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(Lecturer before the Lowell Institute 1917-1918) 









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Americans regard the Balkan question much as 
Lincoln in his Second Inaugural Address described their 
view of slavery. "All know", he said, "that this 
interest was somehow the cause of the war. . . . 
Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or 
the duration which it has already attained. Neither 
anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease 
when, or even before, the conflict itself should cease. 
Each looked for an easier triumph and a result less 
fundamental and astounding." 

There is, however, this difference between slavery 
and the Balkan question, that slavery, as we now see, 
was the real and only cause of the Civil War. Without 
the difference in social institutions the North and 
South would never have been in armed conflict, and 
in spite of the blunders of reconstruction the abolition 
of slavery has removed all danger, and suspicion of a 
danger, of war between the two sections of the coun- 
try. Whereas the Balkan question, in its narrower 
sense, was rather the occasion than the cause of the 
struggle that is now raging. Nevertheless, the Near 
East has long been a source of anxiety to European 
statesmen, a storehouse of explosive material that 



might at any time start a general conflagration. It 
will so remain until its problems are settled upon a 
rational and permanent basis and until the danger of 
Teutonic domination has been removed. 

The United States will be compelled to take part in 
the settlement of these problems. But at present its 
people are, in most cases, wholly unfamiliar with the 
racial, religious, political and geographical factors that 
lie beneath the questions to be solved. They ought, 
therefore, to welcome a book which portrays the recent 
history and condition of the peninsula and of its com- 
ponent nationalities, by a writer who has studied his 
subject on the spot. 

A. Lawrence Lowell. 

Harvard University, Cambridge 
June 12, 1918 


A PRELIMINARY duty of the author of a modern 
volume, and especially of one dealing almost exclu- 
sively with events which have led up to, or taken 
place during, the world's greatest war, seems to be to 
explain the reasons for which the book has been written, 
to state the methods by which the information con- 
tained in it has been acquired, and to assist the reader, 
who has neither time nor desire to make close acquaint- 
ance with the whole of its pages, to discover at a 
glance what particular sections will be of the greatest 
interest to him. 

Before performing this duty, I will, however, give 
the reasons which have prompted me to call this book 
*'The Cradle of the War." For many years, and more 
especially since the re-establishment of the Ottoman 
Constitution in 1908, the numerous problems con- 
nected with the Near East have been a source of 
continual danger to the world's peace. This was due 
in part to the fact that the Balkan Peninsula and Asia 
Minor might at any time be the scenes of insurrection, 
massacre, or local conflict, and in part — a larger part 
— to the international rivalry which has existed for 
years concerning a future domination over many of 
the areas in question. 

These localities, together with the waterways which 
they control, form the great and only corridor from 


west to east and from north to south, and they con- 
stitute the natural highway from Central Europe to 
Asia and from Russia to the Mediterranean. Thus, 
ever since the birth of her Mittel-Europa scheme, 
Germany has been determined to push open the 
Near-Eastern door, in order to be able to strike a 
deadly blow at the very vitals of the British Empire, 
and at the same time automatically to prevent Russia 
from expanding towards warm water. As I shall 
endeavour to show, therefore, it is not so much the 
murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his 
Consort at Serajevo on June 28, 1914, as the develop- 
ments preceding and following that occurrence which 
make the Near East the region of primary existence 
of the present conflict — the area in which many of 
its most important events have been sheltered and 

In the manner that a little cot is made ready for the 
expected child, so did the enemy prepare for the war 
which he was designing. This preparation, in progress 
from the time of the accession of the present Emperor 
to the throne in 1888, was carried out by the gradual 
development of Germanic influence and power in 
Turkey, and by a constant and determined opposi- 
tion to the establishment of stable conditions in the 
Near East. From the moment of the birth of his 
war child, too, the Kaiser has been an ever vigilant 
mother, for instead of allowing the real primary cause 
of the world conflict to be forgotten, he has consistently 
rocked the "cradle" in the apparent hope that she 
who performs this task rules the world. 

My most important object in publishing this volume 
is to explain to the wide public, now interested in the 


subject, the importance of a situation which is not 
always clearly understood by those who have not had 
the opportunity of visiting the Near East. In par- 
ticular I hope to prove that, as the enemy has con- 
sistently worked for the establishment of Germanic 
control throughout the East, any peace which failed 
to put an end to the danger of the success of such an 
object, and any arrangement which would be ineffec- 
tive in setting up an anti-Germanic barrier there, 
must be considered as entirely unsatisfactory from the 
Allied and American standpoint. 

The book itself, which is based upon the manuscript 
from which I drew the notes for my course of lectures 
upon "War and Diplomacy in the Balkans ", delivered 
before the Lowell Institute at Boston during the 
winter of 1917-1918, makes no pretension to be a 
continuous account of all the events which have 
taken place during the period which it covers. It 
claims merely to point out the meaning of some of 
the questions which have led up to and influenced 
the present situation. Moreover, whilst I have been 
a constant visitor to the countries about which I am 
writing, and whilst I have had numerous conversations 
with many of the most prominent men mentioned in 
the text, I have endeavoured to bring my local knowl- 
edge of the countries and of their peoples to bear 
instead of depending upon information furnished by 
statesmen, political chiefs, or historians, who, however 
honest they may wish to be, are almost invariably 
possessed of some national prejudice or personal feel- 
ing which prevents them from seeing this great world 
question with that fairness which is so necessary if 
we are to be in a position to grasp its true present 


and future significance. As far as possible, too, I 
have attempted to produce facts in preference to ex- 
pressions of personal opinion, for, under existing cir- 
cumstances, it is a clear and impartial judgment by 
the public rather than the verdict of a particular 
man which will lead to the amelioration of conditions 
which must be terminated by the present War. 

Of the twelve chapters of which the volume is com- 
posed the first is given up to a summary of the events 
which occurred during the sixty years preceding the 
outbreak of the War — a summary in course of which 
I have sought to point out that the so-called settle- 
ment, which followed the Balkan Wars, was of such 
an unsatisfactory nature as merely to prepare the 
way for a renewed conflagration. Chapters II to VII 
inclusive are devoted to accounts of recent develop- 
ments, in the various Balkan States and in Turkey, 
and in particular to reviews of the causes which have 
led the different countries in question to assume their 
individual war policies. In the course of these sec- 
tions I have alluded to the value of the Serbo-Monte- 
negrin resistance of 1914-1915, to the meaning and 
importance of the Mesopotamian and Syrian cam- 
paigns, and to the reasons responsible for the Rou- 
manian defeat and for the situation existing in Greece 
during the greater part of the War. 

Chapters VIII and XI, which respectively contain 
accounts of the Military Highways of the Balkans 
and of the Bagdad Railway, accounts founded upon 
recent papers which I have read before The Royal 
Geographical Society, are in some ways more detailed 
and more comprehensive than are certain other sec- 
tions of the book, and this because the war importance 


of these communications is such as specially to merit 
their careful and attentive study. 

In Chapters IX and X no attempt is made to pro- 
vide detailed accounts of the progress of the Dar- 
danelles and Salonica campaigns. Here my principal 
idea has been to suggest the objects and results of 
those undertakings, and to utilize my personal knowl- 
edge of the areas in question for the purpose of trying 
to make clear the numerous geographical and military 
diflSculties with which these operations were or are 

Throughout these pages repeated reference is made 
to the fact that, for years, the Central Powers have 
worked not for stable government but for unrest in 
the East. Nevertheless I have devoted my last 
chapter to the subject of the Mittel-Europa scheme, 
for the importance of that question and especially of 
its latest developments in Roumania and Russia is 
such as to necessitate its individual and separate 
consideration. In this section, too, I have included 
a few pages about the future — a future which must 
entail the establishment of conditions likely to result 
in local peace and accord, and therefore in a guarantee 
that no excuse will exist for outside interference on the 
part of those possessed of aggressive and tyrannical 

Among other reasons the fact that they are far too 
numerous prevents me from tendering my thanks by 
name to all those, belonging to the countries about 
which I have written, in England and in America, 
who have given me their valuable assistance during 
the years I have followed the development of events 
in the Near East. I wish, however, to signify my 

xiv PREFx\CE 

appreciation to those, who, by their attendance at 
and by their interest shown in my lectures at home 
and in America, have stimulated me, an Englishman, 
far from home, to undertake the difficult task of the 
preparation of such a book as this in war time. I 
must also take this opportunity of expressing my 
thanks to The Royal Geographical Society for the 
permission given to reproduce the several maps, pre- 
pared for my original papers, by that Society, to the 
American Board of Foreign Missions for the many 
courtesies shown to me by its representatives in the 
East and in America, and to the British Pictorial 
Service for the provision of certain of the illustrations 
included in this volume. 

H. Charles Woods. 

New York, July 11, 1918. 



Foreword by A. Lawrence Lowell vii 

Preface ix 

List of Illustrations . . xxi 

The Near East before the Great War .... 1 
Historical summary of events prior to the re-establish- 
ment of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908 — American 
missions in Turkey — Earlier German intrigues — The 
advent of the New Regime in Turkey — The Bulgarian 
declaration of independence — The annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina by Austria — Effect of the Young Turk- 
ish revolution in the Ottoman Empire — Reasons for 
Christian discontent with the New Regime — The Turco- 
Italian war — Formation of the Balkan League — The 
first Balkan war — Differences between Bulgaria and her 
neighbours — The second Balkan war — Pan-German 
policy from 1908-1913. 


Serbia and Montenegro in the War . . . .41 
Necessity for an outlet on the Adriatic — Results of 
the Balkan wars — The murder of the Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand — The Potsdam Conference of July 5,1914 — 
The Austrian ultimatum — Campaigns of 1914-1915 — 
The typhus scourge — Attitude towards Bulgaria — Re- 
treat to the Adriatic — The role of Serbia in 1914 — Re- 
cent Montenegrin history — Montenegro and the War. 




Turkey and the War 59 

Turco-Greek relations — Growth of German influence 
at Constantinople — Scheme for Armenian reforms — 
Situation immediately after the outbreak of War — 
Germanic intrigues — Allied difficulties — Arrival of 
Goeben and Breslau at Constantinople — Events im- 
mediately leading to the entry of Turkey into the 
European conflagration — The Armenian massacres of 
1915 — The Russo-Turkish operations in northeastern 
Asia Minor — The Mesopotamian campaign — The 
British advance in Palestine. 


Bulgaria and the War 89 

Recent history — Effect of the Balkan Wars — 
Concessions required by Bulgaria — Importance of 
geographical position — Value to both groups of belliger- 
ents — Negotiations preceding the entry of Bulgaria into 
the War — Attitude of the Allies. 



Special position of Roumania — The Bessarabian, 
Transylvanian, and Dobrudjan questions — Difficulties 
after the outbreak of the War — German determination 
to force Roumania into the War on one side or other — 
Events of 1916 — Roumanian military system — The 
plan of campaign — Russian faithlessness — Peace 
terms imposed by the Central Powers. 


Greece and the War 127 

Recent history — M. Venezelos and King George — 
The protective rights of England, France, and Russia — 



The Graeco-Serbian Treaty — The mentality of the 
Greeks — The attitude of King Constantine — Patriot- 
ism of M. Venezelos — The Aegean Island question — 
First struggle between the King and M. Venezelos — 
Second retirement of M. Venezelos — Allied attitude 
towards Greece — Abdication of King Constantine — 
Return to power of M. Venezelos. 


Albania and the Albanians 153 

Importance of the country — Creation of the Prin- 
cipality — General geographical description — Nation- 
ality, religion, and language — The Balkan Wars — 
Regime of Prince William of Wied — The European War 
— The Italian occupation of the south — The future. 


Military Highways of the Balkans .... 174 
General description of the Balkan Peninsula — 
Turkish opposition to railways — The Danube as a 
thoroughfare for military traffic, and as an obstacle to 
through communication — The Belgrade-Constanti- 
nople trunk route — The Nish-Salonica railway — The 
Luleh Burgas-Salonica and the Salonica-Monastir 
lines — Roumanian railways — Serbian railways — Bul- 
garian railways — Turkish communications — Bosnian 
railways — Communications between the Adriatic coast 
and the interior — Railways and roads between Old 
Greece and the remainder of the peninsula — Routes 
leading into Bulgaria from the south and southwest. 


The Dardanelles Campaign 215 

Importance of position of Constantinople — General 
objects of the campaign — The land defences of the 


Turkish capital — The Bosphorus and its defences — 
Description of the Dardanelles — The Peninsula of 
Gallipoli and its defences — The Asiatic coast and its 
defences — Disadvantageous position of an attacking 
fleet — Earlier naval operations — Events following 
landings of April 25 — The Suvla Bay operations — 
Three misconceptions — Necessity for withdrawal of 
expeditionary force — Results achieved. 

The Riddle of Salonica 244 

Objects of the undertaking — General description 
of Macedonia — Port and town of Salonica — The 
climate — Importance of the Vardar Valley — Area 
immediately surrounding city — Significance of the 
Rhodope Balkans — Country to the northwest of Salo- 
nica — Original Allied attempt to advance up the Vardar 
Valley — The passive defence of Salonica — The ad- 
vance upon and capture of Monastir — Difficulties of 
the campaign — Results. 


The Bagdad Railway and the War .... 271 

Military importance of line — Earlier suggestions 
for a railway across Asiatic Turkey — Pan-German 
reasons for a line from the Bosphorus to the Persian 
Gulf — Present state of completion — Historical and 
political accounts of the line — Smyrna- Afiun Karahissar 
railway — Smyrna-Aidin and Mudania-Brusa lines — 
Bagdad railway concession of 1903 — The Taurus 
section — Concession for railway to and port of Alex- 
andretta — The Amanus section — Anglo-Germano- 
Turkish negotiations, 1913-1914 — Facilities for travel 
— Cost of the railway to Turkey — The great southern 
arm or Syrian railways — Bearing of coming im- 
provements upon Allied operations — The future. 




The Lichnowsky disclosures — Changed Germanic 
objects after the outbreak of the War — Methods 
employed for their realization — Enemy successes in 
the East — Necessity for the creation of an Anti- 
German barrier — True basis of a permanent Balkan 
peace — Salonica and Constantinople after the War 
— The future of Turkey. 

Postscript 337 

Some Useful Publications on the Same Subject . . 339 
Index 343 


Turkish Prisoners in Bagdad Frontispiece 


M. Gueshoff 22 

The Serbian Parliament House at Belgrade .... 42 

The Old Turkish Palace at Nish 42 

Bitlis, an Important Town in Eastern Asia Minor ... 76 

Reading the British Proclamation to the Inhabitants of 

Jerusalem, after the Capture 88 

M. Take Jonescu 108 

M. Venezelos 136 

Durazzo from the Sea 156 

Berat, a Picturesque Town in Southern Albania . . . 208 

The Rock-like Coast of the Gallipoli Peninsula . . . 236 

The Village of Bulair 236 

The Arch of Galeritis at Salonica 250 

British Mountain Battery Going into Position on the Salonica 

Front 268 

Baron Marshal von Bieberstein 



The Military Highways of the Balkans . 
Southern Part of the Gallipoli Peninsula 
The Bagdad Railway and Its Tributaries 
The Railways of Syria and Palestine 
The Balkan States . . . . ' . 




History has proved that in the past the Near East 
has been both the scene of and the reason for war after 
war. Consequently throughout the last few decades, 
and especially from the time of the re-establishment of 
the Ottoman Constitution in the year 1908, the polit- 
ical and military situations in the Balkan Peninsula 
and in Asiatic Turkey have been questions of all- 
preponderating importance. This has been due in 
part to the continued state of unrest prevailing there, 
in part to the rivalry existing in Europe concerning the 
futures of these areas, and in part — a greater part — 
to the intrigues of the Central Powers, who finally 
brought about the present war. In short the Near 
East, which was the immediate cause and, when coupled 
with the Pan-German desire for domination from 
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, to a great extent the 
actual reason of the present conflagration, has been for 
many years " The Danger Zone of Europe " — a " danger 
zone" which in its turn has played an all -important 
role in events which have taken place since the summer 
of 1914. 


In order to be able to arrive at a proper under- 
standing of the problems existing there immediately 
prior to the outbreak of the present war, it is necessary 
very briefly to refer to various historical events which 
have taken place in connection with that area during 
the last half -century. The Crimean War, undertaken 
as it was in support of Turkey against Russia, con- 
stituted the substitution of the anti-Russian and pro- 
Turkish policy of Lord Palmerston for the opposite 
programme advocated by Mr. Bright, who championed 
the cause of peace and of the Oriental Christians. 
During the ensuing twenty years, with the exception of 
the constitution of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870 
and the consequent spiritual independence of the Bul- 
garian from the Orthodox Greek Church, no develop- 
ments of far-reaching significance occurred. In 1875, 
however, when a revolution against Turkish authority 
broke out in Herzegovina and to a certain extent in 
Bosnia, it appeared probable that the explosion would 
spread throughout the Balkans. That revolution was, 
however, localised, and it was not until 1877, as a 
result of the massacre of Bulgarians in the present 
kingdom of Bulgaria in 1876, that Russia took up 
arms to protect the Slavs of the south and waged 
a war which constitutes an event of far-reaching 

Whilst the actual results of that war were that the 
Sultan lost a considerable area of his European do- 
minions, that the Principality of Bulgaria and the 
Province of Eastern Roumelia were created, that the 
independence of Serbia and of Roumania from Turkish 
suzerainty was recognised, and that part of Armenia 
was annexed to Russia, the real bearing of that cam- 


paign upon the future history of this part of the world 
is bound up not so much with these results as with 
what would have been its consequences had Russia 
been left undisturbed to settle her differences with 
Turkey. A preliminary treaty was signed between the 
representatives of the Tsar on the one hand and those 
of the Sultan on the other on March 17, 1878. 
Known as the Treaty of San Stefano, in Europe it 
created a large Bulgaria and in Asia it practically freed 
the Armenians from Turkish yoke. But that agree- 
ment did not meet with the approval of the British 
Government, which feared that Bulgaria would become 
a puppet state of Russia, and that the expansion of 
Muscovite power in Asia would constitute a menace to 
the British position in the East. The results were 
that a convention, known as the Cyprus Convention, 
by which Great Britain guaranteed the integrity of 
the Ottoman Empire, in exchange for the Sultan's 
promise to introduce the necessary reforms in his 
dominions, and for the lease of the Island of Cyprus, 
was signed between the British and Turkish govern- 
ments, and that a European Congress was summoned 
at Berlin in June, 1878. The Treaty of Berlin, which 
was the outcome of that Congress, handed back large 
districts of what is known as Macedonia in European 
Turkey, inhabited almost exclusively by Bulgarians, 
to Turkey, and, although nominally insisting upon re- 
forms in that area and in Armenia, in fact left the 
people of those unhappy districts at the mercy of the 
Ottoman authorities. In short, whilst the Russo- 
Turkish Campaign of 1877-1878 was really the first 
war fought for the independence of Macedonia and 
Armenia, its results and the manner in which the 


Great Powers allowed Turkey to ignore her obligations 
of reform were the direct causes of the events which 
led up to the Balkan conflagrations of 1912 and 1913 
— conflagrations which in their turn left the way ready 
for the present war. 

With the British support of Bulgaria in 1885, when 
Eastern Roumelia was incorporated in that country, 
with the attitude taken up by the British Government 
during the Armenian Massacre crisis of 1894-1896, 
and with the granting to Crete of an autonomous 
regime in 1897, there occurred a nominal change of 
policy. But even after that no serious attempts were 
made by Europe to prevent the prolongation of a reign 
of terror in Macedonia and Armenia — a reign of ter- 
ror which was rapidly becoming unbearable. In 1903 
there came the massacres in Macedonia — massacres 
which, be it known, were accepted as constituting the 
slaughter of a Bulgarian and not of a Serbian popula- 
tion — and the beginning of a new British policy arising 
not from Russian but from German danger. Later in 
that year there was formulated an arrangement known 
as the Murzteg Scheme of Reforms — a scheme which 
gave Austria and Russia the predominating share in 
the control of Macedonia but which admitted the 
presence and support of the other Great Powers. By 
it and by the agreements subsequently made, all sorts 
of reforms were promised. Civil assessors were pro- 
vided, and European oflScers, representing all the 
Great Powers except Germany, who did not participate, 
were appointed for the purpose of seeing that these 
reforms were actually carried out by the Ottoman 
Government. This scheme, which constituted a tardy 
effort on the part of Europe to see that the treaty 


obligations of Turkey were actually fulfilled, was 
however treated as a scrap of paper; the hands of 
the international officials were tied, and the state of 
Macedonia daily grew worse and worse. In Armenia, 
too, the lot of the people gradually became more 
dreadful, for whilst reforms were discussed and pro- 
posed, Turkey, profiting by the differences always 
existing between the Great Powers, endeavoured 
slowly to annihilate this unhappy race. 

It was during this troublous period that the Ameri- 
can Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 
which has its headquarters in Boston, established 
numerous posts, hospitals, and schools in Asia Minor, 
and began to perform such indefatigable work for the 
amelioration of the Ottoman Christians. The repre- 
sentatives of this organisation, many of whom I have 
been privileged to meet, and much of whose work I 
have been able to watch, have devoted themselves with 
untiring devotion and under conditions of complete 
self-denial, to the task of bettering the lives of and 
educating the peoples who, as a consequence, have 
grown to realise the true meaning of Western culti- 
vation and civilisation. In short, the existence of the 
Robert College at Constantinople and of the College 
for Girls in the same city, which are not directly under 
the control of the above-mentioned Board, together 
with the judgment and the high-mindedness of the 
American missionaries, are largely responsible for the 
facts that the name of the United States has grown 
to be spoken of with reverence, and that America is 
respected throughout Armenia, Bulgaria, and Albania. 

Whilst the policies of England and Russia during 
the thirty years following the signature of the Treaty 


of Berlin may be described as those of procrastination, 
the Central Powers and particularly Germany were 
working and intriguing for the maintenance of a state 
of unrest in the East destined to prepare the way for 
the eventual realisation of their policies. Indeed, 
ever since the accession of the present Emperor to the 
throne in 1888 that ruler has been carefully develop- 
ing his influence in the East. One year later, and in 

1889, His Majesty paid his first visit to Constantinople 
— a visit more or less connected with the then recent 
.grabbing of the Scutari-Ismid railway and with the 

concession for the prolongation of that line to Angora 
as a German concern. Directly afterwards, early in 

1890, by the "Dropping of the Pilot" there was in the 
retirement of Bismarck a clear reversal of the policy 
based upon the assertions of that statesman to the 
effect that the whole Eastern question was "not 
worth the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier." Be- 
fore and particularly after the appointment of Baron 
Marshal von Bieberstein, who had then been a personal 
friend of the Kaiser's for many years, as Ambassador 
in Constantinople in 1897, Germanic policy was run 
with the sole object of securing concessions in and gain- 
ing the favour of Turkey. Indeed although so far as 
the Balkan States were concerned the Kaiser at this 
time endeavoured to screen his intentions behind a 
nominally Austrian programme, he was really pre- 
paring the way for the realisation of his Pan-German 
dreams in the Near and Middle Easts. Thus the 
power of Von der Goltz Pasha, who introduced the 
present military system into Turkey in 1886, and of 
his pupils was greatly increased until the Ottoman 
army was finally completely under Germanic control. 


After the Turco-Greek War of 1897, the Government 
of BerHn favoured Turkey in the settlement. In 1898 
the Emperor paid his second visit to the Ottoman 
Empire — a visit nominally undertaken as a peaceful 
pilgrimage to Jerusalem but an excursion really decided 
upon as an elaborately arranged coup de theatre. It 
was during that visit that the German ruler even went 
so far as to proclaim himself the friend of the Sultan 
and of all the Moslems who venerated him "for al- 
ways" — a declaration no doubt in part responsible 
for the Bagdad Railway concession which almost 
immediately followed. In the later nineties, too, 
whilst reserving their right to a voice in its final settle- 
.ment, Germany and Austria withdrew from the Concert 
of Europe, so far as concerned the Cretan question, 
thereby, of course, securing the good will of the ex- 
Sultan. Abdul Hamid's refusal to introduce reforms 
in his administration, continued unrest in his European 
dominions, and the appointment of European officers 
to the Macedonian gendarmerie in 1906, were all in 
their turns utilised to further the enemy's cause. In 
short, whilst divergencies of opinion among the Great 
Powers in regard to the Eastern question would, in 
any case, have rendered combined action in favour of 
reforms most difficult, the definite support given by 
Germany to the Sultan, with the express purpose of 
securing a powerful ally when "The Day" came, 
actually encouraged that ruler in the maintenance of 
a regime which finally became an actual disgrace to the 
whole civilised world. 

So much for the events which took place during the 
period preceding the developments which immediately 
led to the Young Turkish Revolution of July, 1908. 


The way for that revolution was made ready by the 
fact that the atrocities and misgovernment permitted 
by the Sultan had created a state of things which was 
not only intolerable to all the subject races of the 
Empire, but also to the more liberal-minded Turks 
themselves. The actual outbreak of 1908 resulted in- 
directly from the existence of the Anglo-French and 
the Anglo-Russian ententes, which came into being 
respectively in 1904 and 1907, and directly from the 
meeting of King Edward with the ex-Tsar at Reval, 
on June 9, 1908. It was that meeting which decided 
the Committee of Union and Progress, then still a 
secret organisation, to take immediate action. That 
action was rendered possible by the spreading of untrue 
propaganda in the Ottoman army to the effect that the 
British policy bound up with the Crimean War had 
been reversed, and that England and Russia had now 
united with the object of bringing about the dismem- 
berment of Turkey. In addition, the Albanians, who 
were holding a Congress at Ferisovitch in the follow- 
ing month, were utilised by the Young Turks to de- 
mand from Abdul Hamid a constitution, the meaning 
of which they did not understand. This demand, 
which was embodied in a telegram, nominally from the 
Albanians, but really concocted by the Committee of 
Union and Progress assembled at Uskub, and addressed 
to the Sultan, finally convinced His Majesty, who de- 
pended upon but none the less feared his Albanian 
Guard, that a constitution must be granted. The 
decree actually establishing the New Regime was 
signed at the end of July, 1908. 

Internationally and locally the Young Turkish Revo- 
lution, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by 


Austria-Hungary, and the declaration of independence 
by Bulgaria which followed that revolution, mark an 
all-important epoch in the development of affairs in 
the Balkans, and in European history, which for years 
has been so closely bound up with the situation in the 
Near East. Internationally speaking, whilst the revo- 
lution in Turkey for a time caused the Ottoman Gov- 
ernment to turn towards England instead of towards 
Germany, the annexation of Bosnia and the inde- 
pendence of Bulgaria are of primary importance, and 
therefore I will begin by a brief reference to the mean- 
ing of these events. 

As a result of a cabinet council held at Rustchuk 
during the night of October 4-5, the actual decla- 
ration of Bulgarian independence was made by King 
Ferdinand at Turnovo, the ancient capital of Bul- 
garia, on October 5, 1908. Prior to this whether or 
not any formal agreement had been arrived at be- 
tween the Austro-Hungarian Government and Prince 
Ferdinand concerning the annexation of the then 
only ** occupied" provinces and the declaration of 
Bulgarian independence has always been far from 
clear. However this may be, and however vehemently 
both the parties who tore up the Treaty of Berlin in 
October, 1908, may deny that any arrangement was 
made, it is certain that when Prince Ferdinand ar- 
rived at Budapest on September 23, he was received 
by the Emperor Francis Joseph with royal honours. 
There is no doubt, too, that the proclamation of Bul- 
garian independence, at an early date, was actually 
decided upon by Prince Ferdinand during his visit 
to Vienna at the end of September. The question 
whether, and if so when. Count Aehrenthal was actually 


officially informed of the Bulgarian programme is 
extremely delicate. Although, on October 3, the 
Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister officially denied 
to the British Ambassador at Vienna all knowledge of 
the impending declaration of Bulgarian independence, 
yet the Ambassador of the Dual Monarchy in Paris, 
when presenting the letter announcing the forth- 
coming annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
President Fallieres on October 3, actually informed 
His Excellency of the imminent declaration of Bul- 
garian independence. Whatever may have been the 
knowledge officially possessed by the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government as to the imminence of the Bul- 
garian declaration of independence it is therefore 
probable that Prince Ferdinand, possibly even in 
possession of Austro-Hungarian assurances that a 
declaration of independence would subsequently be 
permitted if the Bulgarian people remained calm during 
what was expected would only be formalities concern- 
ing the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, may 
have considered it advisable to make good his oppor- 
tunity, and effect his national coup d'etat, while the 
statesmen of the Dual Monarchy were still putting the 
finishing touches upon their arrangements for the 
formal annexation of the already "occupied "provinces. 
By far the most important international results of 
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on October 
7, 1908, were what may be described as the throwing 
back of the Dual Monarchy into the arms of Germany, 
and the accentuation of the division already becoming 
clearly marked between the Triple Entente and the 
Triple Alliance. The policy of Count Aehrenthal, 
which seems to have been framed with the idea that 


the annexation of the two already "occupied " provinces 
would be a mere formality, will probably be handed 
down in history as one of the greatest mistakes ever 
made in statesmanship. Instead of strengthening the 
European position of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment, the annexation, apparently made in ignorance 
of its immediate and far-reaching consequences, forced 
the Government of the late Emperor to turn to Ger- 
many for diplomatic assistance — assistance which 
was given but only at the expense of Austria once more 
becoming the mere puppet of her northern neighbour, 
intsead of being able to develop her own independent 
existence. Moreover, as I shall show elsewhere, the 
policy of Count Aehrenthal went a long way towards 
increasing the tension already existing between Austria- 
Hungary and Serbia — a tension as a result of which 
it was certain that, at the given moment, Russia would 
come to the support of her little Slav brothers. It was 
these consequences which so greatly enhanced the dif- 
ficulties accruing between Austro-Hungary and Russia 
during the Balkan Wars — difficulties which were in 
part responsible for the unsatisfactory arrangement 
of 1913. 

The settlement between Turkey and Bulgaria, fol- 
lowing the declaration of independence by King 
Ferdinand on October 5, 1908, in a way constituted a 
set-off to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
because, whilst the Russian Government lost prestige 
at home and abroad as the result of its inability to 
come to the assistance of Serbia, it gained international 
reputation and strengthened its position in both direc- 
tions by stepping into the breach between Bulgaria 
and Turkey. In February, 1909, and therefore when 


the crisis between these two countries had been in 
progress for four months, a deadlock in the negotiations 
had been reached. Russia then addressed a circular 
Note to the Great Powers, signifying her willingness to 
come to some arrangement with the two parties con- 
cerned — an arrangement which would make good to 
Turkey the difference between the sum already ten- 
dered to and that claimed by her. Finally, and about a 
month later, the Muscovite Government cancelled 
part of the then remaining seventy-four instalments 
of the 1878 war indemnity due to her from Turkey, 
and accepted in exchange the approximately 82,000,000 
francs already tendered to Turkey by Bulgaria. By 
this arrangement Russia may have been temporarily and 
materially the loser, but she thereby gained credit in 
the arena of European diplomacy by preventing an 
outbreak of hostilities in the Balkans — an outbreak 
which in all probability it would have been impossible 
to localise. 

To summarise and to give any comprehensive idea 
of the meaning of the Young Turkish Revolution in 
what was then the Ottoman Empire itself, or to de- 
scribe the effect of that movement in the countries 
bordering upon Turkey, are questions of the utmost 
difficulty. In July, 1908, as I have already said, the 
Young Turks successfully brought about a coup d'etat, 
which, though it endowed the people with a nominal 
constitution, in fact created, in the form of the Com- 
mittee of Union and Progress, a hidden and secret 
government even more autocratic than that of Abdul 
Hamid. Much has been written upon the subject of 
the organisation and work of that Committee, and 
though many be the conversations which I have had 


with its prominent members, I can assert here, without 
fear of contradiction, that but very few, except the 
inner and secret ring of Young Turks themselves, even 
now understand more than the vaguest details of the 
manner in which this mysterious organisation attained 
its power, spread its influence, and, from the moment 
of the change of regime in 1908, kept the entire govern- 
ment of the country in its hands. All that need be 
said here, therefore, is that this body, which on various 
occasions has made a pretence of coming out into the 
open and becoming an oflScial organisation, has never- 
theless really existed as a secret group of individuals, 
the exact roles and power of whom nobody has ever 
been able to discern with certainty. Thus whilst we 
have all heard a great deal about the influence and 
prestige of men like Enver and Talaat Pashas, the 
outside world knows but little of others, such as Doctor 
Nazim, who really constitute and are the secret in- 
fluence behind the throne. This all-important poli- 
tician scarcely ever appears in public, his name rarely 
figures in the papers, and he has never taken a govern- 
mental post. In conversation he appears most mod- 
erate, most liberal, and quite honest. But his never 
changing one-sidedness, his secret chauvinism, and his 
determination to ignore the true meaning of Liberalism, 
render him absolutely typical of the Young Turk 
mentality, and in fact make him the personification 
and the actual backbone of the Committee of Union 
and Progress itself. 

The outstanding feature of the situation in the 
Ottoman Empire is the fact that its ruling nation, 
the Turks, constitutes only a minority of the inhabit- 
ants, and that they have formed, and do form, an army 


of occupation in the country which they purport to 
govern. This means either that there can be no 
Liberalism or Constitutionahsm in the country, or 
that its ruling caste would be outnumbered and out- 
voted by the various alien races of which the population 
is so largely composed. When the Young Turks came 
into power, they proclaimed as their motto "Liberty, 
Fraternity, and Equality ", and asserted that what 
they wished to bring about was a state of feeling by 
which the former differences between Turks, Greeks, 
Bulgarians, Arabs, etc. should be obliterated — a 
state of feeling in which there would only be "Otto- 
mans." But the so-called " Ottomanisation " of the 
Empire really meant the attempted " Turcification " 
of the subject races — an attempted " Turcification " 
which has constituted and still constitutes the funda- 
mental basis of the struggle which has been and is in 
progress in the dominions of the Sultan. 

The historical events of the years 1908-1912 are so 
closely bound up with the internal situation in Turkey 
that I propose to discuss them all in connection with 
that situation, and to divide my remarks into three 
sections, each devoted to a more or less clearly defined 
stage in the development of Near-Eastern affairs. 
The first stage is that which may be said to have lasted 
for approximately a year from the time of the advent 
to power of the Young Turks. During it the in- 
stigators of the New Regime did something to im- 
prove the everyday conditions of life by bringing about 
the downfall of many of Abdul Hamid's spies, by in- 
creasing personal security, and, up to a point, by al- 
lowing freedom of speech and of the press. These 
changes, together with the promise of equality for all 


Ottomans, created in the minds of the non-Turkish 
inhabitants feehngs of expectancy for the future. The 
leaders of the bands came in from the mountains and, 
on receiving a guarantee of a general amnesty, decided 
to throw in their lot with the so-called reformers. At 
first a kind of millennium seemed to have come. As a 
result of this, when I visited Macedonia in the sum- 
mer of 1909, I found that everybody hoped that some 
real reforms would be introduced, that the Government 
would take the leaders of the various races into its 
confidence, and that the Christian populations would 
be permitted to play their part in the direction of the 
country, and to work out the manner in which reform 
should be executed in the best interests of the Empire 
as a whole. 

The Committee not only refrained from living up 
to these hopes, but, having obtained an enormous 
majority in the Chamber, it openly filled the whole 
Ministry and all the government appointments with 
men recruited from its ranks. No endeavours were 
made to devote adequate sums of money to the con- 
struction of roads or railways other than those required 
for strategical purposes. In spite of the early and un- 
doubted loyalty of the leaders of the various Christian 
races, the Armenians of the Cilician Plain were butch- 
ered in thousands in April, 1909, and a determined 
policy destined to withdraw many of the privileges, 
possessed in a greater or lesser degree by all the Chris- 
tian races of the Empire, was inaugurated. Educa- 
tional and religious freedom were curtailed, a brigandage 
law was put into operation in Macedonia before it was 
even passed by the Chamber, and the enforced sur- 
render of arms was so brutally carried out that a reign 


of terror was soon created, as terrible as that which 
existed prior to 1908. The Bulgarians were oppressed 
because of the fear of the support which might accrue 
to them from their already freed brethren of the king- 
dom of Bulgaria; the Greeks were persecuted on ac- 
count of the then state of the Cretan question, and the 
Albanians were maltreated because of their desire to 
proclaim the existence of their nationality and to im- 
prove their education. In short, so rapidly and so 
disastrously did things develop that when I returned 
to Macedonia, early in 1910, I found the condition of 
things much worse than it had been only six months 
previously. Instead of expectancy there was hope- 
lessness, and in place of loyalty there was natural dis- 

The second stage in the development of the internal 
situation in Turkey extended approximately from the 
beginning of the year 1910 until the end of 1911. 
When I was in Turkey in the winter of 1909-1910, as 
I have already explained, the non-Turkish elements 
of the population were not slow to abuse the New 
Regime. Albanians, Greeks, Bulgars, and Serbs alike 
complained, and with reason, that the elections had 
been gerrymandered, and that the Young Turks had 
not fulfilled their promises made in 1908. But in 1909 
these people did not assert that the Moslem population 
was being armed by the Government, that men were 
being illegally arrested, that Turkish bands were 
being secretly formed for the purpose of exterminating 
people believed to be in relation with revolutionaries, 
and that Christians, marked down for death, were 
being assassinated by order of the Committee of 
Union and Progress. During a tour in Macedonia and 


Albania after the outbreak of the Turco-ItaHan War, 
men of all nationalities informed me, I have every 
reason to believe correctly, that the Turkish Govern- 
ment or, perhaps more correctly, the predominating 
clique of the Committee was actually sanctioning, or 
at least conniving at, this state of things. 

At that time the situation in Macedonia was there- 
fore as bad, if not worse, than that existing prior to the 
Constitution. Instead of the promised equality for 
all nationalities, the non-Turkish elements of the 
population had, so to speak, been placed beyond the 
pale of common justice. Christians were expelled 
from their farms in order to be replaced by Mouhaggirs 
(Moslem emigrants) from Bosnia and Bulgaria. A 
systematic and organised campaign for the murder of 
a large number of Bulgarians was instituted. In 
short, the Constitution had been reduced to nothing 
but a name. Moreover, whereas under the Old 
Regime the people enjoyed a certain protection from 
Europe under various schemes of reform sanctioned 
and undertaken by the Great Powers, and whereas 
their religious chiefs were then treated with a certain 
deference by the Constantinople Government, two 
years after the establishment of the Constitution these 
advantages had been done away with and instead no 
amelioration in the actual system of government had 
been introduced. Upon this point the feeling of the 
population seems to have been well expressed in a 
memorandum, drawn up by the Committee of the 
Bulgarian Internal Organisation, and handed to the 
Consuls of Great Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, 
and France, on October 31, 1911. After discussing 
various aspects of the situation in Macedonia, this 


document declared that: "Comparing the present 
state of things to that which existed during the last 
four years of the reign of Abdul Hamid, when there 
was in Macedonia a European Control, and when the 
country enjoyed a certain financial autonomy, the 
people find the present situation much more abominable 
and much more insupportable." 

In Albania the fundamental causes of unrest — the 
attempted denationalisation of the people — were the 
same as in Macedonia. The system employed by the 
authorities and the attitude adopted by the inhabit- 
ants were, however, somewhat different. The Young 
Turks, in place of the secret persecution adopted in 
Macedonia, almost immediately took open measures 
to endeavour to reduce these warlike mountaineers, 
who had always enjoyed a sort of semi-independence, 
to a state of humble obedience to the Central Govern- 
ment. The result of this was that the Albanian ques- 
tion, which was perhaps the most important problem 
for solution by the Government, at once became a 
burning question, and that the attitude of the Turkish 
chauvinists brought about an almost immediate and 
continuous revolution. In the summer of 1910 an 
insurrection, which had for its causes the above-men- 
tioned policy of the Young Turks and also the brutal 
measures taken by Djavid Pasha in Albania in 1908 
and 1909, broke out in the vilayets of Scutari and 
Uskub. That insurrection, which was rife almost 
from end to end of Northern Albania, necessitated 
the sending of a considerable Turkish expeditionary 
force which, although partially successful, carried out 
its work with such brutality that the seeds were sown 
for the Malissori Revolution which took place during 


the summer of the following year. That revolution, 
which began early in 1911 and lasted until the autumn, 
was really the beginning of the end so far as the Young 
Turks were concerned, for it proved that the Albanians, 
disorganised and divided as they were, could wring 
from the Government concessions — concessions which 
though never honestly carried out, nevertheless showed 
to Europe and to the neighbouring Balkan States 
that nothing could be accomplished in Turkey other- 
wise than by force. 

This was the situation in the Ottoman Empire 
itself at the time of the outbreak and during the early 
months of the Turco-Italian War. Beyond its Eu- 
ropean frontiers, the neighbours of Turkey were wait- 
ing with anxiety the development of events in the 
Balkan Peninsula and elsewhere. The governments 
responsible for the foreign policies of Greece, Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Bulgaria, all of whose Leaders I saw 
at the time, whilst professedly anxious for the im- 
mediate reestablishment of peace and for the main- 
tenance of the "Status Quo", were still more concerned 
in making certain that, in view of the attitude of 
Europe, their particular country should not be the 
first to disturb the peace of this ever Danger Zone of 
Europe. The positions of all these Ministers were 
extremely difficult, for they were each threatened by 
a like danger — a danger due to the fact that the 
more chauvinistic politicians of each country were in 
favour of a forward policy drawn up with the object 
of endeavouring immediately to better the lot of their 
brothers domiciled across the Ottoman frontier. In 
Greece the Government was faced by the complica- 
tions of and consequent upon the Cretan question. 


At Belgrade the situation was particularly intricate, 
because the Serbian Administration was forced either 
quietly to witness the ill-treatment of the Serbs in 
Turkey by their Moslem fellow countrymen or else 
to draw the attention of Europe to a situation of dis- 
order in the Ottoman Empire, by way of which alone 
Serbia could gain access to the sea. At Cettinje the 
Montenegrin authorities were in daily danger of find- 
ing themselves in the awkward dilemma of either 
refusing readmission to the discontented Albanians, 
or of facing the dangerous situation to be created by 
a fresh Albanian immigration. At Sofia the King and 
his advisers were not only compelled to study the 
feelings of the powerful section of the population which 
interests itself almost exclusively in the welfare of the 
Macedonian Bulgars, but they were also menaced by 
the attitude of the people who thought that the time 
had come for the employment of the powerful Bul- 
garian army, in order to solve once and for all the 
Macedonian question. Thanks, however, to the far-see- 
ing and moderate attitudes adopted by M. Venezelos, 
by the late M. Milovanovitch, by M. Gregovitch, and by 
M. Gueshoff , the policies of Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, 
and Bulgaria were so shaped that none of those coun- 
tries rushed into war in the autumn of 1911, and they 
therefore had time adequately to prepare for and to 
make the arrangements necessary for the first Balkan 

We now come to the third stage — the negotiations 
and events actually bound up with the formation of 
the Balkan League — negotiations which partially 
overlapped the second stage and to which I will allude 
in their chronological order. M. Gueshoff became 


Bulgarian Premier in March, 1911. Shortly after- 
wards and in May, tentative overtures were made to 
him through the medium of Mr. James D. Bourchier 
— the well-known correspondent of The Times in the 
Balkans — who was then in Athens. From that 
time onwards, whilst relations between Bulgaria and 
Greece were certainly improved, nothing was done 
until October, when the Greek Minister at Sofia in- 
formed M. Gueshoff that Greece would be prepared 
to support Bulgaria in case she were attacked by 
Turkey, provided the latter country were willing to 
enter into a corresponding undertaking. The Gov- 
ernment of Bulgaria, then threatened by the mobili- 
sation of the Ottoman army which took place on the 
outbreak of the Turco-Italian War, agreed to those 
proposals, but nothing definite was then done to in- 
corporate them in treaty form. 

The beginning of that war found M. Gueshoff at 
Vichy, but he returned immediately to Bulgaria, 
holding a conference with M. Milovanovitch, then 
Serbian Premier, in the train and on his way through 
that country. That conference established a basis for 
the ensuing negotiations which were conducted be- 
tween M. Gueshoff and M. Spalaikovitch, who was 
appointed to represent Serbia. These negotiations, 
which took the form of proposals and counter proposals 
upon the subject of the future of Macedonia and other 
matters of importance, continued in Sofia, Belgrade, 
and Paris, to which latter place M. Milovanovitch 
went with the King of Serbia, until the two countries 
finally signed a definite Treaty of Alliance and a Secret 
Annex — which are published in full by M. Gueshoff 
in his book entitled "The Balkan League" — on March 


14, 1912. That Treaty, which was defensive in char- 
acter, definitely guaranteed the support of each party 
to the other in the event of one of them being attacked 
by one or more States, or in the event of any Great 
Power attempting to invade or annex any part of 
then Turkey in Europe in a manner contrary to the 
vital interests of either party. Over and above these 
stipulations, undertakings were entered into binding the 
two signatories not to conclude peace independently 
and arranging for the immediate formulation of a 
military convention which was signed about six weeks 

The Secret Annex, which has turned out to be really 
more important than the Treaty itself, foresaw the 
probability that internal or external difficulties in 
Turkey itself might render the maintenance of the 
Status Quo impossible and fixed the terms upon which 
action might then be taken. In addition it definitely 
decided the future distribution of any areas acquired 
either as a result of the defensive treaty or of what 
may be called the offensive annex. Whilst all terri- 
torial gains were to constitute common property, their 
repartition was to take place upon a definite basis. 
Serbia recognised the right of Bulgaria to the territory 
east of the Rhodopes and the River Struma, whilst 
Bulgaria recognised the similar right of Serbia to the 
territory north and west of the Schar Mountains. 
With regard to the area lying between these two 
boundaries, if the two governments became convinced 
that the formation of an autonomous province were 
impossible, then Serbia undertook to ask for nothing 
beyond a line drawn from Mount Golem on the north- 
east to Lake Ochrida on the southwest. Bulgaria 



promised to accept this line, if His Majesty the Tsar, 
who was to be requested to arbitrate, decided in its 
favour. As autonomy was not then possible, the 
meaning of this agreement was that the Serbs were 
to claim nothing beyond the Mount Golem-Lake 
Ochrida line, that the Bulgarians were to claim nothing 
to the north and west of the Schar Mountains, and that 
all disputes concerning the district between these two 
lines, known as the "Contested Zone", were "to be 
submitted to the final decision of Russia as soon as 
one of the contracting parties declared that, in his 
opinion, an agreement by direct negotiations is im- 

The military convention subsequently signed be- 
tween Bulgaria and Serbia — a convention later fol- 
lowed by various agreements between the respective 
General Staffs — defined the military liabilities of the 
two countries towards one another in case of a de- 
fensive or offensive war and laid down the obligations 
of the respective parties in the case of a declaration of 
war upon Bulgaria by Roumania, and of Austrian or 
Turkish attacks upon Serbia. The number of troops 
to be furnished by the respective countries and certain 
arrangements as to their distribution were foreseen. 
All manner of arrangements were made to endeavour 
to secure the smooth working of the Alliance and to 
prevent the development of any friction between the 
commands or between the armies themselves. In 
fact, had it not been for the inherent rivalry existing 
between the two peoples and for their almost irreconcil- 
able aspirations, the arrangements made upon paper 
were so little short of perfect that one might have 
expected that they would operate in war almost as 


smoothly as the most formal arrangement governing 
the relations of two countries in peace time. 

During the period of the Serbo-Bulgarian negotia- 
tions, conversations were in progress between the Bul- 
garian Government and the Hellenic representative at 
Sofia. These conversations failed to materialise until 
after the signature of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty largely 
because the Greeks were slow to accept the principle 
of autonomy for Macedonia advocated by Bulgaria — 
a principle based on the Twenty-third Article of the 
Treaty of Berlin. However, in May, 1912, the Hel- 
lenic Government agreed to the Bulgarian proposals, 
and a definite Treaty was signed at Sofia on the twenty- 
ninth of that month. That Treaty, also published by 
M. Gueshoff, guaranteed to each of its signatories the 
support of the other in case of war with Turkey, but 
it made no arrangement whatever as to the future 
distribution of the territories to be acquired in a 
common war. It was followed three months later by 
a military convention which set out the respective 
liabilities of the two countries — a convention signed 
immediately before the outbreak of the first Balkan 

There now remains only the question of the re- 
lations between Montenegro and her neighbours. That 
country, which had been on very strained terms with 
Serbia for some years, greatly improved her relations 
with Bulgaria as a result of the personal visit paid 
by King Ferdinand to King Nicholas on the occasion 
of the latter proclaiming himself king of his country 
in August, 1910, and as a consequence of the ability 
displayed by M. Kolousheff — the Bulgarian Minis- 
ter at Cettinje. Notwithstanding this, there was no 


written undertaking between Bulgaria and Montenegro 
at the time of the outbreak of the war, and the agree- 
ment between the two countries, which is possessed of 
no far-reaching poHtical importance, consisted in an 
oral undertaking between the Bulgarian Minister at 
Cettinje and King Nicholas, who concluded it during 
September, 1912. 

It is impossible and unnecessary here to enter into 
details concerning the events which immediately pre- 
ceded or took place during the first Balkan campaign. 
By the middle of August the situation in the Ottoman 
Empire had become so critical that the Austrian Gov- 
ernment proposed a scheme of administrative decen- 
tralisation for European Turkey. About a month 
later the Turks ordered a general mobilisation — a 
mobilisation replied to by the four Balkan States. 
Diplomatic correspondence passed between the Great 
Powers and Turkey and Bulgaria, and between the 
two last-named countries. Montenegro declared war 
on October 8 — a declaration which was followed 
ten days later by the other three States. Thencefor- 
ward the war may be considered as having been di- 
vided into four more or less independent campaigns — 
those in Thrace, in Central and Northern Macedonia, 
in Northern Albania and the sanjak of Novibazar, 
and in Southern Albania and Southern Macedonia. 
In the first of these areas, where the fighting was far 
more severe than anywhere else, the Bulgarians con- 
tained the fortress of Adrianople and made a rapid 
advance to the Chatalja Lines, which they reached in 
less than a month. In the second the Serbians moved 
by way of the Vardar valley and across the Turco- 
Serbian frontier lying to the west of it, fought a great 


and successful battle at Komanovo on October 24, 
reached the seacoast early in November and entered 
Monastir on the eighteenth of that month. In the 
third the Montenegrins advanced into the sanjak of 
Novibazar and into Northern Albania, moving upon 
Scutari along the northeastern and southwestern shores 
of the lake of that name. And lastly the Greeks, 
while detaching a force to attack Janina, struck across 
the Turco-Greek frontier in the direction of Salonica 
— a city which they entered on November 9, thereby 
becoming the victors in the race in progress between 
them and the Serbian army coming by way of the 
Vardar valley and the Bulgarian forces advancing 
through Ishtib and across the Rhodope Balkans. 
Early in December, when Adrianople, Scutari, and 
Janina — the three great fortresses of Turkey in 
Europe — still remained in Ottoman hands, an armis- 
tice was concluded — an armistice which led to the 
first peace congress of London, which assembled on 
the thirteenth of that month. That congress which 
sat intermittently for about a month proved abortive, 
primarily because the Turks, partly as a result of a 
coup d'etat in Constantinople, refused to agree to the 
allied demands for the cession of Adrianople and for 
the establishment of a frontier satisfactory to Bulgaria 
in Thrace, and to a lesser degree because the Ottoman 
Government was loath to agree to a fair settlement in 
regard to the futures of the Aegean Islands and of 

During the first phase of the Balkan struggle two 
important developments had taken place which were 
destined greatly to influence the future trend of events 
in Southeastern Europe. I refer to the international 


crisis arising out of the attitude of the Dual Monarchy, 
secretly supported by Germany, upon the Adriatic 
question, and to the differences already existing be- 
tween Serbia and Bulgaria. In regard to the first of 
these questions, Austria had taken up the attitude 
that on no account would she permit the permanent 
occupation by Serbia of the territories which she had 
conquered on the east of the Adriatic. The adoption 
of this policy resulted in the convocation of the London 
Ambassadorial Conference which in its turn agreed to 
the principle of autonomy for Albania. This naturally 
constituted a great disappointment for Serbia — a 
disappointment which in part led to her bad relations 
with Bulgaria, and to her subsequent attempts to 
secure compensation at the expense of that country. 
Serbia, in face of Russian advice, bowed her head to 
the inevitable, but instead of recognising that her 
disappointment was due to the international situation, 
she endeavoured to suggest that it resulted from 
the attitude assumed by Bulgaria. Hard as was her 
case, this contention was not justified, for whilst the 
Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty definitely bound Bulgaria to 
support Serbia in case she were attacked by Austria, 
it made no mention of assistance in securing for her 
a port on the Adriatic or of any obligation to render 
diplomatic support to Serbia, who in fact evacuated 
and was not militarily driven back from the Adriatic 

Early in February, 1913, when the second phase 
of the first Balkan war began, the relations existing 
between Bulgaria and Serbia were therefore far from 
satisfactory. Militarily speaking, the ensuing events, 
during which once more the heaviest share of the 


fighting fell to the Bulgarians, were for the most part 
concerned with the capture of Adrianople and Janina 
— which were taken respectively at the end and at the 
beginning of March — and with the siege of Scutari, 
which fell into Montenegrin hands under somewhat 
mysterious circumstances, towards the end of April. 
During this time, however, diplomatic conditions were 
going from bad to worse. The assassination of the 
King of Greece on March 18 had removed from the 
arena of Balkan politics a man whose influence had 
always been used in favour of moderation. The po- 
sition as between Serbia and Bulgaria had also become 
considerably aggravated, for instead of the more or 
less secret and unofficial claims already made by the 
former country, the Government of King Peter, which 
was justified in making a point of the fact that Serbia 
had voluntarily furnished an important contingent for 
the operations at Adrianople, now ofiicially urged that 
the Treaty of 1912 "must undergo an amicable re- 
vision." So early as March, too, Serbia began to nego- 
tiate with Greece for the purpose of concluding a de- 
fensive treaty against Bulgaria. 

The second Peace Congress which sat in London in 
May therefore met in an atmosphere bristling with 
difficulties and uncertainty. No secret was made of 
the fact that the relations existing between the Bul- 
garians on the one side and the Serbs and the Greeks 
on the other were far from cordial. The international 
and local situations were also greatly complicated by 
the facts that the Serbs and Greeks hesitated to sign 
the terms of peace prepared by the Ambassadorial 
Conference and by the highly d.angerous situation 
which then existed in regard to the future possession 


of Scutari. After a great deal of delay, Sir Edward 
Grey, probably knowing that Serbia and Greece were 
retarding matters in order to perfect their own agree- 
ment against Bulgaria, made a communication to the 
peace delegates which necessitated their either coming 
to terms at once or preparing to leave London. Finally 
the definite treaty of peace, known as the Treaty of 
London, was signed on May 30 on the basis of the 
terms proposed by the Great Powers some six weeks 

By this time the relations existing between the 
allies had become extremely critical. Serbia was 
openly demanding the revision of the Serbo-Bulgarian 
Treaty because she contended that circumstances un- 
foreseen in it had arisen, and that she had mobilised 
a larger army than was incumbent upon her, and be- 
cause she urged that it was due to her assistance that 
Adrianople had fallen. Greece, with whom there was 
no agreement upon the subject, was also pegging out 
claims in Macedonia. But the real fact of importance 
was that early in 1913, before the conclusion of the 
first war and on the initiative of Greece, that country 
and Serbia entered into a secret arrangement in re- 
gard to the division of spoils secured from Turkey. 
The basis of that arrangement was that the Greeks 
would raise no objection to the Serbian retention of 
Monastir — allotted to Bulgaria by the Serbo-Bul- 
garian Treaty of 1912 — provided the Government of 
King Peter were willing to sanction the incorporation 
of Salonica in the Hellenic Kingdom. That arrange- 
ment was followed by the more formal Graeco-Serbian 
Treaty, which we now know to have been signed on 
June 1, 1913, and therefore two days after the con- 


elusion of the London Peaee Conferenee — a treaty 
which obviously strengthened the hands of Serbia 
and enabled her to make claims from Bulgaria — 
claims which otherwise she would never have been in 
a position to formulate. 

It is not possible here to discuss in detail the argu- 
ments put forward by the various Balkan claimants 
prior to the outbreak of the second war. There 
probably were conditions justifying Serbia in thinking 
that she was entitled to suggest modifications in her 
treaty with Bulgaria. But even if the spirit of that 
treaty had not been fully acted up to by the latter 
country, even if Serbia had performed more than her 
legal obligations, and even if she had been compelled 
to accept a European decision which constituted a 
great setback to her national aspirations, the Govern- 
ment of King Peter was still bound by the letter of a 
document to which it had agreed. In other words, 
whilst Serbia would certainly have been reasonable in 
making amicable suggestions to Bulgaria, she had no 
right to formulate actual demands even as a result of 
gratuitous assistance concerning which she had made 
no preliminary bargain. Moreover, as I have already 
said, one of the most important clauses in the 1912 
agreement specially foresaw the danger of a dispute be- 
tween the allies and decided that, in such a case, both 
parties should submit to the arbitration of the Tsar. 
M. Gueshoff, the Bulgarian Premier, who resigned on 
May 30, up to that time repeatedly expressed the 
willingness of his Government to adopt this course 
which was not then accepted by Serbia. Subsequently, 
when both parties had agreed to arbitration, but when 
things had already gone too far for recourse to this 



method of settling the dispute, an attack was made, 
contrary to the decision of the Sofia Government and 
without the consent of the Cabinet, by part of the Bul- 
garian army, acting by the order of General Savoff 
or of some superior War-Lord, upon the forces of its 
still nominal allies. Whilst no condemnation of those 
responsible for this attack can be too severe, the fact 
that Serbia, supported by Greece, refused to listen 
to the calming telegrams despatched by M. Sazonoff, 
then Russian Foreign Minister, and declared war on 
Bulgaria, clearly proves that these two new allies were 
not averse to accepting a challenge for which they were 
by this time prepared — a challenge in which they 
were supported by a military contingent supplied by 

During the first Balkan war, Roumania played no 
military part, contenting herself by claiming and 
securing compensation at the expense of Bulgaria. 
In the second campaign, however, that country, no 
longer withheld by Russia, invaded the territory of 
her Balkan neighbour, nominally with the object of 
maintaining the balance of power in the Balkans, but 
really for the purpose of wresting from Bulgaria an area 
of territory, the possession of which she had deeply 
coveted for years. This action was largely responsible 
for the subsequent bad relations between the two 
countries — bad relations which, as I shall show else- 
where, constituted the fundamental reason of the down- 
fall of Roumania during the European conflagration. 

The second Balkan war was terminated by the 
Treaty of Bucharest, signed in that city on August 10, 
1913. That Treaty robbed Bulgaria of a large part of 
Macedonia, which went to her under the Serbo-Bul- 


garian Agreement of 1912, and allotted to Greece, 
Kavala and Salonica, besides the large districts lying 
respectively to the south and immediately to the 
north of the Salonica-Monastir Railway. It also gave 
to Serbia and Greece a contiguous frontier and al- 
lowed to Bulgaria only a stretch of the Aegean coast 
which possessed no practicable port and towards which 
there was no adequate or suitable line of communica- 
tion. Moreover, on the north Bulgaria lost not only 
Silistria and the district which would have gone to 
Roumania under the frontier rectification arranged by 
the Protocol of Petrograd, but also a further area of 
territory on the south of the Dobrudja (including the 
towns of Turtukeuie and Dobric), thereby establishing 
the frontier as running from the more or less im- 
mediate neighbourhood of Rustchuk on the Danube 
to that of Varna on the Black Sea. These divisions — 
unnatural and unfair as they were — are those which 
made the Treaty of Bucharest not an instrument of 
peace but of future war. 

During the second Balkan war, the Treaty of Lon- 
don, signed between the former allies and Turkey, was 
torn up by the latter country, who reoccupied Adri- 
anople whilst the Bulgarians were engaged elsewhere, 
and therefore practically without opposition. This 
"scrap of paper" action by the Ottoman Government 
created an entirely new situation so far as Turkey and 
Bulgaria were concerned, and left those two countries 
to negotiate independent terms of peace after the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest. Those terms 
were embodied in the Treaty of Constantinople, signed 
on September twenty-fifth. They substituted for the 
Enos-Midia line, agreed to in London, a boundary 


which practically followed the old Turco-Bulgarian 
frontier from the Black Sea to Mustafa Pasha, turning 
thence in a southerly direction, and subsequently 
hugging the bank of the Maritza as far as its mouth 
and the Aegean coast. In addition to the fact that the 
Bulgarians thereby lost Kirk Kilissa, Adrianople, and 
Demotika and a large part of Thrace, the great sig- 
nificance of this frontier was that it left Dede Agatch 
— the only Aegean port possessed by Bulgaria — un- 
provided with railway connection wrth the remainder 
of that country except by a line which ran for some 
miles through Turkish territory. An arrangement 
was subsequently made between the two Governments 
as to the use of this line, but that arrangement ob- 
viously proved unsatisfactory to Bulgaria, and as I 
shall show elsewhere, it was subsequently abrogated 
by the cession of the territory in question to Bulgaria 
just before the entry of that country into the present 

During much of this time and throughout the winter 
of 1912-1913 and the spring and summer of the latter 
year, the international situations and the actual position 
in the Balkans were highly critical as the result of 
events in and connected with the new Principality of 
Albania. I have already said that, as a consequence 
of the attitude of Austria, the autonomy of that State 
was recognised in principle by the Ambassadorial 
Conference in December, 1912. Four months later, 
and during the second stage of the first Balkan war, 
Scutari, the most important town in the whole coun- 
try, fell into the hands of the Montenegrins, who at 
first absolutely declined to leave it. The policy thus 
taken up by King Nicholas was in entire opposition 


to the programme of the Central Powers, and for a 
moment it seemed destined to lead to a European war. 
Subsequently, however, it was agreed by the Great 
Powers that certain other areas, the population of 
which is predominatingly Albanian, should be in- 
cluded in Serbia or Montenegro, and that Scutari 
should remain Albanian. Following upon this agree- 
ment that city was occupied by contingents landed 
from the international blockading fleets under the 
command of a British admiral — Sir Cecil Burney — 
and these contingents remained in occupation of the 
city and its immediate surroundings up to the very eve 
of the outbreak of the present war. 

Over and above the Scutari question the position 
and future of Albania were of predominating impor- 
tance, for it was during and immediately after this 
period that Europe was called upon to choose a ruler 
for the State which she had created and to fix the 
positions of her northern and southern frontiers, 
which run through areas, the nationality of whose 
inhabitants it is not easy to decide. Indeed so difficult 
was the delimitation of the southern frontier, where 
Italy voiced the legitimate aspirations of the Albanians 
almost as fervently as did Austria in the north, that 
the problem was only settled by the decision of the 
Powers to the effect that the questions of the southern 
Albanian frontier and of the future ownership of the 
Aegean Islands, both of which were in their hands, 
should be interdependent. The result of this decision 
was that Greece, whose claims in the Aegean were as 
reasonable as her demands in Southern Albania were 
unjustifiable, secured all the Aegean Islands occupied 
by her during the Balkan Wars, except Imbros, Tene- 


dos, and Castellorizzo, which, owing to their proximity 
to the Dardanelles, were allotted to Turkey, and that 
she (Greece) was practically compelled to accept an 
Epirus frontier, with which she has remained as dis- 
satisfied as have the Turks with the distribution of 
the Aegean Islands. 

From an international standpoint the development 
of events in the Balkans, between the summer of 1908 
and the close of the Balkan Wars, is of far-reaching 
significance. The Young Turkish Revolution of 1908, 
which at first seemed destined greatly to minimise 
Germanic prestige and power at Constantinople, really 
resulted in an opposite effect, for in spite of the sup- 
port of England for Turkey during the Bosnian and 
Bulgarian crisis of 1908 and 1909 a gradual reaction 
subsequently set in. This was due in part to the 
cleverness and regardlessness of Baron Marshal von 
Bieberstein and in part to the circumstances arising 
out of the policy adopted by the Young Turks. For 
instance, whilst the Germans ignored the necessity for 
reforms in the Ottoman Empire, so long as the Turks 
favoured a Teutonic programme, it was impossible for 
the British Government or the British public to look 
with favour upon a regime which worked to maintain 
the privileged position of Moslems throughout the 
Empire, which did nothing to punish those who in- 
stigated the massacre of the Armenians of Cilicia in 
1909, and which was intent upon disturbing the "Status 
Quo" in the Persian Gulf and upon changing the situ- 
ation of Egypt to the Turkish advantage. Such in- 
deed became the position that even the Turco-Italian 
War, which might well have been expected to shake 
the confidence of the Ottoman Government in the 


bona fides of Italy's ally, did not seriously disturb the 
intimate relations which were gradually developing 
between Berlin and Constantinople. Here again 
enemy foresight was displayed, for in addition to the 
Austrian objection to the inauguration of any Italian 
operations in the Balkans, the German Government, 
when the position of Baron Marshal von Bieberstein 
had become seriously compromised as a result of the 
Italian annexation of Tripoli, which he could not pre- 
vent, suddenly found it convenient to transfer that 
diplomatist to London and to replace him by another, 
perhaps less able, but certainly none the less successful 
in retaining a grasp over everything which took place 
in the Ottoman Capital. 

This brings us to the period immediately preceding 
the outbreak of the Balkan Wars — wars which for 
different reasons all Europe primarily desired to pre- 
vent and subsequently to localise. The Central 
Powers, on their side, naturally feared the disruption 
of the Ottoman Empire, before they were ready to 
derive the full advantages from such an event, and, 
acting through the mouthpiece of the Austrian Govern- 
ment, took the lead in proposing decentralisation for 
European Turkey in August, 1912. On the other 
hand, no doubt representing the Triple Entente, which 
was honestly in favour of the maintenance of the "Sta- 
tus Quo" and of peace, Russia repeatedly counselled the 
Balkan allies not to push matters to extremes. Later 
and after the Turks had ordered a general mobilisation 
— a mobilisation replied to by the Balkan States — 
the Great Powers addressed Notes to the Governments 
of Turkey and of the Balkan States advocating, in the 
first direction, the introduction of reforms, and stating, 


in the second, that should war break out they would 
*' tolerate at the end of the conflict no modifications 
of the present Status Quo in the Balkans." 

These Notes were subsequently treated as mere scraps 
of paper both by the senders and the recipients. More- 
over, whilst as a result of the ensuing campaigns the 
area of Turkey in Europe was in fact reduced in size 
from 65,350 square miles to 10,880 square miles, the 
Balkan Wars at one time seemed destined to terminate 
in a manner even more disadvantageous to Germany. 
Thus, if the four States — Bulgaria, Greece, Monte- 
negro and Serbia — who fought in the first war had con- 
tinued on good terms with one another, the whole 
Balance of Power in Europe would almost certainly 
have been changed. Instead of the Ottoman Empire, 
which prior to the outbreak of those hostilities was 
held by competent authorities to be able to provide 
a vast army, then calculated to number approximately a 
million and a quarter men, there would have sprung 
up a friendly group of countries which in the near 
future could easily have placed in the field a combined 
army approximately amounting to at least a million 
all told. As the interests of such a confederation, 
which might well have been joined by Roumania, would 
have been on the side of the then Triple Entente, the 
Central Powers at once realised that its formation or 
its continued existence would mean for them not only 
the loss of Turkey, but also the gain for their enemies 
of four or five allies, most of whom had already proved 
their power in war. 

The Kaiser was not then prepared to make war, his 
fleet was not ready, his Zeppelins were not perfected, 
and the enlargement of his Kiel Canal was not com- 


pleted. In exerting a restraining influence in Austria, 
Germany therefore then contented herself by creating a 
favorable situation for the future. The Ambassadorial 
Conference, under the chairmanship of Sir Edward 
Grey, succeeded in temporarily maintaining the so- 
called Balance of Power in Europe, and it may also 
have been the means of localising the Balkan conflict. 
But Germany, acting through the mouthpiece of 
Vienna, encouraged the rivalry which existed between 
Bulgaria and her former allies — a rivalry which ended 
in the second Balkan war. That war, and particularly 
the fatal Treaty of Bucharest, favoured as it was by 
Germany, led not to a settlement, but simply to a 
holding in suspense of the numerous Near-Eastern 
questions which had been the means of shaking the 
European concert to its very foundation. In short, 
whilst Germany did not manage to preserve the integ- 
rity and to protect the interests of her friend Turkey, 
by separating the former allies she did bring about the 
establishment of a state of things enabling her in this 
present war to utilise the support of the Ottoman Gov- 
ernment to almost as great an advantage as if there 
had been no Balkan campaign at all. 

To summarise and to recapitulate the causes and 
the results of the Balkan Wars it may be said that 
the first campaign would probably not have occurred 
had the Young Turks made any endeavours to intro- 
duce in Macedonia and Albania even some of the re- 
forms by the promise of which they at first secured not 
only the good will of Europe but also that of the subject 
races of the Ottoman Empire. As far as the second 
war is concerned, that would certainly not have taken 
place had it not been for German intrigue which en- 


couraged rivalry between the Balkan States, and had 
the former allies, one and all, displayed a greater spirit 
of moderation towards one another. With regard to 
the results of these campaigns, over and above those 
to which I have already referred, the entry of Roumania 
into the arena of Balkan politics and the birth of the 
autonomous Albanian State, were events of primary 

From a local standpoint, Turkey, reduced from the 
position of a European power of high importance to 
that of an Asiatic State, possessed only an outpost 
on the European side of the Straits. Bulgaria, who 
undoubtedly accomplished very much the hardest 
work in and provided the greatest number of troops 
for the first war, gained but relatively little from a 
campaign which never could have been thought of, 
begun, or carried out without her co-operation. Serbia, 
although achieving success on the south and east, 
was left still without a free access to the sea — an ac- 
cess for the purpose of obtaining which she really joined 
the Balkan League. Montenegro, who had secured 
big gains, obtained neither Scutari nor a port to re- 
place Antivari, commanded as it is by the Austrian 
fortress of Spitza. Greece, who made the smallest 
sacrifice in, but gained the greatest benefit from, the 
war, did not secure possession of all the territory 
which she coveted in Southern Albania, and she re- 
mained face to face with a continued Turkish menace 
as a result of her acquisition of the Aegean Islands. 
For these reasons it was certain that Bulgaria would 
seize the first opportunity of endeavouring to redeem 
her position, that war between Serbia and her most 
hated neighbour — Austria — could not long be post- 


poned, and that Turkey would intrigue in Europe and 
threaten the Greeks with the object of trying to regain 
possession of the Aegean Islands. In short, the so- 
called settlement of 1913 really left the situation in 
the Balkans more unnatural and more beset by dangers 
than had been the case even during the worst years 
of the reign of Abdul Hamid. 



Although the European Concert prevented an 
immediate outbreak of war as a result of the Balkan 
campaigns, the facts, which I have already given, must 
be sufficient to prove that the events of the years 
1912-1913 created a merely temporary situation, the 
dangers and complications of which it is impossible 
to exaggerate. Almost all the numerous and impor- 
tant questions which had previously existed remained 
unsettled. Moreover, whilst a sort of a new Balkan 
alliance, composed of Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, 
and Roumania, was supposed to have sprung into exist- 
ence, the interests of these countries were so diverse 
that it was impossible to hope that they would be of 
mutual and immediate assistance to one another in 
case of a fresh upheaval brought by certain of the ques- 
tions still unsettled. Thus although the long-talked-of 
war cloud had burst, although two of the most wonder- 
ful campaigns of modern history had been fought, and 
although the much-desired hostilities had been localised, 
little if anything had really been done to solve the 
countless problems which for years had not only en- 
dangered the peace of the Near East but also that of 
all Europe. 


With regard to Serbia the question of an outlet to 
the Adriatic has been the foundation of everything 
which has taken place for the last ten years. This is 
the case because, being an agricultural country in which 
large numbers of cattle and pigs are reared, she must 
have a free and continuous means of exporting her 
livestock without being placed in ever recurring danger 
of the imposition of an embargo rather for political 
than for commercial or sanitary purposes. The crisis 
of the years 1908-1909, concerning the annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, entirely resulted from the 
justifiable claim made by the little Slav State, namely, 
that she should receive compensation for what she 
felt was a blow to her great aspiration — the creation 
of a Greater Serbia with its own access to the sea. 
Again whilst in 1912 Serbia was undoubtedly led to 
risk her national existence and, for the moment, to 
forget her rivalry with Bulgaria, with the avowed 
object of improving the lot of the Serbs then domiciled 
in Turkey, the fact that she hoped to secure a seaport 
at that time was certainly possessed of a far-reaching 
influence upon her policy. Consequently although 
the Balkan Wars resulted in the dominions of King 
Peter being nearly doubled in size, yet as that object 
was not realised, these wars ended in a way which 
was at bottom completely unfavourable to a people 
who have played such a valiant part in the European 
conflict. Thus when I visited Belgrade in the late 
autumn of 1913, I noticed, instead of the blissful joy 
which one would have expected to find existing among 
a people who had then fought two victorious cam- 
paigns and added such enormous territories to their 
country, that a kind of mysterious gloom seemed to 





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mjj^^ ■■-^^^^^^ 


B^^^^^K^^^^^^^Syrfv "SVTS'E*'^& 


The Serbian Parliament House at Belgrade 


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The Old Turkish Palace at Nish 

From a Photograph by the Author 


prevail in all directions. Whilst no Serbian denied it, 
none could or would explain its real reason. It was 
that everybody knew it would be impossible to pursue 
and to develop the national policy of the country, and 
especially to make an advance towards the sea, with- 
out a serious conflict with the most important and the 
strongest of Serbian enemies — Austria. 

So far as Serbia was concerned after the Balkan 
Wars the real source of danger therefore grew more 
than ever to be the daily increasing difficulties between 
the then Triple Alliance and Triple Entente and partic- 
ularly between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Indeed 
it was almost certain that the Ministers of the Dual 
Monarchy would not continue long to look with favour 
upon a peace which, so long as it lasted, had upset 
their whole recent policy. Thus whilst Austria-Hun- 
gary had prevented Serbia from obtaining an outlet 
upon the Adriatic and whilst she had created Albania, 
she had not succeeded in avoiding the establishment of 
a common frontier between Serbia and Montenegro — 
a common frontier which was to be one of the reasons 
for the improvement in the relations between those 
two countries. These changes were entirely opposed 
to the interests of the Dual Monarchy, for in addition 
to the fact that they established a Slav barrier, though 
not a sufficient barrier, to an Austro-German advance 
towards the southeast, they increased the prestige and 
power of Serbia and Montenegro among the Austro- 
Hungarian Slavs in a manner destined still further to 
complicate the task of the government of the Emperor 
Francis Joseph. With regard to Russia, who lost 
a considerable amount of influence in the Balkans 
and particularly in Serbia, as a result of her inability 


to champion the Adriatic interests of that country 
during the crisis of 1912-1913, it was apparent that at 
any given moment the Ministers of the Tsar might 
find (as they subsequently did find) themselves in 
a position in which it would be quite impossible for 
them quietly to witness any further interference with 
the national development of the "Little States", who 
certainly did not receive all the support which they 
expected would be forthcoming from Petrograd during 
the negotiations of 1913. 

That Austria was at once opposed to the benefits 
secured by Serbia during the second Balkan war is 
now proved, for we know, from the speech made by 
Signor Giolitti in the Italian Chamber in December, 
1914, that the day before the signature of the Treaty 
of Bucharest and on August 9, 1913, the Government 
of the Dual Monarchy communicated to Italy and to 
Germany its intention of taking action against Serbia. 
This action was, however, prevented by the opposition 
of Italy and presumably also by that of Germany, who, 
believing the time to be unfavourable, opposed a for- 
ward policy on the part of her ally throughout the 
Balkan Wars. The result was that whilst the policies 
of Germanic Powers certainly received a certain set- 
back by the defeat of Turkey, Count Berchtold was 
entitled to claim a temporary diplomatic success as 
consequences of the destruction of the original Balkan 
League and of the creation of a situation, in which, 
when the supposedly proper time for action had ar- 
rived, it would require a mere spark to ignite not only 
the Balkan but also the European fire. That spark 
was the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his 
consort at Serajevo on Sunday, June 28, 1914. But 


that event, dangerous as in any case it would have 
been from a local standpoint and so far as the relations 
between Austria and Serbia were concerned, was 
really inflammatory because it fell at a moment when 
the Emperor William and his advisers, who were not 
ready for war during the Bosnian annexation crisis or 
the Balkan Wars, thought that Great Britain was 
fully occupied with the situation in Ireland, that the 
internal situation in Russia was such as to prevent 
that country from effectively supporting Serbia, and 
that Italy would at least maintain her neutrality. 

The Kaiser, who had just performed the opening 
ceremony of the enlargement of the Kiel Canal — a 
ceremony at which the British fleet was represented — 
returned immediately to Berlin, in which city I arrived 
two days after the murder. Ignoring altogether va- 
rious subsequently published accounts of ensuing 
events, such as that which appeared in The Times on 
July 28, 1917, and particularly that excellent narrative 
of Mr. Morgenthau, formerly American ambassador to 
Turkey, which constitute absolute proof that war was 
definitely decided upon at an Imperial Conference held 
at Potsdam on July 5 — I was always convinced that 
some such decision was taken in Berlin at that time. 
The atmosphere which then prevailed — an atmosphere 
which was deliberately created — was represented by 
such statements as the necessity for the " chastisement of 
Serbia " — statements made in the press, in the cafes, and 
in the trains. Thus whilst later an artificial feeling of 
calm was in its turn promoted, and whilst the Emperor 
left Berlin on July 6 for a yachting cruise, purposely to 
throw dust in the eyes of Europe, no doubt has ever ex- 
isted in my mind that the Austrian ultimatum, delivered 


at Belgrade on July 23, was actually concocted in Ber- 
lin within a week of the murder of the Archduke, and 
that no amends on the part of Serbia for an atrocity 
for which her Government at least was not responsible 
would have affected the course of events which were 
definitely planned in Berlin two or three weeks before 
any mobilisation measures were taken in France, 
Russia, or Great Britain. If any further proof of the 
above suggestions be required, it may perhaps be found, 
at least in part, in the fact that to the student of Euro- 
pean affairs it was obvious, as soon as the notorious 
ultimatum had been delivered, that its conditions 
were so irrevocable as to show that Austria this time 
was not acting alone or in opposition to the will of 

Moreover, whilst it was equally certain from the 
outset that, whatever were the organisations which 
brought about the death of the heir apparent to the 
Austro-Hungarian throne, the Government of the 
Dual Monarchy would surely seize the opportunity 
of demanding an explanation from Serbia, the wording 
of the document which gave birth to the War was so 
harsh and so unreasonable as to make Vienna unlikely 
to have been its birthplace. Thus when Serbia, within 
the specified time, accepted "in principle" (only with 
the reservations to be expected from the Government 
of a Sovereign State) the demands of her enemy, and 
when Austria immediately broke off diplomatic rela- 
tions, it was perfectly clear that the latter country 
acted not upon her own initiative but at the instiga- 
tion and with the direct support of Germany. This 
being the case, all that need be said here is that within 
five days from the time of the delivery of the original 


ultimatum, Serbia and Austria were at war, and that 
nothing which was or was not done by England, France, 
or Russia would have been likely to avoid the explosion 
in which all the Great Powers, except Italy, immediately 
became involved. 

From the time of the outbreak of the hostilities 
between Austria and Serbia on July 28, until the 
subjugation of that country by the enemy in the late 
autumn of 1915, events in the dominions of King Peter 
may be said to have been divided into three stages. 
The first lasted from the beginning of the war approxi- 
mately until the end of 1914. The Austrians directed 
their first efforts against Belgrade, only separated from 
enemy territory by the Save and Danube, hostilities 
being practically confined during the first ten days to a 
bombardment of that city and to the partial destruc- 
tion of the Save bridge by the Serbians. On or about 
August 12, however, the enemy began a real attack — 
an attack delivered upon the capital and also against 
the northern and western frontiers of Serbia protected 
by the above-mentioned rivers and by the Drina. 
The attack from across the Danube never seriously 
developed, and Belgrade was not then taken. The 
Austrians, on the other hand, having entered Serbia 
in the northwestern corner of that country, were 
eventually defeated between Shabatz and Losnitza 
in an engagement known as the Battle of Jadar, which 
took place about the middle of August. Partly as 
an indirect result of this Serbian victory, and partly 
as a consequence of the situation in Russia, the invad- 
ing armies were then driven back or withdrew into 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Early in September the 
forces of Serbia and Montenegro united in these prov- 


inces, the first-mentioned occupying Vishegrad on the 
Serbo-Bosnian frontier and contingents of the two 
countries ultimately advancing to the immediate 
neighbourhood of Serajevo. 

During the first half of September a second invasion 
of Serbia took place. This time the Austrians, who 
had brought up reinforcements, moved across the 
River Drina. The left or northern flank of this force 
was defeated, the right subsequently being driven 
back in every district save one during very hard fight- 
ing which occurred in the second week of September. 
For the two following months the position was practi- 
cally one of stalemate, neither side seriously advancing 
or retiring across the Austro-Serbian frontier. But in 
November, and after the entry of Turkey into the 
war, the Austrians came on in great force and shelled 
the Serbians out of their trenches, compelling them 
to retire from their frontier and from Valievo and to 
remove their headquarters from that town to Kraguye- 
vatz. The Serbians then took up positions along a 
range of hills extending in a more or less southerly 
direction from Belgrade, later surrendering that city, 
from which the Government had removed to Nish 
directly after the outbreak of hostilities. On Decem- 
ber 3, however, when fresh troops had been brought 
up and more ammunition become available, the gal- 
lant old King, who in spite of his age and physical 
condition took the field himself, made a fiery and 
patriotic speech, which cheered on the army to victory. 
The Austrian centre was pierced and the right or 
southern flank was completely routed. At first the 
enemy's left or north flank was only frustrated in 
its endeavours to drive home its attacks upon the 


Serbian right. But this latter section of his Hne, 
which had advanced too slowly, soon suffered the fate 
of the right, and the Austrian rout became general 
about December tenth. The Serbians took up the 
pursuit immediately and, as the distances are short, 
Valievo was regained on the eighth, and Belgrade re- 
taken, after a desperate battle, on December four- 
teenth. In short, within a fortnight from the time of 
the loss of the capital, that city was not only once more 
in Serbian hands but the army of King Peter had won 
a victory which, it was said, had cost the enemy some 
sixty thousand in killed and wounded. 

The second stage in the development of affairs in 
Serbia is that concerned with the events which occurred 
between the enemy defeat in December, 1914, and the 
Austro-Bulgarian advance which took place in the 
autumn of the following year. Whilst this was a 
period of almost complete military quiescence, it was 
an epoch during which events of far-reaching impor- 
tance took place in and connected with Serbia. To 
begin with, it was then that the country, the sanitary 
conditions in which were quite impossible, was afflicted 
by a scourge of typhus. So severe indeed was the 
epidemic and so terrible were the sufferings of the army 
and people that this may be called the typhus phase 
of the war — a phase during which, if credible eye- 
witnesses can be believed, some two hundred thousand 
victims perished in the course of a few months. Indeed 
the fact that the whole nation was not blotted out and 
that it did not practically cease to exist was largely 
due to the medical assistance sent to Serbia by America 
and by Great Britain. The Serbian army was not 
equipped with proper hospital arrangements and sup- 


plies, and facilities for the maintenance of the neces- 
sary cleanliness were non-existent. In short, it was 
only after the arrival of foreign Red Cross missions, 
especially that of Lady Paget and those accompanied 
by Doctors Strong, Jackson, and their colleagues, many 
of whom came from Boston, that some sort of sani- 
tary conditions were established and that Serbia was 
practically cleaned up. Among other measures taken 
by these gentlemen was the establishment of a system 
of wash-trains. People undressed in tents, carried 
their clothes to one car, got washed and inspected in 
another, and then went back to receive their clean 
bundle of garments. When the work had been com- 
pleted in one district, the train was moved on to another. 

Throughout the greater part of this period most 
important diplomatic negotiations were in progress 
with regard to the Balkans. In February, Italy, whose 
attitude towards the Adriatic problem has often been 
resented by the Serbs almost if not quite as keenly 
as is that of Austria-Hungary towards the Southern 
Slav question, once again took measures which mate- 
rially influenced the Balkan situation to the advantage 
of Serbia. More than three months before that coun- 
try entered the war, the Government of King Victor 
Emanuel informed Austria that it would regard any 
further action in the Balkans by the Dual Monarchy as 
an unfriendly act. Though this may not have been the 
object, the effect of such an action was to prevent 
a renewed attack against the Serbs, when they were 
in the throes of the typhus scourge. 

During the first nine months of 1915, and particu- 
larly during the summer and early autumn of that 
year, the Serbians were passing through a most critical 


period in their history. This was due, on the one 
hand, to the internal disaffection which prevailed in 
large parts of Southern Serbia, and which resulted from 
the attitude of the Government towards the alien popu- 
lation of the districts annexed after the Balkan Wars, 
and on the other to the negotiations then in progress 
between the Allies and the Balkan States in regard 
to the provision of concessions for Bulgaria — con- 
cessions almost certainly destined to have brought 
that country into the War against Turkey and the 
Central Powers. Serbia, instead of recognising that 
her future prosperity and even her independent exist- 
ence can be assured only by the defeat of Austria and 
of Germany, and not by the success of her own arms 
alone, failed to see the necessity for subordinating her 
immediate interests to the good of the Allied cause. 
In other words, for months the Serbian Government, 
or more correctly the Military Party, exalted by tem- 
porary victory, turned a deaf ear to the suggestions 
that they should concede to Bulgaria at least some of 
the disputed areas of Macedonia — areas which that 
country was determined to try to secure, by peace or 
by war, during the present conflagration. The result 
of this attitude, together with the policies of the then 
neutral Greece and Roumania, was that, in place of 
accepting the necessity for what would certainly have 
been difficult and disagreeable sacrifices, other and 
less wise counsels were followed — counsels which 
have been largely responsible for the almost immediate 
subjugation of Serbia and for the condition in which 
that country now finds herself. 

As I shall show, when I come to discuss the above- 
mentioned negotiations at greater length in connec- 


tion with Bulgaria, there were faults not only in the 
attitudes of the Balkan States but also in the Allied 
diplomacy. These faults do not, however, justify the 
wholesale criticisms of those who have never realised 
the difficulties of the Balkan situation, and in partic- 
ular they do not make reasonable the contention that 
the Allies tried to or did sacrifice Serbia in 1915. Once 
Bulgaria entered or was on the point of entering the 
War on the other side, no measures which could have 
then been taken would have saved the army of King 
Peter from total defeat. Thus even did Serbia pro- 
pose, as her advocates state that she did propose, 
to attack Bulgaria before the army of that country 
was fully mobilised, and even had the Allies advised 
her (Serbia) not to take these measures, which has been 
denied officially, such would have been good advice, 
for had the Serbian army advanced towards the east 
at the time in question, nothing could have saved it 
from defeat at the hands of Austria and of Bulgaria 
— defeat in an area where, instead of being able to 
be evacuated from the Albanian coast, the Allies would 
have been powerless to come to its assistance. In 
short, as it was not feasible for Great Britain and for 
France to undertake a Balkan expedition and to land 
troops in neutral Greece, as Serbia suggested, during 
the complicated negotiations preceding the entry of 
Bulgaria into the War, the failure to save Serbia was 
not due to any military fault on the part of the Allies, 
but to the strategic position of our enemies, to their 
overwhelming strength, and to the enormous geographi- 
cal and political difficulties which then existed in the 

The third stage in the development of events in 


Serbia begins from the entry of Bulgaria into the War 
in October, 1915. Prior to and at that time the Austro- 
Germans concentrated in strength on the west bank 
of the River Drina and to the north of the Save and 
Danube. Immediately after the rupture of relations 
between the Allies and Bulgaria, Von Mackensen ad- 
vanced from the first-mentioned area, whilst other 
enemy forces crossed into Serbian territory to the south- 
west of Belgrade and in the immediate vicinity of the 
point where the Morava flows into the Danube. A 
few days later, and on October 14, two more or less 
independent Bulgarian forces advanced into Serbia, 
the one directed on Nish and Pirot and into the north, 
or old part, of that country, and the other aimed at 
Uskub and at the areas of Macedonia coveted by the 
Bulgarians. The Austro-German-Bulgarian armies 
operating in the north soon established connection, 
and Belgrade having been taken on October 10, the 
arsenal town of Kraguyevatz as well as Nish — the 
temporary capital — were in enemy hands by the 
end of the first week in November. The Allied forces 
based upon Salonica were unable seriously to influence 
the situation, and by the middle of that month the 
whole of the Serbian army which had not already been 
captured was in retreat towards the Adriatic. The 
Government, temporarily established at Prisrend, was 
subsequently forced to move to Scutari, where it 
remained until the evacuation of that town in the face 
of the enemy. Finally during the closing weeks of 
1915, and after passing through hardships which it is 
impossible to describe, all that remained of the Serbian 
army was transferred by the Allied fleets from the 
Albanian coast to Corfu, where it was re-equipped and 


reclothed in order to prepare it for its future and valiant 
role in the Salonica campaign. Thus, with the occu- 
pation of all old Serbia by Austro-Bulgarian forces 
and with the capture by the Bulgarians of almost all 
the areas, including Monastir, which they had coveted 
for years, temporarily ended the independence of Serbia 
— an independence, the re-establishment of which is 
still one of the fundamental aims for which the Allies 
are waging war. 

With the exception of Monaco, San Marino, and 
Andorra, Montenegro is the smallest independent 
State in Europe. This independence was formally 
recognised by Turkey and the other Great Powers 
who signed the Treaty of Berlin in the year 1878. 
The kingdom now has an area of approximately 5600 
square miles and a population of about 516,000 souls. 
Although the country possesses a House of Assembly, 
the rule of King Nicholas has, for all practical pur- 
poses, always been absolute. In his own words. His 
Majesty is both ruler of Montenegro and father of its 
inhabitants . Elsewhere Cettin je — the capital — would 
be little more than a village. Its population only num- 
bers about four thousand. The country is poor, and 
derives most of its revenue from land taxes, customs, and 
monopolies. During the reign of King Nicholas, who as- 
cended the throne of Montenegro in the year 1860, sev- 
eral wars have even threatened to blot out the country 
from the map of Europe. Thus in 1862 the campaign 
against Turkey was attended by disastrous results for 
Montenegro. In 1878, by the non-acceptance of the 
Treaty of San Stefano by the Great Powers, Montenegro 
lost advantages which would otherwise have been hers. 


Indeed, in that year and by the Treaty of Berhn, 
Prince Nicholas was compelled to hand over Dulcigno 
to Turkey, to cede Spitza, which dominates the port 
of Antivari, to Austria, and to accept the condition 
imposed upon him by which the port of Antivari and 
all the waters of Montenegro should remain closed to 
ships of war, and that certain police functions, along 
the coast of Montenegro, should be carried out by 
Austria-Hungary. Whilst Dulcigno was returned to 
Prince Nicholas in 1880, the disadvantageous position 
created by the remaining clauses of the 29th Article 
of the Treaty of Berlin were not only never forgotten 
by the people, but they were also the reason largely 
responsible for the Austro-Montenegrin crises which 
arose between 1878 and 1909. In this latter year, 
however, although no changes were made in regard 
to Spitza, it was arranged between King Nicholas and 
the Austrian Government, through the medium of 
Italy, that all restrictions formerly placed upon the 
sovereign rights of Montenegro along her coast should 
be removed, and that, although Antivari was to retain 
the character of a commercial and unfortified port, 
yet it was to be open to ships of war. It is to this 
change, made directly after the Bosnian crisis of 1908- 
1909, that reference was made in the published version 
of the original Treaty, reported to have been made be- 
tween Italy on the one side and Great Britain, France, 
and Russia on the other, just before the entry of Italy 
into the War when it said,^ in speaking of the neutralisa- 
tion of parts of the eastern coast of the Adriatic, that 

^ This Treaty, now reported to have been replaced by another, was 
printed in Current History — a monthly magazine of the New York Times 
for March, 1918. . 


"Montenegro rights are not to be infringed in so far as 
they are based on the declaration exchanged between 
the contracting parties in April and May, 1909." 

Although the Balkan Wars brought about the annex- 
ation of an area of territory which more or less doubled 
Montenegro in size, yet the result of these wars was 
not entirely favourable to that country. Amongst 
other reasons, this was due to the facts that the Mon- 
tenegrins then failed to realise their great national 
aspiration — the permanent possession of Scutari — 
and that the prestige of the Serbian royal family and 
of the Serbians as fighters was so greatly increased 
that everything Serbian became extremely popular 
in Montenegro. Whilst prior to these wars the rela- 
tionship existing between the two countries was 
often far from cordial, subsequently the position was 
so changed that the shortcomings of the Montenegrin 
dynasty and the probability of a union between the 
two States were openly discussed in Cettinje. The 
formation of a common diplomatic service and of a 
combined army was already under consideration during 
the early months of 1914. Under such circumstances, 
even had not the War broken out, it was unlikely that 
Montenegro could long have continued to maintain an 
independent existence. These conditions, together with 
a long-standing hatred of Austria, prompted the Mon- 
tenegrins to throw in their lot with Serbia almost directly 
after the outbreak of hostilities between that country 
and the Dual Monarchy. From that time until the end 
of 1915 the role of King Nicholas' army consisted in the 
defence of his frontiers and in making raids into Herze- 
govina and Bosnia — raids which at first occupied a cer- 
tain number of enemy troops. In June, 1915, King 


Nicholas once more took possession of and annexed 
Scutari, from which he had been compelled to retire at 
the time of the Balkan Wars. Prior to the month of 
December, however, there was no important fighting, 
for it was only when Serbia had been subjugated that 
the enemy made any real endeavour to conquer a 
country, the importance of which was due rather to 
the strategical strength of its position and particularly 
to that of the Lovtchen Mountain, which dominates 
and commands the Austrian naval base at Cattaro, 
than to the efficiency or power of resistance of its army. 
It was, therefore, only during the early days of Janu- 
ary, 1916, when the enemy was compelled to clear 
up the situation in Montenegro, in order to be able to 
develop to the full the advantages he had gained in 
Serbia, and to be in a position to advance into Albania, 
that the Austrians seriously bombarded Mount Lov- 
tchen. Partly owing to the fact that its defenders pos- 
sessed no heavy artillery, which was necessary in order 
to make full use of the great natural strength of this 
position, and partly as a result of circumstances, which 
were not clear, the resistance of the Montenegrins was 
soon at an end, and on January 11 the great national 
stronghold fell into the hands of the enemy, who actually 
entered Cettinje three days later. King Nicholas, ac- 
companied by some of his Ministers and by part of his 
army, fled to Albania, His Majesty himself ultimately 
taking refuge in France. Other members of the royal 
family and of the Government remained behind, capitu- 
lating to the enemy under conditions to which it is bet- 
ter to make no reference here. Thus temporarily ended 
the independent existence of a country, the personal 
bravery of whose inhabitants is above all reproach. 


The great importance of the earher role of Serbia, 
and to a lesser degree of Montenegro, in the War is 
that these countries contained and occupied^ Austrian 
forces which would otherwise have been available for 
use against Russia before the army of that country 
was effectively mobilised and at a time when every 
available Allied man in the east was of value, in that 
his presence necessitated the detachment of Germans 
from the west, where the situation in France was highly 
critical for months. Serbia, having suffered in the 
two Balkan campaigns casualties amounting to over 
seventy-six thousand of all ranks (of whom more than 
thirty thousand were killed or died of wounds or from 
disease), put into the field at least three hundred thou- 
sand men on the outbreak of this war. Montenegro, 
who lost about ten thousand in killed and wounded 
during the events of 1912-1913, furnished the Allies 
with approximately thirty thousand men on the out- 
break of the European conflagration. For this and for 
the gallant way in which the two little Slav States 
fought during the first eighteen months of the present 
war, they deserve credit, almost if not equal, to that 
which must be bestowed upon the Serbians for their 
subsequent valour at Salonica — a valour which I 
shall discuss in connection with that campaign. 



To describe the existing state of things in Turkey 
or to outhne the reasons for them is always an ex- 
tremely difficult task. This is particularly the case 
in regard to the period which intervened between the 
close of the Balkan Wars, that is to say, between the 
signature of the Turco-Bulgarian Treaty of Constan- 
tinople in September, 1913, and the outbreak of the 
European War.^ In general, all that can be said, 
therefore, is that the Committee of Union and Progress, 
which has constituted the only real power in the country 
ever since 1908, occupied a stronger position than that 
which it had held at any time after the months which 
immediately followed the re-establishment of the Con- 
stitution. Not only was the Government completely 
in its hands, but for the moment, at least, all practical 
opposition had disappeared. Indeed that Enver Pasha 
and his supporters had "reconquered" Adrianople, and 
thus broken the time-honoured rule that territory once 
taken from Turkey by a Christian State shall never 
again pass under Ottoman rule, regained for the Com- 
mittee all the prestige which it would otherwise have 

^ The developments of this period and those connected with the entry of 
Turkey into the War, besides events which followed it, are ably and fully 
chronicled by the ex- American Ambassador at Constantinople under the 
title "Ambassador Morgenthau's Story." 


lost, as a result of the losses suffered during the first 
Balkan war. In short, the army, always the backbone 
of the New Regime, was more completely in the hands 
of the Young Turks than had ever been the case before. 
In spite of the effect of the reoccupation of Adrianople 
and of the amicable arrangements made between the 
two countries as to the position of the Turco-Bulgarian 
frontier, the Turks were smarting under losses suffered 
in a war during which the Great Powers had said that 
there should be no modifications in the Balkan "Status 
Quo" existing in 1912. This was particularly the case 
in regard to the results of the decision of the London 
Ambassadorial Conference as to the future ownership 
of the Aegean Islands captured by Greece during the 
first Balkan war. In order to realise the meaning of 
this question to Turkey and to Greece, it is necessary 
to remember what has happened in the Aegean during 
the last few years. The Turco-Italian War of 1911- 
1912 terminated by the Treaty of Lausanne, signed 
on October 15 of the latter year, resulted in the — 
nominally temporary — retention of about twelve of 
the islands, including Rhodes, situated off the south- 
western corner of Asia Minor. These were not,* there- 
fore, conquerable by Greece in 1912 or 1913, and that 
country was only able to occupy the islands actually 
under Turkish rule. Whilst leaving the question of 
the Dodecannese Islands (those in the hands of Italy) 
still undecided, it was therefore in regard to those 
which changed hands during the Balkan Wars that 
the Turco-Greek crisis of 1913-1914 arose. 

The Ambassadorial Conference decided that all the 
islands occupied by Greece, except Imbros, Tenedos, 
and Castellorizzo, which are located close to the outer 


entrance of the Dardanelles, should be retained by 
Greece. Turkey, who was not satisfied with that 
decision, by which she lost the important islands of 
Chios, Mitylene, and Samos, situated only just off the 
coast of Asia Minor, never really accepted it and con- 
tinued to agitate both at home and abroad for the 
possession of territories without which she said that 
the Asiatic power of the Ottoman Empire would be 
endangered. Greece, on the other hand, naturally 
refused to listen to arguments entirely opposed to the 
principle of nationality, and not only retained the 
islands allotted to her, but never really vacated those 
which were to be Turkish. 

This situation existed up to and after the outbreak 
of the European War. In the early summer of 1914, 
the Turks instituted a systematic persecution and 
massacre of the Greeks domiciled in Ottoman territory, 
a massacre which greatly inflamed the sentiments of 
the Greeks throughout the civilised world. On and 
after the month of June, the Turco-Greek crisis was 
rendered more acute by the annexation of Chios and 
Mitylene by Greece and by the purchase by the same 
country of two good and modern battleships, Lemnos 
and Kilkis (formerly Idaho and Mississippi), which 
they secured from America during the summer. 
Launched in the year 1905 and completed in the 
year 1908, these ships, which are each of fourteen 
thousand tons, forestalled the arrival of the two 
Turkish dreadnoughts then being built in England 
for the Ottoman Government, and thus enabled the 
Greeks to assume an attitude which would not other- 
wise have been possible. As a consequence of these 
events, the outbreak of the war found the relations 


existing between the two countries so strained that 
the policies of each of them were temporarily influenced 
by a desire that the European conflagration should be 
utilised in order to favour the national aspirations of 
the parties concerned. 

From a semi-internal point of view, the three all- 
important questions connected with Turkey during 
this period were the gradually improving relations 
between that country and Bulgaria, the augmentation 
of Germanic influence at Constantinople, and the 
negotiations in progress between Europe and the 
Ottoman Government in reference to reforms for Ar- 
menia. In regard to the first of these, it is suflScient 
to say that as a result of the Balkan Wars, both Tur- 
key and Bulgaria had suffered in a manner which 
naturally made these countries of greater importance 
to and brought them into closer sympathy with one 
another. Moreover, as for different reasons they 
were both the most ardent enemies of Greece, it was 
obvious that they would work for the development 
of a policy likely, sooner or later, to enable each of 
them to reacquire territories which they coveted. In 
this connection, too, it is necessary to remember that 
early in 1914, Enver Pasha, a former military attache 
at Berlin and an ardent pro-German, was appointed 
Turkish Minister of War, and that, at about the same 
time. General Liman von Sanders, a German general, 
was nominated to the command of the 1st Turkish 
Army Corps with powers and with a staff which made 
him practically Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman 
army. In short, the secret influence of Germany, 
ever present at Constantinople, once more lost no 
opportunity of developing the already favourable 


ground, partly created by the protests of the British 
and Russian Government against the Turkish re- 
occupation of Adrianople, to an advantage of which 
she was to reap the benefit soon after the outbreak 
of the European War. 

Between the Balkan Wars and the outbreak of 
the European conflagration, there occurred in Turkey 
one other development which, though it never really 
materialised, is none the less possessed of significance. 
I refer to the arrangements made between Russia, 
acting on behalf of the Great Powers, and the Ottoman 
Government concerning the introduction of reforms 
in Armenia. This agreement, which was arrived at 
in February, 1914, and which was based on the ar- 
rangements nominally made in 1878, recognised the 
special position of the Armenians in six vilayets (prov- 
inces) of Eastern Asia Minor, and placed those dis- 
tricts which were to be divided into two groups, under 
two inspectors general, chosen from the subjects of 
two European States and appointed by the Ottoman 
Government on the recommendation of the Powers. 
There was to be a mixed gendarmerie, Christians and 
Moslems were to enjoy the same privileges in regard 
to representation in the local government, and the 
interests of the Armenians were to be properly voiced 
in the Ottoman Parliament by an adequate number of 

According to this arrangement the inspectors gen- 
eral, whose powers and duties constituted the key 
to the question, were to be named for a period of ten 
years, and their engagement was not to be revocable 
during that period. WTien the appointments were 
made, the Turks, however, ignored this and added a 


clause in the final agreements with the so-called in- 
spectors, one of whom was Dutch and the other Nor- 
wegian, stating that the Government could terminate 
its contract at any time by the payment of one year's 
salary, thereby once more turning a scheme for Ar- 
menian reform into a mere farce. In the end, after 
the employees in question had been detained for 
some time at Constantinople, they went to their 
posts, but on the outbreak of the War, which occurred 
directly after their arrival, their appointments were 
cancelled, the Armenians being left to look forward 
and to anticipate a reign of terror, which, when in- 
augurated, proved worse than anything which had 
previously taken place in the annals of their history. 
On the outbreak of the War, therefore, there existed 
in Turkey a state of uncertainty and of unrest which 
made Constantinople the most important neutral 
centre in Europe, — a centre where for three months 
a great diplomatic battle was in progress between 
the representatives of the Central Powers on the 
one side and those of the Allies on the other. To 
understand the nature of this struggle it is necessary 
once more to remember that for years Germany had 
left no stone unturned in preparing the way to secure 
Ottoman support at the crucial moment. She had 
ignored the necessity for and stood in the way of re- 
forms in Macedonia and Armenia. She had provided 
the money and constructed railways which at the 
same time appealed to the Turkish imagination and 
furthered the policy of the " Turcification " of the 
various subject races of the Empire. And lastly, 
both before as during and after the Balkan Wars, 
she had planned and done her utmost to increase 


the general and perhaps not unnatural Turkish fear 
and hatred of Russia — fear and hatred which I have 
already shown were directly responsible for the Revolu- 
tion of 1908, and which constitute the governing fea- 
ture of the foreign policy pursued alike by the Old 
and by the Young Turks. These factors in the situa- 
tion were responsible for the existence of an extremely 
favourable ground for the intrigues of the enemy, who 
scorned no methods, however underhand, provided 
he could secure the support of a country whose as- 
sistance he realised would be invaluable to him. 

The position of the Allies was far more diflScult than 
that of the Central Powers. Instead of a policy run 
by one man — the Kaiser — for one object — German 
aggression — they were compelled to endeavour to 
create a position which would react not only in their 
own favour, but also in that of those most closely 
concerned in it. The task of allies, too, is always 
complicated by the fact that whilst they are obliged 
to act in common agreement, each is naturally pos- 
sessed of her own vital interests and special friend- 
ships. In Turkey this had its effect in various stages 
of the development of events, and the Germans, never 
slow to profit by our difficulties and especially by the 
fact that no Turk, Old or New, would wish to support 
the cause of Russia, persuaded the Ottoman Govern- 
ment that were the Allies to win the war, sooner or 
later the Empire would be split up, and that no promise 
made to it would be of any avail. Thus whilst the 
accuracy of published statements to the effect that a 
definite and absolute Treaty of Alliance was signed 
between Germany and Turkey on or before August 4, 
1914, seems open to great doubt, there is good reason 


to believe that there was a concrete understanding 
between Germany and certain of the more important 
members of the Committee of Union and Progress — 
an understanding about which the Sultan, the then 
Grand Vizier, and such men as Ahmed Djemal Pasha, 
then Minister of Marine, knew nothing. From the 
moment of the outbreak of the European War, there- 
fore, the Allies might have foreseen, even if that treaty 
had not been concluded in a definite form, that the 
circumstances were such as to prevent them from 
being able to provide Turkey with concessions or 
guarantees which would prevent her from being en- 
ticed by the Germanic promises concerning the re- 
conquest of Egypt and of other territories which 
she had lost, from throwing in her lot ultimately 
with the enemy. The principal reasons which made 
this eventuality so probable were not that the people 
disliked England and France or that they admired 
Germany, but because the more chauvinistic elements 
of the population, such as Talaat and Enver Pashas, 
were undoubtedly anxious, as they believed, to rid 
themselves of the Russian danger, and because they 
seemed to think that to side with Germany would 
enable them to inflict some damage upon Greece, from 
whom they were anxious to regain the Aegean Islands. 
Upon neither of these two vital questions was the 
position of the Allies a favourable one, for whilst at 
that time they were bound to treat with respect any 
claims or propositions made by Russia, they were 
almost equally powerless to support the reversal of a 
decision for which they themselves were principally 

Throughout the first three months of the War the 


Germans, who were thus provided with advantageous 
ground upon which to work, spared no pains to drag 
Turkey into the War. The legitimate confiscation 
by England of the two Turkish dreadnoughts in 
building in British yards was badly handled, and 
its reasons were so inadequately explained, that the 
Germans were able to utilise this measure to inflame 
public opinion among the people who had actually 
subscribed a large proportion of the funds to pay for 
these vessels. Soon after this. Admiral Limpus and 
all the ofiicers of the British Naval Mission were re- 
placed in their executive command by Turkish officers, 
being ordered to continue work at the Ministry of 
Marine, should they remain in Turkey. As this 
measure was obviously part of the enemy's plan of 
intrigue — an intrigue destined to give the German 
officers who arrived with and subsequent to Goeben 
full control of the Ottoman fleet — the British Gov- 
ernment subsequently withdrew its representatives, 
who thus left Constantinople under circumstances 
which can hardly have added to Allied prestige. 
Later on the capitulations which date back for cen- 
turies, and which alone were responsible for the safety 
of Europeans domiciled in Turkey, were abolished. 
The foreign ambassadors, including those of the Cen- 
tral Powers, protested, but considering the relations 
then and subsequently existing between the Germanic 
and Ottoman Governments, there can be no doubt 
that the representative of the Kaiser knew full well 
that even the nominal breaking loose of the Turkish 
Government from a system of control, which was vital 
to the whole civilised world, was but a part of the 
game in which he was actually the chief actor. As 


a matter of fact, at the end of April, 1916, it was 
formally announced that Turkey had taken the place 
of Italy in the Triple Alliance, and that she *'had re- 
gained her independence by entering upon equal terms" 
into that alliance. In spite of this declaration and of 
the explanation then given that in none of the minor 
agreements concluded was there any trace of the old 
capitulation rights, it is obvious, as matters of con- 
sular jurisdiction and of the right of residence were 
dealt with, that the Germans secured in fact, if not 
in name, the privileges which they had lost just prior 
to the intervention of Turkey. During this period, 
too, Ottoman intrigue became rife from end to end 
of Albania, and Turkey was persuaded to mobilise 
— a measure which she was not in a financial position 
to undertake, and a measure which could only have 
been directed against the Allies. 

But, though it happened earlier than some of the 
above-mentioned events, the all-important feature and 
the real turning point in the whole situation was the 
arrival at Constantinople of the German Goeben and 
Breslau in the middle of August. The so-called pur- 
chase of these vessels placed the Turks in a position 
which naturally justified them in thinking that they 
were a match for any naval force which they were 
likely to meet in the Black Sea ^ From then, and 
until the outbreak of war, the entire attention of the 
German representative at Constantinople and of the 
Turkish Government was directed towards the rapid 
conveyance of German men and war material to the 

^ Mr. Morgenthau says that the German Ambassador at Constantinople 
never made any secret of the fact that the ships still remained German 


shores of the Bosphorus, As a matter of fact, shortly 
after Turkey entered the war arena, there were at 
least twelve thousand Germans and Austrians in the 
Ottoman dominions. This vast army of supporters and 
instructors was collected largely owing to the fact that 
men, who should have returned to their own countries 
for military service, either remained in or went to Con- 
stantinople, it being understood that their presence 
there would ultimately be more valuable to the common 
cause than would have been their return home. 

It is this weighty question of Goehen and Breslau 
and above all the manner in which it was treated by 
the Allies, which constituted the greatest mistake 
made in connection with the then situation at Con- 
stantinople. Leaving out of account the reasons for 
which these ships were able to escape from their place 
of refuge in Sicily — reasons the real nature of which 
we do not even now know — the Allies, instead of 
grasping the fact then and there in the month of 
August, 1914, that the then arrival of Goehen would 
enable Germany to rush Turkey into the War, and 
instead of immediately following her into the Dar- 
danelles, not as the enemies of Turkey, but as a peace- 
ful precaution and as the protectors and friends of the 
true Ottoman people, continued to ignore the fact 
that the so-called purchase of these vessels was a 
purely bogus and prearranged matter, destined not 
only to give the enemy complete control of the direc- 
tion of affairs in Constantinople but also to provide 
the Turks with ships of a type and possessed of a 
fighting power which entirely altered and influenced 
what might otherwise have been the course of the 
Dardanelles operations. 


Space is too short to enable me to describe the 
details of the manner in which Germany actually 
rushed Turkey into war. Sufficient be it, therefore, 
to say that the Germans finally endeavoured to tele- 
graph instructions to the Turkish staff at Erzerum 
without consulting all, or even most, of the members 
of the Ottoman Government, and that the outbreak 
of hostilities was postponed owing to the fact that 
the telegram was intercepted by a vigilant post- 
office clerk. Later, and on October 28, the Turks 
made an incursion into the Sinai Peninsula, and the 
Germans succeeded, on the same day, in launching 
a naval attack upon Odessa, and upon other of the 
Russian Black Sea ports — an attack which was 
the immediate cause of war. That attack, which was 
carried out without the knowledge of several members 
of the cabinet and certainly without the consent of 
Ahmed Djemal Pasha, resulted in the immediate 
demand of their passports by the Allied ambassadors 
and in the open establishment of a state of war with 

Before approaching an account of the military 
events dealt with in this chapter, brief mention must 
be made of the shocking and atrocious Armenian 
massacres in progress during the year 1915. These 
massacres were more prolonged and more systematic 
than, and, in many ways, entirely different to, those 
which took place in the late nineties in Armenia and 
in Constantinople, or in the Adana neighbourhood in 
1909. In former years, on the occasion of a massacre, 
it was the men and the male children who were for 
the most part butchered, and the outbreaks, whilst 
beginning and ending almost by clockwork and at 


fixed hours, took the form of kilhng people in their 
homes. This was dreadful, more dreadful than can 
be imagined by any one who has not seen it, but it 
was not so terrible as what took place in 1915. At 
that time, instead of murdering the people where 
they happened to be, and then destroying or stealing 
their property, a regular campaign for the purpose of 
exterminating the Armenian race was inaugurated. 
The leading men of each town or village were first 
seized, tortured, and killed. Later the whole popu- 
lation, in many cases made up of well-to-do people 
possessed of good houses, and including the women, 
the feeble, and the young, were forced to leave their 
homes and belongings, and to march on foot towards 
the south and into the desert, going they knew not 
where. These people, unprovided with clothing or 
food, were ill treated by their guards, and abused 
by the Moslem inhabitants of the districts through 
which they passed. The consequence was that, ex- 
posed to the cold and to the heat, some fell by the 
roadside, perishing where they lay, and others, during 
transportation down the rivers Euphrates and Tigris, 
were pushed, dead or alive, from the rafts on which 
they had already suffered from privation for days. 

From an internal standpoint, these massacres meant 
that the Turks ridded themselves of approximately 
one million, that is to say, one half of the Armenians 
formerly estimated to have lived in the Ottoman 
Empire, and that they thereby temporarily went a 
long way towards accomplishing their object of solv- 
ing the Armenian question, by massacre. Externally 
and internally these atrocities, carried out in a manner 
different to the system formerly employed, prove two 


things. First, they show that the Germans, whose 
attention was drawn to the matter both in America 
and in Constantinople, not only took no steps to pre- 
vent a slaughter of innocents, but that they must 
have been actually the moving spirit in events so 
outrageous that they would not have been perpe- 
trated by even the Turks alone. Secondly, they 
indicate the necessity, when the proper time comes, 
of bringing home the responsibility for this atrocious 
conduct to the quarter where it rests, and of seeing 
that, on the declaration of peace, arrangements are 
made concerning the future status of Armenia and of 
the Armenians which will for ever prevent the re- 
currence of such an outbreak. 

As the operations at the Dardanelles are dealt with 
in a special section of this volume, I will turn at once 
to the three other principal campaigns in which Turkey 
has been engaged since the beginning of the War. 
Partly owing to the fact that her frontier is no longer 
contiguous to that of Greece, and partly because the 
Ottoman fleet has never been able to leave the Dar- 
danelles, Turkey could make no endeavour to re- 
conquer the Aegean Islands, which, I have already 
said, was one of her great aspirations at the beginning 
of the War. For the same reason, that is, because its 
communications by sea were completely interrupted, 
the Ottoman Government has been compelled to 
undertake operations in areas with which it could 
maintain connection by land — areas which for obvious 
reasons were those situated in Northeastern Asia 
Minor, at the head of the Persian Gulf, and in the 
neighbourhood of the Turco-Egyptian frontier. 

At the beginning of the Caucasian campaign the 


Russians advanced into Turkey by three practically 
distinct routes, namely, those which led upon Erzerum, 
that running past Mount Ararat and through Bayazid, 
and that leading across the Persian frontier and towards 
the lake and town of Van. Three weeks after the entry 
of Turkey into the War, the Russians secured posses- 
sion of Kuprukeuie, situated about halfway between 
the Turkish frontier and Erzerum. Immediately after 
that, acting on the usual German rule of taking the 
offensive at the first possible moment, the Turks began 
to advance from the direction of Erzerum, and con- 
tinued to do so until the Ottoman forces were de- 
feated during the early part of January, 1915, at and 
near Sarikamish, near the borders of, but within, 
Russian territory. This victory, however, cost the 
Russians something elsewhere, for they were obliged 
temporarily to withdraw from Tabriz, which they 
soon recaptured, and from certain rich districts of 
Persia. From that time onwards, up to the appoint- 
ment of the Grand Duke Nicholas as Commander-in- 
Chief in the Caucasus in the late summer of 1915, 
there was a lull in Eastern Asia Minor, for it was 
not until considerably after the arrival of that General 
that operations in this area began to assume propor- 
tions of serious importance. 

Nevertheless the Russian Generalissimo, who was 
responsible for the military plan of campaign not only 
in Armenia but also on the Persian frontier, began 
at once carefully to prepare the way for his main 
advance upon Erzerum by consolidating his position 
and pushing forward his line between lakes Van and 
Urumiah during the closing months of 1915. Early 
in January of the following year, and therefore in the 


depth of winter, a definite and determined blow was 
struck in the direction of Erzerum. After a large 
Ottoman army had been defeated in the field, the 
Russian commander brought up heavy guns by way 
of mountain roads which had always been considered 
to be well-nigh unpassable in winter. Such was his 
skill that the actual attacks upon Erzerum having 
begun about the twentieth of January, the greatest 
Ottoman fortress in Asia Minor actually fell into 
Muscovite hands on February 16, and therefore 
after a bombardment of little over three weeks. This 
capture was one of the biggest military and political 
victories which had then been won by the Allies in 
the East since the beginning of the War. 

After the fall of Erzerum a Russian force advanced 
through extremely difficult country and along the 
Black Sea coast towards Trebizond, which port was 
taken after a week's severe fighting about the middle 
of April. This, too, constituted a gain of some sig- 
nificance, for in addition to the fact that the loss of 
Trebizond was a great moral blow to Turkey, its 
possession by Russia enormously facilitated her means 
of communication. Thus, instead of being compelled 
to rely entirely upon the road which passes through 
Erzerum to Trebizond, — a road the whole of which 
was not in their hands until considerably after the 
capture of that city, — she was able to utilise the port 
as a means of connection between her bases on the 
north and east of the Black Sea and her forces en- 
gaged in Northeastern Asia Minor. 

Slightly before the capture of Trebizond, the left 
of the Russian line, which at the time of the fall of 
Erzerum ran approximately from that place to a 


point just to the northeast of Mush and from there 
to lakes Van and Urumiah and on to the Persian 
frontier, was advanced in such a way as to include 
the towns of Bitlis and Mush, which were taken re- 
spectively early and late in March, 1916. With the 
capture of Baiburt on the post road from Erzerum 
to Trebizond in June, of Erzingan, the great military 
centre, in July, and of Gumushhane in August, 1916, 
the high-water mark of the Russian advance was 
reached. It resulted in the occupation of the whole 
of the route from Erzerum to Trebizond, which is 
one of the most important roads in this part of the 
Ottoman Empire, and in the establishment of a line 
running from a point on the Black Sea coast, located 
a few miles to the west of Trebizond, through Erzingan, 
Kighi, Mush, the Bitlis Gap, thence round to south of 
Lake Van to Lake Urumiah — a line which though it 
was never actually continuous was nevertheless a 
definite and well-connected front in the possession of 
the army of the ex-Tsar. 

Although the Russians withdrew along certain 
portions of this front during 1917, with the following 
modifications they held approximately the above- 
mentioned line until about the time of the peace 
developments with Germany. Between the Black 
Sea coast and Kighi, lying about halfway between 
Erzingan and Mush, there was no material modifica- 
tion. To the southwest of that town, however, the 
Russians lost certain mountain positions. In May, 
1917, too, they withdrew from Mush, thereby sacri- 
ficing a place of considerable significance. Moreover, 
further to the southeast they retired from the head 
of the Bitlis Gap, through which an all-important 


road runs to Diarbekr. Part of the area between 
this place and Lake Van, however, remained in Rus- 
sian hands, as did also the city of Van, from which 
point the line ran in a southeasterly direction to and 
across the Turco-Persian frontier, near which it turned, 
finally reaching the neighbourhood of Kermanshah. 
Thus, whilst the earlier changes which took place 
resulted in the loss of certain points and areas of 
strategical importance, and whilst the Russian and 
British forces based on Mesopotamia, instead of 
being in actual touch as they were at one time, were 
now separated by a considerable distance, the posi- 
tion of the Muscovite front in Asia at first suffered 
proportionately less as a result of the Russian Revolu- 
tion than did that of the Russian army in Europe. 
In short, it was only at the time of the signature of 
the so-called peace with Germany that the definite 
evacuation of the conquered districts of Asia Minor 
began to make itself so painfully apparent. 

Events are changing so rapidly that it is impossible 
to chronicle exactly what has taken place in the neigh- 
bourhood of the Russo-Turkish frontier during the last 
few months. Sufficient therefore be it to say that by 
the Treaty signed between these two countries at Brest- 
Litovsk on March 3d — a Treaty which is rightly not 
acknowledged by the Allies — Russia undertook to 
withdraw from the Ottoman territory which she 
occupied and also to evacuate the districts of Erivan, 
Kars and Batum. The meaning of this is that the 
areas annexed by Russia after the war of 1877-1878 are 
handed back to their former owner, that their popula- 
tion is left practically at the mercy of the Turks, and 
that once these new possessions were really subdued by 


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the enemy he would have gone a long way towards 
the establishment of a new route into Persia and in 
the direction of the Indian frontier. Armenian and 
Georgian contingents, formed from the local popula- 
tion and from the native elements of the Russian Army 
still loyal to the Allied Cause, have done their utmost 
to resist this subjugation. If it can be maintained 
that resistance, which is obviously worthy of encourage- 
ment by the Allies, is of the highest importance, for it 
might be the means of preventing or at least of delay- 
ing the realisation of Germanic designs in this direction. 
On the other hand, should this be impossible, owing to 
the diflSculty of combating organised and well armed 
forces with irregulars, not adequately provided with 
guns and war materials, then the future of the area 
situated between the Black Sea and the Caspian — 
an area which cannot be left under German domination 
— will remain to be decided, not by the temporary 
arrangement made between the Central Powers and 
Russia, but by the terms of an ultimate and fair peace. 
The second area of Turkish operations is that 
situated between the head of the Persian Gulf and 
Bagdad — that is, the theatre of the Mesopotamian 
campaign.^ Here, as in the Caucasus and on the 
Egyptian frontier, the Turkish policy, aggressive as 
it was or would have been, was directed with the 
object of threatening the British position on the 
Persian Gulf, of seizing Koweit and of pushing for- 
ward into Southern Persia with the principal purpose 
of occupying the oil fields. These Persian oil fields, 

1 A great many aspects of this campaign are discussed in the Report of 
the Mesopotamia Commission presented to Parliament in 1917 and pub- 
lished as a Blue Book numbered C^ 8610. 


which are of great value, He in the neighbourhood of 
Ahwaz and Shustar, and therefore within about 
eighty miles of the Turco-Persian frontier. They 
are connected with Muhammera — actually on the 
Shat-el-Arab — by a pipe line belonging to the Anglo- 
Persian Oil Company. The destruction of this line 
was one of the most important Turkish objectives in 
this locality. 

Before reviewing the actual operations which have 
taken place in this area, it may be well to indicate 
the geography of the country in question. The 
southeastern part of Mesopotamia (it is more correct 
to call this district Babylonia) lies between the lower 
reaches of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates. In shape 
this area may be compared to that of an old-fashioned 
pointed bottomed, soda-water bottle, lying half over 
towards the left-hand side. The neck of that bottle, 
which measures about thirty-five miles in width, is 
situated between Bagdad on the Tigris and Feluja 
on the Euphrates. Its pointed base is at Kurna — • 
the town at which the two rivers unite their waters 
— waters which flow thence for a distance of about 
one hundred miles to the Persian Gulf under the name 
of the Shat-el-Arab. As a sort of label line extending 
practically across the thickest part of the bottle, where 
it measures about one hundred and ten miles, there is 
the Shat-el-Hai Canal, which leaves the Tigris at 
Kut-el-Amara and meets the Euphrates at Nasrieh. 
This canal is navigable for small boats. 

If we accept this rough analogy, it is possible to 
utilise it in order to explain the various stages into 
which the campaign has been practically divided. 
They are : 


(1) The British advance by way of Basra to Kurna 
and the consequent seizure of the base of the bottle. 
This stage was rapidly accomplished, for Basra was 
occupied on November 22, 1914, approximately three 
weeks after the entry of Turkey into the war, and 
Kurna fell on the ninth of the following month. 

(2) The pushing forward by way of the Euphrates 
to Nasrieh at the southern end of the "label", or 
Shat-el-Hai Canal, and by way of the Tigris to Kut- 
el-Amara at the northern end of the same waterway. 
The former place was taken on July 25, and the latter 
was reached on September 28, 1915. 

(3) The further attempted push up the neck of the 
bottle towards Bagdad, the retreat from Ctesiphon 
in November, 1915, and the siege of Kut which 
lasted from December 7, 1915, until its fall on April 29, 

(4) The operations which followed the surrender of 
General Townshend, including the taking of Bagdad, 
and the advance which has taken place since the cap- 
ture of that town in March, 1917. 

Whilst from the first the British were obliged to 
assume what may be called a tactical offensive, they 
were acting, so to speak, strategically on the defensive 
so long as they were only trying to block the Turkish 
advance into areas which were and are of vital im- 
portance to them. By those who can only look at 
maps it is argued that the British object would have 
been achieved and that they should have contented 
themselves with the accomplishment of the first stage 
and with the occupation of Kurna. But militarily 
this would not have been sufficient. Owing to its 
position at the junction of the two rivers, this place 


would have been open to an attack from the north by 
way of the Tigris and from the west along the Eu- 
phrates. Moreover as was proved by the determined 
Turkish thrust into Persia and upon Ahwaz — a thrust 
the effects of which were put an end to by the opera- \ 
tions conducted by General Gorringe in Persian terri- ' 
tory during May, 1915 — the enemy would still have 
been able to attack the Persian oil fields. In addition, 
so long as Nasrieh, on the Euphrates, was not occupied, 
not only Kurna but Basra itself were and would have 
been open to the danger of an attack from the direction 
of that place, which in nonflooded times is the starting 
point of a land route towards the southeast. This 
means that the accomplishment of the first stage in 
the campaign would not have been sufficient under the 

The second stage began with an advance up the 
Tigris to Amara, which fell into General Gorringe's 
hands on June 4, 1915, and with the subsequent attack 
upon Nasrieh, which was occupied on July twenty -fifth. 
It continued with the further advance from Amara j 
to Kut-el-Amara — an advance entailing a forward % 
movement of one hundred and fifty miles measured 
along the banks of the Tigris. The whole of these 
operations were accomplished under conditions of 
the utmost difficulty, for, in addition to the heavy 
opposition put up by the Turks and to the geographical 
obstacles, to which I will refer again later on, light- 
draft river boats had to be collected, prepared, and 
armoured to carry the expedition through an area 
where railways were then nonexistent. 

Thus far the operations in Mesopotamia went fairly 
well, at least from the purely military standpoint. 


Then came the third stage in the campaign, the fatal 
dash for Bagdad — a dash which with the forces 
available and the inadequate preparations was not 
warrantable. Moreover, in addition to its being un- 
justifiable for these reasons, it was in any case a mis- 
take because the holding and the properly defending 
of Kut-el-Amara would probably have prevented any 
serious Turkish incursions into Southern Persia, and 
because, even had the advance of the winter of 1915 
resulted in the occupation of Bagdad, the British 
expeditionary force might well have been unable to 
hold a place having so large a population with a force 
numbering only from fifteen to seventeen thousand 
men. The net consequences of this error were that 
the retirement to and the fall of Kut resulted in a 
serious setback to British prestige in the East, that 
the losses incurred in endeavouring to relieve that 
place immediately prior to April 29, 1916, had no 
corresponding advantage, and that reinforcements, 
which could otherwise have been brought up fresh 
from the base for an advance upon Bagdad during 
the spring and summer of that year, were compelled 
to retake the Sanaiyat and other positions, lying to 
the southeast of Kut and to which the Turks had 
advanced, before once more inaugurating our final 
and successful advance upon Bagdad. 

At the beginning of the fourth stage and during the 
hot season after the fall of Kut in 1916, the British 
Army suffered much from sickness, and the transport 
arrangements, though improving, were still inade- 
quate. From May, therefore, when the surrender of 
General Townshend made it unnecessary immediately 
to push forward on the Tigris, the British policy in 


Mesopotamia was defensive. Sir Percy Lake, acting 
on orders from home, was directed to maintain as 
forward a position as could be made tactically secure 
and to be ready to take advantage of any weakening 
on the Turkish front. These instructions were strictly 
adhered to, and he and his successor, Sir Stanley Maude, 
confined themselves during the summer and autumn of 
that year to developing their river and railway com- 
munications and to improving their general supply 
organisation. As a result of this, when active opera- 
tions were resumed very early in 1917, the advance 
to and the capture of Bagdad on March 11 were ac- 
complished in a highly satisfactory manner. These 
operations and those which took place subsequent to 
the British entry into the city have gone a long way 
towards redeeming the effect of the mistakes which 
were made earlier in the campaign. Indeed, in spite 
of every effort to minimise its importance, the fact 
that the British under General Sir W. R. Marshall 
have now pushed up the Tigris for miles beyond 
Bagdad, in addition to establishing themselves to the 
northeast and to the west and northwest of that city, 
must have had an influence in Turkey, only surpassed 
by the capture of Jerusalem. 

There is no space or reason here to enter into a dis- 
cussion of the manner in which the Mesopotamian 
operations, and particularly the earlier operations, 
were conducted. The accounts which have appeared 
in the press and the report of the British Mesopotamia 
Commission, appointed to inquire into those opera- 
tions, are sufficient to prove that political and military 
miscalculations occurred, that inadequate preparations 
were made, and that the scope of the expedition was 


never sufficiently defined in advance. These are short- 
comings for which severe condemnation is deserved. 
Nevertheless whilst it is not my intention to try to 
make excuses for such mistakes, if we are only to 
apportion blame where blame be due, and in fairness 
to those concerned, we must recognise that the diffi- 
culties to be overcome in Mesopotamia were and are 
enormous. The treacherous climate and the alterna- 
tion of sweltering heat and bitter cold made the regular 
supply of warm clothing, double tents, mosquito nets, 
and other requisites an absolute necessity. Moreover 
the same conditions, which had for their result a large 
amount of sickness, were responsible for the desirability 
of the provision of an abnormal amount of hospital 
accommodation — accommodation which in its turn 
depended upon the adequate organisation of a suffi- 
cient transport — transport which included not only 
the provision and equipment of river steamers but the 
conversion of Basra into such a port as would make 
it an adequate base of operations for a large inland 
military operation. 

Ignoring altogether the immense burden of the 
tonnage question, and of transporting troops from 
England or other parts of the British Empire to the 
Persian Gulf, once arrived there the difficulties to be 
overcome were enormous. Bagdad is distant from 
the sea five hundred and seventy miles. Until the 
construction of railways, which did not exist during 
the earlier stages of the operations, the sole means of 
communication was by way of the Shat-el-Arab and 
the Tigris. Below Basra, which is situated on the 
former channel and about seventy miles from the sea, 
vessels drawing up to nineteen feet of water can navi- 


gate. Above that town, where in 1914 there were 
practically no quays or warehouses, transport is de- 
pendent upon river boats, the draft of which must 
not exceed seven and a half feet for the trip to Kurna 
and three and a half for Amara and beyond. Over 
and above a few vessels owned by Messrs. Lynch, these 
river steamers did not exist, and many of them had 
to be collected from the rivers Hoogli and Irawadi. 
The Tigris twists and turns with sharp bends and 
hairpin corners, leaving in places little or no room 
for vessels, and particularly for those towing barges, 
to pass one another. The stream runs at about four 
knots an hour, and it is difficult for steamers without 
independent paddles to avoid striking the banks when 
going round the corners. No proper charts are or 
can be available for the Tigris, because the channel is 
constantly changing, owing to the shifting of the sand. 
Indeed, so marked is this that in peace time, when 
there was a regular bi-weekly service up and down the 
river, the ships were always either navigated by differ- 
ent local pilots or by men who were compelled upon 
each journey to make inquiries at the various stations 
as to the ever-changing conditions. 

The influence of the floods, which would in any 
case have interfered with the movement of troops 
in the neighbourhood of the Tigris, was rendered far 
greater because of the existence of "deep cuts" (irri- 
gation ditches) which in peace time are used for 
watering the areas situated near the banks of the 
river. Some of these ditches naturally became auto- 
matically filled by the rise of the river, but others 
were able to be put into operation by those who held 
the key of the system by which they were worked. 


Throughout the earher operations, therefore, the 
Turks, who could choose their own positions for de- 
fence, were possessed of an enormous advantage 
over the British who at times had to push forward 
at all costs. In addition, as I shall show elsewhere, 
whilst our difficulties grew greater and greater as our 
communications became longer and longer, the ob- 
stacles to be overcome by the enemy were daily de- 
creasing, owing to the existence and continued im- 
provement in the Bagdad Railway, by means of which 
he was able to convey troops across a considerable 
length of the area which separates Constantinople 
from Bagdad. 

If we ignore the Arabian Independentist Move- 
ment and the proclamation and attitude of the Grand 
Shereef of Mecca, which are more important politically 
than militarily, we now come to the last theatre of 
war in which the Turks have been engaged, namely, 
the area lying to the east of the Egyptian frontier 
and in Palestine. Here we were at first presented 
with an example of what is practically a new feature 
of warfare — namely the necessity for the conveyance 
of a force of considerable size across a practically 
waterless desert which has an average width of about 
one hundred and forty miles. The operations in this 
area began directly after the entry of Turkey into 
the War, by the shelling, by H. M. S. Minerva, of 
the fort and troops at Akaba where preparations 
were being made for an advance upon Egypt. Sub- 
sequently the British abandoned the Turco-Egyptian 
frontier, withdrawing to the line of the Suez Canal, 
where entrenchments were dug. The Turks, who 
had loudly proclaimed the reconquest of their lost 


territory, then (that is to say, early in 1915) advanced 
across the desert by several different routes, and 
with a force of about twelve thousand men ultimately 
reached the immediate neighbourhood of the canal 
during the opening days of February, 1915. Allowed 
to approach the very bank of this water line, and to 
bring up their bridging material, the enemy was, how- 
ever, completely routed on February second and 
third (leaving about five hundred dead and over six 
hundred prisoners), as a result of an attack delivered 
by mixed British troops and of the fire of British 
and French warships stationed in the canal itself. 

For more than a year there was no important de- 
velopment on the Egyptian frontier, but in April, 
1916, the British once more advanced into the desert, 
fighting actions with the Turks in various areas — 
actions which ended in no decision of far-reaching 
importance for either side. About four months later, 
the enemy took the offensive, making a general attack 
in the neighbourhood of Katia, near the Mediterranean 
coast early in August. He was, however, decisively 
defeated, losing four thousand prisoners and thirteen 
hundred killed out of a total force of eighteen thou- 
sand men. The consequence of this was that, during 
the rest of the year, the British were able gradually to 
reconquer Egyptian territory, finally occupying El- 
Arish on the Mediterranean and other places to the 
south of it at the end of December. As a result of 
this success an advance was made into Southern 
Palestine early in 1917, but that advance was not 
carried out in sufficient strength to enable it to be 
permanently maintained and the attempts to capture 
Gaza, in March, failed. From that time onwards, 


particularly during the hot weather, the campaign 
lapsed into stagnancy, and it was only in November 
that Beersheba, Gaza, and Jaffa were captured, with 
the result that the way was made ready for an advance 
upon Jerusalem, which fell into British hands early 
in December. 

That event undoubtedly constitutes the most im- 
portant Allied success gained in the East since the 
beginning of the War. From a military standpoint 
the occupation of the Holy City gives the British a 
base of operations on the east of the Egyptian desert 
and thus enables them to pursue with greater facility 
their further campaign towards the north and east. 
In the former direction, we can now look upon an 
advance to Damascus or even Aleppo, and the conse- 
quent cutting of the Bagdad Railway, near the latter 
place, as a matter of practical consideration. In the 
latter area, that is, just across the Jordan, is the Hedjaz 
Railway — a line which for years has been the only 
connecting link between Arabia and the remainder of 
Turkey. Its protection by the Turks, or even its 
partial occupation by the British, are obviously ques- 
tions of far-reaching importance to the respective 

The moral effect of the capture of Jerusalem must 
be as great, if not greater, than the military, for the 
occupation of that city, following upon that of Bagdad, 
cannot fail to affect the mentality of the Turks, who 
have always regarded these places as of great im- 
portance. Moreover, although Moslems consider 
Mecca and Medina as their two most Holy Cities, 
Jerusalem is also held by them as a sacred place, for 
they reverence Christ, Moses, and Abraham only 


after Mohammed. In addition, and over and above 
this, the British success in Palestine must have a 
further influence because one of the strongest claims 
of the Sultans of Turkey to the position of Caliph, or 
head of the Moslem religion, is due to the fact that 
for years they have been the guardians of the three 
Holy Cities. The King of Hedjaz is in undisputed 
possession of Mecca and Medina; therefore, with the 
fall of Jerusalem, which had been in Mohammedan 
hands since 1243, the Turks lose a place which they 
recognise to be of significance from numerous stand- 



Although the object of this account is neither to 
summarise the history of Bulgaria nor to describe 
the rapid development of that country during the last 
forty years, yet it is interesting to recall the fact 
that modern Bulgaria is the youngest independent 
State, except Albania, in the Balkan Peninsula. Thus 
it was only in the year 1878, after, and as a result of, 
the Russo-Turkish War, that Northern Bulgaria was 
created a principality under the suzerainty of the 
Sultan, and that Eastern Roumelia was formed into 
an autonomous province under a Christian governor- 
general. From the time of the union of the two 
States in 1885 until the declaration of their final 
independence in 1908, the prosperity of the country 
gradually increased. Again from that moment until 
the outbreak of the first Balkan war in October, 1912, 
the Bulgarians continued to work for the develop- 
ment of their national power and for the realisation 
of their great aspiration — the union of the Mace- 
donian Bulgars under the rule of King Ferdinand. 

Prior to the Balkan Wars the area of the kingdom 
of Bulgaria was approximately 38,000 square miles, 
and the population numbered about 4,337,000 souls. 
As a result of these wars, an area roughly including 


8600 square miles was taken from Turkey, but Bul- 
garia was compelled to sacrifice 2687 square miles of 
territory to Roumania. Consequently the net change 
was that the size of the country was only increased 
in such a way that it now has an area of about 43,300 
square miles and a population of somewhat over 
4,750,000 souls. This means that Bulgaria, who pro- 
vided the largest army for the first war, gained by far 
the least from a campaign which could never have 
been carried out without her co-operation. 

As a result of the so-called settlement of the year 
1913, Bulgaria, deprived of the legitimate fruits of 
her original and all-important victories in Thrace, 
where she met and defeated the greater part of the 
Turkish Army, naturally continued to remain on the 
most strained terms with Serbia and Greece. The 
Treaty of London, signed between the Balkan allies 
and Turkey in 1913, was torn up by the latter country, 
who, in spite of protests from both the British and the 
Russian Governments, reoccupied Adrianople during 
the second Balkan war. Notwithstanding this, it 
was claimed by some that the formation of the then 
so-called new Balkan Alliance, made up of Serbia, 
Montenegro, Greece, and Roumania, was as favourable, 
if not more favourable, to the cause of the then Triple 
Entente than would have been the continued existence 
of the original League, formed of Serbia, Bulgaria, 
Greece, and Montenegro. Others, and amongst them 
the Austrians and the Germans, were not slow to 
realise that however friendly to Serbia her new allies 
might be, with the exception of Montenegro those 
so-called allies were not likely immediately to engage 
in a war in which they had no direct interest. 



From the moment of the outbreak of the War, and 
particularly after the entry of Turkey, until Bulgaria 
threw in her lot on the side of the Central Powers, 
the key to the situation in the latter country lay in 
the fact that King Ferdinand and his Government 
were determined to utilise the present conflagration 
in order to try to regain at least some of the losses 
suffered in 1913. For them this was not so much a 
European as a third Balkan war for the independence 
of the Bulgars, subject to alien, this time principally 
Serbian and Greek, rules. It was certain, therefore, 
that they would not throw in their lot with any side 
or countries which did not promise to give them a 
large section of Southern Macedonia and also as 
secondary conditions to restore to them a section of 
the Dobrudja and at least part of Turkish Thrace. 
In other words, the bitter antagonism felt by Bulgaria 
towards Serbia, Greece, and Roumania, and particularly 
towards the first-mentioned country, outweighed the 
traditional hostility towards Turkey and weakened the 
ties of friendship with Russia, whose attitude towards 
the Serbo-Bulgarian dispute of 1913 was far from 
popular at Sofia. Consequently so long as her future 
was not adequately secured elsewhere, Bulgaria was 
unlikely to take up arms against Turkey because her 
only accesses to the sea were by way of her Black 
Sea ports — rendered useless owing to the closing of 
the Dardanelles — and through Dede Agatch, the rail- 
way to which port, according to the Treaty of Con- 
stantinople of September, 1913, ran for some miles 
through Ottoman territory. From the moment of 
the outbreak of the War the great question, therefore, 
was whether Serbia, Greece, and Roumania would or 


could be persuaded to restore to Bulgaria areas of 
territory which she considered should be hers, and 
whether the Allies would guarantee her possession of 
districts of now Ottoman territory, which they actually 
agreed should be allotted to her during the negotia- 
tions of the year 1913. 

Whilst, so far as I know, no detailed official state- 
ment was published on the subject, the conditions 
required by Bulgaria soon became pretty clear. On 
the west the Government of King Ferdinand was 
intent upon the recognition of the Serbo-Bulgarian 
Treaty of March, 1912, as a basis for discussion — a 
basis which would have meant the cession by Serbia 
of considerable areas of her southern territory annexed 
after the Balkan Wars. On the south, whilst claims 
were made to all the district lying between the Graeco- 
Bulgarian frontier, the Struma Valley, and the Aegean, 
satisfaction would probably have been provided by a 
rectification of that frontier in such a manner as to 
give to Bulgaria at least the whole of the Mesta Valley 
and the port of Kavala. On the north, where Rou- 
mania had claimed, secured, and afterwards seized 
territory on the south of the Dobrudja, the Bulgarian 
Government would undoubtedly have agreed to leave 
to that country the territory, including the town of 
Silistria, ceded to her by the Petrograd Protocol of 
May, 1913, provided the more southerly area actually 
seized by Roumania during the second Balkan war 
had been restored to its former owners. With regard 
to the East and in Turkey, there was obviously no 
question of negotiation with the Allies, and there the 
only arrangement which could therefore have been 
expected by Bulgaria was the giving to her of a free 


hand to occupy and retain a part of Thrace, say that 
situated northwest of the Enos-Midia line. 

The enormous war importance of Bulgaria is bound 
up largely with her geographical position. As a re- 
sult of the Balkan campaigns she became the only 
State with a frontier contiguous to that of Turkey 
in Europe, She was, therefore, the sole country 
which could attack or through which a land attack 
could be made upon the European dominions of the 
Sultan. Equally well, it was through Bulgaria alone 
that officers, technical experts, and supplies could be 
sent as they were sent, from Central Europe to Con- 
stantinople. To the Allies, this meant that in 1915 
the support of "Fox" Ferdinand would have carried 
with it an immediate Bulgarian advance into Thrace, 
which in itself would probably have resulted in an 
immediate collapse of Turkish resistance on the Pe- 
ninsula of Gallipoli. In addition, with the entry of 
Bulgaria into the War upon our side, we could not 
only have utilised Dede Agatch and Porto Lagos for 
the disembarkation of armies destined to be able to 
impose terms of peace at the very gates of the Otto- 
man capital, but arrangements would then undoubtedly 
have been arrived at by which Allied or Greek troops 
could have advanced from Salonica or Kavala by way 
of the territory of Tsar Ferdinand. 

Owing to her central position, Bulgaria's value 
was, therefore, out of all proportion even to the high 
fighting efficiency of her military machine. Thus we 
have already seen that the rapid subjugation of Serbia 
was largely due to her action. Equally well, had 
Roumania entered the War against Austria or Ger- 
many during the first year of the European conflagra- 


tion and consequently sent the greater part of her 
forces to undertake a campaign in Transylvania or 
in the Bukovina, the Bulgarians would have been 
able, as they subsequently were able, to make their 
influence most unpleasantly felt along both banks of 
the Danube. And lastly, had Greece either provided 
a force for the support of Serbia, or inaugurated war- 
like operations at the Dardanelles or elsewhere, the 
Bulgarians always could, as they did, easily advance 
to Kavala and into the Greek district which lies be- 
tween the rivers Mesta and Struma. 

The above remarks are sufficient to indicate not 
only what was the importance of Bulgaria in reference 
to the Dardanelles, but also that her position enabled 
her practically to immobilise the military forces of 
her neighbours and to be the means of providing or 
of preventing the establishment of through communi- 
cation between Central Europe and Constantinople. 
The arrival at an understanding between the Allies 
and the Government of Sofia, during the first year 
of the War, would therefore probably have meant an 
augmentation of the Allied armies by at least one 
million two hundred thousand men and that the 
armies composed of these men would have been in 
a position to act in exactly the areas where their 
presence would have been most valuable against the 
enemy. Four hundred thousand Bulgarians would 
have advanced into Turkey, with the result already 
indicated. In spite of the attitude of King Con- 
stantine, M. Venezelos, then Prime Minister, could 
at that time have carried the people of Greece with 
him in favour of a mobilisation of an army of at least 
two hundred thousand to be employed in some cam- 


paign. Five hundred thousand Roumanians could 
have immediately crossed the Austrian frontier. By 
occupying the Bukovina and Transylvania, under cir- 
cumstances in which there would have been no danger 
of Bulgarian aggression from the rear, they would 
not only have furthered the cause of the Allies, and 
particularly that of Russia, but they might well have 
formed an effective link between the Muscovite and 
the Serbian forces. 

So much for the value of Bulgaria to the Allies — a 
value which on its side naturally made her attitude 
of great significance to the enemy. Indeed by the 
maintenance of the neutrality, but still more by the 
support of that country, which rendered the conquest 
of her neighbours a feasible proposition, the Centrai 
Powers gained one of their greatest assets in the War. 
It enabled them to develop to the full advantage the 
utility of Turkey and thus to threaten the British 
positions in Mesopotamia and in Egypt. It enor- 
mously expedited the sending of submarines overland 
to be put together in Constantinople or elsewhere, 
and it facilitated the establishment of bases, without 
which the work of these underwater craft would have 
been greatly curtailed in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
When coupled with the consequent necessity for the 
British withdrawal from the Dardanelles, it constituted 
a moral victory of far-reaching importance at home and 
abroad. And last but not least it resulted in the in- 
auguration of the Salonica campaign and the conse- 
quent employment of troops which would otherwise 
have been available elsewhere. 

The above remarks are sufficient to prove the im- 
portance of Bulgaria to both groups of belligerents 


and to indicate the lines along which alone she might 
have been brought into the War upon the Allied side. 
Whilst there are some who state, I have reason to 
believe without foundation, that an arrangement was 
arrived at between the Central Powers and Bulgaria 
so early that even such concessions as I have outlined 
would not have brought her into the War upon our 
side, there are others who say that in any case such 
concessions were out of proportion to the value of 
King Ferdinand's position and army in the War, and 
that they would have reacted too unfairly upon his 
neighbours to be feasible of arrangement. In discuss- 
ing the matter quite openly, therefore, I must ask 
my readers to believe that my sole object is to explain, 
that in addition to the real interest of all our Balkan 
friends being the achievement of a general Allied 
success, rather than a local victory, each of the Balkan 
States would have furthered her own immediate 
objects and stood to gain by the making of sacrifices 
which for the moment would and might have been 
most difficult. 

Our little ally, Serbia, who in 1915 had already 
fought so well and so bravely, would have been far 
more than repaid for any sacrifices of territory rendered 
necessary by the recognition of the Serbo-Bulgarian 
Treaty and Conventions signed before the outbreak 
of the first Balkan war, by the earlier and certain 
acquisition and annexation of territory which we still 
contend will be hers in Bosnia and Herzegovina and by 
the possession of a proper outlet upon the Adriatic. 
Greece, to whom the retention of Kavala was always 
largely a question of amour propre, could have been 
supplied with more than an equivalent amount of 


territory elsewhere, had she ceded, as M. Venezelos 
was at one time wilHng to cede, an area, the posses- 
sion of which was and is vital to the whole future 
prosperity of Bulgaria. Roumania would have been 
amply compensated for any losses which she might 
have suffered in the Dobrudja by the fact that she 
would have been free to undertake and safe in under- 
taking operations which later on proved at least tem- 
porarily disastrous to her. 

From the moment of the outbreak of the War, and 
particularly from the time of the entry of Turkey into 
the theatre of hostilities, Bulgaria was therefore in 
possession of "goods" which were worth a high price 
alike to the Central Powers and to the Allies. The 
former, who realised the necessity of preparing the 
way for military action, from the first left no stone 
unturned to develop an already advantageous situa- 
tion in order at least to maintain the neutrality and, 
if possible, to secure the support of Bulgaria. The 
situation was favourable for Germanic intrigue, be- 
cause, as a result of the events of 1913, the relations 
between Bulgaria and Turkey had rapidly improved, 
and because, whilst the former country had aspira- 
tions, both across her eastern and southeastern frontiers 
and beyond her western and southwestern boundaries, 
her claims in Thrace were of much less importance 
to her than those in Macedonia. What happened 
therefore was that, although Germany devoted herself 
to endeavouring to secure the good will of Bulgaria, 
she (Germany) also did what was equally important, 
and wrung from Turkey concessions of the greatest 
value to the Government of King Ferdinand. Thus 
whilst many arguments and statements have been 


used and made to the contrary, and whilst the visit 
of Prince Hohenlohe and of the Duke of Mecklenburg- 
Schwerin to Sofia in the summer of 1915 had a most 
important effect, I have reason to beheve that no 
definite agreement existed between the Government 
of King Ferdinand and the Central Powers until the 
very eve of the entry of Bulgaria into the War. In- 
deed, friendly as the relations gradually became be- 
tween. Turkey and Bulgaria, it was really only the 
cession by the former country of the area of Thrace 
through which the railway runs from Mustafa Pasha 
to Dede Agatch, the preliminary agreement which 
was arrived at in July, that made it practically im- 
possible for the Allies to expect to be able to bring 
Bulgaria into the War against Turkey. 

The position of the Allies originally was and it 
gradually became far more difficult than that of the 
enemy. To begin with, there was always Russia 
in the background, who, whilst supporting Serbia on 
the one hand, was regarded with actual suspicion by 
Bulgaria on the other. Moreover, instead of, like 
Germany, being able to negotiate with one party — 
Turkey — for concessions to Bulgaria, England, France, 
Russia, and later Italy, were compelled to approach 
Serbia, Greece, and Roumania, against all of which 
countries, as I have already shown, the Government 
of Sofia had far-reaching claims. Moreover, King 
Ferdinand, who had never forgiven Russia for her 
attitude towards him during the years which elapsed 
directly after his arrival in Bulgaria, was not sorry 
to be able to utilise the enemy victories in Poland 
as an argument in favouring a pro-German policy. 
The net results, therefore, were that when tardily 


and too late the Allies recognised the necessity of 
endeavouring to secure the neutrality, if not the active 
support of Bulgaria, the ground for negotiation was 
extremely unfavourable and that country had already 
set a price upon herself which it was far from easy to 

Throughout the spring and summer of 1915, a con- 
stant exchange of ideas was in progress. Early in 
May the Bulgarian Government outlined the condi- 
tions upon which it would be prepared to join the 
Allies — conditions which were more or less in ac- 
cordance with those which I have already suggested. 
On May 29, the Triple Entente, supported by Italy, 
replied to these proposals but were unable to provide 
full satisfaction, owing to the attitude of Serbia, 
Greece, and Roumania, who were in possession of 
the most important areas in question. On June 15 
the Bulgarian Premier called upon the diplomatic 
representatives of the Entente Powers at Sofia and 
presented to them a Note in which his Government 
asked for further particulars regarding these proposals. 

A definite and fatal hitch then ensued, and it was not 
until a month later and in July, that really determined 
efforts were made, and that pressure was brought to 
bear upon Serbia to accede to at least part of the Bul- 
garian demands. In August this pressure had the 
result of making that country give serious considera- 
tion to the suggestions of the Allies and particularly 
to those of Great Britain, and, after a secret session 
in the Chamber, certain concessions were agreed to 
by the Government of King Peter. But satisfactory 
as might these concessions have been, had they been 
suggested voluntarily and many months earlier, they 


proved useless at the time at which they were made. 
To begin with, they did not satisfy the full claims of 
Bulgaria from an actual territorial standpoint and, 
instead of carrying with them the immediate hand- 
ing over of at least part of the areas in dispute, 
they only made conditional promises as to the future 
— promises which the Bulgarians contended would be 
less likely to be fulfilled by a victorious than by a 
hard-pressed Serbia. Moreover, although the claims 
against Greece and Roumania were less vital, the fact 
that Bulgaria's northern and southern neighbours 
made no sign of following the tardy example of Serbia 
certainly had an adverse effect upon the policy of the 
Sofia Government. And, last but not least, as I have 
already said, by this time Bulgaria had already ar- 
rived at the preliminary, if not the final, agreement 
as to the concessions of the above-mentioned area by 
Turkey — a concession which not only gave the former 
country free and unhindered access to Dede Agatch, 
but also put Sofia in railway connection with Southern 
or new Bulgaria with which communication had for- 
merly to be maintained either by a railway passing 
through Ottoman territory or by roads running right 
across the Rhodope Balkans. 

It is unnecessary here to discuss the details of the 
manner in which Bulgaria entered the War, or to try 
to arrive at conclusions as to the exact moment at 
which a definite agreement was made between that 
country and the Central Powers. Orders for a general 
mobilisation were given on September 19, and it was 
subsequently reported, though the correctness of this 
report is open to doubt, that German officers were 
arriving in Bulgaria to take over the direction of 


various departments and to play the same kind of 
role as their fellow countrymen had played in Turkey 
prior to the entry of that country into the War. The 
result of this mobilisation, which was claimed by 
Bulgaria to mean only the maintenance of an armed 
neutrality, was that on October 4 the Government 
of Petrograd delivered an ultimatum at Sofia, and 
that immediately afterwards the diplomatic repre- 
sentatives of Great Britain, France, and Russia left 
that city. 

From the time of the entry of Bulgaria into the 
War, the only historical events connected with that 
country, which are possessed of European importance, 
are these bound up with the subjugation of Serbia, 
with the Salonica campaign, and with the conquest of 
Roumania. As most of those events took place be- 
yond the frontiers of Bulgaria, they are discussed in 
other sections of this volume. All that remains to 
be said here, therefore, is that whilst Bulgaria has 
shown herself a faithful follower and a powerful sup- 
porter of Kaiserism, signs have often not been wanting 
to prove that she has played her game not so much to 
further the cause of the Central Powers as to conquer 
and to hold the territories which she covets at the 
smallest loss to herself in men and money. Thus 
whilst reports have appeared to the effect that Bul- 
garians have arrived at various parts situated beyond 
the confines of the Balkans, no confirmation of these 
reports, the truth of which is highly unlikely, has ever 
been forthcoming. In short, as various statesmen of 
Bulgaria have often suggested, that country entered 
the War not because she wished to support the policy 
of the Central Powers or to oppose that of the Allies, 


but solely with the object of realising her national 
aspirations — aspirations which had been temporarily 
frustrated by the second Balkan war and by the 
Treaty of Bucharest which terminated it. 

I have endeavoured to enumerate as impartially as 
is possible the events which led to the entry of Bul- 
garia into the War. In so doing, whilst recognising 
the difficulties which existed, I have tried to make no 
secret of the faults in Allied statesmanship — faults 
which resulted in what is one of the greatest diplomatic 
defeats suffered during the War. To summarise these 
faults, it may be said that the importance of Bulgaria 
and of the re-formation of a Balkan alliance favourable 
to the Allies was not recognised until so late that the 
demands of the Sofia Government had been aug- 
mented to a point making them exceedingly difficult 
of gratification. When the desirability for action had 
been realised, instead of accepting the fact that the 
price for "the delivery of valuable goods" is always 
high, no definite line of policy appears to have been 
followed. Two courses were open. It was feasible, 
first, to approach Serbia, Greece, and Roumania in 
order either to ascertain what concessions they were 
willing to provide or to tell them the nature of the 
concessions insisted upon by the Allies. With some- 
thing definite in hand, conversations might then have 
been entered into with Bulgaria, who would thereby 
have been forced to disclose her attitude one way or 
the other. And second, it was practicable to ascertain 
from Bulgaria her conditions, and then t© decide 
whether these conditions should be forced upon her 
neighbours. ^Instead of the adoption of these alterna- 
tives, a sort of halfway course of negotiating first with 


one party and then with the other seems to have been 
adopted — a system which in the end permitted the 
running out of the sands and gave the enemy time to 
bring about a definite arrangement between Turkey 
and Bulgaria. 

The fundamental basis of the whole question was, 
and is, that no Balkan statesman, be he Roumanian, 
Greek, Serbian, or Bulgarian, can or will make sacri- 
fices until he finds himself compelled to do so. Equally 
well no Balkan Government can or will accept less 
than it demands until the necessity for the adoption 
of such a course arises. This is the case, because 
were they to do so they would lay themselves open 
to a charge by the military and chauvinistic parties, 
— a charge which would result in their fall. On the 
other hand, once the leader of a government is in a 
position to affirm to his followers and supporters that 
external pressure has forced him to concede a point, 
however important, then and only then can he hope 
to pass through an internal crisis unscathed. For 
example, in 1912 and very soon after the most explicit 
statements by the Belgrade Government upon the 
necessity for a port upon the Adriatic, orders were 
given for the withdrawal of its army from that coast, 
and this because of the influence which came from 
abroad and particularly from Russia. It is this state 
of things — this mentality — which made it so neces- 
sary for the Allies in 1914-1915 to adopt a policy so 
firm, so uncompromising, and on the face of it so even 
brutal towards all the Balkan States that it would 
probably have enabled each of the Cabinets to accept 
a programme destined to further the real and ultimate 
interests of countries, which, were an enemy victory 


to be realised, would sooner or later be face to face 
with the Austro-German danger — a danger which 
has ruined the prosperity of Serbia for years. In 
short, whilst she must now be ranked among and 
treated as one of our enemies, we are compelled to 
recognise that the policy adopted by Bulgaria resulted 
not only from her illegitimate claims, but also from 
the obduracy of her neighbours — obduracy which has 
unfortunately been largely responsible for disasters 
which all of them have now suffered to a greater or a 
lesser degree. 


RouMANiA — the largest country in or immediately 
connected with the Balkan Peninsula — is made up 
of the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, formally 
united under the name Roumania in December, 1861. 
She occupies a position of immense strategical impor- 
tance, for the most part on the north of the Danube 
and, so to speak, wedged in between Austria-Hungary, 
Russia, and Bulgaria, because, being composed of 
two arms or horns, she controls the routes to the south 
and east. The province of Wallachia, which runs in 
a more or less easterly and westerly direction, together 
with the Dobrudja, bars the way from Central Europe 
into Bulgaria. Moldavia, which spreads out practi- 
cally north and south, constitutes a bridge between 
Austria-Hungary and Southern Russia. 

For these reasons Roumania forms a sort of link 
between East and West. Geographically, it is usual 
to consider the country as situated without and to 
the north of the Balkan Peninsula, and therefore her 
interests may be called semi-international and semi- 
Balkan. As far as the first of these is concerned, the 
policy of Roumania has been and is bound up with 
the fact that it is practically necessary for her to main- 
tain good relations either with the Central Powers 


or with Russia, and that it was and is obviously desir- 
able that her friends should be those destined to be 
the victors in the War. This is the case principally 
because single-handed she is not in a position to wage 
war with a Great Power, and because for years she has 
been desirous of securing possession either of the 
Austro-Hungarian districts inhabited by Roumanians 
or of the area of Russian Bessarabia which she covets. 
The real key of what has taken place since the outbreak 
of the European War therefore lies in the fact that 
Roumania, like all the other Balkan countries and 
peoples, wished to utilise the occasion to realise one 
or perhaps both the aspirations which rest so close to 
the heart of every patriotic citizen. From a Balkan 
standpoint, on the other hand, the most important 
thing is that nothing should take place which would 
in any way threaten the general interests of Roumania 
or so strengthen the positions of her Balkan neighbours 
as to affect these interests. 

In order to understand the position of Roumania, 
it is necessary therefore to realise the full meaning to 
her of the Bessarabian, the Transylvanian, and the 
Dobrudjan questions. So far as the first of these is 
concerned, as Bessarabia contains a Roumanian popu- 
lation of only somewhat under a million, the aspira- 
tions of Roumania to acquire at least a part of that 
province were based upon historical grounds, and upon 
the manner in which this area has changed hands since 
Napoleonic times. By the Peace of Bucharest, signed 
in 1812, the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia 
were restored to the Sultan with the exception of Bes- 
sarabia, which was added to Russia. In 1856, that 
is to say after the Crimean War, the southern portion 


of Bessarabia was restored to Moldavia, and the two 
principalities, still under the suzerainty of the Sultan, 
were placed under the collective guarantee of the 
European Powers. Thus matters stood until after 
the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 and 1878, when Rou- 
mania, who had been of the most material assistance 
to the former country, anticipated that she would 
secure compensation at the expense of Turkey, and 
that she would also retain at least the Bessarabian 
area allotted to her Moldavian province in 1856. 
Not so, however, for the Russians not only prevented 
the Roumanians from being represented at the sign- 
ing of the preliminary treaty of San Stefano in March, 
1878, but they also secured the exclusion of their dele- 
gates from the sittings of the Berlin Conference until 
the representatives of the Great Powers responsible 
for the final Treaty of Berlin, signed in July, 1878, had 
already decided in favour of the Russian claim and 
recognised the independence of Roumania from Turkey 
only on the condition that the former country restored 
to Russia that portion of Bessarabia which had been 
given to Moldavia in 1856. Since that time the owner- 
ship of this area has therefore been a very burning 
question in Roumania. 

The Roumanian dislike of Austria-Hungary and the 
aspiration to acquire areas now belonging to that 
country depend upon the fact that there are domiciled 
near but outside their frontier and in the Dual Mon- 
archy almost four million Roumanians. The great 
majority of these people live in Transylvania, but 
there are also a considerable number in the Bukovina 
and some in what is known as the Banat, situated 
across the Danube from the northern frontier of Ser- 


bia. The treatment of these people by their alien 
government and the natural desire for the union of 
the Roumanian race has been the keystone of the 
foreign policy of those Roumanian statesmen such 
as M. Take Jonescu, who formerly advocated a policy 
of friendship for Russia and who, from the moment 
of the outbreak of the War, advocated a definite pro- 
allied policy on the part of their country. In other 
words, whilst the case is much less strong than that 
of France in regard to Alsace Lorraine, the sentiments 
of every patriotic Roumanian have been bound up 
with the position in Transylvania for many a year. 
As I will explain later on, it is largely these sentiments 
which prompted the Roumanian Government to adopt 
a strategically wrong policy in advancing across its 
northern and western frontiers in the autumn of 1916, 
and it is these sentiments which must make the peace 
terms imposed by the Central Powers so very bitter 
of acceptance by every patriotic Roumanian. 

So much for the questions which for years have in- 
fluenced the policy of Roumania towards Russia and 
Austria-Hungary. Turning to her attitude towards 
the Balkans, although her final independence of Turk- 
ish suzerainty was recognised by the Treaty of Berlin 
in 1878, Roumania played but little part in Balkan 
affairs until 1910, when she was supposed to have 
entered into some kind of treaty arrangement with 
Turkey concerning her attitude in case of war in the 
Near East. However this may be, and whatever may 
have been this arrangement, the army of the late King 
Carol did not take the field during the first Balkan 
war, Roumania at that time contenting herself by 
seizing the opportunity of securing compensation from 

From a Pliotograph by Elliott and Fry, London 

M. Take Jonescu 

M. Take Jonescu, who is one of Roumania's leading statesmen, has always 
been well known for his moderate and far-seeing opinions. A great lawyer 
by profession, at a very early stage in the War he expressed himself openly 
in favor of Roumania's support of the Allies and of a good understanding 
between Serbia and Bulgaria. 


Bulgaria in the Dobrudja, thus once more raising the 
question of that province. 

The Dobrudja is the district which hes between the 
Black Sea and the lower reaches of the Danube, which 
separate it from Russia and from the remainder of 
Roumania. The northern section of the province is 
mostly made up of an alluvial tract of country produced 
by the action of this river, whilst the southern part is 
more barren, being composed largely of steppe and 
treeless territory. The whole district is 'strategically 
of great importance because of its relations with the 
Danube, because it constitutes a sort of gateway 
into the Balkans, and because it now contains the port 
of Constanza (Kustendji) and a railway completed 
since the beginning of the War. As early as Roman 
times forts were built from the Danube, near Cerna 
Voda (Tchernavoda) , to the Black Sea, near Constanza. 
As a result of constant invasion, the population is 
mixed, being composed of the remnants of the races 
which have passed through it at various periods. 

From the point of view of present-day politics, the 
Dobrudja question depends upon events which have 
taken place since the Russo-Turkish War of 1877- 
1878. After that war, its northern part was given to 
Roumania as compensation for the loss of Bessarabia. 
The Bulgaro-Roumanian frontier was delimited by a 
European Commission which, in spite of protests 
from Russia, fixed a boundary running from just to 
the east of Silistria on the Danube to near Mangalia 
on the Black Sea and thus treated comparatively 
favourably the claims of Roumania. This settlement 
led to ill feeling, for whilst Roumania contended that 
her frontier was not strategically such as to enable 


her to defend her port at Constanza and the great 
Cerna Voda bridge across the Danube, which was 
subsequently constructed, Bulgaria rightly argued 
that the population of the Dobrudja was largely Bul- 
garian in nationality. This state of things was in 
part responsible for the fact that Roumania did not 
throw in her lot with the Balkan States against Turkey 
in 1912. Indeed, instead of so doing, it was during 
this period that she entered the diplomatic arena and 
claimed the cession by Bulgaria of a stretch of territory 
on the south of the Dobrudja. As Bulgaria naturally 
resented these concessions, the question was referred 
to an Ambassadors' Conference at Petrograd, which 
decided that Bulgaria should cede the town of Silistria 
to Roumania, and that the frontier of the two countries 
should once more be delimited by a commission. This 
settlement, embodied in what is known as the Proto- 
col of Petrograd, was arrived at early in May, 1913. 

But as the claims of Roumania were not thereby 
satisfied, and as the wringing of this concession from 
Bulgaria naturally created great resentment among 
Bulgarians, the relations existing between the two 
countries at the time of the outbreak of the second 
Balkan war were far from cordial. The result was that 
Roumania, then no longer withheld by Russia, invaded 
Bulgaria, nominally with the object of maintaining 
the balance of power in the Balkans, but really for the 
purpose of wresting from Bulgaria a still further area 
of territory on the south of the Dobrudja. This ac- 
tion on the part of Roumania, who was easily able to 
cross the Danube and to advance to the very gates 
of Sofia, whilst the Bulgarian army was occupied else- 
where, resulted in the fact that the country was in- 


creased in size from an area of just over 50,700 square 
miles to one of just under 53,500 square miles, and 
that her population of just over 7,230,000 souls was 
added to by about 280,000 inhabitants. 

Geographically, politically, and militarily, this 
gave to Roumania more than that rectification of her 
Dobrudja frontier, which she had wanted ever since 
the signing of the Treaty of Berlin, for it secured for 
her a boundary running in a northwesterly direction 
from the immediate vicinity of Varna on the Black 
Sea to a point on the Danube located about halfway 
between Silistria and Rustchuk. Endorsed by the 
fatal Treaty of Bucharest, which terminated the 
second Balkan campaign, this change, which was 
supposed to be going to enable Roumania to defend 
herself against an attack from the south, was in its 
turn responsible for the bad relations which existed 
between Roumania and Bulgaria prior to and after 
the beginning of the European conflagration. 

From the moment of the outbreak of the War, 
therefore, the position of Roumania was an extremely 
difiicult one. On the one hand that country could 
not afford to take sides with Russia or Austria-Hungary 
unless she were absolutely guaranteed the strongest 
material assistance from the group of belligerents 
which she supported. On the other, the statesmen of 
Bucharest recognised that so long as the attitude of 
Bulgaria remained undecided, any war move by Rou- 
mania might lay that country open to an attack on 
the part of her southern neighbour — an attack 
prompted by the events of 1913. Moreover, to add 
to the above-mentioned international difficulties, it 
is now known that some thirty years ago Roumania 


joined Germany in a defensive alliance which was 
almost identical in form to that which existed between 
Italy and the Central Powers. 

The late King Carol, who belonged to the House of 
Hohenzollern, and who was pro-German, was firmly 
convinced that the obligations and interests of his 
country placed her on the side of the Central Powers. 
Strengthened, however, by the declaration of neutral- 
ity by Italy, and really knowing that Germany and 
Austria were the aggressors, the Crown Council as- 
sembled at Sinai a, directly the War began, to discuss 
the future attitude of the country, refused to support 
the expressed opinion of the King, and decided that 
Roumania should remain a peaceful spectator of events 
in progress around her. Later on and after the 
death of King Carol in October, 1914, most far-seeing 
statesmen, particularly M. Take Jonescu, who had 
always believed in friendship with Bulgaria and who 
from the beginning had been in favour of war upon the 
side of the Allies, began to see that, if Roumania were 
to be in a position to realise her larger aspirations, she 
must also be prepared to adopt a definite policy and 
to make sacrifices in the south, as a result of which 
she would secure a free hand in the north and west. 

It was during the time preceding the Muscovite 
retreat, which began in May, 1915, that Russia, who 
could then have minimized the difficulties in any case 
besetting Roumania, should have made agreements 
with that country which would have induced her to 
enter the War and at the same time have compensated 
her for concessions to Bulgaria in the Dobrudja. 
Such a Muscovite policy would have strengthened the 
hands of the Roumanian statesmen who then recognised 


that the maintenance of the Treaty of Bucharest had 
become or was becoming no longer necessary. Had 
it been adopted by the Government of Petrograd, it 
is probable that Roumania, instead of remaining a 
more or less disinterested spectator, during the Allied 
negotiations with Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria of the 
summer of 1915, might well have utilised her all-impor- 
tant influence with Serbia and Greece in favour of the 
reconstitution of the Balkan League, and that she 
might even have taken the initiative and openly proved 
the bona fides of her attitude by giving up at least part 
of the territory which she acquired as a result of the 
Balkan Wars. The result of such action would have 
been far-reaching, for it would not only have definitely 
and permanently secured the neutrality of Bulgaria, at 
least so far as Roumania was concerned, but it would 
have compelled Serbia and Greece to see the necessity 
for the adoption of policies destined most likely ac- 
tually to have brought Bulgaria into the War on the 
side of the Allies. 

From the time of the entry of Bulgaria into the 
War a new position was created in Europe and parti- 
cularly in the Balkans — a position so advantageous 
to the enemy that it remained only essential for him 
to bring about its military consolidation by the defeat 
of Serbia and by the shaping of the policies of Greece 
and of Roumania to suit his strategical plan. The 
Germans recognised that the key of the situation then 
lay in Roumania, owing to her geographical position 
and particularly to the fact of her being practically 
in control of the Lower Danube. Indeed, if any 
definite proof were required, the terms of peace imposed 
upon Roumania, particularly those by which that 


country is to be compelled to facilitate the trans- 
port of enemy troops to the Black Sea coast, consti- 
tute absolute proof that, from the moment she had 
gained Bulgaria, Germany was determined, owing to 
the importance of Roumania as a corridor toward 
the south and east, to bring about her entry into the 
War on one side or the other. She bullied in the hope 
of securing her support. When success in this direc- 
tion proved impossible, the Central Powers played 
their cards to achieve not the continued neutrality, 
but the actual hostility, of Roumania, and, as there 
is little reason to doubt, utilized the influence which 
they possessed in Russia for the purpose of persuading 
that country to bring nominally friendly pressure to 
bear upon the desired opponent. The object of this 
policy was that the enemy realised the significance 
of Roumania as a route to the south and east, and 
that he believed the strength required for the subjuga- 
tion of that country would be well expended, con- 
sidering the results to be achieved. From an initial 
standpoint and so far as the south was concerned, the 
Central Powers could not get control of the Danube 
and of the approaches to Bulgaria across and by way 
of it except by the occupation of at least Wallachia 
and the Dobrudja — a control which at once gave 
them a partially alternative route eastward to that 
provided by the main railway from Belgrade to Con- 
stantinople, the whole of which fell into their hands 
with the entry of Bulgaria and the subjugation of 
Serbia in the autumn of 1915. More indirectly and 
probably looking ahead, the enemy no doubt realised 
that the full benefits of the defeat of Russia or of 
her exit from the War could not be achieved so long as 


Roumania remained neutral and so long as the com- 
munications running towards the south and east 
through Moldavia could not be utilised for the 
transport of his men and material. 

So much for the events connected with the entry 
of Roumania into the War which took place on August 
27, 1916. In order to understand the events which 
followed — events very fully described by John Buchan 
in Nelson's "History of the War", Volume 17 — it 
is necessary once more to refer to the nature and 
position of the northwestern frontier of the country. 
Starting from the north, that frontier makes a semicir- 
cular sweep round the crests of the Carpathians and 
Transylvanian Alps in such a way that Transylvania 
juts out into Roumanian territory in the form of a 
sharp salient. This frontier, which has a length of 
about four hundred miles, is crossed by six important 
passes — the Vulcan, the Rotherturm, the Torsburg, 
the Predeal, the Buzeu, and the Gyimes. Of these 
the Rotherturm, the Predeal, and the Gyimes passes 
are traversed by railways, whilst roads run through 
the remainder and through other mountain gaps of 
lesser significance. 

Directly after Roumania threw in her lot with the 
Allies, her army advanced into enemy territory by 
way of many of these routes. The Austrians, recog- 
nising the weakness of their position — weakness due 
to the above-mentioned salient — performed what 
was really and not only nominally a strategic retreat 
and for about three weeks continued to withdraw, 
contenting themselves only by delaying the militarily 
unsound and far too rapid Roumanian advance. By 
the end of the third week in September, therefore, the 


Roumanians had occupied a band or belt of enemy 
territory running right across Transylvania, their 
centre having pushed forward about sixty miles, 
whilst their right and left flanks had advanced re- 
spectively about twenty -five and about ten miles. 

During this time events on the south and on the 
Danube front had begun to take a serious turn. A Bul- 
garian force, augmented by two Turkish divisions and 
supported by a German contingent, acting under the 
command of Von Mackensen, had been collected on 
the south of that river. During the opening days of 
September, that force advanced across the Roumanian 
frontier and into the area of the Dobrudja annexed 
by that country after the Balkan Wars. No serious 
Roumanian resistance was encountered and by the ninth 
of that month not only Turtukeuie but also Silistria, 
together with a large number of prisoners and a great 
deal of booty, were in Bulgarian hands. A few days 
later, the German general, whose advance was greatly 
furthered by the Bulgarian railways which exist in 
this area, had pushed forward to a line from which 
the railway from Cerna Voda to Constanza was im- 
mediately threatened. The Roumanians, realising 
their danger, hurried troops from the Carpathian 
front to the Dobrudja, and after a battle, in which 
they were supported by Russian and Serbian contin- 
gents (these latter composed, according to Colonel 
Buchan, of Jugo-Slavs taken prisoner by Russia), 
and commanded by a Muscovite general, the enemy 
was temporarily thrown back for a distance of about 
ten miles. 

By approximately September 20, when the Rouma- 
nians found themselves held up in Transylvania, their 


position in the Dobrudja had therefore become highly 
precarious. But what was more important and more 
disastrous was that by that time, too, a great Austro- 
Germanic force, under the command of Von Fal- 
kenhayn, had been concentrated in the East by the 
direction of Von Hindenburg, who became the Kaiser's 
Chief of the General Staff during the closing days of 
August. That drive began a few days later with an 
enemy attack against the Roumanian left centre near 
Hermannstadt — an attack which more or less pene- 
trated, encircled, or turned the Roumanian position 
and compelled the forces of that country hastily to 
retreat towards the east, for the Rotherturm Pass, 
upon which they depended for their communications 
with Wallachia, fell into enemy hands on the twenty- 

From that time onwards things moved apace, partly 
because the Roumanians were ill provided with guns 
and munitions, partly because success is necessary to 
the maintenance of tTie morale of such an army, and 
partly because the task besetting Roumania was 
altogether too great for her. Early in October the 
forces of King Ferdinand were defeated on the centre 
of their position, and by the end of the first week in 
that month Kronstadt was re-taken by the Austro- 
Germans. These enemy successes were followed by 
a very rapid advance towards the Carpathians, espe- 
cially in the area lying to the south and southwest of 
Kronstadt — an advance which gave to the enemy 
the Torsburg Pass by October 14, Predeal being bom- 
barded and destroyed about the same time. The 
Roumanians, however, were able to offer serious 
resistance at this latter point, and the enemy was 


considerably delayed in his attempt to reach Bucharest 
by means of the main line which passes through Sinaia 
and Ployesti. Farther north too, and on the Mol- 
davian frontier, the Roumanians managed to hold up 
the enemy, and their resistance was furthered by the 
extension of the Russian battle line in a southerly 
direction and by the handing over of the defence of 
the northern frontier of Moldavia to the Russians, 
who took over the area lying to the north of the Gyimes 

By October 20 the position in the south had once 
more become very serious, for, whilst attempts had 
previously taken place by both sides to effect cross- 
ings of the Danube, it was only at about that time that 
Von Mackensen inaugurated a further serious drive 
in the Dobrudja. Constanza — the great Roumanian 
port on the Black Sea — was occupied two days later, 
and Cerna Voda and its long bridge, which was not 
adequately destroyed by the Roumanians during their 
hasty retreat, fell into Bulgarian hands almost immedi- 
ately. This, together with the enemy's subsequent 
advance towards the north, greatly strengthened his 
position, for it gave him the practical command of a 
long stretch of the Lower Danube and also facilities 
for the passage of that river which he did not previ- 
ously possess. 

These events constituted the beginning of the end. 
During the closing days of October and the first half 
of November, the Austro-Germans advanced from the 
north with a semi-encircling movement, and, pushing 
forward their right wing into Western Wallachia, 
Crajova, an important railway junction, was occupied 
on the twenty-first, thus practically isolating the 


Roumanian forces which were still holding Orsova, 
consequently making their successful retreat impos- 
sible. At about this time Von Falkenhayn was begin- 
ning to push forward through the more easterly passes 
and on the twenty-seventh Von Mackensen, coming 
from the south, occupied Giurgevo, on the left bank 
of the Danube, thereby having made it unsafe for the 
Roumanians to take up a defensive line along the River 

A glance at the map therefore will show that although 
Bucharest has always been described as an entrenched 
camp, and although it was defended by a girdle of 
forts which run round the city, it was powerless to 
resist an encircling movement which had successfully 
hemmed it in on every side except the northeast. The 
resistance attempted on the line of the Arjish River, 
which runs across the southwest front of the city, 
proved useless, and Bucharest and Ployesti fell into 
enemy hands on December sixth. From that time 
onwards the retreat became a rout, and the Govern- 
ment, Allied Legations, and banks having been removed 
to Jassy, which became the temporary capital, no resist- 
ance was made until the Roumanians reached the 
line of the Lower Sereth, which flows into the Danube 
at Galatz. The enemy, on the other hand, made no 
serious attempt to penetrate that line, for he had 
already achieved his primary object of securing the 
control of the whole of the Lower Danube as far as 
Braila — a control which gave him free access to 
Bulgaria and by way of that country to Turkey. Thus 
matters stood, with the Allied front extending along 
the Carpathians and the Rivers Trotush, Sereth, and 
Danube, from the Gyimes Pass on the northwest 


to a point just to the north of Suhna on the Black Sea 
on the southeast, until the events which immediately 
preceded the fatal and brutal peace finally imposed 
upon Roumania by the Central Powers in May, 

The above-described developments were partly the 
result of events which had taken place prior to the 
entry of Roumania into the War and partly the conse- 
quence of local and international causes, the nature of 
which are worthy of brief examination here. Locally 
speaking, the fundamental question consists not so 
much in what the Roumanians did or did not do, but 
in the fact that those who remembered their magnifi- 
cent conduct and the great part which they played 
in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 expected far too 
much from them in the European War. Thus, whilst 
the Bulgarians began to form a modern army directly 
after the liberation of the principality in 1878, and 
whilst the Serbs commenced to bring their fighting 
machine up to date during the early years of this 
century, the Roumanians did not introduce the regu- 
lations necessary for the creation of an efficient military 
force until 1908. By the law of that year, which 
constitutes the basis of the present organisation, 
service in the semi-permanent army, where men only 
served for intermittent periods and then passed into 
the reserve, instead of spending at least two continuous 
years with the colours, was finally abolished, except 
in the case of certain cavalry units. Helpful and 
necessary as was this reform, it is markedly apparent, 
as the military liability of a Roumanian lasts for twenty- 
one years, that eight years had been all too little for 
the adequate development of a system without which 


the safety of such a country could never be assured. 
It was the existence of this state of things, together 
with the methods of recruitment and training of the 
officers, who are separated by a wide social gulf from 
the masses of the country, and together with the 
fact that, during the neutrality of Roumania, the Gov- 
ernment did not take and could not take the measures 
necessary to secure an adequate amount of war ma- 
terial, which affected the power of an army which 
was nominally much stronger than that of either Serbia 
or Bulgaria. 

From a military standpoint, the plan of campaign 
adopted by Roumania was undoubtedly a mistake. 
The Government, which for a moment appeared to 
think that the rupture of relations with Bulgaria could 
be avoided, ought to have known that, for reasons 
already given, such a desirable object could not then 
be achieved, and that therefore the Roumanian army 
would be compelled to fight on the northern and north- 
western frontiers as well as on the line of the Danube. 
Instead of taking the magnitude of her task into ac- 
count, of recognising that her railway system leading 
up to the Austro-Hungarian frontier was much less 
adequate than that possessed by the enemy, and there- 
fore of contenting herself by endeavouring to block 
the passes of the Carpathians and the Transylvanian 
Alps and devoting herself more closely to the situation 
on the other side of the Danube, Roumania immedi- 
ately took the offensive on the north and west and 
pushed forward into enemy territory. Even the 
strategical advantages to have been gained by a suc- 
cessful advance as far as the line of the Middle Maros 
did not justify such an undertaking, for the passive 


defence of the Carpathians and the Transylvanian 
Alps would certainly have been all that could have 
been safely undertaken, bearing always in mind that 
the Turks were in a position to send forces to Bulgaria, 
that the Bulgarian army itself was in no way immo- 
bilised at Salonica, and that once Roumania had entered 
the War, Germany would spare no pains to insure her 

Nevertheless in this connection, it is always neces- 
sary to remember certain circumstances which miti- 
gate, if they do not altogether remove, the blame which 
would otherwise rest upon those responsible for the 
inauguration of the plan adopted by Roumania. To 
begin with, it is asserted, on good authority, that 
Russia definitely promised to attack Bulgaria and to 
immobilise her army. Moreover, we have to recog- 
nise that the Roumanian Government may not have 
been able to render political motives subservient to 
military necessities. Indeed as the people favoured 
war largely with the object of bringing about the liber- 
ation of their co-nationals domiciled in enemy territory, 
and as it would have been almost impossible for any 
leader to persuade them that this aspiration could be 
realized better by an Allied than by a local Roumanian 
victory, the King and his advisers were at once placed 
in the position of being obliged either to adopt measures 
in total discord with military tenets, or to risk the 
dangers of a policy which would not have been clearly 
understood by a people who for years have turned 
their attention towards Transylvania. 

Turning to the international reasons for the Rou- 
manian disaster, if we dismiss, as we certainly must 
dismiss the suggestion that there was any want of 


loyalty on the part of the Western Allies, then we find 
that the first and primary cause of the defeat of that 
country was due to the fact that she entered the War 
at the wrong time. The enemy had already achieved 
far-reaching successes in the East ; Bulgaria had been 
ranged on the side of the Central Powers for nearly 
a year ; and the power of King Constantine had so 
increased that the attitude of the Greek Government 
was a continual menace to the safety of the Salonica 
expedition — a menace which prevented the objects of 
Roumania being furthered by an attack which might 
otherwise have been made from the direction of the 
Aegean. But what was far more important was that 
whether or not Roumania was actually forced to come 
into the War, the Government of the ex-Tsar certainly 
promised her strong support in men and war material, 
and, as I have just said, encouraged her to think that 
she would only have to fight on her northern and west- 
ern frontiers against Austria and Germany, since Russia 
intended to deal with Bulgaria by means of an expedi- 
tion landed on the Black Sea coast. Not only were 
none of these promises fulfilled, but Russia actually 
held up supplies destined by the other Allies for Rou- 
mania and did nothing whatever even to threaten the 
Bulgarians from the direction of the Black Sea. This 
bad faith was largely responsible for the Roumanian 
defeat. It is as a consequence of it, and of the way 
in which for years Roumania has been treated by Rus- 
sia, that our sympathy must go out to a people whose 
treatment by the enemy is an example of what Ger- 
many means by so-called justice. 

At the moment of writing, it is too early and it is 
unnecessary to discuss in detail the local consequences 


of the peace terms brutally imposed upon Roumania, 
terms which it would have been worse than useless 
for her temporarily to refuse to accept. To begin 
with, it can hardly be admitted that these terms are 
otherwise than temporary, for they should be sub- 
jected to revision when the moment for peace comes. 
Sufficient therefore be it to say that the worst conse- 
quences of the new situation in Southeastern Europe, 
so far as it concerns Roumania herself, are bound up 
with the facts that that country has not only failed to 
secure any part of Transylvania but that she has lost 
the Dobrudja and been compelled to agree to an actual 
rectification of Austro-Hungarian frontier. So far as the 
Dobrudja be concerned, whilst that area, conquered by 
Roumania during the second Balkan war, is to revert 
to Bulgaria, the more northerly part is to go to the 
enemy under conditions which are not plain, Roumania 
merely being assured of a trade route to the Black Sea 
by way of Czerna Voda and Constanza. 

Such a settlement carrying with it the moral strangu- 
lation of Roumania, when coupled with the fact that 
she also now seems practically to have ceded her sov- 
ereignty, so far as her oil fields are concerned, are such as 
to make her position about as disastrous a one as it is 
possible to imagine. In addition, that country has been 
forced to give up other areas which, unless they be re- 
stored when the time of peace comes, will make her 
future position almost entirely negligible from a military 
standpoint. On the Danube the Austro-Hungarian 
frontier is to be extended in a southeasterly direction 
so as to include the Iron Gates, a strip of territory 
and a wharf is to be compulsorily leased to the Govern- 
ment of the Dual Monarchy at Turnu Severin, and 


certain Danubian islands are to be acquired by that 
country. On the north and west of Roumania — 
that is, on the hue followed by the Transylvanian Alps 
and by the Carpathians — and at all the passes of 
importance "the new Roumanian frontier has been so 
far removed to Roumanian ground as military reasons 

In exchange for these losses, if exchange it may be 
called, Roumania is apparently to be allowed to annex 
all or at least part of the Russian Province of Bes- 
sarabia. If this annexation be permitted by the Cen- 
tral Powers, it will certainly carry with it considerable 
satisfaction in Roumania. But from the international 
standpoint it will constitute proof positive of the 
enemy's confidence in his power to establish and to 
maintain control over the whole of Central Europe, and 
of his consequent preference that Bessarabia should be 
incorporated in Roumania rather than that it should 
remain part of Russia where he must know that the 
whole future is uncertain. Once more, therefore, an 
apparent concession, actuated for purely Pan-Germanic 
reasons, seems in progress of employment for the sole 
purpose of developing and consolidating the Kaiser's 
dream for domination in the East. 

These disasters, and they are local disasters, are 
such as in many ways to make the present position 
of Roumania as worthy of sympathy as is that of 
Serbia. But whereas, in spite of diplomatic mistakes, 
the latter country has fought for the Allies since the 
beginning of the War, it is impossible to forget not 
only that Roumania was herself largely responsible 
for her bad relations with Bulgaria, but that she post- 
poned her entry into the theatre of hostilities until 


long after the time at which her assistance would 
have been of special value to the Allies, notably the 
period of the Bulgarian mobilisation, and until no other 
alternative was open to her. These facts must some- 
what lessen the intense feeling which would otherwise 
be forthcoming for her as a victim of Germanism, and 
make that which remains largely dependent upon the 
exceedingly difficult position in which Roumania has 
been placed by the War, and upon the manner in 
which she was treated by Russia before and after her 
adhesion to the cause of the Allies. 



In order to understand the Greek attitude towards 
and role in the War, it is necessary first to reahse the 
meaning of some of the events which have occurred 
in Athens during the last few years and to examine 
the several ways in which the position of that country 
is an entirely special one. After many years of mis- 
government — misgovernment which resulted in con- 
sequences which were temporarily fatal to the pros- 
perity of Greece — a peaceful revolution took place 
in August, 1909. This revolution established the 
power of the Military League which completely and 
absolutely controlled the affairs of the country until 
the spring of 1910. Early in that year M. Venezelos, 
having been summoned to Athens, proposed that a 
National Assembly should be convoked in order that 
the League should be able to retire into the back- 
ground, whilst at the same time avoiding an ordinary 
general election, which could not take place at that 
time owing to the then state of the Cretan question 
and particularly to the fact that the deputies who would 
have been elected by the Cretans to represent them in 
the Greek Parliament could not have been permitted 
to take their seats in view of the attitude of the Pro- 


tecting Powers of Crete and of the Ottoman Gov- 

The meeting of this National Assembly in September, 
1910, practically saved Greece from complications, 
the disastrous nature of which it is impossible to over- 
estimate. M. Venezelos — already the saviour of 
modern Greece — actually formed his Ministry in 
October of that year. In the spring of 1912, when an 
election took place, he was returned with one hun- 
dred and forty-seven supporters in a Parliament then 
composed of one hundred and eighty-one members. 
Since that time this patriotic, far-seeing, and sagacious 
statesman has not only been in part responsible for 
the creation of the original Balkan League, but he 
has steered his country successfully through the two 
Balkan Wars and saved her from utter disaster in a 
manner which should have won him the gratitude and 
the esteem of every patriotic Greek. Indeed suffi- 
cient be it here to say that as a result of the Balkan 
Wars, Greece, which made the smallest sacrifices ex- 
cept Roumania and Montenegro in those campaigns, 
was increased by about one third of its size. Instead 
of being made up of just over 25,000 square miles and 
containing a population of about 2,760,000 souls, im- 
mediately before the War she had an area of about 
42,000 square miles and a. population of over 4,821,000 

The outstanding feature in the earlier part of M. 
Venezelos' regime, that is to say, during the period 
intervening between his arrival at Athens early in 1910 
and the assassination of the late King George at Salonica 
after the first Balkan War and in March, 1913, was the 
striking way in which His Majesty and the new Premier 


forgot their former differences and worked together 
for the regeneration and good of their country. In 
1910 the King, whose tact, wisdom, and moderation 
undoubtedly saved Greece from the serious conse- 
quences which would most certainly have resulted 
from an aggressive policy towards Turkey during 
the earlier years which followed the re-establishment of 
the Ottoman Constitution in 1908, faced by the alterna- 
tive of either sanctioning the continued rule of the 
Military League or of summoning the somewhat un- 
constitutional National Assembly recommended by M. 
Venezelos, finally and wisely decided to adopt the 
latter course. From that time onwards until his 
death, His Majesty, knowing that the Cretan leader 
was the one man in whom the Greek nation then placed 
its confidence, put all his personal feelings on one 
side and consistently utilised the capacity of a man 
without whose assistance and presence one of the 
most rapid regenerations in modern history could 
never have been effected. 

M. Venezelos, whose relations with the royal family 
prior to 1910 had been far from cordial, owing to his 
consistent opposition to the policy of Prince George 
whilst His Royal Highness was High Commissioner of 
Crete (1898-1906), also made up his mind to forget 
the past and to devote himself untiringly to the good 
of the Hellenic cause. Thus, instead of advocating 
the extreme measures suggested by the Military League 
and instead of utilising his influence against the royal 
princes — particularly the Crown Prince, afterwards 
King Constantine — the Prime Minister actually fur- 
thered the establishment of the prestige of the dynasty 
and the reappointment of Prince Constantine as 


Inspector General or Commander-in-Chief of the army 
— a reappointment in fact largely responsible for the 
great popularity which the future King gained during 
the Balkan Wars. In short, M. Venezelos, whose down- 
fall as an Island leader had been one of the primary 
objects of Prince George in Crete, obliterated himself 
and worked loyally with a ruler who, if he were weak 
and sometimes shortsighted, in the end proved that he 
was sufficiently far-seeing to understand that the pros- 
perity of his country could not be developed without 
the assistance of the one great man of modern Greece. 
In order to realise the position of Greece in the War, 
it is necessary to recognise that it is an entirely special 
one, and that her attitude and that of the Allies towards 
her have been influenced by various historical events, 
by the mentality of the people, and by the internal 
struggle which was in progress at Athens from the 
time of the accession until the abdication of King Con- 
stantine. In the first place, as is clearly shown by 
Thomas Erskine Holland in his book entitled "The 
European Concert in the Eastern Question ", Greece 
owes her very existence to the good will and to the 
protection of England, France, and Russia. Thus, 
as early as 1826, Great Britain and Russia signed a 
protocol by which they were to negotiate with the 
Sublime Porte on behalf of the Greeks, whose indepen- 
dence from Turkey had not then been brought about. 
In the following year, when the mediation thus offered 
had been refused by Turkey, and when the Govern- 
ments of Austria and Prussia had declined to accede 
to that protocol, the three Powers (France had by this 
time joined England and Russia) entered into a treaty 
for the object of re-establishing peace between the eon- 


tending parties — the Greeks and the Ottoman Govern- 

In 1830 the Conference of London decided that 
Greece should be entirely independent of Turkey, and 
two years later agreed to offer the throne of that 
country to Prince Otho of Bavaria, and by a convention 
then signed between the representatives of England, 
France, and Russia on the one side, and that of Bavaria 
on the other, that country was placed "under the 
guarantee" of the above-mentioned three Powers. 
By a treaty signed by the representatives of the said 
Protecting Powers with Denmark in 1863 — that is, 
the year following the expulsion of King Otho — it 
was further arranged that "Greece under the sover- 
eignty of Prince William of Denmark a^d the guarantee 
of the three Courts forms a monarchical, independent, 
and constitutional State." Again, when it was agreed 
at the same time, that the Ionian Islands were to 
be united with the Hellenic Kingdom, it was settled 
that those islands were also to be comprised in the 
above-mentioned guarantee. Once more, in 1881, 
when the frontiers of Greece were greatly extended 
by a convention signed between the Great Powers 
and Turkey, it was expressly stated that "they (the 
inhabitants of the then new Greek territory) will enjoy 
exactly the same civil and political rights as subjects 
of Hellenic origin." Ever since that time the Protect- 
ing Powers — England, France, and Russia — and 
particularly England who ceded the Ionian Islands, 
have therefore had special privileges in and obligations 
towards Greece, and they have had the right to inter- 
vene either to protect that country from her foreign 
foes or to defend her people from an unconstitutional 


regime against which they (the Powers) are the guar- 

The second direction in which the position of Greece 
is a special one is bound up with the Graeco-Serbian 
relations depending upon events which preceded and 
immediately followed the second Balkan war. The 
treaty between the two countries, which followed 
other less formal agreements, was actually concluded 
on June 1, 1913, and therefore two days after the signa- 
ture of the document which formally terminated the 
first Balkan War. Whilst so far as I know its full 
text has never been published, it undoubtedly bound 
the parties concerned to come to the support of one 
another and to provide a given force — believed to 
number one hundred and fifty thousand men — should 
either country be attacked by Bulgaria. This being 
the case, it is obvious, directly Bulgaria entered the 
War on the side of the enemy and attacked Serbia, 
that the said treaty came into force. It was argued 
at the time and subsequently by the neutralists in 
Greece and by the supporters of the policy of King 
Constantine, that this treaty had become inoperative, 
because Serbia had refused to support Greece during 
her difficulties with Turkey in the summer of 1914, 
because in 1915 she (Serbia) had tardily and with 
reserves agreed to cede to Bulgaria territory in the 
ownership of which she (Greece) held herself to have 
an interest, and lastly because Bulgaria was acting 
not alone in a purely Balkan war but in conjunction 
with the Central Powers. The answer to these con- 
tentions is that, whilst the Graeco-Serbian Treaty may 
have been of a generally defensive nature, it was 
aimed not against Turkey but against Bulgaria, and 


that as it certainly did not actually specify that it was 
intended as a measure in case of a purely Balkan war, 
it must have been valid in the circumstances which 
arose in 1915. Moreover, whereas an attempt was 
made by the opposition, after the return to power of 
M. Venezelos in the summer of that year, to qualify 
the force of that arrangement in such a way that it 
was only to be operative in case of a Bulgarian and 
not in the eventuality of a European war, no sugges- 
tion to this effect was ever made prior to the triumph 
of The Great Man of modern Greece, who clearly secured 
a mandate for his war and pro-Serbian policies at that 

Turning to questions connected with the mentality 
of the Greeks and with the internal situation in Greece 
as it has influenced the War, it must be remembered 
that outstanding among the Greek national character- 
istics are the exaggerated patriotism, which amounts 
to chauvinism, the love of political strife, and the in- 
dividualism of the people. Every Greek is a politician, 
not only during an electoral campaign, but on each 
day through the year. He loves the strife involved 
in politics because it leads to opposition, and because 
it therefore carries with it a sort of excitement or pleas- 
ure corresponding to that which used to be felt in the 
Olympic Games by the Greeks of old. Patriotic 
though he be, every Greek, therefore, spends all his 
spare time in his accustomed cafe, discussing in vehe- 
ment language topics of which he often has no real 
knowledge. Again the individualism of the people, 
who for the most part fail to recognise the value of 
combination and of co-operation, means that in Greece 
the question of peace or war is largely governed by the 


individual views of the majority. Moreover, whereas 
the Bulgarian army fights as a well-organised machine, 
and whereas the Turk lives his life as fate may direct 
it, the Greek, full of dash as he is, is practically useless 
as a fighter if he be engaged in an unpopular way. 

This means that in war as in peace the policy of 
every Greek Government must of necessity be influ- 
enced by the individual feelings of the people, and that 
from the moment of the outbreak of the European con- 
flagration the whole history of the country has really 
been bound up with a great struggle in progress between 
all the old political chiefs on the one side and a new 
Liberal Party on the other. Thus, if for nearly three 
years this struggle happened to be connected with the 
proper foreign policy of adoption by the Hellenic Gov- 
ernment, that struggle was as much a political and in- 
ternal one, between the anti-Venezelists supported 
and voiced by the ex-King, and the Venezelists, as it 
was an international and external tussle between 
non-Interventionists and Interventionists. 

In spite of the fact that, when Crown Prince, he 
was practically dismissed from his position of Com- 
mander-in-Chief, owing to his lack of prestige with 
the Military League, the ex-King was immensely 
popular during his four years' reign. His military 
reputation, which was principally due to the credit 
given to him for the Greek successes in the Balkan 
Wars, became increased by his appointment as a 
Field Marshal in the German army — an appointment 
which, together with the blatant efforts made by the 
Kaiser to secure his good will, certainly greatly flattered 
His Majesty. Moreover, the democratic ways of the 
sovereign, and the fact that he — a Constantine — 


had married a Sophia, and that by such a matrimonial 
union he had thus rendered possible the realisation of 
the ancient legend that when this happened the Byzan- 
tine Empire would be re-established, played their part 
in securing for the King the love and respect of his 
subjects. Thus, whilst he certainly played the role 
of a "Roi de Grece" — the title conferred by the 
Powers upon Prince Otho in 1832 — His Majesty still 
remained truly identified with the sentiments of his 
people, a large number of whom did not wish to go to 
war on either side. Moreover, the many Greeks 
who idolised the King, but who also sympathised with 
the Allies, resented the suggestion that His Majesty 
had pledged himself and his country to Germany. 
Indeed, whilst the King certainly furthered Germanic 
objects, there seems good reason to suppose that his 
feelings were influenced, not so much by the identity 
of his royal consort, but by his military education in 
the German army, by the attitude of the Kaiser towards 
the retention of Kavala by Greece in 1913, and last but 
not least by his firm conviction that the enemy would 
be the victors and that at all costs, therefore, he must 
not allow his country, which could not protect itself, 
to become involved in war with Bulgaria and the 
Central Powers. 

These sentiments, together with the fact that King 
Constantine never attempted to follow the good ex- 
ample set by his father and to forget the former career 
of M. Venezelos, prompted the Sovereign to do all in 
his power to maintain the neutrality of Greece with 
the object of avoiding what he may perhaps have 
believed to have been a dangerous undertaking and 
still more of opposing the policy advocated by a man 


whom he detested. In other words the King failed to 
reahse that the salvation of Greece depended upon 
the union of qualities which were interdependent, and 
that his own prestige, reputation, and personality could 
only be developed to the full advantage when acting 
as the constitutional mouth-piece of his people. It was 
probably this failure and this inability to forget his 
personal feelings as much as his actual pro-Germanism 
which made possible the disastrous regime which has 
constituted and will constitute a great setback to that 
new spirit of Hellenism which began to develop after 
1910 and particularly after the Balkan Wars. 

M. Venezelos, who is much more stolid, more seri- 
ous, and more far-seeing than any other Greek whom 
I have met, stands out alone among public men in 
his country, because he is primarily a statesman rather 
than a politician. Recognising the wider interests of 
Hellenism, he has always played the role of a "Roi 
des Hellenes", the title especially conferred upon the 
late King George by the Protecting Powers at the 
time of his election to the Greek throne in the year 
1863. A patriot above and before everything else. 
His Excellency, who has constantly demonstrated 
his entire loyalty to the dynasty, was therefore ready 
to try to work with King Constantine as he had done 
with his father. It was with this object in view that, 
until the time of his first dismissal in March, 1915, 
the leader of the Liberal Party, which voiced Imperial- 
ism rather than Parochialism, always disguised his 
disagreements with the King and furthered the increase 
of the royal prestige which would never have attained 
its final zenith had the Premier originally played for 
his own hand instead of for the good of the country. 

Photograph from Britisli Pictorial Service 

M. Venezelos 

(On his left is the Greek Minister in London) 


Thus, if the popularity and power of M. Venezelos 
greatly declined in Greece between the time of his 
re-election of June, 1915, and his return to power after 
the abdication of the King in 1917, this decline is due 
to the fact that His Excellency was subjected to attacks 
fostered by German propaganda and carried out by 
his political and lifelong adversaries — the leaders of 
the Old Parties in Greece — that he was believed to 
have sanctioned a foreign landing on Greek soil, and 
that he favoured war, in which the majority of Greeks 
did not want to engage on either side, rather than 
that he advocated a programme destined to further 
the cause of the Allies. 

Turning to the attitude of Greece towards the War, 
the events which have taken place since 1914 may 
conveniently be discussed as having occurred in four 
more or less distinct stages, the first of which lasted 
until the entry of Turkey into the arena of hostilities. 
That phase began, however, not in August, 1914, 
but from the termination of the Balkan Wars, and this 
largely because before as immediately after the out- 
break of the European conflagration the Aegean Island 
question, to which I have referred elsewhere, was of 
all-preponderating importance to Greece. Indeed 
this question, together with the scandalous and brutal 
way in which the Greeks of Turkey were treated by 
the Ottoman Government during 1914, brought the 
two countries to the verge of hostilities upon several 
different occasions. Thus the fact that the Island 
question is one of those to be settled by the present War 
has always made and still makes it impossible for Greece 
directly or indirectly to further the re-establishment 
of Ottoman power in the Eastern Mediterranean — 


power which would mean not only that Greece would 
lose Chios, Mitylene, and Samos, but that many other 
important islands would immediately be wrested from 

The second historical war stage in Greece was prin- 
cipally bound up with the first struggle which took 
place between M. Venezelos and the King, with the 
question of Graeco-Serbian concessions to Bulgaria, 
and with the election which took place in June, 1915. 
Here it must be recalled to mind that the retirement 
of M. Venezelos in March, 1915, was due to the fact 
that His Excellency was then already in favour of the 
entry of Greece into the War after, and as a result 
of, Macedonian concessions to Bulgaria — conces- 
sions for which he rightly felt that his country would 
have been repaid by the fact that the cause of Hellen- 
ism would have been furthered elsewhere. So strong, 
indeed, was the feeling of the ex-Prime Minister upon 
these subjects that after his retirement from office 
he made known the contents of a memorandum which 
he had addressed to his Sovereign in the previous 
January. M. Venezelos, having stated that the King 
originally approved of the contents of this memoran- 
dum, an official communique was subsequently issued 
in Athens denying that His Majesty ever authorized 
anybody to pursue negotiations destined to result in 
the cession of any Hellenic territory. 

M. Zaimis having refused office, largely because he 
did not consider that an election ought then to be held 
in Greece, M. Gounaris, who is practically the leader 
of the relics of all the former political parties in Greece, 
assumed the reins of the Government and occupied 
the position of Prime Minister from March until after 


the election in June, 1915. That election, at which 
for the first time the districts annexed by Greece as a 
consequence of the Balkan Wars sent representatives 
to Athens, constituted a triumph for M. Venezelos, 
for he secured the return of one hundred and ninety 
deputies out of a total of three hundred and sixteen, 
of which the chamber is now composed. 

The result was, however, a disappointment to those 
who expected that the return to power of M. Venezelos 
would mean the entry of Greece into the War upon the 
side of the Allies. In any case, such an expectation 
was unjustified, but in view of the modifications which 
took place in the European situation between the orig- 
inal proposals made by His Excellency in January 
and his re-election in June, it was perfectly obvious 
that no change in the foreign policy of the country 
could then be anticipated. During this period it 
became evident that the Dardanelles campaign, which 
was naturally watched with breathless excitement 
throughout the Near East, was not developing in a 
manner favourable to the Allies. The Greek General 
Staff, who knew the strength of the defences of the 
Narrows, must have looked with apparent astonishment 
at the attempts which were made to force the Straits 
by the British and French fleets between the latter 
half of the month of February and the naval setback 
of March eighteenth. They knew that these attempts 
ought never to have been made without the assistance 
to the fleet which could have been given by a force 
disembarked upon the northwestern coast of the 
Peninsula of Gallipoli. They knew the advantage 
to the Turks of the delay which occurred between the 
original naval bombardment and the first determined 


landing in April ; and last, but not least, they realised, 
when it was finally collected, that the expeditionary 
force available in April was made up of contingents, 
the strength of which was insufficient. The King and 
General Staff undoubtedly knew of the reasons for 
the inauguration of the Dardanelles Campaign and of 
the Russian attitude towards it — questions explained 
elsewhere. But profiting by the ignorance of the 
General Public, they were able to increase their power 
by contending that they were always right in condemn- 
ing the manner in which the Dardanelles campaign 
was undertaken, if not actually in opposing the inau- 
guration of that campaign at all. 

The second direction in which the European situa- 
tion was modified before, and particularly just after, 
the return to power of M. Venezelos is connected with 
the Allied proposals made with the object of securing 
the co-operation of Bulgaria. So far as Greece was 
concerned, these suggested concessions, which were 
desirable, took the form that her Ally — Serbia — was 
asked to cede to Bulgaria areas to the reversion of 
which she (Greece) thought that she was entitled, 
particularly the Doiran-Ghevgeli Enclave, and that 
the Hellenic Government would have given up Kavala 
and at least a portion of the territory situated between 
the rivers Vardar and Mesta. Greece, like Serbia, 
could and would have been fully compensated for 
these proposed concessions by the acquisition of far 
more than a corresponding amount of territory else- 
where. Whatever may be accepted as the reason of 
the failure of these negotiations, their initiation and 
their abortive result certainly increased the prestige 
of the Court and of the neutralist party in Greece, 


for that party contended that futile attempts had 
been made at the expense of Greece to secure the sup- 
port of Bulgaria — a country which almost every 
Hellene considered to be his traditional enemy. 

The third war stage in Greece begins from the orig- 
inal Allied landing at Salonica on October 1, from 
the resignation of M. Venezelos on October 5, and 
from the actual entry of Bulgaria into the War during 
the first half of October, 1915. It therefore covers 
the period during which the Allies endeavoured to 
come to the direct assistance of Serbia, and in which 
they subsequently retreated to the more or less imme- 
diate vicinity of Salonica. It is connected with the 
later negotiations concerning the treaty obligations of 
Greece towards Serbia. It includes the further develop- 
ment of the unconstitutional rule, which had already 
begun in Greece during the second historical stage, and 
the measures which were taken by the Allies to prevent 
the prolongation of that rule. In short, the historical 
phase which intervened between the beginning of Oc- 
tober, 1915, and the abdication of King Constantine 
in June, 1917, is probably destined to be the most im- 
portant period through which Greece has ever passed. 

It is impossible here to discuss in detail all the events 
which led up to the second resignation of M. Venezelos 
and which occurred during his absence from power, 
or even to touch upon all the negotiations between the 
Allies and the various Governments which held the 
reins of power during this third historical phase. 
Sufficient therefore be it to say that whatever may 
have been his final attitude towards the question of 
Serbian concessions to Bulgaria and especially towards 
the cession of the Doiran-Ghevgeli Enclave by. the 


former country, His Excellency was in favour of an 
honourable interpretation of the Graeco-Serbian Treaty 
and of Greek support for her ally. Whilst the exact 
trend of events at this time is still far from clear, what 
seems to have happened is that, whether or not the 
Premier actually invited the Allies to disembark an 
expeditionary force upon Greek territory, he certainly 
made suggestions in his view destined to enable Greece 
to keep her treaty obligations, should the necessity 
for so doing arise. That contingency, of course, oc- 
curred when Bulgaria actually entered the War. Conse- 
quently, as M. Venezelos had already asked the Pro- 
tecting Powers if, in case of need, they could furnish 
a force in substitution of that which would have been 
forthcoming from Serbia had that country not been 
fully occupied on her northern and western frontiers, 
the Allies, as the protectors of Greece, were certainly 
entitled to take that question as a sanction for that 
campaign. Subsequently, although he issued a formal 
protest against a military passage through Hellenic 
territory — a protest which there is reason to believe 
resulted from the pre-intended withdrawal of the 
King's consent — the fact that M. Venezelos refused 
to take any active steps to prevent such a passage 
was made pretext for his fall. That fall, that enforced 
retirement on October 5, of a Prime Minister who, 
two days after the original landing at Salonica had 
secured a vote of confidence in the historic and stormy 
meeting of the Chamber, which took place on October 3, 
in connection with the question of the Allied disembar- 
kation, constituted a breach of the spirit, if not of the 
letter, of the Hellenic Constitution — a breach which 
would have entitled the Allies then and there to step 


in to enforce constitutionalism, and a breach which 
justified not only the perseverance in an operation, 
which in effect had been sanctioned by the Legal Pre- 
mier and by Parliament, but also their future attitude 
towards a series of governments which in reality were 
all unconstitutional. 

Thenceforward the relationship between the Allies 
and the Hellenic Government was influenced by the 
necessity of subjugating political to military consider- 
ations, and the history of internal events was bound 
up with the great struggle which was in progress 
between liberalism and imperialism on the one side 
and reaction and parochialism on the other. The 
King, who undoubtedly remained truly identified 
with the sentiments of a large section of his people, 
but who certainly had leanings towards and admired 
Germany, believed in a policy of neutrality at all costs 
and utilised the anti-Venezelists for the purposes of 
that policy and in order to keep out of office a man 
whom he personally hated. The result was that the 
many Greeks who idolised His Majesty, but who wished 
to support the Allies, resented the suggestion that 
he had pledged himself to the Central Powers, and 
therefore refrained from throwing in their lot with a 
man who was not in royal favour. It was here that 
the position and task of the Allies were so complicated, 
for whilst no adequate measures seem to have been 
taken to distinguish between " Constantinism " and 
"Pro-Germanism", it was extremely difficult for them 
to do otherwise than to embrace the policy of M. 
Venezelos, who had left no stone unturned to further 
the defeat of the Central Powers. In short, it was in 
part the inability to discover a formula, not necessi- 


tating the combination of " Pro-Allyism " with "Vene- 
zelism", which at the same time increased the magni- 
tude of our task and added to the strength and power 
of the King — a strength and power which for months 
paralysed AHied diplomacy at Athens. 

It is unnecessary here to enter into or even to men- 
tion all the numerous developments which occurred 
between the Allied landing at Salonica in October, 
1915, and the abdication of the King in June, 1917. 
During that period, the reins of the Greek Government 
were in the hands of various statesmen, who openly 
supported the policy of neutrality advocated by the 
King, not because they were pro-Germans, but be- 
cause they believed they were acting in the interests 
of their own country, and because they were opposed 
to M. Venezelos and to everything which he advocated. 
M. Zaimis, who took office in October, 1915, and whose 
government existed purely as a result of the patriot- 
ism of M. Venezelos — his friend from Cretan times — 
remained in power until he was defeated in the Cham- 
ber nominally upon a purely internal question. He 
was succeeded early in November by M. Skouloudis 
— a very far-seeing man — who played the pro- 
German game, not because he wished to further the 
interests of the Kaiser, but rather because he feared 
the consequences of resistance to enemy aggression 
and therefore of intervention in the War. This ex- 
banker of Constantinople, who is one of the best- 
informed men in the Balkan Peninsula, and who recog- 
nised the terrible fate which would await the Ottoman 
Hellenes were Greece to throw in her lot against Tur- 
key, held office until June 21, 1916. 

During that time, as the mouthpiece of the Crown, 


he was responsible for the election of December — 
an election which, though it resulted in a very large 
majority for the policy of M. Gounaris and for the 
Government, really constituted a victory for Liberalism, 
and this because M. Venezelos was able to prevent 
nearly two thirds of the voters from taking any part 
in it. This attitude of abstention by M. Venezelos 
may or may not have been in the ultimate interests 
of Greece, but in its result there lies a proof that, in 
spite of all and every intrigue, the popular Cretan 
leader then still enjoyed the confidence of the great 
proportion of his people. During the Skouloudis 
regime, too, we know that while the Hellenic Govern- 
ment placed numerous difficulties in the way of the 
transport of the Serbian army across Greek territory, 
it countenanced the surrender of Fort Rupel in the 
Struma Valley on May 25, 1916 — a surrender followed 
by the Allied blockade of the Greek coast, and by the 
delivery of a Note demanding the complete demobilisa- 
tion of the Hellenic army, the appointment of a busi- 
ness and nonparty Government, and the immediate 
dissolution of the Chamber which had been illegally 
elected in the previous December. This Note resulted 
in the retirement of M. Skouloudis and the return to 
power of M. Zaimis. His task was too difficult of ac- 
complishment, for owing to the treacherous surrender 
of Kavala, to the Bulgarian advance on the east of 
the Struma, and to the flagrant support given by the 
military authorities to the Reservists' leagues, it was 
impossible to hold the suggested elections, and His 
Excellency once more retired when he had been in 
office about two months. 

Passing over the disturbances which occurred at 


Salonica in August, 1916, between the Venezelist and 
anti-Venezelist troops, and the attitude taken up by 
the King, who publicly thanked certain officers of 
the latter party for their loyalty, the next important 
event was the departure of M. Venezelos from Athens 
on September 24 and the formation by him of an 
Independent Cabinet at Salonica about a fortnight 
later. This development constituted a sort of divid- 
ing of ways, for whilst the Allies did not openly embrace 
the policy of M. Venezelos, it at once became evident 
that their only alternative was either to repudiate 
the step taken by their protege, which was obviously 
impossible under the circumstances, or to work for 
the augmentation of his power and for the increase of 
the size of the sphere of country which acknowledged 

From October onwards events marched apace. 
In that month Admiral de Fournet demanded the 
cession of the whole of the Greek fleet except three 
vessels — a demand which was agreed to by the 
Lambros Ministry. The demobilisation of the Army, 
however, proceeded very slowly, and in November, 
the French Commander-in-Chief insisted upon the 
immediate surrender of ten Greek mountain batteries 
and the subsequent handing over of the remaining 
war material. This peremptory request was not com- 
plied with, and on December 1, Allied troops were 
landed at the Piraeus. The exact nature of the assur- 
ances given by the King as to the likelihood of the 
occurrence of disturbances resulting from this landing 
is uncertain, but the fact remains, as a result of some 
kind of undertaking in this direction, that the Allied 
contingents disembarked were so inadequate in size that 


it became necessary ignomlniously to withdraw them, 
on the understanding that six batteries instead of ten 
would be surrendered. The AlHed Legations having 
been insulted and the Royalist party having maltreated, 
imprisoned, and murdered a large number of Veneze- 
lists, a renewed blockade was declared, — a blockade 
which was accompanied by a demand for reparation 
for the events of December 1 and 2, and for the trans- 
ference of a large proportion of the Greek army to the 

Although the King subsequently agreed to the trans- 
fer of his forces to the Peloponnesus, and although a 
formal apology was made for the events of December, 
it was obvious that after the occurrence of these events, 
it was impossible for the Allies to look with favour upon 
the continuance of a regime which was responsible for 
endangering their whole position in the Balkans. The 
removal of the Hellenic forces proceeded unsatisfac- 
torily, the reign of terror instituted against Venezelists 
was prolonged, and for a time the Allies temporised 
in the hope of being able to accomplish their objects 
without finally resorting to drastic measures. But 
on June 7, 1917, when the question of the distribution 
of the Thessalian harvest had become a matter of the 
utmost urgency, and when it was necessary to prevent 
its being handed over in its entirety to the anti-Veneze- 
list section of the country, M. Jonnart reached Athens 
as the High Commissioner of the Protecting Powers. 
Immediately after his arrival, he claimed from M. 
Zaimis, who was once again Prime Minister, more 
complete guarantees for the safety of the Allied army 
in Macedonia, the restoration of the unity of the 
kingdom, and the working of the constitution in its 


true spirit. Five days later, when Allied troops had 
been landed at the Piraeus, and when various places 
in Thessaly had been occupied, the King, as a result 
of the demand of the High Commissioner, abdicated, 
designating as his successor his second son, Prince 
Alexander — a young man of twenty -four years of age, 
who had previously played no political role in the 
affairs of his country. 

The policy adopted by the Allies at Athens was 
pursued under such difficulties and in such circum- 
stances that unless the whole situation be viewed in 
its broader and proper light, the way may be left 
open for some critics to suggest that their attitude 
towards the King was so short-sighted that they played 
directly into the hands of the enemy, and for others 
to say that Greece was bullied and that in the end the 
abdication of her ruler was brought about for causes 
which were not reasonable. 

The answer to such suggestions is that as the wish 
of the great majority of Greeks was to avoid war on 
either side, the fact that England, France, and Russia 
naturally supported M. Venezelos, who advocated the 
endorsement of the Graeco-Serbian Treaty, which 
meant war, they could not help strengthening the 
hands of his royal and other opponents who stood for 
peace. Moreover whilst they (the Allies) may have 
taken the necessary measures for their self-preserva- 
tion in the wrong way and too late, there can rest 
in the mind of the real student no doubt that as a 
result of their special duties and rights of protection, 
and as a consequence of the Graeco-Serbian Treaty, 
they were entitled to undertake the measures which 
they actually employed. Thus the position was 


entirely unlike that of Belgium, for whilst Germany 
had actually guaranteed the neutrality of that country, 
and whilst she was therefore under a direct obligation 
not to violate that neutrality, the Protecting Powers 
of Greece, who happened to be three of the Allies, had 
a well-defined right to intervene, either to defend that 
country against her foreign foes or to protect her people 
from a regime against which they (the Protecting Pow- 
ers) were and are the guarantors. 

The developments which occurred at Athens during 
the period immediately preceding the resignation of 
the King were neither the only nor I think the prin- 
cipal cause justifying the Allies in bringing about 
the abdication of His Majesty. Their attitude was 
legitimatised by events which had taken place much 
earlier in the War — events which certainly prove 
that the King had not governed in accordance with the 
spirit and letter of the constitution by which he was 
bound. For example, even if we ignore the reasons 
for which M. Venezelos was compelled, in March, 1915, 
to leave office when he had nearly one hundred and 
fifty supporters out of a total of one hundred and 
eighty -four deputies — reasons which, to say the least 
of it, must be in opposition to the spirit of the Greek 
constitution — we find that various events took place 
subsequently which were contrary to the actual letter 
of that document. The elections of both June and 
December, 1915, were held during a mobilisation, and 
many men serving with the colours were allowed to 
vote, which is illegal. Moreover, the old Chamber, 
having been dissolved on May 1, 1915, according to 
the constitution, the new Parliament should have met 
within three months and not on August 16, which 


was actually the case. Once more, as M. Venezelos 
secured a vote of confidence at the time of the Allied 
disembarkation at Salonica, it is impossible to justify 
the attitude of the King in refusing to agree to the 
policy advocated by his then Prime Minister or to see 
by what right His Majesty dissolved the Chamber on 
November 11 and therefore on a second occasion in 
the same year. There seems no reason to doubt, too, 
that the secrecy of letters, which is guaranteed by 
the constitution, did not remain inviolable during 
the regime of King Constantine. These are some of 
the facts, which even if they were more or less con- 
doned at the time, subsequently entitled the Allies to 
make the demands and to take the measures neces- 
sary for the establishment and maintenance of their 
national safety — demands which, though more or 
less backed up by force of arms, were none the less 
demands really made in support of M. Venezelos, 
who, constitutionally speaking, should have been 
and had been the constitutional Premier ever since 
the mandate received from the country in June, 

The fourth stage in the war attitude of Greece 
begins from the abdication of the King on June 12, 
1917, and from the return to power of M. Venezelos, 
who succeeded M. Zaimis and arrived in Athens towards 
the end of that month. Even now it is too early to 
summarise or to forecast what will be the effects of 
the changes from the local Greek or from the larger 
European standpoints. Internally speaking, the dis- 
appearance of the King and the reappointment of the 
one great statesman of modern Greece as her Prime 
Minister have already meant at least the nominal 


reunion of that country under one government, the 
consequent avoidance or at any rate the postponement 
of an outbreak of civil war, and the creation of a new 
atmosphere in the country. Reorganisation of the 
Government departments and of the army are in 
progress, and endeavours are being made to obliterate 
the effect of the chaos which had existed for nearly 
two years. But although M. Venezelos has recalled 
the last legally elected Chamber, in which he was 
returned to power in June, 1915, and although startling 
disclosures have been made, it is impossible to ignore 
the difficulties which beset a premier who is undoubtedly 
much less popular with the people than he was prior 
to his resignation early in 1915. 

From an external or international point of view the 
above-mentioned events have carried with them the 
breaking off of the relations between the Central 
Powers and Greece and a consequent demonstration 
by the Hellenic Government of open friendship for 
the Allies. That friendship is now being proved by the 
active support of Greek contingents on the Salonica 
front. These results are so far satisfactory in that 
the Allies — the Protecting Powers — have been the 
means of re-establishing constitutionalism in Greece, 
whilst at the same time they have created a situation 
which has removed some of the difficulties and compli- 
cations of their position in the Balkans. In short, the 
future depends not so much upon the fighting value or 
importance of the Greek army, as upon the statesman- 
ship, the moderation, and the good will of a man who 
has already saved his country in more than one time of 
crisis, and upon the capacity and ability of the Allies 
to help and to allow this man to work out the destiny 


of his country in such a way as to regain his prestige 
at home and to further the interests of his own people 
and also those of a group of countries who are fighting 
for the protection of small nationalities, and for the 
overthrow of militarism. 



Although her people have obviously not been able 
to play any direct part in the War, the geographical 
and political importance of Albania • is such that the 
history of and conditions prevailing in that country 
are worthy of serious consideration to-day. Geo- 
graphically this importance is due to the fact that Al- 
bania occupies a position which makes it the natural 
means of entry into and exit from a large part of the 
Western Balkans. It is for these reasons that the 
northern area of the country, together with the ports 
of San Giovanni di Medua and Durazzo, are coveted 
by the Serbs, who desire, by securing possession of 
them, to obtain free access to the sea. Equally well, 
situated as it is on the Lower Adriatic, Albania practi- 
cally commands the Straits of Otranto, and the govern- 
ment in control there can therefore influence the whole 
position in the Adriatic Sea to which they lead. It is 
this which makes Italy particularly interested in the 
future of Europe's latest principality and especially in 
that of its southern port Avlona, for that Power cannot 
afford to be menaced by the establishment there of a 
regime hostile to her natural development, her safety, 
and her very existence. 


Closely bound up with these conditions are the facts 
that, for years, Austria has been working untiringly to 
bring about the augmentation of her influence in Al- 
bania, and that Greece has been striving to denational- 
ise the people domiciled across her frontier. The first 
country, actuated by the intense rivalry existing be- 
tween her and Italy upon all questions connected with 
the Western Balkans and the Adriatic, has acted as 
the instrument of Germany and with the object of 
preparing the way for the realisation of the Mittel- 
Europa scheme. The Hellenic Government, on the 
other hand, whilst nominally animated by religious 
objects, has really directed its policy for nationalistic 
motives. The result is therefore that the Albanian 
question, which was nominally settled by the creation 
of an autonomous principality during the Balkan Wars, 
still remains one of the most important problems for 
solution at the end of the present conflagration. It is 
for this reason, and particularly because the Allies 
and the United States of America are pledged to the 
principle of "Government with the consent of the 
Governed" or of "nationality", that we are bound 
to consider how this principle applies to Albania, whose 
people are entitled to expect the same consideration of 
their claims as are those belonging to any other smaller 

Prior to the Balkan Wars, and to the loss of terri- 
tory which was then suffered by Turkey, it was difficult 
accurately to describe what was meant by the geo- 
graphical term "Albania." Whilst an official of the 
Turkish Government always refused to acknowledge 
the existence of a district known by the name, an 
Albanian, a Greek, a Bulgarian, and a Serbian would 


each define the boundaries of Albania in accordance 
with his own national aspirations. Lord Fitzmaurice 
(then Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) in a despatch ad- 
dressed to Earl Granville in the year 1880 described the 
district covered by the geographical expression Albania 
as that territory "which falls mainly within the two 
vilayets of Scutari and Janina, but extends also in an 
easterly direction beyond the watershed of the moun- 
tains dividing the streams which fall into the Adriatic 
from those which fall into the Aegean Sea, and includes 
portions of the vilayets of Monastir and of Kossovo." 
The Principality of Albania, if principality it can 
still be called, contains more or less the area which is 
thus indicated. Situated as it is on the eastern side 
of the Adriatic and wedged in between Montenegro, 
Serbia, Greece, and the sea, this unhappy country is 
the child not of love but of hatred, for its creation was 
brought about by the rivalry which existed between 
the Great Powers, and particularly between Austria 
and Italy, rather than as a result of any feelings of 
friendship for the Albanians. Whilst the independence 
of the country was decided upon by the London Am- 
bassadorial Conference in December, 1912, the frontiers 
have never been definitely fixed, or, more correctly, 
they have never .been observed by the neighbouring 
countries, and especially Greece. At the present 
time, therefore, it is impossible to say whether, in dis- 
cussing Albania, we should include or exclude the large 
southern areas which are in dispute with Greece and 
parts of which have been in Italian hands since an 
earlier period of the War. If we include these in Al- 
bania and consider that country as it was established 
by the Great Powers, then it has an area of about 


11,000 square miles and a population of approximately 
800,000 souls. Measured from north to south it has 
a length of about one hundred and eighty miles, and 
from west to east an approximate width, at its 
broadest part, of only eighty-five miles. 

The greater part of the country is mountainous. 
In the neighbourhood of Scutari, in areas of Central 
Albania, and in the south, there are, however, fertile 
plains watered by various rivers which wend their way 
to the Adriatic. The people devote themselves al- 
most entirely to agriculture, which is carried on with 
primitive implements, such as wooden ploughs, and 
there are no home manufactures. Goat and sheep 
skins, which are exported, are dried by pegging them 
down upon the ground with wooden pegs. One of 
the most important of the exports from the country is 
the bitumen which is found at Selenitza near Avlona. 
The mine is worked by a French company or syndi- 
cate, and the bitumen, which is of one of the best 
qualities known, is transported from the pit's mouth 
to the port on donkeys and pack animals, who wend 
their way across the hills for a distance of some twelve 

Towns properly so called are few and far between, 
for Scutari, with a population of about thirty-two 
thousand souls, and the capital of the north, is the only 
city which boasts of more than fifteen thousand inhabit- 
ants. Durazzo, the so-called capital of the country, 
and the former seat of the Prince's Government, is 
built upon the site of the ancient Dyrrachion. It 
has a population of but ^ve thousand. The city, 
which is located on the northern shore of a commodious 
bay, where it is almost always safe for ships to lie, is 


2 2 


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S3 <a 

S3 S 

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practically surrounded by rocks and by the sea, except 
upon the side where the promontory upon which it is 
built is joined to the mainland. Avlona, now occupied 
by the Italians, is possessed of a fine bay. Its popula- 
tion is about six thousand souls. Elbasan (El Bassan), 
situated as it is in the heart of the country *and in the 
Scumbi Valley, is the proper capital of the country, 
not only on account of its central position, but also 
because its inhabitants are known to be those who 
possess the most moderate political ideas, and therefore 
those who voice what should be the general policy of 
a united Albania. 

From a local as well as from a national point of 
view, one of the most important questions connected 
with Albania to-day is that which concerns the 
nationality of its inhabitants. In order to understand 
this aright it is necessary to remember that in Turkish 
times these people, unlike the other alien races which 
went to make up the European provinces of the Otto- 
man Empire, were not formed into a "millet" or a 
religious "community." In other words, whilst the 
nationality of the Bulgarians and the Greeks was recog- 
nised, as the result of the existence of the Bulgarian 
and Greek Churches, the Albanians had no such 
binding link, and they were classed in the making of 
a census entirely according to their religion. Thus, if 
an Albanian belonged to the Orthodox Church he was 
called a Greek ; if he were a Moslem, he was put down 
as a Turk. This meant not only that the gallant Shky- 
petars, as the Albanians call themselves, were never 
supported by intrigue adroitly hatched in various 
capitals, but that their territory has been and is sub- 
ject to the aspirations of their neighbours. This is a 


question of supreme importance, for whilst up to a 
point Abdul Hamid encouraged the Greeks, the Bul- 
garians, and the Serbians of Turkey in their national- 
istic and religious ideas, with the express purpose of 
causing strife between these elements of the popula- 
tion, the Turks — Old and New — never left a stone 
unturned to subdue the Albanians, whose sentiments 
of nationalism and of patriotism are probably older, 
stronger, and deeper than those of any of the Balkan 

The Albanians are generally and probably accu- 
rately identified by impartial observers as the de- 
scendants of the ancient Illyrians, who were simply the 
inhabitants of Illyria, and who in their turn were the 
offspring of the Pelasgeans — the first people to come 
to Europe. It was therefore to their forefathers that 
the Albanians allege St. Paul referred, when he said 
"Round about into Illyricum I have fully preached 
the gospel of Christ." But little is known about these 
Illyrians except that they were slow to accept the 
civilisation of the Greeks and Romans, and that sub- 
sequently they were driven westwards towards the 
shores of the Adriatic by the advancing hordes of 
Slavs. From the time of the Turkish Conquest, 
which may be said finally to have taken place about 
the year 1478 and soon after the death of the famous 
Albanian hero — Scanderbeg — until the Balkan Wars, 
Albania formed part of the Ottoman Empire, and it 
was nominally ruled from Constantinople. But such 
were the strength and the feelings of nationalism of 
the people, that throughout this period they really 
enjoyed a considerable amount of independence, being 
governed largely by unwritten laws administered by 


the local chieftains. In short, for centuries the Al- 
banians occupied in Europe towards the Government 
the same kind of position as that held in Asia Minor 
by the Kurds. Both races are religiously unorthodox ; 
both races have been utilised by the Turks to support 
them in times of need, and prior to the re-establishment 
of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908, the attitudes of 
both races towards European interference in the Turk- 
ish Empire were made use of by the Central Govern- 
ment as a threat to the Great Powers as each new pro- 
gramme for reform was suggested at Constantinople. 

The Shkypetars are today a wild, warlike, lawless 
people, but nevertheless they have their own — a very 
strict — code of honour, and they are faithful even 
unto death. An Arnaut once engaged is not only the 
most trusty servant and loyal follower in the Near 
East, but he is the most useful protector of his em- 
ployer in whatever difficulty may arise. Indeed, the 
honour of the people is such that if once they have en- 
tertained you in their houses, or if once they have given 
you a promise, you may be absolutely sure that not a 
sacrifice will be too great for them to make in order 
that their promise may be fulfilled. In this con- 
nection I well remember that on one occasion, when 
I was travelling in Albania, it was necessary to ac- 
complish an extremely long journey in the course of 
one day. My guides and horsemen protested against 
my wish to do what they said was almost impossible. 
The matter was, however, finally settled, and we 
started out on the morrow. These men walked hour 
after hour over the roughest of country, and we even- 
tually accomplished my object in spite of almost in- 
surmountable difficulties. But that object was only 


realised because they went far beyond their legal bai'- 
gain, even carrying me across rivers in the dark and 
protecting me against wild dogs, in order that we should 
reach the house of friends by night. Compensation 
they got, but even compensation is not always suf- 
ficient recompense for a promise which is more than 
honourably carried out. 

The Albanians are divided into two main groups — 
the Ghegs and the Tosks. The River Scumbi, which 
enters the Adriatic halfway between the towns of 
Durazzo and Avlona, and its picturesque valley, may 
be said to separate the country inhabited by the 
former from that populated by the latter. The 
Ghegs, or Northern Albanians, are, in their turn, made 
up of a number of warlike tribes, many of whom still 
live a feudal life. The Tosks, or Southern Albanians, 
are more civilised and perhaps less warlike than their 
northern brothers. Their tribal system is much less 
well defined, but they owe their allegiance to local 
beys or chiefs, to whom they turn for guidance in all 
matters of importance. 

Whilst foreign propaganda has done a good deal to 
aggravate the religious feelings of the people, the 
Albanians are not for the most part fanatical from an 
actual religious standpoint. At the present time about 
two thirds of the Albanian population is Moslem. 
Of the remaining one third, the Christians of the north 
are believers in Roman Catholicism, whilst those of 
the south belong to the Orthodox Church. This re- 
ligious division is due to several historical facts. 
Originally the people were all Christians, many of 
them having been converted as early as the first 
century. In earlier times the Albanians belonged to 


the Orthodox faith, but about the middle of the thir- 
teenth century many of the CathoHc Ghegs of the 
north abandoned the Eastern for the Western Church, 
and at the time of Scanderbeg there was a further 
secession. After the arrival of the Turks, when the 
people were Christian in little but name, large num- 
bers embraced Islam, rather from secular than from 
spiritual reasons, that is to say, because the position 
of a Moslem was in many ways a more privileged one 
than that of a Christian. There was a further seces- 
sion in the seventeenth century for similar causes. 
But whilst there is strife between the different 
religious elements, owing generally to misunderstand- 
ings, the people are in principle and at bottom Al- 
banians before they are either Moslems or Christians. 
Consequently, when disputes take place, they occur 
rather as a result of some political or local squabble 
than because of any innate religious feeling. There 
are districts where the inhabitants are entirely Chris- 
tian, and there are others where the population is ex- 
clusively Moslem. But in the greater part of the 
country it is more or less mixed. In the south there 
is less religious strife than in the north. This has 
become particularly the case during the recent years, 
for as the Nationalistic Movement has increased, the 
Orthodox Albanians have grown to understand that 
their religion has been exploited by the Greek Church 
for political purposes, and therefore, the power of that 
Church is greatly decreasing, and the people are slowly 
getting to understand that they need not fear the 
attitude of their Moslem fellow countrymen. 

The Albanians have their own language. It is held 
by most authorities to be of Aryan origin, and it prob- 


ably formed the original speech of the people of large 
parts, if not the whole, of the Balkan Peninsula. Al- 
though the groundwork and grammar of the language 
are supposed to be Indo-European, a large number of 
words have been taken from the Turkish, Latin, Greek, 
Slav, and Italian tongues, which means that there 
are distinct dialects in different parts of the country. 
The people of the various regions have borrowed words 
from the language of the country to which their homes 
are nearest. Thus the ignorant Tosk of the south 
makes use of many more Greek words than a Glieg 
of the north, whom he would only understand with 
a certain difficulty. The fact, too, that Albanian was 
only reduced to writing in comparatively modern 
times, and that no general form of alphabet was de- 
cided upon until after the advent of the Turkish Con- 
stitution, is largely responsible for the differences of 
the dialect which exist to-day. 

Prior to the seventeenth century there is no trace 
of the Albanians reading or writing their own language, 
and the large majority of the people cannot read or 
write to-day. The earliest books which contained 
printed examples of Albanian were published about 
three hundred years ago. These volumes consisted of 
religious works, dictionaries, and textbooks. Much 
later the Roman Catholic clergy furthered the language 
movement by providing the people with books, many 
of which were published in Scutari by the Jesuits, 
who began their work in Albania about the middle of 
the nineteenth century. But it is largely due to the 
religious work undertaken by the British and Foreign 
Bible Society that the people have been provided with 
literature printed in Albanian. As early as 1824 the 


gospel of St. Matthew was printed in Tosk-Albanian 
at Corfu by the Ionian Bible Society — a Society 
promoted and subsidised by the British and Foreign 
Bible Society. Three years later the whole of the New 
Testament was published under the same auspices in 
the same language, but on this occasion the modified 
Greek alphabet, used in the printing, was included in 
order to enable the illiterate people to read its contents. 
Between the years 1860 and 1870 a large portion of the 
Bible was translated by an Albanian, and as a result, 
a volume containing the four Gospels, the Book of 
The Acts, and an alphabet was published for the Ghegs 
in Latin characters, with certain minor alterations, 
in 1866. This publication was followed by others 
printed in the Greek characters for the people of the 
south and in the Latin for those of the north and pub- 
lished in Constantinople between the years 1868 and 

Ten years later, under the direction of Gerasim 
Kyrias, a patriotic Albanian who had studied in the 
American School at Samakov, the Book of Genesis 
and the Gospel of St. Matthew were printed in the 
new national alphabet (i.e. Latin alphabet with modi- 
fications), which had been adopted by an Albanian 
Committee which met to discuss the development of 
literature in 1879. So strong, however, was the Turkish 
opposition to the introduction of these characters that 
various publications subsequently made were not al- 
lowed to be printed in them. It was only, therefore, 
after the re-establishment of the Constitution in 1908 
that the question of the method of writing the language 
was again taken up seriously, and that the new national 
characters (namely, Latin characters with one or two 


modifications) were finally adopted. Their employ- 
ment was as fervently opposed by the Young Turks 
as it had been by their predecessors. 

The present political conditions prevailing in Al- 
bania are largely the outcome of what has taken place 
there during the last few years. Prior to the advent 
to power of the Young Turks, every endeavour was 
made to hinder the Nationalistic Movement. At the 
same time, during the reign of Abdul Hamid, the 
Albanians were treated with the utmost deference, 
and His Majesty did everything in his power to make 
certain of their support in time of need. The Albanian 
Imperial Guard, recruited from the south, was always 
well and regularly paid, and these soldiers were allowed 
to return to their villages as soon as their time had 
expired, instead of being retained with the colours for 
months or years in excess of their proper period of 
service. During the days of the Old Regime, too, the 
Albanians, especially the tribes of the north, were 
permitted to manage their own internal affairs, prac- 
tically without the interference of the Constantinople 
Government. It was only when the northeastern 
Ghegs — always actuated by feelings of antagonism 
towards their Slav brothers — seemed inclined to 
jeopardise the policy of their spiritual and temporal 
master at Constantinople that troops were despatched 
to Albania to quiet the country, either by bombarding 
the malefactors with shell, or by bribing their leaders 
with decorations or with money. 

After the re-establishment of the Ottoman Constitu- 
tion the Young Turks, instead of recognising that the 
Albanians could be of valuable support to them, im- 
mediately antagonised them by endeavouring to abro- 


gate many of the privileges which they had previously 
enjoyed. In the north these endeavours took the 
form of striving to disarm the people, of attempting 
to do away with the tribal and feudal system of gov- 
ernment by which the people had formerly been ruled, 
and of trying to introduce compulsory military service 
which had previously never been enforced. Through- 
out the country, too, and particularly in the south, 
another grievance common to the Moslem and Chris- 
tian Albanians was the attitude of the Sublime Porte 
towards the educational question. Not only did the 
Government fail to establish Albanian schools, but it 
actually opposed their opening and even insisted upon 
the closing of several such establishments run by the 
Albanians themselves. The result of this policy was 
that from the summer of 1909 right up to the time of 
the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, large areas of the 
country were in an almost continuous state of insur- 
rection — a state of insurrection which in the end was 
indirectly if not directly responsible for hastening the 
downfall of Turkey as a European Power. 

The Albanians took no active part in the Balkan 
Wars, and this because they hated both the Balkan 
Allies and the Turks with an equal hatred. On the 
one side they knew that the Serbians, Montenegrins, 
Greeks, and to a lesser degree the Bulgarians, all 
coveted areas of territory which were dear to them. 
On the other hand they recognised that an Ottoman 
victory would result in further attempts to denational- 
ise and to subjugate them. The consequence was, that 
as the Turkish hold over Albania existed only in name, 
practically the whole country was overrun by the 
Serbians, Montenegrins, and Greeks, many of the 


farms and houses being burned, and large portions of 
the population being put to flight. The Balkan Wars 
were, however, an epoch-making period for the people, 
because it was during the first campaign and at the 
end of November, 1912, that Ismail Kemal Bey — a 
former member of the Ottoman Chamber and a lead- 
ing Albanian — proclaimed an independent Govern- 
ment at Avlona and that, some three weeks later, the 
London Ambassadorial Conference decided to estab- 
lish an autonomous Albanian State. That decision, 
which was followed by prolonged negotiations between 
the Great Powers as to the status of and to the position 
of the frontiers of the new principality, was finally 
carried out in a manner which made the adopted 
boundaries of the country a sort of compromise between 
those suggested by the Balkan Allies, who worked for 
a very small Albania, and those advocated by Austria 
and Italy, who, whilst claiming less than did the Al- 
banian Provisional Government, none the less pro- 
posed a settlement too much in accordance with the 
basis of nationality to be acceptable to Serbia, to 
Montenegro, or to Greece. In short, whilst the Al- 
banians finally got Scutari in the north and Korcha and 
Santi Quaranta in the south, they did not secure Ipek, 
Jacova, Prisrend, and Dibra — places which by their 
allotment to Montenegro and to Serbia robbed the 
people of Northern Albania of market towns with 
which they had always been wont to trade. 

In addition to the fact that it did something to make 
known to Europe the claims of the Albanians, the pro- 
visional Government of Ismail Kemal Bey, which in a 
way was the father of the State, together with others 
afterwards set up in districts not occupied by or from 


which the Balkan armies had withdrawn, maintained 
order and did wonders to preserve peace from the 
moment of their estabhshment until long after the 
arrival of the European Commission of Control (the 
appointment of which was decided upon by the Am- 
bassadorial Conference), in the early autumn of 1913. 
Indeed, when I was in Albania immediately after this, 
although I found the international forces in possession 
of Scutari and three or four entirely independent 
governments in different parts of the country, such was 
the state of things that I travelled with perfect safety 
through the greater part of it without any guard other 
than that provided by a native policeman, whose 
presence was necessary to enable a stranger to find 
the way in areas which were almost nowhere possessed 
of better means of communication than those pro- 
vided by the most primitive bridle paths. 

Prince William of Wied, a Major in the German 
Guards, who was nominated to rule Albania by the 
Great Powers in November, 1913, arrived at Durazzo, 
which he constituted his capital, on March 7 of the 
following year. The fact that his regime was a total 
failure is due in part to the international conditions 
then prevailing and in part to the role personally 
played by His Royal Highness. From an international 
standpoint the basis of the whole question was that 
Albania having been constituted largely in order to re- 
lieve European tension, ever-recurring difficulties arose 
between the Great Powers really responsible for its 
government. Moreover, whilst Europe had nominally 
fixed the northern and southern frontiers, she took no 
effective measures to hand over to the Prince terri- 
tory which was his. In the south, the Greeks remained 


in possession of large areas of Albania until the end of 
March, 1914. Most, if not all, of these districts were 
then officially evacuated. But, instead of the Greek 
regular army, there came the Epirote insurgents and 
the Epirote Independent Government, who, secretly 
supported from Athens, maintained a reign of terror 
in an area actually allotted to Albania. Thus through- 
out the stay of the "Mpret", as the Albanians called 
their ruler, the European Concert, if Concert it can 
be called, ignored the necessity for taking the measures 
necessary for the protection of the country and looked 
on pacifically whilst the Greeks infringed the frontiers 
already delimited in the south, and whilst the insur- 
gents threatened and practically besieged Durazzo in a 
manner which finally confined the powers of the Prince 
almost to the very precincts of his palace. 

The above remarks are sufficient to prove the enor- 
mous difficulties which would have in any case beset 
any ruler of Albania. His Royal Highness, whose 
shortcomings were apparent from the first, made little 
endeavour to overcome them. Ignoring altogether his 
attitude towards the southern frontier question, con- 
cerning which he should have made some stipulation 
with the Great Powers before he ever entered upon 
his new task, the Prince made at least two fundamental 
mistakes. By arriving at Durazzo, instead of enter- 
ing his new country by way of Scutari, which was still 
in the hands of the international forces which occupied 
it in the first Balkan war, and which was therefore 
more or less neutral country, the new ruler seemed to 
show his partiality towards Essad Pasha and thus 
offended all the enemies of a man who, if then power- 
ful in the centre of the country, was certainly not be- 


loved beyond the confines of his own particular dis- 
trict. Subsequently, and before it was too late, in 
place of trying to take the people into his confidence 
and of endeavouring to travel among them, the Prince 
appeared to think that he could maintain his authority 
by encouraging one section of the community to sup- 
port him against the other, and that he could succeed 
in Albania without any display of courage. Thus on 
May 24, a few days after the banishment of Essad 
Pasha, at a time when Durazzo was threatened by the 
insurgents, the Prince and his family took refuge on an 
Italian warship — an action which, though he only 
remained there for one night, was sufficient to seal his 
fate in a country where, to say the least of it, cowardice 
is not one of the faults of the people. As time wore on, 
things went from bad to worse until the outbreak of 
the War, immediately before which the international 
contingents vacated Scutari and immediately after 
which the Prince and the International Commission of 
Control left Durazzo. 

Prior to the departure of the Prince on September 11, 
Turkish insurgents, having occupied Avlona, advanced 
upon Durazzo. From that time onwards, therefore, 
the country, once more left without even the vestige of 
a central Government, was ruled by various self-con- 
stituted administrations, all practically independent 
of one another. At first Prince Burhan Eddin, son of 
the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid, was the nominal chief of 
an administration which owed any force which it 
possessed to the local power of Essad Pasha. After 
the subjugation of Serbia and Montenegro, in the 
winter of 1914-1915, when a large number of Serbians 
retreated to the Adriatic coast through Albania, the 


northern and central districts of the country were 
overrun by the Austro-Germans, who finally occupied 
and still hold about three quarters of the principality. 
Over and above the fact that a proclamation was issued 
by the enemy in 1917 to the effect that he proposes to 
create of Albania some kind of autonomous province, 
closely allied to if not constituting an integral part of 
Austria-Hungary, we therefore have no reliable in- 
formation concerning the conditions prevailing in an 
area which is entirely cut off from communication with 
the Allied world. 

In the south, where the Italians occupied Avlona on 
December 25, 1914, and therefore before the entry of 
that country into the War, events have been bound 
up with the attitude of the Hellenic Government 
towards the Epirus question, with the relations exist- 
ing between Greece and Italy upon that subject, and 
with the developments in the zone actually held by 
the forces of King Victor Emanuel. With regard to 
the first two questions, sufficient be it to say that in 
December, 1916, shortly after the capture of Monas- 
tir by the Allies, Colonel Desco n, acting on behalf 
of the French Government, proclaimed the establish- 
ment of a small autonomous A banian State, to include 
Korcha and the area immediately surrounding that 
town. Further to the south, where the Greeks had 
evacuated large areas previously held by them, the 
Italians took over a large section of Epirus and oc- 
cupied Janina, actually in Greek territory, during the 
spring of 1917. After the abdication of King Con- 
stantine in June, 1917, and the return to office of M. 
Venezelos, it was however arranged at the Paris Con- 
ference of the following month that the Italians should 


withdraw from all but the triangular area of Greek 
territory through which the road from Santi Quaranta 
to Korcha runs. This arrangement, together with the 
fact that M. Venezelos has always endeavoured to 
adopt a moderate attitude upon the Southern Al- 
banian frontier question, has, it must be hoped, 
created a new atmosphere — an atmosphere in which 
this highly complicated problem may be able to be 
solved at the same time in acccordance with the prin- 
ciple of nationalities and without serious detriment to 
the interests of the two countries most closely affected 
by this ever-vexed question. 

Whilst, prior to her adhesion to the side of the Allies, 
Italy contented herself by the occupation of the port of 
Avlona, later she extended her front so that it ran along 
the lower reaches of the River Viosa, which constitutes 
the natural defensive line for that city. Subsequently, 
too, she disembarked another force at Santi Quaranta, 
which, acting with the army already at Avlona, ad- 
vanced into the interior and ultimately established 
connection, near the village of Cologna, with the 
Allied forces based upon Salonica. Since that time 
Italy has been in occupation of approximately a 
quarter of the whole country — a quarter in which 
she has done a great deal to improve the conditions 
previously prevailing. Considerable lengths of road 
have been built, thereby not only facilitating means of 
communication, but also providing the native popu- 
lation with work for which a fair rate of pay has been 
given. Agricultural colleges have been established, 
and the farmers, now able to obtain machinery, are 
being encouraged to cultivate their ground systemati- 
cally. Numerous schools have been opened, and the 


children are thus educated in a manner which has 
never previously been possible. And, last but not 
least, the Italians, realising that the way to win the 
people is to leave the direction of local affairs as far 
as possible in Albanian hands, have established Courts 
of Justice, some of which are presided over by natives 
brought over from the large Albanian colony in Italy, 
and have formed a local police corps under the super- 
vision of Italian officers. 

I have said sufficient briefly to explain the past and 
present situations in Albania. With regard to the 
future, there are two questions of outstanding im- 
portance. The first is the problem bound up with the 
frontiers of the country, — a problem with which I 
shall deal elsewhere. The second concerns the future 
status of the principality. On account of the aspira- 
tions of her neighbours, of the lack of development of 
the country, and of the inexperience of the vast majority 
of the people in all matters appertaining to Government, 
I do not think that, for the present at least, Albania 
can exist or manage her affairs entirely alone. Conse- 
quently, as a return to the state of things existing after 
the Balkan Wars is impossible, only two alternatives 
appear possible. The first is some form of autonomy 
under all or perhaps a group of the Allied Great Powers, 
an arrangement carrying with it the difficulties always 
arising from combined control. The second is the pro- 
tection of only one of the countries who are now fight- 
ing for the interests of smaller nationalities. If this 
latter alternative be adopted, unless the United States 
of America or Great Britain were willing to undertake 
the task, it would naturally fall to Italy who has already 
proclaimed **the unity and independence of all Albania 


under the aegis and protection of the Kingdom of 
Italy", and who has, as I have said, shown her good 
will towards the Albanians. Such a solution might not 
at once be acceptable to many of the inhabitants who 
desire to be entirely independent or at least to be under 
the protection of America or England who have no 
direct interests in Albania. But patriots as they are, 
these men will do well to remember that in addition 
to helping them to establish good government and to 
develop their country, the protection of Italy would 
provide them with a powerful friend — a friend without 
whom they might be helpless not onl}^ to enlarge, but 
even to maintain their present frontiers. 


My object in this chapter is to examine a few of the 
geographical and semi-geographical problems which 
have influenced and do influence the situation in the 
Balkan Peninsula, and in particular to enumerate 
some of the military highways which of necessity have 
governed and still govern the operations in this area 
— highways for the possession of which a great deal 
of fighting has been done. In so doing, although I 
have walked, ridden, or driven through most of the 
districts about which I am now writing, I cannot 
attempt to indicate the military importance or the 
actual role played by many of the railways, rivers, 
or roads under discussion. To do so or to consider 
the highways of the Balkans otherwise than as be- 
longing to the countries to which they belonged prior 
to the outbreak of the War would not only be to deal 
with questions discussed elsewhere, but it would also 
necessitate the devotion of a whole volume (such as 
that entitled "Geographical Aspects of Balkan Prob- 
lems" by Doctor Marion Newbigin) instead of only 
one chapter to this all-important aspect of the Balkan 

From a geographical standpoint, the contents of 
the peninsula are extremely diflScult to define. I 


propose, however, to consider it as bounded on the 
north by a Hne roughly drawn from the Port of Con- 
stanza on the Black Sea to Pola on the Adriatic, or, 
practically speaking, by the line of 45° N. Lat. This 
being so, we have to consider the highways of Serbia, 
Bulgaria, Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Monte- 
negro, Albania, and Greece — countries which all lie 
to the south of the Danube and of the Save which 
flows into that river at Belgrade, in addition to those 
of Roumania, to which only brief reference will be 
made, owing to the fact that, geographically speaking, 
most of that country lies without the area under 

The greater part of the peninsula is mountainous, 
but with few exceptions the mountains form chaotic' 
masses rather than regular ranges. The two great 
chains, or so-called chains, are the Balkan Range and 
the Rhodope Balkans. The Balkan Range extends 
from Cape Emine on the Black Sea to the River 
Timok on the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier, thus dividing 
Bulgaria into two main sections, northern and south- 
ern. In places these mountains attain an elevation 
of about eight thousand feet above the sea level. 
The Rhodopes used approximately to form a good 
part of the frontier between Bulgaria and Turkey, 
and they still constitute a natural barrier between 
what may be called Old Bulgaria and that area which 
lies between this range and the Aegean — an area the 
eastern part of which was annexed by the Government 
of King Ferdinand as a result of the Balkan Wars. 
The elevations attained at the eastern end of the range 
are considerably less than those upon the west. Whilst 
in the former district we have nothing higher than the 


Katal Dagh which rises to six thousand feet above the 
sea, in the latter there is the Musa Alia peak, which 
reaches a height of nine thousand feet. The Sredna 
Gora — an offshoot of the main Balkan Range — juts 
forward towards the south almost to meet the Rhodopes 
at Trajan's Gateway between Sofia and Philippopolis, 
and the two ranges, or a prolongation of the two ranges, 
are more or less united at their western end by a 
mountainous area through which the Serbo-Bulgarian 
frontier runs. 

Partly as a result of a generally very confused 
mountain system, the rivers run from various points 
in unexpected directions. Streams which one would 
think should flow east turn suddenly north or west, 
or vice versa. Thus the great Maritza, which rises 
on the Musa Alia group of peaks, after flowing 
eastward across the broad plain of Eastern Roumelia. 
instead of continuing its course towards the Black 
Sea, turns suddenly southwards at Adrianople and 
empties its vast volume of water into the Aegean near 
the port of Dede Agatch. Again, the Vardar and the 
Morava, the former emptying itself into the Gulf of 
Salonica and the latter into the Danube, respectively 
run down valleys the common summit of which may 
be said to be near Uskub. The Drin and the Scumbi 
— the two most important rivers of Albania — wend 
their ways to the sea by valleys, one or both of which 
may sometime constitute the route to be followed by 
a great railway leading down to the shores of the 

The Balkan Peninsula is essentially the meeting- 
place of East with West. Whilst after the wars of 
1912 and 1913 the European dominions of the Sultan 


were enormously reduced, so large a part of the entire 
peninsula belonged to Turkey until comparatively 
recent times that almost the whole area still shows 
signs of Ottoman misrule. This partly accounts for 
the extraordinary surprises by which the traveller is 
met in various parts of the peninsula. In places 
the whole country appears to be perfectly European. 
In others the traveller passes for miles across bare 
country, the soil of which is of a brown-red colour — 
country which almost reminds one of the veldt of South 
Africa. Again, as one wends one's way by road or path 
through the Balkans, and particularly through Turkey, 
one finds that places which from the map would appear 
to be centres of importance are made up of only a few 
houses located in the valley or halfway up some for- 
bidding hillside. Thus the prevailing impression left 
upon one's mind is that Turkish misrule has been re- 
sponsible for the creation of a state of rack and ruin 
and for the existence of conditions which can only be 
improved when a long period of peace has enabled the 
Balkan States as a whole to introduce those reforms 
and that good government which have existed in Bul- 
garia since her liberation in the year 1878. 

In this connection it has always been interesting to 
note the enormous differences which become markedly 
apparent as soon as one leaves Turkey and enters 
Bulgaria. The Bulgarian road is not only well laid 
out but it is maintained in a good state of repair. 
Carriages may roll along without jolting the traveller 
much more than would be the case on an English coun- 
try road. The fields are well cultivated. The ground, 
which much resembles heavy rich English soil, is made 
the best use of. Animals of all kinds are contentedly 


grazing in the pastures, instead of, as in Turkey, 
being allowed to wander in all directions, thereby 
tramping down the standing corn or crossing the 
newly ploughed fallows. Hay and corn crops are 
carefully collected in small, round, thatched ricks. 
The forests are systematically cut, and trees are 
planted in place of those removed for sale or everyday 

The Near East is therefore a land of contrasts. 
Although we have some of the monotonous scenery 
to which I have already referred, one also comes upon 
the unexpected in the opposite direction. For in- 
stance, the magnificent land-locked Bocche di Cattaro 
is a gem of beauty, the like of which it would be difficult, 
if not impossible, to surpass in Europe. Again, there 
are places such as Sofia or Serajevo where civilisation 
has advanced by leaps and bounds. The capital of 
Bulgaria, in 1878 little more than a collection of mud 
huts, is now a prosperous modern city. Equally, 
whilst the Austrians may not have given political 
satisfaction to the Slav population of Bosnia, they 
have undoubtedly made of its capital a city in which 
picturesque beauty is combined with modern comfort. 
Composed partly of modern and partly of Turkish 
houses and nestled on both sides of the narrow valley 
of the river Miljacka, Serajevo is a place in which 
East certainly meets West. 

In view of the influence of climatic conditions upon 
communications no apology is needed for making a 
brief reference to the question of the weather in the 
Balkan Peninsula. In the north and northeast of the 
peninsula the climate is largely governed by the ex- 
tremely cold winds which blow from those directions, 


by the considerable amount of snow which therefore 
falls in many districts, and by the length and severity 
of the frosts. In the south and southwest, partly 
owing to the protection given by the mountains and 
high table-lands, the climate is much milder and the 
rain comes usually with a south or southwest wind. 
In many districts there are very sudden changes in 
the weather, and there is a great contrast between 
the temperature of the day and of the night. For 
instance, at the end of October there comes an almost 
annual short spell of very cold weather at Constan- 
tinople — a spell in which there are always biting 
cold winds and sometimes falls of snow or sleet. From 
then, often until the end of December, the days are 
generally brilliantly fine and warm. Again, even in 
the early autumn the visitor to the interior will find 
that very little exercise will make him warm by day, 
whilst at night, and even when rough shelter is avail- 
able, he will gladly coil up in all the fur garments 
which he may be lucky enough to possess. Both the 
heavy downpours of rain and the melting of the snows 
create conditions which the traveller and the engineer 
have to be prepared to meet. Thus it is no uncommon 
thing for routes which are perfectly passable in summer 
to be completely impassable during times of rain and 
flood. It is this factor which often accounts for the 
existence of alternative roads, used at different seasons 
of the year, and it is this contingency which often 
leads to mistakes in information as to the utility or 
inutility of various communications for military pur- 

Although Turkey now forms but a very small part 
of the Balkan Peninsula, the question of the existing 


communications in the whole area under discussion 
has been largely influenced by the attitude of the Otto- 
man Government. For years much of the politics 
of the Near East has turned upon railroad questions, 
and therefore, whilst considerable parts of the penin- 
sula had already passed out of Turkish hands before 
the construction of railways was practicable in such 
an area, yet up to the time of the Balkan Wars the 
geographical distribution of the European dominions 
of the Sultan was such as to give the Ottoman Gov- 
ernment the deciding voice as to the construction of 
numerous lines leading through Turkey to the sea- 
coast. The building of roads and railways would 
have carried with it economical as well as political 
advantages to the State, but their construction was 
opposed alike by Abdul Hamid and by the Young 
Turks. This opposition was sometimes due to in- 
ternal political reasons, and sometimes it resulted 
from the existence of rival schemes supported by 
different Governments, or by concession hunters who 
were directly or indirectly interested in them. Again, 
as large numbers of railways in Turkey were built 
under a kilometric guarantee from the Government 
— a guarantee which assured the company in question 
a fixed gross income every year — it is well known 
that the Turkish authorities agreed to what was 
often a most extravagant sum, but only when the 
line in question was required for some strategical pur- 
pose, or when its construction was forced upon the 
Sublime Porte by some more than usually active 
diplomatic representative at Constantinople. 

One result of this inadequate provision of railways 
is that the Near East has always been but little under- 


stood by thosewho have only been able to pass hurriedly 
through it, and that once off the beaten track, many 
parts of the Balkan Peninsula are stranger to the 
ordinary outsider than are the wilds of Central Africa. 
Indeed the methods of travel are so diverse that 
whilst in peace time Constantinople can be reached 
in the luxurious Orient Express, once off the great 
international route, one might almost as well be in the 
heart of some unexplored continent. Thus to approach 
the Peninsula of Gallipoli by land, or to get into the 
heart of Macedonia, you must rely upon some fourth- 
rate carriage, whilst to penetrate the rocky valleys of 
Albania you are compelled to content yourself with a 
pack horse, a mule or even a donkey. Again, arrived 
in the interior, accommodation, which is distinctly 
primitive even in many of the larger Balkan towns, 
must either be provided by the transportation of 
camping arrangements or sought in buildings so dirty 
and so unpleasant that it is much easier to pass the 
night than actually to sleep. 

Before approaching a discussion of the actual military 
routes within the real peninsula, I will briefly refer to 
two international highways, which if they be not prop- 
erly in the Balkans themselves are certainly controlled 
by one or more of the rulers in this "Danger Zone" of 
Europe. Ignoring here the numerous interesting facts 
connected with the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus I 
will refer very briefly to the enormous importance of 
Europe's second largest river. Although it is impos- 
sible without entering into countless details to discuss 
its evervarying breadth and depth, it may be interest- 
ing to remember that at Belgrade the Danube is nearly 
one mile wide, and that with certain exceptions its gen- 


eral width between Vienna and the Iron Gates is from 
six hundred and fifty to two thousand yards at low river. 
From the Iron Gates, where the channel is only about 
eighty yards broad, the river widens out, and through- 
out its course to Braila its average breadth, when the 
water is low, is about half a mile. On the Upper 
Danube, that is, on the part above the Iron Gates, 
traffic is maintained by barges and by special river 
steamers drawing, I believe, up to five or six feet of 
water. So far as one is able to ascertain, such vessels 
can now navigate the stretch between Vienna and 
Turnu Severin at practically all times except when 
the river is stopped by the presence of ice. Below 
Turnu Severin and between there and Braila there 
are about twelve feet of water, and small sea-going 
vessels can therefore pass up and down. Between 
Braila and the Black Sea, by way of the Sulina branch, 
there is a minimum depth of about eighteen feet of 
water. This last-named section of the river is under 
the control of the Danubian Commission. 

The above details are sufficient to prove the enormous 
importance of the Danube, not only as a thoroughfare 
for traffic but also as an obstacle to through communi- 
cation between the north and south. No bridges span 
the river between Peterwardein — a Hungarian town 
situated about forty miles to the northwest of Bel- 
grade — and Cerna Voda in Roumania, that is, for a 
distance of nearly six hundred miles. This means 
that the greater part of Roumania — a country the 
communications in which cannot really be considered 
as part of those in the peninsula — is separated from 
the Balkan States by a natural barrier, the width of 
which is in many places much greater than that of 




either the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles. Thus whilst, 
as I shall show below, eight more or less independent 
Roumanian railways run down to the northern bank 
of the Danube at seven different places, and whilst 
six Bulgarian lines approach its southern bank near 
five different towns, connection between the Rou- 
manian and Bulgarian termini, which are for the most 
part situated almost opposite to each other, is main- 
tained solely by ferry boats which do not carry trains. 
Indeed, the only route by which the railway systems 
of the two countries are actually connected is by way 
of a new line through the Dobrudja, a line which I 
shall discuss later on in this chapter. 

Cerna Voda is on the main line from Bucharest to 
Constanza, and therefore upon the route which in 
peace time is followed by the Orient Express upon 
certain days in the week. Here a great viaduct, or 
more correctly, a series of viaducts, cross the river and 
the lower ground and marshes which border upon it. 
In addition to the supplementary sections, which 
have a length of nearly two miles, the bridge over the 
river alone is not only more than eight hundred yards 
long but the roadway is one hundred feet above the 
level of the water. Built by Roumanian engineers at 
a cost of about £1,400,000, and opened in September, 
1895, it constitutes a possession of which the Rou- 
manians may be justly proud. Indeed, as I have said 
elsewhere, its existence, as also that of the port of 
Constanza, which is now one of the most important 
on the Black Sea, are the fundamental causes for 
which the Roumanians desired to secure a properly 
defensible frontier on the south of the Dobrudja, and 
therefore one of the most important reasons for which 


they insisted upon the acquisition of the areas they 
obtained during and as a result of the two Balkan 

The international status of the Danube depends 
upon various treaties and arrangements which date 
back as far as 1814 and 1815. In the former year, and 
by the Treaty of Paris, it was arranged that the navi- 
gation of the Rhine should be free and that it should 
not be prohibited by any one. In 1815 the Congress 
of Vienna confirmed this arrangement. In 1856, and 
by the Treaty of Paris, it was agreed that the Danube, 
the navigation upon which up till that time had been 
regulated by a treaty between Austria and Russia, 
should be placed under the same rules as those which 
had already been made for international water high- 
ways which traverse more than one State. 

This brings us to a point at which it is necessary to 
consider under more or less separate headings the 
work which has been carried out by the Danube 
Commission, and the larger political position of the 
Danube. This international Commission, which was 
instituted by the Treaty of Paris of 1856, was created 
with the special object of executing the works neces- 
sary to put the lower part of the river and its mouths 
into the best possible state for navigation. Its powers 
have been prolonged by various periods, and in 1878, 
and by the Treaty of Berlin, a Roumanian delegate 
was added. At the same time the work of the Com- 
mission was extended as far west as Galatz. Its juris- 
diction having been again prolonged in the year 1883, 
as far as Braila, the Commission has continued to 
exist since 1904 under a three years' agreement made 
under the Treaty of London signed in 1883. 



The Commission is possessed of extra-territorial 
powers, and it is not in any way under the control of 
the Roumanian Government. It has the right to 
levy tolls, to carry out public works, and to institute 
regulations for the navigation on the part of the river 
which it controls. All members and employees, be- 
sides its works and its establishments, and particularly 
those at Sulina, are to be considered neutral, and in 
case of war they are to be equally respected by all the 
belligerents. The Commission has its own flag and 
badge, and it holds general meetings and committees 
in order to carry out the necessary regulations for 
river traffic. 

It is only possible here very briefly to consider the 
larger political status of the Danube, that is, the status 
of the river from its mouth as far as the Iron Gates. 
By the Treaty of Berlin, it was determined that all 
the fortiflcations on the river between its mouth and 
the Iron Gates should be razed, and that no new ones 
should be created. At the same time it was settled 
that no vessel of war, with the exception of those light 
ones in the service of the river police and of the "Sta- 
tionnaires" of the Powers, which were to be allowed 
to ascend as far as Galatz, should navigate this stretch 
of the river. These regulations, and especially those 
connected with the presence of war vessels, have not 
been carried out to their letter, for Roumania cer- 
tainly possessed river monitors which could hardly be 
necessary for police work 

Many of the numerous international arrangements 
connected with the Danube have been "interpreted" 
by the various enemy belligerents in a manner which 
would certainly not have been accepted by international 


lawyers. Sufficient, therefore, be it to say here that 
as no riverian State possesses the right of searching 
ships which do not stop in her ports, and as no ships 
of war may legally navigate the river, there are un- 
decided problems connected with such questions as 
the freedom of the Danube "in respect to commerce", 
as to the definition of the term "vessel of war", and 
as to the possible difference in status between the 
once entirely Roumanian and the joint Roumanian 
and Serbo-Bulgarian (now Austro-German Bulgarian) 
sections. In war these questions were obviously 
destined to be decided only according to the circum- 
stances of the moment and to the power which any 
particular party possessed to support its own point 
of view. 

I will now proceed to a more detailed description of 
the actual routes which exist or the construction of 
which is in progress or proposed. With only a few 
exceptions I shall say but little in regard to roads, 
because for the most part they follow the general 
lines of, or act as feeders to, railways. Moreover, 
in modern days the movements of large armies are so 
influenced by the necessity for the transportation of 
heavy guns and of vast quantities of munitions and 
of supplies, that these armies are usually compelled to 
take the lines of least resistance and to follow railway 
routes. In order to make my remarks as brief and as 
clear as possible I have divided them into three distinct 

1. An account of what may be called the main lines 
of railway in the peninsula. 

2. A summary of the more important secondary 
lines — a summary in which those lines are grouped 


as far as possible in accordance with the countries 
through which they run. 

3. An outhne of various routes which are not followed 
by railways and a brief explanation of some of the 
lines the construction of which has often been pro- 

By far the most important railway in the Balkan 
Peninsula is that which connects Belgrade with Con- 
stantinople and which follows a route traversed at 
various historical periods by Turks, Crusaders, and 
Slavs. It constitutes the Balkan section of the great 
trunk route from west to east and therefore its domina- 
tion forms a prominent feature in the German *' Drang 
nach Osten " scheme. Of its total length of six hundred 
and fifty-nine miles, two hundred and twelve miles 
are in Serbia, two hundred and seventy-one miles 
are in Bulgaria, and the remaining one hundred and 
seventy-six miles are in Turkey. The line, which has 
no kilometric guarantee, was built during the period 
between 1869 and 1888, when it was opened to 
through trafiic. In the former year Baron Hirsch 
obtained a concession to construct certain railways 
in Turkey. Amongst other important lines con- 
tracted for under that arrangement was one to pass 
through, or more correctly near to, Adrianople, and 
to connect Constantinople with the northwestern fron- 
tier of what was then Eastern Roumelia. This line 
was opened to traffic about the year 1872. The 
original Bulgarian section, that is the stretch extend- 
ing from the above-mentioned frontier to Tsaribrod, 
and the Serbian section, namely the length from 
Tsaribrod to Belgrade, were built as a result of several 
conferences which were held under Article X. of the 


Treaty of Berlin. Owing to various political delays 
these sections were not completed until 1888. The 
Turkish section is still worked under an arrangement 
by which Baron Hirsch entered into a formal agree- 
ment with the Sublime Porte, and under which he 
formed a company or syndicate, now called the Oriental 
Railway Company, to exploit the line on behalf of the 
Ottoman Government. The Bulgarian part, which 
now includes the whole section between Luleh Burgas 
and Tsaribrod, and, until the defeat of that country, 
the Serbian part extending from there to Belgrade, 
are worked by the State railways of the respective 
countries. In peace time this route is followed by 
the Orient Express, and through communication is 
maintained by at least one daily passenger train in 
each direction — a train which has become familiarly 
known as the "Conventionnel", probably because its 
existence depends upon a Convention originally signed 
by Austria, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey. 

After crossing the Save by an iron bridge, the length 
of which is over four hundred yards at Belgrade, which 
lies at the junction of that river with the Danube, the 
line runs through hilly country to Veliko Plana. On 
this section, and near a place called Ripany, situated 
about fifteen miles to the south of Belgrade, there is a 
tunnel about a mile and a quarter long. From Veliko 
Plana, where it enters the valley of the Morava, and 
for a distance of some ninety -five miles the line follows 
the banks of that river almost to Nisli, whence it turns 
in a more easterly direction and hugs the bank of the 
Nishava, subsequently crossing the Dragoman Pass 
and the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier. After crossing the 
Sofia plateau the line enters the valley of the great 


Maritza, not by Trajan's Gate, through which the 
historical road to the East ran, but by a pass situated 
just to the southwest of it. Thence it traverses the 
plain of Eastern Roumelia, flanked on the north by the 
Balkan Range and on the south by the Rhodopes, 
until, after leaving Bulgarian territory at Luleh Bur- 
gas, it enters the valley of the Erkene, by which it 
continues its ever-winding way until it reaches the 
northwestern end of what is known as the Peninsula of 
Constantinople. After passing through the Chatalja 
Lines and the ancient walls of the Ottoman capital it 
finally arrives at its terminus on the southwestern side 
of the Golden Horn. 

Second only in significance to this line is the railway 
which connects Nish with Salonica. The length of 
this line is two hundred and seventy-eight miles. The 
northern section, that is, the section from Nish to 
Ristovats, was built by the Serbians and opened in 
the year 1888. Its length is seventy miles. The re- 
maining two hundred and eight miles were built 
for the Ottoman Government by Baron Hirsch, the 
greater part being opened in 1872. The Turkish sec- 
tion, which had no kilometric guarantee, was worked 
by the Oriental Railway Company until the Balkan 
Wars of 1912-1913. As a result of these wars the 
Serbians secured, and subsequently took over the 
working of, the line between Ristovats and Ghevgeli 
— a section which has a length of just over one hun- 
dred and fifty miles. The rest of this line, that is, 
the part between Ghevgeli and Salonica, has been in 
Greek territory since these wars, but the Hellenic 
section continued to be worked by the Oriental Rail- 
way Company until after the order for Greek mobilisa- 


tion issued at the end of September, 1915, when it was 
taken over by the Government, and more or less since 
which time it has been practically in the hands of the 

Following the valleys of the Morava and the Vardar 
this line takes the great highroad from north to south 
across the Balkan Peninsula. If seriously improved 
or rebuilt, and if better harbour facilities were available 
at Salonica, this line would constitute the shortest 
and the most direct route from Europe to Egypt, 
India, and the Far East. Since the outbreak of the 
War, it has been most important partly because t was 
by way of it that Serbia was at first able to communi- 
cate with the sea and partly because it constitutes the 
natural line of advance from Salonica into the interior. 
But as it runs more or less parallel to the Bulgarian 
frontier, and as it passes through one or more narrow 
gorges, it was easy of attack by the army of that 
country, which secured possession of considerable sec- 
tions directly after the Bulgarian entry into the arena 
of the War. 

There remains one other railway of very considerable 
importance. It leaves the main Belgrade-Constan- 
tinople route at Luleh Burgas, a junction situated on 
the right bank of the River Maritza, and lying at a 
distance of about eighteen miles to the south of Adrian- 
ople. This line forms the connecting link between 
the Constantinople-Adrianople Railway and Salonica. 
The first section — that part between Luleh Burgas 
and Dede Agatch, which runs down the valley of the 
Maritza — was originally constructed and worked 
with and by the Oriental railways. Its length is 
approximately sixty miles. The second section, that 


is, the part between Dede Agatch and Salonica, was 
built and exploited up to the time of the Balkan Wars 
by a French company. With a very large kilometric 
guarantee — the highest guarantee ever given for a 
railway built on this system — this line, including 
two short branches, has a length of two hundred and 
sixty-five miles. Of these about ninety miles are now 
in Bulgaria and the remainder nominally in Greece. 
The main line from Dede Agatch to Salonica runs 
practically parallel to and at an average distance of 
some fifteen miles from the Aegean coast, and it 
traverses the plain which lies between that coast and 
the Rhodope Balkans. Passing Gumuljina in Bul- 
garia and Drama, Seres, and Demir Hissar in Greece, 
it approaches within a distance of about twenty miles 
of Kavala, but it touches the seacoast only at Dede 
Agatch and near Porto Lagos. As the geographical 
position of this railway is one of extreme importance 
it is advisable to remember that a loop or branch line 
connects the Maritza Valley Railway with the line to 
Salonica without passing through Dede Agatch, and 
that big ships cannot enter the arm of the sea which 
lies to the north of Porto Lagos. The loop at Dede 
Agatch has its strategical significance, for instead of 
absolutely approaching the coast, it follows a route 
which lies behind the hills and at a distance of nearly 
nine miles from the shore. 

As a result of the Balkan W^ars the ownership and 
the working of the Bulgarian sections of these railways 
— parts which were at once seized by the Bulgarian 
Government — became most unsatisfactory. This was 
the case because the only means of railway communica- 
tion between the main part of Bulgaria and the Bui- 


garian port of Dede Agatch was by way of a line con- 
siderable parts of which were in Ottoman territory. 
In other words, as the Turks owned the railway be- 
tween a point situated just to the southeast of Mus- 
tapha Pasha and Mandra, lying to the southwest of 
Demotika, this line could only be used by the Bul- 
garians on the strength of an arrangement made by 
them with Turkey after the second Balkan war. 
Whilst in peace it was open to countless disadvantages, 
in war it was possessed of complications, the nature of 
which it is impossible to exaggerate. It was for this 
reason that the Germans, as I have explained else- 
where, compelled the Turks to agree to the Turco- 
Bulgarian Convention, by which the formerly Otto- 
man areas situated on the west, or right banks, of the 
rivers Tunja and Maritza were handed over to Bul- 
garia. As a result of this arrangement, the Bulgarians 
secured possession of the whole line from Mustapha 
Pasha to Dede Agatch, and they therefore became the 
owners of the railway from the former place as far as 
Okjilar on the Dede Agatch-Salonica ' line.^ The 
Greeks on their part are the nominal owners of the 
section from Okjilar to Salonica. As in the cases of 
other railways running through now Hellenic territory, 
this line was worked under the old arrangements until 
it was taken over by the Greek Government after the 
promulgation of the 1915 order for mobilisation, since 
which time a considerable area of the country through 
which it runs has been occupied by the Bulgarians. 

^ At the time of writing it is reported that all or part of this area, includ- 
ing the Station of Adrianople, situated on the right bank of the Maritza, 
and known as Karagatch, has been restored to Turkey by Bulgaria. The 
accuracy of this report and the real reason for a second transference of this 
area, however, still remain to be proved. 


Although it is not strictly speaking a main line, its 
geographical position, partly in Greece and partly in 
Serbia, makes it convenient here very briefly to refer 
to the railway which connects Salonica with Monastir. 
This railway, with a total length of one hundred and 
thirty-six miles, was opened in the year 1890. 
With a kilometric guarantee of £572 per mile, it was 
worked by the Oriental Railway Company until the 
Balkan Wars. After that the Serbian, or northern 
section, the length of which is only about fifteen miles, 
was taken over by the Serbian Government. The 
remainder of the line, administered more or less under 
the former arrangements until the 1915 Greek mobili- 
sation, was then taken over by the Hellenic Govern- 
ment. The railway is of considerable importance be- 
cause it serves an area of country which would other- 
wise be far from accessible — the proposed line from 
Kuprulu (Veles) to Monastir running entirely through 
Serbian territory was not constructed before the enemy 
occupation of this area ^ — and because for years it 
has been part of the programme of Balkan railway 
construction to prolong it through Albania to some 
point on the Adriatic. Moreover as it runs through 
Gidia, Veria, and Fiorina, it provides through com- 
munication with Athens by a line which now connects 
Larissa with Gidia — a line concerning which I will 
give further particulars below. 

Having thus briefly outlined the positions and im- 
portance of the main lines of railway in the Balkan 
Peninsula, I will now proceed to a summary of what 
may be called the secondary and for the most part 

^ It is reported that the Germans or the Bulgarians have now built at 
least a considerable section of this line. 


internal communications — that is, communications 
which, important as they are in themselves, do not 
with certain exceptions (particularly in Roumania) 
maintain any connection with those of a foreign 
country. Let us begin with Roumania, which lying 
as it does for the most part to the north of the Danube, 
has only one linking railway with those of the remainder 
of the peninsula. 

Ignoring the roads, which are national and for the 
most part good, the railways of Roumania, which 
have a length of nearly two thousand four hundred 
miles and all of which are either State owned or worked, 
may for the present purposes be discussed under 
two headings — firstly the main line which runs 
more or less east and west across the country together 
with its feeders, and secondly that which runs approxi- 
mately in a northerly and southerly direction through 
the northern horn of the kingdom together with 
its tributaries. The great east and west line starts 
from Constanza, on the Black Sea, crosses the Cerna 
Voda bridge and passing through Bucharest, goes to 
Verciorova on the frontier, whence it turns in a north- 
erly direction and continues its way to Budapest and 
Vienna. This line has numerous feeders which run 
up to it from the south. The first, which joins it at 
Medgidia in the Dobrudja, is the only railway (except 
the trunk line passing through Belgrade) by which 
through communication exists between the Balkan 
Peninsula and the remainder of Europe. Meeting 
the Bulgarian system at Oborishte on the Roumano- 
Bulgarian frontier, it was constructed by the Rou- 
manians after the Balkan Wars, only being completed 
subsequent to the outbreak of the European conflagra- 


tion. With a length of about seventy miles it is highly 
important commercially because it enables goods and 
passengers to be conveyed from Bucharest to Sofia 
or vice versa without the necessity for any trans- 
shipment on the banks of the Danube. It has played 
a significant strategic part in the War, for it greatly 
furthered the Bulgarian advance into Roumania. 
Since the enemy occupation of the Dobrudja this line 
is believed to have been prolonged in a northerly 
direction from Medgidia as far as Babadagh or Tultcha 
or some other point on the south of the Danube. 

Ignoring the great international routes going through 
Moldavia and running up to the Predeal Pass, which 
must be considered separately, this East and West 
Line is approached from the south and from the north 
by several railways which have played a prominent 
part in the War. On the south and running down 
to the Danube, there are six railways, four of which 
approach the northern bank of the river opposite 
or nearly opposite to Bulgarian railway termini. 

On the north, ignoring several lines of more or less 
local significance, the Constanza-Verciorova Railway 
is approached by two important highways. The first 
is the Fateshti-Buzeu line, which constituted the 
route followed by the Berlin-Breslau-Cracow-Lemberg- 
Constanza Express, run prior to the War in competition 
to the Orient Express. Passing over the Chiulnitza- 
Slobodzie-Ployesti branch, and the two lines to the 
west of Bucharest which run up towards but not 
across the Roumanian frontier from Pitesti, we come 
to the Riatra-Cainen Railway which passes through 
the Rotherturm Pass and connects with the Hungarian 
railway system. 


What I have described as the south and north rail- 
way system of Roumania starts from Bucharest and 
runs by way of Ployesti-Buzeu-Adjud and Pashkani 
to Suczawa on the frontier of the Bukovina. This 
railway, which traverses Moldavia, is met at Ployesti, 
in the heart of the oil country, by the international 
line which goes to Sinaia, the great summer resort of 
fashionable Roumanians, and subsequently passes 
through the Predeal Pass into Hungary. The Bu- 
charest-Suczawa line also has branches respectively 
running towards the west and east. Whilst the most 
significant leading in the former direction is that 
which runs from Adjud through the Gyimes Pass 
and into Hungary, the most important running to 
the east are those which connect Buzeu with Fateshti 
near Cerna Voda, Buzeu with Braila, Moresesti with 
Tecuciu (on the independent Russian frontier line 
from Galatz to Jassy) and Pashkani with Jassy and the 
Russian frontier. 

The above remarks, if studied in conjunction with 
a map, are intended to prove four things. Firstly, 
the communications existing in Roumania are of vital 
importance as giving access to the Danube from the 
north and of considerable significance as providing 
the shortest routes from southeastern Hungary into 
Russia. It was for these reasons, as I have already 
explained, that Germany desired the entry of Rou- 
mania into the W^ar on one side or the other. Secondly, 
the railways of Southern Roumania were such as to 
facilitate a military concentration by that country 
on the northern bank of the Danube and therefore 
against Bulgaria, or to further a Bulgarian advance 
into Roumania once a crossing of the river were ef- 


fected, as it was effected at the end of 1916. Thirdly, 
whilst the enemy had an effective system of railways 
running more or less parallel to his Transylvanian 
frontier, the Roumanians had only the one semi- 
circular line from Suczawa by way of Ployesti, Bu- 
charest, and Pitesti to Verciorova — a line which was 
very inadequately connected with the frontier. And 
fourthly, if, and so far as the Roumanian railways 
had been constructed for strategical purposes at all, 
this had been done with a view to war against Russia 
rather than as a preparation for hostilities against 

Turning to Serbia, during the years which preceded 
the outbreak of the War, and particularly since the 
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, the 
Government had been devoting large sums of money 
to railway construction. The Serbian lines are of 
two distinct categories — normal and narrow-gauge 

All the railways in Serbia, except two, really con- 
stitute branches of or feeders to the main trunk line 
from Belgrade to Constantinople. I will deal first 
with those which run from the main line in a more or 
less westerly direction. Of these there are three. 
The first and last — both narrow-gauge lines — are 
important because they jut out towards the Bosnian 
frontier and therefore towards the railways of that 
province, with which ere now they may well have 
been connected by the enemy and with which they 
are destined to be united should Bosnia go to Serbia, 
as we hope that it will as a result of the present War. 
On the east or northeast of the main trunk route there 
are three Serbian railways of considerable and two of 


only local significance. The first important one runs 
from Veliko Plana to Semendria, and follows the 
valley of the Morava. It was used by the Austro- 
German forces when they advanced into Serbia in 
the autumn of 1915. The second connects Nish with 
Prahov on the Danube. The whole of this line was 
not open to passenger traffic before Serbia was over- 
run by the enemy, but it has certainly been completed 
by now. Between these two lines there is an im- 
portant narrow-gauge railway, which unites the main 
trunk route with the one from Nish to Prahov. These 
latter lines facilitated the Bulgarian advance and occu- 
pation of northeastern Serbia. 

As already stated, there are only two railways in 
Serbia which ha^ve no connection with the main trunk 
route from Belgrade to Constantinople. The first of 
these unites Shabatz on the Save with Loznitza on the 
Drina. The second is that which runs through the 
district best known as the Sanjak of Novibazar — 
that narrow tongue of formerly Turkish territory 
which up to the time of the Balkan Wars separated 
Serbia from Montenegro. This line now forms a 
branch of the main route from Nish to Salonica. 
Leaving that railway at Uskub, it runs in a north- 
westerly direction to Mitrovitza and has a length of 
seventy -four miles. It was constructed for the Otto- 
man Government under the arrangements made with 
Baron Hirsch, and it actually formed part of the 
original line from Salonica, for the section from Uskub 
to the then Serbian frontier was not built until after- 
wards. Of the famous and long-proposed railway 
from Mitrovitza to the Austro-Hungarian frontier I 
will say more later on. 


Turning to Bulgaria we have the Balkan country 
in which by far the greatest amount of attention has 
been paid to the construction of railways and roads. 
Whilst in the year 1887 there were no railways in 
Bulgaria proper, only some two hundred miles, con- 
structed under the auspices of the Turkish Govern- 
ment, were open to traffic in Eastern Roumelia. After 
the Balkan Wars, the Bulgarian State, including East- 
ern Roumelia, had over fourteen hundred miles of 
railway open, besides several lines under construc- 
tion. The railways, which are all State owned, are 
well equipped and efficiently run and managed. In- 
deed the visitor who takes the principal routes is so 
well accommodated in sleeping and restaurant cars 
that it is difficult for him to believe that he is really 
travelling on a Balkan branch line at all. Moreover 
the districts which are not yet effectively provided 
with railways are well served with roads which are 
maintained in a state of repair which far surpasses 
that of any other highways existing in the Balkans. 

Whilst some of them are so important that they can 
hardly be considered as branches of the main line, it is 
convenient for the present purposes to consider the 
railways of Bulgaria as feeders of the great trunk 
route from Belgrade to Constantinople. A line runs 
from Sofia up the gorgelike valley of the Isker and 
then across the plains of Northern Bulgaria to Varna 
on the Black Sea. In its turn it has what may be 
called six distinct branches running toward the North, 
five of which approach the Danube at five different 
places, opposite to most of which, as I have already 
said, there are Roumanian railway towns from which 
connection is made with the interior of that country. 


All these lines running up to and towards the Danube, 
together with the trans-Balkan line described below, 
have been most important since 1914. During the 
neutrality of Bulgaria, as since the entry of that 
country into the War, they have been utilised for 
the transportation of men and goods coming from 
Central Europe across or by way of the Danube, to 
Turkey. This has relieved the traffic pressure on 
the main line from Belgrade to Constantinople. More- 
over, after the adhesion of Bulgaria to the cause of the 
enemy, these railways and especially the more easterly 
lines were utilised to facilitate the Bulgarian advance 
into the Dobrudja and Southern Roumania. 

The Sofia- Varna line is connected with the Philip- 
popolis-Burgas railway, to which I will refer in detail 
later, by one which traverses the Balkan Range. This 
line, which is obviously of the greatest importance, 
was only opened quite recently. Instead of following 
the old road from Turnovo to Kazanlik by way of 
the Shipka Pass, it takes a more easterly route and 
passes through the Travna Gap. By so doing a climb 
of nearly 1000 feet is saved, for, whilst the altitude of 
the Shipka is 4378 feet, that of the Travna is only 
3359 feet. The use of this line enables merchandise 
or troops to be rapidly conveyed by railway from 
Northern to Southern Bulgaria, or vice versa, without 
being compelled as formerly to pass through Sofia. 
As a matter of fact it played a considerable role even 
before the entry of Bulgaria into the War, for it was 
by it that munitions destined for Turkey were for the 
most part forwarded from the Danube to the Ottoman 

At Sofia and from the main trunk route a railway 


branches off in a southwesterly direction, and runs 
to Gyuveshevo absolutely on the Serbo-Bulgarian 
frontier. It is important because of the facilities 
which it gives for a military concentration in this part 
of Bulgaria, and therefore for a Bulgarian advance 
upon Uskub, and also because it was intended as the 
Bulgarian section of line finally to link Sofia with that 
town and perhaps to form part of a great line from 
the Danube to the Adriatic. Had the second Balkan 
war not occurred, the Bulgarians would then have 
constructed another line from Radomir, by way of 
Dubnitza and the Struma Valley, to the shores of the 
Aegean. As a matter of fact since their entry into 
the War they have built the northern section of this 
line, which is believed to be open in the form of a light 
railway as far as Lipnitza just to the north of the 
former Graeco-Bulgarian frontier. 

Between Sofia and the Turco-Bulgarian frontier 
there are only two railways which branch from the 
main line. They both run in a northeasterly direction. 
The first is by far the most important. It connects 
Philippopolis with Burgas. The second branch leaves 
the main line at Turnovo Siemenli (Sejmen). It runs 
in an almost due northerly direction to Nova Zagora, 
where it meets the above-described Philippopolis- 
Burgas railway. Its importance has been consider- 
ably decreased of late, for since the construction of 
the section Philippopolis-Cirpan it no longer forms the 
only line connecting Burgas with the remainder of 
Europe, and through traffic from Sofia to Burgas goes 
now by Philippopolis and Cirpan instead of by Tur- 
novo Siemenli. According to some reports a line has 
recently been constructed from Jamboli on the Burgas 


Railway to Adrianople. Others deny these, and hav- 
ing regard to all the circumstances it seems very likely 
that they are not authentic. 

In Turkish Thrace the means of communication are 
still extremely indifferent, and this not only because 
of the lack of railways, but also on account of the bad 
state of repair in which Turkish roads are always main- 
tained. Whilst the construction of several railways 
has been under discussion for years, unless the Germans 
have recently constructed others, the only one actually 
open is that which runs in a northerly direction to 
Kirk Kilissa. It is important because it facilitates 
the means of communication between Turkey and 
Southeastern Bulgaria by shortening the distance to 
be covered by road. 

With regard to the roads, if we ignore all minor 
routes, there are at least three which lead from rail- 
ways in a northerly or northeasterly direction. The 
first unites Adrianople in Turkey with Jamboli in 
Bulgaria, and follows the route possibly now taken 
by the above-mentioned railway. The second runs 
in a northerly direction from Kirk Kilissa towards 
the frontier. Both these were used by the Bulgarians 
in their advance during the first Balkan war. There 
is also a road from near Tchorlu to Midia on the Black 

On the south there are several roads connecting the 
coast of the Sea of Marmora with the railway from 
Constantinople to Adrianople. Without discussing 
those located in the more or less immediate neighbour- 
hood of the Ottoman capital, we have four so-called 
thoroughfares which are worthy of mention. The 
first two connect Rodosto with the railway. Their 


importance is that they enable troops, landed from 
Asia Minor at Rodosto, to be marched into the interior 
and towards Adrianople. The third runs from Rodosto 
by way of Malgara to Keshan where it meets the main 
route by which land communication is maintained 
between Uzun Kupru on the railway and the Peninsula 
of Gallipoli. This last-named road, which was prac- 
tically rebuilt a few years ago, is certainly passable 
for all arms. Even before its completion about the 
year 1910 it was feasible for vehicles to travel by it 
without any danger of being stuck in the mud, and 
without any serious inconvenience to their occupants. 

Having thus very briefly described practically all the 
railways existing in the Balkan Peninsula except those 
in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Greece, I 
will now proceed to a discussion of a few of the great 
international routes which are partly or entirely de- 
void of railways. In order to make the discussion 
the more -clear I will divide it into three main sections. 
They are — 

(1) Some of the possible means of advancing into 
the interior from the Adriatic. 

(2) The routes which lead from what may be called 
Old Greece into the area united to that country after 
the Balkan Wars. 

(3) The roads or communications by which it is 
possible to enter the main part of Bulgaria from the 
Aegean, from Greece, and from Serbia. 

Although at the present time, and when the future 
ownership of large areas of the Balkan Peninsula is 
uncertain, it is useless to enter into a long and detailed 
account of the railways whose construction has been 
proposed at various times, that question is so closely 


bound up with the various existing Hues of communi- 
cation that a brief reference to it may not be out of 
place. In order to understand it aright, and particu- 
larly to grasp what has been done or what may be 
done in the western part of the peninsula, it is neces- 
sary first to give a brief description of the lines leading 
to and already existing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Since the occupation of those provinces in 1878, the 
Austro-Hungarian Government has adopted a policy 
of peaceful penetration — a policy furthered and sup- 
ported by the construction of hotels, of public build- 
ings, of roads, and of railways. A line of great 
importance extends from India on the main Belgrade- 
Vienna Railway to Fiume on the Adriatic. That 
railway and others coming from Vienna and Buda- 
pest give access to a main-line (narrow gauge) railway, 
which runs from north to south of the annexed prov- 
inces and connects Bosnish Brod on the southern 
bank of the Save with Zelenika on the northern shore 
of the Bocche di Cattaro. On the west tliis line is fed 
by branches which connect it with Jajce in Central 
Bosnia and with Gravosa on the Dalmatian coast. 
On the east, in addition to several short and therefore 
comparatively unimportant lines, there are branches 
which run towards the Serbian and Montenegrin 

The natural routes by which two of these railways 
could be connected with those of Serbia would be by 
the construction of lines from Siminhan to Vahevo, 
and from Vardishte to Ujitse. The advantage of the 
adoption of one or both of these plans would be that 
as the Bosnian railways are of the same gauge as those 
of Western Serbia no alteration or reconstruction 


would be required on any of the existing lines. Further 
to the south it will be remembered that prior to the 
Balkan Wars the Austrians had for years been desirous 
of constructing a line through the Sanjak of Novi- 
bazar from Uvats on their frontier to Mitrovitza 
— the terminus of the railway from TJskub. Shortly 
before the re-establishment of the Turkish Constitu- 
tion and when the route still lay across Ottoman terri- 
tory, Abdul Hamid actually signed an Irade granting 
permission for the making of the preliminary surveys 
for its construction. With a length of about one 
hundred and forty miles it would provide an alternative 
route to Salonica. But as there could be no through 
communication on railways of different gauges, it 
is clear that the sole object of this scheme was a 
strategical one — an object which formed part of 
Austria's attempt to push her way down to the Aegean. 
The narrow-gauge lines of Bosnia might be relaid — a 
work entailing enormous expense owing to the moun- 
tainous nature of the country — or the present exist- 
ing line to Banjaluka — a line which is of the normal 
gauge — might be prolonged by way of Jajce and 
Serajevo to the Bosnian frontier, but as things stand 
at present it is difficult to foresee the existence of a 
political situation in which such an undertaking is 
likely to become one of practical politics. 

For many years there have been two more or less 
rival schemes for uniting the Danube with the Adriatic. 
First, a great Slav railway to run through Serbia and 
either Montenegro or Albania; and, second, a line 
through Bulgaria and thence to the seacoast. In view 
of the present political and military situations, it is 
impossible to forecast the considerations which may 


influence the ultimate construction of one or both of 
these hues. Sufficient, therefore, be it to say that 
the Serbian scheme is by no means a new one. It 
would provide connection with Roumania by a bridge 
across the Danube somewhere near Prahov, and it 
would run, via Nish and Mitrovitza, probably to San 
Giovanni di Medua or to Antivari. The Bulgarian 
plan has always been to establish through communi- 
cation from Roumania to Salonica or to the Adriatic 
by way of Sofia. The construction of a bridge across 
the Danube has been proposed at Vidin, Sistova, or 
Rustchuk. The missing links are therefore the section 
from Gyuveshevo to Komanovo, and from Uskub or 
Monastir to the Adriatic. 

In approaching a discussion of the communications 
between the lower part of the Adriatic coast, it will be 
convenient to classify the routes existing prior to the 
enemy advance of 1915-1916 into sections devoted 
respectively to descriptions of the roads then running 
through Montenegro alone, through Albania and 
Montenegro, and through Albania alone. Since that 
time it is probable that the Austro-Germans have 
done a great deal to improve the communications in 
these two countries. 

The only line of advance through Montenegro alone 
runs from the port of Antivari and by way of the 
Antivari-Virbazar railway — a short stretch of narrow- 
gauge line which, with the port of Antivari, was con- 
structed by an Italian company. In Montenegro an 
excellent road connects the Austrian port of Cattaro 
with Cettinje, Podgoritza, and Niksics. As branches 
of this main route there are roads from Riyeka to Vir- 
bazar and thence to Antivari, and from Podgoritza 


to Plavnitza, a port on Lake Scutari. For some time 
prior to the war the Montenegrins had planned to 
build a road from Podgoritza to Andriyevitza and 
to prolong it by two routes running to the frontier. 
It has also been suggested that these roads should 
be extended across the frontier to Novibazar and 
to Mitrovitza respectively. Political conditions and, 
above all, the jealousy existing between Serbia and 
Montenegro had, however, prevented the realisation 
of this latter idea. As things stood at the time of 
the Montenegrin defeat, a road actually existed from 
Podgoritza to Andriyevitza. The most direct and 
easy route to be followed by a possible future rail- 
way is that by way of Andriyevitza, Berane, and 
thence to Novibazar and up the valley of the River 
Ibar to the railway town of Kralievo in Serbia. 

In order to use routes for passing through Albania 
and Montenegro one would land at San Giovanni di 
Medua, and go from there to Scutari by road, or else 
go up the River Boyana to the capital of Northern 
Albania. The port of San Giovanni di Medua con- 
sists of a few houses located on the northern side of 
a small bay. That bay is more or less sheltered, but 
no facilities exist for the disembarkation or embarka- 
tion of men or war material. The road to Scutari 
was made passable for wheeled traffic and for motors 
during the summer of the year 1914 when the new 
bridge over the River Drinitza and near Scutari was 
opened. To use the Boyana, men and goods would have 
to be trans-shipped to small steamers at San Giovanni 
di Medua or at the mouth of the river and again at 
Oboti. From Scutari, lake boats would be used as far 
as Virbazar, Riyeka, or Plavnitza in Montenegro. 


Through Albania alone there are three possible 
general lines of communication between the coast 
and the interior. The first follows the above-men- 
tioned route to Scutari and from there, after running 
up the Drin Valley for some miles, crosses the moun- 
tains to Prisrend — a town allotted to Serbia by the 
London Ambassadorial Conference. This route, which 
dates from Roman times, continues to Ferisovitch on 
the Uskub-Mitrovitza railway, and was used by the 
Serbian Government and by the French Aeroplane 
Mission when they retreated to Scutari at the end of 

The second route, which runs from Durazzo into 
the interior, follows the line of the celebrated Via 
Egnatia for about one hundred and twenty miles, 
reaching the head of the Salonica-Monastir railway 
at the last-named place. Of these one hundred and 
twenty-five miles not more than the section from 
Monastir to Struga — which is about forty-five miles 
— was passable for wheeled traffic, prior to the enemy 
occupation of Northern Albania. The remainder of 
the road consisted of nothing better than an extremely 
bad and ill-kept path, and unless it has been improved 
it could not be utilised by a European force made up 
of all arms and accompanied by the big guns and by 
the transport required in modern warfare. 

As a northern alternative to this route, there is a 
road which connects Durazzo with Tirana and a path 
leading from the latter place to Dibra. In the south 
there is a road from Avlona to Berat and to Elbasan, 
but owing to its greater length and to the fact that 
the plains are practically impassable in bad weather 
it possesses little claim to be considered as of equal 


importance to that which follows the Scumbi Valley. 
Since their occupation of Southern Albania, the Italians, 
as I have said elsewhere, have constructed several 
lengths of road in the area which they hold. 

The third and most southerly route through Albania 
is by far the best road in that country. Throughout 
its length it is passable for wheeled traffic, and it must 
now have been greatly improved by the Italians who 
are in occupation of the greater part of it. Starting 
from Santi Quaranta, a port situated almost immedi- 
ately opposite to the northern end of the Island of 
Corfu, it connects that place with Korcha and with 
Monastir. The first section of the road is part of that 
originally built by the Turks to connect Janina with 
the coast. A part of this route (roughly twenty miles) 
runs through territory which officially belongs to 
Greece. This is the case, because when Santi Qua- 
ranta and Korcha were given by Europe to Albania, 
the natural and existing means of communication 
between these two most important places was inter- 
rupted by a frontier delimitation in the neighbourhood 
of Doliani, a delimitation in which the practical condi- 
tions of life were completely and unfairly ignored at 
the expense of Albania, and in order to put off inter- 
national dangers which were then looming in the 

Before discussing the communications which are 
available between Old Greece, that is, the area which 
formed part of the Hellenic monarchy before the 
Balkan Wars, and the remainder of the peninsula, it 
may be well to remind my readers that whilst that 
country possessed a fairly effective railway system, 
that system was not until after those Wars connected 


with the railways of the remainder of Europe. For 
years two more or less rival schemes, each destined to 
accomplish this object, had been under consideration. 
The Turkish proposal was for the construction of a 
line to join Larissa in Greece with Veria on the Salonica- 
Monastir line. This line would have run parallel to 
but well away from the coast. The Greeks, on the 
other hand, favoured the provision of a line extending 
almost along the shore of the Gulf of Salonica from 
Karate Derven, their terminus, to Gidia on the above- 
mentioned line. As a matter of fact, in January, 1914, 
a contract was signed between the Hellenic Govern- 
ment and a French company for the building of a line 
to follow this the original Greek route, and the line 
is now available for traffic. 

With regard to roads, there are three principal 
routes by which Greece maintains communication 
with her new provinces. To begin with there is a 
good road from Prevesa, at the entrance to the Gulf 
of Arta, to Janina. Further to the northeast there 
is a route which connects Kalabaka — a Greek rail- 
way terminus — with Janina by way of Metsovo. 
Again, from Larissa it is possible to travel by way of 
Elasona to Kozani and thence to the Salonica-Monastir 
railway by several different roads. 

In approaching a discussion of the last question to 
be dealt with here, namely, the routes leading into the 
heart of Bulgaria from the south and southwest, it 
may be said that there are three principal lines, none 
of which is followed by a completed railway, and all 
of which are practicable for wheeled traffic. Two of 
these traverse or practically traverse the Rhodope 
Balkans and the third runs from Northern Macedonia 


up to the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier. Of the first pair 
the most easterly route is that which connects Gu- 
muljina on the Dede Agatch hne with Haskovo in 
Old Bulgaria. The greater part of the road, which 
now lies wholly in Bulgaria, was constructed by the 
Turks for military purposes during the closing years 
of the reign of Abdul Hamid. After the Balkan Wars 
it was greatly improved by the Bulgarians, who fore- 
saw its enormous importance as a means of communi- 
cation with the coast. Always well engineered and 
laid out, this road is certainly now practicable for 
motor traffic, for before the entry of Bulgaria into 
the War it was easy to make the whole journey in a 
day, and by the use of motor cars for hire in Haskovo 
or even in a motor diligence which maintained a daily 

At the end of 1913 when it became necessary for the 
Bulgarians to turn their attention to the provision 
of some satisfactory port upon the Aegean, and to 
connect that port with the interior by a line not pass- 
ing through Turkish territory, the preliminary surveys 
for a railway to follow more or less the above route 
were undertaken. Owing to the engineering difficulties 
and to the necessity for two important tunnels, the 
construction of this line would have taken three or 
four years, and nothing further was done to realise 
the project before the entry of Bulgaria into the 
present War. 

If we ignore the road which leads into but, unless 
it has just been prolonged, not right across the Rho- 
dopes from Drama, and which runs up the Mesta 
Valley, the next route by which it is possible to advance 
right into the interior is that which takes the valley 


of the Struma, and therefore hugs the banks of the 
river of that name. This Hne constitutes the natural 
outlet for Bulgaria tov/ards the Aegean, and particularly 
by way of the port of Kavala. It is for this reason 
that the Government of Sofia was particularly anxious 
to obtain possession of that port, and to secure a 
frontier which gave to Bulgaria the whole Struma 

A good and thoroughly passable Struma Valley 
road, which has now been supplemented by a light 
railway for the greater part of its length, connects 
Demir Hissar with Radomir. For some years prior to 
the Balkan Wars the construction of a railway by way 
of this route was under discussion. That the scheme 
was not executed was due to military and political 
rather than to economic considerations. For obvious 
reasons the Turks were anxious for its construction 
as an alternative to the proposed Bulgarian line from 
Gyuveshevo to Komanovo, and this because it would 
have been easy of attack from the west and from the 
east, and because it would not have given to Bulgaria 
those political advantages possessed by a line leading 
direct from Sofia into Bulgarian Macedonia. The 
idea was also favoured by the French Salonica-Dede 
Agatch Railway Company because the line in question 
would have constituted an important feeder to their 
system. But the Bulgarians were willing to build 
their section only on the condition that the Turks 
agreed to construct the Gyuveshevo-Komanovo line. 
The permanent realisation of this idea, as of many 
others connected with the Balkan Peninsula, will now 
entirely depend upon the territorial changes brought 
about by the war. 


As the means of communication between the valleys 
of the Vardar and the Struma are bad, the only other 
route into Bulgaria which is worthy of consideration 
here is that from Northern Macedonia and that which 
connects Komanovo on the Uskub-Nish railway with 
Gyuveshevo, the Bulgarian frontier terminus. The 
road is certainly passable for wheeled traffic, and it is 
probable that ere now it has been rendered practicable 
for motors. For some years it has always been con- 
sidered that this route might be the one to be followed 
by the first line to establish through connection be- 
tween the Danube and the Adriatic. No serious 
engineering difficulties exist, and the only portion of 
the line that would be costly to construct is the tunnel 
piercing the Deve Bair Mountain. It is therefore 
probable that since their occupation of this part of 
the country the Bulgarians have built or are build- 
ing at least the section of this line where no tunnels 
are required. 

Partly owing to the great difference between the 
amount of water in most of the rivers after the melting 
of the snows and after the dry season, and partly owing 
to the lack of public works, the rivers of the Balkan 
Peninsula, except the Danube, the Save, and the 
Boy ana, are not systematically navigated. I have 
already referred to the importance of the Danube. 
The Save, which more or less forms the western section 
of the northern frontier of the peninsula, has a length 
of about four hundred and forty miles, but of these 
only about three hundred and fifty are navigable. 
The Boyana, which constitutes an outlet for Lake 
Scutari, flows into the Adriatic between the towns of 
Dulcigno and San Giovanni di Medua. In its lower 


coilrse it forms the boundary of Montenegro and 
Albania. When the river is full, and when there is 
enough water to get over the bar at its mouth, it is 
navigable for small vessels as far as Oboti. Thence 
to the port of Scutari there is only sufficient water 
for small stern-wheeled vessels or for boats whose 
owners make their livelihoods by conveying passengers 
from lake and river vessels to the quay. Small barges 
or flat-bottomed boats may be seen drifting down the 
lower reaches of the Maritza, and the rivers of the 
Rhodope Balkans are utilised for floating logs and trees 
to the plain which skirts the Aegean Sea ; but the rivers 
have not really been used for the furtherance of trade. 
In the foregoing pages I have endeavoured to give 
some idea of the military highways of the Balkans. 
In so doing I have not attempted fully to discuss 
the various parts played by these communications in 
the present war, and I have purposely considered the 
position of the frontiers and the ownership of the 
railways to be as they were before the War. To have 
done otherwise would have meant that I must still 
further have burdened my readers with countless 
details, and that I must either have gone into par- 
ticulars which it were better should not be published, 
or else that I should have been compelled to treat 
the whole question so superficially that my remarks 
would have been worthy of no serious attention. 
Consequently, if I have only dealt indirectly with mili- 
tary questions, which are now of vital interest to all, 
I trust that I may have been able to do something to 
make clearer various geographical and other questions 
possessed of far-reaching strategical influence upon a 
situation which is rapidly changing from day to day. 



In the previous chapter, I have endeavoured to show 
that for years the situation in the East has been closely 
bound up with the fact that the Balkan Peninsula — 
the Balkan States and Turkey in Europe — constituted 
and constitute not the Germanic goal but the corridor 
towards a goal, and that Germany has been and is 
determined, by means of the "Drang nach Osten", 
to strike a deadly blow at the very vitals of the British 
Empire and to prevent Russia from pushing forward 
actually or morally towards warm water. Thus, 
whilst by a temporary military penetration across the 
Balkans and right into Asiatic Turkey, the Central 
Powers have greatly increased the strength of their 
strategic position, still more by the driving of a per- 
manent wedge through the same areas would they have 
triumphed by endangering the Allied position through- 
out the East. By the same means they would have 
postponed indefinitely a change in the status of the 
Straits, — the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. On the 
other hand, were good relations to be established be- 
tween the Balkan States, and were Allied influence 
to increase there, at Constantinople and in Asia Minor, 
then an Allied wedge would prevent Germanic expan- 
sion towards the East. From the moment of the out- 


break of the War, therefore, and particularly from Octo- 
ber 31, 1914, when Turkey threw in her lot upon the 
side of the Central Powers, it was the question of this 
Germanic wedge, or rather of the preventing of it, 
which constituted the real raison d'etre and the cause 
of the Allied operations both at the Dardanelles and 
at Salonica. 

For centuries Constantinople, covering as it does 
the great land route from Europe to Asia as well as 
the water highway between the Black Sea and the 
Mediterranean, has been the object of many aspira- 
tions. From earliest times the reigning monarch in 
this city has been able to control these two great thor- 
oughfares as a result of the fortifications constructed 
to protect his capital from attack by land and sea. 
In the past the defences of the Dardanelles and the 
Bosphorus have not only safeguarded the position of 
the Turkish capital, but they have also protected the 
Sea of Marmora. Thus so long as these two channels 
remain impregnable the Ottoman Government can 
not only bring troops from Asia Minor and land them in 
Europe, but the Sultan and his Allies can pour armies 
into Asia Minor, thence to send them by railway and 
by road to areas from which they can threaten the 
Egyptian frontier and the British positions in the Per- 
sian Gulf and even in India. 

Without entering into details, and ignoring a ques- 
tion of all-preponderating importance to which I will 
proceed below, it must therefore be apparent that a 
successful campaign against the forts defending the 
Dardanelles and the Bosphorus would have been pos- 
sessed of consequences the far-reaching results of which 
it is impossible to exaggerate. To begin with, the 


presence of an Allied fleet in the Sea of Marmora 
would have placed Constantinople — the key of the 
Ottoman Empire — at our mercy. Knowing the Turks 
and their leaders as I do, I think that this would have 
meant immediate overtures for peace on their part. 
But, had this not been the case, there seems every 
reason to believe that the arrival of an Allied fleet off 
Constantinople would have strengthened the hands of 
the peace party and consequently that it would have 
brought about a revolution. This belief is supported 
by the opinions of such men as Lord Kitchener and 
Lord Grey, who, according to the report of the Darda- 
nelles Commissioners, *' confidently looked forward 
to a revolution taking place in Constantinople if once 
the British Fleet appeared in the Sea of Marmora." 
In addition, had these highly desirable objects been 
achieved, their immediate effect would have been the 
entry into the War then and there upon our side of the 
at that time neutral Balkan States, — Bulgaria, Greece, 
and Roumania, — thereby creating a situation the 
meaning of which must be obvious to the least well- 
informed student of the War. 

Provided adequate preparations had been made, and 
provided the operations had been inaugurated as a 
combined naval and military campaign, instead of 
being begun by the fleet alone, these objectives might 
in themselves have been well worth the risks and the 
cost of an undertaking, which, however it were carried 
out, would certainly have been costly. This being 
the case, the question of a possible attack upon the 
Dardanelles was naturally discussed by the British 
Cabinet directly after the entry of Turkey into the 
War. Nevertheless nothing definite was done until 


early in January, 1915, when the attitude of the AlHed 
Governments was of necessity suddenly changed by 
the receipt, on January 2, of a very important telegram 
from the British Ambassador at Petrograd, expressing 
a hope, on behalf of the Russian Government, that a 
demonstration against the Turks would be made.^ 
Whilst we do not know the exact contents of this 
telegram — contents which were probably far more 
pressing and far more dictatorial than one is sometimes 
allowed to believe — we are told in the Dardanelles 
Report that they "materially affected the situation" 
and that "The British Government considered that 
something must be done in response to it." In other 
words, an operation which might or might not have 
been a justifiable "gamble" was suddenly forced 
forward into a position in which it had to be considered 
not only in reference to its direct military importance 
but also in proportion to its indirect political and 
military consequences — consequences which might 
have ensued had the Western Allies taken up an atti- 
tude based solely upon their own strategical and mili- 
tary positions at that time. Under these circumstances 
I propose therefore to ask my readers to accept the 
opinion that the undertaking itself was rendered practi- 
cally unavoidable by the above-mentioned Russian 
demand and that its failure was the result not merely 
of shortcomings in the conduct of the campaign, but 
that it was due largely on the one hand to the necessity 
of doing something to relieve the pressure upon Russia, 

1 That telegram and many other details connected with the inauguration 
of the Dardanelles campaign are referred to in the " Dardanelles Commis- 
sion — First Report " which was presented to Parliament by command of His 
Majesty and published in 1917 as an oflficial document numbered Cd 8490. 


when England and France were already fully occupied 
elsewhere, and on the other to the enormous geographi- 
cal difficulties which I will now endeavour to describe. 

Before doing this, I must, however, explain that as 
various journeys in Turkey in Europe and in Asia 
Minor have led me, under different pretexts, to wander 
over most of the ground about which I am writing, 
my task is a particularly difficult one. Not only am 
I obliged to consider how much or how little of my 
knowledge I am justified in imparting to the public, 
but I am also compelled for obvious reasons to with- 
hold the dates and the methods by which I obtained 
my information. To do otherwise might be not 
only to endanger the property but perhaps even the 
lives of some of those who may still be in, or who after 
the War may be returning to Turkey. 

Picnics and shooting expeditions may not have ex- 
cited the suspicions of certain local officials, but even 
so it would be impossible to disclose the localities in 
which these pleasurable excursions took place, or to 
reveal the identities of the different kinds of people 
with whom they were organised. Consequently, if 
any of my descriptions seem somewhat disjointed 
and confused, and if I leave out altogether any refer- 
ences to the routes and methods by which I reached 
the Peninsula of Gallipoli, I hope that my readers will 
bear with me and believe that I am endeavouring so 
far as is possible under the circumstances and in the 
available space to give them an outline of the nature 
of the defences of Constantinople and to bring my 
knowledge of the country to bear in describing a cam- 
paign which was probably more difficult than any 
which has ever been inaugurated in modern times. 


Owing to its geographical position, Constantinople 
is easy to defend by land and sea. The city is situated 
at the southeastern extremity of a sort of peninsula, 
which is bounded on the north by the Black Sea, on 
the east by the Bosphorus, and on the south by the 
Sea of Marmora. Thus by land the capital has only 
to be protected on one, its western front. On the sea 
side Constantinople is also extremely strong, because 
the Marmora can only be approached by way of the 
Bosphorus on the north and through the Dardanelles 
on the southwest. In order to make my account of 
these three series of defences the more clear, I will 
divide it into three sections devoted respectively to 
descriptions of : — 

(1) The land defences including the Chatalja Lines, 

(2) The Bosphorus forts, 

(3) The Dardanelles forts. 

(1) The land defences of the city are divided into 
two sections : the Constantinople and the Chatalja 
Lines. The Constantinople Lines are made up of an 
outer and an inner ring of earthen forts, which extend 
from the village of Makri Keuie on the Sea of Marmora, 
and about two and a half miles west of the ancient city 
walls, to Buyukdere, on the Bosphorus, and at a dis- 
tance of about twelve miles from Constantinople. 
For some years these forts have been said to be out of 
repair and unarmed, and their power of resistance is 
but very small when compared to that of the Chatalja 

(2) The Chatalja Lines, which constitute the real 
land defences of the capital, extend across the Constan- 
tinople Peninsula, at a distance of about twenty-five 
miles to the west of the city. Designed by Von Bluhm 


Pasha, when the Russian army was advancing on Con- 
stantinople in 1878, they cover a front of about sixteen 
miles, a front which is flanked on the south by Lake 
Buyuk Chekmedche — an inlet of the Sea of Marmora, 
and on the north by Derkos Gol. The forts, which 
number about thirty, are constructed on a ridge of 
hills about ^ve hundred feet above the level of the sea. 
A small stream runs across practically their entire 
front. The position is therefore extremely strong, for 
its flanks rest upon the sea and upon these impassable 
lakes and therefore they cannot be turned. The forts 
had always been maintained in an effective state, but 
during and since the Balkan Wars no stone had been 
left unturned to render up-to-date land defences which 
rank only second in importance to the forts situated 
on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. It is therefore 
argued, even in well-informed circles, that had the 
Peninsula of Gallipoli once been conquered by the 
Allies, or had an Allied fleet made its way into the 
Marmora, it might still have remained necessary to 
undertake land operations on a large scale in order to 
penetrate the Chatalja Lines, and therefore actually 
to advance upon Constantinople. Militarily speak- 
ing, there may be something in this point of view, 
but I am convinced that, had a fleet once arrived off 
the Golden Horn, the Turks would either have volun- 
tarily surrendered the city, or a revolution would have 
taken place which would have rendered it unnecessary 
for that fleet either to shell the town or for the city to 
be attacked from the land as well as from the sea side. 
Turning to the Bosphorus, which is important in 
connection with the Dardanelles campaign because it 
was possible that Russian assistance might be forth- 


coming from that direction, assistance which it would 
seem that the Western AlHes were entitled to expect, 
the length of that channel, measured from the Seraglio 
Point at Constantinople to the mouth of the Black 
Sea, is about nineteen miles. The breadth varies 
from about seven hundred and fifty yards, just above 
Rumeli Hissar, to a little over two miles in Buyukdere 
Bay. Except when the wind is exceedingly strong 
from the south and southwest, the current runs from 
the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmora with an average 
speed of two and a half miles per hour, but opposite 
Rumeli Hissar a speed of five miles per hour is occa- 
sionally obtained. The winds are changeable, at times 
blowing from one direction at one end 6f the Bosphorus 
and from another direction at the opposite end. Unlike 
the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus, which resembles a 
winding river, is bordered by picturesque wooden 
houses and by fine and stately palaces. Indeed, both 
sides of this miraculous, wonderful water highway 
are so thickly populated that two continuous towns, 
or more correctly two long series of villages, run prac- 
tically all the way from Galata to Buyukdere on the 
European side, and from Scutari to Beikos on the Asiatic 
Coast. Almost throughout the length of the Bosphorus 
both shores rise immediately from the water's edge. 
In some places the coasts ascend to a height of a little 
more than low hills, but in others their elevation reaches 
that of hundreds of feet, the highest levels being at- 
tained on the borders of the northern end. Many 
small valleys intersect these hills, and countless bays 
add picturesqueness to the scene. 

The most important forts which defend the Bos- 
phorus nearly all lie between Buyukdere in Europe 


and Beikos in Asia and the Black Sea entrance to the 
channel — thus leaving the southern and thickly popu- 
lated parts of the coast almost entirely undefended. 
The forts are extremely well hidden, many of them 
being so carefully placed that it is easy to pass up or 
down the channel without becoming aware of their 
existence. Some are placed close to the water's edge, 
and some are on the slopes of the hills. Moreover, 
the defences are so arranged as to cover the various 
more or less straight lengths, in such a way as to be 
able to fire upon ships alike before they reach, as they 
pass, and after they have passed them. But although 
during recent years much work has been done on the 
Bosphorus, there is no doubt, even if they had to be 
attacked only from the north, that the defences of this 
area are much less strong and far less numerous than 
are those situated on the Dardanelles. 

As in the case of the Dardanelles, the passage of a 
hostile fleet through the Bosphorus could be furthered 
by the landing of a force on one or both of its shores. 
Owing, however, to the existence of the Chatalja 
Lines, it would be difiicult to take the forts on the 
European coast in the rear, or more correctly it would 
be necessary for a landing party to be disembarked 
somewhere within, that is, to the east of, these lines. 
The places suitable for such a landing are naturally 
strictly limited, but the best is Kelia Bay, which, I 
believe, is provided with a fort to guard the main 
defences from any attack in rear, or at least to form a 
lookout station. On the Asiatic coast, on the other 
hand, a landing from the Black Sea was always more 
feasible. Troops, disembarked at or near Riva on 
the Black Sea, would only have had to advance for 


a very few miles in order to occupy the high ground 
lying at the back of and commanding the Asiatic forts 
of the Bosphorus, forts which are practically at no 
point situated on the summit of the hills. The exist- 
ence of a road from Riva to Beikos would have assisted 
a force moving from this direction, and such a force 
might have been able to get guns on to the above- 
mentioned high ground had a landing been effected, 
either as a surprise or when the Turks were not in a 
position adequately to defend this area. More or 
less the same difficulties would have occurred as in 
the attack on the Peninsula of Gallipoli, but, knowing 
the ground in both areas, I consider that that situated 
at the back of the Bosphorus forts is the easier, and 
that even a threatened attack in this direction would 
have greatly minimised the magnitude of our task at 
the Dardanelles. 

The northeastern end of the Dardanelles is distant 
from Constantinople one hundred and thirty miles. 
The length of the Straits, which are winding and 
extremely difficult to navigate, is some thirty-three 
miles. The breadth varies from about thirteen hun- 
dred yards when measured between the towns of 
Chanak, on the Asiatic coast, and Kilid Bahr, on 
the European shore, to four miles or five miles shortly 
after the entrance to the Straits from the Aegean Sea. 
A strong current runs from the Marmora towards the 
Mediterranean. When the wind blows from the north- 
east, that is, more or less straight down the channel, 
the difficulties of navigation and the speed of the 
current are considerably increased. 

The Peninsula of Gallipoli, which bounds the Dar- 
danelles on the northwest, is a long, narrow tongue of 


land, some thirty-five miles in length. Its width is 
only three miles, when measured across the Isthmus 
of Bulair, lying as it does to the northeast of the town 
of Gallipoli. More to the southwest it widens out, 
only to narrow again to a breadth of about four miles 
in rear of the town of Maidos. The northwestern and 
western shores of the peninsula are washed by the 
waters of the Gulf of Saros and of the Aegean Sea. 
The coast rises in many places precipitously from the 
water's edge. Nearly the whole of the country in 
rear of Maidos and of Kilid Bahr consists of hills 
which, in many places, attain a height of six or seven 
hundred feet above the level of the sea. These hills 
are intersected by small rocky valleys, with steep, 
almost precipitous sides, up which I have climbed 
often on my hands and knees. Much of the country, 
and especially these valleys, which run for the most 
part across, and not up and down, the peninsula, are 
covered with scrubby bushes about two or three feet 
high. These bushes tear one's boots and clothes 
and person, and thus, even in peace time, make walk- 
ing through them a highly difficult and disagreeable 
experience. The hills immediately to the west and 
southwest of Kilid Bahr are prettily wooded, the trees 
extending almost to the seashore. Except where the 
Turks and the Germans had recently improved them, 
the roads along and across the peninsula were very 
bad, for before the War communication had usually 
been maintained by sea. As a matter of fact, one of 
the most unpleasant tasks imposed upon the Allied 
troops on the peninsula was that of making and improv- 
ing roads, a task of necessity performed under the 
shell- if not the rifle-fire of the enemy. 


The most important town on the peninsula is GalH- 
poli, at the northeastern entrance to the Dardanelles. 
Its population is about fourteen thousand souls. The 
place is essentially Turkish, and was the first to fall 
into the hands of the Osmanlis, soon after Sulieman 
Pasha crossed the Dardanelles and planted the standard 
of the Crescent in Europe in the year 1356. The only 
other towns of any importance are Maidos and Kilid 
Bahr, lying much lower down the peninsula. Like 
the remainder of the peninsula, which is but sparsely 
populated, both these places would be practically 
unknown were it not for the strategic value of the 
country which surrounds them. As a matter of fact, 
they are hardly ever visited by a foreig^ner, for, in 
addition to the actual difficulties of communication, 
obstacles are placed in the way of every stranger both 
before and during his visit to this all-important area. 

The modern defences of the Peninsula of Gallipoli 
may practically be divided into four groups : 

(1) The two forts built to protect the outer entrance 
to the channel and lying in the immediate neighbour- 
hood of Cape Helles and of Sedd-el-Bahr. Whilst 
these forts were armed with fairly big guns, their 
importance and power of resistance have always been 
insignificant when compared with those guarding the 
Narrows. In this first group, too, there should be 
included two forts, or batteries, which are situated 
respectively about seven and a half miles and about 
nine and a half miles from the southwestern extremity 
of the Dardanelles. They are both placed close to the 
water's edge. 

(2) The forts in rear of, and near, Kilid Bahr, and 
therefore on, or immediately below or above, the nar- 

tSwC7 forts and Balteries 

S.V.W.X.Y Beaches Where British landed 
Dagh- Mountain. Tepe-Hill. HeigMs in feet 

Southern Part of the Gallipoli Peninsula 

From "Map Book of the World-Wide War," Thos. Nelson & Sons, Limited, London and Edinburgh 


rowest part of the Straits. These forts, which are 
at least eleven in number, constitute by far the strong- 
est portion of the defences of the Straits. Here the 
shore literally bristles with redoubts, some being hidden 
amongst the trees which cover the hills, whilst others 
are dotted about right down to the water's edge. 
Yildiz, or Tekeh Fort, which has always been consid- 
ered one of the most important of these defences, 
lies at the extreme outer end of the group, and a little 
to the southwest of Kjlid Bahr. It owes its strength 
to its height above the water, to its field of fire, and 
to the consequent difficulty of damaging it from the 

(3) The forts built to the north and northeast of 
Maidos — forts which, therefore, lie within or above the 
narrowest part of the channel. These defences, of 
which there are six, are built upon the summits of the 
various hills which border this part of the Straits. 
They are so constructed as to be able to fire across 
the channel towards Nagara Point, up the Dardanelles 
in the direction of Gallipoli, and down the Straits 
towards Chanak. 

(4) The Bulair Lines. These defences run across 
the Isthmus of Bulair, and thus defend the Peninsula 
of Gallipoli from an attack by a force endeavouring 
to advance from the land side. They consist of three 
or four redoubts, connected by trenches constructed 
to cover the only road running into the peninsula 
from the remainder of European Turkey. 

There is a great contrast between the two shores of 
the Dardanelles. The Asiatic coast is for the most 
part lower, and the appearance of the country is greener 
and more fertile than that of the Peninsula of Gallipoli. 


Communication by land is also bad, but a passable 
road connects Lamsaki (just opposite Gallipoli) with 
Chanak, and thence runs on down the coast towards 
the entrance of the Straits. The only centre of any 
importance is Chanak or Dardanelles, situated oppo- 
site Kilid Bahr, and united with that place by a sub- 
marine cable, which was reported destroyed early in 
the campaign. The town, which possesses a popu- 
lation of some ten thousand people, is prettily located 
on the water's edge. There is an anchorage for ships, 
both below and above it, and prior to the War the little 
bay immediately to the north of the village was usually 
occupied by some of the ships which go to make up 
the Turkish fleet. As a matter of fact, it was here 
that Messudiyeh — which was the flagship of Admiral 
Limpus until he left Constantinople prior to the out- 
break of war — was torpedoed by the British submarine 
B 11 in December, 1914. In connection with this 
event, there are two interesting stories, so interesting 
indeed that they would be unbelievable had I not 
received them from entirely reliable sources. Ac- 
cording to the first, when the vessel was struck, there 
was a dull boom, and a high cloud of smoke and water 
rose from the surface of the sea. Within ^yq minutes 
she turned turtle, but as the water was shallow, a 
section of the hull rested on the bottom whilst the 
remainder projected above the sea. Nearly all the 
crew were drowned, the only exceptions, as it was 
thought at the time, being a few men who were picked 
up. However, when the ship had settled down, bottom 
upwards, knocks were heard on a part of the vessel 
which was not under water. Men were set to work 
to cut a hole, and after the rescuers had been engaged 


for three days and nights, twenty-three men were 
got out ahve. The second anecdote gives an insight 
into the mentahty of the Turks. Anxious to prove 
that although Messudiyeh had been lost they had. 
secured a prize of no mean importance : they rigged 
up a motor boat to look like a submarine, and towed it 
past the town of Chanak and up to Nagara Point in 
order to make the inhabitants believe that the British 
submarine, which in fact had made good its escape, 
had been downed as a result of the vigilance of the 
Ottoman defence. 

Partly owing to their positions, situated generally 
more or less upon the level of the sea, the defences of 
the Asiatic coast are, from a natural point of view, 
decidedly less strong than are those built upon the 
Peninsula of Gallipoli. The Asiatic forts may, how- 
ever, also be divided into three main or principal groups : 

(1) The two forts built to protect the outer entrance 
of the channel, which lie in the more or less immedi- 
ate vicinity of Kum Kale. These forts were armed 
with guns of a considerable size, but they have always 
been considered, like those corresponding to them upon 
the European shore, as a sort of advanced guard to 
the main defences of the Straits. In this outer group, 
too, there are three other forts, namely, those located 
at and just to the southwest of Kephez Point. 

(2) The forts at and near the town of Chanak, and 
therefore on or near the narrowest part of the channel. 
One of these, Hamidieh I Tabia, is placed rather under 
a mile to the south of the town ; another, Hamidieh III 
Tabia, lies at Chanak, and two more are located above 
but within a distance of about one mile from the Nar- 
rows themselves. 


(3) The three forts built on or in the neighbourhood 
of Nagara Point, and therefore at a distance of about 
three and a half miles above the Narrows. These 
forts occupy a very strong position, 'owing to the way 
in which this cape and also Cape Abydos run out into 
the channel, thus giving two of them good fields of fire 
in more than one direction. 

The above details are sufficient to prove the great- 
ness of the task undertaken by the Allies at the Dar- 
danelles. Throughout the last few years, especially 
since the Turco-Italian and the Balkan wars, and 
particularly since the entry of Turkey into this War, 
the Turks and the Germans had made preparations 
to defend an area which is of vital importance to them. 
Moreover, the whole situation is such as to react al- 
most entirely against belligerents who are compelled 
to depend on the fire of ships and in favour of those 
in occupation of the shores. The Dardanelles are so 
narrow that throughout their greater part the power 
of real manoeuvring is denied to all ships except those 
of a very small size. For the same reasons — that is, 
owing to the narrowness and to the winding nature 
of the channel — the great guns on ships, the range 
of which is many miles, cannot be utilised to the fullest 
advantage. Again, the Turks were able to employ 
all kinds of weapons which would have been valueless 
had the range been greater. Mobile batteries of guns 
and howitzers were placed in countless and secluded 
valleys, in which it was difficult to discover their posi- 
tion and to rain lead upon them from the sea. These 
guns, having made their presence unpleasantly felt, 
were moved by road or on railway lines to places of 
safety even before our fire could be brought to bear 


upon them. The existence of these conditions was 
extremely detrimental and dangerous, not only for 
the smaller vessels endeavouring to penetrate the 
Dardanelles, but also for the Allied troops on the Penin- 
sula of Gallipoli, whose lines and positions could be 
completely raked and enfiladed by fire from Asia 

The enemy was also able to make the fullest use of 
mines, and to fire land torpedoes in the Dardanelles. 
These latter weapons could either be sent on their way 
from proper torpedo tubes, or by other methods of a 
more impromptu nature. From the time of the arrival 
of enemy submarines in the Aegean our difficulties 
were enormously increased, for ships which might 
otherwise have been employed to protect the flank 
of our armies were open to the continuous danger of 
being torpedoed. Again, the presence of these under- 
water craft made it impracticable to utilise transports 
and larger ships for the purpose of the conveyance of 
troops to and from the peninsula. Reliance had 
therefore to be placed upon all manner of smaller craft, 
and the position of each and every new landing was 
influenced by the difficulties and dangers of utilising 
these smaller craft for a passage of more than a few brief 
hours in length. 

The extremely unfavourable position of a fleet de- 
sirous of entering the Sea of Marmora thus rendered 
it highly desirable that a land attack upon the forts 
should have been inaugurated at the very beginning 
of the operations. Such an attack, made by a force 
landed on the northwestern coast of the Peninsula 
of Gallipoli, where in places the shore is low and sandy, 
would probably have been destined greatly to further 


the task of the fleet. Indeed, an army once having 
gained possession of the hills which lie in rear of Maidos 
and Kilid Bahr and which command the forts, would 
have been in control of the whole situation, for, from 
various points on these hills, it is possible, as I have 
done, to look down upon and into some of the European 
redoubts of which we all heard so much during the 

The disembarkment of such a force, even quite at 
the beginning of the operations and before the enemy 
was fully prepared, would have been a matter of 
considerable difficulty, especially as some years ago, 
I believe in 1905 or in 1906, the Turks, in an endeavour 
to guard against a surprise of this nature, built a small 
lookout station on Gaba Tepe — a little promontory 
situated on the western shore of the Peninsula of 
Gallipoli and lying at a distance of about seven miles 
to the northwest of Kilid Bahr. But having regard 
to the fact that most of the forts were constructed 
to fire only towards the Straits and to the enormous 
importance of striking immediately from the land as 
well as from the sea, that this was not attempted or, 
more correctly, that it could not be attempted consti- 
tutes the fatal and most far-reaching mistake made 
at the Dardanelles. It meant, when land operations 
were finally undertaken, that instead of these opera- 
tions being of a subsidiary nature and instead of land- 
ing parties threatening the rear of the forts whilst the 
fleet was endeavouring to force a passage, a land 
campaign of great magnitude had to be undertaken. 
In other words, after April 25, 1915, the ever-increas- 
ing interest in the Dardanelles operations was trans- 
ferred from events on the sea to those on the land. 


where the Allied armies were called upon to fight a 
series of great battles with the object of taking the 
forts by means of siege operations instead of more or 
less by surprise as might have been the case earlier in 
the War. 

Turning to the actual operations, into which I will 
not go in detail, as whole books have been written upon 
the subject, it may be said that the campaign was di- 
vided into three stages : 

(1) The original naval attack upon the Straits, which 
began on February nineteenth. From that time on- 
wards until the sinking of Bouvet, Irresistible, and 
Ocean and the damaging of Inflexible and Gaulois on 
March 18, a series of attacks were made upon the 
forts by ships which entered the Dardanelles and by 
others stationed in the Gulf of Saros. Queen Eliza- 
beth and other vessels made use of indirect fire and 
threw shells right over the Peninsula of Gallipoli. 
Mine-sweeping operations were carried out, and certain 
of the forts which defended the extreme southwestern 
end of the Straits were practically, if not absolutely, 
destroyed. The net results of these operations were 
that indirect fire, even when employed with the assist- 
ance of air observation, proved to be little more than 
a waste of ammunition ; that the Dardanelles forts 
were much stronger than seems to have been supposed ; 
and that the Turks, by the use of mines, possessed a 
deadly advantage, the magnitude of which it is im- 
possible to exaggerate. . 

The second stage is that connected with the landing 
operations which began on Sunday, April 25, and with 
the terrible fighting of the three months which followed 
them. On that day landings were made at numerous 


points at and near the extreme southwestern end of 
the peninsula, and on the beach immediately to the 
north of Gaba Tepe, afterwards known as Anzac 
Beach. The general plan was that these two more or 
less distinct forces, the one composed of a British Divi- 
sion and the other made up of the Australian and New 
Zealand contingents, were to work respectively up 
and across the peninsula with the object of joining 
hands and of sweeping right up and across the penin- 
sula to the Narrows. During the whole of these three 
months the forces landed at the southwestern end of 
the peninsula were fighting for the possession of Achi 
Baba, a height which attains an elevation of about 
seven hundred feet above the sea level. This all- 
important position, which extends practically from 
sea to sea, not only dominates the whole area of country 
lying to the southwest of it, but also forms the south- 
western extremity of the line of hills which traverse 
practically the whole length of the peninsula. Further 
north the operations based on Anzac were practically 
all undertaken with the object of endeavouring to cap- 
ture the crests of Sari Bair and of Khoja Chemen Dagh, 
both of which command this part of the peninsula, 
and the latter of which attains an elevation of nine 
hundred and fifty feet above the level of the sea. 

The third stage in the campaign is that connected 
with the Suvla Bay fighting, which began in August. 
On the sixth of that month a large force was disem- 
barked at Suvla Bay, located about five miles to the 
north of the Anzac Beach. The plan of operations 
was that this force should advance in an easterly 
and southeasterly, whilst the Australasians pushed for- 
ward in a northeasterly, direction towards Sari Bair and 



Chunuk Bair Ridges. Our overseas troops actually 
seized the summits, but the new attack from the north 
did not make the progress which was counted upon, and 
it was not developed quickly enough. The result was 
that it came to a standstill after an advance of some 
two and one half miles, and that the Australasians 
were compelled to withdraw from the positions which 
they had actually seized. After the arrival of rein- 
forcements on August 21 further attempts were made 
to push forward in an easterly direction from the Anzac 
and Suvla areas. Certain tactical features were 
captured, but these last operations left things very 
much as they were before August 21, and the net result 
of the Suvla Bay landings was that we consolidated our 
position and secured possession of a connected line 
extending along a front of about twelve miles. 

Before making a few general remarks upon the 
Dardanelles campaign there are three questions worthy 
of brief explanation. The first concerns the theory, 
entertained in some quarters, that had the British 
been prepared to make the necessary naval sacrifices 
in February, they could have pushed through the Dar- 
danelles then without even attempting to occupy and 
to subjugate the Peninsula of Gallipoli. Militarily 
unsound as this might have been, considering the fact 
that the door could have been slammed behind such 
ships and that their means of supply might therefore 
have been cut off, there would have been at least a 
good argument in favour of such an attempt had it 
not been for the existence of Goehen in the Sea of 
Marmora. The presence of that ship and of Breslau, 
however, rendered the idea of such a raid — for it 
only would have been a raid upon a large scale — worse 


than useless, for in view of the then strength of the 
Allied fleets, that undertaking could have been haz- 
arded only with at best second-class ships — ships 
the power of which, had they even once entered the 
Sea of Marmora, might well have been outmatched 
by the Ottoman fleet, then augmented by a German 
dreadnought and a fast cruiser. 

The second criticism sometimes made by those who 
are not au courant with the situation concerns the sug- 
gestion that if the Peninsula of Gallipoli were so difficult 
of occupation, it would have been better to undertake 
land operations on the Asiatic instead of upon the 
European side of the Straits. This suggestion is not 
worthy of the attention which it would seem to merit 
at first sight. To begin with, whilst the disembarka- 
tion of troops and their advance across the northwestern 
corner of Asia Minor would have been nearly as diffi- 
cult as were the operations on the peninsula, the dis- 
tance to be covered, as the crow flies, instead of only 
amounting to six or seven miles from Anzac and to 
about twelve from Cape Helles, would have been about 
twenty -five miles. Moreover, owing to the topography 
of the ground — the Gallipoli coast is much higher 
than the Asiatic shore — and to the greater strength 
of the European forts, once in possession of Chanak 
and the neighbourhood, even then we should not 
have been in a position safely and surely to dominate 
the Straits and their surroundings. 

We now come to the third and constantly repeated 
suggestion that a landing at or near Bulair would have 
been an enormous advantage to the Allies, because it 
would have cut the Turkish communications and be- 
cause the distance to be covered by an army landed at 

The Rock-like Coast of the Gallipoli Peninsula 

The buildings are in the outskirts of the town of Gallipoli, and the 

Light House, on the right of the picture, may be said to mark the 

northeastern end of the Dardanelles. 

The Village of Bulair 

From Photographs by the Author 


that point would have been less than elsewhere. Both 
these suggestions are largely erroneous. In regard 
to the first this is the case because, whilst communi- 
cation with the Peninsula of Gallipoli is maintained to 
some extent by land, it is principally carried on by sea. 
It is true, however, as I have explained elsewhere, 
that a good road runs from Uzun Kupru on the Con- 
stantinople- A drianople railway to Gallipoli. This road 
traverses the Isthmus of Bulair, following a line which 
runs on its eastern or Dardanelles side. The road 
was well within the range of the guns of ships lying 
in the Gulf of Saros, but even so it could be utilised 
with comparative safety at night. An Allied landing 
might, therefore, have resulted in the occupation of 
this road, but, if so, it would have had to be undertaken 
by a very large force, for not only would the initial 
disembarkation have had to be carried out in the 
teeth of the fire of the big guns in the Bulair Lines, 
but, once in occupation of the isthmus, such a force 
would have been compelled to be prepared to meet 
an attack delivered both by the Turkish army on the 
peninsula and by troops endeavouring to come to its 
assistance from the remainder of Turkey in Europe. 
Moreover, even had we cut this line of communication 
by an occupation of the territory in question, the 
Turks would still have been able to send reinforce- 
ments across the Straits from Chanak or elsewhere — 
a route which they in fact did employ in order to sub- 
stitute for the long and dangerous passage by way of 
the Sea of Marmora, where British submarines were 
operating, a passage of only thirteen or fourteen hun- 
dred yards which could be covered in vessels so small 
that they constituted a most difficult target for in- 


direct fire, for bombardment from the air, or for sub- 
marines. So far as the second point, that is to say, 
the argument in regard to the desirabihty of attack- 
ing the forts from the direction of Bulair be con- 
cerned, sufficient be it to say that although that village 
lies practically at the narrowest part of the peninsula, 
the area in question is located about thirty miles to 
the northeast of the Narrows and therefore of the 
district the possession of which was vital to the Allied 

After what may be described as the final failure of 
the Suvla Bay attack at the end of August, 1915, the 
Dardanelles campaign entered upon a new phase. 
From that moment it became obvious that the Allies 
would be compelled to give up the undertaking alto- 
gether, to endeavour simply to maintain their posi- 
tions upon the Peninsula of Gallipoli or to make the 
preparations necessary for the despatch to and main- 
tenance of a vast army in the northeastern corner of 
the Mediterranean. Even now we do not know all 
the various considerations which governed Allied policy 
at that time. But it is certain that the entry of Bul- 
garia into the War upon the side of the enemy in Octo- 
ber, the continued neutrality of Roumania, and the 
then attitude of Greece created an entirely new situa- 
tion — a situation which in addition to other difficulties 
led to our withdrawal from the Dardanelles in Decem- 
ber, 1915, and January, 1916. 

It would be useless to conceal the fact that that 
withdrawal, which constituted an admission of failure, 
must have resulted in a loss of Allied prestige through- 
out the East, and particularly the Moslem East, where 
even a necessary cutting of losses is not realised some- 


times to be the strongest policy. But having regard 
to all the circumstances, there can be no doubt that 
Sir Charles Monro, who had already then shown him- 
self worthy of the highest confidence of the British 
people, was correct when he said, soon after after he 
took over the command, that the evacuation of Gallipoli 
should be taken in hand at once. The position there 
was unique in history. We held merely a fringe of 
coast line, dominated from the hills occupied by the 
Turks. Communications were insecure and difficult, 
owing to the weather and to the fact that landing places 
could be raked by the enemy's fire. Oflicers and men, 
who could not, as in other theatres of war, be with- 
drawn from the shell-swept area, had suffered seriously 
from the consequent nerve strain and from diseases 
which are so common in that part of the world. More- 
over, had we merely held on to the ground already occu- 
pied, or had we even endeavoured to push forward, 
the number of Turks in future to be immobilised would 
have been comparatively small, and the large pro- 
portion of the Ottoman army would soon have been 
left free for undertakings in Mesopotamia and against 
Egypt. Consequently, as there was no longer any 
hope of achieving a useful purpose by remaining on the 
peninsula, it would have been worse than foolish to 
continue to involve the British Empire in the appalling 
cost resulting from an expedition possessed of every 
military defect — an expedition from which no pos- 
sible strategic or tactical advantages could at that 
time be anticipated. 

To summarise and to recapitulate, I think that in 
order to review the Dardanelles operations in their 
proper light, we must realise not only the mistakes 


which were made but also the enormous diflSculties 
which existed. True it is and true it will ever remain 
that there was no military justification for the way 
in which the campaign was conducted. It is now per- 
fectly clear that those responsible did not recognise 
the real strength of the defences ; for had they done so 
they would have known that an attempt to force the 
Straits without the assistance of an army landed upon 
the Peninsula of Gallipoli was almost doomed to failure. 
The net result of this mistake was that the original 
attack upon the Dardanelles — an attack lasting on 
and off for a month — so put the enemy upon his 
guard and showed him the weak spots in his own de- 
fence, that during a further ^ve weeks he had ample 
opportunity to turn the whole peninsula into a veritable 
entrenched camp. Again it is apparent that at the 
time of and after the landings on April 25, the military 
contingents available and the reinforcements sent out 
were entirely inadequate. For example, the Twenty- 
ninth Division, depleted by casualties suffered during 
the original landing at the southwestern end of the 
peninsula, was entirely unable to maintain the suc- 
cesses which it originally achieved. The result was 
that the Turks, who even then were not really pre- 
pared, and who probably did not number more than 
thirty thousand men on the peninsula itself, brought 
up their reinforcements, large numbers of whom ar- 
rived about a week later, and the Germans, who were 
not at first present in great strength, had plenty of 
time to put in an appearance and to take over the 
complete direction of affairs in Gallipoli. Even subse- 
quently, when large numbers of men were despatched to 
the Mediterranean, with the exception of the August 


landings, the forces available were entirely insufficient 
to insure success in an area which is more difficult 
than any which I have visited during my travels in the 
Near East. 

To set against all this, if we are to do justice to those 
responsible for this great effort, and it was a great 
effort, we must visualise what was the then position in 
Europe. The newly formed British army was not 
ready, and the larger number of units then available 
were urgently required in France. It was this state 
of things which made Lord Kitchener demur and delay 
in sending an expeditionary force to the Eastern Medi- 
terranean. Under ordinary circumstances, therefore, 
there can be no doubt that the War Cabinet should 
have definitely abandoned the idea of an attack upon 
the Dardanelles until their military member and ad- 
viser — The Minister of War — was in a position to 
provide a force and its reinforcements sufficient at 
least to further the task of a fleet endeavouring to force 
its way into the Sea of Marmora. But when the ques- 
tion was already under discussion in January, 1915, 
there came the communication from the Russian Gov- 
ernment to which I have already referred. That 
communication introduced a new element into the 
position — an element which, though its importance 
is often minimised, must, I consider, be held as having 
been the deciding factor in the situation. The Rus- 
sians, who had mobilised their forces much more 
rapidly than was anticipated, and who had greatly 
influenced the situation in Western Europe by their 
advance into East Prussia early in the autumn of 1914, 
appealed for our assistance. The British Govern- 
ment had then two alternatives before it. It could, 


and perhaps it should, have declared that it was not 
and would not be in a position to make a demonstra- 
tion against Turkey in the immediate future. Or it 
could, as it did, consider that something must be 
done in response to an appeal from an Ally who then 
certainly seemed to be playing a prominent part in 
the War. The adoption of the latter course may have 
been ill advised, but as loyalty to Allies comes only 
second to the necessity for the defeat of the enemy, 
whatever our personal opinions may be, it would appear 
that the Dardanelles campaign became a practical 
if not an actual necessity. 

So far as the main objective was concerned, that 
campaign, in which British soldiers and sailors accom- 
plished tasks the magnitude of which it is impossible 
to realise unless one has been to Gallipoli, proved a 
failure. But even so, looking at things in their true 
perspective, and to some extent we are now able to 
do this, as the operations were originally undertaken 
in order to create a diversion in Turkey, it may be 
said, without fear of contradiction, that a good deal 
was accomplished. Thus a large Ottoman force 
which would otherwise have been employed in the 
Caucasus, against Egypt, or in Mesopotamia, was 
certainly immobilised at Gallipoli. Moreover, it is 
stated, though no evidence has been produced in support 
of the theory, that the expedition had considerable in- 
fluence upon the attitude of the Balkan States. This 
latter contention may or may not be true, and the 
question as to whether these supposed advantages 
were or were not commensurate with the loss of valu- 
able lives and treasure incurred must remain a matter 
of opinion. In conclusion therefore let me say that 


the more one knows of the AlHed diflSculties existing 
at that time and the more one has seen of the areas 
in question, the less one is incHned to criticise, and 
that where criticism is due, it is justified not so much 
in regard to the actual undertaking of the campaign, 
but rather as a result of the manner in which almost 
insurmountable difficulties were underestimated by 
those at home and on the spot. 



Although the original Allied landing at Salonica 
took place during the early days of October, 1915, 
the expedition which since then has been based upon 
that port may really be considered as having followed 
and to some extent resulted from the British lack of 
success at the Dardanelles — a lack of success which 
became evident directly after the failure of the Suvla 
Bay operations. At about that time, too, the whole 
position in Southeastern Europe obviously became 
modified by the practical certainty that the enemy 
would ere long undertake a great drive across Serbia, 
by the probabihty that, unless she secured concessions 
at the hands of tlie AUies, Bulgaria would throw in 
her lot with the Central Powers, and by the new situa- 
tion created in Greece resulting from the ' necessity 
of that country either standing by or repudiating her 
treaty obhgations with Serbia. 

To consider in somewhat fuller detail the reasons 
of the Salonica expedition, it may be said that whilst 
a successful Dardanelles campaign would incidentally 
have had the effect of counteracting and forestalling 
the dangers of a German drive towards the East, the 
Salonica operations were inaugurated with the definite 
object of either preventing the establishment of through 



connection between Central Europe and the Bosphorus, 
or at least of threatening the enemy's hnes of communi- 
cation were they once established. Thus, whereas the 
occupation of Constantinople earlier in the War would 
have definitely frustrated Germanic designs in the 
East, an Anglo-French advance from Salonica to Nish 
or even to Uskub would either have prevented a 
successful penetration along the whole length of the 
Belgrade-Constantinople railway or at least have so 
threatened that railway that communication by way 
of it would have continued insecure. 

These were obviously the fundamental objects of 
the Salonica expedition. But closely bound up and 
connected with them were other objects, some of which, 
if they were less directly military, are still almost if 
not equally important. To begin with, if and when 
Bulgaria entered the War upon the German side, it 
was obvious that the Serbians, even had they been 
supported by Greece, at once became powerless to 
defend any large section of their country, and that 
Bulgaria, acting in conjunction with the Central 
Powers, would be in a position to overrun the whole 
of the Western Balkans. Consequently, although the 
Serbs, during the summer of 1915 had turned a deaf 
ear to the advice of the Allies — advice which, had it 
been taken at once, would probably have secured at 
least the neutrality and perhaps even the support of 
Bulgaria — it was almost impossible for sentimental 
as well as for military reasons to leave to her fate a 
little country whose army had fought most gallantly 
during the opening months of the War. In addition, 
as Greece claimed that Serbia was not then able to 
provide the contingent (150,000 men) promised by her 


under the Graeco-Serbian Treaty, she (Greece) would 
have been more or less justified in refusing to come to 
the assistance of her ally had England and France not 
undertaken to do their best to furnish contingents to 
take the place of that which was not available at the 
hands of the Government of King Peter. And lastly, 
once it was evident that the Austro-Bulgaro-Germanic 
armies would be in a position to act as one force and 
that the future policy of Greece was to hang in the 
balance, it became advisable for the Allies to establish 
and to maintain a pied-d-terre in the Balkans — a 
pied-d-terre without which the whole peninsula would 
have fallen into the hands of the enemy, and failing 
which the then neutrals, Greece and Roumania, would 
almost undoubtedly have thrown in their lot with the 
Central Powers. 

The unjustifiable optimists, who contended that we 
should reach Nish or even Uskub before our enemies, 
who believed that our arrival at Salonica would im- 
mediately bring Greece into war on the Allied side, 
and who thought that the Bulgarians would be easy 
of defeat, were doomed to meet with disappointment. 
But this does not justify their whole-hearted criticism 
of our policy in the Balkans — a policy the framing 
of which has been beset by difiiculties on every side. 
Faults, grievous faults there have been, but these 
faults are not bound up with what is stated in some 
quarters to have been Allied influence in restraining 
Serbia from attacking Bulgaria before the latter coun- 
try's overt adhesion to the enemy cause, or with what 
is sometimes argued to have been unjustifiable delay 
in going to the Western Balkans. As I have already 
said, even had we so advised Serbia, who in suggesting 


an immediate attack by her against Bulgaria also in- 
sisted upon the earher sending of an allied force to 
Salonica, such would have been good advice, for the 
Serbian position could not thus have been ameliorated. 
In other words, as it was not feasible for the Allies to 
undertake a Balkan expedition during the complicated 
negotiations which were in progress in the summer of 
1915, or to disembark in Greece without her consent 
or without then infringing the neutrality of that coun- 
try, the failure to save Serbia was not due to Allied 
fault but to the strategic position of our enemies, to 
their overwhelming strength, to the enormous geo- 
graphical difficulties, and to the continued situation 
in Greece — a situation the complications and the 
effect of which it was impossible to foresee. 

In the short space which is here available, it would 
not be possible and I do not propose to try to go into 
the details of all that has taken place in connection 
with the Salonica operations since their original in- 
auguration in October, 1915. My sole object, there- 
fore, is to provide my readers with a description of the 
country connected with these operations, to indicate 
the enormous geographical difficulties which beset a 
force based upon that port, and to outline very briefly 
the three stages into which that campaign may be 
said to have been divided. On account of the very 
different nature of the country which has grown to 
be called Macedonia and of its diverse peoples, nobody 
who has ever travelled in that unhappy district is 
able to consider it as a concrete whole. He thinks of 
it as an area which is divided politically and geographi- 
cally into water-tight compartments ; as a place in- 
habited by diverse populations, and as a locality 


possessed of well-defined routes, which constitute 
natural if not adequately developed lines of communi- 
cation. Consequently, if I seem to be disjointed in 
my description, this is due not to any want of fore- 
thought, but because I feel constrained to write of 
what I have seen rather than to try to produce a 
concise description of something which really does not 

Bulgaria, against which the Allied expedition was to 
operate, and especially Southwestern Bulgaria, is shut 
off from the Aegean by a strip of Hellenic territory 
annexed by Greece after the Balkan Wars. Measured 
from the Vardar Valley on the west to the Graeco- 
Bulgarian frontier on the east, it has a length of 
about one hundred and fifteen miles. With an average 
depth, from the Aegean on the south to the Rhodope 
Balkans on the north, of about fifty miles, this district 
contains the port of Kavala, the towns of Drama and 
Demir Hissar and some of the best tobacco-growing 
areas in the whole Balkan Peninsula. For these 
reasons it is not only rich but also strategically im- 
portant to both Greece and Bulgaria. On the west 
of the Vardar, the territory added to Greece after the 
Balkan Wars extends in the north up to the Moglena 
Mountains and the Serbian frontier and on the west 
to the Albanian boundary and the Adriatic. That 
these two areas are part of Greece meant that, until 
the attitude of the Hellenic Government became cer- 
tain, the Allied position not only at Salonica and in 
the immediate neighbourhood, but also in both the 
above-mentioned districts was extremely complicated 
and difficult. 

The position of Salonica is favourable as a port be- 


cause it is located about halfway along the European 
coast of the Aegean, and because it occupies a fine 
site at the head of a bay, measuring approximately 
twelve and one half miles from northeast to southwest 
— a bay connected with the sea by the Gulf of Salonica, 
which has a length of nearly ninety miles. Both 
shores of the gulf are mountainous. Mount Olympus 
on the west attaining an elevation of nearly ten thou- 
sand feet above the level of the sea. On the east the 
bay is also flanked by hills which extend to the im- 
mediate neighbourhood of the town, but on the west 
the country is low and swampy. Throughout the 
gulf there is deep water, but parts of the bay, through 
which there is an adequate channel, are blocked by 
mud brought down by the Galiko and Vardar. The 
presence of this mud, which is constantly increasing 
and moving, has for a result that the depth of the 
water is always changing and that sections of the bay, 
especially the northwestern corner, which within the 
memory of living man were navigable for small boats, 
are now almost entirely silted up. 

Salonica harbour is of modern construction. It 
consists of a quay measuring about four hundred and 
forty yards long with moles of just over two hundred 
yards long at each end. An island breakwater pro- 
tects it, and ships enter by the southeastern opening. 
Served by a railway and built to have twenty-four 
feet of water, before the War it was impossible for 
ships drawing more than at most twenty-two feet of 
water to get alongside the quays. Further deepening 
beyond twenty-four feet was difficult, owing to the 
fact that the foundations were upon mud. Enlarge- 
ment of this basin, which in ordinary times only pro- 


vides accommodation for at most eight ships of any 
size, has often been under discussion, but prior to the 
War it was never attempted; for, whilst the expense 
of dredging and digging on the northwest was pro- 
hibitive, an extension to the southeast was thought 
to be detrimental to the sites occupied by the best 
buildings in the city. The result of the inadequacy 
of the accommodation and of the high dock dues was 
that, before the War, many ships never entered the 
harbour and discharged their passengers whilst lying 
out in the bay. The quays running from the harbour 
to the White Tower are available for small craft and 
barges, but owing to the south wind, which always 
springs up in the afternoon, and to the then choppy 
state of the water, their utility is considerably minimised. 
The town of Salonica occupies a magnificent position 
at the head of the bay. Rising from the water's edge 
and built in a horseshoe shape on the slopes of the 
hills, prior to the recent fire it was extremely pictur- 
esque. But with the exception of the comparatively 
new street, which runs along the quay from the har- 
bour on the northwest to the residential quarter on 
the southeast, the city was dirty and squalid, and its 
thoroughfares were narrow and winding. Indeed, the 
outstanding impression left upon one's mind was that 
the town constituted something isolated, something 
different from that which exists elsewhere in Europe. 
In one sense it seemed to be completely modern, 
materialistic, and vulgar, whilst in another it had 
the appearance of being a sort of relic of the past. 
This may be accounted for partly by the fact that 
the nature of the population of Salonica is something 
quite unique. Out of a total of about one hundred 


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and twenty-five thousand souls roughly seventy-five 
thousand are Jews. These Jews, who are the de- 
scendants of those expelled from Spain by Ferdinand 
and Isabella, control the business of the city and 
surpass the Greeks in their commercial ability and 
also in society. Besides these Hebrews there are 
about fifteen thousand Dounmes — a sect the real 
beliefs of whom are not properly known to the outer 
world. Distrusted by both Jews and Mohammedans, 
they live a life apart and never marry with the outer 
world. It is from among their number that the 
Young Turks recruited some of the ablest members 
of the Committee of Union and Progress. The re- 
mainder of the population is made up of about twenty- 
five thousand Greeks, five thousand Turks, four 
thousand Bulgars, and of a European colony, all of 
whom, so to speak, exist as a result of the sufferance 
of the Jews, who dominate everything from the most 
menial work to that of banking. It was partly owing 
to the Oriental plan of the city and partly as a conse- 
quence of the houses being built largely of wood and 
mud and of there having been no rain for three months, 
that the fire of August, 1917, which was probably due 
to incendiary causes, did such terrible damage. In- 
deed, such was that damage, that half the area inside 
the ancient walls, which still encompass a great part 
of the business area of the town, including all the 
more important stores, hotels, and banks, was de- 
stroyed, thereby leaving approximately sixty thou- 
sand of the inhabitants homeless and destitute, and 
therefore dependent upon the Allies either for subsist- 
ence in Salonica or for means of transportation to areas 
where they could start life at least temporarily anew. 


Before discussing the geography of this part of the 
Balkans, a few words should be said about the climate 
of this area of Europe. Partly owing to its enclosed 
position, the heat in Salonica itself is intense during 
June, July, August, and the first part of September, 
after which the atmosphere is cooled by the heavy 
rain which invariably falls between the tenth and 
fifteenth of that month. The heat, which is mitigated 
by the fresh sea breeze which always blows in the 
afternoon, is particularly trying at night, and mos- 
quitoes are so numerous that, in many parts of the 
town, it is advisable to sleep under nets almost through- 
out the year. In spite of this, unlike Constantinople 
and Athens, there is no summer resort, and the inhabit- 
ants therefore remain in the city throughout the year. 
The first winter spent by the Allies at Salonica was an 
unusually severe one ; for, whilst it is generally wet in 
January and February, there is seldom a heavy fall 
of snow in the city itself. In the interior where the 
heat in the valleys is very intense, the climate, and 
particularly the temperature at night, naturally de- 
pends upon the elevation of the district in question. 
In winter snow is prevalent in the hills, and traffic 
on many of the roads is often entirely stopped by 
it and by the immense amount of water brought 
down from the mountains at the time of the spring 

The geographical relations of Salonica with the in- 
terior and the whole of the military operations which 
are based upon that port are governed largely by the 
presence of the Vardar Valley and River which flows 
into the sea at a distance of about twelve miles to the 
southwest of the town. It divides East from West 


and forms with the valley of the Morava the great 
highroad from north to south across the peninsula, 
and makes Salonica the natural point of entry into 
and exit from a large area of the Western Balkans. 
Indeed the importance of the valley and of the port 
are interdependent, and it is for this reason that 
Salonica and its surroundings ought either to belong 
to the owners of the hinterland, or that the hinter- 
land ought to be annexed by the owners of the port. 
It is this, together with the fact that Salonica is a 
good starting point for various routes and roads into 
the interior, which have always made its collecting 
and distributing radii very wide. Thus so long ago 
as the Great War, when Napoleon closed the accus- 
tomed routes into Germany, the port of Salonica 
formed one of the new channels of commerce — com- 
merce carried into the heart of the interior by three 
more or less independent routes. The first of these 
ran up the Vardar Valley and through Bosnia. The 
second went by Seres, the Struma Valley, Sofia, and 
Vidin and thus through Hungary and Budapest to 
Vienna. The third deviated from the second at Sofia, 
turning in a northwesterly direction and continuing 
its course into the heart of Europe by way of Nish 
and Belgrade and along the present great trunk route 
from east to west. 

In order to make my description of the geography 
of the country and of the military operations more 
clear, I am going to base it almost entirely upon this 
division of country formed by the Vardar. Thus, 
although the actual valley of that river can hardly 
be said to extend much to the south of the Serbo- 
Greek frontier, it is convenient to consider even the 


area closely surrounding Salonica in its bearing to 
that river. On the west bank, and on both banks in 
the immediate vicinity of its mouths and of the mouth 
of the torrential Galiko, the country is marshy, inter- 
sected by small streams and dikes, and covered largely 
by reeds. This area is therefore practically impassable 
especially in wet weather, and after the melting of the 
snows when the volume of every important Balkan 
river is so enormously increased. The same kind of 
country, growing gradually drier and less marshy as 
one gets away from the river and its mouths, extends 
as far as Yenidje Vardar — a village situated on the 
road to Vodena, and at the foot of the Pajak Planina. 
To the north and northeast of that place as far as 
Karasulu, and particularly between there and the 
frontier, there are hills the slopes of which approach 
nearer and nearer to the right bank of the Vardar. 

On the east or left bank of the river the whole 
character of the country is different, for in general 
it is hilly if not mountainous. Even between the 
railways, to which I will refer in greater detail below, 
there are summits which attain elevations of well 
over one thousand feet above the level of the sea. 
On the east of the Salonica-Doiran line, and par- 
ticularly on the east and southeast of the River Galiko, 
the whole area is mountainous as far as the Valley of 
the Struma on the east and right down into the Chalkis 
Peninsula on the south. Here are detached mountains 
and groups of mountains, such as the Krusha Balkan 
and the Beshik Dagh which respectively attain eleva- 
tions of about three thousand feet and of nearly 
three thousand five hundred feet above the sea. 
Large parts of this area, which has always been very 


inaccessible from the outer world, are covered with 
oak scrub. The population is mixed, but with the 
exception of the Chalkis Peninsula, where the Greeks 
predominate, it is largely made up of Turks. 

A line of hills and positions, immediately defending 
Salonica on the northeast, east, and southeast, runs 
from the Galiko River along the Duad Baba and 
Derbend Hills to the Hortach Dagh, located at a 
distance of about nine miles to the east of the port. 
From this mountain group the obvious line of defence 
for Salonica turns in an easterly direction and runs 
across the Chalkis Peninsula in rear of Lakes Langaza 
and Beshik. This position, which in certain ways 
resembles that occupied by the Chatalja Lines out- 
side Constantinople, is one of very considerable natural 
strength, for its front is almost entirely protected by 
the above-mentioned lakes and by the swamps which 
lie between and to the east of them. Moreover, the 
Hortach Dagh, with an elevation of over three thou- 
sand five hundred feet above the sea, and the Kolo- 
monda Dagh, which is nearly as high, command and 
dominate the whole of the country which lies to the 
north and northeast of them. 

In regard to the communications available in these 
areas, for obvious reasons it is impossible to do more 
than to indicate those which existed prior to the 
arrival of the Allies. On the west of the Vardar 
sufficient therefore be it to say that over and above 
the road and railway to Monastir, the country is so 
marshy and difficult that there are few, if any, routes 
which are worthy of our attention here. The centre 
of the position is well served, for it is possessed of the 
Vardar Valley line and of the Salonica Junction Rail- 


way, which are entirely independent of one another 
throughout their length. To make matters better, 
these two lines are joined by a branch which runs 
from Karasulu on the former to Kilindir on the latter 
railway. Before the War these were all single lines, 
but there can be no doubt that since the Allied occu- 
pation they have been doubled at least for part of 
their length and that they have been supplemented 
by other railways leading to various parts of the 
Allied front. 

Prior to the international occupation of Salonica 
only two so-called roads united that place with the 
hinterland situated to the northeast and southeast. 
The first ran from Salonica to Seres and thence north- 
wards to Demir Hissar and into the Struma Valley. 
This road crosses the northern end of the Beshik Dagh 
by a pass, the highest point of which is just over 
two thousand feet above the level of the sea, and the 
River Struma by a bridge at Hadrie. This route was 
nominally passable for wheeled traflfic, but long after 
the Greek annexation its condition was such as to 
render it quite unfit for ordinary motors. The second 
road ran in a southeasterly direction from Salonica 
towards and into the Chalkis Peninsula. Its condi- 
tion was extremely bad, and it was not passable for 
vehicles for more than a few miles beyond the borders 
of the city. As in the case of the railways since the 
international occupation, there can be no doubt that 
the Allies have greatly improved these two roads, 
especially the latter, and that they have constructed 
numerous routes leading towards and up to the posi- 
tions which they have occupied. 

Turning to a discussion of the more distant hinter- 


land of Salonica, the country is made up of three 
distinct areas — the Vardar Valley district and the 
districts respectively situated to the east and west 
of it. The Vardar Valley is the most important 
existing line of communication in all Macedonia. 
With an approximate length of one hundred and 
fifty miles, if measured from Salonica to Uskub, large 
parts of it are so gorge-like that for some miles, in 
the neighbourhood and to the north of the Graeco- 
Serbian frontier, it is not followed by a road, and 
only by a railway upon which traffic is therefore 
entirely dependent. That railway may be said to 
enter the actual valley near Karasulu Junction. From 
there as far as Kuprulu, and therefore for a distance of 
about seventy-seven miles, the valley is so narrow, 
except at one point, that the line crosses and re-crosses 
the river three times. Leaving the Vardar at Uskub 
it passes through Komanovo and crosses an area made 
up of bare uncultivated hills subsequently to enter 
the Valley of the Morava near the old Serbo-Turkish 

During recent years this line has become of great 
commercial and military importance. Prior and sub- 
sequent to the Balkan Wars, it was used by Serbia 
(under an arrangement first with Turkey and then 
with Greece) as her principal route to the coast, and 
special quays, warehouses, etc., were allotted to her 
at Salonica — quays and warehouses which were 
practically ex-territorial — for her merchandise and 
live stock. Between August, 1914, and October, 
1915, the significance of the Vardar line became enor- 
mous because it was by way of it alone that Serbia was 
able effectively to communicate with the sea. After 


our arrival at Salonica, it was by this route that we 
endeavoured to go to the assistance of Serbia and to 
force our way into the heart of that country. The 
valley and the line were, however, easy of attack, 
and are easy of defence by Bulgaria because of the 
numerous gorges, and because they run more or less 
parallel to and at no great distance from the frontier 
of that country — a frontier which approaches to 
within about five miles of it on the northeast of the 
station of Strumnitza. 

To the east of the Vardar Valley the principal 
feature affecting the relations of Salonica to the in- 
terior and governing the direction of an advance from 
the Aegean coast into the heart of old Bulgaria are 
the Rhodope Balkans. That range is, however, so 
to speak, skirted and partially avoided by one or two 
routes extending from the Vardar Valley towards 
and across the Bulgarian frontier — lines which though 
influenced by the Rhodopes and their off-shoots do 
not actually penetrate that range. Between the 
Graeco-Serbian frontier and Uskub two roads run 
toward the Struma Valley. Though prior to the out- 
break of the War they were in bad condition, both 
have undoubtedly been improved by the Bulgarians 
since their advance into Macedonia. But the most 
important road, running in an easterly direction from 
the Vardar Valley, is that which connects Komanovo, 
situated a few miles to the north of Uskub, with 
Gyuveshevo — a road already fully described elsewhere. 

Turn to the Rhodopes themselves, the western 
and central sections of which, known respectively as 
the Dospat Dagh and the Kara Balkan, form one 
more or less continuous line. But to the east of the 


Kara Balkan this line practically divides into two 
long off-shoots which enclose the valley of the Arda, 
the northern branch following the old Bulgarian 
frontier and the southern arm skirting the plain ad- 
jacent to the sea. Practically no important rivers 
drain the range towards the south, for ignoring the 
Struma, the principal is the Mesta, which enters the 
Aegean about thirty miles to the east of Kavala. 
Leaving on one side the Maritza, the largest rivers 
which flow towards the north and east are the Krishim 
and the Arda, the waters of which latter are augmented 
by those of the Seugudlu River and the Burgas Chai. 

Li order to penetrate the Rhodopes from the south 
it would be necessary either to approach and to occupy 
the plain which borders the Aegean from the west, 
and therefore from the direction of Salonica, or to 
effect fresh landings somewhere along the coast, be- 
tween that port and Dede Agatch, which is located 
just to the west of the mouth of the Maritza. The 
former operation would be dangerous and require a 
large force, for it would entail an advance by way of 
the Salonica-Dede Agatch Railway which runs prac- 
tically parallel to the real front of the enemy — a 
front which in case of such an Allied attempt he would 
undoubtedly establish more or less along the line of 
the Rhodopes. Fresh landings on the other hand 
would not only be beset by the heavy losses and the 
enormous difficulties which always go with such under- 
takings in hostile country, but they would also be 
accompanied by dangers due to the fact that, except 
at Kavala, which has now no doubt been strongly 
fortified by the enemy, good landing places are not 


We now come to the section of country located on 
the west of the Vardar Valley, and lying more or less 
between Salonica and Monastir or between the former 
town and the southern part of the Albanian frontier. 
The geographical and other conditions prevailing here 
were and are in some ways more and in some ways 
less favourable to the Allies than are those existing 
on the other side of the Vardar. On the one hand, 
whilst there are the Moglena and other mountains 
on the Graeco-Serbian frontier and whilst the country 
to the north and northeast of Monastir is very difficult, 
there are no barriers lying to the south and southeast 
of that town which compare in their strength to the 
Rhodopes. Moreover, Salonica is connected with 
Monastir by a road and a railway. The road, which 
is passable for motors, approximately follows the 
railway, but it avoids two great detours made by the 
line. The railway crosses the plain to Veria, where, 
at the southern point of its first bend, it begins to 
enter the hills. No serious gradients are, however, 
encountered until it reaches Vodena. This railway is 
of very great importance, not only because it gives 
access to Monastir, but because it runs more or less 
parallel to and therefore serves the Allied front. 

So much for the favourable conditions in this area. 
From the opposite point of view it was here, during 
the period of her uncertainty, that the attitude of 
Greece so greatly complicated the Allied plan of cam- 
paign. On the east of the Vardar and in the Greek 
district enclosed by that river, the Rhodopes, the 
Bulgarian frontier, and the Aegean, there was the 
danger that the Greek forces stationed there would, 
as they did, make no effort to resist an enemy advance. 


But their strength was known, and the sacrifice of 
that territory was not vital to the whole Allied posi- 
tion. Not so, however, with the area to the south 
of Monastir and to the west of Salonica. There the 
distribution of the Hellenic Kingdom is such that, 
had King Constantine thrown in his lot with the 
enemy, he was in a position so favourable as to enable 
him to jeopardize the entire British and French plan. 
During the earlier stages of the campaign, in addition 
to the facts that the Allies could not know when and 
how far the Greeks would allow the enemy to advance 
into Hellenic territory, that their position was always 
endangered by the presence of spies, whose movements 
and actions they could not control, they were also 
face to face with the ever-present danger of an attack 
upon their left rear delivered from the Greek army, 
the fighting value of which was uncertain, by routes 
particularly suitable for that purpose. The railway 
from Larissa meets the Salonica-Monastir Line at 
Gidia, roads run up from the south to Veria, to Lake 
Ostrovo, and to Fiorina. It was these dangers and 
particularly that connected with the left rear of the 
Allied front at Salonica — dangers to meet which no 
adequate or open precautions could at first be taken 
— which made political events, or more correctly the 
Allied handling of political events in the Greek capital, 
matters possessed of such immense influence upon the 
Salonica campaign. 

To consider very briefly the three stages into which 
the actual military operations have been divided it 
may be said that the first was connected with the 
original Anglo-French attempts to force their way 
into the interior and to reach Nish or Uskub or at 


least to prevent the complete conquest of Serbia. 
These endeavours began as soon as sufficient Allied 
troops had been disembarked to render possible an 
advance into the interior. The French, on the left, 
pushed forward up the Vardar Valley and to the 
west of it and towards the Babuna Pass. The British 
on the right moved forward to the north of Lake 
Doiran. The Serbian retreat on the one hand and 
the Bulgarian advance on the other were, however, 
so rapid that the Allies, unable to effect a junction 
with the Serbs, were compelled to withdraw to Greek 
territory and to the immediate vicinity of Salonica, 
where for months they occupied more or less the 
positions which I have already indicated as constituting 
the natural defensive line of the port. 

The second stage in the campaign lasted from De- 
cember, 1915, until the following September. During 
it the Allies remained practically entirely on the de- 
fensive, occupying themselves with the improvement 
of their communications and with the political situa- 
tion in Greece. It was during this stage, however, 
that the western part of the district lying between 
the Rhodope Balkans and the sea, and particularly 
the area in the vicinity of both banks of the Struma, 
figured prominently in the campaign. In January," 
the Allies destroyed the Great Bridge across the 
Struma near Demir Hissar, later demolishing others 
located in the neighbourhood of Seres. Subsequently 
and in May, the Greeks handed over to the enemy 
Fort Rupel — a position which so to speak constitutes 
the key to the entrance of the Struma Valley. As a 
consequence of this, the Bulgarians were able, during 
the summer, to advance towards the sea, finally occupy- 


ing Kavala, the bulk of the garrison of which place 
surrendered without any resistance in September. 
The then Greek Government repudiated the conduct 
of its commander at Kavala, but the greater part of 
the Army Corps in question was transported to Ger- 
many as the "guests" of the German Government. 
It was therefore evident that even if the then Greek 
Premier — Mr. Zaimis — was not himself responsible, 
there were influences at work which proved that the 
attitude of the Hellenic Government was far from 
reliable. About the same time General Milne — the 
British commander — pushed forward across the 
Struma, thereby making an effective demonstration 
in force with the object of attracting and immobilising 
Bulgarian forces which would otherwise have been 
available for the defence of the area on the west of 
the Vardar. Subsequently, however, owing to the 
difficulty of the ground, to the floods of the Struma, 
and to the strength of the enemy, the British were 
unable to undertake any extended operations in this 
area, and they withdrew to the west of the Struma 
and to areas which are more easily defensible and in 
which the climate is better than that of the swamps 
which border upon the river. 

The third stage in the campaign began with the 
Allied push in the direction of Monastir in the late 
summer of 1916. I have said sufficient already to 
prove that that city is so situated and that the com- 
munications passing through it are such that the place 
is of considerable military importance. But its political 
significance and meaning are even more far-reaching. 
For years the possession of the city has been coveted 
by the Bulgarians, the Greeks, and the Serbians, and 


for years it has been a centre in which Bulgarian, Greek, 
and, to a lesser extent, Serbian propaganda has been 
in full swing. The fact that prior to the Balkan Wars 
the largest element of the population was either Bul- 
garian or Greek partly accounted for the Serbian desire 
to capture the city during the first Balkan campaign. 
The same fact was in part responsible for the second 
war — a war which left in the heart of every Bul- 
garian an outstanding longing to recapture the city 
at the earliest possible opportunity. It was really 
this longing which brought Bulgaria into the War 
against Serbia — a longing which was temporarily 
gratified when it fell into the hands of the enemy soon 
after Bulgaria threw in her lot with the Central Powers. 

When it became obvious, during the early autumn 
of 1916, that we could not advance either across the 
Rhodope Balkans or by way of the Vardar Valley, 
over and above the fact that except for the Greek 
danger, a campaign in the direction of Monastir was 
by way of the line of least resistance, there was there- 
fore the additional object of recapturing from Bulgaria 
her most coveted and cherished war gain, and of restor- 
ing to Serbia a city, for the possession of which she had 
already fought two wars. Consequently it was these 
factors which led to the developments which began 
at the end of August, 1916. 

Up to that time the Bulgarians, who had been 
gradually advancing from Monastir, had reached the 
northern shores of Lake Ostrovo, where there was 
severe fighting. The Allied advance was inaugurated 
early in September, the French and Russians on the 
left moving on Fiorina, the Serbians under General 
Mishitch advancing from the line Vodena-Lake Ostrovo 


against the Moglena Ridge, topped as it is by Mount 
Kaimakchalan which rises to an elevation of nearly 
eight thousand feet above the level of the sea. After 
approximately a fortnight's fighting, the Franco- 
Russian forces took Fiorina and reached the southern 
entrance to the Monastir Plain, whilst the Serbs 
stormed Kaimakchalan, thereby reconquering a corner 
of their former territory. Thenceforth the plan was 
that the left of the Allied line was to demonstrate and 
to hold the enemy first on his defensive line, running 
north of Fiorina and south of the frontier, and then 
on the Kenali front, whilst the Serbs outflanked these 
positions by advancing across the River Tcherna and 
took the hills in the Tcherna Bend. Mishitch's first 
big attack failed, but a few days later he pushed his 
way well into this most difficult country. For the 
ensuing month (October 21 till November 19) the 
weather was extremely bad, but the Serbian Com- 
mander-in-Chief held his ground against repeated 
counter attacks, and by the middle of November 
had advanced to positions from which the Kenali 
line was so hopelessly outflanked that the Bulgarians 
retired from it to the River Bistritza, which runs 
east and west at a distance of only some four miles 
from Monastir. A few days afterwards, and early 
in the morning of Sunday, the nineteenth, the Franco- 
Russian forces entered Monastir, followed a few hours 
later by the Serbians, who crossed the Tcherna. Thus, 
largely due to the skill of General Mishitch and to the 
intense bravery of the Serbians, who had to advance 
over by far the most difficult area of country, and 
who were responsible for the taking of Kaimakchalan 
and the Tcherna Bend, Monastir fell into the hands 


of the Allies on the fourth anniversary of its conquest 
by the Serbians during the first Balkan war. 

The capture of what may almost be described as 
the capital of Macedonia was important both politically 
and militarily. Over and above the reasons already 
given, this is the case because the city would be a good 
jumping-off ground were it decided to increase the 
forces at Salonica in such a way as to enable them to 
deliver a determined blow in the Balkans. Thus from 
Monastir there run routes into Albania and into 
Western Serbia and also a road — if not now a rail- 
way — through Prilep and the Babuna Pass to Ku- 
prulu. Moreover the Allied advance in Western Mace- 
donia was responsible for bringing about the junction 
of the Salonica forces with those of Italy based upon 
the Adriatic, and therefore for enabling that country 
to further the Allied cause in this area. The Italians, 
having occupied Avlona in December, 1914, subse- 
quently extended their sphere of control roughly as 
far as the River Viosa, and later on, as I have shown 
elsewhere, established connection with the Salonica 
army. No full details are available concerning the 
work and difficulties of this Italian force, but its original 
presence and particularly the fact that it now prolongs 
the Allied line from the neighbourhood of Cologna 
near which place the French left rests, to the Adriatic 
has been and is of great importance. Had it not been 
for this expedition on the east of the Adriatic, during 
the regime of King Constantine, the dangers of the 
enemy's pushing forward through Albania and Greece 
and therefore of his out-flanking the Allies, and of 
the junction of Bulgaro-Germanic forces with regular 
and irregular Hellenic contingents would have been 


even greater than they were. Equally well, the fact 
that Italy now holds Southern Albania does a good deal 
to strengthen our strategic position in the Near East 
— a strategic position which has its direct as well 
as its indirect influence upon the War. 

Since the late autumn of 1916, whilst there has been 
occasional and intermittent fighting, there have been 
no far-reaching changes in the Salonica battle front. 
Starting from a point on the Adriatic situated a few 
miles to the north of Avlona, our line now extends 
roughly across Albania in such a way as to leave Berat 
to the enemy and Korcha to the Allies. After passing 
round the north of Monastir, it runs in an almost due 
easterly direction to Lake Doiran where it soon turns 
southeast, approaching the Aegean near and pre- 
sumably on the west of the mouth of the Struma. 
This means that the Allies now hold approximately 
one quarter of Albania, that they are in possession 
of the extreme southern corner of Serbia, and that 
only the northeastern section of New Greece is in 
the hands of the enemy. 

The foregoing remarks will be sufficient to prove 
that the Salonica campaign is quite unlike, and that 
the country is far more difficult than anything else in 
Europe, except perhaps that on the Italian front. 
With the exception of the plain lying to the west of 
the town and of the one which borders upon the Aegean, 
almost the whole of Macedonia is made up of moun- 
tains or disjointed rocky hills. The winding valleys 
which often narrow down to mere gorges are shut in 
by sloping hills so forbidding that advance across 
them seems to be well-nigh impossible. In other 
districts, which are somewhat more open, there is 


hardly a single locality where a forward movement is 
not rendered extremely arduous by the existence of 
defensive positions, the merits of which it is impossi- 
ble to exaggerate. When the Allies went to Salonica, 
the whole of the railways were single lines, built not 
for the purpose of heavy and numerous trains, but 
simply to meet the requirements of the very meagre 
traffic of peace time. The gradients are steep, the 
curves are sharp, and the passing places were few and 
far between. Many of the railways and especially 
the Vardar and the Salonica Junction lines pass 
through defiles and over numerous bridges which are 
easily defensible by an enemy in possession of the hills 
which command the valleys of the Vardar and of the 
Mesta. With the exception of very few roads, the 
paths consisted of the merest tracks strewn with rocky 
stones so numerous that one had to ride, to stumble, or 
to clamber along them as best one might. The native 
bridges were so narrow, so shaky, and so steep, that 
one crossed them only at the greatest risk. Moreover 
the winter rains and snows, which in the mountains 
are very heavy, make the roads — where roads exist 
— and the fords well-nigh, if not quite, impossible. 

This all means, except where the country has been 
occupied for some time and where the methods of 
communication have been improved, that the utility 
of motor vehicles, transport waggons, and big guns 
upon which a modern army depends, is greatly mini- 
mised, and that special transport and mountain guns 
must be provided for service upon the numerous 
tracks which are not passable for wheeled traffic. 
The drought of the summer, which makes water, 
except in the actual valleys, a difficulty for travellers. 


places upon the supply sections of the army a burden 
the magnitude of which it is difficult to exaggerate. 
And lastly the climatic and other conditions are such 
that it was and is impossible to expect that the health 
of the troops engaged would or will be comparable 
to that of those fighting in more healthy theatres of 
war — theatres in which, when contingents are with- 
drawn for rest, measures can be taken, in a way im- 
possible at Salonica, to insure the counteraction of 
what must always be hard and arduous fighting at the 
actual front. 

These are some of the factors which make it im- 
possible to exaggerate the military difficulties sur- 
rounding the conduct of a campaign in this part of 
the Balkan Peninsula — difficulties which when coupled 
with the central and therefore strategically strong 
position of Bulgaria and with the effects of the earlier 
attitude of Greece are responsible for the original 
Allied failure to advance into the interior of Serbia 
and for our subsequent inability in any way seriously 
to defeat the army of King Ferdinand or to threaten 
the enemy's line of communications by way of the 
Belgrade-Constantinople Railway. But if we admit, 
as we must admit, that the Salonica campaign, like 
the operations at the Dardanelles, has not accom- 
plished its primary objects, the undertaking has served 
and is serving certain purposes in the War. It has 
demonstrated the Anglo-French desire to come to the 
support of Serbia. Moreover, what is much more 
important, the existence of the Salonica expedition 
was probably at least partially responsible for pre- 
venting Greece from entering the War upon the side 
of the enemy, and its presence certainly prevented 


the still further success of the secret intrigues and 
propaganda carried out in that country by German 
agents during the regime of King Constantine. These 
results, when coupled with the fact that England and 
France, two of the Protecting Powers of Greece, have 
been able to defend the greater part of that country 
from invasion and thus to carry out their treaty obli- 
gations, are of significance; for, whilst the fighting 
value of the Hellenic army is not of any great im- 
portance to either group of belligerents, the unhindered 
and unhampered use of all the Greek ports, harbours, 
and bays, by enemy submarines, would have carried 
with it danger to the whole Allied position in the East 
— danger so great that it cannot be estimated here. 
For these reasons and for many others, among them 
the fact that the Allies have maintained a foothold 
in the Balkans, the Salonica campaign will be possessed 
of a historical interest and importance the true mean- 
ing of which may not become apparent before or even 
immediately after the final termination of hostilities. 

o lOo zoo 

390 Miles 
■..TTT..^ Proposed. 

Railways open«_» Projected^. 
The Bagdad Railway and its Tributaries 

From a map T>repare(l by Tlio Royal Qeorraphical Society 




My object in this chapter is to examine the impor- 
tance of the Bagdad Railway and its tributaries in the 
War and to give a brief outhne of the political and 
geographical conditions which have influenced the 
construction of these lines. So far as the first of these 
points be concerned, it must be obvious to any reader 
who makes the most superficial study of the subject, 
that this railway, together with the main route across 
the Balkans, constitute the great line of Germanic 
communication from west to east, and that the Bag- 
dad Railway alone is, so to speak, the backbone of 
Turkish utility and power in the War. Thus were it 
not for its existence, the Ottoman resistance in Mesopo- 
tamia and in Syria could have been discounted as a 
practical consideration in the War, and the sending of 
Turkish reinforcements to the Caucasus would have 
been even more materially delayed than has in fact 
been the case. 

That these facilities were intended by Germany to 
be the war conditions in case of an outbreak of hostili- 
ties with England was natural and obvious, in fact so 
natural and so obvious that had the enemy ignored 
the precaution of preparation in Turkey, it would 
have meant the pursuit of a policy which certainly 


was not adopted by him elsewhere. Indeed to those 
who have travelled in the East, and who have watched 
the gradual development of the Pan-German scheme 
there, it was always markedly apparent that the 
objects of the Bagdad Railway were military rather 
than commercial. Were any proof of this required 
it is provided, as I shall endeavour to show below, by 
the facts that the Government of the Kaiser insisted 
upon a railway from the Bosphorus and not from the 
Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, and that it objected, 
when a modification of the original route was proposed, 
to the suggestion that the line should pass through 
Alexandretta and therefore absolutely along the sea- 
shore, at the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean, 
instead of, as it now does, never coming within a dis- 
tance of about ten miles of the coast. 

The present Bagdad line is by no means the first 
that has been under consideration. The idea of 
connecting the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf 
by an overland route, and therefore of shortening the 
journey round the Cape or across the Isthmus of Suez, 
was first suggested about the year 1835. Under dis- 
cussion for many years, the original plan — a plan 
largely based upon the detailed survey made by Colonel 
Chesney in 1835-1837 — was to avoid Asia Minor 
altogether, and to start the proposed railway not from 
the Bosphorus but from some point on the Eastern 
Mediterranean. One proposal was for a railway from 
Alexandretta via Aleppo to the Euphrates and thence 
down the right bank of that river to Koweit; or, for 
a line starting from the same point, but crossing the 
Euphrates near Belis and subsequently following 
either the left bank of that river or the right bank of 



the Tigris to Bagdad and thence to the Gulf. Another 
idea was a hne from TripoH or Beirut through the 
desert via Palmyra to the Euphrates, and thence 
down the valley of that river to the sea. A third 
suggestion, about which but little is known, was to 
connect Ismailia with Koweit by a line which would 
have run practically due east and west. 

Negotiations and pourparlers on the merits of these 
various lines were in progress for many years, a com- 
pany being formed for the purpose of realising Colonel 
Chesney's plan in the early fifties. This company being 
unable to raise the necessary funds, and the British 
Government having refused its support to the scheme 
in 1857, the question lapsed until 1872, when it was 
referred to a Parliamentary Commission, which ap- 
proved of the construction of a line by the route advo- 
cated by Colonel Chesney. Subsequently, however, 
the idea was dropped in favour of one by which early 
in 1876 England purchased shares to the value of 
£4,000,000 in the Suez Canal, which had been open 
to traffic since 1869. 

From this time onwards two reasons gradually led 
up to the idea of connecting not the Mediterranean 
but the Bosphorus with the Persian Gulf. The first 
of these was that, whilst in earlier times there was no 
railway nearer than Brindisi on the overland route 
to India, from the opening of the through line to Con- 
stantinople in 1888 it was natural, if there was to be 
an overland route to the Persian Gulf at all, that such 
a route would follow a line which would necessitate 
the shortest sea passage. The other and from political 
and military points of view far more important reason 
for the change of plan was that German influence. 


gradually developed in Turkey since the accession of 
the present Emperor to the throne, has been entirely 
directed towards the construction of railways which 
would not be easy of attack and communications which 
could not be cut by a group of Powers with the com- 
mand of the sea. Thus, whilst a line starting from the 
Mediterranean would have been quite useless to Turkey 
or Germany as a means of through connection between 
the East and West, a railway broken only at the south- 
ern end of the Bosphorus gives to the enemy an iron 
road the importance of which it is impossible to over- 
estimate. Indeed, so long as the forts of the Darda- 
nelles and of the Bosphorus remain intact, the Sultan 
and his allies enjoy the advantages of naval power in 
a limited area — the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, 
and the Dardanelles — without the possession of a 

Before entering into a discussion of the history, 
geography, and construction of the great trunk line, 
I will endeavour to show in a general way the ac- 
tual meaning and the military and political impor- 
tance of the railways of Asiatic Turkey as they exist 
to-day. Starting from Haidar Pasha, opposite to 
Constantinople, it is now possible to travel by train 
or by water across the greater part of the areas which 
lie between the Ottoman capital and Bagdad on the 
one hand and the Egyptian frontier on the other. 
The Taurus tunnels were pierced in November, 1916, 
and they are now open to traffic maintained at least 
by a narrow-gauge railway. More or less through 
communication has therefore been established right 
across the Anatohan Plateau, along the Plain of Cilicia, 
and through the Amanus Range to a junction about 


ten miles to the north of Aleppo. From here the 
northern prong, or Bagdad Railway proper, continues 
its way in an easterly direction as far as Helif and 
probably to Nisibin. At the other or Bagdad end 
the railway has been completed in a northerly direc- 
tion up to Samarra. If we take it that the respec- 
tive termini are at Helif and at Samarra, this means 
that out of the total distance of approximately fifteen 
hundred miles from Constantinople to Bagdad, about 
twelve hundred miles can be accomplished by train. 

The portion of the journey which cannot be per- 
formed by train is made up of two parts, the first 
of about one hundred and thirty miles across the 
desert from Helif to Mosul. From here the stage to 
Samarra, about one hundred and seventy miles, can 
be accomplished in boats and rafts floated or sailed 
down the Tigris. In addition, what is almost equally 
important is that, since the completion of the Taurus 
and Amanus tunnels, the railway thus constructed 
approaches and crosses the Euphrates at Jerablus. 
From that place there is an alternative means of 
communication with Mesopotamia by way of the 
Euphrates as far as Feluja, now connected by a light 
railway with Bagdad only about thirty-five miles to 
the east. The progress of the construction of the 
Bagdad line has therefore had its direct military advan- 
tages to Turkey in the Mesopotamian campaign. It 
also provides an easier and quicker means of commu- 
nication between Constantinople and Eastern Asia 
Minor than would otherwise have existed so long as 
the Black Sea route was closed to trafiic. For instance, 
the distances to be covered by road between Helif 
and the Bitlis district, or between the head of the rail- 


way and Kharput — a centre of the utmost impor- 
tance — are considerably less than those which would 
otherwise have had to be traversed by road from An- 
gora — formerly the nearest point in railway connec- 
tion with Constantinople. These facilities are of the 
greatest importance to-day because they must further 
the Turco-Germanic objects of reconquering North- 
eastern Asia Minor and of overcoming Armenian 
resistance there and in the areas of the Russian Cau- 
casus now ceded to Turkey by Russia under her terms 
of peace with the Central Powers. 

Up to Aleppo, about eight hundred and forty miles 
from Constantinople, the Anatolian and Bagdad 
railways serve as a means of communication with 
the south as well as with the east. From Aleppo the 
southern prong, before the War owned partly by French 
companies and partly by the Turks themselves (I 
must obviously speak here of the pre-War ownership 
of the railways, for the Turks are believed to have 
seized all those which properly belong to companies 
of Alhed nationality), runs by way of Damascus to 
Deraia. From this point there are two routes. The 
first is by the Hedjaz line, which continues its way 
in a southerly direction as far as Medina. The second 
bends from Deraia in a westerly direction towards 
Haifa, but before reaching that port turns south near 
Nazareth, ultimately extending as far as Bir Auja, 
about thirty -five miles to the southwest of Beersheba.^ 
Although there is at least one break of gauge at Rayak, 
not at Aleppo as is sometimes stated, the strategical 

1 Presumably ere now the Egyptian railway system has been united with 
that of Palestine, but no detailed reference can be made here or in the 
accompanying maps to lines constructed by the British for war purposes. 


importance of these southern prongs is enormous. 
They have rendered possible the threatened attack 
upon Egypt, an attack which, although it never ma- 
terialised, at one time had a certain effect upon the 
general plan of the Allied operations. 

The story of the numerous and various arrange- 
ments which have led up to the existing extension of 
railways in Asia Minor is closely connected with the 
gradual development of Germanic influence in the 
Near East. In 1888, the only railways existing in 
Asia Minor were the Smyrna-Aidin, the Smyrna-Cas- 
saba, the Mersina-Adana, and the Haidar Pasha 
(Scutari) -Ismid lines. All these railways were com- 
pletely, or at least practically, in the hands of English 
capitalists. The Scutari-Ismid line, which now con- 
stitutes the first section of the Anatolian Railway and 
which has a length of about fifty-six miles, was built 
by the Turkish Government in 1871. In 1880 it was 
leased to a British company for a period of twenty 
years. In 1888, however, the Turks, influenced by 
the Germans, dispossessed the British Company and 
handed the line over to a German syndicate financed 
by the Deutsche Bank of Berlin, which then became 
the moving spirit in all the schemes of Germanic rail- 
way construction in the Asiatic dominions of the 
Sultan. Moreover, the Germans secured two Imperial 
Irades, the one giving them the control of this line for 
a period of ninety-nine years, and the other granting 
them the right of extending it to Angora, and therefore 
for a further three hundred and one miles. 

At the same time, the Turks first accepted the idea 
of providing kilometric guarantees for railways, the 
principle of those guarantees being that the Gov- 


ernment promises to the company a fixed sum as the 
gross annual receipts per kilometre of line open to 
traffic. This sum is handed over to the railway by 
the Ottoman Public Debt before that organisation 
passes on its surplus to the Government. In the case 
of the Haidar Pasha-Ismid section the kilometric 
guarantee is 10,300 francs per kilometre, and in that 
of the Ismid- Angora section 15,000 francs per kilo- 
metre. The Anatolian Railway Company, which 
came into being in 1889, completed the railway to 
Angora, which was opened to traffic in 1892. 

In the following year, which constitutes a very im- 
portant epoch, the Germans were granted two further 
concessions. The first gave them the right of prolong- 
ing the railway from Angora to Kaisariya and thence 
through Sivas and Diarbekr and down the Tigris to 
Bagdad. This proposal was not carried out, ostensibly 
on account of the engineering difficulties, but really 
because of the hostility which it created in Russia. 
The idea of this line has, however, never been completely 
given up, and, if we are to believe various authoritative 
publications in Germany, the existence of a concession 
for the construction of lines from Adabazar to Bolu, 
and from Angora by way of Kaisariya to Sivas on the 
north, and to Nigde and Ulu Kushlar on the south, is 
still held to be valid. Indeed, according to Mehr- 
mann's " Diplomatischer Krieg in Vorder Asien", 
published in 1916, some fifty miles of a railway from 
Angora towards Sivas and Erzerum had actually been 
completed in November of that year. There is also 
good reason to suppose that part of the line from Ada- 
bazar to Bolu, following a route fully described in 
my book, *' Washed by Four Seas", and for which a 


concession exists, has been completed since the begin- 
ning of the War. 

The second and all-important concession granted 
to the Germans in 1893 provided for the construction 
of what was then considered to be a branch line from 
Eskishehr to Konia. This line, which has a length of 
two hundred and sixty-nine miles and a kilometric 
guarantee (I believe amounting to about 12,500 francs 
per kilometre), was opened to traffic in 1896. Its com- 
pletion was most important, not only because it laid 
the foundation for the construction of the Bagdad 
railway by its present route, but because one hundred 
miles to the south of Eskishehr it passes through Afiun 
Karahissar and thus establishes railway connection 
between Smyrna and Constantinople by what is still 
known as the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway. 

That line owes its existence to an English company, 
which obtained a concession for its construction in 
1863. Thirty years later, having no kilometric guar- 
antee, the main line extended for a distance of one 
hundred and five miles to Alashehr, and its northern 
arm went only to Soma. In 1893 the Turks handed 
over these lines to a French company, which undertook 
to work them under a special arrangement with the 
Government (its details, as also a great deal of other 
useful information concerning railways in Asiatic 
Turkey, are to be found in "Corps de Droit Ottoman", 
by George Young) and to prolong the main line as 
far as Afiun Karahissar, this latter stretch having a 
kilometric guarantee amounting to nearly 19,000 francs 
per kilometre. For some years the rivalry which 
existed between the French and the German companies 
prevented the actual junction of the two lines, and 


when I was at Afiun Karahissar in 1905 I found the 
two railway systems separated by a distance of a few 
hundred yards and running their trains in such a way 
that the passenger was doomed to miss his connection. 
Subsequently, and I believe after the re-establishment 
of the Turkish Constitution in 1908, the two companies 
arrived at a working arrangement, and the trains of 
the French company started from the German station. 
After that time, too, the French company secured the 
concession to prolong, as far as Panderma on the Sea 
of Marmora, the branch which ran from Magnesia to 
Soma, and thus to open a subsidiary line, the total 
length of which is one hundred and thirteen miles. 
This prolongation, which has no kilometric guarantee, 
has played a most important part in the War, for it was 
on account of its existence that the Turks were able to 
convey troops to districts which lie in the immediate 
vicinity of the Asiatic coast of the Dardanelles. 

Although they form no part of the Bagdad system, 
and have no connection with it, in order to make this 
chapter as complete an account as possible of the 
railways of Asiatic Turkey I will refer here very briefly 
to the Mudania-Brusa Line and to what is known as 
the Smyrna- Aidin Railway. The first of these, which 
unites the ancient capital of the Turkish Empire with 
its port upon the Sea of Marmora, has a length of about 
twenty-six miles. There is no kilometric guarantee, 
and its gauge is three feet three and four-tenths inches 
(one metre), instead of the normal Continental gauge 
of four feet eight and one half inches. By a firman of 
1891 the company has the right to prolong its line to 
meet the Anatolian railway system, but the schemes 
for the establishment of connection either between 


Brusa and the Germanic system near Eskisliehr or 
between Brusa and the Smyrna-Panderma line never 
having been reahzed, this short section has httle poHt- 
ical or mihtary importance. 

The concession for the Smyrna-Aidin Line was given 
to a group of British capitahsts in 1856 without the 
provision of a kilometric guarantee. Since the year 
1866, when these first eighty miles of railway were 
opened to traffic, the system has been gradually ex- 
tended to Egerdir, which lies at a distance of 
two hundred and ninety-four miles to the east of 
Smyrna. Possessed of four short branches, this line 
has always managed to prosper without a kilometric 
guarantee. But unless the War reverses the whole 
position of railways in Asia Minor, it is obvious that 
the dream once entertained by its promoters — that 
it should be prolonged to Konia and thus form the 
first section of the route to Bagdad — is doomed to 
meet with disappointment. 

From the moment of the opening of the railway to 
Konia the German plans for the prolongation of that 
line to the Persian Gulf became more definite and pre- 
cise. The Kaiser, who had paid his first visit to Con- 
stantinople in 1889 — a visit more or less connected 
with the then recent grabbing of the Haidar Pasha- 
Ismid Railway by the Germans and with its prolonga- 
tion to Angora, to which I have already referred — 
went to Turkey again in the year 1898. It was this, 
his second visit, and the appointment of Baron Marshal 
von Bieberstein as German Ambassador in Constan- 
tinople in 1897, that led to the promise of a concession 
for the present railway — a promise which I believe 
was made verbally in 1898. 


There is no reason here to enter into the details 
of the negotiations which intervened between that 
time and the signature of the final agreement five 
years later. These negotiations have been admirably 
reviewed, among others, by Sir Valentine Chirol in 
his "Middle Eastern Question", and by M. Andre 
Cheradame in various works and papers which he has 
published on the subject. Suffice it, therefore, to say 
that in 1899 a preliminary Convention was signed 
between Doctor Siemens — then Director of the Deut- 
sche Bank — and the Porte. That Convention gave 
to the Anatolian Railway Company, in principle, the 
right of constructing a line from Konia to the Persian 
Gulf. In 1902 a formal Convention was approved 
by the Sultan — a Convention which in its turn served 
as the basis of the final agreement of March 5, 1903. 
This agreement, which constitutes the real charter of 
the Bagdad Railway, was actually signed between 
representatives of the Ottoman Government on the 
one hand and those of the Anatolian Railway Company 
on the other. But as the Anatolian Railway Com- 
pany was so blatantly German, and as the Deutsche 
Bank, at that time, wished to cater for international 
financial support, it was carefully arranged before the 
signature of the Convention that a new company, to 
be known as the "Imperial Ottoman Bagdad Rail- 
way Company", should take over the concession 
actually given to men who acted as nominees of the 
Deutsche Bank and of the Anatolian Company when 
they signed the agreement. The new company, with a 
capital of £600,000, was formed on the very day on 
which the concession was signed. 

Although my primary object here is to discuss the 


military and geographical aspects of the Bagdad Rail- 
way, the financial and political details of the Conven- 
tion of 1903 (published in England as a Parliamentary 
Paper on the Bagdad Railway in 1911) are such that 
it seems advisable very briefly to refer to some of 
their principal features. That Convention ensured 
to the company not only the power of building a line 
from Konia to Basra, more or less, though not exactly, 
by the route which it so far follows, but it also gave 
the right to construct branches, the most important 
of which were those from Sadijeh to Khanikin, and 
from Basra to a point on the Persian Gulf to be sub- 
sequently agreed upon, thus totalling nearly two 
thousand miles. The duration of the arrangement 
was to be for ninety -nine years, the existing concessions 
for the lines to Angora and Konia being prolonged for 
a like period. The first section had to be begun at 
once and completed in two years. All sorts of facilities 
and rights were guaranteed and given to the company, 
including the power of constructing ports at Bagdad, 
Basra, and on the Persian Gulf. It was also to have 
the use of the rivers, Shatt-el-Arab, Tigris, and Eu- 
phrates for the conveyance of material and workmen 
required for constructional purposes. In addition 
the concession outlined almost unlimited directions 
in which the power of the company could be increased 
from time to time. 

The financial arrangements between the Govern- 
ment and the company depend partly upon the Con- 
vention and partly upon the subsidiary documents 
which it was thereby agreed should be signed before 
the commencement of each section or group of sec- 
tions. Thus whilst the original concession constitutes 


the promise of the Government to pay the company 
and defines the amount of the kilometric guarantee, 
the subsequent loan contracts, the first three series 
o^ which are pubHshed in the above-mentioned Blue 
Book, actually provide the money for the payment of 
the guarantee, which in fact totals 15,500 francs per 
year per kilometre when each section begins to work. 
That sum is made up of two parts, the first being 
11,000 francs per kilometre for construction provided 
by the Government, and the second being 4500 francs 
per year per kilometre for working expenses. If the 
gross kilometric receipts of the line exceed 4500 francs 
per annum, provision is made as to the distribution of 
the surplus, and further sums were guaranteed for the 
improvement of the line between Haidar Pasha and 
Konia and for the subsequent running of express trains. 
The Bagdad Railway Four Per Cent. Loan Con- 
tract, First Series, to cover the expense of the construc- 
tion of the first section of the line from Konia to Bul- 
gurlu, was signed at the same time as the original 
Convention. It put into force, so far as that section 
was concerned, the arrangements made by the con- 
cession itself. The company sold bonds, issued by the 
Government, on the market, and secured a sum 
amounting to about £1,800,000, which was ample for 
•the construction of a stretch of line on which there 
were no engineering difficulties. As a matter of fact, 
after the opening of that section, which took place in 
1904, the company was left with a considerable surplus 
(sometimes estimated at over £1,000,000), to be 
placed towards the expense of building the much 
more costly sections which were to traverse the Taurus 
and Amanus ranges. 


From Konia to Eregli the railway wanders over a 
sparsely populated plain. For the whole distance, 
and particularly between Karaman and Eregli, one 
sees nothing but miles upon miles of country, only 
very small parts of which are cultivated. The first 
section does not, however, end at Eregli, which would 
have been its natural terminus. In order to comply 
with the terms of the concession, which states that 
sections must be one hundred and twenty-five miles 
in length, the railway was prolonged to a point 
a few hundred yards beyond Bulgurlu. Here, for 
years, a pair of rails laid upon a low embankment were 
left to jut out into space, and to demonstrate that 
things in Turkey are not conducted in a normal manner. 

Although strictly speaking it does not form part 
of the Bagdad Railway, I will briefly refer here to the 
scheme for the irrigation of the plain of Konia, which 
is in the hands of a German company, formed in 1907, 
as an offshoot of the Anatolian and Bagdad railway 
companies and which I have described in detail in my 
book, "The Danger Zone of Europe." The task of 
that company is to bring the waters of Lakes Beyshehr 
and Karaviran through the gorges of the Charshembe 
River in order to irrigates large district which surrounds 
Chumla station. If this has been or can be success- 
fully done — a great deal of work had actually been 
carried out in the year 1909 — some one hundred and 
thirty thousand acres of arid plain will have been effec- 
tively watered. To accomplish this object more than 
two hundred million cubic yards of water will be re- 
quired every year. The Turks hope to be able to 
recover the money spent in building the necessary 
canals, etc. — money advanced by the Germans — 


by selling portions of the land irrigated, by raising the 
rents upon the tenants, and by decreasing if not by 
doing away altogether with the balance to be paid on 
the kilometric guarantees of at least this section of the 
Bagdad Railway. 

The completion of the first section of the line was 
followed by a prolonged delay. This was due partly 
to geographical and partly to political and international 
conditions. From the first of these standpoints the 
difficulty lay in the fact that the second section, which 
enters the Taurus area directly it leaves Bulgurlu, 
was the most costly of construction upon the whole 
line. This meant that as the company would be 
compelled to disburse the handsome surplus left over 
from the first section, it refused to agree to build the 
Taurus length unless it were given, at the same time, 
the money for at least two sections located to the east 
of that range. From a political point of view the ques- 
tion was complicated, for, whilst the Turks had diffi- 
culty in providing and guaranteeing the interest on 
the necessary funds, there arose once more the problem 
as to whether international consent could be secured 
for the raising of these funds, and whether there was 
or was not to be international co-operation in the 

After a great deal of difficulty, in June, 1908 — that 
is, two months before the re-establishment of the Otto- 
man Constitution — an additional Convention and 
an agreement for the second and third series of the 
Bagdad Loan Contract (published in the above-men- 
tioned Parliamentary Paper) were signed between the 
company and the Government. The first of these 
documents slightly modified the original Convention, 


and arranged for the construction of four sections 
to measure not eight hundred but eight hundred and 
forty kilometres and to extend as far as Hehf. The 
second provided for the money necessary for con- 
structional purposes. The signature of these docu- 
ments was in its turn followed by a further delay, this 
time caused by the temporarily changed conditions 
in Turkey itself. The revolution of July, 1908, so 
shook the position of the Germans that for a time they 
did not know where they were. Moreover, for a limited 
period the power of the Ottoman Parliament became 
stronger and stronger, and the influence of the true 
Liberals, who desired to avoid the heavy financial 
burdens placed upon Turkey by the railway con- 
tract, became greater and greater. The results of 
this were that there intervened a great struggle be- 
tween the opponents of the scheme and those who 
desired to modify the railway route on the one 
hand, and the Germans together with the corrupt 
elements of the Ottoman population on the other, 
and that the line was only open as far as Karapunar 
(about ninety miles by railway to the southeast of 
Eregli) at the time of the outbreak of the War. 

On leaving Bulgurlu, at an elevation of about three 
thousand seven hundred feet above the sea, the 
railway immediately begins to wind its way up the 
northern slopes of the Taurus. Following more or 
less the line of the old post-road the gradients are 
steep, but as the country is open and rolling, engineers 
have been able to choose their own route, thus avoid- 
ing any serious constructional difficulties. Arrived at 
the watershed, known as the Karndash Bel (height 
5070 feet), the railway continues its way for two or 


three miles and as far as Ulu Kuslilar — the highest 
station on the whole line at an altitude of four thousand 
nine hundred feet. Near Ulu Kushlar the traveller 
who follows this route by road or train enters a valley 
at first followed by the Tabaz and subsequently by 
the Bozanti Su. That valley, the sides of which are 
bedecked with scattered trees, grows narrower and 
narrower until it becomes a mere gorge, in places so 
narrow that the river flows through a deep rocky 
crevice, where before the construction of the railway 
there was barely room for the road. On the south 
and west one has distant views of the snow-covered 
Bulghar Dagh, whilst on the north and east one has 
occasional glimpses up side valleys which reveal distant 
mountain-tops in winter covered in snow. The result 
of the limitations due to the existence of this gorge is 
that the construction of this stretch of line, about thirty- 
five miles in length, was very costly, for it entailed the 
provision of numerous bridges and lengthy embank- 
ments and a great deal of rock hewing to render it 
secure against floods and washouts. 

At Ak Kupru (altitude 2985 feet) this gorge suddenly 
debouches upon the Vale of Bozanti (Podandus) — 
a fertile district about four miles long by one mile 
wide, in the midst of the Taurus Mountains. In this 
valley the railway and the new road constructed by 
the company diverge from the ancient trade route, 
which takes a more westerly line and passes through 
the Cilician Gates. Bearing off in a southeasterly 
direction, the railway and new road follow the valley 
of the Chakra Su, which flows to the east of the Cili- 
cian Gates. This river runs from the Vale of Bozanti 
into the heart of the mountains and finally dives into 


a dark, cavelike opening, to emerge again on the south- 
ern slopes of the range after a subterranean course 
of some three hundred yards. Prior to the construc- 
tion of the railway the approaches to the places where 
this curious river enters and emerges from its sub- 
terranean course were, I believe, almost entirely un- 

The line was opened as far as Karapunar in Decem- 
ber, 1913. About a year and a half earlier (April, 
1912) it had been completed from the south to Dorak, 
on the southern slopes of the range. It was therefore 
the short section (roughly about thirty miles in length) 
lying between these two places which blocked through 
traffic from December, 1913, until that section was 
actually opened at the end of 1916 or early in 1917.^ 
But the construction of this piece of line constituted 
by far the most difficult engineering task on the whole 
railway. In addition to four tunnels, which have a total 
length of about eleven miles, there was an immense 
amount of earthwork, cutting, and bridge building to 
be done. Some of the bridges over mountain streams 
have piers fifty to one hundred feet high, and in one 
place alone there is a cutting for a distance of some two 
miles. The new road itself, which was constructed 
entirely for railway purposes, is a very fine piece of 
work, for it required an immense amount of under- 
cutting in the cliffs which rise sheer above and fall 
vertically below it in such a way that wooden balus- 
trades had to be provided to ensure against accident. 
From Dorak the line sweeps down the southern slopes 

1 For some time after the opening of this section it was run as a narrow 
gauge Une. Ere now, however, it may possibly have been finished on the 
normal system. 


of the range, and after about fifteen miles meets the 
old Mersina-Adana Railway at Yenije, about half- 
way between Tarsus and Adana. 

After leaving the Bozanti Vale the old post road 
winds its way up to the Tekir Plateau or summit 
(altitude about 4500 feet). Thence, passing through 
scenery of the most magnificent beauty, it approaches 
the Cilician Gates. Here at three thousand six hundred 
feet the gorge is so narrow that the road is supported 
by a revetted embankment over the stream. After 
leaving this historic gateway one continues down the 
valley of one of the tributaries of the Tarsus Chai 
(Cydnus), and after passing over the low foothills of 
the Taurus finally reaches the Mersina-Adana Railway 
at Gulek Boghaz — a station three or four miles to the 
east of Tarsus. It is this road, for years passable for 
strong vehicles, and recently, I believe, considerably 
improved, which was used by the Turks as a means of 
communication before the opening of the Karapunar- 
Dorak section of the railway. If we take it that troops 
coming from the north would have been detrained at 
Bozanti Han, and that they would have joined the rail- 
way again at Gulek Boghaz, the distance to be covered 
on foot would be about forty miles — a distance which 
took me about fourteen hours in a carriage. 

Once at Gulek Boghaz by road, or at Yenije by train, 
the traveller has reached the Cilician Plain — a very 
fertile district which is practically cut off from the 
remainder of Asia Minor by mountains. The scene 
of the terrible massacres which took place in the year 
1909, when some twenty -five thousand Armenians 
were brutally murdered without any adequate protest 
by the Young Turks, it is watered by the rivers Tarsus 


Chai, Seihun, and Djehun. These rivers, which were 
once navigable in their lower reaches, are now only 
muddy channels which serve to conduct vast volumes 
of water from the mountains, in which they rise, to 
the seacoast. This plain, which is cultivated for 
cotton, wheat, and barley, is traversed by the Mersina- 
Adana and the Bagdad railways. The former line, 
which was originally built with English capital, was 
taken over by the Germans in 1908. Forming a 
branch of the Bagdad Railway, between that time and 
the outbreak of the War, it was utilised for the trans- 
port of railway material and rolling stock for the new 
line. Though Mersina could not in any case have 
competed with Alexandretta as a port, the acquisition 
of this short section removed the possibility of any 
competition with the Bagdad Railway in this area. 

Although the concession for their construction was 
not granted until the signature of the agreement 
made between the Government and the company on 
March 19, 1911 — an agreement the main details of 
which, so far as they concerned Alexandretta, were 
published in the Stamboul, a French newspaper issued 
in Constantinople, and also by the late Mr. H. F. B. 
Lynch in The Fortnightly Review for May, 1911 — it is 
convenient to refer to the significance of the branch 
built to and of the port at Alexandretta before leaving 
the Cilician Plain. That concession constitutes the 
most important arrangement made with the company 
since its foundation in 1903. In the first place it 
finally disposed of the idea of a modification in the 
original route — a highly desirable modification which 
would have taken the main line by way of Alex- 
andretta to Aleppo instead of by the present more 


northerly route. These negotiations were partially 
responsible for the delay which occurred before the 
commencement of the construction of the second and 
third sections of the line. The fact that this modi- 
fication was not accepted and that the line now follows 
(with certain changes to which I will refer below) the 
route originally defined by the concession, means that 
in place of running absolutely along the seacoast 
for a good many miles, the railway now approaches 
the coast nowhere within a distance of less than ten 
miles. Under German influence the Turks have 
thereby avoided what would have been a continual 
menace to their communications from the sea; for, 
whilst the section of the railway in the neighbourhood 
of the Gulf of Alexandretta is still the one most easy 
of attack, that attack would now constitute a far 
larger undertaking than were the line to have run close 
to the water's edge. 

Politically and commercially the right given to the 
company to construct the branch to and the port at 
Alexandretta went far beyond anything foreseen in 
the original concession. The Turks were already com- 
mitted by that arrangement not to grant concessions 
for railways running to the coast between Mersina 
and Tripoli to any group except the Bagdad company. 
But this did not anticipate the giving to it rights to 
be enjoyed for a period of ninety-nine years from the 
time of the completion of the railway to Helif, rights 
which really amounted to a lease, and facilities which 
might almost be compared to those formerly enjoyed 
by the Germans at Kiao-Chao. The concessionaires 
obtained the power to build quays, docks, and ware- 
houses, and to police a port which, unlike Haidar Pasha 


within closed Turkish waters, is situated in an area 
over which the Turks could have no direct control so 
long as they did not possess the command of the sea. 
Commercially speaking, too, the acquisition of such a 
prize was of supreme value to Germany, for the pos- 
session of Alexandretta once and for all removed any 
danger of competition for the Bagdad Railway. 

The branch to Alexandretta which leaves the main 
route at Toprak Kale on the Cilician Plain and for 
which there is no kilometric guarantee has a length 
of about thirty-seven miles. After passing through 
the Amanian Gates, which are only about three hun- 
dred yards wide, the railway enters the Plain of Issus, 
subsequently following the seacoast for the remainder 
of its length. Had this section formed part of the 
main line, the Bagdad Railway would probably have 
proceeded from Alexandretta by way of the Beilan 
Pass to Antioch, running thence in an easterly direc- 
tion to Aleppo. As things stand at present, it is 
obvious that the Alexandretta line can have no signifi- 
cance, for it traverses an area which can be directly 
commanded from the sea. It is for this reason that 
it seems highly probable that the enemy may have 
actually taken up the rails in order to utilise them for 
railway construction somewhere upon the through 

The Cilician Plain practically ends at Osmaniya, 
to the east of which place the railway plunges into the 
mountains in order to force its way through the Amanus 
Range. The passage of this range entails a rise from 
about lave hundred to seventeen hundred and fifty feet 
above the sea. After passing over several steel bridges, 
and through a number of small tunnels, the railway 


enters the great Bagche tunnel, five thousand three 
hundred yards in length, which is still, I believe, the 
longest in Turkey. Thus, whilst the passage of the 
Amanus Range is much shorter than that of the Taurus, 
the engineering difficulties were such that there is no 
wonder that the completion, which took place during 
the late summer of 1915, delayed the opening of the 
section which lies between Mamoure and Rajan for a 
period of nearly three years from the time when it was 
possible to reach these temporary termini by train. 

In and immediately to the east of the Amanus 
Range the line follows a trace which is somewhat 
different to that foreseen in the original concession. 
In place of running from Bagche to Kazanali, thence 
across the Kurd Dagh and through Killis and Tel 
Habesch to the Euphrates, the line now turns in a 
southerly direction near Bagche. Passing through 
Islahiya it subsequently follows the valley of the Kara 
Su and runs round the southwestern end of the Kurd 
Dagh. Instead of making Killis, or more correctly 
Tel Habesch, the junction for Aleppo, and of construct- 
ing a branch, as foreseen in the original concession from 
Tel Habesch to Aleppo, this means that the main 
line passes close to Aleppo itself. The result, for 
such as it is worth, is that in place of an Aleppo branch, 
about forty miles in length, the actual junction is 
made at Muslimiya — a place located only ten miles 
to the north of Aleppo. 

To the northeast of Aleppo the next important land- 
mark on the railway is the Jerablus bridge which spans 
the Euphrates. With a length of eight hundred and 
fifty yards its non-completion delayed effective through 
communication from December, 1913 (when the see- 


tion to the west of the Euphrates was opened) ; for 
although a temporary wooden structure was ready in 
1913, the steel bridge, made up of many spans, was not 
reported finished until 1915. To the east of the Eu- 
phrates the railway now continues its way at least as 
far as Helif and probably to Nisibin or beyond. If 
Helif be the point, it means that all the work on the 
main line arranged for in the agreements of 1908 has 
actually been completed, and that it is now possible 
to travel by train, perhaps still with a break of gauge 
in the Taurus, for a distance of over eleven hundred 
miles from Constantinople. According to recent re- 
ports too, as a result of orders given by the German 
General Staff, a branch is now being built from Ras-el- 
Ain to Diabekr, the rails on the French line from 
Homs to Tripoli having been taken up for that purpose. 
We come now to the new Conventions signed be- 
tween the Ottoman Government and the company 
on March 19, 1911, and to the sections of the railway 
which have or have not been constructed since the 
arrival of these agreements. Over and above the 
rights given to the Germans for the construction of the 
Alexandretta branch and of the port of Alexandretta 
(Conventions 2 and 3) to which I have referred above, 
we have in these arrangements firstly the provision 
for the building of the line from Helif to Bagdad, and 
secondly some sort of German undertaking in regard 
to the ownership and control of the section to be 
built from Bagdad to the Persjan Gulf. The ar- 
rangements made for the prolongation of the line to 
Bagdad are given in the Stamboul for March 20, 1911, 
but no reference is made there to the agreements about 
the last section, concerning the general sense of which 


we have certain information, but the definite details of 
which, so far as I am aware, have never been pubHshed. 
With regard to the first of these questions, sufficient 
be it to say that the railway has been planned to take 
the original trace by way of Nisibin to Mosul. Between 
the last two places it follows, not the usual route 
by way of Jezire, but strikes southeast, first across 
a plain on which there are a few villages, and then into 
the desert, which is almost entirely unpopulated and 
where there is but little water. From Helif to Mosul, 
a journey reckoned to take at least thirty hours by 
road, the distance is approximately one hundred 
and fifty miles. There is no reason to know that any 
part of this section or of the proposed branch from 
Mosul to Erbil (length sixty-two miles) has yet been 
constructed. From Mosul, from which point river 
transport can be utilised, the railway is planned to 
cover the length of two hundred and forty miles to Bag- 
dad by way of the regular trade route, which fol- 
lows the right bank of the Tigris and passes through 
Hammam Ali, Tekrit, and Samarra. So far as we 
know, no work has been done from the northern end 
of this section or upon the branch from Sadijeh to 
Khanikin ; but the piece from Bagdad to Samarra, 
built from the southern end and having a length of 
about seventy-five miles, has been open to traffic 
since October, 1914. That the Turks were unable 
to extend the line to Tekrit or beyond is largely due 
to the fact that when the British occupied Basra on 
November 21, 1914, they seized a considerable amount 
of railway material and rolling stock — material which 
would have been of great value to the enemy had he 
been left the opportunity of utilising it either for con- 


structional purposes on the main line or for the building 
of the intended branch from Sadijeh to Khanikin. 

In addition, by the agreements of 1911, the company 
is believed more or less to have renounced its right 
to the construction of the section from Bagdad to the 
Persian Gulf. From a geographical standpoint all 
that need therefore be said upon this question is that 
the line, as originally proposed, was to leave the Tigris 
near Bagdad, and after crossing the Euphrates, to run 
through Kerbela and Nedjef to Zobeir and Basra. 
There was to be a branch from Zobeir "to a point on 
the Persian Gulf to be agreed upon between the Im- 
perial Ottoman Government and the Concession- 
aires." It is unnecessary to say here that the locality 
of that point constitutes one of the most important 
factors in the whole scheme, and that no decision 
upon the subject has ever been published. As things 
stand at present it seems open to doubt whether the 
route suggested for this last section will be adopted 
or whether the permanent line will consist of an im- 
provement of the military railway which we believe 
has been constructed by the British from the Persian 
Gulf up to or almost up to Bagdad. 

Were it not that the War, and particularly the Brit- 
ish advance in Mesopotamia, cannot fail to obliterate 
many of the more important results of the events 
which preceded and followed the signing of the new 
agreements between the Turkish Government and the 
company in March, 1911, those events might be of 
political consequence, the far-reaching significance 
of which it would be impossible to exaggerate. The 
signature of this agreement almost immediately fol- 
lowed the meeting of the Tsar with the Emperor at 


Potsdam in November, 1910, a meeting during which 
the relations existing between Russia and Germany 
were temporarily adjusted. Though the exact nature 
of that arrangement was not known until afterwards 
it is now certain that Russia agreed no longer to oppose 
the construction of the Bagdad Railway, and either 
herself to build or allow the Germans to build a line 
from Khanikin — the terminus of a branch already 
agreed upon between Turkey and the Bagdad Com- 
pany — to Tehran. As compensation for this, the 
Russian position in Northern Persia was recognised 
by Germany. It remained then for Berlin to treat with 
England and France for agreements concerning future 
developments in their respective spheres. The Tripoli 
War of 1911 and the Balkan War of 1912 were not, 
however, favourable periods for negotiation, and it 
was thus only in 1913 that Turkey, in agreement with 
Germany, despatched to London the ex-Grand Vizier 
— Hakki Pasha — to try to bring about agreements 
to be drawn up between the Foreign Office, the Ger- 
man Embassy, and the Ottoman Embassy — agree- 
ments to settle the outstanding differences as regards 
the Bagdad-Persian Gulf section and other cognate 
matters of river transport in these regions. These 
agreements presumably presupposed a continuance 
of friendly and peaceful relations between Turkey, 
Germany, and Great Britain, and it is believed that 
they were practically already concluded when, in 
August, 1914, Great Britain found herself compelled 
to declare war on Germany, Turkey subsequently 
throwing in her lot with our enemies.^ 

^ These are the Agreements to which Prince Lichnowsky refers in his 
famous memorandum. 


Before passing to a brief description of the Syrian 
railways there are still two questions which must be 
mentioned in connection with the Bagdad line. The 
first concerns the facilities which it provides, or which 
it might provide, for travel. The agreement for the 
railway stipulates for the provision of a fortnightly 
express between Constantinople and the Persian Gulf 
and vice versa. This train was to run at an average 
speed of about twenty-eight miles per hour, including 
stops, for the first ^ve years from the opening to trafiic 
of the whole of the main line, that speed subsequently 
to be increased to thirty-seven miles per hour, includ- 
ing stops. This means, were the said express train 
to run at its lower speed, that the journey from Con- 
stantinople to Bagdad would be accomplished in about 
fifty-four hours, and from the Turkish capital to Basra 
in about sixty-six hours. Taking the pre- War time 
necessary for the journey from London to Constan- 
tinople by Orient Express, and allowing for a very short 
delay at the latter place, theoretically it would be 
possible to travel from London to Basra in one hundred 
and forty-four hours, that is, in six days. From Basra 
to Bombay the distance is just over nineteen hundred 
miles — a distance which at, say, twenty knots per hour 
could be accomplished in about eighty-four hours. 
Thus, taking all the conditions at their most favour- 
able value, and allowing a margin of only five hours 
at Basra, travellers and mails could be conveyed from 
London to Bombay by that route in about nine days 
seventeen hours, instead of, as before the War, in be- 
tween thirteen and fourteen days. 

This, of course, shows a considerable nominal sav- 
ing in time — a saving which might even be increased 


by running fast ships from Basra to Karachi and by 
improving the train service between the latter place 
and Bombay. But against the advantages of that 
nominal saving must be set the facts that the jour- 
ney by way of Brindisi and the Suez Canal could 
be speeded up, and that on the great cross-country 
journey, from Constantinople to the Gulf, there would 
be bound to be considerable delays and irregularities 
in the running of the trains, delays due among other 
things to the conditions prevailing in the areas through 
which the line would pass. 

Prior to the outbreak of the War, the tourist desirous 
of travelling by the Anatolian and Bagdad railways 
was certainly not provided with the comforts which 
would have led him to choose such a route in prefer- 
ence to one followed by a first-class ocean steamer. 
Leaving the Bridge at Constantinople at an early hour 
in the m.orning, one traversed the Bosphorus in a 
steamer run in connection with the train. From Haidar 
Pasha to Eskishehr the first stage of the journey took 
ten and one-half hours. As there were no night trains, 
one was compelled to sleep at the latter place, starting 
at 5 A.M. on the morrow for Konia, which is reached 
after a journey of fifteen hours. At Konia the com- 
pany has built a new hotel which, though much cleaner 
and better than those which ordinarily exist in the in- 
terior of Turkey, is still less comfortable than one would 
suppose from its pretentious appearance. Starting 
again at 6.30 a.m. one could go on for the subsequent 
one hundred and ninety miles to Karapunar — a place 
which in its turn was reached after eleven hours. 
The speed on all these sections only averaged about 
eighteen miles per hour. The first time I went to 


Eregli, soon after the opening of the railway, one 
travelled in old-fashioned, non-corridor carriages which 
were neither heated nor provided with the ordinary 
comforts available on long journeys. On a subse- 
quent occasion I found first-class rolling stock which 
compared quite favourably with that run on express 
lines in Europe. Practically nobody except Ambas- 
sadors, high officials of the State, and those provided 
with passes, travel first class, and, as the majority 
of the passengers are natives, who cannot afford any- 
thing better than third, the second-class passenger 
when he gets well into the interior is generally the sole 
occupant of a carriage. The trains are mixed (of 
passenger coaches and baggage cars), and therefore at 
all the larger stations one stops for a sufficient time to 
allow for the loading and unloading of goods. 

As to the actual financial cost to Turkey of a line 
like the Bagdad Railway it is difficult to form any 
reliable estimate. In addition to the fact that only 
short disconnected lengths were open before the War, 
those lengths had not been completed for a sufficient 
time to render possible a consequent development of 
trade. The distance from Konia to Bagdad being six- 
teen hundred and fifty kilometres, the maximum pos- 
sible cost per annum to the Government, if the 
railway had no receipts whatever, would be about 
25,575,000 francs per annum. But against this sum 
must be set not only the actual receipts of the line, 
receipts which for the first section between Konia 
and Eregli amounted to about 514,350 francs in the 
year 1910, but also other and more indirect advantages 
accruing to the Government. Commercially speak- 
ing these advantages are primarily due to the fact 


that in railway districts the peasants, instead of only 
cultivating what they require for their own use and 
for the local markets, develop their land to much fuller 
advantage as soon as they are able easily to send 
away their goods. This results not only in the in- 
creased prosperity of the people, but also in a great 
augmentation in the traffic and in the tithes to be 
collected by the Government. The change is shown 
by the fact that, whilst the receipts of the Anatolian 
Company amounted in 1907 to 10,428,475 francs, in 
1913 they had risen to 20,549,875 francs, thereby 
of course bringing an enormous reduction in the sum 
due from the Government for kilometric guarantees. 
This change is also shown by the fact that the peasants 
began to trade in gold instead of in silver, with the 
result that a vast quantity of gold coin has disappeared 
into the interior during the last few years. 

From a military point of view, over and above the 
advantages of railway communication to which I 
have already referred, the opening up of the country 
has enabled the Ottoman Government to quell more 
than one insurrection in distant parts of the empire. 
In recent years this facility has been particularly 
valuable in the case of the Hedjaz, where there have 
been several rebellions. Moreover, the existence of 
railways renders possible a comparatively rapid mobili- 
sation of at least parts of the army. But this in its 
turn has rather a curious effect, for it means that 
military service is not only much more strictly enforced 
among the sections of the population domiciled near 
to railways, but that the reserves furnished from these 
districts are often called out long before much younger 
men, recruited from more remote districts, have per- 


formed their military obligations. During the last 
six years of almost continuous war the consequences 
of this are that a very unfair burden, which is greatly 
resented by those who have had to bear it, has been 
placed upon the men who come from easily accessible 
areas, and that the Ottoman first-line army, instead of 
being composed of all the younger men of the country, 
often contains units made up of those who ought to 
be utilised only in the second line of the Turkish fight- 
ing machine. 

Turning to the Syrian railways, which geographi- 
cally speaking form a sort of southern prong of the 
Bagdad Railway, I will discuss those lines in their 
relation to the German system, and therefore from 
north to south rather than in the order in which they 
were constructed. To begin with, since the end of 
1906, when the section between Aleppo and Hama 
was opened to traffic, a French line, owned by a com- 
pany known as the "Damas Hama et Prolongements", 
has united the former town with Rayak on the line 
from Beirut to Damascus. With a total length of 
two hundred and six miles, the railway, built on the 
normal continental gauge, has a kilometric guarantee 
amounting, I think, to 13,600 francs per kilometre. 
Its existence depends upon various arrangements made 
between the Government and the company in and sub- 
sequent to the year 1893 — arrangements the details 
of which are very fully set out by Mr. George Young 
in his "Corps de Droit Ottoman." The whole line was 
of easy construction, for it follows the plain and passes 
through fine cornland, which is not liable to floods, as 
the rivers run in deep trenches. There is one big bridge 
over the Orontes at Hama, but elsewhere no other strue- 


tiircs of any engineering significance. The normal- 
gauge branch from Homs to TripoH, with its length of 
about sixty-five miles, which belongs to the same com- 
pany and which was built without a kilometric guar- 
antee after the re-establishment of the Turkish Consti- 
tution, is believed to have been taken up in order that 
the material might be utilised for construction else- 

Unless it has been widened since the beginning of 
the War, which is very unlikely owing to the great 
length of line which would have had to be altered, 
there is a break at Rayak, all the railways to the 
south of which point being of a narrow gauge. Here 
we meet the French system, known as the company 
of the "Chemin de Fer Beyrouth-Damas-Hauran ", 
which owns the line (one hundred and fifty-five miles 
in length) connecting Beirut with Damascus and 
Mezerib, the latter about six miles to the west of Deraia. 
This railway, which has been open to through traflSc 
since 1895, and which has no kilometric guarantee, 
is built upon the somewhat exceptional gauge of 3 
feet 5.34 inches (1.05 metres). 

Starting from Beirut harbour the railway, which is 
on the Abt system (an engine that can work either 
by adhesion or by cogwheels and central rail), climbs 
up the Lebanon for about five thousand feet to a point 
just above Ain Safar. Thence it winds down to the 
valley of the Bekaa, in which is Rayak Junction. 
The gradients are very steep, and therefore even with 
the rack and pinion system short trains are obliged to 
go very slowly. To the east of Rayak the railway 
continues over the plain, until it is compelled to cross 
the Anti-Lebanon, where the gradients, heavy enough 

The Railways of Syria and Palestine 

From a map prepared by The Royal Geographical Society 



to limit the load very closely, are not sufficient to neces- 
sitate at any point the use of the cogwheel system. 
To the south of Damascus the French line, which is 
believed to have been taken up since the War in order 
that the material might be utilised for construction 
elsewhere, ran practically parallel to and on the west 
of the Hedjaz line. 

We now come to the Hedjaz Railway, which is of the 
1.05-metre gauge (adopted in order to correspond with 
that of the Beirut-Damascus line, by which rolling 
stock, etc., had to be imported). Built by the Turks 
themselves with the assistance of foreign engineers, 
and particularly with that of Meissner Pasha — a 
very able German — the railway, which starts from 
Damascus and which is eight hundred and twenty 
miles long, was first opened as far as Medina towards 
the end of the year 1908. Though it was often 
broken by raiding parties, from that time until the 
outbreak of the War it was available for military 
transport purposes to and from the Hedjaz, and for 
the pilgrims for whose use it was largely constructed. 
Never completed to Mecca or prolonged to the coast 
of the Red Sea as proposed, the railway runs through 
districts in which for years the Turkish position has 
been so far from stable that since the beginning of 
the War it could probably not be safely used beyond 
even if as far as Maan. In addition to the line to 
Haifa, to which I will refer in greater detail below, 
the Hedjaz Railway has a branch (twenty-two miles 
in length) which connects Bosra with Deraia. Ac- 
cording to Petermanns Mitteilungen, July, 1915, it 
also has a French feeder (twenty-five miles in length) 
running from Amman to Es Salt, a feeder which it 


was no doubt intended should be prolonged across the 
Jordan Valley to Jerusalem. It is in this last men- 
tioned neighbourhood that the British, based upon 
Jerusalem, have attached the Hedjaz line in order 
subsequently to be able to utilise it for their further 
advance towards Damascus and the north. 

There now remain only two Syrian lines which were 
open to traffic before the outbreak of the War. The 
concession for the first of these — the Haifa Railway 
— having been given in 1890, that line was partly 
built by a British company. The then existing works 
were purchased by the Government in 1902, and the 
railway, which now has an extension from Haifa to 
Acre, and which is built on the 1.05-metre gauge, was 
finally opened to traffic in May, 1906, as a branch of 
the Hedjaz line. The second, to which no special 
reference is necessary, is the Jaffa- Jerusalem line, the 
concession for which was acquired by a French com- 
pany in 1889. Built on the one-metre gauge, with a 
length of fifty -four miles, the line was opened to traffic 
in 1892.1 

Such was the condition of things in Syria on the 
outbreak of the War. Before that time, however, it 
had been often proposed that a normal-gauge railway 
should be constructed on the west of the Jordan in 
order to prolong the line from Rayak at least as far 
as Jerusalem. I believe that a concession had been 
actually granted to the French for a line from the 
former place to Ramie on the route already open from 
Jaffa to Jerusalem. Needless to say work upon this 
section was never begun, and its place was taken by 

^ The north-western part of this line was taken up by the Turks early 
iu the war, but doubtless it has now been relaid by the British. 


a line built by the Turks themselves. That line 
(presumably constructed upon the 1.05-metre gauge, 
in order to correspond with the Hedjaz and Damascus- 
Beirut systems) starts at El Fule on the Deraia-Haifa 
branch. Keeping well inland, it runs in a southerly 
direction (there is a considerable detour near Nablus) 
to Lydda on the Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway. From this 
point the new line follows the old route (the gauge has 
probably been changed) to Lydda, where it leaves 
the branch to Jerusalem and continues its way via 
Beersheba at least to Bir Auja. No details are 
available concerning this section, the length of which 
must be about one hundred and sixty miles. But it is 
obvious that its completion rendered possible the 
threatened attacks upon Egypt during the earlier 
stages of the War, and that its existence played a con- 
siderable role in enabling the Turks to bring up the 
reinforcements with which they so determinately 
resisted the British advance upon Jerusalem. 

Although in passing I have mentioned the improve- 
ments and extensions made upon the Bagdad and 
Syrian railways since the entry of Turkey into the 
War, the knowledge of these coming improvements 
must have played such a prominent part in the Allied 
plan of operations, that it may be advisable here to 
draw the attention of my readers to their meaning and 
effect. In November, 1914, when the Ottoman Gov- 
ernment threw in its lot with the Central Powers, so 
far as the Bagdad Railway was concerned, there was 
a gap of thirty miles in the Taurus, the Amanus tun- 
nels were not completed, the permanent bridge across 
the Euphrates was not in position, and the terminus 
was at Tel-el-Abiad, only about sixty miles to the 


east of that river. This meant not only that Turkish 
reinforcements and material destined to perform as 
much as possible of the eastern journey by train, were 
compelled to be detrained at least twice (in the Taurus 
and Amanus sections) but that the enemy was unable 
to derive the full benefits provided by the Euphrates 
route for water transport. 

Under the above circumstances, it is obvious that 
the constantly increasing Turkish facilities of trans- 
port must have influenced those responsible for orig- 
inally pushing forward in Mesopotamia for a dis- 
tance and in a manner otherwise entirely unjustified 
considering the forces available, the inadequate prep- 
arations, and the diflSculty of the country. Thus, 
the necessity for forestalling the Turks before they 
could effectively improve the Bagdad line must be 
considered as one reason for the inauguration of the 
Mesopotamian campaign directly after the entry of 
Turkey into the War. Moreover, had the Turks been 
left a free hand and had the finished parts of the line 
therefore been available for the transportation of 
railway material instead of being required for mili- 
tary purposes, there can be no doubt that much further 
progress could have been made both on the main route 
and with its several branches. Equally well, in regard 
to the Syrian campaign, had we waited to establish 
a line of adequate defences in an area situated at a 
safe distance to the east of the Canal, until the open- 
ing of the Taurus and Amanus tunnels and until the 
completion of the new railway on the west of the Jor- 
dan, it is obvious that the magnitude of our task and 
the dangers of the situation would have been enor- 
mously increased. As in the case of Mesopotamia, 


it is these conditions which make it safe to assert that 
the taking of measures required for the protection of 
a vital section of the British Empire were necessary 
from the outset, and that having regard to what may 
be the intended future of this part of the world these 
measures may well have entailed a bigger campaign 
than was at first intended. 

The present is a moment at which it is difficult, if 
not undesirable, to make a detailed forecast as to the 
future of the Bagdad Railway, and of the other lines 
in Asiatic Turkey. The only alternative is therefore 
to say that two things seem certain — firstly, that 
sooner or later the Bagdad or some other line from the 
Bosphorus to the Persian Gulf will be completed ; 
and secondly, that its ownership and control must 
depend not so much upon any agreements already 
made as upon the results of the War and particularly 
upon the fate of Turkey. In regard to this latter, 
the Allies must leave no stone unturned to prevent 
the conclusion of a peace which would leave the enemy 
still possessed of the predominating control in an under- 
taking which, once it is robbed of its political signifi- 
cance, can easily be established upon an international 
basis and controlled as a result of the adoption of some 
scheme of internationalisation. That scheme must 
depend upon the future status of the now Asiatic 
dominions of the Sultan. 



To a Britisher who has followed the trend of events 
in the Near East, and who has witnessed the gradual 
development of German intrigues in that area, there 
has never been published a document so important 
and so condemnatory of Germany as the disclosures 
of Prince Lichnowsky. On the one hand the memo- 
randum of the Kaiser's ex-Ambassador in London, 
coming from an authoritative enemy pen, proves that 
practically ever since the Russo-Turkish War and par- 
ticularly from the time of the accession of the present 
Emperor to the throne, the Germans have carefully 
prepared the way for the present War, and for the 
development of the Mittel Europa scheme. And 
on the other side it indicates, if indeed any indication 
were still required, that the so-called rivalry existing 
between England and Germany prior to the War arose 
not from any desire on the part of Great Britain to 
stand in the way of the development of legitimate 
German interests in the Balkans and in Asia Minor, 
but from the unwillingness of the Government of Ber- 
lin to agree to any reasonable settlement of the many 
all-important questions connected with those regions. 

Although for years the Germans had been intrigu- 
ing against the Triple Entente, Prince Lichnowsky, 



Baron Marshal von Bieberstein 

The late Baron Marshi.1 von Bieberstein was German Ambassador in Con- 
stantinople from 1897 until his transference to London in the spring of 1912. 
It was largely to him that the earlier development of Germanic influence in 
Turkey was due, and he was one of the Kaiser's most important instruments 
in furthering the growth of the Mittel Europa scheme. 



a man possessed of personally friendly feelings for 
England, was sent to London in order to camouflage 
the real designs of the enemy and to secure repre- 
sentation by a diplomatist who was intended to make 
good, and who, in fact, did make a high position for 
himself in British official and social circles. The 
appointment itself therefore raises two interesting 
questions. In the first place, while this is not stated 
in the memorandum, it is clear that, whereas Baron 
Marshal von Bieberstein, who had been recalled from 
Constantinople partly as a consequence of the Turco- 
Italian War, was definitely instructed to endeavour 
to make friends with England and to detach her from 
France and Russia, or, if this were impossible, to bring 
about war at a convenient time for Germany, Prince 
Lichnowsky's task was somewhat different. Kept 
at least more or less in the dark as to German objects, 
the Ambassador, who arrived in London when the 
Morocco crisis was considered at an end, instead of 
being intrusted with the dual objects of his predecessor, 
was clearly told to do, and did in fact do, his utmost 
to establish friendly relations with England. The 
Berlin Government, on the other hand, this time main- 
tained in its own hands the larger question of the mak- 
ing of war at what it believed, happily wrongly, to be 
a convenient time for the Central Empires. In the 
second place, although this too is not explained, vari- 
ous references made by Prince Lichnowsky leave little 
doubt in the mind of the reader, who knows the situa- 
tion existing at the German Embassy prior to the out- 
break of war, that the Ambassador himself was aware 
that von Kuhlmann — the Counsellor of Embassy — 
was, in fact, the representative of Pan-Germanism in 


England, and that to this very able and expert intriguer 
was left the work of trying to develop a situation which, 
in peace or in war, would be favourable to the ruler and 
to the class whose views he voiced. 

I have already dealt so fully with the question of 
German intrigues in the East prior to the outbreak of 
the War, that I propose here only briefly to refer to 
one or two points raised in the "Revelations of Prince 
Lichnowsky", published in pamphlet form by The New 
York Times. To begin with, no doubt whatever is 
left upon the mind of the reader that Germany, and 
not Austria, made this War, largely with the object 
of improving her position in the East. Indeed from 
the time of the Congress of Berlin of 1878, when Prince 
Lichnowsky says his country began the Triple Alliance 
Policy, "The goal of our [German] political ambition 
was to dominate in the Bosphorus", and "instead of 
encouraging a powerful development in the Balkan 
States, we [Germany] placed ourselves on the side of 
the Turkish and Magyar oppressors." 

These words contain in essence and in tabulated 
form an explanation of the Pan-German policy in 
progress during the period covered by this book — 
a policy the existence of which has often been refuted 
and denied by those who refused to see that, from the 
first, the Kaiser was obsessed by a desire for domina- 
tion from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. What is 
even more striking, too, is the fact that, in speaking 
of the Balkan War period. Prince Lichnowsky says, 
that "two possibilities for settling the question re- 
mained." Either Germany left the Near-Eastern 
problem to the peoples themselves or she supported 
her allies "and carried out a Triple Alliance policy 



in the East, thereby giving up the role of mediator." 
Once more, in the words of the Prince himself, "The 
German Foreign OflSce very much preferred the latter," 
and as a result supported Austria on the one hand in 
her desire for the establishment of an independent 
Albania, and on the other in her successful attempts 
to draw Bulgaria into the second war and to prevent 
that country from providing the concessions which 
at that time would have satisfied Roumania. So far 
as the first of these questions is concerned, while the 
ex-Ambassador admits the policy of Austria was actu- 
ated by the fact that she "would not allow Serbia 
to reach the Adriatic", the actual creation of Albania 
was justified by the existence of the Albanians as a 
nationality and by their desire for independent govern- 

The second direction in which the enemy devoted 
his energy was an even larger, more German and more 
far-reaching one. "The first Balkan war led to the 
collapse of Turkey and with it the defeat of our policy, 
which has been identified with Turkey for many years," 
says the memorandum. This, as I have already 
explained, at one time seemed destined to carry with 
it results entirely disadvantageous to Germany. The 
Central Powers realized the situation, and having en- 
couraged the Balkan rivalry leading to the second 
war, which brought about not a settlement but simply 
a holding in suspense of the numerous Near-Eastern 
questions of which a settlement was so necessary, 
turned their attention toward the improvement of 
their relations with Turkey more definitely and more 
determinately than had ever been the case before. 
Their policy was carried out by two distinct methods. 


The first, which is mentioned by Prince Lichnowsky, 
was the appointment of General Liman von Sanders 
as practical Commander in Chief of the Turkish Army 
— an appointment which, when coupled with the fact 
that Enver Pasha — an out and out pro-German — 
became Minister of War about the same time, resulted 
in enormous improvement in the efficiency of the 
Ottoman army and in a far-reaching increase of Pan- 
German influence at Constantinople. The second 
lever employed by the enemy was connected with the 
Aegean Islands question. Germany, having first util- 
ized her diplomatic influence in favour of Turkey, 
later on inspired the Government of that country in 
its continued protests against the decision upon that 
question arrived at by the Great Powers. Not con- 
tent, however, with this, the Kaiser, who has now 
adopted the policy of deportations in Belgium, in Po- 
land, and in Serbia, definitely encouraged the Turks in 
a like measure in regard to the Greeks of Asia Minor, 
in order thereby to be rid themselves of a hostile and 
Christian population when the time for action arrived. 
That this encouragement was given was always appar- 
ent to those who followed the course of events in 1914, 
but that it was subsequently admitted by the German 
Admiral Uzidon, to Mr. Morgenthau, constitutes a 
condemnation the damning nature of which it is diffi- 
cult to exaggerate. 

Turning to the larger aspects of the European situa- 
tion as it existed immediately prior to the outbreak 
of the War, there are two questions discussed by Prince 
Lichnowsky which are worthy of brief comment here. 
The first concerns the ambassadorial admissions as 
to the conciliatory attitude adopted by the British 


Government and by the then Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs who sought "to achieve a more friendly 
rapprochement with Germany and to bring the two 
groups nearer together", and whose sincerity in its 
efforts to respect German rights was proved by the 
fact that Sir Edward Grey, before the Bagdad Rail- 
way Treaty was even completed, called German atten- 
tion to English men of business who were seeking oppor- 
tunities to invest capital in territories to be included 
in the German sphere of interest. These admissions 
prove the absolute falseness of all such statements 
as those sometimes made to the effect that Russia 
and France have consistently co-operated with England 
in preventing the completion of the Bagdad Railway. 

The terms of this practically concluded Bagdad 
Railway arrangement, to which I have referred else- 
where, were such that, whilst, had they been known, 
they might have aroused criticism in England, they 
certainly left no cause for complaint by Germany. 
For instance, among other things, that agreement, 
the details of which so far as I know are now published 
for the first time, sanctioned the continuation of the 
Bagdad line to Basra, which right had been foregone 
by Germany in order to secure Alexandretta, and also 
recognized the whole of Mesopotamia up to Basra, 
that is to say, to the north of Basra, as a German zone 
of influence. In exchange for this British, French, 
and Russian economic interests were acknowledged 
respectively on the coasts of the Persian Gulf and in 
the Smyrna- Aidin Railway, in Syria, and in Armenia. 
That such an arrangement was virtually concluded 
clearly proves that the Allies never stood in the way 
of the realization of German economic penetration 


in the Near East and that no concessions, however 
favourable, would have been sufficient to give satis- 
faction to a country determined to establish not its 
economic but its military domination. 

Turning to the events connected with the crisis 
arising out of the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdi- 
nand and his Consort on June 28, absolute proofs 
are provided from two German pens — those of Prince 
Lichnowsky and of Doctor Muhlon, a former member 
of the Krupp Directorate — that Berlin, no longer 
acting through the mouthpiece of Vienna, promoted 
the War, merely utilizing these murders as an excuse 
for what was hoped would be the successful develop- 
ment of Germanic policy. So early as the spring of 
1914, the late Herr von Tschirschky (then German 
Ambassador in Vienna) "declared that war must soon 
come." In view of subsequent events this declaration 
is far more important than is apparent at first sight, 
for Von Tschirschky, before his appointment to Vienna 
in 1907, had been, for some years, the confidential 
representative of the Foreign Office attached to the 
Private Council and Cabinet of the Kaiser. This, 
coupled with the facts that even Prince Lichnowsky 
admits the decisive nature of the Potsdam Meeting 
of July 5th, that soon afterward Herr von Jagow (the 
German Foreign Secretary) was in Vienna to discuss 
everything with Count Berchtold, (Austrian Foreign 
Minister), and that Count Mensdorff (Austrian Am- 
bassador in London) received a protocol stating "that 
it would not matter if war with Russia resulted " con- 
stitute a highly probable explanation of what actually 
occurred. It is that drastic steps were decided upon 
in Berlin a week after the murders, that as Doctor 


Helfferich (then Director of the Deutsche Bank) told 
Doctor Muhlon the Kaiser went on "his northern 
cruise only as a * blind ' . . . remaining close at hand 
and keeping in constant touch", and that the Austrian 
ultimatum to Serbia, concocted either in Berlin or by 
Von Tchirschky in Vienna, was purposely delayed in 
order to enable Germany to put the finishing touches 
upon her military preparations, and particularly, as 
Mr. Morgenthau explains (upon the authority of the 
German Ambassador at Constantinople), to allow the 
time necessary for the bankers to readjust their finances 
for the coming War. 

Up to the outbreak of the War and therefore during 
what may be called the "initiation" stage of German 
intrigues in the East, there seems every reason to 
believe that the enemy was working for the develop- 
ment of his Mittel Europa plan in a manner destined 
not at once to bring him into open conflict with Great 
Britain, or more correctly in a way intended to keep 
England out of the first war and to leave her for pro- 
posed defeat in a subsequent and early conflagration. 
When Great Britain came to the support of France 
and Russia, however, it became necessary to modify, 
or rather to speed up this plan. Instead of being 
able to utilize the present War as a preparatory meas- 
ure for the actual realization of the Mittel Europa 
scheme, Germany was compelled either to give up 
that programme or to endeavour to achieve it during 
the present conflagration. It was this change which 
resulted in the substitution of the "consummation" 
for the "initiation" stage in Pan-German intrigues. 
The "consummation" policy in its turn entailed the 
ranging of Turkey and all the Balkan States, except 


perhaps Greece, on one side or the other, in order that 
the enemy might secure a free run across the Balkans, 
which constitute the one and only corridor toward his 
real goal — the Bosphorus, Asiatic Turkey, Egypt, 
Persia, and India. 

It is only necessary here briefly to remind my readers 
of the developments during the "consummation" 
stage of enemy policy in the East — a stage which 
must be divided into three phases. The first lasted 
from the outbreak of hostilities until after the entry 
of Turkey into the War. That event was of supreme 
importance, for in addition to giving Germany the 
actual military support of that country, it provided 
her with a sort of "island" or "jumping off" place for 
the development of her future plans. This was, how- 
ever, a situation only partially satisfactory to the 
enemy, for owing to the resolute defence sustained by 
Serbia and to the continued neutrality of Bulgaria 
and Roumania, the lack of direct and unhindered 
communication with the East prevented him from 
being able to develop to full advantage the support of 
Turkey. Consequently after the entry of that country 
into the War and during the second "consummation" 
phase, the Germans devoted themselves to the situa- 
tion in Bulgaria. The acquisition of that country 
meant the opening of the German door towards the 
East and the certain and early possession by the enemy 
of the whole of the main line from Belgrade to Con- 

From this time onwards, and during the third "con- 
summation" phase, it therefore only remained for the 
Central Powers to bring about the consolidation of 
their position by the actual defeat of Serbia and by 



either the maintenance of the neutrahty of Greece and 
of Roumania or by the crushing of these countries 
should they enter the War upon the side of the AUies. 
Here they appear to have adopted two different policies. 
In the case of Greece, I believe that the Germanic 
object was to play for continued neutrality and not 
for friendly participation in the War. This may well 
have been the case, because, by her actual co-opera- 
tion, that country could have been of little use to the 
Central Powers. Indeed, had Greece actually thrown 
in her lot with them during the reign of King Con- 
stantine, her long and extremely vulnerable seaboard 
would have placed her in a position in which the Allies, 
by the establishment of a blockade and by seapower 
alone, could either have brought her to her knees or 
forced her into a position in which she would have been 
a heavier economic and military burden to the enemy 
than would have been recompensed by the actual 
fighting support which she was in a position to give. 
The case of Roumania, however, was entirely differ- 
ent, for so long as she remained neutral, Germany 
was compelled to depend upon the single line of rail- 
way running through Serbia and Bulgaria and to forego 
the advantages of the full use of the Danube and of 
the numerous railways leading respectively to its 
northern and southern banks. As already explained, 
it was these advantages, coupled with the great oil 
wealth of Roumania and with the ultimate facilities 
of communication with Southern Russia and the 
Middle East, which have actuated the enemy in his 
policy toward a country even the temporary subjuga- 
tion of which is of great importance to him. 

The above remarks are sufficient to prove the methods 


by and the attention with which the Germans have 
developed their plans for conquest in the East. " Their 
objective," as President Wilson said in his address 
delivered at Baltimore on April 6, 1918, "is undoubt- 
edly to make all the Slavic peoples, all the free and 
ambitious nations of the Balkan Peninsula, all the 
lands that Turkey has dominated and misruled, sub- 
ject to their will and ambition and build upon that 
dominion an empire of force upon which they fancy 
that they can erect an empire of gain and commercial 
supremacy, — an empire as hostile to the Americas 
as to the Europe which it will overawe, — an empire 
which will ultimately master Persia, India, and the 
peoples of the Far East." 

To summarize the extent to which this purpose has 
been realized, and we have to admit its considerable 
success if we are to appreciate the task of the Allies, 
who must prevent the permanency of those successes, 
it has first to be remembered that, whilst the relations 
between Germany and Austria had gradually become 
more intimate from the time of the Bosnian anr^exa- 
tion, it is only since the outbreak of the War that the 
direction of affairs, within the Dual Monarchy, has 
been practically controlled by Berlin. In addition 
the enemy has established his domination over or 
conquered Poland, large sections of Russia, and all 
the Balkan Peninsula (except Southern Albania and 
the greater part of Greece), besides the larger part of 
Asiatic Turkey. He is now preparing to overrun 
Persia. This means that the Central Powers have 
gone a long way towards the temporary establishment 
of their position in the East and that, by the exit of 
Russia from the War, they have rid themselves of a 


formerly existing danger to their "Drang nach Osten" 
policy. It is this indirect result of the Peace of Brest 
Litovsk, this removal of the greatest menace to Ger- 
many's Eastern dreams, which is possessed of conse- 
quences almost if not quite as far-reaching as are those 
connected with the vast enemy forces freed for service 
in the West. 

The peace recently imposed upon Roumania, when 
coupled with other developments which preceded it, 
and particularly with the situation in Russia, consti- 
tutes a definite Pan-Germanic development — prob- 
ably a new development — for it means the opening 
of a fresh door toward the East. The domination of 
Germany in Southern Russia itself gives her routes 
to the northern shore of the Black Sea, the importance 
of which is so obvious that it requires no comment 
here. But those routes could not have been used to 
full advantage and with adequate security so long as 
the Roumanian army, however small and isolated, 
remained a military force in being and so long as it 
held even a section of Northern Moldavia. Thus 
whilst prior to the arrangements made by the Treaties 
of Brest Litovsk and Bucharest the Central Pow- 
ers were already in possession of a direct connection 
with Constantinople and the Black Sea, now that 
Russia and Roumania are both out of the War, the 
enemy has secured a route or routes between Central 
Europe and the East, not only partially but entirely 
alternative to that provided by the railway from Bel- 
grade to Constantinople. By going overland to Odessa 
or Constanza, communication will be available by way 
of the Black Sea with Constantinople. The employ- 
ment of these routes will necessitate little if any delay. 


for, in peace time, whereas the journey from Berhn 
to Constantinople via Odessa required approximately 
sixty hours, by direct train it took about fifty-five 
hours. That the difference will be even less by way 
of Constanza is proved by the fact that, some years 
before the War, the Germans arranged for a special 
express train to run from Berlin by way of Breslau, 
Cracow, Lemberg, and Roumania to Constanza, a 
train so rapid and well arranged that the whole journey 
could be accomplished more quickly and more cheaply 
than by any other ordinary route across Europe. 

It is not, however, only with Constantinople, but 
also in the direction of the Middle East and Central 
Asia that Germany has secured or may now secure 
new facilities for communication. Thus if the enemy 
continues to dominate Roumania and Southern Russia, 
his troops and war material can be conveyed to Con- 
stanza and Odessa, thence to be shipped by way of the 
Black Sea to the ports of Northern Asia Minor and to 
Batum in the Caucasian area, surrendered to Turkey. 
This means, when coupled with the fact that the Rus- 
sian Black Sea Fleet (consisting of two dreadnoughts 
and several older battleships and cruisers and a num- 
ber of torpedo boats and submarines) is unlikely, to 
say the least of it, to act in a manner hostile to Ger- 
many, that the enemy has before him a wholly new 
route from Europe to Asia — a route which does not 
depend upon and which can be used in place of the 
Bagdad Railway. Batum is connected by a railway 
with Tiflis. From this point one line goes to Baku 
on the Caspian, and another runs in a more or less 
southerly direction to Julfa, on the Turco-Persian 
frontier, from which point, since the beginning of the 




War, it has been extended at least to Tabriz, situated 
only about three hundred and thirty miles to the north- 
east of Bagdad. Baku, too, is in railway connection 
with the remainder of Russia. These are conditions 
and developments which affect the whole situation. 

The Germano-Roumano-Russian peace therefore 
indicates the attempted foundation for a policy not 
of German domination from the North Sea to the 
Persian Gulf, but from the Atlantic to the Pacific. 
Over and above the already mentioned communica- 
tions and ignoring the Trans-Siberian Railway, the 
development of this policy is furthered by lines con- 
structed by Russia in areas often held in England to 
be a menace by that country to India. Thus start- 
ing from Krasnovodsk, on the east of the Caspian, 
opposite to Baku, a line runs through Merv, Bokara and 
Samarcand towards the Chinese frontier. A little 
to the east of Samarcand this line is met by another 
coming from Petrograd by way of Moscow, Samara, 
Orenburg, and Tashkend — a line which, were it to 
fall into German hands, could be employed to further 
her world domination schemes without the necessity 
for the one hundred and ninety miles' passage across 
the Caspian. From the above-mentioned junction 
it was reported, prior to the exit of Russia from the 
War, that that country was building a railway towards 
the frontier of Afghanistan. The progress made by 
that line is uncertain, but even if it be not great, the 
distance left unbridged between the completed Rus- 
sian railways of Central Asia and the terminus of the 
Indian system at Peshawar cannot amount to more 
than between four hundred and five hundred miles. 
Whilst happily, at the moment of writing, the enemy 


is not in possession of the railways of all Russia or of 
the Trans-Caspian areas, and whilst equally happily 
the Hindu Kush Range constitutes a natural barrier 
between the termini in question, in considering the 
larger aspects of the situation in Russia, the existence 
of these railways constitutes a question the far-reach- 
ing importance of which it is impossible to ignore. 

Events are moving so rapidly and the situation has 
to be viewed from so many standpoints that it is im- 
possible to indicate the war measures necessary of 
adoption to counter the enemy's designs in the East. 
Nevertheless it is desirable briefly to discuss two condi- 
tions which must be realized after the War — condi- 
tions in a way interdependent and conditions which 
must be brought about if the danger of prolonged 
Teutonic domination in the East is to be averted. I 
refer to the necessity for the establishment of an anti- 
German barrier and to the distribution of Near-Eastern 
territories upon a basis sufliciently fair and just to be 
a safeguard against future wars. In regard to the first 
of these conditions there were or there are two schools 
of thought. According to the first, whilst some form 
of government with the consent of the governed should 
be inaugurated in favour of the various nationalities of 
Austria-Hungary who have not heretofore had an ade- 
quate voice in the direction of their own affairs, the 
Dual Monarchy should remain more or less intact or 
even be strengthened in certain directions with the 
object of enabling its rulers to withstand Germanic 
influence and of creating of it an anti-Prussian barrier. 
This sounds satisfactory and it might at one time have 
been satisfactory. But in view of recent events it 
seems difficult to believe that the adoption of such a 


course would in itself bring about the necessary security. 
This is the case because no guarantees would exist that 
the Austro-Hungarian Government would or could 
break away from the domination of Berlin or that it 
would introduce or still more maintain a regime accept- 
able to all or many of its present subject peoples. 

As an alternative or as a supplementary course we 
are therefore compelled to look to the setting up of 
safeguards only partly in and largely to the East of 
the Dual Monarchy. I refer to a Balkan Barrier. 
It is said by some, as it was said in 1913, that an en- 
larged and strengthened Serbia, or a Balkan League 
composed of a satisfied Serbia, Roumania, and Greece 
would be a sufficient assurance. This theory is with- 
out a sound basis, for I am convinced that no one Bal- 
kan country or no group of countries which left out 
one or more of the neighbouring States, would con- 
stitute an adequate precaution against a further Ger- 
manic effort to dominate the East or against a renewed 
outbreak of war as a result of conditions prevailing 
in this ever "Danger Zone of Europe." Thus were 
Serbia, Roumania, or Greece to be increased in size 
by the inclusion of all the areas which they covet, and 
were the name of Bulgaria to be entirely or practically 
blotted off the map of Europe, so long as the Bulgarian 
race existed under Bulgarian or alien rule, so long 
would there be a certainty of unrest in the Balkans — 
unrest which in its turn would be an excuse for foreign 
intrigue. Equally well were Serbia and Greece al- 
lowed practically to divide Albania, this would not 
only be an injustice to the people of the areas so divided 
but it would leave the way open for renewed European 
and local diflSculties. Consequently it is only by a fair 


and equitable distribution of Balkan territories, that 
there can be established a state of things, which if it be 
not at once acceptable to all the parties concerned, will 
none the less form a basis of a stable peace, a peace 
which will untimately encourage good Balkan relations 
destined automatically, in the end, to help to bar the 
gate in face of German domination in the East. 

To consider first the kind of arrangement which 
should be substituted for the fatal Treaty of Bucharest 
of 1913, whilst I do not agree with its every detail 
and whilst I do not base the following remarks entirely 
upon it, I cannot do better than to refer my readers 
to a potent, well-informed, and comprehensive article 
which appeared under the title "The Final Settlement 
in the Balkans" in The Quarterly Review (Number 
453) for October, 1917.i Though the writer of that 
article speaks of five, it seems to me preferable to say 
that there are three all-important principles which 
must be taken into account in endeavouring to solve 
the Balkan Question. Undoubtedly the first is the 
basis of nationality, which should always be accepted 
unless it be made impossible of adoption by one of the 
other two conditions. Coming next in order are eco- 
nomic and commercial considerations, that is to say, 
the provision for each country of adequate and natural 
access to the sea. In certain cases the realization of 
this consideration may clash with and must take pre- 
cedence over the basis of nationality, for in various 
instances the seaports are not inhabited in majority 
by the same nationality as the interior. Thirdly, in 
view of the complicated nature of the geography of the 

1 The author of this article is Mr. James D. Bourchier, the famous 
Balkan correspondent of The Times. 


peninsula, due weight and consideration must be given 
to the existence of certain natural frontiers and stra- 
tegic requirements, the overlooking of which is not 
possible. In addition to these principles, though not 
upon the same level of importance with them, there 
are certain pre-War European decisions which might 
well be taken as guiding factors and which should not 
therefore be treated as mere ** scraps of paper." 

To attempt to apply these principles in detail would 
mean the expansion of this volume far beyond its avail- 
able capacity and therefore the only course left open 
to me is very briefly to allude to the general conditions 
to be created by their adoption. Beginning with 
Roumania, her natural southern frontier with Serbia 
and Bulgaria would be the Danube, but that river 
cannot be taken as the boundary right to its mouth 
as special arrangements must be made for the Dobrudja 
in order to allow Roumania adequate access to the sea. 
Near Silistria the Danube frontier should therefore be 
replaced by that arranged under the Protocol of Petro- 
grad of May, 1913, by which the town of Silistria went 
to Roumania. On the west and northwest the Rou- 
manian frontiers should be extended in a manner to 
give the Banat and large areas of Transylvania and 
of the Bukovina to that country. The inclusion of the 
Banat in Roumania will constitute a hardship for 
Serbia in that Belgrade would still remain on the 
frontier and that a considerable Serb population exists 
in the southwestern portion of that area. On her 
eastern frontier there should certainly be a modifica- 
tion in favour of Roumania which would give to that 
country at least a portion of Bessarabia. 

Coming to Bulgaria, I think that the Enos-Midia 


line, arranged by the Balkan Allies and sanctioned by 
the Great Powers at the time of the signature of the 
Treaty of London (May, 1913) should be taken as a 
basis in deciding the position of Bulgaria's southeastern 
frontier. The delimitation of the southwestern and 
western boundaries of the dominions of King Ferdinand, 
and therefore the drawing of the Bulgaro-Greek and the 
Bulgaro-Serbian frontiers will be much more compli- 
cated. Here no doubt rests in my mind that Bulgaria 
must be assured adequate access to the Aegean and 
that her frontier should be extended so as to include 
Kavala together with adequate means of approach to 
the coast at that point. With regard to the Bulgaro- 
Serbian and to what may be a future Bulgaro-Greek 
frontier in the neighbourhood or on the west of the 
Vardar Valley, any solution is beset by the ever-present 
difficulty of the Macedonian question and of the arrival 
at a decision as to the nationality of the inhabitants 
of doubtful or disputed areas. That question which 
concerns Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria could be decided 
in one of three ways — according to language, by tak- 
ing a plebiscite, or upon the basis of the arrangements 
made between the parties concerned in 1912. If the 
first of these means were adopted the necessary meas- 
ures would have to be taken to ascertain the areas 
in which Greek and Slav are spoken and to discover 
where the forms of speech particular to Bulgars or 
Serbs are employed. In theory the taking of a plebis- 
cite would be a satisfactory manner of arriving at a 
solution of the problem. But to enable the people 
to vote freely, a plebiscite would have to be conducted 
under the direct auspices of the Allies, or better still 
under the control of America. 


Whilst some other means would have to be found for 
dealing with the areas not already specially mentioned 
and in dispute between Bulgaria and Greece, the third 
and last suggestion for a solution of the Serbo-Bul- 
garian part of the question would seem to be the one 
the simplest and fairest of adoption. It is the simplest 
because the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty and its annex of 
1912 were arranged by the two contracting parties, 
without foreign interference, only ^ye years ago, and 
when the question was looming not in the distance, but 
at a moment when a redistribution of territory was 
actually foreseen. To take that agreement as the basis 
for, though not necessarily the actual text of, a future 
arrangement would be the fairest settlement of the 
problem because Bulgaria would thereby secure much 
less than she now holds (she would have to vacate all 
the districts of Serbia which were Serbian before the 
Balkan Wars, and also the Macedonian areas which 
went to the latter country by the Treaty) and because 
she would obtain probably only a section of the terri- 
tory to be acquired by her under a plebiscite or upon 
the language basis. 

One of the most important problems connected with 
this part of the peninsula concerns the future of Salo- 
nica. ^hat question can hardly be decided primarily 
on the basis of nationality, for the Jewish element of 
the population predominates. Consequently it would 
seem that the allotment of this all-important city 
should be governed largely by the condition that ports 
ought not to be separated from the hinterland which 
they serve and therefore by what may be the future 
distribution of the hinterland in question. Under 
these circumstances all that can be said here is that 


three solutions are feasible. Firstly the city might 
be left to Greece. This would have the advantage 
of avoiding a loss of prestige for M. Venezelos and a 
disappointment for the Greeks. But on the other hand 
Greece, which has plenty of ports, does not require 
Salonica, and the Jews of that city would certainly 
prefer almost any regime to Hellenic rule. Secondly, 
if Central and Western Macedonia accrue to Bulgaria, 
then Salonica might go with them. This settlement, 
possessed of many advantages, would, however, be 
greatly resented alike by the Greeks and the Serbs. 
And thirdly Salonica, by itself, might be constituted a 
free port under the protection of the Powers, or it 
might form the capital and port of an autonomous 
Macedonia, foreseen by the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty 
of 1912 and now to be created under the protection of 
the Powers in order temporarily to get over the diffi- 
culties concerning the future of areas disputed between 
Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria. 

Turning to Albania, whilst upon ethnical grounds 
the frontiers might be considerably extended, the 
decisions of the London Ambassadorial Conference 
might well be taken as a basis in fixing future bound- 
aries. In justice to Albania herself and in the interest 
of future peace, however, there should be certain minor 
rectifications in favour of that country. The prin- 
cipal directions in which attention should be turned 
are towards a change in the south, which would bring 
the whole of the road from Santi Quaranta to Korcha 
within Albania, instead of leaving it to pass through 
a triangular area of Greece, towards the inclusion in 
Albania of Dibra, Prisrend, and Jacova — towns 
which are absolutely essential as market centres, and 


towards the regaining of the tribes of Hoti and Gruda, 
which are so absolutely Albanian in sentiment that they 
will never peacefully accept any form of alien rule. 
With such modifications Albania would be constituted 
on a basis which would make her national existence 
practicable instead of impossible, as it was prior to the 

As Montenegro and Serbia seem destined sooner or 
later to be united either as one kingdom or at least on 
terms so intimate as to make any serious rivalry out 
of the question, I will consider the gains which should 
be assured to those countries as common and discuss 
them all under one heading. Here the most impor- 
tant developments recently arising are the friendly 
understanding said now to have been arrived at 
between Italy and the Slavs and the reported replace- 
ment of the original Treaty between Italy, England, 
France, and Russia by a new agreement. As the nature 
of neither of these arrangements is known, I will merely 
endeavour approximately to sketch the acquisitions 
which should be secured by Montenegro-Serbia. The 
Bocche di Cattaro and the coastal area of Dalmatia, 
lying to the southeast of it, should be Slav. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, together with a length of the Adriatic 
Coast on the north of the Bocche di Cattaro, sufficient 
to give a proper Serbian access to the sea, ought to 
be allotted to that country or to Montenegro. With 
regard to Croatia and to Slavonia, which should be 
considered separately to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
to the remainder of Dalmatia, the futures of these 
areas are bound up with many questions which do not 
fall within the limits of this volume. Sufiicient there- 
fore be it to say that a friendly agreement between 


Italy and the Southern Slavs is essential to the inter- 
ests of both parties and that, when the time for a deci- 
sion comes and when it be possible to ascertain the true 
sentiments of the inhabitants, these sentiments must 
be treated with all possible deference in any solution 
of the Jugo-Slav and Adriatic Questions decided upon 
by the Allies. 

From the foregoing remarks it would seem that 
Greece is the country destined to lose the most and to 
gain the least by any feasible settlement of the Balkan 
Question. This is the case because the claims of 
that country are most difficult of satisfaction in that 
the Hellenic element of the population is for the most 
part scattered and that, where it exists in preponder- 
ating numbers, especially in numerous coastal regions, 
the futures of those regions cannot, for reasons already 
given, be decided solely upon the nationality basis. 
This was of course foreseen by M. Venezelos, when he 
proposed, early in the War, to make concessions to 
Bulgaria and to come to the support of the Allies, 
presumably on the understanding that his country 
should receive compensation without the Balkan 
Peninsula. Had the Premier been able to secure the 
adoption of his point of view at that time, and had 
the support of Greece then been available against 
Turkey, she might well have secured valuable gains 
at the expense of that country. As things stand at 
present, however, unless Greece were to be given 
Monastir, to which she has better racial claims than 
has Serbia, it is difficult to see where her aspirations, 
at any rate on the mainland, can be gratified. But 
whilst we do not know the nature of the arrangement 
reported to have taken the place of the Treaty said to 


have been signed with Italy on her entry into the War, 
it is possible that this arrangement has foreseen the 
desirability of rewarding Greece by the acquisition 
of at least some of the Aegean Islands, now in posses- 
sion of Italy, and that Cyprus, offered to her by Great 
Britain in 1915, might be ceded under some arrange- 
ment at the end of the War. These are concessions 
which would be justified on ethnical grounds and which 
would certainly do something to make up for losses 
possibly to be suffered by Greece in other directions. 

In placing the above suggestions before my readers 
I make no claim that their adoption, as a basis for the 
future settlement of the Balkans, would be entirely 
popular in any of the countries concerned or that 
it would lead to the immediate cessation of unrest in 
the areas in question. Neither of these results is 
possible until sufficient time has elapsed to enable 
tranquillity and prosperity to do something to blot 
out the memories of the past. Those conditions, 
which can only be realized by a justifiable distribution 
of territory, can hardly be brought about by local 
arrangement. When the proper time comes, there- 
fore, it is still for the Allies to adopt the policy defined 
by Sir Edward Grey on September 28, 1915, namely, 
to further "the national aspirations of the Balkan 
States without sacrificing the independence of any 
of them." The continued pursuit of such a policy, 
which may have to be firmly imposed upon the chau- 
vinistic elements of the various nationalities, will tend 
to put an end to a state of things largely responsible 
for rendering possible the present War and for many of 
the events which have taken place since August, 1914. 

The last subject for discussion here is that which 


concerns the futures of what would remain of Turkey 
in Europe — Constantinople and its surroundings — 
and of the Asiatic Dominions of the Sultan. With 
so many factors still undecided, it is too early yet even 
to make any definite suggestions upon these compli- 
cated and all-important questions. To begin with, 
it is impossible to forecast whether Turkey will be 
allowed to continue her independent existence as a 
Great Power, or whether the Ottoman Empire as a 
whole or in part is to be placed directly under Euro- 
pean control. In either case, however, although the 
arrangements would be somewhat different, it is safe 
to say that the present status of Constantinople and of 
the Straits must be changed, and that the Dardanelles 
and the Bosphorus should in the future be unfortified 
and open not only to the ships of war of Turkey but 
to those of all nations. If these conditions be realized 
there are then two alternatives. By the first Turkey 
would continue to be the nominal sovereign power 
at Constantinople, but the city, together with its 
European and Asiatic surroundings, whilst remain- 
ing under the Turkish flag, would be definitely con- 
trolled under some form of international arrange- 
ment hereafter to be decided. By the second, Turkish 
rule would cease altogether in the European area 
situated to the southeast of the Enos-Midia line and 
in a band of Asiatic territory bordering on the south- 
eastern shores of the Bosphorus, the Marmora, and the 
Dardanelles — a band sufficiently wide to safeguard 
the neutrality of those waterways. In that case these 
areas would pass under the direct and absolute control 
of the Powers or of some country or countries nomi- 
nated by them. 


As in the case of Constantinople so with regard to 
the Asiatic Dominions of the Sultan the primary and 
absolute necessity is that Germanic domination must 
cease and that measures must be taken to prevent the 
further butchery and oppression of the non-Turkish 
elements of the population, and particularly to assure 
the safety of the Armenians who remain. This state 
of things might conceivably be brought about whilst 
the Turkish flag still flew over large areas of what are 
now Asiatic Turkey, but in that case, in addition to 
the above suggested safeguards, local autonomy would 
have to be granted to the various now subject peoples. 
On the other hand if a policy of disintegration or of 
complete control be adopted by the Allies, then we 
shall see either the birth of a number of new states 
in Western Asia or the establishment of several autono- 
mous regions each probably directly or indirectly 
under some kind of foreign supervision. That super- 
vision might take the form of a Governor General 
nominated by the Great Powers and assisted by an 
Ambassadorial Council at Constantinople, possessed 
of direct control over that city and of only the indirect 
super visal of several semi-independent States, each 
possessed of their own Governments. Or it might be 
carried out by means of separate and independent 
regimes for Constantinople and for the different areas 
of the interior. These and many other problems are 
destined for the moment to remain unsettled and to 
be decided, when the time for decision comes, upon the 
basis of factors many of which cannot be discussed under 
existing circumstances. 

Throughout this volume I have endeavoured to re- 
view the situation in the East as it actually was and 


is and to admit enemy successes where successes have 
been achieved. At the time of writing, judging from 
the map, those successes are considerable and far- 
reaching. But if the Germans have been generally 
correct in their diagnosis of the "trees", of the details 
of the War, they have been and are almost universally 
wrong in their appreciation of the "woods", the larger 
aspects of the situation. Such mistakes as those con- 
cerning their misinterpretation of the original attitude 
of Great Britain, their opinion of what they called 
"the contemptible little British Army" and their 
optimism in regard to the policy of Italy, together 
with their fatal error in miscalculating the sentiments, 
the determination, and the power of the people of the 
United States, have already caused them to be swept 
from the sea, to lose their colonies, and to be compelled 
to play for a draw or even to be ready to make sacri- 
fices in the West in order to maintain and keep the 
door open for their intrigues and schemes of conquest 
in the East. We may be Westerners or we may be 
Easterners in military policy, but in either case it must 
be clear to every member of the thinking public that 
no terms can be made and that no peace will be lasting 
which does not free the East "from the impudent and 
alien domination of the Prussian military and commer- 
cial autocracy." To fail to achieve this object would 
be to prolong the existence of the Near East as "The 
Danger Zone of Europe" and to leave that area the 
ready "Cradle" for yet another war. 



Readers of the foregoing pages will have discovered 
that they include a review of many of the conditions 
influencing the developments which began on the 
Balkan front on July 6, 1918. In considering those 
developments, and especially the events in the more or 
less immediate vicinity of the Adriatic, the first con- 
dition to be remembered is that we have no information 
as to the progress of events in Northern and Central 
Albania since the enemy occupation of those areas early 
in 1916. Thus whilst we know that the Italians have 
built roads, and I believe one or more sections of rail- 
way, in the districts which they held, we are in total 
ignorance as to the facilities of communication estab- 
lished by the Austrians. All that can be said, there- 
fore, is that, up to the time of the enemy advance in 
1916, there were no railways in Albania and that the 
so-called roads consisted almost exclusively of mere 
tracks not passable for wheeled traffic. 

Consequently, knowing the country as I do, I think 
that the initial Allied goal must be the occupation of 
a line situated to the north of and running more or less 
parallel to the Scumbi Valley. An advance to such a 
line, if it included the capture of the Krabe Mountains, 
lying to the north of Elbasan, would mean the occu- 
pation and the freeing of at least half Albania and the 


almost certain capture of Durazzo and perhaps of 
Tirana. It would place in our hands the natural line 
of communication from the Adriatic into the interior 
— a line which follows the ancient Via Egnatia and the 
Scumbi Valley and a line along which, if it has not 
already been built, a modern road could easily be con- 

By such an advance the Allies would have gained 
the larger part of the plains of Central Albania, the 
western section of the Balkan front would have been 
straightened out in a manner greatly to our advantage, 
and we should be in possession of the section of Albania 
inhabited by the more enlightened element of the popu- 
lation. Moreover the occupation of Durazzo and of 
the Scumbi Valley would wrest from the enemy a port, 
which has probably played its part in enabling him to 
threaten the Allied routes across the Lower Adriatic, 
and it would give to us a new point of entry into and 
means of communication with the Western Balkans. 
Whether those facilities would be utilised for provi- 
sioning the Allied forces on all or parts of the Salonica 
front or whether they would lead to a far-reaching 
advance in the Balkans are questions which cannot be 
discussed here. Sufficient, therefore, be it to say that 
developments taking place at the time of writing these 
few lines (July 15) once more thrust the Near East 
into the forefront of the War and that they justify 
our continued attention to the progress of events in an 
area which becomes ever more and more important. 



Official Documents 

Bagdad Railway (1911) Parliamentary Paper (Cd. 5635). 
Dardanelles Commission, First Report (Cd. 8490) 1917. 
Mesopotamia Commission, Report (Cd. 8610) 1917. 


"Turkey in Europe'' .... Sir Charles Eliot 
"Turkey and Its People" . . . Sir Edwin Pears 
"Macedonia, Its Races and Their 

Future" H. N. Brailsford 

"The Balkan Peninsula" . . . L. W. Lyde and A. F. 

Mockler Ferryman 
"Geographical Aspects of Balkan 

Problems" Marion Newbigin 

" The Eastern Question : an his- 
torical study in European 

Diplomacy" J. A. R. Marriott 

"The Danger Zone of Europe" . H. Charles Woods 
"Washed by Four Seas" . . . H. Charles Woods 
"Report of the International 

Commission to Inquire into 

the Cause and Conduct of 

the Balkan Wars," published 

by the Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace, 

Washington, D. C. 



Nelson's History of the War" . John Buchan 

High Albania'* M. E. Durham 

The Struggle for Scutari" . . M. E. Durham 
The Aspirations of Bulgaria" . Balkanicus 
The Reconstruction of South 

Eastern Europe " . . . . 
The Balkan League" .... 
'Bulgaria and Her People with 

an Account of the Balkan 

Wars, Macedonia and the 

Macedonian Bulgars" 
The King of Roumania" 
The Life of King George of 


' Forty Years in Constantinople ' 
The Middle-Eastern Question' 
■ Corps de Droit Ottoman " . 
'Turkish Memories" . . . 
'Turkey and the War" . . 
The Short Cut to India" . 
'Le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad' 
'Turkey in Transition" . . 
'Revelations of Prince Lich- 

Pamphlet published by The New York Times 

Vladislav R. Savic 
I. E. Gueshoff 

William Seymour Monroe 
Sidney Whitman 

Capt. Walter Christmas 
Sir Edwin Pears 
Valentine Chirol 
George Young, M.V.O. 
Sidney Whitman 
Vladimir Jabotinsky 
David Eraser 
Andre Cheradame 
G. F. Abbott 

Magazine Articles. 

'The Final Settlement in the Balkans" with map. James 
D. Bourchier. The Quarterly Review, October, 1917. 

'Communications in the Balkans." H. Charles Woods. 
The Geographical Journal, April, 1916. 

'The Bagdad Railway." Edwin Pears. Contemporary Re- 
view, November, 1908. 

'The Bagdad Railway." Arthur von Gwinner. Nineteenth 
Century, June, 1909. 


" The Bagdad Railway." Hopkins. Journal of the United 
Service Institution, India, October, 1909. 

"The Bagdad Railway." H. F. B. Lynch.. Fortnightly 
Review, March and May, 1911. 

"A New German Empire: The Story of the Bagdad Rail- 
way." Andre Geraud. Nineteenth Century, May and 
June, 1914. 

"The Bagdad Railway and Its Tributaries." H. Charles 
Woods. The Geographical Journal, July, 1917. 

"The Bagdad Railway Negotiations." Quarterly Review, 
October, 1917. 

"Railways in Western Asia." Lieutenant-Colonel H. Picot. 
Proceedings of the Central Asian Society, 1904. 

"Railways in the Middle East." H. F. B. Lynch. Pro- 
ceedings of the Central Asian Society, 1911. 

"The Bagdad Railway." Andre Cheradame. Proceedings 
of the Central Asian Society, 1911. 


Abdul Hamid, 7, 8, 12. 

Achi Baba, 234. 

Adabazar, 278. 

Adjud, 196. 

Adrianople, 25, 26, 28, 32, 33, 59, 60, 
90 ; road from Jamboli to, 202. 

Adrianople, Station of, 192 n. 

Adriatic Sea, question of, 27, 331 ; 
commanding position of Albania 
with reference to, 153 ; plans for 
running railway from the Danube 
to, 205, 206 ; railways from the 
lower coast of, to the interior, 200- 

Aegean Islands, disposition of, by 
the London Ambassadorial Con- 
ference, 34, 35, 60, 61 ; the ques- 
tion of, 137 ; and Germany, 314 ; 
possible disposition of, after the 
War, 333. 

Aehrenthal, Count, and the proclama- 
tion of Bulgarian independence, 9, 
10; and the annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, 10, 11. 

Afghanistan, 323. 

Afiun Karahissar, 279, 280. 

Ahmed Djemal Pasha, 66, 70. 

Ahwaz, 78, 80. 

Ain Safar, 304. 

Akaba, 85. 

Ak Kupru, 288. 

Albania, under the New Regime, 18, 
19, 164, 165 ; Northern, campaign 
in Balkan War, 25, 26 ; autonomy 
for, agreed upon by London Con- 
ference, 27, 33; and Scutari, 34; 
difficulty of fixing frontiers of, 34 ; 
significance of establishment of, 
39 ; geographical and political 
importance of, 153, 154 ; the 
question of, an important problem, 
154 J geographical limits of, 154- 

156 ; creation of Principality of, 
155, 166 ; geographical description 
of, 156, 157 ; its position in the 
Ottoman Empire, 158, 159 ; under 
the Old Regime, 164 ; under the 
regime of Prince William of Wied, 
167-169; the northern part of, 
overrun by Austro-Germans, 169, 
170 ; the southern part of, occu- 
pied by the Italians, 170-172 ; 
a State, proclaimed by Colonel 
Descoin, 170; improvement in 
conditions in, made by Italians, 

171, 172 ; probable future status of, 

172, 173 ; routes in, 207-209, 337 ; 
operations in, as affected by occu- 
pation of Monastir, 266, 267; in- 
dependence of, supported by Ger- 
many and justified, 313 ; possible 
frontiers of, after the War, 330, 
331 ; present goal of Allies in, 337, 

Albanians, utilised by Young Tiu-ks 
to demand constitution, 8 ; occu- 
pations of, 156 ; nationality of, 
157; descendants of the lUyrians, 
158; character of, 159, 160; two 
groups of, 160 ; religion of, 100, 
161 ; language of, 161-164 ; and 
the Balkan Wars, 165-167. 

Aleppo, 272, 275, 276, 291, 293, 294, 

Alexander, King, of Greece, 148. 

Alexandretta, 272, 291-293, 315. 

Allies, The, diplomacy of, in reference 
to Bulgaria and Serbia, 51, 52; ^ 
difficulties of, in Turkey, 65, 66 ; 
and Gocben and Breslau, 69 ; im- 
portance to, of an understanding 
with Bulgaria, 94, 95 ; difficult 
position of, with relation to Bul- 
garia, 98 ; discussion of states- 



manship of, in the Balkan question, 
102-104, 246 ; influence bearing 
upon their attitude toward Greece, 
130 ; negotiations of, for conces- 
sions by Greece, 140; troops of, 
landed in Greece, 142 ; difficulties 
of their relationship with Greece, 
143 ; blockade Greek coasts, 145 ; 
land troops at Piraeus, 146 ; diffi- 
culties of the policy of, in the 
matter of the Greek king, 148 ; 
justification of their act of causing 
the Greek king to abdicate, 149, 
150 ; present goal of, in Albania, 
337, 338. 

Amanian Gates, 293. 

Amanus Range, 274, 275, 293, 294. 

Amara, 80. 

America, respect for, in Armenia, 
Bulgaria, and Albania, 5. 

American Board of Commissioners 

. for Foreign Missions, establish- 
ments of, in Asia Minor, xiv, 5. 

Amman, 305. 

Anatolian Railway, 276-278, 282. 

Andorra, 54. 

Andriyevitza, 207. 

Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 78. 

Angora, 276-278, 283. 

Anti-German barrier in the East, 
question of, xi, 324-326. 

Anti-Lebanon, the, 304. 

Antioch, 293. 

Antivari, 39, 55, 206. 

Antivari-Virbazar Railway, 206. 

Anzac Beach, 234. 

Arabian Independentist Movement, 

Arda River, 259. 

Arjish River, 119. 

Armenia, part of, annexed to Russia, 
2 ; in the Treaty of BerHn, 3, 4 ; 
Turkey's treatment of, 5 ; scheme 
for reforms in, 63, 64 ; reign of 
terror in, 64, 70-72; British, 
French, and Russian interests in, 315. 

Armenians, massacre of, 4, 5, 64, 
70-72, 290; future safety of, 
should be assured, 335. 

Asia Minor, railways of. See Rail- 
way, Railways. 

Austria-Hungary, on Cretan ques- 
tion withdraws from Concert of 

Europe, 7 ; and the Bulgarian 
declaration of independence, 9, 10 ; 
relation of, to Germany, affected 
by the annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 10, 11 ; relation of 
Serbia to, affected by Bosnian 
annexation, 11 ; attitude of, on 
Adriatic question, 27 ; status of 
Serbia and Montenegro after the 
Balkan Wars a source of disappoint- 
ment to, 43 ; intended to attack 
Serbia in 1913, 44 ; her ultimatum 
to Serbia, 45, 46 ; crises between 
Montenegro and, 55 ; hated by 
Montenegrins, 56 ; her striving for 
influence in Albania, 154 ; future 
of, 324, 325. 

Austrians, their first invasion of 
Serbia in August, 1914, 47; their 
second invasion of Serbia in Sep- 
tember, 1914, 48; defeated by 
Serbians, 48, 49; take Mt. Lov- 
tchen, 57. 

Avlona, 153, 157, 169-171, 208, 266. 

Babuna Pass, 262, 266. 

Bagche tunnel, 294. 

Bagdad, 79, 81-83. 

Bagdad Loan Contract, 284, 286. 

Bagdad Railway, concession, followed 
Emperor's visit to Constantinople, 
7, 281 ; use of, by Turks in Meso- 
potamian campaign, 85 ; military 
importance of, 271, 272; Ger- 
many's scheme for, 271, 272, 292 ; 
objects of, military, 272; earlier 
projects for, 272, 273 ; signing of 
charter of, 282; features of Con- 
vention of 1903, 283 ; financial ar- 
rangements, 283, 284 ; from Konia 
to Eregli, 285 ; delays after com- 
pletion of first section, 286, 287 ; 
description of the Taurus section, 
287-291 ; the Alexandretta line, 
291-293 ; the Amanus section, 
293-295 ; new Conventions of 
March 19, 1911, 295-298; sec- 
tions completed or not since the 
new Conventions, 295-297 ; sec- 
tion from Bagdad to Persian Gulf, 
297 ; agreement of Tsar and Kai- 
ser in 1910 relative to, 297, 298; 
Anglo-Germano-Turkish negotia- 



tions in 1913 and 1914, 298; facil- 
ities for travel on, 299-301 ; journey 
from London to Bombay, 299, 300 ; 
conveniences of travel by, 300, 
301 ; cost of, to Turkey, 301, 302 ; 
military results of, 302, 303 ; pro- 
jected improvements in, affected 
Allied campaign in Mesopotamia, 
307, 308 ; future of, 309 ; arrange- 
ment between Sir Edward Grey 
and Prince Lichnowsky concern- 
ing, 314-316. 

Baiburt, 75. 

Baku, 323. 

Balance of Power, 37, 38. 

Balkan alliance, 20-25, 39, 41, 90, 

Balkan Barrier, question of, 325, 326. 

Balkan Peninsula, description of, 
174-176 ; the meeting-place of 
East and West, 176, 177; a land 
of contrasts, 178; climate of, 178, 
179 ; travelling and accommoda- 
tions in, 181 ; railways and roads 
of, 186-213; rivers of, 213, 214. 
See Balkans. 

Balkan Question, the occasion of the 
War, vii, ix, x ; principles to be 
observed in settling, 326, 327, 333 ; 
suggested definition of boundaries 
of the different nationalities, 327- 

Balkan Range, 175. 

Balkan War, First, beginning and four 
campaigns of, 25, 26; Second, 30-33, 
38, 264; opposed by Powers, 36; 
possibilities of, 37; summary of 
causes and results of, 38, 39 ; result 
of, for Montenegro, 56. 

Balkans, the, importance of condi- 
tions in, 1 ; the Danger Zone of 
Europe, 1 ; war of 1877 in, 2 ; far- 
reaching importance of events in, 
from 1908 to close of Balkan Wars, 
35 ; mentality of Governments 
of, 103. See Balkan Peninsula. 

Banat, the, 107, 327. 

Basra, 79, 80, 83, 283, 297, 299, 315. 

Batum, 76, 322. 

Bavaria, 131. 

Bayazid, 73. 

Beersheba, 87, 276. 

Beikos. 222-224. 

Beirut, 273, 304. 

Beirut-Damascus-Hauran Railway, 

Belgrade, attacked by Austrians, 47; 
surrendered, 48 ; retaken, 49 ; 
again taken by the enemy, 53. 

Belgrade-Constantinople Railway, 

Berane, 207. 

Berat, 208, 267. 

Berchtold, Count, 44, 316. 

Berlin, Congress of (1878), 3 ; Treaty 
of (1878), 3, 184, 185, 188; Rou- 
mania at Congress of, 107. 

Berlin-Constanza Express, 195. 

Beshik Dagh, 254, 256. 

Bessarabia, question of, 106, 107, 327 ; 
partly annexed to Roumania, 125. 

Beyshehr, Lake, 285. 

Bible, the, translated into Albanian, 

Bibliography, 339-341. 

Bieberstein, Baron Marshal von, 
appointment of, as Ambassador 
in Constantinople, 6, 281 ; clever- 
ness and regardlessness of, 35 ; 
recalled from Constantinople, 36 ; 
his instructions, 311. 

Bir Auja, 276, 307. 

Bismarck, retirement of, 6. 

Bistritza River, 265. 

Bitlis, 75. 

Bitlis Gap, 75. 

Bitumen, mine in Albania, 156. 

Black Sea, 321. 

Bocche di Cattaro, 178, 331. 

Bokara, 323. 

Bolu, 278. 

Bosnia and Herzegovina, revolt in, 
1 ; annexation of, 9-11 ; roads and 
railways of, 204, 205 ; future of, 

Bosnish Brod, 204. 

Bosphorus, the, 216, 220 ; description 
of, 221, 222; forts of, 222, 223; 
future status of, 334. 

Bosra, 305. 

Bourchier, James D., 21, 326 n. 

Bouvet, 233. 

Boyana River, 207, 213, 214. 

Bozanti, Vale of, 288, 290. 

Bozanti Han, 290. 

Braila, 119, 182, 184, 196. 



Breslau, arrival at Constantinople, 
68 ; so-called purchase of, 69 ; 
how presence at Constantinople 
might have affected the Darda- 
nelles campaign, 235. 

Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (1918), 76, 

Bright, John, 2. 

British and Foreign Bible Society, 

British Pictorial Service, xiv. 

British, railway concessions to, 277, 
279, 281, 291, 306. 

Brusa, 281. 

Buchan, John, Roumanian events 
described by, 115, 116. 

Bucharest, Treaty of (1913), 31, 32, 
111 ; Peace of (1812), disposition 
of Moldavia and Wallachia made 
by, 106 ; taken by the Germans, 

Bucharest-Suczawa Railway, 196 ; 
branches of, 196. 

Bukovina, the, 107, 327. 

Bulair, 236-238. 

Bulair Lines, 227. 

Bulgaria, Principality of, created, 2 ; 
Eastern Roumelia incorporated 
in, 4 ; declaration of independence 
of, 9, 10 ; and Turkey, Russian 
settlement of difficulties between, 
in 1909, 11, 12; attitude of the 
Government at the beginining of 
the Turco-ItaHan War, 19, 20; 
agrees to proposals from Greece, 
21 ; makes Treaty of Alliance 
with Secret Annex with Serbia, 21- 
23, 329, 330 ; military convention 
between Serbia and, 23 ; treaty 
with Greece made by, in 1912, 
24 ; military convention between 
Greece and, 24 ; relations to Greece 
at the outbreak of the War, 24, 25 ; 
in the first Balkan War, 25, 28; 
strained relations of Serbia and, as 
result of the Adriatic question, 27, 
28 ; and the Second Balkan War, 

30, 31 ; in the Treaty of Bucharest, 

31, 32 ; in the Treaty of Constan- 
tinople, 32, 33 ; position of, at the 
end of the Balkan Wars, 39 ; at- 
titude of Serbia regarding con- 
cessions to, 51 ; entry of, into the 

War, 53 ; improving relations with 
Turkey, 62 ; a young state, 89 ; 
increase in prosperity of, 89 ; area 
of, before the Balkan Wars, 89 ; 
area of, after the Balkan Wars, 89, 
90 ; on strained terms with Serbia 
and Greece after the Balkan Wars, 
90 ; attitude of, toward Serbia, 
Greece, and Roumania, on the one 
hand, and toward Turkey on the 
other, at the beginning of the War, 

91, 92 ; conditions required by, 

92, 99 ; war importance of, due 
largely to her geographical posi- 
tion, 93 ; her importance out of 
proportion^to her fighting efficiency, 

93, 94 ; was able to immobilise 
military forces of her neighbours, 
94 ; importance to the Allies of an 
understanding with, 94, 95 ; value 
of, to the Central Powers, 95 ; 
general considerations regarding 
the concessions required by, 95, 
96 ; Germanic intrigue in, 97, 98 ; 
relations of Turkey and, 97, 98 ; 
question of agreement between 
Central Powers and, 98 ; negotia- 
tions preliminary to entrance of, 
into the War, 99, 100; mobihsa- 
tion ordered by, 100, 101 ; object 
of her entry into the War, 101, 102 ; 
Allied statesmanship and, 102, 
104; and the Dobrudja, 110; 
relations of, to Roumania with ref- 
erence to the Dobrudja, 110 ; Allied 
proposals for concessions from 
Greece to, 140, 141 ; shows marked 
contrast to Turkey, 177, 178 ; 
railways of, 199-202 ; roads lead- 
ing into, 210-214 ; shut from 
Aegean by strip of Greek territory, 
248 ; cause of her entrance into 
the Second Balkan War, 264; 
meaning to Germany of her en- 
trance into the War, 318 ; the 
author's suggestions as to fron- 
tiers of, 327, 328. 

Bulgarian Exarchate, the, 2. 
Bulgarians, massacre of, 2 ; advance 

of, into Roumanian territory, 116; 

lose Monastir, 264-266. 
Bulghar Dagh, 288. 
Bulgurlu, 285-287. 



Burgas, 200, 201. 

Burgas Chai, 259. 

Burhan Eddin, Prince, 169. 

Burney, Sir CecU, 34. 

Buyuk Chekmedche, Lake, 221. 

Buyukdere, 220, 222. 

Buzeu, 195, 196. 

Buzeu Pass, the, 115. 

Cape Abydos, 230. 

Cape Helles, 226. 

Capitulations, Turkish, abolished, 67, 

Carol, King, of Roumania, 112. 

Castellorizzo, 35, 60. 

Cattaro, 57. 

Caucasus campaign, 72-76. 

Central Powers, the, reasons for 
desiring to prevent disruption of 
Turkey, 36 ; propose decentralisa- 
tion of European Turkey, 36 ; gain 
to, of alliance of Bulgaria, 95 ; ques- 
tion of agreement between Bul- 
garia and, 98. See Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Tur- 

Cerna Voda, 109, 110, 118, 182, 183, 
194, 196. 

Cettinje, 54 ; taken by the Austrians, 
57 ; railway to, 206. 

Chakra Su River, 288. 

Chalkis Peninsula, 254-256. 

Chanak, 224, 227-229, 237. 

Charshembe River, 285. 

Chatalja Lines, the, 25, 220, 221. 

Ch6radame, Andr6, on Bagdad Rail- 
way, 282. 

Chesney, Colonel, 272, 273. 

Chios, 61, 138. 

Chirol, Sir Valentine, his Middle 
Eastern Question, 282. 

Chiulnitza-Slobodzie-Ployesti Rail- 
way, 195. 

Chunuk Bair Ridge, 234, 235. 

Cilician Gates, 288, 290. 

Cihcian Plain, 290, 293. 

Cirpan, 201. 

College for Girls at Constantinople, 5. 

Cologna, 171, 266. 

Committee of the Bulgarian Internal 
Organisation, memorandum of, 
17, 18. 

Committee of Union and Progress, 8, 
12, 13, 15-17, 59, 66. 

Conference of London (1830), 131. 

Congress of Berlin (1878), 3. 

Congress of London, first (1912), 26 ; 
second (1913), 28. 

Congress of Vienna (1815), 184. 

Constantine, King, of Greece, reason 
for popularity of, 134 ; flattered 
by attentions of the Kaiser, 134 ; 
reasons for his policy of neutrality, 
135 ; detested Venezelos, 135, 136 ; 
unable to forget personal feelings, 
135, 136 ; first struggle between 
Venezelos and, 138 ; his insistence 
on neutrality, 143 ; abdicates, 

Constantinople, Treaty of (1913), 
32, 33 ; terminus of Belgrade-Con- 
stantinople route, 187, 189 ; im- 
portance of position of, 216 ; land 
defences of, 220, 221 ; Lines of, 220 ; 
the Chatalja Lines, 220, 221 ; the 
Bosphorus forts, 221-223 ; forming 
connection with the East for Ger- 
many, 321, 322; future disposi- 
tion of, 334. 

Constanza, 109, 110, 118, 183, 312, 

Constanza-Verciorova Railway, 194, 

"Conventionnel ", the, 188. 

Corfu, 53. 

Crajova, 118. 

Crete, autonomous r6gime granted 
to, 4. 

Crimean War, the, 2. 

Croatia, 331. 

Ctesiphon, 79. 

Cyprus, lease of, to Great Britain, 
3; possible future disposition of, 

Dalmatia, 331. 

Damascus, 276, 304. 

Danube, the, description of, 181, 182 ; 
importance of, as thoroughfare and 
as obstacle to communication, 182, 
183 ; viaduct across, at Cerna Voda, 
183 ; railways running to, 183, 
195, 196, 199, 200; international 
status of, 184 ; work of the Danube 
Commission, 184, 185 ; the larger 
political status of, 185, 186 ; plans 
for running railway from the 



Adriatic to, 205, 206; in part 
natural frontier of Roum^nia, 327. 

Dardanelles, the, description of, 223, 
224 ; forts of, 223-227,. 229, 230 ; 
unfavourable position of fleet try- 
ing to force, 231, 232 ; future sta'tus 
of, 334. 

Dardanelles, town of, 228. 

Dardanelles Campaign, the conduct 
of, 139, 140, 240; the raison d'Mre 
and the cause of, 215, 216; prob- 
able far-reaching results of, if 
successful, 216, 217; caused by 
important telegram from Russia, 
217-219, 241, 242; difficulties of, 
219, 230, 239-241 ; first stage 
of (naval attack) , 233 ; second 
stage of (operations beginning 
April 25), 233, 234; third stage of 
(Suvla Bay operations), 234, 235; 
question concerning possibility of 
forcing Dardanelles without help 
of troops, 235, 236 ; question con- 
cerning undertaking of operations 
on Asiatic shore, 236 ; question 
concerning a landing at Bulair, 
236-238 ; considerations contribut- 
ing to withdrawal from, 238 ; gen- 
eral remarks on withdrawal from, 
238, 239 ; considerations for and 
against, 241, 242 ; result achieved 
by, 242, 243. 

Dede Agatch, 33, 91, 93, 98, 100, 176, 

Demir Hissar, 191, 212, 248, 256, 

Demotika, 33. 

Denmark, 131. 

Deportations, German policy of, 314. 

Deraia, 276, 305. 

Derkos Gol, 221. 

Descoin, Colonel, 170. 

Deve Bair, Mt., 213. 

Diarbekr, 278, 295. 

Dibra, 166, 208, 330. 

Djavid Pasha, 18. 

Djehun River, 291. 

Dobrudja, the, section of, desired by 
Bulgaria, 91 ; meaning of the 
question of, 106, 109-111 ; present 
status of, 124 ; special arrange- 
ments must be made for, 327. 

Dodecannese Islands, 60. 

Doiran, Lake, 262, 267. 

Doiran-Ghevgeli Enclave, 140, 141. 

Dorak, 289. 

Dospat Dagh, 258. 

Dounmes, in Salonica, 251, 

Drama, 191, 211, 248. 

Drin River, 176. 

Dulcigno, 55, 213. 

Durazzo, 153, 156, 169, 208, 338. 

Eastern Roumelia, Province of, cre- 
ated, 2, 89 ; incorporated in Bul- 
garia, 4. 

Edward, King, 8. 

Egerdir, 281. 

Egypt, campaign near frontier of, 
85-88 ; attack on, made possible 
by railway to Bir Auja, 307. 

El-Arish, 86. 

Elasona, 210. 

Elbasan, 157, 208, 337. 

El Fule, 307. 

El Fule-Bir Auja Railway, 307. 

England, attitude of, toward the 
Treaty of San Stefano, 3 ; policy 
of, during the thirty years follow- 
ing the Treaty of Berlin, 5, 6 ; 
attitude of, toward reforms in 
Ottoman Empire, 35, 36. See 
Great Britain. 

Enos-Midia line, 32, 93, 327. 

Enver Pasha, 59, 62, 66, 314. 

Epirote Independent Government, 

Epirus, frontier of, 35 ; the question 
of, 170. 

Eregli, 285. 

Erivan, 76. 

Erzerum, 70, 73, 278 ; fall of, 74. 

Erzingan, 75. 

Eskishehr, 279, 281. 

Essad Pasha, 168, 169. 

Es Salt, 305. 

Falkenhayn, General von, 117, 119. 

Falli^res, President, 10. 

Fateshti, 196. 

Fateshti-Buzeu Railway, 195. 

Feluja, 275. 

Ferdinand, Prince, of Bulgaria, and 
the declaration of Bulgarian inde- 
pendence, 9, 10 ; visits King 
Nicholas of Montenegro, 24 ; glad 



of an argument in favour of a pro- 
German policy, 98. 

Ferisovitch, Congress at, 8. 

Fitzmaurice, Lord (Lord Edmond 
Fitzmaurice) , his statement of the 
boundaries of Albania, 155. 

Fiume, 204. 

Fiorina, 193, 261, 264, 265. 

Fort Rupel, surrender of, 145, 262. 

Forts, defending Constantinople, 220, 
221 ; of the Bosphorus, 221-223 ; 
of the Dardanelles, 223-227, 229, 

Fournet, Admiral de, 146. 

France, her relation to Greece, 130- 

Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, murder 
of, X, 44 ; his murder inflammatory, 
45 ; action of Germany in connec- 
tion with, 316, 317. 

French, railway concessions to, 279, 
280, 303, 304, 306. 

Frontiers, and strategic requirements, 
principle to be observed in settling 
the Balkan Question, 327. 

Gaba Tepe, 232, 234. 

Galatz, 184, 185. 

Galiko, River, 254. 

Gallipoli, Peninsula of, importance of 
Bulgaria to resistance in, 93 ; land 
communication with, 203 ; dif- 
ficulties of the author in gaining 
information about, 219; descrip- 
tion of, 224, 225 ; forts of, 226, 227. 

Galhpoli, town of, 226. 

Gaulois, 233. 

Gaza, 86, 87. 

George, King, of Greece, assassinated, 
28 ; his co-operation with M. Vene- 
zelos, 128-130; given title of "Roi 
des Hellenes" by the Powers, 136. 

Germany, policy of, in the East, after 
the Treaty of Berlin, 6, 7 ; on 
Cretan question, withdraws from 
Concert of Europe, 7 ; support 
given the Sultan by, 7 ; and the 
annexation of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina, 10, 11 ; secretly supports 
Austria on Adriatic question, 27 ; 
effect of Turkish Revolution of 
1908 on prestige and power of, at 
Constantinople, 35; attitude of. 

toward reforms in Ottoman Em- 
pire, 35, 36 ; her policy in the Bal- 
kan Wars, 37, 38 ; her attitude 
toward . Austrian proposal to at- 
tack Serbia in 1913, 44 ; Austrian 
ultimatum to Serbia the work of, 
45, 46 ; growth of her influence in 
Turkey, 62 ; intrigues of, in Tur- 
key, 64-66 ; succeeds in dragging 
Turkey into the War, 67-70 ; her 
connection with the Armenian 
massacres of 1915, 72 ; intrigues 
of, in Bulgaria, 97, 98 ; long-stand- 
ing alliance of Roumania with, 
111, 112; intrigues to bring Rou- 
mania into the War, 113-115, 196; 
purpose of her "Drang nach 
Osten," 215; her interest in the 
Bagdad Railway and its route, 
271, 272, 292; railways of Asia 
Minor connected with influence of, 
277-282; present War and Mittel 
Europa scheme planned long be- 
fore by, X, 310; so-called rivalry 
between England and, 310 ; pre- 
pared for the making of the War 
at opportune time, 311 ; the War 
made by, to improve her position 
in the East, 312 ; her policy of 
domination from Hamburg to the 
Persian Gulf, 312, 313; deter- 
mined on improvement in rela- 
tions to Turkey, 313, 314; and 
the Aegean Islands, 314; en- 
courages Turks to expel Greeks 
from Asia Minor, 314 ; action of, 
in connection with the murder of 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, in the 
light of disclosures of Prince 
Lichnowsky and Doctor Miihlon, 
316, 317; "initiation" stage of 
her intrigues in the East, 317; 
changed plan of scheme after out- 
break of War, 317; the "con- 
summation" policy of, 317-319; 
her attitude toward Turkey, Bul- 
garia, Serbia, Greece, and Rou- 
mania, 318, 319; President Wil- 
son's statement of her claims in 
the East, 320 ; the extent to which 
her aims have been realized, 320- 
324 ; a fresh door to the East 
opened to, 321, 322 ; is attempting 



to dominate from the Atlantic to 
the Pacific, 323 ; suggested ways of 
barring her advance in the East, 
324-326 ; generally wrong in ap- 
preciation of larger aspects of the 
War, 336. 

Gidia, 193, 210, 261. 

Giolitti, Signor, speech of, in the 
Itahan chamber, 44. 

Giurgevo, 119. 

Goeben, arrival at Constantinople, 68 ; 
so-called purchase of, 69 ; how 
presence at Constantinople might 
have affected the Dardanelles 
campaign, 235. 

Gorringe, General, operations of, in 
Persian territory, 80 ; takes Amara, 

Gounaris, M., 138, 145. 

Graeco-Serbian Treaty (June 1, 1913), 

Granville, Earl, 155. 

Gravosa, 204. 

Great Britain, the Mesopotamian 
campaign of, 77-85 ; operations 
of, near the Turco-Egyptian fron- 
tier and in Palestine, 85-88 ; her 
relation to Greece, 130-132 ; so- 
called rivalry between Germany 
and, 310. See England. 

Greece, attitude of the Government 
at the beginning of the Turco- 
Italian War, 19, 20; makes pro- 
posals to Bulgaria, 21 ; treaty with 
Bulgaria made by, in 1912, 24 ; 
military convention between Bul- 
garia and, 24 ; in the Balkan War, 
26 ; negotiates with Serbia, 28 ; 
enters into secret arrangement 
with Serbia, 29 ; makes treaty with 
Serbia (June 1, 1913), 29; in the 
Treaty of Bucharest, 32 ; and the 
Aegean Islands, 34, 35 ; and the 
Epirus frontier, 35 ; position of, 
at the end of the Balkan Wars, 
39 ; effect on Serbia of policy of, 
51 ; crisis with Turkey over the 
Aegean Islands, 60-62 ; annexes 
Chios and Mitylene, 61 ; purchases 
battleships from America, 61 ; 
importance of geographical posi- 
tioa of Bulgaria with reference to, 
94; advantages to, of concessions 

to Bulgaria, 96, 97; misgovern- 
ment and revolution in, 127 ; con- 
trolled by Military League, 127 ; 
successful statesmanship of M. 
Venezelos in, 127, 128 ; increase 
of size of, as result of Balkan Wars, 
128 ; saved by co-operation of 
King George and M. Venezelos, 
128-130 ; the influences upon her 
attitude and that of the Allies 
toward her, 130 ; owes her exis- 
tence to the protection of England, 
France, and Russia, 130-132; 
declared independent, 131 ; nature 
of her treaty with Serbia, 132, 133 ; 
Government of, must be influenced 
by individual feelings of the people, 
134 ; importance of Aegean Island 
question to, 137 ; the first struggle 
between Venezelos and the King, 
138; effect of the Dardanelles 
campaign on policy of, 139, 140; 
Allied negotiations for concessions 
by, 140 ; the period from October, 
1915, to June, 1917, of great im- 
portance to, 141 ; landing of Allied 
troops in, 142 ; the Allied attitude 
toward, 143 ; neutrality and 
regimes of Zaimis and Skouloudis, 
144, 145 ; Allied blockade of coast 
of, 145 ; Allies land troops at 
Piraeus, 146 ; renewed blockade 
of, 147; King of, abdicates, 148; 
wherein her case differs from that of 
Belgium, 148, 149 ; reorganisation 
of Government and army, 151 ; 
the future of, 151, 152 ; has striven 
to denationalise the Albanians, 
154 ; and the Epirus question, 170 ; 
railways and roads connecting 
other countries to, 209, 210; strip 
annexed by, after Balkan Wars, 
248 ; how conditions in the coun- 
try helped the baffling of Allied 
plans by, 260, 261 ; Germany's 
policy toward, 319 ; question of 
Bulgaro-Greek frontier, 328 ; ques- 
tion of her frontiers after the War, 
332, 333. 
Greeks, persecuted and massacred 
by Turks, 61 ; the mentality of, 
133, 134 ; exportation of, from 
Asia Minor, 314. 



Gregovitch, M.. attitude of, at the 
beginning of the Turco-Italian 
War, 20. 

Grey, Sir Edward (Lord Grey), at 
the second peace congress, 29 ; 
at the Ambassadorial Conference, 
38 ; views of Dardanelles campaign, 
217 ; his arrangement with Prince 
Lichnowsky about the Bagdad 
Railway, 314-316; Allies should 
follow his policy in the Balkans, 

Gruda, tribe of, 331. 

Gueshoff, M., attitude of, at the 
beginning of the Turco-Italian 
War, 20 ; proposals concerning 
Greece made to, 20, 21 ; negotiates 
with M. Spalaikovitch concerning 
treaty with Serlna, 21 ; Graeco- 
Bulgarian Treaty published by, 
24 ; favours arbitration, 30. 

Gulek Boghaz, 290. 

Gumuljina, 191, 211. 

Gumushhane, 75. 

Gyimes Pass, the, 115, 118, 196. 

Gyuveshevo, 201, 206, 212, 213, 258. 

Hadrie, 256. 

Haidar Pasha, 274. 

Haidar Pasha (Scutari)-l8mid Rail- 
way, 277, 278, 281. 

Haifa, 276. 

Haifa Railway, 306. 

Hakki Pasha, 298. 

Hama, 303. 

Haskovo, 211. 

Hedjaz, the, 302. 

Hedjaz, King of, 88. 

Hedjaz Railway, 87, 276, 305. 

Helfferich, Doctor, 316, 317. 

Helif, 275, 287, 295, 296. 

Hermannstadt, 117. 

Herzegovina. See Bosnia. 

Hindenburg, von, 117. 

Hindu Kush ^ange, 324. 

Hirsch, Baron, 187-189, 198. 

Hohenlohe, Prince, 98. 

Holland, Thomas Erskine, his The 
European Concert in the Eastern 
Question, 130. 

Horns, 304. 

Hortach Dagh, 255. 

Hoti, tribe of, 331. 

Illyrians, the, 158. 

Imbros, 34, 60. 

India, 323 ; time from London to, 
299, 300. 

India, on Belgrade-Vienna Railway, 

India-Fiume Railway, 204. 

Inflexible, 233. 

Ionian Bible Society, 163. 

Ionian Islands, 131. 

Ipek, 166. 

Iron Gates, 182, 185. 

Irresistible, 233. 

Irrigation, ditches, in Mesopotamia, 
84 ; of plain of Kornia, 285. 

Ishtib, 26. 

Islahiya, 294. 

Ismailia, 273. 

Ismail Kemel Bey, 166. 

Issus, Plain of, 293. 

Italy, opposed Austrian proposal of 
action against Serbia in 1913, 44 ; 
prevented action of Austria in Ser- 
bia, 50 ; Dodecannese Islands in 
the hands of, 60 ; her interest in 
Albania, 153 ; and the Epirus 
question, 170 ; occupation of 
southern Albania by, 170-172 ; 
and southern Slavs, necessity of 
harmony between, 331, 332. 

Jackson, Doctor, and the typhus 

epidemic in Serbia, 50. 
Jacova, 166, 330. 
Jadar, Battle of, 47. 
Jaffa, 87. 

Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway, 306. 
Jagow, Herr von, 316. 
Jajce, 204. 
JamboH,201, 202. 
Janina, 26, 28, 170, 209, 210. 
Jassy, 119. 

Jerablus, 275 ; bridge, 294. 
Jerusalem, taken by British, 87 ; 

importance of capture of, 87, 88; 

and the Hedjaz Railway, 306. 
Jews in Salonica, 251. 
Jonescu, Take, 108, 112. 
Jonnart, M., 147. 
Julfa, 322. 

Kaisariya, 278. 
Kalabaka, 210. 



Kara Balkan, 258. 

Karachi, 300. 

Karagatch, 192 n. 

Karaman, 285. 

Karapunar, 287, 289. 

Kara Su River, 294. 

Karasulu, 256, 257. 

Karaviran, Lake, 285. 

Karndash Bel, 287. 

Kars, 76. 

Katal Dagh, 176. 

Katia, 86. 

Kavala, 93, 94, 259; allotted to 
Greece, 32 ; question of possession 
of, 92, 96, 135, 140, 212, 248; sur- 
render of, to Bulgaria, 145, 263 ; 
should go to Bulgaria, 328. 

Keha Bay, 223. 

Kephez Point, 229. 

Kerbela, 297. 

Kermanshah, 76. 

Keshan, 203. 

Khanikin, 283, 296, 298. 

Kharput, 276. 

Khoja Chemen Dagh, 234. 

Kiel Canal, ceremony of enlargement 
of, 45. 

Kighi, 75. 

Kilid Bahr, 224-228, 232. 

Kilindir, 256. 

Kilometric guarantee, 180, 277, 278. 

Kirk Kilissa, 33, 202. 

Kitchener, Lord, 217, 241. 

Kolomonda Dagh, 255. 

Kolousheff, M., Bulgarian Min- 
ister at Cettinje, 24. 

Komanovo, 206, 212, 213, 257 ; battle 
at, 26. 

Konia, railway to, 279, 281-283, 
285 ; irrigation of plain of, 285. 

Korcha, 166, 170, 171, 209, 267. 

Koweit, 77, 272. 

Kozani, 210. 

Krabe Mts., 337. 

Kraguyevatz, 48, 53. 

Krasnovodsk, 323. 

Krishim River, 259. 

Kronstadt, 117. 

Krusha Balkan, 254. 

Kiihlmann, Herr von, 311. 

Kum Kale, 229. 

Kuprukenie, 73. 

Kuprulu, 257, 266. 

Kuprulu-Monastir (proposed) Rail- 
way, 193. 
Kurds, 159. 
Kurna, 78-80. 
Kut-el-Amara, 78-81. 
Kyrias, Gerasim, 163. 

Lake, Sir Percy, 82. 

Lambros Ministry, 146. 

Lamsaki, 228. 

Larissa-Gidia Railway, 193, 210, 261. 

Lausanne, Treaty of (October 12, 
1912), 60. 

Lebanon, the, 304. 

Lichnowsky, Prince, importance of 
his disclosures, 310; purpose for 
which he was sent to England, 310, 
311 ; disclosures prove that Ger- 
many made the War with a view 
to the East, 312 ; on the Near- 
Eastern question, 312, 313 ; on 
appointment of Liman von Sanders 
to post in Turkish Army, 314 ; 
his discussion of English attitude 
toward the Bagdad Railway, 314, 
316 ; his proof that Germany uti- 
lized the murder of Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand to promote the War, 
316, 317; on the Potsdam Meet- 
ing, 316. 

Limpus, Admiral, 67, 228. 

Lincoln, Abraham, on the American 
view of slavery, vii. 

London, first peace congress of (1912), 
26 ; second peace congress of (1913), 
28; Treaty of (1913), 29; Treaty 
of (1883), 184. 

London Ambassadorial Conference, 
the, 27, 33, 38, 60, 155, 167, 208, 

Losnitza, 47. 

Lowell Institute, xi. 

Luleh Burgas, 188, 189. 

Luleh Burgas-Salonica Railway, 190, 

Lydda, 307. 

Lynch, H. F. B., 291. 

Lynch, Messrs., vessels of, 84. 

Macedonia, in the Treaty of Berlin, 
3 ; massacre of 1903 in, 4 ; after 
the Murzteg Scheme of Reforms, 
4, 5 ; under the New Regime, 15- 



18 ; Central and Northern, cam- 
paign in, 25, 26 ; Southern, cam- 
paign in, 25, 26 ; disposition of, 
in Treaty of Bucharest, 31 ; dis- 
puted areas of, 51 ; hard to con- 
sider as a concrete whole, 247, 248 ; 
description of, 248, 267; difficul- 
ties in the way of campaigning in, 
267, 268. 

Mackensen, General von, advances 
into Serbia, 53 ; advances into 
Roumania, 116, 118, 119. 

Maidos, 225-227, 232. 

Makri Keuie, 220. 

Malgara, 203. 

Malissori Revolution, 18, 19. 

Maritza River, 176, 214. 

Maritza Valley Railway, 191, 

Marmora, Sea of, 217, 220. 

Marshall, General Sir W. R., 82. 

Massacres, of Bulgarians, 1 ; of 
Armenians, 4, 5, 64, 70-72, 290; 
of Greeks, 61. 

Maude, Sir Stanley, 82. 

Mecca, 87, 88 ; Grand Shereef of, 85. 

Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Duke of, 98. 

Medgidia, 194, 195. 

Medina, 87, 88, 276, 305. 

Mehrmann, his Dijdomatischer Krieg 
in Vorder Asicn, 278. 

Meissner Pasha, 305. 

Mensdorff, Count, 316. 

Mersina, 291. 

Mersina-Adana Railway, 277, 291. 

Merv, 323. 

Mesopotamia, geography of, 78 ; 
Sir Edward Grey's agreement with 
Prince Lichnowsky concerning, 

Mesopotamian campaign, 77-85 ; 
stages of, 79-82 ; difficulties of, 
83-85 ; affected by Allied knowl- 
edge of projected improvements 
in Bagdad Railway, 307, 308. 

Mcssudiyeh, flagship of Admiral 
Limpus, 228, 229. 

Mesta River, 259. 

Mesta Valley, 92. 

Metsovo, 210. 

Mezerib, 304. 

Midia, 202. 

Military League, power of, estab- 
lished in Greece, 127, 129. 

Milne, General, 263. 

Milovanovitch, M., attitude of, at 
the beginning of the Turco-Italian 
War, 20; confers with M. Gues- 
hoff, 21. 

Minerva, shells Akaba, 85. 

Mishitch, General, 264, 265. 

Missionaries, American, 5. 

Mitrovitza, 198, 205, 206. 

Mittel Europa, scheme of, planned 
long before by Germany, x, 310; 
change of plan in scheme of, after 
the outbreak of the War, 317. 

Mitylene, 61, 138. 

Moglena Mts., 248, 260, 265. 

Moldavia, 105. 

Monaco, 54. 

Monastir, 170, 206; taken by the 
Serbians, 26 ; in Graeco-Serbian 
Treaty, 29 ; taken by Bulgarians, 
54 ; railway to, 193, 260 ; road 
from Santi Quaranta to, 209 ; 
political importance of, 263, 264 ; 
taken by the Allies, 263-266 ; im- 
portance of capture of, 266, 267. 

Monro, Sir Charles, 239. 

Montenegro, attitude of the Govern- 
ment at the beginning of the Turco- 
Italian War, 19, 20 ; relations to 
Bulgaria prior to the first Balkan 
War, 24, 25 ; relations to Serbia 
before that war, 24 ; begins the 
Balkan War, 25 ; in the Balkan 
War, 26, 28 ; and Scutari, 33, 34, 57 ; 
position of, at the end of the Balkan 
Wars, 39 ; size of, 54 ; independ- 
ence of, 54 ; form of government 
of, 54 ; recent history of, 54, 55 
under the Treaty of Berlin, 55 
crises between Austria and, 55 
result of Balkan Wars for, 56 
close relations with Serbia, 56 
Austria's hatred of, 56 ; her part 
in the War, 56-58 ; loss of inde- 
pendence of, 57 ; size of her army 
and her losses, 58 ; railways in, 
206, 207. 

Montenegro-Serbia, acquisitions of, 
after the War, 331, 332. 

Morava River, 176, 253. 

Morgenthau, Mr., American Ambas- 
sador to Turkey, his account of 
Turkish affairs, 45, 59 n., 68 n., 



317 ; confession of Admiral Uzidon 

to, 314. 
Mosul, 275, 296. 
Mount Ararat, 73. 
Mount Kaimakchalan, 265. 
Mt. Lovtchen, 57. 
Mt. Olympus, 249. 
Mudania-Brusa Railway, 280. 
Muhammera, 78. 
Mlihlon, Doctor, his evidence that 

Germany promoted the War, 316, 

Murzteg Scheme of Reforms, 4. 
Musa Alia, 176. 
Mush, 75. 
Muslimiya, 294. 
Mustafa Pasha, 98, 192. 

Nagara Point, 227, 230. 

Nasrieh, 78-80. 

Nazim, Doctor, 13. 

Near East, the Danger Zone of 
Europe, 1. See Balkan Penin- 
sular, Balkans. 

Nedjef, 297. 

Newbigin, Doctor Marion, 174. 

Nicholas, Grand Duke, 73. 

Nicholas, King, of Montenegro, 
visited by King Ferdinand of 
Bulgaria, 24 ; his rule absolute, 54 ; 
flight of, 57. 

Nigde, 278. 

Niksics, 206. 

Nish, Serbian Government estab- 
lished in, 48 ; taken by the enemy, 

Nish-Salonica Railway, the, 189, 190. 

Nisibin, 275, 295. 

Northern Bulgaria, created a prin- 
cipality, 89. 

Nova Zagora, 201. 

Novibazar, Sanjak of, 26, 198. 

Ocean, 233. 

Odessa, 70, 321, 322. 

Okjilar, 192. 

Orenburg, 323. 

Oriental Railway Company, 188. 

Orsova, 119. 

Osmaniya, 293. 

Ostrovo, Lake, 261, 264. 

Otho, Prince, of Bavaria, 131, 135. 

Otranto, Straits of, 153. 

Paget, Lady, Red Cross mission of, 
in Serbia, 50. 

Palestine, Southern, advance of 
British into, 86 ; further advance, 
87 ; railways of, 276. 

Palmer ston. Lord, 2. 

Palmyra, 273. 

Panderma, 280. 

Paris, Treaty of (1856), disposition 
of Bessarabia and Moldavia by, 
106, 107 ; definition of status of 
Danube in, 184 ; Treaty of (1814), 

Pashkani, 196. 

Persia, 73; oil fields of, 77, 78; 
Northern, agreement of Tsar and 
Kaiser relative to, 298 ; Germany 
preparing to overrun, 320. 

Persian Gulf, coasts of, arrangement 
between Sir Edward Grey and 
Prince Lichnowsky concerning, 
315. See Bagdad Railway. 

Peshawar, 323. 

Peter, King, of Serbia, 48. 

Peterwardein, 182. 

Petrograd, Protocol of May, 1913, 92, 
110, 327. 

Philippopolis, 176. 

PhilippopoUs-Burgas Railway, 200, 

Pirot, 53. 

Ployesti, 119, 196, 197. 

Podgoritza, 206, 207. 

Porto Lagos, 93, 191. 

Potsdam Conference on July 5, 1914, 
45, 316. 

Prahov, 198, 206. 

Predeal, 117. 

Predeal Pass, the, 115, 196. 

Prevesa, 210. 

Prilep, 266. 

Prisrend, 53, 166, 208, 330. 

Queen Elizabeth, 233. 

Railway, the Belgrade-Constanti- 
nople, 187-189 ; the Nish-Salonica, 
189, 190; the Luleh Burgas-Sa- 
lonica, 190, 191 ; the Maritza Val- 
ley, 191 ; the Salonica-Monastir, 
193, 255, 260; the Kuprulu-Mon- 
astir (proposed), 193; the Con- 
stanza- Verciorova, 194, 195; the 



Fateshti-Buzeu, 195; the Chiul- 
nitza-Slobodzie-Ployesti, 195 ; the 
Riatra-Cainen, 195 ; the Bucharest- 
Suczawa, 196 ; the Sofia-Varna, 
199, 200; the PhiHppopoHs-Bur- 
gas, 200, 201 ; through the Travna 
Gap, 200; the Sofia-Gyuveshevo, 
201 ; the Turnovo-Siemenli-Nova 
Zagora, 201 ; the India- Fiume, 
204 ; the Antivari-Virbazar, 206 ; 
the Cattaro-Niksics, 206; the 
Uskub-Mitrovitza, 208 ; the 
Larissa-Gidia, 210, 261 ; the Vardar 
Valley, 255, 257, 258 ; the Salonica 
Junction, 255, 256 ; to the Persian 
Gulf, early projects for, 272-274; 
reasons for Bosphorus-Persian Gulf 
route, 273, 274; Anatolian, 276, 
277; the Smyrna- Aidin, 277, 280, 
281, 315 ; the Smyrna-Cassaba, 
277, 279, 280; the Mersina-Adana, 
277, 291 ; the Haidar Pasha 
(Scutari) -Ismid, 277, 278, 281 ; the 
Mudania-Brusa, 280 ; to Pandemia, 
has played important pert in War, 
280 ; the Beirut-Damascus-Hauran, 
304 ; the Hedjaz, 305 ; the Haifa, 
306; the Jaffa-Jerusalem, 306; 
the El Fule-Bir Auja, 307. See 
Bagdad Railway. 
Railways, opposed by the Turks, 
180; to the Danube from north 
and south, 183, 195 ; military im- 
portance of, 190, 191, 193, 195, 

196, 200-203; working of, af- 
fected by Balkan Wars, 191, 192; 
of Roumania, 194-197 ; of Serbia, 

197, 198; of Bulgaria, 199-202; 
in Turkish Thrace, 202 ; of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, 204, 205 ; pro- 
posed, for connecting the Danube 
with the Adriatic, 205, 206 ; from 
the lower Adriatic coast to the 
interior, 206-209 ; in Montenegro, 
206, 207 ; connecting Greece with 
othercountries,209,210 ; connecting 
Salonica with the interior, 255, 256 ; 
in Macedonia, condition of, when 
the Allies entered the country, 268 ; 
of Asiatic Turkey, military and 
political importance of, 274-277 ; 
of importance for Germany for 
reconquering Northeastern Asia 

Minor, 276; of Syria and Pales- 
tine, 276, 303-307 ; in Asia Minor, 
German influence in, 277-282. 

Ramie, 306. 

Rayak, 276, 303, 304. 

Revolution, Young Turkish in 1908, 
7-9, 12; MaUssori, 18, 19. See 
Young Turkish Revolution. 

Rhine, the, 184. 

Rhodes, 60. 

Rhodope Balkans, 26, 175 ; signifi- 
cance of, 258, 259 ; ways of pen- 
etrating, 259. 

Riatra-Cainen Railway, 195. 

Ripany, 188. 

Riva, 223. 

Rivers of the Balkan Peninsula, 213, 

Roads, in the Balkans, 178 ; the 
building of, opposed by the Turks, 
180 ; in Turkish Thrace, 202, 203 ; 
in Montenegro and Albania, 206- 
209, 337 ; connecting Greece with 
the outside world, 210 ; leading into 
Bulgaria, 210-214 ; leading from 
Salonica into the interior, 256 ; 
leading from the Vardar Valley 
eastward, 259 ; in Macedonia, 
condition of, 268. 

Robert College, 5. 

Rodosto, 202, 203. 

Rotherturm Pass, the, 115, 117, 195. 

Roumania, independence of, recog- 
nised, 2 ; in the First and Second 
Balkan Wars, 31 ; significance of 
her entry into Balkan politics, 39 ; 
effect on Serbia of policy of, 51 ; 
importance of geographical posi- 
tion of Bulgaria with reference to, 
93, 94 ; advantage to, of conces- 
sions to Bulgaria, 97 ; two parts of, 
105 ; occupies important strategi- 
cal position, 105 ; forms link be- 
tween East and West, 105 ; policy 
of, 105, 106 ; and Bessarabian, 
Transylvanian, and Dobrudjan 
questions, 106, 107 ; foreign policy 
of, 107, 108 ; explanation of her 
movements at her entry into the 
War, 108 ; took no part in the First 
Balkan War, but took compensa- 
tion in the Dobrudja, 108, 109; 
relations of, to Bulgaria with ref- 



erence to the Dobrudja and the 
Bulgaro-Roumanian frontier, 109- 
111; increase in size of, as result 
of Second Balkan War, 110, 111 ; 
difficult position of, after the out- 
break of the War, 111, 112; long- 
standing alliance of, with Ger- 
many, 111, 112; her probable 
action if granted concessions by 
Russia, 112, 113; value of, to 
Germany as a route to the south 
and east, 113-115 ; her entry into 
the War, 115; the northwestern 
frontier of, 115; advance of, into 
enemy territory, 115; advance of 
enemy into territory of, 116, 117; 
conquests of Central Powers in, 
118-120; military system of, 120, 
121 ; her plan of campaign, 121 ; 
mitigating circumstances of her 
campaign, 122 ; international rea- 
sons for her disaster, 122, 123 ; 
peace terms imposed upon, 123- 
126, 321 ; importance to, of properly 
defensible frontier on the south, 
183 ; description and strategical 
significance of railways of, 194- 
197 ; Germany's policy toward, 
319 ; the author's suggestions as 
to frontiers of, 327. 

Royal Geographical Society, xii, xiv. 

Rumeh Hissar, 222. 

Russia, policy of, during the thirty 
years following the Treaty of Ber- 
lin, 5, 6 ; her settlement of Turkish- 
Bulgarian difficulties in 1909, 11, 
12 ; aimed to prevent Balkan 
Wars, 36 ; her position after the 
Balkan Wars, 43, 44 ; makes ar- 
rangement with Turkey respect- 
ing reforms in Armenia, 63 ; Cau- 
casus campaign of, 72, 76 ; under- 
takings of, according to Brest- 
Litovsk Treaty, 76 ; relation to 
Serbia, and Bulgaria, 98 ; and the 
question of concessions to Rou- 
mania, 112, 113; and the Rouma- 
nian disaster, 123 ; her relation to 
Greece, 130-132; effect of im- 
portant telegram from, with ref- 
erence to Dardanelles campaign, 
217-219, 241, 242; agreement 
with Kaiser relative to Bagdad 

Railway and Persia, 297, 298; 
no longer a menace to Germany, 
320, 321. 

Russians, advance into Turkey by 
three routes, 73 ; take Erzerum, 
74 ; occupy entire route from 
Erzerum to Trebizond, 75 ; line 
of, in Asia at high-water mark, 

Russo-Turkish War (1877), 2. 

Rustchuk, 206 ; cabinet council held 
at, 9. 

Sadijeh, 283. 

Salonica, taken by the Greeks, 26 ; 
in Graeco-Serbian Treaty, 29 ; in 
the Treaty of Bucharest, 32 ; 
Allied landing at, 141 ; Venezelos 
forms CaVjinet at, 146 ; railway 
from Nish to, 189, 190; posi- 
tion of, 248-250; harbour, 249, 
250 ; description of, 250 ; popula- 
tion of, 250, 251 ; fire of August, 
1917, 251 ; climate of, 252 ; three 
commercial routes into the interior 
of the country from, 253 ; area 
closely surrounding, 254 ; moun- 
tains in the neighborhood of, 254, 
255 ; railways and roads from, to 
the interior, 255-258 ; signifi- 
cance of Rhodope Balkans to, 
258, 259 ; favourable and unfavour- 
able conditions of area northwest 
of, 260, 261 ; disposition of, after 
the War, 329, 330. 

Salonica campaign, partly result of 
withdrawal from the Dardanelles, 
95, 244; objects of, 244-246; first 
stage of (attempt to advance into 
the interior), 261, 262; second 
stage of (defensive), 262, 263; 
third stage of, 263-267 ; difficulties 
of, 267-269 ; results of, 269, 270. 

Salonica-Dede Agatch Railway Com- 
pany, 212. 

Salonica, Gulf of, 249. 

Salonica-Monastir Railway, 193. 

Samara, 323. 

Samarcand, 323. 

Samarra, 275, 296. 

Samos, 61, 138. 

Sanders, General Liman von, 62, 



San Giovanni di Medua, 153, 206, 
207, 213. 

San Marino, 54. 

San Stefano, Treaty of, 3, 107. 

Santi Quaranta, 166, 171, 209. 

Sari Bair, 234. 

Sarikamish, 73. 

Saros, Gulf of, 225, 233, 237. 

Save River, 213. 

Savoff, General, 31. 

Sazonoff, M., 31. 

Scanderbeg, Albanian hero, 158. 

Scumbi River, 160, 176. 

Scumbi Valley, 337, 338. 

Scutari, 26 ; taken by Montenegrins, 
33 ; question of, 34 ; Government 
moved to, 53 ; permanent posses- 
sion of, desired by Montenegrins, 
56 ; annexed by King Nicholas, 
57; fertile plains near, 156; size 
of, 156 ; Albanians obtain, 166 ; 
connections with, 207. 

Scutari, Lake, 207. 

Sedd-el-Bahr, 226. 

Seihun River, 291. 

Selenitza, 156. 

Semendria, 198. 

Serajevo, x, 44, 178. 

Serbia, independence of, recognised, 
2 ; policy of Count Aehrenthal as 
affecting the relation of Austria to, 
11 ; attitude of the Government 
at the beginning of the Turco- 
Italian War, 19, 20; makes 
Treaty of Alliance with Secret 
Annex with Bulgaria, 21-23, 329, 
330 ; military convention between 
Bulgaria and, 23 ; and Montenegro 
before the Balkan War, 24 ; in 
the Balkan War, 25, 26; and the 
Adriatic question, 27 ; strained 
relations with Bulgaria as result 
of the Adriatic question, 27, 28 ; 
negotiates with Greece, 28 ; de- 
mands revision of Serbo-Bulgarian 
Treaty, 28, 29 ; enters into secret 
arrangement with Greece, 29 ; 
makes treaty with Greece (June 1, 
1913), 29; and the Second Balkan 
War, 30, 31; in the Treaty of 
Bucharest, 32 ; position of, at the 
end of the Balkan Wars, 39 ; 
her need of an outlet to the 

Adriatic, 42 ; her aim not attained 
by the Balkan Wars, 42, 45 ; the 
annexation of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina a blow to her aspiration, 
42 ; the real source of danger to, 
43 ; Austrian ultimatum to, 45, 
46 ; first invasion of, in August, 
1914, 47 ; second invasion of, in 
September, 1914, 48 ; epidemic of 
typhus in, 49 ; internal disaffection 
in the south of, 51 ; her attitude 
toward concessions to Bulgaria, 
51 ; diplomacy of Allies with ref- 
erence to Bulgaria and, 51, 52; 
loss of independence of, 53, 54 ; 
close relations with Montenegro, 
56 ; importance of her role in the 
War, 58 ; size of her army and her 
losses, 58; rapid subjugation of, 
to what due, 93 ; great advantages 
to, of concessions to Bulgaria, 96 ; 
concessions of, to Bulgaria, 99, 
100 ; nature of her treaty with 
Greece, 132, 133 ; railways of, 
197, 198 ; failure to save, due to 
strategic position of the enemy, 
246, 247 ; Germany's policy to- 
ward, 318; question of Bulgaro-. 
Serbian frontier, 328, 329. 

Serbians, defeat Austrians, 48, 49 ; 
retreat and transference of, to 
Corfu, 53, 54. 

Seres, 191, 253, 256, 262. 

Seugudlu River, 259. 

Shabatz, 47. 

Shabatz-Losnitza Railway, 198. 

Shat-el-Arab, the, 78, 83. 

Shat-el-Hai Canal, 78, 79. 

Shedna Gora, 176. 

Shustar, 78. 

Siemens, Doctor, 282. 

Silistria, 32, 92, 110, 116, 327. 

Siminhan, 204. 

Sinaia, 196. 

Sistova, 206. 

Sivas, 278. 

Skouloudis, M., 144, 145. 

Slavery, the American view of, vii ; 
the real cause of the Civil War, 

Slavonia, 331. 

Smyrna-Aidin Railway, 277, 280, 
281 ; arrangement between Sir 



Edward Grey and Prince Lich- 
nowsky concerning, 315. 

Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, 277, 279, 

Sofia, 176, 178, 253. 

Sofia-Gyuveshevo Railway, 201. 

Sofia- Varna Railway, 199, 200. 

Spalaikovitch, M., negotiates with M. 

Spitza, 39, 65. 

Strong, Doctor, and the typhus epi- 
demic in Serbia, 50. 

Struma River, 212, 256, 262. 

Struma Valley, 212, 253, 256, 258, 262. 

Strumnitza, 258. 

Suczawa, 196, 197. 

Suez Canal, Turks defeated near, 
85, 86 ; shares of, purchased by 
England, 273. 

Suvla Bay operations, 234, 235. 

Syria, railways of, 276, 303-307; 
British, French, and Russian in- 
terests in, 315. 

Syrian campaign, affected by Allied 
knowledge of contemplated im- 
provements in Turkish railroad 
systems, 308. 

Tabriz, 73, 323. 

Talaat Pasha, 66. 

Tarsus Chai (Cydnus) River, 290. 

Tashkend, 323. 

Taurus, the, 274, 286, 287; section 
of Bagdad Railway, 287-291. 

Tcherna Bend, 265. 

Tcherna River, 265. 

Tchorlu, 202. 

Tehran, 298. 

Tekeh Fort, 227. 

Tekir Plateau, 290. 

Tenedos, 34, 35, 60. 

Thrace, campaign in, 25 ; Bul- 
garians lose large part of, by Treaty 
of Constantinople, 33 ; Turkish, 
part of, desired by Bulgaria, 91, 
93 ; Turkish, means of communi- 
cation in, 202. 

Tifiis, 322. 

Tigris River, 83, 84. 

Tirana, 208, 338. 

Torsburg Pass, the, 115, 117. 

Townshend, General, surrender of, 
79, 81. 

Transylvania, question of, 106-108, 

Travna Gap, railway through, 200. 

Treaty, of San Stefano (March 17, 
1878), 3; of Berlin (1878), 3, 107; 
of Alliance between Bulgaria and 
Serbia (1912), 21-23, 329, 330; 
between Greece and Bulgaria 
(1912), 24; of London (1913), 
29 ; Graeco-Serbian (June 1, 1913), 
29, 132, 133; of Bucharest (Au- 
gust 10, 1913), 31, 32, 111 ; of Con- 
stantinople (1913), 32, 33; be- 
tween Italy, and Great Britain, 
France, and Russia, 55; of Lau- 
sanne (October 12, 1912), 60; 
of Brest-Litovsk, 76 ; of Paris 
(1856), 106, 107, 184; of Paris 
(1814), 184; of Berlin (1878), 
184, 185, 188; of London (1883), 

Trebizond, 75. 

TripoH, 304. 

TripoH War, 19, 35, 60, 298. 

Tsar, meeting with Kaiser at Pots- 
dam, November, 1910, 297, 298. 

Tsaribrod, 187, 188. 

Tschirschky, Herr von, 316, 317. 

Turco-Bulgarian frontier, 60. 

Turco-Greek War of 1897, 7. 

Turco-Italian War, 19, 35, 60, 298. 

Turkey, Asiatic, importance of con- 
ditions in, 1 ; in war with Russia 
(1853-55), 2; in war with Russia 
(1877), 2; after the Treaty of 
Berlin, 3, 4 ; and the Murzteg 
Scheme of Reforms, 4, 5 ; army of, 
under Germanic control, 6 ; sup- 
port given to, by Germany, 7 ; 
revolution of 1908 in, 7-9, 12; 
and Bulgaria, Russian settlement 
of difficulties between, in 1909, 11, 
12; the Committee of Union and 
Progress, 12, 13 ; the outstanding 
feature in the situation in, 13, 14 ; 
the motto of the Young Turks, 14 ; 
Ottomanisation, 14 ; first year of 
the New Regime in, 14-16 ; 
second and third years of the New 
Regime, 16-20 ; in the First Balkan 
War, 25, 26 ; in the Second Balkan 
War, 32, 33; Imbros, Tenedos, 
and Castellorizzo allotted to, 34, 



35 ; attitude of England and of 
Germany toward reforms in, 35, 
36 ; attitude of Great Powers 
toward, before Balkan Wars, 36, 
37 ; loss in territory through 
Balkan Wars, 37 ; position of, at 
the end of the Balkan Wars, 39, 
40; conditions in, just before the 
outbreak of the War, 59 ; dis- 
pleased with results of the Balkan 
Wars, 60 ; crisis with Greece over 
the Aegean Islands, 60-62 ; per- 
secution and massacre of Greeks 
by, 61 ; improving relations with 
Bulgaria; 62 ; growth of German 
influence in, 62 ; agreement of, 
respecting reforms in Armenia, 
63, 64 ; German intrigues in, 64- 
66 ; position of the Allies in, 65, 
66 ; her fear and hatred of Russia, 
65, 66 ; reasons for her inclination 
toward Germany, 66 ; brought 
into the War by Germany, 67-70; 
abolishes capitulations, 67 ; enters 
Triple Alliance, 68 ; Armenian 
massacres of 1915, 70-72 ; oper- 
ations of, in Northeastern Asia 
Minor, 72-76; and the Brest- 
Litovsk Treaty, 76 ; operations of, 
between head of Persian Gulf and 
Bagdad, 77-85 ; operations of, 
near the Egyptian frontier, 85- 
88 ; relations of Bulgaria and, 97, 
98 ; attitude of, toward Albania, 
158 ; position of Albania in the 
Empire, 158, 159 ; Bulgaria shows 
marked contrast to, 177, 178 ; 
railways and roads in, 202, 203 ; 
Asiatic, military and political im- 
portance of railways of, 274-277 ; 
cost of Bagdad Railway to, 301, 
302 ; military results to, of Bag- 
dad Railway, 302, 303; Central 
Powers aimed to improve relations 
with, 313, 314 ; army of, under 
General Liman von Sanders, 314 ; 
importance to Germany of en- 
trance of, into the War, 318; 
future of, 333-335. 
Turks, defeated near Suez Canal, 
86 ; defeated near Katia, 86 ; op- 
posed to the building of roads and 
railways, 180. 

Turnovo, 191 ; declaration of Bul- 
garian independence made at, 9. 

Turnovo-Siemenli-Nova Zagora Rail- 
way, 201. 

Turnu Severin, 124. 

Turtukeuie, 116. 

Typhus, epidemic of, in Serbia, 49, 

Ujitse, 204. 

Ultimatum, Austrian, to Serbia, 45, 

46, 317. 
Ulu Kushlar, 278, 288. 
Urumiah, Lake, 73, 75. 
Uskub, 53, 176, 198, 201, 206, 257, 

Uskub-Mitrovitza Railway, 208. 
Uvats, 205. 
Uzidon, Admiral, 314. 
Uzun Kupru, 237. 

Valievo, 48, 49, 204. 

Van, lake and town, 73, 75, 76. 

Vardar River, 176 ; importance of, 
252, 253 ; the country to the west 
of, 254 ; the country to the east of, 
254, 255. 

Vardar Valley, the, 25, 26, 213, 248 ; 
importance of, 252, 253 ; railway 
of, 255, 257, 258; description of, 

Vardishte, 204. 

Varna, 199, 200. 

Vehko Plana, 188, 198. 

Venezelos, M., 94, 97; attitude of, 
at the beginning of the Turco- 
Italian War, 20 ; Saviour of 
Greece, 127, 128 ; liis devotion to 
Greece and co-operation with 
King George, 128-130 ; a statesman 
and patriot, 136; desired to co- 
operate with King Constantine, 
136 ; cause of his decline in popu- 
larity, 137 ; first struggle between 
King Constantine and, 138 ; second 
resignation of, 141, 142; the ques- 
tion of his attitude toward the 
landing of Allied troops in Greece, 
142 ; abstention of his followers 
from voting, 145 ; departs from 
Athens and forms Independent 
Cabinet at Salonica, 146 ; Pre- 
mier since June, 1915, 150; return 



to power of, 150; difficulties of 
his position, 151 ; how far the 
future of Greece depends upon, 
151, 152; foresight of, 332. 

Verciorova, terminus of railway, 
194, 195, 197. 

Veria, 193, 210, 260, 261. 

Via Egnatia, 208, 338. 

Vidin, 206, 253. 

Vienna, Congress of (1815), 184. 

Viosa River, 171, 266. 

Virbazar, 206, 207. 

Vishegrad, 48. 

Vodena, 260. 

Von Bluhm Pasha, 220, 221. 

Von dor Goltz Pasha, power of, 6. 

Vulcan Pass, the, 115. 

Wallachia, 105. 

Wash-trains, system of, established 
by American doctors in Serbia, 50. 

Wilhelm II, of Germany, his policy 
in the East, 6 ; his first visit to 
Constantinople, 6 ; his second 
visit to Constantinople, 7, 281 ; 
meeting with Tsar at Potsdam, 
November, 1910, 297, 298 ; obsessed 
by desire for domination from 
Hamburg to Persian Gulf, 312, 

William of Wied, Prince, regime of, 

Wilson, President, quoted on Ger- 
man aims in the East, 320. 

Woods, H. Charles, his Washed by 
Four Seas, 278; his The Danger 
Zone of Europe, 285. 

Yenidje Vardar, 254. 

YildiB, 227. 

Young, George, his Corps de Droit 
Ottoman, 279, 303. 

Young Turkish Revolution of 1908, 
7, 8 ; importance of, in Balkan 
affairs, 8, 9 ; the meaning of, 12 ; 
the Committee of Union and Prog- 
ress, 12, 13, 15-17, 59, 66; effect 
of, on German prestige and power 
at Constantinople, 35. Sec Turkey. 

Young Turks, and the Revolution of 
1908, 7, 8, 12, 13 ; their policy and 
shortcomings, 14-19 ; motto of, 14 ; 
power of, just before the outbreak 
of the War, 60 ; their treatment 
of Albania, 164, 165. 

Zaimis, M., 138, 144, 145, 147, 150, 

Zelenika, 204. 
Zobeir, 297. 

f ^i] i 4 C K 

',ir^ SEA 


D Woods, Henry Charles 

560 The cradle of the war 





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