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THE  CRIMES  OF  KHRUSHCHEV 

PART  1-7 


,.0 


CONSULTATION  WITH 
Mr.  Eugene  Lyons 

SEPTEMBER  4,  1959 


COMMITTEE  ON  UN-AMERICAN  ACTIVITIES 

HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 

EIGHTY-SIXTH  CONGRESS 

FIRST  SESSION 


(INCLUDING  INDEX) 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities 


UNITED  STATES 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
46147°  WASHINGTON  :  1959 


PUBLIC- 


COMMITTEE  ON  UN-AMERICAN  ACTIVITIES 
United  States  House  of  Representatives 

FRANCIS  E.  WALTER,  Pennsylvania,  Chairman 

MORGAN  M.  MOULDER,  Missouri  DONALD  L.  JACKSON,  California 

CLYDE  DOYLE,  California  GORDON  H.  SCHERER,  Ohio 

EDWIN  E.  WILLIS,  Louisiana  WILLIAM  E.  MILLER,  New  York 

WILLIAM  M.  TUCK,  Virginia  AUGUST  E.  JOHANSEN,  Michigan 

Richard  Arens,  Staff  Director 

U 


CONTENTS 


Page 
Synopsis 1 

March  26,  1959:  Testimony  of  Mr.  Eugene  Lyons 5 

Index.. i. 

Ill 


'ot. 


y  Vj  /J  Cj 


Public  Law  601,  79th  Congress 

The  legislation  under  which  the  House  Committee  on  Un-American 
Activities  operates  is  PubHc  Law  601,  79th  Congress  [1946],  chapter 
753,  2d  session,  which  provides: 

Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States 
of  America  in  Congress  assembled,   *  *  * 

PART  2— RULES  OF  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 

Rule  X 

SEC.  121.    STANDING    COMMITTEES 
♦  ♦***♦♦ 

18,  Committee  on  Un-Am.erican  Activities,  to  consist  of  nine  Members. 

Rule  XI 

POWERS    AND    DUTIES    OF    COMMITTEES 

m  *****  * 

(q)    (1)   Committee  on  Un-American  Activities. 

(A)   Un-American  activities. 

(2)  The  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities,  as  a  whole  or  by  subcommit- 
tee, is  authorized  to  make  from  time  to  time  investigations  of  (i)  the  extent, 
character,  and  objects  of  un-American  propaganda  activities  in  the  United  States, 
(ii)  the  diffusion  within  the  United  States  of  subversive  and  un-American  propa- 
ganda that  is  instigated  from  foreign  countries  or  of  a  domestic  origin  and  attacks 
the  principle  of  the  form  of  government  as  guaranteed  by  our  Constitution,  and 
(iii)  all  other  questions  in  relation  thereto  that  would  aid  Congress  in  any  necessary 
remedial  legislation. 

The  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities  shall  report  to  the  House  (or  to  the 
Clerk  of  the  House  if  the  House  is  not  in  session)  the  results  of  any  such  investi- 
gation, together  with  such  recommendations  as  it  deems  advisable. 

For  the  purpose  of  any  such  investigation,  the  Committee  on  Un-American 
Activities,  or  any  subcommittee  thereof,  is  authorized  to  sit  and  act  at  such 
times  and  places  within  the  United  States,  whether  or  not  the  House  is  sitting, 
has  recessed,  or  has  adjourned,  to  bold  such  hearings,  to  require  the  attendance 
of  such  witnesses  and  the  production  of  such  books,  papers,  and  documents,  and 
to  take  such  testimony,  as  it  deems  necessary.  Subpenas  may  be  issued  under 
the  signature  of  the  chairman  of  the  committee  or  any  subcommittee,  or  by  any 
member  designated  by  any  such  chairman,  and  may  be  served  by  any  person 
designated  by  any  such  chairman  or  member. 

******* 

Rule  XII 

LEGISLATIVE    OVERSIGHT   BY   STANDING    COMMITTEES 

Sec.  136.  To  assist  the  Congress  in  appraising  the  administration  of  the  laws 
and  in  developing  such  amendments  or  related  legislation  as  it  may  deem  neces- 
sary, each  standing  committee  of  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Representatives 
shall  exercise  continuous  watchfulness  of  the  execution  by  the  administrative 
agencies  concerned  of  any  laws,  the  subject  matter  of  which  is  within  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  such  committee;  and,  for  that  purpose,  shall  study  all  pertinent  reports 
and  data  submitted  to  the  Congress  by  the  agencies  in  the  executive  branch  of 
the  Government. 


RULES  ADOPTED  BY  THE  86TH  CONGRESS 

House  Resolution  7,  January  7,  1959 

•  **«*•• 

Rule  X 

STANDING    COMMITTEES 

1.  There  shall  be  elected  by  the  House,  at  the  commencement  of  each  Con- 
gress, 

f  *****  * 

(q)  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities,  to  consist  of  nine  Members. 
*•****• 

Rule  XI 

POWERS    AND    DUTIES    OF    COMMITTEES 
******* 

18.  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities. 

(a)  Un-American  activities. 

(b)  The  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities,  as  a  whole  or  by  subcommittee, 
is  authorized  to  make  from  time  to  time  investigations  of  (1)  the  extent,  char- 
acter, and  objects  of  un-American  propaganda  activities  in  the  United  States, 
(2)  the  diffusion  within  the  United  States  of  subversive  and  un-American  prop- 
aganda that  is  instigated  from  foreign  countries  or  of  a  domestic  origin  and 
attacks  the  principle  of  the  form  of  government  as  guaranteed  by  our  Constitu- 
tion, and  (3)  all  other  questions  in  relation  thereto  that  would  aid  Congress 
in  any  necessary  remedial  legislation. 

The  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities  shall  report  to  the  House  (or  to  the 
Clerk  of  the  House  if  the  House  is  not  in  session)  the  results  of  any  such  investi- 
gation, together  with  such  recommendations  as  it  deems  advisable. 

For  the  purpose  of  any  such  investigation,  the  Committee  o-n  Un-American 
Activities,  or  any  subcommittee  thereof,  is  authorized  to  sit  and  act  at  such  times 
and  places  within  the  United  States,  whether  or  not  the  House  is  sitting,  has 
recessed,  or  has  adjourned,  to  hold  such  hearings,  to  require  the  attendance 
of  such  witnesses  and  the  production  of  such  books,  papers,  and  documents,  and 
to  take  such  testimony,  as  it  deems  necessary,  Subpenas  may  be  issued  under 
the  signature  of  the  chairman  of  the  committee  or  any  subcommittee,  or  by  any 
member  designated  by  any  such  chairman,  and  may  be  served  by  any  person 
designated  by  any  such  chairman  or  member. 

*>(<***** 

26.  To  assist  the  House  in  appraising  the  administration  of  the  laws  and  in 
developing  such  amendments  or  related  legislation  as  it  may  deem  necessary, 
each  standing  committee  of  the  House  shall  exercise  continuous  watchfulness 
of  the  execution  by  the  administrative  agencies  concerned  of  any  laws,  the  subject 
matter  of  which  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  such  committee;  and,  for  that 
purpose,  shall  study  all  pertinent  reports  and  data  submitted  to  the  House  by 
the  agencies  in  the  executive  branch  of  the  Government. 

VI 


We  must  realize  that  we  cannot  coexist  eternally,  for  a 
long  time.  One  of  us  must  go  to  his  grave.  We  do  not  want 
to  go  to  the  grave.  They  [meaning  Americans  and  the 
westerners]  do  not  want  to  go  to  their  grave,  either.  So 
what  can  be  done?     We  must  push  them  to  their  grave. 

Statement  by  Nikita  S.  Kln-ushchev 
in  Warsaw,  Poland,  April  1955. 
(See  p.  12.) 


VII 


THE  CRIMES  OF  KHRUSHCHEV 

SYNOPSIS 

Khrushchev — 

as  the  No.  1  Communist  official  in  the  Moscow  area  *  *  * 
sent  thousands  to  their  death,  scores  of  thousands  to  hideous 
slave-labor  camps; 

was  sent  in  1937  as  Stalin's  trusted  killer  [to  the  Ukraine]. 
His  first  move  was  to  summon  a  conference  of  the  entire 
Ukrainian  Government,  staged  as  a  social  occasion.  The 
gathering  was  surrounded  by  the  secret  pohce,  arrested  en 
masse,  and  most  of  his  "guests"  died  in  the  cellars  of  the 
Kiev  and  Moscow  secret  pohce.  When  his  two-year  Ukrain- 
ian purge  was  over,  an  estimated  400,000  had  been  killed 
and  terror  gripped  the  whole  population; 

assumed  [in  1943]  the  task  of  punishing  the  Ukrainian  people 
for  their  welcome  to  the  Germans.  This  second  or  post-war 
purge,  again  under  Khrushchev's  command,  was  if  anything 
more  bloody  and  more  horrifying  than  the  first.  Those 
liquidated,  by  exile  or  death,  ran  into  hundreds  of  thousands; 

[made]  the  final  decision  [as  No.  1  in  the  Kremlin  in  1956]  to 
unleash  the  Red  tanks  that  crushed  Hungary's  freedom  and 
Hungary's  freedom  fighters.  Our  ambassador  in  Moscow  at 
the  time  asked  Khrushchev  what  he  would  do  to  stop  the 
blood  flowing  in  Hungary.  To  which  the  master  of  the 
Kremlin  replied:  "We  will  put  in  more  troops  and  more 
troops  and  more  troops  until  we  have  finished  them."; 

[issued  the]  order  that  trapped  the  top  freedom  fighter. 
General  Maleter,  who  was  summoned  to  a  fake  conference 
under  a  flag  of  truce,  then  arrested,  and  in  due  time  killed; 

[issued  the]  order  that  lured  Nagy,  head  of  the  short-lived 
anti-Communist  government,  out  of  the  Yugoslav  Embassy 
where  he  had  found  asylum.  Though  he  had  been  assured 
immunity,  Nagy  was  arrested  and  eventually  executed. 

So  testified  Mr.  Eugene  Lyons,  a  senior  editor  of  The  Reader's 
Digest,  former  press  correspondent  stationed  in  Soviet  Russia,  student 
of  international  communism  and  biographer  of  Khrushchev,  in  the 
accompanying  consultation  with  the  Committee  on  Un-American 
Activities. 

Commenting  on  the  "peaceful  intentions"  which  Khrushchev 
professes  toward  the  free  world,  Mr.  Lyons  stated : 

They  are  worth  no  more  than  those  of  Hitler  or  Stalin. 
All  tlu-ee  talked  peace  while  making  war.  For  a  man  like 
Khrushchev,  made  in  the  image  of  Leninist  cynicism, 
"peace"  does  not  mean  what  it  does  to  normal  people.     It 

1 

46147*— 59— pt.  It— 2 


2  THE    CRIMES   OF   KHRUSHCHEV 

means  at  most  the  absence  of  major  military  operations, 
while  he  uses  all  other  methods  of  offensive  short  of  shoot- 
ing—blackmail, subversion,  infiltration,  civil  disorder,  guer- 
rilla operations — to  conquer  "the  enemy,"  meaning  us. 

Of  com'se  he  doesn't  want  a  nuclear  showdown.  He's 
not  mad.  He  is  supremely  confident  of  achieving  his  purposes 
by  other  means.  But  he  continually  rattles  his  missiles, 
exploiting  our  pacifism,  our  fears,  our  loss  of  nerve.  The 
Kremlin,  let  us  never  forget,  won  its  greatest  victories  with- 
out war,  at  a  time  when  the  free  nations  had  overwhelming 
military  superiority  and  a  monopoly  of  nuclear  power.  Their 
real  advantages  are  not  military  but  political  and  psycho- 
logical. 

Mr.  Lyons  emphasized  the  duality  of  the  Kremlin's  role  as  follows: 

*  *  *  the  Kremlin  and  Khrushchev,  as  its  current  leader, 
at  the  same  time  represent  a  conventional  government  and  a 
world  revolutionary  movement.  Wliat  the.y  do  as  a  govern- 
ment is  not  binding  on  world  communism.  Every  agreement 
with  them,  even  if  it  were  kept,  is  consequently  a  snare  and  a 
delusion. 

World  communism,  in  fact,  often  uses  such  an  agreement 
as  a  cover  for  stepped-up  activity.  Wlien  Khrushchev  visits 
a  foreign  country  or  meets  with  our  statesmen  at  summit 
meetings,  he  plays  the  role  of  a  head  of  government.  But  he 
ignores — and  we  naively  allow  him  to  ignore — his  more  im- 
portant role  as  the  head  of  a  global  revolutionary  organiza- 
tion. 

He  couldn't  call  off  that  organization  even  if  he  wished  to 
do  so,  which  he  decidedly  doesn't.  World  communism,  with 
its  open  and  underground  Commimist  Parties,  its  network  of 
false-front  organizations,  its  infiltrated  unions  and  govern- 
ments, its  para-military  formations  in  many  countries — the 
whole  colossal  machine  of  power — is  too  vast  and  too  dy- 
namic to  be  stopped  in  mid-course. 

If  ever  we  recognize  the  meaning  of  this  duality,  we  will 
also  recognize  the  futility  of  trying  "to  call  off"  the  cold  war 
and  will  begin  to  fight  it  in  earnest,  on  a  scale  and  with  the 
resom'ces  for  victory. 

The  invitation  to  Khrushchev  to  come  to  the  United  States  "amounts 
to  a  terrific  victory  for  communism,"  Mr.  Lyons  stated: 

It  amounts  to  an  acknowledgment  by  the  world's  leading 
democracy  of  the  Kremlin's  power  and  permanence.  There- 
fore it  adds  dimensions  of  prestige  to  every  Communist  group 
in  every  country. 

Being  master  propagandists,  the  Communists  understand 
the  value  of  symbols.  That  invitation  will  be  taken  by  Com- 
munists, theu'  fellow-travelers,  theu*  victims,  as  a  symbol  of 
cm-  weakness.  More,  of  our  capitulation  to  Moscow 
threats. 

For  years  Khrushchev  has  maneuvered  for  Just  such  an 
invitation.  There  were  times  when  he  would  have  paid  a 
high  price  for  it.     Now  we  have  given  it  to  him  gratis,  be- 


THE    CRI^^.IES    OF    KHRUSHCHEV  3 

cause  he  has  an  ultimatum-gun  pointed  at  our  heads  in 
Berlin.  Even  for  that  1955  summit  meeting,  Moscow  paid 
a  price:  the  withdi-awal  from  Austria.  This  time  it  is  so 
cocky  that,  far  from  restraining  its  hordes,  it  allowed  them 
to  undertake  aggressions  even  while  the  invitation  was  being 
negotiated  and  before  Khrushchev  came  to  our  country. 

I  am  referring  to  the  aggressions  against  Laos  and  India; 
to  the  stepped-up  Communist  activities  in  our  own  back- 
yard, in  the  Caribbean;  to  the  enlarged  terror  m  Tibet;  to 
the  continuing  pressures  in  the  Middle  East  and  in  Berlin. 
While  we  kid  ourselves  with  wishful  thinkmg  about  "thaws" 
and  "relaxed  tensions",  the  Communists  everywhere  are 
intensifying  their  activities. 

*  *  *  *  * 

It  amounts  to  a  body  blow  to  the  morale  of  the  resistance 
in  the  Communist  world.  It's  a  betrayal  of  the  hopes  of  the 
enemies  of  communism  within  that  world,  and  their  numbers 
can  be  counted  by  the  hundi'ed  million. 

The  announcement  of  the  invitation  was  a  day  of  gloom 
and  despair  for  nearly  the  whole  population  of  every  satellite 
country  and  for  tens  of  millions  mside  Russia  itself.  What 
has  been  under  way  in  the  Red  orbit,  ever  since  1917,  is  a 
permanent  civU  war  between  the  rulers  and  the  ruled.  Our 
duty  and  our  opportunity — in  both  of  which  we  have  failed — ■ 
is  to  take  the  side  of  the  people  against  their  oppressors.  We 
have  not  merely  been  neutral  in  that  civil  war,  but  we  have 
constantly  by  om-  policies  sided  with  the  Kremlin  agamst  its 
victims. 

In  response  to  the  contention  that  Khrushchev's  visit  to  the  United 
States  might  cause  him  to  slow  down  or  abandon  his  designs  for  world 
conquest,  Mr.  Lyons  observed: 

It's  a  childish  fairy  tale.  The  Communists  in  high  places 
are  perfectly  well  mformed  about  our  material  prosperity  and 
political  freedom.  Khrushchev  is  not  coming  here  to  confirm 
his  knowledge  of  our  strengths,  but  to  feel  out  our  weak- 
nesses. The  notion  that  he  will  be  impressed  by  our  wealth 
and  liberty  to  the  point  of  curbing  Communist  ambitions  is 
political  innocence  carried  to  extremes. 

What  disturbs  me,  and  many  other  students  of  the  Com- 
munist realities,  is  that  such  fauy  tales  reflect  a  dangerous 
ignorance  of  the  natm'e  of  communism  and  its  objectives. 
The  premise  of  such  nonsense  is  that  the  struggle  between 
the  two  worlds  is  not  really  serious — just  a  misunderstanding 
that  can  be  cleared  up  if  we  get  the  right  people  to  meet  in 
the  right  place  and  say  the  right  words.  It  assumes  that  the 
cancer  can  be  treated  with  mustard-plasters  of  good  will. 

Mr.  Lyons  summarizes  his  conclusions  as  follows: 

In  the  first  place,  the  new  Soviet  boss,  despite  his  home- 
spun exterior,  is  one  of  the  bloodiest  tyrants  extant.  He  has 
come  to  power  over  mountains  of  corpses.  Those  of  us  who 
roll  out  red  carpets  for  him  will  soon  have  red  faces. 


THE    CRIMES    OP   KHRUSHCHEV 

In  the  second  place,  the  exchange  of  visits  between  the 
heads  of  the  two  governments,  even  if  it  brings  a  few  seem- 
ingly positive  results  on  the  margins  of  the  struggle,  must 
prove  deeply  harmful  to  the  core  of  that  struggle.  It  comes 
close  to  an  acknowledgment  of  the  permanence  of  the  Com- 
munist grabs  and  undermines  the  spirit  of  resistance  inside 
the  Communist  world. 

In  the  third  place,  and  perhaps  most  importantly,  the 
great  expectations  aroused  by  the  exchange  reveal  the  tragic 
failure  of  Western  statesmen  to  recognize  the  character  and 
the  magnitude  of  the  Communist  challenge 


THE  CRIMES  OF  KHRUSHCHEV 
(Part  1) 


feiday,  september  4,  1959 

United  States  House  of  Representatives, 

Committee  on  Un-American  Activities, 

Washington,  D.C. 
consultation 

The  following  consultation  with  Mr.  Eugene  Lyons,  of  Pleasantville, 
New  York,  a  senior  editor  of  The  Reader's  Digest,  was  held  at  1 :30 
p.m.  in  Room  226,  Old  House  Office  Building,  Washington,  D.C, 
Hon.  Francis  E.  Walter  of  Pennsylvania,  Chairman  of  the  Committee 
on  Un-American  Activities,  presiding. 

Staff  member  present:  Richard  Arens,  staff  director. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you,  Mr.  Lyons,  solemnly  swear  that  the  testi- 
mony you  are  about  to  give  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and 
nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God? 

Mr.  Lyons.  I  do. 

STATEMENT  OF  EUGENE  LYONS 

Mr.  Arens.  Kindly  identify  yourself  by  name,  residence,  and 
occupation. 

Mr.  Lyons.  My  name  is  Eugene  Lyons.  I  live  at  71  Bedford 
Road,  Pleasantville,  New  York.  I  am  a  senior  editor  of  The  Reader's 
Digest. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Lyons,  would  you  kindly  give  us  a  brief  sketch  of 
your  personal  background,  perhaps  a  word  of  your  education  and  some 
highlights  of  your  career? 

Mr.  Lyons.  I  was  brought  up  in  New  York  City,  went  to  City 
College  and  then  to  Columbia  University  for  one  year  each.  Like  so 
many  youngsters  at  the  time,  just  after  World  War  I,  I  was  caught 
up  in  the  radical  movement.  While-  I  never  joined  the  Communist 
Party,  I  got  pretty  close  to  it.  By  the  middle  of  the  1920's  I  was 
working  for  the  New  York  bureau  of  Tass,  the  official  Soviet  news 
agency. 

At  the  end  of  1927  I  went  to  Moscow  as  United  Press  correspondent, 
arriving  there  early  in  1928.  I  remained  for  six  years.  That  Soviet 
sojoiu-n  cured  me  very  thoroughly  of  my  imported  pro-Soviet  senti- 
ments. I  subsequently  told  the  story  of  my  Soviet  years  in  a  book, 
Assignment  in  Utopia,  published  at  the  end  of  1937. 

Back  home,  I  did  various  types  of  journalistic  work,  and  ended 
up  by  editing  the  American  Mercury  during  the  war  years.  After 
that  I  launched  and  edited  a  magazine,  which  is  still  going,  Pageant. 
Then,  around  1946, 1  joined  the  editorial  staff  of  The  Reader's  Digest, 
with  which  I  am  still  connected. 


6  THE    CRIMES   OF   KHRUSHCHEV 

That,  more  or  less,  is  the  outhne  of  my  professional  career. 

Mr,  Arens.  Now  may  I  inquire  respecting  the  study  which  you 
have  made  of  Soviet  Russia  and  international  communism? 

Mr.  Lyons.  I  had,  of  course,  been  deeply  interested  in  communism 
and  Russia  before  I  went  to  Moscow.  There  I  learned  enough  Russian 
to  help  me  in  continuing  study  of  the  subject  when  I  returned  to  the 
United  States. 

I  have  written  a  number  of  books  on  Soviet  Russia  and  communism. 
Before  Assignment  in  Utopia,  I  had  published  Moscow  Carrousel. 
Subsequently  I  wrote  a  biography  of  Stalin  under  the  title,  Stalin: 
Czar  of  all  the  Enssias;  then  a  history  of  the  American  Communist 
movement,  The  Red  Decade,  which  carried  that  story  to  the  time  of 
publication  in  mid-1941.  My  most  recent  book  was  Our  Secret 
Allies:  The  Peoples  of  Russia. 

In  addition,  of  course,  I  have  written  literally  hundreds  of  articles 
in  this  subject  area  and  made  a  great  many  speeches  and  lectures 
on  the  subject.  Insofar  as  one  can  do  it  while  working  for  a  living, 
I  have  tried  to  keep  myself  abreast  of  developments  in  this  field. 

Mr.  Arens.  May  I  inquire  now,  have  you  made  a  study  of  the  life 
and  activities  of  Nikita  Khrushchev? 

Mr.  Lyons.  Yes.  About  the  time  when  he  was  emerging  as  a 
possible  successor  to  Stalin,  I  began  to  gather  information  about  his 
personality  and  career,  against  my  background  of  general  knowledge 
of  the  Soviet  scene. 

One  of  the  products  of  this  fairly  intensive  study  was  a  biographical 
article  about  the  man  which  appeared  in  the  September  1957  issue 
of  The  Reader's  Digest.  The  title,  which  was  intended  to  be  literal, 
not  just  rhetoric,  was:  Khrushchev,  The  Killer  in  the  Ki'emlin. 
Last  month  I  published  another  in  The  Digest,  of  an  interpretive 
nature:  The  Many  Faces  of  Nikita  Khrushchev. 

Mr.  Arens.  As  a  point  of  departure  in  our  consultation  today, 
would  you  kindly  give  us  briefly  an  outline  of  Khi'ushchev's  personal 
and  political  career? 

Mr.  Lyons.  Khrushchev  was  born  into  a  peasant-worker  family 
65  years  ago,  in  the  provmce  of  Kursk,  in  the  village  of  Kalinovka, 
close  to  the  Ukraine.  He  had  virtually  no  schoolmg  as  a  child,  and 
began  very  early  to  shift  for  himself,  as  a  shepherd  and,  when  he  got  a 
little  older,  in  various  jobs  in  the  mines  and  factories  of  the  Donbas 
region. 

There  is  no  indication  that  he  was  in  any  sense  a  revolutionary. 
But  in  1918,  the  first  year  of  the  Soviet  regime,  he  joined  the  Com- 
munist Party  and  took  part  in  the  civil  war  then  under  way.  He  was 
24  years  old. 

Lilve  so  many  half-literate  yoimg  workers  in  that  period,  he  was 
caught  up  in  a  movement  he  did  not  and  could  not  as  yet  understand. 
He  did  not  become  a  Commimist  through  study  or  soul-searching. 
It  was  an  overnight,  emotional  conversion.  His  communism  has 
remained  primitive  and  unsophisticated  ever  since. 

When  the  civil  war  was  over,  he  went  back  to  factory  work  but 
joined  the  classes  of  a  Rab-Fak,  or  workers'  school,  where  he  got 
his  first  real  schooling.  TMicn  he  graduated,  around  1925,  he  had  the 
equivalent  of  an  elementary  education. 

But  from  the  beginning  he  showed  a  talent  for  getting  ahead  in  the 
new  ruling  group.    He  became  the  party  secretary  in  the  school  and 


THE    CRIMES    OF    KHRUSHCHEV  7 

before  long  he  was  holding  similar  posts  in  several  districts,  finally  in 
a  district  in  the  capital  of  the  Ukraine,  Kiev.  Here  he  caught  the 
eye  of  the  old  Bolshevilc  who  was  then  Moscow's  proconsul  in  the 
Ukraine,  Lazar  Kaganovich,  It  was,  in  fact,  through  the  patronage 
of  Kaganovich  that  he  began  to  move  ahead  fast  as  an  "apparatchik," 
a  job-holder  in  the  party  apparatus. 

Mr.  Arens.  When  did  he  get  to  the  center  of  power,  that  is, 
Moscow? 

Mr.  Lyons.  That  was  in  1929.  For  a  couple  of  years  he  attended 
a  technical  school.  IMeanwhile  Kaganovich  had  returned  to  Moscow 
as  secretary  of  the  Moscow  provmce.  By  1932  Khrushchev  was  his 
second  secretary  or  chief  assistant;  and  in  1934,  Kaganovich  havmg 
become  Commissar  of  Raih'oads,  Khrushchev  succeeded  him  as  head 
of  the  Moscow  city  and  soon  thereafter  the  Moscow  Province  Party. 

That  meant  he  was  really  on  the  high-road  to  power — from  a 
nobody  m  a  technical  school  to  boss  of  the  most  important  provmce 
in  the  country  in  about  three  years!  Stalin  himself  was  watching 
Khrushchev  with  interest  and  approval.  In  1934  Khrushchev  be- 
came a  member  of  the  central  committee  of  the  party,  which  is  to 
say  one  of  the  70  most  unportant  Communists  in  the  country;  and 
four  years  later  he  was  made  an  alternate  member  of  the  all-powerful 
Politburo. 

Mr.  Arens.  Were  those  the  years  which  came  to  be  known  as  the 
blood  pm'ges? 

Mr.  Lyons.  They  were,  mdeed.  And  we  should  never  forget  that 
as  the  No.  1  Communist  ofhcial  in  the  Moscow  area  Khrushchev  of 
necessity  was  neck-deep  in  the  blood-letting.  He  was  responsible 
for  the  political  "pmity"  of  some  400,000  Communists  and  in  direct 
charge  of  their  purging.  His  was  the  task  of  liquidating  the  un- 
worthy, which  meant  that  he  sent  thousands  to  their  death,  scores  of 
thousands  to  hideous  slave-labor  camps. 

Moreover,  his  voice  was  among  the  loudest  in  justifying  the  blood- 
letting and  in  glorifying  Stalin.  In  a  speech  after  one  of  the  major 
pm-ge  trials,  he  exclaimed,  referring  to  the  slaughtered  victims: 

By  lifting  their  hand  against  Comrade  Stalin,  theylifted 
it  against  the  best  humanity  possesses.  For  Stalin  is  our 
hope.  He  is  the  beacon  which  guides  all  progressive  man- 
kind. Stalin  is  om-  banner!  Stalin  is  our  will!  Stalin  is 
our  victory! 

It  was  as  reward  for  his  murderous  zeal  as  a  purger  that  in  1939 
he  was  made  a  full  member  of  the  Politburo. 

The  bloodiest  and  cruelest  of  all  the  blood  purges  took  place  in  the 
Ukraine,  and  here  the  "credit"  goes  to  Khrushchev  personally.  He 
was  sent  there  in  1937  as  Stalin's  trusted  killer.  His  first  move  was 
to  summon  a  conference  of  the  enthe  Ukrainian  Government,  staged 
as  a  social  occasion.  The  gathering  was  surrounded  by  the  secret 
pohce,  arrested  en  masse,  and  most  of  his  "guests"  died  in  the  cellars 
of  the  Kiev  and  Moscow  secret  police. 

Wlien  his  two-year  Uki-ainian  purge  was  over,  an  estimated  400,000 
had  been  Idlled  and  terror  gripped  the  whole  population.  Khrushchev 
had  been  made  secretary  of  the  Ukrainian  Communist  Party,  but  in 
the  popular  mind  he  won  a  more  enduring  title,  the  Hangman  of  the 
Ukraine. 


8  THE    CRIMES   OF   KHRUSHCHEV 

Then,  in  1941,  came  the  war.  The  Soviet  peoples,  as  is  by  now 
generally  knowai,  for  the  most  part  welcomed  the  German  invaders 
as  liberators.  But  nowhere  was  their  reception  more  universal  and 
more  joyous  than  in  the  Ukraine,  as  a  reaction  to  the  horrors  its 
people  had  suffered  at  Khrushchev's  hands. 

When  the  Germans  retreated,  in  1943,  Khrushchev  returned  to  Kiev. 
He  now  assumed  the  task  of  punishing  the  Ukrainian  people  for  their 
welcome  to  the  Germans.  This  second  or  post-war  purge,  again 
under  Klirushchev's  command,  was  if  anything  more  bloody  and 
more  horrif^^ing  than  the  first.  Those  liquidated,  by  exile  or  death, 
ran  into  hundreds  of  thousands. 

In  1949  he  was  recalled  to  AIoscow  and  resumed  his  old  job  as 
secretary  or  party-boss  of  the  province.  However,  as  a  member  of  the 
Politburo  he  had  a  hand  in  all  phases  of  government  and  policy. 
He  was  b}^  this  time  one  of  the  men  closest  to,  and  most  trusted  by, 
Stalin.  It  should  be  remembered,  whatever  Khrushchev  may  say 
now,  that  only  the  true-and-tried  Stalinists,  those  who  had  no  trace 
of  squeamishness  about  mass  murder,  could  have  survived  in  a  place 
of  power.  Khrushchev  remained  alive  and  prospered  when  nearly  all 
others  around  him  were  being  mowed  down  by  terror. 

In  1953,  when  Stalin  died — or  was  murdered  by  his  comrades — 
Khrushchev  was  in  the  small  group  that  made  up  the  so-called  "col- 
lective leadership,"  Under  that  beguiling  phrase,  of  course,  there 
immediately  developed  a  fratricidal  struggle  for  power. 

The  older  men  in  the  group,  like  Molotov  and  Kaganovich,  could 
be  discounted.  The  real  contenders  were  Beria,  the  head  of  the  secret 
police,  Malenkov  and  Khrushchev.  The  entire  collective  leadership 
ganged  up  on  the  man  they  feared  most,  Beria.  They  killed  him,  and 
several  dozen  of  his  henchmen,  within  months  after  Stalin  died. 

With  Beria  eliminated,  Khrushchev  assumed  the  post  of  first  secre- 
tar}^,  which  had  been  held  by  Stalin.  In  1957,  at  one  fell  swoop,  he 
succeeded  in  expelling  Malenkov,  Molotov,  Kaganovich,  and  others 
from  all  positions  of  influence.  To  do  this  he  needed,  and  got,  the 
help  of  Marshal  Georgi  Zhukov,  the  head  of  the  armed  forces.  A 
year  later  he  rid  himself  of  Zhukov  as  well.  To  all  intents  and  pur- 
poses Soviet  Russia  was  again  under  a  one-man  dictatorship. 

It  might  be  appropriate  to  note,  now  that  we're  about  to  receive 
this  dictator  as  an  honored  guest  of  our  President,  that  in  his  hunger 
for  power  Khrushchev  did  not  spare  the  older  man  who  had  been  his 
patron  and  protector  for  some  20  years,  that  is  to  say,  Lazar  Kagano- 
vich.    Gratitude  has  no  place  in  the  Communist  code  of  conduct. 

Nor  did  the  fact  that  his  long-time  patron  had  been  a  Jew  curb 
Khrushchev's  notorious  anti-Semitism.  A  German  socialist  who  a 
year  or  two  ago  interviewed  Khrushchev — Karl  Schmid,  vice-president 
of  the  AVest  German  Reichstag — has  told  how  the  Soviet  boss  ridiculed 
Kaganovich  in  shocking  anti-Semitic  language. 

]\Ir.  Arens.  How  docs  Khrushchev  compare  as  a  person  and  as  a 
leader  with  Stalin? 

Mr.  Lyons.  Probably  history  has  never  seen  two  successive  despots 
so  different  in  their  outward  personalities.  Stalin  was  wholly  the 
introvert:  reticent,  inaccessible,  shy  with  strangers,  a  man  who  worked 
unseen  and  ruled  from  the  dark  fastnesses  of  the  Kremlin. 

Khrushchev  is  a  lusty  extrovert,  gregarious  and  garrulous,  a  mixer 
and  a  fixer.    He  likes  crowds  and  basks  in  the  spotlight.    He  is  a 


THE    CRIMES    OF   lOIRUSHCHEV  9 

consummate  actor  and  sometimes  plan's  the  buffoon.  He  travels  a 
lot.  In  the  last  two  years  he  has  received  more  foreign  politicians, 
journalists,  and  just  important  tourists  than  Stalin  had  received  in 
his  whole  lifetime. 

But  that  contrast  is  entirely  external  and  should  not  mislead  us  as 
to  the  Khrushchev  under  the  surface.  That  basic  Khrushchev  has  a 
genius  for  intrigue,  betrayal,  and  mass  homicide  as  large  as  Stalin's. 
He  is  a  fanatic  Communist,  with  a  tightly  closed  mind  on  anything 
affecting  Communist  doctrine. 

Mr.  Arens.  How,  then,  do  you  account  for  his  so-called  secret 
speech  in  February  1956,  in  which  he  exposed  Stalin's  crimes  and 
blunders? 

Mr.  Lyons.  That  speech,  which  incidentally  is  still  secret  inside 
the  Soviet  Union,  is  an  extraordinary  episode  in  Soviet  history. 
Personally,  I  am  convinced  that  it  was  forced  upon  the  new  bosses 
by  the  knowledge  that  Stalin  and  his  deeds  were  deeply  hated  by  the 
population.  It  was  an  attempt  to  divest  themselves,  so  far  as  they 
could,  of  responsibility  for  the  major  crimes  of  the  man  they  had  long 
served  and  deified. 

Even  more,  it  was  an  attempt  to  reassure  their  own  followers  that 
their  lives,  at  least,  were  safe — that  murder  would  not  be  used  as  a 
political  tool  against  top-echelon  Communists. 

Whatever  the  motivations,  it  had  an  unfortunate  effect  abroad, 
including  our  own  country,  in  that  it  threw  a  false  aura  of  modera- 
tion, almost  of  liberalism,  around  Khrushchev. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  say  "a  false  am^a,"  but  isn't  Khrushchev  more 
moderate  than  Stalin  was? 

Mr.  Lyons.  Only  outwardly.  Under  the  ebulHent  surface  he  is 
every  bit  as  blood-thirsty  and  dictatorial  as  his  dead  master.  Stalin, 
too,  didn't  begin  to  kill  his  closest  associates  until  he  had  been  in 
absolute  power  for  seven  or  eight  years.  Should  the  need  to  kill  arise, 
Khrushchev's  hand,  to  use  his  own  phrase  in  the  matter,  "will  not 
tremble." 

In  that  celebrated  speech,  bear  in  mind,  he  did  not  denounce  terror 
as  such,  but  only  what  he  considered  an  unwise  use  of  terror  by 
Stalin — its  use,  that  is,  against  "good"  Communists.  Khrushchev 
never  mentioned,  and  thus  condoned  by  silence,  Stalin's  larger  crimes 
against  the  entire  people,  the  horrors  of  enforced  collectivization,  the 
genocide  visited  upon  captive  peoples.  He  actually  approved  the 
slaughter  of  Trotskyites  and  other  devjationists  from  the  party-line. 

Far  from  ruling  out  terror,  Khrushchev  in  that  speech  reaffirmed 
its  use — quoting  Lenin  to  that  effect — "when  necessary."  In  the 
process  of  exposing  Stalin  he  thus  accepted  the  essence  of  Stalinism, 
which  is  inhumanity,  deception,  the  readiness  to  kill  and  kiU  "when 
necessary." 

Mr.  Arens.  What  is  your  judgment  of  Khrushchev's  intellectual 
capacity  and  political  ability? 

Mr.  Lyons.  Khrushchev  is  only  half-educated.  Aside  from  party 
literature,  he  probably  has  never  read  a  serious  book.  He  has  made 
no  secret  of  his  contempt  for  intellectuals.  He  rates  the  doer  above 
the  thinker,  the  practitioner  above  the  theorist. 

But  that  should  not  mislead  us  into  underrating  his  intelligence. 
Khrushchev  has  a  peasant-like  shrewdness,  a  quick  and  sharp  wit  and 
is,  in  my  opinion,  more  than  a  match  for  om-  Western  statesmen  in  the 


10  THE    CRIMES    OF   KHRUSHCHEV 

give-and-take  of  argument  or  negotiation.  In  a  way  he  enjoys  the 
advantage  of  ignorance,  in  that  he  can  make  the  most  outrageous 
statements  without  being  self-conscious  about  it. 

As  for  his  pohtical  abihties,  his  career  provides  the  obvious  answer. 
He  survived,  and  in  the  StaUn  era  that  took  consummate  skill.  Then 
he  eliminated  all  competitors,  though  most  of  them  had  believed  him 
lacking  in  the  stature  for  the  dictator's  role. 

Mr.  Arens.  Is  Khrushchev  a  dedicated  Communist  or  an  oppor- 
tunist? 

Mr.  Lyons.  It  is  hard  to  tell  in  any  successful  politician  where 
self-interest  ends  and  dedication  begins,  or  vice  versa.  Obviously  he 
is  a  great  careerist  and  opportunist.  From  the  day  he  joined  the 
ruling  party  he  labored  resolutely  to  advance  his  own  power,  until 
finally  he  reached  the  top. 

At  the  same  time,  however,  he  is  a  dedicated,  know-nothing,  fanatic 
Communist.  He  has  no  doubt  that  he  and  his  cause  are  riding  the 
wave  of  the  future,  that  capitalism  and  all  other  non-Soviet  ways  of 
life  are  doomed  to  defeat  and  extinction.  Though  flexible  enough  on 
other  things,  his  mind  closes  completely  when  these  fundamentals  of 
his  ideology  are  involved. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  have  recounted  Khrushchev's  role  in  the  Stalin 
purges,  before  and  after  the  war.  What  part  did  he  play  in  the  crush- 
ing of  the  Hungarian  revolution? 

Mr.  Lyons.  By  the  fall  of  1956,  when  the  people  of  Hungary  over- 
threw their  hated  puppet  regime,  Khrushchev  was  already  No.  1  in 
the  Kremlin.  What  happened  must  therefore  be  blamed  on  him. 
His  was  the  final  decision  to  unleash  the  Red  tanks  that  crushed 
Hungary's  freedom  and  Hungary's  freedom  fighters. 

Our  ambassador  in  Moscow  at  the  time  asked  Khrushchev  what  he 
would  do  to  stop  the  blood  flowing  in  Hungary.  To  which  the  master 
of  the  Kremlin  replied:  "We  wUl  put  in  more  troops  and  more  troops 
and  more  troops  imtil  we  have  finished  them." 

A  key  figure  in  the  Hungarian  horrors  was  the  Russian  who  carried 
out  the  punitive,  secret-police  phase.  That  was  General  Ivan  Serov, 
a  100  percent  Khrushchev  man.  For  nearly  two  decades  he  had  been 
Klirushchev's  instrument  of  terror,  the  sadist  who  carried  out  the 
Ukrainian  slaughters,  then  succeeded  Beria  as  number  one  execu- 
tioner. Serov  it  was  who  kidnapped  thousands  of  Hungarian  freedom 
fighters  who,  if  they  are  still  alive,  are  even  now  in  Russian  slave 
colonies. 

It  was  Khrushchev's  order  that  trapped  the  top  freedom  fighter. 
General  Maleter,  who  was  summoned  to  a  fake  conference  under  a 
flag  of  truce,  then  arrested,  and  in  due  time  killed.  It  was  Khru- 
shchev's order  that  lured  Nagy,  head  of  the  short-lived  anti-Communist 
government,  out  of  the  Yugoslav  Embassy  where  he  had  found  asylum. 
Though  he  had  been  assured  immunity,  Nagy  was  arrested  and 
eventually  executed. 

So  let's  have  it  clear  for  ourselves  and  for  history:  Major  guilt  for 
the  Hungarian  horrors  must  unquestionably  be  placed  on  Khru- 
shchev's shoulders. 

Mr,  Arexs.  Wliat  is  your  appraisal  of  the  "peaceful  intentions" 
which  Khrushchev  professes  toward  the  free  world? 

Mr.  Lyons.  They  are  worth  no  more  than  those  of  Hitler  or  Stalin. 
AU  thi'ee  talked  peace  while  maldng  war.    For  a  man  like  Khrushchev, 


THE    CRIMES    OF    KHRUSHCHEV  11 

made  in  the  image  of  Leninist  cynicism,  "peace"  does  not  mean  what 
it  does  to  normal  people.  It  means  at  most  the  absence  of  major 
military  operations,  while  he  uses  all  other  methods  of  offensive  short 
of  shooting — blackmail,  subversion,  infiltration,  civil  disorder,  guer- 
rilla operations — to  conquer  "the  enemy,"  meaning  us. 

Of  course  he  doesn't  want  a  nuclear  showdown.  He's  not  mad. 
He  is  supremely  confident  of  achieving  his  purposes  by  other  means. 
But  he  continually  rattles  his  missiles,  exploiting  our  pacifism,  our 
fears,  our  loss  of  nerve.  The  Kremlin,  let  us  never  forget,  won  its 
greatest  victories  without  war,  at  a  time  when  the  free  nations  had 
overwhelming  military  superiority  and  a  monopoly  of  nuclear  power. 
Their  real  advantages  are  not  military  but  political  and  psychological. 

Mr.  Arens.  How  was  it  possible  for  them  to  win  so  consistently 
despite  our  vastly  greater  strength? 

Mr.  Lyons.  It  was  possible — and  remains  possible — because  the 
non-Soviet  world  refuses  to  understand  the  nature  of  communism  and 
its  long-term  strategy.  The  Communists  are  engaged  in  what  Dr. 
Robert  Strausz-Hupe  of  Pennsylvania  University,  who  borrowed  the 
phrase  from  Mao  Tse-tung,  has  called  "protracted  conflict."  It's 
the  title  of  his  new  book  on  the  Red  master-plan. 

Protracted  conflict— what  Lenin  and  Trotsky  called  "permanent 
revolution"^ — ^means  relentless  struggle,  by  any  and  all  means,  year 
after  year.  The  weapons  used  may  change,  the  tactics  may  change, 
but  the  objective,  total  victory  for  communism  throughout  the  world, 
remains  unchanging. 

Under  this  concept  there  is  no  difference,  except  in  the  matter  of 
weapons,  between  hot  and  cold  wars.  They  are  part  of  the  same 
master-plan.  The  concept  rules  out  genuine  truce  or  genuine  coex- 
istence. Every  so-called  crisis  and  every  episode  of  negotiation  is  a 
battle  in  the  over-all  war.  Every  beguiling  slogan  and  promise  is  a 
tactic  of  deception  or  deployment. 

Once  we  understand  this,  we  will  cease  to  delude  ourselves  with 
hopes  of  some  magic  formula  or  agreement  that  will,  as  we  say, 
"end  the  cold  w^ar."  We  will  realize  that  the  cold  war  can't  be 
"ended" — it  can  only  be  won  or  lost.  The  self-delusion  reflected  in 
double-talk  about  relaxing  tensions,  breaking  the  ice,  and  so  forth,  has 
enabled  the  Communists,  even  in  times  of  their  greatest  weakness,  to 
gain  vast  victories.  Today  that  self-delusion  is  infinitely  more  danger- 
ous than  ever  before.  It  gives  Moscow  the  initiative  and  amounts  to 
a  guarantee  of  om*  defeat  by  default. 

Mr.  Arens.  Can  the  free  world  deal  with  Klu-ushchev  as  it  might 
deal  with  the  leader  of  a  free  society? 

Mr.  Lyons.  Of  com-se  not.  In  dealing  with  Khrushchev  we  face 
a  "firm  Bolshevik,"  who  by  definition  despises  truth  and  morals,  who 
rejects  our  code  of  ethics.  He  does  not  consider  himself  bound  by 
his  word  to  non-Soviet  nations,  because  they  are  "the  enemy,"  and 
it  is  merely  good  tactics  to  mislead,  confuse,  and  lie  to  an  enemy, 

Mr.  Arens.  That  helps  explain  why  Moscow  has  violated  vu'tually 
every  treaty  or  agreement  it  has  ever  entered  into. 

Mr.  Lyons.  We  have  before  us  the  pertinent  example  of  the 
summit  conference  in  Geneva  four  years  ago.  The  several  important 
agreements  reached  there  and  solemnl}^  announced  to  the  world  were 
repudiated  by  Moscow  within  months. 


12  THE    CRIMES    OF   IvHRUSHCHEV 

More  than  tliat.  Even  while  Khruslichev  and  President  Eisen- 
hower were  being  photographed  in  chummy  poses  at  Geneva,  Com- 
munist agents  were  cooking  up  an  arms  deal  with  Egypt's  Nasser 
that  has  been  calamitous  for  mankind. 

Mr.  Arens.  Is  peaceful  coexistence  with  the  Ki-emlin  a  realistic 
idea? 

Mr.  Lyoxs.  Mr.  Arens  and  gentlemen  of  the  committee,  no  more 
cynical  phrase  has  ever  been  coined.  To  us  it  means  a  true  cessation 
of  hostilities.  To  them  it  means  a  convenient  method  of  disarming  us 
psychologically,  the  better  to  pursue  the  protracted  conflict. 

Seweryn  Bialer,  a  Polish  Communist  leader  who  defected  to  the 
West,  testified  before  the  Senate  Internal  Security  Subcommittee  ^  to 
having  heard  Khrushchev  say,  in  Warsaw  in  April  1955:  "*  *  *  vve 
must  realize  that  we  cannot  coexist  eternally,  for  a  long  time.  One  of 
us  must  go  to  his  grave.  We  do  not  want  to  go  to  the  grave.  They 
[meaning  Americans  and  the  westerners]  do  not  want  to  go  to  their 
grave,  either.  So  what  can  be  done?  We  must  push  them  to  their 
grave." 

If  we  allow  ourselves  to  be  trapped  by  the  poison-bait  of  coexistence, 
they  can  "push  us"  more  easily.  We  will  drop  our  guard,  while  they 
intensify  their  depredations.  Our  memories  are  unhappily  too  short. 
We  have  forgotten  that  Stalin  in  the  middle  '30s  gave  us  a  period  of 
peaceful  existence,  under  the  flag  of  united  fronts  and  peoples  fronts. 
But  it  was  in  those  very  years  that  Moscow  industriously  deployed 
its  forces  against  our  world, 

Mr.  Arexs.  In  something  of  yours  that  I've  read  you  describe 
what  3'ou  call  the  duality  of  the  Kremlin's  role.  Would  you  care  to 
explain  it? 

Mr.  Lyons.  I  meant  that  the  Kremlin  and  Khrushchev,  as  its 
current  leader,  at  the  same  time  represent  a  conventional  government 
and  a  world  revolutionary  movement.  What  they  do  as  a  govern- 
ment is  not  binding  on  world  communism.  Every  agreement  with 
them,  even  if  it  were  kept,  is  consequently  a  snare  and  a  delusion. 

World  communism,  in  fact,  often  uses  such  an  agreement  as  a  cover 
for  stepped-up  activity.  When  Khrushchev  visits  a  foreign  country  or 
meets  with  our  statesmen  at  summit  meetings,  he  plays  the  role  of  a 
head  of  government.  But  he  ignores — and  we  naively  allow  him  to 
ignore — his  more  important  role  as  the  head  of  a  global  revolutionary 
organization. 

He  couldn't  call  off  that  organization  even  if  he  wished  to  do  so, 
which  he  decidedly  doesn't.  World  communism,  with  its  open  and 
underground  Communist  Parties,  its  network  of  false-front  organiza- 
tions, its  infiltrated  unions  and  governments,  its  para-military  forma- 
tions in  many  countries — the  whole  colossal  machine  of  power — is  too 
vast  and  too  dynamic  to  be  stopped  in  mid-com'se. 

If  ever  we  recognize  the  meanuig  of  this  duality,  we  will  also  recog- 
nize the  futility  of  trying  "to  call  oft'"  the  cold  war  and  will  begin  to 
fight  it  in  earnest,  on  a  scale  and  with  the  resources  for  victory. 

Mr.  Arexs.  In  the  com-se  of  the  next  weeks  Khrushchev  will  be  on 
American  soil  at  the  invitation  of  our  President.  Based  on  your 
background  and  experience  as  a  student  of  communism,  please 
express  yourself  with  respect  to  the  impact  that  visit  will  have  on 
the  Communist  drive  for  world  domination. 

» See  hearings  entitled  "Scope  of  Soviet  Activity  in  tlie  United  States— Part  29",  June  8, 1958. 


THE    CRIMES    OF   KHRUSHCHEV  13 

Mr.  Lyons.  The  mere  invitation,  Air.  Arens,  amounts  to  a  terrific 
victory  for  communism.  It  amounts  to  an  aclmowledgment  by  the 
world's  leading  democracy  of  the  Kremlin's  power  and  permanence. 
Therefore  it  adds  dimensions  of  prestige  to  every  Communist  group  in 
every  country. 

Being  master  propagandists,  the  Communists  understand  the  value 
of  symbols.  That  invitation  will  be  taken  by  Communists,  their 
fellow-travelers,  their  victims,  as  a  symbol  of  om"  weakness.  More, 
of  our  capitulation  to  Moscow  threats. 

For  years  Khrushchev  has  maneuvered  for  just  such  an  invitation. 
There  were  times  when  he  would  have  paid  a  high  price  for  it.  Now 
we  have  given  it  to  him  gratis,  because  he  has  an  ultimatum-gun 
pointed  at  our  heads  in  Berlin.  Even  for  that  1955  summit  meeting, 
Moscow  paid  a  price:  the  withdrawal  from  Austria.  This  time  it  is 
so  cocky  that,  far  from  restraining  its  hordes,  it  allowed  them  to 
undertake  aggressions  even  while  the  invitation  was  being  negotiated 
and  before  Khrushchev  came  to  our  country, 

I  am  referring  to  the  aggressions  against  Laos  and  India;  to  the 
stepped-up  Communist  activities  in  our  own  backyard,  in  the  Carib- 
bean; to  the  enlarged  terror  in  Tibet;  to  the  continuing  pressures  in 
the  Middle  East  and  in  Berlin.  WhUe  we  kid  ourselves  with  wishful 
thinking  about  "thaws"  and  "relaxed  tensions,"  the  Communists 
everywhere  are  intensifying  their  activities. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  wiU  be  the  effect  of  Khrushchev's  visit  on  the 
subjugated  peoples  behind  the  Iron  and  Bamboo  Curtains? 

Mr.  Lyons.  It  amounts  to  a  body  blow  to  the  morale  of  the  resist- 
ance in  the  Communist  world.  It's  a  betrayal  of  the  hopes  of  the 
enemies  of  communism  within  that  world,  and  their  numbers  can  be 
counted  by  the  hundred  million. 

The  announcement  of  the  invitation  was  a  day  of  gloom  and  despair 
for  nearly  the  whole  population  of  every  satellite  country  and  for  tens 
of  millions  inside  Russia  itself.  What  has  been  under  way  in  the  Red 
orbit,  ever  since  1917,  is  a  permanent  civil  war  between  the  rulers  and 
the  ruled.  Our  duty  and  om*  opportunity — in  both  of  which  we  have 
failed — is  to  take  the  side  of  the  people  against  their  oppressors.  We 
have  not  merely  been  neutral  in  that  civil  war,  but  we  have  constantly 
by  our  policies  sided  with  the  Kremlin  against  its  victims. 

A  future  historian  will  face  a  strange  paradox  when  he  comes  to  the 
year  1959:  in  July,  he  will  note,  om*  Congress  and  President  called 
upon  the  American  people  to  pray  for  the  captive  nations;  in  Septem- 
ber those  people  vv^ere  called  upon  to  do  honor  to  the  head  of  the  mob 
that  holds  those  nations  in  captivity! 

Try  to  see  the  Khrushchev  visit  through  the  eyes  of  Hungarians 
or  Poles  or  East  Germans  or  through  the  eyes  of  our  secret  allies  inside 
Russia  proper.  To  them,  I  repeat,  it  must  look  like  a  bewildering 
betrayal  by  the  country  to  which  their  hopes  are  tied. 

Mr.  Arens.  Well  now,  Mr.  Lyons,  it  is  contended  that  when 
Khrushchev,  after  being  dined  and  wined  in  the  White  House  and 
elsewhere,  sees  our  material  wealth  and  industrial  plants,  he  wUl 
change  his  mind  and  abandon  designs  for  world  conquest,  or  at  least 
slow  them  down.    What  is  your  reaction  to  that  contention? 

Mr.  Lyons.  It's  a  childish  fairy  tale.  The  Communists  in  high 
places  are  perfectly  well  informed  about  our  material  prosperity  and 


14  THE    CRIMES    OF    KHRUSHCHEV 

political  freedom.  Khrushchev  is  not  coming  here  to  confirm  his 
knowledge  of  our  strengths,  but  to  feel  out  our  weaknesses.  The  notion 
that  he  will  be  impressed  by  our  wealth  and  liberty  to  the  pomt  of 
curbing  Communist  ambitions  is  political  innocence  carried  to 
extremes. 

What  disturbs  me,  and  many  other  students  of  the  Communist 
realities,  is  that  such  fairy  tales  reflect  a  dangerous  ignorance  of  the 
nature  of  communism  and  its  objectives.  The  premise  of  such  non- 
sense is  that  the  struggle  between  the  two  worlds  is  not  really  serious — 
just  a  misunderstanding  that  can  be  cleared  up  if  we  get  the  right 
people  to  meet  in  the  right  place  and  say  the  right  words.  It  assumes 
that  the  cancer  can  be  treated  with  mustard-plasters  of  good  will. 

But  it  happens,  Mr.  Arens  and  gentlemen  of  the  committee,  that  the 
struggle  is  real,  the  issues  too  profound  to  yield  to  pleasant  talk. 
Should  some  trifling  Soviet  gesture  come  from  the  visit,  the  kind  of 
thing  we  will  eagerly  label  as  a  concession,  the  results  can  be  even  more 
disastrous.  In  our  great  joy  and  relief,  we  will  drop  vigilance  and 
open  all  roads  to  easy  Communist  conquests. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  gather  that  you  consider  the  invitation  a  mistake? 

Mr.  Lyons.  It  begins  as  a  mistake.  But  if  the  American  people 
turn  Klu'ushchev's  visit  into  a  triumphal  march  across  our  continent, 
the  mistake  will  become  a  catastrophe.  For  one  thing,  it  would  be  a 
signal  for  all  the  neutralists  so-called,  for  all  the  fence-sitters  and 
doubters,  to  join  the  Communist  side.  For  them  and  for  millions  of 
others,  it  will  confirm  the  wave-of-the-future  view  of  communism. 

Moreover,  even  for  our  friends  in  the  free  world,  it  will  seem  to  be 
proof  of  our  political  immaturity.  They  will  see  in  it  our  failure  to 
grasp  the  historical  process  of  our  times,  our  pathetic  anxiety  to  find 
an  easy  answer  and  an  alibi  for  inaction. 

The  Soviet  empire — 900  million  strong,  subjugated  and  led  by  some 
33  million  Communists — is  totally  and  irrevocably  committed  to  one 
Communist  world.  They  are  engaged  in  a  war,  whether  there  is 
shooting  and  bombing  or  not,  which  they  could  not  abandon  without 
ceasing  to  be  Communists.  A  momentary  retreat  for  purely  tactical 
reasons  is  conceivable.  But  it  would  be  utterly  meaningless,  since  it 
w^ould  leave  the  larger  struggle  unresolved.  In  the  final  analysis  it 
would  boomerang  against  us  by  lulling  us  into  a  false  sense  of  safety. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  is  your  estimate  of  the  phrase  we  hear  so  much 
these  days,  "reducing  tensions"? 

Mr.  Lyons.  The  Communists  don't  want  to  reduce  them.  Since 
every  one  of  those  tensions  is  of  their  own  manufacture,  they  could 
reduce  or  eliminate  them  at  will.  On  the  contrary,  they  need  those 
tensions — that's  why  they  create  them  in  the  first  place. 

And  from  our  own  angle,  the  illusion  of  reduced  tensions  could  be 
fatal.  What  we  need  is  a  greater  awareness  of  those  tensions  and 
their  implications,  to  the  point  where  we  will  have  no  alternative  but 
to  acknowledge  them  and  to  deal  with  them  courageously.  One  can 
lessen  pain  by  taking  a  sedative,  but  it  leaves  the  disease  itself  un- 
touched. Our  present  eagerness  to  find  sedatives  condemns  us  to 
suffering  the  unchecked  ravages  of  the  disease  of  world  communism, 

Mr,  Arens.  Would  you  care  to  express  yourself  with  respect  to 
the  other  side  of  the  coin,  namely,  the  visits  of  free-world  leaders  to 
the  Ki'cmliu? 


THE    CRIMES    OF   KHRUSHCHEV  15 

Mr.  Lyons.  !My  view  is  implicit  in  what  I  have  said  about  the 
permanent  civil  war  between  the  rulers  and  the  ruled  in  the  Com- 
munist world.  The  fact  that  a  President  of  the  United  States  or  a 
Prime  Minister  of  Great  Britain  makes  the  journey  to  Moscow  can 
bring  only  heartbreak  and  despair  to  those  who  dream  of  freedom. 

The  spectacle  of  top  leaders  of  the  free  world  in  the  role  of  guests  of 
despots  and  killers  must  shake  the  faith  of  our  secret  friends  and 
allies  in  our  professions  of  freedom  and  justice.  In  the  present  case, 
the  very  fact  that  the  President  has  so  long  avoided  this  type  of  ex- 
change, despite  Moscow's  m-ging,  has  placed  a  higher  value  on  it. 
The  fact  that  he  has  finally  consented,  despite  the  arrogance  and 
intransigeance  of  Khrushchev,  gives  it  every  appearance  of  an  act 
of  despPwir,  of  a  capitulation. 

Mr.  Aeens.  Based  on  your  background  and  experience  as  a  student 
of  international  communism,  tell  this  committee,  Mr.  Lyons,  how 
late  it  is  now  on  the  Communist  timetable  for  world  domination. 

Mr.  Lyons.  Later,  much  later,  than  most  people  think.  I  recall 
talldng  to  audiences  before  the  last  war.  When  I  said  that  the  Com- 
munists are  aiming  to  dominate  the  world,  I  am  sm-e  my  listeners 
thought  I  was  exaggerating,  indulging  in  rhetoric.  Yet  here  we  are, 
so  soon  after  as  history  runs,  with  one-thu'd  of  the  human  race  already 
in  the  Communist  straitjacket!  With  extensions  of  Communist 
power,  through  its  parties  and  false-fronts  and  imdergrounds,  deep 
in  the  flesh  of  every  other  nation,  whether  free  or  neutral  or  un- 
committed! 

Only  the  blind  can  fail  to  see  how  fast  Asia  and  Africa  are  being 
subverted,  where  they  cannot  be  taken  by  frontal  assault.  Only  the 
deluded  can  fail  to  see  the  contagion  spreading  in  Latin  America,  in 
the  Near  East,  in  Indonesia,  and  nearly  everywhere  else. 

Timetable?  I  doubt  that  the  Ivi-emlin  has  one  in  any  literal  sense. 
All  that  it  is  doing,  however,  was  clearly  planned  and  publicly  an- 
nounced in  Communist  documents  these  40  years  and  more.  They 
dared  to  make  their  plans  public  because  they  counted  on  our  refusal 
to  believe  them.  Even  yet  we  kid  om'selves  with  fantasies  about 
live-and-let-live  agreements,  though  our  doom  is  clearly  spelled  out 
in  Communist  resolutions. 

The  Communists  do  not  need  physically  to  take  over  the  world  in 
order  to  control  and  exploit  it.  They  merely  need  to  isolate  then- 
main  opponent,  the  United  States,  to  the  point  where  we  have  to  take 
orders  from  Moscow — or  else.  They  prefer  to  take  over  the  industrial 
complex  developed  in  freedom  by  fre'e  men  intact,  rather  than  in  a 
heap  of  nuclear  rubble. 

Mr.  Aeens.  Mr.  Lyons,  you  have,  in  my  humble  judgment, 
diagnosed  the  disease  and  revealed  our  fallacies  in  our  attempts  to 
treat  the  disease.     What  remedy  do  you  suggest? 

Mr.  Lyons.  I  wish  I  had  an  easy  remedy  to  prescribe.  Those  I  see 
are  the  opposite  of  easy.  They  call  for  a  complete  revision  of  our 
thinking  on  the  subject  and,  then,  a  readiness  for  sacrifice  and  risk. 

There  can,  as  I  view  it,  be  no  hope  of  saving  our  world  until  we  have 
a  clear-headed  understanding  of  the  character  and  the  permanence  of 
the  Communist  challenge.  Then  we  will  gi-asp  that  the  struggle  is 
not  subject  to  compromise — that  the  Communists  are  right  when  they 
insist  that  one  or  the  other  of  the  contending  worlds  must  be  totally 


16  THE    CRIMES    OF   KHRUSHCHEV 

defeated  and,  as  Khrushchev  put  it,  "buried."  Only  on  the  basis  of 
such  understanding  can  we  begin  to  develop  a  strategy  for  protracted 
conflict  of  our  own. 

We  will  then  cease  to  regard  every  new  crisis  as  a  separate  challenge, 
but  will  deal  with  it  as  a  part  of  the  all-embracing  struggle.  What's 
more,  we  will  confront  the  enemy  with  crises  instead  of  waiting  inertly 
until  the  next  threat  comes.  We  will  carry  the  cold  war  to  the 
Communist  orbit  and  not,  as  now,  limit  it  always  to  our  side  of  the 
curtains. 

Above  all,  we  will  then  renounce  the  consolations  of  wishful  thinking 
and  patent-medicine  cures.  We  will  know  at  last  that  the  contest 
between  freedom  and  slavery  is  too  big  to  be  resolved  with  a  little 
good  will,  some  exchanges  of  visits,  settlements  that  settle  nothing 
because  they  leave  the  underlying  struggle  unafi'ected. 

Mr.  Arens.  Perhaps  some  other  leader,  coming  after  Khrushchev, 
will  find  what  has  been  called  a  modus  vivendi? 

Mr.  Lyons.  I  have  never  joined  in  the  journalistic  parlor  game  of 
musical  chairs  in  the  Kremlin,  or  "who  will  succeed  whom?"  The 
differences  between  Comrade  X  or  Comrade  Y  may  affect  the  trim- 
mings of  the  permanent  conflict  but  not  its  historical  essence. 

I  believe  that  we  would  be  essentially  in  the  same  position  if 
Malenkov,  Bcria,  or  Molotov  were  dictator  instead  of  Khrushchev. 
The  Communist  machine  is  by  this  time  too  strong  to  depend  on  the 
personality  of  its  operator. 

Our  strange  preoccupation  with  personalities  has  tended  to  obscure 
the  reality  of  the  continuing  menace.  It  reflects  a  desperate  hope  of 
some  miracle  that  will  relieve  us  of  the  unpleasant  necessity  of  facing 
up  to  the  challenge.  That  soporific  hope,  indeed,  explains  our  re- 
peated orgies  of  illogical  optunism. 

We  indulged  in  such  an  orgy  in  the  middle  1930's.  It  takes  an  effort 
of  memory  to  recall  that  nearly  everyone  then  believed  that  Stalin 
was  a  moderate  man,  concerned  only  with  industrializing  his  own 
country.  He  was  through,  we  said,  with  the  nonsense  of  world  revo- 
lution. We  gave  that  as  our  excuse  for  providing  the  machines  and 
the  know-how  and  the  trained  manpower  without  which  the  first 
Five- Year  Plans  would  never  have  taken  off  the  ground. 

Mr.  Arens.  And  we  had  another  such  orgy,  didn't  we,  in  the  war 
years,  when  Soviet  Russia  was  listed  among  the  freedom-loving  and 
peace-loving  nations? 

Mr.  Lyons.  Quite  so.  It  was  on  that  assumption  that,  having 
saved  the  Soviets  from  defeat  at  Hitler's  hands,  we  proceeded  to  turn 
over  to  Stalin  all  of  Eastern  Europe  and  large  slices  of  Asia.  Hadn't 
he  joined  the  United  Nations?  Hadn't  he  gone  along  with  our 
rhetoric  of  Four  Freedoms?  As  compensation  to  Russia  for  remain- 
ing a  good  member  of  the  family  of  nations,  we  handed  over  to  Com- 
munist slavery  more  than  a  hundred  million  East  Europeans,  including 
some  who  had  been  our  gallant  allies. 

After  the  death  of  Stalin  there  was  another  major  orgy  of  optimism. 
Who  can  recall  without  blushing  our  excitement  and  joy  over  the 
supposed  New  Look  and  Smiling  Diplomacy? 

Today,  alas,  we  are  once  more  riding  a  tide  of  self-induced  optimism. 
And  now,  as  then,  the  only  certainties  arc  disappointment,  frustration, 
defeat  by  default. 

Mr.  Arens.  You,  I  take  it,  are  not  among  the  optimists? 


THE    CRIMES    OF    KHRUSHCHEV  17 

Mr,  Lyons.  I  have  said  nothing  today  that  I  have  not,  in  one  form 
or  another,  said  before  or  written  in  books  and  articles.  In  the  nature 
of  the  case  I  have  been  branded  a  pessimist,  lacking  faith  in  our 
country  and  civilization.  I  suppose  that  the  doctor  who  diagnoses 
cancer  instead  of  calling  it  a  pimple  is  likewise  regarded  as  a  pessimist. 
!  But  consider  the  facts.  When  I  began,  in  my  humble  way,  to  try 
to  alert  my  countrymen  to  the  menace  of  communism  about  a  quarter 
of  a  century  ago,  there  were  170  million  people  under  the  iron  heel  of 
communism.  Today  there  are  close  to  a  billion.  I  would  say,  in  all 
conscience,  that  my  pessimism  has  not  been  entirely  unjustified. 

Mr.  Arens.  Are  there  not,  Mr.  Lyons,  any  encouraging  elements 
in  the  otherwise  gloomy  picture? 

Mr.  Lyons.  I  believe  there  are. 

Mr.  Arens.  What,  for  instance? 

Mr.  Lyons.  One,  in  my  judgment,  is  that  the  American  people  do 
instinctively  recognize  the  natm-e  of  the  Communist  threat.  I  have 
had  occasion  in  the  past  year  to  address  audiences  in  several  parts  of 
the  country,  people  fau'ly  close  to  the  grassroots  of  their  communi- 
ties. They  seemed  to  understand  the  Communist  challenge  more 
dearly,  with  less  self-delusion,  than  those  in  positions  of  power  in  our 
own  country  and  other  free  nations. 

I  believe,  therefore,  that  if  we  are  fortunate  enough  to  find  leaders 
with  the  courage  and  clear-headedness  necessary  to  deal  with  the 
Communist  challenge,  the  people  will  follow  them. 

Mr,  Arens.  I,  too,  have  met  such  audiences  and  agi-ee  with  your 
judgment.     What  other  element  of  hope  do  you  see? 

Mr.  Lyons.  The  primary  fact,  if  only  we  acknowledged  it  and  used 
it,  is  that  after  40  years  of  absolute  power,  during  which  the  Soviet 
regime  applied  unlimited  physical  and  mental  terror,  it  has  failed  to 
achieve  what  the  political  scientists  call  "legitimacy."  The  regime, 
that  is  to  say,  cannot,  like  normal  governments,  count  on  the  auto- 
matic allegiance  and  obedience  of  its  subjects. 

Those  of  om*  countrymen  who  announce,  after  a  two-  or  four-week 
tour  of  Russia,  that  its  people  are  firmly  behind  its  dictatorship,  have 
yet  to  explain  why  the  Kremlin  continues  to  depend  on  force  and 
incessant  propaganda,  rather  than  on  the  free  consent  of  the  people. 
Why,  if  the  people  support  the  regime,  is  there  need  for  maintaining 
history's  largest  and  most  ruthless  secret-police  establishment?  Wliy 
does  the  Kremlin  continue  to  make  it  a  capital  crime  for  its  supposedly 
loyal  citizens  to  try  to  leave  the  country  without  permission?  Why, 
if  the  people  are  already  sold  on  it,  does  the  regime  continue  to  train 
and  support  literally  hundreds  of  thousands  of  full-time  "agitators" 
to  sell  the  system? 

Even  a  totalitarian  government  does  not  assign  major  portions  of 
its  budget,  manpower,  brains,  and  energy  to  internal  secm-ity  unless 
it  feels  itself  seriously  insecure.  One  can  judge  an  ailment  from  the 
medicine;  and  in  Soviet  Russia  the  medicine,  in  this  the  forty-second 
year  of  Soviet  dictatorship,  is  still  terror,  intimidation,  and  unlimited 
thought  control. 

Mr.  Arens.  Do  I  detect  in  what  you've  said  some  skepticism  about 
the  reports  on  Russia  being  brought  home  by  American  tom'ists  to 
that  country? 

Mr.  Lyons.  Skepticism  is  a  mild  word  for  how  I  feel  a,bout  it. 
Now  and  then,  of  course,  the  tourist  does  bring  back  some  fragments 


18  THE    CRIMES    OF    KHRUSHCHEV 

of  truth,  especially  in  relation  to  his  own  field  of  competence.  But 
these  morsels  are  few  and  far  between.  Besides,  the  home  folks  can 
hardly  be  expected  to  separate  the  rare  grains  of  truth  from  the 
mountain  of  chaff. 

In  the  forthcoming  October  issue  of  The  Reader's  Digest  I  have  an 
article  entitled  "One  Trip  to  Russia  Doesn't  Make  an  Expert."  I  ex- 
press my  judgment  that  the  new  surge  of  tourist  traffic  to  the  U.S.S.R. 
is  confusing,  rather  than  clarifying,  our  image  of  that  country.  Tlie 
most  mischievous  of  the  findings  of  these  quickie  experts,  as  I  see  it, 
is  to  the  eft'ect  that  the  Soviet  peoples  have  come  to  love  their  chains. 

Even  if  the  finding  were  true,  a  few  days  or  weeks  in  Russia  would 
hardly  suffice  to  prove  it.  I  venture  to  say  that  the  same  people, 
had  they  visited  Hungary  and  Poland  in  the  year  or  two  before  the 
uprisings  in  those  countries,  ^vould  not  have  become  aw\are  of  the 
coming  events.  In  a  police  state  the  explosive  stuff  of  popular  dis- 
content is  always  deep  under  the  surface.  I  can  testify  from  close-up 
experience  that  it  takes  years  of  living  among  the  Kremlin's  helpless 
subjects  to  begin  to  sense  how  they  really  feel. 

Mr.  Arens.  Would  you  sum  up  briefly  your  judgment  of  Khru- 
shchev and  his  impending  visit? 

Mr.  Lyons.  I'll  try.  In  the  first  place,  the  new  Soviet  boss, 
despite  his  homespun  exterior,  is  one  of  the  bloodiest  tyrants  extant. 
He  has  come  to  power  over  mountains  of  corpses.  Those  of  us  who 
roll  out  red  carpets  for  him  will  soon  have  red  faces. 

In  the  second  place,  the  exchange  of  visits  between  the  heads  of 
the  two  governments,  even  if  it  brings  a  few  seemingly  positive  results 
on  the  margins  of  the  struggle,  must  prove  deeply  harmful  to  the 
core  of  that  struggle.  It  comes  close  to  an  acknowledgment  of  the 
permanence  of  the  Communist  grabs  and  undermines  the  spirit  of 
resistance  inside  the  Communist  world. 

In  the  third  place,  and  perhaps  most  importantly,  the  great  ex- 
pectations aroused  by  the  exchange  reveal  the  tragic  failure  of  West- 
ern statesmen  to  recognize  the  character  and  the  magnitude  of  the 
Communist  challenge. 

Mr.  Walter.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Lyons. 

(Thereupon,  at  3:05  p.m.,  Friday,  Septe"aber  4,  1959,  the  consul- 
tation was  concluded.) 


INDEX. 


Individuals  Page 

Beria  (Lavrenti) 8,  10,  16 

Bialer,  Sewervn 12 

Eisenhower  (Dwight  D.)- 12,  13,  15 

Hitler  (Adolf) 1,  10,  16 

Kaganovieh,  Lazar 7,  8 

Khrushchev,  Nikita 1-3,  6-18 

Lenin  (V.  I.) 9,  11 

Lyons,  Eugene 1-3,  5-18  (statement) 

Malenkov  (Georgi) 8,  16 

Maleter  (Pal) 1,  10 

Mao  Tse-tung__ 11 

Molotov  (V.  M.) 8,  16 

Nagy  (Imre) 1,  10 

Nasser  (Gamal  Abdel) 12 

Schmid,  Karl 8 

Serov,  Ivan 10. 

StaUn  (Josef) 1,  6-10,  12,  16 

Strausz-Hup6,  Robert 11 

Trotsky  (Leon) _ 11 

Zhuko V,  Georgi -  8 

Organizations 

Communist  Party,  Soviet  Union: 

Central  Committee 7 

Moscow  Province  Pa'ty 7 

Politburo. 7 

Communist  Party,  Ukraine 7 

Header's  Digest,  The  (magazine) 1,  5 

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