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A Critical Analysis of Patriotism 
As an Ethical Concept 









MAY 1, 1918 

A Critical Analysis of Patriotism 
As an Ethical Concept 









MAY 1, 1918 





Part I. The Impulses of Patriotism 

Chapter I. The Impulses of Attachment 9 

Chapter II. The Impulses of Antipathy 16 

Part II. The Habituation of Patriotism 

Chapter III. The Deliberate Habituation 27 

Chapter IV. The Spontaneous Habituation 35 

Part III. The Beliefs of Patriotism 

Chapter V. The Country as Protector of Self 454* 

Chapter VI. The Oneness of Country and Self 52^ 

Chapter VII. The Intrinsic Value of One's Country. . . 57 

Part IV. The Nature and Value of Patriotism 

Chapter VI II. The Will to National Individuality 7*f y 

Chapter IX. The Nation as an Individual 85 

Chapter X. The Ethical Value of Patriotism in the 

Concrete 99 



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Patriotism is a live issue. It is almost impossible for any one to 
be neutral about it. All men seem to feel that the issue involved is 
one that touches the fundamental interests of their lives. Patriotism 
is an important concept. 

But not all men take the same stand regarding patriotism. There 
is hot disagreement upon the question of its moral value. Some 
champion it as one of the noblest of all virtues; others spurn it as 
one of the basest. Therefore it is highly desirable to arrive at a fair 
judgment of the ethical value of patriotism. 

One of the chief reasons for the radical disagreement about the 
morality of patriotism is that there are widely different assumptions 
as to its nature. It is a sentiment of manifold varieties, and the word 
patriotism may carry quite different implications to different minds. 
The first necessary step, then, before one can pass an ethical judg- 
ment upon it, is to find out what the core of patriotism is. 

This dissertation begins, therefore, by undertaking to determine 
the nature of patriotism, and with no more of a clue in hand than 
the one that it is "the love of country" tries, by an inductive investi- 
gation of what has actually been called patriotism, to bring together 
the important facts in which patriotism is manifested. Hence, while 
the main purpose of the essay is an ethical one, a large portion of it 
is given to inductive analysis. The first three parts are mainly ana- 
lytical. The fourth part endeavors to unify in a central concept the , 
data gathered together in the preceding parts, and, in the light of 
that concept and all the facts, to evaluate patriotism as an ethical 
ideal. It may be noted here that the first three parts are printed as 
they were in the typewritten form presented to Yale University as a 
thesis, but that part four has undergone much rearrangement and 
revision. Chapter eight has been largely rewritten; chapter nine is 
entirely new; and what here appears as chapter ten has been some- 
what changed. 

Acknowledgement is hereby made to the members of the faculty 
of the department of philosophy in Yale University for many helpful 
criticisms. Especially is a debt owed to Professor Charles A. Bennett, 
who suggested the field of patriotism as a fruitful one for investigation, 

6 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

under whose direction the work was done, and whose criticisms 
and suggestions have made more definite than would otherwise have 
been the case, the problems involved. Thanks are due to Professor 
Luther A. Weigle, who read the manuscript, and helped to clarify and 
make accurate the expression of the ideas. And my gratitude is 
given to my wife, whose assistance in the final preparation of the 
manuscript was invaluable, and who by her constant helpfulness and 
loyalty made it possible for the whole work to be brought to com- 

Indianapolis, January, 1920. 




The Impulses of Attachment 

When in 1914 the great war broke out, the world was astounded. 
There were forces at work which men were confident would make 
another war between first-class powers impossible. International re- 
lations and groupings, such as those of commerce, labor, art, science, 
and learning, had increased in strength and number. The terribleness 
and waste of war were deemed to be so fully realized that modern 
nations would have no taste for armed conflict. But the war came on, 
and there must have been mighty causes to be able to produce so 
gigantic a result. What were they? What could be the nature of 
such tremendous causes, that yet remained concealed and in their 
issuance so took men by surprise? The factors were various, and some, 
of course, had been noted, but one factor which was unnoticed by the 
general public and yet which is one of fundamental importance is the 
role taken in patriotism by men's unreasoned dispositions of character. 
If the phenomenon of patriotism is to be fully understood, it must be 
analyzed with a view of discovering what are these deeply ingrained 
sets of mind and character which are its raw material and which make 
it so powerful. 1 

Patriotism is a complex sentiment. There is, in other words, no 
single instinctive response in all human beings to the stimulus, country. 
What, then, are some of the dispositions of which patriotism is com- 
posed? There are impulses which make primarily for attachment, and 
there are those that make primarily for antipathy. One of the most 
important of the impulses of attachment is the disposition of gregarious- 
ness. Hobbes, indeed, and others after him, built their theories of the 
state upon the doctrine that man would have been able to live alone 
had not the company of others been forced upon him, but that there 
is an impulse of gregariousness seems indisputable. It is simply an 
observable fact that there are species of animals that not only live in 
herds, packs, or flocks, but which also show uneasiness and distress at 
being separated from their fellows. James cites the observation of 
Galton on the gregariousness of the South African cattle. 2 If an in- 
dividual of this species were separated from the herd it would direct 
its whole activity towards getting back once more, and when its object 
was attained, would plunge into the heart of the herd as if to bathe its 
very body in contact with its fellows. Now man, as well as other 

io Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

animals, lives a group life, and it seems almost inevitable that he 
should develop an impulse parallel to the outward facts of his existence, 
even were it not probable that he has inherited gregariousness as a 
psychical disposition from his animal ancestors. That the impulse is 
actually present in the human species is shown by the fact that there 
is in man a strong abhorrence of prolonged solitude. Professor James' 
words on this point have come to be almost classical: "To be alone 
is one of the greatest evils for him [the normal man]. Solitary con- 
finement is by many regarded as a mode of torture too cruel and un- 
natural for civilized countries to adopt. To one long pent up on a 
desert island the sight of a human footprint or a human form in the 
distance would be the most tumultously exciting of experiences." 8 
But the impulse is also apparent in more normal experiences. So much 
do men desire the company of others that it is not only an element 
of recreation usually, but the more serious tasks of life often derive 
their value not more because of the ostensible end sought after than be- 
cause of the human association which is involved. 

Wilfred Trotter 4 has made gregariousness central in his study of 
society. He begins by approving of the method of those who have 
come at the study from the standpoint of the instincts, but expresses 
dissatisfaction with the limits of their results, that is, dissatisfaction 
with the kind of analysis that would explain man by referring the 
whole of his conduct to the instincts of self-preservation, nutrition, 
and sex. Such an explanation, he finds, has been historically attempted, 
but after it has gone as far as it could, there has always been left over 
an unexplained X. Trotter accepts self-preservation, nutrition, and 
sex as fundamental instincts, but completes the list by bringing forward 
the i nstinct of th e herd which he offers as the explanation of all human 
activity which was left unexplained by the other three instincts men- 
tioned above. To Trotter there have been two great epoch-making 
forward steps in the evolution of life. The first came with the change 
from unicellular to multicellular organisms, the great advantage of 
which was to make the group of cells the unit of selection, thus to some 
extent relieving the single cell of the burden of the struggle for exist- 
ence, and permitting it a greater chance for variability without running 
a greater risk of extinction. This arrangement, says Trotter, had im- 
portant influences upon all the cells comprised in the organism. The 
second great evolutionary advance came with the change from solitary 
to gregarious animals, and was attended by modifications just as pro- 
found as had accompanied the advance from unicellular to multicellular 

The Impulses of Patriotism ii 

organisms. Here again the power of natural evolution operated upon 
the group as a unit, thus permitting once more greater variability on 
the part of the individual. Association in the herd became increasingly 
valuable in the struggle for existence, and tended to become more and 
more strongly fixed as a disposition of animal nature, a fact which had 
fundamental influence upon the mental characteristics of the individual. 
There are psychological traits which would not exist but for the fact 
of gregariousness. Shyness, embarrassment, fear, anger, love, sympathy, 
sorrow, and gratitude would be devoid of meaning apart from their 
connection with social relations. 

' The first important result of the instinct of gregariousness is that *v 
it makes for homogeneity. That is, it is an impulse making primarily 
for attachment. Each individual tends to become thoroughly assimi- 
lated in the life of the group; the group's ways have a vital meaning to 
him. Sensitiveness to the behavior of his fellows is heightened, and 
resistiveness to the suggestions of the herd is lowered. A suggestion 
from outside is likely to be rejected, and direct experience tends to have 
little meaning, if its teachings are at variance with the beliefs of the Vif 
group. Altruism arises; it is a natural product of the situation where / 
the conditions of life are such that each individual is of necessity con- 
stantly in the habit of regarding the welfare of others as well as that 
of himself. Danger from the outside stimulates each individual, and 
spreads fear through the whole group. The herd huddles together, and ; 
each shares in the panic of all. Loneliness at such a time is unbear/ 

Now man is a social creature, and has the characteristics that re- 
sult from herd instinct. He tends to become solidified with those of 
his own kind, and feel uncomfortable when out of touch with them; 
to be suggestible to the influences of his group, and resistive to the 
influences of other groups; to feel altruism towards those of his own 
herd and aversion towards those of other herds; to be aroused when 
the nation is threatened, and huddle in the group in the face of danger. 
All these characteristics under the proper stimuli are manifested by 
patriotism. A definition of patriotism from the standpoint of attach- 
ment to the group is that of Sumner: "Patriotism is loyalty to the civic 
group to which one belongs by birth or other group bond. It is a 
sentiment of fellowship and cooperation in all the hopes, work, and 
sufferings of the group. 6 

The herd is not tolerant of the nonconformist. The nonconformist 
has in a way become a stranger. He has put himself out of touch 



12 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

with the group. The group knows him and his ways, but he has not 
permitted himself to be thoroughly assimilated by it. And the very 
thing that the herd desires and insists upon is homogeneity. In the 
words of one writer, "The crowd not only needs to make adherents 
and thus maintain its existence and increase in volume and power; it 
needs no less to assimilate, to digest, the individuals which it swallows 
^up." fl The individual,- then, cannot be too insistent upon the expres- 
sion of his own personality. His life, even his inner life, must con- 
form to that of the group. His emotions will not be a matter merely 
of his own concern. "Herd-union does not intensify all emotions. It 
intensifies those which are felt in common, but it actually deadens and 
ishuts down those which are only felt by the individual." 7 And inde- 
pendent thought is even more taboo. "Thought ... is markedly 
individual and personal. . . . Thought is critical, and the Herd 
wants unanimity, not criticism. Consequently Herd-union dtadens 
thought." 8 Hence the nonconformist gets himself disliked, and the 
outcome of the situation has usually been to submerge the individual, 
and assimilate him to the group. The moral of the tale is that patriot- 
ism acts in that way. "Patriotism, which is the crowd-emotion of a 
y Nation, makes at times supreme claims on every citizen and enforces 
them by public opinion so powerful that few can or desire to evade 
them." 9 

These observations throw light upon the question whether patriotism 
is a political or national emotion. Is patriotism attachment to the gov- 
ernment or state, or is it love of one's national group? There can be 
no doubt that it is the latter rather than the former. It is an out- 
growth of tribal feeling. Bertrand Russell is only overstating a truth 
when he says that "Tribal feeling, which always underlay loyalty to 
the sovereign, has remained as strong as it ever was, and is now the 
chief support for the power of the State." 10 

There is an egoistic element in the attachment of patriotism. It 
is an adhesion to one's own, and one's own is but an extension of him- 
self. Patriotism is a personal matter. That is, it is based upon a 
personal relationship. One cleaves to his group not on account of its 
intrinsic worth simply but because of what it is worth to him. The ma- 
jority of men are most loyal to what is nearest themselves. Each one of 
them seems to himself to be the center of his sphere, and things vary 
in importance in direct ratio to their nearness to the center. This 
fact gives the key to a very common kind of patriotism. It is simply the 
loyalty that men feel to the extension of their own ego. 

The Impulses of Patriotism 13 

"One's own" includes the people of his group, i. e., the people who 
are most like himself. These people share many things in common 
with himself. They have similar habits and customs, and all this 
conduces to render them one's own. "One's own" also includes the 
soil. It is that which is beneath one's very feet; it sustains one; it 
nourishes one. Furthermore, one knows it as he cannot know any 
strange land, and as no stranger can know his land. Me lives in it 
throughout the whole year, and knows it intimately in all its peculiar- 
ities and changing moods. Consequently, his patriotism has in it a 
love of the "land where his fathers died." Virgil understood the 
meaning of this love of the soil. He himself felt it keenly, and because 
of it refused to accept the old home estate of a Roman sent into exile. 
It was characteristic that he made ^Eneas lament Troy even when he 
was going out to establish Rome itself. It was because of this under- 
standing, in part at least, that he was led to urge the Romans to get 
back to the soil, realizing that from a love of the soil to a love of our 
soil is but a step. u 

However, what one has been used to should not be taken as the 
only kind of the patriotism of attachment that there is. If adhesion 
to one's own could not be overcome, loyalty to one's earliest home 
would quite uniformly be stronger than patriotism. But sometimes one 
begins to feel that his childhood was spent in cramped quarters, and 
that his early opinions were inadequate. The emotion that he may 
be very likely to feel under such conditions is not that of affection but 
that of contempt and disgust. 1 Quite often when there is a conflict be- 
tween loyalty to the nation and loyalty to the community, loyalty to 
the nation proves the strongerT^Another indication that men are not 
inseparably bound to what they have been used to is that they change 
their nation, adopt another country, and side with it even against the 
country of their birth. Some time ago there appeared in one of the 
large newspapers a letter from a naturalized German in which was this 
sentence: "Perhaps you would appreciate your American citizenship 
better if, like me, you had been born and brought up in Germany." 19 

A reason for this attachment to one's own is the impulse which im- 
pels one to want to feel at home in his world. It is an impulse which 
craves order; and it shows itself in a desire for a unified world. There 
seems to be an esthetic element in it; the normal mind with a sense 
of beauty cannot endure chaos. It represents a rational demand; it 
is, for instance, a driving force in philosophy. It finds another root 


14 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

in the desire for safety. One wants a friendly world in which he feels 
sure of himself and where he can live freely without being troubled 
by the strange or unknown. Now one's country presents a world that 
he knows and can find his way in; consequently, it satisfies this de- 
mand for a unified world organized about one's own life, and by virtue 
of this character it is able to furnish an additional item in the stimuli 
to patriotism. 

Man is attached to his country very much as he is attached to 
himself; he could not very well help the one any more than he could 
help the other. But what is in one way a mere expression of egoism 
becomes also an affection. Unless there is some special reason for the 
contrary, one is likely to cherish a real affection for that with which 
he has long been associated, and especially so, if it has been of use 
to him. This fact gives justification for the popular definition of 
patriotism as "the love of country." This affection even may be 
selfish, but it may also take on a more altruistic character. Altruism 
naturally and perforce develops in a gregarious society. And, more- 
over, the parental instinct adds its strength. The protection of the 
home is a strong sentiment in patriotism. And the tender emotion of 
the parental instinct may be extended to others besides offspring. 
Patriotism gets colored by it, and becomes very much like it. Mc- 
Dougall says that, "Like the fully developed parental sentiment, the 
patriotism of many men is a fusion of this quasi-altrustic extension of 
the self-regarding sentiment with the truly altruistic sentiment of 
love." 13 Patriotism is, then, in part egoistic and in part altruistic) In 
a nation beset with enemies it will indeed take the form of animosity 
toward the enemy, but in a prosperous nation will direct itself very 
frequently to internal improvement. And it may be said that it re- 
tains something of altruism as well as egoism even in war. It is, even 
while being combative towards the out-group, altruistic towards the 
in- group™ 

The spirit of attachment in patriotism may even go so far as to be- 
come a worship. Religious impulse has frequently been an element in 
patriotism. Religion and patriotism were almost the same thing in 
Israel. But there are modern parallels. A clergyman not long ago was 
reported to have said that the men who died upon the field of battle 
(he was thinking of men of his own nation) would straightway reach 
heaven, since they had died for their fellow men. It is evident that 
being a patriot held something of a religious fervor for that clergyman. 
Probably the Kaiser feels a religious exaltation which sustains him in 
the belief that he is the instrument of God. 

The Impulses of Patriotism 15 

Alfred Loisy 16 opposes Christianity and patriotism to one another, 
much to the credit of patriotism. According to Loisy, the teachings 
of Christianity and patriotism are incompatible, and those of Chris- 
tianity are quite inadequate for the present crisis. Therefore patriotism 
is much nobler and not only should but will supplant Christianity. The 

, only living faith, so he says, is that of devotion to one's country. For 
that men will sacrifice. "Certainly," says Loisy, "it is an august life 
for which a man will sacrifice his own without grudging it; but it is 

J not for a blessed immortality in the company of Christ and the saints; 

: it is for the life of the country." 18 This account of what Loisy says 
is set down here not so much because it gives an idea of patriotism, 
but because through it Loisy passionately expresses his own ideal. In 
his book there breathes a most intense love for France. This love, he 
says, is the absorbing passion of the people of France, and is what 
unites them. Again we quote his own words: "There are a faith and 
love in which it [the army] is unanimous [as against the lack of unan- 
imity in Christianity] : the love of our country, and an imperishable 
belief in her future; over these sentiments, all are in communion, and 
the whole country agrees with the army. Here is our common religion: 
one which has no unbelievers; in which those who are faithful to the 
old creed may fraternize indiscriminately with the adherents of the 
newer principles. . . . Differences [of religion] count no longer 

! in face of the absorbing interest, the burning passion, the true religion, 
both of this and of every moment, namely devotion to the immortality 

1 of France." 17 "So long as we live, we are determined to live in our own 
way; and that which gives us our vigour now against the invader is 
neither a lust of conquest, nor the hate which an unjust, cruel, and 
fanatical enemy deserves, but the love of our ancient France, who is 
our all, whom we yearn to preserve, and whom we are vowed to save." 1 ' 
Here is a devotion which amounts to a religion, and it furnishes an ex- 
ample of the working of the religious impulse in patriotism. 

It is not yet time to draw final conclusions, but it is not out of place 
to note in passing that patriotism was not condemned by its egoistic 
ingredients, and is not now justified by its elements of altruism. 
Viewed as a religion, one may say that it is too likely to become 
fanatical. The willingness to die upon the battlefield, rather than / 
goodness, becomes the final test of the desirable citizen. Moreover, 
the injury worked upon others is apt to be overlooked. As a religion, 
patriotism has the strength, but not the necessary universality. What 
it does is wrongly to elevate a good to the standard of the Good. 


The Impulses of Antipathy 

The impulses of antipathy have played an important role in the 
development of patriotism. When one becomes aware of the existence 
of other peoples unlike himself, the sense of difference which arises is 
liable to take on the character of a strong and active aversion to and 
depreciation of them. Nothing is more common than the feeling that 
one's own people is a kind of chosen race, and that all other races 
are inferior. A speaker who had lived many years among the Navajo 
Indians once said that they regarded and called themselves "The Peo- 
ple." They were at the top of mankind; the Mexicans ranked next 
to them; the Americans came third and last. This was their arrange- 
ment of all the peoples that they knew. The same attitude appears in 
civilized man. He is characterized by self-satisfaction, and the peculi- 
arities of others, even of dialect and pronunciation, are enough to 
call forth contempt and ridicule. It follows that strangers can easily 
be enemies. In Latin, the word hostis which at first meant simply 
stranger or foreigner came later to mean enemy. The words of Loisy 
are again appropriate: "In the lower stages of human evolution, a 
foreigner is not far from being an enemy, if he be not one actually. 
In the higher stages of our evolution, among people who think they 
are really civilized, he still seems in practice to be of another species, 
because he has a different mentality, and unusual ways. Each separate 
human group has thus a fashion of collective egoism, whence comes self- 
satisfaction, a pride which may possess dignity, which may be a power, 
but which also may become a source of blindness and wickedness." 19 
This antipathy to foreigners has been strong even when other forces 
appeared to be in the ascendancy. Such was the case, for instance, 
when religion seemed to have the center of the stage; nationalistic 
jealousy was a factor in the movements which centered about Wiclif, 
Huss, Luther, Henry VIII, and John Knox. These men could all 
count upon antipathy to foreigners. And the same antipathy shows 
itself today in the fact thajt the peoples of different nations not only 
hate the enemy, but also show a lack of solicitude about their allies. 
In the outcry for increased production in the spring of 1917, some in- 
dividuals expressed themselves as being ready to plant for American 
consumption, but unwilling that any of the products should go to 

The Impulses of Patriotism 17 

foreigners. And the "foreigners" that were in mind in some in- 
stances were the Canadians, our next-door neighbors. It may be added, 
however, that it does not seem as if there is in race hatred any in- 
surmountable obstacles to overcoming it. Races which are thrown 
into contact become accustomed to one another, and are able to live 
in harmony. 

The form assumed by the general impulse of aversion or antipathy 
may be either defensive or aggressive, and may tend toward either 
self-preservation or self-assertion. There are nations which of their 
own motion will not be warlike, but in which the warlike temper will 
flare up when they are once attacked. In such nations patriotism has 
been associated with the fight for freedoms Sometimes it seems as if 
the definition of the patriot was that he was one who defended his 
country's liberty. This love of freedom is featured in American ex- 
pressions of patriotism. A verse from "Hail, Columbia," will serve 
as an example: 

"Immortal patriots! rise once more: 
Defend your rights, defend your shore: 
Let no rude foe with impious hand 
Let no rude foe with impious hand 
Invade the shrine where sacred lies 
Of toil and blood the well-earned prize." 

The call in this verse is that for defense. 

There is an instinct that attends this impulse to self-preservation 
that strikes one forcibly as being prominent in the patriotism of the 
present time, and that is fear. It is an impulse that manifests itself 
when one's existence or vital interests are threatened. The peoples of 
the world today are in an excitement of fear because each one of them 
believes that national existence and the personal values that depend 
upon it are endangered. There is a reason why it is easy for nations, 
while trusting in their own good intentions, to be suspicious of one 
another. When the individual looks at his own country, he is likely 
to see the common people who are all about him and are like himself. 
And, since he feels that his own purposes are good, he can easily 
credit good motives to his fellow-citizens. But when, on the other 
hand, he looks into another country, he is likely to see the governing 
class looming up, since that is the class that figures most prominently 
in the newspapers. And it is this class which is likely to be most 

1 8 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

aggressively nationalistic, and is, moreover, the object of very little 
understanding by the ordinary man. Hence, while he thinks that all 
the good people that he knows cannot comprise anything that is 
inhuman, he can believe that there may very well be foreign monsters. 
The result is fear, fear of other countries, a fear that breaks out into 
a panic when danger arises, and drives men to seek the safety of the 
fatherland. Now the present is a time of panic, and the impulse 
of fear has put its impress deep upon current patriotism. 

But what is feared tends to become hated too, and so patriotism 
gets tinged with hate. Examples of it are at hand. This war has 
produced its "Hymn of Hate," so labeled, and others not so labeled. 
Many of the Psalms are expressions of patriotic hate, and since the 
war began have been read as such. J. M. Robertson 20 contends that 
patriotism is nothing else but fear and hatred. To his mind patriotism 
is not love or affection at all, and the only apparent affection there 
may be, is that which is compelled by the necessity for common 
action against an enemy. Fear itself, Robertson points out, implies a 
hostile impulse; love and hate, cohesion and repulsion, are to him 
strictly correlative terms; there is no love which is not linked with 
hate. "It is not," he says, "brotherhood, or sympathy, or goodwill that 
unites the general population in a flush of passion against another 
population: the ostensible brotherhood of the moment is merely a 
passing product of the union of egoisms." 21 

It is certain that in great measure Robertson is right. But one 
may well doubt the truth of the assertion that it is necessary to hate 
in order to love. It is not necessary to hate one woman in order to 
love another, or to have an enemy in order to possess a friend. Neither 
does it seem essential in the nature of things to hate one country in 
order to be able to love another. Moreover, hatred is not unqualifiedly 
a term of opprobrium. How can one rightly care for anything without 
in some way resenting attacks upon it? There are such things as 
righteous wrath and righteous hatred if they be directed against what is 

These remarks upon fear and hatred throw further light upon 
some of the phenomena of patriotism already touched upon. One 
can better understand now the frantic excitement that often attends 
a national crisis; fear "more than . . . any other instinct, tends 
to bring to an end at once all other mental activity, riveting the atten- 
tion upon its object to the exclusion of all others." 22 New light is 
thrown upon the solidarity the group shows. Under the stimulus of 

The Impulses of Patriotism 19 

fear, the herd instinctively unites. Unity is the basis of morale. And 
the individual subordinates himself to the group; his normal intolerance 
of isolation is heightened in the presence of fear. And a corollary of 
all this is that the patriotism of fear is destructive of thought, but is 
prolific in unity of emotion and action. 

Self-assertion is an attitude which under the conflict of interests 
with others may be induced. And in the external affairs of nations, it 
may be brought to triumph over the motive of security. The means 
by which this is done is through the argument that only by taking an 
aggressive part can one defend himself, the argument in other words, 
that the best defense is a good offense. The result is that the distinc- 
tion between defensive and offensive warfare is liable to be obliterated, 
a fact which adds to the perplexities of the problem of war. "The 
feeling that war is always defensive wrecks the peace propaganda. 
The word defensive is capable of being stretched indefinitely. It is not 
confined necessarily to preventing an invasion. A people will feel that 
it is fighting a defensive war if it attacks a nation which may attack 
it in the future. ... Or the people may feel that what it re- 
gards as its legitimate expansion is being thwarted. ... So by 
imperceptible gradations every war can be justified, and, as a matter 
of fact, is justified as defensive." 23 When once a war is started, a 
people will support it, even if it is aggressive, and if one couples with 
this the fact that when a nation arms in self-defense, it acquires the 
means of aggression, he can understand how easily a patriotism which 
supports only a policy of self-preservation can be brought to support a 
policy of self-assertion. 

One way in which the will to self-assertion is likely to manifest 
itself is as an impulse to expansion. A stationary condition is not 
satisfactory to the group; it desires to reach out. This impulse shows 
itself in churches and orders of all kinds by the constant demand 
for new members. The group wants to see itself grow. But if na- 
tions grow, they are apt to think that they need more land. And when 
this occurs their patriotism will attach itself to the desire for expan- 
sion, and become imperialism. J. M. Robertson couples the words 
Patriotism and Empire in the title of a book, and in that book he says, 
"Patriotism conventionally defined as the love of country, . . . 
turns out rather obviously to stand for love of more country." 24 And 
where there is coupled with this the impulse of acquisition, it becomes 
plain why the economic rivalry of nations has been so important in 
bringing about the situation out of which war arises. 

20 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

The impulse of expansion undergoes but a slight change to become 
the will to domination. This latter is a primitive impulse. The Indian 
was taught to despise manual labor, but to glory in the overcoming and 
plundering of other tribes. It is still dominant in the race. What 
men desire, at least in the Western world, is power, and they would 
rather exercise dominion over others than be free themselves. Goethe 
puts the idea in poetical form: 

"How often has it arisen! Yes, and it will arise 
Ever and evermore! No man yields sovereignty 
Unto his fellow: none will yield to him 
Who won the power by force, and by force keeps his hold. 
For man, who cannot rule his own unruly heart, 
Is hot to rule his neighbor, bind him to his will." 25 

The desire for dominion was awakened by the Napoleonic aggressions, 
and has played a great part in fanning the flame of nationalism in the 
nineteenth century. It has given nationalism an aggressive and militant 
character. And the people of a democratic country are not immune 
from the virus; they as well as kings sometimes give themselves up to 
the thirst for domination, a fact which has at least some bearing upon 
whether or 'not democracy will make the world safe. The citizen 
rarely disputes the external sovereignty of his country. Consequently 
the fact of internal democracy by no means gives assurance that a 
country will uniformly abstain from assuming the attitude of a dynastic 
state when it faces the world. Democracy often ceases at the water's 

/ Pride is a part of patriotism. Men walk with heads up and chests 
/ out at the consciousness of belonging to a conquering or respected na- 
/ tion. The triumphal processions of the Romans were a spectacle that no 
/ doubt stirred patriotism of this variety in noble Roman hearts. They 
could "point with pride" to their glory. And a little touch of glory 
makes the whole world kin; modern men in their swelling national 
\ pride are of the same stock as the ancient men of Rome. Men now 
identify themselves with their group, and feel that along with it, they 
\ themselves rise or fall in importance. If the country submits to an- 
other's will, they hang their heads in shame; if it imposes upon an- 
other its own will, they hold their heads high. An important practical 
consequence of national pride is that no people now would voluntarily 
consent to peace without honor, which is food for thought in the 
planning of peace. 

The Impulses of Patriotism 21 

The patriotism of pride is not loath to meet its adversary upon the 
field of honor. When nations have a lively sense of power and 
prestige, a situation is created which furnishes admirable fuel for 
trouble. For insecure pride will induce fear, and fearful pride will 
allow no nation to do other than to resent insults, real or supposed, 
promptly and bitterly. Material interests need not clash in order that 
a war be provoked. If the patriot says to himself that the country's 
honor has been assailed, the fight is on, no matter what the insult may 
consist in; it may have to do with only a matter of mere punctilio. 
An insult has been offered, and injured pride does not enjoy itself until 
it reaps revenge. Of course the crime is that the insult is a public 
one. "The act that, more certainly than any other, provokes vengeful 
emotion is the public insult, which, if not immediately resented, lowers 
one in the eyes of one's fellows. Such an insult calls out one's positive 
self-feeling, with its impulse to assert oneself and to make good one's 
value and power in the public eye." 26 

But it does not happen that any one country is allowed to assert 
itself without opposition. Others will follow the example, attempt to 
assert themselves, and make good their prestige. What then happens 
is that there is a race for power, and patriotism becomes a spirit of 
rivalry or emulation. 27 The fact is that what most of us desire is not 
only well-being but prestige, not only the Good, but the Better or the 
Best. Athletic contests are invested with such great interest not only 
because they may be good games, but because they are contests, con- 
tests perhaps between traditional rivals, or are for the championship of 
this, that, or the other. It is likewise with countries. National wel- 
fare is viewed at the present time very largely as a competitive success. 
And affairs have come to such a condition that no one country dares 
to let up in its vigilance in the universal competition. Individually it 
is helpless. If it relaxes, its competitor will monopolize all the ad- 
vantages, its own prestige will be lowered, and it will be inviting 
aggression in which it will be preyed upon. There doesn't seem to be 
much help for the situation except in the concerted action of nations. 
But in the meanwhile the struggle goes on, and patriots throw them- 
selves into the spirit of it with abandon. 

It should be said that it is not inevitable that the impulse of rivalry 
should issue exclusively in destructive conflict. One does not need to 
destroy his competitor in order that he himself should be benefited, and 
in fact enlightened competition does desire the preservation and wel- 
fare of the competitors. One way in which the emulative impulse 

22 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

differs from the combative impulse, for instance, is just this, that 
it does seek to preserve a defeated competitor. The possibility is, 
then, that patriotism may be sublimated into a higher and more inno- 
cent form of rivalry than what we have at present. 

We have, however, to deal with the present fact that the rivalry 
of nations is likely to issue in war. And hence it becomes necessary 
to take into consideration the impulse of pugnacity. The plain fact is 
that war has a fascination. Even if one's own country be not involved, 
one turns eagerly to the war news in the daily papers. History is 
the history of wars. The attractiveness of war is expressed in the fol- 
lowing verse of Richard Le Gallienne: 

I abhor 

And yet how sweet 

The sound along the marching street 
Of drum and fife! and I forget 
Wet eyes of widows, and forget 
Broken old mothers, and the whole 
Dark butchery without a soul." 

There is that about the martial life which excites enthusiasm, and that 
enthusiasm gets connected with patriotism. Patriotism runs at high 
tide in war times. 28 

And now, does the presence of the instinct of pugnacity compel at 
once an unfavorable verdict on patriotism? There is no doubt that 
pugnacity may lead to what is undesirable; it does become "dark 
butchery without a soul." Is patriotism for that to be condemned? In 
answer to this two things may be said. To begin with, militancy may 
be a good, and can no more be condemned in the abstract than can 
pacifism. There is no ground for saying that pacifism is a virtue in 
itself. One might be pacifistic simply because he did not care about 
his fellow men, or simply because he was afraid to fight. Nonresist- 
ance is indeed under some conditions a good, and so is the impulse of 
pugnacity. Totally devoid of it, neither the individual nor the nation 
can live in other than pusillanimous cowardice; their ideals will not 
be much, and from them shall be taken even the little that they have. 
In the second place, patriotism does not issue exclusively in war. It 
has already been shown that it has a positive character of attachment, 
and may develop without reference to war, but wholly with reference 
to the pursuits of peace. 

The Impulses of Patriotism 23 

The analysis of the impulses of patriotism has emphasized the truth 
of a proposition that was stated at the beginning; patriotism is a com- 
plex phenomenon. It is, as it actually appears, composed of a wide 
variety of impulses, which appear in shifting combinations, and show 
themselves now in one person and time and now in another. 

The conclusion may also be drawn that there has been found here 
no ground for passing a final verdict either favorable or unfavorable 
upon patriotism. There has been found in the instinctive basis of 
patriotism an element which gives it its tremendous power, but that 
result does not answer the question regarding the moral worth of 
patriotism. Instincts are just tendencies that taken simply as instincts 
have no moral character at all. Their moral worth depends upon the 
way in which they are used. Consequently, before one can estimate 
the worth of patriotism, he must see how these impulses are used in it. 

The impulses themselves are not patriotism. They form raw material 
for and give character to it, but they themselves are not patriotism. 
They serve equally well as raw material for other human interests far 
removed from this one. Instincts alone are unorganized, and are cap- 
able of being shaped into an indefinite number of meanings. The 
further question that will ultimately have to be answered is that 
concerning what the organizing factor is that can ever give to any 
combination of impulses the meaning, — patriotism. That investigation 
will next be entered upon. 



The Deliberate Habituation 

One way by which the impulses and dispositions of human character 
are amalgamated in patriotism is by habituation. The habits of 
patriotism are just as powerful and important as the impulses. The 
impulses, in fact, are molded into habits, and are profoundly modified 
by the environment and regimen to which they are subjected. The 
habits become the masters of the impulses. Thought at this point 
enters into the problem, but it is not the individual's own thought; it 
is the thought of the society which surrounds him. His articles of 
faith are habits acquired from society. "... It is through 
habit that the influence of intelligence has most control over the lives of 
the majority of civilized men." 1 On the part of the individual, the 
thought is involuntary, or at least unvoluntary, and is accompanied by 
like action. Most of man's beliefs are nonrational, even though he 
supposes that he has come to hold them by his own free and deliberate 
choice. Society holds tremendous power over the building of character; 
in large measure, it controls the material that the mind has to work 
on. And this control is of primary importance. "... The 
essential fact which has made the Great Society possible is the dis- 
covery, handed down by tradition and instruction, that Thought can 
be fed by deliberately collected material, and stimulated, sustained, 
and to a certain extent, controlled by an effort of will." 2 

Now, the patriotic spirit, along with other dispositions, may be* 
acquired as a habit, and the mold into which patriotism runs is no-i 
toriously with most men a matter of circumstances and habituation.! 
Along this line, it is interesting to speculate as to what American 
patriotism would be if this country had never separated from England, 
if the thirteen colonies had not been able to form a federation, or 
if the South had been successful in the Civil War. The loyalty of 
Americans would have been totally different, but no doubt would be 
just as devoted as it actually is. It is a historical fact that English 
patriotism has modified itself to correspond to the expansion of the 
empire. In view of all this, one can hardly resist the conclusion that 
patriotism depends quite largely upon habituation and use and wont. Pa- 
triotism is a national habit; and it is a habit which even were it proved 

j to be nothing but evil, would not be easily broken, since it is acquired 

| from life's earliest years onward. 

28 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

"The superstitions of our early years, 
E'en when we know them to be nothing more, 
Lose not for that their hold upon our hearts; 
Not all are free who ridicule their chains." 3 

There are two kinds of the habituation of patriotism, deliberate and 
spontaneous, conscious and unconscious, direct and indirect. ' The more 
obvious of the two is that of conscious and deliberate habituation. 
There are agencies that are constantly being used with deliberate pur- 
pose towards the regimentation of the populace in patriotism. "Pa- 
triotism is systematically cultivated by anniversaries, pilgrimages, sym- 
bols, songs, recitations, etc." 4 There are numerous patriotic societies, 
such as the Grand Army of the Republic, the Daughters of the Amer- 
ican Revolution, the Sons of Veterans, the Woman's Relief Corps, the 
Daughters of the Confederacy, and others. 6 

But there are other and more important forces back of the inculca- 
tion of patriotism. In most countries the state with all its power is 
vigilant lest patriotism be allowed to become otiose. And it has means 
at its disposal that range from the selection and repression of news 
to the active use of all sorts of influences which sway the mind of the 
public. And these influences do not go unemployed. There are those 
in the state who have a special interest in arousing a strong sentiment of 
patriotism. Conspicuous among such are the professional soldiers. 
They, of course, want a solidified population. Their training has em- 
phasized their appreciation of the value of obedience and uniformity. 
These virtues are essentials in the disipline of an army, and in terms 
of military logic they seem to be essentials in the organization of a 
country. J. M. Robertson has a division of a book which he has 
devoted to a discussion of the regimentation of militarism. 6 But the 
guardianship of the patriotic fire within the state is not turned over 
entirely into soldierly hands. Other interests, whose nature and motives 
in contrast with the straightforward purposes of the country's guardians 
are such as to make it difficult to describe them in the dispassionate 
spirit of scientific and philosophic discourse, are ready with their assist- 
ance. And, of course, the ordinary civilian temper is not averse to the 
rigorous regimentation of patriotic loyalty. 

Hegel 7 thought that it was both right and necessary that the state 
should control public opinion. He considered that the people had no 
opinions of very great worth. ". . . The people, in so far as this 
term signifies a special part of the citizens, does not know what it 

The Habituation of Patriotism 29 

Iwills. To know what we will, and further what the absolute will, 
(namely, reason, wills, is the fruit of deep knowledge and insight, and 
'is therefore not the property of the people." 8 Public opinion without 
ithe guidance of the state was unorganized and dangerous. "The many 
jas individuals, whom we are prone to call the people, are indeed a 
jcollective whole, but merely as a multitude or formless mass, whose 
(movement and action would be elemental, void of reason, violent, and 

I 'terrible." 9 Therefore it was necessary for the proper source of authority 
to organize public opinion. And, of course, this work of organization 
and direction was to be the task of the officials of the state. "The 
highest state officials have necessarily deeper and more comprehensive 
insight into the workings and needs of the state, and also greater skill 
and wider practical experience." 9 There are others who do not hold 
Hegel's philosophical system that yet agree with him in upholding the 
high sovereignty and controlling supervision of the state. 

Ecclesiastical institutions often serve as habituators of nationalistic 
spirit. The rise of nationalism in Spain affords an interesting example, 
for religious motives were at the height of their strength in those 
days. Ferdinand and Isabella got control of the hierarchical religious 
organizations in their dominions by taking from the Pope and to them- 
selves the power to name the prelates of the Catholic church in Spain. 
The Crusading Orders had great vogue in the country, and Ferdinand 
got himself elected to the office of Grand Master in the most important 
of them. These measures accomplished, they were made to tell by the 
rulers of Spain in the process of furthering their dynastic and na- 
tionalistic ambitions. In Japan, Bushido, a mixture of Confucian and 
Shinto elements, is a spirit of patriotism which is at the disposal of 
the state. In Germany, the pastors of the established churches are 
state officials; they are state-appointed and state-paid, and they re- 
flect the state's purposes. In all Christian countries, including our own, 
the churches observe the national patriotic holidays both in time of 
war and peace, and in time of war preach patriotism from the pulpits, 
sometimes at the solicitation of the state, sometimes of their own 

The newspapers are of cardinal importance as agencies of the in- 
culcation of patriotism. It is natural that the newspapers should be 
insurgently patriotic. They are dependent upon the public for their 
subsistence. And the mass of the public is conservative. Consequently, 
the newspapers are as a rule conservative also. Now patriotism is a 
venerable virtue easy for the public to believe in, and it is almost 

30 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

inevitable that journalism should play up that virtue. It is also almost 
as inevitable that the patriotism of the press should be of the militant 
kind. To take that character is simply to follow the line of least re- 
sistance. Public opinion reacts upon the press and circumscribes its 
initiative. And when a people becomes inflamed against another peo- 
ple, the newspapers as a rule (there are, of course, some that are in- 
dependent in their thought and leadership) have to fall in line; the 
sheet that opposed the trend of public emotion would have to pay for 
its folly. The newspapers, moreover, on the whole represent the gen- 
tlemanly business class, and wars promise most to the interests of that 
class. Conflict is quite apt to grow out of economic rivalry, whence it 
naturally follows that those who are most nearly concerned in that 
rivalry (and the newspapers are controlled by such as are of that 
class) will be most interested in the prosecution of a war which bids 
fair to enlarge the economic opportunities of their own country. 

Along with the newspapers as habituators of patriotism go also less 
ephemeral kinds of literature. "The Man Without a Country," 10 for 
instance, has a definite patriotic purpose. And patriotic orations, 
songs, and poetry have the same purpose. Sometimes these composi- 
tions are not jingoistic, but very often they are. Wordsworth's poetry, 
for instance, is of the nonjingoistic character; it is strongly marked by 
love of the soil. But Wordsworth was of unusually broad sympathies, 
and his is not the kind of poetry usually made use of in teaching 
patriotism. J. M. Robertson has written an essay in which he called 
attention to the proclivity of poets to write in a jingoistic strain." 
Virgil, himself a man of broad sympathies, wrote the iEneid at the 
request of Augustus, whose empire-building purposes needed an epic 
after the model of Homer about the founding of Rome. 

An important habituator of patriotism in the training of the young 
is the public school system. The public schools are almost always used 
by those who have them in charge for the maintenance of the existing 
order. But the "existing order" quite regularly means the political one, 
and hence the road is opened for the teaching of patriotism. Prussia 
seems to be an extreme case of the deliberate use of the schools for 
pushing the pet programs of the politically favored classes. "In Prussia 
the avowed use of the schools, not for the spread of truth but for the 
'War against social-democracy' may be in part responsible for that 
absence of Love between members of different classes, that class-war of 
which the growth of social-democracy is only one symptom." 12 Prussia 
also exhibits a peculiarly active brand of patriotism. It has been com- 

The Habituation of Patriotism 31 

monly assumed in the United States that education will make for 
democracy but it is not necessarily so. ^--Education, instead of being ^ 
aimed at freeing and developing the mind, may be aimed only at^rd 
regimentation in a certain system of ideas!/ The fact of the business / ' 
is that as a rule it is so aimed, even where tftere is no such clear and per- 
sistent purpose as there is in Prussia; it is all too easy to fall into the rut I 
of doing the same old things in the same old way. It is simply easier 
to inculcate the same old ideas than it is to teach the ever-varying young 
idea how to shoot. And what education turns out under such methods 
is not free and independent thinkers, but a habituated uniform product. 
"School education, unless it is regulated by the best knowledge and / 
good sense, will produce men and women who are all of one pattern, / 
as if turned in a lathe. . . . Any institution which runs for years in 
the same hands will produce a type. ... In the continental 
schools and barracks, in newspapers, books, etc., what is developed by 
education is dynastic sentiment, national sentiment, soldierly senti- 
ment." 13 And so the schools are used for the maintenance of patriotism, ^ 
— patriotism which only too often is narrow and militaristic. An ex- 
ample of the better kind of purpose to teach patriotism is that in view 
in Bosanquet's lecture on the subject. 14 An example of the kind which 
is likely not to be so temperate and well-considered is that which grows 
out of the demand for the teaching of patriotism which arises under 
the stimulus of war. On May 17, 191 7 V there appeared in a small- 
town newspaper 15 an article dated from New York City, and which 
was evidently furnished by some news association. The headlines were 
as follows: "College Course in Patriotism. Chicago's Mayor Starts 
Chair in Lincoln University. Students True Americans." The open- 
ing paragraph ran thus: "For the first time in the history of American 
education a chair has been established for the teaching of American 
Patriotism. Inspired by the work being done by the Lincoln Memorial 
University, William Hale Thompson, Mayor of Chicago, will provide 
$25,000 for this purpose." A little further on occurred the sentence, 
"Plans have already been made for the opening of the Patriotism De- 
partment." These plans may not have been actually carried out, and 
if they were, may have obtained solid results, but the sound of the 
article was such as would lead one to suspect that what was accom- 
plished would rather prove to be superficial and sensational. This whole 
attempt has been cited here not because it is an isolated incident, 
but for the reason that it is an illustration, extreme though it may 
be, of a tendency. 

32 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

The public schools have textbooks for the purpose of training in 
patriotic loyalty, books which tell of the duties of citizens, and are 
replete with songs and poems to illustrate the points brought out. 18 
The schools of our land make it a part of their chief business to teach 
loyalty to the country. For this business history is plastic material. 
"History, in every country, is so taught as to magnify that country: 
children learn to believe that their own country has always been in the 
right and almost always victorious, that it has produced almost all 
the great men, and that it is in all respects superior to all other coun- 
tries. Since these beliefs are flattering, they are easily absorbed, and 
hardly ever dislodged from instinct by later knowledge." 17 The un- 
pleasant facts are not brought out. Americans, for example, do not usu- 
ally have it called to their attention that in the War of 1812, most of 
their vessels were tied up in port at the end of the war, their national 
capital was captured by the enemy, they won only one important land 
battle and that after the war was over, and that their representatives in 
the peace negotiations had to surrender the principle for which the war 
was fought. The war ended because both sides were willing to re- 
turn to the status quo ante. The patriotic bias dominates even the 
historian himself. "No historian ever gets out of the mores of his own 
society of origin. . . . Even if he rises above the limitations of 
party, he does not get outside the patriotic and ethical horizon in which 
he has been educated, especially when he deals with the history of other 
countries and other times than his own. Each historian regards his 
own nation as the torchbearer of civilization; its mores give him his 
ethical standards by which he estimates whatever he learns of other 
peoples. ... In modern Russian literature may be found passages 
about the 'Civilizing mission' of Russia which might be translated, 
mutatis mutandis, from passages in English, French, or German liter- 
ature about the civilizing mission of England, France, or Germany. 
Probably the same is true of Turkish, Hindoo, or Chinese literature. 
The patriotism of the historian rules his judgment, especially as to ex- 
cuses and apologies for things done in the past, and most of all as to the 
edifying omissions, — a very important part of the task of the historian. 
. . . There is a compusion on the historian to act in this way, 
for if he wrote otherwise, his fellow-countrymen would ignore his 
work." 18 

The habituation of patriotism finds in symbols an instrument ad- 
mirably suited to its purpose. The mind really reacts more strongly 
to symbols than it does to the facts of sense-experience. The potency 

The Habituation of Patriotism 33 

of symbols does not suffer from the admixture of distractions by which 
direct sense-experience is accompanied. Symbols are more purely mean- 
ing, and they come with the momentum of their meaning. Now the 
word "country," embodying an abstract and fairly simple idea, serves 
as a symbol and produces a pure emotion as in art. Other words and 
phrases could be named that are similar in the responses that they 
elicit. "The Monroe Doctrine" is one of the pet symbols of the 
United States. In patriotic poetry and hymnology the flag is featured. 
It is a symbol of the country.^jChildren are taught to sing about the 
flag, by means of which a symbol is implanted in their minds, the 
love of music is appealed to, and patriotism is connected with their 
childhood sentiments.^ The appeal of symbols comes home to one 
when he stands at the dividing line between two countries, at Niagara 
Falls, let us say, and gazes upon two flags, one of them his own and 
the other not. At the present time Great Britain is our ally, but the 
emotion upon beholding the British flag is nothing as compared with 
the feeling of affection experienced upon beholding the American flag. 
The British emblem, though respected, is strange; the American flag 
is one's own. Sumner discusses what he calls the tyranny of the 
apparatus of suggestion, that is, symbols or tokens, and from him is 
worth quoting the following pertinent passage: "The tyranny is great- 
est in regard to 'American' and 'Americanism.' Who dare say that 
he is not 'American'? Who dare repudiate what is declared to be 
'Americanism'? It follows that if anything is base and bogus it is 
always labeled 'American.' If a thing is to be recommended which can- 
not be justified, is is put under 'Americanism.' Who does not shudder 
at the fear of being called 'unpatriotic'? And to repudiate what any 
one chooses to call 'American' is to be unpatriotic. If there is any 
document of Americanism, it is the Declaration of Independence. Those 
who have Americanism especially in charge have repudiated the doc- 
trine that 'governments derive their just powers from the consent of 
the governed,' because it stood in the way of what they wanted to do. 
They denounce those who cling to the doctrine as un-American. Then 
we see what Americanism and patriotism are. They are the duty 
laid upon us all to applaud, follow, and obey whatever a ruling clique 
of newspapers and politicians chooses to say or wants to do. 'England' 
has always been, amongst us, a kind of counter token, or token of 
things to be resisted and repudiated. The 'symbols' or 'tokens' always 
have this utility for suggestion. They carry a coercion with them and 
overwhelm people who are not trained to verify assertions and dissect 

34 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

fallacies." 19 When one's attention is called to these things, it cannot 
help but impose upon him the obligation of examining the bases and 
nature of his own patriotic enthusiasm. 

The deliberate habituation of patriotism has a bearing upon the 
problem of peace. Knowledge of other peoples will not bring harmony 
and mutual goodwill unless it is sympathetic knowledge, and, if it is 
to be sympathetic, our mental prepossessions must be shaped so as to 
open our minds to a just appreciation of unwelcome facts and ways 
at variance with our own. And to accomplish this, the teaching of 
patriotism will have to be directed towards the realizing of the de- 
voutly to be wished consummation. 


The Spontaneous Habituation 

The spontaneous habituation of patriotism has no conscious and set 
purpose, institution, or program. This is the habituation that makes 
itself felt from the mere fact that individuals in a society tend more 
and more to become assimilated to one another. Germany affords an 
extreme example of the deliberate habituation in patriotism. Every 
agency within the empire, including state, church, newspapers, schools, 
and so on, has been used towards securing a uniform result, that of 
nationalistic passion. But every country offers an example of the 
spontaneous habituation of patriotism. There is no less of nationalistic 
loyalty among the Allies than there is in Germany. It is interesting 
that the two kinds of habituation have come into combat. "Among the 
number of embattled principles and counter principles which this war 
has brought into the field, we must include as not the least interesting 
the duel between conscious national direction on the one side and 
unconscious national will and knowledge on the other." 20 In the 
spontaneous habituation of patriotism we are dealing with a more 
subtle and powerful force than the deliberate habituation. The former 
goes deeper than the latter into human life. What we try to teach may 
not be learned, but what we are sets copy in the copybook of life. 
"The genuine beliefs, though not usually the professed precepts, of 
parents and teachers are almost unconsciously acquired by most chil- 
dren; and even if they depart from these beliefs in later life, something 
of them remains deeply implanted, ready to emerge in a time of stress 
or crisis." 21 

It is natural that the citizens of a country should be thus habituated. 
In fact, in large measure, they habituate themselves. The basis of it 
is first of all that men are alike, and are faced with similar problems. 
The fact that men have like instincts, instincts, moreover, that have 
to adjust themselves to identical life conditions, makes it easy to 
assimilate them to one another and to the group. Suggestibility is one 
of these dispositions of human nature. McDougall defines it as "a 
process of communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction 
of the communicated proposition in the absence of logically adequate 
grounds for its acceptance." 22 Suggestion, of course, is not omnipotent. 
There is, for one thing, what is known as a contra-suggestion, that is, 

36 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

behavior in which people do just the opposite to what one tries to 
persuade them to do. Early in the regime of Mr. Herbert Hoover as 
food administrator one butcher reported that his customers wanted 
meat more on meatless than on any other days. And there is always 
the possibility that suggestion may be disregarded altogether. But 
human beings are interdependent, and are open to guidance through 
suggestions from the ideas and practices of their fellows. An in- 
dividual cannot think everything out for himself. Some hardly ever 
do any serious thinking and even the more serious take the bulk of 
their thoughts, at least in other fields than their own special one, upon 
suggestion. Choice is exhausting. It is hard business thinking, and 
we are likely to shirk the irksomeness of it if we can. "Either to be 
exceptional or to appreciate the exceptional requires a considerable 
expenditure of energy, and no one can afford this in many directions." 23 
The chances are, then, that except in such cases as where for some 
reason we are specially critical, an idea suggested will find lodgement in 
the mind and tend to issue in action; and this fact is tremendously im- 
portant in the understanding of a social phenomenon such as patriotism. 

It is rather ominous that today political thought does not seem to 
be as active as it once was. "My own impression," says Graham Wallas, 
"formed after questioning a good many people in different parts of 
England is that, in our country, the quantity of such discussion 
[serious discussion on public questions] which takes place ... is 
diminishing." 24 The great cause of this is the modern industrial sys- 
tem, and it is likely that what is true of England is true also of 
America. And if serious discussion is diminishing it means probably 
that men are doing less serious thinking on political subjects, and that 
they are likely to become more suggestible with regard to them. The 
application to the subject of patriotism is obvious. 

Imitation 25 is another disposition of human nature that is close to 
that of suggestibility. There is contra-imitation as well as contra-sug- 
gestion, and besides imitation there is also invention. But it is a power- 
ful social force. For the interdependence of man makes for imitation 
as well as suggestibility. And society really owes a great deal to it. 
An invention in social living cannot hope to survive unless it is freely 
adopted by masses who have no thought of stopping to reason out its 
utility. And the effect of imitation is that it causes an immense impetus 
towards uniformity and solidarity within the group. "... Men 
and other animals imitate what they see others, especially they of their 
own species, do." 26 And imitation of one's own group tends to assimilate 

The Habituation of Patriotism 37 

him to it, to habituate him in its ways, and secure his loyalty to it 
and its ideals, which is to say, that imitation is a factor in the making 
of patriotism. 

The fact that suggestion and imitation exercise their greatest force 
within the group makes it pertinent to recognize the part that the group 
plays in the process of habituation in patriotism. The fact is that 
because of the individual's membership in a group, the suggestions that 
come to him impinge upon his consciousness with a good deal of force. 
They strike him from all directions at almost the same time, and have 
a multiple dynamic behind them. Now the nation is a group. The 
space-annihilating devices of the present day in conjunction with the 
photographs and vivid descriptive reporting of the newspapers have 
extended and intensified the connections between the individual and his 
national group. The crowd for the individual may now well be, and in 
time of national crisis is, the people of his country. 

This, however, is especially true of city populations, a fact which 
must have allowance made for it in the gauging of public opinion. It 
is the voice of the city-population that has too often been taken as 
the expression of public opinion. "The voice of 'the people' is very 
often nowadays only the voice of the city crowd, faintly re-echoed, if 
echoed at all, in the smaller towns. Sometimes also the noise is that 
of a few editors of newspapers." 27 Another fact which ought to be 
noted is that there are prestige-groups within society. Examples of 
such are an old-fashioned aristocracy, the governing class, and in a 
democracy, the majority. Such groups often exercise compelling co- 
ercive power. 

The coerciveness of the crowd makes for national unity, but it 
has unwelcome features. It is too likely to lead to a high disregard 
of the rights of the nonconformist and an unsympathetic and uncom- 
promising attitude towards other nations. There are no incentives to 
broad-minded thought and sympathy within a homogeneous crowd. 
Opposition is the real matrix out of which reason and tolerance are 
extracted. The government of the United States of America had a 
tolerant spirit stamped upon it because the makers of our institutions 
were many men of many minds. The only way to do justice to their 
differences was by compromise. Close agreement confirms convictions, 
but does not stimulate the imagination. "Where all think alike, no one 
thinks very much. But whatever he does think, he can think with 
all his soul." 28 Without the differences it is more than likely that 
America would not have been quite so tolerant. It follows that the 

38 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

nation, because it has no critic to which it listens, is likely to be 
hard-minded, fanatical, and unyielding. 

The atmosphere in which the individual lives and moves and has 
his being is that of his people's customs or mores. These are in- 
tellectualized folkways. Folkways are the group's ways of dealing with 
its environment. Mores are the folkways plus the convictions as to 
their relation to welfare. Sumner defines them as follows: "The mores 
are the folkways, including the philosophical and ethical generalizations 
as to societal welfare which are suggested by them, and inherent in 
them, as they grow." 29 Tradition, which is crowd-memory, perpetuates 
the mores, and they become the life milieu of the individuals of each 
generation. A large part of one's education, especially his moral educa- 
tion, is gained from the traditions and mores of his people. And their 
teachings are all the more authoritative because one is almost wholly 
unconscious of learning from them. "We learn the mores as uncon- 
sciously as we learn to walk and eat and breathe. The masses never 
learn how we walk, and eat, and breathe, and they never know any 
reason why the mores are what they are. The justification of them is 
that when we wake to consciousness of life we find them facts which 
already hold us in the bonds of tradition, custom, and habit. . . . 
The most important fact about the mores is their dominion over the 
individual. Arising he knows not whence or how, they meet his open- 
ing mind in earliest childhood, give him his outfit of ideas, faiths, and 
tastes, and lead him into prescribed mental processes. They bring to 
him codes of action, standards, and rules of ethics." 30 

The mores have a bearing upon patriotism in various ways. In 
the first place, they are teachers of loyalty. They teach loyalty to the 
group and to country. Patriotism has become imbedded in the mores, 
and when one learns from) them, he becomes indoctrinated with 
patriotism. The concept of patriotism has a long history, and has 
become a venerable ideal. It is not possible that the masses should 
escape having it taught them. The Japanese provide an example of a 
race that par excellence shows the effects of centuries of training in 
nationalistic loyalty; it has given to them a marvellous solidarity. "In 
the war with Russia, in 1904, this people showed what a group is 
capable of when it has a strong ethos. They understand each other; 
they act as one man; they are capable of discipline to the death. Our 
western tacticians have had rules for the percentage of loss which 
troops would endure, standing under fire, before breaking and run- 
ning. The rule failed for the Japanese. They stood to the last man. 

The Habituation of Patriotism 39 

Their prowess at Port Arthur against the strongest fortifications, and on 
the battlefields of Manchuria, surpassed all record. They showed what 
can be done in the way of concealing military and naval movements 
when every soul in the population is in a voluntary conspiracy not to 
reveal anything. These traits belong to a people which has been 
trained by generations of invariable mores." 31 One of the most thor- 
oughly grounded ideals of the Japanese mores is that of patriotism. 

In view of the function of the mores as teachers of loyalty, it be- 
comes necessary to recognize that peace is not going to be easily pro- 
vided for by facile external arrangements or even by the use of in- 
formation, persuasion, and reason. If patriotic loyalty is in such large 
part a matter of habituation, then a change in it will have to be some- 
thing of a matter of habituation too. 

The mores are the objects of loyalty. One gets into the way of 
saying, "These ways are my ways and I am going to stick by them. 
They are mine; I am going to preserve and foster them, and no one 
shall take them from me." Loyalty to the mores forms national 
character. It is tradition which forms a nation of British, Saxon, and 
Norman strains. Tradition unites Walloon and Fleming in Belgium, 
Breton and Gens du Midi in France. 32 The likenesses of a people owe 
no more to the fact of race than to that of the mores. And so the mores 
become what the patriot is conscious of being loyal to. His patriotism 
is not so much love of country as love of the mores. The mores for 
such a spirit of loyalty are the country. When it sings, its song should 
be, "My mores, 'tis of thee, of thee I sing." What it claims for itself is 
the right to be true to the traditions of its own people. When asked to 
justify its allegiance, it in turn asks the question: 

"And who are they who best may claim our trust? 
Surely our own people, of whose blood we are; 
Who from our infancy have proved their love, 
And never have deceived us, save, perchance, 
When kindly guile was wholesomer for us 
Than truth itself."" 

The loyalty to national customs stiffens patriotism, and because of that 
is, from the standpoint of the patriot, highly desirable, but the problem 
that it sets is that of preventing it from being satisfied to remain a 
mere unreasoning superstition. 

The mores get embodied in character, and come to be a veritable 

40 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

spirit of loyalty. They grow out of the life of the people, and return 
to that life. They become actually constituent in personality. The 
mores become a part of ourselves; we not only think of them, we 
think with them. They are so natural tfrat we do not notice them. 
"The more thoroughly American a man is, the less he can perceive 
Americanism. He will embody it ; all he does, says, or writes will be full 
of it; but he can never truly see it, simply because he has no exterior 
point of view from which to look at it." 34 Under such conditions, how 
could one help being patriotic? It is not something that he strives 
after; it is to be what he cannot help being. He is patriotic simply 
because he is himself. 

Some conclusions from the study of the habits of patriotism may 
now be drawn. The complexity of patriotism has further manifested 
itself. And it is evident that the habits of patriotism, like the im- 
pulses, may be either good or bad, or so far as the motive of the in- 
dividual is concerned, ethically colorless. The patriotism of habituation 
is natural, like breathing. The habituated patriot will go with the 
group, and groups like individuals sometimes fall into bad habits. But 
groups also acquire good habits, and will in those matters be worth 
serving. Habituation and conformity in such a case will be valuable. 
Their weakening would often be really disastrous. "There are cases 
in which the discrediting of tradition is like picking out the mortar 
that holds together the fabric of society." 35 There are times when the 
discrediting of patriotism would mean the destruction of the nation. 

The great objection to the patriotism of habituation is that it cannot 
criticize itself. The lack of criticism will, of course, make for over- 
whelming strength. In commenting upon the patriotism of the pres- 
ent time, Russell has written as follows: "This instinct [patriotism], 
just because, in its intense form, it was new and unfamiliar, had re- 
mained uninfected by thought, not paralyzed or devitalized by doubt 
and cold detachment." 38 But it is just an accident if such patriotism 
is good. It may easily be the patriotism of the man who takes the 
stand, "My country, right or wrong," a position which, while there is 
something to be said for it on the ground that countries are fundamental 
institutions which must not be lightly abandoned to destruction, is 
hardly one to be striven for as an ethical ideal. The road to goodness 
is not by chance, but by intelligent self-direction. And the goodness 
of patriotism rests upon the use of intelligence. Patriotism could not 
as matters now stand be done away with by criticism, but its nature 

The Habituation of Patriotism 41 

could be molded. We could habituate ourselves to admire and serve 
in our life what really was to be admired and served. 

But the process of habituation, while it produces a powerful spirit 
of group loyalty, can hardly give a full account of the rise of a con- 
scious ideal like patriotism. The question would remain, "Why the 
habituation, and why so much insistence upon it?" The process im- 
plies a reason for its existence. And reasons become effective through the 
action of an intelligent agent. The objection to a theory like that of 
Sumner is that by it social activity is looked at too exclusively on the 
outside when it ought also to be looked at on the inside. The theory 
does not do justice to the initiative of the mind. The mores for the 
most part seem almost to be active entities, which, starting from en- 
vironmental conditions, develop themselves. Minds are held in their 
grip. But mores are products of human activity and reflection, and if 
one would understand them, he must understand the mind, with not 
only its impulses, but also its ways of thought. Sumner's own work 
shows that he believes in something beyond the mores, and that he 
has an ideal of acting above them. His confidence is placed in thought. 
He believes that he at least can reflect upon the group ways, and that 
a science, or perhaps even a philosophy, of the mores can be established. 
The following are his own words: "Since it appears that the old mores 
are mischievous if they last beyond the duration of the conditions and 
needs to which they are adapted, and that constant, gradual, smooth, 
and easy readjustment is the course of things which is conducive to 
healthful life, it follows that free and rational criticism of traditional 
mores is essential to societal welfare." 37 

Human beings are moved not only by instincts and habits, but also 
by reasons. And it is with the reasoned beliefs of patriotism that the 
following part will deal. 



The Country As Protector of Self 

Patriotism has reasons upon which it rests; it is not a mere in- 
stinctive reaction, nor yet simply a habit. 1 Thought exists, and men 
think. Graham Wallas says that there is an impulse to think. "This 
independent action of Intelligence is, I believe, in its simplest forms 
as 'natural' to us, as much due to inherited disposition, as is the work- 
ing of anyone of the usual list of instincts." 2 There is a rationale of 
patriotism. Patriotism may be unreasoned, but is not for that neces- 
sarily unreasonable. It may coincide with the passions of the masses, 
but may nevertheless rest on logical grounds, and on ideals. It may be 
the object of conscious choice. The treatment of the immigrant shows 
that we have a belief that patriotism can be chosen by the individual. 
We insist on the loyalty of the German-American, which being inter- 
preted means that we are demanding loyalty to a country of choice 
rather than to the country of birth. And for those born Americans, 
we adopt the injunction of Tennyson, 

"Love thou thy land, with love far-brought 
From out the storied Past, and used 
Within the Present, but transfused 
Thro' future time by power of thought."" 

The fact that men do think and have ideals is one of the very reasons 
why patriotism is now so strong. 

What are the reasons urged why one should be patriotic? One 
belief is that one owes his earthly salvation to his country. It is a 
belief that expresses on the level of consciousness the impulse to seek 
safety and help. Men believe that the country is the protector in 
this present world of all the values of life. It is the feeling that 
Spencer expressed when he apostrophized the state in the following 
language: "I supposed you were to act the part of an Argus-eyed and 
Briareus-armed guardian, ever watching over my interests, ever ready 
to step in and defend them; so that whether sleeping or waking, ab- 
sorbed in business or immersed in pleasure, I might have the gratifying 
consciousness of being carefully shielded from injury."* Webster ap- 
pealed to the same feeling in his reply to Hayne: "It is to that 
Union we owe our safety at home, and our consideration and dignity 
abroad. ... It has been to us all a copious fountain of national, 

46 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

social, personal happiness." 5 And the patriot feels that for the pro- 
tection that he has received he must show his gratitude. In return 
for the blessings of the country, he will offer up the sacrifice of patriot- 
ism. If one asks the plain man why he is patriotic, why he thinks, for 
instance, that he ought to enlist, the answer that is often made is that, 
"The country has done a lot for me, and now she needs me. I am 
going to do what I can for my country." 

The country affords protection within the group that it organizes. 
And for this reason, the citizens will support the state. They feel that 
government is a good thing; it guarantees justice and fair play. And 
patriotism with them will grow out of that feeling. It will, of course, 
be a give and take affair. It will not be selfless, altruistic devotion. 
Patriotism of this kind demands that justice be consistently dispensed. 
Most men will not long serve a state that treats them unfairly. No 
patriotism will survive flagrant and continued injustice. And, in truth, 
why should it? Green states the answer: "If the authority of any 
government — its claim on our obedience — is held to be derived not from 
an original covenant, or from any covenant, but from the function 
which it serves in maintaining those conditions of freedom which are 
conditions of the moral life, then no act of the people in revocation of 
a prior act need be reckoned necessary to justify its dissolution. // it 
ceases to serve this function, it loses its claim on our obedience."* 

A country is a peace unit. And men will welcome it as such, for 
there is in men an impulse to peace. The state in modern times arose 
in part as a keeper of the peace. The church was once the power that 
policed Europe, and when that was so, men gave the church their 
supreme allegiance. But the time came when the fear of God was 
no longer a sufficient power to keep men in order, so it became neces- 
sary for some other agency than the church to take up the task. Semi- 
official bodies arose whose business it was to preserve peace, but they 
passed away. There was then no power to keep the lawless forces in 
check. The nobles of feudalism fought with one another, and were 
petty and irresponsible tyrants over their people. Their regime became 
unbearable. Consequently the people united with the kings, and a 
central power was established that stopped the wars of the nobles and 
cities, and gave peace. 

The state within its boundaries is the preserver of law and order. 
And the discharge of that function recommends the state to its citizens. 
Hobbes 7 exalted the state because of his desire for order. The Eng- 
land of his day was torn by civil war. Even J. S. Mill 8 expressed some 

The Beliefs of Patriotism 47 

sympathy with speculative Toryism, as for instance it appeared in 
Wordsworth, because what it meant in such a case, Mill said, was 
the proposition that man ought to be governed. Patriotic eloquence 
takes account of the benefit that the state affords as the preserver of 
the peace. Josiah Quincy, Jr., called for patriotic loyalty to country 
on the ground that in it "Each individual, of whatever condition, has 
the consciousness of living under known laws, which secure equal rights, 
and guarantee to each whatever portion of the goods of life, be it great 
or small, chance or talent or industry may have bestowed." 9 

The civilized life itself at present depends upon the state. The 
word civilization is derived from a stem meaning "state." Civilization 
is that which is possible to men in states, that is, where peace, law, and 
order prevail. The state has been a tremendous gain because it has 
been a larger integration of men, a larger unit of cooperation. Just 
that is its primary function, — to make it possible for men to live 
together. And without the exercise of that function by the state, we 
should be likely to be plunged back again into the chaos of petty 
warring factions. Now patriotism gets connected with this desire 
that government be preserved. The patriot is very apt to feel that if 
his country should be destroyed, it would be a blow at the very 
foundations of all government and safety. He connects civilization 
with his own state, and feels that, "... they who assail the idea, 
the ideal, of the country itself, assail all civilized life and, so far forth, 
are suicides as well as traitors." 10 

But the state does not stop with the bare maintenance of law and 
order. It does other things which are believed to be for the general 
welfare. It looks out for education, transportation, sanitation, the 
care of the infirm, and so forth; it works for better social, industrial, 
and class conditions. The state, in other words, is felt to have a right 
to do all those things which will promote the welfare of mankind. Mill 
said, "... it is not admissable that the protection of persons 
and that of property are the sole purposes of government. The 
ends of government are as comprehensive as those of the social union." 11 
And Aristotle 12 intimated that the state should not only make bare 
existence possible, but should promote the good life. 

The result has been that men have taken an attitude toward the 
state very much like the attitude that they have taken toward God. 
To many people the state has become God. They feel that all the 
values of life depend upon it, as Plato 13 felt that all the values of life 
depended upon the state that he described. That does not mean that 

48 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

they go directly to the state for everything that they want; they do 
not do that with God. They simply expect the state somehow to 
guarantee these values, and to supply them only as a last resort. But 
they will go to it for everything that they want and which they can 
secure in no other way. In the following quotation, the state is de- 
scribed in terms that might almost refer to Providence: "No Amer- 
ican boy or girl . . . lived a day, even, at the beginning of his life, 
when he was not protected by the law of the United-States. From that 
moment the United-States watched over him in ways perhaps which 
he never thought of. Perhaps the school in which these words are read 
would not have existed except for the United-States laws with regard 
to education. Very likely the bread and butter which the boy had 
for breakfast could never have existed but that the country called the 
United-States had made laws and carried on government in such ways 
that the grain could be raised, that the cattle could be fed, and the 
butter made. It is in a thousand such ways as this that the country 
in which we live takes care of us in every hour of our lives. . . . 
The tie which binds you and me to the country which takes care of 
us is a tie as real and it involves duties as distinct as the ties which 
binds a boy to his mother to whom he owes his life and who has always 
taken care of him." 14 What happens when a country towards which 
men have felt in this way, calls for the allegiance of its citizens? Their 
loyalty will be accorded it in the same measure as the completeness with 
which they have trusted to it. 

The state is the only institution in a given area that embodies the 
general will, and consequently it federates the largest number of loyalties 
among the people who live there. A class organization could not fed- 
erate so many loyalties. It could not be done, for instance, by syndical- 
istic organizations. 15 If a man were a member of all such organizations 
that he was eligible to, his whole life would still lack unity. There 
must, then, be something that will unify the life of the individual, 
and unify the whole of society. The fact of the matter is that the 
state at the present time is, and in the predictable future is likely 
to be, the factor which does this. And it is therefore likely also to con- 
tinue to draw the supreme loyalty of men. 

One kind of patriotism is, then, based upon the belief that the 
country is the preserver of law and order. If necessary, the patriot 
will place himself at the service of the state in order to help it dis- 
charge its function as a police power. And he feels it to be neces- 
sary also to show his patriotism in his own obedience to the laws. In 

The Beliefs of Patriotism 49 

the Crito, 18 Socrates, who had shown his patriotism upon the battle- 
field, showed it again by submitting himself to the laws of that 
country which by its institutions had nourished and protected him. 
Bosanquet cites this action of Socrates, and himself adds the comment: 
"That is one thing; true patriotism is the law-abiding spirit." 17 

The state also acts as a protector against aggressions from with- 
out, and on this account men cling to it. The patriot fears other na- 
tions; he believes that they are actuated by sinister designs. The foe 
in patriotic songs and poetry is always 'haughty' and 'wicked.' He 
believes also that if the opportunity is presented, they will work those 
sinister designs against his country. Nor is the fear altogether ground- 
less. To say the least, most governments cannot be trusted to look 
after the interests of their competitors as well as they look after their 
own, and the way in which the world is at present organized makes 
it seem necessary for each nation to look out for itself. Even Russell 
says that "the fear by which the State is strengthened is reasonable 
under present circumstances." 18 Then why should not the state protect 
its own interests and the interests of its citizens? The citizen himself 
will not admit that the state's protection should simply be limited to the 
prevention of the harm that his fellow-citizens might do. He will 
say: "When we agreed that it was the essential function of the state 
to protect — to administer the law of equal freedom — to maintain men's 
rights — we virtually assigned to it the duty, not only of shielding 
each citizen from the trespasses of his neighbours, but of defending 
him, in common with the community at large, against foreign aggres- 
sion." 19 The efforts to provide protection has indeed proved to be too 
big a job for even the state, acting alone, and has led to alliances be- 
tween states. Such alliance is deemed essential. Diplomatic isolation 
could not now be tolerated by scarcely any government or population 
but the most primitive. Perhaps in this very direction lies a way 
to world internationalism. But the protection is still state protection; 
the alliances themselves are the results of the activities of states. 

The fear of other states sometimes gets expressed as the belief that 
existence itself, both national and personal, is threatened. Loisy gives 
vent to this belief: "Are we then right to be patriotic, even at the 
risk of being less or not at all Christian? Doubtless; because our only 
chance of living is bound up with our patriotism." 20 What he seems 
to fear is French extermination. But more often the patriot believes 
that by his loyalty, his own and his country's freedom are preserved. 
Patriotism is a demand for freedom. Zimmerman a long time ago 


50 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

pointed out that nearly every people glories in its real or supposed 
freedom. "Not a few nations," he says, "are seen resembling the 
primitive Greeks, in overvaluing themselves on their real liberty; and 
others, like the degenerate Greeks, priding themselves only on the 
shadow of an antiquated liberty." 21 The United States came into ex- 
istence only after a severe fight for liberty, and consequently American 
patriotism has had the ideal of freedom deeply impressed upon it. The 
words of Patrick Henry come the nearest to being classical. "Is life 
so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains 
and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others 
may take; but as for me, give me liberty or give me death!" 22 The 
Constitution enumerates liberty next to the possession of life among 
the inalienable rights of men. Lincoln expressed it again in his Gettys- 
burg address. "... We here highly resolve that these dead 
shall not have died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a 
new birth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the peo- 
ple, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth." 28 The notes 
of freedom and self-rule of the people are the dominant ones in the 
passage with which Lincoln closed the speech. It has been the Pres- 
ident of the United States who has most clearly and consistently 
defined the aim of the Allies in this present war as that of making 
the world safe for democracy, i. e., for freedom. But the countries 
which are called autocratic also insist that they are fighting for free- 
dom, and they are proclaiming to their peoples that they are fighting 
on the defensive, and in the cause of liberty. The ideal of freedom 
is dear to all. 

Along with the demand for freedom goes the insistence that those 
things which are of great value to one shall be held sacred. The de- 
fense of homes is a cause that arouses masculine patriotism. There is 
an old saying found in Bacon that "Love of his country begins in a 
man's own house." 24 The patriot will sacrifice for his home; and he 
will die that his posterity may enjoy the privileges of a free country. 

The pursuit of happiness is another of the privileges that men deem 
inalienable. And the pursuit of happiness in grown-ups seems to be 
mostly the pursuit of trade. Consequently they will prize what pro- 
tects, and hate what threatens business. One hates the invader of 
his country because he does not want the means of his livelihood to 
pass under the control of an unsympathetic power. The land is the 
form of wealth that is inevitably seized by the invader. And patriotism, 
because of this, gains another connection with the soil. "... 
Patriotism envelops the real estate because the real estate nourishes 

The Beliefs of Patriotism 51 

the lives and careers of the patriots. . . . The emotions of loyalty 
and value congregate about the 'vital interests' of our lives." 25 The 
laying on of burdens of taxation too grievous to be borne is an un- 
warrantable interference with the pursuit of happiness. And so patriot- 
ism often starts over taxes. It was so in the formation of the United 
States. The following extract from a speech by Samuel Adams to the 
newly elected representatives to the Massachusetts colonial legislature 
from Boston, will show what the drift then was: "... As you 
represent a town which lives by its trade," he said, "we expect in a 
very particular manner, though you make it the object of your at- 
tention to support our commerce in all its just rights, to vindicate it 
from all unreasonable impositions and promote its prosperity." 26 The 
trader looks to his government for protection, and when he receives it, 
he has a particular reason for desiring the continued good health of his 
country. The same holds true of workingmen. John Dewey says: 
"... The simple fact of the case is that at present workingmen 
have more to gain from their own national state in the way of legis- 
lative and administrative concessions than they have from some other 
state, or from any international organization." 27 And as long as this 
is true, tradesmen, laborers, and all others who have anything to gain 
by it will be patriots, and violent patriots. 

What kind of patriotism is it that rests upon the belief in one's 
country as the protector of self? Is it patriotism at all? It is not that 
disinterested love of country that the common man has been formally 
taught to regard as patriotism. But it is loyalty to country, and what- 
ever answers to that description must be patriotism. It no doubt makes 
the state a kind of business affair. The primary motive is that of 
prudence. A man defends his country because he needs it. But some 
men serve God in that way, and we call it religion. And so this 
profit-and-loss attachment to country may come under the term pa- 
triotism. One reason, therefore, for patriotism is that the country is 
needful for the protection of life's values. But, on the other hand, 
the attachment to country is not patriotism, if the country is looked 
at merely as means. Patriotism views the country somehow as end. 
If the real and only motive which is getting expressed is that of self- 
interest, any show of patriotism is after all mere camouflage. The point 
is that men will actually come to feel real gratitude and love for the 
country which has protected them. It is a psychological fact that 
affection attaches itself to what has been useful. In this way and 
for this reason, affection attaches itself to country, and becomes pa- 


The Oneness of Country and Self 

The patriot identifies himself with his country. He believes that 
> he and his country are one. This belief is the coming to consciousness 
of the impulse to cling to one's own. And this conviction becomes 
another reason for patriotism. Patriotic loyalty of this kind is not a 
.-business affair. It will not abandon the country even if the latter 
/ should prove unsuccessful in providing protection, but will remain 
steadfast through all the country's vicissitudes. One's country may 
fail to protect him, but if it is still a recognizable expression of himself, 
he will love it. The government or state may be faulty, and yet the 
patriot will still be true. Veblen intimates that one might just as 
well have foreign officials as home-grown capitalists administer one's 
affairs of government. 28 But the patriot is not likely to be persuaded 
to think Veblen's way, and the reason is that the home-grown cap- 
italists somehow seem closer than the foreign officials. It is quite 
true that there are those who refuse to be patriotic because their coun- 
try does not give them what they believe to be justice. Anarchists 
are not patriotic. Socialists sometimes are not patriotic. Some among 
the laboring classes have come to wear their patriotic allegiance but 
lightly. But the issue for them has ceased to be merely that of 
getting justice. It has come to the point where the injustice of the 
industrial situation has gone so far that the dissatisfied classes do not 
even recognize themselves in the state that is supposed to represent 
them. And when that feeling of strangeness creeps into a man's 
heart, he is no longer likely to be a patriot. Patriotism is rendered 
to a country that is one's own. In view of this, it seems rather 
significant that the rise of nationalism has been cotemporal with the 
rise of democracy. 

The country is a part of one's objectified self. And one cannot be 
a self without being objectified. He has to come to expression in some 
way, and he has to have the means and material through which to 
express himself. The individual would lose in individuality if his 
group were broken up. He cannot be a normal human being inde- 
pendent of the group; and the group for the civilized man includes 
"country." "In a profound sense, man is born under the relations of 
country and of government. He can no more live a rational, civilized 

The Beliefs of Patriotism 53 

life without a country, and apart from government, than without the 
family and apart from the social order. Scarce human is the individual 
to whom are applicable Homer's contemptuous words, — 'No tribe, nor 
state, nor home hath he.' " ra The country pours itself into the indi- 
vidual. Jacks says: "The distinction between our own thoughts and 
the nation's thoughts is being obliterated. Ask the first honest man 
you meet to tell you what he is thinking, and if he answers faithfully, 
he will tell you something of what the nation is thinking." 80 The pa- 
triot instinctively feels the oneness between his country and himself, 
and often has a clear belief concerning it. Washington spoke of "that 
country, in whose service I have spent the prime of my life; for whose 
sake I have consumed so many anxious days and watchful nights, and 
whose happiness, being extremely dear to me, will always constitute 
no inconsiderable part of my own." sx Washington identified himself 
with America, and so do all patriots identify themselves with their 
country. If the patriot were asked why one should love his country, 
his reply might very well be, "Why should one love himself?" 

The identification of oneself with his country is greatly helped out 
by the fact that the country is an outgrowth of the family. The idea 
of kinship has been extended to the national group. The nation is 
believed to be of one race. McDougall in speaking of the self-regard- 
ing instinct calls attention to the fact that it is extended to others, and 
says: ". . . This extension should not, and usually does not, stop 
short at the family; in primitive societies the tribe and the clan, which 
are the collective objects of the regards of other tribes and clans, be- 
come also the objects of this sentiment; and among ourselves the 
growing child is led on in the same way to identify himself with, and 
to extend his self-regarding sentiment to his school, his college, his 
town, his profession as a class or collective unit, and finally to his 
country or nation as a whole. 32 The extension of the sentiment cul- 
minates in its application to the country, and this application has 
been historically possible because the country has been believed to be 
the organization of a homogeneous race. 

But the feeling of oneness with the country does not rest solely upon 
the belief in blood kinship. Ethnologists are now pretty well agreed 
that there are no pure races, and that nationality does not coincide 
with race homogeneity. C. D. Burns points out that the Belgians, 
at the time they were seeking nationality, were of different blood. "The 
group had asserted their common ambition and their distinction from 
all other groups. They were not all the same blood or language, but 

54 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

their traditions and purposes were the same." 33 It is not exclusively a 
common ancestry, then, that provides the basis for one to feel at one 
with his country. It is not so much a question of genesis as of condition. 
One feels at home in a country which in general has the same sort of 
character and life as his own. The largest factor is that of a common 
consciousness, no matter how produced. What this means may be un- 
derstood from the words of Bosanquet: "Broadly speaking, the limit 
of a country or nation is the limit of a common experience, such that the 
people share the same mind and feelings, and can understand each 
other's ways of living and make allowance for each other so that the 
same laws and institutions are acceptable and workable for all of 
them." 34 The patriot in a foreign land feels truly like an innocent 
abroad, but his own country is home, sweet home to him. 

The love of the country as one's objectified self coincides with the 
desire for attachment. Man, in other words, wants to objectify him- 
self. He is not satisfied with solipcism. He wants a world, and a world 
that somehow represents himself. Without that he is a lost soul. "The 
man without a country" is pathetic because he has no attachment, no 
fixed world that he can call his own. The country provides a satisfying 
object of attachment, in which the patriot's soul can be at rest. 

Patriotism is devotion to a cause, and the cause is one's own. The 
patriot has made it his by his own choice. It is a part of himself. 
Royce in speaking of patriotic loyalty says: "This plan of the patriot 
has two features: (1) It is through and through a social plan, obedient 
to the general will of one's country, submissive; (2) it is through and 
through an exaltation of the self, of the inner man, who now feels glori- 
fied through his sacrifice, dignified in his self-surrender, glad to be his 
country's servant and martyr, — yet sure that through this very readi- 
ness for self-destruction he wins the rank of hero." 85 The call of war 
is not only a call to sacrifice, but also a call to self-expression. Royce 
continues: "This war-spirit, for the time at least, makes self-sacrifice 
seem to be self-expression, makes obedience to the country's call seem 
to be the proudest sort of display of one's own powers. Honor now 
means submission, and to obey means to have one's way. Power and 
service are at one. Conformity is no longer opposed to having one's 
own will. One has no will but that of the country." 36 Patriotism in 
this character simplifies the problem of duty. It provides a cause into 
which one can throw himself with all his heart, avoid the conflict of a 
divided mind, and it is able to do all this for a man for the reason that 
the cause is his own. It makes a joy out of a duty. An expression of 

The Beliefs of Patriotism 55 

the joy that comes to one in the service of his country's cause is to be 
found in the words supposed to have been uttered by Epaminondas 
when he was dying upon the battlefield. Zimmermann cites the inci- 
dent: "Epaminondas, the Theban, when lying on the ground mortally 
wounded with a spear at the battle of Leuctra, all that troubled him was 
the event of the battle, and what was to become of his arms; but on 
his shield being held up to him, and with assurances that the day had 
gone for the Theban side, he said to the bystanders with a cheerful 
countenance, 'Let not this day, friends, be considered as the end of my 
life, but as the beginning of my happiness and the consummation of my 
glory. I have the satisfaction of leaving my country victorious, haughty 
Sparta humbled, and Greece freed.' Then drawing the spear out of his 
breast, he expired." 37 Even if Epaminondas did not express any such 
dramatic sentiment, it was a common enough experience among mankind 
to be the subject of a credible bit of fiction. The joy was in the fact 
that the cause had triumphed, a cause that he had made his own. The 
patriot identifies himself with his country; in it he sees himself; and 
he shares its sorrows and successes. 

The patriot is provincial. He begins his life of attachment by being 
loyal to what is nearest the center of his own interests. And such attach- 
ment is natural. We are not likely to be so vitally interested in far- 
away things as in the things that are near. It is simply a case of where 
the power of gravitation varies in inverse ratio to the distance between 
the gravitating bodies. Now, the patriot's own nation is nearer to him 
than is any other, and consequently to it he renders his warmest devo- 
tion. Even many who deplore the narrowness of nationalism and them- 
selves do not share that narrowness, do nevertheless have a warm devo- 
tion for their own country. This devotion, strong in spite of a con- 
sciousness of the country's shortcomings, shows itself in Cowper's line: 

"England, with all thy faults, I love thee still." 38 

The patriot believes that he is an unnatural son if he is not devoted 
to his country. To turn against the country is comparable to turning 
against his own mother. And of course no real man of flesh and blood 
and the ordinary feelings of normal human beings, would do such a 
thing as that. The traitor is abnormal, and is something amounting to 
almost a monster. All normal men are believed to thrill to the senti- 

"This is my own, my native land!" 89 

56 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

The country is so close that it is felt to be inhuman baseness not to be 
true to the ties that bind one to it. 

Patriotism is, then, in part a clinging to the nation as an expression 
of one's own life. The patriot fiercely resents attacks upon the nation, 
for they are attacks upon himself. They assail the periphery of his 
personality. He wants his country to be free because in it he finds 
himself expressed, and because he claims the right to continue his self- 
expression through the country. Therefore he hates conquest by an 
enemy. He would rather die fighting than be subjugated, because in 
dying for his country he asserts himself in one last final defiant act. 
It is a supreme act of self-assertion. The country is the patriot's, it is 
vital to him, and while life lasts he will not see it perish from the earth. 


The Intrinsic Value of One's Country 

The patriot believes that his country is intrinsically a fundamental 
value. It is a cause that is worthy. He sees various things in the 
country that furnish the bases for this belief. Sometimes he beholds in 
the state a sacred or semi-sacred institution. A philosophy which put 
the theory of the state in such a way as to furnish a basis for this belief 
was that of Hegel. For Hegel, the state was the development of the 
absolute Idea in the world. The state did not arise in response to the 
needs of men, as philosophers like Mill and Spencer 40 have held, and 
as would probably be held by the patriot who looks upon the country as 
protector or expression of himself. Hegel said, "It is a very distorted 
account of the matter when the state, in demanding sacrifices from the 
citizens, is taken to be simply the civic community, whose object is 
merely the security of life and property. Security cannot possibly be 
obtained by the sacrifice of what is to be secured. . . . The nation 
as a state is the spirit substantively realized and directly real. Hence, 
it is the absolute power on earth." 41 Hegel felt that way about the 
Prussian State. And others have felt almost the same way about their 
state. The desire for a solid and immutable condition of life that the 
view represents is a fundamental one. And when Hegel or any one else 
takes that view of his state, he is at once likely to be a devoted patriot. 

The popular parallel to Hegel's conclusion is the belief that the coun- 
try comes from God. Men seem to want to feel that their origins are 
worthy of reverence, and that they are especially favored. In ancient 
times most people traced their ancestry back to their God. The Jap- 
anese do the same thing in modern times, and have a religion which is 
the expression of that belief. The Shinto religion inculcates reverence 
for the sovereign, ancestral memory, filial piety, nature worship, and 
the belief that the imperial family, which is descended from their god, 
is the fountain head of the whole nation. These elements have been 
infused into Bushido, which Nitobe calls The Soul of Japan, and which 
embodies and inculcates the Japanese national ideals. But the belief 
in the semi-sacred character of the nation is common in all countries. 
How often do we hear it said that America is God's Modern Chosen Peo- 
ple. And at least one of the sovereigns of Europe does not cease to 
mention the patriotism of his tutelary god not only in his prayers, but 
also in his proclamations. 

58 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

This belief in the sacredness of one's country has in monarchies a 
splendid symbol to which to attach itself in the person of the king or 
emperor. The ruling classes encourage this attachment; they them- 
selves feel that they rule by divine right. They have inherited the 
belief from the traditions of the Middle Ages and from such philosophi- 
cal theories as that of Hegel. And the people, also habituated to a cer- 
tain extent in those ideas, share the same belief. If they are thor- 
oughly loyal, they take an attitude towards their king similar to that 
assumed by religious devotees towards their God. But emperor-worship 
is not at all necessary to state-worship. Many who no longer believe in 
the divine right of kings still believe in the divine right of states. The 
state is still often looked upon as sacred and sovereign. The Greek con- 
ception of the omnipotent polis is in the hinterland of our minds. There 
has come down from the Middle Ages a habit of sovereignty which the 
world has not shaken off. And, moreover, men want a supreme power 
which guarantees safety. Patriotism thrives in such soil. When people 
are possessed of these beliefs, patriotism with them can become almost 
a religion. 

The belief that one has a glorious country is a form of the belief 
in its value. This kind of patriotism is fed by contemplation of the 
great names of the past and the deeds of conquering heroes. It can 
attach itself to any characteristic in which the country excels. Some of 
the reasons for patriotism advanced in a school textbook ran somewhat 
as follows: Our country is a great nation. Our territory is big. We 
have an immense population. Our wealth is surpassingly great. Our 
power is tremendous. Our educational standards are high. And we 
are the great exponent of a land of freedom. 42 The moral was that any 
American boy or girl ought to recognize that he lived in a grand and 
glorious country. One of the very common causes of pride is the extent 
of commerce, and in this way the economic factor makes another con- 
nection with patriotism. A few years ago, one of the potent reasons for 
the proposal to subsidize an American merchant marine was that the 
country did not like to feel that the flag was not floating over the sea 
as it once had. 

The consciousness of national glory grows on the pride of power. 
The belief in the country's greatness fuses with and derives dynamic 
from the impulse to power. National power is precious to a certain type 
of patriot. It is even more precious than peace. "The plain fact is 
that people do not prize tranquillity above all other goods. They desire 
influence and power, and are willing to accept the responsibilities and 

The Beliefs of Patriotism 59 

the suffering that these entail." 43 These facts throw light upon the 
patriotism of aggressive nations. The patriots of those nations glory 
in their country's glory, and grow great in the consciousness of its 
power. Imperialism grows out of this temper. And once a country 
is embarked on a career of imperialism, it is hardly to be satisfied 
short of dominion over the world. Even then it will sigh for new 
worlds to conquer. And this characteristic of an insatiable lust for 
glory should not be lost sight of when we are considering the taming 
of an enemy by nonresistance. 

The patriotism that feeds upon the country's glory is jealous of the 
national prestige. Prestige is glory. And a nation cannot continue 
to glory either at home or abroad if it suffers its prestige to be lowered. 
Consequently it must sometimes fight simply to protect that prestige. 
Many of our citizens during the period of crisis with Mexico over the 
exploits of Villa and also during the critical time in our affairs with 
Germany before war was declared, believed that if we did not fight, 
our prestige value would be lowered all over the world, and that we 
should be deprived of the power of acting effectively in world politics. 
The desire of a nation for revenge also is the desire, as much as 
anything else, to restore her fallen prestige. 

Solicitude for the country's honor is another outgrowth of the pa- 
triotism that delights in national glory. One kind of honor is that 
of Belgium standing up in the face of aggression for its integrity and 
for its loyalty to its international obligations. A weaker kind is very 
much like the desire for prestige. It is a desire for the respect of 
others. It appears in the reason that Nitobe gives for Japan's opening 
its doors to the western world. "The sense of honor which cannot 
bear being looked down upon as an inferior power, — that was the 
strongest of motives." 44 This sense of honor will lead to high achieve- 
ments, but the tragedy is that it will so easily lead to war. C. D. 
Broad says, ". . . . It is chiefly when people can be persuaded 
that questions of honor are involved that they can be got to fight." 45 
And when a war is started, no country wants to accept defeat. Each 
one emblazons on its sword the device which is said to have been on 
the sword of a faithful knight of feudal times: "Never draw me with- 
out right; never sheathe me without honor." 

The trouble which is implicit in the situation is that nations be- 
lieve that their glory and welfare are matters of competitive success. 
It is all too commonly believed that the gain of one nation must mean 
the loss of another. Consequently, the attitude that is taken on all 

60 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

sides is simply that of intelligent self-interest. Jealousy arises out of 
such a situation, and jealousy is one of the effective causes of war. 
One of the most significant factors in the diplomatic history preceding 
the present war was that of the rivalry of the great European powers 
for strategic land areas, and for control of the important sea routes 
of the world. There has been a problem of the Mediterranean, the 
Adriatic, Constantinople, the North Sea, the Baltic, the China Sea, the 
Persian Gulf, and so on. Germany, younger than the other nations, 
has been making a desperate effort to catch up with them, and the 
present war is in great part the outgrowth of the friction arising out 
of that effort. 46 

But it is encouraging that the glory of nations does not consist 
exclusively in competitive success, and that there are those who realize 
it. There are those who see that the true good of all countries may 
be worked out at the same time. J. S. Mill expressed a high ideal of 
patriotism when he said: "I believe that the good of no country can be 
obtained by any means but such as tend to that of all countries, nor 
ought to be sought otherwise, even if attainable." 47 This may be 
matched by a passage from American patriotic eloquence uttered by 
no less a patriot than Charles Sumner: "I hope to rescue those terms 
[national glory], so powerful over the minds of men, from the mis- 
taken objects to which they are applied, from deeds of war and the 
extension of empire, that henceforward they may be attached only 
to acts of justice and humanity." 48 The highest good of nations really 
lies in the use of those things which do not perish in the using and of 
which there is enough for all. They are the things of the mind and 
of the spirit. The hope is that the rivalry of nations may be trans- 
ferred from destructive to constructive pursuits. Much better would be 
friendly rivalry in the accomplishments of science, art, scholarship, 
social welfare, and like things. 

The belief in the value of one's country sometimes expresses itself 
in the conviction that the country embodies lofty ideals. Patriots be- 
lieve that their nation represents a great tradition, and stands for ideals 
that are important to the human race. A country may be said to be 
organized about these beliefs. A people is not really effectively unified 
until it is held together by the power of a common ideal. And that 
ideal is a source of strength to patriotism. This idealistic character has 
impressed itself upon even the warlike temper of peoples. They do 
not usually fight over causes that are avowedly materialistic and pred- 

The Beliefs of Patriotism 6i 

atory. It takes a big idea to appeal to the people. ". . . Peo- 
ples in their larger corporate activities are not mercenary, but idealist. 
They know that wars do not 'pay' in the low, material sense. They 
are not seeking present ease and comfort, seldom a present good of 
any kind, but the triumph of an ideal which they associate with their 
national life. Their method may be wrong, but their purpose is essen- 
tially altruistic, perhaps the least selfish of any activity we know." 48 
And the ideal that moves a people must be a morally high ideal, or at 
least must seem to be so. A government could scarcely hope to win 
a hard war without having first enlisted the community's moral con- 

Ideals are in part inherited from the nation's past. What has 
united in the past has been these common ideals ; and it is because there 
were such that the memory of the past is so valuable. But for the 
idealist the future is fully as important as the past. A people is held 
together by what Green calls its "social expectation.'" 50 What binds 
us together in America is not so much the past as the future. Our 
past is a vital factor in our unity. It is remarkable how the various 
elements in our population can apparently so naturally appropriate 
"the Puritan fathers" as their own. The Puritan fathers were only 
one element in the founding of the United States, and at least three- 
quarters of the present inhabitants of this land have no physical in- 
heritance from them, but a far greater proportion of the American 
people count themselves as their spiritual progeny. Nevertheless, the 
American people contains great heterogeneous groups and masses who 
have never been assimilated to the Puritan ideals or traditions. There 
is no common past for all our people. We root back into many lands 
and many traditions. The tie that really binds is what we believe 
to be our common destiny, the ideals that we believe ourselves to be 
progressively realizing. The roots of our unity are in the sky. 

The ideals which a nation believes that it exemplifies are various. 
Sometimes it is that of good government. Virgil felt that Rome was 
spreading peace and order throughout the world. 61 Sometimes it is 
the ideal of justice. The patriot seems to feel that in his country's 
just cause eternal justice itself is being incarnated. "A patriot he 
[Washington] was in the highest sense, not because he loved his 
country with a selfish love, but because he loved justice on the broadest 
scale, and believed that the cause of his country was that of eternal 
justice." 52 But the ideal which has been exploited perhaps more than 
any other is that of freedom. Patriots thrill at the thought that not 

62 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

only is their country the guardian of their freedom, but is the champion 
of freedom throughout all the world. This ideal has the honor of 
having most keenly aroused the consciences of states. "It is a curious 
fact that practically every case in which altruistic action has been 
professed by or recommended to a nation has been a case in which the 
'liberty' of some human beings was in question. Thus both the 
antislavery and the Bulgarian agitations [in England] were questions 
of liberty; and the whole Palmerstonian policy was directed against 
tyranny. There is indeed some ground for believing that the positive 
international moral sense has at present only developed with regard 
to freedom. There are many people, especially in this country, who 
would say that it is the duty of a state, regardless of its own interests, 
to protect the freedom of another state, especially if the inhabitants 
of the latter are of kindred race to themselves." 53 

Patriotism often rests upon the belief in the value of the country's 
civilization. The civilization of a country is its art, culture, customs, 
and in general its way of living. It is its kultur. Loisy speaks for 
France, ". . . though we do not brag of our culture, we are sure 
that the ruin of France would be no gain to civilization. . . . We 
are safeguarding a notable portion of our human inheritance from the 
madness of the destroyer." 54 Sometimes the element of the civilization 
cherished most is that of religion. The Jewish patriotism was an ex- 
ample of this. Sometimes there is a belief that one's own nation has 
a way of doing things better than others. Germany is an example. At 
other times, pride is founded upon the greatness of one's institutions. 
The English and Americans feel such pride. Sometimes patriotism 
waxes enthusiastic over economic accomplishment. The following is 
an expression of patriotism which, while it will no doubt be astonish- 
ing to most people, nevertheless seems to be sincere: "It is an element 
of patriotism to reverence the successful business man of America, and 
Our Nation must request and heed the advice and admonitions of men 
experienced in affairs." 55 The context shows that the author likes the 
status quo of industry and wealth, and wants more of the same thing. 

Each state group has its own history, and is convinced that it makes 
its own contribution to the world's civilization. The patriot applies 
to his own country the spirit that was expressed by Mazzini: "Every 
people has its special mission, which will cooperate towards the fulfill- 
ment of the general mission of Humanity. That mission constitutes 
its nationality. Nationality is sacred." 56 The sense of having a mis- 

The Beliefs of Patriotism 63 

sion possessed Israel; it possesses Germany; it possesses America. 
Longfellow wrote to America, 

"Humanity with all its fears, 
With all the hopes of future years, 
Is hanging breathless on thy fate." 57 

In fact, the number of the civilizing missions that the world is favored 
with is identically equal to the number of countries that have each a 
national consciousness. The consciousness of being the anointed one 
sometimes strikes the level of the ludicrous. The following is not an 
example, — for the New Englander: "As from the first to this day, let 
New England continue to be an example to the world of the blessings 
of free government, and of the means and capacity of men to main- 
tain it. And in all times to come, as in all times past, may Boston 
be among the foremost and boldest to exemplify and uphold whatever 
constitutes the prosperity, the happiness, and the glory of New Eng- 
land." 58 

The patriotism that justifies itself with the reason that the coun- 
try is an intrinsic value often expresses itself in a desire for a better 
country. Patriotism is not exclusively love of country just as it is. 
It is love of an ideal country. The actual country becomes a subject 
of criticism. Literary men have often satirized their country at the 
same time that they loved it. And the criticism may be all the more 
bitter because the love is great. The country's shortcomings are felt 
by those who love it the most. The following lines inflict the faithful 
wound of a true patriot: 

"The ever-lustrous name of patriot 
To no man may be denied because he saw 
Where in his country's wholeness lay the flaw, 
Where, on her whiteness, the unseemly blot. 
England! thy loyal sons condemn thee. — What! 
Shall we be meek who from thine own breasts draw 
Our fierceness? Not ev'n thou shalt overawe 
Us, thy proud children nowise basely got. 
Be this the measure of our loyalty — 
To feel thee noble and weep thy lapse the more. 
This truth by thy true servants is confess'd — 
Thy sins, who love thee most, do most deplore. 
Know thou thy faithful! Best they honour thee 
Who honour in thee only what is best." 59 

64 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

Patriotism consequently does not mean blind devotion to country, 
right or wrong. And the plain fact is that there actually are patriots 
who do not conceive that devotion to country must be consistent even 
at the expense of one's moral convictions. Loyalty to country with 
them does not set aside loyalty to the moral law. The following lines 
are taken from an essay commendatory to patriotism: "Let patriotism 
wholly conform itself to the moral law; let it judge all things, national 
as well as individual, by the unalterable, supreme, standard of right 
and wrong; let it sanction no blind following of the flag, nor any 
unethical exalting of the country's dominance above the country's 
righteousness; let it reject the notion that because war has been de- 
clared, patriots must enlist; let it repudiate the idea that because a 
war has been begun, it must be allowed to end only when victory has 
been secured; — and there will not only be fewer wars, but also, on one 
side at least, wars more in keeping with justice and truth." 80 The 
author is a patriot, but his patriotism is directed by a high ethical 

It follows that patriotism is not inextricably bound up with jingoism. 
Patriotism is not exclusively a war-time virtue. In truth pacifists may 
well assert, and do sometimes, that they are patriots, and differ from 
other patriots only in the way in which they show their patriotism. 
There are uses for the patriot in time of peace as well as in time of 
war. A practical statesman in a patriotic address has said, "We need 
men who will not only be ready to sacrifice for their country in time 
of war, but who will not be a menace to it in time of peace! We want 
patriots in finance. We want patriotism in the organization of corpora- 
tions. We want patriots in the conduct of public utilities. We want 
patriots in rendering loyal obedience to the law." 61 Washington, who 
was a patriot in war, preferred peace, and was a patriot in peace as 
well as in war. When he was about to resign his commission as com- 
mander-in-chief of the army, he wrote his "Letter to the Governors" in 
which he made suggestions for putting the Federal Government on a 
right basis. His "Farewell Address" was characterized by paternal 
solicitude for the future of his country. On both occasions Washing- 
ton, first in peace as well as in war, expressed what was a true spirit 
of patriotism. 

The patriotism that looks within the country demands public spirit. 
It calls for unselfishness on the part of the individual and devotion to 
the betterment of the country. J. S. Mill's Autobiography shows in its 
pages that Mill was actuated in his work by an unselfish and devoted 

The Beliefs of Patriotism 65 

public spirit. High-minded patriots demand everyday devotion to the 
country. Bosanquet tells us what patriotism means to him. He says: 
"In their patriotism, their feeling for the community, Hegel tells us, 
people are apt to follow their custom of being generous before they 
are just, and excuse themselves by a potential romantic magnanimity 
for a lack of prosaic everyday loyalty to the commonwealth. But it is 
this latter, the sense of daily duty, which is real patriotism — the founda- 
tion and seed-plot of the former." 9 * 

This public spirit means, for one thing, that the individual himself 
be a good citizen. ". . . Patriotism demands that, in ourselves, 
we be good and true. The country's worthy citizen must be personally 
worthy, — emulous of culture, devoted to virtue. No man personally 
dishonorable, can be patriotic in the highest degree."* 3 It means, for 
another thing, that a man shall be interested in the welfare of the 
people of his country. Although an enthusiasm for the people some- 
times weakens nationalistic feeling, as in the case of Tolstoy, neverthe- 
less patriotism often derives great strength from humanitarian sym- 
pathy. This sympathy shows itself nowadays in the desire for a 
greater measure of justice in the relations between the classes. In a 
patriotic address, John Grier Hibben says: "In the throes of its new 
birth the world today needs a new industrial conscience, a new sense 
of social responsibility, a new standard of national integrity. We must 
realize that the strength of a nation lies ultimately not in its natural 
resources, or in its method of efficiency, or in its numerical superiority, 
or in its army, or navy, but in its moral and spiritual vigor."* 4 Even 
J. M. Robertson, who on the whole thinks that patriotism is a bad thing, 
has for the nation an ideal of "scientific social development." 86 It 
is easy to see in his book that he has a large sympathy with "the 
people" not only of other countries, but also of his own. That is his 
patriotism. The International Reform Bureau published a book en- 
titled "Patriotic Studies." And it was not, as one might suppose, a 
series of learned articles on the subject of Patriotism. It was a com- 
pilation of Congressional documents of the years 1888-1905 for the 
study of public questions. The questions treated in this volume were 
the following: 1. Moral and Social Functions of Education. 2. 
Municipal Reform. 3. Immigration. 4. The Lord's Day and the 
Rest Day. 5. The Labor Problem. 6. The Family. 7. National 
Reforms. 8. Amusements, With Special Reference to Purity. 9. 
Gambling. 10. Prevention and Punishment of Crime. 11. The 
Liquor Problem. 12. The New Charity." 88 All this was considered 

66 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

by an International Bureau of Reform to be "patriotic studies." Pa- 
triotism then, reveals itself in the doing of those things that aim at the 
true welfare of mankind within a country. And such activities are 
patriotism. "In the peace movement, the temperance reform, the 
judicious and practicable schemes for the abolition of bondage, the 
attempts to discover a more Christian organization of society; — in every 
association and all efforts that seek the highest welfare of man, and 
prepare the way for his free culture and rightful enjoyment, as a 
creature of God, the American idea justifies itself and culminates; and 
by strengthening this tendency, and only thus can Patriotism be faith- 
ful to its law, and vindicate its nature." 67 

It is quite consistent with patriotism that the country should be 
cherished as the servant of humanity. The ideal of service sometimes 
becomes a reason for patriotism. Mazzini's 68 patriotism was of this 
kind. His ideal was that a nation should claim not its own aggrandize- 
ment, but its right to serve humanity as a distinct group. This kind 
of patriotism is that which Royce would recommend as an example 
of the best loyalty. "Enlightened loyalty takes no delight in great 
armies or in great navies for their own sake. If it consents to them, 
it views them merely as transiently necessary calamities. It has no 
joy in national prowess, except in so far as that prowess means a 
furtherance of universal loyalty. . . . We want loyalty to loyalty 
taught by helping many people to be loyal to their own special causes, 
and by showing them that loyalty is a precious common human good, 
and that it can never be a good to harm any man's loyalty except 
solely in necessary defense of our own loyalty. . . . And so, a cause 
is good, not only for me, but for mankind, in so far as it is essentially 
a loyalty to loyalty, that is, is an aid and a furtherance of loyalty in 
my fellows." 69 And Royce, in his last book, made the application 
to patriotism: "Let us, with all our might, with whatever moral in- 
fluence we possess, with our own honor, with our lives if necessary, be 
ready, if ever and whenever the call comes to our people, to sacrifice 
for mankind as Belgium has sacrificed; to hazard all, as Belgium has 
hazarded all, for the truer union of mankind and for the future of 
human brotherhood'" The truest patriot, from this point of view, 
will be the man whose insight will reveal to him what his nation can 
most naturally and best do for humanity, and who uses his powers to 
win the devotion of the nation to the ideal of performing that service. 

What conclusions now are yielded by the bearings of the reasons of 
patriotism? Is patriotism either justified or discredited by them? Once 

The Beliefs of Patriotism 67 

more it is apparent that no ground has been reached upon which alone 
to base a general judgment. To begin with, no reason simply as such 
is either good or bad; some of the reasons of patriotism are good and 
some are evil. Moreover, these beliefs are often based merely upon 
impulse and regimentation. There is "instinctive inference as well as 
. . . instinctive impulse." 71 One will hunt reasons for what he 
believes; many of his reasons are simply after-thoughts. And some- 
times beliefs are not as accurate as instincts and habits. A man's 
feelings may often have more meaning than his beliefs. So the fact 
that a thing appears to be reasoned does not necessarily make it rea- 

The reasons found in patriotism are another element adding to its 
complexity. And the complexity is all the more involved because im- 
pulses and habits have remained in patriotism along with reasons. 
Patriotism is composed of all three, — impulses, habits, and reasons. 
The nature of patriotism will have to be found in a concept that 
unifies all these elements, and its ethical value can be clearly assessed 
only in the light of that concept. Therefore, the nature and value 
of patriotism will be the objects of attention in the remaining chapters. 


The Will to National Individuality 

Patriotism is a complex sentiment. It grows out of a great variety 
of roots and reasons, and finds expression in many forms. In the pre- 
ceding parts of this treatise these foundations and expressions of patri- 
otism have been dealt with. They throw light upon the questions of 
why patriotism is and why it is what it is. It remains for patriotism 
to be defined. 

No one of the many causes or appearances of the sentiment ade- 
quately defines it. Those who fix upon some one impulse, habit, or 
reason, and try to fit all the facts of patriotism into that, oversimplify 
the situation. They leave out essential features. This would hold true 
of J. M. Robertson, 1 who makes patriotism to consist of the impulses 
of fear and hatred. There are important kinds of patriotism, directed 
toward the internal improvement of the country for instance, which 
cannot be so classified. If one followed the clue of Trotter, 2 he would 
explain the phenomenon as the result of the herd instinct. But patriot- 
ism is not purely instinctive. Veblen 8 would lead one to make the 
economic motive and the impulse of rivalry or emulation prominent. 
But patriotism is something more than a contest and a contest, too, 
which is mainly for material goods. Loisy * would make patriotism a 
worthy religion, and recommend it as such. But the love of country 
does not always attain the dignity that it has in Loisy. Powers B makes 
men's interest in their civilization the root of their patriotism. But he 
opens his book with the recognition that men do fight over material 
things. None of these accounts can be used as an adequate basis from 
which to define and present the central concept of patriotism. 

Yet patriotism is one. There is a common center about which all 
the impulses, habits, and beliefs of the sentiment cluster. There is a 
concept "patriotism." It is that concept, though perhaps inarticulate, 
which guides even in the gathering of material for its own definition. 
It will be enlarged after the preliminary examination, but it is present 
from the beginning. 

The clue that one really has in hand when he sets out to study 
patriotism is the popular definition that it is "the love of country." 8 
And it is a hopeful clue from which to start. It does lead one to the 
material that he seeks. Moreover, it shows what patriotism has meant 

72 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

in racial wisdom, the wisdom of the plain people who have long and 
intimately been associated with and been most moved by the sentiment. 

It must be said that in one way the result of an examination of 
this popular definition is negative. The preliminary study made in 
this dissertation shows that. Patriotism is hardly to be defined simply 
as the love of country. Devotion to one's native land is in one phase 
an exalted and intelligent loyalty to country as an ideal, but it may 
show another character. Its nature has instinctive roots. It may be 
no more than a habit. Even the reasoned support of country is not 
exclusively what may be described as love; at any rate, it not uncom- 
monly appears as a quite self-interested affection. The conduct of 
patriots has often been such as to cause wonder if the emotion con- 
suming them were really pure, unmixed love. It has frequently seemed 
that there was mixed in a full portion of hate. The phrase, "the love 
of country," covers a multitude of sins. Patriotism is a pure white 
light, but seems to be one in the sense that it can be broken up and 
any color desired extracted from it. Love of country, in view of such 
facts as these, frequently gets to look like something not quite the 
same as the exalted sentiment of school textbooks and Fourth-of-July 

And yet there must have been some considerations that led to the 
definition of patriotism as the love of country. Out of what facts did 
the definition grow? In the light of all the instincts, habits, and 
reasons of patriotism, what does it seem that the phrase "the love of 
country" covers? 

It seems obvious, for one thing, that patriotism is an attitude toward 
country. It is easily seen that "country" is a constant in the phenom- 
ena of patriotism. The country is the object of the patriot's emotions. 
Patriotism, in other words, has to do with "mother country" or 
"fatherland." And that is to say that patriotism is a feeling of nation- 
ality. "Patriotism is the sentiment in which consciousness of national- 
ity normally expresses itself." 7 One would not know where to look 
for patriotism at all if to begin with he did not know in a general way 
that it was this nationalistic sentiment. Generically, patriotism is like 
family pride, civic pride, team spirit, university spirit, and the like; spe- 
cifically, it is nationalistic spirit. It might be necessary that this be 
said only for the sake of completeness were there not a confusion of 
language on the subject. It is, strictly speaking, a strange and meta- 
phorical use of words to talk about "patriots of the world." Such a 
combination of words may serve a useful purpose of propagandism in 

The Nature and Value of Patriotism 73 

furthering a desirable spirit of internationalism or cosmopolitanism, 
and it may in time take on the further connotation, but it is not his- 
torically accurate. Patriotism in its meaning as a word and as a mat- 
ter of fact has to do with a country, and it will serve to keep thinking 
clear if we hold the term to its historical meaning. Patriotism is the 
sentiment of attachment to one's national group. 

The quality of the sentiment impresses one. Patriotism is not mere- 
ly consciousness of nationality. It is more active and explosive than 
that. It is not even such an emotion as that of thankfulness for the 
country. Thankfulness or joy, is the feeling of returning soldiers as 
they land back upon American shores. Is that feeling of satisfaction 
with the homeland at getting back, patriotism? A kind of love of 
country it may be said to be. But ask the man in the street if it is 
patriotism, and he will hesitate. He will, however, be quite sure that 
it is not anything like as patriotic as the acts of the same soldiers in 
going across to Europe, or in breaking up socialistic parades after they 
get back. The mere joy at being once more in the bosom of one's 
country doesn't seem to be patriotism par excellence. There appears 
to be a great difference between liking one's country and loving it. The 
immigrant may like his new home, like it better than any other, and 
still not be patriotic. What is it that must be added to turn the liking 
of country into patriotism? Patriots demand homage to the country. 
Faith must be shown by works. Patriotism is a passion inspiring active 
allegiance. It is devotion that means service, if necessary "the service." 
The patriot is solicitous for his native land. He not only pronounces 
his country good ; he also wants some good for it. He is, moreover, de- 
termined upon that good. That it be secured and maintained is part 
of his ruling purpose. In sum, his will is set upon it. Patriotism has it 
as an essential characteristic that it includes a will towards one's 

What is it that the patriot wills? Briefly, he is vitally interested 
in the selfhood of his country. The thought of self as to the country 
is always present. Patriotism is the will that the country do some 
such thing as be, remain, express, or develop itself. The thorough- 
going patriot in so far as he is such, is interested in the country, the 
whole country, and nothing but the country. 8 It becomes the this 
of his consciousness and affection. He has just one object in the focus 
of his interests, and that object is this country. The patriot says, 
"This, — this is my own, my native land." Patriotism shows an in- 
tense singleness of affection. The country for the patriot is the one. 


74 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

And now, the fact that patriotism is a will toward the country as 
it is in and for itself may be expressed in another way by saying that 
the patriot has a will toward the country as an individual, and his 
will as to its selfhood is a will toward its individuality. A self is an 
individual considered as an identity. The country has an individual 
place in the patriot's heart; and he desires a singleness of the country 
corresponding to his singleness of affection. Love of country has 
done what all love does; it has individualized its object. It makes its 
object the one, the individual, of its devotion. It is with country as 
with woman. A man can love but one. 8 It is the one to him. And 
he wants it to be the one among all others. What it means to him he 
wants it to be objectively. 

And so patriotism may be described as the will to national individu- 
ality. It is individualism expressed upon the national plane. One 
can see what it is when he observes the reaction of patriots to any sug- 
gestion touching the identity of their country. Opposition to the pro- 
posal for a league of nations is patriotism. It is narrow, perhaps, but 
nevertheless patriotism it is. Those who oppose the idea are actuated 
by the fear that loyalty to the league will develop at the expense of 
loyalty to the nation. The patriot feels for his country, puts himself 
in its place, and cannot bear to see its selfhood or individuality im- 

It should be noted that the will to individuality may exist in strong 
measure when the external basis for it seems to be weak, and vice versa. 
Switzerland has an active patriotism with a heterogeneous people, 
while Sweden has a weaker patriotism with a homogeneous people. 
However, this merely amounts to saying that patriotism is sometimes 
weak and sometimes strong. The nature of patriotism remains the 
same. There is simply a stronger set of stimuli urging it to express 
itself in the one case than in the other. And the fact of individuality 
is not exclusively the stimulus to the will to it. There might be a will 
to an individuality which as yet existed only in ideal, and there can be 
a real individuality which leads only to a very weak fervor for itself, 
In the case of Switzerland and Sweden, the explanation is that the 
Swiss have had to fight for their identity much more than the Swedish. 
There must, however, be an actual individuality at least possible in 
order to justify the will. What we are at present concerned with is 
the description of patriotism as a sentiment. Where there is patriotism 
it is such as described, whatever the stimuli may be. National indi- 
viduality is what the Swiss aim at. The next chapter will take up the 

The Nature and Value of Patriotism 75 

question of whether or not patriotism finds a real individuality to rest 
itself upon. An integrating spectroscope is a spectroscope the slit of 
which is illuminated by light from every part of the source under ex- 
amination; this concept of the will to national individuality is the in- 
tegrating spectroscope of the data of patriotism. 

But the term individuality is an elastic one. It is necessary that it 
should be so. It has to be able to cover a great deal as a concept de- 
fining patriotism, for the manifestations of patriotism are various. 
Patriotism is so manifold that the limits of the definition cannot be 
drawn too closely. Individuality is a comprehensive term. It is, how- 
ever, comprehensible. What does it mean? What are the main forms 
that the will to national individuality takes? And are the main forms 
of patriotism discovered in the answer to that question? Does a 
knowledge of the characteristics of an individual furnish the material 
for the understanding of the tendencies of patriotism. 

The first characteristic of an individual is that it is unique. This 
proposition is agreed upon by practically all philosophers whatever 
may be the school of metaphysics to which they belong. All would 
agree with Royce, for instance, in saying that, "An individual is unique. 
There is no other of its individual kind. If Socrates is an individual, 
then there is only one Socrates in the universe. If you are an indi- 
vidual, then in reality there is no other precisely capable of taking your 
place. If God is an individual, then, as ethical monotheism began by 
saying, There is no Other" 9 "Taken individually" means taken sepa- 
rately. Individuality means, in some sense, separateness. An individual 
case is a distinct or isolated case. When, therefore, one demands that he 
be allowed to be an individual, he means that he demands the right 
to be and remain himself. 

And just this is a fundamental demand in patriotism. It is of no 
use to tell a country, even though it seems to others an insignificant 
one, that it will be better off in another country; that its citizens could 
enjoy to a greater extent the physical satisfactions of life; and that 
they will be able to share in a greater kultur. They will not listen. 
They do not wish to live more comfortably as animals; they do not 
wish to live under the aegis of some one else's. greatness, no matter how 
great that may be. An individual will hardly consent to unself him- 
self. The citizens of any country wish to be themselves, and retain 
their own national individuality. Veblen 10 suggests that so far as 
creature comforts are concerned, we might all be fairly well off if we 
voluntarily surrendered to Germany. Art might also be furthered. 

76 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

And in view of the high cost of resistance, so Veblen says, it might be 
well to accept the German imperial rule. But Veblen also knows that 
no nation will listen to his proposal. And why? It is simply because 
we do not live primarily for creature comforts, or that a classical 
science and philosophy should be developed. Self-preservation is the 
first law of nature. We want to exist, and exist as separate and unique. 
We want to be ourselves, and have an individuality that has a continu- 
ous history of its own. At its lowest terms, the will to individuality is 
a will to live. France will not listen to a counsel to negate that will; 
neither will Belgium; neither will Britain; neither will America; and 
neither will Germany. Patriotism seeks to make the country unique; 
that very will itself becomes a factor making for the uniqueness of 
the country. The country is what the patriot wills; it is his; he 
cherishes it; and in its place he will accept no other. The will to 
uniqueness, which is a form of the will to individuality, does in fact 
turn out to be one of the important forms of patriotism. 

In the second place, an individual is a unitary being. It is one 
whole, an individuum. In comparison with others, it is separate; in 
its own inner constitution, it is a unity. It is one in both its external 
and internal relations. Unity is of two grades, simple and complex. 
The simple unity means solidarity and that in the last analysis the in- 
dividual cannot be further subdivided. An atom would be an indi- 
vidual of this kind. But in our actual experience we do not meet with 
such individuals. What we ordinarily mean by an individual is not 
that which is such by virtue of its indivisibility. Taken just as a 
physical fact, it is divisible. It is when we take it as a fact of meaning 
that we see what we ordinarily have in mind as an individual. An in- 
dividual is such because nothing can be subtracted from it without de- 
stroying its distinctive character. It is a unity not because of physical 
indivisibility, not because it is a simple unit, but because, even in 
complexity, it has in it a principle of unity. The richness of variety 
in it only contributes to the richness of its individuality. Bosanquet 
has made the distinction between the two kinds of individuals. " Indi- 
viduality, it has been said, has prima facie two extremes. An 'atom' 
may claim it, on the ground that it is less than can be divided; a world 
may claim it, on the ground that its positive nature is ruined if any- 
thing is added or taken away." u In another place he says that an 
individuality is "a world self -complete." 12 The principle that indi- 
viduality means unity and the distinction between the two kinds of 
unity are well summed up in the following quotation: "That individu- 

The Nature and Value of Patriotism 77 

ality always involves some sort of unity will hardly be denied. That 
which is in no sense one is in no sense an individual; and the more 
truly a thing can be called one, the more truly can it be called an in- 
dividual. We must distinguish, however, between two aspects of 
unity, — the quantitative aspect or numerical unity, and the qualitative 
aspect or inner coherence." u The atom was an example of numerical 
individuality; the qualitative individual would be exemplified in the 
life of a man. A human being can of course be rent limb from limb, 
but so far as bodily life is concerned he ceases then to be a man; his 
identity as a human individual has been destroyed. 

Now a country is an individual by virtue of being a qualitative 
unity. It is a unity in difference. Aristotle says: "A state is not made 
up only of so many men, but of different kinds of men; for similars do 
not constitute a state." 14 The unity of a country is not a simple but a 
complex unity. It is often quite rudimentary, but its essentials are 
there, if there is any country at all. And those essentials may be de- 
veloped. They at least exist as the material for an ideal unity. Na- 
tional individuality, to be sure, is often an ideal rather than a present 
fact. But the patriot holds just this unity of his country in ideal, and 
strives towards it. His is a will to national unity, national individual- 
ity. There were in the revolutionary period two movements develop- 
ing side by side, — the movements towards independence and unity. 
Washington was a patriot not only because he sought for separation 
from England, but because he consistently counselled unity as among 
the colonies. Lincoln was a patriot not in the sense that he stood for 
the separation of his country from other countries (there was no call 
for that), but in that he stood for the preservation of the unity of the 
United States. He preserved the Union. The nationalistic movements 
of the nineteenth century in Europe were directed in large part towards 
unity. The Germans and Italians strove to the end that all their people 
might be united. Those movements were struggles for national unity, 
and hence struggles for national individuality. 

The stimulus of war brings out in supreme degree the demand of 
the patriot for national unity. The present war has compelled unity 
within each individual nation to an unparalleled extent. The whole 
population in each country has had to be organized for the war. The 
civil and military populations are not now as distinct as they once were. 
"The war is waged not only by the soldier but by the baker, the manu- 
facturer, the engineer, the farmer, the small investor, the women. Un- 
less, therefore, the emotions of the entire country can be keyed up to 

78 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

volunteer pitch and maintained at the point of fighting efficiency, the 
war machine loses momentum." 16 The patriot sees the necessities of 
the times, and insists upon absolute unity. It is the form that his will 
to national individuality then takes. 

The patriot ought, however, to remember that unity does not mean 
solidarity, and that a true individual is not one which has to be main- 
tained by the suppression of all differences. The patriot insists so 
strongly upon unity, no doubt, because he believes that to act as one 
is the only way in which the national individuality can be preserved. 
But he should remember, as some one has remarked, that "a solid front 
does not necessitate a solid head." The unity of patriotism is one of 
will, and moreover is one of good will. There cannot be national 
unity on any basis that ignores that fact. The honest pacifist should 
be treated accordingly. On the other hand, there is no reason why 
the pacifist should be made the recipient of peculiar honors or the 
object of special solicitude. He has thrown his opinion into the arena 
of human affairs, and will have to take his chances. And he in his 
turn should remember that the patriot is fighting for priceless posses- 
sions, more valuable than any material possessions, his own individual- 
ity and the individuality of his country. If the pacifist has a right to 
insist upon his opinion, he must accord the patriot the same right to 
insist upon his. What will take place if the patriot happens to have 
a large majority, and deems it most fair to enact a selective draft law? 
The pacifist can do no other than insist upon his inmost convictions. 
But neither can the patriot. There is inevitably a clash, and the prob- 
lem is to be solved not only as a question of right, but also of expedi- 
ency. It may easily be most expedient, it usually is so, for the patriot 
to grant easy terms to the pacifist. And the latter's right to free speech 
and agitation, as long as he does not actually break or incite to the 
breaking of a law, is really indisputable. But the danger to national 
individuality may be great. It is conceivable that an aggressive enemy 
may be at the very doors. In that case, the nonconformist will have 
to become in some sense a martyr. If his country needs him, he ought 
either to serve or pay the penalty. He might have to suffer imprison- 
ment. Or he might find it wisest and most effective to martyr his con- 
victions to the extent of performing some patriotic service, even to 
bearing arms. The fact that the majority differs from him might well 
be an indication that he is wrong, and that he should revise his opinions 
or at least not insist upon them too strongly; and moreover, if one 
martyrs his convictions to the extent of helping win the war, he may 

The Nature and Value of Patriotism 79 

expect then to get a more ready hearing for his opinions. One is 
always listened to more respectfully when he has identified himself 
with the group than when he has cut himself off from it. Conformity 
for the present might prove the best method of making his ideals effec- 
tive in the long run. It is often easier to work from the inside than 
from the outside. The chick within the shell is in the very best posi- 
tion in the world for breaking through it. 

But the essential point is that patriotism insists on unity within 
the nation. There is no nation engaged in the war which is not in- 
sisting upon the utmost unity of action and even of thought. And this 
rests back upon the unity that had already really been developed. If 
each country had not developed and marshaled its resources to such an 
extent in peace time, they could not be so mobilized in war time, and 
indeed there would be no need for it; the enemy would not be bringing 
such resources to bear. It is just the very complexity and unity in 
complexity in modern nations that makes war so drastic, and makes it 
so necessary that neither side should neglect the bringing of any of its 
resources to bear upon the waging of the war. The will to unity, a 
form of the will to individuality, is quite characteristic of patriotism. 

A characteristic of individuality in human beings and their institu- 
tions is that an individual is self-directing; its destiny is worked out 
from within. The following quotation sums up what is meant: "We 
pass on to the third factor in individuality. We have spoken of it as 
completeness or self-sufficiency ; but in its higher degrees it may also 
be called self-direction. That some measure of independence is essen- 
tial to our notion of individuality will hardly be questioned." 18 The 
phrase "have some individuality" means, in part at least, that one 
make his actions the expression of his own true self. It means to 
think and act for oneself. If one does not do that, we say that he is 
not a real individual. If one is not self -directing, and is subject to the 
will of another, his individuality is, in so far, taken from him, and he 
becomes a part of the individuality of that other. If he is integrated 
in the other's will, he really in a true sense ceases to be even unique. 
Fite says: "As a spiritual individual I am found in every action that 
expresses my meaning, whether it be that of my hand, my typewriter, 
my servant, or my political party; and any object that refuses to ex- 
press my meaning, though it be a member of my own body, is so far 
not truly myself." 17 It follows that one has to be free and independent 
to be an individual. And this is the reason that freedom is so precious; 
not because the free man will live in better material circumstances, but 

80 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

because he wants to be an individual. He wants to be himself, and 
have his chance of working out his life in his own way. 

And patriotism involves just this demand for liberty. The patriot 
wants his country to be free. It must, to satisfy him, be not only a 
recognizable separate unit as among the peoples of the world, but 
must run its own affairs. He wants it to be self-directing and autono- 
mous. He cannot bear to have his country used as a thing, or a mere 
piece of mechanism at the mercy of another's will Any one who is 
patriotic in China will not be satisfied with a situation where any for- 
eign power has concessions over parts of his country's soil. Weak gov- 
ernments frequently find it necessary to guard their neutrality, and 
they do it jealously because the patriotic spirit will not permit them 
to allow others to put them in subjection as a means to the furtherance 
of alien designs. Belgium is an instance. Belgium does not want to 
be a roadway or the battlefield of Europe. She does not want to be a 
pawn in a game. She wants her territory to be the expression of her 
own free life. To stand for her neutrality is to stand for her sovereign- 
ty, and to assert herself. Belgium might utterly perish, but in doing 
so, she would have asserted herself, and she would rather die in that 
magnificent self-assertion than to be the tool of another. It is not 
often that a supposedly sovereign power will, like Luxemburg, allow 
its neutrality to be disregarded without a struggle. President Wilson 
understood the sensitiveness of patriots when he insisted that no for- 
eign troops should be landed in Russia without her consent. Patriot- 
ism is often thought of altogether as the fight for freedom. The patriot 
insists upon the freedom, the autonomy, the sovereignty of his country; 
the will to self-direction is one of the moving forces of patriotism. 

To be a true individual is to have some significance of one's own. 
Individuality comes to mean marked individuality. It stands for the 
opposite of the quality of being common. The phrase "have some in- 
dividuality" often means to have something for which one stands, and 
something that is really significant in the world. It means that one's 
activities should be the expression of a life plan which is his, and 
which has real value. This characteristic takes a step beyond those 
of mere separateness and independence. When we say of one that 
he has no individuality, we do not mean that he is not numerically 
separate from other men, but, in part at least, that he has no life plan 
which is specially his own. He has no significance. The man who 
is an individual is one who has a specific character. And if he prides 
himself upon being an individual he wants to "be somebody." He has 

The Nature and Value of Patriotism 8i 

"self-respect." He regards himself as significant. He wants not only 
to count as one; he wants to count. 

And, again, this is a characteristic of patriotism. Patriotism is a 
will be to be nationally significant. It is national pride. It is national 
ambition, a will to self-respect and the respect of others, a will to na- 
tional standing, greatness, distinction, importance, power. The ex- 
istence of this will to be significant is why nations are so sensitive on 
points of honor and prestige. Their national significance is lowered 
if they allow, let us say, a public insult to go unavenged. It is a reason 
why nations cannot back down in a war when it once gets started, and 
why they can all be for peace after the war, but not while it is being 
waged. National significance, as national significance now goes, will 
not permit them to do other than win the war. This is why states like 
to regard themselves as "powers," for it is as a "power" that a nation 
finds itself significant in world politics. It is why countries fight for 
their "civilization." The predominance of their civilization means the 
fulfillment of their desire for national significance. It is why the 
knowledge of the history and literature of one's country is likely to 
produce patriotism; such knowledge creates both a conviction of the 
country's significance and the desire to realize it further. 

The grounds upon which a country asserts its significance is an im- 
portant matter. As long as military prowess and possession of much 
territory are esteemed to be things of great importance, the nations 
will strive to be significant by being distinguished for those things. If 
the ideals of mankind can be more largely turned to constructive activ- 
ities, the nations will strive to be significant along those lines. There 
are patriots whose ideals are of the latter type. They seek the internal 
development of their country as a means of making it more worth 
while and hence more significant. The significance that they seek is 
not merely that which glories in the admiration and perhaps envy of 
the world; it is not a significance adjudged by a jury of mankind, but 
one that they themselves find in making their country approximate an 
ideal. Patriotism is the will to be nationally significant; another main 
characteristic of the will to individuality is what is working in im- 
portant manifestations of patriotism. 

An individual, at least a finite individual, is one of a community. 
And its individuality, therefore, rests upon a "broad basis of likeness." 18 
The conscious individual, for instance, does not strive to make his 
individuality consist in absolute difference. He wants to be different 
only within certain limits. He does not want to be "outlandish." He 

82 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

wants in certain broad ways to be like his fellows. He would, if it 
were called to his attention, agree that his individuality rested in great 
measure upon membership in his community. 

It is impossible for one to avoid seeing the fact that he is one in a 
world with others. The human individual is a social animal. 19 And 
this fact is formulative of his very individuality. Fite says, "Not 
only does .... intercourse with others broaden the range of 
your self-consciousness; it also furnishes the basis of contrast through 
which you become aware of yourself, and define yourself, and are en- 
abled to assert yourself as a distinct and unique individual." 20 Two 
points are involved in what Fite says. First, we become self-conscious 
in contrast with others; we know ourselves in that way. Second, our 
own individuality becomes richer because others exist. What they 
have become broadens one's own vision of the range of human possi- 
bilities by so much the more; and that broader vision enriches and en- 
larges one's own life. One will, then, find his life expanded by the 
multiplication of his social relations. "If our argument has shown any- 
thing, it has shown that through the extension of his social relations, 
the individual becomes, not less, but more of an individual, and acquires 
a greater individual freedom." a The high integration of society is not 
necessarily inimical to the development of the individual. The fact is 
that as society has been builded into larger wholes, the individual has 
also become more and more significant. Royce says, " . . . . 
our time shows us that individualism and collectivism are tendencies, 
each of which, as our social order grows, intensifies the other." " And 
Royce draws this conclusion: "No individual human self can be saved 
except through the ceasing to be a mere individual." ffl 

The existence of others has important consequences for one's prac- 
tical attitude toward life. When one becomes aware of such existence 
he can no longer act as if it were not. "When I have perceived even 
a chair standing in my way I can no longer proceed as if it were not 
there." 2i And one's conduct will usually be more radically changed 
when it is human individuals that are in the way. The same knowledge 
which shows one himself shows him also other human beings who are 
just as real and important as himself, and upon the basis of that 
knowledge he can logically and ethically find no good reason for 
treating them merely as means for the furtherance of his own interests. 
He cannot simply walk over them as if they were not there. But if 
one is even wise, he will adopt no such ruthless plan of life. He 
will realize that consideration for others is best for himself. He will 

The Nature and Value of Patriotism 83 

not only have less trouble, but he will also find his individuality en- 
riched by his intercourse with other free beings who have their own 
meaning. One cannot be a positive reality unless his neighbors are 
also. And if these things are true, it means that the interests of the 
individuals of a community may be harmonized. When each one 
understands his own true nature, he at the same time realizes that his 
own good is best found in harmony with the others of his community. 
Individualism, rightly interpreted, attains the results desired by those 
who place the emphasis upon collectivism. Howison says: "The 
very quality of personality is, that a person is a being who recognizes 
others as having a reality as unquestionable as his own, and who thus 
sees himself as a member of a moral republic, standing to other per- 
sons in an immutable relationship of reciprocal duties and rights, 
himself endowed with dignity, and acknowledging the dignity of all 
the rest." 26 This is an ideal of individuality as it appears in persons. 
The enlightened individual is really concerned about finding his 
proper place in his world. 

Does patriotism recognize that individuality involves membership 
in a community? Does the patriot actually wish to realize the in- 
dividuality of his country in that way? The answer is that he often 
does. There are patriots who have their hearts in the desire that 
their country be a good neighbor. This desire is, of course, not always 
present in the patriotic state of mind. But neither are the other char- 
acteristics of individuality always invariably present. Some of them 
are always present, and together they make up the will to individual- 
ity which is the essence of patriotism. It must be admitted that only 
too often does the patriot think of the individuality of his country as 
realized apart from or at the expense of others. The more generous 
notion of patriotism is still as much a problem as a fact. And 
yet, in times of peace at least, the patriot sees the good of countries 
other than his own. It is a defensible proposition that even the com- 
mon man is capable of and actually does possess such vision. Cer- 
tainly there are examples of illustrious patriots in whom it is found. 
The following has been penned concerning Professor Royce: " . . 
. . his ethical idealism is best understood as an interpretation of 
the spirit of modern civilization as it had found expression in his 
native land. Not that there was anything of the Chauvinist in Royce. 
If there were aught of value in our social and political ideals it was 
due to the fact that they rested on principles that cross the boundaries 
between nations, and might equally serve as the basis of that com- 

84 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

munity of nations to which he hopefully looked forward." 2a But one 
can also place in evidence the very words of one of the greatest patriots 
of all time, Joseph Mazzini. Mazzini was devoted to the ideal of 
serving humanity. He wrote to the laboring people of his country: 
"Your first duties — first as regards importance — are, as I have already 
told you, towards Humanity. You are men before you are either citi- 
zens or fathers."" But he was also an ardent patriot. He was 
devoted to Italy, to her freedom, unity, and significance. And he 
thought that Italians, like all other men, could serve humanity effec- 
tively only by being in association. "This means [of effective asso- 
ciation]," he says, "was provided for you by God when he gave you 
a country; when, as a wise overseer of labor distributes the various 
branches of employment according to the different capacities of the 
workman, he divided Humanity into distinct groups or nuclei upon 
the face of the earth, thus creating the germ of Nationalities." " The 
duty of a nation was to be the servant of humanity, but that was also 
its glory and its right to be. Patriotism and internationalism were 
complementary. "In labouring for our own country on the right 
principle, we labour for Humanity. Our country is the fulcrum of 
the lever we have to wield for the common good. If we abandon that 
fulcrum, we run the risk of rendering ourselves useless not only to 
humanity, but to our country itself. Before men can associate with 
the nations of which humanity is composed, they must have a National 
existence. There is no true association except among equals. It is 
only through our country that we can have a recognized collective 
existence." " This, then, patriotism quite often actually is. And once 
more, in its positive recognition of the country as truly one of a com- 
munity, patriotism turns out to be the working of the will to national 
individuality. This last phase is an altruistic form of the will. 

The concept of the will to national individuality, derived from the 
popular definition of patriotism as the love of country and wrought 
out in the light of the data which clusters about that popular idea, 
proves to be a seminal principle. If one follows out the various forms 
of the will, he comes to the main forms of patriotism. He could, by 
a knowledge of the characteristics of the will to individuality, foretell 
in general what the manifestations of patriotism would be found to be. 


The Nation As an Individual 

Patriotism is the will to national individuality. What justification 
for its existence in there in the groundwork of fact? Is there really 
any individuality for the will to rest itself upon? Is the country an 

There are those who deny that patriotism really has anything ob- 
jective to feed upon. It is hard, they say, to find anything that the 
flag stands for or to which one addresses his choral chant when he sings, 
"My Country! 'tis of thee." They ask what one's country can mean 
to him. When one speaks of country, is he not thinking of that spot 
of earth which he calls home, those activities and institutions which 
he has seen working in his own community, or perhaps only the map? 
A country as big as the United States, for example, can hardly be said 
to be appreciated by the mind of a single man. Most of the country 
no one has ever even seen. The "collective mind" is shown to be a 
fiction. A people does not form a "person," but remains only a group 
of individuals. And the corollary seems to be that the only ground 
on which to posit a nation has been taken away. The state is said to 
be unreal and artificial. Peoples may be the product of history; a 
state can be made in a day. Ponsonby looks upon a nation as such a 
construction: "A nation is not in its composition primarily a geo- 
graphical nor a racial, but a political unit It must be able 

to uphold its independent political sovereignty." 30 Without the ne- 
cessity for a common defense, that is, there would be no nation. 
Charles Kingsley remarked in the preface to one of his books that 
while there can be loyalty to a king or a queen, there cannot be loy- 
alty to one's country. 81 And so it is that a "country" is an abstrac- 
tion. For the ordinary patriot at least there really is no such thing. 
The country is not an individual, and there is no individuality in it 
for the citizen to rest his patriotism upon. Patriotism is thus left up 
in the air. 

Now one is not driven to the extreme view of the nation as a "per- 
son" in order to answer the criticisms suggested in the foregoing. That 
the state is a "person" is a well-known theory. It is held by those 
impressed by the philosophy of Hegel. It is reflected everywhere in 
the terms they use. They talk constantly of such things as a "col- 

86 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

lective mind" and a "general will." But the state is not personal in 
the sense in which human beings are personal. We expect a person 
to have a body, a brain, and a nervous system. A state or nation 
has none such. But a thing does not have to be a person in order to 
be an individual. >{ot all individuals are personal. All individuals 
have inner unity. The nation has such unity, and it is this which the 
philosophers feel whose theory has just been described. They are the 
"unity philosophers." And they- feel a unity in a state which they 
seek to describe in terms of personality. We all feel the unity. For 
instance, we assume a continuity as existent in a country. Even a 
democratic country must through successive administrations employ 
the same policy abroad. Only we do not feel it necessary to describe 
the unity in terms of personality. The conception of organization 
will serve to explain the unity we find in the nation. What the organi- 
zation is like is further to appear. 

An indication that a great people forms a unit is the fact that it 
is a growth. The ties that bind the nation together are, in a larger 
sphere, very much like those that bind together the family and the 
tribe. The ties of kinship were likely the first that bound together 
associations of men. Perhaps what first appeared was an undifferen- 
tiated horde. But at least the family must have been the first of any 
close associations of men. The great majority of students are united 
on this point. McDougall says: "Primitive human society was prob- 
ably a comparatively small group of near blood relatives." 32 Green 
says, "Every form of right first appeared within societies founded on 
kinship, these being naturally the societies within which the constrain- 
ing conception of a common well being is first operative." " Sumner's 
words reflect his view: "The kin tie, which had been the primitive 
mode of association and coherence in groups, began to break down 
in the sixth century, B. C, in Greece. It was superseded by the social 
tie of a common religious faith and ritual. The Pythagorean and 
Orphic sects developed this tie." 34 The religious bond succeeded the 
kin tie in this case. The well-knit state or polls seems to have come 
even later. At any rate, civil units come later than kin units, and 
grow out of them. The Eskimos now have no civil organization out- 
side of the family. But it is only in backward areas that no larger 
unit than that of the family has arisen. A process of integration has 
been working, and it is a process which has resulted in nations. Spencer 
speaks on this point, " .... In the earliest stage of civiliza- 
tion, when the repulsive force is strong and the aggressive force weak, 

The Nature and Value of Patriotism 87 

only small communities are possible ; a modification of character causes 
these tribes, and satrapies, and gentes and feudal lordships, and clans, 
to coalesce into nations." 35 Friction and growing interests between 
families would in some cases draw them together into a tribe; the 
same process would draw tribes into a nation. The conception that 
holds these societies together is that of a common well-being. But the 
conception first arose in a natural group, the family, and was gradu- 
ally extended through the tribe and up to the nation. Green points 
out that while force has been used in the formation of states, "it has 
only formed states as it has operated in and through a pre-existing 
medium of political, or tribal, or family rights." 38 A people is a 
natural product of natural forces. It at least is not an artificial crea- 

Now a nation is formed when a people is organized under an insti- 
tution, a state. What of the state? Is it an artificial creation? It is 
charged that states come to be ends in themselves, cut themselves off 
from the people, and cause wars over artificial values. 

Some philosophers, those who uphold the high sovereignty of the 
state, in capital letters, really identify the state with the nation. If 
this view be accepted the whole case of the critics of the state as arti- 
ficial is, of course, at once disposed of. But the state is not identical 
with the nation. A state may embrace several nations. The British 
empire is such a super-national state. The state is an institutional 
organization. And yet there is good ground upon which to maintain 
that the state is not an artificial creation. As a people is a growth 
so also is the state. It is true, as is sometimes asserted, that states 
can be made in a day and that there can be artificial states, that is, 
states not resting upon a homogeneous people, but it is not true that 
the state was made in a day. As a people, the raw material of a nation, 
grew out of the family and tribe units, so the state which is the insti- 
tution of a people, grew out of the political institutions of the family 
and the tribe. The first institutions of men, as for instance that of 
the family, were probably the result of natural unreflective coopera- 
tion. They resulted almost as do the effects of a natural law. The 
actions which gave rise to them were in a way like the tropisms of 
primitive organisms. "Genuinely primitive association must have been 
blind, without forethought of advantage to those participating." 87 
Upon these unreflective associations states grew, also without fore- 
thought on the whole, although some reflection no doubt entered into 
the process. Spencer says, "Men did not deliberately establish politi- 

88 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

cal arrangements, but grew into them unconsciously — probably had 
no conception of an associated condition until they found themselves 
in it." 38 Men did not go about it deliberately to form a state as rep- 
resented in the contract theory of Hobbes, but waked up to find they 
were in a state which had grown out of their actions in pursuance of 
satisfaction for their needs. The state did not precede man's political 
character, but arose out of it. Men recognized common rights and 
duties, and the state arose in their efforts to safeguard and give ex- 
pression to them. Thus Green says, "The state, or the sovereign as a 
characteristic institution of the state, does not create rights, but gives 
fuller reality to rights already existing. It secures and extends the 
exercise of powers, which men, influenced in dealing with each other 
by an idea of common good, had recognized in each other as capable 
of direction to that common good, and had already in a certain 
measure secured to each other in consequence of that recognition." 88 

The maturity of nations has come in the modern period. Likewise 
patriotism, in the strong degree in which we know it, is comparatively 
modern. The United States, Germany, Italy are modern states. Tribal 
loyalty was once the strongest bond. But the tribe settled down to 
and came to rule a definite extent of territory. Localized tribes formed 
small units of government. The government was not the representa- 
tive of the will of the whole people, but expressed the will of the man 
or small group of men strong enough to possess the seat of authority. 
Gradually government became more representative. In time small 
states arose. There were such city-states as Athens. These small 
states did not organize all the people of the same race as those under 
their jurisdiction. And when they were enlarged by conquest, they 
were representative of only a comparatively small group near the seat 
of government. All conquests were ruled from the outside and from 
the height of superior power. This power became capable of tremen- 
dous extension. The city of Rome became ruler of a large empire. 
Then ensued the mediaeval period in which the notion of catholicity 
was dominant, and in whose political thinking the all-inclusive and 
sovereign empire was the ideal. The period of nationalism had not 
yet come. The empires of Rome and of Charlemagne were not na- 
tions. Their strength depended not upon the spirit of the whole, but 
upon the existence of a strong force at the center. The fact should 
be noted that the dialectic toward nationalism has not been in a simple 
straight line. Sometimes there have been cases of dissolution on the 
part of large and strong integrations of government. But on the 

The Nature and Value of Patriotism 89 

whole there is a pretty clear movement toward larger and larger gov- 
ernmental integrations, and these integrations have in the main been 
forced to follow the building up of peoples. The mediaeval empires 
fell. The papacy became distrusted as a corrupt and tyrannical foreign 
power. The bloody chaos of feudalism became unbearable. The Cru- 
sades acquainted men with others who were like or unlike themselves. 
The Renaissance heightened the emotions of men, and prepared the 
soil for nationalistic passion. Peoples became welded together, and at 
the beginning of the modern period nations emerged which took up 
into themselves the feudalistic establishments and city-states which had 
flourished during the Middle Ages. These nations met the needs of 
men, and persisted. They entrenched themselves, and gathered force. 
Thus they came to the beginning of the nineteenth century when the 
spirit of nationalism was fanned into a consuming flame by the wars 
of Napoleon, and when again the nationalistic passion was ministered 
to by the romantic movement which aroused once more the emotional 
side of human nature. The crowning height of the process has been 
reached at the present time when the Great War has made nationalistic 
loyalty the ruling passion of mankind. 

A state, then, is the outgrowth of the life of a people. The people 
is a growth, and the state is an institution which has grown along with 
the people. Therefore it would seem as if there were good indica- 
tions for calling each of them real. 

What makes a nation? The elements of a nation show both ob- 
jective reality and inner unity. There are, roughly, three things which 
enter into the makeup of a country. The first of these is a people 
with a common language, customs, traditions, history, and land with 
its associations. Sometimes religion has been an element. In the 
case of cultured peoples, literature has also been such. "The dawn 
of English nationality coincided with the dawn of a truly English 
literature." *° We have already seen how such a people grows. It is 
a natural group; it is based on instinctive association and the stress 
of the struggle for existence. The instincts of patriotism are them- 
selves instrumental in forming the objective basis of patriotism. They 
make for the solidarity of a people. This people doesn't have to be- 
long to one race, for it may be made up of a fusion of races. There 
may be a diversity of classes and interests within the nation. It 
does not have to be absolutely homogeneous, for only a very small 
group indeed could be such. Similars do not constitute a nation. A 
country is a qualitative individual. A unity can be obtained in di- 

90 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

verse elements. The things that have been named seem to be suffi- 
cient to weld together such a unity, a people. A people is an objective 
reality, and one of the bases of a nation. 

The second element is an organization, an institution, in other 
words, a state. The Poles have a common language, customs, tradi- 
tions, and land, but they have no government of their own, and do not 
form a nation. A nation comes into being when a state is formed by 
a people. The state, if a true one, grows out of the life of the people, 
and is to the people what the body is to the soul. The state and the 
people form a unity. Moreover, the institution is just as real as the 
people and their desires, and with the people forms the objective basis 
of a nation. 

The third element is that of a common consciousness. This is 
built upon and implied in the conditions already named. A people 
and a state are both external and internal facts. The raw material of 
which they are formed is external and objective. But that raw mate- 
rial does not come to its full meaning until there is added to it a con- 
sciousness in which it is taken up in unity. There would really be no 
unified people and no state, as the expression of united political life, 
in spite of the external elements which are necessary to the being of 
people and state, unless there existed in the individuals' minds a com- 
mon consciousness or consciousness of community. The very existence 
of a common language testifies to the existence of a common con- 
sciousness, as do common customs, traditions, history, literature, and 
ideals. A land even is something which a people possesses, and which 
furnishes a common bond between the individuals of the group. There 
was a time when the land was literally a common possession, in the 
sense that there was no private property, but ownership is not the only 
way in which a people can have a common interest in the land; there 
may be many associations besides that of common ownership con- 
nected with it. Esthetic appreciation is one of them. Affection for 
the scenes of childhood is another. Esenwein, in describing the art 
of Gogol, the Russian author, uses the following phrases: "Rarely do 
power and delicacy unite in a stylist as they do in Gogol, For the 
one [power], we may find an origin in his love for the sun-steeped 
and snow-blown plains of his native Cossack country. . . . " tt 
What gifted writers have felt other more common folk have felt also. 

These things, then, imply a common consciousness. This con- 
sciousness is a recognition and ratification of existing interrelationships, 
and such a community of thought and feeling and will is funda- 

The Nature and Value of Patriotism 91 

mentally important in the unity of a nation. "No mere interaction 
will constitute a social relation. Nor yet an interaction of otherwise 
self-conscious agents. Not merely must each agent know himself, 
he must know the others .... Unless there be on both sides 
a perfect consciousness of self and of other, and of the relations of 
self and other — in a word, perfect mutual understanding — there will 
be, so far, no completely social relation. A social relation is a self- 
conscious relation In other words, society is constituted 

by mutual understanding." 42 This understanding is that which en- 
ables the group to act as one. "Through this mutual knowledge the 
group, like the individual, is enabled to assert itself as an independent 
force." " Mazzini understood that the unity of a country rested upon 
a sense of oneness in the minds of the people: "Country is not a mere 
zone of territory. The true country is the Idea to which it gives birth; 
it is the thought of love, the sense of communion which unites in one 
all the sons of that territory." ** Here we get a suggestion regarding 
the unity of Switzerland. It is, in large part, a unity in idea. That 
is not saying that it has no objective basis. The Swiss have a com- 
mon land and other bonds of oneness. But the strongest bond seems 
to be that of a conception of common welfare. The unity of Switzer- 
land has, of course, been stimulated from without. One of the most 
potent reasons for Swiss unity is that of necessity for defence. They 
must be one to preserve their freedom. But the fact is that what- 
ever the stimulus was, whatever the difficulties that stood in the way, 
however diverse the original materials may have been, the Swiss are 
now one in the beliefs of the individual members of the nation, and 
that feeling of communion is actually unity in fact. 

It is true, then, that in one way the essence of an institution is in 
idea. "Perhaps the Identical, in this matter of groups, is neither a 
real person nor a nominalist fiction. Let us call it an idea. . . "** 
All true unity is really contributed by the mind. The external falls 
apart, and becomes a mere congeries and not a unity when not held 
together in idea. The external elements form the materials for a unity; 
they make up the basis of an institution; they aid in giving rise to a 
common consciousness; but it is the common consciousness itself that 
is the essence of the unity. In this way the will to individuality as 
an inner fact will in turn make for individuality in objective reality. 
Only, it should be noted on the other hand, when the unity is based 
on external grounds, it is not a mere fiction, and is not left up in the 

92 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

To have a common consciousness, the individuals of a group do not 
have to be acquainted by sense experience with all their land or its 
people. Imagination and sympathy are means by which men feel 
themselves one of a society and parts of an institution. And if, even 
after imagination and sympathy have come to one's help, a country and 
its ideals are said to be abstract and vague, even so, it is such abstract 
things that become a cause, and it is such vague ideals that have the 
greatest motive power. They possess us. We think with them rather 
than of them, and they become a spirit in which we approach all 
things. It is not necessary that we should have an exact formula of 
them in order to make them real. Realities do not only then come 
to exist when we have a clear-cut formula for them, nor do ideas 
first have being when they are put into formal expression. 

One quest of men has been, consciously or unconsciously, to create 
for themselves a unified world. In doing this they have, among other 
things, formed themselves into nations. Nations have met their needs, 
and helped them to feel at home in their world. Countries are real, 
and come close home. With this in mind we can appreciate the feel- 
ing of the traveler abroad who has a sense of the wholeness of his 
home-land and longs for it. The following quotation is an illustra- 
tion of this feeling at the same time that it catalogues some of the 
elements that go into the makeup of a country. "Every time his 
passport is presented, every time he enters a new dominion or crosses 
a new frontier, every time he is delayed at the custom-house, or 
questioned by a policeman, or challenged by a sentinel, every time he 
is perplexed by a new language, or puzzled by a new variety of coin- 
age or currency, — he thanks his God with fresh fervency that through 
all the length and breadth of that land, beyond the swelling floods, 
which he is privileged and proud to call his own land, there is a com- 
mon language, a common currency, a common Constitution, common 
laws and liberties, a common inheritance of glory from the past, and, 
if it be only true to itself, a common destiny of glory for the fu- 
ture!" 46 

Is there anything to indicate that the organizing principles of a 
nation are permanently necessary ones? The ultimate existence and 
value of patriotism will be involved in the answer to that question. 
Is patriotism called for by the fundamental order of reality? 

One of the essential centers of life is a community, a neighborhood, 
those who live near enough to one another that the interests of their 
lives are closely interwoven by the fact of association in space. This 

The Nature and Value of Patriotism 93 

would seem to be a self-evident proposition. Mazzini hit the truth 
when he said that mankind had been placed in groups or nuclei upon 
the face of the earth. The community is an irreducible minimum of 
association among mankind. It is a permanent association, and the 
sentiments that grow out of it will be permanent. There is true 
reason why one of the fundamental virtues is that of being a good 
neighbor. And Veblen was right in saying, "Even with no patriotism, 
love of country, and use and wont as it runs in one's home area and 
among one's own people, would not pass." 47 Patriotism seems to be 
vitally connected with a permanent sentiment, community spirit. 

A community is attached to the soil. It has its basis in a local 
area. That is what makes a community. In other words, it is organ- 
ized upon the geographical principle. The geographical principle is 
one of the permanently necessary principles of human association. 
Now a nation is so associated. A country must have a territory, and 
it is the only institution of which this can be said. "A nation .... 
is primarily a group of men and women related physically. . . . 
The state represents not the common interests of those who are intel- 
lectual, or musical, or religious, but chiefly the common interest of 
those who live in the same district." 48 Patriotism is loyalty to one's 
native land. At least one fundamental principle of a country is a per- 
manent one, the geograohical principle. We have here a suggestion 
as to why the soil is so important in patriotism. Patriotism is nour- 
ished by the soil. The soil not only is what sustains the vital eco- 
nomic interests of those who live upon it, but is the basis of the ex- 
istence of the nation itself. Without the land, and land is country, 
there would be no patriotism. 

There has arisen of late the contention that it would be better to 
do away with the geographical principle of government. Russell 
says, "There is no reason why all governmental units should be geo- 
graphical." 49 It is felt that if geographical frontiers were destroyed 
the cause of peace would be furthered. "When civil war breaks out 
in a country, no real fighting is possible until the contending factions 
are organized on separate territory." ™ It is worse when trouble with 
another country arises. "In domestic affairs we live with and know 
the men who disagree with us; in foreign affairs the opposition lives 
behind a frontier, and probably speaks a different language." 81 But 
it is not clear that we shall gain anything by heeding these sugges- 
tions to obliterate national frontiers. The substitute planned is that 
of syndicalistic organizations. But under such an arrangement fron- 

94 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

tiers would be infinitely multiplied. Men of conflicting loyalties and 
interests would be in touch everywhere. It would simply be an ex- 
change of one antagonism for another. And class wars would be no 
better than nationalistic wars. It would be no better to have class 
against class than nation against nation. So what we come back to 
is governmental organization upon the geographical principle. And 
this means that we come back to some such unit as the nation. And 
why not? Environment makes people alike, and to have a homogene- 
ous people is one of the necessities of a successful government. More- 
over, we must form an attachment somewhere, else live entirely alone. 
And it is right to begin where we are. 

"God gave all men all earth to love, 
But since our hearts are small, 
Ordained for each one spot should prove 
Beloved over all." 

We have said that the territorial arrangement is an inescapable 
one in government, and that the community is a unit below which we 
cannot go. But there cannot help but be interests growing up between 
communities. And historically these interests have led to association 
of communities. Rivalry and friction arise. War follows. The 
mediaeval city-states fought with one another. New York and New 
Jersey are rivals; the writer recalls one occasion when New Jersey 
was threatening suit against New York for befouling the Hudson 
River. The only safeguard against internecine warfare between com- 
munities is a more comprehensive power. So a larger unit grows. 
And these units must be still further integrated. The process will not 
stop until it comes to the nation with its government, the state. How 
much further it will go will be disclosed by future events. 

Is the state a permanently necessary institution? The principle 
of integration embodied in the state is a fundamental one. It is the 
principle of cooperation for cooperation. The good of any institu- 
tion is that of cooperation for some end. The primary end of the 
state is that of cooperation itself. Its purpose is that of enabling 
men to live and work together in peace. Loyalty to the national 
group is loyalty to the principle of human cooperation. The most 
valuable thing about the state is not that it does this or that, but that 
it gets men working together. It provides the setting for further co- 
operation. In its protection against enemies either within or without 

The Nature and Value of Patriotism 95 

the group, it is acting to keep the cooperation of the members of the 
group from being interfered with. 

Thus it will be seen that the state is essentially a peace unit. There 
are those who deny this. There are two theories of the state. One 
is that it is a peace unit. The other is that it is a war unit. It is, 
according to this latter view, organized for the waging of war. Be- 
cause of this latter view there has been of late a great deal of opposi- 
tion to and criticism of the state. It is alleged that all the other 
things besides fighting which the state once did have been taken over 
by other agencies better fitted to do them, and that really the only 
thing which the state now has as its purpose is that of declaring and 
making war. The citizens cooperate in the state only when they have 
a fight on with another state. But it may be replied that it is hardly 
fair to charge all our troubles in war to the state. Wars have been 
waged where there was no state in the modern sense; they have been 
carried on by other agencies than states; and states have lived to- 
gether peaceably. Savage individuals, savage tribes, feudal barons 
have all fought. Race riots have given vent to hatred. Representa- 
tives of labor and capital have fought pitched battles. The United 
States and Canada have lived side by side without ever having found 
it necessary to declare war or even fortify the frontier. 

And the state is really a peace unit. It exists primarily for the 
purpose of keeping order within the area of its jurisdiction. It be- 
comes apparent here how some of the beliefs of patriotism are well- 
founded. The state is needed as the protector of one's self. In the 
Middle Ages, in the absence of any other agency to provide protection, 
there grew up voluntary associations, founded and operated usually 
by warriors, and called regna, whose business it was to keep the peace. 
Here was an attempt to do the work of the state. But the attempt 
failed, and there are now no such organizations. One would not miss 
the mark far in hazarding the opinion that they failed because they 
did not represent a peace unit composed of an integrated people occu- 
pying a given extent of territory. What has been said here would indi- 
cate that what we need to do is so to extend the integration of society 
that the whole world will be a peace unit. The whole problem of 
keeping peace should be made an internal problem. There should be 
no foes without. 

The state is the ultimate protector of all the values of life. The 
citizen was right when he believed that his earthly salvation depended 
upon his state. The state itself does not usually furnish the goods of 

96 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

life, although it does on occasion furnish them. That is not its pri- 
mary business. It does not even guarantee the goods of life. Much, 
of course, depends upon the individual himself. But the just state 
does ultimately protect the individual in all rightful opportunities in 
which he as an individual or in voluntary association with others 
cannot protect himself. The civilized life itself at present depends 
upon the state. The very word "civilization" is derived from a term 
meaning "state." It is that which is possible where there is a settled 
order provided by the state. One can imagine what the state means 
if he pictures himself at the fringe of civilization where he would 
miss the many values of life which the state makes possible. The 
state does its work for the most part noiselessly, but it is just because 
it is so efficient that it is so noiseless. We are not conscious of its 
working, and therefore assume that it is otiose. But it is with us 
all the time, and providing the opportunity for all the values of life. 
The state is a kind of second nature which does not guarantee happy 
living, but offers the opportunities for such a life. 

The state does, however, go beyond its primary purpose. It has 
not, as a matter of fact, been restricted purely to acting the part of 
policeman or night-watchman. Philosophers have disputed a good 
deal about the functions of the state. But when all is said and done 
it has been found necessary for the state to engage in some activities 
which were not purely those of providing protection, but were de- 
signed to promote positively the general welfare. The state truly, as 
Aristotle said, even though it has originated in the bare needs of life, 
has continued for the sake of the good life. The state strives to aid 
men in a positive way. Some community interests thought to be in 
the province of the state are those of education, transportation, com- 
munication, sanitation, taxation, and the maintenance of economic jus- 
tice. And this positive character of the state's functions renders 
patriotism all the more strongly entrenched. 

As already has been intimated, syndicalistic organizations are be- 
ing put forward as rivals of the state. Industry is one of the chief 
interests of men, and is especially virulent at the present time. There 
are those who would organize society according to occupation. And 
when society was completely organized in this way there would be, 
so it is thought, no further excuse for the existence of the state. All 
the legitimate common concerns of men would be taken care of by 
syndicalistic organizations. The economic arguments for or against 
syndicalism are of secondary importance in this connection; the 

The Nature and Value of Patriotism 97 

point of interest is that which bears on syndicalism as a principle of 
government. Graham Wallas has studied these questions. He points 
to the mediaeval experience under the guild system. He says that 
quarrels between the crafts were rife, as were quarrels between the 
craftsmen and the merchants; that the people hated strangers as 
well as the police; that the public health was neglected; and that the 
cities found it impossible to keep order in their own streets during a 
trade dispute. M The fact is that the growth of power on the part of 
Labor and Capital and the conflicts arising because of that power 
render the state more necessary rather than less so. 

There is a true sense in which the state embodies the general will. 
It is, in the area of its jurisdiction, the representatives not of a class, / 
but of all the people living in that area. It is the repository of the 
collective will of its citizens. Therefore, it is fitted to keep the peace, 
and to be for the purpose of keeping peace, the user of force. The 
cry has been raised, "Why is the state armed? No other institution 
feels it necessary to be equipped with an armament." But the truth 
is that it is just because the state is armed that no other institution 
needs to be. One police force is enough. We shall always need the 
state to keep other institutions in harmony. And institutions which 
exist for other purposes than that of the maintenance of law and 
order will have to submit to regulation by the state for the sake of law 
and order. It will be the state's business, among other things, to main- 
tain a democracy of institutions. 

The state, because of the generality of its character, plays an im- 
portant role in federating the loyalties of men. Economic interests, 
religious interests, and so on, do not exhaust the catalogue of human 
activities. Each individual will have touch with other individuals with 
whom he would not outside the state be organized in any institution. 
One may have a neighbor who is of another trade or church. The 
state brings one into a common life with his neighbors. The state's 
character as a power helps it to occupy this role as federator of loyal- 
ties. It is back of all the institutions of life; it sustains them. Con- 
sequently the loyalties given to the other institutions tend to head up 
in the state. It is a universal, too, because its unifying principle, that 
of space, is so universal. Such a principle is very general, and may 
be empty unless enriched by many differentiations within itself; the 
life that it unifies may be very meagre without those differentiations, 
but generality is akin to universality, and just because the principle 
is so general, it may act as a unifier of many in one. A loyalty that 

98 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

shall be an organizer of all loyalties is needed. For the individual, 
even after he is a member of all the voluntary organizations to which 
he is eligible, there ought to be that which will unify his whole life. 
So likewise there ought to be that which will unify the whole of man- 
kind. The state and the church seem to be the only institutions which 
in ideal are capable of achieving these results. And at the present 
time we seem nearer a universal political than religious unification of 
mankind. Human nature is a long way from being ready to warrant 
putting one's trust in it as the guarantee of peace and justice because 
each human being loves his neighbor as himself. At any rate, the 
state will have a fundamental purpose as an integration of mankind 
for so long a time to come that it may be said to be permanently 
necessary. The character of the state as being the condition of all 
the values of civilized life, the embodiment of the general will, and 
the federator of human loyalties, throws light upon the phenomenon 
that when the state calls the individual every other loyalty must go. 

The state seems still to be entitled to its place in the sun. But 
we must keep ourselves at the point where we can criticize our political 
loyalties. Some states on occasion need reform. The morality of 
nations must be criticized. States have grown in response to the needs 
of human beings. They must be kept subservient to those needs. 
The state is not divine. There is no divine right of kings, and there 
is no divine right of states, except as these institutions meet the real 
needs of real human beings. The state has justified its existence, 
but that doesn't mean that the existence of any particular kind of 
state is justified. 

In other words, patriotism seems to be necessitated by the funda- 
mental order of reality. Its existence is justified. Patriotism is essen- 
tially a fundamental human good. But that fact doesn't justify all 
that is found in patriotism. Consequently, the problem is not only 
to evaluate patriotism as an essential ideal, but also to criticize the 
faults and virtues of its different forms. Something of that criticism 
will be the effort of the concluding chapter. 


The Ethical Value of Patriotism in the Concrete 

Patriotism serves a necessary purpose, and is therefore a funda- 
mental human good. In some form it is existentially necessary. The 
problem of patriotism now becomes, then, "What is its form to be?" 
For patriotism as it actually appears in persons and nations is not 
all good. It may be, as an individual possession, morally colorless. 
There are barnacles attached to the ship of state. Zimmermann made 
a keen remark when he said, "The love of one's country, however ex- 
tolled, is, in many cases, no more than the love of an ass for its stall." M 
It may be either noble or narrow. There is a higher and lower patriot- 
ism. It depends on how it expresses itself. Before the ethical value 
of nationalistic loyalty can be fully determined it must be looked at in 
its concrete forms. The varying motives and effects of patriotism 
must be considered. 

Why is patriotism noble? The reason why it has been popularly 
extolled is that it is a form of unselfishness. There is hardly another 
cause in the world today that calls forth such heroic self-sacrifice as 
the cause of one's country. Royce included the state among the 
causes that have organized men in unselfish devotion. He said, 
" .... we have certain human activities that do now already 
tend to the impersonal organization of the life of those engaged in 
them. Such activities are found in the work of art, in the pursuit of 
truth, and in genuine public spirit. Beauty, Knowledge, and the State, 
are three ideal objects that do actually claim from those who serve 
them harmony, freedom from selfishness, and a wholly impersonal de- 
votion." M And unselfishness is one of the fundamental human virtues. 
It makes the individual himself a better man, and is most certainly 
needed in the structure of society. 

\ Patriotism has the tendency to make men idealists. It is hard 
enough to get men's thoughts off of purely material things, and what- 
ever can draw their devotion to an ideal cause is, so far, worth while. 
Patriotism has made for cooperation among men. The primary 
purpose of the state is that of cooperation, that is, of making it pos- 
sible for men successfully to live together. That, on the face of it, 
is a noble purpose. And the state has actually secured a larger range 
of cooperation than what had been attained before it. It has secured 

ioo Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

a wider range of peace. It is a larger peace unit. Hence, the state 
as an integration of men is a gain, and is not, if it is avoidable, to be 
destroyed. It would not, for instance, be a gain to condemn even 
Germany to destruction as long as any other mode of treatment is 
possible. Of course this argument assumes that the state is indis- 
pensable as an institution for the integration of mankind. But it 
really is indispensable. An irreducible unit of society is a community 
— those living in close contact in some given limited territory. Hence, 
the territorial principle is an inescapable one in the organization of 
society. And, if so, communities will, by their conflicts, if by nothing 
else, be organized into states. That is what has happened. No organi- 
zation of society on any other plan is likely to find it possible to dis- 
pense with the state. And now, if the state is so necessary and val- 
uable in the organization of society, patriotism as a force that pre- 
serves the state and its benefits is of value to men. 

But the relations of patriotism to war and internationalism are now 
its most crucial problems. It is often argued that while patriotism 
has done and does what is claimed for it, it has in large measure out- 
lived its usefulness, and is a prolific source of the world's greatest 
troubles at the present time in that it makes for jealousy, conflict, 
and war. Patriotism is said to be divisive, when thought of in world 
terms. Hasn't it, therefore, outlived its usefulness, and isn't it time 
to entrust the keeping of the cooperation of men to a still larger insti- 
tution that shall be worldwide, and thus avoid the conflicts of the 
present? The feeling that prompts this argument is embodied in the 
following words: " .... a striking factor in today's thinking 
is the perception of the immoral consequences of patriotism. We see 
that while devotion to country entails the final sacrifice of self, it en- 
tails also the most inhumane sacrifice of others. We have not yet 
been able to think the matter out. Distraught, we reverence the men 
who are dying for their separate flags and strain our eyes beyond the 
battlefields for the oriflamme of internationalism." M It is evident that 
when countries go to war, all cannot be right, and that fact puts the 
patriots of some country in a false position. One cannot take simply 
the attitude of uncritical patriotism. The good man and the good 
patriot are not necessarily one and the same. If the contrary were 
true, then neither we nor the Germans would have any moral grounds 
upon which to be indignant at one another. Not all causes become 
just simply for the reason that one's country chooses to defend them. 
Aristotle called attention to the fact of varying governments in the 

The Nature and Value of PATRiotrsM ^ibi 

world, and drew the following conclusion: "If, then, there are many 
forms of government, it is evident that the virtue of the good citizen 
cannot be the one perfect virtue. But we say that a good man is he 
who has perfect virtue. Hence, it is evident that the good citizen 
need not of necessity possess the virtue which makes a good man." 88 
A larger view than that of uncritical patriotism is therefore needed, 
and the critic says that such is just what the patriot cannot be ex- 
pected to attain. The critic makes the charge that the cooperation 
that has been gained in patriotism is an obstruction in the way of at- 
taining a larger cooperation. Patriotism, in other words, is not a 
proper force for saving the world. For one thing, it contents a man 
with his own country; the patriot doesn't strive for any higher organi- 
zation of men, and so the spirit of progress is deadened. Moreover, 
so the critic sometimes says, patriotism is simply a cooperation for 
conflict. It is setting men at each other's throats. 

It will have to be admitted first of all that patriotism may be the 
kind of force that its critic describes it to be. And if it were irrev- 
ocably and wholly committed to be such a spirit, one would have to 
pass an unfavorable verdict upon it. Whatever its benefits might other- 
wise be, the world would not tolerate it, if that meant to be forever 
confronted with the possibility of another conflict such as the present 
one. It may, however, be pleaded that the present internecine con- 
flict of patriots is not a permanent condition of mankind. It is a stage 
through which the race is having to pass in its development towards 
world-wide organization. And it is not altogether strange that in the 
process, patriotism should be a temporary difficulty, just as family, 
clan, and provincial pride once were. The factors making for a world 
integration have not yet fully found themselves, and of course, are 
not adequate for the job of overcoming the prejudices of patriots. 
Moreover, it is natural for any stage of progress gained to be a bar 
to further progress. Each stage has to be sharply and definitely con- 
ceived in order to be reached, but that in turn makes it a bar to fur- 
ther development. The vision of the next step simply doesn't come 
easily to men's minds. Moreover, it is easy for them to take achieved 
results as final. Those results have to be taken seriously, if they are 
to yield their full value. And besides, a stage of progress doesn't 
know itself simply as a link in a single logical line of development; 
it has many individual interests of its own, — interests which may give 
it a tendency to fly out of what has been the line of progress. Other 
things, too, get mixed up with it that tend to pull it put of its straight 

A02 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

and narrow path. Patriotism has been mixed up with and betrayed 
by junkeristic, dynastic, and profiteering interests. Patriotism itself 
surely should not have to bear the full blame for . the faults of those 
evil companions, although patriotism, it must be admitted, has been 
in bad company. In the light of all the facts, it seems most accurate 
to say that patriotism taken as a whole does offer difficulties in the 
way of welding men into larger peace units. But after all they are 
only difficulties, and not impassable barriers. They are practical 
rather than theoretical, not rational and necessary. They offer no 
grounds for a final condemnation of patriotism. 

It does not seem to be fair, at any rate, to say that patriotism is a 
disintegrating factor in world affairs. There is no larger unit of co- 
operation that it is breaking up. And patriotism can claim for itself 
that it has come in as a force making for larger groupings of men. If 
patriotism were at one sudden blow stricken out of the world, we 
should be set backward rather than forward in the process of win- 
ning the conditions of world peace. 

Patriotism cannot be set down as an ultimate enemy of peace on 
earth and good will among men because it sometimes supports a war. 
The purpose of a state is not primarily that of waging war, but that 
of enabling men to live together in peace. And correspondingly 
patriotism is not exclusively or mainly a war-waging virtue. In fact, 
it more commonly expresses itself as a peaceful and constructive public 
spirit. Patriotism, as matters now stand, is not likely to cause the 
opening of hostilities, although it will support a war which has al- 
ready been started. And it is, even in war, usually a defensive 
rather than an offensive attitude. This is virtually proved by the fact 
that all the belligerent countries have to make their peoples believe 
that they are fighting a defensive war. That is the way in which 
the martial spirit of patriots has to be appealed to. And it is a sig- 
nificant thing that such is the case. It indicates that the destruction 
of patriotism is not necessary to the attainment of world peace, but 
that the end may be secured simply through the decay of the bellicose 
spirit. As a matter of fact, the conscience of the world has already 
undergone great changes with regard to war. It is probable that the 
earliest savage state was that of almost incessant warfare. And in 
those days, it wasn't necessary to find any pretext for opening hostili- 
ties. The sufficient reason for an attack was that the other group had 
something that the party of the first part wanted. The earliest stage 
of savage, and even civilized life, therefore, was one in which wars 

The Nature and Value of Patriotism 103 

could quite uniformly be frankly wars of aggression. The stage in 
which the present generation seems to be living is that of "wars of 
defense." There are some signs that the next era will be that of peace. 
The whole world is getting tired of war, and longing for international- 
ism. And, what is new, these feelings are springing up all over the 
world at the same time. Perhaps we are already in the transitional 
period. At at rate, it does not seem to be quite accurate to charge 
that patriotism is the first cause of wars in these days. It is safe to 
say that the populations of the world wanted peace in 1914. Some- 
thing else is the first cause of wars. A dispute arises between two 
governments, and patriotism, to be sure, adds fuel to the flames. But 
patriotism in itself is for the most part peaceful until it is fanned 
into fury. 

But even if patriotism does go to war, it is not simply for that to 
be condemned without further ado. The resistance that a nation 
offers is often really a service to the cause of integration in the world. 
For world cooperation cannot be based upon world conquest. That 
is not the way to a broader unity. And whoever opposes such con- 
quest is the friend of true unity. There can be such a thing as an 
integration on a thoroughly bad principle. A robber band or a con- 
scienceless monopolistic "trust" would be examples of just such an 
organization. And there also may be a thoroughly unholy alliance in 
the political realm. It is just that which the spirit of patriotism is at 
the present time preventing. World domination and world brother- 
hood are incompatible, and that proposition right now just as truly 
has a practical application, although in a different way, for those who 
live west of the Rhine as for those who live on the other side. If it 
is wrong for Germany to build up a world-empire on the principle 
of domination, it is wrong for us to let her do it. Integration implies 
a unity of differences. There can, then, be no true integration where 
significant differences are ignored. And there will be no just organiza- 
tion of all the peoples of the world where the individuality of some 
of the parts is disregarded. Within the nation, we demand that the 
individuality of each unit be respected. The pacifist makes that 
demand for himself. And it is just as much right that the individual- 
ity of each nation should be respected in the community of which it 
is a part. The nation occupies the same position with regard to the 
world that the individual occupies with regard to the country. Simi- 
lar rights and similar duties may be claimed for both. It is fair that 

104 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

the same organizing principle should be applied on both the national 
and international levels, namely, unity in difference. 

In other words, the same principles of justice and liberty that must 
guide within the nation must also be normative of the relations be- 
tween states. The integration of a nation is one of will, and, more- 
over, one of good will. The same thing can be said of a world organi- 
zation. The permanent integration of the world will have to be upon 
the basis of good will. And that cannot have been accomplished 
where a great many apparently within the fold are not in it at heart. 
Peace wouldn't necessarily mean good will or true integration. If, 
for instance, we voluntarily surrendered to Germany, as the pacifists 
sometimes urge, and showed good will on our part, that wouldn't 
necessarily call forth the same spirit on the part of Germany. Their 
spirit might simply be that of exaggerated egoism. But on the other 
hand, will it make for good will to go on fighting Germany? In the 
long run, it seems to be the way that is necessary to follow in order 
to bring her to a frame of mind where she can be cooperated with. 
^ ^ It is therefore not completely out of harmony with the cause of 
world cooperation that a state should sometimes go to war. And 
the nation itself has rights and duties. It would not be any more mor- 
ally good for a country to consent to its extinction or the serious crip- 
pling of its individuality than it would be for the human individual 
to commit suicide or incapacitate himself. The state fights for its 
individuality, and individuality is a thing worth fighting for. It is 
right that each individual nation should have the privilege of living a 
life of its own, that is, as long as it does not forfeit its privilege by 
ignoring the rights of others. 

The recognition of the tendencies and power of patriotism shut 
one up to the conclusion that a world organization will have to be 
established along the lines of internationalism rather than those of 
cosmopolitanism. Each group has its own consciousness which will 
have to be taken into account. Wallas says that, "In England the 
'particularism' of trades and professions and the racial feeling of 
Wales and Ulster, of Scotland or Catholic Ireland, seem to be grow- 
ing stronger and not weaker." 57 It will be the same with patriotism in 
a world organization. The successful line of development in world 
organization seems to be one in which the preceding stages are not 
wiped out, but are preserved and made the basis of a new integration, 
jy Therefore, it seems as if the next larger grouping or groupings of men 
will have to be joined onto nationalism. Sumner stated a truth when 

The Nature and Value of Patriotism 105 

he said, " . . . . changes which run with the mores are easily 
brought about, but .... changes which are opposed to the 
mores require long and patient effort, if they are possible at all." " If 
a reform is to be made in the direction of a world integration, it will, 
if it wishes to succeed, have to be joined onto patriotism. 

But there are reasons why it is better that we should develop into 
internationalism rather than cosmopolitanism. The latter contains 
fundamental dangers. It makes too much for detachment, aloofness, 
and selfishness. The Stoics were an example of how cosmopolitanism 
passed into those things. The eighteenth century was an "age of 
Reason" which tended towards cosmopolitanism, and it was a cosmo- 
politanism which though enlightened was chill and abstract. Cosmo- 
politanism tends to reduce all life to a mediocre type. This danger 
is well pointed out in the following words: "I believe largely in the 
comparative permanence of what we call racial characteristics; I sin- 
cerely hope they will not be merged into a common humanity. . . . 
Nearly every group of peoples has developed its own mentality, its 
own psychology, ideas and ideals. We need to preserve the difference 
between those ideas and ideals. If you merge them, you get a common 
— a very common — humanity. All progress takes place in the re- 
action between extremes. All philosophy has arisen from a mixture 
of races which brought to one another different ideas and ideals." 89 
The condition of progress is the preservation of national characteris- 
tics. But, what is even more important, there are in cosmopolitanism 
grave moral dangers involved. G. F. Barbour says: "The great 
meeting-places where the currents of Oriental and Occidental life 
have come together have indeed produced a vivid and brilliant type 
of life, but hardly one that has been morally stable and sound." 80 
Each side finds it easy to adopt the vices of the other, but not the vir- 
tues, and both sides are liable to become superficial. The brilliant 
but shallow and immoral life of Corinth in the days of Paul offers an 

The problem at the present time is to federate groups. Individuals 
have already become unified. But what sets the problem gives rise 
also to a hope. The existence of groups will prove an aid in the ac- 
complishment of world unification. And the wise humanitarian will 
work through the groups that already exist, that is, countries. 

World cosmopolitanism would, at least at present, leave the indi- 
vidual cold; he could not comprehend it, and could not be intelli- 
gently loyal to it. Hence, in order to get effective sympathy and 

106 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

action among men, there must exist a group of the size and meaning 
that is able to appeal to the individual. There must be aroused 
something like what Royce called "provincialism." Provincialism 
might be interpreted in one way as loyalty to that integration of men 
whose individuality expressed the individuality of oneself. And from 
it will be derived dynamic for humanitarianism. Royce said that, 
"... philanthropy that is not founded upon a personal loyalty 
of the individual to his own family and to his own personal duties is 
notoriously a worthless abstraction." 61 And the application was that 
"the province will not serve the nation best by forgetting itself, but 
by loyally emphasizing its own duty to the nation and therefore its 
right to attain and to cultivate its own unique wisdom." 62 Therefore 
Royce said that, "Every one . . . ought, ideally speaking, to be 
provincial, — and that no matter how cultivated, or humanitarian, or 
universal in purpose or in experience he may be or may become." 88 
Provincialism did not mean exclusiveness or jealousy. To Royce, 
"... our province, like our own individuality, ought to be to 
all of us rather an ideal than a mere boast. . . . The better 
aspect of our provincial consciousness is always its longing for the 
improvement of the community." 6i But the point is that the spirit 
of provincialism is a useful force in securing the attachment of men. 
And the clue that one finds in it is that the best way to get a world 
integration is to do it by the federation of nationalities. The organi- 
zation of patriotic loyalties would secure an integration that would 
hang together. Under such an arrangement, the patriot would con- 
tribute strength to internationalism by his very attachment and loyalty 
to his own nation. Nationalism would thus become a spur to a wider 
humanitarian impulse. And patriotism can, if properly educated, be 
counted upon to support international government. The patriot him- 
self will develop an insistent demand for internationalism when he 
once clearly sees, what is true, that the individuality of his own nation 
is best realized in a community of nations where legitimate national 
differences are synthesized in justice. 

This program of the unification of nationalities is to be taken seri- 
ously. Emphasis must be laid not only on nationality but also upon 
unification. The patriot must really recognize that he has another 
loyalty than that to country, namely, that to internationalism. It is 
plain that improvements can be made upon the present world order, 
and the most important thing to do is to work towards some kind of 
arrangement whereby national disputes can be settled according to 

The Nature and Value of Patriotism 107 

international law, and the peace can be kept at the same time that 
justice is done. As a matter of fact, most thoughtful individuals do 
long for some kind of internationalism at the same time that they 
are patriotic. In a situation like the present many are torn by a con- 
flict between loyalty to humanitarianism on the one hand and patriot- 
ism on the other. And it is a situation with which the individual 
cannot deal satisfactorily alone. There must be an end put to the 
system which makes such conflicts possible. But one must remember 
also that the nation is just about as helpless as the individual. The 
nation, too, is faced with a conflict of loyalties which it cannot by 
itself solve. The rescue must come out of a concerted action of 
nations. The situation must be dealt with in the very beginning by 
an international act. It is not to be expected that any one country 
can deal adequately with the present world problems. The disarma- 
ment or non-resistance of any one nation will not be a solution, and 
it seems unreasonable for any one to counsel his own country to take 
any such action. However, we must relate our patriotism to inter- 
nationalism. "We must keep patriotism, and yet go beyond it, if we 
are to save what is best in patriotism itself, just as for the sake of 
religion, religious men had to go beyond their own willingness to die 
for their own faith. Toleration demanded not irreligion, but a better 
religion, and we might have a better patriotism if we could remember 
that we are also citizens of the world." 86 The nations must be in 
some respects like the planets in the system of the universe. The 
planets have each a free swing in their own orbits, but they do not 
collide. Each helps to hold all the rest in place, and together they 
all form one system. We all have, at the present time, in addition 
to the duty of winning the war, the further obligation of working for 
permanent conditions of peace. We may fairly claim that we have 
inherited this war and are not really responsible for it, but if we do 
not discharge our international duties both now and when the con- 
ditions of peace are being planned at the end of this present conflict, 
we shall be responsible for the next war. 

It is a reassuring fact to the internationalist at the same time that 
it is a justification for the continued existence of patriotism that there 
actually have been and are tendencies making not only for closer 
relations between nations, but also for the moralizing of those rela- 
tions. M In material things countries have been drawn closer and 
closer together. They are not economic wholes. They are debtors 
and creditors of one another. They do not keep improved methods 

108 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

of industry in the country where they originated; even improved 
methods of war have not been so restricted. And they are interde- 
pendent in non-material things. Physicians and surgeons do not hide 
their ideas within their own group. And art and science, of course, 
have long been ties that have bound together associations of the citi- 
zens of diverse countries. There is, in short, a wide unofficial inter- 
course between the citizens of different countries, a fact which leads 
Burns to exclaim, "Nor will even diplomatic subtleties be able to 
keep us back: for trust between the citizens of diverse states is trust 
between the states, and the official governments will soon have to 
submit to the new situation." " But states as such consider them- 
selves to be in moral relations with one another. What else can it 
mean that they have foreign secretaries, and employ an extensive 
diplomatic service which does a continuous business; that they have 
been increasingly taking common action for the control of disease or 
the management of postal and telegraphic communication; that they 
have been more and more concluding such peace treaties as exist, for 
instance, between England and the United States? " 

The present war even is proving that the nations of the world are 
closely interrelated. The struggle is world-wide, and it could not have 
assumed such tremendous proportions were not every part of the 
world in close touch with all the rest. And it is significant that the 
contestants are alliances. Lippman well remarks: "The process of 
fusion has gone so far that war itself has ceased to be a national 
enterprise." 60 The existence of alliance is portentous of the relations 
of the future. It will do something towards creating a feeling of sym- 
pathy between the citizens of the allied countries, and it will show 
that the nations can work together. And if they can cooperate in 
war, it ought to be fairly' easy for them to draw the conclusion that 
they can act together in peace. Moreover, if the Allies win the present 
war, the peace that will result will be representative of the interests 
of a large group of very different peoples. It is encouraging, too, in 
the attitude of at least one nation that President Wilson, at the very 
time when he went to war, declared for a league of nations. We 
should do well to remind ourselves that one form of patriotism finds 
its satisfaction in its country as a good neighbor and a servant of 

The observation of moral relations as expressed in the "rules of 
war" has received a jolt in this present conflict. But that doesn't 
necessarily mean that the morality of nations is smashed. The essen- 

The Nature and Value of Patriotism 109 

tial moral temper of the world is shown by the horror that has been 
manifested at the atrocities that have been committed. And, more- 
over, every belligerent nation has been eager to justify itself before the 
world. That in itself is an indication that a world sentiment has 
been formed on the conduct of nations in the declaring and waging 
of war. A century ago militarists did not need to bother themselves 
much about the world's opinion. The moral relationships of states 
in war is further illustrated by the fact that we even hear what is 
officially announced in the war bulletins of our enemies, and that we 
send word to them upon questions in which they still have a common 
interest with ourselves. 70 In view of all these facts it may well be 
asked what forces are doing any better in the direction of a broader 
integration of mankind than the several countries and the patriotic 
citizens of those countries. 

The fact of the business is that patriotism is a stage in the growth 
of loyalty. States and nations are steps in the process of world inte- 
gration. After families, tribes, city-states, and all the rest, have 
come nations. Nations must have the loyalty of mankind because 
they are the largest peace units so far attained, and because they will 
be the foundations of larger peace units} The next step in the organi- 
zation of the race seems to be that of internationalism. And the logic 
of history seems to indicate that international government will come. 
The tendency of societal organization has been toward larger and 
larger wholes. "The tendency to the enlargement of the social unit 
has been going on with certain temporary relapses throughout human 
history. Though repeatedly checked by the instability of the larger 
units, it has always resumed its activity, so that it should probably 
be regarded as a fundamental biological drift the existence of which 
is a factor which must always be taken into account in dealing with 
the structure of human society." 71 The process of enlargement is 
still carrying on. States and nations have actually grown very close 
together, and are increasingly establishing official relations between 
themselves. And the temper of the patriotic spirit has become such 
that on the whole it will not only welcome but further international 
government. In this character patriotism shows itself to be a force 
making not only for the salvation of the one country but of mankind. 
This is at once its justification and an indication of what there is in 
it that the morally good man ought to approve and support. If the 
fundamental justification of patriotism is that it strengthens the prin- 
ciple of cooperation among men and makes for peace, then its con- 

no Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

tinued vindication will be in its further support and extension of the 
primary principle for which it stands. There is good reason why its re- 
lations to war and internationalism are crucial problems of patriotism. 
The fundamental good of the nation is that it is a peace unit, and if 
patriotism comes to the place where it stands for war more than for 
peace, and is in the way of larger groupings of men, it will have de- 
feated itself. The higher patriotism is that which looks toward inter- 

The practical ethical problem in patriotism is that of separating 
the good from the evil, and of preserving the former while allowing 
the latter to fall into disuse. It is fairly certain that nationalism and 
patriotism could not be destroyed even if one thought that such was 
the best thing to do. Some form of an organization of men based 
upon the geographical principle is with us to stay in at least the 
predictable future. And countries will not consent to extinction. 
Patriotism is the will to national individuality, and patriots will in- 
sist upon that individuality. In view of these facts, it seems 
that our salvation does not lie in breaking up the units that al- 
ready exist, but in securing a larger measure of cooperation between 
them. And it is all the more sure that we should proceed in that 
way for the reason that patriotism secures things of great value 
in the world. If we destroyed it, we should lose the good along with 
the evil. This can be illustrated. Patriotism in one way is national 
pride. And pride often causes trouble. But on the other hand, it 
often causes good. It may be said of national pride along with Zim- 
merman: "Virtues and vices are often put in motion by the same 
spring. It is the philosopher's part to make known these springs, and 
the legislator to profit by them. Pride is the gem of so many talents 
and apparent virtues, that to destroy it is wrong, it should only be 
turned to good. 

"Were men not proud what merit should we miss/" 72 

If patriotism were destroyed, it is likely that we should be forced to 
recreate it. N , 

The literature on the subject of the details of reconstruction after 
the war proposes two main lines of approach. Some writers place the 
greatest stress upon the readjustment of the arrangements of national 
and international government. For instance, this school emphasizes 
the need for the international control of backward countries and the 

The Nature and Value of Patriotism hi 

main highways upon the seas. Lippmann says, "... the su- 
preme task of world politics is not the prevention of war, but a satis- 
factory organization of mankind. Peace will follow that." 73 The 
idea seems to be that if the causes of friction are effectively removed, 
trouble will not arise. Another school of writers places its reliance 
upon broadening the vision of men. Powers represents this method 
of approach. He says, "The chief remedy — perhaps we may say the 
only remedy — for ills that flesh is heir to, is to be found in the in- 
creased intelligence and forbearance of men." 74 These methods will 
have to be used in conjunction with each other. It is not safe in the 
near future to trust entirely to human nature as long as irritating 
causes of friction remain, and by removing the causes of friction we 
may allow the belligerent type of patriotism to fall into disuse. But 
neither will any merely external arrangements provide security so long 
as human nature finds its glory in a chauvinistic patriotism. Patriot- 
ism is the will to national individuality. It is a major task of man- 
kind to see that that will is intellectualized and ethicized. 


Part I 

^here is a widespread recognition among psychologists and students of charac- 
ter that the study of conduct should begin with these unreasoned impulses. For 
examples of such a recognition see the following: Jas. R. Angell, Chapters from 
Modern Psychology, pp. 24, 25 ; Wm. McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psy- 
chology, pp. 2, 3, 43; Gilbert Murray, Herd Instinct and the War, a lecture in The 
International Conflict by Murray and others, p. 23 ; Wilfred Trotter, The Instincts 
of the Herd in Peace and War, p. IS; Graham Wallas, The Great Society, p. 41; 
E. B. Holt, The Freudian Wish, p. 132 ; Walter Lippmann, The Stakes of Diplomacy , 
p. SO; A. F. Shand, The Foundations of Character, Introduction, pp. 1-9. 

2 Cf. Francis Galton: Inquiries Into Human Faculty and Its Development, 
p. 72. 

3 Wm. James: The Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, p. 430. Quoted by Wm. 
McDougall: Social Psychology, pp. 85, 86. 

4 Wilfred Trotter: The Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. Other writers 
have emphasized gregariousness, but Trotter's book is the most elaborate and 
important in recent literature. Aristotle declared that man was a social animal. 
See Politics, Book I, Chap. I. Cf. also McDougall: Social Psychology, p. 84. 

e W. G. Sumner: Folkways, p. 15. 

6 Martin Conway : The Crowd in Peace and War, p. 76. 

'Gilbert Murray : Herd Instinct and the War, p. 34. 

'Ibid., p. 37. 

9 Conway: The Crowd, p. 79. 

10 Bertrand Russell: Why Men Fight, p. 51. 

u We have been following here an article by Anne C. E. Allinson entitled "Virgil 
and the New Patriotism" in the Yale Review, October, 1917. 

12 Prof. Max F. Meyer, of the University of Missouri, in a letter in the New 
York Times of August 16, 1917. 

"McDougall: Social Psychology, p. 208. Footnote. 

"The terms out-group and in-group are borrowed from Sumner. See W. G. 
Sumner: Folkways. 

"Alfred Loisy : The War and Religion. 

"Ibid., p. 65. 

17 Ibid., p. 62. 

"Ibid., p. 20. 

"Ibid., p. 79. 

"J. M. Robertson : Patriotism and Empire. 

^Ibid., p. 36. 

22 Wm. McDougall: Social Psychology, p. 55. 

^Walter Lippmann: The Stakes of Diplomacy, p. 208. 

2 *J. M. Robertson : Patriotism and Empire, p. 138. 

^Goethe: Faust, Part II, Act 2. The translation here used is quoted by F. M. 
Stawell: Patriotism and Humanity. /. J. E., April, 1915, p. 299. 

^McDougall : Social Psychology, p. 140. 

1 14 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

"For a book that emphasizes the emulative impulse in its account of the 
behavior of nations see Thorstein Veblen: The Nature of Peace. Cf. pp. 31 ff. 

^William James has contended that the center of the problem of peace and war 
is that there is an impulse of pugnacity. Cf. The Moral Equivalent of War and 
Remarks at the Peace Banquet in Memories and Studies. 

Part II 

Graham Wallas : The Great Society, p. SO. 

'Ibid., p. SO. 

8 Lessing : Nathan the Wise, Act IV, Scene IV. The translation used here is that 
of the edition of Geo. Alex. Kohut. New York, 1917. 

4 W. G. Sumner: Folkways, p. 23. 

B For data concerning such societies in America see Sydney Aaron Phillips: 
Patriotic Societies of the United States. No less than forty-four are listed. 

e J. M. Robertson : Patriotism and Empire. Part II. The Militarist Regimen. 

7 Hegel : The Philosophy of Right, Dyde's edition. 

8 Ibid., p. 310. 

Hbid., pp. 313, 314. 

10 Edward Everett Hale : The Man Without a Country. 

U J. M. Robertson : The Jingoism of Poets. See his Criticisms, Vol. II. 

"Graham Wallas : The Great Society, p. 153. 

13 Sumner: Folkways, pp. 630, 631. t 

14 The Teaching of Patriotism. In Social and International Ideals. Lect. I. 

15 The Citizen of Milford, Conn. 

"Cf. Harry Pratt Judson: The Young American, Ella Lyman Cabot and Others: 
A Course in Citizenship; Constance D'Arcy Mackay: Patriotic Plays and Pageants 
for Young People. 

"Russell: Why Men Fight, pp. 160, 161. 

18 W. G. Sumner : Folkways, pp. 635, 636. 

w Ibid., p. 177. 

trotter : Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, p. 205. 

a Russell : Why Men Fight, p. 154. 

22 McDougall: Social Psychology, p. 97. 

^Cooley : Human Nature and the Social Order, p. 265. 

24 Graham Wallas: The Great Society, pp. 281, 282. 

*M. Gabriel Tarde has made more of this disposition than any other writer. 
See Tarde: The Laws of Imitation. His definition of imitation is on p. XIV, in 
preface to the second edition. 

^Sumner : Folkways, p. S. Italics mine. 

W C. D. Burns : The Morality of Nations, p. 106. 

^Lippmann: The Stakes of Diplomacy, p. 51. 

^Sumner: Folkways, p. 30. 

ao Ibid., pp. 77, 173, 174. 

31 Ibid., p. 71. 

82 Cf. C. D. Burns: The Morality of Nations, pp. 14, 15. 

^Lessing: Nathan the Wise, Act III, Sc. VII. Kohut's edition. 

34 Cooley : Human Nature and the Social Order, p. 36. Quoted by Ross : Social 
Psychology, p. 4. 

Notes 115 

36 Ross: Social Psychology, p. 273. 

36 Russell : Why Men Fight, p. 236. The fact that patriotism has been relatively 
uncriticized is not its only source of strength ; it is an important one. 
37 Sumner: Folkways, p. 95. Italics mine. 

Part III 

x The beliefs, however, are often closely related to the impulses and habits, and 
may simply be the latter raised to the level of consciousness. In fact, when an 
impulse or a habit gets raised to the conscious level, it becomes a belief. 

2 Graham Wallas : The Great Society, p. 36. 

3 Alfred Tennyson. Poem has no title. Stanza given is* the opening one. See 
The Works of Alfred Lord Tennyson, London and New York, MacMillan Co., 
1892, p. 64. 

4 Herbert Spencer: Social Statics, p. 283. 

6 Daniel Webster : Reply to Hayne. Jan. 26, 1830. 

"Green : Works. Vol. II. The Principles of Political Obligation, p. 384. Italics 

7 Cf. Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan. 

8 J. S. Mill. In letter to John Sterling, Oct. 20-22, 1831. Elliott: Letters, Vol. 
I, p. IS. 

9 Josiah Quincy, Jr.: Second Centennial of Boston. Sept. 17, 1830. 

10 L. T. Chamberlin : Patriotism and The Moral Law, p. 10. 

U J. S. Mill: Principles of Political Economy, Vol. II, p. 397. 

"Cf. Aristotle: Politics, Bk. I, Chap. 1, p. 3. Jowett's edition. 

"Cf. Plato : The Republic. 

"Edward Everett Hale: The Man Without a Country. Preface, pp. IV, V. 
School edition; Boston; Little, Brown, and Co.; 190S. 

15 The term "syndicalism" as here used means roughly the principle that societal 
control should be in the hands of organizations based upon the fact of common 
occupation. Cf . G. D. H. Cole : The World of Labour. 

"Plato: Crito, pp. 371 ff. Jowett's edition. 

"Bernard Bosanquet : Social and International Ideals, p. 8. 

18 Bertrand Russell: Why Men Fight, p. 55. 

"Herbert Spencer : Social Statics, pp. 296, 297. 

^Loisy: The War and Religion, pp. 36, 37. 

^Zimmermann : On National Pride, p. 94. 

22 Patrick Henry: Speech in Virginia Legislature, 1775. 
^Abraham Lincoln: Gettysburg Address. Nov. 19, 1863. 

24 Bacon: De Augmentis Scientarum, B. VI, Ch. III. (Spedding and Ellis). 
Quoted by Alexander F. Shand: The Foundations of Character, p. 7. 

^Walter Lippmann: The Stakes of Diplomacy, pp. 74, 75. 

26 Samuel Adams: Protest of Boston Against Taxation. May 24, 1764. 

^John Dewey: Progress, /. J. E., April, 1916, p. 321. ( 

^Cf. Veblen: The Nature of Peace, pp. 166, 167. 

^Chamberlain : Patriotism and The Moral Law, p. 6. 

^L. P. Jacks: The Changing Mind of a Nation at War, pp. 78, 79. Jacks is 
talking of war-time conditions. 

n6 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

81 George Washington: Letter to the Governors. June 18, 1783. Italics mine. 

32 McDougall: Social Psychology, p. 207. 

M C. D. Burns: The Morality of Nations, p. 11. 

84 Bosanquet: Social and International Ideals, p. 3. 

35 Royce : The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 40. 

"Ibid., p. 41. 

87 Zimmermann : On National Pride, pp. 280, 281. 

^William Cowper : The Task, II, 206. 

39 Sir Walter Scott : The Lay of the Last Minstrel. Canto Sixth. 

"Cf. Mill: On Liberty; and Spencer: Social Statics. 

"Hegel: The Philosophy of Right, pp. 330, 337. 

^Cf. H. P. Judson: The Young American. Chap. I, pp. 9, 10. 

"H. H. Powers: The Things Men Fight For, p. 283. 

"Nitobe: Bushido, The Soul of Japan, p. 116. 

"C. D. Broad: The Prevention of War. /. J. E., Jan., 1916, p. 243. 

"For a clear statement of the diplomatic aims of the different nations in this 
present war see H. H. Powers : The Things Men Fight For. 

47 J. S. Mill: Letter dated Oct. 25, 1865. Elliott: Letters. Vol. II, p. 47. 

48 Chas. Sumner: The True Grandeur of Nations. Boston, July 4, 1845. 

"Powers : The Things Men Fight For, p. 340. 

""Green : Works. Vol. II. The Principles of Political Obligation, p. 338. 

^See Anne C. E. Allinson: Virgil and the New Patriotism, Yale Review, Oct., 
1917, p. 158. 

B2 King: Washington or Greatness. In Patriotism and Other Papers, pp. 72, 73. 

M L. S. Woolf : International Morality. /. /. E., Oct., 1915, p. 18. 

64 Loisy: The War and Religion, p. 21. 

^Elroy Headley : Patriotic Essays, Introduction, p. XV. 

M Mazzini : 1834. Quoted by Rose : Nationality in Modern History, p. 74. 

57 Longfellow : The Building of the Ship. 

^Josiah Quincy, Jr. Speech at Second Centennial of Boston, Sept. 17, 1830. 

69 Wm. Watson : The True Patriotism. See The Poems of William Watson, New 
York and London, Macmillan Co., 1893, p. 76. 

^Chamberlin : Patriotism and The Moral Law, pp. 24, 25. 

"Chas. E. Hughes: Addresses Before the Empire State Society, S. A. R. Nov. 
26, 1906. 

62 Bosanquet : Social and International Ideals, preface, pp. VI, VII. 

^Chamberlin : Patriotism and The Moral Law, p. 14. 

e4 John Grier Hibben : The Higher Patriotism, p. 18. 

"J. M. Robertson: Patriotism and Empire, p. 202. 

""International Reform Bureau : Patriotic Studies, 1888-1905. 

67 Thos. S. King : Patriotism and Other Papers, p. 49. 

""Cf . E. A. Venturi : Joseph Mazzini, with two essays by Mazzini : Thoughts on 
Democracy and The Duties of Man. 

"Royce: Loyalty, pp. 214, 215, 118. 

70 Royce: Duties of Americans in the Present War. In The Hope of the Great 
Community, pp. 3, 4. Italics mine. 

"Graham Wallas : Human Nature in Politics, p. 100. 

Notes 117 

Part IV 

l J. M. Robertson: Patriotism and Empire. 

2 W. Trotter: The Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. 

3 T. Veblen : The Nature of Peace. 

4 Loisy: The War and Religion. 

5 H. H. Powers : The Things Men Fight For. 

"Cf. statement of procedure in the preface. 

7 Sophie Bryant: Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. IX, p. 

8 Of course, one can care about the fate of countries other than his own and be 
interested in institutions of another order, the church, for instance, but when he 
does these things, he does them in his character as something other than a patriot. 
No person is merely a patriot. In so far as he is a patriot his interest is absorbed 
in his country. 

9 Royce: The World and the Individual, Vol. I, p. 292. 

10 Veblen : The Nature of Peace. Cf . Chap. IV, Peace Without Honour. 

"Bosanquet : The Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 68. 

12 Ibid., margin of p. 68. 

18 E. B. Talbot: Individuality and Freedom. Philosophical Review, November, 
1909, p. 600. 

"Aristotle: Politics. Book II, Chap. 2, p. 28. Jowett's translation. 

16 Gertrude B. King: The Servile Mind. /. /. E., July, 1916, p. S03. 

"Ellen B. Talbot: Individuality and Freedom. Philosophical Review, Novem- 
ber, 1909, p. 603. 

"Warner Fite : Individualism, p. 14. 

"Ellen B. Talbot: Individuality and Freedom. Philosophical Review, Novem- 
ber, 1909, p. 602. 

"Cf. Aristotle: Politics. Book I, Chap. 2, p. 4. Jowett's edition. 

^Warner Fite: Individualism, p. 126. 

"Ibid., p. 122. 

^Royce: The Problem of Christianity, Vol. I, p. 1S2. 

™Ibid, preface, p. XXV. 

24 Fite: Individualism, p. 173. 

2B Howison: The Limits of Evolution, p. 7. 

"C. M. Bakewell: Royce As an Interpreter of American Ideals. /. J. E., p. 
307, April, 1917, Vol. XXVII. 

^Joseph Mazzini: On the Duties of Man, Ch. V. In E. A. Venturi: Joseph 
Mazzini, p. 312. 

™lbid., p. 313. 

™Ibid., pp. 314, 315. 

'"Arthur Ponsonby, /. J. E., Jan., 1915, pp. 143, 144. 

"Cited by Edward Everett Hale: The Man Without a Country, introduction, 
p. VIII. 

82 McDougall: Social Psychology, p. 85. 

^Green: Works, Vol. II, Principles of Political Obligation, p. 523. 

34 Sumner: Folkways, pp. 566, 567. 

^Spencer: Social Statics, p. 300. 

n8 Patriotism as an Ethical Concept 

""Green : Works, Vol. II, Principles of Political Obligation, table of contents, p. 
XXXV, for p. 446. 

OT H. C. Brown: Human Nature and the State, /. J. E., Jan., 1916, p. 179. 

^Spencer: Social Statics, p. 279. 

89 Green : Works, Vol. II, Principles of Political Obligation, p. 444. 

*°Rose: Nationality in Modern History, p. 12. 

41 J. Berg Esenwein: Short Story Masterpieces : Russian. Introduction- to Gogol, 
p. 67. 

42 Warner Fite: Individualism, p. 100. Italics mine. The last sentence, also, 
comes before the rest of the passage in the author's own text. 

"Ibid., p. 112. 

"Joseph Mazzini: On the Duties of Man, Ch. V. In E. A. Venturi: Joseph 
Mazzini, p. 317. 

"Ernest Barker: The Discredited State, Political Quarterly, Feb., 1915, p. 111. 

"Robert C. Winthrop: The Patriot Traveler in a Foreign Land. See H. P. 
Judson: The Young American, p. 118. 

47 Veblen: The Nature of Peace, p. 142. 

"C. D. Burns: The Morality of Nations, pp. 7, 65. 

49 Russell: Why Men Fight, p. 151. 

^Lippmann : The Stakes of Diplomacy, p. 38. 

"Ibid., p. 50. 

"Cf. Graham Wallas: The Great Society, p. 308. 

M Zimmermann : On National Pride, p. 137. 

M Royce: The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 212. Italics mine. 

M Anne C. E. Allinson: Virgil and the New Patriotism, Yale Review, October, 
1917, p. 141. 

^Aristotle: Politics, Book III, Ch. 3, p. 72. Jowett's translation. 

57 Graham Wallas: The Great Society, p. 10. 

^Sumner: Folkways, p. 94. 

"'A. C. Haddon: Universal Races Congress, Record of Proceedings, London, 
1911, p. 26. Quoted by G. F. Barbour, /. /. E., Oct., 1913, pp. 14, 15. Footnote. 

"G. F. Barbour, /. J. E., Oct., 1913, p. 15. 

fll Royce : Provincialism, p. 99. In Race Questions and Other American Problems. 

a2 Ibid., p. 99. 

^Ibid., p. 65. 

"Ibid., pp. 100, 102. 

"F. Melian Stawell, /. J. E., April, 1915, pp. 296, 297. 

"C. D. Burns and L. S. Woolf have made a good deal of these tendencies. Cf. 
C. D. Burns: The Morality of Nations, and L. S. Woolf: International Govern- 

67 C. D. Burns: The Morality of Nations, p. 237. 

Tor these and similar facts see C. D. Burns: The State and Its External Re- 
lations. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1915-1916, p. 300. 

69 Lippmann: The Stakes of Diplomacy, p. 45. 

70 The New York Times of Nov. 27, 1917, contained a report to the effect that 
the United States Government was preparing to notify Berlin of the steps that had 
been taken in the United States regarding the internment of unnaturalized Ger- 
mans in this country. It was the purpose to inform Germany of the number of 

Notes 119 

those interned, who they were, and how they were treated. The object was to re- 
assure Germany that the interned Germans were not being ill-treated, and so to 
protect Americans interned in Germany. 

"Trotter: The Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, pp. 121, 122. 

"Zimmerman: On National Pride, p. 306. 

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