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Full text of "The crimes of Khrushchev"

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THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

PART 1-7 






,.0 



CONSULTATION WITH 
Mr. Eugene Lyons 

SEPTEMBER 4, 1959 



COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 




(INCLUDING INDEX) 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Un-American Activities 



UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
46147° WASHINGTON : 1959 



PUBLIC- 



COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 
United States House of Representatives 

FRANCIS E. WALTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

MORGAN M. MOULDER, Missouri DONALD L. JACKSON, California 

CLYDE DOYLE, California GORDON H. SCHERER, Ohio 

EDWIN E. WILLIS, Louisiana WILLIAM E. MILLER, New York 

WILLIAM M. TUCK, Virginia AUGUST E. JOHANSEN, Michigan 

Richard Arens, Staff Director 

U 



CONTENTS 



Page 
Synopsis 1 

March 26, 1959: Testimony of Mr. Eugene Lyons 5 

Index.. i. 

Ill 







'ot. 



y Vj /J Cj 



Public Law 601, 79th Congress 

The legislation under which the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities operates is PubHc Law 601, 79th Congress [1946], chapter 
753, 2d session, which provides: 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 
of America in Congress assembled, * * * 

PART 2— RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Rule X 

SEC. 121. STANDING COMMITTEES 
 ♦***♦♦ 

18, Committee on Un-Am.erican Activities, to consist of nine Members. 

Rule XI 

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES 

m ***** * 

(q) (1) Committee on Un-American Activities. 

(A) Un-American activities. 

(2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommit- 
tee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, 
character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, 
(ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propa- 
ganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks 
the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and 
(iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary 
remedial legislation. 

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the 
Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investi- 
gation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable. 

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American 
Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such 
times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, 
has recessed, or has adjourned, to bold such hearings, to require the attendance 
of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and 
to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under 
the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any 
member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person 
designated by any such chairman or member. 

******* 

Rule XII 

LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT BY STANDING COMMITTEES 

Sec. 136. To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws 
and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem neces- 
sary, each standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives 
shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative 
agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdic- 
tion of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports 
and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of 
the Government. 



RULES ADOPTED BY THE 86TH CONGRESS 

House Resolution 7, January 7, 1959 

• **«*•• 

Rule X 

STANDING COMMITTEES 

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Con- 
gress, 

f ***** * 

(q) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members. 
*•****• 

Rule XI 

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES 
******* 

18. Committee on Un-American Activities. 

(a) Un-American activities. 

(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, 
is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, char- 
acter, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, 
(2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American prop- 
aganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and 
attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitu- 
tion, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress 
in any necessary remedial legislation. 

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the 
Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investi- 
gation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable. 

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee o-n Un-American 
Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times 
and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has 
recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance 
of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and 
to take such testimony, as it deems necessary, Subpenas may be issued under 
the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any 
member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person 
designated by any such chairman or member. 

*>(<***** 

26. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in 
developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, 
each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness 
of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject 
matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that 
purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by 
the agencies in the executive branch of the Government. 

VI 



We must realize that we cannot coexist eternally, for a 
long time. One of us must go to his grave. We do not want 
to go to the grave. They [meaning Americans and the 
westerners] do not want to go to their grave, either. So 
what can be done? We must push them to their grave. 

Statement by Nikita S. Kln-ushchev 
in Warsaw, Poland, April 1955. 
(See p. 12.) 



VII 



THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

SYNOPSIS 

Khrushchev — 

as the No. 1 Communist official in the Moscow area * * * 
sent thousands to their death, scores of thousands to hideous 
slave-labor camps; 

was sent in 1937 as Stalin's trusted killer [to the Ukraine]. 
His first move was to summon a conference of the entire 
Ukrainian Government, staged as a social occasion. The 
gathering was surrounded by the secret pohce, arrested en 
masse, and most of his "guests" died in the cellars of the 
Kiev and Moscow secret pohce. When his two-year Ukrain- 
ian purge was over, an estimated 400,000 had been killed 
and terror gripped the whole population; 

assumed [in 1943] the task of punishing the Ukrainian people 
for their welcome to the Germans. This second or post-war 
purge, again under Khrushchev's command, was if anything 
more bloody and more horrifying than the first. Those 
liquidated, by exile or death, ran into hundreds of thousands; 

[made] the final decision [as No. 1 in the Kremlin in 1956] to 
unleash the Red tanks that crushed Hungary's freedom and 
Hungary's freedom fighters. Our ambassador in Moscow at 
the time asked Khrushchev what he would do to stop the 
blood flowing in Hungary. To which the master of the 
Kremlin replied: "We will put in more troops and more 
troops and more troops until we have finished them."; 

[issued the] order that trapped the top freedom fighter. 
General Maleter, who was summoned to a fake conference 
under a flag of truce, then arrested, and in due time killed; 

[issued the] order that lured Nagy, head of the short-lived 
anti-Communist government, out of the Yugoslav Embassy 
where he had found asylum. Though he had been assured 
immunity, Nagy was arrested and eventually executed. 

So testified Mr. Eugene Lyons, a senior editor of The Reader's 
Digest, former press correspondent stationed in Soviet Russia, student 
of international communism and biographer of Khrushchev, in the 
accompanying consultation with the Committee on Un-American 
Activities. 

Commenting on the "peaceful intentions" which Khrushchev 
professes toward the free world, Mr. Lyons stated : 

They are worth no more than those of Hitler or Stalin. 
All tlu-ee talked peace while making war. For a man like 
Khrushchev, made in the image of Leninist cynicism, 
"peace" does not mean what it does to normal people. It 

1 

46147*— 59— pt. It— 2 



2 THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

means at most the absence of major military operations, 
while he uses all other methods of offensive short of shoot- 
ing—blackmail, subversion, infiltration, civil disorder, guer- 
rilla operations — to conquer "the enemy," meaning us. 

Of com'se he doesn't want a nuclear showdown. He's 
not mad. He is supremely confident of achieving his purposes 
by other means. But he continually rattles his missiles, 
exploiting our pacifism, our fears, our loss of nerve. The 
Kremlin, let us never forget, won its greatest victories with- 
out war, at a time when the free nations had overwhelming 
military superiority and a monopoly of nuclear power. Their 
real advantages are not military but political and psycho- 
logical. 

Mr. Lyons emphasized the duality of the Kremlin's role as follows: 

* * * the Kremlin and Khrushchev, as its current leader, 
at the same time represent a conventional government and a 
world revolutionary movement. Wliat the.y do as a govern- 
ment is not binding on world communism. Every agreement 
with them, even if it were kept, is consequently a snare and a 
delusion. 

World communism, in fact, often uses such an agreement 
as a cover for stepped-up activity. Wlien Khrushchev visits 
a foreign country or meets with our statesmen at summit 
meetings, he plays the role of a head of government. But he 
ignores — and we naively allow him to ignore — his more im- 
portant role as the head of a global revolutionary organiza- 
tion. 

He couldn't call off that organization even if he wished to 
do so, which he decidedly doesn't. World communism, with 
its open and underground Commimist Parties, its network of 
false-front organizations, its infiltrated unions and govern- 
ments, its para-military formations in many countries — the 
whole colossal machine of power — is too vast and too dy- 
namic to be stopped in mid-course. 

If ever we recognize the meaning of this duality, we will 
also recognize the futility of trying "to call off" the cold war 
and will begin to fight it in earnest, on a scale and with the 
resom'ces for victory. 

The invitation to Khrushchev to come to the United States "amounts 
to a terrific victory for communism," Mr. Lyons stated: 

It amounts to an acknowledgment by the world's leading 
democracy of the Kremlin's power and permanence. There- 
fore it adds dimensions of prestige to every Communist group 
in every country. 

Being master propagandists, the Communists understand 
the value of symbols. That invitation will be taken by Com- 
munists, theu' fellow-travelers, theu* victims, as a symbol of 
cm- weakness. More, of our capitulation to Moscow 
threats. 

For years Khrushchev has maneuvered for Just such an 
invitation. There were times when he would have paid a 
high price for it. Now we have given it to him gratis, be- 



THE CRI^^.IES OF KHRUSHCHEV 3 

cause he has an ultimatum-gun pointed at our heads in 
Berlin. Even for that 1955 summit meeting, Moscow paid 
a price: the withdi-awal from Austria. This time it is so 
cocky that, far from restraining its hordes, it allowed them 
to undertake aggressions even while the invitation was being 
negotiated and before Khrushchev came to our country. 

I am referring to the aggressions against Laos and India; 
to the stepped-up Communist activities in our own back- 
yard, in the Caribbean; to the enlarged terror m Tibet; to 
the continuing pressures in the Middle East and in Berlin. 
While we kid ourselves with wishful thinkmg about "thaws" 
and "relaxed tensions", the Communists everywhere are 
intensifying their activities. 

* * * * * 

It amounts to a body blow to the morale of the resistance 
in the Communist world. It's a betrayal of the hopes of the 
enemies of communism within that world, and their numbers 
can be counted by the hundi'ed million. 

The announcement of the invitation was a day of gloom 
and despair for nearly the whole population of every satellite 
country and for tens of millions mside Russia itself. What 
has been under way in the Red orbit, ever since 1917, is a 
permanent civU war between the rulers and the ruled. Our 
duty and our opportunity — in both of which we have failed —  
is to take the side of the people against their oppressors. We 
have not merely been neutral in that civil war, but we have 
constantly by om- policies sided with the Kremlin agamst its 
victims. 

In response to the contention that Khrushchev's visit to the United 
States might cause him to slow down or abandon his designs for world 
conquest, Mr. Lyons observed: 

It's a childish fairy tale. The Communists in high places 
are perfectly well mformed about our material prosperity and 
political freedom. Khrushchev is not coming here to confirm 
his knowledge of our strengths, but to feel out our weak- 
nesses. The notion that he will be impressed by our wealth 
and liberty to the point of curbing Communist ambitions is 
political innocence carried to extremes. 

What disturbs me, and many other students of the Com- 
munist realities, is that such fauy tales reflect a dangerous 
ignorance of the natm'e of communism and its objectives. 
The premise of such nonsense is that the struggle between 
the two worlds is not really serious — just a misunderstanding 
that can be cleared up if we get the right people to meet in 
the right place and say the right words. It assumes that the 
cancer can be treated with mustard-plasters of good will. 

Mr. Lyons summarizes his conclusions as follows: 

In the first place, the new Soviet boss, despite his home- 
spun exterior, is one of the bloodiest tyrants extant. He has 
come to power over mountains of corpses. Those of us who 
roll out red carpets for him will soon have red faces. 



THE CRIMES OP KHRUSHCHEV 

In the second place, the exchange of visits between the 
heads of the two governments, even if it brings a few seem- 
ingly positive results on the margins of the struggle, must 
prove deeply harmful to the core of that struggle. It comes 
close to an acknowledgment of the permanence of the Com- 
munist grabs and undermines the spirit of resistance inside 
the Communist world. 

In the third place, and perhaps most importantly, the 
great expectations aroused by the exchange reveal the tragic 
failure of Western statesmen to recognize the character and 
the magnitude of the Communist challenge 



THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 
(Part 1) 



feiday, september 4, 1959 

United States House of Representatives, 

Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington, D.C. 
consultation 

The following consultation with Mr. Eugene Lyons, of Pleasantville, 
New York, a senior editor of The Reader's Digest, was held at 1 :30 
p.m. in Room 226, Old House Office Building, Washington, D.C, 
Hon. Francis E. Walter of Pennsylvania, Chairman of the Committee 
on Un-American Activities, presiding. 

Staff member present: Richard Arens, staff director. 

The Chairman. Do you, Mr. Lyons, solemnly swear that the testi- 
mony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Lyons. I do. 

STATEMENT OF EUGENE LYONS 

Mr. Arens. Kindly identify yourself by name, residence, and 
occupation. 

Mr. Lyons. My name is Eugene Lyons. I live at 71 Bedford 
Road, Pleasantville, New York. I am a senior editor of The Reader's 
Digest. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Lyons, would you kindly give us a brief sketch of 
your personal background, perhaps a word of your education and some 
highlights of your career? 

Mr. Lyons. I was brought up in New York City, went to City 
College and then to Columbia University for one year each. Like so 
many youngsters at the time, just after World War I, I was caught 
up in the radical movement. While- I never joined the Communist 
Party, I got pretty close to it. By the middle of the 1920's I was 
working for the New York bureau of Tass, the official Soviet news 
agency. 

At the end of 1927 I went to Moscow as United Press correspondent, 
arriving there early in 1928. I remained for six years. That Soviet 
sojoiu-n cured me very thoroughly of my imported pro-Soviet senti- 
ments. I subsequently told the story of my Soviet years in a book, 
Assignment in Utopia, published at the end of 1937. 

Back home, I did various types of journalistic work, and ended 
up by editing the American Mercury during the war years. After 
that I launched and edited a magazine, which is still going, Pageant. 
Then, around 1946, 1 joined the editorial staff of The Reader's Digest, 
with which I am still connected. 



6 THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

That, more or less, is the outhne of my professional career. 

Mr, Arens. Now may I inquire respecting the study which you 
have made of Soviet Russia and international communism? 

Mr. Lyons. I had, of course, been deeply interested in communism 
and Russia before I went to Moscow. There I learned enough Russian 
to help me in continuing study of the subject when I returned to the 
United States. 

I have written a number of books on Soviet Russia and communism. 
Before Assignment in Utopia, I had published Moscow Carrousel. 
Subsequently I wrote a biography of Stalin under the title, Stalin: 
Czar of all the Enssias; then a history of the American Communist 
movement, The Red Decade, which carried that story to the time of 
publication in mid-1941. My most recent book was Our Secret 
Allies: The Peoples of Russia. 

In addition, of course, I have written literally hundreds of articles 
in this subject area and made a great many speeches and lectures 
on the subject. Insofar as one can do it while working for a living, 
I have tried to keep myself abreast of developments in this field. 

Mr. Arens. May I inquire now, have you made a study of the life 
and activities of Nikita Khrushchev? 

Mr. Lyons. Yes. About the time when he was emerging as a 
possible successor to Stalin, I began to gather information about his 
personality and career, against my background of general knowledge 
of the Soviet scene. 

One of the products of this fairly intensive study was a biographical 
article about the man which appeared in the September 1957 issue 
of The Reader's Digest. The title, which was intended to be literal, 
not just rhetoric, was: Khrushchev, The Killer in the Ki'emlin. 
Last month I published another in The Digest, of an interpretive 
nature: The Many Faces of Nikita Khrushchev. 

Mr. Arens. As a point of departure in our consultation today, 
would you kindly give us briefly an outline of Khi'ushchev's personal 
and political career? 

Mr. Lyons. Khrushchev was born into a peasant-worker family 
65 years ago, in the provmce of Kursk, in the village of Kalinovka, 
close to the Ukraine. He had virtually no schoolmg as a child, and 
began very early to shift for himself, as a shepherd and, when he got a 
little older, in various jobs in the mines and factories of the Donbas 
region. 

There is no indication that he was in any sense a revolutionary. 
But in 1918, the first year of the Soviet regime, he joined the Com- 
munist Party and took part in the civil war then under way. He was 
24 years old. 

Lilve so many half-literate yoimg workers in that period, he was 
caught up in a movement he did not and could not as yet understand. 
He did not become a Commimist through study or soul-searching. 
It was an overnight, emotional conversion. His communism has 
remained primitive and unsophisticated ever since. 

When the civil war was over, he went back to factory work but 
joined the classes of a Rab-Fak, or workers' school, where he got 
his first real schooling. TMicn he graduated, around 1925, he had the 
equivalent of an elementary education. 

But from the beginning he showed a talent for getting ahead in the 
new ruling group. He became the party secretary in the school and 



THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 7 

before long he was holding similar posts in several districts, finally in 
a district in the capital of the Ukraine, Kiev. Here he caught the 
eye of the old Bolshevilc who was then Moscow's proconsul in the 
Ukraine, Lazar Kaganovich, It was, in fact, through the patronage 
of Kaganovich that he began to move ahead fast as an "apparatchik," 
a job-holder in the party apparatus. 

Mr. Arens. When did he get to the center of power, that is, 
Moscow? 

Mr. Lyons. That was in 1929. For a couple of years he attended 
a technical school. IMeanwhile Kaganovich had returned to Moscow 
as secretary of the Moscow provmce. By 1932 Khrushchev was his 
second secretary or chief assistant; and in 1934, Kaganovich havmg 
become Commissar of Raih'oads, Khrushchev succeeded him as head 
of the Moscow city and soon thereafter the Moscow Province Party. 

That meant he was really on the high-road to power — from a 
nobody m a technical school to boss of the most important provmce 
in the country in about three years! Stalin himself was watching 
Khrushchev with interest and approval. In 1934 Khrushchev be- 
came a member of the central committee of the party, which is to 
say one of the 70 most unportant Communists in the country; and 
four years later he was made an alternate member of the all-powerful 
Politburo. 

Mr. Arens. Were those the years which came to be known as the 
blood pm'ges? 

Mr. Lyons. They were, mdeed. And we should never forget that 
as the No. 1 Communist ofhcial in the Moscow area Khrushchev of 
necessity was neck-deep in the blood-letting. He was responsible 
for the political "pmity" of some 400,000 Communists and in direct 
charge of their purging. His was the task of liquidating the un- 
worthy, which meant that he sent thousands to their death, scores of 
thousands to hideous slave-labor camps. 

Moreover, his voice was among the loudest in justifying the blood- 
letting and in glorifying Stalin. In a speech after one of the major 
pm-ge trials, he exclaimed, referring to the slaughtered victims: 

By lifting their hand against Comrade Stalin, theylifted 
it against the best humanity possesses. For Stalin is our 
hope. He is the beacon which guides all progressive man- 
kind. Stalin is om- banner! Stalin is our will! Stalin is 
our victory! 

It was as reward for his murderous zeal as a purger that in 1939 
he was made a full member of the Politburo. 

The bloodiest and cruelest of all the blood purges took place in the 
Ukraine, and here the "credit" goes to Khrushchev personally. He 
was sent there in 1937 as Stalin's trusted killer. His first move was 
to summon a conference of the enthe Ukrainian Government, staged 
as a social occasion. The gathering was surrounded by the secret 
pohce, arrested en masse, and most of his "guests" died in the cellars 
of the Kiev and Moscow secret police. 

Wlien his two-year Uki-ainian purge was over, an estimated 400,000 
had been Idlled and terror gripped the whole population. Khrushchev 
had been made secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, but in 
the popular mind he won a more enduring title, the Hangman of the 
Ukraine. 



8 THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

Then, in 1941, came the war. The Soviet peoples, as is by now 
generally knowai, for the most part welcomed the German invaders 
as liberators. But nowhere was their reception more universal and 
more joyous than in the Ukraine, as a reaction to the horrors its 
people had suffered at Khrushchev's hands. 

When the Germans retreated, in 1943, Khrushchev returned to Kiev. 
He now assumed the task of punishing the Ukrainian people for their 
welcome to the Germans. This second or post-war purge, again 
under Klirushchev's command, was if anything more bloody and 
more horrif^^ing than the first. Those liquidated, by exile or death, 
ran into hundreds of thousands. 

In 1949 he was recalled to AIoscow and resumed his old job as 
secretary or party-boss of the province. However, as a member of the 
Politburo he had a hand in all phases of government and policy. 
He was b}^ this time one of the men closest to, and most trusted by, 
Stalin. It should be remembered, whatever Khrushchev may say 
now, that only the true-and-tried Stalinists, those who had no trace 
of squeamishness about mass murder, could have survived in a place 
of power. Khrushchev remained alive and prospered when nearly all 
others around him were being mowed down by terror. 

In 1953, when Stalin died — or was murdered by his comrades — 
Khrushchev was in the small group that made up the so-called "col- 
lective leadership," Under that beguiling phrase, of course, there 
immediately developed a fratricidal struggle for power. 

The older men in the group, like Molotov and Kaganovich, could 
be discounted. The real contenders were Beria, the head of the secret 
police, Malenkov and Khrushchev. The entire collective leadership 
ganged up on the man they feared most, Beria. They killed him, and 
several dozen of his henchmen, within months after Stalin died. 

With Beria eliminated, Khrushchev assumed the post of first secre- 
tar}^, which had been held by Stalin. In 1957, at one fell swoop, he 
succeeded in expelling Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and others 
from all positions of influence. To do this he needed, and got, the 
help of Marshal Georgi Zhukov, the head of the armed forces. A 
year later he rid himself of Zhukov as well. To all intents and pur- 
poses Soviet Russia was again under a one-man dictatorship. 

It might be appropriate to note, now that we're about to receive 
this dictator as an honored guest of our President, that in his hunger 
for power Khrushchev did not spare the older man who had been his 
patron and protector for some 20 years, that is to say, Lazar Kagano- 
vich. Gratitude has no place in the Communist code of conduct. 

Nor did the fact that his long-time patron had been a Jew curb 
Khrushchev's notorious anti-Semitism. A German socialist who a 
year or two ago interviewed Khrushchev — Karl Schmid, vice-president 
of the AVest German Reichstag — has told how the Soviet boss ridiculed 
Kaganovich in shocking anti-Semitic language. 

]\Ir. Arens. How docs Khrushchev compare as a person and as a 
leader with Stalin? 

Mr. Lyons. Probably history has never seen two successive despots 
so different in their outward personalities. Stalin was wholly the 
introvert: reticent, inaccessible, shy with strangers, a man who worked 
unseen and ruled from the dark fastnesses of the Kremlin. 

Khrushchev is a lusty extrovert, gregarious and garrulous, a mixer 
and a fixer. He likes crowds and basks in the spotlight. He is a 



THE CRIMES OF lOIRUSHCHEV 9 

consummate actor and sometimes plan's the buffoon. He travels a 
lot. In the last two years he has received more foreign politicians, 
journalists, and just important tourists than Stalin had received in 
his whole lifetime. 

But that contrast is entirely external and should not mislead us as 
to the Khrushchev under the surface. That basic Khrushchev has a 
genius for intrigue, betrayal, and mass homicide as large as Stalin's. 
He is a fanatic Communist, with a tightly closed mind on anything 
affecting Communist doctrine. 

Mr. Arens. How, then, do you account for his so-called secret 
speech in February 1956, in which he exposed Stalin's crimes and 
blunders? 

Mr. Lyons. That speech, which incidentally is still secret inside 
the Soviet Union, is an extraordinary episode in Soviet history. 
Personally, I am convinced that it was forced upon the new bosses 
by the knowledge that Stalin and his deeds were deeply hated by the 
population. It was an attempt to divest themselves, so far as they 
could, of responsibility for the major crimes of the man they had long 
served and deified. 

Even more, it was an attempt to reassure their own followers that 
their lives, at least, were safe — that murder would not be used as a 
political tool against top-echelon Communists. 

Whatever the motivations, it had an unfortunate effect abroad, 
including our own country, in that it threw a false aura of modera- 
tion, almost of liberalism, around Khrushchev. 

Mr. Arens. You say "a false am^a," but isn't Khrushchev more 
moderate than Stalin was? 

Mr. Lyons. Only outwardly. Under the ebulHent surface he is 
every bit as blood-thirsty and dictatorial as his dead master. Stalin, 
too, didn't begin to kill his closest associates until he had been in 
absolute power for seven or eight years. Should the need to kill arise, 
Khrushchev's hand, to use his own phrase in the matter, "will not 
tremble." 

In that celebrated speech, bear in mind, he did not denounce terror 
as such, but only what he considered an unwise use of terror by 
Stalin — its use, that is, against "good" Communists. Khrushchev 
never mentioned, and thus condoned by silence, Stalin's larger crimes 
against the entire people, the horrors of enforced collectivization, the 
genocide visited upon captive peoples. He actually approved the 
slaughter of Trotskyites and other devjationists from the party-line. 

Far from ruling out terror, Khrushchev in that speech reaffirmed 
its use — quoting Lenin to that effect — "when necessary." In the 
process of exposing Stalin he thus accepted the essence of Stalinism, 
which is inhumanity, deception, the readiness to kill and kiU "when 
necessary." 

Mr. Arens. What is your judgment of Khrushchev's intellectual 
capacity and political ability? 

Mr. Lyons. Khrushchev is only half-educated. Aside from party 
literature, he probably has never read a serious book. He has made 
no secret of his contempt for intellectuals. He rates the doer above 
the thinker, the practitioner above the theorist. 

But that should not mislead us into underrating his intelligence. 
Khrushchev has a peasant-like shrewdness, a quick and sharp wit and 
is, in my opinion, more than a match for om- Western statesmen in the 



10 THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

give-and-take of argument or negotiation. In a way he enjoys the 
advantage of ignorance, in that he can make the most outrageous 
statements without being self-conscious about it. 

As for his pohtical abihties, his career provides the obvious answer. 
He survived, and in the StaUn era that took consummate skill. Then 
he eliminated all competitors, though most of them had believed him 
lacking in the stature for the dictator's role. 

Mr. Arens. Is Khrushchev a dedicated Communist or an oppor- 
tunist? 

Mr. Lyons. It is hard to tell in any successful politician where 
self-interest ends and dedication begins, or vice versa. Obviously he 
is a great careerist and opportunist. From the day he joined the 
ruling party he labored resolutely to advance his own power, until 
finally he reached the top. 

At the same time, however, he is a dedicated, know-nothing, fanatic 
Communist. He has no doubt that he and his cause are riding the 
wave of the future, that capitalism and all other non-Soviet ways of 
life are doomed to defeat and extinction. Though flexible enough on 
other things, his mind closes completely when these fundamentals of 
his ideology are involved. 

Mr. Arens. You have recounted Khrushchev's role in the Stalin 
purges, before and after the war. What part did he play in the crush- 
ing of the Hungarian revolution? 

Mr. Lyons. By the fall of 1956, when the people of Hungary over- 
threw their hated puppet regime, Khrushchev was already No. 1 in 
the Kremlin. What happened must therefore be blamed on him. 
His was the final decision to unleash the Red tanks that crushed 
Hungary's freedom and Hungary's freedom fighters. 

Our ambassador in Moscow at the time asked Khrushchev what he 
would do to stop the blood flowing in Hungary. To which the master 
of the Kremlin replied: "We wUl put in more troops and more troops 
and more troops imtil we have finished them." 

A key figure in the Hungarian horrors was the Russian who carried 
out the punitive, secret-police phase. That was General Ivan Serov, 
a 100 percent Khrushchev man. For nearly two decades he had been 
Klirushchev's instrument of terror, the sadist who carried out the 
Ukrainian slaughters, then succeeded Beria as number one execu- 
tioner. Serov it was who kidnapped thousands of Hungarian freedom 
fighters who, if they are still alive, are even now in Russian slave 
colonies. 

It was Khrushchev's order that trapped the top freedom fighter. 
General Maleter, who was summoned to a fake conference under a 
flag of truce, then arrested, and in due time killed. It was Khru- 
shchev's order that lured Nagy, head of the short-lived anti-Communist 
government, out of the Yugoslav Embassy where he had found asylum. 
Though he had been assured immunity, Nagy was arrested and 
eventually executed. 

So let's have it clear for ourselves and for history: Major guilt for 
the Hungarian horrors must unquestionably be placed on Khru- 
shchev's shoulders. 

Mr, Arexs. Wliat is your appraisal of the "peaceful intentions" 
which Khrushchev professes toward the free world? 

Mr. Lyons. They are worth no more than those of Hitler or Stalin. 
AU thi'ee talked peace while maldng war. For a man like Khrushchev, 



THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 11 

made in the image of Leninist cynicism, "peace" does not mean what 
it does to normal people. It means at most the absence of major 
military operations, while he uses all other methods of offensive short 
of shooting — blackmail, subversion, infiltration, civil disorder, guer- 
rilla operations — to conquer "the enemy," meaning us. 

Of course he doesn't want a nuclear showdown. He's not mad. 
He is supremely confident of achieving his purposes by other means. 
But he continually rattles his missiles, exploiting our pacifism, our 
fears, our loss of nerve. The Kremlin, let us never forget, won its 
greatest victories without war, at a time when the free nations had 
overwhelming military superiority and a monopoly of nuclear power. 
Their real advantages are not military but political and psychological. 

Mr. Arens. How was it possible for them to win so consistently 
despite our vastly greater strength? 

Mr. Lyons. It was possible — and remains possible — because the 
non-Soviet world refuses to understand the nature of communism and 
its long-term strategy. The Communists are engaged in what Dr. 
Robert Strausz-Hupe of Pennsylvania University, who borrowed the 
phrase from Mao Tse-tung, has called "protracted conflict." It's 
the title of his new book on the Red master-plan. 

Protracted conflict— what Lenin and Trotsky called "permanent 
revolution"^ — ^means relentless struggle, by any and all means, year 
after year. The weapons used may change, the tactics may change, 
but the objective, total victory for communism throughout the world, 
remains unchanging. 

Under this concept there is no difference, except in the matter of 
weapons, between hot and cold wars. They are part of the same 
master-plan. The concept rules out genuine truce or genuine coex- 
istence. Every so-called crisis and every episode of negotiation is a 
battle in the over-all war. Every beguiling slogan and promise is a 
tactic of deception or deployment. 

Once we understand this, we will cease to delude ourselves with 
hopes of some magic formula or agreement that will, as we say, 
"end the cold w^ar." We will realize that the cold war can't be 
"ended" — it can only be won or lost. The self-delusion reflected in 
double-talk about relaxing tensions, breaking the ice, and so forth, has 
enabled the Communists, even in times of their greatest weakness, to 
gain vast victories. Today that self-delusion is infinitely more danger- 
ous than ever before. It gives Moscow the initiative and amounts to 
a guarantee of om* defeat by default. 

Mr. Arens. Can the free world deal with Klu-ushchev as it might 
deal with the leader of a free society? 

Mr. Lyons. Of com-se not. In dealing with Khrushchev we face 
a "firm Bolshevik," who by definition despises truth and morals, who 
rejects our code of ethics. He does not consider himself bound by 
his word to non-Soviet nations, because they are "the enemy," and 
it is merely good tactics to mislead, confuse, and lie to an enemy, 

Mr. Arens. That helps explain why Moscow has violated vu'tually 
every treaty or agreement it has ever entered into. 

Mr. Lyons. We have before us the pertinent example of the 
summit conference in Geneva four years ago. The several important 
agreements reached there and solemnl}^ announced to the world were 
repudiated by Moscow within months. 



12 THE CRIMES OF IvHRUSHCHEV 

More than tliat. Even while Khruslichev and President Eisen- 
hower were being photographed in chummy poses at Geneva, Com- 
munist agents were cooking up an arms deal with Egypt's Nasser 
that has been calamitous for mankind. 

Mr. Arens. Is peaceful coexistence with the Ki-emlin a realistic 
idea? 

Mr. Lyoxs. Mr. Arens and gentlemen of the committee, no more 
cynical phrase has ever been coined. To us it means a true cessation 
of hostilities. To them it means a convenient method of disarming us 
psychologically, the better to pursue the protracted conflict. 

Seweryn Bialer, a Polish Communist leader who defected to the 
West, testified before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee ^ to 
having heard Khrushchev say, in Warsaw in April 1955: "* * * vve 
must realize that we cannot coexist eternally, for a long time. One of 
us must go to his grave. We do not want to go to the grave. They 
[meaning Americans and the westerners] do not want to go to their 
grave, either. So what can be done? We must push them to their 
grave." 

If we allow ourselves to be trapped by the poison-bait of coexistence, 
they can "push us" more easily. We will drop our guard, while they 
intensify their depredations. Our memories are unhappily too short. 
We have forgotten that Stalin in the middle '30s gave us a period of 
peaceful existence, under the flag of united fronts and peoples fronts. 
But it was in those very years that Moscow industriously deployed 
its forces against our world, 

Mr. Arexs. In something of yours that I've read you describe 
what 3'ou call the duality of the Kremlin's role. Would you care to 
explain it? 

Mr. Lyons. I meant that the Kremlin and Khrushchev, as its 
current leader, at the same time represent a conventional government 
and a world revolutionary movement. What they do as a govern- 
ment is not binding on world communism. Every agreement with 
them, even if it were kept, is consequently a snare and a delusion. 

World communism, in fact, often uses such an agreement as a cover 
for stepped-up activity. When Khrushchev visits a foreign country or 
meets with our statesmen at summit meetings, he plays the role of a 
head of government. But he ignores — and we naively allow him to 
ignore — his more important role as the head of a global revolutionary 
organization. 

He couldn't call off that organization even if he wished to do so, 
which he decidedly doesn't. World communism, with its open and 
underground Communist Parties, its network of false-front organiza- 
tions, its infiltrated unions and governments, its para-military forma- 
tions in many countries — the whole colossal machine of power — is too 
vast and too dynamic to be stopped in mid-com'se. 

If ever we recognize the meanuig of this duality, we will also recog- 
nize the futility of trying "to call oft'" the cold war and will begin to 
fight it in earnest, on a scale and with the resources for victory. 

Mr. Arexs. In the com-se of the next weeks Khrushchev will be on 
American soil at the invitation of our President. Based on your 
background and experience as a student of communism, please 
express yourself with respect to the impact that visit will have on 
the Communist drive for world domination. 

» See hearings entitled "Scope of Soviet Activity in tlie United States— Part 29", June 8, 1958. 



THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 13 

Mr. Lyons. The mere invitation, Air. Arens, amounts to a terrific 
victory for communism. It amounts to an aclmowledgment by the 
world's leading democracy of the Kremlin's power and permanence. 
Therefore it adds dimensions of prestige to every Communist group in 
every country. 

Being master propagandists, the Communists understand the value 
of symbols. That invitation will be taken by Communists, their 
fellow-travelers, their victims, as a symbol of om" weakness. More, 
of our capitulation to Moscow threats. 

For years Khrushchev has maneuvered for just such an invitation. 
There were times when he would have paid a high price for it. Now 
we have given it to him gratis, because he has an ultimatum-gun 
pointed at our heads in Berlin. Even for that 1955 summit meeting, 
Moscow paid a price: the withdrawal from Austria. This time it is 
so cocky that, far from restraining its hordes, it allowed them to 
undertake aggressions even while the invitation was being negotiated 
and before Khrushchev came to our country, 

I am referring to the aggressions against Laos and India; to the 
stepped-up Communist activities in our own backyard, in the Carib- 
bean; to the enlarged terror in Tibet; to the continuing pressures in 
the Middle East and in Berlin. WhUe we kid ourselves with wishful 
thinking about "thaws" and "relaxed tensions," the Communists 
everywhere are intensifying their activities. 

Mr. Arens. What wiU be the effect of Khrushchev's visit on the 
subjugated peoples behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains? 

Mr. Lyons. It amounts to a body blow to the morale of the resist- 
ance in the Communist world. It's a betrayal of the hopes of the 
enemies of communism within that world, and their numbers can be 
counted by the hundred million. 

The announcement of the invitation was a day of gloom and despair 
for nearly the whole population of every satellite country and for tens 
of millions inside Russia itself. What has been under way in the Red 
orbit, ever since 1917, is a permanent civil war between the rulers and 
the ruled. Our duty and om* opportunity — in both of which we have 
failed — is to take the side of the people against their oppressors. We 
have not merely been neutral in that civil war, but we have constantly 
by our policies sided with the Kremlin against its victims. 

A future historian will face a strange paradox when he comes to the 
year 1959: in July, he will note, om* Congress and President called 
upon the American people to pray for the captive nations; in Septem- 
ber those people vv^ere called upon to do honor to the head of the mob 
that holds those nations in captivity! 

Try to see the Khrushchev visit through the eyes of Hungarians 
or Poles or East Germans or through the eyes of our secret allies inside 
Russia proper. To them, I repeat, it must look like a bewildering 
betrayal by the country to which their hopes are tied. 

Mr. Arens. Well now, Mr. Lyons, it is contended that when 
Khrushchev, after being dined and wined in the White House and 
elsewhere, sees our material wealth and industrial plants, he wUl 
change his mind and abandon designs for world conquest, or at least 
slow them down. What is your reaction to that contention? 

Mr. Lyons. It's a childish fairy tale. The Communists in high 
places are perfectly well informed about our material prosperity and 



14 THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

political freedom. Khrushchev is not coming here to confirm his 
knowledge of our strengths, but to feel out our weaknesses. The notion 
that he will be impressed by our wealth and liberty to the pomt of 
curbing Communist ambitions is political innocence carried to 
extremes. 

What disturbs me, and many other students of the Communist 
realities, is that such fairy tales reflect a dangerous ignorance of the 
nature of communism and its objectives. The premise of such non- 
sense is that the struggle between the two worlds is not really serious — 
just a misunderstanding that can be cleared up if we get the right 
people to meet in the right place and say the right words. It assumes 
that the cancer can be treated with mustard-plasters of good will. 

But it happens, Mr. Arens and gentlemen of the committee, that the 
struggle is real, the issues too profound to yield to pleasant talk. 
Should some trifling Soviet gesture come from the visit, the kind of 
thing we will eagerly label as a concession, the results can be even more 
disastrous. In our great joy and relief, we will drop vigilance and 
open all roads to easy Communist conquests. 

Mr. Arens. I gather that you consider the invitation a mistake? 

Mr. Lyons. It begins as a mistake. But if the American people 
turn Klu'ushchev's visit into a triumphal march across our continent, 
the mistake will become a catastrophe. For one thing, it would be a 
signal for all the neutralists so-called, for all the fence-sitters and 
doubters, to join the Communist side. For them and for millions of 
others, it will confirm the wave-of-the-future view of communism. 

Moreover, even for our friends in the free world, it will seem to be 
proof of our political immaturity. They will see in it our failure to 
grasp the historical process of our times, our pathetic anxiety to find 
an easy answer and an alibi for inaction. 

The Soviet empire — 900 million strong, subjugated and led by some 
33 million Communists — is totally and irrevocably committed to one 
Communist world. They are engaged in a war, whether there is 
shooting and bombing or not, which they could not abandon without 
ceasing to be Communists. A momentary retreat for purely tactical 
reasons is conceivable. But it would be utterly meaningless, since it 
w^ould leave the larger struggle unresolved. In the final analysis it 
would boomerang against us by lulling us into a false sense of safety. 

Mr. Arens. What is your estimate of the phrase we hear so much 
these days, "reducing tensions"? 

Mr. Lyons. The Communists don't want to reduce them. Since 
every one of those tensions is of their own manufacture, they could 
reduce or eliminate them at will. On the contrary, they need those 
tensions — that's why they create them in the first place. 

And from our own angle, the illusion of reduced tensions could be 
fatal. What we need is a greater awareness of those tensions and 
their implications, to the point where we will have no alternative but 
to acknowledge them and to deal with them courageously. One can 
lessen pain by taking a sedative, but it leaves the disease itself un- 
touched. Our present eagerness to find sedatives condemns us to 
suffering the unchecked ravages of the disease of world communism, 

Mr, Arens. Would you care to express yourself with respect to 
the other side of the coin, namely, the visits of free-world leaders to 
the Ki'cmliu? 



THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 15 

Mr. Lyons. !My view is implicit in what I have said about the 
permanent civil war between the rulers and the ruled in the Com- 
munist world. The fact that a President of the United States or a 
Prime Minister of Great Britain makes the journey to Moscow can 
bring only heartbreak and despair to those who dream of freedom. 

The spectacle of top leaders of the free world in the role of guests of 
despots and killers must shake the faith of our secret friends and 
allies in our professions of freedom and justice. In the present case, 
the very fact that the President has so long avoided this type of ex- 
change, despite Moscow's m-ging, has placed a higher value on it. 
The fact that he has finally consented, despite the arrogance and 
intransigeance of Khrushchev, gives it every appearance of an act 
of despPwir, of a capitulation. 

Mr. Aeens. Based on your background and experience as a student 
of international communism, tell this committee, Mr. Lyons, how 
late it is now on the Communist timetable for world domination. 

Mr. Lyons. Later, much later, than most people think. I recall 
talldng to audiences before the last war. When I said that the Com- 
munists are aiming to dominate the world, I am sm-e my listeners 
thought I was exaggerating, indulging in rhetoric. Yet here we are, 
so soon after as history runs, with one-thu'd of the human race already 
in the Communist straitjacket! With extensions of Communist 
power, through its parties and false-fronts and imdergrounds, deep 
in the flesh of every other nation, whether free or neutral or un- 
committed! 

Only the blind can fail to see how fast Asia and Africa are being 
subverted, where they cannot be taken by frontal assault. Only the 
deluded can fail to see the contagion spreading in Latin America, in 
the Near East, in Indonesia, and nearly everywhere else. 

Timetable? I doubt that the Ivi-emlin has one in any literal sense. 
All that it is doing, however, was clearly planned and publicly an- 
nounced in Communist documents these 40 years and more. They 
dared to make their plans public because they counted on our refusal 
to believe them. Even yet we kid om'selves with fantasies about 
live-and-let-live agreements, though our doom is clearly spelled out 
in Communist resolutions. 

The Communists do not need physically to take over the world in 
order to control and exploit it. They merely need to isolate then- 
main opponent, the United States, to the point where we have to take 
orders from Moscow — or else. They prefer to take over the industrial 
complex developed in freedom by fre'e men intact, rather than in a 
heap of nuclear rubble. 

Mr. Aeens. Mr. Lyons, you have, in my humble judgment, 
diagnosed the disease and revealed our fallacies in our attempts to 
treat the disease. What remedy do you suggest? 

Mr. Lyons. I wish I had an easy remedy to prescribe. Those I see 
are the opposite of easy. They call for a complete revision of our 
thinking on the subject and, then, a readiness for sacrifice and risk. 

There can, as I view it, be no hope of saving our world until we have 
a clear-headed understanding of the character and the permanence of 
the Communist challenge. Then we will gi-asp that the struggle is 
not subject to compromise — that the Communists are right when they 
insist that one or the other of the contending worlds must be totally 



16 THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

defeated and, as Khrushchev put it, "buried." Only on the basis of 
such understanding can we begin to develop a strategy for protracted 
conflict of our own. 

We will then cease to regard every new crisis as a separate challenge, 
but will deal with it as a part of the all-embracing struggle. What's 
more, we will confront the enemy with crises instead of waiting inertly 
until the next threat comes. We will carry the cold war to the 
Communist orbit and not, as now, limit it always to our side of the 
curtains. 

Above all, we will then renounce the consolations of wishful thinking 
and patent-medicine cures. We will know at last that the contest 
between freedom and slavery is too big to be resolved with a little 
good will, some exchanges of visits, settlements that settle nothing 
because they leave the underlying struggle unafi'ected. 

Mr. Arens. Perhaps some other leader, coming after Khrushchev, 
will find what has been called a modus vivendi? 

Mr. Lyons. I have never joined in the journalistic parlor game of 
musical chairs in the Kremlin, or "who will succeed whom?" The 
differences between Comrade X or Comrade Y may affect the trim- 
mings of the permanent conflict but not its historical essence. 

I believe that we would be essentially in the same position if 
Malenkov, Bcria, or Molotov were dictator instead of Khrushchev. 
The Communist machine is by this time too strong to depend on the 
personality of its operator. 

Our strange preoccupation with personalities has tended to obscure 
the reality of the continuing menace. It reflects a desperate hope of 
some miracle that will relieve us of the unpleasant necessity of facing 
up to the challenge. That soporific hope, indeed, explains our re- 
peated orgies of illogical optunism. 

We indulged in such an orgy in the middle 1930's. It takes an effort 
of memory to recall that nearly everyone then believed that Stalin 
was a moderate man, concerned only with industrializing his own 
country. He was through, we said, with the nonsense of world revo- 
lution. We gave that as our excuse for providing the machines and 
the know-how and the trained manpower without which the first 
Five- Year Plans would never have taken off the ground. 

Mr. Arens. And we had another such orgy, didn't we, in the war 
years, when Soviet Russia was listed among the freedom-loving and 
peace-loving nations? 

Mr. Lyons. Quite so. It was on that assumption that, having 
saved the Soviets from defeat at Hitler's hands, we proceeded to turn 
over to Stalin all of Eastern Europe and large slices of Asia. Hadn't 
he joined the United Nations? Hadn't he gone along with our 
rhetoric of Four Freedoms? As compensation to Russia for remain- 
ing a good member of the family of nations, we handed over to Com- 
munist slavery more than a hundred million East Europeans, including 
some who had been our gallant allies. 

After the death of Stalin there was another major orgy of optimism. 
Who can recall without blushing our excitement and joy over the 
supposed New Look and Smiling Diplomacy? 

Today, alas, we are once more riding a tide of self-induced optimism. 
And now, as then, the only certainties arc disappointment, frustration, 
defeat by default. 

Mr. Arens. You, I take it, are not among the optimists? 



THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 17 

Mr, Lyons. I have said nothing today that I have not, in one form 
or another, said before or written in books and articles. In the nature 
of the case I have been branded a pessimist, lacking faith in our 
country and civilization. I suppose that the doctor who diagnoses 
cancer instead of calling it a pimple is likewise regarded as a pessimist. 
! But consider the facts. When I began, in my humble way, to try 
to alert my countrymen to the menace of communism about a quarter 
of a century ago, there were 170 million people under the iron heel of 
communism. Today there are close to a billion. I would say, in all 
conscience, that my pessimism has not been entirely unjustified. 

Mr. Arens. Are there not, Mr. Lyons, any encouraging elements 
in the otherwise gloomy picture? 

Mr. Lyons. I believe there are. 

Mr. Arens. What, for instance? 

Mr. Lyons. One, in my judgment, is that the American people do 
instinctively recognize the natm-e of the Communist threat. I have 
had occasion in the past year to address audiences in several parts of 
the country, people fau'ly close to the grassroots of their communi- 
ties. They seemed to understand the Communist challenge more 
dearly, with less self-delusion, than those in positions of power in our 
own country and other free nations. 

I believe, therefore, that if we are fortunate enough to find leaders 
with the courage and clear-headedness necessary to deal with the 
Communist challenge, the people will follow them. 

Mr, Arens. I, too, have met such audiences and agi-ee with your 
judgment. What other element of hope do you see? 

Mr. Lyons. The primary fact, if only we acknowledged it and used 
it, is that after 40 years of absolute power, during which the Soviet 
regime applied unlimited physical and mental terror, it has failed to 
achieve what the political scientists call "legitimacy." The regime, 
that is to say, cannot, like normal governments, count on the auto- 
matic allegiance and obedience of its subjects. 

Those of om* countrymen who announce, after a two- or four-week 
tour of Russia, that its people are firmly behind its dictatorship, have 
yet to explain why the Kremlin continues to depend on force and 
incessant propaganda, rather than on the free consent of the people. 
Why, if the people support the regime, is there need for maintaining 
history's largest and most ruthless secret-police establishment? Wliy 
does the Kremlin continue to make it a capital crime for its supposedly 
loyal citizens to try to leave the country without permission? Why, 
if the people are already sold on it, does the regime continue to train 
and support literally hundreds of thousands of full-time "agitators" 
to sell the system? 

Even a totalitarian government does not assign major portions of 
its budget, manpower, brains, and energy to internal secm-ity unless 
it feels itself seriously insecure. One can judge an ailment from the 
medicine; and in Soviet Russia the medicine, in this the forty-second 
year of Soviet dictatorship, is still terror, intimidation, and unlimited 
thought control. 

Mr. Arens. Do I detect in what you've said some skepticism about 
the reports on Russia being brought home by American tom'ists to 
that country? 

Mr. Lyons. Skepticism is a mild word for how I feel a,bout it. 
Now and then, of course, the tourist does bring back some fragments 



18 THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

of truth, especially in relation to his own field of competence. But 
these morsels are few and far between. Besides, the home folks can 
hardly be expected to separate the rare grains of truth from the 
mountain of chaff. 

In the forthcoming October issue of The Reader's Digest I have an 
article entitled "One Trip to Russia Doesn't Make an Expert." I ex- 
press my judgment that the new surge of tourist traffic to the U.S.S.R. 
is confusing, rather than clarifying, our image of that country. Tlie 
most mischievous of the findings of these quickie experts, as I see it, 
is to the eft'ect that the Soviet peoples have come to love their chains. 

Even if the finding were true, a few days or weeks in Russia would 
hardly suffice to prove it. I venture to say that the same people, 
had they visited Hungary and Poland in the year or two before the 
uprisings in those countries, ^vould not have become aw\are of the 
coming events. In a police state the explosive stuff of popular dis- 
content is always deep under the surface. I can testify from close-up 
experience that it takes years of living among the Kremlin's helpless 
subjects to begin to sense how they really feel. 

Mr. Arens. Would you sum up briefly your judgment of Khru- 
shchev and his impending visit? 

Mr. Lyons. I'll try. In the first place, the new Soviet boss, 
despite his homespun exterior, is one of the bloodiest tyrants extant. 
He has come to power over mountains of corpses. Those of us who 
roll out red carpets for him will soon have red faces. 

In the second place, the exchange of visits between the heads of 
the two governments, even if it brings a few seemingly positive results 
on the margins of the struggle, must prove deeply harmful to the 
core of that struggle. It comes close to an acknowledgment of the 
permanence of the Communist grabs and undermines the spirit of 
resistance inside the Communist world. 

In the third place, and perhaps most importantly, the great ex- 
pectations aroused by the exchange reveal the tragic failure of West- 
ern statesmen to recognize the character and the magnitude of the 
Communist challenge. 

Mr. Walter. Thank you very much, Mr. Lyons. 

(Thereupon, at 3:05 p.m., Friday, Septe"aber 4, 1959, the consul- 
tation was concluded.) 



INDEX. 



Individuals Page 

Beria (Lavrenti) 8, 10, 16 

Bialer, Sewervn 12 

Eisenhower (Dwight D.)- 12, 13, 15 

Hitler (Adolf) 1, 10, 16 

Kaganovieh, Lazar 7, 8 

Khrushchev, Nikita 1-3, 6-18 

Lenin (V. I.) 9, 11 

Lyons, Eugene 1-3, 5-18 (statement) 

Malenkov (Georgi) 8, 16 

Maleter (Pal) 1, 10 

Mao Tse-tung__ 11 

Molotov (V. M.) 8, 16 

Nagy (Imre) 1, 10 

Nasser (Gamal Abdel) 12 

Schmid, Karl 8 

Serov, Ivan 10. 

StaUn (Josef) 1, 6-10, 12, 16 

Strausz-Hup6, Robert 11 

Trotsky (Leon) _ 11 

Zhuko V, Georgi - 8 

Organizations 

Communist Party, Soviet Union: 

Central Committee 7 

Moscow Province Pa'ty 7 

Politburo. 7 

Communist Party, Ukraine 7 

Header's Digest, The (magazine) 1, 5 

o ^ 



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