The cradle of the war, the Near East and Pan-Germanism. With foreword by A. Lawrence Lowell

ii CIVILE OF

.CHARLES WOODS. ERGS.

THE
CRADLE OF THE WAR

THE NEAR EAST AND PAN-GERMANISM

BY
H. CHARLES WOODS, F.R.G.S.

(Lecturer before the Lowell Institute 1917-1918)

WITH FOREWORD BY A. LAWRENCE LOWELL

PRESIDENT OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY

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1918

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MY MOTHER AND FATHER

WHOSE DEVOTED ENCOURAGEMENT

HAS BEEN MY CONSTANT SUPPORT

IN A STUDY OF THE PROBLEMS

HEREIN DISCUSSED

FOREWORD

Americans regard the Balkan question much as
Lincoln in his Second Inaugural Address described their
view of slavery. "All know", he said, "that this
interest was somehow the cause of the war. . . .
Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or
the duration which it has already attained. Neither
anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease
when, or even before, the conflict itself should cease.
Each looked for an easier triumph and a result less
fundamental and astounding."

There is, however, this difference between slavery
and the Balkan question, that slavery, as we now see,
was the real and only cause of the Civil War. Without
the difference in social institutions the North and
South would never have been in armed conflict, and
in spite of the blunders of reconstruction the abolition
of slavery has removed all danger, and suspicion of a
danger, of war between the two sections of the coun-
try. Whereas the Balkan question, in its narrower
sense, was rather the occasion than the cause of the
struggle that is now raging. Nevertheless, the Near
East has long been a source of anxiety to European
statesmen, a storehouse of explosive material that

vii

viii FOREWORD

might at any time start a general conflagration. It
will so remain until its problems are settled upon a
rational and permanent basis and until the danger of
Teutonic domination has been removed.

The United States will be compelled to take part in
the settlement of these problems. But at present its
people are, in most cases, wholly unfamiliar with the
racial, religious, political and geographical factors that
lie beneath the questions to be solved. They ought,
therefore, to welcome a book which portrays the recent
history and condition of the peninsula and of its com-
ponent nationalities, by a writer who has studied his
subject on the spot.

A. Lawrence Lowell.

Harvard University, Cambridge
June 12, 1918

PREFACE

A PRELIMINARY duty of the author of a modern
volume, and especially of one dealing almost exclu-
sively with events which have led up to, or taken
place during, the world's greatest war, seems to be to
explain the reasons for which the book has been written,
to state the methods by which the information con-
tained in it has been acquired, and to assist the reader,
who has neither time nor desire to make close acquaint-
ance with the whole of its pages, to discover at a
glance what particular sections will be of the greatest
interest to him.

Before performing this duty, I will, however, give
the reasons which have prompted me to call this book
*'The Cradle of the War." For many years, and more
especially since the re-establishment of the Ottoman
Constitution in 1908, the numerous problems con-
nected with the Near East have been a source of
continual danger to the world's peace. This was due
in part to the fact that the Balkan Peninsula and Asia
Minor might at any time be the scenes of insurrection,
massacre, or local conflict, and in part — a larger part
— to the international rivalry which has existed for
years concerning a future domination over many of
the areas in question.

These localities, together with the waterways which
they control, form the great and only corridor from

X PREFACE

west to east and from north to south, and they con-
stitute the natural highway from Central Europe to
Asia and from Russia to the Mediterranean. Thus,
ever since the birth of her Mittel-Europa scheme,
Germany has been determined to push open the
Near-Eastern door, in order to be able to strike a
deadly blow at the very vitals of the British Empire,
and at the same time automatically to prevent Russia
from expanding towards warm water. As I shall
endeavour to show, therefore, it is not so much the
murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his
Consort at Serajevo on June 28, 1914, as the develop-
ments preceding and following that occurrence which
make the Near East the region of primary existence
of the present conflict — the area in which many of
its most important events have been sheltered and
nurtured.

In the manner that a little cot is made ready for the
expected child, so did the enemy prepare for the war
which he was designing. This preparation, in progress
from the time of the accession of the present Emperor
to the throne in 1888, was carried out by the gradual
development of Germanic influence and power in
Turkey, and by a constant and determined opposi-
tion to the establishment of stable conditions in the
Near East. From the moment of the birth of his
war child, too, the Kaiser has been an ever vigilant
mother, for instead of allowing the real primary cause
of the world conflict to be forgotten, he has consistently
rocked the "cradle" in the apparent hope that she
who performs this task rules the world.

My most important object in publishing this volume
is to explain to the wide public, now interested in the

PREFACE xi

subject, the importance of a situation which is not
always clearly understood by those who have not had
the opportunity of visiting the Near East. In par-
ticular I hope to prove that, as the enemy has con-
sistently worked for the establishment of Germanic
control throughout the East, any peace which failed
to put an end to the danger of the success of such an
object, and any arrangement which would be ineffec-
tive in setting up an anti-Germanic barrier there,
must be considered as entirely unsatisfactory from the
Allied and American standpoint.

The book itself, which is based upon the manuscript
from which I drew the notes for my course of lectures
upon "War and Diplomacy in the Balkans ", delivered
before the Lowell Institute at Boston during the
winter of 1917-1918, makes no pretension to be a
continuous account of all the events which have
taken place during the period which it covers. It
claims merely to point out the meaning of some of
the questions which have led up to and influenced
the present situation. Moreover, whilst I have been
a constant visitor to the countries about which I am
writing, and whilst I have had numerous conversations
with many of the most prominent men mentioned in
the text, I have endeavoured to bring my local knowl-
edge of the countries and of their peoples to bear
instead of depending upon information furnished by
statesmen, political chiefs, or historians, who, however
honest they may wish to be, are almost invariably
possessed of some national prejudice or personal feel-
ing which prevents them from seeing this great world
question with that fairness which is so necessary if
we are to be in a position to grasp its true present

xii PREFACE

and future significance. As far as possible, too, I
have attempted to produce facts in preference to ex-
pressions of personal opinion, for, under existing cir-
cumstances, it is a clear and impartial judgment by
the public rather than the verdict of a particular
man which will lead to the amelioration of conditions
which must be terminated by the present War.

Of the twelve chapters of which the volume is com-
posed the first is given up to a summary of the events
which occurred during the sixty years preceding the
outbreak of the War — a summary in course of which
I have sought to point out that the so-called settle-
ment, which followed the Balkan Wars, was of such
an unsatisfactory nature as merely to prepare the
way for a renewed conflagration. Chapters II to VII
inclusive are devoted to accounts of recent develop-
ments, in the various Balkan States and in Turkey,
and in particular to reviews of the causes which have
led the different countries in question to assume their
individual war policies. In the course of these sec-
tions I have alluded to the value of the Serbo-Monte-
negrin resistance of 1914-1915, to the meaning and
importance of the Mesopotamian and Syrian cam-
paigns, and to the reasons responsible for the Rou-
manian defeat and for the situation existing in Greece
during the greater part of the War.

Chapters VIII and XI, which respectively contain
accounts of the Military Highways of the Balkans
and of the Bagdad Railway, accounts founded upon
recent papers which I have read before The Royal
Geographical Society, are in some ways more detailed
and more comprehensive than are certain other sec-
tions of the book, and this because the war importance

PREFACE xiii

of these communications is such as specially to merit
their careful and attentive study.

In Chapters IX and X no attempt is made to pro-
vide detailed accounts of the progress of the Dar-
danelles and Salonica campaigns. Here my principal
idea has been to suggest the objects and results of
those undertakings, and to utilize my personal knowl-
edge of the areas in question for the purpose of trying
to make clear the numerous geographical and military
diflSculties with which these operations were or are
beset.

Throughout these pages repeated reference is made
to the fact that, for years, the Central Powers have
worked not for stable government but for unrest in
the East. Nevertheless I have devoted my last
chapter to the subject of the Mittel-Europa scheme,
for the importance of that question and especially of
its latest developments in Roumania and Russia is
such as to necessitate its individual and separate
consideration. In this section, too, I have included
a few pages about the future — a future which must
entail the establishment of conditions likely to result
in local peace and accord, and therefore in a guarantee
that no excuse will exist for outside interference on the
part of those possessed of aggressive and tyrannical
designs.

Among other reasons the fact that they are far too
numerous prevents me from tendering my thanks by
name to all those, belonging to the countries about
which I have written, in England and in America,
who have given me their valuable assistance during
the years I have followed the development of events
in the Near East. I wish, however, to signify my

xiv PREFx\CE

appreciation to those, who, by their attendance at
and by their interest shown in my lectures at home
and in America, have stimulated me, an Englishman,
far from home, to undertake the difficult task of the
preparation of such a book as this in war time. I
must also take this opportunity of expressing my
thanks to The Royal Geographical Society for the
permission given to reproduce the several maps, pre-
pared for my original papers, by that Society, to the
American Board of Foreign Missions for the many
courtesies shown to me by its representatives in the
East and in America, and to the British Pictorial
Service for the provision of certain of the illustrations
included in this volume.

H. Charles Woods.

New York, July 11, 1918.

CONTENTS

PAOE

Foreword by A. Lawrence Lowell vii

Preface ix

List of Illustrations . . xxi

The Near East before the Great War .... 1
Historical summary of events prior to the re-establish-
ment of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908 — American
missions in Turkey — Earlier German intrigues — The
advent of the New Regime in Turkey — The Bulgarian
declaration of independence — The annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina by Austria — Effect of the Young Turk-
ish revolution in the Ottoman Empire — Reasons for
Christian discontent with the New Regime — The Turco-
Italian war — Formation of the Balkan League — The
first Balkan war — Differences between Bulgaria and her
neighbours — The second Balkan war — Pan-German
policy from 1908-1913.

n

Serbia and Montenegro in the War . . . .41
Necessity for an outlet on the Adriatic — Results of
the Balkan wars — The murder of the Archduke Franz
Ferdinand — The Potsdam Conference of July 5,1914 —
The Austrian ultimatum — Campaigns of 1914-1915 —
The typhus scourge — Attitude towards Bulgaria — Re-
treat to the Adriatic — The role of Serbia in 1914 — Re-
cent Montenegrin history — Montenegro and the War.

xvi CONTENTS

III

PAGE

Turkey and the War 59

Turco-Greek relations — Growth of German influence
at Constantinople — Scheme for Armenian reforms —
Situation immediately after the outbreak of War —
Germanic intrigues — Allied difficulties — Arrival of
Goeben and Breslau at Constantinople — Events im-
mediately leading to the entry of Turkey into the
European conflagration — The Armenian massacres of
1915 — The Russo-Turkish operations in northeastern
Asia Minor — The Mesopotamian campaign — The
British advance in Palestine.

IV

Bulgaria and the War 89

Recent history — Effect of the Balkan Wars —
Concessions required by Bulgaria — Importance of
geographical position — Value to both groups of belliger-
ents — Negotiations preceding the entry of Bulgaria into
the War — Attitude of the Allies.

V

ROUMANIA AND THE WaR 105

Special position of Roumania — The Bessarabian,
Transylvanian, and Dobrudjan questions — Difficulties
after the outbreak of the War — German determination
to force Roumania into the War on one side or other —
Events of 1916 — Roumanian military system — The
plan of campaign — Russian faithlessness — Peace
terms imposed by the Central Powers.

VI

Greece and the War 127

Recent history — M. Venezelos and King George —
The protective rights of England, France, and Russia —

CONTENTS xvii

PAGE

The Graeco-Serbian Treaty — The mentality of the
Greeks — The attitude of King Constantine — Patriot-
ism of M. Venezelos — The Aegean Island question —
First struggle between the King and M. Venezelos —
Second retirement of M. Venezelos — Allied attitude
towards Greece — Abdication of King Constantine —
Return to power of M. Venezelos.

VII

Albania and the Albanians 153

Importance of the country — Creation of the Prin-
cipality — General geographical description — Nation-
ality, religion, and language — The Balkan Wars —
Regime of Prince William of Wied — The European War
— The Italian occupation of the south — The future.

vm

Military Highways of the Balkans .... 174
General description of the Balkan Peninsula —
Turkish opposition to railways — The Danube as a
thoroughfare for military traffic, and as an obstacle to
through communication — The Belgrade-Constanti-
nople trunk route — The Nish-Salonica railway — The
Luleh Burgas-Salonica and the Salonica-Monastir
lines — Roumanian railways — Serbian railways — Bul-
garian railways — Turkish communications — Bosnian
railways — Communications between the Adriatic coast
and the interior — Railways and roads between Old
Greece and the remainder of the peninsula — Routes
leading into Bulgaria from the south and southwest.

IX

The Dardanelles Campaign 215

Importance of position of Constantinople — General
objects of the campaign — The land defences of the

xviii CONTENTS

Turkish capital — The Bosphorus and its defences —
Description of the Dardanelles — The Peninsula of
Gallipoli and its defences — The Asiatic coast and its
defences — Disadvantageous position of an attacking
fleet — Earlier naval operations — Events following
landings of April 25 — The Suvla Bay operations —
Three misconceptions — Necessity for withdrawal of
expeditionary force — Results achieved.

The Riddle of Salonica 244

Objects of the undertaking — General description
of Macedonia — Port and town of Salonica — The
climate — Importance of the Vardar Valley — Area
immediately surrounding city — Significance of the
Rhodope Balkans — Country to the northwest of Salo-
nica— Original Allied attempt to advance up the Vardar
Valley — The passive defence of Salonica — The ad-
vance upon and capture of Monastir — Difficulties of
the campaign — Results.

XI

The Bagdad Railway and the War .... 271

Military importance of line — Earlier suggestions
for a railway across Asiatic Turkey — Pan-German
reasons for a line from the Bosphorus to the Persian
Gulf — Present state of completion — Historical and
political accounts of the line — Smyrna- Afiun Karahissar
railway — Smyrna-Aidin and Mudania-Brusa lines —
Bagdad railway concession of 1903 — The Taurus
section — Concession for railway to and port of Alex-
andretta — The Amanus section — Anglo-Germano-
Turkish negotiations, 1913-1914 — Facilities for travel
— Cost of the railway to Turkey — The great southern
arm or Syrian railways — Bearing of coming im-
provements upon Allied operations — The future.

CONTENTS xix

XII

PAGE
MITTEL-EUROPA 310

The Lichnowsky disclosures — Changed Germanic
objects after the outbreak of the War — Methods
employed for their realization — Enemy successes in
the East — Necessity for the creation of an Anti-
German barrier — True basis of a permanent Balkan
peace — Salonica and Constantinople after the War
— The future of Turkey.

Postscript 337

Some Useful Publications on the Same Subject . . 339
Index 343

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Turkish Prisoners in Bagdad Frontispiece

PACING PAGE

M. Gueshoff 22

The Serbian Parliament House at Belgrade .... 42

The Old Turkish Palace at Nish 42

Bitlis, an Important Town in Eastern Asia Minor ... 76

Reading the British Proclamation to the Inhabitants of

Jerusalem, after the Capture 88

M. Take Jonescu 108

M. Venezelos 136

Durazzo from the Sea 156

Berat, a Picturesque Town in Southern Albania . . . 208

The Rock-like Coast of the Gallipoli Peninsula . . . 236

The Village of Bulair 236

The Arch of Galeritis at Salonica 250

British Mountain Battery Going into Position on the Salonica

Front 268

Baron Marshal von Bieberstein

310

MAPS

The Military Highways of the Balkans .
Southern Part of the Gallipoli Peninsula
The Bagdad Railway and Its Tributaries
The Railways of Syria and Palestine
The Balkan States . . . . ' .

176
226
271
304
360

THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE
GREAT WAR

History has proved that in the past the Near East
has been both the scene of and the reason for war after
war. Consequently throughout the last few decades,
and especially from the time of the re-establishment of
the Ottoman Constitution in the year 1908, the polit-
ical and military situations in the Balkan Peninsula
and in Asiatic Turkey have been questions of all-
preponderating importance. This has been due in
part to the continued state of unrest prevailing there,
in part to the rivalry existing in Europe concerning the
futures of these areas, and in part — a greater part —
to the intrigues of the Central Powers, who finally
brought about the present war. In short the Near
East, which was the immediate cause and, when coupled
with the Pan-German desire for domination from
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, to a great extent the
actual reason of the present conflagration, has been for
many years " The Danger Zone of Europe " — a " danger
zone" which in its turn has played an all -important
role in events which have taken place since the summer
of 1914.

2 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

In order to be able to arrive at a proper under-
standing of the problems existing there immediately
prior to the outbreak of the present war, it is necessary
very briefly to refer to various historical events which
have taken place in connection with that area during
the last half -century. The Crimean War, undertaken
as it was in support of Turkey against Russia, con-
stituted the substitution of the anti-Russian and pro-
Turkish policy of Lord Palmerston for the opposite
programme advocated by Mr. Bright, who championed
the cause of peace and of the Oriental Christians.
During the ensuing twenty years, with the exception of
the constitution of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870
and the consequent spiritual independence of the Bul-
garian from the Orthodox Greek Church, no develop-
ments of far-reaching significance occurred. In 1875,
however, when a revolution against Turkish authority
broke out in Herzegovina and to a certain extent in
Bosnia, it appeared probable that the explosion would
spread throughout the Balkans. That revolution was,
however, localised, and it was not until 1877, as a
result of the massacre of Bulgarians in the present
kingdom of Bulgaria in 1876, that Russia took up
arms to protect the Slavs of the south and waged
a war which constitutes an event of far-reaching
importance.

Whilst the actual results of that war were that the
Sultan lost a considerable area of his European do-
minions, that the Principality of Bulgaria and the
Province of Eastern Roumelia were created, that the
independence of Serbia and of Roumania from Turkish
suzerainty was recognised, and that part of Armenia
was annexed to Russia, the real bearing of that cam-

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR 3

paign upon the future history of this part of the world
is bound up not so much with these results as with
what would have been its consequences had Russia
been left undisturbed to settle her differences with
Turkey. A preliminary treaty was signed between the
representatives of the Tsar on the one hand and those
of the Sultan on the other on March 17, 1878.
Known as the Treaty of San Stefano, in Europe it
created a large Bulgaria and in Asia it practically freed
the Armenians from Turkish yoke. But that agree-
ment did not meet with the approval of the British
Government, which feared that Bulgaria would become
a puppet state of Russia, and that the expansion of
Muscovite power in Asia would constitute a menace to
the British position in the East. The results were
that a convention, known as the Cyprus Convention,
by which Great Britain guaranteed the integrity of
the Ottoman Empire, in exchange for the Sultan's
promise to introduce the necessary reforms in his
dominions, and for the lease of the Island of Cyprus,
was signed between the British and Turkish govern-
ments, and that a European Congress was summoned
at Berlin in June, 1878. The Treaty of Berlin, which
was the outcome of that Congress, handed back large
districts of what is known as Macedonia in European
Turkey, inhabited almost exclusively by Bulgarians,
to Turkey, and, although nominally insisting upon re-
forms in that area and in Armenia, in fact left the
people of those unhappy districts at the mercy of the
Ottoman authorities. In short, whilst the Russo-
Turkish Campaign of 1877-1878 was really the first
war fought for the independence of Macedonia and
Armenia, its results and the manner in which the

4 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

Great Powers allowed Turkey to ignore her obligations
of reform were the direct causes of the events which
led up to the Balkan conflagrations of 1912 and 1913
— conflagrations which in their turn left the way ready
for the present war.

With the British support of Bulgaria in 1885, when
Eastern Roumelia was incorporated in that country,
with the attitude taken up by the British Government
during the Armenian Massacre crisis of 1894-1896,
and with the granting to Crete of an autonomous
regime in 1897, there occurred a nominal change of
policy. But even after that no serious attempts were
made by Europe to prevent the prolongation of a reign
of terror in Macedonia and Armenia — a reign of ter-
ror which was rapidly becoming unbearable. In 1903
there came the massacres in Macedonia — massacres
which, be it known, were accepted as constituting the
slaughter of a Bulgarian and not of a Serbian popula-
tion — and the beginning of a new British policy arising
not from Russian but from German danger. Later in
that year there was formulated an arrangement known
as the Murzteg Scheme of Reforms — a scheme which
gave Austria and Russia the predominating share in
the control of Macedonia but which admitted the
presence and support of the other Great Powers. By
it and by the agreements subsequently made, all sorts
of reforms were promised. Civil assessors were pro-
vided, and European oflScers, representing all the
Great Powers except Germany, who did not participate,
were appointed for the purpose of seeing that these
reforms were actually carried out by the Ottoman
Government. This scheme, which constituted a tardy
effort on the part of Europe to see that the treaty

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR 5

obligations of Turkey were actually fulfilled, was
however treated as a scrap of paper; the hands of
the international officials were tied, and the state of
Macedonia daily grew worse and worse. In Armenia,
too, the lot of the people gradually became more
dreadful, for whilst reforms were discussed and pro-
posed, Turkey, profiting by the differences always
existing between the Great Powers, endeavoured
slowly to annihilate this unhappy race.

It was during this troublous period that the Ameri-
can Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions,
which has its headquarters in Boston, established
numerous posts, hospitals, and schools in Asia Minor,
and began to perform such indefatigable work for the
amelioration of the Ottoman Christians. The repre-
sentatives of this organisation, many of whom I have
been privileged to meet, and much of whose work I
have been able to watch, have devoted themselves with
untiring devotion and under conditions of complete
self-denial, to the task of bettering the lives of and
educating the peoples who, as a consequence, have
grown to realise the true meaning of Western culti-
vation and civilisation. In short, the existence of the
Robert College at Constantinople and of the College
for Girls in the same city, which are not directly under
the control of the above-mentioned Board, together
with the judgment and the high-mindedness of the
American missionaries, are largely responsible for the
facts that the name of the United States has grown
to be spoken of with reverence, and that America is
respected throughout Armenia, Bulgaria, and Albania.

Whilst the policies of England and Russia during
the thirty years following the signature of the Treaty

6 THE CRADLE OF, THE WAR

of Berlin may be described as those of procrastination,
the Central Powers and particularly Germany were
working and intriguing for the maintenance of a state
of unrest in the East destined to prepare the way for
the eventual realisation of their policies. Indeed,
ever since the accession of the present Emperor to the
throne in 1888 that ruler has been carefully develop-
ing his influence in the East. One year later, and in

1889, His Majesty paid his first visit to Constantinople
— a visit more or less connected with the then recent
.grabbing of the Scutari-Ismid railway and with the

concession for the prolongation of that line to Angora
as a German concern. Directly afterwards, early in

1890, by the "Dropping of the Pilot" there was in the
retirement of Bismarck a clear reversal of the policy
based upon the assertions of that statesman to the
effect that the whole Eastern question was "not
worth the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier." Be-
fore and particularly after the appointment of Baron
Marshal von Bieberstein, who had then been a personal
friend of the Kaiser's for many years, as Ambassador
in Constantinople in 1897, Germanic policy was run
with the sole object of securing concessions in and gain-
ing the favour of Turkey. Indeed although so far as
the Balkan States were concerned the Kaiser at this
time endeavoured to screen his intentions behind a
nominally Austrian programme, he was really pre-
paring the way for the realisation of his Pan-German
dreams in the Near and Middle Easts. Thus the
power of Von der Goltz Pasha, who introduced the
present military system into Turkey in 1886, and of
his pupils was greatly increased until the Ottoman
army was finally completely under Germanic control.

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR 7

After the Turco-Greek War of 1897, the Government
of BerHn favoured Turkey in the settlement. In 1898
the Emperor paid his second visit to the Ottoman
Empire — a visit nominally undertaken as a peaceful
pilgrimage to Jerusalem but an excursion really decided
upon as an elaborately arranged coup de theatre. It
was during that visit that the German ruler even went
so far as to proclaim himself the friend of the Sultan
and of all the Moslems who venerated him "for al-
ways"— a declaration no doubt in part responsible
for the Bagdad Railway concession which almost
immediately followed. In the later nineties, too,
whilst reserving their right to a voice in its final settle-
.ment, Germany and Austria withdrew from the Concert
of Europe, so far as concerned the Cretan question,
thereby, of course, securing the good will of the ex-
Sultan. Abdul Hamid's refusal to introduce reforms
in his administration, continued unrest in his European
dominions, and the appointment of European officers
to the Macedonian gendarmerie in 1906, were all in
their turns utilised to further the enemy's cause. In
short, whilst divergencies of opinion among the Great
Powers in regard to the Eastern question would, in
any case, have rendered combined action in favour of
reforms most difficult, the definite support given by
Germany to the Sultan, with the express purpose of
securing a powerful ally when "The Day" came,
actually encouraged that ruler in the maintenance of
a regime which finally became an actual disgrace to the
whole civilised world.

So much for the events which took place during the
period preceding the developments which immediately
led to the Young Turkish Revolution of July, 1908.

8 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

The way for that revolution was made ready by the
fact that the atrocities and misgovernment permitted
by the Sultan had created a state of things which was
not only intolerable to all the subject races of the
Empire, but also to the more liberal-minded Turks
themselves. The actual outbreak of 1908 resulted in-
directly from the existence of the Anglo-French and
the Anglo-Russian ententes, which came into being
respectively in 1904 and 1907, and directly from the
meeting of King Edward with the ex-Tsar at Reval,
on June 9, 1908. It was that meeting which decided
the Committee of Union and Progress, then still a
secret organisation, to take immediate action. That
action was rendered possible by the spreading of untrue
propaganda in the Ottoman army to the effect that the
British policy bound up with the Crimean War had
been reversed, and that England and Russia had now
united with the object of bringing about the dismem-
berment of Turkey. In addition, the Albanians, who
were holding a Congress at Ferisovitch in the follow-
ing month, were utilised by the Young Turks to de-
mand from Abdul Hamid a constitution, the meaning
of which they did not understand. This demand,
which was embodied in a telegram, nominally from the
Albanians, but really concocted by the Committee of
Union and Progress assembled at Uskub, and addressed
to the Sultan, finally convinced His Majesty, who de-
pended upon but none the less feared his Albanian
Guard, that a constitution must be granted. The
decree actually establishing the New Regime was
signed at the end of July, 1908.

Internationally and locally the Young Turkish Revo-
lution, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR 9

Austria-Hungary, and the declaration of independence
by Bulgaria which followed that revolution, mark an
all-important epoch in the development of affairs in
the Balkans, and in European history, which for years
has been so closely bound up with the situation in the
Near East. Internationally speaking, whilst the revo-
lution in Turkey for a time caused the Ottoman Gov-
ernment to turn towards England instead of towards
Germany, the annexation of Bosnia and the inde-
pendence of Bulgaria are of primary importance, and
therefore I will begin by a brief reference to the mean-
ing of these events.

As a result of a cabinet council held at Rustchuk
during the night of October 4-5, the actual decla-
ration of Bulgarian independence was made by King
Ferdinand at Turnovo, the ancient capital of Bul-
garia, on October 5, 1908. Prior to this whether or
not any formal agreement had been arrived at be-
tween the Austro-Hungarian Government and Prince
Ferdinand concerning the annexation of the then
only ** occupied" provinces and the declaration of
Bulgarian independence has always been far from
clear. However this may be, and however vehemently
both the parties who tore up the Treaty of Berlin in
October, 1908, may deny that any arrangement was
made, it is certain that when Prince Ferdinand ar-
rived at Budapest on September 23, he was received
by the Emperor Francis Joseph with royal honours.
There is no doubt, too, that the proclamation of Bul-
garian independence, at an early date, was actually
decided upon by Prince Ferdinand during his visit
to Vienna at the end of September. The question
whether, and if so when. Count Aehrenthal was actually

10 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

officially informed of the Bulgarian programme is
extremely delicate. Although, on October 3, the
Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister officially denied
to the British Ambassador at Vienna all knowledge of
the impending declaration of Bulgarian independence,
yet the Ambassador of the Dual Monarchy in Paris,
when presenting the letter announcing the forth-
coming annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to
President Fallieres on October 3, actually informed
His Excellency of the imminent declaration of Bul-
garian independence. Whatever may have been the
knowledge officially possessed by the Austro-Hun-
garian Government as to the imminence of the Bul-
garian declaration of independence it is therefore
probable that Prince Ferdinand, possibly even in
possession of Austro-Hungarian assurances that a
declaration of independence would subsequently be
permitted if the Bulgarian people remained calm during
what was expected would only be formalities concern-
ing the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, may
have considered it advisable to make good his oppor-
tunity, and effect his national coup d'etat, while the
statesmen of the Dual Monarchy were still putting the
finishing touches upon their arrangements for the
formal annexation of the already "occupied "provinces.
By far the most important international results of
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on October
7, 1908, were what may be described as the throwing
back of the Dual Monarchy into the arms of Germany,
and the accentuation of the division already becoming
clearly marked between the Triple Entente and the
Triple Alliance. The policy of Count Aehrenthal,
which seems to have been framed with the idea that

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR 11

the annexation of the two already "occupied " provinces
would be a mere formality, will probably be handed
down in history as one of the greatest mistakes ever
made in statesmanship. Instead of strengthening the
European position of the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment, the annexation, apparently made in ignorance
of its immediate and far-reaching consequences, forced
the Government of the late Emperor to turn to Ger-
many for diplomatic assistance — assistance which
was given but only at the expense of Austria once more
becoming the mere puppet of her northern neighbour,
intsead of being able to develop her own independent
existence. Moreover, as I shall show elsewhere, the
policy of Count Aehrenthal went a long way towards
increasing the tension already existing between Austria-
Hungary and Serbia — a tension as a result of which
it was certain that, at the given moment, Russia would
come to the support of her little Slav brothers. It was
these consequences which so greatly enhanced the dif-
ficulties accruing between Austro-Hungary and Russia
during the Balkan Wars — difficulties which were in
part responsible for the unsatisfactory arrangement
of 1913.

The settlement between Turkey and Bulgaria, fol-
lowing the declaration of independence by King
Ferdinand on October 5, 1908, in a way constituted a
set-off to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
because, whilst the Russian Government lost prestige
at home and abroad as the result of its inability to
come to the assistance of Serbia, it gained international
reputation and strengthened its position in both direc-
tions by stepping into the breach between Bulgaria
and Turkey. In February, 1909, and therefore when

n THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

the crisis between these two countries had been in
progress for four months, a deadlock in the negotiations
had been reached. Russia then addressed a circular
Note to the Great Powers, signifying her willingness to
come to some arrangement with the two parties con-
cerned — an arrangement which would make good to
Turkey the difference between the sum already ten-
dered to and that claimed by her. Finally, and about a
month later, the Muscovite Government cancelled
part of the then remaining seventy-four instalments
of the 1878 war indemnity due to her from Turkey,
and accepted in exchange the approximately 82,000,000
francs already tendered to Turkey by Bulgaria. By
this arrangement Russia may have been temporarily and
materially the loser, but she thereby gained credit in
the arena of European diplomacy by preventing an
outbreak of hostilities in the Balkans — an outbreak
which in all probability it would have been impossible
to localise.

To summarise and to give any comprehensive idea
of the meaning of the Young Turkish Revolution in
what was then the Ottoman Empire itself, or to de-
scribe the effect of that movement in the countries
bordering upon Turkey, are questions of the utmost
difficulty. In July, 1908, as I have already said, the
Young Turks successfully brought about a coup d'etat,
which, though it endowed the people with a nominal
constitution, in fact created, in the form of the Com-
mittee of Union and Progress, a hidden and secret
government even more autocratic than that of Abdul
Hamid. Much has been written upon the subject of
the organisation and work of that Committee, and
though many be the conversations which I have had

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR 13

with its prominent members, I can assert here, without
fear of contradiction, that but very few, except the
inner and secret ring of Young Turks themselves, even
now understand more than the vaguest details of the
manner in which this mysterious organisation attained
its power, spread its influence, and, from the moment
of the change of regime in 1908, kept the entire govern-
ment of the country in its hands. All that need be
said here, therefore, is that this body, which on various
occasions has made a pretence of coming out into the
open and becoming an oflScial organisation, has never-
theless really existed as a secret group of individuals,
the exact roles and power of whom nobody has ever
been able to discern with certainty. Thus whilst we
have all heard a great deal about the influence and
prestige of men like Enver and Talaat Pashas, the
outside world knows but little of others, such as Doctor
Nazim, who really constitute and are the secret in-
fluence behind the throne. This all-important poli-
tician scarcely ever appears in public, his name rarely
figures in the papers, and he has never taken a govern-
mental post. In conversation he appears most mod-
erate, most liberal, and quite honest. But his never
changing one-sidedness, his secret chauvinism, and his
determination to ignore the true meaning of Liberalism,
render him absolutely typical of the Young Turk
mentality, and in fact make him the personification
and the actual backbone of the Committee of Union
and Progress itself.

The outstanding feature of the situation in the
Ottoman Empire is the fact that its ruling nation,
the Turks, constitutes only a minority of the inhabit-
ants, and that they have formed, and do form, an army

14 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

of occupation in the country which they purport to
govern. This means either that there can be no
Liberalism or Constitutionahsm in the country, or
that its ruling caste would be outnumbered and out-
voted by the various alien races of which the population
is so largely composed. When the Young Turks came
into power, they proclaimed as their motto "Liberty,
Fraternity, and Equality ", and asserted that what
they wished to bring about was a state of feeling by
which the former differences between Turks, Greeks,
Bulgarians, Arabs, etc. should be obliterated — a
state of feeling in which there would only be "Otto-
mans." But the so-called " Ottomanisation " of the
Empire really meant the attempted " Turcification "
of the subject races — an attempted " Turcification "
which has constituted and still constitutes the funda-
mental basis of the struggle which has been and is in
progress in the dominions of the Sultan.

The historical events of the years 1908-1912 are so
closely bound up with the internal situation in Turkey
that I propose to discuss them all in connection with
that situation, and to divide my remarks into three
sections, each devoted to a more or less clearly defined
stage in the development of Near-Eastern affairs.
The first stage is that which may be said to have lasted
for approximately a year from the time of the advent
to power of the Young Turks. During it the in-
stigators of the New Regime did something to im-
prove the everyday conditions of life by bringing about
the downfall of many of Abdul Hamid's spies, by in-
creasing personal security, and, up to a point, by al-
lowing freedom of speech and of the press. These
changes, together with the promise of equality for all

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR 15

Ottomans, created in the minds of the non-Turkish
inhabitants feehngs of expectancy for the future. The
leaders of the bands came in from the mountains and,
on receiving a guarantee of a general amnesty, decided
to throw in their lot with the so-called reformers. At
first a kind of millennium seemed to have come. As a
result of this, when I visited Macedonia in the sum-
mer of 1909, I found that everybody hoped that some
real reforms would be introduced, that the Government
would take the leaders of the various races into its
confidence, and that the Christian populations would
be permitted to play their part in the direction of the
country, and to work out the manner in which reform
should be executed in the best interests of the Empire
as a whole.

The Committee not only refrained from living up
to these hopes, but, having obtained an enormous
majority in the Chamber, it openly filled the whole
Ministry and all the government appointments with
men recruited from its ranks. No endeavours were
made to devote adequate sums of money to the con-
struction of roads or railways other than those required
for strategical purposes. In spite of the early and un-
doubted loyalty of the leaders of the various Christian
races, the Armenians of the Cilician Plain were butch-
ered in thousands in April, 1909, and a determined
policy destined to withdraw many of the privileges,
possessed in a greater or lesser degree by all the Chris-
tian races of the Empire, was inaugurated. Educa-
tional and religious freedom were curtailed, a brigandage
law was put into operation in Macedonia before it was
even passed by the Chamber, and the enforced sur-
render of arms was so brutally carried out that a reign

16 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

of terror was soon created, as terrible as that which
existed prior to 1908. The Bulgarians were oppressed
because of the fear of the support which might accrue
to them from their already freed brethren of the king-
dom of Bulgaria; the Greeks were persecuted on ac-
count of the then state of the Cretan question, and the
Albanians were maltreated because of their desire to
proclaim the existence of their nationality and to im-
prove their education. In short, so rapidly and so
disastrously did things develop that when I returned
to Macedonia, early in 1910, I found the condition of
things much worse than it had been only six months
previously. Instead of expectancy there was hope-
lessness, and in place of loyalty there was natural dis-
trust.

The second stage in the development of the internal
situation in Turkey extended approximately from the
beginning of the year 1910 until the end of 1911.
When I was in Turkey in the winter of 1909-1910, as
I have already explained, the non-Turkish elements
of the population were not slow to abuse the New
Regime. Albanians, Greeks, Bulgars, and Serbs alike
complained, and with reason, that the elections had
been gerrymandered, and that the Young Turks had
not fulfilled their promises made in 1908. But in 1909
these people did not assert that the Moslem population
was being armed by the Government, that men were
being illegally arrested, that Turkish bands were
being secretly formed for the purpose of exterminating
people believed to be in relation with revolutionaries,
and that Christians, marked down for death, were
being assassinated by order of the Committee of
Union and Progress. During a tour in Macedonia and

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR 17

Albania after the outbreak of the Turco-ItaHan War,
men of all nationalities informed me, I have every
reason to believe correctly, that the Turkish Govern-
ment or, perhaps more correctly, the predominating
clique of the Committee was actually sanctioning, or
at least conniving at, this state of things.

At that time the situation in Macedonia was there-
fore as bad, if not worse, than that existing prior to the
Constitution. Instead of the promised equality for
all nationalities, the non-Turkish elements of the
population had, so to speak, been placed beyond the
pale of common justice. Christians were expelled
from their farms in order to be replaced by Mouhaggirs
(Moslem emigrants) from Bosnia and Bulgaria. A
systematic and organised campaign for the murder of
a large number of Bulgarians was instituted. In
short, the Constitution had been reduced to nothing
but a name. Moreover, whereas under the Old
Regime the people enjoyed a certain protection from
Europe under various schemes of reform sanctioned
and undertaken by the Great Powers, and whereas
their religious chiefs were then treated with a certain
deference by the Constantinople Government, two
years after the establishment of the Constitution these
advantages had been done away with and instead no
amelioration in the actual system of government had
been introduced. Upon this point the feeling of the
population seems to have been well expressed in a
memorandum, drawn up by the Committee of the
Bulgarian Internal Organisation, and handed to the
Consuls of Great Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary,
and France, on October 31, 1911. After discussing
various aspects of the situation in Macedonia, this

18 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

document declared that: "Comparing the present
state of things to that which existed during the last
four years of the reign of Abdul Hamid, when there
was in Macedonia a European Control, and when the
country enjoyed a certain financial autonomy, the
people find the present situation much more abominable
and much more insupportable."

In Albania the fundamental causes of unrest — the
attempted denationalisation of the people — were the
same as in Macedonia. The system employed by the
authorities and the attitude adopted by the inhabit-
ants were, however, somewhat different. The Young
Turks, in place of the secret persecution adopted in
Macedonia, almost immediately took open measures
to endeavour to reduce these warlike mountaineers,
who had always enjoyed a sort of semi-independence,
to a state of humble obedience to the Central Govern-
ment. The result of this was that the Albanian ques-
tion, which was perhaps the most important problem
for solution by the Government, at once became a
burning question, and that the attitude of the Turkish
chauvinists brought about an almost immediate and
continuous revolution. In the summer of 1910 an
insurrection, which had for its causes the above-men-
tioned policy of the Young Turks and also the brutal
measures taken by Djavid Pasha in Albania in 1908
and 1909, broke out in the vilayets of Scutari and
Uskub. That insurrection, which was rife almost
from end to end of Northern Albania, necessitated
the sending of a considerable Turkish expeditionary
force which, although partially successful, carried out
its work with such brutality that the seeds were sown
for the Malissori Revolution which took place during

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR 19

the summer of the following year. That revolution,
which began early in 1911 and lasted until the autumn,
was really the beginning of the end so far as the Young
Turks were concerned, for it proved that the Albanians,
disorganised and divided as they were, could wring
from the Government concessions — concessions which
though never honestly carried out, nevertheless showed
to Europe and to the neighbouring Balkan States
that nothing could be accomplished in Turkey other-
wise than by force.

This was the situation in the Ottoman Empire
itself at the time of the outbreak and during the early
months of the Turco-Italian War. Beyond its Eu-
ropean frontiers, the neighbours of Turkey were wait-
ing with anxiety the development of events in the
Balkan Peninsula and elsewhere. The governments
responsible for the foreign policies of Greece, Serbia,
Montenegro, and Bulgaria, all of whose Leaders I saw
at the time, whilst professedly anxious for the im-
mediate reestablishment of peace and for the main-
tenance of the "Status Quo", were still more concerned
in making certain that, in view of the attitude of
Europe, their particular country should not be the
first to disturb the peace of this ever Danger Zone of
Europe. The positions of all these Ministers were
extremely difficult, for they were each threatened by
a like danger — a danger due to the fact that the
more chauvinistic politicians of each country were in
favour of a forward policy drawn up with the object
of endeavouring immediately to better the lot of their
brothers domiciled across the Ottoman frontier. In
Greece the Government was faced by the complica-
tions of and consequent upon the Cretan question.

20 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

At Belgrade the situation was particularly intricate,
because the Serbian Administration was forced either
quietly to witness the ill-treatment of the Serbs in
Turkey by their Moslem fellow countrymen or else
to draw the attention of Europe to a situation of dis-
order in the Ottoman Empire, by way of which alone
Serbia could gain access to the sea. At Cettinje the
Montenegrin authorities were in daily danger of find-
ing themselves in the awkward dilemma of either
refusing readmission to the discontented Albanians,
or of facing the dangerous situation to be created by
a fresh Albanian immigration. At Sofia the King and
his advisers were not only compelled to study the
feelings of the powerful section of the population which
interests itself almost exclusively in the welfare of the
Macedonian Bulgars, but they were also menaced by
the attitude of the people who thought that the time
had come for the employment of the powerful Bul-
garian army, in order to solve once and for all the
Macedonian question. Thanks, however, to the far-see-
ing and moderate attitudes adopted by M. Venezelos,
by the late M. Milovanovitch, by M. Gregovitch, and by
M. Gueshoff , the policies of Greece, Serbia, Montenegro,
and Bulgaria were so shaped that none of those coun-
tries rushed into war in the autumn of 1911, and they
therefore had time adequately to prepare for and to
make the arrangements necessary for the first Balkan
campaign.

We now come to the third stage — the negotiations
and events actually bound up with the formation of
the Balkan League — negotiations which partially
overlapped the second stage and to which I will allude
in their chronological order. M. Gueshoff became

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR 21

Bulgarian Premier in March, 1911. Shortly after-
wards and in May, tentative overtures were made to
him through the medium of Mr. James D. Bourchier
— the well-known correspondent of The Times in the
Balkans — who was then in Athens. From that
time onwards, whilst relations between Bulgaria and
Greece were certainly improved, nothing was done
until October, when the Greek Minister at Sofia in-
formed M. Gueshoff that Greece would be prepared
to support Bulgaria in case she were attacked by
Turkey, provided the latter country were willing to
enter into a corresponding undertaking. The Gov-
ernment of Bulgaria, then threatened by the mobili-
sation of the Ottoman army which took place on the
outbreak of the Turco-Italian War, agreed to those
proposals, but nothing definite was then done to in-
corporate them in treaty form.

The beginning of that war found M. Gueshoff at
Vichy, but he returned immediately to Bulgaria,
holding a conference with M. Milovanovitch, then
Serbian Premier, in the train and on his way through
that country. That conference established a basis for
the ensuing negotiations which were conducted be-
tween M. Gueshoff and M. Spalaikovitch, who was
appointed to represent Serbia. These negotiations,
which took the form of proposals and counter proposals
upon the subject of the future of Macedonia and other
matters of importance, continued in Sofia, Belgrade,
and Paris, to which latter place M. Milovanovitch
went with the King of Serbia, until the two countries
finally signed a definite Treaty of Alliance and a Secret
Annex — which are published in full by M. Gueshoff
in his book entitled "The Balkan League" — on March

22 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

14, 1912. That Treaty, which was defensive in char-
acter, definitely guaranteed the support of each party
to the other in the event of one of them being attacked
by one or more States, or in the event of any Great
Power attempting to invade or annex any part of
then Turkey in Europe in a manner contrary to the
vital interests of either party. Over and above these
stipulations, undertakings were entered into binding the
two signatories not to conclude peace independently
and arranging for the immediate formulation of a
military convention which was signed about six weeks
later.

The Secret Annex, which has turned out to be really
more important than the Treaty itself, foresaw the
probability that internal or external difficulties in
Turkey itself might render the maintenance of the
Status Quo impossible and fixed the terms upon which
action might then be taken. In addition it definitely
decided the future distribution of any areas acquired
either as a result of the defensive treaty or of what
may be called the offensive annex. Whilst all terri-
torial gains were to constitute common property, their
repartition was to take place upon a definite basis.
Serbia recognised the right of Bulgaria to the territory
east of the Rhodopes and the River Struma, whilst
Bulgaria recognised the similar right of Serbia to the
territory north and west of the Schar Mountains.
With regard to the area lying between these two
boundaries, if the two governments became convinced
that the formation of an autonomous province were
impossible, then Serbia undertook to ask for nothing
beyond a line drawn from Mount Golem on the north-
east to Lake Ochrida on the southwest. Bulgaria

M. GUESHOFF

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR 23

promised to accept this line, if His Majesty the Tsar,
who was to be requested to arbitrate, decided in its
favour. As autonomy was not then possible, the
meaning of this agreement was that the Serbs were
to claim nothing beyond the Mount Golem-Lake
Ochrida line, that the Bulgarians were to claim nothing
to the north and west of the Schar Mountains, and that
all disputes concerning the district between these two
lines, known as the "Contested Zone", were "to be
submitted to the final decision of Russia as soon as
one of the contracting parties declared that, in his
opinion, an agreement by direct negotiations is im-
possible."

The military convention subsequently signed be-
tween Bulgaria and Serbia — a convention later fol-
lowed by various agreements between the respective
General Staffs — defined the military liabilities of the
two countries towards one another in case of a de-
fensive or offensive war and laid down the obligations
of the respective parties in the case of a declaration of
war upon Bulgaria by Roumania, and of Austrian or
Turkish attacks upon Serbia. The number of troops
to be furnished by the respective countries and certain
arrangements as to their distribution were foreseen.
All manner of arrangements were made to endeavour
to secure the smooth working of the Alliance and to
prevent the development of any friction between the
commands or between the armies themselves. In
fact, had it not been for the inherent rivalry existing
between the two peoples and for their almost irreconcil-
able aspirations, the arrangements made upon paper
were so little short of perfect that one might have
expected that they would operate in war almost as

24 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

smoothly as the most formal arrangement governing
the relations of two countries in peace time.

During the period of the Serbo-Bulgarian negotia-
tions, conversations were in progress between the Bul-
garian Government and the Hellenic representative at
Sofia. These conversations failed to materialise until
after the signature of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty largely
because the Greeks were slow to accept the principle
of autonomy for Macedonia advocated by Bulgaria —
a principle based on the Twenty-third Article of the
Treaty of Berlin. However, in May, 1912, the Hel-
lenic Government agreed to the Bulgarian proposals,
and a definite Treaty was signed at Sofia on the twenty-
ninth of that month. That Treaty, also published by
M. Gueshoff, guaranteed to each of its signatories the
support of the other in case of war with Turkey, but
it made no arrangement whatever as to the future
distribution of the territories to be acquired in a
common war. It was followed three months later by
a military convention which set out the respective
liabilities of the two countries — a convention signed
immediately before the outbreak of the first Balkan
War.

There now remains only the question of the re-
lations between Montenegro and her neighbours. That
country, which had been on very strained terms with
Serbia for some years, greatly improved her relations
with Bulgaria as a result of the personal visit paid
by King Ferdinand to King Nicholas on the occasion
of the latter proclaiming himself king of his country
in August, 1910, and as a consequence of the ability
displayed by M. Kolousheff — the Bulgarian Minis-
ter at Cettinje. Notwithstanding this, there was no

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR 25

written undertaking between Bulgaria and Montenegro
at the time of the outbreak of the war, and the agree-
ment between the two countries, which is possessed of
no far-reaching poHtical importance, consisted in an
oral undertaking between the Bulgarian Minister at
Cettinje and King Nicholas, who concluded it during
September, 1912.

It is impossible and unnecessary here to enter into
details concerning the events which immediately pre-
ceded or took place during the first Balkan campaign.
By the middle of August the situation in the Ottoman
Empire had become so critical that the Austrian Gov-
ernment proposed a scheme of administrative decen-
tralisation for European Turkey. About a month
later the Turks ordered a general mobilisation — a
mobilisation replied to by the four Balkan States.
Diplomatic correspondence passed between the Great
Powers and Turkey and Bulgaria, and between the
two last-named countries. Montenegro declared war
on October 8 — a declaration which was followed
ten days later by the other three States. Thencefor-
ward the war may be considered as having been di-
vided into four more or less independent campaigns —
those in Thrace, in Central and Northern Macedonia,
in Northern Albania and the sanjak of Novibazar,
and in Southern Albania and Southern Macedonia.
In the first of these areas, where the fighting was far
more severe than anywhere else, the Bulgarians con-
tained the fortress of Adrianople and made a rapid
advance to the Chatalja Lines, which they reached in
less than a month. In the second the Serbians moved
by way of the Vardar valley and across the Turco-
Serbian frontier lying to the west of it, fought a great

26 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

and successful battle at Komanovo on October 24,
reached the seacoast early in November and entered
Monastir on the eighteenth of that month. In the
third the Montenegrins advanced into the sanjak of
Novibazar and into Northern Albania, moving upon
Scutari along the northeastern and southwestern shores
of the lake of that name. And lastly the Greeks,
while detaching a force to attack Janina, struck across
the Turco-Greek frontier in the direction of Salonica
— a city which they entered on November 9, thereby
becoming the victors in the race in progress between
them and the Serbian army coming by way of the
Vardar valley and the Bulgarian forces advancing
through Ishtib and across the Rhodope Balkans.
Early in December, when Adrianople, Scutari, and
Janina — the three great fortresses of Turkey in
Europe — still remained in Ottoman hands, an armis-
tice was concluded — an armistice which led to the
first peace congress of London, which assembled on
the thirteenth of that month. That congress which
sat intermittently for about a month proved abortive,
primarily because the Turks, partly as a result of a
coup d'etat in Constantinople, refused to agree to the
allied demands for the cession of Adrianople and for
the establishment of a frontier satisfactory to Bulgaria
in Thrace, and to a lesser degree because the Ottoman
Government was loath to agree to a fair settlement in
regard to the futures of the Aegean Islands and of
Crete.

During the first phase of the Balkan struggle two
important developments had taken place which were
destined greatly to influence the future trend of events
in Southeastern Europe. I refer to the international

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR 27

crisis arising out of the attitude of the Dual Monarchy,
secretly supported by Germany, upon the Adriatic
question, and to the differences already existing be-
tween Serbia and Bulgaria. In regard to the first of
these questions, Austria had taken up the attitude
that on no account would she permit the permanent
occupation by Serbia of the territories which she had
conquered on the east of the Adriatic. The adoption
of this policy resulted in the convocation of the London
Ambassadorial Conference which in its turn agreed to
the principle of autonomy for Albania. This naturally
constituted a great disappointment for Serbia — a
disappointment which in part led to her bad relations
with Bulgaria, and to her subsequent attempts to
secure compensation at the expense of that country.
Serbia, in face of Russian advice, bowed her head to
the inevitable, but instead of recognising that her
disappointment was due to the international situation,
she endeavoured to suggest that it resulted from
the attitude assumed by Bulgaria. Hard as was her
case, this contention was not justified, for whilst the
Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty definitely bound Bulgaria to
support Serbia in case she were attacked by Austria,
it made no mention of assistance in securing for her
a port on the Adriatic or of any obligation to render
diplomatic support to Serbia, who in fact evacuated
and was not militarily driven back from the Adriatic
coast.

Early in February, 1913, when the second phase
of the first Balkan war began, the relations existing
between Bulgaria and Serbia were therefore far from
satisfactory. Militarily speaking, the ensuing events,
during which once more the heaviest share of the

28 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

fighting fell to the Bulgarians, were for the most part
concerned with the capture of Adrianople and Janina
— which were taken respectively at the end and at the
beginning of March — and with the siege of Scutari,
which fell into Montenegrin hands under somewhat
mysterious circumstances, towards the end of April.
During this time, however, diplomatic conditions were
going from bad to worse. The assassination of the
King of Greece on March 18 had removed from the
arena of Balkan politics a man whose influence had
always been used in favour of moderation. The po-
sition as between Serbia and Bulgaria had also become
considerably aggravated, for instead of the more or
less secret and unofficial claims already made by the
former country, the Government of King Peter, which
was justified in making a point of the fact that Serbia
had voluntarily furnished an important contingent for
the operations at Adrianople, now ofiicially urged that
the Treaty of 1912 "must undergo an amicable re-
vision." So early as March, too, Serbia began to nego-
tiate with Greece for the purpose of concluding a de-
fensive treaty against Bulgaria.

The second Peace Congress which sat in London in
May therefore met in an atmosphere bristling with
difficulties and uncertainty. No secret was made of
the fact that the relations existing between the Bul-
garians on the one side and the Serbs and the Greeks
on the other were far from cordial. The international
and local situations were also greatly complicated by
the facts that the Serbs and Greeks hesitated to sign
the terms of peace prepared by the Ambassadorial
Conference and by the highly d.angerous situation
which then existed in regard to the future possession

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR 29

of Scutari. After a great deal of delay, Sir Edward
Grey, probably knowing that Serbia and Greece were
retarding matters in order to perfect their own agree-
ment against Bulgaria, made a communication to the
peace delegates which necessitated their either coming
to terms at once or preparing to leave London. Finally
the definite treaty of peace, known as the Treaty of
London, was signed on May 30 on the basis of the
terms proposed by the Great Powers some six weeks
earlier.

By this time the relations existing between the
allies had become extremely critical. Serbia was
openly demanding the revision of the Serbo-Bulgarian
Treaty because she contended that circumstances un-
foreseen in it had arisen, and that she had mobilised
a larger army than was incumbent upon her, and be-
cause she urged that it was due to her assistance that
Adrianople had fallen. Greece, with whom there was
no agreement upon the subject, was also pegging out
claims in Macedonia. But the real fact of importance
was that early in 1913, before the conclusion of the
first war and on the initiative of Greece, that country
and Serbia entered into a secret arrangement in re-
gard to the division of spoils secured from Turkey.
The basis of that arrangement was that the Greeks
would raise no objection to the Serbian retention of
Monastir — allotted to Bulgaria by the Serbo-Bul-
garian Treaty of 1912 — provided the Government of
King Peter were willing to sanction the incorporation
of Salonica in the Hellenic Kingdom. That arrange-
ment was followed by the more formal Graeco-Serbian
Treaty, which we now know to have been signed on
June 1, 1913, and therefore two days after the con-

30 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

elusion of the London Peaee Conferenee — a treaty
which obviously strengthened the hands of Serbia
and enabled her to make claims from Bulgaria —
claims which otherwise she would never have been in
a position to formulate.

It is not possible here to discuss in detail the argu-
ments put forward by the various Balkan claimants
prior to the outbreak of the second war. There
probably were conditions justifying Serbia in thinking
that she was entitled to suggest modifications in her
treaty with Bulgaria. But even if the spirit of that
treaty had not been fully acted up to by the latter
country, even if Serbia had performed more than her
legal obligations, and even if she had been compelled
to accept a European decision which constituted a
great setback to her national aspirations, the Govern-
ment of King Peter was still bound by the letter of a
document to which it had agreed. In other words,
whilst Serbia would certainly have been reasonable in
making amicable suggestions to Bulgaria, she had no
right to formulate actual demands even as a result of
gratuitous assistance concerning which she had made
no preliminary bargain. Moreover, as I have already
said, one of the most important clauses in the 1912
agreement specially foresaw the danger of a dispute be-
tween the allies and decided that, in such a case, both
parties should submit to the arbitration of the Tsar.
M. Gueshoff, the Bulgarian Premier, who resigned on
May 30, up to that time repeatedly expressed the
willingness of his Government to adopt this course
which was not then accepted by Serbia. Subsequently,
when both parties had agreed to arbitration, but when
things had already gone too far for recourse to this

I

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR 31

method of settling the dispute, an attack was made,
contrary to the decision of the Sofia Government and
without the consent of the Cabinet, by part of the Bul-
garian army, acting by the order of General Savoff
or of some superior War-Lord, upon the forces of its
still nominal allies. Whilst no condemnation of those
responsible for this attack can be too severe, the fact
that Serbia, supported by Greece, refused to listen
to the calming telegrams despatched by M. Sazonoff,
then Russian Foreign Minister, and declared war on
Bulgaria, clearly proves that these two new allies were
not averse to accepting a challenge for which they were
by this time prepared — a challenge in which they
were supported by a military contingent supplied by
Montenegro.

During the first Balkan war, Roumania played no
military part, contenting herself by claiming and
securing compensation at the expense of Bulgaria.
In the second campaign, however, that country, no
longer withheld by Russia, invaded the territory of
her Balkan neighbour, nominally with the object of
maintaining the balance of power in the Balkans, but
really for the purpose of wresting from Bulgaria an area
of territory, the possession of which she had deeply
coveted for years. This action was largely responsible
for the subsequent bad relations between the two
countries — bad relations which, as I shall show else-
where, constituted the fundamental reason of the down-
fall of Roumania during the European conflagration.

The second Balkan war was terminated by the
Treaty of Bucharest, signed in that city on August 10,
1913. That Treaty robbed Bulgaria of a large part of
Macedonia, which went to her under the Serbo-Bul-

32 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

garian Agreement of 1912, and allotted to Greece,
Kavala and Salonica, besides the large districts lying
respectively to the south and immediately to the
north of the Salonica-Monastir Railway. It also gave
to Serbia and Greece a contiguous frontier and al-
lowed to Bulgaria only a stretch of the Aegean coast
which possessed no practicable port and towards which
there was no adequate or suitable line of communica-
tion. Moreover, on the north Bulgaria lost not only
Silistria and the district which would have gone to
Roumania under the frontier rectification arranged by
the Protocol of Petrograd, but also a further area of
territory on the south of the Dobrudja (including the
towns of Turtukeuie and Dobric), thereby establishing
the frontier as running from the more or less im-
mediate neighbourhood of Rustchuk on the Danube
to that of Varna on the Black Sea. These divisions —
unnatural and unfair as they were — are those which
made the Treaty of Bucharest not an instrument of
peace but of future war.

During the second Balkan war, the Treaty of Lon-
don, signed between the former allies and Turkey, was
torn up by the latter country, who reoccupied Adri-
anople whilst the Bulgarians were engaged elsewhere,
and therefore practically without opposition. This
"scrap of paper" action by the Ottoman Government
created an entirely new situation so far as Turkey and
Bulgaria were concerned, and left those two countries
to negotiate independent terms of peace after the
conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest. Those terms
were embodied in the Treaty of Constantinople, signed
on September twenty-fifth. They substituted for the
Enos-Midia line, agreed to in London, a boundary

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR 33

which practically followed the old Turco-Bulgarian
frontier from the Black Sea to Mustafa Pasha, turning
thence in a southerly direction, and subsequently
hugging the bank of the Maritza as far as its mouth
and the Aegean coast. In addition to the fact that the
Bulgarians thereby lost Kirk Kilissa, Adrianople, and
Demotika and a large part of Thrace, the great sig-
nificance of this frontier was that it left Dede Agatch
— the only Aegean port possessed by Bulgaria — un-
provided with railway connection wrth the remainder
of that country except by a line which ran for some
miles through Turkish territory. An arrangement
was subsequently made between the two Governments
as to the use of this line, but that arrangement ob-
viously proved unsatisfactory to Bulgaria, and as I
shall show elsewhere, it was subsequently abrogated
by the cession of the territory in question to Bulgaria
just before the entry of that country into the present
war.

During much of this time and throughout the winter
of 1912-1913 and the spring and summer of the latter
year, the international situations and the actual position
in the Balkans were highly critical as the result of
events in and connected with the new Principality of
Albania. I have already said that, as a consequence
of the attitude of Austria, the autonomy of that State
was recognised in principle by the Ambassadorial
Conference in December, 1912. Four months later,
and during the second stage of the first Balkan war,
Scutari, the most important town in the whole coun-
try, fell into the hands of the Montenegrins, who at
first absolutely declined to leave it. The policy thus
taken up by King Nicholas was in entire opposition

3.4 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

to the programme of the Central Powers, and for a
moment it seemed destined to lead to a European war.
Subsequently, however, it was agreed by the Great
Powers that certain other areas, the population of
which is predominatingly Albanian, should be in-
cluded in Serbia or Montenegro, and that Scutari
should remain Albanian. Following upon this agree-
ment that city was occupied by contingents landed
from the international blockading fleets under the
command of a British admiral — Sir Cecil Burney —
and these contingents remained in occupation of the
city and its immediate surroundings up to the very eve
of the outbreak of the present war.

Over and above the Scutari question the position
and future of Albania were of predominating impor-
tance, for it was during and immediately after this
period that Europe was called upon to choose a ruler
for the State which she had created and to fix the
positions of her northern and southern frontiers,
which run through areas, the nationality of whose
inhabitants it is not easy to decide. Indeed so difficult
was the delimitation of the southern frontier, where
Italy voiced the legitimate aspirations of the Albanians
almost as fervently as did Austria in the north, that
the problem was only settled by the decision of the
Powers to the effect that the questions of the southern
Albanian frontier and of the future ownership of the
Aegean Islands, both of which were in their hands,
should be interdependent. The result of this decision
was that Greece, whose claims in the Aegean were as
reasonable as her demands in Southern Albania were
unjustifiable, secured all the Aegean Islands occupied
by her during the Balkan Wars, except Imbros, Tene-

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR 35

dos, and Castellorizzo, which, owing to their proximity
to the Dardanelles, were allotted to Turkey, and that
she (Greece) was practically compelled to accept an
Epirus frontier, with which she has remained as dis-
satisfied as have the Turks with the distribution of
the Aegean Islands.

From an international standpoint the development
of events in the Balkans, between the summer of 1908
and the close of the Balkan Wars, is of far-reaching
significance. The Young Turkish Revolution of 1908,
which at first seemed destined greatly to minimise
Germanic prestige and power at Constantinople, really
resulted in an opposite effect, for in spite of the sup-
port of England for Turkey during the Bosnian and
Bulgarian crisis of 1908 and 1909 a gradual reaction
subsequently set in. This was due in part to the
cleverness and regardlessness of Baron Marshal von
Bieberstein and in part to the circumstances arising
out of the policy adopted by the Young Turks. For
instance, whilst the Germans ignored the necessity for
reforms in the Ottoman Empire, so long as the Turks
favoured a Teutonic programme, it was impossible for
the British Government or the British public to look
with favour upon a regime which worked to maintain
the privileged position of Moslems throughout the
Empire, which did nothing to punish those who in-
stigated the massacre of the Armenians of Cilicia in
1909, and which was intent upon disturbing the "Status
Quo" in the Persian Gulf and upon changing the situ-
ation of Egypt to the Turkish advantage. Such in-
deed became the position that even the Turco-Italian
War, which might well have been expected to shake
the confidence of the Ottoman Government in the

36 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

bona fides of Italy's ally, did not seriously disturb the
intimate relations which were gradually developing
between Berlin and Constantinople. Here again
enemy foresight was displayed, for in addition to the
Austrian objection to the inauguration of any Italian
operations in the Balkans, the German Government,
when the position of Baron Marshal von Bieberstein
had become seriously compromised as a result of the
Italian annexation of Tripoli, which he could not pre-
vent, suddenly found it convenient to transfer that
diplomatist to London and to replace him by another,
perhaps less able, but certainly none the less successful
in retaining a grasp over everything which took place
in the Ottoman Capital.

This brings us to the period immediately preceding
the outbreak of the Balkan Wars — wars which for
different reasons all Europe primarily desired to pre-
vent and subsequently to localise. The Central
Powers, on their side, naturally feared the disruption
of the Ottoman Empire, before they were ready to
derive the full advantages from such an event, and,
acting through the mouthpiece of the Austrian Govern-
ment, took the lead in proposing decentralisation for
European Turkey in August, 1912. On the other
hand, no doubt representing the Triple Entente, which
was honestly in favour of the maintenance of the "Sta-
tus Quo" and of peace, Russia repeatedly counselled the
Balkan allies not to push matters to extremes. Later
and after the Turks had ordered a general mobilisation
— a mobilisation replied to by the Balkan States —
the Great Powers addressed Notes to the Governments
of Turkey and of the Balkan States advocating, in the
first direction, the introduction of reforms, and stating,

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR 37

in the second, that should war break out they would
*' tolerate at the end of the conflict no modifications
of the present Status Quo in the Balkans."

These Notes were subsequently treated as mere scraps
of paper both by the senders and the recipients. More-
over, whilst as a result of the ensuing campaigns the
area of Turkey in Europe was in fact reduced in size
from 65,350 square miles to 10,880 square miles, the
Balkan Wars at one time seemed destined to terminate
in a manner even more disadvantageous to Germany.
Thus, if the four States — Bulgaria, Greece, Monte-
negro and Serbia — who fought in the first war had con-
tinued on good terms with one another, the whole
Balance of Power in Europe would almost certainly
have been changed. Instead of the Ottoman Empire,
which prior to the outbreak of those hostilities was
held by competent authorities to be able to provide
a vast army, then calculated to number approximately a
million and a quarter men, there would have sprung
up a friendly group of countries which in the near
future could easily have placed in the field a combined
army approximately amounting to at least a million
all told. As the interests of such a confederation,
which might well have been joined by Roumania, would
have been on the side of the then Triple Entente, the
Central Powers at once realised that its formation or
its continued existence would mean for them not only
the loss of Turkey, but also the gain for their enemies
of four or five allies, most of whom had already proved
their power in war.

The Kaiser was not then prepared to make war, his
fleet was not ready, his Zeppelins were not perfected,
and the enlargement of his Kiel Canal was not com-

38 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

pleted. In exerting a restraining influence in Austria,
Germany therefore then contented herself by creating a
favorable situation for the future. The Ambassadorial
Conference, under the chairmanship of Sir Edward
Grey, succeeded in temporarily maintaining the so-
called Balance of Power in Europe, and it may also
have been the means of localising the Balkan conflict.
But Germany, acting through the mouthpiece of
Vienna, encouraged the rivalry which existed between
Bulgaria and her former allies — a rivalry which ended
in the second Balkan war. That war, and particularly
the fatal Treaty of Bucharest, favoured as it was by
Germany, led not to a settlement, but simply to a
holding in suspense of the numerous Near-Eastern
questions which had been the means of shaking the
European concert to its very foundation. In short,
whilst Germany did not manage to preserve the integ-
rity and to protect the interests of her friend Turkey,
by separating the former allies she did bring about the
establishment of a state of things enabling her in this
present war to utilise the support of the Ottoman Gov-
ernment to almost as great an advantage as if there
had been no Balkan campaign at all.

To summarise and to recapitulate the causes and
the results of the Balkan Wars it may be said that
the first campaign would probably not have occurred
had the Young Turks made any endeavours to intro-
duce in Macedonia and Albania even some of the re-
forms by the promise of which they at first secured not
only the good will of Europe but also that of the subject
races of the Ottoman Empire. As far as the second
war is concerned, that would certainly not have taken
place had it not been for German intrigue which en-

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR 39

couraged rivalry between the Balkan States, and had
the former allies, one and all, displayed a greater spirit
of moderation towards one another. With regard to
the results of these campaigns, over and above those
to which I have already referred, the entry of Roumania
into the arena of Balkan politics and the birth of the
autonomous Albanian State, were events of primary
significance.

From a local standpoint, Turkey, reduced from the
position of a European power of high importance to
that of an Asiatic State, possessed only an outpost
on the European side of the Straits. Bulgaria, who
undoubtedly accomplished very much the hardest
work in and provided the greatest number of troops
for the first war, gained but relatively little from a
campaign which never could have been thought of,
begun, or carried out without her co-operation. Serbia,
although achieving success on the south and east,
was left still without a free access to the sea — an ac-
cess for the purpose of obtaining which she really joined
the Balkan League. Montenegro, who had secured
big gains, obtained neither Scutari nor a port to re-
place Antivari, commanded as it is by the Austrian
fortress of Spitza. Greece, who made the smallest
sacrifice in, but gained the greatest benefit from, the
war, did not secure possession of all the territory
which she coveted in Southern Albania, and she re-
mained face to face with a continued Turkish menace
as a result of her acquisition of the Aegean Islands.
For these reasons it was certain that Bulgaria would
seize the first opportunity of endeavouring to redeem
her position, that war between Serbia and her most
hated neighbour — Austria — could not long be post-

40 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

poned, and that Turkey would intrigue in Europe and
threaten the Greeks with the object of trying to regain
possession of the Aegean Islands. In short, the so-
called settlement of 1913 really left the situation in
the Balkans more unnatural and more beset by dangers
than had been the case even during the worst years
of the reign of Abdul Hamid.

n

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO IN THE WAR

Although the European Concert prevented an
immediate outbreak of war as a result of the Balkan
campaigns, the facts, which I have already given, must
be sufficient to prove that the events of the years
1912-1913 created a merely temporary situation, the
dangers and complications of which it is impossible
to exaggerate. Almost all the numerous and impor-
tant questions which had previously existed remained
unsettled. Moreover, whilst a sort of a new Balkan
alliance, composed of Serbia, Montenegro, Greece,
and Roumania, was supposed to have sprung into exist-
ence, the interests of these countries were so diverse
that it was impossible to hope that they would be of
mutual and immediate assistance to one another in
case of a fresh upheaval brought by certain of the ques-
tions still unsettled. Thus although the long-talked-of
war cloud had burst, although two of the most wonder-
ful campaigns of modern history had been fought, and
although the much-desired hostilities had been localised,
little if anything had really been done to solve the
countless problems which for years had not only en-
dangered the peace of the Near East but also that of
all Europe.

m THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

With regard to Serbia the question of an outlet to
the Adriatic has been the foundation of everything
which has taken place for the last ten years. This is
the case because, being an agricultural country in which
large numbers of cattle and pigs are reared, she must
have a free and continuous means of exporting her
livestock without being placed in ever recurring danger
of the imposition of an embargo rather for political
than for commercial or sanitary purposes. The crisis
of the years 1908-1909, concerning the annexation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, entirely resulted from the
justifiable claim made by the little Slav State, namely,
that she should receive compensation for what she
felt was a blow to her great aspiration — the creation
of a Greater Serbia with its own access to the sea.
Again whilst in 1912 Serbia was undoubtedly led to
risk her national existence and, for the moment, to
forget her rivalry with Bulgaria, with the avowed
object of improving the lot of the Serbs then domiciled
in Turkey, the fact that she hoped to secure a seaport
at that time was certainly possessed of a far-reaching
influence upon her policy. Consequently although
the Balkan Wars resulted in the dominions of King
Peter being nearly doubled in size, yet as that object
was not realised, these wars ended in a way which
was at bottom completely unfavourable to a people
who have played such a valiant part in the European
conflict. Thus when I visited Belgrade in the late
autumn of 1913, I noticed, instead of the blissful joy
which one would have expected to find existing among
a people who had then fought two victorious cam-
paigns and added such enormous territories to their
country, that a kind of mysterious gloom seemed to

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The Serbian Parliament House at Belgrade

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The Old Turkish Palace at Nish

From a Photograph by the Author

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO IN THE WAR 43

prevail in all directions. Whilst no Serbian denied it,
none could or would explain its real reason. It was
that everybody knew it would be impossible to pursue
and to develop the national policy of the country, and
especially to make an advance towards the sea, with-
out a serious conflict with the most important and the
strongest of Serbian enemies — Austria.

So far as Serbia was concerned after the Balkan
Wars the real source of danger therefore grew more
than ever to be the daily increasing difficulties between
the then Triple Alliance and Triple Entente and partic-
ularly between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Indeed
it was almost certain that the Ministers of the Dual
Monarchy would not continue long to look with favour
upon a peace which, so long as it lasted, had upset
their whole recent policy. Thus whilst Austria-Hun-
gary had prevented Serbia from obtaining an outlet
upon the Adriatic and whilst she had created Albania,
she had not succeeded in avoiding the establishment of
a common frontier between Serbia and Montenegro —
a common frontier which was to be one of the reasons
for the improvement in the relations between those
two countries. These changes were entirely opposed
to the interests of the Dual Monarchy, for in addition
to the fact that they established a Slav barrier, though
not a sufficient barrier, to an Austro-German advance
towards the southeast, they increased the prestige and
power of Serbia and Montenegro among the Austro-
Hungarian Slavs in a manner destined still further to
complicate the task of the government of the Emperor
Francis Joseph. With regard to Russia, who lost
a considerable amount of influence in the Balkans
and particularly in Serbia, as a result of her inability

44 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

to champion the Adriatic interests of that country
during the crisis of 1912-1913, it was apparent that at
any given moment the Ministers of the Tsar might
find (as they subsequently did find) themselves in
a position in which it would be quite impossible for
them quietly to witness any further interference with
the national development of the "Little States", who
certainly did not receive all the support which they
expected would be forthcoming from Petrograd during
the negotiations of 1913.

That Austria was at once opposed to the benefits
secured by Serbia during the second Balkan war is
now proved, for we know, from the speech made by
Signor Giolitti in the Italian Chamber in December,
1914, that the day before the signature of the Treaty
of Bucharest and on August 9, 1913, the Government
of the Dual Monarchy communicated to Italy and to
Germany its intention of taking action against Serbia.
This action was, however, prevented by the opposition
of Italy and presumably also by that of Germany, who,
believing the time to be unfavourable, opposed a for-
ward policy on the part of her ally throughout the
Balkan Wars. The result was that whilst the policies
of Germanic Powers certainly received a certain set-
back by the defeat of Turkey, Count Berchtold was
entitled to claim a temporary diplomatic success as
consequences of the destruction of the original Balkan
League and of the creation of a situation, in which,
when the supposedly proper time for action had ar-
rived, it would require a mere spark to ignite not only
the Balkan but also the European fire. That spark
was the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his
consort at Serajevo on Sunday, June 28, 1914. But

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO IN THE WAR 45

that event, dangerous as in any case it would have
been from a local standpoint and so far as the relations
between Austria and Serbia were concerned, was
really inflammatory because it fell at a moment when
the Emperor William and his advisers, who were not
ready for war during the Bosnian annexation crisis or
the Balkan Wars, thought that Great Britain was
fully occupied with the situation in Ireland, that the
internal situation in Russia was such as to prevent
that country from effectively supporting Serbia, and
that Italy would at least maintain her neutrality.

The Kaiser, who had just performed the opening
ceremony of the enlargement of the Kiel Canal — a
ceremony at which the British fleet was represented —
returned immediately to Berlin, in which city I arrived
two days after the murder. Ignoring altogether va-
rious subsequently published accounts of ensuing
events, such as that which appeared in The Times on
July 28, 1917, and particularly that excellent narrative
of Mr. Morgenthau, formerly American ambassador to
Turkey, which constitute absolute proof that war was
definitely decided upon at an Imperial Conference held
at Potsdam on July 5 — I was always convinced that
some such decision was taken in Berlin at that time.
The atmosphere which then prevailed — an atmosphere
which was deliberately created — was represented by
such statements as the necessity for the " chastisement of
Serbia " — statements made in the press, in the cafes, and
in the trains. Thus whilst later an artificial feeling of
calm was in its turn promoted, and whilst the Emperor
left Berlin on July 6 for a yachting cruise, purposely to
throw dust in the eyes of Europe, no doubt has ever ex-
isted in my mind that the Austrian ultimatum, delivered

46 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

at Belgrade on July 23, was actually concocted in Ber-
lin within a week of the murder of the Archduke, and
that no amends on the part of Serbia for an atrocity
for which her Government at least was not responsible
would have affected the course of events which were
definitely planned in Berlin two or three weeks before
any mobilisation measures were taken in France,
Russia, or Great Britain. If any further proof of the
above suggestions be required, it may perhaps be found,
at least in part, in the fact that to the student of Euro-
pean affairs it was obvious, as soon as the notorious
ultimatum had been delivered, that its conditions
were so irrevocable as to show that Austria this time
was not acting alone or in opposition to the will of
Germany.

Moreover, whilst it was equally certain from the
outset that, whatever were the organisations which
brought about the death of the heir apparent to the
Austro-Hungarian throne, the Government of the
Dual Monarchy would surely seize the opportunity
of demanding an explanation from Serbia, the wording
of the document which gave birth to the War was so
harsh and so unreasonable as to make Vienna unlikely
to have been its birthplace. Thus when Serbia, within
the specified time, accepted "in principle" (only with
the reservations to be expected from the Government
of a Sovereign State) the demands of her enemy, and
when Austria immediately broke off diplomatic rela-
tions, it was perfectly clear that the latter country
acted not upon her own initiative but at the instiga-
tion and with the direct support of Germany. This
being the case, all that need be said here is that within
five days from the time of the delivery of the original

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO IN THE WAR 47

ultimatum, Serbia and Austria were at war, and that
nothing which was or was not done by England, France,
or Russia would have been likely to avoid the explosion
in which all the Great Powers, except Italy, immediately
became involved.

From the time of the outbreak of the hostilities
between Austria and Serbia on July 28, until the
subjugation of that country by the enemy in the late
autumn of 1915, events in the dominions of King Peter
may be said to have been divided into three stages.
The first lasted from the beginning of the war approxi-
mately until the end of 1914. The Austrians directed
their first efforts against Belgrade, only separated from
enemy territory by the Save and Danube, hostilities
being practically confined during the first ten days to a
bombardment of that city and to the partial destruc-
tion of the Save bridge by the Serbians. On or about
August 12, however, the enemy began a real attack —
an attack delivered upon the capital and also against
the northern and western frontiers of Serbia protected
by the above-mentioned rivers and by the Drina.
The attack from across the Danube never seriously
developed, and Belgrade was not then taken. The
Austrians, on the other hand, having entered Serbia
in the northwestern corner of that country, were
eventually defeated between Shabatz and Losnitza
in an engagement known as the Battle of Jadar, which
took place about the middle of August. Partly as
an indirect result of this Serbian victory, and partly
as a consequence of the situation in Russia, the invad-
ing armies were then driven back or withdrew into
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Early in September the
forces of Serbia and Montenegro united in these prov-

48 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

inces, the first-mentioned occupying Vishegrad on the
Serbo-Bosnian frontier and contingents of the two
countries ultimately advancing to the immediate
neighbourhood of Serajevo.

During the first half of September a second invasion
of Serbia took place. This time the Austrians, who
had brought up reinforcements, moved across the
River Drina. The left or northern flank of this force
was defeated, the right subsequently being driven
back in every district save one during very hard fight-
ing which occurred in the second week of September.
For the two following months the position was practi-
cally one of stalemate, neither side seriously advancing
or retiring across the Austro-Serbian frontier. But in
November, and after the entry of Turkey into the
war, the Austrians came on in great force and shelled
the Serbians out of their trenches, compelling them
to retire from their frontier and from Valievo and to
remove their headquarters from that town to Kraguye-
vatz. The Serbians then took up positions along a
range of hills extending in a more or less southerly
direction from Belgrade, later surrendering that city,
from which the Government had removed to Nish
directly after the outbreak of hostilities. On Decem-
ber 3, however, when fresh troops had been brought
up and more ammunition become available, the gal-
lant old King, who in spite of his age and physical
condition took the field himself, made a fiery and
patriotic speech, which cheered on the army to victory.
The Austrian centre was pierced and the right or
southern flank was completely routed. At first the
enemy's left or north flank was only frustrated in
its endeavours to drive home its attacks upon the

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO IN THE WAR 49

Serbian right. But this latter section of his Hne,
which had advanced too slowly, soon suffered the fate
of the right, and the Austrian rout became general
about December tenth. The Serbians took up the
pursuit immediately and, as the distances are short,
Valievo was regained on the eighth, and Belgrade re-
taken, after a desperate battle, on December four-
teenth. In short, within a fortnight from the time of
the loss of the capital, that city was not only once more
in Serbian hands but the army of King Peter had won
a victory which, it was said, had cost the enemy some
sixty thousand in killed and wounded.

The second stage in the development of affairs in
Serbia is that concerned with the events which occurred
between the enemy defeat in December, 1914, and the
Austro-Bulgarian advance which took place in the
autumn of the following year. Whilst this was a
period of almost complete military quiescence, it was
an epoch during which events of far-reaching impor-
tance took place in and connected with Serbia. To
begin with, it was then that the country, the sanitary
conditions in which were quite impossible, was afflicted
by a scourge of typhus. So severe indeed was the
epidemic and so terrible were the sufferings of the army
and people that this may be called the typhus phase
of the war — a phase during which, if credible eye-
witnesses can be believed, some two hundred thousand
victims perished in the course of a few months. Indeed
the fact that the whole nation was not blotted out and
that it did not practically cease to exist was largely
due to the medical assistance sent to Serbia by America
and by Great Britain. The Serbian army was not
equipped with proper hospital arrangements and sup-

50 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

plies, and facilities for the maintenance of the neces-
sary cleanliness were non-existent. In short, it was
only after the arrival of foreign Red Cross missions,
especially that of Lady Paget and those accompanied
by Doctors Strong, Jackson, and their colleagues, many
of whom came from Boston, that some sort of sani-
tary conditions were established and that Serbia was
practically cleaned up. Among other measures taken
by these gentlemen was the establishment of a system
of wash-trains. People undressed in tents, carried
their clothes to one car, got washed and inspected in
another, and then went back to receive their clean
bundle of garments. When the work had been com-
pleted in one district, the train was moved on to another.

Throughout the greater part of this period most
important diplomatic negotiations were in progress
with regard to the Balkans. In February, Italy, whose
attitude towards the Adriatic problem has often been
resented by the Serbs almost if not quite as keenly
as is that of Austria-Hungary towards the Southern
Slav question, once again took measures which mate-
rially influenced the Balkan situation to the advantage
of Serbia. More than three months before that coun-
try entered the war, the Government of King Victor
Emanuel informed Austria that it would regard any
further action in the Balkans by the Dual Monarchy as
an unfriendly act. Though this may not have been the
object, the effect of such an action was to prevent
a renewed attack against the Serbs, when they were
in the throes of the typhus scourge.

During the first nine months of 1915, and particu-
larly during the summer and early autumn of that
year, the Serbians were passing through a most critical

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO IN THE WAR 51

period in their history. This was due, on the one
hand, to the internal disaffection which prevailed in
large parts of Southern Serbia, and which resulted from
the attitude of the Government towards the alien popu-
lation of the districts annexed after the Balkan Wars,
and on the other to the negotiations then in progress
between the Allies and the Balkan States in regard
to the provision of concessions for Bulgaria — con-
cessions almost certainly destined to have brought
that country into the War against Turkey and the
Central Powers. Serbia, instead of recognising that
her future prosperity and even her independent exist-
ence can be assured only by the defeat of Austria and
of Germany, and not by the success of her own arms
alone, failed to see the necessity for subordinating her
immediate interests to the good of the Allied cause.
In other words, for months the Serbian Government,
or more correctly the Military Party, exalted by tem-
porary victory, turned a deaf ear to the suggestions
that they should concede to Bulgaria at least some of
the disputed areas of Macedonia — areas which that
country was determined to try to secure, by peace or
by war, during the present conflagration. The result
of this attitude, together with the policies of the then
neutral Greece and Roumania, was that, in place of
accepting the necessity for what would certainly have
been difficult and disagreeable sacrifices, other and
less wise counsels were followed — counsels which
have been largely responsible for the almost immediate
subjugation of Serbia and for the condition in which
that country now finds herself.

As I shall show, when I come to discuss the above-
mentioned negotiations at greater length in connec-

52 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

tion with Bulgaria, there were faults not only in the
attitudes of the Balkan States but also in the Allied
diplomacy. These faults do not, however, justify the
wholesale criticisms of those who have never realised
the difficulties of the Balkan situation, and in partic-
ular they do not make reasonable the contention that
the Allies tried to or did sacrifice Serbia in 1915. Once
Bulgaria entered or was on the point of entering the
War on the other side, no measures which could have
then been taken would have saved the army of King
Peter from total defeat. Thus even did Serbia pro-
pose, as her advocates state that she did propose,
to attack Bulgaria before the army of that country
was fully mobilised, and even had the Allies advised
her (Serbia) not to take these measures, which has been
denied officially, such would have been good advice,
for had the Serbian army advanced towards the east
at the time in question, nothing could have saved it
from defeat at the hands of Austria and of Bulgaria
— defeat in an area where, instead of being able to
be evacuated from the Albanian coast, the Allies would
have been powerless to come to its assistance. In
short, as it was not feasible for Great Britain and for
France to undertake a Balkan expedition and to land
troops in neutral Greece, as Serbia suggested, during
the complicated negotiations preceding the entry of
Bulgaria into the War, the failure to save Serbia was
not due to any military fault on the part of the Allies,
but to the strategic position of our enemies, to their
overwhelming strength, and to the enormous geographi-
cal and political difficulties which then existed in the
Balkans.

The third stage in the development of events in

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO IN THE WAR 53

Serbia begins from the entry of Bulgaria into the War
in October, 1915. Prior to and at that time the Austro-
Germans concentrated in strength on the west bank
of the River Drina and to the north of the Save and
Danube. Immediately after the rupture of relations
between the Allies and Bulgaria, Von Mackensen ad-
vanced from the first-mentioned area, whilst other
enemy forces crossed into Serbian territory to the south-
west of Belgrade and in the immediate vicinity of the
point where the Morava flows into the Danube. A
few days later, and on October 14, two more or less
independent Bulgarian forces advanced into Serbia,
the one directed on Nish and Pirot and into the north,
or old part, of that country, and the other aimed at
Uskub and at the areas of Macedonia coveted by the
Bulgarians. The Austro-German-Bulgarian armies
operating in the north soon established connection,
and Belgrade having been taken on October 10, the
arsenal town of Kraguyevatz as well as Nish — the
temporary capital — were in enemy hands by the
end of the first week in November. The Allied forces
based upon Salonica were unable seriously to influence
the situation, and by the middle of that month the
whole of the Serbian army which had not already been
captured was in retreat towards the Adriatic. The
Government, temporarily established at Prisrend, was
subsequently forced to move to Scutari, where it
remained until the evacuation of that town in the face
of the enemy. Finally during the closing weeks of
1915, and after passing through hardships which it is
impossible to describe, all that remained of the Serbian
army was transferred by the Allied fleets from the
Albanian coast to Corfu, where it was re-equipped and

54 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

reclothed in order to prepare it for its future and valiant
role in the Salonica campaign. Thus, with the occu-
pation of all old Serbia by Austro-Bulgarian forces
and with the capture by the Bulgarians of almost all
the areas, including Monastir, which they had coveted
for years, temporarily ended the independence of Serbia
— an independence, the re-establishment of which is
still one of the fundamental aims for which the Allies
are waging war.

With the exception of Monaco, San Marino, and
Andorra, Montenegro is the smallest independent
State in Europe. This independence was formally
recognised by Turkey and the other Great Powers
who signed the Treaty of Berlin in the year 1878.
The kingdom now has an area of approximately 5600
square miles and a population of about 516,000 souls.
Although the country possesses a House of Assembly,
the rule of King Nicholas has, for all practical pur-
poses, always been absolute. In his own words. His
Majesty is both ruler of Montenegro and father of its
inhabitants . Elsewhere Cettin je — the capital — would
be little more than a village. Its population only num-
bers about four thousand. The country is poor, and
derives most of its revenue from land taxes, customs, and
monopolies. During the reign of King Nicholas, who as-
cended the throne of Montenegro in the year 1860, sev-
eral wars have even threatened to blot out the country
from the map of Europe. Thus in 1862 the campaign
against Turkey was attended by disastrous results for
Montenegro. In 1878, by the non-acceptance of the
Treaty of San Stefano by the Great Powers, Montenegro
lost advantages which would otherwise have been hers.

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO IN THE WAR 55

Indeed, in that year and by the Treaty of Berhn,
Prince Nicholas was compelled to hand over Dulcigno
to Turkey, to cede Spitza, which dominates the port
of Antivari, to Austria, and to accept the condition
imposed upon him by which the port of Antivari and
all the waters of Montenegro should remain closed to
ships of war, and that certain police functions, along
the coast of Montenegro, should be carried out by
Austria-Hungary. Whilst Dulcigno was returned to
Prince Nicholas in 1880, the disadvantageous position
created by the remaining clauses of the 29th Article
of the Treaty of Berlin were not only never forgotten
by the people, but they were also the reason largely
responsible for the Austro-Montenegrin crises which
arose between 1878 and 1909. In this latter year,
however, although no changes were made in regard
to Spitza, it was arranged between King Nicholas and
the Austrian Government, through the medium of
Italy, that all restrictions formerly placed upon the
sovereign rights of Montenegro along her coast should
be removed, and that, although Antivari was to retain
the character of a commercial and unfortified port,
yet it was to be open to ships of war. It is to this
change, made directly after the Bosnian crisis of 1908-
1909, that reference was made in the published version
of the original Treaty, reported to have been made be-
tween Italy on the one side and Great Britain, France,
and Russia on the other, just before the entry of Italy
into the War when it said,^ in speaking of the neutralisa-
tion of parts of the eastern coast of the Adriatic, that

^ This Treaty, now reported to have been replaced by another, was
printed in Current History — a monthly magazine of the New York Times
for March, 1918. .

56 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

"Montenegro rights are not to be infringed in so far as
they are based on the declaration exchanged between
the contracting parties in April and May, 1909."

Although the Balkan Wars brought about the annex-
ation of an area of territory which more or less doubled
Montenegro in size, yet the result of these wars was
not entirely favourable to that country. Amongst
other reasons, this was due to the facts that the Mon-
tenegrins then failed to realise their great national
aspiration — the permanent possession of Scutari —
and that the prestige of the Serbian royal family and
of the Serbians as fighters was so greatly increased
that everything Serbian became extremely popular
in Montenegro. Whilst prior to these wars the rela-
tionship existing between the two countries was
often far from cordial, subsequently the position was
so changed that the shortcomings of the Montenegrin
dynasty and the probability of a union between the
two States were openly discussed in Cettinje. The
formation of a common diplomatic service and of a
combined army was already under consideration during
the early months of 1914. Under such circumstances,
even had not the War broken out, it was unlikely that
Montenegro could long have continued to maintain an
independent existence. These conditions, together with
a long-standing hatred of Austria, prompted the Mon-
tenegrins to throw in their lot with Serbia almost directly
after the outbreak of hostilities between that country
and the Dual Monarchy. From that time until the end
of 1915 the role of King Nicholas' army consisted in the
defence of his frontiers and in making raids into Herze-
govina and Bosnia — raids which at first occupied a cer-
tain number of enemy troops. In June, 1915, King

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO IN THE WAR 57

Nicholas once more took possession of and annexed
Scutari, from which he had been compelled to retire at
the time of the Balkan Wars. Prior to the month of
December, however, there was no important fighting,
for it was only when Serbia had been subjugated that
the enemy made any real endeavour to conquer a
country, the importance of which was due rather to
the strategical strength of its position and particularly
to that of the Lovtchen Mountain, which dominates
and commands the Austrian naval base at Cattaro,
than to the efficiency or power of resistance of its army.
It was, therefore, only during the early days of Janu-
ary, 1916, when the enemy was compelled to clear
up the situation in Montenegro, in order to be able to
develop to the full the advantages he had gained in
Serbia, and to be in a position to advance into Albania,
that the Austrians seriously bombarded Mount Lov-
tchen. Partly owing to the fact that its defenders pos-
sessed no heavy artillery, which was necessary in order
to make full use of the great natural strength of this
position, and partly as a result of circumstances, which
were not clear, the resistance of the Montenegrins was
soon at an end, and on January 11 the great national
stronghold fell into the hands of the enemy, who actually
entered Cettinje three days later. King Nicholas, ac-
companied by some of his Ministers and by part of his
army, fled to Albania, His Majesty himself ultimately
taking refuge in France. Other members of the royal
family and of the Government remained behind, capitu-
lating to the enemy under conditions to which it is bet-
ter to make no reference here. Thus temporarily ended
the independent existence of a country, the personal
bravery of whose inhabitants is above all reproach.

58 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

The great importance of the earher role of Serbia,
and to a lesser degree of Montenegro, in the War is
that these countries contained and occupied^ Austrian
forces which would otherwise have been available for
use against Russia before the army of that country
was effectively mobilised and at a time when every
available Allied man in the east was of value, in that
his presence necessitated the detachment of Germans
from the west, where the situation in France was highly
critical for months. Serbia, having suffered in the
two Balkan campaigns casualties amounting to over
seventy-six thousand of all ranks (of whom more than
thirty thousand were killed or died of wounds or from
disease), put into the field at least three hundred thou-
sand men on the outbreak of this war. Montenegro,
who lost about ten thousand in killed and wounded
during the events of 1912-1913, furnished the Allies
with approximately thirty thousand men on the out-
break of the European conflagration. For this and for
the gallant way in which the two little Slav States
fought during the first eighteen months of the present
war, they deserve credit, almost if not equal, to that
which must be bestowed upon the Serbians for their
subsequent valour at Salonica — a valour which I
shall discuss in connection with that campaign.

Ill

TURKEY AND THE WAR

To describe the existing state of things in Turkey
or to outhne the reasons for them is always an ex-
tremely difficult task. This is particularly the case
in regard to the period which intervened between the
close of the Balkan Wars, that is to say, between the
signature of the Turco-Bulgarian Treaty of Constan-
tinople in September, 1913, and the outbreak of the
European War.^ In general, all that can be said,
therefore, is that the Committee of Union and Progress,
which has constituted the only real power in the country
ever since 1908, occupied a stronger position than that
which it had held at any time after the months which
immediately followed the re-establishment of the Con-
stitution. Not only was the Government completely
in its hands, but for the moment, at least, all practical
opposition had disappeared. Indeed that Enver Pasha
and his supporters had "reconquered" Adrianople, and
thus broken the time-honoured rule that territory once
taken from Turkey by a Christian State shall never
again pass under Ottoman rule, regained for the Com-
mittee all the prestige which it would otherwise have

^ The developments of this period and those connected with the entry of
Turkey into the War, besides events which followed it, are ably and fully
chronicled by the ex- American Ambassador at Constantinople under the
title "Ambassador Morgenthau's Story."

60 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

lost, as a result of the losses suffered during the first
Balkan war. In short, the army, always the backbone
of the New Regime, was more completely in the hands
of the Young Turks than had ever been the case before.
In spite of the effect of the reoccupation of Adrianople
and of the amicable arrangements made between the
two countries as to the position of the Turco-Bulgarian
frontier, the Turks were smarting under losses suffered
in a war during which the Great Powers had said that
there should be no modifications in the Balkan "Status
Quo" existing in 1912. This was particularly the case
in regard to the results of the decision of the London
Ambassadorial Conference as to the future ownership
of the Aegean Islands captured by Greece during the
first Balkan war. In order to realise the meaning of
this question to Turkey and to Greece, it is necessary
to remember what has happened in the Aegean during
the last few years. The Turco-Italian War of 1911-
1912 terminated by the Treaty of Lausanne, signed
on October 15 of the latter year, resulted in the —
nominally temporary — retention of about twelve of
the islands, including Rhodes, situated off the south-
western corner of Asia Minor. These were not,* there-
fore, conquerable by Greece in 1912 or 1913, and that
country was only able to occupy the islands actually
under Turkish rule. Whilst leaving the question of
the Dodecannese Islands (those in the hands of Italy)
still undecided, it was therefore in regard to those
which changed hands during the Balkan Wars that
the Turco-Greek crisis of 1913-1914 arose.

The Ambassadorial Conference decided that all the
islands occupied by Greece, except Imbros, Tenedos,
and Castellorizzo, which are located close to the outer

TURKEY AND THE WAR 61

entrance of the Dardanelles, should be retained by
Greece. Turkey, who was not satisfied with that
decision, by which she lost the important islands of
Chios, Mitylene, and Samos, situated only just off the
coast of Asia Minor, never really accepted it and con-
tinued to agitate both at home and abroad for the
possession of territories without which she said that
the Asiatic power of the Ottoman Empire would be
endangered. Greece, on the other hand, naturally
refused to listen to arguments entirely opposed to the
principle of nationality, and not only retained the
islands allotted to her, but never really vacated those
which were to be Turkish.

This situation existed up to and after the outbreak
of the European War. In the early summer of 1914,
the Turks instituted a systematic persecution and
massacre of the Greeks domiciled in Ottoman territory,
a massacre which greatly inflamed the sentiments of
the Greeks throughout the civilised world. On and
after the month of June, the Turco-Greek crisis was
rendered more acute by the annexation of Chios and
Mitylene by Greece and by the purchase by the same
country of two good and modern battleships, Lemnos
and Kilkis (formerly Idaho and Mississippi), which
they secured from America during the summer.
Launched in the year 1905 and completed in the
year 1908, these ships, which are each of fourteen
thousand tons, forestalled the arrival of the two
Turkish dreadnoughts then being built in England
for the Ottoman Government, and thus enabled the
Greeks to assume an attitude which would not other-
wise have been possible. As a consequence of these
events, the outbreak of the war found the relations

62 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

existing between the two countries so strained that
the policies of each of them were temporarily influenced
by a desire that the European conflagration should be
utilised in order to favour the national aspirations of
the parties concerned.

From a semi-internal point of view, the three all-
important questions connected with Turkey during
this period were the gradually improving relations
between that country and Bulgaria, the augmentation
of Germanic influence at Constantinople, and the
negotiations in progress between Europe and the
Ottoman Government in reference to reforms for Ar-
menia. In regard to the first of these, it is suflScient
to say that as a result of the Balkan Wars, both Tur-
key and Bulgaria had suffered in a manner which
naturally made these countries of greater importance
to and brought them into closer sympathy with one
another. Moreover, as for different reasons they
were both the most ardent enemies of Greece, it was
obvious that they would work for the development
of a policy likely, sooner or later, to enable each of
them to reacquire territories which they coveted. In
this connection, too, it is necessary to remember that
early in 1914, Enver Pasha, a former military attache
at Berlin and an ardent pro-German, was appointed
Turkish Minister of War, and that, at about the same
time. General Liman von Sanders, a German general,
was nominated to the command of the 1st Turkish
Army Corps with powers and with a staff which made
him practically Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman
army. In short, the secret influence of Germany,
ever present at Constantinople, once more lost no
opportunity of developing the already favourable

TURKEY AND THE WAR 63

ground, partly created by the protests of the British
and Russian Government against the Turkish re-
occupation of Adrianople, to an advantage of which
she was to reap the benefit soon after the outbreak
of the European War.

Between the Balkan Wars and the outbreak of
the European conflagration, there occurred in Turkey
one other development which, though it never really
materialised, is none the less possessed of significance.
I refer to the arrangements made between Russia,
acting on behalf of the Great Powers, and the Ottoman
Government concerning the introduction of reforms
in Armenia. This agreement, which was arrived at
in February, 1914, and which was based on the ar-
rangements nominally made in 1878, recognised the
special position of the Armenians in six vilayets (prov-
inces) of Eastern Asia Minor, and placed those dis-
tricts which were to be divided into two groups, under
two inspectors general, chosen from the subjects of
two European States and appointed by the Ottoman
Government on the recommendation of the Powers.
There was to be a mixed gendarmerie, Christians and
Moslems were to enjoy the same privileges in regard
to representation in the local government, and the
interests of the Armenians were to be properly voiced
in the Ottoman Parliament by an adequate number of
deputies.

According to this arrangement the inspectors gen-
eral, whose powers and duties constituted the key
to the question, were to be named for a period of ten
years, and their engagement was not to be revocable
during that period. WTien the appointments were
made, the Turks, however, ignored this and added a

64 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

clause in the final agreements with the so-called in-
spectors, one of whom was Dutch and the other Nor-
wegian, stating that the Government could terminate
its contract at any time by the payment of one year's
salary, thereby once more turning a scheme for Ar-
menian reform into a mere farce. In the end, after
the employees in question had been detained for
some time at Constantinople, they went to their
posts, but on the outbreak of the War, which occurred
directly after their arrival, their appointments were
cancelled, the Armenians being left to look forward
and to anticipate a reign of terror, which, when in-
augurated, proved worse than anything which had
previously taken place in the annals of their history.
On the outbreak of the War, therefore, there existed
in Turkey a state of uncertainty and of unrest which
made Constantinople the most important neutral
centre in Europe, — a centre where for three months
a great diplomatic battle was in progress between
the representatives of the Central Powers on the
one side and those of the Allies on the other. To
understand the nature of this struggle it is necessary
once more to remember that for years Germany had
left no stone unturned in preparing the way to secure
Ottoman support at the crucial moment. She had
ignored the necessity for and stood in the way of re-
forms in Macedonia and Armenia. She had provided
the money and constructed railways which at the
same time appealed to the Turkish imagination and
furthered the policy of the " Turcification " of the
various subject races of the Empire. And lastly,
both before as during and after the Balkan Wars,
she had planned and done her utmost to increase

TURKEY AND THE WAR 65

the general and perhaps not unnatural Turkish fear
and hatred of Russia — fear and hatred which I have
already shown were directly responsible for the Revolu-
tion of 1908, and which constitute the governing fea-
ture of the foreign policy pursued alike by the Old
and by the Young Turks. These factors in the situa-
tion were responsible for the existence of an extremely
favourable ground for the intrigues of the enemy, who
scorned no methods, however underhand, provided
he could secure the support of a country whose as-
sistance he realised would be invaluable to him.

The position of the Allies was far more diflScult than
that of the Central Powers. Instead of a policy run
by one man — the Kaiser — for one object — German
aggression — they were compelled to endeavour to
create a position which would react not only in their
own favour, but also in that of those most closely
concerned in it. The task of allies, too, is always
complicated by the fact that whilst they are obliged
to act in common agreement, each is naturally pos-
sessed of her own vital interests and special friend-
ships. In Turkey this had its effect in various stages
of the development of events, and the Germans, never
slow to profit by our difficulties and especially by the
fact that no Turk, Old or New, would wish to support
the cause of Russia, persuaded the Ottoman Govern-
ment that were the Allies to win the war, sooner or
later the Empire would be split up, and that no promise
made to it would be of any avail. Thus whilst the
accuracy of published statements to the effect that a
definite and absolute Treaty of Alliance was signed
between Germany and Turkey on or before August 4,
1914, seems open to great doubt, there is good reason

66 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

to believe that there was a concrete understanding
between Germany and certain of the more important
members of the Committee of Union and Progress —
an understanding about which the Sultan, the then
Grand Vizier, and such men as Ahmed Djemal Pasha,
then Minister of Marine, knew nothing. From the
moment of the outbreak of the European War, there-
fore, the Allies might have foreseen, even if that treaty
had not been concluded in a definite form, that the
circumstances were such as to prevent them from
being able to provide Turkey with concessions or
guarantees which would prevent her from being en-
ticed by the Germanic promises concerning the re-
conquest of Egypt and of other territories which
she had lost, from throwing in her lot ultimately
with the enemy. The principal reasons which made
this eventuality so probable were not that the people
disliked England and France or that they admired
Germany, but because the more chauvinistic elements
of the population, such as Talaat and Enver Pashas,
were undoubtedly anxious, as they believed, to rid
themselves of the Russian danger, and because they
seemed to think that to side with Germany would
enable them to inflict some damage upon Greece, from
whom they were anxious to regain the Aegean Islands.
Upon neither of these two vital questions was the
position of the Allies a favourable one, for whilst at
that time they were bound to treat with respect any
claims or propositions made by Russia, they were
almost equally powerless to support the reversal of a
decision for which they themselves were principally
responsible.

Throughout the first three months of the War the

TURKEY AND THE WAR 67

Germans, who were thus provided with advantageous
ground upon which to work, spared no pains to drag
Turkey into the War. The legitimate confiscation
by England of the two Turkish dreadnoughts in
building in British yards was badly handled, and
its reasons were so inadequately explained, that the
Germans were able to utilise this measure to inflame
public opinion among the people who had actually
subscribed a large proportion of the funds to pay for
these vessels. Soon after this. Admiral Limpus and
all the ofiicers of the British Naval Mission were re-
placed in their executive command by Turkish officers,
being ordered to continue work at the Ministry of
Marine, should they remain in Turkey. As this
measure was obviously part of the enemy's plan of
intrigue — an intrigue destined to give the German
officers who arrived with and subsequent to Goeben
full control of the Ottoman fleet — the British Gov-
ernment subsequently withdrew its representatives,
who thus left Constantinople under circumstances
which can hardly have added to Allied prestige.
Later on the capitulations which date back for cen-
turies, and which alone were responsible for the safety
of Europeans domiciled in Turkey, were abolished.
The foreign ambassadors, including those of the Cen-
tral Powers, protested, but considering the relations
then and subsequently existing between the Germanic
and Ottoman Governments, there can be no doubt
that the representative of the Kaiser knew full well
that even the nominal breaking loose of the Turkish
Government from a system of control, which was vital
to the whole civilised world, was but a part of the
game in which he was actually the chief actor. As

68 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

a matter of fact, at the end of April, 1916, it was
formally announced that Turkey had taken the place
of Italy in the Triple Alliance, and that she *'had re-
gained her independence by entering upon equal terms"
into that alliance. In spite of this declaration and of
the explanation then given that in none of the minor
agreements concluded was there any trace of the old
capitulation rights, it is obvious, as matters of con-
sular jurisdiction and of the right of residence were
dealt with, that the Germans secured in fact, if not
in name, the privileges which they had lost just prior
to the intervention of Turkey. During this period,
too, Ottoman intrigue became rife from end to end
of Albania, and Turkey was persuaded to mobilise
— a measure which she was not in a financial position
to undertake, and a measure which could only have
been directed against the Allies.

But, though it happened earlier than some of the
above-mentioned events, the all-important feature and
the real turning point in the whole situation was the
arrival at Constantinople of the German Goeben and
Breslau in the middle of August. The so-called pur-
chase of these vessels placed the Turks in a position
which naturally justified them in thinking that they
were a match for any naval force which they were
likely to meet in the Black Sea ^ From then, and
until the outbreak of war, the entire attention of the
German representative at Constantinople and of the
Turkish Government was directed towards the rapid
conveyance of German men and war material to the

^ Mr. Morgenthau says that the German Ambassador at Constantinople
never made any secret of the fact that the ships still remained German
property.

TURKEY AND THE WAR 69

shores of the Bosphorus, As a matter of fact, shortly
after Turkey entered the war arena, there were at
least twelve thousand Germans and Austrians in the
Ottoman dominions. This vast army of supporters and
instructors was collected largely owing to the fact that
men, who should have returned to their own countries
for military service, either remained in or went to Con-
stantinople, it being understood that their presence
there would ultimately be more valuable to the common
cause than would have been their return home.

It is this weighty question of Goehen and Breslau
and above all the manner in which it was treated by
the Allies, which constituted the greatest mistake
made in connection with the then situation at Con-
stantinople. Leaving out of account the reasons for
which these ships were able to escape from their place
of refuge in Sicily — reasons the real nature of which
we do not even now know — the Allies, instead of
grasping the fact then and there in the month of
August, 1914, that the then arrival of Goehen would
enable Germany to rush Turkey into the War, and
instead of immediately following her into the Dar-
danelles, not as the enemies of Turkey, but as a peace-
ful precaution and as the protectors and friends of the
true Ottoman people, continued to ignore the fact
that the so-called purchase of these vessels was a
purely bogus and prearranged matter, destined not
only to give the enemy complete control of the direc-
tion of affairs in Constantinople but also to provide
the Turks with ships of a type and possessed of a
fighting power which entirely altered and influenced
what might otherwise have been the course of the
Dardanelles operations.

70 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

Space is too short to enable me to describe the
details of the manner in which Germany actually
rushed Turkey into war. Sufficient be it, therefore,
to say that the Germans finally endeavoured to tele-
graph instructions to the Turkish staff at Erzerum
without consulting all, or even most, of the members
of the Ottoman Government, and that the outbreak
of hostilities was postponed owing to the fact that
the telegram was intercepted by a vigilant post-
office clerk. Later, and on October 28, the Turks
made an incursion into the Sinai Peninsula, and the
Germans succeeded, on the same day, in launching
a naval attack upon Odessa, and upon other of the
Russian Black Sea ports — an attack which was
the immediate cause of war. That attack, which was
carried out without the knowledge of several members
of the cabinet and certainly without the consent of
Ahmed Djemal Pasha, resulted in the immediate
demand of their passports by the Allied ambassadors
and in the open establishment of a state of war with
Turkey.

Before approaching an account of the military
events dealt with in this chapter, brief mention must
be made of the shocking and atrocious Armenian
massacres in progress during the year 1915. These
massacres were more prolonged and more systematic
than, and, in many ways, entirely different to, those
which took place in the late nineties in Armenia and
in Constantinople, or in the Adana neighbourhood in
1909. In former years, on the occasion of a massacre,
it was the men and the male children who were for
the most part butchered, and the outbreaks, whilst
beginning and ending almost by clockwork and at

TURKEY AND THE WAR 71

fixed hours, took the form of kilhng people in their
homes. This was dreadful, more dreadful than can
be imagined by any one who has not seen it, but it
was not so terrible as what took place in 1915. At
that time, instead of murdering the people where
they happened to be, and then destroying or stealing
their property, a regular campaign for the purpose of
exterminating the Armenian race was inaugurated.
The leading men of each town or village were first
seized, tortured, and killed. Later the whole popu-
lation, in many cases made up of well-to-do people
possessed of good houses, and including the women,
the feeble, and the young, were forced to leave their
homes and belongings, and to march on foot towards
the south and into the desert, going they knew not
where. These people, unprovided with clothing or
food, were ill treated by their guards, and abused
by the Moslem inhabitants of the districts through
which they passed. The consequence was that, ex-
posed to the cold and to the heat, some fell by the
roadside, perishing where they lay, and others, during
transportation down the rivers Euphrates and Tigris,
were pushed, dead or alive, from the rafts on which
they had already suffered from privation for days.

From an internal standpoint, these massacres meant
that the Turks ridded themselves of approximately
one million, that is to say, one half of the Armenians
formerly estimated to have lived in the Ottoman
Empire, and that they thereby temporarily went a
long way towards accomplishing their object of solv-
ing the Armenian question, by massacre. Externally
and internally these atrocities, carried out in a manner
different to the system formerly employed, prove two

72 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

things. First, they show that the Germans, whose
attention was drawn to the matter both in America
and in Constantinople, not only took no steps to pre-
vent a slaughter of innocents, but that they must
have been actually the moving spirit in events so
outrageous that they would not have been perpe-
trated by even the Turks alone. Secondly, they
indicate the necessity, when the proper time comes,
of bringing home the responsibility for this atrocious
conduct to the quarter where it rests, and of seeing
that, on the declaration of peace, arrangements are
made concerning the future status of Armenia and of
the Armenians which will for ever prevent the re-
currence of such an outbreak.

As the operations at the Dardanelles are dealt with
in a special section of this volume, I will turn at once
to the three other principal campaigns in which Turkey
has been engaged since the beginning of the War.
Partly owing to the fact that her frontier is no longer
contiguous to that of Greece, and partly because the
Ottoman fleet has never been able to leave the Dar-
danelles, Turkey could make no endeavour to re-
conquer the Aegean Islands, which, I have already
said, was one of her great aspirations at the beginning
of the War. For the same reason, that is, because its
communications by sea were completely interrupted,
the Ottoman Government has been compelled to
undertake operations in areas with which it could
maintain connection by land — areas which for obvious
reasons were those situated in Northeastern Asia
Minor, at the head of the Persian Gulf, and in the
neighbourhood of the Turco-Egyptian frontier.

At the beginning of the Caucasian campaign the

TURKEY AND THE WAR 73

Russians advanced into Turkey by three practically
distinct routes, namely, those which led upon Erzerum,
that running past Mount Ararat and through Bayazid,
and that leading across the Persian frontier and towards
the lake and town of Van. Three weeks after the entry
of Turkey into the War, the Russians secured posses-
sion of Kuprukeuie, situated about halfway between
the Turkish frontier and Erzerum. Immediately after
that, acting on the usual German rule of taking the
offensive at the first possible moment, the Turks began
to advance from the direction of Erzerum, and con-
tinued to do so until the Ottoman forces were de-
feated during the early part of January, 1915, at and
near Sarikamish, near the borders of, but within,
Russian territory. This victory, however, cost the
Russians something elsewhere, for they were obliged
temporarily to withdraw from Tabriz, which they
soon recaptured, and from certain rich districts of
Persia. From that time onwards, up to the appoint-
ment of the Grand Duke Nicholas as Commander-in-
Chief in the Caucasus in the late summer of 1915,
there was a lull in Eastern Asia Minor, for it was
not until considerably after the arrival of that General
that operations in this area began to assume propor-
tions of serious importance.

Nevertheless the Russian Generalissimo, who was
responsible for the military plan of campaign not only
in Armenia but also on the Persian frontier, began
at once carefully to prepare the way for his main
advance upon Erzerum by consolidating his position
and pushing forward his line between lakes Van and
Urumiah during the closing months of 1915. Early
in January of the following year, and therefore in the

74 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

depth of winter, a definite and determined blow was
struck in the direction of Erzerum. After a large
Ottoman army had been defeated in the field, the
Russian commander brought up heavy guns by way
of mountain roads which had always been considered
to be well-nigh unpassable in winter. Such was his
skill that the actual attacks upon Erzerum having
begun about the twentieth of January, the greatest
Ottoman fortress in Asia Minor actually fell into
Muscovite hands on February 16, and therefore
after a bombardment of little over three weeks. This
capture was one of the biggest military and political
victories which had then been won by the Allies in
the East since the beginning of the War.

After the fall of Erzerum a Russian force advanced
through extremely difficult country and along the
Black Sea coast towards Trebizond, which port was
taken after a week's severe fighting about the middle
of April. This, too, constituted a gain of some sig-
nificance, for in addition to the fact that the loss of
Trebizond was a great moral blow to Turkey, its
possession by Russia enormously facilitated her means
of communication. Thus, instead of being compelled
to rely entirely upon the road which passes through
Erzerum to Trebizond, — a road the whole of which
was not in their hands until considerably after the
capture of that city, — she was able to utilise the port
as a means of connection between her bases on the
north and east of the Black Sea and her forces en-
gaged in Northeastern Asia Minor.

Slightly before the capture of Trebizond, the left
of the Russian line, which at the time of the fall of
Erzerum ran approximately from that place to a

TURKEY AND THE WAR 75

point just to the northeast of Mush and from there
to lakes Van and Urumiah and on to the Persian
frontier, was advanced in such a way as to include
the towns of Bitlis and Mush, which were taken re-
spectively early and late in March, 1916. With the
capture of Baiburt on the post road from Erzerum
to Trebizond in June, of Erzingan, the great military
centre, in July, and of Gumushhane in August, 1916,
the high-water mark of the Russian advance was
reached. It resulted in the occupation of the whole
of the route from Erzerum to Trebizond, which is
one of the most important roads in this part of the
Ottoman Empire, and in the establishment of a line
running from a point on the Black Sea coast, located
a few miles to the west of Trebizond, through Erzingan,
Kighi, Mush, the Bitlis Gap, thence round to south of
Lake Van to Lake Urumiah — a line which though it
was never actually continuous was nevertheless a
definite and well-connected front in the possession of
the army of the ex-Tsar.

Although the Russians withdrew along certain
portions of this front during 1917, with the following
modifications they held approximately the above-
mentioned line until about the time of the peace
developments with Germany. Between the Black
Sea coast and Kighi, lying about halfway between
Erzingan and Mush, there was no material modifica-
tion. To the southwest of that town, however, the
Russians lost certain mountain positions. In May,
1917, too, they withdrew from Mush, thereby sacri-
ficing a place of considerable significance. Moreover,
further to the southeast they retired from the head
of the Bitlis Gap, through which an all-important

76 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

road runs to Diarbekr. Part of the area between
this place and Lake Van, however, remained in Rus-
sian hands, as did also the city of Van, from which
point the line ran in a southeasterly direction to and
across the Turco-Persian frontier, near which it turned,
finally reaching the neighbourhood of Kermanshah.
Thus, whilst the earlier changes which took place
resulted in the loss of certain points and areas of
strategical importance, and whilst the Russian and
British forces based on Mesopotamia, instead of
being in actual touch as they were at one time, were
now separated by a considerable distance, the posi-
tion of the Muscovite front in Asia at first suffered
proportionately less as a result of the Russian Revolu-
tion than did that of the Russian army in Europe.
In short, it was only at the time of the signature of
the so-called peace with Germany that the definite
evacuation of the conquered districts of Asia Minor
began to make itself so painfully apparent.

Events are changing so rapidly that it is impossible
to chronicle exactly what has taken place in the neigh-
bourhood of the Russo-Turkish frontier during the last
few months. Sufficient therefore be it to say that by
the Treaty signed between these two countries at Brest-
Litovsk on March 3d — a Treaty which is rightly not
acknowledged by the Allies — Russia undertook to
withdraw from the Ottoman territory which she
occupied and also to evacuate the districts of Erivan,
Kars and Batum. The meaning of this is that the
areas annexed by Russia after the war of 1877-1878 are
handed back to their former owner, that their popula-
tion is left practically at the mercy of the Turks, and
that once these new possessions were really subdued by

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TURKEY AND THE WAR 77

the enemy he would have gone a long way towards
the establishment of a new route into Persia and in
the direction of the Indian frontier. Armenian and
Georgian contingents, formed from the local popula-
tion and from the native elements of the Russian Army
still loyal to the Allied Cause, have done their utmost
to resist this subjugation. If it can be maintained
that resistance, which is obviously worthy of encourage-
ment by the Allies, is of the highest importance, for it
might be the means of preventing or at least of delay-
ing the realisation of Germanic designs in this direction.
On the other hand, should this be impossible, owing to
the diflSculty of combating organised and well armed
forces with irregulars, not adequately provided with
guns and war materials, then the future of the area
situated between the Black Sea and the Caspian —
an area which cannot be left under German domination
— will remain to be decided, not by the temporary
arrangement made between the Central Powers and
Russia, but by the terms of an ultimate and fair peace.
The second area of Turkish operations is that
situated between the head of the Persian Gulf and
Bagdad — that is, the theatre of the Mesopotamian
campaign.^ Here, as in the Caucasus and on the
Egyptian frontier, the Turkish policy, aggressive as
it was or would have been, was directed with the
object of threatening the British position on the
Persian Gulf, of seizing Koweit and of pushing for-
ward into Southern Persia with the principal purpose
of occupying the oil fields. These Persian oil fields,

1 A great many aspects of this campaign are discussed in the Report of
the Mesopotamia Commission presented to Parliament in 1917 and pub-
lished as a Blue Book numbered C^ 8610.

78 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

which are of great value, He in the neighbourhood of
Ahwaz and Shustar, and therefore within about
eighty miles of the Turco-Persian frontier. They
are connected with Muhammera — actually on the
Shat-el-Arab — by a pipe line belonging to the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company. The destruction of this line
was one of the most important Turkish objectives in
this locality.

Before reviewing the actual operations which have
taken place in this area, it may be well to indicate
the geography of the country in question. The
southeastern part of Mesopotamia (it is more correct
to call this district Babylonia) lies between the lower
reaches of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates. In shape
this area may be compared to that of an old-fashioned
pointed bottomed, soda-water bottle, lying half over
towards the left-hand side. The neck of that bottle,
which measures about thirty-five miles in width, is
situated between Bagdad on the Tigris and Feluja
on the Euphrates. Its pointed base is at Kurna — •
the town at which the two rivers unite their waters
— waters which flow thence for a distance of about
one hundred miles to the Persian Gulf under the name
of the Shat-el-Arab. As a sort of label line extending
practically across the thickest part of the bottle, where
it measures about one hundred and ten miles, there is
the Shat-el-Hai Canal, which leaves the Tigris at
Kut-el-Amara and meets the Euphrates at Nasrieh.
This canal is navigable for small boats.

If we accept this rough analogy, it is possible to
utilise it in order to explain the various stages into
which the campaign has been practically divided.
They are :

TURKEY AND THE WAR 79

(1) The British advance by way of Basra to Kurna
and the consequent seizure of the base of the bottle.
This stage was rapidly accomplished, for Basra was
occupied on November 22, 1914, approximately three
weeks after the entry of Turkey into the war, and
Kurna fell on the ninth of the following month.

(2) The pushing forward by way of the Euphrates
to Nasrieh at the southern end of the "label", or
Shat-el-Hai Canal, and by way of the Tigris to Kut-
el-Amara at the northern end of the same waterway.
The former place was taken on July 25, and the latter
was reached on September 28, 1915.

(3) The further attempted push up the neck of the
bottle towards Bagdad, the retreat from Ctesiphon
in November, 1915, and the siege of Kut which
lasted from December 7, 1915, until its fall on April 29,
1916.

(4) The operations which followed the surrender of
General Townshend, including the taking of Bagdad,
and the advance which has taken place since the cap-
ture of that town in March, 1917.

Whilst from the first the British were obliged to
assume what may be called a tactical offensive, they
were acting, so to speak, strategically on the defensive
so long as they were only trying to block the Turkish
advance into areas which were and are of vital im-
portance to them. By those who can only look at
maps it is argued that the British object would have
been achieved and that they should have contented
themselves with the accomplishment of the first stage
and with the occupation of Kurna. But militarily
this would not have been sufficient. Owing to its
position at the junction of the two rivers, this place

80 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

would have been open to an attack from the north by
way of the Tigris and from the west along the Eu-
phrates. Moreover as was proved by the determined
Turkish thrust into Persia and upon Ahwaz — a thrust
the effects of which were put an end to by the opera- \
tions conducted by General Gorringe in Persian terri- '
tory during May, 1915 — the enemy would still have
been able to attack the Persian oil fields. In addition,
so long as Nasrieh, on the Euphrates, was not occupied,
not only Kurna but Basra itself were and would have
been open to the danger of an attack from the direction
of that place, which in nonflooded times is the starting
point of a land route towards the southeast. This
means that the accomplishment of the first stage in
the campaign would not have been sufficient under the
circumstances.

The second stage began with an advance up the
Tigris to Amara, which fell into General Gorringe's
hands on June 4, 1915, and with the subsequent attack
upon Nasrieh, which was occupied on July twenty -fifth.
It continued with the further advance from Amara j
to Kut-el-Amara — an advance entailing a forward %
movement of one hundred and fifty miles measured
along the banks of the Tigris. The whole of these
operations were accomplished under conditions of
the utmost difficulty, for, in addition to the heavy
opposition put up by the Turks and to the geographical
obstacles, to which I will refer again later on, light-
draft river boats had to be collected, prepared, and
armoured to carry the expedition through an area
where railways were then nonexistent.

Thus far the operations in Mesopotamia went fairly
well, at least from the purely military standpoint.

TURKEY AND THE WAR 81

Then came the third stage in the campaign, the fatal
dash for Bagdad — a dash which with the forces
available and the inadequate preparations was not
warrantable. Moreover, in addition to its being un-
justifiable for these reasons, it was in any case a mis-
take because the holding and the properly defending
of Kut-el-Amara would probably have prevented any
serious Turkish incursions into Southern Persia, and
because, even had the advance of the winter of 1915
resulted in the occupation of Bagdad, the British
expeditionary force might well have been unable to
hold a place having so large a population with a force
numbering only from fifteen to seventeen thousand
men. The net consequences of this error were that
the retirement to and the fall of Kut resulted in a
serious setback to British prestige in the East, that
the losses incurred in endeavouring to relieve that
place immediately prior to April 29, 1916, had no
corresponding advantage, and that reinforcements,
which could otherwise have been brought up fresh
from the base for an advance upon Bagdad during
the spring and summer of that year, were compelled
to retake the Sanaiyat and other positions, lying to
the southeast of Kut and to which the Turks had
advanced, before once more inaugurating our final
and successful advance upon Bagdad.

At the beginning of the fourth stage and during the
hot season after the fall of Kut in 1916, the British
Army suffered much from sickness, and the transport
arrangements, though improving, were still inade-
quate. From May, therefore, when the surrender of
General Townshend made it unnecessary immediately
to push forward on the Tigris, the British policy in

82 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

Mesopotamia was defensive. Sir Percy Lake, acting
on orders from home, was directed to maintain as
forward a position as could be made tactically secure
and to be ready to take advantage of any weakening
on the Turkish front. These instructions were strictly
adhered to, and he and his successor, Sir Stanley Maude,
confined themselves during the summer and autumn of
that year to developing their river and railway com-
munications and to improving their general supply
organisation. As a result of this, when active opera-
tions were resumed very early in 1917, the advance
to and the capture of Bagdad on March 11 were ac-
complished in a highly satisfactory manner. These
operations and those which took place subsequent to
the British entry into the city have gone a long way
towards redeeming the effect of the mistakes which
were made earlier in the campaign. Indeed, in spite
of every effort to minimise its importance, the fact
that the British under General Sir W. R. Marshall
have now pushed up the Tigris for miles beyond
Bagdad, in addition to establishing themselves to the
northeast and to the west and northwest of that city,
must have had an influence in Turkey, only surpassed
by the capture of Jerusalem.

There is no space or reason here to enter into a dis-
cussion of the manner in which the Mesopotamian
operations, and particularly the earlier operations,
were conducted. The accounts which have appeared
in the press and the report of the British Mesopotamia
Commission, appointed to inquire into those opera-
tions, are sufficient to prove that political and military
miscalculations occurred, that inadequate preparations
were made, and that the scope of the expedition was

TURKEY AND THE WAR 83

never sufficiently defined in advance. These are short-
comings for which severe condemnation is deserved.
Nevertheless whilst it is not my intention to try to
make excuses for such mistakes, if we are only to
apportion blame where blame be due, and in fairness
to those concerned, we must recognise that the diffi-
culties to be overcome in Mesopotamia were and are
enormous. The treacherous climate and the alterna-
tion of sweltering heat and bitter cold made the regular
supply of warm clothing, double tents, mosquito nets,
and other requisites an absolute necessity. Moreover
the same conditions, which had for their result a large
amount of sickness, were responsible for the desirability
of the provision of an abnormal amount of hospital
accommodation — accommodation which in its turn
depended upon the adequate organisation of a suffi-
cient transport — transport which included not only
the provision and equipment of river steamers but the
conversion of Basra into such a port as would make
it an adequate base of operations for a large inland
military operation.

Ignoring altogether the immense burden of the
tonnage question, and of transporting troops from
England or other parts of the British Empire to the
Persian Gulf, once arrived there the difficulties to be
overcome were enormous. Bagdad is distant from
the sea five hundred and seventy miles. Until the
construction of railways, which did not exist during
the earlier stages of the operations, the sole means of
communication was by way of the Shat-el-Arab and
the Tigris. Below Basra, which is situated on the
former channel and about seventy miles from the sea,
vessels drawing up to nineteen feet of water can navi-

84 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

gate. Above that town, where in 1914 there were
practically no quays or warehouses, transport is de-
pendent upon river boats, the draft of which must
not exceed seven and a half feet for the trip to Kurna
and three and a half for Amara and beyond. Over
and above a few vessels owned by Messrs. Lynch, these
river steamers did not exist, and many of them had
to be collected from the rivers Hoogli and Irawadi.
The Tigris twists and turns with sharp bends and
hairpin corners, leaving in places little or no room
for vessels, and particularly for those towing barges,
to pass one another. The stream runs at about four
knots an hour, and it is difficult for steamers without
independent paddles to avoid striking the banks when
going round the corners. No proper charts are or
can be available for the Tigris, because the channel is
constantly changing, owing to the shifting of the sand.
Indeed, so marked is this that in peace time, when
there was a regular bi-weekly service up and down the
river, the ships were always either navigated by differ-
ent local pilots or by men who were compelled upon
each journey to make inquiries at the various stations
as to the ever-changing conditions.

The influence of the floods, which would in any
case have interfered with the movement of troops
in the neighbourhood of the Tigris, was rendered far
greater because of the existence of "deep cuts" (irri-
gation ditches) which in peace time are used for
watering the areas situated near the banks of the
river. Some of these ditches naturally became auto-
matically filled by the rise of the river, but others
were able to be put into operation by those who held
the key of the system by which they were worked.

TURKEY AND THE WAR 85

Throughout the earher operations, therefore, the
Turks, who could choose their own positions for de-
fence, were possessed of an enormous advantage
over the British who at times had to push forward
at all costs. In addition, as I shall show elsewhere,
whilst our difficulties grew greater and greater as our
communications became longer and longer, the ob-
stacles to be overcome by the enemy were daily de-
creasing, owing to the existence and continued im-
provement in the Bagdad Railway, by means of which
he was able to convey troops across a considerable
length of the area which separates Constantinople
from Bagdad.

If we ignore the Arabian Independentist Move-
ment and the proclamation and attitude of the Grand
Shereef of Mecca, which are more important politically
than militarily, we now come to the last theatre of
war in which the Turks have been engaged, namely,
the area lying to the east of the Egyptian frontier
and in Palestine. Here we were at first presented
with an example of what is practically a new feature
of warfare — namely the necessity for the conveyance
of a force of considerable size across a practically
waterless desert which has an average width of about
one hundred and forty miles. The operations in this
area began directly after the entry of Turkey into
the War, by the shelling, by H. M. S. Minerva, of
the fort and troops at Akaba where preparations
were being made for an advance upon Egypt. Sub-
sequently the British abandoned the Turco-Egyptian
frontier, withdrawing to the line of the Suez Canal,
where entrenchments were dug. The Turks, who
had loudly proclaimed the reconquest of their lost

86 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

territory, then (that is to say, early in 1915) advanced
across the desert by several different routes, and
with a force of about twelve thousand men ultimately
reached the immediate neighbourhood of the canal
during the opening days of February, 1915. Allowed
to approach the very bank of this water line, and to
bring up their bridging material, the enemy was, how-
ever, completely routed on February second and
third (leaving about five hundred dead and over six
hundred prisoners), as a result of an attack delivered
by mixed British troops and of the fire of British
and French warships stationed in the canal itself.

For more than a year there was no important de-
velopment on the Egyptian frontier, but in April,
1916, the British once more advanced into the desert,
fighting actions with the Turks in various areas —
actions which ended in no decision of far-reaching
importance for either side. About four months later,
the enemy took the offensive, making a general attack
in the neighbourhood of Katia, near the Mediterranean
coast early in August. He was, however, decisively
defeated, losing four thousand prisoners and thirteen
hundred killed out of a total force of eighteen thou-
sand men. The consequence of this was that, during
the rest of the year, the British were able gradually to
reconquer Egyptian territory, finally occupying El-
Arish on the Mediterranean and other places to the
south of it at the end of December. As a result of
this success an advance was made into Southern
Palestine early in 1917, but that advance was not
carried out in sufficient strength to enable it to be
permanently maintained and the attempts to capture
Gaza, in March, failed. From that time onwards,

TURKEY AND THE WAR 87

particularly during the hot weather, the campaign
lapsed into stagnancy, and it was only in November
that Beersheba, Gaza, and Jaffa were captured, with
the result that the way was made ready for an advance
upon Jerusalem, which fell into British hands early
in December.

That event undoubtedly constitutes the most im-
portant Allied success gained in the East since the
beginning of the War. From a military standpoint
the occupation of the Holy City gives the British a
base of operations on the east of the Egyptian desert
and thus enables them to pursue with greater facility
their further campaign towards the north and east.
In the former direction, we can now look upon an
advance to Damascus or even Aleppo, and the conse-
quent cutting of the Bagdad Railway, near the latter
place, as a matter of practical consideration. In the
latter area, that is, just across the Jordan, is the Hedjaz
Railway — a line which for years has been the only
connecting link between Arabia and the remainder of
Turkey. Its protection by the Turks, or even its
partial occupation by the British, are obviously ques-
tions of far-reaching importance to the respective
parties.

The moral effect of the capture of Jerusalem must
be as great, if not greater, than the military, for the
occupation of that city, following upon that of Bagdad,
cannot fail to affect the mentality of the Turks, who
have always regarded these places as of great im-
portance. Moreover, although Moslems consider
Mecca and Medina as their two most Holy Cities,
Jerusalem is also held by them as a sacred place, for
they reverence Christ, Moses, and Abraham only

88 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

after Mohammed. In addition, and over and above
this, the British success in Palestine must have a
further influence because one of the strongest claims
of the Sultans of Turkey to the position of Caliph, or
head of the Moslem religion, is due to the fact that
for years they have been the guardians of the three
Holy Cities. The King of Hedjaz is in undisputed
possession of Mecca and Medina; therefore, with the
fall of Jerusalem, which had been in Mohammedan
hands since 1243, the Turks lose a place which they
recognise to be of significance from numerous stand-
points.

IV

BULGARIA AND THE WAR

Although the object of this account is neither to
summarise the history of Bulgaria nor to describe
the rapid development of that country during the last
forty years, yet it is interesting to recall the fact
that modern Bulgaria is the youngest independent
State, except Albania, in the Balkan Peninsula. Thus
it was only in the year 1878, after, and as a result of,
the Russo-Turkish War, that Northern Bulgaria was
created a principality under the suzerainty of the
Sultan, and that Eastern Roumelia was formed into
an autonomous province under a Christian governor-
general. From the time of the union of the two
States in 1885 until the declaration of their final
independence in 1908, the prosperity of the country
gradually increased. Again from that moment until
the outbreak of the first Balkan war in October, 1912,
the Bulgarians continued to work for the develop-
ment of their national power and for the realisation
of their great aspiration — the union of the Mace-
donian Bulgars under the rule of King Ferdinand.

Prior to the Balkan Wars the area of the kingdom
of Bulgaria was approximately 38,000 square miles,
and the population numbered about 4,337,000 souls.
As a result of these wars, an area roughly including

90 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

8600 square miles was taken from Turkey, but Bul-
garia was compelled to sacrifice 2687 square miles of
territory to Roumania. Consequently the net change
was that the size of the country was only increased
in such a way that it now has an area of about 43,300
square miles and a population of somewhat over
4,750,000 souls. This means that Bulgaria, who pro-
vided the largest army for the first war, gained by far
the least from a campaign which could never have
been carried out without her co-operation.

As a result of the so-called settlement of the year
1913, Bulgaria, deprived of the legitimate fruits of
her original and all-important victories in Thrace,
where she met and defeated the greater part of the
Turkish Army, naturally continued to remain on the
most strained terms with Serbia and Greece. The
Treaty of London, signed between the Balkan allies
and Turkey in 1913, was torn up by the latter country,
who, in spite of protests from both the British and the
Russian Governments, reoccupied Adrianople during
the second Balkan war. Notwithstanding this, it
was claimed by some that the formation of the then
so-called new Balkan Alliance, made up of Serbia,
Montenegro, Greece, and Roumania, was as favourable,
if not more favourable, to the cause of the then Triple
Entente than would have been the continued existence
of the original League, formed of Serbia, Bulgaria,
Greece, and Montenegro. Others, and amongst them
the Austrians and the Germans, were not slow to
realise that however friendly to Serbia her new allies
might be, with the exception of Montenegro those
so-called allies were not likely immediately to engage
in a war in which they had no direct interest.

(

BULGARIA AND THE WAR 91

From the moment of the outbreak of the War, and
particularly after the entry of Turkey, until Bulgaria
threw in her lot on the side of the Central Powers,
the key to the situation in the latter country lay in
the fact that King Ferdinand and his Government
were determined to utilise the present conflagration
in order to try to regain at least some of the losses
suffered in 1913. For them this was not so much a
European as a third Balkan war for the independence
of the Bulgars, subject to alien, this time principally
Serbian and Greek, rules. It was certain, therefore,
that they would not throw in their lot with any side
or countries which did not promise to give them a
large section of Southern Macedonia and also as
secondary conditions to restore to them a section of
the Dobrudja and at least part of Turkish Thrace.
In other words, the bitter antagonism felt by Bulgaria
towards Serbia, Greece, and Roumania, and particularly
towards the first-mentioned country, outweighed the
traditional hostility towards Turkey and weakened the
ties of friendship with Russia, whose attitude towards
the Serbo-Bulgarian dispute of 1913 was far from
popular at Sofia. Consequently so long as her future
was not adequately secured elsewhere, Bulgaria was
unlikely to take up arms against Turkey because her
only accesses to the sea were by way of her Black
Sea ports — rendered useless owing to the closing of
the Dardanelles — and through Dede Agatch, the rail-
way to which port, according to the Treaty of Con-
stantinople of September, 1913, ran for some miles
through Ottoman territory. From the moment of
the outbreak of the War the great question, therefore,
was whether Serbia, Greece, and Roumania would or

92 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

could be persuaded to restore to Bulgaria areas of
territory which she considered should be hers, and
whether the Allies would guarantee her possession of
districts of now Ottoman territory, which they actually
agreed should be allotted to her during the negotia-
tions of the year 1913.

Whilst, so far as I know, no detailed official state-
ment was published on the subject, the conditions
required by Bulgaria soon became pretty clear. On
the west the Government of King Ferdinand was
intent upon the recognition of the Serbo-Bulgarian
Treaty of March, 1912, as a basis for discussion — a
basis which would have meant the cession by Serbia
of considerable areas of her southern territory annexed
after the Balkan Wars. On the south, whilst claims
were made to all the district lying between the Graeco-
Bulgarian frontier, the Struma Valley, and the Aegean,
satisfaction would probably have been provided by a
rectification of that frontier in such a manner as to
give to Bulgaria at least the whole of the Mesta Valley
and the port of Kavala. On the north, where Rou-
mania had claimed, secured, and afterwards seized
territory on the south of the Dobrudja, the Bulgarian
Government would undoubtedly have agreed to leave
to that country the territory, including the town of
Silistria, ceded to her by the Petrograd Protocol of
May, 1913, provided the more southerly area actually
seized by Roumania during the second Balkan war
had been restored to its former owners. With regard
to the East and in Turkey, there was obviously no
question of negotiation with the Allies, and there the
only arrangement which could therefore have been
expected by Bulgaria was the giving to her of a free

BULGARIA AND THE WAR 93

hand to occupy and retain a part of Thrace, say that
situated northwest of the Enos-Midia line.

The enormous war importance of Bulgaria is bound
up largely with her geographical position. As a re-
sult of the Balkan campaigns she became the only
State with a frontier contiguous to that of Turkey
in Europe, She was, therefore, the sole country
which could attack or through which a land attack
could be made upon the European dominions of the
Sultan. Equally well, it was through Bulgaria alone
that officers, technical experts, and supplies could be
sent as they were sent, from Central Europe to Con-
stantinople. To the Allies, this meant that in 1915
the support of "Fox" Ferdinand would have carried
with it an immediate Bulgarian advance into Thrace,
which in itself would probably have resulted in an
immediate collapse of Turkish resistance on the Pe-
ninsula of Gallipoli. In addition, with the entry of
Bulgaria into the War upon our side, we could not
only have utilised Dede Agatch and Porto Lagos for
the disembarkation of armies destined to be able to
impose terms of peace at the very gates of the Otto-
man capital, but arrangements would then undoubtedly
have been arrived at by which Allied or Greek troops
could have advanced from Salonica or Kavala by way
of the territory of Tsar Ferdinand.

Owing to her central position, Bulgaria's value
was, therefore, out of all proportion even to the high
fighting efficiency of her military machine. Thus we
have already seen that the rapid subjugation of Serbia
was largely due to her action. Equally well, had
Roumania entered the War against Austria or Ger-
many during the first year of the European conflagra-

94 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

tion and consequently sent the greater part of her
forces to undertake a campaign in Transylvania or
in the Bukovina, the Bulgarians would have been
able, as they subsequently were able, to make their
influence most unpleasantly felt along both banks of
the Danube. And lastly, had Greece either provided
a force for the support of Serbia, or inaugurated war-
like operations at the Dardanelles or elsewhere, the
Bulgarians always could, as they did, easily advance
to Kavala and into the Greek district which lies be-
tween the rivers Mesta and Struma.

The above remarks are sufficient to indicate not
only what was the importance of Bulgaria in reference
to the Dardanelles, but also that her position enabled
her practically to immobilise the military forces of
her neighbours and to be the means of providing or
of preventing the establishment of through communi-
cation between Central Europe and Constantinople.
The arrival at an understanding between the Allies
and the Government of Sofia, during the first year
of the War, would therefore probably have meant an
augmentation of the Allied armies by at least one
million two hundred thousand men and that the
armies composed of these men would have been in
a position to act in exactly the areas where their
presence would have been most valuable against the
enemy. Four hundred thousand Bulgarians would
have advanced into Turkey, with the result already
indicated. In spite of the attitude of King Con-
stantine, M. Venezelos, then Prime Minister, could
at that time have carried the people of Greece with
him in favour of a mobilisation of an army of at least
two hundred thousand to be employed in some cam-

BULGARIA AND THE WAR 95

paign. Five hundred thousand Roumanians could
have immediately crossed the Austrian frontier. By
occupying the Bukovina and Transylvania, under cir-
cumstances in which there would have been no danger
of Bulgarian aggression from the rear, they would
not only have furthered the cause of the Allies, and
particularly that of Russia, but they might well have
formed an effective link between the Muscovite and
the Serbian forces.

So much for the value of Bulgaria to the Allies — a
value which on its side naturally made her attitude
of great significance to the enemy. Indeed by the
maintenance of the neutrality, but still more by the
support of that country, which rendered the conquest
of her neighbours a feasible proposition, the Centrai
Powers gained one of their greatest assets in the War.
It enabled them to develop to the full advantage the
utility of Turkey and thus to threaten the British
positions in Mesopotamia and in Egypt. It enor-
mously expedited the sending of submarines overland
to be put together in Constantinople or elsewhere,
and it facilitated the establishment of bases, without
which the work of these underwater craft would have
been greatly curtailed in the Eastern Mediterranean.
When coupled with the consequent necessity for the
British withdrawal from the Dardanelles, it constituted
a moral victory of far-reaching importance at home and
abroad. And last but not least it resulted in the in-
auguration of the Salonica campaign and the conse-
quent employment of troops which would otherwise
have been available elsewhere.

The above remarks are sufficient to prove the im-
portance of Bulgaria to both groups of belligerents

96 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

and to indicate the lines along which alone she might
have been brought into the War upon the Allied side.
Whilst there are some who state, I have reason to
believe without foundation, that an arrangement was
arrived at between the Central Powers and Bulgaria
so early that even such concessions as I have outlined
would not have brought her into the War upon our
side, there are others who say that in any case such
concessions were out of proportion to the value of
King Ferdinand's position and army in the War, and
that they would have reacted too unfairly upon his
neighbours to be feasible of arrangement. In discuss-
ing the matter quite openly, therefore, I must ask
my readers to believe that my sole object is to explain,
that in addition to the real interest of all our Balkan
friends being the achievement of a general Allied
success, rather than a local victory, each of the Balkan
States would have furthered her own immediate
objects and stood to gain by the making of sacrifices
which for the moment would and might have been
most difficult.

Our little ally, Serbia, who in 1915 had already
fought so well and so bravely, would have been far
more than repaid for any sacrifices of territory rendered
necessary by the recognition of the Serbo-Bulgarian
Treaty and Conventions signed before the outbreak
of the first Balkan war, by the earlier and certain
acquisition and annexation of territory which we still
contend will be hers in Bosnia and Herzegovina and by
the possession of a proper outlet upon the Adriatic.
Greece, to whom the retention of Kavala was always
largely a question of amour propre, could have been
supplied with more than an equivalent amount of

BULGARIA AND THE WAR 97

territory elsewhere, had she ceded, as M. Venezelos
was at one time wilHng to cede, an area, the posses-
sion of which was and is vital to the whole future
prosperity of Bulgaria. Roumania would have been
amply compensated for any losses which she might
have suffered in the Dobrudja by the fact that she
would have been free to undertake and safe in under-
taking operations which later on proved at least tem-
porarily disastrous to her.

From the moment of the outbreak of the War, and
particularly from the time of the entry of Turkey into
the theatre of hostilities, Bulgaria was therefore in
possession of "goods" which were worth a high price
alike to the Central Powers and to the Allies. The
former, who realised the necessity of preparing the
way for military action, from the first left no stone
unturned to develop an already advantageous situa-
tion in order at least to maintain the neutrality and,
if possible, to secure the support of Bulgaria. The
situation was favourable for Germanic intrigue, be-
cause, as a result of the events of 1913, the relations
between Bulgaria and Turkey had rapidly improved,
and because, whilst the former country had aspira-
tions, both across her eastern and southeastern frontiers
and beyond her western and southwestern boundaries,
her claims in Thrace were of much less importance
to her than those in Macedonia. What happened
therefore was that, although Germany devoted herself
to endeavouring to secure the good will of Bulgaria,
she (Germany) also did what was equally important,
and wrung from Turkey concessions of the greatest
value to the Government of King Ferdinand. Thus
whilst many arguments and statements have been

98 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

used and made to the contrary, and whilst the visit
of Prince Hohenlohe and of the Duke of Mecklenburg-
Schwerin to Sofia in the summer of 1915 had a most
important effect, I have reason to beheve that no
definite agreement existed between the Government
of King Ferdinand and the Central Powers until the
very eve of the entry of Bulgaria into the War. In-
deed, friendly as the relations gradually became be-
tween. Turkey and Bulgaria, it was really only the
cession by the former country of the area of Thrace
through which the railway runs from Mustafa Pasha
to Dede Agatch, the preliminary agreement which
was arrived at in July, that made it practically im-
possible for the Allies to expect to be able to bring
Bulgaria into the War against Turkey.

The position of the Allies originally was and it
gradually became far more difficult than that of the
enemy. To begin with, there was always Russia
in the background, who, whilst supporting Serbia on
the one hand, was regarded with actual suspicion by
Bulgaria on the other. Moreover, instead of, like
Germany, being able to negotiate with one party —
Turkey — for concessions to Bulgaria, England, France,
Russia, and later Italy, were compelled to approach
Serbia, Greece, and Roumania, against all of which
countries, as I have already shown, the Government
of Sofia had far-reaching claims. Moreover, King
Ferdinand, who had never forgiven Russia for her
attitude towards him during the years which elapsed
directly after his arrival in Bulgaria, was not sorry
to be able to utilise the enemy victories in Poland
as an argument in favouring a pro-German policy.
The net results, therefore, were that when tardily

BULGARIA AND THE WAR 99

and too late the Allies recognised the necessity of
endeavouring to secure the neutrality, if not the active
support of Bulgaria, the ground for negotiation was
extremely unfavourable and that country had already
set a price upon herself which it was far from easy to
pay.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1915, a con-
stant exchange of ideas was in progress. Early in
May the Bulgarian Government outlined the condi-
tions upon which it would be prepared to join the
Allies — conditions which were more or less in ac-
cordance with those which I have already suggested.
On May 29, the Triple Entente, supported by Italy,
replied to these proposals but were unable to provide
full satisfaction, owing to the attitude of Serbia,
Greece, and Roumania, who were in possession of
the most important areas in question. On June 15
the Bulgarian Premier called upon the diplomatic
representatives of the Entente Powers at Sofia and
presented to them a Note in which his Government
asked for further particulars regarding these proposals.

A definite and fatal hitch then ensued, and it was not
until a month later and in July, that really determined
efforts were made, and that pressure was brought to
bear upon Serbia to accede to at least part of the Bul-
garian demands. In August this pressure had the
result of making that country give serious considera-
tion to the suggestions of the Allies and particularly
to those of Great Britain, and, after a secret session
in the Chamber, certain concessions were agreed to
by the Government of King Peter. But satisfactory
as might these concessions have been, had they been
suggested voluntarily and many months earlier, they

100 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

proved useless at the time at which they were made.
To begin with, they did not satisfy the full claims of
Bulgaria from an actual territorial standpoint and,
instead of carrying with them the immediate hand-
ing over of at least part of the areas in dispute,
they only made conditional promises as to the future
— promises which the Bulgarians contended would be
less likely to be fulfilled by a victorious than by a
hard-pressed Serbia. Moreover, although the claims
against Greece and Roumania were less vital, the fact
that Bulgaria's northern and southern neighbours
made no sign of following the tardy example of Serbia
certainly had an adverse effect upon the policy of the
Sofia Government. And, last but not least, as I have
already said, by this time Bulgaria had already ar-
rived at the preliminary, if not the final, agreement
as to the concessions of the above-mentioned area by
Turkey — a concession which not only gave the former
country free and unhindered access to Dede Agatch,
but also put Sofia in railway connection with Southern
or new Bulgaria with which communication had for-
merly to be maintained either by a railway passing
through Ottoman territory or by roads running right
across the Rhodope Balkans.

It is unnecessary here to discuss the details of the
manner in which Bulgaria entered the War, or to try
to arrive at conclusions as to the exact moment at
which a definite agreement was made between that
country and the Central Powers. Orders for a general
mobilisation were given on September 19, and it was
subsequently reported, though the correctness of this
report is open to doubt, that German officers were
arriving in Bulgaria to take over the direction of

BULGARIA AND THE WAR 101

various departments and to play the same kind of
role as their fellow countrymen had played in Turkey
prior to the entry of that country into the War. The
result of this mobilisation, which was claimed by
Bulgaria to mean only the maintenance of an armed
neutrality, was that on October 4 the Government
of Petrograd delivered an ultimatum at Sofia, and
that immediately afterwards the diplomatic repre-
sentatives of Great Britain, France, and Russia left
that city.

From the time of the entry of Bulgaria into the
War, the only historical events connected with that
country, which are possessed of European importance,
are these bound up with the subjugation of Serbia,
with the Salonica campaign, and with the conquest of
Roumania. As most of those events took place be-
yond the frontiers of Bulgaria, they are discussed in
other sections of this volume. All that remains to
be said here, therefore, is that whilst Bulgaria has
shown herself a faithful follower and a powerful sup-
porter of Kaiserism, signs have often not been wanting
to prove that she has played her game not so much to
further the cause of the Central Powers as to conquer
and to hold the territories which she covets at the
smallest loss to herself in men and money. Thus
whilst reports have appeared to the effect that Bul-
garians have arrived at various parts situated beyond
the confines of the Balkans, no confirmation of these
reports, the truth of which is highly unlikely, has ever
been forthcoming. In short, as various statesmen of
Bulgaria have often suggested, that country entered
the War not because she wished to support the policy
of the Central Powers or to oppose that of the Allies,

102 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

but solely with the object of realising her national
aspirations — aspirations which had been temporarily
frustrated by the second Balkan war and by the
Treaty of Bucharest which terminated it.

I have endeavoured to enumerate as impartially as
is possible the events which led to the entry of Bul-
garia into the War. In so doing, whilst recognising
the difficulties which existed, I have tried to make no
secret of the faults in Allied statesmanship — faults
which resulted in what is one of the greatest diplomatic
defeats suffered during the War. To summarise these
faults, it may be said that the importance of Bulgaria
and of the re-formation of a Balkan alliance favourable
to the Allies was not recognised until so late that the
demands of the Sofia Government had been aug-
mented to a point making them exceedingly difficult
of gratification. When the desirability for action had
been realised, instead of accepting the fact that the
price for "the delivery of valuable goods" is always
high, no definite line of policy appears to have been
followed. Two courses were open. It was feasible,
first, to approach Serbia, Greece, and Roumania in
order either to ascertain what concessions they were
willing to provide or to tell them the nature of the
concessions insisted upon by the Allies. With some-
thing definite in hand, conversations might then have
been entered into with Bulgaria, who would thereby
have been forced to disclose her attitude one way or
the other. And second, it was practicable to ascertain
from Bulgaria her conditions, and then t© decide
whether these conditions should be forced upon her
neighbours. ^Instead of the adoption of these alterna-
tives, a sort of halfway course of negotiating first with

BULGARIA AND THE WAR 103

one party and then with the other seems to have been
adopted — a system which in the end permitted the
running out of the sands and gave the enemy time to
bring about a definite arrangement between Turkey
and Bulgaria.

The fundamental basis of the whole question was,
and is, that no Balkan statesman, be he Roumanian,
Greek, Serbian, or Bulgarian, can or will make sacri-
fices until he finds himself compelled to do so. Equally
well no Balkan Government can or will accept less
than it demands until the necessity for the adoption
of such a course arises. This is the case, because
were they to do so they would lay themselves open
to a charge by the military and chauvinistic parties,
— a charge which would result in their fall. On the
other hand, once the leader of a government is in a
position to affirm to his followers and supporters that
external pressure has forced him to concede a point,
however important, then and only then can he hope
to pass through an internal crisis unscathed. For
example, in 1912 and very soon after the most explicit
statements by the Belgrade Government upon the
necessity for a port upon the Adriatic, orders were
given for the withdrawal of its army from that coast,
and this because of the influence which came from
abroad and particularly from Russia. It is this state
of things — this mentality — which made it so neces-
sary for the Allies in 1914-1915 to adopt a policy so
firm, so uncompromising, and on the face of it so even
brutal towards all the Balkan States that it would
probably have enabled each of the Cabinets to accept
a programme destined to further the real and ultimate
interests of countries, which, were an enemy victory

104 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

to be realised, would sooner or later be face to face
with the Austro-German danger — a danger which
has ruined the prosperity of Serbia for years. In
short, whilst she must now be ranked among and
treated as one of our enemies, we are compelled to
recognise that the policy adopted by Bulgaria resulted
not only from her illegitimate claims, but also from
the obduracy of her neighbours — obduracy which has
unfortunately been largely responsible for disasters
which all of them have now suffered to a greater or a
lesser degree.

ROUMANIA AND THE WAR

RouMANiA — the largest country in or immediately
connected with the Balkan Peninsula — is made up
of the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, formally
united under the name Roumania in December, 1861.
She occupies a position of immense strategical impor-
tance, for the most part on the north of the Danube
and, so to speak, wedged in between Austria-Hungary,
Russia, and Bulgaria, because, being composed of
two arms or horns, she controls the routes to the south
and east. The province of Wallachia, which runs in
a more or less easterly and westerly direction, together
with the Dobrudja, bars the way from Central Europe
into Bulgaria. Moldavia, which spreads out practi-
cally north and south, constitutes a bridge between
Austria-Hungary and Southern Russia.

For these reasons Roumania forms a sort of link
between East and West. Geographically, it is usual
to consider the country as situated without and to
the north of the Balkan Peninsula, and therefore her
interests may be called semi-international and semi-
Balkan. As far as the first of these is concerned, the
policy of Roumania has been and is bound up with
the fact that it is practically necessary for her to main-
tain good relations either with the Central Powers

106 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

or with Russia, and that it was and is obviously desir-
able that her friends should be those destined to be
the victors in the War. This is the case principally
because single-handed she is not in a position to wage
war with a Great Power, and because for years she has
been desirous of securing possession either of the
Austro-Hungarian districts inhabited by Roumanians
or of the area of Russian Bessarabia which she covets.
The real key of what has taken place since the outbreak
of the European War therefore lies in the fact that
Roumania, like all the other Balkan countries and
peoples, wished to utilise the occasion to realise one
or perhaps both the aspirations which rest so close to
the heart of every patriotic citizen. From a Balkan
standpoint, on the other hand, the most important
thing is that nothing should take place which would
in any way threaten the general interests of Roumania
or so strengthen the positions of her Balkan neighbours
as to affect these interests.

In order to understand the position of Roumania,
it is necessary therefore to realise the full meaning to
her of the Bessarabian, the Transylvanian, and the
Dobrudjan questions. So far as the first of these is
concerned, as Bessarabia contains a Roumanian popu-
lation of only somewhat under a million, the aspira-
tions of Roumania to acquire at least a part of that
province were based upon historical grounds, and upon
the manner in which this area has changed hands since
Napoleonic times. By the Peace of Bucharest, signed
in 1812, the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia
were restored to the Sultan with the exception of Bes-
sarabia, which was added to Russia. In 1856, that
is to say after the Crimean War, the southern portion

ROUMANIA AND THE WAR 107

of Bessarabia was restored to Moldavia, and the two
principalities, still under the suzerainty of the Sultan,
were placed under the collective guarantee of the
European Powers. Thus matters stood until after
the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 and 1878, when Rou-
mania, who had been of the most material assistance
to the former country, anticipated that she would
secure compensation at the expense of Turkey, and
that she would also retain at least the Bessarabian
area allotted to her Moldavian province in 1856.
Not so, however, for the Russians not only prevented
the Roumanians from being represented at the sign-
ing of the preliminary treaty of San Stefano in March,
1878, but they also secured the exclusion of their dele-
gates from the sittings of the Berlin Conference until
the representatives of the Great Powers responsible
for the final Treaty of Berlin, signed in July, 1878, had
already decided in favour of the Russian claim and
recognised the independence of Roumania from Turkey
only on the condition that the former country restored
to Russia that portion of Bessarabia which had been
given to Moldavia in 1856. Since that time the owner-
ship of this area has therefore been a very burning
question in Roumania.

The Roumanian dislike of Austria-Hungary and the
aspiration to acquire areas now belonging to that
country depend upon the fact that there are domiciled
near but outside their frontier and in the Dual Mon-
archy almost four million Roumanians. The great
majority of these people live in Transylvania, but
there are also a considerable number in the Bukovina
and some in what is known as the Banat, situated
across the Danube from the northern frontier of Ser-

108 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

bia. The treatment of these people by their alien
government and the natural desire for the union of
the Roumanian race has been the keystone of the
foreign policy of those Roumanian statesmen such
as M. Take Jonescu, who formerly advocated a policy
of friendship for Russia and who, from the moment
of the outbreak of the War, advocated a definite pro-
allied policy on the part of their country. In other
words, whilst the case is much less strong than that
of France in regard to Alsace Lorraine, the sentiments
of every patriotic Roumanian have been bound up
with the position in Transylvania for many a year.
As I will explain later on, it is largely these sentiments
which prompted the Roumanian Government to adopt
a strategically wrong policy in advancing across its
northern and western frontiers in the autumn of 1916,
and it is these sentiments which must make the peace
terms imposed by the Central Powers so very bitter
of acceptance by every patriotic Roumanian.

So much for the questions which for years have in-
fluenced the policy of Roumania towards Russia and
Austria-Hungary. Turning to her attitude towards
the Balkans, although her final independence of Turk-
ish suzerainty was recognised by the Treaty of Berlin
in 1878, Roumania played but little part in Balkan
affairs until 1910, when she was supposed to have
entered into some kind of treaty arrangement with
Turkey concerning her attitude in case of war in the
Near East. However this may be, and whatever may
have been this arrangement, the army of the late King
Carol did not take the field during the first Balkan
war, Roumania at that time contenting herself by
seizing the opportunity of securing compensation from

From a Pliotograph by Elliott and Fry, London

M. Take Jonescu

M. Take Jonescu, who is one of Roumania's leading statesmen, has always
been well known for his moderate and far-seeing opinions. A great lawyer
by profession, at a very early stage in the War he expressed himself openly
in favor of Roumania's support of the Allies and of a good understanding
between Serbia and Bulgaria.

ROUMANIA AND THE WAR 109

Bulgaria in the Dobrudja, thus once more raising the
question of that province.

The Dobrudja is the district which hes between the
Black Sea and the lower reaches of the Danube, which
separate it from Russia and from the remainder of
Roumania. The northern section of the province is
mostly made up of an alluvial tract of country produced
by the action of this river, whilst the southern part is
more barren, being composed largely of steppe and
treeless territory. The whole district is 'strategically
of great importance because of its relations with the
Danube, because it constitutes a sort of gateway
into the Balkans, and because it now contains the port
of Constanza (Kustendji) and a railway completed
since the beginning of the War. As early as Roman
times forts were built from the Danube, near Cerna
Voda (Tchernavoda) , to the Black Sea, near Constanza.
As a result of constant invasion, the population is
mixed, being composed of the remnants of the races
which have passed through it at various periods.

From the point of view of present-day politics, the
Dobrudja question depends upon events which have
taken place since the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-
1878. After that war, its northern part was given to
Roumania as compensation for the loss of Bessarabia.
The Bulgaro-Roumanian frontier was delimited by a
European Commission which, in spite of protests
from Russia, fixed a boundary running from just to
the east of Silistria on the Danube to near Mangalia
on the Black Sea and thus treated comparatively
favourably the claims of Roumania. This settlement
led to ill feeling, for whilst Roumania contended that
her frontier was not strategically such as to enable

no THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

her to defend her port at Constanza and the great
Cerna Voda bridge across the Danube, which was
subsequently constructed, Bulgaria rightly argued
that the population of the Dobrudja was largely Bul-
garian in nationality. This state of things was in
part responsible for the fact that Roumania did not
throw in her lot with the Balkan States against Turkey
in 1912. Indeed, instead of so doing, it was during
this period that she entered the diplomatic arena and
claimed the cession by Bulgaria of a stretch of territory
on the south of the Dobrudja. As Bulgaria naturally
resented these concessions, the question was referred
to an Ambassadors' Conference at Petrograd, which
decided that Bulgaria should cede the town of Silistria
to Roumania, and that the frontier of the two countries
should once more be delimited by a commission. This
settlement, embodied in what is known as the Proto-
col of Petrograd, was arrived at early in May, 1913.

But as the claims of Roumania were not thereby
satisfied, and as the wringing of this concession from
Bulgaria naturally created great resentment among
Bulgarians, the relations existing between the two
countries at the time of the outbreak of the second
Balkan war were far from cordial. The result was that
Roumania, then no longer withheld by Russia, invaded
Bulgaria, nominally with the object of maintaining
the balance of power in the Balkans, but really for the
purpose of wresting from Bulgaria a still further area
of territory on the south of the Dobrudja. This ac-
tion on the part of Roumania, who was easily able to
cross the Danube and to advance to the very gates
of Sofia, whilst the Bulgarian army was occupied else-
where, resulted in the fact that the country was in-

ROUMANIA AND THE WAR 111

creased in size from an area of just over 50,700 square
miles to one of just under 53,500 square miles, and
that her population of just over 7,230,000 souls was
added to by about 280,000 inhabitants.

Geographically, politically, and militarily, this
gave to Roumania more than that rectification of her
Dobrudja frontier, which she had wanted ever since
the signing of the Treaty of Berlin, for it secured for
her a boundary running in a northwesterly direction
from the immediate vicinity of Varna on the Black
Sea to a point on the Danube located about halfway
between Silistria and Rustchuk. Endorsed by the
fatal Treaty of Bucharest, which terminated the
second Balkan campaign, this change, which was
supposed to be going to enable Roumania to defend
herself against an attack from the south, was in its
turn responsible for the bad relations which existed
between Roumania and Bulgaria prior to and after
the beginning of the European conflagration.

From the moment of the outbreak of the War,
therefore, the position of Roumania was an extremely
difiicult one. On the one hand that country could
not afford to take sides with Russia or Austria-Hungary
unless she were absolutely guaranteed the strongest
material assistance from the group of belligerents
which she supported. On the other, the statesmen of
Bucharest recognised that so long as the attitude of
Bulgaria remained undecided, any war move by Rou-
mania might lay that country open to an attack on
the part of her southern neighbour — an attack
prompted by the events of 1913. Moreover, to add
to the above-mentioned international difficulties, it
is now known that some thirty years ago Roumania

112 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

joined Germany in a defensive alliance which was
almost identical in form to that which existed between
Italy and the Central Powers.

The late King Carol, who belonged to the House of
Hohenzollern, and who was pro-German, was firmly
convinced that the obligations and interests of his
country placed her on the side of the Central Powers.
Strengthened, however, by the declaration of neutral-
ity by Italy, and really knowing that Germany and
Austria were the aggressors, the Crown Council as-
sembled at Sinai a, directly the War began, to discuss
the future attitude of the country, refused to support
the expressed opinion of the King, and decided that
Roumania should remain a peaceful spectator of events
in progress around her. Later on and after the
death of King Carol in October, 1914, most far-seeing
statesmen, particularly M. Take Jonescu, who had
always believed in friendship with Bulgaria and who
from the beginning had been in favour of war upon the
side of the Allies, began to see that, if Roumania were
to be in a position to realise her larger aspirations, she
must also be prepared to adopt a definite policy and
to make sacrifices in the south, as a result of which
she would secure a free hand in the north and west.

It was during the time preceding the Muscovite
retreat, which began in May, 1915, that Russia, who
could then have minimized the difficulties in any case
besetting Roumania, should have made agreements
with that country which would have induced her to
enter the War and at the same time have compensated
her for concessions to Bulgaria in the Dobrudja.
Such a Muscovite policy would have strengthened the
hands of the Roumanian statesmen who then recognised

ROUMANIA AND THE WAR 113

that the maintenance of the Treaty of Bucharest had
become or was becoming no longer necessary. Had
it been adopted by the Government of Petrograd, it
is probable that Roumania, instead of remaining a
more or less disinterested spectator, during the Allied
negotiations with Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria of the
summer of 1915, might well have utilised her all-impor-
tant influence with Serbia and Greece in favour of the
reconstitution of the Balkan League, and that she
might even have taken the initiative and openly proved
the bona fides of her attitude by giving up at least part
of the territory which she acquired as a result of the
Balkan Wars. The result of such action would have
been far-reaching, for it would not only have definitely
and permanently secured the neutrality of Bulgaria, at
least so far as Roumania was concerned, but it would
have compelled Serbia and Greece to see the necessity
for the adoption of policies destined most likely ac-
tually to have brought Bulgaria into the War on the
side of the Allies.

From the time of the entry of Bulgaria into the
War a new position was created in Europe and parti-
cularly in the Balkans — a position so advantageous
to the enemy that it remained only essential for him
to bring about its military consolidation by the defeat
of Serbia and by the shaping of the policies of Greece
and of Roumania to suit his strategical plan. The
Germans recognised that the key of the situation then
lay in Roumania, owing to her geographical position
and particularly to the fact of her being practically
in control of the Lower Danube. Indeed, if any
definite proof were required, the terms of peace imposed
upon Roumania, particularly those by which that

114 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

country is to be compelled to facilitate the trans-
port of enemy troops to the Black Sea coast, consti-
tute absolute proof that, from the moment she had
gained Bulgaria, Germany was determined, owing to
the importance of Roumania as a corridor toward
the south and east, to bring about her entry into the
War on one side or the other. She bullied in the hope
of securing her support. When success in this direc-
tion proved impossible, the Central Powers played
their cards to achieve not the continued neutrality,
but the actual hostility, of Roumania, and, as there
is little reason to doubt, utilized the influence which
they possessed in Russia for the purpose of persuading
that country to bring nominally friendly pressure to
bear upon the desired opponent. The object of this
policy was that the enemy realised the significance
of Roumania as a route to the south and east, and
that he believed the strength required for the subjuga-
tion of that country would be well expended, con-
sidering the results to be achieved. From an initial
standpoint and so far as the south was concerned, the
Central Powers could not get control of the Danube
and of the approaches to Bulgaria across and by way
of it except by the occupation of at least Wallachia
and the Dobrudja — a control which at once gave
them a partially alternative route eastward to that
provided by the main railway from Belgrade to Con-
stantinople, the whole of which fell into their hands
with the entry of Bulgaria and the subjugation of
Serbia in the autumn of 1915. More indirectly and
probably looking ahead, the enemy no doubt realised
that the full benefits of the defeat of Russia or of
her exit from the War could not be achieved so long as

ROUMANIA AND THE WAR 115

Roumania remained neutral and so long as the com-
munications running towards the south and east
through Moldavia could not be utilised for the
transport of his men and material.

So much for the events connected with the entry
of Roumania into the War which took place on August
27, 1916. In order to understand the events which
followed — events very fully described by John Buchan
in Nelson's "History of the War", Volume 17 — it
is necessary once more to refer to the nature and
position of the northwestern frontier of the country.
Starting from the north, that frontier makes a semicir-
cular sweep round the crests of the Carpathians and
Transylvanian Alps in such a way that Transylvania
juts out into Roumanian territory in the form of a
sharp salient. This frontier, which has a length of
about four hundred miles, is crossed by six important
passes — the Vulcan, the Rotherturm, the Torsburg,
the Predeal, the Buzeu, and the Gyimes. Of these
the Rotherturm, the Predeal, and the Gyimes passes
are traversed by railways, whilst roads run through
the remainder and through other mountain gaps of
lesser significance.

Directly after Roumania threw in her lot with the
Allies, her army advanced into enemy territory by
way of many of these routes. The Austrians, recog-
nising the weakness of their position — weakness due
to the above-mentioned salient — performed what
was really and not only nominally a strategic retreat
and for about three weeks continued to withdraw,
contenting themselves only by delaying the militarily
unsound and far too rapid Roumanian advance. By
the end of the third week in September, therefore, the

116 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

Roumanians had occupied a band or belt of enemy
territory running right across Transylvania, their
centre having pushed forward about sixty miles,
whilst their right and left flanks had advanced re-
spectively about twenty -five and about ten miles.

During this time events on the south and on the
Danube front had begun to take a serious turn. A Bul-
garian force, augmented by two Turkish divisions and
supported by a German contingent, acting under the
command of Von Mackensen, had been collected on
the south of that river. During the opening days of
September, that force advanced across the Roumanian
frontier and into the area of the Dobrudja annexed
by that country after the Balkan Wars. No serious
Roumanian resistance was encountered and by the ninth
of that month not only Turtukeuie but also Silistria,
together with a large number of prisoners and a great
deal of booty, were in Bulgarian hands. A few days
later, the German general, whose advance was greatly
furthered by the Bulgarian railways which exist in
this area, had pushed forward to a line from which
the railway from Cerna Voda to Constanza was im-
mediately threatened. The Roumanians, realising
their danger, hurried troops from the Carpathian
front to the Dobrudja, and after a battle, in which
they were supported by Russian and Serbian contin-
gents (these latter composed, according to Colonel
Buchan, of Jugo-Slavs taken prisoner by Russia),
and commanded by a Muscovite general, the enemy
was temporarily thrown back for a distance of about
ten miles.

By approximately September 20, when the Rouma-
nians found themselves held up in Transylvania, their

ROUMANIA AND THE WAR 117

position in the Dobrudja had therefore become highly
precarious. But what was more important and more
disastrous was that by that time, too, a great Austro-
Germanic force, under the command of Von Fal-
kenhayn, had been concentrated in the East by the
direction of Von Hindenburg, who became the Kaiser's
Chief of the General Staff during the closing days of
August. That drive began a few days later with an
enemy attack against the Roumanian left centre near
Hermannstadt — an attack which more or less pene-
trated, encircled, or turned the Roumanian position
and compelled the forces of that country hastily to
retreat towards the east, for the Rotherturm Pass,
upon which they depended for their communications
with Wallachia, fell into enemy hands on the twenty-
sixth.

From that time onwards things moved apace, partly
because the Roumanians were ill provided with guns
and munitions, partly because success is necessary to
the maintenance of tTie morale of such an army, and
partly because the task besetting Roumania was
altogether too great for her. Early in October the
forces of King Ferdinand were defeated on the centre
of their position, and by the end of the first week in
that month Kronstadt was re-taken by the Austro-
Germans. These enemy successes were followed by
a very rapid advance towards the Carpathians, espe-
cially in the area lying to the south and southwest of
Kronstadt — an advance which gave to the enemy
the Torsburg Pass by October 14, Predeal being bom-
barded and destroyed about the same time. The
Roumanians, however, were able to offer serious
resistance at this latter point, and the enemy was

118 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

considerably delayed in his attempt to reach Bucharest
by means of the main line which passes through Sinaia
and Ployesti. Farther north too, and on the Mol-
davian frontier, the Roumanians managed to hold up
the enemy, and their resistance was furthered by the
extension of the Russian battle line in a southerly
direction and by the handing over of the defence of
the northern frontier of Moldavia to the Russians,
who took over the area lying to the north of the Gyimes
Pass.

By October 20 the position in the south had once
more become very serious, for, whilst attempts had
previously taken place by both sides to effect cross-
ings of the Danube, it was only at about that time that
Von Mackensen inaugurated a further serious drive
in the Dobrudja. Constanza — the great Roumanian
port on the Black Sea — was occupied two days later,
and Cerna Voda and its long bridge, which was not
adequately destroyed by the Roumanians during their
hasty retreat, fell into Bulgarian hands almost immedi-
ately. This, together with the enemy's subsequent
advance towards the north, greatly strengthened his
position, for it gave him the practical command of a
long stretch of the Lower Danube and also facilities
for the passage of that river which he did not previ-
ously possess.

These events constituted the beginning of the end.
During the closing days of October and the first half
of November, the Austro-Germans advanced from the
north with a semi-encircling movement, and, pushing
forward their right wing into Western Wallachia,
Crajova, an important railway junction, was occupied
on the twenty-first, thus practically isolating the

ROUMANIA AND THE WAR 119

Roumanian forces which were still holding Orsova,
consequently making their successful retreat impos-
sible. At about this time Von Falkenhayn was begin-
ning to push forward through the more easterly passes
and on the twenty-seventh Von Mackensen, coming
from the south, occupied Giurgevo, on the left bank
of the Danube, thereby having made it unsafe for the
Roumanians to take up a defensive line along the River
Aluta.

A glance at the map therefore will show that although
Bucharest has always been described as an entrenched
camp, and although it was defended by a girdle of
forts which run round the city, it was powerless to
resist an encircling movement which had successfully
hemmed it in on every side except the northeast. The
resistance attempted on the line of the Arjish River,
which runs across the southwest front of the city,
proved useless, and Bucharest and Ployesti fell into
enemy hands on December sixth. From that time
onwards the retreat became a rout, and the Govern-
ment, Allied Legations, and banks having been removed
to Jassy, which became the temporary capital, no resist-
ance was made until the Roumanians reached the
line of the Lower Sereth, which flows into the Danube
at Galatz. The enemy, on the other hand, made no
serious attempt to penetrate that line, for he had
already achieved his primary object of securing the
control of the whole of the Lower Danube as far as
Braila — a control which gave him free access to
Bulgaria and by way of that country to Turkey. Thus
matters stood, with the Allied front extending along
the Carpathians and the Rivers Trotush, Sereth, and
Danube, from the Gyimes Pass on the northwest

120 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

to a point just to the north of Suhna on the Black Sea
on the southeast, until the events which immediately
preceded the fatal and brutal peace finally imposed
upon Roumania by the Central Powers in May,
1918.

The above-described developments were partly the
result of events which had taken place prior to the
entry of Roumania into the War and partly the conse-
quence of local and international causes, the nature of
which are worthy of brief examination here. Locally
speaking, the fundamental question consists not so
much in what the Roumanians did or did not do, but
in the fact that those who remembered their magnifi-
cent conduct and the great part which they played
in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 expected far too
much from them in the European War. Thus, whilst
the Bulgarians began to form a modern army directly
after the liberation of the principality in 1878, and
whilst the Serbs commenced to bring their fighting
machine up to date during the early years of this
century, the Roumanians did not introduce the regu-
lations necessary for the creation of an efficient military
force until 1908. By the law of that year, which
constitutes the basis of the present organisation,
service in the semi-permanent army, where men only
served for intermittent periods and then passed into
the reserve, instead of spending at least two continuous
years with the colours, was finally abolished, except
in the case of certain cavalry units. Helpful and
necessary as was this reform, it is markedly apparent,
as the military liability of a Roumanian lasts for twenty-
one years, that eight years had been all too little for
the adequate development of a system without which

ROUMANIA AND THE WAR 121

the safety of such a country could never be assured.
It was the existence of this state of things, together
with the methods of recruitment and training of the
officers, who are separated by a wide social gulf from
the masses of the country, and together with the
fact that, during the neutrality of Roumania, the Gov-
ernment did not take and could not take the measures
necessary to secure an adequate amount of war ma-
terial, which affected the power of an army which
was nominally much stronger than that of either Serbia
or Bulgaria.

From a military standpoint, the plan of campaign
adopted by Roumania was undoubtedly a mistake.
The Government, which for a moment appeared to
think that the rupture of relations with Bulgaria could
be avoided, ought to have known that, for reasons
already given, such a desirable object could not then
be achieved, and that therefore the Roumanian army
would be compelled to fight on the northern and north-
western frontiers as well as on the line of the Danube.
Instead of taking the magnitude of her task into ac-
count, of recognising that her railway system leading
up to the Austro-Hungarian frontier was much less
adequate than that possessed by the enemy, and there-
fore of contenting herself by endeavouring to block
the passes of the Carpathians and the Transylvanian
Alps and devoting herself more closely to the situation
on the other side of the Danube, Roumania immedi-
ately took the offensive on the north and west and
pushed forward into enemy territory. Even the
strategical advantages to have been gained by a suc-
cessful advance as far as the line of the Middle Maros
did not justify such an undertaking, for the passive

122 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

defence of the Carpathians and the Transylvanian
Alps would certainly have been all that could have
been safely undertaken, bearing always in mind that
the Turks were in a position to send forces to Bulgaria,
that the Bulgarian army itself was in no way immo-
bilised at Salonica, and that once Roumania had entered
the War, Germany would spare no pains to insure her
annihilation.

Nevertheless in this connection, it is always neces-
sary to remember certain circumstances which miti-
gate, if they do not altogether remove, the blame which
would otherwise rest upon those responsible for the
inauguration of the plan adopted by Roumania. To
begin with, it is asserted, on good authority, that
Russia definitely promised to attack Bulgaria and to
immobilise her army. Moreover, we have to recog-
nise that the Roumanian Government may not have
been able to render political motives subservient to
military necessities. Indeed as the people favoured
war largely with the object of bringing about the liber-
ation of their co-nationals domiciled in enemy territory,
and as it would have been almost impossible for any
leader to persuade them that this aspiration could be
realized better by an Allied than by a local Roumanian
victory, the King and his advisers were at once placed
in the position of being obliged either to adopt measures
in total discord with military tenets, or to risk the
dangers of a policy which would not have been clearly
understood by a people who for years have turned
their attention towards Transylvania.

Turning to the international reasons for the Rou-
manian disaster, if we dismiss, as we certainly must
dismiss the suggestion that there was any want of

ROUMANIA AND THE WAR 123

loyalty on the part of the Western Allies, then we find
that the first and primary cause of the defeat of that
country was due to the fact that she entered the War
at the wrong time. The enemy had already achieved
far-reaching successes in the East ; Bulgaria had been
ranged on the side of the Central Powers for nearly
a year ; and the power of King Constantine had so
increased that the attitude of the Greek Government
was a continual menace to the safety of the Salonica
expedition — a menace which prevented the objects of
Roumania being furthered by an attack which might
otherwise have been made from the direction of the
Aegean. But what was far more important was that
whether or not Roumania was actually forced to come
into the War, the Government of the ex-Tsar certainly
promised her strong support in men and war material,
and, as I have just said, encouraged her to think that
she would only have to fight on her northern and west-
ern frontiers against Austria and Germany, since Russia
intended to deal with Bulgaria by means of an expedi-
tion landed on the Black Sea coast. Not only were
none of these promises fulfilled, but Russia actually
held up supplies destined by the other Allies for Rou-
mania and did nothing whatever even to threaten the
Bulgarians from the direction of the Black Sea. This
bad faith was largely responsible for the Roumanian
defeat. It is as a consequence of it, and of the way
in which for years Roumania has been treated by Rus-
sia, that our sympathy must go out to a people whose
treatment by the enemy is an example of what Ger-
many means by so-called justice.

At the moment of writing, it is too early and it is
unnecessary to discuss in detail the local consequences

124 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

of the peace terms brutally imposed upon Roumania,
terms which it would have been worse than useless
for her temporarily to refuse to accept. To begin
with, it can hardly be admitted that these terms are
otherwise than temporary, for they should be sub-
jected to revision when the moment for peace comes.
Sufficient therefore be it to say that the worst conse-
quences of the new situation in Southeastern Europe,
so far as it concerns Roumania herself, are bound up
with the facts that that country has not only failed to
secure any part of Transylvania but that she has lost
the Dobrudja and been compelled to agree to an actual
rectification of Austro-Hungarian frontier. So far as the
Dobrudja be concerned, whilst that area, conquered by
Roumania during the second Balkan war, is to revert
to Bulgaria, the more northerly part is to go to the
enemy under conditions which are not plain, Roumania
merely being assured of a trade route to the Black Sea
by way of Czerna Voda and Constanza.

Such a settlement carrying with it the moral strangu-
lation of Roumania, when coupled with the fact that
she also now seems practically to have ceded her sov-
ereignty, so far as her oil fields are concerned, are such as
to make her position about as disastrous a one as it is
possible to imagine. In addition, that country has been
forced to give up other areas which, unless they be re-
stored when the time of peace comes, will make her
future position almost entirely negligible from a military
standpoint. On the Danube the Austro-Hungarian
frontier is to be extended in a southeasterly direction
so as to include the Iron Gates, a strip of territory
and a wharf is to be compulsorily leased to the Govern-
ment of the Dual Monarchy at Turnu Severin, and

ROUMANIA AND THE WAR 125

certain Danubian islands are to be acquired by that
country. On the north and west of Roumania —
that is, on the hue followed by the Transylvanian Alps
and by the Carpathians — and at all the passes of
importance "the new Roumanian frontier has been so
far removed to Roumanian ground as military reasons
require."

In exchange for these losses, if exchange it may be
called, Roumania is apparently to be allowed to annex
all or at least part of the Russian Province of Bes-
sarabia. If this annexation be permitted by the Cen-
tral Powers, it will certainly carry with it considerable
satisfaction in Roumania. But from the international
standpoint it will constitute proof positive of the
enemy's confidence in his power to establish and to
maintain control over the whole of Central Europe, and
of his consequent preference that Bessarabia should be
incorporated in Roumania rather than that it should
remain part of Russia where he must know that the
whole future is uncertain. Once more, therefore, an
apparent concession, actuated for purely Pan-Germanic
reasons, seems in progress of employment for the sole
purpose of developing and consolidating the Kaiser's
dream for domination in the East.

These disasters, and they are local disasters, are
such as in many ways to make the present position
of Roumania as worthy of sympathy as is that of
Serbia. But whereas, in spite of diplomatic mistakes,
the latter country has fought for the Allies since the
beginning of the War, it is impossible to forget not
only that Roumania was herself largely responsible
for her bad relations with Bulgaria, but that she post-
poned her entry into the theatre of hostilities until

126 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

long after the time at which her assistance would
have been of special value to the Allies, notably the
period of the Bulgarian mobilisation, and until no other
alternative was open to her. These facts must some-
what lessen the intense feeling which would otherwise
be forthcoming for her as a victim of Germanism, and
make that which remains largely dependent upon the
exceedingly difficult position in which Roumania has
been placed by the War, and upon the manner in
which she was treated by Russia before and after her
adhesion to the cause of the Allies.

VI

GREECE AND THE WAR

In order to understand the Greek attitude towards
and role in the War, it is necessary first to reahse the
meaning of some of the events which have occurred
in Athens during the last few years and to examine
the several ways in which the position of that country
is an entirely special one. After many years of mis-
government — misgovernment which resulted in con-
sequences which were temporarily fatal to the pros-
perity of Greece — a peaceful revolution took place
in August, 1909. This revolution established the
power of the Military League which completely and
absolutely controlled the affairs of the country until
the spring of 1910. Early in that year M. Venezelos,
having been summoned to Athens, proposed that a
National Assembly should be convoked in order that
the League should be able to retire into the back-
ground, whilst at the same time avoiding an ordinary
general election, which could not take place at that
time owing to the then state of the Cretan question
and particularly to the fact that the deputies who would
have been elected by the Cretans to represent them in
the Greek Parliament could not have been permitted
to take their seats in view of the attitude of the Pro-

128 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

tecting Powers of Crete and of the Ottoman Gov-
ernment.

The meeting of this National Assembly in September,
1910, practically saved Greece from complications,
the disastrous nature of which it is impossible to over-
estimate. M. Venezelos — already the saviour of
modern Greece — actually formed his Ministry in
October of that year. In the spring of 1912, when an
election took place, he was returned with one hun-
dred and forty-seven supporters in a Parliament then
composed of one hundred and eighty-one members.
Since that time this patriotic, far-seeing, and sagacious
statesman has not only been in part responsible for
the creation of the original Balkan League, but he
has steered his country successfully through the two
Balkan Wars and saved her from utter disaster in a
manner which should have won him the gratitude and
the esteem of every patriotic Greek. Indeed suffi-
cient be it here to say that as a result of the Balkan
Wars, Greece, which made the smallest sacrifices ex-
cept Roumania and Montenegro in those campaigns,
was increased by about one third of its size. Instead
of being made up of just over 25,000 square miles and
containing a population of about 2,760,000 souls, im-
mediately before the War she had an area of about
42,000 square miles and a. population of over 4,821,000
souls.

The outstanding feature in the earlier part of M.
Venezelos' regime, that is to say, during the period
intervening between his arrival at Athens early in 1910
and the assassination of the late King George at Salonica
after the first Balkan War and in March, 1913, was the
striking way in which His Majesty and the new Premier

GREECE AND THE WAR 129

forgot their former differences and worked together
for the regeneration and good of their country. In
1910 the King, whose tact, wisdom, and moderation
undoubtedly saved Greece from the serious conse-
quences which would most certainly have resulted
from an aggressive policy towards Turkey during
the earlier years which followed the re-establishment of
the Ottoman Constitution in 1908, faced by the alterna-
tive of either sanctioning the continued rule of the
Military League or of summoning the somewhat un-
constitutional National Assembly recommended by M.
Venezelos, finally and wisely decided to adopt the
latter course. From that time onwards until his
death, His Majesty, knowing that the Cretan leader
was the one man in whom the Greek nation then placed
its confidence, put all his personal feelings on one
side and consistently utilised the capacity of a man
without whose assistance and presence one of the
most rapid regenerations in modern history could
never have been effected.

M. Venezelos, whose relations with the royal family
prior to 1910 had been far from cordial, owing to his
consistent opposition to the policy of Prince George
whilst His Royal Highness was High Commissioner of
Crete (1898-1906), also made up his mind to forget
the past and to devote himself untiringly to the good
of the Hellenic cause. Thus, instead of advocating
the extreme measures suggested by the Military League
and instead of utilising his influence against the royal
princes — particularly the Crown Prince, afterwards
King Constantine — the Prime Minister actually fur-
thered the establishment of the prestige of the dynasty
and the reappointment of Prince Constantine as

130 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

Inspector General or Commander-in-Chief of the army
— a reappointment in fact largely responsible for the
great popularity which the future King gained during
the Balkan Wars. In short, M. Venezelos, whose down-
fall as an Island leader had been one of the primary
objects of Prince George in Crete, obliterated himself
and worked loyally with a ruler who, if he were weak
and sometimes shortsighted, in the end proved that he
was sufficiently far-seeing to understand that the pros-
perity of his country could not be developed without
the assistance of the one great man of modern Greece.
In order to realise the position of Greece in the War,
it is necessary to recognise that it is an entirely special
one, and that her attitude and that of the Allies towards
her have been influenced by various historical events,
by the mentality of the people, and by the internal
struggle which was in progress at Athens from the
time of the accession until the abdication of King Con-
stantine. In the first place, as is clearly shown by
Thomas Erskine Holland in his book entitled "The
European Concert in the Eastern Question ", Greece
owes her very existence to the good will and to the
protection of England, France, and Russia. Thus,
as early as 1826, Great Britain and Russia signed a
protocol by which they were to negotiate with the
Sublime Porte on behalf of the Greeks, whose indepen-
dence from Turkey had not then been brought about.
In the following year, when the mediation thus offered
had been refused by Turkey, and when the Govern-
ments of Austria and Prussia had declined to accede
to that protocol, the three Powers (France had by this
time joined England and Russia) entered into a treaty
for the object of re-establishing peace between the eon-

GREECE AND THE WAR 131

tending parties — the Greeks and the Ottoman Govern-
ment.

In 1830 the Conference of London decided that
Greece should be entirely independent of Turkey, and
two years later agreed to offer the throne of that
country to Prince Otho of Bavaria, and by a convention
then signed between the representatives of England,
France, and Russia on the one side, and that of Bavaria
on the other, that country was placed "under the
guarantee" of the above-mentioned three Powers.
By a treaty signed by the representatives of the said
Protecting Powers with Denmark in 1863 — that is,
the year following the expulsion of King Otho — it
was further arranged that "Greece under the sover-
eignty of Prince William of Denmark a^d the guarantee
of the three Courts forms a monarchical, independent,
and constitutional State." Again, when it was agreed
at the same time, that the Ionian Islands were to
be united with the Hellenic Kingdom, it was settled
that those islands were also to be comprised in the
above-mentioned guarantee. Once more, in 1881,
when the frontiers of Greece were greatly extended
by a convention signed between the Great Powers
and Turkey, it was expressly stated that "they (the
inhabitants of the then new Greek territory) will enjoy
exactly the same civil and political rights as subjects
of Hellenic origin." Ever since that time the Protect-
ing Powers — England, France, and Russia — and
particularly England who ceded the Ionian Islands,
have therefore had special privileges in and obligations
towards Greece, and they have had the right to inter-
vene either to protect that country from her foreign
foes or to defend her people from an unconstitutional

132 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

regime against which they (the Powers) are the guar-
antors.

The second direction in which the position of Greece
is a special one is bound up with the Graeco-Serbian
relations depending upon events which preceded and
immediately followed the second Balkan war. The
treaty between the two countries, which followed
other less formal agreements, was actually concluded
on June 1, 1913, and therefore two days after the signa-
ture of the document which formally terminated the
first Balkan War. Whilst so far as I know its full
text has never been published, it undoubtedly bound
the parties concerned to come to the support of one
another and to provide a given force — believed to
number one hundred and fifty thousand men — should
either country be attacked by Bulgaria. This being
the case, it is obvious, directly Bulgaria entered the
War on the side of the enemy and attacked Serbia,
that the said treaty came into force. It was argued
at the time and subsequently by the neutralists in
Greece and by the supporters of the policy of King
Constantine, that this treaty had become inoperative,
because Serbia had refused to support Greece during
her difficulties with Turkey in the summer of 1914,
because in 1915 she (Serbia) had tardily and with
reserves agreed to cede to Bulgaria territory in the
ownership of which she (Greece) held herself to have
an interest, and lastly because Bulgaria was acting
not alone in a purely Balkan war but in conjunction
with the Central Powers. The answer to these con-
tentions is that, whilst the Graeco-Serbian Treaty may
have been of a generally defensive nature, it was
aimed not against Turkey but against Bulgaria, and

GREECE AND THE WAR 133

that as it certainly did not actually specify that it was
intended as a measure in case of a purely Balkan war,
it must have been valid in the circumstances which
arose in 1915. Moreover, whereas an attempt was
made by the opposition, after the return to power of
M. Venezelos in the summer of that year, to qualify
the force of that arrangement in such a way that it
was only to be operative in case of a Bulgarian and
not in the eventuality of a European war, no sugges-
tion to this effect was ever made prior to the triumph
of The Great Man of modern Greece, who clearly secured
a mandate for his war and pro-Serbian policies at that
election.

Turning to questions connected with the mentality
of the Greeks and with the internal situation in Greece
as it has influenced the War, it must be remembered
that outstanding among the Greek national character-
istics are the exaggerated patriotism, which amounts
to chauvinism, the love of political strife, and the in-
dividualism of the people. Every Greek is a politician,
not only during an electoral campaign, but on each
day through the year. He loves the strife involved
in politics because it leads to opposition, and because
it therefore carries with it a sort of excitement or pleas-
ure corresponding to that which used to be felt in the
Olympic Games by the Greeks of old. Patriotic
though he be, every Greek, therefore, spends all his
spare time in his accustomed cafe, discussing in vehe-
ment language topics of which he often has no real
knowledge. Again the individualism of the people,
who for the most part fail to recognise the value of
combination and of co-operation, means that in Greece
the question of peace or war is largely governed by the

134 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

individual views of the majority. Moreover, whereas
the Bulgarian army fights as a well-organised machine,
and whereas the Turk lives his life as fate may direct
it, the Greek, full of dash as he is, is practically useless
as a fighter if he be engaged in an unpopular way.

This means that in war as in peace the policy of
every Greek Government must of necessity be influ-
enced by the individual feelings of the people, and that
from the moment of the outbreak of the European con-
flagration the whole history of the country has really
been bound up with a great struggle in progress between
all the old political chiefs on the one side and a new
Liberal Party on the other. Thus, if for nearly three
years this struggle happened to be connected with the
proper foreign policy of adoption by the Hellenic Gov-
ernment, that struggle was as much a political and in-
ternal one, between the anti-Venezelists supported
and voiced by the ex-King, and the Venezelists, as it
was an international and external tussle between
non-Interventionists and Interventionists.

In spite of the fact that, when Crown Prince, he
was practically dismissed from his position of Com-
mander-in-Chief, owing to his lack of prestige with
the Military League, the ex-King was immensely
popular during his four years' reign. His military
reputation, which was principally due to the credit
given to him for the Greek successes in the Balkan
Wars, became increased by his appointment as a
Field Marshal in the German army — an appointment
which, together with the blatant efforts made by the
Kaiser to secure his good will, certainly greatly flattered
His Majesty. Moreover, the democratic ways of the
sovereign, and the fact that he — a Constantine —

GREECE AND THE WAR 135

had married a Sophia, and that by such a matrimonial
union he had thus rendered possible the realisation of
the ancient legend that when this happened the Byzan-
tine Empire would be re-established, played their part
in securing for the King the love and respect of his
subjects. Thus, whilst he certainly played the role
of a "Roi de Grece" — the title conferred by the
Powers upon Prince Otho in 1832 — His Majesty still
remained truly identified with the sentiments of his
people, a large number of whom did not wish to go to
war on either side. Moreover, the many Greeks
who idolised the King, but who also sympathised with
the Allies, resented the suggestion that His Majesty
had pledged himself and his country to Germany.
Indeed, whilst the King certainly furthered Germanic
objects, there seems good reason to suppose that his
feelings were influenced, not so much by the identity
of his royal consort, but by his military education in
the German army, by the attitude of the Kaiser towards
the retention of Kavala by Greece in 1913, and last but
not least by his firm conviction that the enemy would
be the victors and that at all costs, therefore, he must
not allow his country, which could not protect itself,
to become involved in war with Bulgaria and the
Central Powers.

These sentiments, together with the fact that King
Constantine never attempted to follow the good ex-
ample set by his father and to forget the former career
of M. Venezelos, prompted the Sovereign to do all in
his power to maintain the neutrality of Greece with
the object of avoiding what he may perhaps have
believed to have been a dangerous undertaking and
still more of opposing the policy advocated by a man

136 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

whom he detested. In other words the King failed to
reahse that the salvation of Greece depended upon
the union of qualities which were interdependent, and
that his own prestige, reputation, and personality could
only be developed to the full advantage when acting
as the constitutional mouth-piece of his people. It was
probably this failure and this inability to forget his
personal feelings as much as his actual pro-Germanism
which made possible the disastrous regime which has
constituted and will constitute a great setback to that
new spirit of Hellenism which began to develop after
1910 and particularly after the Balkan Wars.

M. Venezelos, who is much more stolid, more seri-
ous, and more far-seeing than any other Greek whom
I have met, stands out alone among public men in
his country, because he is primarily a statesman rather
than a politician. Recognising the wider interests of
Hellenism, he has always played the role of a "Roi
des Hellenes", the title especially conferred upon the
late King George by the Protecting Powers at the
time of his election to the Greek throne in the year
1863. A patriot above and before everything else.
His Excellency, who has constantly demonstrated
his entire loyalty to the dynasty, was therefore ready
to try to work with King Constantine as he had done
with his father. It was with this object in view that,
until the time of his first dismissal in March, 1915,
the leader of the Liberal Party, which voiced Imperial-
ism rather than Parochialism, always disguised his
disagreements with the King and furthered the increase
of the royal prestige which would never have attained
its final zenith had the Premier originally played for
his own hand instead of for the good of the country.

Photograph from Britisli Pictorial Service

M. Venezelos

(On his left is the Greek Minister in London)

GREECE AND THE WAR 137

Thus, if the popularity and power of M. Venezelos
greatly declined in Greece between the time of his
re-election of June, 1915, and his return to power after
the abdication of the King in 1917, this decline is due
to the fact that His Excellency was subjected to attacks
fostered by German propaganda and carried out by
his political and lifelong adversaries — the leaders of
the Old Parties in Greece — that he was believed to
have sanctioned a foreign landing on Greek soil, and
that he favoured war, in which the majority of Greeks
did not want to engage on either side, rather than
that he advocated a programme destined to further
the cause of the Allies.

Turning to the attitude of Greece towards the War,
the events which have taken place since 1914 may
conveniently be discussed as having occurred in four
more or less distinct stages, the first of which lasted
until the entry of Turkey into the arena of hostilities.
That phase began, however, not in August, 1914,
but from the termination of the Balkan Wars, and this
largely because before as immediately after the out-
break of the European conflagration the Aegean Island
question, to which I have referred elsewhere, was of
all-preponderating importance to Greece. Indeed
this question, together with the scandalous and brutal
way in which the Greeks of Turkey were treated by
the Ottoman Government during 1914, brought the
two countries to the verge of hostilities upon several
different occasions. Thus the fact that the Island
question is one of those to be settled by the present War
has always made and still makes it impossible for Greece
directly or indirectly to further the re-establishment
of Ottoman power in the Eastern Mediterranean —

138 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

power which would mean not only that Greece would
lose Chios, Mitylene, and Samos, but that many other
important islands would immediately be wrested from
her.

The second historical war stage in Greece was prin-
cipally bound up with the first struggle which took
place between M. Venezelos and the King, with the
question of Graeco-Serbian concessions to Bulgaria,
and with the election which took place in June, 1915.
Here it must be recalled to mind that the retirement
of M. Venezelos in March, 1915, was due to the fact
that His Excellency was then already in favour of the
entry of Greece into the War after, and as a result
of, Macedonian concessions to Bulgaria — conces-
sions for which he rightly felt that his country would
have been repaid by the fact that the cause of Hellen-
ism would have been furthered elsewhere. So strong,
indeed, was the feeling of the ex-Prime Minister upon
these subjects that after his retirement from office
he made known the contents of a memorandum which
he had addressed to his Sovereign in the previous
January. M. Venezelos, having stated that the King
originally approved of the contents of this memoran-
dum, an official communique was subsequently issued
in Athens denying that His Majesty ever authorized
anybody to pursue negotiations destined to result in
the cession of any Hellenic territory.

M. Zaimis having refused office, largely because he
did not consider that an election ought then to be held
in Greece, M. Gounaris, who is practically the leader
of the relics of all the former political parties in Greece,
assumed the reins of the Government and occupied
the position of Prime Minister from March until after

GREECE AND THE WAR 139

the election in June, 1915. That election, at which
for the first time the districts annexed by Greece as a
consequence of the Balkan Wars sent representatives
to Athens, constituted a triumph for M. Venezelos,
for he secured the return of one hundred and ninety
deputies out of a total of three hundred and sixteen,
of which the chamber is now composed.

The result was, however, a disappointment to those
who expected that the return to power of M. Venezelos
would mean the entry of Greece into the War upon the
side of the Allies. In any case, such an expectation
was unjustified, but in view of the modifications which
took place in the European situation between the orig-
inal proposals made by His Excellency in January
and his re-election in June, it was perfectly obvious
that no change in the foreign policy of the country
could then be anticipated. During this period it
became evident that the Dardanelles campaign, which
was naturally watched with breathless excitement
throughout the Near East, was not developing in a
manner favourable to the Allies. The Greek General
Staff, who knew the strength of the defences of the
Narrows, must have looked with apparent astonishment
at the attempts which were made to force the Straits
by the British and French fleets between the latter
half of the month of February and the naval setback
of March eighteenth. They knew that these attempts
ought never to have been made without the assistance
to the fleet which could have been given by a force
disembarked upon the northwestern coast of the
Peninsula of Gallipoli. They knew the advantage
to the Turks of the delay which occurred between the
original naval bombardment and the first determined

140 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

landing in April ; and last, but not least, they realised,
when it was finally collected, that the expeditionary
force available in April was made up of contingents,
the strength of which was insufficient. The King and
General Staff undoubtedly knew of the reasons for
the inauguration of the Dardanelles Campaign and of
the Russian attitude towards it — questions explained
elsewhere. But profiting by the ignorance of the
General Public, they were able to increase their power
by contending that they were always right in condemn-
ing the manner in which the Dardanelles campaign
was undertaken, if not actually in opposing the inau-
guration of that campaign at all.

The second direction in which the European situa-
tion was modified before, and particularly just after,
the return to power of M. Venezelos is connected with
the Allied proposals made with the object of securing
the co-operation of Bulgaria. So far as Greece was
concerned, these suggested concessions, which were
desirable, took the form that her Ally — Serbia — was
asked to cede to Bulgaria areas to the reversion of
which she (Greece) thought that she was entitled,
particularly the Doiran-Ghevgeli Enclave, and that
the Hellenic Government would have given up Kavala
and at least a portion of the territory situated between
the rivers Vardar and Mesta. Greece, like Serbia,
could and would have been fully compensated for
these proposed concessions by the acquisition of far
more than a corresponding amount of territory else-
where. Whatever may be accepted as the reason of
the failure of these negotiations, their initiation and
their abortive result certainly increased the prestige
of the Court and of the neutralist party in Greece,

GREECE AND THE WAR 141

for that party contended that futile attempts had
been made at the expense of Greece to secure the sup-
port of Bulgaria — a country which almost every
Hellene considered to be his traditional enemy.

The third war stage in Greece begins from the orig-
inal Allied landing at Salonica on October 1, from
the resignation of M. Venezelos on October 5, and
from the actual entry of Bulgaria into the War during
the first half of October, 1915. It therefore covers
the period during which the Allies endeavoured to
come to the direct assistance of Serbia, and in which
they subsequently retreated to the more or less imme-
diate vicinity of Salonica. It is connected with the
later negotiations concerning the treaty obligations of
Greece towards Serbia. It includes the further develop-
ment of the unconstitutional rule, which had already
begun in Greece during the second historical stage, and
the measures which were taken by the Allies to prevent
the prolongation of that rule. In short, the historical
phase which intervened between the beginning of Oc-
tober, 1915, and the abdication of King Constantine
in June, 1917, is probably destined to be the most im-
portant period through which Greece has ever passed.

It is impossible here to discuss in detail all the events
which led up to the second resignation of M. Venezelos
and which occurred during his absence from power,
or even to touch upon all the negotiations between the
Allies and the various Governments which held the
reins of power during this third historical phase.
Sufficient therefore be it to say that whatever may
have been his final attitude towards the question of
Serbian concessions to Bulgaria and especially towards
the cession of the Doiran-Ghevgeli Enclave by. the

142 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

former country, His Excellency was in favour of an
honourable interpretation of the Graeco-Serbian Treaty
and of Greek support for her ally. Whilst the exact
trend of events at this time is still far from clear, what
seems to have happened is that, whether or not the
Premier actually invited the Allies to disembark an
expeditionary force upon Greek territory, he certainly
made suggestions in his view destined to enable Greece
to keep her treaty obligations, should the necessity
for so doing arise. That contingency, of course, oc-
curred when Bulgaria actually entered the War. Conse-
quently, as M. Venezelos had already asked the Pro-
tecting Powers if, in case of need, they could furnish
a force in substitution of that which would have been
forthcoming from Serbia had that country not been
fully occupied on her northern and western frontiers,
the Allies, as the protectors of Greece, were certainly
entitled to take that question as a sanction for that
campaign. Subsequently, although he issued a formal
protest against a military passage through Hellenic
territory — a protest which there is reason to believe
resulted from the pre-intended withdrawal of the
King's consent — the fact that M. Venezelos refused
to take any active steps to prevent such a passage
was made pretext for his fall. That fall, that enforced
retirement on October 5, of a Prime Minister who,
two days after the original landing at Salonica had
secured a vote of confidence in the historic and stormy
meeting of the Chamber, which took place on October 3,
in connection with the question of the Allied disembar-
kation, constituted a breach of the spirit, if not of the
letter, of the Hellenic Constitution — a breach which
would have entitled the Allies then and there to step

GREECE AND THE WAR 143

in to enforce constitutionalism, and a breach which
justified not only the perseverance in an operation,
which in effect had been sanctioned by the Legal Pre-
mier and by Parliament, but also their future attitude
towards a series of governments which in reality were
all unconstitutional.

Thenceforward the relationship between the Allies
and the Hellenic Government was influenced by the
necessity of subjugating political to military consider-
ations, and the history of internal events was bound
up with the great struggle which was in progress
between liberalism and imperialism on the one side
and reaction and parochialism on the other. The
King, who undoubtedly remained truly identified
with the sentiments of a large section of his people,
but who certainly had leanings towards and admired
Germany, believed in a policy of neutrality at all costs
and utilised the anti-Venezelists for the purposes of
that policy and in order to keep out of office a man
whom he personally hated. The result was that the
many Greeks who idolised His Majesty, but who wished
to support the Allies, resented the suggestion that
he had pledged himself to the Central Powers, and
therefore refrained from throwing in their lot with a
man who was not in royal favour. It was here that
the position and task of the Allies were so complicated,
for whilst no adequate measures seem to have been
taken to distinguish between " Constantinism " and
"Pro-Germanism", it was extremely difficult for them
to do otherwise than to embrace the policy of M.
Venezelos, who had left no stone unturned to further
the defeat of the Central Powers. In short, it was in
part the inability to discover a formula, not necessi-

144 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

tating the combination of " Pro-Allyism " with "Vene-
zelism", which at the same time increased the magni-
tude of our task and added to the strength and power
of the King — a strength and power which for months
paralysed AHied diplomacy at Athens.

It is unnecessary here to enter into or even to men-
tion all the numerous developments which occurred
between the Allied landing at Salonica in October,
1915, and the abdication of the King in June, 1917.
During that period, the reins of the Greek Government
were in the hands of various statesmen, who openly
supported the policy of neutrality advocated by the
King, not because they were pro-Germans, but be-
cause they believed they were acting in the interests
of their own country, and because they were opposed
to M. Venezelos and to everything which he advocated.
M. Zaimis, who took office in October, 1915, and whose
government existed purely as a result of the patriot-
ism of M. Venezelos — his friend from Cretan times —
remained in power until he was defeated in the Cham-
ber nominally upon a purely internal question. He
was succeeded early in November by M. Skouloudis
— a very far-seeing man — who played the pro-
German game, not because he wished to further the
interests of the Kaiser, but rather because he feared
the consequences of resistance to enemy aggression
and therefore of intervention in the War. This ex-
banker of Constantinople, who is one of the best-
informed men in the Balkan Peninsula, and who recog-
nised the terrible fate which would await the Ottoman
Hellenes were Greece to throw in her lot against Tur-
key, held office until June 21, 1916.

During that time, as the mouthpiece of the Crown,

GREECE AND THE WAR 145

he was responsible for the election of December —
an election which, though it resulted in a very large
majority for the policy of M. Gounaris and for the
Government, really constituted a victory for Liberalism,
and this because M. Venezelos was able to prevent
nearly two thirds of the voters from taking any part
in it. This attitude of abstention by M. Venezelos
may or may not have been in the ultimate interests
of Greece, but in its result there lies a proof that, in
spite of all and every intrigue, the popular Cretan
leader then still enjoyed the confidence of the great
proportion of his people. During the Skouloudis
regime, too, we know that while the Hellenic Govern-
ment placed numerous difficulties in the way of the
transport of the Serbian army across Greek territory,
it countenanced the surrender of Fort Rupel in the
Struma Valley on May 25, 1916 — a surrender followed
by the Allied blockade of the Greek coast, and by the
delivery of a Note demanding the complete demobilisa-
tion of the Hellenic army, the appointment of a busi-
ness and nonparty Government, and the immediate
dissolution of the Chamber which had been illegally
elected in the previous December. This Note resulted
in the retirement of M. Skouloudis and the return to
power of M. Zaimis. His task was too difficult of ac-
complishment, for owing to the treacherous surrender
of Kavala, to the Bulgarian advance on the east of
the Struma, and to the flagrant support given by the
military authorities to the Reservists' leagues, it was
impossible to hold the suggested elections, and His
Excellency once more retired when he had been in
office about two months.

Passing over the disturbances which occurred at

146 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

Salonica in August, 1916, between the Venezelist and
anti-Venezelist troops, and the attitude taken up by
the King, who publicly thanked certain officers of
the latter party for their loyalty, the next important
event was the departure of M. Venezelos from Athens
on September 24 and the formation by him of an
Independent Cabinet at Salonica about a fortnight
later. This development constituted a sort of divid-
ing of ways, for whilst the Allies did not openly embrace
the policy of M. Venezelos, it at once became evident
that their only alternative was either to repudiate
the step taken by their protege, which was obviously
impossible under the circumstances, or to work for
the augmentation of his power and for the increase of
the size of the sphere of country which acknowledged
him.

From October onwards events marched apace.
In that month Admiral de Fournet demanded the
cession of the whole of the Greek fleet except three
vessels — a demand which was agreed to by the
Lambros Ministry. The demobilisation of the Army,
however, proceeded very slowly, and in November,
the French Commander-in-Chief insisted upon the
immediate surrender of ten Greek mountain batteries
and the subsequent handing over of the remaining
war material. This peremptory request was not com-
plied with, and on December 1, Allied troops were
landed at the Piraeus. The exact nature of the assur-
ances given by the King as to the likelihood of the
occurrence of disturbances resulting from this landing
is uncertain, but the fact remains, as a result of some
kind of undertaking in this direction, that the Allied
contingents disembarked were so inadequate in size that

GREECE AND THE WAR 147

it became necessary ignomlniously to withdraw them,
on the understanding that six batteries instead of ten
would be surrendered. The AlHed Legations having
been insulted and the Royalist party having maltreated,
imprisoned, and murdered a large number of Veneze-
lists, a renewed blockade was declared, — a blockade
which was accompanied by a demand for reparation
for the events of December 1 and 2, and for the trans-
ference of a large proportion of the Greek army to the
Peloponnesus.

Although the King subsequently agreed to the trans-
fer of his forces to the Peloponnesus, and although a
formal apology was made for the events of December,
it was obvious that after the occurrence of these events,
it was impossible for the Allies to look with favour upon
the continuance of a regime which was responsible for
endangering their whole position in the Balkans. The
removal of the Hellenic forces proceeded unsatisfac-
torily, the reign of terror instituted against Venezelists
was prolonged, and for a time the Allies temporised
in the hope of being able to accomplish their objects
without finally resorting to drastic measures. But
on June 7, 1917, when the question of the distribution
of the Thessalian harvest had become a matter of the
utmost urgency, and when it was necessary to prevent
its being handed over in its entirety to the anti-Veneze-
list section of the country, M. Jonnart reached Athens
as the High Commissioner of the Protecting Powers.
Immediately after his arrival, he claimed from M.
Zaimis, who was once again Prime Minister, more
complete guarantees for the safety of the Allied army
in Macedonia, the restoration of the unity of the
kingdom, and the working of the constitution in its

148 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

true spirit. Five days later, when Allied troops had
been landed at the Piraeus, and when various places
in Thessaly had been occupied, the King, as a result
of the demand of the High Commissioner, abdicated,
designating as his successor his second son, Prince
Alexander — a young man of twenty -four years of age,
who had previously played no political role in the
affairs of his country.

The policy adopted by the Allies at Athens was
pursued under such difficulties and in such circum-
stances that unless the whole situation be viewed in
its broader and proper light, the way may be left
open for some critics to suggest that their attitude
towards the King was so short-sighted that they played
directly into the hands of the enemy, and for others
to say that Greece was bullied and that in the end the
abdication of her ruler was brought about for causes
which were not reasonable.

The answer to such suggestions is that as the wish
of the great majority of Greeks was to avoid war on
either side, the fact that England, France, and Russia
naturally supported M. Venezelos, who advocated the
endorsement of the Graeco-Serbian Treaty, which
meant war, they could not help strengthening the
hands of his royal and other opponents who stood for
peace. Moreover whilst they (the Allies) may have
taken the necessary measures for their self-preserva-
tion in the wrong way and too late, there can rest
in the mind of the real student no doubt that as a
result of their special duties and rights of protection,
and as a consequence of the Graeco-Serbian Treaty,
they were entitled to undertake the measures which
they actually employed. Thus the position was

GREECE AND THE WAR 149

entirely unlike that of Belgium, for whilst Germany
had actually guaranteed the neutrality of that country,
and whilst she was therefore under a direct obligation
not to violate that neutrality, the Protecting Powers
of Greece, who happened to be three of the Allies, had
a well-defined right to intervene, either to defend that
country against her foreign foes or to protect her people
from a regime against which they (the Protecting Pow-
ers) were and are the guarantors.

The developments which occurred at Athens during
the period immediately preceding the resignation of
the King were neither the only nor I think the prin-
cipal cause justifying the Allies in bringing about
the abdication of His Majesty. Their attitude was
legitimatised by events which had taken place much
earlier in the War — events which certainly prove
that the King had not governed in accordance with the
spirit and letter of the constitution by which he was
bound. For example, even if we ignore the reasons
for which M. Venezelos was compelled, in March, 1915,
to leave office when he had nearly one hundred and
fifty supporters out of a total of one hundred and
eighty -four deputies — reasons which, to say the least
of it, must be in opposition to the spirit of the Greek
constitution — we find that various events took place
subsequently which were contrary to the actual letter
of that document. The elections of both June and
December, 1915, were held during a mobilisation, and
many men serving with the colours were allowed to
vote, which is illegal. Moreover, the old Chamber,
having been dissolved on May 1, 1915, according to
the constitution, the new Parliament should have met
within three months and not on August 16, which

150 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

was actually the case. Once more, as M. Venezelos
secured a vote of confidence at the time of the Allied
disembarkation at Salonica, it is impossible to justify
the attitude of the King in refusing to agree to the
policy advocated by his then Prime Minister or to see
by what right His Majesty dissolved the Chamber on
November 11 and therefore on a second occasion in
the same year. There seems no reason to doubt, too,
that the secrecy of letters, which is guaranteed by
the constitution, did not remain inviolable during
the regime of King Constantine. These are some of
the facts, which even if they were more or less con-
doned at the time, subsequently entitled the Allies to
make the demands and to take the measures neces-
sary for the establishment and maintenance of their
national safety — demands which, though more or
less backed up by force of arms, were none the less
demands really made in support of M. Venezelos,
who, constitutionally speaking, should have been
and had been the constitutional Premier ever since
the mandate received from the country in June,
1915.

The fourth stage in the war attitude of Greece
begins from the abdication of the King on June 12,
1917, and from the return to power of M. Venezelos,
who succeeded M. Zaimis and arrived in Athens towards
the end of that month. Even now it is too early to
summarise or to forecast what will be the effects of
the changes from the local Greek or from the larger
European standpoints. Internally speaking, the dis-
appearance of the King and the reappointment of the
one great statesman of modern Greece as her Prime
Minister have already meant at least the nominal

GREECE AND THE WAR 151

reunion of that country under one government, the
consequent avoidance or at any rate the postponement
of an outbreak of civil war, and the creation of a new
atmosphere in the country. Reorganisation of the
Government departments and of the army are in
progress, and endeavours are being made to obliterate
the effect of the chaos which had existed for nearly
two years. But although M. Venezelos has recalled
the last legally elected Chamber, in which he was
returned to power in June, 1915, and although startling
disclosures have been made, it is impossible to ignore
the difficulties which beset a premier who is undoubtedly
much less popular with the people than he was prior
to his resignation early in 1915.

From an external or international point of view the
above-mentioned events have carried with them the
breaking off of the relations between the Central
Powers and Greece and a consequent demonstration
by the Hellenic Government of open friendship for
the Allies. That friendship is now being proved by the
active support of Greek contingents on the Salonica
front. These results are so far satisfactory in that
the Allies — the Protecting Powers — have been the
means of re-establishing constitutionalism in Greece,
whilst at the same time they have created a situation
which has removed some of the difficulties and compli-
cations of their position in the Balkans. In short, the
future depends not so much upon the fighting value or
importance of the Greek army, as upon the statesman-
ship, the moderation, and the good will of a man who
has already saved his country in more than one time of
crisis, and upon the capacity and ability of the Allies
to help and to allow this man to work out the destiny

152 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

of his country in such a way as to regain his prestige
at home and to further the interests of his own people
and also those of a group of countries who are fighting
for the protection of small nationalities, and for the
overthrow of militarism.

VII

ALBANIA AND THE ALBANIANS

Although her people have obviously not been able
to play any direct part in the War, the geographical
and political importance of Albania • is such that the
history of and conditions prevailing in that country
are worthy of serious consideration to-day. Geo-
graphically this importance is due to the fact that Al-
bania occupies a position which makes it the natural
means of entry into and exit from a large part of the
Western Balkans. It is for these reasons that the
northern area of the country, together with the ports
of San Giovanni di Medua and Durazzo, are coveted
by the Serbs, who desire, by securing possession of
them, to obtain free access to the sea. Equally well,
situated as it is on the Lower Adriatic, Albania practi-
cally commands the Straits of Otranto, and the govern-
ment in control there can therefore influence the whole
position in the Adriatic Sea to which they lead. It is
this which makes Italy particularly interested in the
future of Europe's latest principality and especially in
that of its southern port Avlona, for that Power cannot
afford to be menaced by the establishment there of a
regime hostile to her natural development, her safety,
and her very existence.

154 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

Closely bound up with these conditions are the facts
that, for years, Austria has been working untiringly to
bring about the augmentation of her influence in Al-
bania, and that Greece has been striving to denational-
ise the people domiciled across her frontier. The first
country, actuated by the intense rivalry existing be-
tween her and Italy upon all questions connected with
the Western Balkans and the Adriatic, has acted as
the instrument of Germany and with the object of
preparing the way for the realisation of the Mittel-
Europa scheme. The Hellenic Government, on the
other hand, whilst nominally animated by religious
objects, has really directed its policy for nationalistic
motives. The result is therefore that the Albanian
question, which was nominally settled by the creation
of an autonomous principality during the Balkan Wars,
still remains one of the most important problems for
solution at the end of the present conflagration. It is
for this reason, and particularly because the Allies
and the United States of America are pledged to the
principle of "Government with the consent of the
Governed" or of "nationality", that we are bound
to consider how this principle applies to Albania, whose
people are entitled to expect the same consideration of
their claims as are those belonging to any other smaller
nationality.

Prior to the Balkan Wars, and to the loss of terri-
tory which was then suffered by Turkey, it was difficult
accurately to describe what was meant by the geo-
graphical term "Albania." Whilst an official of the
Turkish Government always refused to acknowledge
the existence of a district known by the name, an
Albanian, a Greek, a Bulgarian, and a Serbian would

ALBANIA AND THE ALBANIANS 155

each define the boundaries of Albania in accordance
with his own national aspirations. Lord Fitzmaurice
(then Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) in a despatch ad-
dressed to Earl Granville in the year 1880 described the
district covered by the geographical expression Albania
as that territory "which falls mainly within the two
vilayets of Scutari and Janina, but extends also in an
easterly direction beyond the watershed of the moun-
tains dividing the streams which fall into the Adriatic
from those which fall into the Aegean Sea, and includes
portions of the vilayets of Monastir and of Kossovo."
The Principality of Albania, if principality it can
still be called, contains more or less the area which is
thus indicated. Situated as it is on the eastern side
of the Adriatic and wedged in between Montenegro,
Serbia, Greece, and the sea, this unhappy country is
the child not of love but of hatred, for its creation was
brought about by the rivalry which existed between
the Great Powers, and particularly between Austria
and Italy, rather than as a result of any feelings of
friendship for the Albanians. Whilst the independence
of the country was decided upon by the London Am-
bassadorial Conference in December, 1912, the frontiers
have never been definitely fixed, or, more correctly,
they have never .been observed by the neighbouring
countries, and especially Greece. At the present
time, therefore, it is impossible to say whether, in dis-
cussing Albania, we should include or exclude the large
southern areas which are in dispute with Greece and
parts of which have been in Italian hands since an
earlier period of the War. If we include these in Al-
bania and consider that country as it was established
by the Great Powers, then it has an area of about

156 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

11,000 square miles and a population of approximately
800,000 souls. Measured from north to south it has
a length of about one hundred and eighty miles, and
from west to east an approximate width, at its
broadest part, of only eighty-five miles.

The greater part of the country is mountainous.
In the neighbourhood of Scutari, in areas of Central
Albania, and in the south, there are, however, fertile
plains watered by various rivers which wend their way
to the Adriatic. The people devote themselves al-
most entirely to agriculture, which is carried on with
primitive implements, such as wooden ploughs, and
there are no home manufactures. Goat and sheep
skins, which are exported, are dried by pegging them
down upon the ground with wooden pegs. One of
the most important of the exports from the country is
the bitumen which is found at Selenitza near Avlona.
The mine is worked by a French company or syndi-
cate, and the bitumen, which is of one of the best
qualities known, is transported from the pit's mouth
to the port on donkeys and pack animals, who wend
their way across the hills for a distance of some twelve
miles.

Towns properly so called are few and far between,
for Scutari, with a population of about thirty-two
thousand souls, and the capital of the north, is the only
city which boasts of more than fifteen thousand inhabit-
ants. Durazzo, the so-called capital of the country,
and the former seat of the Prince's Government, is
built upon the site of the ancient Dyrrachion. It
has a population of but ^ve thousand. The city,
which is located on the northern shore of a commodious
bay, where it is almost always safe for ships to lie, is

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ALBANIA AND THE ALBANIANS 157

practically surrounded by rocks and by the sea, except
upon the side where the promontory upon which it is
built is joined to the mainland. Avlona, now occupied
by the Italians, is possessed of a fine bay. Its popula-
tion is about six thousand souls. Elbasan (El Bassan),
situated as it is in the heart of the country *and in the
Scumbi Valley, is the proper capital of the country,
not only on account of its central position, but also
because its inhabitants are known to be those who
possess the most moderate political ideas, and therefore
those who voice what should be the general policy of
a united Albania.

From a local as well as from a national point of
view, one of the most important questions connected
with Albania to-day is that which concerns the
nationality of its inhabitants. In order to understand
this aright it is necessary to remember that in Turkish
times these people, unlike the other alien races which
went to make up the European provinces of the Otto-
man Empire, were not formed into a "millet" or a
religious "community." In other words, whilst the
nationality of the Bulgarians and the Greeks was recog-
nised, as the result of the existence of the Bulgarian
and Greek Churches, the Albanians had no such
binding link, and they were classed in the making of
a census entirely according to their religion. Thus, if
an Albanian belonged to the Orthodox Church he was
called a Greek ; if he were a Moslem, he was put down
as a Turk. This meant not only that the gallant Shky-
petars, as the Albanians call themselves, were never
supported by intrigue adroitly hatched in various
capitals, but that their territory has been and is sub-
ject to the aspirations of their neighbours. This is a

158 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

question of supreme importance, for whilst up to a
point Abdul Hamid encouraged the Greeks, the Bul-
garians, and the Serbians of Turkey in their national-
istic and religious ideas, with the express purpose of
causing strife between these elements of the popula-
tion, the Turks — Old and New — never left a stone
unturned to subdue the Albanians, whose sentiments
of nationalism and of patriotism are probably older,
stronger, and deeper than those of any of the Balkan
race.

The Albanians are generally and probably accu-
rately identified by impartial observers as the de-
scendants of the ancient Illyrians, who were simply the
inhabitants of Illyria, and who in their turn were the
offspring of the Pelasgeans — the first people to come
to Europe. It was therefore to their forefathers that
the Albanians allege St. Paul referred, when he said
"Round about into Illyricum I have fully preached
the gospel of Christ." But little is known about these
Illyrians except that they were slow to accept the
civilisation of the Greeks and Romans, and that sub-
sequently they were driven westwards towards the
shores of the Adriatic by the advancing hordes of
Slavs. From the time of the Turkish Conquest,
which may be said finally to have taken place about
the year 1478 and soon after the death of the famous
Albanian hero — Scanderbeg — until the Balkan Wars,
Albania formed part of the Ottoman Empire, and it
was nominally ruled from Constantinople. But such
were the strength and the feelings of nationalism of
the people, that throughout this period they really
enjoyed a considerable amount of independence, being
governed largely by unwritten laws administered by

ALBANIA AND THE ALBANIANS 159

the local chieftains. In short, for centuries the Al-
banians occupied in Europe towards the Government
the same kind of position as that held in Asia Minor
by the Kurds. Both races are religiously unorthodox ;
both races have been utilised by the Turks to support
them in times of need, and prior to the re-establishment
of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908, the attitudes of
both races towards European interference in the Turk-
ish Empire were made use of by the Central Govern-
ment as a threat to the Great Powers as each new pro-
gramme for reform was suggested at Constantinople.

The Shkypetars are today a wild, warlike, lawless
people, but nevertheless they have their own — a very
strict — code of honour, and they are faithful even
unto death. An Arnaut once engaged is not only the
most trusty servant and loyal follower in the Near
East, but he is the most useful protector of his em-
ployer in whatever difficulty may arise. Indeed, the
honour of the people is such that if once they have en-
tertained you in their houses, or if once they have given
you a promise, you may be absolutely sure that not a
sacrifice will be too great for them to make in order
that their promise may be fulfilled. In this con-
nection I well remember that on one occasion, when
I was travelling in Albania, it was necessary to ac-
complish an extremely long journey in the course of
one day. My guides and horsemen protested against
my wish to do what they said was almost impossible.
The matter was, however, finally settled, and we
started out on the morrow. These men walked hour
after hour over the roughest of country, and we even-
tually accomplished my object in spite of almost in-
surmountable difficulties. But that object was only

160 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

realised because they went far beyond their legal bai'-
gain, even carrying me across rivers in the dark and
protecting me against wild dogs, in order that we should
reach the house of friends by night. Compensation
they got, but even compensation is not always suf-
ficient recompense for a promise which is more than
honourably carried out.

The Albanians are divided into two main groups —
the Ghegs and the Tosks. The River Scumbi, which
enters the Adriatic halfway between the towns of
Durazzo and Avlona, and its picturesque valley, may
be said to separate the country inhabited by the
former from that populated by the latter. The
Ghegs, or Northern Albanians, are, in their turn, made
up of a number of warlike tribes, many of whom still
live a feudal life. The Tosks, or Southern Albanians,
are more civilised and perhaps less warlike than their
northern brothers. Their tribal system is much less
well defined, but they owe their allegiance to local
beys or chiefs, to whom they turn for guidance in all
matters of importance.

Whilst foreign propaganda has done a good deal to
aggravate the religious feelings of the people, the
Albanians are not for the most part fanatical from an
actual religious standpoint. At the present time about
two thirds of the Albanian population is Moslem.
Of the remaining one third, the Christians of the north
are believers in Roman Catholicism, whilst those of
the south belong to the Orthodox Church. This re-
ligious division is due to several historical facts.
Originally the people were all Christians, many of
them having been converted as early as the first
century. In earlier times the Albanians belonged to

ALBANIA AND THE ALBANIANS 161

the Orthodox faith, but about the middle of the thir-
teenth century many of the CathoHc Ghegs of the
north abandoned the Eastern for the Western Church,
and at the time of Scanderbeg there was a further
secession. After the arrival of the Turks, when the
people were Christian in little but name, large num-
bers embraced Islam, rather from secular than from
spiritual reasons, that is to say, because the position
of a Moslem was in many ways a more privileged one
than that of a Christian. There was a further seces-
sion in the seventeenth century for similar causes.
But whilst there is strife between the different
religious elements, owing generally to misunderstand-
ings, the people are in principle and at bottom Al-
banians before they are either Moslems or Christians.
Consequently, when disputes take place, they occur
rather as a result of some political or local squabble
than because of any innate religious feeling. There
are districts where the inhabitants are entirely Chris-
tian, and there are others where the population is ex-
clusively Moslem. But in the greater part of the
country it is more or less mixed. In the south there
is less religious strife than in the north. This has
become particularly the case during the recent years,
for as the Nationalistic Movement has increased, the
Orthodox Albanians have grown to understand that
their religion has been exploited by the Greek Church
for political purposes, and therefore, the power of that
Church is greatly decreasing, and the people are slowly
getting to understand that they need not fear the
attitude of their Moslem fellow countrymen.

The Albanians have their own language. It is held
by most authorities to be of Aryan origin, and it prob-

162 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

ably formed the original speech of the people of large
parts, if not the whole, of the Balkan Peninsula. Al-
though the groundwork and grammar of the language
are supposed to be Indo-European, a large number of
words have been taken from the Turkish, Latin, Greek,
Slav, and Italian tongues, which means that there
are distinct dialects in different parts of the country.
The people of the various regions have borrowed words
from the language of the country to which their homes
are nearest. Thus the ignorant Tosk of the south
makes use of many more Greek words than a Glieg
of the north, whom he would only understand with
a certain difficulty. The fact, too, that Albanian was
only reduced to writing in comparatively modern
times, and that no general form of alphabet was de-
cided upon until after the advent of the Turkish Con-
stitution, is largely responsible for the differences of
the dialect which exist to-day.

Prior to the seventeenth century there is no trace
of the Albanians reading or writing their own language,
and the large majority of the people cannot read or
write to-day. The earliest books which contained
printed examples of Albanian were published about
three hundred years ago. These volumes consisted of
religious works, dictionaries, and textbooks. Much
later the Roman Catholic clergy furthered the language
movement by providing the people with books, many
of which were published in Scutari by the Jesuits,
who began their work in Albania about the middle of
the nineteenth century. But it is largely due to the
religious work undertaken by the British and Foreign
Bible Society that the people have been provided with
literature printed in Albanian. As early as 1824 the

ALBANIA AND THE ALBANIANS 163

gospel of St. Matthew was printed in Tosk-Albanian
at Corfu by the Ionian Bible Society — a Society
promoted and subsidised by the British and Foreign
Bible Society. Three years later the whole of the New
Testament was published under the same auspices in
the same language, but on this occasion the modified
Greek alphabet, used in the printing, was included in
order to enable the illiterate people to read its contents.
Between the years 1860 and 1870 a large portion of the
Bible was translated by an Albanian, and as a result,
a volume containing the four Gospels, the Book of
The Acts, and an alphabet was published for the Ghegs
in Latin characters, with certain minor alterations,
in 1866. This publication was followed by others
printed in the Greek characters for the people of the
south and in the Latin for those of the north and pub-
lished in Constantinople between the years 1868 and
1879.

Ten years later, under the direction of Gerasim
Kyrias, a patriotic Albanian who had studied in the
American School at Samakov, the Book of Genesis
and the Gospel of St. Matthew were printed in the
new national alphabet (i.e. Latin alphabet with modi-
fications), which had been adopted by an Albanian
Committee which met to discuss the development of
literature in 1879. So strong, however, was the Turkish
opposition to the introduction of these characters that
various publications subsequently made were not al-
lowed to be printed in them. It was only, therefore,
after the re-establishment of the Constitution in 1908
that the question of the method of writing the language
was again taken up seriously, and that the new national
characters (namely, Latin characters with one or two

164 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

modifications) were finally adopted. Their employ-
ment was as fervently opposed by the Young Turks
as it had been by their predecessors.

The present political conditions prevailing in Al-
bania are largely the outcome of what has taken place
there during the last few years. Prior to the advent
to power of the Young Turks, every endeavour was
made to hinder the Nationalistic Movement. At the
same time, during the reign of Abdul Hamid, the
Albanians were treated with the utmost deference,
and His Majesty did everything in his power to make
certain of their support in time of need. The Albanian
Imperial Guard, recruited from the south, was always
well and regularly paid, and these soldiers were allowed
to return to their villages as soon as their time had
expired, instead of being retained with the colours for
months or years in excess of their proper period of
service. During the days of the Old Regime, too, the
Albanians, especially the tribes of the north, were
permitted to manage their own internal affairs, prac-
tically without the interference of the Constantinople
Government. It was only when the northeastern
Ghegs — always actuated by feelings of antagonism
towards their Slav brothers — seemed inclined to
jeopardise the policy of their spiritual and temporal
master at Constantinople that troops were despatched
to Albania to quiet the country, either by bombarding
the malefactors with shell, or by bribing their leaders
with decorations or with money.

After the re-establishment of the Ottoman Constitu-
tion the Young Turks, instead of recognising that the
Albanians could be of valuable support to them, im-
mediately antagonised them by endeavouring to abro-

ALBANIA AND THE ALBANIANS 165

gate many of the privileges which they had previously
enjoyed. In the north these endeavours took the
form of striving to disarm the people, of attempting
to do away with the tribal and feudal system of gov-
ernment by which the people had formerly been ruled,
and of trying to introduce compulsory military service
which had previously never been enforced. Through-
out the country, too, and particularly in the south,
another grievance common to the Moslem and Chris-
tian Albanians was the attitude of the Sublime Porte
towards the educational question. Not only did the
Government fail to establish Albanian schools, but it
actually opposed their opening and even insisted upon
the closing of several such establishments run by the
Albanians themselves. The result of this policy was
that from the summer of 1909 right up to the time of
the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, large areas of the
country were in an almost continuous state of insur-
rection — a state of insurrection which in the end was
indirectly if not directly responsible for hastening the
downfall of Turkey as a European Power.

The Albanians took no active part in the Balkan
Wars, and this because they hated both the Balkan
Allies and the Turks with an equal hatred. On the
one side they knew that the Serbians, Montenegrins,
Greeks, and to a lesser degree the Bulgarians, all
coveted areas of territory which were dear to them.
On the other hand they recognised that an Ottoman
victory would result in further attempts to denational-
ise and to subjugate them. The consequence was, that
as the Turkish hold over Albania existed only in name,
practically the whole country was overrun by the
Serbians, Montenegrins, and Greeks, many of the

166 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

farms and houses being burned, and large portions of
the population being put to flight. The Balkan Wars
were, however, an epoch-making period for the people,
because it was during the first campaign and at the
end of November, 1912, that Ismail Kemal Bey — a
former member of the Ottoman Chamber and a lead-
ing Albanian — proclaimed an independent Govern-
ment at Avlona and that, some three weeks later, the
London Ambassadorial Conference decided to estab-
lish an autonomous Albanian State. That decision,
which was followed by prolonged negotiations between
the Great Powers as to the status of and to the position
of the frontiers of the new principality, was finally
carried out in a manner which made the adopted
boundaries of the country a sort of compromise between
those suggested by the Balkan Allies, who worked for
a very small Albania, and those advocated by Austria
and Italy, who, whilst claiming less than did the Al-
banian Provisional Government, none the less pro-
posed a settlement too much in accordance with the
basis of nationality to be acceptable to Serbia, to
Montenegro, or to Greece. In short, whilst the Al-
banians finally got Scutari in the north and Korcha and
Santi Quaranta in the south, they did not secure Ipek,
Jacova, Prisrend, and Dibra — places which by their
allotment to Montenegro and to Serbia robbed the
people of Northern Albania of market towns with
which they had always been wont to trade.

In addition to the fact that it did something to make
known to Europe the claims of the Albanians, the pro-
visional Government of Ismail Kemal Bey, which in a
way was the father of the State, together with others
afterwards set up in districts not occupied by or from

ALBANIA AND THE ALBANIANS 167

which the Balkan armies had withdrawn, maintained
order and did wonders to preserve peace from the
moment of their estabhshment until long after the
arrival of the European Commission of Control (the
appointment of which was decided upon by the Am-
bassadorial Conference), in the early autumn of 1913.
Indeed, when I was in Albania immediately after this,
although I found the international forces in possession
of Scutari and three or four entirely independent
governments in different parts of the country, such was
the state of things that I travelled with perfect safety
through the greater part of it without any guard other
than that provided by a native policeman, whose
presence was necessary to enable a stranger to find
the way in areas which were almost nowhere possessed
of better means of communication than those pro-
vided by the most primitive bridle paths.

Prince William of Wied, a Major in the German
Guards, who was nominated to rule Albania by the
Great Powers in November, 1913, arrived at Durazzo,
which he constituted his capital, on March 7 of the
following year. The fact that his regime was a total
failure is due in part to the international conditions
then prevailing and in part to the role personally
played by His Royal Highness. From an international
standpoint the basis of the whole question was that
Albania having been constituted largely in order to re-
lieve European tension, ever-recurring difficulties arose
between the Great Powers really responsible for its
government. Moreover, whilst Europe had nominally
fixed the northern and southern frontiers, she took no
effective measures to hand over to the Prince terri-
tory which was his. In the south, the Greeks remained

168 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

in possession of large areas of Albania until the end of
March, 1914. Most, if not all, of these districts were
then officially evacuated. But, instead of the Greek
regular army, there came the Epirote insurgents and
the Epirote Independent Government, who, secretly
supported from Athens, maintained a reign of terror
in an area actually allotted to Albania. Thus through-
out the stay of the "Mpret", as the Albanians called
their ruler, the European Concert, if Concert it can
be called, ignored the necessity for taking the measures
necessary for the protection of the country and looked
on pacifically whilst the Greeks infringed the frontiers
already delimited in the south, and whilst the insur-
gents threatened and practically besieged Durazzo in a
manner which finally confined the powers of the Prince
almost to the very precincts of his palace.

The above remarks are sufficient to prove the enor-
mous difficulties which would have in any case beset
any ruler of Albania. His Royal Highness, whose
shortcomings were apparent from the first, made little
endeavour to overcome them. Ignoring altogether his
attitude towards the southern frontier question, con-
cerning which he should have made some stipulation
with the Great Powers before he ever entered upon
his new task, the Prince made at least two fundamental
mistakes. By arriving at Durazzo, instead of enter-
ing his new country by way of Scutari, which was still
in the hands of the international forces which occupied
it in the first Balkan war, and which was therefore
more or less neutral country, the new ruler seemed to
show his partiality towards Essad Pasha and thus
offended all the enemies of a man who, if then power-
ful in the centre of the country, was certainly not be-

ALBANIA AND THE ALBANIANS 169

loved beyond the confines of his own particular dis-
trict. Subsequently, and before it was too late, in
place of trying to take the people into his confidence
and of endeavouring to travel among them, the Prince
appeared to think that he could maintain his authority
by encouraging one section of the community to sup-
port him against the other, and that he could succeed
in Albania without any display of courage. Thus on
May 24, a few days after the banishment of Essad
Pasha, at a time when Durazzo was threatened by the
insurgents, the Prince and his family took refuge on an
Italian warship — an action which, though he only
remained there for one night, was sufficient to seal his
fate in a country where, to say the least of it, cowardice
is not one of the faults of the people. As time wore on,
things went from bad to worse until the outbreak of
the War, immediately before which the international
contingents vacated Scutari and immediately after
which the Prince and the International Commission of
Control left Durazzo.

Prior to the departure of the Prince on September 11,
Turkish insurgents, having occupied Avlona, advanced
upon Durazzo. From that time onwards, therefore,
the country, once more left without even the vestige of
a central Government, was ruled by various self-con-
stituted administrations, all practically independent
of one another. At first Prince Burhan Eddin, son of
the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid, was the nominal chief of
an administration which owed any force which it
possessed to the local power of Essad Pasha. After
the subjugation of Serbia and Montenegro, in the
winter of 1914-1915, when a large number of Serbians
retreated to the Adriatic coast through Albania, the

170 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

northern and central districts of the country were
overrun by the Austro-Germans, who finally occupied
and still hold about three quarters of the principality.
Over and above the fact that a proclamation was issued
by the enemy in 1917 to the effect that he proposes to
create of Albania some kind of autonomous province,
closely allied to if not constituting an integral part of
Austria-Hungary, we therefore have no reliable in-
formation concerning the conditions prevailing in an
area which is entirely cut off from communication with
the Allied world.

In the south, where the Italians occupied Avlona on
December 25, 1914, and therefore before the entry of
that country into the War, events have been bound
up with the attitude of the Hellenic Government
towards the Epirus question, with the relations exist-
ing between Greece and Italy upon that subject, and
with the developments in the zone actually held by
the forces of King Victor Emanuel. With regard to
the first two questions, sufficient be it to say that in
December, 1916, shortly after the capture of Monas-
tir by the Allies, Colonel Desco n, acting on behalf
of the French Government, proclaimed the establish-
ment of a small autonomous A banian State, to include
Korcha and the area immediately surrounding that
town. Further to the south, where the Greeks had
evacuated large areas previously held by them, the
Italians took over a large section of Epirus and oc-
cupied Janina, actually in Greek territory, during the
spring of 1917. After the abdication of King Con-
stantine in June, 1917, and the return to office of M.
Venezelos, it was however arranged at the Paris Con-
ference of the following month that the Italians should

ALBANIA AND THE ALBANIANS 171

withdraw from all but the triangular area of Greek
territory through which the road from Santi Quaranta
to Korcha runs. This arrangement, together with the
fact that M. Venezelos has always endeavoured to
adopt a moderate attitude upon the Southern Al-
banian frontier question, has, it must be hoped,
created a new atmosphere — an atmosphere in which
this highly complicated problem may be able to be
solved at the same time in acccordance with the prin-
ciple of nationalities and without serious detriment to
the interests of the two countries most closely affected
by this ever-vexed question.

Whilst, prior to her adhesion to the side of the Allies,
Italy contented herself by the occupation of the port of
Avlona, later she extended her front so that it ran along
the lower reaches of the River Viosa, which constitutes
the natural defensive line for that city. Subsequently,
too, she disembarked another force at Santi Quaranta,
which, acting with the army already at Avlona, ad-
vanced into the interior and ultimately established
connection, near the village of Cologna, with the
Allied forces based upon Salonica. Since that time
Italy has been in occupation of approximately a
quarter of the whole country — a quarter in which
she has done a great deal to improve the conditions
previously prevailing. Considerable lengths of road
have been built, thereby not only facilitating means of
communication, but also providing the native popu-
lation with work for which a fair rate of pay has been
given. Agricultural colleges have been established,
and the farmers, now able to obtain machinery, are
being encouraged to cultivate their ground systemati-
cally. Numerous schools have been opened, and the

172 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

children are thus educated in a manner which has
never previously been possible. And, last but not
least, the Italians, realising that the way to win the
people is to leave the direction of local affairs as far
as possible in Albanian hands, have established Courts
of Justice, some of which are presided over by natives
brought over from the large Albanian colony in Italy,
and have formed a local police corps under the super-
vision of Italian officers.

I have said sufficient briefly to explain the past and
present situations in Albania. With regard to the
future, there are two questions of outstanding im-
portance. The first is the problem bound up with the
frontiers of the country, — a problem with which I
shall deal elsewhere. The second concerns the future
status of the principality. On account of the aspira-
tions of her neighbours, of the lack of development of
the country, and of the inexperience of the vast majority
of the people in all matters appertaining to Government,
I do not think that, for the present at least, Albania
can exist or manage her affairs entirely alone. Conse-
quently, as a return to the state of things existing after
the Balkan Wars is impossible, only two alternatives
appear possible. The first is some form of autonomy
under all or perhaps a group of the Allied Great Powers,
an arrangement carrying with it the difficulties always
arising from combined control. The second is the pro-
tection of only one of the countries who are now fight-
ing for the interests of smaller nationalities. If this
latter alternative be adopted, unless the United States
of America or Great Britain were willing to undertake
the task, it would naturally fall to Italy who has already
proclaimed **the unity and independence of all Albania

ALBANIA AND THE ALBANIANS 173

under the aegis and protection of the Kingdom of
Italy", and who has, as I have said, shown her good
will towards the Albanians. Such a solution might not
at once be acceptable to many of the inhabitants who
desire to be entirely independent or at least to be under
the protection of America or England who have no
direct interests in Albania. But patriots as they are,
these men will do well to remember that in addition
to helping them to establish good government and to
develop their country, the protection of Italy would
provide them with a powerful friend — a friend without
whom they might be helpless not onl}^ to enlarge, but
even to maintain their present frontiers.

VIII
MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS

My object in this chapter is to examine a few of the
geographical and semi-geographical problems which
have influenced and do influence the situation in the
Balkan Peninsula, and in particular to enumerate
some of the military highways which of necessity have
governed and still govern the operations in this area
— highways for the possession of which a great deal
of fighting has been done. In so doing, although I
have walked, ridden, or driven through most of the
districts about which I am now writing, I cannot
attempt to indicate the military importance or the
actual role played by many of the railways, rivers,
or roads under discussion. To do so or to consider
the highways of the Balkans otherwise than as be-
longing to the countries to which they belonged prior
to the outbreak of the War would not only be to deal
with questions discussed elsewhere, but it would also
necessitate the devotion of a whole volume (such as
that entitled "Geographical Aspects of Balkan Prob-
lems" by Doctor Marion Newbigin) instead of only
one chapter to this all-important aspect of the Balkan
question.

From a geographical standpoint, the contents of
the peninsula are extremely diflScult to define. I

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 175

propose, however, to consider it as bounded on the
north by a Hne roughly drawn from the Port of Con-
stanza on the Black Sea to Pola on the Adriatic, or,
practically speaking, by the line of 45° N. Lat. This
being so, we have to consider the highways of Serbia,
Bulgaria, Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Monte-
negro, Albania, and Greece — countries which all lie
to the south of the Danube and of the Save which
flows into that river at Belgrade, in addition to those
of Roumania, to which only brief reference will be
made, owing to the fact that, geographically speaking,
most of that country lies without the area under
discussion.

The greater part of the peninsula is mountainous,
but with few exceptions the mountains form chaotic'
masses rather than regular ranges. The two great
chains, or so-called chains, are the Balkan Range and
the Rhodope Balkans. The Balkan Range extends
from Cape Emine on the Black Sea to the River
Timok on the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier, thus dividing
Bulgaria into two main sections, northern and south-
ern. In places these mountains attain an elevation
of about eight thousand feet above the sea level.
The Rhodopes used approximately to form a good
part of the frontier between Bulgaria and Turkey,
and they still constitute a natural barrier between
what may be called Old Bulgaria and that area which
lies between this range and the Aegean — an area the
eastern part of which was annexed by the Government
of King Ferdinand as a result of the Balkan Wars.
The elevations attained at the eastern end of the range
are considerably less than those upon the west. Whilst
in the former district we have nothing higher than the

176 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

Katal Dagh which rises to six thousand feet above the
sea, in the latter there is the Musa Alia peak, which
reaches a height of nine thousand feet. The Sredna
Gora — an offshoot of the main Balkan Range — juts
forward towards the south almost to meet the Rhodopes
at Trajan's Gateway between Sofia and Philippopolis,
and the two ranges, or a prolongation of the two ranges,
are more or less united at their western end by a
mountainous area through which the Serbo-Bulgarian
frontier runs.

Partly as a result of a generally very confused
mountain system, the rivers run from various points
in unexpected directions. Streams which one would
think should flow east turn suddenly north or west,
or vice versa. Thus the great Maritza, which rises
on the Musa Alia group of peaks, after flowing
eastward across the broad plain of Eastern Roumelia.
instead of continuing its course towards the Black
Sea, turns suddenly southwards at Adrianople and
empties its vast volume of water into the Aegean near
the port of Dede Agatch. Again, the Vardar and the
Morava, the former emptying itself into the Gulf of
Salonica and the latter into the Danube, respectively
run down valleys the common summit of which may
be said to be near Uskub. The Drin and the Scumbi
— the two most important rivers of Albania — wend
their ways to the sea by valleys, one or both of which
may sometime constitute the route to be followed by
a great railway leading down to the shores of the
Adriatic.

The Balkan Peninsula is essentially the meeting-
place of East with West. Whilst after the wars of
1912 and 1913 the European dominions of the Sultan

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 177

were enormously reduced, so large a part of the entire
peninsula belonged to Turkey until comparatively
recent times that almost the whole area still shows
signs of Ottoman misrule. This partly accounts for
the extraordinary surprises by which the traveller is
met in various parts of the peninsula. In places
the whole country appears to be perfectly European.
In others the traveller passes for miles across bare
country, the soil of which is of a brown-red colour —
country which almost reminds one of the veldt of South
Africa. Again, as one wends one's way by road or path
through the Balkans, and particularly through Turkey,
one finds that places which from the map would appear
to be centres of importance are made up of only a few
houses located in the valley or halfway up some for-
bidding hillside. Thus the prevailing impression left
upon one's mind is that Turkish misrule has been re-
sponsible for the creation of a state of rack and ruin
and for the existence of conditions which can only be
improved when a long period of peace has enabled the
Balkan States as a whole to introduce those reforms
and that good government which have existed in Bul-
garia since her liberation in the year 1878.

In this connection it has always been interesting to
note the enormous differences which become markedly
apparent as soon as one leaves Turkey and enters
Bulgaria. The Bulgarian road is not only well laid
out but it is maintained in a good state of repair.
Carriages may roll along without jolting the traveller
much more than would be the case on an English coun-
try road. The fields are well cultivated. The ground,
which much resembles heavy rich English soil, is made
the best use of. Animals of all kinds are contentedly

178 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

grazing in the pastures, instead of, as in Turkey,
being allowed to wander in all directions, thereby
tramping down the standing corn or crossing the
newly ploughed fallows. Hay and corn crops are
carefully collected in small, round, thatched ricks.
The forests are systematically cut, and trees are
planted in place of those removed for sale or everyday
use.

The Near East is therefore a land of contrasts.
Although we have some of the monotonous scenery
to which I have already referred, one also comes upon
the unexpected in the opposite direction. For in-
stance, the magnificent land-locked Bocche di Cattaro
is a gem of beauty, the like of which it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to surpass in Europe. Again, there
are places such as Sofia or Serajevo where civilisation
has advanced by leaps and bounds. The capital of
Bulgaria, in 1878 little more than a collection of mud
huts, is now a prosperous modern city. Equally,
whilst the Austrians may not have given political
satisfaction to the Slav population of Bosnia, they
have undoubtedly made of its capital a city in which
picturesque beauty is combined with modern comfort.
Composed partly of modern and partly of Turkish
houses and nestled on both sides of the narrow valley
of the river Miljacka, Serajevo is a place in which
East certainly meets West.

In view of the influence of climatic conditions upon
communications no apology is needed for making a
brief reference to the question of the weather in the
Balkan Peninsula. In the north and northeast of the
peninsula the climate is largely governed by the ex-
tremely cold winds which blow from those directions,

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 179

by the considerable amount of snow which therefore
falls in many districts, and by the length and severity
of the frosts. In the south and southwest, partly
owing to the protection given by the mountains and
high table-lands, the climate is much milder and the
rain comes usually with a south or southwest wind.
In many districts there are very sudden changes in
the weather, and there is a great contrast between
the temperature of the day and of the night. For
instance, at the end of October there comes an almost
annual short spell of very cold weather at Constan-
tinople— a spell in which there are always biting
cold winds and sometimes falls of snow or sleet. From
then, often until the end of December, the days are
generally brilliantly fine and warm. Again, even in
the early autumn the visitor to the interior will find
that very little exercise will make him warm by day,
whilst at night, and even when rough shelter is avail-
able, he will gladly coil up in all the fur garments
which he may be lucky enough to possess. Both the
heavy downpours of rain and the melting of the snows
create conditions which the traveller and the engineer
have to be prepared to meet. Thus it is no uncommon
thing for routes which are perfectly passable in summer
to be completely impassable during times of rain and
flood. It is this factor which often accounts for the
existence of alternative roads, used at different seasons
of the year, and it is this contingency which often
leads to mistakes in information as to the utility or
inutility of various communications for military pur-
poses.

Although Turkey now forms but a very small part
of the Balkan Peninsula, the question of the existing

180 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

communications in the whole area under discussion
has been largely influenced by the attitude of the Otto-
man Government. For years much of the politics
of the Near East has turned upon railroad questions,
and therefore, whilst considerable parts of the penin-
sula had already passed out of Turkish hands before
the construction of railways was practicable in such
an area, yet up to the time of the Balkan Wars the
geographical distribution of the European dominions
of the Sultan was such as to give the Ottoman Gov-
ernment the deciding voice as to the construction of
numerous lines leading through Turkey to the sea-
coast. The building of roads and railways would
have carried with it economical as well as political
advantages to the State, but their construction was
opposed alike by Abdul Hamid and by the Young
Turks. This opposition was sometimes due to in-
ternal political reasons, and sometimes it resulted
from the existence of rival schemes supported by
different Governments, or by concession hunters who
were directly or indirectly interested in them. Again,
as large numbers of railways in Turkey were built
under a kilometric guarantee from the Government
— a guarantee which assured the company in question
a fixed gross income every year — it is well known
that the Turkish authorities agreed to what was
often a most extravagant sum, but only when the
line in question was required for some strategical pur-
pose, or when its construction was forced upon the
Sublime Porte by some more than usually active
diplomatic representative at Constantinople.

One result of this inadequate provision of railways
is that the Near East has always been but little under-

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 181

stood by thosewho have only been able to pass hurriedly
through it, and that once off the beaten track, many
parts of the Balkan Peninsula are stranger to the
ordinary outsider than are the wilds of Central Africa.
Indeed the methods of travel are so diverse that
whilst in peace time Constantinople can be reached
in the luxurious Orient Express, once off the great
international route, one might almost as well be in the
heart of some unexplored continent. Thus to approach
the Peninsula of Gallipoli by land, or to get into the
heart of Macedonia, you must rely upon some fourth-
rate carriage, whilst to penetrate the rocky valleys of
Albania you are compelled to content yourself with a
pack horse, a mule or even a donkey. Again, arrived
in the interior, accommodation, which is distinctly
primitive even in many of the larger Balkan towns,
must either be provided by the transportation of
camping arrangements or sought in buildings so dirty
and so unpleasant that it is much easier to pass the
night than actually to sleep.

Before approaching a discussion of the actual military
routes within the real peninsula, I will briefly refer to
two international highways, which if they be not prop-
erly in the Balkans themselves are certainly controlled
by one or more of the rulers in this "Danger Zone" of
Europe. Ignoring here the numerous interesting facts
connected with the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus I
will refer very briefly to the enormous importance of
Europe's second largest river. Although it is impos-
sible without entering into countless details to discuss
its evervarying breadth and depth, it may be interest-
ing to remember that at Belgrade the Danube is nearly
one mile wide, and that with certain exceptions its gen-

182 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

eral width between Vienna and the Iron Gates is from
six hundred and fifty to two thousand yards at low river.
From the Iron Gates, where the channel is only about
eighty yards broad, the river widens out, and through-
out its course to Braila its average breadth, when the
water is low, is about half a mile. On the Upper
Danube, that is, on the part above the Iron Gates,
traffic is maintained by barges and by special river
steamers drawing, I believe, up to five or six feet of
water. So far as one is able to ascertain, such vessels
can now navigate the stretch between Vienna and
Turnu Severin at practically all times except when
the river is stopped by the presence of ice. Below
Turnu Severin and between there and Braila there
are about twelve feet of water, and small sea-going
vessels can therefore pass up and down. Between
Braila and the Black Sea, by way of the Sulina branch,
there is a minimum depth of about eighteen feet of
water. This last-named section of the river is under
the control of the Danubian Commission.

The above details are sufficient to prove the enormous
importance of the Danube, not only as a thoroughfare
for traffic but also as an obstacle to through communi-
cation between the north and south. No bridges span
the river between Peterwardein — a Hungarian town
situated about forty miles to the northwest of Bel-
grade — and Cerna Voda in Roumania, that is, for a
distance of nearly six hundred miles. This means
that the greater part of Roumania — a country the
communications in which cannot really be considered
as part of those in the peninsula — is separated from
the Balkan States by a natural barrier, the width of
which is in many places much greater than that of

I

I

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 183

either the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles. Thus whilst,
as I shall show below, eight more or less independent
Roumanian railways run down to the northern bank
of the Danube at seven different places, and whilst
six Bulgarian lines approach its southern bank near
five different towns, connection between the Rou-
manian and Bulgarian termini, which are for the most
part situated almost opposite to each other, is main-
tained solely by ferry boats which do not carry trains.
Indeed, the only route by which the railway systems
of the two countries are actually connected is by way
of a new line through the Dobrudja, a line which I
shall discuss later on in this chapter.

Cerna Voda is on the main line from Bucharest to
Constanza, and therefore upon the route which in
peace time is followed by the Orient Express upon
certain days in the week. Here a great viaduct, or
more correctly, a series of viaducts, cross the river and
the lower ground and marshes which border upon it.
In addition to the supplementary sections, which
have a length of nearly two miles, the bridge over the
river alone is not only more than eight hundred yards
long but the roadway is one hundred feet above the
level of the water. Built by Roumanian engineers at
a cost of about £1,400,000, and opened in September,
1895, it constitutes a possession of which the Rou-
manians may be justly proud. Indeed, as I have said
elsewhere, its existence, as also that of the port of
Constanza, which is now one of the most important
on the Black Sea, are the fundamental causes for
which the Roumanians desired to secure a properly
defensible frontier on the south of the Dobrudja, and
therefore one of the most important reasons for which

184 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

they insisted upon the acquisition of the areas they
obtained during and as a result of the two Balkan
wars.

The international status of the Danube depends
upon various treaties and arrangements which date
back as far as 1814 and 1815. In the former year, and
by the Treaty of Paris, it was arranged that the navi-
gation of the Rhine should be free and that it should
not be prohibited by any one. In 1815 the Congress
of Vienna confirmed this arrangement. In 1856, and
by the Treaty of Paris, it was agreed that the Danube,
the navigation upon which up till that time had been
regulated by a treaty between Austria and Russia,
should be placed under the same rules as those which
had already been made for international water high-
ways which traverse more than one State.

This brings us to a point at which it is necessary to
consider under more or less separate headings the
work which has been carried out by the Danube
Commission, and the larger political position of the
Danube. This international Commission, which was
instituted by the Treaty of Paris of 1856, was created
with the special object of executing the works neces-
sary to put the lower part of the river and its mouths
into the best possible state for navigation. Its powers
have been prolonged by various periods, and in 1878,
and by the Treaty of Berlin, a Roumanian delegate
was added. At the same time the work of the Com-
mission was extended as far west as Galatz. Its juris-
diction having been again prolonged in the year 1883,
as far as Braila, the Commission has continued to
exist since 1904 under a three years' agreement made
under the Treaty of London signed in 1883.

I

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 185

The Commission is possessed of extra-territorial
powers, and it is not in any way under the control of
the Roumanian Government. It has the right to
levy tolls, to carry out public works, and to institute
regulations for the navigation on the part of the river
which it controls. All members and employees, be-
sides its works and its establishments, and particularly
those at Sulina, are to be considered neutral, and in
case of war they are to be equally respected by all the
belligerents. The Commission has its own flag and
badge, and it holds general meetings and committees
in order to carry out the necessary regulations for
river traffic.

It is only possible here very briefly to consider the
larger political status of the Danube, that is, the status
of the river from its mouth as far as the Iron Gates.
By the Treaty of Berlin, it was determined that all
the fortiflcations on the river between its mouth and
the Iron Gates should be razed, and that no new ones
should be created. At the same time it was settled
that no vessel of war, with the exception of those light
ones in the service of the river police and of the "Sta-
tionnaires" of the Powers, which were to be allowed
to ascend as far as Galatz, should navigate this stretch
of the river. These regulations, and especially those
connected with the presence of war vessels, have not
been carried out to their letter, for Roumania cer-
tainly possessed river monitors which could hardly be
necessary for police work

Many of the numerous international arrangements
connected with the Danube have been "interpreted"
by the various enemy belligerents in a manner which
would certainly not have been accepted by international

186 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

lawyers. Sufficient, therefore, be it to say here that
as no riverian State possesses the right of searching
ships which do not stop in her ports, and as no ships
of war may legally navigate the river, there are un-
decided problems connected with such questions as
the freedom of the Danube "in respect to commerce",
as to the definition of the term "vessel of war", and
as to the possible difference in status between the
once entirely Roumanian and the joint Roumanian
and Serbo-Bulgarian (now Austro-German Bulgarian)
sections. In war these questions were obviously
destined to be decided only according to the circum-
stances of the moment and to the power which any
particular party possessed to support its own point
of view.

I will now proceed to a more detailed description of
the actual routes which exist or the construction of
which is in progress or proposed. With only a few
exceptions I shall say but little in regard to roads,
because for the most part they follow the general
lines of, or act as feeders to, railways. Moreover,
in modern days the movements of large armies are so
influenced by the necessity for the transportation of
heavy guns and of vast quantities of munitions and
of supplies, that these armies are usually compelled to
take the lines of least resistance and to follow railway
routes. In order to make my remarks as brief and as
clear as possible I have divided them into three distinct
sections.

1. An account of what may be called the main lines
of railway in the peninsula.

2. A summary of the more important secondary
lines — a summary in which those lines are grouped

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 187

as far as possible in accordance with the countries
through which they run.

3. An outhne of various routes which are not followed
by railways and a brief explanation of some of the
lines the construction of which has often been pro-
posed.

By far the most important railway in the Balkan
Peninsula is that which connects Belgrade with Con-
stantinople and which follows a route traversed at
various historical periods by Turks, Crusaders, and
Slavs. It constitutes the Balkan section of the great
trunk route from west to east and therefore its domina-
tion forms a prominent feature in the German *' Drang
nach Osten " scheme. Of its total length of six hundred
and fifty-nine miles, two hundred and twelve miles
are in Serbia, two hundred and seventy-one miles
are in Bulgaria, and the remaining one hundred and
seventy-six miles are in Turkey. The line, which has
no kilometric guarantee, was built during the period
between 1869 and 1888, when it was opened to
through trafiic. In the former year Baron Hirsch
obtained a concession to construct certain railways
in Turkey. Amongst other important lines con-
tracted for under that arrangement was one to pass
through, or more correctly near to, Adrianople, and
to connect Constantinople with the northwestern fron-
tier of what was then Eastern Roumelia. This line
was opened to traffic about the year 1872. The
original Bulgarian section, that is the stretch extend-
ing from the above-mentioned frontier to Tsaribrod,
and the Serbian section, namely the length from
Tsaribrod to Belgrade, were built as a result of several
conferences which were held under Article X. of the

188 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

Treaty of Berlin. Owing to various political delays
these sections were not completed until 1888. The
Turkish section is still worked under an arrangement
by which Baron Hirsch entered into a formal agree-
ment with the Sublime Porte, and under which he
formed a company or syndicate, now called the Oriental
Railway Company, to exploit the line on behalf of the
Ottoman Government. The Bulgarian part, which
now includes the whole section between Luleh Burgas
and Tsaribrod, and, until the defeat of that country,
the Serbian part extending from there to Belgrade,
are worked by the State railways of the respective
countries. In peace time this route is followed by
the Orient Express, and through communication is
maintained by at least one daily passenger train in
each direction — a train which has become familiarly
known as the "Conventionnel", probably because its
existence depends upon a Convention originally signed
by Austria, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

After crossing the Save by an iron bridge, the length
of which is over four hundred yards at Belgrade, which
lies at the junction of that river with the Danube, the
line runs through hilly country to Veliko Plana. On
this section, and near a place called Ripany, situated
about fifteen miles to the south of Belgrade, there is a
tunnel about a mile and a quarter long. From Veliko
Plana, where it enters the valley of the Morava, and
for a distance of some ninety -five miles the line follows
the banks of that river almost to Nisli, whence it turns
in a more easterly direction and hugs the bank of the
Nishava, subsequently crossing the Dragoman Pass
and the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier. After crossing the
Sofia plateau the line enters the valley of the great

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 189

Maritza, not by Trajan's Gate, through which the
historical road to the East ran, but by a pass situated
just to the southwest of it. Thence it traverses the
plain of Eastern Roumelia, flanked on the north by the
Balkan Range and on the south by the Rhodopes,
until, after leaving Bulgarian territory at Luleh Bur-
gas, it enters the valley of the Erkene, by which it
continues its ever-winding way until it reaches the
northwestern end of what is known as the Peninsula of
Constantinople. After passing through the Chatalja
Lines and the ancient walls of the Ottoman capital it
finally arrives at its terminus on the southwestern side
of the Golden Horn.

Second only in significance to this line is the railway
which connects Nish with Salonica. The length of
this line is two hundred and seventy-eight miles. The
northern section, that is, the section from Nish to
Ristovats, was built by the Serbians and opened in
the year 1888. Its length is seventy miles. The re-
maining two hundred and eight miles were built
for the Ottoman Government by Baron Hirsch, the
greater part being opened in 1872. The Turkish sec-
tion, which had no kilometric guarantee, was worked
by the Oriental Railway Company until the Balkan
Wars of 1912-1913. As a result of these wars the
Serbians secured, and subsequently took over the
working of, the line between Ristovats and Ghevgeli
— a section which has a length of just over one hun-
dred and fifty miles. The rest of this line, that is,
the part between Ghevgeli and Salonica, has been in
Greek territory since these wars, but the Hellenic
section continued to be worked by the Oriental Rail-
way Company until after the order for Greek mobilisa-

190 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

tion issued at the end of September, 1915, when it was
taken over by the Government, and more or less since
which time it has been practically in the hands of the
Allies.

Following the valleys of the Morava and the Vardar
this line takes the great highroad from north to south
across the Balkan Peninsula. If seriously improved
or rebuilt, and if better harbour facilities were available
at Salonica, this line would constitute the shortest
and the most direct route from Europe to Egypt,
India, and the Far East. Since the outbreak of the
War, it has been most important partly because t was
by way of it that Serbia was at first able to communi-
cate with the sea and partly because it constitutes the
natural line of advance from Salonica into the interior.
But as it runs more or less parallel to the Bulgarian
frontier, and as it passes through one or more narrow
gorges, it was easy of attack by the army of that
country, which secured possession of considerable sec-
tions directly after the Bulgarian entry into the arena
of the War.

There remains one other railway of very considerable
importance. It leaves the main Belgrade-Constan-
tinople route at Luleh Burgas, a junction situated on
the right bank of the River Maritza, and lying at a
distance of about eighteen miles to the south of Adrian-
ople. This line forms the connecting link between
the Constantinople-Adrianople Railway and Salonica.
The first section — that part between Luleh Burgas
and Dede Agatch, which runs down the valley of the
Maritza — was originally constructed and worked
with and by the Oriental railways. Its length is
approximately sixty miles. The second section, that

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 191

is, the part between Dede Agatch and Salonica, was
built and exploited up to the time of the Balkan Wars
by a French company. With a very large kilometric
guarantee — the highest guarantee ever given for a
railway built on this system — this line, including
two short branches, has a length of two hundred and
sixty-five miles. Of these about ninety miles are now
in Bulgaria and the remainder nominally in Greece.
The main line from Dede Agatch to Salonica runs
practically parallel to and at an average distance of
some fifteen miles from the Aegean coast, and it
traverses the plain which lies between that coast and
the Rhodope Balkans. Passing Gumuljina in Bul-
garia and Drama, Seres, and Demir Hissar in Greece,
it approaches within a distance of about twenty miles
of Kavala, but it touches the seacoast only at Dede
Agatch and near Porto Lagos. As the geographical
position of this railway is one of extreme importance
it is advisable to remember that a loop or branch line
connects the Maritza Valley Railway with the line to
Salonica without passing through Dede Agatch, and
that big ships cannot enter the arm of the sea which
lies to the north of Porto Lagos. The loop at Dede
Agatch has its strategical significance, for instead of
absolutely approaching the coast, it follows a route
which lies behind the hills and at a distance of nearly
nine miles from the shore.

As a result of the Balkan W^ars the ownership and
the working of the Bulgarian sections of these railways
— parts which were at once seized by the Bulgarian
Government — became most unsatisfactory. This was
the case because the only means of railway communica-
tion between the main part of Bulgaria and the Bui-

192 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

garian port of Dede Agatch was by way of a line con-
siderable parts of which were in Ottoman territory.
In other words, as the Turks owned the railway be-
tween a point situated just to the southeast of Mus-
tapha Pasha and Mandra, lying to the southwest of
Demotika, this line could only be used by the Bul-
garians on the strength of an arrangement made by
them with Turkey after the second Balkan war.
Whilst in peace it was open to countless disadvantages,
in war it was possessed of complications, the nature of
which it is impossible to exaggerate. It was for this
reason that the Germans, as I have explained else-
where, compelled the Turks to agree to the Turco-
Bulgarian Convention, by which the formerly Otto-
man areas situated on the west, or right banks, of the
rivers Tunja and Maritza were handed over to Bul-
garia. As a result of this arrangement, the Bulgarians
secured possession of the whole line from Mustapha
Pasha to Dede Agatch, and they therefore became the
owners of the railway from the former place as far as
Okjilar on the Dede Agatch-Salonica ' line.^ The
Greeks on their part are the nominal owners of the
section from Okjilar to Salonica. As in the cases of
other railways running through now Hellenic territory,
this line was worked under the old arrangements until
it was taken over by the Greek Government after the
promulgation of the 1915 order for mobilisation, since
which time a considerable area of the country through
which it runs has been occupied by the Bulgarians.

^ At the time of writing it is reported that all or part of this area, includ-
ing the Station of Adrianople, situated on the right bank of the Maritza,
and known as Karagatch, has been restored to Turkey by Bulgaria. The
accuracy of this report and the real reason for a second transference of this
area, however, still remain to be proved.

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 193

Although it is not strictly speaking a main line, its
geographical position, partly in Greece and partly in
Serbia, makes it convenient here very briefly to refer
to the railway which connects Salonica with Monastir.
This railway, with a total length of one hundred and
thirty-six miles, was opened in the year 1890.
With a kilometric guarantee of £572 per mile, it was
worked by the Oriental Railway Company until the
Balkan Wars. After that the Serbian, or northern
section, the length of which is only about fifteen miles,
was taken over by the Serbian Government. The
remainder of the line, administered more or less under
the former arrangements until the 1915 Greek mobili-
sation, was then taken over by the Hellenic Govern-
ment. The railway is of considerable importance be-
cause it serves an area of country which would other-
wise be far from accessible — the proposed line from
Kuprulu (Veles) to Monastir running entirely through
Serbian territory was not constructed before the enemy
occupation of this area ^ — and because for years it
has been part of the programme of Balkan railway
construction to prolong it through Albania to some
point on the Adriatic. Moreover as it runs through
Gidia, Veria, and Fiorina, it provides through com-
munication with Athens by a line which now connects
Larissa with Gidia — a line concerning which I will
give further particulars below.

Having thus briefly outlined the positions and im-
portance of the main lines of railway in the Balkan
Peninsula, I will now proceed to a summary of what
may be called the secondary and for the most part

^ It is reported that the Germans or the Bulgarians have now built at
least a considerable section of this line.

194 THE CRADLE OE THE WAR

internal communications — that is, communications
which, important as they are in themselves, do not
with certain exceptions (particularly in Roumania)
maintain any connection with those of a foreign
country. Let us begin with Roumania, which lying
as it does for the most part to the north of the Danube,
has only one linking railway with those of the remainder
of the peninsula.

Ignoring the roads, which are national and for the
most part good, the railways of Roumania, which
have a length of nearly two thousand four hundred
miles and all of which are either State owned or worked,
may for the present purposes be discussed under
two headings — firstly the main line which runs
more or less east and west across the country together
with its feeders, and secondly that which runs approxi-
mately in a northerly and southerly direction through
the northern horn of the kingdom together with
its tributaries. The great east and west line starts
from Constanza, on the Black Sea, crosses the Cerna
Voda bridge and passing through Bucharest, goes to
Verciorova on the frontier, whence it turns in a north-
erly direction and continues its way to Budapest and
Vienna. This line has numerous feeders which run
up to it from the south. The first, which joins it at
Medgidia in the Dobrudja, is the only railway (except
the trunk line passing through Belgrade) by which
through communication exists between the Balkan
Peninsula and the remainder of Europe. Meeting
the Bulgarian system at Oborishte on the Roumano-
Bulgarian frontier, it was constructed by the Rou-
manians after the Balkan Wars, only being completed
subsequent to the outbreak of the European conflagra-

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 195

tion. With a length of about seventy miles it is highly
important commercially because it enables goods and
passengers to be conveyed from Bucharest to Sofia
or vice versa without the necessity for any trans-
shipment on the banks of the Danube. It has played
a significant strategic part in the War, for it greatly
furthered the Bulgarian advance into Roumania.
Since the enemy occupation of the Dobrudja this line
is believed to have been prolonged in a northerly
direction from Medgidia as far as Babadagh or Tultcha
or some other point on the south of the Danube.

Ignoring the great international routes going through
Moldavia and running up to the Predeal Pass, which
must be considered separately, this East and West
Line is approached from the south and from the north
by several railways which have played a prominent
part in the War. On the south and running down
to the Danube, there are six railways, four of which
approach the northern bank of the river opposite
or nearly opposite to Bulgarian railway termini.

On the north, ignoring several lines of more or less
local significance, the Constanza-Verciorova Railway
is approached by two important highways. The first
is the Fateshti-Buzeu line, which constituted the
route followed by the Berlin-Breslau-Cracow-Lemberg-
Constanza Express, run prior to the War in competition
to the Orient Express. Passing over the Chiulnitza-
Slobodzie-Ployesti branch, and the two lines to the
west of Bucharest which run up towards but not
across the Roumanian frontier from Pitesti, we come
to the Riatra-Cainen Railway which passes through
the Rotherturm Pass and connects with the Hungarian
railway system.

196 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

What I have described as the south and north rail-
way system of Roumania starts from Bucharest and
runs by way of Ployesti-Buzeu-Adjud and Pashkani
to Suczawa on the frontier of the Bukovina. This
railway, which traverses Moldavia, is met at Ployesti,
in the heart of the oil country, by the international
line which goes to Sinaia, the great summer resort of
fashionable Roumanians, and subsequently passes
through the Predeal Pass into Hungary. The Bu-
charest-Suczawa line also has branches respectively
running towards the west and east. Whilst the most
significant leading in the former direction is that
which runs from Adjud through the Gyimes Pass
and into Hungary, the most important running to
the east are those which connect Buzeu with Fateshti
near Cerna Voda, Buzeu with Braila, Moresesti with
Tecuciu (on the independent Russian frontier line
from Galatz to Jassy) and Pashkani with Jassy and the
Russian frontier.

The above remarks, if studied in conjunction with
a map, are intended to prove four things. Firstly,
the communications existing in Roumania are of vital
importance as giving access to the Danube from the
north and of considerable significance as providing
the shortest routes from southeastern Hungary into
Russia. It was for these reasons, as I have already
explained, that Germany desired the entry of Rou-
mania into the W^ar on one side or the other. Secondly,
the railways of Southern Roumania were such as to
facilitate a military concentration by that country
on the northern bank of the Danube and therefore
against Bulgaria, or to further a Bulgarian advance
into Roumania once a crossing of the river were ef-

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 197

fected, as it was effected at the end of 1916. Thirdly,
whilst the enemy had an effective system of railways
running more or less parallel to his Transylvanian
frontier, the Roumanians had only the one semi-
circular line from Suczawa by way of Ployesti, Bu-
charest, and Pitesti to Verciorova — a line which was
very inadequately connected with the frontier. And
fourthly, if, and so far as the Roumanian railways
had been constructed for strategical purposes at all,
this had been done with a view to war against Russia
rather than as a preparation for hostilities against
Austria-Hungary.

Turning to Serbia, during the years which preceded
the outbreak of the War, and particularly since the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, the
Government had been devoting large sums of money
to railway construction. The Serbian lines are of
two distinct categories — normal and narrow-gauge
lines.

All the railways in Serbia, except two, really con-
stitute branches of or feeders to the main trunk line
from Belgrade to Constantinople. I will deal first
with those which run from the main line in a more or
less westerly direction. Of these there are three.
The first and last — both narrow-gauge lines — are
important because they jut out towards the Bosnian
frontier and therefore towards the railways of that
province, with which ere now they may well have
been connected by the enemy and with which they
are destined to be united should Bosnia go to Serbia,
as we hope that it will as a result of the present War.
On the east or northeast of the main trunk route there
are three Serbian railways of considerable and two of

198 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

only local significance. The first important one runs
from Veliko Plana to Semendria, and follows the
valley of the Morava. It was used by the Austro-
German forces when they advanced into Serbia in
the autumn of 1915. The second connects Nish with
Prahov on the Danube. The whole of this line was
not open to passenger traffic before Serbia was over-
run by the enemy, but it has certainly been completed
by now. Between these two lines there is an im-
portant narrow-gauge railway, which unites the main
trunk route with the one from Nish to Prahov. These
latter lines facilitated the Bulgarian advance and occu-
pation of northeastern Serbia.

As already stated, there are only two railways in
Serbia which ha^ve no connection with the main trunk
route from Belgrade to Constantinople. The first of
these unites Shabatz on the Save with Loznitza on the
Drina. The second is that which runs through the
district best known as the Sanjak of Novibazar —
that narrow tongue of formerly Turkish territory
which up to the time of the Balkan Wars separated
Serbia from Montenegro. This line now forms a
branch of the main route from Nish to Salonica.
Leaving that railway at Uskub, it runs in a north-
westerly direction to Mitrovitza and has a length of
seventy -four miles. It was constructed for the Otto-
man Government under the arrangements made with
Baron Hirsch, and it actually formed part of the
original line from Salonica, for the section from Uskub
to the then Serbian frontier was not built until after-
wards. Of the famous and long-proposed railway
from Mitrovitza to the Austro-Hungarian frontier I
will say more later on.

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 199

Turning to Bulgaria we have the Balkan country
in which by far the greatest amount of attention has
been paid to the construction of railways and roads.
Whilst in the year 1887 there were no railways in
Bulgaria proper, only some two hundred miles, con-
structed under the auspices of the Turkish Govern-
ment, were open to traffic in Eastern Roumelia. After
the Balkan Wars, the Bulgarian State, including East-
ern Roumelia, had over fourteen hundred miles of
railway open, besides several lines under construc-
tion. The railways, which are all State owned, are
well equipped and efficiently run and managed. In-
deed the visitor who takes the principal routes is so
well accommodated in sleeping and restaurant cars
that it is difficult for him to believe that he is really
travelling on a Balkan branch line at all. Moreover
the districts which are not yet effectively provided
with railways are well served with roads which are
maintained in a state of repair which far surpasses
that of any other highways existing in the Balkans.

Whilst some of them are so important that they can
hardly be considered as branches of the main line, it is
convenient for the present purposes to consider the
railways of Bulgaria as feeders of the great trunk
route from Belgrade to Constantinople. A line runs
from Sofia up the gorgelike valley of the Isker and
then across the plains of Northern Bulgaria to Varna
on the Black Sea. In its turn it has what may be
called six distinct branches running toward the North,
five of which approach the Danube at five different
places, opposite to most of which, as I have already
said, there are Roumanian railway towns from which
connection is made with the interior of that country.

200 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

All these lines running up to and towards the Danube,
together with the trans-Balkan line described below,
have been most important since 1914. During the
neutrality of Bulgaria, as since the entry of that
country into the War, they have been utilised for
the transportation of men and goods coming from
Central Europe across or by way of the Danube, to
Turkey. This has relieved the traffic pressure on
the main line from Belgrade to Constantinople. More-
over, after the adhesion of Bulgaria to the cause of the
enemy, these railways and especially the more easterly
lines were utilised to facilitate the Bulgarian advance
into the Dobrudja and Southern Roumania.

The Sofia- Varna line is connected with the Philip-
popolis-Burgas railway, to which I will refer in detail
later, by one which traverses the Balkan Range. This
line, which is obviously of the greatest importance,
was only opened quite recently. Instead of following
the old road from Turnovo to Kazanlik by way of
the Shipka Pass, it takes a more easterly route and
passes through the Travna Gap. By so doing a climb
of nearly 1000 feet is saved, for, whilst the altitude of
the Shipka is 4378 feet, that of the Travna is only
3359 feet. The use of this line enables merchandise
or troops to be rapidly conveyed by railway from
Northern to Southern Bulgaria, or vice versa, without
being compelled as formerly to pass through Sofia.
As a matter of fact it played a considerable role even
before the entry of Bulgaria into the War, for it was
by it that munitions destined for Turkey were for the
most part forwarded from the Danube to the Ottoman
frontier.

At Sofia and from the main trunk route a railway

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 201

branches off in a southwesterly direction, and runs
to Gyuveshevo absolutely on the Serbo-Bulgarian
frontier. It is important because of the facilities
which it gives for a military concentration in this part
of Bulgaria, and therefore for a Bulgarian advance
upon Uskub, and also because it was intended as the
Bulgarian section of line finally to link Sofia with that
town and perhaps to form part of a great line from
the Danube to the Adriatic. Had the second Balkan
war not occurred, the Bulgarians would then have
constructed another line from Radomir, by way of
Dubnitza and the Struma Valley, to the shores of the
Aegean. As a matter of fact since their entry into
the War they have built the northern section of this
line, which is believed to be open in the form of a light
railway as far as Lipnitza just to the north of the
former Graeco-Bulgarian frontier.

Between Sofia and the Turco-Bulgarian frontier
there are only two railways which branch from the
main line. They both run in a northeasterly direction.
The first is by far the most important. It connects
Philippopolis with Burgas. The second branch leaves
the main line at Turnovo Siemenli (Sejmen). It runs
in an almost due northerly direction to Nova Zagora,
where it meets the above-described Philippopolis-
Burgas railway. Its importance has been consider-
ably decreased of late, for since the construction of
the section Philippopolis-Cirpan it no longer forms the
only line connecting Burgas with the remainder of
Europe, and through traffic from Sofia to Burgas goes
now by Philippopolis and Cirpan instead of by Tur-
novo Siemenli. According to some reports a line has
recently been constructed from Jamboli on the Burgas

202 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

Railway to Adrianople. Others deny these, and hav-
ing regard to all the circumstances it seems very likely
that they are not authentic.

In Turkish Thrace the means of communication are
still extremely indifferent, and this not only because
of the lack of railways, but also on account of the bad
state of repair in which Turkish roads are always main-
tained. Whilst the construction of several railways
has been under discussion for years, unless the Germans
have recently constructed others, the only one actually
open is that which runs in a northerly direction to
Kirk Kilissa. It is important because it facilitates
the means of communication between Turkey and
Southeastern Bulgaria by shortening the distance to
be covered by road.

With regard to the roads, if we ignore all minor
routes, there are at least three which lead from rail-
ways in a northerly or northeasterly direction. The
first unites Adrianople in Turkey with Jamboli in
Bulgaria, and follows the route possibly now taken
by the above-mentioned railway. The second runs
in a northerly direction from Kirk Kilissa towards
the frontier. Both these were used by the Bulgarians
in their advance during the first Balkan war. There
is also a road from near Tchorlu to Midia on the Black
Sea.

On the south there are several roads connecting the
coast of the Sea of Marmora with the railway from
Constantinople to Adrianople. Without discussing
those located in the more or less immediate neighbour-
hood of the Ottoman capital, we have four so-called
thoroughfares which are worthy of mention. The
first two connect Rodosto with the railway. Their

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 203

importance is that they enable troops, landed from
Asia Minor at Rodosto, to be marched into the interior
and towards Adrianople. The third runs from Rodosto
by way of Malgara to Keshan where it meets the main
route by which land communication is maintained
between Uzun Kupru on the railway and the Peninsula
of Gallipoli. This last-named road, which was prac-
tically rebuilt a few years ago, is certainly passable
for all arms. Even before its completion about the
year 1910 it was feasible for vehicles to travel by it
without any danger of being stuck in the mud, and
without any serious inconvenience to their occupants.

Having thus very briefly described practically all the
railways existing in the Balkan Peninsula except those
in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Greece, I
will now proceed to a discussion of a few of the great
international routes which are partly or entirely de-
void of railways. In order to make the discussion
the more -clear I will divide it into three main sections.
They are —

(1) Some of the possible means of advancing into
the interior from the Adriatic.

(2) The routes which lead from what may be called
Old Greece into the area united to that country after
the Balkan Wars.

(3) The roads or communications by which it is
possible to enter the main part of Bulgaria from the
Aegean, from Greece, and from Serbia.

Although at the present time, and when the future
ownership of large areas of the Balkan Peninsula is
uncertain, it is useless to enter into a long and detailed
account of the railways whose construction has been
proposed at various times, that question is so closely

204 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

bound up with the various existing Hues of communi-
cation that a brief reference to it may not be out of
place. In order to understand it aright, and particu-
larly to grasp what has been done or what may be
done in the western part of the peninsula, it is neces-
sary first to give a brief description of the lines leading
to and already existing in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Since the occupation of those provinces in 1878, the
Austro-Hungarian Government has adopted a policy
of peaceful penetration — a policy furthered and sup-
ported by the construction of hotels, of public build-
ings, of roads, and of railways. A line of great
importance extends from India on the main Belgrade-
Vienna Railway to Fiume on the Adriatic. That
railway and others coming from Vienna and Buda-
pest give access to a main-line (narrow gauge) railway,
which runs from north to south of the annexed prov-
inces and connects Bosnish Brod on the southern
bank of the Save with Zelenika on the northern shore
of the Bocche di Cattaro. On the west tliis line is fed
by branches which connect it with Jajce in Central
Bosnia and with Gravosa on the Dalmatian coast.
On the east, in addition to several short and therefore
comparatively unimportant lines, there are branches
which run towards the Serbian and Montenegrin
frontiers.

The natural routes by which two of these railways
could be connected with those of Serbia would be by
the construction of lines from Siminhan to Vahevo,
and from Vardishte to Ujitse. The advantage of the
adoption of one or both of these plans would be that
as the Bosnian railways are of the same gauge as those
of Western Serbia no alteration or reconstruction

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 205

would be required on any of the existing lines. Further
to the south it will be remembered that prior to the
Balkan Wars the Austrians had for years been desirous
of constructing a line through the Sanjak of Novi-
bazar from Uvats on their frontier to Mitrovitza
— the terminus of the railway from TJskub. Shortly
before the re-establishment of the Turkish Constitu-
tion and when the route still lay across Ottoman terri-
tory, Abdul Hamid actually signed an Irade granting
permission for the making of the preliminary surveys
for its construction. With a length of about one
hundred and forty miles it would provide an alternative
route to Salonica. But as there could be no through
communication on railways of different gauges, it
is clear that the sole object of this scheme was a
strategical one — an object which formed part of
Austria's attempt to push her way down to the Aegean.
The narrow-gauge lines of Bosnia might be relaid — a
work entailing enormous expense owing to the moun-
tainous nature of the country — or the present exist-
ing line to Banjaluka — a line which is of the normal
gauge — might be prolonged by way of Jajce and
Serajevo to the Bosnian frontier, but as things stand
at present it is difficult to foresee the existence of a
political situation in which such an undertaking is
likely to become one of practical politics.

For many years there have been two more or less
rival schemes for uniting the Danube with the Adriatic.
First, a great Slav railway to run through Serbia and
either Montenegro or Albania; and, second, a line
through Bulgaria and thence to the seacoast. In view
of the present political and military situations, it is
impossible to forecast the considerations which may

206 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

influence the ultimate construction of one or both of
these hues. Sufficient, therefore, be it to say that
the Serbian scheme is by no means a new one. It
would provide connection with Roumania by a bridge
across the Danube somewhere near Prahov, and it
would run, via Nish and Mitrovitza, probably to San
Giovanni di Medua or to Antivari. The Bulgarian
plan has always been to establish through communi-
cation from Roumania to Salonica or to the Adriatic
by way of Sofia. The construction of a bridge across
the Danube has been proposed at Vidin, Sistova, or
Rustchuk. The missing links are therefore the section
from Gyuveshevo to Komanovo, and from Uskub or
Monastir to the Adriatic.

In approaching a discussion of the communications
between the lower part of the Adriatic coast, it will be
convenient to classify the routes existing prior to the
enemy advance of 1915-1916 into sections devoted
respectively to descriptions of the roads then running
through Montenegro alone, through Albania and
Montenegro, and through Albania alone. Since that
time it is probable that the Austro-Germans have
done a great deal to improve the communications in
these two countries.

The only line of advance through Montenegro alone
runs from the port of Antivari and by way of the
Antivari-Virbazar railway — a short stretch of narrow-
gauge line which, with the port of Antivari, was con-
structed by an Italian company. In Montenegro an
excellent road connects the Austrian port of Cattaro
with Cettinje, Podgoritza, and Niksics. As branches
of this main route there are roads from Riyeka to Vir-
bazar and thence to Antivari, and from Podgoritza

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 207

to Plavnitza, a port on Lake Scutari. For some time
prior to the war the Montenegrins had planned to
build a road from Podgoritza to Andriyevitza and
to prolong it by two routes running to the frontier.
It has also been suggested that these roads should
be extended across the frontier to Novibazar and
to Mitrovitza respectively. Political conditions and,
above all, the jealousy existing between Serbia and
Montenegro had, however, prevented the realisation
of this latter idea. As things stood at the time of
the Montenegrin defeat, a road actually existed from
Podgoritza to Andriyevitza. The most direct and
easy route to be followed by a possible future rail-
way is that by way of Andriyevitza, Berane, and
thence to Novibazar and up the valley of the River
Ibar to the railway town of Kralievo in Serbia.

In order to use routes for passing through Albania
and Montenegro one would land at San Giovanni di
Medua, and go from there to Scutari by road, or else
go up the River Boyana to the capital of Northern
Albania. The port of San Giovanni di Medua con-
sists of a few houses located on the northern side of
a small bay. That bay is more or less sheltered, but
no facilities exist for the disembarkation or embarka-
tion of men or war material. The road to Scutari
was made passable for wheeled traffic and for motors
during the summer of the year 1914 when the new
bridge over the River Drinitza and near Scutari was
opened. To use the Boyana, men and goods would have
to be trans-shipped to small steamers at San Giovanni
di Medua or at the mouth of the river and again at
Oboti. From Scutari, lake boats would be used as far
as Virbazar, Riyeka, or Plavnitza in Montenegro.

208 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

Through Albania alone there are three possible
general lines of communication between the coast
and the interior. The first follows the above-men-
tioned route to Scutari and from there, after running
up the Drin Valley for some miles, crosses the moun-
tains to Prisrend — a town allotted to Serbia by the
London Ambassadorial Conference. This route, which
dates from Roman times, continues to Ferisovitch on
the Uskub-Mitrovitza railway, and was used by the
Serbian Government and by the French Aeroplane
Mission when they retreated to Scutari at the end of
1915.

The second route, which runs from Durazzo into
the interior, follows the line of the celebrated Via
Egnatia for about one hundred and twenty miles,
reaching the head of the Salonica-Monastir railway
at the last-named place. Of these one hundred and
twenty-five miles not more than the section from
Monastir to Struga — which is about forty-five miles
— was passable for wheeled traffic, prior to the enemy
occupation of Northern Albania. The remainder of
the road consisted of nothing better than an extremely
bad and ill-kept path, and unless it has been improved
it could not be utilised by a European force made up
of all arms and accompanied by the big guns and by
the transport required in modern warfare.

As a northern alternative to this route, there is a
road which connects Durazzo with Tirana and a path
leading from the latter place to Dibra. In the south
there is a road from Avlona to Berat and to Elbasan,
but owing to its greater length and to the fact that
the plains are practically impassable in bad weather
it possesses little claim to be considered as of equal

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 209

importance to that which follows the Scumbi Valley.
Since their occupation of Southern Albania, the Italians,
as I have said elsewhere, have constructed several
lengths of road in the area which they hold.

The third and most southerly route through Albania
is by far the best road in that country. Throughout
its length it is passable for wheeled traffic, and it must
now have been greatly improved by the Italians who
are in occupation of the greater part of it. Starting
from Santi Quaranta, a port situated almost immedi-
ately opposite to the northern end of the Island of
Corfu, it connects that place with Korcha and with
Monastir. The first section of the road is part of that
originally built by the Turks to connect Janina with
the coast. A part of this route (roughly twenty miles)
runs through territory which officially belongs to
Greece. This is the case, because when Santi Qua-
ranta and Korcha were given by Europe to Albania,
the natural and existing means of communication
between these two most important places was inter-
rupted by a frontier delimitation in the neighbourhood
of Doliani, a delimitation in which the practical condi-
tions of life were completely and unfairly ignored at
the expense of Albania, and in order to put off inter-
national dangers which were then looming in the
distance.

Before discussing the communications which are
available between Old Greece, that is, the area which
formed part of the Hellenic monarchy before the
Balkan Wars, and the remainder of the peninsula, it
may be well to remind my readers that whilst that
country possessed a fairly effective railway system,
that system was not until after those Wars connected

210 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

with the railways of the remainder of Europe. For
years two more or less rival schemes, each destined to
accomplish this object, had been under consideration.
The Turkish proposal was for the construction of a
line to join Larissa in Greece with Veria on the Salonica-
Monastir line. This line would have run parallel to
but well away from the coast. The Greeks, on the
other hand, favoured the provision of a line extending
almost along the shore of the Gulf of Salonica from
Karate Derven, their terminus, to Gidia on the above-
mentioned line. As a matter of fact, in January, 1914,
a contract was signed between the Hellenic Govern-
ment and a French company for the building of a line
to follow this the original Greek route, and the line
is now available for traffic.

With regard to roads, there are three principal
routes by which Greece maintains communication
with her new provinces. To begin with there is a
good road from Prevesa, at the entrance to the Gulf
of Arta, to Janina. Further to the northeast there
is a route which connects Kalabaka — a Greek rail-
way terminus — with Janina by way of Metsovo.
Again, from Larissa it is possible to travel by way of
Elasona to Kozani and thence to the Salonica-Monastir
railway by several different roads.

In approaching a discussion of the last question to
be dealt with here, namely, the routes leading into the
heart of Bulgaria from the south and southwest, it
may be said that there are three principal lines, none
of which is followed by a completed railway, and all
of which are practicable for wheeled traffic. Two of
these traverse or practically traverse the Rhodope
Balkans and the third runs from Northern Macedonia

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 211

up to the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier. Of the first pair
the most easterly route is that which connects Gu-
muljina on the Dede Agatch hne with Haskovo in
Old Bulgaria. The greater part of the road, which
now lies wholly in Bulgaria, was constructed by the
Turks for military purposes during the closing years
of the reign of Abdul Hamid. After the Balkan Wars
it was greatly improved by the Bulgarians, who fore-
saw its enormous importance as a means of communi-
cation with the coast. Always well engineered and
laid out, this road is certainly now practicable for
motor traffic, for before the entry of Bulgaria into
the War it was easy to make the whole journey in a
day, and by the use of motor cars for hire in Haskovo
or even in a motor diligence which maintained a daily
service.

At the end of 1913 when it became necessary for the
Bulgarians to turn their attention to the provision
of some satisfactory port upon the Aegean, and to
connect that port with the interior by a line not pass-
ing through Turkish territory, the preliminary surveys
for a railway to follow more or less the above route
were undertaken. Owing to the engineering difficulties
and to the necessity for two important tunnels, the
construction of this line would have taken three or
four years, and nothing further was done to realise
the project before the entry of Bulgaria into the
present War.

If we ignore the road which leads into but, unless
it has just been prolonged, not right across the Rho-
dopes from Drama, and which runs up the Mesta
Valley, the next route by which it is possible to advance
right into the interior is that which takes the valley

212 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

of the Struma, and therefore hugs the banks of the
river of that name. This Hne constitutes the natural
outlet for Bulgaria tov/ards the Aegean, and particularly
by way of the port of Kavala. It is for this reason
that the Government of Sofia was particularly anxious
to obtain possession of that port, and to secure a
frontier which gave to Bulgaria the whole Struma
Valley.

A good and thoroughly passable Struma Valley
road, which has now been supplemented by a light
railway for the greater part of its length, connects
Demir Hissar with Radomir. For some years prior to
the Balkan Wars the construction of a railway by way
of this route was under discussion. That the scheme
was not executed was due to military and political
rather than to economic considerations. For obvious
reasons the Turks were anxious for its construction
as an alternative to the proposed Bulgarian line from
Gyuveshevo to Komanovo, and this because it would
have been easy of attack from the west and from the
east, and because it would not have given to Bulgaria
those political advantages possessed by a line leading
direct from Sofia into Bulgarian Macedonia. The
idea was also favoured by the French Salonica-Dede
Agatch Railway Company because the line in question
would have constituted an important feeder to their
system. But the Bulgarians were willing to build
their section only on the condition that the Turks
agreed to construct the Gyuveshevo-Komanovo line.
The permanent realisation of this idea, as of many
others connected with the Balkan Peninsula, will now
entirely depend upon the territorial changes brought
about by the war.

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS 21S

As the means of communication between the valleys
of the Vardar and the Struma are bad, the only other
route into Bulgaria which is worthy of consideration
here is that from Northern Macedonia and that which
connects Komanovo on the Uskub-Nish railway with
Gyuveshevo, the Bulgarian frontier terminus. The
road is certainly passable for wheeled traffic, and it is
probable that ere now it has been rendered practicable
for motors. For some years it has always been con-
sidered that this route might be the one to be followed
by the first line to establish through connection be-
tween the Danube and the Adriatic. No serious
engineering difficulties exist, and the only portion of
the line that would be costly to construct is the tunnel
piercing the Deve Bair Mountain. It is therefore
probable that since their occupation of this part of
the country the Bulgarians have built or are build-
ing at least the section of this line where no tunnels
are required.

Partly owing to the great difference between the
amount of water in most of the rivers after the melting
of the snows and after the dry season, and partly owing
to the lack of public works, the rivers of the Balkan
Peninsula, except the Danube, the Save, and the
Boy ana, are not systematically navigated. I have
already referred to the importance of the Danube.
The Save, which more or less forms the western section
of the northern frontier of the peninsula, has a length
of about four hundred and forty miles, but of these
only about three hundred and fifty are navigable.
The Boyana, which constitutes an outlet for Lake
Scutari, flows into the Adriatic between the towns of
Dulcigno and San Giovanni di Medua. In its lower

214 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

coilrse it forms the boundary of Montenegro and
Albania. When the river is full, and when there is
enough water to get over the bar at its mouth, it is
navigable for small vessels as far as Oboti. Thence
to the port of Scutari there is only sufficient water
for small stern-wheeled vessels or for boats whose
owners make their livelihoods by conveying passengers
from lake and river vessels to the quay. Small barges
or flat-bottomed boats may be seen drifting down the
lower reaches of the Maritza, and the rivers of the
Rhodope Balkans are utilised for floating logs and trees
to the plain which skirts the Aegean Sea ; but the rivers
have not really been used for the furtherance of trade.
In the foregoing pages I have endeavoured to give
some idea of the military highways of the Balkans.
In so doing I have not attempted fully to discuss
the various parts played by these communications in
the present war, and I have purposely considered the
position of the frontiers and the ownership of the
railways to be as they were before the War. To have
done otherwise would have meant that I must still
further have burdened my readers with countless
details, and that I must either have gone into par-
ticulars which it were better should not be published,
or else that I should have been compelled to treat
the whole question so superficially that my remarks
would have been worthy of no serious attention.
Consequently, if I have only dealt indirectly with mili-
tary questions, which are now of vital interest to all,
I trust that I may have been able to do something to
make clearer various geographical and other questions
possessed of far-reaching strategical influence upon a
situation which is rapidly changing from day to day.

IX

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN

In the previous chapter, I have endeavoured to show
that for years the situation in the East has been closely
bound up with the fact that the Balkan Peninsula —
the Balkan States and Turkey in Europe — constituted
and constitute not the Germanic goal but the corridor
towards a goal, and that Germany has been and is
determined, by means of the "Drang nach Osten",
to strike a deadly blow at the very vitals of the British
Empire and to prevent Russia from pushing forward
actually or morally towards warm water. Thus,
whilst by a temporary military penetration across the
Balkans and right into Asiatic Turkey, the Central
Powers have greatly increased the strength of their
strategic position, still more by the driving of a per-
manent wedge through the same areas would they have
triumphed by endangering the Allied position through-
out the East. By the same means they would have
postponed indefinitely a change in the status of the
Straits, — the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. On the
other hand, were good relations to be established be-
tween the Balkan States, and were Allied influence
to increase there, at Constantinople and in Asia Minor,
then an Allied wedge would prevent Germanic expan-
sion towards the East. From the moment of the out-

216 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

break of the War, therefore, and particularly from Octo-
ber 31, 1914, when Turkey threw in her lot upon the
side of the Central Powers, it was the question of this
Germanic wedge, or rather of the preventing of it,
which constituted the real raison d'etre and the cause
of the Allied operations both at the Dardanelles and
at Salonica.

For centuries Constantinople, covering as it does
the great land route from Europe to Asia as well as
the water highway between the Black Sea and the
Mediterranean, has been the object of many aspira-
tions. From earliest times the reigning monarch in
this city has been able to control these two great thor-
oughfares as a result of the fortifications constructed
to protect his capital from attack by land and sea.
In the past the defences of the Dardanelles and the
Bosphorus have not only safeguarded the position of
the Turkish capital, but they have also protected the
Sea of Marmora. Thus so long as these two channels
remain impregnable the Ottoman Government can
not only bring troops from Asia Minor and land them in
Europe, but the Sultan and his Allies can pour armies
into Asia Minor, thence to send them by railway and
by road to areas from which they can threaten the
Egyptian frontier and the British positions in the Per-
sian Gulf and even in India.

Without entering into details, and ignoring a ques-
tion of all-preponderating importance to which I will
proceed below, it must therefore be apparent that a
successful campaign against the forts defending the
Dardanelles and the Bosphorus would have been pos-
sessed of consequences the far-reaching results of which
it is impossible to exaggerate. To begin with, the

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN 217

presence of an Allied fleet in the Sea of Marmora
would have placed Constantinople — the key of the
Ottoman Empire — at our mercy. Knowing the Turks
and their leaders as I do, I think that this would have
meant immediate overtures for peace on their part.
But, had this not been the case, there seems every
reason to believe that the arrival of an Allied fleet off
Constantinople would have strengthened the hands of
the peace party and consequently that it would have
brought about a revolution. This belief is supported
by the opinions of such men as Lord Kitchener and
Lord Grey, who, according to the report of the Darda-
nelles Commissioners, *' confidently looked forward
to a revolution taking place in Constantinople if once
the British Fleet appeared in the Sea of Marmora."
In addition, had these highly desirable objects been
achieved, their immediate effect would have been the
entry into the War then and there upon our side of the
at that time neutral Balkan States, — Bulgaria, Greece,
and Roumania, — thereby creating a situation the
meaning of which must be obvious to the least well-
informed student of the War.

Provided adequate preparations had been made, and
provided the operations had been inaugurated as a
combined naval and military campaign, instead of
being begun by the fleet alone, these objectives might
in themselves have been well worth the risks and the
cost of an undertaking, which, however it were carried
out, would certainly have been costly. This being
the case, the question of a possible attack upon the
Dardanelles was naturally discussed by the British
Cabinet directly after the entry of Turkey into the
War. Nevertheless nothing definite was done until

218 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

early in January, 1915, when the attitude of the AlHed
Governments was of necessity suddenly changed by
the receipt, on January 2, of a very important telegram
from the British Ambassador at Petrograd, expressing
a hope, on behalf of the Russian Government, that a
demonstration against the Turks would be made.^
Whilst we do not know the exact contents of this
telegram — contents which were probably far more
pressing and far more dictatorial than one is sometimes
allowed to believe — we are told in the Dardanelles
Report that they "materially affected the situation"
and that "The British Government considered that
something must be done in response to it." In other
words, an operation which might or might not have
been a justifiable "gamble" was suddenly forced
forward into a position in which it had to be considered
not only in reference to its direct military importance
but also in proportion to its indirect political and
military consequences — consequences which might
have ensued had the Western Allies taken up an atti-
tude based solely upon their own strategical and mili-
tary positions at that time. Under these circumstances
I propose therefore to ask my readers to accept the
opinion that the undertaking itself was rendered practi-
cally unavoidable by the above-mentioned Russian
demand and that its failure was the result not merely
of shortcomings in the conduct of the campaign, but
that it was due largely on the one hand to the necessity
of doing something to relieve the pressure upon Russia,

1 That telegram and many other details connected with the inauguration
of the Dardanelles campaign are referred to in the " Dardanelles Commis-
sion — First Report " which was presented to Parliament by command of His
Majesty and published in 1917 as an oflficial document numbered Cd 8490.

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN 219

when England and France were already fully occupied
elsewhere, and on the other to the enormous geographi-
cal difficulties which I will now endeavour to describe.

Before doing this, I must, however, explain that as
various journeys in Turkey in Europe and in Asia
Minor have led me, under different pretexts, to wander
over most of the ground about which I am writing,
my task is a particularly difficult one. Not only am
I obliged to consider how much or how little of my
knowledge I am justified in imparting to the public,
but I am also compelled for obvious reasons to with-
hold the dates and the methods by which I obtained
my information. To do otherwise might be not
only to endanger the property but perhaps even the
lives of some of those who may still be in, or who after
the War may be returning to Turkey.

Picnics and shooting expeditions may not have ex-
cited the suspicions of certain local officials, but even
so it would be impossible to disclose the localities in
which these pleasurable excursions took place, or to
reveal the identities of the different kinds of people
with whom they were organised. Consequently, if
any of my descriptions seem somewhat disjointed
and confused, and if I leave out altogether any refer-
ences to the routes and methods by which I reached
the Peninsula of Gallipoli, I hope that my readers will
bear with me and believe that I am endeavouring so
far as is possible under the circumstances and in the
available space to give them an outline of the nature
of the defences of Constantinople and to bring my
knowledge of the country to bear in describing a cam-
paign which was probably more difficult than any
which has ever been inaugurated in modern times.

2^0 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

Owing to its geographical position, Constantinople
is easy to defend by land and sea. The city is situated
at the southeastern extremity of a sort of peninsula,
which is bounded on the north by the Black Sea, on
the east by the Bosphorus, and on the south by the
Sea of Marmora. Thus by land the capital has only
to be protected on one, its western front. On the sea
side Constantinople is also extremely strong, because
the Marmora can only be approached by way of the
Bosphorus on the north and through the Dardanelles
on the southwest. In order to make my account of
these three series of defences the more clear, I will
divide it into three sections devoted respectively to
descriptions of : —

(1) The land defences including the Chatalja Lines,

(2) The Bosphorus forts,

(3) The Dardanelles forts.

(1) The land defences of the city are divided into
two sections : the Constantinople and the Chatalja
Lines. The Constantinople Lines are made up of an
outer and an inner ring of earthen forts, which extend
from the village of Makri Keuie on the Sea of Marmora,
and about two and a half miles west of the ancient city
walls, to Buyukdere, on the Bosphorus, and at a dis-
tance of about twelve miles from Constantinople.
For some years these forts have been said to be out of
repair and unarmed, and their power of resistance is
but very small when compared to that of the Chatalja
Lines.

(2) The Chatalja Lines, which constitute the real
land defences of the capital, extend across the Constan-
tinople Peninsula, at a distance of about twenty-five
miles to the west of the city. Designed by Von Bluhm

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN 221

Pasha, when the Russian army was advancing on Con-
stantinople in 1878, they cover a front of about sixteen
miles, a front which is flanked on the south by Lake
Buyuk Chekmedche — an inlet of the Sea of Marmora,
and on the north by Derkos Gol. The forts, which
number about thirty, are constructed on a ridge of
hills about ^ve hundred feet above the level of the sea.
A small stream runs across practically their entire
front. The position is therefore extremely strong, for
its flanks rest upon the sea and upon these impassable
lakes and therefore they cannot be turned. The forts
had always been maintained in an effective state, but
during and since the Balkan Wars no stone had been
left unturned to render up-to-date land defences which
rank only second in importance to the forts situated
on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. It is therefore
argued, even in well-informed circles, that had the
Peninsula of Gallipoli once been conquered by the
Allies, or had an Allied fleet made its way into the
Marmora, it might still have remained necessary to
undertake land operations on a large scale in order to
penetrate the Chatalja Lines, and therefore actually
to advance upon Constantinople. Militarily speak-
ing, there may be something in this point of view,
but I am convinced that, had a fleet once arrived off
the Golden Horn, the Turks would either have volun-
tarily surrendered the city, or a revolution would have
taken place which would have rendered it unnecessary
for that fleet either to shell the town or for the city to
be attacked from the land as well as from the sea side.
Turning to the Bosphorus, which is important in
connection with the Dardanelles campaign because it
was possible that Russian assistance might be forth-

THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

coming from that direction, assistance which it would
seem that the Western AlHes were entitled to expect,
the length of that channel, measured from the Seraglio
Point at Constantinople to the mouth of the Black
Sea, is about nineteen miles. The breadth varies
from about seven hundred and fifty yards, just above
Rumeli Hissar, to a little over two miles in Buyukdere
Bay. Except when the wind is exceedingly strong
from the south and southwest, the current runs from
the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmora with an average
speed of two and a half miles per hour, but opposite
Rumeli Hissar a speed of five miles per hour is occa-
sionally obtained. The winds are changeable, at times
blowing from one direction at one end 6f the Bosphorus
and from another direction at the opposite end. Unlike
the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus, which resembles a
winding river, is bordered by picturesque wooden
houses and by fine and stately palaces. Indeed, both
sides of this miraculous, wonderful water highway
are so thickly populated that two continuous towns,
or more correctly two long series of villages, run prac-
tically all the way from Galata to Buyukdere on the
European side, and from Scutari to Beikos on the Asiatic
Coast. Almost throughout the length of the Bosphorus
both shores rise immediately from the water's edge.
In some places the coasts ascend to a height of a little
more than low hills, but in others their elevation reaches
that of hundreds of feet, the highest levels being at-
tained on the borders of the northern end. Many
small valleys intersect these hills, and countless bays
add picturesqueness to the scene.

The most important forts which defend the Bos-
phorus nearly all lie between Buyukdere in Europe

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN 22S

and Beikos in Asia and the Black Sea entrance to the
channel — thus leaving the southern and thickly popu-
lated parts of the coast almost entirely undefended.
The forts are extremely well hidden, many of them
being so carefully placed that it is easy to pass up or
down the channel without becoming aware of their
existence. Some are placed close to the water's edge,
and some are on the slopes of the hills. Moreover,
the defences are so arranged as to cover the various
more or less straight lengths, in such a way as to be
able to fire upon ships alike before they reach, as they
pass, and after they have passed them. But although
during recent years much work has been done on the
Bosphorus, there is no doubt, even if they had to be
attacked only from the north, that the defences of this
area are much less strong and far less numerous than
are those situated on the Dardanelles.

As in the case of the Dardanelles, the passage of a
hostile fleet through the Bosphorus could be furthered
by the landing of a force on one or both of its shores.
Owing, however, to the existence of the Chatalja
Lines, it would be difiicult to take the forts on the
European coast in the rear, or more correctly it would
be necessary for a landing party to be disembarked
somewhere within, that is, to the east of, these lines.
The places suitable for such a landing are naturally
strictly limited, but the best is Kelia Bay, which, I
believe, is provided with a fort to guard the main
defences from any attack in rear, or at least to form a
lookout station. On the Asiatic coast, on the other
hand, a landing from the Black Sea was always more
feasible. Troops, disembarked at or near Riva on
the Black Sea, would only have had to advance for

224 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

a very few miles in order to occupy the high ground
lying at the back of and commanding the Asiatic forts
of the Bosphorus, forts which are practically at no
point situated on the summit of the hills. The exist-
ence of a road from Riva to Beikos would have assisted
a force moving from this direction, and such a force
might have been able to get guns on to the above-
mentioned high ground had a landing been effected,
either as a surprise or when the Turks were not in a
position adequately to defend this area. More or
less the same difficulties would have occurred as in
the attack on the Peninsula of Gallipoli, but, knowing
the ground in both areas, I consider that that situated
at the back of the Bosphorus forts is the easier, and
that even a threatened attack in this direction would
have greatly minimised the magnitude of our task at
the Dardanelles.

The northeastern end of the Dardanelles is distant
from Constantinople one hundred and thirty miles.
The length of the Straits, which are winding and
extremely difficult to navigate, is some thirty-three
miles. The breadth varies from about thirteen hun-
dred yards when measured between the towns of
Chanak, on the Asiatic coast, and Kilid Bahr, on
the European shore, to four miles or five miles shortly
after the entrance to the Straits from the Aegean Sea.
A strong current runs from the Marmora towards the
Mediterranean. When the wind blows from the north-
east, that is, more or less straight down the channel,
the difficulties of navigation and the speed of the
current are considerably increased.

The Peninsula of Gallipoli, which bounds the Dar-
danelles on the northwest, is a long, narrow tongue of

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN 225

land, some thirty-five miles in length. Its width is
only three miles, when measured across the Isthmus
of Bulair, lying as it does to the northeast of the town
of Gallipoli. More to the southwest it widens out,
only to narrow again to a breadth of about four miles
in rear of the town of Maidos. The northwestern and
western shores of the peninsula are washed by the
waters of the Gulf of Saros and of the Aegean Sea.
The coast rises in many places precipitously from the
water's edge. Nearly the whole of the country in
rear of Maidos and of Kilid Bahr consists of hills
which, in many places, attain a height of six or seven
hundred feet above the level of the sea. These hills
are intersected by small rocky valleys, with steep,
almost precipitous sides, up which I have climbed
often on my hands and knees. Much of the country,
and especially these valleys, which run for the most
part across, and not up and down, the peninsula, are
covered with scrubby bushes about two or three feet
high. These bushes tear one's boots and clothes
and person, and thus, even in peace time, make walk-
ing through them a highly difficult and disagreeable
experience. The hills immediately to the west and
southwest of Kilid Bahr are prettily wooded, the trees
extending almost to the seashore. Except where the
Turks and the Germans had recently improved them,
the roads along and across the peninsula were very
bad, for before the War communication had usually
been maintained by sea. As a matter of fact, one of
the most unpleasant tasks imposed upon the Allied
troops on the peninsula was that of making and improv-
ing roads, a task of necessity performed under the
shell- if not the rifle-fire of the enemy.

226 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

The most important town on the peninsula is GalH-
poli, at the northeastern entrance to the Dardanelles.
Its population is about fourteen thousand souls. The
place is essentially Turkish, and was the first to fall
into the hands of the Osmanlis, soon after Sulieman
Pasha crossed the Dardanelles and planted the standard
of the Crescent in Europe in the year 1356. The only
other towns of any importance are Maidos and Kilid
Bahr, lying much lower down the peninsula. Like
the remainder of the peninsula, which is but sparsely
populated, both these places would be practically
unknown were it not for the strategic value of the
country which surrounds them. As a matter of fact,
they are hardly ever visited by a foreig^ner, for, in
addition to the actual difficulties of communication,
obstacles are placed in the way of every stranger both
before and during his visit to this all-important area.

The modern defences of the Peninsula of Gallipoli
may practically be divided into four groups :

(1) The two forts built to protect the outer entrance
to the channel and lying in the immediate neighbour-
hood of Cape Helles and of Sedd-el-Bahr. Whilst
these forts were armed with fairly big guns, their
importance and power of resistance have always been
insignificant when compared with those guarding the
Narrows. In this first group, too, there should be
included two forts, or batteries, which are situated
respectively about seven and a half miles and about
nine and a half miles from the southwestern extremity
of the Dardanelles. They are both placed close to the
water's edge.

(2) The forts in rear of, and near, Kilid Bahr, and
therefore on, or immediately below or above, the nar-

tSwC7 forts and Balteries

S.V.W.X.Y Beaches Where British landed
Dagh- Mountain. Tepe-Hill. HeigMs in feet

Southern Part of the Gallipoli Peninsula

From "Map Book of the World-Wide War," Thos. Nelson & Sons, Limited, London and Edinburgh

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN 227

rowest part of the Straits. These forts, which are
at least eleven in number, constitute by far the strong-
est portion of the defences of the Straits. Here the
shore literally bristles with redoubts, some being hidden
amongst the trees which cover the hills, whilst others
are dotted about right down to the water's edge.
Yildiz, or Tekeh Fort, which has always been consid-
ered one of the most important of these defences,
lies at the extreme outer end of the group, and a little
to the southwest of Kjlid Bahr. It owes its strength
to its height above the water, to its field of fire, and
to the consequent difficulty of damaging it from the
sea.

(3) The forts built to the north and northeast of
Maidos — forts which, therefore, lie within or above the
narrowest part of the channel. These defences, of
which there are six, are built upon the summits of the
various hills which border this part of the Straits.
They are so constructed as to be able to fire across
the channel towards Nagara Point, up the Dardanelles
in the direction of Gallipoli, and down the Straits
towards Chanak.

(4) The Bulair Lines. These defences run across
the Isthmus of Bulair, and thus defend the Peninsula
of Gallipoli from an attack by a force endeavouring
to advance from the land side. They consist of three
or four redoubts, connected by trenches constructed
to cover the only road running into the peninsula
from the remainder of European Turkey.

There is a great contrast between the two shores of
the Dardanelles. The Asiatic coast is for the most
part lower, and the appearance of the country is greener
and more fertile than that of the Peninsula of Gallipoli.

THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

Communication by land is also bad, but a passable
road connects Lamsaki (just opposite Gallipoli) with
Chanak, and thence runs on down the coast towards
the entrance of the Straits. The only centre of any
importance is Chanak or Dardanelles, situated oppo-
site Kilid Bahr, and united with that place by a sub-
marine cable, which was reported destroyed early in
the campaign. The town, which possesses a popu-
lation of some ten thousand people, is prettily located
on the water's edge. There is an anchorage for ships,
both below and above it, and prior to the War the little
bay immediately to the north of the village was usually
occupied by some of the ships which go to make up
the Turkish fleet. As a matter of fact, it was here
that Messudiyeh — which was the flagship of Admiral
Limpus until he left Constantinople prior to the out-
break of war — was torpedoed by the British submarine
B 11 in December, 1914. In connection with this
event, there are two interesting stories, so interesting
indeed that they would be unbelievable had I not
received them from entirely reliable sources. Ac-
cording to the first, when the vessel was struck, there
was a dull boom, and a high cloud of smoke and water
rose from the surface of the sea. Within ^yq minutes
she turned turtle, but as the water was shallow, a
section of the hull rested on the bottom whilst the
remainder projected above the sea. Nearly all the
crew were drowned, the only exceptions, as it was
thought at the time, being a few men who were picked
up. However, when the ship had settled down, bottom
upwards, knocks were heard on a part of the vessel
which was not under water. Men were set to work
to cut a hole, and after the rescuers had been engaged

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN 229

for three days and nights, twenty-three men were
got out ahve. The second anecdote gives an insight
into the mentahty of the Turks. Anxious to prove
that although Messudiyeh had been lost they had.
secured a prize of no mean importance : they rigged
up a motor boat to look like a submarine, and towed it
past the town of Chanak and up to Nagara Point in
order to make the inhabitants believe that the British
submarine, which in fact had made good its escape,
had been downed as a result of the vigilance of the
Ottoman defence.

Partly owing to their positions, situated generally
more or less upon the level of the sea, the defences of
the Asiatic coast are, from a natural point of view,
decidedly less strong than are those built upon the
Peninsula of Gallipoli. The Asiatic forts may, how-
ever, also be divided into three main or principal groups :

(1) The two forts built to protect the outer entrance
of the channel, which lie in the more or less immedi-
ate vicinity of Kum Kale. These forts were armed
with guns of a considerable size, but they have always
been considered, like those corresponding to them upon
the European shore, as a sort of advanced guard to
the main defences of the Straits. In this outer group,
too, there are three other forts, namely, those located
at and just to the southwest of Kephez Point.

(2) The forts at and near the town of Chanak, and
therefore on or near the narrowest part of the channel.
One of these, Hamidieh I Tabia, is placed rather under
a mile to the south of the town ; another, Hamidieh III
Tabia, lies at Chanak, and two more are located above
but within a distance of about one mile from the Nar-
rows themselves.

230 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

(3) The three forts built on or in the neighbourhood
of Nagara Point, and therefore at a distance of about
three and a half miles above the Narrows. These
forts occupy a very strong position, 'owing to the way
in which this cape and also Cape Abydos run out into
the channel, thus giving two of them good fields of fire
in more than one direction.

The above details are sufficient to prove the great-
ness of the task undertaken by the Allies at the Dar-
danelles. Throughout the last few years, especially
since the Turco-Italian and the Balkan wars, and
particularly since the entry of Turkey into this War,
the Turks and the Germans had made preparations
to defend an area which is of vital importance to them.
Moreover, the whole situation is such as to react al-
most entirely against belligerents who are compelled
to depend on the fire of ships and in favour of those
in occupation of the shores. The Dardanelles are so
narrow that throughout their greater part the power
of real manoeuvring is denied to all ships except those
of a very small size. For the same reasons — that is,
owing to the narrowness and to the winding nature
of the channel — the great guns on ships, the range
of which is many miles, cannot be utilised to the fullest
advantage. Again, the Turks were able to employ
all kinds of weapons which would have been valueless
had the range been greater. Mobile batteries of guns
and howitzers were placed in countless and secluded
valleys, in which it was difficult to discover their posi-
tion and to rain lead upon them from the sea. These
guns, having made their presence unpleasantly felt,
were moved by road or on railway lines to places of
safety even before our fire could be brought to bear

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN 231

upon them. The existence of these conditions was
extremely detrimental and dangerous, not only for
the smaller vessels endeavouring to penetrate the
Dardanelles, but also for the Allied troops on the Penin-
sula of Gallipoli, whose lines and positions could be
completely raked and enfiladed by fire from Asia
Minor.

The enemy was also able to make the fullest use of
mines, and to fire land torpedoes in the Dardanelles.
These latter weapons could either be sent on their way
from proper torpedo tubes, or by other methods of a
more impromptu nature. From the time of the arrival
of enemy submarines in the Aegean our difficulties
were enormously increased, for ships which might
otherwise have been employed to protect the flank
of our armies were open to the continuous danger of
being torpedoed. Again, the presence of these under-
water craft made it impracticable to utilise transports
and larger ships for the purpose of the conveyance of
troops to and from the peninsula. Reliance had
therefore to be placed upon all manner of smaller craft,
and the position of each and every new landing was
influenced by the difficulties and dangers of utilising
these smaller craft for a passage of more than a few brief
hours in length.

The extremely unfavourable position of a fleet de-
sirous of entering the Sea of Marmora thus rendered
it highly desirable that a land attack upon the forts
should have been inaugurated at the very beginning
of the operations. Such an attack, made by a force
landed on the northwestern coast of the Peninsula
of Gallipoli, where in places the shore is low and sandy,
would probably have been destined greatly to further

232 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

the task of the fleet. Indeed, an army once having
gained possession of the hills which lie in rear of Maidos
and Kilid Bahr and which command the forts, would
have been in control of the whole situation, for, from
various points on these hills, it is possible, as I have
done, to look down upon and into some of the European
redoubts of which we all heard so much during the
campaign.

The disembarkment of such a force, even quite at
the beginning of the operations and before the enemy
was fully prepared, would have been a matter of
considerable difficulty, especially as some years ago,
I believe in 1905 or in 1906, the Turks, in an endeavour
to guard against a surprise of this nature, built a small
lookout station on Gaba Tepe — a little promontory
situated on the western shore of the Peninsula of
Gallipoli and lying at a distance of about seven miles
to the northwest of Kilid Bahr. But having regard
to the fact that most of the forts were constructed
to fire only towards the Straits and to the enormous
importance of striking immediately from the land as
well as from the sea, that this was not attempted or,
more correctly, that it could not be attempted consti-
tutes the fatal and most far-reaching mistake made
at the Dardanelles. It meant, when land operations
were finally undertaken, that instead of these opera-
tions being of a subsidiary nature and instead of land-
ing parties threatening the rear of the forts whilst the
fleet was endeavouring to force a passage, a land
campaign of great magnitude had to be undertaken.
In other words, after April 25, 1915, the ever-increas-
ing interest in the Dardanelles operations was trans-
ferred from events on the sea to those on the land.

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN 233

where the Allied armies were called upon to fight a
series of great battles with the object of taking the
forts by means of siege operations instead of more or
less by surprise as might have been the case earlier in
the War.

Turning to the actual operations, into which I will
not go in detail, as whole books have been written upon
the subject, it may be said that the campaign was di-
vided into three stages :

(1) The original naval attack upon the Straits, which
began on February nineteenth. From that time on-
wards until the sinking of Bouvet, Irresistible, and
Ocean and the damaging of Inflexible and Gaulois on
March 18, a series of attacks were made upon the
forts by ships which entered the Dardanelles and by
others stationed in the Gulf of Saros. Queen Eliza-
beth and other vessels made use of indirect fire and
threw shells right over the Peninsula of Gallipoli.
Mine-sweeping operations were carried out, and certain
of the forts which defended the extreme southwestern
end of the Straits were practically, if not absolutely,
destroyed. The net results of these operations were
that indirect fire, even when employed with the assist-
ance of air observation, proved to be little more than
a waste of ammunition ; that the Dardanelles forts
were much stronger than seems to have been supposed ;
and that the Turks, by the use of mines, possessed a
deadly advantage, the magnitude of which it is im-
possible to exaggerate. .

The second stage is that connected with the landing
operations which began on Sunday, April 25, and with
the terrible fighting of the three months which followed
them. On that day landings were made at numerous

234 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

points at and near the extreme southwestern end of
the peninsula, and on the beach immediately to the
north of Gaba Tepe, afterwards known as Anzac
Beach. The general plan was that these two more or
less distinct forces, the one composed of a British Divi-
sion and the other made up of the Australian and New
Zealand contingents, were to work respectively up
and across the peninsula with the object of joining
hands and of sweeping right up and across the penin-
sula to the Narrows. During the whole of these three
months the forces landed at the southwestern end of
the peninsula were fighting for the possession of Achi
Baba, a height which attains an elevation of about
seven hundred feet above the sea level. This all-
important position, which extends practically from
sea to sea, not only dominates the whole area of country
lying to the southwest of it, but also forms the south-
western extremity of the line of hills which traverse
practically the whole length of the peninsula. Further
north the operations based on Anzac were practically
all undertaken with the object of endeavouring to cap-
ture the crests of Sari Bair and of Khoja Chemen Dagh,
both of which command this part of the peninsula,
and the latter of which attains an elevation of nine
hundred and fifty feet above the level of the sea.

The third stage in the campaign is that connected
with the Suvla Bay fighting, which began in August.
On the sixth of that month a large force was disem-
barked at Suvla Bay, located about five miles to the
north of the Anzac Beach. The plan of operations
was that this force should advance in an easterly
and southeasterly, whilst the Australasians pushed for-
ward in a northeasterly, direction towards Sari Bair and

I

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN 235

Chunuk Bair Ridges. Our overseas troops actually
seized the summits, but the new attack from the north
did not make the progress which was counted upon, and
it was not developed quickly enough. The result was
that it came to a standstill after an advance of some
two and one half miles, and that the Australasians
were compelled to withdraw from the positions which
they had actually seized. After the arrival of rein-
forcements on August 21 further attempts were made
to push forward in an easterly direction from the Anzac
and Suvla areas. Certain tactical features were
captured, but these last operations left things very
much as they were before August 21, and the net result
of the Suvla Bay landings was that we consolidated our
position and secured possession of a connected line
extending along a front of about twelve miles.

Before making a few general remarks upon the
Dardanelles campaign there are three questions worthy
of brief explanation. The first concerns the theory,
entertained in some quarters, that had the British
been prepared to make the necessary naval sacrifices
in February, they could have pushed through the Dar-
danelles then without even attempting to occupy and
to subjugate the Peninsula of Gallipoli. Militarily
unsound as this might have been, considering the fact
that the door could have been slammed behind such
ships and that their means of supply might therefore
have been cut off, there would have been at least a
good argument in favour of such an attempt had it
not been for the existence of Goehen in the Sea of
Marmora. The presence of that ship and of Breslau,
however, rendered the idea of such a raid — for it
only would have been a raid upon a large scale — worse

^36 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

than useless, for in view of the then strength of the
Allied fleets, that undertaking could have been haz-
arded only with at best second-class ships — ships
the power of which, had they even once entered the
Sea of Marmora, might well have been outmatched
by the Ottoman fleet, then augmented by a German
dreadnought and a fast cruiser.

The second criticism sometimes made by those who
are not au courant with the situation concerns the sug-
gestion that if the Peninsula of Gallipoli were so difficult
of occupation, it would have been better to undertake
land operations on the Asiatic instead of upon the
European side of the Straits. This suggestion is not
worthy of the attention which it would seem to merit
at first sight. To begin with, whilst the disembarka-
tion of troops and their advance across the northwestern
corner of Asia Minor would have been nearly as diffi-
cult as were the operations on the peninsula, the dis-
tance to be covered, as the crow flies, instead of only
amounting to six or seven miles from Anzac and to
about twelve from Cape Helles, would have been about
twenty -five miles. Moreover, owing to the topography
of the ground — the Gallipoli coast is much higher
than the Asiatic shore — and to the greater strength
of the European forts, once in possession of Chanak
and the neighbourhood, even then we should not
have been in a position safely and surely to dominate
the Straits and their surroundings.

We now come to the third and constantly repeated
suggestion that a landing at or near Bulair would have
been an enormous advantage to the Allies, because it
would have cut the Turkish communications and be-
cause the distance to be covered by an army landed at

The Rock-like Coast of the Gallipoli Peninsula

The buildings are in the outskirts of the town of Gallipoli, and the

Light House, on the right of the picture, may be said to mark the

northeastern end of the Dardanelles.

The Village of Bulair

From Photographs by the Author

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN 237

that point would have been less than elsewhere. Both
these suggestions are largely erroneous. In regard
to the first this is the case because, whilst communi-
cation with the Peninsula of Gallipoli is maintained to
some extent by land, it is principally carried on by sea.
It is true, however, as I have explained elsewhere,
that a good road runs from Uzun Kupru on the Con-
stantinople-A drianople railway to Gallipoli. This road
traverses the Isthmus of Bulair, following a line which
runs on its eastern or Dardanelles side. The road
was well within the range of the guns of ships lying
in the Gulf of Saros, but even so it could be utilised
with comparative safety at night. An Allied landing
might, therefore, have resulted in the occupation of
this road, but, if so, it would have had to be undertaken
by a very large force, for not only would the initial
disembarkation have had to be carried out in the
teeth of the fire of the big guns in the Bulair Lines,
but, once in occupation of the isthmus, such a force
would have been compelled to be prepared to meet
an attack delivered both by the Turkish army on the
peninsula and by troops endeavouring to come to its
assistance from the remainder of Turkey in Europe.
Moreover, even had we cut this line of communication
by an occupation of the territory in question, the
Turks would still have been able to send reinforce-
ments across the Straits from Chanak or elsewhere —
a route which they in fact did employ in order to sub-
stitute for the long and dangerous passage by way of
the Sea of Marmora, where British submarines were
operating, a passage of only thirteen or fourteen hun-
dred yards which could be covered in vessels so small
that they constituted a most difficult target for in-

238 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

direct fire, for bombardment from the air, or for sub-
marines. So far as the second point, that is to say,
the argument in regard to the desirabihty of attack-
ing the forts from the direction of Bulair be con-
cerned, sufficient be it to say that although that village
lies practically at the narrowest part of the peninsula,
the area in question is located about thirty miles to
the northeast of the Narrows and therefore of the
district the possession of which was vital to the Allied
cause.

After what may be described as the final failure of
the Suvla Bay attack at the end of August, 1915, the
Dardanelles campaign entered upon a new phase.
From that moment it became obvious that the Allies
would be compelled to give up the undertaking alto-
gether, to endeavour simply to maintain their posi-
tions upon the Peninsula of Gallipoli or to make the
preparations necessary for the despatch to and main-
tenance of a vast army in the northeastern corner of
the Mediterranean. Even now we do not know all
the various considerations which governed Allied policy
at that time. But it is certain that the entry of Bul-
garia into the War upon the side of the enemy in Octo-
ber, the continued neutrality of Roumania, and the
then attitude of Greece created an entirely new situa-
tion — a situation which in addition to other difficulties
led to our withdrawal from the Dardanelles in Decem-
ber, 1915, and January, 1916.

It would be useless to conceal the fact that that
withdrawal, which constituted an admission of failure,
must have resulted in a loss of Allied prestige through-
out the East, and particularly the Moslem East, where
even a necessary cutting of losses is not realised some-

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN 239

times to be the strongest policy. But having regard
to all the circumstances, there can be no doubt that
Sir Charles Monro, who had already then shown him-
self worthy of the highest confidence of the British
people, was correct when he said, soon after after he
took over the command, that the evacuation of Gallipoli
should be taken in hand at once. The position there
was unique in history. We held merely a fringe of
coast line, dominated from the hills occupied by the
Turks. Communications were insecure and difficult,
owing to the weather and to the fact that landing places
could be raked by the enemy's fire. Oflicers and men,
who could not, as in other theatres of war, be with-
drawn from the shell-swept area, had suffered seriously
from the consequent nerve strain and from diseases
which are so common in that part of the world. More-
over, had we merely held on to the ground already occu-
pied, or had we even endeavoured to push forward,
the number of Turks in future to be immobilised would
have been comparatively small, and the large pro-
portion of the Ottoman army would soon have been
left free for undertakings in Mesopotamia and against
Egypt. Consequently, as there was no longer any
hope of achieving a useful purpose by remaining on the
peninsula, it would have been worse than foolish to
continue to involve the British Empire in the appalling
cost resulting from an expedition possessed of every
military defect — an expedition from which no pos-
sible strategic or tactical advantages could at that
time be anticipated.

To summarise and to recapitulate, I think that in
order to review the Dardanelles operations in their
proper light, we must realise not only the mistakes

240 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

which were made but also the enormous diflSculties
which existed. True it is and true it will ever remain
that there was no military justification for the way
in which the campaign was conducted. It is now per-
fectly clear that those responsible did not recognise
the real strength of the defences ; for had they done so
they would have known that an attempt to force the
Straits without the assistance of an army landed upon
the Peninsula of Gallipoli was almost doomed to failure.
The net result of this mistake was that the original
attack upon the Dardanelles — an attack lasting on
and off for a month — so put the enemy upon his
guard and showed him the weak spots in his own de-
fence, that during a further ^ve weeks he had ample
opportunity to turn the whole peninsula into a veritable
entrenched camp. Again it is apparent that at the
time of and after the landings on April 25, the military
contingents available and the reinforcements sent out
were entirely inadequate. For example, the Twenty-
ninth Division, depleted by casualties suffered during
the original landing at the southwestern end of the
peninsula, was entirely unable to maintain the suc-
cesses which it originally achieved. The result was
that the Turks, who even then were not really pre-
pared, and who probably did not number more than
thirty thousand men on the peninsula itself, brought
up their reinforcements, large numbers of whom ar-
rived about a week later, and the Germans, who were
not at first present in great strength, had plenty of
time to put in an appearance and to take over the
complete direction of affairs in Gallipoli. Even subse-
quently, when large numbers of men were despatched to
the Mediterranean, with the exception of the August

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN 241

landings, the forces available were entirely insufficient
to insure success in an area which is more difficult
than any which I have visited during my travels in the
Near East.

To set against all this, if we are to do justice to those
responsible for this great effort, and it was a great
effort, we must visualise what was the then position in
Europe. The newly formed British army was not
ready, and the larger number of units then available
were urgently required in France. It was this state
of things which made Lord Kitchener demur and delay
in sending an expeditionary force to the Eastern Medi-
terranean. Under ordinary circumstances, therefore,
there can be no doubt that the War Cabinet should
have definitely abandoned the idea of an attack upon
the Dardanelles until their military member and ad-
viser — The Minister of War — was in a position to
provide a force and its reinforcements sufficient at
least to further the task of a fleet endeavouring to force
its way into the Sea of Marmora. But when the ques-
tion was already under discussion in January, 1915,
there came the communication from the Russian Gov-
ernment to which I have already referred. That
communication introduced a new element into the
position — an element which, though its importance
is often minimised, must, I consider, be held as having
been the deciding factor in the situation. The Rus-
sians, who had mobilised their forces much more
rapidly than was anticipated, and who had greatly
influenced the situation in Western Europe by their
advance into East Prussia early in the autumn of 1914,
appealed for our assistance. The British Govern-
ment had then two alternatives before it. It could,

242 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

and perhaps it should, have declared that it was not
and would not be in a position to make a demonstra-
tion against Turkey in the immediate future. Or it
could, as it did, consider that something must be
done in response to an appeal from an Ally who then
certainly seemed to be playing a prominent part in
the War. The adoption of the latter course may have
been ill advised, but as loyalty to Allies comes only
second to the necessity for the defeat of the enemy,
whatever our personal opinions may be, it would appear
that the Dardanelles campaign became a practical
if not an actual necessity.

So far as the main objective was concerned, that
campaign, in which British soldiers and sailors accom-
plished tasks the magnitude of which it is impossible
to realise unless one has been to Gallipoli, proved a
failure. But even so, looking at things in their true
perspective, and to some extent we are now able to
do this, as the operations were originally undertaken
in order to create a diversion in Turkey, it may be
said, without fear of contradiction, that a good deal
was accomplished. Thus a large Ottoman force
which would otherwise have been employed in the
Caucasus, against Egypt, or in Mesopotamia, was
certainly immobilised at Gallipoli. Moreover, it is
stated, though no evidence has been produced in support
of the theory, that the expedition had considerable in-
fluence upon the attitude of the Balkan States. This
latter contention may or may not be true, and the
question as to whether these supposed advantages
were or were not commensurate with the loss of valu-
able lives and treasure incurred must remain a matter
of opinion. In conclusion therefore let me say that

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN 243

the more one knows of the AlHed diflSculties existing
at that time and the more one has seen of the areas
in question, the less one is incHned to criticise, and
that where criticism is due, it is justified not so much
in regard to the actual undertaking of the campaign,
but rather as a result of the manner in which almost
insurmountable difficulties were underestimated by
those at home and on the spot.

X

THE RIDDLE OF .SALONICA

Although the original Allied landing at Salonica
took place during the early days of October, 1915,
the expedition which since then has been based upon
that port may really be considered as having followed
and to some extent resulted from the British lack of
success at the Dardanelles — a lack of success which
became evident directly after the failure of the Suvla
Bay operations. At about that time, too, the whole
position in Southeastern Europe obviously became
modified by the practical certainty that the enemy
would ere long undertake a great drive across Serbia,
by the probabihty that, unless she secured concessions
at the hands of tlie AUies, Bulgaria would throw in
her lot with the Central Powers, and by the new situa-
tion created in Greece resulting from the ' necessity
of that country either standing by or repudiating her
treaty obhgations with Serbia.

To consider in somewhat fuller detail the reasons
of the Salonica expedition, it may be said that whilst
a successful Dardanelles campaign would incidentally
have had the effect of counteracting and forestalling
the dangers of a German drive towards the East, the
Salonica operations were inaugurated with the definite
object of either preventing the establishment of through

244

THE RIDDLE OF SALONICA 245

connection between Central Europe and the Bosphorus,
or at least of threatening the enemy's hnes of communi-
cation were they once established. Thus, whereas the
occupation of Constantinople earlier in the War would
have definitely frustrated Germanic designs in the
East, an Anglo-French advance from Salonica to Nish
or even to Uskub would either have prevented a
successful penetration along the whole length of the
Belgrade-Constantinople railway or at least have so
threatened that railway that communication by way
of it would have continued insecure.

These were obviously the fundamental objects of
the Salonica expedition. But closely bound up and
connected with them were other objects, some of which,
if they were less directly military, are still almost if
not equally important. To begin with, if and when
Bulgaria entered the War upon the German side, it
was obvious that the Serbians, even had they been
supported by Greece, at once became powerless to
defend any large section of their country, and that
Bulgaria, acting in conjunction with the Central
Powers, would be in a position to overrun the whole
of the Western Balkans. Consequently, although the
Serbs, during the summer of 1915 had turned a deaf
ear to the advice of the Allies — advice which, had it
been taken at once, would probably have secured at
least the neutrality and perhaps even the support of
Bulgaria — it was almost impossible for sentimental
as well as for military reasons to leave to her fate a
little country whose army had fought most gallantly
during the opening months of the War. In addition,
as Greece claimed that Serbia was not then able to
provide the contingent (150,000 men) promised by her

240 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

under the Graeco-Serbian Treaty, she (Greece) would
have been more or less justified in refusing to come to
the assistance of her ally had England and France not
undertaken to do their best to furnish contingents to
take the place of that which was not available at the
hands of the Government of King Peter. And lastly,
once it was evident that the Austro-Bulgaro-Germanic
armies would be in a position to act as one force and
that the future policy of Greece was to hang in the
balance, it became advisable for the Allies to establish
and to maintain a pied-d-terre in the Balkans — a
pied-d-terre without which the whole peninsula would
have fallen into the hands of the enemy, and failing
which the then neutrals, Greece and Roumania, would
almost undoubtedly have thrown in their lot with the
Central Powers.

The unjustifiable optimists, who contended that we
should reach Nish or even Uskub before our enemies,
who believed that our arrival at Salonica would im-
mediately bring Greece into war on the Allied side,
and who thought that the Bulgarians would be easy
of defeat, were doomed to meet with disappointment.
But this does not justify their whole-hearted criticism
of our policy in the Balkans — a policy the framing
of which has been beset by difiiculties on every side.
Faults, grievous faults there have been, but these
faults are not bound up with what is stated in some
quarters to have been Allied influence in restraining
Serbia from attacking Bulgaria before the latter coun-
try's overt adhesion to the enemy cause, or with what
is sometimes argued to have been unjustifiable delay
in going to the Western Balkans. As I have already
said, even had we so advised Serbia, who in suggesting

THE RIDDLE OF SALONICA 247

an immediate attack by her against Bulgaria also in-
sisted upon the earher sending of an allied force to
Salonica, such would have been good advice, for the
Serbian position could not thus have been ameliorated.
In other words, as it was not feasible for the Allies to
undertake a Balkan expedition during the complicated
negotiations which were in progress in the summer of
1915, or to disembark in Greece without her consent
or without then infringing the neutrality of that coun-
try, the failure to save Serbia was not due to Allied
fault but to the strategic position of our enemies, to
their overwhelming strength, to the enormous geo-
graphical difficulties, and to the continued situation
in Greece — a situation the complications and the
effect of which it was impossible to foresee.

In the short space which is here available, it would
not be possible and I do not propose to try to go into
the details of all that has taken place in connection
with the Salonica operations since their original in-
auguration in October, 1915. My sole object, there-
fore, is to provide my readers with a description of the
country connected with these operations, to indicate
the enormous geographical difficulties which beset a
force based upon that port, and to outline very briefly
the three stages into which that campaign may be
said to have been divided. On account of the very
different nature of the country which has grown to
be called Macedonia and of its diverse peoples, nobody
who has ever travelled in that unhappy district is
able to consider it as a concrete whole. He thinks of
it as an area which is divided politically and geographi-
cally into water-tight compartments ; as a place in-
habited by diverse populations, and as a locality

248 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

possessed of well-defined routes, which constitute
natural if not adequately developed lines of communi-
cation. Consequently, if I seem to be disjointed in
my description, this is due not to any want of fore-
thought, but because I feel constrained to write of
what I have seen rather than to try to produce a
concise description of something which really does not
exist.

Bulgaria, against which the Allied expedition was to
operate, and especially Southwestern Bulgaria, is shut
off from the Aegean by a strip of Hellenic territory
annexed by Greece after the Balkan Wars. Measured
from the Vardar Valley on the west to the Graeco-
Bulgarian frontier on the east, it has a length of
about one hundred and fifteen miles. With an average
depth, from the Aegean on the south to the Rhodope
Balkans on the north, of about fifty miles, this district
contains the port of Kavala, the towns of Drama and
Demir Hissar and some of the best tobacco-growing
areas in the whole Balkan Peninsula. For these
reasons it is not only rich but also strategically im-
portant to both Greece and Bulgaria. On the west
of the Vardar, the territory added to Greece after the
Balkan Wars extends in the north up to the Moglena
Mountains and the Serbian frontier and on the west
to the Albanian boundary and the Adriatic. That
these two areas are part of Greece meant that, until
the attitude of the Hellenic Government became cer-
tain, the Allied position not only at Salonica and in
the immediate neighbourhood, but also in both the
above-mentioned districts was extremely complicated
and difficult.

The position of Salonica is favourable as a port be-

THE RIDDLE OF SALONICA 249

cause it is located about halfway along the European
coast of the Aegean, and because it occupies a fine
site at the head of a bay, measuring approximately
twelve and one half miles from northeast to southwest
— a bay connected with the sea by the Gulf of Salonica,
which has a length of nearly ninety miles. Both
shores of the gulf are mountainous. Mount Olympus
on the west attaining an elevation of nearly ten thou-
sand feet above the level of the sea. On the east the
bay is also flanked by hills which extend to the im-
mediate neighbourhood of the town, but on the west
the country is low and swampy. Throughout the
gulf there is deep water, but parts of the bay, through
which there is an adequate channel, are blocked by
mud brought down by the Galiko and Vardar. The
presence of this mud, which is constantly increasing
and moving, has for a result that the depth of the
water is always changing and that sections of the bay,
especially the northwestern corner, which within the
memory of living man were navigable for small boats,
are now almost entirely silted up.

Salonica harbour is of modern construction. It
consists of a quay measuring about four hundred and
forty yards long with moles of just over two hundred
yards long at each end. An island breakwater pro-
tects it, and ships enter by the southeastern opening.
Served by a railway and built to have twenty-four
feet of water, before the War it was impossible for
ships drawing more than at most twenty-two feet of
water to get alongside the quays. Further deepening
beyond twenty-four feet was difficult, owing to the
fact that the foundations were upon mud. Enlarge-
ment of this basin, which in ordinary times only pro-

250 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

vides accommodation for at most eight ships of any
size, has often been under discussion, but prior to the
War it was never attempted; for, whilst the expense
of dredging and digging on the northwest was pro-
hibitive, an extension to the southeast was thought
to be detrimental to the sites occupied by the best
buildings in the city. The result of the inadequacy
of the accommodation and of the high dock dues was
that, before the War, many ships never entered the
harbour and discharged their passengers whilst lying
out in the bay. The quays running from the harbour
to the White Tower are available for small craft and
barges, but owing to the south wind, which always
springs up in the afternoon, and to the then choppy
state of the water, their utility is considerably minimised.
The town of Salonica occupies a magnificent position
at the head of the bay. Rising from the water's edge
and built in a horseshoe shape on the slopes of the
hills, prior to the recent fire it was extremely pictur-
esque. But with the exception of the comparatively
new street, which runs along the quay from the har-
bour on the northwest to the residential quarter on
the southeast, the city was dirty and squalid, and its
thoroughfares were narrow and winding. Indeed, the
outstanding impression left upon one's mind was that
the town constituted something isolated, something
different from that which exists elsewhere in Europe.
In one sense it seemed to be completely modern,
materialistic, and vulgar, whilst in another it had
the appearance of being a sort of relic of the past.
This may be accounted for partly by the fact that
the nature of the population of Salonica is something
quite unique. Out of a total of about one hundred

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THE RIDDLE OF SALONICA 251

and twenty-five thousand souls roughly seventy-five
thousand are Jews. These Jews, who are the de-
scendants of those expelled from Spain by Ferdinand
and Isabella, control the business of the city and
surpass the Greeks in their commercial ability and
also in society. Besides these Hebrews there are
about fifteen thousand Dounmes — a sect the real
beliefs of whom are not properly known to the outer
world. Distrusted by both Jews and Mohammedans,
they live a life apart and never marry with the outer
world. It is from among their number that the
Young Turks recruited some of the ablest members
of the Committee of Union and Progress. The re-
mainder of the population is made up of about twenty-
five thousand Greeks, five thousand Turks, four
thousand Bulgars, and of a European colony, all of
whom, so to speak, exist as a result of the sufferance
of the Jews, who dominate everything from the most
menial work to that of banking. It was partly owing
to the Oriental plan of the city and partly as a conse-
quence of the houses being built largely of wood and
mud and of there having been no rain for three months,
that the fire of August, 1917, which was probably due
to incendiary causes, did such terrible damage. In-
deed, such was that damage, that half the area inside
the ancient walls, which still encompass a great part
of the business area of the town, including all the
more important stores, hotels, and banks, was de-
stroyed, thereby leaving approximately sixty thou-
sand of the inhabitants homeless and destitute, and
therefore dependent upon the Allies either for subsist-
ence in Salonica or for means of transportation to areas
where they could start life at least temporarily anew.

252 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

Before discussing the geography of this part of the
Balkans, a few words should be said about the climate
of this area of Europe. Partly owing to its enclosed
position, the heat in Salonica itself is intense during
June, July, August, and the first part of September,
after which the atmosphere is cooled by the heavy
rain which invariably falls between the tenth and
fifteenth of that month. The heat, which is mitigated
by the fresh sea breeze which always blows in the
afternoon, is particularly trying at night, and mos-
quitoes are so numerous that, in many parts of the
town, it is advisable to sleep under nets almost through-
out the year. In spite of this, unlike Constantinople
and Athens, there is no summer resort, and the inhabit-
ants therefore remain in the city throughout the year.
The first winter spent by the Allies at Salonica was an
unusually severe one ; for, whilst it is generally wet in
January and February, there is seldom a heavy fall
of snow in the city itself. In the interior where the
heat in the valleys is very intense, the climate, and
particularly the temperature at night, naturally de-
pends upon the elevation of the district in question.
In winter snow is prevalent in the hills, and traffic
on many of the roads is often entirely stopped by
it and by the immense amount of water brought
down from the mountains at the time of the spring
thaw.

The geographical relations of Salonica with the in-
terior and the whole of the military operations which
are based upon that port are governed largely by the
presence of the Vardar Valley and River which flows
into the sea at a distance of about twelve miles to the
southwest of the town. It divides East from West

THE RIDDLE OF SALONICA 253

and forms with the valley of the Morava the great
highroad from north to south across the peninsula,
and makes Salonica the natural point of entry into
and exit from a large area of the Western Balkans.
Indeed the importance of the valley and of the port
are interdependent, and it is for this reason that
Salonica and its surroundings ought either to belong
to the owners of the hinterland, or that the hinter-
land ought to be annexed by the owners of the port.
It is this, together with the fact that Salonica is a
good starting point for various routes and roads into
the interior, which have always made its collecting
and distributing radii very wide. Thus so long ago
as the Great War, when Napoleon closed the accus-
tomed routes into Germany, the port of Salonica
formed one of the new channels of commerce — com-
merce carried into the heart of the interior by three
more or less independent routes. The first of these
ran up the Vardar Valley and through Bosnia. The
second went by Seres, the Struma Valley, Sofia, and
Vidin and thus through Hungary and Budapest to
Vienna. The third deviated from the second at Sofia,
turning in a northwesterly direction and continuing
its course into the heart of Europe by way of Nish
and Belgrade and along the present great trunk route
from east to west.

In order to make my description of the geography
of the country and of the military operations more
clear, I am going to base it almost entirely upon this
division of country formed by the Vardar. Thus,
although the actual valley of that river can hardly
be said to extend much to the south of the Serbo-
Greek frontier, it is convenient to consider even the

254 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

area closely surrounding Salonica in its bearing to
that river. On the west bank, and on both banks in
the immediate vicinity of its mouths and of the mouth
of the torrential Galiko, the country is marshy, inter-
sected by small streams and dikes, and covered largely
by reeds. This area is therefore practically impassable
especially in wet weather, and after the melting of the
snows when the volume of every important Balkan
river is so enormously increased. The same kind of
country, growing gradually drier and less marshy as
one gets away from the river and its mouths, extends
as far as Yenidje Vardar — a village situated on the
road to Vodena, and at the foot of the Pajak Planina.
To the north and northeast of that place as far as
Karasulu, and particularly between there and the
frontier, there are hills the slopes of which approach
nearer and nearer to the right bank of the Vardar.

On the east or left bank of the river the whole
character of the country is different, for in general
it is hilly if not mountainous. Even between the
railways, to which I will refer in greater detail below,
there are summits which attain elevations of well
over one thousand feet above the level of the sea.
On the east of the Salonica-Doiran line, and par-
ticularly on the east and southeast of the River Galiko,
the whole area is mountainous as far as the Valley of
the Struma on the east and right down into the Chalkis
Peninsula on the south. Here are detached mountains
and groups of mountains, such as the Krusha Balkan
and the Beshik Dagh which respectively attain eleva-
tions of about three thousand feet and of nearly
three thousand five hundred feet above the sea.
Large parts of this area, which has always been very

THE RIDDLE OF SALONICA ^5

inaccessible from the outer world, are covered with
oak scrub. The population is mixed, but with the
exception of the Chalkis Peninsula, where the Greeks
predominate, it is largely made up of Turks.

A line of hills and positions, immediately defending
Salonica on the northeast, east, and southeast, runs
from the Galiko River along the Duad Baba and
Derbend Hills to the Hortach Dagh, located at a
distance of about nine miles to the east of the port.
From this mountain group the obvious line of defence
for Salonica turns in an easterly direction and runs
across the Chalkis Peninsula in rear of Lakes Langaza
and Beshik. This position, which in certain ways
resembles that occupied by the Chatalja Lines out-
side Constantinople, is one of very considerable natural
strength, for its front is almost entirely protected by
the above-mentioned lakes and by the swamps which
lie between and to the east of them. Moreover, the
Hortach Dagh, with an elevation of over three thou-
sand five hundred feet above the sea, and the Kolo-
monda Dagh, which is nearly as high, command and
dominate the whole of the country which lies to the
north and northeast of them.

In regard to the communications available in these
areas, for obvious reasons it is impossible to do more
than to indicate those which existed prior to the
arrival of the Allies. On the west of the Vardar
sufficient therefore be it to say that over and above
the road and railway to Monastir, the country is so
marshy and difficult that there are few, if any, routes
which are worthy of our attention here. The centre
of the position is well served, for it is possessed of the
Vardar Valley line and of the Salonica Junction Rail-

256 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

way, which are entirely independent of one another
throughout their length. To make matters better,
these two lines are joined by a branch which runs
from Karasulu on the former to Kilindir on the latter
railway. Before the War these were all single lines,
but there can be no doubt that since the Allied occu-
pation they have been doubled at least for part of
their length and that they have been supplemented
by other railways leading to various parts of the
Allied front.

Prior to the international occupation of Salonica
only two so-called roads united that place with the
hinterland situated to the northeast and southeast.
The first ran from Salonica to Seres and thence north-
wards to Demir Hissar and into the Struma Valley.
This road crosses the northern end of the Beshik Dagh
by a pass, the highest point of which is just over
two thousand feet above the level of the sea, and the
River Struma by a bridge at Hadrie. This route was
nominally passable for wheeled traflfic, but long after
the Greek annexation its condition was such as to
render it quite unfit for ordinary motors. The second
road ran in a southeasterly direction from Salonica
towards and into the Chalkis Peninsula. Its condi-
tion was extremely bad, and it was not passable for
vehicles for more than a few miles beyond the borders
of the city. As in the case of the railways since the
international occupation, there can be no doubt that
the Allies have greatly improved these two roads,
especially the latter, and that they have constructed
numerous routes leading towards and up to the posi-
tions which they have occupied.

Turning to a discussion of the more distant hinter-

THE RIDDLE OF SALONICA 257

land of Salonica, the country is made up of three
distinct areas — the Vardar Valley district and the
districts respectively situated to the east and west
of it. The Vardar Valley is the most important
existing line of communication in all Macedonia.
With an approximate length of one hundred and
fifty miles, if measured from Salonica to Uskub, large
parts of it are so gorge-like that for some miles, in
the neighbourhood and to the north of the Graeco-
Serbian frontier, it is not followed by a road, and
only by a railway upon which traffic is therefore
entirely dependent. That railway may be said to
enter the actual valley near Karasulu Junction. From
there as far as Kuprulu, and therefore for a distance of
about seventy-seven miles, the valley is so narrow,
except at one point, that the line crosses and re-crosses
the river three times. Leaving the Vardar at Uskub
it passes through Komanovo and crosses an area made
up of bare uncultivated hills subsequently to enter
the Valley of the Morava near the old Serbo-Turkish
frontier.

During recent years this line has become of great
commercial and military importance. Prior and sub-
sequent to the Balkan Wars, it was used by Serbia
(under an arrangement first with Turkey and then
with Greece) as her principal route to the coast, and
special quays, warehouses, etc., were allotted to her
at Salonica — quays and warehouses which were
practically ex-territorial — for her merchandise and
live stock. Between August, 1914, and October,
1915, the significance of the Vardar line became enor-
mous because it was by way of it alone that Serbia was
able effectively to communicate with the sea. After

258 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

our arrival at Salonica, it was by this route that we
endeavoured to go to the assistance of Serbia and to
force our way into the heart of that country. The
valley and the line were, however, easy of attack,
and are easy of defence by Bulgaria because of the
numerous gorges, and because they run more or less
parallel to and at no great distance from the frontier
of that country — a frontier which approaches to
within about five miles of it on the northeast of the
station of Strumnitza.

To the east of the Vardar Valley the principal
feature affecting the relations of Salonica to the in-
terior and governing the direction of an advance from
the Aegean coast into the heart of old Bulgaria are
the Rhodope Balkans. That range is, however, so
to speak, skirted and partially avoided by one or two
routes extending from the Vardar Valley towards
and across the Bulgarian frontier — lines which though
influenced by the Rhodopes and their off-shoots do
not actually penetrate that range. Between the
Graeco-Serbian frontier and Uskub two roads run
toward the Struma Valley. Though prior to the out-
break of the War they were in bad condition, both
have undoubtedly been improved by the Bulgarians
since their advance into Macedonia. But the most
important road, running in an easterly direction from
the Vardar Valley, is that which connects Komanovo,
situated a few miles to the north of Uskub, with
Gyuveshevo — a road already fully described elsewhere.

Turn to the Rhodopes themselves, the western
and central sections of which, known respectively as
the Dospat Dagh and the Kara Balkan, form one
more or less continuous line. But to the east of the

THE RIDDLE OF SALONICA ^9

Kara Balkan this line practically divides into two
long off-shoots which enclose the valley of the Arda,
the northern branch following the old Bulgarian
frontier and the southern arm skirting the plain ad-
jacent to the sea. Practically no important rivers
drain the range towards the south, for ignoring the
Struma, the principal is the Mesta, which enters the
Aegean about thirty miles to the east of Kavala.
Leaving on one side the Maritza, the largest rivers
which flow towards the north and east are the Krishim
and the Arda, the waters of which latter are augmented
by those of the Seugudlu River and the Burgas Chai.

Li order to penetrate the Rhodopes from the south
it would be necessary either to approach and to occupy
the plain which borders the Aegean from the west,
and therefore from the direction of Salonica, or to
effect fresh landings somewhere along the coast, be-
tween that port and Dede Agatch, which is located
just to the west of the mouth of the Maritza. The
former operation would be dangerous and require a
large force, for it would entail an advance by way of
the Salonica-Dede Agatch Railway which runs prac-
tically parallel to the real front of the enemy — a
front which in case of such an Allied attempt he would
undoubtedly establish more or less along the line of
the Rhodopes. Fresh landings on the other hand
would not only be beset by the heavy losses and the
enormous difficulties which always go with such under-
takings in hostile country, but they would also be
accompanied by dangers due to the fact that, except
at Kavala, which has now no doubt been strongly
fortified by the enemy, good landing places are not
available.

260 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

We now come to the section of country located on
the west of the Vardar Valley, and lying more or less
between Salonica and Monastir or between the former
town and the southern part of the Albanian frontier.
The geographical and other conditions prevailing here
were and are in some ways more and in some ways
less favourable to the Allies than are those existing
on the other side of the Vardar. On the one hand,
whilst there are the Moglena and other mountains
on the Graeco-Serbian frontier and whilst the country
to the north and northeast of Monastir is very difficult,
there are no barriers lying to the south and southeast
of that town which compare in their strength to the
Rhodopes. Moreover, Salonica is connected with
Monastir by a road and a railway. The road, which
is passable for motors, approximately follows the
railway, but it avoids two great detours made by the
line. The railway crosses the plain to Veria, where,
at the southern point of its first bend, it begins to
enter the hills. No serious gradients are, however,
encountered until it reaches Vodena. This railway is
of very great importance, not only because it gives
access to Monastir, but because it runs more or less
parallel to and therefore serves the Allied front.

So much for the favourable conditions in this area.
From the opposite point of view it was here, during
the period of her uncertainty, that the attitude of
Greece so greatly complicated the Allied plan of cam-
paign. On the east of the Vardar and in the Greek
district enclosed by that river, the Rhodopes, the
Bulgarian frontier, and the Aegean, there was the
danger that the Greek forces stationed there would,
as they did, make no effort to resist an enemy advance.

THE RIDDLE OF SALONICA 261

But their strength was known, and the sacrifice of
that territory was not vital to the whole Allied posi-
tion. Not so, however, with the area to the south
of Monastir and to the west of Salonica. There the
distribution of the Hellenic Kingdom is such that,
had King Constantine thrown in his lot with the
enemy, he was in a position so favourable as to enable
him to jeopardize the entire British and French plan.
During the earlier stages of the campaign, in addition
to the facts that the Allies could not know when and
how far the Greeks would allow the enemy to advance
into Hellenic territory, that their position was always
endangered by the presence of spies, whose movements
and actions they could not control, they were also
face to face with the ever-present danger of an attack
upon their left rear delivered from the Greek army,
the fighting value of which was uncertain, by routes
particularly suitable for that purpose. The railway
from Larissa meets the Salonica-Monastir Line at
Gidia, roads run up from the south to Veria, to Lake
Ostrovo, and to Fiorina. It was these dangers and
particularly that connected with the left rear of the
Allied front at Salonica — dangers to meet which no
adequate or open precautions could at first be taken
— which made political events, or more correctly the
Allied handling of political events in the Greek capital,
matters possessed of such immense influence upon the
Salonica campaign.

To consider very briefly the three stages into which
the actual military operations have been divided it
may be said that the first was connected with the
original Anglo-French attempts to force their way
into the interior and to reach Nish or Uskub or at

THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

least to prevent the complete conquest of Serbia.
These endeavours began as soon as sufficient Allied
troops had been disembarked to render possible an
advance into the interior. The French, on the left,
pushed forward up the Vardar Valley and to the
west of it and towards the Babuna Pass. The British
on the right moved forward to the north of Lake
Doiran. The Serbian retreat on the one hand and
the Bulgarian advance on the other were, however,
so rapid that the Allies, unable to effect a junction
with the Serbs, were compelled to withdraw to Greek
territory and to the immediate vicinity of Salonica,
where for months they occupied more or less the
positions which I have already indicated as constituting
the natural defensive line of the port.

The second stage in the campaign lasted from De-
cember, 1915, until the following September. During
it the Allies remained practically entirely on the de-
fensive, occupying themselves with the improvement
of their communications and with the political situa-
tion in Greece. It was during this stage, however,
that the western part of the district lying between
the Rhodope Balkans and the sea, and particularly
the area in the vicinity of both banks of the Struma,
figured prominently in the campaign. In January,"
the Allies destroyed the Great Bridge across the
Struma near Demir Hissar, later demolishing others
located in the neighbourhood of Seres. Subsequently
and in May, the Greeks handed over to the enemy
Fort Rupel — a position which so to speak constitutes
the key to the entrance of the Struma Valley. As a
consequence of this, the Bulgarians were able, during
the summer, to advance towards the sea, finally occupy-

THE RIDDLE OF SALONICA 263

ing Kavala, the bulk of the garrison of which place
surrendered without any resistance in September.
The then Greek Government repudiated the conduct
of its commander at Kavala, but the greater part of
the Army Corps in question was transported to Ger-
many as the "guests" of the German Government.
It was therefore evident that even if the then Greek
Premier — Mr. Zaimis — was not himself responsible,
there were influences at work which proved that the
attitude of the Hellenic Government was far from
reliable. About the same time General Milne — the
British commander — pushed forward across the
Struma, thereby making an effective demonstration
in force with the object of attracting and immobilising
Bulgarian forces which would otherwise have been
available for the defence of the area on the west of
the Vardar. Subsequently, however, owing to the
difficulty of the ground, to the floods of the Struma,
and to the strength of the enemy, the British were
unable to undertake any extended operations in this
area, and they withdrew to the west of the Struma
and to areas which are more easily defensible and in
which the climate is better than that of the swamps
which border upon the river.

The third stage in the campaign began with the
Allied push in the direction of Monastir in the late
summer of 1916. I have said sufficient already to
prove that that city is so situated and that the com-
munications passing through it are such that the place
is of considerable military importance. But its political
significance and meaning are even more far-reaching.
For years the possession of the city has been coveted
by the Bulgarians, the Greeks, and the Serbians, and

264 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

for years it has been a centre in which Bulgarian, Greek,
and, to a lesser extent, Serbian propaganda has been
in full swing. The fact that prior to the Balkan Wars
the largest element of the population was either Bul-
garian or Greek partly accounted for the Serbian desire
to capture the city during the first Balkan campaign.
The same fact was in part responsible for the second
war — a war which left in the heart of every Bul-
garian an outstanding longing to recapture the city
at the earliest possible opportunity. It was really
this longing which brought Bulgaria into the War
against Serbia — a longing which was temporarily
gratified when it fell into the hands of the enemy soon
after Bulgaria threw in her lot with the Central Powers.

When it became obvious, during the early autumn
of 1916, that we could not advance either across the
Rhodope Balkans or by way of the Vardar Valley,
over and above the fact that except for the Greek
danger, a campaign in the direction of Monastir was
by way of the line of least resistance, there was there-
fore the additional object of recapturing from Bulgaria
her most coveted and cherished war gain, and of restor-
ing to Serbia a city, for the possession of which she had
already fought two wars. Consequently it was these
factors which led to the developments which began
at the end of August, 1916.

Up to that time the Bulgarians, who had been
gradually advancing from Monastir, had reached the
northern shores of Lake Ostrovo, where there was
severe fighting. The Allied advance was inaugurated
early in September, the French and Russians on the
left moving on Fiorina, the Serbians under General
Mishitch advancing from the line Vodena-Lake Ostrovo

THE RIDDLE OF SALONICA 265

against the Moglena Ridge, topped as it is by Mount
Kaimakchalan which rises to an elevation of nearly
eight thousand feet above the level of the sea. After
approximately a fortnight's fighting, the Franco-
Russian forces took Fiorina and reached the southern
entrance to the Monastir Plain, whilst the Serbs
stormed Kaimakchalan, thereby reconquering a corner
of their former territory. Thenceforth the plan was
that the left of the Allied line was to demonstrate and
to hold the enemy first on his defensive line, running
north of Fiorina and south of the frontier, and then
on the Kenali front, whilst the Serbs outflanked these
positions by advancing across the River Tcherna and
took the hills in the Tcherna Bend. Mishitch's first
big attack failed, but a few days later he pushed his
way well into this most difficult country. For the
ensuing month (October 21 till November 19) the
weather was extremely bad, but the Serbian Com-
mander-in-Chief held his ground against repeated
counter attacks, and by the middle of November
had advanced to positions from which the Kenali
line was so hopelessly outflanked that the Bulgarians
retired from it to the River Bistritza, which runs
east and west at a distance of only some four miles
from Monastir. A few days afterwards, and early
in the morning of Sunday, the nineteenth, the Franco-
Russian forces entered Monastir, followed a few hours
later by the Serbians, who crossed the Tcherna. Thus,
largely due to the skill of General Mishitch and to the
intense bravery of the Serbians, who had to advance
over by far the most difficult area of country, and
who were responsible for the taking of Kaimakchalan
and the Tcherna Bend, Monastir fell into the hands

THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

of the Allies on the fourth anniversary of its conquest
by the Serbians during the first Balkan war.

The capture of what may almost be described as
the capital of Macedonia was important both politically
and militarily. Over and above the reasons already
given, this is the case because the city would be a good
jumping-off ground were it decided to increase the
forces at Salonica in such a way as to enable them to
deliver a determined blow in the Balkans. Thus from
Monastir there run routes into Albania and into
Western Serbia and also a road — if not now a rail-
way — through Prilep and the Babuna Pass to Ku-
prulu. Moreover the Allied advance in Western Mace-
donia was responsible for bringing about the junction
of the Salonica forces with those of Italy based upon
the Adriatic, and therefore for enabling that country
to further the Allied cause in this area. The Italians,
having occupied Avlona in December, 1914, subse-
quently extended their sphere of control roughly as
far as the River Viosa, and later on, as I have shown
elsewhere, established connection with the Salonica
army. No full details are available concerning the
work and difficulties of this Italian force, but its original
presence and particularly the fact that it now prolongs
the Allied line from the neighbourhood of Cologna
near which place the French left rests, to the Adriatic
has been and is of great importance. Had it not been
for this expedition on the east of the Adriatic, during
the regime of King Constantine, the dangers of the
enemy's pushing forward through Albania and Greece
and therefore of his out-flanking the Allies, and of
the junction of Bulgaro-Germanic forces with regular
and irregular Hellenic contingents would have been

THE RIDDLE OF SALONICA 267

even greater than they were. Equally well, the fact
that Italy now holds Southern Albania does a good deal
to strengthen our strategic position in the Near East
— a strategic position which has its direct as well
as its indirect influence upon the War.

Since the late autumn of 1916, whilst there has been
occasional and intermittent fighting, there have been
no far-reaching changes in the Salonica battle front.
Starting from a point on the Adriatic situated a few
miles to the north of Avlona, our line now extends
roughly across Albania in such a way as to leave Berat
to the enemy and Korcha to the Allies. After passing
round the north of Monastir, it runs in an almost due
easterly direction to Lake Doiran where it soon turns
southeast, approaching the Aegean near and pre-
sumably on the west of the mouth of the Struma.
This means that the Allies now hold approximately
one quarter of Albania, that they are in possession
of the extreme southern corner of Serbia, and that
only the northeastern section of New Greece is in
the hands of the enemy.

The foregoing remarks will be sufficient to prove
that the Salonica campaign is quite unlike, and that
the country is far more difficult than anything else in
Europe, except perhaps that on the Italian front.
With the exception of the plain lying to the west of
the town and of the one which borders upon the Aegean,
almost the whole of Macedonia is made up of moun-
tains or disjointed rocky hills. The winding valleys
which often narrow down to mere gorges are shut in
by sloping hills so forbidding that advance across
them seems to be well-nigh impossible. In other
districts, which are somewhat more open, there is

268 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

hardly a single locality where a forward movement is
not rendered extremely arduous by the existence of
defensive positions, the merits of which it is impossi-
ble to exaggerate. When the Allies went to Salonica,
the whole of the railways were single lines, built not
for the purpose of heavy and numerous trains, but
simply to meet the requirements of the very meagre
traffic of peace time. The gradients are steep, the
curves are sharp, and the passing places were few and
far between. Many of the railways and especially
the Vardar and the Salonica Junction lines pass
through defiles and over numerous bridges which are
easily defensible by an enemy in possession of the hills
which command the valleys of the Vardar and of the
Mesta. With the exception of very few roads, the
paths consisted of the merest tracks strewn with rocky
stones so numerous that one had to ride, to stumble, or
to clamber along them as best one might. The native
bridges were so narrow, so shaky, and so steep, that
one crossed them only at the greatest risk. Moreover
the winter rains and snows, which in the mountains
are very heavy, make the roads — where roads exist
— and the fords well-nigh, if not quite, impossible.

This all means, except where the country has been
occupied for some time and where the methods of
communication have been improved, that the utility
of motor vehicles, transport waggons, and big guns
upon which a modern army depends, is greatly mini-
mised, and that special transport and mountain guns
must be provided for service upon the numerous
tracks which are not passable for wheeled traffic.
The drought of the summer, which makes water,
except in the actual valleys, a difficulty for travellers.

THE RIDDLE OF SALONICA 269

places upon the supply sections of the army a burden
the magnitude of which it is difficult to exaggerate.
And lastly the climatic and other conditions are such
that it was and is impossible to expect that the health
of the troops engaged would or will be comparable
to that of those fighting in more healthy theatres of
war — theatres in which, when contingents are with-
drawn for rest, measures can be taken, in a way im-
possible at Salonica, to insure the counteraction of
what must always be hard and arduous fighting at the
actual front.

These are some of the factors which make it im-
possible to exaggerate the military difficulties sur-
rounding the conduct of a campaign in this part of
the Balkan Peninsula — difficulties which when coupled
with the central and therefore strategically strong
position of Bulgaria and with the effects of the earlier
attitude of Greece are responsible for the original
Allied failure to advance into the interior of Serbia
and for our subsequent inability in any way seriously
to defeat the army of King Ferdinand or to threaten
the enemy's line of communications by way of the
Belgrade-Constantinople Railway. But if we admit,
as we must admit, that the Salonica campaign, like
the operations at the Dardanelles, has not accom-
plished its primary objects, the undertaking has served
and is serving certain purposes in the War. It has
demonstrated the Anglo-French desire to come to the
support of Serbia. Moreover, what is much more
important, the existence of the Salonica expedition
was probably at least partially responsible for pre-
venting Greece from entering the War upon the side
of the enemy, and its presence certainly prevented

270 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

the still further success of the secret intrigues and
propaganda carried out in that country by German
agents during the regime of King Constantine. These
results, when coupled with the fact that England and
France, two of the Protecting Powers of Greece, have
been able to defend the greater part of that country
from invasion and thus to carry out their treaty obli-
gations, are of significance; for, whilst the fighting
value of the Hellenic army is not of any great im-
portance to either group of belligerents, the unhindered
and unhampered use of all the Greek ports, harbours,
and bays, by enemy submarines, would have carried
with it danger to the whole Allied position in the East
— danger so great that it cannot be estimated here.
For these reasons and for many others, among them
the fact that the Allies have maintained a foothold
in the Balkans, the Salonica campaign will be possessed
of a historical interest and importance the true mean-
ing of which may not become apparent before or even
immediately after the final termination of hostilities.

o lOo zoo

390 Miles
■..TTT..^ Proposed.

Railways open«_» Projected^.
The Bagdad Railway and its Tributaries

From a map T>repare(l by Tlio Royal Qeorraphical Society

»

XI

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR

My object in this chapter is to examine the impor-
tance of the Bagdad Railway and its tributaries in the
War and to give a brief outhne of the political and
geographical conditions which have influenced the
construction of these lines. So far as the first of these
points be concerned, it must be obvious to any reader
who makes the most superficial study of the subject,
that this railway, together with the main route across
the Balkans, constitute the great line of Germanic
communication from west to east, and that the Bag-
dad Railway alone is, so to speak, the backbone of
Turkish utility and power in the War. Thus were it
not for its existence, the Ottoman resistance in Mesopo-
tamia and in Syria could have been discounted as a
practical consideration in the War, and the sending of
Turkish reinforcements to the Caucasus would have
been even more materially delayed than has in fact
been the case.

That these facilities were intended by Germany to
be the war conditions in case of an outbreak of hostili-
ties with England was natural and obvious, in fact so
natural and so obvious that had the enemy ignored
the precaution of preparation in Turkey, it would
have meant the pursuit of a policy which certainly

272 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

was not adopted by him elsewhere. Indeed to those
who have travelled in the East, and who have watched
the gradual development of the Pan-German scheme
there, it was always markedly apparent that the
objects of the Bagdad Railway were military rather
than commercial. Were any proof of this required
it is provided, as I shall endeavour to show below, by
the facts that the Government of the Kaiser insisted
upon a railway from the Bosphorus and not from the
Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, and that it objected,
when a modification of the original route was proposed,
to the suggestion that the line should pass through
Alexandretta and therefore absolutely along the sea-
shore, at the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean,
instead of, as it now does, never coming within a dis-
tance of about ten miles of the coast.

The present Bagdad line is by no means the first
that has been under consideration. The idea of
connecting the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf
by an overland route, and therefore of shortening the
journey round the Cape or across the Isthmus of Suez,
was first suggested about the year 1835. Under dis-
cussion for many years, the original plan — a plan
largely based upon the detailed survey made by Colonel
Chesney in 1835-1837 — was to avoid Asia Minor
altogether, and to start the proposed railway not from
the Bosphorus but from some point on the Eastern
Mediterranean. One proposal was for a railway from
Alexandretta via Aleppo to the Euphrates and thence
down the right bank of that river to Koweit; or, for
a line starting from the same point, but crossing the
Euphrates near Belis and subsequently following
either the left bank of that river or the right bank of

1

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR 273

the Tigris to Bagdad and thence to the Gulf. Another
idea was a hne from TripoH or Beirut through the
desert via Palmyra to the Euphrates, and thence
down the valley of that river to the sea. A third
suggestion, about which but little is known, was to
connect Ismailia with Koweit by a line which would
have run practically due east and west.

Negotiations and pourparlers on the merits of these
various lines were in progress for many years, a com-
pany being formed for the purpose of realising Colonel
Chesney's plan in the early fifties. This company being
unable to raise the necessary funds, and the British
Government having refused its support to the scheme
in 1857, the question lapsed until 1872, when it was
referred to a Parliamentary Commission, which ap-
proved of the construction of a line by the route advo-
cated by Colonel Chesney. Subsequently, however,
the idea was dropped in favour of one by which early
in 1876 England purchased shares to the value of
£4,000,000 in the Suez Canal, which had been open
to traffic since 1869.

From this time onwards two reasons gradually led
up to the idea of connecting not the Mediterranean
but the Bosphorus with the Persian Gulf. The first
of these was that, whilst in earlier times there was no
railway nearer than Brindisi on the overland route
to India, from the opening of the through line to Con-
stantinople in 1888 it was natural, if there was to be
an overland route to the Persian Gulf at all, that such
a route would follow a line which would necessitate
the shortest sea passage. The other and from political
and military points of view far more important reason
for the change of plan was that German influence.

274 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

gradually developed in Turkey since the accession of
the present Emperor to the throne, has been entirely
directed towards the construction of railways which
would not be easy of attack and communications which
could not be cut by a group of Powers with the com-
mand of the sea. Thus, whilst a line starting from the
Mediterranean would have been quite useless to Turkey
or Germany as a means of through connection between
the East and West, a railway broken only at the south-
ern end of the Bosphorus gives to the enemy an iron
road the importance of which it is impossible to over-
estimate. Indeed, so long as the forts of the Darda-
nelles and of the Bosphorus remain intact, the Sultan
and his allies enjoy the advantages of naval power in
a limited area — the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora,
and the Dardanelles — without the possession of a
fleet.

Before entering into a discussion of the history,
geography, and construction of the great trunk line,
I will endeavour to show in a general way the ac-
tual meaning and the military and political impor-
tance of the railways of Asiatic Turkey as they exist
to-day. Starting from Haidar Pasha, opposite to
Constantinople, it is now possible to travel by train
or by water across the greater part of the areas which
lie between the Ottoman capital and Bagdad on the
one hand and the Egyptian frontier on the other.
The Taurus tunnels were pierced in November, 1916,
and they are now open to traffic maintained at least
by a narrow-gauge railway. More or less through
communication has therefore been established right
across the Anatohan Plateau, along the Plain of Cilicia,
and through the Amanus Range to a junction about

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR 275

ten miles to the north of Aleppo. From here the
northern prong, or Bagdad Railway proper, continues
its way in an easterly direction as far as Helif and
probably to Nisibin. At the other or Bagdad end
the railway has been completed in a northerly direc-
tion up to Samarra. If we take it that the respec-
tive termini are at Helif and at Samarra, this means
that out of the total distance of approximately fifteen
hundred miles from Constantinople to Bagdad, about
twelve hundred miles can be accomplished by train.

The portion of the journey which cannot be per-
formed by train is made up of two parts, the first
of about one hundred and thirty miles across the
desert from Helif to Mosul. From here the stage to
Samarra, about one hundred and seventy miles, can
be accomplished in boats and rafts floated or sailed
down the Tigris. In addition, what is almost equally
important is that, since the completion of the Taurus
and Amanus tunnels, the railway thus constructed
approaches and crosses the Euphrates at Jerablus.
From that place there is an alternative means of
communication with Mesopotamia by way of the
Euphrates as far as Feluja, now connected by a light
railway with Bagdad only about thirty-five miles to
the east. The progress of the construction of the
Bagdad line has therefore had its direct military advan-
tages to Turkey in the Mesopotamian campaign. It
also provides an easier and quicker means of commu-
nication between Constantinople and Eastern Asia
Minor than would otherwise have existed so long as
the Black Sea route was closed to trafiic. For instance,
the distances to be covered by road between Helif
and the Bitlis district, or between the head of the rail-

276 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

way and Kharput — a centre of the utmost impor-
tance— are considerably less than those which would
otherwise have had to be traversed by road from An-
gora — formerly the nearest point in railway connec-
tion with Constantinople. These facilities are of the
greatest importance to-day because they must further
the Turco-Germanic objects of reconquering North-
eastern Asia Minor and of overcoming Armenian
resistance there and in the areas of the Russian Cau-
casus now ceded to Turkey by Russia under her terms
of peace with the Central Powers.

Up to Aleppo, about eight hundred and forty miles
from Constantinople, the Anatolian and Bagdad
railways serve as a means of communication with
the south as well as with the east. From Aleppo the
southern prong, before the War owned partly by French
companies and partly by the Turks themselves (I
must obviously speak here of the pre-War ownership
of the railways, for the Turks are believed to have
seized all those which properly belong to companies
of Alhed nationality), runs by way of Damascus to
Deraia. From this point there are two routes. The
first is by the Hedjaz line, which continues its way
in a southerly direction as far as Medina. The second
bends from Deraia in a westerly direction towards
Haifa, but before reaching that port turns south near
Nazareth, ultimately extending as far as Bir Auja,
about thirty -five miles to the southwest of Beersheba.^
Although there is at least one break of gauge at Rayak,
not at Aleppo as is sometimes stated, the strategical

1 Presumably ere now the Egyptian railway system has been united with
that of Palestine, but no detailed reference can be made here or in the
accompanying maps to lines constructed by the British for war purposes.

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR 277

importance of these southern prongs is enormous.
They have rendered possible the threatened attack
upon Egypt, an attack which, although it never ma-
terialised, at one time had a certain effect upon the
general plan of the Allied operations.

The story of the numerous and various arrange-
ments which have led up to the existing extension of
railways in Asia Minor is closely connected with the
gradual development of Germanic influence in the
Near East. In 1888, the only railways existing in
Asia Minor were the Smyrna-Aidin, the Smyrna-Cas-
saba, the Mersina-Adana, and the Haidar Pasha
(Scutari) -Ismid lines. All these railways were com-
pletely, or at least practically, in the hands of English
capitalists. The Scutari-Ismid line, which now con-
stitutes the first section of the Anatolian Railway and
which has a length of about fifty-six miles, was built
by the Turkish Government in 1871. In 1880 it was
leased to a British company for a period of twenty
years. In 1888, however, the Turks, influenced by
the Germans, dispossessed the British Company and
handed the line over to a German syndicate financed
by the Deutsche Bank of Berlin, which then became
the moving spirit in all the schemes of Germanic rail-
way construction in the Asiatic dominions of the
Sultan. Moreover, the Germans secured two Imperial
Irades, the one giving them the control of this line for
a period of ninety-nine years, and the other granting
them the right of extending it to Angora, and therefore
for a further three hundred and one miles.

At the same time, the Turks first accepted the idea
of providing kilometric guarantees for railways, the
principle of those guarantees being that the Gov-

278 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

ernment promises to the company a fixed sum as the
gross annual receipts per kilometre of line open to
traffic. This sum is handed over to the railway by
the Ottoman Public Debt before that organisation
passes on its surplus to the Government. In the case
of the Haidar Pasha-Ismid section the kilometric
guarantee is 10,300 francs per kilometre, and in that
of the Ismid- Angora section 15,000 francs per kilo-
metre. The Anatolian Railway Company, which
came into being in 1889, completed the railway to
Angora, which was opened to traffic in 1892.

In the following year, which constitutes a very im-
portant epoch, the Germans were granted two further
concessions. The first gave them the right of prolong-
ing the railway from Angora to Kaisariya and thence
through Sivas and Diarbekr and down the Tigris to
Bagdad. This proposal was not carried out, ostensibly
on account of the engineering difficulties, but really
because of the hostility which it created in Russia.
The idea of this line has, however, never been completely
given up, and, if we are to believe various authoritative
publications in Germany, the existence of a concession
for the construction of lines from Adabazar to Bolu,
and from Angora by way of Kaisariya to Sivas on the
north, and to Nigde and Ulu Kushlar on the south, is
still held to be valid. Indeed, according to Mehr-
mann's " Diplomatischer Krieg in Vorder Asien",
published in 1916, some fifty miles of a railway from
Angora towards Sivas and Erzerum had actually been
completed in November of that year. There is also
good reason to suppose that part of the line from Ada-
bazar to Bolu, following a route fully described in
my book, *' Washed by Four Seas", and for which a

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR ^79

concession exists, has been completed since the begin-
ning of the War.

The second and all-important concession granted
to the Germans in 1893 provided for the construction
of what was then considered to be a branch line from
Eskishehr to Konia. This line, which has a length of
two hundred and sixty-nine miles and a kilometric
guarantee (I believe amounting to about 12,500 francs
per kilometre), was opened to traffic in 1896. Its com-
pletion was most important, not only because it laid
the foundation for the construction of the Bagdad
railway by its present route, but because one hundred
miles to the south of Eskishehr it passes through Afiun
Karahissar and thus establishes railway connection
between Smyrna and Constantinople by what is still
known as the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway.

That line owes its existence to an English company,
which obtained a concession for its construction in
1863. Thirty years later, having no kilometric guar-
antee, the main line extended for a distance of one
hundred and five miles to Alashehr, and its northern
arm went only to Soma. In 1893 the Turks handed
over these lines to a French company, which undertook
to work them under a special arrangement with the
Government (its details, as also a great deal of other
useful information concerning railways in Asiatic
Turkey, are to be found in "Corps de Droit Ottoman",
by George Young) and to prolong the main line as
far as Afiun Karahissar, this latter stretch having a
kilometric guarantee amounting to nearly 19,000 francs
per kilometre. For some years the rivalry which
existed between the French and the German companies
prevented the actual junction of the two lines, and

280 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

when I was at Afiun Karahissar in 1905 I found the
two railway systems separated by a distance of a few
hundred yards and running their trains in such a way
that the passenger was doomed to miss his connection.
Subsequently, and I believe after the re-establishment
of the Turkish Constitution in 1908, the two companies
arrived at a working arrangement, and the trains of
the French company started from the German station.
After that time, too, the French company secured the
concession to prolong, as far as Panderma on the Sea
of Marmora, the branch which ran from Magnesia to
Soma, and thus to open a subsidiary line, the total
length of which is one hundred and thirteen miles.
This prolongation, which has no kilometric guarantee,
has played a most important part in the War, for it was
on account of its existence that the Turks were able to
convey troops to districts which lie in the immediate
vicinity of the Asiatic coast of the Dardanelles.

Although they form no part of the Bagdad system,
and have no connection with it, in order to make this
chapter as complete an account as possible of the
railways of Asiatic Turkey I will refer here very briefly
to the Mudania-Brusa Line and to what is known as
the Smyrna- Aidin Railway. The first of these, which
unites the ancient capital of the Turkish Empire with
its port upon the Sea of Marmora, has a length of about
twenty-six miles. There is no kilometric guarantee,
and its gauge is three feet three and four-tenths inches
(one metre), instead of the normal Continental gauge
of four feet eight and one half inches. By a firman of
1891 the company has the right to prolong its line to
meet the Anatolian railway system, but the schemes
for the establishment of connection either between

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR 281

Brusa and the Germanic system near Eskisliehr or
between Brusa and the Smyrna-Panderma line never
having been reahzed, this short section has httle poHt-
ical or mihtary importance.

The concession for the Smyrna-Aidin Line was given
to a group of British capitahsts in 1856 without the
provision of a kilometric guarantee. Since the year
1866, when these first eighty miles of railway were
opened to traffic, the system has been gradually ex-
tended to Egerdir, which lies at a distance of
two hundred and ninety-four miles to the east of
Smyrna. Possessed of four short branches, this line
has always managed to prosper without a kilometric
guarantee. But unless the War reverses the whole
position of railways in Asia Minor, it is obvious that
the dream once entertained by its promoters — that
it should be prolonged to Konia and thus form the
first section of the route to Bagdad — is doomed to
meet with disappointment.

From the moment of the opening of the railway to
Konia the German plans for the prolongation of that
line to the Persian Gulf became more definite and pre-
cise. The Kaiser, who had paid his first visit to Con-
stantinople in 1889 — a visit more or less connected
with the then recent grabbing of the Haidar Pasha-
Ismid Railway by the Germans and with its prolonga-
tion to Angora, to which I have already referred —
went to Turkey again in the year 1898. It was this,
his second visit, and the appointment of Baron Marshal
von Bieberstein as German Ambassador in Constan-
tinople in 1897, that led to the promise of a concession
for the present railway — a promise which I believe
was made verbally in 1898.

282 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

There is no reason here to enter into the details
of the negotiations which intervened between that
time and the signature of the final agreement five
years later. These negotiations have been admirably
reviewed, among others, by Sir Valentine Chirol in
his "Middle Eastern Question", and by M. Andre
Cheradame in various works and papers which he has
published on the subject. Suffice it, therefore, to say
that in 1899 a preliminary Convention was signed
between Doctor Siemens — then Director of the Deut-
sche Bank — and the Porte. That Convention gave
to the Anatolian Railway Company, in principle, the
right of constructing a line from Konia to the Persian
Gulf. In 1902 a formal Convention was approved
by the Sultan — a Convention which in its turn served
as the basis of the final agreement of March 5, 1903.
This agreement, which constitutes the real charter of
the Bagdad Railway, was actually signed between
representatives of the Ottoman Government on the
one hand and those of the Anatolian Railway Company
on the other. But as the Anatolian Railway Com-
pany was so blatantly German, and as the Deutsche
Bank, at that time, wished to cater for international
financial support, it was carefully arranged before the
signature of the Convention that a new company, to
be known as the "Imperial Ottoman Bagdad Rail-
way Company", should take over the concession
actually given to men who acted as nominees of the
Deutsche Bank and of the Anatolian Company when
they signed the agreement. The new company, with a
capital of £600,000, was formed on the very day on
which the concession was signed.

Although my primary object here is to discuss the

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR 28S

military and geographical aspects of the Bagdad Rail-
way, the financial and political details of the Conven-
tion of 1903 (published in England as a Parliamentary
Paper on the Bagdad Railway in 1911) are such that
it seems advisable very briefly to refer to some of
their principal features. That Convention ensured
to the company not only the power of building a line
from Konia to Basra, more or less, though not exactly,
by the route which it so far follows, but it also gave
the right to construct branches, the most important
of which were those from Sadijeh to Khanikin, and
from Basra to a point on the Persian Gulf to be sub-
sequently agreed upon, thus totalling nearly two
thousand miles. The duration of the arrangement
was to be for ninety -nine years, the existing concessions
for the lines to Angora and Konia being prolonged for
a like period. The first section had to be begun at
once and completed in two years. All sorts of facilities
and rights were guaranteed and given to the company,
including the power of constructing ports at Bagdad,
Basra, and on the Persian Gulf. It was also to have
the use of the rivers, Shatt-el-Arab, Tigris, and Eu-
phrates for the conveyance of material and workmen
required for constructional purposes. In addition
the concession outlined almost unlimited directions
in which the power of the company could be increased
from time to time.

The financial arrangements between the Govern-
ment and the company depend partly upon the Con-
vention and partly upon the subsidiary documents
which it was thereby agreed should be signed before
the commencement of each section or group of sec-
tions. Thus whilst the original concession constitutes

284 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

the promise of the Government to pay the company
and defines the amount of the kilometric guarantee,
the subsequent loan contracts, the first three series
o^ which are pubHshed in the above-mentioned Blue
Book, actually provide the money for the payment of
the guarantee, which in fact totals 15,500 francs per
year per kilometre when each section begins to work.
That sum is made up of two parts, the first being
11,000 francs per kilometre for construction provided
by the Government, and the second being 4500 francs
per year per kilometre for working expenses. If the
gross kilometric receipts of the line exceed 4500 francs
per annum, provision is made as to the distribution of
the surplus, and further sums were guaranteed for the
improvement of the line between Haidar Pasha and
Konia and for the subsequent running of express trains.
The Bagdad Railway Four Per Cent. Loan Con-
tract, First Series, to cover the expense of the construc-
tion of the first section of the line from Konia to Bul-
gurlu, was signed at the same time as the original
Convention. It put into force, so far as that section
was concerned, the arrangements made by the con-
cession itself. The company sold bonds, issued by the
Government, on the market, and secured a sum
amounting to about £1,800,000, which was ample for
•the construction of a stretch of line on which there
were no engineering difficulties. As a matter of fact,
after the opening of that section, which took place in
1904, the company was left with a considerable surplus
(sometimes estimated at over £1,000,000), to be
placed towards the expense of building the much
more costly sections which were to traverse the Taurus
and Amanus ranges.

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR 285

From Konia to Eregli the railway wanders over a
sparsely populated plain. For the whole distance,
and particularly between Karaman and Eregli, one
sees nothing but miles upon miles of country, only
very small parts of which are cultivated. The first
section does not, however, end at Eregli, which would
have been its natural terminus. In order to comply
with the terms of the concession, which states that
sections must be one hundred and twenty-five miles
in length, the railway was prolonged to a point
a few hundred yards beyond Bulgurlu. Here, for
years, a pair of rails laid upon a low embankment were
left to jut out into space, and to demonstrate that
things in Turkey are not conducted in a normal manner.

Although strictly speaking it does not form part
of the Bagdad Railway, I will briefly refer here to the
scheme for the irrigation of the plain of Konia, which
is in the hands of a German company, formed in 1907,
as an offshoot of the Anatolian and Bagdad railway
companies and which I have described in detail in my
book, "The Danger Zone of Europe." The task of
that company is to bring the waters of Lakes Beyshehr
and Karaviran through the gorges of the Charshembe
River in order to irrigates large district which surrounds
Chumla station. If this has been or can be success-
fully done — a great deal of work had actually been
carried out in the year 1909 — some one hundred and
thirty thousand acres of arid plain will have been effec-
tively watered. To accomplish this object more than
two hundred million cubic yards of water will be re-
quired every year. The Turks hope to be able to
recover the money spent in building the necessary
canals, etc. — money advanced by the Germans —

THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

by selling portions of the land irrigated, by raising the
rents upon the tenants, and by decreasing if not by
doing away altogether with the balance to be paid on
the kilometric guarantees of at least this section of the
Bagdad Railway.

The completion of the first section of the line was
followed by a prolonged delay. This was due partly
to geographical and partly to political and international
conditions. From the first of these standpoints the
difficulty lay in the fact that the second section, which
enters the Taurus area directly it leaves Bulgurlu,
was the most costly of construction upon the whole
line. This meant that as the company would be
compelled to disburse the handsome surplus left over
from the first section, it refused to agree to build the
Taurus length unless it were given, at the same time,
the money for at least two sections located to the east
of that range. From a political point of view the ques-
tion was complicated, for, whilst the Turks had diffi-
culty in providing and guaranteeing the interest on
the necessary funds, there arose once more the problem
as to whether international consent could be secured
for the raising of these funds, and whether there was
or was not to be international co-operation in the
scheme.

After a great deal of difficulty, in June, 1908 — that
is, two months before the re-establishment of the Otto-
man Constitution — an additional Convention and
an agreement for the second and third series of the
Bagdad Loan Contract (published in the above-men-
tioned Parliamentary Paper) were signed between the
company and the Government. The first of these
documents slightly modified the original Convention,

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR 287

and arranged for the construction of four sections
to measure not eight hundred but eight hundred and
forty kilometres and to extend as far as Hehf. The
second provided for the money necessary for con-
structional purposes. The signature of these docu-
ments was in its turn followed by a further delay, this
time caused by the temporarily changed conditions
in Turkey itself. The revolution of July, 1908, so
shook the position of the Germans that for a time they
did not know where they were. Moreover, for a limited
period the power of the Ottoman Parliament became
stronger and stronger, and the influence of the true
Liberals, who desired to avoid the heavy financial
burdens placed upon Turkey by the railway con-
tract, became greater and greater. The results of
this were that there intervened a great struggle be-
tween the opponents of the scheme and those who
desired to modify the railway route on the one
hand, and the Germans together with the corrupt
elements of the Ottoman population on the other,
and that the line was only open as far as Karapunar
(about ninety miles by railway to the southeast of
Eregli) at the time of the outbreak of the War.

On leaving Bulgurlu, at an elevation of about three
thousand seven hundred feet above the sea, the
railway immediately begins to wind its way up the
northern slopes of the Taurus. Following more or
less the line of the old post-road the gradients are
steep, but as the country is open and rolling, engineers
have been able to choose their own route, thus avoid-
ing any serious constructional difficulties. Arrived at
the watershed, known as the Karndash Bel (height
5070 feet), the railway continues its way for two or

^88 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

three miles and as far as Ulu Kuslilar — the highest
station on the whole line at an altitude of four thousand
nine hundred feet. Near Ulu Kushlar the traveller
who follows this route by road or train enters a valley
at first followed by the Tabaz and subsequently by
the Bozanti Su. That valley, the sides of which are
bedecked with scattered trees, grows narrower and
narrower until it becomes a mere gorge, in places so
narrow that the river flows through a deep rocky
crevice, where before the construction of the railway
there was barely room for the road. On the south
and west one has distant views of the snow-covered
Bulghar Dagh, whilst on the north and east one has
occasional glimpses up side valleys which reveal distant
mountain-tops in winter covered in snow. The result
of the limitations due to the existence of this gorge is
that the construction of this stretch of line, about thirty-
five miles in length, was very costly, for it entailed the
provision of numerous bridges and lengthy embank-
ments and a great deal of rock hewing to render it
secure against floods and washouts.

At Ak Kupru (altitude 2985 feet) this gorge suddenly
debouches upon the Vale of Bozanti (Podandus) —
a fertile district about four miles long by one mile
wide, in the midst of the Taurus Mountains. In this
valley the railway and the new road constructed by
the company diverge from the ancient trade route,
which takes a more westerly line and passes through
the Cilician Gates. Bearing off in a southeasterly
direction, the railway and new road follow the valley
of the Chakra Su, which flows to the east of the Cili-
cian Gates. This river runs from the Vale of Bozanti
into the heart of the mountains and finally dives into

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR 289

a dark, cavelike opening, to emerge again on the south-
ern slopes of the range after a subterranean course
of some three hundred yards. Prior to the construc-
tion of the railway the approaches to the places where
this curious river enters and emerges from its sub-
terranean course were, I believe, almost entirely un-
explored.

The line was opened as far as Karapunar in Decem-
ber, 1913. About a year and a half earlier (April,
1912) it had been completed from the south to Dorak,
on the southern slopes of the range. It was therefore
the short section (roughly about thirty miles in length)
lying between these two places which blocked through
traffic from December, 1913, until that section was
actually opened at the end of 1916 or early in 1917.^
But the construction of this piece of line constituted
by far the most difficult engineering task on the whole
railway. In addition to four tunnels, which have a total
length of about eleven miles, there was an immense
amount of earthwork, cutting, and bridge building to
be done. Some of the bridges over mountain streams
have piers fifty to one hundred feet high, and in one
place alone there is a cutting for a distance of some two
miles. The new road itself, which was constructed
entirely for railway purposes, is a very fine piece of
work, for it required an immense amount of under-
cutting in the cliffs which rise sheer above and fall
vertically below it in such a way that wooden balus-
trades had to be provided to ensure against accident.
From Dorak the line sweeps down the southern slopes

1 For some time after the opening of this section it was run as a narrow
gauge Une. Ere now, however, it may possibly have been finished on the
normal system.

290 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

of the range, and after about fifteen miles meets the
old Mersina-Adana Railway at Yenije, about half-
way between Tarsus and Adana.

After leaving the Bozanti Vale the old post road
winds its way up to the Tekir Plateau or summit
(altitude about 4500 feet). Thence, passing through
scenery of the most magnificent beauty, it approaches
the Cilician Gates. Here at three thousand six hundred
feet the gorge is so narrow that the road is supported
by a revetted embankment over the stream. After
leaving this historic gateway one continues down the
valley of one of the tributaries of the Tarsus Chai
(Cydnus), and after passing over the low foothills of
the Taurus finally reaches the Mersina-Adana Railway
at Gulek Boghaz — a station three or four miles to the
east of Tarsus. It is this road, for years passable for
strong vehicles, and recently, I believe, considerably
improved, which was used by the Turks as a means of
communication before the opening of the Karapunar-
Dorak section of the railway. If we take it that troops
coming from the north would have been detrained at
Bozanti Han, and that they would have joined the rail-
way again at Gulek Boghaz, the distance to be covered
on foot would be about forty miles — a distance which
took me about fourteen hours in a carriage.

Once at Gulek Boghaz by road, or at Yenije by train,
the traveller has reached the Cilician Plain — a very
fertile district which is practically cut off from the
remainder of Asia Minor by mountains. The scene
of the terrible massacres which took place in the year
1909, when some twenty -five thousand Armenians
were brutally murdered without any adequate protest
by the Young Turks, it is watered by the rivers Tarsus

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR 291

Chai, Seihun, and Djehun. These rivers, which were
once navigable in their lower reaches, are now only
muddy channels which serve to conduct vast volumes
of water from the mountains, in which they rise, to
the seacoast. This plain, which is cultivated for
cotton, wheat, and barley, is traversed by the Mersina-
Adana and the Bagdad railways. The former line,
which was originally built with English capital, was
taken over by the Germans in 1908. Forming a
branch of the Bagdad Railway, between that time and
the outbreak of the War, it was utilised for the trans-
port of railway material and rolling stock for the new
line. Though Mersina could not in any case have
competed with Alexandretta as a port, the acquisition
of this short section removed the possibility of any
competition with the Bagdad Railway in this area.

Although the concession for their construction was
not granted until the signature of the agreement
made between the Government and the company on
March 19, 1911 — an agreement the main details of
which, so far as they concerned Alexandretta, were
published in the Stamboul, a French newspaper issued
in Constantinople, and also by the late Mr. H. F. B.
Lynch in The Fortnightly Review for May, 1911 — it is
convenient to refer to the significance of the branch
built to and of the port at Alexandretta before leaving
the Cilician Plain. That concession constitutes the
most important arrangement made with the company
since its foundation in 1903. In the first place it
finally disposed of the idea of a modification in the
original route — a highly desirable modification which
would have taken the main line by way of Alex-
andretta to Aleppo instead of by the present more

292 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

northerly route. These negotiations were partially
responsible for the delay which occurred before the
commencement of the construction of the second and
third sections of the line. The fact that this modi-
fication was not accepted and that the line now follows
(with certain changes to which I will refer below) the
route originally defined by the concession, means that
in place of running absolutely along the seacoast
for a good many miles, the railway now approaches
the coast nowhere within a distance of less than ten
miles. Under German influence the Turks have
thereby avoided what would have been a continual
menace to their communications from the sea; for,
whilst the section of the railway in the neighbourhood
of the Gulf of Alexandretta is still the one most easy
of attack, that attack would now constitute a far
larger undertaking than were the line to have run close
to the water's edge.

Politically and commercially the right given to the
company to construct the branch to and the port at
Alexandretta went far beyond anything foreseen in
the original concession. The Turks were already com-
mitted by that arrangement not to grant concessions
for railways running to the coast between Mersina
and Tripoli to any group except the Bagdad company.
But this did not anticipate the giving to it rights to
be enjoyed for a period of ninety-nine years from the
time of the completion of the railway to Helif, rights
which really amounted to a lease, and facilities which
might almost be compared to those formerly enjoyed
by the Germans at Kiao-Chao. The concessionaires
obtained the power to build quays, docks, and ware-
houses, and to police a port which, unlike Haidar Pasha

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR 293

within closed Turkish waters, is situated in an area
over which the Turks could have no direct control so
long as they did not possess the command of the sea.
Commercially speaking, too, the acquisition of such a
prize was of supreme value to Germany, for the pos-
session of Alexandretta once and for all removed any
danger of competition for the Bagdad Railway.

The branch to Alexandretta which leaves the main
route at Toprak Kale on the Cilician Plain and for
which there is no kilometric guarantee has a length
of about thirty-seven miles. After passing through
the Amanian Gates, which are only about three hun-
dred yards wide, the railway enters the Plain of Issus,
subsequently following the seacoast for the remainder
of its length. Had this section formed part of the
main line, the Bagdad Railway would probably have
proceeded from Alexandretta by way of the Beilan
Pass to Antioch, running thence in an easterly direc-
tion to Aleppo. As things stand at present, it is
obvious that the Alexandretta line can have no signifi-
cance, for it traverses an area which can be directly
commanded from the sea. It is for this reason that
it seems highly probable that the enemy may have
actually taken up the rails in order to utilise them for
railway construction somewhere upon the through
route.

The Cilician Plain practically ends at Osmaniya,
to the east of which place the railway plunges into the
mountains in order to force its way through the Amanus
Range. The passage of this range entails a rise from
about lave hundred to seventeen hundred and fifty feet
above the sea. After passing over several steel bridges,
and through a number of small tunnels, the railway

294 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

enters the great Bagche tunnel, five thousand three
hundred yards in length, which is still, I believe, the
longest in Turkey. Thus, whilst the passage of the
Amanus Range is much shorter than that of the Taurus,
the engineering difficulties were such that there is no
wonder that the completion, which took place during
the late summer of 1915, delayed the opening of the
section which lies between Mamoure and Rajan for a
period of nearly three years from the time when it was
possible to reach these temporary termini by train.

In and immediately to the east of the Amanus
Range the line follows a trace which is somewhat
different to that foreseen in the original concession.
In place of running from Bagche to Kazanali, thence
across the Kurd Dagh and through Killis and Tel
Habesch to the Euphrates, the line now turns in a
southerly direction near Bagche. Passing through
Islahiya it subsequently follows the valley of the Kara
Su and runs round the southwestern end of the Kurd
Dagh. Instead of making Killis, or more correctly
Tel Habesch, the junction for Aleppo, and of construct-
ing a branch, as foreseen in the original concession from
Tel Habesch to Aleppo, this means that the main
line passes close to Aleppo itself. The result, for
such as it is worth, is that in place of an Aleppo branch,
about forty miles in length, the actual junction is
made at Muslimiya — a place located only ten miles
to the north of Aleppo.

To the northeast of Aleppo the next important land-
mark on the railway is the Jerablus bridge which spans
the Euphrates. With a length of eight hundred and
fifty yards its non-completion delayed effective through
communication from December, 1913 (when the see-

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR 295

tion to the west of the Euphrates was opened) ; for
although a temporary wooden structure was ready in
1913, the steel bridge, made up of many spans, was not
reported finished until 1915. To the east of the Eu-
phrates the railway now continues its way at least as
far as Helif and probably to Nisibin or beyond. If
Helif be the point, it means that all the work on the
main line arranged for in the agreements of 1908 has
actually been completed, and that it is now possible
to travel by train, perhaps still with a break of gauge
in the Taurus, for a distance of over eleven hundred
miles from Constantinople. According to recent re-
ports too, as a result of orders given by the German
General Staff, a branch is now being built from Ras-el-
Ain to Diabekr, the rails on the French line from
Homs to Tripoli having been taken up for that purpose.
We come now to the new Conventions signed be-
tween the Ottoman Government and the company
on March 19, 1911, and to the sections of the railway
which have or have not been constructed since the
arrival of these agreements. Over and above the
rights given to the Germans for the construction of the
Alexandretta branch and of the port of Alexandretta
(Conventions 2 and 3) to which I have referred above,
we have in these arrangements firstly the provision
for the building of the line from Helif to Bagdad, and
secondly some sort of German undertaking in regard
to the ownership and control of the section to be
built from Bagdad to the Persjan Gulf. The ar-
rangements made for the prolongation of the line to
Bagdad are given in the Stamboul for March 20, 1911,
but no reference is made there to the agreements about
the last section, concerning the general sense of which

296 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

we have certain information, but the definite details of
which, so far as I am aware, have never been pubHshed.
With regard to the first of these questions, sufficient
be it to say that the railway has been planned to take
the original trace by way of Nisibin to Mosul. Between
the last two places it follows, not the usual route
by way of Jezire, but strikes southeast, first across
a plain on which there are a few villages, and then into
the desert, which is almost entirely unpopulated and
where there is but little water. From Helif to Mosul,
a journey reckoned to take at least thirty hours by
road, the distance is approximately one hundred
and fifty miles. There is no reason to know that any
part of this section or of the proposed branch from
Mosul to Erbil (length sixty-two miles) has yet been
constructed. From Mosul, from which point river
transport can be utilised, the railway is planned to
cover the length of two hundred and forty miles to Bag-
dad by way of the regular trade route, which fol-
lows the right bank of the Tigris and passes through
Hammam Ali, Tekrit, and Samarra. So far as we
know, no work has been done from the northern end
of this section or upon the branch from Sadijeh to
Khanikin ; but the piece from Bagdad to Samarra,
built from the southern end and having a length of
about seventy-five miles, has been open to traffic
since October, 1914. That the Turks were unable
to extend the line to Tekrit or beyond is largely due
to the fact that when the British occupied Basra on
November 21, 1914, they seized a considerable amount
of railway material and rolling stock — material which
would have been of great value to the enemy had he
been left the opportunity of utilising it either for con-

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR 297

structional purposes on the main line or for the building
of the intended branch from Sadijeh to Khanikin.

In addition, by the agreements of 1911, the company
is believed more or less to have renounced its right
to the construction of the section from Bagdad to the
Persian Gulf. From a geographical standpoint all
that need therefore be said upon this question is that
the line, as originally proposed, was to leave the Tigris
near Bagdad, and after crossing the Euphrates, to run
through Kerbela and Nedjef to Zobeir and Basra.
There was to be a branch from Zobeir "to a point on
the Persian Gulf to be agreed upon between the Im-
perial Ottoman Government and the Concession-
aires." It is unnecessary to say here that the locality
of that point constitutes one of the most important
factors in the whole scheme, and that no decision
upon the subject has ever been published. As things
stand at present it seems open to doubt whether the
route suggested for this last section will be adopted
or whether the permanent line will consist of an im-
provement of the military railway which we believe
has been constructed by the British from the Persian
Gulf up to or almost up to Bagdad.

Were it not that the War, and particularly the Brit-
ish advance in Mesopotamia, cannot fail to obliterate
many of the more important results of the events
which preceded and followed the signing of the new
agreements between the Turkish Government and the
company in March, 1911, those events might be of
political consequence, the far-reaching significance
of which it would be impossible to exaggerate. The
signature of this agreement almost immediately fol-
lowed the meeting of the Tsar with the Emperor at

298 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

Potsdam in November, 1910, a meeting during which
the relations existing between Russia and Germany
were temporarily adjusted. Though the exact nature
of that arrangement was not known until afterwards
it is now certain that Russia agreed no longer to oppose
the construction of the Bagdad Railway, and either
herself to build or allow the Germans to build a line
from Khanikin — the terminus of a branch already
agreed upon between Turkey and the Bagdad Com-
pany — to Tehran. As compensation for this, the
Russian position in Northern Persia was recognised
by Germany. It remained then for Berlin to treat with
England and France for agreements concerning future
developments in their respective spheres. The Tripoli
War of 1911 and the Balkan War of 1912 were not,
however, favourable periods for negotiation, and it
was thus only in 1913 that Turkey, in agreement with
Germany, despatched to London the ex-Grand Vizier
— Hakki Pasha — to try to bring about agreements
to be drawn up between the Foreign Office, the Ger-
man Embassy, and the Ottoman Embassy — agree-
ments to settle the outstanding differences as regards
the Bagdad-Persian Gulf section and other cognate
matters of river transport in these regions. These
agreements presumably presupposed a continuance
of friendly and peaceful relations between Turkey,
Germany, and Great Britain, and it is believed that
they were practically already concluded when, in
August, 1914, Great Britain found herself compelled
to declare war on Germany, Turkey subsequently
throwing in her lot with our enemies.^

^ These are the Agreements to which Prince Lichnowsky refers in his
famous memorandum.

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR 299

Before passing to a brief description of the Syrian
railways there are still two questions which must be
mentioned in connection with the Bagdad line. The
first concerns the facilities which it provides, or which
it might provide, for travel. The agreement for the
railway stipulates for the provision of a fortnightly
express between Constantinople and the Persian Gulf
and vice versa. This train was to run at an average
speed of about twenty-eight miles per hour, including
stops, for the first ^ve years from the opening to trafiic
of the whole of the main line, that speed subsequently
to be increased to thirty-seven miles per hour, includ-
ing stops. This means, were the said express train
to run at its lower speed, that the journey from Con-
stantinople to Bagdad would be accomplished in about
fifty-four hours, and from the Turkish capital to Basra
in about sixty-six hours. Taking the pre- War time
necessary for the journey from London to Constan-
tinople by Orient Express, and allowing for a very short
delay at the latter place, theoretically it would be
possible to travel from London to Basra in one hundred
and forty-four hours, that is, in six days. From Basra
to Bombay the distance is just over nineteen hundred
miles — a distance which at, say, twenty knots per hour
could be accomplished in about eighty-four hours.
Thus, taking all the conditions at their most favour-
able value, and allowing a margin of only five hours
at Basra, travellers and mails could be conveyed from
London to Bombay by that route in about nine days
seventeen hours, instead of, as before the War, in be-
tween thirteen and fourteen days.

This, of course, shows a considerable nominal sav-
ing in time — a saving which might even be increased

300 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

by running fast ships from Basra to Karachi and by
improving the train service between the latter place
and Bombay. But against the advantages of that
nominal saving must be set the facts that the jour-
ney by way of Brindisi and the Suez Canal could
be speeded up, and that on the great cross-country
journey, from Constantinople to the Gulf, there would
be bound to be considerable delays and irregularities
in the running of the trains, delays due among other
things to the conditions prevailing in the areas through
which the line would pass.

Prior to the outbreak of the War, the tourist desirous
of travelling by the Anatolian and Bagdad railways
was certainly not provided with the comforts which
would have led him to choose such a route in prefer-
ence to one followed by a first-class ocean steamer.
Leaving the Bridge at Constantinople at an early hour
in the m.orning, one traversed the Bosphorus in a
steamer run in connection with the train. From Haidar
Pasha to Eskishehr the first stage of the journey took
ten and one-half hours. As there were no night trains,
one was compelled to sleep at the latter place, starting
at 5 A.M. on the morrow for Konia, which is reached
after a journey of fifteen hours. At Konia the com-
pany has built a new hotel which, though much cleaner
and better than those which ordinarily exist in the in-
terior of Turkey, is still less comfortable than one would
suppose from its pretentious appearance. Starting
again at 6.30 a.m. one could go on for the subsequent
one hundred and ninety miles to Karapunar — a place
which in its turn was reached after eleven hours.
The speed on all these sections only averaged about
eighteen miles per hour. The first time I went to

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR 301

Eregli, soon after the opening of the railway, one
travelled in old-fashioned, non-corridor carriages which
were neither heated nor provided with the ordinary
comforts available on long journeys. On a subse-
quent occasion I found first-class rolling stock which
compared quite favourably with that run on express
lines in Europe. Practically nobody except Ambas-
sadors, high officials of the State, and those provided
with passes, travel first class, and, as the majority
of the passengers are natives, who cannot afford any-
thing better than third, the second-class passenger
when he gets well into the interior is generally the sole
occupant of a carriage. The trains are mixed (of
passenger coaches and baggage cars), and therefore at
all the larger stations one stops for a sufficient time to
allow for the loading and unloading of goods.

As to the actual financial cost to Turkey of a line
like the Bagdad Railway it is difficult to form any
reliable estimate. In addition to the fact that only
short disconnected lengths were open before the War,
those lengths had not been completed for a sufficient
time to render possible a consequent development of
trade. The distance from Konia to Bagdad being six-
teen hundred and fifty kilometres, the maximum pos-
sible cost per annum to the Government, if the
railway had no receipts whatever, would be about
25,575,000 francs per annum. But against this sum
must be set not only the actual receipts of the line,
receipts which for the first section between Konia
and Eregli amounted to about 514,350 francs in the
year 1910, but also other and more indirect advantages
accruing to the Government. Commercially speak-
ing these advantages are primarily due to the fact

302 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

that in railway districts the peasants, instead of only
cultivating what they require for their own use and
for the local markets, develop their land to much fuller
advantage as soon as they are able easily to send
away their goods. This results not only in the in-
creased prosperity of the people, but also in a great
augmentation in the traffic and in the tithes to be
collected by the Government. The change is shown
by the fact that, whilst the receipts of the Anatolian
Company amounted in 1907 to 10,428,475 francs, in
1913 they had risen to 20,549,875 francs, thereby
of course bringing an enormous reduction in the sum
due from the Government for kilometric guarantees.
This change is also shown by the fact that the peasants
began to trade in gold instead of in silver, with the
result that a vast quantity of gold coin has disappeared
into the interior during the last few years.

From a military point of view, over and above the
advantages of railway communication to which I
have already referred, the opening up of the country
has enabled the Ottoman Government to quell more
than one insurrection in distant parts of the empire.
In recent years this facility has been particularly
valuable in the case of the Hedjaz, where there have
been several rebellions. Moreover, the existence of
railways renders possible a comparatively rapid mobili-
sation of at least parts of the army. But this in its
turn has rather a curious effect, for it means that
military service is not only much more strictly enforced
among the sections of the population domiciled near
to railways, but that the reserves furnished from these
districts are often called out long before much younger
men, recruited from more remote districts, have per-

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR 303

formed their military obligations. During the last
six years of almost continuous war the consequences
of this are that a very unfair burden, which is greatly
resented by those who have had to bear it, has been
placed upon the men who come from easily accessible
areas, and that the Ottoman first-line army, instead of
being composed of all the younger men of the country,
often contains units made up of those who ought to
be utilised only in the second line of the Turkish fight-
ing machine.

Turning to the Syrian railways, which geographi-
cally speaking form a sort of southern prong of the
Bagdad Railway, I will discuss those lines in their
relation to the German system, and therefore from
north to south rather than in the order in which they
were constructed. To begin with, since the end of
1906, when the section between Aleppo and Hama
was opened to traffic, a French line, owned by a com-
pany known as the "Damas Hama et Prolongements",
has united the former town with Rayak on the line
from Beirut to Damascus. With a total length of
two hundred and six miles, the railway, built on the
normal continental gauge, has a kilometric guarantee
amounting, I think, to 13,600 francs per kilometre.
Its existence depends upon various arrangements made
between the Government and the company in and sub-
sequent to the year 1893 — arrangements the details
of which are very fully set out by Mr. George Young
in his "Corps de Droit Ottoman." The whole line was
of easy construction, for it follows the plain and passes
through fine cornland, which is not liable to floods, as
the rivers run in deep trenches. There is one big bridge
over the Orontes at Hama, but elsewhere no other strue-

304 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

tiircs of any engineering significance. The normal-
gauge branch from Homs to TripoH, with its length of
about sixty-five miles, which belongs to the same com-
pany and which was built without a kilometric guar-
antee after the re-establishment of the Turkish Consti-
tution, is believed to have been taken up in order that
the material might be utilised for construction else-
where.

Unless it has been widened since the beginning of
the War, which is very unlikely owing to the great
length of line which would have had to be altered,
there is a break at Rayak, all the railways to the
south of which point being of a narrow gauge. Here
we meet the French system, known as the company
of the "Chemin de Fer Beyrouth-Damas-Hauran ",
which owns the line (one hundred and fifty-five miles
in length) connecting Beirut with Damascus and
Mezerib, the latter about six miles to the west of Deraia.
This railway, which has been open to through traflSc
since 1895, and which has no kilometric guarantee,
is built upon the somewhat exceptional gauge of 3
feet 5.34 inches (1.05 metres).

Starting from Beirut harbour the railway, which is
on the Abt system (an engine that can work either
by adhesion or by cogwheels and central rail), climbs
up the Lebanon for about five thousand feet to a point
just above Ain Safar. Thence it winds down to the
valley of the Bekaa, in which is Rayak Junction.
The gradients are very steep, and therefore even with
the rack and pinion system short trains are obliged to
go very slowly. To the east of Rayak the railway
continues over the plain, until it is compelled to cross
the Anti-Lebanon, where the gradients, heavy enough

The Railways of Syria and Palestine

From a map prepared by The Royal Geographical Society

i

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR 305

to limit the load very closely, are not sufficient to neces-
sitate at any point the use of the cogwheel system.
To the south of Damascus the French line, which is
believed to have been taken up since the War in order
that the material might be utilised for construction
elsewhere, ran practically parallel to and on the west
of the Hedjaz line.

We now come to the Hedjaz Railway, which is of the
1.05-metre gauge (adopted in order to correspond with
that of the Beirut-Damascus line, by which rolling
stock, etc., had to be imported). Built by the Turks
themselves with the assistance of foreign engineers,
and particularly with that of Meissner Pasha — a
very able German — the railway, which starts from
Damascus and which is eight hundred and twenty
miles long, was first opened as far as Medina towards
the end of the year 1908. Though it was often
broken by raiding parties, from that time until the
outbreak of the War it was available for military
transport purposes to and from the Hedjaz, and for
the pilgrims for whose use it was largely constructed.
Never completed to Mecca or prolonged to the coast
of the Red Sea as proposed, the railway runs through
districts in which for years the Turkish position has
been so far from stable that since the beginning of
the War it could probably not be safely used beyond
even if as far as Maan. In addition to the line to
Haifa, to which I will refer in greater detail below,
the Hedjaz Railway has a branch (twenty-two miles
in length) which connects Bosra with Deraia. Ac-
cording to Petermanns Mitteilungen, July, 1915, it
also has a French feeder (twenty-five miles in length)
running from Amman to Es Salt, a feeder which it

306 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

was no doubt intended should be prolonged across the
Jordan Valley to Jerusalem. It is in this last men-
tioned neighbourhood that the British, based upon
Jerusalem, have attached the Hedjaz line in order
subsequently to be able to utilise it for their further
advance towards Damascus and the north.

There now remain only two Syrian lines which were
open to traffic before the outbreak of the War. The
concession for the first of these — the Haifa Railway
— having been given in 1890, that line was partly
built by a British company. The then existing works
were purchased by the Government in 1902, and the
railway, which now has an extension from Haifa to
Acre, and which is built on the 1.05-metre gauge, was
finally opened to traffic in May, 1906, as a branch of
the Hedjaz line. The second, to which no special
reference is necessary, is the Jaffa- Jerusalem line, the
concession for which was acquired by a French com-
pany in 1889. Built on the one-metre gauge, with a
length of fifty -four miles, the line was opened to traffic
in 1892.1

Such was the condition of things in Syria on the
outbreak of the War. Before that time, however, it
had been often proposed that a normal-gauge railway
should be constructed on the west of the Jordan in
order to prolong the line from Rayak at least as far
as Jerusalem. I believe that a concession had been
actually granted to the French for a line from the
former place to Ramie on the route already open from
Jaffa to Jerusalem. Needless to say work upon this
section was never begun, and its place was taken by

^ The north-western part of this line was taken up by the Turks early
iu the war, but doubtless it has now been relaid by the British.

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR 307

a line built by the Turks themselves. That line
(presumably constructed upon the 1.05-metre gauge,
in order to correspond with the Hedjaz and Damascus-
Beirut systems) starts at El Fule on the Deraia-Haifa
branch. Keeping well inland, it runs in a southerly
direction (there is a considerable detour near Nablus)
to Lydda on the Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway. From this
point the new line follows the old route (the gauge has
probably been changed) to Lydda, where it leaves
the branch to Jerusalem and continues its way via
Beersheba at least to Bir Auja. No details are
available concerning this section, the length of which
must be about one hundred and sixty miles. But it is
obvious that its completion rendered possible the
threatened attacks upon Egypt during the earlier
stages of the War, and that its existence played a con-
siderable role in enabling the Turks to bring up the
reinforcements with which they so determinately
resisted the British advance upon Jerusalem.

Although in passing I have mentioned the improve-
ments and extensions made upon the Bagdad and
Syrian railways since the entry of Turkey into the
War, the knowledge of these coming improvements
must have played such a prominent part in the Allied
plan of operations, that it may be advisable here to
draw the attention of my readers to their meaning and
effect. In November, 1914, when the Ottoman Gov-
ernment threw in its lot with the Central Powers, so
far as the Bagdad Railway was concerned, there was
a gap of thirty miles in the Taurus, the Amanus tun-
nels were not completed, the permanent bridge across
the Euphrates was not in position, and the terminus
was at Tel-el-Abiad, only about sixty miles to the

308 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

east of that river. This meant not only that Turkish
reinforcements and material destined to perform as
much as possible of the eastern journey by train, were
compelled to be detrained at least twice (in the Taurus
and Amanus sections) but that the enemy was unable
to derive the full benefits provided by the Euphrates
route for water transport.

Under the above circumstances, it is obvious that
the constantly increasing Turkish facilities of trans-
port must have influenced those responsible for orig-
inally pushing forward in Mesopotamia for a dis-
tance and in a manner otherwise entirely unjustified
considering the forces available, the inadequate prep-
arations, and the diflSculty of the country. Thus,
the necessity for forestalling the Turks before they
could effectively improve the Bagdad line must be
considered as one reason for the inauguration of the
Mesopotamian campaign directly after the entry of
Turkey into the War. Moreover, had the Turks been
left a free hand and had the finished parts of the line
therefore been available for the transportation of
railway material instead of being required for mili-
tary purposes, there can be no doubt that much further
progress could have been made both on the main route
and with its several branches. Equally well, in regard
to the Syrian campaign, had we waited to establish
a line of adequate defences in an area situated at a
safe distance to the east of the Canal, until the open-
ing of the Taurus and Amanus tunnels and until the
completion of the new railway on the west of the Jor-
dan, it is obvious that the magnitude of our task and
the dangers of the situation would have been enor-
mously increased. As in the case of Mesopotamia,

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR 309

it is these conditions which make it safe to assert that
the taking of measures required for the protection of
a vital section of the British Empire were necessary
from the outset, and that having regard to what may
be the intended future of this part of the world these
measures may well have entailed a bigger campaign
than was at first intended.

The present is a moment at which it is difficult, if
not undesirable, to make a detailed forecast as to the
future of the Bagdad Railway, and of the other lines
in Asiatic Turkey. The only alternative is therefore
to say that two things seem certain — firstly, that
sooner or later the Bagdad or some other line from the
Bosphorus to the Persian Gulf will be completed ;
and secondly, that its ownership and control must
depend not so much upon any agreements already
made as upon the results of the War and particularly
upon the fate of Turkey. In regard to this latter,
the Allies must leave no stone unturned to prevent
the conclusion of a peace which would leave the enemy
still possessed of the predominating control in an under-
taking which, once it is robbed of its political signifi-
cance, can easily be established upon an international
basis and controlled as a result of the adoption of some
scheme of internationalisation. That scheme must
depend upon the future status of the now Asiatic
dominions of the Sultan.

XII

MITTEL EUROPA

To a Britisher who has followed the trend of events
in the Near East, and who has witnessed the gradual
development of German intrigues in that area, there
has never been published a document so important
and so condemnatory of Germany as the disclosures
of Prince Lichnowsky. On the one hand the memo-
randum of the Kaiser's ex-Ambassador in London,
coming from an authoritative enemy pen, proves that
practically ever since the Russo-Turkish War and par-
ticularly from the time of the accession of the present
Emperor to the throne, the Germans have carefully
prepared the way for the present War, and for the
development of the Mittel Europa scheme. And
on the other side it indicates, if indeed any indication
were still required, that the so-called rivalry existing
between England and Germany prior to the War arose
not from any desire on the part of Great Britain to
stand in the way of the development of legitimate
German interests in the Balkans and in Asia Minor,
but from the unwillingness of the Government of Ber-
lin to agree to any reasonable settlement of the many
all-important questions connected with those regions.

Although for years the Germans had been intrigu-
ing against the Triple Entente, Prince Lichnowsky,

310

I

Baron Marshal von Bieberstein

The late Baron Marshi.1 von Bieberstein was German Ambassador in Con-
stantinople from 1897 until his transference to London in the spring of 1912.
It was largely to him that the earlier development of Germanic influence in
Turkey was due, and he was one of the Kaiser's most important instruments
in furthering the growth of the Mittel Europa scheme.

I

MITTEL EUROPA 311

a man possessed of personally friendly feelings for
England, was sent to London in order to camouflage
the real designs of the enemy and to secure repre-
sentation by a diplomatist who was intended to make
good, and who, in fact, did make a high position for
himself in British official and social circles. The
appointment itself therefore raises two interesting
questions. In the first place, while this is not stated
in the memorandum, it is clear that, whereas Baron
Marshal von Bieberstein, who had been recalled from
Constantinople partly as a consequence of the Turco-
Italian War, was definitely instructed to endeavour
to make friends with England and to detach her from
France and Russia, or, if this were impossible, to bring
about war at a convenient time for Germany, Prince
Lichnowsky's task was somewhat different. Kept
at least more or less in the dark as to German objects,
the Ambassador, who arrived in London when the
Morocco crisis was considered at an end, instead of
being intrusted with the dual objects of his predecessor,
was clearly told to do, and did in fact do, his utmost
to establish friendly relations with England. The
Berlin Government, on the other hand, this time main-
tained in its own hands the larger question of the mak-
ing of war at what it believed, happily wrongly, to be
a convenient time for the Central Empires. In the
second place, although this too is not explained, vari-
ous references made by Prince Lichnowsky leave little
doubt in the mind of the reader, who knows the situa-
tion existing at the German Embassy prior to the out-
break of war, that the Ambassador himself was aware
that von Kuhlmann — the Counsellor of Embassy —
was, in fact, the representative of Pan-Germanism in

312 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

England, and that to this very able and expert intriguer
was left the work of trying to develop a situation which,
in peace or in war, would be favourable to the ruler and
to the class whose views he voiced.

I have already dealt so fully with the question of
German intrigues in the East prior to the outbreak of
the War, that I propose here only briefly to refer to
one or two points raised in the "Revelations of Prince
Lichnowsky", published in pamphlet form by The New
York Times. To begin with, no doubt whatever is
left upon the mind of the reader that Germany, and
not Austria, made this War, largely with the object
of improving her position in the East. Indeed from
the time of the Congress of Berlin of 1878, when Prince
Lichnowsky says his country began the Triple Alliance
Policy, "The goal of our [German] political ambition
was to dominate in the Bosphorus", and "instead of
encouraging a powerful development in the Balkan
States, we [Germany] placed ourselves on the side of
the Turkish and Magyar oppressors."

These words contain in essence and in tabulated
form an explanation of the Pan-German policy in
progress during the period covered by this book —
a policy the existence of which has often been refuted
and denied by those who refused to see that, from the
first, the Kaiser was obsessed by a desire for domina-
tion from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. What is
even more striking, too, is the fact that, in speaking
of the Balkan War period. Prince Lichnowsky says,
that "two possibilities for settling the question re-
mained." Either Germany left the Near-Eastern
problem to the peoples themselves or she supported
her allies "and carried out a Triple Alliance policy

I

MITTEL EUROPA 313

in the East, thereby giving up the role of mediator."
Once more, in the words of the Prince himself, "The
German Foreign OflSce very much preferred the latter,"
and as a result supported Austria on the one hand in
her desire for the establishment of an independent
Albania, and on the other in her successful attempts
to draw Bulgaria into the second war and to prevent
that country from providing the concessions which
at that time would have satisfied Roumania. So far
as the first of these questions is concerned, while the
ex-Ambassador admits the policy of Austria was actu-
ated by the fact that she "would not allow Serbia
to reach the Adriatic", the actual creation of Albania
was justified by the existence of the Albanians as a
nationality and by their desire for independent govern-
ment.

The second direction in which the enemy devoted
his energy was an even larger, more German and more
far-reaching one. "The first Balkan war led to the
collapse of Turkey and with it the defeat of our policy,
which has been identified with Turkey for many years,"
says the memorandum. This, as I have already
explained, at one time seemed destined to carry with
it results entirely disadvantageous to Germany. The
Central Powers realized the situation, and having en-
couraged the Balkan rivalry leading to the second
war, which brought about not a settlement but simply
a holding in suspense of the numerous Near-Eastern
questions of which a settlement was so necessary,
turned their attention toward the improvement of
their relations with Turkey more definitely and more
determinately than had ever been the case before.
Their policy was carried out by two distinct methods.

314 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

The first, which is mentioned by Prince Lichnowsky,
was the appointment of General Liman von Sanders
as practical Commander in Chief of the Turkish Army
— an appointment which, when coupled with the fact
that Enver Pasha — an out and out pro-German —
became Minister of War about the same time, resulted
in enormous improvement in the efficiency of the
Ottoman army and in a far-reaching increase of Pan-
German influence at Constantinople. The second
lever employed by the enemy was connected with the
Aegean Islands question. Germany, having first util-
ized her diplomatic influence in favour of Turkey,
later on inspired the Government of that country in
its continued protests against the decision upon that
question arrived at by the Great Powers. Not con-
tent, however, with this, the Kaiser, who has now
adopted the policy of deportations in Belgium, in Po-
land, and in Serbia, definitely encouraged the Turks in
a like measure in regard to the Greeks of Asia Minor,
in order thereby to be rid themselves of a hostile and
Christian population when the time for action arrived.
That this encouragement was given was always appar-
ent to those who followed the course of events in 1914,
but that it was subsequently admitted by the German
Admiral Uzidon, to Mr. Morgenthau, constitutes a
condemnation the damning nature of which it is diffi-
cult to exaggerate.

Turning to the larger aspects of the European situa-
tion as it existed immediately prior to the outbreak
of the War, there are two questions discussed by Prince
Lichnowsky which are worthy of brief comment here.
The first concerns the ambassadorial admissions as
to the conciliatory attitude adopted by the British

MITTEL EUROPA 315

Government and by the then Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs who sought "to achieve a more friendly
rapprochement with Germany and to bring the two
groups nearer together", and whose sincerity in its
efforts to respect German rights was proved by the
fact that Sir Edward Grey, before the Bagdad Rail-
way Treaty was even completed, called German atten-
tion to English men of business who were seeking oppor-
tunities to invest capital in territories to be included
in the German sphere of interest. These admissions
prove the absolute falseness of all such statements
as those sometimes made to the effect that Russia
and France have consistently co-operated with England
in preventing the completion of the Bagdad Railway.

The terms of this practically concluded Bagdad
Railway arrangement, to which I have referred else-
where, were such that, whilst, had they been known,
they might have aroused criticism in England, they
certainly left no cause for complaint by Germany.
For instance, among other things, that agreement,
the details of which so far as I know are now published
for the first time, sanctioned the continuation of the
Bagdad line to Basra, which right had been foregone
by Germany in order to secure Alexandretta, and also
recognized the whole of Mesopotamia up to Basra,
that is to say, to the north of Basra, as a German zone
of influence. In exchange for this British, French,
and Russian economic interests were acknowledged
respectively on the coasts of the Persian Gulf and in
the Smyrna- Aidin Railway, in Syria, and in Armenia.
That such an arrangement was virtually concluded
clearly proves that the Allies never stood in the way
of the realization of German economic penetration

316 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

in the Near East and that no concessions, however
favourable, would have been sufficient to give satis-
faction to a country determined to establish not its
economic but its military domination.

Turning to the events connected with the crisis
arising out of the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdi-
nand and his Consort on June 28, absolute proofs
are provided from two German pens — those of Prince
Lichnowsky and of Doctor Muhlon, a former member
of the Krupp Directorate — that Berlin, no longer
acting through the mouthpiece of Vienna, promoted
the War, merely utilizing these murders as an excuse
for what was hoped would be the successful develop-
ment of Germanic policy. So early as the spring of
1914, the late Herr von Tschirschky (then German
Ambassador in Vienna) "declared that war must soon
come." In view of subsequent events this declaration
is far more important than is apparent at first sight,
for Von Tschirschky, before his appointment to Vienna
in 1907, had been, for some years, the confidential
representative of the Foreign Office attached to the
Private Council and Cabinet of the Kaiser. This,
coupled with the facts that even Prince Lichnowsky
admits the decisive nature of the Potsdam Meeting
of July 5th, that soon afterward Herr von Jagow (the
German Foreign Secretary) was in Vienna to discuss
everything with Count Berchtold, (Austrian Foreign
Minister), and that Count Mensdorff (Austrian Am-
bassador in London) received a protocol stating "that
it would not matter if war with Russia resulted " con-
stitute a highly probable explanation of what actually
occurred. It is that drastic steps were decided upon
in Berlin a week after the murders, that as Doctor

MITTEL EUROPA 317

Helfferich (then Director of the Deutsche Bank) told
Doctor Muhlon the Kaiser went on "his northern
cruise only as a * blind ' . . . remaining close at hand
and keeping in constant touch", and that the Austrian
ultimatum to Serbia, concocted either in Berlin or by
Von Tchirschky in Vienna, was purposely delayed in
order to enable Germany to put the finishing touches
upon her military preparations, and particularly, as
Mr. Morgenthau explains (upon the authority of the
German Ambassador at Constantinople), to allow the
time necessary for the bankers to readjust their finances
for the coming War.

Up to the outbreak of the War and therefore during
what may be called the "initiation" stage of German
intrigues in the East, there seems every reason to
believe that the enemy was working for the develop-
ment of his Mittel Europa plan in a manner destined
not at once to bring him into open conflict with Great
Britain, or more correctly in a way intended to keep
England out of the first war and to leave her for pro-
posed defeat in a subsequent and early conflagration.
When Great Britain came to the support of France
and Russia, however, it became necessary to modify,
or rather to speed up this plan. Instead of being
able to utilize the present War as a preparatory meas-
ure for the actual realization of the Mittel Europa
scheme, Germany was compelled either to give up
that programme or to endeavour to achieve it during
the present conflagration. It was this change which
resulted in the substitution of the "consummation"
for the "initiation" stage in Pan-German intrigues.
The "consummation" policy in its turn entailed the
ranging of Turkey and all the Balkan States, except

318 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

perhaps Greece, on one side or the other, in order that
the enemy might secure a free run across the Balkans,
which constitute the one and only corridor toward his
real goal — the Bosphorus, Asiatic Turkey, Egypt,
Persia, and India.

It is only necessary here briefly to remind my readers
of the developments during the "consummation"
stage of enemy policy in the East — a stage which
must be divided into three phases. The first lasted
from the outbreak of hostilities until after the entry
of Turkey into the War. That event was of supreme
importance, for in addition to giving Germany the
actual military support of that country, it provided
her with a sort of "island" or "jumping off" place for
the development of her future plans. This was, how-
ever, a situation only partially satisfactory to the
enemy, for owing to the resolute defence sustained by
Serbia and to the continued neutrality of Bulgaria
and Roumania, the lack of direct and unhindered
communication with the East prevented him from
being able to develop to full advantage the support of
Turkey. Consequently after the entry of that country
into the War and during the second "consummation"
phase, the Germans devoted themselves to the situa-
tion in Bulgaria. The acquisition of that country
meant the opening of the German door towards the
East and the certain and early possession by the enemy
of the whole of the main line from Belgrade to Con-
stantinople.

From this time onwards, and during the third "con-
summation" phase, it therefore only remained for the
Central Powers to bring about the consolidation of
their position by the actual defeat of Serbia and by

I

MITTEL EUROPA 319

either the maintenance of the neutrahty of Greece and
of Roumania or by the crushing of these countries
should they enter the War upon the side of the AUies.
Here they appear to have adopted two different policies.
In the case of Greece, I believe that the Germanic
object was to play for continued neutrality and not
for friendly participation in the War. This may well
have been the case, because, by her actual co-opera-
tion, that country could have been of little use to the
Central Powers. Indeed, had Greece actually thrown
in her lot with them during the reign of King Con-
stantine, her long and extremely vulnerable seaboard
would have placed her in a position in which the Allies,
by the establishment of a blockade and by seapower
alone, could either have brought her to her knees or
forced her into a position in which she would have been
a heavier economic and military burden to the enemy
than would have been recompensed by the actual
fighting support which she was in a position to give.
The case of Roumania, however, was entirely differ-
ent, for so long as she remained neutral, Germany
was compelled to depend upon the single line of rail-
way running through Serbia and Bulgaria and to forego
the advantages of the full use of the Danube and of
the numerous railways leading respectively to its
northern and southern banks. As already explained,
it was these advantages, coupled with the great oil
wealth of Roumania and with the ultimate facilities
of communication with Southern Russia and the
Middle East, which have actuated the enemy in his
policy toward a country even the temporary subjuga-
tion of which is of great importance to him.

The above remarks are sufficient to prove the methods

320 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

by and the attention with which the Germans have
developed their plans for conquest in the East. " Their
objective," as President Wilson said in his address
delivered at Baltimore on April 6, 1918, "is undoubt-
edly to make all the Slavic peoples, all the free and
ambitious nations of the Balkan Peninsula, all the
lands that Turkey has dominated and misruled, sub-
ject to their will and ambition and build upon that
dominion an empire of force upon which they fancy
that they can erect an empire of gain and commercial
supremacy, — an empire as hostile to the Americas
as to the Europe which it will overawe, — an empire
which will ultimately master Persia, India, and the
peoples of the Far East."

To summarize the extent to which this purpose has
been realized, and we have to admit its considerable
success if we are to appreciate the task of the Allies,
who must prevent the permanency of those successes,
it has first to be remembered that, whilst the relations
between Germany and Austria had gradually become
more intimate from the time of the Bosnian anr^exa-
tion, it is only since the outbreak of the War that the
direction of affairs, within the Dual Monarchy, has
been practically controlled by Berlin. In addition
the enemy has established his domination over or
conquered Poland, large sections of Russia, and all
the Balkan Peninsula (except Southern Albania and
the greater part of Greece), besides the larger part of
Asiatic Turkey. He is now preparing to overrun
Persia. This means that the Central Powers have
gone a long way towards the temporary establishment
of their position in the East and that, by the exit of
Russia from the War, they have rid themselves of a

MITTEL EUROPA 321

formerly existing danger to their "Drang nach Osten"
policy. It is this indirect result of the Peace of Brest
Litovsk, this removal of the greatest menace to Ger-
many's Eastern dreams, which is possessed of conse-
quences almost if not quite as far-reaching as are those
connected with the vast enemy forces freed for service
in the West.

The peace recently imposed upon Roumania, when
coupled with other developments which preceded it,
and particularly with the situation in Russia, consti-
tutes a definite Pan-Germanic development — prob-
ably a new development — for it means the opening
of a fresh door toward the East. The domination of
Germany in Southern Russia itself gives her routes
to the northern shore of the Black Sea, the importance
of which is so obvious that it requires no comment
here. But those routes could not have been used to
full advantage and with adequate security so long as
the Roumanian army, however small and isolated,
remained a military force in being and so long as it
held even a section of Northern Moldavia. Thus
whilst prior to the arrangements made by the Treaties
of Brest Litovsk and Bucharest the Central Pow-
ers were already in possession of a direct connection
with Constantinople and the Black Sea, now that
Russia and Roumania are both out of the War, the
enemy has secured a route or routes between Central
Europe and the East, not only partially but entirely
alternative to that provided by the railway from Bel-
grade to Constantinople. By going overland to Odessa
or Constanza, communication will be available by way
of the Black Sea with Constantinople. The employ-
ment of these routes will necessitate little if any delay.

322 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

for, in peace time, whereas the journey from Berhn
to Constantinople via Odessa required approximately
sixty hours, by direct train it took about fifty-five
hours. That the difference will be even less by way
of Constanza is proved by the fact that, some years
before the War, the Germans arranged for a special
express train to run from Berlin by way of Breslau,
Cracow, Lemberg, and Roumania to Constanza, a
train so rapid and well arranged that the whole journey
could be accomplished more quickly and more cheaply
than by any other ordinary route across Europe.

It is not, however, only with Constantinople, but
also in the direction of the Middle East and Central
Asia that Germany has secured or may now secure
new facilities for communication. Thus if the enemy
continues to dominate Roumania and Southern Russia,
his troops and war material can be conveyed to Con-
stanza and Odessa, thence to be shipped by way of the
Black Sea to the ports of Northern Asia Minor and to
Batum in the Caucasian area, surrendered to Turkey.
This means, when coupled with the fact that the Rus-
sian Black Sea Fleet (consisting of two dreadnoughts
and several older battleships and cruisers and a num-
ber of torpedo boats and submarines) is unlikely, to
say the least of it, to act in a manner hostile to Ger-
many, that the enemy has before him a wholly new
route from Europe to Asia — a route which does not
depend upon and which can be used in place of the
Bagdad Railway. Batum is connected by a railway
with Tiflis. From this point one line goes to Baku
on the Caspian, and another runs in a more or less
southerly direction to Julfa, on the Turco-Persian
frontier, from which point, since the beginning of the

I

I

MITTEL EUROPA 323

War, it has been extended at least to Tabriz, situated
only about three hundred and thirty miles to the north-
east of Bagdad. Baku, too, is in railway connection
with the remainder of Russia. These are conditions
and developments which affect the whole situation.

The Germano-Roumano-Russian peace therefore
indicates the attempted foundation for a policy not
of German domination from the North Sea to the
Persian Gulf, but from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
Over and above the already mentioned communica-
tions and ignoring the Trans-Siberian Railway, the
development of this policy is furthered by lines con-
structed by Russia in areas often held in England to
be a menace by that country to India. Thus start-
ing from Krasnovodsk, on the east of the Caspian,
opposite to Baku, a line runs through Merv, Bokara and
Samarcand towards the Chinese frontier. A little
to the east of Samarcand this line is met by another
coming from Petrograd by way of Moscow, Samara,
Orenburg, and Tashkend — a line which, were it to
fall into German hands, could be employed to further
her world domination schemes without the necessity
for the one hundred and ninety miles' passage across
the Caspian. From the above-mentioned junction
it was reported, prior to the exit of Russia from the
War, that that country was building a railway towards
the frontier of Afghanistan. The progress made by
that line is uncertain, but even if it be not great, the
distance left unbridged between the completed Rus-
sian railways of Central Asia and the terminus of the
Indian system at Peshawar cannot amount to more
than between four hundred and five hundred miles.
Whilst happily, at the moment of writing, the enemy

324 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

is not in possession of the railways of all Russia or of
the Trans-Caspian areas, and whilst equally happily
the Hindu Kush Range constitutes a natural barrier
between the termini in question, in considering the
larger aspects of the situation in Russia, the existence
of these railways constitutes a question the far-reach-
ing importance of which it is impossible to ignore.

Events are moving so rapidly and the situation has
to be viewed from so many standpoints that it is im-
possible to indicate the war measures necessary of
adoption to counter the enemy's designs in the East.
Nevertheless it is desirable briefly to discuss two condi-
tions which must be realized after the War — condi-
tions in a way interdependent and conditions which
must be brought about if the danger of prolonged
Teutonic domination in the East is to be averted. I
refer to the necessity for the establishment of an anti-
German barrier and to the distribution of Near-Eastern
territories upon a basis sufliciently fair and just to be
a safeguard against future wars. In regard to the first
of these conditions there were or there are two schools
of thought. According to the first, whilst some form
of government with the consent of the governed should
be inaugurated in favour of the various nationalities of
Austria-Hungary who have not heretofore had an ade-
quate voice in the direction of their own affairs, the
Dual Monarchy should remain more or less intact or
even be strengthened in certain directions with the
object of enabling its rulers to withstand Germanic
influence and of creating of it an anti-Prussian barrier.
This sounds satisfactory and it might at one time have
been satisfactory. But in view of recent events it
seems difficult to believe that the adoption of such a

MITTEL EUROPA 325

course would in itself bring about the necessary security.
This is the case because no guarantees would exist that
the Austro-Hungarian Government would or could
break away from the domination of Berlin or that it
would introduce or still more maintain a regime accept-
able to all or many of its present subject peoples.

As an alternative or as a supplementary course we
are therefore compelled to look to the setting up of
safeguards only partly in and largely to the East of
the Dual Monarchy. I refer to a Balkan Barrier.
It is said by some, as it was said in 1913, that an en-
larged and strengthened Serbia, or a Balkan League
composed of a satisfied Serbia, Roumania, and Greece
would be a sufficient assurance. This theory is with-
out a sound basis, for I am convinced that no one Bal-
kan country or no group of countries which left out
one or more of the neighbouring States, would con-
stitute an adequate precaution against a further Ger-
manic effort to dominate the East or against a renewed
outbreak of war as a result of conditions prevailing
in this ever "Danger Zone of Europe." Thus were
Serbia, Roumania, or Greece to be increased in size
by the inclusion of all the areas which they covet, and
were the name of Bulgaria to be entirely or practically
blotted off the map of Europe, so long as the Bulgarian
race existed under Bulgarian or alien rule, so long
would there be a certainty of unrest in the Balkans —
unrest which in its turn would be an excuse for foreign
intrigue. Equally well were Serbia and Greece al-
lowed practically to divide Albania, this would not
only be an injustice to the people of the areas so divided
but it would leave the way open for renewed European
and local diflSculties. Consequently it is only by a fair

326 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

and equitable distribution of Balkan territories, that
there can be established a state of things, which if it be
not at once acceptable to all the parties concerned, will
none the less form a basis of a stable peace, a peace
which will untimately encourage good Balkan relations
destined automatically, in the end, to help to bar the
gate in face of German domination in the East.

To consider first the kind of arrangement which
should be substituted for the fatal Treaty of Bucharest
of 1913, whilst I do not agree with its every detail
and whilst I do not base the following remarks entirely
upon it, I cannot do better than to refer my readers
to a potent, well-informed, and comprehensive article
which appeared under the title "The Final Settlement
in the Balkans" in The Quarterly Review (Number
453) for October, 1917.i Though the writer of that
article speaks of five, it seems to me preferable to say
that there are three all-important principles which
must be taken into account in endeavouring to solve
the Balkan Question. Undoubtedly the first is the
basis of nationality, which should always be accepted
unless it be made impossible of adoption by one of the
other two conditions. Coming next in order are eco-
nomic and commercial considerations, that is to say,
the provision for each country of adequate and natural
access to the sea. In certain cases the realization of
this consideration may clash with and must take pre-
cedence over the basis of nationality, for in various
instances the seaports are not inhabited in majority
by the same nationality as the interior. Thirdly, in
view of the complicated nature of the geography of the

1 The author of this article is Mr. James D. Bourchier, the famous
Balkan correspondent of The Times.

MITTEL EUROPA 327

peninsula, due weight and consideration must be given
to the existence of certain natural frontiers and stra-
tegic requirements, the overlooking of which is not
possible. In addition to these principles, though not
upon the same level of importance with them, there
are certain pre-War European decisions which might
well be taken as guiding factors and which should not
therefore be treated as mere ** scraps of paper."

To attempt to apply these principles in detail would
mean the expansion of this volume far beyond its avail-
able capacity and therefore the only course left open
to me is very briefly to allude to the general conditions
to be created by their adoption. Beginning with
Roumania, her natural southern frontier with Serbia
and Bulgaria would be the Danube, but that river
cannot be taken as the boundary right to its mouth
as special arrangements must be made for the Dobrudja
in order to allow Roumania adequate access to the sea.
Near Silistria the Danube frontier should therefore be
replaced by that arranged under the Protocol of Petro-
grad of May, 1913, by which the town of Silistria went
to Roumania. On the west and northwest the Rou-
manian frontiers should be extended in a manner to
give the Banat and large areas of Transylvania and
of the Bukovina to that country. The inclusion of the
Banat in Roumania will constitute a hardship for
Serbia in that Belgrade would still remain on the
frontier and that a considerable Serb population exists
in the southwestern portion of that area. On her
eastern frontier there should certainly be a modifica-
tion in favour of Roumania which would give to that
country at least a portion of Bessarabia.

Coming to Bulgaria, I think that the Enos-Midia

328 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

line, arranged by the Balkan Allies and sanctioned by
the Great Powers at the time of the signature of the
Treaty of London (May, 1913) should be taken as a
basis in deciding the position of Bulgaria's southeastern
frontier. The delimitation of the southwestern and
western boundaries of the dominions of King Ferdinand,
and therefore the drawing of the Bulgaro-Greek and the
Bulgaro-Serbian frontiers will be much more compli-
cated. Here no doubt rests in my mind that Bulgaria
must be assured adequate access to the Aegean and
that her frontier should be extended so as to include
Kavala together with adequate means of approach to
the coast at that point. With regard to the Bulgaro-
Serbian and to what may be a future Bulgaro-Greek
frontier in the neighbourhood or on the west of the
Vardar Valley, any solution is beset by the ever-present
difficulty of the Macedonian question and of the arrival
at a decision as to the nationality of the inhabitants
of doubtful or disputed areas. That question which
concerns Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria could be decided
in one of three ways — according to language, by tak-
ing a plebiscite, or upon the basis of the arrangements
made between the parties concerned in 1912. If the
first of these means were adopted the necessary meas-
ures would have to be taken to ascertain the areas
in which Greek and Slav are spoken and to discover
where the forms of speech particular to Bulgars or
Serbs are employed. In theory the taking of a plebis-
cite would be a satisfactory manner of arriving at a
solution of the problem. But to enable the people
to vote freely, a plebiscite would have to be conducted
under the direct auspices of the Allies, or better still
under the control of America.

MITTEL EUROPA Sm

Whilst some other means would have to be found for
dealing with the areas not already specially mentioned
and in dispute between Bulgaria and Greece, the third
and last suggestion for a solution of the Serbo-Bul-
garian part of the question would seem to be the one
the simplest and fairest of adoption. It is the simplest
because the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty and its annex of
1912 were arranged by the two contracting parties,
without foreign interference, only ^ye years ago, and
when the question was looming not in the distance, but
at a moment when a redistribution of territory was
actually foreseen. To take that agreement as the basis
for, though not necessarily the actual text of, a future
arrangement would be the fairest settlement of the
problem because Bulgaria would thereby secure much
less than she now holds (she would have to vacate all
the districts of Serbia which were Serbian before the
Balkan Wars, and also the Macedonian areas which
went to the latter country by the Treaty) and because
she would obtain probably only a section of the terri-
tory to be acquired by her under a plebiscite or upon
the language basis.

One of the most important problems connected with
this part of the peninsula concerns the future of Salo-
nica. ^hat question can hardly be decided primarily
on the basis of nationality, for the Jewish element of
the population predominates. Consequently it would
seem that the allotment of this all-important city
should be governed largely by the condition that ports
ought not to be separated from the hinterland which
they serve and therefore by what may be the future
distribution of the hinterland in question. Under
these circumstances all that can be said here is that

330 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

three solutions are feasible. Firstly the city might
be left to Greece. This would have the advantage
of avoiding a loss of prestige for M. Venezelos and a
disappointment for the Greeks. But on the other hand
Greece, which has plenty of ports, does not require
Salonica, and the Jews of that city would certainly
prefer almost any regime to Hellenic rule. Secondly,
if Central and Western Macedonia accrue to Bulgaria,
then Salonica might go with them. This settlement,
possessed of many advantages, would, however, be
greatly resented alike by the Greeks and the Serbs.
And thirdly Salonica, by itself, might be constituted a
free port under the protection of the Powers, or it
might form the capital and port of an autonomous
Macedonia, foreseen by the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty
of 1912 and now to be created under the protection of
the Powers in order temporarily to get over the diffi-
culties concerning the future of areas disputed between
Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria.

Turning to Albania, whilst upon ethnical grounds
the frontiers might be considerably extended, the
decisions of the London Ambassadorial Conference
might well be taken as a basis in fixing future bound-
aries. In justice to Albania herself and in the interest
of future peace, however, there should be certain minor
rectifications in favour of that country. The prin-
cipal directions in which attention should be turned
are towards a change in the south, which would bring
the whole of the road from Santi Quaranta to Korcha
within Albania, instead of leaving it to pass through
a triangular area of Greece, towards the inclusion in
Albania of Dibra, Prisrend, and Jacova — towns
which are absolutely essential as market centres, and

MITTEL EUROPA 331

towards the regaining of the tribes of Hoti and Gruda,
which are so absolutely Albanian in sentiment that they
will never peacefully accept any form of alien rule.
With such modifications Albania would be constituted
on a basis which would make her national existence
practicable instead of impossible, as it was prior to the
War.

As Montenegro and Serbia seem destined sooner or
later to be united either as one kingdom or at least on
terms so intimate as to make any serious rivalry out
of the question, I will consider the gains which should
be assured to those countries as common and discuss
them all under one heading. Here the most impor-
tant developments recently arising are the friendly
understanding said now to have been arrived at
between Italy and the Slavs and the reported replace-
ment of the original Treaty between Italy, England,
France, and Russia by a new agreement. As the nature
of neither of these arrangements is known, I will merely
endeavour approximately to sketch the acquisitions
which should be secured by Montenegro-Serbia. The
Bocche di Cattaro and the coastal area of Dalmatia,
lying to the southeast of it, should be Slav. Bosnia
and Herzegovina, together with a length of the Adriatic
Coast on the north of the Bocche di Cattaro, sufficient
to give a proper Serbian access to the sea, ought to
be allotted to that country or to Montenegro. With
regard to Croatia and to Slavonia, which should be
considered separately to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
to the remainder of Dalmatia, the futures of these
areas are bound up with many questions which do not
fall within the limits of this volume. Sufiicient there-
fore be it to say that a friendly agreement between

332 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

Italy and the Southern Slavs is essential to the inter-
ests of both parties and that, when the time for a deci-
sion comes and when it be possible to ascertain the true
sentiments of the inhabitants, these sentiments must
be treated with all possible deference in any solution
of the Jugo-Slav and Adriatic Questions decided upon
by the Allies.

From the foregoing remarks it would seem that
Greece is the country destined to lose the most and to
gain the least by any feasible settlement of the Balkan
Question. This is the case because the claims of
that country are most difficult of satisfaction in that
the Hellenic element of the population is for the most
part scattered and that, where it exists in preponder-
ating numbers, especially in numerous coastal regions,
the futures of those regions cannot, for reasons already
given, be decided solely upon the nationality basis.
This was of course foreseen by M. Venezelos, when he
proposed, early in the War, to make concessions to
Bulgaria and to come to the support of the Allies,
presumably on the understanding that his country
should receive compensation without the Balkan
Peninsula. Had the Premier been able to secure the
adoption of his point of view at that time, and had
the support of Greece then been available against
Turkey, she might well have secured valuable gains
at the expense of that country. As things stand at
present, however, unless Greece were to be given
Monastir, to which she has better racial claims than
has Serbia, it is difficult to see where her aspirations,
at any rate on the mainland, can be gratified. But
whilst we do not know the nature of the arrangement
reported to have taken the place of the Treaty said to

MITTEL EUROPA 333

have been signed with Italy on her entry into the War,
it is possible that this arrangement has foreseen the
desirability of rewarding Greece by the acquisition
of at least some of the Aegean Islands, now in posses-
sion of Italy, and that Cyprus, offered to her by Great
Britain in 1915, might be ceded under some arrange-
ment at the end of the War. These are concessions
which would be justified on ethnical grounds and which
would certainly do something to make up for losses
possibly to be suffered by Greece in other directions.

In placing the above suggestions before my readers
I make no claim that their adoption, as a basis for the
future settlement of the Balkans, would be entirely
popular in any of the countries concerned or that
it would lead to the immediate cessation of unrest in
the areas in question. Neither of these results is
possible until sufficient time has elapsed to enable
tranquillity and prosperity to do something to blot
out the memories of the past. Those conditions,
which can only be realized by a justifiable distribution
of territory, can hardly be brought about by local
arrangement. When the proper time comes, there-
fore, it is still for the Allies to adopt the policy defined
by Sir Edward Grey on September 28, 1915, namely,
to further "the national aspirations of the Balkan
States without sacrificing the independence of any
of them." The continued pursuit of such a policy,
which may have to be firmly imposed upon the chau-
vinistic elements of the various nationalities, will tend
to put an end to a state of things largely responsible
for rendering possible the present War and for many of
the events which have taken place since August, 1914.

The last subject for discussion here is that which

334 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

concerns the futures of what would remain of Turkey
in Europe — Constantinople and its surroundings —
and of the Asiatic Dominions of the Sultan. With
so many factors still undecided, it is too early yet even
to make any definite suggestions upon these compli-
cated and all-important questions. To begin with,
it is impossible to forecast whether Turkey will be
allowed to continue her independent existence as a
Great Power, or whether the Ottoman Empire as a
whole or in part is to be placed directly under Euro-
pean control. In either case, however, although the
arrangements would be somewhat different, it is safe
to say that the present status of Constantinople and of
the Straits must be changed, and that the Dardanelles
and the Bosphorus should in the future be unfortified
and open not only to the ships of war of Turkey but
to those of all nations. If these conditions be realized
there are then two alternatives. By the first Turkey
would continue to be the nominal sovereign power
at Constantinople, but the city, together with its
European and Asiatic surroundings, whilst remain-
ing under the Turkish flag, would be definitely con-
trolled under some form of international arrange-
ment hereafter to be decided. By the second, Turkish
rule would cease altogether in the European area
situated to the southeast of the Enos-Midia line and
in a band of Asiatic territory bordering on the south-
eastern shores of the Bosphorus, the Marmora, and the
Dardanelles — a band sufficiently wide to safeguard
the neutrality of those waterways. In that case these
areas would pass under the direct and absolute control
of the Powers or of some country or countries nomi-
nated by them.

MITTEL EUROPA 335

As in the case of Constantinople so with regard to
the Asiatic Dominions of the Sultan the primary and
absolute necessity is that Germanic domination must
cease and that measures must be taken to prevent the
further butchery and oppression of the non-Turkish
elements of the population, and particularly to assure
the safety of the Armenians who remain. This state
of things might conceivably be brought about whilst
the Turkish flag still flew over large areas of what are
now Asiatic Turkey, but in that case, in addition to
the above suggested safeguards, local autonomy would
have to be granted to the various now subject peoples.
On the other hand if a policy of disintegration or of
complete control be adopted by the Allies, then we
shall see either the birth of a number of new states
in Western Asia or the establishment of several autono-
mous regions each probably directly or indirectly
under some kind of foreign supervision. That super-
vision might take the form of a Governor General
nominated by the Great Powers and assisted by an
Ambassadorial Council at Constantinople, possessed
of direct control over that city and of only the indirect
super visal of several semi-independent States, each
possessed of their own Governments. Or it might be
carried out by means of separate and independent
regimes for Constantinople and for the different areas
of the interior. These and many other problems are
destined for the moment to remain unsettled and to
be decided, when the time for decision comes, upon the
basis of factors many of which cannot be discussed under
existing circumstances.

Throughout this volume I have endeavoured to re-
view the situation in the East as it actually was and

336 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

is and to admit enemy successes where successes have
been achieved. At the time of writing, judging from
the map, those successes are considerable and far-
reaching. But if the Germans have been generally
correct in their diagnosis of the "trees", of the details
of the War, they have been and are almost universally
wrong in their appreciation of the "woods", the larger
aspects of the situation. Such mistakes as those con-
cerning their misinterpretation of the original attitude
of Great Britain, their opinion of what they called
"the contemptible little British Army" and their
optimism in regard to the policy of Italy, together
with their fatal error in miscalculating the sentiments,
the determination, and the power of the people of the
United States, have already caused them to be swept
from the sea, to lose their colonies, and to be compelled
to play for a draw or even to be ready to make sacri-
fices in the West in order to maintain and keep the
door open for their intrigues and schemes of conquest
in the East. We may be Westerners or we may be
Easterners in military policy, but in either case it must
be clear to every member of the thinking public that
no terms can be made and that no peace will be lasting
which does not free the East "from the impudent and
alien domination of the Prussian military and commer-
cial autocracy." To fail to achieve this object would
be to prolong the existence of the Near East as "The
Danger Zone of Europe" and to leave that area the
ready "Cradle" for yet another war.

1

POSTSCRIPT

Readers of the foregoing pages will have discovered
that they include a review of many of the conditions
influencing the developments which began on the
Balkan front on July 6, 1918. In considering those
developments, and especially the events in the more or
less immediate vicinity of the Adriatic, the first con-
dition to be remembered is that we have no information
as to the progress of events in Northern and Central
Albania since the enemy occupation of those areas early
in 1916. Thus whilst we know that the Italians have
built roads, and I believe one or more sections of rail-
way, in the districts which they held, we are in total
ignorance as to the facilities of communication estab-
lished by the Austrians. All that can be said, there-
fore, is that, up to the time of the enemy advance in
1916, there were no railways in Albania and that the
so-called roads consisted almost exclusively of mere
tracks not passable for wheeled traffic.

Consequently, knowing the country as I do, I think
that the initial Allied goal must be the occupation of
a line situated to the north of and running more or less
parallel to the Scumbi Valley. An advance to such a
line, if it included the capture of the Krabe Mountains,
lying to the north of Elbasan, would mean the occu-
pation and the freeing of at least half Albania and the

338 THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

almost certain capture of Durazzo and perhaps of
Tirana. It would place in our hands the natural line
of communication from the Adriatic into the interior
— a line which follows the ancient Via Egnatia and the
Scumbi Valley and a line along which, if it has not
already been built, a modern road could easily be con-
structed.

By such an advance the Allies would have gained
the larger part of the plains of Central Albania, the
western section of the Balkan front would have been
straightened out in a manner greatly to our advantage,
and we should be in possession of the section of Albania
inhabited by the more enlightened element of the popu-
lation. Moreover the occupation of Durazzo and of
the Scumbi Valley would wrest from the enemy a port,
which has probably played its part in enabling him to
threaten the Allied routes across the Lower Adriatic,
and it would give to us a new point of entry into and
means of communication with the Western Balkans.
Whether those facilities would be utilised for provi-
sioning the Allied forces on all or parts of the Salonica
front or whether they would lead to a far-reaching
advance in the Balkans are questions which cannot be
discussed here. Sufficient, therefore, be it to say that
developments taking place at the time of writing these
few lines (July 15) once more thrust the Near East
into the forefront of the War and that they justify
our continued attention to the progress of events in an
area which becomes ever more and more important.

SOME USEFUL PUBLICATIONS ON THE SAME

SUBJECT

Official Documents

Bagdad Railway (1911) Parliamentary Paper (Cd. 5635).
Dardanelles Commission, First Report (Cd. 8490) 1917.
Mesopotamia Commission, Report (Cd. 8610) 1917.

Books

"Turkey in Europe'' .... Sir Charles Eliot
"Turkey and Its People" . . . Sir Edwin Pears
"Macedonia, Its Races and Their

Future" H. N. Brailsford

"The Balkan Peninsula" . . . L. W. Lyde and A. F.

Mockler Ferryman
"Geographical Aspects of Balkan

Problems" Marion Newbigin

" The Eastern Question : an his-
torical study in European

Diplomacy" J. A. R. Marriott

"The Danger Zone of Europe" . H. Charles Woods
"Washed by Four Seas" . . . H. Charles Woods
"Report of the International

Commission to Inquire into

the Cause and Conduct of

the Balkan Wars," published

by the Carnegie Endowment

for International Peace,

Washington, D. C.

340

THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

Nelson's History of the War" . John Buchan

High Albania'* M. E. Durham

The Struggle for Scutari" . . M. E. Durham
The Aspirations of Bulgaria" . Balkanicus
The Reconstruction of South

Eastern Europe " . . . .
The Balkan League" ....
'Bulgaria and Her People with

an Account of the Balkan

Wars, Macedonia and the

Macedonian Bulgars"
The King of Roumania"
The Life of King George of

Greece"

' Forty Years in Constantinople '
The Middle-Eastern Question'
■ Corps de Droit Ottoman " .
'Turkish Memories" . . .
'Turkey and the War" . .
The Short Cut to India" .
'Le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad'
'Turkey in Transition" . .
'Revelations of Prince Lich-

nowsky"
Pamphlet published by The New York Times

Vladislav R. Savic
I. E. Gueshoff

William Seymour Monroe
Sidney Whitman

Capt. Walter Christmas
Sir Edwin Pears
Valentine Chirol
George Young, M.V.O.
Sidney Whitman
Vladimir Jabotinsky
David Eraser
Andre Cheradame
G. F. Abbott

Magazine Articles.

'The Final Settlement in the Balkans" with map. James
D. Bourchier. The Quarterly Review, October, 1917.

'Communications in the Balkans." H. Charles Woods.
The Geographical Journal, April, 1916.

'The Bagdad Railway." Edwin Pears. Contemporary Re-
view, November, 1908.

'The Bagdad Railway." Arthur von Gwinner. Nineteenth
Century, June, 1909.

USEFUL PUBLICATIONS 341

" The Bagdad Railway." Hopkins. Journal of the United
Service Institution, India, October, 1909.

"The Bagdad Railway." H. F. B. Lynch.. Fortnightly
Review, March and May, 1911.

"A New German Empire: The Story of the Bagdad Rail-
way." Andre Geraud. Nineteenth Century, May and
June, 1914.

"The Bagdad Railway and Its Tributaries." H. Charles
Woods. The Geographical Journal, July, 1917.

"The Bagdad Railway Negotiations." Quarterly Review,
October, 1917.

"Railways in Western Asia." Lieutenant-Colonel H. Picot.
Proceedings of the Central Asian Society, 1904.

"Railways in the Middle East." H. F. B. Lynch. Pro-
ceedings of the Central Asian Society, 1911.

"The Bagdad Railway." Andre Cheradame. Proceedings
of the Central Asian Society, 1911.

INDEX

Abdul Hamid, 7, 8, 12.

Achi Baba, 234.

Adabazar, 278.

Adjud, 196.

Adrianople, 25, 26, 28, 32, 33, 59, 60,
90 ; road from Jamboli to, 202.

Adrianople, Station of, 192 n.

Adriatic Sea, question of, 27, 331 ;
commanding position of Albania
with reference to, 153 ; plans for
running railway from the Danube
to, 205, 206 ; railways from the
lower coast of, to the interior, 200-
209.

Aegean Islands, disposition of, by
the London Ambassadorial Con-
ference, 34, 35, 60, 61 ; the ques-
tion of, 137 ; and Germany, 314 ;
possible disposition of, after the
War, 333.

Aehrenthal, Count, and the proclama-
tion of Bulgarian independence, 9,
10; and the annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, 10, 11.

Afghanistan, 323.

Afiun Karahissar, 279, 280.

Ahmed Djemal Pasha, 66, 70.

Ahwaz, 78, 80.

Ain Safar, 304.

Akaba, 85.

Ak Kupru, 288.

Albania, under the New Regime, 18,
19, 164, 165 ; Northern, campaign
in Balkan War, 25, 26 ; autonomy
for, agreed upon by London Con-
ference, 27, 33; and Scutari, 34;
difficulty of fixing frontiers of, 34 ;
significance of establishment of,
39 ; geographical and political
importance of, 153, 154 ; the
question of, an important problem,
154 J geographical limits of, 154-

156 ; creation of Principality of,
155, 166 ; geographical description
of, 156, 157 ; its position in the
Ottoman Empire, 158, 159 ; under
the Old Regime, 164 ; under the
regime of Prince William of Wied,
167-169; the northern part of,
overrun by Austro-Germans, 169,
170 ; the southern part of, occu-
pied by the Italians, 170-172 ;
a State, proclaimed by Colonel
Descoin, 170; improvement in
conditions in, made by Italians,

171, 172 ; probable future status of,

172, 173 ; routes in, 207-209, 337 ;
operations in, as affected by occu-
pation of Monastir, 266, 267; in-
dependence of, supported by Ger-
many and justified, 313 ; possible
frontiers of, after the War, 330,
331 ; present goal of Allies in, 337,
338.

Albanians, utilised by Young Tiu-ks
to demand constitution, 8 ; occu-
pations of, 156 ; nationality of,
157; descendants of the lUyrians,
158; character of, 159, 160; two
groups of, 160 ; religion of, 100,
161 ; language of, 161-164 ; and
the Balkan Wars, 165-167.

Aleppo, 272, 275, 276, 291, 293, 294,
303.

Alexander, King, of Greece, 148.

Alexandretta, 272, 291-293, 315.

Allies, The, diplomacy of, in reference
to Bulgaria and Serbia, 51, 52; ^
difficulties of, in Turkey, 65, 66 ;
and Gocben and Breslau, 69 ; im-
portance to, of an understanding
with Bulgaria, 94, 95 ; difficult
position of, with relation to Bul-
garia, 98 ; discussion of states-

344

INDEX

manship of, in the Balkan question,
102-104, 246 ; influence bearing
upon their attitude toward Greece,
130 ; negotiations of, for conces-
sions by Greece, 140; troops of,
landed in Greece, 142 ; difficulties
of their relationship with Greece,
143 ; blockade Greek coasts, 145 ;
land troops at Piraeus, 146 ; diffi-
culties of the policy of, in the
matter of the Greek king, 148 ;
justification of their act of causing
the Greek king to abdicate, 149,
150 ; present goal of, in Albania,
337, 338.

Amanian Gates, 293.

Amanus Range, 274, 275, 293, 294.

Amara, 80.

America, respect for, in Armenia,
Bulgaria, and Albania, 5.

American Board of Commissioners

. for Foreign Missions, establish-
ments of, in Asia Minor, xiv, 5.

Amman, 305.

Anatolian Railway, 276-278, 282.

Andorra, 54.

Andriyevitza, 207.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 78.

Angora, 276-278, 283.

Anti-German barrier in the East,
question of, xi, 324-326.

Anti-Lebanon, the, 304.

Antioch, 293.

Antivari, 39, 55, 206.

Antivari-Virbazar Railway, 206.

Anzac Beach, 234.

Arabian Independentist Movement,
85.

Arda River, 259.

Arjish River, 119.

Armenia, part of, annexed to Russia,
2 ; in the Treaty of BerHn, 3, 4 ;
Turkey's treatment of, 5 ; scheme
for reforms in, 63, 64 ; reign of
terror in, 64, 70-72; British,
French, and Russian interests in, 315.

Armenians, massacre of, 4, 5, 64,
70-72, 290; future safety of,
should be assured, 335.

Asia Minor, railways of. See Rail-
way, Railways.

Austria-Hungary, on Cretan ques-
tion withdraws from Concert of

Europe, 7 ; and the Bulgarian
declaration of independence, 9, 10 ;
relation of, to Germany, affected
by the annexation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 10, 11 ; relation of
Serbia to, affected by Bosnian
annexation, 11 ; attitude of, on
Adriatic question, 27 ; status of
Serbia and Montenegro after the
Balkan Wars a source of disappoint-
ment to, 43 ; intended to attack
Serbia in 1913, 44 ; her ultimatum
to Serbia, 45, 46 ; crises between
Montenegro and, 55 ; hated by
Montenegrins, 56 ; her striving for
influence in Albania, 154 ; future
of, 324, 325.

Austrians, their first invasion of
Serbia in August, 1914, 47; their
second invasion of Serbia in Sep-
tember, 1914, 48; defeated by
Serbians, 48, 49; take Mt. Lov-
tchen, 57.

Avlona, 153, 157, 169-171, 208, 266.

Babuna Pass, 262, 266.

Bagche tunnel, 294.

Bagdad, 79, 81-83.

Bagdad Loan Contract, 284, 286.

Bagdad Railway, concession, followed
Emperor's visit to Constantinople,
7, 281 ; use of, by Turks in Meso-
potamian campaign, 85 ; military
importance of, 271, 272; Ger-
many's scheme for, 271, 272, 292 ;
objects of, military, 272; earlier
projects for, 272, 273 ; signing of
charter of, 282; features of Con-
vention of 1903, 283 ; financial ar-
rangements, 283, 284 ; from Konia
to Eregli, 285 ; delays after com-
pletion of first section, 286, 287 ;
description of the Taurus section,
287-291 ; the Alexandretta line,
291-293 ; the Amanus section,
293-295 ; new Conventions of
March 19, 1911, 295-298; sec-
tions completed or not since the
new Conventions, 295-297 ; sec-
tion from Bagdad to Persian Gulf,
297 ; agreement of Tsar and Kai-
ser in 1910 relative to, 297, 298;
Anglo-Germano-Turkish negotia-

INDEX

345

tions in 1913 and 1914, 298; facil-
ities for travel on, 299-301 ; journey
from London to Bombay, 299, 300 ;
conveniences of travel by, 300,
301 ; cost of, to Turkey, 301, 302 ;
military results of, 302, 303 ; pro-
jected improvements in, affected
Allied campaign in Mesopotamia,
307, 308 ; future of, 309 ; arrange-
ment between Sir Edward Grey
and Prince Lichnowsky concern-
ing, 314-316.

Baiburt, 75.

Baku, 323.

Balance of Power, 37, 38.

Balkan alliance, 20-25, 39, 41, 90,
128.

Balkan Barrier, question of, 325, 326.

Balkan Peninsula, description of,
174-176 ; the meeting-place of
East and West, 176, 177; a land
of contrasts, 178; climate of, 178,
179 ; travelling and accommoda-
tions in, 181 ; railways and roads
of, 186-213; rivers of, 213, 214.
See Balkans.

Balkan Question, the occasion of the
War, vii, ix, x ; principles to be
observed in settling, 326, 327, 333 ;
suggested definition of boundaries
of the different nationalities, 327-
333.

Balkan Range, 175.

Balkan War, First, beginning and four
campaigns of, 25, 26; Second, 30-33,
38, 264; opposed by Powers, 36;
possibilities of, 37; summary of
causes and results of, 38, 39 ; result
of, for Montenegro, 56.

Balkans, the, importance of condi-
tions in, 1 ; the Danger Zone of
Europe, 1 ; war of 1877 in, 2 ; far-
reaching importance of events in,
from 1908 to close of Balkan Wars,
35 ; mentality of Governments
of, 103. See Balkan Peninsula.

Banat, the, 107, 327.

Basra, 79, 80, 83, 283, 297, 299, 315.

Batum, 76, 322.

Bavaria, 131.

Bayazid, 73.

Beersheba, 87, 276.

Beikos. 222-224.

Beirut, 273, 304.

Beirut-Damascus-Hauran Railway,
304.

Belgrade, attacked by Austrians, 47;
surrendered, 48 ; retaken, 49 ;
again taken by the enemy, 53.

Belgrade-Constantinople Railway,
187-189.

Berane, 207.

Berat, 208, 267.

Berchtold, Count, 44, 316.

Berlin, Congress of (1878), 3 ; Treaty
of (1878), 3, 184, 185, 188; Rou-
mania at Congress of, 107.

Berlin-Constanza Express, 195.

Beshik Dagh, 254, 256.

Bessarabia, question of, 106, 107, 327 ;
partly annexed to Roumania, 125.

Beyshehr, Lake, 285.

Bible, the, translated into Albanian,
163.

Bibliography, 339-341.

Bieberstein, Baron Marshal von,
appointment of, as Ambassador
in Constantinople, 6, 281 ; clever-
ness and regardlessness of, 35 ;
recalled from Constantinople, 36 ;
his instructions, 311.

Bir Auja, 276, 307.

Bismarck, retirement of, 6.

Bistritza River, 265.

Bitlis, 75.

Bitlis Gap, 75.

Bitumen, mine in Albania, 156.

Black Sea, 321.

Bocche di Cattaro, 178, 331.

Bokara, 323.

Bolu, 278.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, revolt in,
1 ; annexation of, 9-11 ; roads and
railways of, 204, 205 ; future of,
331.

Bosnish Brod, 204.

Bosphorus, the, 216, 220 ; description
of, 221, 222; forts of, 222, 223;
future status of, 334.

Bosra, 305.

Bourchier, James D., 21, 326 n.

Bouvet, 233.

Boyana River, 207, 213, 214.

Bozanti, Vale of, 288, 290.

Bozanti Han, 290.

Braila, 119, 182, 184, 196.

346

INDEX

Breslau, arrival at Constantinople,
68 ; so-called purchase of, 69 ;
how presence at Constantinople
might have affected the Darda-
nelles campaign, 235.

Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (1918), 76,
321.

Bright, John, 2.

British and Foreign Bible Society,
162.

British Pictorial Service, xiv.

British, railway concessions to, 277,
279, 281, 291, 306.

Brusa, 281.

Buchan, John, Roumanian events
described by, 115, 116.

Bucharest, Treaty of (1913), 31, 32,
111 ; Peace of (1812), disposition
of Moldavia and Wallachia made
by, 106 ; taken by the Germans,
119.

Bucharest-Suczawa Railway, 196 ;
branches of, 196.

Bukovina, the, 107, 327.

Bulair, 236-238.

Bulair Lines, 227.

Bulgaria, Principality of, created, 2 ;
Eastern Roumelia incorporated
in, 4 ; declaration of independence
of, 9, 10 ; and Turkey, Russian
settlement of difficulties between,
in 1909, 11, 12; attitude of the
Government at the beginining of
the Turco-ItaHan War, 19, 20;
agrees to proposals from Greece,
21 ; makes Treaty of Alliance
with Secret Annex with Serbia, 21-
23, 329, 330 ; military convention
between Serbia and, 23 ; treaty
with Greece made by, in 1912,
24 ; military convention between
Greece and, 24 ; relations to Greece
at the outbreak of the War, 24, 25 ;
in the first Balkan War, 25, 28;
strained relations of Serbia and, as
result of the Adriatic question, 27,
28 ; and the Second Balkan War,

30, 31 ; in the Treaty of Bucharest,

31, 32 ; in the Treaty of Constan-
tinople, 32, 33 ; position of, at the
end of the Balkan Wars, 39 ; at-
titude of Serbia regarding con-
cessions to, 51 ; entry of, into the

War, 53 ; improving relations with
Turkey, 62 ; a young state, 89 ;
increase in prosperity of, 89 ; area
of, before the Balkan Wars, 89 ;
area of, after the Balkan Wars, 89,
90 ; on strained terms with Serbia
and Greece after the Balkan Wars,
90 ; attitude of, toward Serbia,
Greece, and Roumania, on the one
hand, and toward Turkey on the
other, at the beginning of the War,

91, 92 ; conditions required by,

92, 99 ; war importance of, due
largely to her geographical posi-
tion, 93 ; her importance out of
proportion^to her fighting efficiency,

93, 94 ; was able to immobilise
military forces of her neighbours,
94 ; importance to the Allies of an
understanding with, 94, 95 ; value
of, to the Central Powers, 95 ;
general considerations regarding
the concessions required by, 95,
96 ; Germanic intrigue in, 97, 98 ;
relations of Turkey and, 97, 98 ;
question of agreement between
Central Powers and, 98 ; negotia-
tions preliminary to entrance of,
into the War, 99, 100; mobihsa-
tion ordered by, 100, 101 ; object
of her entry into the War, 101, 102 ;
Allied statesmanship and, 102,
104; and the Dobrudja, 110;
relations of, to Roumania with ref-
erence to the Dobrudja, 110 ; Allied
proposals for concessions from
Greece to, 140, 141 ; shows marked
contrast to Turkey, 177, 178 ;
railways of, 199-202 ; roads lead-
ing into, 210-214 ; shut from
Aegean by strip of Greek territory,
248 ; cause of her entrance into
the Second Balkan War, 264;
meaning to Germany of her en-
trance into the War, 318 ; the
author's suggestions as to fron-
tiers of, 327, 328.

Bulgarian Exarchate, the, 2.
Bulgarians, massacre of, 2 ; advance

of, into Roumanian territory, 116;

lose Monastir, 264-266.
Bulghar Dagh, 288.
Bulgurlu, 285-287.

INDEX

347

Burgas, 200, 201.

Burgas Chai, 259.

Burhan Eddin, Prince, 169.

Burney, Sir CecU, 34.

Buyuk Chekmedche, Lake, 221.

Buyukdere, 220, 222.

Buzeu, 195, 196.

Buzeu Pass, the, 115.

Cape Abydos, 230.

Cape Helles, 226.

Capitulations, Turkish, abolished, 67,

Carol, King, of Roumania, 112.

Castellorizzo, 35, 60.

Cattaro, 57.

Caucasus campaign, 72-76.

Central Powers, the, reasons for
desiring to prevent disruption of
Turkey, 36 ; propose decentralisa-
tion of European Turkey, 36 ; gain
to, of alliance of Bulgaria, 95 ; ques-
tion of agreement between Bul-
garia and, 98. See Germany,
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Tur-
key.

Cerna Voda, 109, 110, 118, 182, 183,
194, 196.

Cettinje, 54 ; taken by the Austrians,
57 ; railway to, 206.

Chakra Su River, 288.

Chalkis Peninsula, 254-256.

Chanak, 224, 227-229, 237.

Charshembe River, 285.

Chatalja Lines, the, 25, 220, 221.

Ch6radame, Andr6, on Bagdad Rail-
way, 282.

Chesney, Colonel, 272, 273.

Chios, 61, 138.

Chirol, Sir Valentine, his Middle
Eastern Question, 282.

Chiulnitza-Slobodzie-Ployesti Rail-
way, 195.

Chunuk Bair Ridge, 234, 235.

Cilician Gates, 288, 290.

Cihcian Plain, 290, 293.

Cirpan, 201.

College for Girls at Constantinople, 5.

Cologna, 171, 266.

Committee of the Bulgarian Internal
Organisation, memorandum of,
17, 18.

Committee of Union and Progress, 8,
12, 13, 15-17, 59, 66.

Conference of London (1830), 131.

Congress of Berlin (1878), 3.

Congress of London, first (1912), 26 ;
second (1913), 28.

Congress of Vienna (1815), 184.

Constantine, King, of Greece, reason
for popularity of, 134 ; flattered
by attentions of the Kaiser, 134 ;
reasons for his policy of neutrality,
135 ; detested Venezelos, 135, 136 ;
unable to forget personal feelings,
135, 136 ; first struggle between
Venezelos and, 138 ; his insistence
on neutrality, 143 ; abdicates,
148.

Constantinople, Treaty of (1913),
32, 33 ; terminus of Belgrade-Con-
stantinople route, 187, 189 ; im-
portance of position of, 216 ; land
defences of, 220, 221 ; Lines of, 220 ;
the Chatalja Lines, 220, 221 ; the
Bosphorus forts, 221-223 ; forming
connection with the East for Ger-
many, 321, 322; future disposi-
tion of, 334.

Constanza, 109, 110, 118, 183, 312,
322.

Constanza-Verciorova Railway, 194,
195.

"Conventionnel ", the, 188.

Corfu, 53.

Crajova, 118.

Crete, autonomous r6gime granted
to, 4.

Crimean War, the, 2.

Croatia, 331.

Ctesiphon, 79.

Cyprus, lease of, to Great Britain,
3; possible future disposition of,
333.

Dalmatia, 331.

Damascus, 276, 304.

Danube, the, description of, 181, 182 ;
importance of, as thoroughfare and
as obstacle to communication, 182,
183 ; viaduct across, at Cerna Voda,
183 ; railways running to, 183,
195, 196, 199, 200; international
status of, 184 ; work of the Danube
Commission, 184, 185 ; the larger
political status of, 185, 186 ; plans
for running railway from the

348

INDEX

Adriatic to, 205, 206; in part
natural frontier of Roum^nia, 327.

Dardanelles, the, description of, 223,
224 ; forts of, 223-227,. 229, 230 ;
unfavourable position of fleet try-
ing to force, 231, 232 ; future sta'tus
of, 334.

Dardanelles, town of, 228.

Dardanelles Campaign, the conduct
of, 139, 140, 240; the raison d'Mre
and the cause of, 215, 216; prob-
able far-reaching results of, if
successful, 216, 217; caused by
important telegram from Russia,
217-219, 241, 242; difficulties of,
219, 230, 239-241 ; first stage
of (naval attack) , 233 ; second
stage of (operations beginning
April 25), 233, 234; third stage of
(Suvla Bay operations), 234, 235;
question concerning possibility of
forcing Dardanelles without help
of troops, 235, 236 ; question con-
cerning undertaking of operations
on Asiatic shore, 236 ; question
concerning a landing at Bulair,
236-238 ; considerations contribut-
ing to withdrawal from, 238 ; gen-
eral remarks on withdrawal from,
238, 239 ; considerations for and
against, 241, 242 ; result achieved
by, 242, 243.

Dede Agatch, 33, 91, 93, 98, 100, 176,
190-192.

Demir Hissar, 191, 212, 248, 256,
262.

Demotika, 33.

Denmark, 131.

Deportations, German policy of, 314.

Deraia, 276, 305.

Derkos Gol, 221.

Descoin, Colonel, 170.

Deve Bair, Mt., 213.

Diarbekr, 278, 295.

Dibra, 166, 208, 330.

Djavid Pasha, 18.

Djehun River, 291.

Dobrudja, the, section of, desired by
Bulgaria, 91 ; meaning of the
question of, 106, 109-111 ; present
status of, 124 ; special arrange-
ments must be made for, 327.

Dodecannese Islands, 60.

Doiran, Lake, 262, 267.

Doiran-Ghevgeli Enclave, 140, 141.

Dorak, 289.

Dospat Dagh, 258.

Dounmes, in Salonica, 251,

Drama, 191, 211, 248.

Drin River, 176.

Dulcigno, 55, 213.

Durazzo, 153, 156, 169, 208, 338.

Eastern Roumelia, Province of, cre-
ated, 2, 89 ; incorporated in Bul-
garia, 4.

Edward, King, 8.

Egerdir, 281.

Egypt, campaign near frontier of,
85-88 ; attack on, made possible
by railway to Bir Auja, 307.

El-Arish, 86.

Elasona, 210.

Elbasan, 157, 208, 337.

El Fule, 307.

El Fule-Bir Auja Railway, 307.

England, attitude of, toward the
Treaty of San Stefano, 3 ; policy
of, during the thirty years follow-
ing the Treaty of Berlin, 5, 6 ;
attitude of, toward reforms in
Ottoman Empire, 35, 36. See
Great Britain.

Enos-Midia line, 32, 93, 327.

Enver Pasha, 59, 62, 66, 314.

Epirote Independent Government,
168.

Epirus, frontier of, 35 ; the question
of, 170.

Eregli, 285.

Erivan, 76.

Erzerum, 70, 73, 278 ; fall of, 74.

Erzingan, 75.

Eskishehr, 279, 281.

Essad Pasha, 168, 169.

Es Salt, 305.

Falkenhayn, General von, 117, 119.

Falli^res, President, 10.

Fateshti, 196.

Fateshti-Buzeu Railway, 195.

Feluja, 275.

Ferdinand, Prince, of Bulgaria, and
the declaration of Bulgarian inde-
pendence, 9, 10 ; visits King
Nicholas of Montenegro, 24 ; glad

INDEX

349

of an argument in favour of a pro-
German policy, 98.

Ferisovitch, Congress at, 8.

Fitzmaurice, Lord (Lord Edmond
Fitzmaurice) , his statement of the
boundaries of Albania, 155.

Fiume, 204.

Fiorina, 193, 261, 264, 265.

Fort Rupel, surrender of, 145, 262.

Forts, defending Constantinople, 220,
221 ; of the Bosphorus, 221-223 ;
of the Dardanelles, 223-227, 229,
230.

Fournet, Admiral de, 146.

France, her relation to Greece, 130-
132.

Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, murder
of, X, 44 ; his murder inflammatory,
45 ; action of Germany in connec-
tion with, 316, 317.

French, railway concessions to, 279,
280, 303, 304, 306.

Frontiers, and strategic requirements,
principle to be observed in settling
the Balkan Question, 327.

Gaba Tepe, 232, 234.

Galatz, 184, 185.

Galiko, River, 254.

Gallipoli, Peninsula of, importance of
Bulgaria to resistance in, 93 ; land
communication with, 203 ; dif-
ficulties of the author in gaining
information about, 219; descrip-
tion of, 224, 225 ; forts of, 226, 227.

Galhpoli, town of, 226.

Gaulois, 233.

Gaza, 86, 87.

George, King, of Greece, assassinated,
28 ; his co-operation with M. Vene-
zelos, 128-130; given title of "Roi
des Hellenes" by the Powers, 136.

Germany, policy of, in the East, after
the Treaty of Berlin, 6, 7 ; on
Cretan question, withdraws from
Concert of Europe, 7 ; support
given the Sultan by, 7 ; and the
annexation of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, 10, 11 ; secretly supports
Austria on Adriatic question, 27 ;
effect of Turkish Revolution of
1908 on prestige and power of, at
Constantinople, 35; attitude of.

toward reforms in Ottoman Em-
pire, 35, 36 ; her policy in the Bal-
kan Wars, 37, 38 ; her attitude
toward . Austrian proposal to at-
tack Serbia in 1913, 44 ; Austrian
ultimatum to Serbia the work of,
45, 46 ; growth of her influence in
Turkey, 62 ; intrigues of, in Tur-
key, 64-66 ; succeeds in dragging
Turkey into the War, 67-70 ; her
connection with the Armenian
massacres of 1915, 72 ; intrigues
of, in Bulgaria, 97, 98 ; long-stand-
ing alliance of Roumania with,
111, 112; intrigues to bring Rou-
mania into the War, 113-115, 196;
purpose of her "Drang nach
Osten," 215; her interest in the
Bagdad Railway and its route,
271, 272, 292; railways of Asia
Minor connected with influence of,
277-282; present War and Mittel
Europa scheme planned long be-
fore by, X, 310; so-called rivalry
between England and, 310 ; pre-
pared for the making of the War
at opportune time, 311 ; the War
made by, to improve her position
in the East, 312 ; her policy of
domination from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf, 312, 313; deter-
mined on improvement in rela-
tions to Turkey, 313, 314; and
the Aegean Islands, 314; en-
courages Turks to expel Greeks
from Asia Minor, 314 ; action of,
in connection with the murder of
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, in the
light of disclosures of Prince
Lichnowsky and Doctor Miihlon,
316, 317; "initiation" stage of
her intrigues in the East, 317;
changed plan of scheme after out-
break of War, 317; the "con-
summation" policy of, 317-319;
her attitude toward Turkey, Bul-
garia, Serbia, Greece, and Rou-
mania, 318, 319; President Wil-
son's statement of her claims in
the East, 320 ; the extent to which
her aims have been realized, 320-
324 ; a fresh door to the East
opened to, 321, 322 ; is attempting

350

INDEX

to dominate from the Atlantic to
the Pacific, 323 ; suggested ways of
barring her advance in the East,
324-326 ; generally wrong in ap-
preciation of larger aspects of the
War, 336.

Gidia, 193, 210, 261.

Giolitti, Signor, speech of, in the
Itahan chamber, 44.

Giurgevo, 119.

Goeben, arrival at Constantinople, 68 ;
so-called purchase of, 69 ; how
presence at Constantinople might
have affected the Dardanelles
campaign, 235.

Gorringe, General, operations of, in
Persian territory, 80 ; takes Amara,
80.

Gounaris, M., 138, 145.

Graeco-Serbian Treaty (June 1, 1913),
29.

Granville, Earl, 155.

Gravosa, 204.

Great Britain, the Mesopotamian
campaign of, 77-85 ; operations
of, near the Turco-Egyptian fron-
tier and in Palestine, 85-88 ; her
relation to Greece, 130-132 ; so-
called rivalry between Germany
and, 310. See England.

Greece, attitude of the Government
at the beginning of the Turco-
Italian War, 19, 20; makes pro-
posals to Bulgaria, 21 ; treaty with
Bulgaria made by, in 1912, 24 ;
military convention between Bul-
garia and, 24 ; in the Balkan War,
26 ; negotiates with Serbia, 28 ;
enters into secret arrangement
with Serbia, 29 ; makes treaty with
Serbia (June 1, 1913), 29; in the
Treaty of Bucharest, 32 ; and the
Aegean Islands, 34, 35 ; and the
Epirus frontier, 35 ; position of,
at the end of the Balkan Wars,
39 ; effect on Serbia of policy of,
51 ; crisis with Turkey over the
Aegean Islands, 60-62 ; annexes
Chios and Mitylene, 61 ; purchases
battleships from America, 61 ;
importance of geographical posi-
tioa of Bulgaria with reference to,
94; advantages to, of concessions

to Bulgaria, 96, 97; misgovern-
ment and revolution in, 127 ; con-
trolled by Military League, 127 ;
successful statesmanship of M.
Venezelos in, 127, 128 ; increase
of size of, as result of Balkan Wars,
128 ; saved by co-operation of
King George and M. Venezelos,
128-130 ; the influences upon her
attitude and that of the Allies
toward her, 130 ; owes her exis-
tence to the protection of England,
France, and Russia, 130-132;
declared independent, 131 ; nature
of her treaty with Serbia, 132, 133 ;
Government of, must be influenced
by individual feelings of the people,
134 ; importance of Aegean Island
question to, 137 ; the first struggle
between Venezelos and the King,
138; effect of the Dardanelles
campaign on policy of, 139, 140;
Allied negotiations for concessions
by, 140 ; the period from October,
1915, to June, 1917, of great im-
portance to, 141 ; landing of Allied
troops in, 142 ; the Allied attitude
toward, 143 ; neutrality and
regimes of Zaimis and Skouloudis,
144, 145 ; Allied blockade of coast
of, 145 ; Allies land troops at
Piraeus, 146 ; renewed blockade
of, 147; King of, abdicates, 148;
wherein her case differs from that of
Belgium, 148, 149 ; reorganisation
of Government and army, 151 ;
the future of, 151, 152 ; has striven
to denationalise the Albanians,
154 ; and the Epirus question, 170 ;
railways and roads connecting
other countries to, 209, 210; strip
annexed by, after Balkan Wars,
248 ; how conditions in the coun-
try helped the baffling of Allied
plans by, 260, 261 ; Germany's
policy toward, 319 ; question of
Bulgaro-Greek frontier, 328 ; ques-
tion of her frontiers after the War,
332, 333.
Greeks, persecuted and massacred
by Turks, 61 ; the mentality of,
133, 134 ; exportation of, from
Asia Minor, 314.

INDEX

351

Gregovitch, M.. attitude of, at the
beginning of the Turco-Italian
War, 20.

Grey, Sir Edward (Lord Grey), at
the second peace congress, 29 ;
at the Ambassadorial Conference,
38 ; views of Dardanelles campaign,
217 ; his arrangement with Prince
Lichnowsky about the Bagdad
Railway, 314-316; Allies should
follow his policy in the Balkans,
333.

Gruda, tribe of, 331.

Gueshoff, M., attitude of, at the
beginning of the Turco-Italian
War, 20 ; proposals concerning
Greece made to, 20, 21 ; negotiates
with M. Spalaikovitch concerning
treaty with Serlna, 21 ; Graeco-
Bulgarian Treaty published by,
24 ; favours arbitration, 30.

Gulek Boghaz, 290.

Gumuljina, 191, 211.

Gumushhane, 75.

Gyimes Pass, the, 115, 118, 196.

Gyuveshevo, 201, 206, 212, 213, 258.

Hadrie, 256.

Haidar Pasha, 274.

Haidar Pasha (Scutari)-l8mid Rail-
way, 277, 278, 281.

Haifa, 276.

Haifa Railway, 306.

Hakki Pasha, 298.

Hama, 303.

Haskovo, 211.

Hedjaz, the, 302.

Hedjaz, King of, 88.

Hedjaz Railway, 87, 276, 305.

Helfferich, Doctor, 316, 317.

Helif, 275, 287, 295, 296.

Hermannstadt, 117.

Herzegovina. See Bosnia.

Hindenburg, von, 117.

Hindu Kush ^ange, 324.

Hirsch, Baron, 187-189, 198.

Hohenlohe, Prince, 98.

Holland, Thomas Erskine, his The
European Concert in the Eastern
Question, 130.

Horns, 304.

Hortach Dagh, 255.

Hoti, tribe of, 331.

Illyrians, the, 158.

Imbros, 34, 60.

India, 323 ; time from London to,
299, 300.

India, on Belgrade-Vienna Railway,
204.

India-Fiume Railway, 204.

Inflexible, 233.

Ionian Bible Society, 163.

Ionian Islands, 131.

Ipek, 166.

Iron Gates, 182, 185.

Irresistible, 233.

Irrigation, ditches, in Mesopotamia,
84 ; of plain of Kornia, 285.

Ishtib, 26.

Islahiya, 294.

Ismailia, 273.

Ismail Kemel Bey, 166.

Issus, Plain of, 293.

Italy, opposed Austrian proposal of
action against Serbia in 1913, 44 ;
prevented action of Austria in Ser-
bia, 50 ; Dodecannese Islands in
the hands of, 60 ; her interest in
Albania, 153 ; and the Epirus
question, 170 ; occupation of
southern Albania by, 170-172 ;
and southern Slavs, necessity of
harmony between, 331, 332.

Jackson, Doctor, and the typhus

epidemic in Serbia, 50.
Jacova, 166, 330.
Jadar, Battle of, 47.
Jaffa, 87.

Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway, 306.
Jagow, Herr von, 316.
Jajce, 204.
JamboH,201, 202.
Janina, 26, 28, 170, 209, 210.
Jassy, 119.

Jerablus, 275 ; bridge, 294.
Jerusalem, taken by British, 87 ;

importance of capture of, 87, 88;

and the Hedjaz Railway, 306.
Jews in Salonica, 251.
Jonescu, Take, 108, 112.
Jonnart, M., 147.
Julfa, 322.

Kaisariya, 278.
Kalabaka, 210.

35^

INDEX

Kara Balkan, 258.

Karachi, 300.

Karagatch, 192 n.

Karaman, 285.

Karapunar, 287, 289.

Kara Su River, 294.

Karasulu, 256, 257.

Karaviran, Lake, 285.

Karndash Bel, 287.

Kars, 76.

Katal Dagh, 176.

Katia, 86.

Kavala, 93, 94, 259; allotted to
Greece, 32 ; question of possession
of, 92, 96, 135, 140, 212, 248; sur-
render of, to Bulgaria, 145, 263 ;
should go to Bulgaria, 328.

Keha Bay, 223.

Kephez Point, 229.

Kerbela, 297.

Kermanshah, 76.

Keshan, 203.

Khanikin, 283, 296, 298.

Kharput, 276.

Khoja Chemen Dagh, 234.

Kiel Canal, ceremony of enlargement
of, 45.

Kighi, 75.

Kilid Bahr, 224-228, 232.

Kilindir, 256.

Kilometric guarantee, 180, 277, 278.

Kirk Kilissa, 33, 202.

Kitchener, Lord, 217, 241.

Kolomonda Dagh, 255.

Kolousheff, M., Bulgarian Min-
ister at Cettinje, 24.

Komanovo, 206, 212, 213, 257 ; battle
at, 26.

Konia, railway to, 279, 281-283,
285 ; irrigation of plain of, 285.

Korcha, 166, 170, 171, 209, 267.

Koweit, 77, 272.

Kozani, 210.

Krabe Mts., 337.

Kraguyevatz, 48, 53.

Krasnovodsk, 323.

Krishim River, 259.

Kronstadt, 117.

Krusha Balkan, 254.

Kiihlmann, Herr von, 311.

Kum Kale, 229.

Kuprukenie, 73.

Kuprulu, 257, 266.

Kuprulu-Monastir (proposed) Rail-
way, 193.
Kurds, 159.
Kurna, 78-80.
Kut-el-Amara, 78-81.
Kyrias, Gerasim, 163.

Lake, Sir Percy, 82.

Lambros Ministry, 146.

Lamsaki, 228.

Larissa-Gidia Railway, 193, 210, 261.

Lausanne, Treaty of (October 12,
1912), 60.

Lebanon, the, 304.

Lichnowsky, Prince, importance of
his disclosures, 310; purpose for
which he was sent to England, 310,
311 ; disclosures prove that Ger-
many made the War with a view
to the East, 312 ; on the Near-
Eastern question, 312, 313 ; on
appointment of Liman von Sanders
to post in Turkish Army, 314 ;
his discussion of English attitude
toward the Bagdad Railway, 314,
316 ; his proof that Germany uti-
lized the murder of Archduke Franz
Ferdinand to promote the War,
316, 317; on the Potsdam Meet-
ing, 316.

Limpus, Admiral, 67, 228.

Lincoln, Abraham, on the American
view of slavery, vii.

London, first peace congress of (1912),
26 ; second peace congress of (1913),
28; Treaty of (1913), 29; Treaty
of (1883), 184.

London Ambassadorial Conference,
the, 27, 33, 38, 60, 155, 167, 208,
330.

Losnitza, 47.

Lowell Institute, xi.

Luleh Burgas, 188, 189.

Luleh Burgas-Salonica Railway, 190,
191.

Lydda, 307.

Lynch, H. F. B., 291.

Lynch, Messrs., vessels of, 84.

Macedonia, in the Treaty of Berlin,
3 ; massacre of 1903 in, 4 ; after
the Murzteg Scheme of Reforms,
4, 5 ; under the New Regime, 15-

INDEX

353

18 ; Central and Northern, cam-
paign in, 25, 26 ; Southern, cam-
paign in, 25, 26 ; disposition of,
in Treaty of Bucharest, 31 ; dis-
puted areas of, 51 ; hard to con-
sider as a concrete whole, 247, 248 ;
description of, 248, 267; difficul-
ties in the way of campaigning in,
267, 268.

Mackensen, General von, advances
into Serbia, 53 ; advances into
Roumania, 116, 118, 119.

Maidos, 225-227, 232.

Makri Keuie, 220.

Malgara, 203.

Malissori Revolution, 18, 19.

Maritza River, 176, 214.

Maritza Valley Railway, 191,

Marmora, Sea of, 217, 220.

Marshall, General Sir W. R., 82.

Massacres, of Bulgarians, 1 ; of
Armenians, 4, 5, 64, 70-72, 290;
of Greeks, 61.

Maude, Sir Stanley, 82.

Mecca, 87, 88 ; Grand Shereef of, 85.

Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Duke of, 98.

Medgidia, 194, 195.

Medina, 87, 88, 276, 305.

Mehrmann, his Dijdomatischer Krieg
in Vorder Asicn, 278.

Meissner Pasha, 305.

Mensdorff, Count, 316.

Mersina, 291.

Mersina-Adana Railway, 277, 291.

Merv, 323.

Mesopotamia, geography of, 78 ;
Sir Edward Grey's agreement with
Prince Lichnowsky concerning,
315.

Mesopotamian campaign, 77-85 ;
stages of, 79-82 ; difficulties of,
83-85 ; affected by Allied knowl-
edge of projected improvements
in Bagdad Railway, 307, 308.

Mcssudiyeh, flagship of Admiral
Limpus, 228, 229.

Mesta River, 259.

Mesta Valley, 92.

Metsovo, 210.

Mezerib, 304.

Midia, 202.

Military League, power of, estab-
lished in Greece, 127, 129.

Milne, General, 263.

Milovanovitch, M., attitude of, at
the beginning of the Turco-Italian
War, 20; confers with M. Gues-
hoff, 21.

Minerva, shells Akaba, 85.

Mishitch, General, 264, 265.

Missionaries, American, 5.

Mitrovitza, 198, 205, 206.

Mittel Europa, scheme of, planned
long before by Germany, x, 310;
change of plan in scheme of, after
the outbreak of the War, 317.

Mitylene, 61, 138.

Moglena Mts., 248, 260, 265.

Moldavia, 105.

Monaco, 54.

Monastir, 170, 206; taken by the
Serbians, 26 ; in Graeco-Serbian
Treaty, 29 ; taken by Bulgarians,
54 ; railway to, 193, 260 ; road
from Santi Quaranta to, 209 ;
political importance of, 263, 264 ;
taken by the Allies, 263-266 ; im-
portance of capture of, 266, 267.

Monro, Sir Charles, 239.

Montenegro, attitude of the Govern-
ment at the beginning of the Turco-
Italian War, 19, 20 ; relations to
Bulgaria prior to the first Balkan
War, 24, 25 ; relations to Serbia
before that war, 24 ; begins the
Balkan War, 25 ; in the Balkan
War, 26, 28 ; and Scutari, 33, 34, 57 ;
position of, at the end of the Balkan
Wars, 39 ; size of, 54 ; independ-
ence of, 54 ; form of government
of, 54 ; recent history of, 54, 55
under the Treaty of Berlin, 55
crises between Austria and, 55
result of Balkan Wars for, 56
close relations with Serbia, 56
Austria's hatred of, 56 ; her part
in the War, 56-58 ; loss of inde-
pendence of, 57 ; size of her army
and her losses, 58 ; railways in,
206, 207.

Montenegro-Serbia, acquisitions of,
after the War, 331, 332.

Morava River, 176, 253.

Morgenthau, Mr., American Ambas-
sador to Turkey, his account of
Turkish affairs, 45, 59 n., 68 n.,

354

INDEX

317 ; confession of Admiral Uzidon

to, 314.
Mosul, 275, 296.
Mount Ararat, 73.
Mount Kaimakchalan, 265.
Mt. Lovtchen, 57.
Mt. Olympus, 249.
Mudania-Brusa Railway, 280.
Muhammera, 78.
Mlihlon, Doctor, his evidence that

Germany promoted the War, 316,

317.
Murzteg Scheme of Reforms, 4.
Musa Alia, 176.
Mush, 75.
Muslimiya, 294.
Mustafa Pasha, 98, 192.

Nagara Point, 227, 230.

Nasrieh, 78-80.

Nazim, Doctor, 13.

Near East, the Danger Zone of
Europe, 1. See Balkan Penin-
sular, Balkans.

Nedjef, 297.

Newbigin, Doctor Marion, 174.

Nicholas, Grand Duke, 73.

Nicholas, King, of Montenegro,
visited by King Ferdinand of
Bulgaria, 24 ; his rule absolute, 54 ;
flight of, 57.

Nigde, 278.

Niksics, 206.

Nish, Serbian Government estab-
lished in, 48 ; taken by the enemy,
53.

Nish-Salonica Railway, the, 189, 190.

Nisibin, 275, 295.

Northern Bulgaria, created a prin-
cipality, 89.

Nova Zagora, 201.

Novibazar, Sanjak of, 26, 198.

Ocean, 233.

Odessa, 70, 321, 322.

Okjilar, 192.

Orenburg, 323.

Oriental Railway Company, 188.

Orsova, 119.

Osmaniya, 293.

Ostrovo, Lake, 261, 264.

Otho, Prince, of Bavaria, 131, 135.

Otranto, Straits of, 153.

Paget, Lady, Red Cross mission of,
in Serbia, 50.

Palestine, Southern, advance of
British into, 86 ; further advance,
87 ; railways of, 276.

Palmer ston. Lord, 2.

Palmyra, 273.

Panderma, 280.

Paris, Treaty of (1856), disposition
of Bessarabia and Moldavia by,
106, 107 ; definition of status of
Danube in, 184 ; Treaty of (1814),
184.

Pashkani, 196.

Persia, 73; oil fields of, 77, 78;
Northern, agreement of Tsar and
Kaiser relative to, 298 ; Germany
preparing to overrun, 320.

Persian Gulf, coasts of, arrangement
between Sir Edward Grey and
Prince Lichnowsky concerning,
315. See Bagdad Railway.

Peshawar, 323.

Peter, King, of Serbia, 48.

Peterwardein, 182.

Petrograd, Protocol of May, 1913, 92,
110, 327.

Philippopolis, 176.

PhilippopoUs-Burgas Railway, 200,
201.

Pirot, 53.

Ployesti, 119, 196, 197.

Podgoritza, 206, 207.

Porto Lagos, 93, 191.

Potsdam Conference on July 5, 1914,
45, 316.

Prahov, 198, 206.

Predeal, 117.

Predeal Pass, the, 115, 196.

Prevesa, 210.

Prilep, 266.

Prisrend, 53, 166, 208, 330.

Queen Elizabeth, 233.

Railway, the Belgrade-Constanti-
nople, 187-189 ; the Nish-Salonica,
189, 190; the Luleh Burgas-Sa-
lonica, 190, 191 ; the Maritza Val-
ley, 191 ; the Salonica-Monastir,
193, 255, 260; the Kuprulu-Mon-
astir (proposed), 193; the Con-
stanza- Verciorova, 194, 195; the

INDEX

355

Fateshti-Buzeu, 195; the Chiul-
nitza-Slobodzie-Ployesti, 195 ; the
Riatra-Cainen, 195 ; the Bucharest-
Suczawa, 196 ; the Sofia-Varna,
199, 200; the PhiHppopoHs-Bur-
gas, 200, 201 ; through the Travna
Gap, 200; the Sofia-Gyuveshevo,
201 ; the Turnovo-Siemenli-Nova
Zagora, 201 ; the India- Fiume,
204 ; the Antivari-Virbazar, 206 ;
the Cattaro-Niksics, 206; the
Uskub-Mitrovitza, 208 ; the
Larissa-Gidia, 210, 261 ; the Vardar
Valley, 255, 257, 258 ; the Salonica
Junction, 255, 256 ; to the Persian
Gulf, early projects for, 272-274;
reasons for Bosphorus-Persian Gulf
route, 273, 274; Anatolian, 276,
277; the Smyrna- Aidin, 277, 280,
281, 315 ; the Smyrna-Cassaba,
277, 279, 280; the Mersina-Adana,
277, 291 ; the Haidar Pasha
(Scutari) -Ismid, 277, 278, 281 ; the
Mudania-Brusa, 280 ; to Pandemia,
has played important pert in War,
280 ; the Beirut-Damascus-Hauran,
304 ; the Hedjaz, 305 ; the Haifa,
306; the Jaffa-Jerusalem, 306;
the El Fule-Bir Auja, 307. See
Bagdad Railway.
Railways, opposed by the Turks,
180; to the Danube from north
and south, 183, 195 ; military im-
portance of, 190, 191, 193, 195,

196, 200-203; working of, af-
fected by Balkan Wars, 191, 192;
of Roumania, 194-197 ; of Serbia,

197, 198; of Bulgaria, 199-202;
in Turkish Thrace, 202 ; of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, 204, 205 ; pro-
posed, for connecting the Danube
with the Adriatic, 205, 206 ; from
the lower Adriatic coast to the
interior, 206-209 ; in Montenegro,
206, 207 ; connecting Greece with
othercountries,209,210 ; connecting
Salonica with the interior, 255, 256 ;
in Macedonia, condition of, when
the Allies entered the country, 268 ;
of Asiatic Turkey, military and
political importance of, 274-277 ;
of importance for Germany for
reconquering Northeastern Asia

Minor, 276; of Syria and Pales-
tine, 276, 303-307 ; in Asia Minor,
German influence in, 277-282.

Ramie, 306.

Rayak, 276, 303, 304.

Revolution, Young Turkish in 1908,
7-9, 12; MaUssori, 18, 19. See
Young Turkish Revolution.

Rhine, the, 184.

Rhodes, 60.

Rhodope Balkans, 26, 175 ; signifi-
cance of, 258, 259 ; ways of pen-
etrating, 259.

Riatra-Cainen Railway, 195.

Ripany, 188.

Riva, 223.

Rivers of the Balkan Peninsula, 213,
214.

Roads, in the Balkans, 178 ; the
building of, opposed by the Turks,
180 ; in Turkish Thrace, 202, 203 ;
in Montenegro and Albania, 206-
209, 337 ; connecting Greece with
the outside world, 210 ; leading into
Bulgaria, 210-214 ; leading from
Salonica into the interior, 256 ;
leading from the Vardar Valley
eastward, 259 ; in Macedonia,
condition of, 268.

Robert College, 5.

Rodosto, 202, 203.

Rotherturm Pass, the, 115, 117, 195.

Roumania, independence of, recog-
nised, 2 ; in the First and Second
Balkan Wars, 31 ; significance of
her entry into Balkan politics, 39 ;
effect on Serbia of policy of, 51 ;
importance of geographical posi-
tion of Bulgaria with reference to,
93, 94 ; advantage to, of conces-
sions to Bulgaria, 97 ; two parts of,
105 ; occupies important strategi-
cal position, 105 ; forms link be-
tween East and West, 105 ; policy
of, 105, 106 ; and Bessarabian,
Transylvanian, and Dobrudjan
questions, 106, 107 ; foreign policy
of, 107, 108 ; explanation of her
movements at her entry into the
War, 108 ; took no part in the First
Balkan War, but took compensa-
tion in the Dobrudja, 108, 109;
relations of, to Bulgaria with ref-

356

INDEX

erence to the Dobrudja and the
Bulgaro-Roumanian frontier, 109-
111; increase in size of, as result
of Second Balkan War, 110, 111 ;
difficult position of, after the out-
break of the War, 111, 112; long-
standing alliance of, with Ger-
many, 111, 112; her probable
action if granted concessions by
Russia, 112, 113; value of, to
Germany as a route to the south
and east, 113-115 ; her entry into
the War, 115; the northwestern
frontier of, 115; advance of, into
enemy territory, 115; advance of
enemy into territory of, 116, 117;
conquests of Central Powers in,
118-120; military system of, 120,
121 ; her plan of campaign, 121 ;
mitigating circumstances of her
campaign, 122 ; international rea-
sons for her disaster, 122, 123 ;
peace terms imposed upon, 123-
126, 321 ; importance to, of properly
defensible frontier on the south,
183 ; description and strategical
significance of railways of, 194-
197 ; Germany's policy toward,
319 ; the author's suggestions as
to frontiers of, 327.

Royal Geographical Society, xii, xiv.

Rumeh Hissar, 222.

Russia, policy of, during the thirty
years following the Treaty of Ber-
lin, 5, 6 ; her settlement of Turkish-
Bulgarian difficulties in 1909, 11,
12 ; aimed to prevent Balkan
Wars, 36 ; her position after the
Balkan Wars, 43, 44 ; makes ar-
rangement with Turkey respect-
ing reforms in Armenia, 63 ; Cau-
casus campaign of, 72, 76 ; under-
takings of, according to Brest-
Litovsk Treaty, 76 ; relation to
Serbia, and Bulgaria, 98 ; and the
question of concessions to Rou-
mania, 112, 113; and the Rouma-
nian disaster, 123 ; her relation to
Greece, 130-132; effect of im-
portant telegram from, with ref-
erence to Dardanelles campaign,
217-219, 241, 242; agreement
with Kaiser relative to Bagdad

Railway and Persia, 297, 298;
no longer a menace to Germany,
320, 321.

Russians, advance into Turkey by
three routes, 73 ; take Erzerum,
74 ; occupy entire route from
Erzerum to Trebizond, 75 ; line
of, in Asia at high-water mark,
75.

Russo-Turkish War (1877), 2.

Rustchuk, 206 ; cabinet council held
at, 9.

Sadijeh, 283.

Salonica, taken by the Greeks, 26 ;
in Graeco-Serbian Treaty, 29 ; in
the Treaty of Bucharest, 32 ;
Allied landing at, 141 ; Venezelos
forms CaVjinet at, 146 ; railway
from Nish to, 189, 190; posi-
tion of, 248-250; harbour, 249,
250 ; description of, 250 ; popula-
tion of, 250, 251 ; fire of August,
1917, 251 ; climate of, 252 ; three
commercial routes into the interior
of the country from, 253 ; area
closely surrounding, 254 ; moun-
tains in the neighborhood of, 254,
255 ; railways and roads from, to
the interior, 255-258 ; signifi-
cance of Rhodope Balkans to,
258, 259 ; favourable and unfavour-
able conditions of area northwest
of, 260, 261 ; disposition of, after
the War, 329, 330.

Salonica campaign, partly result of
withdrawal from the Dardanelles,
95, 244; objects of, 244-246; first
stage of (attempt to advance into
the interior), 261, 262; second
stage of (defensive), 262, 263;
third stage of, 263-267 ; difficulties
of, 267-269 ; results of, 269, 270.

Salonica-Dede Agatch Railway Com-
pany, 212.

Salonica, Gulf of, 249.

Salonica-Monastir Railway, 193.

Samara, 323.

Samarcand, 323.

Samarra, 275, 296.

Samos, 61, 138.

Sanders, General Liman von, 62,
314.

INDEX

357

San Giovanni di Medua, 153, 206,
207, 213.

San Marino, 54.

San Stefano, Treaty of, 3, 107.

Santi Quaranta, 166, 171, 209.

Sari Bair, 234.

Sarikamish, 73.

Saros, Gulf of, 225, 233, 237.

Save River, 213.

Savoff, General, 31.

Sazonoff, M., 31.

Scanderbeg, Albanian hero, 158.

Scumbi River, 160, 176.

Scumbi Valley, 337, 338.

Scutari, 26 ; taken by Montenegrins,
33 ; question of, 34 ; Government
moved to, 53 ; permanent posses-
sion of, desired by Montenegrins,
56 ; annexed by King Nicholas,
57; fertile plains near, 156; size
of, 156 ; Albanians obtain, 166 ;
connections with, 207.

Scutari, Lake, 207.

Sedd-el-Bahr, 226.

Seihun River, 291.

Selenitza, 156.

Semendria, 198.

Serajevo, x, 44, 178.

Serbia, independence of, recognised,
2 ; policy of Count Aehrenthal as
affecting the relation of Austria to,
11 ; attitude of the Government
at the beginning of the Turco-
Italian War, 19, 20; makes
Treaty of Alliance with Secret
Annex with Bulgaria, 21-23, 329,
330 ; military convention between
Bulgaria and, 23 ; and Montenegro
before the Balkan War, 24 ; in
the Balkan War, 25, 26; and the
Adriatic question, 27 ; strained
relations with Bulgaria as result
of the Adriatic question, 27, 28 ;
negotiates with Greece, 28 ; de-
mands revision of Serbo-Bulgarian
Treaty, 28, 29 ; enters into secret
arrangement with Greece, 29 ;
makes treaty with Greece (June 1,
1913), 29; and the Second Balkan
War, 30, 31; in the Treaty of
Bucharest, 32 ; position of, at the
end of the Balkan Wars, 39 ;
her need of an outlet to the

Adriatic, 42 ; her aim not attained
by the Balkan Wars, 42, 45 ; the
annexation of Bosnia and Herze-
govina a blow to her aspiration,
42 ; the real source of danger to,
43 ; Austrian ultimatum to, 45,
46 ; first invasion of, in August,
1914, 47 ; second invasion of, in
September, 1914, 48 ; epidemic of
typhus in, 49 ; internal disaffection
in the south of, 51 ; her attitude
toward concessions to Bulgaria,
51 ; diplomacy of Allies with ref-
erence to Bulgaria and, 51, 52;
loss of independence of, 53, 54 ;
close relations with Montenegro,
56 ; importance of her role in the
War, 58 ; size of her army and her
losses, 58; rapid subjugation of,
to what due, 93 ; great advantages
to, of concessions to Bulgaria, 96 ;
concessions of, to Bulgaria, 99,
100 ; nature of her treaty with
Greece, 132, 133 ; railways of,
197, 198 ; failure to save, due to
strategic position of the enemy,
246, 247 ; Germany's policy to-
ward, 318; question of Bulgaro-.
Serbian frontier, 328, 329.

Serbians, defeat Austrians, 48, 49 ;
retreat and transference of, to
Corfu, 53, 54.

Seres, 191, 253, 256, 262.

Seugudlu River, 259.

Shabatz, 47.

Shabatz-Losnitza Railway, 198.

Shat-el-Arab, the, 78, 83.

Shat-el-Hai Canal, 78, 79.

Shedna Gora, 176.

Shustar, 78.

Siemens, Doctor, 282.

Silistria, 32, 92, 110, 116, 327.

Siminhan, 204.

Sinaia, 196.

Sistova, 206.

Sivas, 278.

Skouloudis, M., 144, 145.

Slavery, the American view of, vii ;
the real cause of the Civil War,
vii.

Slavonia, 331.

Smyrna-Aidin Railway, 277, 280,
281 ; arrangement between Sir

358

INDEX

Edward Grey and Prince Lich-
nowsky concerning, 315.

Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, 277, 279,
280.

Sofia, 176, 178, 253.

Sofia-Gyuveshevo Railway, 201.

Sofia- Varna Railway, 199, 200.

Spalaikovitch, M., negotiates with M.
Gueshoff,21.

Spitza, 39, 65.

Strong, Doctor, and the typhus epi-
demic in Serbia, 50.

Struma River, 212, 256, 262.

Struma Valley, 212, 253, 256, 258, 262.

Strumnitza, 258.

Suczawa, 196, 197.

Suez Canal, Turks defeated near,
85, 86 ; shares of, purchased by
England, 273.

Suvla Bay operations, 234, 235.

Syria, railways of, 276, 303-307;
British, French, and Russian in-
terests in, 315.

Syrian campaign, affected by Allied
knowledge of contemplated im-
provements in Turkish railroad
systems, 308.

Tabriz, 73, 323.

Talaat Pasha, 66.

Tarsus Chai (Cydnus) River, 290.

Tashkend, 323.

Taurus, the, 274, 286, 287; section
of Bagdad Railway, 287-291.

Tcherna Bend, 265.

Tcherna River, 265.

Tchorlu, 202.

Tehran, 298.

Tekeh Fort, 227.

Tekir Plateau, 290.

Tenedos, 34, 35, 60.

Thrace, campaign in, 25 ; Bul-
garians lose large part of, by Treaty
of Constantinople, 33 ; Turkish,
part of, desired by Bulgaria, 91,
93 ; Turkish, means of communi-
cation in, 202.

Tifiis, 322.

Tigris River, 83, 84.

Tirana, 208, 338.

Torsburg Pass, the, 115, 117.

Townshend, General, surrender of,
79, 81.

Transylvania, question of, 106-108,
115,327.

Travna Gap, railway through, 200.

Treaty, of San Stefano (March 17,
1878), 3; of Berlin (1878), 3, 107;
of Alliance between Bulgaria and
Serbia (1912), 21-23, 329, 330;
between Greece and Bulgaria
(1912), 24; of London (1913),
29 ; Graeco-Serbian (June 1, 1913),
29, 132, 133; of Bucharest (Au-
gust 10, 1913), 31, 32, 111 ; of Con-
stantinople (1913), 32, 33; be-
tween Italy, and Great Britain,
France, and Russia, 55; of Lau-
sanne (October 12, 1912), 60;
of Brest-Litovsk, 76 ; of Paris
(1856), 106, 107, 184; of Paris
(1814), 184; of Berlin (1878),
184, 185, 188; of London (1883),
184.

Trebizond, 75.

TripoH, 304.

TripoH War, 19, 35, 60, 298.

Tsar, meeting with Kaiser at Pots-
dam, November, 1910, 297, 298.

Tsaribrod, 187, 188.

Tschirschky, Herr von, 316, 317.

Turco-Bulgarian frontier, 60.

Turco-Greek War of 1897, 7.

Turco-Italian War, 19, 35, 60, 298.

Turkey, Asiatic, importance of con-
ditions in, 1 ; in war with Russia
(1853-55), 2; in war with Russia
(1877), 2; after the Treaty of
Berlin, 3, 4 ; and the Murzteg
Scheme of Reforms, 4, 5 ; army of,
under Germanic control, 6 ; sup-
port given to, by Germany, 7 ;
revolution of 1908 in, 7-9, 12;
and Bulgaria, Russian settlement
of difficulties between, in 1909, 11,
12; the Committee of Union and
Progress, 12, 13 ; the outstanding
feature in the situation in, 13, 14 ;
the motto of the Young Turks, 14 ;
Ottomanisation, 14 ; first year of
the New Regime in, 14-16 ;
second and third years of the New
Regime, 16-20 ; in the First Balkan
War, 25, 26 ; in the Second Balkan
War, 32, 33; Imbros, Tenedos,
and Castellorizzo allotted to, 34,

INDEX

359

35 ; attitude of England and of
Germany toward reforms in, 35,
36 ; attitude of Great Powers
toward, before Balkan Wars, 36,
37 ; loss in territory through
Balkan Wars, 37 ; position of, at
the end of the Balkan Wars, 39,
40; conditions in, just before the
outbreak of the War, 59 ; dis-
pleased with results of the Balkan
Wars, 60 ; crisis with Greece over
the Aegean Islands, 60-62 ; per-
secution and massacre of Greeks
by, 61 ; improving relations with
Bulgaria; 62 ; growth of German
influence in, 62 ; agreement of,
respecting reforms in Armenia,
63, 64 ; German intrigues in, 64-
66 ; position of the Allies in, 65,
66 ; her fear and hatred of Russia,
65, 66 ; reasons for her inclination
toward Germany, 66 ; brought
into the War by Germany, 67-70;
abolishes capitulations, 67 ; enters
Triple Alliance, 68 ; Armenian
massacres of 1915, 70-72 ; oper-
ations of, in Northeastern Asia
Minor, 72-76; and the Brest-
Litovsk Treaty, 76 ; operations of,
between head of Persian Gulf and
Bagdad, 77-85 ; operations of,
near the Egyptian frontier, 85-
88 ; relations of Bulgaria and, 97,
98 ; attitude of, toward Albania,
158 ; position of Albania in the
Empire, 158, 159 ; Bulgaria shows
marked contrast to, 177, 178 ;
railways and roads in, 202, 203 ;
Asiatic, military and political im-
portance of railways of, 274-277 ;
cost of Bagdad Railway to, 301,
302 ; military results to, of Bag-
dad Railway, 302, 303; Central
Powers aimed to improve relations
with, 313, 314 ; army of, under
General Liman von Sanders, 314 ;
importance to Germany of en-
trance of, into the War, 318;
future of, 333-335.
Turks, defeated near Suez Canal,
86 ; defeated near Katia, 86 ; op-
posed to the building of roads and
railways, 180.

Turnovo, 191 ; declaration of Bul-
garian independence made at, 9.

Turnovo-Siemenli-Nova Zagora Rail-
way, 201.

Turnu Severin, 124.

Turtukeuie, 116.

Typhus, epidemic of, in Serbia, 49,
50.

Ujitse, 204.

Ultimatum, Austrian, to Serbia, 45,

46, 317.
Ulu Kushlar, 278, 288.
Urumiah, Lake, 73, 75.
Uskub, 53, 176, 198, 201, 206, 257,

258.
Uskub-Mitrovitza Railway, 208.
Uvats, 205.
Uzidon, Admiral, 314.
Uzun Kupru, 237.

Valievo, 48, 49, 204.

Van, lake and town, 73, 75, 76.

Vardar River, 176 ; importance of,
252, 253 ; the country to the west
of, 254 ; the country to the east of,
254, 255.

Vardar Valley, the, 25, 26, 213, 248 ;
importance of, 252, 253 ; railway
of, 255, 257, 258; description of,
257.

Vardishte, 204.

Varna, 199, 200.

Vehko Plana, 188, 198.

Venezelos, M., 94, 97; attitude of,
at the beginning of the Turco-
Italian War, 20 ; Saviour of
Greece, 127, 128 ; liis devotion to
Greece and co-operation with
King George, 128-130 ; a statesman
and patriot, 136; desired to co-
operate with King Constantine,
136 ; cause of his decline in popu-
larity, 137 ; first struggle between
King Constantine and, 138 ; second
resignation of, 141, 142; the ques-
tion of his attitude toward the
landing of Allied troops in Greece,
142 ; abstention of his followers
from voting, 145 ; departs from
Athens and forms Independent
Cabinet at Salonica, 146 ; Pre-
mier since June, 1915, 150; return

360

INDEX

to power of, 150; difficulties of
his position, 151 ; how far the
future of Greece depends upon,
151, 152; foresight of, 332.

Verciorova, terminus of railway,
194, 195, 197.

Veria, 193, 210, 260, 261.

Via Egnatia, 208, 338.

Vidin, 206, 253.

Vienna, Congress of (1815), 184.

Viosa River, 171, 266.

Virbazar, 206, 207.

Vishegrad, 48.

Vodena, 260.

Von Bluhm Pasha, 220, 221.

Von dor Goltz Pasha, power of, 6.

Vulcan Pass, the, 115.

Wallachia, 105.

Wash-trains, system of, established
by American doctors in Serbia, 50.

Wilhelm II, of Germany, his policy
in the East, 6 ; his first visit to
Constantinople, 6 ; his second
visit to Constantinople, 7, 281 ;
meeting with Tsar at Potsdam,
November, 1910, 297, 298 ; obsessed
by desire for domination from
Hamburg to Persian Gulf, 312,
313.

William of Wied, Prince, regime of,
167-169.

Wilson, President, quoted on Ger-
man aims in the East, 320.

Woods, H. Charles, his Washed by
Four Seas, 278; his The Danger
Zone of Europe, 285.

Yenidje Vardar, 254.

YildiB, 227.

Young, George, his Corps de Droit
Ottoman, 279, 303.

Young Turkish Revolution of 1908,
7, 8 ; importance of, in Balkan
affairs, 8, 9 ; the meaning of, 12 ;
the Committee of Union and Prog-
ress, 12, 13, 15-17, 59, 66; effect
of, on German prestige and power
at Constantinople, 35. Sec Turkey.

Young Turks, and the Revolution of
1908, 7, 8, 12, 13 ; their policy and
shortcomings, 14-19 ; motto of, 14 ;
power of, just before the outbreak
of the War, 60 ; their treatment
of Albania, 164, 165.

Zaimis, M., 138, 144, 145, 147, 150,

263.
Zelenika, 204.
Zobeir, 297.

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560 The cradle of the war

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