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THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

PART 3 



CONSULTATIONS WITH 

Gen. Bela Kiraly 

Mr. Joseph Kovago 

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS 
FIRST SESSION 




SEPTEMBER 10, 1959 
(INCLUDING INDEX) 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Un-American Activities 



UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
46147° WASHINGTON : 1959 



COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 
United States House of Representatives 

FRANCIS E. WALTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 
MORGAN M. MOULDER, Missouri DONALD L. JACKSON, California 

CLYDE DOYLE, California GORDON H. SCHERER, Ohio 

EDWIN E. WILLIS, Louisiana WILLIAM E. MILLER, New York 

WILLIAM M. TUCK, Virginia AUGUST E. JOHANSEN, Michigan 

Kjchard Arens, staff Director 

II 



CONTENTS 



Page 

Synopsis 1 

September 10, 1959: Statement of — 

Gen. Bela Kiraly 5 

Mr. Joseph Kovago 21 

Index I 

ni 



Public Law 601, 79th Congress 

The legislation under which the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities operates is Pubhc Law 601, 79th Congress [1946], chapter 
753, 2d session, which provides: 

Be it enacted hy the Senate and House of Representatives of the United Slates 
of America in Congress assenMed, * * * 

PART 2— RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Rule X 

SEC. 121. STANDING COMMITTEES 
******* 

18. Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members. 

Rule XI 

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES 
******* 

(q) (1) Committee on Un-American Activities. 

(A) Un-American activities. 

(2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommit- 
tee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, 
character, and objects of «n-Am<^rican propaganda activities in the United States, 
(ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and vm-American propa- 
ganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks 
the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and 
(iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary 
remedial legislation. 

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the 
Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of anj^ such investi- 
gation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable. 

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American 
Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such 
times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, 
has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance 
of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and 
to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under 
the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any 
member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person 
designated by any such chairman or member. 

•fC 3|C ^ 9}C y 9|C ^ 

Rule XII 

LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT BY STANDING COMMITTEES 

Sec. 136. To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws 
and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem neces- 
sary, each standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives 
shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative 
agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdic- 
tion of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports 
and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of 
the Government. 

IV 



RULES ADOPTED BY THE 86TH CONGRESS 

House Resolution 7, January 7, 1959 
9 m * * * * ^ 

Rule X 

STANDING COMMITTEES 

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Con- 
gress, 

(q) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members 

:i: tii !lfi * * * * 

Rule XI 

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES 

8p aft JJC 3|E 9|£ sf ^fi 

18. Committee on Un-American Activities. 

(a) Un-American activities. 

(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, 
is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, char- 
acter, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, 
(2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American prop- 
aganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and 
attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitu- 
tion, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress 
in any necessary remedial legislation. 

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the 
Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investi- 
gation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable. 

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American 
Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times 
and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has 
recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance 
of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and 
to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under 
the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any 
member designated by any such chairman, -and may be served by any person 
designated by any such chairman or member. 

******* 

26. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in 
developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, 
each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulriess 
of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject 
matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that 
purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by 
the agencies in the executive branch of the Government. 



We will put in more troops and more troops and more 
troops until we have finished them. 

Nikita Khiuishchev's response to a 
question by a former U.S. Ambassa- 
dor on the slaughter in Hungary. 



VI 



THE CROIES OF KHRUSHCHEV 
SYNOPSIS 



Eyewitness accounts of Khrushchev's brutal suppression of tlie 
Hungarian patriots, his diplomatic treachery in connection with the 
Hungarian revolution, and the present wave of terror gripping the 
people of Hungary are recounted in the accompanying consultation 
with the Committee on Un-American Activities by the former com- 
mander-in-chief of the armed forces of the freedom fighters, General 
Bela Kiraly, and the former mayor of Budapest, Joseph Kovago. 

Describing the invasion by Soviet troops of Hungary, General 
Kiraly stated: 

These interfering Soviet armed forces did not carry out even 
a regular street fight, fighting only freedom-fighter groups. 
They carried out a terror attack against Budapest with 
artillery and tanks. They would slioot against a single mov- 
ing person on the street, against homes, against churches, 
against apartment houses, without any discrimination. 

But after five days of battle, the Soviet leadership found 
out that they lost the battle. To avoid the annihilation of 
the Soviet units, Khrushchev himself carried out one of his 
most sinister actions. 

He sent to Budapest his first deputy, Mikoyan; and he sent 
Mr. Suslov from the party leadership. These two Soviet 
men sat down with the revolutionary government. They 
found out that they were defeated. After talldng with 
Khrushchev by means of the telephone— and by the approval 
of Khrushchev — they concluded an armistice with the 
Hungarian Government on the 29th of October in the 
Parhament Building of Budapest. 

After this valid and legal armistice, concluded by the duly 
credentialed Soviet delegates and the Hungarian Govern- 
ment, the Hungarian Government let the Soviet troops 
withdraw from Budapest. The order was reestablished in 
Budapest. Freedom fighters patrolled the streets; the 
population was jubilant. 

We were told that in the night the Hungarian delegation 
will go to the Soviet headquarters in Tokol, a village south of 
Budapest. The aim to go to the Soviet headquarters was 
announced to be the ceremonial signing of the final text of 
the agreement. 

4c 4e :|i * * 

The Hungarian delegation entered the Soviet headquarters 
with good faith, intending to sign the final text of Soviet- 

1 



2 THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

Hungarian agreement which ah'eady was agreed upon in the 
Hungarian Parhament. 

•* * * tf * 

About midnight General Serov entered tlie room and, no 
doubt on the order of Khi'ushchev, arrested the Hungarian 
delegation. Serov, as the chief of the secret police, was di- 
rectly under the order of the first secretary of the Commu- 
nist Party, which means that Serov was a direct subordinate 
of Khi'ushchev. He coidd not carry out any major action 
without Khrushchev's direct order, I mean on the basis of 
my experience in the Communist-ruled country, tlie arrest 
of a diplomatic delegation by the secret police chief covdd 
only be carried out by the direct order of the first secretary 
of the party, who was Khrushchev. 

Commenting on Khrushchev's diplomatic treachery, General Kiraly 
observed: 

I l)elieve that one of the most dramatic and most important 
crimes that ever has been committed in modern times was 
that diplomatic treachery in Budapest and it was hour to 
hour carried out by Khrushchev himself. November 4, 1956, 
the beginning of the second Soviet aggression and the arrest 
of General Pal Alaleter and the Hungarian diplomatic dele- 
gation, is the second "day of infamy" of modern history. 

In regard to the present suppression of the people in Hungar}'-, 
General Ku'aly testified that: 

It means that Hungary today is a nation-wide prison, im- 
prisoned by Khrushchev's army units. Under the shadow 
of this one hundred thousand Russian bayonets when in 
1958 — one and a half years after the Hungarian revolution — 
Khrushchev visited Budapest, the following reception was 
given to him: 

Wlien he landed in the airport of Budapest tlie government 
did not even dare to send a military honor guard to receive 
Khi-ushchev, the prime minister of the Soviet Union. They 
sent there a secret police honor guard. It lias not occmTed 
in recent times that a prime minister of a great power could 
not be received by military units but a secret police unit. I 
believe it is one of the greatest humiliations which ever oc- 
curred to a prime minister of a great power. 

"Peaceful coexistence" vnih the Ivi^emlin, General Kiraly stated^ 

is as great a fraud as the whole diplomatic action was in 
Budapest in November 1956. The peaceful coexistence is 
a dreadful thing:. 



'&• 



Kln'ushchev's peaceful coexistence means that the status 
quo is recognized. The peaceful coexistence of Khrushchev 
does not intend peacefully to coexist, but does intend to 
have a direct or indirect recognition of the suppression of 
one hundred million westernized people from the Baltic 



down to Bulgaria and Albania 



THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 3 

Commenting on the exchange of visits by distinguished personages 
as a tactic in the struggle with international communism, General 
Kiraly stated : 

All of these actions are used to defraud, to cheat public 
opinion of the free world, to lull their vigilance, and, in the 
meantime, to make progress toward their principal goal to 
conquer the whole world. 

Joseph Kovago, former mayor of Budapest, stated: 

From the time that Khrushchev came into power, he is the 
man responsible for all the mass murders and tortures of the 
Hungarian men, women, and children. 

In regard to the intervention of the Soviet troops in Hungary, 
Mr. Kovago testified that: 

They, the Soviet troops, invaded Budapest, and I am an 
eyewitness who saw with my own eyes that these tanks 
turned into streets where there were just apartment houses 
and nothing else. And these tanks shot against these 
apartment houses, and a considerable part of Budapest 
became in ruins. 

There were killed children, women, young and old men 
without distinction, whether or not they were freedom 
fighters. 

* * * * * 

During and after the revolution and freedom fight there 
were approximately 30,000 Hungarians killed by armed 
forces of Khrushchev. According to official reports 2,500 
persons were executed; however, the victims of Khrushchev's 
secret police are probably higher — 12,000 persons were de- 
ported to the Soviet Union; hundreds of thousands of 
persons were imprisoned; 15,000 were confined to forced 
labor camps. 

And finally Khrushchev ordered the re-establishment of 
concentration camps which were abolished before the 
revolution of 1956. 

In regard to the present situation in ^Hungary, Mr. Kovago stated: 

The Hungarian people are in an apathy of despair. The 
new wave of terror which took place in Hungary after the 
revolution is increasing, and the complete control by the 
Soviet Union of the country is so striking and so clear to 
every Hungarian that the people are gradually losing their 
hope of regaining freedom. 

The prison camps are again full. The conditions are 
terrible. The secret police are again in action even if they 
are not so conspicuous today. 

Commenting on the varied roles which Khrushchev reveals to the 
world, Mr. Kovago observed: 

I think that Khrushchev is the best disciple of Machiavelli 
because if his own interest dictates it, he will kill; while he 
finds it useful, he will smile, will kiss children, will shake 
hands and show a good face. 

46147°— 59— pt. 3 2 



THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 
(Part 3) 



THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1959 

United States House of Representatives, 

Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington, D.C. 
Consultations 

The following consultations with Gen. Bela Kiraly and Joseph 
Kovago, respectively, were held at 10 a.m. in room 226, Old House 
Office Building, Washington, D.C, Hon. Francis E. Walter, of 
Pennsylvania, Chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activ- 
ities, presiding. 

Staff members present: Richard Arens, staff director; George C. 
W^illiams, investigator. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order, and the first 
witness will be sworn. 

Do you, General Kiraly, solemnly swear that the testimony you 
are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth, so help you God? 

General Kiraly. I do. 

The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Arens. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. BELA KIRALY 

Mr. Arens. Kindly identify yourself by name, residence, and 
occupation. 

General Kiraly. My name is Bela Kiraly; my residence is 310 
Riverside Drive, New York 25, New York; and at present I am a 
member of the Hungarian Committee and the executive co-president 
of Hungarian Freedom Fighters Federation, Inc. 

Mr. Arens. How long have you been a resident of the United States, 
please, sir? 

General Kiraly. I arrived here on December 15, 1956, and since 
that time I have been a resident of the United States. 

Mr. Arens. General, would 5'ou kindly give us a brief, personal 
sketch of your life: where and when you were born, a word about your 
education, and then, if you please, sir, just the highlights of your 
career? 

General Kiraly. I was born in Kaposvar in Hungar}^ 1912. I 
graduated from high school in the same city. Then I was a student 
at the Hungarian Mihtary Academy, where I graduated in 1935. 

Then I served in different posts in the Hungarian army, graduated 
from the Commanding General Staff College, and was a general staff 
officer of the Hungarian army. 

5 



6 THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

I participated in World War II in the Hun£j;arian army, and, after 
World War II, I served again in the new democratic ai-my. 

I was a member of the Communist Party of Hungary. 

I became a general and commander of the Hungarian General Staff 
College; and from that post I was arrested in 1951, condemned to 
death, and after five years of imprisonment, in September 1956 I was 
released on parole. 

A month later the Hungarian revolution broke out, during which 
I was elected commander-in-chief of the National Guard of Hungary 
and Budapest military garrison. 

In the second part of November I liad to escape from Hungary; 
via Vienna I came to the United States. 

Mr. Arens. Now, sir, would you recount in your own words the 
highlights of the Hungarian revolution, concerning which much has 
been written and much has been said, but the lessons of which some 
people seem to be disposed to ignore? 

General Kiraly. Yes. The Hungarian revolution, in its essence, 
was a spontaneous nationwide uprising with tvo basic aims. The 
first basic aim of it was to abolish the Communist one-party dictator- 
sliip, the Communist social and economic order, and to establish a 
new democratic and economic system, parliamentary government, 
based on a general secret election. 

The second basic aim of the Hungarian revolution was to get rid 
of the Soviet colonial rule and to establish the nation's independence. 

These two basic aims were accepted by the whole nation, and the 
whole nation wanted to achieve these goals by the utmost sacrifice. 

The Hungarian revolution, however, did not break out from one 
day to the other. Before the revolution there was a long period during 
which a so-called reform movement tried to elaborate a reform pro- 
gram for the above-mentioned two basic aims; and tliis reform move- 
ment aimed to achieve those goals by peaceful means. 

Until October the 23rd, 1956, tliis reform movement developed; 
and on the 23rd of October, in the form of a huge demonstration in 
Budapest, the people of Budapest announced their strong will to 
achieve these two basic aims — but I want to accentuate again — 
through peaceful means. 

On that day the Communist Party leadership in Budapest found 
out that the Communist Party had only two alternatives: Either to 
let tliis reform movement progress further — in that case the Com- 
munist Party would have been obliged to make basic concessions to 
this reform movement — or the second alternative, to use the forces 
which were at the disposal of the Communist Party to suppress this 
reform movement and reestablish the former one-party dictatorsliip 
and the authority of the Communist Party. 

The Muscovite party leadership decided upon the second. They 
decided to use force against this reform movement to hinder the 
further development and to suppress this reform movement. 

For that aim the party secretary, Mr. Gero, ordered the secret 
police to use tlieir arms against the demonstrators; and it was the 
turning point of the events. 

It was a turning point where the peaceful reform movement was 
turned into a revolution. The first major action of the revolution 
was the toppling down of the huge statue of Stalin, which was the 
symbol of Soviet domination. The freedom lighters Jioisted the 



THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 7 

Hungarian flag, decorated with the ancient coat-of-arms of free 
Hungary, upon the remnant of the StaUn statue. 

Mr. Arens. May I interrupt you here please, General, to ask 3'ou a 
few questions. 

As of the time of the outbreak of the revolution in the form of 
violence, how many people or what percentage of the people of 
Hungary were actually members of the Communist Party? 

General Kiraly, At the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution 
members of the Communist Party were near to one million. That 
means that one out of every ten of the inhabitants was a member of 
the Communist Party. 

It proves,, on the other hand, tliat to belong to the Communist 
Party did not mean that one was a Communist too. Again the fact 
that during the revolution many people with Communist Party 
affiliation fought against the Communist dictatorship, showed that 
really adherence to the Communist Party did not mean that one was 
indeed a convinced Communist. 

Mr. Arens. Coidd you tell us. General, if j^ou know, what was the 
membership of the Communist Party in Hungary at tlie time of the 
takeover by the Communists? 

General Kiraly. When the Communists took over? I believe it is 
much better to tell that after World War II. I believe it is more 
correct. 

Mr. Arens. All right, sir. 

General Kiraly. After World War II the Communist Party con- 
sisted of a handful of people who came back from the Soviet Union 
as Soviet citizens, and I do not believe that the underground Com- 
munist Party which acted in Hungary during World War II was more 
than a couple of hundred. 

Mr. Arens. What percentage of the members of the Communist 
Party in Hungary at the time of the revolution were dedicated Com- 
munists? 

General Kiraly. The number of the dedicated Communists in 1945 
I do not guess was multiplied very much. Really there were some 
idealistic persons who believed that perhaps the Communist ideology, 
the Communist Party, and social system would be able to help the 
nation to be rebuilt from the ruins which the nation suffered during 
World War II. 

But many of these idealists were disillusioned and many, many of 
them had been arrested. A handful of former Communists, for ex- 
ample, who returned from the West from exile, who were Communists 
in France and other Western countries and returned to Hungary to 
cooperate with those who came from Moscow, v/ere, almost without 
exception, arrested because the Khrushchevian party leadership from 
Moscow did not trust any but those who were in Moscow for these 
twenty years between the two world wars. 

They were willing to put in key positions only those who returned 
from Moscow and were Soviet citizens and knew all the background 
activities of the Communist Party, the terrors and so on, and who did 
not dare to make the least diversion from the Muscovite line. In 
those Kln'uslichev could trust so mucli as in himself. If he gave any 
order, he could be positive that they would carry it out. 



8 THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

Mr. Arexs. Now, General, please tell us bow you account for the 
one million members of tbe Communist Party in Hungary, as distinct 
from tbe relatively small bard core of dedicated Communists. 

General Kiraly. Many, many factors obliged persons to join tbe 
Communist Party. Tbe first was some sort of opportunism, because 
tbe Communist Party, even before tbe time wben tbey took over by 
tbe belp of tbe Soviet occupation autborities, was in tbe position to 
decide wbo sbould serve in tbat and tbat and tbat key position. 
Even before tbe takeover, tbe Communist Party could decide wbo 
will work wbere. 

Consequently one factor was opportunism, to bave tbe Communist 
support to get good jobs at tbe time. 

Number two: Tbe Communist Party mostly before tbe takeover 
had to play some political games against tbe democratic parties. 
Therefore, tbe Communist Party needed masses in tbe party to show 
itself as tbe strongest party, and consequently tbe Communist Party 
not only gave concession? to its members, but pressed people lo join 
the party in order to have high numbers in tbe party. 

Therefore, for example, tbe Communist Party was tbe only party 
which accepted definitely Fascists into its membership. Tbe other 
parties could not afford, and did not want, to accept Fascists; tbe 
Communist Party could; and a Fascist, even if be committed war 
crimes during tbe war, could have asylum inside tbe Communist 
Party. That was tbe second thing. 

The third thing: Many people were joining the Communist Party 
because of fear, because to be a party member did mean, in some 
respects, a defense against tbe atrocities of the secret police and other 
terror organizations. 

Many people wanted nothing else but not to be disturbed. Having 
tbe Communist Party membership card, at least tbey were not dis- 
turbed by authorities, by the tax office, and so on and so on. 

So the Communist Party membership meant more or less greater 
security than not belonging to tbe Communist Party. 

If I may I would show my own example. 

Mr. Arens. If you will, please, sir. 

General Kiraly. I joined some sort of resistance activities against 
the Nazis, and I myself went over to the Russian side because they 
were the only so-called liberators in Hungary; and with many soldiers, 
I went over and I offered to fight against tbe Nazis. 

For two or three days we were cheered by tbe Soviets as allies, so to 
say. But wben the front line was far enough to hinder us to make any 
disturbances to tbe Soviet units, to tbe Soviet soldiers, we were dis- 
armed and declared prisoners of war and were being brought to the 
Soviet Union. 

Wben we were very near to tbe Rumanian-Soviet frontier, with a 
group I escaped from tbe train which was intending to take us — who 
wanted to fight against tbe Nazis, who wanted to fight with the 
Soviets as long as Hungary will be free — we faced tbe danger to be 
brought to the Soviet Union. 

And then we escaped. We managed to escape from tbe train very 
near the Soviet frontier. 

We returned to Hungary, and there I got in touch with bigb-ranldng 
officers who investigated everybody's activities during the war. 



THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 9 

Without some sort of investigation nobody could join the new army. 
There a general told me that — 

if you escaped from the Soviet prison camp, you will be found 
here by Soviet patrols, so it is definitely positive that you will 
be taken back and nobody knows when you will return to 
Hungary. 

You have only three alternatives: Either you will escape 
to the West where the Western troops are, into Austria or 
into Germany; or 3'ou will go underground in Hungary and 
wait until the Soviets will withdraw from Hungary; or you 
have to join the Communist Party. In that case, even 
having escaped from Soviet prison camp, it does not make 
any harm to you. 

I was positive that I could do a lot of good for my nation, and I 
joined the party and joined the army. 

So when I fu"st met a Soviet officer from the Russian Occupation 
Commission in Hungary, he said: "I know very well that you escaped 
from the prison camp, but it does not mean anything." 

So it was the only possibility to remain there. If I had not, I 
would have been brought back to Russia. 

So in the everjxlay life, a Communist Party member's security was 
a little bit greater until the takeover in 1949 when the Communists 
seized power. They knew that a great number of the party members 
were not trustworthy for the Kremlin and for the party, and to 
intimidate their own party membership they made big purges even 
among the Commxunists. 

It was one of the most important factors in the rule, the continuous 
intimidation of the nation, individuals, including the Communist 
Party members too. 

Mr. Arens. Was that the time when you were purged from the 
party? 

General Kiraly. My purge was not a party purge; my purge was 
a personal matter because in 1951, when the Korean war was going 
on and the big tension existed between Yugoslavia and the Communist 
bloc and in this tension Hungary was selected to be the most em- 
bittered competitor of Tito, then many frontier clashes and distm-b- 
ances occurred and even there was a possibility that at least perhaps 
a limited war would break out between Yugoslavia and Hungary. 

Therefore, the army ♦•was purged of everybody who was not trust- 
worthy for the party. 1951-52 were the two years when there was 
not definitely a party purge, but an army purge, during which period 
of time they made the army completely servile and trustworthy for 
the party. 

Mr. Arexs. Now may I inquire, before we get to the actual shooting 
in the revolution itself, if you have information respecting the tech- 
niques of the takeover of Hungary by the relatively few Communists? 

General Kiraly. Yes. Of course this would be a much more proper 
question for Mr. Kovago, who was a politician and knew these matters 
well. 

Mr. Arens. We shall ask him about it, too, later on. 

General Kiraly, I was at the time in the army and, though not a 
politician, I, as everybody, could see which were the most important 
developments in the takeover. The basis of the takeover was not a 



10 THE CRIMES OF KHRrSHCHEV 

Hungarian internal forco or internal action; tlie basis of the takeover 
was the presence of the Soviet Control Commission in Hungary which 
until the coming in force of the peace treaty in September 1947 was 
the real control power in Hungar}^ 

No man in the army or in the administration could be appointed 
to a responsible position without the approval of the Soviet Control 
Commission. Consequently until 1947, autumn, the takeover went 
on step by step in the background by putting persons in the key posi- 
tions, such sorts of persons whom the Communist Party trusted. 

What the political side of the takeover is, the most important steps 
and factors are the following: 

In 194.5, in the fall, there was an election in Hungary, During this 
election the Communist Party polled only 17 percent of all the votes; 
consequently the Smallholders' Party, which polled the majority of 
all the votes, would have been in a position to form a one-party 
government because they had an absolute majority in the Parliament 
of Hungary; however, again the Control Commission forced the Small- 
holders' Party to form a coalition government, including the Com- 
munist Party and the Social Democrat Party and the National 
Peasant Party, 

Now the second step was to begin to cut off from the majority party, 
from the Smallholders' Party, those persons and groups who were the 
most outspoken anti-Communists. So that the main anti-Communist 
party, the Smallholders' Party, was pressed to exclude from the party 
persons and groups that were the backbone of the anti-Communist 
policy. 

After 1947, in the autumn, when the Control Commission had been 
abolished because the peace treaty was in force, the Communist 
Party was in a position from which they controlled the most important 
positions in the state administration. 

Even more important, the secret pohce was by that time so well 
organized that it controlled all sectors of the administration and the 
every-day life in Hungary. So when the Control Commission was no 
longer in power in Hungary, the secret police Avas everywhere and could 
arrest whomever they wanted. 

From that time on the rigid cruelty became even more definite a 
factor than before. 

Again there was another factor in Hungary, The Soviet occupa- 
tion force existed in Hungary, so that ev^ybody saw the Soviet 
soldiers there and everybody knew that if any thought of action whicli 
would not suit the Communist Party and their Kremlin bosses, the 
Soviet army would have been used for suppressing any such activities. 

So these forces — key persons in key positions, secret police, the 
presence of the Soviet army, and the suppression of the most anti- 
Communist party, tlie Smallholders' Party — made the Communists 
capable of making an open takeover which was carried out between 
1947 and 1948, 

During this period the Communist Party managed fully to control 
the country, and in the year of 1948 tliey openly announced the 
Communist takeover. 

In 1949 they made a ncAV type, a Communist-type, election in 
Hungary. In this election -I don't exactly know — about 97 percent 
of the population "voted" for the one-party list. 



THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 11 

On August 20, 1949, the Communist Party was already in position 
to declare the so-called people's democracy, which is the form of 
bolshevism in Hungary, led of com'se by the Ivi'emliu and by the 
local Communist agents. 

Mr. Arens. Now, sir, during the actual revolution, what post or 
posts did you occupy in Hungary? 

General Kiraly. During the revolution I acted in three posts. 
Two of them were elected posts. I w^as elected to be the chairman 
of the revolutionary Home Defense Committee. The task of this 
committee wns to control all the armed forces of the country. 

The second post was also an elected post. I was elected to be 
the commander-in-chief of the National Guard, which was a new 
armed force, which was the armed force of the freedom fighters. 

Third, by tiie Nagy government, the revolutionary government, I 
was appointed to be the military commander of tlie Budapest garrison, 
which was not an elected but an appointed position, over the armed 
forces being concentrated in the Budapest area. 

Mr. Arens. Now will you kindly, in your own words, detail the 
principal events of the revolution until it was completely over. 

General Kiraly. Yes. As I previously stated, on October 23rd, 
1956, a peaceful demonstration was transformed into a bloody revolu- 
tion by the opening of fire of the secret police. 

Fire was very soon opened by the freedom fighters, too, when they 
were able to capture some units of the secret police who approached 
the building of the Radio of Budapest, from which the secret police 
units opened fire against the freedom fighters. 

When they — the freedom figliters — managed to capture and disarm 
some of the reinforcements of the secret police, by the very weapons of 
the secret police the freedom fighters returned the fire of the secret 
police. 

The second most important step in the revolution was that the 
government ordered an army unit, a whole regiment, on the spot to 
help the secret pohce to disperse the demonstrators who were at 
the time already revolutionary fighters. 

It was a characteristic event. The regiment was under the control 
of the Soviet advisers under the control of the secret police agents in 
the army. It was led by young officers, all of them having been 
workers' and peasants' children. This regiment under such control 
and under tlie leadership of officers of worker and peasant origin and 
under the leadership which, in the majority, consisted of officers 
with Communist Party membership, this regiment refused to carry 
out the orders of the Kremlin-led Communist dictators of Hungary, 
and some of the soldiers joined the freedom fighters; some of tlie 
soldiers offered their weapons to the freedom fighters and dispersed 
and went home. 

Some dispersed with their own weapons, but none of the soldiers 
were willing to carry out the Muscovite order to shoot against their 
own compatriots. 

Then the thu-d step was the intervention of the Soviet armed 
forces in Hungary, and it was the first violation of the independence 
of Himgary. The United Nations Special Committee on the Problem 
of Hungary, the United Nations General Assembly, an organization 
of international lawyers, and many other prominent international 

46147 "^sa^pt. 8 3 



12 THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

bodies investigated the case and stated that the Soviet Union, even 
on the basis of the Warsaw Pact, had no right at all to interfere in 
Hungary's internal matters by their armed forces stationed in 
Hungary. 

Anyway, the third step was interference of the Soviet troops 
stationed in Hungary. 

Then the matter is very, very characteristic how they behaved. 
These interfering Soviet armed forces did not carry out even a regular 
street fight, fighting only freedom-fighter groups. They carried out 
a terror attack against Budapest with artillery and tanks. They 
would shoot against a single moving person on the street, against 
homes, against churches, against apartment houses, without any 
discrimination. 

This whole Soviet intervention was characteristic of what the Soviet 
Union does in places they occupy. Their attack was a terror action. 
By shooting against the peaceful population and against apartment 
buildings, they intended to intimidate the country and to disillusion 
them of the revolution. 

However, the result of the battle which began between the invading 
Soviet forces and the freedom fighters, reinforced by several Hun- 
garian army units which joined the freedom fighters, was a success 
of the Hungarians. During a five-day battle the Soviet troops (ap- 
proximately two armored divisions) were defeated by the Hungarian 
freedom fighters in Budapest. 

Many hundred vSoviet tanks were burned out. Many Soviet sol- 
diers were killed ; of course Hungarian freedom fighters also. Children 
and women on the streets were killed by the Soviet invaders. 

But after five days of battle, the Soviet leadership found out that 
they lost the battle. To avoid the annihilation of the Soviet units, 
Khrushchev himself carried out one of his most sinister actions. 

He sent to Budapest his first deputy, Mikoyan; and he sent Mr. 
Suslov from the party leadership. These two Soviet men sat down 
■with the revolutionary government. They found out that they were 
defeated. After talking with Khrushchev by means of the telephone — 
and by the approval of Khrushchev — they concluded an armistice 
with the Hungarian Government on the 29th of October in the Parlia- 
ment Building of Budapest. 

After this valid and legal armistice, concluded by the duly creden- 
tialed Soviet delegates and the Hungarian Government, the Hungarian 
Government let the Soviet troops withdraw from Budapest. The 
order was reestablished in Budapest. Freedom fighters patrolled the 
streets; the population was jubilant. 

Diplomatic actions were further developed on the 2nd of November. 
The Soviet Government gave a proposal to Hungary to continue t\\o 
negotiation. In the first note of the Soviet Government, it wtvs 
positively declared that the aim of the further diplomatic negotiation 
is the decision how to withdraw the Soviet troops from Hungary and 
how to allow Hungary to regain her national independence. 

I myself participated partly in this development on November 2nd. 
I myself was, on tlie order of Prime Minister Imre Nagy, in the office 
of the Soviet ambassador, Andropov. Andropov announced to me 
that "We [the Soviet Government and the Soviet people] have nothing 
in our minds against the Hungarian people. We sympathize with 
you. And I am ordered by the Soviet Government to propose further 



THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 13 

negotiations with the Hungarian Government concerning the details 
of the mthdrawals of the Soviet troops." 

And he asked me to call from his own ofRce our Prime Minister 
Imi-e Nagy to find out the decision of the Hungarian Government. 

This I did, and immediately by word I informed Air. Andropov 
that the Hungarian Government is ready to negotiate. 

And then, again by the order of Khrushchev himself, the most 
sinister diplomatic activity and negotiation began. We used to call 
this whole action a second "day of infamy." We believe that was the 
right name, because after om* government accepted the Soviet 
proposal, again a duly credentialed Soviet delegation appeared in the 
Hungarian Parliament, consisting of high-ranldng Soviet officers, 
generals. 

They sat down with the duly credentialed Hungarian delegation, in 
which two ministers. Minister of Defense Pal Alaleter and Minister 
of State Erdei, and some experts participated. 

The definite aim of these negotiations was to decide the technical 
details of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. 

These negotiations began on November 3rd, about noontime, and 
lasted until about six o'clock in the afternoon. This testimom' of 
mine is again — I believe — very important because very few people 
escaped or survived of those who were informed about this sinister 
fraud of the Soviet Union, of Khi'ushchev, 

At six o'clock on November 3rd I talked to the chief of staff of the 
Hungarian army, General Kovacs, w^ho also was a member of this 
committee. General Kovacs stated to me that, "There is a full agree- 
ment between the Soviet delegation and the Hungarian delegation on 
the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, and the last. day until the SoA^iet 
troops have to leave Hungary is January 15." 

We w ere told, that in the night the Hungarian delegation will go to 
the Soviet headquarters in Tokol, a village south of Budapest. The 
aim to go to the Soviet headquarters was announced to be the cere- 
monial signing of the final text of the agreement. There was only one 
question open — the Hungarian delegation wanted as the last day of 
the Soviet withdrawal December 15th, and the Soviet wanted January 
15th. 

It was the only open question, and the Hungarian Government 
made the decision that if the Soviet insisted on having January 15 
as the last day, they Avould agree. 

The Hungarian delegation entered the Soviet headquarters with 
good faith, intending to sign the final text of Soviet-Hungarian 
agreement which already was agreed upon in the Hungarian Parlia- 
ment. 

Then indeed a dramatic event occurred. It was the second "day of 
infamy" of modern history. The Hungarian delegation continued 
their negotiations on the spot — Even we had some telephone calls 
back. It could be supposed that the negotiations began as real diplo- 
matic negotiations. 

About midnight General Serov entered the room and, no doubt on 
the order of Khrushchev, arrested the Hungarian delegation. Serov, 
as the chief of the secret police, was directly under the order of the 
first secretary of the Communist Party, which means that Serov was 
a direct subordinate of Khrushchev. He could not carry out any 
major action without Khrushchev's direct order. I mean on the basis 
of my experience in the Communist-ruled country, the arrest of a 



14 THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

diplomatic delegation by the secret police chief could only be carried 
out by the dh-ect order of the first secretary of the party, who was 
Khrushchev. 

Consequently, these shameful arrests could only be taken as an 
action of Khrushchev, for which he, in his own person, is alone 
responsible. 

Mr. Arens. What did he do? What did Sorov do? 

General Kiraly. Serov arrested Maletcr, Erdei, and all the mem- 
bers of the Hungarian delegation. And from that point they dis- 
appeared, we do not know what happened; but we both, Mr. Kovago 
and I, were under treatment of the secret police and can imagine 
what happened with these persons. 

They have been imprisoned, tliey have been brainwashed, they 
have had to go through all the terrors of the secret police which we 
all went through, except the Communist fellow travelers like Erdei, 
who was later released. 

After that some of the delegation, more important the Home 
Defense Minister, one of the heads of this diplomatic delegation, was 
executed in Hungary in 195S. The circumstances of the execution 
show again how the Kremlin^that is, how Khrushchev — is controlling 
foreign countries like Hungary under their colonial rule. 

If the time is proper and I am allowed, I will be able to tell details 
of the trial and the execution. 

Mr. Arens. You have told us now what happened during the 
incident of the arrest of the Hungarian delegation and the disappear- 
ance of the official credentialed delegates. Now continue with your 
theme, if you please, sir, in the chronology of events. 

General Kiraly. Yes. 

Mr. Arens. Excuse me just a moment please, sir. Where were 
you at the time of the arrest of the Hungarian delegation? 

General Kiraly. I was in the headquarters of the National Guard 
of Hungary in Budapest. It was in the middle of Budapest in a big 
building. It was previously the headquarters of the police chief of 
Budapest. From that place we had direct contact with the Parlia- 
ment, which was the seat of revolutionary government. I had a 
personal telephone contact with Prime Minister Imre Nagy. We 
could call each other without any operator in between us. As the 
things developed on November 4th, I was in direct connection with 
Premier Imre Nagy, and all the details of events were always reported 
to him in two or three minutes. 

Near midnight our connection with General Maletcr was cut. I 
mean tliere was no more ansvver on the telephone on which we could 
call him before at the Soviet headquarters. I immediately informed 
the premier that sometliing was wrong; until now we were able to 
call the Hungarian delegation and to get in connection with them, 
now we could not. 

Then we sent an officer-led detachment to the Soviet headquarters 
witli tanks which crossed tlie Danube — the Soviet headquarters was 
on an island. Our detachment crossed the Danube on a secret ferry 
which we had. We were in radio communication with this detach- 
ment. 

Minute to minute they reported: "We are crossing the Danube." 
**Wc arc approaching Tokol." "We see the building of the Kussian 
headquarters." 



THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 15 

And then all further communication Avas cut. The detachment, 
with good faith, jumped out of the tanks, and all of them disappeared. 
We do not know anything about them since that time on. 

Then alarming reports began to pour in from different parts of 
Hungary. The first came from Kiskunhalas. The reports described 
how the Soviet troops attacked the military barracks without warning. 
Without warning they began to shoot at the barracks and made a 
blood bath there and occupied the barracks. 

The second report came from Kecskemet, another big city in the 
Hungarian great plain, telling the same. Time after time I reported 
to the prime minister what was going on; that the Soviet troops were 
attacking. 

The prime minister told me: "I forbid you to give any order to 
open fire because the Soviet ambassador [the above-mentioned 
Andropov] is with me and he is telling that something is wrong, some 
misunderstanding has happened, and he just wants to call IQirushchev 
himself in Moscow to clear the situation, because something is wrong. 
Nobody gave orders to the Soviet troops, he insisted." 

So I believe that Khrushchev decided to sacrifice Andropov, if 
needed, when sendmg him to the Hungarian Parliament to pretend 
that the whole thing was a misunderetanding and they wanted — with 
good faith — to carry" out what they had agreed to earlier on that day. 

"I forbid you to make any military arrangements. Something is 
wrong, and Andropov will talk v.dth AIoscow, with Khrushcliev him- 
self, and everything will be all right," Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister 
of Hungary, concluded. 

I do not want to go into further details here. The same things 
happened all over Hungary what I told above. In the eastern and 
central part of Hungary, the Soviet troops invaded us from Czecho- 
slovakia, from Russia and from Rumania. 

From city to city the freedom fighters reported to us the details of 
the aggression. We had very good connections with freedom fighters 
in the country and cities. In the meantime the city of Budapest itself 
w^as reached and attacked by the Soviet forces. 

I reported to the prune minister that we have a very thin defensive 
line in the city; if we do not open fire immediately this very thin 
defense will be broken through, then we cannot do anything. 

I asked him that either he himself or I myself — as in the absence of 
the Home Defense Minister I was the highest-ranldng general in the 
army since the revolutionary government rehabilitated me and gave 
me back my rank of which I was bereft during the court martial — 
should go on the radio and make an announcement that there is a 
Soviet aggression and that everybody everywhere would have to de- 
fend the place where he is. I feared that some defense objects would 
be broken through if we did not give orders immediately^. 

The connections in Budapest were not very perfect, and the military 
arrangements were not too much developed because many Soviet-loyal 
generals and staff officers were yet in the army who made disturbances 
in the leadership. 

The only means, according to my opinion, at that time seemed to 
be a radio announcement that we were being attacked and we had to 
defend the city and everybody was ordered to defend the place where 
he was. Unfortunately the typical Khrushchevian fraud with Andro- 
pov having been in the Parliament made such a great influence on 



16 THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

Prime Minister Imre Nagy that he forbade every sort of general 
announcement on the radio or any other way. He told me: 

You are forbidden to issue any sort of military order be- 
cause if you order the opening of fire, it means war. 

As long as by accident troops are shooting at each other it 
is an accident and it could be smoothed out; but if you, as a 
responsible leader of the army, announce an opening of fu'e 
through radio or any other implement it will mean war. 

To decide war — as you know — is not a military task but 
a government responsibility. We do not want to make 
war on the Soviet Union. 

Very soon, of course, our thin defensive line was broken through, 
and the Russian tank units invaded Budapest. 

Mr. Arens. What units attacked at that point? Were they all 
Russian troops or were there some non-Russian troops? 

General Kiraly. Sir, number one: The new invading force were 
new troops brought from Russia and other parts of the Soviet orbit. 
The new aggressors were not those troops stationed in Hungary before 
the revolution, some of which had been defeated by us. The new 
attack was launched by brand new troops with a very high number 
of tanks and with a very heavy concentration against Budapest. 
That is the military part of it. 

What your question is concerned with, sir: a very high number of 
the invading troops of soldiers consisted of Mongolian and other 
Asiatic races. 

May I continue? 

Mr. Arens. If you please, sir. 

General Kiraly. Then between about two and three o'clock — I do 
not know the precise hour, we did not see a watch at the tune — my 
own lieadquarters was approached by a Soviet tank column. 

I mimediately called the prime minister and reported that we were 
about to be attacked. From my position I was able to watch the 
approaching Soviet tanks and I, so to say, counted them off to the 
prime minister. 

I said the point where they were turning to us and I counted them, 
and I had reached about twenty or so numbers, but we were very 
lucky. This tank unit did not attack our headquarters, which had 
no tank defense, of course. Consequently it would have suffered 
tremendously. We would only have been able to fight by means of 
hand grenades and "Molotov cocktails," but they made a turn and 
began to go in a direction where the Parliament itself lay. 

I reported to the prime minister: "We are not attacked, but the 
tank column is going toward the Parliament, toward your own 
hoadtjuarters." 

Then the prime minister told me: "Thank you. I do not want any 
furtlior reports." And then he went to the microphone and made his 
historical announcement. 

In my own words it was: "Today at daybreak Soviet troops 
attacked our capital with the obvious intention to overthrow the legal 
govornmont. Our troops are in fighting. I am informing the nation 
and the world of tliis fact." 

Almost word for word this was his last announcement. In the 
last minute when he himself saw with his own naked eyes the invading 



THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 17 

tanks he realized that we, Hke it or not, were in a war. In this 
announcement the prime minister really did not make a declaration 
of war, but registered the fact that we were invaded and we were in 
a war. 

To see, like in Vinnitsa people saw hundreds of corpses, those who 
were killed by Khrushchev's mercenaries and some perhaps personally 
by Khrushchev is a very dramatic and very tragic scene. However, 
I cannot compare any of these even dramatic killings with the sort 
of diplomatic treachery personally made by Khrushchev. Mikoyan 
and Suslov — when negotating in Budapest — were in close connection 
with Khrushchev, and on November 4th Mr. Andropov also was in 
telephone connection with him. Consequently day-to-day arrange- 
ments, hour-to-hour orders, how to carry out the shameful diplomatic 
fraud were given by Khrushchev himself. 

I believe that one of the most dramatic and most important crimes 
that ever has been committed in modern times was that diplomatic 
treachery in Budapest and it was hour to hour carried out by Khru- 
shchev himself. November 4, 1956, the beginning of the second Soviet 
aggression and the arrest of General Pal Maleter and the Hungarian 
diplomatic delegation, is the second "day of infamy" of modern history. 

Mr. Arens. General, based upon your intimate Imowledge of the 
Hungarian people, what, in your opinion, will be the impact upon the 
Himgarian people when they read in the press about Khrushchev's 
visit to the United States and his reception here, where he will be 
wined and dined by our officialdom, including the White House itself? 

General Kiraly. Sir, I only can quote two small examples of what, 
happened in Hungary when Khrushchev was there. Hungary is 
until now occupied by one hundred thousand Soviet soldiers. Com- 
pared with the Hungarian population, which is more than nine 
million, each one hundred Hungarians are watched by one Kussian 
soldier. 

It means that Hungary today is a nation-wide prison, imprisoned 
by Khrushchev's army units. Under the shadow of this one hundred 
thousand Russian bayonets when in 1958 — one and a half years after 
the Hungarian revolution — Khi'ushchev visited Budapest, the follow- 
ing reception was given to him: 

When he landed in the airport of Budapest the government did not 
even dare to send a military honor guurd to receive Khrushchev, the 
prime minister of the Soviet Union. They sent there a secret police 
honor guard. It has not occurred in recent times that a prime 
minister of a great power could not be received by military units but 
a secret police unit. I believe it is one of the greatest humiliations 
which ever occurred to a prime minister of a great power. 

Number two: He went on a sightseeing tour like he will go here, 
and I want to quote two events, both of which I can prove with 
Budapest newspapers, with Communist newspapers. 

It occurred in 1958, April to be very precise. He went to Szolnok — 
it is a peasant area — where in the whole district the peasants were 
ordered to get there and hsten to Khrushchev. When Khrushchev 
began to talk the big crowd of, I don't know how many times ten 
thousands or a hundred thousand, peasants could not be controlled. 

They began to leave the place by the coaches, and big dust clouds 
showed a very brave and a very definite demonstration that "they 



18 THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

could force us to appear here but they could not force us to listen to 
this tyrant of our nation." 

Khrushchev afterward acknowledged this event but did not tell 
anything. I believe on the basis that he realized the peasants are 
always the most embittered anti-Communists in these countries where 
their small lands were communized. Khrushchev did not care about 
this demonstration because those were peasants, and he knew they 
did not like him. 

Then next he was brought to Tata, It is a big mining area. The 
Communists always boasted that the miners and the steelworkers of 
heavy industry "are the backbone of the Communist system." 

They brought Khrushchev to tliis mining area to show that "if the 
peasants did not like you, these are your real comrades and they will 
applaud and acclaim you." 

There the miners also could be forced to get to the spot and begin 
to listen to Mr. Khrushchev, but very soon they began to leave the 
place in high numbers, in big groups. Then Khrushchev lost his 
temper, because his greatest hope faded away. Even the miners of 
Hungary refused to listen to him. He shouted the following — and I 
have a note. If I am allowed I will quote that, mentioning the Com- 
munist source of Budapest. When these miners left the place in big 
numbers, in great groups, Khrushchev — very irritated — shouted after 
those who left the place — and I quote word for word: 

Your demonstration is in vain. You have to swallow the 
fact: What is to be will be. 

It was written in the Hungarian Communist newspaper Nepsza- 
badsag and announced by Budapest radio on April 10th, 1958 

It means that the Communist newspaper and the Communist radio 
had to recognize the fact: the miners, who were believed to be the 
backbone of the Communist Party and Communist system, were 
brave enough to demonstrate: "We do not want to listen to that man 
who personally is responsible for the bloody suppression of the 
country." 

I believe if these suppressed people dare to demonstrate that they 
do not want this man, they do not want his system, they will not 
sympathize if they hear about a possible triumphant reception of this 
man anywhere in the free world. 

Mr. Arens. Is peaceful coexistence with Khrushchev and the 
Kremlin and international communism possible? 

General Kiraly. Sir, the "peaceful coexistence," is as great a fraud 
as the whole diplomatic action was in Budapest in November 1956. 
The peaceful coexistence is a dreadful thing. 

The peaceful coexistence means that one hundred million East 
Central Em-opean peoi>le will, against their own will, be forced to live 
in the Communist orbit. 

Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence means that the status quo is 
recognized. The peaceful coexistence of Khrushchev does not intend 
peacefully to coexist, but does intend to have a direct or indirect recog- 
nition of the suppression of one hundred million westernized people 
from the Baltic down to Bulgaria and Albania. 

I believe that even if after this recognition Khrushchev would be 
sincerely wilhng to coexist, even at that time it would be one of the 



THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 19 

most unjust situations because this system would recognize the sup- 
pression of one hundred milhon westernized people in the Soviet orbit. 

Mr, Arens. Now, if in the next few weeks Khrushchev pledges to 
the West his peaceful intentions and pledges to the West that he 
does not want war, can we believe him? 

General Kiraly. Such sort of announcement could only be believed 
if Khrushchev would allow the one hundred million westernized East 
Central European people to announce their own will. 

Khrushchev would be obliged to let them choose the system they 
want to live in on the basis of the Declaration on Liberated Em'ope 
adopted in Yalta and the Peace Agreements of Paris after World 
War II. Under these agreements, all the East Central Em-opean 
people have the right to choose their own government by secret 
election. If Khrushchev wants something sincerely, he has to carry 
out at least the Yalta agreement. Afterward we will see what this 
one hundred million people wish. I know democracy is what they 
want. 

Mr. Arens. General, were you a member of the Communist Party? 

General Kiraly. Yes, I was. 

Mr. Arens. What is the objective of the international Communist 
operation? 

General Kiraly. One thing, sir— and this one thing never has been 
denied by the Communists- — this simple announcement of Khrushchev 
"We will bury you." Or Khrushchev's last announcement when he 
visited Eastern Germany. In Leipzig he made a big speech. Very 
clearly he announced that capitalism— as they are naming the 
West— will be ruined and communism has to overrule the globe. 

This is a single thing. Out of it they never made any secret. 
They always announced it clearly: It is the aim of international com- 
munism to annihilate the freedom of the free world and to override 
the globe with the Communist system. 

Mr. Arens. Is the international Communist empire now at war 
with the free world? 

General Kiraly. Yes, they are in a continuous war in many, many 
fields. Not to mention the Asiatic developments now from the 
Indian border to Laos, but they are in war even in Europe. The 
radio broadcasts, the newspapers, all the international events like the 
youth festival in Vienna, were an effort to attack and to ruin the West. 

But — thank God — many of my friends were, for example, in Vienna. 
That city, being a place outside the Iron Curtain area, the organizere 
of the festival could not suppress the freedom of speech. I can with 
a great responsibility announce that there in this battle, which was 
a battle of ideals, the Communists lost — not in the ofTicial meetings 
which were controlled by the Communist Party, but in tlie streets 
where they were debating centers, where free speech could not be 
controlled. 

There, in front of the youth of uncommitted countries, freedom was 
wliat won. It was a battle, and such battles are occurring day to day 
on different fields. 

Mr. Arens. General, are we engaged in a popularity contest with a 
competing economic system; or are we engaged in a death struggle 
with a world conspiracy which threatens freedom everywhere? 

General Kiraly. We are in a death struggle against the greatest 
conspirator of mankind, and this struggle is going on day and night. 



20 THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

Mr. Arens. Earlier in your testimony, General, you mentioned the 
execution of Imre Nagy and General Pal Maleter. Would you give 
us the details of that atrocity? 

General Kiraly. According to a communique of the Hungarian 
Mmister of Justice, the translation of which was reported by Reuters 
of June 17, 1958, Imre Nagy, Prime Minister of Hungary; General 
Pal Maleter, Defense Minister of Hungary; and their associates were 
tried and found guilty and executed. 

These illegal executions were first announced by Moscow radio on 
June 16, 1958, and not by Budapest authorities which announced it 
only on June 17, 1958. 

Only two months prior to these scandalous executions, Khrushchev 
spent one week in Budapest. The coincidence of the time of tlie 
possible trial and Khrushchev's visit in Budapest indicates that he 
had a direct hand even in Imre Nagy's execution. 

The whole Imre Nagy case is a shocking phenomenon showing what 
the Khrushchevian treachery, relentlessness, and tyi-anny over indi- 
viduals, as well as nations, means. 

It is well known that after the second Soviet aggression on Novem- 
ber 4th, 1956, Imre Nagy sought asylum in the Yugoslavian Embassy 
in Budapest. On November 22, 1956, after Janos Kadar, the Soviet- 
imposed Prime Minister of Hungary, stated in writing that the 
Hungarian regime did not want to start proceedings against Imre Nagy 
and his associates, Nagy and his party left the Yugoslav Embassy. 
After leaving the building they were kidnaped by Soviet military 
forces and deported to Rumania. 

In a verbal note, the Yugoslav Government stated — and I quote — 
"There was a flagrant breach of the agreements reached." 

It is quoted from the report of the United Nations Special Com- 
mittee on the Problem of Hungary, General Assembly, the 11th Session, 
Supplement No. 18 in 8 (A-3592) page 10. 

Janos Kadar, the Soviet-imposed Prime Minister of Hungary, made 
the following statement in a radio speech shortly after the kidnaping 
of the group: 

We have promised not to start any punitive proceedings 
against Imi-e Nagy and we shall keep our word. 

This is quoted from Nepszabadsag, November 27, 1956. 

In spite of this statement Imi-e Nagy and his associates were 
executed. 

Wlio commanded Janos Kadar to break his own promise? No one 
else other than Khrushchev. Furthermore Imi-e Nagy and his associ- 
ates were in the hands of Khrushchev's secret police, and not in the 
hands of Hungarian secret police, and they were confined outside of 
Hungary. 

It is very probable tliat even the execution was carried out by 
Khrushcliev's mercenaries. 

Mr. Arexs. General, you have seen communism in action in the 
raw, with all its brutalities. Can you tell us if we can defeat this 
force in the world by exchanging ballet dancers with the Soviet Union? 

General Kiraly. Never. 

Mr. Arexs. Can we defeat this monstrous t^Tanny by sending and 
exchanging art work? 

General Kiraly. Ai't work? Never. 



THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 21 

Mr. Arens. Will Khi-ushchcv and his thirty-three million zealots 
change by an exchange of visits between our country and the Soviet 
Union by distinguished personages? 

General Kiraly. Never. All of these actions are used to defraud, 
to cheat public opinion of the free world, to lull their vigilance, and, 
in the meantime, to make progress toward then- principal goal to con- 
quer the whole world. 

Mr. Arens. Will the international Communist conspiracy have 
any intention of changing its strategy or its tactics of infiltration and 
subversion over the world when Khrushchev goes to Iowa to see some 
of our farms; and when he goes to New York City and meets with 
certam of the businessmen who will be wining and dining him? 

General Kiraly. Never. 

]Mr. Arens. Will Khi'ushchev or his gang of international outlaws 
who are dripping in blood now change. General, after Khrushchev is 
received by the officialdom of this Nation, given its honors as a head 
of state? 

General Kiraly. Never, because the Communist system could not 
change its principal tactics of terror, of continuous shakeups, of con- 
tinuous explosions even inside their S3'stem and emph-e. If they 
would change either internationally or internally, their present 
method — if they were to give substantial freedom mside their own 
country, if they were to liberalize their system inside — it would, like 
it happened in Hungary, positively progress to full freedom, which 
they never can allow. Freedom and communism are diametrically 
opposite of each other. 

The Chairman. Do you, Mr. Kovago, solemnly swear that the 
testimony 3^ou are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. KovAGO. I do. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH KOVAGO 

Mr. Arens. Please identify yourself by name, residence, and 
occupation. 

Mr. Kovago. My name is Joseph Kovago, I am a resident of 219 
Potomac Road, Fairfax, Wilmington, ^Delaware. My profession is 
that of mechanical engineer, and I am the former mayor of Budapest. 

Mr. Arens. Ai'e you also, Mr. Kovago, connected with the 
Assembly of Captive Em'opean Nations? 

Mr. Kovago. Yes, sir. I am the vice-chairman of the Assembly 
of Captive European Nations, and I am the vice-chairman of the 
Hungarian Committee in New York. 

Mr. Arens. You have stated that you were formerly mayor of 
Budapest. Would you kindly give us a very succinct resume of your 
own personal background? 

Mr. Kovago. I was born in 1913 in Csomoder, Hungary. 

Finishing my elementary and high schools, I graduated from the 
Military Academy of Budapest. Then I served in the army as a 
young officer. Then I attended the Technical University of Budapest 
where I graduated in 1943 as a mechanical engineer. 

In the last years of the w^ar, we organized an anti-Nazi resistance 
movement of which I was one of the organizers. I was the fii'st assist- 



22 THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

ant to the leader of the anti-Nazi miHtary movement, General Janos 
Kiss. We got arrested by Nazis, and my friends were execut ed. With 
the help of my friends who were not arrested I sm-vived. 

After the war I became a member of the Smallholders' Party of 
Hungary, which was the largest party in opposition before the war 
and during the Nazi times. It was a democratic, anti-Communist 
party. 

On the ticket of the Smallholders' Party I was fu"st appointed to 
be vice-mayor of Budapest, and serving in this office there came the 
free election of the Budapest city council where I was elected the 
mayor of Budapest in 1945, November. 

I served in my office from that time on until 1947, June, when 
political events forced me to resign from my office. 

Mr. Arens. Wliat were the political events, if 3^ou do not mind an 
interruption at the moment? 

Mr. KovAGO. The Communist Party attacked our party; and 
though we gained in a free election in 1945 the absolute majority 
of the votes, we could not carry out our program, we could not govern 
the country because the Communist Party with the help of occupy- 
ing Soviet forces prevented us from carrying out our programs, and 
forced our party to form a coalition government, in which the Com- 
munist Party was included. 

At the beginning of 1947 the secretary general of my party, Bela 
Kovacs, one of the most respected leaders of our country, w^as arrested 
by Soviet troops, opposing communism and the Communist takeover. 

Later on other members of the party were arrested also; and the 
prime minister, Mr. Ferenc Nagy, and the speaker of parliament, 
!Monsignor Bela Varga, were compelled to escape the country. 

I considered this to be a virtual takeover by the Communists and 
I resigned from my office, sending a letter to the city council in which 
I frankly declared that I fullheartedly disagreed with the present 
political situation. 

Mr. Arens. What happened then, sir? 

Mr. KovAGo. Then I did not take part any more in the political hfe 
of the country, but worked as a mechanical engineer in different jobs. 

In 1950, I was arrested by the Communist secret police, and after 
six months of having been tortured and questioned, I was put on a 
secret trial and got a lifetime sentence. I was accused of having built 
political, economic, and cultural relations with the West. 

I spent six and a half years in different prisons; and just before the 
revolution, I was released on September 18th, 1956, on a parolee 
status for a half year on the condition that a new trial will take place. 

Then came the revolution, in which — as it is a well-known fact — 
the whole Hungarian people took part. I helped to reorganize my 
party. I was elected a member of the executive committee of my 
party, later on the secretary general of my party. 

I was reelected as mayor of Budapest on November 2nd, 1956, and 
I was appointed by Imrc Nagy's government to be the member of a 
five-member delegation which had the duty to carry out political dis- 
cussions in connection with Hungary's new international political 
status with the Soviet Union and, if necessary, with other powers. 

When the second Russian intervention took place, I still remained in 
the country and took part in the resistance. That was a desperate 
struggle which we carried on. But on November 30th, 1956, I saw 



THE CRIMES OF IvHRUSHCHEV 23 

that my lifo was again in utmost danger; I would be grabbed again 
and put back in prison. I escaped the country with my family. 

Then I visited European cities: Vienna, The Hague, Paris, London. 
Then on January 20th, 1957, I came to this country and from that 
time on I am living here. 

j\Ir. Akens. General Kiraly has detailed in his testimony today the 
events of the Hungarian revolution. We should like to avoid an 
unnecessary duplication of the testimony, but there are a number of 
items we would like to explore witli you please, sir. 

First of all, based upon your experience in the revolution and as an 
authority in Hungary as ma3'or of Budapest, are you equipped to 
assess the responsibility for the crimes committed by the Communists 
in Hungary? 

Mr. KovAGO. First of all, the crimes began just after the Second 
World War. The Hungarian nation never was Communist and 
never had been Communist but the Communist Party, being a 
handful, a small minority, carried out a takeover by the help of the 
Russian army. 

Dm'ing this fight many good Hungarians were executed, killed, and 
deported to Siberia and other parts of the Soviet Union. 

This crime against the Hiuigarian nation w^as carried on during the 
later years, and it is a well-known fact that that was a terrible terror 
in the country during which time, again new Hungarian patriots went 
to the gallows. 

We all experienced personally the tortures and the cruel methods 
which were applied agamst each Hungarian patriot who opposed the 
Communist regime. 

This terror and this murder of the nation made the hearts of the 
Hungarian patriots full of despair and dissatisfaction, and that was 
the mainspring of the Hungarian revolution. 

And then from the time that Khi-ushchev came into power, he is 
the man responsible for all the mass murders and torUu-es of the 
Hungarian men, women, and children. 

Mr. Arens. During the intervention by the Soviet troops, did they 
confine their military activities to military targets? 

Mr. KovAGO. No, sir. They, the Soviet troops, invaded Budapest, 
and I am an eyewitness who saw with my own eyes that those tanks 
turned into streets where there were just apartment houses and nothing 
else. And these tanks shot against these apartment houses, and a 
considerable part of Budapest became in ruins. 

There were killed children, women, young and old men without 
distinction, whether or not they were freedom fighters. 

Mr. Arens. What will be the reaction in Hungary when the 
Hungarian people read about Khrushchev's reception in the United 
States — how he will be wined and dined by our officialdom? 

Air. KovAGo. The first ciuestion which comes to the mind of 
Hungarian people is: How it is possible that this butcher of Budapest 
and Hungary is coming to the greatest free country of the world. 

Mr. Arens. Can you explain why Khrushchev had Imre Nagy 
executed and favored Janos Kadar? 

Mr. KovAGo. That is a very interesting and very enlightening 
problem, because both Janos Kadar and Imre Nagy took part in the 
revolution. At the beginning of the revolution, for about six da3'S, 



24 THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 

Janos Kadar himself was an active participant in the Hungarian 
revolution because he became fully aware of the true sentiments of 
despair of the people. 

Imre Nagy was killed and murdered on Khrushchev's order because 
Nagy refused to subordinate the Hungarian interest to that of the 
Soviet Union. He refused to pledge loyalty to the Soviet Union while 
Janos Kadar pledged loyalty to the Soviet Union, and in this way he 
became the new puppet of Khrushchev in Hungary. This man 
carried out all the orders of Khrushchev, never hesitated to take part 
in this great crime against the peace-loving and heroic Hungarian 
people. 

Mr, Arens. Did you have occasion to participate in any of the 
conferences following the actual shootings in which you observed the 
treachery of the Communists? 

Mr. KovAGo. I will be able to complete a little bit the description 
which General Kiraly gave quite clearly with the following: 

I was present in the Parliament Building and I had a conference with 
Zoltan Tildy, Minister of State of the Imre Nagy government, and other 
members of the government, on October 31, 1956, when there came a 
telephone call from Mikoyan, the first assistant of Khrushchev. 

Mikoyan wanted to have a conference with Zoltan Tildy. Before 
Zoltan Tildy left for that conference, we talked details over, all the 
problems which we had to raise before Mikoyan during the conference. 
These were the following: 

The immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Hungary; 
Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact which we had 
ah'cady declared; 

The re-establishment of the multi-party system in Hungary; 
Preparations for a free election and re-establishment of the 
complete sovereignty and self-determination of the Hungarian 
peoples. 

When Zoltan Tildy returned from an one-hour long conference with 
Miko3"an, he told me with a happy and smiling face: "I raised all the 
problems and he agreed with everything." 

This shows that Mikoyan was sent by Khrushchev to Hungary to 
cheat the Hungarian Government and to prepare this trap and 
treachery, because from that time on the Hungarian revolutionary 
government has acted in the belief that we will be able to arrange and 
solve all matters with the Soviet Union in a peaceful way. 

But the reason for this treacherous diplomacy was, as General 
Kiraly pointed out rightly, to lull our alertness and to prevent us from 
concentrating troops and take all the necessary steps to continue our 
fight. 

We never could imagine that the official delegation, an official 
representative of a great power, would prepare a trap for arresting 
the official delegation of the Hungarian Government which started 
negotiations on the very initiative of the Soviet Government. 

Air. Arexs. Based upon your background and experience, can the 
representatives of the United States of America negotiate with 
Khrushchev as they would with a man of good faith? 

Mr. KovAGo. This example shows in itself that we never can believe 
that Khrushchev is carrying on negotiations in good faith, 

]\Ir. Arexs. What do you think is the guiding pohtical prmciple 
of Khrushchev? 



THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV 25 

Mr. KovAGO. I think that Khrushchev is the best disciple of 
Machiavelh because if his own interest dictates it, he will kill; while 
he finds it useful, he will smile, will kiss children, will shake hands and 
show a good face. 

Mr. Arens. Will he ever relinquish the objective which he 
announced of burying the free world? 

Mr. KovAGO. I do not think he will ever give up this idea and 
those tactics because his final goal is to deceive the free world in order 
to attain its gradual surrender. 

Mr. Arens. Do you have information respecting the losses in the 
Hungarian revolution? 

Mr. KovAGO. Yes, sir. 

During and after the revolution and freedom fight there were 
approximately 30,000 Hungarians killed by armed forces of Khrush- 
chev. According to official reports 2,500 persons were executed; 
however, the victims of Khrushchev's secret police are probably 
higher— 12,000 persons were deported to the Soviet Union; hundreds 
of" thousands of persons were imprisoned; 15,000 were confined to 
forced labor camps. 

And finally Khrushchev ordered the re-establishment of concentra- 
tion camps which were abolished before the revolution of 1956. 

Mr. Arens. You have told us certain connections and sources of 
information which you presently have, Mr. Kovago. Endly on the 
record give us a general resume of the conditions now in Hungar3^ 

Mr. Kovago. The Hungarian people are in an apathy of despair. 
The new wave of terror which took place in Hungary after the revolu- 
tion is increasing, and the complete control by the Soviet Union of 
the country is so striking and so clear to every Hungarian that the 
people are gradually losing their hope of regaining freedom. 

The prison camps are again full. The conditions are terrible. The 
secret police are again in action even if they are not so conspicuous 
today. And generally all the eftorts for improvements which were 
carried on before the revolution have been gradually abolished under 
the regime of Janos Kadar. 

Under these circumstances it is a real heroism to continue the 
resistance against this oppression. 

Mr. Arens. How many of your compatriots have chosen to live 
elsewhere than under the "blessed regime" of the people's republic 
which Klu'ushchev heads by a puppet in Hungary? 

Mr. Kovago. After the revolution more than 200,000 Hungarians 
escaped the country. 

Mr, Arens. If they were permitted to do so, how many of your 
compatriots w^ould leave this "people's paradise" of Khrushchev's in 
Hungary? 

Mr. Kovago. I am sure, sir, that if the people would be able to 
escape, then the overwhelming majority of the Hungarian people 
would not remain. 

But a country must survive the greatest tragedies of history, and 
all the people cannot and should not escape. 

The Chairman. Gentlemen, we thank you very much for the 
splendid contribution which you have made today. 

(Whereupon at 12 noon, September 10, 1959, the consultations 
were concluded.) 



INDEX 



Individuals 

Page 

Andropov (Yuri V.) - 12, 13, 15, 17 

Erdei (Ferenc)___ ._ 13, 14 

Gere ( Erno) 6 

Kadar, Janos 20, 23-25 

Khrushchev, Nikita vi, 1-3, 7, 12-15, 17-21, 23-25 

Kiraly, Bela 1-3, 5-21 (statement); 23, 24 

Kiss, Janos 22 

Kovacs, Bela 22 

Kovacs (Istvan) 13 

Kovago, Joseph 1, 3; 9, 14, 21-25 (statement) 

Maleter, Pal 2, 13, 14, 17, 20 

Mikoyan (Anastas I.) .-_ 1, 12, 17, 24 

Nagv, Ferenc 22 

Nagy, Irme 11-16, 20, 22-24 

Serov (Ivan Aleksandrovich) 2, 13, 14 

Suslov (Mikhail Andreevich) 1, 12, 17 

Tildy, Zoltan 24 

Tito (Josip Broz) _ 9 

Varga, Bela 22 

Organizations 

Assembly of Captive European Nations 21 

Communist Party, Hungary 6-10, 19, 22 

Hungarian Committee (New York City) 5, 21 

Hungarian Freedom Fighters Federation, Inc 5 

Hungarian Home Defense Committee 11 

Hungarian National Peasant Party 10 

Hungarian Smallholders' Party 10, 22 

Hungarian Social Democratic Party 10 

Hungary, Government of : National Guard 6, 11 

Soviet Control Commission. {See entry under Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics, Government of.) 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Government of: 

Soviet Control Commission 10 

Yugoslavia, Government of: Embassy, Budapest 20 

United Nations: 

General Assembly 11 

Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary 11 

Publications 
N^pszabadsdg (newspaper) 18, 20 

United Nations Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, General 

Assembly, 11th Session Supplement No. 18in 8 (A-3592) 20 



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