what  would  have  been  an  almost  insuperable 
difficulty  a  hundred  years  ago;  but  co-ordination  by 
telegram  with  people  whom  you  cannot  meet  and  see 
at  every  few  days'  interval  is  another  thing  from 
co-ordination  by  personal  interview  between  com- 
manders or  their  envoys  none  of  whom  are  twenty- 
houi-s  from  your  centre. 

Serious,  however,  as  these  material  advantages  are 
to  the  central  Powers,  they  are  certainly  outweighed 
especially  in  the  later  pliaso  of  the  general  campai'^n, 


by  the  corresponding  disadvantages ;  for  the  blockade 
of  certain  prime  materials,  even  where  it  is  not 
a1)solute,  is  a  most  serious  thing  for  a  modern 
belligerent  and  a  partieidarly  serious  thing  for  that 
belligerent  if  he  is  a  Prussian. 

All  war  connotes  a  lavish  expenditure  of  most 
things  usually  husbandel,  from  human  life  to  horse 
flesh.  But  Prussian  war  particularly  depends  upon 
the  power  of  this  lavish  expenditiu-e.  The  whole 
spirit  of  Prussian  warfare  is  to  win  at  once,  and  tlie 
whole  weakness  for  Prussia  lies  in  the  inability  of  the 
Prussian  commander,  text-book  or  professor,  to  tell 
you  Avhat  is  to  be  done  in  case  of  a  progressive  defeat. 
The  successes  of  Prussia  in  this  war  have  been 
successes  due  to  immediate  and  expensive  attack,  of 
heavy  artillery  against  fortification,  of  close  formation 
in  overwhelming  numbers  in  the  field,  and  of  forced 
rapid  marching.  I  do  not  belittle  this  spirit.  It  is 
one  of  the  two  only  ways  of  winning.  What  I  am 
pointing  out  is  that  it  involves  a  lavish,  a  spendthrift, 
exjjenditui-e  of  eciri/tkinff  in  the  sweep  forward  to 
succeed  once  and  for  all. 

So  there  we  have  two  impoi-taut  things  pointing 
to  the  necessity  of  very  rapid  immediate  supply  if 
Prussia  and  her  Ally  are  to  win.  First,  that  all  war 
involves  this  enormous  consumption  as  in  a  matter  of 
life  and  death.  Secondly,  that  in  particular  Prussian 
war  demands  it. 

But  there  is  a  third  element  favouring  blockade 
to-day.  Modern  war  demands  such  expenditure  in  a 
peculiar  degree,  because  modern  war  deals  with  tlia 
maximum  numbers  of  men,  horses,  material,  fuel,  and 
all  the  rest  of  it :  it  mobilises  a  whole  nation. 

There  is  yet  a  fourth  factor  advantaging  the 
blockaders  and  disadvantaging  the  blockaded  in 
modern  war,  and  that  is  the  peculiar  nature  of  certain 
indi.spensable  materials  for  modern  war. 

It  so  haf)pens  that  modern  war  requires  for  its 
conduct  a  whole  category  of  materials  such  as  petrol, 
copper  and  certain  of  the  chemicals  necessary  to  the 
production  of  high  explosives,  which  materials  are 
not  universally  discovered,  are  mostly  extra-European 
in  origin,  and  depend  for  their  introduction  to  Central 
Europe  mainly  upon  sea-borne  commerce. 

Consider,,  for  instance,  the  position  of  tl:e 
Gemianic  Powers  in  the  matter  of  petrol.  Without 
petrol  you  cannot  fly,  and  without  petrol  your  tran- 
sport— at  least  in  Western  Europe — is  grievously 
hampered.  Well,  the  main  supplies  of  petrol  come 
from  Asia,  from  America,  from  the  Eussian  Cauca- 
sian region,  from  Eoumania,  and  from  Galicia.  Of 
aU  these  fields  the  Eoumanlan  alone  is,  in  theory  at 
least  (of  what  is  actually  happening  I  say  nothing), 
open  readily  to  supply  the  Germanic  I'owers.  And  even 
if  this  field  were  as  open  practically  as  it  is  in  the 
theory  of  international  law,  a  Eussian  advance 
southward  over  the  Hungarian  Plain  would  intercept 
it,  and  has  already  partially  Intercepted  It. 

Imagine  the  j^osltions  reversed,  and  the  Import- 
ance of  this  factor  of  disadvantage  will  appear. 
Supposing  the  main  sources  of  petrol  in  the  world  lay 
within  Austria-Hungary  and  the  German  Empire, 
see  what  an  advantage  our  enemies  would  then 
jjossess !  As  it  Is  that  advantage  Is  exactly,  or 
nearly  exactly  transferred  to  the  British  and  their 
Allies. 

Having  said  so  much  on  the  material  advantages 
and  disadvantages  of  the  position  occupied  at  this 
moment  by  the  Germanic  Powers  in  the  centre  of 
Europe,  let  us  turn  to  the  moral  account  and  strike 
a  balance.  It  is  Important  to  do  so,  because  upon 
the    moral   factor    everything    ultimateiy  depends — 


2* 


Octolxir  17,  1914 


LAND    A:&TD    water 


thoiigli  tliis  factor  is  much  more  difficult  to  appreciate 
than  is  the  material,  and  can  never  be  appreciated  so 
exactly. 

First  of  all  -vve  have  the  factor  of  homogeneity  : 
which  of  the  two  bodies  of  opponents  is  moralli/  the  viost 
vniled,  the  Allies  or  the  Ilapshiirg-IIohcnzollerns  ? 

There  is  here  a  very  subtle  problem. 

The  Allies  consist  in  three  great  national  groups, 
to  which  must  be  added  the  two  smaller  nations  of 
Belgium  and  Servia.  Now  as  regards  each  of  these 
gi'oups,  the  national  feeling  is  absolute  and  unanimous. 
Evoiy  single  Frenchman,  every  single  Belgian,  every 
single  Eussian,  every  single  Servian  is  determined 
upon  the  French,  the  Russian,  the  Servian,  and  what 
is  now  the  Belgian  ob  ject  of  the  war.  One  may  even 
justly  say  that  (with  the  exception  of  certain  German 
populations  in  the  Russian  Baltic)  those  populations 
which  are  not  in  sj-mpathy  with  the  central  govern- 
ments of  Russia  and  England,  but  which  are  subject 
to  them,  are  far  more  in  sympathy  with  the  anti- 
German  policy  of  Russia  and  England  than  with  any 
other  ])art  of  Russian  or  British  policy.  For  instance, 
the  chief  doubtful  element  of  aU,  the  Poles,  are,  as  a 
nation,  far  more  inclined  to-day  to  support  Russian 
than  Prussian  aims.  Tlie  Allies  have  then  that 
essential  moral  element  in  strategy :  a  common 
purpose  really  inspiring  them. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Germanic  Powers  are 
handicapped  by  the  fact  that  only  the  Gorman 
speaking  core,  and  not  quite  all  of  that,  is 
enthusiastic  for  theu'  cause.  The  Magyars  are 
certainly  in  sympathy,  but  they  are  disparate.  They 
are  occupied  (or  have  been  until  the  present  war)  in 
the  government  and  even  the  oppression  of  aliens. 
Millions  of  Roumanians,  and  millions  of  Catholic 
Slavs  who  are  not  of  the  Mag}'ar  temper  and  who  do 
not  desire  any  Austro-Hungarian  success,  are  subject 
to  them.  The  Austrian-German  is  somewhat  at  issue 
with  the  Catholic  Slav  of  Bohemia,  violently  at  issue 
with  the  small  Itahan- speaking  population  in  the 
Bouth  on  the  Adriatic.  That  brave,  intelligent,  and 
intensely  vital  Italian  body  is  a  highly  important 
factor  for  disruption  and  peril  to  the  Hapsburgs  at 
the  present  moment. 

There  is  a  sufficient  measure  of  orthodox  Serbs 
in  the  south-east  to  be  another  source  of  peril ;  and 
though  the  Austrian-Pole  is  not  averse  from  Austria, 
Polish  feeling  must  be  taken  as  a  whole,  and  it  has 
been  permanently  alienated  from  the  Germanic  claim 
by  the  political  incapacity  of  Prussia.  For  Prussia 
cannot  govern. 

Belgium,  which  Germany  proposes  to  adminis- 
trate (we  may  look  at  any  moment  for  a  policy  of 
annexation,  that  is — even  without  formal  decree — for 
the  establishment  of  German  Courts,  as  of  German 
currency,  and  for  the  official  Gennan  re-naming  of 


Belgian  topogi'aphy),  is  less  reducible  to  the  German 
claims  than  any  area  in  Euro^je,  great  or  small. 
Alsace-Lorraine  is  enemy's  country  to  the  Germans, 
though  it  talks  the  German  tongue  ;  and  all  Prussian 
Poland — that  is,  everything  more  than  one  hundred 
miles  east  of  Berlin,  and  everything  more  than  thirty 
miles  from  the  Baltic  Sea — is  stiU  more  bitterly  anti- 
Gennan. 

If,  upon  the  immediately  preceding  map,  you 
mai-k  Avith  a  thick  black  line  the  frontier  of  the  area 
occupied  by  our  enemies  at  this  moment  and  mark 
off  with  hatching  the  ai'ca  occujiied  by  populations  dis- 
affected to  those  who  occupy  their  ten-itory  with  arms, 
you  will  find  no  such  areas  among  the  AUies  and  a 
very  large  proportion  of  such  areas  within  the  territory 
for  the  moment  administrated  by  our  enemies. 

Yet  another  modification  must,  however,  be 
allowed  before  we  have  any  complete  view  of  the 
spiritual  factors  the  strategist  must  consider. 

Though  the  German  powers  are  thus  handicapped 
by  whole  regions  which  are  either  actively  hostile  or 
doubtful  in  their  allegiance,  they  liaA'^e  this  advantage 
— that  where  they  are  united  they  are  completely 
luiited.  What  the  war  may  bring  forth  in  the  long 
run  we  can  none  of  us  tell,  but  we  may  make  quite 
certain  that  at  the  present  moment,  and  for  a  long 
time  to  come,  that  which  is  German  in  the  Germanic 
effort  stands  as  one  man.  The  Allies — Russia, 
England,  and  France — may  be  equally  determined  upon 
one  object ;  but  the  German  resistance  is  one  thing. 

The  Russians  coming  over  the  boundary  of  East 
Prussia,  the  threat  of  a  French  advance  upon,  say, 
Treves,  each  violently  affect  and  almost  in  the  same  degree 
a  man  of  education  living  in  Leipsic.  But  to  hear 
that  the  Germans  were  recently  occupying  the  govern- 
ment of  Suwalki  makes  no  Englishman's  blood  boil. 
Few  Russians  would  feel  it  intolerable  that  the 
Germans  should  have  been  in  Arras.  ITie  stay  of 
some  hours  which  the  Germans  made  in  Ai'ras  (where, 
by  the  way,  they  failed  to  bum  the  MSS.,  upon  which 
the  Life  of  St.  Patrick  is  based,  but  seem  to  have 
destroyed  St.  Waast)  means  to  a  Fi-enchman  some- 
thing very  different  from  what  it  can  mean  to  any 
Englishman.  Thirty  shells  dropped  upon  Westminster 
Abbey  and  leaving  it  a  rain  would  mean  to  an 
Englishman  something  quite  different  from  the  burning 
of  Rheims.  To  most  Frenchmen  it  would  mean 
nothing  at  all. 

That  is  the  moral  strategical  disadvantage  in  all 
alliances,  that  every  alliance  is  "  weak  at  the  seams," 
but  this  alliance  suffers  from  the  weakness  less 
perhaps  than  any  alliance  in  the  past  has  suffered 
from  similar  divergences. 

I  cannot  complete  this  brief  survey  of  the  general 
situation  (so  far  as  material  and  moiul  forces  are 
concerned)  without  recalling  (1)  on  the  material  side 
the  factor  of  numbers;  (2)  on  the  moral  side  the 
factor  of  claim. 

(1)  In  the  material  factor  of  numbers  there  is  a 
very  simple  formula,  which  anyone  may  use  like  a 
rule  of  thumb,  to  remember  what  the  situation  is.  Of 
trained  men  in  the  first  line  (that  is,  the  young  armies 
with  their  full  complements  of  all  arms  and  nothing 
improvised)  you  may  put  down  the  Germanic  Powers 
at  110;  the  French  at  40;  the  British — in  the  first 
phase  at  3  ;  the  Russians  at,  say,  25,  growing  rapidly 
through  30  to  50. 

In  the  phase  immediately  succeeding,  allowing 
for  similar  losses  on  all  sides,  you  get,  with  the 
Germanic  Powers  still  at  110,  the  new  British  forces 
swelling  from  three  up  to  anything  you  like — say 
twenty  or  even  twenty-five.     If  the  war  were  very 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  17,  1914 


mnch  prolonged  tliat  figure  miglit  be  increased 
indefinitoly.  The  lUissiaa  thirty  or  fifty  increases  to 
100,  to  150,  and,  at  a  pinch,  to  250.  The  French 
forty  cannot  increase.  It  was,  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war,  at  its  maximum. 

(2)  As  to  the  moral  factor  of  claim,  no  one,  even 
a  student  considering  mere  strategies,  can  neglect  it. 
The  Prussians  claim  nile,  the  Allies  freedom.  It  is 
true  that  the  Germanic  Powers,  and  particularly  the 
modern  Grerman  Empire,  are  fighting  for  theii-  life  ;  but 
then  so'  is  everybody  else — except,  possibly,  Eussia ; 
and  even  Eussia  would  cease  to  be  Eussia  without  her 
family  of  kindred  states.  But  there  is  this  indisput- 
able difference  between  the  fight  for  life  of  the  Allies 
and  the  fight  for  life  of  their  enemy :  that  the  enemy 
is  claimmg  as  part  of  his  fight  for  life  something 
which  no  Eurojjean  will  ever  accept.  No  Western 
European,  at  least,  has  ever  accepted  contentedly,  or 
ever  will  accept  without  ceaseless  revolt,  an  alien 
government.  The  conception  that  he  would  do  so  is 
the  great  strategic  miscalculation  modern  Prussia 
made  a  generation  ago.     She  is  too  stupid  to  learn. 

It  is,  in  truth,  a  strategic  miscalculation  and  one 
has  a  right  to  allude  to  it  in  a  strategic  commentary, 
for  there  is  one  great  principle  underlying  all 
strategics,  which  is  this :  "  77/e  success  of  a  camjjargn 
can  onli/  be  measured  i?!  terms  of  ifs political  object." 

For  instance-  Napoleon  succeeded  in  171)0-97 
because  his  object  was  to  clear  the  Austrians  out  of 
the  Lombard  Plain.  If  his  object  had  been  to  turn 
the  men  of  the  Lombard  Plain  into  Mahommedaus 
the  campaign  w^ould  have  been  an  infinitely  more 
difficult  task  and  he  would  have  failed. 

Here  is  an  important  concrete  note  upon  what  I 
mean.  Germany  by  her  action  in  Belgium  has  not, 
as  a  plain  matter  of  fact,  saved  any  appreciable 
number  of  men  upon  her  communications.  Those 
communications  are  not  lOD  miles  in  length.  She 
thought  by  one  miscalculation  that  they  w^ould  run 
through  Belgium,  as  they  do  through  Luxemburg,  in 
territory  free  from  peril.  She  has  produced  a  state  of 
affaire  in  which  those  few  miles  require  a  larger 
gan-ison  than  they  would  have  required  had  she  done 
no  more  than  civilised  Europeans  in  the  past  have 
done,  to  wit,  executed  those  who  broke  the  laws  of 
war  and  spared  the  rest.  My  judgment  in  this  will 
be  disputed.     I  believe  it  to  be  sound. 

THE    "BLOCK"    OR    DEADLOCK. 

There  is  the  foundation,  moral  and  material,  upon 
which  the  situation  now  rests.  Let  us  next  turn  to 
the  present  strategical  position  and  what  led  up  to  it. 

The  first  characteristic  of  that  strategical  position 
is  a  "  block  "  or  deadlock  upon  the  East  as  upon  the 
West;  which  block  has  lasted,  roughly  speaking,  for 
a  month. 

The  second  characteristic  of  the  position  is  that 
the  block  is  maintained  well  exterior  to  anything  vital 
in  the  Germanic  powers. 

Upon  the  west  it  is  almost  entirely  external  to 
their  boundaries ;  only  Upper  Alsace,  and  a  fraction  of 
that,  is  in  the  hands  of  the  French. 

Upon  the  east  it  is  largely  so  ;  only  Eastern 
Galicia  and  a  few  miles  of  East  Prussia  is  in  the  hands 
of  the  Eussians;  all  West  Poland  is  in  the  hands 
of  the  Germans. 

To  perceive  how  true  both  these  propositions  are, 
look  at  the  following  diagram. 

Here  is  the  front  of  the  positions  occupied  by 
the  German  ai-mies  in  the  west  to-day  (Tuesday, 
October  13  th)— represented  by  a  full  line.     Compare 


TbeCkaiuiet 


DOTTED    LtNiiS    EEPUESENT    POSITIONS    ON    SKITK3IBER    \".ni, 
FULL    LlNIiS    REPRESENT    POSITIONS    ON    OCTOBKR    lyTlI. 

it  with  the  similar  position  occupied  a  calendar  month 
ago,  upon  September  13th — represented  by  a  dotted 
line — and  see  how  slight  has  been  the  change. 
There  has,  it  is  true,  been  an  extension  northward, 
due  to  the  successive  attempts  of  France  and  Germany 
to  outflank  each  other,  but,  so  far  as  the  advance  of 
the  one  party  or  of  the  other  is  concei-ned,  hardly  any 
such  advance  has  taken  place. 

Turn  to  the  same  question  in  the  east,  and  thougli 
the  deadlock  is  not  there  so  striking,  it  is  remarkable 
enough.     Hei-e  you  have  the  Austro-German  front  a 


^ 


•••..L£MB£RG' 


IV 


DOTTED    LINES    KEPEKSENT    POSITIONS    ON    SEPTEMBER    loTH. 
FULL   LINES   BEPBESINT   POSITIONS   ON   OCTOBEB    13tH. 

month  ago  in  dotted  lines,  and  in  a  full  line  what 
appears  to  be  the  Austro-German  front  to-da}". 

As  to  the  way  in  which  these  blocked  fronts 
keep  the  Allies  at  arm's  length  to  the  east  and  the 
west  of  Germanic  territory,  the  reader  can  under- 
stand it  best  by  looking  at  the  following  rough  diagram. 

In  this  sketch,  the  German-speaking  area  (1),  in  so 
far  as  it  corresj^onds  with  the  feeling  in  favour  of  our 
enemies,  is  marked  wdth  deep  hatching.  The  area 
in  favour  of  our  enemies  (3),  but  not  German-speaking 
as  a  whole,  is  marked  with  another  hatching ;  the 
boundaries  of  territory  occupied  by  the  German  and 
the  Austrian  Empires  in  arms  is  marked  with  a  broad 
black    line.      Finally,    the    batching    (2)    represents 


4* 


October  17,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


1.  QERMAy    SPEAKIKO    AND    MOEALLT   AITACHKD. 

2.  OEBUAK   EPSAKIKQ   OUT   OF   STMPATHT. 

3.  NON-OESXAN   EPEAKINO   BUT   IN   STUPATHT. 

4.  THB         ■WiriTR         POBTION         WITHIS  BLACK         B0Tj:;DA3Ha 

KBPRKSEKTS     RACES     NKITir2B    ORRilAN    SPEAKIXQ    NOB     IM 
STXPATHY.  BLACK     I.IN1>S     BEPBKSXNT    BOUNDARIES     Or 

TEEBITOBT   NOW   OCCOPIED   BY    OERUANIC   rOKCrS. 

the  areas  witLin  this  broad  black  line  wlxich  are 
German-speaking  but  opposed  to  the  war  and  not 
morally  attached  to  the  German-speaking  core.  All 
the  rest — not  German  either  in  speech  or  sympathy 
— a  larger  area,  is  left  white.  It  is  apparent  at 
n  glance  how  the  war  is  still  being  pushed  well  back 
from  what  is,  for  our  enemies,  their  own  soil.  "We  shall 
not  be  bringing  pressure  upon  that  soil,  we  shall  not 
have  turned  them  from  invaders  into  beleagured  men, 
— nationally  speaking,  they  are  still  far  from  it — until 
we  have  got  them  back  somewhere  on  to  the  deeply 
hatched  central  area. 

Now,  what  are  the  conditions,  both  expected  and 
unexpected,  which  have  led  to  this  "  block  "  or  dead- 
lock of  opposing  lines,  east  and  west,  external  to  the 
Germanic  core  we  are  fighting ;  and  what  are  the 
prospects  of  the  future,  or  rather,  what  alternative 
prospects  do  those  conditions  promise  ? 

The  "  block  "  to  east  and  to  west,  in  so  far  as  it 
represents  a  failure  in  the  general  German  plan,  is  a 
failure  due  to  the  breakdown  of  what  may  be  vulgarly 
called  "  the  strategy  of  rush." 

In  a  minor  degree  this  "  strategy  of  rush  "  failed 
also  on  the  side  of  the  Allies  when  the  French  had  to 
give  up  their  premature  attempt  upon  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  and  suffered  a  heavy  defeat  (in  the  last 
third  of  August)  south  of  Metz.  In  the  eastern  field 
it  failed  still  more  conspicuously  when  the  quite 
unexpectedly  rapid  Russian  advance  into  East  Prussia 
broke  so  disastrously  at  the  same  time  before 
Tannenberg. 

But  these  failures  in  the  "  rush  strategy  "  of  the 
Allies  were  but  of  sliglit  effect  upon  the  general 
conduct  of  the  war  compared  with  the  failure  in  the 
"  rush  strategy  "  of  the  Germanic  powers. 

For  the  Allies  never  intended  to  "  rash "  the 
campaign  as  a  whole.  The  French  preliminary  work 
in  Alsace-Lorraine  was  that  of  an  advance  guard. 
The  Eus.sian  work  in  East  Prussia  was  equally 
detached  from  the  general  aggregation  of  later  Russian 
forces  ten  times  as  numerous.  The  French,  when 
they  failed  in  their  preliminary  clutch  at  Lorraine, 
had  an  army  corps  cut  up  and  lost  the  strength  of 
perhaps  a  division,  as  well  as  over  fifty  guns.  The 
Russians,  in  their  preliminary  clutch  at  East  Prussia, 
had  a  couple  of  army  corps  cut  up  and  lost  perhaps 
30,000  men,  perhaps  50,000,  perhaps  more,  to  the 
enemy.  But  as  regards  the  vast  national  armies  and 
the  general  national  plan,  neither  of  the  two  Allies 
came  out  perceptibly  the  weaker  from  these  mischances. 


On  the  otlier  hand,  the  fuihu'e  of  the  German 
"  rush  strategy  "  determined  the  whole  first  phase  of 
the  war,  and  for  this  reason — th^t,  in  the  German 
case,  the  "  rush  strategy  "  was  not  experimental  initial 
work  with  heavy  reserves  behind  it.  It  was  something 
fundamental  in  the  whole  German  scheme  upon  which 
this  war  was  designed,  and  involved  all  the  German 
power. 

There  are  in  any  form  of  contested  human 
efforts — a  speculative  adventuring  in  commerce,  a 
prize  fight,  a  race,  or  a  war — two  alternative  avenues 
to  success.  By  the  fii-st  you  concentrate  effort  upon 
immediate  mastery  over  your  enemy.  You  keep  little 
reserve.  You  risk  all.  If  you  win  you  win  not  only 
thoroughly,  but  at  an  expense  less  probably  in 
material  and  certainly  less  in  time  than  in  the  alter- 
native method — which  is  this : — To  maintain  an 
ample  reserve,  to  expect  your  enemy,  to  hold  him  and 
to  master  him  at  last,  and  slowly,  by  your  power  of 
perpetually  bringmg  up  fresh  strength. 

In  a  race,  for  instance,  it  is  the  contrast  between  a 
man  who  sprints  and  a  man  who  starts  slow  but 
counts  on  his  staying  power ;  in  a  wrestling  match  it 
is  the  contrast  between  a  man  who  lavishly  spends  his 
energy  in  the  first  bout  as  against  a  man  who  merely 
resists  until  the  third  or  fourth.  And  in  modern  war 
it  is  the  prime  contrast  between  the  two  great  schools 
of  strategy  that  dominate  modern  war.  Not  that 
each  school  is  not  attached  to  a  vigorous  offensive, 
but  that  the  one  risks  initial  weakness  for  the  advan- 
tage of  a  strong  reserve,  the  other  risks  the  upsetting 
of  all  its  plans  for  the  advantage  of  immediate  success 
to  be  achieved  by  all  its  force  available  in  the  field. 

It  need  hardly  be  added  that  neither  in  war  nor 
in  any  other  form  of  contest  is  the  one  method 
demonstrably  superior  to  the  other.  History  is  as  full 
of  success  in  either  case  as  of  disaster,  and  the  whole 
choice  in  a  modern  war  in  Europe  depends  upon  the 
calculation  of  modem  European  conditions. 

Germany  deliberately  decided  for  the  first  of 
these  two  methods.  She  was  to  bring  her  all  into  the 
field  at  once.  So  was  Austiia.  Her  best  armies  were 
to  advance  upon  the  west,  to  overwhelm  the  numeri- 
cally inferior  French  forces  before  the  full  weight  of 
Russia  could  come  into  play.  Upon  the  east  her 
Austrian  Ally  Avas  to  march  immediately  and  boldly 
into  Russian  Poland,  strike  across  the  A'^istula  by  the 
Krasnik  road  for  Lublin  (as  along  the  arrow)  and  get 
right  on  the  main  Russian  railway  and  communications 
in  the  valley  of  the  Bug. 


'^^t-lCiA 


rKw 

lEMBERQ    . 


Russia  would  return.     But  meanwhile  she  had 
been  held  by  this  rapid  Austrian  advance — this  up- 


«• 


LAND     AND    WATER 


October  17,  1914 


setting   of  her   communications— wliilc   France   was 

bcin<»  settled.  , 

'in  the  caf=e  of  the  western  halt  of  tins  plan 
Germany  had  two  first-rate  pieces  of  right  judgment 
upon  her  side.  She  claimed  that  modern  howitzer  iii'e 
would  dominate  modern  fortification,  and  she  proved 
rio-ht.  She  claimed,  in  other  words,  that  the  1  rench 
rcTiauce  unon  strongholds  would  betray  them  in  the 
field  of  llmr.  She  claimed  that  the  fortresses  ot  the 
Mcuse  would  impose  no  a]ipreciablc  delay.  Further 
she  calculated  that  she  could  put  (by  the  excellence  ot 
her  organisation,  and  considering  that  the  strain  would 
bo  but  a  momentary  one)  the  vast  majority  of  her 
forces  north  of  the  Mense  in  Belgium  and  maiutam 
them  supplied  through  the  narrow  gap  of  Lidgo 
for  the  few  days  necessary  to  an  invasion  of  France. 
Once   they   should  have  broken    through  thus   they 


^y^c. 


■"■iZ' 


woidd  have  other  communications  open  to  them 
through  Luxembourg  and  Treves,  and  the  jn-essurc 
would  be  relieved. 

Hero  again  they  Avere  perfectly  right.  They 
had  brought  against  the  Allied  army  on  the  Sarabre 
forces  far  larger  than  any  commander  or  critic 
outside  Germany  had  thouglit  possible. 

Again,  the  advance  on  Paris  was  as  rapid  as 
human  physical  effort  and  human  intelligence  com- 
bined could  make  it.  Few  finer  things  liave  been 
done  in  the  history  of  war  than  that  amazing 
advance. 

Up  to  the  last  days  of  August  and  to  the  first 
days  of  September  the  "rush"  strategy  Berlin  had 
planned  Avas  triumphant.  Then  (about  the  anni- 
versary of  Sedan)  in  the  first  week  of  September  came 
the  failure  in  both  theatres  of  war. 

In  the  eastern  theatre  the  Austro-Hungarian 
ally  had  pushed  his  main  army  right  up  into  Eussiau 
Poland,  had  carried  everything  before  him,  had  quite 
defeated  the  troops  he  had  found  at  Krasnik  and  had 
piu-sued  the  road  to  Lublin.  But  the  Eussian  mobili- 
s.ition  had  proved  more  rapid  and  smooth  than 
German  calculations  admitted.  The  forces  Russia 
brought  into  the  field  at  the  end  of  August  destroyed 
the  lighting  power  of  the  Austrian  Hanking  army 
r(3und  Lemberg,  taking  from  it  perhaps  400  guns  and 
certainly  60,000  to  70,000  prisoners.  The  victors 
poiu'cd  over  and  occupied  all  eastern"  G  alicia.  The 
chief  Aiisti'o-Hungarian  force  which  had  been  so 
successfully  moving  upon  Lublin  was  compelled  to 


retire    beyond   the    San    and   up  the  Upper  Vistula 

Valley. 

Meanwhile  in  France  the  policy  of  a  large 
reserve  had  vindicated  itself,  and  the  fresh  masses 
deliberately  kept  out  of  the  field  during  the  great 
retreat  from  Mons  and  Charlcroi  appeared  from  behind 
the  screen  of  Paris  and  compelled  Von  Kluck's  retreat. 
From  that  moment  in  either  theatre  of  war, 
eastern  or  western,  the  strategy  of  "  rush  "  failed. 

But  precisely  at  that  moment  of  failure  came  in 
another  element  to  produce  the  "  block  "  or  deadlock 
Avhich  marlced  the  rest  of  the  month  of  September  and 
the  first  days  of  October.  Another  modern  element 
(which  the  British  service  could,  perhaps,  after  the 
experience  of  South  Africa,  expect  better  than  any 
other  in  Em-ope)  modified  wliat  at  first  looked  like  the 
progressive  defeat  of  the  Germanic  allies.  This 
element  w^as  the  formidable  resisting  power  of 
entrenched  infantry,  backed  by  heavy  guns.  It  was 
in  the  western  field  of  war  that  this  new  element  was 
particularly  observable.  Upon  one  of  the  best  long 
defensive  positions  discoverable  in  Europe  from  the 
Argonne  to  Noyon  the  German  army  held  its  own 
day  after  day. 

Yet  another  new  element  appeared.  Your 
turning  movement,  the  essence  of  which  is  that  it 
should  be  unexpected  (in  the  absence  of  heavy 
numerical  superiority)  proved  no  longer  possible  in 
modern  war.  To  bring  up  great  forces  by  railway 
Avas  a  matter  not  of  hours  but  of  days ;  _  and  the 
movement  could  be  observed  almost  sufficiently  by 
old-fashioned  methods  of  intelligence— cavalry,  spies, 
prisoners — its  discovery  could  be  made  even  more 
certain  by  the  use  of  air-craft.  Finally,  the  only 
roads  by  which  the  work  could  be  done,  the  railroads, 
limited  to  precise  and  known  lines  the  methods  of  its 
advance. 

Under  all  these  conditions  the  attempt  to  turn  the 
G  erman  line  by  its  right  north  of  Noyon  failed.  E very 
new  French  body  brought  up  to  extend  that  turning 
movement  was  met  and  checked  by  the  arrival  of 
a  corresponding  German  body,  drawn,  as  the  Allied 
body  had  them  drawn,  from  the  centre  and  the  east. 
Until  after  the  extension  of  the  line  northward  to  the 
Belgian  frontier  at  the  end  of  September  the  turning 
movement  as  'such  may  be  said  to  have  definitely 
failed.  It  had  proved  to  be  nothing  but  an  extension 
of  the  block  already  established. 

Something  of  the  same  soi-t  appears  to  have 
gone  on  in  the  eastern  field  of  war,  though  there 
certain  modifications  appeared.  Germany  lent  aid  to 
the  Austro-Hungarlan  forces ;  between  them  tlie 
resistance  to  the  Eussian  advance  pro\'ed  stronger  and 
stronger,  and  the  progress  of  the  Eussian  hosts 
through  G  alicia  grew  less  and  less  pronounced,  until 
with  the  first  days  of  October  things  were  at  a 
standstill  in  southern  Poland.  Meanwhile  in 
northern  Poland  the  very  same  phenomenon  was 
repeated  on  a  small  scale  as  had  taken  place  in 
France  upon  a  gigantic  one. 

A  rapid  German  advance  to  the  Niemen  failed, 
turned  back,  Avas  pressed  to  a  certain  line  of  defence 
partly  behind  and  partly  in  front  of  the  frontier  of  the 
Gcniian  lilmpirc,  and  there,  for  the  moment,  at  least, 
established  a  stalemate. 

With  this  close  and  stationary  grip  so  unex- 
pectedly prolonged  in  either  theatre  of  the  great  war 
ends  its  first  phase. 

Under  Avhat  conditions  does  the  second  phase 
open,  and  Avhat  promises  to  be  its  leading  charac- 
teristic ?  What  kind  of  ilghting  are  we  to  expect  in 
the  immediate  future  ? 


6* 


October  17,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


To  foi'ccast  a  single  deTelo2)ment  in  war  is 
impossible,  but  to  state  necessaiy  alternatives  is 
possil)le  euougli. 

Now,  among  all  the  tlieoretical  possibilities  of 
the  situation,  among  all  the  ways  in  which  the  block 
may  break  up  to  oiu:  adA^antage  or  disadvantage,  two 
are  very  much  the  most  likely — (a)  in  tlie  v.est  the 
alternatives  lie  with  far  greater  probability  between 
the  Allies  brealcing  the  German  main  communications 
and  the  Germans  iurning  the  main  Allied  line  ;  {h)  in 
the  east — that  is,  in  the  Vistula — the  alternatives 
o]:)viously  lie  between  an  action,  however  prolonged, 
which  wiU  idtimately  release  German  troops  for  the 
west  or  will  ultimately  call  for  German  reinforcement 
from  the  west  eastward.  No  great  action  upon  the 
Vistula — M'ith  wet  weather  coming  on  and  cold,  with 
very  poor  roads,  and  hardly  any  railways — can  be  a 
draw.  It  may  be  prolonged  but  it  wiU  not  be  a  draw. 
You  will  certainly  have  the  initiative  passing  to  the 
one  side  or  to  the  other  of  the  hosts  that  face  each 
other  to-day  in  southern  Poland. 

Observe  the  consequences.  If  the  pressure  upon 
Germany  here  ceases,  or  is  relieved,  German  brought 
back  forces  returning  to  tlie  west  may  pass  througli 
the  gate  on  the  Meu.se  that  is  still  open  at  St.  Mihiel 
and  may  so  force  back  the  whole  right  of  the  Allied 
line  and  open  those  shorter  communications  with 
Germany  which  I  have  alluded  to  so  often  in  these 
columns.  If,  on  the  contrary,  pressure  on  Germany 
and  south  Poland  increases,  Silesia  is  in  danger  and  a 
withdrawal  of  troops  from  the  western  Held,  the 
maintenance  of  a  mere  defensive  in  that  field,  will  be 
imperative  to  our  enemies  even  if  they  have  gained 
successes  hitherto  against  the  Allies  in  France. 

The  whole  position  may  simply  be  put  thus  : — 

The  Germans  having  failed  to  break  the  Allied 
line  in  theii*  attacks  in  the  western  front  in  France  at 
Arias,  at  Albert,  and  at  Roye,  have  a  better  chance  of 
iurning  it  by  bringing  down  their  reinforcements 
(following  on  the  fall  of  Antwerp)  upon  the  flank  of 
the  Allies,  that  is,  between  Lille  and  the  sea.  Already 
their  cavalry  are  threatening  such  a  move.  Already 
they  are  in  Lille. 

The  Allies,  on  their  side,  have  no  opportunity  of 
turning  a  Grerman  line,  which  now  extends  right  up  to 
the  Dutch  frontier,  and  may,  at  any  moment  it 
chooses,  touch  the  sea.  But  they  may  break  it ;  and  an 
obvious  place  for  their  efforts  is  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  the  Franco-Belgian  frontier. 

Jtleanwhile,  whichever  of  the  forces  in  north- 
eastern France  now  in  movement  has  the  better  of 
the  other,  what  happens  in  southern  Poland  will  be 
the  final  and  decisive  thing.  For  if  there  is  hero  an 
action  which  releases  existing  and  victorious  German 
forces,  those  forces  can  in  a  few  days  appear  A\here 
they  ■will  in  the  western  field,  and  particukrly- 
through  the  gate  of  St.  Mihiel,  which  is  being  kept 
open  at  a  great  effort.  But  if  the  Russians  are 
victorious  in  south  Poland,  then,  no  matter  what 
happens  in  France,  the  menace  overhanging  Silesia 
will  be  of  such  weight  that  the  Germans  will  certainly 
turn  to  a  defensive  in  the  west,  and  will  use  every 
rmm  they  can  spare  for  the  defence  of  the  valley  of 
the  Oder. 

Upon  the  upper  part  of  that  valley  lie  the  wealth, 
the  mines,  half  the  industrial  life  of  modem  Germany. 
To  threaten  this  with  destruction  is  like  threatening 
the  destruction  of  Lancashire  and  the  AVest  Eiding. 

Ill  the  lower  part  of  that  valley  lie  the  pro- 
perties of  the  very  class,  the  Prussian  military  caste, 
which  is  at  the  heart  of  this  war,  and  whose  claims  to 
over-ride  the  public  kw  of  Europe,  and  to  destroy  the 


lesser  nations,  is  the  spiritual  motive  maintaining  the 
whole  of  this  disastrous  business. 

The  elements  of  the  problem  are,  therefore  : — 

(1)  The  effect  of  the  fall  of  Antwerp,  the  number 
and  quality  of  the  troops  thus  released ; 

(2)  The  appearance  of  these  and  other  reinforce- 
ments upon  the  Western-German  front  bet\veen  the 
Belgian  frontier  and  Noyon  ; 

(3)  The  way  in  which  the  gate  at  St.  Mihiel  is 
being  kept  open  by  the  Germans  ;  and 

(4)  Tlie  positions  in  south  Poland,  with  their 
chances  of  victory  and  defeat,  upon  which,  more  than 
upon  any  other  factor,  the  future  would  ap]^)ear  to 
turn. 

Each  of  these  foui*  main  elements  has,  in.  the  last 
few  days,  developed  with  great  rapidity,  and  I 
proi)Ose,  in  conclusion,  to  examine  each. 

I. 

THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE 

FALL  OF  ANTWERP. 

When  the  German  effort  was  first  opened  against 
Antwerp  it  was  certain  that  the  fortress  must  fall,  nor 
was  it  Aerv  difficidt  to  set  limits  within  wliich  that 
fall  must  come. 

One  of  the  three  or  four  very  great  conclusions, 
hitherto  disputed,  now  established  by  this  war,  is  the 
conclusion  that  modem  howitzer  fire  dominates  modern 
j)ermanent  works — at  least,  the  modem  permanent 
works  of  the  type  which  all  the  great  ring  fortresses 
had.  After  the  fall  of  the  fort  Camp  des  Romains 
and  the  consequent  German  occupation  of  St.  Mihiel 
just  below,  it  was  no  longer  possible  for  anyone  to 
believe  that  Li^ge,  Namui-,  Maubeuge,  and  the  rest 
had  each  suffered  on  account  of  some  peculiar  local 
cii'cumstance. 

We  can  even  give  a  time-table.  ManonviUIers, 
a  very  strong  isolated  work,  fell  (seven  or  eight  weeks 
ago)  after  not  less  than  seven  and  not  more  than 
eleven  days'  bombardment ;  the  last  of  the  Liege  forts 
after  seven  ;  the  last  of  the  Namur  forts  after  two  or 
three ;  the  last  of  the  Maubeuge  defences  after  eight. 
Troyon  successfully  resisted  for  five  days,  and  was 
then  relieved.  Camp  des  Komains  appears  to  have 
succumbed  to  two  or  three  days  of  the  same  form  of 
attack. 

The  weapon,  therefore,  by  which  Antwerp  was 
accounted  for  was  simply  the  8-inch  and  perhaps  also 
the  11 -inch  howitzer. 

The  forts  of  the  south-eastern  section  (Waelhera, 
Wavre  St.  Catherine,  Lierre)  were  silenced  in  more 
than  forty-eight  and  less  than  sixty  hours.  A  short 
chance  of  resistance  lay  in  the  mobile  defence  of  the 
garrison,  especially  along  the  line  of  the  Nethe.  But 
the  numerical  superiority  of  the  enemy  over  the 
remaining  garrison  enabled  him  to  cross  after  a 
three  days'  resistance.  Then  the  howitzers  were 
further  brought  up  to  bombard  the  city  itself,  and 
there  was  no  particular  military  reason  why  it  should 
continue  to  hold  out.  The  value  of  a  gamson 
numerically  inferior  to  an  Investing  enemy  lies  in  the 
fact  that  behind  fortifications  it  can  employ  and  divert 
from  other  fields  the  more  numerous  forces  opposed 
to  it.  AVlien  the  fortification  has  gone,  and  it  can  no 
longer  serve  this  purpose,  its  only  proper  place  is 
the  open  field.  The  gaiTlson  of  Antwerp  ■withdrew 
somewhat  late,  but  more  than  half  seem  to  have 
re-establLshed  contact  by  the  western  road  with  their 
fellows  and  with  the  Allies  near  the  sea  coast. 

Now  there  are  two  points  in  connection  with 
these  events.     The  first  is  only  of  academic  interest 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


October  17,  1914 


to-day.  It  is  wLcther  the  garrison  remained  too  long 
within  tlic  walls  of  Antwerp,  and  whether,  therefore, 
the  small  di-aits  of  the  Allies  sent  in  to  counsel  and 
aid  such  prolonged  resistance  were  justified  in  ^their 
an-ival  and  m  that  prolongation.     There  is  no  doubt 


of  the  object:  the  object  was  to  see  whether  the 
German  forces  m  front  of  Antwerp  could  not  bo  held 
until  the  Allies  had  done  the  trick  further  south  and 
had  pierced  into  the  German  lines  east  of  Lille.  At 
any  rate  Antwerp  fell  before  that  success  was 
achieved  (for  it  is  not  even  yet  achieved),  and  the 
delay  therefore  proved  not  an  advantage  but  a  hiirt. 
Instead  of  the  garrison  getting  av/ay  in  good  condition, 
for  u.se  in  the  Meld,  when  the  first  breach  had  been 
made  in  the  fortifications,  only  a  portion  got  away ; 
another  smaller  portion— but  over  20,000  men— are 
prisoners  of  wai- ;  not,  indeed,  in  the  hands  of  the 
enemy,  but  interned  in  Holland.  These  include  a 
certain  number  of  Englishmen.  It  is  evident  that  every 
hour's  delay,  as  the  Gennans  advanced  northward 
towaixls  the  city,  nan-owed  the  belt  between  the  German 
lines  and  the  Dutch  frontier.  For  Antv/erp  lies 
squeezed  up  along  that  frontier.  And  along  that  belt 
the  retreat  had  to  be  conducted.  That  belt  was 
naiTOwed  so  much  Avhen  Antwerp  fell  that  part  of  the 
evacuating  garrison,  including  2,000  British,  would 
not  or  could  not  risk  the  defile  and  took  refuge  in 
Holland. 

But  the  second  point  is  not  of  academic  interest, 
but  is  still  of  poignant  and  practical  interest,  and  that 
second  point  concerns  the  immediate  value  of  this 
act  to  the  Gei-mans.     This  is  threefold. 

(c)  What  number  of  troops  has  the  fall   of 
Antwei"p  released   for   the   use  of  the 
enemy. 
{b)  Of  what  quality  are  these  troops, 
(c)  In  what  dii'ection  will  they  probably  be 
used. 
(a)  As  to  the  numbers  actually  released  by  tlie 
fall  of  Antwerp. 

We  have  first  of  all  the  two  guesses  and  the 
biassed  statement. 

The  biassed  statement  talks  of  200,000  men. 
Now  we  may  dismiss  that  immediately.  The  care- 
fully organised  Prussian  system  of  influencing  oi^inion 
includes  fantastic  stories  spread  through  Copenhagen 
and  Rome,  as  weU  as  the  reasonable  stuff  from 
Amsterdam  and  the  really  sober  and  accurate  officiid 
communiques.  This  German  talk  of  200,000  men 
released  by  the  fall  of  Antwei-p  belongs  to  the  first 
and  worst  category.  The  two  guesses  are  the  French 
estimate  of  60,000,  and  a  local  estimate  (on  the 
sources  of  which  I  need  not  dwell)  of  45,000. 

I  conceive  the  French  estimate  to  be  the  nearest 
to  the  tmth.  More  than  45,000,  of  whatever  kind 
of  troops,  the  Gennans  must  have  had  in  the  face  of 
the  resistance  they  had  to  meet  upon  the  Nethc, 
and  of  the  probable  (though,  as  it  turned  out,  not  the 
actual)  task  before  them  in  the  occupation  of  a  city 
which,  with  its  suburbs,  counts  nearer  three-quarters 
of  a  million  than  half-a-million  in  numbers.  But 
since  we  may  be  absolutely  certain  that  in  an  action 
where  their  artillery  was  sure  to  succeed  and  under 
such  active  menace  to  their  communications  through 
Bortbem  France,  the  Germans  would  not  wixste  a 
single  man  before  Antwerp,  we  need  not  put  the 
numbers  at  over  00,000. 

Nor  ai-e  all  those  00,000  released.  A  certain 
number — not  large — will  be  requu-ed  to  police 
Antwerp  itself  and  to  occupy  the  neighbourhood.  A 
much  larger  number  are  accounted  for  by  the  neces.sity 
of  facing  the  line  of  troops  parallel  with  the  sea-coast, 


Belcian,  English,  and  French.,  from  north  and  south  cf 
Ostend  onwards.  Say  that  40,000  men  are  released 
from  directly  in  front  of  Antwerp  arul  }'ou  have 
probably  an  exaggerated  statement.  Moreover,  the 
same  act  releases  for  the  field  a  much  larger  number 
of  Belgian  troops,  who  can  give  and  have  given  a 
very  good  account  of  themselves  against  an  equal 
number  of  the  German  reserves. 

We  may  sum  up  and  say  that  the  direct  result, 
the  full  amount  of  extra  troops  free  for  German  work 
from  before  Antv/erp,  is  not  the  significant  point  in 
the  matter.  Call  it  a  division  and  not  two  divisions 
and  you  will  not  be  far  out.  W/iat  is  far  more 
important  is  the  effect  of  the  fall  of  Antwerp ^  in 
rdeasiiig  vim  now  used  aloi)(j  the  communications 
leticecn  JJeije  and  the  French  frontier,  and  the  tiininf/ 
of  the  fall  of  Antwerp  for  the  arrival  in  France  of  nc:a 
German  troops. 

So  long  as  tlic  Belgian  Army  lay  within  Antwerp 
it  potentially  threatened  the  main  line  of  German 
communications  through  Belgium.  Readers  of  tliesc 
columns  will  remember  the  raid  upon  the  railway 
between  Louvain  and  Brussels  some  three  or  four 
weeks  ago.  Now  the  getting  rid  of  this  threat 
means  (1)  tbe  release  of  men  kept,  on  account  of  the 
threat,  on  the  main  line,  Liege— Namur — Hirson ; 
(2)  the  power  of  moving  forward  into  France  new 
troops. 

Let  us  take  these  points  in  order.  What  release 
of  men  wiU  be  effected  from  the  main  line  through 
Belgium  by  the  withdi-awal  of  the  Antwerp  menace  ? 
Nothing  very  great. 

Ox  two  things,  one.  Either  this  astonishing  new 
Prussian  doctrine  (that  murder  and  fire  are  tolerable 
to  the  Em-opean  conscience  for  the  purpose  of  securing 
communications  through  hostile  country)  has  been 
successful,  or  it  has  not.  Either  the  railway  lino 
from  Liege  to  Hirson  wanted  its  regular  complement 
of  men  a  mile  (and  a  di\ision  could  have  held  it 
anyhovv),  or  it  did  not.  ///  cither  case  the  fall  cf 
Antioerp  onli/  releases  the  force  that  was  previously 
masking  Antwerp.  It  does  not  release  any  consider- 
able force  kept  upon  the  main  line  of  communications 
to  the  south.     There  is  no  more  mere  ten-or  than  before. 

But  here  comes  in  the  second  point.  The 
Germans  quite  ceiiainly  attacked  Antwerp  at  this 
late  moment  in  order  to  be  free  to  move  through 
Belgium  on  to  tlie  Allied  fiank  new  troops  which, 
till  this  moment,  they  had  not  ready.  What  arc  those 
troops  ? 

It  is  certain  that  Germany  is  about  to  bring 
through  Belgium  against  the  Allies  in  France  very 
considerable  new  forces.  Of  what  they  will  consist 
we  can  only  guess.  They  cannot  come  in  great  force 
until  there  has  been  some  decision  in  the  east ;  they 
■may  be  the  better  trained  of  the  new  conscripts  ;  they 
may  be  yet  further  bodies  tentatively  and  perilously 
withdrawn  from  the  left  and  the  centre  of  the  long 
German  line  in  France.  But  though  the  bringing  of 
those  forces  upon  the  Hank  of  the  Allied  lino,  that  is 
upon  the  Franco -Belgian  frontier  at  Lille,  and  to  the 
west  thereof,  is  the  most  probable  event  of  the  near 
futiu-e,  and  though  the  fall  of  Antwerp  will  facilitate 
the  movement,  I  do  not  sec  a\  hence  the  enemy  can  very 
seriously  increase  his  value  (not  his  numbers)  in  this 
field.  The  German  Government  has  undoubtedly 
called  up  all  its  boys  and  old  men.  Unlike  the  French, 
it  will  keep  no  reserves,  but  stakes  all  on  now.  Equally 
undoubtedly  it  is  noAV  ready  to  put  into  the  field  in 
France  sojne  new  ti-aincd  and  probably  mixed  force  : 
it  would  not  attack  Antwerp  till  that  was  ready.  Eat 
of  wliat  value  v.ill  that  force  be  ? 


8* 


OctoLcr  17,  1011 


LAND    AND    WATEB 


As  to  the  troops  that  wlR  he  actually  released 
fi'om  before  ^ijitwcr])  ^ve  have  de&iite  evidence.  They 
arc  not  troops  o£  the  first  line.  They  are  reserves, 
and  for  the  most  part  reserves  of  the  second  class. 
Upon  this  all  evidence  agrees.  German  witnesses  are 
silent ;  and  Belgian,  English,  and  French  witnesses 
wJio  have  been  able  to  test  the  matter  in  action  are  in 
no  doubt.  As  to  what  neto  troops  may  be  coming 
over  common  sense  can  guide  iis.  The  fall  of  Antwerp 
does  not  send  against  tlie  Hank  of  the  iUhed  line 
young,  new  and  fully  trained  troops.  It  can  send 
new  troops ;  it  can  send  young  troops ;  it  can  send 
old  reservists.  Bat  it  Avill  not  and  cannot  send  first-class 
material.  It  will  send  men  of  the  latest  hardly  trained 
levies  and  of  the  oldest  and  worse  reserves — many  of 
them  also  but  partially  trained.  It  cannot  do  what 
it  did  two  weeks  ago  at  Koye  and  at  Arras. 

The  fall  of  Antwerp  will  release,  it  must  be 
remembered,  a  large  siege  train  ;  but  that  large  siege 
train  has  been  in  existence  all  these  weeks  since  the 
fall  of  Maubouge  ;  and  the  immediate  work  before  the 
German  araiy  is  not  a  new  siege,  but  the  release  of  its 
main  communications  betv.een  Noyon  and  Belgium 
from  pci-il. 

Now  there  are  two  v/ays  in  which  this  release  may 
be  effected.  The  Allied  line  which  runs  up  opposed 
to  the  west  froit  of  the  enemy  from  the  corner 
where  the  Aisue  joins  the  Oise  up  to  and  beyond  the 
Belgian  frontier,  may  be  pierced  or  it  may  be  turned. 
And  the  last  question  we  have  to  ask  about  this  new 
body  of  men  which  the  fall  of  Antwerp  will,  directly 
and  indirectly,  let  loose  upon  our  flank  from  the  Franco- 
Belgian  frontier  around  Lille,  is  the  direction  in  which 
this  body  will  be  launched.  If  the  Germans  still 
thuik  tlicy  can  break  the  Allied  line  they  will  send 
these  reinforcing  bodies  of  theirs  east  of  LiUe,  and 
down  to  the  Arras  district,  where  they  have  already 
tried  to  break  the  line  and  faUed,  or  to  the  Roye  district 
further  south,  where  they  have  also  tried  to  break 
it  and  failed.  If,  as  is  more  probable,  they  propose 
to  outflank  and  to  turn  the  Allied  line,  then  they  will 
launch  their  new  forces  upon  the  district  westward  of 
Lille,  that  is,  between  Lille  and  the  sea.  We  shall  see 
which  they  do,  but  it  seems  probable  at  this  moment 
of  writing,  the  afternoon  of  Tuesday,  Oct.  13th,  that 
they  sliould  attempt  the  latter  adventure. 

In  order  to  see  why  this  should  be,  let  us  briefly 
con.sider  what  the  fortunes  of  this  West  front  have 
been  during  the  last  month  and  are  to-day. 

II. 
THE    WEST    FRONT,    ROYE-ARRAS. 

Briefly,  the  situation  upon  the  west  front,  which 
makes  one  believe  that  the  new  German  reinforce- 
ment w  ill  rather  attempt  to  outflank  us  by  LiHe  than 
to  cut  us  further  south  is  as  follows : 

The  line  held  by  the  eneni}'  east  and  west,  right 
acro.sg  Clia.npagne,  from  Noyon  to  the  Argonne,  was, 
as  wc  have  seen,  capable  of  envelopment.  Its  right, 
or  western  ilank  up  north  of  Noyon  toAvards  the 
Belgian  frontier,  was  exposed.  But  since  the 
numbers  were  iicarly  equal  on  both  sides,  and  since 
a  modern  turning  movement  involves  the  use  of  great 
numbci-s  and  of  railways,  and  can  be  Avatched  from 
the  ail-  as  well  as  in  older  fashion,  the  attempt  of 
tl:e  French  to  creep  northward  and  outflank  was 
contmually  met  by  further  Gennan  reinforcement, 
which  crept  northward  and  tried  in  its  turn  to 
outflank  the  French,  until  the  line  went  clawing  up 
northward  Avith  each  attempt  of  the  one  party  to  get 
round  the  other,  so  that  Avithin  three  Aveeks  it  had 
bti-etched  about  seventy  miles  and  Avas  touching  on 


the  Belgian  frontier.  Neither  party  being  able  to 
ontHank  the  ct!  ci",  an  attempt  was  made  upon  either 
side  to  outflank  the  opponent's  line  on  this  west 
front.  The  progressive  extension  of  the  two 
antagonists  passed  up  through  Eoye,  through  Albert, 
through  Arras,  and  at  last  to  a  point  about  ten  miles 
south  of  LiEe. 

It  must  be  particularly  noted  that  in  this  attempt 
the  Germans  had  a  numerical  superiority.  They 
outnumbered  and  still  outnumber  the  Allies.  They 
brought  up  great  masses  from  their  centre  and  their 
left.  They  made  three  attempts  to  break  the  French 
line,  each  of  Avhich  had  a  considerable  measm-e  of 
success,  and  each  of  which  failed.  One  was  tlie 
attempt  round  the  to\vu  of  Roye,  the  other  to  the 
north  again  round  the  town  of  Albert,  the  thix-d  and 
last  round  about  the  town  of  Ai-ras  to  the  north  again. 


*%        ,^RMEMTIERCS 


Attack  to  cut 

namur 


•^0  *-         -..»  PCI  I 


CO/PIEGNE 


THB   ALTKKM.VTIVB    USB    OF   QEBMAN    KKINFOKCKllliNTa    KITHJiE   UO 

CUT   OB  TO   OUTFI.ANK  TBI  ALLIKD   LINE. 

In  this  diagnxm  I  have  roughly  suggested 
these  three  "  bulges  "  Avhich  the  Gennaus  jjushed  out 
Avithout  succeeding  in  breaking  the  French  line. 

Every  one  of  these  bulges  (or  "salients")  has 
been  thrown  back  again.  Eoye  is  reoccupied  by  the 
French,  Avho  are  no av  also  either  attacking  or  occupying 
Lassigny.  They  have  long  ago  got  back  Albert. 
They  are  far  to  the  east  of  Arras,  which  they  reteok 
last  week. 

III. 
THE    GATE    AT    ST.    MIHIEL. 

There  is  no  need,  in  connection  with  the  third 
element  in  this  week's  critical  situation,  to  reproduce 
at  length  the  description  given  on  the  past  of  the 
"open  door"  at  St.  Mihiel  on  the  Upper  Meuse. 
Two  diagrams  AviU  sufiSce  to  recall  it  to  the  reader's 
recollection.       Hie    first    diagram    shows    why   the 


C   VERDUN 
slM 


TOUL 


XE 


9* 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  17,  1914 


oneuin<r  of  this  door  at  St.  Mihlcl  (upon  the  Upper 
Meuser  while  it  has  not  yet  become  important,  might 
at  anv  moment  become  important.         ,      ^^  ,         ,. 

Here  you  have  the  German  line  A— B  from  tlie 
Belgian  frontier  of  France  to  Noyon,  B-C  from 
No?ou  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Verdun,  taeed  by  tiie 
Allied  lino.  Verdun  and  Toul  are  two  strong  for- 
tresses with  a  wall  or  barrier  of  forts  between  them 
On  the  wrong  side  of  that  wall,  to  the  east  of  that 
wall,  is  a  German  force  M :  on  the  right  side  of  that 
wall  to  the  west,  is  a  French  force  N :  at  b,  halt  way 
between  Verdun  and  Toul,  is  St.  Mihiel— a  town  right 
on  the  barrier  of  forts,  protected  by  two  of  these 
forts,  and  standing  on  the  River  Meuse,  which  is  the 
obstacle  those  forts  protect.  A  couple  of  Y^eks  ago 
the  Gei-mans  quite  unexpectedly  attacked  and  reduced 
the  two  forts  (Paroches  and  Camp  des  Romains)  com- 
manding St.  Mihiel  town,  and  in  an  attempt  to  cross 
the  river  (which  now  tm-ns  out  to  have  been  a  femt) 
they  were  thrown  back  by  the  French  force  opposite 

them  at  N.  •  l      mi       i 

But  here  comes  in  the  important  point  :  lltoutih 
the  altempted  crossmr/  at  St.  Mihiel  was  but  a  feint  and 
did  not  succeed  {for  the  Allies  loithdrew  none  of  then- 
troops  and  tccakened  no  part  of  their  line  under  that 
menace)  the  gap  in  the  line  of  furls,  the  occi/jmtion  of 
the  toicn  of  St.  Mihiel,  and  the  power  that  occupation 
(/ives  of  crossinj  the  river  whenecer  sufficient  forces  come 
vp,  is  still  jcalouslij  retained  hy  the  Germans. 


success  in  Poland,  pour  troops  through  the  gap  and 
take  the  Allied  line  in  reverse— supposing  she  has  not 
up  to  that  moment  been  able  to  relieve  the  pressure 
upon  the  west  or  right  flank  of  the  Gemian  armies  in 
France.  If  she  is  not  acting  with  some  such  object, 
ultimately  involving  the  investment  of  Verdun  or  of 
Toul,  the  re-establishment  of  communications  through 
Alsace-Lorraine,  and  the  pouring  of  great  masses 
through  which  shall  force  back  or  take  in  reverse  the 
eastern  end  of  the  Allied  line,  then  her  action  is 
meaningless.  And  meaningless  action  is  not  the 
Prussian  way  in  war. 

But  such  action  as  the  bringing  up  of  krge  new 
hordes  through  the  St.  Mihiel  '•  door "  presupposes 
the  release  of  great  numbers  from  the  eastern  theatre 
of  war.  It  is  upon  the  result  of  the  fighting  in 
Poland  that  all  ultimately  turns. 

IV. 
THE    MAIN    ISSUE    IN    POLAND. 


'Radius  cf action  j 
from  V'erdan.J 


ot.  MlLuel      ie-KWW*«t»ww*w«^«»t*w-M<niiiim«  > 
llajJwa/tDMetz 

%idivis  oF  action 
from  Toul  ^ 


xrv 


Now  this  is  surely  of  capital  importance.     Here 

in  Diagram  XIV.  you  may  see  the  importance  which 

Gennany   attaches    to    the    crossing.        Her    forces 

occupy,  and  have  occupied  for  now  so  many  days, 

a  position  apparently  perilous  and  quite  abnormal  in 

■war.     She  has  thrust  a  v.-edge  in  between  the  radius 

of  action  of  the  fortress  of  Toul  and  the  radius  of 

action  of  the  fortress  of    Verdun.      She  keeps  that 

gap  open  as  a  sort  of  roadway,  very  narrow,  but  just 

wide  enough  for  her  purpose.     All  the  efforts  of  the 

French  to  advance  from  Toul  on  to  the  valley  where 

the  railway  leads   from  Metz  to  Thiaucourt — which 

valley  is  called  the  Rupt  du  Mad — she  concentrates 

forces  to  repel  and  succeeds  in  repelling.    She  similarly 

repels  all  efforts  on  the  part  of  the  garrison  of  Verdun 

to  get  south  and  to  close  the  issue  from  the  northern 

side.     She  anxiously  and  successfully  maintains  her 

railhead   at  Thiaucourt,  which  is  the  end  of  rapid 

communication  from  Metz,  and  which,  through  Metz, 

communicates  Avith  all  central  Germany  behind  Metz 

and  with  all  the  great  depots  of  the  middle  Rhine. 

Though  she  makes  no  further  effort  to-day  to  cross 

the  Meuse  at  St.  Mihiel,  she  yet  holds  tenaciously  to 

St.  Mihiel  town  and  bridge,  and  is  not  driven  from  it. 

I  suggest  that  Germany  is  here  keeping  open  a 

door ;  and  that  in  the  expectation  of  victories  in  the 

east  of  Europe  and  of  consequent  reinforcements  she 

means  to  hold  that  door  open  until  she  can,  tlu'ough 


.cT   VRVSSIA 


^  >^-^«^"'».-'" 


rs. 


PRZ£MYSL 


AUSTRO -HUNGARIAN  EMPIRE 


XV 


Let  us  turn,  then,  to  what  we  may  justly  conceive 
to  be  the  most  important  theatre  of  all,  the  basin  of 
the  Middle  and  Upper  Vistula. 

It  is  necessary  in  time  of  modern  war  that  news 
officially  permitted  to  the  public  should  be  cut  dov.n 
to  very  simple  and  terse  expression.  But  an  inevitable 
consequence  attaching  to  this  necessity  is  a  mis- 
apprehension of  the  enemy's  strength  in  any  particular 
field.  Until  things  begin  to  go  ill  we  tend  to  under- 
estimate his  strength ;  and  when  things  go  ill,  to 
over-estimate  it.  And  this  simply  because  in  the 
lack  of  sufficient  bases  for  judgment  the  emotions 
of  hope  or  fear  take  the  place  of  calculation. 

If  a  full  story  of  what  has  happened  in  southern 
Poland  during  the  last  ten  days  were  permitted,  the 
public  would  be  alarmed  ;  but  they  would  be  unduly 
alarmed. 

Briefly,  there  has  been  a  very  considerable  set-back 
of  the  tide,  if  we  are  merely  considering  the  ebb  and 
flow  of  the  line.  The  Russian  forces,  which  had  been 
advancing  almost  uninteniiptedly  through  Galicia, 
first  discovered  that  very  considerable  German  re- 
inforcements had  come  up  to  strengthen  the  Austrian 
armies,  and  next  that  they  could  effect  no  proper 
concentration  upon  their  own  side  if  the  Galician 
army  were  to  continue  its  western  march.  The 
adcanced parties  (only)  of  the  Russian  forces  therefore 
have  fallen  back  from  just  in  front  of  the  line 
rietrokow^-Kielce-Stopnltza-Taruow — upon  which  line 


10* 


Gctobor  17,   1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


Tiiiicli  the  largest  iininber  of  their  effectives  were 
upon  tlie  left,  between  Tarnow  up  to  and  just  across 
tlic  Vistula — to  tlie  line  of  the  Vistula  itself,  and  that 
rctii'emcnt  is  one  of  about  sixty  miles.  It  has  been  a 
duly  organised  retreat,  made  for  the  purpose  of 
concentration,  and  averaging  about  ten  miles  a  day. 

Lest  there  should  be  a  misapprehension  as  to  the 
nature  of  this  retirement  and  as  to  its  gravity,  it  is 
most  important  to  appreciate  that  we  are  dealing  with 
the  concentration  of  at  least  two  Eussian  armies.  The 
Ivussian  army  which  I  have  marked  in  dots  iipon  this 
sketch  map  as  A — the  same  which  had  been  going 
forward  so  successfully  through  Galicia  and  towards 
Cracow — was  well  ahead  of  the  Russian  army  which  I 
have  marked  B,  and  which  was  concentrating  east  of 
the  Vistula  at  the  same  moment  that  the  army  A  was 
advancing  through  Galicia  in  front  of  it.  The  Russian 
forces  which  less  than  a  fortnight  ago  faced  the 
advancing  Germans  along  the  line  Stopnitza-Kielce- 
Pietrokow  were  advanced  forces  thrown  forward  in 
front  of  the  main  Russian  body  upon  and  beyond  the 
Vistula.  In  other  words,  while  the  advanced  Russi;in 
bodies  on  the  noiih  of  the  line  were  falling  back 
towards  the  Vistula,  other  bodies  from  the  east  were 
coming  up  to  reinforce  them. 

But  note  that  this  necessity  for  a  concentration 
upon  the  Vistula  south  of  Warsaw,  in  face  of  the 
unexpectedly  strong  German  advance,  compelled  the 
body  A  to  fall  back  very  much  further  east.  It  had 
to  get  behind  the  River  San  if  it  Avas  to  be  in  line  with 
the  main  body  to  the  north,  and  in  getting  behind  the 
River  San,  A  had  also  to  give  up  the  investment  of 
Przcmysl. 

At  the  moment  of  writing,  Tuesday  evening, 
•what  30U  seem  to  have  in  this  all  important  theatre 
of  file  war  is  a  situation  made  up  of  the  following 
elements : — - 

(fl)  Russian  forces  of  unknown  amount  but  very 
large— certainly  over  1,. 500, 000  men — 
hold  the  line  of  the  River  Vistula  from 
Ivangorod  to  Sandomir,  and  thence 
southwards,  holding  the  line  of  the 
River  San  up  to  the  neighbourhood  of 
Jaroslav.  There  are  further  Ru.ssian 
forces  to  the  south,  but  I  am  concerned 
with  the  immediate  battle  line  alone. 
{i)  An  Austro-Gennan  force  of  unknown 
amount,  but  presumably  approximately 
equal  or  a  little  less,  has  advanced  in 
the  last  ten  days  from  the  line 
Petrokow — Tarnow  to  this  same  line 
of  the  Vistula  and  the  San.  The 
German  reinforcements  are  on  the 
north,  or  left;  the  concentrated  Austrian 
forces,  both  those  intact  and  those 
formed  from  the  remnants  of  the  army 
defeated  at  Lemberg,  form  the  south  or 
right  of  the  allied  line, 
(c)  The  Russian  retirement  behind  the  Vistula 
and  the  San  has  not  been  the  result  of 
any  check  in  the  field,  still  less  of  any 
defeat.  It  is  quite  evidently  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  most  rajjid  concentration 
of  the  Russian  forces  now  in  southern 
Poland  with  the  reinforcements  coming 
from  the  east,  is  best  effected  by  a 
retirement  of  the  first  to  meet  the 
advance  of  the  second.  It  is  equally 
evident  that  the  Ru.ssian  commanders 
have  deliberately  taken  up  the  defensive 
behind  or  upon  the  Vistida  and  the 
San. 


{d)  In  connection  with  the  retirement  of  the 
one  army  and  tlie  advance  of  the  other, 
there  have  happened  a  number  of  those 
incidents  whicli  always  mark  a  reth'c- 
ment  before  the  enemy.    The  advancing 
enemy  picks  up  stragglers,  bogged  guns, 
and  so  forth  ;    and  the  retiring  army 
loses  them.  All  that  is  quite unimjjortant 
to  the  iiltimate  issue,  except  in  the  case 
of  a  disorganised  moven:ient.     Tlie  chief 
point  (no  doubt  exaggerated)  which  the 
Germans  can  make  in  this  connection  is 
the  picking  up  of  2,000  men,  wounded 
and   othervvise,  in   the   neighboiu-hood 
of  Grojec. 
(e)  This  concentration  upon  the  Vistula  and 
the  San  has  partly  relieved  Przemysl. 
At  least,  it  has  apparently  disengaged 
the    western    section    of    tlie    invest- 
ment. 
It  is  probable  that  at  the  moment  of  writing  full 
contact  has  already  been  taken  from  north  to  south 
and  that  the  struggle  is  engaged.       And  upon  that 
struggle,  as  I  have  pointed  out  several  times  in  tliese 
comments,  ranch  more  wiU  depend  than  the  fate  of 
Polish  teiTitory  and  of  the  eastern  campaign.     For  if 
or  when  the  Russian  forces  behind  the  Vistula  and  tlie 
San  pass  from  the  defensive  to  the  offensive,  and  if  cr 
when  the  allied  Germanic  forces  before  them  begin  to 
retire,  the  threat  upon  Silesia  is  at  hand.     In  projjor- 
tion    to    the    completeness    of   such   a   victory  the 
"  pressm-e  "  upon  the  allied  powers,  and  particularly 
upon  the  German  empire,  would  be  severe.     Silesia 
would  be  in  peril,    and   the   western   march  of  the 
Russians  woidd  be  resumed. 

If,  upon  the  contrary,  the  Russian  forces  are  in 
part  disorganised  by  a  German  victory,  or  even  held, 
then  will  come  the  opportunity  for  Germany  to  bring 
both  Gennan  and  Austrian  troops  westward  and  to 
attempt  a  final  decision  of  the  campaign  in  France. 
For  among  other  thmgs  that  the  war  has  shown  is  the 
organisation  whereby  the  Prussians  can  with  unex- 
pected rapidity  transfer  troops  from  west  to  east  along 
their  parallel  lines  of  communication. 

I  sum  up  and  say  that  upon  these  operations  v/hich 
have  the  Middle  and  Upper  Vistula  for  their  theatre 
depends,  more  than  upon  any  other,  the  immediate 
future  of  the  campaign. 

V. 

THE  OPERATIONS  IN  NORTH 
POLAND. 

The  great  importance  of  the  coming  action  in  south 
Poland  belittles  what  has  happened  in  the  north  of 
that  country.  But  in  view  of  the  rather  violent 
denouncing  by  Berlin  of  the  Russian  official  com- 
muniques, it  is  as  Avell  that  we  should  be  clear  as  to 
what  has  happened.  To  be  thus  clear  will  sene  the 
double  purpose  of  making  us  understand  one  import- 
ant detail  of  the  Avar,  and  also  (what  is  perhaps  of 
more  value)  it  will  enable  us  to  test  the  value  of  the 
German  official  communique  under  defeat.  It  may 
well  be  that  this  piece  of  psychology  wiU  be  really 
useful  to  us  in  the  near  future.  Hitherto,  the 
Gennan  official  communiques  have  been  models  of 
exactitude.  They  have  suppressed  unpleasant  truths, 
but  they  have  not  as  a  rule  told  direct  untruths,  nor 
have  they  shown  any  sign  of  "  nerves."  But,  as  I 
think  I  can  show,  the  Gennan  official  commiiniquo 
dealing  with  the  most  recent  operations  in  North 
Poland  is  both  disingenuous  and  full  of  "  nerves." 


11» 


LAND    AND     WATEE 


October  17,  1914 


Tliat  official  commmikfue  tells  us  that  the 
Eussiaa  victories  before  Suwalki  and  Augustowo  are 
"  inventions"  ;  that  no  attempt  was  made  to  besiege 
the  fortress  of  Osowiecs;  that  the  Germans  never 
intemled  anjhow  to  occupy  the  pi'ovince  of  Suwalki ; 
and  that  the  Eussians  do  not  tell  the  truth  because 
.  they  did  not  in  their  eaalier  oflieial  communiques 
describe  the  defeat  of  Tannenberg-. 

It  is  weE  to  pay  paiiicular  attention  to  this 
German  nieaaage,  beeaiisa  it  is  the  first  of  all  the 
(lei-man  official  raessages  to  adopt  this  tone  of  false- 
hood, exaggeration,  and  complaint.  The  plain  facts 
about  the  campaign  between  the  East  Prussian 
{voatier  and  the  liiver  Niemen  I  told  last  week. 
They  are  known  to  all  students  of  th'is  war  throughout 
Um-ope  by  this  time,  and  they  are  simple  and  decisive. 

Briefly,  four  or  five  German  army  corps  advanced 
aeross  the  German  frontier  upon  a  front  of  anything 
between  eighty  and  one  hundred  miles.  An  attempt 
was  made  to  cross  the  Niemen  at  Drusskiniki,  while  at 
the  same  time  a  siege  train  was  brought  \vp  to  bombard 
tlie  forts  of  Osowiees.  The  German  attempt  to  cross 
the  Niemen  was  beaten  back,  the  mass  of  the  Gennan 


^^maB" 


*>**••■ 


\_    .---'7.  .  ,.  _  ,.  ir    '       -    ''i  '■^■'''£""* 


2*    M«R*.  often  5urTcund<d  Cy  Karvh. 
■T=KThc  Suwalki  CiuK«fty  ihreugh  thi  Minh. 


force  retu-ed  ujjon  Mariampol-Suwalki-Augustowo.    In 
doing  this  the  pressure  upon  Osowiees  was  relieved. 


and  incidentally  some  of  the  big  German  howitzers 
were  abandoned.  The  Eussians  coming  through  the 
Eorests  of  Augustowo  occupied  that  town,  and,  along 
the  railway  to  the  south,  they  advanced  from  Osowiees 
right  over  the  Prussian  frontier.  The  Prussians  in 
their  retreat  left  in  Eussian  hands  about  10,000 
prisoners  and  about  40  guns.  Nearly  all  their  forces 
arc  now  back  over  the  Prussian  frontier,  while  Eussian 
forces  are  occupying  Lyck  and  Margrabowa,  where  the 
German  Emperor  has  an  establishment.  Further,  it 
is  a  matter  of  history  that  the  German  forces  while 
they  occupied  the  Government  of  Suwalki  exercised 
administrative  authoi'ity  and  treated  it  as  their  owm. 

The  whole  thing  is  nothing  very  enormous.  It 
is  not  upon  the  scale  of  the  fighting  in  France  or  the 
fighting  upon  the  Vistula  in  southern  Poland.  But 
to  say  that  it  does  not  represent  a  Eussian  victory  is 
nonsense.  To  say  that  no  attempt  was  made  to  take 
Osowiees  is  even  w'orse  nonsense.  A  commander  who 
should  have  tried  to  cross  the  Niemen  without  dealing 
with  Osowiees  would  have  been  even'  more  incom- 
petent than  Napoleon's  own  brother  in  the  same  field 
of  war  a  hundred  years  ago — and  that  is  saj-ing  a 
good  deal.  While  as  for  the  Eussians  not  mentioning 
in  their  oflficial  communiques  in  any  detail  the  defeat 
of  Tannenberg,  the  simple  reply  is  that  in  none  of 
the  official  communiques  of  this  war  does  the  defeated 
party  give  details  or  the  earliest  information.  Both 
the  Austrian  and  the  German  official  communiques 
left  us  in  complete  ignorance  of  the  overwhelming 
Eussian  victory  at  Lemberg. 

I  repeat,  the  point  is  important  because  we  shall 
p?rhaps  have  need  in  the  near  future  to  understand 
the  psychology  of  official  German  news  under  circum- 
stances advei-se  to  Germany. 

Here  we  must  leave  the  eastern  field,  and  with 
it  this  week's  examination  of  the  war.  The  event  in 
that  eastern  field  is  stiU  undecided.  Until  it  is 
decided  the  very  critical  moment  through  which  the 
war  is  again  passing — its  thu-d  crisis — cannot  be 
further  anafysed. 


WAR    PUBLICATIONS. 

Tins  current  issue  ol  the  Academy  is  one  of  exceptional  interest, 
containing  as  it  does  a  translation  of  matter  by  that  great  theoriser, 
Bernhardj,  ■which  has  not  been  previously  published  in  English. 
Bcnihardi  has  more  or  less  deservedly  com©  in  for  very  adverse  criticism 
of  late,  but  as  an  exponent  of  the  Pjussian  theory  as  to  the  method  of 
waging  war  he  stands  alone.  Kietzsche  and  the  re'st  pointed  the  way  of 
blood  ajid  iron,  outlined  the  ideals  of  the  Germanic  races,  but  it  remained 
for  Bemhardi  to  detail'  the  means  by  which  these  ideals  were  to  be 
translated  into  practical  teims.  It  may  be  remembered  that  the 
Aeadevnj  secured  the  British  rights  of  Admiral  Mahan's  article  on  sea- 
fov,-er  a  few  weeks  ago;  the  present  securing  of  fresh  ISornhardi  matter 
13  yet  another  instanc*  of  the  enterprise  characbeiising  the  present 
niauagemcnt  of  our  contemporary. 

,,A,  ^^^P'^  °f  ^"7  c'e^cr  dra-n-ings  is  comprispcl  in  the  recenUv 
published  booklet,  KvUur  and  the  German  Blunderbuss,  with  verses 
by  H.  Robertson  Murray,  and  Charles  Grave  as  the  artist.  The 
dream  of  the  superman,  as  interpreted  in  Germany,  is  pictured  with 
ruthless  irony,  aid  there  is  in  the  last  two  pages  of  Ihe  booklet  a  very 
good  forecast  of  German  awakening. 

The  list  of  works  on  the  period  ani  personality  of  Napoleon  is 
probably  one  of  the  loncest  lists  in  literature.  A  recent  addition  is 
i\upohon  at  Work,  traji.«i7ated  from  the  Frer.ch  of  Colonel  Vach.'-  and 
coniprismg  a  minute  study  of  Napoleon's  methods  in  hia  various 'cam- 
paigns, more  especially  the  campaign  of  1806.  The  author,  one  of  the 
foremost  French  strategists  and  tacticians  of  the  present  dav,  sets 
^^IZa  f  "ij*  ''""^  ^^  .''"^"'  e.xamination  of  the  Napoleonic 
JTni^i  ,  f^'^fl'''  "^'^  ^^"^  °^  "•"  German  st^ff  in  1370,  it  is 
possible  to   formulate  rules  of  war  for  use  at  the  present  dav      Events 

JTot  mX'ri!n'  "■TP'^S"  ,'"'^«  Proved  that  the  advance  of  scienoe  has 
Varhr';  V^.^;.  •  "^  u'*  •'='""=  P-L^P^ip'-e^  of  ^^rfare,  and  Colonel 
Th»  K.  V  J^- '?  ™"'^'?  '"'"■«  ^^""''''^  ">=>"  >t  appears  at  first  si^ht 
i,  serin,'^^  r^"'"^^'  •f^"'-''  i?™^"?  ""^  '"^'^  noteworthy  contributions 
^maTof  lHt7."l-n"  ""*'  ""^"^^'  ""d  "^  «'«  =anie  time  it  contains 
grJ^'   meilJ^'Srworl'"™'*""   ''"""""'"^  °"'   °^     '^«     ^•■-'^■' 

•nV^T-'v"^?  *  double  numter  this  week  containing  a  supplement 
6ntaLd     Punch  aad  tl»  Prussian  Bully."    Some  twa  dozeaSons 


are  reproduced,  ^mongst  them  being  some  fine  e,tamples  of  the  work 
of  Sir  John  Tenniel,  John  Leech,  and  Linlev  Sambouine,  as  well  as 
the  well-known  present-day  Punch  cartoonists"  In  the  opening  cartoon 
which  13  to-day  of  special  interest  in  view  of  recent  events  "  Kin<^ 
Punch  presenteth  Prussia  with  the  Order  of  '  St.  Gibbet' '  "  for 
tearing  up  the  "  scrap  of  paper  "  in  which  Prussia  pledged  herself  to 
respect  the  integrity  of  Denmark. 

I.N  this  time  that  is  surely  the  forging  of  a  new  age  in  the 
hjstory  of  humanity,  such  a  book  as  J.  Comvns  Carr's  Cuastinn 
UokemM  13  matter  for  congratulation  to  the  author  and  to  Messrs 
Macmillan  and  Co.,  the  publishers,  Tor  the  writer  tells  intimately 
and  well  of  the  great  ones  of  tlio  Victorian  age;  ho  writes  of  the 
true  Lohemia,  of  Burnc-Jones,  Eossetti,  Forde  Madox  Browne,  and 
aU  the  pre-Eaphaehtes,  while  other  of  his  pages  concern  such  names  as 
those  of  Du  Manner,  Dickens,  and  Meredith.  Yet  again  he  talks  of 
Sex  in  Iragedy,"  "the  English  School  of  Painting,"  Henrv  Irving 
and  other  tlieraes  pertiining  to  the  time  before  mediocrity  and  a  peace 
tnat  was  apparently  permanent  had  cramped  the  arts.  It  is  a  book  of 
great  names  and  great  subjects,  and,  as  for  its  construction,  it  may 
be  said  that  there  is  dignity  as  well  as  inttre.st  for  the  reader-ths 
boott  13  literature,  m  tlie  best  sense  of  the  word. 


I.v  another  part  of  the  paper  we  draw  attention  to  the  necessity  for 
thoroughly  reliable  waterproof  garments   and  ac-cessories  in  the  "ideal 
service    kit.     It  is   worthy  of  note,   in    this   connection,   that   Messrs 
Anderson,  Anderson,  and  Anderson  are  makers  of  tlie  sealed  regulation 
paUern  waU-rproof,  and  that  the  name  of  the  firm  is  a  gnarant<^  of  th« 


In  tlie  event  of  readers  experiencing  difficulty  or  delay  in 
obtaining  copies  of  Lan-d  and  Water  from  their  newsagents'  the 
proprietors  will  bo  glad  to  be  advise<l  of  same.  Copies  o.i'n  be 
.mmex^,.Ttcly  obtained  on  application  to  the  offices  of  the  County 
Gentlemaii  Pubhshmg  Ck>mpany,  Ltd.,  Central  House,  Kings- 
way,  W.C.  (see  subscription  form  on  page  16'). 


12* 


October  17,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATEK 


THE   WAR   BY  WATER. 

By   FRED    T.    JANE. 

NOTE. — THIS    A-nTlCLB    HAS    BEEN    SUBMIITED    TO   THK    PKCSS    BUiKAU,    WHICH    DOK3    NOT    OBJECT   TO    THE    P0BLICATION    A3    CKNSOCED 
AND  TAKES   NO  BESPONSIBILITT   FOE  TH«  C0EBECTNE3S   OF  THE   STATEMENTS. 


^^^i  •*=  German  Territory 
=■  Dutch  Territory 

O         9         O                   lO  20 

I 1  I ■ 

Scale  in   Miie» 


THE   NORTH   SEA. 

^HE  principal  event  of  last  week  was  the  sinking, 
off  Sohiermonnikvog,  of  the  German  destroyer 
S  126  by  the  Britisli  submarine  E  9,  the  same 
boat  which  sank  the  Hela. 

The  Germans  now  appear  to  have  raised  some 
query  about  the  incident  haviiig  happened  inside  Dutch 
territorial  waters.  This  is  absurd,  as  no  submarine  could 
act  inside  territorial  waters  owing  to  the  depth  being  too  little. 

So  far  as  can  be  gathered  S 126 — which  was  a  boat  of  487  tons 
and  28  knot  speed,  laid  down  ten  years  ago — was  patrolling 
across  the  mouth  of  the  Ems.  She  was  torpedoed  forward  and 
sank  in  three  minutes. 

The  significance  of  the  incident  is  two-fold.  In  the  first 
place — as  the  map  indicates — S  126  was  torpedoed  virtually 
inside  "  the  front  door  "  and  the  moral  effect  of  this  following 
on  the  loss  of  the  Uda  cannot  but  be  considerable.  At  the 
present  time  the  importance  of  any  successful  submarine  attack 
lies  rather  with  the  locahty  in  which  it  takes  place  than  with  the 
actual  value  of  the  bag.  For  example,  suppose  a  German  battle 
cruiser  to  be  submarined  while  attempting  to  enter  Harwich 
harbour,  the  loss  would  be  heavy  but  it 
would  not  come  under  the  head  of  "  un- 
expected." Therefore,  it  would  have  no 
particular  moral  effect  on  the  enemy.  On 
the  other  hand,  an  unexpected  loss  is 
bound  to  influence  nerves. 

In  the  second  place — and  the  moral 
effect  of  this  on  the  Germans  is  bound 
to  be  great — a  destroyer  is  in  the  ordin- 
ary way  immune  from  torpedo  attack  as 
a  torpedo  will  pass  underneath  her. 
Consequently,  the  torpedo  which  sank 
S  126  was  clearly  deUborately  "  set  "  for 
a  depth  suitable  to  hit  a  destroyer.  This 
means  that  all  patrol  work  by  destroyers 
will  be  nervy  work  in  future ;  they  will 
at  once  realise  that  we  have  marked 
them  down  for  destruction,  and  draw 
tlieir  own  conclusions  as  to  the  why  and 
wherefore. 

Out  of  which  the  pressure  on  the 
Cierman  Fleet  will  become  greater  than  it 
already  is. 

ANTWERP. 

The  Germans  state  that  Antwerp 
will  be  valuable  to  them  for  the  attack 
■on  England,  but  unless  this  means  that 
they  intend  to  ignore  the  neutrality  of 
Holland  it  is  an  idle  proposition.  The 
Scheldt  is  a  neutral  river. 

Supposing  the  neutrality  of  Holland 
to  bo  violated  by  them,  there  will  still 
bo  the  circumstance  that  all  shipping  at  Antwerp  has  been 
destroyed,  and  such  as  can  be  got  there  by  canal  or  by 
land  transit  is  inconsiderable.  Old  torpedo  boats  and  the 
lesser-sized  submarines  could  possibly  be  transported  as  the 
Russians  transported  them  across  Siberia  ten  years  ago ;  but  a 
naval  base  cannot  be  improvised,  and  the  Dutch  Fleet, 
which  is  specially  designed  for  inshore  work,  would  probably 
«oon  make  short  work  of  any  German  naval  force  in  the 
Scheldt. 

Consequently,  it  is  unlikely  that,  for  the  present  at  any  rate, 
the  Germans  intend  to  violate  Dutch  neutrality,  and  we  may 
take  it  tliat  statements  about  what  they  mean  to  do  from  Antwerp 
ire  merely  bluff  intended  to  produce  a  "  moral  effect  "  on  ua. 

THE    LOST   CRUISERS. 

The  New  York  Herald  "  through  the  kindness  of  the  German 
Admiralty  "  has  been  permitted  to  publish  the  personal  narrative 
■of  Kapitan  Lieut.  Weddingcn  of  U  9,  and  hofw  he  sank  the 
three  Cressies  sinKle-handed.  It  is  an  interesting  story,  made 
all  the  more  rcali.stic  by  its  compliments  to  our  sailors.  But, 
technically,  it  is  absurd.  The  V  9  does  not  carry  any  spare 
torpedoes,  and  she  has  only  tlirce  tubes.  Four  is  less  than  the 
flix  known  to  have  been  fired  ;  but  the  four  specifically  mentioned 


as  fired  is  still  one  too  many.    We  may,  I  think,  safely  take  it 
that  at  least  one  German  submarine  went  under. 

THE   MEDITERRANEAN. 

There  are  (at  the  moment  of  writing)  no  fresh  developments, 
nor  do  any  seem  hkely,  in  the  Adriatic  just  at  present. 

In  the  black  Sea,  on  the  other  hand,  quite  another  state  of 
affairs  prevails. 

The  Russian  Black  Sea  Fleet  is  reported  to  have  put  to 
sea,  presumably  in  an  effort  to  make  certain  that  the  Goeben 
and  Breslau  do  not  become  German  again  in  the  Black  Sea. 

The  Goeben  is  individually  more  than  twice  as  powerful 
and  a  very  great  deal  faster  than  any  battleship  in  the  Russian 
Euxine  Fleet.  Should  she  emerge  nothing  but  blockading  a 
fleet  very  close  to  Constantinople  could  effect  anything  against 
her.    Her  possibihties  are  as  serious  as  they  are  enormous. 

Of  the  Russian  battleships  only  three — pre-Dreadnoughts 
all — possess  any  modem  fighting  value,  and  it  is  probable  that 
the  Gochen  could  outrange  all  of  them  easily,  since  all  are  mounted 
with  big  guns  of  a  now  antique  model. 

The  situation  is  further  comphcated  by  the  fact  that  there 


'\'Approximate  spot  where  S 126  W3S  submarined. 


\ 


\     \  <ffl^ 


CUADT  TO   ILLU8TBATE  THE  SUBUABININO   OF  OEBUAN  T.  B.  D,  8  126   BT  BRITISH   SUBUABINE 


is  understood  to  be  a  secret  treaty  between  Turkey  and  Roumania, 
so  that  should  the  Goehen  emerge  as  a  belligerent  Turk  she  could 
look  to  find  a  possible  base  in  a  Roumanian  harbour.  The 
attitude  of  Turkey  is,  therefore,  of  international  importance ; 
and  the  flight  of  the  GoAen  may  yet  turn  out  to  have  been  a 
clever  piece  of  high  strategy. 

THE    BALTIC. 

Here,  again,  nothing  of  much  moment  is  taking  place. 
Presumably  the  Germans  have  established  a  blockade,  but 
since  this  must  accord  with  Russian  plans  and  anticipations 
it  can  hardly  be  considered  as  a  Germ.an  advantage.  The  Russian 
official  reports  deny  that  a  single  Russian  ship  has  been  lost, 
and  there  is  every  reason  to  deem  this  correct. 

Incidentally,  the  Russian  Admiral  is  that  Von  Essen,  who — 
as  captain  of  the  Novik—viBS  one  of  the  two  or  tliree  Russian 
officers  who  earned  glory  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War  debacle. 

The  other,  once  Captain  Wiren  of  the  Bat/an,  is  now 
Commander-in-Chief  at  Kronstadt.  As  for  the  still  one  otlicr — 
Admiral  Grigorovitch — what  he  has  done  for  the  Russian  Navy 
is  too  well-known  to  need  comment.  The  Germans  have  nothing 
to  put  against  this  trio  of  men  who  have  been  through  the  mill. 
It  is  unfortunate  for  our  national  pride  (though  it  is  really  a 


13» 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  17,  1914 


compliment  to  us)  that  Germany  will,  as  I  read  things,  seek  her 
Trafalgar  in  the  Baltic  rather  than  the  North  Sea.  From  what 
1  know  of  the  re-organised  Russian  Navy,  tlie  part  of  the  Gennan 
admiral  will  be  Yiileneuvc,  not  Nelson. 

THE    FAR   EAST. 

The  advance  upon  Kiao-Chau  continues.  There  is  reason  to 
believe  that  all  the  German  warships  in  the  harbour  will  presently 
fall  victims  to  land  attacks  from  the  Japanese,  who  have  tho 
valuable  e.xperienco  of  two  previous  wars  to  bring  on  results  of 
this  nature. 

THE    HIGH   SEAS    GENERALLY. 

At  the  moment  of  writing  the  German  predatory  cruisers 
are  taking  a  rest.  This,  presumably,  means  that  by  easy  stages 
they  are  proceeding  to  fresh  hunting  grounds,  whence  a 
recrudescence  of  attack  may  be  expected.  To  the  number  of 
known  corsairs  the  light  cniiser  Leipzig  (twenty-three  knots) 


^Belaian. 


CZZ]  Dutch, 


osuhd 


^''"^-■'^ ''■■••■•'"■••''' "fi'fiYifiir'iiii 


^ 


I.OCALITl"    Oi'    TilK    BIVER    SCHELDT. 


must  now  be  added.  Her  original  port  was  Kiao-Chau,  but  her 
last  heard  of  "  stamping  ground "  was  off  the  west  coast  of 
South  America,  where  she  has  made  two  captures — one  of  these 
worth  about  £120,000. 

Vigilance  on  the  part  of  British  consuls  all  over  the  world 
m  detecting  suspicious  supply  craft  and  warning  our  cruisers 
is  the  surest  method  of  capturing  German  corsairs.  Unfortunately 


in  a  great  many  minor  places  our  consular  service  is  represented 
by  any  handy  foreign  resident.  In  peace  time  this  system 
(common  to  all  countries)  is  economical ;  but  war  is  indicating 
its  disadvantages.  A  ncutrjil  cannot  possibly  be  expected  to 
throw  tho  same  energy  into  the  business  as  a  Britisher.  I  am 
inclined  ■  to  fancy  that  one  immediate  result  of  this  war  wUI 
be  a  very  considerable  change  in  our  consular  service,  unless 
"  Britain  for  the  British  "  is  to  remain  a  nacre  empty  chat- 
word. 

The  Admiralty  has  just  issued  an  olllcial  statement  in 
connection  with  the  duel  between  the  Carmania,  and  the  Cap 
TrajaUjar.  Tho  outstanding  feature  of  the  report  is  that  we 
appear  to  have  aimed  steadily  at  the  watcrlinc  of  the  enemy, 
whereas  the  enemy  aimed  at  the  Carmania' s  upperworks.  This 
is  a  reproduction  of  what  used  to  take  place  in  the  Great  War  of 
a  I'.undred  years  ago. 

IT'.ifortunatcly,  we  are  still  without  data  as  to  whether  the 
hi^::h  aim  of  the  Germans  was  merely  bad  gunnery  or  whether 
it  was  of  dehberate  intent.     Probably  it  was  the  former. 


THE  WAR  IN  THE  AIR. 

In  the  bombardment  of  Antwerp  the  Gennans  are 
reported  to  have  employed  si.^  Zeppelins.  As  explained  in 
previous  articles  anything  German  which  is  lighter  than  air 
is  for  public  purposes  a  "  Zeppelin,"  so  for  "  Zeppelin  "  wo 
had  better  read  "  dirigible  airship." 

Now  the  Germans  started  this  war  with  sixteen  big  rigid 
airships  built  or  completing  and  six  others  in  course  of 
construction.  At  the  very  outside  they  had  nine  Parsevals  or 
inferior  non-rigid  imitations.  Tliis  gives  a  maximum  total 
of  twenty-five  all  told-  Of  these  we  know  that  three  have  been 
destroyed  for  certain,  probably  double  that  number.  We 
shall  not  be  far  wrong  if  we  put  the  total  of  available  and  cfiec- 
tive  airships  at  somewhere  about  eighteen  to  twenty.  Secret 
Zeppelins  are  as  impossible  as  secret  Dreadnoughts — they  are  too 
big  to  try  to  hide. 

At  least  as  many  dirigibles  will  be  required  on  the  Russian 
frontier  as  on  the  western  side.  From  which  we  can  calculate 
that  the  number  of  dirigibles  of  all  kinds  available  for  service 
against  Antwerp  would  have  been  between  six  and  nine. 

We  had  better  assume  the  latter  number ;  because  fragile 
craft  like  dirigibles  are  never  likely  to  be  able  to  materialise 
in  full  strength  at  any  selected  moment. 

Two  more  raids  have  been  made  by  our  aeroplanes  on  the 
German  airship  sheds  at  Cologne  and  Dusseldorf.  No  success 
seems  to  have  attended  the  Cologne  attempt,  but  the  flame  seen 
issuing  from  the  Dusseldorf  shed  is  clear  proof  that  there  is 
certainly  one  Zeppelin  which  will  never  fly  again,  also  probably 
one  shed  that  will  no  longer  be  of  any  use. 


FIELD  ENTRENCHMENTS  AND  THEIR 

DEFENCE. 

By  COL.  F.  N.  MAUDE,  C.B.,  late  R.E. 


SPEAKING  with  an  experience  of  many  years,  there  is 
nothing  so  difficult  to  teach  in  peace  time  as  the 
construction  and  "  siting "  of  field  entrenchments. 
Men  very  soon  get  tired  of  lifting  earth,  with 
unaccustomed  back  muscles  and  blistered  hands,  on 
some  disused  patch  of  uninteresting  land— all  that  can  be 
spared  them  for  the  purpose.  The  whole  idea  of  digging 
a  pit  and  squatting  in  it  to  shoot  seems  so  childishly  simple 
that  in  a  very  short  time  the  interest  slackens,  and  unless  you 
are  lucky  enough  to  have  the  assistance  of  war-experienced 
sergeants  and  subalterns,  the  whole  business  becomes  tedious 
and  subveriiive  of  disciphne  in  the  highest  degree. 

This  last  remark  may  require  elucidation  for  civilian  reader.'?, 
as  the  connection  is  not  at  first  obvious  ;  but,  in  reality,  it  is  very 
simple.  Men  come  back  from  trenchwork  thoroughly  stiifi 
and  sore,  with  an  appalling  thirst  on  them.  The  canteen  is  a 
confortablo  resort,  and  though  drunl:enncs3  is  now  almost 
extinct,  yet  the  couple  of  extra  glasses  of  beer  and  the  next 
mormng's  muscular  stiffness,  not  to  mention  the  blistered  hands, 
bring  them  back  to  work  in  just  that  condition  of  nervous 
imtabriity  which  renders  friction  with  authority  nearly 
inevitable.  Someone  oi  other  loses  his  temper,  a  couple  of 
men  are  marched  back  to  the  guardroom,  and  a  settled  gloom 
descends   on   the   trenches.     Every  little   sliift  or  evasion   is 


practised  to  save  the  sore  hands  and  aching  muscles,  unless  you 
have  with  you  some  of  the  above-mentioned  assistants,  to  cheer 
the  men  up  and  interest  them  with  bits  of  practical  experience. 

Fortunately,  during  the  last  few  years  there  have  been  many 
such  men  in  the  regular  army,  and  nothing  struck  me  so  much 
when  watching  the  Infantry  Pioneer  classes  at  Chatham  as  the 
greatly  increased  interest  in  their  work  v/hich  all  ranks  showed, 
as  compared  with  my  experience  as  instructor  in  earlier  years, 
and  reports  from  the  front  show  how  much  we  are  profiting 
from  this  altered  state  of  things  almost  daily.  If  instruction  in 
fieldworks  had  not  become  a  living  reaUty,  had  it  remained 
in  the  "  before  the  war  "  condition,  matters  on  the  Maine  might 
have  taken  a  very  different  course. 

The  real  difficulty  of  this  class  of  instruction,  and  I  write 
for  the  benefit  of  the  very  many  officers  fresh  to  the  work  in  the 
New  Armies,  lies  in  the  absolute  simphcity  of  the  fundamental 
ideas  and  the  extreme  difficulty  of  reconciling  all  the  conflicting 
tendencies  contained  in  these  ideas.  The  bedrock  principle 
all  through  the  practice  of  warfare  is  "  to  kill  your  man  first 
before  he  can  kill  you  " ;  clearly,  when  he  is  dead  he  can  do  you  no 
further  damage.  But,  to  begin  with,  you  do  not  always  know 
where  he  is,  or  how  he  intends  to  attack  you  ;  so  you  dig  a  hole  to 
get  cover  from  both  sight  and  bullets,  and  wait  for  him  to 
commence  operations  or,  at  the  best,  to  give  himself  away. 


U* 


October  17,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


Now  we  get  to  the  first  difficulty.  The  closer  you  can  get 
your  eye  to  the  ground  level,  the  safer  and  more  invisible  you 
become. 

The  ideal  trench,  which  is  only  a  hole  laterally  extended, 
would,  therefore,  be  something  like  this.    The  earth  dug  out 


Fig.  I. 


Rg.  ni. 


boin;;  thrown  a.v/ay  behind  down  a  convenient  slope  or  otherwise 
distributed  so  as  to  be  quite  invisible,  a  ver}'  difficult  condition 
to  satisfy.  Still,  heaped  up  bracken  or  heather,  transplanted 
turnip  tops,  etc.,  will  suffice  to  liide  the  firer's  head  almost 
completely,  and  his  body  has  the  whole  thickness  of  the  hill 
as  protection  against  the  bullets. 

But  now  you  have  practically  sacrificed  your  best  chance 
of  kilhng  the  enemy  first — admittedly  the  best  defence  in 
principle — for  ground  is  seldom  absolutely  level,  and  any  bush, 
stone,  or  even  a  homely  cabbage  may  intervene  to  break  your 
line  of  si.','ht,  and  even  in  a  trench  you  cannot  move  sideways 
to  clear  it,  for  there  are  other  men  alongside  of  you  who  want  a 
clear  field  of  view  just  as  badly,  and  they  will  not  give  way. 
So  from  the  very  first  your  personal  interest  begins  to  clash 
with  your  neighbours,  and  you  are  up  against  the  first  lesson  of 
co-ordinated  action,  viz.,  the  necessity  of  self  sacrifice  for  the  pood 
of  the  community  which  runs  through  all  warUke  action  from 
start  to  finish,  and  invariably,  in  the  long  nm,  brings  Victory 
to  the  Race  in  which  this  instinct  of  self-sacrifice  rules  higher  than 
the  instinct  of  self-preservation. 

Again,  even  if  no  obstacles  of  the  above  nature  intervene, 
one  seldom,  in  Northern  Europe,  finds  ground  sloping  uniformly 
towards  the  enemy.  Generally,  the  section  of  the  hill-sides  on 
which  we  arc  now  fighting,  and  shall  continue  to  fight  for  a  long 
time  to  come  has  this  section,  viz. :  Convex  towards  the  enemy. 


Line  of  Fire 


Fig   It 


and  clearly,  if  you  bring  your  eyes  down  to  ground  level  at  A, 
an  enemy  at  B,  perhaps  only  twenty  yards  away,  will  be  quite 
invisible,  and  if  he  rushes  forward  you  have  no  second  chance 
to  stop  him.  Again  and  again  positions  have  been  lost  because 
this  elementary  fact  has  been  forgotten  by  men  trying  to  solve 
other  problems  to  which  I  shall  hereafter  allude. 

The  common-sense  solution  of  the  difficulty  will  obviously 
be  to  Ujse  a  profile  shewn  in  Fig.  III.  This,  at  least,  extends 
the  field  of  fire  very  considerably.  But  it  introduces  at  once 
new  complications  for  it  is  practically  impossible  to  hide  the 
fresh  earth  of  this  higher  breastwork,  it  takes,  generally,  longer 
to  make  and  does  not  give  equal  protection. 


Now  it  happens  that  the  prevailing  section  of  the  ground 
in  South  Africa  was  ahnoat  invariably  concave  towards  the 
enemy :  Hence  a  man  in  a  trench  at  the  top  of  a  slope 
could  see  indefinitely  out  to  his  front,  a  fact  of  which  the  Boers 
at  once  took  every  advantage,  and  we,  as  usual  in  South  Africa, 
quite  rightly  at  once  copied  their  example.  But  when  we  came 
back  to  England  and  began  teaching  the  deep  Boer  trench 
as  applicable  to  the  very  different  circumstances,  we  blundered 
into  a  very  bad  hole  indeed.  Fifty  years  ago  we  had  gone  to  the 
other  extreme.  Our  teaching  staff  for  the  Army  when  I  joined 
had  all  learnt  their  work  practically  before  Sebastopol,  where  the 
rock  cropped  up  close  to  the  surface,  the  slopes  generally  convex, 
and  as  a  consequence  they  had  taught  us  to  rely  more  on  the  type 
of  trench  in  Fig.  IV.,  precisely  as  their  successors  after  South 
Africa  taught  Fig.  I.,  and  what  we  now  have  to  do  is  to  avoid 
both  extremes,  except  where  suitable  conditions  prevail,  and 
generally  to  choose  the  best  working  compromicc  between  them 
on  each  occasion.probably  something  hke  Fig.  III.  above, fitted  out, 
of  course,  with  head  cover  and  so  forth  as  I  shall  explain  here- 
after. For  the  moment  all  I  want  to  make  clear  is  the  essential 
compromise  between  fire  power  and  cover  which  has  to  be  made 
in  every  case,  and  to  suggest  to  the  many  men  under  training 
or  waiting  for  appointment  how  much  they  can  facilitate 
their  own  progress  in  the  future  by  bearing  this  simple 
"duality"  in  mind  and  going  out  into  the  country  and  training 
their  eyes  to  appreciate  the  points  involved  in  obtaining  a 
workable  compromise  between  the  two. 


Fi3.  IV. 


To  dwellers  in  London,  I  recommend  a  walk  over  Wimbledon 
Common,  dipping  down  towards  Kingston  and  across  Richmond 
Park.  For  those  who  can  spare  time  to  go  farther,  I  suggest  a 
walk  over  the  North  Downs,  or  any  chalk  country  in  the 
neighbourhood.  Our  troops  are  fighting  principally  in  chalk 
districts  now,  and  as  I  continue  these  letters  I  shall  call  attention 
to  the  different  characteristics  in  the  countries  we  shall  have  to 
traverse.  I  will  only  now  add  that,  whereas  in  the  chalk  downs, 
one  is  constantly  driven  to  the  use  of  the  type  in  Fig.  IV. ;  in  the 
Eifel — a  volcanic  district  I  expect  many  of  our  troops  will 
traverse — the  concave  type  of  ground  prevails,  and  Fig.  I.  will  find 
its  application. 


A    DIARY    OF    THE    WAR. 


SYiNOPSIS. 

July  23bd. — AustroHungarian  ultimatum  to  Scrvis. 

July  25rH. — King  Peter  of  Servia's  appeal  to  Russia. 

JlTLY  27th. — Sir  Edward  Grey  proposed  a  London  Conference 
between  French,  German,  Italian,  and  Great  Britain's  Ambassadors. 

July  28rH. — Austria-Hungary  declared  war  on  Servia. 

July  29rH. — A  partial  Ru.ssian  mobilisation  was  signed  on  receipt 
of  the  news  of  the  bombardment  of- Belgrade.  English  block  Exchange 
closed.     English  Uank  Rate,  8  per  cent. 

August  1st. — General  Russian  mobilisation  ordered.  German 
mobilisation  ordered  by  Emperor.  Germany  declared  war  on  Russia 
and  followed  up  this  declaration  by  invading  the  Grand  Duchy  of 
J..uzemburg. 

August  2.nd. — Germany's  ultimatum  to  Belgium. 

August  3Kn. — Sir  Edward  Grey  statod  British  policy  and  revealed 
Germany's  amazing  oiler,  in  the  event  of  our  neglecting  our  obligations 
to  France.  Mobilisation  of  the  Armv.  Ultimatum  to  Germany. 
German  and    French  Ambassadors  left  Paris  and  Berlin. 


AcfiU?T  4th. — Germany  rejected  England's  ultimatum.  English 
Government  took  over  control  of  railways.  War  declared  between 
England  and  Germany. 

August  Sth. — I»rd  Kitchener  appointed  Secretary  of  State  for 
War.     H.M.S.  Amphion  struck  a  mine  and  foundered. 

August  6th. — House  of  Commons,  in  five  minutes,  passed  a  vote  of 
credit  for  £100,000,000,  and  sanctioned  an  increase  of  the  Army  by 
500,000  men.     State  control  of  food  prices. 

August  Si-h. — Lord  Kitchener  issued  a  circular  asking  for  100,000 
men. 

August  9'i~a. — The  enemy's  submarine,  U15,  was  sunk  by  H.M.S. 
Birmmgham. 

August  10th. — France  declared  war  on  Austria-Hungary.  German* 
advanced  on  Namur.  The  new  PrMs  Bureau  established  by  the 
Government  for  the  issue  of  official  war  news. 

August  11th. — England  declared  war  against  Austria. 

August  15th. — The  Tuar  addressed  a  Proclamation  to  the  Polish 
populations  of  Russia,  Germany,  and  Austria,  promising  to  restore  to 
Poland  complete  autonomy  and  guarantees  for  religious  liberty  aad 
the  use  of  the  Polish  language. 


]5« 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  17,  1914 


AccnsT  l&ra.— Japanese  ultimatnm  to  Gcrmajiy  demaiading  the 
withdrawal  of  her  vessels  of  war  from  the  Far  East.     / 

AuoDST  17th.— The  British  Expeditionary  Force  safely  landed  in 
trance. 

The  Belgian  Government  transferred  from  BrusseU  to  Antwerp. 

August  18th.— General  Sir  H.  Smith-Dorrien  appointed  to  com- 
mand of  an  Army  Corps  of  the  British  Expeditionary  Force,  in 
succession  to  the  late  General  Grierson. 

August  2arH.— The  Servians  gained  a  decisive  victory  over  the 
Austrians  near  l^habatz. 

August  21st.— The  German  forces   entered   Brussels. 

August  22nd.— Scrvia  announces  that  their  army  had  won  a  great 
victory  on  the  Drina.     The  Austrian  losses  were  very  heavy. 

August  23Rt>.— Japan  declared  war  on  Germany.  The  Ru.ssian 
•rniy  gained  an  important  victory  near  Gumbenoen  against  a  force  of 
160,U0O  Germans. 

August  24i-h.— It  was  announced  that  Xamur  had  fallen. 

August  27Tn.— Mr.  Churchill  announced  in  the  House  that  the 
German  armed  merchantman  Kaiser  M'ilhelin  der  Crosse  had  been 
■unk  by  H.M.S.  Highflyer  on  the  West  Africa  Coast. 

August  28i-h. — A  concerted  operation  was  attempted  against  the 
Germans  in  the   Heligoland  Bight. 

The  First  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  sank  the  Maim.  The  First 
Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  sank  one  cruiser,  Koln  class,  and  another 
cruiser  disappeared  in  the  mist,  heavily  on  fire,  and  in  a  sinking 
condition. 

Two  German  destroyers  were  simk  and  many  damaged.  The  total 
British  casualties  amounted  to  sixty-nine  killed  and  wounded. 

Lord  Kitchener  announced  that  "  The  Government  have  decided 
that  onr  Army  in  France  shall  be  increased  by  two  divisions  and  a 
cavalry  division,  besides  other  troops  from  India." 

Skptejtber  2nd. — The  British  Cavalry  engaged,  with  distinc- 
tion, the  Cavalry  of  the  enemy,  pushed  them  back,  and  captured  ten 
guns.  The  Russian  Army  completely  routed  four  Austrian  Army  Corps 
near  Lemberg,  capturing  150  guns. 

SEaTTEMBER  3bd. — The  French  Government  moved  to  Bordeaux. 

September  4Tn. — The  Russian  Array  under  General  Ruzsky,  cap- 
tured Lemberg,  and  the  Army  of  General  Brussiloff  took  Halicz. 

Settember  Sth. — The  formal  alliance  of  England,  France,  and 
Russia  was  signed  in  London  by  the  representatives  of  the  three 
Governments  concerned,  bindinp;  each  nation  to  conclude  peace,  or 
discuss  terms  of  peace,  only  in  conjunction  with  its  Allies. 

September  6rH. — It  was  announced  that  the  scout-cruiser  PatJi- 
finder  foundered  on  Saturday  afternoon  after  running  upon  a  mine. 

September  9th. — ^The  English  Army  crossed  the  Marne,  and  the 
enemy  retired  about  twenty-five  miles. 

September  11th. — Our  let  Army  Corps  captured  twelve  Maxim 
guns  and  some  prisoners,  and  our  2nd  Army  Corps  took  360  prisoners 
and  a  battery. 

September  13th. — On  the  left  wing  the  enemy  continued  his  retreat- 
ing movement.  The  Belgian  Army  puehed  forward  a  vigorous  offensive 
to  the  south  of  Lierre. 

Septemher  14th. — ^AU  day  the  enemy  stubbornly  disputed  the 
passage  of  the  Aisne  by  our  troops,  but  nearly  all  the  crossings  were 
secured  by  sunset. 

Septemser  ISth. — The  Allied  troops  occupied  Rheims.  Six 
hundred  prisoners  and  twelve  guns  were  captured  by  the  Corps  on 
the  right  of  the  British. 

September  15th. — Submarine  E9,  Lieutenant-Commander  Max 
Kennedy  Horton,  returned  safely  after  having  torpedoed  the  German 
cruiser  Hela,  six  miles  south  of  Heligoland. 

September  20ih. — ^Rheims  Cathedra]'  was  bombarded. 
The  British  auxiliary  cruiser  Carmania,  Captain  Noel  Grant,  Royal 
Navy,  sank  the  Cap  Trafalgar  oS  the   east  coast  of  South  America. 
September  22nd. — H.M.  ships   Aboukir,  Hague,   and  Cressy  were 
sunk  by  submarines  in  the  North  Sea. 

Seitember  23rd. — British  aeroplanes  of  the  Naval  wing  delivered 
an  attack  on  the  Zeppelin  sh«ds  at  Biisseldorf . 

Sefteheer  2&rH. — There  was  much  activity  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy  aU  along  the  line.  Some  heavy  counter-attacks  were  repulsed, 
and  o(Hisiderabre  loss  was  inflicted  on  the  enemy. 

September  28th. — At  certain  points,  notably  between  the  Aisne 
and  the  Argonne,  the  enemy  made  further  violent  attacks,  which  were 
repulsed. 

Septie-Mber  29th. — There  was  practically  no  change  in  the  sitnation. 
The  Allied  left  had  some  very  heavy  fighting,  but  they  weU  held  their 


Octobeb  1st. — The  arrfval  of  the  Indian  Expeditionary  Force  at 
Marseilles  was  announced. 

October  2xd. — His  Majesty's  Government  have  authorised  a  mine- 
laying  policy  in  certain  areas  and  a  system  of  mine-fields  has  b«en 
establisncd  and  is  being  developed  upon  a  considerable  scale. 

October  5th. — In  Russia,  after  a  battle  which  lasted  ten  days, 
the  G'ermau  army  which  was  operating  between  the  front  of  East 
Prussia  and  the  Niemen  w'as  beaten  all  along  the  line  and  retreated, 
abanaouing  a  considerable  quantity  of  material. 

October  Tth. — Submarine  E  9  (Lieutenant- Commander  Max  K. 
Horton)  returned  safely  after  having  torpedoed  and  sunk  a  German 
torpedo-boat  destroyer  off  the  Ems  river. 


DAY    BY    DAY. 

THURSDAY,    OCTOBER   Sth. 

In  the  Nortliern  region  of  our  left  wing  the  enemy  made  no 
progress  anywhere.  They  fell  back  in  several  places,  particularly 
to  the  north  of  Arras.  The  operations  of  the  two  cavalry  forces 
developed  almost  to  the  North  Sea. 

FRIDAY,    OCTOBER    9th. 

On  our  left  wing  the  opposing  cavalry  forces  still  operated 
to  the  north  of  Lille  and  of  La  Bassee,  and  the  battle  proceeded 
along  a  line  passing  through  the  districts  of  Lens,  Arras,  Braysur- 
Sonmie,  Chanlues,  Roye,  and  Lassigny.  Sharp  fighting  took 
place  in  the  Roye  region,  where  during  the  last  two  days  1,600 
prisoners  were  taken.  The  British  naval  airmen  carried  out 
another  successful  raid  on  the  Zeppelin  sheds  at  Dusseldorf. 
They  destroyed  a  Zeppelin.  The  bombardment  of  Antwerp 
continued. 

SATURDAY,    OCTOBER    10th. 

The  War  OfEce  announced  that  Antwerp  was  evacuated 
yesterday. 

SUNDAY,    OCTOBER    11th. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Admiralty  announced  that  in  the 
retreat  westward  of  the  Anglo-Belgian  forces,  some  2,000  British 
Naval  Marines  and  3,000  Belgians  were  cut  o£E  by  the  Germans 
and  compelled  to  retire  into  Dutch  territorj>-,  where  they  had 
to  lay  down  their  arms.  The  German  cavalry,  which  had  seized 
certain  crossing  points  on  the  Lys  to  the  east  of  Aire,  were  driven 
off  and  retired  into  the  neighbourhood  of  Armentieres.  Two 
German  aeroplanes  fiew  over  Paris  and  dropped  twenty 
bombs  in  various  places.  It  was  announced  that  King  Carol 
of  Roumania  died  yesterday. 

MONDAY,    OCTOBER    12th. 

Six  bombs  were  dropped  on  Paris  by  a  German  airman. 
The  Russian  cruiser  Pallada  was  sunk  in  the  Baltic  on  Sunday 
by  a  German  submarine. 

TUESDAY,    OCTOBER    13th. 

The  town  of  Lille  was  occupied  by  a  German  army  corps. 

Between  Arras  and  Albert  we  made  marked  progress. 
In  the  centre  we  also  made  progress  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Berry-au-Bac.  ^ 

The  Austrian  army  corps  which  were  beaten  in  Galicia 
tried  to  reform  twenty-five  miles  west  of  Przemysl. 

WEDNESDAY,    OCTOBER    1-tth. 

It  was  announced  that  the  Belgian  Government  had  removed 
from  Ostend  to  Havre. 

The  Belgian  field  army,  with  King  Albert  still  at  its  head, 
was  also  in  Northern  France. 

It  was  ofiScially  announced  from  Petrograd  that  two  German 
submarines  were  sunk  in  the  attack  in  the  Baltic,  by  which  the 
Russians  lost  the  cruiser  Palladia. 


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AND  LAND  AND  WATER,"  ILLUSTRATED,  Central 
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postage. 

Cbe^aes  and  Postal  Ordon  thoaU  be  crossed  aad  made  payable  to  The  County  Ocatleman  Publlsbiax  Co.,  Ltd. 
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BY  WATEK,"  together  with  a  valuable  rofeionce,  "  THE  TOPOGKAPHICAX  GUIDE,"  can  be  obtoined  through  any  Newsagent,  or  on  application  to  the  Offices  of 

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16* 


October   17,    19 14 


LAND     AND     WATER 


BURBERRY  WAR   KIT 

The  Burberry  Weatherproof 


Infantry    or  Cavalry   Patterns,  lined 
wool,  or  with  detachable  fleece  lining, 


lUustraud 
M Hilary 
Brochure 

As   supplied  to    every   regiment   in    H.M.'s     Pen fne. 
Army,  has  been  indispensable  to  Officers  ever 
since  the  beginning    of    the    South    African 
War. 

LORD  KITCHENER  referring  to  THE 
BURBERRY  described  it  as  "a  most  valu- 
able addition  to  his  campaigning  kit." 
Burberry  Coats  are  labelled  "  Burberrys." 
Be  sure  that  yours  is  genuine,  otherwise 
at  sorest  need  the  imitation   may  fail  you. 

Burberry  Khaki  Uniforms 

Designed  by  Burberrys  for  the  War  Office, 
and  proofed  by  their  process,  are  supplied 
with  the  greatest  expedition. 

Pea  Jackets 

Made  in  Burberry- 
proofed  Regulation  coat- 
ing, lined   fleece   or  fur. 

Burberrys' War  Kit 

includes,  besides  full 
Service  Dress,  Haver- 
sacks, Slings,  Puttees, 
Shirts,  S.  B.  Belts,  Water 
Bottles. 

Gabardine  Ground 
Sheets  and  Sleeping  Bags 

GABARDINE  DAWAC-« 
BiToaac  weighing  only  3}  lbs. 
inclnnve  of  pegi. 


PEACE 
PRICES 

Regiments  in  any  part 
of  the  United  Kingdom 
waited  upon  by  ap> 
pointment. 


Burberry  Service  Dress 

OFFICERS  IN  FRANCE 
.  ,        .  can  obtain  all  War  Kit  from 

a  iThe   Burberry       pointment.  Burberrys'  Paris  House. 

BURBERRYS    Haymarket    S.W.    LONDON 

8    &    10   Soul   Malesherbes  PARIS;   Basingstoke  and  Provincial  Agents. 


FURS 

At  Special  Prices 


With  the  object  of  linding 
work  for  our  staff  of 
skilled  Furriers  we  have, 
during  the  last  few  weeks, 
designed  and  made  about 
loo  Fur  Coats  in  four 
different  shapes,  of  which 
the  garment  sketched  is 
an  example.  These  coats 
are  made  from  sound  and 
reliable  skins.  They 
follow  the  lines  of  the 
latest  Paris  Mcdels,  and 
the  shape  and  finish  are 
excellent. 

Seal  Musquash  Coat  {as  sketch). 
made  from  reliable  skins,  lined 
new  striped  chiftbn  tafteta  silk. 


Price 


13* 


-=-      Gns. 


Actual   Value,    igj  Cns. 


KHAKI  ARMY  RUGS 

Very  warm  and  durable.  \f\//: 
Size  6o  X90  in.        Each  lU/O 


DebenKain 
&Freebod[y 

Wijimore  Street, 

iCevrhdisN  Square}  London  VC 


IMPORTANT     PRIVATE     SALE 


OF 


HIGH-CLASS  SECOND-HAND  AND  ANTIQUE   FURNI- 
TURE^   CARPETS^    PLATE^    LINEN^    PICTURES^    PIANOS 


TO   THC   VatUE   OF  OVER  £500,000.  MUST   BE  SOLD   EMTIRELV   WITHOUT  RESERVE. 

ENTIRE  CONTENTS  OF  A  LARGE  WEST-END  CLUB 


Removed  from  St.  James's  St.,  S.W.. 
for  convenience  of  Sale. 


ANY  ARTICLE  MAY  BE  HAD  SEPARATELY,  and.  if  desired.  CAN  REMAIN  Stored  Free,  and  payment  made  when 
delivery  required,  or  will  be  PACKED  FREE  AND  DELIVERED  OR  SHIPPED  TO  ANY  PART  OF  THE  WORLD. 


98    COMPLETE    BEDROOMS. 

Comprising  i6  well-made  solid  oak  bedroom  suites  complete  £5  17t.  Bd. ;  solid  oak 
bedsteads  to  match,  complete  16*.  6d. ;  handsome  china  toilet  services,  from  St.  6d.  ; 
large  bedroom  and  other  carpets,  from  7i.  6d.  ;  u  well-made  solid  walnut  bedroom 
suites  complete  at  5  tl. ;  massive  black  and  brass-mounted  bedsteads,  full  size,  com- 
plete with  spring  mattresses,  at  2St. ;  three  very  handsome  design  white  enamel  bed- 
room suites  of  Louis  XIV.  style  at  £S  Ito. ;  four  well-made  large  solid  oak  bedroom 
suites  at  £6  17«.  6d. :  four  very  artistic  Sheraton  design  inlaid  mahogany  bedroom  suites 
at  £7  ISft.  ;  three  artistic  large  solid  walnut  bedroom  suites  at  £9  17s.  6d. ;  several  5ne 
01(]  English  gent's  wardrobes,  fitted  sliding  trays  and  drawers,  from  £1  ISt,  ;  several 
fine  bow-front  and  other  chests  of  drawers,  from  57t.  6d. ;  old  Queen  Anne  and  other 
tallboy  chests,  from  6  gt.  :  six  very  choice  inlaid  mahogany  bedroom  suites,  13  fs. ; 
elaborate  all-brass  Sheraton  style  bedsteads  with  superior  spring  mattresses  complete, 
45*.  ;  choice  Chipi>endale  design  bedroom  suites,  12  gj. ;  Chippendale  design  bedsteads 
to  match  ;  Queen  Anne  design  solid  mahogany  bedroom  suites,  £14  14i. ;  all-brass  square 
tube  full-size  bedsteads  with  superior  sprmg  mattresses,  at  £3  17».  Sd.  ;  costly  Chippen 
dale  design  mahogany  bedroom  suite,  16  gt. ;  costly  inlaid  satinwood  bedroom  suites 
£45  :  panelled  satinwood  bedstead  to  match,  9  tS. 

DINING-ROOMS,  SMOKING-ROOMS  AND  LIBRARIES 

.Several  fine  quality  real  Turkey  carpets  about  9  ft.  by  it  ff.  from  £4  17».  6d.  ; 
real  Turkey  rujjs  at  17t.  6d.  :  massive  carved  oak  sideboard,  £5  15s.  ;  overmantel 
fitment  to  match,  £2  10s.  ;  extending  dining^  table  to  match,  £2  17s.  6d. ;  two 
elegantly-carved  armchairs  and  six  small  ditto  to  match,  i^  15s. ;  elegant  Queen  Anne 
design  sideboard,  fitted  drawers,  cupboards,  etc.,  £7  15s.  :   set  of  eight  Queen  Anoe 


design  dining  room  chairs,  comprising  two  large  carved  chairs  and  six  smaller  ditto 
£7  ISt.  ;  oval  extending  Queen  Anne  design  dining  table  £4  10s.  ;  Queen  Anne  design 
mantel  mirror  to  match,  42s.:  18  luxurious  Chesterfield  settees,  £2  15s.  ;  luxurious 
lounge  easy  chairs  to  match  at  £1  lOt. ;  magnificently  carved  grandfather  clocks ; 
fine  tone  upright  piano,  £7  15s.;  a  magnificent  instrument  by  George  Brinsniead, 
12  tS. ;  and  an  exceptionally  fine  small  grand  piano,  £25,  equal  to  new.  Several  sets 
of  complete  Old  English  table  glass  from  £4  15s.  ;  set  of  four  oak  American  roll-top 
desks  at  £3  15s.  ;  and  many  other  items  too  numerous  to  mention  here. 

DRAWING-ROOMS   AND  ANTE-ROOMS. 

Nineteen  elegant  design  large  Axminster  bordered  carpets  from  3  ^  ;  elegant 
design  suite,  comprisingluxuriously  sprung  settee,  with  two  lounge  easy  chairsand  four 
occasional  chairs,  covered  rich  Paris  silk  tapestry,  iW  168.  ;  very  elegant  Louis  XIV. 
design  china  cabinet  to  match,  £6  15s.  ;  choice  centre  table,  21s.;  and  Louis  XIV. 
design  overmantel,  35s.  -  elaborately  carved  and  gilt  Louis  Sei/e  design  suite  of  seven 
pieces,  including  settee,  12  gs.  complete ;  white  enamelled  French  cabinets ;  Vernis 
Marten  painted  tables,  escritoires,  etc. ;  the  satinwood  decorated  china  cabinet, 
A  ft.  6  in.  wide,  £14  14s. :  satinwood  decorated  centre  table,  £2  lOs.  ;  satinwood 
decorated  overmantel,  £3  10s.  ;  costly  satinwood  decorated  suite,  covered  choice 
brocade  gobelin  blue  silk,  £16  IBs. 

Also  BED  and  TABLE  LINEN,  Carpets,  Curtains,  Draperies,  &c. 

SILVER  and  SHEFFIELD  PLATE,  &c.,  &c. 

Five  full-sized  billiard  tables  from  30  gS*  complete  with  all  accessories.  Billiard 
dinine  table,  three  iron  safes,  and  thousands  of  other  items  impossible  to  mention  here, 
including  two  nearly  new  motor  cars. 


Write  for  Complete  Catalogue  {"Land  and  Water"),  Illustrated  bv  Photographs.       Now  Ready.       Sent  anywhere  Post  Free. 

THE  FURNITURE  &  FINE  ART  DEPOSITORIES,  Ltd. 


48  to  60   PARK  STREET,    UPPER  STREET,   ISLINGTON,    LONDON,   N. 


Grand  Prix, 
Diploma  of  Honour,  and 


Gold  Medals, 
(Paris  Exhibition,  1912. 


The  following  Number  Motor 
'Buses  pass  Park  Street,  Isling- 
ton: Nos.  4,   ig,  43,  43a,  and  30. 

'Phone  3472  North. 
Cab  Fares  refunded  to  all  pur- 
chasers. 

Business  Hours :    Open  every 

day,  9  till  9,  except  Saturdays, 

when  we  close  at  i. 

ESTAIiLISHED  OVER 
HALF  -A  -  CENTURY. 


By  Royal  Appointment 


to  II. M.  the  King  of  Spain. 


IMPORTANT     NOTICE.— 

We  have  NO  WEST  END 
BRANCHES,  neither  are  we 
connected  with  ANY  OTHER 
DEPOSITORIES-  Our  ONLY 
ADDRESS  is  as  above.  Having 
NO  WEST  END  EXPENSES 
TO  MAINTAIN  enables  us  to 
offer  GENUINE  advantages  in 
really  Fine  Antique  and  High- 
class  Goods. 

L.  LEWIS,  Manager 


Grand  Prix 

auH  Gold  Medals, 


International  Exhibition, 
Rome,  1913. 


35 


LAND    AND    WATER 


^_-=y-> 


October   17,   19 14 


THROUGH   THE   EYES 
OF  A  WOMAN 

Some  Leaves  from  a  Feminine  Note  Book 


TAKE  us  on  the  whole,  we  are  not  an  imaginative 
race.  It  is  verv  difficult  for  us  to  picture  the 
hirrors  of  invasion  when  such  a  thing  has  never 
happened  in  our  experience  nor  in  that  of  our 
forefathers.  Owing  to  what  has  been  neatly 
described  as  a  geographical  accident,  the  people  of  this 
country  are  in  very  different  case  from  those  on  the  Continent, 
and  this  has  its  natural  result  on  life  in  genera).  It  is  probably 
for  these  reasons  that  the  charge  of  apathy  has  been  made 
against  us.  Fugitives  from  abroad,  escaping  from  scenes  of 
horror  and  desolation,  marvelled  and  were  perhaps  somewhat 
shocked  at  seeing  us  proceeding  on  our  way  much  the  same 
as  usual.  They  asked  whether  the  English  really  knew  they 
were  at  war.  '  We  may  perhaps  have  been  slow  in  fully 
realising  it,  but  every  day  now  drives  the  fact  harder  home. 
To  those  living  in  London  one  of  the  first  visible  signs  of 
being  in  a  state  of  war  has  been  the  darkening  of  the  streets 
at  night.  This  most  certainly  helps  to  stimulate  the  imagina- 
tion. Gone  are  the  sky-signs,  the  illuminated  lettering,  and 
all  the  eye-catching  devices  of  electric  advertisement.  No 
longer  are  there  the  brightly-lighted  shop  windows  that  in 
times  of  peace  remained  brilliant  and  shining  far  into  the 
night.  The  street  lamps  are  carefully  graded,  those  which 
are  not  absolutely  necessary  for  the  safety  of  traffic  being 
unlit.  Added  to  this,  folk  who  are  awake  at  night  can  some- 
times hear  a  patrolling  airship  with  engines  throbbing  dis- 
tinctly as  she  passes  overhead.  It  is  the  first  unusual 
demonstration  we  have  had,  though  it  probably  will  not  be 
the  last.  Many  people  lately  have  made  a  pilgrimage  to  the 
Embankment  after  it  is  dark  to  see  the  effect  of  the  search- 
lights that  pivot  from  the  top  of  Charing  Cross  against  the 
sky.  This  also  is  new  to  our  experience,  and  makes  its  own 
peculiar  claim  upon  the  imagination. 

The  Families  Left  Behind 

The  Soldiers'  and  Sailors'  Families  Association  has  been 
very  busy  since  the  outbreak  of  war  and  has  relieved  several 
cases  of  distress  that  almost  instantaneously  arose.  It  will  be 
remembered  that  Queen  Alexandra  made  an  appeal  on  behalf 
of  the  Association, ^  but  this  was  withdrawn  shortly  after 
to  allow  freer  scope  for  the  Prince  of  Wales's  Fund.  Those  in 
authority  felt  that  the  two  appeals  running  simultaneously 
might  interfere  one  with  the  other  and  lead  to  confusion. 
Lady  Londonderry,  as  President  of  the  Durham  County 
Branch  of  the  Soldiers'  and  Sailors'  Families  Association,  has 
just  made  a  statement  regarding  the  administration  of  relief 
in  that  county,  which  makes  very  interesting  reading.  The 
Association  here  has  had  no  fewer  than  11,151  cases  on  its 
books,  and  the  numbers  have  increased  week  by  week.  .The 
organisation  is  relying  for  funds  upon  the  balance  of  the 
money  collected  in  Durham  for  Durham  families  at  the  time 
of  the  Boer  War,  upon  contributions  and  subscriptions  which 
have  been  given  now,  and  a  contribution  from  the  Prince  of 
Wales's  Fund.  This  last  has  been  sufficiently  large  to  enable 
Lady  Londonderry  to  hope  that  there  may  be  no  need  to 
make  any  further  appeal  on  behalf  of  the  Association.  A 
detailed  return  is  shortly  to  be  published  giving  an  account 
of  the  way  in  which  the  relief  has  been  distributed  amongst 
the  dependents  of  our  troops  at  the  front. 

All  those  who  have  been  interested  in  the  Association  in 
the  past  are  anxiously  waiting  to  see  how  the  new  scheme  of 
the  Government,  which  came  into  operation  on  the  12th  of 
this  month,  will  work.  The  Government  has  undertaken  to 
make  the  payments  direct,  and  it  is  now  a  matter  of  State 
control.  Wliether  this  means  the  resulting  decrease  of 
personal  interest  remains  to  be  seen.  That,  as  we  all  know, 
is  the  danger  of  the  State  machine.  The  county  branches  of 
the  Soldiers'  and  Sailors'  Families  Association  have  counted 
many  helpers  amongst  their  ranks,  who  watch  over  the  various 
cases  and  pay  frequent  visits  to  the  different  homes.  The 
personal  note,  therefore,  has  not  been  lacking  in  the  past,  and 
in  many  instances  has  proved  of  great  value  in  the  good  work 
accomplished. 


Patriotic  Shopping 

Women  have  many  duties  at  present,  and  not  least 
amongst  them  is  patriotic  shopping.  We  can  all  do  a  very 
formidable  best  to  encourage  home  industries.  It  has  been 
shown  quite  recently  that  though  we  are  at  war  with  Germany 
German  commercial  agents  still  overrun  our  markets.  The 
German  trader,  naturally  enough,  is  sufficiently  astute  to 
know  that  he  must  disguise  his  nationality  ,  but  this  presents 
no  difficultv.  To  this  end  German  businesses  are  making  an 
effort  to  be  turned  into  English  limited  liability  companies 
and  traders  in  neutral  countries  are  being  used  as  middlemen 
by  German  concerns.  By  these  subterfuges  German  trade 
with  this  country  is  by  no  manner  of  means  as  completely 
closed  as  it  should  be.  The  remedy  for  this  lies  in  the  hands 
of  the  English  shopping  public.  If  everybody  made  a  point 
of  examining  the  articles  they  buy  and  mquiring  as  to  their 
origin  the  British  trader  and  British  trade  would  have  a  very 
decided  stimulus.  There  has  never  been  such  a  chance  as 
the  present  for  promoting  English  manufactures  and  strangling 
German  competition.  If  every  mistress  of  a  house  makes 
up  her  mind  that  nothing  of  German  manufacture  shall  enter 
her  doors  she  will  help  her  native  land  in  the  most  practical 
of  all  practical  ways.  Nor  need  this  be  an  uninteresting  task 
to  perform.  If  we  once  set  our  minds  to  cope  with  the 
question  we  should  learn  more  about  the  clothes  we  wear 
and  the  food  we  eat  than  we  probably  have  ever  known 
before,  and  the  study  cannot  fail  to  be  a  fascinating  one. 

Lace  and  the  Belgians 

Belgian  lace  is  being  given  a  foremost  place  in  the 
catalogue  of  many  a  great  shop's  wares,  and  the  examples 
now  being  displayed  amply  merit  attention.  Apart  from 
all  sentimental  value  attaching  to  work  done  by  our  brave 
Ally,  lace  made  by  the  Belgians  has  always  ranked  high  in 
excellence  and  been  a  foremost  industry  of  the  country.  The 
specimens  shown  in  London  are  particularly  beautiful,  and  it 
is  no  wonder  that  many  people  have  taken  the  opportunity  to 
add  to  their  lace  collection.  There  are  various  signs  that  lace 
is  to  be  much  used  on  evening  frocks  and  tea  gowns.  This  is 
a  time  when  the  tea  gown  has  undoubtedly  come  into  its  own. 
Women  who -have  been  out  all  day,  serving  on  various  charity 
organisations,  attending  first-aid  lectures,  and  working  in 
many  other  ways,  are  well  inclined  towards  the  rest  frock 
when  they  reach  their  own  home  again.  And  the  rest  gown 
at  its  best  is  as  becoming  a  garment  as  the  heart  of  woman 
can  desire.  Planned  upon  up-to-date  lines,  it  partakes  much 
of  the  nature  of  an  evening  dress,  but  is  infinitely  easier  to 
don.  A  pretty  gown  of  Neapolitan  violet  charmeuse,  intended 
for  the  trousseau  of  a  war-wedding  bride,  had  wide  scarf 
sleeves  of  delicately-meshed  lace,  with  a  tiny  edging  of  hand- 
embroidered  violets,  outlined  by  a  background  of  leaves  in 
very  natural  colourings.  The  lace  was  toned  to  the  shade  of 
old  parchment,  of  the  colour  to  which  the  inferior  dentelles 
never  aspire.  That  the  cheaper  kinds  of  lace,  however,  rarely 
justify  their  existence  is  too  well  established  a  fact  for  pressing 
at  this  or  any  other  time. 

A  Good  Response 

Many  gifts  have  reached  Devonshire  House  in  response 
to  the  Queen's  appeal  for  knitted  belts  and  socks  for  the 
troops  at  the  front.  No  fewer  than  six  thousand  pairs  of 
socks  have  been  forwarded  by  the  women  of  Dundee  through 
Colonel  Hill,  chairman  of  the  Dundee  Territorial  Association, 
and  from  Lady  French's  Fund  comes  a  regular  supply  every 
week.  Lady  Salisbury  has  sent  five  hundred  pairs,  Mrs. 
Ronald  Greville  seven  hundred  pairs,  and  Ladv  Phillips  has 
sent  over  a  thousand  pairs  of  socks  and  three  hundred  belts. 
It  has  been  requested  that  the  givers  of  socks  will  see  that 
each  pair  is  sewn  together,  so  that  one  sock  may  not  escape 
from  its  fellow.  This  small  detail,  however,  is  forgotten  by 
numerous  people,  and  the  result  is  that  a  staff  of  a  dozen 
sewing  women  is  kept  constantly  employed  at  Devonshire 
House   sewing   the   socks   together   in    pairs. 

Erica. 


36 


The  County  Gentleman 


AND 


LAND  &WATER 


Vol.  LXIV.         No.  2735 


SATURDAY,  OCTOBER  10,   1914 


rpubllshed  ast       pri  c  e  s  i  xpen  ce 
La  newspaperJ      pubushed  weekly 


lyig^t,  Sporl  and  General 


FIELD-MARSHAL    EARL    ROBERTS 

The  Grand  Old  Man  of  the  Army,   who  has  recenlly  celebrated  his  eighty-second  birthday 


LAND     AND     WATER 


Oc'ober    lo,    1914 


v/////////////////AV/:v/.VA//r//.f/r.'/AVA-.v/..Y/.-//.YA-A 

v. 


u 


A    RECRUITING   SONG 

"  To  arms  !  "  is  the  cry 

That  comes  echoing  by 
Through  the  length  of  the  day  and  the  night 

"  To  arms  !  "  calls  the  King, 

With  a  soldierlike  ring 
That  tells  that  his  summons  is  right. 

To  the  order  come  forth 

From  the  South  and  the  North, 
From  the  limits  of  East  and  of  West  ; 

Come  forth  and  don't  lag, 

Come  and  fight  for  the  flag. 
Obeying  the  nation's  behest. 

Old  England  is  ready 
For  freedom  to  fight  ; 

Her  purpose  is  steady, 
Her  standpoint  is  right. 

Though  never  denying 

That  peace  has  its  charms. 

Her  colours  high  flying. 

To  foemen  replying, 

You'll  stfll  have  her  crying, 
"  To  arms  !  " 

"  To  arms  !  "  cries  the  Russ, 

Who  is  warring  with  us, 
And  the  same  cry  the  children  of  France  ; 

"  To  arms  !  "  Belgium  calls 

As  her  tottering  walls 
Are  opposing  the  German  advance. 

Our  Colonies  call. 

And  the  Hindoos  are  all 
Most  eager  their  duty  to  do  ; 

So  come  out  and  fight. 

For  the  Black  and  the  White 
Are  maintaining  the  Red,  White,  and  Blue. 

Old  England  is  steady, 
Not  longing  for  strife. 

But  eagerly  ready 
To  fight  for  her  life, 

Her  summons  is  winging 
To  townships  and  farms  ; 

Her  Britishers  bringing. 

With  cheers  loud  and  ringing, 

She's  lustily  singing, 
'  To  arms  !  " 

MOSTYN    T.    PiGOTT 


S^ssi:>K-vK:%:-/<c-/9(;K:9K3Sca«SK:>K-.M;>K:»:>K»KK»ec-/Ky.e:%w.»c:K:K:7KSK^ 


:^,i;^MriciilAi,/X^'.:.^fii<:i^'^ 


>«»:;«»c%(»«:«:«eit«:yxsK:«m«>K:^«»i:»c-.>K%KiK:«:iKiK»s»« 


18 


October   lo,    19 14 


LAND     AND     WATER 


Copyritkt,  Horact  W.  NuMli 


THE  SENTINEL 


19 


LAND     AND    WATER 


October   lO,   19 14 


IN    THE    TRAIL    OF    WAR 


ON    THE    ROAD    TO    RHEIMS 

All  that  is  left  of  a  small  village  near  Soi(ey>Ie-Bois 


Copyriglit,  Central  A'ra'S 


20 


October  10,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


^^  ^KIBLCE     (  V 
STOPN/TZA  .^-^ 

Ccu-r.  ""-"'""■■TAIWOW       ^    JAROSLAV 


v.. 


MIST  d"'^     .  ^'"'^  z   I   c  T  ^K 

A   U    O     1     i^    Q  ^   ^  "      .^PRZ£M5YL    \eMBBRO     '^ 

%-       Mil-  .  ^^^"  ^ 


THE    WAR    BY    LAND. 

By  HILAIRE    BELLOG. 


THE    EASTERN    THEATRE    OF    WAR. 

IN  the  Eastern  theatre  of  war  we  arc  upon  the 
eve  of  events  whicli  will  profoundly  affect  the 
future  of  the  whole  European  stnig^le.  It 
may  even  be  true  to  say  that  at  the  moment 
of  wi-iting  we  are  in  the  midst  of  those  events. 
The  ih-st  chapter  of  what  will  soon  be  a  complete 
story  has  apparently  been  closed  in  the  Northern  part 
of  tlio  Eastern  field  between  the  Niomen  and  the 
frontier  of  East  Prussia.     Meanwhile  the  much  more 


important  chapters  that  have  still  to  be  um-oUed  upon 
the  Upper  Vistula,  in  the  Southern  department  of 
this  same  Eastern  field,  have  not  yet  reached  any 
conclusion. 

It  will  be  remembered  from  what  was  said  in 
these  columns  last  week,  that  these  series  of  operations 
in  Poland  were  remarkable  from  the  fact  that  they 
included  two  quite  separate  battlefields.  We  must 
still  use  that  term  "battlefields,"  f5r  though  the 
actions  extend  over  a  front  nowadays   of  anything 


!• 


LAND    AND    WATER 


OctoLer  10,  1914 


from  50  to  150  miles,  yet  tlic  essentials  wliicli  dis- 
tiiij,nusli  a  battle  and  a  field  of  battle  fi-om  a  campaign 
and  tlic  "theatre"  in  wliicli  that  campaign  takes 
place  still  distingnisli  the  very  extensive  lines  along 
-vvhicli  to-day  a  decision  is  readied.  You  have  the 
two  fronts,  the  contact  of  one  ^vith  the  other,  the 
cohesion  of  either  party,  the  attempt  of  the  one 
either  to  break  or  to  envelop  tlie  other.  And  the 
whole  action  is  tactical,  not  strategical. 

Using  then  the  term  "  battlefield,"  greatly 
extended  as  it  has  become  in  time  and  space,  lor  the 
scenes  of  these  protracted  modern  actions  you  have, 
I  say,  in  the  Eastern  theatre  of  war  two  distinct 
battlefields  wherein  it  is  sought  by  either  party  to 
reach  a  decision  upon  the  soil  of  Poland.  Tliese  two 
battlefields  arc  independent  of  one  another.  They 
are  occupied  on  the  Gennanic  side  by  two  separate 
cohesive  bodies. 

(1)  The  body  which  has  been  struggling  to 
obtain  possession  of  the  Vp]ier  Kiernen  and  the 
crossings  thereof  between  CIrodno  and  Ivcnno. 

(2)  The  body  which  is  concerned  to  arrest  and  if 
possible  to  thrust  back  the  great  Ihissian  Ai-my, 
which,  since  its  victory  at  Lcmberg  has  been  pressing 
westward  through  Galicia  towards  Silesia. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  it  was  remarked  in 
these  notes  last  v.cek  that  the  Southern  of  the  two 
fields  was  the  more  important. 

AVhcn  you  have  two  separate  actions  of  this  sort 
going  on,  one  well  in  front  of  the  other,  the  ultimate 
ilccision  which  will  aiTect  the  fortunes  of  both  is  most 
likely  to  arise  in  that  field  which  contains  the  larger 
total  number  of  combatants.  If  you  have  a  situation 
such  as  that  presented  in  the  accompanying  diagi-am, 
where  an  action  is  going  on  between  black  and  white, 
A— B  and  C— 1)  with 


A  C 


Commutticationsl 


E   G 


B  D 


Comtnumc^tions 


F   H 


V 


A-B  attacking  C-D  and  having  the  initiati\e, 
while  at  the  same  time  another  action  is  L'oino-  on 
betu^en  two  otlier  sets  of  the  same  oppponents  at 
h—F  and  a— II.  then  either  the  success  of  A- B 
against  C-I)  ^-iU  ultimately  threaten  the  ccmmuni- 
cations  of  the  successful  G—II  against  B—V  or  the 


success  of  G — H  against  E — F  will  iJtimately 
threaten  the  communications  of  A — B.  In  other 
words,  when  two  actions  like  these  are  being  fought 
out,  not  abreast  of  one  another  on  one  line,  but  criss- 
cross, one  of  the  two  will  be  the  master  action  con- 
trolling in  the  long  run  the  results  of  the  other.  It 
must  nearly  always  be  the  lai-ger  of  the  two  sets  of 
bodies  involved  ^vhich  so  controls  the  action  of  the 
smaller  set.  Supposing  A — B  to  be  succes.sf  id  against 
C — D,  A — B  will  none  the  less  ultimately  have  to 
turn  back  if  G — H  has  been  successful  against  the 
much  larger  body  of  A — B's  fellows  at  E— F. 

The  elements  contained  in  this  diagram  are 
precisely  those  governing  the  general  operations  in 
the  Eastern  theatre  of  war.     It  will  be  apparent  that 


^,«».  tUf,, 


v-"'?'^^^:^'"- '"■ 


'^risrs 


tit 


in  the  Northern  battlefield  you  had  in  front  of  the 

Niemen  a  successful  advancing  German  bodv,  A B. 

pressing  upon  a  defending  Eussian  bodv,  C  -1),' 
while  down  south  near  the  Upper  Vistula  vou  had  a 
much  larger  body,  G— H,  advancing  against  corre- 
spondingly large  Germanic  forces,  E~F.  The  result 
of  the  action,  E— F,  Cr— H,  woidd  ultimately  control 
the  movements  of  the  action  A— B,  C— D.  For, 
however  successful  A— B  might  be  in  the  north,' 
G—II  and  E— F  were  really  deciding  the  issue  of  the 
war  in  the  Avhole  of  the  Eastern  theatre.  They  were 
the  principal  forces  engaged.  If  E-^F  wins,  for 
instance,  and  pushes  G--H  back,  the  success  of 
A— B  becomes  of  comparatively  small  importance. 
If  G— H  wins  he  will  bo  threatening  by  his  large 
numbers  the  communications  of  the  "smaller  bodv 
A — B  and  compelling  its  retreat. 

All  this  is  supposing  that  A— B  in  the  north 
continues  to  advance,  but,  as  a  fact,  this  smaUer 
Gei-man  army  which  has  been  attacking  the  IJussians 
on  the  Niemen,  and  advaiu'ing  to  cross  that  river, 
has  failed  and  is  no\v  in  retreat.  Meanwhile,  the 
much  larger  Austro-Germanv  Army  which  is  pre- 
paring to  provoke  a  decision  upon  the  Upper  A'i.stula 
has  not   yet   reached   that   decision— and   upon  the 


2» 


October  10,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


lesiilt  of  its  action,  favourable  or  disastrous  to  Austria 
aaid  Germany,  will  turn  the  first  pliase  of  the  war  in 
the  East.  Moreover,  if  the  action  is  really  decisive,  it 
will  violently  react  upon  the  campaign  in  France. 

Before  taking  these  two  fields  of  battle  in  detail, 
I  woidd  insist  on  this  last  point,  upon  the  very  grave 
effect  upon  the  max  as  a  whole  that  the  first  decisive 
results  in  Poland  must  necessarily  have.  It  is  agreed 
that  the  "  pressure  "  which  Russia  may  be  able  to 
bring  upon  Germany  will  be  of  capital  effect  upon  the 


the  eastern  "pressure"  upon  Gennany  upon  which 
the  west  so  eagerly  counts. 

Now,  it  is  because  a  decision  one  way  or  the  other 
appears  to  be  imminent  that  the  operations  in  Poland 
at  this  moment  have  resumed  their  interest  for  us. 

Having  said  so  much  let  me  turn  to  the  ■two 
battlefields  in  detail. 

THE   ACTIONS   IN    THE   VALLEY   OF 

THE    NIEMEN. 


campaign  in  the  "West.  Tlic  date  at  whicb  this 
"  pressure  "  might  begin  was  voiy  foolishly  advanced, 
and  too  many  organs  of  public  opinion,  in  this  country 
especially,  v.rote,  at  tlie  opening  of  the  war,  as  though 
Berlin  were  to  be  menaced  in  a  few  days.  It  was 
impossible,  unless  the  mles  of  arithmetic  were  to  be 
suspended,  for  any  such  "  pressure  "  to  be  felt  before 
the  third  week  in  'October,  even  supposing  the 
maximum  success  conceivable  on  the  part  of  the 
Eussians,  and  the  collapse  of  their  opponents.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  it  is  already  apparent  that  the 
"  prcssm-e  "  will  come  in  any  case  later  than  this 
most  favom-able  date.  Further,  it  is  equally  apparent 
that  the  first  "  pressure  "  wliich  our  common  enemies 
could  be  put  under  by  the  Russians  would  be  applied  not 
in  the  heart  of  the  German  Empire,  nor  at  its  capitjil, 
but  in  Silesia,  because  Silesia  is  the  nearest  populous 
and  wealthy  province  exposed  to  a  Russian  advance. 

Now,  a  decision  reached  within  the  next  few 
days  or  in  the  next  week  or  two  by  the  Russians  over 
the  Germans  in  the  eastern  theati-e  of  war  would 
mean  the  beginning  of  that  "  pressure  "  upon  Silesia, 
an  advance  along  tlie  valley  of  the  Oder,  the  turning 
of  the  Eastern  fortresses  of  Prussia  hi  Poland,  notably 
Posen  and  Thorn,  and  the  way  open  to  a  march  upon 
industriiU  Saxony  and  the  capifcU  itself. 

Conversely,  the  success  of  the  Germans,  should 
they  arrest  the  Russian  march  through  Galicia,  and 
still  more  should  they  thrust  back  the  Russians  in 
that  field,  would  mean  the  indefinite  postponement  of 


On  the  above  skeleton  map  the  reader  will 
discover  the  size  and  to  some  extent  the  nature  of  the 
field  of  operations  in  Northern  Poland.  It  must  first 
be  obsei"vcd  that  the  artificial  frontier  between  the 
Russian  Empire  and  East  Prussia,  which  here  cuts 
through  Northern  Poland,  has  long  "been  crossed  by 
the  advancing  Gennan  forces,  and  that  these  have 
been  advancing  directly  upon  the  Niemcn  with  the 
object  of  crossing  that  stream. 

Tlie  Nicnicn  is  the  great  natural  obstacle  to  any 
invasion  of  Russia  from  the  west ;  at  least  if  such  an 
invasion  tiike  place  upon  the  northern  pait  of  her 
western  fi-outier.  "When  Napoleon  was  occupied  in 
re-erecting  Poland  as  a  nationality,  he  had  imposed 
npon  the  Russians  the  Niemen  as  a  frontier  between 
Russia  and  Poland,  though,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
Pohsli  nation  extends  its  tenitory  far  to  the  east  of 
that  river.  It  was  across  the  Niemen  that  Napoleon 
marched  his  gi-eat  force  in  June,  1812,  and  one 
that  the  Niemen  was  to  the 
in  liistory  what  the  Meuse  is 
France.  To  obtain  possession 
its  crossing  places,  then,  was 
the  object  of  the  Gennan  advance  in  this  quarter. 
All  the  countiy  between  the  East  Prussian  frontier 
and  the  Niemen  (a  matter  of  over  50  mUcs  even  at 
the  naiTOwest  point  between  the  two  lines  in  this 
region)  is  a  mass  of  water  and  wood  and  marsh.  Some 
few  of  the  lakes  I  have  set  down  in  the  sketch  map, 
but  the  total  number  appearing  upon  any  detailed  map 


might  almost  say 
fortunes  of  Russia 
to  the  fortunes  of 
of    this    liver    and 


8» 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


October  10,  1914 


is  very  miicli  Lir^or  and  the  whole  scheme  of  them  and 
ihoir  KUiTOuading  maitihes  and  forests  very  much  more 
complicated.  But  even  from  so  elcmentarj  a  sketch 
one  cau  see  that  the  few  roads  available  to  an  armj'  in 
its  advance  upon  the  Niemen  are  here  of  capital  impor- 
tance. Every  one  of  them  (and  particularly  the 
causeway  by  \\hic'h  the  main  advance  was  made  from 
Suwalki  to  Seiny)  is  a  series  of  ckjilcs :  tliat  is,  of 
pLices  where  an  army  cannot  march  upon  any  but  a 
vcrv  narrow  front  :*  a  place  where  tlie  columns  are 
confined  to  one  road  only  and  camiot  spread  out  upon 
either  side. 

It  was  on  September  23rd,  that  is,  a  fortnight 
ago,  the  AVednesday  before  lust,  that  the  Russian 
Clenei-al  IJenneukampf,  retreating  from  before  the 
Gei-man  advance,  got  his  last  troops  over  the  Niemen 
and  waited  the  ap]n-oach  of  the  enemy  to  that  ri\er. 
'J'he  point  at  which  they  proposed  to  cross,  or  at  least 
the  chief  of  the  several  points,  was  Drusskeniki.  They 
had  already  throA\Ti  their  pontoons  across  when  the 
counter-offensive  upon  the  part  of  the  llussians  began. 
'I'hc  opening  of  it  was  no  more  than  the  shelling  of  the 
German  pontoon  bridges  as  the  Prussians  were 
crossing  them  upon  the  Friday,  the  2yth,  and  the 
next  phase  after  the  success  of  this  check  given  to  the 
invaders  was  a  violent  ai-tillcry  duel  between  the 
massed  guns  of  either  army  firing  from  positions 
facing  each  other  across  the  river.  In  the  hope  that 
their  artiUerj'  had  sufficiently  dominated  the  enemy's, 
the  Crermans  began  their  preparations  for  a  second 
crossing.  This  second  attempt  was  made  at  the  end 
of  the  day ;  before  night  it  had  failed  as  the  first  had. 
Ei-om  this  check  at  Drusskeniki  the  Germans  fell 
back  upon  what  has  been  throughout  all  the  inter- 
vening days  a  retreat,  sometimes  so  pressed  as  to 
involve  local  disasters.  By  Monday,  September  ~8th, 
after  foiu'  days  of  this  retreat,  the  rearguard  of  the 
German  retirement  was  at  Seiny,  which  means  that 
the  main  body  had  been  covering  quite  fifteen  miles 
u  day.  The  whole  business  in  its  rapidity  and  reverse 
was  not  unlike  the  general  retreat  which  we  call  in  the 
"W^est  the  battle  of  Marne.  The  retreat  was  also  of 
course  being  carried  out  along  the  whole  front,  not 
only  in  the  centre  with  the  main  columns  through 
Seiny,  but  up  North  as  far  as  Mariampoland  Southward 
as  far  as  Augustowo.  Inhere  are  no  railways  in  this  belt 
between  the  Niemen  and  the  German  frontier.  The  four 
German  Army  Corps  which,  according  to  the  French 
Official  Communique,  were  involved,  could  not  there- 
fore receive  rapid  reinforcement  even  'if  such  rein- 
forcement could  be  spared  either  from  the  Southern 
field  or  from  elsewhere.  Two  days  later,  therefore,  by 
Thursday,  October  1st,  the  mass  of  the  German  forces 
fell  back  upon  a  line  Marlarapol-Suwalki-Augustowo, 
the  retreat  of  the  central  portion  which  had  to  follow^ 
the  causeway  through  the  marshes  from  Seiny  to 
Suwalki  being  particularly  painful  and  expensive. '  The 
Iiussians  advancing  from  the  lino  Simno-Sereje-Lipny 
on  the  centre  drove  the  German  centre  right  down 
this  nan-o\v  defile. 

The  decision  in  this  extended  action  was  reached, 
liowever,  not  in  the  centre,  but,  as  seems  necessary 
iiowadaj-s  in  any  extended  and  lengthy  modern 
action,  upon  one  of  the  wings.  The  operative  wing 
hero  was,  of  course,  the  Southern  one,  the  Eussian 
left  and  German  right.  For  to  get  round  this  wing 
Avas  to  cut  the  Germans  off  from,  or  at  least  to 
endanger,  their  communications  with  their  own 
country.  There  is,  however  on  this  wing  a  gi-eat 
mass  of  wood  as  well  as  of  lake  country,  Icnown  as 
the  Forests  of  Augustowo.  It  i?  nearly  a  week's 
march   across    by    its   few   soft   and   sodden  rosul?. 


This  was  the  i)rincipal  impediment  to  the  general 
llussian  movement,  but  apparently  upon  the  Tluu'sday, 
October  1st,  the  obstacle  was  sunnounted,  or  turned, 
and  Augustowo  was  occupied,  the  Eussian  advance 
then  proceeding  to  Eatchki,  which  was  also  taken  at 
the  point  of  the  bayonet,  and  it  seemed  as  though  the 
German  retreat  in  "this  direction  would  have  to  proceed 
not  by  the  way  the  (fcrman  advance  had  come,  but 
northward  and  separate  from  the  retreat  of  another 
group  of  German  forces  whose  action  I  will  now 
describe. 

This  subsidiary  gi-oup  in  the  ad-  ;ice  on  tho 
Niemen  had  undertaken  to  protect  tl..  right  fiank 
of  the  advance,  the  investment  of  the  fortress  of 
Osowiecs. 

This  separate  ojieration  upon  the  Southern  or 
right  fiank  of  the  general  German  advance  upon  the 
Niemen  came  a  little  behind  the  central  main  part  of 
that  advance.  We  have  seen  that  the  attempt  to 
cross  the  Niemen  at  Drusskeniki  belonged  to 
September  23th.  It  was  not  until  the  morrow  tliat 
the  attack  upon  the  forts  of  Osowiecs  began.  The 
bombardment  of  those  forts  continued  apparently  for 
no  more  than  two  da3's.  Indeed,  the  retreat  of  tl  e 
centre  from  Niemen  must  have  involved  hasty  orders 
from  the  German  headquarters  to  the  troojis  on 
the  extreme  right  in  front  of  the  fortress,  and 
these  began  their  reti-eat  towards  Prussia  again. 
In  this  retreat  they  had  the  advantage  of  a  railway 
which  their  fellows  in  the  main  bodies  to  the  North 
had  not.  But  it  Avas  just  as  heavily  pressed  as  the 
retirement  of  the  main  bodies  of  the  North.  The 
Eussian  cavahy  were  in  CJrajcwo  with  the  first  of 
the  month,  and  on  the  next  day,  Friday  the  2nd,  they 
were  over  tho  frontier. 

All  these  operations,  therefore,  in  Northern 
Poland  and  in  the  valleys  of  the  Bobr  and  the  Niemen 
(to  which  the  Eussians  have  given  the  name  of  the 
"Battle  of  Augustowo,"  which  were  fought  over  a 
front  of  more  than  a  hundred  miles  and  which  occu2)ied 
altogether  more  than  ten  davs)  have  resulted  in  the 
retirement  of  the  four  invading  German  Army  Corps 
back  over  their  own  frontier,  and  it  is  probable  that  at 
the  moment  of  writing,  though  fighting  is  still  going 
on  just  west  of  Suwalki,  all  the  German  forces  have 
been  withdi-aAvn  from  that  part  of  Northern  Poland 
which  lies  over  the  artificial  frontier  between  the 
Eussian  Empire  and  East  Prussia. 

THE  OPERATIONS  IN  SOUTHERN 
POLAND  UPON  THE  UPPER 
VISTULA. 

It  wUl  be  seen  from  what  has  just  been  said  that 
the  Eussian  siiccess  in  Northern  Poland  is  locally 
decisive,  not  that  avc  have  any  account  of  great  captures 
of  men  or  material,  biit  that  the  German  object  de- 
liberately undertaken  has  not  been  reached  and  the 
German  plan  has  failed.  But  this  failure,  as  avc  have 
seen,  only  concerns  four  Army  Corps. 

The  operations  in  Southern  Poland,  which  have 
not  yet  come  to  a  decision  and  in  which  the  two  main 
forces  have  not  yet  even  thoroughly  taken  contact, 
must  be  watched  Avith  far  greater  interest  and  will 
have  far  more  effect  upon  the  campaign  as  a  Avhole. 

In  order  to  grasp  the  way  in  Avhich  this  great 
action  is  being  approached,  the  way  in  Avhich  the 
opposing  forces  are  manoeuvi-ing  for  position,  and  the 
nature  of  the  gi-ound  over  Avhich  the  shock  will  take 
place,  Ave  must  master  the  very  simple  elements  of  the 
field,  remembering  that  the  forces  that  will  join  battle 
in  the   field,   and  that   have  perhaps   already   done 


4» 


October  10,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


something  towai-ds  acliieving  a  decision  at  the  moment 
of  WTiting,  are  nearly  four  times  as  numerous  in 
southern  Poland  as  thej  are  in  that  northern  field 
which  we  have  just  been  examining.  We  have,  it  is 
presumed  in  the  official  notices,  fifteen  or  sixteen 
army  corps,  Austrian  and  Gei-man,  drawn  up  to  check, 
and  if  possible  to  throw  back,  the  Russian  advance 
through  south  and  central  Poland. 

The  general  story  of  what  has  preceded  the 
coming  great  action  in  the  Galician  field  may  be 
rajiidly  recalled. 


would  take.  They  might  elect  to  mass  the  whole 
Austro-German  force  (now  presumably  under  one 
Prussian  Commander-in-Chief)  at  a  point  where  the 
three  Empires  meet,  and  there  to  await  the  Eussian 
shock,  abandoning  Cracow.  At  first,  when  it  was 
discovered  that  entrenchments  had  been  made  just 
inside  Eussian  Poland,  upon  the  line  Kaliscz-Wielun- 
Czenstochowa,  it  was  believed  that  some  such  plan  was 
intended.  A  line  of  troops  would  stand  upon  the 
defensive  to  protect  the  river  flank  from  being  turned, 
and  the  big  action  would  come  behiad,  or  to  the  west, 


CrcLcow 


%,  *Lem!)er< 


rosmos  of  th«  adbtelin  aemies  ix  oalicia,  and  thb  linb  op  gekjias  RziNFOECMiB^rr  raoii  the  west. 


Eather  more  than  a  month  ago,  just  as  Von 
ICluck  Avas  approaching  Paris,  the  Eussians  broke  up 
one  of  the  two  great  Austrian  armies  opposed  to  them 
in  Southern  Poland.  They  broke  up  the  army  round 
Lcmberg,  Army  2,  whereupon  Anny  1,  immediately  to 
the  north  of  this,  fell  back.  The  Eussians  advanced 
after  securing  Lembcrg  and  its  many  munitions  and 
their  very  numerous  prisoners — some  60,000 — and 
their  considerable  captures  in  guns  and  material ; 
they  isolated  Przemysl,  occupied  the  Passes  of  the 
Carpatbians  behind  that  fortress,  took  Jaroslav, 
reached  Debitza  last  week,  and  proposed  to  advance 
the  remaining  week's  march  upon  Cracow.  Part  of 
the  defeated  Austrian  Army  No.  2  got  itseK  shut 
up  in  Przemysl,  but  tlic  remainder,  together  with 
Anny  No.  1,  fell  back  before  the  Eussian  advance, 
crossing  the  San  river  and  the  plains  behind  it,  and 
making  for  the  Upper  Vistula  and  for  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Cracow,  perpetually  retiring  rapidly  and 
avoiding  a  decision.  Should  the  fortress  of  Cracow 
be  masked  and  passed  by  the  Eussians,  Silesia  would 
be  open  to  Eussian  attack  and  a  new  phase  of  the 
campaign  would  begin  with  the  invasion  of  the 
Gei-man  Empire. 

Meanwhile,  large  German  bodies  were  bcmg 
organised  and  sent  eastward  to  help  the  Austrians  in 
this  southern  field,  to  check  the  Eussian  advance  and 
to  save  Silesia  from  the  invasion  that  threatened  it. 
For  some  time  it  was  uncertain  what  form  this 
German  advance  in  reinforcement   of  the  Austrians 


of  Cracow.  But  what  the  Germans  have  done  in  the 
la.st  week  shows  that  they  and  their  Allies  have  no 
intention  of  fighting  so  far  west,  but  rather  propose 
to  meet  the  enemy  upon  the  line  of  the  Upper  Vistula 
below  Cracow.  Their  troops  have  been  located  upon 
the  line  Pietrokow-Stopnitza,  coming  right  down  to 
the  left  bank  of  the  Vistula  at  a  point  just  noi-th  of 
Tarnow,  and  ilie  whole  series  of  bodies  along  this  line 
is  moving  southward. 

Such  a  disposition  obviously  calls  a  halt  to  the 
Eussian  westerly  advance  along  the  main  railway 
through  Galicia  towards  Cracow  and  Silesia.  They 
liad  isolated  Przemysl  and  taki'u  the  passes  through 
the  Carpathians,  behind  that  fortress,  nearly  a  fort- 
night ago.  They  had  come  up  to  a  line  passing  from 
Dukla  through  Krasnow  to  the  main  Lembcrg-Cracow 
railway  line  ten  days  ago.  Their  vanguard  had 
already  reached  and  passed  Debitza  and  was  approach- 
ing Tamow  when  the  nature  of  this  German  move  was 
apparent.  This  move  they  must  now  face  by  looking 
no  longer  westward  nor  advancing  further  along  the 
main  raihvay  towards  Cracow  and  Silesia,  but  north- 
wards and  westwards  towards  across  the  upper  reaches 
of  the  river  Vistula,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  which 
the  shock  will  come.  They  will  have  the  advantage 
in  this  shock  of  a  main  railway,  that  from  Lcmberg  to 
Cracow,  immediately  in  the  rear  of  their  line,  where 
the  Austro-German  forces  will  have  one  rather 
further  back  in  the  main  line  to  Kielce,  which  is  also 
the    trunk    line    through     Warsaw     to     Petrograd 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  10,  1914 


THB  SOUTHKHN   OE  MAIS   FIELD   OV  ACTION   IN  THK   EASTERN   AKEA   OF   WAB. 


from  Vienna.     Of  direct  raihvay  communication  the 
(jjei-mans  and  Austi-ians  m]l  have  only  one  artcn^ 
that  coming  from  Silesia ;   for  the  railway  reaching 
Czenstochowa  from  Germany  is   only  a  light  line. 
Further  the  gauge   of  the   Kiolce    EaUway  is  the 
Jlussian   gauge,  different   from   that   of  the   rest  of 
Europe.     The  Gennans  have  axles  and  wheels  suited 
to  this  gauge  and  applicable  to  their  o-v\ni   rolling 
stock,  but  in  what  quantity  and  whether  upon  the 
spot  or  no  we  cannot  teU.     (I  have  marked  upon  the 
map  the   points   Zombkovice   Junction   and  Wielce 
Junction  Avherc   the  breach  of  gauge  occurs).     The 
(jiermans  have  the  worst  roads  for   supply  ;behinil 
them,    the    roads    to     the    south    of    the    Vistula 
being  good   macadamised  roads    and    those   to   the 
north  mainly  un-macadamised  tracks.     The  country 
to  the   north   of  the  Vistula  through   which,  pre- 
sumably, the  Austro-German  advance  will  come,  is 
open  enough,  though  hilly  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
the  river,  and  gets  more  wooded  as  one  goes  noi-th- 
ward  to  the  Kielce  raihvay  line.     The  couiitiy  to  the 
south  of  the  Vistula,  as  I  have  marked  it,  is  consider- 
ably wooded,  and,  upon  the  i-iglit  flank  of  the  southern 
orGalieian  Eussian  force,  is  one  great,  almost  unbroken 
forest  in  tlie  angle  between  the  Vistula  and  the  San. 

Apait  from  the  Eussian  army  in  Galicia,  which 
has  advanced  fi-om  Lcmberg  since  its  victoiy  there, 
a  new  army  is  coming  up  through  Central  Poland, 
and  the  Eussian  forces,  th«ugli  massed  mainly  to  the 
south,  yet  extend  up  through  Kielce  and  beyond, 
everywhere  approaching  contact  with  the  Austro- 
German  line  in  front  and  to  the  west  of  them : 
which  line  would  seem  to  nm  fi'om  Pieti'okow  to 
Stoimitza  and  is  extending  to  the  south. 

There  are,  in  biief,  the  tactical  elenients  of  the 
field  in  which  this  great  decision  is  to  be  challenged. 


But  what  precise  form  the  battle  line  will  take 
when  the  shock  comes  we  cannot  teU.  StiU  less  can 
we  conjecture  the  issue. 

THE  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  WESTERN 
THEATRE    OF   WAR. 


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GKXEBAL  MAP  OF  OPEEATIONS  IN  THB  WESTEEN  AKEA. 

In   the  Western   theatre   of   war  there  is  very 
little  that  is  new  in  France.     The  new  thing  in 


6* 


October  10,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


Belgium  is  the  active  pursuit  of  the  Siege  of  Antwerp 
by  the  enemy. 

In  France,  two  districts  claim  our  attention — 
the  ona  upon  the  extreme  East  wing,  round  about 
Verdun,  and  the  Toul — Verdun  fortified  line,  and 
^\j-gonne,  where  a  German  offensive  has  for  the 
naoment  failed  ;  the  other — the  decisive  point — the 
extreme  Western  wing.  West  of  the  Oise  and  North 
of  the  Somme,  of  -wiiich  we  are  as  yet  told  very 
little  indeed,  but  where  a  series  of  violent  actions,  the 
decision  in  which  may  come  at  any  moment,  are 
l>eing  fought  from  Eoye  right  up  to  the  Belgian 
fi-ontier. 

To  take  these  in  their  order — 

THE      OPERATIONS      BETWEEN 
ARGONNE  AND  LORRAINE. 


'.      ',      ^f^ONTFAUCQN 
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w. 


The  operations  in  the  field  which  comprises 
the  Ai^nne,  Verdun,  St.  Mihiel,  and  the  AVoeuvre 
AvUl  have  no  meaning  for  us  until  we  can  grasp 
some  general  object  the  enemy  has  in  mind. 
They  can  hardly  be  desiiltory  and  disconnected 
actions,  as  at  first  sight  they  appear  to  be ;  that 
is  not  the  way  of  any  soldier,  least  of  all  of  German 
soldiers. 

In  my  notes  of  a  week  ago  I  pointed  out  the 
difficulty  of  determining  the  motive  of  the  enemy  in 
establishing  a  bridge  head  over  the  Meuso  at  St. 
Mihiel.  If  he  was  not  able  or  did  not  intend  to 
advance  in  force  through  this  gap  in  the  Toul — Verdun 
line  of  fortifications,  why  was  he  at  the  pains  of 
occupying  a  dangerous  salient  and  of  reducing  two 
strong  permanent  works  and  of  attempting,  under 
heavy  loss  (and  failing),  to  establish  himself  upon  the 
other  side  of  the  river  ?  The  Germans  having  opened 
that  door  have  not  used  it.  I  said  that  if  they  were 
not  intending  an  advance  in  force  through  this  door 
they  had  opened — if  they  had  not  men  enough  in  that 
region  to  mask  Toul  and  Verdun  and  at  the  same 
time  to  pour  a  large  force  straight  on  to  Eevigny — 
then  they  could  only  be  attempting  a  diversion, 
and  the  whole  thing  must  be  regarded  as  a  feint, 
undertaken  in  the  hopes  of  relicNdng  the  increasing 
pressure  on  their  M-est  wing  out  beyond  the  Oise. 
But  there  is  another  possibility  which  would  also 
account  for  those  attacks  which  take  place  on  the 
west  side  of  the  Mouse  with  such  regularity  and  with 
equal  regularity  fail,  and  that  third  possibility  is  the 
hope  or  the  intention  of  investing  Verdun.  It  may 
well  be  that  the  German  General  Staff,  which  has  had 


to  change  its  major  plans  already  twice,  and  must  have 
to  change  details  in  those  plans  continually,  have 
more  than  onoe  determined  that  the  fall  of  the  great 
frontier  fortress  line  was  essential  to  their  success  and 
more  than  once  hesitated  before  the  task  in  view  of 
the  heavy  reinforcement  required  upon  the  right  vring 
beyond  the  Oise.  Hesitation  and  fluctuation  of  tliis 
sort  would  account  for  nearly  all  that  has  happened. 
The  idea  that  Verdim  must  be  invested,  the  beg:innin£r 
of  that  task,  its  abandonment  under  pressure  from  the 
west,  then  its  being  taken  up  again  AviU  accoimt  for 
most  or  all  of  wliat  has  happened  in  this  region.  It 
accounts  for  the  attack  on  the  fort  at  Troyon  to  the 
south  of  Verdun  before  the  German  retreat  began. 
Indeed  in  those  days — ^the  second  week  of  September — 
the  investment  of  Verdun  was  0}X!nly  put  for\^'ard  as  an 
objective  in  the  German  official  communiques.  The 
Cro^^Ti  Prince's  Army,  which  was  princijially  occupied 
in  this  task  and  which  had  its  headquarters  at  Ste. 
Menehould,  was  compelled  to  fall  back  as  far  as 
Varennes  in  the  general  retreat  of  the  Gennan  line 
imposed  by  Von  Kluck's  peril :  the  retirement  wliich 
goes  by  the  name  of  the  Battle  of  the  Marne.  But 
after  the  Crown  Prince's  Army  had  thus  retreated  the 
counter  offensive  was  attempted  several  times,  and 
both  these  counter  attacks  undertaken  by  the  Crown 
Prince  from  the  sides  of  the  Argonne  down  south  on 
to  the  French  positions  west  of  Verdun,  and  the 
subsequent  advance  fi*om  Thiaucoui-t  on  to  the 
Meuse  at  St.  Mihiel,  were  presumably  combined 
actions  liairing  for  their  common  object  the  isolation 
of  Verdun. 

The  last  of  these  numerous  strokes  to  fail  has 
been  that  of  the  Crown  Prince  on  Saturday  and 
Sunday  last  and  of  this  the  sketch  map  below  gives 
the  details. 


^ 
^ 


^ 

^ 


MONTFAUCON 


VARENNES 


While  an  unsuccessful  attempt  was  being  made  to 
force  the  Mouse  at  St.  Mihiel  and  so  isolate  Verdun 
from  the  east,  the  Crown  Prince's  Army  acting  from 
Montfaucon  and  the  open  region  North  of  Varennes 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  10,  1914 


made  a  dctcnniueJ  effort  to  push  back  the  Frencli  lino 
AVcst  of  Verdun  aud  to  isolate  the  fortress  upon  that 
side.  These  same  forces  of  the  enemy  had  already 
more  than  once  tried  to  force  that  line  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Clermont,  or  rather,  in  the  open  country 
betAveen  Clermont  and  Vareunes.  But  they  had  failed 
in  each  such  attempt,  although  they  had  pushed  their 
outposts  beyond  Varennes  itself  and,  until  this  week, 
had  permanently  occupied  that  town.  Their  attack 
of  last  Saturday  was  made  in  another  direction.  It  was 
masked  by  the  woods  of  Argoune  fi-om  Avhich  they 
debouched  upon  the  western  side,  turning  thence 
Bouthwanls  and  aiming  at  Ste.  Menehould.  The  Wood 
of  La  Grurie,  through  which  this  march  was  under- 
taken, lies  to  the  north  of  the  main  road  that  crosses  the 
Argonne  from  Varennes  to  Vienne  by  w^ay  of  the  little 
place  called  La  Haraz6e.  In  diy  weather  it  is  possible  to 
bring  guns  and  train  through  this  wood  (a  clay  sod)  even 
without  the  use  of  the  great  high  road  between  Varennes 
and  Vienne,  and,  if  an  advance  in  force  were  detei-muied 
on,  the  railway  round  the  Pass  of  GrandprtS  would  be 
of  gi-eat  service.  AVc  have  been  given  no  account  of 
the  action,  nothing  more  than  the  bare  statement  iii 
the  Official  Conununique  that  in  the  result  the  whole  of 
the  German  force  which  has  taken  the  offensive  was 
tlu-ust  back  behind  the  line  of  the  main  road,  and  that 
should  mean  that  Varennes  has  again  fallen  into 
French  hands.  It  also  means  quite  certainly  that 
for  the  moment  the  attempt  to  invest  Verdun  is 
abandoned. 

Meanwhile,  at  the  other  end  of  this  field,  the 
ganison  of  Toul,  which  has  thrust  out  an  effort  north- 
ward during  the  last  week,  is  holding  the  southern 
edge  of  the  Eupt  do  Mad.  Of  course,  if  it  could 
cross  that  valley  (which  is  the  line  by  which  Thiau- 
com"t,  the  Gennan  headquarters  here,  is  fed,  and 
along  which  its  railway  runs),  or  if  it  even  seriously 
fhreatencd  that  line,  the  troops  at  St.  Mihicl  would 
have  to  faU.  back.  We  are  not  told  what  is  passing 
in  that  neighbom-hood  in  sufficient  detail  to  judge 
Avhether  St.  Mihiel  can  be  held  much  longer,  but  if 
the  advance  from  the  south  upon  the  Eupt  de  Mad, 
slow  as  it  is,  contuiues,  it  is  certain  that  the  advanced 
German  body  on  the  Meuse  must  retu-e. 

THE  WESTERN   FRONT. 

With  regard  to  the  western  front,  there  neither 
is  anj-thing  communicated  which  materially  modifies 
the  situation  of  last  week  nor  if  any  such  knowledge 
had  reached  one  Avould  it  be  advisable  to  discuss  it 
publicly,  because  it  is  evident  that  upon  this  front  the 
decision  of  the  campaign  hangs.  The  general  line  is 
public  property.  The  belt,  for  the  possession  of  which 
the  struggle  rages,  is  that  of  the  district  round  Eoye, 
of  the  great  open  fields  between  ^Ubert  and  Combles, 
and  further  north  the  neighbourhood  of  AiTas.  AVliat 
fortunes  that  straggle  will  have  we  do  not  yet  know, 
it  hangs  even  and  it  !s  largely  veiled.  Certain  main 
facts  about  it  are  public  property,  as  that  the  enemy 
has  heavily  reinforced  the  central  and  southern  pait 
of  that  line  between  the  Oise  and  the  Somme  ;  at  least 
two  Bavarian  army  corps  hitherto  elsewhere  have 
appeared  before  Eoye.  He  expects  further  to  rein- 
force it  with  the  troops  he  hopes  to  be  able  to  spare 
from  Belgium  after  the  success  of  his  present  opera- 
tions there.  Against  this  special  effort  the  Gennans 
are  making  in  the  line  protecting  their  communications 
and  their  west  or  right  Hank  the  Allies  are,  of  course, 
making  con-csponding  effort?,  but  of  the  nature  of 
these  nothing  must  be  said. 

One  thii>g  the  general  reader  will  do  well  to 
appreciate  when,  or  before,  the  curtain  lifts  and  the 


result  of  the  gi'cat  .struggle  is  known,  and  that  is  the 
length  of  this  new  line  Avhich,  beginning  in  skinnishcs 
round  Noyon,  has  developed  nearly  uj)  to  the  Belgian 
fi'ontier.  It  is  no  less  than  70  miles ;  nearly  a  week'.s 
march.  One  main  railway  line  feeds  the  German  effort 
here.  It  is  also  their  main  Ime  of  communication  in 
the  whole  front  between  iS^oyon  and  the  Argonne.  The 
Allies  opposed  to  them  aie  fed  by  a  whole  system  of 
railways  and  the  sea  behind  that  system,  and  this 
stubborn  defence  of  the  Gennan  communications  and 
this  momentous  attack  upon  them  is  the  lii'st  of  the 
gi'cat  railtoay  wars  of  the  modern  era.  The  r«//«'«^.» 
are  here  the  chief  strategic  factor  upon  our  side,  just 
as  the  ra /Arc/ j/ behind  the  Gennan  line 


(Passage  deleted  by  Censor.) 


These  two  things,  the  great  extension  of  the  liiie 
and  the  fact  that  railwa^-s  arc  the  core  of  modern 
movements  in  the  field,  at  least  in  highly  develo2)ed 
countries,  must  have  this  effect  upon  our  judgment : 
that  we  must  never  consider  a  gi-cat  modern  fianking 
movement  of  this  kind  as  presenting  the  clement  of 
sui-prise.  There  arc  conditions  under  which  it  might, 
by  good  luck,  possess  that  invaluable  element,  but 
those  conditions  must  be  very  rare.  As  a  rule,  the 
moving  of  such  great  masses  of  men  over  such 
gi'cat  distances  and  by  a  method  of  communication 
every  yard  of  which  is  necessarily  known  to  the 
enemy,  and  none  of  which  can  be  shifted  or  exchanged, 
a  method  of  communication  tied  vdth  peculiar  immo- 
bility to  certain  du-ections,  makes  everywhere  against 
the  possibility  of  surprise.  That  element  of  surprise 
stiU  exists  in  modern  war.  It  was  very  e\ idcnt  when 
the  Genu anS  accumulated  so  unexpected  a  mass  of 
men  to  the  north  of  the  Mouse  before  their  attack 
upon  the  Sambre  at  the  end  of  August.  But  it  will 
hardly  be  found  in  the  great  flank  movements  whereby 
eveiy  modem  army  will  attempt  to  defeat  an  enemy 
that  is  fairly  its  equal  in  numbers,  material,  and  con- 
dition of  mind.  It  is  worth  pointing  out  that  in 
every  theatre  of  the  war,  not  only  here  in  France,  but 
yesterday  before  the  Niemcn  and  to-mon-ow  ujwn 
tlie  Vistula,  this  featui'e  has  or  will  appear.  To  break 
a  modern  line  if  it  be  properly  held  is,  as  against  an 
equal  enemy,  so  difficult,  or  perhaps  so  nearly  impos- 
sible, that  the  effort  will  necessarily  be  to  "  claw 
round."  On  the  Niemen  the  trick  was  done  when  the 
sujjcrior  Eussian  forces  got  through  the  woods  of 
Augustowo  and  carried  that  towTi,  and  something  of 
the  sort  will  presumably  be  found  to  decide  each  one 
of  these  enonnous  battles  until  the  campaign  is  con- 
cluded. The  exception  was  the  lengthy  action  which 
goes  by  the  name  of  the  Battle  of  Lembei-g,  when  the 
Second  Austrian  Anny  was  defeated  more  than  a 
month  ago  by  the  Eussians.  There  the  line  broke, 
but  the  case  was  exceptional,  for  the  opposed  forces, 
even  if  equal  in  numbers,  were  in  no  way  equal  in 
homogeneity  and  determination. 

[Po474Cv?/>A— Since  writing  the  above  the  French 
official  message  of  this  Tuesday  evening  (when  these 
notes  arc  made  up  for  Press)  has  come  in  and  informs 
us  that  large  masses  of  cavalry  acting  as  a  screen 
for  new  forces  of  artillery  and  infantry  behind  them 
have  a])peared  in  the  neighbourhood  of  LUle  and 
Armenticres.  The  position  of  these  places  upon  the 
sliglit  sketch  at  the  head  of  this  section  and  the 
relation    they    bear     to     the     general    luie    should 


8* 


October  10,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


sufficiently  show  the  importance  of  this  news.  It 
means  that  whether  by  tho  releasing  of  men  i'roiu  the 
gaiTJsons  in  Belgium,  or  from  the  anival  of  new 
contingents,  or  from  transference  from  the  east,  the 
enemy  proposes  to  bring  further  forces  u])on  the  ilank 
of  the  existing  French  line,  that  is  upon  if  not  behind 
its  western  extreme.  It  is  he  avIio  is  attempting  to 
lengthen  still  fmihcr  the  extension  of  this  great  new 
front  which  during  the  last  fortnight  has  crept  up 
from  Noyon  northwards  until  it  has  now  reached  the 
Belgian  frontier. 

What  fortunes  the  move  may  have  we  cannot 
tell  for  at  least  two  days. 

AVe  learn  from  the  same  communication  and 
from  one  previous  to  it  that  there  has  again  been 
some  slight  advance  in  the  centre  or  rather  in  the 
left  centre  over  the  trenches  that  have  defended  the 
crest  of  the  plateau  above  Soissons  and  towards 
Oraonne.  In  this  local  success  the  French  acknow- 
ledge the  aid  of  the  British  contingents.  But  there 
has  been  no  serious  development  or  change  along  tho 
old  main  front  between  the  Oise  and  the  Argonne. 

THE    SIEGE    OF    ANTWERP. 


have  the  ring  of  "  old  forts,"  the  original  works  by 
which  the  modem  city  was  defended.  tStrictly  speaking, 
the  scheme  is  not  a  ring  but  three-quarters  of  a  cu-cle 
reposing  upon  the  Scheldt,  most  of  the  country 
behind  or  to  the  west  of  which  is  not  available  for 
siege  operations  because  it  can  be  flooded,  and 
because  the  last  portion  of  it  is  foreign  territoiy 
and  Dutch. 

Finally,  a  thii-d  set  of  defences,  at  an  average  of 
about  ten  to  fifteen  thousand  yards  from  the  centre 
of  the  city,  consisting  in  a  chain  of  modem  forts, 
completes  the  scheme. 

It  is  against  the  southern  sector  of  these  outer 
forts  that  the  (jcnnan  howitzer  lire  has  been  directed 
during  the  last  few  days.  The  attack  began  last 
THiesday  morauig  upon  the  works  of  AYaelhem  and 
Wavi'o  St.  Catherine.  Next  day  it  was  extended  to 
the  work  at  Lien-e.  Upon  Thursday  evening  these 
works  were  still  replying,  but  iipon  the  Friday  a 
bi'each  in  the  outer  ring  was  so  far  effected  that  the 
besieguig  army  was  able  to  reach  the  line  of  the  Eiver 
Ncthe  behind  it. 

Here  appeared,  and  is  still  appealing,  what  has 
become  a  characteristic  of  all  efforts  against  permanent 


"Ratide  of  lODOOyds. 


rtAX   SllOWIXa   tub   rOCTI^ICAIIO^-S  BOUND  A>TWlajF. 


There  arc  many  reasons  Avhy  sjjecidation  upon 
the  course  of  the  last  great  Gemian  operation,  tho 
Siege  of  Antwei-p,  should  be  prudejitly  restricted. 
But  it  is  impossible  to  give  a  summary  of  the  news 
this  week  without  saying  something  of  this  most 
important  development.  It  will  be  sufficient  if  we 
confine  ourselves  to  the  official  commimiques  and  noto 
their  bearing  upon  the  situation. 

The  City  of  Antwerp  is  protected  by  three  groups 
of  works.  Fii-st,  immediately  round  its  densely- 
inhabited  portion  the  old  continuous  ditch  or  enceinte. 
This  rampart,  though  it  has  no  relation  to  modem 
fortiiicatiou,  prevents  something  which  has  happened 
to  all  the  other  brailment  rings  in  tho  nortli,  and 
which  would  not  have  happened  to  them  had  they 
also  possessed  a  ditch  and  rampart.  I  mean  the 
introduction  of  small  l)odies  of  the  eTiomy  between 
the  outer  forts  into  the  heart  of  u  place. 

Next,  outside  the  suburbs  and  at  ranges  varyuig 
from  3000  to  4000  yai-ds  to  the  heart  of  the  city,  you 


Avorks  in  this  war,  and  what  will  be  just  as  apparent 
when  we  come  to  attack  Gennan  permanent  works  iu 
our  turn.  It  is  one  of  the  chief  lessons  of  tho 
campaign.  Howitzer  fire  dominates  regular  fortifica- 
tion far  more  than  was  imagined  before  the  war  broke 
out,  but  on  the  other  hand  the  resisting  power  of 
infantry  and  field  artiUeiy  behind  any  defensive  lino 
is  far  greater  than  was  expected.  It  is  exactly  what 
you  had  in  the  attack  upon  the  !Meuse  the  other  day 
in  front  of  St.  Mihiel.  The  permanent  works  fell  or 
were  silenced  by  heavy  howitzer  fire  in  a  little  over 
two  da3s'  engagement, but  the  defence  of  the  infantry 
upon  the  other  side  of  tho  stream  rendered  useless 
this  achievement,  and,  though  a  breach  had  been  driven 
through  a  line  of  regular  fortification,  progress  could 
not  be  made  beyond  that  line.  The  Beli^ian  Amiy  has 
been  able  to  maintain  itself  behind  the  Nethe  and  the 
Dyle  ever  since  tlie  first  attack  was  made.  The 
ofiieiid  communique  which  tells  us  that  the  (Jcrmaii 
shells  were  falling  as  far  as  Conticb  also  tells  us  that 


»• 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  10,  1914 


tlie  enemy  failed  repeatedly  in  his  attempt  to  tlirow 
pontoons  across  the  river. 

The  last  news,  -nhich  is  as  late  as  7  o'clock  on 
Tuesday  evening,  when  these  notes  are  put  into  thoir 
linal  form,  tells  us  that  this  resistance  was  still 
offeotively  maintainod  and  that  the  garrison  of 
AntAverp  had  imposed  three  fuU  days  of  immobility 
upon   the   enemy. 

It  is  obvious  that  here,  as  throughout  the 
campaign,  time  is  a  very  important  factor  for  the 
(tcrmans.  They  hope  by  this  operation  against 
Antwerp,  if  or  when  it  is  successful,  to  effect  two 
thino-s :  to  release  g^cat  masses  of  troops,  perhaps  not 
of  the  best,  but  hitherto  held  to  their  lines  of 
communication  through  Belgium,  which  were  always 
threatened  by  a  sortie  from  the  Antwerp  garrison, 
such  as  took  plase  two  weeks  ago  ;  secondly,  they 
jiropose  to  occupy  the  whole  of  Belgian  territory  with 
the  fall  of  its  last  political  centre. 

But  all  this  is  so  obvious  that  it  hardly  needs 
recital. 

AVhat  is  less  ob^^ous  is  the  calculation  which  has 
made  the  enemy  undertake  this  operation  so  late  in 
the  day.  That  he  should  have  delayed  upon  it 
during  the  first  rush  one  can  understand,  but  that  he 
should  have  postponed  it  until  the  fourth  week  of  the 
Battle  of  the  Aisne,  that  is,  while  his  communications 
had  been  in  some  jeopardy  for  quite  twenty  days,  is 
remarkable.  I  sugger^,  though  it  is  only  a  suggestion, 
that  the  explanation  of  so  tardy  an  action  is  to  be 
found  in  two  things.  First,  that  the  siege  train  is 
limited.     We  all  know  that  it  takes  a  long  time  to 


make  great  howitzers,  and  the  total  number  that  can 
be  brought  against  fortification  restricts  attacks  of  this 
kind.  Nothing  was  done  against  Verdun  until 
Maubeuge  had  fallen. 

The  other  thing  I  suggest  is,  if  the  conjecture  has 
anything  in  it,  of  real  importance,  for  it  will  affect  tlio 
whole  development  of  the  campaign. 

I  suggest  that  Grermany  had  never  envisaged  tlie 
resistance  of  Belgium.  She  did  envisage  the  resist- 
ance of  the  Belgian  town  of  Namur  because  she 
thought  that  this  point  would  be  so  vital  to  the 
French  that  they  would  seize  it  and  try  to  hold  it. 
She  did  envisage,  of  course,  the  reduction  of  the 
French  strongholds,  and,  necessaril}',  of  Maubeuge, 
which  lay  right  upon  her  proposed  line  of  invasion 
and  commanded  its  railway. 

Now,  when  a  German  plan  is  made,  it  has  the  merit 
of  being  thought  out  thoroughly ;  it  has  the  demerit 
of  not  being  clastic,  of  not  allowing  for  the  unfore- 
seen.  The  places  which  Grermany  thought  she  would 
have  to  deal  with  she  not  only  studied,  but  weakened 
by  long  and  very  closely  calculated  acts  of  treachery. 
They  were  full  of  spies  (as  England  is  at  the  present 
moment) ;  all  their  best  emplacements  for  heavy  guns 
were,  if  not  prepared  beforehand  (as  was  the  case  at 
Maubeuge)  upon  property  which  had  been  conveyed 
to  German  owners  by  stealth,  yet  calculated  and  the 
opportunities  for  making  them  known.  I  suggest 
that  in  the  case  of  Antwerp  this  peculiar  method  of 
preparing  war,  which  is  one.  of  the  chief  surprises 
of  the  present  campaign,  was  neglected,  and  to  this 
neglect  we  owe  the  delay. 


NOTE. — THIS  ABTICIiS  HAS   BEEN   BUBMrTTED  TO  THE  PRESS   BUEEATT,   WHICH   DOES   NOT  OBJECT   TO  THE   PUBLICATION  A3  CSNSORZO 
AND   TAKES   NO  EESPONSIBIUTT   FOE  THE   OOEEBOTNBSS  OF  THE   STATEMENTS. 

IN  ACCOBDANCB    WITH    THE    EEQUIEEMENTS     OP     THE    PEBSS    BtTEEATT,    THE    POSITIONS     OF    TEOOPS    ON    PLANS     ILLUSTEATIXO    THI3 
AETICLK    MUST   ONLY   B£  BEQAEDED   AS   APPEOIIMATE,  AKD   KG   DEFINITB   STBICNaTE  AT  ANT   POIXT   IS   INDICATED. 


A    TOPOGRAPHICAL    GUIDE    TO    THE 

WAR    ZONE. 


By   E.    CHARLES   VIVIAN. 


Cracow. — The  second  city  of  Austrian  Galicia,  and  one 
of  the  strongest  of  Galician  fortress  towns,  being  equal  to 
Przemsyl  in  this  latter  respect.  The  population  of  the  town  is 
about  100,000,  mainly  Polish,  with  about  25  per  cent,  of  Jewish 
stock  and  7  per  cent.  German.  The  industries  of  the  town  are 
unimportant  as  regards  manufactures,  but  there  is  a  large  trade 
in  local  agricultural  produce.  Cracow  is  situated  about  ton 
miles  south  of  the  frontier  dividing  Galicia  from  Russian  Poland, 
and  is  next  only  to  Lemberg  in  importance  among  Galician 
centres  of  trade.  It  is  a  railway  junction  of  some  magnitude,  lines 
branching  hence  north-west  to  Breslau  and  Silesia,[south-west  of 
Vienna  and  Austrian  centres,  and  east  to  Tarnow  and  Lemberg. 
Cracow  has  always  ranked  as  a  great  educational  centre  for  tho 
PoUsh  race,  and  in  its  university  the  Polish  language  has  been 
exclusively  used  since  1870  ;  while  its  academy  of  science,  founded 
in  1872,  is  the  principal  institution  of  its  kind  in  GaUcia. 

Javorow.— Situated  fifteen  miles  east  of  Jaroslav,  and  the 
terminus  of  a  line  of  rail  running  cast  to  Lemberg.  It  is  about 
equidistant  from  Lemberg,  Jaroslav,  and  Przemsyl. 

^^  Vistula,  River.— Tho  principal  river  of  Poland,  and 
'  the  cradle  of  the  Polish  nationality,"  has  a  total  length  of 
fi20  miles,  with  a  drainage  area  of  over  70,000  square  "miles. 
It  uses  in  the  Bcskides  Hills,  in  Galicia,  at  a  height  of  3,G75  feet 
\vv7^  se.a-'evel,  and  is  formed  of  the  junction  of  the  Black  and 
U  hite  Vistulas  ;  in  its  extreme  upper  course  its  direction  is  north 
east^  through  an  elevated  valley  between  the  Bcskides  and  the 
oandomierz  heights,  nnd  here  it  separates  Russian  Poland  from 
Galicia,  while  by  the  time  it  reaches  Cracow  it  has  acquired 
euch  a  volume  as  to  bo  nearlv  100  yards  iu  width.  At 
Znnwichvost  it  enters  Russian  Poland,  and  receives  the  San 


as  its  tributary,  turning  due  north,  and  traversing  a  valley  lying 
below  the  level  of  the  Polish  plateau.  This  valley  is  bordered 
by  limestone  crags,  and  is  about  ten  miles  in  width.  From 
Jusefow  the  river  turns  slightly  to  the  west  of  north,  and  attains 
a  width  of  1,000  yards  at  normal  times  ;  though  the  banks 
are  dammed  up  by  the  inhabitants  of  the  surrounding  country, 
floods  in  the  Carpathians  sometimes  cause  the  river  to  break  its 
banks,  when  it  inundates  hundreds  of  square  miles  in  the  plains 
of  Opolic  and  Kozienic,  the  waters  sometimes  reaching  over  100 
miles  from  the  river  bed.  The  nature  of  the  country  below 
AV^arsaw  is  such  that  the  river  frequently  changes  its  bed,  so  much 
Bo  that  towns  which  used  to  stand  on  the  left  bank  of  tho 
river  are  now  on  its  right  bank.  It  enters  Prussia  near  the  fortress 
town  of  Thorn,  and,  forcing  a  way  through  the  Baltic  ridge, 
turns  north-cast  and  enters  the  Baltic  Sea  by  way  of  the  Frischa 
HafE  at  Dantzic.  It  is  navigable  for  small  boats  and  rafts 
practically  as  far  as  Cracow,  and,  at  a  cost  of  1,000,000  sterling, 
lias  been  deepened  and  dredged  near  its  mouth  by  the  Prussian 
Government,  with  a  view  to  increasing  the  value  and  availability 
of  Dantzic  as  a  port.  An  artificial  channel  has  been  constructed 
from  Rothebude,  twelve  and  a  half  miles  up  the  river,  to  its  mouth, 
and  the  minimum  depth  of  this  is  six  feet.  The  river  has  an 
extremely  violent  current  during  the  rainy  autumn  season, 
and  is  practically  unbridgable  in  its  lower  reaches  at  this  time. 
General  commercial  navigation  is  maintained  from  the  mouth 
of  the  river  up  to  its  junction  with  the  Wicprz,  and  for  this 
distance  the  Vistula  is  regarded  as  the  cliief  commercial  artery 
of  Poland.  Its  chief  tributaries  on  the  right  bank  are  the  San, 
the  Wicprz,  and  the  Bug  ;  on  the  left  bank,  the  Nida  and  the 
Pilica.  The  principal  towns  on  the  Vistula  are  Cracow, 
Sandomierz,  Warsaw,  Plock,  Thorn,  and  Dantzic. 


10* 


October  10.  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


THE   WAR   BY   WATER. 

By   FRED    T.    JANE. 


CHABT  OV  TKX   rXCIFIC,  tKDICATIKO    THB    ABBl.    OF    TBM    OFKBATIONS    OF    TE>    OBBHXN    CHINA    S^Ui-DBON,   OF    WHICH    BOMa    SUITS 

El.Ta  ^mAMMO  OTt  THB  FUI   UL^VB. 


KOTE. — TUia    ARTICLI    has    BEEM   SrBUITTBD  TO  THE   FBESS   BCBBAU,  WHICH  DOBS  NOT  OBJBCX  TO  THB   FCBLICATION   AS   CEXSOBED 
AND  TAKB8   NO  BE8F0KSIBII.ITT   FOB  THB  C0BRECTNES8  OF  THB   STATElfEXTS. 


THE   FAR    EAST. 

THE  situation  hero  is  somewhat  complicated  by  the 
fact  that  the  Scharnhorst  and  Gnciacnau,  which 
were  supposed  to  bo  blockaded  in  Kiao-Chau, 
appear  to  have  got  out  before  the  Anglo-Japaneso 
blockade  was  completed.  They  have  been  reported 
loose  in  the  Pacific. 

To  date  their  exploits  have  not  gone  further  than  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  old  French  gunboat  Zdee — wliich  was  disarmed  as 
useless — and  tho  bombardment  of  an  unfortified  town  in  the 
Fiji  Islands.    Neither  exploit  is  glorious,  but  it  counts. 

Since  these  two  ships  have  escaped,  we  may  take  it  that  all 
the  swift  cruisers  have  done  the  same  thing,  and  that  the  present 
German  fleet  loose  in  the  Pacific  is  as  follows  : — 

icharnliorat,  ll.flOO  tons.    Gum,    8    8-2',  0    6'.    Speed  221-23 

kta.    Belt,  G  inches. 
Oncittr.aii,  11,000  tons.    Guns,  8  8-2'  C  G*.     Speed  2i^23  kts. 

Belt,  0  inches. 
Lnpzig,  3,250  tons.     Guns,  10  41'.     S|ieeil,  23  kts. 
Nurnbcrg,  3,450  tons.     Guns,  10  41'    Speed,  23i  kts. 
Emdin,  3,000  tons.    Guns,  10  4-1'.    Speed,  24J  kt«. 

Of  these  wo  already  know  all  about  the  Emden.  As  for  the 
others,  the  SchartJioral  went  badly  aground  three  or  four  years 


ago,  and  thereafter  failed  to  steam  at  any  decent  speed.  Tie 
Gfneisenau  also  was  never  quite  a  success.  But  the  odds  (on 
which  we  must  calculate)  are  that  both  e\u^a  have  since  been 
brought  to  efficiency. 


(Passage  deleted  by  Censor.) 


As  for  the  lesser  German  cruisers,  the  fighting  value  of  these 
is  trivial.    But  they  have  to  be  caught. 

The  mystery  is  where  they  have  all  been  hiding,  and  why 
they  havo'been  hidden  so  long.  The  secret  bases  must  bo  more 
numerous  than  we  thought.  These  bases  can  hardly  be  on  tho 
mainland  anywhere,  for,  if  so,  some  of  them  must  have  been 
heard  of. 

Coaling  at  sea  is  possible  enough.  A  whole  fleet  once  coaled 
in  mid-Atlantic  twenty  years  ago.  Consequently  it  is  by  no 
means  unlikely  that  tho  (Jerman  raiders  do  not  always  use  lonely 
islands  as  ba,se3,  but  have  certain  fixed  rendezvous  on  the  high  seas 
where  they  can  always  meet  colliers  and  other  supply  ships. 


11» 


LAND    AND     WATER 


October  10,  1914 


This  is  simple  enough,  as  outside  the  trade  routes  the  whole 
ocean  is  more  or  less  an  uninhabited  desert.  Presently,  of  course, 
their  bottoms  will  foul,  but  that  will  hardly  be  yet. 

The  "  German  Fleet "  inside  Kiao-Chau  probably  consists  of 
most  of  the  other  ships  of  their  China  squadron.  These  are 
(or  were)  : — 

Four  gunboats — litis,  Jagtcar,  Tiger,  Luchs. 

Three  river  gunboata— r«t»(7ia«,  Valerland,  OUer. 

Two  destroyers — Taku  and  <S  90. 

One  miscellaneous — Titania. 

Of  these  the  Tsittgtau  is  that  much  paragraphed  "  sold-for-a 
dollar"  gunboat.    One  of  the  destroyers  has  been  sunk— pre- 
sumably by  land  fire  from  the  Japanese,  which  has  also  put  the 
litis  more  or  less  out  of  action. 

The  Kaiser  is  understood  to  have  ordered  the  garrison  to  hold 
out  to  the  last.  It  may  obey  instructions  and  do  so.  But  the 
difference  between  that  and  immediate  surrender  only  exists  in 
terms  of  useless  sacrifice  of  life.  It  is  unlikely  to  delay  the  fall 
of  Kiao-Chau  by  more  than  a  few  days. 


'     K  I   AU 

C  H  AU 
B  AY 


CBANt  PT 


.C.EVELYN 


KiAo  cnAU  (tsixg-tau). 

THE  MEDITERRANEAN. 

Official  news  from  the  Adriatic  is  mostly  iinimportant,  and 
In  all  cases  very  stale.  Unofficial  news  carries  us  very  little 
further  except  that  Italy  appears  to  be  the  only  sufferer  from 
Austrian  mines,  and  Austria  has  had  to  compensate  heavily. 
The  only  other  suficrers  have  been  Austrian  warships  and 
merchant  vessels.  On  a  rough  calculation  Austria  to  date  must 
be  something  like  500  per  cent,  out  of  pocket  over  her  mining 
investment. 

To  the  time  of  writing  the  only  thing  of  real  importance 
achieved  by  the  Allies  in  the  Adriatic  is  the  capture  of  Lissa. 
This  advanced  base  being  secured,  Cattaro  can  well  be  left  alone 
so  far  as  naval  operations  are  concerned.  A  blockade  is  quite 
as  effective  and  a  great  deal  cheaper  than  a  bombardment. 

Elsewhere  the  Dardanelles  question  has  obtruded  itself. 
The  Turks  temporarily  closed  the  Dardanelles  because  vessels 
of  the  Anglo-French  Fleet  stopped  and  searched  ingoing  traffic. 
This  Turkish  protest  is  unlikely  to  have  the  remotest  effect  on  the 
Allies'  strategy.  So  long  as  the  Goeben  and  Breslau  retain  their 
crews  on  board  them,  so  long  will  it  be  necessary  to  make  certain 
of  their  destruction  should  they  emerge  from  their  place  of 
presumed  internment,  and  to  intercept  supplies  to  them. 

In  the  press  of  more  exciting  matter  it  is  not  properly  recognised 
what  a  nuisance  the  Ooeben  business  is,  nor  how  difficult  it  is  to 
deal  with.  It  is  the  old  story  of  Punica  fides.  Germany  has 
certainly  achieved  one  advantage  in  this  war.  She  has  given 
US  reason  to  believe  that  given  a  weak  and  complacent  neutral 
no  ordinary  laws  of  war  will  count  with  her.  And  we  are  paying 
for  this  by  ships  diverted  from  the  Adriatic  operations.  This^ 
come  to  think  of  it,  is  a  strategical  gain  for  Germany.  It  is,  to  be 
sure,  along  similar  linos  to  the  tactics  of  Ananias  in  the  past, 
but  for  the  present  it  ser^'es.  I  cannot  help  thinking  that 
matters  could  be  aimpUfied  were  the  Allied  Fleet  to  make  it 
clearly  public  that,  in  the  event  of  the  God>en  and  Breslau  re- 
appearing these  ships  will  be  regarded  as  pirates  and  no  quarter 
whatever  will  be  extended  to  their  crews.  Then,  should  they 
emerge  and  presently  intern  themselves  again  in  some  Turkish 
harbour,  no  awkward  questions  about  neutrality  could  be  raised. 
A  pirate  has  no  legal  status. 

It  is  abundantly  clear  that  Germany  has  not  complied  with 
international  law  in  the  matter  of  the  internment  of  these  two 
ships.  It  is  equally  clear  that  unless  international  law  is  to  become 
a  dead  letter  something  must  be  done  to  assert  the  necessity  of 
observing  it. 


In  the  distorted  perspective  in  which  we  necessarily  see  naval 
events  just  as  they  happen,  this  matter  of  the  Goeben  and  Breslau 
appears  as  a  quite  minor  matter.  But  if  one  truism  more  than 
another  can  be  accepted  as  Go-spel  for  the  present  war  it  is  the 
old  proverb,  "  It  is  the  little  things  that  coimt." 

The  centre  of  Mediterranean  interest  is  not  in  the  Adriatic, 
where  the  Allies  are  bound  to  accomplish  more  or  less  as  they 
list,  but  outside  the  Dardanelles  and  the  possibilities  of  a  re- 
incarnation of  the  Goeben  and  Breslau.  Of  itself  the  menace  is 
of  no  great  account.  But  it  has  some  decided  value  as  "  the 
menace  that  waits." 


THE   NORTH   SEA. 

The  Admiralty  notification  that  mines  have  been  laid  in  a 
certain  area  in  the  North  Sea — I  have  roughly  indicated  the  area 
by  a  diagram  (see  next  page),  because  latitudes  and  longitudes 
convey  Uttle  to  the  non-technical  reader — is  the  immediate  answer 
to  the  submarining  of  the  three  Cressys. 

The  mine  field  will  considerably  hamper  future  German 
submarine  movements,  especially  those  of  such  submarines  as 
may  happen  to  be  out  and  which  will  know  nothing  of  the  danger 
awaiting  their  return  unless  warned  by  those  "  observation 
stations  "  which  the  Germans  are  supposed  to  have  established 
on  our  East  Coasts. 

The  weak  point  of  a  mine  field  is  that  "  roads  through  it  '* 
must  necessarily  exist,  and  these  can  of  course  be  observed, 
either  directly  as  our  submarines  observed  them  inside  the  Bight 
of  Hehgoland  or  by  the  misuse  of  neutral  fishing  craft.  On  this 
account  alone  the  closing  of  all  British  harbours  on  the  East 
Coast  to  aUen  fishing  craft  or  craft  so  registered  is  a  very  wise 
measure,  while  the  public  notification  of  the  mine  field  will 
render  pretty  clear  the  status  of  any  fishing  craft  found  prowling 
•  about  the  prohibited  area  no  matter  what  flag  it  may  chance 
to  be  flying. 

German  submarines  can  still  emerge  from  the  Heligoland 
direction,  but  they  will  have  to  come  along  a  more  or  less  well- 
defined  route,  where  there  is  just  enough  vagueness  in  the 
Admiralty  statement  to  leave  it  not  quite  clear  whether  other 
mined  areas  than  those  mentioned  do  not  exist. 

Out  of  all  this  we  can  take  it  that,  so  far  as  the  British  Navy 
is  concerned,  the  mine  is  taken  to  be  the  answer  (or  one  of  the 
answers)  to  the  submarine.  A  submarine  travelling  on  the 
surface  has  a  fair  chance  of  crossing  a  mine  field  without  much 
risk,  but  a  submarine  on  the  surface  is  no  particular  danger  to 
anyone.  She  is  easily  to  be  annihilated  by  destroyers  and  torpedo 
boats  if  detected,  and  detection  is  not  very  difficult. 

In  connection  with  this  matter  attention  may  be  drawn  to 
the  circumstance  that  German  official  reports  of  submarine 
movements  have  frequently  referred  to  "  ten-day  cruises." 

Now,  by  simple  arithmetic  we  can  easily  calculate  that  there 
are  few  if  any  German  submarines  capable  of  ten-day  cruises 
unaided,  allow  as  we  will  for  lying  by  on  the  surface  at  night. 
The  utmost  radius  of  anything  up  to  U  24  is  "  on  paper  "  2,000 
miles  on  the  surface.  Supposing  surface  cruising  for  only  twelve 
hours  out  of  the  twenty-four,  this  works  out  about  eight  days 
at  ten  knots,  without  taking  into  account  fuel  expended  in 
re-charging  accumulators  for  under-water  work. 

Of  course  it  is  possible  for  a  boat  to  lie  below  water  with 
no  machinery  working,  and  so  far  as  machinery  and  fuel  supply 
is  concerned  to  carry  tliis  on  fairly  indefinitely,  so  long  as  she 
can  keep  on  renewing  at  intervals  her  air  supply.  Nothing  very 
definite  is  known  as  to  what  the  fresh  air  supply  method  in 
German  boats  consists  of,  but  in  any  case  it  is  not  a  matter 
to  be  arranged  for  in  a  few  minutes. 

Apart  from  this  machinery  question  there  is  the  human 
element  to  consider,  and,  altogether,  I  for  one  refuse  to  believe 
that  any  German  submarine  can  manage  to  be  self-supporting 
for  ten  days  under  war  conditions.  Assuredly  these  ten-day 
submarines  must  have  floating  bases  of  some  sort,  bases  which  can 
hardly  have  proceeded  out  of  the  Heligoland  Bight,  unless  they 
v.'ere  established  at  least  nine  weeks  ago. 

We  have  got  to  face  the  circumstance  that  Germany  is  not 
basing  her  efforts  against  us  from  her  own  shores.  She  has 
probably  been  particularly  careful  so  to  arrange  matters  that  no 
neutral  is  either  involved  or  suspected.  But  bases  of  some  kind 
must  exist. 

It  is  none  too  soon  that  we  have  virtually  closed  North  Sea 
traffic  except  to  vessels  conducted  by  our  own  pilots.  We 
perhaps  ought  to  have  done  it  the  instant  that  the  AmpJdon 
was  lost,  without  regard  to  neutral  susceptibilities.  No  honest 
neutral  can  possibly  object  to  the  precautions  which  we  have 
taken.  As  iudicated  last  week  all  neutrals,  save  the  Dutch, 
have  suffered  badly  from  the  German  system  of  indiscriminate 
niine-laying.  The  only  possible  answer  was  to  lay  mines  every- 
where where  the  Germans  have  not  done  so,  but  apparently 
mean  to  lay  them. 

It  is,  of  course,  the  duty  of  the  British  Navy  to  "  smash  tho 
enemy."    But  a  higher  and  more  important  duty  still  is  to  sea 


12* 


October  10,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


to  it  that  the  enemy  13  rendered  impotent.  The  unfortunate 
thing  is  that  quite  a  considerable  section  of  the  public  is  of 
opinion  that  "  the  Navy  is  doing  nothing  "  on  account  of  the 
fact  that  it  has  done  its  work  so  well  that  the  main  German 
Fleet  prefers  to  keep  out  of  danger.  Will  the  public  which 
demands  an  impossible  Trafalgar  be  good  enough  to  reaUse 
that  for  years  the  German  view  of  things  has  publicly  been  stated 
and  restated  ad  nauseum  :  "  Ko  matter  what  the  circumstances, 
the  plain  duty  of  the  German  Fleet  is  to  attack.  Only  in  the 
attack  can  victory  reside." 

This  attack  lia3  not  been  delivered.    It  is  unlikely  to  be 
delivered  until  economic  pressure  forces  it.    But  why  not  1 


Sinijily  because  the  British  Navy  is  too  much  in  the  way. 
The  lligh  Sea  Fleet  has  no  prospects  whatever  of  advantage 
by  coming  out.    In  consequence  it  remains  inactive. 

To  adopt  the  chess  simile,  which  I  have  used  before — it  is 
"  in  check."  The  xdtimate  result  may  be  "  checkmate,"  or  it 
may  be  merely '"  stale  mate  "  (for  which  the  Germans  are  playing). 
But  why  expect  that  Admiral  Jellicoe  should  go  ia  for  a  reckless 
•exchange  of  pieces  which  at  the  best  could  merely  provide  head- 
lines for  the  daily  press  ? 

Or  to  put  it  another  way,  woidd  any  card  player  as  fourth 
Jiand  with  the  four  of  diamonds  in  his  hand  play  his  ace  to  take 
the  three  ?  Germany's  game  and  Germany's  hope  is  that  the 
British  public,  looking  for  a  Trafalgar,  will  demand  the  ace  to 
be  put  down. 

I  have  insisted  till  all  readers  must  be  more  or  less  tired  of  it 
that  the  main  elements  of  this  war  are  psychological.  I  am 
Jifrnid,  however,  that  I  must  continue  to  insist  on  the  point. 
In  the  8tronj;cst  possible  fashion  I  wish  to  impress  tliat  Germany's 
f/nme  is  based  on  the  expectation  that  presently  the  British  nation 
will  demand  that  the  Navy  "  does  something,"  trusting  to  luck 
tliat  the  things  really  accomplished  by  it,  being  inconspicuous, 
will  not  count. 

A  Trafalgar  won  by  "  the  man  in  the  street "  is  nn  unthink- 
able thing  along  all  the  lines  of  past  history.  But  the  past  is 
the  i»ast.  Tlio  present  war  is  along  hitherto  unknown  lines. 
To  Buy  tliat  it  ia  being  fought  in  the  streets  cf  London  sounds 
hyperbole  ad  aJjsurditm.    Yet  it  ia  something  like  the  situation. 


A  good  thousand  years  ago  the  all-powcrfuI  Athenian  Navy 
met  its  doom  because  the  Democracy  put  in  its  oar  wrongly.  On 
the  people  of  England  to-day  it  depends  that  the  same  old 
mistake  is  not  repeated  with  the  same  terrible  result. 

If  the  man  in  the  street  can  be  persuaded  to  crab  the  Navy 
and  to  insist  on  its  "  doing  something,"  Germany  is  going  to  win. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  man  in  the  street  will  merely  rcmalu 
ifldifEerent  and  "  trust  the  Navy,"  Germany's  chances  sink  to  zero. 

Thus  and  in  such  way  the  tsventieth-eentury  Trafalgar  has 
to  be  fought  by  the  public,  and  the  only  weapon  is  blind  confi- 
dence in  the  British  Navy.  Blind  confidence  be  it  noted.  It 
may  take  some  doing,  but  it  has  to  be  done. 

ON    THE    HIGH   SEAS 
GENERALLY. 

First  place  is  naturally  claimed  by 
the  Ernden,  which,  as  briefly  mentioned 
last  week,  has  now  added  five  to  her 
previous  bag  of  six  in  the  Baj*  of  Bengal, 
and  has  probably  added  more  since. 
As  expected,  after  shelling  Madras  she 
made  for  Pondicherry,  where,  for  no 
apparent  reason,  she  anchored  on  Sep- 
tember 2ith.  She,  however,  presently 
made  off  without  doing  anything,  where- 
from  we  may  assiune  that  she  was  intent 
on  combining  a  hasty  sweeping  of  boiler 
tubes  with  such  moral  efiect  as  was  to 
be  obtained  by  anchoring  only  littlo 
more  than  a  mile  away  from  Government 
House. 

The  Emden  steamed  away  leaving 
Pondicherry  imharmed ;  but  the  result  of 
her  commerce  raiding  has  since  come  in. 
She  has  now  eleven  ships  to  her  credit. 
But— well,  eleven  is  not  much  out  of  four 
thousand.  To  equal  the  privateers  of 
Nelson's  days  the  Emden  and  her  consorts 
must  multiply  all  their  captures  by 
something  like  thirty.  And  wlien,  if 
ever,  they  have  done  it,  the  fact 
will  still  remain  that  a  destruction  of 
10  per  cent,  in  the  old  Great  \\'ar 
of  an  odd  hundred  years  ago  did  not 
destroy  British  commerce.  The  90  per 
cent,  left  carried  on  quite  men'ilv. 
The  99  per  cent,  left  over  to-day 
are  hardly  hkely  to  worry  more  than 
their  predecessors  of  the  last  Great 
War.  Losses  can  be  created — they  are 
bound  to  be  created.  But  no  matter 
how  long  the  German  corsairs  may 
remain  afloat,  there  is  no  question  of 
their  accomphshing  any  damage  that 
really  matters. 

Another  predatory  cruiser  has  now 
turned  up  on  the  East  Coast  of  America, 
and  it  is  also  now  reported  that  the 
remaining  cruisers  at  Kiao  Chau  have 
broken  loose.  This  information  is  doubt- 
fid.  But,  be  the  cruisers  many  or  few, 
the  damage  that  they  can  do  is  strictly  hmited  and  their 
ultimate  fate  is  certain. 

Of  far  more  moment  is  it  to  record  that  the  Cameroons 
in  West  Africa  have  now  fallen  into  our  hands,  and  that  the 
Cumberland,  stationed  in  those  parts,  has  captured  eight  German 
merchant  ships  and  a  German  gunboat. 

Germany's  cruisers  (the  Emden  especially)  are  putting  up  a 
very  good  fight.  They  are  acting  from  cleverly  prearranged 
bases,  and  most  of  them  ha\e  so  far  cleverly  evaded  inter- 
ception by  our  defending  cruisers.  But  there  is  nothing  to 
su""est  that  this  state  of  affairs  can  be  maintained  for  more  than 
a  limited  time.  It  may  take  v.-eeks  or  it  may  take  months,  but 
sooner  or  later  every  German  commerce  raider  will  meet  her 
fate.  Before  that  occurs  considerable  damage  will  no  doubt 
be  done,  but  the  ultimate  failure  of  the  commerce  war  and  the 
probability  that  it  will  eventually  cost  as  much  or  more  to 
Germany  than  the  damage  inflicted  on  us  is  self-evident. 

The  Germans  do  not  "appear  to  be  greatly  perturbed  by  the 
loss  of  trade  which  we  have  caused  them.  At  any  rate  they 
profess  not  to  be,  and  in  matters  of  this  sort  it  is  never  wise 
to  assume  that  the  enemy  is  merely  bliLfling.  They  must  cer- 
tainlv  have  calculated  that  the  Biitish  Fleet  would  destroy 
their"  over-seas  trade  and  capture  all  their  over-seas  possessions. 
The  latter  was  unavoidable ;  the  former  they  have  minimised 
BO  far  as  possible  by  laymg  up  their  merchant  ships.  An  instruc- 
tive article  in  the  Times  of  October  3rd  quotes  from  Ilcrr  Ilcineken, 
head  of  the  Nord  Deutschcr  Lloyd,  the  \-iew  that  all  Germany 


13» 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  10,  1914 


kas  to  fear  is  a  reduction  of  dividends  during  the  war,  and  antici- 
pation that  once  the  war  is  over  over-sea  trade  will  be  resumed  as 
nsnal.  They  do  not  believe  in  the  permaacnt  capture  by  us  of 
GciTuan  markets. 

In  this  connection  a  series  of  remarkable  articles  which  recently 
appeared  in  The  Engineer  took  a  somewhat  similar  view,  that 
ie  to  say,  it  was  very  clearly  proved,  chapter  and  verse,  that 
unless  our  traders  adopt  German  methods — and  supply  what 
customers  want  without  regard  to  whether  it  is  the  best  thing 
for  them,  and  take  to  the  metric  system  for  all  ti-ansaetions  with 
countries  usin?  it— our  capture  of  German  markets  will  be 
temporarily  only. 

This,  I  am  afraid,  is  much  more  important  than  any  successes 
fro  or  con  in  the  commerce  war  now  proceeding  on  the  high  seas. 

It  is  advisable  to  remember  that  our  cruisers  on  the 
Indian  Station  have  been  busy  seeing  to  it  that  Indian  troops 
get  to  the  front  without  let  or  hindrance.  This  they  have  done, 
and  discounted  the  Emdeii's  efforts  to  that  extent.  Had  she 
managed  to  intercept  a  single  transport,  it  would,  so  far  as 
material  effect  is  concerned,  have  counted  a  great  deal  more 
than  the  sinking  of  even  a  hundred  British  merchant  ships. 
.Morally  the  Emden  has  done  extremely  wefl,  hut  she  has  failed 
to  interjere  Kith  the  transport  of  Indian  troops  to  France.  She 
bas  won  with  the  pennies,  but  lost  with  the  poimds.  It  is  the 
pounds  that  count  most. 

GENERAL   SURVEY. 

On  land  something  like  a  "  stale  mate  "  seems  to  exist.  On 
the  water  the  position  is  not  materially  different.  This  kind  of 
eitaation  caimot,  however,  go  on  indefinitely. 

My  reading  of  the  whole  situation,  at  the  time  of  going  to 
press,  is  that  on  land  we  have  secured  a  mild  advantage,  but  that 


on  the  water  a  similar  mild  advantage  rests  with  the  enemy.  Hia 
predatory  cruisers  are  now  remarkably  well  handled,  and,  unless 
luck  be  with  us,  we  must  be  prepared  for  heavy  losses  before  the 
corsairs  are  accounted  for.  They  come  from  the  unknown,  they 
inflict  damage,  then  they  vanish  into  the  unknown. 

The  object,  of  course,  is  to  create  panic  in  our  overseas  trade. 
This  so  far  they  have  failed  to  accomplish.  But  the  attempt  is 
none  the  less  serious  on  that  account. 

In  everything  it  is  now  abundantly  clear  that  Gennan  strategy 
is  to  face  the  British  Navy  with  the  virtually  impossible,  and 
trust  to  it  that  a  non-teclmical  democracy,  finding  the  impossible 
unachieved,  will  compel  a  "  show  "  naval  policy  instead  of  a 
certain  one. 

The  only  possible  comment  is  that  the  German  strategy  is 
excessively  clever,  and,  given  a  few  more  Emdens,  it  may  succeed. 
The  precise  German  target  is  the  underwriters  of  Lloyd's. 

On  land  the  war  is  being  waged  by  indiscriminate  slaughter. 
On  the  water  finer  issues  are  at  stake.  The  Germans  have  dis- 
carded all  ideas  of  direct  money-making  by  captures ;  everything 
is  concentrated  on  the  creation  of  a  trade  panic  by  losses  inflicted 
on  us. 

This  particular  campaign  is  deliberate  and  well  calculated.  I 
view  it  with  grave  misgivings.  The  Germans  have  tricked  us  into 
beheving  that  we  hold  the  imquestioned  mastery  of  the  seas. 
Now,  any  number  of  their  cruisers  are  contesting  it  on  Alabama 
lines.  In  their  doing  of  it  they  have  scored  a  goal  against  us. 
It  is  folly  to  minimise  that  goal.  They  have  far  too  many  agents 
in  our  midst  ready  to  cry,  "  Go  up  to  Ramoth-Gilead  and  prosper." 
The  problem  before  our  guardian  cruisers  is  a  very  heavy  one. 
It  is  practically  seeking  for  the  needle  in  a  bundle  of  hay.  And 
it  is  imperatively  necessary  to  find  that  needle  ! 

We  shall  find  it ;  but  the  naval  work  entailed  is  enormous. 


THE    WAR    BY   AIR. 


By    FRED    T.    JANE. 


KOTE. — TUIS  ASTICLB  HAS   BZ£N   SCBJIITIED   TO   TUB  FRSSS  BUBEAU,  WHICH  DOES   NOT  OBJECT   TO  THE  PUBUCATION  AS   CENSOEED 
AND  TAKBS   NO  EESPONSIBnm   POB    THE   COaBECTNESS   OF  THE   STATEMENTS. 


AERIAIj  news  this  week  is  somewhat  chaotic.  It 
mostly  consists  on  the  German  side  of  vague 
bomb  dropping — chiefly  from  dirigibles.  The 
general  result  has  been  the  expenditure  of  the 
maximum  of  bombs  with  the  minimmn  of  effect. 

So  far  as  can  be  gathered,  the  Germans,  having  found  it  well 
nigh  impossible  to  hit  any  particular  desired  object,  have  given 
up  this  particular  aspect  of  the  air  campaign,  and  arc  now 
seeking  to  create  a  reign  of  terror  by  indiscriminate  bombs 
dropped  anywhere  where  habitations  exist. 

Aly  reading  of  this  circumstance  is  that  the  Germans  have 
foimd  that  they  had  over-calculated  as  to  their  '"  aerial  menace," 
and  that  they  have  subsequently  panicked  more  or  less.  Nothing 
worth  mention  can  possibly  be  achieved  against  non-combatants. 
The  more  that  German  aircraft  attack  these  the  greater  we  can 
put  down  their  failure  at. 

For  the  rest,  British  aeroplanes  continue  to  make  German 
aeroplane  enterprise  undesirable.  The  '"  shortage  of  petrol " 
story  is  being  repeated  with  variations  of  a  quite  realistic  nature, 
but  every  indication  is  to  the  effect  that  we  have  secured  the 
command  of  the  air  and  that  "  petrol  shortage  "  is  merely  a 
convenient  exeuse. 

There  is  a  fair  amount  of  evidence  that  we  have  taken  on  the 
air  as  part  of  our  heritage.  For  example,  the  official  report  of 
the  replacement  of  a  propeller  blade  in  mid-air  by  some  of  the 
crew  of  one  of  our  dirigibles—name  not  disclosed.  It  does  not 
mean  anything  very  special,  but  it  d-ocs  spell  efficiency. 

Germany's  great  air  effort  is  yet  to  come.  But  to  misquote 
an  old  Armada  statement  of  Drake's,  "  We  have  singed  the 
Kaiser's  moustache,"  and  if  and  when  the  Gennan  aerial  Ai-mada 
docs  appear  we  can  rest  fairly  confident  that  Wilhem  II.  of 
Ocnnany  will  fare  Uttle  better  than  Philip  11.  of  Spain  did  in  1588. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  exactly  the  same  elements  are 
present.  On  the  German  side  we  have  the  same  vague  threats, 
the  same  vague  stories  of  invincibihty ;  the  same  vague  appeal 
to  the  Deity.  On  our  side  we  have  the  same  casual  confidence, 
the  same  individual  confidence,  the  same  conviction  that  wo 
are  mostly  faced  with  bluff. 

Personaliy,  I  think  that  there  will  be  the  same  sequel.  But, 
sooner  or  later,  I  do  think  that  the  air  invasion  will  come,  and 
we  will  be  very  ill-advised  to  treat  it  as  an  empt^  threat.  Foot- 
ball has  replaced  bowls  as  a  popular  sport..  Let  us  go  on  playin" 
football  a  la  Drake  at  bowls.  But  let  us  take  Germany's  con^ 
templated  aerial  A  rmada  as  .seriously  as  our  Elizabethan  ancestors 
took  the  Great  Armada  of  PhiEp  of  Spain. 


This  Armada  will  not  sail  till  it  is  very  numerous  and  till 
certainty  of  success  seems  clear  on  paper.  To  put  the  fear  of 
God  into  the  civil  population  will,  of  course,  be  the  principal 
objective ;  no  very  real  damage  is  likely  to  be  achieved.  Moral 
effect  will  be  everything. 

The  trial  before  us  is  probably  no  light  one.  London  may  well 
have  to  suffer  several  chapters  of  the  "  Book  of  the  Revelation." 
We  have  no  airships  to  meet  a  determined  German  airship  attack. 
On  our  aeroplanes  and  on  our  aeroplanes  only  will  victory 
depend.  It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  all  concerned  are- 
ready  to  meet  this  German  aerial  Armada  in  the  same  spirit  as  our 
Elizabethan  Ancestors  faced  a  similar  crisis. 

After  we  have  faced  it  and  beaten  it  will  be  quite  time  enough 
to  make  songs  about  it. 

Perhaps  the  most  interesting  aerial  exploit  of  the  week  is 
the  circumstance  that  an  Italian  aeroplane  has  succeeded  in 
locating  several  Austrian  mines.  No  similar  success  has  been 
recorded  in  our  own  latitudes,  nor  can  we  hope  too  much  that 
it  will  be.  Our  home  waters  are  far  more  turbid  and  far  less 
smooth  than  the  placid  Adriatic. 

All  the  same,  however,  this  matter  is  of  the  greatest 
siguineance.  Once  aeroplanes  can  be  tangibly  employed 
to  detect  things  under  water,  a  great  step  will  have  been 
made  towards  defeating  submarine  warfare  whether  fixed  or 
mobile. 

For  the  rest,  it  would  appear  that  our  aeroplanes  employed 
in  the  land  warfare  are  using  bombs  more  freely  than  at  first, 
and  that  they  are  well  in  advance  of  the  Germans  in  this  par- 
ticular phase  of  aerial  warfare. 

Loss  and  damage  from  the  air  is  likely  enough  to  befall  ns 
sooner  or  later,  but  all  the  indications  are  that  we  hold  the 
upper  hand. 

Given  that  isolated  hostile  successes  count  for  nothing  what- 
ever. So  far  as  can  be  gau|;ed,  serious  aerial  warfare  is  bound  to 
mean  heavy  losses  on  either  side,  with  victory  only  to  the  sido 
which  aggregates  best,  possibly  only  to  the  side  which  has  any- 
thing left  over  after  a  definite  clash. 

The  air  is  still  a  quite  novel  battlefield.  But  in  so  far  as 
the  results  of  the  present  war  can  teach  us  anything,  they  teach 
Ihat  the  human  element  is  the  determinating  factor  even  more 
in  the  air  than  on  the  water  or  under  the  water. 

In  the  past  we  have  been  told  ad  nauseam  that  war  to-day  is 
a  "  matter  of  m.aehiuery."  Everything  seems  to  indicate  that 
With  the  very  latest  appliances  the  human  clemcut  counts  for 
more  and  more. 


U* 


October  10,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


A    DIARY    OF    THE    WAR. 


SYNOPSIS. 

Auciusi  3ed.— Sir  Edward  Grey  stated  British  policy  and  revealed 
Genuany's  amazing  offer,  in  the  event  of  our  neglecting  our  obligations 
to  France.  Mobilisation  of  the  Army.  Ultimatum  to  Germany. 
German  and   French  Ambassadors  left  Paris  and  Berlin. 

AcGUST  4rii. — Germany  rejected  England's  uUiraatum.  English 
Government  took  over  control  of  railways.  War  declared  between 
England  ajid  Germany. 

August  Sib. — Lord  Kitchener  appointed  .Secretary  of  State  for 
War.     U.M.S.  Amphion  struck  a  mine  and  foundered. 

August  &m. — House  of  Commons,  in  five  minutes,  passed  a  vote  of 
credit  for  £100,000,000,  and  sanctioned  an  increase  of  the  Army  by 
500,000  men.     i;ta.te  control  of  food  prices. 

Avcvii  8ni.— Lord  Kitchener  issued  a  circular  asking  for  100,000 
men. 

August  9iH. — Tha  enemy's  submarine,  U15,  was  smik  by  II. M.S. 
iiirmiiigliaM. 

August  IOik. — France  declared  war  on  Austria-Hungary.  Germans 
Advar.ced  on  Namur.  The  new  Press  Bui-eau  established  by  tha 
Goverumcnt  for  the  issue  of  official  v.ar  ncv.s. 

AcGCSi  llxn. — England  declared  v.ar  against  Austria. 

August  15th. — -The  Tsar  addressed  a  Proclamation  to  the  Polish 
populations  of  Uussia,  Germany,  and  Austria,  promising  to  restore  to 
Poland  complete  autonomy  and  guarantees  for  religious  liberty  and 
the  use  of  lh«  Polish  language. 

August  15ui. — Japanese  ultimatum  to  Germany  demanding  the 
withdrawal  of  her  vessels  of  war  from  the  Ear  East. 

August  17ia. — The  British  Expeditionary  Force  safely  landed  in 
France. 

The  Belgian  Government  transferred  from  Brussels  to  Antwerp. 

August  18th. — General  Sir  H.  Smith-Dorrien  appointed  to  com- 
mand of  an  Army  Corps  of  tlie  British  Expeditionary  Force,  in 
succession  to  the  lato  General  Grierson. 

August  SOth. — The  Servians  gained  a  decisive  victory  over  tha 
Austriaus  near  i:tiabalz. 

Aucust  21st. — The  German  forces  entered   Brussels. 
August  22xp. — Servia  announces  that  their  army  had  won  a  grcit 
victory  on  the  Drina.     The  Austrian  losses  were  very  heavy. 

August  23itD. — Japan  declared  war  on  Germany.  The  Russian 
army  gained  an  important  victory  near  Gumbcuucn  against  a  force  of 
160,000  Germans. 

August  24rH. — It  was  announced  that  Namur  had  fallen. 

The  British  forces  v.ero  engaged  all  day  on  Sunday  and  after  dark 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Mons,  and  held  their  ground.  Luncville  was 
occupied  by  the  Germans. 

August  27rH. — Mr.  Churchill  announced  in  the  House  that  the 
German  armed  merchantman  Kaiser  M'ilhelm  der  Crosse  had  been 
•unk  by  U.M.S.  UijhflycT  on  the  West  Africa  Coast. 

August  28th. — A  concerted  operation  was  attempted  against  th« 
Ocriuans  in  tha  Heligoland  Bight. 

The  First  Light  Cruiser  SquaJron  sank  the  Maim.  The  First 
Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  sanlc  one  cruiser,  Koln  class,  and  another 
crui.'ier  disappeared  in  the  mist,  heavily  on  fire,  and  in  a  sinking 
condition. 

Two  German  destroyers  were  sunk  and  many  damaged.  The  total 
British  casualties  amounted  to  sixty-nine  killed  and  wounded. 

Lord  Kitchener  announced  that  "  The  Government  have  decided 
that  our  Army  in  France  shall  be  increased  by  two  divisions  and  s 
cavalry  division,  besides  other  troops  from  India." 

Eepteubeb  1st. — The  Russians  met  with  a  check  in  East  Prussia, 
but  were  successful  in  minor  engagements  in  Galicia. 

Eeptembee  2xd. — Continuous  fighting  was  in  progress  along  almost 
the  whole  lino  of  battle.  The  BrilL-sh  Cavalry  engaged,  with  distinc- 
tion, the  Cavalry  of  the  enemy,  pushed  them  back,  and  captured  ten 
tuns.  The  French  Army  gained  ground  in  the  Lorraine  region.  The 
Russian  Army  completely  routed  four  Austrian  Army  Corps  near 
Lemberg,  capturing  150  guns. 

SrrrEiiBEis  3aD. — The  French  Government  moved  to  Bordeaux. 
Sr.PTii:MBr:i»  4Tn. — ^The  Russian  Army  nndcr  General  Riasky,  cap- 
tured Lemberg,  and  the  Army  of  General  BrussiloH  took  Halicz. 

SciTEMBER  5ni.— The  formal  alliance  of  England,  France,  and 
Russia  was  signed  in  London  by  the  representatives  of  the  three 
(Governments  concerned,  binding  each  nation  to  conclude  peace,  or 
UiscuBii  terms  of  peace,  only  in  conjunction  with  its  Allies. 

StjTEMBFji  6ni. — It  was  announced  that  the  scout-cruiser  Path- 
finder foundered  on  Saturday  afternoon  after  running  upon  a  mine. 

Septembeb  Trn.— -General  Joffrcs'  plans  were  being  steadily  carried 
out.  The  Allied  forces  acted  on  tho  ofleiisive  and  were  successful  in 
checking  and  forcing  back  in  a  northeasterly  direction  the  German 
forces  opposed  to  them. 

Slitlmbeh  &ni. — The  .\llies  gained  ground  on  the  left  wing  along 
the  line  of  tha  Ourcq  and  the  Petit  Morin  river.  Here  the  British 
troops  drove  the  enemy  back  ten  miles.  Further  to  the  right,  from 
Vitry-le-Francois  to  Sermaise  Ics-Bains  tho  enemy  was  pressed  back 
in  tho  direction  of  Rheims. 

SLrrKMBcn  9ru. — Tha  English  Army  crossed  tho  Marnc,  and  the 
enemy  retired  about  twenty-five  miles. 

SKiTr.ME!:<5  lliij.— Our  l.-it  Army  Corps  captured  twelve  Maxim 
puns  and  some  prisoners,  and  our  2nd  Army  Corps  took  350  prisoners 
and  a  battery. 

So'TciiBKU  l.'SfH.— On  the  left  wing  the  enemy  continued  his  retreat- 
ing movement.  The  Belgian  Army  pushed  forv.ard  a  vigorous  offensive 
to  t.Hc  south  of  Lierre. 


StpiiiiiiJEK  14iM. — All  day  tha  enemy  tlubbornly  diip.iteJ  tha 
passage  of  the  Aisno  by  oar  troops,  but  nearly  all  the  crossiagj  wer« 
secured  by  sunset.  On  our  right  and  left  the  French  troo{«  wera 
confronted  with  a  similar  task,  in  which  they  wera  B'jcce^sful. 

SEi'TtiiaEii  15iH. — The  AOied  troops  occupied  Rheims.  Sii 
hundred  prisoners  and  twelve  guns  were  captured  by  the  Corps  on 
the  right  of  the  British. 

Septembeb  I6ra. — Submarine  E9,  Lieutenaiit- Commander  Max 
Kennedy  Horton,  returned  safely  after  having  torpedoed  tha  German 
cruiser  Ucla,  six  milee  south  of  Heligoland. 

Seitembek  19th. — The  Russian  army  seized  tho  fortified  positions 
of  SIcniawa  and  Sambor. 

Septembee  20rn.— Rheims  Cathedral  was  wantonly  bombarded,  and 
nothing  is  left  but  the  four  bare  walls. 

The  British  auxiliary  cruiser  Carrnania,  Captain  Noel  Grant,  Royal 
Navy,  sank  the  Cap  Trafalgar  off  the  east  coast  of  South  America. 
The  action  lasted  one  hour  and  forty-five  minutes,  when  the  German 
sliip  capsized  and  sunk,  her  suivivors  being  lescuad  by  an  empty 
collier. 

Skftemeee  22-\d. — H.M.  ships  Ahouhir,  Ilogut,  and  Criisy  were 
sunk  by  submarines  in  the  North  Sea.  The  Ahouhir  was  torpedoed, 
and  whilst  the  Uogut  and  the  Creasy  had  closed  and  were  standing 
by  to  save  the  crew,  they  were  also  torpedoed. 

September  23rd. — British  aeroplanes  of  the  Naval  wing  delivered 
an  attack  on  the  Zeppelin  sheds  at  Diisseldorf  and  Flight-Lieutenant 
Collet  dropped  three  bombs  on  a  Zeppelin  shed,  approaching  v/ithia 
400  feet.  1 1  -a 

Sepiembep.  25rH. — The  German  right  wing  was  strengthened  by 
the  transfer  of  Army  Cci^ps  both  from  the  centre  of  tiieir  line  and  from 
their  left  in  Lorraine  and  tlio  ^'o3gcs.  Along  the  line  of  the  Aisnc  there 
was  little  change  in  the  general  position. 

Sepiembkb  26th. — Thero  was  much  activity  on  the  part  of  tha 
enemy  all  along  tho  line.  Soma  heavy  counter-attacks  were  repulsed, 
and  considerable  loss  was  inflicted  on  the  enemy. 

September  27th. — Bedwecn  the  Oise  and  the  Somme  and  to  tiia 
north  of  the  Somme,  the  battle  continued  along  a  very  ext'Cnsive  front 
with  perceptible  progress  on  our  part.  By  tlie  evening  our 
troops  regained  the  ground  they  had  lost.  Between  the  Argonne  and 
the  Meuse  there  was  nothing  new  to  report.  In  the  south  of  th« 
Woeuvre  the  Germans  occupied  a  line  which  passed  through  St.  Miliiei 
and  tlie  north-west  of  Pout-a-Moussom. 

September  28th. — At  certain  points,  notably  between  the  Aisna 
and  the  Argouue,  the  enemy  made  further  violent  attacks,  wlucli  wera 
repulsed. 

SKPrEMBER  29th. — There  was  praotically  no  change  in  the  situation. 
The  Allied  left  had  some  very  heavy  fighting,  but  they  well  held  their 
own. 


DAY    BY    DAY. 

THURSDAY,    OCTOBER    1st. 

The  Allied  line  moved  forward  to  the  north  of  the  Somme  and 
in  the  Southern  AVoeuvre,  the  district  to  the  east  of  Verdun.    Tha 
arrival  of  the  Indian  Expeditionary  Force  at  Marseilles  waj 
announced. 
FRIDAY,    OCTOBER    Sad. 

On  the  left  wing  the  battle  continued  very  fiercely,  partlcu- 
larl}'  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Roye.  On  the  Mouse  the  German.^ 
attempted  to  throw  a  bridge  across  the  river  near  St.  Mihiel,  but 
it  was  destroyed.  On  the  remainder  of  the  front  everytliing  was 
quiet.  Tho  Secretary  of  the  Admiralty  commimicated  tlia 
following  :  "  The  German  policy  of  mine-laying  combined  with 
their  submarine  activities,  makes  it  necessary  on  military  ground."! 
for  the  Admiralty  to  adopt  counter-measures.  His  Majesty's 
Government  have,  therefore,  authorised  a  mine-laying  policy 
in  certain  areas  and  a  system  of  mine-fields  has  been  established 
and  is  being  developed  upon  a  considerable  scale. 

SUNDAY,    OCTOBER   4th. 

On  our  left  wing  the  battle  was  in  fidl  progress  in  the  Arras 
region.  Progress  was  made  in  the  Soissons  region,  where  the 
enemy's  trenches  were  taken.  On  almost  all  tho  remainder 
of  the  front  the  Iidl  continued.  A  German  army,  four  corps 
strong,  established  between  the  frontier  of  East  Prussia  and  the 
Niemen,  has  had  its  left  wing  thrown  back  oa  Mariampol  and 
Suwalki. 

MONDAY,    OCTOBER    5ih. 

On  our  left  wing  to  the  north  of  the  Oise  the  battle  continued 
with  great  violence.  At  certain  points  we  had  to  yield  ground. 
C>n  the  remainder  of  the  front  there  was  no  change.  In  Russia, 
after  a  battle  which  lasted  ten  days,  the  German  army  which 
was  operating  between  the  front  of  East  Prussia  and  the  Niemaa 
was  beaten  all  along  the  hne  and  retreated,  abandoning  a 
considerable  quantity  of  material. 

TUESDAY,    OCTOBER    Cth.  ^ 

The  situation  remains  "  in  statu  quo." 
WEDNESD.\Y,    OCTOBER    7th. 

It  was  rojiortcd  tliat  a  German  destroyer  had  been  sunk  by  s 
P.riliyh  submarine  oil  the  German  coast.  The  authorities  at 
Antwerp  annoimced  tha  probability  of  bombardment  of  the  city. 


15» 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  10,  1914 


CORRESPONDENCE. 

BucKiNOHAM  Palace, 

October  5th,  1914. 

On  August  Gth  I  appealed  to  the  nation  to  assist  me  in 
founding  a  National  Fund  to  prevent  and  alleviate  military  and 
civil  distress  arising  in  consequence  of  the  War.  To-day,  after 
the  lapse  of  exactly  two  montlis,  I  am  happy  to  say  that  the 
fund  has  reached  the  splendid  total  of  £3,000,000.  I  wish  to 
take  this  opportunity  of  thanking  once  more  the  many  thousands 
of  generous  subscribers  who  have  helped  me  to  achieve  this 
grand  result. 

I  have  delegated  the  responsibility  of  administering  the  Fund 
to  the  Executive  Committee,  which  I  have  appointed  on  the 
advice  of  the  Prime  Minister,  and  I  count  upon  the  Committee 
to  see  that  assistance  in  emergency  cases  is  adequate  and  given 
with  as  little  delay  as  circumstances  permit.  I  trust  that  the 
portion  of  the  Fimd  which  is  to  be  applied  in  relief  of  civil  distress 
mav,  as  far  as  possible,  flow  into  productive  channels,  such  as 
assisting  schemes  for  male  and  female  employment  and  perhaps 
industrial  training,  for  it  is  as  repugnant  to  me  as  it  must  be  to 
the  recipients  that  assistance  should  be  distributed  only  in  the 
form  of  doles.  What  men  most  want  is  work,  and  what  the 
young  people  need  is  training. 

The  sum  which  has  aheady  been  raised  is  magnificent,  and  I 
am  confident  that  the  generous  British  public  will  continue  to 
do  their  utmost  to  alleviate  the  distress  which  war  inevitably 
brings  in  its  train.  EDWARD. 

COLONIAL  INFANTRY. 

We  are  requested  to  state  that  the  High  Commissioners 
of  Canada,  Australia,  and  South  Africa  view  with  favour  tlio 
formation  of  the  Colonial  Infantry  Battalion  which  has  been 
authorised  by  the  War  Office,  and  is  now  proceeding  afc  the 
White  City,  Shepherd'a  Bush  entrance. 

Tlie  High  Commissioners  will  cooperate  as  far  aa  possible, 
and  advise  all  those  men  who  have  at  present,  or  have  had, 
association  with  the  Overseas  Dominions  and  Colonies,  and 
who  have  nob  already  enlisted  elsewhere,  to  apply  for  enrol- 
ment in  this  Battalion  of  Colonial  Infantry. 

Applications  in  person  or  by  writing  should  be  made  to 
Coloned  Arthur  du  Cros,  M.P. 


WAR    PUBLICATIONS. 

Thb  Sporting  Times  maintains  its  reputation  for  "  livenesB,"  and 
forms  a  welcome  relief  from  eternal  disquisitions  on  the  fate  of  Von 
Muck  and  the  situation  on  the  Niemen.  The  cartoon  of  the  week  ie 
cspccjally  clover,  and  at  the  present  time  the  "Pink  'Un  "  forms  an 
edmirably  witty  addition  to  the  smoking-room  table  list,  combining 
genuine  smartness  with  a  thorough  review  of  racing  matters. 

TnB  Tathr  has  organised  a  Games  Bureau  to  supply  indoor  games 
cf  every  description  to  the  various  institutions  where  our  soldiers  and 
sailors  are  being  restored  to  heallh.  All  games  should  be  addressed 
U)  Mrs  Hugh  Spottiswoode  (Hon.  Superintendent),  Tathr  Games 
Bureau,  Great  New-street,  London,  E.G.,  who  will  distribute  them  on 
a  regular  plan  to  the  various  hospitals  and  other  places  where  the 
wounded  are  lying.  All  packages  sent  should  have  the  name  and 
address  of  the  donor  clearly  written  on  the  outside  of  each  package. 

Thb  current  number  of  the  Asiatic  Ilevicw,  devoted  especially  to 
features  connected  with  the  war,  gives  particular  prominence  to  our 
Eastern  Allies,  special  articles  by  Lieut.-Col.  Yate  on  "  The  British 
Army  in  Europe "  and  "  The  Mighty  Voice  of  India "  being  well 
worthy  of  attention,  while  Marmaduke  Pickthall  also  contributes  a 
survey  of  "  Turkey  in  Europe,"  and  D.  N.  Singh  deals  with  "  The 
Indian  Press  and  the  War."  The  situation  in  the  eastern  area  of 
conflict  ia  reviewed  by  E.  Charles  Vivian  in  an  article  entitled  "  The 


Oi)cning  of  the  Eastern  Campaign,"  and  altogether  the  number  is  one 
of  great  interest  from  a  topical  as  well  as  an  Asiatic  point  of  view. 

One  of  the  latest  additions  to  the  ranks  of  British  publications. 
Colour,  23  showing  what  can  be  done  in  the  way  of  capturing  German 
trade  by  adopting  the  method  of  production  long  pursued  in  the  case  of 
Juyend,  the  famous  Munich  paper,  and  other  continental  publicjitions. 
The  third  number  of  Colour,  recently  to  hand,  contains  reproductions 
in  colour  of  the  work  of  famous  British  and  other  ai-tists ;  Brangwyn 
and  Augustus  John  have  been  well  ropreeentcd  in  its  pages,  and  Orpen's 
name  is  another  that  may  bo  mentioned  in  connection  with  this  excellent 
production,  wliilo  the  stylo  of  story  and  article  in  the  paper  is  on 
a  level  with  its  illustrations.  Up  to  the  present  Colour  is  the  best 
thing  that  has  been  done  in  the  way  of  shilling  monthly  production. 

The  issue  of  The  Academy  for  the  current  week  is  especially 
interesting.  Its  principal  feature  is  an  "  Open  Letter  "  to  Lord  Roberts, 
in  which  the  lessons  of  the  present  campaign  are  neatly  enforced,  and 
the  work  of  tho  veteran  soldier  is  emphasised  in  its  connection  with 
cur  present  specially-recruited  army,  A  good  article  entitled  "  The 
Amateur  Strategist,"  bj[  E.  Charles  Vivian,  points  out  tho  pitfalls 
that  await  criticism  of  military  affairs  without  the  necessary  knowledge, 
and  "  The  Belgian  Refugees  throws  much  light  on  the  organisation 
of  the  relief  of  our  influx  of  visitors.  Two  of  tho  reviews  are  of 
excellent  topical  value,  "  Britain's  Sure  Shield  "  treating  of  the  work 
of  the  Navy,  and  "  Armies  and  their  Secrets  "  dealing  with  the  German 
and  Russian  forces.  It  must  be  admitted  that  The  Academy  gives  us 
this  week  a  remarkably  fine  number. 

Army  Drill  Made  Easy,  a  sixpenny  manual  issued  by  the  Temple 
Press,  has  been  written  and  illustrated  by  the  staff  of  The  Regiment, 
the  well-kncrsvn  "  soldier's  paper  " ;  unlike  any  other  publication,  official 
or  unofficial,  this  has  been  specially  written  to  meet  the  present  need  for 
concentrated  active  service  training.  Every  word  matters  to  the 
officers  and  men  now  in  the  ranks.  'The  drill  explained  is  only  the  drill 
necessary  in  war  training.  Mere  parade  "  frillings  "  have  been  cut  out 
under  the  practical  supervision  of  the  editorial  stalT,  who  know  from 
actual  experience  the  specialised  Idnd  of  training  needed  to  fit  a  man 
for  active  service  as  quickly  as  possible.  Army  Drill  Made  Easy 
should  be  of  the  greatest  assistance  both  to  recruits  and  to  the 
ex-N.C.O.,  v/ho,  rejoining  the  forces,  finds  his  knowledge  a  trifle  rusty. 
A  useful  addition  to  the  book  is  the  Army  A.B.C.,  in  which  a  great 
number  of  Army  terms  are  explained. 

Of  particular  interest  at  ths  present  time  is  the  official  history  of 
the  Franco-Prussian  War  of  1870,  issued  by  Messrs  George  Allen  and 
Unwin  in  one  large  volume  at  a  guinea.  The  various  campaigns  of  the 
war  are  described  by  milif-ary  officers  who  actually  took  part,  and  the 
book  counts  as  an  authoritative  record  of  the  strategy  and  tactics  in 
every  field  of  the  operations.  Of  especial  interest  is  the  account  of 
Bourbaki's  ill-fated  operations,  and  tho  section  devoted  to  the  study 
of  the  campaign  conducted  over  the  present  field  of  action.  Most  of 
the  work  is  written  from  an  extremely  German  point  of  view,  but 
although  the  successes  of  German  arms  are  emphasised,  and  tho  unfit- 
ness of  Napoleon's  armies  in  the  field  is  brought  well  to  the  front,  this 
bias  is  not  permitted  to  obtrude  to  an  extent  which  interferes  with  the 
correctness  of  the  narrative.  Though  we  may  resent  the  pro-German 
attitude,  we  must  also  bear  in  mind  that  France  of  1870  was  a  very 
different  country  from  Republican  France  of  to-day,  and  the  strictures 
passed  in  this  volume  wore  fully  justified  by  the  events  of  the  time. 
The  book  is  historical  and  authoritative,  and  must  be  counted  as  a 
work  of  permanent  value. 


The  Board  of  Agriculture  and  Fisheries  recommend  any  farmer  who 
i%  experiencing  difficulty  in  obtaining  farm  hands  to  apply  to  the  local 
Labour  Exchange,  the  address  of  which  can  be  obtained  at  any 
post  office.  The  labour  exchanges  are  making  special  efiorts  to  furnish 
farmers  with  the  names  of  suitable  men  and  women  who  have  had 
previous  experience  in  farm  work,  and  all  applicants  will  be  inter- 
viewed and  parsed  by  a  farmer  of  standing  before  they  are  put  into 
communication  v/ith  those  who  are  in  need  of  them. 

H.M.  Q0EEX  Maey's  Royal  Naval  Hospital  at  Southend  will  be 
opened  shortly  for  the  reception  of  wounded  seamen  and  marines  from 
the  Navy.  One  of  its  cliiof  needs  will  be  an  efficient  supply  of 
sweaters  and  jerseys  for  tho  use  of  the  men  returning  to  duty  after 
having  been  restored  to  health.  Cricketers,  football  players,  and 
rowing  men  do  not  neod  to  bo  told  of  the  inestimable  value  of  a  sweater 
for  warding  off  chill.  To  these  patients  such  a  gift  would  be  a 
veritable  godsend,  seeing  that  the  winter  is  approaching  and  tho  cold 
in  tho  North  Sea  v/ill  be  intense  for  men  on  destroyers  and  other 
craft  doing  patrol  duty. 


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16* 


October   lo,    1914  LAND     AND     WATER 

MODERN    SIEGE    ARTILLERY 


Copyngkt.  i  nier national  Illustrations 


GERMANS  VIEWING  THE  DAMAGED  FORTS  AFTER  THE  FALL  OF  NAMUR 


Copynflii',  intmuuumal  lUvMalioni 


THE  EFFECT  OF  THE  GERMAN  GUNS  AT  NAMUR 
All  ihat  remains  ot  one  ol  the  Greal  Forls 


21 


LAND     AND     WATER 


October    lo,    1914 


SHOOTING  OVER  DOGS 


From  an  Old  Print 


WALKING    UP 


By  GUY  C.    POLLOCK 


THIS  is  indeed,  by  the  irony  of  fate,  a  wonderful 
year  for  partridges,  and  I  have  lately  had  some 
actual  and  extremely  heating  proof  of  this. 
Three  of  us  have  been  spending  three  days  in 
walking  up  the  birds  on  the  Little  Shoot,  and, 
since  all  three  have  undertaken  such  duties  as  the  State  can 
find  for  us,  and  these  three  days  represent  the  whole  holiday 
of  busy  men,  I  am  not  in  a  mood  to  apologise  too  much  for 
carrying  on  peaceful  sport  while  the  country  is  at  war.  If 
excuse  were  needed  it  might  be  found  in  the  local  lamentations 
of  the  village  over  the  abandonment  to  a  very  great  extent 
of  shooting  and  hunting,  and  in  the  frantic  persuasions  made 
in  vain  to  us  to  fill  the  gaps  caused  in  the  local  shooting 
world  by  the  war.  It  does  the  village  harm  and  not  good 
tiiat  shooting  should  be  abandoned,  while  the  ramified 
interests  of  various  trades  and  tlieir  dependents  are  also 
injured. 

These,  however,  are  brave  words,  and  I  am  bound  to 
say  that  one  goes  about  this  business  of  shooting  partridges 
in  war  time  with  an  uneasy  mind,  and  that  every  Territorial 
sentry  with  his  rifle  seems  to  shame  the  man  with  a  shot-gun 
on  his  shoulder,  however  clear  he  may  have  his  patriotic 
conscience.  Troops  pass  along  the  roads  by  day,  and  one's 
night's  rest,  filled  with  its  inevitable  dreams  of  war,  is  broken 
by  the  hoarse  sounds  of  challenges  upon  the  bridges.  You 
cannot  get  away  from  the  war  by  walking  after  partridges  in 
a  home  county.  You  cannot  really  feel  that  the  duty  of 
"  carrying  on,"  laudable  and  harmless  as  it  may  be  for  those 
who  are  not  permitted  to  render  military  aid,  is  satisfactory 
or  ennobling. 

These  thoughts  were  too  keenly  present  with  us  all  to 
allow  the  shooting  to  be  good.  They  weighed  especially 
with  the  ex-officer  who,  still  hoping  for  active  re-employment, 
found  his  usually  accurate  aim  greatly  diverted  by  the 
thrusts  of  a  disquieted  spirit.  Besides,  we  came  down  three 
pale,  wan,  overworked  wretches  on  whom  a  day's  walking 
under  a  blazing  September  sun  over  stubbles  and  grass  fields 
baked  to  a  desert  dryness  and  roots  languishing  with  tired 
leaves  had  an  uncommonly  exhausting  effect.  Thus  it 
befell  that  for  the  first  two  days,  when  the  coveys  were 
young  and  foolish,  we  shot  extremely  badly.  And  I  do  not 
think  that  the  ineradicable  loquacity  of  the  chief  beater, 
partly  induced  by  the  fact  that  he  had  a  brother  at  the 
front  and  had  been  himself  rejected  for  the  Army  on  account 
of  faulty  eyesight,  really  helped  us  much.  Even  the  black 
dog,  the  indefatigable,  seemed  to  feel  the  influence  of  these 
days — so  much  so  that,  brought  to  one  supposed  runner  in 
the  turnips,  she  just  lay  down  and  said  very  plainly  :  "  I 
don't  believe  there's  no  sich  person."  When  the  man  of 
affairs  had  found  the  bird  for  her  she  could  hardly  be  per- 
suaded to  make  a  full  and  frank  apology. 

For  my  own  part,  I  had  during  the  first  two  days  an 
excellent  excuse  for  poor  marksmanship.  Accident  had 
deprived  me  of  the  use  of  my  cherished  weapon,  and  I  was 
reduced  to  a  spare  gun  which  never  did  suit  me  well,  and 
with  which  I  have  become  thoroughly  unfamiliar.  I  did 
not  hesitate  to  impress  upon  the  others  and  upon  the  chief 
beater,  when  he  bemoaned  the  poverty  of  my  aim,  the  fact 
of  this  misfortune.  But  I  will  confess  that  when  the  right 
gun  turned  up  the  discomforting  thought  came  that,  unless 


the  aim  were  very  sensibly  improved,  the  excuses  made  for 
failure  would  make  me  look  unusually  foolish.  Fortune, 
however,  was  kind  enough  to  put  me,  on  the  last  day,  in  a 
mood  to  shoot  as  well  as  I  can.  It  was,  for  me,  one  of  those 
days  on  which  one  goes  out  not  caring  particularly  whether 
one  hits  or  misses.  Either  the  intense  heat  or  the  war,  or 
both,  brought  an  indifference  of  spirit,  and  such  indifference, 
quelling  the  tumult  of  over-eager  "  nerves,"  is  just  what  one 
wants  for  shooting.  Anyhow,  the  last  day  and  the  new  gun 
were  tolerably  successful. 

On  the  last  day,  moreover,  by  a  freak  of  nature,  the 
coveys  sat   extremely   tight.     On  the  first   day,   when   the 
noise  and  the  effect  of  guns  were  presumably  strange  to  them, 
the  birds  rose  in  a  surprising  hurry,  and  showed  how  strong 
and  forward  they  were  by  going  off  like  rockets.     On  the 
second  day  they  were  obviously  perturbed.     On  the  third — a 
day  of  rest  having  intervened — they  lay  and  waited  for  us  to 
kick  them  up.     And  they  waited  on  one  occasion  in  cabbages 
— an   unusual    incident,    accounted   for,    no   doubt,    by   the 
excessive  drought  and   by  the  fact  that   such  moisture  as 
remained  from  an  early  morning  mist  was  there  to  be  found. 
The  man  of  affairs  bemoaned  the  impatience  which  took 
several  coveys  up  at  some  distance,  and  expressed  a  preference 
for  the  shower  of  birds  which  suddenly  bursts  all  round  one's 
progress  across  the  drills  of  a  root  field.     But  that  seems  to 
me  a  mistaken  preference.     Whenever  a  covey  of  partridges 
gets  up  in,  the  course  of  a  day's  walking  it  is  almost  bound  to 
surprise  the  gun.     But  when  the  sudden  whirr  fills  all  the  air 
with  accountable  birds  I  am  myself  reduced  to  a  deplorable 
indecision.     The  first  bird  is  easily  picked,  though  one  is  apt 
to  fire  at  too  close  a  range.     The  second,  being  found,  is  too 
often  abandoned  for  what  may  seem  a  more  suitable  chance 
at  a  bird  rising  after  the  first  lot  are  well  on  the  wing.     And 
this  second  bird  is  apt  to  prove  a  less  hardy  and  well-grown 
specimen  than  one  would  select  in  a  perfectly  calm  moment. 
The  perversity  of  coveys,  of  course,  adds  to  the  very 
real  enjoyment  of  walking  up  on  a  limited  acreage,  where 
half  the  sport  is  the  effort  to  push  the  birds  in  the  right 
direction  and  to  keep  them  within  the  boundaries.     One  such 
covey  defeated  us  very  handsomely.     We  pursued  it  with 
admirable  craft  and  guile  over  four  fields,  and  imagined  that 
we  had  it  fixed,  with  all  its  twelve  well-grown  members,  in  a 
convenient  strip  of  swedes  and  turnips.     To  make  doubly 
sure  we  took  a  wide  and  hurried  sweep  over  an  adjacent 
stubble  towards   the   roots.     Inevitably,   therefore,   we   dis- 
turbed our  covey  on  the  stubble,  to  which  it  must  have  run 
out  of  the  roots,  and  then  it  finally  defeated  all  our  efforts  by 
flying  right  out  of  oiir  ground.     As  I  watched  it  go  I  said  to 
the  chief  beater  :    "  We  shall  never  get  one  of  that  lot,"  and 
he  answered  :    "  No,  sir,  I  don't  believe  we  ever  shall." 

These  are,  however,  the  misfortunes  which  lend  charm 
and  variety  to  sport.  I  expect,  if  we  are  still  able  to  pursue 
our  partridges  before  all  the  cover  is  gone,  that  we  shall  have 
great  fun  trying  to  outflank  that  covey.  If  all  else  fails, 
thfise  twelve  cratty  birds  will  play  games  with  us  and  keep 
us  walking  and  manoeuvring  if  out  shooting.  It  would  be  a 
pity  to  shoot  them.  Their  loss  would  spoil  much  genuine 
sport.  They  are  better  out  of  the  bag  ,  at  all  events,  it  is 
better  for  us  to  regard  them  in  that  light,  for  they  will  remain 
out  of  it. 


22 


The  County  Gentleman 


AND 


LAND  &  WATER 


Vol.  LXIV.  No.  2734 


SATURDAY,  OCTOBER  3,   19 14 


PUBLISHED  AS-)         P  R I  C  E   S  I  X  P  E  N  C  E 

La  newspaper  J       published  weekly 


Cupyiricht,  Scuman 


GENERAL   SIR   H.   SMITH-DORRIEN 

Who  is  so  ably  commanding  one  of  the  Army  Corps  at  the  Front 


LANM)     AND     WATER 


October  3,    1914 


HISTORY    REPEATS    ITSELF 


THE  HUNS  A.D.  451 

An  old  French  Engraving,  showinR  the  hordes  of  barbarians  who  were  defeated  at  Chalons 

The  Kaiser's  legions  have  copied  their  methods  as  far  as  acts  of  barbarity,  cruehy,  and  vandalism  are  concerned 


Copyright,  (  enlral  AVws 


October  3,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


THE    WAR    BY    LAND. 

By  HILAIRE    BELLOC. 

KOTE. — THIS   HESSAOE  HAS   BEEX   6CBMITTED  TO   THK   PEKS8   BUEKAU,   WHICH    DOES   KOT   OBJECT  TO  THE   PUBLICATION   AS  CENSOKED 

AND  TAKKS  NO  KESrOXSlBlI.lTr   FOB  THH   CORRKCTNE88   Olf   TUB   STATEMENT. 

IN  ACCOBDANCK     WITH    THK    SEQUIBEinENTS     OF     THK    PRESS    BUREAU,    THE    POSITIONS     OP    TROOPS    ON    PLANS     ILLUSTRATING    THIS 

ARTICLE   MUST  ONLI   BE  SSaACDED  AS   ArPEOXIMATE,   AND   NO   DETINITB  STRENGTH   AT   ANT   POINT   IS   INDICATED. 


1  iijn      w 

T 


THE    WESTERN    THEATRE  OF  WAR. 

[HE  uitcrcst  of  the  war  this  week  in  the 
west  turns,  as  it  has  done  for  now  a  fort- 
night past,  npon  the  holding  of  the  main 
line  from  the  Argonne  to  the  Oise,  and 
the  turning  of  the  opposed  Gei-man  lines 
there  round  by  our  left  and  the  German  right.     To 
that  situation  we  are  accustomed,  and  its  slow  progress 
varies  only  in  certain  details  later  to  be  discussed. 

But  there  has  also  entered  into  this  western  field 
since  last  week  a  new  development  which  may  prove 
to  be  of  gi-eat  importance  and  which  is  at  any  rate  of 
great  interest ;  and  that  is  the  German  advance  across 
the  Upper  Meuse  between  Verdun  and  Toul. 

Our  survey  of  the  operations  in  the  west  for  this 
week,  therefore,  is  concerned  with  a  general  scheme 
corresponding  to  the  diagram  opposite,  where  the 
main  dark  line  B,  C,  and  the  shoiier  lines 
A,  B,  C,  D,  represent  the  German  forces  from  in  front 
of  St.  Mihiel  at  D,  round  to  the  north  of  Verdun  at 
C,  thence  right  across  Champagne  to  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Noyon  at  B,  and  thence  back  to  the  north 
again  past  St.  Quentin  at  A. 

Opposite  to  and  in  contact  with  this  formation 
everywhere  you  have  the  Allied  line  E,  F,  G,  II. 


For  a  fortnight  past  the  Gcmians  on  the  defensive 
along  B,  C,  have  resisted  the  pressure  of  the  Allies 
along  F,  G,  and  have  in  their  turn  failed  in  the 
counter-offensive  attempts  to  bi*eak  the  Allied  line 
F,  G,  opposite  them.  During  the  last  ten  days  of 
that  fortnight  a  turning  movement  has  been  bringing 
an  increasing  pressure  against  their  right  wing,  and 


E .  A 

A 

#  _ 

C 

G\^ 

H  ^ 

A.I. 

the  French  force  E,  F,  has,  with  varying  fortunes  of 
advance  and  retreat,  .been,  on  the  whole,  pressing  back 
very  slowly  the  opposing  Gennan  forces  A ,  B.     If  or 


1* 


la:n"d   and   avater 


October  3,  1914 


whon  that  pressure  jwsses  a  certain  limit,  if  or  when 
A  E  is  jiressecl  back  through  a  sufficient  angle  by  the 
advance  of  E  V,  tlic  Avhole  German  main  line  B  C 
■would  be  so  imperilled  that  it  would  at  the  worst  find 
itself  involved  in  disaster,  and  at  the  best  compelled 
to  retire ;  for  its  main  communications  are  only  pro- 
tected by  this  right  Aving  A  B. 

But  meanwhile  exactly  the  same  thing  is  being 
attemjited  the  other  way  round  at  the  further  or 
eastern  end  of  the  line,  and  here  the  enemy  from 
C  D  is  apparently  trying  to  press  back  the  French  at 
G  K,  and  get  behind  //leir  line  and  compel  them 
to  retirement  as  an  alternative  to  disaster. 

There  is  no  need  to  consider  in  detail  this  week 
the  operations  reported  upon  the  main  front  between 
the  Oise  and  the  Argonnc.  The  notes  of  last  week 
give  in  sufficient  detail  the  various  sections  of  this 
line :  the  ridge  l)etween  Craonne  and  Noyon  ;  the 
great  rolling  plain  country  north  of  Eheims  and 
stretching  on  to  Argonne.  And  in  those  notes  it 
was  sufficiently  sliown  that  neither  had  the  German 
defensive  yet  been  considerably  pushed  back,  nor  the 
Allied  offensive  appreciably  advanced. 


village  of  Kogent  I'Abbosse.  The  Prussian  Guard  here 
attacked  with  peculiar  violence,  but  their  counter- 
oiTensive  was  repelled  by  the  French.  There  is  no 
indication  that  the  hills  of  Kogent  I'Abbesse  were  at 
any  moment  occujjied  by  French  troops,  but  it  is 
evident  that  there  Avas  a  desperate  attempt  made  to 
break  the  French  line  at  this  central  point,  and  that 
it  failed. 

Further  to  the  east,  again,  that  line  of  railway  of 
which  1  .spoke  last  week  between  Bazaucourt  and  the 
Pass  of  Grand  Pre  over  the  Argonne,  and  the  approach 
to  which  by  the  French  marked  so  imjwrtant  an 
advance  ten  days  ago,  was  saved  last  Friday  by  a 
German  counter-advance  before  which,  according  to 
the  official  French  co)im/a/irj/fe,  the  French  troojis  gave 
gi-ound  at  first.  They  later  recovered  the  belt  that 
had  been  lost,  but  no  more.  Following  the  French 
official  co)iiiiuiniqu6  of  Wednesday,  September  30tii, 
very  slight  changes  on  this  main  front  may  be 
expresssd  in  the  following  sketch,  where  the  dark 
line  shows  the  Allies'  front  on  Tuesday  last,  and  the 
dotted  line  its  jjosition  a  week  earlier.  They  are 
almost  identical. 


Cotnpel^iz 


BKKTCa   SUOn'lNO   THE   V£BT   SLIOjn'   CHAXOES   JSFFBCTED   OX   THE   MAIN   FEOXT   DURINQ   THE   PAST   WEEK. 


There  is  this  Aveek  nothing  to  tell  but  the 
continuation  of  that  tale— save  that  there  has  been 
.some  appreciable  advance  upon  the  western  end  of  the 
long  line  in  the  hills  above  the  Aisne.  For  instance, 
a  very  heavy  battery  of  German  guns  just  above 
€onde  was  silenced  by  French  and  English  fire  on 
Saturday  last;  and  at  the  moment  of  writing  a 
telegram  from  Paiis  affirms  that  the  quarries  of 
Autreches,  the  galleries  of  which  have  served  for  one 
of  the  strongest  positions  against  Soissons,  are  in  the 
hands  of  the  French.  But  Craonne  was  still  held, 
when  that  message  came  through,  by  the  Gei-mans  ; 
and  the  advance,  such  as  it  was,  upon  these  hills  of 
the  Aisne,  was  not  as  j-et  definitive  in  any  way.  The 
plateau  was  not  yet  carried. 

In  the  second  part  of  the  line,  the  forty  miles 
that  run  behind  Eheims  and  in  front  of  the  Biver 
Snippe  towards  the  Argonne,  very  desperate  counter- 
attacks were  repoi-ted,  of  which  the  official  French 
commnmqfcj  of  last  Sunday  states  that  they  had 
every  appearance  of  being  launched  with  the  determina- 
tion of  settling  the  gi-eat  battle  before  the  beginning 
ot  this  week.  There  was  particularly  violent  fio^htiu"- 
just  to  the  east  of  the  limip  of  hills  connected  with  the 


We  may  take  it,  then,  that  at  the  moment 
of  writing,  and  so  far  as  the  official  statements 
carry  us,  the  deadlock  between  the  region  of  IS'oyou 
and  the  Argonne  continues.  Each  line  is  held  by 
the  other. 

"With  the  turning  movement  upon  the  west,  slow 
as  it  has  been  in  its  progress,  there  has  been  progress, 
but  of  a  chequered  kind.  It  has  been  interrupted  by 
a  counter-offensive,  only  checked  during  the  last 
tlu-ee  days. 

Ten  days  ago  in  the  official  news  upon  which  the 
last  notes  Avere  based  the  French  Avere  at  Lassigny — 
or  rather  had  reached  the  heights  to  the  east  of  that 
town  towards  Noyon.  Three  days  later— that  is,  a 
week  ago — they  were  here  met  by  superior  forces, 
before  Avhich  they  gave  ground.  But  this  retirement 
Avas  compensated  for  by  work  further  north.  Here 
the  French,  having  taken  Peronne  much  at  the  same 
time  as  they  entered  Lassigny,  held  it  against  a  A'ery 
fierce  counter-offensive,  abandoned  it  again,  and  in 
the  first  days  of  this  Aveek  retook  it.  In  this  renewed 
advance  the  official  report  tells  of  guns  and  prisoners 
captured  upon  the  failure  of  a  rcncAA'cd  German 
counter-offensive ;  but  from  the  same  soui'ce  we  leam 


2* 


OctoW  3,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


AMBRAI 


^S^sSi"^ 


I  \Mues 


fCOMPtECNE     i^      ^^">.  ^ 
SOISSONS 


'^^Ms 


German  line  protecting  the  Oise  Communications 
French  line  attacking  same  about  Tuesday  last 


roerrioss    on    thb    irBsr,    iLLuarrEATixo    th»    captubb    or 

FEBONNS    AND    ATTACK    ON     I.ASSiaNT. 


from  it  that  line  Avliich  feeds  Laon  and  then  goes 
south  itself.  It  is  this  line  by  which  munitions  are 
brought  along  the  German  front  after  they  have  come 
by  the  main  German  railway  line  of  communication 
down  the  Oise. 

Unfortunately  Tergnier  lies  in  a  bay  or  recess 
of  tlic  general  line  which  the  Germans  are  holding  at 
tliis  point  to  defend  their  communications  ;  and  it 
will  probably  be  reached  later  than  other  more  salient 
points  ujjon  that  line,  such  as  Noyon  itself,  or  St. 
Quentin.  Tlie  holding  of  the  main  line  and  of  the 
Oise  north  of  Tergnier  would  be  of  great  effect — even 
of  decisive  effect — for  it  would  compel  a  general 
German  retirement  back  north  from  the  defensive 
position  now  held  to  the  south  along  the  Aisne.  But 
the  captiu'e  of  Tergnier,  where  all  the  roads,  rail- 
ways, and  waterways  cross  and  branch,  would  be  even 
more  than  decisive  :  it  would  be  vital. 


(Passage  deleted  by  Censor.) 


that   the   extreme   point   of   German    occupation   on 
Tuesday  last  came  as  far  as  Chaulnes. 


(Pas.sage  deleted  by  Censor.) 


The  nature  and  value  of  this  turning  movement 
round  by  the  Gennan  right,  upon  which  aU  eyes  are 
now  fixed,  is  best  apparent  when  we  remember  that 
the  line  of  the  Oise  and  the  railway  following  it  is 
the  main  artery  of  supply  by  which  the  whole  main 
German  defensive  position  along  the  Aisne  and  across 
Champagne  lives. 

In  the  notes  of  more  than  one  student  of  this 
campaign  it  has  been  remarked  tliat,  even  if  the 
enemy  abandons  St.  Quentin  and  Noyon  and  crosses 
the  Oi.se,  he  will  find  upon  the  further  eastern  or  left 
bank  another  series  of  positions  of  wooded  hills  which 
he  shovdd  be  able  to  maintain  at  great  length.  But 
those  who  put  forward  this  hypothesis,  though  it 
proves  them  to  have  followed  the  map,  forget  that  the 
whole  strength  of  the  German  defen.sive  position 
depends  upon  its  heavy  artillery.  The  munition  of 
that  heavy  artilleiy,  and,  for  that  matter,  the  retirement 
of  it,  makes  the  chief  line  of  railway  up  to  Belgium  a 
necessity,  and  therefore,  if  the  enemy  loses  the  line 
of  the  Oise,  down  Avhich  that  railway  runs,  he  will 
have  lost  everything.  On  that  very  account,  the 
fighting  for  the  line  of  the  Oise  has  been  the  fierce 
and  hai'dly  contested  thing  we  have  been  reading  of 
for  more  than  ten  days  past.  The  Germans  know 
that  upon  holding  it  the  life  of  their  army  depends  ; 
tlic  French  know  that  upon  their  reaching  it  victory 
for  them  depends. 

If  the  reader  will  look  at  the  above  map  he  will 
note  the  junction  of  Tergnier.  It  is  a  point  of  very 
liigh  strategic  importance,  and  that  for  several  reasons. 
In  the  first  place,  it  is  the  junction  not  only  between 
two  main  lines,  but  also  lietween  two  systems,  each 
with  its  separate  orgaTiisation — the  railway  company 
called  the  Nord  and  the  railway  company  called  the 
'E)it.  Next,  because  it  lias  workshops  and  repairing 
sheds,  and  is  in  every  way  (so  far  as  the  Frencli 
retreat  left  it  intact)  a  depot  for  railway  material. 
Ijastly,  because  there  runs  southward   and  eastward 


There  is  another  feature  in  the  main  Gei-man 
communications  at  this  point  which  has  been  a  good 
deal  neglected  in  the  Press  of  both  countries,  and  is 
well  worth  examining.  This  is  the  canal  running 
along  the  valley  of  the  Oise  and  connecting  it  with 
quite  the  upper  reaches  of  the  Somme  near  St.  Quentin, 
and  fuither  prolonged  so  as  to  connnect  the  Oise  with 
the  Aisne.  The  branch  from  the  Oise  to  the  Aisne  is 
undoubtedly  supplying  the  German  line  on  the 
plateau  of  Soissons.  We  know  by  the  experience 
of  the  battle  of  Meaux  that  the  barges  upon  the  canals 
have  been  very  lai'gely  used  by  the  enemy  for  the 
transport  of  ammunition.  Further,  a  canal  in  a  flat 
country  will  probably  have  been  subjected  to  less 
damage  during  the  retreat  Avhen  the  Allied  armies 
were  falling  back  from  Mons  over  this  countiy  than 
a  railway.  To  carry  the  line  of  the  Oise  would  be 
not  only  to  carry  the  main  line  communication  with 
Belgium  and  with  the  bases  in  Germany :  it  woiild 
also  be  to  carry  the  canal  communication,  and  to  cut 
two  arteries  at  once. 

THE    NEW    GERMAN    OFFENSIVE 
ON    THE    MEUSE. 

So  much  then  for  the  turning  movement  round 
by  the  West  of  the  main  German  defensive  position 
and  of  its  progress  to  the  present  date. 

But  as  I  have  already  said,  there  is  a  new 
element  before  us  in  the  success  the  Germans  have 
had  during  this  week  at  the  other  end  of  the  whole  of 
this  theatre  of  war,  when  they  silenced  certain  forts 
in  the  centre  of  the  chain  between  Toul  and  Verdun, 
and  here  began  crossing  the  Mouse. 

Before  I  deal  with  that  eastern  movement  in  any 
detail,  however,  it  will  be  well  to  point  out  how  it 
stands  relatively  to  the  western  turning  movement  by 
which  the  Fi'ench  are  threatening  the  Germans  along 
the  Oise. 

The  German  advance  across  the  Meuse  (as  sho^vn 
in  diagram  on  the  following  page)  after  breaking  the 
Toul- Verdun  line  would  obviously  involve,  if  it  were 
pressed  far  enough  and  with  sufficient  strength,  a 
rapid  and  general  retirement  of  the  French  and 
English  line  between  the  Oise  and  the  Meuse  :  for 
it  would  come  in  behind  the  right  wing  of  that  line. 
But  it  would  not  be  of  such  vital  ill- consequence  to 
the  Allies,  however  successful  it  should  prove  to  be. 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  3,  1914 


,VERDUN 


■   Germ»n  Line 
Zi   Allied  Lin« 


'■New  German 
Offensive 


d*TOUL 


PLAN    8H0W1S0    KKW   OKRMAX    OKFiiN.SIVK   IS    TltK    EAST,  AGAINST 
THE    LINE    VKRDUN-TOUI.. 

as  Avould  the  success  of  the  turning  movement  round 
by  the  Oisc  be  vital  in  its  ill-consequence  to  the 
(rermans.  In  the  regrettable  necessity  oE  retiring 
the  ^vliole  eastern  or  right  end  of  the  main 
Allied  line  before  the  serious  threat  of  a  German 
advance  across  the  Ujjper  Meuse,  the  French 
and  their  Allies  would  lose  much  country  which 
the  enemy  would  ravage ;  they  would  suffer  a 
dispiriting  check  after  the  general  success  of  the 
last  three  weeks ;  they  would  be  retreating  where 
they  had  hoped  confidently  to  advance.  ^J'he  tide 
which  had  seemed  to  set  in  with  a  strong  flood  would 
liave  appeared  to  ebb  again.  But  nothing  essential 
would  have  gone.  No  line  of  communication  sening 
the  Allies  would  have  been  cut,  and  though  new  and 
much  better  lines  of  communication  for  the  Germans 
would  have  been  ojjened,  a  success  of  this  kind  could 
not  possibly  be  decisive.  The  corresponding  success 
of  the  Allies  upon  the  west  wing,  upon  the  other 
hand,  Avould  be  necessarily  decisive.  Supposing  the 
unlikely  and  bizarre  coincidence  of  a  successful 
German  advance  in  foi-ce  across  the  Upper  Meuse, 
coming  at  the  same  time  with  a  successful  French 
advance  reaching  to  the  Upper  Oise,  the  foni/er  would 
have  no  decisive  effect  upon  the  direction  of  the 
campaign.  The  latter  vvoidd  compel  an  immediate 
j'nd  rapid  evacuation  by  the  German  Army  of  all 
positions  in  France. 

Important,  therefore,  as  this  Gennan  demonstra- 
tion upon  the  Upper  Meuse  to  the  east  is,  if  it  is 
•being  made  in  force,  we  must  not  lose  sight  of  the 
fact  that  it  is  secondary  only  in  importance  compared 
Avith  the  priraaiy  and  capital  business  of  that  fighting 
in  front  of  Noyon  and  St.  Quentin,  where  the  German 
Army  is  defending  its  very  existence,  and  the  Allies 
attempting  no  less  than  the  decision  of  the  campaign. 
AVith  this  Avarning  we  can  turn  to  examination  in 
greater  detail  of  the  new  German  movement  which 
threatens  the  extreme  French  right. 

During  the  last  few  days,  then,  the  enemy  has 
advanced  from  the  east  against  the  ToulA^erdun  line, 
the  barrier  of  forts  on  the  Upper  IMeuse,  and  has 
pierced  it. 

The  district  as  a  whole  can  be  best  appreciated  by 
some  such  sketch  map  as  that  on  the  following  page. 

The  Eiver  Meuse  runs  in  a  trench  a  little  north 
of  noi-th-east;  on  either  side  of  this  trench  rise 
wooded  heights,  foi-ming  ui)on  the  east  a  plateau, 
known  as  the  Heights  of  tlie  Meuse.  This  plateau 
falls  sharply  on  its  eastern  side  on  to  the  plain  called 
"the  Woemi-e  Country."  In  the  midst  of  this 
stands  Thiaucourt,  the  headquarters  of  the  late 
German  advance  to  tlie  river.  The  heights  of  the 
ISIeuse  have  opposite  them,  beyond  the  river,  a 
district  neariy  corresponding  and  about  the  same 
lieight  Avith  themselves,  also  falling  steeply  down 
some  300  feet  upon  the  trench  through  which  the 


Meuse  runs.  This  stretch  of  the  river  is  protected 
as  follows  : 

It  has  been  made  into  a  barrier  first  by  the  great 
fortresses  of  Verdun  and  Toul  to  the  north  and  to 
the  south,  and  next  by  a  chain  of  Avorks  dominating 
the  river  A-alley,  the  larger  of  Avhich  arc  called  in  order 
fi'om  north  to  south  :  CJenlcourt,  Troyon,  Parodies, 
Camp  des  Iiomains,  LiouvlUe,  and  Girouville.  Two 
towns  of  some  size  stand  upon  the  river  between 
Verdun  and  Toul ;  these  are  St.  ^liliiel  and  Com- 
mercy,  of  Avhich  St.  Mihiel  is  the  inost  central,  l}ing 
almost  exactly  half-way  betAveen  Yerdun  and  Toul. 

The  German  advance  first  got  a  footing  on  the 
plateau  at  the  salient  height  of  Hatton-Chatel,  and 
then  advanced  to  St.  ^Mihiel,  Avhere  the  river  Avas 
crossed  after  the  guns  A\'ithin  the  Avork  at  Les 
Parodies  and  the  Avork  at  Camp  des  Itomains  had 
been  silenced. 

With  St.  Mihiel  and  its  bridge  thus  in  possession 
of  the  enemy,  the  French  line  ran  as  the  dotted  line 
does  upon  the  map.  Its  formation  has  been  ofRcially 
communicated  through  the  French  Government  to  the 
Press,  and  may  therefore  be  printed  here. 


(Passage  deleted  by  Censor.) 


It  Avill  be  seen  from  the  above  and  from 
the  map  on  the  foUoAving  page  that  the  total 
effect  of  the  new  German  offensive  in  this  region 
so  far  has  been  to  occupy  a  projection  or  salient, 
the  base  of  which  is  the  dotted  Ime  marking 
the  old  French  front  of  more  than  a  week  ago,  the 
outer  boundary  of  which  passes  through  Apremont 
round  to  the  Avest  of  the  work  of  Parodies,  and  then 
to  a  jioint  between  Spada  village  and  the  Fort  of 
Tro^'on.  This  salient  giA'es  the  Germans  their  cross- 
ing over  the  Meuse.  It  is  here  that  they  have  driven 
a  breach  tlu'ough  the  barrier  Toul-A'^erdun. 

In  order  to  seize  the  natiii-e  and  importance  of 
the  newly  undertaken  German  operations  upon  the 
Ujjj^er  Meuse  Ave  have  to  consider  four  points. 

(f/)  First  and  most  important,  the  object  Avith 
which  this  ncAv  offensiAe  has  been  under- 
taken on  the  part  of  the  enemy. 
(i)  Tlie  numbers  iuA'olved. 
(c)  The  distances  iuA-olved  and  the  disposition 
of    the     advancing    troops,    French    and 
German,   so  far   as  those  dispositions  are 
madcknoAvn  by  the  official  dispatches  Avliich 
may  be  examined  and  explained  A\itliout 
indiscretion. 
(d)  The    actual    results     achieved     by    the 
Germans   during   the   past    Aveek   in   this 
effort  of  theirs  to  cross  the  Meuse  as  given 
us  by  these  same  disjjatches. 
It  Avill  be  seen  that  of  these  four  points  the  last 
two  are  concerned  with  established  facts  and  can  be 
dealt  Avith  accurately  while  the  first  tAvo  are  matters 
our  conjectures  on  which  Avill  dej)end  tipon  our  judg- 
ment as  AA'ell  as  upon  official  record,  and  that  judgment 
cannot  be  final. 

Yet  it  is  in  the  first  two  j^oints — and  particularly 
in  the  first — that  the  Avliole  interest  of  the  matter  lies. 
For  our  one  concern  in  this  ATry  grave  subject  is 
the  purpose  the  German  commanders  had  in  mind  and 
their  poAver  A\'hen  they  at  last  attacked  the  Toul- 
Yerdun  line  to  achicA'c  that  purpose. 

NoAV,  AA'hatever  their  purpose  be  their  power  to 
to  achieve  it  Avill  depend  upon  numbers  ;  as,  indeed, 
other  things   being  equal,  does   everything   in   Avar. 


4» 


October  3,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


^K^ 


^^^  of  crown  Pnncasfforce 


% 


%! 


^ 


.FRESHES 


O 

o 

>«*or    h  \hattoh^:>hattonville 

>N^^°/         ^     .  f:«VICNEULLES   O 

•VILLAGE   ^ 


-^SPADA 
/,ljv  .VILLAGE   :|     -.^.^^.y^,^^^,^   Q 


THIAUCOURT 
German  H.Q. 


PONT  A  MOUSSON  • 


%®     \        WORM  OF  ^  ^ 
^'^J^    \XGIROUVlLLE 


Fortified  Zones 

within  Limits  of 

Protection  of 

Larger  Permanent  Works  X' 

Fores  and  Redoubts 


The  French  Line 


'Se 


OSNXBAli  MAP  SHOWINO   THl  WKUC's  OPSBATIONS  ON  TBJI  TOVb-VZEDITN   LINB  WITH  TBI  CSOSSINO   AT   ST.    MIHnsl., 


But  we  neither  know  their  purpose  nor  the  numbers 
at  their  command  for  the  achievement  of  that  purpose, 
nor  the  forces  opposed  to  them  to  baulk  them  of  that 
purpose.  AVe  can  only  in  these  matters  depend  upon 
conjecture  and  deduction  from  facts  communicated  by 
the  French  and  English  commanders  for  official 
publication. 

We  can,  however,  say  with  certitude  that,  while 
we  do  not  know  the  purpose  of  the  enemy  in  thus 
advancing  to,  and  wedging  a  crossing  over,  the  Upper 


Meuse,  that  purpose  must  be  to  achieve  one  of  fwo 
objects.  We  can  even  say  (as  is  so  often  the  case  in 
the  history  of  war)  that  in  their  prosecution  of  the 
one  object  they  may  be  led  on  to  attempt  the  second, 
or  that  in  their  failure  to  attempt  the  one  may  be 
involved  in  a  still  more  important  failure  concerning 
the  other. 

These  two  objects  are  (1)  a  feint,  which  is  a  dis- 
traction of  the  Allies  not  seriously  intended  to  be 
pressed  home,  but  valuable  because  it  rnay  make  them 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  3,  1914 


-withdraw  forces  they  really  need  elsewhere,  (2)  a 
serious  effort  to  turn  the  Allied  right  and  establish 
those  new  short  and  convenient  lines  of  communica- 
tion direct  to  Germany  through  Mvtz  and  Strasburg 
which  Avoiild  greatly  increase  the  strength  of  the 
German  Army. 

In  other  words,  eil/ier  the  Germans  are  here 
attempting  no  more  than  to  turn  off  the  attention  of  the 
Allies  from  the  Oise,  to  make  them  nervous  about  theii- 
extreme  eastern  flank,  and  to  make  them  withdraw 
men  from  the  west  (where  the  chief  peril  to  tlie 
German  Army  now  Ues)  ;  or,  they  are  intending— 
with  larger  masses  than  we  had  supposed  to  bo  present 
— a  very  serious  operation :  pushing  in  between  Toul 
and  Verdun,  taking  or  masking  these  fortresses,  and 
so  threatening  the  rear  of  the  French  line  between 
Eheims  and  Argonne  that  it  will  be  compelled  to  fall 
back.  With  it  will  then  fall  back,  as  rapidly,  and  perhaps 
Avith  disaster,  the  troops  on  the  Upper  Moselle — that  is, 
in  the  region  of  Nancy  and  facing  the  Yosges. 

It  is  further  evident,  as  I  have  said,  that  the 
success  of  the  lesser  object  might  very  well  lead  to 
the  prosecution  of  the  more  serious  one. 

Though  the  thing  Avas  begun  as  a  feint  in  order 
to  distract  the  Allies  and  to  make  them  withdraw 
men  from  the  west,  yet  if  it  went  through  successfully 
it  might  assume  such  importance  that  it  would  be 
worth  the  German  while  to  bring  men  round  to  this 
eastern  point  upon  the  ^leuse,  to  push  forward 
threatening  the  rear  of  the  Allies,  and  to  make  the 
whole  of  the  French  line  now  in  Champagne  between 
llheims  and  the  Argonne  fall  right  back,  dragging 
Avith  it  all  the  troops  now  in  the  IMoselle  valley  soutli 
of  and  beyond  Toul. 

The  elements  of  the  business  should  be  clear 
from  the  following  diagram  : 


Here  you  have  the  Allied  line  A^ — B,  with  the 
German  line  in  contact  with  it  E — F.  These  stretch 
from  east  to  west  right  across  from  the  Eiver  Oise  to 
the  forest  of  Argonne.  To  the  right  or  east  of  these 
two  lines  you  have  a  German  force  G — H  of  unknown 
size  proposing  to  get  through  the  parallel  opposed 
by  Verdun— V  and  Toul— T  and  the  forts  XXX 
between  them.  It  is  evident  that  if  this  German 
force  G— H  could  get  to  M  before  the  Allied  Ime  had 
turned  back  to  save  itself,  that  Gennan  force  G — H 
Avould  have  turned  the  Allied  line  and  would  have 
brought  its  right  wing  to  disaster.  If,  therefore, 
G — II  is  iu  sufficient  force  to  go  forward  and  if  he 
has^  not  in  fi-ont  of  him  at  K — L  French  forces 
sufficient  to  stop  him,  he  can  at  the  most  destroy  the 
right  wing  of  the  Allies,  and,  at  the  least,  compel  it  to 
fall  back  from  A — B  where  it  now  lies  to  say  A 0. 

But  if  the  Allied  bne  should  fall  back  on  to 
^I — N  it  Avould  leave  the  remaining  French  armies, 
1'— Q.  which  are  watching  the  region   of  Toul— t' 


and  Nancy — N,  and  the  Upper  Moselle  Valley — Z, 
separated  from  their  fellows  and  doomed.  Therefore, 
to  avoid  disaster  these  armies  also,  P — Q,  Avould  have 
to  fall  back  to  some  such  jjosition  as  S — T,  and  the 
general  result  Avould  be,  after  a  German  success  of  this 
kind,  not  only  that  the  Avhole  mass  of  the  French  Army, 
east  of  Bhcims  at  least,  Avould  have  been  thi-ust  risht 
aAvay  from  the  frontier  and  have  suffered  all  the 
consequences  of  a  rapid  retreat,  but  also  that  the 
Germans  Avould,  after  their  success,  be  able  to  use  the 
ncAV  great  lines  of  communication,  X  X — Y  Y,  which 
had  hitherto  been  blocked  to  them  from  the  fact  that 
their  tAvo  chief  railways,  fj-om  Metz  the  one,  from 
Strasburg  the  other,  run  through  Verdun — V  and 
Toul — T  respectively. 

We  may  sum  up  this  first  point,  then,  our 
conjecture  as  to  the  object  of  the  German  move,  by 
saying  that  it  is  either  a  movement  in  force  designeel 
to  threaten  the  right  rear  of  the  general  French  line, 
to  isolate  and  force  back  the  French  armies  on  the 
Upper  Moselle  and  to  establish  new  and  much  better 
lines  of  communication  from  the  German  bases  to 
the  German  armies  in  the  field ;  or  it  is  a  feint, 
undertaken  as  yet  Avith  no  sufficient  force,  intended 
only  to  distract  the  French  commanders  so  that 
they  shall  Avithdraw  troops  from  the  Avest  Avhere 
the  existing  German  communications  are  in  peril. 
But  Ave  may  add  that  if  the  insufiicient  forces, 
used  merely  for  a  feint  have  rapid  and  unexpected 
success,  it  may  be  Avortli  the  German  while  to 
reinforce  them  and  turn  the  feint  into  a  serious 
effort. 

Such  being  the  only  possible  alternatives,  the 
only  possible  two  objects  the  Germans  have  in  making 
their  new  nioA'e,  let  us  next  consider  what  forces  they 
can  use  to  achieve  either  the  one  object  or  the  other. 
If  their  purpose  be  only  a  feint,  a  comparatively 
small  force  would  be  sufficient.  One-tenth  of  their 
total  effectives  in  line  between  Alsace  and  Picardy 
Avould  do  the  business — say  six  divisions  or  a  little 
more.  With  these  they  could  maintain  the  defensive 
Avhich  they  have  so  carefully  prepared  in  the  difficult 
Yosges  country ;  and  they  could  fend  off  dm-ing  the 
days  in  Avhich  the  feint  Avas  in  progress,  even  if  no 
longer,  attficks  from  the  gamsons  of  Vei-dun  and  of 
Toul  down  from  the  north  and  up  from  the  south 
of  tlieir  forward  western  movement. 

The  reduction  of  the  forts  upon  the  j\Ieuso 
• — the  opening  of  a  breach  through  the  ban-ior  does 
not  affect  this  discussion  —  it  Avould  have  had 
to  be  done  anyhow,  Avhether  for  a  feint  or  for  a 
serious  effort. 

It  was  not  a  question  of  numbers,  but  of  the 
poAver  of  the  big  howitzers  against  modern  fortifi- 
cation ;  and  the  piercing  of  the  line  by  the  silencing 
of  the  forts,  though  a  necessary  preliminary  to  the 
success  of  such  a  feint,  is  not  in  itself  equivalent  to 
the  success  even  of  that  feint,  let  alone  of  a  serious 
bloAv.  It  may  be  compared  to  the  forcing  of  a  door  in 
a  wall  Avlien  you  have  some  unknown  number  of 
opponents  on  the  other  side  of  the  door  after  it  is 
forced,  and  two  bodies  of  opponents  to  the  right  and 
to  the  left  of  the  door  to  threaten  your  men  as  they 
go  through.  You  have  opened  the  door  as  a  ruse  to 
distract  or  really  intending  to  go  through — but  you 
have  done  no  more. 

If,  therefore,  the  Germans  have  not  collected 
here  any  considerable  mass  of  men  ("  considerable  " 
as  the  Avord  may  be  used  in  the  present  gigantic 
campaign — for  forces  that  Avould  have  been  great 
arniies  in  the  past  are  to-day  but  fractions  of  the 
millions  engaged),  if,  I  say  the   Germans  have    not 


C* 


October  3,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


accumulated  a  considerable  mass  of  men  at  tliis  point 
(at  least  eight,  better  ten  divisions),  a  feint  their 
effort  was  intended  to  be  and  a  feint  it  will  remain  ; 
and  the  Trench  commanders,  if  they  can  be  certidn 
that  the  nunibers  here  are  not  very  large,  wiU  not 
reinforce  them  from  the  centre  or  the  west,  the 
resistance  to  be  opposed  to  the  German  on  the  Meuse; 
they  will  not  weaken  their  line  elsewhere ;  they  will 
continue  to  stake  ever}i;hing  upon  the  big  tujiiing 
movement  against  the  Upper  Oise.  Under  that 
hypothesis  the  new  German  offensive  on  the  Meuse, 
however  alanning,  will  not  be  decisive. 

But  if,  in  the  other  alternative,  the  Germans 
have  really  accumulated  large  masses  here,  even  if  they 
liave  enough  reserves  to  make  their  feint  first  a 
dangerous  feint  and  from  that  an  advance  in  force,  then 
the  new  move  may  be  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the 
future  of  the  war.  The  door  has  been  opened.  "With 
sufficient  troops  to  mask  Verdun  and  Toul  upon  either 
side  of  that  now  open  door,  a  large  force  could  appear 
in  a  veiy  short  time  so  near  to  the  rear  of  the  right 
wing  of  the  main  French  line  as  to  compel  it  to  fall 
back,  or,  if  it  did  not  fall  back  rapidly  enough,  to 
involve  it  in  disaster. 

And  in  order  to  see  how  this  is  we  must  turn  to 
the  third  point,  the  distances  involved  and  the 
dispositions  of  the  troops  so  far  as  they  are  known. 


Nearly  half  of  that  is  the  ^vidth  of  the  forest  district 
of  Argonne  and  the  hilly  country  to  the  east  of  the 
Argonne  again,  and  half-way  to  the  Meuse  is  still 
hea\"ily  wooded.  The  road  and  the  railway  line  from 
Verdun  to  Ste.  Menehould  through  the  jDass  of  Les 
Islettes  (where  a  Norfolk  squire  helped  to  win  the 
battle  of  Valmy)  are  held  by  the  French,  to  the  north 
of  whom,  ruiining  from  Varennes  to  the  big  bend  of  the 
Meuse  near  Forges,  lies  the  Crown  Prince's  army.  It  will 
be  seen  from  the  map  that  the  left  of  this  Array  where  it 
touches  the  Meuse  is  just  out  of  range,  and  no  more, 
to  the  north  of  the  northermost  forts  of  Verdun. 

Now  the  line  through  which  the  new  German 
offensive,  whether  a  feint  or  more  seriously  intended, 
had  to  pass — the  fortified  line  Verdun-Toul — is,  in 
its  greatest  length  from  its  northernmost  extremity  on 
these  same  northern  forts  of  Verdun  to  its  southern- 
most extremity  in  the  southernmost  forts  of  Toul, 
well  over  45  miles  in  extent.  While  the  space 
between  the  two  nearest  points  in  the  circle  of  forts 
round  Toul  and  the  circle  of  forts  round  Verdun  is 
well  over  SO  miles  and  nearer  35.  Finally,  a  third 
measurement  of  the  elements  of  this  problem,  the 
distance  from  the  central  point  in  this  Verdun-Toul 
line,  St.  Mihiel,  and  a  point  right  behind  the  right 
wing  of  the  main  French  line  such  as  Eevigny,  is  more 
than  25  but  less  than  30  miles. 


^^  ^1 


^Passof 

>  I  I  I  I  >" 

'Xjraivd.Pre 


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^^^•^O^cr.7?^a^^  BOURSE 
STfMENENOL/y 


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."^Q 


"^^I^BAR  LE  Due 


,ST  MIHIEL 


x5*  '^^^V   Direct  RaUway 

Cii  g>^  Jp  I  I  I  I  I  I   I  t  (   t  I  I 
"^TOUL    witicStrcLsbizrj 
and  CkivGralRhzxi^ 

B3 


The  gi-eat  body  of  the  Allied  line  which  lies 
across  the  country  of  Champagne  temiinates  and 
reposes  towards  the  east  upon  the  forest  of  Argonne, 
tlie  upper  course  of  the  River  Aisne,  and  the  railway 
rtmning  parallel  to  these  upper  reaches  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Villc-sur-Tourbes.  From  this  terminus 
or  extreme  right  wing  of  the  French  main  line,  which 
is  opposed  to  the  great  defensive  German  position  that 
lias  been  held  by  the  enemy  for  the  last  fortnight,  you 
have  to  the  outer  works  of  Verdun  a  distance  of  some- 
what  more   than   twenty  miles — two  days'  marches. 


Let  us  put  these  distances  together  and  see  what 
they  mean  in  time.  With  the  Germans  in  possession 
of  a  crossing  of  the  Meuse  between  Verdun  and  Toul, 
and  about  half  way  between  those  two  fortresses,  at 
St.  Mihiel,  the  door  to  their  advance  iipon  the  rear  of 
the  main  French  line  in  Champagne  is  open  at  a  point 
more  than  a  day's  march  from  Toul  upon  the  south 
and  more  than  a  day's  march,  rather  nearer  two  days' 
march,  from  Verdun  upon  the  north.  The  German 
columns  advancing  westward,  therefore,  across  tho 
Meuse  at  St.  Mihiel  need  fear  no  sudden  or  unexpected 


7» 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  3,  1914 


attack  from  tlic  one  fortress  or  the  other.  If  tliey 
have  sufficient  forces  they  should  be  able  to  mask  the 
garrisons  of  both  those  strongholds  without  fear  of 
interruption  to  theii-  columns  passing  across  the 
lileusc  between  them. 

Next,  unless  the  forces  opposed  to  them  upon 
the  Meuse  are  strong  enough  to  arrest  this  westward 
marcli,  it  is  but  two  days'  advance  from  a  German 
crossing  of  the  Meuse  in  force  near  St.  ]\Iihiel  to  the 
ajipoarance  of  the  German  columns  at  Eeyigny, 
directly  in  the  rear  of  the  French  line.  A  snnilar 
number  of  days  would  brmg  the  Crown  Prince's  Army 
down  round  or  through  the  Argonne  until  it  was  at 
Ste.  Menehould,  and  abreast  of  the  companion  force 
which  had  come  across  the  Meuse  from  St.  Mihiel  to 
Kevigny. 

AVe  sum  up  and  find  that  any  decisive  German 
siiccess  upon  the  western  or  left  bank  of  the  Meuse 


Tliere  is  the  whole  matter  of  this  new  German 
offensive  movement  upon  the  Upper  ^Nfeuso.  If  it  is 
seriously  intended,  if  it  is  being  prosecuted  with  large 
forces,  and  if  no  correspondiiigly  large  French  forces 
are  present  to  arrest  it  after  the  crossing  of  the  ^leuse 
and  the  forcing  of  the  fortified  line  Toul- Verdun,  all 
these  consequences  wiU  follow.  But  if  it  is  only  a 
feint  undertaken  with  insufficient  forces,  and  if  the 
French  commanders  disregard  the  distraction  attemjited 
here,  the  decisive  field  of  the  campaign  will  still  be,  not 
tliat  of  the  Upper  Meuse,  but  that  where  the  heaviest 
fighting  is  now  proceeding  between  St.  Quentin  and 
Peronne  for  the  possession  of  the  Oise  Valley  with  its 
railway  line  and  canals. 

Ijastly,  we  may  easily  establish  how  much  has 
actually  been  done  in  this  region  of  the  Upper  Meuse. 
To  follow  this  I  will  ask  tlie  reader  to  look  at  this 
sketch. 


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e* 


II.AN-    KHOWINO    DETAILS    OF    XHB    ILTE- DE- FOXI  NOW    HBLD    BY   THK    GERMANS    OVER   THE    MECjK   AT    ST.    UlUIKL, 


at  such  a  central  point  as  the  neighbourhood  of  St. 
Mihiel,  half-way  between  Verdun  and  Toul,  would 
mean  a  threatenmg  of  the  Allied  line  in  Champagne, 
with  two  days'  grace  to  escape  and  no  more.  In  other 
words,  it  would  mean  an  immediate  retirement  of  that 
line,  coupled  with  a  con-esponding  retirement  of  the 
French  troops  lying  round  Nancy  and  upon  the  Upper 
Moselle  Valley  south  of  Toul.  The  whole  French 
line  would  be  bent  backwards  behind  Bar-le-Duc  and 
the  upper  valley  of  the  Ornain.  Verdun  and  Toul 
would  be  invested,  and  when,  or  if  they  fell,  the  new 
and  du-ect  railway  communications  from  Germany 
through  Alsace-Lorraine  would  be    opened  by  the 


The  nature  of  the  crossing  Avhich  the  Germans 
have  obtained  over  the  Eiver  Meuse  at  St.  Mihiel  can 
here  be  gi'asped  in  some  detail. 

They  hold  a  bridge-head,  or  tete-de-pont,  and,  so 
long  as  they  hold  it,  they  command  a  bridge  in  what 
was  formerly  the  unbroken  barrier  between  Verdun 
and  Toul.  But  they  do  not  possess  this  entry  with- 
out drawbacks  in  their  position.  There  are  two  roads 
leading  across  the  hill  country  between  the  Meuse 
and  the  plain  of  Woeuvre.  There  is  no  railway. 
The  rail-head  is  more  than  a  day's  march  away  at 
Thiacom-t.  Of  these  two  roads,  the  main  road  passing 
through  Apremont  is  in  the  hands  of  the  French,  for 
the  French,  coming  up  from  the  garrison  of  Toul  on 


8* 


October  3,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


the  south,  have  jjushed  as  far  as  Apreinont  and 
occupied  it.  They  arc  confined  so  far  to  the  use 
of  the  smaller  side  road  Avhich  goes  round  through 
Spiula  and  Vigneulles.  It  is  along  the  line  of  this 
side  road  that  they  have  been  operating  the  whole 
time  from  their  headquaiiers  and  rail-head  at  Thiau- 
court.  They  took  the  heights,  as  we  shall  see,  at 
Hatton  Chatel,  but  the  French  troojis  coming  south 
from  Verdun  have  got  past  the  level  of  the  Fort  of 
Troyon,  just  as  those  coming  up  from  Toul  have  got 
past  the  Fort  of  Liouville  and  up  to  Apremont.  The 
enemy,  therefore,  has  but  a  very  narrow  entry, 
threatened  on  both  sides,  and  he  cannot  use  it  save 
with  very  considerable  forces  protecting  his  flanks. 

The  Fort  "  Camp  des  Eomains,"  enfilading  the 
Eiver  Meuse  all  above  St.  Mihiel  town  and  bridge, 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  so  did  the  work  of 
Les  Parodies  opposite.  It  was  the  fall  of  these  works 
which  gave  them  then*  bridge  head  and  their  crossing 
at  St.  Mihiel ;  but  a  week  has  passed,  and  they  have 
not  attempted  to  enlarge  the  breach  either  southwards 
towards  Toul  or  northwards  towards  Verdun.  It  is 
very  narrow — not  eight  miles  ;  while  its  one  line  of 
supply,  the  side  road  from  Sjjada  and  Vigneulles,  is 
continually  threatened  from  the  north. 

It  was  about  eight  days  ago  that  the  Germans 
began  to  bombaixi  the  permanent  works  round 
St.  Mihiel.  By  last  week-end  they  had  silenced 
these  two  permanent  works.  Parodies  and  the  Camp 
des  Eomains,  proving  once  more  the  accuracy  of  the 
German  forecast  that  modem  howitzer  fire  would 
dominate  modern  fortification. 

The  Meuse  was  crossed  by  the  Germans  at 
St.  Mihiel  at  the  week-end.  But  after  ^this  crossing 
there  was  no  advance.  None  (apparently)  for  days  ! 
An  action  took  place  upon  the  left  bank  which  forced 
the  invaders  back  towaixls  the  stream.  They  were 
not  compelled  to  recross  the  Meuse,  but  their  advance 
was  checked.  Since  then  there  has  been  nothing  to 
show  us  whether  a  great  movement  were  intended 
or  no. 

The  whole  thing  is  of  a  piece  with  what  the 
war  has  shoA\Ti  us  elsewhere,  to  wit,  that  modem 
pennanent  works  have  not  the  resisting  power  which 
was  expected  of  them,  but  that  troops  in  the  open 
npon  the  defensive  have  a  greater  resisting  power 
than  was  exjiected  of  them.  The  whole  of  last 
Sunday  the  movement  still  remained  hung  up, 
perhaps  on  accovmt  of  losses,  perhaps  because  the 
German  advance  was  not  in  great  force  after  all.  The 
whole  of  the  Monday  it  still  remained  hung  up  ;  the 
lack  of  movement  being  ascribed  upon  that  day  to  a 
dense  fog  which  covered  the  Woeuvre  country.  The 
whole  of  Tuesday  it  remained  hung  up.  I  write  this 
on  Wednesday  evening,  and  of  AVednesday  we  have 
no  news. 

AleanwhUe,  one  indication  that  the  Gennan 
advance  was  not  as  yet  being  conducted  in  greater 
force  was  afforded  by  the  news  that  the  garrison  of 
Toid  had  been  able  to  get  north  against  the  Hank  of 
that  advance  as  far  as  Beaumont,  This  jjoint  had 
been  reached  by  the  columns  marching  north  from 
Toul  very  shortly  after  the  moment  when  the  first 
crossing  of  the  ileuse  by  the  Germans  at  St.  JMihiel 
Avas  effected.  If  the  French  have  been  able  to  maintain 
those  positions  at  Beaumont  they  seriously  threaten 
tlie  supply  of  the  Gennan  columns  crossing  at  St. 
Mihiel.  .  There  is  another  indication  in  the  same 
sense :  The  troops  acting  from  Verdun  and  marching 
south  advanced  in  the  com-se  of  Sunday  and  Monday. 
How  far  they  advanced  an  official  Froudi  coinninniqiK'. 
has  told  us.     They  reached  the  work  at  Troyon,  and 


that  work  stands.  Coupled  with  the  advance  of  the 
Toul  garrison  to  the  north,  this  corresponding  move- 
ment from  Verdim  southwards  points  to  the  presence 
of  smaller  rather  than  greater  nimibers  in  the  German 
advance  upon  St.  Mihiel  and  across  the  Meuse  there. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  must  note  that,  whether  for 
purposes  of  distraction  and  of  making  the  French 
command  take  the  thing  too  seriously,  or  as  a  piece  of 
real  news,  the  German  Government  has  put  into  the 
German  Press  strong  statements  to  the  effect  that 
this  German  advance  across  the  Meuse  at  St.  Mihiel 
is  being  made  in  force  and  may  prove  decisive. 

So  much  at  the  moment  of  writing  (Wednesday 
evening)  is  all  we  know  upon  this  important  and 
perhaps  critical  development  of  the  campaign. 

The  line  of  forts,  hitherto  a  wall,  between  Toul 
and  Verdun  is  broken.  The  enemy  may  or  may  not 
intend  to  use  that  advantage  seriously.  They  may 
or  may  not  be  able.     But  the  hole  is  there. 

With  this  I  conclude  the  review  of  operations  in 
the  western  field  of  war.  One  very  important  develop- 
ment in  that  field,  the  siege  of  Antwerp,  has  opened 
as  these  lines  go  to  press,  but  this  operation  has  not 
at  the  moment  of  writing  proceeded  far  enough  to 
permit  of  any  useful  summary  of  its  progress  being 
made  this  week. 

THE    OPERATIONS    IN    THE    EAST. 


^  O  s  T  R 

I.- ._> 

utarcliijiq  •*-* 


R  E 


What  has  happened  in  the  eastern  theatre  of 
war  this  week  may  be  put  into  two  sentences.  The 
Gemian  invasion  of  Russia  is  still  at  a  deadlock  upon 
the  Niemen.  The  Russian  invasion  of  Galicia  is  still 
moving  westward  towards  Cracow,  and  still  at  the 
pace  to  which  Ave  have  now  grown  accustomed  dm'ing 
the  whole  month  of  September.  It  is  a  slow  but  a 
regular  advance,  which  it  has  been  said  here  more 
than  once  cannot  be  of  effect  in  exercising  "  pressure  " 
on  industrial  Germany  before,  at  earliest,  the  third 
Aveek  of  October. 

But  the  interest  of  the  position  in  the  eastern 
theatre  of  Avar  does  not  consist  in  these  expected  and, 
as  it  Avero,  regular  developments.  It  consists  in  this 
much  larger  question ;    which  of  two  great  and  widely 


LAND    AND     WATER 


October  3,  1914 


separated  battlefields   wiU  detemiiue   the   immediate 
future  of  the  campaign  in  Poland  ? 

I  say  Poland,  because  Ave  must  never  forget  that 
the  country  where  all  this  lighting  is  going  on,  from 
the  Baltic  to  the  Cai-pathians,  though  hithorio  artifi- 
cially divided  under  the  rule  of  Gennany,  llussiii,  and 
Austria,  is  really  one  country  with  an  intense  and 
living  national  soid.  This  soul  it  is  largely  the 
purpose  of  our  Allies  to  release,  and  certainly  the 
purpose  of  the  Prussian  Power  to  maintain  in 
subjection. 

To  return  to  the  two  battlefields.  There  is  one 
northern  one  u|X)n  the  Frontiers  of  East  Prussia, 
another  southern  one  in  Galicia. 

lIl)on  the  north  the  German  armies  have  in\aded 
Russia.  Tliey  have  crossed  the  Russian  frontier  in 
the  Government  of  Suwalki,  and  have  approached  the 
line  of  the  Niemen.  Tliey  have  attempted  and 
hitherto  failed  to  force  this  line  at  the  point  of 
Druskiniki,  somewhat  below  Grodno.  A  little  above 
tliis  point,  the  Russian  forces  wliich  are  defending  the 
line  of  the  Niemen  and  opposing  the  invasion,  ci-oss 
the  river  and  extend  through  the  fore.it  district  of 
Augustoff,  almost  to  the  Prussian  frontier.  All  this 
is,  by  the  way,  the  theatfe  of  the  first  operations  in 
Napoleon's  gi-eat  campaign  of  1812. 

Now  this  considerable  but  hitherto  not  decisive 
German  pressure  against  the  Russian  armies  in  the 
north,  this  invasion  of  Russian  temtory,  and  this 
struggle  for  the  crossing  of  a  Russian  river,  would, 
if  it  stood  alone,  be  comparable  to  the  struggle  in  the 
western  theatre  of  war  for  the  line  of  the  Upper 
Meuse  and  of  the  Aisne.  More,  we  should  be 
considering  a  Gennan  offensive  possessed  of  the 
initiative ;  and  though  we  should  not  in  the  case  of 
Russia  presuppose  the  German  objective  to  be  either 
a  march  upon  the  Russian  capital,  or  any  other 
serious  form  of  invasion,  yet  we  should  not  be 
discounting  the  chances  of  a  Russian  retreat.  It  is 
the  Germans  who  are  advancing  here  as  they  were 
until  recently  in  the  "West. 

But  the  great  difference  between  the  eastern 
theatre  of  war  and  the  western,  is  that  this  Niemen 
battlefield  is  balanced  by  a  very  different  state  of 
affairs  between  200  and  300  miles  off  to  the  south 
in  Galicia.  To  continue  the  parallel  with  the 
west :  the  whole  thing  is  as  though,  while  our 
enemies  were  fighting  to  force  the  Aisne  and  the 
Upper  Meuse,  we  had  di-iven  another  body  of  them 
back  through  Lombardy  and  were  ap2)roaching 
Milan,  which  was  for  them  a  point  of  capital 
importance — a  point  wdiere  our  "  pressure "  upon 
them  and  the  anxiety  they  would  feel  for  their  safety 
woidd  become  acute. 

For  the  Russian  armies  which  have  invaded  the 
Austrian  Empire  so  successfully  in  Galicia  are  now 
not  only  proceeding  at  a  regular  rate  (including  all 
that  they  carry  or  mask  by  the  way)  of  about  eight 
miles  in  a  day,  but  a.re  pointing  directly  at  that  first  part 
of  the  Gennan  temtoiy  upon  which  they  can  exercise 
severe  pressure  when  they  reach  it — the  rich  industrial 
district  of  Silesia,  with  its  chief  centre  and  fortress 
at  Breslau. 

The  Russian  detachments  sent  across  the  Car- 
pathians towards  the  Hungarian  plain  are  but  flanking 
Iwdies.  The  mai-ch  of  the  mass  of  the  Russian  Annies 
is  this  field  is  directly  along  the  main  railway  line  from 
Lembcrg  (which  was  carried  exactly  a  month  ago) 
through  Jaroslav  to  Cracow.  The  Russians  have 
already  isolated  and  contained  Przemysl.  Their  van 
has  reached  Dembitza,  si.\ty  miles  west  of  Jaroslav. 
They  are  well  within  a  fortnight  of  Cracow  unless 


a  retai-ding  action  is  fought  against  them  by  the 
retreating  Austro-Prussian  forces.  They  are  sulfi- 
ciently  numerous  to  mask  Cracow  as  they  have  ma.sked 
Przemysl,  and  this  done,  if  their  advance  continues  at 
it  present  rate,  the  "  jiressm-e "  of  which  we  have 
heard  so  much,  the  "pressure"  which  Russia  has  to 
exercise  upon  the  German  Empire  will  begin.  For 
the  head  of  the  invading  troops  will  be  in  the  industrial 
province  of  SUesia,  levying  ransom  and  doing  all  those 
things  which  incline  one's  enemy  to  peace. 

Now  it  is  a  principle  universal  in  strategics  that 
you  must  not  get  "off-side."  That  is,  you  must  not 
be  so  far  beyond  your  general  line  that  your  enemy, 
or  a  portion  of  his  forces,  can  get  upon  your  communi- 
cations behind  the  too  forward  position  which  you 
occupy.  Even  a  salient  in  a  line  is  dangerous  if  it  is 
too  pronounced.  To  put  it  simply,  a  body  which  has 
got  in  front  of  its  fellows  is  in  danger  of  being  cut  off. 
That,  by  the  way,  is  what  happened  to  the  two 
Russian  Ai-my  Corps  in  East  Prussia  a  month  ago, 
when  they  were  cut  up  by  the  Germans  round 
Tannenberg. 

In  conformity  with  this  principle,  it  was  a  sound 
deduction  to  presume  that  there  would  be  no  serious 
advance  through  Silesia  until  East  Prussia  was  cleared 
of  any  large  Gennan  forces,  until,  that  is,  the  fortified 
line  Thorn— Dantzig  on  the  lower  Vistula  was  passed 
by  the  Russian  annies  invading  by  the  north,  as  their 
fellows  were  invading  by  the  south. 

This  principle  would  still  hold  if  the  Germans  in 
East  Prussia  had  remained  upon  the  defensive  ;  but 
with  the  present  paradoxical  situation  this  principle 
does  not  hold.  The  Prussian  forces  advancing  upon 
the  Niemen  are  very  far  from  being  abreast  of  their 
defeated  fellows  and  Allies  in  the  south.  Each 
advance  may  be  regarded  as  being  "off -.side."  The 
Russians  advancing  and  attacking  in  Galicia  are 
far  ahead  of  the  Russian  defence  and  retreat  on  to 
the  Niemen.  The  Germans  advancing  on  the  Niemen 
are  far  aliead  of  the  Austro-Gemian  retreat  in  Galicia. 

Two  considerations,  however,  enable  us  to  make 
something  of  tliis  topsy-turvy  double  plan  of  campaign. 
The  first  is  the  distance  between  the  two  main  fields 
of  battle  in  this  eastern  theatre  of  war  ;  the  second  is 
the  comparative  size  of  the  forces  involved. 

The  great  distance  of  the  fighting  on  the  Niemen. 
from  the  fighting  in  Galicia  renders  the  operations 
independent  of  each  other,  at  least  for  many  weeks. 
There  is  no  tkreat  from  the  north  upon  the  Russian 
communications  in  the  south,  in  spite  of  the  German 
advance  in  the  north.  There  is  no  threat  from  the 
south  upon  the  German  communications  in  the  north, 
in  spite  of  the  Russian  advance  in  the  south.  In 
other  words,  the  paradox  of  a  Gei-man  force  content 
to  advance  on  the  right  of  a  great  field  v/hUe  its  fellows 
and  allies  are  in  fuU  retreat  on  the  left  of  the  same  is 
tolerable  for  some  little  time  because  that  field  is  so 
vast  that  many  days  would  be  required  before  success 
or  failure  at  one  extremity  could  be  felt  at  the  other. 

It  remains  true  that  one  of  these  two  advances — 
either  the  German  in  the  north  or  the  Russian  in  the 
south — will  ultimately  compel  even  a  distant  enemy 
to  retrace  his  steps.  Sooner  or  later  the  German 
advance  from  East  Prussia,  if  it  is  continued,  will 
compel  the  southern  Russian  armies  in  Galicia  to  halt 
and  retire,  or  the  advance  of  the  Russian  ai-mies  in 
Galicia  will  compel  the  advance  of  the  German  armies 
upon  the  Niemen  to  halt  and  retire. 

And  it  is  here  that  the  factor  of  numbers  comes 
in.  Tlie  operations  in  the  south — that  is,  in  Galicia — 
have  been  so  decisive  and  so  continuous  as  from  this 
cause  alone  to  give  them  a  preponderance  over  the 


10* 


October  3,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATEK 


operations  in  the  north,  in  East  Prussia,  and  the  basin 
of  the  Niemen.  But  apart  from  this,  the  niunbers  of 
tlic  Eussian  advance  in  the  south  are  so  great  that 
Avithout  a  doubt,  if  it  is  continued,  it  "vvill  be  the 
deciding  factor  in  all  the  eastern  theatre  of  the  war. 

In  other  -words,  gi-anted  that  the  advance  in  Galicia 
continues  at  its  present  rate,  and  granted  that  the 


Prussian  success  in  approaching  the  Niemen  is  con- 
tinued by  a  crossing  of  that  river,  it  is  the  former 
operation  that  will  check  the  latter.  It  is  the  Eussian 
pr(3gi-ess  upon  Silesia  that,  under  such  conditions, 
would  necessarily  recall  the  Prussian  forces  now 
operating  in  the  north  against  the  line  of  the 
Niemen. 


A    DIARY    OF    THE    WAR. 


SYNOPSIS. 

August  24i'H. — It  was  announced  tliiit  Namur  had  fallen. 

The  British  forces  were  engaged  all  day  on  Sunday  and  after  dark 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Mous,  and  held  their  ground.  Lunevillo  was 
occupied  by  the  Germans. 

August  27th. — Mr.  Churchill  announced  in  the  House  that  the 
German  armed  merchantman  Kaiser  Wilhebii  chr  Grosse  had  been 
sunk  by  H.M.S.  Uiijhflijer  on  the  West  Africa  Coast. 

August  28th. — A  concerted  operation  was  attempted  against  the 
Germans   in   the   Heligoland   Bight. 

The  First  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  sank  the  Mainz.  The  First 
Battle  Cruiser  Squadron  sank  one  cruiser,  Koln  class,  and  another 
cruiser  disappeared  in  the  mist,  heavily  on  fire,  and  in  _a  sinking 
condition. 

Two  German  destroyers  were  sunk  and  many  damaged.  The  total 
British  casualties  amounted  to  sixty-nine  killed  and  wounded. 

Lord  Kitchener  announced  that  "  The  Government  have  decided 
that  our  Army  in  France  shall  be  increased  by  two  divisions  and  a 
cavalry  division,  besides  other  troops  from  India." 

September  1st. — The  Russians  met  with  a  check  in  East  Prussia, 
but  were  successful  in  minor  engagements  in  Galicia. 

September  2nd. — Continuous  fighting  was  in  progress  along  almost 
the  whole  line  of  battle.  The  British  Cavalry  engaged,  with  distinc- 
tion, the  Cavalry  of  the  enemy,  pushed  them  back,  and  captured  ten 
euns.  The  French  Army  gained  ground  in  the  Lorraine  region.  The 
Russian  Army  completely  routed  four  Austrian  Army  Corps  near 
Lemberg,  capturing  150  guns. 

September  3bd. — The  French  Government  moved  to  Bordeaux. 

September  4th. — The  Russian  Army  under  General  Ruzsky,  cap- 
tured Lemberg,  and  the  Army  of  General  Brussiloff  took  Halicz. 

September  5th. — The  formal  alliance  of  England,  France,  and 
Russia  was  signed  in  London  by  the  representatives  of  the  three 
Governments  concerned,  bindinf;  each  nation  to  conclude  peace,  or 
discuss  terms  of  peace,  only  in  conjunction  with  its  Allies. 

September  6th. — It  was  announced  that  the  scout-cruiser  Path- 
finder  foundered  on  Saturday  afternoon  after  running  upon  a  mine. 

September  7th.— General  Joffres'  plans  were  being  steadily  cariied 
out.  The  Allied  forces  acted  on  the  offensive  and  were  successful  in 
checking  and  forcing  back  in  a  northeasterly  direction  the  German 
forces  opposed  to  them. 

September  8th. — The  Allies  gained  ground  on  the  left  wing  along 
the  line  of  the  Ourcq  and  the  Petit  Morin  river.  Here  the  British 
troops  drove  the  enemy  back  ten  miles.  Further  to  the  right,  from 
Vitry-le-Francois  to  Sermaise-les-Baina  the  enemy  was  pressed  back 
in  the  direction  of  Rlieims. 

Skitember  9rH. — The  English  Army  crossed  the  Marne,  and  the 
enemy  retired  about  twenty-five  miles. 

September  11th. — Our  let  Army  Corps  captured  twelve  Maxim 
guns  and  some  prisoners,  and  our  2nd  Army  Corps  took  350  prisoners 
and  a  battery. 

September  13th. — On  the  left  wing  the  enemy  continued  his  retreat- 
ing movement.  The  Belgian  Army  pushed  forward  a  vigorous  offensive 
to  the  south  of  Lierre. 

SEPTEvaER  14th.— All  day  the  enemy  ntubbomly  disputed  the 
pa.<!eage  of  the  Aisne  by  our  troops,  but  nearly  all  the  crossings  were 
secured  by  sunset.  On  our  right  and  left  the  French  troops  were 
confronted  with  a  similar  task,  in  which  they  were  successful. 

Sfptemser  15th. — The  Allied  troops  occupied  Rheims.  Six 
hundred  prisoners  and  twelve  guns  were  captured  by  the  Corps  on 
the  ri^ht  of  the  British. 

Sepiember  16th.— Submarine  E9,  Lieutenant-Commander  Max 
Kennedy  Horton,  returned  safely  after  having  torpedoed  the  German 
cruiser  Hela,  six  miles  south  of  Heligoland. 

Seitj;mbrr  19th. — The  Russian  army  seized  tli«  fortified  positions 
of  Sieniawa  and  Sanibor. 

September  20rn. — Rheims  Cathedral  was  wantonly  bombarded,  and 
nothing  is  left  but  the  four  bare  walls. 

The  British  auxiliary  cruiser  Cannania,  Captain  Noel  Grant,  Royal 
Kavy,  sank  the  Cap  Trafalgar  off  the  east  coast  of  South  America. 
The  action  lasted  one  hour  and  forty-five  minutes,  when  the  German 
ship  capsized  and  sunk,  her  survivors  being  rescued  by  an  empty 
collier. 

Sei>tember  22.SD.— H.M.  ships  Abotikir,  Uoque,  and  Cresty  were 
sunk  by  submarines  in  the  North  Sea.  The  Aboukir  was  torpedoed, 
and  whilst  the  lloijue  and  the  CreH^.y  had  closed  and  were  standing 
by  to  save  the  crew,   they  were  also  toi-pedoed. 

SEPTEMSEn  23rtn.— British  aeroplanes  of  the  Xaval  wing  delivered 
an  attack  on  the  Zeppelin  sheds  at  Diisseldorf  and  Flight-Lieuten.int 
Ci)llf-t  dropped  thre«  bombs  on  a  Zeppelin  shed,  approacliing  within 
SO)  leeL 


DAY    BY    DAY. 

FRIDAY,    SEPTEMBER    2Sth. 

The  Gcinian  right  wing  was  strengthened  by  the  transfer  of 
Army  Corps  botli  from  the  centre  of  their  line  and  from  their  left 
in  Lorraine  and  the  ^''osge.s.  This  force  concentrated  near 
St.  Quentin,  was  attacked  by  the  French  operating  between  the 
Somme  and  the  Oise.  A  general  and  very  vigorous  action  took 
place  in  this  quarter.  Along  the  line  of  the  Aisne  there  was 
little  change  in  the  general  position. 

SATURDAY,    SEPTEMBER    26th. 

There  was  much  activity  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  all  along 
the  line.  Some  heavy  counter-attacks  were  repulsed,  and 
considerable  loss  was  inflicted  on  the  enemy. 

SUNDAY,    SEPTEMBER    27th. 

On  Our  Left  Wing.— Between  the  Oise  and  the  Somme 
and  to  the  north  of  the  Somme,  the  battle  continued  along  a  very 
extensive  front  with  perceptible  progress  on  our  part.  From  the 
Oise  to  Rheims  the  Germans  at  several  places  made  very  furious 
attacks,  some  carried  to  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  but  all  repulsed. 
The  lines  of  the  French  and  German  trenches  were  in  many  places 
only  a  few  hundred  yards  apart. 

In  the  Centrk. — From  Rheims  to  Souain  the  Prus.sian 
Guard  attempted,  but  without  success,  a  vigorou.s  offensive 
movement,  and  were  thrown  back  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Berru 
and  Nogent  I'Abbesse.  From  Souain  to  the  Argonne  the  enemy 
gained  some  advantage  in  the  course  of  their  attacks  yesterday 
morning  between  the  road  from  Somme-Py  and  Chalons-sm-- 
Mame  and  the  railway  line  from  Sainte-Menehould  to  Vouziera. 
By  the  evening  our  troops  regained  the  ground  they  had  lost. 
Between  the  Argonne  and  the  Meuse  there  was  nothing  new  to 
report.  In  the  south  of  the  Woeuvre  the  Germans  occupied  a  line 
which  passed  through  St.  Mihicl  and  the  north-west  of  Pont-a- 
Moussom. 

MONDAY,    SEPTEMBER    28tli. 

There  was  no  change  in  the  general  situation.  Comparative 
calm  reigned  on  part  of  the  front.  Nevertheless  at  certain  points, 
notably  between  the  Aisne  and  the  Argonne,  the  enemy  made 
further  violent  attacks  which  were  repulsed. 

TUESDAY,    SEPTEMBER    29th. 

There  was  practically  no  change  in  the  situation.  The 
Allied  left  had  some  very  heax^-  fighting,  but  they  well  held 
their  own. 


SPORTSMAN'S    BATTALION. 

The  Sportsman's  Battalion  is  a  corps  for  gentlemen  up  to 
forty-five  years  of  age,  and  only  those  exceptionally  fit  and 
accustomed  to  outdoor  sport  are  accepted.  It  is  the  only  corps 
in  England  for  which  the  age  limit  has  been  specially  extended 
by  the  authorities,  and  has  been  sanctioned  by  Lord  Kitchener, 
who  has  expressed  his  thanks  for  the  offer  of  its  services. 
Directly  its  full  complement  has  been  reached  and  passed  by 
the  authorities  it  becomes  a  unit  of  the  regular  Army.  The  Chief 
Recruiting  Officer  is  E.  Cuncliffe-Owen,  and  the  recruiting 
station  is  the  Indian  Room,  Hotel  Cecil,  London,  applicants 
being  seen  from  ten  in  the  morning  until  six  in  the  evening. 
Recruiting  officers  have  also  vi.sited  various  provincial  centres. 

The  corps  is  an  infantry  one,  the  training  will  be  the  ordinary 
infantry  training— its  length  dependent,  of  course,  on  the 
recruits'  proficiency — and  the  medical  examination  the  ordinary 
Army  examination.  Payment  at  Army  rates.  Payment  by  the 
recruit  for  his  equipment  is  optional. 

Among  applicant.s  are  :— Victor  Hughes  Hallett  (Raymond 
Carew),  a  well-known  sporting  writer ;  Sylvester  Stannard, 
R.B.S. ;  Sydney  Smith,  brother  of  Mr.  F.  E.  Smith  ;  Mr.  John 
Charleton,  of  Ludlow,  owner  of  a  pack  of  hounds ;  and  Mr. 
Rupert  Tattersall.  The  corps  is  announced  as  for  gentlemen 
\ip  to  forty-five  years  of  age  accustomed  to  sport.  It  must  not 
be  suppo.sed  for  a  moment  that  money  is  a  bar  to  the  recruit ; 
nil  suitable  applicants  are  welcome,  and  there  are  no  compulsoiy 
expenses. 


11» 


LAND    AND     WATER 


October  3,  1914 


THE   WAR  BY  WATER. 

By   FRED   T.   JANE. 


^"> 


■f 


l»>" 


CATTAROC Torpedo  base) 


General  line  of 
Franco-British 
blockade 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN. 

IT  appears  ttafc  Cattaro,  an  important  Austrian  torpedo 
base,  is  now  being  vigorously  attacked  by  tlie  Franco- 
British  Fleet.  Thiee  Austrian  battleships  are  said  to  be 
inside  the  harbour.  It  may  be  so  :  but  they  will  pro- 
bably turn  out  to  be  old  coast  defence  ships  at  the  best. 
We  are  also  told  of  further  losses  to  Austrian  torpedo  craft 
blown  up  by  theii  own  mines.  These  stories  may  be  true  :  but 
they  bear  a  suspicious  resemblance  to  events  of  some  weeks  ago. . 
The  Austrians  have  made  such  an  extraordinary  muddle  on 
land  that  it  is  always  possible  that  they  have  done  something  of 
the  same  kind  at  sea.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Austrian  Navy 
was  of  known  efficiency  in  the  ordinary  way. 

It  has  no  prospects  whatever  of  accomplishing  anything, 
and  I  am  strongly  inclined  to  believe  that  (except  perhaps  a  few 
old  vessels  of  no  fighting  value)  it  is  all  safely  inside  the  defences 
of  Pola,  and  will  remain  there,  trusting  to  luck  that  the  conclu- 
sion of  hostilities  will  see  it  as  a  force  of  some  kind  of  poten- 
tiality. In  matters  of  this  sort  we  must  not  accept  what  we 
would  Like  to  see,  but  what  is  the  obvious  thing  to  do. 

Now,  it  would  be  obviously  ridiculous  for  the  Austrians  to 
split  themselves  into  tliree  isolated  divisions,  as  they  have  been 
reported  as  having  done.  It  would  simply  be  asking  for  the 
ultimate  destruction  of  one  or  perhaps  aD  three  of  the  divisions. 

It  is  infinitely  more  probable  that  they  have  accepted  the 
inevitable  and  adopted  the  only  wise  course  of  refusing  to  be 
drawn  into  action. 

It  is  probable  that  Cattaro  will  ultimately  be  reduced. 
Since  Lissa  has  already  been  occupied,  it  will  form  a  convenient 
base  for  the  blockade  of  the  Adriatic.    But  beyond  that  we 


should  not  expect  too  much.  If  a  superior  fleet  prevents  over- 
seas supplies  and  destroys  trade  it  has  accomplished  the  main 
purpose  for  which  a  fleet  exists.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  the  public 
would  do  well  to  remember  that  point. 

Indeed,  it  may  be  questioned  whether  (supposing  the 
fortifications  to  be  as  important  as  reported)  operations  against 
Cattaro  were  necessary  or  advisable,  ezce^l  in  so  far  as  the 
provision  of  a  handy  base  may  have  been  a  prime  necessity. 
Naval  warfare  only  accidentally  consists  of  "  Tsushimas  "  :  the 
real  work  is  far  better  expressed  in  that  Mahad  phrase,  "  The 
silent  pressure  of  Sea  Power." 

Battles  come  under  the  head  of  clumsy  necessities.  The  real 
measure  of  success  in  naval  operations  is  the  stultifying  of  any 
efforts  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  Good  chess  players  do  not  go 
in  for  a  reckless  exchange  of  pieces  in  the  hopes  that  something 
may  result  therefrom.  They  play  for  the  definite  object  of 
checkmate.  The  main  rules  of  naval  warfare  are  singularly 
analogous  to  the  rules  of  chess. 

ON    THE    HIGH    SEAS   GENERALLY. 

On  September  22nd  the  German  cruiser  Emden  appeared 
ofi  Madras  at  9  p.m.,  and  her  first  two  shots  succeeded  in 
firing  some  of  the  petroleum  tanks  of  the  Burma  Oil  Company. 
These  tanks  are  fully  exposed  in  the  open  roadstead,  but  at 
the  same  time  the  Emden  made  such  remarkably  good  shooting, 
seeing  it  was  night,  that  it  seems  clear  that  she  must  have  been 
in  possession  of  very  accurate  knowledge  as  to  the  exact  location 
of  the  tanks. 

The  exact  damage  done  was  not  very  great — roughly,  about 
£20,000.    Probably  doing  damage  was  aot  so  much  the  prime 


12* 


OctoLcr  3,  1914 


LAND     AND    WATER 


objective  as  "  moral  effect  "  on  the  population  of  India.  Anglo- 
Indians  tell  me  tliat  they  think  that  the  Emden's  performances 
in  this  direction  are,  they  surmise,  alreadj'  very  considerable, 
and  that  unless  she  is  speedily  brought  to  book  they  will  be 
greater  still. 

There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  this  is  what  the  Germans 
are  trying  to  do.  "  Shake  confidence  in  the  British  Raj  "  is 
much  more  probably  the  order  than  ""  Destroy  British  trade  by 
every  means  in  your  power." 

The  Emden,  of  course,  will  ultimately  be  captured  or 
destroyed.  This  may  easil}-  happen  before  these  hues  are  in 
print,  "especially  as  she  can  now  no  longer  retreat  safely  to  German 
New  Guinea  or  the  Bismarck  Archipelago. 

The  Australian  forces  have  now  virtually  captured  the 
whole  of  these  German  possessions,  although  the  number  of 
men  engaged  compared  to  the  area  occupied  is  such  that  con- 
siderable bays  for  replenishing  supplies  may  yet  be  available. 

For  the  rest,  it  may  be  conceded  that  if  the  captain  of  the 
Emden  lives  through  he  will  certainly  have  earned  special 
promotion  for  having  conducted  matters  against  us  along  the  best 
possible  scientific  lines.  His  ship  is  undoubtedly  being  well 
iiandled,  and  it  will  do  us  no  harm  to  remember  that  here,  as 
elsewhere,  the  Germans  have  made  no  bad  mistakes,  since  the 
initial  error  of  the  Goeben. 


joj 


^ 


51\1-    TO    INDICATE    THK    PLACES   WHEEl    THK    GEBMAX    CBCISKRS 

UATE   OPKKATED. 
KA — ILUtLSBUmC,  KG — K0N108BKB0,  K.W. — KAISER  WII.HKLM    DIR 
OBOS8B,    D — DEESDEN,    B — EMDKN      (tHS     KAISER    WII.HELM    DEB 
OBOfiSE's    EFFORT    OFF    ICELAND    WAS    MERELT    A   FISUING    BOAT). 

This  should  not  be  taken  to  imply  that  we  have  made 
mistakes,  but  it  should  certainly  be  taken  as  implying  that 
the  task  being  accomplished  by  our  Navy  is  a  very  considerable 
one ;  that  we  have  certain  weak  points,  that  the  Germans  have 
ahown  themselves  singularly  cognisant  of  these,  and  that  the 
British  public  must  not  expect  bricks  to  be  made  without  straw. 
1  There  is  now  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  apparent 
incoherence  of  the  German  commerce  war  in  the  early  days  was 
part  of  a  settled  and  clever  scheme — intended  to  lull  us  into  a 
false  sense  of  security. 

But  as  the  just  issued  ofllcial  list,  corrected  to  September  23rd, 
only  reports  a  total  bag  of  twelve  ships  of  about  59,000  tons 
between  Augu.st  6th  and  September  18th,  and  at  least  six  raiders 
were  employed,  it  is  abundantly  clear  that — although  only  two 
corsairs  (both  armed  hners)  have  been  disposed  of — the  British 
Xavy  has  certainly  cried  "  Clieck "  to  most  of  the  German 
moves.  This  is  the  utmost  that  we  can  reasonably  expect 
outside  the  chapter  of  luck  and  accident. 

The  list  of  captures  is  somewhat  interesting.    It  is : — 

Emd'n  ..         ..         ..         . .  0  ships  totally  20,443  tons. 

Dre3den            2     „            „       29,988  „ 

Kaiser  Wilhelm  der  Orossc  . .  2     „            „    .     2,458  „ 

Koniijuherg        1      „            „         6,800  „ 

Karliruhc         .,         ,,         . .  1     „            „        4,650  „ 

Cap  Tra/algar . .         ..         ..  0     „            „               0  „ 

The  Kaiser  Wilhelm  der  Grosse  had  also  a  fishing  boat  of 
227  tons  to  her  credit  account.  The  total  number  of  fishing 
boats  destroyed  by  warships  in  and  aroim'd  the  North  Sea  is 
twenty-three. 

Tlie  same  report  gives  the  total  bag  by  mines  as  eight  British, 
five  Danes,  one  Swede,  and  one  Norwegian.  That  is  to  say, 
taking  proportions  into  account,  the  bulk  of  the  daniflge  has  been 
<lone  to  neutral  merchant  shipping.  Only  the  Dutch  have  been 
fortunate  enough  to  .sustain  no  loss. 

The  Emden  hps  reappeared  and  sunk  four  British  merchant 
■ships  valued  at  apj-roximateiy  £2f)0,(K)0.  This  exploit,  however, 
does  not  materially  affect  the  main  situation. 


THE    BALTIC. 

Reports  from  various  sources,  which  on  the  face  of  them 
appear  to  be  quite  authentic,  have  been  received  to  the  effect 
that  the  Russian  armoured  cruiser  Bayan  has  sunk  a  German 
cruiser  and  two  German  torpedo  boats  which  she  encountered 
mine-laying  in  the  Baltic.  The  story  of  the  cruiser  is  improbable, 
and  it  is  far  more  likely  that  the  simken  ship  is  one  of  the  special 
mine-layers,  Albatross  or  Naxtihts,  which  displace  somewhere 
around  2,000  tons  and  are  capable  of  from  twenty  to  twenty -one 
knots  speed.  These  boats  carry  400  mines  each.  Or  it  may 
have  been  the  old  fifteen-knot  Pelilan,  which  is  the  third  regular 
mine-layer  of  the  German  Na\y. 

Pending  some  further  official  German  report  on  the  matter, 
it  may  be  wiser  to  accept  the  whole  story  with  a  certain  amount 
of  caution.  Generally  speaking,  Gennan  reports  have  been 
quite  as  correct  as  our  own,  or  any  of  those  issued  by  our  Allies. 
The  story  of  the  two  German  divisions  engaging  each  other 
which  I  commented  on  last  week  has  not  been  officially  reported 
in  Germany,  but  that  omission  is  merely  human  nature.  Their 
official  story  of  the  Heligoland  aSair  was  quite  accurate,  ^d  it 
is  vouched  for  by  the  circumstance  that  they  admit  a  heavier 
loss  than  we  had  claimed  in  our  own  official  report. 

Consequently,  we  had  best  take  the  German  official  as  true. 
The  probable  real  happening  is  that  the  Bayan  sank  one  mine- 
layer and  two  nondescripts  which  were  with  her.  This  much 
we  can  take  between  the  lines  of  the  somewhat  vague  German 
official  statement. 

Everything  done  by  Germany  to  date  has  been  absolutely 
according  to  plans  and  the  losses  sustained  have  been  relatively 
slight,  probably  less  than  the  Germans  had  anticipated.  In  the 
Baltic  Russia  is  playing  against  Germany  a  practically  similar 
game  to  that  which  the  Germans  are  playing  against  us  in  the 
North  Sea.  Germany  appears  to  be  keeping  open  her 
Scandinavian  trade,  which  just  now  is  of  immense  importance 
to  her. 

In  another  month  or  so  a  fresh  situation  will  arrive,  because 
the  ice  will  be  beginning  to  form.  At  present,  so  far  as  has 
been  reported,  Libau  is  the  Russian  naval  base.  Libau^is  an 
ice-free  harbour,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  its  fortifications  are  weak, 
and  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  Russians  will  risk  being  blockaded 
in  it.  It  is  by  no  means  improbable  that  they  will  shortly  retire 
on  Kronstadt,  where — according  to  the  usual  peace  programme — 
they  would  be  frozen  in. 

In  this  connection  everything  depends  upon  how  soon 
the  battleships  of  the  Gangoot  class  can  be  got  ready  for  sea. 
Not  only  are  these  vessels  altogether  superior  in  fighting  value 
to  the  German  reserve  vessels  which  are  operating  in  the  Baltic, 
but  each  of  them  is — by  a  remarkable  stroke  of  Russian 
Admiralty  prescience — fitted  with  an  ice-breaker  bow.  Conse- 
quently, if  the  Russians  retire  on  Kronstadt,  it  by  no  means 
follows  that  they  will  be  demobilised  there,  as  the  Germans 
may  be  inclined  to  calculate. 

I  am  by  no  means  sure  that  of  the  two  menaces  from  which 
the  German  Fleet  suffers,  the  British -Fleet  in  the  North  Sea 
and  the  Russian  Fleet  in  the  Baltic,  the  Russian  may  not  be 
the  greater  menace  of  the  two,  once  the  new  ships  are  ready. 
The  "  reason  why  "  is  as  follows  : 

From  the  general  position  we  can  gather  that  the  German 
Admiralty  in  its  plans  has  made  full  allowance  for  the  British 
blockade,  and  all  that  it  has  accomplished.  But  it  is  by  no 
means  so  clear  that  they  made  sufficient  allowance  for  the  factor 
of  the  Russian  Fleet,  and  its  possible  influence  on  their  trade 
with  Sweden.  The  Press  campaign  which  the  German  agents 
are  carrying  on  in  Sweden  is  confirmation  of  this  theory.  Sweden, 
as  I  mentioned  last  week,  is  in  the  unfortunate  position  of  having 
long  and  grave  suspicions  of  Russia  and  her  designs,  and  to  that 
extent  she  was  thrown  into  the  arms  of  Germany.  She  by  now 
is  fully  aware  of  the  German  attitude  to  weak  neutrals  which 
may  be  convenient  to  her.  All  the  same,  however,  it  is  extremely 
improbable  that  in  any  circumstances  Sweden  will  take  sides. 
If  she  did,  her  conflicting  interests  would  probably  incline  her 
to  Germany,  against  whom  she  has  no  past  grievance  and  against 
whom  she  has  no  frontier.  We  have  to  remember  that  every 
patriotic  Swede  cherishes  against  Russia  on  account  of  Finland, 
much  the  same  kind  of  feeling  that  every  patriotic  Dane  has 
against  Germany  on  account  of  Schleswig-Holstein. 

THE   NORTH   SEA. 

Reading  iK-tween  the  lines,  the  Admiralty  preface  to  the 
reports  of  the  surviving  commanding  officers  of  the  three 
submarined  Cressies  is  to  the  effect  that  no  dictates  of  humanity 
should  be  allowed  to  interfere  with  the  military  duties  of  warships 
This  is  quite  right.  To  blan\e  the  Germans  for  taking  advantage 
of  tlie  fact  is  foolish — "  war  is  war." 

On  the  other  hand,  the  official  reports  of  the  commanding? 
officers  make  it  abundantly  clear  that  the  Ahouhr  was  generally 
consi(U'red  to  have  stnick  a  mine,  and  that  no  submarine  danger 
was  apprehended. 


13* 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


October  3,  1914 


The  resultant  out  of  everything  published  or  not  published 
is  that  "  Run  for  it "  is  the  only  safe  answer  to  a  submarine 
attack.  Tliis,  of  course,  is  analogous  to  the  answer  to  the  lire- 
ships  in  the  old  days.  So  the  "  new  danger  "  is  not  so  very  new 
after  aU. 

The  German  story  that  U9  alone  was  responsible  for  the 
whole  business  of  sinking  the  Cre-ssies  may  be  dismissed  at  once 
as  absurd.  L'9  has  only  three  torpedo  tubes,  and  the  250-ton 
submarine  able  to  reload  her  tubes  in  a  submerged  condition  has 
yet  to  be  invented.  There  were  certainly  two  German  sub- 
marines engaged — more  probably  from  three  to  six,  that  is  to 
say,  two  divisions,  for  submarines  work  in  threes. 

L"9  and  her  sisters  carry  two  tubes  forward  and  one  aft. 
This  after  tube  is  a  species  of  reserve  one,  and  in  a  general  way 
would  not  be  made  use  of.  The  class  is  not  big  enough  to  do 
much  in  the  way  of  carrying  spare  torpedoes,  and  it  requires 
a  good  deal  of  imagination  to  picture  any  of  them  reloading  tubes 
while  under  water  in  action  even  if  they  did. 

Now,  we  know  that  at  least  six  torjjedoes  were  fired,  of 
which  five  liit  and  one  missed.  That  is  the  number  of  torpedoes 
seen,  and  that  suggests  at  least  three  boats  which  fired  two 
torpedoes  each,  as  it  makes  no  allowance  for  unseen  torpedoes 
which  missed. 

Why  the  Germans  persistently  assert  that  J79  alone  did  the 
mischief  is  somewhat  of  a  m3-ster3\  The  most  reasonable 
explanation  is  that  f/9  did  most  of  the  work,  and  that  they  are 
seeking  to  create  the  impression  that  one  German  submarine  is 
worth  three  British  ships.  The  idea  that  {79  was  the  sole 
survivor  of  a  division  is  more  pleasurable  than  probable.  And 
since  German  reports  spoke  of  "  hopes  "  of  1/9  returning  safely, 
it  would  look  as  though  the  other  boats  had  got  back,  but  that 
the  P9  is  missing.  Only  the  Cressy  appears  to  have  fired  at 
anything,  and  she  only  two  or  three  shots,  with  moderate 
uncertainty  as  to  the  result. 

An  incident  of  some  importance  is  the  story  fairly  general 
amongst  the  survivors  of  a  mysterious  trawler  which  was  about 
at  the  time,  and  wliich  one  of  our  cruisers  was  reported  to  have 
fired  at  and  sunk.  The  suggestion  is  that  this  trawler  was 
directing  operations  under  the  guise  of  being  a  surreptitious  mine- 
layer. If  so,  the  ruse  was  certainly  a  clever  one — though  it  is 
hardly  one  which  is  likely  to  be  repeated  with  success. 

The  only  other  additional  light  thrown  on  the  disaster  from 
the  ofiicial  narratives  is  the  pleasing  absence  of  panic  in  the 
British  cruisers,  although  they  were  manned  by  scratcli  crews, 
which  had  not  long  been  together.  This  is  a  point  of  considerable 
importance,  as  although  the  Germans  rely  on  their  submarines 
to  reduce  our  maieiiel,  they  must  be  relying  to  a  still  greater 
extent  on  creating  a  moral  effect  on  the  personnel. 

The  well  authenticated  circumstance  of  the  singing  of  "  It's  a 
long,  long  way  to  Tipperary,"  and  the  jesting  response  to  the 
ffiect,  "  It  certainly  is  if  you  have  to  swim  there,"  is  a  clear 
indication  that  this  German  success  had  no  psychological  effect 
whatever  on  our  Navy. 

The  definite  Admiralty  order  to  the  effect  that  in  future  no 
big  ships  are  to  be  risked  for  lite-saving  is  the  surest  safeguard 
against  any  similar  "  regrettable  incident  "  in  the  future. 

Meanwhile,  it  may  still  pertinently  be  asked,  "  How  did  the 
Germans  cornc  to  Ije  on  the  spot  to  intercept  our  cruisers  "  ? 

I  mentioned  this  point  last  week,  and  I  repeat  it  now.  The 
odds  against  submarines,  ci-uising  aimlessly,  blundering  into 
anything,  are  very  small  indeed.  It  is  of  the  utmost  importance 
to  ascertain  the  German  system  of  information. 

THE    DUTCH   PROBLEM. 

When  first  I  raised  the  question  of  Holland  in  these  Notes 
I  did  so  as  a  subsidiary  subject,  and  in  connection  with  the 
circumstance  that  if  the  German  Army  can  be  supplied  overseas 


via  Holland,  the  starving-out  blockade  of  our  Navy  must 
necessarily  be  handicapped,  and  the  war  prolonged  accordingly. ' 

Last  week  we  heard  that  the  Dutch  Government  had  issued 
orders  as  regards  transit  of  food  stuffs.  These  orders  allow  of 
everything  which  we  can  reasonably  expect.  But,  according  to 
details  furnished  by  several  correspondents — who  give  figures 
to  prove  their  points — there  is  reason  to  query  whether  tlie  samb 
control  is  exercised  over  other  contraband.  For  instance,  a 
very  large  quantity  of  dynamite  recently  went  to  Holland. 
It  was  certified  by  the  Dutch  firm  to  which  it  was  consigned 
that  it  was  required  to  blow  up  buildings  in  the  fire  zone  of 
frontier  fortresses !  One  cannot  help  suspecting  that  some 
superfluous  tons  will  find  their  way  to  combatants  who  may  be 
short  of  the  explosive  in  question. 

In  some  quarters  there  is  a  fear  that  too  great  an  insistence 
on  our  rights,  too  strict  a  demand  for  clear  neutrality,  miglit 
involve  us  in  war  with  Holland  just  at  the  time  when  the  South 
African  Dutch  have  come  splendidly  into  fine  with  the  Empire. 

It  seems  to  be  overlooked  that — no  matter  what  Germati 
influences  may  be  at  work  in  Dutch  Court  circles — nothing  save 
insanity  would  induce  Holland  to  declare  war  against  us.  It 
would  simply  be  throwing  away'all  her  East  Indian  possessions, 
with  which  she  does  a  trade  of  about  £53,000,000  a  year.  The 
mouth  of  the  Rhine  is  not  worth  tliat  to  her.  Nor  is  any  "  scrap 
of  paper  "  which  Germany  may  have  given  her. 

THE   FAR    EAST. 

Operations  against  Kiao-Chau  (Tsing-tau)  continue  to 
proceed  with  deliberation — the  only  proceedings  of  much  interest 
being  aerial  ones,  which  are  of  the  bomb-dropping  order  on  both 
sides.    No  particular  results  have  been  recorded. 


KUU    CHAU    (tSINO-TAu). 

The  Japanese  must  now  be  fairly  close  on  the  doomed 
strongliold,  as  the  German  ships  in  the  harbour  have  been  firing 
on  their  troops.  The  Kiao-Chau  operations  arc  unlikely  to  go 
down  to  history  as  a  second  siege  of  Port  Arthur — the  nearest 
historical  analogy  is  the  seige  of  AVei-hai-wci  in  the  Chin o- Japanese 
J  War.  Here  the  Japanese  closed  round  the  shore  defences  in 
•  deliberate  and  methodical  fasliion,  and  then,  at  the  selected 
moment,  delivered  a  famous  and  successful  torpedo  attack  on 
the  Chinese  warships,  which  they  had  previously  shelled  from 
the  shore. 


z 


THE    WAR    BY   AIR. 

By    FRED    T.    JANE. 


EPPELIN  operations  on  a  small  scale  continue. 
'ITie  latest  exploit  has  been  the  dropping  of  further 
bombs  on  Ostcnd,  and  (from  aeroplanes)  on 
certain  Belgian  villages.  The  damage  done  was 
trivial,  but  a  certain  amount  of  alarm  was  caused 
to  the  civil  population.  The  precise  objective  at  Ostend  appears 
to  have  been  to  blow  up  an  ammunition  train,  which,  however 
had  already  left  when  the  attack  was  made.  * 

There  seems  no  particular  reason  to  believe  the  theory  that 
where  Zeppelins  are  concerned  (the  same  can  hardly  be  said  for 


aeroplanes)  deliberate  and  indiscriminate  bomb  dropping  on 
non-combatants  is  intended.  This  conclusion  we  can  arrive  at 
from  a  description  of  unexploded  Zeppelin  bombs  which  have 
been  found.  They  are  stated  to  be  4  feet  long  by  about  8  inches 
in  diameter,  with  picric  as  the  explosive.  Were  the  terrorising 
of  the  civil  population  the  object,  sometliing  far  less  expensive 
would  be  equally  effective.  The  Ostend  and  other  authorities 
would  be  well  employed  in  seeking  to  ascertain  how  and  in  what 
way  the  Germans  learned  of  the  existence  of  the  ammunition 
train. 


U* 


October  3,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


lUP  TO   INDICATE   GESXAK   DLBIQIBLB  SHEDS. 

THE    OBDIXABT    SHEDS    TOO    SMALL    FO I    ZKPPELISS   ABK    OF    SMALL    IMPORTANCE  AND    ABE    DESIOXED    FOB    SHELTERING   "  !•  ASSET AIS,"   ETC., 
AUiCKAIT  THAT   CAN   BE   DEFLATED   ANrWHBEB,  AND   DO   NOT   DEPEND   ON   SHEDS  FOB  THEIR  EFFECTIVE  EXISTE.SCE.      THE  FOLLOWIN'O  STATIONS 

HAVE  SINCE  BEEN   ADDED  :   FUHLSBCTTEL,   SCHWIDBBMXJHL,   MANZELL. 


Stories  of  Zeppelins  being  prepared  for  coining  aerial  raids 
on  the  fleet  still  continue  ;  and,  judging  from  correspondence 
which  I  receive,  there  is  a  certain  amount  of  public  uneasiness 
as  to  how  Zeppelins  can  be  met. 

The  Russians  have  now  on  view  at  Petrograd  "  the  remains 
of  a  Zeppelin,"  which  is  said  to  have  been  brought  down  by  rifle 
shot ;  but  if  this  be  correct,  it  was  a  pic«  of  luck  which  we  can 
hardly  expect  to  see  repeated. 

Something  considerable  can,  of  course,  be  done  by  firc- 
shell  from  aerial  guns,  and  a  naval  fleet  occupies  so  large  an  area 
that  the  ordinary  guns  of  some  ships  are  likely  to  reach  a  Zeppelin, 
unless  she  is  fly\)g  at  a  height  which  would  reduce  the  chances 
of  bomb  success  to  an  infinitesimal  fraction.  The  chances  of 
correct  aim  in  dropping  on  moving  ships  Ls  small  at  the  best  even 
for  low  altitudes.  And  the  amount  of  damage  to  be  done  to  a 
big  ship  by  bombs  is  probably  not  very  great. 

There  is  no  doubt,  however,  that  the  most  serious  answer 
and  menace  to  Zeppelins  is  from  the  air,  whether  by  way  of 
aeroplanes  towing  grapnels  over  the  envelopes  or  propcUers, 
dropping  inflammatory  bombs,  or,  better,  by  incidents  such  as  that 
which  recently  occurred  at  Diisseldorf. 

"  Diisseldorf  '  represents  the  best  possible  form  of 
defensive  attack,  because,  deprived  of  its  shed,  a  Zeppelin  is 
useless.  Unfortunately,  Germany  has  an  enormous  number  of 
.sheds  (thirty  all  told)  as  the  accompanying  map  indicates ; 
atill,  the  majority  are  not  out  of  reach  of  a  determined  attack, 
such  as  that  delivered  by  the  Naval  Flying  Corp,  on  Diisseldorf. 

Here,  by  a  bold  drop  to  an  altitude  of  only  400  feet.  Flight 
Lieut.  CoUett  succeeded  in  dropping  three  incendiary  bombs  on 
the  Zeppelin  shed  there,  owned  by  the  "  Delag  "  Company. 

According  to  German  statements,  "  a  few  windows  were 
broken,  but  otherwise  no  damage  was  done."  This  may  be  true, 
or  it  may  not !  We  have  no  means  of  ascertaining  the  damage, 
and  the  Germans,  aware  of  that,  would  naturally  conceal  it. 
We  may  hope  that  the  shed  was  fired,  and  that,  as  reported  from 
Switzerland,  there  was  a  Zeppelin  inside  it  at  the  time.  But 
this  is  probably  too  good  to  be  true. 

The  importance  of  the  matter,  however,  i.s  that  our  aviators 
have  miccceded  in  steering  them.selves  to  the  required  spot. 
This  must  be  very  evident  to  the  Germans  ;  also  tiiat.  having 
found  one  spot,  we  shall  presnntly  find  others.  We  may 
confidently  e.xpcct  Ciuly  rcj)etitioiis  of  tlie  Diisseldorf  incident, 
and — since  the  attack  on  Diisseldorf  was  undertaken  by  a  naval 


airman — satisfy  ourselves  that  the  Navy  is  taking  as  few  risks  aa 
possible  in  connection  with  German  threats  as  to  what  their 
Zeppelins  will  accomplish  against  our  Dreadnoughts. 

Later  news  of  aerial  warfare  consists  of  some  very  circum- 
stantial non-oflScial  stories  as  to  another  Zeppelin  brought  down 
by  Russian  gun  fire.  As  remarked  a  week  or  two  ago,  more 
Zeppelins  than  Germany  ever  built  have  already  been  destroyed 
on  paper !  The  story  alluded  to  may  be  a  re-hash  of  the 
Zeppelin  taken  to  Petrograd.  On  the  other  hand,  the  details 
about  its  being  injured  by  two  shots  and  brought  down  by  a 
third  are  far  more  suggestive  of  a  Parseval  as  the  victim. 

If  a  shell  does  chance  to  burst  inside  it — a  not  very  likely 
contingency — it  would  certainly  be  "  all  up  "  with  any  non- 
rigid  dirigible.  But  the  odds  against  any  such  contingency  are 
heavy.  A  couple  of  holes  in  the  dirigible  is  the  best  that  any 
non-special  gun  firing  at  one  and  hitting  it  can  normally  expect. 
Now  the  entry  hole  in  a  gas  bag  is  not  going  to  do  much,  for 
hj'drogen  does  not  escape  downwards.  Consequently,  only  the 
exit  hole  matters.  Out  of  that  exit  hole  the  hydrogen  will 
assuredly  escaj)e,  but  it  will  take  its  time  in  escaping. 

A  variant  of  the  stor}'  described  three  motors  as  having  been 
Lit,  and  finally  a  Lit  on  the  fourth.  Putting  aside  the  fact  that 
no  Zeppelin  has  more  than  three  motors,  the  story  is  technically 
absurd.  TLe  more  reasonable  LypotLesis  is  that  a  non-rigid  was 
brought  down  owing  to  the  leakage  caused  by  three  holes  in  her. 
Also  the  number  of  captured  reported  (eight)  is  the  crew  of  a 
Parseval.  A  Zeppelin  carries  about  thirty  men  as  crew.  The 
probability  is  that  everything  in  the  airship  line  is  described  as 
"  Zeppelin  " — this  word  being  used  as  a  generic  term.  Occa- 
rionally  it  appears  to  be  a  news  generic  for  aeroplanes  also  ! 

Licidentally,  this  vague  idea  as  to  what  a  Zeppelin  is  appeals 
to  be  shared  by  quite  a  number  of  people  who  should  know  better. 
For  example,  a  correspondent  tells  me  of  an  engineer  friend  of 
Lis  who  asserts  that  he  could  build  a  Zeppelin  shed  (something 
approacLing  Charing  Cross  Station  in  dimen.sions  in  six  weeks, 
and  pull  it  down  and  re-erect  it  in  one  week !  This  would  be  a 
fair  record  for  an  ordinary  aeroplane  hangar. 

The  Zeppelin  danger  is  real  enough,  as  it  is,  without  need  of 
the  accompaniment  of  any  unreasoning  panic. 

The  latest  available  list  of  German  dirigible  sheds  is  given 
on  the  plan  above.  Unless  otherwise  stated,  the  above  are 
military  sheds.  All  private  ones  capable  of  liolding  Zeppelins 
are  subsidised. 


]o» 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  3,  1914 


CORRESPONDENCE. 

Knglemere,  Ascot,  Berks. 

September  10,  1914. 

To  the  Editor  of  Land  and  Water. 

Sib,— The  result  of  my  appeal  to  sportsmen  -wlio  are 
unable  to  take  the  field  to  give  the  use  of  their  race  glasses, 
field  glasses,  or  stalking  glasses  to  our  non-commissioned 
ofiicei-s  under  orders  for  the  front,  has  been  most  gratifying. 

In  the  first  three  days  after  the  issue  of  the  appeal  over 
2,000  glasses  were  received.  These  glasses  are  being  dis- 
tributed as  rapidly  as  possible  among  the  non-commissioned 
officei-s  destined  for  active  service.  I  should  like  to  take  the 
opportunity  of  conveying  their  sincere  gratitude  to  the  owners 
who  have  given  them  the  use  of  their  glasses. 

Most  of  the  glasses  received  have  been  of  the  best  modem 
patterns,  and  it  is  easy  to  realise  how  valuable  they  will 
prove  in  the  field.  Those  who  do  not  possess  field  glasses,  and 
who  desire  to  assist,  should  send  cheques  to  the  Secretary, 
National  Service  League,  72,  Victoria-street,  London,  S.W. 
All  glasses  should  also  be  sent  to  this  address. 

It  will  be  my  pleasure  to  send  a  personal  letter  of  thanks 
to  those  who  in  this  way  contribute  to  the  safety  and  welfare 
of  our  splendid  soldiers. 

Every  effort  will  be  made  to  restore  the  glasses  at  the  con- 
clusion of  the  war.  lu  all  cases  an  index  number  is  stamped 
upon  the  glasses,  and  a  record  of  their  disposal  registered  at 
the  oflices  of  the  National  Service  League. 

Yours  very  truly, 

Roberts,  P.M. 

WAR    PUBLICATIONS. 

Among  works  of  fiction  peculiarly  applicable  to  the  present  time 
must  be  reckoned  Walter  Bloem's  The  Iron  Year,  recently  published 
by  Messrs.  John  Lane.  It  is  worthy  of  not«  that  tiiis  book  ran  through 
twenty  editions  in  Germany  shortly  after  its  first  publication,  though 
most  people  are  not  likely  to  take  as  a  recommendation  the  fact  that 
the  Kaiser  read  it  aloud  to  the  members  of  his  family  circle.  It  is, 
however,  a  well-told  and  extremely  topical  story  of  the  year  1870, 
and  the  personal  interest  is  supplied  by  the  love  of  a  French  officer 
for  a  Gennan  girl.  The  work  bears  the  stamp  of  reality,  and  the 
book  is  interestmg  as  a  study  of  the  first  struggle  between  the  two 
nations  from  a  fairly  unprejudiced  point  of  view. 

A  vi;ry  useful  little  pocket  book  for  junior  officers  on  service 
has  been_ issued  by  The  World's  Wori,  of  Bedford  Street,  Strand,  at 
t!ie  price  of  half  a  crown.  The  book  is  novel  in  iarm,  being  linked 
at  the  back  after  the  manner  of   loose-leaf  pocket  books,  in  order  to 


■av«  wear  on  the  back  of  the  cover,  and  pages  and  cover  alike  ara 
waterproofed.  Contents  include  an  English-Frciich-German  vocabulary 
of  most  necessary  phrases,  notes  on  reconnaissance  and  map  reading, 
field  engineering,  field  messages,  and  practically  all  the  points  that 
are  constantly  cropping  up  in  the  course  of  field  operations.  Light, 
handy,  and  thoroughly  serviceable,  the  little  book  is  one  that  every 
junior  officer  might  with  advantage  add  to  his  outfit. 

If  Bernhardi  showed  us  the  doctrine  by  means  of  which  Germany 
hopes  to  dominate  the  world,  so,  just  as  surely,  Franz  Beyerling,  in 
his  book,  Jena  or  Sedan/  shows  us  the  material  with  which  Germany 
is  to  accumplish  its  ambition.  Bernhardi  is  the  enthusiast,  recognising 
difficulties,  but  believincr  in  the  power  of  the  nation  to  overcome  all 
difficulties,  and  its  rignl  to  make  the  attempt  for  world-power; 
Beyerling  is  the  critic,  a  German  writing  from  a  German  viewpoint, 
and  telling  of  things  as  he  sees  them — as  they  are.  His  story  con- 
cerns only  the  life  of  a  German  garrison;  it  embodies  no  high-flown 
phrases,  no  attempt  at  tlie  expression  of  a  creed  or  a  belief;  it  is  a 
simple  recital  of  fact,  and  as  such  is  a  terrible  indictment  of  the 
German  army.  He  tells  how,  thougli  the  world  has  advanced 
immeasurably  in  the  past  four  decades,  the  German  army  has  advanced 
not  one  step ;  it  is  still  the  wooden  machine  of  Great  Frederick's  time, 
and  so  simply  is  this  shown  that  the  force  of  the  lesson  is  doubled. 
For  those  who  would  learn  the  real  causes  contributing  to  German 
errors  as  a  miUtary  power,  this  story,  with  its  wonderful  realism 
and  absence  of  all  attempt  at  dramatic  effect,  is  a  convincing  handbook. 
We  recommend  it  to  all  students  of  the  war  and  the  fighting  values  of 
the  armies  taking  part  therein.  Messrs.  Heineraann  have  done  well  in 
issuing  a  two-shilling  edition  of  this  remarkable  book  at  the  present 
time. 

Messks.  Kegan,  Paul,  and  Co.  have  recently  reissued  von  der 
Goltz's  Conduct  of  Wnr  in  one  half-guinea  volume.  While  professing  to 
be  only  a  summary  of  "the  various  ways  of  manipulating  troops  of  which 
use  can  be  made  in  wa.r,"  it  is  a  manual  of  instruotiou  for  tie  conduct 
of  war,  as  well  ae  a  work  of  considerable  historical  vaJue.  We  recom- 
mend it  to  all  who  make  a.  serious  study  of  operatione  in  the  field 
of  the  present  campaign,  as  well  as  to  those  who  desire  to  read  military 
history  intelligently.  Its  author  was  no  theorist,  but,  as  a  lieutenant- 
general,  with  practical  war  experience,  was  able  to  base  his  etatements 
on  work  actuallv  accomplished  as  well  as  on  the  experience  of  former 
commanders.  I'ogether  with  the  work  of  Clausewitz,  published  by  the 
same  firm,  this  must  rank  among  the  most  impoi-taut  books  of  the 
season.  — 

The  autumn  show  of  the  National  Rose  Society  having  been 
abandoned  for  this  year,  the  Council  of  the  Society,  at  a  recent  meet- 
ing, unanimously  decided  to  send  a  donation  of  fifty  guineas  to  the 
Relief  Fund  which  is  being  raised  by  the  Society's  Royal  Patroness, 
Queen  Alexandra. 

TrtE  military  authorities  are  purchasing  large  quantities  of  farm 
and  market  garden  produce  for  the  use  of  H.M.  troops  throughout 
the  country.  For  the  purpose  of  facilitating  supply  and  of  preventing, 
as  far  as  possible,  a  scarcity  of  produce  arising  in  one  district  while 
there  is  a  surplus  in  another,  farmers  are  urged  to  assist  the  War 
Office  by  stating  the  quantity  of  produce  they  have  to  sell  at  fair 
market  price. 


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October  3,    19 14 


LAND     AND     WATER 


LAND    AND    WATER 


October  3,   1 914 


CAPTAIN  WILMOT  S.  NICHOLSON  OF  H.M.S.  HOGUE  Capynght,  Wfsi  &  Son,>iouihsea 

WKoii  10  be  consratulated  on  hit  rescue  in  ihe  North  Sea  afler  the  founderina  of  hi»  ship,  The  follawinn  quotation  is  from  one  of  the  men  who  were 
aboard  the  Hoguc  :  "A  few  minutes  later  wc  were  slruckjwice.  Captain  Nicholson,  who  was  on  the  bridRc.  was  ascool  as  a  cucumber.  He  gave  us  the 
word  (o  lip  over  everything  that  would  float,  to  lake  off  our  clothes,  and  to  look  after  ourselvei.  It  was  done  ship-shaj  e-  The  Navy  rule  is  keep  your 
mouth  shut  and  do  your  job  well '  We  did  it.  It  went  off.  as  you  might  say.  juit  like  evolulion^.  The  ship  turned  o»er  and  we  saw  the  Captain  with 
nolhing  on  sliding  down  the  keel  inlet  the  water." 

10 


The  County  Gentleman 


AND 


LAND  &  WATER 


Vol.  LXIII.         No.  2733 


SATURDAY,  SEPTEMBER  26,   1914 


rPUBLlSHED  AS"]         PRICE   SIXPENCE 

La  newspaperJ       published  weekly 


Copyright,  Topical  Prtss 

H.R.H.  THE   PRINCE  OF  WALES 

The  Prince's  Regiment,  the  2nd  Grenadier  Guards,  has  now  moved  out  of  London  for  a  destination 
at  present  unknown.  His  Royal  Highness,  who  has  been  transferred  to  the  1st  Grenadier  Guards, 
expressed  great  regret  that  he  was  not  permitted  to  go  to  the  front,  and  has  since  approached  Lord 
Kitchener  on  the  subject,  but  it  is  understood   that  at   present   his  wish  cannot  be  complied  with. 


LAND     AND     WATEW 


September   26,    19 '4 


1010 


September  20,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


HONS 


CMltBIIMf 


to        If        to      IS 

lilt 


Sca.Le   o/  Miles 


««, 


<>-.. 


T.i^XMnN 


taAUB£UC£CfaZUiO 


.UCATtAO^-^^ 


DIMffT 


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0.0 


Still  hxildifiy  out 


iTMLNCHOULO       ^ 


Tout 

SlMirU 


THE    WAR    BY    LAND. 

By  HILAIRE    BELLOG. 


THE    WAR    IN    THE    WEST. 

THK  whole  meaiiing  of  the  Western  Avar  at 
the  present  moment  is  this  : 
That  the  Germans  have  retreated  up 
to,  and  are  defending,  an  admirable  defen- 
sive line  about  half-way  between  Paris  and  the 
frontier ;  that  they  have  held  this  line,  with  varying 
fortunes,  for  twelve  days  ;  that  this  state  of  affaii's 
cannot  be  indefinitely  continued ;  and,  finally,  that  the 
chances  of  its  breaking  down  arc,  at  the  moment  I 
Avrite  this  (Wednesday)  evening,  against  the  enemy. 
Either  {A)  they  wiU  find  themselves  strong  enough  to 
(i)  at  the  best  for  themselves  to  break  the  French 
line  at  its  centre,  Rlieims ;  (5)  at  least  to  press  back 
the  Allied  line,  which  has  for  these  ten  days  been 
attempting  to  dislodge  them ;  or  {B)  they  will  yield 
to  tlio  increasing  pressure  upon  their  western  flank 
and  will  begin  a  retirement,  which  will  be  first  under- 
taken from  the  jilateau  Craonne-Noyon,  and  will  later 
extend  to  the  whole  line. 

Of  these  two  alternatives  [JB)  is  the  more  likely. 

That  is  the  whole  gist  of  the  war  in  the  Westeni 
field. 

Our  business,  therefore,  if  we  wish  to  understand 
what  is  going  on,  is  fir.^t  to  summarise  again  the  three 
great  movements  which  led  the  Germans  to  tlieir 
present  position  ;  next  to  grasp  the  nature  and  exact 
situation  of  the  defensive  SO-mile  line  upon  which 


the  Germans  have  taken  their  stand ;  and,  lastly, 
through  a  detailed  examination  of  this  line  by  sections, 
to  sum  up  thcu"  vaiying  fortunes  along  it. 

AVlien  w^e  have  these  elements  in  hand  we  shall 
understand  the  great  battle  Avhich  has  occupied  the 
Allied  troops  since  the  13th  of  this  month  ;  we  shall 
be  able  to  consider  its  tendency,  and,  perhaps,  to 
guess  at  its  end. 

The  summaiy  of  the  operations  which  led  up  to 
the  present  position  is  as  follows  : 

The  Germans,  bringing  in  through  Belgium  a 
little  more  than  double  the  number  of  troops  whicli 
the  French  commanders  had  thought  them  able  to 
bring  by  this  route,  met  and  forced  back  the  Allied 
forces,  not  half  their  OAvn,  Avhich  had  been  drawn  up 
to  meet  them  along  the  River  Sambre.  The  strength 
of  a  defensive  attitude  would  have  prevented  what 
followed  had  Namur,  on  the  right  of  the  French 
defensive  line,  stood.  But  as  Namur  fell  in  the  first 
day's  shock  (Sundiiy,  August  23rd),  the  whole  line 
along  the  Sambre  (including  the  British  contingent, 
which  stretched  up  past  Mons)  was  compelled  on  that 
night  and  the  following  Monday  to  an  exceedingly 
rapid  and  very  hard  pressed  retirement. 

This  retirement,  accompanied  by  veiy  heavy 
losses  upon  the  part  of  the  Allies,  was  pursued  by  the 
overwhelming  German  numbers  Avith  the  utmost 
rapidity.     The  whole  advance  upon  the  one  side  and 


1* 


LAND    AND    WATER 


SeptemLer  26,  191-4 


retirement  upon  the  other  ])ivoted  upon  the  neigh- 
hourhoocl  of  Yerdun ;  while  the  ^Vestern  extremity  of 
the  Gennan  line,  where  was  massed  the  hirgcst  hody 
of  men  (like  the  swelled  end  of  a  club),  made  straight 
lor  Paris. 

Tliis  tidal  movement  lasted  ten  days,  from 
August  24th  to  September  2nd-3rd.  At  the  end  of 
it,  in  the  early  part  of  the  fii-st  week  of  September, 
from  AVednesday,  September  2nd  (the  anniversary  of 
Sedan),  to  Friday,  September  4th,  tlie  main  Gennan 
mass  in  the  west  stood  in  touch  with  the  fortifica- 
tions of  Paris,  and  the  complete  success  of  the  German 
phin  seemed  assured. 

This  Avestcrn  extremity  of  the  German  line  where 
the  largest  single  mass  of  troops  was  gathered  imder 
the  command  of  A'on  Kluck  (it  is  generally  known  as 
the  1st  Gennan  Army)  was  apparently  about  to  attack 
the  outer  works  of  Paris.  It  had  come  south  of  Senlis 
and  Creil,  through  the  woods  of  Chantilly  and  Erme- 
nonville,  and  had  come  out  upon  the  great  open  plain 
which  stretches  for  a  day's  march  to  the  north-east  of 
the  capital,  within  a  mile  or  two  of  an  extreme  range 
from  the  forts.  It  had  met  the  most  extended 
batteries  of  the  defence. 

At  this  moment,  after  the  middle  of  the  first  week 
of  September,  ended  the  first  phase.  The  invasion 
had  pressed  in  a  great  bow  south  of  Eevigny  in  the 
veiy  woods  of  Argonne,  south  of  Yitry,  south  of 
Sommesous,  south  of  Sezanne — right  up  to  this 
l)lain  just  north-east  of  Paris.  Everything  was 
ready  for  the  final  blow. 

Tlie  immediate  business  of  the  Geimans  was  to 
lii-eak  the  Allied  line  where  it  sagged  most,  near  Yitry, 
to  drive  half  of  it  eastward  against  the  Gennan  armies 
in  Lon-atne  ;  the  other  half  of  it  beyond  or  into  Paris — • 
the  investment  of  which  ca2:)ital  Avould  then  have  been 
undertaken. 

Just  then  it  was  discovered,  probably  by  the  ainnen 
of  A"on  Kluck's  army,  that  the  French  commanders 
had  accumulated,  behind  the  screen  of  the  Paris 
fortified  zone,  a  very  much  larger  reserve  than  the 
Germans  had  allowed  for.  For  this  had  Joffre 
weakened  his  mainline,  or  rather  refused  to  strengthen 
it  as  it  fell  back.  On  this  secret  hoard  had  the  French 
relied  for  turning  the  tide.  There  Avas  a  moment's 
liesitation  upon  the  part  of  Yon  Kluck  whether  to 
retire  from  this  menace  by  the  way  he  had  come  or  to 
march  rapidly  across  the  numerically  inferior  troops 
in  front  of  him  (before  this  French  reserve  could  come 
up)  and  so  to  join  and  help  the  two  great  Gennan 
masses  on  his  left,  from  Sezanne  to  "\^itr\-,  in  breaking 
the  French  central  line. 

He  decided  for  the  latter  and  bolder  course. 
With  the  end  of  that  week,  the  5th  and  0th  of 
September,  he  was  undertaking  this  flank  march. 

His  boldness  was  disastrous  to  the  whole  German 
plan.  The  numerically  inferior  forces,  along  the  face 
of  Avhich  he  marched,  included  the  British  contingent, 
with  the  Gth  French  Army  on  its  left,  and  upon 
its  right  the  5th  French  Army.  These  were  the 
troops  Yon  Kluck  had  driven  before  him  from  Mons 
and  Charicroi.  Periiaps  he  thought  them  exhausted. 
Far  from  it,  they  immediately  took  the  counter- 
offensive  (backed  by  this  Paris  reserve  coming  up  in 
gi;eater  and  greater  numbers  from  beliind  and  from 
within  the  fortiiications  of  Paris),  stopped  the  whole 
of  the  German  movement,  and  began  to  assume  the 
initiative. 

During  all  that  week-end  A'on  Kluck  fought 
desperately  along  the  Oiircq  to  save  his  com- 
munications. He  handled  the  matter  so  well  that  he 
cHicl  save  them,  but  he  was  compelled  to  a  precipitate 


retreat,  the  British  and  the  French  5th  Ai-mv 
pressing  him  back  over  the  Marne  between 
Meaux  and  Chateau  Thieny,  while  the  French 
Cth  Army,  and  its  reinforcements  from  the  reserve, 
crossed  the  Oiircq.  The  fighting  in  this  quarter  during 
all  the  week-end  and  the  beginning  of  the  next  or 
second  week  of  September,  from  Sunday,  the  Gth,  to 
Wednesday,  the  9th,  was  exceedingly  heavy,  and  Avill 
be  known  to  history  as  the  Battle  of  ^leaux. 

It  was  not  until  Thursday,  September  10th,  that 
a  true  result  was  reached,  and  that  Yon  lOuck's 
genei'al  retreat  began. 

This  retreat  was  handled  so  well  that  in  the  next 
two  and  a  half  days  it  had  covered  the  whole  distance 
to  the  river  Aisne  and  the  neighbourhood  of  Soissons, 
some  of  the  Gennan  regiments  being  compelled  to 
marches  of  over  twenty  miles  a  day,  and  none  to 
inarches  of  less  than  iifteen.  Yon  Kluck's  retreat 
was  not  only  rapid  but  was  also  so  strongly  conducted 
that  his  losses  in  prisoners  and  cajitured  guns  were,  in 
comparison  with  his  great  numbers,  insignificant.  At 
the  end  of  the  Aveek,  on  Satiu'day,  Sei^tember  12th,  he 
was  upon  the  Aisne  and  about  to  take  up  those 
defensive  positions  to  the  north  of  that  river  which 
had  evidently  been  most  carefully  examined  and 
chosen  before  the  war  broke  out,  and  upon  Avhich  so 
desperate  a  resistance  has  been  offered  during  the  last 
ten  days. 

Yon  Kluck's  retreat  over  these  forty  miles  and 
more  of  country  involved,  of  course,  a  coiTCsponding 
retreat  u2:)on  the  j)art  of  the  two  great  German  masses 
lying  successively  to  his  left,  between  his  own  Anny 
and  Yerdun ;  and  while  he  was  taking  up  his  defensive 
position  upon  the  Aisne  before  Soissons  //lej/  fell  back 
through  the  Plain  of  Champagne  until  they  were  in 
line  with  him  along  the  continuation  of  that  defensive 
position  ;  which  continuation  runs  north  of  Eheims 
and  along  the  river  Suippe  to  the  forest  of  Argonne. 
By  Sunday,  September  iuth,  the  whole  mass  of  the 
German  forces — much  more  than  a  million  men— was 
standing  at  bay  along  the  line  marked  ujion  the  general 
map  at  the  head  of  this,  which  line  extends  from  the 
Argonne,  past  Phcims  and  Soissons,  to  the  river  Oise 
at  a  point  between  Noyon  and  Com2)iegne. 

Thus  ended  the  second  phase  of  the  Westei'n 
campaign^a  general  German  retreat  across  the  river 
Manie,  pressed  everywhere  by  the  advancing  Allies, 
])robably  to  be  known  in  history  as  the  Battle  of  the 
Marne. 

The  third  phase  oj^ened  upon  Monday, 
September  14th,  and  is  still  in  progress.  It  consists 
in  a  vast  defensive  action  undertaken  by  the  Germans 
all  along  this  line  of  80  miles  and  more  which  they 
occupy  from  the  Oise  to  the  Ai-gonne ;  a  chosen  and 
prepared  defensive  position,  which  is  among  the 
strongest  and  the  best  in  Western  Em-ope.  The 
nature  of  that  position  and  of  the  action  dependent 
upon  it,  the  points  in  which  it  has  been  pressed  back, 
the  points  upon  which  the  Gennans  have  found  it 
possible  to  advance,  their  chances  of  success  and 
failure  are  the  main  object  of  our  study  in  this  week's 
notes,  and  must  next  bo  described  in  detail. 

THE    DEFENSIVE    POSITION. 

The  original  defensive  position  taken  up  by  the 
Gennans,  when  on  Sunday,  September  13th,  they 
turned  after  their  retreat  to  face  their  pursuers  is  here 
seen  to  run  in  a  fairly  even  line  east  and  west 
from  the  Forest  of  Argonne  to  the  Oise  River, 
along  a  line  of  heights  varying  in  character  from 
east  to  west.  The  main  position  is  marked  in  a 
broken  line. 


September  2G,  1914 


LAND    AXD    WATEE 


(WESTERN 


EASTERfil-IMB 


Contour  Lints  »t  130  Fett. 
»-•  —  •—•—    Ori^ml  ilain  Dtfcttiivt  Ctrmtu  fbsiHoiu 


PLAN   SUUMAKISINO  THB  FIT!   SECTIONS  OV  TIIB   GZBMAN   FOSITION. 


The  first  general  cliaracteristic  in  this  sketch  of 
the  great  defensive  position  which  Avill  strike  the 
observer  is  that  it  consists  essentially  of  two  limbs. 

(1)  The  plateau  running  from  Craonne  all  along 
the  north  of  the  river  Aisne  j)ast  the  tovra  of  Soissons 
to  the  Oise. 

(2)  A  long  low  ridge,  or  rather  swell,  which  goes 
in  a  great  curve  fi-om  the  Aisne  at  Berry-au-Bac  to 
the  neighbourhood  of  the  Forest  of  Argonne,  all 
round,  and  behind,  and  then  to  the  east  of,  the  town 
of  Eheims. 

It  will  fuiiher  be  convenient,  for  reasons  that 
will  appear  in  a  moment,  to  divide  the  whole  line 
where  it  is  to  be  examined  in  detail  into  five  sections ; 
numbered  from  west  to  east,  1,  2,  3,  4,  and  5  ;  1, 
2,  3,  being  the  sections  of  the  first  or  western  limb  ; 
4  and  5  of  the  eastern  or  second  limb. 

The  first  or  western  limb  (which  may  also  be 
called  the  Soissons  half),  is  a  rather  high  tableland 
which  has  been  cut  by  the  erosion  of  a  number  of 
brooks  into  a  series  of  separate  platforms.  All  of  these 
platfomis  or  buttresses  join  up  to  the  Noi-th  with  one 
ruiming  level  of  land.  The  whole  district  may  be 
regarded  as  a  sort  of  flat-topped  embankment  rising 
c\ery\vhere  above  the  north  bank  of  the  river  Aisne 
along  its  lower  reaches,  from  its  emergence  above  the 
I'lains  of  Champagne  until  its  junction  with  the  Oise. 
But  it  is  an  embankment  the  sides  of  which  have 
been  deeply  scored  by  erosion ;  ravines  have  been 
cut  out  of  it  on  its  southern  edge  by  the  series  of 
brooks  which  ran  from  the  summit  down  to  the  Aisne. 

This  "embankment,"  or  plateau,  falls  very 
gradually  from  east  to  west.  It  is  over  450  feet 
above  the  river  on  the  west,  above  Craonne,  where 
two  conspicuous  sununits  mark  its  culminating  points. 
Within  five  miles  of  the  Oise,  at  and  above  Lombray, 
it  is  no  more  than  300  feet  above  that  river.  Its 
total  length  from  the  village  of  Craonne  to  Pontoise 
on  the  Oise,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Noyon,  is,  as  the 
crow  flies,  fifty-eight  kilometres,  or  rcry  nearly  thirty- 
seven  miles. 

And  here  we  must  begin  that  five-fold  division  of 
tlie  whole  line  which  best  suits  an  analysis  of  the 
present  operations.  Of  that  five-fold  division,  i/tree 
divisions  belong  to  the  Western  limb  we  are  now 
<liscu.ssing.  Against  tliis  Soissons,  or  western  half  of 
the  defensive  line  held  by  the  Germans,  you  have 
operating : — 

(r/)  LTpon  tlie  left,  between  SoLssons  and  the  Oise, 
and  up  along  the  Oise  towai-ds  Noyon,  the  Gth  French 


army,  with  all  those  reserves  it  has  to  strengthen  it. 
These  bodies  are  slowly  but  continuously  pressing 
forward  with  the  object  of  getting  round  the  German 
right,  in  connection  with  that  attempt  to  harass,  and 
perhaps  to  break,  those  German  main  communications, 
the  full  plan  of  which  I  shall  deal  with  on  a  later 
page. 

(i)  From  Soissons,  eastward  and  to  the  right,  as 
far  as  some  such  point  as  Pont  d'Arcy,  you  have, 
against  the  centre  of  the  hiUs,  the  British  contingent 
operating — resisting  fierce  counter-attacks  launched  by 
the  Germans,  slowly  proceeding  against  strong  pressure 
to  force  the  heights  in  front  of  them,  and,  having 
reached  the  summit  of  the  plateau,  to  press  the 
Gennans  down  the  northern  slope  beyond  it. 

(c)  To  the  right,  or  east,  again,  from  the 
neighbourhood  of  Pont  d'Arcy  to  where  the  Plains  of 
Champagne  begin,  beyond  Craonne,  and  on  over  the 
flats  to  the  neighbourhood  of  BeiTy-au-Bac,  you  have 
the  5th  French  army  engaged  in  a  similar  attempt 
upon  the  rather  higher  hills  in  front  of  them. 

So  much  for  the  first  or  western  limb  of  the 
defensive  line,  the  operations  against  wliich  I  must 
describe  more  thoroughly  in  a  moment,  premising 
meanwhile  that  in  this  division  of  the  whole  position 
into  two  "  limbs "  or  halves,  the  region  between 
Craonne  and  Berry  au  Bac  must  be  regarded  as  mixed, 
and  as,  in  a  fashion,  belonging  to  both.  For  while  it 
belongs  to  the  eastern  plains  by  its  open  character 
(flat,  without  a  bank),  it  belongs  to  the  western 
Soissons  half  in  so  far  as  it  lies  north  of  the  Aisne. 

(2)  As  to  the  second  eastern  limb  of  this  long 
position,  wliich  may  also  be  called  the  "  Elieims " 
limb,  it  runs  from  the  point  of  Berry  au  Bac  to  the 
Argonne  through  very  different  country.  It  follows 
the  course  of  the  Eiver  Suippe,  and  the  backbone 
of  it  is  that  swell  which  I  described  last  week, 
and  which  I  have  alluded  to  again  this  week,  rising 
northward  and  eastward  from  the  water  of  the  Suippe, 
crowned  genfrally  with  plantations,  and  stretching 
tlu'ough  the  tumbled  rough  lunvps  of  bare  plough 
land  before  Villc-sur-Tom-bes  until  it  reposes  upon 
the  Argonne.  AU  this  eastern  limb  of  the  great 
defensive  position  stretches  through  bare  hcdgeless 
fields  cut  by  orderly  spinneys.  It  lies  low  along  the 
horizon.  It  differs  wholly  from  the  wooded  ravined 
and  somewhat  bold  heights  of  the  westei-n  limb 
between  Craonne  and  the  Oise. 

This  slight  swell  running  be3'ond  the  Suippes  is, 
as  I  have  said,  the  backbone  of  the  second  limb  of  the 


- .— ','  ■^- ^ 


LAND    AKD    WATEE 


September  2G,  1914 


German  defensive  licre ;  but  that  defensive  has  not 
found  itself  eompellcd  by  the  pressure  in  front  of  it  to 
remain  so  far  buck.  . 

The  Germans  have  found  themselves  sufficiently 
strong  immediately  in  front  of  llheims  to  retrace  their 
stepslmd  to  advance  well  across  the  Suippe,  and  to 
lieights  that  now  thi-eaten  the  great  town  itself. 


The  positions  occupied  by  the  Gennans  after  the  first 
week's  efforts,  successes,  and  failures  is  represented  by 
the  dotted  line  which  in  its  sinuosity  with  its  recesses 
and  salients  marks  the  progress  of  the  Allies  and  the 
coiTcsponding  points  where  the  German  counter-offen- 
sive of  the  Germans  has  succeeded  and  the  Allies 
have  fallen  back. 


NO  YON 


COMPIEGNE 


86  MiUs 


I 
80  8^<>tg 


VJ 


THE   DOTTED   LINE,   IXDICATINO   THE   PEESENT  APPEOXIMATE   VOUITIOS   OV   THE   GERJIAN   ARMIES,   SHOWS   HOW   THE   TUKNlXa    MOVEMEST 
HOUND   NOTON    WILL   COMl'EL   A   GKNEEJL   GEEMAN   KETIKEMEXT   FKOM  TUB   ILATEAU   OF   SOlSbONS. 


"We  shall  not  understand  the  whole  of  these 
operations — Avhich  may  prove  decisive,  so  far  at  least 
as  the  first  part  of  the  great  campaign  in  France  is 
concerned — unless  Ave  grasp  the  fact  that  the  Germans 
in  the  course  of  the  past  week  attempted,  a/id  tvere 
partial/^  successful  in,  a  strong  counter-offensive  in 
this  region,  which  they  themselves  describe  as  their 
"  centre." 

I  shall  have  occasion  Avith  this  "  Eheims  " 
limb  of  the  defensive  German  line  (as  in  the  case  of 
the  first,  or  Soissons,  limb)  to  discuss  the  matter  in 
more  detail  later ;  but  for  the  moment  I  Avould  beg 
the  reader  to  note  the  tAvo  groujis  of  heights  which 
stand  Avell  South  of  the  Suippe  and  close  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Eheims.  The  one,  called  the 
height  of  Brimont,  is  marked  A  upon  the  sketch  at 
the  head  of  this  ;  the  other,  the  heights  of  Nogent 
and  Pompelle,  stand  right  doAvn  to  the  Vcsle,  and  are 
marked  B  and  C. 

The  German  counter-offensive  in  this  region  was 
so  successful  during  the  days  Thursday,  the  17th,  and 
Friday,  the  18th  of  September,  that  it  advanced  thus 
near  to  Eheims,  put  up  heavy  artillery  on  these 
heights,  and  at  the  end  of  the  movement  (by  the 
Saturday,  the  19th)  Avas  m  a  position  gravely  to 
imperil  the  monuments  of  the  town,  to  bombard  it,  and 
to  malce  the  position  of  the  French  Avithin  and  to 
Bouth  of  it  exceedingly  difficult  to  hold. 

This  successful  counter-offensiA-e  of  the  Germans 
just  round  Eheims  Avas  not  continued  throughout  the 
Avhole  length  of  this  second  limb.  When  one  gets 
fm-ther  east  on  to  the  Upper  Suippe  Valley  (it  is 
hardly  a  valley  but  rather  a  A'ery  shalloAv  depression  in 
the  naked  plain  of  Champagne)  the  French  offensive 
was  in  these  same  days  successful  in  its  turn  and 
])ushed  back  the  Germans  from  the  line  Souain- 
Le-Mesnd-le-Hurlus-Massiges,  which  they  had  taken 
up,  and  threatening  a  certain  railway  Avhich,  when  we 
come  to  details,  we  shall  see  to  be  of  great  hnpoi-tance 
to  the  whole  German  position.  In  this  advance  the 
h  rench  captured  a  battalion. 

We  may  sum  up  and  say  that  by  the  end  of  the 
third  week  in  September,  Sunday,  the  20th,  after  this 
imdecided  defensive  action  of  the  Germans  had  been 
maintanicd  for  a  f.dl  week,  the  general  result  can  be 

tabulated  m  the  diagram  of  elements  printed  beloAV  : 

'i'he  fii-st  even  line  upon  which  the  German 
defensive  relied  at  tlie  beginning  of  these  operations 
IS  represented  in  this  diagram  by  a  double  black  line. 


I  have  already  made  mention  of  one  railway,  that 
behind  Souain.  Before  proceeding  to  the  details  of 
all  this  great  defensive  action  between  the  Argonue 
and  the  Oise,  I  Avill  sa}'  a  Avord  upon  the  German 
railway  communications  as  a  Avhole,  for  upon  an" 
understanding  of  these  dej^ends  the  A\'hole  of  our  com- 
prehension of  the  German  chances  of  success  and  of 
the  German  peril. 

THE     COMMUNICATIONS. 

It  is  evidently  of  the  first  importance  to  notice 
exactly  what  the  communications  are  behind  the 
German  defensive  lines,  and  to  knoAV  Avhere  tho}^  lie, 
and  to  consider  their  length,  if  we  are  to  judge  the 
situation  con-ectly;  for  upon  a  threat  to  those  com- 
munications will  depend  the  success  of  the  Allies  and 
the  ousting  of  the  Germans  from  their  jiositions 
betAveen  the  Oise  and  the  Argonne. 

Of  roads  there  are  any  number ;  good  roads, 
along  Avhich  considerable  rainy  AA'eather  might  impede 
traffic,  but  all  of  AA'hich  are  open  to  the  use  of  an 
army.  So, far  as  road  traffic  is  concerned,  the  Avhole 
district  betAveen  the  Oise  and  the  Mouse  may  be 
treated  as  one  field,  with  ample  opportunity,  even  for 
so  lai'ge  a  force  as  the  German  invading  army,  to 
supply  itself  or  to  retreat.  All  that  Ave  have  to 
remember  about  their  numerous  roads  is  the  bridges 
OA'cr  the  main  rivers,  and  these,  if  the  retreat  be 
orderly,  are  fairly  replaced  by  pontoons. 

But  A\ith  railway  facilities  it  is  otherAvise.  There 
are  only  two  lines  AA'hich  ultimately  lead  to  the  great 
bases  of  the  Germans — to  the  depots,  the  stores,  and 
the  manufactories  and  arsenals  in  Germany,  from 
Avhich  the  Army  is  fed  and  munitioned. 

The  first  of  these  tAVo  lines,  that  upon  AA'hich  the 
AA'hole  original  plan  depended,  is  the  main  European 
trunk  line  which  taps  Cologne  and  its  district,  and 
passes  through  Aix-la-Chapelle,  Liege,  Kamur,  and  so 
doAvn  the  valley  of  the  Oise  to  Paris.  I  have  mai'ked 
it  A,  A,  A. 

The  second  line,  which  I  liaA'^e  marked  B,  B,  B, 
connects  Avith  Germany  by  a  more  southern  route. 
Save  for  these  tAA'O  lines.  A,  A,  A  and  B,  B,  B,  no 
railway  leads  from  the  enemy's  front  in  France  to 
his  stores  in  Germany. 

This  second  line  is  less  strong  than  the  Belgian, 
but  still  is  necessary.  It  runs  in  a  peculiar  fashion. 
It  taps  the  TrcA-es-Coblenz  region  and  after  going 
through  Luxemburg  (at  which  nominally  iadependcnt 


4* 


September  26.  1914 


LAND    AND    WATEB 


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THB  TWO   MAIN   QERXAN   LINKS  OF  COMITOXICATION. 


town  and  behind  it  the  Germans  have  done  every- 
thing in  the  way  of  platforms,  accumulation  of 
rolling  stock,  doubling  of  lines,  &c.,  to  facilitate* 
their  advance),  the  continuation  of  railway  supply 
to  the  present  German  front — while  Verdun  still 
stands — is  compelled  to  foUow  a  very  devious  route 
which  we  must  carefully  note  to  understand  the 
future  of  the  campaign.  Should  Verdun  fall,  or 
should  the  line  of  forts  between  Verdun  and  Toul  be 
pierced,  a  whole  set  of  new,  short  and  excellently 
provided  communications  woidd  be  opened  (as  I 
remai'ked  last  week)  to  the  Germans.  But  meanwhile 
this  line  of  theirs  through  Luxemburg  is  their  only 
second  line  beyond  that  main  one  through  Belgium. 

Now  this  second  line  is  over  long  and  twisted. 
It  cannot  go  through  Veixlun,  so  it  has  to  run 
through  Montmedy,  down  the  Meuse  as  far  as 
Mezieres,  There  is  no  opportunity  for  tui-n- 
ing  back  south  to  feed  the  army  imtil  Mezieres 
is  reached.  There  is  a  light  railway  crossing  the 
Forest  of  Mazarin  and  the  Eiver  Bar,  and  so  uniting 
the  main  railway  from  Eheims  to  the  frontier  with 
the  main  railway  upon  the  Meuse.  But  there  can  be 
no  continuous  traffic  along  it,  both  on  account  of  the 
difference  of  gauge  and  on  account  of  the  very  small 
rolling  stock  of  this  light  railway.  Supply  must 
therefore  come  right  up  to  Mezieres  and  then 
painfully  down  again  to  llheims,  past  Bethel. 

Upon  these  two  main  railway  lines — the  chief 
one  down  the  valley  of  the  Oise,  from  Belgium 
through  Namur,  Le  Gateau,  St.  Quentin,  Noyon ; 
the  secondary  one  from  Luxemburg  to  Mezieres  and 
then  back  from  Mezi5res  through  Bethel  to  Eheims 
— the  existence  of  the  German  army  (and  in  par- 
ticular of  its  heavy  artillery !)  depends.  A  great 
number  of  cross  lines — especially  the  main  line  from 
Tergnier  Junction  to  Eheims  and  the  very  valuable 
cross  line  from  Busigny  Junction  to  Hirson — relieve 
the  pressure  on  the  main  lines.  But  for  the  supply 
of    German    material    to    the    ai-mies    and  for  the 


converse  evacuation  of  wounded  and  wastage  home 
onl^  these  two  main  lines  exist. 

The  cutting  of  the  line  along  the  Oise,  even  so 
low  down  as  St.  Quentin  or  Tergnier  itself,  would  be 
a  disastrous  thing  for  the  German  army  if  it  had  not 
before  that  moment  succeeded  in  piercing  some  part 
of  the  French  line.  The  other  secondary  main  line 
Luxemburg-Mezi^res-Eheims  is  not  as  yet  aj)- 
proached  anywhere  by  an  Allied  force,  but  being 
tortuous  and  long,  it  is  therefore,  if  or  when  it  is 
approached,  more  vulnerable.  Now  the  whole  peril 
of  the  present  position  of  the  Gennans  lies  in  the 
threat  extended  by  a  French  advance  from  Amiens 
upon  St.  Quentin,  and  by  the  French  advance  from 
the  south  upon  Noyon  against  the  main  Oise  line. 
And  aU  the  anxiety  for  the  Crown  Prince's  army  is 
due  to  the  fear  for  the  Luxemburg-Mezicres  line. 
Bail  way  communications  dominate  tlie  issue. 

One  point  will  at  once  occur  to  the  reader,  and 
that  is,  how  far  a  railway,  cut  at  its  main  bridges 
at  least  by  the  retreating  Allies,  can  still  be  used  by 
the  Gennans  who  have  followed  the  Allied  retreat  ? 

Of  the  conditions  of  the  railways  now  behind  the 
German  position  we  know  nothing.  But  even  if  at 
certain  points  the  time  has  been  too  short  to  provide 
temporary  bridges  sufficient  to  cany  rolling  stock,  the 
inten'uption  at  such  points  does  not  prevent  the 
general  use  of  the  system.  Unless  by  some  accident 
(which  has  certainly  not  taken  place  in  so  rapid  and 
unexpected  a  retirement)  the  whole  rolling  stock  of 
one  section  isolated  between  two  cut  bridges  were 
lacking,  and  unless  such  a  section  were  innocent  of 
locomotives,  the  whole  system  can  be  used  by  the 
invaders  ;  and  the  only  delay  in  the  use  of  it  is  in  the 
trans-shipment  of  munitions  wherever  a  permanent 
breach  in  the  line  still  exists. 

I  wUl  now  take,  section  by  section,  the  attack 
upon  the  German  defensive  position,  with  its  various 
results,  adverse  and  favourable,  since  the  Aisne  was 
reached  upon  Sunday,  September  13th. 


6» 


LAND     AND     WATEE  September  2G,  1914 

FIRST     OR    EXTREME    WESTERN    SECTION. 


The  first  section  is  that  lying  between  Soissons 
and  the  line  of  tlie  Oise  betAveen  Noyon  and  Comj)iegne 
to  the  west. 

This  section  is  somewhat  over  twenty  miles  in 
length.  The  crossing  of  the  Aisne  and  the  following 
lip  of  the  Oise  in  ilank  of  the  Grerraans  was  here 
enti-usted,  as  we  have  seen,  to  the  6th  French  Army. 

Sunday  and  Monday,  September  13th- 14th,  were 
the  two  days  devoted  to  the  crossing  of  the  river 
which,  difficult  though  it  was,  could  only  be  the 
prelude  to  the  real  struggle  beyond. 

The  Gennan  defensive  line  does  not  consist  in 
the  Eiver  Aisne,  but  in  the  plateau  beyond  that 
stream  to  the  north.  As  will  be  seen  from  the 
sketch,  the  genei'al  base  of  that  plateau  is  exceedingly 
irregular,  for  it  is  deeply  ravined ;  but  a  continuous 
central  ridge  is  its  main  defensive  featui-e.  The 
jK)iiits  at  which  the  river  Avas  crossed  in  force  by  the 
6tli  Army  were  Vic  and  Pontnoy,  where  pontoons 
Avere  thrown  across  under  a  heavy  fire  from  the  gun 
positions  upon  the  advancing  outlines  of  the  jjlateau, 
which  fall  in  steep  slopes  doAvn  from  the  north  to  the 
Aisne.  By  Tuesday  morning  the  French  troops  had 
taken  these  first  buttresses  of  the  plateau,  that  is, 
they  had  pushed  back  the  German  line  from  the  edges 
of  the  slopes  above  the  river.  They  marched,  fighting, 
through  St.  Christophe  and  occupied  Nouvron  and 
Autreches  and  the  deepish  valley  of  Morsain.  The 
Gennans  still  maintained  a  number  of  guns,  pushed 
forward  upon  the  high  fiats  jjetwcen  Autreches  and 
the  centre  ridge,  and  it  was  the  intention  of  the 
French  command  in  this  district  to  push  forward 
sufficiently  to  cut  off  these  guns.  But  the  attempt 
failed. 

In  the  night  between  the  Tuesday  and  the 
Wednesday  a  determined  counter-offensive  undertaken 
by  the  Germans  from  the  district  round  about 
Nampcol  drove  the  French  back  nearly  to  the  river, 


and  Autreches  in  particular  was  abandoned.  All  that 
"Wednesday  night  the  searchlights  played  upon  the 
trenches  the  French  had  dug  nearer  the  stream  and 
the  shelling  of  these  trenches  by  the  Gennans  was 
continuous.  Upon  Thursday, however,  September  1 7th , 
the  value  of  the  considerable  reseiwes  which  the 
French  (in  spite  of  their  heavy  work  and  in  spite  of 
what  they  were  doing  further  west  upon  the  Oise) 
still  keep,  was  apparent.  These  forces  were  brought 
across  the  river,  the  Gennan  counter-offensive  was 
checked  in  the  forenoon  of  that  Thursday,  and  the 
Avhole  Gei^nan  line  here  was  pushed  right  back  to 
Nampcel  itself  and  beyond.  In  other  Avords  it  Avas 
pushed  right  on  to  the  jirincipal  ridge  of  the  plateau. 
But  further  north  it  could  not  for  the  moment  be 
pushed.  It  stood  firm.  And  from  this,  the  crest  of 
the  Avhole  defensive  position  at  its  Avestern  end,  the 
lieaA-y  guns  were  still  playing  on  Sunday  the  20th 
upon  the  Valley  of  the  Aisne  beloAV. 

In  this  partially  successful  operation  some  six 
hundred  prisoners  and  a  number  of  machine  guns  Avere 
taken. 

But  meauAvhile  other  French  forces  had  been 
sloAvly  Avorking  up  the  A'alley  of  the  Oise  in  the  west 
and  so  menacing  the  fiank  of  the  German  position.  It 
needs  no  elaboration  of  description  to  sho-.v  that  this 
turning  moA'cment  Avould,  if  it  were  successful,  compel 
the  abandonment  of  at  least  all  this  part  of  the  plateau 
and  ridge  above  the  Aisne  by  the  Germans  :  for  they 
Avould  be  menaced  in  rear.  Ncavs  of  such  a  success 
liad  not  reached  London  by  Wednesday  night,  but  a 
steady  if  sIoav  advance  Avas  being  made  in  this  direction. 

What  has  been  said  aboAC  Avith  regard  to  the 
German  communications  wiU.  sufficiently  indicate  the 
purpose  and  value  of  such  an  advance.  Unfortunately, 
there  is  nothing  to  tell  us  exactly  Avhat  its  extent  may 
be  up  to  and  including  Sunday  September  20th.  But 
Ave  may  take  it  that  those  reaches  of  the  Oise  above 


6» 


Sfeptembcr  26,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


Noj'ou,  where  the  course  of  the  river  turns  from  north 
and  south  to  east  and  west  had  not  been  reached,  for 
if  they  had  the  Gorman  line  would  have  been  enveloped. 
Its  commanders  would  retire  before  that !  We  are 
also,  of  coui'se,  and  rightly,  left  in  complete  ignorance 
of  the  strength  Avith  which  this  movement  is  being 
attcmjjted. 

But,  tlu'ee  or  four  days  ago,  the  French  had  in 
this  movement  abeady  reached  Lassigny  and  had 
occupied  the  heights  to  the  east  of  that  village.  The 
news  of  that  occupation  means  (1)  that  the  Germans 
still  possess  their  main  line  of  communications  and 
could  still  use  the  i-ailway  down  the  Oise  valley  as  far 
as  Noyon;  (2)  tliat  the  French  had  enough  men  to 
spare  in  this  quarter  for  a  continued  advance  within  a 
day's  march  of  the  river  and  of  the  railway  line  up 
northward  and  round  the  right  German  wing. 

Meanwhile,  much  further  to  the  north  and  form- 


ing no  part  of  the  general  French  defensive  line,  the 
communications  round  St.  Quentin  were  being  held  by 
the  Germans  against  a  French  force  of  unknowa 
magnitude,  which  was  advancing  upon  them  from 
Aniiens.  Peronne  had  akeady  been  abandoned,  and  the 
shock  betAveen  the  advancing  army  (which  might  here 
so  seriously  menace  the  very  existence  of  the  Gorman 
defensive  line  to  the  south)  and  the  German  troops 
defending  St.  Quentin  was  upon  the  point  of  being 
joined :  but  at  the  moment  of  waiting  this,  upon  the 
Wednesday  evening  of  the  week,  no  news  of  contact 
being  yet  established  in  the  neighbourhood  of  St. 
Quentin  has  reached  London. 

It  is  not  probable  that  in  face  of  such  pressure  on 
their  western  side  and  nearly  behind  them  the  Germans 
can  hold  the  plateau  above  the  Aisne.  We  sliall 
almost  certainly  hear  of  a  French  advance  here  and  of 
a  German  retu-ement. 


SECT.  IL— THE  CENTRAL  SECTION  OF  THE  WESTERN  OR  SOISSONS  LEVEL. 


-    *  ...  * 

.•••■r.ii-»;;i.-N  ■■•. 


,-  > 


^ 


^^ 


SOiSSONS. 


CRAONNE 


PONT 
ARCY 


'"••     •''  •■'  .-.;  :•  .• .'    J   ■■  A 


To  BERRY 
AU  BAC 


I  3  S  « 


SCALE     OF     MILES. 


••M«>.*~* /?/£^f  oF  the  Plateau  B'Main  Defensive  Line. 
BBOi  First  German  Gun  Positions. 


This  section  is  entrusted  to  the  British  con- 
tingent and  runs  eastward  along  the  Aisne  for  nearly 
twenty  miles  fi-om  Soissons  past  the  Pont  d'Arcy. 
The  crossing  of  the  Aisne  seems  to  have  lx>en  a  matter 
of  greater  difficulty  here  than  with  the  French  lower 
dowTi,  but  was  effected  during  the  same  Sunday  and 
Monday  at  Missy  to  Chivres,  at  Conde,  and  further 
east,  unfortunately  at  very  great  expense.  The 
Guai'ds  were  heavily  engaged  in  and  near  the  wood  of 
Soupir  on  the  Monday,  and  it  seems  possible  that  tlie 
last  detachments  were  not  got  across  until  the 
Tuesday,  September  15th.  Once,  however,  that  river 
was  bridged  and  crossed  an  advance  comparable  to 
that  undertaken  by  the  French  to  the  west  was  con- 
ducted by  the  British  contingent.  The  British  troops 
took  the  slopes  ojjposed  to  them,  and  occupied  in 
particular  Vas.sogne  and  Vendresse  on  the  same  day 
(Thm-sday  1 7th)  that  the  French  to  the  west  had 
thrown  back  the  Geraian  defensive  on  to  the  central 
ridge.  >It  is  to  be  presumed  that  a  corresponding  lino 
was  held  by  the  British  westward  from  A'endresse 
through  the  line  of  villages  halfway  up  the  slopes. 
TliL<3  section,  where  the  British  advance  liad  been  made 
on  to  the  hills,  suffered  from  counter  attacks  by 
night  exactly  as  the  French  section  had  suffered 
between  the  Tuesday  and  the  Wednesday,  but  tlie 
British  held  their  own  firmly,  and  counter  attacks 
do  not  appear  to  have  succeeded  in  making  them 
lose  ground  at  any  moment,  or  in  pushing  them  back 


towards  the  river.  Here,  as  in  the  first  or  western 
section,  the  main  German  defensive  had  been  thrust 
back  on  to  the  highest  point  of  the  ridge,  but  there 
it  was  during  Sunday  last,  September  20th,  still 
maintained.  It  even  held  the  critical  nock  of  Bravo. 
It  can  hardly  continue  in  that  position.  The  Hanking 
movement  up  the  Oise,  as  it  compels  the  Germans 
west  of  Soissons  to  retire,  will  compel  a  retirement 
before  the  British  contingent  also.  AVhile  the  British 
contingent  had  avoided  being  forced  back  dming  the 
violent  counter-offensive  assaults  of  the  Gennans 
during  these  days  they  had  also  captured  some  200 
prisoners  and,  like  the  French  to  the  west,  a  few 
machine  guns.  But  what  was  more  important,  a 
certain  number  of  pieces  from  the  heavy  German 
artillery  which  had  hitherto  overlooked  the  Valley  of 
the  Aisne,  were  isolated  by  this  advance  and  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  British. 

THIRD  OR  RIGHT  WESTERN  SECTION. 

llie  third  or  right  western  section  of  the  Gonnan 
defensive  position  concerns  a  much  smaller  section  of 
country  than  the  two  othei's  to  the  left  of  it,  but  a 
very  important  one. 

The  plateau  which  forms  the  whole  of  the 
western  limb  of  the  general  Gorman  defensive  Hue 
here  ends  in  the  bold  headland  of  Craonnc.  This 
headland  has  not  only  exceedingly  steep  sides  but 
also  stands  so  well  up  above  the  Plain  to  the  cast 


7* 


LAND    AND    AVATER 


September  26,  1914 


that  it  is  one  of  tlie  most  notaLle  foutures  iu  the  hiiid- 
scapc  from  tlic  ]ilain  of  IJhoiiiis,  aud  has  been  noticed 
by  every  traveller  who  has  come  into  Elieims  from 
Laon.  The  village  of  Craonne,  from  which  this  liead- 
hmd  takes  its  name,  stands  up  on  the  southern  slope, 
not  qnito  at  the  top,  which  top  is  Hat,  and  forms  the 
eastward  cuhniuation  of  the  whole  plateau.  There 
was  directed  against  this  important  knot  of  hill 
country  about  Thm-sday  and  Friday  hist  the  Avholo 
Avcight  of  the  Fi-cnch  5th  Army,  but  what  exact 
measure  of  success  it  obtained  is  exceedingly  difficult 
to  discover.  The  llghtmg  reached  up  to  the  plateau 
itself,  aud  a  number  of  prisoners  from  the  11th  and 
12th  German  Army  Corps  were  taken ;  but  it  is  hardly 
likely  that  Craonne  village  Avas  permanently  held  l^ 
Sunday.  If  it  had  been,  the  fact  would  have  been 
mentioned  in  the  French  commnuique.  It  seems 
more  likely  that  here,  as  elsewhere,  the  effort  of  the 
Allies  sAumg  up  to  the  foot  of  the  slopes  and  partially 
occupied  them,  but  had  not  j-et  carried  the  heights. 
When,  or  if,  a  retirement  from  the  plateau  begins, 
Craonne  will  go  with  the  rest ;  but  the  position  is  too 
valuable  to  be  abandoned  so  long  as  the  last  chance  of 
piercing  through  Eheinis  remains  to  the  Germans. 

SUMMARY  OF  THE  OPERATIONS 
UPON  THE  WESTERN  HALF  OF 
THE   DEFENSIVE  LINE. 

By  Sunday,  September  20th,  then,  the  general 
position  in  the  Western  half  of  the  German  general 
position — that  is,  the  hilly  part  between  Craonne  and 
the  River  Oise— was  as  follows  : 

The  Germans  everywhere  still  held  the  highest 
point  of  the  plateau  from  Craonne  right  away  to  the 
heights  behind  Nampcel  that  overlook  the  Oise.  The 
French  and  English  held  the  ramparts  of  this  plateau, 
that  is  the  first  projections  which  stand  out  like 
peninsula;  from  the  central  ridge  and  are  separated  by 
the  brook-valleys  which  run  down  from  that  ridge  to 
the  Aisne.  The  German  position  on  the  ridge  was 
held  by  heavy  artillery  against  Avhich  the  Allies  were 
bringing  an  increasing  number  of  lieaAy  guns,  which 
heavy  aiiiHery  had  in  the  first  days  of  the  week  done 
great  execution  against  the  Allies ;  had  not  compelled 
it  anywhere  to  retire  permanently,  had  gi-avely 
damaged  the  open  town  of  Soissons,  but  was  gradually 
relaxing  its  fii-e  as  the  heavy  guns  of  the  Allies  came 
up.  Meanwhile,  a  French  body  of  unknown  magni- 
tude Avas  Avorking  up  beyond  the  Oise  to  the  North, 
round  the  right  Aving  of  the  Germans,  but  had  not 
yet  occupied  Noyon,  nor  turned  that  right  Aving, 
though  it  Avas  akeady  beyond  Lassigny  and  had 
occupied  the  heights  to  the  east  of  that  village. 

THE    SECOND    EASTERN,    OR 

"RHEIMS,"   LIMB    OF    THE    GERMAN 

DEFENSIVE    POSITION. 

I  have  said  that  the  backbone  of  aU  the  eastern 
limb  of  the  Gemian  defensive  position  from  where  that 
position  crossed  the  Aisne  at  Beny-au-Bac  to  the 
Argonne  was  an  even  sweU  of  land  running  to  the 
north  and  east  of  the  river  Suippe,  and  this  was 
apparently  the  position  taken  up  and  held  in  the  first 
days  Avhcu  the  great  Gennan  retreat  across  Champagne 
came  to  a  standstill  and  was  brought  into  Ime  Avith 
Von  Kluck's  reti-eat  from  Meaux  to  the  Aisne.  That 
is,  we  must  regard  the  main  German  line  as  standing 
from_  Beny-au-Bac  and  following  the  Suippe  to 
feouam,  and  thence  eastward  through  Lo  Mesnil 
Massige.s    and    Villc-sur-Tourbc    to    the    Argonne' 


This  first  line  is  most  rationally  divided  at  Bazancourt 
because,  although  such  a  point  cuts  it  in  two  A'cry 
unequal  portions  as  to  length,  yet  these  tAvo  portions 
balance  each  other  in  imi)ortance,  and  each  has  a 
character  of  its  oavu. 

(1)  The  jjortion  betAveen  Craonne — Beny-au-Bac 
and  Bazancourt  lies  directly  north  of  E,  and,  as  it 
Avere,  threatens  the  great  city  of  Eheims.  Eheims, 
politically  from  its  Avealth  and  size,  strategically  from 
its  accumulated  stores  and  the  fact  that  it  is  a  junction 
of  five  raihvay  lines  and  scA'cn  main  roads,  was 
essential  to  any  successfid  counter-offensive  the 
Germans  might  attempt  to  push  home. 

(2)  The  second  section,  on  the  other  hand,  from 
Bazancom*t  to  the  Argonne  runs  through  very  deserted 
country  of  no  political  importance,  and  contains  but 
one,  though  that  an  important,  .strategical  feature. 
This  strategical  feature  is  the  side  Ihie  of  railway 
Avhich  starts  from  the  junction  Avith  the  main  Ehcinis- 
Eethel-Mezicres  line  at  Bazancourt  and  is  prolonged 
to  the  other  side  of  the  Argonne.  This  radAvay  Avas 
obviously  of  the  first  value  to  the  Gennan  Army  Avhen 
it  undertook  the  count^r-offensiA'C  and  began  to  move- 
south,  for  it  runs  parallel  to  the  line  this  advance 
would  take,  and  can  serve  the  whole  of  it  with 
ammunition  and  food.  On  the  other  hand,  this 
raihvay  is  not  prolonged  eastward  across  the  Meuso, 
and  does  not  help  dii-ectly  to  feed  the  main  German 
armies  from  theii*  depots  in  Lorraine,  or  thi'ough  the- 
Belgian  lines. 

SECTION    IV.— THE   FIRST,   OR  LEFT, 
PORTION  OF  THE  EASTERN  LIMB. 

What  happened  here  in  the  week  since  the 
Gennans  took  up  theii*  general  defensive  line  on  the 
Simday  before  last  (September  13th)  is  a  strong  aud 
partially  successful  counter-offensive  undertaken  b}' 
the  Germans,  Avith  the  object  of  recaptu.ring  the  city 
of  Eheims,  and,  at  the  same  time,  of  breaking  the 
French  line.  It  is  in  connection  with  this  partially 
successful  counter-offensive  that  there  took  place  in 
the  latter  pai-t  of  the  week,  upon  the  Saturday  and 
the  Sunday,  the  19th  and  the  20th,  the  bombardment 
of  the  toAvn  of  Eheims,  in  Avhich  grievous  damage 
to  the  cathedral  was  inflicted  by  shell  fire. 

Of  all  the  five  sections  of  the  defensive  position, 
this  fourth  section  in  the  centre  is  the  most  critical 
to  the  Allies,  as  the  first  on  the  western  AA'ing  is  the 
most  critical  to  the  Germans.  AVe  have  seen  hov\', 
when,  in  the  fii'st  section,  the  Gennan  right  is  turned, 
the  Avhole  German  defensive  position  must  be  lost  ; 
but,  as  against  this,  the  Germans  have  made  a  very 
violent  effort  to  break  the  French  in  this  fourth,  or 
centra],  section;  that  is,  in  the  field  round  Eheims. 
They  liaA'e  here  secured  so  considerable  an  advance- 
that  they  actually  occupy  at  the  moment  of  Avriting  a 
dangerous  salient,  and  not  only  liaA'e  they  secm-ed  this 
advance,  but  they  have  estaljlished  positions  upon  the 
heights  east  and  north  of  Eheims,  Avhence  they  have 
been  able  (especially  from  the  cast)  to  bombard 
the  city. 

The  original  defensive  position  as  I  described  it 
last  week  is  that  SAvell  of  land  i-unning  from  the  Aisne 
eastward  parallel  to  and  north  of  the  Suippe  Elver,  a 
muddy  little  streani.  But  more  than  a  Aveek  ago 
the  Germans  Avcre  able  to  get  well  to  the  south  of 
this,  up  to  a  second  defensive  position  nearer  Eheims 
and  lying  npon  the  f  lu-thcr  side  of  the  Suippe  and  on 
the  edge  of  the  plain  on  the  fiu-thcr  side  of  Avhich 
Eheims  stands.  They  did  more.  They  took  the 
heights  of  Brimont,  an  isolated  hiU  to  the  north  of 


8* 


September  26,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


O 


-#VERZENAY 


^^Vv 


VII 


8KXTCB  SHOWINO  THB  HIIOUTS  BOUND  BEIIUS  JUSTD  TEI   POINTS   OF   UAIN   OSKMAN   COVKTEK-OFFEXSITI. 


tlic  city  at  a  range  of,  about  9000  yards,  while  on  the 
east  they  penetrated  so  far  that  they  were  able  to 
establish  tliemselves  upon  the  more  important  group 
of  hills,  also  isolated  in  the  plain,  which  take  their 
name  from  the  village  of  Nogent  I'Abbesse.  Brimont 
Avas  retaken  by  the  French  in  part,  but  lost  again. 
Nogent  I'Abbesse  hill  was  not  retaken,  but  a  lower 
spur  to  the  south  called  PompeUe  was  seized  by  the 
French  at  the  week-end,  and  is  apparently  still  held 
by  them,  though  it  is  a  difficult  place  to  hold  against 
aiiylx)dy  that  has  the  higher  hill  to  the  north.  From 
these  two  groups  of  heights,  Brimont  at  very  long 
range,  Nogent  rAbbesse  hill  at  no  more  than 
7000  yards,  the  city  has  been  bombarded  for  many 
days.  But  so  far  this  bombai-dmcnt  has  not  had  the 
ofloct  of  weakening  the  French  centi*e.  Sooner  or 
h'.tor  the  French  will  have  brought  up  heavy  artillery 
o£  their  own  to  that  high  position  called  "  the  mountain 
of  Eheims,"  particularly  to  the  gun  position  above 
Vcrzenay,  where,  though  at  very  long  range,  batteries 
upon  the  hill  of  Nogent  can  be  reached.  Whether 
tliey  hold  the  other  group  of  liills  to  the  west  of 
Eheims  above  Pouillon  avc  have  not  as  yet  been  told. 
But  if  or  Avhen  they  do,  those  hills  dominate  the 
heights  of  Brimont  at  a  comparatively  short  range 
and  should  make  them  untenable  to  the  enemy. 

While  tliis  artillery  action  from  the  heights  of 
Brimont  and  of  Nogent  I'Abbesse  is  going  on  against 
liheims  and  the  French  troops  in  it  and  around  it, 
with  the  object  of  there  breaking  the  French  centre,  a 
more  violent  assault,  consistmg  in  successive  infantry 
attacks,  has  been  taking  ])lace  throughout  that  part  of 
the  same  Held  which  lies  between  Craonne  and  Berry- 
au-Bac.  The  reason  that  a  specially  active  couuter- 
cffeusivc  has  been  undertaken  here  by  the  Germans  in 


assistance  of  and  parallel  with  the  attack  on  Eheims 
close  by  is  that  this  point  out  of  all  the  line  is  best 
siuted  for  an  attempt  at  breaking  the  French  containing 
forces.  (1)  It  is  an  open  plain.  (2)  It  is  very  near 
the  place  where  the  Allies  join — always  a  weak  point 
in  a  mixed  line.  (3)  It  is  very  near  the  exact 
geographical  centre  of  the  whole  defensive  position — 
which  is,  of  course,  the  ideal  point  at  which  to  break 
any  line,  because  the  largest  fraction  remaining  after 
such  a  breach  is  a  minimum.  (4)  Finally,  the  j^laco 
must  be  used  for  the  counter-offensive,  or  it  Avould 
become  itself  the  most  dangerous  field  for  a  French 
offensive.  If  the  Germans  here  relied  entirely  upoit 
the  defensive,  they  would  be  holding  the  only  part  of 
the  whole  line  whifh  has  no  ridge  or  crest  from  which 
they  can  dominate  the  advance  of  an  enemy.  It  is 
the  only  serious  gap  in  all  the  80  miles. 

But  this  attempt  to  break  the  French  line  by 
German  infantry  assault  between  Craonne  and  Berr}- 
au-Bac  has  hitherto  not  been  any  more  successful  than 
the  coiTcsponding  attempt  to  break  it  by  shell  fire 
round  the  city  of  Eheims  itself. 

Moreover,  the  Gennans  are  here  heavily  handi- 
capped by  the  presence  behind  the  field  of  Eheims  of 
the  deeply  ravined  and  Avooded  hills  Avhich  run  from, 
Pouillon  all  the  way  to  the  Aisne  and  on  the  south  by 
the  moimtain  of  Eheims.  They  are  attacking  men 
who  have  strong  positions  on  Avhich  to  retire. 

Vigorous  as  the  German  counter-offensive  Avith 
Eheims  for  its  centre  has  been,  and  partially 
successful  as  it  has  been,  it  is  threatened  not  only  by 
the  gi'eat  turning  movement  near  Noyon,  but  also  by  a 
German  retirement  and  a  French  advance  further  to 
the  east  in  the  5th  section  of  the  line  between  Bazan- 
coiui  and  the  Argonno,  Avhich  menaces  the  other  Aving. 


9» 


LAND    AND    WATER 


September  26,  1914 


SECTION    V. -THE    FIELD    TO    THE 
EAST  OF  RHEIMS. 


This  fifth,  or  easternmost,  section  of  the  long 
defensive  Ime  between  the  Oise  and  the  Argonne  is  of 
importance  projwrtionate  to  the  numbers  which  the 
French  can  spare  in  their  advance  across  it. 

It  foi-ms  the  left  of  that  united  defensive  position 
which  the  enemy  has  taken  up  all  across  Champagne 
and  the  Soissons  comitry.  It  is  a  wing,  and  if  by 
any  chance  the  French  could  here  break  through,  they 
would  turn  the  position  as  thoroughly,  and  with  more 
complete  results,  than  if  it  were  turned  upon  the  west, 
though  the  success  of  a  turning  movement  by  the 
west  along  the  Oise  is  much  the  more  likely 
happening. 

This  eastern  effoi-t,  if  it  were  fully  successful, 
would  cut  off  the  main  German  army  fi-om  the  Crown 
Prince's  army  upon  the  Meuse,  and  from  the  army  of 
Ijorraine  beyond  the  Meuse. 

But  men  cannot  be  everywhere  at  once,  and,  as 
the  great  reserve  was  accumulated  behind  Paris,  it  is 
almost  certainly  up  the  valley  of  the  Oise  that  the 
weight  of  the  French  turning  movement  is  being 
delivered,  and  should  succeed.  But  even  though  the 
Fi-ench  should  fail  to  pierce  the  Grennan  line  here, 
they  may  succeed  in  pushing  it  back  so  much  as  to 
alter  very  materially  the  future  of  the  campaign. 

In  order  to  appreciate  how  this  may  be,  I  will 
ask  the  reader  to  look  at  the  few  lines  and  names 
marked  upon  the  sketch  above. 

It  wiU  be  seen  that  a  lateral  railroad  nms 
roughly  east  and  west  behind  the  Gemian  line  in  this 
part  of  the  field ;  the  German  defensive  position  held  a 
week  ago,  Souain-Le  Mesnil-Les  Hurlus-Massiges- 
Ville-sur-Tourbe,  stretching  along  this  line  right  to 
the  Argonne.  The  raihvay  of  which  I  speak,  running 
through  St.  Maj*tin,  Sommepy,  and  Manre,  feeds  the 
whole  of  this  line.  That  railway,  further,  goes  on 
through  a  sort  of  pass  in  the  Argonne,  where  a  main 
road  also  crosses  and  where  there  is  a  clearing  of  the 
woods  (known  as  the  Gap  of  Grand  Pre),  and  though 
this  railway  does  not  stretch  as  far  as  the  Meuse,  it 
docs  connect  up  at  its  railhead  with  the  Ci-own 
Prince's  Army.  That  Gap  of  Grand  Pr6  (famous  in 
the  Revolutionary  Wars  as  one  of  the  passes  through 
which  the  Prussians  forced  the  Argonne  before  their 
defeat  at  Valmy)  is  exceedingly  important  to  the 
whole  scheme  of  the  German  armies,  as  the  following 
diiigram  of  the  elements  involved  will  show. 

The  CrovsTi  Prince  was  investing  Verdun  in  the 
jwsition  A  B.  The  French  advance  of  a  fortnight 
ago  compelled  him  to  give  up  this  investment  and  to  go 
down  the  Meuse  to  the  position  C  D.  Now  it  is  at 
that  jwsition,  C  D,  that  the  railway  of  wliich  we  are 
swaking  here  links  up  the  main  German  Armies  on 
the  great  defensive  position  which  i-uns  acrosss  the 


Champagne  country  and  along  the  Aisne  to  the  Oise. 
This  railway,  therefore,  though  not  a  main  line  of 
communication  and  only  joining  the  main  line  at 
Bazancourt,  is  of  great  importance  to  the  Crown 
Prince's  present  position.  Upon  the  holding  of  it 
depends  the  command  of  the  power  to  cross  and  to 
retreat  by  the  middle  Meuse  below  the  fortified  zone 
of  Verdim.  If  the  main  German  Ai'my  should  fall 
back  behind  that  railway,  and  if  the  French  defensive 
in  the  direction  of  the  arrows  should  be  able  to  obtain 
possession  of  the  line  or  be  able  to  cut  it,  the  Crow^^ 
I'rince  would  have  to  fall  back  further  to  the  north  in 
the  direction  F ;  he  would  lose  much  of  the  Meuse :  the 
remaining  positions  through  which  a  retreat  could  be 
accomplished  would  be  con-espondingly  cramped  ;  and, 
perhaps  most  important  of  all,  the  army  in  Lorraine, 
which  is  stiU  in  touch  with  him  at  M.N.O.,  would  be 
separated  by  a  big  gap  fi'om  him  and  from  the  rest. 

Well,  in  this  attempt  to  get  hold  of  the  railw  ay 
which  leads  from  Bazancourt  through  the  pass  of 
Grand  Pro,  the  French  have  three  main  roads  by  which 
to  advance.  Each  of  these  I  have  marked  upon  the 
sketch  at  the  beginning  of  this  section.  You  have 
the  road  leading  north  through  St.  Martin,  the  road 


9a» 

t 


[East:  Witvsr  ofhiAJnGirman  \  gi»€^      [ 
Army  in  ChasRpa^sre         '®' J^ 


■-.v? 


A      &S 


1 


^IVERDVN 

?.5 


\ 


PLAN   SHOWIXO  THE  IITPOKTAXCB   OF   OAP   OY   OKAND   PES 
TO  TUB   GEBMAX   SCUKME. 

leading  north  through  Sommepy,  and  the  road  leading 
north  through  Manre. 

Of  the  French  fortunes  upon  the  first  of  these 
roads  we  have  heard  nothing  ;  and  it  is  to  be  presimied 
tliat  the  advance  along  this  has  not  been  pushed  very 
far,  for  it  lies  within  the  range  of  those  heights  of 
Nogeut  I'Abbesse  to  the  west  which  we  know  the 
Gennans  to  be  occupying,  and  from  wdiicli  they  ha\e 
bombarded  Eheims. 

But  the  French  progress  along  the  other  two  roads 
has  been  considerable.  On  Sunday  they  were  in 
Souain,  and  on  Monday  they  took  Le  Mesnil  and 
IMassiges.  They  were,  therefore,  by  Tuesday  morning 
in  possession  of  what  had  been,  three  days  before,  the 
advanced  German  defensive,  and  within  half  a  day's 
march  of  the  railway  line,  which  is  their  ultimate 
object.  If  they  cross  that  railway  line  (with  the 
important  results  I  have  suggested)  we  shall  know  it 
by  the  mention  of  theii*  presence  in  Sommepy  and 
Manre,  and  possibly  in  St.  Martin  as  well. 

THE  ACTIONS  TO  THE  EAST  OF 
ARGONNE. 

As  to  what  is  going  on  to  the  east  of  Argonne 
we  know  veiy  little.  The  numbers  here  involved  are 
not  very  great,  and  the  whole  work  here  is  subsidiary 
to  the  great  main  conflict  taking  place  to  the  west  of 
Argonne  and  between  that  forest  and  the  Oise.  But 
information  reached  this  country  last  Wednesday  that 
during  the  first  days  of  the  week  there  had  been 


10* 


September  20,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


PLAN   BROWISa  THB   POSITION   lAST  OF  TH»  ARaONNI. 


another  attempt  to  pierce  the  fortified  line  between 
Venlnii  and  Toul,  with  all  the  consequences  that 
■would  attach  to  such  a  German  success  :  the 
sudden  provision  of  shoi-ter  communications,  the 
taking  of  the  French  advance  through  Champagne 
in  reverse,  etc. 

The  attack  on  the  fort  of  Troyon  was  made  this 
time  not  from  the  western  side  of  the  Meuse  (as  was 
that  of  a  fortnight  ago  when  the  Crown  Prince  was 
still  holding  on)  but  from  the  east.  The  foi-ts  along 
the  Meuse  here  (of  which  the  principal  arc  the  works 
of  Jenicourt,  Troyon,  and  Camp  des  llomains  with  an 
outlying  fort  at  Liouville)  stand  upon  the  isolated 
summits  of  a  bare  crest  which  overlooks  the  trench 
through  which  the  Meuse  nms.  To  the  cast  of  this 
crest  lies  a  wide  belt  of  hilly  and  wooded  country 
falling  at  last  rather  shai-ply  into  the  basin  of  the 
^Moselle.  From  the  plains  of  that  basin  and  against 
the  line  of  these  hills  and  woods  a  serious  German 
attempt  would  seem  to  have  been  made  against,  or 
i-ither  towai-ds,  that  work  of  Troyon  which  is  the 
central  and  most  impoiiaut  work  of  the  barrier  series, 
and  the  advantage  to  the  enemy  of  takuig  which  I 
described  last  week. 

Tiie  headquai-tors  of  the  Gennan  Army  during 
this  attack  were  at  Thiaucourt.  A  difficult  region  of 
•wood  and  lake  to  the  south  protected  it  from  the 
attack  of  the  French  forces  round  Toiil  and  Nancy 
f  ui-tlicr  south  still ;  and  the  German  assault  was  made 
from  all  along  the  line  running  throiigli  Ti-esauvaux 
and  Yigneulles,  to  Heudicoui-t ;  that  is,  it  proceeded 
everywhere  from  the  plain  at  tlio  base  of  the  hills  up 
the  first  wooded  slopes.  The  French  report  that  it 
was  evci'ywhere  repelled. 


SUMMARY    OF    THE    WHOLE 
DEFENSIVE    POSITION. 

If  we  now  put  together  tlicse  five  sections  of  the 
line  which  the  Geraians  are  holding  against  the  Allies 
from  the  Oise  to  the  Ai'goune  and  examine  the  matter 
as  a  whole,  what  Ave  see  is  what  we  might  have 
expected  from  the  routine  imposed  both  by  tradition 
and  by  national  necessity  upon  French  and  upon 
German  strategy. 

You  have  here  in  the  main  lines  and  on  a  some- 
what reduced  scale  a  repetition  of  the  position  of  three 
weeks  ago,  just  before  the  Battle  of  the  Marne. 

Save  tbat  the  Germans  are  technically  upon  the 
defensive  instead  of  just  having  ceased  an  offensive 
moveiuent,  and  save  for  the  fact  that  the  line  as  a 
whole  is  straighter  than  was  the  line  between  Paris 
and  Verdun  three  weeks  ago,  the  main  features  are 
repetitions  of  the  featui-es  we  then  noticed  in  the 
struggle  between  the  two  forces. 

For  there  is  (a)  a  determined  attempt  upon  the 
pai-t  of  the  Germans  to  break  through  the  centre,  in 
the  former  case  at  Vitiy,  in  this  case  at  Eheims  ; 
(b)  a  resistance  offered  at  this  centre  by  the  French 
coupled  with  an  attempt  to  work  round  the  two 
German  wings ;  this  attempt  being  weakest  and 
pressed  with  least  men  on  the  French  right  or  eastern 
extremity  of  the  line,  and  strongest  and  pressed  with 
most  men  on  the  French  left  or  western  extremity  of 
the  line ;  (c)  the  use  of  a  reserve  by  the  French  is 
also  apparent.  It  is  not  an  unexpected  or  hidden 
reserve  like  that  which  did  so  much  to  decide  the 
retirement  of  Von  Kluck  from  I'aris.  We  know  that 
the  reserve  is  acting  against  the  Gemian  right  and 


n» 


LAND    AND     WATEE 


Beptember  2G,  1914 


threatening  tlic  main  German  comniunications.  But 
it  is  a  reserve  upon  the  size  and  direction  of  which 
a  wise  silence  is  preserved.  All  we  know  of  this 
fresh  French  Army  at  this  moment  is  that  it  took 
I'eronne  last  Saturday  and  is  now  advancing  on 
St.  Qvientin. 

Should  the  C.ermaus  break  through,  either 
between  Craonnc  and  Berry  au  Bac,  or  between  Berry 
an  Bac  and  Bazancourt— that  is,  in  the  immediate 
neighbourhood  of  Eheims— it  is  obvious  that  such  a 
counter-offensive  woidd  mean  a  great  and  decisive 
success  for  the  enemy.  But  in  our  attemj^t  to  judge 
the  future  we  can  but  note  that  such  a  success  has 
not  been  approached.  For  ten  days  every  effort  has 
been  concentrated  by  the  enemy  upon  the  central 
portion  of  the  line  to  achieve  that  success.  If  the 
centre  of  Eheims  continues  to  be  successfully  held  by 
the  French,  there  remain  the  two  turning  move- 
ments :  the  operations  upon  the  wings. 

I  have  said  when  speaking  of  the  sections  in 
detail  that  the  advance  along  the  west  of  the  Argonne, 
if  it  shall  pass  and  cross  and  hold  the  railway  line 
from  Bazancoui-t  to  Grand  Pre,  will  have  important 
results.  It  will  compel  the  Crown  Prince's  Anny 
upon  the  Meuse  to  go  northwards ;  it  will  narrow  the 
gate  through  which  a  German  retreat  could  be 
effected ;  it  may  even  withdraw  pressure  from  the 
French  troops  in  LoiTaine.  But  an  advance  on  this 
eastern  side  of  the  line  would  only  be  decisive  if  it 
were  made  in  very  great  force  and  could  count  upon 
ultimately  holding  tlxe  German  lines  of  commimication 
here.  Now  these  go  directly  north  from  Eheims  to 
Mezieres  thi-ough  Eethel,  and  are  far  from  even  a 
successful  advance  of  the  French  in  the  east.  More- 
over, of  a  decisive  aocumulation  of  nimfibers  upon  the 
east,  or  French  right,  there  has  been  no  sign.  The 
chief  operation  is  upon  the  French  left  and  along  the 
valley  of  the  Oise.  It  is  here  that,  of  the  three  possi- 
bilities which  the  general  position  suggests,  the  most 
probable  of  all  must  be  loolced  for.  It  should  be  bg  the 
turning  movement  here  round  Nogon  that  the  Germans 
should  be  compelled  to  abandon  the  Soissons plateau. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  main  line  of  communication 
by  which  the  greater  pai-t  of  GeiTnan  stores  and 
artillery  munitions  comes  is  that  which  runs  directly 
from  the  Belgian  frontier  down  the  valley  of  the  Oise. 
After  the  fall  of  Maubeuge  that  line  was  open  through- 
out, save  of  course  where  such  bridges  as  the  British 
contingent  and  the  French  5th  Army  had  destroyed 
in  their  retreat  from  Mons  have  been  re2)laced  by 
pontoon  bridges  and  trestle  bridges  which  caimot  bear 
the  weight  of  a  ti-ain.  But,  at  any  rate  for  the  most 
part,  this  line  can  be  used  and  is  being  used  by  the 
Germans.  Conversely,  if  that  line  be  cut  permanently 
and  held  by  the  Allied  troops,  retreat  is  imposed  upon 
the  Gei-mans,  and  if  that  retreat  were  then  delayed  it 
would  be  converted  into  disaster. 

Supposmg,  therefore,  that  the  French  centre  is  not 
pierced,  everything  would  seem  to  tui-n  upon  the 
success  of  the  French  troops  which  we  kno^v  to  be 
operating  in  the  Oise  valley  near  Noyon  and  pushing 
up  northward  there,  and  the  appearance  in  sufficiently 
large  numbers  of  other  troops  before  St.  Qucntin, 
coming  we  may  presume  from  the  direction  of  Amiens. 
There  is  a  French  Army  there — marching,  as  I  have 
said,  from  Peronne  since  last  Saturday.  Upon  what 
it  does,  and  upon  what  the  other  forces  further  to  the 
south  round  Noyon  can  do,  mainly  depends  the  issue 
of  this  general  action  :  whether  it  shall  be  decisive  of 
the  first  phase  of  the  Avar  in  the  Avest  or  no. 

It  is  just  at  this  point,  when  one  is  summing  up 
the  whole  position,  that  there  comes  in  an  element 


which,  from  the  present  onwards,  will  be  of 
increasing  importance :  I  mean  what  the  French 
call  the  moral — the  mental  attitude  which  is  closely 
bound  up  with  the  physical  condition  of  an  army. 

AVhenover  two  forces  apj^roximately  equal  meet, 
and  whenever  neither  has  succeeded  in  outmanoeuvring 
or  tricking  the  other,  the  spirit  turns  the  scale.  That 
supreme  clement  is  not  of  decisive  importance  in  the 
first  days  of  a  camjiaign,  unless  the  campaign  was 
begun  Avith  the  opposing  forces  in  very  different  states, 
of  mind — the  one  desj^ondcnt,  the  other  confident. 

Here  there  Avas  no  such  difference  apparent 
between  French  and  Germans.  Neither  party  out- 
marched the  other  :  neither  party  showed  diu-ing  the 
first  three  Avceks  of  heavy  fighting  (from  the  Sunday 
A\hen  the  Germans  Avere  successfiU  on  the  Sambre  to 
the  Sunday  Avhen  they  took  up  the  defensive  position 
on  the  Aisne)  any  lack  of  confidence  or  any  doubt  of 
success.  The  German  Army  of  invasion,  as  a  A\liole, 
like  its  commanders,  Avere  still  confident  of  ultimate 
victory :  so  Avere  the  French  and  the  British  con- 
tingent AA'hich  stood  Avith  the  French. 

Now,  it  is  an  uuAvise  thing,  in  the  examination 
of  any  human  acti\ity,  but  particularly  in  folloAving  a 
campaign,  to  force  a  judgment  of  the  future  beyond 
the  limits  of  A'ery  cautious  conjecture.  But  it  does 
seem  as  though,  in  this  element  of  moral,  time  was  at 
last  Avorkinjj  against  the  invasion. 

The  counter-offensive  has,  indeed,  been  A-ery 
vigorously  taken  by  the  Germans  over  and  over  again. 
They  have  not  slackened  theii*  heavy  and  accurate 
artillery  Avork  ;  they  have  lost  no  conspicuous  number 
of  prisoners  in  these  operations  as  a  AA'hcle.  But  their 
position  is  not  one  in  which  an  army  noui'ished  iipon 
the  tradition  and  led  by  the  aims  cf  the  Prussian 
serA'ice  can  feel  its  former  confidence.  To  begin  Avith, 
the  initiative  has  passed  to  the  Allied  side.  Next, 
the  threat  of  a  decision  is  against  the  Germans.  If 
the  position  on  the  plateau  above  Soissons  is  turned 
it  must  be  abandoned.  That  it  may  be  turned  is  noAV 
an  obvious  and  increasing  peril.  If,  being  turned, 
the  plateau  is  not  abandoned  Avith  sufficient  celerity, 
it  must  be  abandoned  at  a  cost  AA-hich  may  vary 
from  heavy  losses  of  materiel  to  disaster. 

It  must  further  be  remembered  that  the  initial 
efforts  imppsed  upon  the  greater  part  of  the  German 
forces,  especially  those  towards  the  AA-est  of  the  line 
(which  is  precisely  the  point  where  the  Allied  efforts 
are  now  concentrated),  Avere  particularly  designed  for 
an  immediate  success.  The  enormous  ex2)enditure  of 
energy  demanded  of  these  men  presupposed  the  rapid 
reaping  of  a  rcAvard.  True,  there  Avas  little  sign 
of  exhaustion  in  the  retreat  after  the  Battle  of 
!Meaux  upon  the  Aisne.  But  a  defensiAC  Avhich  is 
threatened  upon  its  wings,  and  after  many  days  has 
failed  in  every  attempt  at  a  counter-offensive,  is  of  its 
nature  a  weakening  thing.  The  spiritual  factor 
Avhich  is  ultimately  the  decider  of  all  warfai-e — Avhere 
the  material  factors  ai-e  more  or  less  equal — faA'ours 
the  Allies. 

THE   EASTERN   FIELD   OF  WAR. 

In  the  Eastern  theatre  of  Avar  there  is  no  ncAva 
of  moment  this  week,  save  the  occupation  by  the 
Eussian  Army  of  Jaroslav. 

We  cannot  predicate  anything  decisive  of  the 
position  in  Galicia,  nor  conjectui-e  even  upon  the 
broadest  lines  a  date  when  a  victorious  Eussian  ai-my 
might  ap2>ear  in  Silesia,  until  Ave  haA^e  more  definite 
ncAvs  of  what  is  really  happening  to  the  Austria^ 
forces  with  their  German  reinforcements  noAV  upou 
the  defensive  along  the  San. 


12* 


September  20,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


THE   WAR   BY   WATER. 

By   FRED    T.    JANE. 


ON    THE    HIGH   SEAS   GENERALLY. 

THE  week,  or,  rather,  tlie  week's  news,  has  been 
marked  by  a  recrudescence  of  German  corsairs — 
ships  which  undoubtedly  hava  secret  bases  in 
>vhich  they  have  probably  been  hiding. 
Of  these  the  most  dangerous  and  mysterious 
is  the  24-knot  Emilen,  which  was  at  Kiao-Chau 
just  before  the  waa*  broke  out. 

On  Sept.  10th,  nothing  having  been  seen  or  heard  of  her 
in  the  six  weeks'  interval,  acoompanied  by  the  Marhomannia, 
of  3335  tons,  used  as  a  collier,  she  suddenly  appeared  in  the 
Bay  of  Bengal,  where,  between  Sept.  10th  and  14th,  she  cap- 
tured six  British  merchant  ships.  Of  these  she  sank  five  and 
sent  tlie  remaining  vessel  into  Calcutta  ■with  the  crews.  At 
some  later  date  sho  was  rcpoiied  from  Rangoon  having  made 


ever,  seeking  her  bases  is  likely  to  approximate  to  the  search 
for  a  needle  iu  a  bundle  of  hay. 

There  are  at  least  ten  ways  by  which  she  can  return  to 
the  Pacific.  There  are  at  least  two  neutral  property  owners — ■ 
Dutch  and  American — on  whom  she  can  call  for  coal  to  take 
her  to  the  nearest  German  port.,  and  both  these  have  scattered 
possessions.  Theare  axe  groups  of  islands  in  each  case.  There 
are  scores  of  sheltered  places  in  which  she  can  coal  from  colliera 
or  other  vessels  sent  for  the  purpose.  We  can  be  perfectly 
certain  that  in  this  matter  of  supplies  everything  has  been 
carefully  prearranged. 

Sooner  or  later  we  shall  intercept  and  destroy  the  Eiiuhn, 
but  till  then  she  has  aei-ious  possibilities,  as,  for  example,  the 
stoppage  of  all  outward  trade  from  Calcutta. 

The  stories  of  the  captured  who  were  landed  at  Calcutta 


I^/eatsaloravaiCahle 


/or  coaling   ^^H 

•  German.  Hli 

-  Hostile 


CAROLINE  ISLANDS 


8ISMARK 

ARCHIPELAGO 


NEW  POMMERN 


MAP  TO   INBICATB  THB  KXTREMI   DIPFICULTT  OTf  CATCHING  THK   "  EUDKX  "   IN  THE   EAST   IXDIAN  AECinPELAaO.  THE  DOTS  OXLT  IXDICATE 

THE  PBINCIFAI.   ISLANDS — THESE   ABE  MAST  OTHEBS.        THE  ABSOWS   INDICATE  ONLY  HEB   CHIEF  POSSIBLE  WAYS   OF   KKTUEN  TO  HEB  BECEKT 

BASES.        THE   DIFFICCLTIES   0»   INTEECEPTION  ABB   COEEESPOXDIXOLY   OBVIOCS,   EVEN   IF   NEOTBALS   BE   IGNOEED. 


further  captures.  The  loss  incuiTed  by  her  first  raid  is  esti- 
mated at  something  like  £300,000.  On  Tuesday  last  she  again 
made  herself  unpleasantly  notorious,  by  dropping  nine  shells 
into  Madras,  aaid  doing  damage  to  the  value  of  £100,000. 

Tlie  attack  on  Neu  Pommern  in  the  Bismarck  Archipelago 
began  on  Sept.  11th.  It  is  probable  that  the  Emden  had  been 
using  the  Bismarck  Archipelago  as  a  base,  and  being  kept 
au  courant  from  the  Neu  Pommern  wireless  station,  started 
out  on  her  marauding  career  just  before  our  attack  developed, 
a,  career  which  may  easily  run  into  a  million  pounds  before  she 
is  accounted  for. 

The  total  we  can  bring  against  her  of  vessels  of  equal 
«peed  or  thereabouts  is :  — 


Eiiat  Imlia  Sqnarlron 
China  Squadron    ... 
Ditto 

Australian  Fleet  ... 
Ditto 
Ditto 


Daetmouth 

Kewcastle 
Yabmoutu 

AnSTBALlA 

Melboubni 
Sydney 


Of  course,  if  we  knew  her  exact  base,  or  oven  her  exact 
Bases,  interception  would  bo  very  easy.     Unfoiiunatcly,  how- 


form  instructive  reading.  They  agree  that  the  German  shoots 
ing  was  not  very  good,  and  mention  the  marked  courtesy  with 
which  they  were  treated.  This  coui-tesy  was  also  remarked  on 
by  victims  of  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  der  Grosse.  It  is  in  curious 
contrast  to  the  behaviour  of  the  German  army  towards  non- 
combatants,  and  is  suggestive  in  some  of  its  details — as,  for 
e.xa.niple,  the  giving  up  of  cabins — of  sjiccial  orders. 

Another  circumstance  is  that  the  German  officei-g  were 
under  the  impression  that  Paris  was  invested  and  that  several 
British  Dreadnoughts  had  been  sunk  in  the  North  Sea.  From 
this  distinctly  German  intelligence  it  would  seem  that  they  are 
in  wireless  touch  with  Germany-  possibly  they  arc  directed 
from  headquarters  at  Berlin.  In  the  old  days  a  comir^-i'ce 
raider  roamed  the  seas  ignorant  of  happenings  and  perforce 
acting  blindly  and  iiiclepeiidcutly.  Now,  by  means  of  wireloss, 
co-operation  on  a  general  plan  is  possible,  and  there  are  indicar 
lions  that^mo  kind  of  plan  is  now  in  operation,  which  cer- 
tainly was  not  the  case  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 

More  or  less  conleniporanoously  with  the  Emden's  career 
of  destruction  two  other  German  corsairs  have  appeared.  In 
each  case  the  date  was  the  samc^— Sqit.  14th. 

Of  these  the  first  is  the  23J-knot  Knnwf/xherff  (qneiy 
Nurnherg  or  Ltijr.ig),  also  from  Kiao-Chan.     Shortly  beforo 


13» 


LAND    AND    WATEB 


September  2C,  1914 


ytRX  \Ta3  declared  the  Eonlngslerg  docs  not  appear  to  have 
been  iu  commission  anywhere. 

This  cruiser  happened  into  Zanzibar,  where  she  found  our 
old  third  class  cruiser  I'egMus,  of  the  Cape  Station,  lying  by 
iu  the  open  roadstead  sweeping  boiler  tubes.  The  German 
ajinc<I  with  a  broadside  of  five  40  calibre  4.16,  opened  fire  on 
the  I'esdiiis,  which  could  only  reply  with  a  broadside  of  four 
old  27-calibre  4-iuch  of  short  range  and  high  trajoctoiy. 

The  German  cruiser,  according  to  our  oilicial  accounts, 
killed  twenty-five  of  the  crew  of  the  Pef;asus  and  wounded 
iifty-two  out  of  a  total  of  234.  There  are  also  ten  missing. 
If  the  Gei-man  cruiser  had  any  sense  at  all,  her  corresponding 
loss  was  absolutely  nothing.  She  had  merely  to  steam  to  and 
fi-o  at  long  range  and  fire  at  a  stationary  target  which  could 
not  reach  her  with  replica. 

The  rfgasiis  is  reported  as  having  been  beached— she 
probably  drifted  ashore  a  blaaiug  wreck.  The  German  cruiser 
was  last  seen  steaming  south. 

So  far  as  wo  are  immediately  concerned,  this  means  that 
simultaneously  with  the  Emden's  performances  in  the  Bay  of 
IJengal  we  have  to  look  for  a  German  cruiser  on  the  Cape  of 
Good  Hope  station,  where  wo  have  nothing  regularly  stationed 
capable  of  catching  a  23i-knot  cruiser. 

Gut  of  which  we  may  expect  to  hear  of  German  activities 
in  that  direction. 

The  third  incident  is  that,  also  on  Sept.  14th,  the  British 
armed  liner  Carmania  encountered  the  German  armed  liner 
Cap  Trafalgar  (or  her  sister,  the  Berlin)  off  the  East  Coast  of 
South  America.  This  battle  between  two  enormous  liners  is 
certainly  the  most  curious  conflict  of  modera  times.  Their 
very  bulk  protected  them  against  the  small  guns  with  which 
they  were  each  armed  in  this  "  battle  of  haystacks." 

At  the  end  of  one  and  three-quarter  houiV  firing  the 
Berlin  (or  Cap  Trafalgar)  capsized  and  sank.  Her  return  fire 
killed  nine  men  in  the  Carmania,  seriously  wounded  five,  and 
slightly  wounded  twenty-one.  The  survivors  of  the  German 
ship,  whose  losses  are  not  known,  were  picked  up  by  a  collier 
from  which  she  had  been  coaling. 

The  British  losses  indicate  that  the  battle  must  have  been 
engaged  furiously  on  both  sides,  but  that  our  shooting  was 
much  the  better. 

This  is  the  second  German  armed  liner  to  bo  disposed  of. 
Both  w-ere  caught  coaling — apparently  the  only  chance  of 
bringing  them  into  action.  The  mission  of  a  commerce 
destroyer  is  not  to  fight  if  she  can  possibly  help  it;  even  a 
victory  may  impair  her  utility.  The  problem,  of  adequate 
repression  of  coi^sairs  is  thus  considerably  amplified. 

From  the  public  point  of  view  the  circumstance  that  the 
British  Navy  has  so  far  only  eliminated  two  of  the  commerce 
raiders  may  seem  to  suggest  a  certain  inadequatencss.  Such  a 
view,  however,  is  entirely  incorrect.  The  German  raiders 
appear  to  be  kept  supplied  with  coal  from  vessels  which  may 
be  lying  anywhere.  These  come  out  as  required  and  coal  the 
raider  at  sea  or  in  any  convenient  bay.  The  exact  problem 
befoi-e  our  Navy  is  best  to  be  expressed  popularly  by  getting 
someone  secretly  to  select  a  certain  letter  on  this  page  and  for 
the  reader  then  to  endeavour  to  discover  what  particular  word 
that  letter  is  in.  Just  a  little  something  can  be  done  along  the 
line  of  probahlo  words  to  be  selected,  but  veiy  little.  Blind 
chance  must  of  necessity  be  the  predominant  factor. 

Elsewhere,  yet.  again  on  Sept.  14th,  an  attempt  was  made 
to  blow  up  H.M.S.  Dwarf  in  the  Camei-oon  River.  The 
attempt  failed.  Two  days  later  the  Dwarf  was  rammed  by  a 
German  mei-chant  ship,  but  slie  was  only  slightly  damaged, 
while  the  German  ship  was  driven  ashore  with  some  consider- 
able loss.  The  incident  has,  of  course,  no  bearing  on  the 
general  issues  of  the  war,  but  it  sci-ves  to  illustrate  the  tenacity 
with  which  the  Germans  are  conducting  operations,  and  also 
that  they  are  by  no  means  unfruitful  in  "'  dodges." 

THE   NORTH   SEA. 

From  further  details  to  hand  it  appears  that  our  sub- 
marine E9  (Lieut.-Com.  Jlorton)  succeeded  in  torpedoing  the 
German  cruiser  Ilda  within  six  miles  of  the  Gennan  coast. 
The  Utla,  it  may  be  stated  at  once,  was  no  material 
loss  to  the  German  Navy.  She  was  a  very  old  tub  armed 
with  four  15J  pounders.  Reconstructed  and  rcboilered  in 
1910,  she  was  possibly  capable  of  some  21  knots,  although  IS 
knots  is  the  most  ever  officially  recorded  of  her.  Beside  her 
our  old  Speedy  (mined  by  Germans)  was  a  moro  efficient  figh<> 
ing  unit,  albeit  though  of  less  than  half  the  size. 

Physically,  then,  the  Ilela  was  no  loss  whatever  to  Ger- 
manj-.  Psychologically  the  submarining  of  a  Gennan  Dread- 
nought in  the  North  Sea  would  have  been  of  less  value  to  u.<;. 

Up  till  now  tho  Germans  have  generally  regarded  our 
blockade  as  something  up  by  Scapa  Flow  and  the  Orkneys  in 
the  Aorth  Sea  and  behind  the  Straits  oi  Dover  in  the  South. 

The  submarining  of  the  Ilela  has  now  taught  them;  that 
eur  effective  blockade  commences  inside  their  "  front  door  ' 
that  is  to  say,  well   inside  the  impregnable  fortifications  ol 


Heligoland.  According  lo  calculations,  German  ships  insida 
the  Heligoland  area  might  come  and  go  as  they  listed.  British 
tubmariuo  E9  has  now  indicated  to  them  that  this  is  a  mis- 
taken calculation  on  their  part-,  and  it  is  difficult  to  overesti- 
mate the  iiupoi-tanco  of  this.  Wo  do  not  know  the  exact, 
location  of  the  High  Sea  Fleet,  but  it  is  probably  not  at  its  base 
at  Wilhelmshaven.  If  it  be  at  Cuxhaven,  or  in  the  Canal,  it 
is  virtually  blockaded  thei'O  and  cut  off  from  its  base  by  our 
submaiiues.  Whether  our  submarines  are  there  or  not  their 
presence  will  have  to  be  assumed.  It  might  bo  claimed  by 
some  that  the  High  Sea  Fleet  is  "  bottled  in." 

Personally,  however,  I  do  not  incline  to  this  opinion. 
When  all  is  said  and  done,  a  submarine  is  not  a  vessel  which 
can  stay  under  water  for  more  than  a  limited  time.  For 
that  reason  modem  makes  of  submarines  arc  now  all  armed 
with  guns,  as  a  protection  against  any  gunned  enemy  waiting 
till  they  come  to  the  surface. 

Wo  must  not,  therefore,  eocpect  miracles  out  of  our  sub- 
marines which  form  the  inshore  blockade.  Rather  we  may 
expect  that  if  jind  when  the  Germans  come  out  at  the 
"  selected  moment  "  for  "  Dor  Tag,"  they  will  have  to  precede 


HAMBUR^i 


THE     DOTTKD     LINE     EBPEE8EKTS     ASSUMED     ISTEMOB      GEBMAN 

DXFEXCB   LINE.      THE    BLACK    BARS    EEPRESENT    WHAT    OKKMANY 

HAS  TO    LOOK    FOB    ON    ACCOUNT    OP    THE    ENTEBPEISE    OF    11.  M, 

EUBUAGINE   £9, 


the  movement  by  a  considerable  force  of  armed  submarines  and 
destroyci-s. 

With  submarines  the  "  macliiuc  force "  is  absent.  All 
depends  on  individual  initiative. 

I  have  no  exact  knowledge  of  the  German  submarine 
service,  but  I  can  pretend  to  some  fair  knowledge  of  the 
German  Navy  generally.  On  the  strength  of  that  knowledge 
I  confess  to  blank  surprise  that  the  Ulo  managed  to  get  where 
she  was  when  she  was  sunk  by  the  Birmingham,  or  that  any 
subiaarine  should  have  sunk  the  Pathfinder  where  she  did. 

I  am  inclined  to  regard  these  boats  as  having  been  com- 
manded by  ecsceptionally  able  officers.  There  probably  rcniiaJu 
one  or  two  others  equally  able  with  whom  sooner  or  later  we 
shall  come  into  contact.  But — so  far  as  my  knowledge  can 
take  me — there  is  nothing  in  the  German  Navy's  oidinaiy 
routine  suitable  for  the  peculiar  morale  required  of  an  effective 
submarine.  To  explain,  a  submarine  to  be  effective  must, 
essentially  be — for  want  of  a  better  word — "  democratic." 
The  old  "  master  and  man  "  idea  is  utterly  unworkable  in  a 
.submarine.  The  "  ego  "  of  the  officers  and  that  alone  counts 
for  anything. 

On  Tuesday  afternoon  it  was  officially  announced  that  the 
A  hoii7,ir  had  been  submarined  at  a  spot  not  stated,  but  pre.sum- 
ably  off  the  Dutch  coast,  as  survivors  were  landed  at  Yuminden 
and  Amsterdam.  Her  sister  ships,  tlie  Hague  and  Cressy  stood 
by  her,  and  presently  shared  the  same  fate.  Thug  already 
have  we  heard  of  those  "  other  GeiTnan  submarine  officers  " 
of  whom  I  had  written  above  before  this  news  came  to  hand. 

As  fighting  units  none  of  the  three  lost  cruisers  were  of 
any  particular  value.  They  were  verging  on  the  obsolete. 
Originally  designed  for  21  knots,  some  fifteen  yeai-s  ago,  they 
were  capable  of  little  more  than  17  knots  at  the  time  of  their 


14* 


ScptcmLcr  26,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


loss.  Other  particulars  arc:  Displacement,  12,00  tons;  arma;- 
iruent,  two  9-2,  40  cal.,  twelve  G  inch,  and  some  lesser  guns.  They 
liad  a  6-inch  armour  belt.  Their  chief  value  to  us  was  that 
there  was  nothing  in  the  German  Navy  exactly  equivalent 
to  them.  Of  the  German  armoured  cruisei-s — excluding  battle 
cruisers — only  the  modern  Blilcher  could  engage  them  with 
any  prospect  of  success.  On  that  account  they  had  a  value 
in  excess  of  their  ordinaiy  fighting  value. 

The  real  significance  of  the  incident  is  that  Germany  is 
steadily  pursuing  her  policy  of  seeking  to  destroy  our 
supcinority  by  slow  degrees  with  submarine  and  mine  attack; 
and  it  is  idle  to  disguise  that  so  far  the  policy  has  pi-oved 
successful.  She  has  now  inflicted  on  us  far  heavier  losses  than 
wo  have  on  her.  She  has  also  demonstrated  to  her  own  satis- 
faction that  the  North  Sea  is  by  no  means  a  "  British  lake." 

All  the  sam3,  however,  losses  of  this  kind  must  be 
expected,  as  I  mentioned  some  three  weeks  ago.  In  Germany 
the  incident  will  probably  be  hailed  as  a  species  of  Trafalgar. 
The  inference  will  be  drawn  that  the  Ciessies  might  have  been 
Dreadnoughts,  and  that  the  three  lost  might  well  have  been 
a  dozen. 

Actually,  however,  it  is  greatly  to  be  questioned  whether 
the  moral  effect  of  the  thrco  Cressics  being  sunk  counter- 
balances the  sinking  of  the  useless  little  Hela  inside  Germany's 
'■  front  door."     There  is  not  the  same  psychological  result. 

The  successful  attack  on  the  Cressicx  proves  determina- 
tion. It  indicates  that  at  least  three  German  submarines 
are  to  some  extent  capable  of  the  peculiar  eflort  necessary  to 
submarine  success.  But  it  does  not  prove  them  capable  of 
the  arduous  duties  which  our  submarines  are  performing;  the 
torpedoing  of  warships  comes  under  the  head  of  light  and 
inspiriting  duties.  Also  it  is  yet  to  be  proved  whether  or 
no  the  German  submarines  were  acting  on  "  information 
received,"  a  point  which  will  have  to  be  determined  at  an 
early  date. 

THE    BALTIC. 

Last  week's  war  and  rumours  of  wars  in  the  Baltic  have 
now  i-esolved  themselves  into  a  fairly  reasonable  stoi-y  of  two 
German  divisions  engaging  each  other  by  mistakes.  I  am 
afraid  we  cannot  put  it  down  to  "  nerves,"  as  it  is  an  easily 
Tuade  error,  as  manoeuvres  have  shown  before  now.     It   has 


Russian  Aurora 


German 

DAY  SIUIOUETTE. 


■A.  ayC   ^   ^  ^  O^  *  * 


long  been  a  canon  of  warfare  to  fire  at  any  approaching  torpedo 
craft  unless  they  make  the  private  signal. 

Torpedo  craft  approaching  a  supposed  enemy  cannot, 
however,  do  this  without  drawing  attention  to  themselves  and 
so  depriving  themselves  of  the  most  valuable  factor  of  surprise. 
The  ship  attacked  cannot 
])oss.ibly  aifford  to  risk  delay  by 
signalling — she  must  open  firo 
instantly.  Once  fire  is  opened 
there  is  small  prospect  of  the 
error  being  discovered  till 
much  mischief  has  been  done 
on  cither  side. 

The  Germans  are  pecu- 
liarly liable  to  make  this  error, 
because  the  silhouettes  of 
German  and  Russian  ships  are 
extremely  alike  in  many  cases. 
A  large  number  of  Russian  destroyers  arc  Gei-man  built 
or  of  German  design,  and  exactly  like  German  destroyers, 
while  the  three-funnelled  cruisers  on  either  side  are  none 
too  easily  differentiated  even  in  the  daytime.  Regarded 
its  silhouettes,  the  difference  is  clear  enough  on  inspec- 
tion, but  the  little  details  which  we  do  not  show  at 
night  cannot  be  recognised.  The  appended  illustration  will 
clucidato  my  point.  The  Adalbert  class  at  night  may  well  be 
taken  for  the  Russian  Aurora  class,  the  Boon  or  Karlsruhe 
classes  for  the  Russian  Tioriatijr  class,  and  any  four-funnelled 
German  for  one  of  the  four-funnelled  Russians. 

These  Russians  are  exactly  the  ships  which  might  have 
been  cxpee-tcd  to  be  met. 

The  story  of  what  really  happened,  of  how  much  mischief, 
if  any,  was  doTic,  will,  of  coui-se,  bo  unobtainable  till  the  war 
is  over.     That  the  incident  occurred  sccma,   however,   to  bo 


beyond  all  doubt,  on  account  of  the  German  offioial  statomenB 
referred  to  last  week  that  "  fifteen  out  of  twenty-nine  units  of 
the  Baltic  Fleet  were  engaged  in  action."  Whether  tlie  fiftccu 
were  fighting  the  other  fourteen,  or  merely  fighting  among 
themselves,  we  cannot  tell.  But  as  there  is  a  Russian  official 
report  to  the  effect  that  nothing  is  known  of  the  alleged  battle, 
we  may  take  it  for  certain  that  the  German  Baltic  Fleet  is  at 
pi-esent  suffering  from  self-inflicted  injuries  which  aie  probably 
more  serious  than  has  been  allowed  to  transpire. 

It  is  possible — though,  perhaps,  not  veiy  probable — that 
this  particular  internal  eri-or  will  give  the  Russian  Fleet  soma 
material  advantage  in  the  Baltic. 

Following  upon  this  news  we  have  had  unofficial  details  of 
battles  between  Russian  and  German  ships.  On  these  I  place 
no  weight  whatever.  There  have  possibly  been  a  few 
skirmishes,  but  it  is  abundantly  clear  that  the  exact  game 
which  the  Germans  are  playing  against  us  at  the  front  door 
is  being  played  against  them  by  the  Russians  at  their  back 
doors.  Neither  operation  lends  itself  to  commemoration  on 
Dibdin  lines — for  all  that  Dibdin  was  inspired  by  veiy  little 
more  occasionally.  But  we  shall  do  well  to  appreciate  the  help 
which  the  Russian  Fleet  is  giving  us.  If  the  Germans  issue 
from  their  front  door  the  Russians  may  bo  at  their  back  door 
very  quickly. 

They  cannot  capture  heavily  fortified  bases  lifce  Kiel. 
They  cannot  achieve  various  other  impossible  hypotheses.  But 
they  can  undoubtedly  in  such  circumstances  do  much  to  trans- 
form the  Baltic  from  a  German  Tnto  a  "  Russian  lake." 

Once  the  Russian  Dreadnoughts  are  fit  to  take  the  seas  the 
Russian  menace  to  Germany  is  going  to  be  of  a  quite  serious 
nature.  So  serious,  indeed,  that  it  is  quite  on  the  cards  that 
our  fleet  will  never  obtain  the  satisfaction  of  a  fleet  action. 
The  old  German  battleships  now  serving  in  the  Baltic  are  no 
match  for  the  Russian  Dreadnoughts — German  Dreadnoughts 
will  have  to  be  detached  to  meet  them  or  a  blockade  in  the 
Baltic  accepted. 

The  situation,  as  I  read  it,  is  that  (pending  some  bad  mis- 
take) Germany  must  hold  such  Baltic  trade  as  she  has  at  all 
hazards.  This  is  the  more  important  in  that  the  Dutch  Govern- 
ment has  now  given  unequivocal  signs  of  absolute  neutrality.  lb 
has  cut  off  those  supplies  which  up  till  now  have  rendered  our 
naval  blockade  in  a  minor  note  so  far  as  food  supplies  are  con- 
cerned. Henceforward,  Hol- 
land has  ceased  to  bo  a  Gei-man 
supply  port.  It  remains  for  us 
now  to  convince  Denmark  and 
Scandinavia  that  it  is  undesir- 
able to  play  the  part  of  the  too 
benevolent  neutral. 

It  cannot  be  too  strongly 

emphasised  that  if  contiguous 

neutrals     all    remain     strictly 

neutral,  the  British  Navy  can 

and  will  starve  Germany  into 

an  early  surrender  quite  apart 

from  the  land  battles  in  France,  or  whatever  tliey  may  produce. 

Holland  has  adopted  the  sensible  course — strict  neutrality 

and  a  trust  in  the  Triple  Entente — a  tnist  that  will  be  suitably 

protected.     To  Denmark,  Sweden,  and  Norway,  it  now  i-emains 

to  do  the  same. 


Prinz  Adalbert 


NIGHT  SILHOUETTE. 


So  far  as  the  Danes  are  concerned,  memories  of  Schleswig- 
Ilolstein  probably  suffice  already.  In  case  of  a  victory  for  the 
Allies,  Denmark  can  ask  and  obtain  her  price  for  honourable 
neutrality.  On  the  other  hand,  Sweden  to  a  large  extent,  and 
Norway  to  a  lesser  one,  have  in  the  past  been  somewhat  afraid 
of  Russia,  and  inclined  to  regard  Germany  as  a  set-off. 

A  possible  sweeping  victory  for  the  Russians  cannot  bo 
regarded  with  any  particular  joy  for  Sweden,  with  memories 
behind  her  of  the  loss  of  Finland.  However,  Scandinavian 
traffic  is  overseas,  and  supplies  vid  Scandinavia  are  not  likely 
to  reduce  appreciably  the  economic  pressure  which  the  British 
blockade  in  the  North  Sea  is  putting  on  Gennany. 

At  (I  largely  attended  meeting  of  the  Jockey  Club,  held  at  Derby 
House,  it  wiia  nnaniniously  .ngreed  by  tlio  members  present  that 
it  wa«  desiialile  tliat  racing  should  be  continued,  when  practicable,  at 
Newmarket  and  clficwhero. 


15* 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


September  26,  1914 


THE    WAR    BY   AIR. 

By    FRED    T.    JANE, 


IT  NOW  seems  abundantly  establislicd  that  at  the  front 
British  aviators  have  secured  a  considerable  nwral 
ascendancy  over  the  Germaa  ones.  This  circum- 
stance is  all  the  more  interesting  owing  to  the  fact  that 
German  machines,  if  not  better  than  oui-s  in  all 
respects,  are  fully  equal  to  them,  and  genei-ally  faster. 
The  100  h.p.  Mercedes  cugiuei,  with  which  most  of  them  are 
fitted,  is  probably  the  best  acriaJ  engine  in  the  world.  In  any 
case,  our  ascendancy  has  not  been  caused  by  the  machine,  but 
by  the  man. 

Even  here,  however,  a  curious  circumstance  arises.  The 
bulk  of  the  best  records  have  been  made  in  Germany,  and, 
putting  aside  national  prejudices,  one  is  constrained  to  admit 
that  the  average  Gennan  aviator  is  the  more  skilful  pilot  of 
the  two.  There  ai-e  exceptions,  of  course — for  example,  so  far 
as  I  can  ascertain,  Germany  has  no  pilot  equai  to  our  Captain 
Longcroft.  But  in  matters  of  this  sort  it  is  the  average  which 
counts,  and  the  better  average  in  the  matter  of  pure  technique 
is  in  favour  of  Geirmany. 

How  comes  it,  then,  that  the  ascendancy  is  ours?  Well, 
£0  far  as  I  can  gather,  it  is  what  is  vulgarly  known  as  "  a 
matter  of  guts  " 

Piecing  together  all  that  one  can  glean  from  official 
reports,  general  Press  items  and  private  correspondence,  the 
iret  result  is  as  follows : 

The  German  aviator's  psychological  attitude  on  g[oing  into 
aerial  action  is — 

"  I'll  kill  you,  once  I  get  half  a  chance." 
The  British  aviator,  on  the  other  hand,  mentally  replies : 

"  Bloia  your  chancei.  You  may  or  may  not  kill  me,  but 
I  am  going  to  kill  you." 

This  particular  mental  attitude  is  one  which  the  German 
m.ind  cannot  attune  itself. 

The  German  aerial  pilots  are  sportsmen  right  enough  up 
to  a  certain  point.  But  they  are  not  mentally  constituted  to 
stand  against  the — to  them — •"  unsportsmanlike  "  conduct  of 
British  aviators.  From  the  German  point  of  view — as  I  read 
it — reckless  "  exchange  of  pieces  "  is  one  of  those  things  best 
left  alone.  It  is  not  done  on  land  or  water,  therefore,  it  ia 
improper  in  thi>  air. 

Our  fighting  aviatoi-s — tliank  God — think  otherwise. 
Victor  and  vanquished  to  die  together  is  too  tough,  a  proposi- 
tion for  most  of  the  enemy.  And  so,  when  a  German  pilot 
meets  a  British  one  in  the  air,  he  ia  mostly  concerned  about 
getting  back  to  somewhea-e  where  recognised  militai-y  war  game 
rules  obtain. 

There  are  no  "  rules  of  the  game  "  for  the  air.  There  is 
not  a  pilot  in  the  British  air  service  prepared  to  conform  to 
land  conventions.  Our  pilots  just  go  out  "to  kill  the  enemy." 
The  result  is  that  they  generally  do  kill  him,  unless  his  superior 
speed  allows  him  to  escape. 

"  Victory  or  death  "  has  been  laughed  at  often  enough  as  a 
music-hall  phrase;  but  ita  practical  application  has  certainly 
put  the  fear  of  God  into  German  aviators. 

A  curious  war  incident  is  that  while  motoring  somewhere 
in  Franco  Commander  Samson,  R.N.  (of  the  British  Naval  Air 
Service),  met  some  Uhlans,  and  scooped  the  lot  without  loss  to 
us.  The  German  Press  Bureau  will  probably  presently  explain 
that  the  motor-car  was  armoured,  and  the  chances  uneven. 
That  is  as  it  may  be.  But  the  fact  remains  that  our  five 
Hying  men,  against  five  Uhlans,  secured  an  easy  victory. 

A  rumour  is  current  to  the  eJIect  tiat  German  aircraft  are 
short  of  petrol.  This  is  by  no  means  improbable.  England 
just  at  present  is  the  easiest  market  for  those  who  supply  petrol 
from  overseas,  and  our  aerial  demands  on  motor  spirit  must 
liave  been  very  materially  increased  of  late.  Tliero  is— or  at 
any  rate  recently  was— danger  in  proceeding  to  Dutch  or 
Danish  ports  owing  to  the  indiscriminato  laying  of  mines  by 
the  Germans  in  the  North  Sea.  Consequently  those  who  ssil 
the  seas  with  petrol  take  no  unnecessary  risks  in  proceeding 
to  those  neutral  ports  which  are  now  Germany's  supply 
harbours. 

It  will  certainly  be  poetic  justice  if  by  this  mine  laying  the 
Germans  have  made  a  petrol  famine  for  themselves.  It  is 
extraordinary  that  the  German  machine— so  absolutely  perfect 
in  many  ways— should  break  down  over  side  issues  which 
should  easily  have  been  detected  as  dangers  at  the  outset  To 
bo  sure,  a  proverb  to  the  effect  that  war  cannot  be  made  by 
machinery  dates  from  the  Peloponnesian  Wax  of  over  2,000 
years  ago.     Here,  as  elsewhere,  the  German  plans  appear  to 


have  been  absolutely  complete  save  for  one  thing — that  the 
human  element  was  not  taken  into  account. 

We  shall  be  well  advised,  however,  not  to  build  too  much 
on  Germany's  present  aerial  inactivity  being  entirely  due  to  a 
shortage  of  petrol.  Germany  must,  in  any  case,  have  enormous 
resci-ves  which  she  does  not  wish  to  touch  till  ncccsbary.  There 
is  probably  a  bad  shortage  of  normal  petrol  supplies — but  just 
as  probably,  that  is  all. 

Rather  I  am  inclined  to  attribute  the  present  marked 
diminution  in  German  aeroplane  activity  to  stomachic  troubles 
produced  by  the  "  I'm  going  to  kill  you  whatever  happens  " 
tactics  of  our  warlike  aviators. 

Zeppelin  alarms  still  continue  to  reach  us  via  Holland. 
"We  have  had  circumstantial  tales  of  a  mine  layer  convoyed  by 
a  Zeppelin.  Zeppelins,  which  taJte  at  least  nine  months  to  build, 
are  being  turned  out  at  the  rate  of  one  a  week.  The  necessary 
sheds  for  them  (which  are  at  least  as  large  as  Eheims  Cathe- 
dral) are  presumably  being  produced  at  the  same  rate!  Aero- 
planes, we  are  told,  are  being  turned  out  at  the  rate  of  seventy 
a  week;  for  all  that  the  utmost  normal  capacity  of  the  entire 
German  aeroplane  industry  is  between  half  to  one-third  of  that 
amount.  And  over -10,000  Gemians  have  volunteered  for  the 
air  fleet. 

No  doubt  intentions  exist.  But  the  best  of  intentions 
cannot  make  even  moderately  efficient  pilots  inside  six  months. 

Now,  according  to  the  official  statemjent  of  the  Federation 
Aeronautique  Internationale,  the  number  of  pilots  qualified 
and  still  alive  up  to  the  end  of  March,  1914 — since  when  no 
learners  are  likely  to  have  acquired  enough  knowledge  to  count 
for  very  much — is  aa  follows : 

Gebmax         ...        699  British  ...  694 

Austrian       ...         1-18  French  ...  1,273 

Bklqian  ...  84 

847  KussiAN  ...  215 

2,205 

These  figures  are  very  approximate,  because  in  every  case 
the  certificates  obtained  include  a  certain  number  of  men  who 
merely  secured  their  certificates  and  then  gave  up  flying.  Also 
there  are  many  military  fliers  who,  for  one  reason  and 
another,  have  not  troubled  about  aero  clubs.  But,  putting  one 
thing  with  another,  the  trained  aeroplane  flyers  of  the  Triple 
Entente  are,  roughly,  two  to  one  against  the  German 
combination. 

Six  months  hence,  if  they  train  in  the  meanwhile,  the  odd 
9,000  of  the  German  volunteei-s  will  become  dangerous,  if 
machines  can  be  found  for  them,  and  if  they  are  prepared  to 
face  British'  methods  in  aerial  warfare.  Otherwise  they  are 
unlikely  to  affect  the  situation. 

A  big  proportion  of  these  10,000  aerial  volunteers  will 
probably  quickly  arrive  at  tho  efficiency  required  to  drop  bombs 
from  dirigibles  on  defenceless  towns.  But  I  do  not  think  that 
any  raw  material — especially  German  raw  material — is  going 
to  be  of  value  for  any  fighting  in  the  air. 

Also  there  ia  the  question  of  Zeppelin  sheds.  On  account 
of  pressure  of  other  matter  I  have  not  space  this  week  to  illus- 
trate where  the  Germans,  <tc.,  sheds  are  in  relation  to  this 
oountry---and  attacks  on  it.  Next  week  this  map  will  be  given. 
Meanwhile,  it  is  well  to  remember  that  it  takes  something  like 
a  year  to  build  a  Zeppelin  shed,  and  that  to  pull  it  down  and 
re-erect  ifc  elsewhere  can  hardly  be  accomplished  insiide  two  or 
three  months.  Also,  that  German  tenure  of  French  and 
Belgian  soil  is  still  somewhat  "  uncertain." 

TtCB  reissue  of  the  book  On  War,  by  Clauscwitz,  th«  founder, 
practically,  of  modern  German  strategy,  by  Messrs.  Kegan,  Paul,  and 
Co.,  Ltd.,  at  the  present  time,  is  particularly  appropriate,  and  th« 
guinea  eet  of  three  volumes  gives  appropriate  fonn  to  a  work  of  intense 
interest  for  its  own  sake,  aa  well  as  the  interest  attaching  to  tlie  book 
in  -inew  of  the  prceeni  European  eituation.  Writing  before  1840, 
Clausewitz  is  regarded  as  tho  Darwin  of  modem  stra.tegy,  liis  one 
defect  being  a  failure  to  comprehend  tlie  Napoleonic  ideal  of  initiative. 
His  theory  that  the  defensive  is  the  strongest  form  of  strategy  haa 
been  abandoned  perforce  by  the  German  strategists  of  modem  times, 
for  the  only  hope  of  Germany  in  war  lay  in  th«  offensive;  yet  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  Claiiscmtz  was  right  in  his  conolu.';ions.  Clauee- 
i\itz  w'orked  always  on  the  idea  of  tho  snnival  o!  the  fittest,  and 
since  his  doctrine  did  not  admit  that  the  fittest  for  survival  was  always 
tho  best  in  an  ethical  sense,  ho  stands  as  the  founder  of  modem 
German  mthlessnees.  His  work,  (however,  is  reasoned  and  sincere ;  it 
Ftands  for  all  time  as  the  groat  nineteenth- century  analysis  of  the  life 
hisstory  of  nations,  and,  while  not  a  book  for  the  light  reader,  is  of 
permanent  value  to  the  student  seriously  inclined.  As  a  military  text- 
book, Clausewitz's  On  War  as  too  well  known  to  need  wcoaunendation. 


16* 


September   26,    191 4 


L  A  N  D     AND     W  A  T E  K 


^ 


I 


!^ 


i« 


Xeo  Britannicus 


The  British  Lion  is  the  sort 
Of  thing  to  spend  the  day  with, 

At  any  kind  of  friendly  sport 
The  animal  to  play  with  ; 

But  do  not  anger  him,  because 

He  has  the  most  tremendous  claws 

A  wholly  tranquil  creature  he. 
Who  likes  to  spend  his  leisure 

In  making  lots  of  £  s.  d. 
Wherewith  to  purchase  pleasure 

But  irritate  him  and  a  roar 

Of  mighty  volume  is  in  store. 

He's  not  at  all  the  kind  of  beast 

To  get  into  a  flurry, 
Nor  does  he  trouble  in  the  least 

If  folks  his  leisure  worry  ; 
But  harm  his  friend  and  you'll  not  fail 
To  see  a  lashing  of  his  tail. 

The  German  Eagle  is  a  bird 
That  causes  small  annoyance  ; 

No  sound  from  it  is  ever  heard 
Which  dissipates  his  joyance  ; 

But  batter  Belgium  and  you'll  trace 

Black  looks  upon  the  Lion's  face. 

The  Eagle  lately  gave  a  prance. 
And  'mid  much  loud  concussion 

Went  first  to  meet  the  Man  of  France 
And  secondly  the  Russian  ; 

The  Lion,  too,  she  chanced  to  meet, 

And  now  she  beats  a  bad  retreat. 

The  Teuton  Eagle^has  a  fleet 

On  which  she  s  spent  much  money, 

And  which  the  Lion  wants  to  meet  ; 
But  this  seems  truly  funny — 

It  gives  no  sign  of  any  sort 

Of  ever  coming  out  of  port. 

And  so  the  war  goes  grimly  on 

To  its  predestined  finish  ; 
The  Eagle,  grave  and  woebegone, 

Sees  hope  on  hope  diminish  ; 
The  Lion,  with  a  sigh  most  deep. 
Still  pining  to  resume  his  sleep. 

MOSTYN    T.    PiGOTT 


'^■W"//-v/-y/---y/MM/.v////.vA-.v/.v//rm.v/.v/y///////.^^^^^^^ 


vKi'xyyi-//t»«sKis5»Kis«j«»K»5»«»«:>4«;M;»'.»5:>K»«>K»c»5:s«:at:«:ac« 


101  I 


LAND     AND     WATER  September  26,    1914 

THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE 


FRENCH  INFANTRY  CHARGING 


I    Copyright,  Cetttral  News 


FRENCH  DRAGOONS 

In  purtuil  of  flying  German  Uhl»n»  paxing  through  a  village  on  the  Marne 


Copyright,  Topical  Press 


FRENCH  INFANTRY 

In  action  against  Germans,  who  are  fighting  a  rear-guard  action 


Copyright,  Central  New: 


IOI2 


September  26,    19 14 


LAND    AND     WATER 


THE    HAVOC  OF  WAR 


Copynght,  Cetaral  Sr:.s 


THE  BEAUTIFUL  TOWN  OF  DINANT.  NOW  A  SAD  RUIN 


C'opyrigm,  Cenirat  Newi 


VIEW  OF  TERMONDE 
A  scene  which  bringi  home  to  ui  the  horrori  o(  bombardment 


IOI3 


LAND      AND     W  AT  !•  K 


September  26,    i»yi4 


Born  1820 
Still  going  strong. 


"Ah,  vain  uegkets  !     One  cannot  brino  back  the  past. 

"That  is  where  you  are  avrong.     If  "Johnnie  Walkek,"  Black  Label,  were  not  a  thing  of 
the  past,  it  would  not  be  for  me  a  thing  of  the  present." 

"  Jolinnie   Walker,"   Black  Label,  is  a  thing  of  the  past,  because  every  drop  is  guaraBteed   over 
12  years  old. 

It  is  a  thing  of  the  pi-eseiit  because  it  is  obtainable  everywh.ere. 

And  it  is  a  thing  of  the  future    because    the    past,  present    and    future  policy  of    maintaining 
large  reserves  to  meet  fln^  over  increasing  demand  ensiu^es  beyond   doubt  its  uniform   quality. 

GUARANTEED  SAME  QUALI  lY  THllOUGHOUT  THE  WOULD. 

John  Walker    &    Sons,    Ltd.,    Scotch    Whisky    Distillers,    Kilmarnock, 


1014 


The  County  Gentleman 


AND 


LAND  &WATER 


Vol.  LXIIl.         No.  2732 


SATURDAY,    SEPTEMBER   19,   1914 


fPUBtlSHED  AST 

La  newspaperJ 


PRICE     SIXPENCE 
PUBLISHED  WEEKLY 


Photograph  by  Swaine,  ir/i  N«c  liond'Strut,  W . 


THE    MAHARAJA   OF    BIKANIR 

Who  is  on  his  way  over  to  lead  his  troops  in  the  defence  of  the   British  Empire.      Not  the  least 

gratifying  result  of  the  war  has  been  the  spontaneous  action   of  all  classes  and  creeds  in   India  to 

place  their  services  and   their  wealth  at  the  disposal  of  the   British  Government. 


LAND     AND     WATER  September  19,  19 14 

SOLDIER-SPORTSMEN 


Left  to  right,  top 

VISCOUNT  CASTLEROSSE.  2nd  LIEUTENANT  IN  THE 
IRISH  GUARDS 

Who  ii  reported  wounded  and  misting.     He  is  an  all-round  sportiman 
and  particularly  fond  o(  golf. 

Left  to  right,  bottom 

LIEUTENANT  LORD  R.  E.  INNES-KER  OF  THE  IRISH 

GUARDS 

Reported    wounded    and  missing.       Like  his  brothers   the  Duke  of 

Roxburghe   and    Lord    Alitlair    Innes-Ker,   he    is  particularly  fond 

of  polo. 


Copyright,  Sport  and  Gencial 

CAPTAIN  LORD  H.  C.  C.   SEYMOUR  OF  THE 
GRENADIER  GUARDS 

Who  hat  been  wounded  in  the  course  of  the  actions  carried  out  by 
the  British  Expeditionary  Force.  Lord  Seymour  is  a  fine  horseman 
and  has  steered  many  winners  past  the  post  in  regimental  racing. 

CAPTAIN  GEORGE  BELLVILLE  OF  THE 

16th  LANCERS 

Who    has   been     wounded.?     Captain     Bellville    is   captain    of     his 

regimental  polo   team   and   has  played  in  many  imporlant  tournaments 

for  the  Old   Cantabs,  in  fact,  he  is  one  of  the  best  No.  1  s  who  hat 

ever  played  in  Mr.  Buckmaster's  famous  side. 


lOOO 


Seiitcniber  19,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


jj     aa    3f 

1 1-: 1 


Sca-ie  of  MtUs 


THE    WAR    BY    LAND. 

By  HILAIRE    BELLOG. 


THE   WESTERN    THEATRE    OF   WAR. 

WHEN  these  notes  of  last  week  were 
Avritten  it  was  already  evident  that 
the  extreme  (and  largest)  bodies  of 
the  German  invasion — those  near  Paris 
— had  already  unexpectedly  found 
themselves  in  the  presence  of  a  large  reseiTe 
accumulated  by  the  French  commanders  behind 
Paris.  They  had  thus  before  them  superior  numbei-s 
and  must  retire. 

It  was  then  evident  that  the  only  chance  the 
Germans  had  of  relieving  or  neg.itiving  this  pi-essure 
upon  their  extreme  riglit  near  Paris  was  to  break 
tiirfiugh  somewhere  upon  the  long  line  between  Paris 
and  the  fortified  line  Verdun — Toul.  This  Fi-ench 
line  (with  its  British  contingent  towards  the  left  of 
it)  ran  in  a  gi-cat  curve  behind — that  is,  south  of — • 
ProA-ins,  La  Fere  Champenoise,  Sommesous,  Vitry-lc- 
Fran^ois,  and  Po\  igny.  It  was  further  evident  that 
tlie  chief  Gennan  pressure  in  the  attempt  to  break 
the  French  line  would  fall  somewhere  in  the  neigh- 
lx)urhood  of  Vitry-le-Francois.  Whether  the  Gennans 
would  succeed  in  this  or  whether  they  wovdd  be  com- 
jielled  to  a  general  i-etreat  was  still  doubtful. 

Since  writing  thus  last  week,  events  have  proved 
that  the  Gennan  effort  to  break  tln-ough  was  dooiut-d. 
The  alternative  to  such  success    upon  their  [):nt,  a 


general  retirement,  was  therefore  undertaken,  and 
that  retirement  proceeded  throughout  Fridaj',  Satur- 
day, and  Sunday,  until,  ujwn  Monday  last,  the 
Germans  were  holding  a  line  parallel  with,  and  nortli 
of,  the  River  Aisne,  and  occupying  certain  heights 
which  j^ass  above  and  along  the  river  Suippe,  a 
tributary  of  the  Aisne  The  Allied  bodies  following 
the  Germans  in  this  retreat  passed  from  near 
I'aris,  through  Meaux  and  Soissons;  from  Provins, 
through  Montmirail  and  Chateau  Thierry ;  from 
Sezanne,  through  Ejiernay ;  from  Vitry-le-Franyois, 
through  Chalons  towards  Eheims  ;  and,  on  the  extreme 
right,  from  Ilevigny  uj)  to  the  southern  edge  of  the 
Forest  of  Argonne,  near  Ste.  Menehould.  The  whole 
of  this  vast  movement  of  rai)id  retirement  upon  the 
pai-t  of  the  Gennan  forces,  and  of  equally  ra])id 
advance  upon  the  part  of  their  pursuers,  will  be  known 
to  history  under  the  general  title  of  The  B.\rn.E  ot 

TIIK  M.\BNK. 

Before  understanding  anything  in  detail  it  is 
neces.sary  to  understand  it  in  general,  and  the  general 
scheme  of  what  happened  in  the  course  of  last  week, 
that  is,  of  the  sudden  retirement  of  the  German 
right  wing  from  in  front  of  Paris,  with  all  the 
vast  consequences  that  have  followed  upon  that 
retirement,  may  be  put  into  the  shape  of  a  fairly 
simple  diagram. 


LAND    AND    WATER 


September  19,  1914 


TTowcvcr  wc  number  tliem  tlierc  were  in  the  nuuu 
three  £?reat  Oerinau  masses,  (1),  (-'),  and  (3)  advancnig 
into  France  from  the  north,  and  pushin<?  back  on  to 
the  line  Verdun— Paris  the  French  line  with  its 
British  contingent.  This  French  line  one  may  roughly 
represent,  not  in  size  but  in  position,  by  the  band 
A— B  between  the  fortified  line  Vci-dun— Toiil  (V— T) 


September  9th  roughly  represented  by  this  sketch, 


m 


^ 


PARIS 


^  -  5 


DUGBAM    OF   THK    KJ.EMKXTS    OF   THE    FRAXCp-GF.KMAN     POhlTIOM 
ON    SKPTEMBEB   OtK    BEFORE    THE   OKBMAN    BETKEAT. 

and  Paris  (P)  in  which,  both  as  to  proportionate  size 
and  as  to  position  the  British  contingent  is  represented 
by  the  shaded  portion.  Within  and  to  the  east  of 
Paris  the  Frenc-h  commanders  had  kept  back  a  large 
reserve,  represented  by  the  square  block  X.  That  was 
the  position  on  September  3rd  and  4th,  when  the 
largest  of  the  German  armies,  No.  1.,  was  at  the  gates 
of  the  French  capital.  Tiie  commander  of  this  large 
Gennan  army  (1)  got, wind  for  the  first  time  of  the 
existence  of  this  large  reserve  in  these  two  days.  He 
thereupon  attempted  with  great  boldness  not  to  retreat 
but  to  turn  suddenly  at  right  angles  to  the  direction 
he  had  hitherto  been  pursuing,  join  up  with  Army 
No.  2  along  the  line  C — D,  and  in  conjunction  with 
that  Army,  and  with  Army  No.  S  break  through 
the  Allied  line  and  cut  it  into  two.  In  this  attempt 
to  march  right  across  tlie  front  of  the  French  left  and 
the  British  contingent,  along  the  line  C — D,  Avliich  was 
too  bold,  he  ^\•as  caught ;  and  he  had  to  retire  the  \vay 
he  had  come,  while  the  men  of  the  great  reserve  at  X 
Avere  pouring  through  and  round  Paris  after  him 
along  E— F,  and  the  British  contingent  was  pounding 
up  behind  him. 

That  is  the  whole  story  which  explains  the 
change  in  the  campaign,  and  it  is  the  only  story  which 
explains  it. 

liut  once  so  considerable  a  change  had  been 
effected  in  the  [wsition  of  Army  (1),  the  position  of 
Anny  (2)  and  of  Army  (3)  was  at  once  gravely 
compromised.  Instead  of  the  three  main  German 
ma.s.ses  forming  a  continuous  line,  two-thirds  of  them 
were  now  threatened  in  flank,  and  the  retirement  of 
Anny  No.  (1)  upon  their  right  compelled  them  to 
retire  also  ;  mass  No.  (2)  having  to  go  back  somewhat 
more  precipitately  than  mass  No.  (3).  Thus  the  entire 
Gennan  advance  was  converted  into  a  full  German 
retreat,  and  from  being  originally  in  such  a  position  as 
is  indicated  in  the  following  sketch  (where  the  black  is 


SECOND  rOSITIOM   (SEI'TE.MBEE   OlU    TO    IOtII),  WHEN  THK  GEEJIAN 

KIOKT    HAD    BECiUN    TO    KETUEAT,  KHOWINQ    ISOLATION  01'  GERMAN 

CENTRE    AND    LEIT. 

•which  their  centre  and  eastern  portions  at  A  and  B 
stand  for  a  moment  in  an  exceedingly  dangerous,  isolated 
position.  From  this  position  they  could  only  extricate 
themselves  by  retiring  in  their  turn  and  taking  up  a 
united  line  again  with  the  anny  that  had  retired  from 
Paris,  so  that  by  the  Sunday  morning  the  whole 
German  line  was  in  retreat  towards  a  defensive  position 
along  the  Aisne  (60  miles  from  Paris)  after  the  fashiou 
indicated  upon  the  sketch  below. 


^^ 


^.f 


PARIS 


^^;i5 


x^o. 


RESERVE 

BEPTEHBEB  Ct». — FIRST   POSITION,  BKIOKE  THE  RETREAT   OP  TUB 
GERMAN    RIGHT. 

Gennan  and  the  white  the  Allies),  which  was  the 
position  on  September  3rd  and  4tli,  the  Gennan 
armies  Avere  compelled  to  jxiss  throngh  a  stage  upon 


THIRD    POSITION    (SEPTEMBER    12th),  WHEN    THE   WHOLE    GERMAN 

LINK    WAS    IN    CONCERTED     RETREAT     TO     ITS     PEEPAEED    POSITION 

ON   THE   AISNB. 

Now  to  this  general  scheme  of  the  retirement, 
which  was  thus  forced  upon  the  mass  of  the  German 
forces,  must  be  added  one  important  modification. 
There  was  present  in  the  field  not  only  the  three  main 
masses  (1),  (2),  and  (3),  but  a  4th  body  (4)  which 
had  come  round  not  from  the  north  but  from  Luxem- 
bourg under  the  Crown  Prince,  and  had  already  begun 
to  bombard  Verdun.  Should  Verdun  fall,  and  the  line 
of  forts  connecting  it  with  Toul,  yet  a  5th  body  (5) 
would  be  present  upon  the  flank  of  the  French  line, 
imperilling'its  advance  and  checking  the  retreat  of  the 
other  three  German  bodies. 

The  task  before  the  French,  therefore,  was  not 
merely  the  simple  one  of  following  up  a  general 
German  retreat.  It  could  not  depend  upon  the 
continuance  of  that  retreat  save  by  holding,  until  it- 
had  driA'cn  the  German  Hue  past  it,  the  fortress  of 
Verdun,  and  that  fortress,  as  we  know  from  the 
experience  this  Avar  has  given  of  the  lessened  resisting 
power  of  fortification  against  modem  siege  artillery, 
Avas  in  grave  peril. 

So  much  for  the  general  scheme,  the  sudden 
retreat  of  the  first  German  mass  on  the  left  before  the 
French  lleserve,  the  subsequent  retirement  of  the  tAva 
other  German  ma.sses  to  the  east  of  this,  and  the  peril 
of  Verdun. 

I  Avill  now  take  each  of  these  in  detail  and  first 
descriljc  Avhat  took  place  Avhen  the  AVestern  German 
Army  tried  to  inarch  across  the  Anglo-French  front, 
failed  in  that  bold  attempt,  and  was  compelled  to- 
retire  very  rai)idly  toAvards  the  north-east.  Tliese 
o])eratioiis,  the  first  part  of  the  General  Battle  of  the 
.Alarne,  may  be  called  I'/ie  Baffle  of  Meaux  (or  the 
Battle  of  the  Ourcq). 

Next  I  shall  describe  in  detail  the  ground  over 
Avhich  the  German  centre  retired,  and  the  Frencli 
centre  advanced  through  the  j)lateau  of  Sezanne  and 


2* 


September  19,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


PARIS 


SKETCH      BHOWIXO      THB      POSITIONS     OF     THE     lOrRTS      GEBJIAN' 

CKOL'P     (t)     VNDEK   THE    CKOW:?    PKIXCE     i:»     FROXT     OF     VEKDUX, 

AXD    OP   THB    GEKMAX    ABUT    (5)    IN    LOERAIXE. 

the  mai-shes  of  St.  Gond,  next  the  retreat  of  the 
Germiua  left  from  Vitry  over  the  flat  country  of 
Champagne,  and  histly  the  neighbourhood  of  Yerduu 
and  the  nature  of  the  peril  to  that  fortress. 

THE   BATTLE   OF   MEAUX 

(or  of  The  Ourcq). 

The  field  of  operations  which  we  are  about  to 
follow  imder  the  general  title  of  the  Battle  of  Meaux 
(the  original  action  which  turned  the  tide  of  the  cam- 
]>aign),  runs  from  Paris  on  the  west  to  the  sources  of 
the  Petit  Morin  upon  the  east,  from  the  Seine  and  the 
town  of  Nogent  upon  the  south  to  the  Eiver  Aisne 
and  the  town  of  Soissons  upon  the  north. 

At  some  time  upon  Wednesday,  September  2nd 
(and  the  anniversary  of  Sedan),  or  possibly  as  late  as 
Thm-sday,  September  3rd,  the  first  German  Army,- 
under  General  vonKluck,  numbering  perhaps  200,000 
men,  perhaps  somewhat  more,  was  still  facing  Paris, 
and  advancing  toAvards  that  town  from  the  neighbour- 
liood  of  Creil,  Compiegne,  and  Senlis.  It  then  got 
wind  of  a  very  large  reserve  which  had  secretly  been 
gathered  by  the  French  commanders  within  and  behind 
the  fortifications  of  Paris,  and  this  news  alt<;red  all  its 
an-angements. 

At  this  moment  the  command  of  Von  Kluck 
roughly  occupied  the  positions  marked  on  the  map  by 
the  shaded  portions  A  A. 


tSTMNAY 


NOGENT 


SCALe    of     2S 


PLAN'     SUOWINO     THE     POSITIO:*     OF     THE     QEBMAX     BIGHT     WIXO 
(abut    VXDEU   von   kluck)    on    8KPTEHBEB  SbD. 

It  had  in  front  of  it  three  forces  which  (until 
tlie  i-eserve  Ijehind  Paris  could  come  up)  were  still 
inferior  in  numbers  to  itself.  Tliese  three  forces 
were : — 

(1)  Tliat  line  of  the  French  forces  on  the 
extreme  left  which  the  French  call  their  6th  Army. 

(2)  T!ie  British  contingent  which  had  just  gone 
south  of  the  ^Fariie,  blowing  up  the  bridge  of  Lagny 
behind  it  in  its  retreat,  and  which  had  in  front  of  it 
tke  forest  of  Crccy. 


(3)   That   Freneli  force,  known  as  tlie  oth  Frerich 
Army,  Avhieli  lay  to  the  right  again,  probably  along- 
the  Seine. 

The  general,  Yon  Kluok,  in  command  of  the 
Gei*man  Army  at  A  A,  finding  himself  tlireatened  by 
this  unexpected  resen-e  in  front  of  him,  which  had  been 
hidden  by  the  fortified  zone  of  Paris,  and  which  had 
been  gathered  there  by  the  French  conmianders  witli 
the  object  of  thus  tui-ning  the  tide,  determined  in  this 
difficult  situation  to  act  as  follows  : 

He  proposed  to  march  right  away  across  the 
IManie  and  across  the  river  called  the  Grand  Morin, 
in  the  direction  of  the  arrow  B  B,  and  in  two  days' 
march  to  have  joined  and  concentrated  up  against  the 
Gei-man  armies  to  the  east  of  him,  which  then,  Avith 
his  forces  added,  could  have  pierced  the  Allied  line 
somewhere  along  the  middle  Seine — say,  beyond 
Nogent. 

It  will  be  apparent  that,  finding  thus  unexpectedly 
in  front  of  hmi  forces  which,  when  they  had  all  joined, 
would  be  superior  to  his  own.  Von  Kluck  had  no 
choice  but  either  to  retreat  the  way  he  had  come  (and 
so  leave  the  other  German  armies  to  the  east  of  him 
isolated  and  exposed  upon  their  western  Hank)  or  to 
decide  as  he  did,  and  to  march  along  the  line  B  B  to 
join  them. 

But  observe  that  this  march  along  the  line  B  B 
was  one  of  those  hazai-dous  operations  which  every 
elementary  text-book  upon  strategy  (and,  for  that 
miitter,  all  historical  experience  as  well)  defines  to  bo 
the  most  dangerous  of  all.  He  proposed  to  march 
ri(/ht  along  his  enemy  s  front.  He  risked  doing  so 
because  he  under-estimated  the  power  remaining  to 
the  French  and  British  contingents  upon  that  front  of 
tiiking  the  counter-offensive  after  the  severe  experience 
of  their  recent  retreat  from  the  l^lgian  frontier. 

He  was  aware,  however,  that  this  big  reserve 
behind  Pai-is  would,  while  he  was  hunying  south- 
eastward, come  up  along  such  hues  as  C  C  and  D  D 
and  graduidly  reinforce  the  line  of  his  enemies.  He 
was  consequently  concerned  (a)  for  certain  German 
detachments  which  lay  isolated  to  the  north,  notably 
in  the  direction  of  Compiegne,  and  {h)  for  liis  com- 
nmnications,  which  lay  roughly  along  the  line  E  E. 

He  therefore  left  a  very  strong  body  upon  the 
plateau  Avhich  runs  west  of  the  Biver  Ourcq,  aud 
particulai-ly  large  forces  around  the  villages  of 
Penchard  and  Bregy.  With  the  rest  of  his  army  he 
undertook  that  perilous  advance  in  fix>nt  of  his  enemy's 
lines  which  he,  or  his  superiors,  prefeiTcd  to  the 
confession  of  failure  involved  in  a  retirement. 

Upon  Satui-day,  September  5th,  the  columns  of  this 
first  German  Army,  Von  Kluck 's,  the  largest  German 
Army  in  the  field,  crossed  the  Marne  at  Trilport,  La 
Fei-te  Sous-Jouan-e,  and  just  below  Chateau  Thierry. 
The  French  5th  Army  fell  back  before  this  advance  ; 
and  on  Sunday,  the  Gth,  the  remainder  of  the  Germans, 
with  the  exception  of  the  lai-ge  rearguard  which  had 
been  left  to  keep  off  the  increasing  French  pressure 
idong  the  Oui-cq,  had  pushed  right  down  through 
Coulommiers  to  the  neighbourh.jod  of  Pro\-ins.  Its 
cavalry  patrols  had  even  reached  the  Seine  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Nogent. 

The  situation  then  upon  the  Sunday  night  may 
be  summarised  in  the  following  map. 

It  was  in  that  night,  the  night  between  Sunday 
and  Monday,  the  Oth  and  7th  September,  that  tlie 
counter-offensive  began.  The  French  5th  Army 
attacked  with  the  bayonet  and  recovered  some  little 
ground  north  of  the  Seine,  and  by  daylight  on  ^Monday 
both  the  5th  FrencJi  Army  and  the  Briti.sh  contingent 
advanced  northward  against  the  enemy.     The  British 


3» 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


September  19,  1914 


Go/ 


^  Seine 

POSITION   OF   VOX    KLUCk's   AKMT   ON   SUXUAI   NIGHT, 
SEFl'EMBEB  GtH. 

fought  their  way  through  and  beyond  the  Forest  of 
Crecy  and  through  Coulommiers.  The  5th  Trench 
Army  heyond  them  to  the  east  attacked  La  Ferte 
Gaucher  and  Esternay  and  this  southern  part  of  the 
Allied  line  crossed  the  Grand  Morin  Eiver  and 
approached  the  next  defensible  line  held  by  the 
Germans,  the  Petit  Morin. 

On  Tuesday,  the  Sth,  the  British  contingent  and 
the  5th  French  Army  continued  to  advance  and  pushed 
the  German  line  right  over  the  Petit  Morin  on  to  the 
Manie,  after  capturing  Montmirail. 

On  the  AV'ednesday,  the  9th,  these  two  bodies, 
the  British  contingent  and  the  French  Sth  Army, 
continued  to  push  the  Germans  back.  The  British 
crossed  the  Marnc,  mainly  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
La  Fertd-s.-Jouan-e,  in  spite  of  very  sharp  resistance 
at  that  point,  while  the  French  5th  Anuy,  which,  by 
the  nature  of  the  local  topography  had  to  swing 
further  round  and  cover  more  distance  to  reach  the 
Marne,  put  in  a  day  and  a  half  of  forced  marching, 
and  arrived  upon  that  river  u^wn  the  Thufsday,  the 
10th,  between  Chateau  ThiexTy  and  Dormans. 

On  Thui'sday,  the  10th,  therefore,  so  far  as  the 
southern  forces  were  concerned,  they  had  pushed  the 
Germans  everyAvhere  right  back  to  and  over  the  Manie, 
their  sweep  pivoting,  as  it  were,  upon  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Meaux. 

But  meanwhile,  during  those  same  three  days, 
the  GeiTnan  rearguard  stretched  along  the  plateau  to 
the  west  of  the  Ourcq  was  putting  up  a  very  fine 
defence  against  the  increasing  pressure  it  had  to  meet, 
an  increasing  pressure  because  what  had  been  the  Gth 
French  Army  was  now  very  largely  reinforced,  and 
with  every  hour  more  and  more  reinforced  from  the 
reserve  behind  and  in  Paris,  the  presence  of  which  has 
turned  the  campaign. 

The    French    lost    very    hcavil}-    during     this 
fighting,  especially  round   Bt'gy  and   Penchard.     It 
was    mainly    an    artillery    action.        They     finally 
succeeded  in  forcing  the  line  of  the  Ourcq  (which  is 
liere  a  deep  ravine  between  two  plateaux  upon  either 
side),  and  when  that  was  done,  the  position  of  the 
German   first   Army  being  that    suggested    in    the 
following  map,  it  had  no  choice  but  to   retreat  as 
i-apidly  as  it  could  towards  the  north-east,  along  the 
arrows  AAA.,    and  so    reach  the    next  defensive 
position  about  thii-ty-five  miles  away  along  the  Aisne. 
This,  General   von   Kluck's   great  command,  which, 
during  the  retreat  of  the  Allies,  had  advanced  directly 
upon     Paris     with     such     wonderful     organization, 
speed,    and    success,    now    did     with     organization 
and     speed     hardly     less     worthy     of     admiration. 
It   is   true  that,  as  is  always  the  case  in  a   retire- 
ment,   and   especially    in    a    rapid    retirement,  much 
material,  and  many  halting  and  wounded  men   were 


left  behind  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  advancing 
enemy.  But  the  proportion  of  prisoners,  guns,  and 
material  lost  was  not  at  all  large  compared  with  the 
very  great  force  concerned.  There  woidd  seem  to 
have  been  picked  up  in  the  first  two  days  of  this 
retu-ement,  Thursday,  the  10th,  and  Friday,  the  11th, 
somewhat  over  20  guns,  many  wagons  of  course,  and 
about  G,000  stragglers  and  Avounded. 

Bv  Saturday  morning,  the  12th,  the  retreat  had 
reached  the  line  of  the  Yesle  where  it  falls  into  the 
Aisne,  and  so  down  the  Aisne  to  the  town  of  Soissons, 
and  the  advanced  cavalry  of  the  Allies  could  observe 
the  rapitUy  retiring  enemy  from  the  high,  steep  ridge 
which  lies  just  to  the  south  of  those  rivers. 

During  Sunday,  the  first  check  was  administered 
to  the  pursuit  by  the  German  forces  which  Avas  now 
taking  up  its  defensive  position  along  and  to  the 
north  of  the  line  of  the  Aisne. 

By  Monday  the  German  retreat  had  thoroughly 
establi.'^hed  itself  in  the  new  defensive  position  north 
of  the  Aisne  and  to  the  east  along  the  Suippe.      Ifc 


<J)  Ibzvst  of^ 

•      ---A 

COMPl£CN£ 


aCTHEl. 


^9"^-^ 


PORMANS 


I 


SccLle  of  Miles 


SKETCH    SHOWING    THE    FORCING    OP   THE    MARNE   AND    THE    OVRCQ 

BT   THE   ALLIES    ON    BEPTEMBEB   9tH    TO    IOtH,  AND   THE    RETREAT 

Oi'    VOX    KLUCK    ON    TO   THE    DEFENSIVE   POSITIONS    NORTH    OF  THB 

AISNE   AND    VESLE, 


was  a  general  concentration  of  neariy  the  whole 
German  Army — not  only  of  Von  Kluck's  retreat, 
but  of  the  other  retreating  bodies  to  the  east  of  him 
which  had 'come  up  through  Champagne  and  joined, 
each  in  its  place,  along  this  defensive  line  from 
Soissons  eastward.  On  that  day  the  Germans 
turned  on  their  pursuers,  and  began  the  great 
defensive  action  which  is  still  in  doubt  at  the 
moment  in  Avhich  I  write  these  lines.  The  other 
parts  of  this  general  concentration  concern  my  next 
section,  the  retreat  of  the  Germans  in  the  centre, 
and  their  pursuit  by  the  French  (the  4th  and  3rd 
French  Armies)  over  the  central  Marne  and  towards 
lihcinis. 

THE  GERMAN  RETREAT  FROM 

SEZANNE. 

The  story  of  the  retreat  undertaken  by  the 
second  of  the  great  German  masses,  that  immediately 
to  the  east  or  left  of  Yon  Kluck's  larger  army,  can  be 
told  in  far  less  space.  It  concerns  those  bodies  Avhich 
lay  east  of  Montmirail  and  west  of  the  escarpment 
from  which  the  plateau  of  Sezanne  looks  down  upon 
the  great  plain  of  Champagne. 

^It  would  srem  that  the  German  forces  here 
engaged  belonged  in  the  main  to  the  command  of 
von  IJueloAV.  They  probably  included  the  Guard. 
But  details  of  this  sort  are  unimportant  in  the  under- 
standing of  a  movement ;  the  names  and  numbers  of 


4» 


September  19,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


corps  are  only  of  value  in  sueh  an  niuler.standing  if 
tlioy  enable  us  to  keep  a  continuous  picture  in  mind. 

The  main  point  to  seize  is  that  the  second  of  the 
great  German  masses  holding'  the  line  against  the 
Allies  between  Paris  and  the  Toul — Verdun  line  was 


RHEIMS 


FLAN    SHOWISO    THK     GEKMAV     I,rSB     OF    RETREAT    TO    PREFAJtXD 
POSITION   KOSTH   OV   RHXIMS. 


operating  upon  what  is  calW  '!»*  PlaV'-'u  of  Sezanne, 
and  lay  next  upon  the  left  of  And  to  the  east  of  von 
Kluck's  army.  This  second  of  the  great  German 
masses  stood  iirm  in  front  of  the  high  road  that  leads 
from  La  Fere  Champenoise,  through  Sezanne  to 
Esteniay.  It  extended  beyond  that  high  road  at  the 
moment  of  tlie  fiuthest  German  advance  towards  the 
south. 

The  German  forces  upon  and  beyond  this  road 
had  behind  them  an  interesting  and  difficult  piece  of 
countiy,  called  the  Marshes  of  Saut  Gond,  which  are 
the  sources  of  the  river  called  the  Petit  Morin.  These 
marshes  are  in  process  of  reclamation,  but  they  ai-e 
not  yet  entirely  reclaimed  ;  and,  even  in  a  dry  siimmer 
like  this,  they  present  some  slight  obstacle  to  an  anny 
tliat  should  be  heavily  pressed  or  in  too  desperate 
a  retreat.  They  are  formed  by  the  presence  in  a 
calcareous  soil  of  a  clay  Ijasin  which  holds  the  water, 
and  by  the  fashion  in  which  the  heights  aronnd  leave 
a  great  flat,  in  which  the  watei-s  can  gather,  but  Avhich 
is  pinched  at  its  western  issue,  where  the  river  runs 
out  near  St.  Prix  between  two  opposing  hills. 

Through  these  marshes  of  St.  Gond  the  Petit 
Morin  i-uns  in  the  shape  of  a  canalised  drain  or  ditch, 
into  which  the  other  ditches  of  the  reclamation  scheme 
fall. 

These  marshes  are  about  ten  miles  long :  at  their 
naiTOwest  less  than  a  mile,  at  their  broadest  over  two 
miles  broad.  They  are  crossed  by  no  less  than  fom- 
country  roads,  branching,  two  from  Brous.sy,  two  from 
Bannes ;  and  above  and  below  the.se  country  roads  go 
the  great  high  roads  northwards  on  either  side  of  the 
marsh^one  through  St.  Prix  to  Epemay,  upon  the 
Mai-ne,  and  the  other  through  Morains'  to  Mareuil 
upon  the  JIame.  At  Epemay  and  at  Mareuil  are 
bridges,  and  the  second  road — tiiat  to  Mareuil — runs 
everywhere  just  upon  and  below  that  escarpment 
whereby  the  plateau  of  Sezanne  falls  on  to  the  plain 
of  Champagne. 

I  have  said  that  in  a  hurried  retreat  very  heavily 
pressed  by  the  enemy  these  marshes  of  St.  Gond 
might  prove  an  awkward  ob.stacle,  even  in  a  dry 
summer,  and  even  though  they  are  crossed  by  five 
roads ;  for  a  large  force  would  be  strictly  conGned  to 
tliose  roads  and  would  Ije  ui^on  defiles,  tliat  is,  confined 
to  long  and  narrow  columns,  while  it  was  crossing  the 


marshes.  But  it  is  evident  that  there  was  no  such 
heavy  pressure  upon  this  retreat  of  the  German  second 
group.  All  the  energy  to  be  spent  in  those  days  by 
the  Allies  was  being  exercised  upon  the  ami)'  of  von 
Kluck  immediately  to  the  west.  A\niat  happened  was 
that  when  the  army  of  von  Kluck  was  driven  out  of 
Montmirail  and  all  the  points  to  the  west  thei-eof, 
this  second  German  mass,  lying  upon  the  plateau  and 
along  the  high  road  through  Sezanne  and  Esteruay 
had  to  fall  back  because  its  western  or  right  tlank  was 
isolated.  It  probably  fell  back  in  the  night  between 
the  9th  and  lOtli  September.  It  continuetl  its  retreat 
(followed  by  the  4th  French  Army)  over  the  ^Marne 
at  Epernay  and  the  neighbourhood,  marching  by  the 
two  great  roads  to  the  east  and  to  the  west  of  the 
marsh,  and  probably  somewhat  relieved  the  pressure 
on  its  columns  by  using  the  roads  across  the  marsli 
as  well.  It  made  for  liheims  and,  in  common  with 
all  the  other  German  forces,  took  up  by  the  Sunday 
night  (September  13th)  that  main  defensive  line 
north  of  Bheims  which  I  shall  describe  when  I 
summarize  all  these  movements. 

It  is  possible  that  this  ro'reat,  which  the  French 
closely  followed,  was  the  scene  of  that  capture  of  guns 


Ch 


RHEIMS     ^-iC-^e 
5^ 


VITR7 


"^ftso. 


'n£ 


SKETCH     SHOWINe     THB      DKFEXSITB     POSITION      ON     WHICH       TUB 
OEBKANS   KXTIR£D. 


of  which  we  have  had  brief  notice  by  telegram,  but  it 
is  more  likely  that  this  capture  took  place  more  to  the 
east,  in  the  retreat  of  the  third  Gennan  mass  Avhich  I 
shall  next  describe. 

While  I  am  upon  this  point  it  is  worth  explain- 
ing that  the  captm-e  of  corjjs  artillery  does  not  moan 
the  capture  of  the  arlillery  of  a  corps.  Tlic  Pi-ess 
Bureau  made  a  highly  exaggerated  estimate  when  they 
talked  of  ICO  guns;  thirty-six  wiU  turn  out  to  be 
nearer  the  mark.  The  corps  artillery  consists  only  of 
those  guns  which  are  at  the  disposal  of  the  corps  as  a 
whole  and  not  attached  to  divisions.  It  is  but  a 
fi-action,  vaiying  according  to  organisation,  of  the 
whole  artillery  attached  to  a  corps  d'armee. 

THE  GERMAN  RETREAT  ACROSS 
CHAMPAGNE  FROM  THE  LINE 
LA  FERE  CHAMPENOISE— VITRY 
— REVIGNY. 

Most  important,  and  most  lasting  in  its  effects, 
of  all  the  various  eo-oixlinated  Gennan  retirements 
last  week  was  the  retirement  of  the  third  great  mass 
of  troops,  which  had  pushed  furthest  to  the  south  and 
Avliich,  having  come  right  across  the  great  plain  of 
Champagne,  was  holding Sommesous,Vitry-le-Francois, 
the  railway  line  and  the  high  road  between  them,  and 


.1* 


LAND    AND    WATER 


ScptemLer  19,  1914 


MOUNT  A/M 


sizAHne 


o 


75 


SO 


ScALf.  ofMile:> 


SKPTCH   BHOWINO   THE    GERMAN    LIKE    OF    F.EIIiEVT 
FEOM    LA     rkRB    CHAJll-KNOISK-VlTBr— HEVW.Nr. 


had  cntrcncliod  a  defensive  Hue  along  the  Eivcr  Saulx, 
and  further  along  the  River  Oruain  (its  tributary)  as 
far  as  Eevigny. 

The  interest  of  this  great  German  advance  on  \  itrj 
had  lain  in  the  fact  that  it  passed  over  the  most  open 
country  of  all,  had  reached  further  south  than  the 
rest,  and  was  the  front  upon  A\hich,  if  anywhere,  the 
Allied  line  was  likely  to  he  pierced. 

I  have  described  how  an  escarpment  runs  from 
Sezamie  northwai-d  towards  Epernay  npon  the  Marne, 
along  and  beyond  which  escarpment  went  the  retreat 
of  the  second  great  bod^^  of  the  Germans,  that  which 
retreated    from    Sezanne    and    Esternay   across    the 
marshes    to    Epernay,    Rheims,   and    the     defensive 
line    beyond.       From     this    escarpment    one    looks 
down  eastward  upon    a   great  rolling  plain   of   bare 
land,  dotted  here  and  there  with  regular  plantations, 
which  plain  is  the  Plain  of  Champagne.     Upon  the 
eastern   side   of    this   plain   rises  hilly   and   Avooded 
country,  at  the  gate  of  which  stands  Revigny,  and 
the  principal  groups  of  woods  in  which  are  called  the 
Wood  of  Beluoue,  and  to  the  north  of  it  the  great 
forest  of  the  Argonne.     Between  that  escarpment  of 
Sezanne  on  the   Avest  and   this   wooded   country  of 
Argonne  on  the  east,  you  have  an  open  chalky  land,  not 
vmlike  Salisbuiy  Plain  in  many  parts  of  it,  but  better 
served  Avith  roads  and  fairly  served  with  railways,  in- 
cluding one  great  trunk  line  ;  provided  also  with  great 
accumulations  of  provisions  in  such  towns  as  Chalons, 
its  capital,  Yitry,  La  Fere  Champenoisc,  Rheims. 

Here,   upon  the  slightly   concave   line   running 
from  Sezanne,  south  of  Yitry,  to  Revigny,  lay,  as  we 
saw  last  week,  the  crisis  of  this  first  phase  of  the 
campaign.     Here  it  was  that  the  General  commanding 
the  German  Corps  at  Yitry  urged  his  troops  (in  an 
Order  which  fell  into  French  hands  after  his  precipitate 
retreat)  that  upon  their  power  to  advance  in  the  next 
few  days  would  depend  the  whole  German  scheme. 
AVe  now  know  that  this  advance  did  not  take   place, 
that,  on  the  contrary,  the  Gei-mans  retreated  from  this 
line    between     La     Fere     Champenoi.se-Sommesous- 
Yitry-Rovigny,  as  they  retreated  from  the  line  Sezanne- 
Esternay,  and  for  the  same  reasons.     AYhen  A'on  Ivluck 
was  so  unexpectedly  pushed  back  on  the  extreme  Avcst 
by  the  advent  of  the  reserve  which  had  been  secretly 
accumulated  under  Paris,  the  A\hole  Gorman  line,  sec- 
tion by  section,  had  to  give  way,  from  Paris  (where  the 
pressure  began)  right  away  to  the  forest  of  Argonne. 

As  is  always  the  case  in  such  a  retirement — as 
■was  the  case  for  instance  in  our  own  retirement  from 
the  Sambre  nearl}'  a  month  ago — the  extreme  of 
the  line  fuiihest  from  the  part  that  retires  first 
receives  the  last  news  and  is  the  last  to  retire.     This 


extreme  scdiun  has  always  therefore  to  retire  with 
o-reater  precipitation  and  under  more  difficult  circum- 
stances than  its  neighbours.     And  the  German  bodies 
occupying  this  Champagne  country  between  the  escarp- 
ment and  the  woods,  an  open  gap  of  roughly  50  miles, 
unavoidably  fell  back  hurriedly  and  a  little  late,      iheir 
retreat    began    on    September    10th.      They    aban- 
doned Yitry  le  Francois  in  particular  under  extreme 
pressure,  leaving  in  that  headquarters  town  many  of 
their  papers  ami  much  of  their  baggage.     AV  luit  the 
Avholc  of  tliis  body  may  have  lost  in  the  wayof  guns 
and  Avai,»rons  Ave  do  not  know,  but  they  fell  back,  as 
(lid   all   the   others,    to  the  north,    marching   across 
Champno-ne  through  the  end  of  that  Thursday,  the 
Avhole  of  the  Fridav  (llth)  ar.d  tlie  Saturday  (I2th) 
until  on  the  Suiidav  they  also  too';  up  their  place  in 
the  excellent  defensive  line  which  the  German  com- 
manders had  indicated  north  of  inieims.      It  was  a 
hurried  but  a  fine  piece  of  work.     There  lies,  isolated 
on  the  escarpment  of  the  Plateau  that  bounds  the 
Plain  of  Champagne  upon  the  Avest,  a  single  hUl  called 
"  Mont  Aime  "  though  Avhy  beloved,  or  if  beloved,  I 
cannot  tell.     From  that  lonely  height  a  man  can  look 
eastward  over  all  the  Champagne  like  a  sea  and  discover 
its  endless  rolling  fields  bare  and  empty  before  him 
and  its  streams  of  roads.       On  this  height  I  could 
wish    to    have    stood    last     Friday    in    the    south- 
westerly gale  Avatching  the  long  lines  threading  nort  i- 
AN-ard  across  the  flats  and  knowing  that  these  A\ero  the 
columns  of  the  iuA'aders  in  retreat. 

So  much,  then,  for  the  retirement  nortliward  and 
eastward  of  the  three  great  German  bodies  between 
September  9th— 10th  and  September  13th— 14:th: 
that  is,  between  the  night  and  the  early  morning  of 
AYednesday  and  Thursday  of  last  Aveek,  and  the  night 
and  early  morning  of  Sunday  and  Monday  last.^ 

Ry  the  time  the  retreat  Avas  over,  the  German 
liiie— the  retirement  of  Avhose  three  great  sections  had 
been  accomplished  with  singular  success,  and  Asith 
astonishing  rapidity— was  drawn>p  upon  a  defensive 
position  in  which  it  prepared  to  give  battle,  iiiat 
battle  is  being  desperately  fought  at  the  moment  in 
A\'hich  these  lines  are  Avritten,  AYednesday  afternoon, 
and  has  already  occupied  the  two  preceding  days. 

My  next  task  Avill  be  to  describe  the  defensive 
position  Avhich  has  thus  been  adopted  by  the  enemy, 
and  to  conjecture  at  his  motives  for  standing  where  he 
does  to  resist  the  further  advance  of  the  Allied  line. 

I  Avould  beg  the  reader  to  folloAV  this  section 
with  particular  care,  for  it  concerns  a  crowning  act  in 
this  Avar.  The  Germans  have  studied,  and  fallen 
back  upon  one  of  the  best  defensive  positions  in 
AYestern  Europe  and  are  there  conducting  the  Battle 

•  OF    THE   AlSNK   AND    SuiPl'E. 


THE  GERMAN  DEFENSIVE  POSITION. 


:% 


TI.E  CEIOIAX  DEFENSIVE  rOSlTION,  FROM  LAST  MONDAY  TO  LAST 
WEDNESDAY,  SEPTEMBER  UTH  TO  IGTH.  THE  BKITISH  CON- 
TINGENT ATTACKED  FBOM  SOISSONS  ON  THE  LEFT  TO  ^EAB 
CRAONNE    ON    THE    RIGHT.  TO  THE.B    LEFT    LP   TO  THE     FOREST 

DE  L'AIGLE  WAS  THE  FRENCH  GtH  AUMY  ;  TO  THEIK  RIGHT  TUB 
FRENCH       5TH      army.  THli;     WHOLE      LINK      HERE      SHOWN       IB 

BETWEEN   FIFTY   AHO   SIXTY   MILES  LOSS. 


6* 


September  19,  1914 


L  A  X  D    A  X  D    WATER 


This  position  which  the  German  amiics  (with  the 
exception  of  that  of  the  Crown  Prince,  isolated  beyond 
Ai-gonne  upon  the  extreme  left)  took  up  upon  last 
Sunday  niglit  and  Monday  morning  is  naturally 
divided  into  two  quite  different  sections.  The  first,  or 
eastern,  section  runs  from  a  wood  called  "  The  forest 
of  the  Eagle,"  or  "  de  L'Aigle,"  just  north  of 
Compicgne  to  the  large  village  of  Craonue,  a  distance 
of  about  30  miles. 

This  first  half  of  the  German  position,  the 
western  half,  is  everywhere  parallel  to  the  river  Aisne 
and  it  follows  the  first  ridge  to  the  north  of  that 
river,  a  ridge  in  which  the  short  northern  tributaries 
(which  are  no  more  than  brooks)  t<ike  their  rise.  Tliis 
line  of  heights  is  nowhere  more  than  five  miles  from 
the  river,  and  nowhere  less  than  three.  It  is  a  good 
deal  cut  up  along  its  front  by  i-avines,  for  the  northern 
brooks  tributary  to  the  Aisne  run  in  rather  deep  little 
trenches  with  steep  sides.  •  It  is  an  even  plateau, 
more  or  less,  exactly  following  the  valley  of  Braisne 
below,  and  only  broken  by  these  short  lateral  clefts 
which  greatly  aid  its  defence  by  their  steepness  as 
also  by  their  wooded  slopes. 

The  second,  or  eastern  limb  of  the  position 
crosses  the  river  Aisne  near  to  and  just  south  of 
Neuchatel  and  then  runs  along  a  low,  flat  ridge 
admirably  formed  for  artillery  and  parallel  to  the 
course  of  the  river  Suippe.  This  ridge  runs,  as  does 
the  Suippe,  below  it  in  a  gi*eat  curve  north-west  and 
north  of  the  town  of  Kheims.  This  second  or  eastern 
section  of  the  German  defensive  line  is  of  a  length 
which  Ave  cannot  discover  from  the  telegrams.  If  it  is 
properly  linked  up  with  the  CroAATi  Prince's  anny  on 
the  east  it  is  not  less  than  forty  miles  long,  for  that  is 
about  the  distance  from  Neuchatel  to  the  Argonne 
across  the  great  plain  of  Champagne.  If  it  is  not 
jjroperly  linked  up  with  the  Crown  Prince's  army 
on  the  east  (a  very  unlikely  chance !),  then  there 
is  a  gap  somewhere  nliout  Monthois  of  which  the 
French  will  certainly  take  advantage ;  and  in  that 
case  this  eastern  line  is  only  as  long  as  the  first,  or 
about  30  miles  long. 

You  have,  then,  the  German  annies  taking  up 
this  defensive  line,  certainly  60 — more  probably  over 
70 — miles  in  length,  and  awaiting  the  assault  of 
the  Allies. 

It  must  de  remembered  that  the  enemy  s  armies 
are  intact,  that  tliey  have  lost  liille  in  prisoners  or  guns 
— nothing  comparable  to  what  the  Allies  lost  in  their 
rapid  retreat  from  the  Belgian  frontier — and  that 
they  are  still  in  numbers  certainly  equal  to  their 
ojiponents  and  probably  superior. 

Now  of  what  natui-e  is  this  defensive  position 
which  the  Germans  have  taken  up  ? 

The  very  first  thing  a  student  notes  about  it  is  that 
it  has  been  carefully  thought  out.  It  is  not  a  chance 
position  taken  up  haphazard  or  under  the  stress  of 
some  too  rapid  retreat  which  has  at  last  been  given 
breathing  space.  It  is  a  line  upon  which,  in  case 
of  retreat,  the  Gennan  commanders  had  dctennined 
to  stand,  and  it  is  the  line  on  which  they  can  best 
stand  between  Paris  and  the  Meiise.  It  has  been 
studied  thoroughly  by  spies  dming  peace,  and  it  is 
very  good. 

Considei-  first  the  character  of  the  heights  held 
between  Craonne  and  the  Forest  of  the  Eagle  (or 
de  I'Aigle).  They  are  everywhere  unifomi,  save 
in  the  ravines  of  Morsain.  The  open  ridge  rarely 
rise5  to  more  than  300  feet  above  the  river;  it 
only  falls  to  less  than  200  ft.  above  the  river  upon 
its  western  edge  towards  the  forest,  ami  this  fall  is 
everywhere  gradual.     Tb.e  line  of  the  plateau  is  every- 


where fairly  even.  It  is,  as  I  have  said,  cut  up  on  its 
front  by  the  ravines  through  which  the  northern 
tributary  brooks  of  tlie  Aisn  >  fall ;  and  these  ravines 
are  steep  and  wooded.  But  though  such  a  disposition 
of  the  land  a  little  interferes  with  the  homogeneity 
and  evenness  of  the  defence,  it  is  much  more  of  an 
obstacle  to  the  attack.  It  is  here  from  Soissons  along 
the  Aisne  for  about  20  miles  that  the  British 
contingent  is  at  Avoi'k. 

So  much  for  the  western  section  of  the  German 
line  along  the  Aisne.  But  the  eastern  section  of  the 
line,  which  runs  from  Craonne  across  to  the  woods  of 
the  Argonne  in  a  flat  curve  across  the  plains  of  Cham- 
pagne, is  even  better  suited  to  defence. 

It  is  a  line  of  low  woodland  on  a  crest  upon 
wliich  a  wide  shelf  of  plough  land  falls  down  to 
the  shallow  depression  in  which  runs  the  white  and 
inuddy  water  of  the  Suippe  river,  a  tributary  of 
the  Aisne.  The  slope  in  front  of  this  ridge  of 
wood  is  quite  bare,  save  for  a  few  artificial  plantations. 
It  consists,  as  I  have  said,  of  huge  stretches  of  jilough 
land,  now  stubble  ;  and  from  this  almost  uniform  line 
of  slight  elevations  it  sinks  southward  and  eastward 
doAvn  to  the  Suippe  in  a  perfect  natural  glacis.  On 
the  further  or  southern  side  of  the  river  rises  a 
corresponding  but  longer  slope  of  perfectly  bare  and 
open  land  which  can  be  swept  in  all  its  breadth  by 
artilleiy  on  the  opposing  ridge.  This  line  north  of 
the  Suippe,  commanding  a  glacis  before  it  and 
dominating  a  slight  and  long  rise  beyond  the  water, 
is  perfect,  and  that  is  the  eastern  section  of  the 
Gennan  line. 

The  two  sections  of  the  line,  therefore,  that  from 
Compicgne  to  Craonne,  and  that  along  the  Suippe  in 
the  north  Champagne  country  are  each  in  different 
ways  exactly  suited  for  defence.  I  repeat,  it  was  no 
haphazard  which  made  the  German  retirement  halt 
precisely  along  this  series  of  positions.  It  was  a  plan 
known  and  studied. 

The  interest  of  the  action  now  engaged  on  this 
excellent  line  has  many  aspects,  but  the  first  is 
the  question  whether  the  Gennan  armies  intend  a 
counter-offensive,  or  rather  intend  to  cover  the 
retirement  of  their  convovs  across  the  Meuse  ? 

Ever^-thing  in  war  must  be  conjoctm-e  in  the 
shape  of  alternatives.  The  best  and  surest  com- 
mander himself  in  the  field  does  not  know  from  day 
to  day  wliat  the  hazard  of  war  Avill  bring.  He  doe.s 
not  know  (if  it  brings  victoiy)  exactly  what  form  the 
victory  Anil  take,  nor  hoAv  it  can  best  be  used  :  he  is 
ignorant  of  it  until  it  has  come  about.  He  does  not 
know  (if  it  brings  defeat)  hoAv  that  defeat  A\-ill  come 
or  how  it  may  best  be  i-etricA'cd. 

It  is  not  possible,  therefore,  to  say  that  the 
position  taken  up  by  the  Gennans  does  not  mean  a 
counter-offensiA'e  in  the  near  future.  It  is  impossible 
to  say  this  for  the  simj^le  reason  that,  even  if  the 
German  commanders  do  not  intend  it  upon  this 
Wednesday  (when  I  am  Avriting  the  present  lines), 
they  may  have  an  opportunity  for  intending  it  (and 
may  therefore  take  it  up)  by  the  time  these  lines  are 
on  the  machines  upon  Thursday. 

But  on  the  balance  of  i)robabilities  it  Avould  seem 
that  they  rather  intend  to  cover  a  retirement  over  the 
Upper  Aisne,  and  later  OA*er  the  Meuse  or  into  Belgium, 
than  to  attempt  an  immediate  counter-offensiA^e.  Their 
forces  uj)on  the  left  or  east,  those  of  the  Crown  Prince 
and  those  of  the  Genuan  armies  in  LoiTaine,  are 
certainly  moving  northward  and  eastward — that  is, 
retiring.  Further,  the  opportunities  for  a  counter- 
offensive  are  Aveak  along  the  line  which  they  have 
taken  up.     It  is  essentially  a  line  difficult  of  assault 


LAND    AND     WATER 


Scptcml)er  19,  1914 


but  not  easy  to  move  fonvard  from  ;  particularly  upon 
what  would  bo  the  workiui^j  wing  of  a  uow  advance, 
tliat  part  of  tlio  line  which  lies  between  Craonue 
and  tlio  Valley  of  the  Oise  beyond  Soissons. 

Another  interest  of  the  German  jwsition  is 
■whether  it  is  in  peril  upon  either  of  its  wings.  In 
other  words,  whether  the  Germans  can  lie  mana3uvred 
out  of  it  by  a  French  movement  around  their  west — 
beyond  Conipiejjne,  or  round  tlieir  east — between  the 
main  army  and  the  CroMu  Prince's.  In  the  latter 
case  there  would  be  disaster.  It  would  mean  the 
separation  of  the  German  force,  as  a  whole,  into  two, 
and  the  piercing  of  its  centre  by  a  French  advance 
directed  due  north,  along  the  valley  of  the  Upper 
Aisne.  The  disaster  would  not  necessarily  be 
immediate.  But  the  separation  would  mean  the  end 
of  all  offence  in  France  and  the  beginning  of  a 
defensive  war  on  German-Belgian  soil.  If  the  French 
get  between  the  Cromi  Prince  on  the  Mouse  and  the 
main  defensive  German  line  noiih  of  Eheims,  that 
must  follow.  For  though  both  sections  of  the  retreat 
would  reunite  towards  the  Ehine,  they  Avould  have 
lost  the  initiative  for  good. 

But  such  a  gap  between  the  Crown  Prince's 
Army  and  the  main  defensive  line  presupposes  negli- 
gence or  inability  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  It 
presupposes  that  his  forces  here  are  not  linked  vip  with 
the  forces  of  the  Crown  Prince,  though  far  romid  the 
north  of  Argonne ;  and  to  pi'esupjjose  negligence  or 
inability  in  an  enemy  avIio  has  conducted  so  masterly 
a  defence  and  so  rapid  and  inexpensive  a  retreat  is 
surely  foolish.  AVe  cannot  presuppose  without  better 
evidence  any  chance  of  the  French  working  round  by 
the  east  through  such  a  gap. 

The  other  question,  whether  the  Allies  may  not 
be  able  to  work  round  the  left  or  icest  of  the  German 
line  is  much  more  open.  It  is  possible  that  they  here 
have  fuiiher  troops.  It  is  probable  that  they  have 
the  use  in  a  rather  roundabout  way  of  hitherto 
undamaged  railways.  It  is  certain  that  nothing  is 
held  by  the  enemy  in  any  force,  if  even  by  patrols 
(which  I  doubt)  west  of  the  Oise  river,  and  it  is 
therefore  conceivable  that  a  French  manoeuvre  round 
by  the  west  may  be  attempted  and  possibly  that  it 
may  succeed.  The  Germans  have  large  bodies  of  their 
Cavalry  here  posted  to  watch  and  prevent  it.  But 
even  so,  when  the  Allied  line  does  overlap  the  Avestern 
Gennan  flank,  or  even  before  it  does,  while  it  merely 
threatens,  the  German  Ime,  having  got  its  convoys 
away  eastward  and  having  built  its  bridges  across  the 
two  rivers  Aisne  and  Meuse,  can  retire  in  order  and 
intact. 

One  truth  must  be  borne  in  mind  in  these  critical 
days.  It  is  the  truth  to  which  these  notes  are  always 
recurring.  So  long  as  the  army  of  either  opponent 
remains  in  no  marked  inferiority  to  the  other  that 
opponent  will  not  remain  permanently  upon  the 
defensive.  Even  if  the  German  army  does  not 
attempt  a  counter-offensive  from  its  jn-esent  positions 
(the  least  likely  of  the  two  alternatives),  even  if  it 
continues  its  retirement  north  and  east,  it  none  the 
less  awaits,  and  has  somewhere  prepared  for,  a  counter- 
offensive  later  on  ;  and  the  retirement,  so  long  as  it  is 
caiTied  out  in  good  order,  means  nothing  one  way  or 
the  other  to  the  ultimate  issue  of  the  cam2)aign  iiulU 
one  or  other  of  the  combatants  has  forced  his  opjwnent 
to  a  Decision,  and  has,  in  that  Decision,  achieved  his 
piu-pose  of  largely  weakening  in  numbers,  or  destroy- 
ing in  cohesion,  the  organised  force  resisting  him. 

The  nuiin  German  line,  then,  is  standing  upon  the 
defensive  from  about  the  nuddle  of  the  Argonne, 
round  to  the  north  of  Hheims  and  along  the  Aisne! 


It  is  composed  of  the  concentration  of  the  three  main 
German  bodies,  the  lirst  and  largest  body  under 
Yon  Kluck  from  in  front  of  Paris,  the  second 
from  in  front  of  Sezanne,  the  third  from  in  front 
of  Vitr}'.  So  far  as  the  telegrams  Avhich  had 
reached  London  b}'  Wednesday  afternoon  inform  us, 
this  German  concentration  on  the  defensive  lino 
was  .still  very  actively  maintaining  its  defensive  at  that 
moment ;  it  was  vigorously  counter-attacking  the 
offensive  Allied  line,  and  everywhere  holding  its  own. 
If  it  had  not  new  reinforcement  (as  Avas  probable),  it 
had  at  least  received  new  munitions,  and,  if  it  were 
only  lighting  to  cover  a  retirement  of  convoys,  it  Avas 
giving  those  convoys  every  leisure  t<i  retire. 

But  the  defensive  line  occupied  by  the  Germans 
north  of  liheims  and  along  the  Aisne  docs  not 
exhaust  the  field.  Iliere  is  a  fourth  body  west  of 
the  Meuse,  and  east  of  the  Argonne,  a  somewhat 
isolated  body,  which  is  of  peculiar  importance  to  the 
fortunes  of  this  camjiaign.  The  ])osition  and  chances 
of  this  fourth  body  I  Avill  attempt,  from  the  A'ery  few 
indicati(ms  avc  have  received,  to  describe.  That 
fouiili  body  is,  as  we  have  seen,  the  anny  of  the 
Crown  Prince,  formerly  in  front  and  to  the  Avest  and 
south  of  Verdun  ;  to-day  to  the  north  of  that  toAvn. 

THE    CROWN    PRINCE'S    ARMY. 


SCALt    Of  HILCS 


SKETCH  SHOWING    THE    VKRDUX-TOTIL  LINE    AND    POSITION    OF    THB 

CKowN  i'bince's  aemy  bkfoeb  the  gekman  ketkeat  began. 


We  luvA'c  continually  seen  in  these  notes  hoAV  a 
fortified  Hue,  running  from  the  great  fortress  of 
Verdun  to  the  great  fortress  of  Toul,  bars  the  move- 
ment of  an  in\'ading  anny  from  the  east  ujion  Paris, 
and  hoAv  in  particular  it  prevents  the  use  of  Kues  of 
communication  into  France  from  the  great  depots  in 
Alsace-Lorraine ;  for  one  of  the  main  railways  passes 
under  the  guns  of  Verdun,  two  others  converge  under 
the  guns  of  Toul,  and  the  railway  connecting  the  tAvo 
fortresses  is  everywhere  under  the  guns  of  the  forts 
that  unite  them  in  a  line  along  the  A-alley  of  the 
Meuse.  We  have  further  seen  that  in  this  war  (so 
far)  the  German  cLiini  to  reduce  modern  fortification 
quickly  by  modern  howitzer  fire  has  been  A'ery  largely 
successful.  It  was  alrao.st  immediatelA'  successful  at 
Liege,  wholly  successful  at  Xamur,  and  successful 
after  about  a  week  or  nine  days  at  ^faubeuge. 

If  \'erduu  had  fallen,  or  if  the  line  of  forts 
between  Verdun  and  Toul  has  been  2>icrced,  the  cam- 
])aign  Avould  have  changed  altogether  in  aspect.  The 
Germans  Avould  no  longer  have  had  to  feel  nervous,  as 
they  uow  do,  about  their  long  communications  through 
Belgium  :     they   would   ha\'e    had   immediate    shoi-t; 


September  19,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


comnmnications  open  tliroiiijli  Alsace-Lorraine.  The 
French  forces  along  the  Moselle  and  the  INIeurthe 
would  have  been  imperilled  and  perhaps  cut  off.  The 
French  line  from  the  Argonne  to  Paris  woidd  ha\"e 
been  taken  in  flank  by  the  existing  German  forces  in 
LoiTaine,  -which  forces,  reinforced  from  the  (lerman 
centre,  miglit  have  been  strong  enough  to  roU  up  the 
French  line  west  of  the  Argonne. 

As  a  fact,  Yerdun,  Toul,  and  the  line  between 
them,  held.  But  it  was  the  particular  mission  of  the 
Crown  Prince's  army  to  reduce  one  of  the  two  for- 
tresses, Verdun  or  Toul,  or  better,  because  more 
economic,  to  break  somewhere  the  chain  of  forts 
between  the  two  strongholds.  With  that  object,  tlie 
Cro^^^l  Princetook  uj)  his  headquarters  at  St.  Menehould 
just  at  the  western  gate  of  the  Argonne  (so  as  to  be  in 
touch  with  the  main  Grerraan  ai-mies  in  Champagne) 
and  began  to  operate  with  liis  separate  army  against 
the  Toul- Verdun  line. 

It  is  important  to  note  that  this  army  teas  separate, 
and  not  a  true  portion  of  tbe  general  German  line. 
That  general  line  ended  at  Eevigny,  on  tlie  edge  of  those 
woods  which  bound  the  Champagne  j)lain  to  the  east. 
The  Crown  Prince  M-as  acting  almost  iudepcndently 
of  this  general  German  line  (the  extremity  of  which 
lay  south  of  him),  though  no  doubt  he  was  keeping  in 
touch  with  it.  His  function  was  not  to  help  to  break 
the  Allied  line  in  Champagne,  or  even  on  the  edge  of 
Champagne,  but  to  do  the  particular  and  local  work 
of  isolating  Veixlun,  by  breaking  the  line  of  forts 
between  Verdun  and  Toul.  Tlien,  presumably,  he 
would  proceed  to  the  reducing  of  Verdun  itself.  As 
I  have  said,  the  value  of  the  Crown  Prince's  task, 
should  it  be  achieved,  lay  in  the  fact  that  it  would 
eliminate  the  barrier  protecting  the  flank  of  the 
long  French  line  from  Toul — ^^erdun  to  Paris  and 
would  open  new,  good,  and  quite  short  lines  of 
communication  for  the  invaders  from  their  depots 
in  western  Germany :  a  relief  as  Avelcome  as  Avater 
to  a  thirsty  man. 

We  have  no  indications  as  yet  to  tell  us  precisely 
when  all  those  dispositions  had  been  taken  which  made 
it  possible  for  the  Crown  Prince  to  begin  his  attack  on 
the  Toid — Verdun  line  of  forts  which  blocked  the 
easy  communications  from  Gemianv. 

His  army  appears  to  have  been  somewhat  Mated 
and  never  very  fortunate.  Perhaps  he  interfered. 
It  was  twice  thrown  over  the  Meuse  in  its  first 
attempts  to  cross  a  fortnight  ago,  and,  even  after  the 
general  French  retirement  in  front  of  the  general 
German  advance  to  the  west  left  the  Meuse  open,  the 
Crown  Prince's  ai-my  (with  which  we  should,  perhaps, 
.^  include  that  of  Wurtemburg)  advanced  with  diflficulty 
through  the  wooded  and  hilly  countiy  to  the  west 
and  north  of  Verdun. 

At  last  (and,  it  would  seem,  not  earlier  than  a 
week  ago)  it  was  in  a  position  to  begin  operations. 

It  possessed,  we  may  be  certain,  ihe  11 -inch 
howitzers  with  which  hitherto  all  the  serious  siege 
work  has  been  conducted  (of  these  I  will  speak  agam 
in  a  moment),  and  there  could  have  been  no  more 
difficulty  in  getting  them  down  by  rail  and  by  road 
to  the  middle  Meu.se  valley  than  there  was  in  getting 
them  in  front  of  Muubeuge.  It  was  only  a  question 
of  another  day  or  two's  travel.  But  it  woxild  seem 
that  the  fortifications  of  the  eastern  frontier  were 
more  thoroughly  held  than  those  of  Maubeuge.  At 
any  rate,  they  have  been  more  successful.  Tlxe  first, 
and,  as  matters  tunied  out,  the  only,  attack  was 
delivered  on  the  work  at  Troyon,  and  the  selection 
of  this  point  was  as  wise  and  as  thoroughly  thought 
out  as  lias  been  every  part  of  the  German  scheme — 


until  some  unexpected  accident  has  come  to  impose 
new  dispositions  upon  the  German  commanders. 

Troyon  was  chosen  because  if  it  fell  Verdun 
would  be  isolated  from  Toul,  the  line  would  be 
broken,  and  the  frontier  open  to  the  invaders.  It  is 
true  that  no  line  of  railway  here  crosses  the  Meuse, 
nor  even  any  principal  road,  but  with  Troyon  captured, 
the  victors  would  be  astraddle  of  the  line  between 
Verdun  and  Toul,  they  would  have  cut  the  road  and  the 
railway  between  the  two  places  and,  much  more 
important,  they  would  have  cut  the  line  of  forts 
between  the  two  places.  Troyon  was  well  chosen 
because  it  commanded  the  widest  gap  in  that  line  of 
forts  coming  between  what  is  called  the  Fort  of  Parodies 
and  the  Fort  of  Geuicourt.  If  Troyon  had  been  taken 
the  German  forces  just  to  the  east  could  have  advanced 
from  their  rail-head  at  Thiaucourt  by  Vignculles  to 
cross  the  Ideuse  under  the  captured  work  (there  is  a 
road  all  the  way,  though  it  is  not  one  of  the  principal 
roads),  and  this  advance  would  have  been  free  from 
disturbance  by  the  garrison  of  Verdun  on  the  one 
hand  and  the  garrison  of  Toul  on  the  other.  Further, 
Troyon  is,  of  all  the  works  along  the  Meuse,  pcrhajis 
the  strongest,  and  yet  (under  the  circumstances  of 
this  campaign)  the  most  vulnerable  !  ■ 

This  ])aradox  is  due  to  the  fact  that  these  forts 
along  the  Lleuse  between  ^'erdun  and  Toul  have  been 
built  for  an  ex2)ected  assault,  not  through  violated 
neutral  territory,  but  from  the  legitimate  and  existing 
Franco-German  frontier.  Troyon  is  admirably  situated 
to  withstand  an  attack  from  the  east.  It  is  not 
similarly  well  situated  to  Avithstand  an  attack  in 
reverse  from  the  west.  It  is  dominated  by  the 
heights   above   Woimbloy  on  the  edge  of  the  woods 


T'Uy' 


S-oTLffes  ill,  ErLffLisK  YuucdLs 

SKETCH   SHOWS   THg   yi7LSKBABILrrT   OF   TOBT   TROTOX  TO   ATTACK 
rEOM    THB    WEST. 

of  which  there  are  positions  CO  ft.  above  the  works 
of  Troyon  :  and  it  is  doubtless  upon  this  escarpment 
to  the  west  of  the  Meuse  that  the  Gei-man  howitzers 
were  emplaced. 

Troyon  was  relieved  by  the  necessity  under 
which  the  Crown  Prince  found  himself  of  retiring 
when  the  third  gi'cat  German  body — that  stretching 
from  Peronne  past  Frere  and  Vitry  through  Cham^ 
pagne  to  Eevigny— had  itselE  retired  past  the  edge 
of  Argonne  and  had  left  St.  Menehould  behind 
unsupported. 


9» 


LAND     AND     WATER 


September  19,  1914 


The  accompanying  diagi-am  slioiiW  make  the  point 


One  long  day's  March. 


clear.  M.  is  St.  Monehould :  V.  is  Verdun :  Tr.  is 
Ti'oyon :  T.  is  Toul :  E.  is  Eevigny :  V.  at  the  foot  of 
the  map  is  Vitry.    AAlien  the  Gennan  body  A — B  has 


retired  (as  it  did  retire  between  September  10th  and 
13th)  to  the  position  C — D,  it  is  evident  that  an  army 
in  tlie  position  E — F  commanded  from  M.  is  isolated 
from  its  fellows  and  must  retire  northward  to  the 
position  G — H.  Tlie  French  by  September  12th  had, 
in  then.'  advance,  already  reached  the  line  M — N,  and 
there  was  a  moment  Avhen  it  looked  as  though  the 
Crown  Pruice's  army,  dela}'ed  either  by  its  heavy 
artillery,  or  by  neglect,  might  be  caught  by  the 
French  advance  before  it  could  get  away.  At  the 
present  moment,  so  far  as  advices  have  hitherto 
reached  London  (on  the  afternoon  of  Wednesday),  the 
Crown  Prince's  army  is  no  longer  in  such  danger.  It 
has  withdrawn  to  positions  corresponding  to  G — H  on 
the  diagram,  and  is  free  to  cross  the  Meuse  out  of 
reach  of  the  garrison  of  Verdun.  It  wUl,  of  course,  if 
that  "  bunching  "  takes  place  upon  the  Meuse  which 
under  one  alternative  must  take  place,  add  to  the 
difficulties  of  the  crossing  of  that  river  :  but  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  see  how  the  Crown  Prince's  .  nny  can  now  be 
in  real  danger,  unless  the  French  kept  locked  up  in 
Verdun  a  much  larger  number  of  men  than  is 
generally  supposed.  And  even  then,  this  addition  to 
the  French  ai-mies  in  the  field  could  do  little  more  than 
l^ress  the  pursuit.  It  has  no  oj^poi-tunity  to  suiTound. 
Having  thus  dealt  in  some  detail  with  the  fortunes 
of  the  retiring  German  line  during  its  week  of  retreat, 
and  with  the  comparatively  isolated  body  of  the  Crown 
Pi'ince,  we  must  tui-n,  in  order  to  complete  the  whole 
pictm'e,  to  certain  operations  which  were  being  under- 
taken in  Belgium  at  the  same  time. 


THE   OPERATIONS  IN    BELGIUM. 


DUNKIRK  I 


tOSTEND 

3  CHENT 


H 


O 


L 


< 


I 


•  > 


^ 


>..  -. 


v.^^^^^ 


« 

P^ 


ScstLs.  cf  Mdbes 


LQNCWY    V^* 


10» 


Septemlxn-  19,   1911 


LAND    A  X  D    W  A  T  E  R 


These  operntinrs,  viLidi  wore  tal<iiig  place  on  the 
Belgiiin  Phiin  wliilo  all  the  above  was  happennig  in 
France,  thongli  in  no  Avay  decisive  last  week,  nor  even 
as  yet  affecting  the  result,  are  well  worth  our  notice. 

It  was  apparent  upon  September  Sth  that  the 
able  but  hazardous  attempt  of  the  great  German  Army 
under  Kluck  to  get  past  the  unexpected  hirge  forces 
in  front  of  him  had  failed.  lie  was  still  heavily 
defending  the  line  of  the  Ourcq,  but  he  was  being 
pressed  in  from  the  soutli  and  he  must  reti*eat.  The 
news  was  jiresumably  conveyed  at  once  to  Antwerp, 
and  on  the  9th  the  Belgian  Army,  which  the  fortifi- 
cations of  that  town  maintained  intact,  resumed 
operations.  Those  operations  were  continued  throngli- 
out  the  9th,  the  10th,  and  the  11th  of  tlie  month, 
that  is,  the  Wednesday,  the  Thursday,  and  the  Friday 
of  last  week,  and  during  those  days  they  took  the 
.  fonn  oi  a  gi"eat  sortie  of  the  beleaguered  ganison  of 
Antwerp  towards  the  south,  the  Geraians  in  the 
North  of  Belgium  falling  back  before  this  ad\ance. 
On  Saturday,  the  12th,  German  reinforcements  had 
come  up  from  the  South  of  Belgium  in  sufficient 
numbers  to  check  the  Belgian  movement.  On  Sunday 
last,  September  13th,  the  Belgians  retired  again 
behind  the  guns  of  Antwerp. 

Let  us  see,  first,  what  was  the  natm-e  of  those  five- 
day  operations  ;  secondly,  what  was  their  object ;  and, 
thirdh',  how  far  that  object  was  achieved. 

The  nature  of  the  operations  was  as  follows  : — 
The  Belgian  troops,  issuing  out  of  Antwei-p,  worked 
round  to  the  south  and  east,  driving  the  Germans  out 
of  Aerschot,  and  ultimately,  by  the  Wednesday  night 
or  the  Thursday  moniing,  lying  along  a  line  from 
Malines  to  Louvain.  From  Malines  to  Louvain 
runs  a  canal.  The  Belgian  line  lay  just  to  the 
east  of  that  canal,  and  there  was  actually  some 
fighting  within  the  ruins  of  Louvain  itself.  More 
than  this,  certain  patrols  of  cavalry,  and,  perhaps, 
small  bodies  of  infantry  as  well,  had  got  round 
to  the  i-ailway  line  between  Louvain  and  Brussels, 
cutting  the  same  near  the  station  of  Cortenberg, 
which  is  almost  exactly  between  the  two  towns, 
but  slightly  nearer  LouA-ain.  The  line  seems  to 
have  been  cut  somewhere  betv/eeu  the  two  X's  which 
I  have  marked  upon  the  sketch. 

Meanwhile,  during  the  whole  of  that  Tuesday, 
"Wednesday,  and  Thursday  the  Gennans  were  hurrying 
up  reinforcements  from  the  south.  On  the  Saturday, 
they  took  the  counter-offensive,  and  the  Belgian  line 
retreated  northward,  ag-ain  pivoting  upon  Malines ; 
on  the  Sunday  morning  or  the  Saturday  evening  they 
repassed  and  evacuated  Aerschot  (the  inhabitants  of 
Avliich  they  put  behind  their  lines  to  save  them  from 
the  outrages  which  would  follow),  and  by  Sunday 
evening  they  were  shut  up  again  behind  the 
guns   of   Antwei-p. 

The  whole  of  this  little  manoemTe,  therefore 
(little  only  on  account  of  the  vast  scale  of  the  present 
•wars — f(jr  the  numbers  engaged  cannot  have  been  far 
short  of  40,000  men),  was  acted  upon  an  in-eguhir 
field  (marked  upon  the  sketch  as  a  shaded  area)  the 
longest  jueasurement  of  which  is  less  than  thirty  miles. 

Xow  what  was  its  object  ?  Its  object  was  two- 
fold. First  to  harass  the  line  of  German  communica- 
tiou  through  Belgium,  and,  secondly,  to  draw  back 
again  towards  the  north  certain  of  the  reinforcements, 
small  as  they  woi-e,  which  the  Gennans  were  sending 
down  to  stiffen  their  retiring  line  in  France  and 
probabl\',  as  I  have  said,  to  guaixl  their  extreme  i-iglit 
from  envelopment. 

We  should  be  equally  in  error  if  we  regarded  this 
little  sortie  from  Ant\verp,  ending  so  shoi-tly  after  its 


first  effort  in  a  retirement,  as  either  presenting  a 
seriitiis  menace  to  the  Gennan  communications  or  as 
futile.  It  did  not  present  a  serious  menace  to  the 
German  communications  for  the  moment,  but  it  put  a 
fear  into  the  German  commanders  for  the  safety  of 
those  communications,  and  a  fear  that  will  less 
constantly  be  renewed. 

The  object  of  such  an  operation  as  this  is  to 
make  the  enemy  just  at  the  moment  when  he  is  most 
bewildered  in  the  crush  of  a  retreat  tlnviugh  too 
narrow  an  issue,  feel  insecure  cccrj/irZ/rrc.  The  object 
is  not  to  cut  his  communications — [there  is,  unfortu- 
nately, nothing  like  the  strength  in  Belgium  to  do 
that,  and  a  terrilde  pity  it  is  :  a  couple  of  extra  Army 
Corps  put  into  Antwerp  at  the  beginning  of  the  war 
would  have  decided  it  in  its  present  phase  !] — but  only 
to  harass  its  communications.  The  object  is  to  prevent 
the  commanders  of  the  Gennan  retirement  from  being 
able  to  say  to  themselves : — "  ]My  lines  of  supply 
through  Belgium  are,  now  that  I  have  burnt  and 
han-ied  and  killed  ci\iHans,  as  safe  as  my  lines  of 
supply  through  Luxemburg,  and  I  can  count  upon 
them  absolutely." 

Now  this  harassing  of  the  Germans  in  Belgium 
happens  to  be  of  particular  value  in  the  present  cam- 
paign, because  evei'ything  goes  to  show  that  the 
German  commanders  risked  their  whole  strength  in 
the  advance  on  Paris  and  left  then-  communications 
through  Belgium  guarded  less  strongly  than  has  ever 
been  the  case  with  any  other  amiy  advancing  through 
hostile  temtory.  They  haA'e  already  evacuated  Ter- 
monde  (after  destroying  it)  and  have  only  threatened 
Ghent.  They  have  deliberately  refused  to  occupy  the 
sea  coast  at  Ostend  ai;d  Dunkirk,  which  they  had 
ample  opportunity  of  doing.  They  have  put  ujjon 
those  conununications  their  very  last  resen^es  in  quite 
insufficient  numbers,  relying  upon  two  things  for  their 
security  :  the  establishment  of  a  terror  along  those 
lines,  and  the  absence  of  a  highly  trained  army,  with 
its  full  complement  of  all  arms,  in  Antwerp. 

In  other  words,  they  have  run  this  great  risk  of 
leaving  the  root  of  their  communications  ill-guarded, 
relying  upon  the  terror  created  by  the  murder  of 
civilians  and  piiests  and  the  burning  of  villages  and 
churches  to  make  up  for  a  lack  of  troops.  Now  this 
policy  of  terror  has  been  successfvd  only  up  to  a  certain 
point.  The  repetition  day  after  day  of  new  outrages 
proves  that.  The  inferior  troops  of  the  last  Gennan 
reserve  left  in  Belgium  are  not  wholly  seom-e  from  the 
vengeance  of  those  whose  country  they  have  ravaged 
as  no  European  country  was  ravaged  before  in  modern 
times,  and  Avhose  temtory  they  first  guaranteed  to  be 
neutral  and  then  invaded.  And  while  their  securi.V 
is  thus  shaken  it  must  be  equally  evident  to  thmn 
that  they  have  under-estimated  the  offensive  power  of 
the  mitrained  and  half-ti'ained  forces  added  to  the 
I'egular  forces  upon  their  flank  in  Antwerp. 

That  is  jwecisely  the  effect  Avhich  sorties  of  this 
kind  have  ;  they  distract. 

The  Belgians  only  got  as  far  as  the  line  Brussels 
— Louvain,  and  they  only  did  that  at  a  great  expense 
of  energy  and  under  the  necessity  of  an  immediate 
retreat.  But  they  compelled  the  withdrawing  of 
German  forces  from  the  south.  They  checked  to 
some  extent  the  dribble  of  the  remaining  reinforce- 
ments into  France,  and,  most  important  of  all,  they 
rendered  the  wholly  insufficient  guardians  of  the 
Gennan  communications  in  Belgium  uncertain  whether 
the  next  blow  Avould  not  be  more  serious. 

On  the  other  hand  avo  must  not  exaggerate  the 
effects  which  a  sortie  such  as  this  has  had,  and  here  I 
■would  beg  the  reader  to  look  at  the  scheme  of  the 


11* 


LAND    AND     \VATER 


SeptomLcr  19,  1914 


Geman  communications  tlirongli  Belgium  and  Luxem- 
burg into  France  as  they  appear  upon  the  fket^t-li  map 
at  the  head  of  this  section, 


and  also  in  the  diagram 


upon  the  accompanying  sketch 


LOUVAIN 


The  German  Armies  in  the  field  occupied  last 
week-end,  at  the  moment  when  their  retirement  was  in 
full  swing,  an  area  in  Noi-thern  France  which  may  be 
dianrammatically    represented    by   the    shaded    arCca 
A — B — C — D.     Supplies  of  food  and  of  ammunition 
could,  as  long  as  Yerdun  (at  B)  and  Toul  (at  C)  held 
out,  and  the  line  of  forts  B — C  between  them,  only 
reach  this  area  through  the  line  A — B.     Now  to  reach 
this  line  A — B  you  had,  of  course,  a  very  great  number 
of  excellent  roads,  but  ammunition  in  large  quantities, 
especially  for  artillery,  demands  in  modern  times  the  con- 
trol of  i-ailroiKls  as  well :  and  of  railroads  there  were  but 
two  main  Hues  upon  which  the  German  armies  during 
their  gi'cat  advance  could  depend  for  supply.     The  one 
was  the  main  line  L — N — M — F,  which  is  the  gi-eat 
European    line   between    Paris   and   Berlin,    and    in 
which   L   stands   for   Liege,  N   for  Namur,  M   for 
!Maubeuge,  and  F  for  La  Fere.     The  other  was  the 
great    line   through    Luxemburg,  X ;     Longwy,   Y ; 
and   Mezieres,    Z.     In   the    retreat   from    Paris    the 
French  Cth  Army  has   so   out-flanked   the    German 
1st  Army  that  it  can  no  longer  depend  upon  the  main 
line  of  supply  from  M  to  F,  the  extremity  of  the 
German  line  being  pushed  back  east  of  the  line  jVl — F. 
But  there  are  ])lenty  of  railways  between  M  and  /, 
which  I  have  indicated  by  dotted  lines,  and  there  is 
also  one  between  N  and  Z.     So  long  as  Liege,  Namur, 
and  Maubeuge  are  in  German  hands,  these  subsidiary 
lines  branching  south  from   Maubeutje  and  Namur 
can  contiime  to  feed  the  amiy,  and  the  pressure  upon 
them  is  relieved  also  by  a  side  line  from  G  (Givet) 
running  through  Marienbourg  at  K.     What  import- 
ance the  Germans  attach  to  this  connecting  line  is 
proved  by  their  nervous  destruction  of  ^larienbourg 
the  other  day.     It  is  one  of  the  now  too  many  points 
in  Belgiiun  where  their  policy  has  been  to  establish 
a  mere  terror. 

So  long,  then,  as  the  first  great  line  of  communi- 
cations L — ^I — F  is  held  by  the  Germans  up  to  and 
beyond  M  they  can  feed  their  amiies  through  their 
original  main  line,  and  pressure  upon  it  is  further 
i-elieved  by  a  subsidiar}-  line  running  from  L  (Liege) 
through  Louvain  and  Brussels  to  Mons,  where  a 
branch  connects  again  with  Maubeuge.     It  was  this 


subsidiary  line  which  the  Belgians  just  managed  to 
reach,  and  for  a  moment  to  cutdm-ing  their  operation.s 
of  last  week.  They  did  not  get  near  the  main  line 
L — M,  but  they  did  make  the  defenders  of  it  anxiuus. 
As  for  the  second  great  line  of  sujiply  X — Y — Z 
running  through  Luxemljurg,  liongwy,  and  Mezieres, 
it  is  perfectly  safe,  even  while  Yerdun  holds  out ;  for 
it  is  beyond  the  striking  distance  of  that  fortress,  and 
there  are  no  French  forces  to  the  south  sufficient  to 
menace  it  for  some  time  to  come.  Should  Yerdun 
fall,  thei-e  would  be  open  another  new  line  of  the 
utmost  importance  to  the  Germans.  It  is  a  lino 
coming  straight  from  their  depots  at  Metz  (the  line 
-which  I  have  marked  upon  the  sketch  S — T)  and  with 
the  breakdown  of  the  Yerdun-Toul  ban-ier  (B — C) ' 
further  lines,  as  I  explained  last  week,  will  provide. 
"  ample  and  short  communication  from  Germany  and 
the  Bhinc  bases  through  Als;;c  '-Lorraine. 

From  all  the  above  it  will  be  evident  that  so  long 
as  the  two  main  lines  L — M,  X — Z  and  the  subsidiary 
liranoh  lines  are  open  to  the  Germans  thn'  can  be 
fully  supplied,  and  they  would  but  strengthen  theui- 
selves  in  their  retreat  by  shortening  their  lines  of 
communication.  If  the  French  forces  could  (which  is 
unlikelv)  get  round  on  to  the  subsidiary  lines  south  of 
i\[  in  "the  direction  of  the  aiTOW  marked  upon  the 
sketch,  the  Germans  would  only  have  (so  long  as 
A'erdun  holds  out)  one  railway  line  to  depend  uj)on 
and  would  be  in  a  very  difficult  position.  13ut  failing 
this,  a  continued  Belgian  menace  to  the  line  L — M 
gi-avely  incommodes  them,  and  if  it  were  really  cut 
they  would  be  in  as  difficult  a  position  as  though  the 
French  had  got  round  in  the  direction  of  the  arrow. 
That,  as  briefly  as  one  can  put  it,  is  the  menace  to  the 
German  communications  from  the  north  to-day,  and 
the  explanation  of  these  and  subsequent  Belgian 
operations  from  Antwerp. 


SUMMARY    OF    THE    OPERATIONS 
IN    THE    WEST. 

The  whole  of  the  above  mav  now  be  sunnnarized 
as  follows : 


L.tife, 


to  Atj( -l^-CXa^eils 


OCTLlXIxa    EOUGHLT    TUE    I-RESE-tT    POSITION'    IS    THE    WESTEUN 
AREA. 

The  German  line  which  upon  September  4th 
occupied  the  positions  (1)  (1)  (1)  and  was  within  a 
march  of  Paris,  with  the  Crown  Prince's  army  P, 
trvinsr  to  break  through  the  Yerdun-Toul  barrier  at 
Troyon,  now  occupies  the  positions  (2)  (2)  (2)  from 
near  Compiegne,  along  the  Aisne,  round  north  of 
Plieims  to  tlie  Argonne,  while  the  Crown  Prince's 
ariny  at  P  has  retired  to  Q.  There  has  l.)een  a  general 
German  retirement  pivoting  on  the  Argonne  and 
amounting  at  its  maximum  to  GO  miles.  From  a  line 
convex  against  the  centre  of  France  it  is  now  a  line 
concave  near  the  Belgian  frontier. 


ia« 


September  19,  1914 


LAND     AND    WATER 


This  lino  is  oiilv  ja>t  in  toncli,  if  in  toucli  at  all, 
with  its  old  main  line  of  communications  between 
Comjnegne  and  Maubeuge  ;  but  it  still  has  its  subsi- 
diary line  of  communications  (S)  (S)  (S)  dependant  on 
the  upper  part  of  this  old  main  line  above  Maubeuge, 
and  it  has  a  second  line  of  communications  through 
Miziens,  Longwy,  and  Luxemburg. 

The  defensive  positions  which  it  occupies  along 
the  Aisne  and  Suippe  rivers  (2)  (2)  (2),  are  hardly  of 
a  sort  that  can  be  pierced.  They  may  be  turned 
round  the  western  end  at  W.,  or,  far  less  probably, 
round  the  eastern  end  at  E.  The  Germans  may 
intend  a  counter-offensive  from  this  ridge  (2)  (2)  (2), 
but  more  probably  they  are  holding  it  in  order  to 
protect  the  retirement  of  their  convoys  across  the 
Aisne  and  the  Meuse  behind  them.  Such  a  retire- 
ment, if  it  takes  place,  with  its  Avings  at  W.  and  E. 
intact,  can  be  effected  in  good  order,  Avith  the  Gennan 
army  unbroken  and  as  strong  as  ever  it  was  prepared 
to  take  the  counter-offensive  when  it  so  chooses,  when 
it  is  thoroughly  restored  and  remunitioned,  and 
rejiosing  perhaps  upon  the  gi'cat  fortress  of  Met?. 
But  such  a  retirement  if  it  is  hampered  by  movements 
ill  flank  by  the  enemy  round  W.  or  even  round  E. 
may  have  to  cross  the  rivei-s  on  too  naiTOw  a  front,  in 
which  case  its  lines  of  convoys,  artillery,  Avaggons,  and 
marching  men  would  be  caught  in  the  defiles  of 
the  bridges,  and  it  Avould  probably  suffer  heavy  loss. 

Meanwhile,  everyone  shoidd  repeat  to  himself  that 
fundamental  doctrine  Avhich  was  so  contmually  insisted 
upon  in  these  notes  before  the  French  took  the 
counter-offensive : 

Of  two  opponents  in  arms,  one  has  not  defeated  the 
other  until  he  has  hrovjht  that  other  to  a  Decision.  A 
Decision  is  not  achicced  inilil  the  armjj  of  one  of  the 
two  opponents  is  pierced  or  enveloped. 

The  German  anny  has  been  neither  pierced  nor 
enA^elopcd.  It  is  to-day  Avhat  it  Avas  three  Aveeks  ago. 
It  has  lost  far  less  in  projx»rtion  than  the  Allies  liaA'o 
lost ;  and  if,  though  it  be  the  less  probable  alternative, 
it  again  takes  the  offensiA'e  after  holding  the  ridge 
(2)  (2)  (2),  only,  that  Avould  be  an  operation  quite 
consonant  to  the  history  and  nature  of  Avar. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  Allies  are  in  sufficient 
numbers  or  possess  sufficiently  rapid  means  of 
moving  troops  round  the  western  extremity  of  the 
line  (2)  (2)  (2),  then  the  German  retirement  may  be 
rendered  difficult  indeed,  and  jwrhaps  disastrous. 

I  AviU  conclude  this  part  Avith  some  mention  of 
three  points  which  are  now  clearer  than  they  Avere 
earlier  in  the  war — a  point  concerning  the  prisoners,  a 
point  conceniing  the  German  siege  artillery,  and  a 
point  concerning  the  supply  of  munitions. 

THE    PRISONERS. 

There  is  a  factor  in  the  issues  of  this  war  AAhicli 
will  be  considei-able  even  if  large  fractions  of  the 
Gennan  forces  should  be  enveloped  and  suiTcnder  in 
the  course  of  it,  and  which  Avill  be  much  more 
important  if  successes  of  this  kind  do  not  take  place. 
This  factor  is  the  factor  of  the  prisoners  now  in 
Gennan  hands. 

The  official  list  is.sued  by  the  Gennan  GoA-ern- 
mcnt  bears  every  mark  of  accuracy.  In  the  case  of 
the  British  contingent  the  numbers  are  suqn-isingly 
low,  less  than  half  the  total  of  "  missing."  It  may 
be  lio])ed  that  these  indicate  the  presence  among  the 
"  missing"  of  many  who  will  later  find  their  rogimonts 
again.  But  at  any  rate,  judged  by  this  test,  Avhich 
is  a  fair  one,  the  Gennan  figures  are  not  above  the  mark. 
We  must  remember  that  in  a  retreat,  and  almost 
in   proportion    to   the   rapidity  of   tbat   retreat,  the 


retiring  body  automatically  loses  groat  numbers  of 
men.  So  slight  a  thing  as  a  blister  on  a  man's  foot 
means,  in  a  rapid  retirement,  a  big  chance  of  his 
capture.  Nearly  all  Avounded  fall  into  the  hands  of 
the  enemy,  as  do  that  large  proportion  of  men  in  a 
conscript  army — men  only  just  called  up  from 
sedentary  ocimj^ations  of  all  kinds — a\1io  fall  out  in  a 
pressed  march. 

It  is,  by  the  Avay,  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
things  about  the  first  four  daj's  of  this  rapid  retirement 
of  the  first  German.armj'  and  part  of  the  second  upon 
the  line  Soissons — Eheims,  that  it  seems  as  yet  to  have 
lost  so  few  men.  We  have  not  yet  the  full  tale,  but 
in  the  first  four  days  the  records  sent  in  did  not 
account  for  7,000  prisoners,  even  adding  to  the 
ofiicial  figm'es  the  unofficial  accounts  of  surrenders. 

Well,  the  figures  of  French  prisoners  in  Germany 
on  this  same  list  come  to  nearly  1,700  officers  and 
nearly  87,000  men.  And  this  does  not  include  the 
prisoners  from  Maubeuge,  in  the  fall  of  Avhioh  the 
Gennans  claimed  the  very  large  total  of  40,000 
prisoners. 

In  this  last  item  there  probably  /*  exaggeration. 
Many  of  the  older  men  in  Maiibeuge  Avill  have  been 
pressed  mto  the  A\-ork  of  defending  the  city,  and  the 
estimate  must  have  been  a  very  rough  one  taken  in 
the  excitement  of  success.  But  even  if  you  halve  it, 
it  brings  the  total  number  of  French  prisoners  for 
Gennany  at  the  present  moment  to  Avell  over  100,000. 

I  repeat,  if  considerable  bodies  of  the  Germans 
now  in  retreat  are  ultimately  rounded  up,  if  there  are 
general  surrenders  due  to  the  cuttings  off  of  com- 
munications  and  the  barring  of  the  line  of  retirement, 
we  shall  soon  haA-e  an  equal  batch  of  prisoners  to  set 
against  this  very  large  number.  It  is  conceivable, 
though  improbable,  that  an  exchange  might  take  place. 
But  if  no  such  disasters  overtake  the  Gennans  for  some 
time  to  come,  there  AviU  be  a  big  preponderance  of 
this  asset  upon  the  Gennan  side.  Put  the  matter  as 
gently  as  you  like,  but  acknoAvledge  that  the  Prussian 
theory  of  Avar  will  regard  these  men  as  hostages  :  that 
is  at  once  the  strength  and  the  Aveakness  of  Avhat  is 
called  the  "  Frederician  tradition,"  and  the  conclusion 
is  that  the  Allies  must  Avholly  disregard  all  threats 
and  all  bai-gains  connected  Avith  this  gi-eat  body  of 
prisoners.  It  is  certainly  the  French  policy  to  dis- 
regard that  very  graA"e  sentimental  AA'eapon  in  the 
hands  of  the  enemy.  We  may  presume  that  the 
policy  AviU  be  carried  through  in  spite  of  eveiything, 
but  Ave  must  be  prepared  for  A'ery  bitter  sacrifice  unlens 
corresponding  numbers  of  the  enemy  fall  into  our 
hands. 

THE    GERMAN    SIEGE    ARTILLERY. 

The  telegi-ams,  hoAvever  confused,  sensational,  and 
occasionally  absurd,  AvhIch  we  recelA^e  in  regard  to 
German  siege  work  can,  if  aac  compare  them  one  with 
another,  give  us  some  information  as  to  the  measui-e 
of  success  obtained  by  the  enemy  in  this  direction. 

It  is,  in  the  first  place,  quite  clear  that  the  real 
work  that  has  been  done  against  fortifications  so  far  has 
been  done  by  the  Gennan  11 -inch  hoAvItzer.  Now 
this  gun  is  nothing  abnonnal  or  new.  It  cone- 
sponds  to  the  Frenclx  howitzer  Avhich,  if  my  memory 
serves  me  aright,  is  a  275  mm.,  or  thereabouts:  a 
calibre  differing  by  less  than  one  thirtieth  from  the 
German.  If  I  am  not  mistaken  there  is  in  the 
British  service  a  corresponding  gun  of  about  nine- 
tenths  of  the  French  calibre,  or  rather  less,  and  about 
nine-eleA^enths  of  the  German.  In  other  Avords,  all  the 
great  PoAA'crs  possess  a  gun  of  this  type.  The  only 
difference  between  them  is  the  difference  you  alwa}s 


18* 


LAND    AND    WATER 


September  19,  1914 


gd  in  the  eternal  compromise  between  mobility  and 
weight.  One  Power  tliinks  that  a  ra/h'r  lighter  gun  is 
■worth  while  on  account  of  its  greater  niobilit\-. 
Another  Tower  risks  a  slight  loss  of  mobilit\-  for  the 
sake  of  a  raiher  heavier  gun. 

It  is  true  that  the  shells  dropped  by  these 
howitzers  have  produced  more  effect  on  foiiifleatiou 
than  was  expected.  It  is  not  true  that  they  have 
always,  and  will  necessarily  always,  produce  a  wholly 
uucalculated  effect.  The  heaviest  artillery  in  a  modern 
fortress  Avill  always  outrange  them,  and  though  the 
howitzer  can  hide — that,  coupled  with  searching 
trenches,  is  the  whole  purpose  of  its  high-angle  fire- 
yet,  in  most  cases,  only  good  a>rial  observation  could 
direct  its  fire  sufficiently  accurately  from  any  distance  to 
make  its  effect  immediately  decisive.  It  is  probable  or 
certain  that  we  shall  see  not  only  fortresses  upon  this 
side  of  the  frontier,  but  fortresses  upon  the  other  side, 
yield  to  howitzer  fire  more  rapidly  than  had  been  ex- 
pected by  those  who  theorised  in  peace  time  upon  these 
machines ;  but  it  is  not  true  that  we  shall  see  miracles. 
It  is  certain  that  when  the  history  of  their  lx)nibard- 
ment  comes  to  be  written,  we  sliall  find  that  Naraur 
and  even  Maubeuge  -were  not  as  heavily  gunned  as 
they  might  have  been,  or  were  not  sufficiently  provided 
Avith  trained  men  or  adequately  defended.  It  is  a 
matter  upon  which  we  must  hold  our  judgment  in 
suspense,  because  we  have  not  yet  full  data  upon  it ; 
but  it  would  seem  that  the  big  420mra.  howitzer 
(17  inches  or  rather  less)  has  liitherto  done  nothing 
off  rails  and  very  little  on  i-ails.  There  is  no  I'casou 
why  you  should  not  make  a  howitzer  as  big  as  the 
Sliot  Tower,  save  the  loss  in  mobility  ;  and  hitherto 
the  consensus  of  opinion  has  been  that  at  somewhere 
less  than  a  foot  you  had  arrived  at  the  maximum 
calibre  wliich  could  be  combined  with  any  real  mobility 
for  this  tj'pe  of  weapon. 

THE    QUESTION   OF    MUNITIONS. 

One  of  tlie  most  interesting  hints  we  had  from 
the  telegrams  during  ^'on  Kluck's  retreat  upon  the 
Aisne  was  the  apparent  dearth  of  ammunition  from 
which  that  General  and  his  command  suffered.  Tliis 
would  seem  to  have  l>een  particularly  the  case  with 
his  ax-tillery.  The  action  fought  along  the  right 
bank  of  the  Ourcq  upon  September  7th,  8tli,  and  Uth 
was,  in  the  main,  an  artillery  duel  of  peculiar  violence, 
and  it  Avould  seem  as  though,  when  the  retreat  was 
imdertaken  upon  the  10th,  throughout  that  day,  as 
also  throughout  the  11th  and  12th,  the  retiring 
German  forces  were. short  of  shells. 

Now  we  know  that  they  were  also,  during  those 
days,  just  out  of  toucli  with  their  main  line  of  com- 
munications \)y  rail,  winch  main  line  funs  along  the 
Oise  valley  by  Noyon  and  Compiegne  and  Creil ;  and 
the  incident  suggests  what  commonsense  would  also 
teach  one  :  the  capital  importance  in  a  modern  cam- 
paign of  multii^lying  railway  communication  behind 
one  to  one's  base,  jxirticuiarly  for  the  supply  of 
projectiles  to  guns  in  the  field. 

Modern  quick-firing  artillery  can  dispose  of 
.something  like  ten  times  as  much  auununition  in  the 
same  time  as  could  the  guns  of  twenty  years  ago.  It 
could,  at  a  maximum  rate  of  filing"^  dispose  of  far 
more ;  but  in  practice  it  can  and  does  dispose  of  it,  if 
the  artillery  duel  be  severe,  at  thio  enonnous  rate. 

One  of  the  vital  questions,  theivfore,  that  '^^  ill 
probably  crop  up  in  the  course  of  the  present  campaign 
will  be  this  question  of  the  exhaustion  of  avtiilerv 
sup]ilies._  It  is  probable  that  the  story  of  General 
Pau  having  captured  an  ammunition  column  upon  his 
left  (and  the  German  riglit)  during  or  just  before  the 


battle  of  Jtleaux  may  be  accurate  ;  but  apart  from 
this,  it  was  the  temporary  loss  of  the  railway  which 
presumably  made  all  the  difference  ;  and,  perhaps,  not 
a  little  of  the  manoeuvring  which  is  going  on  at  the 
present  moment  upon  the  western  extremity  of  the 
Gennan  defensive  line  has  for  its  intention  not  only 
the  outliaukiug  of  that  extremity,  but  the  denial  to 
that  present  defensive  German  line  of  the  main  railway 
which  here  runs  direct  from  the  Belgian  depots 
throngli  Xoyon  to  Compicgne. 

THE  EASTERN  THEATRE  OF  WAR. 

In  the  eastern  theatre  of  war  the  decisive  result 
of  last  week,  when  the  llussian  armies  over^xhelmed 
the  second  Austrian  Anny  by  Lemberg,  has  not  up  to 
the  moment  of  writing  (Wednesday  afternoon)  been 
followed  up  by  a  corresjjondingly  decisive  blow,  such 
as  was  promised  us,  against  the  first  Austrian  Army. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  second  Austrian 
Army,  which  had  been  drawn  up  between  Kamionka 
and  Halicz,  -was  after  several  days'  fighting  forced 
back  upon  Lemberg  and  broken  to  pieces.  The 
victorious  llussians  in  this  part  of  the  field  then  stood 
riglit  upon  the  flank  of  the  first  Austrian  Arm}-,  largely 
reinforced  by  their  Gennan  allies,  and  having  their 
right  at  Tomaszov  exposed  to  the  Eussian  attack.  So 
far  as  can  be  gathered  from  the  rather  confused 
accounts  which  have  reached  us  in  the  west,  the 
Russians  did  damage  this  fii-st  Austrian  Anny  on  its 
flank  at  Tomaszov,  but  they  did  not  roll  it  up,  and 
their  general  attempt,  upon  failing  to  do  this,  consisted 
in  a  manoeuvre  to  get  round  its  left  wing  near  the 
A'istula  and  force  it  backwards. 

The  latest  telegrams  received  point  to  some 
measure  of  success  in  this  manoeuvre ;  but  that 
manoeuvre,  be  it  remembered,  is  not  a  decisive  one. 
the  first  Austrian  Army  is  not  enveloped ;  it  is 
onh-  being  pushed  back.  The  Russians  have  crossed 
the  lower  part  of  the  Eiver  San,  apparently  at  the 
point  and  in  the  direction  indicated  by  the  arrow  in 
the    accomjianying   map.     They  have  by  their  own 

Kussian    FotanJ 


G  A^titC  I  A        •iw«i«ti» 


h'alic 


y» 


tcalt  /  Mila 

account  already  got  astride  of  the  railway  between 
Cracow  and  the  strong  fortress  of  Przemysl  (though 
it  seems  difficult  to  understand  how  they  can  have 
got  so  far  in  so  short  a  time)  ;  they  have — again 
according  to  the  official  account — secured  the  position 
of  Gorodok ;  and  they  certainly  have  reached  Mosiska. 
If  j-ou  draw  a  line  through  these  places,  with  a 
hypothetical  point  for  the  place  in  which  they  shall 
ha^■e  cut  the  railway  from  Cracow  to  Przemysl,  you 
v.ill  .see  that  the  Hussian  positions  form  a  half-circle 
round  the  Austrian  Army,  which  is  falling  back 
everywhere  upon  Przemjsl.  How  far  this  success 
has  been  continuous  and  thorough,  only  the  future  can 
show.  If  even  a  half -circle  can  be  drawn  from  the 
mountains  to  the  mountains,  enclosing  the  first 
Austrian  Anny  round  and  iu  i'rzemysl,  with  the 
raain  railway  pass  OA'cr  the  Carpathians  behind 
it  held  b}'  the  liussiaus  at  liusko,  there  should 
at    least    be    a    decisi\e    result    against     this    fii'st 


U* 


September  19,  1014 


LAND    AND     WATER 


anuv,  as  tlioro  was  nearly  a  fi)rtuiglit  ago 
agaiust  the  secouJ.  But  that  deeisiou  has  not  yet 
been  reached,  and  until  it  has  been  reached  we 
cannot  even  approximately  guess  at  the  date  when 
pressure  can  begin  to  be  exercised  in  Silesia.  The 
advance  through  Silesia  northwards,  past  Breslau 
towards  Posen  and  Berlin  is  (whatever  the  success  in 
Galicia)  dependant  upon  a  corresponding  success  in 
East  Prussia ;  and  for  the  moment  East  Prussia  is  no 
longer  in  the  hands  of  Eussian  armies  but  has  been 
recovered  by  Gemian  ones.  I  do  not  mean  that 
severe  pressui'e  could  not  be  exercised  upon  Silesia  by 
the  Eussians  even  Avhile  and  though  Germans  holding 
East  Prussia  should  threaten  and  even  invade  the 
northern  frontier  of  Eussian  Poland.  That  frontier  is 
too  far  off  to  interfere  with  the  communications  of  the 
Eussian  army  monng  upon  Breslau.  But  I  do  mean 
that  before  a  general  advance  eastward  can  take  place, 
before  you  can  get  past  Posen  and  directly  on  the 
road  to  Berlin,  you  must  have  your  northern  flank 
secure ;  and  that  flank  will  not  be  secure  so  long  as 
large  and  undefeated  German  armies  occupy  East  and 


SerliH-  • 


Qhom 
Posen  • 

Breslau     • 


Po^aruf. 


West  Prussia,  and  in  geneitJ  the  country  beyond  the 
Vistula  and  the  great  fortresses  upon  that  river — - 
Thorn  and  Dantzig.  Before  Eussia  holds  the  line 
Dantzig-Thorn  she  may  hold  Silesia.  But  until  she 
holds  the  line  Dantzig-Thorn  she  cannot  advance 
upon  Berlin.  _ 


CORRESPONDENCE. 

We  have  received  a  communication  from  a  firm  of 
solicitors  regarding  a  review  -whicli  appeared  in  our  issue  of  the 
5th  inst. 

We  take  the  earliest  opportunity  of  publishing  this  letter 
together  with  our  reply. 

28,  Budge  Row,  Cannon   Street,  E.G. 
September  14th,  1914. 

Dear  Sirs, — The  Committee  of  the  Constitutional  Club  havo 
called  the  attention  of  Mr.  Edward  Seymour  OdcU  to  the 
number  of  your  paper  issued  on  the  5th  inst.,  from  which  the 
following  is  an  extract : 

"  Pity  he  was  too  soon  for  Mr.  '  Odell '  of  the  Constitu- 
tional Club.  The  Kaiser's  spy  system  had  not  then  come  up 
to  date." 

In  view  of  the  grave  implications  contained  in  this 
passage,  the  Committee  state  it  is  necessary  for  Mr.  Odell  to 
vindicato  himself  publicly  if  he  wishes  to  remain  a  member 
of  the  Club. 

Mr.  Edward  Seymour  Odell  is  the  only  member  of  the 
Club  named  Odell,  and  wo  are  instructed  by  him  to  invite 
you  to  give  any  explanation  you  think  fit,  and  to  require  you 
to  funiish  us  with  the  name  of  the  writer  of  the  article,  to 
publish  a  full  and  complete  apology,  and  to  make  reasonable 
pecuniary  compensation  for  the  grave  injury  done  to  him  by 
the  paragraph  in  question. 

Mr.  Edward  Seymour  Odell  instructs  us  to  say  that  he  is 
the  son  of  Mr.  Frederick  Odell,  formerly  a  nwmber  of  the 
London  Stock  Exchange,  that  ha  was  born  at  Highbury, 
educated  in  London,  and  has  all  his  business  life  been  con- 
nected with  the  London  Stock  Exchange.  Mr.  Odell  docs  not 
speak  German,  and  is  in  no  way  connected  with  Germany. 

This  matter  is  of  great  and  immediate  importance  to  Mr. 
Odell,  and  he  must  take  steps  at  once  to  clear  himself  from 
the  imputations  cast  upon  him.  We  have  therefore  to  say 
that  unless  a  satisfactory  answer  to  this  letter  is  received  by 
twelve  o'clock  to-morrow  legal  proceedings  will  be  taken. 

This  letter  is  sent  to  you  by  hand. 

Yours  faithfully, 

(Signed)  Whites  k  Co. 

To  the  Proprietors  and  Publishers  of  Land  and  Water, 
Central  House,  Kingsway,  W.C. 

September  15th/ 14. 
Messrs.  Whites  <t  Co., 

28,  Budge  Row,  Cannon  Street,  E.C. 

Dear  Sii-s, — Referring  to  your  letter  of  the  14th  inst., 
■we  are  surprised  to  learn  that  any  English  gentleman  should 
suppose  our  remark  was  aimed  at  him.  We  printed  the  name 
"  Odell  "  in  inverted  commas  so  as  to  convoy  that  a  German 
spy  had  assumed  the  disguise  of  a  loyal  subject.  We  regret 
to  learn  that  a  genuine  member  of  the  Constitutional  Club 
has  been  thereby  pained. 

The  writer  of  the  review  heard  of  a  Gorman  spy  tnasquera- 
ding  under  that  name,  and  that  the  Kaiser's  devices  involved 
visits  to  the  club.  Nothing  was  further  from  our  thought 
than  that  a  British  member  of  the  club  could  feel  aggrieved, 
aad   we  intended  no  offcuco  or  imputation  agaiust  a  fellow- 


countryman,  much  less  one  connected  with  the  London  Stock 
Exchange. 

The  fraud  on  Mr.  E.  S.  Odell  has  laid  him  open  to  regret- 
table annoyance.  He  and  every  Bnton  will  admit  that  in  war 
time  a  journalist's  dutj'  requires  the  exposure  of  the  enemy's 
im-oads  on  our  hospitality. 

We  shall  print  this  correspondence  in  our  next  issue,  feel- 
ing sure  Mr.  E.  S.  Odell  will  see  that  a  Press  jealous  of  the 
nation's  interest  is  one  of  our  potent  safeguards  in  time  of 
war.  Yours  faithfully, 

(Signed)     A.  Douglas  Farmer, 

Secretary. 
TLo  County  Gentleman  Publishing  Company,  Ltd. 


KHAKI    EQUIPMENT. 

Whex  about  two  years  ago  the  War  Office  issued  orders  to  tlie 
effect  that  all  officers  were  to  wear  khaki  shirts,  Messrs.  Robinson  and 
Cleaver,  with  their  usual  enterprise,  immediately  made  large  quantities 
of  these  shirts  to  the  regulation  sealed  pattern,  and  sent  samples 
to  all  regiments  stationed  m  England,  so  that  when  the  demand  first 
arose  with  the  outbreak  of  war  the  firm  was  inundated  with  orders  from 
all  over  the  country.  Owing  to  their  large  stocks  on  hand  they  were 
able  to  cope  with  the  sudden  demand  satisfactorily,  and  notwithstanding 
the  tremendous  demand  for  khaki  at  the  present  time,  Messrs.  Robinsoii 
and  Cleaver,  owing  to  their  foresight  in  this  matter,  are  in  the  fortunate 
position  of  being  able  to  supply  for  a  considerable  time  to  come  the 
regulation  sealed  pattern  khaki  shirt  in  the  reliable  quality  for  which 
the  firm  has  so  high  a  reputation. 

In  the  matter  of  socks  for  marching — a  detail  of  equipment  of 
which  thfl  importance  cannot  be  over-estimated — Messrs.  Robinson  and 
Cleaver  have  devoted  much  time  and  care  to  the  production  of  a 
thoroughly  satisfactory  article,  and  this  is  supplied  in  plain  undyed 
wool,  and  also  in  Lovat  and  heather  shades.  Red  Cross  requirements 
are  fully  met  by  the  supplies  in  stock,  while  members  of  officers' 
training  corps  and  young  officers  joining  the  Service  cannot  do  better 
than  go  to  Messrs.  Robinson  and  Cleaver  for  their  outfits,  which,  while 
perfect  in  every  detail,  are  moderate  in  price.  Complete  service  kits, 
either  to  measure  or  ready  for  immediate  wear,  form  one  of  the 
present  specialities  of  tlie  firm. 

WONDERFUL  WAR  PICTURES  AT  THE  SCALA  THEATRE. 

All  lyondon  is  flocking  to  sec  the  war  pictures  at  the  Scala  Theatre, 
and  the  greatest  credit  is  due  to  the  management  for  the  enterprise 
which  they  are  showing  in  obtaining  from  the  various  battlefields  in 
different  parts  of  Europe  films  for  the  kinematograph,  by  means  of 
which  we  are  able,  here  in  England,  to  watch  the  actual  incidents 
and  phases  of  the  fighting  in  the  world's  war.  In  many  cases  the 
intrepid  oi)crator8,  in  imminent  peril  of  their  lives,  have  taken  their 
cameras  right  into  the  firing  lines,  and  the  resulting  films  are  thrilling 
in  the  extreme.  A  particular  feature  at  the  Scala  Theatre  are  the 
numerous  films  shown  in  the  actual  colours  by  the  kinenia- 
colour  process,  which  shows  up  the  contrasting  uniforms  with  splendid 
effect.  A  film  (also  in  colour)  taken  in  Kiel  Harbour  before  the  war, 
in  which  a  Zeppelin  is  seen  flying  over  the  German  battleships,  is  among 
the  many  of  which  the  spectator  is  bound  to  retain  a  vivid  recollection. 
Ther?  are  s-'veral  naval  films,  and  all  are  capital.  An  excellent  band 
and  a  demonstrator,  who  explains  from  the  stage  the  successive  items, 
add  to  the  general  enjoyment.  In  fact,  all  readers  of  Land  and  }Viiler 
can  be  cordially  recommended  to  pay  a  visit  to  the  Scala,  and  to  take 
their  families  also. 

The  .Toint  Secretaries  of  the  National  Relief  Fund  have  informed 
us  that  their  .Subscription  Sub  Committee  tiaj*  heard  of  a  good  many 
cases  in  which  use  has  been  made  of  its  name,  or  of  the  names  of  those 
coniietted  with  it,  with  the  object  of  securing  support  for  appeals 
which  are  quite  unauthorised.  Our  readers  may  be  assured  that  any 
extravagant  or  grotesque  appeals  emanate  from  persons  who  hav« 
neither  the  authorisatioa  nor  the  support  pf  this  committee. 


15* 


LAND    AND    WATER 


September  19,  1914 


ANIMAL  DEFENCE    SOCIETIES   AND 
HORSES   IN    WARFARE. 


By    ROY    HORNIMAN. 


BEFORE  ilcaliiig  with  tlic  actu.il  issue  wliicli  I  am 
anxious  to  bring  to  the  public  notice,  and  which  is 
siu^'cstcd  by  the  phrase  at  the  head  of  this  article, 
it  is' necessary  to  state  a  few  preliminary  facts. 
The  part  played  by  the  horse  soldier  in  the 
present  and  recent  wars  has  entirely  falsified  tho 
prediction  put  fonvard  at  tho  time  when  artillery  was  being 
revolutionised  that  cavaliy  would  becomo  less  and  less  im- 
portant. Its  importance  has,  on  the  contrary,  grown  side  by 
side  with  the  astonishing  development  of  gunnery  of  all  kinds. 
The  exigencies  of  artillery  and  transport  demand  a  greater 
supply  of  horses  than  ever  befoi-e.  With  the  growth  of 
mechanical  transport  for  purposes  of  civil  life,  and  for  more 
than  one  other  reason  which  will  bo  fairly  obvious,  the  ques- 
tion of  a  supply  of  horses  available  for  service  in  time  of  war 
L:i£  become  acute.  There  is,  in  fact,  great  danger  of  a  shortaije. 
That  this  is  felt  to  be  the  case  was  shown  by  the  feverish 
activity  with  which  foreign  agents  were  occupied  in  buying 
up  all  the  horses  obtainable  in  the  United  Kingdom  for  soiue 
yeai-s  before  the  present  crisis.  In  Ireland  the  writer  was  told 
that  the  vast  majority  of  these  buyers  were  Gei-mans  and 
Austrians,  as  the  English  military  authorities  declined  to  pay 
the  prices  asked.  We  allowed  the  supply  of  our  best  horses 
to  be  seriously  interfered  with  to  the  advantage  of  our  preseat 
opponents. 

It  thus  becomes  obvious,  without  reference  at  the  moment 
to  the  humane  side  of  the  question,  that  any  laxity  in  our 
Army  veterinary  arrangements,  either  a.t  the  front  or  on  any 
other  line  of  defence,  constitutes  a  serious  economic  defect. 

That  these  veterinary  arrangements  are  totally  inadequate 
no  one  will  deny  who  is  acquainted  with  the  true  state  of 
affairs,  or  who  has  read  Sir  Edward  Ward's  sUitement  on  the 
subject.  A  cavalry  officer,  wounded  and  returned  home,  states 
that  he  lost  three  chargers  which  had  been  slightly  wounded 
because  there  were  no  facilities  for  removing  them  to  a  base 
hospital,  of  which  there  are  all  too  few.  He  adds  th.at  he 
never  saw  a  veterinary  officer.  This  is  not  surprising;  it  was 
yeai's  before  the  work  of  the  Red  Cross  was  recognised  and 
placed  on  a  proper  basis. 

Before  I  arrive  at  the  main  reason  of  my  article,  I  should 
like  it  to  be  clearly  understood  that  such  animal  defence 
societies  as  I  am  connected  with  are  not  unre.isonable  senti- 
uieutalists  on  the  question  of  the  use  of  horses  in  war. 

It  is  clear  to  them  that  there  can  be  no  injustice  in  using 
horses  to  fight  in  defence  of  a  couutiy  in  which  the  practical 
standard  of  the  treatment  of  animals  is  the  highest  in  the 
world.  Those  agonies  which  humans  endure  for  their  enfran- 
chisement they  may  clearly  ask  horses  to  share  when  thei 
interests  of  the  latter  are  also  at  stake.  I  would  the  reason, 
for  animal  suffering  were  always  so  well  grounded. 

From  this,  it  follows,  however,  that  by  all  rules  of  honour 
aud  gratitude  we  are  bound  to  protect  them  by  some  such 
organisations  as  the  Red  Cross,  which  has  become  an  economic 
necessity  and  a  humane  duty.  Hundreds  of  thousands  of 
pounds  will  be  saved  aud  a  great  amount  of  agony  and  suffer- 
ing mitigated  and  prevented.  A  beginning  has  been  made. 
Certain  animal  defence  societies  are  anxious  to  place  all  their 
forces  at  the  disposal  of  the  Government,  both  in  the  interests 
of  the  country  and  those  of  the  animals. 

The  Blue  Cross  Fund  of  Our  Dumb  Friends'  League  came 
into  existence  at  the  time  of  the  Balkan  War,  when  it  was 
able  to  send  £500  to  Lady  Lowther,  the  wife  of  our  Ambas- 
sador at  Constantinople,  for  the  use  of  army  horses.  When 
the  present  war  began  it  at  once  set  to  work. 

The  committee  of  the  Blue  Cross  Fuud  does  not  expect 
miracles.  The  proper  care  of  wounded  horses  in  warfare,  and 
especially  the  removal  and  proper  nursing  of  those  engaged  on 
the  field  of  battle,  is  a  comparatively  new  idea.  Indeed,  the 
whole  attitude  towards  animal  life  has  evolved  enoi-mously, 
aud  in  this  respect  Britons  lead  the  van. 

To  begin  with,  thei-e  is  a  very  important  point  to  be 
settled,  a  point  which  must  bo  settled  by  international  con- 
vention before  any  society  can  work  efficiently  on  the  battle- 
field. Certain  nations  which  do  not  share  tho  advanced  views 
of  this  country  would  see  no  difference  between  the  saving 
of  guns  and  the  saving  of  horses.  With  them  horses 
are  munitions  of  war,  nothing  more.  The  recognition  of 
the   Blue  Ci-oss   will   be   a    long   and   troublesome   business. 


This  generation  may  not  see  it.  But  the  necessary  spade 
work  leading  to  this  end  becomes  dilficiilt  in  tho  face  of 
recent  action  taken  by  the  Royal  Society  for  the  Prevention 
of  Cruelty  of  Animals.  Before  the  war  was  majiy  days  old 
the  R.S.P.C.A.  issued  the  following  circular: 

HORSES  ON  THE  BATTLEFIELD. 

In  view  of  the  great  d«sire  of  a  large  body  of  the  public  that 
special  steps  should  be  taken  to  ameliorate  the  condition  of  horsed 
on  the  battlefield,  the  Council  of  the  R.S.P.C.A.  aimouuce  that  the 
Military  Authorities  have  publicly  stated  that  710  private,  auxiliary,  or 
vitluntei'T  veturinar'j  corps  for  Jestrai/ing  wounded  horsfa  will  he 
allowed  to  enter  tht  sphere,  of  hoslitities,  and  that  no  voluntarij 
aKiintance  in  the  way  uf  supplyinrj  bandages,  ineilicines,  etc.,  is  required. 
The  Army  Veterin-iry  Jiepavtment  of  the  War  Office  is  in  sole  charge 
of  this  work,  and  has  provided  special  instruments  for  the  killing  of 
wounded  animals  by  Veterinary  Officers  of  their  own  largely  increased 
staff,  and  by  all  soldiers  of  and  above  the  rank  of  sergeant.  Further, 
the  Army  Veterinary  Corps  has  provided  for  a  chain  of  hospitals  for 
the  treatment  of  those  animals  that  can  be  cured.  All  funds  for 
animals  available  at  this  time  will  be  required  for  the  protection  of 
those,  unfit  for  military  requirements,  left  in  this  country  to  do  the 
extra  strenuous  work  which  will  inevitably  devolve  upon  them. 

By  means  of  circulars,  newspaper  advertisements,  and 
posters,  the  above  statement  was  disseminated  broadcast;  the 
last  paragraph  definitely  implies  that  no  hoi-ses  under  Army 
control  will  be  allowed  to  receive  voluntary  help  of  any  kind. 

This  is  absolutely  contrary  to  facts. 

I  ask  the  R.S.P.C.A.  to  publish  the  facsimile  of  the  War 
Office  document,  wherein  it  publicly  makes  the  stateimenb 
attributed  to  it. 

Tho  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  Army  veterinary  officers 
are,  as  they  must  do,  unle-ss  they  wish  to  be  gi-ossly  inhumane, 
accepting  help  in  every  direction.  A  more  kindly  set  of  men 
do  not  exist,  and  it  is  grotesque  to  suppose  that  they  are 
■  flying  in  the  face  of  headquarter  instructions.  Many  of  Our 
Dumb  Friends'  League  ambulances  have  been  refitted  and  are 
in  use  by  the  militaiy,  and  medical  comforts  have  been  supplied 
afc  request  in  large  quantities.  Anybody  reading  the  state- 
ment quoted  would  naturally  come  to  the  conclusion  that 
societies  or  individuals  collc-cting  money  for  the  purpose  of 
assisting  Army  horses  were  doing  so  without  tho  least  chance 
of  succeeding  in  their  object. 

Indeed,  as  a  result  of  the  circuLar,  imputations  of  bad  faith 
.igainsb  Our  Dumb  Friends'  League  have  not  been  wanting, 
and  to  show  that  I  have  not  strained  its  implication  or  its 
effect  on  the  public  mind,  subscribers  have,  in  some  instances, 
asked  for  their  money  back.  I  am  happy  to  say  that  on  being 
informed  of  the  true  state  of  the  case  they  have  returned  their 
subscriptions  to  the  fund.  The  circular  thus  resolved  itself 
into  an  attack  on  those  societies  which  had  once  again  been 
compelled  by  the  policy  of  .Jeimyn-street  to  undertake  a  work 
which  tho  R.S.P.C.A.  might  have  initiated  years  ago. 

I  assert  most  unequivocally  that,  although  the  R.S.P.C.A. 
has  been  founded  ninety  years,  although  it  is  by  far  the  richest 
of  all  animal  defence  societies,  it  has  beyond  argument  left 
nearly  every  new  departure  in  animal  defence  to  those  societies 
which  have  come  into  being.  There  should  never  have  been 
any  need  for  the  existence  of  the  Canine  Defence  Society,  the 
Equine  Defence  Society,  the  Bird  Society,  the  Animal  Defence 
Society,  and  Our  Dumb  Friends'  League,  with  its  seven  societies 
in  one.  Those  who  doubt  this  should  read  the  courteous  but 
scathing  indictment  by  Mr.  Stephen  Coleridge  in  the  Fort- 
ni'jhtly  Review  of  April,  1914. 

In  conclusion,  the  public  will  be  glad  to  hear  that  Army 
horses  may  be  helped  in  spite  of  the  published  circular  referred 
to  above.  The  work  of  the  Blue  Cross  Fund  grows  steadily. 
We  have  a  balance  of  £1,200,  and  subscriptions  and  large  gifts 
of  stores  are  coming  in  daily.  We  shall  hope,  when  we  have 
shown  that  we  can  be  useful  in  the  sphere  open  to  us,  to 
establish,  under  the  supervision  of  the  military  authorities, 
base  hospitals  at  tho  front. 


With  recruiting  headquarters  at  the  Hotel  Cecil,  a  private  complete 
battalion  is  bein;;  formed  of  1,300  strong,  hardy,  sporting  gentlemen  up 
to  45  years  of  age.  The  battalion  has  been  accepted  by  Lord 
Kitchcuer,  and  affords  an  opportunity  for  men  wishing  to  serve  of 
joining  under  congenial  conditions.  Application  can  be  made  person- 
ally at  the  Hotel  Cecil  recruiting  ofiite  between  tho  hours  of  10  a.m. 
and  6  p.m.,  or  by  writing  and  sending  name,  address,  age,  height, 
weight,  and  medical  certificate  to  the  Officer  in  Command,  Recruiting 
OiBce,  Hotel  Cecil,  Strand,  London. 


16* 


September  19,  1914 


LAND    AND     WATER 


Mir   TO    ILLUSTRATE    ArPEOXIiMTELT    THK    NEUTBAL    CO-tsTS    AND    INLAXI>   COHmlNICATIONS    BY    WHICH    FOODS   AND    RAW    MATKKIALS    CAN    Ba 
OOT   UNTO  OEBMANT   AND   AUSTRIA.        TH«   DOTTID   LINKS   EirBESBNT  THE   ArPUOXIMATK   EXTENT   OF   DKLIVERT   AREA. 


THE   WAR  BY   WATER. 

By   FRED    T.    JANE. 


THE   NORTH    SEA. 

/A  T  the  time  of  writing  the  past  week  has  been 
/^k  uneventful  so  far  as  any  fighting  is  concerned. 

/  ^  A  sweep  has  been  made  so  far  as  the  Heligo- 
/  ^L  land  Bight,  but  no  hostile  warships  were  sighted. 
-^        -^^  Tlio  sweep  must  not  be*  regarded  as  ineffec- 

tive on  that  account,  for  it  musti  have  had  a, 
<  cojisidcrable  moral  value  as  indicating  to  the  Gemians  that  wo 
are  both  ready  and  willing  to  attack. 

By  order  of  the  Admiralty  (which  has  secured  all  the 
more  willing  obedience  from  issuing  its  directions  in  the  form 
of  a  polite  "request")  all  lights  along  the  coast  have  been 
greatly  reduced;  and  in  certain  places  the  lighthouses  have 
been  left  unlit.  To  this  latter  circunistancc  has  been  attri- 
buted the  loss  of  the  armed  liner  Oceanic,  of  17,274  gross 
tonnage  and  21  knot  speed.  She  is  alleged  to  have  been 
wrecked,  but  no  official  details  are  forthcoming.  Unofficial 
stories  range  from  her  having  gone  full-speed  ashore  on  an 
unlit  coast  to  having  been  submarined  and  l>eached. 

Tlio  losses  of  trawlers  and  neutrals  by  North  Sea,  mines 
indicates  a  pleasing  diminution,  which  may  be  attributed 
partly  to  the  circumstance  that  Admiralty  advice  as  to  courses 
to  be  followed  is  now  more  strictly  observed,  and  to  the 
untiring  efforts  of  the  mine  sweepers. 

Special  regulations  have  been  promulgated,  and  came 
into  force  on  Monday,  as  to  vessels  entering  the  Thames.  These 
must  now  all  call  at  the  Tongue  liglitship  or  at  th»  Margate, 
Deal,  or  Dover  lightiliips,  and  take  on  board  a  licensed  pilot. 
Outgoing  vessels  have  to  take  iii.slruclions  as  to  the  exact 
course  to  be  followed.  This,  of  course,  means  (liat  mines  have 
been  or  are  about  to  be  laid  in  certain  places  as  a  precaution 


against  Germaus  seeking  to  lay  mines  under   the  British  or 

a  neutral  flag.  ^  -rr  n      j 

Some  remarks  of  mine  last  week  on  the  subject  of  Holland 
appear  to  have  been  misunderstood  by  one  or  two  rcadeas, 
who  fail  to  realise  that  the  Dutch  will  presently  be  in 
the  same  invidious  position  as  the  Danes  were  in  the 
Napoleonic  wars.  Behind  Holland  is  Germany — a  long- 
dreadcd  power  which  has  suddenly  become  very  polite,  for 
Dutch  ports  offer  useful  facilities  for  food  supply.  If  the 
Dutch  fleet  is  wanted,  Germany  will  no  more  hesitate  to  sei'/.o 
it  and  use  Dutch  harbours  as  a  war  base  against  us  than  she 
hesitated  to  use  Belgian  territory  as  a  base  against  France. 

Tlie  immediate  result  would  be  double  work  for  our  North 
Sea  patrols.  Against  this  is  to  be  put  the  utility  of  Holland 
as  a  convenient  neutral  through  whom  German  supplies  can 
be  obtained.  Just  at  present  these  two  circumstances  more  or 
loss  balance  each  other  for  cither  side,  but  this  balance  can 
only  be  maintained  so  long  as  the  Germans  do  not  obtain  control 
of  French  harbours.  The  value  of  Holland  as  a  source  of  food 
import  to  Germany  would  then  decline  appreciably,  while  the 
value  of  taking  possession  of  Dutch  harbours  and  Dutch 
torpedo  craft  would  rise  correspondingly. 

On  the  other  hand,  supposing  the  Gennans  to  be  beaten 
back  and  contained  at  bay  in  their  own  country,  the  question  of 
whether  we  can  afford  to  allow  them  to  be  fed  through  Holland 
will  assuredly  rise  as  a  problem  of  naval  strategy.  The  busiues.<» 
of  the  Fleet  is  to  fight  the  enemy's  fleet  if  it  comes  out,  and 
if  it  will  not  come  out  to  put  ou  suflkient  economic  pressure 
to  compel  a  sortie  or  surrender. 

Wo  know  that  already,  on  account  of  the  blockade,  some 
I.jOO  idle  ships  lie  at  Hamburg,  that  food  prices  in  Gennany 
are  very  high,  and  that  the  scarcity  of  raw  material  has  led 


17' 


LAND    AND    WATER 


September  19,  1914 


to  much  unemplovmcnt— a  goncral  condition  which  is  aheady 
characterised  by  'the  German  Socialist  newspaper  I  oruarls 
83  •'  The  Internal  Danger." 

On  the  other  hand,  Dutch  imports  have  risen  very  con- 
•iderably,  and  the  effect  of  the  British  Navy  is  to  that  extent 
discredited.  Sooner  or  later  Holland  will  have  to  make  her 
neutrality  definite,  or  elso  lake  sides.  The  sheer  brutality 
vith  which  Germany  treated  Belgium  is  thus  explained.  1  le 
awful  fate  of  Belgium  was  a  broad  hint  to  Uollaud.  Thus  the 
Dutch  are  placed  between  the  millstones— German  military 
force  close  by,  and  British  naval  force  acting  over  perhaps  a 
hundred  miles  away.  Holland,  like  Belgium,  will  presently 
have  to  make  her  decision  between  present  loss  and   future 

^*'°'An  official  German  report  admits  the  loss  of  the  Hein, 
sunk  by  a  subniai-ine.  She  is,  however,  no  great  loss  as  a 
/•■'htiiig  unit,  being  rather  inferior  to  our  Spredi/. 

°  An  unofficial  report  says  that  the  I'lithfindtr  was  sunk 
not  by  a  mine,  but  by  a  submarine,  and  that  that  submarine 
was  subsequently  found  and  sunk.  If  this  story  be  true,  ib 
indicates  considerable  daring  on  the  part  of  the  Germaai  sub- 
marine scn'ice,  for  it  must  have  entailed  a  long  above-water 
cruise,  the  distance  which  Gorman  submarines  can.  travel 
under  water  being  very  small,  probably  an  endurance  of  not 
more  than  fifty  miles  all  told.  If  a  submarine  did  deliver  the 
attack,  there  is  every  probability  that  the  story  of  her  sub- 
sequent destruction  is  correct. 

THE   BALTIC. 

A  NUMBER  of  vague  rumours  when  pieced  together  suggest 
that  the  greater  part  of  Uio  German  Fleet  is,  or  has  been, 
operating  in  the  Baltic,  the  older  ships  acting  in  the  Aaland 
direction,  and  the  Dreadnoughts,  if  any,  cruising  off  Kiel 
mainly  with  the  object  of  keeping  Uicir  crews  fit. 

In  the  great  Napoleonic  Wars  this  "  taking  exercise  out- 
side the  backdoor  "  was  not  possible  to  any  blockaded  fleet. 
It  is  a  very  considerable  asset  to  the  Germans,  and  one  which 
most  of  us  have  hitherto  rather  overlooked.  It,  of  course,  has 
not  the  same  hardening  effect  as  actual  war  service,  bub  there 
will  necessarily  be  a  vast  difference  between  this  "  keeping 
the  sea  "  and  lying  idle  in  harbour. 

The  "  right  thing  "  for  an  inferior  fleet  is  naturally  some- 
what limited.  Humanly  speaking,  it  should  never  amount  to 
very  much.  But  the  naval  situation  as  I  read  it  is  that  the 
Gei-man  High  Sea  Fleet  still  continues  to  make  no  mistakes 
and  to  wait  patiently  in  the  hopes  of  our  making  some. 
Admiral  Ingenholt  is  not  to  be  lured  out  by  the  best  of  our 
devices.  Our  respect  for  him  as  a  capable  opponent  should 
rise,  not  fall,  accordingly. 

At  the  time  of  going  to  press  there  is  a  belated  official 
German  report,  dated  Monday,  to  the  effect  that  the  Baltic 
squadron,  "  which  consists  of  twenty-nine  units,"  has  fifteen 
vessels  in  action.  It  probably  refers  to  some  destroyer  or  light 
cruiser  action. 

THE    FAR   EAST,    Etc. 

Herbertsuoe  in  Neu  Pommern  (formei'ly  New  Britain), 
■which  was  ceded  to  Germany  in  1885,  was  attacked  and  cap- 


now  far  too  strong  to  offer  any  chances  of  successful  intern- 
ment in  some  Chinese  harbour.  The  objective,  if  any,  would 
probably  be  Chee-foo. 


CEM1AN  POSSESSIOM  ■■ 
BRlTliH  WM 


KEU   POMMEEN   AND   ADJACENT   GERMAN   POSSESSIONS. 

turcd  by  an  Australian  Naval  force  on  the  11th  and  12th. 
The  capture  is  of  importance,  as  it  entailed  the  possession  of 
a  German  wireless  station,  which  might  have  been  useful  to 
any  prcdatoiy  cruiser  making  those  waters. 

At  KiaoChau  the  principal  operations  sccan  to  cc.nsist 
in  German  cilorts  to  lay  fresh  mines,  and  Japanese  counter- 
efforts  to  prevent.  Stories  of  the  blockaded  ciuisors 
endoavoui-ing  to  break  out  can  be  dismissed  as  possible  ratlicr 
than  probable.     The  blockading  Japanese  force  must  be  by 


PORT  ARTHUR  (Japanese) 


KIAOCKAU 
iCerman) 


PLAN    SHOWIXO   THE   SITUATION   IN   THE   FAB   EAST, 

ON    THE    HIGH    SEAS   GENERALLY. 

Last  .Saturday  brought  the  news  of  the  capture  of  the 
Hamburg-American  liner  liethania,  7548  tons,  off  Jarniaica,  into 
which  port  she  was  brought,  with  some  400  prisoners,  mostly 
belonging  to  the  crew  of  the  lata  ai-moured  liner,  Eaker 
Wilhelm  der  Grosse,  which  was  sunk  by  the  Iliyhflyer.  The 
capture  of  various  lesser  ships  was  also  reported,  the  total 
to  date  being  100. 

Meanwhile,  several  German  cruisers  are  still  afloat,  but 
their  interference  with  British  trade  has  been  trivial.  German 
miscalculations  in  connection  with  commerce  warfare  have 
been  vei-y  considerable  indeed ;  for  all  the  harm  that  has  been 
done  wo  might  just  as  well  be  at  peace. 

On  the  German  side,  however,  matters  are  becoming  acute. 
Various  important  liners  are  held  up  at  New  York,  where  they 
are  beingt  maintained  in  idleness  at  vary  heavy  expense. 
Rumour  has  it  that  these  ships  have  now  received  ordera  to 
attempt  a  rush  home.  Rumour  has  probably  anticipated 
actual  orders,  but  such  orders  will  no  doubt  eventually  bo 
given.  The  projected  sale  to  the  United  States  of  these  big 
fast  liners  has  fallen  through,  so  they  are  lying  at  New  York, 
unsaleable,  earning  nothing,  and  costing  their  usual  upkeep. 
AVealthy  as  are  the  Hamburg-American  Line  and  the  Nord- 
Deutscher' Lloyd,  a  continuation  of  this  state  of  affaire  must 
bring  them  face  to  face  with  bankruptcy. 

If  they  can  get  the  ships  back  there  is  a  good  prospect  of 
sale  to  the  Germany  Navy.  Hence  the  attempt  to  run  home 
is  fairly  certain  to  occur  at  some  time. 

Success  is  another  niattor.  The  Channel  is  impossible. 
The  only  possible  successful  route  is  round  the  North  of  Scott- 
land.  To  slip  tlu-ough  here  and  so  into  the  Baltic  offei-s  .=ome 
prospect  of  success  on  a  dark  night,  but  the  outlook  for  the 
Germans  is  none  too  rosy,  unless,  of  course,  some  co-incident 
fleet  action  bo  taken. 

This  course,  however,  is  improbable,  as  the  consequent 
risk  would  be  altogether  out  of  proportion  to  the  possible  gain. 

It  would  seem  that,  humanly  speaking,  the  "  silent 
pressure  of  Sea  Power  "  is  such  tliat  it  is  immaterial  what  the 
great  German  shipping  lines  do.  Their  choice  is  little  but 
to  try  to  discover  which  is  the  lessor  of  two  evils. 


GERMANS— ROSE-COLOURED. 

Mn.  William  Heinemann  has  issued  a  two-shilling  edition  of 
F.  W.  Wile's  book.  Men  Around  the.  Kaiser,  which  gives  a  fairly 
faithful  picture  of  the  leading  men  of  Germany— as  they  app<»artd  to 
Kuglish  eyes  before  the  great  awakening  of  last  month.  The  volume  is 
frankly  eulogistic;  with  Louvain  and  Dinant  still  in  mind,  we  are  but 
little  inclined  to  agree  with  the  a^ithor's  views  on,  say,  the  Crown 
Prince  or  Btthmann-HolUveg.  Bernstorff,  again,  is  painted  in  very 
glowing  colours  ns  "peculiarly  at  home  in  the  American  environment,' 
and  it  is  not  until  we  come  on  the  sketches  of  Eeinhardt  and  Straus.«, 
and  their  like,  that  we  are  inclined  to  agreement  with  the  estimates 
of  these  men  as  given  here.  Biographically,  the  book  is  of  little  value, 
and  its  personal  appeal  is  weakened  by  the  estimation  in  which  these 
men  are  held  at  the  present  time;  as  a  race,  wo  Engli.sh  are  naturally  a 
little  bi.i.ssod  against  the  "men  around  the  Kaiser,"  to  say  nothing  of 
the  Kaiser  hiVnsclf,  at  present.  The  chief  value  of  the  book  lies  in  its 
power  to  show  ns  what  fools  we  were  to  believe— as  the  author  believed 
when  he  wrote  it^that  the  Germans  are  a  civilised  and  peaceful  peogle. 


13* 


Sqjtomber  19,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


THE    WAR    BY   AIR. 

By    FRED    T.    JANE. 


THE  end  of  last  week  brought  us  alarming  luiiiours 
of  a  Germau  Ztppeliu  iuvasiou  of  Euglaud  cid 
Calais,  prccwled  by  a  bombardment  of  Dover 
from  across  the  Cliauuel  by  monster  guns.  The 
guns  Ave  can  dismiss;  the  suitable  gun  is  not  yeb 
built.  As  for  the  Zeppelins,  sheds  for  them  ai'e 
not  available  at  Calais,  and  a  Zeppelin  without  a  shed  is  a 
very  harmless  sort  of  thing.  It  is  like  the  crawling  wasp  of 
the  autumn,  in  full  possession  of  its  sting,  but  not  in  a  position 
to  use  it  e.^cept  in  special  circumstances. 

Vei-y  wisely,  however,  the  responsible  authorities  did  not 
take  the  llueat  as  an  idle  one.  A  naval  airship  was  ordered 
to  cruise  over  London,  and  at  the  same  time  a  request,  of  the 
nature  of  a  command,  was  issued  as  to  the  extinction  of  all 
prominent  sky  sights  and  similar  leading  lights. 

All  of  which  is  to  the  good.  The  "  aerial  menace  "  to  us 
so  far  exists  merely  as  "newspaper  yarns"  or  ''speculations 
of  fanatics."'  All  of  which  is  very  good  in  its  way,  but  it  does 
not  nullify  the  possibilities  of  such  attack.  As  I  mentioned 
last  week,  Germany's  air  suijcriority  is  probably  regarded  by 
lier  as  her  trump  card.  It  is  probably  also  a  card  to  be  held 
back  and  not  played  till  the  psychological  moment. 

The  new  type  aerial  searchlight  now  in  full  use  is  likely 
)o  make  surprise  attacks  exceedingly  difficult,  and  also  every 
place  that  matters  is  by  now  well  supplied  with  anti-aerial 
guns.  There  is  consequently  not  the  least  occasion  to  panic. 
But  all  the  same  the  danger  is  renL  Germany  iu  the  air  is 
just  about  in  the  same  relation  to  us  (or  more  so)  as  we  are  to 
Germany  on  the  water,  and  it  is  idle  to  imagine  that  in  her 
own  time  Germany  will  not  use  or  attempt  to  use  her 
superiority. 

Wc  have  no  occasion  to  fear  her  aeroplanes.  Even  from 
the  shores  of  France  they  cannot  well  act  from  a  French  base; 
and  even  if  they  did,  the  damage  that  they  could  do  is  more 
or  less  trivial.  Zeppelins,  however,  arc  quite  another  affair. 
Once  a  base  is  established  in  France,  London's  danger  will  be 
acute.  It  may  come  to-morrow,  or  not  till  ne.xt  week  or  the 
week  after,  or  later  still.  But  the  danger  is  there,  and  it 
should  not  be  ignored. 

Germany  in  her  own  time  will  seek  to  panic  us.  She 
hoped  to  do  so  with  the  commerce  attack.  This  operation  did 
not  come  off.  The  attempt  left  our  traders  cold.  North  Sea 
mines  have  been  little  more  successful.  The  third  vial  is 
likely  to  come  fromufhe  air.  If  so,  it  will  rest  with  the  people 
of  London  not  to  accept  the  Kaiser  as  the  insti-umcnt  of  the 
Almighty.  They  wiU  have  to  accept  things  with  philosophical 
calm — no  easy  task. 

It  is  inadvisable  to  discuss  what  waj's  and  means  we  may 
liave  of  meeting  this  possible  aerial  attack.  ;^or  that  matter 
no  one  knows  for  certain  what  will  happen  when  aeroplanes 
attack  airships.  We  are  far  too  prone  to  seek  the  analogy  of 
torpedo  craft  attacking  battleships.  The  analogy  is  easy;  but 
it  may  be  absolutely  delusive.  For  all  we  know  the  positions 
may  be  x-evcrsed  entirely. 

In  any  case  it  is  idle  to  speculate  too  freely  as  to  what 
an  Hcroplanc  can  accomplish  against  a  Zeppelin.     It  can  cer- 
tainly in  the  last  resort  ram  her  and  destroy  a  gas  bag— with 
•luck,  two  gas  bags.     But  the  average  Zeppelin  has  seventeen 
bags,  and  what  are  two  among  so  many  ?     At  any  rate,  and 


in  order  to  minimise  possible  future  panic,  it  should  be  remem- 
bered that — according  to  German  calculations — a  Zcppclia 
can  take  a  great  deal  of  punishment  without  suffering  much 
for  it  laitil  she  hud  achieved  her  object. 

This,  of  course,  is  identical  with  the  theory  about 
destroyers  charging  a  battleship.  According  to  the  theory  the 
battleship  will  very  probably  inflict  deadly  wounds  on  an 
attacking  destroyer,  but  these  wounds  will  not  take  effect 
until  the  destroyer  has  managed  to  achieve  her  especial  pur- 
pose. Rightly  or  wrongl)',  German  aerial  ideas  run  along 
similar  lines.  It  is  held,  that  a  Zeppelin  cannot  be  destroj-cd 
without  a  time  intei-vaL  In  that  time  interval  she  should 
have  been  able  to  do  her  work.  It  is  along  these  lines,  it 
may  bo  noted,  that  German  regiments  are  handled — without 
regard  to  the  ultimate  loss  so  long  as  the  initial  object  is 
achieved. 

Hence  the  danger.  The  public  in  London  and  other  large 
cities  can  only  defend  themselves  by  implicit  obedience  to  all 
orders  as  to  the  display  of  lights,  and  by  keeping  calm  vihat- 
ever  happens.  The  actual  damage  to  be  effected  even  ]-y  a 
Zeppelin  is  comparatively  small;  the  main  object  aimed  at 
is  "  moral  effect." 

General  French  has  now  issued  a  report  of  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps,  which  emphasises  the  fact  that  in  actual  air 
fighting  five  German  aeroplanes  have  been  destroyed. 

The  report,  with  the  expression  ''  fired  at  constantly  1  y 
both  friend  and  foe,"  draws  attention  to  ono  of  the  dangers 
to  which  our  airmen  are  exposeel.  At  the  present  time  there 
is  with  aircraft  no  such  thing  as  the  "  obviously  British  "  or 
"obviously  German"  which  obtains  on  the  sea.  All  aero- 
planes are  pretty  much  alike  (indeed,  the  Germans  have  some 
of  British  make,  and  we  some  of  German,  make),  and  although 
they  are  marked  on  the  underside,  it  is  rarely  possible  to  see 
those  marks  under  war  conditions.  "  Shoot  first  and  inquire 
afterwards  "  is  about  the  only  workable  order  where  aeroplanes 
are  concerned. 

It  is  persistently  reported  that  we,  the  French,  and  the 
Belgians,  are  adopting  an-ows  for  use  against  troops.  The 
arrows  are  so  designed  that  they  will  spread  in  falling,  and 
it  is  c^alculated  that  a  bunch  of  400  (the  regulation  supplv) 
would  do  more  mischief  than  bombs,  since  dropped  from' a 
heiglib  they  would  pierce  men  like  bullets. 

Bombs  from  aeroplanes  have  so  far  achieved  very  little 
— real  utility  wor-k  consists  in  scouting,  directing  fire,  and  in 
fighting  any  of  the  enemy  similarly  engaged.  This  last  is 
cei-tainly  more  effectually  done  by  actual  coufiict  iu  the  air 
than  by  rifle  fire  directed  from  below,  both  as  regards  greater 
certainty  of  result,  and  also  because  the  thousands  of  bullets 
discharged  into  the  air  must  all  fall  again  someuhere.  No 
casualties  whatever  have  so  far  been  reported  from  this  cause, 
but  circumstances  in  which  a  friendly  force  might  sustain 
heavy  casualties  from  returningi  bullets  is  great.  The 
theory  that  a  bullet  shot  upwards  burns  itself  up  in  the 
air  like  a  meteorite  is  inadmissable.  All  such  bullets 
must  fall  somewhere,  and  if  several  thousand  chanced  to 
fall  on  a  friendly  regiment,  there  would  be  little  of  that 
regiment  left. 

The  only  proper  place  in  which  to  meet  aerial  attack  is 
in  the  air. 


A    TOPOGRAPHICAL    GUIDE   TO    THE 

WAR    ZONE. 

By   E.    CHARLES   VIVIAN. 


Bar-te-Duc  or  Bar-sur-Ornata.  —  The  principal 
tj)wn  of  the  di'partniont  of  Meusf,  France,  situated  on  the  river 
Oruain,  a  tributary  of  the  Meuse.  It  is  in  the  immediate  vicinity 
of  the  .Marne-Rhine  canal,  and  is  a  station  on  the  Paris-Strasbourg 
lino  of  rail,  being  also  connceted  by  rail  with  the  fortress  town 
of  Verdun.  Its  population  is  about  17,()0().  The  town  was 
founded  by  Frederick  the  First,  Duke  of  Lorraine,  in  the  tenth 
centurj-,  and  in  mediaeval  timojj  was  strongly  fortified.  A  few 
traces    of    the    old    foi-tifications,    which    were    dismantled    by 


Louis  XIV.  in  1670,  still  remain,  and  Bar-le-Duc  of  the  present 
day  is  an  educational  centre  with  considerable  trade  in  wool, 
wood,  and  wine. 

Bielgoray  or  Bilgoray.  —  A  small  town  of  the 
province  of  Lublin,  in  Russian  Poland,  about  seventy-five 
kilometres  .south  of  the  town  of  Lublin.  It  is  about  live 
kilometres  distant  from  tiie  frontier  of  Austrian  (Jalicia,  and  about 
five  kilometres  distant  from  the  river  Tanow,  a  tributary  of 
the  San. 


19» 


XAND    AND    WATER 


Septenil^er  19,  1914 


Chateau-Thierry.  —  Cliief  town  of  au  anondissement 
in  the  (Icpaitmcut  of  Aisiie,  France,  situated  on  the  right  banlc 
of  the  river  Mame,  and  connected  witli  a  suburb  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  river  bv  a  stone  bridge  for  road  traffic.  The  (own 
is  generally  stated  t"o  liavc  been  named  from  the  ruins  of  an  old 
castle  on  the  top  of  a  hill  near  the  town,  which  ruins  are  supposed 
to  have  been  a  castle  built  bv  Charles  Martel  for  Thicrrv  1\' . 
It  has  been  captured  bv  both  English  and  Spanish  and  jiiliaged 
in  media.>val  times,  and  has  suffered  pillage  on  more  than  one 
occasion,  while  during  the  campaign  of  1811  the  town  was 
completely  wrecked,  and  Napoleon  obtained  a  victory  over  tlie 
Russo-Prussian  forces  in  the  neighbouihood.  The  present 
population  of  the  town  is  about  7,<)0<),  and  it  has  direct  rail 
ironimunication  with  Paris,  Chalons,  Rheims,  and  Laou. 

Dormans.— Situated  on  the  Paris-Chalons  line  of  rail, 
in  the  west  of  the  department  of  Mame,  and  on  the  left  bank 
of  tlie  river  Maine.  It  is  in  a  hilly  district,  and  is  on  the  direct 
Rheims  to  Paris  road. 

Haringhe,— A  Helgian  village  in  the  province  of  East 
Flanders,  about  two  miles  south  of  RoUsbrugge,  and  practically 
on  the  French  frontier. 

La-Ferte-Sous-Jouarre.  — A  town  in  the  north-cast 
of  the  department  of  Seine-et-Marne,  France,  situated  on  the 
river  Mame,  and  at  the  junction  of  the  ParLs-Chalons  and  Pans- 
Troves  lines  of  rail.  It  is  the  site  of  extensive  stone  quarries, 
and  is  a  town  of  considerable  importance. 

Laon.— The  chief  town  of  the  department  of  Aisne.  situated 
eighty-seven  miles  north-east  of  Paris,  on  the  main  line  of  rail 
from  "Paris  to  Belgium.  The  Paris-Mezieres  and  Paris-Le  Cateau 
lines  also  branch  fi'om  Laon,  and  there  is  a  line  from  Laon  to 
Klieinis.  Laon  is  considered  "■  the  strategic  key  of  the  whole 
region  comprised  between  the  Aisne  and  the  northern  frontier." 
and  is  surrounded  by  a  ring  of  defences  about  five  miles  distant 
from  the  town,  in  addition  to  a  central  citadel.  The  population 
of  the  town  is  about  16XXX),  exclusive  of  th(<  normal  garrison, 
which,  as  Laon  ranks  as  a  first-class  military  post,  is  considerable,  j 

Lotzea.— A  town  in  East  Prussia,  about  thirty-five  miles 
from  the  Russian  frontier.  It  is  situated  on  the  Mauer  I-ake, 
under  cover  of  the  guns  of  the  fortress  Feste  Boyen.  It  is  a 
station  on  the  railway  from  Lyck  to  the  Baltic  fortress  of 
Koenigsberg. 

Lublin.— Capital  of  a  province  of  the  same  name  in 
Russian  Poland,  and  one  of  tlie  chief  centres  of  south-western 
Russia,  with  a  population  of  over  C0,00().  It  is  about  fortv-fn  e 
miles  from  the  frontier  of  Austrian  Galicin,  and  is  an  imptirtant 
railway  centre.  The  Uncs  AVar.savr-Bucharest  and  Warsaw- 
Ekaterineslav  branch  here,  and  there  is  also  a  hne  from  Lublin 
to  Radzin  and  Ostrow  in  the  north  of  Poland. 

Lyck. — A  station  on  the  East  German  strategic  railway, 
situated  about  twenty  miles  south  of  Margrabova.  Four  lines 
branch  hence  to  Prostken  on  the  Russian  frontier,  to  Johannisburg, 
to  Rossel,  and  to  Goldapp  in  East  Prussia.  Lyck  itself  is  a 
fortified  post  of  some  importance. 

Mantra/. — -^  village  of  western  or  French  Lorraine 
on  the  western  slope  of  the  Voages  Mountains,  situated  near  the 
•St  Die  terminus  of  the  strategic  railway-  running  east  to  Fraizc 
after  branching  off  from  the  main  St.  Die-Bruyere  line. 

Marchiennes. — A  Belgian  town  on  the  River  Sambre, 
about  two  miles  west  of  Charleroi,  in  the  coalmining  district  of 
southern  Belgium.  The  population  is  about  19,000,  and  the 
town  is  situated  on  the  Maubeuge-Chaileroi  line. 


Soissons. — A  city  in  the  department  of  Aisno,  France, 
forming  a  fortified  post  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river  Aisne  where 
this  stream  is  joined  by  the  Crise.  It  is  on  the  Paris-Laon  line  of 
rail,  and  is  about  sixty-five  miles  north-east  of  Paris.  Its 
population  is  about  12,000,  and  its  cathedral  of  Notre  Dame 
8t  Gervais  and  St  Protais,  dating  from  the  twelfth  century,  in 
one  of  the  principal  examples  of  early  French  ecclesiastical 
architecture.  The  history  of  Soissons  dates  back  to  Roman 
occui)ation  in  France,  and  the  town  played  a  prominent  part  in 
the  wars  between  England  and  France  during  the  middle  ages, 
while  the  town  was  captured  and  recaptured  by  the  Allies  and 
the  French  during  the  campaign  of  18U.  In  the  war  of  1870 
Soissons  capitulated  to  the  Gennans  after  a  bombardment  lasting 
three  days.  It  is  at  the  present  time  an  important  railway 
centre,  as  the  Amiens-Rheims  line  crosses  the  Paris-Laou 
railway  here. 


WAR    PUBLICATIONS. 

Sen.  Lnntl.  nnd  Air  Strategy,  by  Sir  G'Cor^e  Aston,  K.C.I!.,  i»  a 
volume  intended,  as  the  author  anuounces  on  the  title  page,  to  "  give 
us  a  national  strategy,  a  national  tactics."  It  is  ba^ed  on  lectures 
delivered  by  the  author  at  the  Camberley  .Staff  College,  and  d-cal.i 
principally  with  laud  strategy,  such  subjects  as  concentration  and  disper- 
sion, lines  of  communication,  fortification,  and  coast  defence  being  par- 
ticularly well  reproseiitcd.  In  the  matter  of  air  warfare,  the  author  treats 
of  recent  development."!,  the  us«  of  aeroplanes  and  airships,  combat 
between  aircraft,  and  the  use  of  aircraft  in  gaining  information.  The 
book  is  undeniably  technical;  at  the  same  time  the  study  of  strategy 
involves  a  mass  of  interesting  historical  matter,  and,  while  the  author  ha.» 
been  careful  to  ktep  the  practical  side  of  his  subject  in  view  throughout 
his  work,  he  has  at  the  same  time  made  his  .subject  an  interesting  oue, 
and  ha."!  refrained  from  writing  over  the  head  of  the  average  man. 
Primarily  valuable  as  a  text  book  for  the  naval  and  military  officer, 
the  book  is  to  be  recommended  at  the  present  time  as  a  work  of  great 
interest  to  the  great  majority  who  desire  to  approach  the  problem.^  of 
the  present  campaign  with  .some  military  knowledge.  We  would  siigge.it. 
in  view  of  the  great  number  of  young  officers  now  joining  the  servicc.i. 
that  a  cheaper  form  than  the  present  half-guinea  edition  of  the  work 
would  have  been  desirable,  and  trust  that  the  publishers,  Messrs.  Johji 
Murray,  have  under  consideration  some  means  of  supplying  to  bona  fide 
military  and  naval  applicants  a  slightly  cheajjer  edition. 

S.O'E  criticism  of  war  topics  forms  a  feature  of  current  issues  of 
The  Acndemy.  The  present  week's  issue  contains  an  explanation  of 
the  much-discussed  report  in  a  recent  .'^unday  edition  of  the  Times, 
and  a  number  of  other  well-informed  and  interesting  war  articles. 

Ix  our  review  of  Capt.  Johnson's  book.  The  Fmindations  nf 
Sfralegi/,  which  appeared  in  last  week's  issue  of  Lund  nnd  H'nfT,  the 
publishers  of  the  book  were  wrongly  styled  "  Jlessrs.  George  Allen  & 
Fisher  Unwin."  The  correct  style  of  the  firm,  which  has  no  connectiin 
with  that  of  Mr.  T.  l-'isher  Unwin,  is  "  Messrs.  George  Allen  &  Unwin, 

Ltd." 

Few  men  are  belter  qualified  to  judge  of  Bernhardi's  claims  and 
assertii.us  than  Professor  Cramb,  who.se  book,  Gerrr.any  and  England. 
consLstiug  of  a  series  of  lectures  given  at  Queen's  College,  Harley-street, 
has  been  published  by  John  Murray.  In  this  little  half-crown  volume 
is  shown  the  real  reason  of  German  antagonism  to  England ;  it  is  made 
dear  that  the  hostility  among  educated  Germans  is  due  to  "the  fact 
that  this  Empire  appears  to  them  the  main,  or  even  the  sole,  ob.slac!e 
to  the  attainment  of  a.  great  national  ideal,  for  which  they  are  b<«ind 
to  labour,  and,  if  need  be,  to  contend."  Professor  Cramb,  aa  a 
professor  of  modern  history,  speaks  with  authority,  and  at  the  aam^ 
time  he  speaks  with  scrupulous  fairness;  his  lectures  form  a  weighty 
indictment  of  Bernhardi  and  the  doctrine  which  for  forty  years  has 
dominated  Germany.  The  book  is  one  that  ought  to  be  read  by  every 
thoughtful  student  of  the  preseut  war  and  its  causes,  and  Lord  Rubert.i' 
wisht  that  it  should  be  read  by  "everyone  who  wishes  to  understand 
the  present  crisis,"  is  one  that  we  thoraughly  endorse. 

Amoxg  the  well-known  employers  who  are  holding  out  inducements 
to  their  staffs  to  respond  to  the  call  to  arms,  Messrs.  James  Carter  & 
Co.,  of  llaynes  Park,  S.W.,  the  well-known  seedsmen,  arc  not  only 
keepin''  pos'itions  open,  but  paving  half  wage.?  to  all  members  of  their 
staff  wlio  are  accepted  for  service.  No  distiuctio.n  between  married  or 
unmarried  is  made,  as  Messrs.  James  Carter  &  Co.  realise  the  latter 
have  dependents  also. 


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September   19,   191 4 


LAND     AND     W'ATEK 


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^    o 


lOOI 


LAND    A'N  D     WATER 


September   19,   1914 


Water   Meadows  and  Stubble   Fields 


By   GUY    C.    POLLOCK 


IT  is  surelv  reasonable  to  hope  that  before  these  lines 
appear  iii  print  all  doubt  or  hesitation  as  to  recruits 
lor  the  new  army  will  have  been  ended.  As  things 
now  are,  with  the  story  of  our  little  army's  heroic 
stand  against  desperate  odds  hot  in  the  memory, 
it  is  difficult  to  conceive  the  mind  of  the  man  who  does  not 
genuinely  thirst  for  such  training  as  may  fit  him  for  battle 
against  an  insolent  and  savage  enemy. 

They  say  that  the  country  needs  enlightenment,  especially 
in  the  great  towns  and  industrial  districts.  That  may  be 
so.  Yet  it  seems  odd  we  have  been  taught  to  believe  that 
here  dwelt  the  sections  of  our  people  most  intelligent  and 
most  alert.  The  rural  districts  were  supposed  to  enjoy  a 
monopoly  of  slow-witted  lethargy.  Yet  the  rural  districts 
perfectly  understand  the  war, 
the  German  menace,  and  the 
duty  of  a  Briton. 

Two  days  ago  I  found 
myself,  for  the  first  time  since 
war,  on  a  chalk  stream  with 
a  rod  in  my  hand.  It  was  not 
a  very  gay  experience.  A 
mist  of  tears  and  rage  came 
between  an  angler  and  what 
used  to  be  his  passionate 
sport.  But  that  is  a  mere 
digression.  I  had  not  been 
fishing  long  before  I  was 
hailed  by  the  excellent  fellow 
who,  with  another,  older  than 
himself,  cuts  our  weeds  for 
us  and  looks  after  our 
hatches.  The  second  weed- 
trimming  had  been  under- 
taken just  before  the  declara- 
tion of  war. 

His  first  words  were : 
"  Well,  sir,  I  never  expected 
to  see  you  again.  I  said  to 
Carter,  I  says,  you  may  be 
sure  we  shan't  see  none  of  the 
gentlemen  here  again.  Gone 
to  the  war  you  may  depend 
on  it,  I  says." 

With  an  almost  apologetic 
regret  I  explained  the  non- 
military  character  of  our  oc- 
cupations and,  in  self  defence, 
the  reluctance  of  authority 
to  accept  such  material  aid  as 
one  had  been  able  to  offer. 
My  friend  joined  me  in  these 
regrets.  He,  too,  had  offered 
himself.  But  they  wouldn't 
have  him.  Forty-one  are  his 
years,  and  a  fine  upstanding 
man  he  is.     "  But,  sir,"  he  went  on,   "  they  may  take  us 

yet.       Let  us  get  at  them devils.       That    is    what    I 

want.     That's  what  I  tells  the  missus  and  the  kids." 

He  had  said  nothing  about  the  payment  due  to  Carter 
and  himself  for  the  weed  cutting.  No  doubt  they  had 
counted  that  out  as  a  personal  sacrifice  on  the  altar  of 
patriotism.  But  he  was  glad  as  well  as  surprised  to  receive 
it.  He  went  on  to  talk  about  the  war  and  recruiting.  He 
told  me  of  a  neighbouring  farmer  who  had  gone  to  his  young 
men  and  told  them  that  the  country  wanted  them.  "  Four- 
teen of  them  there  was,  as  fine  a  set  of  fellows  as  you  might 
find  anywhere.  And  all  cf  them  went,  and  all  of  them  was 
accepted  barring  one.  Too  short  he  was— but  eager,  right 
eager."  He  told  me  the  same  tale  of  all  the  neighbourini; 
villages.  He  told  me  of  ten  of  them  talking  in  a  bar  when 
a  recruiting  sergeant  happened  along,  and  how  all  but  one 
stood  up  at  once  in  response  to  an  appeal.  And  what  he 
told  me  was  confirmed  from  other  sources.  The  villages 
of  Hampshire— I  heard  of  one.  to  take  exception,  where 
only  two  men  could  be  got,  and  I  heard  of  one  man  brave 
enough  to  confess  that  he  "  hadn't  the  heart  for  the  job  " 
(a  man,  this,  who  might  make  a  better  soldier  than  some 
who  enlist  with  unthinking  valiance)— have  poured  in  men 
to  the  new  army.  And  I  went  back  to  my  indifferent  siege 
of  a  great  trout,  engaged  in  the  meal  time  of  one  of  the  most 
bafflmg  evenmg  rises  by  which  I  have  ever  been  worsted 


A  LIKELY  SPOT 


wondering   where   the   brains   and   heart   of   England   really 
rested — in  the  rural  or  in  the  industrial  districts. 

Angling  with  a  dry  fly  in  a  chalk  stream  is  not — experts 
crede — a  really  exhilarating  business  while  one's  country 
is  at  grips  with  Fate,  while  one's  friends  and  fellows  arc  being 
killed  to  defend  one's  own  liberties.  I  do  not  think  angling 
is  any  more  a  matter  for  shame — so  long  as  a  man  has  offered 
what  he  can  of  personal  service — than  any  other  reasonable 
occupation  or  recreation.  But  it  seems  so.  And  all  the 
ancient  zest  has  gone  for  it.  You  cannot  catch  wary  trout 
without  a  great  concentration  of  will  and  skill.  You  cannot 
concentrate  any  thought  on  anything  except  the  country's 
need,  the  army's  heroism,  the  navy's  splendour,  and  the 
duty  of  a  man.     Mj'  creel  was  light  at  the  day's  end,  and  I 

found  only  part  of  that 
recreation  of  spirit  which  I 
sought  by  the  water  meadows. 
So  it  will  be  with  shoot 
ing.  We  have  the  purpose 
now  to  go  to  the  little  shoot 
— which  might  so  easily  be- 
come the  big  shoot  in  these 
days  when  shoots  are  going 
so  tragically  cheap — for  some 
days  and  to  kill  some  part- 
ridges, hares,  and  rabbits  for 
the  general  food,  while  still 
leisure  and  opportunity  may 
be  found.  That  again  is,  I 
think,  a  reasonable  and  even 
necessary  excursion.  Nothing 
will  be  gained  by  complete 
cessation  of  shooting.  Much 
will  be  lost  and  jeopardised. 
A  source  of  food  supply 
would  be  stopped,  and  the 
evils  of  unemployment  would 
be  spread  widely.  Already 
the  game  food  manufacturers, 
the  game  farmers,  the  keepers, 
the  gun  makers,  the  powder 
factories,  the  beaters,  face  the 
prospect  of  evil  fortunes. 
It  will  not  help  the  fortunes 
and  the  resisting  powers  of 
this  country  to  make  these 
fortunes  worse  than  they 
must  be.  But  I  cannot  sup- 
pose that  any  of  us  will  enjoy 
very  keenly  the  sport  of 
shooting  partridges  in  these 
desperate  and  bloody  days. 
The  thought  of  killing,  for 
one  thing,  has  become  not 
less  but  more  horrible  in 
itself.  And  there  are  other 
fields  for  killing  than  the  stubbles  of  this,  as  yet,  peaceful 
and  inviolate  countryside. 

But  these  rural  sports  have  one  sound  effect.  They 
reinforce  that  actual  love  for  F,ngland  which  drives  men  to 
any  sacrifice  not  less  surely  than  the  hottest  conceptions  of 
an  ethically  righteous  cause.  One  looks  along  the  chalk 
stream,  at  the  woods  and  water  meadows,  the  broody 
peace  of  a  sunht  evening  in  England  ;  one's  eye  follows  the 
undulations  of  stubble  and  roots  and  plough,  of  coppices  and 
hedgerows,  of  farm  and  villages  ;  one  says  to  oneself  :  "Here 
is  the  England  that  is  mine,  the  fields  I  know,  the  beauty  that  I 
love."  And,  so  seeing,  no  man  could  fail  to  give  his  unimportant 
life  to  save  this  England  if  England  shall  have  need  of  it. 


Copyright,  Alan  R.  Haig  Brown 


In  spite  of  being  inundated  with  orders  for  military  kit,  in  which 
since  the  South  African  war,  Burberrys  have  speciahsed  with  such 
splendid  results,  this  enterprising  firm  has  without  interruption  con- 
tinued its  seasonable  innovations  in  ladies'  out-door  dress,  which, 
as  usual,  will  be  the  universal  standard  of  autumn  and  winter  fashion. 
Burberrys  believe  with  confidence  that  their  many  distinguished 
clients  will  recognise  the  desirabiHty  at  this  national  cri.sis  of  supporting 
a  typically  Bnti.sh  house  in  its  endeavour,  not  only  to  do  justice  to  its 
reputation,  but  to  maintain  undiminished  its  entire  stafi  and  the 
families  of  such  married  members  as  are  now  serving  our  country. 
Burberry  wcatherproofs,  owing  to  their  wonderful  wearing  properties, 
are  economical  as  well  as  efficient,  and  the  new  Burberrv  cloths  eclipse 
in  beauty  of  colouring  and  artistic  originalitv  ofjdesign' those  hitherto 
introduced.  A  post  card  to  Haymarket  willelicit  illustrated  catalogue 
and  patterns. 


1002 


The  County  Gentleman 


AND 


LAND  &WATER 


Vol.  LXIil.         No.  2731 


SATURDAY,    SEPTEMBER   12,   1914 


rPUBLISHED  AS") 

La  newspaperJ 


PRICE     SIXPENCE 
PlIBLISHtD  WEEKLY 


Copyright,  W.  A.  Rouch 


CAPTAIN    FRANCIS   GRENFELL 


Whose  cool  courage  and  daring  in  action  on  the   Belgian   Frontier  played  a  prominent  part  in 
the  9th  Lancers'  brilliant  feat  of  arms.      He  is  a  dashing  horseman,  an  all-round   sportsman, 
and  a  first-class  polo  player,  having  assisted  his  regiment  and  also  the  team  of  Old  Etonians 
to  gain  many  notable  successes  at  the  London  Clubs. 


LAND    AND     WATER 


September   12,    19 14 


BOYS   OF   THE   OLD   BRIGADE 


AM?!'?i^l':i.^'^^'^'^Y  WELL  ENTRENCHED 

AND  HOLDING  THEIR  OWN  AGAINST  SUPERIOR  NUMBERS 

The  troop.  »re  firing  «  calmly  and  critically  ai  though  at  target  practice 

988 


Copyright^  Ntsospaper  Illustrations 


Scptombn-  12,  1914 


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THE    WAR    BY    LAND. 

By  HILAIRE    BELLOG. 


THE    EASTERN    THEATRE    OF    WAR. 

IPROPOSP]  in  my  notes  of  this  week  to  begin 
Avith  an  examination  of  the  Eastern  field  of  the 
war.  Becanse  liere  things  have  Ixjen  brought 
to  at  least  a  local  decision. 

From  the  very  beginning  of  this  vast  series  of 
Enro]X!an  campaigns  it  has  rightly  been  taken  for 
granted  that  a  factor  of  time  was  involved  peculiar  to 
this  universal  war. 

In  all  wars  the  factor  of  time  is  a  positive 
detenninant.  That  is,  it  is  a  factor  the  neglect  of 
which  makes  nonsense  of  all  the  rest,  and  the  under- 
standing of  which  is  essential  to  the  understanding  of 
all  the  rest,  liut  in  this  war,  more  tlian  in  any  other 
which  I  can  call  to  mind,  the  factor  of  time  is 
emphasised  with  extreme  simplicity  and  absolute 
effect. 

To  repeat  what  has  been  said  ujion  all  sides  (and 
more  than  once  in  these  pages),  the  forces  of  the  two 
<Jernianic  Powers,  tliKMiteued  from  tlio  West  and  from 
llie  East,  find  themselves  superior  to  tlie  Western,  at 
the  mo.st  equal  to  the  Eastern,  enemy.  By  an  acci- 
dent, happy   for   the  Germanic   powers,  the  Eiistern 


enemy  cannot  enter  the  field  until  long  after  the 
Western  enemy.  Therefore  it  is  the  whole  business 
of  the  Germanic  forces  so  tlireatencd  to  destroy  the 
menace  from  the  West  before  the  menace  from  the 
East  comes  into  play. 

The  Western  enemy  of  the  Germanic  Powers  is 
the  French  Army,  which,  Avith  its  six  per  cent,  con- 
tingent of  English  and  its  unexpected  and  fortunato 
addition  in  strength  received  through  the  resistance 
of  the  Belgian  Militia  and  Trained  Uegulai's,  stands 
to  the  Germanic  Powers  in  the  proj^ortion  of  rather 
more  than  1  to  rather  less  than  3.  The  Eastern 
enemy  is  the  Russian  Amny,  which  is  superior  in 
mere  number  to  the  Armies  of  the  two  Germanic 
Powers  combined. 

Let  me  show  first  in  more  detail  tlian  has 
hitheiio  been  attempted  in  these  pages  why  the 
l)ressure  exercised  by  the  Kussian  Army  will  be  felt 
later  than  is  generally  imagined. 

That  Russia  would  mobilise  more  slowly  than 
France  has  been  amply  appreciated.  'I'here  was  hero 
an  element  of  delay  amounting  to  a  fortnight  or  three 
weeks. 


LAND    AKD    WATEPw 


SeptoniIxT  12,  1014 


That  T!i!s>Ia  woiilil,  once  niol»ilise(T  and  once 
advancing,  bo  luniblo  to  l)iiug  tliat  j)iessure  to  beuv 
(luring  the  fiivst  weeks  of  the  war  was  less  geiienilly 
appreciated. 

AN'hcn  the  critic  measures  the  minimum  distance 
between  some  point  of  the  Kussian  frontier  and  the 
I'rnssian  capital  of  Berlin  he  is  struck  bv  the  short- 
ness of  the  line  between  tise  one  and  tlic  other. 

That  point  upon  the  Eussian  frontier  nearest  to 
Berlin  is  to  be  found  at  Pyzdrv,  where  the  river  Warta 
leaves  the  territory  of  I'ussian  Poland  to  enter  the 
ten-itory  of  Prussian  Poland,  and  from  this  point  to 
Eerlin  'itself  is  almost  exactly  2S.-2  kilometres,  or 
between  175  and  180  miles. 

If,  therefore,  the  problem  were  merely  one  of  a 
Pussiau  advance  from  that  point  upon  the  Pussian 
frontier  to  the  capital  of  Prussia  the  factor  of  time 
wo\dd  not  be  of  the  striking  impoi'tance  it  is.  The 
advance  required  in  order  to  strike  at  the  Prussian 
capital  would  not  behalf  as  mucii  again  as  t!ie  advance 
]-e(piired  to  strike  from  the  German  frontier  in  the 
A^'est  at  the  French  capital. 

But  the  problem  cannot  be  stated  upon  these 
lines,  and  to  envisage  it  so  is  quite  to  misunderstand 
the  elements  of  the  Eastern  Campaign. 

'J'here  are  two  things  which  prevent  so  simple  a 
])lan  as  a  direct  advance  on  Berlin  from  the  extreme 
of  Pussian  Poland. 

(1)  It  so  ha])pons  that  the  two  Germanic  Powers 


SSRLir* 


.1 


'^r, 
^^f 


f 


C  A  L    /    C  /  A 


PLAN  gllOWIXOl  HOW  THK  CON-;iilL'K  VIION  OF  THE  WKSTEBS 
l:rSSlAN  FKONTIKK  KKN1)EK.S  KRCJOSSAltT  THK  TOTAL  MrBJtlOATIOX 
Oi-  AUSTRIA  AND  KAST  I'RUSSIA,  IN  OXUEK  TO  SECUKK  THS 
IXAXKS  Oy  THK  AUJIV,  BjaciUK  THK  DIBliCT  MAEClt  OS  BERLIN 
IS    BiaUN. 

lie  (by  the  configuration  of  the  Eussian  frontier  on 
the  west)  upon  the  jlank  of  anv  such  advance 
towanls  Berlin.  AVere  the  Itussian"  Armies  mereh 
to  go  straight  Ijefore  them  in  an  advance  upon 
the  Prussian  capital  they  would  leave  behind  them 
tmWaten  upon  their  right  in  A,  as  upon  the  left  in  B, 
to  the  North  and  to  the  South,  great  bodies  A  Prussian 
and  B  Austrian,  which,  by  marching,  the  one  South, 
the  other  Norih,  along  such  lines  as  (I)  and  (.•>)  into 
Prussian  Poland,  would  fall  upon  the  communications 
of  such  a  Pussian  advance  and  destroy  it.  Therefore 
those  Avho  draw  up  the  general  Paissian  plan  mu.st  first 
allow  for  the  holding  of  (Jcrnuin  territory  as  far  as  the 
Ime  C-I)  on  the  North-which  is  th"e  line  of  the 
JiOwer  Vistula— and  for  the  holding  of  Austrian 
terntory  up  to  the  line  E-P,  that  is  the  whole  of 


Galicia,  before  an  advance  upon  Berlin  can  be  under- 
taken. It  is  not  until  the  advancing  Pussian  columns 
are,  roughly,  abrea.st  along  the  whole  line  North  and 
South  from  Danzig  to  Cracow  tliat  a  direct  East  and 
West  march  upon  the  heart  of  CJermany  could  begin. 

(r2)  It  so  hapjiens  that  the  Northern  of  these  two 
flanking  fields  (to  wit,  the  provinces  of  East  and  AVest 
Prussia  up  to  the  line  of  the  A'istula,  between  1'honi 
and  Danzig)  is  composed  for  the  most  part  of  country 
])articularly  defensible,  a  mass  of  mar.sh  and  lake  ill- 
])ro\  ided  with  communications.  Further,  the  ultimate 
boundary  of  all  this,  the  line  of  the  Vistula  itself,  is 
artificially  defended  by  strong  works,  especially  at 
Danzig  and  at  Thorn,  its  two  extremities.  In  other 
■^^ords,  just  where  the  Eussians  had  to  meet  their  most 
formidable  human  opposition,  that  of  the  Prussitm 
military  organisation,  they  also  had  to  meet  t!ie  most 
formidable  natural  conditions. 

On  the  other  hand  there  is  a  form  of  advance 
which  Pussia  can  underiake  against  (Jcrmany  and 
which  will  bring  pressure  to  bear  upon  Germany  long 
before  any  direct  march  upon  Berlin  has  begun.  If 
Pussia  occupies  Galicia  thoroughly  and  in  this  region 
thoroughly  defeats  the  mass  of  the  Austrian  forces  : 
if  she  then  proceeds  AYestward  and  by  North  dmvn 
the  A'alley  of  the  Oder,  she  will  be  striking  immediately 
at  the  Easternmost  of  the  great  industrial  regions  of 
the  German  Empire,  and  will  thus  be  bringing 
immediate  pressure  to  bear  upon  the  whole  (lerman 
social  system. 

That  first  great  industrial  region  is  Silcffia :  All 
that  I'ljper  N'alley  of  the  Oder  of  which  Breslaii  is 
tlie  capital. 

Now  it  is  probable  from  the  nature  of  the  recent 
liussian  successes  (with  which  I  shall  next  deal)  that 
Si!e.>ia  will  be  struck  before  the  line  of  the  Lower 
Od:n-  is  I'cached  ;  and  when  the  Silesian  Plain,  with  its 
dense  population,  its  nourishing  industries,  and  the 
open  road  it  affords  into  Siixony  (another  -wealthy 
industrial  region)  is  reached  by  the  Pussian  armies, 
anxiety  will  for  the  first  time  be  seriously  felt  l)y  the 
German  Commanders  in  France. 

But  how  long  will  it  be  l)efore  even  Silesia,  let 
alone  the  line  of  the  Lower  Oder  or  Berlin  itscli',  can 
be  thus  threatened  ? 

In  order  to  answer  that  (juestion  we  have  to  con- 
sider the  measure  of  the  Eussian  success  in  (falicia  and 
the  distances  involved  by  an  advance  after  this  success. 

The  Eussian  success  in  Galicia  has,  at  the  moment 
of  writing,  every  appearance  of  being  decisive,  and  it 
would  seem  as  though  the  progress  of  the  J^ussiau 
invasion  would  now  be  continued  almost  xinchecked 
until  Silesia  itself  was  reached  and  the  pressure  upon 
Germany  begun. 

For  the  first  time  since  the  opening  of  the  cam- 
paigns in  Western  and  Eastern  Europe  one  is  able  to 
give  here  a  consecutive  account  of  a  decisive  action. 
Indeed,  this  is  the  first  decisive  action  that  has  taken 
place  at  all  since  the  opening  of  the  Campaign.  A\'e 
liaAc,  further,  more  detailed  accounts  of  A\hat  took 
place  than  we  liaA'C  hitherto  had  of  anything  that 
has  happened  in  the  AVestern  theatre  of  war. 

To  begin  at  the  beginning. 

AVhile  a  rapid  and,  as  it  has  turned  out,  prema- 
ture Pussian  advance  was  taking  place  through  East 
Prussia,  to  the  norili  of  that  great  projection  upon 
the  map  which  is  made  by  Pussian  Poland,  the 
Austi-ians  to  the  south  of  that  same  projection  had 
invaded  Pussian  Poland  with  equal  rapidity  and 
success. 

Ik'fore  we  go  further  it  is  impoi-tant  to  remember 
here  what  the  polifical  object  of  the  two  Cfennauic 


Sq)teiiiT)or  1.:?,   I'JM 


LAND    AND    WATER 


powers,  acting  uiulcr  the  clircctiou  of  Berlin,  has  been 
in  risking  the  eliances  of  this  tremendous  war. 

That  object  is  briefly  to  reduce  France  to  such  a 
positiou  in  Euroj^c  that  she  will  in  future  count 
among  the  second-rate  States,  her  anny  limited  at 
the  will  of  her  conqueror ;  and  this  is  to  be  done 
not  by  ariuexing  any  territory,  but  by  crushing 
military  victories  followed  by  crushing  iiiuincial 
indemnities,  and  a  c(mtinuously  crushing  economic 
treaty  enforced  perhaps  by  garrisons.  Eussia  is 
merely  to  be  checked  ;  to  be  prevented  from  iii\'ading 
Germany  or  Austria,  and,  above  all,  to  be  prevented 
from  exercising  such  pressure  as  shall  compel  the 
(j'ennans  to  return  too  early  from  their  task  of 
crushing  the  French,  before  that  task  is  accomplished. 
Finallv,  anfainst  Eno;land  the  determination  is  to 
achieve  so  thorough  a  victory  as  shall  (I)  prevent 
England  from  ever  becoming  a  military  State. 
(2)  To  compel  England  to  impoverish  herself  at 
(Jcrinany's  expense  and  to  share  with  Germany  her 
2)resent  control  of  Colonial  areas,  of  dependent  civilisa- 
tions, and  of  sea-borne  trade.  In  general,  England  is 
in  this  plan  to  be  a  still  commercial  and  still  pros]>erous 
State — for  it  is  not  thought  possible  to  prevent  this — 
but  a  State  constrained  to  admit  the  pretensions  of  a 
greater  rival  from  Avhich  she  will  always  ultimately 
have  to  receive  her  oixlcrs  iu  Colonial  and  connnercial 
])olicy  throughout  the  world.  It  is  lielieved  in 
(Jennany  that  a  sudden  attack  upon  the  British  fleet 
<lelivered  at  a  chosen  moment  of  calm,  and  perhaps 
at  the  end  of  the  dark,  very  heavily  supported  by 
aircraft,  and  striking  at  the  inner  blockading  line, 
will  at  least  so  cripple  that  line  as  to  leave  the 
North  Sea,  already  mined  in  regions  known  to  the 
fiiemv,  free  at  least  for  a  raid.  It  is  believed  that 
sueh  a  mid  wo'.dd  paralyse  any  British  effort  abroad. 

Xow  iu  the  prosecution  of  this  general  plan  it  is 
evident  that  there  can  be  no  thought  of  "  concpiering" 
liussia.  The  thing  Is  llatly  impossible.  It  will  be 
much  truer  to  describe  the  German  conception  as  an 
ultimate  underetjinding  between  Kussia  and  the 
Uermanic  Powers  for  the  control  of  the  world. 

Ti-an.slated  into  militarv  terms,  therefore,  the 
policy  of  the  Germanic  Powei-s  is,  upon  their  western 
frontiers  to  destroy  all  French  offensive  pou  er  rapidly, 
to  confuse  and  hairy  England  by  some  raid  ;  uj)on 
their  eastern  frontier  to  prove  to  the  Ilusslan  (Jeneral 
Staff  its  inability  to  invade  (icrmany  or  Austria. 

The  German  General  Staff  (and  the  Austrian 
forces  at  its  disposal)  are  to  show  the  Russian  (ieneral 
Staff  that  attempt  after  attempt  to  invade  the  territory 
of  the  Hohcnzollerns  or  the  Hapsburgs  is  doomed  to 
fail  until  at  last  the  iiussiau  General  Staff  shall  give 
up  the  game. 

The  recent  success  of  Prussia  against  ^\c  two 
Russian  army  cor])s  near  Osterode  is  an  exact  model  of 
what  the  Gennan  Gencrsd  Staff  have  planned  through- 
out this  war  to  tak'j  place  upon  their  eastern  frontiers. 

It  is  this  attitude  of  Berlin  (and,  therefore,  of 
Austria,  too)  towards  what  the  Germans  describe  as 
the  "  Slav  pcrU. "  which  gives  to  the  great  victory  at 
Lcmbci-g  its  exceptional  immediate  impoi-tance  and 
may  give  to  that  action  a  capital  and  deterininant 
olfect  upon  the  whole  war.  For  it  is  the  exact 
oj)posite  of  what  B«'rliu  hoped  for  and  expected  from 
the  Austrians. 

lliey  hoj^ed  for  a  "  blocking"  effect— the  defeat 
of  a  Russian  army  not  followed  by  victoi-ious  pursuit 
and  i>rofound  invasion,  but  by  simihir  successive 
defeats  of  further  Russian  armies  as  they  advanced. 
What  they  have  received  is  the  destruction  of  one  of 
the  two  Austrian  frontier  forces  which  should  have 


imposed  that  "  blocking  "  effect  upon  the  enemy,  and, 
at  the  moiuent  of  writing,  the  immediate  peril  of 
destruction  to  the  other. 

The  story  of  the  Austrian  disaster  is  as  follows  :— 

Two  Austrian  .Armies  were  organised  upon  the 

northern  slopes  of  the  Carpathians,  facing  nortii-cast, 

across  Galicia,  and  it  was  from  Galicia  into  the  Polish 

Government  of  I^uIjHu  that  the  advance  was  directed. 


BRtST 


Vrentitp 


HALICZ 


iiusT   rosiTiON   or  titk  two  Austrian    armiks   previous  to 

TlIK    ADVANCf. 

'^\\(i  first  Austrian  Army  (I.)  reposed  its  right  ujion  the 
Vistula,  at  the  place  where  this  stream  forms  a  frontier 
between  CJalicia  and  Russian  Poland.  Its  right 
stretched  to  the  town  of  Tomazov,  its  left  was  on  the 
Vistula  itself  at  Sandomir,  its  supplies  were  drawn 
from  Przeraysl.  The  front  along  which  it  was  tlnis 
drawn  uj)  was  about  eighty  miles  in  length,  and  it 
will  give  some  idea  of  the  magnitude  of  these  eastern 
oj^erations  (which  the  distance  of  the  field  tends  to 
dwarf  in  our  western  ejes)  that  this  one  Austrian 
front  was  more  i/inii  tin;  whole  front  recentlij  occupied 
III/  the  German  Armij  in  France,  between  Amiens  and 
the  Bdgiun  frontier. 

This  first  Anny  then  (I.),  the  exact  composition 
and  niagnitude  of  which  we  cannot  yet  determine,  but 
which  can  hardly  have  numbei'cd  less  than  five,  and 
may  have  numbered  seven,  Army  Corps,  with  their 
full  reserves  and  independent  cavalry,  or  anything 
from  :300,000  to  400,000  men,  advanced  directly  north 
by  east  upon  the  town  of  Ijublln,  much  at  the  same 
time  as  the  German  Anny  in  the  west  was  advancing 
across  the  Belgian  frontier  upon  the  line  Le  Cateau- 
Cambrai — that  is  al)out  ten  days  ago.  They  estab- 
lished contact  with  the  Russian  forces  in  this  region 
upon  a  line  passing  through  the  town  of  Krasnik, 
some  fifteen  miles  within  the  frontier,  and  rather  less 
than  thirty  from  Lublin  itself.  When  they  had  thus 
established  contact  they  completed,  against  the 
Russians  opposed  to  them,  o^^erations  which  they 
claimed  in  their  official  report  of  the  action  as  a 
complete  victory — a  victory  including  the  capture  of 
many  guns  and  of  many  prisoners. 

Now  when  a  victory  is  thus  claimed  without  any 
proof  of  the  enemy's  line  having  been  turned  or 
pierced,  it  nearly  always  means  that  the  side  claiming 
it  has  succeeded  in  merely  continuing  its  advance ;  the 
guns  taken  are  the  guns  abandoned  in  the  enemy's 
retreat ;  the  men  captured  are  the  stragglers  and  tlio 
much  more  numerous  Avounded  Avliich  the  enemy's 
retreat  leaves  in  tlio  hands  of  the  advancing  army. 
Indeed,  the  official  Austrian  descrijition  which  spoke 
of  the  Russians  as  hastily  retiring  towards  the  Valley 
of  the  Bug  could  only  coiTCspond  to  some  such 
movement,  and,  in  general,  the  Austrian  forces  in  this 
fielil  h;ul  met  their  opponents  a  couple  of  days'  march 
before  ijublin  in  a  line  passing  through  Krasnik  and, 
in  a  series  of  actions  which  take  their  common  name 


3* 


LAKD    AND    AYATER 


September  U,  1914 


from  the  town  of  Krasnilc,  IkuI  f..veo<l  tliose  opponents 
back  Avithout  cnvi'lopini^  or  breakinfj  tlieni. 

Actions  of  this  sort  repeatod  in  the  eastern 
tlieatre  of  the  war  were  exactly  what  the  (ieneral  Stalf 
lit  Berlin  liad  planned  and  desired.  Tlieir  repetition 
would  ultimately  ])rove  to  the  llussians  the 
impossibility  of  invading  llupsburg  or  llolienzoUern 
territory  in  force. 

But  as  it  so  hai)|)eued,  the  whole  effect  oi  tliis 
success  was  first  negatived  and  then  completely  ruined 
by  what  took  place  immediately  to  the  east. 

This  main  adxanced  Austrian  body  v.hieli  was 
marching  upon  Lublin  and  Avhicli  we  call  Austrian 
Army  No.  I.  had  to  the  ea.st  of  it,  that  is  upon  its 
right  Hank,  another  force  which  we  will  call  Austrian 
Army  No.  II.  This  Austrian  Army  No.  11.  was 
drawn  up  upon  a  line  the  left  of  which  re])osed  upon 
iCaniionka  and  the  riglit  of  which  extended,  roughly, 
.south  and  eastward  from  that  town  down  to  Halicz. 

This  Austrian  Army  No.  II.  was  presumably  at 
lirst  no  larger  than  Austrian  Army  No.  I.  which  was 
making  the  main  advance  u[X)n  Liiblin  :  for  the  second 
Army  was  only  thus  extended  n])on  the  flank  of  the 
lirst  to  jH-otect  the  first  army  from  being  turned  and  to 
cover  from  attack  the  comniuuications,and  those  depots 
lying  in  the  fortified  town  of  Ijcniberg,  for  Army 
No.  II.,  and  for  Army  No.  I.  in  the  fortified  town  of 
Bi'zemysl. 

Now  this  flanking  force,  Army  No.  II.,  evidently 
came  npagainst  something  much  l)igger  than  itexpected. 
It  had  to  be  i-a])idly  reinforced  to  meet  the  Itussian 
bodies  which  it  discovered  upon  its  front,  and  the  action 
to  which  it  was  com]>clled  became,  against  the  will  of 
the  Austrian  connnanders,  juuch  more  im])ortant 
than  that  other  action  in  Avhich  Army  No.  I.  had 
been  enjjaged  near  ICrasnik. 

These  reinforcements  were  so  rapid  and  so 
numerous  that  when  the  shock  came  more  than  six 
Austrian  Array  Corps  were  in  line  in  this  second 
Austrian  Armv  lietween  Kamiunka  and  llalicz. 
They  were  the  "ard,  the  7th,  the  11th,  the  1:2th,  the 
Kith,  and  the  llth,  with  five  Divisions  of  Cavalry 
and  some  unknown  contingent  of  the  Last  lleserves, 
the  Laudsturni. 

It  is  especially  to  be  noted  that  this  great  con- 
centratltm  of  men  amounted  to  scnnething  like  a  third 
of  all  those  Austria-Hungary  can  put  into  the  field. 
If  Ave  add  to  it  Army  No.  I.  upon  its  left  inuch 
more  tlian  half,  i)erhai)S  two-thirds,  of  the  total 
Austrian  forces  were  ])resent  \i])on  this  Cialician 
front.  The  Bussian  Army  marching  to  meet 
this  Army  No.  II.  of  the "  Austrians "  lay  at  first 
Avitli  its  left  n])on  the  railroad  at  Dubno,  its 
light  beyond  Luzk.  It  crossed  the  frontier  on 
August  20th,  the  day  Avhen  the  Germans  Averc 
marching  through  Brussels;  it  pushed  back  the 
Au.strian  outposts  A'ery  sloAvly  ;  indeed,  its  advance 
appears  to  have  been  heavily  contested.  It  Avas 
not  until  Tuesday,  September  1st,  ten  davs  ago,  that 
the  full  mass  of  the  Austrian  Army  No.' II.  felt  the 
shock. 

Tlie  Eussian  attack  lasted  apparentlv  over  forty- 
eight  hours,  and  upon  the  third  day  (just  at  the 
moment  Avhen  the  (lerman  advance  ni  'France  had 
come  to  the  neigh hourhood  of  I'aris)  the  Austrian 
forces  of  Ai-my  No.  II.  broke  and  partially  dissolved. 

It  Avas  not  a  victory  like  Sedan  in  wliicli  an  armv 
i.s  sm-rounded  and  wholly  destroyed.  But  it  Avas  a 
victory  of  the  partial  type  in  Avliich  tlie  cohesion  of 
the  enemy's  force  as  a  w  hole,  and  tlierefore  its  military 
value,  is  .so  largely  impairi'd  as  to  destroy  all  its  power 
for   the    immediate   future   and   most  'of    its   power 


throughout  the  Campaign.  A'ery  nearly  one-third  of 
the  men  here  drawn  up  to  meet  the  Bussians  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy,  as  did  200  of  their  guns,  and 
the  decisive  miturc  of  the  result  is  still  better  proA-ed 
by  the  abandounxent  of  Ijemberg. 

The  situation  by  September  5th,  last  Saturday, 
Avas   that   of    the    accompanying    sketch,    Avith   ouo 


SEMANOIR. 


CRACOW 


PRI-^liVL     J^      O 


N\^ 


OLEM&ErSG 


^.^k^ 


A'J5TRIAN5     K     \      <\ 


6EC0XD   I'OSlT10>r    OF   THE  AUSTBIAX   AKMIE3   AiXiiE    TU;i   BAITLB 

or  i,s3iisi:K(i. 


Austrian    army    (I.)    successful    in    the 
trvinsr  to  break  a    Bussfau   force    before 


North    and 

.J,  .„  .^^v.,..  ..V  ^. „.,.....„  ^v..v.v  .^^^v..^  it  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  J^iublin-Cholm,  Avhile  the  other 
army  (II.)  had  broken  before  a  larger  Bussian  force 
in  front  of  Lemberg  aiid  had  abandoned  that  toAvn 
to  the  eneuAy. 

Immediately  after  this  Bussian  success  in  front 
of  Lemberg  it  became  clear  that  this  defeat  of  Austrian 
Army  No.  II.,  complete  as  it  Avas,  or  rather  because 
it  was  so  complete,  Avas  no  more  than  the  beginning 
of  the  business. 

It  is  obvious  from  the  sketch  that  for  the 
Bussians  so  to  destroy  Austrian  Army  No.  II.  Avas 
equivalent  to  their  putting  themselves  immediately 
\ipou  the  flank  of  Austrian  Army  No.  I.;  and  the  great 
Bussian  force  Avhich  had  put  out  of  action  one-third 
of  the  military  power  of  Anstriti  in  front  of  Lemberg 
Avas  now  in  a  positioji  to  attack  the  second  third  of 
that  military  poAver — the  fraction  which  I  liaA'C  called 
the  Austrian  Army  No.  I.- — in  flank.  It  couhl 
threaten  its  communications  Avitli  I'rzemvsl,  its  base. 

Here  a  verv  curious  situation  seems  to  have 
arisen.  Au.strian  Army  No.  I.,  threatened  in  flank 
by  the  enemy  after  the  defeat  of  Austrian  Army 
No.  II.,  should  have  retreated  as  fast  as  it  could  to 
sa\'e  itself  from  being  turned.  The  first  I'cports 
received  were  to  the  effect  that  it  had  so  retreated. 
But  later  repoiis  told  a  different  story,  and  what  seems 
to  have  happened  after  is  that  Austrian  Army  No.  1. 
instead  of  falling  back  made  a  desperate  attempt  to 
get  round  the  rear  of  the  successful  Bussian  force 
upon  its  rigiit  in  the  direction  A — B.  In  that 
aitemjjt  it  is  said  so  far  to  have  failed.  It  is  even 
said  to  have  lost  5,000  prisoners,  and  to  have  had  the 
10th  Army  Cor])s  cut  up  in  the  attempt.  It  is 
obvious  that  a  daring  stroke  of  this  sort  is  paid  for  in 
])ropoi-tion  to  its  daring. 

Austrian  Army  No.  I.  therefore  Avas  compelled  to 
retreat,  and,  at  the  time  of  Avriting  this  (^^'ednesday 
evening),  the  Bussians  already  clanned  a  partial 
victory  oA'cr  its  right  Aving.  The  retreat  of  the 
first  Austrian  Army  cannot  have  taken  place  on 
Brzemysl,  for  that  line  A\as  threatened  by  the  Bussian 
advance  from  Lemberg.  The  retreat  must  be  Avell 
to  the  Avest,  towards  Cracow,  and  the  Bussian 
message  is  to  the  effect  that  this  Au.strian  Army 
No.  I.  thus  in  retreat  was  caught  in  flank  and 
soA'crely  pressed.      How    thorough    that    defeat   has 


ecpt.-ml)cr  U,  1911 


LAND    AND     WATER 


been  wc  cannot  toll  until  further  details  come  in  ; 
but  it  is  evident  that  the  first  Austrian  Army  was 
in  a  position  to  suffer  defeat,  and  almost  equally 
evident  that  it  woidd  not  have  escaped  from  its 
jiosition  without  at  least  some  veiy  heavy  loss. 
Things  may  even  be  worse  for  the  remaining 
Austrian  Army  ;  wc  do  not  yet  kno^v.  Ihit  at  the 
moment  of  writing  it  is  not  yet  cut  off. 

The  question  now  arises,  what  u.se  the  liussians 
can  make  of  this  victory,  if  it  is  complete  :  that 
is,  if  the  first  Austrian  Army  is  broken  up  as  the 
.second  was,  and  if  the  advance  through  Galicia  into 
Silesia  remains  imcheckcd. 

The  first  thing  that  strikes  one  is  the  great  way 
that  the  Armies  liave  to  travel.  It  is  nearly  a  month's 
marching  from  the  district  of  Jjemberg  to  the  German 
frontier  ;  but  against  this  delay  in  time  there  are  two 
things  to  be  said  :  I'irst,  it  is  evident  from  the  map 
that  once  Galicia  was  clear  of  opposition,  forces  in 
Itussian  Poland  gathered  at  A^'arsaw  or  between  that 
centre  and  the  Gennan  frontier  coidd,  if  they  were  in 
sufficient  nvmibers,  come  down  upon  Silesia,  before  the 
main  Russian  Army,  now  in  the  ueighbourliood  of 
Lemberg,  could  come  uj).  It  is  an  imiwobable  because 
u  diiugerous  policy.  'The  Russians  thus  advancing 
as  a  detached  body  iu  front  of  their  main  body 
might  have  to  meet  forces  sujx^rior  to  their  own 
and  suffer  just  what  their  companions  have  sufl'ered 
in  Eas-t  Prussia.  It  is  more  probable  that  the 
pressure  upon  Silesia  (if  the  Russian  victory  is 
indeed  complete,  and  if,  as  seems  probable,  the  line 
of  advance  undertaken  will  be  westward  through 
Galicia)  will  not  begin  imtil  at  least  a  month  has 
passed. 

Tlie  second  consideration,  however,  is  more  pract- 
ical. It  is  this.  The  wealthy  industrial  district  for 
which  the  word  "Silesia"  stands  is  not  confined  to  the 
German  province  whose  capital  is  J5reslau.  It  extends 
into  Austrian  and  even  into  Rus.sian  ti/rritory  ;  and  the 
disturbance  caused  to  the  society  of  the  enemy  b\'  his 


presence  in  territories  which  can  bo  held  to  ransom, 
and  the  social  Ufc  of  which  is  important  to  the  whole 
Germanic  alliance,  will  begin  before  the  German 
frontier  is  crossed. 

But  before  we  leave  this  first  division  of  this 
week's  comments,  the  eastern  theatre  of  the  war,  some- 
thing must  be  said  of  the  effect  j)roduced  by  the 
German  victories  in  East  Prussia. 

The  extent  of  the  check  there  received  by  the 
Russian  Armies  has  not,  perhaps,  been  fully  appre- 
ciated by  the  public  of  this  country. 

The  German  official  report  first  claimed  30,000 
prisoners — later,  more  than  double  that  number. 
Accurate  as  these  official  reports  usually  are,  one  is 
disinclined  to  accept  the  very  large  second  estimate  ; 
or,  at  least,  one  is  inclined  to  suggest  that  its  j)ro- 
duction  immediately  after  the  Lemberg  disaster  was 
too  much  of  a  coincidence. 

It  is  only  a  conjecture  made  for  what  it  is  worth, 
but  the  conjecture  may  be  risked  that  of  some  five 
Rxtssian  Army  Gorps  present  in  East  Prussia,  two 
got  pushed  further  ahead  than  was  safe  and  \\erv' 
caught.  That  they  Avere  completely  surrounded  and 
destroyed  there  is  no  evidence.  That  their  fighting 
value  for  the  immediate  future  was  destroyed  is 
probable.  But  a  conjecture  it  remains,  and  more 
than  a  conjecture  it  will  not  be  until  we  have  some 
full  account  of  the  reverse  here  suffered  by  our 
Allies. 

It  Avould  be  possible  for  the  main  Russian  Anny 
in  Galicia  to  march  on  into  Silesia  before  this  check 
was  set  right  by  the  occupation  of  East  Prussia  in 
force.  But  it  would  not  be  possible  to  begin  a 
general  advance  upon  Berlin,  or  upon  the  centre  of 
Gennany,  while  large  and  victorious  German  forces 
still  stood  upon  the  lower  Tistula.  And  all  this  lino 
of  argument  reinforces  one's  conclusion  that  it  is 
unwise  to  expect  the  effect  of  the  Russian  pressiu-e 
iu  the  East  to  be  felt  in  the  west  until  several  weeks 
have  passed. 


THE    WESTERN    FIELD. 


3CAL!     Of     MiCtS 


COMPIECNE 


o 


RHEIMS 


Wi 
I& 

V  ^^5" 


VILLES  TOURBftS 


la  o  z?"«  < 

»VALMY      ar^^ 


In  the  western  field  of  the  war,  that  is  in  operations.  We  can  only  say  that  the  problem 
Northern  France,  we  arc  approaching  very  rapidly  presents  it.self  in  a  certain  form  ;  we  cannot  yet  say 
the  most  critical   moment  in  tlio  first  pliase  of  the     how  that  problem  will  be  solved. 


LAND    AND    WATER 


Soptombor  1:?,  1914 


Tlic  form  in  Aviiicli  this  prublcm  prc-iouts  itself 
Las  boon  so  tleavly  put  in  the  yoiioiv.l  Tress,  that  the 
ivpetitiou  of  it  hero  may  seem  tedious  to  the  reader. 
I  will,  novei-thele?-s,  repeat  its  main  elements,  because, 
simple  as  they  are,  they  must  be  fully  grasped  if  the 
future  of  this  campaign  is  to  bo  imderstood. 

At  the  end  of  last  week  it  seemed  as  though  a)i 
investmeut  of,  or  at  least  an  attack  upon,  the  Northern 
and  Eastci-u  sections  of  the  fortifications  of  Paris  was 
intt>ndi>d  by  the  Oerman  eommandei-s.  They  had 
suc-eessfully  advanced  with  amazing  ra]iidity  from  the 
Belgian  frontier  to  the  gates  of  the  French  caj)ital. 
Tliei-o  v.-as  not  anyone  following  and  commenting 
npo:i  the  military  history  of  the  campaign  Avho  did 
not  hope  (if  his  heart  was  with  the  Allies)  that  this 
task  would  be  undert;iken  by  the  invaders  or  who 
did  not  dread  it  if  his  syn^xithies  were  with  the 
Germans. 

It  is  almost  self-e\  idcnt  that  to  iindeiiake  a  task 
of  such  magnitude  as  the  attack  upon  the  Northern 
and  Eastern  forts  alone  in  a  perimeter  of  over  100 
miles,  and  that  in  the  presence  of  an  unbeaten  army, 
would  be  to  imperil  the  whole  future  of  the  (.{ennan 
forces  of  invasion.  But  it  Avas  suggested  in  these 
comments^ 

(1)  That  the  overwhelming  advance  upon  Paris 
would  never  have  been  made  unless  Paris  had  been  its 
ti-ue  objective. 

(i)  That  the  moral  importance  of  entering  Paris, 
both  positive  in  its  effect  upon  the  (Icrman  nation 
and  negative  in  its  effect  upon  the  Allies,  would 
hardly  permit  the  (lerman  commanders  to  give  up  the 
prey,  even  temporarih'. 

As  a  nnitter  of  fact,  the  right  v.ing  -that  is  the 
extreme  western  extremity — of  the  (icrman  invading 
line  was,  upon  Saturday  and  Sunday  last,  deliljeratcly 
hi-ltcd.  The  forces  opposed  to  it  at  the  moment  (in 
the  neighbourhood  of  Creil)  were  certainly  not  suffi- 
cient to  have  com]>ellcdthis  halt,  or  to  have  imposed  it 
upon  a  reluctant  enemy.  The  change  of  plan,  though 
c.  itiinly  made  at  the  last  moment,  wa.s  deliberately 
chos:n  and  as  delibei-ately  acted  upon  by  those  who 
were  resj)onsiblc  for  the  (Jermau  mo\'ements  as  a 
whole.  And  the  change  of  plan  was  this.  Of  the 
forces  which  had  niai'ched,  one  overlapping  the  other, 
until  the  German  army  of  invasion  was  stretched  over 
the  whole  of  northern  France  from  the  neighbourhood 
of  Paris  at  Creil  in  the  west  to  Verdun  in  the  east, 
the  extreme  western  ones  turned  suddenly  at  right 
angles  to  their  previous  course  and  began  nnirching 
south  and  east  in  the  directions  indicated  in  the  sketch 
below  by  the  arrows. 


,.,tstk-«» 


f       >      lO       15     JOIJ 


die  J'-'/.r 


EKF.TCB    fcHOWIXO    THE    WKt'KL    Oi'    THE    <!KKJIAN     ET.3I1T    WINT., 

cr.  1st  akmy,  between  seitiubeb  3rd  axd  SKritKEEn  5th.' 

Paris  was  left  neglected    uj)on   the  light;  i,r,d 
■while  the  remainder  of  the  German  lincAvas  advaucino- 


southward  (each  body  directly  towards  the  front  of 
the  position  it  occupied)  these  Avestcrn  units  alone 
(conventionally  known  here  as  the  First  German 
Army)  turned  partly  away  from,  but  in  the  main  per- 
pendicular to,  the  original  direction  which  they  had 
hithci'to  strictly  and  rajndl}-  followed  from  Mons  and 
Charleroi  towards  the  Frer.ch  ca])ital. 

AVhy  did  they  do  this  ?     AVhat  had  happened? 

'fhe  answer  to  such  questions  can  only  be  found 
in  one  of  two  allernatives. 

Either  {a)  the  v.hole  German  advance  upon  li'aris 
was  not  intended  as  a  fundamental  part  of  the  campaign, 
but  was  in  the  nature  of  a  feint ;  or,  {fi)  the  Gcnnan 
advance  had  on  its  western  extreme  come  up  against 
a  snrpri.se  ;  had  met  forces  nnexpcctcdly  strong,  liad 
come  up  against  an  unsuspected  reserve  maintained 
by  the  French  deliberately  during  all  the  reti'cat, 
and  maintained  at  the  cost  of  weakening  the  defensive 
line  Avhich  retired  so  precipitately  (])ut  remained 
unbroken)  during  that  retreat. 

There  is  indeed  a  third  jiossiljility,  which  has  only 
to  be  named  to  be  reiected.  As  it  has  been  suggested 
in  some  quarters  1  A\ill  not  leave  it  unnoticed. 

This  third  conjecture  is  that  the  cessation  of  the 
Gernnui  ad\ancc  upon  Paris  was  due  to  an  exhaustion 
of  that  adva)ice  in  numbers  and  in  energy.  There  are 
many  reasons  \\hy  this  conjecture  may  be  safely 
rejected. 

It  is  c\ident  that  the  advance  was  ])lanned  in 
great  detail,  and  Avith  a  full  organisation  of  its  daily 
effort  and  its  reser\-es  of  strength. 

It  is  equally  evident  that  the  check,  had  it  been 
due  to  this  cause,  would  have  taken  the  form  of  an 
increasing  exhaustion  long  before  Paris  was  reached, 
and  of  that  exhaustion  there  has  been  no  sign. 

Further,  the  extreme  German  right  wing,  which 
was  thus  suddenl}'  turned  perjiendicular  to  its  original 
direction,  has  been  so  turning  in  these  last  few  days, 
Avitli  full  enei-gy  ;  it  is  still  defending  itself  vigorously 
against  what  are  obviously  superior  numbers.  It  has, 
as  I  write,  taken  a  strong  counter  offensive  upon  the 
Ourcq.  AVhile  the  deliberate  choice  of  a  new  and,  at 
first  sight,  puzzling  direction  towards  the  east  and 
south  (while  Paris  lay  to  the  Avest)  is  still  furtlier 
evidence  of  a  change  of  \Aixa.  \ci-y  different  in  character 
from  mere  beAvilderment,  or  from  any  confusion  due 
to  some  miscalcidation  by  the  German  commanders  of 
their  remaining  energy. 

Nothing  can  explain  this  unexpected  Avbcel  but 
the  necessity  of  a  new  ])l;in,  and  that  necessity  arising 
from  the  discover^',  behind  and  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Paris,  of  a  large  French  }-eservc  force  of  Avhose 
existence,  or,  at  any  rate,  of  anIiosc  numljcrs,  the 
enemy  were  hitherto  ignorant. 

AMuit  is  that  new  jdan  which  has  thus  been 
suddenly  adopted  by  the  Germans,  Avhen  they  dis- 
covered this  unexpected  weight  of  men  on  their  right, 
and  what  are  its  chances  of  success  ? 

While  the  German  advance  on  Paris  was  taking 
]>lace,  the  various  bodies  of  the  ( rerman  Line  between 
the  j\[eusc  and  Paris  were  occupied  in  attempting  to 
outflank  the  Allied  line  Avhich  was  retreating  before 
them.  In  any  one  day  of  the  advance,  after  the  line 
of  the  Sambre  was  abandoned,  the  positiim  was  always 
somcAvhat  after  the  fash  ion  of  t!i  is  diagram .  The  Allied 
line  being  held  by  bodies  A  B  C  i^  of  the  enemy, 
opjwsed  to  its  OAvn  bodies  F  G  II  K,  fresh  bodies, 
drawn  from  the  superior  numbers  of  the  Germans, 
kept  coming  round,  as  at  E,  to  euA-elop  the  Allied  lino 
if  possible.  This  attempt  to  envelop  Avas  oidy 
avoided  day  after  day  by  the  continued  ra])id,  but 
luckily  orderly,  retreat  of  the  Allies  upon  positions  to 


G» 


Sei)tcmber  1:2,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


./ 


7  7^  ^  7^ 


I 

M 


I t 

N 


O 


tlie  rear,  as  at  M  N  O,  etc.  Day  after  day  tlio 
superior  numbers  of  the  invadei'S  permitted  them  to 
extend  beyond  the  ■western  extreme  of  the  Allies  and 
con-espondinsi'ly  forced  the  Allies  to  retreat.  They 
■were  happy  to  be  able  to  retreat — even  at  so  great  an 
expense  in  guns,  munitions,  and  men— and  to  escape 
encirclement  and  annihilation.  For  such  encirclement 
smd  annihilation  German  strategy  presupposes,  and  in 
superiornumbers — acting  rapidly  and  hn-ishly  spent  — 
all  that  over-simple  strategy  depends. 

An  effort  undertaken  at  such  an  enormous 
expense  of  energy  ■with  so  clear  an  object,  cannot  for 
a  moment  be  regaixled  as  intended  to  dupe  its  enemy. 
The  immense  cost  in  numljers  alone  by  Avhich  the 
Gennans  hoped  to  purchase  an  immediate  success, 
proves  that  this  success— an  envelopment — was  really 
attempted,  and  attempted  in  a  fashion  easily  recog- 
nisable. The  extraordinary  pace  at  'whicli  the 
manoeuvre  was  forced  points  to  exactly  the  same 
conclusion. 

Suddenly,  when  the  Allied  line  had  been  pushed 
back  so  far  that  its  left  repo.se  upon  Paris,  its  right 
upon  Verdun,  the  Oennan  scheme  changed  in  one 
day — Septeml^er  4th.  The  attempted  envelopment 
ceases,  (^uite  a  new  mana-uvre,  the  attempt  to  break 
the  Allied  line,  succeeds  to  it. 

Not  only  does  this  attempt  to  break  the  Allied 
line  take  the  place  of  the  earlier  attempt  at  envelop- 
nient,  but  the  bi-eaking  of  that  line  has  suddenly 
become  an  immediate  necessity  for  the  invaders. 
Their  main  game  has  failed.  They  have  not  got 
round  their  inferior  enemy.  He  will  now  never  be 
suiTOundod,  and  the  master-idea  of  the  (lerman  Staff 
hits  missed  its  goal.  But  if  they  succeed  in  pu.^hlng 
back  the  French  lines  or  breaking  their  centre  the 
<  iermans  have  at  least  saved  them.selves,  and  possibly 
destroyed  a  large  body  of  th.eir  opponents ;  if  they 
fail  in  this  last  attempt  not  to  turn  but  to  break  the 
French  lines  thei-e  is  nothing  open  to  them  but  retreat. 

Why  is  this? 


Upon  the  accompanying  diagram  which,  though 
giving  only  the  barest  elements  of  the  position,  is 
drawn  to  scale,  the  necessity  under  which  the  Germans 
now  are  of  breaking  the  Allied  line  or  retreating 
^\-iIl  be  clear. 

From  positions  near  Meaux,  twenty-five  miles 
east  of  the  forts  of  Paris,  the  German  armies  which 
had  hitherto  been  achieving  the  immensely  ra])id 
invasion  of  northern  I'rance,  after  the  check,  extended 
in  a  great  convex  arc  to  A^eixlun. 

They  were  fed,  as  to  projectiles  and  everything 
else,  by  lines  of  communication  coming  from  Belgium 
and  Luxembourg  in  the  direction  of  the  arrows  (1 ) — ( I ) . 
Their  right  wing  at  JM.,  INleaux,  having  come  up  against 
unexpectedly  large  reserves  (there  gathered  to  a^vait 
them  by  the  French)  was  bent  back.  It  has  had  to 
tm-n  back  eastward.  On  their  left  is  the  great  fortress 
of  A'erdun,  which  is  still  holding  out;  another  great 
fortress  to  the  south  is  Toul,  and  between  these  two 
a  chain  of  forts  at  a  a  a  is,  if  not  impassable,  at  least 
only  to  be  passed  at  an  immense  expense  in  men  and 
at  some  considerable  expense  in  time. 

But  south  of  Toul,  and  covering  the  gap  between 
that  fortress  and  the  fortress  of  Epiual,  sundry  French 
forces  at  L.L.L.  (which  may  be  called  the  French 
ai-my  of  Lorraine)  are  confronted  by  further  German 
forces,  K.K.K.,  stretched  along  the  frontier  between 
France  and  Gennany  in  this  region. 

Now  ob.serve  that  if  the  considerable  numerical 
superiority  of  the  French  near  M.  pennits  them  tliei'e 
to  march  round,  and  push  back,  the  German  right 
wing,  the  existing  communications  (I)  (1)  of  the  main 
German  annies  in  the  north  arc  at  once  threatened. 
Should  this  considerable  body  of  the  Allies  in  the 
neighbourhootl  of  M.  continue  the  pressure  which  it 
has  been  exercising  during  the  last  four  days,  the 
German  forces  between  A'erdun  and  Paris,  if  they 
cannot  break  through  to  the  south,  woidd  have  no 
choice  but  to  retreat.  The  initiative  will  have  passed 
from  them  to  their  enemies,  and  it  is  even  jx>ssible 
that,  unless  the  retreat  is  conducted  as  precipitately  as 
was  the  advance,  their  supplies  might  be  cut  and  they 
might  suffer  disastei*. 

But  if  the  Germans  break  the  centre  of  the  French 
line  towai*ds  the  east,  say  at  sonie  such  point  as  \ . 
(which  stands  i-oughly  for  A'itry-le-Francois)  or  even 
if,  Avithout  breaking  it,  they  push  it  back  to  such  a 
line  as  the  positions  W.  AV.  W.  (corresponding  roughly 
to  a  line  passing  through  Troycs),  then  the  Germans, 


^ 


r- 


^1 


'^^ 


e         I  ft 


ScU.    .1    M.i.. 


:f 


^  -■'■> 


Di&OR.\H  saowttro  Taa  linw  or  tuj  two  abuics  on  and  ltvzb,  seftihbdb  \ta.. 


1* 


LAND    AXD     WATER 


September  U,  1914 


tTioiu'li   pivssod   in  upon  tlitir  riglit  at  ^I  will  luvve 
acliitn-o<l  their  immediate  ol^joct. 
For :  - 

(//)  They  Avill  have  compelled  the  Frencli 
bodies  at  Jj.  L.  either  to  retreat  precipitately 
through  the  gap  of  Xaney  betv/een  Toiil  aud 
I'pinal,  or  to  bo  caught  in  reverse  and 
annihilated : 

(//)  Tliey  will  have  permitted  their  own 
army  in  Lorraine  [K  K  K)  to  pass  through 
the  gap  of  Xancy  and  to  join  up  in  a  direct 
i'orward  march  with  what  Inid  hitheiio  been 
tlieir  northern  armies  cut  off  tVom  them  by  the 
])rojecting  fortress  of  Verd\in. 

(r)  More  important  still,  they  will  have 
wiped  out  the  strategical' factor  of  the  fortified 
frontier  line  Verdun — Toul,  and  Epinal— 
Eclfort.  For  once  the  Germans  are  behind 
that  line,  tliat  line  might  as  well  not  exist ; 
and  the  garrisons  within  the  fortresses  can  be 
picked  up  at  their  leisure. 

{f/)  Finnlhi,  and  most  im/jorlant  nf  all,    lie 
Germans  {if  theij  achiece  i/iis  pusliing  back  or 
hreahnt/  of  1/ie  French  line  in  ilie  neighbour- 
hood   of     /'.)     \cill  pick    up    communicaltons 
{;?),    (2),   (2)  far  preferaUe  1o   the  onli/  onea 
iheij   now   have   ahnr/   (1),    (1).       The  former 
(2),  (:?),  (i),  are  Avhat  they  have  always  wished 
to  lii.ve,  but  have  1)een  debarred  from  by  the 
barrier  of  the  foi-tiiied  frontier.     They  are  lines 
li'ading  directly    and  shortly   to    their    great 
depots  on  the  u]iper  Khine  and  in  Lorraine, 
well  served  Avith  roiling  stock,  numerous,  and 
parallel.     Quite  another  matter  from  the  long, 
crowded  and  insuiiicient  lines  (1),  (1),  through 
the    intensely    hostile    territory   of    Belgium. 
Hero  along  (t),  (.•2),  is  a  mass  of  railways — no 
less   than    six    main    lines,    coming    straight 
across  the  Eliine— to  feed  the  iuAading  army  ; 
and   the  threat    to    their    existing    lines    at 
(1),  (1),  even,  if  the  French  pressure  around 
the  (rerman  right  at  ]\[  continues  and  develops 
to   tlie    X'orth,  will    have  become  negligible, 
because  the  German  line  vrill  have  new  and  far 
better  seiTice  of  supply  from  Ahacc-Lonaine. 
This    should    make    it    clear    that    everything 
depends    in    the    next  few   days  upon   whether    the 
(lernians  can  (I)  break  throngh,  or  even  (2)  seriously 
push  back  the  eastern  part  of  the  Allied  line,  that  is 
the  French  troops  stretched  from  half-way  between 
Paris  and  Verdun  to  Verdun  itself. 

In  the  first  ease,  supposing  the  Germans  break 
through  in  the  iieighbo  .irhood  of  Vitry,  all  that  is 
caught  to  the  east  of  the  ])oint,  including  the  French 
troo])s  in  Lorraine  at  (L),  (L),  (L),  would  bo  doomed. 
In  the  second  case,  supposing  they  do  not  break 
the  French  line  but  merely  cause  it  to  retire,  though  no 
decision  would  have  been  arrived  at  (always  supposing 
that  the  troops  in  Lorraine  had  time  to  retreat  rapidly 
through  the  gap  and  join  their  fellows  beyond)  and 
though  the  German  forces  Avuuld  still  find  an  intaet 
aud  unbroken  ariny  in  front  (jf  them,  yet  the  invaders 
v.ould  have  manage.i  to  estal)!ish  themselves  in  a 
stronger  position  than  before.  The  difficult  and  few 
Ik-lgiau  lines  of  communication  (1),  (1),  would  have 
lost  their  importance.  Xo  turning  movement  against 
their  north  v.-ould  then  threaten  their  supplies,  for 
their  snjiplies  would  then  come  directly  from  the  east, 
and  they  would  have  estaljlished  ncAv,  much  more 
ninnerous,  much  stronger,  and  much  shorter  lines  of 
su]iply  coming  straight  from  dbectly  over  the  Ehine 
beliind  them. 


One  may  illustrate  the  three  possible  results 
Avhich  the  situation  appears  to  present  in  the  three 
following  diagrams. 

Li   the   first,    Avl.erc    it    is    supposed    that   the 


^\^  X  lik 


j^    Verduis 


<^ 


^  end 

VITFY*  LE 


SKKTCH    SHOWING     EESCLT 

IF     THE     ALLIED     LIXK      IS 

KEITHEB       rHKSPKD       BACK 

KOa  I'lEECED. 


FRANCOIS 


fpiNAL 


litLFORT 

German  forces  in  the  north  betvicen  Verdun  and 
l\iris  have  failed  to  pierce  the  Allied  line,  they  will 
have  no  choice  but  to  retire  along  their  existing  line* 
of  communication  (1) — (1),  in  the  direction  marke<l 
by  the  aiTOAvs.  They  Avill  be  in  danger  of  being  cut 
off  from  their  fellows,  K  K,  in  Lon-aiue ;  they  Avill 
be  in  danger  of  seeing  their  oidy  communications 
through  Belgium  aud  the  north  (1)  (1)  cut  by  the 
advance  of  the  sujierior  Allied  forces  along  A  B. 

In   the  second    supposition,  having  broken  the 


PARI  S 


a 


0 


a 


<^ 


^ 


SKr.TCH     6K0WIXO    KrEl'LT 
IF  ALLIED  LINE  IS  riEECED. 


BELFORT 


Allied  line  at  V,  they  would  have  cut  off  the  French. 
army  in  Lorraine,  L  L  L,  and  could  confidently 
expect  its  tjestruction.  At  the  same  time,  they  would 
feel  no  more  anxiety  about  their  old  abandoned  com- 
nninications  along  (1) — (1),  for  they  Avould  depend,. 
Avhcn  the  French  army  in  Lorraine  had  gone,  upon 
the  neAv  and  better  commnnications  along  (2) — (2). 
From  that  moment  onwards  the  German  forces  icould  be, 
fur  the  first  time,  in  a  definite  position,  of  superiority 
over  the  Allies  in  the  irtstern  field  of  the  tear. 

The  third  possibility  is  that  of  the  Allied  line^ 

%     0^  ^ 


PARIS     ^ 


^c|» 


TOrjL 


SKETCH     SHOWING      EESILT 

IF     THE     ALLIED      LIKE     IS 

rUSHED   BACK. 


■^- 


2 

'  epi;-jal 


-«ELFORT 


pushed  back  into  such  a  position  as  Vv  W  W,  joined 
by  the   troops   from   Lorraine   and  not  broken,  nor 


8* 


Sopkniber  U\  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


liavinj^  in  any  part  sufPorecl  (li^^as{ov,  l>ut  lioncefov- 
Avav<l  I'acod  by  a  German  army  standing  noi-th  and 
•sontb,  based  upon  new  and  better  commnnications 
coming  directly  from  tbc  cast  in  (:2) — (i),  liaviiig 
ttivnod  the  lortilied  frontier  Verdun-Belfort  and 
eliminated  it  as  an  obstacle. 

It  Avill  be  seen  from  all  tliis  tbat  every  effort 
Avill  be  made  by  tbe  Allies  dnring  tbese  critical  days 
to  maintain  a  combination  of  two  main  elements  in 
tlieir  strengtb,  (1)  tbe  resistance  of  tbe  concaA'e  line, 
especially  wliere  it  is  most  tbreatened  wliicli  is  in  tbe 
sag  at  V.  (Vitry  Ic  Frangois)  :  (:2)  tbe  prosecution  of 
tbo  enveloping  movement  against  tbe  Crerman  rigbt 
wing  at  M. — tbe  region  of  Meanx — wbere  tbere  is  so 
far  a  definite  numerical  snperiorit}'  on  tbe  side  of  tbc 
Allies,  tbongii  tbe  Allies  are  still  inferior  in  numbers 
to  tbe  total  of  tbe  German  line. 

If  botli  tbese  factors  combined  are  maintained 
— tbat  is,  if  tbe  pressure  at  M  goes  on  and  tbe 
resistance  at  V  liolds — there  is  sKCces-t.  If  tbe 
Insisting  line  breaks  at  V  or  elsewbere  tbere  is 
ifisushr.  Even  if  it  is  only  pushed  back  tbere  is, 
lor  tbe  moment,  failure. 

Such  are  the  comparatively  simple  elements  of 
this  most  critical  moment  in  the  first  part  of  so  vast  a 
movement  of  men.  Such  are  the  three  inconceivable 
issues  of  tbese  grave  days. 

THE    CRITICAL    POINTS  IN    DETAIL. 

it  is  not  without  interest  to  consider  in  some 
dctiiil  the  ground  over  which  both  those  critical  parts 
of  the  Allied  forces,  the  enveloping  people  at  it  and 
the  ivsistiug  people  Jit  V,  are  moving. 

The  lieUl  in  which  pressure  is  being  brought  upon 
the  (Jerman  right  and  turning  it  back  from  Paris,  is 
the  lower  valley  of  tbe  Marue.  A  sketch  of  this  field 
is  liere  appended.     Tbe  Marne  is  a  river  which  flows 


twenty  miles  N.  by  E.  of  tbo  outermost  Paris  forts) 
there  How  into  tbo  ilarne  from  o]>posite  sides  two 
tributaries. 

Tbo  one  from  tbc  iic-rtb  boars  tbe  name  of  tbe 
Onrcq ;  that  from  tbe  south  tbe  nanie  of  the  Grand 
Morin.  The  latter  is  known  as  the  Grand  Morin, 
or  tbe  Great  Morin,  to  distinguish  it  from  another 
tributary  coming  in  further  to  tbe  cast  and  known 
as  tbc  little  Morin,  or  Petit  florin.  It  is  in  the 
angle  formed  by  tbe  (Jrand  ]\Iorin  and  the  Ouroq 
tbat  the  (Tcrman  riglit  v»ing,  recently  in  touch 
v>ith  the  fortifications  of  Paris,  was  caught  on 
September  4tb,  jtli,  and  Gtb,  Avbcn  the  presence  of  an 
unexpected  French  reserve  force  in  and  about  l*aris 
was  first  appreciated  by  the  enemy.  Tbe  German 
right  wing  or  ]  st  Army  was  thus  caught  by  superior 
forces,  among  v.hicb  was  tbe  British  contingent,  which 
contingent  lay  at  first  along  tbe  Grand  Morin  four  dajs 
ago,  was  already  across  the  Petit  ilorin  by  Tuesday, 
and  is  now  across  the  jMarne  in  its  advance  against  tbe 
German  retreat.  It  has  upon  its  rigbt  tbe  5tb 
Freueli  Army;  while  u])on  tbe  Onrcq  is  the  larger 
l)ody  known  as  the  Oth  French  Ami}',  which  has 
behind  it  those  reserves  recently  called  up  from  Paris 
and  from  tbe  west  of  tbat  town. 

It  is  evident  that  while  the  Germans  in  tlieir 
retirement  before  these  superior  numbers  will  delay 
tbe  advance  of  every  op])osing  unit  as  much  as 
possible,  they  will,  or  should,  show  peculiar  energy  in 
resisting  the  noiih-westeru  side  of  tbe  angle,  the 
French  advance  across  the  line  of  the  Onrcq.  For  as 
this  advance  proceeds  the  German  troops  still  lingering 
or  hampered  in  the  noi-th  (whence  they  have  come) 
are  in  danger  of  being  cut  off,  and  the  cavalry  of  tbc 
French  resen'e  and  other  bodies  which  it  can  spare 
from  its  superior  numbers,  tend  perpetually  to  approach 
tbe  lino  A.  H.,  by  which  the  (Jerman  right  Aving  or 


o 


lO 


15 

I 


HO 

—I— 


Sccl6s    of  Miles' 


25 

—J 


SEMLIS* 


PARIS 


into  the  Seine  just  above  Paris  having- come  in  a 
great  ber.d  across  the  Champagne  cotnitry.  If  avo  f.x 
our  attcjition  upon  the  town  of  Meau.x,  \vf  sluul  see 
tliat  in  the  neiglibourhood  of  that  town  (which  is  some 


1st  .■Vrmy  originally  advanced  and  by   which  it  still 
receives  its  supplies. 

V]Wi\  the  pressure  tbat  can  be  exercised  in  this 
field  of  the  v.ar  xcry  largely  depends  the  success  of  the 


P* 


LAND     AND    WATER 


September  13,  1914 


comljiuetl  manoeuvre  ui>on  wliich  the  Allies  are  now 
c'.neentmted,  and  which,  if  it  is  imiwsed  upon  the 
(U-nuan  invasion,  will  compel  that  invasion  to  retreat. 
Tlie  other  held  in  whieh  the  Allies  are  concerned 
is  the  equaUv  i.ni)ort;int  one  stretcdiing  in  a  great 
concave  throncvh  A'itrv-le-Franct.is.to  the  fortified  line 
b.>tween  \'erdun  and  Toul.  Here  the  conditions  are 
as  follows  : — ■ 


«\» 


o 


fEl»9W^ 


„VA<-'"1' 


*  »  »  "> 


sxKTrn  snowiNO  tiir  CP-mcvL  section  ok  thr  frexck  likb 

KE.UI     VITST-LK-F2AN9OIS     WHKN     TUK     MAIN"     QliBMAN     ArrACK 
FALLS. 

The  eastern  side  of  this  field,  that  lying  towards 
the  Meuse  and  the  fortified  line  Verdun — Toul,  is 
country  both  hilly  and  thickly  wooded.  It  is  a 
country  not  only  'of  deep  i\niues  and  considerable 
fin-ests,  but  of  pasture  lands,  often  fairly  "close  "  and 
"  blind  " — cat  up  by  hedges  and  full  of  spinneys  and 
copses  as  well  as  woods.  To  the  north  stretches  the 
long  low  ridge  of  the  Argonne,  a  lump  of  clay,  crossed 
by  five  or  six  main  roads,  but  only  two  railways.  The 
main  tJerman  effoi-t  to  break  the  French  line  must  be 
made  to  the  west  of  this  wooded,  ravhied,  and  ditlicult 
coimtry,  for  to  the  Avest  of  it  lie  plains,  at  first  very 
o])en  and  bare ;  and  even  farther  east  there  is  easy 
roUmg  ploughed  and  heath  country  with  Avide 
horizons;  such  as  is  suitable  to  the  manoeuvring  of 
great  forces. 

It  is  across  this  open  country — the  plains  Avhich 
take  their  name  from  the  town  of  Chalons  on  the 
IMarne,  and  the  great  Avheat  district  that  lies  to  the 
south  and  east  of  those  plains — that  the  main  German 
effort  to  pierce  the  French  line,  now  in  progress,  is 
directed.     Its  centre  of  effort  is  against  Vitry. 

In  this  critical  effort,  upon  the  success  or  failure 
of  Avhich  Avill  so  largely  turn  the  fate  of  France,  the 
Jinnies  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia  and  of 
AViuiemberg,  the  10th  Corps  and  the  Guard  are 
traversing  country  Avhicli  has  been  throughout  all 
recorded  history  the  battlefield  of  tlic  (hnils. 

It  is  the  first  time,  I  think,  in  history  that  the 
parallel  eastern  obstacles  which  cover  France  have 
been  thus  turned,  or  that  an  invader  has  been  approach- 
ing from  the  north,  but,  saA'e  for  this  anomaly,  history 
here  repeats  itself  in  an  astonishing  fashion. 

It  must  have  been  about  the  4th  of  September, 
Friday  last,  that  once  more  men  from  Brandenburg 
saw  before  them  south  of  the  great  camp  at  Chalons 
the  half-staiTcd  rolling  plain  of  the  Cliampagne- 
Pouillcuse,  utterly  bare  sa\e  for  dwarf  lines  of  newly- 
l)lanted  firs.  And  as  they  looked  over  that  mournful 
country,  Avhicli  is  like  a  tumbled  sea  of  hillocks  and 
rounded  dips  Avidi  the  dull,  low  line  of  Argonne 
crossing  the  eastern  horizon,  one  crest  and  roll  over 
Avhieh  they  marched  Iwre  the  tomb  of  Kellennan,  and 
Avas  the  lonely  position  of  A'alray.  "Whatever  column 
it  was  that  cro.ssed  this  field,  some  man  among  them 
as  he  crossed  the  high  road  rested  for  a  moment  where 


young  Goethe  rested,  and  If  he  glanced  back  during  a 
halt,  may  liave  Avondered,  as  Goethe  Avondered,  whether 
he  Avere  not  at  the  beginning  of  a  new  world. 

But  there  is  more  tlian  this.  In  that  same  lost 
and  barren  region  of  the  huge  Catalaunian  Plain, 
coming  along  the  Pomau  Poad,  Avhicli  skirts  tliu; 
Camp  of  Chalons  and  is  the  main  avenue  of  advance 
soutliAvard,  by  Suippes,  some  column  passed  imme- 
diately beneath  the  ramparts  of  that  amazing  thing 
Avhicli'  is  still  called  the  Camp  of  Attila.  It  is  a  huge 
oval  bank,  reminding  one  in  its  shape  of  those  modern 
tracks  (such  as  Brooklands)  Avhere  petrol  races  are 
run,  and  also  in  its  size — for  it  is  many  hundred  yards 
in  length.  But  it  is  piled  much  higher  than  the 
banks  of  these  modern  racing  tracks,  and  in  its  bulk 
and  isolation  it  is  the  most  iiupressiw  thing  a  man 
may  see  in  the  Avhole  course  of  European  travel.  This 
Camii.  tradition  afiinns,  Avas  the  fortification  Avherein 
the  Huns  secured  themselves  before  they  marched 
some  two  days  further  south,  and  Avere  broken  t  > 
pieces  at  last  by  the  discipline  of  the  lloman  people, 
and  by  that  })OAver  there  is  in  the  Latin  blood  to  digest 
and  to  bring  into  useful  service  the  barbarians. 

Even  as  I  Avrite  these  lines  upon  the  ^\''ednesday 
of  the  week  I  do  not  know,  for  there  is  no  immediate 
news  in  England,  Avhether  this  effort  of  the  iuA'ader 
upon  the  French  centre  at  Vitry  has  succeeded.  But 
1  know  that  he  is  marching  o\er  sacred  ground  Avhere 
there  rise  against  him  the  infiuences  of  the  dead. 
Not  so  far  av>-ay,  a  day's  march  behind  the  defending 
line,  is  the  house  that  nourished  Daiiton.  If  that  line 
is  pierced  the  iuA-ader  may  burn  the  house,  still 
standing,  AA'here  Joan  of  Arc  Avas  born. 

Such,  then,  is  the  nature  of  the  ground  and  sucli 
the  position  of  the  opposing  forces  at  the  most  critical 
])oint  of  all  in  this  campaign.  Sliould  tlie  extreme 
French  right  fall  past  Pevigny-aux-A'aches  and 
approach  Bar  Ic  Due,  it  Avill  be  high  time  for  tiie 
French  Army  in  Loi-raine  at  L  L  L  to  retire. 

And  here  one  cannot  but  digress  to  consider  the 
aiTcsting  of  the  Gennan  offensive  Avliich  has  been 
acluc^-ed  so  far  by  the  troops  covering  the  open 
country  betAvecn  Nancy  and  the  Vosges. 

Indeed,  one  of  the  chief  puzzles  of  this  great  war, 
Avith  its  astonishing  armour  of  concealment,  is  the 
position  ami  the  implied  success  in  their  resistance  of 
the  forces  that  cover  this  bit  of  open  ground. 

I  have  seen  in  more  than  one  telegram  the  phrase 
"  Fortifications  of  Nancy."  In  particular  avc  Avere 
told  in  one  despatch  three  days  ago  that  the  German 
Emperor  Avas  Avith  the  troops  that  Avere  '•  attacking 
the  fortifications  of  Nancy."  But  the  phrase  has  nu 
meaning.  Nancy  is  an  open  tonn.  There  are  a  few 
field  Avorks  in  front  of  it  Avhic'i  C(.)uld  ha.ve  no  effect 
sa\'e  to  delay  for  a  very  short  time  any  determined 
advance  upon  the  city.  There  is  only  one  permanent 
Avork  Ea.st  of  the  Nancy  line,  and  that  is  the  Fort  of 
Manonvillers,  Avhich  fell  (apparently)  after  a  bombard- 
ment of  some  twelve  days,  and  has  been  in  the  liands 
of  the  enemy  for  over  a  Aveek.  For  the  rest  tli.'? 
defence  of  Nancy  and  of  all  that  gap  depends  entirely 
upon  an  army  in  the  field.  That  army  cannot  be 
of  any  gi-eat  size.  '  It  is  only  composed  of  just 
Avhat  can  be  spared  to  cover  the  gap  bctwee'i 
Toul  and  Epinal,  but  it  has  so  far  apparently  fulfilled 
its  task.  It  will  bc^  of  interest  to  discover,  Avhen  news 
can  be  given  us,  Avhether  the  Germans  have  pursued, 
in  the  case  of  Nancy,  their  hitherto  constant  practice 
of  bambarding  open  towns.  There  is  no  town  in 
Franco  that  Avould  be  more  vulnerable  to  an  argument 
of  that  sort  and  there  is  none  Avhere  greater  destruction 
could  be  caused  by  such  a  breach  of  civilised  traditiou.s. 


10* 


Soijten.1x-i-  1:2,   I'Jl-i 


LAND    AXD    WATER 


Its  (.liaracti'i-  as  tlic  on  pita!  still  of  a  province  and  liut 
I'cociit'y  of  a  kingdom,  its  inmionse  wealtii,  its 
i('inarka1)lo  triiiinjjlis  of  arcliitectui'O,  and  its  ooiu- 
nionial  character  all  lend  tlionisolvesto  this  conclusion, 
ami  nialce  it  a  ilt  subject  for  the  experiment.  Ou  the 
other  ])and  no  such  bonibaixlment  Avoiild  have  any 
effect  npon  the  disposition  of  the  armies  in  the  field, 
und  the  position  of  Nancy  will  bo  held  or  abandoned 
ill  the  present  temper  of  the  French  exactly  as  thou'rh 
it  were  a  few  lields  of  barren  ground.  For  the  whole 
mind  of  tlie  nation  is  bent  upon  a  strategic  task,  and 
not  c\en  nn  entry  into  Paris  would  have  disturbed 
tliiit  mind  from  its  immediate  object,  which,  is  not  the 
siiving  (jf  bcuiity  or  Avcalth,  but  a  iinal  victory. 

THE    EFFECT   OF   THE  SIEGE  GUNS. 

The  mention  of  such  a  boiiibardment,  whi^'h 
may  oven  now  bo  taking  place,  leads  me  to  return 
to  a  inatter  of  which  J  have  spoken  already  in  these 
comments  (la.st  week,  1  think,  and  the  v>eek  before)  — 
the  power  of  resLstance  opposable  by  the  French 
f<n-tresscs  to  the  German  claim  that  modern  forti- 
fication Avill  alwaj's  bi-eak  dov.n,  and  speedily,  under 
the  effect  of  modem  siege  ai-tillerv. 

Xamur  was  an  exceptional  case,  for  we  see  more 
and  more,  as  the  details  come  in,  that  Xamur  was  not 
in  a  postui'c  for  defence.  Had  it  held  out  but  a 
few  days,  the  French  counter-offensive  through  the 
Ardennes  would,  probably,  have  succeeded;  the  line 
of  the  Sambre  could  certainly  have  been  held. 
X'amur  fell  Avith  an  unexpected  rapidity,  and  one 
which  will  presumably  not  be  i-ejieated  ;  but  it  is  none 
the  less  apparent  that  the  German  claim  is  largely 
Kuccessful  in  practice,  and  that  the  new  siege  artillery 
dominates  the  old  .system  of  fortification. 

If  that  is  the  case,  as  it  Avould  appear  to  be  :  if  the 
modern  ring  fortress,  thinigh  it  may  have  resisting 
jiov.vr  for  weeks,  has  not  resisting  power  for  nnjnths 
— and,  perhaps,  has  only  resisting  power  for  days — 
the  strateg}'  of  the  Allies  will  have  io  considei*  how 
far,  in  a)iy  future  development,  the  resistance  of  any 
inodeni  fortification  can  be  relied  upoii. 

-\t  the  present  moment,  for  instance,  the  whole 
of  this  gn.-at  line  of  the  Allies  is  reposing  idtimately 
UjMjn  Verdun  and  upon  Paris.  It  is  true  that  against 
J'aris  no  attempt  has  boon  made,  nor  does  it  aj)pear  as 
yet  that  hea^■y  siege  guns  have  Ijcen  brought  up 
against  A'^ordun.  IJut  it  may  well  be  that  in  some 
future  dcAelopment  of  the  campaign— and  perhaps  no 
distant  development— the  value  of  fortified  positions 
as  a  pivot,  still  more  as  a  refuge  to  armies  in  being, 
Avill  disapjicar.  AVe  must  expect  to  hear  of  their 
,  fall  under  any  determined  effort  directed  against 
them,  and  it  is  unfortunately  true  that  as  yet  a  siege 
artillery  <jf  convsponding  foi'cc  to  be  brought  against 
the  enemy's  jwsitions,  Avhen  these  in  their  turn  arc 
attacked,  may  be  lacking. 

There  is  nothing  impossible,  or  even  secret,  in 
the  construction  of  such  large  pieces  as  the  Germans 
have  brought  forwanl;  but  it  takes  time.  Their  supply 
to  tlie  Allies  is  a  task  to  which,  Avithout  any  doubt, 
the  attention  of  at  least  two  of  the  three  Allied 
Powers  has  already  been  turned.  It  is  one  Avhich  they 
Avdl  not  be  able  to  solve  bef<n'e  a  date  distant  by  many 
months  from  the  present.  One  niight  put  it  so  bluntly 
as  to  say  that  it  looks  as  though  the  Germanic  Powers 
Avould  be  able  to  rely  upon  the  permanent  fortiiications 
they  have  established  more  than  the  Allied  Powers 
can  rely  npon  theirs,  because  the  Allies  eannot  have 
for  many  )nontlis  such  howitzers  to  use  against  pre- 
])ured  fortresses  as  Prussia  already  commands  to  th'' 
uuml^er  of  perliaps  half  a  hundred. 


Aleaiiwhile,  it  remains  true  that  the  idtimate  fate 
of  this,  as  of  all  campin'gns,  dejiends,  not  upon  arti- 
ficial Avorks,  Avhich  introduce  no  more  than  the  element 
of  dehiA',  but  upon  the  success  or  failure  of  armies  in 
the  field. 

THE  NATURE  OF  THE  NEWS 
RECEIVED. 

Now  that  Ave  shall  probably  receive  fuUer  news 
from  the  seat  of  Avar  than  has  been  either  advisable 
(jr  jiossible  during  the  past  month,  it  may  be  v.orth 
Avhile  to  consider  certain  points  about  that  ucavs  and 
the  wa}-  in  Avhich  Ave  should  judge  it. 

The  first  thing  to  be  grasped  is  that  the  reports 
reaching  us  are  bound  to  be  for  some  time  to  come,  as 
they  have  been  in  the  immediate  past,  apparently  self- 
ci^ntrauictory. 

There  are  ftnir  sources  from  Avhicli  Ave  receive 
information,  an.d  the  motives  and  the  methods  of 
their  authors  are  A'ery  different. 

There  is  first  of  all  the  report  of  the  journalist 
sent  out  by  his  projn'ictor  in  search  of  the  jiicturesque 
and  the  vivid  :  sometimes  such  a  source  of  information 
is  acquainted  Avith  the  elements  of  military  affairs, 
more  often  he  is  not.  At  aiiy  rate  the  descriptions  he 
sends  cannot  be  of  value  to  the  comprehension  of  the 
cam])aign  as  a  v.hole  nor  are  they  intended  to  be. 
(K'Casionallv  in  such  descriptions  you  get  a  phrase 
which  supplies  you  with  some  truth  to  what  has  really 
happened  in  a  particular  place  on  a  particular  day,  but 
as  a  rule  they  tell  you  nothing  of  the  general  moA'e- 
incnt,  the  fortunes  of  Avhich  alone  concern  the  fate  of 
the  countiy. 

Xext  there  are  the  stories  fi-om  individuals,  par- 
ticularly from  i)rlvate  soldiei's,  Avhich  present  the  very 
high  local  interest,  but  must  bepiitin  the  same  category 
as  the  last,  so  far  as  general  comprehension  is  concerned. 

Thirdl}-,  there  arc  the  despatches  proceeding  from 
officers  in  the  field  and  occasionally  commmiicated  to 
the  public  by  their  Goveruinents.  This  source  of 
information  is  of  course  of  the  highest  value,  but  it  is 
always  somewhat  belated.  It  Avill  be  of  capital  interest 
Avhen  the  history  of  the  war  comes  to  be  Avritten,  but 
for  following  the  campaign  Avhile  it  is  in  progi-ess  this 
•soui'cc  of  information  comes  as  a  rule  too  late. 

Finally,  there  are  the  official  digests  or  short 
communiques  issued  by  the  A'arious  GoA'enaments,  our 
OAvn,  our  Allies,  and  our  enemies. 

This  last  sources  is  the  only  secure  foundation  ou 
Avhich  one  can  build  a  knowledge  of  the  campaign  as 
it  goes  on,  and  it  is  imp<^)rtant  to  appreciate  Avhat  the 
(jualities  of  these  communiques  are.  In  the  first  place 
tiuy  are  accurate  .so  far  as  they  go,  and  this  is  just  as 
true  of  the  enemies'  communiques  as  of  om-s.  The 
public  is  apt  to  be  confused  upon  this  point,  because 
every  nunour,  falsehood  or  exaggeration  proceeding 
from  enemy  sources  is  lumped  together  Avith  or 
Avithout  that  distinction  of  origin. 

I  can  recall  no  official  CJerman  communique 
A\hich,  so  far  as  it  Avent,  Avas  not  accurate.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  newspaper  connnent  in  Gennany  and 
the  stories  sent  by  the  German  financial  press  are 
often  ludicrous  and  impossible. 

Jhit  the  second  jwi'it  about  these  ofl^icial  com- 
municpus,  Avhether  from  enemies  or  from  friends,  is 
that  they  invariably  suppress  news  Avhich  is  unfavour- 
able to  their  <jwn  side.  For  instance,  the  German 
communiques  said  nothing  about  that  decisive  action 
in  front  of  Jjcmberg  Avhich  must  necessarily  influence 
the  Avhole  of  the  v.ar,  and  in  the  same  way  we  have 
li'ai'ned  from  the  enemy  of  more  than  one  rcA'crse  Avhich 
neither  our  Allies'  despatches  nor  our  own  told  us  of. 


11* 


LAND    AND     WATER 


September  12,  1914 


U|)on  tlie  wliole  the  ooniiniiniiiues  of  the  Allied 
Goveruinents  are  less  reserved  in  this  way  than  those 
of  the  (icnuauio  Croverninents.  For  instance,  one 
could  learn  from  the  French  communiques  of  the 
retirement  of  the  15th  Army  Corps  in  Lorraine  before 
the  Crown  Prince  of  Bavaria's  army  three  weeks  ago, 
hut  even  when  revei-se  is  admitted  it  is  put  in  such 
terms  that  it  is  minimised. 

The  object  of  any  CJovornmeut  in  acting  thus 
is  clear.  It  is  twofold.  It  desires  to  maintain  the 
spirits  of  its  public  and  of  its  army,  and  it  desires  to 
keep  from  the  enemy  too  full  a  knowledge  of  what 
hi.s  sticcess  may  have  been.  For  even  u  successful 
Ciicnu',  imless  lie  has  managed  to  surromid,  remains 
lurgelv  ignorant  of  the  damage  he  has  inflicted. 
Tiiere  is  a  third  character  attachmg  to  these 
C02umuuiques  which  I  have  not  seen  noticed  in  the 
jHiblic  press  and  which  is  yet  of  supreme  importance  ; 
it  is  the  fact  that  a  great  number  of  them  are 
nccessaril}'  translations  and  that  translation  is  the 
most  didicult  of  all  literary  arts.  I  cannot  judge  of 
how  far  the  translations  from  the  German  have  been 
accurate :  for  instance  I  do  not  know  Avliether  the 
phrase  about  the  Englisli  being  encircled  ten  days  ago 
Avas  a  true  rendering  of  the  German  or  not.  But  1 
can  judge  the  translations  from  French  into  English 
and  from  English  into  Frencli  which  have  been  appear- 
ing in  the  press  of  the  two  countries  during  the 
campaign,  and  I  discover  from  these  exercises  at  once 
tl'.e  importance  and  the  great  didicnlty  of  rciTdering 
any  message,  es2)ecially  a  terse  one,  into  u  foreign 
tongue. 


Thus,  about  a  week  ago,  I  came  upon  this  phrase 
in  the  English  jn-ess,  translating  a  Frencli  communique : 
"  Our  line  has  nowhere  been  really-  pierced."  In  com- 
mon with  everyone  who  read  that  sentence  I  fourd  it 
exceedingly  alarming,  but  Avhen  I  got  my  French 
paper  I  found  that  the  original  phrase  was  not  "  really 
])iereed "  but  "  licellement  eutamee."  Now  this 
word  "  entamee  "  does  not  mean  pierced  at  all. 
It  means  damaged,  bitten  into,  jjitted.  For 
instance,  when  you  talk  of  a  weapon  being 
"  cntamfe  "  it  does  not  mean  that  there  is  a  hob' 
through  it,  it  means  that  the  rust  has  pitted  the 
steel.  Generally,  the  word  signifies  a  liurt  done 
to  the  surface  of  anj  thing  and  so  grave  as  not  to  Ik; 
immediately  reparable.  A\^hat  the  French  Govern- 
ment's despatch  conveyed  in  the  original  was  the  idea 
that  the  line  had  been  severely  tested  at  more  than 
one  point  but  had  everywhere  recovered  itself.  There 
was  no  thought  of  picrcu/j/  in  the  writer's  mind  when 
he  wrote  that  sentence. 

That  is  only  one  instance,  for  every  day  I  come 
across  something  more  or  less  of  the  same  kind  ;  and 
I  think  it  woi-th  mentioning  in  days  like  these 
when  sucli  meagre  and  hurried  news  so  jwwcrfully 
moves  public  opinion.  I  cannot  but  believe  that 
there  will  be  misunderstanding  not  only  in  the  jJublio 
mind,  but  on  the  field,  nnless  the  difficulties  of  that 
most  subtle  and  at  the  same  tune  stubborn  task,  the 
transvaluation  of  language,  are  appreciated  at  their 
true  value.  For  educated  Europe  has  gone  back,  not 
forward,  in  this  during  the  last  fifty  years. 

(Copyripflit  1914.     All  rifjlits,  iiicludiuw  A'.noricvu  rights,  roseryed). 


A    DIARY    OF    THE    WAR. 


SYNOPSIS. 

AncuST  18ni. — General  Sir  II.  SmilliDorrien  appointed  to  com- 
iDand  of  an  Army  Corps  of  the  JJritisii  Kxpcditioiiarv  l-'orce,  in 
•uccession  to  the  late  General  Griersoii, 

August  20th.— The  Servians  gained  a  decisive  victory  over  the 
Austrian.^  near  thabatz. 

August  21st.— The  German  forces   entered   Brussel.H. 

August  22xd. — >Servi»  announces  tiiat  their  army  had  won  a  great 
Victory  on  the  Drina.     The  Austrian  losses  were  very  heavy. 

August  23»n.— JajMn  declared  war  on  Germany.  The  Russian 
army  gamed  an  important  victory  near  Gunihennen  against  a  force  of 
J6-3,t;00  Germans. 

August  24th. — It  was  announced  that  Namur  had  fallen. 

The  British  forces  were  engaged  all  day  on  Sunday  and  after  dark 
m  the  neighbourhood  of  Mons,  and  field  their  ground".  Luneville  was 
occupied  by  the  Germans. 

August  27th.— Mr.  Churchill  announced  in  the  House  that  the 
German  armed  merchantman  Kai\ifr  ]yiUie!in  iter  G'ro.o^e  had  bec^n 
»uiik  by  H.JI.S.  Hujhpjt-T  on  the  West  Africa  Coast. 

A  strong  force  of  British  marines  has  been  sent  to  Osteud  and 
has  occupied  the  town  without  opposition. 

August  28th.— A  concerted  operation  was  attempted  against  tlie 
Germans  in  the   Heligoland   Bight. 

The  First  Light  Cruiser  Squatlron  sank  the  Mainz.  The  Firot 
Iiattl-3  Cruiser  Squadron  sank  one  cruiser.  Koln  class,  and  another 
cruiser  disappeared  in  the  mist,  heavily  on  fire,  and  in  a  sinkuii- 
condition.  .  = 

.  Jy'°  German  destroyers  were  snnk  and  manv  da.maged.  The  total 
British  casualties  amounted  to  sixty-nine  killed  "and  wounded. 

Lord  Kitchener  anuoanced  that  "The  Government  have  decided 
that  our  Army  m  Fr.-ince  shall  be  increased  by  two  divisions  and  a 
cavalry  division,  besides  other  troops  from  India." 

August  31st.— At  one  point  in  tlie  centre  of  the  Allied  line  the 
French  troops  succeeded  in  beating  the  enemy  back  as  far  as  Guise. 

f-'EPTEjiBER  1st.— The  Russians  met  with  "a  check  in  East  Prussia, 
but  were  successful  in  minor  engagements  in  Galicia. 

September  2.n-d.— Continuous  fighting  was  in  progress  alomr  almost 
the  whole  line  of  battle.  The  British  Cavalry  engaged,  with  distinc- 
tion, the  Cavalry  of  the  enemy,  pushed  them  back,  "and  captured  ten 
•guns.  The  French  Army  gained  ground  in  the  Lorraine  region  The 
Russian  Army  completely  routed  four  Austrian  Army  Corps  near 
Lemberg,  capturing  150  guns. 

Settembkii  3kd.— The  French  Government  moved  to  Bordeaux. 

BfTTEJiBER  4th.— The  Russian  Army  under  General  Ruzskv  cap- 
tured I.emberg.  and  the  Army  of  General  BrussilofE  took  Halicz" 

Peitemder  5™.— The  forma!  alliance  of  England,  Fiance  and 
Russia  was  signed  in  London  by  the  repres-?ntatives  of  the  'tlire- 
Ooveriiments  concerned,  binding;  each  nation  to  conclude  peace  or 
discuss  terms  of  peace,  only  in  conjunction  with  its  Allies.  ' 


DAY    BY    DAY. 

SUNDAY,    SEPTEMBER    6th. 

The  British  Arinv  was  reported  south  of  tlie  Marno,  and  in 
line  witli  the  French  forces  on  tlie  riglit  and  left.  The  late.st 
information  about  the  enemy  stated  that  they  were  iieglectin:» 
Paris  and  marcliing  in  a  south-easterly  direction  towards  the 
Manie  and  towards  the  left  and  centre  of  the  French  line. 

The  1st  German  Army  was  located  to  be  between  La  Ferte- 
sous-Jouarre  and  Essises  VofEort.  The  2nd  German  Armv,  after 
taking  Rheims,  advanced  to  Chateau-Thierry  and  to  the  east 
of  tliat  place.  The  4th  German  Army  was  reported  on  the  west 
of  the  Argonne,  between  Suippes  and  Ville-sur-Toiube.  All 
these  points  were  reached  by  the  Gennan?  on  September  .3rd. 

The  7th  German  Army  has  been  repulsed  by  a  Frencli 
Corps  near  D'Einville.  It  would,  therefore,  appear  that  the 
enveloping  movement  upon  the  .\nglo-French  left  Hank  has  been 
abandoned  by  the  Germans,  either  because  it  is  no  longer 
practicable  to  continue  sucli  a  great  extension  or  because  the 
alternative  of  a  direct  attack  upon  the  allied  line  is  preferred. 

It  was  announced  that  the  scout-cruiser  Pathfinder  foundered 
on  Saturday  afternoon  after  running  upon  a  mine. 
MONDAY,    SEPTEMBER    7th. 

General  Joffres"  plans  were  being  steadily  carried  out.  Tho 
Allied  forces  acted  on  the  offensive  and  were  successful  in  checkin,^ 
and  forcing  back  in  a  north-easterly  direction  the  German  forces 
opposed  to  them. 

TUESDAY,    SEPTE.MBER    8th. 

Tlie  general  position  continued  satisfactory.  The  Allies 
gained  ground  on  the  left  wing  along  the  line  of  the  Ourcrj  and 
tho  Petit  Morin  river.  Here  the  British  troops  drove  the  enemy 
back  ten  miles.  Further  to  the  right,  from  Vitry-le-Francoi.=i 
to  Sermai.sc-les-Bains  the  enemy  was  pressed  back  in  the  direction 
of  Rheims.  In  tlie  vicinity  of  Lunoville  an  attempt  by  the 
Germans  to  advance  was  repidsed.  As  to  the  Russian 
operations  in  (iaiicia,  the  offensive  continued.  Forty  gun?  were 
captured  at  Mikolaioff  and  the  Austrians  retired  hurriedly. 
WEDNESDAY,    SEPTEMBER    9th. 

On  the  l^tfc  wi^-?  all  the  German  attempts  to  break  through 
■our  troOos,  who  were  on  the  right  bank  of  tlie  Ourc  |  failed. 
The  English  Army  crossed  the  Maine,  and  the  enemy  retired 
about  twenty-five  miles. 


12* 


Septemljcr  1.^,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


THE   WAR   BY   WATER. 


By  FRED  T.  JANE. 


THE  NORTH  SEA. 

TOWARDS  the  cud  of  l:\st  week  the  Press  Bureau 
reported  that  a  number  of  damaged  German 
destroyers  v.erc  at  Kiel,  and  that  others  Lad  sunk 
outsid'a  tha  Caual.  Speculations  as  to  some 
further  action  wera  rife.  Some  surmised  an 
affray  with  the  Russians  in  the  North  Sea,  but 
it  is  far  more  probably  a  belated  German  sequel  to  tbc  Heligo- 
land affair. 

Wiiheliii&havcn — as  the.  map  indicates — is  far  nearer  to 
Heligoland  than  Kiel.  On  tlie  other  hand,  Kiel  is  no  great 
dis-ti.ncc  away,  and,  as  Wiihelmshaven  is  an  active  base  for 
tlestroycr  divisions,  it  is  probable  that  the  authorities  con- 
sidered it  inadvisabk>  to  allow  fresh  and  vutried  forces  to 
contemplate  what  had  happcnid  to  the  division  to  which 
V  187  belonged.  The  boats  which  escaped  must  have  been 
terribly  mauled. 

In  this  connection  we  have  to  remember  that  the  bulk 
of  the  German  crews  are.  relative  to  our  own  men,  compara- 
tively raw,  and  also  necessarily  unfortified  by  those  traditions 
of  past  warfare  which  are  so  valuable  an  asset  to  tha  British 
Navy. 

We  have  further  to  remember  how  sedulously  the  men  of 
the  German  Navy  have  been  taught  to  despise-  the  British  and 
British  gunnery.  Psychology,  therefore,  becomes  a  matter  of 
o:;lreriie  importance. 

Auotlur  instance  of  the  iiinueuco  of  psychology  on  the 
German  scheme  of  things  is  t^j  be  found  in  last  Frida.y's  night 
raid  on  the  British  trawlers  in  tiie  North  Sea- -a  perfectly 
uselcs:  operation  from  tli<»  niilit;iry  point  of  view,  unless,  of 
fonrsc,  it  was  influenced  by  the  idea  that  the  fifteen  trawlers 
<apture<l  can  be  used  for  further  indiscriminate  mine  laying, 
their  crews  being  terrorised  into  concealing  the  presence  of 
German  combatants  on  board  them. 

This  is  a  point  of  view  worthy  of  consideration.  If  there 
is  one  thing  more  certain  than  another,  it  is  that  German  v/a»-- 
ships  did  not  risk  the  danger  of  going  out  for  the  mere 
"  glory  "  of  capturing  soma  inoffensive  British  fishermen.  So 
the  above  is  one  cxplanati'iu  of  that  •  German  naval  victory  " 
over  which  our  Press  has  since  made  so  merry. 

Another,  and  I  am  inclined  to  think  a  truer,  explanation 
13  that  the  nx>ve  was  a.  purely  psychological  one.     As  students 

of  hi.story  (even  if  not  from  pcr- 

PSYCHOLOGY  sonal     experience)      the     German 

AND    ACTION.       <    authorities  cannot  be  unaware  of 

the  deadly  effects  of  inaction  on  a 

fleet  bottled  up  iu  harbour.     Just  as  later  on  it  was  deemed 


^f  ^-'^^ 


place,  to  ask  ourselves  how  we  would  act  if  compelled  to  do 
our  best  with  an  inferior  force,  untried,  without  traditions, 
deliberately  educated  on  false  ideals  as  to  superiority,  and 
with  the  pusillanimity  of  the  capture  of  the  O'oeben  to  live 
down.  "  Prove  something  at  all  costs  "  is  the  only  possible 
move. 

And  so  we  arc  very  ill-adviiod  to  make  merry  about 
German  victories  (probably  on  the  Dogger  Bank)  over  British 
fishermen.  Rather  we  should  remember  that  the  capture  of 
a  bathing  machine  from  an  East  Coast  watering  place  might 
well  be  a  most  valuable  moral  asset  to  the  German  Fleet.  To 
the  inferior  naval  power  the  most  trival  gain  has  a  real  value. 


GLKMAM 


AMPIIIO:'     SPKW   PA.-Tuiit*xn 


WAi-    TO    ILI.UtfTR.iTK    THK    DOCKT.tSDS    AND    I-nlVCIP.VL    PRFV-VTB 

I'IBUS    AT    WHOSK    YAUDS    D-VMAOKD    OICUMAX    WARSHIPS  CAN    B> 

EXPAIRilD. 


advisable  not  to  allow  the  outposts  to  see  the  effects  of  Briti.sh 
gunnery  on  the  Heligoland  destroyoi"»,  so  it  liad  been  dc-sirable 
to  demonstrate,  by  producing  the  spoils  of  victory,  that 
Germany  "  rules  the  waves  "  in  the  North  Sea.  In  attempting 
to  assess  any  operation  we  hav*>  to  put  ourselves  iu  the  enemy's 


BRITISH 


DiAOP-AM     TO      ILH;STE.ITK      TlIK      USSPECTIVK      LOSSES      IX      THa 

KOBTK     SKA     IN    TEB31S     Of     Al-PBOXIMATB     FIQHTISO     TALUK    TO 

SEPTKMBKE  7tU   (oXB   MOSTU's   WABFABE). 

One  is  bound  to  confess  that  t^e  German  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  High  Sea  Fleet  has  made  no  errors  to  date. 

More:  I  am  of  opinion  that — thanks  to  the  additional 
circumstance  tljat  we  have  since  lost  the  SjieeiJ;/  and  I'a/Ii- 

fuller  by  mines  in  quick  succession 

THE    EFFECT  —   those      responsible      for      the 

OF    MINES.  destinies  of  the  German  High  Sea 

Fleet  are  neither  disheartened  nor 

dissatisfied  with  the  present  situation. 

They  have,  it  is  true,  lost  three  small  cruisers  and  a 
destroyer,  plus  an  unknown  number  of  other  destroyers 
damaged.  Against  this,  however,  they  can  place  the  fact  that 
their  mines  kave  destroyed  three  British  warships,  and  some- 
thing approaching  a  reign  of  terror  is  iu  process  of  being 
created  in  the  North  Sea.  This,  of  course,  is  exactly  according 
to  the  plan  of  campaign. 

Results  have  not  in  any  case  come  up  to  full  expectations, 
but  here,  at  least,  Germany  is  iu  a  position  to  play  a  waiting 
game.  We  shall  do  well  to  remember  this  and  to  keep 
on  remembering  it.  The  appended  diagram  indicates  that  so 
far  Germany  has  lost  more  than  she  has  gained  so  far  as 
iiiali  ritf  is  concerned.  But  I  am  by  no  means  sure  that  in 
her  opinion  ''  honours  easy  "  is  not  the  prevailing  conviction. 

THE   MEDITERRANEAN. 

The  item  of  chief  interest  so  far  this  week  is  that  Admiral 
Sir  Berkeley  Milne  should  have  relinquished  his  command 
and  a  French  Admiral  taken  his  place  in  command  of  tho 
Anglo-French  force. 

It  is  desirable  to  state  the  reason.  The  British  admiral 
was  tho  senior,  while  tho  French  Admiral  de  Lapeyere  had  by 
far  the  biggest  number  of  ships  under  his  own  command.  Tho 
Austrian  Navy  is  France's  especial  affair,  and  so  as  a  matter 
of  international  courtesy  matters  have  been  placed  iu  his 
hands,  and  the  senior  British  admiral  has  come  home.  A 
senior  officer  cannot  serve  under  a  junior  one. 

There  was  no  other  solution  of  the  problem.  Everywhere 
near  homo  the  British  Commander-in-Chief,  Admii'al  Jellicoe, 
controls  things;  in  the  Mediterranean  France  is  supreme.  The 
weak  point  of  allied  Fleeta  is  two  leaders  and  the  consequent 
divergence  of  ideas.  Admiral  Milne  is  sacrificed  to  a  principle. 
It  is  a  valuable  principle,  so  no  more  is  to  be  said.  For  good 
or  ill  the  Allie-j  must  be  one  and  undivided.  Thus,  and  thus 
only,  is  victory  to  be  assured. 

Tho  ilofhen  is  .still  ''  interned  "  in  Turkish  waters,  and  has 
nominally  passed  into  the  Turkish  Navy.  But  her  own  crew 
are  apparently  still  aboard  her,  and  tho  possibilities  of  what  this 
battle  cruiser  can  do,  using  the  Dardanelka  as  a  base,  are 
immense. 

Just  at  present  Turkey  is  adopting  a  peaceful  policy, 
but  there  is  no  telling  how  long  that  policy  v.-ill  endure.  In 
any  case  the  Turks  arc  notoriously  easy  to  ''  manage,"  .so  that 
the  prospect  of  tho  Gadien's  reappearance  hns  to  be  calculated 
for  in  the  genoi-al  plan. 

The  appended  sketch  ni.np  indicates  tho  value  of  tho 
Dardanelles  as  a  base,  the  possibilities  of  dodging  about  around 


13» 


LA?JD    AND    AVATER 


ScptonLcr  1.^,  I'JU 


the  Hands  bein?  immense.  A^eo,  should  Turkey  bo  at 
Ccrn;nv's  disposal,  lyirg  in  wait  for  the  Goebmout.id,  the 
Sv-dadl«  vould  not  necessarily  be  of  any  avail,  as  coal  is 
To  b  obtained  at  various  points  along  the  coast  o  As-a  Mnion 
The  principal  of  these  arc  marked  en  the  map,  but  there  are 
it  Vast  /dccn  other  harbours  which  could  be  -arranged 
for,"  and  all  of  them  well  inside  International  Law. 

ON   THE    HIGH   SEAS   GENERALLY. 

The  situation  this  week  is  best  described  as  "  Business  as 
u»=ual."     Certain  German  cruisers  are  still  at  large,  but  they 

BLACK 


\^ 


u\ 


^iO^ 


y'''N"'/iAUXANDRETTA 


MAP    TO     INDICATE   THE    rOSSIElLlTT    Ol'    THE    "OOEEES        IN    TUB 

LLV.INT,     AND     TllK     llIiriCULTlES      OF     CATCHING     HY.3,     BUOCin 

&1I£   EMEliQE. 


are  apparently  acting  without  any  coherent  pb.in,  and  their 
fcxtinction  is  merely  a  matter  of  time. 

Material  damage  done  by  tlicm  is  trivial,  while  the  moral 
damage  on  which  a  '■  ijuerie  de  eonne"  must  r.eccssarily 
depend  appears  to  be  entirely  nou-cxistcnt. 

It  should  be  generally  realised  thai  the  duty  of  the  British 
Navy  is  not  so  much  the  actual  catching  of  commeixo 
destroyers  as  rendering  them  impotent.  To  date  this  has  been 
done.  British  overseas  trade  is  just  as  safe  at  present  as  it 
■was  in  the  times  of  peace.  The  dianccs  of  German  intercep- 
tion aro  considerably  less  than  the  chances  of  running  into  a 
drifting  iceberg.  In  this  matter  the  plans  of  the  German 
Naval  Staff  have  gone  hopelessly  ''  aglcy." 

For  the  last  week  no  captures  of  moment  have  been 
r?corded.  German  trade,  except  via  Holland,  is  practically 
wiped  off  the  seas. 

Ill  this  connection  the  position  of  Holland  is  likely  to 
become  a  problem  in  the  early  future.     Germany  is  dependent 

oil  oversea,  -imports  of    foodstiifi's 
THE    POSITION  almost  as   much  as  we  are.     Her 

OF    HOLLAND.  indiscriminate   mine-laying    has   at 

Ica.st  had  sufficient  method  in  it 
not  to  interfere  with  Dutch  Trade.  The  pro  Pits  to  Holland 
are  probably  very  great  indeed — hence  the  pro-German  atti- 
tude of  the"Dutch. 


The  Dutch  Navy  is  of  no  great  account,  but  it  is  .nill 
ample  enough  to  have  a  potential  danger  where  its  small 
craft  are  concerned.  An  ultimatum  to  Holland  would,  how- 
ever, materially  lessen  the  ta.<;k  of  the  British  Navy;  and 
sooner  or  later  seme  such  action  soeias  bound  to  occur.  It 
is  impossible  that  Holland  shall  indefinitely  continue  to 
act  the  "benevolent  neutral"  to  Germany.  At  the  present 
moment  Holland  is  (indirectly)  Germany's  overseas  foo<l 
centre. 

By  the  "silent  pressure  of  Sea  Power  our  Navy  can 
6tai-ve  Germany  into  surrender  without  regard  to  whatever 
happens  in  the  Land  Campaign,  to  which  we  are  attaching 
just  at  present  an  undue  importance. 

For  an  aimy  to  act,  if  mit^t  he  fr,l.  The  German 
"machine"  is  fed  throvgh  Holland.  If  this  war  is  to  be 
brought  to  a  speedy  conclusion,  wc  must  declare  war  against 
;ill  the  neutrals  who  at  present  keep  Germany  in  food  su))p!ies. 
If  they  caro  to  keep  their  ships  in  harbour,  it  will  be  prob- 
ably a  very  benevolent  war;  there  is  no  quarrel  outside  the 
food  question.  But — ue  mu-<l  xtarre  C'erni.n':/  into  firrraidfr. 
People  generally  regard  this  as  a  military  war,  with  the 
Navy    just  playing  round,   picking   up   the  scraps   which   fall 

from     the     Kaiser's    table.     Tlicy 
THE    IMPORTANCE       are  wrong.     On  the.  lirUiish  T«r//, 
OF    FOOD    SUPPLY.      """'    ''"    f'>"f   "fone,    the   vlliinale 
■iyfirc  (Ifpinih:  Given  an  absolutely 
free  hand,  the  British  Navy  would  starve  Germany  into  sur- 
render inside  a  month,  though  Germans  ruled  in  Paris  and 
beat     all     the     Eussians     back     from     Berlin.      Psychology 
counts   for  much.     Overwhelmin^g   the   enemy    by    waves   cf 
soldiers    counts   for   as   much,    or    more.     But — food    supply 
is  a  larger  target  still.     A  soldier  cannot  f'ght  on  an  empty 
belly. 

The  trouble  is  that  we  do  not  realise  our  "  Sea  Power.' 
AVc  have  not"  advanced  an  inch  since  a  hundred  years  ago. 
We  have  still  no  conception  of  what  a  Navy  (given  a  fiee 
hand)  could  accomplish ;  for  all  that  most  of  us  are  ready  to 
subscribe  to  the  theory  that  "  Waterloo  was  v.on  at  Trafalgar," 
eleven  years  before. 

I  have  tried  to  think  of  a  diagram  which  will  explain 
how  a  British  warship  several  thousand  miles  away  can 
materially  affect  the  local  situation.  I  cannot  produce  that 
diagram.     It  is  too  complicated. 

But  I  can  assert  my  conviction  that,  whatever  may  happen 
on  land  (in  front  of  the  footlights),  the  real  issues  depend 
upon  the  British  Navy  (not  shown  on  the  stage).  Conie  to 
think  of  it,  stage  effects  are  produced  on  somewhat  similar 
lines.  The  "  man  behind"  controls  results.  In  this  particu- 
lar World  V/ar  the  "  man  behind  "  is  the  British  Navy.  If 
the  British  Navy  has  a  free  hand  to  stop  German  oversea  food 
supplies,  tTie  inevitable  result  is  "  Exit  Gcnnauy." 

THE   FAR   EAST. 

TuE  Japanese  investment  of  Kiao  Chau  is  proceeding 
slowly.  The  whole  of  the  sea  approaches  have  been  heavily 
minefl,  and  there  is  nothing  inherently  improbable  in  the 
report  thAt  the  Japanese  Fleet  has  already  removed  about 
1,200  mines.  This  work  will  probably  continue  for  some  time 
to  come.  Various  adjacent  islands  have  been  occupied — 
mainly  as  look-out  stations  against  further  German  efforts  in 
the  niiuc-laying  directions.  Japan  is  never  likely  to  foigctf 
her  terrible  experiences  with  mines  in  the  war  with  llussia 
ten  years  ago. 

In  the  course  of  this  week's  operations  she  has  lost  one 
destroyer,  wrecked  by  going  ashore — a  very  cheap  sacrifice  so 
far  to  the  mines  around  Kiao-Chau. 


THE    WAR    BY   AIR. 

By    FRED    T.    JANE. 


So  FAR  wc  have  heard  a  good  deal  less  than  we 
expected  about  aenal  warfare.  To  be  sure,  the 
Press  has  destroyed  more  Zenpe-lins  than  Genwuiy 
ever  possessed,  and  it  has  now  created  a  German  air 
fleet  of  "  8'2  "  destined  to  bombard  Paris  from 
above.  Details  of  this  sort  are,  however,  not 
germane  to  serious  facts. 

Turning  to  facts,  there  is  good. reason  to  suppose  that 
Germany's  sudden  embarkation  on  war  was  by  no  means 
entirely  unconnected  with  her  aerial  position,  and  a  belief  in 
the  proverb,  "  V\'ho  rules  the  air,  v.iil  rule  the  world."     At  liic 


outbreak  of  war  the  approximate  aerial  forces  available  were 
as  follows : 

Gkuman  French    Ku.=;.ii.vx    Dkitish 

Battle  Aiiohips     ...     1-5         1  —  — 

Scoiitiiij,'  Airship.'...     10         14  3  2 

Acrojilanps — About  equal  eitlicr  side. 

The  Germans  had  Iv.o  other  battle  airships  in  an  advanced 
condition,  and  these  two  are  by  now  probably  completed.  All 
Powers  had  airships  building,  both  large  and  small.  Austria 
pcvscssed  uoliiing  at  the  moment,  but  one  Zeppelin  building 


14* 


September 


1:2,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


was  fiiiily  advivncecl.     Every  Power  had  a  few  small  aiisliips 
of  uo  war  utility,  which  I  have  omitted  from  the  above  list. 

In  the  matter  of  aeroplanes  Germany  had  a  lead  iu 
efficiency  and  numbers  over  any  other  individual  power.  The 
Germans  and  Anstrians  between  them  about  balanced  the 
Tiinle  Entente  in  actual  efficient  .slrongUi. 

Since  good  aeroplanes  can  be  built  iu  si.x  weeks  or  less,  it 
is  obvious  that  exact  figui'es  mean  nothing  where  they  are 
concerned.  The  question  resolves  itself  into  the  number  of 
pilots,  who  take  at  least  six  mouths  to  train. 

With  airships,  on  the  other  hand,  exact  figures  go  for  <a 
great  deal.     It  takes  a  good  year  to  construct  a  large  airship, 

and    a  very   considerable,    time   to 

AIRSHIPS  AND  THEIR     turn     out  "  merely    a     small     one. 

BUILDING.  TJjat     is     why    we     can     discount 

stories  of  scores  of  German  airships 

built  sine?  the  end  of  last  July. 

We  may  now  briefly  consider  what  has  actually  happened. 
A  Ztppelin  has  dropped  bombs  on  Antwerp;  but,  generally 
ypcaking,  no  real  oifcnsivc  capacity  has  yet  been  indicated. 
Tlie  scouting  work  done  has  probably  been  fairly  good,  but 
inferior  to  similar  work  done  by  aci-oplancs,  as  a  Zeppelin  is 
a  fairly  easy  target. 

This  has  neees?itated  caution.  The  number  of  Zeppelins 
dc'troyed  to  date  is  thi-ce  for  certain — I  doubt  if  it  is  more. 
The  French  appear  to  have  lost  one  dirigible,  name  unknown. 
Our  own  dirigibles  have  not  been  near  any  fighting  so  far  as 
is  knov.n.  but  have  rendered  invaluable  scouting  service  in 
connection  with  tlie  E.-cpeditionaiy  Force.  This  sums  up  the 
ainhip  ;,ituatiou  to  date. 

Wc  may  now  turn  to  the  aeroplanes.  These  appear  to 
bave  been  extremely  useful  in  locating  troops,  guns,  &c.     A 

considerable  number  on  either  .side 

AEROPLANES    AND      have  been  brought  down   by  rifle 

RIFLE    FIRE.  fire.     This  is  due  1o  the  fact  tliat 

in  order  to  m.akc  cfltetive  ocsevva- 

tion  a  comparatively  low  altitude  is  csscutiaJ.     Also  all  troops 


appear  to  have  adopted  the  sa,me  metliod  of  rifle  attack — a 
steady  firo  on  a  spot  some  dislancs  ahead.  Every  aero- 
plane destroyed  seems  to  have  xuu  into  such  a  shov.er  of 
bullets. 

Unless  the  pilot  be  hit  the  chances  of  an  aeroplane  being 
iujui'ed  by  rifle  fire  arc  very  small.  Descriptions  are  usually 
so  vaiguo  that  it  is  difficult  to  suggest  exact  percentages;  1  ut 
at  a  rough  approximation  it  looks  as  though  at  least  half  tie 


< 


9ATTtE      AIRSHIP 


S 


■         AEROPLANE 

DIAQRAM  TO  ILLUSTUATB  THK  AI'PP.OXIMATZ  T.VBGET  OITEKED 
BY  VABIOUS  CLASSES  OV  AIECKAIT.  THK  rOTlOSTIAL  l)A3tA9.-f 
BY      B03IB      IS,     rr     SHOCLD     BE      NOTKD,      IN      ABOCT     THS      SAMIC 

riioroiaioN. 


aeroplane  casualties  have  been  brought  about  by  hasty  and  ill- 
considered  movements  on  the  part  of  pilots  endeavouring  to 
get  out  of  the  bullet  zone.  Possibly  three-quarters  are  to  be 
attributed  to  this  cause.  The  killing  of  a  single  soldier  iu 
ordinary  land  fighting  is  calculated  to  require  some  thonsauciH 
of  bullets;  it  can  certainly  need  no  less  to  hit  an  aeroplane 
pilot,  despite  the  fact  that  he  has  no  cover  unless  he  chances 
to  be  in  a  bullet-jiroof  machine. 

In  conclusion,  although  comparatively  little  has  so  far 
been  heard  of  the  aerial  arm,  v.'e  maj'  expect  any  day  to  hear 
of  further  developments. 


A    TOPOGRAPHICAL    GUIDE   TO   THE 

WAR    ZONE. 

By   E.    CHARLES   VIVIAN. 


Arys. — -V  town  in  East  Pnis-ia.  on  the  .Si)ciding  Lake, 
about  twenty  miles  west  of  Lyck,  and  on  the  Lyck-llothflless 
Jinc  of  rail. 

Audun-le-Roman.— Situated  on  tlie  railway  between 
Thionville  and  Longiiyon,  a  little  over  a  mile  witliin  the  French 
frontier. 

Bojan.— Situated  within  sight  of  the  Roumanian  frontier, 
in  the  .\u.«trian  province  of  Bukovina.  It  is  about  four  miles 
from  the  Bussiian  frontier,  and  is  on  the  line  of  rail  from 
Tchernovitz  to  Moghilev  and  Odessa. 

Chalons-sur-Marnc— Tlie  chief  town  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  Marne,  in  Fiance,  population  about  22,'XKI.  It  is  107 
miles  east  of  Paris  by  rail,  and  is  situated  on  the  !i!ainc  Canal. 
It  is  in  time  of  peace  the  lieadquartera  of  the  6tli  Army  CoipH, 
and  is  a  military  training  station  of  considerable  importance. 

Champenoux.— Situated  about  seven  milfs  north-ca.st 
<if  Xan.-\-,  and  about  four  miles  from  the  German  frontier.  It  is 
elightly  south  of  the  strategic  railway  from  Toul  to  Vic. 

Compeigne. — A  thickly -wooded  district  about  twenty 
miles  west  of  Sois.'-.on.^  and  fifteen  miles  north-east  of  Senlis. 
It  is  about  tliirly-six  miles  north-north-east  of  Paris. 

Dantzic. — Dantzic,  or  Danzi;i,  is  situated  at  the  south - 
we.st'-in  e.\tremity  of  the  gulf  of  Dantzic,  on  the  Baltic  Sea,  and 
is  a  strongly  fortified  port  of  the  province  of  West  Prussia,  of  which 
it  is  the  capital.  The  main  city  is  built  on  tlie  left  bank  of  the 
Kiver  Vistula,  hom  two  to  three  miles  from  its  mouth,  and  251 
miles  north-east  of  Berlin.  The  fortifications  include  ramparts 
and  bastions,  and  means  for  flooding  the  surrounding  ci>nntiyin 
^-a.'-e  of  attack  ;  a  large  garrison  is  maintained  in  the  town,  even 
in  limes  of  peace,  and  the  total  jiopulation  is  over  KK'/ifK).  The 
ifottlaii,  a  .small  tributary  of  the  Vistula,  traverses  the  main  town, 
vrliifh  contains  a  harbour ;  most  of  the  port  trade,  however,  is 
dune  through  the  Neufahrwasser  harbour,  which  gives  directly 
ou  to  the  gulf  of  Dantzic.  The  principal  railway  lines  are  those 
connecting  the  town  with  Berlin  to  the  south-west,  with  Stettin, 
more  directlv  west,  and  with  Koenigsburg  at  the  eastern  extremity 


of  the  Gulf  of  Dantzic.  The  manufacture  of  arms  and  ai  tillery 
is  largely  carried  on  here,  and  there  is  also  a  naval  building 
yard  and  depot,  and  a  marine  station.  The  im])orts  by  sea  amount 
annually  to  about  £3,0(X),0()0,  and  the  sea-borne  exports  to  a 
.■similar  figure  ;  the  principal  exports  are  grain  and  timber,  and  the 
chief  imx)orts  coal,  petroleum,  and  fish  from  the  Baltic  ports. 

Dyle. — A  river  of  central  Belgium,  tributary  to  the  Nellie, 
which  in  turn  flows  into  the  Scheldt.  The  Dyle  passes  through 
Jjouvain  and  Mechlin. 

Fere  Champenoise. — An  imivirtant  junction  of  roads 
e.ist  of  Paris,  and  about  midway  between  Chalons  and 
Coulommiers.  about  twenty-four  miles  west-south-west  of 
Chalons.  It  is  also  a  station  on  the  Kheims-Esternay  line 
of  rail. 

Florenville. — A  town  of  Belgian  Luxembourg,  situated 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  river  Semois.  It  is  adjacent  to  the  French 
frontier,  and  ia  about  fifteen  miles  east  from  Sedan. 


fifteen       miles       north-west      of 
of    the    Strasbourg-Bale    railway. 


Gebweilcr.— Situated 
llulhausen,  ou  a  branch 
Population,  about  13,000. 

Gol<I;\pp. — The  jioiiit  of  junction  for  the  Insterburg-Lvck 
and  Stalluponen-Rastenburg  strategic  railway  lines  in  East 
Prussia.  It  is  situated  about  twelve  miles  west  of  the  Ki!s.jian 
frontier  in  the  Government  of  Gumbinnen,  and  is  a  town  of 
considerable   importance. 

Gorodok. — A  village  about  eiglitoen  miles  east  of  the 
Austrian  frontier,  situated  in  the  Kussiun  Government  of  Podolia, 
near  the  Lemberg-Odessa  line  of  rail. 

Hal. — A  to'.vn  in  Belgium,  situated  on  the  P.iver  Sambre, 
about  nine  miles  south  of  Brussels,  at  the  point  of  junction  of  the 
Brus.sels-Mons  and  Bnissels-Tournay  railways.  It  is  about 
twenty-five  miles  north-wast  of  Charleroi. 

Kibarty. — The  frontier  village,  on  the  Eusaian  side,  of 
one  of  the  Berlin-Petersburg  lines  of  r.ill. 


i; 


XAND    AXD    AVATER 


September  12,  1914 


K«zmin.— f?it"atcd  about  twelve  miles  east  of  the  frontier 
Btatiou  of  Siitaiioff,  on  the  liver  Smotryc?,  in  the  Russian 
Government  of  PodoUa.  It  is  a  vilhige  of  little  normal 
impititancc. 

Marnc  River.— Rises  in  the  department  of  Haute 
Mamo,  in  eastern  France,  among  the  hills  to  the  south  of  the 
dt-partmeiit,  and  flows  with  an  average  north-west  direction  to 
Vilrs-,  in  the  department  of  .Afarne.  Thence  It  sjiaduuHy  bends 
westward  to  Epernay  and  Dormaus,  afterward  cntcimg  the 
department  of  .Scine-et-Jfarne  and  bending  slightly  to  the  south 
to  join  the  Seine  about  five  miles  south  of  Pans.  Chateau 
Thierrv,  Meaux,  and  Lagny  are  tiie  piincipal  towns  on  the  inev 
in  the'present  theatre  of  war  in  Franco.  The  Maine  forms  one 
of  the  prineipal  arteries  by  which  goods  are  transported  to 
Paris  fnnn  the  east  in  normal  times. 

Meaux.— Chief  town  of  arrondissement,  in  tlie  department 
of  Scinc-et-ilarne,  about  twenty -seven  miles  east-north-east 
of  Paris.  Its  population  is  about"  13,(KX),  and  it  is  the  site  of  an 
important  wool  market  in  normal  times.  It  is  situated  on  the 
ri\er  Marne,  and  on  the  Paris-Rheims  line  of  rail. 

Miawa. — A  station  in  Russian  Poland  on  the  Warsaw- 
Deutsoh  E\!au  line  of  rail,  and  about  ten  miles  from  the  German 
fnjutier.     It  is  the  first  station  on  the  Russian  side  of  the  frontier. 

Morhange.— In  German,  Morchingen,  a  town  in 
German  Lorraine,  near  the  junction  of  the  Metz-Strasbourg 
and  Nancy-Saargemuud  lines  of  rail,  about  ten  miles  north  of 
Marsal. 

Montmirail- — Situated  about  fifteen  miles  north-north- 
west of  Sezanne,  on  the  Paris-Esternay  line  of  rail,  and  at  the 
junction  of  main  roads  running  north-west  and  south-west  to 
La  Ferte  Gaucher  and  La  Fcrtersous-Jouarre. 

M ortagne, — A  tributary  of  the  Meurthe,  flowing  between 
Luneville  and  Nancy. 

Neidenburg. — A  station  on  the  strategic  frontier  railway 
of  East  Prussia,  situated  between  the  junctions  of  Soldau  and 
Oertelburg,  and  about  six  miles  north  of  the  Polish  frontier. 

Nikolaief,  or  Mikolaicw.— A  strongly  fortified  centre 
in  Austrian  Galicia,  a  short  distance  north  of  the  River 
Dneister,  and  about  three  miles  east  of  the  railway  from  Lemberg 
to  Stryj  or  Stiyi.  It  is  about  twenty-four  miles  directly  south 
of  Lemberg,  and  is  of  considerable  strategic  importance. 

Olkusch. — A  railway  station  in  Russian  Poland,  about 
six  miles  from  the  Austrian  frontier.  It  is  on  the  Kielce-Benazin 
line  of  rail,  t>  hich  runs  parallel  with  the  frontier  at  this  point. 

Ourcq,  River. — A  small  northern  tributary  of  the  Ifarne, 
flowing  west  from  the  eastern  bonndaiy  of  the  department 
of  Aisne  to  La  Ferte  Milton,  whence  it  turns  due  south,  flowing 
by  j\Iurcuil  and  Lizy-sur-Ourcq  and  joining  the  Marne  about 
four  miles  south  of  tlie  last-named  town. 

Rawa  Russka. — Situated  about  thirty-two  miles  north- 
north-west  of  Lemberg,  in  Austrian  Galicia,  and  about  fourteen 
miles  from  the  frontier  of  Russian  Poland.  It  is  an  important 
railway  junction,  as  the  Jaroslav-Sokal  and  Lembcrg-Bekac 
lines  cross  here. 

Rheims,  or  Reims. — A  town  in  the  north  of  the  depart- 
ment of  JIarne,  ninety-seven  miles  north-east  from  Paris  by 
rail,  with  a  population  of  about  1 10,000.  It  is  the  most  important 
centre  of  the  woollen  trade  in  France,  and  is  also  one  of  the 
principal  centres  of  the  champagne  industry,  employing  upwards 
of  20,'XX)  hands  in  this  business.  In  peace  time  it  is  the  head- 
quarters of  a  large  garrison,  and  is  considered  a  fortified  town. 
Five  railways  radiate  from  the  town  to  Paris,  Esteinay,  Chalons 
Mezieres,  and  Laon,  and  Rheims  ranks  as  one  of  the  principal 
cities  of  northern  France. 

Schoppinitz. — A  village  near  the  eastern  extremity  of 
Silesia,  in  eastern  Prussia,  situated  on  the  Przeinsza  river, 
near  the  point  where  the  German,  Austrian,  and  Russian  Empires 
join. 

Sez&nne. — About  sixty  miles  cast  of  Paris,  on  the  main 
Paris  to  Chalons  road.  It  is  an  important  railway  junction 
as  the  Paris-Chalons  and  Rheims-Troycs  lines  of  rail  cross  here. 

Tcbcrnovilz.— Capital  of  Buhovina,  an  Austrian 
province,  lying  to  the  south-east  of  Galicia.  Tcheruovitz  is 
situated  on  the  banks  of  the  Pruth  river,  and  is  a  thriving  town 
of  about  87,000  inhabitants.  It  is  only  a  few  miles  from  the 
Russian  frontier,  and  is  near  the  junction  of  the  railway  lines  from 
Odessa  and  Bukharest  to  Lemberg. 

Thionvillc.— In  German,  Diedenhofen,  is  a  fortified 
town  of  Gei-man  Lorraine,  twenty-two  miles  north  from  Metz 
by  rail,  with  a  population  of  about  11,000.  It  is  an  important 
railway  junction,  witli  four  linos  branching  to  Luxembourg, 
Mezieres,  .Afetz,  and  Saargemund,  and  is  about  ten  miles  distant 
from  the  Freiich  frontier. 


Tilsit. — A  town  of  East  Prussia,  on  the  River  Niemcn 
and  on  the  Insterburg-Meiucl  line  of  rail.  It  is  sixty  miles  north- 
east of  Ivoenigsburg  and  about  twelve  miles  from  the  Rus.sian 
frontier,  and  is  the  capital  of  Prussian  Lithuania.  The  population 
is  about  24,000.  Tilsit  is  the  scene  of  the  signing  of  the  treaty 
between  Napoleon  and  the  Emperor  Alexander  in  1807,  con- 
cluding a  peace  which  represented  the  total  hiunihation  of  Prussia. 
Its  manufactures,  and  trade  in  timber  and  northern  commerce, 
are  considerable. 

Toul. — Chief  town  of  an  arrondissement  in  the  depart- 
ment of  Meurthe  et  Moselle,  fourteen  miles  west  of  Nancy, 
on  the  Paris-Strasbourg  line  of  rail,  and  also  on  the  Jraiuc- 
Rhine  Canal.  It  is  an  artillery  station  of  considerable  magnitude, 
and  is  protected  by  an  echelon  of  forts  of  great  strength  ;  these 
are  stationed  on  the  summits  of  hills  surrounding  the  town  ; 
and  Fort  St.  Michel,  the  highest,  is  at  an  elevation  of  1,400  feet. 
From  1874  onward  attention  has  been  devoted  to  strengthening 
the  portions  round  Toul,  and  it  is  now  one  of  the  principal 
points  of  defence  inside  the  French  eastern  frontier,  being  con- 
nected with  \'crdun  by  forts  in  commanding  positions.  The 
population  of  the  town,  apart  from  the  ganison,  is  about  10,t<00. 

Vilvordc. — Or  Mlvoorden,  a  station  on  the  railway 
from  Mechlin  to  Brussels,  almost  midway  between  the  two, 
situated  on  the  right  bank  of  the  River  Senne. 

Vifry-ic-Francois. —  An  important  road  and  railway 
junction  about  twenty  miles  south  of  Chalons,  in  the  department 
of  Marne,  and  chief  town  of  an  anondissement.  It  is  on  the  main 
line  from  Paris  to  Strasbourg,  while  the  line  from  Chalons  to 
Troves  also  passes  through  licre,  and  it  is  also  the  point  of 
junction  for  the  Marne-Rhine  and  Haut-Marne  canals.  Cement 
works,  iron  founding,  and  agricultural  trades  comprise  the 
chief  industries,  and  the  population  is  about  9,000. 

Vladimlr-Volynsk. — In  southern  Russia,  about  twenty 
miles  north  of  the  frontier  of  Austrian  Galicia,  on  the  main  road 
from  Warsaw  to  Dubno.  It  is  a  district  town  in  the  government 
of  Volhynia,  and  is  thirty-four  miles  S.W.  of  the  south-westcin 
railway  station  of  Kovc-1.  Its  population  is  estimated  at  about 
10,000;  and  it  is  a  great  Jewisli  centre,  three-quarters  of  the 
inhabitants  being  Jews. 


OPPORTUNE    PUBLICATIONS. 

Admiral  Jfahaii,  of  the  United  States  Navy,  contributes  to  the 
current  i.«ue  of  The  Academij  an  article  on  "  Sea  Power  and  the 
Present  War,"  which  we  commend  to  the  notice  of  our  i^eaders. 
.Vmerican  neutrality  is  playing  a  larger  part  in  the  v.'ar  than  meet 
people  realise,  and  Admiral  Mahan's  article,  embodying  to  a  certain 
fxtcnt  the  American  point  of  view,  is  as  opportune  as  it  is  interesting. 

Among  the  trades  that  have  suffered  as  a  result  of  the  war,  that 
of  publishing  takes  very  nearly  first  place,  but  here  and  there  a  book 
dealing  with  one  or  other  aspect  of  the  present  situation  stands  out  an 
noteworthy  and  commands  attention.  Such  a  work  is  issued  by  Messrs. 
George  Allen  and  Fisher  Unwin,  and  is  entitled  "  The  Foundations  of 
Strategy,"  written  by  Capt.  H.  M.  Johnstone,  E.E.  It  is,  .".s  the 
author  remarks,  quite  impossible  to  compress  the  art  of  strategy  into 
the  compass  of  a  book,  but  it  is  possible  to  indicate  the  foundations 
of  strategy,  and  that  is  what  has  been  done  in  the  volume  under 
ronsidoratiou.  The  chapters  on  mobility,  intelligence,  training  anil 
its  influence  on  strategy,  the  influence  of  fortresses,  and  "  turning  :i 
flank,"  will  be  found  not  only  relevant  to  the  present  campaign  now 
being  waged  by  our  own  men,  but  will  also  be  of  extreme  use  to  voung 
officers  who  have  to  make  a  real  study  of  this  most  intercKting  subject, 
and  the  book  as  a  whole  is  well  worthy  of  serious  consideration  by  those 
who  have  to  know  the  art  of  war  from  a  practical  point  of  view.  At 
the  same  time,  the  book  is  not  too  technical;  it  is  .<;o  written  .^s  to  make 
an  appeal  to  the  general  reader,  and  anyone  who  peruses  its  pages 
carefully  will  find  at  the  end  that  he  has  a  far  more  correct  view  of 
the 'Operations  at  present  in  progress  than  could  be  gained  by  endlef« 
study  of  the  reports  of  "our  special  correspondent"  or  "our  military 
critic."  We  commend  the  work  as  not  only  opportune,  but  rfally 
useful.     The  price  of  the  volume  is  5s.  net. 


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1C» 


September    i2,    I914 


LAND     AND     WATER 

WAR    SCENES 


Copyright^  Af      ;  .,;'    ;'.    ,  .'..._/.i 

FRENCH   INFANTRY  IN   ACTION 


Vopyrigkt,   Newspaper  fltuxttattom 

ZEPPELIN  BOMB  HAVOC 
IN  ANTWERP 


II    »• 


Copyright,  "  Topical  "  War  Service 

BRITISH  TROOPS  LEAVING  A 
FRENCH  BASE 


Copyright,  Newspaper  Illustrations 

ZEPPELIN     BOMB  HAVOC 
IN  ANTWERP 


CopyrifU,  Neu:j:afrr  I lluslratioHS 


GERMAN   CULTURE   (>) 
German  Troopi  iooling  and  wantonly  deitroying  Buildings  at  Vise 

,  ....  ,,     %"''"'^'  '» '''V'>''i>l'  "»'«''' 'PMnl  o' till!  fact  that  the  refinement  and  culture  o(  the  Germanic  race.  mu5l  make  ii.ell  fell 

mroJlhaul  the  world.      I  be  eiamplei  t.iat  ihcy  proKide  at  preMni  durini  the  war  are  not,  however,  luch  as  will  appeal  to  the  more  civiliied  racea 

989 


LAND     AND     WATER  September  12,   1914 

THE    RUSSIAN   ARMY 


THE  FAMOUS  CU/RASSIERS  OF  THE  GUARD 


Copyright,  Newspaper  Illustrations 


RUSSIAN   INFANTRY   OF  THE   LINE 
Slow  but  Sure 


990 


Copyright,  NtiCspaper  Illustrations 


Septembers  1 2,    19 14 


L  A  N'T>    AND     WATER 


THE   COSSACKS   ARE   COMING 


Copyright,  Newspaper  lUusiraliom 
I 


«,.        ,  THE  TERRIBLE  COSSACKS 

Who.e  hery  reputation  and  gradual  approach  are  already  c.u.ing  con.ternation  in  Berlin 


w« 


Copyright,  Newspaper  Illustrations 


The  nr„.r,..  „f  .k    R  A  l       .  .    ^  FAMOUS  RUSSIAN  CAVALRY  REGIMENT 

I  he  progress  of  the  RuMian  Armies  through  Austria  and  Eait  Pri...i.  ;•  K-;„„       .  u  j      .l  ■ 

,„A  ik  ;,  k,ij-    7".""*.""°  '^"\  rrussia  is  being  watched  with  intense  interest, 
and  their  brilliant  victories  over  the  Austrian,  are  a  matter  of  intense  satisfaction 


991 


LAND    AND    WATER 


September   12,   19 14 


I 


■  < 

O    u 

o  a 

-1 2 
81 


992 


The  County  Gentleman 


AND 


LAND  &WATER 


Vol.  LXIIl.         No.  2730  SATURDAY,     SEPTEMBER   5,    1914 


rpublished  ast        pricr    sixpence 
La  newspapzrJ        published  weekly 


I'lujitsnipli  by  Liii^^ano 


VICE-ADMIRAL  H.S.H.  PRINCE  LOUIS  OF  BATTENBERG 

The  First  Sea  Lord,  is  one  of  the  most  able  and  popular  Men  in  the  Navy 


LAND     AND     WATER  September  5,   1914 

THE    FRENCH    ARMY 


'^ 


"■K- 


STAFF  OFFICERS  IN   CONSULTATION 

Generil  Silveslre  (in  forage  cap)  with  his  Staff  considering  the  siralcgellc  movemenls  of  the  French  Cavalry 


Copynght,  Ac 


i  ■  '-'Uaiiuui 


A 


BODY  OF  FRENCH   LANCERS 
Welcome  vitilort  in  a  Belgian  village 


J 

Copynglu,  Aemspaper  lUmlriiHoiis 


976 


September  5,  1914 


LAND    AND    AVATER 


'OSTEND. 


DUNKIRK 


CALAIS 


BOULOGNE 


^^f5      CHARLEROI 


ARRAS 

BAPAUME 
ABBEVILLE 


lAMBRAr 


LECATEAU    CHIMAY 


AMIENS^ 


ERONNE     GUISE' 


NOYON* 


LA  FERE 


O    5   lO  15  20  15 

■     ' I I I I 


SCALE  OF  MILES 


50 


PARIS 


THE    WAR    BY    LAND. 


By   HILAIRE    BELLOC. 


AT  the  moment  this  article  "vvas  first  written — some  thirty-six  hours  before  it  could  be  in  the 
hands  of  the  public — the  situation  at  the  front  in  the  western  field  of  the  war  was  more 
difficult  to  grasp,  and  one's  judgment  upon  it  was  more  dependent  upon  mere  conjecture, 
than  had  been  the  case  in  any  previous  phase  of  the  operations.  The  news  was  more  meagre 
than  it  had  yet  been,  and,  while  meagre,  was  made  the  more  useless  by  occasional  very  vivid  and 
very  ignorant  descriptions  of  warfare,  \viitten  by  correspondents  who  had  in  mind,  not  our 
information,  but  a  momentary  nervous  effect  and  a  corresponding  profit  for  their  proprietors. 

Nevertheless,  it  was  possible  upon  that,  Wednesday,  evening  to  arrive  at  a  general  judgment 
of  the  situation,  or  at  any  rate  of  the  positions ;  and  one  which  did  not  include  too  mucli 
doubtful  matter.     The  news  of  Thiu'sday  coiToborated  those  conclusions. 

If  the  reader  will  look  at  the  sketch  outline  which  is  set  at  the  head  of  this  article  he  will  perceive 
that  there  is  no  mark  made  ujwn  it  for  the  position  of  the  opposing  troops  or  for  the  frontiers 
existing  before  the  war  between  the  different  governments,  French,  Gennan,  and  Belgian.  Both  these 
omissions  arc  deliljcrately  made,  because  I  desire  to  show  by  a  series  of  reasoned  steps  what  has 
liapjjcned — and  only  then,  by  diagrams,  to  show  how  the  Allied  line  fell  back. 

I  will  therefore  beg  the  reader  to  follow  the  very  elementary  exposition  I  shall  now  midcrtake 
w ith  the  aid  of  tlie  few  lines  and  iK)ints  marked  upon  this  sketch  map.  It  only  concerns  the  northciu 
front  between  Verdun  and  Paris,  because  it  is  upon  this  front  that  the  issue  of  the  first  phase  of  our 
western  war  will  be  decided  in  the  next  few  days.  What  is  happening  south  of  Verdun  is  of  little 
consequence  to  the  groat  issue  north  and  west  of  that  fortress — it  is  of  the  less  consequence  since  the 
repelling  of  the  Crown  Prince's  army,  which  was  attemjjting  to  pierce  the  line  of  the  Meuse  north  of 
Verdun. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  from  the  Friday  evening,  August  21,  to  the  Sunday  evening, 
j\ugust  2.T,  the  Allied  line  was  massed  upon  the  River  Meuse  above  Namur,  and  also  along  the  line  of 
the  Sambre,  and  so  on  to  Mous.  This  long  cordon  of  men  from  a  little  west  of  Mons  to  Namur  itself 
?d  thi'ouy;h  Charlcroi.     It  consisted  upon  the  left   (that  is  in  the  neighljourhood  of  Mons)  of 


somewhat  less  than  80,000  British  troops.     Th 


e  remaining 


two-thirds  of  the  line 


ruimnig  up 


along 


^ 


LAND    AKD    WATEPw 


SeptemlxT  5,  1914 


the  rio-lit  tlirougli  Charlcroi  ami  along  the  lower  Saiiibrc  to  Nauuir  (wLeiv  tlie  Samljro  falLs  into 
the  ]\feuse)  was  h fid  by  the  5th  French  Army,  iucluduig  Algerian  troops.  There  were,  perha)»s. 
upon  the  whole  of  this  lino  live  army  corps,  including  the  two  of  the  English  contingent:  there  may 
liave  been  six,  but  the  lesser  number  is  the  more  probable.  It  was  against  this  line,  from  JMons 
to  Xamur,  tliat  the  whole  weight  of  the  (lerman .  shook  Avas  delivered.  AVhethor  eight  or 
whether  ten  Army  Corps  attacked  we  do  not  know,  but  we  are  certain  from  the  nature  of  the 
lio-htin*'  that  the  oil'ensive  (as  was  to  be  expeotedj  eamo  on  in  much  laiger  numbers  than  the  defensive 

it  had  to  meet. 

The  Anglo-French  line  from  IMtms  to  Kamur  stood  the  shock  thoroughly  during  tlios.^  two  days. 
The  weight  of  this  attack  came  against  the  centre,  uj)on  Charleroi;  it  was  there  delivered  ii';  once  with 
the  intention  of  breaking  the  line  of  the  Sambre  and  also  of  securing  the  passage  of  the  river.  That 
attack,  thouo-h  the  line  swayed  backwards  and  forwards  across  the  Sajnbre  at  this  point,  failed  in  ifs 
immediate  object.     The  Allied  line  was  not  broken  by  the  (Jennan  assault. 

At  2  o'clock,  however,  of  that  same  Sunday,  August  •23rd,  about  the  fortieth  hour  of  the  struggle, 
the  eastern  forts  which  defend  Namur  down  the  Meuse  valley  were  silenced  by  the  siege  howitzer  'iv\' 
of  the  Germans;  and  through  a  gap  of  about  .«evi'u  miles  so  opened,  the  Germans  entered  the  town  an<l 
thenceforward  conunanded  the  bridges  over  the  two  rivers.  They  were  not  perhaps  in  full  command 
of  those  bridges  till  about  5  o'clock  in  the  aftei-noon,  but  tlie  fact  that  they  would  be  in  connnand  ol' 
them  was  known  to  the  French  commanders  not  long  after  ~  o'clock,  when  these  eastern  forts 
Avere  silenced. 

As  I  explained  in  nn'  notes  of  last  week,  it  was  the  fall  of  Kamur  with  its  bridge-heads  which 
changed  the  whole  aspect  of  the  campaign.  Until  that  moment  a  counter-offensive  tiirough  tlie 
Ardennes  was  the  French  game,  after  it  a  jmrely  defensi\e  strategy  was  imposed.  The  Allied  line 
between  Mons  and  Namur,  which  the  Crermans  had  tried  to  break  and  had  failed  to  brealc,  now  had  to 
fall  back  because  the  fortress  protecting  its  right  was  gone.  The  French  round  Charleroi,  getting  the 
news  hrst,  began  to  retire  on  the  Sunday  evening,  and  the  hhiglish  to  their  left  immediately  afterwards 
in  the  darkness  between  Sunday  and  Monday.     1  illu.sti-ute  this  by  the  accompatiying  diagrams,  because. 


THE  ENGLISH 
CONTINGENT' 


TO  CAMBRA! 


MONS 


CHARLEROI 


NAMUP 


r 


TO  LE  CATEAU 


TO  ME 


SKV.TCH    SHOWJNO    lICiW   THK    lALL    OF     XAMUB     IN     THB     E.VEr.T     AFTKKXOON     OF     SUNDAT,    AUGUST     23RI),    I.\70LV'ED     AX     IMJIKMATS 

BET1U1::V8NT   OF   THK   WilOLK    ALLIED    LIXK,    PBOCKEDIXO     IP.OM     EIGHT   TO    LUFT,    AXD     KOT     UNDHRTAKEX     OX     THB     KXTEESIB     LKFT, 

WHEBM  WAS   THK  EXOLISH   CONTIXOKXT,  TILL   UABKXESS  HAD   FALLEX. 

though  the  matter  was  described  last  week,  it  not  only  bears  reiteration,  but  needs  it.  The  fall  of 
iS'annir  has  changed,  prolonged,  and,  perhaps,  made  more  decisive  the  whole  European  War. 

The  French  counter-offensive  through  the  Ardennes  to  the  east  of  the  Meuse,  pivoting  on 
Kamur,  and  hitended  to  thrust  iip  against  the  Gennan  eommimications  in  Belgium,  coidd  no  longer 
pivot  on  Namur,  becau.se  Nanuir  was  gone,  it  had  also  to  fall  back.  The  Allied  troops  which  had 
held  the  line  of  the  Sanibre,  ])i'olonged  from  Kannir  to  Mons,  fell  back,  heavily  pressed  by  the  enemy, 
to  the  position  Cambrai-Le  Cateau-Mezih-es.  There  were,  as  a  fact,  troops  beyond  Cambrai  towards 
Arras  ;  and  there  were,  of  coui-sc,  many  troops  protecting  the  line  of  the  Upper  Meuse  between 
!Mezicres  and  Verdun. 

Kow  it  will  be  noted  from  the  map  at  the  head  of  these  connnents,  that  the  Engli.sh  contingent 
which  had  held  the  country  round  about  Mons  had  not  fallen  directly  back.  Init  backwards  and  io  the 
Jeff  at  the  same  time.  Tlie  retreat  was  diagonal.  For  the  line  Ca"m1)rai-Lo  Cateau  is  not  directly 
behind  the  line  ^^lons-Charleroi,  but  at  an  oblique  thereto. 

This  'oearing  to  tiie  left  during  the  whole  of  that  r.-treat  nx-int,  of  course,  that  the  march  Avas 
longer  than  it  would  have  been  if  it  had  been  a  direct  falling  back.  It  Avas  immensely  arduous,  kept 
up  morc  or  less  day  and  night,  and  involving  heavy  losses  in  men  Avho  co\dd  not  keep  up  and  men  who 


2* 


September  5,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


were  wouuded  as  the  operation  proceeded.  It  Avill  be  found,  \vhen  the  detailed  hlstoiy  of  tlic  war  is 
writt-en,  that  cei-tain  units  must  liave  covered  not  less  than  15  miles  a  day  during  the  whole  of  that 
terrible  business.  And  the  English  contingent  thus  falling  back  from  Mons  to  the  line  Cambrai-Le 
Cateau  accomplished  with  success  as  difficult  a  task  as  is  ever  set  to  men  in  the  prosecution  of  a  war. 
They  accomplished  it  successfully. 

The  pressm-e  of  the  Gennaus  upon  the  retreating  force  was  kept  up  through  the  astonishingly  rapid 
advance  made  by  those  enemies — a  rapidity  upon  which  I  shall  comment  later  in  this  article  in  a  different 
connection. 

The  Cambrai-Le  Cateau-Mezieres  line  was  reached,  and  the  Allied  troops  re-formed  thercon, 
upon  Tuesday  night,  August  2jth. 

Upon  the  Wednesday,  August  26th,  the  superior  Gorman  forces  to  the  north  which  had  pursued 
thus  heavily  during  the  retreat,  attacked  with  the  bulk  of  their  forces  (and  the  best  of  their  forces)  to 
the  west ;  that  is,  they  attacked  the  Cambrai-Le  Cateau  section,  the  left  section,  of  the  Allied  line, 
with  peculiar  vigour  and  in  numbers  drawn  thither  for  the  pui-pose  of  an  immediate  and  decisive  blow, 
comparable  to  that  unsuccessfully  delivered  three  days  before  at  Charleroi. 

They  did  this  because  it  was  now  their  object,  not  to  break  through  the  line,  but  to  outflank  it,  imd 
to  get  round  it  by  the  west :  to  bend  back  and  come  round  on  to  the  rear  of  its  left  extreme.  It  war. 
on  this  account  that  they  attacked  the  western  extreme  of  the  line.     The  double  an-ow  means  that  in 

the  fii-st  engagement,  that  on  August  22nd 
and  23rd,  the  matu  German  assault  was  hurled 
at  the  centre  of  the  line  :  that  in  the  second 
engagement,  on  the  2Gth,  it  was  hui'led  at  the 
western  extreme  in  the  hope  of  turning  the 
whole  line.  At  this  western  extreme  were  the 
English. 

This  project  the  English  contingent  which 
held  that  left  extreme  defeated.  They  were 
not  outflanked :  they  were  not  pierced ;  but 
they  fell  back  still  further  to  a  line  repre- 
senting about  one  more  day's  march  behind, 
that  is  to  the  south  and  west  of  the  line 
Cambrai-Le  Cateau. 


CAMKRAI 


DIAGRIU  8H0WIX0  THI  DIBECTION  OF  TUB  >IAIN  ATTACK  (a) 
ON  TBB  EATCBDAT  AND  SUNOAT,  AUGUST  22ltD  AKO  23rI>,  ON 
THB  CXXTBB  OF  THB  ALLIED  LINK  AT  CBABLEBOt,  IN  AN  ATTKJIPT 
TO  PIXBCB  IT ;  (b)  ON  TUB  WEDKKSDAT,  AtJOUST  2GTH,  ON  THB 
EXTBZXITT  OF  THB  ALLIBD  LINB  (WUEBB  THB  ENQLIEU  COK- 
TIXGENT  stood)    IN   AN  ATTEMPT  TO   ENVELOP  IT. 


Upon  the  Thursday,  the  27th  of  August 
the  Allied  hne  as  a  whole  ran  from  Mezi^res 
westward,  but  no  longer  through  Le  Cateau  to 
Cambrai  with  some  slight  prolongation  towards 
AiTas.  It  was  bent  back  and  ran  from 
ileziures,  south  of  Hii-son,  south  of  Guise,  just  north  of  St.  Quentin,  to  strike  the  Upper  Somme 
above  and  to  the  east  of  Amiens. 

At  that  moment — a  moment  not  exactly  identical  all  along  the  line,  but  coiTCsponding  rouglily  to 
the  afternoon  of  last  Thursday,  August  27th — there  begins  a  two-fold  development  of  the  campaign 
which  would,  had  the  Allied  line  failed,  have  made  of  the  following  few  days  the  critical  days  in  the 
fii'st  phase  of  the  western  war. 

This  two-fold  development  was  as  follows : — 

First,  the  rapid  Gei-man  advance  was  checked  for  the  moment,  and  with  it  (for  the  moment)  the 
everlasting  German  routine  of  advancing  to  outflank  with  their  superior  numbers  towards  the  west,  or 
left,  of  the  Allied  line. 

Secondly,  in  the  checking  of  this,  in  the  taking  of  the  shock,  the  Allied  line  fluctuated  in  a  cm-ious 
and  even  dangerous  manner.  It  was  so  bent  that  no  one  could  at  fii-st  tell,  from  the  fragmentary 
reports  reaching  us,  either  whether  it  would  probably  break,  or  whether  there  was  a  breaking  point 
in  the  enemy's  line,  or  where  in  either  case  the  strain  would  come.  But  though  the  twisting  of 
the  line  did  not  yet  afford  any  ground  for  judging  the  future,  we  could,  by  putting  together  the 
reports  that  had  so  far  reached  us,  see  what  the  curve  of  flexion  had  been,  and  what  the  serpentine 
front  then  held  would  appear  to  be.     We  could  also  judge  the  peril. 

Remember  that  no  connected  news  of  the  whole  operations  had  been  communicated  for  three 
days,  either  by  the  French  or  the  English  censorship,  and  that  therefore  the  conjectm-es  remained 
only  conjectures ;  but  they  were  based  upon  the  reports  of  eye-witnesses  in  the  Press,  and  upon  the 
putting  together  of  those  reports. 

What  would  seem  to  have  happened  by  that  day,  Saturday  last,  the  2i)th,  was  something 
like  tliLs,  going  from  light  to  left,  from  east  to  west,  along  the  line : 

From  Verdun  to  Mezi^res,  along  all  the  upper  valley  of  the  Meuse,  attempts  to  cross  that  river 
undei-taken  by  the  army  commanded  by  the  Prassian  Crown  Prince  and  the  troops  from  Wurtemburg 
had  been  resisted.     The  line  appears  to  have  been  held  between  Verdun  and  MeziSres. 

So  much  for  Section  I. 

In  the  section  just  to  the  left,  or  west,  of  this — Section  II. — you  had  a  strong  pressure  of  the 
enemy  making  for  Rethel  and  the  line  of  the  Aisne.  I  take  it  to  be  certain  that  the  enemy  was  south 
of  Mczieres,  and  we  know  from  ofiicial  despatches  that  he  was  pressing  in  all  the  neighbourhood  of 
Soigny. 

Immediately  to  the  left  (or  west)  again,  in  Section  III.,  there  was  a  successful  counter-offensive  of 
the  French.  Tliat  counter-offensive  may  quite  possibly  not  have  been  maintained.  It  may  have  got 
"  'fore-side,"  and  have  had  to  retire.  But  there  are  such  definite  accounts  of  the  pushing  of  the 
Hanoverian  10th  Anny  Coi-ps  and  the  Prussian  Guards  towards  Guise,  that  they  cannot  be  neglected. 


Z* 


la:n^d  A:^^D   watee 


September  5,  1914 


Prom  tlic  next  section  agaia  to  tlie  west,  or  loft, 


Section 


lY,  "nliicli  was  tliut  Lcld  by  the  Britisb 
contini,'ent  supported  by  French  troops,  the  line  bent  back  again  to  the  south.  There  had  been 
announced,  for  forty-eight  hours  past,  strong  German  pressure  towards  the  ring  of  forts  round  La  Fere, 
and  unless  I  misread  the  exceedingly  interesting  account  given  in  a  London  morning  paper  on 
"NVediiesdav,  and  relating  presumedly  "to  Saturday  and  Sunday,  the  line  was  then  bent  back  beyond 
St.  Quentin',  Avhich  is  the  town  there  described  as  having  been  abandoned.  There  were,  even  at  that 
date,  English  soldiers  as  far  back  as  Xoyon,  though  it  does  not  follow  that  the  lighting  had  got  as  far 
soutii  as°that,  for  Noyon  may  have  been  no  more  than  the  headquarters  of  the  resistance  at  this 
indented  portion  of  the  line. 

In  the  fifth  section,  still  more  to  the  west  and  the  left,  we  had  the  defensive  line  of  the  Allies 
faciii"-  along  the  line  of  the  Sommc  from  Ham  to  Perrone  and  up  as  far  as,  and  perhaps,  a  little  behind, 
the  town  oF  Bapaume ;  the  cannonade  on  this  extreme  left  being  heard  from  Yillers  on  the  other  side 

of  the  Sorame. 

Puttinf  all  these  together,  v,-e  are  now  in  a  position  to  establish  the  defensive  line  which  the 
Allies  were  holding  against  the  Prussian  advance  at  the  end  of  last  week.  How  far  they  had 
succeeded  in  holding,  whether  they  had  not  even  taken  the  coimter-offensive,  no  kind  of  information 
had  reached  London. 

That  line,  tlien — tlie  suuious  line  held  by  the  Allies  during  last  week-end — ^the  accompanying 
sketch  describes.  Its  first  section  still  held  tlie  Upj^er  Meuse.  Its  second  was  bent  back  behind 
Soigny,  and  perliaps  already  to  the  Aisue.     Its  third,  on  the  contrar}%  'i\'as  pressed  out  towards  Hirson 


CAMBRAJ    ^^f  ATEAU     hIRSON  MEZIEREs\ 


SEDAN 


AMIENS  •^i<* 


RETHEL 
'^  QfTHEAISNe 


O    5    10  15  20  15 
i ! I      1      I       I 


<'^3>>-. 


SO 


SCALE    O?    MILES 

7h  PARTS  65  miles 


m. 


SKETCH     SHOWIXO     EOtTGHLT     THE     mOBABLE     DE^■E^•S^VE     LI-NK     OF     L.VST     TL'iSDAT     (oX     THE     LAST     TELEGKAMS     BECEIVSD     BT 

WEDNESDAY    KIGHt). 


Its  fifth  went 


right 


up 


an<l  Guise.     Its  fourth  was  deeply  indented  towards  La  Fere  and  Noyon 
again  and  held  the  enemy  from  near  Bapaume,  through  Peronne  to  Ham. 

It  will  be  immediately  apparent  from  such  a  conclusion  that  two  main  offensive  efforts  were 
being  made  by  the  Germans  to  break  the  AUied  line,  and  that  the  attempt  to  outflank  it  only  was  for 
the  moment  abandoned.  These  two  efforts  correspond  to  the  two  indentations  in  the  line,  one  in  front 
of  Bethel,  the  other  in  front  of  Noyon.  If  both  and  each  of  these  sections  could  hold  against  the 
pressure  directed  against  them,  the  line  would  remain  intact,  though  it  should  still  further  retire.  If 
either  were  forced,  the  line  would  be  pierced  and  the  first  phase  of  the  war  decided  in  favour  of  the 
enemy.     That  was  the  peril  six  days  ago. 

The  indentation  pointing  towards  Noyon  corresponds  to  the  valley  of  the  Oise,  and  is  the  shoi'tcst 
road  of  approach  to  Paris.     It  was  upon  this  notch  presumably  that  the  weight  of  the  assault  fell. 

Certain  corollaries  attach  to  these  conclusions.  Thus  it  "^is  evident  that  from  this  week-end  the 
mam  communications  between  Paris  and  London,  which  run  through  Boulogne  and  Amiens,  were  so 
gravely  threatened  that  travel  along  them  had  to  be  abandoned,  while  the  supply  of  the  English 
contingent  had  also  in  future  to  come  from  further  west  along  the  coast. 

It  iij  again  evident  that  the  threat  on  the  Oise  valley,  the  deep  indentation  of  the  line 
before  Xoyon,  meant  two  things.  It  meant,  first,  that  the  extensive  left  of  the  Allied  line  was  in 
danger  of  being  cut  off,  and  therefore  the  numerical  inferiority  of  the  Allies— already  pronounced— 
would  be  gravely  emphasised,  and  that  the  Allies  would  have  suffered  their  first  defeat  in  the  field. 
It  meant,  secondly,  that,  even  if  the  Allies'  left  should  succeed  in  retiring  and  escaping  such  a 
disaster,  the  advance  of  the  German  extreme  right  upon  Paris  would  be  the  next  step.  Such  an  advance 
would  not  mean  that  the  French  Anny  in  the  field  had  accepted  an  adverse  decision.  It  would 
still  be  in  being  and  still  be  able  to  continue  the  struggle  indefinitely.  It  would  not  run  the  risk 
of  shutting  up  any  considerable  portion  of  its  total  forces  behind  the  forts  of  Paris.  It  would 
reserve  itself  for  continued  free  action  upon  the  flank,  and  (if  possible)  upon  the  communications 
of  the  enemy  as  he  advanced  upon  the  capital.  To  advance  ujion  the  capital  would  be,  for  the 
enemy,  nothmg  but  a  stroke  of  moral  effect.  What  moral  effect  means  in  war,  how  it  may  lead 
men  to  wasteful  energy,  when  and  in  what  degree  it  may  be  of  value,  I  discussed  last  week. 


Septemljcr  5,  1914 


LAND    AND     WATEB 


But  it  is  not  to  bo  believed  that  a  Germau  Array  could  resist  the  temptation,  if  the 
opportunity  offers,  of  a  march  upon  Paris,  strategically  useless  as  such  a  march  would  be.  It  is 
lianlly  any  more  to  be  believed  that  a  modern  French  Army,  engaged  in  this  war  upon  the 
stupendous  task  of  savmg  the  culture  of  Christendom  from  dissolution,  and  historic  France  from  final 
disaster,  would  hesitate  to  sacrifice  the  capital,  and  to  preserve  the  strategic  advantage  such  a  sacrifice 
would  involve.  In  plain  English,  the  Crennan  advance  is  now  in  contact  with  the  outer  defences 
of  Paris.  This  means  that  we  must  expect  as  a  possibility^,  or  a  probability  of  the  immediate 
future,  a  falling  back  of  the  Avhole  defensive  line  from  Verdun  to  Paris  through,  or  perhaps  south  of, 
the  Eeims  Camp,  abandoning  La  Fere,  and  roughly  foUowiug  the  VaUey  of  the  lower  Mame.  That 
advance  should,  before  these  lines  appear,  have  reached  the  outer  ring  of  forts  in  fi'ont  of  Paris. 
Though  the  forts  wiU  be  defended,  I  do  not  believe  that  a  French  armed  force  of  any  size  ^-ill  allow 
itself  to  be  detached  and  contained  within  that  entrenched  camp. 


BAPAUMf  #V 


Siruwus  line  stiU  held  last-  rrr      , 


yCUlSE.  ^N 


enc^ 


VERDUN 


PARIS 


O 


30 
-J 


60 
r 


no 


SCALE 


OF 


MILES 


SKElCn    OF    TDK   TWO   LINES    OP    THE    AXLIXD    BRTIKBKENT   nl    THE    COUESK  OF   THB   LAST    SIX   DAYS,  AND.  OF   THE   LIXB  THAT   WlLIi 
rnOBABLT   BB   HELD   WHEK   OB   II  THE   ALLIES  EEPOSB  THEIE    LEFT   ON   PARIS. 

I  conceive  that  the  next  phase  will  consist  in  a  withdrawal  of  the  AUied  Ai-my  in  the  field,  its 
left  based  on  the  resistance  of  the  forts  round  Paris — short  or  long — its  main  object  a  prolongation  of 
the  struggle  with  the  enemy  dra^vn  further  and  further  in,  and  with  the  army  preserved  intact  to  take 
a  counter  offensive,  however  belated,  at  last.  Strategically,  the  Germans  should  mask  Paris,  and  not 
waste  time,  space,  and  men  in  a  diversion  towards  that  particular  area  of  ground.  The  moral  effect  of 
their  entry  into  Paris  is  already  discounted.  Whether  their  dramatic  instinct  can  be  conquered 
by  their  strategical  reasoning  in  this  matter  remains  to  be  seen.  Tliey  know,  as  strategists,  that  their 
one  and  only  business  is  to  put  the  Allied  Army  out  of  action,  not  to  enjoy  the  ban-en  effect  of  an 
occupation.  It  will  be  a  waste  in  any  case.  How  much  of  a  waste  only  the  length  of  the  resistance 
can  show.  Perhaps  they  wUl  not  so  waste  their  remaining  energy.  We  cannot  tell  till  the  event. 
Whether  their  brains  will  master  their  appetite  we  shall  know  in  a  very  few  days. 

CERTAIN    SUBSIDIARY    POINTS. 

Tliere  are  many  matters  in  connection  with  this  rapid  Gei-man  advance,  the  check  received  eight 
days  ago,  its  resumed  heavy  pressure  upon  two  points,  the  sinuous  line  of  advance  thus  hammered  out, 
and  the  present  advance  on  Pai-is,  while  subsidiaiy  to  the  main  issue,  are  of  poignant  interest  to  the 
people  of  this  countiy. 

Tlie  first,  of  com-se,  is  the  nature  of  the  casualties  suffered  by  the  English  contingent,  their 
proportion  and  then-  meaning. 

Witli  regard  to  these  the  following  points  should  be  noticed  : 

(1)  The  total  casualties,  when  they  are  known,  will  considerably  exceed  6,000,  the  first  figure 
given.  Over  5,000  have  already  been  received  for  rather  less  than  three-fourths  and  rather  more  than 
two-thii-ds  of  the  British  forces  engaged. 

(2)  Whenever  a  force  re/ires  lighting  before  another  force  which  advances  fighting  and  which 
presses  upon  the  retirement  of  its  opponent,  much  the  gi-eatcr  number  of  casualties  of  the  retiring  force 
must  be  niarked  "  missing."  This  distressing  word  does  not  mean  that  the  men  are  lost,  still  less  that 
they  are  killed ;  it  does  not  mean  that  they  arc  wounded  in  so  rapid  a  retii-cmont.     Men  who  cannot 


&• 


LxVND    AND    WATER  September  5,  1014 

keep  up  vltli  a  pressed  marcli  fall  out  and  are  taken  prisoner.  The  losses  count  to  tlie  full  in  a 
military  sense ;  tliey  are  complete  losses  to  the  effectives  of  the  fighting  force ;  but  they  do  not  spell 
death  or  even  wounds  necessarily;   their  numbers  are  m  excess  of  the  total  number  of  killed  and 

(3)  The  descriptions  given  of  a  force  in  retreat  (descriptions  which  never  ought  to  be  given  unless 
full  news  from  the  war  is  permitted)  are  utterly  misleading  to  the  civilian  mind,  and  confuse  it. 
Tliey  veil  from  it  the  true  nature  of  that  operation.  A  retreat  is  disheartening,  it  is  painful,  and  all 
the  rest  of  it ;  but  in  mere  strategj-  it  is  an  operation  like  any  other.  It  only  differs  from  an  advance 
in  tins— that'  you  abandon  to  the  enemy  that  wastage  from  yom-  organisation  which  you  Avould,  in 
an  ad\-ance,  send  back  out  of  the  way  and  well  cared  for  to  your  base. 

There  are  certain  simple  mottoes  in  the  reading  of  warfare,  whether  historical  or  contemporary, 
which  everybody  should  have  before  him  as  immutable  guides^  to  judgment.  They  may  almost  be 
reduced  to  three.  At  any  rate,  three  such  epigrams  are  the  basis  of  all  sound  judgment  in  the  matter, 
and  the  cure  for  all  panic. 

I  will  put  them  thus  and  emphasize  them  by  italics  : — 

(1)  Any  armed  force  advances  or  retires  in  columns.     lijjglds  deployed  in  a  line. 

(2)  Until  an  army  has  been  rendered  materially  tceaker  in  numbers  or  equipment  to  its  opponent,  no 
decision  has  been  reached:  that  is,  there  has  been  no  victory  and  no  defeat. 

(3)  Save  in  the  exceptional  case  of  an  army  caught  in  column  before  it  can  deploy,  there  is  no  render- 
ing of  an  army  materially  tceaker,  still  less  is  there  any  destruction  of  an  armed  force,  until  its  deployed  line 
is  cither  (a)  turned,  or  {b)  piei'ced. 

The  amiy  of  the  Allies,  though  it  repose,  as  it  may  repose  before  these  lines  appear,  on  an 
invested  Paris,  though  it  retire  south  from  an  occupied  Paris,  is  not,  to  the  hour  of  my  writing  this, 
turned  or  pierced.     It  is  in  full  being. 

THE  EASTERN  FIELD   OF  WAR. 


O  lOO  200 


»l 


^^^^^Ma: 


SCALE    OF  MILES 


'^    U 


SKETCH  OF   THI  FISLD  OP   0FY.T.\.T10SS   IX  THB   EAST,  EETWKEX  TH2    EUSSIAX,   AND   Till    AUSTRO-HUNGARIAX  AXD    GEEMAX  AR.VIKS. 

I  said  last  week,  and  it  wiU  have  to  be  said  frequently  in  the  course  of  comments  upon  these 
campaigns,  that  to  depend  upon  immediate  pressure  exercised  by  the  Eussian  annies  upon  the  Germanic 
powers,  and  particulariy  upon  Beriin,  is  to  depend  upon  a  vain  thing. 

1^^^  pressure  cannot  come— I  am  willing  to  wager  that  it  will  not  come— before  the  close  of 
October.  And  it  cannot  be  an  immediate  pressure  from  the  very  nature  of  the  operations  to  which 
Jiussian  Armies  in  the  custom  field  of  war  are  condemned.  'This  is  due  to  three  quite  evident 
lactora  :  (1)  the  gi-eat  distances  involved,  (2)  the  paucity  of  communications  to  the  east  of  the  liussian 

6» 


September  5,  1914  LAND    AND    WATER 

frontier  and  to  some  extent  in  the  belt  immediately  west  of  it,  (3)  the  presence  of  considerable  opposing 
forces. 

As  to  (1) :  I  think  the  most  striking  way  of  showing  to  the  eye  of  the  reader  what  this  depen- 
dence npon  "  the  Eussian  steam  roller "  means,  is  to  put  before  him  the  following  diagi-am.  It  is 
absurdly  simple,  but  I  think  it  is  effective.     Ilere  are  three  arrows.     The  first  (a)  represents  the 

advance  which  a  Eussian  Ai-my  must  make  from  it.s 
extreme  starting  point  to  Berlin  :  even  if  it  were  as 
rapid  in  its  advance  (which  is  impossible)  and  as 
successful  (which  it  has  not  hitherto  been)  as  the 
German  forces  in  the  west.  The  second  aiTOw  (.}) 
represents  the  distance  which  the  Eussian  ai-mics 
would  still  have  to  cover  after  they  had  masked  or 
taken  the  frontier  fortresses,  thoroughly  invaded  the 
heart  of  Prussian  territory,  and  had  passed  the  town 
of  Posen — an  advance  which  could  not  be  made  until 
the  Austrian  menace  upon  theii"  flank  had  been 
destroyed.  The  third  broader  aiTow  (c)  represents 
upon  the  same  scale  the  distance  at  the  present 
iRBows  sHowiNQ  coMP.vEATivK  LI.NOTH  OP  ADYA.Nci :  niomcnt  scparatiug  thc  Prussian  Army  (with  its 
(a)  foe  RUSSIANS  IK  EAST  PRUSSIA  UPON  BERLIN.  AustHau  atixillaries)  froffi  Paris.     I  think  the  contrast 

(B)   FOB  RUSSIANS  BEPORE   POSEN   UPON   BEHLIN.  -^    sufficiently   strikiug. 

(c)    JOB    OERMANS    ON    TUBIE    PRESINT   POSITION   UPON  T-.i'i'  11  ■!        ijli.l  Tt 

PABM.  i>ut   it    is    au-eady   evident  that   the    liussian 

advance  vrill  be  neither  unchecked  nor  particularly 
rapid.  Two  things  have  happened  this  week,  the  one  certainly  fortunate  to  Eussia,  the  other  certainly 
unfortunate,  wliich  g^ve  one  the  right  to  speak  in  tliis  fashion. 

The  unfortunate  thing  is  a  heavy  defeat  suffered  by  the  forces  which  have  been  invading  East 
Prussia.  This  defeat  appears  to  have  taken  place  in  front  of  Osterode.  We  have  the  German  official 
account  (and  German  official  accounts  have  hitherto  been  singularly  accurate)  which  speaks  of  30,000 
prisoners  and  of  a  total  defeat.  We  have  the  Eussian  admission  of  a  check,  and  we  have  the  further 
admission  of  great  numbers  having  been  brought  up  against  two  army  corps  which  were  caught  in 
isolation.  We  ought  not  to  attach  undue  importance  even  to  an  action  of  this  kind,  which  would  have 
been  decisive  in  any  of  the  smaller  wars  of  the  past ;  but  it  is  a  very  important  thing.  It  wiU  be 
retrieved ;  and  it  will  be  retrieved  by  numbers,  as  also  by  the  intense  determination  of  the  Eussian 
people.  But,  for  the  moment,  it  makes  progress  towards  the  line  of  the  Vistula,  Danzig,  Graudenz, 
Thorn,  impossible,  and  the  Eussian  SAvecp  through  Eastern  Prussia  towards  the  lower  Vistula  has 
been  held  up. 

The  second  piece  of  news,  fortunate  rather  than  unfortunate  to  Eussia,  though  not  yet  conclusive, 
equally  proves  with  what  deliberation  the  western  advance  must  be  undertaken.  It  is  upon  a  larger 
scale  than  the  check  received  to  the  north  of  Eussian  Poland  in  East  Prussia,  and  the  field  in  which  it 
has  taken  place  is  Gahcia — that  is,  the  northern  belt  of  the  Austrian  dominions  between  the  Carpathians 
and  the  Eussian  border,  and  the  southern  part  of  that  western  projecting  lump  of  Prussia  which 
corresponds  to  Eussian  Poland.  Here  an  Austrian  advance  had  been  proceeding  during  the  week,  not 
without  successes  that  might  be  called  victories,  towards  Lublin,  and  attended  by  a  peculiar  success  at 
Kielce.  This  advance  appears  to  have  been  checked  by  the  Eussians  and  to  be  heavily  threatened  at 
this  moment  by  a  counter-offensive  directed  against  the  town  of  Lemberg  to  the  south.  We  have  now 
authoritative  news  that  this  counter-offensive  was  entirely  successful.  Thus  the  main  Austrian 
attack  upon  Eussia  has  failed,  and  its  momentum  has  been  checked  and  broken.  Therefore,  after  due 
delay  for  re-organisation  and  for  coming  up  westward,  the  Eu.ssian  masses  wiU  be  free  to  cross  the 
extreme  western  boundary  of  Eussian  Poland,  and  begin  their  march  upon  the  line  of  the  Oder. 
But  not  tiU  some  time  hence. 

But  the  process,  even  though  unchecked  for  the  future,  must  necessarily  be  a  slow  one.  Until  the 
line  of  the  Oder  is  reached,  there  is  no  threat  to  Berlin,  let  alone  any  heavy  pressure  which  could  make 
Pi-ussia  retire  her  men  from  the  Western  theatre  of  war.  And  in  general,  I  repeat  what  I  have  said 
before  in  these  notes :  I  think  there  will  not  be,  under  the  most  favourable  circumstances,  any  anxiety 
in  the  We&iern  field  for  what  is  going  on  in  the  East  until  after  the  middle  of  October.  If  the 
circumstances  are  not  favourable,  but  are  unfavom-able,  then  there  will  be  no  such  pressure  for  months. 
For,  after  October,  the  few  roads  will  be  difficult  and  the  approach  of  winter  wiU  handicap  all  advance. 

If  anyone  has  placed  reliance  on  the  extraordinary  telegrams  which  announce  the  retirement  of  men 
from  the  Western  field  of  war  to  help  in  the  Eastern,  he  may  be  content  to  forego  that  consolation. 
The  Prussians  (and  Austrians)  to  the  west  of  the  Ehine  will  use  every  man  they  can  in  that  Western 
theatre  of  war  for  many  weeks  to  come.  The  train-loads  seen  going  eastward  through  Belgium  are 
either  train-loads  of  wounded  evacuated  towards  the  base,  or  men  being  moved  from  one  part  of  the 
Western  field  to  another.     Men  drafted  to  the  East  they  most  certainly  are  not. 

I  will  conclude  by  some  appreciation  of  what,  I  think,  has  been  in  everybody's  mind  during  the 
past  week — the  success  of  certain  German  theories,  the  coming  tiiie  of  many  Gemian  prophecies,  and 
the  achievement  of  tasks  which  Germany  had  openly  proposed  to  herself.  But  I  will  suggest  not  only 
the  success  of  Germany  in  these  matters,  but  also  the  modifications  of  that  success,  which  I  now  append. 

We  are,  at  this  stage  of  the  war,  at  last  able  to  appreciate  more  or  less  in  their  right 
proportion  certain  facts  which  were  conjectural  and  doubtful  during  the  first  weeks;  and  before 
we  proceed  to  our  weekly  summary  and  reading  of  what  has  happened  to  date  in  the  two  fields  of 
operations,  the  Western  and  the  Eastern,  it  woidd  be  well  to  enumerate  those  facts  and  to  grasp 
them  for  the  purposes  of  our  fm-ther  judgment. 


LAND    AND    WATEE  September  5,  1914 

1.    THE    FACTOR   OF   NUMBERS. 

As  vas  pointed  out  in  tlxc  first  of  these  aiticlcs,  other  things  being  equal,  the  deciding  factor  in 
■  a  campaign  is  tlie  factor  of  numbers— not  necessarily  of  numbers  as  a  whole,  but  of  numbers  at  the 
decisive  place  and  time. 

Now  the  first  fact  dominating  all  the  others  is  this :  Tlie  attack  of  the  German  and  Austi-Jan 
Empires  upon  France  has  been  made  in  far  larger  numbers  than  Avas  expected  by  the  French  and  tluir 
Allies.     That  is  the  simple  explanation  of  all  that  has  happened  hithei-to  in  the  "West. 

If  Ave  go  by  the  elementary  method  of  counting  the  adult  nudes  subject  to  the  Hohenzollerns  and 
the  Hapsbm-gs  and  contrasting  them  with  the  adult  males  citizens  of  the  French  Eepublic,  we  get  a 
disproportion  of  roughly  13  to  4.  It  is,  as  a  fact,  rather  more  than  12  to  rather  less  than  4  :  it  is 
almost  exactly  121  to  31) :  it  is  an  overwhelming  disproportion. 

I  repeat :  in  military  affairs,  other  things  being  equal,  the  deciding  factor  is  numbers.  It  Avas  so 
in  the  gi-eat  effort  of  the  French  Ilevolution.  It  Avas  so  in  1870.  Those  "  other  things  "  are  nearly 
equal  in  the  great  modern  conscript  armies:  training,  equipment,  and  the  rest.  Numbers  should 
decide. 

If,  then,  the  proportion  of  more  than  three  to  one  had  held,  the  result  in  the  Western  theatre  of 
Avar  Avould  have  been  a  foregone  conclusion.  It  should  not  have  taken  three  Aveeks.  But  there  Avere, 
of  course,  a  great  number  of  most  important  qualifications  to  so  crude  a  conti'a,st.  These  modifications 
may  be  roughl}-  but  accurately  summarised  under  Aa'C  heads,  which  I  place  in  order  of  theii*  importance 
from  least  to  most : 

(1)  Xot  all,  nor  nearly  all,  of  the  adult  male  population  of  the  two  central  Empires  is 
trained  to  arms.  This  is  of  less  and  less  vabie  to  the  French  as  everj'  day  of  the  Avar  passes, 
for  the  untrained  men  are  being  Avith  every  day  digested  more  and  more  thoroughly  into  the 
trained  mass. 

(2)  One  of  the  two  Germanic  monarcliies,  the  ITapsburgs,  had  to  deal  Avith  a  heterogeneous 
population,  much  of  Avhich  Avas  iU  disposed  to  the  German  spirit  and  to  goA'ernment  by  German  speaking 
men.  Therefore,  the  numbers  Avhich  Austria  could  lend  to  German}'  for  action  against  France,  though 
large,  Avas,  in  any  case,  very  much  less  than  the  mass  of  her  forces.  And  this  heterogeneous 
character  of  the  Hapsbiirg  dommions  further  Aveakened  Austria  in  a  matter  Avhicli  Avas  the  match  that 
lighted  the  Avhole  Avar — the  Sla\'s,  upon  her  southern  boundary,  Avho  had  escaped  her  control,  and  Avhom 
slie  had  foolishly  proposed  to  govern  against  their  Avills  ;  the  Servians. 

(•3)  The  French  Army  discovered,  Avhen  the  crisis  came,  tAvo  influences  in  its  favour — the  Belgian 
rcsistajice  and  the  English  alliance.  The  unexpected  and  A^ery  A'aluable  resistance  of  the  Belgians  Avho, 
though  not  possessed  of  an  army  trained  on  the  same  lines  as  the  great  conscript  armies,  though  able 
to  put  innnediately  into  the  field  but  a  very  small  proportion  of  theu*  total  adult  males,  and  tliose,  in 
pirt,  militia,  determined  a  delay  of  at  least  twelve  days  in  the  plans  of  the  German  General  Staff.  It 
is  not  exaggerated  but  sober  language  to  say  that  the  sacrifice  of  Belgium  promises  the  redemption  of 
Eiu-ope.     It  will  not  count  less  but  more  as  time  goes  on. 

Far  more  unportant,  in  the  military  sense,  Avas  the  final  decision  of  the  British  GoA^ernment  to 
su],port  the  French.  That  decision  effected  two  things.  It  gave  to  France  a  small  but  very  valuable 
accretion  of  troops,  six  per  cent,  of  all  forces,  not  quite  ten  per  cent,  to  the  total  of  the  first  line,  but 
jnore  than  10  per  cent,  of  the  total  in  the  area  Avlierc  tlie  chief  blow  fell,  and  the  Bi-itish  contmgent 
tlr.is  afforded  Avas  not  only  of  most  excellent  military  character,  but,  Avhat  is  even  more  valuable, 
under-estimated  by  the  Germans.  Fcav  things  are  Avorth  more  in  Avar  than  an  under-estimate  on  the 
part  of  your  enemy,  either  of  the  numbers  or  of  the  quality  of  the  troops  he  is  going  to  meet  at  any 
particular  point. 

Of  further  and  still  greater  importance  to  the  French  Avas  the  opening  of  the  sea  to  them  by  the 
l^ntlsh  Fleet.  So  long  as  the  sea  remains  open  to  the  one  group  of  enemies  and  closed  to  the  other, 
.so  long  there  is  necessarily  a  slowly  increasing  strain  upon  the  one  and  a  permanent  source  of  sui^ply 
open  to  the  other. 

(4)  The  plan  of  attack  long  designed  and  openly  described  by  the  German  Powers  Avas  one  in 
Avhich  everything  had  to  be  done  at  once  and  in  the  first  stages  of  the  campaign.  There  Avas  no 
iin-angement  in  fortification  or  in  strategy  for  delay.  There  Avill  prove  to  be  little  ai-rangemcjit  for 
retirement. 

It  will  be  asked  Avhy  this  last  feature  can  be  counted  as  a  modification  of  the  enormous  numerical 
preponderance  again.st  the  French.  The  ansAveris  that  though  it  does  not  affect  that  preponderance  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  though,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  actually  due  to  the  presence  of  such  a 
pi-eponderance  ^thc  rush  system  Avas  only  designed  because  those  avIio  designed  it  counted  on  superior 
rannbers — yet  if  it  is  checked  it  modifies  the  A-alue  of  numbers  in  two  Avays.  First,  the  checks,  partial 
and  temporary  though  they  be,  involve  enormous  losses  quite  out  of  proportion  to  the  losses  of  the 
(.efence  ;_  second,  they  bring  the  front  of  the  defence  more  and  more  parallel  to  the  German  lines  of 
communication.  That  is,  until  the  defending  line  is  outflanked  or  pierced  the  offensive  opposed  to  it 
goes  on  into  a  more  and  more  perilous  position  Avitli  a  les  ■  and  less  chance,  lat/css  it  acccceds,  of  securing 
its  hnc  of  ^suppl}-  against  a  counter  attack. 

(o)  Finiilly,  the  most  important  modification,  Avliich  everybody  has  noticed,  is  that  in  the  long 
run  the  uuniense  numbers  of  Hussia  Avill  begin  to  tell.  When  or  if  they  arc  telling  with  all  their 
torce,  the  numerical  preponderance  Avhich  Avas  so  enormous  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  AviU 
gradually  turn  to  its  opposite.  The  Cierman  Powers  will  be  putting  not  a  little  more  than  12  men 
agamst  somcAvhat  less  than  4  men,  but  a  little  more  than  12  (even  if  thoy  had  had  no  losses)  to  a  good 
i.eal  over  IG  or  17.  Already,  from  the  presence  of  Russian  armies  over  the  Eastern  frontiers,  the 
proportion  of  German  and  Austrian  troops  to  French  west  of  the  Rhine  can  hardly  be  more  than 
7  to  A,  and  is  perhaps  by  this  time  as  low  as  G  to  4.      And  the  great  main  business  of  the  /dlies  is, 

8* 


Septcmbor  5,  1914  LAND    AXD    WATER 

hv  furtlier  Englisli  contingents,  bj  iicrpetual  wearing  down  of  tlie  enemy,  by  compelling  Iiim  to 
expend  men  on  bis  communications,  to  make  the  proportion  4  to  4  at  last — and  tlien  to  take  tli3 
counter  offensive. 

These  things  being  so,  it  is  obvious  that  the  one  outstanding  thing  in  the  jn-esent  situation  is  the 
power  of  the  defending  line  to  hold.  It  may  fall  back.  .  In  falling  back  it  may  expose  to  every  kind 
of  suffering  the  French  districts  that  are  abandoned.  It  cannot  but,  in  so  faUing  back,  affect  in  some 
degree  the  state  of  mind  of  the  defenders.  But  it  remains  mathematically  true  that  so  long  as  that 
line  holds,  and  so  long  as  it  is  neither  pierced  nor  turned,  (1)  there  has  been  no  decision,  (2)  eveiy  day 
that  passes  is  in  favour  of  the  Allies. 

2.  THE  SUCCESS  OF  GERMAN  THEORY. 

Tlie  second  outstanding  fact  which  the  progress  of  the  war  has  hitherto  revealed  is  the  success  of 
certain  peculiarly  Gei-man  theories  now  that  they  have  been  pxit  to  the  test  of  practice,  though  it  is 
important  for  us  to  measure  the  exact  amount  of  that  success,  and  not  to  exaggerate  it. 

Among  the  theories  characteristically  German,  and  propounded  without  actual  warftu'e  to  prove 
or  disprove  them  during  the  last  generation,  were,  in  particular,  the  three  theories — • 

(1)  That  modem  fortification  would  fall  at  once  to  a  combination  of  heavy  bombardment  by  siege 
artillery  and  determined  rushes  thrown  upon  it,  at  great  expense  of  life,  by  the  infantry  of  the  enemy. 

(2)  That  men  very  slightly  trained,  or  even  untrained,  coidd  be  incorporated  into  and  digested  by 
a  trained  force  in  large  proportions,  and  rapidly,  during  the  course  of  a  camjjaign. 

(3)  That  attacks  in  masses,  and  in  fairly  close  formation,  could  be  earned  out  with  all 
the  advantage  of  weight  and  numbers  they  connote,  and  could  be  carried  out  because  discipline 
coidd  be  pushed  to  such  a  point  that  even  the  enormous  losses  involved  would  not  check  the 
advance. 

Now,  in  regard  to  these  three  main  points  of  German  theory,  we  must  clearly  seize  this  fact : 
Tlie  war  has  proved  them  to  be,  upon  the  whole,  sound.  Or  put  it  this  way  :  if  you  were  a  determined 
opponent  of  all  these  theories  (and  I  have  written  against  them  strongly  myself)  then  the  war,  so  far, 
will  have  proved  a  disap]K)intment  to  you,  and  you  will  be  constrained  by  intellectual  candour  to 
admit  en'or. 

But  if  you  put  youi-self  at  the  other  standjwiut,  and  stand  in  the  shoes  of  the  man  who  believed 
in  tho.se  theories  whole-heartedly,  and  who  based  his  certitude  of  final  victory  upon  then*  complete 
reliability,  then  it  is  quite  another  story.  For  while  the  German  theories  produced  during  peace,  and 
as  yet  untested  by  experience,  have  been  vindicated  against  their  opponents,  they  have  not  been 
completely  vindicated  by  any  means  ;  and  the  extent  to  which  theii*  full  success  was  necessary  to  the 
German  scheme  is  essential  to  our  estimate  of  the  chances  of  victory  or  defeat. 

For  instance,  it  is  perfectly  true  that  modern  fortification  has  yielded  to  heavy  siege  artilleiy,  and 
perhaps  to  a  combination  of  that  with  rushes  of  infantry ;  but  it  has  not  been  the  sudden  affaii-  that 
was  expected  by  the  Germans,  save  in  the  case  of  Namur.  The  forts  of  Liege  held  out  apparently  for 
4  or  5  days  after  the  heavy  siege  artillery  was  trained  upon  them ;  the  fort  of  ManonviUiers,  an  isolated 
work  upon  the  eastern  frontier,  resisted  for  ten  days  at  the  least,  and  perhaps  twelve.  It  is  as  v.ell, 
by  the  way,  in  this  connection,  not  to  take  too  seriously  the  stories  of  some  mysterious  German 
howitzer  which  nobody  knew  to  exist.  All  wars  produce  marvellous  rumonrs  of  that  kind,  and  nearly 
all  such  rumours  are  nonsense.  There  is  no  limit  to  the  size  of  your  siege  gun  or  shell,  save  the  limit 
of  mobility,  in  every  sense  of  that  word,  including  rapidity  of  fire.  But  it  is  possible  that  the  numbors 
and  the  mobility  of  the  large  German  howitzers  were  imderestiraated. 

We  find  then  that,  in  this  department  of  German  theory  the  Germans  were  much  more  right  than 
their  critics,  but  were  not  altogether  right,  and  the  whole  question  is  how  thoroughly  they  had  to  bo 
right  for  their  general  plan  to  be  successful. 

As  to  the  second  theory,  we  have  not  yet  been  able  to  test  it.  The  use  of  large  proportions  of 
untrained  or  half  trained  reserves  broke  down  badly  in  East  Prussia  at  the  beginning  of  the  Eussiiun 
advance,  but  there  is  no  sign  of  any  breakdown  in  the  West,  where  perhaps  a  more  moderate 
proportion  of  the  untrained  reserve  was  incorporated.  It  is  probable  that  we  shall  find,  when  the 
detailed  history  of  the  war  comes  to  be  written,  that  the  incorporation  of  these  untrained  masses  was, 
as  in  the  case  of  the  .•ther  theories,  more  successfid  than  the  critics  of  the  Germans  had  imagined,  but 
less  successful  than  the  Germans  themselves  believed  it  would  l>e.  It  is  probable,  for  instance,  that 
checks  (as  that  before  Antwerp  the  other  day)  occur  wherever  the  proportion  of  untrained  men  is  more 
than  a  certain  minimum,  and  it  is  probable  that  the  effect  of  these  elements  would  be  felt  in  any 
retirement  undertaken,  at  least  in  the  earlier  days  of  the  war.  For  instance,  you  will  find  the  rout 
after  Gumbinnen  probably  explained  by  this  featm-e. 

Finally,  in  the  matter  of  close  fomiation  and  the  weight  of  numbers  in  advancing  against  an 
enemy's  position,  the  results  have  far  exceeded  what  the  critics  of  the  German  theory  put  forward, 
iitf,  by  all  accounts,  the  effort  is  exceptional,  unique,  and  incapable  of  repetition.  It  is  not  a  nonnal 
process  of  war,  such  as  the  Germans  expected  to  establish  to  their  own  advantage.  It  is  not,  as  was 
the  charge  of  the  column  under  Napoleon,  an  operation  to  be  repeated  by  veterans  indefinitely  ;  it  is 
a  thing  subject  to  peculiar  strain,  the  men  having  passed  through  which  cannot  be  used  in  such  a 
strain  repeatedly. 

This  last  point,  if  it  bo  established,  is  of  the  first  importance  to  the  future  fortunes  of  the 
campaign,  for  it  must  mean  that  the  losses  in  the  effort  to  break  the  Allied  line,  which  effort.s  have 
filled  the  last  ten  days,  have  been  altogether  out  of  proportion  to  the  masses  employed. 

It  is  impossible  to  guess  at  those  losses,  but  it  is  possible  to  establish  a  minimum  and  a  maximum. 
They  may  have  been  over  200,000 ;  they  can  hardly  have  been  under  150,000,  counting  every  form  o£ 
loss  from  death  to  lameness. 


LAND    AND    WATER 


September  5,  1914 


3.  THE  UNEXPECTED  RAPIDITY  OF  ADVANCE. 

The  rate  of  the  German  advance,  to  wliich  allusion  has  been  made  elsewhere,  is  tlie  third  lesson  we 
have  to  leani  from  the  openinf?  phases  of  the  war.  ,      -,   -^  ,       i  i    .„    , 

It  was  evident  from  the  first  mention  of  the  generxil  German  plan  (and  it  has  been  openly  taJked 
of  by  no  one  more  tlian  the  Germans  for  more  than  ten  years  past)  that  this  phm  demanded  not  only 
surprise,  nor  only  superior  numbers,  nor  even  only  the  added  success  that  was  promised  against 
fortifications,  but  also  a  power  of  exceedingly  rapid  advance ;  for  a  blow  is  not  a  knock-out  blow  unless 

it  is  a  swift  blow.  .  .  •     ,-n   t  -l    th 

Now,  in  this,  as  in  the  other  matters  I  am  here  exammmg,  the  German  theory  has  justified  itself 
in  the  main,  but,  here  again,  not  as  completely  as  full  and  immediate  success  demanded;  fui-thcr,  tlio 
success  is  subject  to  a  most  impoi-tant  qualification  with  which  I  shall  deal  in  a  moment. 

When  tiic  French  feU  back  from  the  line  of  the  Sambre  after  the  fall  of  Namur,  the  pressure 
exercised  upon  the  retreat  by  the.Gennan  forces  was  never  relaxed  dui-ing  the  whole  of  three  full  days 
and  nights.     It  was  a  maiTe'llous  piece  of  oi-ganisation  and  of  effective  military  will. 

The  new  line  taken  up  by  the  Allies  made  an  angle  with  the  old  line,  and  at  the  same  time  Avas 
more  extended  to  the  AVest  than  the  old  line.  The  conversion  was  roughly  from  the  line  A — B  on 
the  aecompanyiug  sketch,  held  till  Sunday  night,  tlie  .23rd  of  August  (12  days  ago),  through  the  dotted 

^ '  line  E — E  reached  on  Tuesday  night  (ten  days 

ago)    to    the    line   C — D   held   on   Wednesday 


MONS 


NAMUR* 


OS       10      15       20     ZS 
■        '         ■         ■  ■         ■ 


(A 


SCALE     OF     MILES 


fcKETCH   enOWIXO   KATUEK   AND    KXTEXT    OF   THE    HAPID    AlLIJiD 
KJiTIRIMKXT  A:;D   OtfiMAN  ADVAKCr,   AUG.   23EU-:i(3TK. 

^"■■i«'^^—      THE  ALLIED   LISB.  . 

^^BM  TKJ>  ENGLISH  CONTINGENT. 


THE  INTEKIIEDIATE 

mii  20th. 


POSITION    ON     LVtNlXG     Or 


averaged 


to 
night  and  Thursday  morning  a  week  ago  ;  and 

because  there   was  this  angle  between  the   old 

front  and  the  new,  and  because  the  new  front 

extended  more  to  the  AV'est  than  the  old  front 

had    done,    the   heaviest   of   the   marching  fell, 

as  we  have  seen,   to   the   western   part  of  the 

line  ;    that    is,   upon   the  English   contingent ; 

Avhicli  is  represented  in  my  sketch  by  the  thick 

part  of  the  lines. 

But  the  remarkable  thing  about  even  that 

Avestern    extremity   is   that   the  Germans   Avere 

able]  to  keep  up  their  jjressure  throughout  the 

AA'hole   of  so   rapid  a  retreat.     It  Avas  the  true 

pressure  of  an  army ;  it  AA'as  not  merely  cavalry 

keeping  in   touch,   nor   advance   bodies   feeling 

the   AA^ay   for   the   main   columns.      When   the 

fighting  Avas  fiercest  upon  Wednesday,  the  Allied 

line  had  still  in  front  of  it — after  20  to  30  miles 

of     retreat — as    heaA^y    a    body    of    attack    as 

it   had    had    upon    the     Sunday    before    upon 

in  some  places  12  to  15  miles  a  day  fot  those 


the  Sambre.      The  Gennan  advance  had 
two  and  a  half  days. 

I  repeat,  the  character  of  this  advance,  carried  ovit  by  such  an  cnonnous  body  of  men  without  a 
liit<:h,  is  unique.  It  Avould  be  fast  going  for  a  Avell-organised  army  approaching  a  distant  goal  undis- 
turbed. For  an  army  actually  fighting  as  it  advanced,  and  fighting  against  so  equal  a  resistance,  and 
moving  in  such  unprecedented  numbers,  it  is  amazuig. 

But  after  saying  so  much,  we  must  again  qualify  our  admission  of  the  Gennan  achievement  by 
certain  considerations  which  greatly  modify  its  value  to  its  authors. 

It  is  noAv  apparent  that  these  very  rapid  strategical  moves  upon  the  part  of  the  Gennans  are  of  a 
piece  with  the  eorrespondmg  tactical  policy  of  a  rush,  dense  and  rapid,  Avhich,  if  it  fails,  inA'olves  a 
considerable  period  of  recuperation  to  foUoAV.  The  three  days  of  Monday,  Tuesday',  and  Wednesdaj-, 
from  ten  days  to  a  week  ago,  saw  this  very  rapid  rush  from  the  line  A — B  to  the  line  C — D.  The 
four  days  foUoAving  saw  hardly  any  advance  at  aU  ;  and,  so  far  as  can  be  gathered  from  the  very  con- 
fused, fragmentary,  and  hitherto  quite  incomplete  telegi-ams  received  this  Avcek,  the  three  following 
d:iys  (Sunday,  ^Monday,  and  Tuesday  last) — making  six  days  in  aU — also  saAv  very  little  advance. 

In  other  words,  this  rapidity,  .A\'hich  it  Avould  be  folly  not  to  admire  and  pedantic  not  to  be 
i'.stonished  at,  is  a  rapidity  essentially  local  and  essentially  restricted  to  efforts  isolated  in  tune.  It  is 
not  like  the  rapidity  Avhich  marked  the  great  advance  of  the  Grand  Army  upon  Uhn,  or  any  other  of 
the  rapid  general  advances  of  history.  It  is  not  even  a  rapidity  con-esponding  to  the  marches  Avhioh 
shut  up  the  French  Array  in  Sedan  44  years  ago.  It  is  a  rapidity  essentially  not  continuous.  This  is 
not  to  say  that  it  fails  to  achieve  its  purpose — far  from  that  :  so  far  this  strategical  rush  and  halt  h;is 
achieved  its  immediate  purpose — but  it  has  not  achieved  its  end.  The  Germans  have  plenty  of  time 
bef(jre  them,  measured  by  the  rate  of  their  first  advance.  The  time  is  more  restricted  if  it  be  measured 
by  the  rat-e  of  their  advance  plus  the  first  halt  Avhich  succeeded  it.  It  is  more  restricted  stiU  if  we 
ct>nsider  another  factor,  to  Avhich  I  Avill  noAv  tuiii. 

^J'hat  factor  is  what  I  may  call  "  the  expense  of  rapidity." 
^'liiere  are  two  principles  upon  which  any  great  effort  may  be  based  in  any  form  of  human  activity. 
You  may  strain  to  increase  the  productivity  of  your  capital  and  spend  only  the  income  of  it,  or  you 
may  spend  the  capital  itself.  You  may  be  aiming  at  creating  an  extra  force  Avhieh  shall  be  ahvays  in 
existence  and  alw;i\  s  dopondable,  or  you  may  be  aiming  at  an  effect  Avhich  is  necessarily  restricted  to  a 
fihoit  time  because  the  achievement  of  it  Avears  away  your  veiy  means  of  achievement. 


lO* 


September  5,  1914  LAND    AND    WATER 

Now  it  is  clearly  evident  in  the  present  campaign  that  this  astonishing  and  admirable  rapidity 
auhievod  by  the  advancing  body  of  German  forces  in  the  north  is  an  expenditure  of  capital.  It  is  ii 
rapidity  acquired  at  an  expense  M'liich  limits  it  strictly  to  a  cei-tain  not  very  prolonged  period,  and 
condemns  it  as  certainly  to  exhaustion,  unless  a  decision  is  reached  within  quite  the  first  weeks  of 
the  war. 

Of  many  proofs  of  this,  one  is  sufficient.  The  rapid  extension  westward  and  southward  of  the 
German  adA-ance  has  been  effected  by  the  bringing  along  westward  perpetually  of  fresh  men  and 
bringing  them  up  behind  the  front  that  has  last  been  lighting.  Tlie  thing  has  resembled  a  wave 
wliich  breaks  in  bias  upon  a  sandy  beach.  "When  its  efl'oi-t  is  spent,  when  there  is  no  more  fresh 
niaterial  wherewith  to  extend  the  line,  the  advance  is  checked.  I  do  not  mean  by  this  that  the 
swaying  backward  and  forward  of  the  line  of  contact,  which  has  gone  on  for  now  six  days  since  the 
llrst  check  given  to  this  rapid  Geiman  advance,  is  a  situation  in  favour  of  the  Allies  and  against  the 
Gemians :  whether  it  is  for  us  or  against  us  can  only  be  determined  by  the  result,  and  by  the 
discovery,  at  the  close  of  the  struggle,  that  our  line  is  pierced  or  theirs.  All  I  mean  is  that,  so  far  as 
ihe  mere  element  of  rapidity  is  concerned,  this  halt  to  which  the  Gemians  were  constrained  between 
theh'  lii-st  rapid  advance  (August  23 — 26)  and  theii-  second  (August  30 — September  1)  proves  at  what 
an  expense  the  ru.sh  is  eifectod. 

4.  THE    PERFECTION   OF  THE   INTELLIGENCE    DEPARTMENT. 

Finall}'  v.e  have,  subject  to  less  qualification  than  any  other  of  the  German  successes,  the  success 
of  the  German  intelligence  system,  or,  to  use  an  old-fashioned  word,  the  succcess  of  the  Gemian  spy. 

Very  few  people  in  this  country  have  the  lea.st  idea  either  of  the  perfection  of  the  spy  system 
that  has  been  organised  tliroughout  Europe  from  Berlin,  or  of  its  almost  incredible  extent.  The 
French  themselves,  though  they  had  ample  cause  for  suspicion  and  a  national  memory  that  should 
have  left  them  in  little  doubt  upon  the  matter,  were  divided  (before  the  war)  in  tlieir  judgment  of  this 
cs.sential  to  a  German  success  ;  and  I  have  heard  and  have  half-believed  the  ridicule  that  was  poured 
upon  those  who  talked  of  the  "  avant-guerre." 

As  for  England,  the  Gonnan  spy  system  therein  has  been  almost  entirely  neglected  by  the 
Government  and  by  the  people,  and  to  this  day  I  doubt  if  one  educated  man  in  a  thousand  has  even 
3'ct  suspected  its  extent  and  its  exact  organisation.  Conversely,  the  German  Government  and 
military  authorities  have  been  able  to  keep  from  their  enemies  all  knowledge  of  such  affairs  domestic 
to  their  forces  as  they  desired  to  keep  secret. 

I  say  that  in  this  capital  point  avc  have  the  success  of  a  Gemian  theory — or,  rather,  the  triumph 
of  a  German  claim — which  we  can  qualify  less  than  any  other,  and  which  is  the  most  perfect  of  all. 
But  even  tliis  one  is  subject  to  some  modification,  a  modification  parallel  to  those  which  we  have  been 
able  to  apply  to  every  other  fomi  of  German  success  we  have  examined.  It  is  this  :  that  the  element 
of  time  is  against  it.  A  perfected  intt'lligenco  system,  the  use  of  a  great  horde  of  spies  spread 
throughout  Europe  and  admirably  co-orduiated,  is  of  supreme  iniportance  at  the  beginning  of  a  war, 
as  is  the  converse  achievement  of  keeping  from  one's  enemies  knowledge  of  one's  own  movements  and 
material.  But  it  is,  on  the  face  of  it,  an  advantage  which  suffers  rapid  attrition  in  the  progress  of  a 
campaign.  Eighting  has  not  long  proceeded  before  the  enemy  upon  whom  you  have  spied  knows 
what  you  have  found  out,  and  has  also  begun  to  discover  and  to  destroy  your  mtelligence  sjsteni 
within  his  lines.  Fighting  has  not  long  proceeded  before  the  enemy  from  whom  you  ha\o  kept 
knowledge  of  cei-tain  points  of  your  material  jmd  organisation  discovers  them  by  your  very  successes. 

It  would  be  folly  to  depend  upon  this  consideration  for  the  belittling  of  a  good  intelligence 
pj'stcm.  A  good  intelligence  system  gives  immense  initial  advantages,  and  initial  advantages  often 
dcter;iiiiie  a  campaign.     But  my  point  is  that  the  advantage  /*  essentially  an  initial  advantage  alone. 


L 


A    DIARY    OF    THE    WAR. 

SYNOPSIS.  Accr.T  2.SD.     .         . 

Germany  «  ultimatum  to  Belgium. 
Jrr,\  23rd. 

Aubtro-Hungai'ian  ultimatum  to  Servia.  Avi.:;.st  3ed. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  stated  British  policy  and  revealed  Germany's 

Jvi-i  25th.  amazing  offer,  in  the  event  of  our  neglecting  our  obligations 

King  Pct«r  of  Servia's  appeal  to  Russia.  to  France.     MobiIi.<iation  of  the  Army.     Ultimatum  to  Oer.niany 

TrtT  97TIT  *''*'    Belgian    appeal    to    England.     German    aud    French 

7..    ,. ,        ,  r>  iTi/-r  i»,r.v  Ambassadors  left  Paris  and  Berlio. 

Sir  tdward  Grey  proposed  a  Lfindon  Conlettnce  between  Fienc-h, 

German,  Italian,  aud  Great  Britain's  Ambassador!.  Arcvsr  4xh 

Jrtx  28tr.  Germany  rejected   ultimatum.     English    Government    took   over 

Austria- Hungary  declared  war  on  Senia.  control    of    railwaj-6.      War    declared    between    England    and 

"    '  Germany. 

Jri.v  2SrH.  Vice-Admiral   Sir  John   Jellicoe  appointed  to  command   of   the 

A  partial  Hufisian  mobilisation,  confined  to  the  Army  Corps  on  Homo  Fleets,  with  the  acting  rank  of  admiral, 
the    borders    of    Austria-Hungary,    was    signed    on   receipt   of 

the   news  of   the   bombardment  of    Belgrade.     English   Stock  Arcrsr  5th. 

Exchange  closed.     English  Bank  Rate,  b  per  cent.  I«rd  Kitchener  appointed  Secretary  of  State  for  War.     II. M.S. 

Jiiijihion    M,nick     a    mine     and     fouuderc-d.     5Iany    Gennan 

Arcriir  1st.              _  fcliips  seized. 
Gencr.-.l    Hussian    mobilisation    ordered.      Germ.nn    mobilisation 

m-dpied  by  Emperor.     Germany  declared   war  on  Russia  and  Acoist  6th. 

•»5           followed    up    this   declaration    by    immediately    invading   the  House  of  Commons,  in  five  minutes,  passed  a  vote  of  credit  for 

(Jraiid  Duchy  of  Luxemburg,  the  neutral  fctata  between  Irance  £100,000,000,   and   sanctioned    an   increase  of   the   Army    by 

and  Germany.     King  George   made  a   final   effort   for   peace,  500,000  men.     .State  control  of  food  prices.     The  German  battle 

dispatching  a   direct  personal  tel"gram  to  the  Tsar,  offering  cruiser   Cuchrn   and  her  e.s*oit     driven  into  Messina  by  two 

iiiidiation.     Before   it    could    reach    St.    Petersburg   Germany  Briti^L  cruisers.     A  fieico  battle  still  continued  bciort  Liege. 

dvc!ared  war.  Italy  declared  her  neutrality. 

11* 


LAND    AND     WATER 


September  5,  1914 


AvavsT  7th. 

Tha  German  cruiser  Coeben,  with  her  escort  the  Breflau,  loU 
Messhia.  Offrmans  oi'.tside  Li^^c  ivikcd  for  a  Iwentyfoiir 
h  nirs"  amitfUcc  to  collect  their  killed  ar,d  wounded.  Ai-nsistita 
refused  by  Belgians. 

Aoar-w  Sin. 

French   troops  invaded  .AUace  and  reached   Mii'haiuen  aft-er  a 
f.harp  engagement,  in  which  the  Germans  were  routed  v.ith  tha 
bayonet.     Lord  Kitchener  issued  a  circular  asking  ior  100,000 
men. 
Avava-  9th. 

One  of  the  cruiser  squadrons  of  Uie  Main  Fleet  was  attacked  by 
GeiTiian  Bubmarines.  The  enemy's  submarine,  U15,  was  sunk 
by  H.M.S.  Birmingham. 

Aoonar  lOrn. 

Fiance  declared  war  on  Austria-Hungary.  Li^go  forts  stul 
r.ntaken.  G'ermans  advanced  on  Namnr.  The  ne-.v  Pri?s.» 
Jtureaa  cstablislied  by  the  Government  for  the  issue  of  officii! 
war  news  opened. 

AccuST  llm. 

Ino  Goeben  and  Sreslau  took  refuge  in  the  Dardanelles.  Eng!a:i<i 
declared  war  against  Austria.. 

August  12Ta. 

Conhen  and  Breslau  purchased  by  Turkey.  Bombardment  of 
Liege  forts  resumed. 

Alojst  15th. 

The  Tsar  addressed  a  Proclamation  to  the  Polish  populations  of 
Kuseia,  Germany,  and  Austria,  promising  to  restore  to  Poland 
complete  autonomy  ajid  guarantees  for  religious  liberty  and 
the  use  of  the  Poli^^h  language. 

August  16th. 

Japanese  ultimatum  to  Germany  demanding  the  withdrawal  of 
her  vessels  of  war  from  the  Far  East. 

August  17ih. 

The  British  Expeditionary  Force  safely  landed  in  France.     Death. 

of  Lieut. -General  Sir  Jam«s  Grierson. 
Tlie  Belgian  Government  transfencd  from  Brussels  to  Antwerp. 

August  18th. 

General  Sir  H.  Smith-Dorrien  appointed  to  comir:and  of  an  Amiy 

Corps  of  the  Britisli  Expeditionary  Force,  in  succession  to  tha 

late  General  Grierson. 
Some  desultory  fighting  took  plac«  in  the  Xorth  Se*. 

August  20th. 

The  Servians  gained  a  decisive  victory  over  the  Austiians  near 
fchabatz. 

Aj^usi  21st. 

The  German  forces  entered  Brussels. 

AoGCSi  22L\D. 

Servia  announces  that  their  array  had  won  a  great  victory  on  tha 
Drina.     The  Austrian  losses  v.cre  very  heavy. 

August  23rd. 

J.ipan  declared  war  on  Germany.  Tlie  Russian  army  gained  an 
important  victory  near  Gumltenneu  against  a  force  of  160,000 
Germans. 

August  24rH. 

It  was  announced  that  Kamur  had  fallen. 

The  British  forces  were  engaged   all  dny  on  Sunday  and  after 

daik  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Mons,  and  held  their  ground. 
Luneville  was  occupied  by  the  Germans. 

August  27ih. 

Mr.  Churchill  announced  in  the  House  that  the  German  armed 
merchantman  Kaiser  Wilhclm  der  Grosst  had  been  sunk  by 
H.M.S.  Highfyer  on  the  West  African  coast. 

A  strong  force  of  British  marines  has  been  sent  to  Ostend  and 
has  occupied  the  town  without  opposition. 


DAY    BY    DAY. 

FRIDAY,    AUGUST    28th. 

Early  in  tlie  morning  a  concerted  operation  was 
attempted  against  tlie  Germans  in  the  Heligoland  Bight. 

The  First  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  sank  the  Main:, 
receiving  only  very  sUght  damage.  The  First  Battit- 
Cruiser  Squadron  sank  one  cruiser,  Koln  class,  and 
another  cruiser  disappeared  in  the  mist,  heavily  on  firo 
and  in  a  sinking  condition. 

All  the  German  cruisers  which  engaged  were  thus  disposed 
of. 

Two  German  destroyers  were  sunk  and  many  damaged. 
The  total  British  casualties  amounted  to  sistv-niaa 
killed  and  wounded. 
Lord  Kitchener  announced  in  tlie  House  of  Lords  that 
^  '■  The  Government  have  decided  that  our  Army  in 
France  shall  be  increased  bv  two  divisions  and  a 
cavalry  division,  besides  other  troops  from  India.  Tha 
first  division  of  these  troops  is  now  on  its  wav." 

SATURDAY,    AUGUST    29th. 
No  official  news. 


SUNDAY.    AUGUST   SGth. 

The  following  statement  summarises  that  communicated 
by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  : — 

Although  the  oliicial  dispatches  fi'om  Sir  John  French  on 
the  recent  battles  have  not  yet  been  received  it  is 
possible  now  to  state  in  general  outline  what  the 
British  share  in  the  recent  operations  has  been. 

•There  has,  in  efiect,  been  a  four  days'  battle — on 
August  23rd,  24th,  25th,  and  2Cth.  During  the  whole 
of  this  j)eriod  the  British  troops,  in  conformity  with  the 
general  movement  of  the  French  armies,  were  occupied 
in  resisting  and  checking  the  German  advance  and 
in  withdrawing  to  the  new  lines  of  defence. 

Tlie  battle  began  at  Mons  on  Sunday,  during  which  day 
and  part  of  the  night  the  German  attack,  which  wa.s 
stubbornly  pressed  and  repeated,  was  completely  checked 
on  the  British  front. 

On  Monday,  the  24th,  the  Germans  made  vigorous 
efforts  in  superior  numbers  to  prevent  the  safe 
withrdawal  of  the  British  Army  and  to  di-ive  it  into  the 
fortress  of  Maubeugo.  This  eHort  was  frustrated  by 
the  steadiness  and  skill  with  which  the  British  retire- 
ment was  conducted. 

The  British  retirement  proceeded  on  the  25th  with  con- 
tinuous fighting,  though  not  on  the  scale  of  the  previou.s 
two  days,  and  by  the  night  of  the  25th  the  British 
Army  occupied  the  line  Cambrai-Landrecies-le-Cateau. 

It;  had  been  intended  to  resume  the  retirement  at  day- 
break on  the  2Gth,  but  the  German  attack,  in  which  no 
less  than  five  Corps  were  engaged,  was  so  close  and 
fierce  that  it  was  not  possible  to  carry  out  this  intention 
imtii  the  afternoon. 

The  battle  on  this  day,  August  26th,  was  of  the  most 
severe  and  desperate  character.  The  troops  offered  a 
superb  and  most  stubborn  resistance  to  the  tremendous 
odds  with  which  they  were  confronted,  and  at  length 
extricated  themselves  in  good  order,  though  with  serious 
losses  and  under  the  heaviest  artillery  fire. 

No  p;nn3  were  taken  by  the  enemy  except  those  the  horses 
of  which  were  all  killed,  orwhich  were  shattered  by  high 
explosive  shells. 

Sir  John  French  estimates  that  during  the  whole  of  these 
operations,  from  the  23rd  to  the  26th  inclusive,  his  losses 
amount  to  5,000  or  6,000  men.  On  the  other  hand  the 
losses  suffered  by  the  Germans  in  their  attacks  across 
the  open,  and  through  their  dense  formation,  are  out  of 
all  proportion  to  those  which  we  have  suffered. 

Since  the  26th,  apart  from  cavalry  fighting,  the  British 
Army  has  not  been  molested.  Reinforcements 
amounting  to  double  the  loss  suffered  have  already 
joined. 

MONDAY.    AUGUST   31st. 

At  one  point  in  the  centre  of  the  Allied  line  the 
Frenph  troops  succeeded  in  beating  the  enemy  back  a3 
far  33  Guise. 

The  Queen  of  the  Belgians  and  her  three  children 
arrived  in  England. 

TUESD.4Y,    SEPTEMBER    1st. 

The  Russians  met  with  a  check  in  East  Pru.ssia,  but 
were  successful  in  minor  engagements  in  Galicia. 

WEDNESDAY,    SEPTEMBER    2nd. 

Continuou.s  fighting  was  in  progress  along  almost  the 
v.hole  line  of  battle.  The  British  Cavalry  engaged, 
with  distinction,  the  Cavalry  of  the  enemy,  pushed 
them  back,  and  captured  ten  guns.  The  French 
Army  continued  the  offensive  and  gained  ground  in 
the  Lorraine  region.  The  Russian  Army  have  com- 
pletely routed  four  Austrian  Army  Corps  near  Lemberg, 
iaPiictiug  enormous  losses  and  capturing  150  guns. 


Mojt  timely  and  appropriate  is  the  production  of  a  volume  entitled 
War  and  Alien  Enemies,  which  has  been  written  bv  Mr.  Arthur  Page, 
and  published  by  Messrs.  Stevens  and  .Sons,  of  "Chancery  Lane,  at 
five  Bhillinga.  The  book  gives  full  information  about  the  la\v.«  affecting 
the  defiaitiyn  of  alien  enemies,  their  state  and  property  on  land,  their 
state  and  property  at  sea,  tlie  rules  of  contraband  of  v;ar,  the  right  of 
alien  enemies  to  contract  or  trade,  and  the  way  in  which  war  affects 
parin,erBhip3  or  c^mpanioB  in  v/hich  alien  enemies  are  concerned. 
\Vritten  by  a  barrister  atlaw  who  is  thoroughly  conversant  with  this 
branch  of  legal  work,  the  book  is  a  clear  guide  to  the  law  on  the 
subject,  and  will  doubtless  be  found  of  great  nse  by  all  who  are  in  any 
way  affected  commercially  and  directly  by  the  present  colossal  struggle 
between  the  natijna. 


12* 


Sept<?inber  5,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


THE   WAR   BY   WATER. 


By    FRED   T.    JANE. 


THE    NORTH    SEA. 

OX  iLe  iXiOiuing  of  August  28th  there  occuiTed 
certain  opeintious  which  were  hailed  by  the  daily 
Press  as  a  "  gi-eat  navaj  victoiy  "  which  is,  ofi 
course,  an  iucorrccb  term  to  employ  for  whab 
after  all  was  merely  a  '  minor  operation  "  of  war. 
The  mere  fact  that  the  Gorman  official  report 
conceals  nothing  indicates  that  the  vanquished  so  regard  it; 
and  in  naval  welfare  it  is  always  the  opinion  of  the  vanqwlshed 
u/iich  mutters  most.  Had  the  German  Admiralty  issued  an 
incorrect  report,  our  advantage  would  have  been  greater.  Bub 
of  this  later  on.  Let  us  fii-st  review  what  hajipened  in  detail, 
and  then  proceed  to  draw  conclusions. 

Heligoland  is  a  small  island  some  46  miles  from  Cuxhavcn, 
which  guards  the  entrance  to  the  Kiel  Canal,  and  in  or  near 
which  Ih©  German  High  Seas  Flctt  was  probably  lying  at  the 
same  time.  It  is  also  about  equidistant  from  the  naval  arsenal 
at  Wilhelmshaven.     Lying  as  it  does  at  th<j  apes  of  a  triangle 


The  first  act  of  the  drama  was  a  species  of  prologue.  "SVe 
learn  from  the  official  report  that  British  submarines  have  for 
the  last  three  weeks  been  in  the  habit  of  cruising  in  what  is 
known  as  "  outside  the  enemy's  front  door."  It  is  the  first 
time  in  histoiy  that  submarines  have  been  used  as  scouts; 
hitherto  they  have  always  been  i-egarded  as  sharpshooters  and 
agents  of  destruction  generally,  their  unique  possibilities  in 
the  way  of  inshore  obsei"vation  having  apparently  escaped 
attention.  Those  who  knew  of  the  intention  to  use  submarines 
in  the  scout  capacity  have  ever  been,  careful  to  ignore  the 
subject. 

The  Germans — so  far  as  we  can  sxirmise — were  ignorant 
of  the  submarine  scouts.  They  doubtless  kept  a  very  sharp 
look-out  for  submarine  attack;  but  not  being  attacked  con- 
sidered the  coast  as  clear — a  legitimate  assumption  on  the  parb 
of  any  Fleet  which  I'egards  the  submarine  from  the  conveu- 
tional  standpoint. 

For  reasons  which — since  nothing  al)out  the  miilter  hsa 


J&  =    Approximate  scene  of 
ttdS  engagement 


NORTH 

SEA 


HELICOLANO 
\5 


THE  HAGUE 


"V-^. 

-'.x^ 


Y 


tvji 


4- 


immm^^mmm^ 


between  these  two  impoiiant  points,  Heligoland  is  a  vital  out- 
post in  the  German  scheme  of  coast  defence.  Enormous  sums 
have  been  expended  on  fortifying  it,  and  in  the  construction 
of  a  harbour  proof  agaiiist  torpedo  attack. 

The  utmost  secrecy  has  always  been  observed  about  Heligo- 
land, but  it  was  obviously  always  intended  to  be  the  advanced 
base  of  the  Gc;-man  light  squadrons  and  submarines,  behind 
A.  iiich  the  battle  fleet  could  move  with  impunity  between  Kiel 
;ind  'WilliebnBliaven,  via  Brunsbrnttel  and  Cuxhaven. 

The  cx.-.tt  constitution  of  the  attacking  British  force  has 
not  been  stated,  nor  for  various  rer-sons  is  it  likely  to  be  stated 
for  some  time  to  come.  We  are  simply  told  of  "  strong  forces  " 
of  destroyers  (under  Commodore  Tyi-whitt)  supported  by  light 
cruisers  (undc^r  Commoflorc  Goodcnough)  and  battle  cruisors 
(under  Rcai-Adniirals  Beatty,  Moore,  and  Christian),  acting 
in  conjunction  with  submarines  (Commodoio  Keys).  From 
the  Navy  List  the  names  of  most  of  the  principal  ships  em- 
ployed can  l.e  conjectured  ;  but  such  conjectures  may  not  jieces- 
Mrilv  bo  correct.  M'v  t/oit.!  than  th.Tt  the  official  act  unt 
Bcto,sAr;.y  j;ivfcti  all  Uie  story. 


appeared  in  the  public  Press  at  tho  time  of  writing — need  not 
l)e  more  speci.lcally  referred  to,  there  were  grounds  to  believe 
that  a  German  torpedo  squadron  would  be  creeping  out  somcn 
time  on  or  about  August  l;7th. 

It  came;  light  cruisers  and  a  number  of  destroyers,  prob- 
ably two  divisions  of  twelve  each,  as  the  Gennans  generally 
woi-k  in  groups  of  that  number,  with  a  ciuiser  at  the  head  of 
each.  The  third  Geniian  cruiser,  Ariadnr,  was  old  and 
slow.  Sho  was  not  in  commission  before  the  mobilisation 
of  the  fleet,  and  it  is  improbab'e  that  .ihe  was  leading  a 
destroyer  elivisiou.  It  is  more  likely  that  she  was  an  ordinary 
look-out  ship. 

Accounts,  other  than  the  official  report,  are  ncre.<?'^r.rily 
vaguo  and  conflicting.  In  matters  of  this  sort  personal  impres- 
sions go  for  vei-y  little,  save  from  the  psychologic.-il  standpoint. 
The  oielinary  participant  sees  iittle  or  nothing  of  the  game 
savo  in  bis  own  immediate  vicinity,  and  he  is  generally  too 
mvcli  occupied  to  see  very  much  even  thev(\  His  fiH^linjTS  are. 
thore-forp,  ii)ore  valuable  evidence  than  his  virion  or  n.j'pcscd 
vision. 


U 


LAND    AND    WATER 


September  5,  1914 


"jmi — 


RAGU5A"'--,    o'a-.CATT/\RO( Torpedo  base) 


General  line  of 
Franco-British 
blockade 


Psycbologically — and  deducting  fifty  per  ceat.  from  all 
stories  for  "  literary  licence  "  on  the  part  of  journalistic  traii- 
scribere,  we  arrive  at  the  pleasing  conviction  that  our  men  took 
the  matter  very  much  as  they  took  similar  operations  in  peace 
manoeuvres.     This  is  a  valuable  psychological  asset. 

The  official  report — entirely  on  the  mat-erial  side — is  wisely 
none  too  explicit.  It,  however,  gives  us  all  that  we  really  need 
to  know. 

It  is  an  old  adage  of  nava,l  wai-fare  that  the  only  effective 
defence  against  torpedo  attack  ia  what  is  known  as  "stopping 
the  earths."  To  look  for  the  enemy  at  night  on  the  sea  is 
equivalent  to  seeking  for  the  proverbial  needle  in  a  bundle  of 
hay.  The  only  effective  v;ay  of  catching  the  enemy  is  to  be 
■'  outside  the  door  "  *■<>  caitch  him  oither  starting  out  or  return- 
ing. To  catch  him  starting  is  difficult;  ho  is  likely  to  be  far 
too  wary  to  be  caught  coming  out.  The  scientific  method  is  to 
let  him  go  out,  see  to  it  that  his  chances  of  doing  mischief 
when  out  are  small,  and  infcca-cept  him  on  his  return !  And 
this  is  exactly  what  Admiral  Beatty  did. 

Led  by  the  Aretlnisa,  our  destroyers  got  in  and  lay  in 
■wait  somewhere  off  the  north-west  of  Heligoland.  Here  in 
due  course  they  were  found  by — or  rather  thei/  found — the 
Germans  conring  back.  In  the  action  which  ensued  it  would 
appear  that  two  Gorman  cruisers  (probably  Mainz  and 
Ariadne)  engaged  the  Arethiim  with  a  certain  amount  of 
success,  at  a  range  of  "  about  3,000  yards,"  which  suggests  an 
early  morning  action. 

Nc'ther  of  the  Germans  carried  anything  heavier  than  the 
41,  whereas  the  Arethiisa  had  a  couple  of  6  inch  available. 
All  tho  same,  however,  Iho  Germans  had  ten  4  I'a  bearing 
against  the  two  6  inch  and  thrctr  4  inch  of  the  Atefhnsa. 
According  to  our  official  report  one  of  the  Germans  was  badly 
damaged  by  a  lucky  shell  (6  inch  wa  can  safely  presume). 
This  v;as  to  bo  expected ;  but  the  off  chances  were  all  Gorman. 

The  damaged  German  tlion  withdrew,  but  her  place  was 
presently  taken  by  another  cruiser,  and  the  Arethiisa.  (as  was 
to  be  expected)  was  somewhat  badly  knocked  about.  It  is 
probable  that  at  and  about  this  early  part  of  Act  Two  the 
Germans  expected  to  sink  or  capture  her. 


Meanwhile  all  the  destroyers  on  cither  side  were  in  action. 
The  i-esult  of  any  such  action  was  a  foregone  conclusion. 
German  destroyers  are  "  torpedo  boats  "  first,  a.nd  "  gun  ships  "^ 
afterwards.  British  desti'oyers  approximately  average  half 
the  German  torpedo  armament  and  double  the  German  gun 
power.  ' 

The  German  destroyers  put  up  a  fight  against  heavy  odd.s, 
and  then  scattered  and  escaped.  One  (or  two)  were  sunk. 
The  rest  are  officially  assumed  to  have  been  "well  punished." 
This  assumption  is  probably  correct;  but  the  outstanding 
result  is  that  they  got  away.  How  much  stomach  thoy  may 
have  kft  for  further  fightdng  remains  to  be  seen.  Personally, 
I  incline  to  the  opinion  that  it  will  not  be  long  before  they  are 
heard  of  again. 

From  here  onward  it  is  very  difficult,  if  not  quite  im- 
possible, to  reconcile  the  two  official  accounts.  The  British 
account,  so  far  as  it  reveals  anything,  suggests  that  the  German 
cruisers  persistently  attacked  the  Arethiisa,  and  that  she  waa 
in  a  very  tight  p'.aco  when  the  British  battle  cruisers  arrived 
on  the  scene  and  saved  her. 

The  German  official  account,  however,  reads  as  quite  a 
different  story.  It  implies  that,  so  far  from  seeking  to  com- 
plete the  destruction  of  the  Arefhtisa,  the  German  cruisers 
were  driven  off  by  her  and  the  destroyers.  "  Went  in  a 
westerly  direction  "  can  only  have  one  possible  meaning. 
West  is  directly  away  from  Heligoland;  it  spells  running  out 
to  sea  in  h5pes  of  getting  back  later  on.  It  is  curious  that  in 
describing  tho  Second  Act  each  side  should  (between  the  lines) 
suggest  that  it  had  rather  the  worst  of  the  encounter!  Of 
course,  this  is  the  general  impression  always  left  by  confused 
fighting.  From  which  we  may  take  it  that  the  fighting  was 
very  confused  indeed,  and  that  the  fall  of  the  curtain  on 
Act  Two  was  that  esxih  side  imagined  the  other  to  be  top- 
weight. 

This  is  not  a  popular  interpretation  by  any  manner  of 
means ;  but  so  fai-  as  I  can  piece  things  together  from  tho  data 
aYaila.ble  it  is  the  bed-rbck  truth  of  the  matter. 

Act  Three  is  far  simpler.  V/hethor,  as  they  believe,  ths 
Germans  wore  in  flight ;  whether,  as  we  imagine,  the  Germa.na 


U* 


Se2)tcmber  5,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


v'crs  seeking  to  complete  the  destruction,  the  next  st^ige  of  the 
drama  is  one  and  the  same  thing. 

It  is  fairly  clear  that  the  German  cruiser  Mainz  was  sunk 
by  our  light  cruiser  squadron;  lb  is  far  more  abundantly 
clear  that  our  battle  cruiser  squadron  performed  the  same 
office  for  the  Koln  and  Ariadne.  All  three  of  thcss  Gennan 
li"ht  cruisers  have  now  ceased  to  exist. 

In  addition^ the  Germans  admit  to  the  loss  of  the  destroyer 
V  187.  They  do  nob  mention  the  actual  loss  of  any  other 
dcstioyet-.  Personally,  I  think  that  only  one  was  actually 
sunk,  and  that  our  "  two  sunk "  ia  duo  to  two  conflicting 
accounts  of  the  sinking  of  the  V  187. 

It  is  the  easiest  possible  mistake  to  make  in  v/ar.  There 
is  not  the  remotest  reason  to  believe  that  the  Germans,  having 
officially  admitted  more  serious  lo.sses.  would  risk  concealing 
tho  loss  of  a  further  infci-ior  vessel. 

I  put  the  rc-sii't  of  tho  battle  as  follows  :  — 


SCKK. 


BRITT3II. 

Ml. 


Badly  Dahaoed. 

Arelhusa  (light  «ruissr). 

Lntirel  (destroyer). 

TJherty  (destrojcr). 
Davvcld. 


GERMAN. 

Ariadne  (li^'ht  cruiser). 
Koln  (light  cruiser). 
Maim  (light  cruiser). 
V  187  (destroyer). 

SO. 


10   to   20    dcetroyera    (jiroLably    10 
only). 


All  of  which  spells  a  British  victory  clea.rly  enough,  but  it 
does  not  spell  anything  to  which  the  epithet  of  "  great  "  should 
be  applied,  because  its  material  effect  on  the  naval  war  cannot 
be  other  than  subsidiary. 

In  the  matter  of  details  :  our  light  cruisers  are  of  approxi- 
rnately  the  same  speed  as  the  German  ones,  but  our  battle 
cruisers  are  considerably  faster.  To  this  probably  is  due  the 
fact  that  the  other  two  German  cruisers  were  accounted  for. 
They  could,  of  coui-se,  neither  fight  nor  run  away  from  th  • 
lAon  and  her  sisters.  Incidentally,  the  fact  that  our  light 
cruiser  squadron  was  undamaged  further  suggests  that  the 
CcJTn.ins  were  running  from  them. 

According  to  the  first  oflQcial  report- — the  second  one  is  silent 
—  at  some  time  during  the  proceetlings  the  battle  cruisers  were 
"  attacked  by  submarines  and  floating  mines."  There  is  a 
vagueness  in  this  phrase.  It  may  mean  either  that  the  big 
.ships  nearly  ran  on  to  a  mine  field,  or  that  the  surprised 
German  cruisers  dropped  mines  in  the  hopes  that  the  enemy 
would  run  on  to  tbenii — a  very  old  device.  If  it  were  this 
latter,  then  probably  the  Germans  will  have  to  do  a  great 
deal  of  mine  sweeping  ere  they  can  safely  venture  out  again. 

It  is  difficult  to  believe  that  the  submarine  attack  and 
tho  "floating  mine  attack  '  on  our  battle  cruiser  squadron 
took  place  at  the  same  time  or  place,  except  in  so  far  as  tho 
submarines  may  have — by  showing  themselves — manoeuvred  to 
drive  or  lure  the  British  Fleet  on  to  a  mine  field. 

The  apparent  impotence  of  the  German  submarines,  whicli 
did  no  harm,  is  not  a  matter  on  which  to  lay  much  stress.  The 
fact  that  they  were  on  the  spot  at  the  psychological  moment 
indicates  that  the  German  submarines  are  efficient.  That  their 
ffforts  were  unsuccessful  comes  in  the  chapter  of  accident. 

We  have  now  to  consider  the  psychological  side  of  the 
matter.  Had  the  German  cruisers  tamely  surrendered  to  our 
battle  cruisers,  it  would  merely  have  been  bowing  to  the 
i;iovitable.  From  things  as  they  happened  wo  can  therefore 
tlraw  the  inference  that  the  morale  of  the  German  Navy  on 
August  28th  was  still  quite  good,  despite  the  deteriorating 
influences  of  being  more  or  less  shut  in. 

The  vessels  which  went  out  must  have  gone  out  knowing 
that  theirs  was  a  dangerous  mission.  It  is  easy  to  surmise 
their  particular  objective,  and  they  must  have  known  that 
that  would  be  suspected  by  the  British  Fleet.  But  probably 
at  the  moment  when  they  were  surprised  they  were  congratu- 
lating themselves  on  being  safely  back  in  their  own  waters, 
having  met  neither  good  fortune  nor  bad. 

Now  comes  in  an  interesting  problem.  The  presence  of 
British  battle  cruisers  with  the  light  squadron  indicates  that 
the  possibility  that  the  German  battle  cruisers  would  come 
c  ut  to  support  tho  German  light  squadron  was  allowed  for. 
.•lud  likely  enough  it  was  thought  or  hoped  that  tho  German 
High  Sea  Fleet  would  follow. 

No  big  German  ship  intervened.  They  may  all  havp 
been  too  far  away  to  do  so.  But  that  attributes  lack  of 
prescience  to  the  enemy— ever  a  dangerous  thing  to  do  when 
one  is  endeavouring  to  estimate  hostile  intentions. 

Rather,  in  my  opinion,  the  German  heavy  ships  kept  out 
of  tho  way  as  part  of  a  deliberate  plan.  A  trap  was  to  ba 
liuspscted.  Nothing  was  to  be  gained  by  coming  out,  whereas 
a  sortie  w.".s  bound  (o  nioaji  fresh  losses.  Henc#.  as  I  read  it, 
the  immobility  of  the  High  Sea  Fleet.  If  this  reading  be 
correct,  it  goes  to  indicate  tho  correctness  of  my  assumption 
in  the  first  of  these  articles — that  the  High  Sea  Flo?fc  intends 


playing  a  waiting  game,  and  will  only  come  out  before  "  dor 
Ta'' ''  under  pressure  of  home  circumstances.  Such  hom-j 
ciicv.mstances  had  obviously  not  arisen  by  August  28th. 

If  Admiral  Beatty  sought  to  draw  the  Main  Fleet,  his 
oi>eration,  brilliantly  conceived  and  executed  though  it  was, 
was  to  that  extent  a  failure,  or  rather  uill  bt  so  rccjarchd  hy 
the  (/frmans. 

Hence  the  iuappropriateness  of  that  term  "  Great  Naval 
Victory  "  in  which  our  Press  has  so  freely  indulged.  To  adopt 
a  chessboard  simile,  we  have  had  a  success;  but  that  success 
is  merely  the  capture  of  a  pawn.  It  brings  us  matorially 
nearer  to  checkmate,  but  a  series  of  several  such  captures  will 
be  needed  beforo  checkmate  is  arrived  at. 

Since  the  Oueben  affair — especially  since  it  has  transpired 
that  this  battle  cruiser  and  th©  Breslau  ran  away  together 
from  the  small  British  cruiser  Gloucester,  little  more  powerful 
than  the  Breslau — thei-e  has  been  a  tendency  on  the  part  of 
the  public  to  despise  the  German  Fleet.  We  have  all  of  us 
perhaps  forgotten  that  the  truth  about  tho  affaire  Goehcn  has 
probably  been  sedulously  concealed  so  far  from  the  Gennan 
Navy.  At  any  rate,  the  affair  of  Heligoland  seems  to  indi- 
cate that  we  shall  have  to  wait  awhile  before  reaping  the 
moral  benefit  of  the  Goeben  incident. 

Or  it  may  be  that,  having  realised  the  deceit  of  tho 
policy  under  which  they  were  educated  to  despise  the  British 
Navy,  German  sailors  (possibly  ever  less  credulous  than  their 
loaders  imagined)  have  risen  to  the  occasion,  and  are  seeking 
to  prove  Uiemselvcs.  However  things  may  stand,  even  from 
the!  bare  official  reports  (I  place  no  reliance  whatever  on 
published  personal  narratives),  it  is  abundantly  clear  that  off 
Heligoland  the  German  Navy  did  acquit  itself  well  against 
overwhelming  odds,  and  that  we  shall  do  best  to  esteem  our 
enemies  accordingly. 

For  the  rest,  the  most  pleasing  feature  of  the  action  off 
Heligoland  is  that  our  Admirals  obviously  take  nothing  for 
granted,  any  more  than  Nelson  and  his  compeers  did  in  the 
great  wai-s  of  a  hundred  years  ago.  "  One  Englishman  is 
worth  three  Frenchmen  "  was  taught  to  raw  recruits;  but  our 
Admiralty  wisely  saw  to  it  that  their  forces  were  ever  two  to 
one  at  the  crucial  point  I 

In  concluding  this  survey  of  the  Heligoland  affair,  it  is 
necessary  to  dr.iw  attention  to  the  curious  story  (vouched  fur 
by  the  official  Press  Bureau)  that  when  the  German  cruisers 
sank,  and  their  survivors  were  being  rescued,  German  officers 
were  observed  shooting  their  own  men. 

Unofficial  stories  to  the  effect  that  German  prisoners 
assert  that  they  had  been  given  to  iinderstand  that  if  captured 
they  would  be  put  to  death  by  the  British  with  great  barbarity 
may  be  dismissed  as  a  fiction,  probably  invented  this  side  of 
the  North  Sea.  Even  if  told  it  on  the  other  side,  it  is  very 
unlikely  that  the  most  unsophisticated  German  sailor  would 
really  have  believed  it;  it  is  certa.in  that  no  German  officer 
did  or  does.  So  the  "  to  save  them  from  a  worse  fate"  story 
can  go  by  the  board  at  once. 

The  shooting  incident  would  never  have  appeared  in  an 
official  report  unless  it  were  absolutely  authenticated.  It  did 
take  place,  and  the  explanation,  as  I  read  it,  is  this :  "  Dcr 
Tag  "  (which  we  used  to  believe  was  merely  a  British  scare- 
monger's fancy)  was  a  very  real  thing  indeed  to  the  officers  of 
the  German  Navy. 

^^'e  have  probably  even  now  no  conception  as  to  what  it 
meant  to  those  who  treated  our  Fleet  so  handsomely  at  Kiel 
only  a  few  short  weeks  ago. 

In  tlie  past  I  'have  known  German  naval  officers  fairly 
well.  At  any  rate,  well  enough  to  know  that  they  would  never 
lose  their  heads  in  any  circumstances  sufficiently  badh'  to 
shoot  their  own  fellow  sufferers  without  some  very  good  and 
valid  reason. 

That  reason  is  not  to  be  supplied  over  the  circumstance 
that  small  cruisers  were  sunk  by  the  battle  cruiser  squadron. 
Tlie  obvious  is  necessarily  the  obvious. 

We  must,  therefore,  seek  further  back  for  tho  cause  of 
this  extraordinary  incident.  It  is  probably  to  be  found  in  the 
vague  happenings  of  Act  Two.  I  take  it  that  in  one  or  more 
of  the  German  cniiser-s  under  fire  from  our  destroyers  and 
light  cru'sers  panic  occun'ed.  Or,  if  there  were  no  actual 
pai;'f,  there  was  shooting  so  wild  that  it  amounted  to  the 
sanio  tiling.  Game  to  the  last,  the  German  officers  spent  their 
ln.sf  moments  in  avenging  themselves  upon  those  who  they 
ciclitixl  with  being  responsible  for  the  failure  of  "Der  Tag" 
as  tiijy  had  realised  it. 

Ia  a  general  way,  this  action  is  probably  regarded  as 
insensate  and  insane.  It  may  be  so,  but  I  view  it  in  quite 
another  light.  To  my  mind  it  indicates  that,  whatever  the 
Gorman  bluejacket  may  be,  his  officers  are  of  the  highest 
posiiblo  metal.  We  will  do  well  to  rev>.lreuce  and  respect  them 
as  enemies  worthy  of  our  steel. 

Officially,  Germany  has  admitted  a  defeat  in  the  affair  of 
Heligoland.  But  v.o  shall  bo  wiso  to  realise  that  at  sea  we  are 
fighting  against  men  who  are  inspired  by  a  spirit  v.'hich  it  ia 


11 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


September  5,  1914 


impcssiblc  not  to  respect  'W'hcn  we  cousider  tlio  Goelen 
fiasco,  I  am  by  no  means  sure  that,  dc":pitc  the  losses  siis- 
t.vined,  the  Hcligolacd  affair  may  not  be  a  German  moral 
success. 

The  more  ne  appi-eciato  matters  from  this  point  of  view, 
the  b«tter  for  our  ultimate  success. 

ON    THE    HIGH    SEAS    GENERALLY. 

The  most  iiaportant  event  during  the  past  week  has  been 
the  sinking  by  U.M.S.  Hi{jhfhjer,  off  tho  West  Coast  of  Africa, 
of  tho  armed  German  liner  Kaiser  Wilhelm  der  Grossf.  As 
the  Hujhfli/er  sustained  some  casualties,  the  liner  evidently 
put  up  a  fight  of  some  sort.  That  she  was  brought  to  book  is 
a  jnatter  for  sincere  congratulation.  She  was  capable  of  a 
speed  of  23  knots.  It  is  doubtful  whether  the  Uitjhfli/cr  at 
the  present  time  is  good  for  more  than  about  20,  and  tho  other 
British  ships  on  the  station  are  slower  still.  At  any  rate,  the 
liner  was  far  the  swifter,  and  tho  fact  that  she  was  brougiit  to 
look  comes  in  the  chapter  of  luck. 

The  career  of  the  Kaiser  WiUidm  der  Grosse  was  sonie>- 
what  mystra-ious.  When  war  broke  out  she  was  at  New  York, 
vhore  rightly  or  wrongly  the  Germans  have  long  been  sus- 
pected of  having  a  secret  store  of  guus  and  anunuuition 
rtpresentod  as  "  spar©  parts." 

The  liner  left  New  York,  and  for  eleven  days  nothing 
whatever  was  heard  of  her.  Then  off  the  African  coast  she 
fctopped  the  Castle  liner  Gaiician,  asked  for  news  of  H.M.S. 
Carnarvon,  ajrrested  two  passengers,  but  did  no  more.  A  little 
'later  she  stopped  another  Castle  liner,  but  again  mado  r.o 
attempt  at  capture.  On  the  other  hand,  she  ordered  the 
wireless  to  be  thrown  overboard.  Her  next  meeting  was  with 
the  Highflyer. 

One  explanation  of  the  mystery  is  that  this  commerce- 
destroyer  which  destroyed  no  commerce  had  been  oiHlered  to 
reserve  herself  for  some  special  purpose.  Another  possible 
solution  is  that  she  was  so  flurried  with  the  possibilities  of 
meeting  British  cruisers  that  she  did  not  dare  risk  standinjf  by 
to  capture  a  prize.  Yet  another,  that  having  found  herself  on 
the  scene  of  operations,  she  realised  the  impossibility  of  doing 
.■mything  with  a  prize,  and  so  trusted  to  damaging  trado  by 
teiTorisJng.  This  last  seems  to  me  the  most  probabTe  explana- 
tion. 

Elsewhere  on  the  high  seas  the  process  of  clcanng  thern  of 
hostile  merchant  shipping  continues.  It  is  an  example  of  what 
Mahan  has  called  "  the  silent  pressure  of  Soa  Power."  It  is 
far  less  dramatic  than  the  fighting  side  of  naval  operations, 
Init  it  was  none  the  less  useful  on  that  account.  Also,  whereas 
fighting  entails  expenditure,  elimination  of  the  enemy's  trade 
rtprosents  a  substantial  profit  both  for  the  immediate  present 
and  for  the  future  also. 

In  this  connection,  however,  I  would  once  more  draw 
attention  to  what  I  mentioned  last  week :  tha  danger  that 
German  diplomacy  may  drag  the  United  States  into  the 
quarrel  and  on  to  the  German  side.  An  ofBcial  note  from  Uio 
British  Government  to  the  U.S.  Government  on  the  subject  of 
German  liners  interned  in  U.S.  ports  brings  the  matter  one 
step  forward.  The  American  Press  and  tho  American  people 
aro  splendid  in  tho  matter  of  realising  what  wc  are  fighting  for. 
But  "  business  is  business." 

Mr.  Churchill  spoke  nothing  but  the  bald  truth  when  ho 
told  the  United  States,  "  If  we  go  under  it  will  be  your  turn 
next."  On  that  particular  point  I  have  already  elaborated. 
It  is  waste  of  space  to  reiterate.  But  hero  lies  a  very  real 
danger  point. 

W«lnesday  brought  us  an  official  Brazilian  announcement 
to  the  effect  that  the  German  cruiser  Dresden  had  sunk  a 
British  merchant  ship  off  the  Brazilian  coasts.  The  Drrsdi  n, 
normally  belongs  to  the  cruiser  division  of  tho  Iligh  Sea  Fleet 
{I.e.,  German  "  Home  Fleet ").  It  would  look  as  though  sho 
hai^j^ome  secret  base  in  or  near  Brazilian  waters.  Her  ecal 
stipply  is  nominally  sufficient  for  5,500  miles  at  slow  speed ; 
It  actually  suffices  for  hardly  a  thousand  miles  at  full  speed 
or  standing  by  for  full  speed,  as  a  commerce  destroyer  must 
do— that  is  to  say,  three,  or  at  tlie  outside,  four  days'  steamin.'r. 
Kven  making  a;'.l  allowances  for  her  having  lain  by  a  good  deal, 
the  must  have  had  to  coal  at  least  twice  since  v. ai-  v.as  declared. 

THE    FAR     EAST. 

Japanese  operations  against  Kiao-Chau  have  commenced. 
The  whole  of  the  Gcnnan  squadron,  which  consists  of  tho 
rrmourod  cruisers  SchnmhorH  and  Gnekenau,  the  small 
cruisers  ifmrffn,  Lripsi:,  and  yuryiheri;,  four  gunbats,  and  two 
destroyers,  together  with  the  old  Austrian  cruiser  Kahcr:ir. 
}:iUahctk,  is  understood  to  be  blockaded  inside  the  harbour.  It 
will  probably  lie  their  inactive  till  such  time  as  tho  Japanese 
Jiavc  established  howitzer  batteries  for  its  destruction.  We 
may  depend  upon  it  that  they  will  attack  it  as  they  attacked 
the  Port  Arthur  Fleet  in  the  Kusso-Japanese  War. 


Kiao-Chau  is  believed  to  be  veiy  strongly  fortified.  Tha 
garriscn,  5,000  strong,  has  made  every  preparation  for  a  sicga 
and  bombardm.cnb — all  buildings  likely  to  bo  useful  as  marks 
for  Japanese  gunners  having  been  destroyed.  So  a^lso  have 
tha  Chinese  villages  insido  tho  territory.  The  place  is  said 
to  bo  provisioned  for  eight  months,  but  this  is  probably  a  very 
generous  estimate. 

The  financial  conditions  of  Japan  are  liliely  to  influence 
laigcly  tho  plan  of  campaign,  that  is  to  say,  it  is  probable  that 
tho  naval  part  of  tho  operations  will  bo  entrusted  to  the 
ordinary  "  active  fleet,"  which  is  ample  to  deal  with  aJl  con- 
tingencies. Tho  place  is,  of  course,  ccrtnjn  to  be  taken ;  con- 
soquontly  Japan  can  well  a.lord  to  proceed  economically. 

Tho  operations  of  British  warships  in  Far  Eastern  waters 
will  necessarily  bo  of  an  undramatic,  but  none  the  less  useful 
nature.  German  trade  with  China  has  been  very  considerable, 
i-.nd  a  great  deal  of  useful  spadcwork  will  bo  done  by  "  showing 
the  flag "  in  all  Chinese  hai-bours.  The  Chinese  are  an 
unimaginative  people,  and  the  mex-a  cessation  of  GeiTnan 
imports  will  not  of  itself  give  us  the  markets  as  schemed  for 
by  the  Government..  The  Chinese  will  have  to  be  impressed 
with  object  lessons  in  the  shape  of  eoutinually  seeing  British 
warships  and  having  the  disappearance  of  German  ones  pointed 
out  to  them. 

THE    MEDITERRANEAN. 

The  situation  here,  up  to  the  time  of  writing,  continues 
normal.  The  Austrian  Fleet  remains  effectually  shut  in  while 
the  French  are  bombarding  Cattaa'O,  which  is  one  of  the  several 
Austrian  naval  stations  in  the  Adriatic.  The  indications  are 
that  the  majority  of  these  stations  will  eventually  be  reduced. 
The  Austrian  battle  fleet  is  hopelessly  inferior  to  tha  Anglo- 
Fi-ench  blockading  force.  It  is  probably  cruising  near  Lissa, 
but  common  prudence  will  prevent  it  from  engaging  in  a  fleet 
action  unle-ss  compelled. 

Such  action  could  in  no  way  affect  the  present  general 
situation  in  the  Adriatic.  Torpedo  attacks  will  come  along 
Oater,  but  at  present  the  Anglo-iFrench  forces  axe  at  least  200 
miles  from  the  main  Austrian  base  at  PoLa,  and  so  too  far 
away  for  a  concei-ted  effort  to  promise  much  if  any  success. 

The  probability  of  immediate  hostilities  between  Turkey 
and  Greece  may  profoundly  affect  the  Mediterranean  situation. 
At  the  present  moment  the  Goehcn  and  Bredau  are  Turkish, 
but  once  war  is  declared  German  crews  for  them,  ajo  likely 
enough  to  materialise  from  somewhere. 

The  possibility  of  this  will  necessitat«  a  certain  weakening 
of  tho  Adriatic  blockade,  and  this  may  tempt  the  Austrian 
fleet  to  come  out  to  try  conclusions  with  tho  Anglo-French 
force. 

THE     BALTIC. 

Baltic  operations  are  somewhat  obscure.  As  mentioned 
last  week,  it  is  probable  that  the  Russians  are  more  or  less 
waiting  and  that  the  Germans  are  more  or  less  blockading. 
The  "  Russian  battleship  driven  ashore  "  of  earlier  reports  is 
now  almost /Certainly  to  be  identified  with  tho  German  light 
cruiser  Magdeburg,  which  is  officially  admitted  to  have  gone 
ashore  and  subsequently  to  have  been  blown  up. 

Of  the  various  official  and  non-official  tales  of  this  inci- 
dent, I  am  most  inclined  to  believe  the  story  that  sho  got 
aground  by  pure  accident,  and  was  subsequently  found  and 
blown  up  by  tho  Russian  cruisers.  There  is  nothing  to  indi- 
cate that  any  actual  battle  on  a  considerable  scale  ever  took 
place.  AVe  have  to  remember  that  Russian  trade  interests 
are  comparatively  trivial,  and  that  nautically  Russia  has  every- 
thing to  gain  by  delaying  major  operations  till  some  of  the 
Gangoots  ai-o  ready  for  sea. 

It  is  an  open  secret  now  that  Russia  knew  that  this  war 
was  coming,  but  that  she  did  not  expe«t  tha  Kaiser  to  strike 
for  another  two  years.  Consequently  she  did  not  accelerate 
her  new  ship  construction,  wisely  consideiing  that  her  first 
task  was  to  train  tha  necessary  crews,  without  which  mere 
ships  ara  useless. 

AVhen  tha  Russian  fleet  does  go  into  action  the  men  who 
m.an  it  will  be  something  very  different  from  those  who  perished 
at  Tsushima.  So  long  as  Germany  has  a  numerical  superiority 
she  can  keep  the  Russian  Navy  at  bay  in  the  Baltic;  but  I 
question  whether  the  Germans  would  have  much  chance 
against  an  equal  Russian  force.  The  Russian  Navy  is  now 
trained  along  Franco-British  lines — that  is  to  say,  officers  and 
men  have  cultivated  the  cetmeraderie  of  the  French  Navy  v.hile 
they  have  imitated  the  British  in  playing  football  together. 
It  is  things  of  this  sort  that  count  altogether  beyond  "  paper 
calculations." 

On  the  water,  the  Germans  appear  to  have  regarded  the 
Russians  as  a  negligible  factor  or  thereabouts.  Wo  may  yet 
see  them  vciy  seriously  undeceived  on  this  point.  There  is 
a  very  wide  gulf  between  the  Grigorovitch  Navy  of  to-day 
and  the  Rodjcstvensky  Navy  of  ten  years  ago. 


IC* 


SontcmLor  5,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


As  for  the  Maftdcltiirrt.  she  was  one  of  the  latest  German 
cruisers,  nominally  designed  to  steam  at  25  knots,  but  capable 
of  somethin<;  up  to  30  knots  at  a  tpurt.  Her  armament  was 
slight^ — twelve  41-inch  guns,  but  she  had  a  belt  of  3^  inches, 
and  so  was  fairly  immune  (anj'  way  on  paper)  against  attacks 
from  others  of  her  kind.  She  is  correspondingly  a  decided 
loss  to  the  German  Navy;  for  all  that  the  Eussians  have 
nothing  available  in  the  same  class  with  her.  Such  Russian 
cruisere  as  are  available  are  considerably  more  powerful,  but 
also  a  great  deal  slowei*. 

The  consort  of  the  Ma^rldturq  was  the  Mumchcn,  of  about 
the  same  gi:ii  power,  but  somewhat  slower  and  uuarmoured. 


In  the  division  presumably  employed  in  the  Baltic  are  three 
other  light  cruisers — Aiiffsbuif/,  Sluiiyart,  and  Dan:!{f. 

Of  these  the  first  is  nominally  nearly  as  fast  as  the  Ma(iJe- 
htirg,  bub  rumour  ha^  it  that  her  turbines  have  been  damaged. 
The  other  two  little  ships  are  comparatively  old. 

The  net  result  of  Baltic  operations  to  date  is  that  tha 
really  effective  German  scouting  force  is  reduced  about  one- 
third,  and  that  apart  from  this  there  have  been  no  losses  on 
either  side,  saving  the  few  Eussian  lighthouses  v.'hich  the 
Germans  have  wantonly  desti'oyed.  The  value  of  this  parti- 
cular operation  is  the  cost  of  the  rounds  vfhich  the  Germans 
Lave  fired. 


A    TOPOGRAPHICAL    GUIDE   TO    THE 

WAR    ZONE. 

By   E.    CHARLES   VIVIAN. 


Allensfein. — An  important  railway  junction  on  the 
East  Prussian  strategic  railways,  upward  of  fifty  miles  north- 
west of  the  Russian  frontier,  and  about  midway  between 
Gumbiunen  and  Thorn.  It  is  connected  with  both  these  points 
by  rail,  and  is  also  on  the  line  from  Oertelburg  to  Marienburg 
and  Dantzic. 

Belfcrt. — The  territory  of  Belfort,  at  present  about 
twenty-eight  miles  in  length  by  thirteen  in  breadth,  is  all  that 
is  left  to  France  by  the  Treaty  of  1871  out  of  the  former  Depart- 
ment of  Uaut  Rhin,  and  comprises  less  than  si.^  of  the  former 
thirty  cantons  of  which  the  Department  was  made  up.  It  is 
bounded  north-east  and  east  by  German  Alsace,  south-east  and 
south  by  Switzerland,  north  by  the  Vosges  Department,  and 
west  and  south-west  by  the  Departments  of  Haute-Saonc  and 
Doubs.  The  chief  town  of  the  Department,  also  named  Belfort, 
is  27j  miles  south-east  from  Paris,  on  the  railways  Paris  to  BAlc 
and  Lyons  to  Strasbourg.  The  population  of  the  town  is  nearly 
35,000.  Its  fortifications  have  been  greatly  strengthened  since 
the  war  of  1870-71,  and  the  town  is  now  one  of  the  strongest 
frontier  defences  on  the  French  side.  The  chief  fortification  is 
the  citadel,  in  front  of  which  is  placed  a  colossal  figure,  "  The 
Lion  of  Belfort,"  by  Bartholdi,  erected  to  commemorate  tlie 
brave  defence  of  the  town  by  the  French  in  1870-71.  Situated 
as  it  is  among  the  wooded  hills  of  the  Vosges  range,  Belfort  is 
of  great  natural  strength,  and  this,  together  with  the  French 
fortifications,  renders  it  an  almost  imjiregnable  position  to  attack 
from  the  German  side. 

Chambery- — Capital  of  the  Department  of  Savoje, 
situated  between  the  upper  valleys  of  the  Rhone  and  the  Isirc 
rivers.  Popidation  about  22,000.  It  is  about  fifty  miles  distant 
from  the  Italian  frontier,  on  the  Paris-Lyons-Turin  hne  of 
railway. 

Diewze. — A  railway  station  in  German  Lorraine,  on  the 
Saargemund-Avricourt  line  of  rail.  It  is  about  ten  miles  from 
the  French  frontier,  and  about  five  miles  north-cast  of  Marsal. 

Gumbinnen, — The  chief  town  of  a  Government  district 
of  the  same  name  in  East  Prussia,  situated  on  an  affluent  of  the 
Ri\cr  Pregel,  on  the  railway  from  Eydtkuhncn  to  Koenigsbur^'. 
and  about  twent3--two  miles  west-south-wost  from  the  Russian 
frontier.  The  population,  including  a  small  garrison,  is  estimated 
at  about  12,000,  and  the  town  is  engaged  in  various  industries, 
of  which  the  chief  are  iron-founding  and  the  manufacture  of 
agricultural  machinery. 

Jodoigne. — A  small  town  about  seven  miles  south  of 
Tirlemont,  in  the  province  of  Brabant,  Belgium.  It  is  a  station 
ou  the  Namur-Tirlemont  line  of  rail. 

Johannisburg. — Situated  on  the  strategic  railway  from 
Lyck  to  Allcnstein,  in  East  Prussia,  on  the  south  of  the  Spieding 
Lake,  and  about  fifteen  miles  north  of  the  Polish  frontier. 

Maubeuge. — A  first-class  French  fortress  town  about 
five  miles  south  of  the  Belgian  frontier  and  eleven  or  twelve  miles 
south  of  Mons.  It  is  the  point  at  which  the  main  line  from  Paris 
to  Belgium  branches  for  Brussels  and  Liege,  and  is  the  site  of  a 
huge  arsenal.  It  is  about  midway  between  Valenciennes  ar.d 
Thuin. 

Philippsville. — A  town  of  Southern  Belgium  about  ten 
iniios  from  C!ivet,  on  the  French  frontier,  find  almost  midway 
Lotwccn  Givct  and  Charleroi.  It  is  situated  in  wooded  country, 
and  is  connected  by  railway  with  Charleroi  and  Charlevillc  on 
the  French  side  of  the  frontier. 


Posen. — A  Prussian  province  with  an  area  about  equal  to 
that  of  Belgium,  bounded  on  the  north  by  the  province  of  Prussia, 
on  the  east  by  Russian  Poland,  on  the  south  by  Silesia,  and  oii 
the  west  by  Brandenburg.  The  population  is  upwards  of  1,900,000, 
the  majority  of  whom  are  Poles,  with  a  minority  of  about  a  third 
of  the  population  Germans.  Posen,  the  capital  city  of  the 
province,  is  situated  at  the  confluence  of  the  Warthe  and  Cybina 
rivers,  150  miles  cast  of  Berlin  ;  it  is  a  first-class  fortress  of  great 
strategic  importance,  consisting  of  an  inner  citadel  and  an  outer 
line  of  twelve  main  forts  encircling  the  city.  The  main  town  is 
on  the  west  bank  of  the  Warthe  river,  and  the  eastern  or  Polish 
part  of  the  town  is  regarded  as  the  poor  district  by  the  superior 
Germans  of  the  west  city.  The  total  population  is  about  70,0()U, 
including  a  greater  percentage  of  Jews  than  in  any  other  German 
centre,  and  in  normal  times  there  is  a  garrison  of  about  8,000  men. 
The  town  is  on  the  main  Berlin-Thorn-Petersburg  line  of  rail, 
and  is  also  connected  by  direct  lines  with  Stettin  and  with  Brcslau, 
from  which  latter  town  it  is  about  ninety  miles  distant  in  a  direct 
northerly  direction.  In  the  north,  and  especially  in  the  north-ea&t 
of  the  province,  the  country  is  dotted  with  small  lakes  and  ponds, 
and  these  are  interspersed  with  large  tracts  of  fen  and  marshland. 
Ill  addition  to  the  railway  facilities  which  exist  throughout  the 
province,  numerous  canals  and  navigable  rivers  afford  means  of 
communication  between  the  principal  trading  centres. 

St.  Amand. — An  important  railway  jimction  situated  in 
the  line  of  fortifications  extending  from  Lille  to  Maubeuge,  in 
Northern  France.  It  is  on  the  left  bank  of  the  River  Escaut,  a 
tributary  of  the  Scheldt,  and  is  a  junction  for  no  less  than  six 
lines  of  rail,  which  connect  it  with  practically  all  the  main  Belgian 
lines,  and  with  Lille,  Douai,  Valenciennes,  and  Paris. 

Soldau. — Situated  about  ten  miles  inside  the  German 
frontier,  on  the  railway  line  from  Warsaw  to  Dantzic  on  tlic 
Baltic  coast.  This  line  is  crossed  at  Soldau  by  the  strategic 
railway  from  Oertelburg  to  Thorn.  Definite  occupation  of  Soldau 
and  command  of  its  railway  junction  threatens  all  the  railway 
communications  of  East  Prussia. 

Thora. — A  town  and  first-class  fortress  in  the  province  of 
East  Prussia,  situated  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Vistula  river,  about 
ten  miles  from  the  Russian  frontier,  ninetj'-two  miles  south  of 
Dantzic.  It  is  a  point  of  considerable  strategic  importance,  and 
has  ranked  as  a  first-class  fortress  since  1878.  The  popuhition 
is  about  25,000,  of  whom  two-fifths  are  Poles,  and  the  town  has  a 
considerable  trade  in  grain  and  timber  as  well  as  a  certain  amount 
of  manufacturing  activity.  The  Vistula,  navigable  at  this  point, 
provides  means  of  communication  with  Dantzic  and  with  inter- 
vening towns  toward  the  north,  and  Thorn  is  also  connected  by 
rail  with  Posen  and  AUenstein  by  means  of  the  strategic  railway 
of  the  eastern  frontier,  and  with  Warsaw  to  the  east,  and  Berlin 
to  the  west  by  direct  lines. 

Wilhelmshaven. — The  principal  German  naval  station 
and  port  on  the  North  Sea,  sixty  miles  north-west  from  Bremen. 
The  harbour  has  an  extent  of  about  200  acres  and  a  depth  of 
27  feet,  this  being  known  as  the  "  new  harbour,"  and  connected 
with  vaiious  repairing  and  equipment  docks  and  with  the  outer 
harbour.  There  is  also  a  special  torpedo  harbour,  together  with 
three  dry  docks  and  a  shipbuilding  basin — altogether  Willielms- 
haven  is  admirably  equipped  for  the  production  and  shelter  of 
every  class  of  battleship  and  naval  war  craft,  is  protected  fully 
against  any  attack  by  sea,  being  rituated  on  the  western  sid^ 
of  Jade,  or  Jahdc,  Bay,  and  defended  by  the  Elbe  fortifications 
and  the  Heligoland  defences. 


17* 


LAND    AND    WATER 


September  5,  1914 


ROME    OR    CARTHAGE? 

NEVER  since  the  Romans  dreed  the  dread  decree  "  Delenda  est  Caiihago "  has  such  an 
avowal  been  made  to  the  world  as  is  revealed  in  the  book  of  General  Friedrich  Vou  Bcrnliardi, 
"Germany  and  the  Next  War,"  WTitteu  as  far  back  as  1911.  The  destruction  of  the  British 
as  a  world-empire  and  theii-  replacement  by  the  Germans  is  the  ieil  motif. 

Every  citizen  of  the  British  Empire  should  read  the  book.  Quotations,  however  copious,  are  inadequate. 
The  work  has  small  literary  craft,  its  arguments  and  teclmique  are  clumsy,  but  its  theme  is  terrible. 

Bemhai'di  continually  stultifies  his  own  ai'guments.  He  explains  at  length  that  Germany  is 
surrounded  by  crafty  and  jealous  enemies,  all  eager  for  a  favourable  opportunity  to  declare  war.  Later  he 
points  out,  equally  strongly,  that  Germany  must  go  to  war  at  all  costs  for  the  pui-pose  of  acquii-ing  colonies 
either  from  Portugal,  Belgimn,  France,  or  England.  The  Aviiter  is  careful  not  to  include  South  America,  as 
it  is  obvious  that  friendship  with  the  United  States  must  be  com-ted. 

Having  explained  to  his  own  satisfaction,  and,  no  doubt,  to  that  of  the  Geiman  jjeople,  that  the  English 
are  incapable  of  colonising  as  it  should  be  done  by  a  cultured  and  enlightened  race,  and  emphasised  how  that 
this  grent  work  is  solely  the  prerogative  of  the  races  of  Central  Em-ope,  he  completely  knocks  the  bottom 
out  of  argiunent  when  he  says — 

"  The  political  and  national  development  of  the  German  people  has  always,  so  far  back  as  German 
history  extends,  been  hampered  and  hindered  hy  the  hereditary  defects  of  its  character — that  is,  by  the 
particulaiism  of  the  individual  races  and  States,  the  theoretic  dogmatism  of  the  parties,  the  incapacity  to 
sacrifice  personal  interests  for  great  national  objects  from  want  of  patriotism  and  of  political  common  sense, 
often,  also,  by  the  pettiness  of  the  prevailing  ideas.  Even  to-day  it  is  painful  to  see  how  the  forces  of  the 
German  nation,  which  are  so  restricted  and  confined  in  their  activities  abroad,  are  wasted  in  fi-uitless  quaiTels 
among  themselves." 

Mr.  Edward  Ai-nold  did  his  countrymen  a  service  by  publishing  a  cheap  edition,  which  can  now  be 
obtained  everywhere.  It  is  an  antidote  to  British  apathy.  Our  recruits  and  volunteers  should  carry  it  ia 
their  knapsacks  to  learn  from  it  the  details  of  the  work  before  them.  [Editor  Land  and  Water.] 


THE    TEUTON    UNVEILED. 

Our  parks  contain  groups  of  men  drilling  in  khaki  cr 
plain  clothes  (whilst  uniforms  are  being  made),  but  they  are 
not  a  tithe  of  those  who  should  become  our  effectivea.  Our 
business  folk  have  failed  to  grasp  the  situation;  they  try  to 
conduct  businets  at  utual  rather  than  conduct  it  by  the  aid 
of  women  to  fill  the  places  of  men. 

The  feeling  ia  too  prevalent  that  paying  is  equal  to 
fighting,  and  that  those  who  pay  have  done  their  duty.  The 
public  appear  to  be  soothing  tliemselvcs  with  thoughts  about 
our  Army  being  abroad  fighting,  our  Navy  protecting  our 
shores  from  invasion,  our  race  from  the  colonies  sending 
fighting  men,  and  whilst  those  lay  down  their  livea  the 
"  Steam  Roller "  of  Russia  is  coming  to  flatten  out  the 
Germans,  so  tliat  all  the  patriotic  work  left  for  our  people  at 
home  is  to  "  capture  Germany's  trade." 

Further  from  the  capital  we  glean  a  livelier  impression  cf 
alertness.  Tho  Scotch  are  pouring  recruits  into  the  war  depots 
in  relatively  grcater  numbers  than  the  English ;  even  in  Ireland 
tho  ablev-bodied  man  is  under  arms,  or  aching  to  find  a  rifle 
to  carry.  In  northern  and  middle  England  the  martial  spirit 
is  aj-oused;  thoy  only  think  war!  Canada,  Australia,  South 
Africa,  and  India  are  arming,  and  yet  the  War  Office  of  Great 
Britain  has  only  just  got  its  first  100,000  men. 

Yet  southern  England  breeds  no  slackers,  they  only  want 
to  be  aroused.  They  do  not  know  the  war  game,  they  do  not 
understand  its  gravity.  They  for  so  long  have  only  had  to 
fight  against  trade  competition  that  battb  rivaJry  ia  strange 
to  them ;  they  have  been  at  peace  so  long  and  the  Teuton  seems 
»o  friendly,  that  thoy  do  not  see  v.hat  has  been  prepared  for 
them  or  what  they  are  "  up  against."  Thay  are  strange  to  the 
inward  spirit  of  the  military  Germanic  race  and  its  belief  in  a 
God-ordained  mission  to  conquer  the  world  and  impose  a 
domination  upon  the  other  "weaker"  races  peoplinc  the 
Earth.  *•    r     e> 

To  present  in  tabloid  form  some  of  the  docti-ines  of  the 
Germanic  religion  of  conquest  the  text  book  of  Geraaany's 
military  spirit  must  be  drawn  upon.  It  is  called  "  Gennany 
and  the  Next  War."  The  author  appears  to  bo  a  Gomiaii 
patriot,  soldier,  diplomat,  preacher,  prophet,  and  standard 
bearer. 

The  first  of  his  prophecies  has  pa-oved  true.  War  has 
come,  and  with  it  the  spirit  of  vengeance,  ferocity,  and  det«r- 
nunation.  This  is  what  he  calmly  prophesies  as  the  harvest  to 
be  reaped  from  the  seed  Germany  sowed.  In  the  opening 
chapter  of  his  book  tho  song  is  sung  of  the  Soldior-Priest- 
1  rophct.  It  IS  of  tho  splendour  of  war,  the  Divino  mission 
of  those  who  wage  it,  and  tie  glorious  para^lise  of  the  happy 
warrior.  To  undewtand  Bernhardi  and  imbibe  his  spirit  wo 
quote  his  ■vrords :' 

THE    SONG     OF    THE    SWORD. 

I  .-  ^*J"  ^  *  biological  necfcsitv  of  Ihe  fii-s*  impoi-lance  a,  reen- 
JaUve  ekmcct  in  the  life  of  ma.ikind  which  cwinot  bo  dispensed 
-With,  since  without  it  an  unhc:ihhy  development  will  follow   whi.'h 


excludes  every  advancement  of   the  race,   and   therefore   all  real 
civilisation.     "War  is  tho  father  of  all  things." 

Strong,  healthy,  and  flourishing  nations  increase  in  numbers. 
From  a  given  imoment  they  require  a  continual  ezpanfiion  of  their 
frontiers,  they  requiio  new  territory  for  the  aocommodatiou  of 
their  surp'-us  population.  Since  aimc£t  every  part  of  the  glol)6  is 
inhabited,  new  territory  must,  as  a  rule,  be  obtained  at  the  cost 
of  its  possessors — that  is  to  say,  by  oonqaent,  which  thus  becomes 
a  law  of  necessity. 

Might  is  at  onoe  the  supreme  right,  and  the  dispute  as  to 
what  is  ri":ht  is  decided  by  the  arbitrament  of  war.  War  gives 
a  biologically  just  decision,  since  its  decisions  rest  on  the  very 
nature  of  things.     .     .     . 

**■••• 

The  efforts  directed  towards  the  abolition  of  war  must  not 
only  -bo  tenned  foolish,  but  absolutely  immoral,  and  must  be  stigma- 
tised as  unworthy  of  tho  human  race.  To  what  does  tho  whole 
question  amount?  It  is  proposed  to  deprive  men  of  the  right  and 
the  possibility  to  sacrifice  tlheir  highest  material  possessions,  their 
physit-al  life,  for  ideals,  and  thus  to  realise  the  highest  moral 
unselfishness.  It  is  proposed  to  obviate  the  great  quarrels  between 
nations  and  States  by  Courts  of  Arbitration — that  is,  by  arrange- 
ments. A  one-sided,  restricted,  formal  law  is  to  be  establiebed 
in  the  place  of  the  decisions  of  history.  The  weak  nation  is  to 
have  the  same  right  to  live  as  the  powerful  and  vigorous  nation. 
The  .whole  idea  represents  a  presumptuous  encroachment  on  the 
natural  laws  of  development,  which  can  only  lead  to  the  most 
disastrous  consequences  for  humanity  generally.  .  .  .  Tho 
inevitableness,  the  idealism,  and  the  blessing  of  war,  as  an  indis- 
pensable and  stimulating  law  of  development,  muft  be  repeatedly 
emphasised.     .     .     . 

Bernhardi  discusses  the  past  of  the  Germanic  States  In 
Europe  during  the  Napoleonic  Wars  to  point  out  the  danger 
of  neutrality  when  the  world  is  on  fire. 

According  to  all  human  calculation,  the  participation  of  Prussia 
in  the  war  of  1805  would  have  given  tho  Allies  a  decisive 
superiority.  The  adherence  to  neutrality  led  to  the  ci'aeh  of  1806, 
and  would  have  meant  the  final  overthrow  of  Prussia  as  a  State 
had  not  the  moral  qualities  still  existed  there  which  Frederick  the 
Great  h.id  ingrained  on  her  by  his  wars. 

Among  all  political  sins,  tho  eia  of  feebleness  is  the  most 
contemptible ;  it  is  the  political  sin  against  the  Holy  Ghost. 
[Treitschke.] 

In  the  opinion  of  the  Teuton  Gei-raany  is  thei  "  pre- 
dominant partner  "  in  the  Germanic  family  and  in  the  Trip!e 
Alliance. 

The  internal  disruption  of  the  Triple  .\lli.ince,  as  shown 
t'eaily  by  tb«  .iction  of  Italy  towards  Turkey,  threatens  to  bring 
tiie  ciisis  quickly  to  aliead.  The  period  which  destiny  has  allotted 
us  for  concentrating  our  forces  and  preparing  oui^elves  for  the 
deadly  struggle  may  soon  be  passed. 

•  .      •  •  •  •  • 

Wliile  the  aspiring  Great  Powers  of  tho  Far  East  cannot  at 
present  directly  influence  oar  policy,  Turkey — iho  predominant 
Power  of  the  Near  East — is  of  paramount  importance  to  ns.  She 
is  our  natural  ally ;  it  is  eraphatioally  our  Interest  to  keep  in  close 
touch  with  her.  Tho  wisest  course  would  have  been  to  have  made 
her  carLicT  a  member  of  the  Triple  AU4inco,  and  so  to  have  pre- 
vented tha  Turco-Italian  war,  which  threatens  to  chango  the  whole 
politico]  situation,  to  cur  disadvantage.     Turkey  would  gain  in  two 


18* 


Sq^temLcr  5,  1914 


LAND    AND    WxiTER 


waj'S  :  she  asaores  her  position  both  against  Russia  and  against 
England — the  two  States,  that  is,  with  whose  hoflUity  we  liave 
to  reckon.  Turkey,  also,  is  th<<  only  Power  which  can  threaten 
ICugland's  position  in  Egypt,  and  thus  menace  the  short  sea  route 
and  the  land  communications  to  India.  V\'b  ou^ht  to  spare  no 
eacrifices  to  secure  this  country  a"?  an  ally  for  tlie  eventuality  of  a 
var  with  England  or  Russia,  Turkey's  intert^ts  are  onrs.  It  is 
also  to  tlie  obvious  advantage  of  Italy  that  Turkey  maintain  Jicr 
oonimanding  position  on  the  Bosphorus  and  at  tlie  Dardanelles, 
tliat  this  important  key  should  not  be  transferred  to  the  keeping 
of  foreigners,  and  belong  to  Russia  or  England. 

We  have  to  count  more  on  J:ipaneso  hostility  Uian  Japanese 
friendship.  .  .  .  The  apparently  peaccfid  state  of  things  must 
not  deceive  us;  we  ore  facing  a  hidden,  but  none  the  less  fcrmi<V 
able,  crisis — perhaps  the  most  momentous  crisis  iu  the  history  of 
the  (!ennan  nation. 

We  have  fought  in  the  last  great  wars  for  our  national  union 
and  our  position  .among  the  Powers  of  Kuro/tf :  we  now  must 
decide  whether  we  wish  to  d-^velop  into  and  maintain  a  Worlif 
KmjJtre,  and  procure  f<.r  Ciiman  .-ipirit  and  Cionnan  idea.s  tliat 
fit  recognition  which  hue  been  hitherto  withheld  from  thtni. 

Save  as  regards  Japan,  the  further  tho  Prophet  has 
departed  from  his  own.  coiiutry  tho  loss  true  have  been  his 
prognostications.  The  distant  fields  on  to  whicli  he  cast  his 
vision  were  gi'een,  but  not  as  verdant  as  General  Bernhardi, 
wlio  appears  to  have  taken  cas  true  the  leaflets  used  iu  our 
domestic  political  strife  where  any  and  all  sides  predicted  the 
v/oj  to  come  from  our  English-speaking  cousins  across  the  sea, 
from  our  brothers  in  Cana<la,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  South 
Africa;  from  India,  Egj-pt.  and  all  other  parts  and  depen- 
dencies of  our  Empire,  if  this,  that,  or  the  other  political 
nostrum  were  not  swallowed  or  rejected.  He  believes,  or 
wishes  his  readers  to  believe,  that  the  United  States  of  America, 
are  anxiously  waiting  the  py.'ichological  moment  to  blot  our 
Emj)irc  out  for  ever- — our  great  colonies  and  dependencies  wcro 
■looking  for  the  moment  when  they  could  shake  themselves  free 
from  England's  detestable  grasp,  India  to  drive  the  last  of  our 
race  iuto  the  ocean  and  thus  be  free,  Tuvkey  to  take  Egypt 
Lack  into  its  empty  crop  and  (here  digest  her  people  at  leisure. 
And  when  all  these  moments  came  about  the  day  of  Germany 
would  arrive  to  shatter  the  British  Empire  to  pieces  and  on 
the  du«t  build  up  her  own.  Pit}-  he  was  too  soon  for  Mr. 
"  Odell  "  of  the  Constitutional  Club.  The  Kaiser's  spy  system 
had  not  then  como  up  to  date. 

DOUBT  !    THE    BEGINNING    OF    WISDOM. 

With  all  Bernhardi's  enthusiasm  and  prophetic  ardour 
his  military  instinct  warned  him  that  (iiere  were  difTiculties 
ahead.  These  he  sets  out  with  a  frankness  equalling  his 
ajiprccijitiou  of  the  goal  to  which  Germany  means  to  march  : 

Spain  alone  of  the  remaining  European  Powcr.s  has  any  inde- 
pendent importance.  She  has  developed  a  certain  antagonism  to 
France  by  her  Morocco  policy,  an<I  may,  therefore,  beconiei  evcn- 
tu.-illy  a  factor  in  German  ixjlicy.  'i'lie  pe'tty  State*,  on  the  contrary, 
firm  no  independent  centre*  of  triavity,  but  mny,  in  event  of  war, 
prove  to  possess  a  by  no  means  negligible  impoitanc?  :  the  small 
Jtalkau  States  for  Austria  and  Turkey ;  Denmark,  Holhind, 
Belgium,  and  Switzerland,  and  eventually"  Sweden,  for  Germiuiy. 

Switzerland  and  Belgium  count  »s  neutral.  The  former  was 
declared  neutral  at  tlie  Congress  of  Vienna  on  November  20th, 
1815,  under  the  collective  guaraiitee  of  the  fignatorv  Powers; 
Belgium,  in  the  Treaties  of  I^ondon  of  November  15th,  1831,  and  of 
April  19th,  1839,  on  the  part  of  the  five  Great  Power*,  the  Nether- 
lands, and  Belgium  itself. 

If  W'e  look  at  these  conditions  as  a.  whole,  it  .appears  that  on 
the  continent  of  Europe  the  power  of  the  Central  European  Triple 
Alliance  and  that  of  the  Statues  united  against  it  by  alliance  an<l 
.-igreemcnt  balance  each  other,  providtfl  that  Italy  lielongs  to  tlie 
J»aj{ne.  If  we  take  into  calculation  tha  imponderabilia,  whojie 
weight  can  only  be  guessed  at,  the  Bcale  i!«  inclined  slightly  iu 
^  f.avour  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  On  the  other  band,  England  iiidin- 
putably  rides  the  sea.  In  consequence  of  her  crusliing  naval 
Kiiperiority  when  allied  with  France,  and  of  the  geographical  condi- 
tions, she  may  cause  the  greater  damage  to  fSemiany  by  cutting 
off  her  maritune  trade.  'J'here  is  also  a  not  inconsiderable  army 
available  for  a  continental  war.  When  all  cf.nyiderations  aje  taken 
into  account,  our  opponents  have  a.  polilic.nl  superiority  not  to  be 
nnderestimated.  If  Frame  succeeds  in  strengthening  her  army  by 
large  colonial  levies  and  a  strong  English  landing  force, "this 
superiority  would  be  as»erte<l  on  land  aVo.  If  Italy  really  with- 
draws from  the  Triple  Alliance,  very  distinctly  euperW  forces  will 
ba  united  against  Germany  ami  Austria. 

Under  these  conditions  the  position  of  Germany  is  e.xlra- 
oinlinarily  difficult. 

•  ••••• 

An  intensive  colonial  policy  is  for  us  fisp.cially  an  absolut? 
ne.e;.-ily. 

A  higidy  interesting  examination  follows  of  the  political 
eomplicationg  of  tho  European  Powers.  Bernhardi  does  not 
permit  himself  to  harbour  delusions.  Although  he  had  pre- 
viously set  forth  the  position  of  Belgium  as  neutral,  he  now 
mora  minutely  discusses  her  position,  foreshadowing  her 
<iitering  into  a  combination  opposed  to  the  Gtrmanic  alliance, 
a.'ul  the  Germanic  view  of  tho  right  to  violate  bcr  neutra.!ity. 

COMPLICATIONS    TO    BE    CONSIDERED. 

We  must  endeavour  to  obtain  in  this  svstem  onr  merited 
position  at  the  he.ad  of  a  federation  of  Centra"l  European  States, 
»nd  thi's  reduce  the  imaginary  European  efptilibrium,  in  one  way 


or  the  other,  to  its  true  value,  and  correspondingly  to  increase  oar 
own  power. 

A  fui'ther  question,  suggested  by  the  present  political  position, 
13  whether  all  the  political  treaties  which  were  concluded  at  the 
beginning  of  the  last  century  under  quite  oUier  conditions — in  fact, 
uiuler  a  different  conception  of  what  constitutes  a  State — can,  or 
ought  to  be,  periuaneiitly  observed.  When  Belgium  was  pro- 
claimed Jieuti-al,  ilo  one  contemplat;d  Ih.at  she  would  lay  claim  t> 
a  large  and  viuuable  region  of  Africa.  It  may  well  be  asked 
whether  the  acquisition  of  such  territory  is  not  ifuso  facto  a  brciicli 
of  neutrality,  for  a  State  from  which — ^theoretically  at  least — all 
danger  of  war  has  been  removed  has  no  right  to  enter  into  political 
c.nnpetition  with  the  other  States.  Tltis  argume:it  is  the  more 
justiliable  bacause  it  may  safely  be  assumed  that,  iu  event  of  a 
war  of  Germany  against  France  and  England,  the  two  last-men- 
t'oned  States  would  try  to  unite  their  forces  in  Belgium.  La.stly, 
•the  neutr.ality  of  the  Congo  State''  must  be  termed  mora  than 
problematic,  since  Belgium  claims  the  right  to  cede  or  sell  it  to  n, 
non-neutral  country.  The  conception  of  permanent  neutraTity  is 
<ntirely  contrary  to  the  essential  nature  of  the  State,  whichcviu 
•  mly  attain  its  highest  moral  aims  in  competition  with  other  States. 
Its  complete  development  presupposes  such  competition. 

Again,  the  principle  that  no  State  can  ever  interfMTe  in  tlie 
internal  affairs  of  another  State  is  repugnant  to  the  highest  rights 
of  the  State.  This  principle  is,  of  course,  very  variously  inter- 
preted, and  powerful  States  have  never  retrained  from  a  high- 
handed interference  iu  ihe  internal  affairs  of  smaller  ones. 

THE    RUSSIAN     STEAM-ROLLER. 

If  we  now  turn  our  attention  to  the  East,  in  order  to  forecast 
Russia's  probable  behaviour,  we  must  begin  by  admitting  that, 
from  a  I'us<;ian  standpoint,  a  war  in  tlie  West  holds  out  better 
prospects  of  .success  than  a  renewed  war  with  Japan,  and  possibly 
with  China.  The  Empire  of  the  Czar  finds  in  the  West  powerful 
allies,  v. ho  are  impiitieiitly  waiting  to  join  illi  an  attack  on 
Germany.  The  geographical  conditions  and  means  of  communi- 
<ation  there  allow  a  far  more  rapid  and  systematic  development  of 
power  tha«  in  Manchuria.  Public  opinion,  in  which  hatred  of 
tlemiany  is  as  persiistent  .as  ever,  would  be  in  favour  of  such  a 
^■..•l^,  and  a  victory  over  Germany  and  Austria  would  not  only 
open  the  road  to  Const.antinople,  but  would  greatly  improve  tho 
political  and  economic  influence  of  Russia  in  Western  Europe. 
.Siich^a  success  would  afford  a  splendid  compensation  for  the  defeats 
in  Asia,  and  would  offer  advantages  such  as  never  could  be  expected 
oil  the  far-distant  Eastern  frontiers  of  the  Empire. 

Shoidd  Russia,  then,  after  weighing  these  chances,  launch  out 
into  an  offensive  war  in  the  Wert,  the  struggle  would  probably 
rssume  a  quite  different  character  from  that,  for  example,  of  a 
Franco-German  war.  Russia,  owing  to  her  vast  extent,  is  in  the 
fiict  place  secure  against  complete  subjugation.  In  case  of  defeat 
lier  centre  of  gravity  is  not  shifted.  A  Russian  w.ar  can  hardly 
ever,  th&cefore,  become  a  struggle  for  political  existence,  au'd 
cause  that  straining  of  every  nerve  which  such  a  struggle  entails. 

A\'e  cannot  count  on  seeing  a  great  commander  at  our  head  ; 
a  second  Frederick  the  Great  will  hardly  appear. 

•••••• 

We  cannot  blink  the  fact  that  we  have  to  de.al  with  immen.ss 
military  difficulties,  if  we  are  to  attain  our  own  political  ends 
or  r^pel  successfully  the  attack  of  our  opponents. 

GERMANY'S    DOORS— OPEN    AND    SHUT. 

In  the  first  pface,  the  geographical  configuration  and  position 
of  our  country  are  very  unfavourable.  Our  open  eastern  frontier 
offers  no  opportunity  for  continued  defence,  and  Berlin,  the  centre 
of  the  Government  and  axlministration,  lies  in  dangerous  proxinuty 
to  it.  Our  western  frontier,  in  itself  s.trong,  can  be  easily  turned 
on  the  north  through  Belgium  and  Holland.  No  natural  obstaeI«, 
no  strong  fortress,  is  there  to  oppose  a  hostile  invasion,  and 
neutrality  is  only  a  paper  bulwark.  So  in  the  south,  the  barrier 
of  the  Rhine  can  easily  be  turned  through  Switzerland.  There, 
tji  course,  the  character  of  the  country  offers  considerable  difti- 
culties,  and  if  the  Swiss  defend  themselves  resolutely,  it  might  iMt 
lie  easy  to  break  down  their  resistance.  Their  army  is  no  despicaljie 
factor  of  strength,  and  if  they  were  attacked  in"  their  mountjins 
they  svould  fight  as  they  did  .at  Senipach  and  Mmien. 

The  natural  approaches  from  the  North  Sea  to  th»  BiJlic, 
the  Sound,  and  tlie  Great  Belt,  are  commanded  by  foreign  guns, 
and  can  easily  fall  a.  prey  to  our  enemies. 

The  narrow  coast  with  which  we  face  to  the  North  Sea  forms 
in  itself  a  strong  front,  but  can  e3.sily  be  taken  in  the  rear  through 
Holland.  England  is  planted  before  our  coasts  in  such  a  manner 
that  our  entire  oversea  commerce  can  be  eatily  bkn-ked.  In  tli« 
Fouth  and  sonth-eaat  alone  are  we  secure*!  by  Austria  from  direct 
invasion.  Otherwise  we  are  encircled  by  our  enemies.  We  ni.oy 
have  to  face  attacks  on  three  side.s.  Thi"s  cirtiim.itance  compels  n» 
to  fight  on  the  inner  lines,  and  so  presents  certain  advantages;  but 
it  is  also  fraught  with  dangers,  if  onr  opponents  underitand  how  to 
act  on  a  correct  and  consistent  plan. 

ISOLATION. 

If  we  look  ,at  our  general  political  position,  wc  cannot  conceal 
tho  fact  that  we  stand  isolated,  and  cannot  expect  support  from 
anyone  in  carrying  out  our  positive  political  plans.  England, 
France,  and  Russia  have  a  common  interest  in  breaking  dowii  our 
pov.er.  This  interest  will  sooner  or  Later  be  asserted  by  arms.  It 
is  not  therefore  tho  interest  of  any  nation  to  increase"  Germany's 
power.  If  we  wish  to  a<ttain  an  extension  of  our  power,  as  is 
natural  in  our  position,  we  must  win  it  by  the  sword  against  vastly 
superior  foes. 

Such  a  w.ar— for  ns  more  than  for  any  other  nation— mn.it 
be  a  war  for  our  political  and  national  existence.  This  mnist  b^i 
so,  for  our  opponents  can  only  attain  their  political  aims  bv  ahii'-.^t 
annihilating  us  by  land  and  by  sea. 

We  must  thcref.i-e  prepare  not  only  for  a  short  Avar,  but  for 
a,  protracted  campaign.  We  miist  lie  armed  in  order  to  complete 
tho  overthrow  of  our  enemies,  should  the  vicilory  be  ours;  .and  if 
worsted,  to  continue  to  defend  ourselves  in  the  verj-  heart  of  OUT 
country  until  snocesa  at  last  is  won,  , 


k 


19» 


LAND    AND    WATER 


September  5,  1914 


In  the  view  of  the  <1.iiis;pis  ai-.J  the  i-ircumstance  tliat  we  are 
net  frtixiiig  enough  to  entertain  any  idea  of  provoking  a  b;vUlc,  the 
quest-cn  remaine.  What  are  the  means  of  defensive  naval  strategy 
to  secnre  protection  from  a  superior  and  welJ-preparcd  enemy,  and 
gradually  to  become  its  maetcr? 

The  plan  might  be  fomicd  of  anticipat.ing  the  enemy  by  a 
euddcn  attatk,  instead  of  waiting  passively  for  Lim  to  attack  first, 
and  of  opening  the  war  as  the  Japanese  did  before  Port  Arthur. 
In  this  way  the  English  fleet  might  be  badly  damaged  at  the  out- 
set of  the  real  hostilities,  its  superiority  might  be  lessened,  and 
the  beginning  of  the  effective  blockade  delayed  at  least  for  a  short 
time.  It  is  not  unthinkable  that  6Uoh  an  attempt  will  be  made. 
Such  au  undertaking,  however,  doee  not  seem  to  me  to  proniise 
any  great  success. 

The  war  against  the  English  commerce  must  none  the  Jess  be 
boldly  and  energetically  prosecuted,  and  sliould  start  unexpectedly. 
The  priws  which  fall  into  our  hands  must  be  remorsclesdy 
destroyed,  since  it  will  usually  be  impossible,  owing  to  the  great 
English  superiority  and  the  few  bases  we  have  abroad,  to  bring 
them  back  in  safety  without  exposing  our  vessels  to  great  risks. 

It  would  be  necessary  to  take  further  steps  to  i>ecure  tie 
importation  from  abroad  of  supplies  necessary  to  us,  since  oni'  own 
••oniraunicatione  will  be  completely  cut  off  by  the  English.  The 
simplest  and  cheapest  way  would  be  if  we  obtained  foreign  goods 
through  Holland  or  perhaps  neutral  Belgium;  and  could  e-xpoit 
some  part  of  our  own  products  through  the  great  Diitch  and 
Flemish  harbours.  New  commercial  routes  might  ba  discovered 
through  Denmark.  Our  own  oversea  commerce  would  remain 
suspended,  but  such  measures  would  prevent  an  absolute  stagnar 
tiou  of  trade. 

It  is,  liov.ever,  very  unlikely  that  England  would  tolerate  such 
communications  through  neutral  temtory,  since  in  that  way  the 
effect  of  her  war  on  our  trade  would  be  much  reduced.  The 
attempt  to  block  these  trade  routes  would  approximate  to  a  breach 
of  neutrality,  and  the  States  in  question  would  have  to  face  the 
luomeiitoos  question,  whether  they  would  conform  to  England's 
will,  and  thus  incur  Germany's  enmity,  or  would  prefer  that 
adhofiion  to  the  German  Empire  wliich  geography  dictates.  They 
would  have  the  choice  between  a.  naval  war  witi  England  and  a 
Continental  war  with  their  German  neighbours — two  possibilities, 
each  of  which  contains  great  dangers.  That  England  would  pay 
much  attention  to  the  neutrality  of  weaker  neighbours  when  such 
a  stake  was  at  i^sue  is  hai'dly  credible, 

GERMANY,    WHEN    THE    SEA    HATH    SPOKEN. 

Yet  after  a  month's  war  only  four  unarmed  merchant  ships 
Under  the  British  flag  have  been  "  remorselessly  destroyed,'' 
plus  a  boat  line-fishing  iu  Icelandic  waters. 

A  country  like  the  German  Empire  depends  on  an  extensive 
foreign  trade  in  order  to  find  work  and  food  for  it*  grov.ing 
population. 

Ixt  us  imagine  the  endless  misery  which  a  protracted  stoppage 
or  definite  destruction  of  our  oversea  trade  would  bring  upon  the 
whole  n.Ttion,  and  in  particular  on  the  masses  of  the  industrial 
cla.'^.sefi  who  live  on  our  export  trade. 

*  «  *  •  •  • 

Complicated  and  grave  questions,  military  as  well  as  political, 
are  thus  raised  by  an  Auglo-German  war.  Our  trade  wotdd  in  ajiy 
case  suffer  greatly,  for  sea  communications  coidd  be  cut  off  on  every 
side.  Let  us  assume  that  France  and  Russia  seal  our  land  frontiers, 
then  the  only  trade  route  left  open  to  us  is  through  Switzerland 
and  .\ustria — a  condition  of  affairs  whicih  would  aggravate  diffi- 
culties at  home,  and  should  stimulate  us  to  carry  on  the  war  with 
incicased  vigour.  In  any  caee,  when  war  threatens  we  must  lose 
no  time  .in  preparing  a  road  on  which  we  can  import  the  most 
essential  foodstuffs  and  raw  materials,  and  also  exi»rt,  if  only  in 
small  quantities,  the  surplus  of  our  industrial  products.  .Such 
measures  (annot  be  made  on  the  spur  of  the  moment.  They  nmeS, 
be  etaLoratcd  in  peace  time,  and  a  definite  department  "of  the 
Government    must    be    responsible    for   these  preparations. 

These  suggestions  indicate  the  preliminary  measures  to  be 
adopted  by  us  in  the  eventuality  of  a  war  with  England.  We 
should  at  first  carry  on  a  defensive  war,  and  would  therefore  h.ave 
to  reckon  on  a  blockade  of  our  coasts,  if  wc  succeed  in  repelling 
the  probable  English  attack. 

Such  a  blockade  can  be  carried  out  in  two  ways.  England 
can  blockade  closely  our  North  Sea  coaift,  and  at  the  same  time 
bar  the  Danisli  straits,  so  as  to  cut  off  communi«itions  with  our 
Baltic  ports;  or  she  can  seal  up  on  the  one  side  the  Channel 
between  England  and  the  Continent,  on  the  other  side  the  open 
eea  betweeii  the  north  of  Scotland  and  Norway,  on  the  Peterhcad- 
Ekcrsund  line,  and  thus  cripple  our  oversea  commerce  and  also 
control  the  Belgo-Dutoh,  Danish,  and  Swedish  shipping. 

We  must  fight  the  French  fle.^t,  so  to  spCitk,  on  land—;'.*'.,  we 
must  defeat  France  so  decisively  that  she  would  be  compelled  to 
rciKHiMce  her  alliance  with  England  and  withdraw  her  fleet  to  R.ave 
Iier.self  from  total  destruction.  Jntt  a.?  in  1870-71  we  marched  to 
the  ehore«  of  the  Atlantic,  .eo  this  time  again  we  must  resolve  on 
«M  absolute  conquest,  in  order  to  capture  the  Frencli  naval  ports 
atid  d&otroy  the  French  naval  depots.  It  would  be  a  war  to  the 
knife  with  Fi-ance,  one  which  would,  if  victorious,  aniiihihite  once 
for  all  the  French  position  a."?  a  Great  Power. 
I,    —  •  '  »  »  *  ■ 

Who,  then,  can  doubt  that  Germany  has  set  herself  the 
task  of  ruling  the  world? 

Since  war  broke  out  Germans  have  bunit  Belgian  libraries, 
universities  and  churches,  shot  priests  and  doctors,  destroyed 
public  monuments  and  hospitals.  Their  Emperor's  instructions 
■were  to  act  like  the  Goths  with  Alaric,  and  by  "  ruthlessly 
destroying"  the  population  to  strike  such  terror  into  man, 
woman,  and  child  that  none  might  dare  to  raise  thedr  cyc« 


whilst  his  destroyers  passed.     Wc  know  why  General  Bernhardi 
endorses  and  quotes  from  Trcitschke's  "  Politic." 

"God  will  fee  to  it,"  says  Treit«thke,  "that  war  aJwaya 
recurs  as  a  drastic  medicine  for  the  human  race !  " 

His  Calho'ic  allies  from  Austria  and  Bavaria  secure  this 
crumb  of  comfort : 

The  dogmatism  of  Protestant  orthodoxy  and  the  Jesuitic  ten- 
dcncics  of  ultiamoutaniEiu  of  the  Catholics  must  be  sinnKiuiited 
before  any  common  i-cligiou6  movement  can  be  contemplated.  Cut 
no  Gennau  statesman  can  disregard  this  aspect  of  affairs,  nor  must 
he  ever  forget  that  the  greatness  of  our  nation  is  rooted  exdutively 
on  Protestantism.  Jyfgaily  and  socially,  all  denominations  enjoy 
equal  rights,  but  the  Gcrmaji  State  must  never  rcnouuee  the 
leadership  in  the  domain  of  free  spiritual  development.  To  do  ce 
would  mean  loss  of  prestige. 

The  late  Professor  Cramb  (lecturer  on  Modern  History, 
Queen's  College,  London),  with  his  Gennan  education  and  wide 
knowledge  of  German  histoid,  literature,  and  thought,  here 
confirms  Bemhardi.  He  declares  that  Germany's  part  in  the 
future  is 

to  resume  that  creative  rMe  in  religion  which  the  whole  Tcutonio 
race  abandoned  fourteen  ccntuiies  ago.  Judsea  and  Galilee  cast 
their  dreary  spell  over  Greece  and  Rome  when  Greece  and  Rome 
were  already  sinking  into  decreptitude  and  the  creative  power  in 
them  was  exhausted,  when  wearinees  and  bittemces  wakened  with 
their  greatest  spirits  at  day  and  sank  to  Sleep  again  with  them 
at  niglit.  But  Judsea  and  Galilee  struck  Germany  in  the  splendour 
and  heroism  of  her  prime.  Germany  and  the  whole  Teutonic  people 
in  the  fifth  century  made  the  great  error.  They  conquered  Rome, 
but,  dazzled  by  Rome's  authority,  they  adopted  the  religion  and 
the  culture  of  the  vanquished.  Germany's  own  deep  relii^ious 
instinct,  her  native  genius  for  religion,  manifested  in  her  creative 
success,  was  arrested,  stunted,  thwarted.  But,  having  once 
adopted  the  new  faith,  she  strove  to  Uve  that  faith,  and  for  more 
than  thirty  generations  she  has  struggled  and  wrestled  to  see  with 
eyes  that  were  not  her  eyes  to  worsliip  a  God  that  wa£  not  her 
God,  to  live  with  a  world  vision  that  was  not  her  vision,  and  to 
strive  for  a  heaven  that  was  not  her  heaven. 

Very  consoling  for  the  Rhine  Provinces  and  South  Ger- 
many, apparently  !  Germany,  if  victorious,  will  not  confine  ita 
ilirective  powers  to  the  ways  of  Nations,  but  will  invade  the 
re-alms  of  God  and  produce  a  new  and  universal  religion ! 
What  a  portentous  concept!  Theru  is  foetus  in  the  womb  o£ 
destiny  which,  if  not  destroyed,  promises  to  grow  into  a 
monster.  The  new  Germany  seeks  to  tumble  down  old  ideals, 
shatter  old  faiths,  destroy  human  liberty,  set  us  a  spurious 
Napol.^ouism,  and  force  us  to  bow  before  a  shrine  from  whence 
the  spirit  has  departed.  Such  is  the  new  "  Protestantism  "  oil 
which  the  greatness  of  the  Gennan  Empire  is  to  be  exdusivelj 
rooted.  Its  gospel,  however,  is  not  to  be  found  in  Luther,  nor 
is  it  even  original — it  has  been  taken  without  acknowledge- 
ment from  the  ''  Decline  and  Fall,"  and  is  but  a  pale  reflex  of 
the  pigments  used  by  Gibbon. 

Professor  Cramb  suggests  that  the  new  cult  is  already  an 
established  creed  in  Germany,  for  he  proclaims: 

In  Europe,  I  say,  tlxis  conflict  between  Christ  and  Napoleon 
for  the  masiteiy  over  the  minds  of  men  is  the  most  sigmficant 
spiritual  phenomenon  of  the  twentieth  century. 

^lore  tlian  the  Em-ope  of  1800  and  1801,  which  saw  in  the 
vi«tor  of  Marengo  the  ilohanvmcd  of  a  new  era,  the  cnunciator  of 
a  new  faith,  young  Gemiany,  the  Germany  of  to-day,  in  the 
writings  of  'Treitachke  and  of  the  followers  of  Tmtschke,  studies 
Napoleonism,  illumining  politics  with  an  austere  and  uplifting 
grandeur.  In  the  wiitings  of  Nietzsche  and  of  the  followers  of 
Nietzsche  they  study  the  same  Napoleoniem,  transforming  the 
principles  of  everyday  life,  breathing  a  new  spirit  into  ethics, 
transfiguring  the  tedious,  half-hypocritical  morality  of  an  earlier 
generation. 

The  baleful  fires  of  Louvain  University  are  but  lit  from 
the  torch  with  which  Khalif  Omar  fired  the  Librai-y  of  Alex- 
andria— the  philosophies  of  Paynim  and  Teuton  toucli  a 
common  periphery. 


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20' 


September  5,   19 14  LAND     AND     WATER 

SCENES  IN  BELGIUM 


Copyrieht.  Ntmpaper  lUusttaHoiu 


BELGIAN   CYCLE  CORPS  EVACUATING   DItST 


CapyritU.  Span  and  Gentral 


GEKMAiN    HAKADE  AT  BRUSSELS 
Artillery  pasting  through  one  of  the  main  street! 


977 


LAND    AM)    WATER 


September   5,    1914 


IN    THE  WAR    ZONE 


FRENCH  INFANTRt'  ENTRENCHED  AND  IN  ACTION  NEAR  CHARLrEROl 


CjpyngH,  C:n:ral  Wctts 


^•"^asi^ 


WITH  THE  SERVIAN  ARMY 

Th:  Scrviaa  Arm/  passinj  through  Nisch  aher  their  gieat  victory  over  the  Austrians 


Lupyn^lil,  tt.it:iai    ,\i;ijs 


978 


September  5,    1914 


L  A  N  D     AND     ^X  A  T  E  R 


Copyright,  CeiUral  .\e: 


FRENCH   ARTILLERY  TAKING   UP  THEIR   POSITION 


Copyr:glil,  Luna  and  n'au, 


Copyright,  Land  and  Water 

RUSSIAN  TROOPS  MARCHING  THROUGH   ST.   PETERSBURG 
Scenes  o(  great  enthuiiiim  marked  the  Declaration  of  War  in  Rus.ia 


'-"PyntM.  r„pi.-2l  P,e.i 


THL   iVlJBlLlSATlON   Or  THE   RUSSIAN   ARMY 
The  Czar  reviewing  Troopi  prior  (o  their  moving  off  to  ihc  Front 


979 


T.  A  N  D     A  N  D     W  A  T  E  R 


September  5,    19 14 


Performances    by 
BRITISH-MADE 

DUNLOP 

tyres 

in  the  great  races  of  the  year  can  be  explained  only 
by  a  wonderful  property  of  resistance  to  wear. 
The  lesson  they  convey  is  that  Dunlop  tyres  will 
give  exceptional  length  of  service  in  everyday  motor- 
ing, and  that  the  safest  choice  is  always  the  Dunlop. 


The  new  and  improved  Dunlop  sleel- 
sludded  tyre  a  great  advance  in 
non-skid  tyre  construction  —  is  giving 
everywhere  extraordinarily  good  service. 


IN   TIME  OF  WAR 

Dunlop  lyres  — grooved,  steel-studded,  and  plain 
—can  be  obtained  with  the  same  facility  as  before 
the  war  through  the  usual  agents.  By  buying 
British-made  goods  you  help  to  support  the 
industries  and  workpeople  of  your  own  country. 

THE   DUNLOP   RUBBER   CO.,    LTD. 

FOUNDERS    OF    THE    PNEUMATIC    TYRE    INDUSTRY 

Aston  Cross,  Biniiinshani  ;  14  Regent  Street, 
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Dunlop  Solid  Tyres  for  Heavy  Commercial  Vehicles 


TAILOR  -  MADE 

SHIRTS 


Designed  and  cut  by  our 
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and  quite  different  from 
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Shirt  (as  sketch),  perfect 
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THE   REGULAR  USE  OF 


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Prevents  the  Septic 
poisoning  caused  by 

BAD     TEETH. 

2.  Prevents  and  arrests 

SORE    THROAT. 

3.  Acts  like  a  charm 
for  washing  tender 
feet  and  spraying 
the  air  of  sick  rooms 


DebenKam 
O^Freeb 

Wigmore  Street. 

tCovcndivh  Square)  London  W 


980 


LAND  &  WATER 


Vol.  LXIII.  No.  2729 


SATURDAY,  AUGUST  29,   19 14 


rpubllshed  ast       price  sixpence 
La  newspaperJ        published  weekly 


Photoiraph  by  Hector  Mttrchison 
Strictly  Copyright 


MR.    HILAIRE    BELLOC 


Whose  comprehensive  Weekly  Articles  in  "  Land  &  Water  "  are  creating 
immense  interest  throughout  the  United  Kingdom 


LAND    AND    WATER 

ENGLISH    TROOPS 


August  29,   1 9 14 


THE  SILENT  ARMY 

The  Expeditionary  Force  Ditembarking  at  Boulogne 


Cupyiigkt,  L.N. A. 


962 


August   29,    1914 


L'AND    AND     WATER 

FRENCH    TROOPS 


CopyrigU  Topical  Pnxs 


FRENCH   INFANTRY   RtSllNG  ON   THE  BELGIAN   PLAINS 


Copyright,  Topical  Presi 


FRENCH   TROOPS   MOVING  OUT  OF   NAMUR 


963 


LAND    AND    WATER 


August  29,   1914 


964 


August  29,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


BRUSSELS 


AIECE 


■;  CALAIS 


ROlliAlX  'iT,    ^ 

CAMBfiAl*         •lECATIAU 

F      a     A 


NATIONAL  FftOhTltftS 


10     20    30    «0     so 


100 


Sc6/e  cf  Miles 


W^  DIFFICULT  COUNTRY 

(T)  Tha  Ardennes 


■XL 


THE    WAR    BY    LAND. 

By   HILAIRE   BELLOC. 

THE  NEWS  with  wliich  the  English  public  is  confronted  this  week  from  the  seat  of  war 
is  at  once  exceedingly  serious  and  largely  indeterminate,  at  least  it  is  undeteiinined  at  the 
moment  of  writing. 
It  is  serious  because  it  clearly  points  to  a  reversal  all  along  the  line  of  the  plans 
formed  by  the  Allies.     Against  the  French  offensive  in  Alsace-Lorj-ame  to  the  south,  a 
Gorman  counter-offensive  has  succeeded.     In  the  north,  against  the  German  offensive,  the  counter- 
offensive  of  the  Allies  has  failed. 

Such  news,  in  spite  of  its  gravit}',  remains  indeterminate,  because  there  has  not  (Thursday 
noon)  yet  reached  London  or  Paris  any  news  to  shoAv  that  the  check  to  the  counter-offensive  in 
tlic  north,  or  to  the  offensive  in  the  south,  has  resulted  in  any  clear  diminution  of  military  power 
in  the  forces  of  cither  combatant.     There  has  been  as  yet  no  decision. 

With  so  much  said  by  way  of  preliminary,  Ave  will  turn  to  the  details  of  the  news,  and  I  would 
remark  that  in  foUo^ving  these  details,  apart  from  the  fcAV  sketches  and  diagrams  that  illustrate 
particular  points,  a  reference  to  the  outline  set  above  this  ai-ticle  will  always  be  useful.  It  gives  in 
the  simplest  form  the  field  of  operations  upon  the  French  frontier,  with  its  fortresses,  its  main  lines 
of  defence,  and  the  ai-eas  of  difllcult  and  easy  country  for  the  passage  of  troops. 


On  Wednesdiiy  last,  August  19th,  the  world  was  in  doubt  upon  w^hat  will  be  the  main  question  of 
all  this  war  in  its  earlier  stages  :  to  wit,  where  the  main  forces  of  the  two  opposing  groups  of  armies 
were  to  be  found. 

This  doubt  extended  in  some  degree  (as  events  have  proved)  to  the  General  Officers  in  command 
of  tliose  groups. 

ThLi  doubt  did  not  begin  to  be  solved  for  the  general  public  in  France  and  England  until  the 
moniing  of  last  Sunday,  August  23rd.  It  was  not  fully  solved  until  there  came  the  very  gi-ave  news 
of  the  following  da}^  Monday,  August  24th,  as  to  the  retirements  in  portions  of  the  front  which 
l!ie  accompanying  sketch  will  make  plain. 


I 


!• 


LAIS'D     AND    WATER 


August  29,  1914 


"Wlion  tlic  news  of  tliat  Sunday  and  that  ISronday  liad  been  recel\-cd  in  London  and  Paris,  it  was 
evident  at  once  A\licrc  tlie  enemy  liad  Lis  main  foi-ccs,  and  where  the  forces  opposed  to  him  had  proved 
inferior  to  his  o^ni.  The  consequences  of  tliat  inferiority  were  a  very  serious  set-back  for  the  cause  of 
the  Allies,  and  an  equally  considerable  advantage  gained  by  the  Grerman  powers. 

]^noui,di  was  said  last  week  to  show  that,  other  things  being  equal,  what  determines  success 
or  failure  in  war  is  the  element  of  numbers. 

jS'ow,  because  there  were  at  critical  points  on  two  sections  of  the  theatre  of  operations  a  larger 
number  of  the  enemy  than  had  been  allowed  for,  that  enemy  has  obtained  the  advantage  which  we 
must  clearly  understand  if  we  are  to  appreciate  the  gravity  of  the  moment.  The  two  sections  of  the 
whole  theatre  of  war,  the  two  fields  in  critical  points  of  which  these  advantages  had,  by  Tuesday  last, 
been  gained  by  the  Germans  are  (1)  that  marked  A — A  upon  the  accompanying  sketch,  being  that  part  of 
Lorraine  which  lies  between  the  Yosges  and  the  fortress  of  IMetz ;  (2)  that  marked  B — B  on  the 
s.nne  sketch  being  all  that  country  lying  in  front  of  and  round  the  angle  formed  by  the  junction 
of  the  Sambre  and  the  Mouse  IJivers. 

The  German  advance,  the  falling  back  of  the  Allies,  Avas  in  each  case  over  a  belt  of  from  12  to  21 
miles  in  width,  in  each  case  occupied  some  few  days,  and  in  each  case  has  been  due  to  the  presence, 
on  one  particular  front  of  the  Allies,  of  ninnbers  superior  to  those  that  were  expected — though  in  the 
second  field,  that  of  the  Sambre  and  the  Meuse,  another  element  besides  that  of  numbers  entered  into 
the  calculations,  to  wit,  the  factor  of  Xamur. 

I  will  take  these  two  fields  of  German  success  and  of  French  and  Allied  failure  in  their  order. 

1.    THE  GERMAN  COUNTER-OFFENSIVE  IN  LORRAINE. 

A  French  force,  the  position  and  size  of  which  are  not  matter  for  public  comment,  but  tlie 
movements  and  command  of  Avhich  have  been  communicated  to  the  public  by  the  French  Government, 
had  for  some  days  been  undertaking  a  strong  offensive  movement  across  the  frontier  of  the  annexed 
jirovinces,  Alsace-Lorraine. 

It  will  be  seen  in  the  accompanying  sketch  that  this  frontier,  running  from  in  front  of  Metz  down 
to  Belfort,  is    diA-ided  into  two    sections    b}-  the    Yo.-^ges   JNEountains,  along  the  crest  of  which  it 

runs  for  some  little  way.      The  French  oifen- 


METZ  IFortKedl 


LORRAINE 


SAARBUftC 


NANCY 


*^TheDof)on 


STRASSaURG 
(Firtiried) 


Head 


,Bridge  Heg^ 


0     12      5 


sive,  undertaken  with  considerable  forces,  was 
in  the  direction  of  the  aiTOws  marked  "  passes  "  : 
that  is,  it  included  the  passage  of  the  Vosges 
Mountains  by  the  capture  of  the  passes 
across  them.  It  included  an  advance  upon, 
and,  as  events  turned  out,  the  recapture  of, 
the  open  town  of  Mulhouse ;  it  included  the 
occupation  of  that  high  culminating  mass  at 
the  northern  end  of  the  Vosges  known  as  the 
Donon ;  and  it  included  a  forward  movement 
across  the  oj^en  country  in  between  Metz  and 
the  Yosges,  particidarly  the  capture  and  the 
holding  of  Saarbourg,  a  railway  junction  the 
occupation  of  which  cuts  direct  communication 
between  Metz  and  Strasbourg. 

In  all  this  vigorous  offensive  effort,  the 
combined  Army  Coi-ps  forming  the  army  of 
Alsace  -  Lorraine  under  General  Pau  had, 
up  to  and  including  the 
August  19th  (that  is, 
week)  been  successful, 
move  was  threefold : 

(1.)  First,  and  least  important,  it  had  a  jjolitical  object.  The  two  million  population  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  being  for  the  most  part  unfriendly  to  the  Gennans,  and  the  memory  of  their  annexation 
being  very  bitter  to  tlie  French,  the  presence  of  French  troops  upon  their  soil  was  calculated  to  be  an 
element  of  confusion  for  Germany  and  of  moral  adA'antage  to  the  spirit  of  the  French  people  at  the 
inception  of  the  campaign. 

(2.)  Secondh',  and  far  more  im2>ortant,  it  had  for  its  object  the  putting  of  pressure  upon  the 
extreme  German  left,  so  that  the  enemy's  forces  might  be  drawn  down  in  that  direction  and  Aveakened 
in  their  main  attempt,  which  Avas  likely  to  be  in  the  north.  At  the  same  time,  a  successful  campaign 
in  Alsace -Lon-aine,  proceeding  from  south  to  north,  Avould  gTadually  close  one  bridge-head  after 
another  across  the  lihine,  and  cut  the  communications  between  the  south  German  depots  and  stores 
and  the  German  armies  in  the  field. 

(3.)  Thirdly,  and  most  important,  it  Avould  so  engage  German  attention  upon  the  front  Metz- 
Strasbourg  as  to  divert  or  delay  any  effort  along  the  front  jMetz-Longwy. 

The  importance  of  this  third  point  a  little  consideration  Avill  explain.  The  Allies  occupying,  as 
they  did,  positions  in  the  north  between  Lille  and  LongAvy,  if  the  Germans  had  struck  in  between 
i*kletz  and  LongAvy,  they  Avould  not  only  have  taken  the  line  of  the  Allies  in  the  rear  and  have 
threatened  it  Avith  envelopment,  but  they  Avould  in  particular  have  cut  off  Avhat  is  technically  called 
a  sahent.     A  salient,  in  this  connection,  means  a  position  occupied  by  troops  such  that  it  is  thrusfc 


Sc^le  ofA-^cr^gT  Mjrchtng  tJ^y$; 


day  of  "Wednesday, 
Wednesday  of  last 
The  object  of   this 


position  occupi 
general  line.     It  is  evident  that  in  the  line  Lille — Longw^',  the  allied 


out  like  a  horn  from  some  „.. ,„_.     ^,  ..,^, .......  ,,.„„  ,„  ,..^  ....>.  ..^„,v.     ^v^^.  •  „    ,   ^.^^  cil»i>..* 

forces  upon  the_ Sambre  and  the  Meuse  from  IMons  through  Kamur  to  Mczieres  (in  the  sketch  opposite) 


were  such 


a  salient  in  the  general  nllied  line. 


2» 


Angiist  29,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


NAMUR 


M 


ULLE 


O 

I- 


MONS 


^  LONCWY        MEfZ   ^ 

MEZIERES      ^4^^       «  K 

VERDUN 


STRASBURC 

0 


^•MULHOUSE 


too 


Scale  of  Miles 


200 

4 


300 


m 


Xow,  if  a  salient  is  taken  in  reverse  the  effect  is  tlie  more  disastrous,  from  the  fact  that  in  a 
salient  so  many  of  the  men  are  at  a  distance  from  and  unable  to  get  back  to  the  reai*  where  their 
communications  are  threatened.  To  cut  off  an  enemy  occup^-ing  a  salient  angle  thus  is  a  more 
complete  operation  than  the  mere  turning  of  a  line.  One  great  historic  example  of  such  a  peril  is  that 
in  Avhich  the  French  stood  a  little  before  the  battle  of  Tourcoing.  They  were  thrown  out  in  exactly 
this  ■way,  on  a  projecting  angle,  and  the  Duke  of  York  drew  up  his  plan  of  battle  with  the  object  of 
cutting  them  off  along  the  base  of  the  salient  angle. 

1  said  last  week  why  it  seemed  unlikely  that  the  principal  German  effort  would  be  made  from 
between  Longwy  and  Metz.  Such  an  effort  would  have  to  be  made  right  in  front  of  the  fortress  of 
A'crdun.  But  though  the  pirincipal  German  effort  would,  as  I  thought,  probably  be  made  in  the 
Delgian  field  to  the  noi-th  and  against  the  Allied  line  from  Mons  to  Namur,  yet  it  might  lie 
accompanied  by  a  subsidiary  movement  of  the  Germans  from  between  Longwy  and  Metz  coming  up 
in  the  du*ection  of  the  arrow. 

Now,  if  by  a  vigorous  offensive  along  K.K.K.  j-ou  could  engage  all  the  attention  of  the  enemy  on 
the  Metz-Stnisljom'g  hue  and  bring  all  the  troops  he  had  to  spare  in  the  south  at  N.N.,  yon  would, 
whatever  luck  yom*  offensive  had,  good  or  bad,  jn-evcnt  him  from  going  from  M.,  between  Metz  and 
Longwy,  in  the  direction  of  the  aiTov.',  and  j'ou  Avould  to  that  extent  be  saving  your  northern  positions 
between  ]jille  and  Longwy  from  anxiety. 

AU  this  being  clear,  and  the  reason  why  an  offensive  in  Alsace-LoiTaine,  ultunately  threatening 
the  line  Metz-Strasbourg,  was  attempted  by  the  French,  let  us  see  why  and  how  far  it  failed. 

Beyond  the  Vosges,  in  the  plain  of  Alsace  the  success  was  considerable,  especially  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  ilulhouse.  Every  pass  in  the  Vosges  was  taken,  that  at  Saales,  that  at  Ste. 
!Marie,  and  that  called  the  Bonhomme  fuiiher  south,  being  the  most  important.  The  great  mountain 
mass  which  is  the  culmination  of  the  Vosges  range  on  the  north,  and  called  the  Donon,  was  occupied. 
In  Upper  Alsace,  up  to  the  line  of  the  Rhine  at  li.R.,  General  Pan  had  a  complete  success.  He  drove 
the  Germans  across  the  I'iver,  rcoccupied  Mulhouse,  and  took  twenty-four  guns  and  many  prisoners. 
Meanwhile,  further  to  the  west,  that  is  in  front  of  Saarbourg  and  Metz,  the  left  wing  of  this  army 
also  went  fonvard  and,  as  we  noted  last  week,  it  successfully  got  across  the  Metz-Strasbourg  railway 
and  occupied  the  junction  of  Saai'bourg. 

That  was  the  position  on  the  evening  of  AVednesday,  August  19th,  the  Wednesday  of  last  week. 
Then  came  the  Gennan  counter-offensive. 

The  French  progressive  movement  into  Alsace  and  Lorraine  had  the  effect  of  bringing  a  very 
considerable  body  of  the  enemy  down  south  to  meet  it.  How  many  we  do  not  yet  know.  I  doubt 
whether  it  was  less  than  four  Army  Coi*ps.  Then  this  German  counter-offensive  was  concentrated 
upon  the  v^estern  part  of  this  particular  field,  that  is,  upon  the  left  of  General  Pau's  army,  between 
Metz  and  the  mountains.     It  threw  back  the  inferior  French  forces  opposed  to  it,  recrossed  the 

frontier,  and  by  Sunday,  August  ;23rd,  it  had  bent  back 
the  Avhole  of  that  French  left  Aving  to  such  a  positI<m  as  is 
indicated  in  the  following  sketch.  The  French  were  only 
holding  the  hue  of  the  River  Meurthe,  nor  every wliei-e  holding 
that.  The  Germans  were  in  Luncnlle.  Tlie  troops  on  the 
Donon  and  in  the  Pass  at  Saales  had  had  to  retire  with  the 
general  French  retirement  lest  they  should  be  left  isolated. 
The  passes  on  the  southern  part  of  the  mountains,  however, 
Avcre  still  held  by  the  French,  and  their  troops  still  dominated 
the  upper  plain  of  Alsace,  the  town  of  Mulhouse,  and  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine  at  this  pai-t. 

The  German  success  to  the  west  of  the  mountains,  when 
they  pushed  the  French  back  on  to  the  line  of  the  ilLMirtlie 
and  beyond  it,  did  not  only  consist  in  compelling  the  inferior 


METZ       • 


UJJE  TO  V«!tT. TKniCM  XTrEFOIlCEPl 


8* 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


August  2'J, 


1914 


Frcncli  forces  before  them  to  retire,  but  inclnded  the  capture  of  many  guns  and  prisoners ;  the  German 
claim  in  this  respect  being  fifty  guns  and  10,000  men  taken,  while  the  French  dovcrnment  affirm — as 
is,  indeed,  probable  under  such  cu-cumstances — that  the  figures  are  exaggerated. 

To  sum  up,  there  was,  on  the  extreme  left  of  the  general  field  of  operations  (300  miles  long),  a 
very  distinct  German  success  achieved  between  ]\Ietz  and  the  A''osges  Mountains,  which  had  the  effect 
of  di-ivino-  the  French  back  across  the  frontier  from  twelve  to  twenty  miles  south  of  the  fm-thest 
positions  they  had  reached  in  Lorraine.  The  success  was  accompanied  by  the  capture  of  manj'  guns 
and  men,  and  involved  the  loss  of  the  northern  part  of  the  Vosges  Mountains  with  their  passes, 
though  not  as  yet  of  the  southern  part  nor  of  the  plain  of  Upper  Alsace  beyond.  Pressm-e  was 
removed  from  the  south  of  the  German  line,  and  the  communications  of  Alsace-Lorraine  with  South 
Germany,  were,  after  this  success,  seciu-e. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  bringing  of  such  large  German  forces — perhaps  a  quarter  of  all  the 
German  ai-my — so  far  south,  made  impossible  any  taking  in  reverse  of  the  Allies  in  the  noi-thern 
field,  that  is  upon  the  Belgian  frontier,  for  the  moment. 

So  m\ich  for  what  happened  in  Lorraine  and  in  the  south  between  Wednesday,  August  19th, 
when  the  French  offensive  was  still  successful,  and  Mondaj',  the  24tli,  when  the  left  wing  of  that 
offensive  found  itself  pressed  back  upon  the  Menrthe  by  the  German  counter-offensive.  This  German 
success  was  followed  hy  the  evacuation  two  days  later  of  all  Alsace  by  the  French,  and  the  abandon- 
ment by  them  of  all  the  jiasses  of  the  Vosges.    From  the  dotted  line  which  they  occupied  10  days  ago 


*■     ¥    + 


TOUL 
PosfY/on  on  Auy.  f9 
Pos/'t/on  on  Au^.  25 

T/ie  frontier 


Scale,     or  Miuns 


SAe(-ch  show/ny  territory  /ost  '■ 
6y /^rench  on  Soc/t/Perrp-^snc/  oFtfie 
///re  6<stiveen  A  ug.  /3  a/?c^  A  ug.  25 


-an 


open 


town- 


-was 


till 


they   have   been   forced   back   to   the    line   shoAvni    Ijy    crosses.     Nancy 

intact,  but  the  Germans  are  everywhere  across  the  frontier.  ,  They  fm-ther  claimed  the  capture  of 

many  field  pieces  abandoned  in  the  Vosges  mountains. 

The  French  having  retired  to  the  line  of  the  Meurthe  in  French  Lorraine,  some  miles  witliiii 
the  fi-ontier,  and  their  right  having  retu-ed  to  the  frontier  itself  in  front  of  Belfort  and  along  the  crest 
of  the  southern  Vosges,  they  remained  in  this  position  upon  the  defensive  throughout  the  Monday  and 
up  to  Tuesday  morning.  Last  Tuesday,  however,  a  general  attack  Avas  delivered  by  the  enemy 
•along  the  whole  of  the  French  front  in  this  region.  It  was  repelled.  Since  then  we  have  had  no 
further  news  from  the  southern  extreme  of  the  fi'ontier,  save  one  message,  which  indicates  that 
fightmg  for  the  moment  had  ceased,  and  announcing  considei-able  losses  to  the  enemy  in  his  retu'ement 
of  three  days  ago. 

It  is  certain  that  by  this  time  every  available  man  is  being  drafted  towards  the  prmcipal  field  of 
operations  in  the  north,  and  that  the  French  in  the  south  will  remain  entirely  upon  the  defensive. 

Much  more  important  in  the  final  event  will  be  the  measure  of  success  attending  this  other 
German  effort  in  the  northern  field  of  the  theatre  of  war-  upon  the  Franco -Belgian  frontier,  and  to  that 
I  wiU  next  turn. 

2.    THE  MAIN  GERMAN  FLANKING  MOVEMENT  THROUGH  BELGIUM. 

l^Y  that  same  Wednesday,  August  19th,  Wednesday  of  last  week,  it  was  apparent  that  the 
main  German  effort  Avas  going  to  be  made  through  the  Belgian  plain,  which  lies  north  of  the 
Elvers  Sambre  and  Meuse.  That  the  main  effort  would  be  made  here  was,  as  we  saw  last  week, 
probable,  because  that  was  undoubtedly  the  original  plan  of  the  German  General  Staff  when  they 
took  it  for  granted  that  tlie  Belgians  Avould  sell  their  honour  and  allow  the  passage  of  the 
German  armies  tlirough  theii-  country  to  proceed  undistiu-bed.  The  imexpected  resistance  of  Lioge, 
before  siege  artilleiy  could  bo  brought  up  against  it,  had  disturbed  and  delayed  this  plan,  as  ■v^-e 
all  know.  But  it  is  exceedingly  difficult  'to  change  a  line  of  advance  once  determined  and 
plotted  out  in  detaU ;  and  however  much  delayed,  it  was  still  probable  that  the  original  plan 
would  be   followed.     Followed  it   was.     The    siege  artillerv  had   come    up    and    sUenced   the   forts 


4» 


August  29,  1911  LAND    A:ND     WATER 

of  Liogo,  and  mucli  tlic  largest  body  of  the  total  German  forces  bcjond  tlio  Rlinio  lu  tlie  west 
■was  massed  to  the  north  of  the  Meuse.  A  sufficient  supply  was  accumulated  for  tliis  groat  effort, 
and  it  is  probable  that  -^Nhen  an  accurate  history  of  the  war  is  available  we  shall  find  that  not 
less  than  seven,  and  perhaps  eight.  Army  Corps  out  of  a  total  of  certainly  less  than  twenty,  were 
massed  thus  north  of  the  Meuse  upon  the  extreme  left  wing  of  the  Allies  for  the  great  flanking 
movement  round  their  line  by  the  north. 

The  last  stand  that  could  be  made  by  the  Belgian  Army  to  these  immensely  superior  forces 
was  made  on  that  same  Wednesday,  a  day's  march  east  of  Brussels,  and  after  it  the  Bclgums 
retired  behind  the  guns  of  Antwerp,  leaving  Brussels  open  to  the  advance.  In  the  late  morning 
of  the  morrow,  Thursday,  August  20th,  the  Thursday  of  last  week,  the  heads  of  the  German 
columns  appeared  before  the  cajjital  of  Belgium,  which  had  been  left  open  to  admit  them  without 
resistance.  From  about  half-past  two  o'clock  of  that  day,  throughout  the  whole  of  the  remainder  of 
that  day,  the  German  commanders  organised  a  military  parade,  the  object  of  which,  though  confined 
ta  what  is  called  "  moral  effect,"  was  military  and  defensible.  Thej'  marched  through  Brussels  one  of 
their  Army  Corps  specially  picked  for  the  job  because  it  was  quite  fresh.  They  had  speciallj-  accoutred 
it,  given  it  a  good  rest,  put  into  it  for  a  veneer  a  few  of  the  units  that  had  been  in  the  earlier  fighting, 
and  bidden  it  pi-epare  for  the  show  as  for  a  rcAiew.  These  40,000  men  they  passed  through  the  cit}-, 
accompanied  by  music,  and  by  every  adjunct  which  could  impress  the  civilian  spectator — even  to  the 
stiff"  parade  step  which  is  characteristic  of  the  Prussian  drill. 

Xow  it  is  here  advisable,  after  the  somewhat  iU-timed  ridicule  which  was  poured  upon  this 
manifestation,  to  explain  what  is  meant  by  moral  effect  in  warfare,  and  why  a  commander  will,  under 
some  conditions,  wisely  employ  it. 

WHAT  IS   "MORAL  EFFECT"? 

Strictly  speaking,  aU  operations  of  v.'ar  dej^end  for  their  success  upon  moral  effect,  with  the 
exception  of  that  operation  in  which  a  hostile  force  is  completely  surrounded  and  maybe  exterminated. 

In  everj-  other  case  you  obtain  your  success  over  your  enemy — or  at  any  rate  over  the  survivors 
among  your  enemy — by  reducing  them  into  a  condition  of  mind  in  Avhich  their  opposition  is  ineffective. 
The  whole  discussion  between  closer  and  more  open  fonnations :  between  the  power  of  modern  fortifi- 
cations to  withstand  modern  siege  artillery,  and  the  opposite  theoiy  :  between  the  survivor  and  non- 
survivor  and  shock  tactics  for  cavalry — all  these  depend  ultimately  upon  one's  judgment  of  "  moral 
effect." 

But  there  is  evidently  a  difference  in  degi'ee.  No  one  can  doubt  the  ovex-ttdielming  result  of  a 
double  flank  movement  enveloping  an  inferior  force.  To  depend  upon  such  a  movement  as  that  for 
success  is  to  depend  upon  something  like  a  certitude  in  human  ps3chology.  At  the  other  end  of  the 
line  you  get  the  story  of  the  Chinese  troops  that  ten-ified  the  enemy  by  making  faces  and  imitating  the 
cries  of  wild  beasts. 

There  is  a  whole  category  of  actions  in  warfare  which  are  of  doubtful  use  because  they  lie 
beyond  tlie  line  after  which  the  p.sychological  effect  is  weak.  Such  actions  are  specially  said  to 
have  no  true  strategic  but  only  a  "  moral "  effect. 

For  instance,  the  proclamation  of  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  threatening  Paris  with  destruction 
before  the  invasion  of  France  in  1792,  is  rightly  regarded  by  historians  as  a  blunder.  Its  moral  effect, 
if  any,  was  to  strengthen  the  French  moral.  Again,  Napoleon's  entry  into  ^Moscow  was  effected  at  an 
enormous  expense  of  men,  after  an  advance  far  too  prolonged,  and  the  corresponding  moral  effect  of 
holding  the  capital  in  such  a  country  as  Russia  was  in  no  way  worth  the  expense  of  time,  men,  and 
energy  which  it  cost. 

Now  what  we  have  to  seize  in  the  present  campaign  is  that  the  German  Government  and  the 
German  military  commanders  have  carefully  estimated  and  intend  to  apply  this  factor  of  "  moral  effect  " 
apart  from  direct  action  in  the  field,  up  to  a  certain  point  and  in  certain  particular  ways,  for  which  Ave 
must  be  prepared.  I  do  not  say  that  their  estimate  is  just :  I  should  even  imagine  that  they  will 
exaggerate  this  factor.  But  what  I  do  say  is  that  their  action  here,  as  in  eveiy  other  matter,  will  be 
detaUed  and  calculated ;  and  it  will  be  veiy  foolish  on  the  part  of  those  who  are  their  opponents  to 
imagine  that  any  piece  of  parade,  severity,  or  demonstration  has  been  undertaken  by  the  German 
commanders  at  random,  or  without  their  having  seen,  just  as  clearly  as  we  see  it,  the  vain  side  of 
such  accessories  to  war. 

By  marching  through  Brussels,  for  instance,  the  Gennan  commanders  added  a  full  day's  fatigue 
and  a  full  day's  delay  to  at  least  one  body  of  their  troops,  and  perhaps  to  as  many  more.  The  choice 
of  a  fresh  Army  Coi-j)s  was  a  patent  thing  which  deceived  nobody  into  thinking  that  the  troops  which 
liad  recently  been  fighting  M'ere  those  fresh  troops  whom  the  populace  of  Brussels  gazed  upon.  The 
breaking  into  parade  step  made  no  careful  observer  believe  that  those  who  indulged  in  it  were  on  that 
account  the  more  formidable  in  battle  ;  nor  did  the  playing  of  brazen  instruments,  and  the  rest. 

None  the  less,  the  decision  of  the  Gennan  commanders  to  make  this  demonstration  was  not,  as  too 
many  have  imagined,  a  piece  of  emptj-  theatricalism.  Its  effect  was  calculated  beforehand,  and  that 
effect  has  been  in  part  attamed.  No  one  reading  the  press  hostile  to  Germany  on  the  morrow  of  last 
Tliursday,  when  the  news  was  known,  can  have  cloubted  that  this  piece  of  parade  did  in  some  degree^ 
perhaps  in  a  less  degi-ce  than  the  Gennan  commanded  had  hoped — affect  the  spirit  of  their  opponents. 

It  is  exactly  the  same  with  the  much  graver  policy  of  torture  and  murder.  The  German  troops 
have  here  direct  orders  from  their  superiors  and  a  clear  object  before  them. 

They  expect  to  be  operating  in  ho.stile  coimtry — at  any  rate  they  have  good  hopes  of  being  in  liostiL? 
countr}^  during  all  the  earlier,  and  perhaps  more  critical,  phases  of  the  campaign.  If  they  meet  with 
resistance  upon  the  part  of  the  civilian  population  (though  that  only  consists  of  women,  elderly  men, 
and  children),  their  difficulties  will  be  enonnously  increased. 

5» 


LAND    AND    WATER 


August  29,  1914 


Since  these  elderly  men,  women,  and  chiidren  have,  in  the  nature  of  things,  no  kind  of 
orrfanization,  the  terror  inspired  by  the  fato  of  individuals  may  he  expected  to  cow  all  the  rest. 
Therefore,  orders  will  he  strictly  observed  to  adopt  any  means  of  spreading  such  terror  wheno^•cr  there 
is  so  much  as  a  suspicion  of  resistance  upon  the  part  of  the  civilian  population,  and  on  this  account  wo 
must  he  prepared  for  not  only  the  summary  shooting  of  elderl}-  men  and  youths  who  have  been  caught 
with  arms  in  their  hands,  but  also  of  any  who  have  been  suspected.  Again,  Avhonever  there  is  a 
suspicion  against  the  population  of  any  place,  we  must  expect  the  putting  to  death  of  elderly  men  and 
women,  and  even  children,  the  destruction  of  property  upon  all  sides,  the  burning  of  homes. 

I  do  not  say  that  this  is  wise  upon  the  part  of  the  Germans.  Personally,  I  think  that  in  so 
acting  they  are  handicapping  themselves  politically,  and  probably,  in  the  later  phases  of  the  campaign, 
militarih'-  as  well.  But  the  point  to  remember  is  that  these  actions  arc  calculated  actions.  In 
]3cl"ium,  for  instance,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  absence  of  all  civilian  resistance  after  the  first  few- 
da  vs  has  encouraged  the  German  commanders  in  the  belief  that  these  methods  are  of  immediate 
niilitary  value.  They  will  be  pursued  in  France  as  in  Belgium,  and,  should  a  force  land  in 
England,  in  England  as  in  France.     We  must  be  prepared  for  it. 

The  same  rule  applies  to  the  ransoming  of  towns.  Here  it  is  not  the  town  into  which  ten-or  has 
to  be  struck,  but  the  financial  power  of  the  enemy.  Take,  for  instance,  the  case  of  the  Belgian  towns 
:nid  provinces  in  the  last  few  da^'s.  A  total  of  about  £10,000,000  has  been  exacted.  England  and 
France  at  once  granted  this  sum  to  Belgium,  wliich  is  as  much  as  saying  that  Germany,  by  her 
successful  occnpation  of  Belgium,  has  fined  her  principal  opponents  already  £10,000,000,  and  inspired 
in  the  minds  of  those  who  have  no  country  in  particular  and  whose  principal  object  is  cosmopolitan 
linauce,  the  dread  of  fui-ther  loss.  Gemiany  knows  how  j^owcrful  these  men  arc,  and  relies  upon  their 
indirect  suijpoi-t. 

THE    THREAT    TO    THE    SEA    COAST. 

Finally,  there  is  the  very  powerful  moral  effect  upon  which  Gennany  is  certainly  counting,  and 
for  which  we  must  in  this  country  be  specially  prepared  :  ihc  occiqudion  of  the  sea  coast.  There  is 
nothing  to  prevent  comparatively  small  detached  bodies  of  the  Gennan  armies,  especially  strong  in 
cavahy,  froni  occupying  Ostend,  Dunkirk,  Calais,  and  ultimately  Boulogne,  except  a  decision  in  the 
valley  of  the  !Meuse  adverse  to  German  anns.  If  the  Germans  are  successful  in  the  valley  of  tlio 
Meuse  they  will  certainly  occupy  the  poi'ts  of  the  Straits  of  Dover. 

We  may  tell  ourselves,  and  tell  ourselves  truly,  all  manner  of  concrete,  solid,  and  consoling  things 
conceming  such  an  occupation  : — That  the  Fleet  can  always  master  any  particular  section  of  coast  to 
%.  liich  it  directs  its  attention  ;  that  there  are  no  vessels  of  war  in  these  ports ;  that  it  is  just  as  easy 
to  fly  over  to  England  from  the  western  part  of  the  Belgian  plain  as  from  the  sea  coast ;  that  no 
iinne-layer  could  get  out  of  these  porfs  without  observation  from  the  fleet ;  that  British  com- 
nr.mications  over  sea  with  the  British  forces  and  their  Allies  could  be  maintained  further  to  the 
west,  (S;c.,  &c.  It  is  .still  true  that  the  presence  of  Gennan  troops  u])on  the  further  side  of  the  Straits 
(if  Dover  would  profoundly  affect  the  state  of  mind  of  the  Allies.  It  would  be  of  a  "  moral  effect " 
apparently  disproportionate  to  the  effort  required.  Whether  it  Avill  rcaUy  be  disproportionate  or  no 
•  illy  the  event  can  show  ;  but  at  any  rate  it  will  be  attempted — unless  the  series  of  actions  upon  the 
!Meuse  goes  adversely  to  the  Gennan  arms.  And  we  shall  be  very  unwise  indeed  unless  we  prepare 
ourselves  for  the  news  of  such  an  occupation  of  the  sea  coast. 

Let  me  noAv  return  to  the  consideration  of  the  series  of  actions  that  have  taken  place,  and  at  the 
moment  of  writing  are  still  taking  place,  in  the  Mouse  valley. 


»  L.'iLe 


.O'^ 


^=^ 


1 1  cat 


THE   CONTINUATION    OF   THE    OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MEUSE   AND   SAMBRE. 

We  left  those  operations  upon  the  Thiu-sday  of  last  Aveek,  when  the  Gennans  were  marching 
through  Brussels.  It  v/as  by  the  Friday,  in  the  afternoon  of  that  day,  that  the  first  German  shell  fell 
into  the  station  of  Charleroi,  upon  the  Kiver  Sambre ;  and  it  is  from  this  moment  that  the  general 
operation  of  the  Allied  armies  against  the  German  armies  of  the  Belgian  plain  and  the  Ardennes 
begins. 

If  the^  reader  will  tm-n  back  to  the  general  map  published  at  the  head  of  these  comments,  he  will 
note  that  in  the  northern  field  of  operations  the  Eiver  iTeuse  turns  a  sharp  corner  at  the  town  of 

Namur ;  after  having  run  roughly  from 
north  to  south  it  begins  to  run  roughly 
from  east  to  west.  At  this  comer  thci-e 
comes  into  the  Meuse  the  Eiver  Sambre 
which,  running  from  cast  to  west,  con- 
tinues the  line  of  the  Lower  Meuse. 
North  of  this  line  lies,  of  course,  that 
Belgian,  plain  of  which  mention  is  miulo 
so  frequently  in  all  dcscri2:)tions  of  the 
campaign.  South  of  that  line  is  to  bo 
found  rough  wooded  country,  deeply 
ravined,  and  called  the  Ardennes.  It  is 
rougher  and  wilder  to  the  east  and  to  the 
south,  and  falls  into  cultivatable  land  as 
one  goes  westward  and  northward,  the 
Sambre  itself  coining  from  soui'ces  in  almost 
flat  country  and  only  running  through 
hilly  countiy  as  it  approaches  Namnr. 


•  t,QNCwy 


iCAi£  cr  t-iiLca 


6* 


Au^ist  29,  1911  LAIs^D    AND    WATER 

Now,  when  it  was  evident  tliat  the  Germans  woukl  make  their  principal  attempt  thronirh  the 
Eelgian  jJain,  the  Allies  occupied  a  line  passing  through  Lille,  Mons,  along  the  Samhre  by  Cliarleroi 
to  Namur.  I'hat  Avas  a  clear  necessity,  but  they  also  massed  some  very  large  numbers  on  a  line 
bending  back  along  the  U])per  ISIeuse  I'rom  Kamur  southward.  The  English  contingent  lay  about 
Mons.  It  was  the  French  Fifth  Anny,  largely  comjjosed  of  troops  from  Algiers,  that  lay  along  the 
Sambre  from  above  Cliarleroi  to  as  far  as  Naiuur.  Namur  itself  aj)pears  to  haxe  been  somewhat 
insuificicntly  held  by  a  Belgian  contingent.  Behind  were  the  large  French  forces  continued  up  the 
valley  of  the  Meuse. 

So  much  we  know  because  it  has  been  made  public  property  by  the  authorities.  Something  more 
we  know  from  official  telegrams  and  from  private  accounts  that  have  been  printed  in  the  press  of  Paris 
and  London.     But  there  still  remains  a  much  greater  part  to  conjecture. 

Let  us  first  deal  with  what  ^ye  know. 

The  German  attack  came  in  full  force  upon  the  line  of  the  Sambre,  and  there,  of  course,  greatly 
outnumbered  the  defenders.  It  chief  objective  was  not  the  extreme  of  the  line  to  tiie  west, 
as  might  bo  expected  of  German  tactics  and  a  desu-e  to  outflank,  but  in  a  direct  attack,  the 
bridges  at  and  near  Cliarleroi.  This  attack  was  maintained  throughout  Saturday  and  through 
the  first  part  of  Sunday  without  result.  The  English  contingent  held  its  ground  on  the  left 
near  Mons  against  forces  which  seem  to  have  been  superior  to  it  by  approiimately  20  per  cent. 
The  French  along  the  Sambre,  particularly  pressed  for  the  possession  of  the  bridge  at  Cliarleroi, 
lost  and  recovered,  again  lost  and  again  recovered  that  passage.  AVliile  this  was  proceeding  the 
larger  Fi-ench  forces  along  the  Upper  Meuse  were  proposing  to  pass  eastward  through  the 
Ardennes  countiy.  Had  they  succeeded  in  pressing  far  eastward  through  this  difficult  and  highl\- 
defcnsible  land  of  forests  and  deep  ravines,  they  would  have  threatened  more  and  more  with 
every  mile  of  their  advance  the  communications  and  the  su2)ply  of  the  Gennan  armies  in  the 
Belgian  plain,  for  that  communication  and  those  supplies  largely  come  by  road  across  the  ^Meuse 
between  Namur  and  Liege.  Further,  such  an  advance  would  have  separated  the  northern  German 
army  from  the  southem  portion,  which  was  operating  from  Luxembourg. 

One  hj'pothesis  of  what  followed  upon  and  after  the  Sunday  is  the  following : 

It  is  obvious  that  this  advance  eastwai-d  through  the  Ardennes  would  pivot  round  the  fortress 
of  Namur.  The  advance  along  the  arrow  marked  (1)  in  the  above  sketch  would  march  the 
furthest :  next  that  along  the  arrow  marked  (2),-  and  last  along  the  ^leuse  itself,  depending 
upon  the  success  of  the  two  more  southern  columns,  that  along  the  arrow  marked  (3).'  While, 
so  long  as  the  line  on  the  Sambre  was  held,  this  turning  movement  romid  the  Ardennes  by 
the  east  was  in  no  fear  for  its  rear. 

Such  is  one  hypothesis  upon  the  nature  of  the  counter-offensive  designed  by  the  Allies  against  the 
vigorous  Gennan  offen.sive  undertaken  from  the  Belgian  plain. 

That  counter-offensive — according  to  this  conjecture — broke  down ;  and  this  breakdown  is  the 
gi-avest  news  of  all  that  has  yet  reached  us  from  the  seat  of  war. 

The  advices  received  and  published  in  London  and  Paris  up  to  and  including  the  news  of  last 
Wednesday  morning  pointed,  indeed,  to  no  decisive  result.  They  did  not  indicate  that  the  one 
opponent  had  as  yet  appreciably  diminished  the  military  power  of  the  other ;  but  they  did  strongly 
suggest  that  the  counter-offensive  designed  by  the  Allies  again.st  the  Gennan  advance  had  failed,  and 
tliey  made  it  seem  exceedingly  improbable  that  any  immediate  attempt  to  restore  it  would  be  attcHipted. 

The  failure  appears  to  have  depended  upon  two  isolated  events — a  check  in  the  southernmost 
French  effort,  marked  (1)  upon  the  above  sketch,  and,  much  more  important,  the  fall  of  Namur :  at 
least,  the  fall  of  the  eastern  forts  and  the  consequent  loss  of  the  bridge-heads  over  the  two  riAcrs 
Sambre  and  Meuse  at  the  critical  point  where  these  rivers  meet. 

If  Namur  had  still  held  as  a  pivot  upon  which  the  tuniing  movement  could  depend,  the  fact  that 
the  southernmost  French  column  was  arrested  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Neuchateau  might  not 
have  had  very  permanent  results.  The  second  colimin  to  the  north  coming  up  on  the  Hank  of 
the  Gennan  armies  from  Luxembourg  might,  indeed,  have  reversed  that  result ;  and  in  any  case, 
the  occupation  of  even  a  part  of  the  Aixlennes  country  by  French  troops  would  have  menaced 
the  supply  of  their  opponents  upon  the  Belgian  plain. 

But  when  (or  if)  Namur  went,  the  hinge  upon  which  all  that  arm  was  swinging  went  with 
it,  and  not  only  would  the  French  turning  movement  eastward  through  the  Ardennes  become 
impossible,  but  it  woidd  become  equally  impossible  to  hold  the  valley  of  the  Sambre. 

AU  this,  I  repeat,  is  pure  conjecture.  It  is  based  upon  the  sujjposition  that  the  news  of 
Namur  came  at  the  critical  moment  and  that  on  receipt  of  it  only  was  the  retreat  from  the  Sambre 
determined  upon.  Tlie  fuller  accounts  that  will  reach  us  later  will  show  whether  this  hypothesis 
is  sound  or  no. 

The  way  in  which  Namur  was  essential  to  the  whole  plan  will  be  easily  appreciated  when 

we  consider  that  the  ring  of  forts  protected  the  junction  of 
the  two  rivers  and  of  the  bridges  whereby  they  might 
simultaneously  be  crossed. 

Observe  the  effect  of  this.  In  the  accompanying  duigrani 
you  have  the  complex  obstacle  A.  A.  A.,  consisting  of  a 
main  river  and  its  tributars',  which  obstacle  is  presented  both 
to  M.  advancing  upon  it  and  to  N.,  who  is  preparing  to  meet 
him  and  to  take  a  coimter  offensive  against  him.  A  fortress, 
X,  X,  X,  X,  held  by  N.'s  men,  contains  and  protects  the  two 
ojiportnnities,  bridges  (B.B.),  whereby  the  obstacle  can  l>e 
siinnoHuteJ.     N.  can  move  at  his  choice  across  the  obstacle  by 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


August  29,  1914 


mLiLLC 

'^^V^ 

©V 
©V 

^    Moms 

0 

®         ©      / 

©/ 

® 

these  bricl^i-os,  under  protection  of  the  foiiress,  aud  appear  in  force  Avhere  he  chooses.  He  could  appear 
in  force  at'tackiiig  along  line  (1)  or  along  line  (2)  at  his  choice.  The  various  pai-ts  of  his  enemy  M  are 
se])iu-atcd  and  delayed  by  the  obstacle :  he  is  not.  So  long  as  the  foiiress  holds,  N  commands  the 
bridge-heads  which  sui-mount  that  obstacle  in  his  favour,  while  leaving  it  stiU  a  cause  of  delay  to  his 

oucmy. 

But  suppose  the  foi-trcss  X,  X,  X,  X  to  fall,  and  the  conditions  are  exactly  reversed.     Tlien  it  is 

3>I  that  has  the  bridges  -.  it  is  !M  tliat  is  no  longer  suffering  from  the  obstacle,  and  it  is  N  who  is 

restricted  by  it.      Further,  the  line  wdiich  N  is  holding  along  one  part  of  the  obstacle  up  to  and 

reposing  upon  the  fortress  is  turned  by  the  falling  of  the  fortress  into  the  hands  of  M.      M  can  pour 

over  on°to  N's  flank.      The  obstacle  which  N  is  holding  is  no  longer  an  obstacle  to  hun,  because  he 

possesses  the  bridge  for  crossing  it ;  and  N.  will  be  rolled  up  unless  he  falls  back  immediately. 

M  beino-  here  the  German  attack,  N  the  allied  defence  along  the  Sambre  X,  X,  X,  the  fortress  of 

Namur  protecthig  the  bridges  across  the  junction  of  the  Sambre  and  the  Meuse  (which  together  fonn 

the  triple  obstacle  in  question),  with  Namur  in  German  hands,  the  position  of  the  AUies  defending  the 

Sambre  becomes  hnpossible.     The  Allies  have  to  fall  back,  and  at  the  same  time  the  counter-oli'ensive 

to  the  east  across  the  Meuse  through  the  Ardennes  can  no  longer  be  pui-sued. 

The  total  result  under  this  hypothesis  is  that  from  holding  the  positions  (1)  (1)  (1)  (1)  (1)  on  the 

accompiinying  sketch,  the  Allies  had  by  last  Monday  evening 
to  fall  back  u2)on  positions  roughly  represented  by  (2)  (2)  (2) 
(2)  (2).  Here,  however,  conjecture  becomes  necessarily  vaguer 
and  less  well  based,  because  we  sbaU  not  precisely  know  (and 
even  for  those  who  know,  it  would  be  a  duty  to  be  silent) 
where  the  rclielc  defensive  line  against  the  next  Gei-man 
advance  AviU  lie.  We  shall  not  know  this  until  the  news  of  its 
retention,  or  the  failure  to  retain  it,  reaches  us.  It  is  even 
possible  that  a  large  French  force  is  still  free  to  act  and  to 
take  the  counter- offensive — we  do  not  know. 

It  is  however  already  evident  that  the  full  plan  of  the 
Allied  Gfeueral  Staff  involves  what  is  called  a  "  refusing  "  of 
their  left ;  that  is  a  bending  back  of  their  left  wing  from  the 
general  line.  This  left  wing  Avas  lying  upon  Wednesday  last 
along  the  line  Canibrai — Le  Cateau.  This  extreme  portion 
was  held  by  the   English    contingent.     That  of  coui-se  leaves 

the  whole  of  the  north-east  open  to  a  Gennan  advance,  but  at  the  same  time  it  leaves  the  flank  of 

that  advance  open  to  attack  from  the  south  if  that  unknown  factor,  the  French  masses  upon  the  right, 

can  come  up  in  time  and  in  sufficient  numbers.       'j'liis  is  indeed  the  whole  oljject  of  refusing  a  wing — 

you  do  it  when  your  enemy  is  trying  to  turn  jou  if  you  think  that  you  have  enough  men  to  strike  up 

at  his  flank  dm-ing  the  turning  movement. 

Our  information,  then,  24  hours  before  this  appears  in  print,  is  no  more  than  the  following  :  the 

Allied  line  has  retired  from  its  original  positions  (1)  (1)  (1)  by  very  heavy  marches  for  three  days  to  (3) 

(3)  upon  its  extreme  left.     It  has  fallen  back 

from    the    neighbourhood    of    Mons    to    the 

neighbourhood  of  Cambrai.     The  task  of  the 

heaviest  marchmg  has  fallen  upon  the  English 

contingent,     which     is      extended      between 

Cambrai  and  Le  Cateau.     To  the  right,  any- 

■\vhere  within  the  triangle,   ABC,    are  the 

main  French  masses,  certainly  10  Army  Corps 

in  number,  perhaps  already  more.     What  they 

have  in  front  of  them  vre  do  not  know  :  they 

certainly  had  superior  numbers  in  the  fighting 

of  last  Sunday;    the  new  arrivals   from   the 

south  may  already  have  redressed  the  balance. 

Meanwhile,  there  is  of  course  nothing  to  pre- 
vent the  German  cavalry  from  working  round 

by  the  left  in  raids  if  they  think  it  will  be  of 

useful  moral  effect  to  do  so,  and  some  of  that 

cavalry  has  already  appeared  near  Lille   and 

near  Douai,  and   even  further   upon   French 

territory. 

THE   NATURE    OF   THE    FALL   OF   NAMUR. 

It  is  again  a  matter  of  conjecture,  but  of  conjecture  most  vital  to  the  fortunes  of  the  whole  of  our 
campaign,  what  exactly  happened  at  Namur.  For,  if  Namur  was  sufiiciently  held  and  was  taken — or 
at  least,  certain  of  its  forts  were  taken— so  quickly  only  under  the  effect  of  shell  fire,  it  must  mean 
that  the  whole  theory  under  which  ring  fortresses  were  built,  and  upon  which  the  Allied  plan  was 
based,  is  eiToneous ;  it  must  mean  that  the  German  theory  is  sound  and  the  French  theory  is  unsound 
in  the  niatter  of  fortification  ;  it  must  moan  that  your  ring  fortress  can  be  carried  in  a  comparatively 
short  time,  if  not  by  a  rash,  then  under  the  effect  of  siege  artillery. 

^  Now,  putting  together  all  the  very  slight  evidence  which  l)ad  reached  this  country  by  the  morning 
of  Thursday  last,  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  so  grave  a  conclusion  can  be  drawn.  The  eastern 
forts  of  Nainur  appear  to  have  been  silenced  late  upon  Saturday,  or  early  upon  Sunday,  the  town  to 
have  been  occupied  in  the  coiu-se  of  Sundav,  and  certain  of  the  vvcstern  forts  to  be  still  holding  out  in 


\ 

A 

/. 

y 

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\ 

.KAMUB 

\ 

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MONS.    ><®         \j) 

A 

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•  <J)f    \               .MEZftRB 

•oou/j      ',      \,oy^ 

? 

"^yikiKiM 

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CAKBeW  (^ 

' 

It 

6KETCH     EHOWIXG    I!ET:EEliEj;T    OF    ALLIED     TROOl  S     FKOM    THEIB 
I'OaiTION    or    LAST    WEEK, 

(1)  (1)  to  their  present  position  (3)  (3),  of  -nliioli  the  portion  between 
Cambrai  and  Le  Cateau  is  published,  -nhile  that  represeutinj  tha  main 
French  Body  to  the  right  is  not  cortain,  but  lies  somewhcro  within  tho- 
space  marked  with  a  query. 


8* 


Anm-.st  29,  1 914  L  A  ^^  D    A  N  D    W  A  T  E  R 


"o 


the  evening  of  that  day.  At  least  this  view  of  the  matter  is  established  by  two  convevging  pieces  of 
evidence,  the  one  from  German,  the  other  from  French  sources.  Again,  by  the  Sunday  evening  th.e 
retreat  from  the  Sambre  was  in  full  swing  and  tlie  Allied  cannon  were  iu  front  of  Phillipevillo  back 
several  liours'  marching  from  the  Sambre.  We  hear  of  a  very  small  garrison  in  Namur,  and  that 
gan-ison  Belgian — 3,000  is  the  almost  incredibly  small  figure  given.  AVe  are  further  told  that  the 
most  eastern  of  the  forts  round  Namur,  that  furthest  advanced  down  the  !Mcuse,  Avas  silenced  almost 
immediately  ;  and  more  than  that  we  are  not  told.  !Now  we  can  be  perfectly  certain  from  the  experience 
at  Poi-t  Arthur,  that  the  immediate  silencing  of  a  modern  fort  by  mere  shell  lire  is  quite  abnormal,  as 
■we  know  by  the  experience  of  both  Er-lung-shan  fort  at  Port  Arthur  and  of  Fleron  fort  and  others  at 
Liege  that  it  is  impossible  (also  under  nonnal  circumstances)  to  rash  it.  IMore  than  that  we  do  not 
know.  But  it  wiU  require  very  strong  evidence  indeed  to  prove  that  modem  fortification  is  subject, 
when  it  is  properly  defended,  to  immediate  disaster  of  this  sort.  If  it  is,  not  only  Namur, 
but  Toul  and  Verdun — and  not  oidy  Toul  and  Yerdun,'  but  Metz  and  Strasbourg — are  in  the 
tame  boat. 

^Ul  this  reading,  from  sparse  and  unco-ordinated  news  of  Avhat  has  happened  daring  this  week 
upon  the  Sambre  and  Meuse,  is  based  upon  the  hypothesis  that  Namur  did  fall  as  was  announced,  and 
that  the  Anglo-French  line  did  retire  from  one  to  two  days'  marcli  behind  the  line  Mons-Namur,  which 
is  roughly  the  line  of  the  Sambre. 

But  there  is  a  f ui-ther  element  in  the  combination  which  had  not  been  accounted  for  by  "Wednesday 
night  last.  Much  more  important  in  number,  and  even  in  composition,  than  the  French  forces  upon 
Sambre,  were  the  French  masses  to  the  South  of  that  river,  which  were  destined  to  ojierate  in  the 
.t\a"dennes. 

AVe  have  seen  that  of  these  gi-eat  bodies,  one  Avas  checked  in  front  of  Neufchateau  by  the  Gennan 
forces  proceeding  from  southern  Belgian  Luxembourg  ;  but  until  we  have  news  of  those  masses  as  a 
■whole  we  cannot  detennine  the  result  of  the  conflict  upon  the  north-eastern  frontier.  Even  though 
■we  know  that  the  troops  holding  the  line  of  the  Sambre  fell  back,  their  ultimate  fortune,  their 
immediate  future  task,  and  the  chances  of  a  decision  one  way  or  the  other,  would  stiU  depend  upon 
tlie  positions  taken  up  by  these  masses  to  the  south  of  the  Sambre  line,  and  the  action  upon  which 
they  might  be  directed.  The  most  probable  conjecture  is  that  we  shall  find  them,  Avhen  the  veil  is 
lifted  again,  extending  the  line  of  the  others  towards  the  south.  We  remain — late  upon  Wednesday 
night — in  necessaiy  ignorance  of  their  position  and  their  movements. 

One  or  two  things  which  may  explain  the  postponement  of  a  deci-sion  appears  through  the  very 
nieagi-e  information  to  hand,  It  is  evident,  for  instance,  that  the  mass  of  the  (jcrman  attack  was 
directed  against  the  Sambre  line,  and  liad  there  a  great  superiority  in  numbers  over  the  defensive.  It 
is  further  evident,  since  men  cannot  be  in  two  places  at  once,  that  there  is  a  correspondingly  weak 
body  opposite  the  Middle  Meuse,  where  the  French  forces  should  be  strongest,  l^ut,  on  the  other 
liand,  we  know  that  in  this  country  of  the  Middle  Meuse,  and  to  the  east  of  it,  are  the  best  defensive 
positions  for  a  force  Aveaker  than  its  opponents,  and  wooded  comitry  in  which  the  superiority  of  the 
French  field  gun  is  largely  lost. 

Another  thing  that  comes  through  from  the  telegram  is  that  the  Gennans  liave  used  in  this  great 
effort  the  very  best  of  their  troops.  Not  only  numbers,  quality  also  has  been  demanded  for  this 
supreme  effort.     The  guard  Avas  there. 

Finally  Ave  knoAv  that,  up  to  the  last  telegrams  received,  the  enemy's  movement  had,  as  a  turning 
moA-ement,  failed.  The  German  offensive  had  not  yet  threatened  the  Allied  line  in  flank.  If  or 
Avlien  tlic  concentrated  Gennan  mass  in  the  north  noAv  passing  the  Sambre  could  achieve  a  decisive 
result,  the  general  Allied  line  along  the  French  frontier  Avould  be  turned.  If  this,  its  extreme 
northern  portion,  AA'as  either  pierced  or  euA-eloped,  the  success  of  what  is  knoAvn  to  be  the  Gennan 
strategy  iu  this  campaign  would  be  scaled.  AVe  knoAv  that  the  enemy  avUI  nnike  every  effort  to 
achieve  tluit  end. 

At  one  moment,  Avhen  the  ncAvs  of  the  fall  of  Namur  came  in  upon  Monday  niorning  (the  general 
public  had  it  early  in  the  afternoon  of  that  day),  it  looked  as  though  the  Allied  Hank  Avas  broken  or 
cut.  The  later  telegi-ams,  extending  over  more  than  tAvo  full  days,  though  they  tell  us  little,  do  not 
confirm  that ;  AvhUe  the  position  in  Avhich  the  guns  of  the  retreat  Avere  draAvn  up,  accoixling  to  the 
"  Times  "  con-espondent  upon  Sunday  night,  point  to  the  falling  back  of  the  line  as  a  whole,  not 
to  its  having  been  pierced.  AVc  may  be  quite  confident  that  up  to  the  time  this  last  telegram  was  sent 
the  line  Avas  intact. 

It  shoidd  further  be  remarked  that  the  direction  of  the  full  Piiissian  advance  upon  Charleroi 
makes  us  susi)end  our  judgment  as  to  a  further  attempt  at  outflanking  by  the  Avcst.  You  cannot 
outflank  indefinitely,  unless  you  have  indefinitely  superior  numbei-s ;  and,  though  the  numbers  which 
the  enemy  lias  here  massed  against  the  extreme  of  the  Allied  line  are  superior  to  Avhat  is  m  front  of 
tliem,  they  are  not  so  greatly  superior,  apparently,  as  to  permit  of  an  immediate  further  extension 
Avcstward  beyond  Avhat  they  have  already  achieved.  AYerc  that  so,  their  effort  AA'ould  not  ha\'e  been 
against  Charleroi,  but  to  the  Avest  of  Mons.  They  Avould  only  have  attempted  to  hold  the  French 
forces  upon  the  line  of  the  Sambre  Avhile  they  brought  their  gi-eatest  pressure  to  bear  upon  the  Avesteni 
extreme  of  the  line  against  and  beyond  the  English  left. 

AYe  may  sum  uj)  and  .say  that,  until  further  ncAvs  is  receiAcd,  there  is  no  evidence  of  a  decisive 
rcsult  here  upon  the  Franco-Belgian  frontier,  but  only  of  a  retirement  on  the  part  of  the  Allies,  a\  ith 
a  corresponding  advance  on  the  part  of  the  Germans. 

^Meanwhile,  Avhat  is  most  probable  is  an  attempt  of  the  Gemians  to  turn  the  Allied  line  round 
Cambrai.  AVhether  that  operation  can  be  .successfully  carried  out  or  not  Avill  depend  almost  entirely 
\ipon  the  unknown  factor — the  numbers  the  French  have  gathered  Avitliin  striking  distance  south  and 
cast  of  Lc  Cateau. 

9* 


LAND    AND    WATER 


August  29,  1914 


THE    OPER.\TIONS  IN    EASTERN   EUROPE. 

Two  tilings  preclomiuate  in  anv  compreliousion  of  the  campaign  upon  tlie  eastern  frontiers  of 
Prussia.  The  iirst  is  the  extent  of  the  liussian  achance,  the  second  the  racial  and  political  conditions 
undor  which  that  advance  is  taking  place. 

Both  these  points  in  their  most  general  characters  arc  expressed  in  the  accompanying  sketch. 


I    DAV-5 


'■'it.K'Ci    ar  MiLs.^ 


H£MEL 


ASBA     OCCUPISD    BY 

POLISH       RACE,   LANOUASE,   REa.<|OI0N 


-<- 

TO  EErlLU-l 


Slvoteli  showing  the  approximate  frontier  betwoon  Polish  and  German  nationalities,  frontier  of  Province  of  East  Prussia  now  ia 
Eussian  hands  and  of  the  fortified  line  of  the  Vistula  which  bara  the  advance  on  Berlin. 

It  was  upon  Saturday  last,  the  22nd,  that  the  first  wave  of  the  Eussian  advance  won  what  may  be 
called,  A\'ithout  exaggeration,  a  decisive  success  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  town  of  Gumbinnen,  about 
twenty -five  miles  from  the  frontier :  the  "  first  wave,"  because  it  is  in  the  nature  of  the  mobilization 
arrangements  of  Eussia  that  three  successive  bodies  shall  follow  -wcstw^ard  across  the  frontier,  and  it 
was  the  first  of  these,  amounting  to  perhaps  somewhat  less  than  200,000  men,  which  won  the  action 
at  Gumbinnen. 

The  forces  over  which  this  success  was  acliieved  were  estimated  at  some  160,000  men,  or  tlu-ee 
Army  Corps,,  with  perhaps  certain  divisions  of  cavaliy.  The  advance  was  followed  up  to  Insterberg, 
some  fifteen  miles  further  along  the  main  railway,  by  which  line  the  invasion  is  proceeding. 

"We  must  remember,  in  all  that  we  hear  of  the  fighting  in  this  eastern  theatre  of  the  war,  that  the 
gi-cat  mass  of  the  men  opposed  to  the  Eussians  are  taken  from  that  half -trained  or  untrained  reserve 
which  is  a  feature  of  the  Pnissian  military  system.  They  are  not  expected  to  do  as  well  as  the 
regularly  trained  troops.  ^Yhat  they  are  expected  to  do  in  this  pai't  of  the  German  dominions  is  to 
impose  delay  upon  the  enemy,  and  little  more. 

At  any  rate,  the  success  of  last  Saturday  obviously  isolates,  as  a  glance  at  the  map  will  show,  the 
town  of  Tilsit.  But  there  is  more  than  this.  Apart  from  this  advance  directly  westward  across  the 
frontier  by  the  Eussians  (which  lias  for  its  base  the  town  of  Vilna),  there  was  moving  up  in  flank  from 
A\'arsaAv  another  Eussian  force  wliich  marched  upon  Allenstein,  'and  this  advance  in  flank  determined 
the  precipitate  retreat  of  the  Gemian  forces,  and  may  be  said  without  exaggeration  to  have  given,  b>- 
the  evening  of  Sunday,  all  East  Prussia  east  of  tlie  line  Konigsberg- Allenstein  into  Eussian  hands. 
Twenty-four  hours  later  it  was  already  e^•ident  that  one  portion  of  the  rapidly  retreating  Prussian 
forces  would  tlu-ow  itself  into  Konigsberg,  and  already,  at  the  time  of  writing,  all  retreat  to  the  south 
out  of  Konigsberg  is  cut  off.  The  other  portion  of  the  defeated  German  army  has,  as  repoiied  above, 
fallen  back  upon  Osterode,  abandoning  in  its  rapid  retreat  a  cei-tain  number  of  field  guns  and  vehicles, 
and  losing  also  a  certain  proportion  of  prisoners,  presumably  stragglers  from  so  rapid  a  retirement. 

We  do  well  to  remember  in  aU  this  that  we  have  only  heard  so  far  the  victor's  story, 
there  can  be  no  doubt,  to  simi  up  the  general  result,  that  the    province  of  East  Prussia"  is 
dominated  as  a  whole  by  the  Eussian  forces,  which  have  invaded  it  from  the  south  and  the 
at  the  same  moment.     Tilsit  is  certainly  isolated  and  Konigsberg  probably  already  isolated  also 
belt  just  east  of  the  boundary  of  the  province — including  Allenstein  itself — v.as  still  in  German  hands 
last  Wednesday,  but  the  forces  occupying  it  were  in  retreat. 

Meanwhile  it  is  well  to  warn  the  reader  in  the  west  of  Em-ope  that  we  should  not  too  hastily 
assume  for  the  Eussian  advance  a  rate  comparable  to  the  advance  of  successful  invading  armies 
in  the  west,  and  further  that  we  do  not  really  know  the  rate  of  the  possible  or  probable  Eussian 
advance  tmiil  the  line  of  the   Vislula  is  miccelsfuJly  negoiialed. 

As  to  the  first  of  these  points,  the  rapidity  of  advance  in  this  part  of  Eastern  Europe  is 
checked  by  the  comparative  rarity  of  good  hard  roads— a  week's  rain  turns  most  of  these  tracks 
into  a  morass— the  fact  that  the  south  of  the  Province  of  East  Prassia  is  a  mass  of  small  meres 
with  marshes  lying  about  them,  and  the  fact  that  behind  the  Eussian  advance  is  an  insufficient 
railway  system ;  that  is,  a  sparse  series  of  lines,  a  net-work  with  very  wide  meshes,  which  will 
not  supply_  an  advancing  amiy  as  the  western  railways  of  Europe  could  do. 

The  line  of  the  Vistula  is  of  the  first  importance.  It  is,  roughly  speaking,  the  line  Thorn— 
Graudenz— Danzig ;  both  Thorn  and  Danzig  ai'e  obstacles  of  the  first  class,  and  the  line  as  a 
whole  is  not  weakly  held. 


But 

now 

east 

A 


10» 


A\i"ust  39,  191-1  LAND    AND    WATER 


o 


If  or  wlien  tlie  line  of  tlie  Vistula  is  passed,  we  may  regard  ihe  Russian  ad\ancG  as  beginning 
seriously  to  threaten  and  incommode  the  German  powers  :  not  before.  And  we  must  remember  that 
it  is  just  Avlien  the  Yistida  is  crossed  that  Austrian  pressure  from  tiie  south  may  become  serious 
for  the  Russians. 

The  total  length  of  this  first  field  of  the  Russian  invasion,  from  the  nearest  jjoint  upon  the  '\"istula 
to  the  corresponding  nearest  point  upon  the  eastern  frontier  of  Prussia,  is  no  less  than  130  miles  :  that 
is  the  distance  the  invader  must  cover  before  lie  begins  to  exercise  any  real  in-essure,  and  even  then 
he  will  not  exercise  it  until  he  has  masked  or  isolated  the  Vistula  forti-esses. 

If  or  when  the  Vistula  is  passed,  the  invaders  will  find  themselves  not  only  in  territory  every 
mile  of  advance  through  -ivhich  will  more  and  more  grievously  incommode  Prussia  politically,  but 
actually  within  200  miles  of  Berlin  itself. 

Fm-ther,  when  the  line  of  the  VistiJa  is  crossed,  the  front  of  the  Russian  advance  to  the  north 
Avill  be  abreast  of  any  further  advance  attempted  from  the  western  districts  of  Russian  Poland  :  as,  for 
instance,  an  advance  directly  upon  the  Polish  town  of  Posen  (to  give  it  its  Crtrman  name)  so  long 
oppressed  by  Prussian  domination. 

It  will  be  seen  from  all  this  that  Avith  the  best  of  luck  the  Russians  will  not  begin  to  exercise  just 
yet  an  effective  pressui-e  in  this  field,  and  il  caiiiwt  he  too  ofleii  ropeated  thai  ihouyh  the  element  of 
time  is  a  factor,  in  every  cariipait/ii,  and  is  a  factor  of  peculiar  importance  in  titis  campait/n,  thai  there 
are  yet  several  weeks  in  which  the  Prussians  arc  free  to  operate  in  the  iccst  before  they  need  be 
really  anxious  about  the  attack  falUny  upon  them  from  the  east. 

Ahnost  as  important  as  the  probable  movement  of  the  Russian  armies  and  the  rate  of  their 
advance  is  the  distribution  of  the  population  through  which  that  advance  wiU  take  place  ;  for  it  is 
certain  now  that  the  Polish  population  will  favour  the  Russian  advance  at  the  expense  of  Prussia.  It 
is  exceedingly  important  to  seize  the  racial  realities  underlying  the  artificial  political  frontiers  in  this 
district.     They  will  explain  a  gi'eat  deal  of  Avhat  is  to  come. 

It  will  be  seen  upon  the  sketch  map  printed  opposite  that  the  conquest  of  East  Prussia  is  the  con- 
quest of  a  sort  of  ba.stion  of  Germanism  out  and  beyond  Poland,  and  that,  as  the  Russian  advance 
approaches  the  Vistula,  it  enters  what  is,  for  the  pm-poses  of  its  march,  friendly  territory.  It  vvill 
further  be  seen  to  what  a  gi-eat  distance  westward  stretches  this  solid  gi-oup  of  Polish  population,  upon 
whose  moi-al  support  the  invader  can  rely.  It  is  true  that  the  jounger  men  have  aU  been  taken  to  serve 
unwillingly  mider  the  Prassian  flag,  but  it  remains  equally  true  that  in  all  the  ambient  business  of 
information  and  in  every  other  form  of  succour,  Avluitever  of  the  populace  remains  in  all  that  wide  flat 
land  wiU  be  a  force  adverse  to  the  Gennauic  powers,  and,  for  the  moment  at  least,  sympathetic  with  the 
invader.  Nor  will  that  feeling  anywhere  be  stronger  than  in  the  toAvn  of  Posen  itself,  should  the 
invader  reach  it,  for  nowhere  is  the  subterranean  conflict  between  the  Slav  and  the  Geiinan  more  bitter, 
and  nowhere  has  the  former  security  of  Prussia  aftirmed  itself  with  greater  harshness. 

A    DIARY    OF    THE    WAR. 

SYNOPSIS.  Biili-h  criii'.ci-B.     A  fioico  battle  still  continued  before  Litg*^ 

JcLY  23kd.  ^''''y  declared  her  uuutiality. 

.\i'^tro-Hungarian  uUimatnm  to  Scrvia.  August  Ttif. 
Ji'LY  25th.  ■^'"'  t'ei'iiian   rniifcr  Cnrhm,  v.ith  her  esroifc  the  Bnshni,  left 

King  Peter  of  Servia's  appeal  to  Hussia.  M<:-.'5«ina.    Gcimans   outside    I.iige   adced    for   a    twency-foiir 

J         27Tn  ■  hours*  aniii.=tice  to  collect  their  killed  and  wounded.     Aniiiistice 

Sir  EdwMd  Grey  proposed  a  London  Conference  between  Ficuch.  refused  by  Belgians. 

German,  Italian,  and  Great  Britain's  Ambassadors.  ACGCSt  bth  .        ,    ,     ,,  ,  ,    ,   ,,..„ 

Ir    •  PflxiT  rrench    troops  mvaded  Alsac*  and  r<  ached  Mulhausen  after  a 

"  ,      ,   .    „  J     1       J  o       •  tharp  engagement,  in  whidi  the  Germans  were  routed  willi  t],e 

AuGtna-Hungary  declared  war  on  Senia.  bayonet.     Lord  Kitchener  i.sued  a  circular  asking  for  100,000 

July  29th.  _  nien. 

A  partial  Sufisian  mobilisation,  confined  to  the  Army  Corps  on  August  9ih 

the  borders   of    Austria-Hungary,   was    siKiied   on   receipt   of  n„»  ,'(  (i,„  ,._„;„„    , j  „.,      t  n      Ar  •     i-i     i  ii     i     '  i 

the   news  of   the   bombardment  of    Belgra.le.     E„iiUsh   Stock  r^nL^^.I^n.",,!?,    '^|>"         "'";  ^'"'^  ^'^■^^  was  attacI:ou  by 

Exchange  closed.     English  Bank  Rate,  3>er  cent.  "  W  H  M  s"  ^fm;W,a».      ^     ^  ^  submarine,  LIS,  was  sui.k 

August  1st.  August  lOiit 

'•'tr.Xl  I'^r'^^v     ">°'^"'*f,'""    '"•''<^"<',-      y^'^'"""    niobiUsatinn  France' declared    war   on    Ausiria  Hungary.       Liege   forts   still 

?    C^l^      h'^   i  1    T""^.       •      '''i-7}"  °'   "^^^^^      1'^'^  •"»'«k<="-       Germans  ad vancoa  on   Xamur.       The  new   Press 

followed    up    tins    declaration    by    immediatelv    invadinctlia  «„,.„„     „,i„ur  i     i  i      »i      r>                   .  c      .u     •             i     <••  •  i 

f<..-..j  n,  I,,.  „»  T ^~i, ju-    „  ..„i  c.  .    I   ,           ••<.•,  <.••.!  JJureau  established  by  the  Govcriiiuent  for  the  issue  of  ofhcial 

Grand  Uuciiy  of  Luxemburg,  the  neutral  State  between  r  ranee  ^  .,j  news  ouencd 

and   Germany.     King  George  made  a  final  effort  for  peace,  ,              ,.                 pe    ■  . 

dispat<^hing  a  direct  personal  telegram  to  the  Tsar,  offering  ^'"'^'^^.L     ™'  ,           i  n      t      .     ,       ,        .,,-,,,,         „     ,      , 

mediation.      Before  it  could  reach  St.    Petersburg  Germany  Ihe  ^o.t'-n  and  Bm?ou  took  refuge  in  the  Dardancllts.    England 

declared  war.  declared  war  againet  Auetria. 

August  2vi>  August  12th. 

Germany ■«  ultimatum  to  Bekium.  Corbrn  and    Bwlau  purchased   by   Turkey.     Bombardment   of 


August  3rd. 


Liege  forts  resumed. 
August  ISth. 


Sir  Edward  Grey  stated  British  policy  .and  revealed  Germany"*  ''"'- 'T..^"""-         , ,         j      t,      i        .•      .      ,      t,  ,.  .^ 

amazing  offer,  in  the  event  of  our  neglecting  our  obligations  ■^'J?  l?ar  addressed  a  Proclamation  to  the  Pohah  populations  cf 

to  Ffance.     Mobilisation  of  the  Army.     Lltimatum  to  Germany  Uufisia.   Germany,  and  Au&tna,  promising  to  restore  to  Poland 

after    Belgian    appeal    to     England.       German    and    French  complete   autonomy  and  gnarantees  for  religious  liberty    and 

Ambassadors  kft  Paris  and  Berlin.  "'«  "*«  °^  '"e  i"!'*!!  language. 

Alcust  4in.  August  l&rn. 

Germany  Tejected   ultimatum.     English    Government    took   over  Japanese  ultimatum  to  Germany  dcmandi;ig  the  withdrawal  of 

control    of    railways.      War    declared    between    England    and  her  vessels  of  war  from  the  l ar  East. 

Germany.  August  ITth. 

Vice- Admiral   Sir  John   Jellicoe  appointed   to  command   of   the  The  British  Expeditionary  Force  .cafc'y  landed  in  France.     Ecatb 

Home  Fleets,  with  the  acting  rank  of  admiral.  of  Lieut.-General  Sir  James  Grierson. 

Ai  tiUST  oin.  Ti'e  Belgian  Government  trausfcned  from  Brussels  to  Antwerp. 

Jxird  Kitchener  appointed  ."secretary  of  State  for  War.     H.M.S.  August  ISth. 

Jinphiiin    struc'k     a    mine     and    founderod.     Many     German  General  Sir  TL  Smith-Dorrien  apfxiintcd  to  command  of  r.n  Ai my 

fc;ii|>8  seized.  (,'orps  of  tlio  British  E.^peditionary  Force,  in  euocession  to  the 

Auciv-'r  6tic.  late  General  Grierson. 

ji";i8e  of  Commons,  in  five  minutes,  passed  n  vote  of  credit  for  .'■'omo  desultory  fighting  took  plaoa  in  the  North  Sea. 

£100,000,000,    and   sanctioned    an   increase  of   the   Army    by  Aucr-r  20rH. 

fiOO.OOO  men.     State  control  of  food  inices.     Tlie  German  battle  The  Servians  gained  a  decisive  victory  over  the  Austiians  near 

truiscr   C'oeOen   and   her   escort  driven  into   Messina   by   two  ;:habatz. 

II* 


liAND    AND     WATER 


August  29,  1914 


DAY    BY    DAY. 

FniD.W,    AUGUST    21st. 

Tltc  German  forces  entered  Brussels  and  were  met  by  the 
IJurgomastcr,  who  informed  them  tliat  Brussels  was  an 
open  and  undefended  city. 

SATURDAY,    AUGUST     22nd. 

The  Servian  Press  Bureau  announced  tl\.it  the  Servian 
Army  had  won  a  great  victory  on  the  Drina.  The 
Austrian  losses  were  very  heavy. 

The  French  War  Office  frankly  admitted  that  the 
French  reverse  in  Lorraine  was  more  .seiions  tlian  was 
thought  at  first,  but  officially  denied  the  ridiruloiis  and 
exaggerated  accounts  sent  abroad  by  the  "Wolif  Bureau. 

SUNDAY,    AUGUST    23rd. 

Since  no  reply  was  received  to  her  ultimatum  of  August 
15th,  Japan  declared  war  on  Germany.  In  ofliciul 
Japanese  circles  it  is  considered  that  it  will  take  tlircc 
months  to  reduce  the  garrison  at  Tsingtao.  They  are 
fully  provisioned  for  eight  months.  The  Russian 
General  Staff  announced  that  the  Russian  Army  had 
gained  an  important  victory  near  Gumbennen  against 
a  force  of  160,000  Germans. 

Tlie  Germans  are  reported  to  have  suffered  enormous 
losses. 

MONDAY.    AUGUST   24th. 

It  was  annoimccd  that  Namur  had  fallen. 

The  British  forces  were  engaged  all  day  on  Sunday 
and  after  dark  with  the  enemy  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Mons,  and  held  their  ground. 

The  British  troops  were  opposed  by  two  German  Army 
Corps  and  two  Cavalry  Divisions.  The  Biitish 
casualties  were  not  heav\-,  but  the  enemy  suffered  very 
heavily. 

Lime%'ille  was  occupied  by  the  Germans. 

The  British  Commander-in-Chief,  China,  reported  that 
on  Saturday  afternoon  the  destroyer  Kennet,  v.-hilst 
chasing  a  German  destroyer,  S80,  approached  too  close 
to  the  battery  at  Tsing-tau  and  sustained  the  following 
casualties — Three  killed  and  seven  wounded. 

The  Kennel  was  not  materially  damaged. 

TUESDAY,    AUGUST    25tli. 

Mr.  Asqidth  annoimced  in  the  House  of  Commons  that 
the  Government  had  heard  from  Sir  John  French  that 
the  withdrawal  alreadv  announced  of  his  troops  to  their 
new  position  had  been  successfully  effected.  They 
were  pressed  hard  by  the  enemy,  who  were,  howevei-, 
shaken  off. 

The  Field-Marshal  provisionally  estimated  the  casualties 
at  something  over  2,000. 

Lord  Kitchener,  speaking  in  the  House  of  Lords,  said  : — 

"  The  Expeditionary  Force  has  taken  the  field  on  tl:o 
French  north-west  frontier,  and  has  advanced  to  the 
neighbourhood  of  Mons,  in  Belgium.  Our  troops  liave 
already  been  for  thirty-si.'i  hours  in  contact  v.-ith  a 
superior  force  of  German  invaders. 

"  Duiing  that  time  they  have  maintained  the  traditions 
of  British  soldiers,  and  have  behaved  with  the  utmost 
gallantry." 

Lord  Kitchener  telegraphed  to  Sir  John  Frcnch'as  follows  : 

"  Congratulate  troops  on  their  splendid  work.  ^\'e  arc 
all  proud  of  them." 

A  telegram  received  by  the  Foreign  OIEcc  reported  that  a 
Zeppelin  airship  passed  over  Antwerp  on  Monday 
night.  Six  shrapnel  bombs  were  dropped.  Much 
damage  was  done  to  property,  and  t?,-elve  lives  were 
lost. 

Sucli  a  bombardment  constitutes  a  violation  of  Article 
26  of  the  fourth  Hague  Convention. 

WEDNESDAY,    AUGUST    26th. 
Situation  unchanged. 

THURSDAY,    AUGUST    27th. 

Mr.  Churchill  announced  in  the  House  that  the  German 

armed  merchantman  Kaiser   WilheLn  der  Grosse  had 

been  sunk  by  H.M.S.  U'Kjhflijer  ou  the  AVest  African 

coast. 
This  was  the  ship  which  had  been  trying  to  arrest  traffic 

between  tliis  country  and  the  Cape."   It  was  one  of 

the  verj-  few  German  armed  ships  which  had  been  able 

to  get  to  sea. 
The  survivors  were  landed  before  the  vessel  was  sunk. 

The  losses  on  H.M.S.  Highflyer  were  one  man  killed  and 

five  slightly  injured. 
A  strong  force  of  British  marines  has  been  sent  to  Ostend 

and  has  occupied  the  town  without  opposition. 


PRODUCTION    OF    FOOD. 

Tire  Board  of  Agriculture  .nnd  Fisheries  have  received  from  their 
Consultative  Committee  the  following  recommendatio.'is,  wliich  must 
in  all  casi'3  bo  dependent  upon  (1)  local  conditions,  and  (2)  the  circum- 
stances of  the  individual  liolding.  The  Agricultural  Consultativa 
Committee  are  of  opinion  that,  jn  the  existing  circumstancos  agricul- 
turists should  do  all  in  their  power  to  secure  that  the  gupplv  of  horae- 
produced  foodstuffs  may  bo  iu  excess  of  the  normal.  In  this  respect 
the  requirements  of  tlie  future  with  regard  both  to  cropping  and  to  th<> 
maintenance  of  the  fullest  complement  of  live  stock  that  holdings  can 
usefully  carry,  must  be  carefully  borne  iu  mind. 

1.  The  acreage  under  wheat  should  be  largely  increased  wherever 
practicable.  In  this  direction  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  on  clean 
land,  and  by  the  aid  of  suitable  artificial  manure,  good  crops  of  wheat 
can  be  obtained  in  successive  years.  Attention  is  drawn  to  sect.  26 
of  the  Agricultural  Holdings  Act,  1C03,  which  permits  any  system  of 
cropping  subject  to  the  holding  being  protected  from  deterioration. 

2.  Where  wheat  cannot  be  grown,  the  sowing  of  winter  oats,  winter 
barley,  and  rye  might  be  substituted.  These  croiJs  ripen  early,  and 
allow  the  labour  on  harvest  to  be  distributed  evenly. 

3.  The  cabbage  crop  is  also  one  to  be  considered  where  land  cnn 
bo  spared.  It  provides  a  considerable  weight  of  food  suitable  fur 
eilliL-r  human   or  animal  consumption. 

4.  Thci-e  is  much  land  of  a  certain  class  now  under  grass  which 
would  probably  pay  for  breaking  up.  If  this  land  is  scheduled  as 
arable  in  the  farm  agreement,  the  tenant  has  the  option  of  ploisghiii';; 
it  up.  If  it  is  scheduled  as  grass  the  Agricultural  Consultative  Com- 
mittee suggest  co-operation  between  owner  and  occupier  as  to  tlie 
advisability  of  breiiking  up  certain  fields  in  view  of  the  national  ques- 
tion of  increasing  home-grown  foodstuffs. 

5..  Where  a  surplus  of  grass  or  clover  exists  ensilage  might  ba 
made.  Particulars  of  the  best  methods  can  be  obtained  from  the 
Board  of  Agriculture  Leaflet  No.  9. 

6.  The  slaughter  of  jinmature  or  breeding  stock  of  every  descrip- 
tion should  be  avoided.  Where  circumstances  permit  tha  total  head 
of  live  stock  should  be  increased,  particularly  animals  such  as  pigs, 
which  niidtiply  quickly. 

Ewe  lambs  might  with  advantage  be  put  to  the  r.ani  towards  the  end 
of  the  year. 

7.  While  there  should  be  no  diminution  in  the  numljer."!  of  live 
stock  kept,  the  strictest  economy  (subject  to  proper  conditioning)  and 
foresight  with  regard  to  feeding  is  advocated. 

The  cheapest  efficient  forms  of  food  should  be  used,  and  no  waste, 
spaces  capable  of  producing  food  for  animals  should  be  allowed.  No 
recommendation  is  attempted  as  to  the  e.xact  description  of  the  food- 
stuffs to  be  grown,  as  this  must  depend  upon  the  special  circumstances 


tural  Organiser.  But  the  following  crops  among  others  are  worthv 
of  consideration  :  Tiifolium,  vetches,  ryo  for  spring  feeding,  and 
Italian  rye  grajss.  By  adopting  such  measures  the  more  valuable  foods 
would,  so  far  as  possible,  bo  freed  for  human  consumption. 

The  composition  of  the  Consultative  Committee  is  as  follows.  Tlie 
Eight  Hon.  Sir  Ailwyn  Fellowes,  K.C.B.  (Chairman),  Mr.  Charlca 
Bathurst,  M.P.,  Mr.  Charles  Bidwell,  Mr.  H.  Trustam  Eve,  Mr.  S.  W. 
Farmer,  Mr.  C.  B.  Fisher,  Jlr.  E.  N.  Nunnelcv,  Mr.  Francis  II. 
Padwick,  Mr.  G.  Scobv,  Mr.  G.  C.  Smyth-Eichards,  Mr.  Eichard 
SVntton,  the  Hon.  Edward  Strutt,  Mr.  Christoplier  Tumor,  Messrs. 
A.  Ooddard  and  C.  B.  Marshall,  joint  secretr,ries. 

THE    YEAR'S    CROPS. 

TnE  Board  of  Agriculture  and  Fisheries  have  expedited  the  tabula- 
tion of  the  agriculture  returns  collected  in  June  last,  and  are  now  abl« 
to  estimate,  subject  to  final  revision,  the  acreage  of  certain  crops,  and 
til?  number  'of  live  stock  in  England  and  Wales  this  year.  On  th» 
basis  of  the  reports  received  from  their  Crop  Reporters,  tlso  Board  ara 
able  to  make  an  estimate  of  the  total  production  of  the  following 
crops  ; 


1914. 
QnartCK. 

1913. 
Quarters. 

Increase  -^  or  Dccre.ise  — 

Quartera. 

Per  Cent. 

AVTieat 

7,320,000 
G.liO.OOO 
9,100,000 
1,080,000 
435,000 

Tons. 

2,880,000 

G,(>-t2,000 

0,323,000 

9,379,000 

915,000 

422,000 

Tons. 
2,895,000 

+  678,000 
-183,000 
-279,000 
+ 165,000 
+   13,000 

Tons. 
-  15,000 

-HO 

"Rftt-lpV     

-   3 

Oatg   

—   3 

-flS 

Pea's  

-H    3 

Potatoes  

-     J 

The  v.heat  crop  is  not  only  10  per  cent,  larger  than  in  1913,  but 
is  well  above  the  average  of  the  last  ten  years.  The  crop  of  beans  is 
the  largest  since  1907,  while  that  of  potatoes  is  only  slightly  below 
that  of  last  j-ear,  which  was  the  largest  on  record. 

UxDEn  its  statutory  constitution  the  Eoad  Board  las  availabla 
a  considerable  sum,  at  present  over  £1,000,000,  to  provide  work  upon 
the  loads  at  such  times  as  these.  The  Eoads  Improvement  Associa- 
tion, in  view  of  the  disorganisation  of  industry  consequent  on  the  war, 
is  compiling  as  rapidly  as  possible,  for  submission  to  the  local  authori- 
ties and  the  Government  Departments,  a  series  of  suggestions  for  road 
improvements  in  various  areas  upon  which  this  imemployed  labour 
could  be  most  usefully  utilised.  The  various  provincial  branches  of 
the  Roads  Improvement  Association  have  been  asked  to  tend  in  lists 
for  their  respective  districts.  Readers  not  in  touch  witli  any  of  tho 
iR.I.A.  branches  who  would  like  to  submit  proposals  should  address 
communications  to  the  General  Secretary  of  the  As.sociatjon,  ISIr. 
Wallace  E.  Riche,  15,  Dartmouth-street,  Westminster,  London,  S.W'- 
Details'  sliould  be  forwarded  of  trunk  and  important  roads  that  necil 
widening,  strengthening,  and  rs-surfacing  where  the  minimum  amount 
of  land  is  required,  or  where  it  can  b«  acquired  without  much  diflicuity. 


12* 


August  29,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


THE   WAR   BY   WATER. 


By   FRED   T.    JANE. 


LEGITIMATE 


THE  MI.\E  QUESTION. 
T  13  nob  possible,  nor  would  ib  be  desirable,  to  record 
uaval  incidents  on  day-by-day  lines.  Tbo  first 
official  report  is  necessarily  brief,  and  when  a  more 
extended  one  appears  it  usually  puts  things  in  a  mora 
or  less  totally  differenb  light. 

The  sinking  of  the  Amjilikin  is  a  case  in  point. 
The  fuller  official  report  should  go  far  to  reassure  public  opinion 
on  the  subject  of  mines,  which,  since  the  I'ctropavlovsk  was 
blown  up  instantaneously  ab  Port  Arthur  in  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  have  been  regarded  by  the  public  as  "  apjial- 
lingly,  etc.,  etc.,  etc.,  deadly." 

In  one  sense  what  the  public  thinks  does  not  matter.  In 
another  sense  it  matters  a  very  great  deal,  for  public  appre- 
benaions  are  certain  to  be  comnumicated  to  relatives  iu  the 
Fleet,  wherein  everyone  day 
and  night  knows  that  a  m,ine 
may  be  stnack.  The  best  logic 
for  that  is  Farragut's  "  Dama 
the  torpedoes." 

This,  attitude,  however, 
will  become  difficult  to  pre- 
serve if  micn  are  constantly 
receiving  letters  from  their 
nearest  and  dearest  about 
"  those  diabolic  mines !  "  Psy- 
chology is  everything  in  naval 
Nvai-fare,  and  "  nerves "  aro 
easily  communicated  if  the 
process  goes  on  long  enough. 
Far  too  much  about  "  the 
mine  danger  "  has  appeared  iu 
print. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the 
mine  is  merely  potentially 
dangierou9.  The  Felropai- 
lovsk  was  not  sunk  iu  a 
moment  by  a  mine,  but  be- 
cause that  particular  mine 
exploded  her  main  magazines. 
That  did  the  mischief.  Simi- 
larly, the  Amphicn  would 
probably  have  still  been  afloat  had  she  hit  the  mine  anywhere 
except  where  she  did  hit  it'.  Even  so,  she  remained  afloat  for 
a  considerable  time,  and  the  loss  of  life  directly  due  to  the 
mine  seems  to  have  been  small. 

The  Russo-Japanese  War  was  prolific  in  mines,  both  sides 
having  ships  hit.  I  chanced  to  have  many  personal  friends 
in  both  fleets,  and  aiicv  the  war  "  experiences  "  were,  naturally 
enough,  very  get-atrable. 

Of  the  Japanese  ships  which  hit  mines  the  ITatsuse  took 
some  two  hours  to  sink,  and  no  lives  were  lost.  The  Russians 
aver  that  she  sank  in  three  minutes,  like  the  I'elropavlovsh 
did,  but  that  in  no  way  corresponds  with  the  narratives  of  her 
crew. 

The  TatJtima  kept  afloat  for  many  hours,  and  foundered 
felowly  while  being  towed  home  rather  too  fast  a  day  later. 

The  AsaJii  was  hit  by  two  mines,  which  both  glanced  off, 
and  exploded  without  doing  any  more  harm  than  wetting 
eveiybody. 

The  ShikUhima  hit  one  mine   wliich  did  not  explode. 

The  Mikfifa  hit  nothing. 

That  is  the  true  story  of  the  most  dramatic  mine  incident 
in  the  world's  histor)- — the  entire  Japanese  battle  fleet  steam- 
ing unconsciously  into  a  mine  field. 

On  the  Russian  side  the  Pefroparlovnk  was,  of  course,  as 
stated,  blown  to  pieces  immediately  by  the  explosion  of  her 
magazines;  but  the  cruiser  Bai/rrn,  when  she  hit  a  mine,  merely 
had  one  compartment  filled,  and  steamed  into  harbour  at  a 
reduced  speed 

These  are  in  each  case  bits  of  information  from  those 
who  had  been  in  the  ships  mentioned ;  and — since  blockade 
mines  have  not  been  made  materially  more  deadly  in  the 
interim — theso  details  should  servo  to  remove  the  impression 
that  a  mane  is  necessarily  any  worse  than  a  torpedo  or  big 
shell.  The  only  really  terrible  thing  about  its  menace  is  that 
it  (like  the  submarine)  is  unsceu  attack. 

For  the  rest,  it  may  be  added  that  mines  may  play  n.  most 
useful  part  in  the  British  blockade,  since  it  is  far  easier  for  tis 
to  secure  results  by  mining  a   definite  area  which  must  Lo 


passed  than  for  tho  Germans  to  accomjilish  things  on  the* 
"  dropping  by  chance  "  principle. 

There  is  one  matter  which  I  have  omitted  in  the  fore- 
going, and  that  is  the  part  played  by  the  mine-sweepers — i.e., 
small  vessels  fitted  for  removing  mines  laid  by  the  enemv. 

The  tremendous  importance  of  this  last  is  that,  whether 
or  no  the  British  fleet  lays  mines,  the  German  fleet  dares  nob 
move  out  without  sweeping  its  way.  Sweeping  is  not  the 
kind  of  thing  which  can  be  done  at  battle-cruiser  speed.  It 
is  to  be  done  easily  enough,  but  it  takes  iinie.  And  time  is 
everything,  for  it  allows  due  notice  to  be  given  of  every  move 
of  the  enemy;  in  other  words,  it  renders  au  evasive  surprise 
(humanly  speaking)  impossible. 

Meanwhile,  several  neutral  merchant  ships  have  been 
sunk  by  mines,  and  au  Admiralty  notification  issued  to  tha 

effect  that  the  Germans  have 


HOSTlLf 
NAVAL  BASE 


HOSTILE 
NAVAL  BASE 


SENSELESS    MIN£LAYINC„- 


mined  trade  routes  well  out 
in  tlie  North  Sea.  This  is  a 
violation  of  International 
Law.  Also  a  senseless  pro- 
ceeding, as  ib  is  devoid  of  any 
niilitaiy  utility.  In  the 
North  Sea  neutral  ships  ara 
the  chief  victims;  in  the 
Adriatic  the  Austrians  have 
lost  a  torpedo  boat  and  a  fine 
liner  by  their  own  mines  ! 

The  only  real  use  of  mines 
is: 

(1)  To  "contain"  a 
hqstils  Fleet. 

(2)  To  prevent  hostile 
movements  along  an  antici- 
pated route. 

As  regards  the  fii-st,  the 
British  Fleet  was  at  sea  and  iu 
position  long  before  Germany 
could  attempt  the  opera- 
tion. As  for  the  second — ■ 
as  mentioned  last  week — the 
Aiiipliion  was  sunk  because 
she  chanced  to  run  into  a 
legitimate  German  anticipation  of  the  movements  of  our 
Expeditionary  Force. 

The  mines  dropped  on  trade  routes  out  at  sea  come  in 
neither  category.  They  simply  indicate  that  those  in  control 
of  German  mine-layers  are  animated  by  the  "  Goehen  spirit," 
which,  being  translated  into  plain  English,  is  "  only  hit 
where  there  is  no  risk  of  being  hit  back." 

TRADE    AND    NAVAL    WARFARE. 

An  event  of  the  utmost  importance  is  now  in  process  of 
taking  place  without  most  of  those  immediately  concerned 
realising  that  the  Fleet  has  anything  to  do  with'  the  matter. 
I  refer  to  the  organised  attempt  which  has  recently  been 
initiated — the  attempt  to  capture  and  hold  all  the  German 
trade  markets.  It  is  a  remarkable  illustration  of  the  truth 
of  the  old  proverb,  "  Trade  follows  the  flag." 

All  the  same,  however,  there  is  a  certain  situation  to  be 
faced.  We  have  swept  and — unless  the  unexpected  occurs-— 
we  shall  go  on  sweeping  German  commerce  from  the  seas. 
This  means  the  automatic  capture  of  all  Gcmian  markets — a 
prospect  of  unexampled  prosperity  for  the  British  Empire  at 
the  expense  of  Germany. 

Germany  cannot  protect  her  trade.  We  can  protect  ours. 
The  deduction  to  neutral  merchants  is  obvious. 

Herein,  however,  lies  the  danger.  Germany  has  nothing 
more  to  lose,  but  she  has  everything  to  gain.  If  she  can  got 
even  a  portion  of  her  trade  under  the  American  flag,  the. 
proverbial  coach  and  horses  through  an  Act  of  Parliament 
will  save  her  from  utter  trade  disintegration. 

In  such  case  we  can  only  press  our  advantage  at  the  expense 
of  Ameiica.  Germany  may  have  her  own  dreams  about 
destroying  America  once  she  can  succeed  in  destroying  her 
European  rivals.  But  no  American  is  likel}'  to  dream  that 
jiarticular  dream.  And  so  there  is  always  the  risk  that  in 
American  diplomacy  present  advantage  may  bulk  larger  than 
future  possibilities,  especially  since  the  recent  Japanese  action. 
Whatever  Japan's  intentions  may  be,  they  aro  bound  to  bo 


13* 


LAND    AND    WATER 


August  29,  1914 


follcTved  tvith  apprehension  on  the  part  of  the  United  States, 
to  whom  our  Oriental  ally  is  a  mcuacc  in  the  sauio  way  that 
Germany  has  boon  a  menace  to  us  for  many  years  past — 
i.e.,  owing  to  the  pressui-e  of  circumstances. 

So  far  ns  Japan  is  conccmed,  her  quarrel  with  Germany 
is  terribly  genuine.  A  victory  for  Germany  would  mean 
something  infinitely  worse  than  the  Eussian  menace  in  the 
jiast.  The  t-erms  of  ptaco  in  the  German  schcmo  of  things 
include  the  handing  over  of  Saigon  and  Hong  Kong,  possibly 
of  Vladivostok  also. 

In  1899,  soon  after  Russia  had  taken  Port  Arthur,  I  had 
it  from  the  Tsar's  own  lips,  "  We  only  took  Port  Arthur  to 
keep  the  Germans  out  of  it.  We  have  no  quarrel  with  Japan, 
but  we  do  not  trust  Germany." 

Germany  made  up  for  things  by  "  leasing  "  Kiao-Chau. 
liussia  and  Japan  subsequently  went  to  war,  and  Port  Artliur 
is  now  Japanese.  But  after  the  war,  when  Kussia  and  Japan 
comparwl  notes,  they  found  German  influence  behind  all  the 
trouble,  just  as  surely  as  when  all  England  was  shouting  about 
the  Dogger  Bank  aifair,  the  British  Navy  was  watching,  not 
the  Russians,  but  the  Germans. 

Tlicse  details  may  not  seem  exactly  germane  to  the  present 
state  of  ailairs,  but  actually 
they  are  very  much  so.     Gcr- 


ENEMY 

PROM  SECCLT   6A<t 

ON    THE.    LATEST 
SCltNTlftC   UlSt& 


iiiany  had  her  own  schemes  of 
a  Jajjanese  alliance.  Its  tenns 
were  probably  about  as  reli- 
able as  the  alliance  offered  to 
Belgium,  but  that  is  a  side 
issue.  On  the  principle  of 
Tinieo  JJatmeos  dona  ferfTite-^, 
Japan  has  joined  the  Triple 
Entente. 

The  final  issue  now  rests 
with  America.  Will  the 
United  States  sacrifice  her 
trade  interests  to  honour  and 
the  fight  arjiinst  Germany's 
l)id  to  rule  the  entire  workl  1 
Or  will  America  in  1911  do 
what  she,  at  Napoleon's  bid- 
ding, did  in  1812  ?  From  the 
K.aisor's  point  of  view  she  v.'ill. 

The  hour  is  not  yet,  and 
further  discussion  of  it  can  bo 
reserved  for  a  more  convenient 
£ca5on.  1  content  myself  here 
with  indicating  the  possibili- 
ties which  lie  on  the  water. 
American  public  opinion  wo 
are  sxire  of;  but  since  Japan 
has  entered  into  the  World 
War    we    should    not    place 

too     much     dependence     on  ~ 

American  bosses.  Already  Carnegie,  of  free  library  fame.  ha.s 
made  a  better  apology  for  the  Kaiser's  action  than  anything 
ever  issued  in  Berlin. 

The  fact  is  that  this  is  the  first  war  of  modern  times  in 
which  trade  issues  have  been  predominant.  Great  merchant 
navies  have  grown  up  in  the  steam  era.  They  have  grown  up  in 
profound  peace.  True,  there  have  been  wars,  but  this  genera- 
tion has  seen  no  war  in  which  any  appreciable  commerce  was 
at  stake,  and  a  World  War  like  the  present  was  in  the  catet^oi-y 
of  the  "  unthinkable."  "    "^ 

At  the  present  moment  the  Stars  and  Stripes  is  the  only 
neutral  flag  of  any  account,  and  even  it  is  not  likely  to  remain 
useful  to  belligerents  very  long.  The  rulers  of  the  sea  will 
control  the  world's  trade. 

According  to  German  calculations  in  the  past,  we  might 
destroy  German  trade  as  we  have  done,  but  v,o  should  do  so 
at  the  expense  of  our  own,  because  Germany  would  give  us 
BO  much  trouble  that  all  trade  would  pass  to  the  U.S.  flag. 

It  may  so  pass;  but  only  if  Germany  bo  able  to  di.-^pute 
the  mastery  of  the  seas  with  us.  More  on  this  matter  is  likely 
(o  be  heard  later  on— it  is  even  conceivable  that  one  or  two 
German-American  millionaires  may  yet  force  the  United 
.States  into  playing  Germany's  game.  It  is,  anyway,  one  of 
the  things  that  Germany  counts  on. 

We  had  our  chance  to  stand  out  and  take  our  gi-ucllino' 
m  the  Kaiser's  own  season.  Sooner  or  later— probably 
Eooncr-  the  U.S.A.  will  have  to  decide  on  the  same  question. 

Ihe  Kaisers  bid  for  America  has  been  Ions  and  hca 


ENEMY 

fO   i.tCfi6T    EA 


THE     NORTH     SEA. 

About  the  North  Sea  it  is  impossible  to  write  fully.  It  is 
so  veiy  easy  to  give  away  something  in  perfect  innocence.  So 
far  as  I  am  concerned,  1  do  not  propose  to  deal  with  anything 
save  T>"eek-old  official  reports,  nor  any  too  fully  even  v.ith  these. 
Readers  inust  understand  that  in  a  life  and  death  struggle  like 
tlio  present,  restraint  may  bo  necessary,  even  where  official 
reports  are  concerned. 

So  I  confine  myself  to  stating  that  the  Gorman  submarine 
U  15  has  gone  below  to  stay  there;  that  the  pretty  unofficial 
£torir-s  since  published  are  bunkum  pure  and  simple,  and 
finally  that  the  Germans  are  trying  something  which  they  are 
unlikely  to  pull  off. 

Eveiything  written  about  this  war  gets  to  Germany 
within  an  hour  or  so,  and  it  would  be  sheer  idiocy  to  satisfy 
natural  public  curiosity  any  further  just  at  present. 

The  only  other  thing  that  I  can  add  is  that  the  German 
submarines'  service  has  been  unexpectedly  bold  and  daring. 
Our  authorities  credited  it  with  being  that,  and — well, 
"  things  did  not  happen  as  expected  " — by  Germany. 

Presently,  as  many  of  the  Gennans  as  are  not  Goelciu  will 
come  again  to  "  a  certain  place."     They  will  go  below  and  stay 

there  till  the  Judgment  Day. 
That  is  nearly  all  tJiat  is  to  be 
said  about  the  matter. 

There  is  nothing  to  add, 
except  that  when  the  German 
authorities  read  this  they  will 
think  it  a  bit  of  glorious  bluff. 
"Righto."  (German  ofljcers 
commanding  submarines, 
please  note.) 


V 


>0' 


vy, 

ago 

depend 

the  street  has 


and  what  ^apolcon  managed  to  do  a  hundred  odd  years 
IS  possible  of  repetition  to-day.  Far  greater  issues  dot 
.ni  I  resident  Avilson  than  the  British  man  in  the  street 
any  idea  of. 

trar  1^*"  ^f''"'''"';  everything  seems  at   "  set  fair."     Commerce 


THE    MEDITERRANEAN. 

The  Austrian  battleship 
Zriniji  has  now  been  officially 
sunk  so  many  times  by  a  single 
French  shell  that  I  am  con- 
strained to  imagine  tliat  the 
report  may  bo  true.  Other- 
wise I  should  have  been 
entirely  sceptical  —  mainly  . 
along  the  argument  that  there 
is  no  conceivable  reason  why 
she  should  have  been  out  to 
get  hit.  In  this  war  of  sur- 
prises, hov«-ever,  one  never 
knows. 

Otherwise,  there  is  nothing 
to    o-xpect    in    the    Adriatic 

ibut  a  strict  Franco-British 
blockade  to  the  Austrians, 
varied  with  a  few  torpedo 
attacks.  Battle  fleet  actions 
are  excessively  improbable  for  reasons  stated  last  week.  There 
may  be, one — but  only  absolute  lunacy  can  dictate  it. 

THE     FAR     EAST, 

.Japan's  action  so  far  as  the  Far  East  is  concerned  docs  not 
materially  alter  things.  One  v.-ay  and  anoXlier  we  alone  are 
superior  to  anything  of  the  German  Navy  in  the  Far  East,  but 
we  have  no  troops  for  the  necessary  militai-y  assault.  Kiao- 
Chau  will  fall  eventually,  but  it  is  likely  to  prove  a  second 
Port  Arthur,  even  if  (like  the  Russians  at  Port  Arthur) 
reported  guns  have  been  reckoned  as  existing.  According  to 
my  information  the  place  is  not  really  very  strong — anyway, 
nothing  like  reported.  And  so  the  Japanese  will  either  get 
it  within  a  week,  or  else  bes'cge  it  much  as  we  besieged  Sevas- 
topol in  the  Crimean  War  for  many  weaiy  months. 

Everything  depends  on  whether  the  officer  commanding 
is  Goehcn  or  otherwise.  If  he  be  sufficiently  othenvisc,  Kiac- 
Chau  may  yet  remain  German  at  the  end  of  the  war.  This 
possibility  at  least  should  not  be  foi-gotten. 

For  the  rest,  it  may  be  as  well  to  remember  that  Admirnl 
Kuroi  (who  commanded  the  naval  land  battery  which  sunk 
the  Russian  Fleet  at  Port  Arthur)  is  somewhere  in  the  Pacific 
with  the  Asama  and  Azuma.  He  is  a  very  eld  friend  of  mine, 
and  I  do  not  want  to  puff  him  unduly.  But — if  the  betting 
fraternity  has  turned  from  horses  to  ships — I  will  give  them 
tlie  tip  that  it  is  a  two  to  one  that  Kuroi  is  not  the  central 
figure  in  the  Far  East  operations.  If  the  Germans  at  sea 
evade  him — all  right.  If  they  meet  his  two  cruisers — God 
helij  them ! 

SITUATION     IN     THE    ATLANTIC. 


YeiT  little  is  really  known  about  this, 
that  German  commerce  destroyers  are  being 


It  would  appear 
.5  too  harried   by 
British  cruisers  to  do  much  mischief.     This  situation  should 
continue  till  the  corsairs  die  out  automatically.     There  is, 


u* 


August  •20,  1914 


LAND     AND     W  A  T  E  11 


however,  a  very  great  risk  that  what  with  secret  bases  and 
niakjjig  the  most  of  "  within  the  meaning  of  the  Act "  iu 
International  Law,  many  corsairs  will  live  beyond  the  other- 
wise natural  terms  of  their  existence. 

The  trouble  will  not  last.  The  corsairs,  sooner  or  later, 
will  disappear  or  cease  to  fly  the  Gennan  flag  {I'l  la  Goeben),  but 
we  must  be  prepared  to  expect  losses  in  the  interim.  Every 
weak  neutral  aJIords  a  potential  German  base,  and  the 
diilcrcnce  between  the  old-time  pirate  and  a  German  "  cor- 
sair "  is  likely  to  grow  finer  and  finer. 

Luck  may  save  us;  otherwise  we  must  be  prepared  for 
temporary  losses  in  the  Atlantic. 

Eeports  of  actions  there  should  be  accepted  with  caution. 
Tho  German  naval  cruisers  about  are  very  fast,  and  nothing 
short  of  the  direst  necessity  would  induce  them  to  fight.  This 
avoidance  of  action  is  net  Goeben,  but  correct  naval  strategy. 
It  wiU  bo  well  if  we  all  reanember  it.  There  are  many  good 
men  wlio  command  German  cruisers.  Tlicy  will  not  Goeben 
till  forced  to  it. 

Atlantic  reports  are  meagre,  and  unoificial  at  that.  But 
in  so  far  as  they  indicate  anything,  they  do  indicate  that  tho 
captain  of  the  Goeben  is  not  fit  to  black  the  boots  of  the 
German  captains  in  the  Atlantic.  "  Hcucur  to  whom  honour 
is  due  " — even  though  he  be  au  enemy.  Our  immediate  job 
is  to  scupper  the  efficient  enemy  atloat  on  the  high  seas.  After 
that,  it  will  bo  quite  time  enough  to  talk  about  the  German 
ahips  hanging  about  in  harbour. 

The  Germans  on  the  high  seas  are  sportsmen,  and  should 
be  treated  as  such.  Their  ultimate  fate  is  certain  as  anything 
can  be.     Sooner  or  later  wo  shall  get  them. 

Just  at  tlic  present  moment  it  probably  sounds  silly  to 
suggest  that  tlie  fate  of  tlie  world  depends  on  that  "  sporting 
instinct"  which  for  untold  years  tlie  Nonconformist  conscience 
Las  told  us  leads  straight  to  damnaticu  and  hell. 

I  cannot  add  tho  proofs.  I  can  assert  that  I  am  not  a 
"  sporting  prophet,"  but  that  is  all.  I  have  never  followed 
■'sport"  sufhciently  well  to  say  more;  but  so  far  as  I  can 
calculate  the  Germans  have  nautically  very  much  backed  tho 
■wrong  horse. 

"When  you  size  things  up  exactly,  "  war  is  sport  in  war 
time  and  contrariwise  sport  is  war  in  peace  time."  The  transi- 
tion is  by  no  means  so  great  as  some  would  suppose.  This  is 
where  we  have  the  Germans. 

As  placed  hei'c  and  self-censored,  it  probably  sounds  a 
trifle  incoherent. 

A  month  hence  I  may  add  some  explanation.  To-day,  I 
dare  not.  I  can  merely  go  in  for  the  tiresome  reiteration 
that — so  far  as  the  Navy  is  concerned — the  Germans  have 
"  backed  the  wrong  horse." 

It  sounds  like  bluff  and  "  swank  "  to  say  that  "  Der  Tag  " 
is  far  more  likely  to  end  at  the  bottom  of  the  North  Sea  than 
on  the  shores  of  England !  But  so  it  is.  Some  of  it  depends 
on  the  land  defences  of  Lord-knows-where  being  prepared. 

I  cannot  ^o  into  details  (God  gi'ant  that  they  never 
come!);  but  so  far  as  these  lines  concern  ordinary  British 
people,  I  want  them  to  be  prepared  for  learning  one  day  that 
a  dozen  or  so  of  our  Dreadnoucrhts  have  been  sunk. 


The  thing  to  do  iu  such  case  is  to  remember  that  there  is 
a  good  supply  of  other  British  Dreadnoughts  to  take  the  plaw 
of  any  who  go  under. 

The  Genaan  Navy  long  ago  gave  up  serious  reckoning  as  to 
its  battle  chances  against  the  British  Fleet.  To-day  it  no 
longer  trusts  to  guns  or  torpedoes,  submarines,  or  to  aircraft, 
but  to  'common  or  garden"  jnaiic.  It  seeks  to  create  that 
panic.  Tho  Germans  will  continue  to  lie  iu  harbour  till  the 
dark  days  of  winter  come  along.     Then . 

Well,  none  of  us  are  quite  certain  about  that  "  then,"  or 
that  "  Bar  Tag  "  (query  Der  Nicht).  Personally,  I  am  not 
of  opinion  that  German  sailors  who  have  been  left  lying  for 
months  iu  port  saying  "  Der  Tag  "  to  each  other  are  any  moi  j 
likely  to  prove  up  to  the  mark  than  did  Yillcneuve's  men  when, 
an  odd  hundred  years  ago,  they  went  out  to  meet  Nelson's  war- 
worn people  at  Trafalgar. 

As  stated  last -week,  and  as  I  shall  state  every  week  hcre- 
aftor,  the  captain  of  the  Goeben,  when  he  funked  things, 
sacrificed  every  German  hope  on  the  sea. 

Till  then,  we  believed  a  good  deal  of  their  bluff.  Now 
not  a  man  iu  the  Fleet  believes  it. 

We  have  got  the  moral  scoop,  and  the  most  important 
duty  of  the  Fleet  at  the  present  time  is  to  hold  it.  People  can 
calculate  as  they  will  about  "  tons  of  projectiles  per  minute," 
but  things  of  this  sort  have  no  real  war  meaning.     Hence: 

(1)  The  Goeben  ran  away. 

(2)  The  Germans  not  fitted  with  white  feathers  will  try  at 
all  costs  to  make  up  her  deficiency. 

The  result  (with  any  luck  whatever)  will  be  a  foregone 
conclusion. 

No  doubt  there  are  fights  to  comc^ — the  German  captains 
will  put  in  the  best  they  can ;  but,  as  I  prophesied  last  week, 
the  cowardice  of  the  Goeben  has  settled  the  ultimate  result  of 
the  war  on  the  water. 

FINAL    NOTE. 

The  general  situation  at  the  time  of  writing  remains  abso- 
lutley  unchanged  from  what  was  described  last  week,  except 
that  the  German  advance  towards  Osteud  probably  indicates 
that  an  attempt  to  land  a  small  raiding  force  in  this  country 
is  in  contemplation.  The  Germans  have  apparently  no 
prospect  whatever  of  getting  over  any  considerable  body  of 
men,  but  we  may  at  any  time  look  for  the  unexpected  arrival 
of  a  "  forlorn  hope,"  consisting  of  fi'om  500  to  1,000  men,  which 
■will  be  landed  at  the  most  unexpected  point,  not  with  the 
object  of  accomplishing  anything  vital,  but  for  the  sake  of 
moral  effect. 

If  such  an  attempt  be  made,  the  probable  landing  (let  us 
hope)  is  at  the  bottom  of  the  North  Sea;  but,  failing  that, 
anywhere — that  is  to  say,  Seaton  in  Devonshire,  or  Abeiystwith 
in  Wales,  are  just  as  likely  to  be  objectives  as  those  places  along 
the  East  Coast  which  are  awaiting  a  possible  German  invasion. 

The  situation  in  the  Baltic  is  apparently  unchanged.  It 
would  seem  that  the  Germans  are  keeping  up  a  veiy  distant 
and  cautious  blockade  of  the  Russian  coast,  and  that  tho 
Russians  are  waiting  unmoved  until  some  of  the  Gangoot  class 
are  ready  for  sea. 


A    TOPOGRAPHICAL    GUIDE   TO    THE 


WAR    ZONE. 

By   E.    CHARLES   VIVIAN. 


Aix-la-Chapelle. — Known  in  German  as  Aachen. 
A  town  and  watering  place  of  Western  Pru.ssia,  situated  between 
the  Mouse  and  the  Rhine  in  the  Rhine  province,  forty-four  miles 
west  south-west  fiom  Cologne,  on  the  line  of  railway  from 
Cdojne  to  Liege.  Altliough  situated  in  German  territory,  Aix 
is  practically  the  point  of  junction  of  the  German,  Belgian,  and 
Dutch  frontiers,  and  is  a  town  of  considerable  importance,  with 
a  population  of  nearlj'  150,000.  Its  thei-mal  baths  are  widely 
celebrated,  and  it  is  one  of  tlie  great  customs  stations  of  Western 
Germany.  Two  treaties  of  peace  have  been  signed  here — the 
first  in  1CG8,  the  second  in  1748. 

Alsace-Lorraine. — A  Gennan  imperial  territory, 
embracing  the  former  French  provinces  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine, 
and  styled  in  German  Elsass-Lothringen.  It  extends 
from  the  Luxembourg  border  on  the  north  to  Switzerland  in  the 
south,  and  is  bounded  on  the  east  by  the  Palatinate  of  Bavaria, 
and  on  the  weat  by  the  French  frontier,  as  defined  on  tho  conclu- 
sion of  peace  in  1871.  Tho  total  population  of  the  territory 
is  upwards  of  two  millions,  and  its  chief  towns  arc  Strasbourg 
(capital  of  the  tcnitoiv-),  Metz,  Mulhauscn,  Colmar,  Hagenau, 


and  Saargemund.  The  railways  total  upwards  of  1,300  miles, 
and  the  territory  is  of  great  fertility,  being  chiefly  devoted  to 
agricultural  pursuits.  The  Government  is  vested  in  a  Governor- 
General,  appointed  by  the  German  Emperor.  The  Vosges 
mountains  form  a  natiu-al  frontier  defence  practically  from  the 
Swiss  boundary  to  the  latitude  of  Strasbourg,  on  the  western 
side,  and  the  Rhine  valley,  in  the  east  of  the  territory,  forms 
another  hue  of  great  natural  strength.  Good  roads  and 
a  system  of  canals  afford  means  of  communication,  in 
addition  to  the  railways  of  the  territory.  The  Rhine  valley  in 
Alsace  is  the  more  fertile  portion  of  the  whole,  Lorraine  lying 
almost  entirely  on  the  high  plateau  reaching  from  tho  Moselle 
to  the  Saar,  and  being  devoted  in  great  measure  to  coal,  iron 
and  salt  mining.  The  hne  of  German  fortifications  stretches 
from  Altkirch  in  the  south  to  Thionville  in  the  north,  and  ia 
connected  by  a  strategic  railway  linking  up  all  the  principal 
fortified  points. 

Antwerp, — Capital  of  the  Belgian  province  of  the  same 
name,  situated  about  fifty  miles  from  the  sea  and  twenty-five 
miles  north  of  Brussels  by  rail,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  River 


15» 


LAND    AND     WATER 


Anmist  29,  1914 


Scheldt.  It  is  one  of  the  chief  European  ports,  over  sixty 
fhippiug  lines  having  their  headquarters  here,  and  the  quay 
jiocominodation  extends  nearly  three  miles  along  the  bank  of  the 
river.  Tho  total  population  is  about  400,000.  Antwerp  is 
KurrounJed  by  a  ring  of  forls  of  modem  design,  the  strongest 
line  being  that  toward  the  east  and  soutli,  where  eight  forts, 
placed  at  regiilar  inter^-als,  less  than  a  mile  distant  from  each 
ether,  defend  the  citv.  In  addition  to  the  regular  ring  of  defences, 
the  forts  de  ^Vavrc  "and  de  Waelhem,  in  the  south-east,  and  Fort 
de  Schooten,  in  the  north-cast,  fonn  outpost  defences.  On  tlic 
west  forts  St.  Marie,  St.  Philippe,  de  Zwyndrecht,  and  do 
Cruybekc,  defend  the  approaches  to  the  Scheldt,  which  has  to 
be  crossed  before  the  city  can  be  reached  from  this  direction. 

CharUroi.— A  town  of  nearly  28,000  inhabitants,  and 
the  centre  of  the  iron  industry  of  southern  Belgium.  It  was 
fortified  up  to  18G8,  when  its  fortifications  were  converted  into 
])romenades.  It  is  situated  on  the  main  line  from  Mons  to 
Xamur,  about  half-way  between  the  two  towns,  and  is  about 
lifty  miles  directly  south  of  Brussels,  and  roughly  twenty-five 
iiiilcs  from  the  French  frontier. 

Elbe. — One  of  the  most  important  rivers  of  central 
Europe  which,  after  leaving  the  Bohemian-Saxon  frontier,  turns 
north-west,  passing  through  Dresden  to  the  North  German  plain, 
flowing  by  way  of  Torgau,  Magdeburg,  and  Hamburg,  beyond 
which  it  divides  into  the  north  or  Hamburg  Elbe,  and  the  south 
or  Ilarburg  Elbe,  surrounding  the  island  of  Wilhelmsburg  and 
several  smaller  islets.  Beyond  the  islands  the  two  rivers  join 
again  at  Blankenese,  forming  a  stream  of  four  to  nine  miles  in 
width  to  Cuxhaven,  where  the  river  empties  into  the  North  Sea. 
From  Hamburg  to  the  sea  the  bed  of  the  river  has  been  dredged 
to  a  depth  which  will  admit  vessels  of  26  feet  draught,  and  the 
totul  navigable  length  from  the  mouth  is  525  miles.  Between 
Cuxl-.avcn  and  Freiburg  the  Kiel  Canal  has  its  western  outlet 
to  the  Elbe  at  Brunsbiittel.  From  Freiburg  outward  to  tlie  sea 
the  banks  of  the  river  arc  strongly  fortified,  and  the  defences, 
together  with  the  fortifications  on  the  island  of  Heligoland,  off 
the  mouth  of  the  river,  render  the  river  and  canal  practically 
impregnable  to  attack  from  the  sea. 

Galicia. — An  Austrian  territory  with  a  population  of 
about  7. J  millions,  of  whom  the  great  majority  are  Poles  and 
Rutheniaus.  It  is  virtually  a  self-governing  province  of  the 
Austrian  Empire,  and,  occupying  the  northern  part  of  Austrian 
territory,  borders  on  Russian  Poland  and  Russia  itself,  tho 
frontier  being  defined  for  a  great  distance  in  the  west  of  the 
province  by  the  river  Vistula  and  tlie  Sanna  or  San.  The  chief 
towns  of  Galicia  are  Lemberg,  Tarnow,  .Jaroslaw,  Tarnopol, 
Brody,  and  Sanok,  while  the  cliief  town  of  Western  Galicia  is 
Cracow,  an  important  railway  centre  near  the  Russian  and 
German  frontiei-s.  Railways  cross  the  Russian  frontier  from 
Brody  to  Dubno  in  the  east,  and  from  Cracow  to  Czenstochowa 
and  Kielce  in  the  west  of  the  province. 

Heligoland. — Belonging  to  the  Frisian  group  of  islands, 
and  situated  28  miles  north-west  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Elbe,  Heligoland  was  ceded  to  Germany  by  Great  Britain  in 
18D0,  and  has  since  been  made  one  of  the  principal  defences 
of  the  Elbe  mouth  and  the  western  exit  from  the  Kiel  Canal. 
It  forms  one  of  the  strategic  bases  of  the  German  fleet,  and 
possesses  a  harbour,  the  Duneninsel,  in  which  the  largest  vessels 
can  coal  in  safety.  The  population  of  the  island  is,  in  normal 
times  about  2,500,  and  it  ranks  as  a  fashionable  North  German 
watermg  place.  The  island  is  little  over  a  mile  in  length,  but 
in  its  area  are  to  be  found  some  of  the  strongest  and  best  equipped 
forts  m  existence.  It  is  reckoned  as  part  of  the  province  of 
Schleswig-IIolstein — at  present. 

Insterburg.— An  important  town  about  fifty-five  miles 
cast  of  Koenigsburg,  in  East  Prussia.  From  Insterburg  five 
radways  branch  to  Koenigsburg,  Memel,  Thorn,  and  Ljck  in 
Germany,  and  Kovno  in  'Western  Russia.  It  is  the  chief  town  of 
a  circle  in  the  government  district  of  Gumbinnen,  and  is  situated 
at  the  point  where  the  Inster  and  Angerap  rivers  join  to  foim  the 
Pregcl.  It  13  an  active  agricultural  and  manufacturing  town, 
with  a  population  of  about  20,fX)0,  including  a  garrison,  in  normal 
times,  of  about  3,000. 

Lille.— A  town  and  important  railway  centre  of  northern 
1- ranee,  about  155  miles  north  of  Paris  by  rail,  and  about  ten 
miles  from  the  Belgian  frontier.  It  is  the  capital  of  the  depart- 
ment of  ^ord,  and  is  situated  on  the  low  plain  of  the  River 
Doule,  a  tributary  of  the  Scheldt.  Canals  afford  communica- 
tion both  with  Pans  and  Belgium,  and  railways  extend  from 
J.iUe  to  Calais,  Ghent,  Brussels,  and  Paris,  while  tlie  town  is 
also  an  important  point  on  the  railway  which  follows  the 
northern  frontier  from  Dunkirk  to  Longuyon.  It  is  one  of  the 
most  important  manufacturing  towns  on  the  northern  frontier; 
Its  population  IS  upwards  of  200,000,  mainly  devoted  to  flax- 
Fpiimmg  and  kinured  industries,  while  it  is  also  the  site  of  a 
blale  tobacco  factory. 


Luncvillc.— Chief  town  of  an  arrondisscment  in 
the  department  of  Mcuithe  ct  Moselle,  seventeen  miles  south- 
east of  Nancy,  and  240  miles  cast  of  Paris  on  the  Paris-Strasbourg 
line  of  railway,  and  also  on  the  Epinal-Nancy  line.  In  times  of 
peace  it  is  one  of  the  most  important  French  cavalry  stations, 
and  is  fortified,  being  an  outpost  point  of  the  Nancy-Belfort 
line  of  frontier  defences,  and  about  ten  nules  distant  from  tho 
Gorman  frontier.  The  district  round  about  is  mainly  agri- 
cultural, but  the  town  itself  is  a  centre  for  several  manufacturing 
industries.     Its  population  is  about  25,000. 

Mechlin. — Also  "  Malincp,"  of  which  the  more  popular 
name  is  a  corruption.  A  Belgian  city  on  the  River  Dylc,  and 
an  important  railway  junction  about  midway  between  Antwerp 
and  Brussels,  with  lines  extending  in  practically  every  direction, 
as  well  as  a  number  of  main  roads  connecting  with  ail  the  important 
points  of  north-western  Belgium.  It  contains  extensive  raihvay 
workshops  connected  with  the  Belgian  State  railways,  and  has  a 
population  of  about  G0,000. 

Mons.— Situated  about  forty  miles  west  of  Namur,  and 
about  140  miles  from  Paris.  It  is  the  centre  of  the  chief  coal- 
mining district  of  Belgium,  and  is  an  important  railway  junction, 
being  the  point  at  which  two  lines  branch  to  Paris  from  the  north. 
The  eastern,  or  more  direct  line,  is  via  Maubeuge,  and  is  155  miles 
to  Paris,  while  the  western  route,  tia  Douai  and  Arras,  is  17G 
miles.  Mons  is  situated  on  a  hill  and  has  been  fort  ified  for  the 
past  six  centuries ;  it  is  connected  by  rail  with  Charloroi,  thirty- 
five  miles  distant,  and  with  Brussels,  about  forty-five  miles  away. 

Nancy. — Chief  town  of  the  French  department  of 
Meurthe  et  Moselle,  and  up  to  1871  the  capital  of  the  French 
province  of  Lorraine.  The  population,  which  Ls  upwards  of 
1 10,000,  has  doubled  in  the  last  thirty  years  owing  to  the  number 
of  people  who  have  crossed  over  from  German  Lorraine  in  order 
to  be  under  French  rule.  Nancy  is  the  headquarters  of  the 
20th  Army  Corps,  and  is  situated  about  fifteen  miles  from  the 
German  frontier,  on  the  Paris-Strasbourg  railway  and  also  on 
the  Mezieres-Nancy-Epinal  strategic  line  of  frontier  railway. 
It  is  strongly  fortified,  and  is  of  considerable  importance  among 
the  frontier  defences  of  France  in  the  south-east.  The  Maine- 
Rhine  Canal  flows  by  the  town,  and  adds  to  its  facilities  for 
transport. 

Ocrtclburg.— An  important  railway  junction  in  East 
Prussia,  being  the  point  where  the  railway  running  west  from 
Lyck  divides  for  AUenstein  and  Neideuburg.  It  is  about  twenty 
miles  north  of  the  Polish  frontier. 

Sambre. — A  river  of  Northern  France  and  Southern 
Belgium,  rising  in  the  valley  which  lies  between  the  towns  of 
Maubeuge  and  Guise  in  the  north  of  France  (department  Nord). 
It  flows  north-east  by  the  town  of  Maubeuge,  after  which  it  turns 
more  directly  east,  crosses  the  Belgian  frontier,  and  continues  a 
fairly  straight  course  to  Charleroi,  whence  it  flows  by  many 
curves  and  convolutions  to  Namur,  where  it  joins  the  River  Mouse, 
which,  later  on,  becomes  the  Maas  in  Dutch  territor}\ 

Strasbourg. — German  capital  of  the  tcnitoiy  of 
Alsace-Lorraine,  and  a  first-class  fortress,  standing  two  miles 
from  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  and  about  ninety  niiles  north  of 
Bale.  Its  normal  garrison  amounts  to  15,000  men,  and  it  is  the 
headquarters  of  the  15th  German  Army  Corps,  while  the  fortifi- 
cations have  been  enormously  strengthened  since  the  war  of 
1870-71,  and  brought  up  to  date  and  fitted  with  guns  of  the 
most  modern  and  powerful  type.  Its  population  is  over  150,000. 
Railwaj-s  connect  it  with  Mctz,  Nancy,  Bale,  and  all  the  principal 
German  garrison  stations,  the  lines  towards  Geniiany  being 
constructed  with  a  view  to  reinforcing  the  Strasbourg  garrison 
to  any  extent  that  may  be  required. 

Thorembais. — The  name  of  two  Belgian  villages,  situated 
about  tv."o  miles  apart  in  the  province  of  Brabant,  on  the  road 
from  Tirlemont  to  Gerabloux.  The  more  eastern  of  the  two, 
about  nine  miles  from  Gembloux,  is  the  larger  and  more  important. 

Valenciennes. — Situated  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
River  Scheldt,  about  157  miles  north  of  Paris  on  the  Paris- 
Brussels  railway,  at  the  point  where  the  Schojicile  and  Scheldt 
join.  It  is  the  centre  of  an  extensive  and  rich  coalfield,  and  is 
largely  engaged  in  iron  and  steel  industries.  Its  population  is 
upwards  of  25,000.  It  is  connected  by  rail  with  Lille  and 
Maubeuge,  as  well  as  with  various  other  centres,  and  is  one  of  the 
most  important  towns  of  the  department  of  Nord.  The  Belgian 
frontier  is  about  eight  miles  distant  from  the  town.  The  lace  for 
which  Valenciennes  used  to  be  famed  is  but  little  made  here  now. 

Willenburg. — A  German  village,  about  fourteen  miles 
north  of  the  Polish  frontier,  and  an  impoi-tant  point  on  the 
strategic  railway  of  East  Prussia. 


"  The  V/ar  by  Land,"  by  Hil.^irc  EcIIoc,  "  The  War  by  Water," 
by  F.  T.  Jane,  the  Diary  oi  the  War,  and  the  scries  forn^in^  a 
Topographical  Guide,  conimenced  in  tiie  issue  ol  Land  aad  Water 
dated  Au£.  22nd,  which  CAn  be  obtained  through  atiy  newsagent. 


16* 


August  29,   1 9 14 


LAND    AND    WATER 


THE   MYSTERY  OF  THE  NORTH  SEA 


CopyritU,  CrM,  Smihua 


H.M.S.  "MONARCH"  (SUPER-DREADNOUGHT) 
With  her  13-5  Cunt  in  Action.     Eich  projectile  weighi  1,250  lb.,  ind  the  can  fire  ten  guns  on  either  iide 

965 


LAND     AND     WATETv' 


August  29,    1914 


A  DAY  WITH  THE  CUBHUNTERS 
Gone  to  Ground 


Copyright,  Span  and  Geiwrat 


AMONG     THE     CUBS 

All-Round   Value  of  the  Preliminary  Campaign 

By  "RAMBLER" 


I 


N  the  grave 
situation  so 
quickly  brought 
about  by  the  inter- 
national crisis  on 
the  Continent,  the 
vast  majority  o  f 
people  have  been 
little  inclined  to 
turn  their  thoughts 
seriously  or  for  any 
length  of  time  to 
the  subject  of  sport. 
Yet  it  says  much 
for  the  self-posses- 
sion of  the  British 
sportsman  that 
although  his  first 
and  unwavering 
desire  is  to  do  some- 
thing of  solid  use- 
'  Illness  for  his 
tiuntry,  when  and 
where  his  services 
are  not  required, 
he  does  not  fidget 
and  fume  in  gloomy 
idleness,  but  is  up 
and  doing  and 
bracing  himself  with 
healthy  exercise  in 
the  open  air. 
so  iu  a  relatively  minor  degree  grouse  shooting  is 
on  in  the  north,  cricket  and  golf  are  being  played, 
and  a  few  Masters  of  Foxhounds  are  here  and  there  already 
giving  attention  to  the  cubs  in  the  woodlands  and  the 
education  of  their  young  hounds. 

The  hunting  outlook  mav  appear  to  be  decidedly  obscured 
at  the  moment,  for  it  is  feared  that  in  the  coming  winter 
"  money  will  be  very  tight,"  and  that  there  mav  be  manv 
resignations  of  masterships  on  that  account,  while  "it  is  certain 
that  there  will  be  scarcely  any  horses  left  for  hunting  pur- 
poses ;  but  it  is  early  yet  to  talk  of  the  probable  effects  of 
the  great  international  upheaval  upon  our  sport  at  home.  For 
the  time  being,  at  all  events,  hunting  is  not  likely  to  be 
altogether  abandoned,  though,  as  at  the  time  of  the  South 
African  War,  it  will  be  conducted  in  quite  a  subdued  and 
modified  way  as  compared  with  times  of  peace  and  prosperity 
at  home  and  abroad. 


And 
going 


In  the  Farmers'  Interests 

That  cubhunting  is  an  all-important  branch  of  the 
chase  needs  no  telling,  and  if  there  is  to  be  any  regular  hunt- 
ing when  November  comes  round,  war  or  no  war,  the  ensuing 
weeks  must  be  devoted  to  this  educational  part  of  the  business 
by  huntsmen  and  their  hounds.  For  one  thing,  the  conditions 
are  fairly  favourable  for  an  early  start  in  the  big  woodlands 
this  autumn,  and  by  all  accounts  most  countries,  where  the 
preliminary  campaign  is  taken  seriously,  are  well  stocked 
with  foxes.  Farmers'  interests  have  to  be  studied,  and  too 
many  foxes  in  a  country  are  certainly  a  nuisance.  Thorough 
cubhunting,  then,  is  an  advantage  to  all  concerned,  and, 
although  countries  and  their  needs  vary  vastly,  and  no  hard- 
and-fast  rules  may  be  said  to  govern  cubhunting  generally, 
it  is  a  maxim  that  may  be  commonly  applied  that  early  and 
genuipe  work  in  the  big  coverts  means  a  steady  pack  of  hounds, 
straight-necked  foxes,  and  high-class  sport  when  the  real 
thing  begins. 

There  are  some  countries  which  are  ideal  for  the  making 
of  a  pack  of  hounds.  The  Grafton  is  one  :  the  Fitzwilliam 
another  ;  and  many  other  well-wooded  countries  might  be 
named  in  the  same  category.  In  big  well-foxed  woodlands 
there  can  be  real  drilling  without  unnecessary  noise  or  holloa- 
ing, and  without  holding-up  and  mobbing.  I  have  long 
held  the  opinion  that  it  is  neither  for  the  good  of  the  pack 
nor  for  the  encouragement  of  bold  straight-necked  foxes  to 
force  tired  cubs  back  into  covert  when  they  have  been  well 
rattled  and  bustled.  Of  course,  hounds  must  have  blood, 
and  pretty  regularly,  but  not  to  the  excessive  amount  which 
many  huntsmen  seem  to  crave  for.  And  where  the  harvest 
is  over,  and  the  ground  is  not  too  hard,  no  great  harm  can 
be  done  in  allowing  the  hounds  from  following  the  cubs  into 
the  open  occasionally,  though  I  know  that  this  is  not  a  canon 
in  the  creed  of  very  many  Masters  and  huntsmen  until  Sep- 
tember is  over.  I  always  hold  that  the  sporting  custom  of 
the  late  Mr.  Coupland,  during  his  most  successful  mastership 
of  the  Quorn,  is  the  one  to  adopt.  "  Let  every  fox  be  driven 
out  of  covert,"  was  his  maxim,  "  and  then  clap  hounds  on 
the  last  one  to  leave  and  kill  him  if  they  can."  Even  in  early 
September  the  Quorn  used  to  have  some  sharp  little  scurries 
over  the  open  in  those  days  ;  and  I  am  sure  the  subsequent 
winter  sport  proved  that  the  efficiency  of  Tom  Firr  and  his 
beauties  had  in  no  wise  been  adversely  affected. 

Riot 

There  are  widely  different  views  regarding  even  the 
entering  of  young  hounds  to  foxhunting.  There  always 
have  been.  When  Jack  Raven,  Mr.  Meynell's  famous  old 
huntsman,  saw  Jones,  his  cork-legged  whipper-in,  start  off  in 


q66 


August  29,    1 9 14 


LAND     AND     WA  T  E  R 


Copy/ight,  Sport  and  General 

pursuit  of  a  hound  which  was  running  a  hare,  he  pulled  him 
up  with  the  remark  :  "  Let  him  alone  ;  he'll  stop  soon  enough 
when  he  sees  what  he  is  after."  And  so  it  proved  ;  but  there 
are  not  many  huntsmen  at  the  present  day  who  conduct  their 
early  operations  on  quite  such  lenient  principles.  Still, 
even  now  there  are  men  who  let  their  puppies  start 
by  hunting  whatsoever  they  like  so  long  as  they  do  hunt 
something,  and  afterwards  by  degrees  stop  them  from  all 
kinds  of  riot. 

Opinions  vary  also  as  to  the  size  of  the  pack  to  take  into 
the  large  woodlands.  A  few-  Masters  even  now  believe  to 
some  extent  in  the  doctrine  which  used  to  be  held  by  owners 
of  strong  kennels  in  the  early  days — that  of  starting  cub- 
hunting  with  very  large  packs.  I  believe  it  w^as  Mr.  Meynell, 
again,  who  began  by  taking  as  many  as  eighty  couple  into 
the  field  in  August.  No  doubt  it  was  sweet  to  the  ears  of  a 
keen  hunting  man  to  hear  the  woodlands  echo  with  the  music 
of  such  an  enormous  number  of  hounds.  And  how  they 
must  have  made  the  startled  foxes  fly  !  But  Mr.  Meynell 
discovered  that  better  results  could  be  obtained  with  a  far 
smaller  pack,  and  he  soon  brought  the  number  down  to  about 
thirty  couple.  Still,  there  are  Masters  to-day  who  believe 
in  making  quite  a  call  upon  the  resources  of  their  kennel, 
when  the  early  work  begins  in  the  extensive  woodlands. 

The  B!i  Woods  First 

It  has  been  said — but  I  have  never  known  an  instance 
myself — that  some  Masters  are  disposed  to  think  that  by 
"  nursing  "  the  big  coverts  instead  of  hunting  them,  they 
are  more  likely  to  find  in  them  and  have  good  sport  from  them 
in  winter.  It  would  be  a  huge  mistake,  for,  as  the  author 
of  "  Notitia  Venatica  "  laid  down,  so  long  as  there  is  a  chance 
"of  finding  and  killing  foxes  in  the  larger  woodlands  during 
the  first  part  of  cubhunting  at  all  events,  hounds  should  on 
no  account  be  taken  to  draw  small  spinneys.  Perhaps 
there  are  easy-going  short-sighted  huntsmen  who  prefer 
small  coverts  to  large  ones,  if  they  hold  enough  cubs  to 
provide  his  young  hounds  with  a  lesson  and  a  sufficiency 
of  blood.  But  I  have  never  met  the  Master  who  allowed 
the  big  woodlands  to  be  neglected  during  September  when 
there  was  a  chance  to  draw  them. 

And  that  recalls  the  fact  that  in  some  countries  all  the 
big  woodlands  unfortunately  are  not  open  to  hounds  during 
cubhunting.  There  are  shooting  men  who  loyally  see  to  it 
that  a  few  litters  of  foxes  are  reared  in  their  woodlands, 
realising  that  the  loss  of  game  they  occasion  is  not  after  all 
serious.  Yet  they  cherish  a  dislike  to  hounds  drawing  their 
coverts  before  the  shooting  parties  have  been  held,  and  in 
so  acting  they  largely  discount  the  value  of  their  generous 
services  in  preserving  foxes.  The  drawing  of  the  cove  ts 
during  cubhunting  makes  all  the  difference  in  the  world 
to  the  sport  later  in  the  season,  and  it  is  quite  a  mistake  to 
imagine  that  shooting  prospects  suffer  thereby  in  any  material 
degree.  A  few  pheasants  may  desert  the  disturbed  coverts 
for  the  time  being,  but  they  are  quickly  back  in  their  original 
haunts.     This  has  been  proved  again  and  again,  and  j^hooting 


AN  EXPECTANT  FIELD 

in  October  and  November  certainly  cannot  suffer  at  all  by 
visits  of  the  hounds  in  the  latter  part  of  August  and  the 
beginning  of  September. 

Education   for  the  Youn^  Follower 

If  during  this  preliminary  campaign  there  are  far  smaller 
fields  than  usual — in  fact,  if  those  who  come  out  to  see  the 
early  morning  work  in  the  coverts  are  confined  to  a  few 
farmers  and  sporting  residents — so  much  better  for  the  Masters 
and  their  huntsmen.  The  class  of  sportsmen  who  get  the 
real  enjoyment  out  of  cubhunting  arc  what  may  be  called 
the  scientific  sportsmen,  the  genuine  houndmen.  These  it 
is  who  love  to  see  the  young  entry  at  work,  and  to  watch 
the  progress  of  their  education  day  by  day.  There  are 
pleasures  and  delights  in  September  woodland  hunting 
which  the  man  who  hunts  to  ride  cannot  detect  or  appreciate, 
and  large  promiscuous  crowds  at  the  covert-side  during 
cubhunting  are  often  an  intolerable  nuisance.  We  wish 
to  make  no  acquaintance  with  our  familiar  friends  the 
"tailers  "  and  thrusters  until  November  is  here  ;  we  do  not 
wish  to  have  recalled  yet  what  it  is  to  put  up  with  the  jostling 
and  jamming  at  the  gaps  and  gates. 

Cubhunting  no  more  exists  for  the  Young  Rapids 
of  the  chase  than  does  the  rehearsal  at  the  theatre  for  the 
ungodly  gods.  Yet  when  September  is  advanced,  and  the 
cubs  begin  to  fly  at  the  first  challenge,  then  may  some  of 
the  recruits  among  the  field  be  the  better  for  an  occasional 
morning  with  the  hounds.  They  will  learn  more  perhaps 
in  an  hour  than  they  would  in  a  week  in  the  hunting  field  in 
mid-winter ;  they  may  learn  to  appreciate  some  of  the 
difficulties  of  hounds  and  huntsmen  ;  they  may  be  steadied 
by  a  few  mild  ratings  and  expostulations  on  the  part  of  those 
in  authority.  There  is  then  something  to  be  said  for  a  field 
during  cubhunting,  for  if  the  cubs  and  the  puppies  that 
have  been  put  on  benefit  by  gradual  initiation  into  what 
is  expected  of  them,  why  not  also  the  young  follower  of 
hounds.  No  one  wants  to  see  cubhunting  become  a  fashion- 
able amusement,  and  I  think  harm  may  often  come — does 
come — from  the  advertising  of  cubhunting  meets  in  the 
local  newspapers  long  before  the  preliminary  business  has 
taken  on  the  semblance  of  the  Real  Thing,  nevertheless,  when 
September  has  almost  run  its  course,  and  October  darts 
in  the  open  are  being  anticipated,  surely  the  young  sportsman 
and  sportswoman  genuinely  anxious  to  learn  the  game 
should  not  be  discouraged.  Cubhunting  is  a  fine  prepara- 
tory school  all  round,  and  the  character  of  the  coming  season 
will  depend  very  much  upon  how  the  lessons  are  learnt  in 
the  next  six  or  eight  weeks.  Unhappily  the  war  has  broken 
out,  and  the  whole  prospect  of  hunting  has  been  clouded  over 
this  autumn.  We  must  look  beyond  this  winter  for  a  return 
to  the  normal  aspect  for  our  national  sport.  In  the  meantime 
let  us  congratulate  ourselves  that  such  a  sport  has  so  long 
flourished  in  these  islands,  providing  us  with  a  ready  means  of 
securing  horses  in  a  time  of  national  emergency  and  so  many 
brilliant  horsemen  with  the  valour  and  spirit  to  serve  their 
country  in  a  terrible  crisis  such  as  the  present. 


967 


/ 

LAND    AND    WATER 


August  29,   1 9 14 


.•iSS-ii-v^,-; 


Ftom  an  Old  Engraving 


A  BROOD  OF  PARTRIDGES 

PARTRIDGES  AND  OTHER  THINGS 

By  GUY  C.    POLLOCK 


WITHIN  three  days  of  the  partridges  !  That 
should  be  an  exhilarating  and  joyous  thought. 
It  is  not  so.  It  cannot  be  so  while  the  shroud 
of  destiny  is  still  wrapped,  like  a  clammy 
mist  of  death,  over  all  the  world,  and  while 
we  cannot  tell  to  what  new  duties,  trials,  and  tests  of  fortitude 
and  patriotism  these  days  may  call  us. 

Some  day,  in  the  mercy  of  a  divine  dispensation,  we  shall 
have  put  tiiis,  the  greatest  war  of  history,  behind  us.     We 
shall  have  put  behind  us  the  aftermath  of  conflict,  which  may 
well  be  only  less  disturbing 'than  the  war  itself.     We  shall 
have  returned  to  a  normal  England,  free,  proud,  unshaken, 
with  unsullied  hohour  by  sea  and  land.     But  we  shall  not  be 
as  we  were.     Neither  politics  nor  parties,  things  nor  men, 
can  ever  be  what  they  were.     They  will  be,  we  may  hope, 
purer  and  finer,  purged  of  much  pettiness,  exalted  by  sacrifice 
to  nobler  conceptions.     But  not  the  same.     Already  tempora 
mutantur,    nos  el  mutamur  in  Mis.      Yet  it  is  reasonable  to 
believe  that  in  time  the  partridges  of  England,  our  native 
game  bird — neither  decimated  nor  terrified,  let  us  believe,  by 
any  successful  invasion  of  armed  enemies  sweeping  with  fire 
and  sword  over  a  craven  or  defeated  land — will  again  occupy 
our  earnest  thoughts  when  warm  September  daj's  of  a  peaceful 
English  autumn  come  near  again.     War  will  not  drive  from 
us  our  love  of  sport.     Indeed,  our  love  of  sport  may  have 
helped  us  much  in  war.     A  foreign  military  writer,  a  man  of 
wide  experience  of  war,  who  has  himself  commanded  in  many 
campaigns  levies  of  ardent  volunteers,  has  already  expressed 
a  great  surprise  in  the  soldierly  efficiency  of  our  Territorials, 
and  has  attributed  this  efficiency  to  the  British  love  of  sport 
and  from  athleticism,  fit  training  for  the  soldier's  mind  and 
body.     Our  games  and  field  sports  may  yet  vindicate  them- 
selves on  the  battlefields  of  Belgium,  on  the  sacred  shores  of 
this  our  native  land. 

But  I  wish — if  only  I  can  rid  my  mind  sufficiently  of  the 
shadow  of  war,  which  impinges  on  my  manuscript  as  King 
Charles's  head  bothered  the  unhappy  Mr.  Dick — to  consider 
the  partridges  in  relation  to  the  present  crisis.  No  good 
sportsman,  I  think,  is  keen  on  partridge  shooting  now.  Too 
many  who  ha\-e  been  our  comrades  in  the  shooting  field — 


good  fellows,  brave  and  enduring  men — are  facing  shot  and 
shell  at  the  call  of  patriotism  and  a  righteous  cause.  I  could 
not  even  carry  a  gun  over  the  stubbles  and  roots  of  the 
little  shoot  without  too  poignant  memories  of  happier  days, 
when  one  who  now  commands  a  British  cruiser  in  action  did 
such  excellent  execution  in  our  hottest  corner  at  pheasants, 
when  another  who  commands  a  regiment  of  the  expeditionary 
force  shared  the  varied  fortunes  of  a  September  partridge 
day,  when  yet  another,  comrade  of  many  days,  now  recalled 
to  the  colours  of  his  heart,  walked  close  with  me  to  make  a 
triumph  of  the  season's  very  end.  I  should  have,  too,  to 
think  very  nearly  of  our  most  faithful  and  enthusiastic  beater, 
an  old  soldier,  still  a  reservist,  a  person,  I  fear,  with  an 
unquenchable  thirst,  but  with  a  stout  and  lovable  heart, 
tender  to  all  the  brute  creation,  if  not  a  perfect  husband, 
wearing  the  ribbon  of  the  medal  with  four  clasps  which  he  had 
long  since  pawned,  our  excellent  friend,  one  of  our  defenders 
now.  These  memories  would  overpress  the  day  and  take 
from  partridge  shooting  all  its  joyous  friendliness.  It  may 
even  be  that  outpost  duty  and  not  partridges  may  claim  those 
of  us  who,  beyond  the  military  age  and  not  so  sound  as  when 
the  doctor  vetted  us  in  pre-TerritoriaJ  days,  have  offered, 
obeying  a  duty  which  the  poorest  Englishman  could  not 
ignore,  to  go  back  to  military  duty. 

Yet,  with  all  this,  the  game  must  be  shot,  if  possible. 
It  must  be  shot  because  it  will  be  useful,  because  it  may  be 
distributed  either  to  supplement  a  local  food  supply  or  to 
add  to  the  larders,  of  hospitals  delicacies  which  may  have  a 
tragically  enhanced  value.  I  hope  and  believe  that  neither 
on  big  shoots  or  little  shoots  will  there  be  any  attempt  to 
make  a  profit  by  the  sale  of  game  in  war-time.  We  do  not 
want  our  grouse  and  partridges  and  pheasants  for  the  dinner 
tables  of  the  well-to-do.  This  is  no  time  for  many  courses 
and  high  living.  It  is  a  time  for  simple  fare  and  a  com- 
munistic spirit.  We  want  the  game  for  the  sick,  the  wounded, 
and  the  poor.  We  must  shoot  very  liberally  for  the  pot. 
We  must  shoot,  too,  because  it  is  important  not  to  withdraw, 
so  far  as  withdrawal  can  be  avoided,  any  circulation  of  money 
in  British  districts  which  have  been  used  to  depend  for 
prosperity  on  such  expenditure.     Hunting  is  almost  bound 


968 


August  22,  1 9 14 


LAND     AND     WATER 


THE  BRITISH  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 


FIELD-MARSHAL  SIR  JOHN  FRENCH,  K.C.M.G,.  G.C.V.O. 

Field-Marshal  Sir  John  French  wat  born  in  1852,  and  began  his  career  in  the  service  of  his  country  as  a  naval  cadet  and  midship- 
man in  the  Royal  Navy  from  1866  lo  1870.  In  1874  he  entered  tKe  8th  Husbart,  and  wes  transferred  to  the  19th  Hussars,  with 
which  regiment  he  went  through  the  Soudan  Campaign  of  1884-5,  being  in  the  actions  of  Abu  Klea,  Cubut.  and  Metemneh. 
In  1889  he  assumed  command  of  his  regiment,  and  in  1897  was  appointed  Brigadier  in  command  of  the  2nd  Cavalry  Brigade.  On 
the  outbreak  of  the  South  African  war  Sir  John  was  appointed  Major-Ceneral,  and  given  command  of  the  Cavalry  Division  in 
Natal.  He  was  in  command  at  the  battle  of  Elandslaagte,  and  of  the  cavaliy  of  Sir  George  >X''hite's  force  at  Reiifonlein  and 
Lombard's  Kop.  Promoted  Lieutenani-General  in  1900,  he  look  part  in  many  important  engagement!,  remaining  on  actual  field 
service  up  to  the  end  of  the  war.  Promoted  lo  General  in  IS07,  and  appointed  Inspector-General  of  the  Farces,  which  post  he 
held  up  to  1911.  In  1913  he  received  his  Baton,  and  on  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war  was  given  the  post  of  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  Expeditionary  Force 


953 


LAND     AND     WATER 


August    22,     I9I4 


WITH    THE    BELGIAN    ARMY 


DOGS  EMPLOYED  BY  THE  BELGIAN  ARMY 


KING  ALBERT  OF  BELGIUM 

Who  has  been  congratulated  on  all  sides  upon  the  valour 

and  ability  of  his  troops 


Copyright,  Sport  ind  Generai 


BELGIAN  ARTILLERY 

Whose  accurate  fire  has  done  much  to  check  the 

German  advance 


BELGIAN  INFANTRY  MARCHING  TO  THEIR  POSITION 

954 


Photos  by  Newspaper  lUustratioM 


August  22,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATEE 


THE    WORLD'S    WAR. 

The  Meaning  of   Military  Terms  and 
THE  Reading  of  Military  News. 


WHEN  two  independent  communities  conflict  in 
will,  if  neither  give  waj,  there  must  be  recourse 
to  force.  That  is,  each  community  must 
attempt  to  render  life  so  unpleaaing  to  the 
members  of  the  other  community  that,  rather 
than  continue  under  such  conditions,  that  other  community 
will  accept  ita  enemy's  will. 

For  example  :  If  nation  A  desires  to  take  the  goods  of  nation 
B,  while  nation  B  desires  to  retain  ita  goods,  then  there  is  a 
conSict  of  wills.  If  nation  A  refuses  to  give  up  its  project,  and 
nation  B  refuses  to  give  up  its  goods,  recourse  to  force  is 
inevitable. 

Such  a  recourse  to  force  we  call  A  State  of  War,  and  the 
operations  whereby  force  is  exercised  on  either  side  we  call  War. 

It  has  been  found  by  experience  that  men  are  better  able 
to  impose  their  will  thus  by  force  upon  other  men  in  proportion 
as  they  are  (a)  armed  with  a  superior  weapon ;  {&)  numerous  as 
compared  with  their  enemies ;  (c)  so  organised  and  so  infonned 
with  certain  habita  both  of  routine  and  of  obedience  that  they 
can  act  in  great  numbers  to  the  dictatioB  of  one  central  authority, 
with  the  maximum  of  cohesion  and  at  the  same  time  with  the 
maximum  of  elasticity. 

A  number  of  men  so  organised  is  called  sn  Army.  The 
operations  of  an  army,  especially  against  another  army,  are 
termed  Military  Operationg. 

These  operations,  having  now  inany  generations  of  tradition 
behind  them  and  a  continued  development,  have  accumulated  a 
number  of  technical  terms,  and  are  spoken  of  in  a  language  of 
their  own. 

Some  of  these  teclinical  terms  arc  unavoidable,  because  they 
relate  to  things  peculiar  to  warfare ;  others  are  merely  the 
equivalents  of  everyday  words,  and  to  use  them  in  general 
description  is  unnecessary.  But  all  MUiiarij  News  comes  to  u;' 
expressed  in  such  terms,  both  necessary  and  unnecessary,  and 
these  terms  must,  therctoie,  be  understood  if  we  are  to  read 
military  news  intelligently. 

In  order  to  understand  these  terms  and  the  way  in  which 
they  are  used,  we  must  begin  at  the  beginning  and  discover 
(1)  what  is  the  Composition  of  an  Army;  (2)  under  what 
conditions  an  Army  lives  and  moves !  and  (3)  what  task  it  is 
expected  to  accomplish. 

I.— THE    COMPOSITION    OF    AN    ARMY. 

Thb  essential  feature  in  the  composition  of  an  Army  is 
that  it  must  be  divided  and  subdivided  into  separate  parts,  both 
(a)  because  only  b(  tan  its  numbers  be  controlled,  and  the  central 
command  conve)-cd  to  all  its  members.  (6)  Because  only  so  can 
there  be  the  power  to  use  any  part  for  a  time  independently  of 
the  rest ;  n  other  words,  only  thus  can  dasticUy  be  secured, 
(c)  Because  an  Army  demands  the  services  of  men  in  various 
ways,  armed  and  unarmed,  and  because,  among  the  armed,  the 
weapons  differ  in  their  nature  and  use. 

A  modem  national  army  is  first  of  all  divided  into  Army 
Corps.  Each  Army  Corps  is  in  itself  a  complete  model.  It  is 
an  army  fully  found.  If  r,  nation  can  put  into  the  field  but  one 
Army  Corps  it  can  none  the  less  put  into  the  field  a  perfect 
though  small  army.  For  every  Army  Corj)s  has  its  due 
proportion  of  the  various  arms  and  auxiliary  bodies  which 
together  make  up  a  modern  army. 

Each  such  Army  Corps  is  under  the  command  of  a  general 
oflScer  who  is  aided  by  his  staff,  and  it  is  the  peculiar  business  of 
the  staff  to  work  out  the  details  of  timing,  provisioning,  etc.,  in 
the  movements  of  a  Coi-ps.  It  is  a  fair  rule  of  thumb  to  reckon 
an  Army  Corps,  upon  a  war  footing  and  at  the  beginning  of  a 
campaign  before  wastage  sets  in,  at  about  40,000  men. 

An  Army  Corps  is  again  divided  into  Biviaions  :  usually 
two  in  number  :  in  some  services  and  in  some  special  cases,  three. 
Each  Division  contains  a  duo  proportion  of  every  arm  and  each 
is  under  a  General  Officer,  subordinate  to  the  General  commanding 
the  whole  Corps.  But  though  divisions  thus  make  up  an  Army 
Corps,  they  do  not  entirely  constitute  it.  Certain  groups  of  men, 
both  armed  and  unarmed,  arc  ascribed  to  the  Corps  as  a  whole, 
and  not  to  the  Divisions.  For  instance,  in  most  services,  of 
all  the  guns  present  in  an  Army  Coqia,  only  some  arc  attaclicd  to 
the  Divisions,  others  are  under  the  direct  control  of  the  Army 
Corps  as  a  whole,  that  is,  of  its  General  in  command. 


Divisions  are  again  subdivided  into  Brigades,  And  here 
we  approach  the  cross-division  of  all  armies  into  bodies  using 
different  kinds  of  offence,  or,  as  they  are  tecknically  called, 
'' Armsr 

It  is  customarj'  to  speak  of  "  the  three  Arms"  that  is.  Infantry, 
Cavalry,  and  ArtLtlery.  But  an  aim  separate  from  these  is  that 
of  the  Engineers  who  prepare  communications,  undertake  the 
larger  forms  of  fortification,  and  attend  to  all  scientific  work  in 
general,  as  also  what  ia  termed  nowadays  sometimes  "  the  fourth 
arm  " — that  of  the  men  who  work  the  Flying  Machines. 

Not  all  these  arms  are  organised  in  Brigades,  but  Cavalry  and 
Infantry  nearly  always  are,  and  a  Brigade  normally  consists  of 
two  or  three  Regiments.  The  Brigade  is  commanded  by  the  lowest 
grade  of  General  Officer,  who  is  responsible  to  his  General  of 
Division,  who  is  again  responsible  to  the  General  commanding 
the  whole  Army  Corps. 

Below  the  unit  of  the  regiment  are,  of  course,  many  other 
subdivisions,  of  which  the  most  important  to  retain  is  that  of 
the  Ballalian  in  the  Infantry,  for  that  is  the  unit  of  the  principal 
fighting  arm.  The  Battalion  may  be  taken,  by  a  rough  rule  of 
thumb,  to  number,  on  a  war  footing  and  before  wastage  sets  in, 
about  a  thousand  men  ;  and  the  strength  of  a  Brigade  is  reckoned 
in  Battalions  rather  than  in  Regiments.  Thus  the  French 
Brigade,  which  [made  the  reconnaissance  in  force  the  other 
day  into  Upper  Alsace  beyond  Altkirch,  and  which  was  in  its 
turn  a  portion  of  a  whole  Division  advancing  from  Belfort, 
numbered  six  Battalions ;  and  a  Brigade  of  Infantry  in  the 
field  may  generally  be  reckoned  at  from  five  to  eight  of  these 
BaU<dions. 

Another  important  subdivision  to  retain  is  the  Battery  of 
Field  Artillery.  In  some  services  a  Battery  consists  of  six,  in 
others  of  four,  cnns. 

A  rough  h'st  of  the  various  arms  and  auxiliary  forces  into 
which  any  complete  armed  force  is  divided  comprises  not  only 
the  main  arms  of  Cavalry,  Infantry,  Field  ArtiUery,  and 
Engineers,  but  also  a  Medical  Corps,  the  New  Flying  Corps,  and  a 
number  of  smaller  bodies — the  interpreters,  for  instance,  the 
despatch  bearers,  etc. 

A  rough  general  idea  of  the  proportion  these  arms  bear  one 
to  the  other  is  obtained  if  we  give  about  60  per  cent,  to  the 
Infantry,  rather  more  than  20  per  cent,  to  the  Artillery  and 
Engineers,  not  11  per  cent,  to  the  Cavalry,  and  the  small 
remainder  to  the  train,  to  the  administrative  Corps,  etc.  Or 
again,  still  more  roughly,  we  may  consider  a  modem  Army  as 
being  as  to  nearly  two-thirds  of  it  Infantry,  and  as  to  the 
remaining  third  mostly  Artillery  and  Cavalry  in  not  quite  equal 
proportions  (the  Cavalry  less  than  the  Artillery),  with  a  small 
margin  of  a  twentieth  or  so  left  over  for  administrative  and  all 
other  services. 

Of  the  actual  combatants  who  form  but  a  large  majority  and 
not  the  totality  of  any  force,  it  is  customary  to  speak  in  terms  of 
one  of  their  weapons.  Thus  we  say  that  in  such  and  such  an 
action,  such  and  such  a  Commanding  Officer  could  count  upon 
so  many  Bayonets  (Infantry),  so  many  Sabres  (Cavalry),  and  so 
many  Guns  (Artillery). 

Finally,  it  must  be  remembered  that  when  a  great  modern 
national  army  goes  into  a  Campaign,  its  Army  Corps  are  grouped 
together  into  various  larger  forces,  each  with  a  General  Officer  in 
supreme  command.  And  these  larger  forces  are  usually 
designated  by  the  name  of  some  natural  feature  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  which  their  operations  are  to  be  conducted.  Thus  three 
Army  Corps  under  Generals  A,  B,  and  C,  will  be  grouped  together 
to  act  in  the  Meuse  Valley,  will  be  put  under  the  supreme 
command  of  General  D,  and  will  be  called  the  Army  of  the 
Mouse.  The  operations  of  the  whole  national  army,  including 
every  Army  Corps  and  the  various  groups  into  which  they  may 
be  combined,  are  controlled  by  a  Supreme  General  Staff  v/ith  a 
General  Officer  usually  called  a  Generalissimo.  In  the  present 
stniggle  General  JofEro  occupies  that  position  upon  the  French 
side,  and  General  Von  Moltke  upon  the  German. 

A  modern  Army  is  fuuther  distinguished  in  its  composition, 
with  all  the  Great  Powers  save  Britain,  by  the  feature  of  Con- 
scription, and  in  every  case.  Great  Britain  included,  by  the 
feature  of  Mobilisation. 

Conscription  is  a  system  whereby  all  the  able-bodied  males  of 
a  country  are,  on  arriving  at  maturity  (that  is,  in  their  twentieth 
or  twenty-first  year)  summoned  according  to  a  register  that  is 


LAND    AND    WATER 


August  22,  1914 


kept  of  them,  and  examined  to  see  wliicli  of  tliem  are  fit  to 

Of  those  fit  to  bear  arms  the  Government  then  takes  a 
certain  number,  greater  or  less  according  to  its  financial  resources, 
the  task  expected  of  its  army,  and  the  theory  the  pohticians 
and  their  advisers  mav  hold  as  to  the  length  of  training  necessary 
to  the  making  of  a  soldier  and  the  number  required  to  provide 
a  first  line.  Thus,  in  France  nearly  all  those  called  up  and 
practically  all  those  fit  to  bear  arms  are  taken.  In  the  German 
Empire  a'  much  smaller  proportion.  The  men  so  taken  are  put, 
as  it  is  called,  with  the  Odours.  That  is,  are  put  into  umform 
and  into  barracks  to  live  for  a  certain  time  the  life  of  a  soldier, 
and  to  be  trained  in  all  the  duties  of  a  soldier  and  in  the  use  of 
their  weapons.    This  time  varies  from  two  to  three  years. 

Each  yearly  batch  thus  called  up  is  designated  by  the  name 
of  the  year  in  which  it  was  called,  and  is  called  a  Class.  Thus 
when  we  talk  of  "  The  Class  oj  1905  "  we  mean  all  those  men  who 
were  called  up  for  Service  in  1905,  whether  they  were  taken  for 
the  Colours  in  that  j'ear  or  not ;  and  these  men  reniain  marked 
by  that  term  throughout  the  whole  of  their  connection  with  the 
Military  organisation,  that  is,  from  the  moment  they  are  first 
examined  till  they  are  over  forty  years  of  age.  If  we  hear  that 
the  Government  has,  in  say,  1913,  when  they  have  long  ceased  to 
be  with  the  Colours,  "  Called  up  the  Class  of  1905,"  it  means  that 
it  has  summoned  back  to  the  Army  the  suriivors  who  were  first 
examined  as  to  their  fitness  for  ser\-ice  in  that  j'car. 

A  man  having  served  his  two  or  three  years  "  With  the 
Colours  "  passes  some  seven  years  or  so  in  the  "  Reserve  of  the 
Active  Army,"  the  years  immediately  succeeding  these  he  passes 
into  the  Territorial  Army,  and  later  again,  before  coming  to  his 
fortieth  year,  he  passes  into  the  Reserve  of  the  Territorial  Army. 

There  are  thus  in  every  country  where  Conscription  is 
instituted,  four  groups  of  men ;  the  first  and  youngest  group 
in  uniform  and  being  trained  as  soldiers  ;  the  next,  the  immediate 
Reserve  coming  up  a  few  days  at  certain  long  intervals,  to  renew 
Iheir  training ;  the  next  oldest  subject  to  very  short  periods  of 
training  but  still  in  connection  with  the  Army ;  the  fourth,  no 
longer  coming  up  for  any  training,  but  forming  the  last  Resene  of 
all.  These  four  groups  cover  the  trained  male  population 
between  the  ages  of  20  or  21  and  42  or  45,  and  while  tlicy 
are  called  by  difierent  names  in  different  services,  are  everywhere 
arranged  in  these  four  sections  and  correspond  roughly  to  these 
four  groups  of  ages. 

A  very  important  exception  to  this  system  must  here  be 
noticed  because  it  will  be  of  the  greatest  moment  in  the  present 
war. 

In  the  German  Service,  only  a  certain  proportion— far  smaller 
than  the  French — of  the  young  men  are  taken  for  the  Acti\e 
Army.  The  Germans  have  a  larger  population  than  the  French 
by  more  than  fifty  per  cent.,  and  they  claim  that  in  this  fashion 
they  can  pick  the  best  men,  and  yet  have  an  Army  equal  to  their 
neighbours.  Meanwhile  they  put  the  rest  into  a  special  sort  of 
Reserve,  of  which  some  are  slightly  trained  and  some  are  not 
trained  at  all.  This  Special  Reserve  (not  to  bo  confounded 
with  the  Regidar  Reserve  of  trained  men,  who  have  passed 
through  the  ranks),  which  is  of  course  very  large,  is  called  up  in 
time  of  War,  incorporated  with  the  trained  men,  and  trusted 
thus  to  acquire  a  sufBcient  military  habit  to  be  usable  in  the 
Front  line  before  the  war  has  long  proceeded. 

With  this  system  of  a  short-service  active  Army,  backed  by 
a  much  more  numerous  Reserve,  consisting  of  men  who  have 
already  passed  through  the  ranks,  which  system  is  to  be  found  in  all 
modem  countries  (even  in  those  which,  Uke  Britain,  have  not 
the  institution  of  Conscription),  necessarily  goes  the  other  modern 
feature  called  Mobilisation. 

It  is  evident,  before  a  short-seryice  modern  Army  can  begin 
great  operations  in  the  field,  the  men  actually  with  the  Colours 
must  be  supplemented  by  a  greater  or  lesser  number  of  the 
Reserves,  who  are  no  less  a  part  of  the  Army  than  those  actually 
in  uniform  and  in  barracks.  This  process  of  bringing  up  the 
Re8er\'es,  and  so  putting  the  Army  upon  a  War  footing  is,  with 
certain  other  activities  involved,  called  by  the  general  name  of 
Mobilisation,  which  means  the  turning  of  the  Army  from  an 
incomplete  and,  as  it  were,  stationary  condition,  into  a  complete 
condition  in  which  it  is  mobile;  that  is,  loosed  from  all  local 
ties  and  necessities  which  could  hinder  its  action  in  war. 

When  mobilisation  is  decreed,  the  Reserve  men,  who  have 
left  the  Colours  from  one  to  twenty  years  ago,  come  up  to  be 
clothed  and  armed.  They  join  certain  centres  of  concentration 
until  as  many  of  them  as  the  Government  has  chosen  to  call 
up  are  gathered  together  in  places  where  they  can  be  put  into 
uniform,  given  their  weapons,  and  drafted  into  the  Corps  ia 
which  they  belong. 

Every  Conscript  in  a  modem  army  has  a  booklet  or  papers 
describing  the  place,  length,  and  character  of  his  training,  with 
notes  on  the  way  in  which  he  served,  his  abilities,  rank  in  t!;e 
ser\-ice,  etc.,  and  in  particular  a  notification  of  the  place  to  which 
he  is  to  go  when  he  i»  mobilised  and  the  exact  day  o?i  which  he  is  to 
reach  it. 


It  is  clear  that  the'concentration  of  many  hundred  thousands 
of  men  occupied  in  their  various  civilian  duties  over  the  whole 
surface  of  a  country  could  not  be  undertaken  in  one  nor  even  in 
a  few  days.  The  carrying  capacity  of  railways,  the  time  taken 
to  distribute  the  order,  etc.,  the  necessity  of  preventing  confusion, 
and  the  further  necessity  of  grouping  men  from  smaller  centres 
of  concentration  into  larger  ones,  all  take  time.  The  soldier, 
therefore,  who  has  passed  into  the  Reser\-e,  has  marked  upon  his 
papers  liis  duty  to  present  himself  at  such  and  such  a  place  not 
necessarily  on  the  first  day  of  mobilisation  but  on  the  third,  or 
fifth,  or  whatever  day  may  be  appointed. 

Further  time  is  taken  up  in  clothing  and  arming,  in  drafting, 
each  into  his  own  corps,  the  men  called  up,  and  in  moving  tha 
first  troops  towards  the  scene  of  action. 

Mobilisation  is  again  lengthened  by  the  concentration  of 
stores,  the  liberation  and  movement  of  Reserve  weapons,  and  a 
host  of  other  operations. 

The  consequence  is  that  even  with  everything  moving 
exactly  to  a  scheduled  time,  the  mobilisation  of  any  great  modern 
national  army  will  always  take  a  considerable  number  of  days. 
In  France  and  Germany  it  is  not  far  short  of  a  fortnight ;  ia 
Russia  it  is  certainly  over  three  weeks.  The  amount  of  rolling 
stock  available,  the  length  and  direction  of  railways,  the  distribu- 
tion of  population,  all  enter  into  this  calculation ;  and  if  there 
is  any  considerable  hitch  or  confusion  that  period  might  be  very 
disastrously  prolonged. 

It  is  this  operation  of  mobilisation  and  the  length  of  tima 
attached  to  it  which  explains  not  only  the  delay  between  the 
beginning  of  a  state  of  war  and  the  first  decisive  actions,  but 
also  much  of  the  strategics  of  the  campaign. 

For  instance,  in  the  present  embarrassment  of  Germany  the 
fact  that  Russia  mobilises  more  slowlj'  than  France  determines 
the  whole  of  Germany's  main  plan.  She  must  try  to  put  France 
at  least  half  out  of  action,  to  prevent  the  French  Army  at  least 
from  pressing  her  badly  upon  the  West,  before  Russia  comes  into 
play  on  the  East ;  and  that  is  why  she  mobilised  secretly  before 
anybody  else,  and  why  she  made  her  great  effort  of  the  very  first 
days  of  the  war  against  the  Belgian  defences  which  block  her 
easiest  road  for  attacking  the  French  forces. 

II.— THE    CONDITIONS    UNDER   WHICH    AN    ARMY 
LIVES    AND   MOVES. 

An  Army  being  of  its  nature  a  body  of  men  compelled  to 
live  under  highly  artificial  conditions,  consuming  all  kinds  of 
wealth  and  yet  producing  nothing,  covering  at  any  one  time  a 
comparatively  small  area,  which  could  never  produce  even  the 
food  it  requires,  and  being  in  many  other  ways  restricted  by  its 
special  formation  and  purpose,  can  only  be  moved  from  placo  to 


place  under  certain  peculiar  conditions,  and  according  to  certain 
peculiar  rules. 

The  body  of  knowledge  and  practice  concerning  these  rules 
and  conditions  is  (together  with  the  art  of  bringing  it  against  the 
enemy  in  the  best  posture)  called  Strategy.  The  word  Strategy 
simply  means  "  the  conduct  of  an  Army." 

It  is  clear  that,  even  in  its  simplest  state  such  a  body  of  men 
will  require  accumulations  of  food  especially  designed  to  maintain 
it  in  being.  Under  modern  conditions  it  will  require  accumu- 
lations of  many  other  things  beside  food.  Modern  missile 
weapons  (the  rifle  and  the  gun)  cannot  be  used,  save  with  special 
missiles  designed  for  each  particiUar  type  of  weapon.  A  modern 
Army  is  further  a  mass  of  machines  (guns,  rifles,  telegraphic 
and  telephonic  apparatus,  aeroplanes,  dirigibles,  etc.)  all  of  which 
will  be  in  constant  need  of  repair  and  maintenance. 

More  than  any  older  and  similar  force,  it  will  require  repeated 
supplies  of  clothing,  horses,  medicine,  accoutrement.  Of  all 
these  things,  great  stores  must  be  got  together;    the  stock  of 


2» 


August  22,  1914 


L  A  2.'  D    AND    W  A  T  E  E 


such  stores  in  any  one  place  is  called  a  Depot  or  Magazine,  and  tiie 
place  where  the  Magazines  are  accumulated  is  called  a  base. 

It  is  obvious  that  a  fia.se  of  this  kind  is  not  easily  or  quickly 
moved.  It  is  fixed ;  or  af  least  only  to  be  transferred  at  a  vast 
expense  of  time  and  men.  But  it  is  equally  obvious  that  an 
Army  is  useful  in  proportion  to  the  freedom  of  choice  you  have 
in  moving  it. 

An  Army  goes  forward  from  its  base  towards  the  place  in 
which  it  thinks  it  can  best  meet  the  Army  opposing  it,  and  as  it 
goes  forward,  it  must  be  continually  supplied  with  ammunition, 
repairs  and  food.  If  it  were  not  so  supplied,  it  could  not  fight 
more  than  a  very  short  time,  nor  could  its  members  even  remain 
alive ;  they  would  8tar\-e.  This  line,  which  it  rolls  out  behind 
an  Army  in  movement,  connecting  it  with  its  base  ;  which  grows 
longer  and  longer  as  it  advances,  and  which  is  a  prime  necessity 
of  its  being  ia  called  its  Lines  of  Communication,  or,  more  shortly. 


PLAK  K 


A 


0- 


n 


u 


its  Communications.  The  simplest  elements  of  all  Strategy 
then,  may  be  represented  in  such  a  conventional  plan  as  Plan  I. 

Where  A-B  is  the  Army,  C  its  communications  and  D  its 
base. 

It  is  the  very  first  thing  to  remember,  when  we  are  considering 
the  position  of  any  Army,  its  chances  of  success  or  of  defeat, 
or,  in  military  history  the  causes  of  either,  that  an  Army  is 
thus  necessarily  tied  by  its  Communications  to  soma  vitally 
important  Base  of  Supply.  An  army  must  not  be  compared  to  a 
swimmer  moving  at  will  through  the  water.  It  is  better  compared 
to  a  diver  who  is  supplied  with  air  through  a  tube  and  will  perish 
quickly  if  that  line  be  cut.  It  is  not  an  island,  it  is  a  peninsula  ; 
it  is  not  an  isolated  or  detached  tiling,  it  is  a  fruit  upon  a  stalk, 
wiiich  is  gathered  and  consumed  if  the  stalk  be  severed. 

In  practice,  of  course,  these  simple  elements  are  infinitely 
complicated  and  diversified.  For  instance,  as  an  army  advances 
and  its  direction  is  determined  by  circimistances,  advanced  bases 
are  thrown  out.  Again,  a  line  of  Communication  that  has  become 
too  tortuous  can  be  straightened  by  short  cuts,  after  the  anny 
has  advanced;  and  again.  Communications  may  be  continually 
subject  to  interruption  even  by  the  enemy,  and  yet,  if  such 
intermptions  are  not  too  prolonged,  may  remain  intact  for  the 
purpose  they  have  to  serve.  But  the  general  elements  are 
what  I  have  described  and  condition  all  warfare. 

Before  we  go  further,  it  is  as  well  to  establish  a  certain 
number  of  consequences  following  upon  this  triple  arrangement 
of  fighting  force,  communications  and  base ;  they  are  seven  -n 
number. 

(1).  Communications  are  maintained  more  easily  and  at 
a  less  expense  of  energy  and  of  men  in  inverse  proportion  to 
their  length.  The  longer  they  are,  the  more  diflicult  they  are  to 
keep  intact  and  to  keep  working  smoothly.  After  a  certain 
extension,  the  difiiculty  increases  very  rapidly  indeed.  We 
all  know  in  practice  how  true  this  is  of  any  long  sequence  of 
human  activity.  In  a  procession,  for  instance,  the  mfficulties 
of  keeping  a  time-table  increase  very  greatly  with  the  length 
of  the  column. 

(2).  It  is  therefore  important  to  have  communications  as 
direct  as  possible  from  the  fighting  body  to  the  base — that  ia, 
perpendicular  to  the  fighting  front — and  the  advantage  of  this  is 
increased  when  we  consider  the  vulnerability  of  Communications, 
for : — 

(3).  Communications,  even  in  fiicndly  country,  must  be 
guarded  against  secret  attack ;  and  in  hostile  country  or  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  enemy,  from  open  attack.  On  which 
account : — 

(4)  Communications  take  up  a  great  number  of  men  in  the 
guarding  of  them,  and,  therefore,  as  an  army  advances  it  grows 
weaker  and  weaker  in  the  field,  not  only  from  a  natural  wastage 
through  disease  and  wounds,  but  also  because  it  has  to  spare 
more  and  more  men  to  guard  its  Communications.  Napoleon's 
Campaign  in  1812  affords  the  chief  example  of  this. 


(5)  Communications  are  not  only  the  channel  by  which  an 
army  is  fed  with  its  necessaries  for  living  and  fighting,  they  are 
also,  and  the  same,  channel  by  which  an  army  rids  itself  of 
encombrances,  of  its  wounded,  etc.    They  are  largely  the  channel 


PLAN 


C      E 

-|       r- 

-     - 

-cm 


np  and  down  which  orders  and  information  are  conveyed.  There- 
fore, with  this  "  backwards  and  forwards  "  business  they  are 
liable  to  clog;  and  if  they  clog  the  army  is  lost.  Therefore, 
again :  .v=-( 

(G)  It  is  urgent  that  a  wide  front  should  be  served  by  many 
parallel  lines  of  commimication.  If  (as  in  Plan  VI.)  the  broad 
front  A — B  must  have  all  its  Communications  passing  through 
the  narrow  issue  at  C,  it  is  in  peril.  It  is  free  if  it  hiis  separate 
lines  for  each  corps  (Y,  Y,  Y,  Y)  leading  but  to  separate  bases 
A,  A,  A). 

(7)  Though  an  Army  cannot  live  or  fight  for  more  than  a 
very  short  time  detached  from  its  Communications,  it  can 
drop  one  h'ne  of  Communications  and,  as  the  phrase  goes, 
"  Pick  up  "  another.  Thus  in  Plan  II.,  if  a  General  in  the 
position  A — B  wants  to  get  to  E  and  is  afraid  that  in  so  doing 
he  will  unduly  lengthen  or  will  be  in  peril  of  being  cut  oS  from 
his  line  of  Communications  along  C  to  D,  ho  will  not  be  afiaid  to 
march  upon  E  so  long  as  E  is  not  too  far  off,  and  so  long  as  he 
knows  that  E  is  in  touch  by  another  Una  of  Communications  F 
with  another  base  at  G.  A  force  cut  off  from  its  Communications 
is  said  to  be  "  in  the  air."  Bliicher's  march  to  Wavre  after  Ligny 
is  an  example  of  thus  picking  up  an  alternative  line  of 
Communications. 

So  much  for  Communications  and  the  way  in  which  an  Army 
is  bound  by  them. 

The  next  element  to  consider  in  the  conduct  of  an  Army  is 
the  space  which  it  occupies,  and  the  effect  of  space  upon  its 
progress. 

A  great  body  of  men  depending  upon  instruments,  many  of 
them  delicate,  many  of  them  cumbersome,  all — food  included — 

dependent  upon  wheeled  traffic 
or  boats,  must  use  some  con- 
venient avenue  of  advance;  a 
railway,  a  hard  road,  or,  in  the 
case  of  heavier  supplies,  a  river 
or  canal.  But  such  avenues  of  ■ 
advance  are  invariably  narrow 
compared  with  their  length. 
They  are  mere  lines  or  thin 
ribbons.  A  great  body  of  men 
must,  therefore,  advance  in 
columns.  That  is,  in  groups 
which  are  very  long  in  propor- 
tion to  their  width.  But  these 
bodies  must  also,  when  they 
come  to  fight.  Deploy,  that  is, 
spread  out  from  column  into 
line  (Deploy  is  but  the  French 
for  "  unfold  ")  otherwise  they 
could  not  meet  the  enemy  with 
their  full  force.  ■  If  the  body 
A— B  (Plan  III.)  desires  to 
defend  itself  against  or  attack 
the  enemy's  body  C — D,  it  must 
get  its  guns  and  its  rifles  to 
bear  upon  C — D,  and  it  can 
only  do  that  by  getting  them 
out  of  the  long  marching  column 
formation  A — B  into  the  new 
formation  E — F. 
Now,  it  is  evident  that  this  Deployinent  will  take  longer  and 
be  more  cumbersome  in  proportion  as  the  line  A — B  was  extended. 
Therefore,  the  commander  of  an  Army  Corps,  let  us  say,  will  try 
to  advance  in  as  many  short,  parallel  columns  as  possible,  subject 


E     PLAN  IV 


I 


p 


■^.  A 


B 


czn  nzn 


I  ,^' 


i.i 


^^.  A' 


B' 


(ZZI  EZU 


I 


--.  A 


// 


IZZ3  dJ 


P 


LAND    A:SD    WATEP. 


August  ~~, 


lOU 


»lwa73  to  the  difficultjr  of  keeping  to  manv  sucli  paralicl  columns, 
ail  abreast  one  of  the  other.  It  is  obvious  an  army  marching 
thus  (Plan  IV.)  can  deploy  into  the  position  E— F  more  rapidly 
and  easily  than  one  marching  thus  (Plan  V.).  A  General  will 
thcrefore'prefer,  if  he  can  get  it,  a  country  in  which  there  are 
numerous  more  or  less  parallel  roads,  railways,  and  opportunities 
for  water  carriage  leading  more  or  less  side  by  side  towards  the 
extended  front  where  ho  thinks  he  will  have  to  deploy,  and  ia 

I^  PLAN  V 


..^.x  A 


7-1 


cm 


CD  EH]  C 


B 

j  cm 


r"i 


I 
I 
I 

I 


eountiy,  such  as  mountains  and  forests,  where  such  roads  are  few, 
advance  is  hampered.  On  open  and  populated  plains,  where 
such  roads  are  many,  it  can  be  swift. 

It  is  a  further  consequence  of  this  state  of  things  that  a  large 
body  is,  in  proportion  to  its  size,  compelled  to  try  to  act  over  a 
wide  stretch  of  coimtry.  So  long  as  it  is  confined  to  a  narrow 
issue  it  is  cramped  and  can  only  present  a  small  part  of  its  forces 
to  the  enemy,  and  unless  an  Army  Corps,  say,  has  half  a  county 
to  work  over  it  is  at  a  heavy  disadvantage.  (We  shall  see  later 
of  what  importance  this  principle  is  in  the  present  campaign  in 
connection  with  the  narrow  issue  between  Liege  and  the  Dutch 
frontier.) 

A  body  compelled  to  move  in  one  long  column  and  unabla 
from  natural  obstacles  of  wood  or  marsh,  or  mountain,  to  deploy, 


PLAN   VT 


is  said  to  be  parsing  through  a  iefle.    When  it  comes  to  more 
open  country  where  it  can  spread  out  it  is  said  to  debouch. 

All  this  appUes  to  the  moving  and  the  keeping  in  existence 
of  any  army  in  the  field  ;  even  when  it  is  not  in  touch  with,  aroused 
by,  or  in  conflict  against  another  army.  And  this  part  of 
sirategy  which  concerns  the  mere  moving  of  a  groat  body  of 


PLAN  >ai 


c 

1} 


A 

I 


D-   1 


armed  men  is  essential  to  final  success  because  the  health, 
numbers,  and  disposition  of  the  force  when  it  comes  to  fight  will 
all  depend  upon  how  far  such  obvious  conditions  have  been 
considered  and  observed. 

III.— THE    TASK    OF   AN   ARMY. 

The  task  of  an  Army  is  the  task  of  reducing  an  opposing 
Army  to  mihtary  impotence.  That  is,  an  Army  must  try  to 
render  the  enemy  opposed  to  it  tinaUe  or  less  able  to  continue  Us 
activities  as  an  Army. 

Their  are  two  main  ways  in  which  this  can  be  accomplished : 

(A)  You  can  destroy  the  cohesion  of  the  enemy's  force  and 
turn  him  from  a  united  and  organised  whole  into  a  broken  mass 
incapable  of  combined  action. 

(B)  You  can  cut  ofE  the  enemy's  force  from  its  sourcca 
of  supply,  and  so  compel  it  to  the  alternative  of  starving  to  death 
(with  its  weapons  u.<ieles3  in  its  hands  from  lack  of  missiles),  or 
of  surrendering  itself  prisoner,  and  gi\ing  up  those  weapons  into 
your  hands. 

I  will  take  these  two  methods  in  their  order. 

(A)  When  one  Army  defeats  another  by  breaking  its  cohesion 
this  ia  accomplished  (save  in  the  case  of  partial  envelopment, 

leading  to  panic),  by  piercing  the 
line  of  that  Army  in  one  or  more 
places.  It  is  evident  that  when 
the  enemy's  line  is  pierced  you 
have  reduced  hi^  force— origin- 
ally comparable  in  numbers  to 
your  own — to  two  armies  each 
no  more  than  half  your  own. 
You  have  further  overwhelmed 
at  one  point  a  considerable 
number  of  his  troops ,  killed 
many,  scattered  more,  and  dis- 
organised the  rcEt  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  the  point  where  your 
shock  succeeded.  You  have, 
again,  completely  put  an  end  to 
Lis  unity  of  command ;  so  that 
even  the  remnants  of  his  Army 
cannot  co-operate  against  you. 
The  enemy's  line  thus  pierced  is 
defeated  more  or  less  com- 
pletely according  to  the  degree 
in  which  you  have  reduced 
his  forces  from  an  organised 
condition  to  chaos. 

An  attack  of  this  kind  is 
called  A  direct  Frontal  Attack. 
An  historical  example  of  a  battle 
attempted  to  be  won  in  this  . 
fashion  (but  mi?scd;  is  Napoleon's 
attack  on  Wellington's  line  at 
Waterloo,  or  again  Napoleon's 
attack  upon  the  Russian  line  at 
Borodino. 

It  is  evident  that  superiority 
in  numbers  is  here  as  in  every 
other  case  the  deciding  factor. 
It  means  that,  while  you  A — B 
can  oppose  to  your  enemy  C— D 
equal  numbers  at  every  point 
in  his  line,  and  so  engage  and 
"  hold  "  him,  you  are  free  further 
to  mass  at  some  point  K — of  your 
own  clioosing  —  larger  numbers 
than  those  opposite  at  that  point ;  and  these  numbers  can  direct 
against  the  point  opposed  to  them  a  superior  volume  of  fire  and 
a  greater  weight  of  men.  (Plan  VII.)  This  superior  volume  or 
weight  should  break  his  line.  'When  this  direct  effort  of  one  line 
against  another  takes  place,  the  scheme  is  often  called  "  a 
parallel  battle." 

But  superiority  of  numbers,  where  this  is  at  all  considcrabl?, 
is  better  and  more  commonly  utilised  in  the  second  form  of 
attempting  victory,  which  shall  be  next  described. 

(B)  This  second  form  consists  in  flanking  movements,  which 
Lave  for  their  ultimate  object  Evvelopmcnt. 

Let  A— B,  C— D,  (Plan  VIII.),  be  two  armies  drawn  up  in 
liae  opposed  one  to  the  other  and  approximately  equal  in 
numbers.  Add  to  A — B  some  considerable  body  E— F,  either 
connected  with  the  original  line  thus  (see  Plan  IX.)  or  coming 
up  from  elsewhere  in  aid  of  A — B,  thus  (see  Plan  X.).  Th:'* 
extra  body,  whether  belonging  to  the  orignal  line  A — B  (as  in 
the  first  of  these  two  sketches),  or  coming  up  from  elsewhere  in 
aid  of  that  hne  (as  in  the  second  sketch),  threatens  by  its  move- 
ment what  is  called  the  Flanl;  that  is,  the  side  of  C — D.  It 
comes,  fully  deployed  (that  is,  using  its  maximum  offensive 
power)  just  on  that  part  of  C— D's  arrangement  which  is  least  abb 


0-  f 


D 


1 

B 


August  22,  1D14 


LAXD    AIS^D 


WATER 


to  defend  itself.    For  the  line  C— D  Las  nothing  to  oppose  to  tliis 
flanking  movement  but  the  few  men  near  its  extreme  end. 

Observe  that,  in  order  to  meet  tbia  threat  whatever  C — ^D 
docs  will  weaken  him.  Supposing  that  when  he  sees  the  pro- 
longation of  C — D's  line  at  E — F,  he  stretches  his  own  Uno  out 
to  face  that  prolongation,  then  he  makes 
his  line  thinner  and  leaves  it  in  peril  of 
being  pierced  by  superior  forces  opposed 
to  it  at  every  point. 

Suppose  he  turns  round  two  of 
Lis  sub-divisions  M,  M  to  face  and 
hold  oS  the  flanking  movement,  as  in 
Plan  XL,  then  he  leaves  the  other 
four  sub-divisions  N — 0,  N,  00,  faced 
by  superior  forces  {six)  which  may  pierce 
them  or  overwhelm  them. 

As  a  fact,  what  usually  happens 
when  a  flanking  movement  has  been 
executed  with  sufficient  promptitude  is 
that  it  begins  to  turn  into  Envelopment. 
That  is,  the  inferior  force  C — D  bending 
back  first  on  one  wing  M,  M,  to  avoid 
attack  from  one  side,  leaves  itself  inferior 
as  against  the  original  force  A — B  opposed 
to  it.  That  original  force  then  begins  a 
flanking  movement  on  the  other  wing 
before  which  its  inferior  enemy  again 
bends  back  (0,  0),  and  by  that  time  the 
communications  of  C — D  are  in  danger 
of  being  cut.    (Plan  XII.) 

If  they  are  cut  and  the  envelopment 
is  complete,  you  get  a  result  such  as  that 
of  Sedan,  in  which  the  enveloped  Army  being  no  longer  able 
to  receive  food  or  missiles,  is  compelled  to  surrender.  Some- 
times, before  the  process  is  complete,  you  get  a  result  like  that 
of  Waterloo,  where  the  Army  threatened  with  envelopment 
breaks  under  the  strain,  loses  all  unity  and  cohesion,  and  is 
routed ;  that  is,  turned  from  an  organised  unity  into  a  chaos. 

It  is  evident  that  in  all  these  cases  the  presence  of  superior 
numbers  is,  other  things  being  equal,  the  decisive  factor.  It  has 
been  well  said  that  the  art  of  Strategy  consists  in  getting  two 
men  to  a  place  where  only  one  man  is  ready  to  meet  them. 

But  it  does  not  follow  by  any  means  that  of  two  national 
armies  that  which  is  the  larger  is  certain  to  succeed. 

What  is  meant  by  the  aphorism  is  that  wherever  a  particular 
battle  or  gtJieral  action  is  fought,  wherever,  as  another  term  goes, 
things  are  brought  to  a  Decision,  superiority  of  numbers  on  that 
particular  fidd  at  that  partirular  moment,  u  the  chief  deciding 
factor.  Thus,  Napoleon  in  the  Campaign  of  1814  fought  against 
superior  total  numbers ;  but  he  kept  the  various  bodies  of  his 
enemies  separated,  and  attempted  to  be,  and  often  was,  their 
superior  in  each  particular  engagement. 

Now  it  is  in  connection  with  this  truth,  that  not  superiority 
in  the  total  numbers  ultimately  available,  but  the  superiority 

PL.  A  M       IX. 


PLANCH 

c 

A 

_ 

{} 

- 

- 

D 

B 

tlNCS  OF  COMMUNtCATfOAf 
■■■■■ '■-> * 


D-  -I 

■  D-  € 

D-  1 

DQ.  fB 


in  the  numbers  present  on  the  decisive  spot  and  at  the  decisive 
momeTit  decide  an  action,  that  we  can  best  appreciate  the  meaning 
in  war  of  the  O'ostade  ;  and  of  Fortification,  which  is  (in  most  of 
its  iwcs)  no  more  than  a  particular  case  of  the  Olstacls. 

When  we  talk  of  an  Obstacle — a  river,  forest,  marsh,  or  hilly 
country— presented  to  the  strategical  advance  or  offensive  of  an 


army,  we  do  not  connote  by  that  term  what  is  connoted  by  li 
in  civil  affairs.  We  are  not  considering  the  mere  difficulty  of 
passing  it.    For  the  unhampered  army  of  a  civilised  people  can 


n- 


LJNE3  tf   COMMUNICATION 
-    " >  ■    '    > 


D-  I 

d[}    -Ib 


pass  any  such  obstacle  if  sufficient  time  be  allowed  it.    What 
we  coimote  by  it  is  the  Factor  of  Dday. 

Here  (Plan  XIII.)  is  a  river  A— B.    Two  forces,  E  the  lesser. 


ci3    cb   "^ 


"tlMES  «P  CO 


nQ- 
liQ- 

StMUNlCATION  U 


and  F  the  greater,  are  in  presence.  A  third  force  G  is  coming 
up  to  effect  its  junction  with  E.  If  it  succeeds  in  doing  so  the 
combined  force  G-j-E  will  bo  greater  than  its  enemy  F.    The 


P  LAN   301 


t-  1  N  E 5    OF  COMMUNICATIOM 

'  '  "      >  .  ■  ■  ■ 


^"D 


-^^ 


CP 


river  A— B  is  an  Obstacle.  It  is  an  Obstacle  in  favour  of  E,  who 
is  on  the  defensive,  and  agiiinst  F,  who  is  on  the  offensive.  But 
its  only  value  to  E  is  in  its  power  of  delayinrf  F  while  G  comes  up. 
If  there  were  no  Q  to  come  up  and  help  E  the  river  could  no» 


6» 


LAND    AND    WATEB 


August  22,  1914 


save  tlie  weaker  force.  Sooner  or  later  the  superior  force  F, 
hoMiii"  B  by  an  equal  force,  could  detach  a  free  portion  of  his 
men  and  throw  a  bridge  over  the  river.  The  handicap  which 
the  river  A— B  lays  upon  F  is  solely  a  handicap  of  dday  while  G 
is  coming  up.  The  river  is  not  something  behind  which  E  can 
defend  himself  indefinitely.  It  is  something  introducing  the 
factor  of  titne  to  the  advantage  of  what  is,  in  one  particular 
place  and  time,  the  weaker  party. 

A  good  dejenske  position,  that  is,  a  natural  formation  (such 
as  a  crest  of  rolling  land  with  a  long  open  space  before  it)  from 
which  the  most  efiective  fire  can  be  delivered  upon  an  assault, 
is  but  a  particular  case  of  an  obstacle.  A  position  artificially 
fortified,  all  fortification,  is  but  an  obstacle  rendered  by  human 
Art  particularly  difficult  to  pass.    Given  sufficient  time  any 


Pt«j>^EIt.^ 


«>       B 


fortification  can  be  reduced— if  only  by  famine  ;  but  fortification 
introduces,  for  the  benefit  of  those  holding  it,  the  element  of 

delay. 

A  considerable  space  furnished,  or  fiirnishable,  with  lodgings 
for  men  and  horses  and  with  storehouses  for  ammunition  and 
food  and  so  fortified  that  it  is  defensible  upon  every  side  is 
termed  a  fortress,  or,  on  the  largest  scale,  an  entrenched  camp. 

And  here  a  modern  element  of  the  utmost  interest  in  the 
present  campaign  appears. 

The  great  range  of  modern  heavy  artillery  involved  a 
corresponding  increase  in  the  fortified  circle  that  a  complete 
enclosed  defensive  position  would  have  to  be  surrounded  by. 
To  create  a  fortress  under  such  conditions  a  wide  ring  of  forts, 
each  isolated  and  each  designed  to  defend  itself  alone,  was 
designed.  Such  a  ring  would  be  anything  from  six  to  ten  miles 
across,  and  anything  from  twenty  to  thirty  miles  round  or  more. 
The  French  constructed  many  such  after  their  disasters  of  forty 
odd  years  ago,  notably  the  great  chain  or  barrier  of  fortresses 
Bel  fort,  Epinal,  Toul,  and  Yerdun,  on  the  Eastern  frontier. 

When  it  was  first  thought  that  Belgian  neutrality  was  in 
danger  Namur  and  Liege  were  added  to  continue  the  line.  To 
some  extent,  and  at  wider  intervals,  the  Germans  copied  this 
plan.  But  two  schools  arose  with  two  opposite  doctrines  upon 
this  hitherto  untried  system. 

The  one  school,  largely  German,  would  have  it  that  with  a 
sufficieiU  sacrifice  of  men,  some  one — or  more — of  the  forts  on  the 
ring  could  be  "  rushed,"  and  the  system  broken. 

The  other  (mainly  French)  thought  that  such  "  rushing  " 
was  impossible.  That,  with  a  sufficient  army  to  hold  the  spaces 
between  the  forts,  the  stores,  etc.,  within  the  ring  were  safe  for 
months,  and  that  even  with  a  small  force  the  forts  themselves 
could  be  held  (though  the  ring  might  be  pierced  in  the  intervals) 
and  would  continue  to  bar  any  continuous  supply. 

Supposing  the  second  school  to  be  right  and  such  forts  to 
be  capable  of  long  resistance,  then  a  modern  ring  fortress  would 
serve  the  follov;ing  purposes  : — 

(1)  To  delay,  till  its  forts  were  reduced,  the  passage  of 
eupplies  past  it  or  in  its  neighbourhood,  whether  by  road  or, 
much  more  important,  by  railway.  Thus  such  a  ring  protecting 
a  junction  of  lines  or  covering  one  main  line  of  supply  is  of  great 
importance. 

(2)  When  it  was  supported  by  other  neighbouring  fortresses 
and  was  strongly  garrisoned,  to  prevent  an  Army  passing  between 
it  and  the  next  fortress. 

(3)  To  serve  as  a  refuge  within  which  a  force  no  longer 
strong  enough  to  hold  the  field  could  still  maintain  itself  and 
detain  a  greater  number  of  the  enemy  before  it. 

(4)  To  act  as  the  "  pivot  "  upon  which  a  turning  movement 
could  revolve.  If  (Plan  XIV.)  I  want  to  move  that  end  of 
my  force  A — B,  marked  as  M  to  threaten  the  flank  of  my  enemy 
C— -D,  I  may  not  be  quite  superior  enough  in  numbers  to  do  so 
without  leaving  a  dangerous  gap  at  X.  But  if  at  X  I  have  a 
fortress  F  barring  the  passage  for  some  twenty  miles,  I  can  use 
that  fortress  as  a  "  pivot "  for  my  projected  movement.  It  will 
also  supply  me,  or  at  least  supplement  my  supply. 

(5)  To  threaten  the  flank  of  an  Army  which  desires  to 
pass  it. 

If  in  the  accompanying  sketch  (see  Plan  XV.)  the  area 
A  B  C  is  that  commanded  by  the  guns  of  a  ring  fortress,  and  if 


this  ring  fortress  contains  a  large  body  of  armed  men  with  theii 
munitions ;  then  another  army  of  the  enemy's  trying  to  pass  by 
it  along  the  line  D — E  will  be  exposed  to  a  two-fold  peril.  It 
may  be  caught  in  the  act  of  marching,  when  an  army  is  unable  to 
defend  itself,  or,  having  marched  by,  the  communications  which 
it  unrolls  behind  it  will  be  in  danger  of  being  cut  at  any  moment, 
for  the  large  force  within  the  fortified  area  ABC  can  come  out 
and  attack  the  comparatively  weak  and  highly  extended  forces 
which  defend  a  line  of  communications.  This  junction  in  a 
fortress  is  greatly  exposed  when  not  one  fortress  but  two,  joined 
by  a  line  of  forts,  presents  a  large  concentration  behind  that  line 
as  in  the  lino  9  — P. 

So  obvious  is  that  that  there  is  never  any  question  of  passing 
a  fortress  containing  a  considerable  garrison  without  first 
"  Masking  "  it.  To  MasJi  a  fortress  is  to  leave  over  against  it, 
and  between  it  and  the  line  of  march  of  your  own  forces  an  Army 
(as  at  G — II)  large  enough  to  check  any  sally  which  the  Army 
contained  within  the  fortress  might  make  against  your 
communications. 

With  this  we  nearly  exhaust  the  terms  technical  to  this 
kind  of  news,  and  the  comprehension  of  them.  There  remain  to 
be  mentioned  certain  other  terms  requiring  a  brief  mention  : — 
All  those  operations  which  are  subsequent  to  the  general 
movements  of  an  army  and  are  concerned  with  its  Lmmediato 
fate  when  it  is  at  grips  with  the  enemy,  are  called  Tactical 
Operations  as  distinguished  from  strategical.  They  are  so  called 
because  they  take  place  after  the  opposing  forces  have  come 
in  touch  with  one  another  or,  to  use  the  common  term,  are 
In  Contact. 

A  number  of  other  terms  are  too  familiar  to  need  more  than 
a  mention.  We  speak  of  the  Defensive  when  we  mean  the 
expenditure  of  energy  in  the  resisting  of  an  attack  and  of 
the  Oljensive  when  we  mean  the  expenditure  of  energy  in  the 
delivering  of  it.  Wellington,  for  instance,  fought  a  defensive 
action  at  Waterloo  because  all  the  earlier  part  of  that  day 
and  much  the  grcr.ter  part  of  it  was  taken  up  in  prevent- 
ing the  French  from 
Pl\n  XT  piercing  his    hne   until 

Blucher    should    come 
up  in  flank  and  threaten 
them  with  envelopment. 
We   say   that  a 
General  has  the  Initia- 
tive  or  is  "  taking  the 
initiative  "  not  precisely 
when    he     is    on    the 
Offensive    (though    the 
two  things  usually  go 
together),  but  when  he 
is  in  a  position  to  choose 
his  point  of  eSort  and  when  liis  opponent  is  only  in  a  posilon 
to  meet  such  a  movement  after,  and  as  soon  as  he  has  dis- 
covered it. 

There  is  in  connection  with  military  news  not  only  the  difficulty 
of  following  mihtary  terms,  but  a  certain  confusion  resulting 
from  the  way  in  which  modern  news  is  at  once  haphazard,  far 
too  quickly  delivered,  and  dehberately  and  wisely  starved  by 
military  censorship.  I  cannot  do  better  in  order  to  explain  how 
I,  at  least,  should  read  this  news,  and  how  in  my  comments  I 
shall  try  to  piece  it  together,  than  put  down  in  a  list  certain 
rules  which  occur  to  me  : 

Rule  I. — This  rule  is,  not  to  believe  things  physically 
impossible.  Thus  in  one  week  we  have  had  such  statements  as 
the  presence  of  a  German  force  upon  the  River  Aisne  in  France, 
a  Brigade  (of  6,000  men)  suSering  a  loss  of  30,000  men  (in  front 
of  Mulhouse),  and  French  Cavalry  East  of  Liege  a  week  before 
there  were  any  French  troops  near  Namur. 

Rule  II. — Pay  attention  only  to  reports  which  deal  with 
definite  results.  Words  like  "  havoc,"  "  rout,"  "  disorder," 
usually  mean  very  little  in  military  news.  On  the  other  hand 
a  precise  account  of  a  number  of  guns  taken,  of  places  actually 
occupied,  of  the  number  of  prisoners,  etc.,  is  information  upon 
which  you  can  base  an  estimate. 

Rule  III. — Always  believe  the  enemy's  reports  to  be  more 
accurate  and  sober  than  those  from  your  own  side.  Thus, 
when  Berlin  let  us  know  through  Holland  that  Liege 
had  fallen,  the  phrase  was  misleading  and  false,  but  verbal 
accuracy  could  be  pleaded  for  it,  for  though  Liege  the  fortress 
had  not  fallen,  German  troops  had  got  into  Liege  the  town. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  statement  that  25,000  Germans  had  been 
hit  in  the  first  assault  was  manifestly  an  impossible  exagger- 
ation. 

Rule  ZF.— Eemcmber  that  observers  nearly  always  over- 
estimate the  effect  of  their  own  fire,  particularly  in  the  case  of 
Artillery. 

Rule  F.^Follow,  upon  a  large  scale  map,  every  movement 
of  which  you  hear,  and  compare  the  scheme  of  those  movements 
from  day  to  day,  noting  the  nature  of  the  arm  and  the  supposed 
numbers,  ' 


6» 


August  22,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


THE    WAR    BY   LAND. 


By    HILAIRE    BELLOC. 


THESE  notes  upon  the  operations  taking  place  on  tlie 
Continent  are  -written  upon  the  evening  of  Wednes- 
day. Tbey  are  corrected  or  amplified  accoi"ding 
to  the  nevra  received  in  London  upon  Thureday 
morning  up  to  noon.  Thej  are  in  tha  hands  of 
the  public  on  Friday  morning. 

It  is  impossible  to  avoid  in  the  chronicle  whieh  they  attempt 
to  establish  that  gap  between  the  Thursday  noon  and  the  Friday 
morning  which  printing  demands.  The  same  criticism  applies 
to  the  deductions  made  from  such  news  as  has  been  received  ia 
London* 

It  is  the  object  of  these  comments,  and  of  the  deductions 
from  news  received  which  they  will  contain,  to  explain,  as  much 
as  is  in  the  writer's  power,  the  nature  of  the  ojierations  on  land. 
In  order  to  do  this,  it  is  first  necessary  to  get  Bome  idea  of  the 
process  of  events  in  the  Western  theatre  of  war  since  the  first 
days  of  mobilisation. 

I  say  "  In  the  Western  theatre  of  war  "  because  operations 
in  any  way  decisive  of  the  result  have  not  yet  taken  place  in  the 
Eastern  theatre  of  the  war  upon  the  Eastern  and  Southern 
frontiers  of  the  (Jermanic  allies,  anless  we  are  to  accept  the  now 
detailed  accounts  of  an  Austrian  reverse  at  the  hands  of  the 
Servians  at  Shabat. 

In  the  Western  field,  upon  the  other  hand,  operations 
which  will  be  of  weight  in  the  final  decision,  and  others  which 
hare  begun  to  define  the  probable  direction  of  tha  opposed 
armies,  have  already  taken  place. 

In  thus  attempting  to  establish  the  sucoession  of  events 
which  have  led  up  to  the  present  situation  in  the  Western  field  ■ 
of  the  war,  we  must  exclude  what  is  merely  political  and  con- 
sider only  what  is  military. 

Upon  Saturday,  August  Ist,  the  French  Government  gave 
the  first  open  orders  for  mobilisation.  What  previous  steps  it 
may  have  taken  in  preparation  of  the  general  mobilisation  we 
do  not  know.  But,  at  any  rate,  the  life  of  the  country  was 
quite  normal  op  to  and  including  this  Saturday,  August  Ist, 
and  certainly  nothing  in  the  shape  of  general  mobilisation  had 
yet  taken  place.  Tho  full  operation  of  mobilisation  only  began 
in  France  upon  Sunday,  August  2nd. 

What  the  corresponding  stops  may  have  been  upon  the 
Crerman  side  we  do  not  know.  Germany  had  already  declared 
martial  law,  and  she  may  have  begun  her  mobilisation — in  part, 
at  least,  and  particularly  in  the  North — before  France  did.  An 
examination  of  the  first  operations  makes  this  still  more  probable, 
but  we  have  no  positive  information  upon  the  point. 


P\i.lA4 


t"      So^^fj      ft       M«f« 


•(,-'' *r 


The  process  of  fuU  mobilisation  in  both  countries  is  at  least 
12  and  like  to  be  in  practice  more  nearly  14  days :  using  tha 
phrase  "  full  mobilisation  "  to  mean  not  the  bringing  up  of  tho 
troops  to  the  field  of  action,  but  tho  putting  of  them  all  upon 
a  war  footing.  How  many  days  must  elapse  before  the 
mobilised  armies  could  begin  to  undertake  their  principal 
actions  would  depend  upon  the  field  in  which  those  operations 
would  take  place ;  certainlv,  fifteen  or  sixteen  days  is  not  too 
much  to  allow,  seeing  that  tLe  strict  theoretical  minimum  (which 
was  bound  to  be  exceeded)  was  at  least  eleven  days. 

The  French  mobilisation  proceeded  with  quite  unexpected 
smoothness  ;  a  state  of  affairs  most  fortunate  for  the  French, 
which  was  due  to  political  factors  with  which  we  are  not  here 
cojuemcd.  The  results  of  its  accurate  working  Will  be  later 
pointed  out 

Meanwhile,  upon  that  same  Sunday,  August  2nd,  tha 
German  Covering  Troops  fiom  IVcves  had  violatwl  tho  neutral 
territory  of  Luxembourg,  entering  that  independent  State  by 


several  bridges,  paiiicuIaTly  by  those  of  Wasserbillig  and 
Remich. 

At  7  o'clock  in  tho  evening  of  the  same  day  the  German 
Minister  in  Brussels  presented  an  ultimatum  to  the  Belgian 
Government  demanding  unopposed  passage  for  German  Troops 
through  Belgian  territory,  in  otlier  words,  demanding  the  aid 
of  Belgium  against  France.  Tvrelve  hours  were  given  for  tha 
reply,  that  is,  until  7  a.m.  of  tho  following  Monday  morning. 
The  Belgian  Ministry  met  and  discussed  the  position  in  the 
small  hoars  of  Monday,  and  somewhere  about  4  o'tlock  returned 
a  negative  answer  to  the  German  demand.  They  determined  to 
resist  the  violation  of  Belgian  territory. 

Upon  Monday,  August  Srd,  therefore,  the  German  troops 
crossed  the  frontier  between  Germany  and  Belgium ;  tha  troops 

Pla.-aB. 


St 


'»4^, 


^tlulKwJira 


Bslj^ort; 


first  effecting  tliis  violation  of  neutrality  being  those  of  tha 
Vllth  Germany  Army  Corps  coming  from  the  region  of 
Aix-la-Chapelle.  These  troops  were  not  nearly  as  numerous  a* 
has  been  represented.  They  could  not  have  been  fully  mobilised 
troops,  but  only  the  covering  troops  of  the  region.  The  task  set 
them  was  to  force  immediately  the  fortress  of  Lidge. 

Let  me  describe  this  task. 

The  fortress  of  Li^ge  is  a  modem  ring  fortress :  tliat  is,  it 
consists  of  an  area  roughly  circular,  about,  or  rather  less  than 
ten  miles  in  diameter,  protected  by  a  ring  of  forts  (twelve  ia 
number)  surrounding  the  great  industrial  town  of  Liege.  Tho 
River  Meuse  runs  right  through  Liege  and  through  the  middle 
of  the  ring.  One  of  the  main  railways  of  Europe  runs  through 
the  same  circle  and  leads  from  the  chief  German  bases  of 
supply  in  the  North  to  the  Belgian  Plain ;  other  railways  also 
come  in  and  effect  their  junction  with  this  main  lino  within  the 
circle  of  the  Forts.  This  ring  of  forts  lies  quite  close  to  the 
German  frontier — a  day's  march  at  tha  most  away;  at  the 
nearest  point,  less  than  a  day's  march.  Further,  there  is  here 
but  a  very  narrow  passage  between  Liege  and  the  neutral  Dutch 
border  round  Maestricht.  The  Germans,  though  prepared  to 
violate  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  were  determined  not  to  violate 
the  neutrality  of  Holland  for  political  reasons  that  have  nothing 
to  do  with  these  notes.  Therefore  until  the  Liege  ring  of  forts 
were  in  their  hands :  (1)  Thev  could  only  use  road  traffic  to 
supply  their  advance  into  Belgium.  (2)  They  could  only  use 
even  road  traflBc  over  one  very  narrow  belt,  between  the  range  of 
the  Eastern  forts  of  Liege  and  the  Dutch  border. 

To  the  North  of  the  Li^ge  ring  of  forts,  then,  there  was  no 
entry  into  Belgium  save  by  a  very  narrow  gut  between  tha 
extreme  range  of  the  forts  and  the  Dutch  frontier.  Right 
across  this  gap  of  five  miles  or  less  was  the  obstacle  of  the 
Meuse,  having  but  one  bridge,  that  of  Vise,  a  little  town  lying 
on  the  right  bank  of  tha  Meuse,  that  is,  the  bank  towards 
Gcniiany.  Upon  the  south  side  of  Liege  was  difiicult,  high, 
and  barren  country  consistiug  of  upland  woods  and  heaths 
through  which  the  progress  of  supplies  would  be  difiicult,  and 
further  supplies  coming  that  way  would  have  to  cross 
the  Meuse  higher  up  to  reach  tha  Belgian  Plains.  (See  Plan  A.) 


7« 


LAND    AND    WATER 


August 


22,  1914 


TTow  it  was  the  plan  of  the  Gorman  Geueral  Staff— a  plan 
which  thcT  had  foolishly  divulged  to  the  whole  world,  as  la 
their  custom-to  tarn  the  whole  of  the  French  frontier  from 

the  North.  .  •    t)i      t> 

They  designed  to  pursue  the  operation  shown  m  I  Ian  1.. 
The  fortified   French   Frontier  running  from  Verdun  to 
to  Belfort  they  thought  too  strong  to   be  forced      North  of 
Verdun  runs   northward   and   eastward  to   the  Channel   the 
frontier  between  France  and  Belgium.     The  Germans  proposed 


PLAN.  C 


c    u 


•1 

o 

> 


Be![ort: 


or 

C 


Pt 


Muihauscn 


*  AH  Kirch 


with  a  sufficient  force  to  "  hold  "  the  French  upon  their  fortified 
frontier  between  Verdun  and  Belfort.  They  proposed  upon  a 
line  A — B  to  keep  the  French  there  in  check.  Meanwhile 
they  proposed  using  the  fortress  of  Metz  (at  M)  as  a  pivot 
round  which  to  swing  great  masses  E — F  upon  their  right, 
some  through  the  difficult  Ardennes  country  south  of  the 
Meuse,  but  the  greater  part  through  the  Belgian  Plain  (north 
of  the  Meuse.  They  proposed  to  appear  very  early  in  the 
operations — in  quite  the  first  days  of  the  war— over  the 
unfortified  Belgian  frontier  of  France  along  the  line  G — H,  and 
this  operation,  this  swinging  round  of  their  forces,  threatening 
to  envelop  the  French  by  the  French  left  flank,  they  proposed 
to  execute  according  to  the  following  necessary  conditions : 

(1)  Since  it  is  impossible  to  execute  a  flanking  or 
enveloping  movement  unless  you  have  superior  numbers,  and 
since  the  Germans  had  not  superior  numbers  to  the  French, 
if  the  total  of  the  national  forces  be  considered,  and  trained 
men  alone  be  counted,  they  proposed  to  have  superior  forces 
/or  ihe  moment,  and  in  that  particular  field,  by  mobilising 
secretly  some  days  before  the  French,  and  by  appearing 
suddenly  upon  the  position  E — P  (a)  before  the  French  were 
gathered  in  their  full  numbers ;  (b)  while  the  French  were 
guardinar  their  frontier  along  C— D ;  (c)  with  covei-ing  troops 
only,  to  be  rapidly  followed  by  their  fully  mobilised  main  army. 

(2)  This  flanking  movement  pivoting  upon  the  fortress  of 
Metz  and  proceeding  partly  through  the  very  difficult  country 
of  the  Ardennes,  mainly  through  the  Belgian  Plain  (with  its 
ample  supplies,  innumerable  roads,  easy  open  country,  and 
exceptional  mileage  of  railways  and  furniture  of  rolling  stock), 
they  would  effect  without  any  check  or  delay,  because  Belgium 
would  be  too  weak  to  resist,  and  would  allow  them  to  violate 
her  neutrality.  As  for  the  two  great  fortresses  of  Liege  and 
Namur,  they  would,  if  defended,  confuse  the  whole  plan,  but 
this  discounted  neutrality  of  Belgium  forbade  the  idea  that  they 
would  be  defended. 

(3)  By  the  time  the  German  flanking  movement  had  got 
to  the  position  E — F  the  direct  march  upon  Paris  was  open  to  it. 
This  threat  would  so  frighten  the  French  along  their  main 
positions  npon  the  Eastern  frontier  at  C — D  that  they  would 
either  disarrange  all  their  previous  plans  and  begin  hurrying 
Northward  to  save  Paris  (and  so  leave  themselves  open  to  be 
also  turned  by  the  left  wing  of  tho  Germans  from  the  South 
along  the  anow  line  (1 )) ;  or  they  would  sacrifice  Paris,  in  which 
ease  the  flanking  movement  would  close  upon  theiu,  disturb 
their  mobilisation  before  it  was  completed,  and  throw  them 
into  irrecoverable  chaos ;  or  at  the  least  drive  them  southward 
find  compel  a  surrender. 


When  it  was  perceived  that  the  Belgians  would,  most 
unexpectedly,  interfere  with  the  plan  by  refusing  condition  2, 
tho  order  was  given  to  rush  the  ring  of  forts  at  Liege. 

"We  have  seen  that  one  school,  especially  favoured  in  Ger- 
many, believed  that  your  ring  fortress  could  always  be  broken 
by  the  rushing  of  particular  forts.  With  a  sufficient  sacrifice 
of  men  and  conducted  upon  a  sufficient  scale  one  fort  at  least, 
or  two,  could  be  swamped,  and  the  ring  would  bo  broken.  Froiu 
the  night  of  that  Monday,  August  3rd.  until  the  afternoon  of 
tho  AVednesday,  August  5th,  this  bold  attempt  was  made  and 
continued — especially  during  the  hours  of  daAness. 

I  desire  to  eliminate,  as  much  as  possible,  from  these  com- 
ments all  political  considerations.  But  it  is  impossible  not  to 
pause  in  admiration  of  tho  military  effort  here  made.  Men  in 
fairly  close  formation  (the  density  has  probably  been  exag- 
gerated) sacrificed  themselves  in  assault  after  assault  upon  that 
section  of  the  ring  which  looks  towards  Germany.  They  wore 
but  the  men  of  the  covering  troops  of  the  Seventh  German 
Army  Corps ;  they  canno*  have  been  heavily  supported.  They 
had  no  siege  artillery  behind  them  as  yet.  The  effort  was  hope- 
less because  tho  theory  was  wrong ;  but  the  courage  and  th© 
discipline  presented  to  that  task  must  have  been  quite 
exceptional. 

In  the  mid-afternoon  of  this  Wednesday,  August  5th, 
the  whole  ring  held  as  strongly  as  when  it  was  first  attacked. 
Tho  Germans  were,  therefore,  exactly  forty-eight  hours  behind 
their  time-table. 

Upon  the  Thursday,  August  6th,  the  forts  were  still  holding 
out,  but  the  covering  troops  of  two  more  Army  Corps  had  been 
brought  up  from  the  south  and  south-east  against  them,  and 
cither  before  or  after  darkuess  fell  upon  that  day  the  insufficient 
garrison  of  Liege  found  it  impossible  at  once  to  hold  the  forts 
and  to  cover  all  the  intervals  between  them. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  Li<5ge  requires  for  its  full 
defence  50,000  trained  men,  and  that  the  Belgian  service  was 
largely  composed  of  Militia,  and  could  not  send  two-thirds  of 
that  number  at  so  short  a  notice  to  the  defence  of  tho  placo. 
The  holding  of  the  intervals,  therefore,  broke  down ;  and, 
though  the  forts  were  still  intact,  bodies  of  Gcrmaii  troops 
penetrated  in  the  darkness  between  those  two  forts  which  look 
to  the  south-east  and  cowards  the  German  frontier. 

When  the  morning  of  Friday,  August  7th,  dawned,  it  was 
discovered  that  a  considerable  force  of  Germans  had  got  into  the 
ring,  and  were  established  in  the  town  of  Lidge  itself. 

The  situation  was  paradoxical.  Liege  in  the  military  sense 
of  that  name  had  not  fallen  ;  Li6ge  in  the  civilian  sense  had. 
The  ring  of  forts,  not  one  of  which  had  been  captured,  could 
still  prevent  supplies  passing  through  tho  roads  and  railways 
commanded  by  the  forts.    Therefore,  no  advance  through  the 


PLj^jsr  'j> 


'(^ANTWERP 


BPUS3£l$ 

NAMUR 
'DJNANT'  0 

Belgian  ring  was  any  more  possible  than  it  had  been  before  the 
German  entry.  Liege,  the  military  fortress — which  only  means 
the  ring  of  forts — still  blocked  the  way.  But  Liege,  the  great 
industrial  city,  was  held  by  German  soldiers.  So  far  as  mere 
strategy  -was  concerned,  and  apart  from  all  moral  effect,  Liege 
tho  fortress  was  nearly  as  sti-ong  as  ever.  Nearly,  but  not 
quite,  for  the  forts  were  now  no  longer  co-ordinated  by  one 
central  command,  and  it  was  now  possible  to  assault  them, 
each  individually,  upon  every  side. 

On  this  day,  Friday,  August  7th,  the  German  Commander 
asked  for  an  armistice,  partly,  no  doubt,  for  purposes  of  parley. 

It  was  refused. 

On  this  same  day,  Friday,  August  7th,  appeared  at  the 
very  other  end  of  the  field  of  war  the  first  signs  of  a  movement 
that  was  to  have  a  profound  effect  (the  future  will  show  it) 
ujwn  all  succeeding  operations. 


8» 


Angust  22,  191-4 


LAKD    AND    WATER 


The  careful  student  of  foreign  affairs  ■will  remember  toTV, 
fifteen  years  a^o,  ia  a,  famous  trial  at  Kenaes,  there  came  out 
unexpectedly  the  fact  that  the  French  General  Staff  intended 
to  adopt  the  offensive  in  Alsace. 

Now  on  this  Friday,  August  7th,  the  small  advance 
guard  of  the  French — a  brigade,  to  be  accurate — wilh  soma 
cavalry  and  certain  supports  of  artillery  took,  just  before  sunset, 
the  town  of  Altkirch.  Upon  the  next  day,  Saturday,  August  8th, 
this  little  force,  or  at  least  the  mounted  portion  of  it, 
rod*  on  into  Mulhousa. 

The  effect  of  this  raid  (for  it  -was  no  more)  was  to  rouse 
the  Alsatian  people  to  the  conception  of  their  deliverance.  It 
was  (as  so  many  things  will  be  iu  this  war)  political  rather  than 
strategic  ;  but,  as  we  shall  see  in  a  moment,  it  was  not  done 
haphazard ;  there  was  strategy  behind  it. 

On  the  next  day,  Sunday,  August  9th,  the  Fourteenth  Army 
Corps  of  the  Germans,  composed  of  the  men  of  Baden,  advanced 
against  this  daring  French  Brigade  and  against  the  division  of 
■which  they  formed  a  part  and  drove  them  out  of  Mulhousa 
again,  but  did  not  proceed  so  far  as  to  recover  Alkirch. 

From  that  moment,  let  it  be  noted,  the  French  troops  had 
established  themselves  in  the  Southern  extremity  of  the  Alsatian 
Plain  —  that  is,  in  the  beginnings  of  a  flanking  movement 
against  the  extreme  German  left.  They  had  done  this  (Plan  C) 
upon  the  extreme  Southern  end  of  the  UOO-mile  strategic  front. 
Th<»y  were  to  do  more. 

By  Monday,  August  the  10th,  the  next  day,  it  ia  time  to 
turn  to  the  other  extremity  of  the  long  line  of  operations 
and  to  consider  how  the  German  Commanders  proposed  to  treat 
the  unexpected  situation  created  on  the  Belgiaji  Plains  by  the 
check  they  had  received  from  the  resistance  of  the  forts  at 
LiJge. 

It  is  now  quite  clear  what  they  did.  They  could  not,  as 
they  had  originally  intended,  push  forward  great  masses  of  men 
acros3  the  plains  north  of  the  Meuse.  They  did  not  yet 
command  the  railways  by  which  alone  they  could  supply  those 
masses ;  but  what  they  could  at  least  do  was  to  push  forward 
cavalry  with  emergency  rations  and  with  orders  to  live  as  best 
iliey  could  upon  the  country.  To  send  forward  a  cloud  of 
cavalry  thus  was  not  a  useless  or  merely  theatrical  operation  ; 
it  protected  the  slower  advance  of  the  infantry,  which  could  be 
made  either  when  the  Liige  forts  fell  or  whenever,  more  slowly, 
Biipplics  could  be  pushed  up  by  road  over  pontoon  bridges 
thrown  over  the  Meuse,  down  river  and  up  river,  out  of  reach 
of  the  LiSge  forts.  This  ill-provided  but  mobile  body  of 
cavalry,  with  a  little  artillery,  machine  guns,  and  a  few  support- 
ing infantry,  did  ai  m  Plan  D. 

It  was  on  Monday,  August  10th,  along  the  line  A-B  in 
the  Plan  D.  By  Wednesday,  August  12th  it  was  along 
the  line  C-D,  and  was  checked  in  a  hot  action  in  front 
of  Haelen  by  the  Belgians.  Before  the  end  of  the  week, 
that  is,  before  Sunday,  the  16th,  it  was  already  along  the  line 
E-F  and  menacing  Brussels.  Sleanwhile,  quite  a  large  body  of 
cavalry  with  considerable  infantry  supports  had  tried  on  Satur- 
day to  pass  the  Meuse  at  Dinant,  and  had  failed  before  the 
French  artillery  defence  at  that  point. 

So  far  we  heard  nothing  in  this  country  of  what  was 
going  on  behind  this  successful  Cavalry  advance  of  the  Gerniaus, 
and  wo  could  not  judge  how  much,  if  at  all,  the  big  masses  of 
ilie  Army  were  backing  it  up.  Monday,  the  17th,  and  Tues- 
day, the  Isth,  this  screen  of  Cavalry  pressed  no  further  forward ; 
apparently,  therefore,  it  was  wiiting  for  the  mass  of  troops 
which  it  was  designed  to  shelter  to  come  up — but  that  hypo- 
thesis I  will  discuss  a  little  later.  We  leave  the  advanced 
German  Cavalry  with  their  few  Infantry  supports  and  their 
horse  artillery  and  machine  guns  on  this  advance  line  upon 
Tuesday  last,  the  18th,  and  return  to  the  southern  extremity 
where  the  offensive  was  the  other  way  and  the  French  were 
proposing  to  push  in  the  German  left. 

We  have  seen  that  on  Sunday,  August  9th,  the  French 
advance  guard  had  been  driven  out  of  Mulhouse.  But  that 
week-end  the  French  were  making  good  their  positions  upon  the 
crest  and  in  the  passes  of  the  Vosges  Mountains.  Although  we 
heard  little  about  it  in  this  country  it  was  clear  that,  now  their 
mobilisation  was  complete,  the  French  in  considerable  force — • 
perhaps  altogether  three  Army  Corps — meant  to  push  against 
the  German  left  in  Alsace  and  to  try  and  roll  it  up.  They  knew 
then,  what  wo  know  now,  that  Germany  had  no  equal  forces  to 
oppose  to  this  push. 

'J  ho  fighting  to  secure  the  Passes  of  the  Vosges  (Saales, 
Sle.  Marie,  Bonhommo)  went  on  for  five  days ;  the  Passes  were 
secured  and  the  Valleys  leading  down  on  to  the  Alsatian  Plain 
were  hold  in  force.  It  was  the  second  step  towards  the  turning 
of  the  German  left,  of  which  the  reconnaissance  upon  Altkirch 
and  Mulhouse  before  mobilisation  was  completed  had  been  the 
first. 

All  the  German  commanders  could  do  against  superior 
forces  in  this  Alsatian  field  of  war  they  did.  They  could  not 
stop  the  superior  numbers  of  the  French  from  pouring  over  the 
mountains  on  to  the  Plain  of  the  Rhine ;  but  they  ordered  the 


considerable  number  of  their  troops  which  are  round  and  in 
Metz  to  check  the  French  advance  by  threatening  its  rear  and 
by  acting  on  the  western  side  of  the  Vosges  Mountains  in  the 
open  Lorraine  country. 

Already  upon  Tuesday,  August  11th,  the  Germans  conducted 
a  raid  into  France,  about  one  day's  march  in  extent,  along  the 
arrow  marked  (1)  in  the  Plan  "C,"  and  the  next  day,  and 
the  day  after  that,  another  raid  along  the  arrow  marked  (2).  The 
first  of  these  blows  was  directed  towards  Spincourt,  the  others 
towards  La  Garde  and  Blamont.  If  this  German  effort  had 
been  maintained  and  pushed  further  forward  it  is  evident  that 


9  EHL'SSELS 


PLAHK^ 


Cl^ll.i1'i•^iQBEO  UiC^iiA  n:u:4 


the  French  positions  in  the  Vosges  Mountains  would  have  been 
untenable.  They  would  have  been  threatened  from  the  rear 
and  would  have  had  to  retire  out  of  Alsace.  But  the  German 
effort  could  not  be  maintained.  Both  these  raids  were  beaten 
back  by  the  superior  French  forces  in  this  region,  and  by 
Sunday,  the  16th,  the  French  securely  held  the  frontier  round 
Avricourt  and  thus  protected  the  rear  of  their  columns  pushing 
over  the  Vosges. 

On  the  next  day,  Monday,  the  17th,  the  French  had  filled 
and  completely  held  all  the  mountain  valleys  which  lead  down 
from  the  crests  of  the  Vosges  on  to  the  Alsatian  Plain.  Upon 
Tuesday,  the  18th,  they  achieved  a  stroke  of  capital  importance. 
They  got  astraddle  of  the  main  railway  line  uniting  Metz  and 
Strassburg  by  occupying  the  town  and  region  of  Saarbourg, 
and  their  general  situation  on  this  part  of  the  front  was  as  iu 
Plan  F. 

It  was  now  clear  that  a  very  strong  French  offensive  upon 
the  extreme  left  of  the  field  of  operations — that  is,  against  the 
weak  South  of  the  German  line — was  seriously  intended  by  the 
French.  They  were  strongly  posted  just  between  the  two  great 
fortresses  of  Strasburg  and  Metz.  They  held,  at  Saarbourg,  tha 
main  railway  junction  of  that  line.  They  threatened  to 
advance  further  north  immediataly,  and  to  threaten  all  tlio 
southern  communications  of  the  German  army.  It  was  almost 
equally  clear  upon  co-ordinating  all  the  news  relating  to  that 
Tuesday  evening,  the  18th,  that  at  the  other  extremity  of  tha 
field,  upon  the  German  right  in  tha  Belgian  Plain,  a  serious, 
though  belated  offensive,  was  contemplated  against  the  Franco- 
Belgian  left. 

(By  this  time  the  whole  of  the  English  Allied  Force  had 
been  landed,  and  was  presumably  arrived  at  its  allotted  post). 

If  we  pause  to  sum  up  the  situation  as  it  was  revealed  to  be 
upon  Tuesday  night  and  Wednesday  morning  of  this  week  in 
the  telegrams  which  reached  Loudon  upon  the  Wednesday 
evening,  it  runs  as  follows  : — 

Tha  strategical  front  of  the  Germans  upon  which  the  ■whole 
of  the  operations  had  begun,  and  upon  which  at  any  moment 


9» 


LAND    AND    WATER 


Augnst 


22,  1914 


the  first  blows  of  tlio  main  shock  might  be  felt,  stretched  m  a 
long  line,  slightly  coutcx  towards  the  west  and  concave  towards 
the  East,  froiu  a  point  about  10  miles  south  and  west  of  Brussels 
to  Strasburg:  suuth  of  that  town  bodies  of  German  troops 
occupied  the  Alsatian  plain  to  a  point  10  miles  south  and  east 
of  Mulhouse  ia  Alsace.  We  had  not  exact  inforumtion  as  to 
where  tins  lina  ran  across  the  Ardennes  country  betweea 
A,  and  B.,  but  we  can  be  pretty  certain  that  it  ran  much 
as  the  dotted  line  does  on  plan  K.,  because  it  would  bo 
foUr  to  beud  it  too  miwh  forward  ia  front  of  that  line, 
and'  an  equal  weakness  to  leave  it  too  far  baelc.  We  come  to 
certain  knowledge  of  it  again  just  south  of  Longwy,  where 
there  had  been  contact  with  the  French  troops,  and  again  south 
of  Metz,  and  in  a  line  leading  from  south  of  Metz  up  round  by 
the  north  of  Saarbourg  to  points  on  the  east  side  of  the  Vosges, 
where  the  mountain  valleys  open  on  to  the  plain  of  Alsace. 

The  Allies  lie  immediately  in  front  of  this  Hue  and  presumably 
everywhere  in  contact  with  it,  or  were  nearly  in  contact.  The 
public  information  we  have  is  sufficient  to  tell  us  that  contact 
has  actually  been  established  on  the  Belgian  plain  (and  that  of 
course,  for  some  days  past),  on  the  Meuse  between  Namur  and 
the  French  frontier,  in  the  open  country  between  Lcngwy  and 
Verduu,  and,  most  important  of  all,  right  along  a  line  stretching 
from  just  south  of  Metz  to  Mulhouse. 

Now,  such  a  situation  as  this  obviously  and  necessarily 
connotes  a  few  clear  issues.  Exactly  where  the  German  forces 
are  chiefly  massed — and  where,  therefore,  the  first  Gorman 
offensive  will  come — we  can  only  guess.  We  can  be  certain 
that  the  main  concentration  is  in  the  north  of  this  prolonged 
line,  because  the  south  of  it  has  already  partly  yielded. 

The  first  thing  we  notice  is  that  a  general  German  offensive, 
which  is  too  commonly  taken  for  granted,  is  not  yet  the  neces- 
sary result  of  the  situation.  It  is  true  that  everywhere  from 
the  Meuse,  and  along  the  Meuse,  and  down  as  far  as  Verdun  at 
least  (it  would  be  more  accurate  to  say  as  f*r  as  Toul),  the 
French,  np  to  this  moment,  are  standing  upon  the  defensive. 


PLAN    />/.' 


,  TO  oenMAN 

*  SAsra  or 

gurmr 


It  seems  to  be  no  part  of  their  plan  to  do  anything  but 
hold  the  enemy  between  those  points  and  all  along  that  Hue. 
But  to  the  south  of  that  line,  along  the  whole  field  of  the  forti- 
fied frontier  south  of  Toul,  the  French  hare  evidently  begun  a 
vigourous  offensive,  and  that  offensive  is  no  longer  merely  the 
work  of  covering  troops — it  is  clearly  the  beginning  of  a  move- 
ment in  force. 

Now,  circumst;inces  such  as  these  may  bo  resolved  into  a 
few  simple  elements. 

(1)  There  is  a  northern  field  of  operations,  the  extreme 
left  of  the  allied  line,  the  extreme  right  of  the  German.  This 
field  of  operations  is  the  densely  jwpulated  and  well  provisioned 
Belgian  plain  north  of  the  River  Meuse  and  of  the  River 
Sambre. 

(2)  There  is  a  centre,  most  of  which  runs  through  the 
barren,  difficvdt,  sparsely  inhabited,  and  ill-supplied  district  of 
the  Ardennf  8. 

(3)  There  is  a  southern  field  of  operations  (the 
French  right,  the  German  left),  which  runs  through  well- 
populated,  fertile,  and  provisonsd  land,  from  Southern 
Luxembourg  to  southern  Alsace.  But  this  southern  field  (tho 
French  right  wing,  the  German  left),  is  sub-divided  into  a 
northern  portion  next  the  centre,  which  is  the  basin  of  Lorraine, 
and  a  southern  portion  which  is  the  plain  of  Alsace ;  between 
these  two  subdivisions  lies  the  very  difficult  country  of  tho 
Vosges.  This  difficult  country  does  not  separate  the  two 
portions  of  the  southern  part  of  the  field  into  two  entirely 
distinct  portions,  for  tho  Vosges  sink  gradually  as  they  go  north- 
ward until  they  merge  with  the  rolling  country  characteristic  of 
Lorraine:  but  those  mountains,  the  Vosgesj  are  a  sufficient 
obstacle  wherever  they  correspond  with  the  French  frontier,  to 
determine  at  once,  when  we  have  news  of  action  in  their 
neighbourhood,  which  of  the  two  forces  upon  either  side  of 
them  is  acting  upon  the  defensive. 

Of  these  three  fields  of  operations,  which  together  make 
up  the  whole  field  of  the  war  to  the  west  of  Germany,  it  is 


certain  that  ia  the  soutJiern  £eld  and  over  nearly  tho  whole 
extent  of  it  (up  to  the  point  where  that  field  is  covered  by  tho 
fortress  of  Metz)  the  French  Lave  massed  so  many  men  as  t> 
be  able  to  deliver  a  vigorous  oSeasive,  which  they  intend  to 
continue. 

It  is  equally  certain  that  there  is  not  as  yet  in  tho  southern 
field  a  German  force  sufficiently  strong  to  meet  this  oSeosiro 
and  beat  it  back. 

If,  tlierefore,  a  German  offensiro  is  anywhere  to  bo  lookod 
for,  it  must  either  be  in  the  northern  or  in  tho  central  field. 

In  one  of  these — that  is,  either  on  the  Belgian  plains  north 
of  the  lower  Meuso  or  to  tho  south  of  that  river,  an  attack  ia 


Plar,  O. 


{•y 


mM! 


C       T    M«Ji* 


w 


(3),^ 


force  must  be  delivered  by  tho  German  armies  if  they  are  to 
escape  disaster.  And  in  this  second  alternative,  tho  central 
attack,  thci-e  are  two  possibilities.  Tho  concentration  of  tlia 
Germans  to  the  north-ct'utre,  through  the  Ardennes.  Tho 
concentration  of  the  Germans  to  tho  south-centre  near,  and 
north  of,  Metz. 

Weil,  in  trying  to  determine  whether  the  German  plan  would 
be  to  attack  in  strength  towards  the  north,  or  to  attack  in 
strength  upon  one  of  the  two  regions  of  the  centiv?,  and,  if  so, 
which  one,  we  are  met  by  this  very  difficult  dilemma. 

On  the  one  hand  the  original  German  plan  was  undoubtedly 
to  deliver  the  first,  and,  as  it  was  hoped,  overwhelming  offensive 
stroke  by  way  of  the  extreme  north,  across  the  Belgian  plain. 
They  intended  to  be  across  the  French  frontier  to  th;  north  of 
the  Meuse  in  very  considerable  force,  probably  five,  certainly 
over  three.  Army  corps,  before  the  French  mobilization  was  eveu 
complete.  All  this  has  been  described  above.  The  turning 
columns  of  this  great  Banking  movement  should  have  been  upon 
French  soil  between  Lille  and  Mezieres  more  than  a  week  ago. 
We  all  know  how  that  plan,  the  essential  of  which  was  its 
rapidity  and  surprise,  was  checked,  delayed,  and  confused  in  its 
development  through  the  defence  of  Liege.  By  the  evening  of 
Monday,  August  17th,  only  the  cavalry  screen  and  its  few 
supports  had  reached  the  line  turning  north  of  Namur. 

But  though  there  was  delay,  it  did  not  follow  that  the  plan 
should  be  abandoned.  The  turning  movement  was  now  too 
late  to  bo  executed  as  against  an  inferior  foe.  But  when  a 
General  Staff  has  worked  out  all  the  plans  for  a  main  advanoa 
along  oae  piece  of  country,  it  is  extremely  difficult  for  it  to 


Qerman 


PUn   P, 


change  its  lina  of  advance,  even  though  nnforcseeu  accidents 
render  the  use  of  that  line  perilous. 

To  abandon  your  detailed  plans,  whicli  had  prepared  ona 
line  of  advance  for  tho  mass  of  your  troops,  and  to  compose 
another  set  of  plans  for  another  line,  at  high  pressure  and  with 
the  shortest  possible  delay,  involves  such  a  choice  of  results  as 
we  are  continually  meeting  in  everyday  life. 

Knowing  what  everyone  knows  of  tho  Prussian  character, 
the  highly  methodical,  very  stiff  and  inelastic  work,  immensely 
detailed  and  correspondingly  strong  and  brittle,  which  is  the 
Prussian  tradition  in  the.se  things,  it  seems  impossible  that  a 
main  line  of  advance,  once  determined  upon,  can  be  abandoned 
in  the  midst  of  the  first  great  decisive  effort. 


10« 


August  23,  1914 


LAXD    AND    WATEB 


From  all  this  one  would  conclude  that  the  cliief  blow 
against  the  French  defensive  is  still  intended  to  be  delivered 
across  the  Belgian  plains  and  on  into  the  flat  country  of  Xorth- 
East  Franco. 

But  it  is  here  that  the  dilemma  comes  in,  for  while  it  is 
almost  inconceivable  that  such  a  body  of  men  as  the  Prussian 
Geneva  1  Staff  would,  or  could,  change  a  general  plan  before 
even  1 1  e  first  main  shock  was  delivered,  it  is  almost  equally 
impossible  to  see  how  that  general  plan  can  be  maintained. 

Consider  first  what  evidence  we  have  of  its  failure,  and 
secondly,  the  sheer  physical  necessity  of  changing  it,  with  which 
the  enemy  would  appear  to  be  confronted. 

(a)  A  s  to  evidence,  we  know  that  until  Monday  night  or 
thereabouts  all  the  advance  through  the  Belgian  plain  had  been 
the  advance  of  a  screen  of  cavalry.  But  hero  there  was  some- 
thing abnormal — namely,  no  news  of  the  presence  of  large 
bodies  cf  troops  other  than  cavalry,  even  for  two  or  thi'ee  days' 
march  I  ehind  this  screen. 

Note  that  the  news  from  the  front  in  Belgium  has  been 
fairly  full ;  perhaps  a  little  too  full.  Note,  what  is  more  import- 
ant than  all  in  this  connection,  that,  while  time  was  essential  to 
the  operation,  and  rapidity  its  most  necessary  characteristic,  you 
have  a,  whole  week  occupied  in  the  covering  or  pushing  forward 
by  little  more  than  twenty  miles  of  this  fan  of  cavalry,  and  that 
when,  as  has  occasionally  happened,  the  points  on  the  fan  have 
been  pushed  back,  no  considerable  supports  have  been  discovered 
behind  it. 

(b).  The  other  things  we  know  which  lead  us  to  doubt,  by 
surmise  rather  than  by  direct  evidence,  the  continuation  of  the 
oiiginal  plan,  are  :  (1)  The  known  fact  that  the  forts  at  Liege 
were  intact  until  at  least  the  night  of  Wednesday,  August  Ifltli ; 
(2)  the  fact  that  the  forts  of  Lioge  command  the  junction  of 
the  main  railways  by  which  supplies  could  reach  a  large  body 
in  the  Belgian  plain  north  of  the  Meuse;  (3)  that  to  supply  that 
body  from  the  south  of  the  Meuse  across  temporary  bridges  and 
across  the  bridge  of  Huy  (which  appears  to  bo  in  German  hands) 
would  seem  impossible  without  a  good  line  of  railway  to  depend 
upon. 

The  Meuse  between  Liege  and  Namur  in  the  Plan  L, 
with  its  single  permanent  bridge  at  Huy,  with  a  gap  of  less 
than  20  mdes  between  the  furthest  point  dominated  by  the 
western  forts  of  Lii'ge  and  the  furthest  point  dominated  by 
the  eastern  forts  of  Liege,  is  a  considerable  obstacle  to  supply 
even  when  such  supply  is  not  opposed.  Supply  could  not  come 
by  the  main  railway,  which  is  seen  marked  running  along  the 
left  or  northern  bank  of  the  Meuse,  because  that  railviay  is 
commanded  by  the  forts  of  Liege.  Were  there  a  railway 
running  along  the  southern  bank,  or  near  it,  and  then  leading 
to  tlic  German  bases  of  supply,  out  of  range  of  the  forts  of  Liege 
to  the  south  (as  along  the  imaginary  dotted  line  A — B),  then 
certainly  thi-ee,  possibly  five,  Army  Corps  could  have  been  kept 
supplied,  though  they  were  to  the  north  of  the  river.  For  short 
road  journeys  across  the  bridge  at  Huy  and  across  the  other 
temjorary  bridges  (as  at  0,  P,  Q.,  etc.)  would  have  put  little 
strain  upon  the  organisation  of  that  supply.  But  there  is  no 
such  railway. 

Furthei-,  the  whole  of  this  country,  the  Ardennes,  which 
stretches  south  of  the  Meuse,  has  it  communications  running 
along  defp  valleys  and  precipitous  ravines  which  lie  north  and 
south  ;  traverse  communication  east  and  west,  even  by  road,  is 
difiicult  and  slow. 

The  alturnatire  line  of  supply  for  any  considerable  body  of 
invaders  upon  the  Belgium  plain  would  lie,  of  course,  by  the 
main  line  running  through  Lii'ge  and  following  the  left  or 
northern  bank  of  the  Meuse.  This  main  line  directly  taps  the 
German  bases  of  supply  in  the  Ehine  Valley,  has  ample  accommo- 
dation (being  one  of  the  great  European  arteries)  and  is  in 
every  way  fitted  for  the  operation. 

2'here  is  no  doubt  at  all  that  the  use  of  this  line  was  at  once 
essential  to  the  plan  of  the  German  General  Staff,  and  taken  for 
granted  by  that  Staff.  There  is  hardly  less  doubt  that  any 
proper  forwarding  of  supply  on  to  the  Belgium  plain  from  the 
bases  in  the  Bhine  Valley,  until  that  line  is  clear,  will  be 
impossible. 

Here,  then,  you  have  the  crux  in  guessing  whether  or  no 
the  main  German  effort  could  still  bo  made  over  the  Belgian 
plain  to  the  north  of  the  river.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  almost 
impossible  to  change  your  general  lino  of  advance;  on  the  other 
hand,  it  seems  equally  impossible  to  maintain  imder  existing 
conditions  the  supply  necessary  to  such  an  advance.  But,  sum 
up  everything,  especially  considering  the  known  existing 
concentration  to  the  north  and  the  bad  conditions  of  the 
centre,  and  one  can  but  believe  that,  against  fearful  odds,  the 
original  Prussian  plan  will  still  be  finally  attempted,  and  the 
effort  to  break  through  made  over  the  Belgian  plain,  the 
northern   field. 

In  the  central  field  there  is  a  fairly  broad  avenue  of  opera- 
tions in  the  southern  half  from  before  the  fortress  of  Metz  up 
to  and  beyond  Longwy.  The  country,  though  hilly,  is  full  of 
good  roads,  well  populated,  and  served  by  great  main  lines.    In 


the  north  of  the  central  field,  in  the  Ardennes  from  Namur  to 
Longwy,  the  country  is  difiicult,  ravined,  wooded,  ill-provided 
with  transverse  roads  and  railv.ajs.  It  would  seem,  therefore, 
that  if  the  blow  is  to  be  delivered  in  the  central  field,  the  main 
German  mass  must  be  organised  to  strike  in  the  southern  part 
of  that  field. 

It  is  true  that  in  the  case  of  the  Belgian  attempt  the 
march  would  present  a  flank  to  the  fortress  of  Namur;  but 
Verdun  lias  to  the  south  of  it  a  fortified  line  )-uuning  all  the 
way  to  Toul,  generally  known  as  the  Cutcs  dc  Meuse  (which  I 
have  indicated  in  the  sketch  by  little  crosses),  and  behind  this 
there  is  room  for  a  rapid  French  concentration  northward 
against  and  upon  the  flank  of  anyone  attempting  to  break 
through  above  Verdun.  There  is  no  such  lino  running  south 
from  Namur,  only  the  natural  strength  of  the  difiicult  Ardenues 
country. 

One  may  sum  up  the  elements  of  the  whole  situation  as  it 
appeared  in  the  news  of  yesterday — that  is,  as  it  was  in  the  field 
upon  Wednesday,  by  the  use  of  the  accompanying  diagram : 

There  is  a  strategical  front  consisting  in  three  main  sections 
which  lie  slightly  convex  and  facing  the  west:  the  three  main 
sections,  A  B  to  the  north,  C  D  in  the  centre,  and  E  F  to  the 
south.  A  B  is  the  body  in  the  Belgian  plain,  C  D,  the  body 
between  the  Mouse  and  the  Moselle,  E — F,  the  body  between  the 
Moselle  and  the  Ehine. 

Of  these,  the  central  portion  C— D  naturally  subdivides 
itself  into  two,  a  portion  C  Q  corresponding  to  the  difiicult 
Ardennes  country,  and  a  portion  Q  D  corresponding  to  the 
easier  Lorraine  and  southern  Luxembourg  country  ;  while  the 
southern  section  E — E  is  again  naturally  subdivided  into  that 
part  which  lies  in  the  Lorraine  basin  E  E,  and  that  part  which 
lies  in  the  mountains  and  the  plain  of  Alsace  E — F. 

In  front  of  this  line  you  have  the  corresponding  line  of  the 
French  .and  their  Allies,  G — H,  marked  black.  [See  PLin  0]. 
Somewhere  behind  the  German  Line  from  A  to  well  past  E, 
but  not  quite  as  far  as  F,  there  is  concentrated  a  force  larger 
than  elsewhere,  whose  business  it  is  to  strike  such  a  blow  on 
G — H  as  will  break  that  line.  It  may  bo  at  S,  in  the  Belgian 
plain ;  it  may  be  at  T,  in  the  Ardennes ;  it  may  be 
at  TJ,  in  southern  Luxembourg  and  northern  Lorraine.  It 
is  certainly  not  further  down,  ,uor  anywhere  between  U  and 
the  Ehine. 

The  chances  of  its  being  at  S.  depend  upon  the  difliculty  of 
abandoning  an  oiiginal  plan,  for  at  S.  the  concentration  was 
undoubtedly  originally  intended,  and  the  blow  to  be  struck 
along  the  arrow  marked  (1)  ;  but  against  this  is  the  difficulty  of 
keeping  supplied  across  the  Meuse  and  the  impossibility  o£ 
providing  it  through  Liege  until  the  forts  of  Liege  are 
taken.  The  chances  of  its  being  behind  T.  depend  upon 
the  fact  that  in  front  of  T.  there  is  no  fortified  line; 
it  is  an  open  gap.  But,  on  i  the  other  hand,  such  a 
blow  along  arrow  (2)  would  have  to  be  given  against  naturally 
strong  defensive  positions,  and  to  bo  delivered  from  badly 
supplied  and  badly  communicated  country.  The  chances  of 
its  being  at  U,  and  of  the  blow  being  delivered  ah>ng  the  arrow 
marked  (3),  depends  upon  the  good  communications  and  the 
ease  of  advance  in  this  direction,  but  they  have  against  them  the 
fact  that  such  a  blow  would  have  to  be  struck  with  the  fortress 
of  Verdun  on  its  tiauk  and  beyond  A'erdun  the  wall  of  forts 
from  Verdun  to  Toul,  behind  which  the  French  masses  could 
come  up  securely. 

Now  at  one  of  those  three  points  at  least  a  German  mass 
must  break  through  if  the  whole  German  forces  are  to  escape 
disaster,  for  to  the  south  they  are  already  being  pressed  back  by 
a  turning  movement  of  the  French  vigorously  pursued  across 
the  Vosges  along  the  line  of  the  arrow  (4).  If  the  centre  and 
the  north  of  the  German  line  can  bo  held  by  the  French  while 
this  turning  of  the  weak  German  south  succeeds,  the  general 
communications  of  the  whole  German  forces  across  the  Ehina 
would  be  daily  more  and  more  imperilled,  and  the  German 
armies  would  at  last  be  compelled  to  abandon  all  attempt  at 
breaking  through  the  line  before  them  upon  the  north ;  they 
would  have  to  mass  southward  against  this  French  advance  in 
forco  from  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  to  fight  it  with  the  risk,  if  they 
were  pushed  back  on  their  left,  of  finding  their  commimications 
with  their  bases  of  supply  to  the  east  imperilled. 

To  sum  up,  what  seems  the  chance  of  tho  immediate  future 
is  an  attempt  to  break  the  allied  lino  north  of  the  Meuse-Samlu 
line  and  across  the  Belgium  plain.  If  it  succeeds,  the  pressure 
on  the  German  armies  from  the  south  will  at  once  cease  and  all 
French  effort  will  be  concentrated  to  save  the  north.  If  it  fails, 
the  French  advance  on  the  German  left  flank  from  Alsace- 
Lorraine  will  decide  the  campaign. 

That  conjecture,  at  least,  seems  to  repose  on  better  grounds 
than  any  other  :  but  a  mere  conjecture  it  remains  until  wo  have 
news  of  the  main  German  advance  to  decide  our  judgmeut. 

It  need  hardly  be  added  that  if  this  main  German  attack  is 
delivered,  as  I  have  presumed,  through  Belgium,  then  how  many 
men,  and  what  men,  may  be  in  Antwerp  on  its  flank  will  be  one 
decisive  factor  in  the  result. 


!!• 


LAND    AND    WATER 


August  22,  1914 


THE   WAR   BY   WATER. 


By  FRED  T.  JANE. 


IT  is  now  possible  to  discorer  with  eorae  rensonable 
accuracy  what  were  the  German  plans  for  the  naval 
side  of  the  war — plans  which  have  been  hopelessly 
wrecked  in  the  Metliterranean  hj  Italy's  refusal  to 
co-opc-rate  with  the  Austrians.  The  scheme  there  was 
that  the  combined  Italian  and  Austrian  Fleets,  rein- 
forced by  the  Goe)>en,  should  move  against  the  French,  the  bulk 
of  whose  fleet  is  based  on  Toulon. 

A  glance  at  the  map  (in  this  and  in  all  other  diagrams  the 
sizes  of  the  squares  correspond  to  the  approximate  fighting 
value  of  tho  various  squadrons)  will  show  that  half  the  Medi- 
terranean would  at  once  have  been  behind  the  allies,  and  the 
French  in  mai-hed  inferiority. 

Taking  the  unit  of  tho  original  Dreadnought  as  worth  10, 
tho  approximate  relative  figures  of  the  available  Mediterranean 
forces — fchips  available  for  fleet  action — under  the  Gennan  plan 
were  as  follows : 


Itily     ... 

...      80 

Franco 

...     130 

Austria ... 

...      70 

Biitiah 

...      43 

German... 

9 

169 


178 


This  gives  a  slight  superiority  to  the  Triple  Entente,  but  it 
has  to  be  remembered  that  in  the  fii-st  place  Germany  espected 
us  to  remain  neutral,  and,  in  the  second  place,  it  involved  that 
our  Mediterranean  ships  would  immediately  return  to  Home 
waters.  Never  for  one  moment  did  Germany  imagine  that  our 
Mediterranean  Squadron  was  anything  but  a  temporary  blulf. 
The  Goeben  was  detached  to  the  Mediterranean  and  kept  there 
in  that  eure  and  certain  hope. 


What  Germany  planned  for  was 
"What  sho  actually  had  ^^•as  ... 


169  to  130 

79  to  173 


Which  explains  why  the  Gothen  ran  for  the  safety  of  the 
Dardanelles  directly  she  had  secured  such  mild  glory  as  was  to 
be  cbtained  by  the  bombardment  of  an  inoffensive  and  in- 
nocuous Algerian  town.  The  programme  arranged  for  her  was 
the  capture  of  prizes,  what  time  Italy  and  Austria  did  the  work 
required  to  bottlo  up  the  French  in  Toulon  and  Bizorta. 
However,  as  Admiral  TViron  said  about  tho  last  days  at  Port 
Arthur,  •'  Things  did  not  come  off  quite  as  expected." 

All  the  same,  however,  the  Goeben  could  easily  have  fought 
with  the  certainty  of  taking  a  British  battle  cruiser  to  the 
bottom  with  her.  Her  tactics  were  not  "  blue  water  school " 
but  "  blue  funk  school,"  and  the  moral  effect  on  the  German 


Navy  is  likely  to  be  serious.  For  the  Goeben  was  tho  show 
shipof  the  German  Navy.  Everything  in  her  was  "  for  war." 
In  her,  for  at  least  eighteen  months  was  demonstrated  the 
difference  betv/een  the  "  inefBcient  British  Navy "  and  the 
"  business-like  efficiency  of  the  German  Fleet."  It  was  the 
stock  subject  j  and  it  was  so  realistic  that  all  of  us  who  saw 
her  thoroughly  believed  the  latter.  As  for  tho  G-erman  Navy, 
it  swallowed  both  the  ideas  in  tolo.  It  was  taught  to  despise  in 
a  qiiiet  way  the  British  Navy.  This  was  not  arrogance  but 
carefully  calculated  policy. 

And — the  Goeben  did  what,  had  she  been  a  British  warship, 
her  captain  would  have  been  shot  for  !  Eank  cowardice  is  tha 
only  explanation  of  her  captain's  action,  despite  all  the  allow- 
ances we  can  ma!ce  for  the  upsetting  of  eveiything  by  the 
discovery  that  Italy  declined  to  sacrifice  herself  for  the  War 
Lord's  dream  of  "  Der  Tagg."  Or  if  not  rank  cowardice, 
ordinary  common  sense — which  in  war  comes  to  about  the 
same  thing ! 

I  have  devoted  a  good  deal  of  space  to  this  matter  of  the 
Goeben — more  space  than  it  may  seem  to  warrant.  But, 
personally,  I  believe  that  it  is  the  real  Trafalgar  of  the  War. 
Big  battles  we  may  have,  and  if  so  they  will  make  headlines 
beside  whioh  the  story  of  the  ranaway  Goeben  will  appear  quite 
a  trivial  side  issue.  Very  likely.  The  war  will  very  ix)ssibly 
bo  long  and  strenuous  as  generally  supposed,  but  the  star  of  the 
German  Navy  set  for  ever  what  time  the  Goeben  turned  and  fled 
for  the  safety  of  the  Dardanelles. 

Years  ago  the  experts  used  to  write  that  the  history  of  the 
world  would  be  settled  in  the  Mediterranean.  For  the  last  ton 
years  we  have  laughed  at  that.  And  now,  in  an  utterly  unex- 
pected way.  Time  has  proved  them  right.  The  crack  ship 
of  the  German  Navy  in  the  Mediterranean  funked  the 
British  cruisers.  The  moral  effect  of  this  is  bound  to  be  abso- 
lutely unlimitable.  Whether  the  Goeben  becomes  the  Turkish 
Alitylene,  v.-hether  she  remains  interned,  whether  presently  she 
comes  out  again,  matters  nothing.  The  Chino-Ja panose' War 
result  was  settled  when  the  Tche  Yuen  ran  away  from  Captain 
Togo  of  the  Naniwa  at  Asan.  Yalu  was  merely  a  sequel.  And 
so  the  flight  of  tho  Goeben  has  settled  the  result  of  future 
battles. 

That  the  French  should  have  penetrated  the  Adriatic  at 
the  earliest  possible  moment  was,  of  course,  obvious ;  but  that 
they  should  have  done  so  so  quickly  augurs  well  for  their 
efficiency.  A  month  or  two  ago  any  home  prophet  would  have 
described  it  as  highly  improbable.    The  fact,  however,  is  that 


SITUATION   IN   THE   BALTIC   AT   THE   START   OF   THE   WAR. 

For  ohvlau,  re«o«  the  porition  of  the  British  Fleet  la  not  shown.      Proportionate  ,Izes  of  the  Fleet  .re  .nifomi. 

■i  in  the  other   maps. 


12* 


A-iigust  22, 


1914 


LAND    AND    WATER 


tie  Frencli  Fleet  just  at  tie  present  time  is  extremely  efBcient 
— anotlier  of  those  points  which  the  Germans  have  overlooked. 
The  French  camaraderie  between  officers  and  men  has  been 
described  by  competent  independent  witnesses  as  "  beyond 
belief."  Little  wonder,  therefore,  that  no  boggling  occurred  in 
the  rush  for  the  Adi-iatic,  though  we  may  accept  stories  of  naval 
battles  with  judicious  scepticism. 

Austria  had  nothing  out  except  some  small  cruisers 
»perating  against  Montenegro,  and  the  circumstance  that  the 
Aspern  was  stmk  merely  goes  to  indicate  that  the  French 
irrived  before  they  were  expected. 


calculations).  Against  these  the  Second  Squadron  and  Eeserva 
Squadron,  value  56,  appear  to  have  been  sent.  This  Second 
Squadron  consists  of  pre-Dreadnoughts,  of  no  immediate  value 
in  the  North  Sea.  It  was  possibly  reinforced  by  some  Dread- 
noughts sent  through  the  Kiel  Canal ;  indeed,  there  is  some 
reason  to  suspect  that  the  bulk  of  the  German  Fleet  is  at  present 
based  on  Kiel  and  not  at  Wilhelmshaven. 

The  reported  battle  and  defeat  of  the  Russian  Baltic 
Squadron  lacks  confirmation.  It  is  doubtful  whether  the  ships 
have  left  Libau,  as  there  would  be  no  object  in  facing  certain 
defeat,  and  Kussia  has  everything  to  gain  by  delay,  because  one. 


Yt 


DIAGRAM    SHOWING    THE    CONDITION    OF   THINGS   IN    THE    MEDITERRANEAN,   AS   CALCULATED 

IN   THE    GERMAN   WAR    PLAN. 

The  tinted  section  shows   the  anticipated  bases  of  attack. 


Austria  had  nothing  to  gain  by  risking  her  battle  fleet 
against  heavy  odds — here  as  everywhere  else  in  the  war  there  is 
a  species  of  stale-mate  with  battle  fleets.  Nowhere  do  they  face 
each  other  in  anything  like  equal  strength — everywhere  the 
moral  effect  of  the  larger  force  paralyses  the  lesser. 

It  is  improbable  that  the  French  will  go  any  considerable 
distance  up  the  Adriatic.  To  keep  the  Austrians  in  ensures  the 
safety  of  aJl  Mediterranean  trade ;  to  attempt  a  close  blockade 
would  be  to  run  serious  risk  of  torpedo  attack  without  any 
prospect  of  gain  worth  the  adventure.  As  things  are,  if  too 
much  pressure  is  felt,  torpedo  attacks  are  likely  to  be  attempted. 


if  not  two,  of  her  new  Dreadnoughts  are  very  shortly  to  be 
available  as  a  reinforcement.  Meanwhile  the  Baltic  must  be  a 
German  lake,  with  the  Russian  trade  more  or  less  completely 
stopped  and  German  trade  probably  proceeding  without 
hindrance. 

Once  the  Russians  can  utilise  two  of  their  new  Dreadnoughts 
their  approximate  fighting  strength  would  be  55,  and  a  move 
against  the  Germans  may  be  expected.  Such  a  move  would 
have  a  most  useful  effect,  not  only  from  the  consequent 
weakening  of  the  main  German  Fleet  in  order  to  reinforce  their 
division  ia  the  Baltic,  but  also  in  its  demands  upon  the  German 


\^'^ 


THE    SITUATION    IN   THE    MEDITERRANEAN    AS    GERMANY   FOUND    IT. 

The  tinted  section  iliowi  the  Triple   Alliance  actual    bases.      The  ecnrse  of  the  i^nominous  flight  of  The  Pride  of  the  German  Fleet 
u  shown  in  a  dotted  line.      For  such  conduct  •  British  Officer  would  have   been  court-martialled  end  shot. 


sluce,  though  the  Austrians  have  only  eighteen  destroyers,  they 
are  known  to  be  extremely  efficient. 

But  it  is  even  chances  whether  Austria  will  not  presently 
<-liango  sides.  Of  the  sentiment  in  her  army  I  cannot  speak 
with  authority,  but  I  do  know  that  the  feeling  in  her  navy  is 
distinctly  pro- British.  The  close  friendship  between  the  British 
a!id  Austrian  navies  is  a  very  long-standing  affair  indeed,  and 
it  may  bo  taken  as  certain  that  Austria  will  not  throw  away 
anything  that  she  can  avoid  against  tha  British  Navy  in  order 
to  satisfy  the  German  Kaiser  in  his  role  of  War  Lord. 

Turning  to  nearer  homo  we  come  first  of  all  to  tlie  Baltic. 

The  total  It iLssian force  has  anutmost  paper  value  of  33  (here 
as  elsewhere  I  am  using  the  figures  used  in  German  official 


destroyer  flotilla.  This  flotilla  consists  of  about  150  boats,  and 
something  like  one-third  of  this  fores  would  have  to  bo 
withdrawn  from  the  North  Sea  in  order  to  meet  the  Russian 
advance. 

Indeed,  as  Russia  has  some  eighty  destroyers,  the  demand 
might  well  be  heavier.  It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  main 
German  Fleet  is  not  in  a  position  to  operate  against  us  at  any- 
thing  like  full  strength,  and  it  is  by  no  means  improbable  that 
the  bulk  of  the  fleet  will  be  used  against  the  Russians  in  the 
Baltic,  because  it  is  there  that  the  "  greatest  danger  "  threatens. 
There  is  nothing  to  entice  the  German  Dreadnoughts  into  major 
operations  in  the  North  Sea,  as  nothing  short  of  a  decisive 
Tictory  over  the  British  Fleet  could  materially  affect  the  situa- 


13« 


LAND    AND    WATER 


August  22,  1914 


tion.  Ealher,  ttc  niaj  look  for  a  continuance  of  the  pi-esent 
•tate  of  affairs.  The  German  policy  is  clearly  to  attempt  to 
weaken  iLe  British  force  by  subniisrine  attack  and  by  mines. 

How  far  the  Germans  Lavo  gone  in  for  initiscriminata 
mine- laving  we  Lave  no  means  of  ascertaining,  though  personally 
I  do  not  think  they  did  anything  of  the  sort.  The  mines  -which 
sunk  the  Amfhio'n  wero  laid  under  the  impression  that  the 
Britisli  Expeditionary  Force  Trould  sail  from  the  Thames  Estuary 
or  Harwich.  It  is  not  desirable  to  say  anything  about  the  ti-ans- 
port  of  that  force,  except  that  the  German  calculations  conccniing 
it  were  not  successful. 

Tho  war  has  already  been  a  war  of  surprises,  and  chief 
among  these  is  tlie  extremely  small  inconvenience  caused  to 
British  merchant  shipping.  It  is  reasonable  to  expect  that  such 
commerce-destroyers  as  Germany  may  have  on  the  high  seas  will 
automatically  die  a  natural  death  from  want  of  coal  unless  they 
are  allowed  to  supply  themselves  by  the  "  coal  sufiScicnt  to  reach 
the  nciircst  German  harbour  "  subterfuge.  Even  so,  their  power 
for  mischief  Las  apparently  been  greatly  exaggerated  in  the  past. 
We  most  of  us  seemed  to  have  failed  to  realise  how  very  rigid 
the  trade  routes  are.  To  do  any  mischief  at  all  a  privateer  must 
get  on  the  trade  route,  -where  she  is  sure  to  meet  cruisers  looking 
for  her — cruisers  in  -wireless  communication  -with  the  proposed 
victims  of  the  corsair. 

The  capture  of  a  merchant  ship  is  an  operation  requiring 
time  for  its  performance — time  enough  for  a  defending  cruiser 
to  come  up,  if  anywhere  near.  In  addition,  there  is  the  problem 
as  to  what  is  to  to  be  done  with  prizes  when  captured,  owing  to 
the  virtual  impossibility  of  getting  them  into  a  German  harbour. 

Many  people  have  anticipated  that  the  German  battle  cruisers 
will  sooner  or  later  attempt  to  rush  for  the  trade  routes.  Of 
course,  they  may  do  it ;  but,  if  so,  they  will  be  very  ill-advised, 
and  there  will  not  be  the  least  occasion  for  the  public  to  be 
perturbed.  It  is  moderately  certain  that,  if  they  do  manage  to 
get  out,  they  will  ne-ier  get  back  again  ;  and  even  getting  out  is 
not  likely  to  be  easy. 

Tho  general  indications  are  that  for  the  present  the  "War 
on  the  water  will  continue  uneventfully  until  circumstances 
force  the  Kaiser  to  send  his  entire  fleet  to  sea  as  a  forlorn  hojje, 
in  much  the  same  way  that  circumstances  more  or  less  com- 
pelled Napoleon  to  order  Villeneuve  to  leave  harbour  in  the 
Trafalgar  campaign. 

The  official  Germ^n  war  plan,  however,  is  for  the  fleet  to 
remain  safe  behind  the  impregnable  fortifications  which  stud  the 
whole  of  the  German  coast  in  hopes  that  the  British  battleships 
will  come  off  the  coast  and  allow  themselves  to  be  thinned  down 
by  submarine  and  destroyer  attacks. 

If  and  when  the  rush  does  come,  it  is  more  likely  to  be  via 
the  Channel  than  in  the  more  obvious  Scapa  Flow  direction. 
It  -would  be  a  rush  of  desperation  -with  the  object  of  doing 
as  much  damage  as  possible.  However,  it  is  inadvisable  to 
speculate  in  details. 


DIARY   OF    THE    WEEK 

DAY    BY    DAY, 
FRIDAY,    AUGUST    Hth. 

The  French  War  Ministry  olncially  announced  that  the 
French  troops  which  entered  Belgium  by  Charleroi  are 
in  touch  with  the  Belgian  Army. 

The  situation  at  Liege  remained  the  same,  all  the  forts 
were  intact,  and  the  troops  in  excellent  spirits. 

The  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Colonics  vras  informed  by 
the  Governor  of  Nyasaland  that  on  Thursday  morning 
the  Nyasaland  Government  armed  steamer  Gvcndolen 
seized  the  German  Government  armed  Bteamer  Yon 
Wissmann  at  Sphinx  Haven  on  the  eastern  shore  of 
Lake  Nyasa.  The  guns  and  engines  were  removed 
from  the  Von  Wissmann  and  her  crew  taken  prisoners. 

SATURDAY,   AUGUST    ISih. 

The  Tsar  addressed  to  the  Tolifih  populations  of  Ru.ssia, 
Germany,  and  Austria  a  proclamation  promising  to 
restore  to  Poland  her  territorial  integrity  with  complete 
autonomy  and  guarantees  for  religious  liberty  and  the 
use  of  the  Tolish  language.  A  great  battle  took  place 
in  and  around  Dinant,  on  the  river  Meuse.  The  action 
lasted  from  six  in  tlie  morning  till  six  in  the  evening, 
when  the  Germans  had  been  diiven  about  nine  miles 
south  to  a  point  bet-neen  Givct  and  Eoehcfort.  All 
the  forts  at  Lii'ge  reported  to  be  still  intact. 

SUNDAY,    AUGUST    16th. 

Ultimatum  delivered  by  Japan  to  Germ.any  demanding 
the  withdrawal  of  her  vessels  of  war  from  the  Far  East 
and  to  deliver  on  a  date  not  later  than  September  loth 
to  the  Imperial  Japanese  authorities,  without  condition 


or  compensation,  the  entire  leased  territory  of  K.iao- 
chau,  with  a  view  to  the  eventual  restoration  of  tho 
game  to  China.  Germany  given  till  noon  on  Sunday 
next  to  send  her  reply.  The  Japanese  ultimatum  to 
Germany  was  regarded  in  America  as  the  gravest 
development  of  the  war.  Viscount  Chinda,  the  Japanese 
Ambassador,  informed  tho  United  States  Government 
that  every  American  neutral  interest  would  be  safe- 
guarded. Japan's  promise  to  restore  KiaocLau  to 
China  regarded  by  the  United  States  as  satisfactory. 
MONDAY.    AUGUST    17th. 

The  Press  Bureau  announced  that  the  Expeditionary 
Force,  as  detailed  for  foreign  service,  has  been  safely 
landed  on  French  soil.  The  embarkation,  trans- 
portation, and  disembarkation  of  men  and  stores 
were  alike  carried  through  with  tho  greatest  possible 
precision  and  without  a  single  casualty.  Mr.  F.  E. 
Smith,  who  made  this  announcement,  stated,  "  Lord 
Kitchener  wishes  me  to  add  that  he  and  the  country 
are  under  the  greatest  obligation  to  the  Press  for  tho 
loyalty  with  which  all  references  to  the  movements  of 
the  Expeditionary  Force  in  this  country  and  on  their 
landing  have  been  suppressed." 

Lieutcnant-General  Sir  James  Grierson  died  while 
travelling  in  the  train.  General  Grierson  had  been 
designated  to  command  the  Third  Corps  of  the  Expe- 
ditionary Force.  By  his  death  the  Army  lias  lost  one  of 
its  best  leaders.  General  Grierson  was  fifty-five  years 
of  age,  and  joined  the  Eoyal  Artillery  in  1877.  In 
1914  he  was  appointed  Director  of  Military  Operations 
at  the  War  Office,  and  afterwards  commanded  the 
Fir,st  Division  at  Aldershot.  In  recent  years  he  had 
greatly  distinguished  himself  at  manoeuvres.  He  was 
a  brilliant  linguist,  and  was  a  qualified  interpreter  in 
French,  German,  Eussian,  and  Spanish, 

The  Belgian  Government  transferred  from  Brussels  to 
Antwerp,  and  adequate  measures  taken  to  assure  the 
defence  of  Brussels  and  to  protect  it  from  a  surprise 
attack. 

The  Press  Bureau  announced  that  tho  French  troops,  in 
the  course  of  a  rapid  advance  along  tho  Valley  of 
Schirmeck,  secured  a  thousand  prisoners. 

The  French  Fleet  in  the  Mediterranean  made  a  sweep  up 
the  Adriatic  as  far  as  Cattaro,  and  a  small  Austrian 
ci-uiser  of  the  Aspcm  type  was  fired  on  and  sunk, 
TUESDAY,    AUGUST    18th, 

It  was  announced  that  the  King  had  approved  the 
appointment  of  General  Sir  H.  Smith-Dorrien  to 
command  of  an  Army  Corps  of  the  British  Expeditionary 
Force,  in  succession  to  the  late  General  Grierson. 

The  Press  Bureau  issued  the  following  statement :  "  Some 
desultory  fighting  has  taken  place  during  the  day 
between  the  British  patrolling  squadrons  and  flotillas 
and  German  reconnoitreing  cruisers.  No  losses  are 
reported  or  claimed.  A  certain  liveliness  is  apparent 
inr  the  Southern  area  of  the  North  Sea. 

The  French  captured   the    greater  part  of  the  Valleys 
of  the  Vosges  on  the  slopes  of  Alsace,  from  which  the 
French  Army  will  soon  reach  the  plain, 
WEDNESDAY,    AUGUST    19th. 

Eepoi-tcd  that  the  Germans  had  entered  Tirlemont  early 
on  Tuesday  afternoon,  and  that  a  fierce  battle  was 
taking  place  between  the  Belgian  and  German  troops 
along  an  extended  front. 

From  official  sources  in  BerlLa  came  the  nev.'s  that 
Germany  will  not  consent  to  evacuate  Kiaochau,  or 
to  agree  to  Japan's  other  demands.  The  capture  of 
Kiaochau,  it  -was  declared,  would  have  no  more  effect 
on  the  war  than  the  taking  of  Togoland. 
THURSDAY,    AUGUST    20th. 

Reported  that  the  Servians  had  gained  a  decisive 
victory  over  the  Austrians  near  Shabatz.  Three 
Austrian  regiments  were  practically  wiped  out. 

The  Eussian  forces  came  into  collision  v.'itli  First  German 
Army  Corps  near  Stallu-Poncn,  defeating  the  enemy 
and  cnpluriijg  eight  guns,  tv.elve  caissons,  and  two 
maxims. 

Despatches  received  suggest  that  the  German  advance 
in  Belgium,  North  of  the  ileuse,  has  begun.  The  Liege 
forts  still  hold  out.  An  official  statement  was  received 
from  Brussels  to  the  efiect  that  severe  fighting  had 
begun  along  the  whole  front  from  Bale  to  Diest. 
Latest  despatches  announced  the  evacuation  of 
Mechlin  by  the  iUlied  troops  on  tho  Belgian  fighting 
front,  and  a  threatened  attack  on  Brussels  by  the 
German  forces.  In  the  eastern  war  area  the  Russian 
Army_  was  reported  to  have  vigorously  assumed  the 
offeusive. 


U* 


August  23,  1914 


LAND    AND    WATEB 


A    TOPOGRAPHICAL    GUIDE   TO   THE 

WAR   ZONE. 


By  E.   CHARLES  VIVIAN. 


Aerschot,— A  village  midway  between  Loiivain  and 
Diest.  on  the  main  road  connecting  these  two  points. 

AQlivari  or  Bar- — So  called  from  its  position  opposite 
the  Italian  Bari,  ia  a  town  eighteen  miles  north-west  from 
Scutari,  near  the  Adriatic  coast,  and  surrounded  by  dense 
forests  of  olive  trees.  The  population  is  mainly  Albanian,  and 
amounts  to  about  1,600.  The  harbour  will  accommodate  only 
vessels  of  light  draught,  but  is  well-protected.  Antivari  is 
about  twenty  miles  distant  from  the  Austrian  frontier,  and 
forms  the  most  important  harbour  on  the  Montenegrin  coast. 

Be1i;rade. — Capital  of  Servla,  with  a  population  of 
over  00,000,  is  the  most  important  town  in  Servia,  and  one  of 
the  most  important  in  the  Balkan  peninsula.  It  is  situated  at 
the  confluence  of  the  great  rivers  Save  and  Danube,  on  a  trian- 
gular ridge,  of  which  the  southern  side  slopes  up  by  way  of  the 
Avala  Hill  to  the  Shumadiya  mountains  of  central  Servia.  At 
the  northern  end  of  the  city,  on  a  chalk  ridge  200  feet  above  the 
river  level,  ia  situated  the  citadel,  and  just  opposite  this  the 
Hungarian  town  of  Zimony  stands  on  the  other  bank  of  the 
Danube.  The  position  of  Belgrade  has  always  been  considered 
one  of  great  strategical  importance,  more  especially  as  regards 
an  advance  against  Hungarian  territory.  It  is  not  of  such  great 
importance  for  an  advance  from  Hungary  to  Servia,  as  its  garrison 
can  fall  back  on  the  hills  toward  which  the  city  slopes  from  the 
river,  and  thus  can  command  a  succession  of  strong  positions. 
I'rom  Roman  times  onward  the  citadel  of  Belgrade  has  been 
garrisoned,  and,  previous  to  the  Servian  Government's  authority, 
it  was  held  by  a  Turkish  garrison.  Belgrade  is  said  to  have 
known  more  battles  under  its  walls  than  any  other  fortress  in 
Europe.    It  was  delivered  to  the  Scnians  by  Turkey  in  1866. 

Brussels- — The  capital  of  Belgium  and  of  the  Belgian 
province  of  Brabant,  lies  in  the  valley  of  the  river  Senne,  which 
river,  flowing  through  the  city,  is  enclosed  by  an  immense  arch. 
In  old  times  Brussels  was  strongly  fortified,  but  at  the  present 
time  it  has  little  in  the  way  of  artificial  defences  ;  its  chief  military 
station  is  the  suburb  of  Etterbeck,  where  is  accommodation  for 
a  large  force  of  cavalry  and  artillery,  together  with  a  miUtary 
school  and  shooting  ground.  The  Charleroi  and  Willebrocck 
canals  meet  in  Brussels,  and  railway  lines  radiate  from  the  city 
to  Ostend,  Antwerp,  Amsterdam,  Bale,  Paris,  Lille,  and,  in  times 
of  peace,  to  Berlin,  St.  Petersburg,  and  Vienna.  The  population 
of  the  communes  comprised  in  the  Government  of  Brussels  is 
well  over  half  a  million. 

Cattaro. — Capital  of  the  Government  of  the  same  name 
in  Dalmatia,  on  the  Austrian  Adriatic  coast.  It  is  situated  at 
the  head  of  a  winding  gulf,  of  which  the  shores  are  hilly  and 
strongly  fortified.  The  garrison  of  Cattaro  in  normal  times  is 
about  1,500  men,  and  the  total  population  of  the  town  is  about 
6,000,  mainly  Slav,  with  a  German  minority.  Cattaro  lies  quite 
near  the  Montenegrin  frontier,  and,  although  well  protected 
against  attack  from  the  sea  by  its  system  of  forts,  is  liable  to 
attack  from  superior  heights  on  the  Montenegrin  side  of  the 
border,  whence  such  fire  can  be  brought  to  bear  on  the  town 
and  garrison  as  to  make  the  position  practically  untenable.  It 
is  connected  by  road  with  Cettinjc,  the  capital  of  Montenegro, 
and  by  steamer  service  with  Trieste. 

Chateau  Salins. — A  small  town  on  the  river  Seille, 
in  Gei-man  Lorraine,  twenty-five  miles  south-east  from  Metz. 
It  is  a  railway  junction  for  the  Metz,  Nancy,  and  Saargcmund 
lines  of  railway,  and  takes  its  name  from  a  salt  works  in  the 
neighbourhood. 

Chaudfontaine- — The  fort  of  Chaudfontaine  forms  one 
of  the  most  important  points  in  the  defence  of  Liege  from  the 
south-east.  The  village  of  the  same  name,  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
fort,  is  situated  on  the  Lii'gc-Verviers  hne  of  rail,  at  about  six 
miles  distance  from  Liege. 

Colmar. — A  German  town  in  the  territory  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  forty  miles  south  south-west  from  Strasbourg  by  the 
Strasbourg-Bale  Une  of  rail.  It  is  an  important  centre  of  trade 
for  upper  Alsace,  and  has  a  population  upwards  of  iOfi()0.  It 
is  connected  by  rail  with  Mulhausea,  £!trasbourg,  Halstatt, 
Miia?ter,  and  Freibcrc;,  and  forms  an  important  junction  of  the 
strategic  railways  of  the  German  frontier  system. 


Corroy  Le  Grand. — A  village  of  the  province  of 
Brabant,  about  five  miles  south-east  of  the  forts  of  "VVavre. 

Delle. — A  frontier  town  in  French  Alsace,  situated  on 
the  railway  from  Belfort  to  St.  L^rsanne.  Although  situated  on 
the  Swiss  frontier,  Delle  is  the  point  of  junction  for  two  main 
roads  from  German  Alsace. 

Diest. — A  fortified  town  in  the  Belgian  province  of 
Brabant,  thirty-eight  miles  south-east  of  Antwerp,  with  which 
it  is  connected  by  rail,  on  the  Antwerp-Maestricht  line.  Also 
connected  by  rail  with  Brussels  via  Louvain.  The  population 
is  over  8,000,  and  the  fortifications  are  of  only  secondary 
importance. 

Eydtkuhnen. — The  German  frontier  station  on  the 
line  of  rail  from  Konigsberg  in  Germany  to  Vilna  in  Western 
Russia.  The  corresponding  station  on  the  Russian  side  of  the 
frontier  is  Wirballen. 

Hasselt. — The  capital  of  the  Belgian  province  of  Limburg, 
forty-seven  miles  east  of  Brussels,  and  at  an  important  junction  of 
railway  lines  by  which  it  is  connected  with  Dutch  and  Belgian 
centres.  The  population  is  about  15,000.  Hasselt  is  situated  in 
wooded  hilly  country  about  midway  between  Diest  and  Maastricht 
on  the  Dutch  frontier. 

Huy. — A  town  about  midway  between  Liege  and  Namur, 
on  <;he  river  Meuse  and  the  Liege-Namur  railway.  Its 
principal  industries  are  the  extraction  of  coal  and  the  manufacture 
of  firearms,  and  it  is  a  centre  of  considerable  importance,  standing 
in  wooded,  hilly  country. 

Kiao-Chau. — This  important  Chinese  port  was  seized 
in  November,  1897,  by  the  German  Fleet,  nominally  in  repara- 
tion for  the  murder  by  the  Chinese  of  two  German 
missionaries  in  the  province  of  Shantung.  The  result  was  the 
leasing  by  the  Chinese  of  the  port  and  117  square  miles  of  territory 
on  either  side  to  Germany  for  a  period  of  ninety-nine  years, 
together  with  a  further  protected  area.  Large  sums  have  been 
spent  by  Germany  in  the  construction  of  a  breakwater  and  the 
dredging  of  the  harbour,  and,  since  the  expulsion  of  the  Russians 
from  Port  Arthur,  China  and  Japan  have  viewed  with  disapproval 
the  existence  of  a  fortified  German  port  on  the  Chinese  coast.  The 
terms  of  the  Japanese  ultimatum  of  the  17th  inst.  provide  for  the 
dehvery,  "  on  a  date  not  later  than  September  15th,  to  the 
Imperial  Japanese,Govcrment,  without  condition  or  compensation, 
the  entire  leased  territory  of  Kiao-Chau,  with  a  view  to  the 
eventual  restoration  of  the  same  to  China." 

Kiel  CanaL — Known  also  as  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal, 
is  fifty-one  miles  in  length,  and  connects  the  mouth  of  the  Elbe 
with  Kiel  Bay  at  the  western  extremity  of  the  Baltic.  It  is  so 
constructed  that  vessels  of  the  largest  size  can  maintain  a  speed 
of  ten  miles  an  hour  throughout  its  entire  length,  and  is  so  defended 
that  it  is  absolutely  unassailable  from  the  sea  at  cither  end.  The 
object  of  its  con.struction  was  to  double  the  fighting  value  of  the 
German  'Na.vj,  for  any  attacking  fleet  would  have  to  maintain 
a  blockade  at  the  western  end  of  the  canal,  and  also  would  have 
to  blockade  the  entrance  to  the  Baltic,  north  of  Denmark,  in 
order  to  confine  the  German  Fleet  from  the  North  Sea,  while 
a  third  naval  force  would  be  necessary  to  prevent  the  German 
Fleet  from  taking  action  in  the  Baltic  itself.  The  canal  traverses 
the  province  of  Holstein  from  west  to  east,  and  at  its  eastern 
end  is  situated  the  naval  base  of  Kiel,  on  Kiel  harbour,  where 
sufficient  accommodation  is  available  for  the  whole  of  the  German 
Fleet.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  canal,  which  was  finished  only 
a  few  months  ago,  adds  enormously  to  the  striking  value  of  the 
German  Navy,  but  it  is  generally  considered,  with  the  short 
experience  afforded  of  its  usefulness  by  the  present  war,  that  its 
value  has  been  rather  overrated. 

Liege. — Situated  at  the  confluence  of  the  Meuse  and 
the  Ourthe,  Liege  is  one  of  the  principal  Belgian  centres  of 
industry,  being  engaged  largelv  in  the  production  of  coal  and  the 
manufacture  of  small  arms,  of  which  latter  it  produces  more  than 
a  million  pieces  annually.  Metal-smelting,  tools,  electrical 
machines,  and  railway  material  are  also  important  products, 
while  Lii'ge  is  the  centre  of  several  important  industrial  localities. 
The  principal  lines  of  communication  are  the  Meuse  and  a  canal 
which  runs  from  Liege  to  Maastricht,  while  the  railways  run  to 
Namur,  Brussels,  Hasselt,  and  Limbourg,  to  Maastricht,  and  to 


15» 


LAND    AND    WATEB 


August  22,  1914 


Aix-la-Chapellc— the  last-named  lino  has  been  destroyed  since 
the  outbreak  of  the  war.  The  Meuse,  which  flows  through  the 
city,  is  upwards  of  500  feet  wide  at  this  point,  and  is  spanned  by 
sii  bridges.  The  population  of  the  city  is  about  200,000.  The 
ring  of  forts  which  surrounds  the  city,  although  constructed 
in  the  latter  half  of  last  century,  is  of  great  strength,  and 
provided  with  thoroughly  up-to-date  armament.  In  historic 
times  Li*?ge  has  already  undergone  six  sieges ;  one  of  these  was 
conducted  by  the  English  Marlborough  in  1702,  when  the  citadel 
was  taken  by  storm  from  the  P"rench  garrison ;  in  17S2  the 
French  inflicted  heavy  defeat  on  the  Austrians  here.  The  fort 
of  the  Chartreuse  and  the  "  Citadel "  command  the  town 
effectively  from  both  banks  of  the  river,  and  these,  together  with 
the  remaining  forta  of  the  ring  that  encircles  the  town,  render 
this  one  of  the  strongest  positions  in  Western  Europe. 

Longuyon.— An  important  railway  junction  in  the 
extreme  north  of  the  department  of  Meurthe  et  Moselle.  The 
Mezieres-Thionville  and  Luxembourg-Nancy  lines  cross  here. 
It  is  about  twelve  miles  from  the  German  frontier. 

Longwy. — A  fortified  town  in  the  arrondisscment 
of  Bricy,  department  of  Meurthe  et  Moselle,  sixty-three  miles 
west-north-west  of  Nancy,  and  situated  on  a  plateau  commanding 
the  Chiers,  a  tributary  of  the  Meuse,  and  also  commanding  the 
Luxembourg  road.  The  fortress  is  about  400  feet  above  tlie 
level  of  the  surrounding  country,  and  is  strengthened  by  outlying 
fortifications.  In  times  of  peace  the  garrison  is  maintained  at 
a  strength  of  about  5,000,  of  which  about  one-fifth  are  cavalry. 
The  present  population  is  about  10,000,  and  the  chief  industries 
are  iron  and  steel  mining  and  smelting.  The  town  is  situated 
on  the  railway  line  from  Longuyon  to  Arlon,  and  for  the  past 
300  years  has  been  a  fortified  centre. 

Loovain. — An  important  manufacturing  town  twenty- 
eight  miles  east  of  Brussels,  in  the  Belgian  province  of  Brabant. 
It  is  connected  by  rail  with  Brussels,  Liege,  and  Malines,  and 
other  important  centres,  and  has  a  population  of  nearly  50,000. 
The  town  is  laid  out  in  rectangular  fashion,  and  is  traversed  by 
the  small  river  Dyle.  Its  town  hall  ia  considered  one  of  the 
finest  specimens  of  architectural  art  on  the  Continent. 

Luxembourg. — The  Grand-Duchy  of  Luxembourg  is  a 
neutral  and  independent  State,  bounded  east  and  north-east 
by  Prussia,  south  by  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  west  by  the  Belgian 
province  of  Luxembourg.  It  is  governed  by  a  hereditary  grand 
duke  and  a  House  of  Representatives  consisting  of  forty-five 
members,  and  the  total  population  of  the  duchy  ia  about  250,000. 
The  State  possesses  valuable  iron  mines,  and  is  traversed  by 
about  300  miles  of  railways.  It  consists  for  the  most  part  of 
wooded,  hilly  country,  especially  in  the  Ardeimea  or  western 
region,  and  from  a  strategic  point  of  view  is  exceedingly  difiicult 
country.  As  a  state  whose  neutrality  has  been  guaranteed, 
Luxembourg  possesses  no  important  fortifications. 

Macstricht  oi  Maastricht.— The  capital  of  the 
Dutch  province  of  Limburg,  situated  nineteen  miles  by  rail 
north-north-cast  of  Li^ge  on  the  Dutch  State  railway  from 
Maastricht  to  Akon.  The  population  of  the  town  is  about 
40,000,  and  its  chief  trade  is  in  paper  and  firearms.  It  is  built 
round  the  junction  of  the  Gcer  and  Maas  rivers,  and  is  practically 
on  the  border  between  Belgium  and  Holland. 

Messina. — The  city  of  Messina,  which  was  destroyed 
by  the  most  disastrous  earthquake  of  modem  times,  was  a 
strongly  fortified  and  flourishing  city  at  the  north-east  corner 
of  the  island  of  Sicily,  with  an  excellent  harbour  opening  on  the 
Straits  of  Messina.  These  straits,  in  which  the  Goeben  and 
Breslau  sheltered  for  a  time  from  the  British  and  French  fleets, 
are  waters  neutral  to  Italy,  and  are  under  five  miles  in  width 
between  the  Sicilian  coast  and  the  mainland  of  Italy.  The 
straits  run  in  a  north  to  south  direction,  from  Reggio,  on  the 
Italian  mainland,  to  Point  di  Faro,  at  the  extreme  eastern  corner 
of  Sicily. 

Metz. — A  first-class  fortress  guarding  the  German 
frontier  in  Lorraine,  of  which  it  is  the  German  capital.  It  is 
situated  on  the  river  Moselle,  ninety-nine  miles  north-west  of 
Strasbourg  by  rail,  and  lOJ  miles  cast  from  the  French  frontier. 
The  principal  fortifications  consist  of  a  ring  of  modern  forts, 
encircling  the  town  at  a  distance  of  from  two  to  three  miles  from 
it,  and  the  garrison,  made  up  of  Bavarians,  Prussians,  and 
Saxons,  ia  about  22,000  in  times  of  peace— a  number  that  would 
be  enormously  augmented  on  a  war  footing.  The  population  of 
the  town  is  about  60,000,  and  its  industries  are  of  little  importance. 
It  sharea  with  Strasbourg  the  distinction  of  being  the  most 
important  German  fortified  station  on  the  Alsace-Lorraine 
frontier. 

Muihausen. — A  German  town  in  the  Upper  Alsace 
distiict,  twenty-one  miles  north-west  from  Bale  and  the  Swiss 
border  by  rail.    It  has  a  population  of  about  Dfl.OOO,  and  ranks 


as  the  centre  of  the  cotton  industry  of  Alsace.  Its  importance 
as  a  railway  junction  is  considerable,  and  it  is  connected  by  rail 
with  Bale,  Thann,  Belfort,  Colmar,  and  Strasbourg,  and  Mulheim 
and  Freiburg. 

Munsfer- — A  town  of  German  Upper  Alsace,  £;7;tecn 
miles  west-south-west  of  Colmar  by  rail,  and  at  the  foot  of  the 
Vosges  mountains.     Its  population  is  about  C,500. 

Namur. — Capital  of  the  Belgian  province  of  the  same 
name,  thirty-seven  miles  south-east  of  Brussels,  with  which 
it  is  connected  by  rail.  It  is  situated  in  wooded  and  moun- 
ainous  country,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river  Meuse,  and  is 
connected  by  rail  with  Liege,  Paris,  Rheims,  and  Luxembourg, 
as  well  as  with  Brussels.  The  population  is  about  35,000,  and 
the  town  ia  defended  by  fortifications  on  the  surrounding 
heights.  It  is  even  more  strongly  protected  than  Liege,  and  ia 
well  garrisoned  and  difficult  to  invest,  on  account  of  the  nature 
of  the  surrounding  country. 

Nish. — The  second  most  important  town  in  Servia, 
situated  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Nishava,  a  tributary  of  the  liver 
Morava.  It  forms  a  junction  for  the  important  roads  of  the 
Balkan  Peninsula,  and  is  the  point  at  which  the  Vienna- 
Constantinople  and  Vienna-Salonica  railway  linos  divide.  The 
hills  surrounding  the  town  are  fortified  by  earthworks,  and  Nish 
is  always  the  scat  of  a  strong  garrison,  being  considered  of  great 
strategical  importance.  It  is  one  oi  the  most  prosperous  tovrns 
in  Servia,  and  has  a  population  of  nearly  23,000. 

Novo  Radomsk- — A  railway  station  in  Russian  Poland, 
on  the  Warsaw-Tchenstochow  line,  about  thirty -five  miles  from 
the  German  frontier. 

Pola.— The  chief  naval  base  and  arsenal  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  situated  near  the  southern  point  of  the  peninsula  of 
Istria,  on  the  Gulf  of  Venice.  From  the  village  of  Fasana, 
which  overlooks  the  Fasana  Channel,  to  the  Brionian  Islands,  a 
system  of  fortifications  protects  the  harbour  and  port  of  Pola, 
which  is  in  normal  times  occupied  by  a  garrison  of  about  8,000 
men.  The  total  population  ia  about  45,000.  Pola  forms  the 
southern  terminus  of  a  railway  extending  from  Trieste,  with  a 
branch  to  Eovigno,  a  small  port  on  the  Istrian  Peninsula. 

Eechicourt, — Village  and  railway  station  on  the 
Luneville-Saarbourg  line  of  rail.  It  is  situated  just  on  the 
German  side  of  the  frontier. 

Saarburg. — A*  manufacturing  town  in  German  Lorraine, 
about  twelve  miles  from  the  French  frontier.  The  population  is 
about  4,000. 

Sanna. — A  river  flowing  to  the  Vistula  from  the  cast 
and  forming  the  extreme  northern  boundary  between  Austrian 
and  Russian  Poland.  The  actual  frontier  line  includes  the  north 
bank  of  the  river,  which  is  abo  known  as  the  "  San." 

Sieradz- — A  station  on  the  Warsaw-Kalisch  line  of  rail, 
situated  in  Russian  Poland  about  twenty-two  miles  from  the 
German  frontier. 

Sopshider- — A  strong  mountain  position  on  the  bank 
of  the  river  Save,  in  Servia,  about  ten  miles  south  from  Belgrade. 

Tiriemont. — A  village  about  ten  miles  east  of  Brussels 
on  the  main  road  to  Liege,  and  directly  north  of  Namur. 

Verdun. — A  town  and  first-class  fortress  in  the  depart- 
ment of  the  Meuse,  France,  situated  at  the  junction  of  the  Sedan- 
Toul  and  Rheims-Conflans  railway  lines.  The  detached  forts 
surrounding  Verdun  form  a  circle  of  about  twenty-five  miles 
circumference,  and  are  placed  both  on  the  right  and  left  banks 
of  the  Meuse,  and  connected  by  defence  works  with  the  forts 
of  Toul.  Verdun  ranks  as  the  piost  strongly  defended  town 
of  eastern  France,  and  has  a  civihan  population  of  about  14,000. 

Vosges. — A  department  of  France  on  the  eastern  frontier, 
adjoining  Upper  and  Lower  Alsace  of  Germany,  traversed  by 
the  rivers  Meurthe  and  Moselle,  and  bounded  on  the  east  by 
the  Vosgea  Mountains,  wliich  form  the  frontier  line  between 
France  and  Germany  practically  from  the  Swiss  border  in  tl:e 
south  to  the  latitude  of  Strasbourg  in  the  north,  where  they  bend 
north-eastward  into  the  territory  of  Lorraine  and  the  Bavarian 
Palatinate.  Forming  as  they  do  a  natural  frontier  line,  the 
Vosges  crests  are  of  great  strategic  importance,  and  occupation 
of  them  is  absolutely  necessary  to  a  force  desiring  to  dominate 
either  the  department  of  Vosges  on  the  west  or  the  territory 
of  Alsace-Lorraine  on  the  east. 

Warcmme. — The  first  point  of  importance  westward 
from  Liege  on  the  Liege-Louvain  road.  Situated  about  ten 
miles  west  of  Liege,  on  the  railway  from  Liege  to  Antwerp  and 
Brussels. 

Wavre- — An  important  fortified  point  on  the  road  between 
Antwerp  and  Brussels,  about  ten  miles  south  of  Antwerp.  It 
is  situated  slightly  to  the  east  of  the  main  line  connecting  the 
two  cities,  and  its  two  forts  form  protection  for  the  importaal 
town  of  Mechlin  a<:ainst  an  advance  from  the  nortL 


16» 


August  22,    1914  LAND     AND     WATER 

BELGIANS,     DUTCH,    AND    GERMANS 


Copyright.  Ntwspaper  lUuslratioHS        FIRST  AID  ON  THE  FIELD 
Tending  the  wound  of  a  Belgian  Officer 


Copyright,  Newspaper  lUustratiotu 

DUTCH  AND  GERMAN  SOLDIERS  SIDE  BY  SIDE 
On  the  Dutch-Belgian  Frontier  at  Emsden 


,^^,f^-^ 


V  •■ 


/:• 


Copyright,  Sew%paper  lUuslralions 


GERMAN  CAVALRY  OF  THE  2Sih  REGIMENT  ENTERING  MOULAND.  NEAR  VISE 


955 


LAND     AND     WATER 


August    22,     I9I4 


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ING FLANNEL  AT 
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tract Department  st  fine  Con- 
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deluxe.  It  reaches  the  pipe  in  the 
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No  silting  of  parts  to  the  bottom 
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Supp/rmm    la  Lanc  and  Watkh,  August  22,  1914 


The  Great  War  : — 
Notes  and  Criticisms      -        -        --        -        -i* 

Belgians,  Dutch  and  Germans  _        _        _         -  955 

Field-Marshal  Sir  John  French         -         -         -         -  953 

The  Nation's  Bulwarks  ------  956 

With  the  Belgian  Army  ------  954 

Miscellaneous  :— 

Current  Sport        -------  957 

Horse  Sales  --------  958 

Irish  Red  Setter  Trials  ------  957 


WAR  AND  SPORT 

IT  is  with  but  a  thinly  veiled  apology  that  we 
present  this  week's  issue  of  "  The  County 
Gentleman  and  Land  &  Water,"  in  which  it 
will  be  noticed  that  sport  and  all  appertain- 
ing thereto  has  taken  a  subordinate  place.  In 
presenting  the  first  of  our  war  series  we  feel  sure 
that  we  shall  still  command  the  patronage  of  our 
old  and  valued  subscribers,  and,  in  addition,  draw 
on  a  larger  field  of  readers  owing  to  the  nature  of 
the  special  articles  we  shall  publish. 

In  departmg  from  our  sporting   traditions — 

traditions  lasting  over  fifty  years — it  must  not  be 

imagined  that  we  are   in  any  way  advocating  a 

diminution  of  sport  throughout  the  country.     On 

the  contrary,  we  believe  that  at  the  present  time 

the  very  best  thing  that  the  manhood  and  youth 

of  Britc'n  can  do  is  to  occupy  their  spare  time  in 

indulging  in  all   the  healthy  games  and  pastimes 

which  in  the  past  have  made  us  the  nation  that  we 

are  to-day.     It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  had  we 

not  been  such  a  trained  race  of  athletes  it  would  not 

have  been  possible  for  us,  at  such  short  notice,  to 

have  been  prepared  to  place  in  the  field  such   a 

magnificent  body  of  men  as  we  have  done  and  are 

doing — a    Force   requiring   but   little   training    in 

order  to  convert  them  into  valuable  soldiers.     At 

this  period  of  tension  and  nerve  strain  we  cannot 

too  strongly  emphasise  the  advantage  to  be  gained 

by  those  who,  though  not  actively  engaged  at  the 

front,    are    doing  yeoman    service    for    King   and 

Country  at  home  by  taking  as  much  active  exercise 

ao  is  possible,  thus  keeping  the  brain  free  from  fag 

and  the  body  healthy  and  vigorous.     Therefore 

let  the  hunting  man  be  ready  for  the  meet  when 

possible,  the  cricketer  to  take  the  field,  the  golfer 

eager  for  a  few  hours  on  the  links,  the  footballer 

(in  due   season)  for  his  game  and,   last  but  not 

least,  the  sportsman  to  the  moors  and  the  stubbles, 

each  with   the  knowledge  that  by  so  doing  he  is 

preparing  himself  in  the  best  manner  for  the  call- 


should  it  come — to  shoulder  a  rifle  in  defence  of 
King  and  Country.  We  realise,  however,  that, 
much  as  we  advocate  the  adoption  of  sport,  the 
country  does  not  want  to  read  of  games  and 
sporting  events.  There  is  so  much  anxiety  and 
deep  feelmg  for  those  who  are  engaged  in  uphold- 
ing the  honour  of  England  in  the  great  Armageddon 
which  is  convulsing  Europe  and  disturbing  the 
whole  world,  that  the  reading  of  such  light 
literature  seems  almost  irreverent.  All  eyes  are 
and  will  be  concentrated  tor  some  months  on  the 
various  fields  of  battle,  whether  by  land  or  sea. 

In  order  to  keep  our  readers  up  to  date  and 
well  informed  regarding  the  chances  of  the  great 
struggle,  we  have  pleasure  in  announcing  that  we 
have  been  fortunate  in  obtaining  the  services  of  two 
of  the  foremost  writers  in  their  respective  spheres 
of  military  and  naval  warfare.  Mr.  Hilaire  Belloc 
is  writing  a  series  of  articles  each  week  dealing 
with  the  great  War.  His  works  are  so  well  known 
that  it  is  almost  unnecessary  to  introduce  him  to 
our  readers,  but  attention  must  be  called  to  his 
remarkable  article  in  the  "London  Magazine"  in 
May,  1912,  in  which  he  predicted,  with  most 
extraordinary  accuracy  in  detail,  the  proceedings 
of  the  Germans  at  Li^ge  as  they  have  happened 
at  the  opening  of  the  present  War.  Mr.  Belloc 
was  born  in  1870,  and  alter  leaving  school  gained 
his  practical  knowledge  of  martial  matters  whilst 
serving  in  the  8th  Regiment  of  the  French  Artillery. 
He  matriculated  at  Balliol,  and  took  first  class 
honours  in  History  in  1895,  and  from  igo6to  1910 
he  represented  South  Salford  in  Parliament. 

Our  Naval  column  will  be  supplied  by  that 
eminent  writer  of  maritime  matters,  Mr.  Fred.  T. 
Jane,  who  in  this  particular  line  of  work  is  the 
most  able  authority  on  the  subject  at  the  present 
day.  He  is  the  author  of  "The  Imperial  Russian 
Navy,"  "The  Imperial  Japanese  Navy,"  "All  the 
World's  Aircraft,"  "The  British  Battle  Fleet," 
and  many  other  well-known  naval  works. 

In  addition  to  the  above  we  shall  publish  a 
weekly  diary  of  the  War  and  a  valuable  gazetteer 
and  topographical  guide  to  the  War  zone.  The 
information  contained  will  be  thoroughly  up  to 
date,  and  copies  of  the  paper  will  be  delivered  to 
our  readers  within  a  few  hours  from  the  time  the 
copy  leaves  the  authors'  hands. 

We  propose  continuing  these  series  of  War 
articles  until  further  notice. 


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