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THE CRITICS OF HERBARTIANISM
AND OTHER MATTER CONTRIBUTORY TO THE
STUDY OF THE HERBARTIAN QUESTION
OTHER WORKS BY DR. F. H. HAYWARD.
THE ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY OF
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^^ INTEREST IS THE GREATEST WORD IN EDUCATION^'
THE
CRITICS OF HERBARTIANISM
AND OTHER MATTER CONTRIBUTORY TO THE
STUDY OF THE HERBARTIAiN QUESTION
F. H. HAYWARD
D.LiT., M.A., B.Sc. (LoND.), B.A. (Cantab.)
FELLOW OF THE COLLEGE OF PRECEPTORS
ASSISTED BY
M. E. THOMAS
BATTERSEA POLYTECHNIC
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PREFACE.
The following work was begun at Cambridge as a thesis
for the London Doctorate of Letters, was continued at the
Thuringian centre of Herbartianism, and was completed
in a West of England district where, with every passing
day, the vital need for an Herbartian propaganda has
become to the author more and more pressing and
manifest.
Scotsmen,^ with an educational tradition of some sort
at their back, may afford or affect to disparage Herbar-
tianism, but ft Southron who knows the paralytic con-
dition of education in his own country and district will, if
wise, hesitate to stand aloof from a system which — alone
among systems or rudiments of systems — can inspire,
move and fascinate. The sun in the heavens is, after all,
a more useful luminary than any nebula to be generated
a billion years hence by the clash of boreal or other
meteorites.
The man who has read Herbart's educational works
unmoved has read them either without understanding
or with prejudice. Of Herbart's psychology one may
perhaps say with some justification : —
Shall I take a thing so blind,
Embrace her as my natural good,
Or crash her, like a vice of blood,
tJpon the threshold of the mind ?
^ Mr. Darroch is dealt with in the Appendix.
100G227
vi Preface
But Herbart's educational writings are another matter.
The man who has been saved from sin will hesitate to
revile the means of his salvation ; the man who has found
educational light in the pages of Herbart will hesitate to
call the light an illusion. Extinguish Herbartianism and
you extinguish for a century the hopes of education.
Herbart fascinates ; his critics do not.
Two Herbartians have recently died, Professor Lazarus
and Mr. F. G. Eooper, The writer cannot avoid taking
the opportunity of referring to the educational loss in-
volved in the death of the latter. The ranks of ofl&cial
educationists are distinctly poorer now that he is gone
from among us.
A remark as to the use of the term " Herbartianism ".
Purists may protest, but there is real need of a word suf-
ficiently general to embrace the entire school of thought
to which Ziller, Dorpfeld and dozens of other German
thinkers, and a fair sprinkling of thinkers outside Germany,
belong or have belonged. Professor Adams, Dr. Eckoff
and other writers have deliberately employed the term
" Herbartianism," and the present writer therefore feels
but few scruples of conscience in following suit.
Again, the use of " stupid " as a translation of
" stumpfsinnig " is not without its drawbacks. The
writer is conscious of them ; having said so much he
has here said enough.
The work is not precisely a unity, it is rather a collection
of matter dealing with the historical and polemical aspects
of Herbartianism. British educationists will, sooner or
later, have to come to a decision upon their attitude towards
this question, and it is hoped that the matter of the present
volume will be of some assistance to them in the task.
They cannot, at any rate, complain that the weaknesses,
or supposed weaknesses, of Herbartianism have been con-
Preface rii
cealed. At last we know the worst ; and now that the
worst is known some of us feel that the best shines
brightly. However, be it repeated, the book is a series
of contributions rather than a definite unity. But, in
view of the fact that British educational thought seems,
for the moment, to have a predilection for crystallising
itself in books of heterogeneous essays,^ the imperfections
of the present collection may perhaps be pardoned if not
applauded.
The peculiar form of the Natorp section is due to the
fact that it was printed separately from the rest.
Miss Thomas is responsible for the sections on Vogel
and Linde, and desires to express her appreciation of the
help given by Miss A. Kirby, B.A., of Pljrmouth High
School. Miss Thomas has also read through the whole
work, and made many useful suggestions on matters of
detail.
Several of the author's Bristol friends have again helped
him by reading proofs ; so also has Mr. J. W. Besley, the
able Master of Moorland School, Okehampton ; Professor
Alexander and Miss Catherine Dodd (Owens' College,
Manchester) also deserve his thanks ; and to Mr. E. H.
Carter, M.A. (Board of Education), whose soundness of
judgment and knowledge of German educational thought
have been of much assistance, the author wishes to tender
his warm gratitude.
F. H. H.
Okehampton, June^ 1903.
1 Teaching and Organisation (Longmans) ; National Education (Murray) ;
The Nation's Need ^Constable), etc., etc., etc.
CONTENTS.
Prbfacb ^
PART I. Introduction to the Critics op Hebbabtiahibm . 1
PART II. Historical Survey—
1. Herbart (1776-1841) 86
2. Outline of Herbart's Doctrines .... 89
3-5. The Revival of Herbartianism —
Volkmar Stoy (1815-85) 48
Priedrich Wilhelm Dorpfeld (1824-93) . . 46
Tuiskon Ziller (1817-82) 49
6. Outline of Ziller's Doctrines 53
7. Reaction and Controversy 86
8. More Controversy 62
9. Present Position of Herbartianism in Germany • 65
10. Herbartianism in Britain 69
11. Herbartianism in America and Elsewhere . . 76
PART III. Herbartian Literature in English .... 77
(1) Translations 78
(2) Expositions of Herbartianism as Distinguished
from Translations . . ... . .80
(3) Original Works Showing the Influence of Her-
bp,rtian Thought 83
PART IV. The Critics op Herbartianism —
Section I. Dittes ,98
Section II. Wesendonck 107
Section III. Bartels 112
Section IV. Ostermann 11?
Section V. Rrchter 186
Section VI. Vogel 130
Section VII. Sallwiirk 147
Section VIII. Hubatsch 164
Section IX. Drews 168
Section X. Christinger 166
Section XI. Bergemann 169
Section XII. Linde 178
Section XIII. Natorp 178
Section XIV. Kunz 203
APPENDIX. Propessob Darboch on Hebbabtianism . . . 209
Index I ^16
Index II 219
PART I.
INTEODUCTION TO THE CRITICS OF
HERBARTIANISM.
DuBiNG the last twenty years two phenomena have been notice-
able to observers of the educational world — a steady increase in
the inj&uence of the Herbartian system, and a series of vigorous
attacks upon that system from various quarters of the Father-
land. The former phenomenon has been patent to all, the
second to those who have followed the course of events abroad.
It is Germany, the laud in which Herbartianism is indigenous,
which has presented the world with supposed antidotes.
These supposed antidotes, it would be no great exaggeration to
say, have received no notice whatever in this country. Never very
enthusiastic over educational problems, especially unenthusiastic
over such as are not obviously "practical," the British nation
as a whole, and many even of its professional educationists,
have passed two decades unconscious of the fact that the most
complete system of education hitherto given to the world has
been going through a period of keen hostile criticism. Even
America, where Herbartianism has attained a position of honour
and influence, knows little of the battles it has to fight in the
home of its birth.
But even on the English horizon there are bright spots.
Herbartianism itself is being studied, even if its critics are
being ignored. This is as it should be. Whatever its alleged
weaknesses, Herbartianism, as even its enemies admit,i has great
1 Natorp, Herhart, Pestalozzi und die heutigen Aufgaben der Erziehungs-
lehre. Preface.
I
The Critics of Herbartianism
stimulating power, and can teach us much. May-be it is not
destined to survive for ever as the rounded and completed
system which it appears in the eyes of its admirers. Yet the
student of its principles is wanting in ingenuousness who refuses
homage to the greatness of its services.
It must, therefore, be regarded as a promising fact that works
expository of Herbart — such as those of Mr. and Mrs. Felkin —
are being published and read to an increasing extent. These
books, it is true, rarely touch upon the supposed weaker sides
of Herbartianism, and still more seldom deal historically with
the criticisms to which the system has been exposed.^ But the
reason is clear. To criticise Herbart would have been useless
until his name and his principles were known. It is impos-
sible to criticise the non-existent, and a few years ago
Herbartianism among us was virtually in this condition. The
very name of its founder was only known in narrow philo-
sophical circles as that of a philosopher somewhat akin to
Locke, not as that of an educational writer of first rank. But
now this has changed. Herbartianism is in a measure known,
and the English students who yearly visit Germany in general
and Jena in particular seem likely, either as friends or as foes,
to spread its fame in widening circles.
The following attempt to give an account of the chief criti-
cisms of Herbartianism is therefore at the present moment not
perhaps untimely. It may prove of service to the more thought-
ful among our few educational students by stimulating them to
grapple with the question, really of fundamental importance,
whether or not Herbart was on the right tack.
" To the more thoughtful." This indicates the purpose of the
work. It is not written for the student who desires in brief
compass an outline of the Herbartian system, of which he has
heard, perhaps, vague reports. One effect it may have upon
such a student will be a feeling that these Germans are masters
at splitting straws and calUng each other names. And, it must
^ One criticism, that of Voigt, is however appropriately included in Mr.
and Mrs. Felkin's Introdtiction.
Introduction to the Critics of Herbartianistn 3
be confessed, such an impression is to some extent correct.
The Germans are undisputed masters of ponderous controversy.
The present writer started with the intention of translating
verbatim considerable portions (at least) of the critical works
and articles hereafter mentioned, but he has relinquished the
task in favour of presenting condensed summaries of these wordy-
effusions. Still, admitting the appearance of triviality which
marks some of the vigorous mental life of Germany, we must
never lose sight of the fact that many of the problems which
agitate the minds of these controversiaHsts are really the great
world-problems of unfaiUng interest and vitahty.
Let us take a pertinent example. Many of the pages which
follow will deal with the question of the Will, a question ever
present alike to exponents and to opponents of the Herbartian
system. Where lie the real springs of human action ? There
is no exaggeration in saying that this is not only the most
baflSing of speculative problems (as evidenced by the constant
controversies over Libertarianism and Determinism), but the
most directly practical of all questions. Only when it is solved
can we be certain whether our methods of religious and moral
education are not so much beating of the air.
If the springs of action lie in the physiological realm, the
realm of habit and instinct (as a follower of Aristotle or a
devotee of modern science is likely to affirm), then it is clear
that moral education must assimilate itself to the training of
plants and animals ; it must be a matter of drill. If, on the
other hand, we affirm, not "Virtue is Habit," but " Virtue is
Knowledge," or " Virtue is based on Insight " (as a follower of
Socrates, Plato, or Herbart is likely to maintain), the main object
of the educator must be not to drill but to enlighten. It is not
too much to say that public opinion is hopelessly in confusion
over this fundamental question. We find a laborious piling up
of statistics supposed to prove that Board Schools are emptying
the jails. We then hear of these same statistics ruthlessly called
in question, and of confident assertions that knowledge has no
moral effect ; that only a thorough course of drill, accompanied
by rewards and punishments, terrestrial or celestial, can suffice
The Critics of Herbartianism
to keep the wayward feet of man in the narrow path of virtue.
Who is right ? Are we in moral education to be Aristotelians
or Herbartians? Are we to put faith in Habit or in Know-
ledge ?
The answer probably is, that Character is twofold. It has
its passive, mechanical, conservative, and preservative side
given over to the sway of Habit ; hence the enormous im-
portance of the Aristotelian factor in education, a factor
emphasised by William James in a chapter that bids fair to
become a psychological and educational classic.^ But Character
has also its active, growing, changing side, and here Knowledge,
or, to use Herbart's favourite word, Insight, is supreme.''' In
the treatment of this latter aspect of the education question
Herbart is probably matchless. His psychology may or may
not be faulty ; his view may be hyper-intellectual and therefore
one-sided ; but his message is one to which the world, sooner
or later, must give heed. Society is daily manufacturing
criminals because it cannot hear his warning voice crying :
" The stupid man cannot be virtuous ". Nay, if it hears him
above the babel, it rejects his words as blasphemous.
The above is an illustration of the genuinely vital nature of
some of the problems raised in the following pages. Herbart's
famous declarations that " all action springs out of the circle of
thought," that " the stupid man cannot be virtuous," that there
should be "no instruction which does not educate the character,"
are no mere concatenations of syllables, no watchwords for hair-
splitting competitions between rival German professors. Even
when we come to the apparently more academic question
agitated between Natorp and the Herbartians, the question
whether a presentations-mechanism is an adequate explanation
^ Tallis to Teachers, ch. viii. See also his larger work, Principles of
Psychology.
^ There is the analogy of a tree with its half-dead stem and its growing
point. Each of the two is necessary.
^ " Presentation " is a very general word for " impression," " idea," etc., as
most readers will scarcely require to be told, and represents the German
" Vorstellung ".
Introduction to the Critics of Herbartianism 5
of mental facts, or whether a higher principle is involved in
what we call self-consciousness (really another form of the
above question), the problem is genuinely vital. If we solve it
in the Herbartian sense, and accept the deterministic hypothesis,
the task thrown upon teachers is enormous.
It would be no exaggeration to say that we have no right
either to hope or to fear for the human race until this and
similar questions have received solution.
And here, perhaps, an avowal may be appropriately made.
When, several years ago, the present writer began to study the
Herbartian question, two briUiant works, destined to exercise no
small influence over British education, had not then appeared.
These were Herbartian Psychology Applied to Education'^ by
Professor Adams, and Dr. Findlay's Principles of Glass Teach-
ing.^ The former is probably the most readable book on educa-
tion that has ever been written in English,^ and, fortunately, its
raciness and readableness are by no means purchased at the
expense of solid wisdom. The second is almost the only
attempt to nationahse Herbartianism among us by retaining
its most valuable features, and judiciously supplementing or
correcting its defects. With neither of these books will the
present work essay to compete ; its design is, in fact, as different
from theirs as its execution may seem to be far less interesting
to the majority of readers. If, then, the field is already occupied
by two brilliant books and half a dozen others, perhaps less
brilliant though equally necessary and valuable (translations
and expositions of Herbart), why should another writer enter
the field with one or two additional volumes under his arm?
Has he anything fresh to contribute? He has, even if the
neglected critical side of the Herbartian question had not been
the object of much of his work.
Enghsh books on Herbartianism — including the two most
brilliant of all — seem strangely deficient in one respect. The
moral significance of the system is well-nigh ignored. To the
1 Isbister. 2 Macmillan.
^Though the works of Thring and James " run it close ".
The Critics of Herbartianism
writers Herbartianism appears as a thing mainly or exclusively
for the class-room ; they rarely convey the impression that it
is an ethical, social, or religious propaganda, and one that bears
upon the most vital problems now crying for solution. But this
is the aspect which specially strikes the present writer. When
Herbart, by a daring flight of ethical speculation, put " Voll-
kommenheit " among the " moral ideas," he thereby placed the
pedagogic profession on the " sacred " platform ; Ufted the
pursuit of Culture up towards the level of the pursuit of Virtue,
or rather — it would be but slightly erroneous to say — identified
within limits the two pursuits ; and mapped out a plan of
social reform more daring and more positive — probably, also,
more likely to prove permanently efifectual — than the crude
plans which, under the name of " philanthropy," go far to
demonstrate how little modern society cares for " prevention "
so long as " cure " is more thrilling and dramatic.
In the Sttodent's Herbart^ this aspect of Herbartianism —
ignored or merely suggested by British writers on the subject
— has been especially emphasised, and in a projected larger
book the question may be considered at greater length. It is
because, to -the writer, the system founded by Herbart is a
moral gospel for men perishing through stupidity and absence
of ideas, that he is burrowing into its often unattractive Uterature
and serving up, for British readers, more than one instalment
of the product. Even when, as in the present work, which is
largely critical and historical, there are but few opportunities
of proclaiming with loud and emphatic iteration the moral
significance of Interest, such opportunities as present them-
selves should not be ignored. Much will Herbartianism do for
the school; but unless it succeed in transforming that insti-
tution into a temple, and the teaching profession into a pro-
fession claiming " holy orders," other results (e.g., the unification
of the curriculum) will be of but small moment. Herbartianism
in its claims is nothing less than an educational High Church
movement with the transubstantiation of ideas into virtue as
^ By the present writer. (Sonnenschein.)
Introduction to the Critics of Herbartianism 7
its central marvel; it is not (as one would too often gather
from most of the current works on the subject ^) merely an
academic system from which pedagogues can pick up a few
useful hints.
If any gospel has a warning message that gospel is Herbar-
tianism, and the message is that the stupid (stumpfsinnig) man
cannot — cannot — be virtuous. If any gospel can claim to be
constructive and inspiring it is that one which hails many-sided
interest as " a protection against passions, an aid to one's earthly
activity, and a salvation amid the storms of fate ". If any gospel
can claim powers for its priests it is the one which proclaims
how, by the manipulation of the principle of Apperception, the
interaction of a group of ideas will be made to generate Interest
and pass over into Virtue and Character. In the present work
there will be no opportunity to expound in detail this magnifi-
cent doctrine, with the substantial correctness of which Her-
bartianism must stand or fall. But in view of the neglect of
this aspect of the Herbartian question there was good reason
for emphasising it here. If Interest is really a protection against
evil, nay, itself an element in moral good, and if Herbart has
shown how, in normal cases, such Interest can be aroused, then
Herbartianism is a gospel and nothing less. And, after aU, it
is more important that Education should become a "gospel"
than that it should become a " science," though when seen
through an Herbartian medium it begins to appear as both.
Some even of the enemies of the system admit that there is
a certain value in the doctrine of many-sided Interest. But on
the whole the gospel is a new one, and surely as necessary as it
is new. When at Roman Catholic conferences (and the same
spirit is present also in many other religious assemblies), we
find ecclesiastics avowing that they " do not attach much im-
portance to the teaching of arithmetic or geography or other
^ The reason why even Professor Adams and Dr. Findlay do not touch
upon this side of the question is perhaps that the design of their works
scarcely allows of it. But they might have given some pointed indication
of the moral significance of Herbartianism.
8 The Critics of Herbartianism
subjects," ^ we naturally and rightly infer that any teacher who
acquiesces in the spirit voiced by these words is an appendage
rather than a man. Nine-tenths of his work is work to which " he
does not attach much importance ". What a chasm separates
the holders of this view from the beHevers in Herbartianism !
The Herbartians attach very great impartance to these and
other despised subjects. An Interest in such things is, in
their view, a life-force of incalculable value, saving, or help-
ing to save, from many a sin, which, if we are to judge from
appearances, all the sacraments in existence seem powerless to
suppress. " Arithmetic " and " geography " may not be, on the
Herbartian view, so character-forming as history and literature,
but no Herbartian would rank his work so low as to utter words
of disparagement concerning even the humblest subjects in the
curriculum. The wonder is how any teachers can endure to be
told point-blank by their ecclesiastical leaders that their work
is of small importance. But possibly they agree with their
rulers. "The degree of estimation in which any profession is
held becomes the standard of the estimation in which the
professors hold themselves." ^
The Herbartian believes in the moral value of "secular" as
well as " sacred" subjects ; he beheves in many-sided Interest;
ipso facto he beheves in himself and in the future of education.
Interest in anything worthy is a moral force dominating life,
keeping from evil, opening up vistas. Interest protects. Interest
guides. Interest elevates. Two boys may be otherwise identical,
but if one of them is influenced by a saving Interest in natural
science or in history which the other does not possess, such an
Interest is not a thing to which Catholics, or any other people,
ought " to attach httle importance ". Many-sided Interest actually
performs, under our very eyes, the task which the sacraments
profess to perform ; it builds up character and works for moral
salvation.
The distinction between the " sacred " and the " secular "
1 Bishop of Clifton at the Newport Conference, 22nd September, 1902.
^ Burke, Reflections on tJie French Revolution.
introduction to the Critics of Herbartianism 9
things of life is probably the most fatally mischievous distinc-
tion ever drawn by the perverse ingenuity of man. And yet
let us retain it — though with a changed application. There
are " secular " things ; there are " sacred " things. Nine-tenths
of the Bible reading in our schools is practically "secular,"
exerting no special influence whatever upon character. Even
the sacraments appear every whit as ineffective and "secular,"
if we are to judge from the records of prisons, poor-houses,
and inebriate homes, the sacramentalists often contributing
the highest percentage of inmates to these institutions. The
question is whether Herbartianism, once intelligently and
enthusiastically grasped and applied by an army of many
thousand teachers, would not accomplish more for the moral
elevation of man than the devices and denunciations of many
generations have accomplished.
But there are others that Herbartianism hits hard, even harder
than the sacramentalists. " Save the drunkard, rescue the fallen,
shut up this, abolish that," are the cries we hear from our very
best men, the salt of the earth ; men who, in moral fervour,
are often miles in advance of such persons as "do not attach
much importance either to arithmetic or geography," or,
often, even to temperance and such like philanthropic but
"secular" movements. Yet these cries, too, sound pitiably
feeble and thin when once the sonorous trumpet-call of many-
sided Interest has broken upon the ear. Modern philanthropy
is almost wholly reformatory, corrective, and negative : in
sharp contrast to this is Herbartianism ; ever positive, pre-
ventive, constructive. So long as any genuine Herbartian has a
voice and a pen he will urge upon an unbelieving public — which
nominally acknowledges an overruling Benevolence, but daily
reduces him to moral impotence by attributing evil to any cause
except the mental limitations of man — that most if not all
moral evils are gratuitous and unnecessary, the results of empti-
ness of mind, unintelligence, rigidity of thought, absence of
wholesome interests. "Absurd optimism," some one will say;
"a Socratic and Platonic error long ago exploded." Yet evil
must be absolute if it is not ultimately the result of intellectual
10 The Critics of Herbartianisin
defects, such as ignorance and sluggish or diseased imagination.
"The stupid man cannot be virtuous," and conversely the en-
tirely wwstupid man cannot be vicious ; or if he can, the moral
government of the universe is a delusion, and the monarchs of
hell may, for all we know, be holding sway in the councils of
heaven. That and nothing less is the inference we must draw if
the great central doctrine of Herbartianism is false : the doctrine
that "action springs out of the circle of thought," and that
therefore " the smaller the amount of mental activity the
less can we look for Virtue ". In the strange posthumous
book of F. W. H. Myers ^ we are told that to disembodied
spirits " evil seems less a terrible than a slavish thing. It is
an isolating madness from which higher spirits strive to free
the distorted soul." Would moral evil exist but for ignorance
and but for mental disease ?
When the Herbartian seeks to penetrate into the dim recesses
from which issues the human Will, he discerns there, not the
form of a fiend, bafiling daily the armies of heaven, but rather
a chaos of forces, innocent though untamed and undirected,
working out their destiny in the mysterious gloom. And the
Herbartian asks, with wonder, why these dark recesses shovdd
remain dark ; and why a nation which prays for deliverance
"from pride, vainglory, and hypocrisy; from envy, hatred, and
mahce, and all uncharitableness, from fornication and all other
deadly sin," forgets that these, like "hghtning and tempest,"
are effects, and may some day be tracked to their causes.
It takes a higher order of mind to aim at the prevention
of evil than at its cure. The first is the high aim of Her-
bartianism, whereas any housewife, provided she has a warm
heart, can aim at cure — and give alms to every beggar.
"An expansion of the concept of moraUty is required," said
Herbart almost at the outset of his career as an educational
author. The battle which he fought was that of the claims of
" culture " ; the same battle revived years ago by Matthew
Arnold. The word is a bad one and rouses many a prejudice.
^Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death.
Introduction to the Critics of Herbartianism 1 1
But there is no better word for the purpose, and apologies are
after all unnecessary, for the strenuous Hebraic elements sup-
posed to be absent from the notion of Culture are already rooted
in our midst and are never likely to leave us. Our duty
is therefore to exalt Hellenism while not derogating from the
glories of Hebraism. And " Culture " in the eyes of its English
advocate was, after all, no nerveless dilettantism: "there is a
view in which all the love of our neighbour, the impulses
towards action, help, and beneficence, the desire for removing
human error, clearing human confusion and diminishing human
misery, the noble aspiration to leave the world better and
happier than we found it — motives eminently such as are
called social — come in as part of the grounds of culture, and
the main and pre-eminent part. . . . Culture is a study of
perfection." ^ This is Herbartian Ethics deprived of its technical
and deterrent form. The " Culture " gospel may be overdone,
though there is small chance of this in Britain ; the danger is
that we shall ignore rather than exaggerate. But we ignore
at our peril. When a Herbart can tell us that "stupid men
cannot be virtuous " ; when a Matthew Arnold can bewail the
moral and social results of an absence of mental "flexibility,"
and a George Meredith, as if in echo, can explain much of the
vioiousness of the poor as a result of the " dulness and im-
penetrability of their minds," ^ it is time for us to ask whether,
after all, culture and morality are not more closely connected
than we have dreamt.
The writer has elsewhere ^ indicated what he regards as the
real significance of Herbart's " second moral idea ". Practically
speaking that idea represents the forgotten claims of Greek
thought. Greatness, width of mind, culture. Interest appear on
the Herbartian scene as demanded by the moral intuitions of
man. Virtue is no longer abstinence, but an effort after a total
perfection, of which abstinence is only a phase.
^ Culture and Anarchy, pp. 5-6.
2 Ordeal of Richard Feverel. But does Mr. Meredith say this for himself?
3 The Student's Herbart, pp. 39 ff.
12 The Critics oj Herbartianism
Objectors will say — Dittes and others have said it repeatedly
— that culture and many-sided Interest are not virtue. • Herbart
never said that they were. The "second moral idea" is only
one of five, and if the other four are ignored the person is not
" virtuous ". But, conversely, a person is not completely " vir-
tuous " if the "second idea" be ignored. That is to say, an
English aristocrat devoid of ideas, a country ploughman or a
humble housewife with stunted mental development and no
interests, or "daughters of well-to-do parents, whose minds
have been disciplined by no harder work than a study of novels
and talk about the clergy," ^ are not types of moral perfection
even though they may be honest, benevolent, well-meaning,
not grossly sensual, and so forth. They may keep every pro-
hibitory commandment, but they cannot be virtuous in the
Herbartian sense ; a chilling numbness rules nine-tenths of their
nature ; a fatal paralysis confines them in a moral prison house.
" Stumpfsinnige konnen nicht tugendhaft s&in."
To a man who has once drunk deep of the Herbartian spring
mankind appears in a new Hght, no longer as a multitude of
beings each torn by an internal conflict between the angel and
the devil within, but rather as a multitude of sightless hydrozoa
immersed in an inhospitable medium and feeling outwards with
every tentacle for the mental nourishment which never comes.
Said Gray of the poor of England : —
Knowledge to their eyes her ample page
Rich with the spoils of time did ne'er unroll ;
in the great poem whose beauty has too long detracted from
its educational significance. To the Herbartian, the poor
— nay the rich also, scarcely less often — are mutely craving for
something they do not possess, and indeed cannot define, but
the absence of which shows itself in a moral disease, whose
diagnosis has been muddled too long by their spiritual physicians.
" Sin — sin — sin " has been shouted from every pulpit, and the
* The words axe Mr. Rooper's {School and Home Life, p. 315). Many-
sided Interest is a gospel for women as well as for men, and would do much
to save them from hysteria, nervous irritation, self -concentration and self-love
Introduction to the Critics of Herbartianism 13
Herbartians, careless of criticism or convention, retort, " The
stupid man cannot be virtuous ". Where in his anaemic mind
and palsied will lie any springs of noble action ? Can any good
thing come out of such a Nazareth ? >
Evil does not spring from nothing or from Free Will, It has
its causes. It is a disease rather than a miracle. It is to be
cured rather than inveighed against.
To claim Herbartianism as a remedy for aU the evils which
aflflict mankind would be veritable folly, though not greater folly
than to claim as such any single religious or economic prescrip-
tion. There are champions of both the latter. The Socialist
traces all or most ills to poverty, and Gray himself rightly saw
in poverty one cause of the mental and moral degradation of the
poor.
Chill penury repressed their noble rage
And froze the genial current of the soul.
But it is certain that man cannot live by bread alone, and the
preacher, seeing this, brings forward Ms prescription, and traces
all or most ills to the neglect of the " gospel ". But he, too,
sees only an aspect, and a superficial aspect, of the disease ;
sees, in fact, symptoms rather than causes. " Men will not
accept the gospel," we are told. But why should we expect
them to feel the historical meaning of any great World-Tragedy,
if history and literature — the "humanistic" studies which
make us sensitive to nobleness, to pathos, to martyrdom, to
divinity — have been kept afar off? Why should they rever-
ence Christ if they are never taught to reverence Alfred or
Sidney? The thing is absurd. We exclude the " humanities "
from the school, or, what is worse, we teach them soullessly,
or, what is worse again, we confuse them with dates, and
grammar, and construing — and then we complain that the
" gospel " is neglected.
Tennyson sings truly that the course of time and progress
will —
Crook and turn upon itself in many a backward streaming curve ;
for the catechetical Christian schools of Alexandria were qen-
14 The Critics of Herbartianism
turies in advance of modem England in their grasp of the
problem of spiritual education. To the wise Fathers of that
city there were laws of spiritual apperception long since for-
gotten until re-discovered by Tuiskon Ziller.^ Greek thought,
prophetic thought, historical study were necessary preliminaries
for the student before the Christian mysteries and spiritualities
could be discerned. There was less said about the "neglect
of the gospel," and rather a solemn and earnest effort to show
how, in the view of these, the wisest of the early Christians,
Christianity was a culmination, and as such only capable of
being grasped in all its force and significance by minds pre-
pared. But we have forgotten the lesson. With well-nigh
every humanistic element excluded from the school ; with the
fact that, when viewed in the light of the vast moral importance
of the subject, history is practically unknown and untaught
in modern England ; with the other fact, which would strike an
observer as equally appalling, were it not ludicrous in its very
imbecihty, that great literature makes no appeal to the modem
Englishman and but little appeal to the modern English woman ;
we still have the audacity to complain that the soul-message of
a Tragedy, enacted in some unknown country called Palestine,
then under the rule of an unknown nation called the Eomans,
but formerly under kings of its own, unknown except by name,
warned and inspired by unknown men called " prophets " — that
a Tragedy taking place under such unknown conditions exerts
but little attractive force on mankind ! Again be it said, the
thing is absurd. If we wish the "gospel story," or any other
story, or any other humanistic force, to act upon mankind, we
must restore the "humanities" to the school. Thousands of
English souls are hterally perishing from lack of the historical
knowledge which humanises.
Knowledge to their eyes her ample page
Rich with the spoils of time did ne'er unroll.
The truth is that the preacher, if a man of culture, has no
^ Consider the iafe position of the Life of Christ in his scheme of study.
Introduction to the Critics of Herbartianism 15
point of contact with his audience ; he speaks a foreign
language ; he talks of colours to the blind. The " apperception
masses " — the requisite ideas — of his auditors are so few and
attenuated that he, and the moralist, may appeal for a life-
time without touching any inner spring of action. " Dulness
and impenetrability," not deliberate choice of evil for good, are
the causes of much present-day spiritual decline and much of
the desertion of the churches recently revealed. And with this
" dulness and impenetrability " towards what is suggestive of
higher things goes necessarily a heightened susceptibility to
all that is degrading. " If' intellectual interests are wanting,
if the store of thought be meagre, then the ground lies
empty for the animal desires." So says Herbart, wiser a
thousand times than those who shout " sin — sin — sin ".
It is the supreme glory of Herbartianism to have shown how
intimately connected are Intelligence and Virtue, Unintelligence
and Vice. It is the supreme error of many philanthropists not
to have recognised that the secret of failure is often absence of
ideas, scrappiness of ideas, feebleness of ideas. The intolerant
man is intolerant because he has lived only in one mental world ;
the cruel man is cruel often because his imagination is weak ; ^
the impure man is impure largely because he has nothing to
interest him except impurity; the Hooligan is a Hooligan
because he has never been taught to be anything else.
"Human nature," says Euskin, "is kind and generous, but
it is narrow and blind, and can only with difficulty conceive
anything but what it immediately sees and feels. People
would instantly care for others as well as for themselves if
only they could imagine others as well as themselves."^
We have wandered for the moment from the doctrine of
many-sided Interest to that of Gesinnungsunterricht or the
teaching of " humanities," and to that of "Apperception ". But
in truth they are aU connected. The moral value of the first
1 Still there may be " Schadenfreude," pleasure in another's pain, as
Miss Cobbe urges. {Contemporary, May, 1902.) But probably most cruelty
is due to defective imagination. Schadenfreude is, let us hope, insanity.
^.Relation of Art to Morals. (Quoted, Felkin.)
1 6 The Critics of Herbartianism
doctrine, even when applied to subjects such as arithmetic and
geography, is enormous ; while when applied to humanistic
studies (history, literature, etc.) it becomes incalculable. The
doctrine of Apperception is, of course, applicable to all subjects,
at least to all that involve the imparting of knowledge as dis-
tinct from skill or dexterity. A few words more upon it may
therefore not be wholly useless, in view of the fact that the
majority of expositors, with all their lucidity, fail to show its
moral and social significance.
This significance will be discovered by any person who will
take the trouble to try or to conceive an experiment. Let him
go into a country village with eager heart, pure motives, and
boundless energy. He is determined to lay before the people
" whatsoever things are lovely " in religion, in literature, in
science, in history. It is all " lovely " to him ; how easy it must
be to rouse others to a sense of the same loveliness ! How easy
to thrill Englishmen and Christians with a sense of the grandeur
of their national history, with the beauty of their national poetry,
or with the true and deep pathos of that scene when a single man
inspired the Jews in their mountain fortress to throw defiance at
Sennacherib and the greatest army in the world ! Easy ! Alas,
it is not easy ! Mention "Alfred," and the rustic imagination
remains unkindled; "Wessex," "Norseman," and every other
proper name mentioned falls as a meaningless sound : the
apperceiving ideas are not there, and Interest is not awakened.
Tell of the origin of Adonais, and the rustic asks " Who was
Keats ? " and the expositor has to begin the weary task at
another point ; again the apperceiving ideas are not there, and
Interest is not awakened. Turn at last to the Bible, " the poor
man's book," the common heritage of Christians ; surely here
we shall find something that the rustic can appreciate ! Tell
of Sennacherib, tell of Isaiah. In the midst of the narrative
comes the question — if, indeed, an ox-like stare be not the
only response which the enthusiast obtains — "Who were the
Assyrians?" Well-nigh in despair the speaker produces a
map, proceeds to point out Mesopotamia, and — inter alia —
discovers that though "religious education " is the order of the
Introduction to the Critics of Herbartianism 17
day not one person out of ten can point out Palestine on the
map of the world ! Sennacherib and Isaiah, like Guthrum
and Alfred, awaken no interest ; there is no background of
knowledge into which the new material can be received ; the
apperceiving ideas are not there, and Interest is not aroused.
Thus we come back to the old place ; preaching, teaching,
exhortation, books, can exert but little influence unless, early
in Hfe, vistas have been opened up before the mind. " The
conceptions acquired before thirty remain usually the only ones
we ever gain." ^ Immense is the value of ideas. The man who
has them in rich abundance may perchance sink, on occasion,
into debauchery or greed, but he is always open to influences ;
there is always the chance of revolutionising his character. The
hopeless person is the impenetrable person, the man whose
"apperceiving masses" are poor, scanty, or non-existent. Pro-
fessor James's jokes at the expense of the " apperception "
doctrine 2 are therefore out of place. He complains that "the
conscientious young teacher is led to believe that it contains a
recondite and portentous secret ". It does contain a secret,
and a portentous one.
The chief aim of the present work — which is to lay before
Anglo-Saxon readers the critical literature bearing on Herbar-
tianism— precludes the devotion of much further space to a
panegyric of the "Interest" and kindred doctrines. But if
these doctrines possess vitality, clearly Herbartianism has by no
means been criticised out of existence — an impression which
might possibly arise after a perusal of the hostile criticisms
which are summarised in this book. No, Herbartianism lives
and moves and develops. Its critics do good service when
they point out possible dangers and when they demonstrate
obvious errors, but as the system is grounded upon many a
deep moral and psychological truth, though its outworks may
fall to ruin its main walls will surely stand.
" ' Interest — Interest — Interest ' ; all very well : but let us
have definite practical hints." A teacher will respond in this
1 James, Talks to Teachers, p. 168. ^Ibid., p. 156.
2
1 8 The Critics of Herbartianism
wise. Well, Herbartians can give many, but the truth is that
British Education is already well supplied with " practical
hints " (of a sort), and that these, so far as they are good, will
find their proper places in the Herbartian system. The need
is for a new spirit, a definite point of view, a programme, a
creed ; precisely these are provided in the Interest doctrine.
Teachers who once feel that in creating powerfid, permanent
Interests they are regenerating the world as no other body of
professional men are capable of doing, will soon discover
" practical hints " for themselves, and (far more important)
they will realise that school work has a meaning; that the
preparation of their lessons is drudgery no longer, but truly
a preparation for the "Kingdom of God on earth"; and that
they have a right to look in the face of the clerical and the
medical professions with the glance, if not of superiority, yet
at least of equahty, instead of with the cringing glance of
conscious abasement. Is this nothing ? Cannot we balance
a good many "practical hints" against such a boon? The
function of Herbartianism is not to add a new and equally dreary
set of "school-management" books to the lumber-room of a
schoolhouse, but to give a soul, spirit, Hfe, and meaning to the
whole of the schoolmaster's work. We need no Herbartianism
to tell us how geography should be taught ; even now we teach
it fairly well. But we do need Herbartianism to explain to us
in what spirit we should teach it ; we do need Herbartianism
to tell us we are a profession ; we do need it to provide us with
a programme for the future, with a tradition, with a philosophy,
with a court of appeal, with self-respect, with leaders, with
encyclopaedias,^ with stimulus, with hope, with zeal — with every-
thing, in fact, which we do not possess and which the medical
profession in a measure does.
One parting word on the " Interest " doctrine. Is there any
^It is not without significance that the magnificent Encyclopaedia of
Education, published at Langensalza, is edited by the modem leader of
German Herbartianism. The reference is, of course, to Rein's Encyclo-
pcedisches Handbvch der Padagogik (16 volumes).
Introduction to the Critics of Herbartianism 19
truth in the charge brought forward by Dittes that Herbartianism
is devoid of heroism ? Was Herbart's apathy, at a time when
Fichte and other Germans were engaged in the war against
Napoleon's aggression, a symptom of the paralysis which
"Culture" sometimes induces, and a gloomy presentiment of
the flabbiness of his educational system ? He would be a bold
man who, in face of Herbart's spotless life and the enthusiasm
of his followers, would seriously claim this. But there may be
a trace of truth in the charge. "Interest" with Herbart was
mainly to be of the "involuntary" kind. An Herbartian
teacher, consistent to the doctrine of the presentational-mech-
anism, would aim mainly at the smooth working of the forty
or sixty presentational-mechanisms sitting before him in class
and called his " pupils ". " We have of late been hearing much
of the philosophy of tenderness in education ; ' Interest ' must
be assiduously awakened in everything, difficulties must be
smoothed away. Soft pedagogics have taken the place of the
old steep and rocky path to learning." So speaks a great
American writer,^ and (must we not admit ?) there may be now
and then an absence of strenuousness, vigour, and backbone in
Herbartianism ; it may easily degenerate into the " soft peda-
gogics " said to be prevalent in Herbartian America. It may —
or it may not. Professor Adams's reply is at least pertinent.
"The theory of Interest does not propose to banish drudgery,
but only to make 'drudgery tolerable by giving it a meaning." ^
"Interest," says Schurman, "is the greatest word in Educa-
tion " ; let us now finally add, " in morals and religion too ".
Some further remarks will be of service in calling attention to
other really valuable aspects of Herbartianism, aspects likely
to be partly lost sight of during an examination of the weak
points of the system. Partly — not entirely; for reasonable-
minded critics like Dittes, Bartels, and Christinger are by no
means insensitive to its excellences.
Connected with the doctrines of Interest and Apperception is
the one that Instruction cannot be dispensed with or safely
* James, Talks to Teachers, p. 54.
^ Herbartian Psychology, pp. 262-63.
The Critics of Herbartianism
underestimated. Ostermann followed the example of his
master Lotze in attacking Herbart's presentational psychology.
That psychology is probably but an overdone, over-systematised
attempt to explain the fact that ideas or presentations are of
supreme importance for mental life. Now the strange thing is
that some people deny this to be a fact at all.
There are those who tell us that "mere knowledge" is of
small moment ; that the main thing for educationists to look
after is training in good habits, not Teaching or Instruction.
They tell us that we must form in children certain tendencies
rather than confer upon them information. Among those who
adhere to this view are the ecclesiastical and other worthies who
oppose " ethical lessons " on the ground that " virtue cannot be
taught ". To the same group belong advocates of a pre-
dominantly classical education on the ground, not of the know-
ledge it confers, but of the "unrivalled mental gymnastic"
which is provided by construing Homer and composing Latin
verses.^ The same depreciation of knowledge is shown by the
champions of the " heuristic system " of science teaching, who
protest against "lecture methods," and declare that "the great
object in view in education is to develop the power of initiative " P-
The notion is that, provided certain capacities or tendencies
are developed in our pupils, these capacities or tendencies will
be always operative, no matter whether the mind be filled with
mathematical, classical, or other knowledge, or with httle
knowledge of any kind. A man "trained" in the classics is
ready for anything. He is "knowing," even though he may
have little knowledge. He has "Konnen" if not "Kennen".
What are we to say to this ?
There are two opposite dangers to be faced by modern educa-
tionists. One is "didactic materialism" — the view that the
more knowledge we can pile up (never mind how 1) the better.
^"A master's business," says Mr. Benson, "is to try to see that there is
mental effort." " Not a bit of it," replies Sir Oliver Lodge, in the spirit of
a genuine Herbartian, "a master's business is to supply proper pabulum"
{Nineteenth Century, December, 1902).
* Dr. Armstrong's Special Report on the Heuristic Method.
Introduction to the Critics of Herbartianisni 2X
Quantity is here regarded as the main thing. The logical out-
come of this educational poliqy is that habits of initiative, of
independence, and so forth, are not cultivated. Advocates of
" training " rightly protest against this. " Didactic materialism "
is the present-day creed of elementary schools and of all other
schools influenced by the tradition of examinations.
The opposite danger is " didactic formalism " (if the coining
of the phrase may beiallowed). "Smash up the knovsrledge
idol," said Edward Thring, " Create initiative" is the watch-
word of " didactic formalism ".
Now the " Artful Dodger " ^ and many of his fraternity
possessed "initiative " in abundance and yet there was some-
thing seriously deficient in their characters. Waiving the
question of innate criminality (with which the normal teacher
has little to do), may we not say that the defect in the Dodger's
character was that his ideas were wrong ?
On the whole, the tendency — not necessarily the actual
result — of Herbartianism may sometimes be in the direction of
"didactic materialism". If "action springs out of the circle
of thought," vast importance, perhaps exaggerated importance,
will be attached to the conferring of Knowledge. There may
be an undervaluing of " training," of the formation of habit and
of the strenuous sides of character. Herbartianism, we are told,
is hyper-intellectual. It lays too much stress on Instruction.
Such is possibly its occasional tendency. But the Her-
bartians are practical men, and fully alive to the dangers of
their presentational psychology. Thus they wage war against
the purely "narrative" method of teaching, and lay stress
on " developing- presentative Instruction" (entwickelnd-darstel-
lender Unterricht) because of the mental activity this is
supposed to awaken. As shown also in their scheme of
"formal steps," the Herbartians are awake to the problem of
method, and their opposition to the catechetical and memo-
* The example is borrowed from Professor Adams's book, Chapter V. of
which is the best exposure of the " formal education " delusion in our
language.
The Critics of Herbartianism
rising system is another indication that mere quantity has no
attractions for them. Moreover, they are never weary of telling
us that the only legitimate aim of education is the formation of
a strong, moral Will, and that Instruction which fails to build
up such a Will is not educative. Lastly, there is " concentration ".
The conclusion arrived at is that Herbartianism may be a
wholesome corrective to " didactic formalism," a doctrine
which, though less prevalent than that of " didactic ma-
terialism," is every whit as dangerous. There is surely vast
truth in the watchword that "action springs out of the circle
of thought ". Thus one great lesson Herbart has to tell us is
that we cannot dispense with conferring Knowledge. Instruction
is vitally important. However much stress we may rightly
lay on " heuristic " methods and the awakening of mental
activities, we cannot ignore the scientific giving of information.
Man is not always in a pronouncedly conative state, aggressively
striving towards a goal. Mentally as well as physically he
must sometimes passively receive or assimilate. The advocates
of "heuristic" and "gymnastic" methods forget this. Im-
pressed as they are by the great mistake of former generations
of teachers who regarded the minds of the young as so many
tahula rasa, or empty receptacles, the new apostles have swung
to the opposite extreme and would fain make the young into
perpetual motion machines. Such a procedure is grimly de-
scribed by Dorpfeld : " die Schiiler lernen zwar vortrefflich
kauen, aber sie ha ben nichts im Magen ". Which error is the
more serious it is difficult to say. Mental life is rhythmic ; at
one moment it may passively receive, at another it must actively
Herbartianism corrects the error of "didactic formalism ". In
the hands of unskilful teachers it might, perhaps, as already said,
degenerate into a new kind of "didactic materialism," and
indeed Hubatsch^ has boldly avowed that Herbartianism pre-
fers easy subjects to difficult. Some educationists, on the other
hand, will deny that there is any tendency in Herbartianism
I' See pp. l§4 n.
Introduction to the Critics of Herbartianism 23
towards " didactic materialism ". Was not the condemnatory
phrase itself invented by an Herbartian ? Does not methodology
owe much to the Herbartians? Do not the Herbartians lay
enormous or exclusive stress upon character-forming ? Yes, but
with them character-forming has to take place mainly through
Instruction. Herbart had " no conception of Education without
Instruction". This doctrine is, after all, the very essence of
his teaching. If he was wrong here his system was v^rong as
a whole, despite possible excellences of detail. If ideas are not
vitally important then Herbartianism is on the wrong tack.
Connected with the fact of the high place given by Herbartian^
to Instruction is that of their deprecation of the policy of work-
ing merely on the Feelings. Here again Ostermann finds fault
with the reformers, though in reality the practical outcome of
Herbartianism is precisely what Ostermann himself desiderates ;
the Feelings are touched, but via ideas. What Herbart specially
protested against was the direct " swaying of the feelings by
which mothers especially so often beheve they are educating
their children ". Such a procedure, he contended, has little
permanent result. The Feeling comes, and goes again ; the
Character remains untouched. Aim at the circle of thought ;
give ideas, so that, sooner or later, the apperceptive reverber-
ations of these ideas may generate high Feeling — many-sided
Interest. This is the message of the Herbartians. Here
again, surely, they are right, sane, and suggestive. The
utter powerlessness of certain great religious revivals per-
manently to reform the human race is some testimony to the
inadequacy of appeals to pure Feeling. The ebbing tide is with
feeling, the flowing tide is with ideas.
Many other things we owe to Herbart. There are the five
steps of Instruction, called, by Ziller, the " formal steps ". The
bitterest critics of Herbartianism do not deny that here we have
a valuable contribution to educational method. True, we find
the " steps " already suggested by Comenius, but the main
glory of working them out is undoubtedly Herbart's and Ziller's.
Yet to this day, despite their admitted value, they are unknown
in many British training colleges for teachers and misunderstood
24 The Critics of Herbartianism
by expositors.^ For many a decade teachers have been asking
how to draw up notes of lessons. The Herbartians can tell them.
But there are dangers. The formal steps must not be applied
unintelligently to all subjects. They must not always be em-
ployed in the same order. Frequently one or more steps must
be omitted. Still, the first thing necessary is to know them ;
after that, the warnings of Karl Eichter ^ — who, by the bye, is
one of the sanest of the critics of Herbartianism, and fully
recognises the value of this part of the system — ^may well be
attended to.
Then there is the " concentration " ^ doctrine, mainly the
work of Dorpfeld and Ziller, but distinctly foreshadowed in
Herbart's plea for "large unbroken masses of thought". It
is out of such masses, says Herbart, that moral action must
spring. It is by building up such masses that the teacher
will work efifectively on the mind of his pupils. A cmrriculum
consisting of isolated subjects is bound to be not only unwieldy
(" didactic materialism " is a hard master), but also incapable of
arousing Interest. The springs of Apperception are dried up.
There are, it appears on examination, two elements in this
" Concentration " doctrine. First there is the view that know-
ledge should be a whole ; that hard and fast lines of distinction
between one subject and another should be removed ; that one
subject should throw hght upon another. This doctrine may
be called that of " unification ". Slowly it is working its way
into British schools. The walls erected between history and
geography, between arithmetic, algebra, and geometry are being
broken down. Even writers who do not claim to be Herbartians
are moving towards this standpoint. Dr. Armstrong urges us
to " cease to be slaves to a rigid time-table, at least in the earlier
years of school life," and rather, at each stage, " to do incidentally
what is necessary " for the matter in hand."* Only in this way
1 See p. 97. 2 See pp. 125 fE.
' The non-Herbartian reader must be warned that this does not exactly
refer to " concentration of mind ". See what follows.
* Article on " Science in Education " in National Education (Murray),
p. 119.
Introduction to the Critics of Herbartianism 25
can real interest be aroused. When, in the course of a history
lesson, the name of a place is mentioned, the map must be
immediately consulted. The history teacher must not say,
"Geography is outside my province". The teaching of such
subjects as these must be — let us admit the fact boldly —
more diffuse and rambling.
It is striking how from various unexpected quarters comes
testimony to the need of this unification or concentration doc-
trine. The recent famous report on the education of army
officers declared that " military topography is treated too much
as if it was a subject by itself, unconnected with tactics ".
From writers on Sunday Schools comes advice that maps and
geography should be more extensively made use of in teaching
the Bible — very necessary advice and disgracefully belated. ^ We
are, in truth, constantly drawing lines and erecting barriers where
none should exist. Subjects like history, geography, languages,
biblical literature, and so forth, are so mutually connected that,
though each lesson may suitably bear a special name, it shoiild
yet make use of whatever pertinent information can be obtained
from the other subjects. Thus, though the time-table need not
perhaps be abolished, it should be obeyed in no slavish spirit ;
and the person who draws it up should take care that the
various related subjects fit into each other so far as possible. It
is absurd to teach the geography of China alongside of the
history of Alfred.
But there is another element in the concentration doctrine
which is of more dubious value. Ziller, as is well known,
placed at the very centre of his curriculum " character-forming
Instruction". Everything else had to be fastened on to this.
Simple arithmetical exercises had to be set on a basis of
Grimm's fairy tales and the life of Abraham. The history of
the patriarchs had to be used for teaching the geography of the
East. Possibly such a plan involved an unjust treatment of all
subjects except the favoured one at the centre ; and even the
supposed advantage of the plan — that all the thoughts of the
^ See the writer's Stvdent's Herbart for further information as to the
progress of the " concentration " principle.
26 The Critics of Herbartianism
pupil would gather round aaid be connected with the " character-
forming material " — was an illusory advantage. Fortunately,
Ziller and most of his followers were early convinced, as a
result of the criticisms directed against them, that their plan in
the above crude form was unworkable. More " centres " than
one were admitted to be necessary, and the claims of important
subjects like science for a respectful treatment could not be
resisted. Dorpfeld, a safer and saner guide than Ziller, placed
ihreR great knowledge-departments at the " centre," those which
dealt with God, with man, and with nature ; to these three had
to be subordinated or connected (1) the "formal" studies like
mathematics and (2) the dexterities. The knowledge-depart-
ments had, likewise, to support each other.
As a residuum from the exaggerated "concentration" doctrine
of Ziller we find left to us : (1) that all subjects which really
and naturally throw light upon each other should be allowed to
do so ; no artificial walls of separation between subjects should
be permitted ; (2) that character-forming Instruction should
have a place of great honour in the curriculum in virtue of its
enormous importance; (3) that possibly "formal" studies and
dexterities should, as Dorpfeld and Dr. Findlay suggest, be made
to follow the fortunes of the " knowledge-departments " rather
than be pursued in isolation ; thus, at any rate, in primary schools.
The various criticisms which have been directed against the
usual form of the " concentration " doctrine will be found on a
perusal of the argument of Bartels.
Then there is the " culture stages doctrine " — faintly fore-
shadowed by Herbaxt, and applied logically, though only in
part successfully, by Ziller. Here again criticisms have been
copious and severe. The doctrine in its abstract form is un-
doubtedly based on a certain amount of truth, though Dr.
SaUwiirk and others have raised some weighty objections.
The child does perhaps tend to reproduce the history of the
race, and educationists should, if possible, try to adapt their
instruction to the different stages of child-development. ^ But
^ Certain authors oan only be appreciated by persons of a certain age.
Boys of twelve love Marryatt and Ballantyne. Shakespeare's works do not
Introduction to the Critics of Herbartianism 27
no one will admit that Ziller's proposals are entirely satisfactory,
though a few of them may represent an approximation to what
is advisable. The " fairy-tale " proposal for the first school-
year is easily justified. The child at this stage is scarcely
yet a human being ; its moral judgments are poor and fleeting.
The moral Hfe rests so largely on ideas, on imagination, on the
circle of thought, that the best way to support this life in its
earliest beginnings may be to feed the fancy rather than to
stimulate artificially the nascent moral sense. Unfortunately
many of the Zillerians have been unfaithful to this valuable
part of their own doctrine, and have tried to use the fairy-tales
for directly moral purposes, an attempt which critics have rightly
ridiculed.
Again, Ziller's startling proposal to postpone the life of Christ
to the end of the school course, though violently attacked by
Lutherans, is slowly coming to be recognised as justified.
When we find American Doctors of Divinity declaring that
" the child has to repeat a great many pre-Christian stages of
evolution in its own life " because " Christianity came late in
the history of the world"; and when we find them saying
that we must " bring the stress of teaching Christianity, from
the New Testament, a little later than we put it," ^ are we not
bound to admit that perhaps Ziller was, after all, no mere
pedant, but a man with true scientific insight ?
The Eobinson Crusoe proposal is of more doubtful value as
a part of the culture-stages scheme, though the pedagogical
capacities of the story are undoubted ; but the general plan upon
which Ziller has worked out his scheme is valid — that, if the
Bible be retained at all, the child must work through it in
chronological order,^ not dart in and out among the books, and
appeal viery much to the young, and it is doubtful whether, to any great
extent, they should be employed in schools. No young person can appreciate
Thackeray. Facts like these are inadequately recognised.
1 See below, p. 71.
2 This does not mean necessarily to follow the order of the books. See the
writer's Reform of Moral and Biblical Edvfiation for a scheme essentially
Zilleriau at basis.
28 The Critics of Herbartianism
study simultaneously scraps from Samuel, Genesis, Isaiah, etc.
The same remark also applies to the teaching of " secular
history ". On this question our school- managers and teachers
would profitably study Miss Dodd's book The Herbartian
Principles of Teaching.^
Still, when all the merits and all the suggestiveness of the
labours of Herbart and Ziller have been admitted, the critics
remain undaimted. They insist that the underlying psychology
is wrong. It is easy, for example, to ridicule the presentation-
mechanism of Herbart. It is easy to cry aloud for a soul before
whom presentations can appear ; to cry aloud for self-activity, for
a creative principle. These demands can, possibly, be justified
on metaphysical grounds. But for the educator the Herbartian
conception is, far and away, the safer. Assuming that the
creative, free-will, or self-activity principle is metaphysically
justifiable, is it worth anything educationally ? Is it amenable
to systematic guidance ? Examination will show that it has
no existence apart from presentations, though it is probably
not resolvable into these, as Herbart thinks. Now presen-
tations are amenable to systematic control, and though they
are not such well-nigh self-existent entities as Herbartianism
represents them, they are, in a measure, capable of being
treated as such. They have number, intensity, quahty, and
so forth : to some extent, moreover, they appear as mechanical
forces in mutual interaction. For these and other reasons they
are capable of a systematic treatment of which the self-activity
principle, however essential to a complete view of mental life,
is not capable. In fact the educator must, in large measure,
view his pupil as a presentation-mechanism and nothing else.
The pupil may have a soul, and free-will, and transcendent
faculties of all kinds, but it is certain that these faculties have
neither existence nor significance apart from presentations.
Whether Presentationalism has a future before it or not as
psychology or philosophy — it has many supporters and theh-
number is not, perhaps, decreasing — it will probably always
' Sounenschein,
Introduction to the Critics of Herbartianism 29
maintain its place as a valuable working-hypothesis for practical
teachers.
"But," it may be objected, " your presentations are no good
unless they touch and rouse some innate tendencies in the
pupil's soul. Apart from a latent or patent impulse, your
presentations are, to use a homely illustration, ' so much water
on the duck's back'." The writer was once discussing the
Herbartian doctrine of Interest with a highly intelligent man,
gifted, one would think, to an unusual degree with the power
of rousing " interest ". " There is my son," he said, " without
interest in anything. There is my daughter, keenly intelligent.
Approximately they have received the same ' presentations '.
Yet the one feels a keen interest in all speculative questions,
the other feels none." An example like this reveals the weak-
ness of Presentationalism as a completely interpretative system
of philosophy, but does not subvert its enormous value for
educational purposes. What answer is to be made to the
objection just cited? Simply this, that innate faculties are
beyond the reach of all educational systems — not merely of
Herbartianism ; ^ but that, given these innate faculties in what-
ever degree, Herbartianism draws them forth and exercises
them as no other system does or can.^
This, then, is the answer to the group of objections which
come, strangely enough, from two very opposed schools. The
physiologist or the materialist, with his emphasis on brain-
traces and heredity, pours contempt upon Herbart's presenta-
tion-mechanism, and avows that it cannot explain the simplest
cases of instinctive action. The idealist, with his emphasis on
self-consciousness, self- activity, freedom, and so forth, claims
that the presentation-mechanism cannot explain these essential
facts. Each contention may be admitted. But the Herbartian
1 " Doch ist kein Zweifel dass der Erzieher lieber seine Macht auf den
Zogling liber- als unterschatzen mochte." Rein, Padagogik im Grund-
riss, p. 76.
^ Many, as we have seen, would deny this, and claim that Herbartianism
is destructive of initiative.
30 The Critics of Herbartianism
may answer, " The teacher cannot manufacture heredity or make
a clean sweep of brain-traces ; he has no recipe for creating
self-consciousness, no text-book for freedom of will. But he has
the power of giving presentations, and this is his work." The
other factors, as being incalculable or inevitable, he is bound, in
some measure, to neglect. The gardener assumes that his seeds
contain the vital principle — a principle beyond his power of pro-
duction ; his work is to give soil and nourishment. He is not
disturbed by the objection that all his efforts can neither create
a seed nor cause one species to change into another. He answers
that upon him rest the alternatives of life or of death for the
seeds committed to his care.
Educational schools which lay too much stress upon the inner
principle inevitably relapse into vagueness. Frobel is no match
for Herbart ; Natorp's criticism of Herbartianism may or may
not be metaphysically sound, educationally it is, as a whole,
worthless. Let us, if we choose, endow the Will with all kinds
of mysterious potentialities instead of regarding it, with Herbart,
as generated out of the movement of presentations. What
then ? Is our educational system revolutionised a single whit ?
Is the importance of presentations diminished ? Fliigel's ^
answer to Natorp seems here quite conclusive : " Man sehe den
Willen als ein urspriingliches Strebevermogen an. Die Stellung
der Piidagogik bleibt voUkommen dieselbe. Der Wille sei ein
allgemeines Strebevermogen ohne alle Vorstellungen. Als
solches ist er zunachst schlafend, unwirksam, blinder Trieb oder
wie man sich ausdriicken will, jedenfalls muss die schlummernde
Kraft geweckt, ausgelost werden. Wodurch geschieht dies?
Ohne jede Einwirkung wiirde sich kein Mensch zu einem
denkenden, fiihlenden, woUenden Geschopf entwickeln. Es
miissen also Einwirkungen von aussen kommen. Von seiten
der Natur und der Menschen geht dieser Einfluss aus, und er
besteht allgemein gesprochen in Vorstellungen." It matters
not for educational purposes whether we regard the Will, apart
from presentations, as sleeping or as non-existent. Ultimately,
1 Zeitsehrift fUr Philosophie und PMagogik, 1899, p. 273.
Introduction to the Critics of Herbartianism 3 1
no doubt, there is an important and fundamental difference
between the two interpretations, but for the educationist the
difference is practically negligible. In other words, Herbart's
psychology may be incorrectly based, yet for the teacher it may
be the best psychology in existence. Natorp ^ ridicules the notion
that Herbart's educational system can be accepted as approxi-
mately valid, while at the same time its supposed metaphysical
and psychological foundations are to be rejected. Surely he
might have remembered the case of astronomical science, many
of the practical applications of which involve a use of the Ptole-
maic terminology and conceptions as these are found more con-
venient than the Copemican.^
But need one be so apologetic for the supposed foundations
of Herbart's system ? Certainly it is no time to dogmatise in
psychological matters, but Presentationalism — in the persons of
Miinsterberg and others — is sufficiently alive to demand re-
spectful attention. Many of the phenomena of hypnotism and
mental disease, phenomena such as " fixed ideas," and so forth,
immediately suggest Herbart's scheme. ^ No doubt Natorp
would reply that in these very cases self-consciousness is at a
minimum, and that such cases are, for that reason, not typical.
He is right ; but until he has discovered the laws in accordance
with which self-consciousness can be trained apart from presenta-
tions, his observation is of little educational value. And, be it
remembered, the Herbartian principles of education were, after
all, never deduced from the doctrine of the presentation- mecha-
nism. Critics who forget this merely tilt at windmills.
A similar answer can be made to critics of another stamp.
Just as Natorp entered the field as champion of the Will against
Herbartian Presentationalism, so Ostermann has appeared
^ Herbart, Pestalozzi und die heutigen Aufgaben der Erziehungslehre,
p. 3.
^"Auch aus falschen Voraussetzungen lassen sich mitunter richtige
Ergebnisse ableiten," admits one of Herbart's critics. Ostermann, Die
hauptsdchlicfisten Irrtilmer der Herbartschen Psychologie, p. 37.
2 See the remarks of various modern psychologists on the " tendency of
ideas to act themselves out," e.g., Stout, Manual, p. 468, 1st edition.
32 The Critics of Herbartianism
championing, as we have seen, the cause of Feeling. Feeling,
he protests, cannot be resolved into presentations or into any
combination or co-operation of presentations. However closely
connected it may be with these latter, it has peculiar properties
and hence demands peculiar treatment. " Wohl sind die Gefiihle
mit den Vorstellungen eng verkniipft, aber sie sind darum keine
blossen Zustandsweisen derselben, sondern stehen neben ihnen
als selbstandige geistige Vorgange und als ureigne Zustande der
Seele selbst."^ He therefore urges the importance of direct
appeals to the feehngs 'per se through the medium of stirring
stories — a recommendation which, curiously enough, brings
us close up to the proposals of the Herbartians; witness
the doctrine of Gesinnungs-unterricht. Here, as in so
many other points, they have had a fine sense for what
is genuinely important and educative. Their presentation-
mechanism may be a fiction, but it has shown itself an inno-
cent and usefvJ one. A feeling may not be a presentation or
purely the result of presentations, yet it is closely connected
with them (as Ostermann admits in the above quotation), and
hence the Herbartian emphasis on these latter does not in
practice lead astray. It may not be true that " all influence
on the feelings must take place through the circle of thought,"
but any error here involved is more than counterbalanced by
the priceless element of truth,
Herbart's ethics has been criticised even more severely than
his psychology. There seems at first sight an artificiality
appertaining to the " five moral ideas " as great as that which
attaches to the presentation-mechanism. Why five ideas ?
Is this unity? Why accept the five blindly as immediate
intuitions ? Why not find some common basis for them all ?
These questions are pertinent, but the answer to them is that
philosophers have for centuries been trying to unify ethics and
have failed. One portion of the moral notions of man may be
satisfactorily " reduced to lower terms," but another invariably
^ Die hauptsHchlichsten IrrtUmer der Herbartschen Psychologic und ihre
P&dagogischen Konsequenzen, p. 239.
Introduction to the Critics of Herbartianism 33
escapes such reduction. Individual Perfection is one moral
end ; social Justice is another with equally urgent claims, and
it passes the ingenuity of philosophers to base them upon a
common ground. Intuitionism has vitality yet, and Herbart's
ethics with its five moral ideas intuitionally apprehended is at
the present moment as logically defensible as any other system.
One of the most searching of English investigations into ethical
problems has resulted in a return to a purified Intuitionism
in which the ideas of Equity and Benevolence hold a prominent
place, in which the notion (though not necessarily the fact) of
Freedom is regarded as essential to the moral life, and in which
the notion of Perfection cannot be got rid of except by a
desperate effort .^ Here are four ideas, superficially at least
similar to four of Herbart's, yet arrived at in a way altogether
different from his.
"We may probably say with considerable truth that when the
student of education first dips into Herbartianism he is entranced
with the thoroughness and logical connectedness of the system.
Then comes a period of reaction and distrust ; he finds, as he
thinks, that it commits him to fatalism, that personality vanishes,
that a consistent Herbartian is cousin to a materialist. Then
on deeper study he begins to see the astonishing — almost
miraculous — adaptedness of this system for educational pur-
poses and for social reform ; he begins to see that though its
metaphysical basis may be false, and even its psychology de-
ficient in its neglect or misinterpretation of the consciousness-
factor, yet those aspects in which the system is strong are
precisely those which touch upon the work of the teacher. 2 The
student can, if he choose, supply the supposed deficiencies of
Herbartianism by adding correlative spiritual factors ; his mind
will then be at rest, and he can, with a clear conscientse, call
himself a reformed Herbartian. But probably the best features
of his work as educationist will spring out of the original Her-
^ Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics.
^" Herbartianism has its weaknesses, yet it seems to me the best system
for application to education." Professor Adams, Herbartian Psychology,
p. 14.
3
34 The Critics of Herbariianism
bartian contribution — the notion of the presentation-mechanism
and of its intimate connection with volition.
The primary design of the present work is not to give an
exposition of Herbart's principles. The English reader has
now ample opportunities for becoming acquainted with those
principles, and if, in addition, he can read German, he will find
Herbart's own works comparatively easy, once he has acquired
some familiarity with the leading thoughts and the technical
expressions. There are, of course, later developments of Her-
bartianism, and some of these are now available in an EngHsh
form.i
If any one unacquainted with Herbartianism should take up
this book with the desire of mastering the details of that system,
he will thus, in some measure, be disappointed. The design of
the work is to indicate the nature of the present-day educational
controversies over Herbartianism, and in this way to pave the
way to an impartial judgment upon the questions at stake.
A word or two as to the " critics ".
The sections on Wesendonck, Bartels, Hubatsch, and Chris-
tinger deal largely with Ziller. On the other hand the attack
of Dittes was directed exclusively against Herbart. Because of
its importance it has been given in some fulness, and a con-
siderable number of footnotes have been added in order to
ensure that both sides of the question may be known.
The Eichter section deals fully with the "formal steps";
Bergemann is suggestive on the " culture steps " ; while Linde
deals well with the question of " developing presentative
Instruction ".
The attack of Hubatsch is often fresh and forcible, as when
he accuses Herbartians of preferring easy subjects to hard.
Natorp is treated somewhat fully, mainly because of the recency
of the attack and because the Herbartians have oflQcially replied
to him at considerable length. But Natorp's treatise is mainly
philosophical and does not deal with practical problems or, to
any great extent, with Ziller. Ostermann's psychological criti-
^ E.g., Rein's Outlines of Pedagogy.
Introduction to the Critics of Herbartianism 35
cism, owing to the nature of the case and to the condensation
rendered necessary, will probably be found hard ; so also will
Vogel's. Sallwiirk subjects the doctrine of " culture stages "
to a thorough investigation ; Drews deals with Ziller's peculiar
prejudice against questioning (in a few matters Ziller was
distinctly a reactionary) ; while Kunz discusses Herbartianism
from the standpoint of a Eoman Catholic. There are, by the
bye, plenty of other "critics" awaiting exposition — if the task
is worth anyone's performance.
One really great name has been omitted from the list —
that of Dorpfeld. But Dorpfeld himself was an Herbartian,
and though he freely criticised some of Ziller's proposals it
would be misleading to enrol him formally among the critics of
Herbartianism. From one point of view he may be regarded
as its greatest exponent. Moreover if Dorpfeld were dealt with
at all he ought to be dealt with in great fulness. It is only be-
cause, in most English expositions, Zillerianism is identified
with Herbartianism, that there is any temptation whatever to
deal with him as a " critic ".
PART II.
HISTOEICAL SUEVEY.
1. Herbart (1776-1841).
Herbart was a contemporary of Frobel (1783-1852), and a
younger contemporary of Niemeyer (1754-1828), and Pestalozzi
(1746-1827).
The name of Pestalozzi is so well-known in Britain that there
is little need to enter here into an account of the various weighty
reforms of educational method for which we have to thank the
great Swiss philanthropist. Still less need is there to go further
back and trace the connection between Herbart and Eousseau
vid Pestalozzi. The connection has much historical interest ;
but, pedagogicaUy, Herbart's ideas are remote from those of
Eousseau, and show such wide divergences even from those of
Pestalozzi himself ^ that educationists are to some extent divided
on the question whether Herbart was in any sense whatever
faithful to the Pestalozzian tradition. The truth appears to be
that the significance of Pestalozzi lies less in the concrete
achievements of his life (though these were important and
valuable) than in the stimulus and the idealism which he im-
parted to other thinkers. Frobel and Herbart both came into
contact with him (Frobel, 1807-9, Herbart, 1799), and upon
both of them his Anschauung^ doctrine had effect, giving
^ For example, Pestalozzi's work was lamentably weak on the side of
history, whereas history is all-important in the Herbartian system.
^ It is useless to try to translate this word ; accordingly it will be used,
in the present work, as it stands. " Sense Experience," " Intuition,"
" Observation," are all sorry translations.
Historical Survey 37
rise to the Kindergarten system and to the " Apperception "
doctrine.
The name of Niemeyer is unknown in England, but the
influence of this writei* upon Herbart was apparently consider-
able. It was his Principles of Edtication and Instrtiction^ upon
which Herbart, when professor at Konigsberg and Gottingen,
based his pedagogical lectures, and to which frequent references
are made in his works.
It was an age of great names. Besides Frobel, Herbart had
for contemporaries the idealistic thinkers Schelling and Hegel.
As an older contemporary there was, as we have seen, Pesta-
lozzi ; there were also Kant and Fichte. In England, Lancaster
and Bell ^ were working ; Arnold was born in 1795 ; Jacotot in
1770.
Herbart himself was bom in 1776 at Oldenburg. He early
showed signs of promise, and in 1794 entered the University at
Jena, a town destined to become in later years one of the three
chief centres of the educational propaganda associated with his
name. Here he came, via Fichte, under the influence of the
then predominant Kantian philosophy ; we must probably trace
to this source his emphasis upon the moral end of education,
an emphasis which his followers have even increased. From
1797 to 1799 Herbart was in Switzerland as private tutor to
the thi-ee sons of Herr von Steiger, and the letters he despatched
relative to the progress of these boys throw much light upon
the growth of his ideas. In 1799 he met Pestalozzi at Burgdorf,
and in the same year he was to be found at Bremen as student
of philosophy. Three years later, having taken his doctor's
degree, he began at Gottingen to lecture and write on Philosophy
and Education. A little earlier he had written (1801) Ideas on
a Pedagogical Plan of Teaching for Higher Classes, and now,
located at Gottingen, he began seriously to devote himself to
working out an educational system. In 1802 appeared certain
^ Niemeyer was Chancellor of Halle University. In 1836 his book
attained its ninth edition.
2 To hear of Bell among " great " men sounds strange. But some nations
have to be thankful for small mercies.
38 The Critics of Herbattianisftt
works whose titles suggest at once his interest in the life-task
of Pestalozzi : U-pon Pestalozzi's Newest Work ; How Gertrude
Teaches her Children; and Pestalozzi's Idea of an A B C of
Anschauung. In 1804 appeared his Esthetic Revelation of the
World as the Chief Work of Education, and still another
brochure dealing with Pestalozzi. Two years later he came
before the world as author of an educational masterpiece,
General Pedagogy, deduced from the Purpose of Edu^ation.^
Here he appeared as an independent thinker, and no longer in
obvious relation to Pestalozzi. Works on logic, metaphysics,
and moral philosophy also came from his pen. It is clear, from
the foregoing sketch, that Herbart's interests were primarily
educational and only secondarily philosophical. His educa-
tional system was no deduction, as many people suppose, from
a pre-arranged and artificial philosophical system ; his philo-
sophical system was rather an artificial structure thrown around
or placed beneath his educational system. He was not, like
Kant, philosopher first and educationist afterwards ; education
was his first and his last interest. He worked at psychology
and philosophy partly (perhaps mainly) in order to gain a
foundation for his pedagogical ideas.
In 1809 his fame was such as to cause him to be summoned
to the most distinguished philosophic chair in Germany, that
which had been occupied only a few years before by Immanuel
Kant. In 1810 Herbart ventured on the founding at Konigsberg
of a College or Seminar for the training of teachers, an estab-
lishment which, though not numerically strong, and though
fated to come to an end when Herbart left for Gottingen, was
full of significance for the future.^ During the Konigsberg
period Herbart published various works on philosophy, psy-
chology, and metaphysics. In 1833 he went back to Gottingen
and taught again with success and considerable fame. In 1835
appeared his Outline of Pedagogical Lectures, in some respects
^ Referred to as Science of Education by Mr. and Mrs. Felkin.
* As we shall see, Stoy and Ziller both founded " Semmars " on Herbart's
plan.
Historical Survey 39
a more important work than the General Pedagogy because
representing more mature views. In 1841 he died, and with
him Herbartianism seemed, for the time, to have died also.
For the remarkable feature about this system is that at
Herbart's death it possessed but little authority and few ad-
herents, whereas thirty or forty years later it had risen to a
commanding position, and was claiming the allegiance of hun-
dreds if not of thousands of German teachers. This resuscitation
was the work mainly of three men, Stoy, Dorpfeld, and Ziller.
But before an account of the labours of these giants can be
thoroughly intelligible, the leading Herbartian doctrines must
be known in outline, and in the form which they had taken
at the death of Herbart. The term " Herbartianism " covers a
wide field of thought, and we must distinguish the contributions
of the founder from those of his followers.
2. Outline of Herbart's Doctrines.
(1) Most fundamental is Herbart's view that " Character " is
the end of true Education. " Ethics gives the goal," and ethics,
of course, is the science of Morality or Character. Whatever
does not contribute to the moral life is not true Education.
[Needless to say, this view has met with abundant opposition.
Many teachers and writers claim that Education has several
goals — Morality, Knowledge, Skill, etc. — and urge that these
cannot be reduced to one. But the most characteristic feature
of Herbartianism is the denial of any ultimate multiplicity.]
(2) Character, then, is the end, goal, or purpose of Education.
But how is the goal to be reached? " Ethics gives the goal,
psychology gives the means." Hence teachers must know
psychology or mental science.
(3) But z^/iic/i psychology ? "Herbart's ; and the characteris-
tics of this psychology are that the soul has no * faculties *
in the ordinary sense, no semi-independent powers of Will,
Feeling, Memory, etc. ; that it is quite empty but for ' presenta-
tions ' or ideas ; that the whole life of the soul consists in the
rise, fall, and mutual action of these units. Even Will is only
a phase in the movement of presentations."
40 The Critics of Herbartianism
[But what about heredity? Here, perhaps, is the weakest
side of Herbart's psychology. It cannot be said that he denies
organic facts hke heredity and variation ; he admits that the
soul, on becoming united with a bodily organism, receives a
special individuality, bent, or direction. But the tendency of
Herbartianism, and indeed of most educational systems, is to
minimise these facts. And such is natural. An educator cannot
influence heredity ; he must take children as he finds them.
Herbart's psychology was, in part at least, elaborated for peda-
gogical purposes, and thus laid more stress upon environment
and Education than upon such elements as heredity and varia-
tion, which, unhke " presentations," are quite beyond the power
of the teacher.^] *
(4) Since, in accordance with (3), presentations are of supreme
importance, and all action " springs out of the circle of thought "
(i.e., out of presentations), the great task of the educator must
be to form aright this thought-circle. This is the work of
" Instruction ".^ " Education," ^ which is [see (1)] the forming
of a good Will or good Character, must rest mainly or entirely *
upon Instruction, the forming or culture ^ of the circle of thought.
[This emphasis on Instruction is another characteristic of
Herbartianism. Opponents have not been remiss in criticising
this doctrine ; but it has great pedagogical importance.]
(5) Though " the one and the whole work of Education may
be summed up in the concept ' Morahty,' " yet there is another
concept of almost equally fundamental importance, that of
" balanced, many-sided Interest ". If the pupil has attained
to this, ipso facto he has advanced a long way towards Virtue
or Morality. Many-sided Interest is of enormous moral value,
guiding the hfe, keeping from evil, building Character. " If
intellectual interests are wanting, if the store of thought be
^ Cf. Locke, Thcmghts Concemhig Ediccation, § 1. " Of all the men we
meet with, nine parts of ten are what they are, good or evil, useful or not, by
their Education."
2 Unterricht. ' Erziehwiig.
* These alternatives stand for one of the ambiguities of Herbartianism.
' Bildwi^.
Historical Survey 41
meagre, the ground lies empty for the animal desires. . . .
Stupid people cannot be virtuous." Thus it matters com-
paratively little which of the two goals (Morality or Interest)
we regard as the teacher's. Interest may be classified as
empirical, speculative, aesthetic, sympathetic, social, and re-
ligious.
[Here again opponents, especially Catholics and strong
Lutherans, have objected. They have claimed that between
" Virtue " and " many-sided Interest " there is not necessarily
any close connection. But the doctrine is characteristic of
Herbartianism.]
(6) This " many-sided Interest," which is of such supreme
educational importance, depends upon the relation of new
presentations to old. An absolutely unfamiliar object or event
has no "Interest" for us; hence the teacher's task must be
so to arrange his teaching-material that all new matter may
be brought into relation to the previous acquisitions of the
child. The new must be " apperceived " (grasped, interpreted,
assimilated) by the old. Apperception is the process by which
individual ideas are brought into relation to our previous ex-
perience, are assimilated with it, receive meaning from it, and
are thus raised to a position of significance.
[Herbart here amplifies the Anschauung doctrine of Pestalozzi
by showing that new things must not only be presented in con-
crete forms, but also be seized hold of by the previous knowledge
of the pupil. One probable result of this doctrine is the eleva-
tion of those subjects that confer ideas to a chief place in the
cmTiculum ; for Apperception, and therefore Interest, depend
on ideas.]
(7) In working out this doctrine of Interest and Apperception
Herbart arrived at his doctrine of the "formal steps" of
Instruction. This doctrine solves, in large measure, the vexed
question, " How to draw up notes of lessons ". The steps are,
according to Herbart,^ (a) Clearness (the analysis of previous
1 Later Herbartians have greatly improved Herbart's terminology, and
have divided his first step into two. But they have not essentially altered
his doctrine.
42 The Critics of Herbartianism
notions and the addition of the new matter) ; (6) Association ;
(c) System ; (d) Method. At the second stage ^ (Association)
similar phenomena are brought together, compared, and con-
trasted ; at the third, generaUsed notions are attained ; at the
last practical appHcations are made.
[The "formal steps" admittedly constitute one of the most
valuable portions of Herbartian pedagogical doctrine.]
(8) Though "Instruction" is the main work of Education
(inasmuch as " action springs out of the circle of thought "), yet
Herbart admits (inconsistently?) the necessity for two other
tasks. These are " Government "or " Discipline," and " Train-
ing ".2 The former aims at the preservation of external order in
the school; though it is a necessity, it is devoid of direct
character-forming significance and Herbart therefore hesitates
to include it under Education proper. "Training" includes
various processes {e.g., certain punishments) which cannot be
regarded as falUng under " Instruction" and which are yet of
some importance for Character.
The tasks of the teacher are thus Instruction, Training, and
Disciphne.
(9) A word must be said with regard to Herbart's ethical
doctrines which were of an intuitional nature. There are, he
held, five moral notions which we intuitionally recognise as
worthy of approval. These are Inner Freedom, Perfection,^
Benevolence, Right (or Justice), and Equity (or Fairness). The
first of these is almost the same as Conscientiousness, the har-
mony of one's Will with one's Moral Insight. The second is of
special significance to the educator, inasmuch as it is closely
related to the doctrine of " balanced, many-sided Interest ". The
^ Third stage with Ziller.
2 Mr. and Mrs. Felkin translate Regierung as "Government" and Zucht
as " Discipline ". But Regierung really stands for what most English
teachers would call " Discipline," while Zticht may be very roughly trans-
lated "moral Training" or "Training". In this book Van Liew will be
followed ; he constantly represents Regierung by " Discipline " and Zucht
by " Training ".
*Not "perfection" in the usual vague idealistic sense. It represents
efficiency and breadth of Will.
Historical Survey 4^
" second idea " really puts in a claim for culture, breadth of out-
look, strength of mind, etc., as "moral" qualities. The re-
maining three ideas are somewhat, though by no means exactly,
congruent with popular notions. The five ideas are independent
of each other and cannot be further reduced or simplified. On
no account, says Herbart, are we to try to represent morahty as
a calculation of consequences such as pleasure or pain.
3. The Bevival of Herbartianism. — Volkmar Stoy (1815-85).
Though Herbart's educational labours had not passed without
recognition during his lifetime, there seemed no likelihood, in
the year of his death (1841), that his system would ever attain a
commanding position. True, his general philosophy had won
the approval of a circle of thinkers whose aversion to Hegel had
predisposed them to a " reaUstic " system. Among the philo-
sophical followers of Herbart were Drobisch, Striimpell,
Lazarus, Steinthal, Nahlowsky, Waitz, Volkmann, and Gor-
neHus, from whom have come various weighty contributions to
philosophy, more especially to the psychology of language and
of the feelings. But Herbart's pedagogical efforts seemed to
have borne but little fruit. Mager, in the pages of the Pada-
gogische Bevue, and in an important work on the teaching of
languages, was one of the few who, during the decade which
followed 1841, kept alive the memory of the master's educational
labours. But Mager laid down his pen at forty. Waitz, too,
who had contributed substantially to educational theory, and
had, among other things, anticipated Ziller's approval of " fairy
tales," died comparatively young. Herbart's General Pedagogy
remained a first-edition book.
Why this neglect? Partly, perhaps, because Herbart's edu-
cational system belonged, or seemed to belong, to a great philo-
sophical scheme, and at that time there was less desire for such
a system than for plain, matter-of-fact, unphilosophical advice,
for " common sense in Education ". Previous to the Napoleonic
wars Education in Germany had been making great strides ; but
it was seriously affected by the reaction which followed. " Ee-
Ugious Instruction " monopolised, in some parts of Germany
44 The Critics of Herbartianism
the largest space in the curriculum, and interest in educational
principles 'per se seems to have flagged to a considerable extent.
Not wholly, for the German mind even in its most unphilo-
sophical periods cannot brook an entire separation from its
favourite pursuits, and thus a barren empiricism, such as we in
Britain love and pride ourselves upon, was never quite possible
in Germany. But there is clear evidence that the days of the
Holy Alliance, of Louis Philippe, and of '48 were not days of
energetic educational thought.
Moreover we must remember that Herbart's somewhat tech-
nical terminology may have been a drawback to the popularity
of his system.
But the revival of Herbartianism came at length, and had its
seat at Jena.
Karl Volkmar Stoy was born at Pegau in Saxony, 1815.
After studying at Leipzig and Gottingen, he became, in 1839, a
teacher at Weinheim, and four years later was made " privat-
docent" in philosophy and pedagogy at Jena. In this Univer-
sity he deUvered, for many years, the lectures on Education
which ultimately made his name, and that of his master Her-
bart, famous throughout Europe. Students visited Jena from
all parts of the world, even America sending its contingent.
But Stoy saw that, in order to effect permanent results, some
facihties for practical teaching would have to be offered to the
students of Education who had gathered around him. Accord-
ingly a pedagogical society, at first consisting of eleven members,
was formed, and this ultimately grew into a "Seminar" with
school attached. Here lessons were given, criticisms proffered,
and conferences held.
Stoy was more than an educationist ; he was a warm-hearted
philanthropist as \vell. His sympathies for the indigent of
Jena were so keen that, partly out of his own resources, he
founded and equipped a schoolhouse for poor children. Fruit
culture, gardening, etc., were undertaken ; excursions organised ;
gratuitous instruction given. Stoy was a " second Pestalozzi ".
But, hke Pestalozzi, he was not to hve without being the
object of criticism. Although in 1845 he had become Professor
Historical Survey 45
at Jena, and in 1857 had received the honourable title of
" Schulrath " in recognition of his many services, yet in 1866
he felt called upon to remove to Heidelberg, annoyed at certain
attacks which had been made upon his Seminar. This latter
institution, like that which Herbart had founded at Konigsberg,
fell to pieces when the master's hand was withdrawn. But in
1874 he was recalled to his old sphere of labour, and his return
was the signal for a certain revival in the success of his Seminar.
During the closing years of his life he came to be recognised
more definitely than ever as one of the leading exponents of
educational Herbartianism. He died in 1885.
He and his followers had taken up a position of friendly but
not slavish adherence to Herbart's doctrines. They often
objected to their master's somewhat obscure and technical
terminology. The "Interest" doctrine — worked out by the
Zillerians ^ into a veritable gospel — occupied a more modest
place in the programme of the Stoy-Herbartians, and appeared
in the form of a doctrine of " elaboration of the thought circle,"
quite Herbartian in its way, but not daringly ambitious or
propagandist. Even the " formal steps " doctrine was freely
criticised ; not because the followers of Stoy denied its value,
but because they feared it would become a fetish, and check all
freedom and spontaneity in lesson- giving."^ They laid much
stress upon the personality of the teacher, and also upon so
treating or " concentrating " the material of Instruction that
related elements might be brought together, and thus time
and power be saved by making use of psychological laws of
" similarity," etc. But Stoy and his followers rejected the
"concentration"^ doctrine in Ziller's form, and likewise the
fabric of Gesinnungs-unterricht,"* historical " culture-stages,"
and so forth. " The notion of ' concentration,' " Stoy said, " has
1 See p. 56.
A fear justified by the action of many young and enthusiastic Her-
bartians.
'^ See below, p. 54.
^"Character-forming Instruction" — a technical Zillerian term. See
note, p. 53.
46 The Critics of Herbartianism
been taken possession of by the forces of superficiality." "What
is new in Ziller's proposals is not good, and what is good
is not new."
4. The. Revival of Herbartianism — Friedrich Wilhelm
Dorpfeld (1824-93).
Dorpfeld was bom at Wermelskirchen, Ehenish Prussia, in
1824. After an education in the schools of the locality he
occupied several successive posts as teacher previous to entering
on the main work of his life. It was in 1848 that, though still
young, he was appointed, at the initiative of others, to the office
of Principal or Eector of the Lutheran schools in Barmen
(Ehenish Prussia). Other more lucrative posts he might have
sought, but he never did so. His conviction of the true dignity
and future independence of the educational profession was un-
usually intense. Though he was quite aware that the rewards
it proffered were mainly subjective, we find him expressing his
conviction of this dignity in a letter to his betrothed (a clergy-
man's daughter), who had not hesitated to suggest that there
were better things in the world than schoolmastering.
Dorpfeld occupied his post for thirty-two years with success
and ever-increasing influence. The educational works which
came from his pen were extremely numerous and obtained a
wide circulation.! In 1872 the Minister of Education (Falk),
interested in Dorpfeld's efforts to bring about a unity in school
work, officially invited him to put his views before an in-
fluential educational conference. "Concentration" was then,
thanks to Ziller and Dorpfeld, "in the air". The compliment
paid to Dorpfeld — an elementary schoolmaster — was, as he
recognised, no small one : " Ein Schulmeister im Salon des
Ministerhotels — das war in Preussen ein fast erschreckendes
Novum ! "
^ They are now published in ten volumes (Bertelsman, Giitersloh). The
most famous are : Thought and Memory (five editions), Outlines of a Theory
of a Teaching-Plan (two), Didactic Materialism (three), Tivo Pressing
Reforms (three). Dorpfeld's literary activity hsbs given rise to several
thousand printed pages.
Historical Survey 47
In 1880 ill-health caused Dorpfeld to give tip his work at
Barmen. He retired on his pension, and died in 1893.
He was a religious man, yet, like most Herbartians, he often
took up an independent position relative to matters of Church
and theology. He objected to the school being placed under
the direct control and inspection of ministers of religion. To-
wards the end of his life, grieved at the alienation of the
cultured classes from Christianity, he sought to discover an
ethical common-ground on which all good men could stand,
one that was independent of theological opinions.
As an Herbartian — though a critical and by no means bigoted
one — he urged the need of "concentration," but interpreted this
in a somewhat different sense from Ziller. Indeed, he freely
criticised Ziller's proposals, though he recognised the brilliance
and suggestiveness of his contemporary's work. Like Ziller, he
urged that the elementary school (people's school, Volksschule)
should not confine its operations to the " 3 E's ". Two of the
" 3 E's " (Eeading and Writing) are, per se, mere dexterities, and
do not contribute directly to the knowledge and character of the
pupils, while the third (Arithmetic) is a "formal" study and
therefore, though highly necessary, is also deficient on the same
ground. Apperception and many-sided Interest never get a fair
chance in such schools. The most important of all subjects
were, on Dorpfeld 's view, those which add to the mental and
moral riches of the soul; subjects dealing with nature, man,
and God. In quite the second rank come dexterities and formal
studies.
His greatest service was probably his insistence on the need
of a Lehrplan, a definitely thought-out scheme of studies in
which every subject should have an organic place. He had no
sympathy or patience with a loose aggregate of studies such as
is indicated on the average British Time Table. In his own
way he was as eager for " concentration " or unification as
Ziller himself. Not only should the whole curriculum be uni-
fied, each department should undergo the same process. Bible
and catechism, for example, should fit into each other and
constitute a unity, the movement of thought being from biblical
48 The Critics of Herbartianism
stories to catechism, i.e., from concrete to abstract. Character-
formation being the supreme aim of Education, " Religious
Instruction," though not of a narrow dogmatic t3rpe, should
have a central place in the curriculum, or rather should occupy
the central place in company with the two other knowledge-
departments above mentioned.
With respect to the other Zillerian doctrine, that of " culture
stages," Dorpfeld occupied a position of friendly criticism. He
saw that to limit, as Ziller suggested, each year's course to
a definite historical circle would bring about a vivid and deep
comprehension of the material ; and the understanding of the
child would broaden out securely and steadily as the historical
matter advanced from step to step. But, on the other hand,
the Zillerian plan left Uttle or no room for recapitulation, and
the material of the earlier stages would be easily forgotten when
the later stages were being studied. Moreover, these earlier
stages were less morally rich than the later ones. Some schools,
again, did not possess eight classes. Dorpfeld therefore sug-
gested a combination of the " culture- stages " method with the
rival plan of " concentric circles," and strongly objected to the
Zillerian exclusion of the New Testament from the lower classes.
He criticised likewise the • strange preference Ziller sometimes
showed for the employment, in class, of a book rather than the
living voice of the teacher, and while not wholly condemning
the proposal to substitute fairy tales for Bible stories in the early
years, he questioned the advisability of proposing so violent a
change when other less contentious reforms were pressing for
attention.
We have seen that he protested against the elevation of purely
" formal " instruction ^ to the educational throne. He protested
equally against " didactic materiahsm," the doctrine which only
regards the quantity of subjects or of matter learnt, and ignores
^ The viQw according to which the main function of Education must be
to encourage certain habits of exactness, initiative, and so forth, even
though little knowledge may be acquired. The extreme advocates of the
"classics," and the extreme advocates of " heuristic methods," are, as we
have seen, believers in " formal Education ".
Historical Survey 49
the mode of learning and the connection of subjects. In Den-
ken und Geddchtnis Dorpfeld has given to the world what is,
with perhaps one exception, the best exposition of the appercep-
tion process. He did much, also, to clarify the doctrine of the
" formal steps ".
The history of Education presents few men who have had so
clear a view of the opposite dangers which beset the path of the
teacher.
5. The Revival of Herbartianism — Tuiskon Ziller (1817-82).
Tuiskon Ziller was born at Wasungen (Thuringia) in 1817.
After a careful education at the hands of his father, a Protestant
clergyman, he proceeded to the gymnasium (grammar-school)
at Meiningen, and subsequently to the University of Leipzig.
At the latter he studied philology, and also became acquainted
with the philosophy of Herbart through Hartenstein and
Drobisch. But he was no narrow specialist; almost every
available object of study attracted, to a certain extent, his
versatile mind. But the death of his father occurred and this
made Tuiskon the chief support of the family. Accordingly he
became a teacher in the gymnasium at Meiningen and laboured
at this work for five years — apparently with success, his moral
earnestness and energy winning for him the high esteem of his
pupils. The fact that Ziller was no mere theorist unacquainted
with scholastic practice deserves to be kept in mind.
Eeturning to Leipzig, he took up juristic studies, and after a
brief period of political activity became a " privat-docent " in
Jurisprudence (1853). But his interest began to turn more and
more to the working out of the Herbartian principles of Educa-
tion. In 1863 he became a subordinate Professor, and his
inaugural address bore witness to the nature of the task upon
which he had now embarked. Its title was " The Present-day
Efforts for Educational Eeform according to Herbartian Prin-
ciples."
But it was in 1856 that he published his first important peda-
gogical work. Introduction to General Pedagogy, which, how-
ever, was far ecUpsed in power and popularity by the epoch-
4
50 The Critics of Herbartianism
making work of 550 pages, Foundation of a System of
Educative Instruction^ (1864), a work of which Dorpfeld
boldly says that in originality, penetration, and richness of
thought it is without a rival in pedagogical Hterature.^ In 1857
he had published The Discipline of Children, while in 1876
followed his Lectures on General Pedagogy. This work has
reached a third edition.
"Educative Instruction." The phrase conveys no meaning
to English minds. But a reference to section 2 will make
things clear. If the goal of Education be, as Herbart contends.
Morality or Character, and if the chief means to this end is
Instruction, then any Instruction which conduces to Character
is " educative," and arvy Instruction which does not conduce to
Character is non-educative. "Educative Instruction " ^ is In-
struction which, by way of many-sided Interest, makes for
Character. Here we have the keynote to Ziller's work and the
source of the Herbartian zeal.
Like Herbart and like Stoy, Ziller had no intention of con-
fining his pedagogical labours to lectures and authorship. A
" Seminar " with practising-school was brought into existence
(1862). But difficulties were many. The University gave no
support to the project of training teachers, for teaching, in
Germany as in England, had always been a sort of "poor rela-
tion " among the professions. The State was equally backward
in encouraging the reformer. But Ziller was a man of un-
bounded energy, egotism, and self-confidence ; aided by two
citizens of Leipzig he succeeded at last in his worthy project.
Criticism lessons were given ; conferences were held ; enthusiasm
grew. Clearly this man had a magnetic personality, otherwise
he could never have generated out of the materials at his dis-
posal the life and energy which were soon to manifest them-
selves in extreme forms. The institution itself consisted of two
or three moderate-sized rooms on the ground-floor, a limited
^ Orundlegung zur Lehre voni Erziehenden Unterricht. (2nd edition,
1884.)
' Der didaktische Materialismus, p. 3. •* Erziehender Unterricht.
Historical Survey 51
playground, a modest garden and — a cellar for the use of
teachers ! The gloomy steps leading down to the last-mentioned
were jestingly compared by new-comers with the " formal steps "
of Instruction, whose obscurity was supposed to rival that of
the more material escalier. Ziller's chief supporter was Dr.
Barth, formerly head teacher in Stoy's Seminar at Jena.
It was amid such unpromising surroundings that Her-
bartianism experienced its second birth. The extraordinary
personality of Ziller was responsible for the powerful movement
which arose. His moral Idealism and unconquerable enthusi-
asm drew to him many of the best students at Leipsig. He
was an optimist and a prophet. He had no doubts. Education
was to regenerate the world. He was a fervid Christian, yet
no bigot. By the more narrow-minded among the Lutherans
he was dubbed "rationalist" because he would not admit that
the Bible gave the key to every science and because he refused
to approve of it as suitable food for babes. "Free-thinkers,"
on the other hand, despite the existence in Ziller's system of a
soupgon of Darwinism, despised him as a " pietist ".
More momentous in some respects than any of Ziller's other
achievements was his founding of the " Union for Scientific
Pedagogy " ^ (1868). The publications of this society and the
annual reports of its proceedings introduced Zillerianism to a
wide circle of readers. But the chief significance of the matter
lay in the name of the society. The claim of the Zillerians to
be "scientific" teachers was pregnant with results. Those
who refused to acknowledge the supremacy of the new Leipzig
gospel protested vigorously, often bitterly, against the claim.
But Ziller's party have stuck to the name. Nay, not content
with thus implicitly reflecting upon the methods of non-
Zillerians, they have gone so far as to dub their critics " vulgar
pedagogues," 2 "mere practitioners," "mercenaries," "people
1 Verein filr wissenschaftliche Padagogik. Stoy and his adherents be-
longed to it, but many of thena gradually seceded.
^ Dr. Wesendonck (Die Schule Herbart-Ziller und ihre Jilnger) believes '
that this dyslogistic phrase originated among the Stoy section of Her-
bartians.
52 The Critics of Herbartianism
whose mental horizon ends with their noses," " ignoramuses,"
and "literary nullities " to whom " Pedagogy is an El Dorado
of Dilettantism ! "
The truth is that most reforming movements, especially such
as are inspired by a warm and worthy enthusiasm, easily come
to manifest signs of arrogance and bigotry. The Zillerians felt
themselves called to save Germany by the preaching of a new
educational gospel. They felt that their motives were good ;
they believed that their methods were philosophical and scien-
tific. Around them they saw apathy and empiricism. They
criticised ; their criticisms were thrown back upon them ; they
retorted; the tone of both parties became more and more
bitter ; the reformers were not unjustly dubbed " bigots " and
" fanatics " ; they retorted upon their critics the perhaps equally
just charges of apathy, ignorance, and narrow professionalism.
And thus the controversy has gone on to the present day.
Herbartianism, with all its faults, is a system, apparently the
only educational system in existence which has at the same
time a definite psychology, a vast and fairly coherent mass
of hterature, a considerable number of journals devoted to
its cause, a series of great names — above all, the power of rous-
ing enthusiasm ! It has a clearly defined aim : it knows its
mind : it is in earnest. Unfortunately its arrogance has been
almost unbounded, and has aUenated thousands of teachers
who, had they not been scolded, might have become supporters.
But the story of the controversy between the " scientific " and
the "vulgar" pedagogues will be told in a following section
and need not here be anticipated. Let us return to Ziller.
His Union soon numbered five hundred members, and its
influence extended into Austria and Switzerland.^ Ziller 's
success, be it noted, was not the result of his own eloquence
or of any extraneous assistance. He had even to struggle
for the correct oral utterance of his thoughts ; he was deaf.
His Seminar was — what we have seen ! Clearly, then, the
1 Where aji Herbartian journal was established — Swiss Pages for
Educative Instruction.
Historical Survey 53
influence of this man was due either to the force of his ideas
or to the force of his personality, or to both. A Zillerian,
wherever he goes and whatever his faults, is always an en-
thusiast.
In 1881 the Leipzig Seminar celebrated its twentieth birth-
day. From various parts of Germany came past students
anxious to show their esteem for the institute and its chief.
But soon after this an apoplectic stroke reduced that chief to
comparative inactivity. He struggled on with the production
of the current Year-book of his Union, and died at his task
(1882).
6. Outline of Ziller's Doctrines.
Even more emphatically than Herbart, Ziller held to the
view that the true end of Education is moral. He went so
far as to define it as the establishment of the " Kingdom of
God on earth," conceived, of course, after the manner of a
cultured Protestant Lutheran.
Herbart's psychology was, as we have seen, a presentational
psychology. "Action springs out of the circle of thought";
hence the main work of the educator is the formation of this
" circle of thought ". But every circle has a centre, and if the
pupil's " circle of thought " is to be orderly and truly efifectual
in the production of virtue, its centre must be especially rich in
" educative " material. Here we come upon a characteristic
Zillerian doctrine ; at the very centre of aU Instruction must
lie " Gesinnungs-unterricht," ^ character- building Instruction.
But what kind of Instruction is specially " Character- build-
ing " ? Instruction of an historical, biographical, or narrative
kind, including " sacred " history, and, for very young children,
fairy tales and sagas. Ziller's emphasis on the character-form-
ing function of such material is to some, though not a great
1 There is no possibility of an exact English translation of this phrase. It
is a technical phrase, peculiar to Herbartianism. Its meaning will become
clearer as we proceed. Perhaps " humanities," as Dr. Findlay suggests, may
be the best translation.
54 The Critics of Herbartianism
extent in agreement with the old " humanistic " doctrine. This
material, then, must be the very centre of our curriculum.
But our Instruction must form a unity if Apperception is
to take place and Interest to be created. It will never do
to allow our Gesinnungs-unterricht to be separated by hard and
fast lines from other subjects. We must unite all our in-
struction together by means of innumerable connections, and
especially unite it to the central matter. In this way the
pupil's " circle of thought " will become a real unity, and hence
action also will become regular and precise. On the other
hand, if the child has various " circles of thought " his
character must necessarily be devoid of stability.
[This " concentration " doctrine is Zillerian ; it cannot be
found in Herbart, though possibly it can be deduced from his
doctrine that large, unbroken masses of thought are necessary
for moral action. The reader must note the significance of the
result thus attained. Certain subjects {e.g., Mathematics) will
cease to be cultivated in the school as independejit departments
of activity ; they will have to be attached to the central matter
and be dominated by this. Ziller's critics strongly objected to
such a proposal, and succeeding Zillerians have gradually
abandoned or modified it. Herbart certainly never contem-
plated a positive degradation of Mathematics. On the other
hand, Mathematics undoubtedly gains in interest, during the early
stages, by being kept in close connection with the concrete.]
iVnother characteristic Zillerian doctrine is that of " histori-
cal culture stages," supposed to be in part a scientific
corollary from Herbart's " apperception " teaching. Matter
has to be presented to the child of such quality and amount
as to be readily assimilated or "apperceived ". Hence
what is to be presented to the child of six must be very
different from what is presented to the child of twelve. The
child goes through definite stages of development and these
stages, according to Goethe and others,^ are identical, in
1 E.g., Modem biologists par excellence. Spencer says, here agreeing in
principle with Ziller : " The education of the child must accord both in
Historical Survey ee
epitome, with the stages through which the race has gone
historically. The two lines of development run parallel. Hence
if we are to expect easy and ready " apperception " on the part
of our pupils, we must reproduce, in our school instruction, the
stages of race development. The teacher must present to very
young pupils matter similar to that which primitive man under-
stood ; with older pupils matter corresponding to later stages of
civilisation ; and so on.
[This sweeping doctrine — in essence perhaps more Frobelian
than Herbartian — is, no doubt, " scientific " in conception,
though the precise proposals of Ziller have awakened fierce
criticism.]
Coming to details of the material recommended by Ziller for
Gesinnungs-unterricht, we find the following : —
1st school year, 12 of Grimm's Marchen (Fairy tales).
2nd „ Robinson Crusoe.
3rd ,, The Patriarchs. \
4th „ The Judges. _ ., .^, ,, , „
_., „, „. Together with " secular
6th „ The Kmgs. I , . , , . , .
6th „ The Life of Jesus.
7th ,, The Apostles.
8th ,, The Reformation.
This selection is regarded by Ziller as corresponding to eight
stages of racial development, and therefore as also suitable for
the instruction of children at eight different periods. The
above material has to form the very centre of the school curri-
culum. The fairy tales represent the youth of the world ; Eobin-
son Crusoe represents primitive man learning the use of tools ;
the patriarchs represent the nomadic stage, and so forth.
[There is here ample ground for criticism. Is the matter suit-
ably selected ? Is it right, say Protestants, to exclude the Bible
from stages (1) and (2), and to give only one year (6) to the
life of Jesus ? Catholics will object to stage (8) and " secu-
larists " to any use of the Bible.]
mode and arrangement with the education of mankind considered his-
torically. In other words, the genesis of knowledge in the individual
must follow the same course as the genesis of knowledge in the race,"
■ -Ediication, p. 67.
history selected in
similar manner.
56 The Critics of Herbartianistn
Ziller and his followers enthusiastically accepted Herbart's
scheme of " formal steps " and improved on it.
Ziller also accepted the " Interest " doctrine and elaborated
it greatly, showing^ how Interest is a "protection against
passions," "an aid to one's earthly activity," and a "salvation
amid the storms of fate ". In fact, Interest is an important
stepping-stone to, or ingredient in, Virtue.
7. 'Reaction and Controversy }
We now approach the most critical period in the history of
Herbartianism, the years 1884-6.
For a time all had gone well. Stoy at Jena, and, still more,
Ziller at Leipzig had won for Herbartianism or neo-Herbar-
tianism a position of influence. In the Ehine provinces Dorp-
feld as an independent-minded Herbartian and a practical
educationist of no mean ability, had exerted an influence scarcely,
if at all, less than that of the two professors further east. Ad-
herents of Herbartianism were reckoned by hundreds and pro-
bably numbered thousands. Though distinctively Protestant
in inception, the new creed obtained some adherents among
Catholics; Vogt, the successor of Ziller in the Presidency of
the " Union for Scientific Pedagogy," was a Catholic, and Will-
mann, a Professor at Prague, also belonged and belongs to the
older church. Though Germany was the headquarters of the
system, almost every country of Europe (and some outside of
Europe) had its contingent of Herbartian students. In the work
entitled Herhart and the Herbartians (published by Beyer and
Sohne, Langensalza) over a hundred quarto pages, containing no-
thing but a list of Herbartian literature, German, French, Italian,
Koumanian, English (or rather mainly American), Bohemian,
Dutch, Armenian, Danish, Swiss, Croatian, and Hungarian, bear
^ In an exposition extending over two hundred pages of his Grundlegung
zur Lehre vom erziehenden Unterricht.
^It was during the controversies mentioned in this section that Dr.
Klemm arrived in Europe. He refers to them in his work European
Schools. " I left the bookstore with an armful of pamphlets and books, and
poorer by thirty-five marks " (p. 40).
Historical Survey 57
witness to the cosmopolitan nature of the movement. But
the four countries into which the Herbartian influence more
especially extended appear to have been Switzerland, Austria,
Hungary, and America.
Why this popularity? Because, as already pointed out,
Herbartianism was a system, and there was no other well-
marked educational system in existence, though fragments of
systems were plentiful. Herbartianism had its great names and
great ideas ; above all, it had force and enthusiasm. Possibly,
too, its technical terminology, though repellent to many
students, was attractive to others, and the enemies of the
system have even accused its supporters of a love of obscurity
for its own sake, or for the sake of the philosophic depth which
obscurity is supposed to suggest.
But internal dissensions and external attacks were now
imminent. The more moderate Herbartians led by Stoy gradu-
ally found themselves more and more outnumbered, within the
" Union for Scientific Pedagogy," by the Zillerian extremists.
The Herbartian press (which at present numbers eight or nine
journals) was even richer in production then than now, but it
was very largely in the hands of Zillerians.^ Doctrines like
those of the "historical culture stages" and "concentration
centres " — doctrines not very distinctly found in Herbart's own
works — won but little acceptance from the more moderate
section, but were enthusiastically championed as the only
orthodoxy by many of Ziller's own followers. Among these
latter were Vogt, Eein, the two Wigets, Barth, Thrandorf,
Just, Zillig, Ackermann, Niederley, Beyer, Bliedner, Grabs,
Lange, Fliigel, Pickel, Thilo, Staude, Conrad, and Florin, while
among the Herbartians or semi-Herbartians who refused
slavishly to follow Ziller were Dorpfeld, Sallwiirk, Striimpell,
Kern, Frick, Wiessner, Schumann, Credner, and Frohhch ;
some of these would be regarded as followers of Stoy.
^The Year-books of the Union were edited by Ziller; Padagogische
Stvdien by Rein ; Erziehungsschule by Barth. Stoy's own journal, Allge-
meine Schulzeitung, expired in 1882.
58 The Critics of Herbartianism
The great offence which the Zillerians committed was, as we
have seen, to claim to be alone " scientific ". This word was
inscribed on the name of their Union and on the covers of their
journal. Their leader had pronounced the vast majority of
German teachers to be " vulgar pedagogues," " mercenaries,"
and so forth, and the German schools to be, for the most part,
" un-educative " (in the Herbartian sense). That leader died
in 1882 before the storm burst in full fury. On his death his
Seminar, like the previous ones of Herbart and Snoy, ceased
to exist ; but the " Union for Scientific Pedagogy " still held
its ground, Professor Vogt of Vienna, a Catholic, but a de-
voted Zillerian, taking the place vacated by Ziller, which, in
justice, ought, perhaps, to have fallen to the veteran Stoy.
But the breach between the moderate and the extreme sections
was now clearly marked.
As early as 1880 Dr. von Sallwurk,^ of Carlsruhe, though
himself a member of Ziller's Union, had protested, in an
anonymous work entitled Herhart and his Disciples, against
the arrogance of the extremists and their efforts to obtain
patronage from the State. This was a signal for a number
of similar attacks. In 1881 Dr. Bartels, speaking at a teachers'
conference in Carlsruhe, raised objections co " concentration "
and other doctrines of Ziller, declaring them to be artificial and
impracticable. Dr. Sander, of Breslau, raised similar protests,
while praising in no stinted terms the industry and enthusiasm
of Ziller. Frohlich, another member of the Union, expressed
(1883), in a work entitled The Scientific Pedagogy represented
in its Fundamental Doctrines and. elucidated by Examples, his
disapproval of the arrogance of the Zillerians. He, hke Sall-
wiirk, had once been a follower of Ziller, but his zeal had
cooled, and had given place to a critical, though still re-
spectful, attitude of mind. Especially did he protest against
the " concentration " doctrine as containing " a whole nest of
Now one of the most eminent educationists in Germany, editor of
Herbaurt's works, contributor to the magnificent Encyclopcedisches Hand-
buch der Padagogik, etc.
Historical Survey 59
singularities ".^ The " historical culture stages " doctrine and
the doctrine of Gesinnungs-unterricht also came in for criticism.
Even enthusiastic and avowed Zillerians had not scrupled to
modify the proposals of their master. In 1878 and the following
years appeared the important work of Dr. Eein and his colleagues,
Theory and Practice of Instruction in the Elementary School
according to Herbartian Principles? In this work, perhaps
the most comprehensive and laborious which has proceeded
from the Herbartian school (besides a copious historical and
general introduction it gives complete courses for all eight
school years), we find Ziller's scheme already altered in several
important respects. The possibility of having one single centre
of instruction was abandoned ; that is to say, a perfect system
of " concentration " was admitted to be impossible. Even Ziller
himself had shown signs of wholesome and increasing modesty,
and had admitted {e.g., in the Year-book of 1881, and earlier in
a reply to Andreas, 1878) that " concentration " in the original
sense could not be carried out, and that each subject of instruc-
tion must retain its own character, and not be entirely subordin-
ated to the claims and methods of Gesinnungs-unterricht.
But a more pronounced opponent than any hitherto mentioned
was now coming forward. Dittes, in 1870, had interrogated
Ziller as to certain obscurities in the " Year-book " of the Union.
Ziller's reply (in Stoy's Schulzeitung , 1871) is declared by an
anti-Zillerian ^ to have been " angry " and " offensive ".* Other
controversies followed between the two ; and in 1881 Dittes, in
his journal Pddagogium, called attention to Sallwiirk's attack
(see above), and in 1884 to that of Frohlich. Dittes, who was
a Vienna educationist of no mean standing, was especially in-
dignant at the Zillerian claim to be alone " scientific ".
He now devoted himself to a thorough criticism of the Her-
bartian principles. His chief articles upon the subject appeared
^ Ein ganzes Nest von Sonderbarkeiten.
"^ Theorie und Praxis des Volksschul - unterrichts nach Herbartschen
Grundscitzen.
^ Wesendonck. The Schule Herbart-Ziller, p. 33,
■* " Geharnischt " and " widerwartig ".
6o The Critics of Herbartianism
in PMagogium, 1885-6. They were the signal for a whole
series of attacks and counter-attacks distinguished by no small
degree of acerbity on both sides.
Frohlich, who had hitherto been treated with frosty indul-
gence by the Zillerians, now, on the appearance of Dittes in the
field, came in for his share of condemnation. Zillig, one of the
ablest of Ziller's followers, replied to the ex-Zillerian in the
pages of Pddagogischen Studien (1884) ; while the pens of
Rein {ibid.), Beyer (Erziehungsschule), Thrandorf (ibid.), and
Vogt (in the "Elucidations" of the "Year-book") followed
suit in the Zillerian defence. The controversy was a typical
one. Dittes, in the opinion of Thrandorf, was a "pope"
"hurling thunderbolts," etc. ; in the opinion of Vogt, guilty of
"crafty mendacity,"^ etc., and deserving, in consequence of his
" radicalism," to see his journal (Padagogium) confiscated by
a respectable Government which wages war against socialism,
anarchism, and other destructive forces.
There was really nothing in the articles of Dittes to have
called forth such language. He was scrupulously respectful
towards Her hart, freely and frankly admitting the value of
certain of his proposals. Not a word of abuse or ill-taste can
be found in his seven or eight articles. Why then the severity
of the Zillerian rejoinder?
We must take the Germans as we find them. They love
controversy. Their minds are alive. They are strong parti-
sans. Their polemical vocabulary is ample. Their methods
are such as would scarcely be possible in England. Whether,
when they accuse each other of "mendacity," "ignorance,"
"folly," etc., they are to be taken quite seriously, may be
doubted. But certain it is that the amount of educational
literature in Germany is so enormous as to betoken an interest
in Education of which we in England have not the faintest
conception. Now interest in a subject easily degenerates into
fanaticism, and when, as with the Herbartian movement, a deep
moral motive is present, this fanaticism may take extreme forms.
^ Arglistige Verlogenheit,
Historical Survey 6i
In these controversies the best of the argument was often on
the side of the Herbart-Ziller party. But truth compels the
confession that most of the ill-manners was also on the same
side. The reason we have seen. The zeal of these men was
so intense as to generate bitterness and intolerance towards
those who, less earnest, as they thought, than themselves, were
engaged in pouring the cold water of criticism upon the new
Gospel. " Away with your petty criticisms ! Men are perish-
ing." Some such feeling as that here represented lay at the
base of Herbartian intolerance.
Probably if a school of educational workers were to arise in
our country animated by the same spirit of moral reform which
pervades Herbartianism, history would repeat itself. Apathy,
ignorance, professional " touchiness " and conceit, would all be
thrown into the scale against the new movement. "Who are
you that you should try to teach us who have been school-
masters for thirty years ? " would be the cry from thousands of
teachers who, in all their lives, had never given, or perhaps
had never had the opportunity to give, an hour's serious and
independent thought to their professional work. Small wonder
if the new enthusiasts responded with accusations of narrow-
mindedness and unintelHgence, or dubbed the critics "vulgar
pedagogues," " mere practitioners," " people whose mental
horizon ended with their noses," and so forth. The latter label,
indeed, would not be inappropriate if fixed upon some present-
day schoolmasters, who, as Professor Adams says,^ can be shown
to be, with all their modesty, " arrogant and intolerant empirics ".
Considerations such as these throw light upon Herbartian
intolerance, though without entirely excusing it. A body of
moral and educational reformers faced by the problem of com-
parative apathy among teachers, and yet conscious of a high
mission, almost inevitably developed a tone of arrogance and
contempt. Their earnestness blinded them to the value of the
work of non-Herbartians ; they became morbidly sensitive to
criticism, and could see nothing in it but the selfish cry of time-
servers and mercenaries, " Trouble us not ".
^ Herbartian Psychology, p. 5.
62 The Critics of Herbartianism
8. More Controversy.
To resume our historical survey.
Little need be said as to the progress of the Herbartian
movement in Switzerland. The Protestant cantons were some-
what receptive, and one of the ablest of the Zillerians, Theodor
Wiget, founded and edited a journal in the interests of the new
Gospel.^ A critic appeared in the person of Kuoni (1883).
About the same time a conference of Saxony school directors
discussed the question, " How far are the Herbart-Stoy-Ziller
principles to be applied in the higher schools?" and reports
came in from various sides. On the whole the verdict of the
conference was favourable, though Herbart's psychology was con-
demned as one-sided and " unchristian," and certain of Ziller's
proposals, such as "concentration," came in for criticism.
Simultaneously with the Pddagogium articles of Dittes ap-
peared an able work by Dr. Bartels, entitled The Applicability
of the Herhart-Z iller-Stoy Principles of Teaching to Instruction
in Lower Schools.
Bartels saw the good points in Herbartianism, but showed
that many of its doctrines were not by any means absolutely
original. He put in a word for the doctrine of ' ' concentric
circles "^ (the polar opposite of the "culture epochs" doctrine
and strongly opposed by Zillerians). He approved of the
"formal steps" doctrine, though he saw that it could easily
degenerate into rigid formahsm. The " culture steps " doctrine
he attacked. Finally he claimed that the Zillerian proposals
could not possibly be carried into complete execution. "Not
pretty words but deeds do we wish to see." He was answered
by Gopfert.
Eeaders of the present work have probably now learnt enough
upon the subject of the Herbartian controversies in Germany.
^ Swiss Pages for Edticative Instruction.
* The doctrine that the youngest pupils should be taught a little matter
which is to be increased and recapitulated as they go up the school, the
instruction widening out, so to speak, from a fixed centre. The Zillerians
select s^>ecial matter for each year.
Historical Survey 63
In truth the story is a long and, to some extent, a wearisome
one. The same points which were agitated in 1882 are being
agitated at the present moment, the same arguments are being
brought forward, the same charges being made, now as then.
Wearisome, truly, and yet interesting in a way, for such a
wealth of controversial zeal and such irrefragable indications of
interest in education are simply unintelligible in our country.
We cannot imagine what these Germans have to write about.
But they do write, and they do think ; and though much of their
writing and thinking is but going over old ground it is not old
ground to British readers.
There is little need to consider the controversies which
followed upon the time at which we have arrived, though one
which centred round the name of Dr. Just of Altenburg (an
able Hving Zillerian) might have merited some attention.
Eissmann's name should also be mentioned. Though he has
contributed no large work to the Herbartian question, he has
vigorously attacked the Zillerians in a series of articles which,
commencing in 1880, have appeared in various journals for
years past. His arguments are the old ones: that the Zillerians
are arrogant, their theories insecure owing to the comparative
neglect of the teachings of experience, the claims of society are
ignored in favour of those of the individual, and so forth. Other
anti-Zillerians who wrote during the critical years of Herbar-
tianism were Willmann (an Herbartian but not a bigoted one),
Wesendonck ^ (a frequent contributor to Dittes' journal, Pdda-
gogium), and Ostermann. The latter writer pubhshed in 1884
a very important and valuable criticism of the psychology of
the Herbartian school under the title, The Chief Errors of the
Herbartian Psychology and their Pedagogical Consequences.^
This was a very necessary piece of work ; for though Herbart's
psychology had often been criticised by professional philoso-
^ The present writer is much indebted to Wesendonck's articles for infor-
mation on the history of the Herbartian controversy.
^ Die hauptsachlichsten Irrtilmer der Herbartschen PsycJvologie und ihre
padagogisclien Konsequenzen (Schulzesche Hof-Buchhandlung, Oldenburg).
64 The Critics of Herbartianism
phers, and though incidental criticisms had appeared in peda-
gogical books and articles, apparently no writer had attempted
a complete popular investigation of the whole psychological
side of Herbart's work. Ostermann performed his task well.
He showed how impossible it was to resolve the whole mental
life into a presentational series : how, if the attempt be made,
it results in an undervaluing of the other sides of mental life
(Feeling, etc.) and also an undervaluing of physical Education ;
and how the later psychologists of the Herbartian school have
substantially departed from the purely presentational stand-
point of their master. He draws the inference that this
standpoint is clearly an impossible one. His work is one of
the few which are absolutely indispensable to the student of
the Herbartian question. ^
And so the controversy has gone on down to the present
time. Men come forward with attacks upon Herbart's psychology
or Ziller's " culture steps " doctrine : they retail the old argu-
ments ; they receive the same answers. What happened in
the case of Ostermann happened more recently in the case of
Professor Paul Natorp, of Marburg, who, in 1897, delivered a
course of eight pedagogical lectures during the vacation at that
University. He took for their title, Herhart, Pestalozzi and the
Present-day Problems of Educational Doctrine ; ^ dealt with the
question mainly from the philosophical standpoint ; claimed (as
a Neo-Kantian) that Will rather than presentations should
receive the chief stress in any educational doctrine, and finally
urged that Pestalozzi's standpoint was sounder and more
philosophic than Herbart's. Natorp's work is more important
from the standpoint of theory than from that of practice in
^ The Herbartian defence against Ostermann fell to Pastor 0. Fliigel.
In 1887 appeared his Ostermann ilber Herbarts Psychologie (Beyer, Lan-
gensalza) ; Ostermann replied with Zur Herbart-Frage (Schulzesche Hof-
Buchhandlung, Oldenburg, 1888) ; Fliigel followed in the Zeitschrift fiir
Exacte Philosophie, 1888 ; and Ostermann gave the final touches in the
Pddagogischen Jahresbericht, 1888.
^ Herbart, Pestalozzi und die heutigen Aufgaben der Erziehvmgslehre
(Fromman, Stuttgart).
Historical Survey 65
the narrower sense, and he hardly mentions Ziller. This is
always a mistake ; for the Herbartian system is 'par excellence
a pedagogical system, and on its excellence as such it must
stand or fall. Doubtless its philosophical " foundations " have
to be reckoned with, but it is a mistake to suppose that the
imperfection of these supposed foundations is necessarily trace-
able also in the superstructure. Historically, we have seen,
Herbartianism began as a pedagogical system, and its philosophi-
cal principles were sought for subsequently. Possibly, therefore,
considerable modifications in the presentational doctrine of the
founder may be made without any danger to the system as a
whole.
This fact is not, perhaps, adequately recognised even by lead-
ing Herbartians. At any rate Natorp's attack, hke the previous
attacks of Dittes, Ostermann, and others, gave rise to spirited
rejoinders from the leaders of the school. These rejoinders
appeared in the Zeitschrift fur Philosophic und Pddagogik of
1899, and came from the pens of Willmann, Fliigel, Just, and
Eein,
Among other recent opponents of the new school of pedagogy
may be mentioned Bergemann and Linde, both of whom have
made suggestive criticisms, though most of these may be found,
if sought for, in earUer writings. Still, a student interested in
the most recent treatment of the problems may be referred to
these two writers, who show a welcome tendency to avoid
metaphysics.^
9. Present Position of Herbartianism in Germany.
The present tendency of the Herbartian movement is in the
direction of a practical grappling with the detailed problems
of school life. From Herbart's " reals " to the teaching of
^ Special mention should be made of Linde's Der darstellende Unterricht
(Brandstetter, Leipzig) and Bergemann's Die Lehre voji den formalen und
den Kulturhistorischen Stufen (Haacke, Leipzig). Both writers have
also contributed voluminously to Neue Bahnen and other anti-Herbartian
journals.
5
66 The Critics of Herbartianism
Drawing is a far cry. The Herbartians feel this. They still
enter, on occasion, into the metaphysical territory, but their
main interest is, as it should be, the improvement of school
method. In one department of school work their labours have
been specially notable — the department of Eeligious Instruction.
Whatever opinions may be held on this subject, all will agree
that if Eeligious Instruction be given at all it should be given
as well and as thoughtfully as possible. The Herbartians, in
their zeal for character-forming, have noted the inefl&ciency and
absurdity of much of the teaching given under the aegis of the
Lutheran Church. Thus they have attacked catechism-teaching
and mechanical memorising as unpsychological, and have ad-
vocated a more careful selection of material than is customary.
Especially have Ziller's proposals roused keen discussion, and
improvements are bound to follow. Dorpfeld, too, was a promi-
nent advocate of reform in Eeligious Instruction.
The result is that from the Herbartians have come, of recent
years, many first-class school-books dealing with this subject.
The three-volumed work of Dr. Staude {Preparations for the
Biblical History of the Old and New Testament) has gone
through eleven or twelve editions ; a laborious and thorough
work it is ; orthodox, yet suggestive. But Thrandorf and
Meltzer have gone further than Staude, as, for example,
in their work. Religious Instruction at the Middle Stage
of the Lower School and in the Lower Classes of Higher
Schools — Preparations on a Psychological Method. Their
" method " is not only psychological, for the existence of
modern critical problems is by no means unrecognised in
this work, and great theological writers like Wellhausen are
frequently referred to. The second volume of this work is
devoted to the prophets, an almost wholly unexplored region
for English teachers and pupils.
Still more revolutionary are the works of Dr. Heyn.^ These
are for the teachers of the highest classes in schools. There is
absolutely nothing in English which is comparable, in learning,
^ Geschichte Israels, Geschichte Jesu.
Historical Survey 67
in skilfulness of treatment, and in rich suggestiveness with
these works. The youths who are instructed on Dr. Heyn's
plan must become equal in knowledge of the Bible to the
majority of English ministers of religion. Let us picture
for the moment boys in our Grammar Schools being in-
oculated with Holzmann, Nippold, Wellhausen, Weiss, and
Harnack ! Such a procedure may be wise or unwise ; it is
certainly striking. ^
The works of Staude, Thrandorf, Meltzer, and Heyn are
types of the kind of school-book now being yearly brought
out by the Herbartians. Each lesson is worked out on the
" formal steps " principle. But merely to mention the various
works which have appeared on the subject of biblical teaching
during the, past four or five years would fill several pages of
this book. Five or six works on the life of Jesus appeared
almost within a single year, any one of which would excel in
boldness and thoroughness of treatment any school-book we
possess on the subject,
EeUgious Instruction is not the only subject at which the
Herbartians are working hard, but it is perhaps the one in
which their efforts appear most original. Articles and books
come almost daily from their press dealing with every depart-
ment of school activity. Metaphysics, psychology, and ethics
are left to Pastor Fliigel and other recognised veterans who
have survived the older battles ; the younger Herbartians are
" practical men," only, unlike the " practical" teachers of some
countries, these young Herbartians have principles of their own.
In the present-day Herbartian movement Theory and Practice
have at last met on equal terms.
"What then," it may be asked, "is the future of Herbar-
tianism?" The question is no easy one to answer. There is
much difl&culty in ascertaining the precise number of adherents
which Herbartianism possesses even if we consider only its
native country. The difficulty arises from two facts. First, as
^ Some selections from Heyn are to be found in the present writer's book
published last year {The Reform of Moral and Biblical Edtication).
68 The Critics of Herbartianism
we have seen, a teacher may belong to an Herbartian Society —
even to the most extreme society, Ziller's Union — without
being committed to an approval of all the proposals put forward
by the leaders of the movement. Secondly, there is every reason
to believe that many teachers are in sympathy with Herbar-
tianism who are quite unconnected with any organisation.
These two facts tend, of course, to neutralise each other. Of
the two, probably the second is the more important. However,
there seems every reason to believe that several thousands of
German teachers draw their inspiration from Herbart and his
followers, Stoy, Ziller, and Dorpfeld. Several hundred belong
to Ziller's Union, several hundred more to the Westphalian and
Thuringian Societies, several hundred more to other societies.
Are the Herbartian teachers of the elementary or of the
secondary grade? Of both. Herbartianism has a peculiar
adaptedness to elementary schools. But in Germany, as in
England, teachers in such schools are for various reasons not so
able or willing to adopt new proposals as teachers in higher
schools. Still an appreciable influence has been exerted by
Herbartianism upon the lower grades of Education, though
possibly a still greater influence has been exerted upon the
higher or secondary grades.
The second test of the condition of present-day Herbartianism
is its literary output. This has been already mentioned in
referring to Eeligious Instruction. But a few further rough
statistics may be given.
Quoting from Die Herbartische Padagogik in der Litteratur
(a supplement to Herbart und die Herbartianer), we find that
from 1895 to 1899 about 200 books or articles came from the
Herbartian School dealing with general pedagogical questions ;
about 160 dealing with the various parts of Gesinnungs-unter-
richt, especially biblical teaching and history ; considerable
numbers dealing with drawing, languages, geography, science,
and especially mathematics. Other books and articles deal
with discipline, athletics, the philosophy and history of Educa-
tion, and so forth.
The German Herbartians alone produce certainly ten times
Historical \ Survey 69
as many serious contributions to educational literature as all
the teachers of Britain. Under " serious contributions " there
is no need to include " reading- books," " exercises in arith-
metic," and so forth.
New men have taken the places vacated by Stoy, Dorpfeld
and Ziller. Dr. Eein maintains the Zillerian banner at Jena ;
and though Dr. Frick, once "the best-hated pedagogue in
Prussia," and the head of the great "Prancke Stiftungen" at
Halle, is no more,^ men like Ackermann, Just, Ufer, Lange,
Sallwiirk and Beyer hve on, and others are rising to hand down
the Herbartian — in some cases the Zillerian — tradition. Though
its pages are not confined to Herbartian writers, the Encyclojpdd-
isches Handbuch der Pddagogik is really a magnificent tribute
to Herbartian zeal.
10. Herbartianism in Britain.
In the British Isles Herbartianism — mainly in the form of
Zillerianism — obtained a precarious foothold some years ago.
Precarious; for the origin of the movement was scarcely
recognised and its philosophical meaning almost wholly ignored.
Still, one is bound to recognise in the scheme adopted some
time back by the Halifax School Board an honest attempt to
unify or " concentrate " the curriculum. Thus the history and
geography of Scotland were taught in connection with each
other ; ancient weapons of war (used at Bannockburn, etc.)
were to be drawn by the children, while maps of the Scottish
river-basins, plans of battles, composition themes, reading- books,
and pieces for recitation were all to be made or selected in
accordance with the same general scheme. Praiseworthy though
the attempt was, it does not appear to have won the favour of
the teachers ; whether this fact is a reflection on the scheme or
on the teachers need not be discussed. In other places a more
partial "concentration" has been or is being attempted; com-
^ For details of Dr. Frick's work see De Garmo's Herbart and the Her-
bartians, and Klemm's European Schools. For Dr. Rein's work at Jena
consult De Garmo, or Miss Dodd's Introdvction.
70 The Critics of Herbartianism
position themes are being selected from the subject matter of
other lessons ; history and geography, sometimes literature
also, are kept more or less in relation to each other. But, on
the whole, though Professor Armstrong may pour contempt
upon the plan of "chopping our lives up into three-quarters-
of-an-hour sections, during each of which we do some-
thing different," and may urge the necessity for assimilating
scholastic procedure to the methods of ordinary life,^ the
rigidity of the time-table seems to defy serious attack. Partly
this is due to governmental necessities, but largely also to lack
of culture and want of mental elasticity on the part of teachers.
In the higher departments of educational work we see distinct
signs that the rigid barriers once existent even between kindred
subjects are being broken down, and that the need for grouping
together such subjects is becoming recognised. The Matricula-
tion Examination of the University of London has borne witness
to this tendency, as, for example, when history and geography
were grouped together, and " general elementary science "
rather than any definite branch of science was prescribed.
Workshop practice, " Sloyd," etc., are being made to bear upon
the needs of the physical laboratory ; ^ reading books are be-
coming less " scrappy " ; the partitions between different
branches of mathematics are, thanks to Mr. Branford,^ Pro-
fessor Perry, and others, being removed, and possibly before
long the absurdity of employing a science teacher distinct
from the teacher of mathematics will become obvious. The
increasing importance now being attached to a general subject
like " Nature Study " also witnesses to a growing feeling that
knowledge should be unified to the highest possible degree, and,
indeed, one of its advocates has suggested it as a focus for the
curriculum.^
The other Zillerian doctrine — that of " culture stages " — has
1 Professor Laurie says somewhere in Ms Institutes, " life and the school
should be never disjointed".
^ Findlay, Principles of Class Teaching, p. 359.
^ Journal of Education, September, 1898.
* Professor Patrick Geddes. See the present writer's Student's Herbart,
p. 74.
Historical Survey 71
also obtained some recognition, though possibly the impulse in
this case has not come exclusively from Germany, but has
rather resulted from the general spread of evolutionary thought.
Certain it is that Herbert Spencer proclaimed the essential
features of the doctrine some years before Zillerianism became
influential in Germany. In point of fact the claim for priority
is here rather ridiculous, as the doctrine is traceable in many
writers who Hved long before either Spencer or Ziller ; in
Goethe, in Lessing, even in Clement of Alexandria.
But the books which, written in EngUsh, bear the clearest
signs of Zillerian influence are not often Enghsh books, except
in such cases as that of Miss Dodd's Introduction to Herbartian
Principles of Teaching, where the influence is admitted on the
title page. They are American. Dr. Adler's book, ^ for example,
and the recently pubhshed collection of essays on Eeligious
Education edited by Bishop Potter,^ could scarcely have been
produced in a country like England, where neither teachers nor
professors of Education concern themselves with problems of
the kind therein discussed.^ Canon Bell's Beligious Education in
Secondary Schools * shows what might be thought to be (when
looked at through a magnifying glass) a few traces of Zil-
lerianism, as when, for example, he points out that the Old
Testament has a certain affinity with the moral nature of
young people. Much more distinctly is the " culture stages "
doctrine recognisable in the new movement for reformed mathe-
matical and science teaching. Men are beginning to preach
that the child in its educational development must, to a certain
^ The Moral Instruction of Children (Arnold).
^Principles of Beligious ^dticaiicw. (Longmans). See Dr. Stanley Hall's
essay and especially the words already quoted : " The child has to repeat
a great many pre-Christian stages of evolution in its own life," for
" Christianity came late in the history of the world." We must " bring
the stress of teaching Christianity a little later than we put it ". Clearly,
Ziller has his up-to-date followers !
^ Professor Adams's little Primer on Teaching, with Special Reference to
Sunday School Work (T. & T. Clark) is a recent and welcome exception to
this statement.
* Macmillan.
72 The Critics of Herbartianism
extent, recapitulate the history of the race, discovering anew
the composition of the atmosphere, passing from empirical
mathematics to abstract, and so forth. The doctrine is not
without its difficulties ; but it is also not without a rich and
almost immeasurable suggestiveness.
But, after all, "concentration" and "culture stages" are
Herbartian doctrines only in a derived sense. Absolutely Her-
bartian are the doctrine of the formal steps, the doctrine of
many-sided Interest, and the emphasis upon the value of
humanistic subjects (history, literature, etc.). How fare these
in Britain ? The answer is disappointing.
True, the five steps of Instruction are used in several of the
training institutions connected with Universities or University
Colleges, and recently a disappointing book of lessons supposed
to be drawn up along Herbartian lines has been published.
But, on the whole, this undoubtedly valuable part of the Her-
bartian system has been neglected, and probably will continue
to be neglected until the nation and until boards of managers
definitely ask for new light and new methods.
The great central Herbartian doctrine of "many-sided
Interest " has exerted practically no influence beyond a super-
ficial one. It may have helped to make lessons easy and
"interesting," but this is not Herbartianism. ^ "Instruction
requires toil on the pupil's part." The vital moral bearings of
the doctrine have scarcely been thought of, and even our most
brilliant writers on the system seem fearful lest, by straying
into this ethical region, they will earn the painful reproach of
being " fanatical ". The lady writers on the subject here show
a good example, but, on the whole, confession must be made
that the proclamation of the gospel of "many-sided Interest"
— a gospel of moral reform and spiritual regeneration — has been
feeble and unworthy.
Strangely, sadly, unaccountably obtuse have we been to the
last Herbartian doctrine here to be mentioned — the doctrine of
Gesinnungs-unterricht or " character-forming Instruction," the
^ See the Studenfs Herbart, pp. 51-53.
Mis tor teal Survey 73
doctrine which sees enormous and unique value in fairy tale,
legend, history, and literature. With a national history far
surpassing that of Germany or America in continuity and in
capabilities for moral instruction, we are content to remain
uninspired by its lessons, unmoved by its great names, ignorant
of its movements, deaf to its voices. A true educationist, when
told of recent revivals of "patriotism," can but smile sardoni-
cally when he contemplates the damning facts that Alfred the
Great and Earl Simon are practically unknown in the land
they loved ; that it is the hardest possible task to get a " patrio-
tic " audience (or any other audience) to read the history of
their own land, still more that of any other land; that the
elementary schoolmaster, called upon to conduct an Evening
Continuation School, may babble " Commercial Arithmetic,"
but will scarcely even dream of opening the sealed book of
English literature, though brought down to our very alleys in a
penny form ^ ; that our very Churches, though professedly wor-
shipping "whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are
honourable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are
pure, whatsoever things are lovely," ^ show by their weekly
bills of fare that the " whatsoever " is, for them, pitiably poor ;
that the secondary schools of Britain teach more Greek and
Latin than English, and that the English they teach is sometimes
technical and uninspiring ; and that our very M.P.'s would, in
the opinion of an eminent authority, make fewer mistakes if
they knew a little more history. ^ Astounding, unaccountable,
well-nigh criminal is our neglect of the subjects which, above
all others, are culture-giving and character-forming. But it is
of a piece with our whole conduct. With one voice we hail
" Eehgious Instruction" as peculiarly "sacred," and proceed
to fence it off and deprive it of interest ; with another voice we
hail all other Instruction as "secular," and proceed to degrade
it to base utiHtarian ends. Pitman's shorthand displaces his-
tory! "commercial arithmetic" displaces literature!
^ Mr. Stead's Penny Poets, etc. "^ Philippians iv. 8.
" Address of the President of the Royal Historical Society, 20th February,
1902.
74 The Critics of Herbartianism
Only from one standpoint is the outlook satisfactory ; Her-
bartian writings are now fairly copious in Britain, and are
steadily increasing in number. Mr. and Mrs. Felkin deserve
the gratitude of all educationists for their pioneer work ^ ; thanks
mainly to them Herbart can now be read in English, and their
excellent introductions have done much to make his doctrines
known. Miss MuUiner's book^ is not so well known as it
deserves to be ; Miss Dodd's ^ is also a good piece of work on
constructive lines, written with the ardour of an enthusiast.
There are translations of Ufer, Eein, and Lange (in each case
by Americans) ; there is Professor De Garmo's Herbart and the
Herbartians ^ with its admirable account of the labours of
Herbart' s followers, Ziller, Eein, Lange, Stoy, and Frick, and
of the progress of the movement in America ; there is the little
Student's Herbart ^ by the present writer, with its regressive
treatment of the whole question; above all these are two
books of marked originaUty, that of Professor Adams and
that of Dr. Findlay. The former^ it would be superfluous
to praise ; it is unique. The latter, •" except where, incidentally,
the author's knowledge of the life of Nicholas Nickleby
shows signs of excusable rustiness, is also admirable in every
respect — nay, in certain matters markedly original. It is the
very book which British Education needs ; mainly Herbartian,
as when it lays stress upon the content of the mind, the process
of apperception, the use of the formal steps, the value of history,
and so forth; but boldly departing from Herbartian doctrine
where the latter reveals its weakness, namely in that department
of scholastic work which deals not with the conferring of ideas,
but with the imparting of skill in speech and in other directions.
^Herbart's Science of Education, and Letters and Lectures (Sonnen-
schein) ; also Introduction to Herbart' s Science and Practice of Education
(Sonnenschein).
* Application of Psychology to Education (Sonnenschein).
^ Introduction to the Herbartian Principles of Teaching (Sonnenschein).
* Heinemann. " Sonnenschein.
' Herbartian Psychology applied to Education (Isbister).
' Principles of Class Teaching (Macmillan).
Historical Survey 75
But nowhere in Britain is there an Herbartian school, training
college, or institute. Nowhere, at least, except in Manchester,
where Miss Dodd, with the usual enthusiasm of a Zillerian, has
succeeded in founding a practising school in connection with
the Day Training College of that city. It is significant that
Day Training Colleges, unless an Herbartian happens to be in
charge, have to exist without such an institution.
11. Herbartianism in America and Elsewhere.
Far more impressive is Herbartian progress in America than
in Britain. The reader cannot help having been struck by the
fact that a number of the works above mentioned are by
Americans. The truth is, as Dr. Eckoff says,^ " American
educators have begun to live, move, and have their being in
an atmosphere of Herbartianism ". That this has its dangers
is obvious from the complaint raised by some critics that " soft
pedagogy " is too prevalent west of the Atlantic, and there is
little doubt that, in the hands of extremists, Herbartianism can
become deficient in strenuousness and backbone. But, on the
whole, the new movement is working wonders. It makes
teachers into enthusiasts, and any movement that can accom-
pUsh such a task as that must be almost infinitely valuable.
In 1892 a " Herbart Club " was organised at Saratoga, and
consists mainly of teachers. The works of Lange and Ufer and
Herbart' s Psychology have been translated by members of this
club. Professor De Garmo, one of its leading spirits, has also
pubhshed several valuable works of his own upon the subject.^
Dr. McMurry and Colonel Parker have contributed to the theory
and practice of " culture stages " and " concentration " ; to the
latter of which American history somewhat lends itself (periods
of settlement, etc.). Hiawatha is extensively used in American
schools, and its use is to an extent defended on Zillerian or
* Herbart's ABC of Sense Perception, p. xiv. (Arnold).
^His latest, Interest and Ediication (Macmillan), presents some special
features of importance. See pp. 96-7.
76 The Critics of Herbartianism
Herbartian principles. Dr. Dewey's name should, of course, be
mentioned also. But it would be superfluous to expatiate furtfier
upon the progress of the movement among our cousins.
Nor is there special need to refer to its progress in other
countries. If we are to judge by the bibliography of Herbart-
ianism, Austria, Holland, Scandinavia, Hungary, Switzerland,
have all received stimulus, while, on the other hand, Latin and
Sclavonic nations have paid but little attention to the move-
ment. It represents the one great effort of the Protestant and
Teutonic world to make Education simultaneously into a Science
and into a Gospel. Say what we will, criticise how we like, it
is a movement to be reckoned with.
PART III.
HEEBAETIAN LITEEATUEE IN ENGLISH.
It has been thought well to give, as supplementary to the pre-
ceding historical sketch, notices of the chief works in English
which are, partly or wholly, Herbartian in spirit or origin.
Such works may be divided into three groups : —
(1) Translations of the writings of Herbart and his followers ;
such translations are generally prefaced by expository introduc-
tions, and may, to this extent, fall in group two.
(2) Expositions of Herbartian principles, and of the Herbar-
tian movement in general.
(3) Works which, though based largely or wholly on Herbar-
tian principles, represent independent efforts at construction ;
works which are genuinely national, though they may owe much
inspiration to foreign writers.
As witnesses to the progress of the Herbartian movement,
the third group is the most important, and the first the least
important of the three. The pioneer work of translation under-
taken by Mr. and Mrs. Felkin was necessary, but, once accom-
plished, had to give place to more constructive efforts in the
direction of nationalising Herbartianism. Britain will scarcely
borrow the Herbartian system en bloc, hence the most signifi-
cant books on the subject are, at the present moment, those
like Dr. Findlay's, in which we see the system arraying itself
in garments not obviously foreign.
In the following notices special attention will therefore be
given to the several books belonging to the third class, less
attention to those of the second class, and least attention of all
78 The Critics of Herbartianism
to those books, however valuable in themselves, which are but
translations of German originals.
(1) Translations.
The, Science of Ediwation ; Its General Principles Deduced
from its Aim : and the Esthetic Bevelation of the
World. By J. F. Herbart. Translated from the
German with a Biographical Introduction by Henry
M. and Emmie Felkin. (Sonnenschein.)
This book is indispensable to the genuine student of education
unless he is able to read Herbart in the original ; it is the trans-
lation of Herbart's masterpiece, Allgemeine Pddagogik. But the
work would be difficult for a beginner, though the translators
have added a useful and able introduction.
Letters and Lectures on Education. By J. F. Herbart. Trans-
lated from the German and Edited with an Introduction
by Henry M. and Emmie Felkin. (Sonnenschein.)
Herbart's letters, here translated, are those he wrote to
Herr von Steiger, the father of the three pupils placed under
his charge during the years 1797-9. They represent Herbart's
earliest thoughts on educational matters, but are otherwise
unimportant.
Herbart's lectures, on the other hand, represent his most
mature thought. They were delivered only a few years before
his death, and many years after the composition of the Allge-
meine Pddagogik. They are considerably easier in every respect
than that work.
Outlines of Edu/iational Doctrines. By J. F. Herbart. Translated
by A. F. Lange. Annotated by Charles de Garmo. (The
Macmillan Company.)
This work, despite its title, is really a translation of Herbart's
Lectures, and is thus a duplicate of the last work. With so
much Herbartian territory still untrodden {e.g., the works of
Dorpfeld) it is to be regretted that two authors should under-
take the same task.
Herbartian Literature in English 79
Still this translation is a good one ; moreover Dr. de Garmo's
notes touch upon some of the recent advances in American
pedagogy.
Herhart's A B G of Sense-Perception and Minor Pedagogical
Works. Translated, with Introduction, Notes and
Commentary, by W. J. Bckoff. (Appleton, New York ;
Arnold, London.)
This is a translation of several short works and addresses
produced or delivered by Herbart a few years after the com-
position of the Steiger letters. They are specially interesting
as dealing with Herhart's early views upon Pestalozzi ; the
educationist is feeling his way towards a more complete and
scientific system than that of his great contemporary and in-
spirer. The chief work in this volume [The ABC of Anschauung)
deals with the teaching of mathematics.
The Application of Psychology to the Science of Education. By
J. F. Herbart. Translated and Edited with Notes and
an Introduction to the Study of Herbart by Beatrice C.
Mulliner. (Sonnenschein.)
These letters were written during Herhart's Kbnigsberg period,
and represent much more mature views and wider experience
than the Steiger letters, the early works published at Gottingen,
and even the Allgemeine Pddagogik. Many of the passages con-
tained in them were subsequently employed in Herhart's Text-
book of Psychology. The present volume will be, perhaps, more
attractive to the majority of students on account of Miss
Mulliner's able Introduction than on account of the letters
themselves. The editor has illumined the subject with many
wise remarks and pertinent references ; she writes with ardour
and force.
A Text-book of Psychology. By J. F. Herbart. Translated by
Margaret K. Smith. (Appleton, New York ; Arnold,
London.)
Important for the student of Herhart's psychology, but re-
pellant, owing to its very condensation, to the average student.
8o The Critics of Herbartianism
Outlines of Pedagogics. By Prof. W. Eein. Translated by C.
C. and Ida J. van Liew, with additional notes by the
former. (Sonnenschein.)
This is a translation of Padagogik im Grundriss by the
prominent Herbartian upon whom has fallen the mantle of
Ziller. It is brief, but clear and admirable, and will convey to
most readers a favourable impression of modern Zillerianism.
The translator, in a few brief notes, has helped to show the
attitude of American thought towards the movement.
Introduction to the Pedagogy of Herbart. By C. Ufer. Author-
ised Translation from the Fifth German Edition under
the auspices of the Herbart Club. By J. C. Zinser.
Edited by Charles De Garmo. (Heath, Boston ; Isbister,
London.)
C. Ufer is a prominent German Zillerian. His work, here
translated through the activity of the American " Herbart Club,"
is similar in size and tone to Prof. Rein's.
Apperception. A Monograph on Psychology and Pedagogy. By
Dr. K. Lange. Translated by members of the Herbart
Club. Edited by Charles de Garmo. (Heath, Boston ;
Isbister, London.)
This magnificent work on the psychology of Apperception,
and on the pedagogical consequences and the historical develop-
ment of the doctrine, needs no praise. No other book, except
possibly Dorpfeld's Denken und Geddchtnis, has ever dealt
so ably with the subject. At the same time the translator's
terminology is confusing in one place, the word " perception '*
standing for what most British psychologists would call " sen-
sation ".
(2) Expositions of Hebbabtianism as Distinguished FBOSf
Tbanslations.
An Introduction to HerharVs Science and Practice of Education.
By Henry M..and Emmie Felkin. (Sonnenschein.)
This important work is probably the one from which most
Herbartian Literature in English 8 1
British students of Herbartianism have derived their first know-
ledge of the movement.
Beginning with a brief account of the present influential
position of the Herbartian system, the authors pass on to a
discussion of the psychological basis worked out by the founder.
This, and the following chapter on ethics, are both difificult, and
may repel many "practical teachers " who are pining for mere
" hints " ; though the writers have illuminated the somewhat
technical discussion with many a pertinent quotation, the ques-
tion presents itself whether a better procedure would not have
been to put the educational problem in the foreground and to
have worked backwards to psychology and ethics, somewhat
after Herbart's own fashion.
In chapter iii., where " practical pedagogy " is reached, the
meaning of " educative instruction " is expounded and the great
doctrine of many-sided Interest introduced. Then comes a very
full section on the " formal steps " and another on the " dual
theory of the concentration centres and historical culture epochs,"
that is, upon Ziller's development of Herbart's principles. Voigt's
criticism of this development is given in great fulness and will
be found highly valuable, as will also the full examples of
Zillerian procedure.
The writers translate Zucht by " Discipline " and Eegierung
by " Government ". While carefully pointing out (p. 156) the
ambiguity in the word " DiscipHne " (used by many British
teachers in the sense of mere " preservation of order ") they
use it in preference to " Training " as a translation of Zucht.
This is perhaps a mistake. It is better to translate Zucht
" Training " or " Moral Training," and Eegierung " Dis-
cipline ",
Herbart and the Herbartians. By Charles de Garmo.
(Heinemann.)
This book is similar in size and design to the last. Its
exposition of Herbart's own doctrines is, however, less full,
but this is compensated for by a good treatment of some of
Herbart's chief successors, Stoy, Ziller, Dr. Eein, Dr. Lange
6
82 The Critics of Herhartianistn
and Frick (Dorpfeld is strangely omitted), and by four chapters
on the development of Herbartianism in America. The chapters
on Stoy and Frick are specially noteworthy, inasmuch as these
two Herbartians are practically unknown to British readers.
Stoy, as already pointed out, was the leader of the moderate and
orthodox Herbartians, as distingmshed from the more revolu-
tionary Herbartians who followed Ziller. Frick was the head
of the great "Francke SH/tungen" at Halle, and in that capacity
worked out the application of Herbartian principles to secondary
schools, in which Zillerian " concentration " would be obviously
difficult.
An American educationist, whose name is not so well known
in Britain as it should be. Colonel Parker, worked out (partly, no
doubt, under Herbartian influence), a scheme of "concentration,"
very different, however, in, principle from Ziller's. Eeaders will
find details of this in Dr. de Garmo's book.
The Student's Herbart. A Brief Educational Monograph dealing
with the Movement Initiated by Herbart and Developed
by Stoy, Dorpfeld and Ziller. By F. H. Hayward.
(Sonnenschein.)
This brochure differs from most expositions of Herbartianism
in several respects. It is brief. Its thought moves regressively :
starting with the problem of moral evil the author works back-
wards to the need for Herbartian Interest, and then again
backwards to Apperception, Lastly, it contains a brief summary
of the supposed weaknesses of Herbartianism.
(3) Oriqinaii Wobks Showing the Influence of
Hebbartian Thought.
The Herbartian Psychology applied to Education. By J. Adams,
M.A., B.Sc. (Isbister.)
There are not many British books on education that deserve
the adjective " brilliant ". A William James may write spark-
ling Talks with Teachers, but William James lives in the stimu-
lating atmosphere of the Western Continent. The above work
Herbartian Literature in English 83
by the Professor of Education in the University of London is
British, yet it sparkles. It is, in its own way, unique.
" Herbartianism," says the writer, " has weaknesses, and
some of its rivals have points of superiority ; yet it seems to
me the best system for application to education." " It does
not follow that the writer is a Herbartian. It is enough that
he finds this system fits most readily into his own experience,
and seems to him best suited to explain educational facts to
others."
Prof. Adams has little patience with the humdrum empiri-
cism of the average schoolmaster, which impudently claims to
be " practical " and based on " experience ". " One main aim
of this book is to induce the cave-dwellers to move their heads.
It is unwillingness to turn round and look about them that
marks the true cave-dweUer. Many teachers are content to
play with the little black puppets of their school world, and
sturdily refuse to look beyond the school walls, or even to
admit that there is a beyond. . . . Certainly all that they know
about education has been known long ago." " The modest
schoolmaster is an arrogant and intolerant empiric. . . . Such
teachers haughtily resent any attempt to enlighten them."
The author proceeds to discuss the relation between psych-
ology and education, reviewing, in passing on towards Herbar-
tianism, the systems of Locke and Frobel.
He points out — it needed very much to be pointed out —
that Herbartianism and Frobelianism are, in appearance at any
rate, diametrically opposed. Herbart practically starts, not with
the mind, but with ideas.
The soul which he posits is "no more a real soul than it is a
real crater of a volcano. It has absolutely no content. . . .
What Locke did for innate ideas Herbart did for innate facul-
ties. . . . What he has taken from the soul he has transferred
to the ideas ; . . . these have a vitality aU their own."
The author follows with a lucid explanation of the appercep-
tion doctrine, one of the best expositions, in a brief form, to
be found in our language. He shows how this doctrine goes
beyond mere associationism ; " the associationist explains very
84 The Critics of Herbartianism
clearly why each of the ideas has come into the dome of
consciousness in which it is found, but he neglects to explain
why the same idea does not follow the same word in each
case ". It is a case of " apperception masses," not of mere
associational links. Again, " if Herbartianism did nothing more
than emphasise the fact that no two people ever have exactly
the same idea, and particularly that no master and pupil can
ever have the same idea, it would justify its existence ". The
cry for " things, not words " would only " substitute one fallacy
for another ; things are not a whit better than words in ensur-
ing that the same idea shall be called up in two minds. . . . The
average child does not see what the master is showing him. . . .
The Herbartian has none of that reverence for hard facts so
characteristic of the ' plain man '." In other words, the " ap-
perception masses " of each individual, even of each child,
vitally influence the cognition of any new experience ; " unlike
most psychologies, Herbart's has an obvious and immediate
bearing upon education," and indeed (though Prof. Adams
merely hints at this and does not work it out into detail) upon
morality and conduct. " If the idea that the soul ought to
choose is not there to choose, what can the soul do but choose
amiss? "
Chapter v. deals with " Formal Education " and is immensely
valuable, in view of the pretensions, alike of classical teachers,
of advocates of " heuristic " methods, and of admirers of the
" three E's " as the main pabulum of the primary school.
These three classes are united in discounting knowledge or
ideas, and in laying stress upon certain activities. " There is
a prevailing impression . . . that it really does not matter very
much what one learns. The culture comes all the same. It is
not the what ; it is the how." Prof. Adams exposes the fallacy
of all this. The great thing is ideas, apperception-masses.
Education in crime is " formally " as high as education in the
classics ; orchard-robbing, for example, calls out prudence, fore-
thought, caution, observation, firmness, and so forth. " The
soul is not a mere knife that may be sharpened on any whet-
stone, and when sharpened may be applied to any purpose.
Herbartian Literature in English 85
The knife takes the character from the whetstone." " We can-
not separate the mind from its content. . . . Above all, it is
certain that we cannot exercise the mind in vacuo. . . . The
choice of subjects is important ; a subject must be chosen for
its own sake, not for the sake of its general effect in training
the mind."
Then follows another chapter on the apperception doctrine ;
the limitations of "observation" are pointed out; and then
come several other luminous chapters, not very distinctively
Herbartian.
In his final chapter, that on Interest, Prof. Adams discusses
the relation between Interest and Attention, and between
Interest and Apperception : he shows, from the Herbartian
standpoint, the folly of imposing drudgery on children in order
to " train " them for the battle of life — the theory which largely
dominates the procedure of didactic " formalists " ; " the theory
of interest," he says, " does not propose to banish drudgery, but
only to make drudgery tolerable by giving it a meaning " : in
relation to this he again lays stress — as every Herbartian does
— on a worthy content for all studies ; " it is not necessary
to go to Eome in order to learn Latin, . . . but it is necessary
that it should be learnt as something having a meaning in
itself, not as a mere exercise ".
The author concludes the most racy book on education in the
English language with an indication of how Herbartianism may
be destined to join hands ultimately with Frobel's more organic
view of life. " The latest word of the Herbartians deposes
interest from its place as the first principle of education and
makes it rank second to the principle of self-realisation.
Interests must be tested by their efifect on the child's develop-
ment, viewed in connection with its place in the organic unity
of the world in which it has to live."
Primer on Teaching, with Special Beference to Sunday School
Work. By J. Adams, M.A., B.Sc, Professor of Education
in the University of London. (T. & T. Clark.)
Herbartianism in the Sunday School ! In this little book
Prof. Adams applies educational principles — including the
86 The Critics of Herbartianism
Herbartian " formal steps " — to the work of Biblical teaching.
Probably the most valuable chapter is the one in which the
" steps " are expounded and illustrated ; and the section on
the Socratic method, with illustrations in Prof. Adams's
characteristic style, is excellent.
We find, as we should expect, the usual Herbartian emphasis
on ideas ; "they do seem to have a power of their own".
" Temptation consists in the effort of an idea to realise itself."
We find likewise the Herbartian emphasis on creating healthy
interests rather than on denouncing evil ; "we must fight evil
indirectly by supplying ideas of good ". " The kind of apper-
ception masses in the mind really determines what kind of mind
it is." Apperception and Interest are therefore vital. " The
business of the teacher is so to arrange the ideas in the mind of
the pupil that apperceptive attention to desirable things will be
aroused." Even the sowing of almost chance ideas may result
in a subsequent harvest ; "very often the teacher must intro-
duce ideas into the mind of the pupil, not so much for their
immediate importance as for the use to be made of them at
some future lesson ".
Herbartian though he is, and strong opponent of purely
"formal" teaching, Prof. Adams recognises some value in the
"training" ideal of the formalists. "The process of working
for the rule gives the mind a certain amount of training. The
mind is a better mind because it has done this particular bit of
work."
Principles of Class Teaching. By Dr. J. J. Findlay. (Mac-
millan.)
Though he admits his indebtedness to Herbartian writers
like Prof. Eein, Dr. Findlay would object to be labelled " Her-
bartian ". The label might be regarded as implying an absence
of originality. Nevertheless, an examination of his book reveals
the fact that, though it is an original and valuable contribution
to British educational literature, its merits are entirely those
which distinguish Herbartian books. If Dr. Findlay is not an
Herbartian there are no Herbartians in existence.
Herbartian Literature in English 87
Character-forming is the end of education ; every subject in
the time table must be challenged as to its power of helping to
worthy living. " We acknowledge the final supremacy of the
ethical ideal." Technological subjects may be admitted into
the upper classes of the school, but the teaching of them must
be distinguished from education proper. Currency arithmetic
should be excluded except from upper classes. The school must
no longer be subjected to the " vulgar ideals of the nineteenth
century ". Surely this is the voice of Herbart !
Dr. Findlay is a humanist, though other claims than those of
humanism are recognised. For each month or six weeks we
should select "some central theme of great humanistic interest"
capable of easy correlation with other groups. He approves of
fairy tales for the young, but prefers to regard them as luxury
rather than as staple food.
Two doctrines, each of enormous educational importance, stand
out clearly in Dr. Findlay's book, the two doctrines upon which
Ddrpfeld laid stress. Our writer is under no obligations to
the Westphalian schoolmaster, but he has arrived at the same
results.
The first doctrine is that the conferring of skill or dexterity
{e.g., in language, in writing, etc.) obeys a different set of educa-
tional laws than the conferring of knowledge ; the " formal
steps," which are valuable in the latter procedure, are inapplic-
able to the former. " The chief error of the strict Herbartians
seems to He in their attempt to regard the Arts as subservient to
the same laws of method which apply to branches of knowledge.
Music, Drawing, Eeading are all brought by Ziller and Eein
under the scheme of the Five Steps." " While in Instruction
we proceed from sense-observation to perception and conception,
in Performance we proceed from sense observation or (to use a
more convenient term) from contemplation to active imitation."
But for their proper task, the conferring of knowledge, the five
steps are admirable, though they have their dangers ; " the
followers of Herbart in Germany have here achieved results
which cannot be assailed except on minor points ". Dr. Findlay's
account of the steps is one of the clearest and most judicial in
88 The Critics of Herbartianism
the English language ; he summarises them thus : " first ob-
servation, then varied observation, comparison with earlier
observation, and finally — as the crown and completion of these
particular experiences — the new, higher form of thought ". He
conveniently uses the word " Section " as equivalent to the
German " method-unit ".
The second doctrine which is prominent in Dr. Findlay's book
is that the " knowledge " subjects, being those that awaken the
keenest interest and build up the " circle of thought " (all action
springs out of this " circle "), must be more central in the cur-
riculum than formal subjects and dexterities. This was precisely
the contention of Dorpfeld,^ and Dr. Findlay works it out in
a more systematic way than has ever yet been attempted in
English. There must be a worthy "content" to our studies,
worthy and rich ideas. Mere mental gymnastic is of little use
unless employed upon such a worthy " content ".
The following quotations will illustrate Dr. Findlay's view on
this question : —
" Cleverness and skill in the forms of Art degrade the worker
unless his mind and heart are filled with worthy ' content ' asso-
ciated with those ' forms '." If there is anything worthy of study
in the life and hterature of the French people let us learn
French ; if there is nothing worthy we might as well learn
Fiji ; the latter would be as much a gymnastic as French.
" The subject-matter of language teaching must be derived
from the topics familiar to the child's circle of ideas," e.g., the
Humanities and the Occupations ; " the advantage of cor-
relation is obvious ". Grammar, likewise, can scarcely claim
independent treatment as an abstract science ; it is rather to
be subordinated to practical language exercises ; it is a mistake
to divorce it and panegyrise it as a mental gymnastic. Similarly
philology must be subordinated to hterature ; " the decay of
the faculty-psychology has led to a distrust of language teach-
ing as a special medium for mental discipline ". So with music,
drawing, and other more or less "formal" subjects; unless
^ Grundlinien einer Theorie des Lehrplans.
Herbartian Literature in English 89
they are associated with a worthy subject-matter or " content "
their value is slight. Dr. Findlay " distrusts the cultivation of
any art merely for its own sake ". We must (in music) start
with songs possessing a worthy content ; an interest in the
technique of the art comes later. " The teacher of art must
be permitted to take the child step by step through the exercises
necessary to attain skill, but in the choice of models and of
subjects he is bound to submit to the suggestions offered from
the Humanities, the Occupations, Nature-study, etc., of the
general syllabus."
The above remarks are wholly in the spirit of Dorpfeld ;
subjects which convey "ideas" must form the centre of the
curriculum. Many of Dr. Findlay's other suggestions are in
the direction of "concentration" or " correlation ". He is up
in arms against any syllabus — overcrowded, as is usually the
case — whose parts are scrappy and disconnected. " One lesson
per week in Drawing or Science is bound to spell failure, especi-
ally if these pursuits are conducted without relation to other
studies." Isolated biographies are of little use. It is "hopeless"
to teach the Bible, or anything else, in scraps. Geometrical
Drawing is oflScially separated from theoretical Geometry!
Miscellaneous scrappy "Eeaders" are rightly being discarded
in favour of books called Historical, Geographical, or Science
Eeaders, which correlate the acquirement of the art of reading
with some other branch of study. " Concentration " will help
the teacher in various ways, and conduce to that " unity of the
pupil's life" which is the j&nal goal of teaching. The teacher
of science or history must not ignore such things as composi-
tion. History and literature should be brought together and
treated together ; they form the Humanities. Natural science
depends partly for its success on being correlated with practical
work in workshops. The educational value of practical pursuits
is not sufficiently recognised; "the elementary school of the
nineteenth century has created a gulf between the pursuits of
home and the pursuits of school which must somehow be
bridged over ". Sloyd is now being adapted to the needs of the
Physical Laboratory.
90 The Critics of Herbartianism
" We advocate the doctrine of Concentration as a practical and
essential contribution to the theory of the curriculum." At least
in the case of young children, " results are decisive enough to
enable us to speak confidently of the advantages of a scheme of
study which centres round one theme ". But for older children
" the utmost we can do is to be prepared for such associations
as present themselves — to put our mathematics, for example, on
a basis of Physical Science, our Arts of Expression into rela-
tionship with the Humanities, and our Arts of Eepresentation
into relationship with the Humanities and with Nature Know-
ledge ".1 Still " concentration " has its limits ; " some pursuits
cannot by any ingenuity be brought into the " circle ".
Dr. Findlay has been criticised for attacking the "frankly
empirical" tone of most British works on education. But his
standpoint is the inevitable one for any educationist influenced
by Herbart. " We can only establish education as a profes-
sional pursuit by devoting to its study the same elaborate care,
the same spirit of devotion to our profession, as we witness in
other callings which have won the confidence of the public."
We must seek " a scientific basis for our work ". Every new
course of study must present " a new scientific problem ".
DiflBcult pupils should especially awaken in the professional
teacher a sense of professional pride. " There is an immense
field of exploration awaiting teachers who have a psychological
equipment."
School and Home Life. By F. G. Eooper, M.A. (A. Brown &
Sons.)
Though the name of Herbart is scarcely mentioned once in
this volume of high-toned essays, the ideas of Herbart and his
followers are everywhere to the fore. One essay (" The Pot of
Green Feathers ") is an exposition, carried out in a fresh and
untechnical manner, of the doctrine of Apperception. Though
the book makes " no claim for originality," it is stimulating and
inspiring.
^ This sentence, which sunamarises much of Dr. Findlay's book, is one of
the most important in recent British educational literature.
Herbartian Literature in English ' 91
There are so few educationists who are in earnest over the
moral aspects of education that Mr. Eooper's words — which
remind us of Ziller's claim that mauy-sided Interest is " a pro-
tection against passions " — are doubly welcome. " You want
to combat drinking and gambling. . . . Many youths (though
not all) may be induced to avoid such temptations ... if you
only provide them with other occupations." Mr. Rooper, in
this connection, sees much value in manual dexterities, but
his argument is obviously applicable to the whole curriculum.
" All teachers are missionaries by profession " is a bold state-
ment, but Mr. Rooper makes it, and it illustrates the spirit of
his book.
Many of his best suggestions concern manual training, Sloyd,
the kindergarten, etc. ; manual work he regards as a necessary
part of the curriculum, not for technical, but for educational
reasons. But Mr. Rooper remains essentially a humanist and
an Herbartian. " I believe that an intelligent study of the Bible
and Shakespeare, and of classical English writers, is incom-
parably more important than . . . manual training." Only
through literature can imagination and taste be developed.
Cruelty is largely due to defective imagination. Children must
be " assisted to admire heroism in all its forms ". Fairy tales,
fables, allegories, etc., are therefore of immense value. " If
any one thinks that it would be better if the child's mind could
move only in the sphere of the exact, I would reply (1) that this
does not seem to be nature's process ; (2) that looking to the
mode of growth of the mind it does not seem even possible ; and
(3) that if you try to keep the child's mind to exactness you
may clip and pluck the wings of imagination. Now without
imagination there is little advance in knowledge, little discovery
in the sphere of morality." But no " treatise on elementary
ethics " is advisable for schools.
Mr. Rooper's Herbartianism is still more obvious in his
suggestions for concentration or correlation. Dislocation in
one's thought-masses results in inconsistencies of character ;
the child does not grow up " a single self " ; "a man may become
like a musical box which can play two quite different tunes ",
92 TTie Critics of Herbartianistn
Isolated thoughts are powerless ; apperception must take place
before thoughts can rouse interest or exert influence. " The
main fault of the present routine in Standards I. and II. is the
isolated way in which each subject is treated." The teacher
must " find ways of connecting together, not merely the parts
of one study, but different studies with each other ". The
science of number must be kept in close connection with natural
history, history, geography, and even stories dealing with family
life ; the intelligent apprehension of number has been hindered
by the isolation of its study, an isolation which was opposed
by Frobel's system. Early reading lessons should be based on
object lessons rather than on " readers ". Object teaching,
language teaching, drawing, and modelling should be mutually
connected. Beading, writing, and speaking should similarly be
interwoven. Songs should be connected with children's studies
and occupations. Natural science, philology and art shoiild be
treated as one subject for young children. Art and literature
should illustrate each other, e.g., a picture may serve to con-
centrate a number of studies. Studies in natural history should
contain conduct lessons. The motto for evening schools should
be, " Concentrate your studies, group your instruction round
one central subject ".
Not mere external '* discipline " or " training " will make a
perfect man. Like every Herbartian, Mr. Eooper lays stress
on moral insight and therefore on instruction. *' Good habits
are not by themselves a complete education." His own scheme
of " concentration " would " tend to humanise children ". What
studies are pre-eminently character-forming? Not the three E's;
they cannot be regarded as the essence of elementary education,
and indeed they can be better taught if the curriculum is not
confined to them. " For the three E's, I substitute Nature and
Human Nature as the epitome of educational studies. Of these
twins neither should be neglected, although the latter is the
more important." Pupils must be made acquainted "through
literary studies with the best side of human nature ". Stories
from Grimm, stories from history, and so forth, are of supreme
character-forming importance,
Herbartian Literature in English 93
The value of formal grammar is not great ; even as a guide
to speech it leads astray as often as it helps. But practice
in actual composition is immensely important.
In the important essay, " Drawing in Evening Schools "
(based partly on the researches of M. Passy), Mr. Eooper
traces out the bearings of apperception upon elementary draw-
ing, and shows how easily the senses are misled when a draw-
ing " type " pre-exists in the mind.
Mr. Eooper, in all the above suggestions, is in full conformity
with Herbartianism. His conformity is less when he bestows
genuine though not lavish praise upon the classical curriculum
of public schools. " The teacher (in such schools) mistrusts the
growth of a receptive attitude in his class." Composing in Greek
or Latin encourages independent mental activity. It is a mis-
take for the teacher to make the lesson too easy. [Herbart
himself would agree with this, though some modern Herbar-
tians tend towards " soft pedagogy ".] Mr. Eooper is, however,
strictly Herbartian when he points out that " feelings are
linked together, not directly, but through the mediation of
thought," words which remind us of the dictum that " action
springs out of the circle of thought ",
Every Herbartian boasts proudly of being " scientific " ; he
is no despiser of " theory," no worshipper of " common-sense ".
Nor is Mr. Eooper. " Common-sense is not the ordinary judg-
ment which every one possesses, but the rare judgment of which
every one approves." " I believe that the studies of German
writers on education help to solve such (educational) mysteries; "
there exists " an inexhaustible gold mine of educational philo-
sophy " for those who choose to biirrow into it.
Introduction to the Herbartian Principles of Teaching. By
Catherine I. Dodd. (Sonnenschein.)
Miss Dodd sees how disastrously un-educative {i.e., non-forma-
tive of character) most of our schools are, and enthusiastically
advocates reform along Zillerian lines.
The book possesses one defect. The authoress too closely
identifies the Herbartian movement with the narrower Zillerian
94 The Critics of Herbartianism
movement ; Herbart is described as an advocate of the " culture
epochs " doctrine (which, except to a limited extent, he scarcely
was ; in fact his presentational psychology was out of sympathy
with a doctrine essentially one of heredity); "the Herbartians "
(instead of " some Herbartians ") are said to " place history as
the centre of all the subjects to be studied ". Except for this
defect — due to the fact that great Herbartians like Dorpfeld
have not yet attracted the attention of British authors to the
extent that Ziller has — Miss Dodd's book is admirable, and
immensely more inspiring and suggestive than the " school-
management " books studied by most teachers.
The great feature of the work is the strong case it presents
for the teaching of fairy-tales, history, and literature ; in fact for
the Gesinnungs-unterricht of the Zillerians. " True history
teaching should place before all the children in the country
noble and great men, and so help to raise them to a higher moral
level. ... If striking examples of goodness, courage, truth,
and falsehood from the pages of the Bible or profane history are
put before children they form their own moral judgments
very readily. . . . Our Arthur, Alfred, Eichard the Lion-hearted,
and Cranmer might become part of the life of every English
child if we gave history the position it merits in our primary
schools."
She recommends the use, when possible, of original historical
sources ; the giving of some definite ideas concerning general
historical sequence ; and also the touching, lightly but really,
upon the history of other countries than our own. With history
goes literature. " The reading of literature in school has a high
moral influence," and yet " rarely do children acquire either
the power of reading aloud intelligently or a taste for good
literature ".
Great stress is, of course, laid upon " concentration," inter-
preted along Zillerian lines. Isolation and scrappiness are the
bane of biblical and similar teaching. Miss Dodd's detailed
suggestions for " concentration " in the lower classes are excel-
lent ; Bobinson Crusoe, the^ story of the Armada, are to form
centres for the attachment of various material. But why "con-
Herbartian Literature in English 95
centrate " ? One readily sees various advantages ; interest is
increased, not merely transitory interest, but true permanent
interest ; memory is strengthened, and a logical memory is
developed; the pressure of an overwhelming number of sub-
jects is taken off the time-table. Concentration will help us
to proportion our subjects according to natural relationships
existing between them, and to get rid of quantities of irrele-
vant subject-matter which text-books are constantly offering.
" Isolated ideas are feebly impressed and easily forgotten."
The " culture-stages " doctrine is advocated ; " children are
psychically nearer to remote ages than to the present ". Like
every Herbartian, Miss Dodd also attacks the exaggerated im-
portance often given to " formal studies ". " They are only
means to an end." " We read because we want to get at
ideas."
Nature Studies and Fairy-Tales. By Catherine I. Dodd.
(Nelson.)
Miss Dodd is the best English writer on the fairy-tale ques-
tion, and her suggestions relative to the employment of such
tales, together with nursery rhymes, Greek legends, and similar
matter, would have been referred to in connection with her
Introduction, except that in the present work she has dealt
much more fully with the question. There can be no doubt
as to the excellence of the scheme she has worked out for the
lower classes of schools Fairy-tales offer so many points of
contact with " nature " that there is every reason for combining
their study with the study of nature, in other words, of apply-
ing here the principle of " concentration ". Drawing and
plaster work are also suggested as further applications of the
concentration principle.
The book contains a whole series of lessons and suggestions
which will prove of great value to the teacher of junior classes,
while for educationists in general Miss Dodd's lengthy and able
defence of the use of fairy-tales, and her history of the fairy-tale
question cannot fail to be of interest. She makes use of the
" five steps " of Herbart and Ziller.
96 Tlu Critics of Herbartianism
Interest and Education. By Charles de Garmo. (The Mac-
millan Company.)
This book marks an advance from what may be called the
primitive Interest doctrine, which ignores, or passes lightly
over, the innate outward-going tendencies of the child, to the
more advanced form of the doctrine, which eagerly avails itself
of these tendencies. The work thus represents a kind of
synthesis of Herbartianism with FrobeUanism, and also, be
it added, with the " heuristic " doctrine, and with Spencer's
doctrine of the primary importance of life-preserving studies.
In fact the Herbartianism of the book is observable mainly or
solely in the emphasis on Interest.
This " Interest " is to be a form of " self-expression ". " This
mental activity, taking root first in the instincts and impulses
of the physical nature, and developing into conscious desire for
the realisation of certain ends, is at bottom nothing but the
effort to express self in accordance with the varying ideals im-
planted by physical nature, or developed by growing insight into
the ideal nature of the man." " Interest is a feeling that accom-
panies the idea of self-expression. ... It has its primary root
in inherited impulse."
Great stress is laid on the active side of mental Ufe. " Our
greatest lack ... is the meagreness of opportunity for vigorous
outgoing motor expression." The writer is in one place grimly
humorous. "It is some comfort to the teacher to know that
... he cannot wholly spoil a thoroughly active mind, or en-
tirely counteract the influence of the outside world of achieve-
ment. Yet our school education should be of a character actively
to promote the quaUties that lead to survival." " Education has
to give permanent and strong interests in the realities of life."
The view that lays stress on self-expression corrects two
opposite errors, (1) the theory of effort, " that the sheer dead
lift of will is the only sure means of getting the child to the goal
and the only way whereby his mind can be trained to do the
hard things that are sure to confront him in later life " ; (2) the
method of coaxing by means of pleasurable excitations.
The " heuristic" element in Dr. de Garmo's book is seen in
Herbartian Literature in English 97
combination with the Interest doctrine. " As soon as school
work assumes the form of problems to be solved by the self-
activity of the pupils, we have at once a concrete application of
the doctrine of interest." But the school has not to engage in
" mere shadow or imitation discoveries ".
l^otes of Lessons on the Herbartian Method. {Based on Her-
bart's Plan.) By M. Fennel and Members of a Teaching
Staff. (Longmans.)
It is painful to have to criticise this book. Except for a brief
preface, to the correctness of which no exception can be taken,
the book contains scarcely a trace of Herbartianism from begin-
ning to end. The " five steps " employed by the " teaching
staff" are, for the most part, not Herbartian steps at all. " Ee-
capitulation," here given as the "fifth step," is not recognised as
one at all by the Herbartians ; a " step " implies progress, not
movement over the same ground. Again, Ziller's doctrine that
the aim of the lesson should be clearly stated to the class at
or near the beginning of the lesson, is apparently misunderstood
by the authors, though a saving clause has been introduced into
the preface. Thus we find as the aim of the first lesson in the
volume, "To exercise imagination of class and lead them to
know the origin of English Prose and Poetry ". Conceive of a
Zillerian saying to his pupils : " Now children, the aim of this
lesson is to exercise your imagination ! " In a so-called " object
lesson " on a horse (the lesson should really be called an " in-
formation lesson," for the object is only shown in a picture) the
" application " (step four) consists of such mere information as
that when alive the horse is the chief beast of burden in temper-
ate climates. This may be an " application " of the horse, but it
is not an " application " of the knowledge acquired in a lesson ;
in short, the writer wholly fails to grasp the meaning of " appli-
cation " in the Herbartian system.
Clearly Herbartianism, like Frobelianism, will have to be
saved from those supposed friends, who, with inadequate know-
ledge of its principles, seek to guide others in the application
of them.
PART IV.
THE CRITICS OF HBRBARTIANISM.
SECTION I.
DITTES.
(1884-86.)
References.
Dittos. Padagogium, 1884, p. 296.
1885, pp. 437, 505, 573, 637.
1886, pp. 500, 580.
Just. Jahrhuch des Vereins fUr wissenschaftliche PSdagogik, 1886, p.
212.
Glockner. Pddagogisclie Studien, 1886, p. 193.^
Thilo and Fliigel. Dittes ilber die praktische und theoretische PhUosophie
Herbarts (Beyer, Langensalza).
In the history of the Herbartian question the Dittes controversy
is one of first importance in view of its magnitude and virulence.
It sprang up during the two or three critical years when from
almost every side fierce attacks came in, and when the two
leaders of the movement, Stoy and Ziller, could no longer
engage in the task of defence. Herbartianism, moreover, was
torn by internal discord. Men like Frohlich and Sallwiirk had
apostatized from Zillerianism ; Stoy, before his death, had
definitely broken with the extremists, and these, in response,
^In this same number is an .article, entitled, "Dr. Dittes as Director of
the Vienna Padagogium," intended to show that Dittes was a man " without
character, without conscience, and without fidelity to duty ".
Dittes 99
had developed an acerbity and touchiness which were excep-
tional even in the painful annals of German controversies. The
criticisms offered by Dittes were studiously moderate in tone ;
the retorts of his antagonists were the opposite. He was guilty
of " crafty mendacity " and unintelligence, and deserved to have
his journal confiscated for its "radical" tendencies. Dittes, it
should be remarked, was a prominent Vienna educationist.
The first article in Pddagogium (1884) was a review of the
work of the ex-Zillerian Frohlich. " Where," asks Dittes, " is
this boasted ' scientific pedagogy ' about which even its adherents
quarrel ? It seems like the machine of which some one said,
' It is very good, and has only one defect, that it doesn't work '."
The 1885 articles were more important.
Beginning with Herbart's psychology, Dittes shows that the
doctrine of " reals," according to which the soul is absolutely
simple, devoid of faculties, etc., is quite useless. In fact, the
metaphysical doctrine of Being is a fatal stumbling-block to
Herbart's system. He constantly oscillates between appearance
or happening and real Being. Ordinary mental processes are
mere appearance ; the " real " soul is already " ripe " and in-
capable of development. Herbart cannot deny experience, but
he reduces it to a fiction. ^ Eeal knowledge lies beyond man's
grasp.
Dittes then reviews Herbart's ethics, dealing successively
with his emphasis on the " aesthetic judgment," with the
avowed absence of a single unifying idea,^ and with the
inability of the ethics to give practical guidance. He then
proceeds to criticise the " five moral ideas ". Logically, Her-
^ One must omit most of the metaphysical discussion. Dittes' result is
probably correct. Herbart here appears as a Kantian. But still we can learn
much from the phenomenological side of his work.
^ Herbart expressly warned men against trying to make ethics into a
sham unity. Our judgments are disparate and must remain so. But
Thilo contends that Herbart's ethics really has a unity, inasmuch as it
is based on the sesthetic judgment passed on will-relations. All harmony
rests on diversity.
loo The Critics of Herbartianism
bart's system of ideas suffers from the defect that the first
(Inner Freedom) stands for a relation of Will to Insight, not
of Will to Will. The real content of morality is given by the
other four, and we cannot get a fifth idea out of the relation
of the Will to these four. Thus, the first idea is not co-ordinate
with the others.
Id&a of Perfection} — Unless a Will be morally good, its
Perfection (in Herbart's sense), that is its Intensity, Extensity,
and Concentration, arouses no approval. We do not praise a
strong-minded robber. Herbart's second idea stands rather for
physical and intellectual than for moral eminence. ^
Idea of Benevolence. — But why should my Will devote itself
to the Will of another person ? Surely only on the ground of
welfare ? Am I to support the will of a robber ?
Idea of Bight or Laio. — " Strife displeases." Does it always ?
May I not rightly strive to save something imperilled ? Were
prophets and reformers wrong in stirring up strife? Must an
assaulted person do nothing 9^ Significant that when Herbart's
countrymen were struggling against Napoleon, he himself re-
mained in his empty Konigsberg classroom. He was consistent
with his doctrine that " strife displeases" ! His fourth idea is
too rigid. We must not forbid strife altogether.
^ Better, " Breadth and efficiency of Will ". The word " Perfection "
scarcely suggests Herbart's meaning.
2 This raises a vastly important point. Herbart regarded each of his
five ideas as unmoral when taken alone, in abstraction. He explicitly says
[Lectures, § 17) that the second idea is not in itself adequate to determine
virtue, "for that can never be done by any one practical idea alone".
But Herbart regarded strength and breadth of character as a vital element
in the complete moral life. Here comes in his stress on many-sided
Interest, a notion closely related to the second moral idea. We do not
value hardness in a diamond if the latter be devoid of brilliance. But
each quality is valuable in the other's company. So with Ruskin's Ideas
of Relation, Ideas of Power, etc. Abstraction is not separation. Thus
the objection of Dittes has been anticipated. The same kind of answer
is to be made in connection with the Idea of Benevolence.
* Again the same answer. There are five ideas ; any one is an ab-
straction.
Dittes loi
Idea of Equity or Fairness. — Is it true that every deed, good
or bad, must be recompensed after its kind ? Does an un-
compensated good deed displease ? Surely not ! It shines
with an added brilliancy. Again, evil deeds do not displease
because unrequited, but because evil. One evil deed recom-
pensed by another ! Herbart himself admitted that the difficult
idea of Equity may conflict with that of Benevolence.^
Again, can "Taste" be a sure foundation for moraHty?^
Surely one person's " Taste " may conflict with another's !
Have the ideas any force ? No, they are powerless, as indeed
is Herbart's entire system of Ethics, which is " devoid of every
trace of heroism and energy".^
Then, as to Herbart's pedagogy ; does this rest securely, as
he says, on his ethics and psychology ? In point of fact his
psychology gives us only a presentation-mechanism which
awakens nothing but horror and which excludes soul-life and
real development. The " soul " itself remains stiff and im-
potent. Herbart's ethics likewise give us nothing to aim at.
The moral ideas, as already said, have no force.
Again, the distinction of Regierung from Zucht is of dubious
vaHdity. The former appears almost as a stranger living at the
cost of its two companions, Zucht and Unterricht. Begierung
is said to care only for the present while Zucht cares for the
future — surely an unnecessary distinction, for all Education
must look after both present and future. If Eegierung is
uneducative why mention it?*
^The fifth idea is certainly a difficult one, but yet it seems to exist.
What else do we mean by approving of Gratitude and (as Butler did) of
Resentment ? Let us remember again the ahstractness of Herbart's ideas ;
they are not to be taught as such to children.
2 Herbart merely means "immediate Intuition". The ideas are not
products of reasoning. They are based on "insight".
^ Surely it is important to apprehend the moral law, though it is equally
important for our inclinations and habits to conform to it [Lectures, § 9).
■* The reply of Just is conclusive. Herbart's distinctions are useful to
be known, but need not be carried as such into practice. Herbart's
classification shows the educator where the needs lie, and prevents the
errors which spring from mental confusion. A "good disciplinarian" is
I02 The Critics of Herbartianisni
Herbart came nearest to the true view when he said that the
Idea of Perfection suggested soundness of body and mind, a
"coming to the full " of a child's powers. Why did he not
follow out this Pestalozzian concept, "the harmonious develop-
ment of all powers " ? Herbart answers that the second idea
does not stand for the whole of Virtue. The reason is that he
has narrowed it down.
He lived remote from the world and did not know children,
hence his error that Virtue is the only end of Education; hence
also his dragging in of aesthetic and religious culture under
" Interest "; likewise his reduction of Feeling and Will to pre-
sentations, and his superficial treatment of the culture of the
dispositions and of the body. We cannot say he actually forgot
any of the chief ends of Education, but his subordination of
them to Virtue made their treatment irrational.^
Herbart's psychology excluded any sensible survey of mental
life. Facts like race, nationality, and sex were ignored.
He laid great stress on Virtue as the end of Education. But
has he, with all his stress on " educative Instruction," shown
us the path to Virtue ? No ; towards the end of his life his
confidence in Instruction grew faint. It is necessary, he tells
us, that what is learnt be fdt. Individual differences may
hamper our task ; the things learnt may be forgotten ; the
environment may corrupt, and all our precautions be in vain.^
not necessarily a good educator. Herbart expressly says : " In practice,
Regierung and Zucht combine " {Lectures, § 42).
^ Just retorts that when Dittes divides Education into aesthetic, moral,
etc., he is really assuming separate faculties and separate exercises for
each faculty. But this gets rid of all unity in Education, and may even
result in a conflict of studies, and the creation of distinct " circles of
thought ". Moreover such a division encourages Egoism ; Intellect would
be encouraged apart from Morality. [There is truth on both sides. Certain
practical distinctions must be made ; but still the Herbartian doctrine is
useful as laying stress on the unity of all education. It is a great mistake
to isolate different departments, e.g., "sacred " subjects. Let us have one
" circle of thought " if possible.]
■■' That Herbart became less enthusiastic towards the end of his life was
not surprising. We must remember that the General Pedagogy was a
Dittes 103
His original view of moral Education was spoilt by his per-
verted notion of the origin of the Will ; he overestimates the
value of intellectual culture and therefore of Instruction.
What a heterogeneous mass of conceptions he gives us ! He
tells us that the teacher must bring singly to actuality the two
members of Inner [Freedom (Insight and Will) ; then the two
must be connected. Then, as a fourth step, Effort is to actualise
morality permanently. As further factors come inclinations
and habits.^
At one moment we hear of "many-sided Interest" as the
goal, at another of " Perfection ".^ Good maxims are said to
come from the aesthetic judgment, but this, on its part, only
works powerfully when woven into the total Interest.
Whence come the five moral ideas ? Herbart says the soul
is absolutely simple, even without faculties ; how then can it
give rise to these ideas ? Are they their own father ? And how
can they fuse to a unity ? ^
Herbart speaks of children passing judgments on others
juvenile book. Glockner retorts on Dittes that though Herbart may have
come to admit the feeble influence of Instruction, he equally emphasised
the v?eak influence of Zucht or Training ; and he never denied that the
Will was rooted in the circle of thought.
1 Just replies that Dittes is again regarding distinctions drawn for clear-
ness' sake as separate stages. Moral Insight is not formed apart from Feel-
ing, and this is brought about by the observation of images of human action.
The aesthetic judgment is not cold, but involves a feeling of sympathy
with the perceived acts. All the several tasks of moral Education really
go on side by side. Attempt and Action give rise to Will, and this renders
Training necessary. [Herbart expressly says, " We can seldom wait for
the development of the aesthetic judgment"; Lectures, § 27. Dittes has
here again, as in his criticisms of the Moral Ideas and of Regierung and
Zucht, regarded abstract distinctions as separate stages, quite contrary to
Herbart's intention.]
^ The second moral idea is undoubtedly connected closely with many-
sided Interest. But Glockner rightly replies that Herbart never put for-
ward either of these notions as the complete goal of Education.
^ Glockner replies, " The ideas arise along with their objects. Every re-
action must be different for each different experience. If the soul were
not simple we might then rightly ask, ' Whence the fusion ? ' "
104 "J^he Critics of Herbartianisni
before themselves — thus, of judgment apart from moral dis-
position. But the writer has never seen such a naked judgment
in children.^
The moral ideas, Herbart tells us, are without force. If so,
whence comes the motive force? By the ideas becoming
involved in Interest, we are told ; Training must be connected
with Instruction. But yet Herbart constantly tells us that
the Will is rooted in presentations ; so whence comes the real
and original spring of the moral life ? Even Interest (rooted
in presentations) cannot yield it. His doctrine is false to facts
and also to Christianity, which says that action springs from the
heart, not from the circle of thought.^
The presentational doctrine is false. A child has numberless
pleasures, pains, desires, etc., before presentations. ^ Again Effort
is not always directed to the freeing of checked presentations ;
on the contrary, it often aims at freeing from some disagreeable
presentation.
Herbart's whole scheme of mental statics and dynamics is
false, and, therefore, his scheme of " educative Instruction " is
false also. Character-strength, with him, rests on " great masses
of thought-material which work a deep resultant feeling ". Chris-
tianity says, " Blessed are the poor in spirit " ! A poor peasant
wife may have a finer character than the most learned professor.*
Alas for men if the most precious of things is dependent upon
deep thought ! Again, it is not true that opposed presentations
always darken and check each other; they often clarify each other.
The longer Herbart lived the more he came to see that other
1 Just retorts, " Then Dittes must know children very badly. Any
mother or teacher will confirm Herbart." [But Dittes probably means,
"Will the judgments spring up spontaneously?"]
2 Dittes' criticism is here probably sound. If we accept pure presenta-
tionalism and deny any original tendency to act we cannot explain volition.
But see Introdiuition, pp. 30-1.
* Glockner, following Herbart, answers that a feeling may be presenta-
tional at basis, i.e., due to a multitude of obscure stimuli. [But no one can
prove this.]
* Glockner politely replies that even the Devil can quote texts for his
purpose. A " learned prpfessor " may be " poor in spirit ".
DitUs to5
agencies besides Instruction were of moral value ; hobbies, home
training, habituation, etc.^ But though Herbart's views became
more sound, he never abandoned the doctrine that punishments
and rewards, which imitate nature, do not serve for moral
bettering.2
Herbart is also unfortunate with his " Interest " doctrine.
He rightly says, " Interest is self -activity," but he ought to
distinguish its two elements : (a) activity ; (6) satisfaction. His
classification of Interests is also illogical. He mixes up forms of
Interest (Empirical, Speculative, Contemplative) with contents of
Interest (objects of experience, etc.). Above all he never tells
us the real origin of Interest ; his psychology prevents him.
Was there, or was there not, a germ of Interest before the
objects of Interest came to be known?
Reform of Herbart's Interest Doctrine. — We can classify In-
terests, says Dittes, according to either form or matter. Form-
ally we should have Empirical, Speculative, Contemplative,
Mnemonic, Productive, etc. Herbart himself has mentioned
a Systematic and a Methodic Interest. We could also speak
of an Analytic and a Synthetic Interest. According to Matter
or Content we could classify Interest as Esthetic, Eeligious,
Historic, Agricultural, Practical, Scientific, etc. There is also
Personal Interest (in health, etc.).
Herbart was not the discoverer of the Interest doctrine.
Comenius, Pestalozzi, Niemeyer and others had anticipated
him. Thus Niemeyer urged teachers to excite indwelling
forces. But these men rightly regarded Interest as depending
on a spontaneous force of the mind, as the development of a
natural germ. Herbart's special mechanism does not really
explain Interest at all.
He makes good remarks on Attention and Apperception.
This is the best part of his work. But Comenius long ago
^ Such things, says Glockner, come under Zucht and Regierung. Her-
bart never discounted them.
^ Nor do they, says Glockner. They ser\'e to warn and admonish, but
equally well bad men and good. [Herbart is here in opposition to the
doctrine of " natural punishments " advocated by Spencer and others.]
io6 The Critics of Herbartianism
had urged that all Instruction should conform naturally to
the pupil's standpoint. Even Herbart's best work is injured
by perversions and exaggerations, which mostly arise out of
his false mechanical view of presentations.
In the scheme of " Formal Steps " the terms " System " and
"Method" are ill chosen; and the terms "Analysis" and
" Synthesis " are used waveringly. The Herbartian pedagogy
not only rests on untenable foundations, and is a failure in its
outlines, but it is also extremely deficient, obscure, and con-
fused in its definitions and terminology. Its originality consists
mainly in its unsuccessful elucidations of old thoughts, and in
the introduction of new names and classifications which, for the
most part, are badly brought forward, have no value, scientific
or practical, and are also precisely adapted to cause a complete,
confusion of concepts and language. The terminology would
prevent any communication with parents, boards of managers,
etc.
Herbart's suggestions for dealing with classics, mathematics,
and geography {e.g., his recommendation to connect this last
one with other subjects) are good. But he has not dealt with
modern languages, drawing, and singing. His remarks on
religious Instruction are obscure. Virtually he hands the sub-
ject over to the theologians. Its culmination, he says, lies in
Confirmation (accompanied by a special confession) and the
Holy Communion (a sign of general brotherhood). He recom-
mends Plato's Krito and Apology for strengthening religious im-
pressions. (What will religious people say ?) He says nothing
of fairy tales, neither does he tell us whether schools should
be sectarian, unsectarian, or governmental. At times he says
some hard things about Church arrogance, but he finally leaves
the Church in an almost impregnable position. His metaphysic
is really incompatible with Eehgion, hence he bases rehgion
merely on practical needs, e.g., the need to keep the mind
humble.^
^ Glockner shows, by quotations, that Herbart's piety was warm and
sincere.
Wesendonck 107
SECTION II.
WESENDONCK.
(1885.)
Reference.
Wesendonck. Die Schule Herbart-Ziller und ihre JUnger vor dem Forum
der Kritik. Pichlers Witwe und Sohn, Vienna and Leipzig, 1885.
The above work is, in part, a critique of Herbartian and
Zillerian (chiefly the latter) ideas, but its main interest lies in
its scathing exposure of the controversial methods of the
Zillerians. The author shows that, with all their zeal and
merits, these men have very bad manners. Among other things,
they accuse their opponents of being "vulgar pedagogues,"
"mere practitioners," "ignoramuses," "nullities," "people to
whom pedagogy is an El Dorado of dilettantism," and " people
whose mental horizon ends with their noses ".
Wesendonck commences with an historical survey of the
Herbartian movement, dealing in some detail with the work
of Stoy and Ziller. He criticises Ziller as follows : —
He was not devoid of merits. He had much knowledge,
much boldness, and a warm love for man. But he did not
know the capacities of the average child, nor the distinction
between the desirable and the attainable. That is to say, he
was unpractical, and must therefore not be accepted as a pope.
When he approved of putting the whole Bible into the
hands of children he was wrong ; many parts are unsuitable,
indeed unreadable.
His proposal to make the elementary schools schools for the
poor only, was thoroughly bad. It would degrade these schools,
and generate pride, envy, etc. Separate schools for different
ranks would be not only unadvisable, but far too expensive for
any State. Still special schools for neglected or peculiar children
are useful.
His condemnation of French as an uneducative language is
lo8 The Critics of Herbartianisni
unjust. Ziller was prejudiced against modern languages and
only approved of giving a smattering of them for practical
purposes, e.g., to future merchants. If such languages are to
be postponed to the University stage they vpill never be learnt
properly.
He rightly demands that Syntax be learnt inductively during
the course of reading, but he is wrong in demanding the same
for Etymology. Surely, to learn the conjugations, etc., in this
way would be wearisome and distracting. What a vast amount
of reading would be necessary, and how insecure the knowledge
would be ! The first thing should be a rapid glance at the
conjugations, then reading. Herbart was here more sound
than Ziller.
The Zillerian curriculum is overcrowded, including such
things as reading foreign handwriting. In higher schools
musical and theatrical exhibitions are to take place. But
where are the buildings, utensils, etc., to be obtained? Who is
to bear the expense ? Ziller recommends that in the accessory
classes of upper schools medicine should be taught to future
physicians, Hebrew to future theologians, etc. But surely a
school should be on general lines ; pupils may not yet know their
future calling. Science would do the theologians more good.^
Ziller expected vast knowledge from his teachers, e.g., know-
ledge of foreign forms of speech (and even their constituents)
which have been introduced into the vernacular.
He objects to a merely "popular" style of teaching. But
many subjects must be taught "popularly" or not at all.
Teachers would have to live to the age of Methuselah to satisfy
Ziller's demands.
Ziller 's " concentration " plan would really lead to a breaking-
up of connected matter. The pupil would only acquire scrappy
^ Ziller is often attacked from two sides. Some critics contend that a
school should " prepare for life ; " these protest against his claim that
schools should " educate," i.e., form character. Others protest against his
admission of professional subjects in upper classes. The two objections
neutralise each other. Ziller was right in laying the main stress on " Edu-
cation," but he made quite sufficient concessions to utilitarian demands.
Wesendonck 109
knowledge, not connected views of a subject. Only the " con-
centration " material at the centre will get justice, and children
will even get tired of this owing to its constant recurrence.
To use the story of the " seven little goats " for purposes of
arithmetic, geography, etc., is only to make children hate the
story. Why, after all, this craving for " concentration " ? The
child hears all kinds of matter and yet does not lose his
personality. Besides, where is the " concentration " in using
twelve fairy tales ? And is there any proof that this plan of
"concentration" aids character?
The fairy tales are useful aids to imagination and feeling, but
have little bearing on morality. They are partly survivals from
pagan mythology, partly later in origin ; they certainly do not
represent any one "culture epoch". But even if they did, is
it necessary to lead Christian children through heathen and
Jewish stages?^
Some of the fables positively shook our moral or aesthetic
feelings ; others appear silly even to the young ; in other cases
the lessons deduced from them are beyond children's capacities,
e.g., "Don't judge according to appearances". (How, then, is
a child to judge ?)
Again, as FrohUch has shown, the Kobinson Crusoe stage is
not suitable for children of seven, for things like sea, ship-
wreck, etc., are beyond them. The desire for travel comes
about the age of twelve, and then the story has much value.
But it represents a stage of culture far in advance of the patri-
archal, and is also morally in advance of it. What folly, there-
fore, to put it before the patriarchal period !
Whole stages are missing from Ziller's scheme, e.g., the pre-
language stage, the stages of fetichism,^ polytheism, etc. His
scheme is not even orthodox ; where does the fall of man come
in? The present-day stage is left out altogether, though the
^ Yes, says (in effect) Dr. Stanley Hall. See p. 71.
^ Dr. Stanley Hall in his daring contribution to Principles of Religious
Education recommends " nature study " for Sunday Schools, as correspond-
ing to the stage of fetichism in the race.
no The Critics of Herbartianism
most important of all. Is the boy of fourteen a man already ?
Apparently so, if the eighth stage is the final one.
Is the life of Jesus a " stage," properly speaking? Is it to
be " lived through " ? In any case its importance is under-
estimated in the Zillerian scheme. Moreover the eighth stage
(the Eeformation) is a stage of heresy for Catholics.
In Ziller's plan there is an absence of recognition given to
such principles as nationality, patriotism, the rights of man, the
Hmitation of the absolute power of rulers, the extension of state
power in the interests of members, tolerance, love of men in
general. Ziller's selection of historical material is arbitrary.
Again his distinction between "educative" and "uneduca-
tive " instruction is artificial ; all material, properly handled, ought
to be educative. There should be moral ideas in it all, though the
pupils may not be conscious of them.i But some departments
are better than others for moral purposes. History (religious
and profane) is especially good, but fables (we have seen) are
not so good as Ziller thinks them to be.
His attempt to teach modern history contemporaneously
with ancient is unpractical, and violates true concentration. No
wonder some of his followers wish to teach history partly back-
wards, partly forwards.
Ziller sometimes appears like a theologian of the Middle Ages
in his overvaluation of the Jews, Greeks, and Eomans, and in
his admiration for Latin.
Another defect of Herbartianism is its cumbrous terminology.
Instead of " Eegierung " why not say " outer guidance " ; in-
stead of "Zucht," "inner guidance"? Moreover, the dis-
tinction between these two and between them and Instruction
was known long before Herbart. That Instruction should not
only give knowledge but also form character is no new dis-
covery. The whole Herbartian school sufifers from verbosity
1 This is nonsense. The only important moral part played by mathe-
matics is that the study may possibly function as a life interest. But history
deals with man as such. Ziller's distinction, though only a rough one, is
quite justified.
Wesendonck 1 1 1
and arrogance. The reader of the writings of the Herbartians
requires a special dictionary, and must discount their claims to
be the only educationists.
Generally it may be said that the Zillerians overestimate the
value of Instruction, owing to their adherence to Herbart's
presentational psychology. Parental love, family love, imita-
tion, personality of the teacher, influence of companions and
books, are far more influential.
Still, the Herbart-Ziller system has certain excellences, among
which may be mentioned (1) its insistence on many-sided
Interest as contrasted with dry knowledge or skill, and on the
rousing of involuntary attention ; (2) its insistence on the view
that Instruction must be "educative" {i.e., from character);
but supreme authority must not be given to any one kind of
instruction-material ; (3) the apperception doctrine ; (4) the
articulation of Instruction ; here come in the " formal steps "
which are useful but must not be slavishly followed ; moreover
they are not exclusively Herbartian ; (5) Ziller's grand design
of forming a teaching-plan, in place of a mere aggregate of
studies ; he carried it to absurdities, but he deserves praise for
aiming at it; (6) Ziller's recommendation of conversational
rather than catechetical methods ; Dittes and others have, how-
ever, made the same recommendation ; (7) Ziller's emphasis on
the dignity of the educational calHng. But he and many other
Herbartians think too much of home education and regard
schools mainly as auxiliary agents, though upon them he some-
times puts too great demands. Moreover his thoughts were
fixed too much on the upper classes of society.
Wesendonck's work, as already said, is largely devoted to an
exposure of the controversial methods of the Herbartians. Vogt,
successor of Ziller, comes in for special castigation. Because
Dittes had written a critique — one quite free from offensive
personalities — Vogt must needs accuse him of " mendacity,"
"hostility to all science," "plagiarism," "impiousness," "party
spirit," and so forth, and urges that the State should suppress
all forms of " anarchism," such as those represented by the
112 The Critics of Herbartianism
" radicalism " of Dittes and his " terrorist " followers. Yet
Vogt was head of a union aiming at "educative Instruction,"
i.e.. Instruction that makes for character !
SECTION III.
BARTELS.
(1885.)
Reference.
Bartels. Die Anwendbarkeit der Herbart-Ziller-Stoy'schen didaktiscJien
Grundsdtze fUr den Unterricht in Volks- und Bilrgcrschulen. Wittenberg,
1885, 1888,
It was to Dr. Bartels, director of the " Biirgerschulen " of
Gera, that Stoy sent the epigrammatic message which pro-
claimed the breach between the moderate and the extreme (or
Zillerian) followers of Herbart. " "What is good in Ziller is not
new, what is new is not good."
Ziller's doctrines (says Bartels) are defective on the practical
side. Herbart himself had recognised the important part played
by practice. Speculation and psychology are not the only things
necessary for pedagogy. We may recognise Ziller's services,
yet deny them to be very Titanic.
The Herbartians build their system on ethics and psychology.
This is good, but insufficient. Religion has independent worth
and goes far beyond the " moral ideas ". Man has to be made
into God's image ; he must be " saved " ; this is not the same
as being fed with a number of Interests. Even Ziller, though
going beyond Herbart in recognising the claims of religion, did
not sufficiently emphasise the need of Christian faith.
The defects of Herbart's psychology have been adequately
exposed by Ostermann and others. Whatever Herbartians
may say, the soul has faculties, and cannot be resolved into
a presentation-mechanism. Attention cannot be explained on
Herbart's theory ; though occasioned by presentations, it ia
Bartels 113
something more than they. Herbart's view results in an
exaggeration of the power of education.
''Educative, Instruction" — The Herbartians lay great stress
on this " Instruction which forms Character," and strongly
condemn much Instruction and many Schools as really " un-
educative ". Very good ! But Luther, Comenius, Locke,
Pestalozzi, Niemeyer, Diesterweg had all urged that Instruc-
tion should make for Character, and Diesterweg's views were
very similar, on this subject, to those of Herbart,
" Schools do not Educate." — The old fashion was to give the
" Three E's," plus religious Instruction in the form of indigest-
ible biblical and catechetical material. Then science came to
the front, and there occurred a heaping-up of new subjects —
" didactic materialism " — but no principle of selection. Hence
" Interest " was not aroused, for the material was not arranged
in accordance with the child's natural capacities. But ' ' Interest,"
say the Herbartians, is the one great essential ; it is an end, not
a mere means ; self-activity must be roused.
"Good," says the critic, "but not original." Pestalozzi,
Niemeyer, Diesterweg saw this. Moreover, the Herbartians
lay exaggerated stress on Instruction, and depreciate such
influences as personality, family, and environment,
" Culture stages." — Here the Zillerians go quite beyond Her-
bart. Ziller claims that language shows that a similar develop-
ment took place in race and in individual, and this is one of the
supports of his doctrine. But does he ever really prove that the
individual goes through the stages of the race ? Never ! Men
like Frohlich claim that though there are analogies there is no
real parallelism. Is it possible to believe that there are eight
stages of racial development capable of being represented by
the eight arbitrarily selected stages of a German elementary
school ? Strange ! Dr. Staude, though a Zillerian, has ad-
mitted that the stages of child development cannot be very
exactly defined, and Sallwxirk has attacked Ziller's plan at
many points. He has asked, for example, whether the Protes-
tant German Empire and the Lutheran catechism necessarily
represent the highest hitherto attainable stages of human pro-
8
114 The Critics of Herbartianism
gress. And is not a scheme seriously defective if it is only
applicable to Protestant children ?
Sallwiirk's book created a sensation, and Eein, in his reply,
had to modify his master's scheme, and lay stress on national
rather than cosmopolitan "culture stages ". Dorpfeld likewise,
though an Herbartian, has only accepted the " culture stages "
doctrine on condition of its being combined with the " concentric
circles " plan.
Let us consider Ziller's proposal to use fairy tales as the
centre of the first year's instruction. These tales may be
useful, but they cannot take the place of religious Instruction
proper. They are imagination- and /eeZm^-material, and work
aesthetically, not morally.^ Moreover, some of the objections
to the bibUcal stories {e.g., that they represent sons who deceive
their parents) hold good of certain fairy tales. Few of the tales
recommended by Ziller have moral value ; some are positively
pernicious, and represent wrong acts being rewarded. But how
grandly reward and punishment are represented in the Bible !
And how hollow the moral lessons deduced from the twelve
fairy tales ! Still again, how absurd to subordinate all Instruc-
tion in the first year to these twelve stories, a plan which
unnaturally spUts up Instruction ! Use the stories, but not as
material for moral, arithmetical, and other Instruction. Avoid,
moreover, stimulating the fancy too much.
Biblical narratives are by no means too difiicult for young
children; indeed, they are so natm-al, truthful, simple, and
impressive that they readily seize the juvenile mind. Fables
are known even to children as being fictitious, and should not
be used for religious Instruction. Doubtless biblical stories
require some preparation, but this has already been provided
in Christmas and other festivals.
Then as to Eobinson Crusoe. The high claims put forward
on behalf of this story (that it is full of moral value, etc.) cannot
be justified ; moreover the story ought not to belong to the
1 This is precisely what the wiser Zillerians would admit. The child is
too young to be fed with moral or religious material in the ordinary sense.
Battels 115
second school year, it would do better for boys of thirteen
craving for adventures ; Crusoe, too, is an eighteenth-century
hero, largely fictitious ; he does not represent a " culture stage "
earlier than the patriarchal. He knows agriculture, the com-
pass, etc. ; no child at the age supposed possesses the requisite
apperception-material, and if he did he would get tired of Crusoe,
Crusoe, for a whole year. Far better would it be to let the
children " begin at home " than to try to make them assimilate
all the geographical and other matter presented in the Crusoe
story. Herbart, like Eousseau, approved of the story, but not
for seven-year-olds. Besides, why should such young children
have to "subject nature to their service" as Crusoe did? In
fact the case for Crusoe is far weaker than for the fairy tales.
Less need be said of the other school years, for which the
Zillerians definitely select biblical material. But the problem
still rises ; is there the parallelism between racial and individual
development? Do the "culture stages" correspond to real
apperception stages of the child's mind? Especially wrong is
the giving of only one year to the life of Christ, and the long
time spent on the Old Testament. Are the " judges " any
advance on the "patriarchs"?
What about schools in which the year's course is not com-
pleted— as happened even at the practising school in Leipzig !
Various hindrances may prevent a child from reaching the first
class. Surely a scheme should meet contingencies like these !
Again, what about a school without eight classes ? In a four-
class school are we to dro'p stages, or alternate them thus :
1880, Fables ; 1881, Eobinson ; 1882, Fables ; and so on ? But
the latter plan means that Eobinson must sometimes precede
Fables !
Beligious Services. — As the Zillerians reject biblical history
for the earHer years they compensate for the loss by means of
rehgious services which, however, are not supposed to take the
form of "Instruction". But who can deal, e.g., with the life
of Jesus without giving " Instruction " ? Moreover, to separate
devotion from Instruction is scarcely conformable with the
doctrine of " Concentration ". Again, these services will
ii6 The Critics of Herbartianism
necessarily be either beyond the younger children or below the
older ones — hence weariness.
" Concentric Circles." — The Herbartians are severe on this
plan, that of making each " school year " take up much the same
material as the previous one, but amplifying it in ever widening
circles. In preference to this the Herbartians recommend a
chronological order (" culture stages "), and claim that " con-
centric circles " involve weariness and satiety owing to constant
repetitions.
But (says the critic) this plan of "circles" has long been
approved by great educationists, like Comenius, and even
Herbartians like Dorpfeld and Lentz approve of it, though in
conjunction with the rival plan. It is quite right to begin with
some simple facts and then make them more definite as the age
of the pupil iacreases ; thus we keep the old material safe and
sound (which the Zillerians are in danger of not doing) and add
each year fresh material. The old apperceives the new.
Ziller's plan allows of all kinds of thought-wanderings, as
when the mention of Bremen is supposed to awaken such
Interest as to justify a geographical discussion. Surely we
ought to go "from near to far". Instead of following this
sound principle, Ziller allows quite young children to learn
about the geography of the East, and to discuss all kinds of
difficult matters (hke hereditary succession, in connection with
the Judges). The plan of "concentric circles," on the other
hand, allows of a gradual advance.
If the ZiUerians protest against everlasting repetition, we
protest against neglect of repetition. Again, the plan of
" culture stages " can only properly be applied to eight-class
schools, that of "concentric circles " to any schools ; and thus
even if a boy has to leave school before reaching the top class
this is not so serious a matter in the second case as in the first.
" Concentration." — The Herbartian psychology ignores the
unity of the self; hence an artificial " concentration " has to be
brought about. All educators admit that knowledge should be
unified as far as possible. But instead of effecting this, Ziller's
plan really brings about disunion, for each department of study
Ostermann 117
that is subordinated to the central one receives only a scrappy
treatment. Thus geography has to follow the fortunes of the
patriarchs and so forth, instead of pursuing its own natural
course. Ziller has tried to deny that this is the outcome of his
proposals, but in vain.
It is quite right to connect together related material. But
the tendency of Ziller's plan is towards a merely external con-
necting, as when the burial of the patriarchs in the limestone
hills of Canaan is used as a peg on which to hang a lesson on
the properties of chalk. Surely each subject should be allowed
to awaken its own interest. Many even of his followers have
modified his plan so as to introduce several " centres," and to
give independence to science, etc. Moreover the supposed paral-
lelism between Jewish and profane history is quite imaginary.
Still, the Zillerians deserve credit for having insisted on the
idea of " concentration ". Lessons should fit into each other
and throw as much light upon each other as possible. All
natural and useful connections should be made use of.
The Formal Steps. — This is the best part of the Herbartian
system, though it is not original. Comenius had drawn up a
very similar plan : Example, Explanation, Bule, Exercise. The
teacher must not become enslaved to Herbart's scheme. The
first of the " steps " is often unnecessary, and the giving of the
" goal " is not always possible.
SECTION IV.
OSTEEMANN.
(1887.)
Reference.
Ostermann. Die hauptsdchlichsten IrrtUmer der Herbartschen Psy-
chologie und-ihre pcidagogischen Konsequenzen. Oldenburg and Leipzig,
1887.
No part of Herbart's philosophy has been more violently
attacked ttan his psychology ; a work dealing with the " Critics
ii8 The Critics of Herbartianism
of Herbartianism" ought therefore to include a discussion of
psychological problems. Ostermann's attack was on these
lines, and also touched upon pedagogical matters.
Herbart thought himself driven to the assumption of a
multitude of absolutely simple " reals," devoid of " faculties,"
etc., by the contradictions which experience offers, e.g., the
contradiction involved in the view that a single thing can
possess a multiplicity of qualities. ^
From the interaction of these hypothetical " reals " arise (on
Herbart's view) presentations or ideas. Once a presentation
has arisen it persists unchanged until disturbed by others.
With these it may enter into various relations.
(1) Two similar tones {e.g.) ma^y fuse to a stronger tone.
(2) Two disparate sensations (colour, smell, etc., of an orange)
may complicate or unite.
(3) Two contrary presentations may check each other so far
as they are opposed, and unite so far as they are not checked.
No presentation is ever destroyed, though it may be driven
below the threshold and then merely strive to be presented.
The amount of checking it experiences depends on (1) its own
native strength ; (2) the degree of opposition exerted by other
presentations.
Apperception occurs when a new presentation is passive
relatively to old presentations.^ Attention is largely dependent
on Apperception ; it is the energetic and lasting self-maintenance
of a presentation in consciousness.
Ostermann offers various criticisms of the above doctrine.
Even supposing that the " simple " soul is able to generate pre-
sentations, how can these latter persist after the ceasing of the
conjunction which brought them forth ? Herbart regarded the
presentations as immortal, but the analogy of the first law of
motion is not to the point (" A body persists . . . "), for
1 Ostermann's discussion of Herbart's metaphysics must here be almost
entirely omitted.
2 Don Quixote's fixed ideas seized hold of a new experience (windmills)
«|.nd interpreted or apperceived it,
Ostermann 119
presentations are inner states, not, like motion, external quali-
ties of a body. Surely a presentation generated out of the
interaction of " reals " must cease when the interaction is
over.
Herbart was wrong when he regarded all presentations as
having definite intensities and definite amounts of mutual
opposition. The memory-image of a thunderclap is of very
different intensity from that of the sound itself. Again, Wundt
has shown experimentally that two contrasting impressions
(black and white) do not only not check, but actually aid each
other. So also with concepts ; what easier than to think of
opposites ? Herbart, in fact, forgets that though the presenta-
tion-contents may be opposed, the mental activities they call
forth may not be opposite at all.
What is the nature of the supposed " checking " between
two presentations ? He regards it as a kind of mutual me-
chanical pressure. But is this a tenable view ? True, the
soul, in experiencing the two opposed presentations, a and b,
may strive to remove this opposition by getting rid of one of
them. But can a and b resist each other? Are they in-
dependent existences? Herbart's view destroys the unity of
the soul}
Again, what meaning can be attached to the statement that
the checked presentations show a " striving to be presented"?
We can understand it if we regard it as a material tension. But
presentations are mental states ; how, then, can they be in
unconsciousness ? Herbart was driven to this view by the
stringency of his metaphysics ; being forbidden to assume
" faculties " he had to assume that presentations always exist,
even in unconsciousness. But on our theory they need no more
exist than the note of a musical string need always be sound-
ing ; the conditions of reproduction exist, but not the note itself.
Even the physiological view would be better than Herbart's,
1 This conclusion is probably a true one. Still, we must not forget that
Herbart's metaphysical " real " or " soul " is supposed to be existent all
this time.
The Critics of Herbartianism
for it provides a substratum (nerves, etc.) for presentations.
But Herbart will neither allow of this nor of any activity of the
soul itself. With him, each presentation is virtually a little soul,
and the total soul-activity is divided up into presentation-
activities ; thus there is no unity, and we cannot understand
how presentations come ever to be united. Eeally this union
is the work of the soul, but Herbart has to assume links between
the presentations; each of the latter, however, is, for him, an
entity in itself.
He conveniently allows that the action and suffering of the
presentation are also the action and suffering of the soul. Thus
we appear to have a double series of events.
The doctrine of mutual " checking " involves either that the
presentations are separate entities or that one part of the soul
checks another part. Each view destroys the unity of the soul.
Or can it be that the whole soul checks itself? Again, how
can the soul itself be "unalterable" if all these processes take
place in it? Herbart insists that the metaphysical soul takes
no part in mental events !
There is no possible way of explaining mental life if we
assume that each presentation has a content and activity of its
own. No theory of " fusion " will stiffice. In aU mental
processes there must be present a unitary principle which
compares, relates, etc., the different presentations. We cannot
explain Intelligence and the forming of general ideas as a result
of the reproduction, fusion, and checking of a multitude of
similar presentations. The concept itself cannot be "pre-
sented"; it is abstract, and stands for certain relations estab-
lished by thought. Thus the concept "animal" grasps in itself
all different animals.
Herbart has a theory of " collective presentations " ^ which
he regards as stepping-stones to concepts proper. But if such
presentations existed we should be unable to revive the older
^Generally called "generic images" by English psychologists. Such
an image {e.g., of " man ") is supposed to be the vague residual image left
after a number of individual images of men have been superimposed.
Ostermann 121
single ones, for their special traits would have been suppressed.
Throughout the whole of Herbart's system the unifying function
of the soul is ignored.
Equally unsatisfactory is his treatment of Feeling and Desire,
which are supposed to arise out of presentations according as
the movements of these favour or hinder each other. Herbart
infers that pedagogically the presentations are the most im-
portant mental elements, while joys and sorrows are but
transitory. Even sensible feelings, according to Herbart, rest
ultimately on minute presentational units. There is no " Feel-
ing" faculty, or "Desire" faculty; all depends on the inter-
actions of presentations. Desire is an advancing movement,
Feeling a resting condition.
But surely (says Ostermann) Feeling belongs to the soul, not
to presentations. The Herbartians transfer the effect of the
"checkings " to the soul itself. But in reality what one
presentation loses in activity another must gain. There is no
gain or loss for the soul taken as a whole ; why then should it
experience pleasure or pain ? Or is there a constant oscillation
of pleasure and pain corresponding to the checking, etc., of
presentations? Surely we must posit a faculty of Feeling,
which is quite as original a function as Presentation. Presen-
tations may stimulate this faculty into operation, hut there must
first he the faculty itself. How otherwise would such an idea
as that of danger give rise to any feeling at all ? Of course the
faculty is not separate from the soul itself. Herbart's attack
was directed against a false faculty doctrine which separated
the " facilities " from the soul.
There are. many sensory pains, etc., which come into con-
sciousness without any presentational content. Can Herbart
deny or explain this ? ^ Again, feelings differ in colouring as
well as in intensity ; compare avarice with aesthetic feeling.
Ballauf and other Herbartians admit this, but it is not recon-
cilable with Herbart's own doctrine.
Again, if it be true that those presentations which rise to the
1 He posits minute presentational elements as the basis of such pains,
etc.
The Critics of Herbartianism
highest clearness bear the most lively feelings, we should expect
the study of mathematics to be intensely emotional. Facts tell
a different story. Again, the clear image of a distant friend
awakens melancholy, not pleasure. The Herbartian theory
ignores the content, or significance, or worth of presentations,
and considers their quantitative relations only. Later Her-
bartians, like Ballauf and Sfcrumpell, have tended to admit a
" Feeling " faculty, thus being really faithless to Herbart.
The Herbartians are right in emphasising the close con-
nection between Desire and Presentation ; we cannot desire
what we cannot think of. But we do not desire what is
actually present, whereas, according to Herbart, each desire is
bound to a present content.
Certain cases of mental disturbance mentioned by Nathan
prove that the Will can control the course of presentations, and
is therefore not a mere product of them.
Tlfie Will and its Freedom. — Will (according to Herbart) is
Desire plus Certainty. Desire is a product of the presentation-
mechanism ; so also must Will be. But if moral action is
dependent on an estimation of value (as Herbart affirms), how
can this be reconciled with the mechanical view? He holds
that the moral judgment must, in order to prevail, be connected
with a strong unified mass of thoughts, whose mechanical
strength will overcome all opposing ideas. Good ! But where
is the role of the moral judgment ?
Even his notion of a fusion of repeated volitions (after the
manner of the formation of concepts) does not lift us out of the
realm of mechanism. Freedom, in fact, is entirely excluded
from the system. No doubt he speaks of Inner Freedom
( = volition according to the moral judgments) but even this
seems to depend on the mechanical strength of presentation-
masses. Where is responsibility ? He dismisses the question
with a few words. Practically, he says, we must not go beyond
the Will in passing judgment. But as he resolves Will into a
mechanical process, he really gets rid of responsibility. We
may admit that the question is a difficult one, but somehow we
must preserve responsibility.
Ostermann 123
The *' Faculty" Doctrine. — Herbart was right in protesting
against the vulgar " faculty doctrine," which destroys the unity
of the soul, brings on the scene empty powers apart from
concrete mental life, and substitutes for a scientific explanation
of mental facts a mere appeal to a suppositious "faculty". But
Herbart has not succeeded in explaining mental life in terms
of presentations, and by analogies derived from mechanics.
Moreover, certain phenomena point to a distinct " memory
faculty " as possessed by certain prodigies. Again there are
specific differences of memory. We must assume that the soul
has other modes of expressing itself than Presentation, though
we must not assume any faculty separate from the soul itself.
Pedagogical Results. — Because of his presentationalism, Her-
bart lays great stress on Instruction and upon the forming of
"large unbroken masses of thought". The energy of the
moral judgments depends upon their being connected with
strong thought-masses.
Is this view tenable ? The fact is, there must be an original
unity such as is not provided by Herbart's system of separate
presentations. The " concentration " doctrine does not bring
about a unity, for we are never told how the presentations can
fuse. Nor are we given any explanation of the moral life ; for
whence comes the notion of worth if the whole mental life
consists of presentations ? Still, the " concentration " plan has
much intellectual value ; it impresses facts on the memory and
conduces to culture ; it may even indirectly help character.
But character depends mainly on disposition, not on presenta-
tions.
The peculiar " concentration " and " culture stages " doctrines
of the Zillerians are highly artificial, and would probably have
been condemned by Herbart himself, for he cautions us against
aiming at an artificial unity, and against disrupting what ought
to be connected.
The " Interest " doctrine is said to be the most important one
in the Herbartian scheme, and to have great moral significance.
But on examination we find that Interest is a form of " in-
voluntary attention," and depends upon the strength of pre-
124 ^^"^ Critics of Herbartianism
sentations. Thus we are brought back to a mechanical view.
At times we are told that Interest finds complete satisfaction
in the 'present ; at other times that it compels to continuous
self-activity and advance. In fact the Interest doctrine cannot
be reconciled with Herbart's mechanical scheme. It is impos-
sible to regard Feeling as a transitory modification of presenta-
tions.
The Herbartians lay stress on the need of Imagination.
Actions must be thought about, pictured ; model images of
actions must be formed. In this way (we are told) practical
hindrances will be conquered when they arise. There is truth
in this, but, after all, reflection will not ensure vigorous action.
Strong Will depends mainly on natural endowment and on
practice in overcoming difficulties.
Even the Herbartians feel at times the need of calling forth
energy, as when they recommend that at the beginning of each
lesson its goal should be stated, so that, in this way, the pupil
may exert all his powers. But where are these powers ? How
can we explain them if each presentation has a definite maximum
of energy, and there is no real energy of the soul itself ? The
only hope of the Herbartians is in " concentrating " many pre-
sentations. But in reality Will power arises through conflict,
habit, natural endowment, etc. ; moreover, physical exercises
contribute to it, as the English have recognised.
But a Will must not only be strong, but directed to the
Good. Here again Habit is important, but there must also be
Education, and a rousing of Interest in what is good. But
Interest is rooted in Feeling, hence Education must confer more
than mere enlightenment. How are we to touch the heart ?
Through actual occurrences, human life, example. The main
thing is not Instruction, hut Inspiration. Stories from history,
songs, poetry, etc., are useful ; Instruction, when given, must
attach itself to concrete foundations, to definite situations,
events, etc.^
^ Needless to say, all Herbartians would agree with this ; they lay im-
mense stress on history, poetry, etc,
Richter 125
The Herbartians reply that mere appeals to Feeling have no
permanent effect, for feelings are but transitory modifications of
presentations. But their psychology is wrong. Feeling is as
original as presentations, and leaves behind a permanent after-
effect— Interest. Still, there may be excess even here ; and the
Herbartians are right in emphasising the close connection of
feelings and presentations.
Herbartianism has furthered educational science ; it has pro-
tested against catechetical methods; it has urged the import-
ance of rousing independent and connected thought. But its
goal is one-sided ; it neglects physical education ; its terminology
is artificial ; its selection of fairy-tales for moral purposes is a
mistake, for these tales are not moral ; its emphasis on " con-
centration " is overdone ; and its followers tend to become blind
followers of their master's prescriptions.
SECTION V.
RICHTER.
(1887.)
Reference,
Richter. Die Herbart-Zillerschen formalen Stufen des Unterrichts, nach
ihrem Wesen, ihrer geschichtlichen Grundlage, und ihrer Anwendung im,
Volksschulunterrichte. Hesse, Leipzig, 1887. Second edition, 1898.
This work is a " gekronte Preisschrift," an essay which won
the prize offered in 1886 by an educational institute in Dresden
for the best work on the subject, "The appHcability of the
Herbart - Ziller formal steps to instruction in elementary
schools ".
The author goes into the whole question with German
thoroughness ; shows who were Herbart's predecessors (Com-
enius, etc.) in the task of working out the " formal steps " ;
compares Herbart's treatment with Ziller's ; and finally arrives
at the result that they are, on the whole, a sound contribution
126 The Critics of Herbartianism
to pedagogical practice inasmuch as they rest on the laws of
learning, and lighten the task of teaching and acquisition.
More valuable, however, than these portions of the work are
the author's remarks on the limitations and dangers of the
" formal steps ". But the reader must remember that the
general verdict of Eichter — into the exact grounds of which we
cannot here go — is favourable.
The chief danger which the author urges is a famiUar one
— that mechanical teachers will apply the " steps " without
judgment and discretion, and make them into a rigid scheme
which will check rather than encourage thought.
Ziller himself has aheady pointed out certain hmitations of
his scheme. It is inapplicable to such material as is already
abstract in form, e.g., a scientific reading book, a grammar, a
catechism,^ an historical table, a portion of the Bible with
direct didactic tendency (Sermon on the Mount, etc.). Such
materials already represent worked-up results, hence they
afford no opportunity of a movement from Anschauung to
Denken (thinking), and so on. Similarly, the correcting or the
repetition of exercises, and various accidental occurrences such
as may happen on a school excursion, cannot, as a rule, be
treated in accordance with the formal steps. So also with the
acquisition of skill in writing, etc.
In point of fact, Ziller's excepting of catechetical instruction
from the scope of the formal steps is not altogether valid.
Even religious instruction should start from the concrete and
work forward towards the maxims of the catechism, in full accord-
ance with Herbart's procedure, which starts with Anschauung,
goes on to Thinking, and finally arrives at Application.
The Zillerians attack the catechism violently, on the grounds
that it omits any initial statement of the goal of the lesson,
checks free activity by the way it throws out its questions,
makes children use words they do not fully understand and
1 The common teaching of the catechism proceeds on precisely opposite
principles to the formal steps. The child learns the abstract statement,
and then this is illustrated by concrete examples when possible.
Richter 127
judgments not arising from insight, and breaks up what should
be in connection. This assault of the Zillerians is in part
justified, but they ignore the fact that there may be a real use
for the catechism.
They also undervalue questioning in general, and prefer to
draw out children's speech by such words as "and," "but,"
etc. Here, again, this proposal may be useful in certain cir-
cumstances, e.g., when a child is reproducing something already
learnt ; but again we must not lay down any rule.
Children have small powers of speech and of mental grasp ;
we tnust use questions ; they help to impress facts. At higher
stages questions involving long answers are good.
Some extreme Zillerians have even recommended that in
teaching writing an attempt should be made to carry out the
formal steps ; letters have to be analysed into their elements,
compared, and so forth. This is absurd. Writing, reading,
drawing, singing are matters of -practice, and must be treated
as such.^
Ziller it was, not Herbart, who used the expression " formal "
in connection with the steps. The expression implies that the
material is neghgible. This is not so. The material of in-
struction must dictate its own methods of treatment.
The Herbartians underestimate the value of silent, spon-
taneous development. The object itself exerts power upon the
pupil.
Ziller recommends the division of a lesson into method units,
each of which is to be worked through in accordance with the
formal steps. But if the units are very small, great artificiality
and weariness result from such a treatment. Ziller tries to
avoid this by recommending movements from one " method
unit " to another and back again.
Let us rather consider the children's capacities in dividing
^ Dr. Findlay has done splendid service by drawing a clear line of de-
marcation between " the acquirement of knowledge " and " the acquirement
of skill ". It is to the former process that the " formal steps " are applicable.
Principles of Class Teaching.
128 The Critics of Herbartianism
up our material. One lesson may prepare the way for another;
thus the latter may not require the "first step" (preparation)
at all. Now one step, now another, may be omitted, and
various other modifications of the scheme be made according
to circumstances. Sometimes a lesson must be mainly syn-
thesis (step two) ; sometimes " application " may be impossible
without great artificiality (as when the Herbartians bring moral
considerations on the scene which are only remotely connected
with the rest of the lesson). We see clear signs of artificiality
in the lessons drawn up by Eein, Staude, and other Her-
bartians, especially in dealing with the fifth step, which, with
them, becomes either mere repetition or goes quite beyond the
child.
The Herbartians are right in urging that abstraction must be
preceded by apperception, but it is not true that abstraction
must always follow apperception. The child may be too young
to go beyond the stage of apperception. But the Zillerians
seem to think that all the five stages must be run through on
every occasion.
They also urge that the goal of the lesson should be held
clearly in view from the first, and that it must be given by the
children — a process which involves (says Eichter) much guess-
work and waste of time.
The Zillerians say that the goal must be actual, not a mere
" next chapter," etc. But often we cannot follow out this
prescription, for to do so would be actually to introduce the
new matter, which is forbidden. The Zillerian rule has its
utility, but often cannot be carried out.
Ziller also recommends that at the first stage many side-
issues may be permitted to be suggested by the pupils ; this
is supposed to prepare the way for the new matter. But in
point of fact the plan merely leads to useless discursiveness.
Herbart has actually warned us against such a danger.
For the stage of synthesis Ziller makes the unexpected pro-
posal that instead of the teacher presenting the new matter
to the pupils it may be read by the pupils out of a book. Here
he departs from Herbart, and men like Dorpfeld have rightly
Richter 129
protested against so reactionary a proposal. To think that a
child, halting and stumbling as he reads, can properly assimilate
the new matter is absurd.
Again Ziller recommends that exercises on the new material
be imposed on individual scholars — not on the class collectively.
But this means that most of the pupils will be doing nothing
but listening. Surely, questions — on which Ziller does not look
with favour — 'will engage the attention of the whole class.
As a substitute, Ziller proposes a kind of discussion or dis-
putation ; without this, he says, the pupils do not become fully
conscious of what they know and can do. Strange proposal !
This mediaeval disputation method has long been banished from
the Latin school ; here is Ziller trying to introduce it into the
elementary school ! But how is the method possible with large
classes? Where will discipline be? How are we to prevent
chattering, or to draw forth the silent members of the class ?
Ziller, like many educationists, objects to children learning
ready-made scientific results from text-books, and recommends
that they start from the concrete and work towards the abstract
results. But he is inconsistent in permitting (at the stage of
" system ") the attained results to be compared with the results
in a book. If pupils are once allowed to use a book at all they
will have curiosity enough to use it for other purposes.
At the last stage ("application") Ziller recommends (in con-
nection with the treatment of " Gesinnungsstoff ") that children's
imagination should be exercised on action ; for thinking about
action aids real subsequent action by helping to conquer possible
hindrances. "What would you have done in Adam's place?
What would you have done in such and such dangerous circum-
stances ? "
But is there much value in this? Moralisings are of little
use. Unless children have had considerable life experiences
they cannot profit by such discussions ; or they may even be
led to think of actions of dubious value. It is easy to imagine
action ; but though spirit may be willing, flesh is weak.
Many of the " applications " recommended by Zillerians like
Staude are quite beyond the mental capacity of children. What
9
130 The Critics of Herbartianism
is the use of discussing with them the social origin of revolu-
tions or the rights and wrongs of polygamy ?
It is important that the formal steps, when used, shall be
used with due regard to the nature of the object taught, and
of the pupil. Some children are more capable of abstract
thought than others whose minds are of the Anschauung type.
Some heads are " practical," others " theoretical ". Then,
again, differences of age are important. We must not with
young children always insist on the third and fourth stages,
for these children may be too young to " abstract " correctly.
Conversely, older pupils we must not always force into infantile
grooves by insisting on the first two stages.
After school days are over, new matter is not acquired in
exact accordance with the "formal steps". The new often
comes as already abstract. Schools must remember that they
have to consider the future of their pupils, and must not over-
estimate the value of any scheme.
Then there is the teacher. The formal steps afford him
useful guidance, and he ought not to give himself over to
mere lawlessness. Still, the Herbartian rules are only general,
and cannot give precise directions. In the same way a judge
has to apply general laws to special cases. The best advice
to teachers is — learn the rules first, and afterwards acquire the
necessary freedom, " The letter killeth, the spirit giveth Hfe."
SECTION VI.
VOGEL.
(1887.)
Reference.
Vogel. Herhart oder Pestalozzi. Eine kritische Darstellung und Ver-
gleichung ihrer Systeme als Beitrag zur richtigen Wilrdigung ihres
gegenseitigen Verhdltnisses. Dr. August Vogel, 1887.
" HuBKAH for Herbart ! " " Hurrah for Pestalozzi ! " are cries
we hear on every side. It is important that we should decide
as to the respective claims of these leaders.
Vogel 131
Pestalozzi was a genial reformer whose life, except for one
brief period at Burgdorf, seemed a failure. But he was a true
pioneer. Though despised by many of his contemporaries, he
is now regarded by mankind as one from whom progress
received a new impulse. But a second impulse was required
for the establishment and development of his principles.
Herbart was another educational philosopher whose views,
like those of Pestalozzi, received but scant recognition in his
hfetime, but who, nevertheless, founded a school of thinkers.
Its earliest adherents misunderstood his system and engaged
in conflict with Pestalozzi's followers ; the former maintaining
that Herbart was the first to employ psychology for educational
purposes, the latter claiming that Pestalozzi had already done
this.
Herbart' s Starting Point in Psychology. — Herbart makes the
" ego " the starting point in psychology and discovers a con-
tradiction in it, a contradiction which rests entirely upon
his assumption that Knowing and Being are irreconcilable ;
throughout his system, as the bitter opponent of Idealism, he
seeks to establish this. We feel, however, Vogel maintains,
that Being in its highest sense is known, and that the anti-
thesis between Being and Knowing cannot be maintained;
even Herbart is not prepared to uphold it logically ; he states
that the beginning of knowledge consists in ideas and that
these rest on experience which teaches what things are. Man
lives among ceaseless confusion of the different departments of
Being and Happening, of appearances which are involved in
change, and feelings consequent on these changes bring ideas
home to him. The foundation doctrine of Herbart 's Psychology
is that feelings or perceptions are self-preservations of the soul,
and this means that the soul is not originally a power for
reflexion, it is not composed of real and ideal activity ; but
rather there must be postulated for its whole spiritual mani-
foldness, a sufficient number of presentations, and self-con-
sciousness arises only from these and exists entirely in the
relations among these ; it is only a changed relation of the soul,
yet inner experience sufficiently proves that the I and self-
132 The Critics of Herbartianism
consciousness do not remain, as it were, on the periphery of
the soul as on accidental relation. They are rather that which
constitutes the inmost germ of it, that which gives it its worth
and supreme importance. If we take self-consciousness as the
essential element from the idea of the soul, it fades away to an
uncertain something which cannot form the centre of the whole
inner life of a man in all its height and breadth. The necessary
hypothesis for all spiritual and moral life and action is lacking
in a soul without self-consciousness, and if the latter is a matter
of accident entirely, every scientific explanation of the spiritual
life is thereby rendered impossible.
The Soul, according to Herbart, is a Real Thing, and as
such, a simple essence, subject to neither time nor space ; it
has talents and faculties neither to receive nor to produce
anything, and its Simple Quale is and remains unknown.
That Time and Place must be excluded from a soul, as a
simple essence existing for itself, rests on easily understood
general metaphysical principles. But of greater importance is
Herbart's assertion that the Soul in its absolute being can
receive nothing from without, nor produce anything of itself,
but that all mental life arises from the relations between several
simple essences and the accidental union of these.
Now Herbart's real soul has originally neither presentations
nor feelings, nor desires ; it knows nothing of itself and nothing
of other things. In it there are no forms of thought, no laws
of wUling and acting, and no sort of preparation, however
distant, for these. Yet in spite of this impressive assurance,
every Real essence of Herbart's, and therefore also the real
soul, has a distinct peculiar quality through which the effects
proceeding from the union of several essences are determined.
Does Herbart then mean that while every effect can only
spring from the union of several essences, one by itself exer-
cises no effect ? If he does not mean this, he must maintain
that the Quahty peculiar to a Real essence is present in the
union, but vanishes in the non-union. But a quality which is
neither a power, nor a faculty, nor anything else of this sort,
must be nothing, and such a quahty cannot possibly exercise
Vogel 133
any influence in the union of several real essences — not even
the apparent effect of Her barf s ideas — nor can the world of
Being and Happening be explained by means of such essences.
The union of essences which presupposes pressures and re-
sistances, postulates some power of receiving and producing
in the essences, which must be present not only in their union,
but when they are isolated also.
Psychology and Physiology. — Further, it seems to us a doubtful
proceeding to try and explain purely psychical events by such
expressions as belong to mechanics and hydrostatics. May
they always remain as pictures and analogies, not as true
explanations ! And when Herbart traces analogy between
psychology and physiology, and asserts that as the latter
constructs the body from fibres, so the former constructs the
soul out of sets of presentations, and as in the one case the
excitability of the fibres is a much disputed point, so in the
other case is the excitability of the sets of presentations ; this
is again an indication of Herbart's mechanical comprehension
of the soul's functions.
The now generally received hypothesis of the indivisible and
therefore simple atoms unchangeable in spite of all apparent
change, certainly explains many natural appearances more
naturally than the older scientific propositions; yet directly it
is taken over into the territory of the Soul, it sets itself in
direct opposition to scientific axioms as well as to Experience.
Soul Evolution. — The soul is ever forming for itself higher
and broader ideas, which furnish the undeniable essentials for
the perfecting of the moral life. Least of all then should
Herbart call the soul unchangeable unless he mean that all
progress in soul-life is but appearance and deception, and this
he seems to argue.
Herbart's Theories Preclude Possibility of Progress. — That
the soul steps out of life exactly as it entered it, precludes all
possibility of evolution, and makes the perfecting of the man,
and, therefore, of the human race, an illusion and deceptive
appearance only. Ethics and psychology are then unnecessary
and impossible. A psychology which denies every power, every
134 ^he Critics of Herbartianism
faculty, and, especially, every kind of evolution of the Soul,
cannot include in its survey the infinite rich life of the latter,
and can never suffice for scientific investigation, or guide the
teacher and moral educator.
With Herbart, the real Soul is at the basis of all psycho-
logical events, and in its accidental union with other reals, it
suffers through the feelings some sort of disturbance, then
Presentation results. We note throughout the term disturb-
ance, not exciting or inciting. Herbart makes the Soul in-
violable and incapable of change, but the man who sees in
these outer causes the first beginnings of more and more perfect
development of the human soul, the proper reason of which lies
in itself, will not only not regard them as disturbances, but as
necessary and blessed incitement to the further evolution of a
soul that is capable of development, and only from this stand-
point can the perfecting of the individual, as well as of the
whole race, be logically accepted as possible. If Herbart
wishes, as he does, not only to grant the possibility of this,
but to declare and explain it, he must first of all renounce the
rigid unchangeableness of the soul; unchangeableness and
evolution form an irreconcilable antithesis, although this very
unchangeableness and self-preservation premises a latent power
of resistance, but we do not agree with Herbart when he says
that this power disappears when opposing force is withdrawn.
It rather is real and active, and is first perceived by us upon
a given incitement. Otherwise, all independence and freedom
is denied to man, that spark of the Divine Being which Nature
called into existence according to her own laws, and without
which all presentations due to other reals would be valueless
to its own life and development. If it cannot be denied that
the psychological course of soul-hfe, as far as it appears, is
subject to laws, yet it must also be granted that it withdraws
itself from these natural laws, just in proportion as it retires
into the depths of its proper self.
As far as the spirit makes use of the wonderfully constituted
organism of the body for its activity, so far, but only so far, is it
lawful to apply the laws of statics and mechanics, as well as
Vogel 135
mathematical calculation, to psychology. No laws of natvire
apply to the transcendental Being of the Soul. The man who
thinks he can sound the depths of the power of the inner soul-
Hfe by an example in arithmetic is a materiahst, and, therefore,
an atheist.
Innate Special Faculty. — Herbart violently contests the exist-
ence of innate special faculty. We, however, contend that the
faculties themselves are different modifications of the one soul,
which is the same in aU of them. Just as many coexist in the
absolute, as the members in an organism, as ideas in criticism,
so are the faculties related to the soul.
Even Herbart, in spite of his violent polemic against soul
powers, cannot do away with the necessity of vindicating at
least three powers for his real soul : Perception, Presentation,
Eeproduction or Memory.
With Herbart the only happening that takes place in the
soul is self-preservation against disturbance, but Desu-e and Will
are something quite different from self-preservation, since the
soul in these conditions places itself in connection with the outer
world. With Herbart the true hfe of the soul, if such it can be
called, like the Buddhist-Nirvana, continues, in spite of all dis-
turbance from without, to all eternity. That which otherwise
would gladden the human soul or sadden it to death, leaves no
trace according to Herbart's doctrine.
The Will. — In considering the Will we enter the domain of
ethics, and if Herbart had extended his metaphysical and psy-
chological hypothesis in this direction it would have been
impossible for him to arrive at any fundamental ethical ideas.
How could an essence without any powers or activities be
made responsible for any thought or wish or deed ? Yet
responsibihty is the base idea of all ethical considerations.
Without spontaneous power, the soul is simply a sport for
that chance which, according to Herbart, is supreme throughout
the universe. He would have the soul in its inner being as
little moved by the wildest combat of conflicting presentations
as the centre of the earth by the thunder of cannon or the
march of war-steeds. It is not the Intellect which thinks and
136 The Critics of Herbartianism
observes, not the Eeason which weighs according to its own
principles, not the Will which resolves, but presentations in
their union become powers independent of the actionless, and,
therefore, irresponsible soul.
Herbart's Idea of God. — If Herbart, in spite of all this, at-
tributes five moral ideas — Freedom, Perfection, Benevolence,
Right, and Equity — to the Soul, according to which it judges
an expression of Will as being pleasing or hateful, moral or im-
moral, good or bad, this is indeed opposed to his whole system,
though by it he obtains a bridge by which to pass over into the
territory of ethics and aesthetics, which would be otherwise
impossible — and here he is surely guilty of inconsistency, and
according to his metaphysics God is also a simple real essence
with simple quality, who like every other real soul can only
arrive at thinking through union with other souls, and therefore
cannot be the commanding intelligence or the Creator of Souls.
Thus, in criticising Herbart's metaphysics, Vogel attacks first
his premise that contradictions form the beginning and the end
of all speculation, and that these contradictions lie in the forms
of the data, as they are at first thought of by means of ideas.
His Elaboration of Ideas. — He contends that although the
notional elaboration of the data or of experience, especially in
the case of the beginner, becomes entangled in all sorts of con-
tradictions, these do not arise from the data. Incorrect results
in Science, as in life, rest for the most part on incorrect
premises which have been obtained by a superficial or hastily
concluded observation of the data, and only a small proportion
are due to insufficient comparison of correctly obtained facts
of experience or to purely logical mishaps. Motive for thought
cannot be sought in the contradiction, but rather in the strong
impulse which is woven into the very heart of man, to discover
the law, which lies at the root of given appearances, i.e., the truth,
towards which insufficient experience can be no starting point
at all.
"The Method of Relations." — Herbart's "Method of Rela-
tions " by which he seeks to expand ideas, leads too soon into
the airy regions of purely metaphysical ideas, and away from
Vogel 137
the necessary practical experience, and though professedly-
starting from the latter he soon rejects its authority as being
burdened with contradictions which only thinking is able to
solve, whereas these pretended contradictions should be elimin-
ated at once by means of closer observation. With regard to
Herbart's ideas of Things themselves and to the idea of Being,
as a kind of fixing, it is easier to agree with him, and Kant had
already established the same, but when he argues that the
Real does not lie in the thing thought of, but in the thinking,
he places Thinking and Being in irreconcilable hostility.
"Accidental Helps to Vision." — He sets in motion with his
"accidental helps to Vision" and his construction of Ideas an
artificial apparatus, and does not lead up to real explanations.
He leaves us to put " accident " in the place of real cause, but
where chance reigns laws have no power, and where no law
operates there is an end of science, the object of which is the
discovery of laws in the apparent chaos of appearances.
Herbart's System in Opposition to Idealism. — Vogel feels that
Herbart's whole system is the exact opposite of the idealistic in
which the Ego is itself the only true Real and the principle of
all things, therefore of the so-called objective world. Herbart
does not recognise a Real in the Ego, but only a relation arising
out of the objective presentations, whereas the Ego, as well as
self-consciousness, can surely neither proceed from mere pre-
sentations of the Objective world, nor can these presentations
exist without a presupposed self-consciousness. The Ego must
be a thinking subject, and thinking without self-consciousness is a
contradiction. Herbart seems to limit knowledge to accidental
and soulless appearance, not to agreement of Thinking with
Being, and instead of leading up to truth, seems to go down into
the darkness of doubt, though it is only fair to say that Herbart
at times commits himself to a contradiction and gives glimmers
of the Actual.
Vogel's Summing Up. — In summarising his criticism, Vogel
says, " We cannot recognise either Herbart's principles or the
deductions therefrom as correct, and the wearisome tediousness
of his expositions and terminology militates strongly against
t^S The Critics of Herbartianism
their acceptance ". The latter objection, however, Vogel brings
also against Kant and Fichte. " On the other hand, the bold-
ness of Herbart's thought in referring the whole psychic life to
the presentation as the final cause, must exercise effect on
every thinker who is seeking for final causes, and all hypotheses
which throw light on the way to these, deserve our thanks and
recognition. No one of them may be able to solve the pro-
blem of soul-life or the riddles of the world, but yet may
serve to guide the restless, eager, investigating mind towards
the solution of the most difficult problems that are presented
to the minds of men."
Pestalozzi's Psychology : The Moral Life. — While claiming
on the one hand that the animal instincts in man must be sub-
dued in order that the human may evolve unchecked, on the
other hand Pestalozzi argues that as human art is subordinate
to man's spirit, its cultivation is imperative upon every indi-
vidual, and the germ of the power for this lies in the inner soul
of man and proceeds from the union of spiritual, moral, and
physical powers, powers innate in man and endowed with the
impulse towards development and perfection.
A Child's Powers. — The powers of a child are immeasurable,
but for healthy evolution must develop in orderly, organic
unity, the unity of an organism in which the God-hke essence
lives, an essence which is free and autonomous, and which
though imbibing hfe from its sense-surroimdings is not physi-
cally bound. At first it exists in germ only, and is subject to
eternal, immutable laws which lie at the basis of all natural
development ; but divine love, and human love if it has a divine
bias, is the mainspring which directs the uplifting of man's
sensual and animal nature through his spiritual nature. Faith
and love unify all his powers of knowing and acting, and are to
man as an eternal evolving being, as the roots are to a tree,
giving him strength to draw the nourishment necessary for
his development.
Cf. Qui que tu sois, ramour est ton maitre,
II Test, il le fut, et il le doit etre. (Dumas.)
t^ogel 139
Motive Powers of Development. — Pestalozzi next makes a fine
distinction between animal thinking and animal art (dependent
on the perceptions of oux race from purely sensual contemplation),
and human power of thinking (of which the highest results of
the animal are no sort of proof, just as the highest technical
excellence may be possible without creative power). The think-
ing of our race, as human thought, certainly does not proceed
from a power which is connected with the delicate fibres of our
flesh and blood. Our thought, in so far. as it is truly human,
proceeds from the divine power to subject our flesh to our
thought, and is to purely animal thinking as darkness is to
Ught, contradictory, and the latter leads to inhumanity.
Man's Innate Power of Effort. — Then Pestalozzi maintains
that it is no incentive from without, no foreign will outside a man,
which causes the development of his powers. It is his own will,
his own innate power of effort which effects the awakening of
his heart to feeling, his mind to thinking, or his physical powers
to activity.
Moral Power. — By means of his moral power man raises
himself to the position of highest dignity of which his nature is
capable, to the divine.
Intellectual Power. — The intellectual power of oiir race
Herbart regards as a power of the humanity of om- nature, the
component powers of which are those of contemplation, speech,
and thought. The power of contemplation, if not unnatural,
confused, or badly regulated leads a man under all circumstances
to individual, clear presentations about the objects of his sur-
roundings. Next comes the need of expression, and the gift of
speech is immeasurably great, and is essential to the power of
thought ; it may be regarded as the chief help whereby the
knowledge won through contemplation may be made general
and fruitful.
Pestalozzi' s Moral Teaching. — In agreement with Kant as
well as with the philosophical idealism of later times, Pestalozzi
is entirely opposed to Herbart from the point of view that the
faculties and powers of the human soul do not spring from the
influence of outward accident, but are rather innate and im-
k46 The Critics of Herbartianism
manent, so that they constitute the proper inner essence of the
soul. It is clearly seen that he regards the moral power as the
highest, and as that which raises man above the animal and out-
wards to the eternal and divine, and he also clearly shows to
what extent moral freedom is not a matter of free-wiU, but a law
of order and harmony. Thus, Nature must obey her laws.
She has no will. But I must not obey the law within me, if
I do not will it : in this I am my own judge and therefore
a nobler creature than all nature beside, Man finds himself
pledged in both the sensual and the mental worlds, — in the
one through his body — in the other through his will. The laws
of both are in essence the same, because both command order
and harmony in the worlds ruled by them ; natures gifted
with this Knowledge obey the law at first because they ought,
and then because they wish to do so. Still though Pestalozzi
shows that the laws of nature and of the spirit are one and the
same, he does not transport mechanical laws of nature to the
mental world, and he claims that the power of abstraction is the
very essence of thought power.
The ' Soul ' as Viewed by Pestalozzi and Compared with
Herbart's. — Vogel thinks Pestalozzi's ideas more suitable as a
basis for the moral ordering of the world and a natm-al education,
in just the way that Herbart's seem unsuitable. Herbart's sovd
seems a dead thing, without life and effort ; Pestalozzi's is the
source of never-ending Hfe. In the one case we have a soul
which in its absoluteness neither requires nor is capable of
development ; in the other, one whose impulses endeavour to
evolve the powers slumbering within it to infinite perfection.
The one is a mechanism, the other an organism ; the one repels
all force from without as disturbance, the other in joyous and
happy action grasps after what is beneficial for itself and its
fellows. Scarcely greater opposites can be imagined, and they
admit of no compromise ; the educationist may decide for him-
self which is the most inspiring and to which of the two leaders
he will entrust the soul of his pupil — Herbart or Pestalozzi.
Educational Theories of Pestalozzi. — From the starting point
that the development of the man himself, the masterpiece of
Vogel 141
creation, is the common need of humanity, Pestalozzi proceeds
to distinguish sharply the training of the animal in man from the
training of the human, and to enforce that when the highest
perfection of the animal is attained this does not touch the
boundary line of the evolution of the human. To satisfy man's
nature only in regard to food, warmth, and rest is to make him
sensual, selfish, and lazy.
The object of all education is therefore the raising of man's
nature from the sensuous selfishness of animal existence to the
height of blessedness possible for him through the harmonious
building up of his heart, mind and art. The peace arising
therefrom is the first requisite for all human development, and
with Pestalozzi the only eternal foundation for this evolution
of our nature towards humanity is hove, only through its sacred
power does man rise to the divine that lies within him. The
development of the man cannot come through a one-sided brain
development ; mechanical cleverness counts but little on the
whole. Again it is : —
Qui que tu sois, I'amour est ton maitre,
II Test, il le fut, et il le doit etre. (Dumas.)
Love is essentially the centre, and true love proceeds only from
true faith, that of a trustful human child in his Divine Father.
This basis of education naturally presupposes the free-will as
the centre of all the powers, and thus the man must be educated
to perform all his duties towards God, his neighbour and him-
self willingly, readily, cleverly, through the activity of his faith
and love ; he must be made intelligent for all the business of life
and for every emergency, and accustomed to necessary activity
and effort.
Still, however important training for vocation and position in
life may be, education must not make this its all-important
object ; the perfection of man's whole human nature is its goal.
The true nature of man is in itself neither good nor bad ; its
character depends upon whether it can freely develop according
to its essence and destiny or not — no man ought therefore to say
man is abject and depraved — it is only the men in whom the
power and the right feeling of their human nature have be-
142 The Critics of Herbartianism
come annihilated through sensuality and negligence who are
abject and depraved. Nature has done her work completely,
man must do his ; she has placed within him in rich abundance
the germs of all those powers which are necessary for our
eternal and earthly destiny. What we have to do is to assist
their natural development by bestowing upon them the en-
lightened love, the trained intellect and art of our race. Human
art is in this like the art of the gardener under whose care a
thousand trees bloom and grow, but to none of which does he
give the germs of development. A teacher plants no power
in man, nor does he give life or breath to any power, he only
takes care that no external force shall check or disturb their
natural development, and must be guided in so doing by what
centuries of experience have taught our race of human power.
Again, though the educator begins with the individual and
his special needs, he must embrace and have for his aim the
whole of humanity ; the race, not the individual, is the cry of the
Divine voice within us, in the hearing and following of which
lies the true nobility of human nature ; man is not in the world
for his own sake, but that he may perfect himself in the perfect-
ing of his brethren. The art of training men is the highest,
though the hardest, possible to man ; there is no calling on earth
which calls for greater culture and greater skill and deeper
knowledge of humanity and its needs. The means employed
must always tend to strengthen and purify the moral-rehgious
bond which unifies all man's powers. Faith must come about
through faith, and thought through thought, not only through
knowledge of what is believed and thought ; and love must come
through love ; and all can come about only through the training
of man's powers to the higher laws of his will ; a training which
must be consistent for each individual with the degree of develop-
ment to which he has already arrived.
The, Development of Power. — The natural development of
each power comes through the use of the same, through work
and industry — therefore the physical activity of our race is the
true, divinely ordained means for the development of the human
nature in man. Industry forms the intellect and gives force to
Vogel 143
the feelings of the heart, and in order that this development may-
proceed, encouragement is necessary, and in certain cases cor-
rection ; hence Pestalozzi does not condemn corporal punishment,
though he lays stress on the fact that the consistent daily and
hourly conduct and example of those around them is the highest
incentive for children — they cannot be kept in order by fear of
corporal punishment, but should be moved to do right of their
own free will out of gratitude and love, because it is right, and
for the sake of their own advantage.
The Moral Power. — Only as a moral being does man advance
to perfection, and the educator must strive to awaken, nourish
and strengthen moral and religious feeling in the child. This
is effected first by the mother's sacred care, in the steady, quiet
satisfaction of the child's physical needs, as this begets trust
and love, the foundation of morality ; and man must love, trust,
and obey man, before he loves, trusts, and obeys God. Moral
instruction is not so much the Teacher's as the Parent's task.
Man's struggle after perfection is the one thing, aided by Divine
guidance, that is capable of destroying evil.
The Mental Poz(;er.— This is entirely one of the humanity
of our nature, and hence its development is especially the
educator's goal. The child likes to think as much as he does
to walk, to learn as much as to eat, if only his instruction
is as well prepared as his food. To make the child feel "I can
do something " is the teacher's special task, and the feeling one
of the child's greatest rewards.
The Science of Teaching. — This comprises three natural
means : —
Simple Observation : Memory and Application of what is
Observed : Imagination. — The real value of human knowledge
consists in this, that a man who knows a great deal and can
apply it, must be able to harmonise more than another with his
circumstances and to develop himself uniformly.
Instruction therefore is Subordinate to Training. — Great
simplicity should characterise the Teaching art, that is, all
imparting of knowledge should start from the very simple, and
lead by easy stages to what is dif&cult, keeping pace always with
144 The Critics of Herbartianism
the growth of power in the pupil, always encouraging, never
wearying him. The range of subjects should be neither too
wide nor too narrow. None of us need all Knowledge. The
form of instruction is valuable in so far as it arouses the inde-
pendent action of the child. Only that which is in full harmony,
mental, spiritual, and physical, with the individual, is for that
individual really truth. Catechising, therefore, is a most natural
form of instruction, and only such material should be chosen as
can appeal to a child's mind and give him real pleasure and
interest. Natural objects, pictures, and illustrations are most
essential to the forming of clear ideas in a child's mind, and to
his being able to express the same. Correct sense-impressions
lead to knowledge. The art of Teaching lies in showing right
relations and associations, and in strengthening these im-
pressions, and the power to express the same. Independent
imaginative work follows naturally.
The Physical - or Artistic Power. — Knowledge without the
power to use it is a fatal gift to any man. The physical basis
of the development of artistic power is instinct ; but art is
needed in directing this development. Just as the theory and
practice of form and number may be regarded as the gymnastics
of the mental power, so the mechanical exercise of the senses
and limbs is necessary for the development of the art power.
Here, again, the germs of the power are in man, and the
development of mechanical skill by simple exercises leading to
more difficult ones consistent with the circumstances of the indi-
vidual child is all that is needed, till practice leads to correct
performance, and then to freedom and independence in any
art.
Unity of the Powers. — Again, the Moral, Mental, and Physical
Powers are not contradictory, they are united by a sacred and
organic inner bond towards a common end, i.e., the evolution
towards perfection of the humanity in man, and all art in train-
ing must work towards this goal, the ennobling and satisfaction
of our human and Divine nature. Only that which lays hold
of the man, and satisfies his heart, mind, and hand is truly
advantageous to him. If one part suffers, all suffer with it.
Vogel 145
Harmonious development is the key-note of Pestalozzi's theories,
and though no one man can be said yet to have attained thereto,
he would have us " press forward, if haply we may do so ".
The Science and Art of Education : Herbart and Pestalozzi.
— Vogel points out to us that those who wish to build a science
of education on experience should be very careful to observe
how many times it is necessary to try the same experiment with
different gradations, before a resultant average can be obtained
which is capable of giving a theory and a working hypothesis in
the domain of those sciences, so essentially founded on experience,
as physics and chemistry. Education, as a science, must be
distinguished from the art of Education, for science is the orderly
arrangement of precepts which constitute an harmonious whole,
and in which the results are derived from axioms, and axioms
from first principles ; while an art is the sum total of exercises
which must be united to bring about a certain object. Science,
therefore, demands guidance from theorems proceeding from
philosophic thinking, while Art demands constant action cor-
responding with the result to be attained ; and the application of
Science to Art is necessary before entering upon that action by
means of which the final artistic result is to be attained. Never-
theless one must not expect to turn out an infallible master of
any art by following a specific scheme of rules arrived at by such
preparation, nor must one demand from it infallible directions
as to treatment. One must trust one's power of discovery suf-
ficiently to be able to do the right thing at the right moment,
and if this be the case in mere technical art so much more is it
so in that art of all arts. Education. Here, perhaps, individual
actions of the trainer may seem insignificant, but the whole
tenor of his treatment is of vital importance.
Great Insight into Human Nature Necessary. — Pestalozzi
compares child-training to the gardener's art. Herbart rather
calls attention to the distinctions between them dependent on
the complexity of child nature. We feel the first requirement
of the educator to be an exact knowledge of human nature, not
within its ordinary limitations, but in its infinite capacity for
development, and with this an understanding of the relations of
146 The Critics of Herbartianism
all kinds of knowledge to the various interests of humanity, and
a tactful application of the same.
Government of Children. — In the government of children the
great consideration is the training of the Will, so that it may not
be the mere creature of wild impulses leading first one way and
then another. Force may have present results, but true training
makes for the discipline of the future. The best training is that
of Love and Persuasion ; sympathy is a potent factor, and also
brings about the best present results, for though willing is more
important than knowing, it has its root in thought and in in-
struction, which incites mental activity and interest, through
presentations which depend, to a great extent, on experience
and environment.
Foundations of Educational Systems. — These should be based
on Ethics and Psychology, and if on the latter, Herbart's is
wrong. Logically, the idea of training does not enter into his
system, and yet he contradicts himself, for to carry out his
system premises the existence of soul powers. The chief aim of
education is, according to Pestalozzi, the elevation of our nature
from the sensual selfishness of our animal self, to humanity
through Faith and Love, while Herbart would inculcate Virtue or
Morality. But it seems to us that Virtue and Morality are to
Faith and Love as the stream to the source, as effect to cause,
and as greater abstractions they may have less soul life and less
power to excite Will. Spontaneous free-will must be premised if
humanity is to be raised ; Faith and Love make all things possible.
Herbart practically denies the spontaneity of Will ; and yet the
human Will must be raised to resignation and to sacrifice for
truth and right through Faith and Love. Pestalozzi holds that
education can only draw out from the mind what is already
there. It can arouse already existing powers, it cannot implant
them.
Herbart denies to the man every faculty and every power
which animals and plants possess. According to him the mind
of man is constructed in accordance with outer circumstances,
and it is thus the task of art to take care that this construction
will follow lines which will cause the mind to correspond to the
Sallwurk 147
purpose of man's being. As he makes the soul entirely without
spontaneity, he renders it like any other machine, capable only
of elaborating what it receives. It certainly adds to the responsi-
bility of the educator, since in accordance with this theory it rests
entirely in his hands whether the pupil becomes a reasoning per-
son or a wild animal. This may be the logical conclusion from
Herbart's psychology, yet, as a working hypothesis, his system
has much to recommend it. The training of strength and breadth
of Character, through many-sided Interest, is indeed the pre-
eminent goal of the educator. Life itself, it may be urged,
affords here and there opportunity for the unfolding of the
human-divine powers, without the necessity for specific guidance,
but it cannot be denied that a proper guidance, with regularly
planned method, is a far more certain means for the accom-
plishment of the desired end, or should, at least, work hand in
hand with life.
We owe an incalculable debt to Pestalozzi as the pioneer who
penetrated to the profoundest depth of human nature, and laid
bare its psychological organism, as well as the imperishable
foundations upon which rest the means through which its
powers may be developed. His Teacher and Pupil are friends,
while Herbart's are rather Master and Scholar. Perhaps in
practice both relations are needed, and instruction must fill the
gaps left by experience and environment, and ensure concen-
trated attention and many-sided development.
SECTION VII.
SALLWURK.
(1887.)
Reference.
Sallwurk. Gesinnungs-unterricht und Kulturgeschichte. Beyer und
Sohne (Langensalza), 1887.
Db. E. von Sallwubk was the author of an important book,
published anonymously in 1880 under the title of Herbart und
148 The Critics of Herbartianism
seine Jiinger (Herbart and his disciples), which gave rise to ani-
mated controversies between the extreme Zillerians and their
critics. Other works followed in 1885 and subsequent years ;
the most important of these is probably the one above. Sall-
wiirk's own attitude is that of a moderate Herbartian severely
critical towards Zillerian proposals. He is especially good in
his treatment of the scientific foundations of the culture-stages
doctrine.
Character-forming Instruction (Gesinnungs-unterricht) may
take various forms.
(1) It may be pragmatic, making an attempt to provide the
pupil with guidance and teaching for each contingency of life.
But the worst of this method is that it deals largely with out-
ward experience, whereas the child is a child and must be
treated as such.
(2) It may be organic, following the development of the
presentation world of the pupil, and advancing strictly from
simple to complex.
(3) The third method may be called genetic, and is based on
the maxim that the moral development of the individual
imitates that of the race. Thus a course of instruction in
accordance with general history would satisfy the needs of the
child. But the advocates of this method have never yet proved
the maxim upon which their method rests ; moreover, one
questions whether they have succeeded, without too much arti-
ficiality, in obtaining from history material for instruction which
corresponds to the step- by-step development of the normal child.
After deahng with " Character-forming Instruction " along
pre-Herbartian lines, Sallwiirk proceeds to discuss the proposals
of Ziller.
Ziller's most dangerous tendency was towards a hasty
dogmatism. This is shown in his doctrine of culture stages
as applied to the central matter provided for " Character-
forming Instruction ".
He proposes that after the early courses of fairy tales, Eobin-
son Crusoe, etc., the children should be taught along two paral-
Sallwiirk 149
lei lines, profane history and sacred history ; German Sagas
being taught along with the Patriarchs ; the Niebelungen along
with the Judges ; the founders of the German kingdom (Henry I.,
etc.) along with the Jewish Kings ; the Eeformation along with
Jesus and the Prophets ; the War of Freedom along with the
Apostles ; and the recent re-erection of the German Empire
along with the Lutheran Catechism. MeanwhUe for the higher
schools Greek thought should be treated in a similar way ; thus
the Odyssey would be taught simultaneously with the Niebe-
lungen and the Judges, while Herodotus would accompany
Kings, etc.
How much of this scheme is Herbart's own ? Very little ;
only those portions which deal with the classics (Odyssey) and
with Robinson Crusoe. Practically speaking, the scheme is
Ziller's. Herbart himself put Thucydides after the younger
Xenophon, thus reversing the historical order and showing
how little he believed in the " culture-stages " doctrine.
The connecting together of secular and profane history may
be morally useful as showing the advance of inner ethical ideas,
but " concentration " would suffer, and, indeed, historical truth.
Let us consider Ziller's arguments. The child, we are told,
has to begin in the child world of the fairy tales ; here he gets
to know single things in their concrete forms. Then, in passing
through the Eobinson Crusoe stage (the conquest of natural
hindrances) he learns the necessity for mutual help and for
authority. Next he becomes like the tribal dependents of the
patriarchal age. Activity springs up ; the powers of each indi-
vidual in the community are valued and used ; national form is
assumed (Judges period). There comes now a recognition of an
ethical order among the free individuals of the State (Kings
period). Then out of obedience there springs up love for the
highest authority ; Christ appears and tries to bring God's king-
dom on the earth.
Ziller tries to show the significance of this scheme from the
point of view of Herbart's five moral ideas. But inasmuch as
these ideas, however valuable, were deduced dialectically and
not historically, they do not really correspond to Ziller's stages.
150 The Critics of Herbartianism
He correlates " Inner Freedom " with his fairy-tale period ;
" Perfection " (VoUkommenheit) with his Eobinson Crusoe
period ; and Benevolence with his patriarchal period. All this
is fantastic. If any one idea is first, it is that of " Eight or
Law," for we come into the world as members of society. How-
ever, Ziller, taking the three primary ideas and the five social
ideas, obtained eight in all, and imagined that these corre-
sponded to his eight cultm'e stages.
Again, though he speaks of " culture stages," his teaching
course is really determined by one kind of culture only, namely,
ethico-religious, and even that along Christian lines only, except
so far as, in highest schools, the classics are studied. Surely
art, science, etc., must bs considered.
The child, before entering school, is already in part familiar
with Christianity. How is it possible, then, to make a child
" live through " the pre-Christian stages?
Ziller's followers have by no means slavishly adhered to his
plan. Thus Willmann admits errors in the master's scheme,
and Staude declares it to be a piece of audacity to assume that
between the ages of six and fourteen the child passes through
eight apperception stages, each stage demanding certain ma-
terial and no more. It is inconceivable that the eight years
passed in the elementary school should have such a philosophic
basis.
Again, Staude criticises Ziller for leaving it uncertain whether
children do in any case pass through the eight stages, or whether
this only happens if we arrange our instruction properly. He
also points out that the various stages cannot be definitely marked
ofi" from each other, and criticises the importance attached to
the Judges period and to the periods subsequent to Christ ; the
time devoted to the study of Christ must be increased. But
the fundamental weakness in the works of men like Ziller,
Staude, and Eein, is that they never prove that the assumed
congruence between racial and individual development really
exists.
O. W. Beyer (Ueber die Naturwissenschaften in der Erzie-
hungsschule) is an earnest writer upon the question of natural
Sallwurk 151
science teaching. He is convinced that the above-mentioned
congruence exists ; embryology is a witness. But Ziller never
thought of applying the culture-stages doctrine to the teaching
of any subject except historical ones. Beyer goes further.
He calls attention to such facts as children's love of wandering,
hunting, looking after animals, and so forth. He regards these
as indications that the child is reproducing the hunting, nomadic
and other primitive stages of development. In this connection
school excursions, school gardens, school workshops, etc. (the
last bear closely on the later civic stage) are important. There
is something of the vagabond and of Eobinson Crusoe in every
child.
Accordingly Beyer proposes that an attempt be made to follow
the different development-stages of human work, the making
and preparation of food, the discovery of fire, etc. No doubt
these stages were vastly important for the race,. But have they
any significance for the individual ? Is there any close relation
between them and his mental development, his presentational
life ? Is there really any mental stage in the individual corre-
sponding to the discovery of fire ?
Beyer thinks there is. He identifies the culture stages (stage
of the use of fire, etc.) with the conditions of adaptation in Dar-
win's scheme, and believes that the earlier stages have left
especially deep traces, because of their length. But is this so ?
Have the various culture-stages (hunting, agriculture, etc.) ever
really modified the bodily structure ? ^ And was there ever any
precise separation between the stages ?
Just as Beyer has applied the culture-stages doctrine to science
teaching, another Zillerian, Menard, has applied it to art.
Examination of the Scientific Foundations of the Culture-
stages Doctrine. — Ziller has never applied his doctrine to the
entire realm of human development, only to the ethical. But
surely there would be a certain charm in generalising the maxim,
and, drawing inspiration from it, to carry on the work willed by
Providence. Let us, however, examine it.
1 Here Sallwurk touches on the great problem whether habits are tranS'
mitted to offspring.
152 TTu Critics of Herhartianism
The culture-stages doctrine implies that racial development is
a real development, i.e., a progression from a lower to a higher
stage. But evolution is not always upward, though it is always
in the direction of adaptation to environment. Organs have to
become adapted to new conditions. Some blind animals possess
rudimentary eyes in their early stages of existence ; is the dis-
appearance of the eyes an advance ? Surely not, in the sense of
the culture-stages doctrine, though in the sense of adaptation to
conditions it is an advance. Culture is a question of the favour-
able or unfavourable relations in which the surrounding material
world places those wrestHng with it ; culture itself may not alter
the bodily or mental organisation ; thus previous culture stages
may not have been handed down to the human beings of the
present day, and therefore education need not pay any attention
to such previous stages. Only that which exists in the present
conditions of culture, or that which is represented in present-day
instincts, can be attended to by education. Moreover, the human
race passed through many stages previous to the historic ones
— hunting, nomadic, etc. — but we cannot trace them. Again,
human culture has not been an uninterrupted advance : it has
repeatedly doubled back or retrogressed ; or an older culture, it-
self incapable of further advance, may have fertilised a younger
culture. Thus oriental culture has influenced Greek rather than
developed continuously along its own lines.
True, the development of the individual does not always pro-
ceed along one definite line ; but we must not, for this reason, imi-
tate the involved and perplexing procedure of racial development.
Enough has been said in connection with Beyer's proposals
to show that we must not imitate the forms of material develop-
ment, for these forms (the use of fire, etc.) merely demonstrate
incidentally a mental and ethical advance, but are in themselves
of no educational significance, however great their significance
for the race as a whole.
Let us proceed to consider inner development.
Intellectual Development. — There are great difficulties here for
the culture stages theory ; man was once quite devoid of science;
are we to imitate this stage ? The question of speech would
Sallwurk 153
oflfer an extraordinarily good field for study ; but even with
advanced peoples, speech is still primitive and cannot express
logical distinctions very clearly ; thus in English, concretes and
abstracts are not completely distinguished, and in most lan-
guages there is a confusion between 'post hoc and propter hoc
{cf., the particles since, quum, nachdem, puisque).
Even if science could give us an account of man's intellectual
development, education must not copy it, unless, with Eousseau,
we wish to lead out of instead of into culture. Surely we shall
teach European writing, not hieroglyphics ; developed word-
forms, not primitive roots.
Ethical Development. — In the realm of ethical thought there
has been no change in the moral ideas, though much change in
their application (marriage, etc.); from the first dawn of culture
man seems to have had them. Thus family life, even in the
crudest form, develops all the ideas.
Ziller's strange notion of developing the moral ideas one after
the other (Inner Freedom at the fairy-tale stage, VoUkommenheit
at the Crusoe stage, and so on) would involve a dissection of
morality ; nay, the pupils would for a long time live without
morality, for Inner Freedom involves insight into all the other
ideas, and therefore cannot exist alone. It is clear that the
simple ideas cannot and ought not to develop step by step ; and
further, that the deduced social relations are beyond the capacity
of juniors, so that the imaginary actions the latter are directed
to consider would be fatal to earnestness.
Further Criticisms of Ziller's Plan. — The child's nature is
rooted in the present. To insist that the child should live
through past stages is to rely on superficial views of the culture-
stages doctrine, and is, indeed, difiicult to be justified by an Her-
bartian, who is supposed to lay much stress on the present rela-
tions of the pupils.
Again, can we parallel sacred history with the real culture
development of man ? The question culminates in this : Are the
Protestant German Empire and the Lutheran Catechism neces-
sarily the highest stage of human culture ? It is difficult here
to share Ziller's optimism,
1 54 The Critics of Herbartianism
Again, Joseph, David, etc., are introduced to the pupil after
Eobinson Crusoe has been accompanied over the world, and
after questions like property, obedience, etc., have been intro-
duced. In point of fact, Ziller puts Crusoe much too early, as
some Zillerians admit.
The Zillerians criticise some of the Old Testament stories on
various grounds, and substitute fairy tales for them in the first
year. Thus the narratives of the Creation and Fall have to be
withheld ; all sorts of limitations, reservations, and exclusions
are proposed. But, in reality, if the Old Testament stories are
taught simply and undogmatically they will be found suitable
enough, and better than the fairy tales ; and, indeed, these latter
are altogether too childish for children who have entered school.
We must not base extravagant hopes on the social culture of
thirteen-year-old pupils who are still under home protection.
We must undertake with them natural and remunerative tasks,
and give them the right disposition to do their own appointed
work ; to go beyond this will be a mistake.
SECTION VIII.
HUBATSCH.
(1888.)
Bsfer&nce.
Hubatsch. Gesprdche ilber die Herbart-ZUlersche PtLdagogik. Kunzes
Nachfolger, Wiesbaden.
This violent attack upon Herbartianism is in the form of con-
versations between a supposed juvenile enthusiast for the system
and educationists of a disillusioned type. A certain vein of
cynicism runs through this critique. Hubatsch is one of the few
critics who see scarcely anything that is good in the proposals of
the reformers, though he praises Herbart's strenuous consist-
ency.
Hubatsch 155
Herbart's psychology is rejected even by men who cling to his
pedagogy. It sounds impressive owing to its technical ter-
minology. But the ruin of the psychology involves the ruin of
the pedagogy, for the two are closely connected. Herbart's
notion of a simple soul and of a presentational mechanism, with
quantitative laws only, is purely fanciful. The experiments of
Munk, and facts such as the loss of words for certain ideas, show
that the brain is concerned in all thought, hence a system which
ignores facts like the brain is doomed. A psychology suitable
for pedagogy must not ignore experience, physiology, etc.
Ziller indidges in prolix declamations but ignores important
points. He was ignorant of man and of the world, yet he
abused all opponent's as fools. He said: " Woe to the schools
where dexterities and knowledge are regarded as the highest
goals to aim at, where ' practical ' interests, future usefulness,
etc., are primarily regarded, and not the impiilse to know and
will ". Is this the utterance of a man who knows the world ?
Do we live in a Utopia ? Ziller blames the schools for the
absence of great men ; but surely if any schools were able to
produce useless and helpless men those schools would be
Ziller' s, with their constant feeding of pupils on character-
material.
Following Herbart, ZiUer recognised three classes of schools,
Gymnasia, Burgerschulen, and Volksschulen. Each has to be
transformed into an " educative school ". No doubt he admits the
claims of the future vocation, etc., but he protests against the
mixing up of ideals. The " chief classes," devoted to " educa-
tion" proper, must be distinguished from the "subsidiary
classes " devoted to professional training. But surely Ziller
forgets human nature when he draws this sharp distinction,
and, in point of fact, the " subsidiary classes " would prove the
greatest attraction.
ZiUer has a dream of small school communities, unconnected
with State, Town, or Church. How httle he knows the world !
State control is daily increasing.
He urges a diminution in school hours and in home lessons,
and many breaks in the school lessons for open-air exercise,
156 The Critics of Herbartianism
This would be possible, he says, if teachers knew better how to
employ the pupil's time ... if ... if ... if " concentra-
tion," etc., were effected. Present-day teachers are no good;
they have no missionary zeal. But Ziller is wrong. Teachers
must limit themselves to definite narrow goals. If wider cul-
ture were possessed by them criticism would awaken, and there
would be system no longer.^ So long as large classes exist in
schools, it is no good to " talk big ". Moral education must rest
mainly on habit, rule, custom, obedience, religious instruction,
influence, etc. Experience, activity, struggle are the best
teachers. 2
When you have obtained your finely educated teachers, ac-
quainted with the latest researches, will they choose the
lower schools ? Surely Ziller ought to have founded a philan-
thropic "brotherhood". Pedagogical enthusiasm is rare; so
long as teachers do their duty that is enough. A day has only
twenty-four hours. How many thousand volumes must a man
read before becoming a Zillerian teacher ?
" Educative Instruction." Strange terminology, that of the
Herbartians ! Preposterous claims to have discovered a
" science " of pedagogy ! Pedagogy is merely an art with
a narrow aim ; it picks up its knowledge from other sources.
To give the name of science to a pedagogy founded on the doc-
trine of a presentational-mechanism — a doctrine which ignores
the rich life of the soul, its secret impulses, the thousand riddles
of the world — is monstrous !
Do not all educators try to educate through Instruction ?
The Zillerians answer, " Only in a chance way. You tried to
cultivate the Understanding, the Taste, the Imagination, etc.,
but you forgot that Will is the one supreme goal ; you should
aim at creating Virtue and Christian Love, and the Kingdom of
God on earth." But is education impossible, then, with Jews,
Moslems, etc, ? It was Ziller who added the rehgious notion
^ In other words, Hubatsch pleads for a narrow, brutal professionalism
without ideals.
^ Yes, and how many pupils sMCCMwi? The need of Instruction is the
great Herbartian message, a far more valuable one than that of Hubatsch.
Hubatsch 157
to Herbart's system and claimed that Christianity alone in-
cludes all that is humanly good. He rejected French and also
various classical authors (Horace) as not truly educative ; but
surely this is pure fanaticism ; all men of culture must know
French, Horace, etc.
"Action depends on the circle of thought," say the Herbar-
tians. This is really Socrates redivivus. The doctrine is wrong.
Man has desires, inclinations, etc. It is no good to deny inborn
activities, or to call them purely " formal ". Darwinism and the
inductive method show that " faculties" must be assumed, such
as no presentations can invert. When Dickens described pure-
minded children amid squalor and vice, was he wrong ? Ziller
and Herbart are really in conflict over this question ; Ziller prac-
tically admits " faculties ".
The relation between " many-sidedness " and Virtue is not
clear. Sxirely a one-sided person may be virtuous, and vice
versd. " Yes," says Herbart, " but Interest must be awakened
if Instruction has to bear on Virtue. Moreover, morality is
really impossible without intelligence, for the circle of thought
limits everything." " But surely many-sided Interest is often
connected with self-love, pride, etc." " No," says Herbart,
"the Interest is not, in such cases, genuine." " Eeally," re-,
sponds the critic, "what about Voltaire, Bacon, Cicero, Seneca?"
Christianity lays stress on Faith and Love, not on Knowledge
and many-sided Interest. Where is the real connection between
the latter and Virtue ?
Interest, say the Herbartians, " is a protection against pas-
sions," which often spring from narrowness of mind ; it is a
means of " help in the afl'airs of life," and it is a means of
"safety amid the storms of fate," as opening up new paths. But
(says the critic) a owe- sided Interest is often more satisfactory.
There are many gradations between stupidity and many-sided
Interest.
Herbart denies that true Interest is of the nature of Desire.
It is, he says, a peaceful thing, and not an impatient " pressing
forward ". But (says the critic) such Interest is neither fish nor
flesh. And, in point of fact, some of Herbart's six classes of In-
158 The Critics of Herbartianism
terest are " peaceful," some are not ; his whole classification is
illogical. "Speculative" interest is not "peaceful," as "aes-
thetic " is. Some of the interests are interests in definite
objects ; others in relations. Again, religious interest easily
passes over into a Feeling (of Fear, Hope, etc.).
Then the "concentration" and "culture-stages " doctrines are
of dubious value, and scarcely found in Herbart's own works.
They rest on bad psychology or partial analogies. There is no
history of mankind in general, only of nations. Fables are pro-
ducts of advanced not primitive culture ; primitive man regarded
animals as enemies, whereas the fables lay stress on the unity of
nature, and really spring from a time when animals had already
been- tamed. Sleeping princesses, etc., were no part of primi-
tive man's world. He thought mainly of the dreadful, vast
forces of nature. It is impossible to extract morals out of
Marchen. Moreover, schools have to teach reality, and the
imagination must not be over- stimulated.
Again, though " Eobinson Crusoe " is a splendid story for
children, suggesting self-power, stimulating imagination (how to
act in hour of need), sympathy, etc., yet the story does not re-
present any one stage of development. Men did not make
clothes, etc., nor live alone after Eobinson's fashion. He al-
ready had the ideas of civilisation in his mind. How different
the child of eight ! At no stage ought we to make the story the
centre of instruction, the story brings forward foreign and excep-
tional scenery. But the story is an excellent one for reading at
a certain age.
Others of Ziller's stages are equally dubious. The Odyssey
stage is said to correspond to that of navigation ; doubtless selec-
tions from this poem are useful, but not as the centre of instruc-
tion. What a medley Ziller's material is, animal fables, modern
Eobinson, ancient patriarchs, Greek heroes, etc. ! Many of the
" stages " (the Livy stage, the Anabasis stage, etc.) may be use-
ful in school, but have only very superficial parallels in the race.
The child has parents whom it imitates ; how differently did the
race learn ! Most of the Zillerian parallels and connections,
e.g., between Greek and Jewish history are equally artificial.
Hubatsch 159
How absurd, also, to begin with geography of Asia (Ararat,
etc.) ! We should begin at home.
The great " Interest " doctrine ! The Herbartians make In-
terest an end, not a mere means. It must rest on involuntary
attention, itself favoured by Begierung, and resting on sensible
intensity as well as on contrast, newness, expectation, etc. But,
says the critic, what is the first germ of Interest ? How can
Interest be generated merely out of presentations, apart from
any central ego ? The Herbartians say, " Interest arises when
presentations come forward freely ; without this freedom there
may still be attention, but of a forced kind ". In point of
fact the whole mathematical theory of presentations, their inter-
actions, etc., is so obscure as to ruin the doctrine of Interest
which rests on it. In its essence it is materialistic or atomistic.
But presentations are not atoms ; they are much more complex,
and cannot be treated as homogeneous. A tone and the Koman
Empire cannot be treated as alike ; some presentations are highly
complex ; concepts, too, are peculiar ; yet Herbart lumps all these
together as presentations.
Again, Herbart lays great stress on primitive and apperceptive
attention ; but whence comes the agency in this ? He is com-
pelled to admit the necessity for voluntary attention ; here we
have the agent, the Will. Siirely this factor is important.
Attention is a function of the Will. It may be voluntary or
involuntary. It is this WUl that explains everything. But
Herbart only brings it on the scene at the very end of the series
— Attention, Interest, Will. There is with him no original
Will. According to him, out of primitive attention there arises,
by a storing up of presentations, apperceptive attention ; out of
this finally emerges Interest. But why not reverse the process,
and say that the living will-power of the soul shows itself in
impulses, interest, etc. ? The Will is the presupposition, not the
result of Education ; we must work upon the Will by presenting
to it suitable objects for arousing Interest. Interest presupposes
Will, not vice versd.
The Herbartian emphasis upon immediate interest and the
partial depreciation of mediate interest overlooks the fact that
i6o The Critics of Herbartianism
we cannot gather grapes from thorns ; we must take men as we
find them. Happy if we can awaken even mediate interest.
To say, " Don't interest to teach, but teach to awaken Interest,"
is sophistry. The teacher can only awaken Interest by being
interesting. How can you awaken an interest in Latin declen-
sions except by first conveying the impression that it is some-
thing fine, mighty, worthy, etc., to know Latin? But this is
mediate Interest.
Again, Herbart admits that Interest depends on the one side
on natural capacity which cannot be created. But if so, many-
sided Interest is unnatural. He and Ziller compare education
to an imaginary process in which an angular body gradually
approximates to the spherical form by the excitation of many-
sided Interest. But the illustration will not serve. Either the
angular body is alterable or not. If unalterable, many-sided
Interest has no influence ; if alterable, the individuality vanishes.
" It is alterable," say the Zillerians, " but mainly so in youth,
and the difficulty of alteration increases with age ; hence the
importance of Education." They teU us that all must be
amateurs in everjrthing, virtuosi in one department. But all
cannot be amateurs in everything ; individuality prevents it. A
theory which professes to unite individuality with many-sided
Interest is so absurd as to be impervious to attack.
No doubt Herbart contends that many-sided Interest is a foe
to fickleness as well as to one-sidedness, and he lays stress on
Absorption (Vertiefung) as well as Eeflection (Besinnung). But
Absorption really presupposes Interest, and this depends on
innate powers. One man likes Mathematics, another Languages,
etc.
The Goal of Edvx^ation. — This is, according to Ziller, the
forming of ethico-religious personalities according to the ideal
of the Kingdom of God. But a transcendent goal like this will
not do. When parents send their children to school what do
they expect ? Surely that the children be made into useful and
capable persons. Education only deals with the preliminary
part of life, the part before independence is reached. The
Herbartian goal may be very good, but only for adults. It is
Hubatsch i6i
no good to rave against existent schools. All their attempts
correspond to definite needs that have grown up. We must
be practical people. The age will not stand mere " culture
ideals ". Education has several distinct tasks.
" No," say the Herbartians, " Instruction must not be separ-
ated from Education, Knowledge from Morality. Instruction
must serve Education; it must create Virtue." But this is a
great mistake. Owe goal is not enough. There must be as
many goals as there are directions of human activity. Moral
and intellectual Education are two different things} and the
latter is far more effective than the former, for no Education
can wash a Moor white. Moral action rests on impulses deeply
buried ; the teacher is not responsible for them ; if he were we
should punish not the criminal but his teacher. ^
"No," says Herbart, "action springs out of the circle of
thought." But character cannot be altered so easily.
"Formal Culture." — Apart from the rousing of aesthetic and
other Interest, and the formation of a " circle of thought,"
Herbart despised languages, mathematics, etc. But formerly
people believed that the study of the classics was a fine mental
gymnastic, a fine training in logic, in fact fine " formal culture ".
So also with mathematics. But the Herbartians contend that
these subjects must not be treated in independence. Thus these
men encourage scattered, superficial thinking, and the tearing
apart of what belongs together. The true principles of language
and mathematics are not learnt. Note the superficial connec-
tions established by Zillerians !
History. — The Herbartians rightly lay great stress on this
subject, but mainly because of its moral aspects. But this view
of the subject will conduce to the encouragement among children
of premature judgments upon characters. A sound judgment
upon historical characters demands severe abstraction. Far
better use common life as moral material.
1 Elsewhere Hubatsch says that there are three aims to be kept in view :
(1) moral ; (2) intellectual ; (3) professional.
^ In other words, the great Herbartian message is of no value whatever.
II
1 62 The Critics of Herbartianism
The new pedagogy uses force with its material. It is like
a French garden in which nothing is allowed to grow up
naturally. Language is subordinated to History ; Mathematics
to Nature - Knowledge. But formerly we thought that the
hardest subjects were the best ; the Herbartians put the easiest
in the seat of honour.
Herbart seems constantly to be thinking of horriR education ;
here there is some sense in talking of analytical Instruction, etc.,
for the soul of the one pupil is an open book to the tutor.
Herbart at times distinctly depreciates the value of the school.
How remote his ideas from modern conditions !
Then the " formal steps ". Comenius urged the importance
of the first, as also of others. The Zillerians often treat the
material with violence, and there is danger that the pure image
of the object studied may be erased owing to premature com-
parisons with other objects. Let the teacher ensure clear
Anschauung, and not trust too much to words and " steps ".
Analysis is the main thing ; synthesis is understood of itself ;
the third step (Association) is only valuable if we are aiming at
some inductive result; so with the other steps, they are not
always necessary. Herbart never intended that the " steps "
should be always employed. But Ziller has insisted on this,
and has even invented " teaching units ".^ There must be more
consideration of the individual peculiarities of subject and pupil.
Again, the fifth step (Application) should often be the third ; it is
absurd to use comparisons until the material itself is familiar.
^Dr. Pindlay prefers the word "section" for the "teaching unit" of
Ziller.
Drews 163
SECTION IX.
DREWS.
(1890.)
Bieference.
Drews. Die Katechese und das Lehrverfahren der Herbartianer. Velhagen
und Klasing (Bielefeld and Leipzig).
This brief critique is directed against the Zillerian policy of depre-
cating the catechetical or questioning method. The author, who,
however, is not blind to the merits of his opponents, attempts to
show (what ought surely to be in no need of proof) that the
method may have a legitimate place in school work.
It is at first sight strange that the Herbartians should make
this attack. For the two parties are at one in their objection to
mere "learning by heart," in their approval of a thorough
working-in of material, and in their ideal way of regarding the
work of education.
Doubtless the catechetical method was established in pre-
psychological days, and needs to be looked at in a new light.
Still, there is no need to follow the Zillerians in their policy of
wholesale condemnation.
We agree with the Herbartians that our Instruction must act
on the Will, and we need not here quarrel with them as to
how far the influence of the Instruction can extend. Neither
need we quarrel with them as to their doctrine of many-sided
Interest, which, after all, is not very different from the doctrine
of the " harmonious development of all faculties ". " All
faculties " ; this is a just protest against mere memorising.
The two views may differ fundamentally in their philosophical
foundations, but there is no conflict in practice. All intelligent
parties wish to make teaching " heuristic," that is, to arouse the
mental activity and independence of the pupil. The catechetical
method really arose out of a desire to get rid of mere me-
morising. The example of Socrates was followed, and attempts
164 The Critics of Herbartianism
made to educe the unknown from the known, a procedure only
possible when the " known " already contains the germ of the
"unknown," and impossible of application to subjects which
rest on experience. This, in reality the catechetical method,
conforms to Ziller's own requirements.
The Herbartian terminology is new, but the facts it stands for
have long been known. Knowledge is for life, not for school.
We must begin with Anschauung (Intuition or Observation),
and go on to Conception ; we must proceed from particulars to
generals. Alike in the catechetical and in the Herbartian pro-
cedure this is recognised, and likewise a final stage, that of
AppUcation. The catechetical method itself is not to blame if,
in religious teaching, this valid principle is not recognised ; the
fault lies with tradition and authority.
Ziller divided Anschauung into two stages, and Abstraction
into two also. But there is no new discovery in this. Still, the
Herbartians can teach us something here, especially with regard
to history and religion, subjects in which there are often given
too few sense-impressions. Ziller's formal steps must be used
with great discretion.
Ziller proposed that history should first be read from books,
in order that a grasp of the whole story might be acquired ; that
then the history should be gone through again, this time from
the point of view of geography and the history of culture ; and
that then finally the psychological, ethical, and religious side of
the narrative should be considered in the course of a third
perusal. But Dorpfeld is surely right in claiming that the oral
teaching of new matter is better than acquisition from books.
The catechetical method has doubtless been too abstract, and
has not paid sufficient attention to Anschauung, and to number
of instances. The formal steps have the advantage of not
overlooking anything. But they occasionally verge on the
unnecessary ; thus, the third and fourth stages lie so close
together that they scarcely need to be distinguished ; com-
parison of several objects and the grasping of the common
features are so closely connected that to make of them two
distinct stages would conduce to weariness. It is right enough
Drews 165
to compare the conflict between Gregory VII. and Henry IV.
of Germany with that between Samuel and Saul ("Association"
stage) ; but a further stage (" System ") is scarcely called for.
On the other hand, the fifth stage (" Application ") is quite
suitable, though when cases of " imaginary action " are being
considered, it is important that these cases be not too remote,
otherwise the procedure degenerates into mere babble. In
sum, the catechetical method may well make a discreet use of
the formal steps.
The Zillerians do not attack questioning •per se, for they
approve of a method of discussion or disputation (question and
answer). What they object to in the catechetical method is
that, being a method logically developed and working towards
a goal chosen by the teacher, the procedure is artificial, and
the answers of the children spurious. It is this logical sequence
which the Zillerians attack, as a sequence only understood by
the teacher, not by the pupil himself. All acts of will are
directed to a goal, but there is here no goal before the pupil.
The Zillerians, therefore, rightly contend that every lesson must
have its goal clearly known from the first, and advocates of the
catechetical method may learn something from them.
Another objection is that the catechetical method does not
take account of the mental condition of the individual child. It
is the teacher's course of thought that is followed. Ziller's plan,
on the other hand, is for the teacher only " formally " to lead
the talk, entering in when there is confusion and hesitation.
But this objection is somewhat exaggerated. A good teacher
will, during his catechetical procedure, allow children to discuss
various points : " What do you think of that ? " he will ask.
But it is doubtful whether there is any need of so minute a
consideration of each child's individual nature as the Zillerians
suppose. Experience decides here ; and so long as children are
zealous and interested the method cannot have been unsuccess-
ful. Ziller under-estimates the rapidity and agility of the child's
mental processes, and his method of discussion or disputation
would really be one of laborious weariness.
In short, the ZiUerians should not break with the past, but
rather build upon it, and improve it.
1 66 The Critics of Herbartianism
SECTION X.
CHRISTINGER.
(1895.)
'Reference.
Christinger. Friedrich Herbart's Erziehungslehre und ihre Fortbilder
bis auf die Gegenwart, nach den Quellschriften dargesteUt und beurteilt.
Schulthess, Zurich, 1895.
The above, by a Swiss educationist who claims to be a
"neutral" in the Herbart-Ziller controversy, is one of the
sanest and most judicious works with which the writer is
acquainted.
It deals biographically with Herbart and Ziller ; discusses the
contributions of each to pedagogical science ; passes judgment
without any signs of prejudice ; gives information relative to the
other leading exponents of Herbartianism ; touches briejfly upon
its chief opponents ; and finally gives a few specimen lessons
on Herbartian lines.
Critique of Herbart's Pedagogy. — It does not pay sufiBcient
attention to physical education. We must regard man's nature
as a whole.
Female education has to some extent special ends — narrower
than those of man — in view. Herbart scarcely recognises this.
Education for the practical duties of life is neglected. Unless
children are successful in the struggle for existence their mental
and moral life cannot thrive. Herbart inadequately recognises
the poverty and effort which are the lot of the poor.
Instead of aiming at "many-sided balanced Interest" we
must recognise that, for the sake of efficiency, a single interest
must, as a rule, be allowed to predominate, though it may not
exclude others.
No doubt aesthetic judgments influence character and act as
motives. But some natures are rougher than others, and cer-
tainly there are two other things which influence character
Chrt stinger 167
profoundly — self-interest and religion. Herbart recognises the
force of religion, but not of Christianity in particular. He sees
that a sense of humility is necessary, but scarcely thinks of
making " children of God " inspired by a love of God. Nay
he even hands over the richest province of instruction to
theologians.
One cannot admit that Herbart was ignorant of childhood ; he
learnt more in the four years of his Steiger tutorship than many
men would learn in a far longer time. But he was too far
removed from the working classes and their cares ; his circle was
the circle of the cultured.
But his excellences outweigh his defects. No doubt Education
has other aims than Virtue in the narrow sense ; still if we want
one word to describe its aim " Virtue " is the best; it will then
signify all human excellences of understanding and disposition.
We must not only give knowledge, we must educate ; for mere
knowledge leads to evil unless morality be uppermost. Herbart
has convincingly shown how presentations come to the help of
character, and how they are far more important than punish-
ments, etc. But he never worked out thoroughly the question
of habit.
His plan of " formal steps " is also of imperishable value,
though mechanical teachers may abuse it.
Critiqtie of Ziller. — Ziller had more practical experience than
Herbart. He admitted the existence of innate dispositions —
which Herbart tended to deny ; he urged the unity of moral
and religious education, and regarded Jesus Christ as the ideal
which we should place before us. Ziller's proposals were some-
times right, sometimes wrong, but generally both.
He was wrong when, for example, he deprecated preparing
children for the tasks of practical life.^ We must not neglect
this, however great the stress we lay on character-forming.
His schemes of small school-communities, and of schools for
distinct social groups, were retrograde.
In the following particulars he was partly right, partly wrong : —
^ Except in the upper classes of schools.
1 68 The Critics of Herbartianism
In substituting five " formal steps " for Herbart's four he
was right ; but there is some danger of making the first step
too lengthy or artificial. Still it is right to begin, as a rule,
with analysis : " from known to unknown ". But we cannot
always state the goal of the lesson ; it would be a mere word
to our pupils. Often it is best to give the concrete object before
the name.
As to "Concentration," Ziller was right in putting character-
forming in the foreground. Let us give the best hours of the
day to it, and let us throw light upon it from all departments of
study. But we must not so use character-forming instruction
as to deprive other departments of their own claims. If we
teach arithmetic, geography, etc., in connection, e.g., with biblical
history, the former subjects will be unjustly treated, and great
gaps will be left in them. Moreover, the children will get tired
if the same central material is served up daily.
The fundamental idea of " culture stages " is right, but Ziller 's
working-out is fantastical. It is not true that the epic fable first
occupied the mind of man ; the religious myth was still earlier.
Moreover, mankind as a race was never in Eobinson Crusoe's
condition, with his advanced knowledge of civilisation. Further,
neither the fables nor the story of Crusoe have such moral value
as to be made a basis of " character-forming Instruction ". On
the other hand, the life of Christ requires two years at least.
In point of fact, the first " culture stage " (properly so called)
was probably the one when men first began to care for the
beautiful. Before this time they thought only of the necessary,
and could scarcely be regarded as possessing culture at all.
Later came care for the useful — the second " culture stage ; "
later again, the stage of seeking truth; still later, care for the
Kingdom of God, the realisation of the moral ideal. But through
the later stages the earlier ones still persist.
Some pupils are more talented than others ; girls are quicker
than boys ; thus the stages are run through more quickly in some
cases than in others.
Ziller is right in claiming that in schools only scientific facts —
not hasty theories — should be taught. He is also right in urging
Bergemann 169
that pupils in the upper classes of a school should be trained for
the definite professional duties of life. [Still, schools must
" educate " ; that is Ziller's main contention.]
Above all he is right in his goal. Education must be real ;
must rouse activities ; must form character and power. Mental
culture will not hurt morality, but will rather help it. The work
of education is to implant many germs, not to let the child grow
out of one, as Frobel supposed.
SECTION XI.
BERGEMANN.
(1897.)
Beferem-ces.
(1) Die Lehre von den formalen und den Kultur-historischen Stufen und
von der Kcmcentration im Lichte der unbefangenen Wissenschaft (Haacke,
Leipzig, 1897).
(2) Der entwickelnd-darstellende Unterricht, Neue Bahnen, 1897, p. 156.
(3) Die Fabel vom ErzieJienden Unterricht, Die Lehrerin, 1897, p. 306.
The attainment of a certain degree of freshness in dealing
critically with Herbartianism may be placed to the credit of
Dr. Bergemann, of Jena.
In the third of the above he dismisses " educative Instruc-
tion " as a mere "fable". Herbart's psychology is exploded,
and no longer are we able to identify Education with Instruction.
There is really no proportion between many-sided Interest and
Intelligence on the one side, and Virtue or Morality on the
other. Morality is only one aim of Education. Where is the
connection between morals and mathematics ?
What does science say ? Is human nature so simple that it
can be brought under one formula ? Surely man is a product
of at least three factors — heredity, environment, and individual
variation ; and his mind is complex also, functioning in three
ways — Presentation, Feeling, Will. Education is a part of one's
i7o The Critics of Herbartianism
environment, but there are the other two factors (heredity and
variation) over which no control can be exercised.
The first thing for the teacher to do is to know the innate
constitution of his pupils. With regard to the three mental
functions there may be great differences in different people.
Presentation, Feeling, and Will do not stand in any relation to
each other. Hence it is absurd to talk of the last two as being
modifications of presentations.
" Educative Instruction," the culture of the thought-circle so
as to form character, is a fable. The teacher must look after
Feeling and Will, as well as the thought-circle. In other words,
he must train as well as teach. Teaching may give prudence,
but cannot make men better. Morality cannot be taught. The
main thing to look after in character-forming is Habit, and
connected with this, reward, punishment, intercourse, and
example.^
The Herbartians mix up the several distinct tasks of Educa-
tion. Moral Education is different from intellectual. Action
really springs out of the depths of Feeling, Impulse, and Will.
These are independent of presentations. Herbartianism is a
bad preparation for the hour of trial. What is the good of
theoretical morality ?
The second of the above productions deals with ' ' developing
presentative Instruction " which the Herbartians prefer to
Instruction in the form of narrative. Pupils must be encouraged
by gentle hints to huild up the material. Thus they are pro-
ductively active, instead of being mere recipients of information.
But (asks Bergemann) is the method so very valuable after all?
Surely, when a pupil listens to a teacher he must attend, and
this is a form of mental activity. Moreover, he has to exercise
his imagination actively in order to follow the teacher's account.
Herbartians say that their method causes more pleasure than
1 This argument means that Herbartianism is nonsense, and that the
circle of thought has no influence on character. But surely it is not nonsense.
Though Habit, etc., are important, they will only conduce to conservative
Morality. Moral insight must be aroused, and this necessitates " teaching ".
Bergemann 171
the other; but surely this will depend on the teacher's tact.
Both methods may be useful.
For what subjects do the Herbartians use it ? Nature-
knowledge, geography, history, poetry.
But surely in the case of nature-knowledge it is far better to
use concrete olives, or, at least, pictures of olives, than to try to
build up the notion of an olive through imagination ! ^ So in the
case of geography and history we must use concrete experience,
pictures, etc., as much as possible, otherwise we shall merely
encourage lawlessness.
But the method is useful in dealing with poetry, for here
imagination may be allowed to have much free play, and facts
are at a discount.
The main question is, whether it is better to give to the pupil
the image or to let him build it up for himself. The Herbartians
say, " The latter, because in this way activity is roused ". But
surely it is also roused when the child has to attend. The
proposed method compels the child to attend to matter and form
at the same time — too great a task. In fact, the proposed
method, though not without its uses, can easily be overdone.
The first of the above works is the most important.
Bergemann holds that the Herbartians neglect formal educa-
tion, and lay most stress upon heaping up knowledge. Surely
we must develop the intellectual capacity as such, and here
language, as connected with general notions, is of great im-
portance. Similarly, it is important to cultivate the habit of
attention."
The "formal steps" are useful, but must not be used slavishly.
It is right to give the goal of the lesson at the beginning. But
the Herbartians ignore the value of repetition.
^ Eight. Pestalozzi and some modem Herbartians would here be at
" daggers drawn ".
^Thus, while Herbart thinks highly of involuntary attention, Berge-
mann lays more stress on voluntary, as having more significance for
character-forming purposes.
172 The Critics of Herbariianism
The doctrine of " culture stages " is defective in many ways,
though no doubt it represents a grain of truth.
Man was once a cave-dweller. Does the child go through this
stage of development ? If so, at exactly what age ? According
to Ziller's scheme, the child passes in twelve months from the
nomadic stage to the next, and when he has arrived at the age
of fifteen he stands at the stage of present-day civilisation ! In
fourteen years he has recapitulated the history of the race !
At the age of six he is at the fable stage. But this is no real
stage of human progress at all, and if it were one, it would be
far below the patriarchal.
During the first six years (i.e., before he goes to school) he
apparently makes no progress at all, while in the eight years of
school life he passes through all the stages from remote antiquity
to the present day !
How absurd to allow a child at the fable stage to read, write,
and calculate, if this stage were a real one through which
primitive man once passed ! The fables are devoid of moral
value, and would also soon become wearisome.
For the second school year the Zillerians prefer Eobinson
Crusoe (excluding the Bible). This is to cast out Satan by
means of Beelzebub.
Is the parallelism doctrine really true ? Great men may
invent wonderful doctrines, but, after all, science has to decide
upon their truth. And science decides that the parallelism be-
tween race and individual is run through mainly in the
embryonic stage of the individual. As soon as the child is
born he is ready to seize hold of the modern world which lies
around him ; he is not at some pre-historic cannibal stage.
Hence, instead of the teacher trying to transplant the child back
into a long-vanished past, he should begin with the concrete
world, and only subsequently work back to past ages when the
child's curiosity about them is aroused. The Herbartians claim
that the past is simpler and more fundamental than the present.
Not so. The child lives in the present, acquires the speech of
the present, learns about the persons, buildings, etc., of the
present. Thus the present should be the starting point, and
Linde
173
imagination must build on this. There must be no exaggerated
stress on history ; science has changed all views.
Then as to " concentration ". This rests on false metaphysics,
and does not really conduce to unity of character. The really
natural method is that of " concentric circles," a plan which the
Herbartians object to as conducing to weariness. But do
children really weary of their surroundings? No, they gradually
learn more and more about them. Home, country, etc., come
to be loved. Character rests on Will, Feeling, etc., not on
Thought. The Herbartians seem to think that giving an ideal
is the only thing necessary ; surely training is more important.
Again, the Herbartians refuse to approve of moral instruction
apart from religious. This is a mistake. It involves that
morality is not the same for all, but varies according to sect.
Moreover, men have come to regard the God of Sinai as a myth,
and thus morals are in danger of being pulled down along with
religion.
SECTION XII.
LINDE.
(1899.)
Reference.
Linde. Der darstsllende Unterricht nach den Qrundsatzen der Herbart-
ZillerscJien Schule und vom Standpunkte des Nicht-Herbartianers. Brand-
stetter, Leipzig, 1899.
This is an able and impartial discussion of the so-called method
of " developing-presentative Instruction " which many of the
Herbartians prefer to the method of description and narration.
Instead of the teacher telling and describing, he leads on the
pupils by suggestion, illustration, and question to construct for
themselves the whole scene or object under discussion. This
plan is supposed to encourage mental activity, fluency of speech,
and other desiderabilia.
Linde gives an account of the views of Herbart, Ziller, and
others upon this question, and then expresses his own opinion.
174 The Critics of Herbartianism
With Herbart there were, primarily, two kinds of instruction.
One kind was occupied solely with widening the pupil's know-
ledge and experience ; the other with the working over of ex-
istent stores of knowledge so as to arrive at general relations.
The first was " merely presentative," the second " analytic ".
There was a third kind, in which not only was new knowledge
conferred, but this was also worked over systematically. It gave
certain elements and then elucidated the relations between
them. Such instruction was " synthetic ".
" Merely presentative " instruction was of the nature of " tell-
ing " or "describing". It might take the form of an informal
talk, for the living voice is better than a book. Clearly the pupil
must, in such a case, have already had much experience of
reality, or he cannot understand the teacher's references ; more-
over, the pupil's vocabulary must correspond to his experiences.
If his vocabulary be narrow, how can he properly appreciate the
teacher's instruction?
Ziller uses the terms " analysis " and " synthesis " in a some-
what different way from his master. He does not admit that
there is any independent " analytical " method. Analysis is
but a preparation for synthesis ; it is the first of the " formal
steps ". The pupil is led to search among his already-acquired
ideas (analysis), as these are necessary elements in the appercep-
tion of new ones (synthesis). In Ziller's " analysis " there is
no aiming at universal principles or relations. It merely reveals
to the educator the already acquired knowledge of the scholar.
Similarly, Ziller's "synthesis" involves no aiming at universal
principles, but only the giving of concrete material.^
Both Herbart and Ziller lay stress on Association and System
for the elaboration of new ideas. But Ziller lays far more stress
than Herbart on the relation borne by the already possessed
knowledge to the new material. This distinction is important.
Ziller, aiming at making the far-off and remote vividly known,
sees the importance of using the knowledge already possessed.
^ These distinctions desen-e to be kept in mind by the student of Herbart
and Ziller, otherwise much confusion is likely to arise.
Linde 175
Thus the ideas of Sago and the Eeed Palm can be obtained by
help of hothouse varieties as a basis. Herbart would also lead
to the unknown by means of the known, but he laid greater stress
than Ziller on the value of a fluent, inspiring narrative or descrip-
tion by the teacher. The blending of old with new takes place
quietly and spontaneously ; but to Ziller the process is conscious,
logical, methodical. The process of appropriating the new takes
place under the eyes of the teacher, who has gone down into the
soul of the pupil, brought latent ideas to light, and thus illuminated
what is new and strange. This is Ziller's " presentative In-
struction ;" it makes a special art of the union of analysis with
synthesis.
While Herbart thought highly of narrative and description —
the method of monologue — Ziller thought more of dialogue or
conversation. New facts are not to be told to the child, but are
to be led up to from those he already knows. Instead of saying,
" Joseph and Mary went south," the teacher says, "Joseph and
Mary went in the same direction as if we went to Bavaria " ;
thereupon the children will say, " To the south ". Instead of
describing in his own words the inundations of the Nile, he
leads up to them, and then, examining the map, asks, " WiU all
Egypt be inundated ? " Discovering that high land bounds the
Nile valley, the children will decide that this land will remain
uncovered. " Where are the people likely to build their
houses ? " On this high land. And thus the class develops
the subject, and finally narrates the facts arrived at.
The "developing" method is said to arouse the self-activity
of the pupil to a high degree. Children construct history. Their
wills and characters are supposed to be influenced by the method
far more than by the narrative and descriptive method of Her-
bart. The teacher should never do what the scholar himself can
perform. The pupil must deliberate, and state his own ques-
tions. Ziller claimed that this method of " disputation " rouses
keen interest and joy, and also conduces greatly to fluency of
speech on the part of the pupils. The method is also said to
bring difficulties easily to light and to promote co-operation.
Ziller and his friends {e.g., Eein) attack the descriptive and
176 The Critics of Herbartianism
narrative method as being defective in the respects just indi-
cated. This last method is supposed to check the activity of
the pupils, and the teacher can never be certain that the pupils
fully grasp or apperceive what he tells them. The child may
join false ideas to what the teacher says.
But in point of fact, though the " developing" method some-
times has its advantages, the "narrative " method has its advan-
tages also, and these often balance the others.
The aim of both methods is to represent vividly to the pupil's
mind something not actually present, e.g., a palm, % storm at sea,
an historical event.
Now often the narrative or descriptive method is good for this
purpose. Men like Foltz and Dorpfeld lay stress on the inspir-
ing power of warm and eloquent delivery, and the latter writer
has urged that there are moments so solemn that any break in the
teacher's story would disturb the whole process of apperception.
The pupil must simply listen in silent sympathy. A quiet state
like this is often highly productive ; our best thoughts then
come, and the ego is systematised and organised. Speech at
such a moment would actually check the creative current. The
method of disputation might conduce to a kind of outward ac-
tivity, but the depths of the nature might be unaffected. There
are always times when the narrative method is the better one ;
and there are reserved natures which cannot express themselves
outwardly. A child listening to a narrative is active in a sense,
while the "much speaking" encouraged by the "developing"
method is no clear proof of deep thought.
The " developing " method has dangers of its own. It shows
a tendency to bring about false conjectures or guessing, especi-
ally in the case of young children, who, not yet possessing full
power to combine thought, often miss the crucial point of the
lesson.
The method often causes many ideas to be summoned up
where only one is necessary. In order to lead on to some result
(e.gr., the image of a foreign product) a whole series of objects
are called to mind. The teacher's illustrations may not really
appeal to the child as nearly as he supposes. It may have been
Linde xii
far better for the teacher to narrate and describe and let the child
interpret the narrative or description spontaneously, using his
own mental resources. In fact, the teacher cannot control the
apperception of the pupil so much as he may think.
If the teacher describes or narrates with vividness, the child
will readily apperceive the new, investing it with familiarity ac-
cording to his own knowledge. This may be a better plan than
a piecemeal method of disputation and dialogue.
Another difficulty of the " developing " method is that the
thoughts uttered by one child may not resemble those of the
other children.
Again, the method makes very great demands on the skill of
the teacher.
It is often best for the teacher just to let the new matter have
its own silent course.
Does the " developing " method really conduce to fluent
speech ? Schmidt, Dorpfeld, and others have denied this. A
vivid narrative sets forth right forms of speech as samples ; these
sink into the child's mind, and are really more effective than the
repartee encouraged by the "developing" method.
Hence one arrives at the conclusion that though the " develop-
ing " method is often useful, its excellencies are shared by the
other method, and this latter has certain advantages of its own.
Hence an alternation of the two may be advisable.
A Few Further Points. -^There is some difference of opinion
among Zillerians as to whether the last three " formal steps "
should be regarded as belonging to presentative instruction, or
whether this instruction does not end with concrete " synthesis "
(the second step). This last was Ziller's view ; the processes of
abstraction are no part of presentative instruction.
In addition to the dialogue method, Ziller recommended the
extensive use of reading. Bible history had to be taught by these
means.
In very many cases, instead of using the " developing " or
the narrative methods, the best plan is to present the object
itself, or a picture of it, to the pupils.
12
17^ The Critics of Herbartianism
SECTION XIII.
NATORP.
(1899.)
GAie/ 'References.
(1) Natorp, Herbart, Pestalozzi und die heutigen Aufgaben der Erzie-
hungslehre, 1899. Fromman, Stuttgart.
(2) Fliigel, Just , and Rein, " Herbart, Pestalozzi und Herr Professor
Paul Natorp". Zeitschrift filr Philosophie und Pddagogik. 4th vol.
1899.
(3) Willmann, "Der Neukantianismus gegen Herbarts Padagogik".
Zeitschrift filr Phil, und Pad. 2nd vol. 1899.
(4) Willmann, " Uber Socialpadagogik ". Jahi-btich des Vereins filr
wissenschaftliche Padagogik. 1899.
(5) Natorp, " Kant oder Herbart ? Eine Gegenkritik." Die Deutsche
Schule. July and August, 1899.
One of the most recent, and in many respects the most interest-
ing, of the many attacks upon Herbartianism has come from the
philosophical chair of Marburg. Professor Paul Natorp is no
neophytic opponent of presentational philosophy. An avowed
follower of the "transcendental" movement inaugurated by
Kant ; an author of works upon the theory of knowledge ; ^
editor of the neo-Kantian Philosophische Monatshefte, and a
frequent contributor to its pages,^ Professor Natorp has long
been in occupation of a philosophical standpoint removed toto
coelo from that of Herbartianism. A criticism from such a
source is bound to be far-reaching, bound to assail psychological
principles even though leaving details and consequences un-
challenged. Such indeed is the nature of the present attack.
It assails the supposed foundations of Herbartianism, and only
touches incidentally upon the deductions and applications of
the system.
^ Descartes Erkenntnisstheorie, 1882 ; Forschungen zur Oeschichte des
Erkervntnissproblems im Alterthum, 1884,
2"Einleitung in die Psychologie nach Kritischer Methods," 1888;
" Analekten zur Geschichte der Philosophie," 1882.
Natorp 179
The controversy initiated (or rather resuscitated) by Professor
Natorp is but one phase of the controversy which perennially
divides philosophers into sharply opposed classes — the con-
troversy between Spiritualism and Materialism, Idealism and
Empiricism, Spontaneity and Mechanism. Though Herbart was
no materialist, his principles have a greater affinity with a
thoroughly mechanical (if not materialistic) view of the universe
than with the opposite views. Presentationalist he was, in an
emphatic sense, and Presentationalism is an ally (though a
treacherous one) of Materialism. On the question of the Free-
dom of the Will, Herbart's attitude was likewise quite unam-
biguous ; he was avowedly a determinist.^ No wonder therefore
that Natorp, a Kantian or neo-Kantian, devoted to the ter-
minology if not to the cause of Libertarianism, could see little
to approve of in the principles of Herbart.
Upon the central problem thus indicated, there appears no
likelihood of a philosophical consensus. Every man, we are
told, is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian, either a
Libertarian or a Determinist, we may even say, either a Nator-
pian or an Herbartian, according as his interests and impulses
are directed to the active and moral or to the speculative and
natural worlds. Not, of course, that Herbart was indifferent to
moral problems. His educational system is pervaded through
and through by a sense of their supreme importance, a sense so
extreme that Natorp has to protest against the supposed neglect
of the logical and aesthetic factors. But whereas Natorp's
emphasis is constantly laid upon the inner principle of self,
Herbart works from without inwards, and thus reveals his
metaphysical affinity with Locke and Empiricism. Whichever
side the reader may take in this interminable controversy of
philosophy, he will not fail to admire the rigorous consistency
with which Herbart, starting from the presentational standpoint,
works 2 upwards to an elaborate system and downwards to a
multitude of practical applications.
iHis emphasis on the idea of "Inner Freedom" does not conflict with
this statement.
2 Of course Herbart recognises a " Soul ". But virtually the presenta-
tion, not the soul, is his unit.
i8o The Critics of Herbartianism
No small fluttering occurred in the Herbartian dove-cote when
Professor Natorp's attack saw the light. Previous attacks there
had been, e.g., those of Vogel, Dittes, Ostermann, to say nothing
of the more academic criticisms ^ to which all systems of philo-
sophy are exposed. But Natorp's attack touched Herbartians
at tender places. Their master was a "dogmatist"; he was
unable to " develop " a thought ; he could neither understand
nor appreciate Pestalozzi, though he tried to patronise his
memory ; his philosophical followers were few and (what was
worse) were antiquated " veterans " ; in short, Herbart was
overrated and his followers were old-fashioned.
It was no wonder, therefore, that the Herbartians responded
with vigour to the attack opened upon them. No better intro-
duction can be found to present-day educational problems of
the philosophic type than a perusal of the two sides of this
controversy.
The most systematic reply to Natorp is contained in the
fourth volume of the Z eitschrift filr Philosophie und Pddagogik,
1899. As if to disprove the charge of numerical inferiority
(a charge certainly based on very slight grounds) the reply
came from several hands.
Pastor Flvigel, certainly a " veteran " in the defence of Her-
bartianism (he had defended it against the previous strictures
of Dittes and Ostermann), replied to the more specially psycho-
logical side of Natorp's attack. Dr. Just, well known as an
active writer on the Herbartian side and as director of an
important school, defended Herbart's Ethic. The discussion
of the pedagogical aspects of the question fell to the task of
Professor Eein. But in a system such as Herbartianism, in
which the Psychology, Ethics and Pedagogy are connected
with some degree of closeness, the three defenders necessarily
intruded on each other's domain, especially in their discussion
of the Will.
In the discussions which follow, the portions indicated by the
letter (A) are expository of Natorp's criticism, those by (B) give
^ E.g., those of Lotze and Trendelenburg.
Natorp i8i
the Herbartian reply, while those indicated by (C) are remarks
of the present writer.
(1) The (supposed) parlous state of Herbartianism.
(A) Professor Natorp declares himself not blind to the value
of the Herbartian system. He attributes to it much stimulating
power, many detailed excellences (more especially in the realm
of practice), and considerable utility for the teacher who is
beginning his work. It is the system as a whole which he con-
demns, and it is its theoretical and philosophical aspects which
alone he feels competent to discuss. [Natorp, p. 1.] ^
He is astonished at the enormous and apparently increasing
influence of Herbart, an influence perhaps equal to that of all
other educational writers put together.^ Each age has its
problems, and a dogmatist like Herbart is not the best guide in
face of the onward movement of mankind. [2.]
The strange thing is that Herbart's influence on education
remains paramount although the philosophical foundations of his
system have been almost abandoned. Scarcely a single active
professional philosopher is an Herbartian, though a few veterans
still exist. Even enthusiasts, while confident of the strength of
the structure raised, admit that its foundations are in need of
change. In view of the fact that almost all German philoso-
phers have touched upon education, why this peculiar confidence
in Herbart ? [4.]
Firstly because of the earnest interest he felt in education, and
the prominent place it occupies in his system. Kant treated
pedagogy as a secondary matter; with him, moreover, the
necessary psychology is almost non-existent, and his ethic shows
a lack of immediate practical applicability. Fichte's principles
1 The pages of the works consulted are given for the convenience of
those who wish to refer to the originals.
2 He considers that instead of going to Herbart we should go (1) for the
end or goal of education, to Kant ; (2) for ways and methods, to Pestalozzi
at his best ; (3) for questions of organisation, to Pestalozzi, Fichte and
Schleiermacher,
1 82 The Critics of Herbartianism
are far removed from the workaday world of education.
Schleiermacher , however, approaches Herbart more closely, and
it is astounding that his influence is so small. He is as much
a psychologist and a moralist as Herbart, and there is much of
immediate practical value in his work ; yet he has founded no
school, and there are few tolerable works which deal with his
pedagogical labours, while Herbartian literature counts its hun-
dreds of volumes. Doubtless Schleiermacher' s manner is at the
root of the difference. [5.]
A second reason for Herbart's influence is the impressiveness
of his manner. He employs the short, measured speech of
authority. There is no wearisome weighing of /or and against,
no doubt or hesitation, such as we find in Schleiermacher.
Herbart's ripe results shine forth like fruit on a tree, and only
need to be shaken in order to fall into the basket. The talent
of authority which, as a practical teacher, he possessed in an
unusual degree, has passed into his theoretical delivery. Hence
men feel that he lived in the very element of pedagogic practice,
and as he was, in addition, Philosopher, Moralist and Psycholo-
gist, he has aroused unusual confidence. [6.]
Then, again, his educational doctrines have proved really
fruitful in practice, and this, with many, is a clear sign of their
truth. [7.]
To appeal to the practical value of Herbart's doctrine is, how-
ever, tacitly to surrender the claim that they are philosophically
established. Away with his theories ! But Herbart himself
would scarcely agree to having the useful maxims of his pedagogy
picked out while his system as a whole is renounced. And there
Natorp agrees with Herbart : a theoretical foundation is neither
superfluous nor of secondary importance. [7.]
Are, then, the foundations of Herbart's system really secure ?
If they are not, no excellence of another kind can compensate
for the deficiency ; neither his genuine enthusiasm for education ,
his love for human beings, nor his distinct sense for the useful
and appHcable. Self-confidence is doubtless necessary for the
practical man ; but for the theorist, self-criticism. It is here that
Herbart is deficient. We distrust his dogmatic, "It is so ". [8.]
Natorp 183
Criticisms of Herbartianism have not been wanting. Attacks
upon special points, especially upon Ziller's development of
the system, have been numerous, and Herbartians themselves
have surrendered or greatly modified some of the chief parts
of their master's pedagogy. Dittes and Ostermann (the latter
from approximately the standpoint of Lotze) have been
among the chief opponents ; Ostermann's direct attack upon
Herbart's psychology comes close to the present criticism. In
fact, modern psychology is leaving Herbartianism quite behind.
But the decision of the question, " For or against Herbart ? " is
really not so much a psychological question as one concerning
Logic, Ethics and Esthetics, for it is these studies which have
to decide what the aim of education is to be. Even from the
point of view of the means. Psychology is not so important as
adherents and opponents of Herbart alike suppose. The other
three studies are the real foundations of Pedagogy, Knowledge,
Morality and Esthetic culture being the ends with which they
are concerned ; while Psychology may be regarded either as
identical with these (or contained in them), or as a special
study which informs as to the application of the general prin-
ciples of education (ascertained from the other three studies) to
each special case in its peculiarity. Thus, while the human
content of consciousness — with its three aspects, scientific,
moral, aesthetic — builds itself up out of its elements in accor-
dance with unchanging laws — this growth may be hindered in
special cases, and here comes in the value of Psychology and
Physiology. Thus, after all, the value of Psychology for educa-
tion is but slight, and in any case is quite secondary ; hence
even if Herbart's psychological presentation- mechanism were a
valid notion (which it is not), it would be no basis for education.
That basis cannot be found in Psychology at all. [11.]
(B) The defenders of Herbartianism have done their best to
answer the above criticisms.
Instead of Herbartianism as a philosophical and psychological
system being little more than "historical," and its advocacy
being confined to "veterans," psychologies of the Herbartian
184 The Critics of Herbartianism
school " rule the present market ". Natorp's emphasis on physi-
ology has no point for Herbartians, for they welcome all physio-
logical and psycho-physical investigations. (Fliigel, pp. 257-9.)
The complaint that Herbart's psychology ignores the difficulties
of individual cases is refuted by the existence of Herbart's letters
on the application of Psychology to Pedagogy, in which he dis-
cusses the difficulties arising from physiological hindrances ;
and also by the zeal of Herbartians like Strtimpell, Ufer,
Triiper, and Koch in these very directions. Natorp claims
that Herbartian psychology is useless in such cases ; in reality
he himself exaggerates the psychological value of physiology.
Contrast his view with that of the psycho-physicist Miinster-
berg, who expUcitly denied that his favourite study can throw
real light on mental problems. [259-60.]
Herbart was not a " dogmatist ". He emphasised the neces-
sity for scepticism at the beginning of philosophical thinking as
the only salvation from " stupid and arrogant dogmatism," and
warned teachers against impressing their own modes of thinking
on their scholars. Instead of Herbart being incapable of doubt,
he once exclaimed : " Are we never to be able to grasp the whole
completely? " [Rein, pp. 298-300.]
(C) The charge of " dogmatism " is of little real gravity ; the
exposition of any systematic scheme must appear dogmatic
unless the expounder choose to qualify and apologise in every
paragraph. But if Herbart's system were a rigidly fixed
one how can we explain the varied development it has experi-
enced from his followers? Moreover, no men have done more
for the study of abnormal mental phenomena manifested in
children than the Herbartians.
Still, the defenders of Herbart serve their cause ill when they
try to defend his Psychology en bloc. Natorp is right in re-
garding it as scientifically antiquated. The whole tendency of
modern psychological thought is away from a system which,
though not exactly ignoring biological facts, has no logical place
for them, and which was elaborated in pre-Darwinian times.
Herbartian psychologists have been compelled to concede that
Natorp 185
ideas are not absolute causes, but rather occasions of volition.
Still, the value of the work of Striimpell, Volkmann, Waitz,
Cornelius, Nahlowsky, and other Herbartians is admitted.
Moreover, a presentational Psychology may be, after all, the
best for a pedagogue, seeing that presentations are the material
with which he works.
(2) The "disconnectedness" of Herbart's teaching.
(A) Herbart was devoid of the power of developing his prin-
ciples logically and consecutively. Clear in details — indeed a
model of clearness — he seems to have had no feeling that these
must hang together in indissoluble connection. Will it never be
the lot of a true thinker to influence the teachers of the rising
generation ? [Natorp, p. 8.]
(B) What a contrast between the above opinion of Natorp
and that expressed in the Herbart Recollections, which describe
Herbart's maxims as " bound together as closely as the mem-
bers of a mathematical demonstration ! " [Eein, p. 300.]
(C) The above objection of Natorp is probably the most
unfounded of any in his book. There is no system of philosophy
in existence of a more unitary character than Herbart's. The
unit is the presentation, and everything hangs upon this. There
is no " Will-faculty," etc., to introduce disturbing factors ; Her-
bart, indeed, was a vigorous opponent of every "faculty"
doctrine. His system may be right or wrong, but that it is
thoroughgoing and systematic in the highest degree few will
deny.
(3) Attitude and relation of Herbart to Pestalozzi.
(A) Pestalozzi is the only educationist at present held in a
reverence at all commensurable with that given to Herbart.
But he is not reckoned as a philosopher. People tell us that
Herbart has methodically embodied in his own system the best
of Pestalozzi — the principles which the great Swiss teacher had
arrived at in a half-dreaming manner. Keally this is not so,
1 86 The Critics of Herbartianism
There is a great contrast between the two, and Herbart never
did justice — could not do justice — to his predecessor ; though
he praises and patronises him often enough, he alters his
thoughts and subordinates them to his own. [Natorp, p. 5.]
Whereas Herbart, as seen above, subordinated everything to
the moral aim, Pestalozzi insisted on the necessary unity of the
culture of " Head, Heart and Hand," of Intellect, "Will and
Artistic ability. [12.]
He insisted, too, upon the necessity of an investigation of the
elements of mental hfe and then upon a steady advance to the
complex content of consciousness. [12.]
In these two points Pestalozzi is in full agreement with
Kant, as also in others, such as his emphasis on the fimda-
mental concept of Anschauung and his ethical views. He had
scarcely read Kant, but perhaps he had learnt some of his
fundamental thoughts from conversation with Fichte. From
the point of view of sociology and social pedagogy he even went
beyond Kant. Pestalozzi was no dreamer ; he had investigated
the fundamental springs and form of human nature, and it was
for this reason that, though he fell into errors of detail, he
anticipated so accurately the further developments of mankind.
[13.]
Herbart, on the contrary, stands in pronounced contrast to
Pestalozzi. He was excellent as a practitioner of education ;
Pestalozzi was not. He was well versed in all kinds of science,
and was a clear thinker in matters of detail. But he was in-
capable of forming systematic and all-embracing views, even
incapable of understanding them when offered by others (Kant,
Fichte, Pestalozzi). [13-4.]
The two men did not mean the same thing when they spoke
of psychology, and it is not true that Herbart supphed the
desiderated psychological foundation for his predecessor's views.
Pestalozzi meant the fundamental laws by which the content
of human culture grows from its elements, these elements being
deduced from Ethics, Logic and Esthetics. Contrast this with
Herbart's presentational-mechanism ! [14-5.]
Natorp 187
(B) Herbart constantly confesses his indebtedness to Pesta-
lozzi, as can be seen by any unprejudiced reader of those
writings of Herbart which deal with his predecessor's work.
In addition to obligations of a minor character ^ no one had
a finer understanding than Herbart of the Pestalozzian doctrine
of Apperception-Instruction. He even remained true to his
master when, long ago, men's enthusiasm for the latter had
waned. Natorp with his illegitimate formula " Herbart or
Pestalozzi " implies an opposition between them, but in point
of fact Herbart worked on the lines of his predecessor, and the
true formula is " Herbart and Pestalozzi ". Natorp' s formula
has been invented by the enemies of Herbartianism, who use
Pestalozzi's name for controversial purposes. [Eein, pp. 296-7.]
Natorp is thoroughly prejudiced against Herbart, while to-
wards Pestalozzi his attitude is equally prejudiced but in the
opposite direction. He completely passes over Pestalozzi's
many obscurities and inconsistencies. But apart from this,
he always sees Pestalozzi through the spectacles of his own
theory of knowledge, just as Niederer had thrown the doctrine
of the great Swiss into confusion by a dragging in of the
philosophy of Fichte. It is a service of Wiget to have revealed
the additions of Niederer. 'Natorp appears ignorant of Wiget's
work. Apparently Natorp's prejudice against Herbart is due
to the impossibility of fitting the clear unambiguous thoughts
of the latter into the structure of a ready-made theory of know-
ledge, while Pestalozzi's ambiguities are much more adaptable
for such a purpose. [300-1.]
The Pestalozzian doctrine of Anschauung has really but
little affinity with that of Kant. Pestalozzi understood by
Anschauung the impression of an outer object upon our senses,
not, as Natorp thinks, the generation of the mathematical form of
anschaubar things out of the pure elements of our Anschauung
itself (an addition of Niederer). Pestalozzi would have rejected
Natorp's interpretation as readily as he did Niederer's. [301-2.]
Along with this must go Natorp's undervaluing of Psychology
^ Such as the use of transparent plates of horn.
i88 The Critics of Herbartianism
and his exaltation of criticism of knowledge into the first place,
by which choice he condemns himself to unfruitfulness. More-
over, Pestalozzi would never have founded his system upon the
notion of a pure spontaneity. [302.]
(A) Natorp in his reply (Die Deutsche Schule, August, 1899)
justifies his greater severity towards Herbart on the ground that
the latter's professions are greater than those of Pestalozzi, and
are therefore to be judged accordingly. He also stoutly main-
tains the existence of Kantianism in Pestalozzi previous to the
influence of Niederer. There is no real contradiction in appeal-
ing to experience and at the same time to deduction (vide
Kant, Pestalozzi, etc.).
(C) The present writer's reading leads him here to side again
with the Herbartians. There is nothing " condescending " about
Herbart's treatment of his great predecessor. The principle of
Anschauung was "the grand idea of its discoverer, the noble
Pestalozzi ". Herbart seized hold of it gratefully, and, in the
opinion of the vast majority of educationists, developed it
successfully into the Apperception doctrine by showing the
essential contribution of the mental factor.
(4) The aim or goal of Education.
(A) In considering the aim or goal of education we find that
Herbart lays great stress upon Ethics. Morality is the goal of
education. But this is a one-sided view. Logic and .Esthetics
have a right to insist upon their aims, Knowledge and .Esthetic
culture. [Natorp, p. 11.]
In point of fact education must rest on Philosophy as a whole,
not upon two fragments of it. Psychology and Ethics, Will,
Intellect, ^Esthetic imagination — all three must be considered,
along with, of course, their respective psychologies. [11-2.]
(B) Natorp would be right if the three goals (Ethical, Intel-
lectual and Esthetic) were of equal worth. But they are not
so. There is only one absolute goal, as Kant himself points
Natorp 189
out ; a good and moral Will is always good, while Esthetic or
Intellectual power may be devoted to evil purposes. Hence
Ethics alone gives the goal of Education. Logic and Esthetics
have a subordinate use only.
Even Natorp himself in another place [p. 72] admits (here
contradicting himself) that the Ethical end is the highest educa-
tional goal, not merely as the most elevated but also as including
and controlling the others. The difference between the two
men is that while with Natorp the place of the highest educa-
tional aim (Morality) remains a mere phrase, for Logical and
^Esthetic culture go their own ways — with Herbart the latter
appear as preliminary steps or means to the moral goal. Here,
too, Pestalozzi is in full agreement with Herbart. He declares
that only by a subordination of all the other claims of our nature
to the higher claims of Morality is a harmony of our powers
possible. [Just, pp. 277-8.]
(C) The question above mooted is no easy one to answer, and
its solution has as much philosophical interest as pedagogical.
Moralists {e.g., Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 6th edition, pp.
399-402) have frequently found a difficulty in considering the
possible conflict of the Moral with the Logical goal. Suppose
that on a complete view of the universe we became convinced
that it was essentially cruel or purposeless, would it be our duty
to proclaim the truth ? Would not the claims of the moral life
be endangered by such a proclamation ? If so, have we to risk
the subversion of morality ? Or have we to regard Morality as
the highest end and endeavour to subordinate everything, even
Truth, to that ? Such ultimate questions cannot be solved to
the satisfaction of every one ; some controversialists will insist
that Truthfulness is an absolute duty, others will subordinate
it to Morality, while others again will be so bold as to deny the
possibility of a conflict. Similar questions arise with respect
to the relations of Art and Morality.
The question is, therefore, not merely one between Herbart
and Natorp, but one of perennial interest.
With regard to the pedagogical aspect of the question, it may
190 The Critics of Herbartianism
be pointed out that English teachers, who for the most part
have not yet been appreciably touched by the Herbartian spirit,
do not feel the importance of the issue thus raised. Their ideals
are those of imparting knowledge and dexterity — mainly the
Logical and Esthetic ideals. So far as the Moral ideal affects
them at all, its operations are confined to a few definite " re-
ligious " lessons ; it does not permeate their whole work. The
two aims remain separated by conventional barriers ; hence,
when a teacher is asked to instil " temperance " or " humani-
tarianism " he frequently regards these subjects as " outside
his province ". But such a confession is virtually an exaltation
of the Logical and .Esthetic ideals at the expense of the Moral.
The case just cited probably represents the usual attitude of the
English teacher. The two ideals are conventionally held apart
in the " Time Table," but when there is any possibility of mutual
interference the " Moral " has to give way.
The agitations for " religious" education are in large measure
an outcome of this hard and fast separation which is made
between " sacred " and " secular " subjects, a separation which
is itself due to a non-recognition of the moral value of "secular" ^
subjects and an ignorance of the psychology of human motive.
The great service of Herbartianism has been to break down
the barrier above indicated. "Secular" instruction loses its
stigma if it can be shown to enter into the field of motive and
action. This it does when Apperceptive Interest has been
aroused. Geography, Mathematics, Science become moral forces,
for as sources of "Interest" they draw or impel the pupil in
the direction of an elevated life. Even on a lower view they
may be regarded as moral forces so far as they may have the
effect of keeping the pupil throughout his Hfe fi'om the debasing
pursuits which the ignorant man almost inevitably follows.
1 " Abgesehen vom Religions-unterricht, von dem man vermdge seines
Inhalts einen einfluss auf Gemiit und Willen des Zoglings erwartet, ver-
folgen die Unterrichts-gegenstande einen selbstandigen Zweck, namlich
die Aneignung eines bestimmten Wissens und Konnens, damit der Zogling
dereinst im Leben sich gut forthelfen konne. . . . Eine solche Auffassung
ist . . . unhaltbar." Beiu, Padagogik im Orundriss, pp. 78-9.
Natorp 191
" The stupid man cannot be virtuous," for he has no springs of
action except such as lead to vice. The man with a vital
interest in Art, or Science, or History has an enormously
greater chance of being " virtuous " (using this word even in
the usual narrow sense) than the man devoid of such interest.
Positively these interests are springs of worthy volition ; nega-
tively they keep from vice.
In short, " Interest " is the bridge from the Intellectual to
the Moral realm — a bridge which popular theology, with its
hard and fast separation of the " sacred " from the " secular,"
is daily rejecting. It is the imperishable work of Herbart to
have discovered (the word is not too strong) this bridge, and to
have arrayed Esthetic and Scientific culture under the banner
of Virtue. If many-sided Interest be so important, so vital, as
Herbartians allege, then the demonstration of the unitary nature
of Herbart's goal is his crowning achievement. The teacher of
Mathematics is the teacher of Virtue, and there is no longer any
need to regard Education as having three or more conflicting
ends in view.
(5) Herbart's mistaken separation of " Training " from
" Discipline ".
(A) Eeserviug for future consideration the very important
question of the relation of Instruction (culture of the Under-
standing) to Education as a whole (culture of the Will), we
have now to consider the validity of Herbart's distinction be-
tween the other two agencies. Training (Zucht) and Discipline
(Eegierung). [Natorp, pp. 48-9.]
Herbart lays stress upon the fact that Instruction (the culture
of the Understanding or the formation of the "circle of
thought ") is the chief agency for the culture of the Will also.
" There ought to be no Instruction which does not educate."
By Training he means whatever, apart from Instruction
proper, cultivates the Will. But what then remains for
Discipline? Something comparatively unimportant; indeed
something, according to Herbart himself, hardly belonging to
192 The Critics of Herbartianism
Education but yet not entirely separable from it. The purpose
of Discipline lies in the present, not in the future ; it aims
merely at outward order, which is a prerequisite of education,
but not in itself educative. No doubt Discipline immediately
influences the pupil's state of mind, but it serves no ulterior
purpose. Punishment (under Discipline) ignores the intention
of the agent, and considers only the act itself ; while genuinely
educative punishment considers intention also. [49-50.]
Natorp holds that his separation of Training from Discipline
is utterly untenable, and points out that even Herbartians have
remodelled it. [50.]
Discipline is supposed to regulate merely the outer behaviour
of the pupil. But surely outer behaviour is subject to the laws
of morality ! The question is, whether, in connection with
education, the merely " right " relation apart from the moral
can be of any value. Surely not. External order is necessary,
but only for the sake of the internal moral order. The educator
cannot separate himself into a moral and into a merely " right "
being. A punishment which aims at subjection pure and simple
and does not address itself to the will of the pupil is imper-
missible. Even outer order must only be preserved through
moral means, and the pupil, though himself ignorant of the
right way, must willingly confide in the guidance of the tutor.
[51.]
Herbart seems to think that at such a stage the child is
devoid of will ; but surely it has a will in process of becoming ;
and this very fact makes the psychical influences upon it of great
importance. The smallest influence has not only a momentary
but a permanent result. [52.]
Certainly we may admit that there are permanent and
momentary, moral and merely right, positive and negative
influences ; influences through the will of the pupil and through
merely momentary excitations. But the latter must be abso-
lutely subordinated to the former. Hence the separation of
Training from Discipline is untenable, and we are left only
with Training and Instruction. [53.]
Natorp 193
(B) Natorp declares that Herbart's doctrine of " Discipline "
is in no single point tenable. But this is to shoot beyond the
mark. Herbartians have already modified Herbart's doctrine,
and instead of the three divisions, Training, Disciphne and In-
struction, now adopt two, Guidance (Fiihrung) and Instruction.
But Herbart's differentiation of Training from Discipline has
still some theoretical and practical significance. Natorp himself
admits the distinction between negative and positive modes of
action in connection with the training of children ; merely
" right " as contrasted with genuinely " moral " ; momentary as
contrasted with lasting ; modes which make use of momentary
stimuli as contrasted with those which act through the Will.
Here, then, is the distinction between "Discipline" and
" Training " ; both, however, ought to be subsumed under the
concept of "Guidance". [Eein, p. 303.]
(C) Despite the partial recantation of Herbartians from the
triple classification of their master, this classification can
frequently be illustrated in the concrete from English methods
of teaching. The functions of "Discipline" pure and simple
seem in no danger of being, absorbed in those of the other
two, so far, at any rate, as Elementary Schools are con-
cerned.
In view of the large classes which are usual rather than
exceptional in these schools, the necessity of firm Discipline is
all-important. "Are you a good disciplinarian?" is the first
question asked of a candidate for a pedagogic post, and the
meaning of the question is, " Are you able to maintain a system
of military precision? "
The question of punishments is the most important in this
connection. The punishments of Discipline are based mainly
on the Eetributive and Exemplary theories ; while those of
Training (in the Herbartian sense) rest on the Eeformatory
theory. In this country of large classes, the Exemplary theory
is the prevalent one in school life ; and the chief scholastic
offences are not " moral offences" at all, but offences against
a rigid code of military rules which have no existence or utility
13
194 The Critics of Herbartianism
outside of school life, and which would have none in school but
for the exigencies of the large-class system.
It would be no exaggeration to say that in the English
elementary school —
" Discipline " is regarded as all-important.
"Training" (in the Herbartian sense) is, except so far as it
comes under "religious influence," almost non-existent.
" Instruction " is plentiful, but its genuinely educative (i.e.,
will-forming) character is unrecognised owing to the artificial
separation, based largely on theological prejudices, between
"sacred" and "secular" subjects, and an almost complete
ignoring of the Herbartian doctrine that action springs out
of the circle of thought, and that, through the mediation of
" Interest," " secular " instruction can become a moral force and
pass into action.
It may therefore be said that Herbart's much criticised three-
fold classification has still some significance, though in practice
there is sometimes no precise separation between the three
agencies, and with the majority of teachers no clear recognition
of their essential differences.
(6) The Herbartian doctrine of " Educative Instruction " — The
distinction between Instruction (Unterricht) and Training
{ZuAiht).
(A) At first one would be inclined to understand these latter
in the following sense : —
Instruction — the culture of the Understanding.
Training — the culture of the Will.
But tliis cannot be Herbart's meaning, for he refuses to admit
the dist notion between the three soul faculties, Understanding,
Feeling and Will. Moreover, he insists that there should be
no Instruction which does not educate [i.e., form the Will), and
the final aim of Education must be, in accordance with this,
an ethical aim. With Herbart the Will has no territory of its
own in the mental life, and is a pure result of the movement
of the presentation-masses; thus the whole culture of the
Natorp 195
Will — or nearly the whole — depends on the culture of the
Understanding, the formation of the circle of thought — in other
words, on Instruction.
What then remains for Training ? Only the supplementary
and secondary influences which come through the stimulus
of pleasure and pain so far as these influences are directed to
Will-Culture, and are not merely on account of Discipline.
[Natorp, pp. 54-5.]
The close connection or virtual identity between the culture
of the Will and that of the Understanding is the essence of
Herbart's famous theory — that of Educative Instruction. No
doubt, with Pestalozzi, in spite of his emphasis on the Instruction
of " Head, Heart and Hand," the final goal of Education is the
Morality of the Will, an aim in which, according to him, the
other possible aims unite. Still the culture of the Intellect or
of the Esthetic faculty has with him a relative independence.
But this view is departed from by Herbart and stiU more by the
Herbartians. They seem to ignore the claims of the intellectual
and aesthetic and to exaggerate those of the moral nature of
man. But surely a thing may be intellectually true or false,
aesthetically correct or incorrect, quite apart from moral con-
siderations. [55-6.]
It is said that Knowledge and Ability (Konnen) are dead
possessions provided they do not influence the culture of the
moral Will. But we are not speaking of a " dead " Knowledge
or Ability, but of living and creative processes. Doubtless,
the kind of consciousness connected with them is also related
closely to Will consciousness ; Morality indeed is the pro-
minent point towards which these others point ; still there is a
kind of independence in the three. It was Kant who established
this threefold classification ; Schiller and Pestalozzi agreed
with it ; while Herbart, and still more his adherents, are in
danger of destroying it. [56.]
We must not wonder if reactionaries welcome Herbart's
doctrine as a reason for refusing satisfaction to the intellectual
and aesthetic needs of the people. [56-7.]
The real reproach, however, only attaches to Herbart himself
196 The Critics of Herbartianistn
in a small degree. In fact it is diflficult to reconcile clearly his
exaggerated stress upon the Will when the aim of education
is being considered with his extraordinary minimising of the
8ignij5cance of the Will in general. The culture of the Will
depends not, of course, on the Will itself, but, in accordance
with his Ethics, upon Taste. Hence one would expect him to
put .3j]sthetic culture at the summit; yet he reaUy almost ignores
it. The Will, according to him, depends on the movement of
presentations, hence the formation of the " circle of thought "
is "everything to the educator". Only a small task is left to
the feeling-influences of Training, the task of " making a path
for instruction ". [57-8.]
Thus we find that when Herbart considers the aim of
education he lays an exaggerated emphasis on the culture of
the moral Will, and ignores the claims of intellectual and
aesthetic culture ; but when he considers the means, he lays an
equally exaggerated emphasis on Instruction (Understanding-
culture). [58.]
(B) Natorp's criticism is based on a caricature of Herbart's
doctrine. He has omitted Herbart's central thought, that of
Interest. It is this concept which connects the Instruction goal
(culture of the Understanding) with the goal of Education in
general (culture of the Will). It is true, Natorp refers to
" Interest " (p. 64), but strangely regards it as a side goal of
Education, and he does not enter upon the psychological rela-
tions of the factor of Interest to Presentation and Willing.
Interest is the fundamental concept of the theory of Educative
Instruction, and it possesses a permanent worth even if the
practical details of Herbartianism were abandoned. Moreover,
" Interest " supplies the very element of inner activity which
Natorp finds missing in Herbart's system, and, moreover, brings
Herbart into close connection with Pestalozzi. He declares
that his chief effort was identical with that of his predecessor,
namely, to find out the best order of succession, the best fitting-
together of the teaching material, so that the attention of the
children may be seized and enchained. It was with this aim in
Natorp 197
view that Pestalozzi tried to understand the normal process of
man's development, individual and racial, and this work has
been taken up by Herbartians (witness their doctrine of " culture
steps"). [Rein, pp. 304-5.]
(C) The judgment upon the above issue must probably be of
a mixed character.
Natorp has undoubtedly committed a most serious oversight
— perhaps the worst of all in his work — in not recognising the
central position of Herbart's " Interest " doctrine.^ It is this
doctrine which bridges over the gap between intellectual and
moral Education. It is Interest which converts an intellectual
apprehension of History or of Natural Science into a moral
force, a force which not only negatively keeps the pupil " out of
mischief," but positively moulds his future conduct and pursuits.
Interest (provided we do not mean by it a merely momentary
feeling of pleasure) is the greatest moral force in existence, we
might almost say, the only moral force if we except the re-
wards and punishments of " Training " and " Discipline ". It is
safe to say that a pupil who has a keen interest in Literature
or in some social or cosmic question (we must not ignore the
"many-sidedness" of Herbart's concept of Interest) is certain.
1 Natorp replies [Die Deutsdie Schule, August, 1899, pp. 507-8) that he
only is following Herbart's own exposition {Allgemeine Pcidagogik, Book I.,
chapter ii.), according to which, though Morality is the chief goal of
education, " many-sided Interest " is another goal not necessarily entirely
identical with the other. Moreover, Herbartian " Interest " is not, as Eein
thinks, a " forward-willing " directed to the future (and therefore constitut-
ing the missing element desiderated by Natorp), but is, according to Her-
bart, strictly dependent on the perceptions of the moment. It works from
without, not from within, and hence is quite a different thing from what
Natorp demands.
Natorp has done good service in pointing out the elements of hesitation
in Herbart (though it is difficult to see how these elements can be recon-
ciled with a charge of "dogmatism"). But undoubtedly " Interest " and
the close connection between " Interest " and character form the essence
of Herbartian doctrine, and this essence stands firm even though Herbart
may momentarily or provisionally have raised doubts.
198 The Critics of Herbartianisnt
other things being equal, to grow up more moral than indi-
viduals devoid of such interests.
Again, Natorp's reproach that Herbart, in considering the
ways and means of Education, lays undue stress upon Intel-
lectual culture (just as, conversely, in considering the aim of
Education, he lays undue stress upon Morality) is rebutted by
the point just mentioned, viz., the very wide meaning attached
by Herbart to the notion of " Interest ". If " Interest " meant
with Herbart "Empirical" and "Speculative Interest" only,
Natorp s strictures might be well justified. But one of the most
characteristic features of Herbart' s doctrine is that Interest
must be many-sided. Empirical and Speculative Interest are
only two varieties out of the six he enumerates, the others
being ^Esthetic, Sympathetic, Social and Eeligious.
It may be admitted, however, on Natorp's side, that though
Apperceptive Interest is always a moral agency, some varieties
are morally educative m a greater degree than others. The
connection between Mathematics and Morahty is less close than
that between Literature and Morality. Doubtless, as pointed
out before, each of these studies has a moral influence of two
kinds : (1) An interest in tiiem keeps their possessor " out of
the mischief " which results from emptiness of mind and
absence of engrossing pursuits. (2) An mterest in them leads
on to a life of genuinely elevated character. But beyond this,
virtue, m the narrower sense, is not appreciably^ influenced
by mathematical study owing to the abstract nature of the
subject and the absence in it of the humanistic factor.
There are, in point of fact, two concepts of Virtue. The
Greek concept is a wide one, and is inclusive of Wisdom and
Culture. The Puritanical concept omits these latter elements.
There can be no doubt but that Herbart accepted the wider
ideal, and hence he could, with perfect appropriateness, connect
Instruction with Virtue and Morality, and regard the latter as
^ Perseverance, exactness and similar qualities are, no doubt, cultivated,
but they are not " virtuous " in the narrower sense, though there is plenty
of room for them vrithin the larger ideal.
Natorp 199
springing directly out of the " circle of thought " which it is
the work of Instruction to form. Even on an acceptance of
the narrower ideal, the connection between Morality and In-
struction is important, and Herbart has won an immortaUty of
fame by working it out. Still, in this latter case the connection
is less striking and direct, though surely real enough to merit
the solemn attention of teachers and reformers. A vast amount
of evil is directly traceable to emptiness of mind, and philanthro-
pists may with good reason devote their efforts to creating healthy
interests and impulses, rather than to removing the necessary
after-results of this emptiness.
(7) The Herbartian Theory of the Will, considered ethically.
Kant and Herbart.
(A) Herbart constantly waged war against certain Kantian
doctrines, though, in Natorp s opinion, these doctrines are the
only secure basis for Ethics and Pedagogy.
Kant's central thought was the Autonomy of the moral Will.^
The moral Will must not be determined by anything external to
itself ; any command, impulse, or desire. It must be determined
by itself alone, and be not only an executive but a law-giving
Will. Its only principle is that of harmony or consistency with
itself, and this principle is clearly a, formal one. [Similarly with
Understanding ; that which is objectively true is consistent ; in
both cases, conflict or contradiction is the test of untruth.] The
strongest appeal that can ever be made to the human Will re-
sults from this fact of self-judgment. Surely Education should
recognise this fact and demand the highest thing possible from
man. Was it not a retrogression when Herbart surrendered
this point of view ? [19-22.]
His reasons for doing so were psychological. How can such
a faculty of absolute self-determination be thought of? Will
must depend on presentations ; there is no Will per se ; hence
^ Kant's famous " categorical imperative " was, " Act only on such a
maxim as you can at the same time will to be a universal law ". In other
words, " Never make exceptions for yourself ".
2O0 Ttie Critics of Herbartianism
the Will cannot sit in judgment on the Will. But surely (re-
plies Natorp) though no single act of Will can give the law to
another act, yet there is the formal law of the Will ; the har-
mony of the Will with itself. Herbart ignores this. Harmony
of willing is the ultimate test of morahty, just as harmony of be-
lief is the ultimate test of truth. [22-5.]
(B) The above question is the fundamental one in the present
discussion. Natorp is a libertarian ; the Will is, with him, a
causeless spontaneity. It is the one vital element in man and
the universe ; it is the norm of the moral life. [Fliigel, p. 261.]
Kant's great service was to reject the pleasure-theory of
morals, and to lay emphasis on the forw, of willing. Did
Herbart really depart from Kant's position ? No. He still
opposed the pleasure theory, and held that moral worth can
only be found in the form of wilUng. [Just, pp. 279-80.] Her-
bart and Natorp both feel that it is necessary to find somewhere
a judgment upon the Will, in order to know whence comes its
worth and dignity. Natorp finds that the Will is good so far as
it is autonomous — devoid of all motive except itself. Thus, the
good Will is the one which suppresses every momentary desire
or makes it conform to itself. But surely this is possible with
great sinners as well as great saints ! An avaricious or ambitious
man may will with perfect consistency. [Fliigel, p. 263.]
No doubt "harmony of the Will with itself" is aesthetically
pleasing. Napoleon's will was in harmony with itself, but, being
egoistic, was immoral. If the good Samaritan had made a
general rule of hating the Jews, would he have been immoral
in relieving the distressed man ? Mere harmony of Will does
not prove morality of Will ; there must be a general type of
worthy willing. [Just, p. 282.]
Herbart, quite as strongly as Kant, insisted that the moral
Will must be free from external motives, sensuous impulses,
etc. But he rightly rejected absolute self-determination, which
means merely caprice, and is devoid of moral quaUty. There
must be some standard outside the Will itself. Here we come
to the " moral ideas " which Herbart enunciated. [Just, p. 280.]
Natorp 20 1
Kant's Ethics were the product of an age which strove after
independence. MoraUty appeared as mere self-rule or Egoism .
Nietzsche drew the logical consequence from Kant's system.
[Willmann, Zeitschrift.]
(C) The above discussion may appear academic, but it is
really of deep philosophic interest. Whence are we to derive
our standard of moral action ? Kant, Herbart, and Natorp
agree that a mere formless thing like "pleasure" which may
arise from any one of a multitude of causes, cannot provide such
a standard.
Are we then, with Kant and Natorp, to fall back on a
formal principle of mere consistency or universality? The
difficulty here is that an immoral man may be very " consistent"
indeed.^
Herbart was, therefore, driven on to seek some other ground
for morality, and he found it in the " five moral ideas," in-
tuitively or aesthetically apprehended. He, like Sidgwick, was
"forced to recognise the need of a fundamental ethical intui-
tion "."" The two writers are agreed that only by postulating one
or more spontaneous intuitions, each incapable of logical proof,
can a moral standard be acquired. The " aesthetic judgments"
of Herbart are essentially similar in nature to the " intuitive "
judgments of Sidgwick.
(8) The Herhartian Theory of the Will considered Psycho-
logically. The Doctrine of " Faculties ".
(A) Men frequently regard the faculties of Presentation,
Feeling, and Will as more or less external to each other.
Herbart was at great pains to abolish this separation and to
base mental life on one foundation only — the complex inter-
action of innumerable presentations. Herbart was correct so
far as he contended that the three fundamental faculties are not
1 " The Rational Egoist . . . might accept the Kantian principle and
remain an Egoist." (Sidgwick, Metliods of Ethics, preface.)
•^Ibid.
The Critics of Herbartianism
self-sufl&cient or mutually hostile. Man is never merely a
presentative, merely a feeling, or merely a volitional being ; all
three aspects coexist, though one may be predominant. Herbart
did great service in calling attention to the errors of the vulgar
" faculty " doctrine. [40.]
True, his own view is wrong. He makes his presentations
into powers or activities, and bases Feeling and Will upon them.
This is to ignore the fact that the latter are as fundamental as
presentations ; Herbart, however, obscures the illegitimacy of
his doctrine by constantly regarding presentations as already
forces or powers. [41.]
If once we recognise Will as a peculiar content of conscious-
ness, we must infer that it goes beyond the mere presentation
of an object in consciousness ; it presses forward beyond the
sphere of the given. All this is unintelhgible on Herbart's
view, which regards Will as rooted in presentations, and not as
being a law to itseK, and thus " free ". [42-3.]
(B) When Natorp tries to establish the doctrine of there
being something peculiar to the Will, he does so by pointing
out the supposed endlessness of the Will. I pull my boots on
in order to go to the post, in order to, . . . in order to . . .
But this only lands us in the pleasure-theory. [Fliigel, pp.
265-6.]
(C) It seems impossible to accept Herbart's view of the mind
as being fundamentally presentational. Why should not Feeling
and Will be as ultimate as Presentations ? Again, we are
conscious of the phenomenon mentioned by Natorp — an or-
ganisation of our whole life in accordance with some voluntary
plan, a plan which, though modified by new circumstances, is
not abrogated, but rather receives these circumstances into
itself. Will does not appear as a mere product of presentations,
but often as dominating these, and pressing on beyond them.
It is extremely difficult, on Herbart's theory, to explain the
unity of consciousness which is manifested in facts like these.
But the reader of Natorp's strictures might possibly imagine
Kunt 263
that Herbart had been the victim of inadvertence. This was not
so. His psychology may be wrong, but it was dehberately
adopted. Herbart saw the fallacy of the vulgar " faculty " doc-
trine, and also serious pedagogical errors which follow from a
recognition of distinct " faculties ". Accordingly he sought for a
unitary principle, and found it (he thought) in presentations.
Thus his error, if error it is, must not be regarded as one arising
out of blindness or ignorance.
After all, the presentational doctrine has much value for the
teacher. Just as a house builder presupposes that the force of
gravity will wo^ be absent and that earthquakes and eruptions
will be absent during the building of a house, so the teacher
assumes normal conditions in his pupils, and thinks mainly of
the one factor which is definitely within his own power to confer
— presentations, which constitute his -bricks and mortar. If the
child is normal, the normal impulses, etc., will be called forth by
the presentations. Thus Herbart's Psychology lays stress pre-
cisely upon those mental processes which are under the control
of the teacher.
These, then, are the main points raised by the controversy be-
tween Natorp and the Herbartians. However philosophically
important, they have only an indirect bearing on pedagogical
questions. Indeed, Natorp makes no pretensions of being an
educationist, and Professor Eein condemns him on this ground.
SECTION XIV.
KUNZ.
(1900.)
Kunz. Zur Wilrdigung der Herbart-Zillerschen Padagogik. Eberle and
Rickenbach, Einsiedeln, Switzerland, 1900.
Hebbartianism is essentially Protestant in its inception, and
many of Ziller's proposals bear this fact upon their face. . Thus,
ao4 The Critics of Herbartianism
for example, the recognition of the German Reformation as a
distinct "culture stage" would be unwelcome or impossible to
anyone but a Lutheran.
A few Roman Catholics have identified themselves with the
movement, among them Vogt, the successor of Ziller in the
headship of the Union for Scientific Pedagogy, and Willmann,
a professor at Prague. Such men would, of course, have to
withhold approval from certain details of Ziller's plan.
Some interest may attach itself to a consideration of the point
of view adopted by intelligent CathoUcs towards the Herbartian
system as a whole.
Director Kunz has many good words to say for the system.
It is pervaded by a noble spirit, and it stimulates to a deeper
grasp of the teacher's task, especially to a consideration of how
to base Instruction on psychological foundations and to carry
it out with a definite goal in view. It also rightly places religious
instruction in a central place (except in the first two years, where
the central matter is not religious).
But, no system resting on natural Ethics and psychology can
endure. A divine revelation is necessary if we are to understand
the human soul, and from it we learn about man's creation in
God's image, his fall, and his divine goal. Revelation Hkewise
gives us in Jesus Christ the true ideal to set before us. Such
matters as these cannot be discovered by reason. Pedagogy
must be based on Theology and Christianity.
Hence the defect of Herbartianism. To Her hart an act was
good if it agreed with the five moral ideas ; to Christianity it is
good if it corresponds to God's will. The aesthetic judgment in
the one case, God in the other, gives the verdict. To Herbart,
man is his own lawgiver, and there are no supernatural laws.
Even Protestants have objected to Herbart's exclusive stress
upon the aesthetic judgment ; thus Christinger holds that while
this judgment can give a motive, belief La God is a far stronger
one. In reality, Christianity goes far deeper than Herbartianism.
The real goal of education must be the restoration of the original
communion with God.
Kunz
205
Herbart rather late in life (1831) admitted that Higher help
was necessary, but both he and his follower Ziller regarded
religion rather as a complement to morality than as its founda-
tion. The goal, he says, is strength of character; but surely
this must rest on Eeligion. Ziller went rather further than
Herbart and, far more explicitly than his master, regarded the
goal of education as moral and religious.
Many useful points can be gathered from the Herbartian
system, but it is essentially Protestant, and quite ignores the
Catholic sacraments ; while Catholic pedagogy regards these
latter as communicating supernatural blessing.
The Herbartians rightly protest against schools which do not
educate, i.e., form character. They say rightly that knowledge
without virtue has no value, and that the latter should be the
one goal of education. But this was no new discovery. The
old Fathers (Augustine, Gregory, and others) said this.
Herbart' s psychology deprives the soul of all original powers.
Character rests on presentations or ideas. But this doctrine
conflicts with Christian and pre-Christian thought; it destroys
the freedom of the will and moral responsibility, likewise the
unity of the person. The mind is but a presentational mechan-
ism. Herbart expressly approved of Locke's tabula rasa, though
not in the sense that foreign impressions can be made upon it.
The materialist says, "Man is a product of parents, etc.";
Herbart says, " Man is a product of the influence of his outer
world ". The teacher, for Herbart, is no longer a loving gar-
dener, guiding the unfolding of an inner life, but a technologist
controlling a machine, or a chemist bringing together and mixing
certain materials.
The Herbartians rightly lay stress on Interest, and show how
by a psychological procedure this is aroused ; here come in the
" formal steps ". But surely it must not be a balanced Interest ;
some Interests are more important than others, those of sym-
pathy are more important than those of knowledge. Especially
essential are the moral and religious, while Interest in knowledge
is less important.
How does Virtue come out of Interest? Here the Herbartians
2o6 The Critics of Herbartianism
overvalue Instruction, for though presentations influence the Will
they do not compel it. The Will is free, and may go counter
to insight.
The scheme of " formal steps " has been but little opposed,
and on the whole is useful. Kehr, however, has insisted that
we must not have one model for everything ; each subject and
each class requires special treatment ; moreover, the scheme
manifests signs of hairsplitting. The formal steps are based on
psychological principles, but are inapplicable in some cases, e.g.,
the correction and repetition of exercises ; description ; the work-
ing over of any material already arranged in encyclopaedic form
(catechism. Sermon on the Mount, history tables, grammar,
etc.).
" Gesinnungsstoff." — This phrase (" character-forming ma-
terial ") is not well chosen; it places religious teaching on the
same level with profane history, whereas it is quite unique, a
supernatural bread.
" GtiUure Stages.'' — This doctrine is a mere figment. Ziller's
stages are (1) Darwinian, (2) Protestant, (3) German. But we
do not agree with "scientific pedagogy," or with the Eeforma-
tion, or, being Swiss republicans, with German imperialism as
the one ideal of state life. A child from six to fourteen cannot
run through many stages of human development, only those
of childhood. Sallwiirk has rightly contended that the child is
rooted in the present ; Frohlich, likewise, that the present-day
Christian view rather than the view of men ages ago should be
the one given to the child.
Eein and others have modified Ziller's scheme mainly by
choosing national culture stages (except in the case of bib-
lical instruction). But the whole doctrine is dubious. We
must start from the present, the near. What is early and
primitive is really far removed from the child, and we should
never make a spring into the past except (1) when this is
necessary to explain the present, (2) when points of contact
already exist in the child's mind. Moreover, many " stages "
really occur simultaneously.
Ziller's detailed scheme is defective in the following aspects.
Kunz 207
(1) The fairy tales are not primitive, but very late material.
(2) Children know that these stories are untrue ; what im-
pression, then, will be made?
(3) The stories delight and rouse the imagination, but have
no religious value ; often they are immoral. The baptized
child has a right to Christian teaching. It is true, Ziller and
Eein propose that there should be "children's services" devoid
of systematic instruction ; but surely instruction is necessary for
any real influence to be exerted. And it is not true that biblical
stories, properly selected, are too hard for children. True, even
fairy tales sometimes have a moral kernel.
(4) Eobinson Crusoe is a late and foreign story, and is beyond
the interest of seven to eight year old children. Many Zil-
lerians reject it. Willmann does, on the ground that it is neither
classical nor national ; it deals with foreign regions and must in
any case be seriously modified before being used. Still, it has
its value as material for free reading with pupils of ten to twelve.
The very early history of the world has no place in the Zillerian
plan of Bible study, which begins with the patriarchs ; but surely
this history is essential. The Zillerians omit it because they
cannot force it into their eight stages.
Only one, year for Catechism ! Surely this would be in-
adequate even if all the preceding years had been a preparation
for it.
The Niebelungen song may be useful for upper schools, but is
scarcely so for the people's school, least of all for the lower
grades (third and fourth years). The notion that love rewards
with suffering is beyond young children. Moreover, though
there is exemplified much fidelity, courage, etc., the song
abounds also in betrayal, hate, revenge, etc.
There is no repetition in the Zillerian plan ; each year
involves fresh work. Surely, Christ ought to be the centre of
all, not the mere end of the course. Dorpfeld himself admits
that there is some need of repetition, such as occurs in the
plan of "concentric circles".
The notion of concentration is good, but on Ziller's plan there
is an actual tearing asunder of material, though at times Ziller
2o8 The Critics of Herbartianism
admitted (here contradicting himself) that each department of
study must assert its independent claims.
Rein and others have modified some of ZUler's details.
Gesinnungs-unterricht has to be a centre for the geography,
nature study, and language study. But only in the first year is
arithmetic connected up with Gesinnungs unterricht ; drawing
only in the first three years ; singing not at all except so far as
the words are concerned. Real connections are largely ignored
in Ziller's plan. Interest is deadened ; monotony is produced ;
the lesson is split into tiny units.
Surely spatial matters (geography and natural knowledge)
form a better basis than temporal matters (history and nar-
ratives). Every action presupposes a place. The Zillerian
plan has been condemned by Bartels, Frick, Stoy, Frohlich,
Weissmer, Wehmann, Wesendonck, Ruegg, Sallwiirk, and
others.
The goal aimed at by Ziller can be reached in another way
— by ethical concentration. Moral and religious matters must
always be kept in the forefront. The religious standpoint gives
us an ideal point of view and a deep grasp of all other subjects.
A world-view must pervade everything ; religious instruction
must not be isolated.
Natural concentration is good ; related departments may be
unified. The reading book is valuable as connecting instruction
in language with instruction in things.
Ziller's plan is quite impracticable ; it demands eight years
and a separate teacher for each. What about schools which
have only one class ? It is true Hollkamm has tried to apply
Zillerianism even here, dividing the course into four sections and
various subsections, and combining the catechism stage with
biblical history.
APPENDIX.
PEOFESSOR DARROGH ON HERBARTIANISM.
Quite recently a British critic has appeared^ in the person of Mr.
(now Professor) Darroch, who, apparently since the present writer's
visit to the University of Edinburgh in the autumn of 1901, has
realised the capacities of the subject that had been already, at that
time, avowedly selected for research by the visitor.
The most prominent feature of Mr. Darroch's criticism is its per-
sistent irrelevancy. Acquainted with the objections raised by Lotze to
Herbart's psychology (these are given here under " Ostermann "), Mr.
Darroch reproduces them at some length under the impression that he
is thus damaging Herbart's pedagogy. The psychology is, according
to him, the foundation of the pedagogy. The latter is "derived,"
"deduced," or " developed " from the former, which is its "starting-
point," the " point of departure," containing the " original assumptions "
upon which the pedagogy is " based " or " ostensibly founded ". Would
any reader believe, after this, that, as a matter of fact, Herbarfs psychology
was elaborated years after his chief educational works were written ?
Professor James is right. " Even where, as in the case of Herbart,
the advancer of the art of teaching was also a psychologist, the peda-
gogics and the psychology ran side by side, and the former was not
derived in any sense from the latter," ^ Moreover the present writer
had already hinted that " Herbart's presentational mechanism was by
no means the starting-point of his educational proposals ".^ The whole
question is dealt with somewhat fully in the present work.*
It should not, however, be inferred that Mr. Darroch has completely
^ Herbart ; a Criticism (Longmans, 1903) ; also Journal of Education^
March, 1903.
2 Talks with Teachers, p. 8.
8 The Student's Herbart, p. 8. * Pp. 28-32.
2io Appendix
ignored The Student's Herbart. That little work, with its list of twenty
or more objections to Herbartianisra collected after considerable stixdy of
German educational literature, has clearly proved of immense service
to him. Mr. Darroch never admits this service, his only references to
the work being hostile. But his respect for the book is such that not
only does he apparently reproduce one after another its arguments and
ideaa, but he does so even when these arguments and ideas are perhaps
of dubious validity.
A few of the following instances may be irrelevant —of that the reader
must judge ; but the rest are surely obvious enough ; and, as Mr.
Darroch has chosen to criticise The Stvdent's Herbart, a reply from the
author of that book will not be out of place.
The one writer speaks of " an apperceiving machine which responds
smoothly and immediately " (p. 53); the other follows suit with "an
apperceiving machine which responds easily and smoothly " (p. 41).
The one writer points out that " two opposite dangers face our schools,"
the first represented by " heuristic " advocates, the second by the
"didactic materialism" to which Herbartianism in some of its forms
may perhaps tend, and goes on to say that " educationists must avoid
both extremes," seeing that " mental life is rhythmic " (pp. 25-26) ; the
other writer follows suit with, " As, on the one hand, the Herljartians
lay the emphasis upon the one aspect of our mental life, so in like
manner the extreme advocates of the heuristic method lay the emphasis
on the other, but the truth lies in neither extreme, but in realising
clearly the twofold aspect of all intellectual process " (p. 44 ; stultified
on p. 123). The one writer quotes the objection that a robber exem-
plifies the "second moral idea" (p. 50); the other follows suit with
"the successful swindler and cracksman" (p. 75). The one writer
complains that " even the much vaunted ' Nature Study ' may be
scrappy and ineffective " (p. 54) ; the second is tortured by the fact that
" there is at the present day so much teaching of nature knowledge and
of elementary science of a purely desultory kind " (p. 100). The one
writer refers to Professor Patrick Geddes as an advocate of placing
Nature Study " at the centre of the circle of knowledge " (p. 74) ; the
second writer — apparently regarding his countryman as a representative
Herbartian — speaks of " some enthusiasts " who would " make Nature
Study the centre of the circle of knowledge " (p. 131 ; also p. 144), the
plain truth being that no avowed Herbartian has ever made such a pro-
posal. The one writer refers to Miss Ravenhill's advocacy of the claims
of Hygiene (p. 74) ; the second seems to dignify her likewise with Her-
bartian honours (p. 144). The one writer, omitting the original meaning
of " didactic materialism " (the term was invented by Dorpfeld to stand
Appendix 211
for the blind policy of heaping up subject after subject in response to
utilitarian, ecclesiastical and other demands), uses the term in a slightly
and allowably modified sense (p. 25) ; the second writer faithfully
follows suit with the same omission and the same definition ; ^ " didactic
materialism," says the one, "is a belief in quantity apart from quality"
(p. 21) ; says the other, " it looks to the quantity of knowledge acquired
rather than to its quality " (p. 108). The first writer ventured on a
new and possibly erroneous interpretation of Herbart's Ethics, regarding
it as an attempt to expand the concept of Virtue by the inclusion of
elements "not always included" in that concept (p. 40); the spcond
writer discovers that Herbart, " as it seems to me rightly, extends the
conception (of morality) to include more than mere goodness" (p. 66).
The first writer describes the " second moral idea " as " puzzling " (p. 40) ;
by some strange fatality the second writer also finds it " somewhat
diflicult to understand " (p. 73). Still, when the first writer, beginning
to see daylight, suggests that the idea stands for " greatness, or at least
a notion very much like it," in fact for " strength and richness of mind "
(pp. 40-1), the second also describes it as one 01 " greatness " or " strength
of character" (p. 74), in this case inserting quotation marks (though
without giving the source of his quotation. When the one writer,
making a possibly erroneous conjecture, said, " Herbart felt that moral
reformers were too negative in their views," their chief message being
" avoid — avoid — avoid " (p. 42), he was attempting, on his own account,
an interpretation of the historical genesis of " second moral idea " which,
1 Not that Mr. Darroch never strays into originality. He invents the
hybrid " didactive " ; he gives an alternative metaphysical explanation of
the term " materialism " (p. 21), an explanation which the inventor Dorpfeld
would have smiled at ; lastly he avows that " one section of the (Herbartian)
school" has already "logically reached" the standpoint of "didactic
materialism". It was rather questionable policy on the part of the pre-
sent writer to claim that Herbartianism itself might tend towards " didactic
materialism," the term itself having been invented by an Herbartian as
one condemnatory of a system against which Herbartianism was a protest :
however, questionable or not, the second writer follows suit, and even brings
into existence a "section" of the school which has already reached, by a
"logical process," the standpoint here referred to (p. 108). Will Mr.
Darroch give some information as to the whereabouts of this " section,"
so completely unknown to the present writer ? A subtle and quite pro-
blematic tendency is one thing ; an arrival by " logical " process is another.
There is not, and there never has been, a single Herbartian who has ever
" logically reached " the standpoint of " didactic materialism " ; Mr. Darroch
is here challenged to mention one.
212 Appendix
whether correct or not as an interpretation, was at any rate novel. In
point of fact he knew as little as Mr. Darroch as to the actual motives
and convictions which led Herbart to the enunciation of his system of
Ethics. However, it is satisfactory to know that the second writer sup-
ports— though without referring the interpretation to its original source
— the view put forward by his predecessor. " Herbart," says Mr. Darroch,
" insists on the positive aspect of virtue ; it is not a mere not-doing, but
a doing "(p. 70).
Again and again the arguments and counter-arguments of The Student's
Herbart seem to be reproduced by Mr. Darroch without any acknowledg-
ment of their origin. The one writer warns against confusing pleasantry
with Interest (p. 51) ; the other feels called upon to utter a similar warning
(p. 46). The one writer defends Herbart against the " robber " argument
by pointing out that " the robber is not moral, for there is a ' third moral
idea ' namely Benevolence, and a ' fourth moral idea ' namely Justice,
and two others " (p. 50) ; the other writer reproduces this without quoting
his source : " against the criticism of Herbart it has been more than once
advanced i that we must take into account the other moral ideas. . . .
For Herbart also laid down that we should aim at Benevolence, at
Justice, at Equity" (p. 76). The one writer, in his list of supposed
errors in Herbartianism, says, " Herbartianisui confuses culture and
many-sided Interest with Virtue " (p. 86) ; the second is harrowed by
the thought that " the Herbartian theory tends to identify virtue with
culture " (p. 83). The one writer points out that Herbartians, in the
eyes of some people, " undervalue difficult formal studies " (pp. 88-9) and
" lay too great stress on Instruction " (p. 87) ; the second writer bewails
that " along with the overvaluing of instruction we have the under-esti-
mation, and, in some cases, the almost total neglect of formal studies "
(p. 112). The one writer replies to his own objection — that there may
be in Herbartianism a subtle tendency towards " didactic materialism "
— by referring to the "formal steps" as a proof that the Herbartians
are no mere pilers-up of indiscriminate knowledge (pp. 53,. 89) ; the
other writer's exposition takes the same direction : "the Herbartian may
reply : what about the five formal steps of method which form an in-
tegral and fundamental part in the theory ? " (p. 109). The one writer,
after discussing ZiUer's plan of " concentration," concludes that we must
" keep in close touch with each other those subjects which throw light
upon each other " (p. 67) or " belong to each other " (p. 72) — " we must
1 '» More than once." Yes, in Germany. Phrases like these, so suggestive
of an encyclopaedic study of Herbartianism, are characteristic of Mr,
Darroch's work. See p. 74, "Napoleon and Bacon".
Appendix 213
follow wherever the laws of Association naturally lead us" (p. 73) ; the
second writer, posing as a "critic of Herbartianism," comes to the same
conclusion : " the only safe rule for the teacher is that wherever there
is or has been real relation between two facts or groups of facts the
nature of the relation should be unfolded and enforced " (p. 133). The
one writer warns against the artificial forms of " concentration " which
would "divorce materials which should naturally be united together"
(p. 67) ; the second warns against " bonds of an imaginary nature " and
urges us to be " sure that there is, or has been, a real connection between
the facts which he seeks to conjoin" (pp. 1 46-7). The one writer urges that
"subjects differ greatly in importance" (p. 73), some being of " supreme,"
others of " moderate," others of " small " importance (p. 22) ; the second
writer is impressed by the fact that " some subjects are more valuable in
the education of the child than others " (p- 145) and traces the recogni-
tion of this truth to the enunciation of the "concentration" principle.
Mr. Darroch introduces an occasional variation by, to all appearance,
borrowing ideas from other writers than the present. Page 100 is a
supreme example of his powers. The first complete thought is from
The Student's Herbart, the next two are based on Professor Adams's
chapters " Formal Education " and " Observation," and the last two
on Professor James's chapter "Apperception". "Apperception," says
the latter, " means nothing more than the act of taking a thing into
the mind." " Apperception," says Mr. Darroch, after having impressed
the same lesson as his American original, " means nothing more than
the act of taking a thing into the mind," an act which, clearly, Mr.
Darroch is well able to perform. He, at any rate, does not despise
" Instruction ".
Idea after idea, argument after argument, conclusion after conclusion,
even phrase after phrase, does Mr. Darroch seem to borrow — almost ex-
clusively from Herbartian writers ; but his only references to the men
who have saved his book from vacuity are hostile.
What is the conclusion of the matter 1 Mr. Darroch has nothing fresh,
original, or stimulating to present to the teachers of Britain. His
criticisms of Herbartianism are either irrevelant or antiquated. His
positive suggestions are mainly those made by the present writer
several months before his own essays appeared, or by other Herbartian
or semi-Herbartian writers. Surely it is not right — not fair — for men to
borrow suggestion after suggestion from a system and then profess to be
its critics. Yet, after all, these critics are, though unwillingly, witnesses
for the defence ; whenever they prepare to grapple with practical
educational problems they cannot help first refreshing themselves from
the Herbartian spring.
214 Appendix
The writer has no objection to Mr. Darroch, or any one else, using
his work, but he thinks the bounds of legitimate use are passed when
no acknowledgment is made, and when, to cover the service, an attack
is made upon the very book that has proved so serviceable. The public
must judge.
After all, Herbartianism works. Education is more an art than a
science, and a system of education must be judged by its fruits. Perus-
ing such a work as Mr. Darroch's, an Herbartian will impatiently re-
call the words of Edmund Burke : " Applaud us when we run ; console
us when we fall ; cheer us when we recover ; but let us pass on — for
God's sake let us pass on "}
P.S. — Mr. Darroch's reply is that his Journal of Education article
was printed before the University booksellers at Edinburgh procured
The StudenVs Herhart. Comment on this is hardly necessary in view of
the facts (1) that the quotations given above are entirely taken from
Mr. Darroch's hook, not his article ; (2) that his book followed The
Student's Herhart at an interval of six months ; (3) that in it he refers
three times by name to The Student's Herhart.
The fact is, Mr. Darroch wrote in a hurry, and did not do justice
either to himself or to the men from whom he hastily gathered ideas.
He is surely capable of better things than this.
1 Speech at Bristol, 1780.
INDEX I.
Herbart, life of, 37-9.
Herbartianism
as left by Herbart, 39-43.
its unpretentious position at his
death, 39, 43-4.
attitude of Stoy and his followers,
45-6.
attitude of Dorpfeld, 47-9.
leading doctrines of Ziller, 53-6.
rupture between the Zillerians and
the other Herbartians, 45-6, 51,
67-8.
Herbartianism outside of Ger-
many, 52, 56-7, 62, 75-6.
controversies over Herbartianism,
66.
reasons for the influence of Her-
bartianism, 52, 57.
present position of Herbartianism
in Germany, 65-9.
in Britain, 69-75.
V. Frobelianism, 30, 55, 83, 85,
96.
unpractical or overpractical ? 102,
107, 108, 112, 129, 155-6, 160-1,
166, 167.
and physical facts and ciilture,
102.
Christianity and religious instruc-
tion, 104, 106, 107, 109, 112, 114,
115, 157, 167, 204.
admitted excellences, 105-6, 111,
125, 147, 204.
reactionary elements, 110, 128-9,
129, 164, 167.
The Moral Significance of Herbar-
tianism, 5-19 (especially 8, 18),
84, 87, 195.
moral importance of ideas owing
to their connection with Voli-
tion, 4, 7, 10, 17, 27, 41, 47, 92,
103, 124, 129.
The Moral Significance of Herbar-
tianism (continued).
generation of Virtue out of ideas
by way of Apperception and In-
terest, 6-7, 12, 15, 18, 19, 40, 56,
91, 146, 190-1, 197-9.
generation of Vice out of ignorance
or poverty of ideas, 7, 9-10, 11,
12, 13, 15, 17, 91, 191.
evil an effect, not an entity, 10-13.
Habit V. Insight, 3-4, 92, 101, 124,
129, 170.
the Interest doctrine, 6, 7, 8, 9,
18, 40, 45, 56, 72, 91, 105, 111,
113, 123, 157-8, 159-60, 169, 190,
196-7, 197-8, 205.
Herbartianism a gospel of positive
moral reform, 9, 10, 11, 86, 198-9.
" Educative instruction " versus
" technological instruction," 60,
87, 91, 102, 110, 111, 112, 113,
156, 161. 167, 169, 176, 194-5,
196-7, 205.
Herbartianism and " soft peda-
gogics " ; supposed absence of
strenuousness, 19, 75, 96, 100,
101, 162, 171, 175-6.
Herbartianism and the gymnastic
doctrine or fallacy, 20, 21, 22-3,
85, 88-9, 96-7, 161, 162, 163.
Herbart's Ethics, 42-3.
apparent artificiality of Herbart's
ethics ; absence of unity, 32, 99,
103, 123.
Herbart and Sidgwick, 33, 201.
the " second moral idea " and its
importance, 11, 12, 100, 102.
no "moral idea" valid in isola-
tion, 12, 100-1.
Herbart's Ethics based on " taste "
or the " aesthetic judgment," 99,
101, 122, 123, 136, 149, 153, 200.
2l6
Index
HerharVs Ethics {continued).
character the one end of educa-
tion, 39, 53, 87, 102, 194-9.
inability to give practical guidance,
99.
the five ideas not co-ordinate, 100.
criticism of the "five ideas," 100-
101.
Determinism and Libertarianism,
5, 122, 134, 141, 146-7, 179, 205.
Herbart's Psychology and Philo-
sophy.
metaphysical doctrine, 99, 118,
131.
his Preseptationalism versus a
Spiritualistic Psychology, 4-5,
28-9, 39, 101, 112, 118-23, 131-6,
179, 201-3, 205.
possible weaknesses, 4, 20, 21, 29-
31, 32, 33, 64, 104, 112, 118-25,
133-5, 155, 201-3.
the "faculty" doctrine, 39, 112,
121, 123, 133-5, 157, 201-3, 205.
Herbart's educational doctrines
not deduced from his psychology,
31, 38, 65, Appendix.
value of Presentationalism for
educational purposes, 28-31, 32,
33, 40, 83, 84.
consequent value of Instruction
in the Herbartian system; the
"content" of studies, the con-
ferring of knowledge, are impor-
tant, 40-1, 84-5, 86, 88-9, 92, 95,
102, 103, 104-5, 110, 113, 121,
123, 143, 156, 161, 169, 173, 196,
205-6.
place of Discipline and Training
in the Herbartian system, 42, 92,
101, 110, 146, 156, 170, 173, 191,
193-4, 195-6.
vitality of Presentationalism, 31.
Presentationalism, Heredity,
Physiology and Physical Edu-
cation, 29, 40-1, 94, 133, 155,
160, 166, 167, 169-70.
punishments, 105, 193-4.
relation of feelings to ideas, 32,
121-2, 124.
uselessness of working merely on
the feelings, 23, 125.
" developing -presentative Instruc-
tion," 21, 170-1, 173-7.
Herbarfs Psychology and Philosophy
(continued).
Didactic Materialism, Didactic
Formalism, 20-1, 48, 84, 86, 93,
95, 113, 161, 162, 171.
Apperception.
meaning of, 41, 118.
significance of, 14-17.
relation to Anschauung, 36-7, 41,
188.
relation to Association, 83-4.
relation to Interest and Attention,
16-17, 92, 105, 118.
" Oesinnungsstoff" {= humanistic
material).
importance of, 8, 26, 53-4, 72-3, 87,
91, 92, 94-5, 110, 161, 168, 206.
neglect of, 13, 14, 72-3.
The " Formal Steps " of Instrtiction,
21, 23-4, 41-2, 45, 49, 56. 87-8, 95,
97, 106, 111, 117, 124, 125-30, 162,
164, 167-8, 171, 174-5, 177, 205-6.
modifications and dangers of, 24,
87, 117, 126-30, 162.
inapplicable to the teaching of
dexterities, 74, 87, 127.
inapplicable to certain other cases,
126, 206.
The Doctrine of " Culture Stages,"
14, 26, 45, 48, 54, 71-2, 95, 109,
113-6, 123, 148-54, 158, 168, 197,
206.
scientific basis of the doctrine, 26-
7, 95, 113, 148, 148-51, 172.
" fairy tales," the Odyssey, etc.,
27, 43, 48, 55, 87, 91, 94, 95, 106,
109, 114, 125, 149, 153-4, 158,
168, 172, 207.
Robinson Crusoe, 27, 55, 94, 109,
114, 149, 154, 158, 168, 172, 207.
The Old Testament, 154.
postponement and abbreviation of
the life of Christ, 27, 48, 110,
115, 150, 168, 207.
the Reformation stage, 55, 110,
114-5.
advantages, 48.
difficulties, 48, 55, 109-10, 113-6,
123, 149-50, 158, 164-5, 167-8,
172, 206-7.
repetition ignored, 171, 207.
"concentric circles," 48, 62, 114,
116, 173, 207.
Index
217
The Doctrine, of " Concentration" 24,
45-6, 47, 53-4, 58, 88-90, 91-2, 94-
5, 106, 110, 116-7, 123, 149, 158,
168, 173, 207-8.
need for " concentration," 24, 54,
89, 91-2, 94-5.
two interpretations, 24-5.
increasing recognition of the need
for unification of studies, 24-5,
70, 92.
limits of ♦' concentration," 90,
116.
" concentration " according to
Ziller, 25-6, 54.
The Doctrine of " Concentration "
(continued).
difficulties and modifications of
Ziller's scheme, 26, 59, 108-9,
116, 161, 208.
" concentration," according to
Dorpfeld, 26, 47.
" concentration " according to
Stoy, 45-6.
" concentration " according to Dr.
Findlay, 88.
rational concentration, 26.
The teaching of dexterities, 87.
Practical purswits, 89, 91.
INDEX II.
References to Herbart and Ziller are, except in a few imtances, omitted.
ACKERMANN, 57, 69.
Adams, 5, 7, 19, 21, 33, 61, 71, 74,
82-6, Appendix.
Adler, 71.
Andreas, 59.
Armstrong, 20, 24, 70.
Arnold, 10-11.
Augustine, 205.
Bacon, 157.
Ballauf, 121, 122.
Bartels, 19, 26, 34, 58, 62, 112-7, 208.
Barth, 51, 57.
Bell, 37.
Bell, Canon, 71.
Benson, 20.
Bergemann, 34, 65, 169-73.
Beyer, 57, 60, 69, 150-1, 152.
Bliedner, 57.
Branford, 70.
Burke, 8, Appendix.
Butler, 101.
Christinqer, 19, 34, 166-9, 204.
Cicero, 157.
Clement, 71.
Clifton, Bishop of, 8.
Cobbe, Miss, 15.
Comenius, 23, 105, 113, 116, 117, 126,
162.
Conrad, 57.
Cornelius, 43, 185.
Credner, 57.
Darroch, Preface and Appendix.
Darwin, 151.
De Garmo, 69, 74, 75, 78, 79, 80, 81-2,
96-7.
Dewey, 76.
Dickens, 157.
Diesterweg, 113.
Dittes, 12, 19, 34, 59, 98-106, 111, 112,
180 183
Dodd, 28, 69, 71, 74, 75, 93-5.
Dorpfeld, 22, 24, 26, 35, 39, 50, 56, 57,
66, 78, 80, 87-9, 94, 114, 116, 138,
164, 176, 207.
— Life of, 46-7.
— Doctrines of, 47-9.
Drews, 163-6.
Drobisch, 43.
EcKOPF, 75, 79.
Felkin, 2, 38, 42, 74, 78, 80.
Fennel, 97.
Fichte, 37, 138, 181, 186, 187.
Findlay, 5, 7, 26, 53, 70, 74, 86-90,
127.
Florin, 59.
Plugel, 30, 57, 64, 65, 67, 98, 180,
183-4, 200, 202.
Foltz, 176.
Frick, 57, 69, 82, 208.
Frbbel, 30, 36, 83, 85, 92, 96, 169.
Frohlich, 57, 58, 59, 60, 98, 99, 109,
113, 206, 208.
Glockne'r, 98, 103, 104, 105, 106.
Goethe, 54, 71.
Gopfert, 62,
Grabs, 57.
Gray, 12, 13.
Gregory, 205.
Hall, 71.
Hayward, 6, 11, 25, 27, 67, 72, 74, 82.
330
Index
Herbart, 2, 3, 4, 6, 19, 23, 24, 26, etc.
— Life of, 36-9.
— Doctrines of, 39-43.
Heyn, 66-7.
Hollkamm, 208.
Hubatsch, 22, 34, 154-62.
James, 4, 5, 17, 19, 82, Appendix.
Just, 57, 63, 65, 69, 98, 101, 102, 103,
104, 180, 188-9, 200.
Kant, 38, 138, 139, 178, 181, 186, 195,
199-201.
Kehr, 206.
Kern, 57.
Klemm, 56, 69.
Koch, 184.
Kunz, 203-8.
Kuoni, 62.
Langb, a. F., 78.
Lange, K., 57, 69, 74, 76, 80.
Laurie, 70.
Lazarus, Preface, 43.
Lentz, 116.
Lessing, 71.
Linde, 34, 173-7.
Locke, 2, 40, 113, 179, 205.
Lodge, 20.
Lotze, 20, 180.
Luther, 113.
Maoeb, 43.
McMurray, 75.
Menard, 151.
Meredith, 11.
Mulliner, 74, 79.
Munk, 155.
Miinsterberg, 31, 184.
Myers, 10.
Nahlowsky, 43, 185.
Nathan, 122.
Natorp, 1, 4, 30, 31, 34, 64, 178-203.
Niederer, 187, 188.
Niederley, 57.
Niemeyer, 36, 37, 105, 113.
Nietzsche, 201.
OsTERMANN, 10, 23, 31, 32, 34, 63-4,
112, 117-25, 180, 183.
Parkbb, 76, 82.
Perry, 70.
Pestalozzi, 36, 37, 88, 44, 79, 102, 105,
113, 130, 131, 138-47, 180, 181,
185-8, 195, 196.
Pickel, 57.
Plato, 3.
Potter, 71.
Rein, 18, 29, 34, 57, 59, 60, 65, 69, 74,
80, 86, 114, 128, 150, 175, 180,
184, 185, 187, 190, 193, 196-7,
203, 206, 207, 208.
Richter, 24, 34, 128-30.
Rissmann, 63.
Rooper, Preface, 12, 90-3.
Rousseau, 36, 115, 153.
Ruegg, 208.
Ruskin, 15, 100.
Sallwurk, 26, 57, 58, 59, 69, 98, 113,
114, 147-54, 206, 208.
Sander, 58.
Schiller, 195.
Schleiermacher, 181, 182.
Schmidt, 177.
Schumann, 57.
Seneca, 157.
Shurman, 19.
Sidgwick, 33, 189, 201.
Smith, 79.
Socrates, 3, 157, 163.
Spencer, 54-5, 71, 96.
Staude, 57, 66, 113, 128, 129, 150.
Stead, 73.
Steiger, 37, 78.
Steinthal, 43.
Stout, 31.
Stoy, 38, 39, 51, 56, 57, 82, 98, 112,
208.
— Life of, 44-5.
— Doctrines of, 45-6.
Striimpell, 43, 57, 122, 184, 186.
Tennyson, Preface, 13.
Thilo, 57, 98, 99.
Thrandorf, 57, 60.
— and Meltzer, 66.
Thring, 5, 21.
Trendlenburg, 180.
Triiper, 184.
Upeb, 69, 74, 75, 80, 184.
Index
22t
Van Liew, 42, 80.
Vogel, 35, 130-47, 180.
Vogt, 56, 57, 58, 60, 112, 114, 204.
Voigt, 2, 81.
Volkmann, 43, 185.
Voltaire, 157.
Waitz, 43, 185.
Wehmann, 208.
Weissmer, 208.
Wesendonck, 34, 51, 59, 63, 107-12,
208.
Wiessner, 57.
Wiget, 57, 62, 187.
Willmann, 66, 63, 65, 150, 201, 204,
207.
Wundt, 119.
ZiLLEB, 14, 23, 24, 26, 27, 38, 39, 54,
56, 57, 59, etc.
— Life of, 49-53.
— Characteristics, 49-53, 107.
— Doctrines of, 53-6.
— on school organisation, 107.
— on naodern languages, 107-8.
— on inductive methods of lan-
guage-teaching, 108.
Zillig, 57, 60.
Zinser, 80.
THE ABEBDEEK UNIVEBSITT PBESS LIMITED,
BY THEiSAME AUTHOR
THE REFORM OF MORAL AND BIBLICAL EDUCATION
ON THE LINES OP HERBARTIANISM, GKITICAL THOUGHT
AND THE ETHICAL NEEDS OF THE PRESENT DAY.
EDUCATION. — "An extremely clever, even brilliant book ; also distinctly novel
and — we feel tempted to say — therefore, distinctly welcome. . . . Interesting from
cover to cover."
WESTERN TIMES.— " Almost as exciting and exhilarating as Jnles Verne, . . .
An admirable volume of exposure and suggestion."
THE SCHOOL WORLD. — "This book, as we should have expected, is interesting
from cover to cover. . . . There was room for Dr. Hay ward's book, and with the
main contentions we are wholly in agreement. ... A thorough lighting book."
WESTMINSTER REVIEW.— "The newly constituted authorities must stand in
need of help and guidance in arranging their schemes for instruction in elementary
schools, and we learn from Mr. Frank H. Hayward how urgent this need is. . . .
We unhesitatingly urge all teachers and all members of committees of management
to study his book."
TIMES. — "Dr. Hayward is an Herbartian and an enthusiast who is aghast at
the lack of method and enlightenment in the teaching of religion and the training
of character, especially in primary schools. His solution of the religious difficulty
is ' Neither Church nor Dissent, but Educationists, ' and this maxim he urges in a
number of racy chapters criticising the present practice, and giving a useful
'Scheme of Instruction'."
THE LITERARY WORLD. — "The Moral Instruction League can congratulate
itself on having a protagonist so able and so fearless."
Mr. W. T. STEAD in the " Review of Reviews ". — " Mr. Hayward has flung into
the educational arena one of the brightest, brainiest and breeziest books that it has
been my good fortune to read for some time. ... It would be easy to fill pages
with extracts from his incisive and audacious frontal attack upon the system of
instruction which both the defenders and the opponents of the Education Act seem
to regard as beyond criticism."
WESTERN DAILY MERCURY.— " A bold book, an outspoken book. There is
audacity in its views and its language, but it is the audacity of an apostle's fervour.
... A book emphatically worth the reading."
WEDNESBURY HERALD.—' ' The writer is a perfect master of his subject. The
book ought to be read at this juncture by every teacher in day and Sunday schools,
by members of town and county councils, and all to whom the new Education Act
appeals for the exercise of some amount of common-sense in putting this much-
neglected branch of education upon a proper footing."
WESTERN MORNINQ NEWS.—" We would urge every one interested in educa-
tion to examine Mr. Hayward' s scheme."
SCOTSMAN. — "An able study of the remediable errors in existing methods of
education."
YORKSHIRE POST. — "Mr. Hay ward's book contains much sound criticism and
advice, and many original suggestions ; it is conceived in the right spirit and
appears at the right time,"
BRISTOL TIMES,— "An original work by Dr. Hayward which cannot be too
widely read. His arm stretches wide and his spade digs deep, and there is probably
not an educationist living who would not find therein innumerable suggestions."
WESTERN DAILY PRESS.— "It is a bold step he has taken, but it may fairly
be said that he has laid his plans on a broad and, as far as possible, inotfensivo
basis. ... He does not deal merely in generalities. He has set forth a scheme of
character-forming instruction which must have been the work of much labour and
time. . . . Dr. Hay ward's book is very readable."
GLASGOW HERALD. — "The book contains a very well-informed discussion of
this subject, and presents in a remarkably vivid way many topics well worthy of
the serious consideration of teachers and school managers."
DUNDEE ADVERTISER.—" Apart from its important subject, this book is
written in a very lively style. , . . Every school board member should peruse this
volume, if it be only for the purpose of mortifying the flesh by taking the conceit
out of himself."
THE REFORM OF MORAL AND BIBLICAL mmM-cmtinued.
BRISTOL MERCURY (Leading Article).— "A well-studied contribution to the
science of education in tlie domain which alone gives real trouble."
EAST ANQLIAN DAILY TIMES.—" The Herbartian doctrine or method . . .
is presented by Mr. Hay ward, in the constructive portion of his work, with an
attractiveness which some will find irresistible."
NEW AQE. — "Some admirable criticisms on present-day methods of moral and
religious teaching. . . . We commend this volume to the serious attention of school
managers and teachers."
THE PRESIDENT ELECT OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF TEACHERS (Q.
Sharpies, Esq.), who quoted from the booii at the Buxton Conference, says :
" No book has moved me so profoundly for many years as this startling work. It
should be read by every educationist in the country."
ETHICS. — "We can strongly recommend it. Its exposure of the utter inade-
quacy of present educational methods towards moral ends is most scathing. . . .
The book is packed with useful information, proceeds from a scholarly mind, has
moral power, and has many practical and detailed suggestions in the direction of
reform."
THE STUDENT'S HERBART.
A BRIEF EDUCATIONAL MONOGRAPH DEALING WITH THE
SYSTEM INITIATED BY HERBART AND DEVELOPED BY
STOY, DORPPELD AND ZILLER.
Professor ADAMS, Professor of Education in the University of London,
writes: "I read with much interest y ova Student's Herhart. It is an admirable
bird's-eye view of the Herbartian Pedagogy, and cannot fail to be of great service
to students. Perhaps its most valuable feature is the perspective it affords of the
important and the unimportant. The selection and arrangement are excellent.
For the size of the book it is amazingly complete. You have certainly rendered a
great service to the theory of education in England by giving us this brightly
written and instructive monograph. I look forward mth much interest to your
promised work on the Critics of Herbartianism."
EDUCATION. — "The terse, direct and forceful manner in which Dr. Hayward
tells us what he has to say attracts and rivets one's attention. . . . We trust that
those who have not yet perused its pages will do so."
THE LITERARY WORLD. — "A concise and lucid exposition of the great re-
former's principles which are winning more and more enthusiastic adherents in the
ranks of educationists."
UNIVERSITY EXTENSION JOURNAL.— " This delightful little book. . . .
Written in a clear, popular manner, it will do much to enable the student of
Herbartian literature to grasp the main principles of the great master, and
appreciate the changes which have been introduced by modern writers "
SECONDARY EDUCATION. — " It is quite impossible to give here a satisfactory
abstract of this delightful account of Herbartianism. We can only say that few,
we think, can read the little book without receiving encouragement, stimulus and
practical help in their work."
GLASGOW HERALD. — "Teachers and school board members should read this
short and vigorous exposition of a very earnest thinker and writer on education."
WESTMINSTER REVIEW.— "No better introduction than this to the study of
the works of the master could be desired."
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN.— " Any one wishing to gain a little knowledge of
Herbartianism rapidly cannot do better than read The StudenVs Herbart by Dr.
F. H. Hayward. The writer has caught some of the enthusiasm of Herbart and
his followers, but is not blind to their weaknesses, devoting one of his tive sections
to the consideration of them."
THE GUARDIAN. — " One can only wish that there were equally clear and concise
monographs on other educationists. "
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