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THE CRISIS OF THE NAVAL WAR

The Crisis of the
Naval War

By
ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET

Viscount Jelligoe of Scapa

G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.

With 8 Plates and 6 Charts

NEW >iSJr YORK
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY

lrt( rt 3 H> "vi'2 '*£'{

The Officers and Men

of our
Convoy, Escort, Patrol and Minesweeping Vessels

and their

Comrades of the Mercantile Marine

by whose splendid gallantry, heroic self-sacrifice, and

unflinching endurance the submarine

danger was defeated

INTRODUCTION

Owing to the peculiar nature and demands of naval
warfare, but few dispatches, corresponding to those de-
scribing the work and achievements of our great armies,
were issued during the progress of the war. In a former
volume I attempted to supply this defect in the historical
records, which will be available for future generations, so
far as the Grand Fleet was concerned, during my period
as its Commander-in-Chief. The present volume, which
was commenced and nearly completed in 1918, was to
have been published at the same time. My departure
on a Naval mission early in 1919 prevented me, however,
from putting the finishing touches to the manuscript until
my return this spring.

I hesitated as to the publication of this portion of what
is in effect one complete narrative, but eventually decided
not to depart from my original purpose. There is some
reason to believe that the account of the work of the Grand
Fleet gave the nation a fuller conception of the services
which the officers and men of that force rendered in cir-
cumstances which were necessarily not easily appreciated
by landsmen.

This second volume, dealing with the defeat of the
enemy's submarine campaign, the gravest peril which ever,
threatened the population of this country, as well as of

the whole Empire, may not be unwelcome as a statement

Vll

viii Introduction

of facts. They have been set down in order that the
sequence and significance of events may be understood,
and that the nation may appreciate the debt which it
owes, in particular, to the seamen of the Royal Navy and
the Mercantile Marine, who kept the seas during the
unforgettable days of the intensive campaign.

This book, therefore, gives the outline of the work
accomplished by the Navy in combating the unrestricted
submarine warfare instituted by the Central Powers in
February, 1917. It would have been a labour of love to
tell at greater length and in more detail how the
menace was gradually overcome by the gallantry, endur-
ance and strenuous work of those serving afloat in ships
flying the White or the Red Ensigns, but I had not the
necessary materials at my disposal for such an exhaustive
record.

The volume is consequently largely Concerned with
the successive steps taken at the Admiralty to deal with
a situation which was always serious, and which at times
assumed a very graye aspect. The ultimate result of all
Naval warfare must naturally rest with those who are
serving afloat, but it is only just to the Naval officers and
others who did such fine work at the Admiralty in
preparing for the sea effort, that their share in the
Navy's final triumph should be known. The writing of
this book appeared also to be the only way in which I could
show my keen appreciation of the loyalty and devotion to
duty of the Naval Staff, of the many clever, ingenious
and audacious schemes developed and carried through for
the destruction of submarines and the safeguarding of
ocean-borne trade, and of the skilful organization which
brought into being, and managed with such success, that

Introduction ix

great network of convoys by which the sea communica-
tions of the Allies were kept open. The volume shows
how the officers who accompanied me to the Admiralty
from the Grand Fleet at the end of 1916, in association
with those already serving in Whitehall and others who
joined in 1917, with the necessary and valuable assistance
of our comrades of the Mercantile Marine, gradually pro-
duced the measures by which the Sea Service conquered
the gravest danger which has ever faced the Empire.

There were at times inevitable set-backs as the enemy
gained experience of our methods, and new ones had then
to be devised, and we were always most seriously handi-
capped by the strain imposed upon the Fleet by our
numerous military and other commitments overseas, and
by the difficulty of obtaining supplies of material, owing
to the pre-occupation of our industries in meeting the
needs of our Armies in equipment and munitions; but,
generally speaking, it may be said that in April, 1917,
the losses reached their maximum, and that from the fol-
lowing month and onwards the battle was being slowly
but gradually won. By the end of the year it was becom-
ing apparent that success was assured.

The volume describes the changes carried out in the
Admiralty Staff organization; the position of affairs in
regard to submarine warfare in the early part of 1917;
and the numerous anti-submarine measures which were
devised and brought into operation during the year.
The introduction and working of the convoy system is
also dealt with. The entry of the United States of
America into the war marked the opening of a new phase
of the operations by sea, and it has been a pleasure to
give particulars of our cordial co-operation with the

x Introduction

United States Navy. The splendid work of the patrol
craft and minesweepers is described all too briefly, and I
have had to be content to give only a brief summary of
the great services of the Dover and Harwich forces.

Finally, an effort has been made to suggest the range
and character of the work of the Production Departments
at the Admiralty. It is impossible to tell this part of the
story without conveying some suggestion of criticism since
the output never satisfied our requirements. I have en-
deavoured also to indicate where it seemed to me that
changes in organization were not justified by results, so
that in future years we may benefit by the experience
gained. But I would not like it to be thought that I did
not, and do not, realize the difficulties which handicapped
production, or that I did not appreciate to the full the
work done by all concerned.

It is unfortunate that attempts to draw attention to
the lessons taught us by the war are regarded by many
people either as complaints of lack of devotion to the
country's interests on the part of some, or as criticisms
of others who, in the years before the war or during the
war, were responsible for the administration of the Navy.
In anticipation of such an attitude, I wish to state em-
phatically that, where mention is made of apparent
shortcomings or of action which, judged by results, did
not seem to meet a particular situation, this is done solely
in order that on any future occasion of a similar character
— and may the day be long postponed — the nation may
profit by experience.

Those who are inclined to indulge in criticism should
ever bear in mind that the Navy was faced with problems
which were never foreseen, and could not have been fore-

Introduction xi

seen, by anyone in this country. Who, for instance,
would have ever had the temerity to predict that the
Navy, confronted by the second greatest Naval Power in
the world, would be called upon to maintain free com-
munications across the Channel for many months until
the months became years, in face of the naval forces of
the enemy established on the Belgian coast, passing
millions of men across in safety, as well as vast quantities
of stores and munitions? Who would have prophesied
that the Navy would have to safeguard the passage of
hundreds of thousands of troops from the Dominions to
Europe, as well as the movement of tens of thousands of
labourers from China and elsewhere? Or who, moreover,
would have been believed had he stated that the Navy
would be required to keep open the sea communications
of huge armies in Macedonia, Egypt, Palestine, Meso-
potamia and East Africa, against attack by surfaee vessels,
submarines and mines, whilst at the same time protecting
the merchant shipping of ourselves, our Allies, and
neutral Powers against similar perils, and assisting to
ensure the safety of the troops of the United States when
they, in due course, were brought across the Atlantic?
Compare those varied tasks with the comparatively modest
duties which in pre-war days were generally assigned to
the Navy, and it will be seen how much there may be to
leam of the lessons of experience, and how sparing we
should be of criticism. Wisdom distilled from events
which were unforeseeable should find expression not in
criticisms of those who did their duty to the best of their
ability, but in the taking of wise precautions for the
future.

Little mention is made in this volume of the work of

xii Introduction

the Grand Fleet during the year 1917, but, although that
Fleet had no opportunity of showing its fighting power, it
must never be forgotten that without the Grand Fleet,
under the distinguished officer who succeeded me as
Commander-in-Chief at the end of 1916, all effort would
have been of no avail, since every operation by sea, as well
as by land, was carried out under the sure protecting shield
of that Fleet, which the enemy could not face.

I am conscious of many shortcomings in the book,
but it may prove of interest to those who desire to know,
something of the measures which gradually wore down
the German submarine effort, and, at any rate, it is the
only record likely to be available in the near future of the
work of fighting the submarines in 1917.

June, 1920.

G©NTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

1. Admiralty Organization : the Changes in 1917 . 1

" 2. Submarine Campaign in the Early Part of 1917 32

' 3. Anti-Submarine Operations .... 53

- 4. The Introduction of the Convoy System . . 102

■* 5. The Convoy System at Work .... 119

6. The Entry of the United States : Our Naval

Policy Explained 153

-7. Patrol Craft and Minesweeping Services . .182

8. The Dover Patrol and the Harwich Forces . 197

9. The Sequel 223

10. " Production " at the Admiralty during 1917 . 228

11. Naval Work 247

12. The Future 252

Appendices 261

Index 321

LIST OF PLATES

A Mine Exploding

Frontispiece

A German Submarine of the U-C Type

A German Submarine of the later Cruiser Class

A Smoke Screen for a Convoy .

The Dummy Deck-house of a Decoy Ship .

A Convoy Zigzagging .....

A Convoy with an Airship ....

Drifters at Sea ......

A Paddle Minesweeper ....

A German Mine on the Surface .

Two Depth Charges after Explosion .

The Tell-tale Oil Patch ....

A Submarine Submerging ....

Periscope of Submerged Submarine Travelling at Slow
Speed

A Submarine Submerged ....

FACING PAGE

48
80
80
128
128
160
192
192
224
224
256

256
256

LIST OF CHARTS

(CONTAINED IN THE POCKET AT THE END OF THE BOOK)

A. Approach Areas and Typical Routes.

B. Typical Approach Lines.

C. Barred Zones Proclaimed by the Germans.

D. Patrol Areas, British Isles.

E. Patrol and Minesweeping Zones in the Mediterranean.

F. Showing French and British Ports within Range of the

German Bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge.

The Crisis of the Naval War

CHAPTER I

ADMIRALTY ORGANIZATION; THE CHANGES IN 1917

It is perhaps as well that the nation generally remained
to a great extent unconscious of the extreme gravity of
the situation which developed during the Great War, when
the Germans were sinking an increasing volume of mer-
chant tonnage week by week. The people of this country
as a whole rose superior to many disheartening events and
never lost their sure belief in final victory, but full know-
ledge of the supreme crisis in our history might have
tended to undermine in some quarters that confidence in
victory which it was essential should be maintained, and,
in any event, the facts could not be disclosed without
benefiting the enemy. But the position at times was
undoubtedly extremely serious.

At the opening of the war we possessed approxi-
mately half the merchant tonnage of the world, but
experience during the early part of the struggle revealed
that we had not a single ship too many for the
great and increasing oversea military liabilities which we
were steadily incurring, over and above the responsibility
of bringing to these shores the greater part of the food for
a population of forty-five million people, as well as nearly
all the raw materials which were essential for the manufac-
ture of munitions. The whole of our war efforts, ashore

2 The Crisis of the Naval War

as well as afloat, depended first and last on an adequate
volume of merchant shipping.

It is small wonder, therefore, that those who watched
from day to day the increasing toll which the enemy took
of the country's sea-carrying power, were sometimes filled
with deep concern for the future. Particularly was this
the case during the early months of unrestricted submarine
warfare in 1917. For if the menace had not been
mastered to a considerable extent, and that speedily, not
only would the victory of the Allies have been imperilled,
but this country would have been brought face to face with
conditions approaching starvation. In pre-war days the
possibility of these islands being blockaded was frequently
discussed ; but during the dark days of the unrestricted
submarine campaign there was ample excuse for those
with imagination to picture the implication of events
which were happening from week to week. The
memories of those days are already becoming somewhat
dim, and as a matter of history and a guide to the future,
it is perhaps well that some account should be given, how-
ever inadequate, of the dangers which confronted the
country and of the means which were adopted to avert the
worst consequences of the enemy's campaign without
ceasing to exert the increasing pressure of our sea power
upon his fighting efficiency, and without diminishing our
military efforts overseas.

The latter points were of great importance. It was
always necessary to keep the Grand Fleet at a strength
that would ensure its instant readiness to move in waters
which might be infested by submarines in large numbers
should the Germans decide upon some operation by the
High Sea Fleet. The possibility of action between the
fleets necessitated the maintenance of very strong
destroyer forces with the Grand Fleet.

Admiralty Changes in 1917 3

Similarly our oversea military expeditions, with the
consequent large number of merchant ships in use as
transports or supply ships, required a considerable force
of destroyers and other small craft. These commitments
greatly reduced the means at our disposal for dealing with
the hostile submarines that were attempting to prevent
the import of food and raw materials into the country.

Readers of books, and particularly books dealing with
war, show a natural avidity for what may be described as
the human side of a contest as well as for the dramatic
events. But, whether it be prosecuted by sea or by land,
war is largely a matter of efficient and adequate organiza-
tion. It is a common saying that we muddle through
our wars, but we could not afford to muddle in face of
the threat which the enemy's unrestricted submarine
campaign represented. It is impossible, therefore, to
approach the history of the successful efforts made by sea
to overcome this menace without describing in some detail
the work of organization which was carried out at the
Admiralty in order to enable the Fleet to fulfil its new
mission. In effect those responsible for the naval policy
of the country conducted two wars simultaneously, the
one on the surface, and the other under the surface. The
strategy, tactics and weapons which were appropriate to
the former, were to a large extent useless in the contest
against mines and submarines which the enemy employed
with the utmost persistency and no little ingenuity. Even
in the Russo-Japanese war, where the mine was little used,
it exerted a marked influence on the course of the war ;
the Germans based their hopes of victory in the early days
of the struggle entirely on a war of attrition, waged against
men-of-war, as well as merchant ships. The submarine,
which was thrown into the struggle in increasing numbers,
represented an entirely new development, for the sub-

4 The Crisis of the Naval War

marine is a vessel which can travel unseen beneath the
water and, while still unseen, except for a possible momen-
tary glimpse of a few inches of periscope, can launch a
torpedo at long or short range and with deadly accuracy.
In these circumstances it became imperative to organize
the Admiralty administration to meet new needs, and to
press into the service of the central administration a large
number of officers charged with the sole duty of studying
the new forms of warfare which the enemy had adopted
and of evolving with scientific assistance novel methods of
defeating his tactics.

Whilst the enemy's campaign against merchant
shipping always gave rise to anxiety, there were certain
periods of greatly increased activity. During the summer
months of 1916 the losses from submarine attack and
from submarine-laid mines were comparatively slight, and,
in fact, less than during the latter half of 1915, but in the
autumn of 1916 they assumed very serious proportions.
This will be seen by reference to the following table, which
gives the monthly losses in British, neutral and Allied
mercantile gross tonnage from submarine and mine attack
alone for the months of May to November inclusive :

May ... 122,793 September... 229,687

June ... 111,719 October ... 352,902

July ... 110,757 November... 327,245

August ... 160,077

Another disturbing feature was the knowledge that we
were not sinking enemy submarines at any appreciable
rate, whilst we knew that the Germans had under con-
struction a very large number of these vessels, and that
they were thus rapidly adding to their fleet. It was a
matter also of common knowledge that our output of

Admiralty Changes in 1917 5

new merchant ships was exceedingly small, and I, in
common with others, had urged a policy of greatly
increased mercantile ship construction. These facts,
combined with the knowledge that our reserves of food
and essential raw materials for war purposes were very
low, led me, when commanding the Grand Fleet, to the
inevitable conclusion that it was essential to concentrate
all our naval efforts so far as possible on the submarine
menace, and to adopt the most energetic measures for the
protection of our sea communications and the destruction
of the enemy's submarines. Although it was not easy
to see the exact means by which this could be achieved, it
appeared necessary as a first step to form an organization
having as its sole duty the study of the question, com-
prising such officers as would be most likely to deal
effectively with the problem, supported by the necessary
authority to push forward their ideas. Another necessity
was the rapid production of such material as was found
to be required for anti-submarine measures.

With these ideas in my mind I had written letters
to the Admiralty on the subject, and was summoned to
a conference in London on November 1 by Mr. Balfour,
the First Lord. The whole question of the submarine war-
fare was fully discussed with Mr. Balfour and Sir Henry
Jackson (then First Sea Lord) during the two days spent in
London. I had at that time formed and expressed the view
that there was very little probability of the High Sea Fleet
putting to sea again to risk a Fleet action until the new
submarine campaign had been given a thorough trial.
With the High Sea Fleet " in being " we could not afford
to deplete the Grand Fleet of destroyers, which could
under other conditions be employed in anti-submarine
work, and therefore the probable German strategy in these
circumstances was to keep the Fleet " in being." At

6 The Crisis of the Naval War

the same time the situation appeared so serious that I
went so far as to , suggest that one Grand Fleet flotilla
of destroyers might under certain conditions be withdrawn
for anti-submarine duties in southern waters.

The misgivings which I entertained were, of course,
shared by all those in authority who were acquainted with
the facts of the case, including the Board of Admiralty.

On November 24 Mr. Balfour telegraphed offering
me the post of First Sea Lord, and in the event of
acceptance requesting me to meet him in Edinburgh to
discuss matters. After consultation with Sir Charles
Madden, my Chief of Staff, I replied that I was prepared
to do what was considered best for the Service.

During the conference with Mr. Balfour in Edin-
burgh on November 27, 1916, and after I had agreed
to go to the Admiralty, he informed me of the consequent
changes which he proposed to make in flag officers' appoint-
ments in the Grand Fleet. Amongst the changes he
included Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, who would be relieved
of his post as second in command of the Grand Fleet
and commander of the 1st Battle Squadron, as he had
practically completed his term of two years in command.
I thereupon asked that he might be offered the post of
Second Sea Lord, and that Commodore Lionel Halsey,
who had been serving as Captain of the Fleet, might
be offered that of Fourth Sea Lord. In my view it
was very desirable that an officer with the great
experience in command possessed by Sir Cecil Bumey
should occupy the position of Second Sea Lord under
the conditions which existed, and that one who had
served afloat during the war in both an executive and
administrative capacity should become Fourth Sea Lord.
I also informed Mr. Balfour of my desire to form an
Anti-Submarine Division of the War Staff at the

Admiralty Changes in 1917 7

Admiralty, and asked that Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff,
C.B., should be offered the post of Director of the
Division, with Captain F. C. Dreyer, C.B., my Flag
Captain in the Iron Duke, as his assistant.

All these appointments were made.

Although I arrived in London on November 29, I
did not actually take office as First Sea Lord until
December 5, owing to an attack of influenza. On that
day I relieved Sir Henry Jackson, but only held office
under Mr. Balfour for two or three days, as the change
of Government took place just at this period, and Sir
Edward Carson came to the Admiralty in place of Mr.
Balfour.

This book is intended to record facts, and not to
touch upon personal matters, but I cannot forbear to
mention the extreme cordiality of Sir Edward Carson's
relations with the Board in general and myself in
particular. His devotion to the naval service was obvious
to all, and in him the Navy possessed indeed a true and
a powerful friend.

The earliest conversations between the First Lord
and myself had relation to the submarine menace, and
Sir Edward Carson threw himself wholeheartedly into
the work. This was before the days of the unrestricted
submarine campaign, and although ships were frequently
torpedoed, very large numbers were still being sunk by
gun-fire. The torpedo did not come into general use
until March, 1917.

One of the most pressing needs of this period of attack
by gun-fire was consequently a great increase in the
number of guns for use in defensively armed merchant
vessels, and here Sir Edward Carson's assistance was of
great value. He fully realized the urgent necessities of the
case, and was constant in his efforts to procure the neces-

8 The Crisis of the Naval War

sary guns. The work carried out in this connection is
given in detail in Chapter III (p. 68).

During Sir Edward's tenure of office the reorganiza-
tion of the Naval Staff was taken in hand. Changes from
which great benefit resulted were effected in the Staff
organization. Sir Edward very quickly saw the necessity
for a considerable strengthening of the Staff. In addition
to the newly formed and rapidly expanding Anti-Sub-
marine Division of the Naval Staff, he realized that the
Operations Division also needed increased strength, and
that it was essential to relieve the First Sea Lord of the
mass of administrative work falling upon his shoulders,
which had unfortunately been greatly magnified by the
circumstances already described.

It is as well at this point to describe the conditions
in regard to Staff organization that existed at the
Admiralty at the end of 1916, and to show how those
conditions had been arrived at.

Prior to 1909 there was no real Staff, although the
organization at the Admiralty included an Intelligence
Department and a Mobilization Division. The Director
of Naval Intelligence at that time acted in an advisory
capacity as Chief of the Staff. Indeed prior to 1904
there were but few naval officers at the Admiralty
at all beyond those in the technical departments of the
Director of Naval Ordnance and Torpedoes and the
members of the Board itself. The Sea Lords were even
without Naval Assistants and depended entirely on the
help of a secretary provided by the civilian staff at the
Admiralty.

In 1910 a new branch was formed termed the
Mobilization and Movements Department under a
Director. This branch was a first step towards an
Operations Division.

Admiralty Changes in 1917 9

Under Mr. Churchill's regime at the Admiralty in
1911 a more regular Staff organization was introduced
and a Chief of the War Staff, acting under the First Sea
Lord, was appointed. The organization introduced during
his term of office is thus shown graphically :

CHIEF OF STAFF

Director of Director of Director of

Operations Division. Intelligence Division. Mobilization Division .

In addition to other duties, the Mobilization Division was
charged with the responsibility for the supply of fuel to
the Fleet, from the Staff point of view.

In the organization introduced in 1911 the duties of
the Chief of the Staff were denned as being of an
advisory nature. He possessed no executive powers.
Consequently all orders affecting the movements of ships
required the approval of the First Sea Lord before issue,
and the consequence of this over-centralization was that
additional work was thrown on the First Sea Lord. The
resultant inconvenience was not of much account during
peace, but became of importance in war, and as the war
progressed the Chief of the Staff gradually exercised
executive functions, orders which were not of the first
importance being issued by the Staff in accordance with
the policy approved generally by the First Sea Lord.
The fault in the organization appeared to me to lie
in non-recognition of the fact that the First Sea Lord
was in reality the Chief of the Naval Staff, since he was
charged with the responsibility for the preparation and
readiness of the Fleet for war and for all movements.
Another anomaly existing at the Admiralty, which was
not altered in the 1911 reorganization of the War Staff,
was that the orders to the Fleet were not drafted and

io The Crisis of the Naval War

issued by the War Staff, but by the Military Branch of
the Secretary's Department.

The system was only workable because the very able
civil servants of the Military Branch were possessed of
wide Admiralty experience and worked in the closest co-
operation with the naval officers. Their work was of the
most strenuous nature and was carried out with the
greatest devotion, but the system was manifestly wrong
in principle.

On the outbreak of war the necessity for placing the
War Registry (a part of the Military Branch) directly
under the Chief of the Staff became apparent, and this
was done.

In December, 1916, when I took up the post of First
Sea Lord, the Admiralty War Staff was still being worked
on the general lines of the organization introduced by
Mr. Churchill in 1911, but it had, of course, expanded
to a very considerable extent to meet war conditions, and
a most important Trade Division, which dealt with all
questions connected with the Mercantile Marine, had
been formed at the outbreak of war under the charge of
Captain Richard Webb. This Division, under that very
able officer, had carried out work of the greatest national
importance with marked success.

The successive changes in the Staff organization
carried out during the year 1917 were as follows :

In December, 1916, an Anti-Submarine Division of
the Staff was formed. This Division did not, for some
reason, appear in the Navy List as part of the Staff
organization until some months had elapsed, although it
started work in December, 1916. The officers who
composed the Division were shown as borne on the books
of H.M.S. President.

The Division relieved the Operations Division of the

Admiralty Changes in 1917 n

control of all vessels, including aircraft, which were en-
gaged in anti-submarine offensive and defensive work, and
took over also the control of mine-sweeping operations.
The Division was also charged with the duty of examining
and perfecting all experimental devices for combating
the submarine menace and of producing fresh schemes
for the destruction of enemy submarines. This organiza-
tion is open to the criticism that matters concerning
operations and material came under the same head, but
they were so closely allied at this stage that it was deemed
advisable to accept this departure from correct Staff
organization. The personnel of the Division came with
me from the Grand Fleet, and at the outset consisted of
one flag officer — Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff, C.B. — two
captains, four commanders, three lieutenant-commanders,
and two engineer officers, in addition to the necessary
clerical staff. The small staff of four officers already at
the Admiralty engaged in anti-submarine experimental
work, which had done much to develop this side of war-
fare, was absorbed. The new Division worked directly
under me, but in close touch with the then Chief of the
War Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver.

In the early spring of 1917 the illogical nature of the
War Staff organization became apparent, in that it had
no executive functions, and as the result of discussions
between Sir Edward Carson and myself the decision was
taken that the duties of the Naval Staff (the term decided
upon in place of that of War Staff) should be made
executive, and that the First Sea Lord should assume
his correct title as Chief of the Naval Staff, as he had,
in fact, already assumed the position.

At the same time the operational work of the Staff
was grouped under two heads, the first mainly concerned
with operations against the enemy's surface vessels, and

12 The Crisis of the Naval-War

the second with the protection of trade and operations
against the enemy's under- water warfare, whether the
means he employed were submarines or mines.

The officer, Vice- Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, K.C.B.,
charged With the supervision of the first-named work was
styled Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff (D.C.N.S.), and
the officer connected with the second, Rear- Admiral
A. L. Duff, C.B., was given the title of Assistant Chief
of the Naval Staff (A.C.N.S.).

The duties of Director of the Anti-Submarine Division
of the Staff, hitherto carried out by Admiral Duff, were
at this time taken over by Captain W. W. Fisher, C.B.,
who was brought down from the Grand Fleet for the
purpose. Captain Dreyer, who had been Admiral Duff's
original assistant, had in the meantime been appointed
Director of Naval Ordnance, and had been succeeded by
Captain H. Walwyn, D.S.O.

The Mine-Sweeping Division of the Staff was also
formed, and the importance of the question of signal
communications was recognized by forming a Signal
Section of the Staff.

The adoption of the title of Chief of the Naval Staff
by the First Sea Lord necessarily made the functions of
the Staff executive instead of advisory.

The Staff organization at this period is shown
graphically below.

c. n. s.

D. C. N. S. , A. C. N. S.

(iliza- Signal Intell

Opera- Mobiliza- Signal Intelli- Trade Convoys Anti-Sub- Mine-

tions tion Section, gence Division. Section, marine Sweeping

Division. Division. Division. Division. Division.

Home Foreign

Admiralty Changes in 1917 13

Stress was laid in a Staff memorandum issued by me
on the fact that the various divisions were on no account
to work in watertight compartments, but were to be in
the closest touch with one another. The dotted line
connecting the D.C.N.S. and the A.C.N.S. in the graph
was defined as indicating that there should be the fullest
co-operation between the different portions of the Staff.

In the summer of 1917 the growth of the convoy
system necessitated further expansion of the Naval Staff,
and a Mercantile Movements Division was added. The
duties of this division were to organize and regulate the
movements of convoys of merchant ships. A staff of
officers had been by this time sent abroad to the ports
from which convoys were directed to sail, and the Mer-
cantile Movements Division, acting in close touch with
the Ministry of Shipping, arranged the assembly and
movements of the convoys and their protection.

The organization of the portion of the Staff under the
A.C.N.S. at this stage is shown below.

a. c. n. s.

Director of Director of Director of Director of

Mercantile Trade Anti-Sub- Mine-Sweeping

Movements Division. marine Division.

Division. (Captain R.N.) Division. (Captain R.N.)

(Captain R.N.) | (Captain R.N.) |

Staff. I Staff.

Convoy Movements

Section. Section.

Staff.

The portion of the organization under the A.C.N.S.
comprised the following numbers in December, 1917 :

Mercantile Movements Division, 36 Officers, with a
clerical staff.

Trade Division, 43 Officers, with a clerical staff of 10
civilians.

14 The Crisis of the Naval War

Anti-Submarine Division, 26 Officers, with a clerical
staff.

Mine-Sweeping Division, 8 Officers, with a clerical
staff.

Of this number practically the whole of the Mercantile
Movements and Anti-Submarine Divisions were added
during the year 1917, whilst large additions were also
made to the Trade Division, owing to the great increase
of work.

During the first half of the year 1917 the Operations
Division of the Naval Staff received a much needed
increase of strength by the appointment of additional
officers, charged, under the Director of the Operations
Division, with the detailed preparation of plans for opera-
tions. Further additions to this branch of the Staff were
made in the latter half of the year.

Matters were in this position with the reorganization
of the Naval Staff in hand and working towards a definite
conclusion when, to the intense regret of those who had
been privileged to work with him, Sir Edward Carson
left the Admiralty to become a member of the War
Cabinet.

Before leaving the subject of work at the Admiralty
during Sir Edward Carson's administration, mention
should be made of the progress made in the difficult task
of providing officers for the rapidly expanding Fleet. The
large programme of small craft started in the early part
of 1917 involved the eventual provision of a great number
of additional officers. Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, the
Second Sea Lord, took this matter in hand with con-
spicuous success, and the measures which he introduced
tided us over a period of much difficulty and made pro-
vision for many months ahead. Sir Cecil Burney, by
reason of his intimate knowledge of the personnel — the

Admiralty Changes in 1917 15

result of years of command afloat — .was able to settle also
many problems relating to personnel which had been the
cause of dissatisfaction in the past.

Sir Edward Carson, on leaving the Admiralty, was
succeeded by Sir Eric Geddes as First Lord. Sir Eric
had been brought into the Admiralty in May, 1917, in
circumstances which I will describe later.* One of his
first steps as First Lord which affected Admiralty
organization was the appointment of a Deputy First Sea
Lord. This appointment was frankly made more as a
matter of expediency than because any real need had
been shown for the creation of such an office. It is un-
necessary here to enter into the circumstances which led
to the appointment to which I saw objections, owing to
the difficulty of fitting into the organization an officer
bearing the title of Deputy First Sea Lord.

Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss — who had come
to England for the purpose of conferring with the
Admiralty before taking up the post of British Com-
mander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean — was selected by
the First Lord as Deputy First Sea Lord.

Shortly after assuming office as First Lord, Sir Eric
Geddes expressed a wish for a further consideration of the
question of Admiralty organization. To this end he
appointed a joint War Office and Admiralty Committee
to compare the two organizations.

Having received the report of the Committee, the First
Lord and I both formulated ideas for further reorganiza-
tion. My proposals, so far as they concerned the Naval
Staff, were conceived on the general lines of an extension
of the organization already adopted since my arrival at the
Admiralty, but I also stated that the time had arrived
when the whole Admiralty organization should be divided

* Vide Chapter X.

16 The Crisis of the Naval War

more distinctly into two sides, viz., the Operational side
and the Materiel or Administrative side, and indicated
that the arrangement existing in the time of the old Navy
Board might be largely followed, in order that questions
of Operations and Materiel should be quite clearly
separated. This, indeed, was the principle of the Staff
organization which I had adopted in the Grand Fleet,
and I was anxious to extend it to the Admiralty.

This principle was accepted — although the term
"Navy Board" was not reinstituted — the Admiralty
Board being divided into two Committees, one for Opera-
tions and one for Materiel, the whole Board meeting at
least once a week, as required, to discuss important ques-
tions affecting both sides. Whilst it was necessary that
the Maintenance Committee should be kept acquainted
with the requirements in the shape of material needed for
operations in which the Fleet was engaged — and to the
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff was assigned this particular
liaison duty — I was not in favour of discussing questions
affecting ordinary operations with the whole Board, since,
in addition to the delay thereby involved, members of the
Maintenance Committee could not keep in sufficiently
intimate touch with such matters, and opinions might
be formed and conclusions expressed on an incom-
plete knowledge of facts. Questions of broad policy
or of proposed major operations were, of course, in
a different category, and the above objections did not
apply.

The further alterations in Naval Staff organization
were not adopted without considerable discussion and
some difference of opinion as to detail, particularly on the
subject of the organization of the Operations Division of
the Naval Staff, which I considered should embrace the
Plans Division as a sub-section in order to avoid over-

Admiralty Changes in 1917 17

lapping and delay. In my view it was undesirable for a
body of officers not working under the authority of those
in close touch with the daily operations of the Fleet to
put forward plans for operations which necessarily involved
the use of the same vessels and material, as such a pro-
cedure must inevitably lead to impracticable suggestions
and consequent waste of time; the system which I
favoured was that in use in the Army, where the Opera-
tions Section of the Staff dealt also with the working
out of plans.

The Admiralty Staff organization necessarily differed
somewhat from that at the War Office, because during the
war the Admiralty in a sense combined, so far as Naval
operations were concerned, the functions both of the War
Office and of General Headquarters in France. This was
due primarily to the fact that intelligence was necessarily
centred at the Admiralty, and, secondly, because the
Admiralty acted in a sense as Commander-in-Chief of all
the forces working in the vicinity of the British Isles. It
was not possible for the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand
Fleet to assume this function, since he could not be pro-
vided with the necessary knowledge without great delay
being caused, and, further, when he was at sea the other
commands would be without a head. The Admiralty
therefore necessarily assumed the duty, whilst supplying
each command with all the information required for
operations. The general lines of the Staff organizations
at the War Office and at General Headquarters in France
are here given for the sake of comparison with the Naval
Staff organization.

1.— The British War Office.

The approximate organization is shown as concisely as
possible in the following diagram :

The Crisis of the Naval War

CHIEF OF IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF

Director of Staff Duties.
I

Director of Military
Operations.

Director of Military
Intelligence.

Staff War Or-

duties ganiza-
Organiza- tion of
tion and forces,
training.

General Signals
questions and com-
of train- munica-
ing. tions.

Operations oh all fronts

Intelli-
gence.

Espion-
age.

The

Press.

The other important departments of the War
Office on the administration side are those of the Ad-
jutant-General and the Quartermaster-General, the
former dealing with all questions relating to the personnel
of the Army under the various headings of organization,
mobilization, pay and discipline, and the latter with all
questions of supply and transport.

A Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff was
attached to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. His
main duty was to act as a liaison between the General Staff
and the administrative departments of the War Office.

The whole organization of the British War Office
is, of course, under the direction and control of the
Secretary of State for War.

2. — The Staff Organization at General Headquarters in
France.

FIELD MARSHAL
Commander-in-Chief.

Chief of the

Adjutant-General

General

Staff.

(Personnel,
Discipline, etc.).

G. S. (a)

G. S. (6)

(Operations)

(Staff Duties)

Plans and Exe-

War Organiza-

cution In-

tions and

telligence.

Establishments
Liaison between
G. S. (a) and
Administrative
Services.

Quartermaster-
General
(Transport and
Supply, etc.).

Admiralty Changes in 1917 19

ATTACHED TO GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.
(But not Staff Officers.)

Artillery Adviser Engineer-m-Chief. Inspector of

(Advises Chief of Advises as in case of Training.

General Staff on Artillery.

Artillery matters
and operations).

Advises Administrative
Departments as
necessary.

N.B. — The Inspector of Training works in consultation with the Chief of
the General Staff.

It will be seen that whilst at the War Office the liaison
between the General Staff and the administrative side was
maintained by a Deputy Chief of the General Staff, in
the organization in the field the same function was per-
formed by the Staff Officer known as G.S. (0).

It will also be seen that neither at General Head-
quarters nor in the case of an Army command does the
Chief of the General Staff exercise control over the
administrative side.

After some discussion the Admiralty organizations
shown in the Tables A and B on page 20 were adopted,
and I guarded as far as possible against the objection to
keeping the Plans Division separate from the Operations
Division by the issue of detailed orders as to the conduct
of the business of the Staff, in which directions were given
that the Director of the Plans Division should be in close
touch with the Director of the Operations Division before
submitting any proposals to the Deputy Chief of Naval
Staff or myself.

During the remainder of my service at the Admiralty
the organization remained as shown in Tables A and B
on p. 20. It was not entirely satisfactory, for reasons
already mentioned and because I did not obtain all
the relief from administrative work which was so desir-
able.

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Admiralty Changes in 1917 21

Early in 1918, after my departure from the Admiralty,
the following announcement appeared in the Press :

The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announce-
ment : —

The Letters Patent for the new Board of Admiralty having
now been issued, it may be desirable to summarize the changes
in the personnel of the Board and to indicate briefly the altera-
tions in organization that have been decided upon.

Acting Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver now brings to a
close his long period of valuable service on the Naval Staff and
will take up a sea-going command, being succeeded as D.C.N.S-
by Rear-Admiral Sydney Fremantle. Rear-Admiral George
P. W. Hope has been selected for the appointment of Deputy
First Sea Lord, formerly held by Admiral Wemyss, but with
changed functions. Commodore Paine, Fifth Sea Lord and
Chief of Naval Air Service, leaves the Board of Admiralty in
consequence of the recent creation of the Air Council, of which
he is now a member, and formal effect is now given to the
appointment of Mr. A. F. Pease as Second Civil Lord, which
was announced on Thursday last.

In view of the formal recognition now accorded, as ex-
plained by the First Lord in his statement in the House of
Commons on the 1st November, to the principle of the division
of the work of the Board under the two heads of Operations
and Maintenance, the Members of the new Board (other than
the First Lord) may be grouped as follows : —

Operations. Maintenance.

First Sea Lord Second Sea Lord.

and (Vice-Admiral Sir H. L. Heath.)

Chief of Naval Staff.
(Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss.)

Deputy Chief of Naval Staff. Third Sea Lord.

(Rear-Admiral S. R. Fremantle.) (Rear- Admiral L. Halsey.)

Assistant Chief of Naval Staff. Fourth Sea Lord.

(Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff.) (Rear-Admiral H. H. D.

Tothill.)

22 The Crisis of the Naval War

Deputy First Sea Lord. Civil Lord.

(Rear-Admiral G. P. W. Hope.) (Right Hon. E. G. Pretyman,

M.P.)

Controller.
(Sir A. G. Anderson.)

Second Civil Lord.
(Mr. A. F. Pease.)

Financial Secretary.
(Right Hon. T. J. Macnamara, M.P.)

Permanent Secretary.
(Sir O. Murray.)

The principle of isolating the work of planning and direct-
ing naval war operations from all other work, in order that
it may receive the entire attention of the Officers selected for
its performance, is now being carried a stage further and
applied systematically to the organization of the Operations
side of the Board and that of the Naval Staff.

In future the general distribution of duties between the
Members of the Board belonging to the Naval Staff will be
as follows : —

First Sea Lord and Chief Naval policy and general direc-
of Naval Staff tion of operations.

Deputy Chief of Naval War operations in Home
Staff Waters.

Assistant Chief of Naval Trade Protection and anti-
Staff submarine operations.

Deputy First Sea Lord . . General policy questions and

operations outside Home
Waters.

The detailed arrangements have been carefully worked out
so as to relieve the first three of these officers of the necessity
of dealing with any questions not directly connected with the
main operations of the war, and the great mass of important
paper work and administrative detail which is inseparably and
necessarily connected with Staff work, but which has hitherto

Admiralty Changes in 1917

tended to compete for attention with Operations work generally
will under the new organization be diverted to the Deputy
First Sea Lord.

The grouping of the Directors of the Naval Staff Divisions
will be governed by the same principle.

The only two Directors that will work immediately under
the First Sea Lord will be the Director of Intelligence Division
(Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall) and the Director of Training
and Staff Duties (Rear-Admiral J. C. Ley), whose functions
obviously affect all the other Staff Divisions alike.

Under the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff will be grouped
three Directors whose duties will relate entirely to the planning
and direction of operations in the main sphere of naval
activity, viz. : —

Director of Operations Division Captain A. D. P. Pound,

(Home)
Director of Plans Division . . Captain C. T. M. Fuller,

C.M.G., D.S.O.
Director of Air Division . . Wing Captain F. R. Scarlett,

D.S.O.

together with the Director of Signals Division, Acting-Captain
R. L. Nicholson, D.S.O., whose duties relate to the system of
Fleet communications.

Under the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff will be grouped
four Directors, whose duties relate to Trade Protection and
Anti-Submarine Operations, viz : —

Director of Anti-Submarine
Division

Director of Mine-sweeping
Division

Director of Mercantile Move-
ments Division

Director of Trade Division . .

Captain W. W. Fisher, C.B.
Captain L. G. Preston, C.B.
Captain F. A. Whitehead.
Captain A. G. Hotham.

Under the Deputy First Sea Lord there will be one Director
of Operations Division (Foreign) — Captain C. P. R. Coode.
D.S.O.

24 The Crisis of the Naval War

The chief change on the Maintenance side of the Board
relates to the distribution of duties amongst the Civil Members.
The continuance of the war has caused a steady increase in
the number of cases in which necessary developments of
Admiralty policy due to the war, or experience resulting from
war conditions give rise to administrative problems of great
importance and complexity, of which a solution will have to be
forthcoming either immediately upon or very soon after the
conclusion of the war. The difficulty of concentrating attention
on these problems of the future in the midst of current adminis-
trative work of great urgency may easily be appreciated, and
the Civil Lord has consented to take charge of this important
matter, with suitable naval and other assistance. He will,
therefore, be relieved by the Second Civil Lord of the adminis-
tration of the programme of Naval Works, including the
questions of priority of labour and material requirements
arising therefrom and the superintendence of the Director of
Works Department.

It has further been decided that the exceptional labour
and other difficulties now attending upon the execution of the
very large programme of urgent naval works in progress have
so greatly transformed the functions of the Director of Works
Department of the Admiralty that it is desirable, whilst these
abnormal conditions last, to place that Department under the
charge of an expert in the rapid execution of large engineering
works.

The Army Council have consented, at the request of the
First Lord of the Admiralty, to lend for this purpose the ser-
vices of Colonel Alexander Gibb, K.B.E., C.B., R.E., Chief
Engineer, Port Construction, British Armies in France.
Colonel Gibb (of the Firm of Easton, Gibb, Son and Com-
pany, which built Rosyth Naval Base) will have the title of
Civil Engineer-in-Chief, and will be assisted by the Director
of Works, who retains his status as such, and the existing Staff
of the Department, which will be strengthened as necessary.

Another important change has reference to the organization
of the Admiralty Board of Invention and Research, and has
the object at once of securing greater concentration of effort

Admiralty Changes in 1917 25

in connection with scientific research and experiment, and
ensuring that the distinguished scientists who are giving their
assistance to the Admiralty are more constantly in and amongst
the problems upon which they are advising.

Mr. Charles H. Merz, M.Inst.C.E., the well-known Electrical
Consulting Engineer, who has been associated with the Board
of Invention and Research (B.I.R.) since its inception, has
consented to serve as Director of Experiments and Research
(unpaid) at the Admiralty to direct and supervise all the
executive arrangements in connection with the organization of
scientific Research and Experiments. Mr. Merz will also be a
member of the Central Committee of the B.I.R. under the
presidency of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher. The functions
of the Central Committee will, as hitherto, be to initiate, in-
vestigate, develop and advise generally upon proposals in
respect to the application of Science and Engineering to Naval
Warfare, but the distinguished scientific experts at present
giving their services will in future work more much closely
with the Technical Departments of the Admiralty immediately
concerned with the production and use of apparatus required
for specific purposes.

The general arrangements in regard to the organization of
scientific research and experiment will in future come under
the direct supervision of the First Lord.

Possibly by reason of the manner in which the
announcement was made, the Press appeared to assume
that the whole of this Admiralty organization was new.
Such was not the case. Apart from the changes in the
personnel of the Board itself and a slight rearrangement
of their duties and those due to the establishment of an
Air Ministry (which had been arranged by the Cabinet
before December, 1917), there were but slight alterations
in the organization shown in Table A, as will be seen by
comparing it with Table C on p. 27, which indicates
graphically the organization given in the Admiralty
communique.

26 The Crisis of the Naval War

It will be seen that the alterations in Naval Staff
organization were as follows :

(a) The new Deputy First Sea Lord — Rear-
Admiral Hope — who since the spring of 1917 had
been Director of the Operations Division, was given
the responsibility for operations in foreign waters,
with a Director of Operations (foreign) under him,
and was also definitely charged with the administra-
tive detail involving technical matters. The special
gifts, experience and aptitude of this particular officer
for such work enabled him, no doubt, to relieve the
pressure on the First Sea Lord for administrative
detail very materially.

(6) The Operations Division was separated into
two parts (home and foreign), with a Director for
each, instead of there being a Deputy Director for
home and an Assistant Director for foreign work,
both working under the Director. This was a
change in name only, as the same officer continued
the foreign work under the new arrangement.

(c) The Director of the Intelligence Division and
the Director of Training and Staff Duties were shown
as working immediately under the First Sea Lord
and Chief of the Naval Staff.

(d) A Director of the Air Division was intro-
duced as a result of the Naval Air Service having
been separated from the Admiralty and placed under
the Air Ministry. A larger Admiralty Staff organiza-
tion for aerial matters thus became necessary, since
the Staff could no longer refer to the Naval Air
Service.

There were no other changes in the Staff organization.
As regards the general Admiralty organization, there

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Admiralty Changes in 1917

was no change except that caused
by the disappearance of the separ-
ate Naval Air Service, the addition
of a Second Civil Lord, and some
reorganization of the Board of
Invention and Research which had
been under discussion for some
months previously.

It is probable that in 1918 the
Chief of the Naval Staff had more
time at his disposal than was the
case in 1917, owing to the changes
in organization initiated in the
later year having reached some
finality and to the fact that the
numerous anti-submarine measures U
put in hand in 1917 had become jj
effective in 1918. •§

The future Admiralty Naval ^
Staff organization, which was in
my mind at the end of 1917, was a
development of that shown in
Table A, p. 20, subject to the
following remarks :

In the organization then
adopted the personality and experi-
ence during the war of many of the
officers in high positions were of
necessity considered, and the
organization to that extent adapted
to circumstances. This resulted in
somewhat overloading the staff at
the head, and the principle on
which the Board of Admiralty

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28 The Crisis of the Naval War

works, i.e., that its members are colleagues one of another,
and seniority in rank does not, theoretically, give greater
weight in council, was not altogether followed. Thus the
Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, the Assistant Chief of
the Naval Staff, and the Deputy First Sea Lord were,
by the nature of their duties, subordinate to the Chief of
the Naval Staff and yet were members of the Board. The
well-known loyalty of naval officers to one another tended
to minimize any difficulties that might have arisen from
this anomaly, but the arrangement might conceivably give
rise to difficulty, and is best avoided if the Board system
is to remain.

The situation would be clearer if two of the three
officers concerned were removed altogether from the
Board, viz., the Deputy First Sea Lord and the Assistant
Chief of the Naval Staff, leaving only the Deputy Chief
of the Naval Staff as a member of the Board to act in
the absence of the Chief of the Naval Staff and to relieve
him of the administrative and technical work not
immediately connected with operations.

The work of the two officers thus removed should,
under these conditions, be undertaken by officers who
should preferably be Flag Officers, with experience in
command at sea, having the titles of Directors of Opera-
tions, whose emoluments should be commensurate with
their position and responsibilities.

I did not consider it advisable to carry out this altera-
tion during the war, and it was also difficult under the
hour to hour stress of war to rearrange all the duties of
the Naval Staff in the manner most convenient to the
conduct of Staff business, although its desirability was
recognized during 1917.

It may be as well to close this chapter by a few
remarks on Staff work generally in the Navy. In the first

Admiralty Changes in 1917 29

place it is necessary in the Navy to give much weight to
the opinions of specialist officers, and for this reason
it is desirable that they should be included in the Staff
organization, and not "attached" to it as was the case
with our Army in pre-war days. The reason for this is
that in the Army there is, except in regard to artillery,
little " specialization." The training received by an
officer of any of the fighting branches of the Army at
the Staff College may fit him to assist in the planning and
execution of operations, provided due regard is paid to
questions of supply, transport, housing, etc.

This is not so in a navy. A ship and all that she con-
tains is the weapon, and very intimate knowledge of the
different factors that go to make a ship an efficient weapon
is necessary if the ship is to be used effectively and if
operations in which the ship takes so prominent a part
are to be successfully planned and executed, or if a sound
opinion is to be expressed on the training necessary to
produce and maintain her as an efficient weapon.

The particular points in which this specially intimate
knowledge is required are :

(a) The science of navigation and of handling
ships of all types and classes,
(o) Gunnery,
(c) Torpedoes and mines.

It is the case at present (and the conditions are not
likely to alter) that each one of these subjects is a matter
for specialist training. Every executive officer has a
general knowledge of each subject, but it is not possible
for any one officer to possess the knowledge of all three
which is gained by the specialist, and if attempts are
made to plan operations without the assistance of the
specialists grave errors may be made, and, indeed, such

30 The Crisis of the Naval War

errors were made during the late war, perhaps from this
cause.

In my view, therefore, it is desirable that specialist
officers should be included in a Naval Staff organization
and not be merely "attached" to it. It may be said
that a Staff can take the advice of specialist officers who
are attached to it for that purpose. But there is a danger
that the specialist advice may never reach the heads of
the Staff. Human nature being what it is, the safest
procedure is to place the specialist officer where his voice
must be heard, i.e. to give him a position on the Staff,
for one must legislate for the average individual and for
normal conditions of work.

The Chief of a Staff might have specialist knowledge
himself, or he might assure himself that due weight had
been given to the opinions of specialists attached to a
Staff ; but, on the other hand, it is possible that he might
not have that knowledge and that he might ignore the
opinions of the specialists. The procedure suggested is
at least as necessary when considering the question of
training as it is in the case of operations.

In passing from this point I may say that I have heard
the opinion expressed by military Staff officers that the
war has shown that artillery is so all important that it
would be desirable to place the Major-General of the Royal
Artillery, now attached to General Headquarters, on the
Staff for operational matters.

Finally, great care should be exercised to prevent the
Staff becoming larger than is necessary, and there is some
danger that the ignorant may gauge the value of the Staff
by its size.

Von Schellendorff says on this subject :

" The principle strictly followed throughout the German
Service of reducing all Staffs to the smallest possible dimensions

Admiralty Changes in 1917 31

is moreover vindicated by restricting every Staff to what is
absolutely necessary, and by not attaching to every Army,
Army Corps and Divisional Staff representatives of all the
various branches and departments according to any fixed
rule.

" There cannot be the slightest doubt that the addition of
every individual not absolutely required on a Staff is in itself
an evil. In the first place, it unnecessarily weakens the strength
of the regiment from which an officer is taken. Again it in-
creases the difficulty of providing the Staff with quarters, which
affects the troops that may happen to be quartered in the same
place ; and these are quite ready enough, as it is, occasionally
to look with a certain amount of dislike — though in most cases
it is entirely uncalled for — on the personnel of the higher Staffs.
Finally, it should be remembered — and this is the most weighty
argument against the proceeding — that idleness is at the root
of all mischief. When there are too many officers on a Staff
they cannot always find the work and occupation essential for
their mental and physical welfare, and their superfluous energies
soon make themselves felt in all sorts of objectionable ways.
Experience shows that whenever a Staff is unnecessarily
numerous the ambitious before long take to intrigue, the
litigious soon produce general friction, and the vain are never
satisfied. These failings, so common to human nature, even
if all present, are to a great extent counteracted if those con-
cerned have plenty of hard and constant work. Besides, the
numbers of a Staff being few, there is all the greater choice in
the selection of the men who are to fill posts on it. In forming
a Staff for war the qualifications required include not only
great professional knowledge and acquaintance with service
routine, but above all things character, self-denial, energy,
tact and discretion."

CHAPTER II

THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN IN THE EARLY PART OF 1917

The struggle against the depredations of the enemy sub-
marines during the year 1917 was two-fold; offensive in
the direction of anti-submarine measures (this was partly
the business of the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval
Staff and partly that of the Operations Division);
defensive in the direction of protective measures for trade,
whether carried in our own ships or in ships belonging
to our Allies or to neutrals, this being the business of
the Trade and Mercantile Movements Divisions.

Prior to the formation of the Mercantile Movements
Division the whole direction of trade was in the hands
of the Trade Division of the Staff.

The difficulty with which we were constantly faced
in the early part of 1917, when the effective means of
fighting the submarine were very largely confined to the
employment of surface vessels, was that of providing a
sufficient number of such vessels for offensive operations
without incurring too heavy risks for our trade by the
withdrawal of vessels engaged in what might be termed
defensive work. There was always great doubt whether
any particular offensive operation undertaken by small
craft would produce any result, particularly as the numbers
necessary for success were not available, whilst there was
the practical certainty that withdrawal of defensive vessels
would increase our losses; the situation was so serious
in the spring of 1917 that we could not carry out experi-

Submarine Campaign: Early Part of 1917 33

ments involving grave risk of considerably increased
losses.

On the other hand, the sinking of one enemy sub-
marine meant the possible saving of a considerable number
of merchant ships. It was difficult to draw the line be-
tween the two classes of operations.

The desire of the Anti-Submarine Division to obtain
destroyers for offensive use in hunting flotillas in the
North Sea and English Channel led to continual requests
being made to me to provide vessels for the purpose.
I was, of course, anxious to institute offensive operations,
but in the early days of 1917 we could not rely much on
depth-charge attack, owing to our small stock of these
charges, and my experience in the Grand Fleet had
convinced me that for success in the alternative of hunt-
ing submarines for a period which would exhaust their
batteries and so force them to come to the surface, a large
number off destroyers was required, unless the destroyers
were provided with some apparatus which would, by sound
or otherwise, locate the submarine. This will be realized
when the fact is recalled that a German submarine could
remain submerged at slow speed for a period which would
enable her to travel a distance of some 80 miles. As this
distance could be covered in any direction in open waters
such as the North Sea, it is obvious that only a very
numerous force of destroyers steaming at high speed
could cover the great area in which the submarine might
come to the surface. She would, naturally, select the
dark hours for emergence, as being the period of very
limited range of vision for those searching for her. In
confined waters such as those in the eastern portion of the
English Channel the problem became simpler. Requests
for destroyers constantly came from every quarter, such
as the Commanders-in-Chief at Portsmouth and Devon-

34 The Crisis of the Naval War

port, the Senior Naval Officer at Gibraltar, the Vice-
Admiral, Dover, the Rear-Admiral Commanding East
Coast, and the Admiral at Queenstown. The vessels they
wanted did not, however, exist.

Eventually, with great difficulty, a force of six
destroyers was collected from various sources in the
spring of 1917, and used in the Channel solely for hunt-
ing submarines ; this number was really quite inadequate,
and it was not long before they had to be taken for convoy
work.

Evidence of the difficulty of successfully hunting sub-
marines was often furnished by the experiences of our
own vessels of this type, sometimes when hunted by the
enemy, sometimes when hunted in error by our own
craft. Many of our submarines went through some
decidedly unpleasant experiences at the hands of our own
surface vessels and occasionally at the hands of vessels
belonging to our Allies. On several such occasions the
submarine was frequently reported as having been sunk,
whereas she had escaped.

As an example of a submarine that succeeded not
only in evading destruction, but in getting at least even
with the enemy, the case of one of our vessels of the " E "
class, on patrol in the Heligoland Bight, may be cited.
This submarine ran into a heavy anti-submarine net, and
was dragged, nose first, to the bottom. After half an
hour's effort, during which bombs were exploding in her
vicinity, the submarine was brought to the surface by
her own crew by the discharge of a great deal of water
from her forward ballast tanks. It was found, however,
that the net was still foul of her, and that a Zeppelin
was overhead, evidently attracted by the disturbance in
the water due to the discharge of air and water from the
submarine. She went to the bottom again, and after

Submarine Campaign: Early Part of 1917 35

half an hour succeeded in getting clear of the net. Mean-
while the Zeppelin had collected a force of trawlers and
destroyers, and the submarine was hunted for fourteen
hours by this force, assisted by the airship. During this
period she succeeded in sinking one of the German
destroyers, and was eventually left unmolested.

For a correct appreciation of submarine warfare it
is necessary to have a clear idea of the characteristics
and qualities of the submarine herself, of the numbers
possessed by the enemy, and of the rate at which they
were being produced. It is also necessary, in order to
understand the difficulty of introducing the counter
measures adopted by the Royal Navy, to know the length
of time required to produce the vessels and the weapons
which were employed or which it was intended to employ
in the anti-submarine war.

The German submarines may be divided into four
classes, viz. : Submarine cruisers, U-boats, U.B. -boats,
U.C. -boats. There were several variations of each class.

The earlier submarine cruisers of the " Deutschland "'
class were double-hulled vessels, with a surface displace-
ment of 1,850 tons, and were about 215 feet long; they
had a surface speed of about 12 knots and a submerged
speed of about 6 knots. They carried two 5.9-inch guns,
two 22 pounders, two torpedo tubes, and 12 torpedoes.
They could keep the sea for quite four months without
being dependent on a supply ship or base.

The later submarine cruisers were double-hulled, 275-
320 feet long, had a surface speed of 16-18 knots, and
a submerged speed of about 7 to 8 knots. They carried
either one or two 5.9-inoh guns, six torpedo tubes, and
about 10 torpedoes. They had a very large radius of
action, viz., from 12,000 to 20,000 miles, at a speed of
6 knots. A large number (some 30 to 40) of these boats

36 The Crisis of the Naval War

were under construction at the time of the Armistice, but
very few had been completed.

There were two or three types of V-boats. The
earlier vessels were 210 to 220 feet long, double-hulled,
with a surface displacement of about 750 tons, a surface
speed of 15 to 16 knots, and a submerged speed of about
8 knots. They carried one or two 4.1-inch guns, four
to six torpedo tubes, and about 10 torpedoes.

Later vessels of the class were 230 to 240 feet long,
and of 800 to 820 -tons surface displacement, and carried
six torpedo tubes and 16 torpedoes. Some of them, fitted
as minelayers, carried 36 mines, and two torpedo tubes,
but only two torpedoes. A later and much larger class of
minelayers carried a 5.9-inch gun, four torpedo tubes, 42
mines, and a larger number of torpedoes. The earlier
U-boats could keep the sea for about five weeks without
returning to a base or a supply ship ; the later U-boats had
much greater sea endurance.

The smaller U.B.-boats were single-hulled, and about
100 feet long, had a surface speed of 7 to 9 knots and
a submerged speed of about 5 knots, and carried one
22-pounder gun, two torpedo tubes and four torpedoes.
These boats could keep the sea for about two weeks with-
out returning to a base or supply ship. A later class
were double-hulled, 180 feet long, with greater endurance
(8,000 miles at 6 knots), a surface speed of 13 knots and
a submerged speed of 8 knots; they carried one 4.1-inch
gun, five tubes and 10 torpedoes.

The earliest U-C.-boats were 111 feet long, with a
surface displacement of 175 tons, a surface speed of 6^4
knots, and a submerged speed of 5 knots. They carried
12 mines, but no torpedo tubes, and as they had a fuel
endurance of only 800 miles at 5% knots, they could
operate only in southern waters.

Submarine Campaign: Early Part of 1917 37

The later U.C.-boats were 170 to 180 feet long,
double-hulled, had a surface speed of 11 to 12 knots and a
submerged speed of about 7 knots, carried 18 mines, three
torpedo tubes, five torpedoes, and one 22-pounder gun,
and their fuel endurance was 8,000 to 10,000 miles at a
speed of 7 to 8 knots.

At the end of February, 1917, it was estimated that
the enemy had a total of about 130 submarines of all
types available for use in home waters, and about 20 in
the Mediterranean. Of this total an average of between
one-half and one-third was usually at sea. During the
year about eight submarines, on the average, were added
monthly to this total. Of this number some 50 per cent,
were vessels of the mine-laying type.

All the German submarines were capable of prolonged
endurance submerged. The U-boats could travel under
water at the slowest speed for some 48 hours, at about
4 knots for 20 hours, at 5 knots for about 12 hours, and
at 8 knots for about 2 hours.

They were tested to depths of at least 180 feet, but
many submerged to depths exceeding 250 feet without
injury. They did not usually lie on the bottom at depths
greatly exceeding 20 fathoms (120 feet).

All German submarines, except possibly the cruiser
class, could dive from diving trim in from 80 seconds to
one minute. The U.B. class had particularly rapid diving
qualities, and were very popular boats with the German
submarine officers. Perhaps the most noticeable features
of the German submarines as a whole were their excellent
engines and their great strength of construction.

Prior to the month of February, 1917, it was the
usual practice of the enemy submarine in the warfare
against merchant ships to give some warning before
delivering her attack. This was by no means a universal

38 The Crisis of the Naval War

rule, particularly in the case of British merchant vessels,
as is evidenced by the attacks on the Lusitania, Arabic,
and scores of other ships.

In the years 1915 and 1916, however, only 21 and
29 per cent, respectively of the British merchant ships
sunk by enemy submarines were destroyed without
warning, whilst during the first four months of the
unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917 the figure rose
to 64 per cent., and went higher and higher as the months
progressed.

Prior to February, 1917, the more general method
of attack on ships was to " bring them to " by means
of gun-fire ; they were then sunk by gun-fire, torpedo, or
bomb. This practice necessitated the submarine being on
the surface, and so gave a merchant ship defensively armed
a chance of replying to the gun-fire and of escaping, and
it also gave armed decoy ships a good opportunity of
successful action if the submarine could be induced to
close to very short range.

The form of attack on commerce known as "unre-
stricted submarine warfare" was commenced by Germany
with the object of forcing Great Britain to make peace by
cutting off her supplies of food and raw material. It has
been acknowledged by Germans in high positions that the
German Admiralty considered that this form of warfare
would achieve its object in a comparatively short time,
in fact in a matter of some five or six months.

Experienced British naval officers, aware of the extent
of the German submarine building programme, and above
all aware of the shadowy nature of our existing means of
defence against such a form of warfare, had every reason
to hold the view that the danger was great and that the
Allies were faced with a situation fraught with the very
gravest possibilities.

Submarine Campaign: Early Part of 1917 39

The principal doubt was as to the ability of the enemy
to train submarine crews with sufficient rapidity to keep
pace with his building programme.

However, it was ascertained that the Germans had evi-
dently devoted a very great number of their submarines
to training work during the period September, 1915, to
March, 1916, possibly in anticipation of the unrestricted
warfare, since none of their larger boats was operating
in our waters between these months; this fact had a
considerable bearing on the problem.

As events turned out it would appear either that
the training given was insufficient or that the German
submarine officer was lacking in enterprise.

There is no doubt whatever that had the German
craft engaged in the unrestricted submarine warfare
been manned by British officers and men, adopting
German methods, there would have been but few Allied
or neutral merchant ships left afloat by the end of 1917.

So long as the majority of the German submarine
attacks upon shipping were made by gun-fire, the method
of defence was comparatively simple, in that it merely
involved the supply to merchant ships of guns of sufficient
power to prevent the submarine engaging at ranges
at which the fire could not be returned. Whilst the
method of defence was apparent, the problem of supply-
ing suitable guns in sufficient numbers was a very different
matter. It involved arming all our merchant ships with
guns of 4-inch calibre and above. In January, 1917, only
some 1,400 British ships had been so armed since the
outbreak of war.

It will be seen, therefore, that so long as ships sailed
singly, very extensive supplies of guns were required to
meet gun attack, and as there was most pressing need
for the supply of guns for the Army in France, as well

40 The Crisis of the Naval War

as for the anti-aircraft defence of London, the prospect
of arming merchant ships adequately was not
promising.

When the enemy commenced unrestricted submarine
warfare attack by gun-fire was gradually replaced by
attack by torpedo, and the problem at once became
infinitely more complicated.

Gun-fire was no longer a protection, since the sub-
marine was rarely seen. The first intimation of her
presence would be given by the track of a torpedo coming
towards the ship, and no defence was then possible beyond
an endeavour to manoeuvre the ship clear of the torpedo.
Since, however, a torpedo is always some distance ahead
of the bubbles which mark its track (the speed of the
torpedo exceeding 30 knots an hour), the track is not, as
a rule, seen until the torpedo is fairly close to the ship
unless the sea is absolutely calm. The chance of a ship
of low speed avoiding a hit by a timely alteration of
course after the torpedo has been fired is but slight.
Further, the only difficulty experienced by a submarine
in hitting a moving vessel by torpedo-fire, once she has
arrived in a position suitable for attack, lies in estimating
correctly the course and speed of the target. In the case
of an ordinary cargo ship there is little difficulty in guess-
ing her speed, since it is certain to be between 8 and
12 knots, and her course can be judged with fair accuracy
by the angle of her masts and funnel, or by the angle
presented by her bridge.

It will be seen, then, how easy was the problem before
the German submarine officers, and how very difficult was
that set to our Navy and our gallant Mercantile Marine.

It will not be out of place here to describe the methods
which were in force at the end of 1916 and during the
first part of 1917 for affording protection to merchant

Submarine Campaign: Early Part of 1917 41

shipping approaching our coasts from the direction of the
Atlantic Ocean.

The general idea dating from the early months of the
war was to disperse trade on passage over wide tracts
of ocean, in order to prevent the successful attacks which
could be so easily carried out if shipping traversed one
particular route. To carry out such a system it was neces-
sary to give each vessel a definite route which she should
follow from her port of departure to her port of arrival ;
unless this course was adopted, successive ships would
certainly be found to be following identical, or practically
identical, routes, thereby greatly increasing the chance of
attack. In the early years of the war masters of ships
were given approximate tracks, but when the unrestricted
submarine campaign came into being it became necessary
to give exact routes.

The necessary orders were issued by officers stationed
at various ports at home and abroad who were designated
Shipping Intelligence or Reporting Officers. It was, of
course, essential to preserve the secrecy of the general
principles governing the issue of route orders and of the
route orders themselves. For this reason each master
was only informed of the orders affecting his own ship,
and was directed that such orders should on no account
fall into the hands of the enemy.

The route orders were compiled on certain principles,
of which a few may be mentioned :

(a) Certain definite positions of latitude and
longitude were given through which the ship was
required to pass, and the orders were discussed with
the master of each vessel in order to ensure that
they were fully understood.

(6) Directions were given that certain localities

42 The Crisis of the Naval War

in which submarines were known to operate, such as
the approaches to the coast of the United Kingdom,
were, if possible, to be crossed at night. It was
pointed out that when the speed of the ship did
not admit of traversing the whole danger area at
night, the portion involving the greatest danger
(which was the inshore position) should, as a rule,
be crossed during dark hours.

(c) Similarly the orders stated that ships should,
as a rule, leave port so as to approach the dangerous
area at dusk, and that they should make the coast at
about daylight, and should avoid, as far as possible,
the practice of making the land at points in general
use in peace time.

(d) Orders were definite that ships were to zigzag
both by day and at night in certain areas, and if kept
waiting outside a port.

(e) Masters were cautioned to hug the coast, as
far as navigational facilities admitted, when making
coastal passages.

The orders (o), (c) and (d) were those in practice in
the Grand Fleet when circumstances permitted during
my term in that command.

A typical route order from New York to Liverpool
might be as follows :

" After passing Sandy Hook, hug the coast until
dark, then make a good offing before daylight and steer
to pass through the following positions, viz :

Lat. 38° N. Long. 68° W-

Lat. 41° N. Long. 48° W.

Lat. 46° N. Long. 28° W.

Lat. 51° 30' N. Long. 14° W.

"Thence make the coast near the Skelligs approxi-

Submarine Campaign : Early Part of 1917 43

mately at dayligKt, hug the Irish coast to the Tuskar,
up the Irish coast (inside the banks if possible), and across
the Irish Channel during dark hours. Thence hug the
coast to your port ; zigzag by day and night after passing,
Long. 20° W.

Sometimes ships .were directed to cross to the English
coast from the south of Ireland, and to hug the English
coast on their way north.

The traffic to the United Kingdom was so arranged
in the early part of 1917 as to approach the coast in four
different areas, which were known as Approach A, B,
C, and D.

Approach A was used for traffic bound towards
the western approach to the English Channel.

Approach B for traffic making for the south of
Ireland.

Approach C for traffic making for the north of
Ireland.

Approach D for traffic making for the east coast
of England via the north of Scotland.

The approach areas in force during one particular
period are shown on Chart A (in pocket at the end of the
book). They were changed occasionally when suspicion
was aroused that their limits were known to the enemy,
or as submarine attack in an area became intense.

The approach areas were patrolled at the time, so far
as numbers admitted, by patrol craft (trawlers, torpedo-
boat destroyers, and sloops), and ships with specially
valuable cargoes were given directions to proceed to a
certain rendezvous on the outskirts of the area, there to
be met by a destroyer or sloop, if one was available for
the purpose. The areas were necessarily of considerable

44 The Crisis of the Naval War

length, by reason of the distance from the coast at which
submarines operated, and of considerable width, owing
to the necessity for a fairly wide dispersion of traffic
throughout the area. Consequently, with the com-
paratively small number of patrol craft available, the
protection afforded was but slight, and losses were
correspondingly heavy. In the early spring of 1917,
Captain H. W. Grant, of the Operations Division at
the Admiralty, whose work in the Division was of great
value, proposed a change in method by which the traffic
should be brought along certain definite " lines " in each
approach area. Typical lines are shown in Chart B.

The idea was that the traffic in, say, Approach Route
B, should, commencing on a certain date, be ordered
by the Routeing Officer to pass along the line Alpha.
Traffic would continue along the line for a certain period,
which was fixed at five days, when it would be automatic-
ally diverted to another line, say Gamma, but the traffic
along Gamma would not commence until a period of 24
hours had elapsed since discontinuance of the use of the
line Alpha. This was necessary in order to give time for
the patrol craft to change from one line to the other.
During this period of 24 hours the arrangement for
routeing at the ports of departure ensured that no traffic
would reach the outer end of any of the approach lines,
and consequently that traffic would cease on line Apha
24 hours before it commenced on line Gamma. After a
further period of five days the line would again change
automatically.

It was necessary that Shipping Intelligence Officers
should have in their possession the orders for directing
traffic on to the various lines for some considerable time
ahead, and the masters of ships which were likely to be
for some time at sea were informed of the dates between

Submarine Campaign: Early Part of 1917 45

which the various lines were to be used, up to a date
sufficient to cover the end of their voyage. There was,
therefore, some danger of this information reaching the
enemy if a vessel were captured by a submarine and the
master failed to destroy his instructions in time. There
was also some danger in giving the information to
neutrals.

However, the system, which was adopted, did result
in a reduction of losses during the comparatively short
time that it was in use, and the knowledge that patrol
craft on the line would be much closer together than
they would be in an approach area certainly gave con-
fidence to the personnel of the merchant ships, and those
who had been forced to abandon their ship by taking to
the boats were afforded a better chance of being picked
up.

Various arrangements were in existence for effecting
rapidly a diversion of shipping from one route to another
in the event of submarines being located in any particular
position, and a continual change of the signals for this
purpose was necessary to guard against the possibility of
the code being compromised by having fallen into enemy
hands, an event which, unfortunately, was not infrequent.

Elaborate orders were necessary to regulate coastal
traffic, and fresh directions were continually being issued
as danger, especially danger from mines, was located.
Generally speaking, the traffic in home waters was
directed to hug the coast as closely as safe navigation
permitted. Two reasons existed for this, (a) in water of
a depth of less than about eight fathoms German sub-
marines did not care to operate, and (b) under the
procedure indicated danger from submarine attack was
only likely on the side remote from the coast.

46 The Crisis of the Naval War

Here is an example of the instructions for passing up
Channel :

From Falmouth to Portland Bill. — Hug the coast,
following round the bays, except when passing Torbay.
(Directions followed as to the procedure here.)

From Portland Bill to St. Catherines. — Pass close
south of the Shambles and steer for Anvil Point, thence
hug the coast, following round the bays.

And so on.

As it was not safe navigationally to follow round the
bays during darkness, the instructions directed that ships
were to leave the daylight route at dusk and to join the dark
period route, showing dimmed bow lights whilst doing so.

Two "dark period routes " were laid down, one for
vessels bound up Channel, and another for vessels bound
down Channel, and these routes were some five miles apart
in order to minimize the danger of collision, ships being
directed not to use their navigation lights except for
certain portions of the route, during which they crossed
the route of transports and store ships bound between
certain southern British ports (Portsmouth, Southampton
and Devonport) and French ports.

Routes were similarly laid down for ships to follow
when navigating to or from the Bristol Channel, and
for ships navigating the Irish Sea.

Any system of convoy was at this time out of the
question, as neither the cruisers to marshal the convoy
to the submarine area, nor the destroyers to screen it
when there, were available.

There was one very important factor in the situation,
viz., the comparative rate at which the Germans could
produce submarines and at which we could build vessels
suitable for anti-submarine warfare and for defence of
commerce. The varying estimates gave cause for grave

Submarine Campaign: Early Part of 1917 47

anxiety. Our average output of destroyers was four to
five per month. Indeed, this is putting the figure high ;
and, of course, we suffered losses. The French and
Italians were not producing any vessels of this type,
whilst the Japanese were, in the early part of 1917, not
able to spare any for work in European waters, although
later in the year they lent twelve destroyers, which gave
valuable assistance in the Mediterranean. The United
States of America were not then in the war. Conse-
quently measures for the defence of the Allied trade
against the new menace depended on our own production.

Our submarines were being produced at an average rate
of about two per month only, and — apart from motor
launches, which were only of use in the finest weather
and near the coast — the only other vessels suitable for
anti-submarine work that were building at the time,
besides some sloops and P-boats, were trawlers, which,
whilst useful for protection patrol, were too slow for most
of the escort work or for offensive duties. The Germans'
estimate of their own submarine production was about
twelve per month, although this figure was never realized,
the average being nearer eight. But each submarine
was capable of sinking many merchant ships, thus
necessitating the employment of a very large number of
our destroyers ; and therein lay the gravity of the situa-
tion, as we realized at the Admiralty early in 1917 that
no effort of ours could increase the output of destroyers
for at least fifteen months, the shortest time then taken
to build a destroyer in this country.

And here it is interesting to compare the time
occupied in the production of small craft in Great Britain
and in Germany during the war.

In pre-war days we rarely built a destroyer in less

48 The Crisis of the Naval War

than twenty-four months, although shortly before the war
efforts were made to reduce the time to something like
eighteen to twenty months. Submarines occupied two
years in construction.

In starting the great building programme of destroyers
and submarines at the end of 1914, Lord Fisher increased
very largely the number of firms engaged in construct-
ing vessels of both types. Hopes were held out of the
construction both of destroyers and of submarines in
about twelve months; but labour and other difficulties
intervened, and although some firms did complete craft
of both classes during 1915 in less than twelve months,
by 1916 and 1917 destroyers averaged about eighteen
months and submarines even longer for completion.

The Germans had always built their small craft rapidly,
although their heavy ships were longer in construction
than our own. Their destroyers were completed in a
little over twelve months from the official date of order
in pre-war days. During the early years of the war it
would seem that they maintained this figure, and they
succeeded in building their smaller submarines of the
U.B. and U.C. types in some six to eight months, as
U.B. and U.C. boats began to be delivered as early as
April, 1915, and it is certain that they were not ordered
before August, 1914.

The time taken by the Germans to build submarines
of the U type was estimated by us at twelve months,
and that of submarine cruisers at eighteen months.
German submarine officers gave the time as eight to ten
months for a U-boat and eighteen months for a sub-
marine cruiser.*

* It is to be observed that Captain Persius in a recent article gives a
much longer period for the construction of the German submarines. It is not
stated whether he had access to official figures, and his statement is [not [in
agreement with the figures given by German submarine officers.

A German Submarine of the U-G Type (Minelayer).

A German Submarine of the later Cruiser Class.

Submarine Campaign : Early Part of 1917 49

It is of interest to note here the rate of ship produc-
tion attained by some firms in the United States of
America during the ,war.

As I mention later,* the Bethlehem Steel Company,
under Mr. Schwab's guidance, produced ten submarines
for us in five months from the date of the order. Mr.
Schwab himself informed me that towards the end of
the war he was turning out large destroyers in six weeks.
The Ford Company, as is well known, produced sub-
marine chasers of the " Eagle " type in even a shorter
period, but these vessels were of special design and
construction.

I have dealt so far with the question of anti-submarine
measures involving only the use of destroyers and other
small surface craft. There were, of course, other methods
both in use and under consideration early in 1917 when
we took stock of the situation.

For some time we had been using Decoy vessels, and
with some success ; it was possible to increase the number
of these ships at the cost of taking merchant ships off the
trade routes or by building. A very considerable increase
was arranged.

The use of our own submarines offensively against
enemy submarines had also been tried, and had met with
occasional success, but our numbers were very limited
(the total in December, 1916, fit for oversea or anti-
submarine work was about forty). They were much
needed for reconnaissance and offensive work against
surface men-of-war in enemy waters, and only a few were
at the time available for anti-submarine operations, and
then only at the cost of other important services.

The hydrophone had been in the experimental stage
and under trial for a considerable period, but it had not

* Vide Chapterjvi, p. 157.

50 The Crisis of the Naval War

so far developed into an effective instrument for locating
submarines, and although trials of the different patterns
which had been devised were pushed forward with energy,
many months elapsed before it became a practicable
proposition.

One of the best offensive measures against the enemy
submarines, it was realized, was the mine, if laid in
sufficiently large numbers. Unfortunately, in January,
1917, we did not possess a mine that was satisfactory
against submarines.

Our deficiency in this respect was clearly shown in
the course of some trials which I ordered, when one of
our own submarines was run against a number of our
mines, with the result that only about 38 per cent, of
the mines (fitted, of course, only with small charges)
exploded. The Germans were well aware that our mines
were not very effective against submarines.

We possessed at the time mines of two patterns, and
whilst proving unsatisfactory against submarines, they
were also found to be somewhat unreliable when laid
in minefields designed to catch surface vessels, owing
to a defect in the mooring apparatus. This defect was
remedied, but valuable time was lost whilst the necessary
alterations were being carried out, and although we
possessed in April, 1917, a stock of some 20,000 mines,
only 1 ,500 of them were then fit for laying. The position,
therefore, was that our mines were not a satisfactory anti-
submarine weapon.

A new pattern mine, which had been designed on the
model of the German mine during Sir Henry Jackson's
term of office as First Sea Lord in 1916, was experi-
mented with at the commencement of 1917, and as soon
as drawings could be prepared orders for upwards of
100,000 were placed in anticipation of its success. There

Submarine Campaign: Early Part of 1917 51

were some initial difficulties before all the details were
satisfactory, and, in spite of the greatest pressure on manu-
facturers, it was not until November, 1917, that mines
of this pattern were being delivered in large numbers.
The earliest minefields laid in the Heligoland Bight in
September and October, 1917, with mines of the new pat-
tern met with immediate success against enemy sub-
marines, as did the minefields composed of the same type
of mine, the laying of which commenced in November,
1917, in the Straits of Dover.

When it became possible to adopt the system of bring-
ing merchant ships in convoys through the submarine zone
under the escort of a screen of destroyers, this system be-
came in itself, to a certain extent, an offensive operation,
since it necessarily forced the enemy submarines desirous
of obtaining results into positions in which they themselves
were open to violent attack by depth charges dropped by
destroyers.

During the greater part of the year 1917, however,
it was only possible to supply destroyers with a small
number of depth charges, which was their principal
anti-submarine weapon ; as it became feasible to increase
largely the supply of these charges to destroyers, so the
violence of the attack on the submarines increased, and
their losses became heavier.

The position then, as it existed in the early days of
the year 1917, is described in the foregoing remarks.

The result measured in loss of shipping (British,
Allied, and neutral) from submarine and mine attack in
the first half of the year was as follows in gross tonnage :

January

324,016

April

... 870,359

February ...

500,573

May

... 589,754

March

555,991

June

,.. 675,154

52 The Crisis of the Naval War

Because of the time required for production, it was
a sheer impossibility to put into effect any fresh devices
that might be adopted for dealing with submarine war-
fare for many months, and all that could be done was
to try new methods of approach to the coast and, as
the number of small craft suitable for escort duty
increased, to extend gradually the convoy system already
in force to a certain extent for the French coal trade
and the Scandinavian trade.

In the chapters which follow the further steps which
were taken to deal with the problem, and the degree of
success which attended them, will be described.

CHAPTER III

ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

The previous chapters have dealt with the changes in
organization carried out at the Admiralty during the
year 1917 largely with the object of being able to deal
more effectively with the submarine warfare against
merchant ships. Mention has also been made of the sub-
marine problem with which the Navy had to deal;
particulars of the anti-submarine and other work carried
out will now be examined.

A very large proportion of the successful anti-sub-
marine devices brought into use during 1917, and
continued throughout the year 1918, were the outcome
of the work of the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval
Staff, and it is but just that the high value of this
work should be recognized when the history of the war
comes to be written by future historians. As has been
stated in Chapter I, Rear- Admiral A. C. Duff, C.B.,
was the original head of the division, with Captain F. C.
Dreyer, C.B., Commander Yeats Brown, and Com-
mander Reginald Henderson as h'is immediate assistants.
Captain H. T. Walwyn took the place of Captain
Dreyer on March 1, 1917, when the latter officer became
Director of Naval Ordnance. When Admiral Duff was
appointed Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, with a seat
on the Board, in May, 1917, Captain W. W. Fisher,
C.B., became head of the division, which still remained
one of the divisions of the Staff working immediately

54 The Crisis of the Naval War

under the A.C.N.S. It is to these officers, .with their
most zealous, clever and efficient staff, that the
institution of many of the successful anti-submarine
measures is largely due. They were indefatigable in
their search for new methods and in working out and
perfecting fresh schemes, and they kept their minds open
to new ideas. They received much valuable assistance
from the great civilian scientists who gave such ready
help during the war, the function of the naval officers
working with the scientists being to see that the effort
was being directed along practical lines. They were also
greatly indebted to Captain Ryan, R.N., for the exceed-
ingly valuable work carried out by him at the experimental
establishment at Hawkcraig. Many brilliant ideas were
due to Captain Ryan's clever brain.

I doubt whether the debt due to Admiral Duff and
Captain Fisher and their staff for their great work can
ever be thoroughly appreciated, but it is certainly my
duty to mention it here since I am better able to speak
of it than any other person. In saying this I do not
wish to detract in the least from the value of the part
performed by those to whose lot it fell to put the actual
schemes into operation. Without them, of course,
nothing could have been accomplished.

When the Anti-Submarine Division started in
December, 1916, the earlier devices to which attention
was devoted were :

(1) The design and manufacture of howitzers
firing shell fitted to explode some 40 to 60 feet under
water with which to attack submarines when
submerged.

(2) The introduction of a more suitable pro-
jectile for use against submarines than that supplied

Anti-Submarine Operations 55

at the time to the guns of destroyers and patrol
craft.

(3) The improvement of and great increase in
the supply of smoke apparatus for the screening of
merchant ships from submarines attacking by gun-
fire. ,«-a

(4) A great increase in the number of depth
charges supplied to destroyers and other small
craft.

(5) The development of the hydrophone for
anti-submarine work, both from ships and from
shore stations.

(6) The introduction of the "Otter" for the
protection of merchant ships against mines.

(7) A very great improvement in the rapidity of
arming merchant ships defensively.

(8) The extended and organized use of air craft
for anti-submarine work.

(9) A great development of the special service or
decoy ship.

(10) The introduction of a form of net protection
for merchant ships against torpedo fire.

Other devices followed, many of which were the out-
come of work in other Admiralty Departments, par-
ticularly the Departments of the Director of Naval
Ordnance and the Director of Torpedoes and Mines,
working in conjunction with the Anti-Submarine or
the Operations Division of the Naval Staff. Some
of the new features were the development of depth-
charge throwers, the manufacture and use of fast coastal
motor-boats for anti-submarine work, the production
of mines of an improved type for use especially against
submarines, very considerable developments in the use

56 The Crisis of the Naval War

of minefields, especially deep minefields, including
persistent mining in the Heligoland Bight and the lay-
ing of a complete minefield at varying depths in the
Straits' of Dover ; also, after the United States entered
the war, the laying of a very extensive minefield right
across the northern part of the North Sea. The provision
of " flares " for illuminating minefields at night, and a
system of submarine detection by the use of electrical
apparatus were also matters which were taken up and
pressed forward during 1917. During the year the
system of dazzle painting for merchant ships was brought
into general use.

On the operational side of the Naval Staff the work
of dealing with enemy submarines before they passed
out of the North Sea was taken in hand by organized
hunting operations by destroyers and other patrol craft,
and by the more extended use offensively of our own
submarines, as vessels became available.

Considerable developments were effected in the
matter of the control of mercantile traffic, and much
was done to train the personnel of the mercantile marine
in matters relating to submarine warfare.

Taking these subjects in detail, it will be of interest
to examine the progress made during the year.

Howitzers

The howitzer as a weapon for use against the sub-
marine when submerged was almost non-existent at the
beginning of 1917, only thirty bomb-throwers, on the
lines of trench-mortars, being on order. By April of
that year designs for seven different kinds of bomb-
throwers and howitzers had been prepared and approved,
and orders placed for 1,006 weapons, of which number
the first 41 were due for delivery in May. By the end

Anti-Submarine Operations 57

of May the number of bomb-throwers and howitzers on
order had been increased to 2,056, of eight different
patterns. Over 1,000 of these weapons fired a bomb or
shell carrying a burster exceeding 90 lbs. in weight, and
with a range varying between 1,200 and 2,600 yards.
Later in the war, as we gained experience of the value
of this form of attack, heavier bombs were introduced
for use in the existing bomb-throwers and howitzers.
The howitzer as an anti-submarine weapon was handi-
capped by the comparatively small weight of the bursting
charge of its shell. This applied more particularly to
the earlier patterns, and to inflict fatal injury it was
necessary to burst the shell in close proximity to the
submerged submarine. This weapon, although not very
popular at first, soon, however, proved its value, when
employed both from patrol craft and from merchant ships.

One curious instance occurred on March 23, 1918,
of a merchant ship being saved by a 7.5-inch howitzer.
A torpedo was seen approaching at a distance of some
600 yards, and it appeared certain to hit the ship. A
projectile fired from the howitzer exploded under water
close to the torpedo, deflected it from its course, and
caused it to come to the surface some 60 yards from the
ship ; a second projectile caused it to stop, and appar-
ently damaged the torpedo, which when picked up by
an escorting vessel was found to be minus its head.

Delivery of howitzers commenced in June, 1917, and
continued as follows :

No. of Howitzers Total completed,
adultly issued. <%£%%*

July 24, 1917 35 ... 48

October 1, 1917 92 ... 167

December 10, 1917 377 ... 422

58 The Crisis of the Naval War

The slow rate of delivery, in spite of constant
pressure, which is shown by these figures gives some
idea of the time required to bring new devices into
existence.

Projectile for Use Against Submarines

In January, 1917, the Director of Naval Ordnance
was requested by the Anti-Submarine Division of the
Naval Staff to carry out trials against a target represent-
ing the hull of a German submarine, so far as the details
were known to us, to ascertain the most suitable type
of projectile amongst those then in existence for the
attack of submarines by guns of 4.7-inch calibre and
below.

The results were published to the Fleet in March,
1917. They afforded some useful knowledge and demon-
strated the ineffectiveness of some of the shells and fuses
commonly in use against submarines from 12-pounder
guns, the weapon with which so many of our patrol
craft were armed. The target at which the shell was
fired did not, however, fully represent a German sub-
marine under the conditions of service. The trials were
therefore continued, and as a result, in June, 1917, a
further order was issued to the Fleet, giving directions as
to the type of projectile to be used against submarines
from all natures of guns, pending the introduction of
delay action fuses for the smaller guns; this was the
temporary solution of the difficulty until a new type of
shell evolved from the experience gained at the trials
could be produced and issued. The trials, which were
exhaustive, were pressed forward vigorously and con-
tinuously throughout the year 1917, and meanwhile more
accurate information as to the exact form of the hull and
the thickness of the plating of German submarines became

Anti-Submarine Operations 59

available. Early in 1918 the first supplies of the new
fuses were ready for issue.

Smoke Apparatus

The earlier smoke apparatus for supply to merchant
ships was designed towards the end of 1916.

One description of smoke apparatus consisted of an
arrangement for burning phosphorus at the stern of a
ship; in other cases firework composition and other
chemicals were used. A dense smoke cloud was thus
formed, and, with the wind in a suitable direction, a
vessel could hide her movements from an enemy sub-
marine or other vessel, and thus screen herself from
accurate shell fire.

In another form the apparatus was thrown overboard
and formed a smoke cloud on the water.

The rate of supply of sets of the smoke apparatus to
ships is shown by the following figures :

April 1, 1917

... 1,372 sets

July 8, 1917

... 2,568 ,,

October 5, 1917 ...

... 3,445 ,,

November 26, 1917

... 3,976 „

Depth Charges

Depth charges, as supplied to ships in 1917, were of
two patterns : one, Type D, contained a charge of 300 lb.
of T.N.T., and the other, Type D*, carried 120 lb. of
T.N.T. At the commencement of 1917 the allowance
to ships was two of Type D and two of Type D*, and
the supply was insufficient at that time to keep up the
stock required to maintain on board four per destroyer,
the number for which they were fitted, or to supply all
trawlers and other patrol craft with their allowance. The
great value of the depth charge as a weapon against sub-

60 The Crisis of the Naval War

marines, and the large number that .were required for
successful attack, became apparent early in 1917, and
the allowance was increased. Difficulty was experienced
throughout the year in maintaining adequate stocks
owing to the shortage of labour and the many demands
on our industries made by the war, but the improve-
ment is shown by the fact that while the average output
per week of depth charges was only 140 in July, it had
become over 500 by October, and that by the end
of December it was raised to over 800, and was still
increasing very rapidly. As a consequence, early in 1918
it was found possible to increase the supply very largely,
as many as 30 to 40 per destroyer being carried.

Improvements in the details of depth charges were
effected during 1917. One such improvement was the
introduction of a pistol capable of firing at much greater
depths than had been in use before. The result was
that all vessels, whether fast or slow, could safely use
the 300-lb. depth charge if set to a sufficient depth. This
led to the abolition of the Type D* charges and the
universal supply of Type D.

In spite of the difficulties of dropping depth charges
so close to submarines as to damage them sufficiently
to cause them to come to the surface, very good results
were obtained from their use when destroyers carried
enough to form, so to speak, a ring round the assumed
position at which the submarine had dived. In order to
encourage scientific attack on submarines, a system of
depth charge " Battle Practice " was introduced towards
the end of 1917.

It is as well to correct a common misapprehension
as to the value of depth charges in destroying submarines.

Many people held very exaggerated ideas on this
subject, even to the extent of supposing that a depth

Anti-Submarine Operations 61

charge would destroy a submarine if dropped within
several hundred yards of her. This is, unfortunately,
very far indeed from being the case; it is, on the
contrary, necessary to explode the charge near the
submarine in order to effect destruction. Taking the
depth charge with 300 lb. weight of explosive, ordinarily
supplied to destroyers in 1917, it was necessary to explode
it within fourteen feet of a submarine to ensure destruc-
tion ; at distances up to about twenty-eight feet from the
hull the depth charge might be expected to disable a
submarine to the extent of forcing her to the surface,
when she could be sunk by gun-fire or rammed, and
at distances up to sixty feet the moral effect on the crew
would be considerable and might force the submarine to
the surface.

A consideration of these figures will show that it
was necessary for a vessel attacking a submarine with
depth charges to drop them in very close proximity, and
the first obvious difficulty was to ascertain the position
of a submarine that had dived and was out of sight.

Unless, therefore, the attacking vessel was fairly
close to the submarine at the moment of the latter diving
there was but little chance of the attack being successful.

Hydrophones

'The Hydrophone, for use in locating submerged sub-
marines, although first evolved in 1915, was in its infancy,
so far as supply to ships was concerned, at the commence-
ment of 1917. Experiments were being carried out by the
Board of Invention and Research at Harwich, and by
Captain Ryan, R.N., at Hawkcraig, and although very
useful results had been obtained and a considerable number
of shore stations as well as some patrol vessels had been
fitted with hydrophones, which had a listening range of

6z The Crisis of the Naval War

one or two miles, all the devices for use afloat
suffered from the disadvantage that it was not possible
to use them whilst the ship carrying them was moving,
since the noise of the vessel's own machinery and of
the water passing along the side prevented the noise
made by other vessels being located. What was required
was a listening instrument that could be used by a
ship moving at least at slow speed, otherwise the ship
carrying the hydrophone was herself, when stopped, an
easy target for the submarine's torpedo. It was also
essential, before an attack could be delivered, to be able
to locate the direction of the enemy submarine, and prior
to 1917 all that these instruments showed was the presence
of a submarine somewhere in the vicinity.

Much research and experimental work was carried
out during the year 1917 under the encouragement and
supervision of the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval
Staff. Two hydrophones were invented in the early part
of 1917, one by Captain Ryan, R.N., and one by the
Board of Invention and Research, which could be used
from ships at very slow speed and which gave some
indication of the direction of the sound; finally, in the
summer of 1917, the ability and patience of one inventor,
Mr. Nash, were rewarded, and an instrument was devised
termed the "fish" hydrophone which to a considerable
extent fulfilled the required conditions. Mr. Nash, whose
invention had been considered but not adopted by the
Board of Invention and Research before h< brought it to
the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff, laboured
under many difficulties with the greatest energy and per-
severance; various modifications in the design were
effected until, in October, 1917, the instrument was
pronounced satisfactory and supplies were put in
hand.

Anti-Submarine Operations 63

The next step was to fit the "fish" hydrophone in
certain auxiliary patrol vessels as well as some destroyers,
" P" boats and motor launches, to enter and train men
to work it, and finally to organize these vessels into
"submarine hunting flotillas," drill them, and then set
them to their task.

This work, which occupied some time, was carried out
at Portland, where a regular establishment was set up
for developing the "fish " hydrophone and for organizing
and training the " hunting flotillas " in its use. A con-
siderable amount of training in the use of the hydrophone
was required before men became efficient, and only those
with a very keen sense of hearing were suited to the
work. The chances of the success of the hunting flotillas
had been promising in the early experiments, and the
fitting out of patrol craft and organizing and drilling
them, proceeded as rapidly as the vessels could be ob-
tained, but largely owing to the slow production of
trawlers it was not until November that the first hunting
flotilla fitted with the " fish " hydrophone was actually
at work. The progress made after this date is illustrated
by the fact that in December, 1917, a division of drifters,
with a "P" boat, fitted with this "fish" hydrophone
hunted an enemy submarine for seven hours during dark-
ness, covering a distance of fifty miles, kept touch with
her By sound throughout this period, and finished by
dropping depth charges in apparently the correct position,
since a strong smell of oil fuel resulted and nothing further
could be heard of the submarine, although the drifters
listened for several hours. On another occasion in the
same month a division of drifters hunted a submarine for
five hours. The number of hydrophones was increased as
rapidly as possible until by the end of the year the system
was in full operation within a limited area, and only

64 The Crisis of the Naval War

required expansion to work, as was intended, on a large
scale in the North Sea and the English Channel.

Meanwhile during 1917 directional hydrophones,
which had been successfully produced both by Captain
Ryan and by the Board of Invention and Research,
had been fitted to patrol craft in large numbers, and
"hunting flotillas" were operating in many areas. A
good example of the working of one of these flotillas
occurred off Dartmouth in the summer of 1918, when
a division of motor launches fitted with the Mark II
hydrophone, under the general guidance of a destroyer,
carried out a successful attack on a German submarine.
Early in the afternoon one of the motor launches dropped
a depth charge on an oil patch, and shortly afterwards
one of the hydrophones picked up the sound of an
internal combustion engine ; a line of depth charges was
run on the bearing indicated by the hydrophone. The
motor launches and the destroyer remained listening,
until at about 6.0 p.m. a submarine came to the surface
not far from Motor Launch No. 135, which fired two
rounds at the submarine before the latter submerged.
Other motor launches closed in, and depth charges
were dropped by them in close proximity to the wash
of the submarine. Oil came to the surface, and more
depth charges were dropped in large numbers on the
spot for the ensuing forty-eight hours. Eventually
objects came to the surface clearly indicating the
presence of a submarine. Further charges were dropped,
and an obstruction on the bottom was located by means
of a sweep. This engagement held peculiar interest
for me, since during my visit to Canada in the
winter of 1919 the honour fell to me of presenting to
a Canadian — Lieutenant G. L. Cassady, R.N.V.R.—
at Vancouver the Distinguished Service Cross awarded

.„.- - - ..-._ . s- ■

A Mine Exploding.

Anti-Submarine Operations 65

him by His Majesty for his work in Motor Launch
No. 135 on this occasion.

Motor Launches were organized into submarine hunt-
ing flotillas during the year 1917. These vessels were
equipped with the directional hydrophone as soon as its
utility was established, and were supplied with depth
charges. In the summer of 1917 four such hunting
flotillas were busy in the Channel; the work of one
of these I have described already, and they certainly con-
tributed towards making the Channel an uneasy place
for submarine operations.

These results were, of course, greatly improved on
in 1918, as the numbers of ships fitted with the "fish "
and other hydrophones increased and further experience
was gained.

The progress in supply of hydrophones is shown by
the following table :

Shark Fin Fish
Type. Type.

Supply of
Date. General Service
1917. Portable Type.

Directional

Mark I and

Mark II.

July 31 ...

... 2,750

500

August 31

... 2,750

700

September 30

... 2,750

850

October 31

... 8,500

1,000

December 31

... 3,680

1,950

870 37

Hydrophone Stations and Training Schools

At the beginning of 1917 four shore hydrophone
stations were in use. During the year eight additional
stations were completed and several more were nearing
completion. The first step necessary was a considerable
increase in the instructional facilities for training listeners
both for the increased number of shore stations and

66 The Crisis of the Naval War

for the large number of vessels that were fitted for
hydrophone work during the year.

The greater part of this training took place at the
establishment at Hawkcraig, near Rosyth, at which
Captain Ryan, R.N., carried out so much exceedingly
valuable work during the war. I am not able to give
exact figures of the number of officers and men who were
instructed in hydrophone work either at Hawkcraig or
at other stations by instructors sent from Hawkcraig,
but the total was certainly upwards of 1,000 officers and
2,000 men. In addition to this extensive instructional
work the development of the whole system of detecting
the presence of submarines by sound is very largely due
to the work originally carried out at Hawkcraig by
Captain Ryan.

The first hydrophone station which was established
in the spring of 1915 was from Oxcars Lighthouse in
the Firth of Forth; it was later in the year transferred
to Inchcolm. Experimental work under Captain Ryan
continued at Hawkcraig during 1915, and in 1916 a
section of the Board of Invention and Research went
to Hawkcraig to work in conjunction with him. This
station produced the Mark II directional hydrophone of
which large numbers were ordered in 1917 for use in
patrol craft. It was a great improvement on any
hydrophone instrument previously in use. Hawkcraig
also produced the directional plates fitted to our sub-
marines, as well as many other inventions used in detect-
ing the presence of submarines.

In addition to the work at Hawkcraig an experimental
station under the Board of Invention and Research
was established near Harwich in January, 1917. The
Mark I directional hydrophone was designed at this
establishment in 1917, and other exceedingly valuable

Anti-Submarine Operations 67

work was carried out there connected with the detection of
submarines.

At Malta an experimental station, with a hydrophone
training school, was started in the autumn of 1917,
and good work was done both there and at a hydrophone
station established to the southward of Otranto at about
the same time, as well as at a hydrophone training school
started at Gallipoli at the end of the year.

"Otters" and Paravanes

The " Otter " system of defence of merchant ships
against mines was devised by Lieutenant Dennis Burney,
D.S.O., R.N.,* and was on similar lines to his valuable
invention for the protection of warships. The latter
system had been introduced into the Grand Fleet in
1916, although for a long period considerable opposi-
tion existed against its general adoption, partly on
account of the difficulties experienced in its early days
of development, and partly owing to the extensive
outlay involved in fitting all ships. However, this oppo-
sition was eventually overcome, and before the end of
the war the system had very amply justified itself by
saving a large number of warships from destruction by
mines. It was computed that there were at least fifty
cases during the war in which paravanes fitted to war-
ships had cut the moorings of mines, thus possibly saving
the ships. It must also be borne in mind that the cutting
of the moorings of a mine and the bringing of it to the
surface may disclose the presence of an hitherto unknown
minefield, and thus save other ships.

Similarly, the "Otter" defence in its early stages
was not introduced without opposition, but again all
difficulties were overcome, and the rate of progress in its

*A son of Admiral Sir Cecil Burney.

68 The Crisis of the Naval War

use is shown in the following statement giving the number
of British merchant ships fitted with it at different periods
of 1917 :

By July 1, 95 ships had been fitted.

By September 1, 294 ships had been fitted.

By December 1, 900 ships had been fitted.

The system was also extended to foreign merchant
ships, and supplies of " Otters " were sent abroad for this
purpose.

A considerable number of merchant ships were
known to have been saved from destruction by mine by
the use of this system.

Defensive Arming of Merchant Ships

The defensive arming of merchant ships was a matter
which was pressed forward with great energy and
rapidity during the year 1917. The matter was taken
up with the Cabinet immediately on the formation of
the Board of Admiralty presided over by Sir Edward
Carson, and arrangements made for obtaining a consider-
able number of guns from the War Office, from Japan,
and from France, besides surrendering some guns from
the secondary and anti-torpedo boat armament of our
own men-of-war, principally those of the older type,
pending the manufacture of large numbers of guns for
the purpose. Orders for some 4,200 guns were placed
by Captain Dreyer, the Director of Naval Ordnance,
with our own gun makers in March, April and May,
1917, in addition to nearly 3,000 guns already on order
for this purpose ; 400 90-m.m. guns were obtained from
France, the mountings being made in England. Special
arrangements were also made by Captain Dreyer for

Anti-Submarine Operations

the rapid manufacture of all guns, including the pro-
vision of the material and of extra manufacturing
plant.

These orders for 4,200 guns and the orders for 2,026
howitzers placed at the same time brought the total
number of guns and howitzers under manufacture in
England for naval and merchant service purposes in
May, 1917, up to the high figure of 10,761.

At the end of the year 1916 the total number of
merchant ships that had been armed since the commence-
ment of the war (excluding those which were working
under the White Ensign and which had received offen-
sive armaments) was 1,420. Of this number, 83 had
been lost.

During the first six months of 1917 armaments were
provided for an additional 1,581 ships, and during the
last six months of that year a further total of 1,406 ships
were provided with guns, an aggregate number of 2,987
ships being thus furnished with armaments during the
year. This total was exclusive of howitzers.

The progress of the work is shown by the following

figures :

Number of guns that had been
Date. provided for British Merchant

Ships excluding Howitzers.

January 1, 1917 1,420

April 1, 1917
July 1, 1917
October 1, 1917
January 1, 1918

2,181
3,001
3,763
4,407

The figures given include the guns mounted in ships
that were lost through enemy action or from marine
risks.

It should be stated that the large majority of the

70 The Crisis of the Naval War

guns manufactured during 1917 .were 12-pounders or
larger guns, as experience had shown that smaller weapons
were usually outranged by those carried in submarines, and
the projectiles of even the 12-pounder were smaller than
was desirable. Of the 2,987 new guns mounted in
merchant ships during the year 1917 only 190 were
smaller than 12-pounders.

Aircraft for Anti-Submarine Work

Anti-submarine work by aircraft was already in
operation round our coasts by the beginning of 1917,
and during the year the increase in numbers and improve-
ment in types of machines rendered possible considerable
expansion of the work. Closer co-operation between
surface vessels and aircraft was also secured, and as
the convoy system was extended aircraft were used both
for escort and observation work, as well as for attack on
submarines. For actual escort work airships were
superior to heavier-than-air machines owing to their
greater radius of action, whilst for offensive work against
a submarine that had been sighted the high speed of the
seaplane or aeroplane was of great value.

In 1916 and the early part of 1917 we were but ill
provided with aircraft suitable for anti-submarine opera-
tions at any considerable distance from the coast, and
such aircraft as we possessed did not carry sufficiently
powerful bombs to be very effective in attacking sub-
marines, although they were of use in forcing these vessels
to submerge and occasionally in bringing our surface craft
to the spot to press home the attack.

The Royal Naval Air Service, under Commodore
Godfrey Paine, devoted much energy to the provision
of suitable aircraft, and the anti-submarine side of the
Naval Staff co-operated in the matter of their organiza-

Anti-Submarine Operations 71

tion; with the advent of the large "America" type
of seaplane and the Handley-Page type of aeroplane,
both of which carried heavy bombs, successful attacks
on enemy submarines became more frequent. They
were assisted by the airships, particularly those of the
larger type.

Improvements which were effected in signalling
arrangements between ships and aircraft were instru-
mental in adding greatly to their efficiency, and by the
early summer of 1917 aircraft had commenced to play
an important part in the war against submarines and
in the protection of trade.

Thereafter progress became rapid, as the following
figures show :

In June, 1917, aeroplanes and seaplanes patrolling
for anti-submarine operations covered 75,000 miles,
sighted 17 submarines, and were able to attack 7 of
them.

In September, 1917, the distance covered by anti-
submarine patrols of aeroplanes and seaplanes was 91,000
miles, 25 submarines were sighted, of which 18 were
attacked.

In the four weeks ending December 8, 1917, in spite
of the much shorter days and the far less favourable fly-
ing weather experienced, the mileage covered was again
91,000 miles; 17 submarines were sighted, of which 11
were attacked during this period.

As regards airships the figures again show the
increased anti-submarine work carried out :

In June, 1917, airships engaged in anti-submarine
patrol covered 53,000 miles, sighted and attacked 1
submarine.

In September, 1917, they covered 83,000 miles, and
sighted 8 submarines, of which 5 were attacked.

72 The Crisis of the Naval War

In the four weeks ending December 8, 1917, they
covered 50,000 miles, sighted 6 submarines, and attacked
5 of them.

The airships were more affected by short days, and
particularly by bad weather, than the heavier than air
craft, and the fact that they covered practically the same
mileage in the winter days of December as in the summer
days of June shows clearly the development that took
place in the interval.

During the whole of 1917 it was estimated that our
heavier than air craft sighted 135 submarines and attacked
85 of them, and our lighter than air craft sighted 26 and
attacked 15. The figures given in Chapter IX of the
number of submarines sunk during the war by aircraft
(viz. 7 as a minimum), when compared with the number
of attacks during 1917 alone suggest the difficulties of
successful attack.

In September, 1917, as extensive a programme as
was consistent with manufacturing capabilities, in view of
the enormous demands of the Army, was drawn up by the
Naval Staff for the development of aircraft for anti-
submarine operations during 1918.

The main developments were in machines of the large
" America " type and heavy bombing machines for
attacking enemy bases, as well as other anti-submarine
machines and aircraft for use with the Grand Fleet.

Included in the anti-submarine operations of aircraft
during 1917 were the bombing attacks on Bruges, since
the German submarines and the shelters in which they
took refuge were part of the objective.

These attacks were carried out from the aerodrome
established by the Royal Naval Air Service at Dunkirk.
During 1917 the Naval Air Forces of the Dover Com-
mand, which included the squadrons at Dunkirk, were

Anti-Submarine Operations 73

under the command of Captain C. L. Lambe, R.N., and
the operations of this force were of a very strenuous
character and of the utmost value.

Bombing operations prior to the year of 1917 had
been carried out by various types of machines, but the
introduction of the Handley-Page aeroplanes in the
spring of 1917 enabled a much greater weight of bombs
— viz. some 1,500 lbs. — to be carried than had hitherto
been possible. These machines were generally used for
night bombing, and the weight of bombs dropped on
the enemy bases in, Belgium rose with great rapidity as
machines of the Handley-Page type were delivered, as
did the number of nights on which attacks were made.
It was no uncommon occurrence during the autumn of
1917 for six to eight tons of bombs to be dropped in
one night. I have not the figures for 1918, but feel no
doubt that with the great increase in aircraft that became
possible during that year this performance was constantly
exceeded.

Special Service or Decoy Ships

The story of the work of these vessels constitutes a
record of gallantry, endurance and discipline which
has never been surpassed afloat or ashore. The
earliest vessels were fitted out during the year 1915
at Scapa, Rosyth, Queenstown and other ports, and
from the very first it was apparent that they would
win for themselves a place in history. The earliest
success against an enemy submarine by one of these
vessels was achieved by the Prince Charles, fitted
out at Scapa, and commanded by Lieutenant Mark-
Wardlaw, an officer on the Staff of Admiral Sir Stanley
Colville, then Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and
Shetlands. In the early months of 1917 it was decided

74 The Crisis of the Naval War

to augment greatly the force of these special service vessels,
and steps were taken to organize a separate Admiralty
Department for the work. Special experience was
needed, both for the selection of suitable ships and for
fitting them out, and care was taken to select officers
who had been personally connected with the work during
the war; the advice of successful commanders of decoy
ships was also utilized. At the head was Captain
Alexander Farrington, under whose directions several
ships had been fitted out at Scapa with great ingenuity
and success. Every class of ship was brought into the
service : steam cargo vessels, trawlers, drifters, sailing
ships, ketches, and sloops specially designed to have the
appearance of cargo ships . These latter vessels were known
as " convoy sloops " to distinguish them from the ordinary
sloop. Their design, which was very clever, had been
prepared in 1916 by Sir Eustace T. D'Eyncourt, the
Director of Naval Construction. The enemy submarine
commanders, however, became so wary owing to the
successes of decoy ships that they would not come to the
surface until they had inspected ships very closely in the
submerged condition, and the fine lines of the convoy
sloops gave them away under close inspection.

In the early spring of 1917 the Director of Naval
Construction was asked whether the " P " class of patrol
boats then under construction could be altered to work
as decoy vessels, as owing to their light draught they
would be almost immune from torpedo attack.

A very good design was produced, and some of the
later patrol boats were converted and called " P Q's."
These vessels had the appearance of small merchant ships
at a cursory glance. They would not, however, stand
close examination owing, again, to their fine lines, but
being better sea boats than the "P's," by reason of

Anti-Submarine Operations 75

their greater freeboard, the design was continued, and
they met with considerable success against submarines
(especially in the Irish Sea) by ramming and depth
charge tactics, the submarines when submerged probably
not realizing when observing the " P Q.'s " through a
periscope the speed of which they were capable.

During 1917, when the unrestricted submarine war-
fare was in progress, many of the decoy vessels were
fitted with torpedo tubes, either above water or sub-
merged, since, as the submarine commanders became
more wary, they showed great dislike to coming to the
surface sufficiently close to merchant ships to admit of
the gun armament being used with certainty of success.
A torpedo, on the other hand, could, of course, be used
effectively against a submarine whilst still submerged.
The use also became general of casks or cargoes of wood
to give additional flotation to decoy ships after being
torpedoed, so as to prolong their life in case the submarine
should close near enough to allow of effective gunfire.

Another ruse adopted was that of changing the disguise
of a decoy ship during the night, so that she could not be
identified by a submarine which had previously made an
attack upon her. In all cases of disguise or of changing
disguise it was essential that the decoy ship should assume
the identity of some class of vessel likely to be met with
in the particular area in which she was working, and
obviously the courses steered were chosen with that
object in view.

Again, since for success it was essential to induce
the submarine to come within close range so that the decoy
ship's gunfire should be immediately effective, it was
necessary that her disguise should stand the closest possible
examination through the periscope of a submarine. Ger-
man submarine commanders, after a short experience of

y6 The Crisis of the Naval War

decoy ships, were most careful not to bring their vessels
to the surface in proximity to craft that were appar-
ently merchant ships until they had subjected them to
the sharpest scrutiny at short range through the periscope,
and the usual practice of an experienced submarine
commander was to steer round the ship, keeping sub-
merged all the time.

Not only was it essential that there should be no
sign of an armament in the decoy ship, or a man-of-war-
like appearance in any respect, but when the "panic"
signal was made to lead the submarine commander to think
that his attack had succeeded, precautions had to be taken
against the presence of more than the ordinary number of
men in the boats lowered and sent away with the supposed
whole ship's company ; also the sight of any men left on
board would at once betray the real character of the decoy
ship and result in the disappearance of the submarine and
the probable sinking of the disguised craft by torpedo fire.

During the late summer of 1917 it became evident
that the submarine commanders had become so suspicious
of decoy craft that the chances of success by the larger
cargo vessels were not sufficient to justify any further
addition to existing numbers in view of the increasing
shortage of shipping ; a considerable fleet of steamers build-
ing for this purpose was therefore diverted to trade
purposes. The number of smaller vessels, particularly
sailing craft, was, however, increased especially in
Mediterranean waters where they had not been previously
operating on an extensive scale.

It is impossible to close these remarks on this class
of vessel without testifying once more to the splendid
gallantry, self-sacrifice, skilful resource and magnificent
discipline shown by those on board. This is illustrated
by descriptions of a few typical actions fought during 1917.

Anti-Sub marine Operations 77

The first which I relate took place on February 17,
1917, when a decoy vessel, a steamship armed with five
12-pounder guns, commanded by that most gallant officer,
Captain Gordon Campbell, R.N., was torpedoed by a
submarine in a position Lat. 51.34 N., Long. 11.23 W.

Captain Campbell saw the torpedo coming and
manoeuvred to try and avoid being hit in the engine-
room, but as he purposely always selected a very slow
ship for decoy work his attempt was only partially success-
ful and the engine-room began to fill. No signal for
assistance was made, however, as Captain Campbell
feared that such a signal might bring another vessel on
the scene and this would naturally scare the submarine
away. The usual procedure of abandoning the ship in
the boats with every appearance of haste was carried
out, only sufficient hands remaining hidden on board to
work the guns. The periscope of the submarine was
next sighted on the quarter within 200 or 300 yards,
and she came slowly past the ship still submerged and
evidently examining the vessel closely through the peri-
scope. She passed within a few yards of the ship, then
crossed the bow and came to the surface about 200 yards
off and passed down the port side again close to. Captain
Campbell waited until every gun would bear before giving
the signal for " action." The decoy ship's true character
was then revealed ; concealed gunports were thrown open ;
colours were hoisted, and a hot fire opened from all guns.
The submarine was hit at once and continued to be hit
so rapidly that it was evidently impossible for her to
submerge. She sank in a very short time. One officer and
one man were picked up. A signal was then made for
assistance and help arrived within a couple of hours. The
decoy ship was rapidly filling, but efforts were made to
tow her into port, and with the greatest difficulty, and

78 The Crisis of the Naval War

entirely owing to the splendid manner in which all hands
stuck to the work, she was brought into Berehaven with
her stern under water thirty-six hours later and beached.
The great restraint shown by Captain Campbell, in with-
holding fire as the submarine passed her in a submerged
condition, and the truly wonderful discipline and steadiness
and ingenuity which baffled so close an examination of
the ship were the outstanding features of this great exploit.

On April 22, 1917, a decoy ship known as " Q22,"
a small sailing vessel with auxiliary power, armed with
two 12-pounder guns, and commanded by Lieutenant
Irvine, R.N.R., while in a position about fifty miles south
of Kinsale Head, sighted a submarine on the surface which
opened fire immediately at a range of about 4,000 yards.
The fire was accurate and the decoy ship was hit fre-
quently, two men being killed and four wounded in a
few minutes and the vessel considerably damaged. As
further concealment appeared useless the guns were then
unmasked and the fire returned with apparently good
results, several hits being claimed. The enemy's fire
then fell off in accuracy and she increased the range,
and after about one and a half hours' fighting the light
became too bad to continue the action. It was thought
that the submarine was sunk, but there was no positive
evidence of sinking.

On April 30, 1917, a decoy ship — H.M.S. Prize — a
small schooner with auxiliary power, armed with two
12-pounder guns and commanded by Lieutenant W. E.
Sanders, R.N.R., a New Zealand officer, sighted, when
in position Lat. 49.44 N., Long. 11.42 W., a sub-
marine about two miles away on the port beam at
8.30 p.m. At 8.45 p.m. the submarine opened fire on
the Prize and the " abandon ship " party left in a small
boat. The submarine gradually approached, continuing

Anti-Submarine Operations 79

to pour in a heavy fire and making two hits on the
Prize which put the motor out of action, wrecked the
wireless office, and caused much internal damage besides
letting a great deal of water into the ship.

The crew of the Prize remained quietly hidden at
their concealed guns throughout this punishment, which
continued for forty minutes as the submarine closed,
coming up from right astern, a position no doubt which
she considered one of safety. When close to she sheered
off and passed to the port beam at a distance of about
one hundred yards. At this moment Lieutenant Sanders
gave the order for " action." The guns were exposed and
a devastating fire opened at point blank range, but not
before the submarine had fired both her guns, obtaining
two more hits, and wounding several of the crew of the
Prize. The first shell fired from the Prize hit the foremost
gun of the submarine and blew it overboard, and a later
shot knocked away the conning tower. The submarine
went ahead and the Prize tried to follow, but the damage to
her motor prevented much movement. The firing con-
tinued as the submarine moved away, and after an interval
she appeared to be on fire and to sink. This occurred
shortly after 9.0 p.m., when it was nearly dark. The
Prize sent her boats to pick up survivors, three being
taken out of the water, including the commander and one
other officer. The prisoners on coming on board ex-
pressed their willingness to assist in taking the Prize into
port. It did not at this time seem likely that she would
long remain afloat, but by great exertion and good seaman-
ship the leaks were got under to a sufficient extent to
allow of the ship being kept afloat by pumping. The
prisoners gave considerable help, especially when the ship
caught fire whilst starting the motor again. On May 2
she met a motor launch off the coast of Ireland and was

80 The Crisis of the Naval War

towed into port. In spite of the undoubted great damage
to the submarine, damage confirmed by the survivors, who
were apparently blown overboard with the conning
tower, and who had no thought other than that
she had been sunk, later intelligence showed that she
succeeded in reaching Germany in a very disabled condi-
tion. This incident accentuated still further the recur-
rent difficulty of making definite statements as to the
fate of enemy submarines, for the evidence in this case
seemed absolutely conclusive. The commander of the sub-
marine was so impressed with the conduct of the crew of
the Prize that when examined subsequently in London
he stated that he did not consider it any disgrace to have
been beaten by her, as he could not have believed it
possible for any ship's company belonging to any nation
in the world to have been imbued with such discipline as
to stand the shelling to which he subjected the Prize
without any sign being made which would give away her
true character.

Lieut. -Commander Sanders was awarded the Victoria
Cross for his action and many decorations were given
to the officers and ship's company for their conduct in
the action. It was sad that so fine a commander and so
splendid a ship's company should have been lost, a little
later in action with another submarine which she engaged
unsuccessfully during daylight, and which followed her in
a submerged condition until nightfall and then torpedoed
her, all hands being lost.

It was my privilege during my visit to New Zealand
in 1919 to unveil a memorial to the gallant Sanders which
was placed in his old school at Takapuna, near Auckland.

On June 7, 1917, a decoy ship, the s.s. Pargust,
armed with one 4-inch gun, four 12-pounder guns and
two torpedo tubes, commanded by Captain Gordon

A Smoke Screen for a Convoy.

The Dummy Deck-house of a Decoy Ship.

Anti-Submarine Operations 81

Campbell, R.N., who had meanwhile been awarded the
Victoria Cross, was in a position Lat. 51.50 N., Long.
11.50 W., when a torpedo hit the ship abreast the
engine-room and in detonating made a hole through
which water poured, filling both engine-room and boiler-
room. The explosion of the torpedo also blew one of
the boats to pieces. The usual procedure of abandoning
ship was carried out, and shortly after the boats had
left, the periscope of a submarine was sighted steering for
the port side. The submarine passed close under the stern,
steered to the starboard side, then recrossed the stern to
the port side, and when she was some fifty yards off on the
port beam her conning tower appeared on the surface and
she steered to pass round the stern again and towards one
of the ship's boats on the starboard beam. She then came
completely to the surface within one hundred yards, and
Captain Campbell disclosed his true character, opened
fire with all guns, hitting the submarine at once and con-
tinuing to hit her until she sank. One officer and one man
were saved. The decoy ship lost one man killed, and one
officer was wounded by the explosion of the torpedo.

As in the case of the action on February 17 the dis-
tinguishing feature of this exploit was the great restraint
shown by Captain Campbell in withholding his fire
although his ship was so seriously damaged. The gallantry
and fine discipline of the ship's company, their good
shooting and splendid drill, contributed largely to the
success. The decoy ship, although seriously damaged,
reached harbour.

On July 10, 1917, a decoy ship, H.M.S. Glen, a small
schooner with auxiliary power and armed with one
12-pounder and one 6-pounder gun, commanded by Sub-
Lieutenant K. Morris, R.N.R., was in a position about
forty miles south-west of Weymouth when a submarine

82 The Crisis of the Naval War

was sighted on the surface some three miles away. She
closed to within two miles and opened fire on the Glen.
The usual practice of abandoning ship was followed, the
submarine closing during this operation to within half
a mile and remaining at that distance examining the Glen
for some time. After about half an hour she went ahead
and submerged, and then passed round the ship at about
200 yards distance, examining her through the periscope,
finally coming to the surface about 50 yards off on the
port quarter. Almost immediately she again started to
submerge, and fire was at once opened. The submarine
was hit three or four times before she turned over on her
side and disappeared. There was every reason to believe
that she had sunk, although no one was on deck when
she disappeared. No survivors were rescued.

The feature of this action was again the restraint
shown by the commanding officer of the Glen and the
excellent discipline of the crew.

On August 8, 1917, the decoy ship H.M.S. Dunraven,
in Lat. 48.0 N., Long. 7.37 W., armed with one 4-inch
and four 12-pounder guns and two torpedo tubes, com-
manded by Captain Gordon Campbell, V.C., R.N.,
sighted a submarine on the surface some distance off. The
submarine steered towards the ship and submerged, and
soon afterwards came to the surface some two miles off
and opened fire. The Dunraven, in her character of a
merchant ship, replied with an after gun, firing inten-
tionally short, made a smoke screen, and reduced speed
slightly to allow the submarine to close.

When the shells from the submarine began to fall
close to the ship the order to abandon her was
given, and, as usual with the splendidly trained ship's
company working under Captain Campbell, the operation
was carried out with every appearance of disorder, one

Anti-Submarine Operations 83

of the boats being purposely left hanging vertical with
only one end lowered. Meanwhile the submarine closed.
Several shells from her gun hit the after part of the
Dunraven, causing a depth charge to explode and setting
her on fire aft, blowing the officer in charge of the after
gun out of his control station, and wounding severely the
seaman stationed at the depth charges. The situation
now was that the submarine was passing from the port to
the starboard quarter, and at any moment the 4-inch maga-
zine and the remaining depth charges in the after part of
the Dunraven might be expected to explode. The 4-inch
gun's crew aft knew the imminence of this danger, but
not a man moved although the deck beneath them was
rapidly becoming red hot; and Captain Campbell was
so certain of the magnificent discipline and gallantry of
his crew that he still held on so that the submarine might
come clearly into view on the starboard side clear of the
smoke of the fire aft. In a few minutes the anticipated
explosion occurred. The 4-inch gun and gun's crew were
blown into the air just too soon for the submarine to be
in the best position for being engaged. The explosion
itself caused the electrical apparatus to make the " open
fire " signal, whereupon the White Ensign was hoisted and
the only gun bearing commenced firing; but the sub-
marine submerged at once.

Fifteen minutes later a torpedo hit the ship, and
Captain Campbell again ordered "abandon ship" and
sent away a second party of men to give the impression
that the ship had now been finally abandoned although
her true character had been revealed. Meanwhile he had
made a wireless signal to other ships to keep away as he
still hoped to get the submarine, which, now keeping
submerged, moved round the ship for three quarters of
an hour, during which period the fire gained on the

84 The Crisis of the Naval War

Dunraven and frequent explosions of ammunition took
place.

The submarine then came to the surface right astern
where no guns could bear on her, and recommenced her
shellfire on the ship, hitting her frequently. During this
period the officers and men still remaining on board
gave no sign of their presence, Captain Campbell, by
his example, imbuing this remnant of his splendid ship's
company with his own indomitable spirit of endurance.
The submarine submerged again soon afterwards, and
as she passed the ship Captain Campbell from his sub-
merged tube fired a torpedo at her, which just missed.
Probably the range was too short to allow the torpedo to
gain its correct depth. She went right round the ship,
and a second torpedo was fired from the other tube, which
again missed. This torpedo was evidently seen from the
submarine, as she submerged at once. The ship was
sinking, and it was obviously of no use to continue the
deception, which could only lead to a useless sacrifice of
life; wireless signals for assistance were therefore made,
and the arrival of some destroyers brought the action to a
conclusion. The wounded were transferred to the
destroyers and the ship taken in tow, but she sank whilst
in tow forty-eight hours later.

This action was perhaps the finest feat amongst the
very many gallant deeds performed by decoy ships
during the war. It displayed to the full the qualities of
grim determination, gallantry, patience and resource,
the splendid training and high standard of discipline,
which were necessary to success in this form of warfare.
Lieutenant Charles G. Bonner, R.N.R., and Petty-Officer
Ernest Pitcher, R.N., were awarded the V.C. for their
services in this action, and many medals for conspicuous
gallantry were also given to the splendid ship's company.

Anti-Submarine Operations 85

Captain Campbell, as will be readily realized, met
with great success in his work, and he was the first to
acknowledge how this success was due to those who
worked so magnificently under his command, and he
also realized the magnitude of the work performed by
other decoy ships in all areas, since he knew better than
most people the difficulties of enticing a submarine to
her doom.

On September 17, 1917, in position Lat. 49.42 N.,
Long. 13.18 W., the decoy ship Stonecrop, a small
steamer commanded by Commander M. Blackwood,
R.N., armed with one 4-inch, one 6-pounder gun and
some stick-bomb throwers and carrying four torpedo tubes,
sighted a submarine, which opened fire on her at long
range, the fire being returned by the 6-pounder mounted
aft. After the shelling had continued for some time
the usual order was given to " abandon ship," and a
little later the periscope of the submarine was sighted
some distance away. The submarine gradually closed,
keeping submerged, until within about a quarter of a
mile, when she passed slowly round the ship, and finally
came to the surface at a distance of about 500 yards on
the starboard quarter. She did not close nearer, so the
order was given to open fire, and hitting started after
the third round had been fired and continued until the
submarine sank stern first. No survivors were picked
up, but all the indications pointed to the certainty of
the destruction of the submarine,

[Patrol Gunboats

Mention may here be made of another vessel of a special
class designed in 1917. In the early summer, in con-
sequence of the shortage of destroyers, of the delays in
the production of new ones, and the great need for more

86 The Crisis of the Naval War

small craft suitable for escorting merchant ships through
the submarine zone, arrangements were made to build a
larger and faster class of trawler which would be suitable
for convoy work under favourable conditions, and which to
a certain extent would take the place of destroyers.
Trawlers could be built with much greater rapidity than
destroyers, and trawler builders who could not build
destroyers could be employed for the work, thus supple-
menting the activities of the yards which could turn out
the bigger craft.

Accordingly a 13-knot trawler was designed, and a
large number ordered. Great delays occurred, however,
in their construction, as in that of all other classes of
vessel owing to the pressure of various kinds of war work
and other causes, and only one was delivered during 1917
instead of the twenty or so which had been promised, whilst
I believe that by July, 1918, not more than fourteen had
been completed instead of the anticipated number of
forty. I was informed that they proved to be a most
useful type of vessel for the slower convoys, were excel-
lent sea boats, with a large radius of action, were a great
relief to the destroyers, and even to light cruisers, for
convoy work. It is understood that some fifty were
completed by the end of the war.

Net Protection for Merchant Ships

This idea originated in 1915 or 1916 with Captain
Edward C. Villiers, of the Actseon Torpedo School ship.
Experiments were carried out by a battleship at Rosyth,
in the first instance, and later at Scapa. They were at
that time unsuccessful.

At the end of 1916 I gave directions for a reconsidera-
tion of the matter, and fresh trials were made;
but early in 1917 there seemed to be no prospect of

Anti-Submarine Operations 87

success, and the trials were again abandoned. However,
Captain Villiers displayed great confidence in the idea,
and he introduced modifications, with the result that
later in the year 1917 directions were given for fresh
trials to be undertaken. At the end of the year success
was first obtained, and this was confirmed early in 1918,
and the device finally adopted. A curious experience
during the trials was that the vessel carrying them out
was actually fired at by a German submarine, with the
result that the net protection saved the ship from being
torpedoed. It is not often that an inventor receives such
a good advertisement.

Depth Charge Throwers

The first proposal for this device came from Ports-
mouth, where the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral the
Hon. Sir Stanley Colville, was indefatigable in his efforts
to combat the submarine ; throwers manufactured by
Messrs. Thorny croft, of Southampton, were tried and
gave good results. The arrangement was one by which
depth charges could be projected to a distance of 40 yards
from a vessel, and the throwers were usually fitted one
on each quarter so that the charges could be thrown out
on the quarter whilst others were being dropped over
the stern, and the chances of damaging or sinking the
submarine attacked were thus greatly increased.

As soon as the earliest machines had been tried orders
were placed for large numbers and the supplies obtained
were as follows :

Deliveries commenced in July, 1917.
By September 1, 30 had been delivered.
By October 1, 97 had been delivered.
By December 1, 238 had been delivered.

88 The Crisis of the Naval War

Coastal Motor Boats

At the end of 1916 we possessed 18 fast coastal motor
boats, carrying torpedoes, and having a speed of some
36 knots. They had been built to carry out certain
operations in the Heligoland Bight, working from
Harwich, but the preliminary air reconnaissance which
it had been decided was necessary had not been effected
by the end of 1916 owing to bad weather and the lack
of suitable machines.

When winter set in it became impossible, with the
type of aircraft then existing, to carry out the intended
reconnaissance, and early in 1917' I abandoned the idea
of the operations for the winter and sent the boats to
the Dover Command for Sir R. Bacon to use from
Dunkirk in operations against enemy vessels operating
from Ostend and Zeebrugge. They quickly proved their
value, and it became evident that they would also be
useful for anti-submarine work. A large number were
ordered,, some for anti-submarine work and some for cer-
tain contemplated operations in enemy waters, including a
night attack on the enemy's light cruisers known to
lie occasionally in the Ems River, an operation that it was
intended to carry out in the spring of 1918. A daylight
operation in this neighbourhood, which was carried out
during 1918, did not, from the published reports, meet
with success, the coastal motor boats being attacked by
aircraft, vessels against which they were defenceless. The
new boats were of an improved and larger type than the
original 40-feet boats. Delays occurred in construction
owing principally to the difficulty in obtaining engines
by reason of the great demand for engines for aircraft,
and but few of the new boats were delivered during the
year 1917.

Anti-Submarine Operations 89

Mining Operations

The policy which was carried out during 1917 in
this respect, so far as the supply of mines admitted,
aimed at preventing the exit of submarines from
enemy ports. Incidentally, the fact that we laid
large numbers of mines in the Heligoland Bight rendered
necessary such extensive sweeping operations before any
portion of the High Sea Fleet could put to sea as to
be very useful in giving us some indication of any move-
ment that might be intended. In view of the distance
of the Grand Fleet from German bases and the short
time available in which to intercept the High Sea Fleet
if it came out for such a purpose as a raid on our coasts,
or on convoys, the information thus gathered would have
proved of great value.

In planning mining operations in the Heligoland
Bight, it was necessary to take into consideration certain
facts. The first was the knowledge that the Germans
themselves had laid minefields in some portions of the
Bight, and it was necessary for our minelayers to give
such suspected areas a wide berth. Secondly, it was
obvious that we could not lay minefields in areas very near
those which we ourselves had already mined, since we
should run the risk of blowing up our own ships wfth our
own mines.

Mining operations had necessarily to be carried out
at night, and as there were no navigational aids in the
way of lights, etc., in the Heligoland Bight, the position
in which our mines were laid was never known with
absolute accuracy. Consequently an area in which we
had directed mines to be laid, and to which a minelayer
had been sent, could not safely be approached within a
distance of some five miles on a subsequent occasion.

go The Crisis of the Naval War

The use in mining operations of the device known
as "taut wire" gear, introduced by Vice- Admiral
Sir Henry Oliver, was of great help in ensuring
accuracy in laying minefields and consequently in
reducing the danger distance surrounding our own
minefields.

As our mining operations increased in number we
were driven farther and farther out from the German
ports for subsequent operations. This naturally increased
the area to be mined as the Heligoland Bight is bell-
mouthed in shape, but it had the advantage of making
the operations of German minesweepers and mine-
bumpers more difficult and hazardous as they had to work
farther out, thus giving our light forces better chances
of catching them at work and engaging them. Such
actions as that on November 17, 1917, between our light
forces and the German light cruisers and minesweepers
were the result. We did not, of course, lay mines in
either the Danish or Dutch territorial waters, and these
waters consequently afforded an exit for German vessels
as our minefields became most distant from German
bases.

Broadly speaking, the policy was to lay mines
so thoroughly in the, Heligoland Bight as to force
enemy submarines and other vessels to make their
exits along the Danish or Dutch coasts in territorial
waters.

At the end of the exit we stationed submarines to
signal enemy movements and to attack enemy vessels.
We knew, of course, that the enemy would sweep other
channels for his ships, but as soon as we discovered the
position of these channels, which was not a very difficult
matter, more mines were laid at the end. In order to
give neutrals fair warning, certain areas which included

Anti-Submarine Operations 91

the Heligoland Bight were proclaimed dangerous. In
this respect German and British methods may be con-
trasted : We never laid a minefield which could possibly
have been dangerous to neutrals without issuing a warning
stating that a certain area (which included the minefield)
was dangerous. The Germans never issued such a warning
unless the proclamation stating that half the Atlantic
Ocean, most of the North Sea, and nine-tenths of the
Mediterranean were dangerous could be considered as
such. It was also intended, as mines became available,
to lay more deep minefields in positions near our own
coast in which enemy submarines were known to work ;
these minefields would be safe for the passage of surface
vessels, but our patrol craft would force the submarines to
dive into them. This system to a certain extent had
already been in use during 1915 and 1916.

Schemes were also being devised by Admiral of the
Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson, who devoted much of his time
to mining devices, by which mines some distance below
the surface would be exploded by an enemy submarine
even if navigating on the surface.

Such was the policy. Its execution was difficult.

The first difficulty lay in the fact that we did not
possess a thoroughly satisfactory mine. A percentage only
of our mines exploded when hit by a submarine, and they
failed sometimes to take up their intended depth when
laid, betraying their presence by appearing on the
surface.

Energetic measures were adopted to overcome this
latter defect, but it took time and but few mines were
available for laying in the early months of 1917.

The result of our minelaying efforts is shown in the
following table :

The Crisis of the Naval War

Year.

1915

1916

First quarter of 1917
Second ,, ,,

Third

Mines laid
in the Heligoland
Bight.

4,498

1,679

4,865

6,386

3,510

Deep mines laid

off our own coasts

'o catch submarines.

983
2,573

[3,843

In the Straits of Dover, Thames Estuary and off the
Belgian coast we laid 2,664 mines in 1914, 6,337 in 1915,
9,685 in 1916, and 4,669 in the first three quarters of 1917.

These last mines were laid as fast as the alterations,
made with a view to increasing their efficiency, could be
carried out.

During the early part of the year 1917 the new pattern
of mine, known as the " H " Type, evolved in 1916, had
been tried, and although not perfectly satisfactory at the
first trials, the success was sufficient to warrant the placing
of orders for 100,000 mines and in making arrangements
for the quickest possible manufacture. This was done
by the Director of Torpedoes and Mines, Rear-Admiral
the Hon. Edward Fitzherbert, under the direction of the
then Fourth Sea Lord, Rear-Admiral Lionel Halsey.

Deliveries commenced in the summer of 1917, but by
the end of September only a little over 1,500 were ready
for laying. Some 500 of these were laid in September
in the Heligoland Bight and were immediately successful
against enemy submarines. More were laid in the Bight
during October, November and December, and the re-
mainder, as they were produced, were prepared for laying
in the new minefield in the Straits of Dover. In the
fourth quarter of the year a total of 10,889 mines was
laid in the Heligoland Bight and in the Straits of Dover.

During this last quarter delivery of " H " pattern

Anti-Submarine Operations 93

mines was as follows : In October 2,850, November 5,800,
December 4,800 ; total 12,450. So that it will be seen
that the mines were laid as fast as delivery was made.

The great increase in projected minelaying operations
during the year 1917 made it necessary also to add con-
siderably to the number of minelaying vessels.

In January, 1917, the only vessels equipped for this
service were four merchant ships and the Flotilla Leader
Abdiel, with a total minelaying capacity of some 1,200
mines per trip. It was not advisable to carry out mine-
laying operations in enemy waters during the period near
full moon owing to the laibility of the minelayers being
seen by patrol craft. Under such conditions the position
of the minefield would be known to the enemy. As the
operation of placing the mines on board occupied several
days, it was not possible to depend on an average of more
than three operations per ship per month from the larger
minelayers. Consequently, with the intended policy in
view, it was obvious that more minelayers must be
provided.

It was inadvisable to use merchant ships, since every
vessel was urgently required for trade or transport pur-
poses, and the alternative was to fit men-of-war for
minelaying. The only old vessels of this type suitable for
mining in enemy waters were ships of the " Ariadne "
class, and although their machinery was not too reliable,
two of these vessels that were seaworthy were converted
to minelayers. In addition a number of the older light
cruisers were fitted with portable rails on which mines
could be carried when minelaying operations were con-
templated, in place of a portion of the armament which
could be removed ; a flotilla of destroyers, with some fur-
ther flotilla leaders, were also fitted out as minelayers, and
several additional submarines were fitted for this purpose.

94 The Crisis of the Naval War

For a projected special scheme of minelaying in
enemy waters a number of lighters were ordered, and
some of the motor launches and coastal motor boats
were fitted out and A utilized for mining operations on the
Belgian coast towards the end of 1917.

By the end of that year 12 light cruisers, 12 destroyers
and flotilla leaders and 5 submarines had been fitted for
minelaying. Two old cruisers had been added to the
minelaying fleet and several other vessels were in hand
for the same purpose. The detailed plans of the arrange-
ments were prepared and the work of fitting out mine-
layers carried out under the supervision of Admiral R. N.
Ommanney, C.B., whose services in this matter were of
great value. The rapidity with which ships were
added to the minelaying fleet was largely due to his
efforts.

On the entry of the United States of America into
the war a further development of mining policy became
feasible. The immense manufacturing resources of the
United States rendered a large production of mines an
easy matter, with the result that as soon as the United
States Navy produced a reliable type of mine the idea of
placing a mine barrage across the northern part of the
North Sea which had been previously discussed became
a matter of practical politics. With this end in view a still
further addition to the minelaying fleet became necessary,
and since the mining would be carried out at leisure in
this case and speed was no great necessity for the mine-
layer owing to the distance of the minefields from enemy
waters, an old battleship was put in hand for conversion.

With the enormous increase in the number of mines
on order the problem of storage became of importance,
including as it did the storage of the very large number,
some 120,000, required for the northern barrage.

Anti-Submarine Operations 95

The Third Sea Lord, Admiral Lionel Halsey, took
this matter in hand with characteristic energy, and in
conjunction with United States naval officers made all the
necessary arrangements.

The United States mines were stored in the vicinity
of Invergordon, and the British mines intended for use
in the northern barrage were located at Grangemouth,
near Leith, where Rear-Admiral Clinton Baker was in
charge, as well as in other places, whilst those for use in
the Heligoland Bight and Channel waters were stored at
Immingham and other southern depots.

The laying of the North Sea mine barrage was not
accomplished without very considerable delay, and many
difficulties were encountered. It was originally antici-
pated that the barrage would be completed in the spring
of 1918, but owing to various defects in both British
and United States mines which made themselves apparent
when the operations commenced, due partly to the great
depth of water as well as to other causes, a delay of
several months took place ; and, even when near com-
pletion, the barrage was not so effective as many had hoped
in spite of the great expenditure of labour and material
involved. I have not the figures of the number of sub-
marines that the barrage is thought to have accounted for,
but it was known to be disappointing.

Flares

In the late summer of 1917 flares were experimented
with; they were intended to be used from kite balloons
with the object of sighting submarines when on the surface
at night. Previously searchlights in destroyers had been
used for this purpose. The flares were not much used,
however, from kite balloons owing to lack of opportunity,
but trials which were carried out with flares from patrol

96 The Crisis of the Naval War

craft, such as trawlers and drifters, demonstrated that they
would fee of value from these vessels, and when the
Folkestone-Grisnez minefield was laid in November and
December, 1917, it was apparent that the flares would be
of use in forcing submarines to dive at night into the
minefield to escape detection on the surface and attack by
gunfire.

Manufacture on a large scale was therefore com-
menced, and during 1918 the flares were in constant use
across the Straits of Dover.

Electrical Submarine Detector

The existence of this very valuable device was due to
the work of certain distinguished scientists, and experi-
ments were carried out during 1917. It was brought to
perfection in the late autumn, and orders were given to
fit it in certain localities. Some difficulty was experienced
in obtaining the necessary material, but the work was well
in hand by the end of the year, and quickly proved its
value.

Submarine Against Submarine

Prior to the year 1917 the only areas in which our
own submarines operated against enemy vessels of the
same type was in the North Sea, or occasionally in the
vicinity of the Hebrides. Grand Fleet submarines were
used in the northern areas during 1916, and Harwich
submarines operated farther south, but the number of
underwater craft available was insufficient for any ex-
tended method of attack. Early in 1917, when our
mercantile losses were very heavy, some submarines were
withdrawn from the Harwich and Humber districts and
formed into a flotilla off the coast of Ireland for this form
of operation. Some risk had to be accepted in thus re-

Anti-Submarine Operations 97

ducing our submarine strength in southern waters. At
the same time some Grand Fleet submarines were
organized into a watching patrol in the area off the
Shetland Islands, through which enemy submarines were
expected to pass. The watch off the Horn Reef and in the
Heligoland Bight, which had previously been in force,
was also maintained.

A little later the submarine flotilla off the Irish coast
was strengthened, and a regular patrol instituted near
the North Channel between Ireland and Scotland. The
next step was the withdrawal of some "0" Class sub-
marines from coastal work on our east coast to work in
the area between England and Holland near the North
Hinder Lightship, a locality much frequented by enemy
submarines on passage. Still later some submarines were
attached to the Portsmouth Command, where, working
under Sir Stanley Colville, they had some striking suc-
cesses ; others went to the Dover Command. The latter
were fitted with occulting lights on top of the conning-
tower, and were moored at night to buoys in the Dover
Net Barrage, in places where enemy submarines were
likely to pass, in order that they might have a chance of
torpedoing them. A division of submarines was also sent
to Gibraltar, to operate against enemy cruiser submarines
working in that vicinity or near the Canaries. Successes
against enemy submarines were also obtained in the latter
locality.

Finally, the arrival of some United States submarines
enabled the areas in which this form of attack was in
force to be still further extended, after the American per-
sonnel had been trained to this form of warfare. There was
a great increase in the number of enemy submarines
sunk by this method of attack during 1917 as compared
with previous years; the number of vessels sunk does

98 The Crisis of the Naval War

not, however, convey a complete appreciation of the
effect of this form of anti-submarine warfare. The great
value of it lay in the feeling of insecurity that it bred
in the minds of the enemy submarine commanders. The
moral effect of the constant apprehension that one is
being " stalked" is considerable. Indeed, the combina-
tion of our aircraft and our submarine patrols led to our
vessels reporting, regretfully, that it was very seldom that
German submarines were found on the surface in day-
light, and towards the end of 1917 quite a large pro-
portion of the attacks on merchant ships took place at
night.

The work for our own vessels was very arduous indeed.
It was only on rare occasions that it was possible to
bring off a successful attack on a submarine that had
been sighted, the low underwater speed of submarines
making it difficult to get into position when the enemy
was only sighted at short range, which was naturally
usually the case.

In order to obviate this difficulty directions were given
in 1917 to design a special type of submarine for this form
of warfare, and I believe that the first vessel was completed
by the autumn of 1918.

This account of the development of anti-submarine
measures during 1917 would not be complete without
mention of the work of the Trade Division of the Staff,
of which Captain Richard Webb, C.B., was the Director
until September.

This Division was either partly or wholly responsible
for :

(1) The great increase in the rapidity of placing
the armaments on board merchant ships.

(2) The establishment of schools of instruction
for captains and officers of the Mercantile Marine.

Anti-Submarine Operations 99

This training scheme was begun at Chatham Bar-
racks in February, 1917, by Commander E. L. B.
Lockyer, acting under Captain Webb, and later was
extended to Portsmouth, Cardiff and Greenock. Its
success was so marked, and its benefit in assisting
officers to handle their ships in the manner best calcu-
lated to save them from submarine attack so great,
that the Admiralty was continually being pressed by
shipowners and by the officers of the Mercantile
Marine to extend the instruction to more and more
ports. This was done so far as possible, our principal
difficulty being to provide officers capable of giving
the instruction required.

(3) The provision of wireless plant and operators
to the Mercantile Marine. This was another matter
taken up with energy during 1917, and with excellent
results.

(4) The drilling of guns crews for the merchant
ships. Men were invited to go through a course
of drill, and large numbers responded and were
instructed at the Royal Naval Depot at the Crystal
Palace.

All these matters were additional to the important
work upon which the Trade Division was constantly
employed, which included all blockade questions, the
routeing of merchant ships, examination of ships, etc.

In addition to the instructional anti-submarine course
for masters and officers, gunnery courses for cadets and
apprentices were started at Portsmouth, Chatham and
Devonport. A system of visits to ships by officer in-
structors for the purpose of affording instruction and for
inspection, as well as for the purpose of lecturing, was
instituted, and arrangements were made for giving in-

roo The Crisis of the Naval War

struction in signalling. Some idea of the work carried
out will be gathered from the following figures showing
the instructional work carried out during the year 1917 :

Masters 1,929

Officers 2,149

Number of cadets and apprentices

passed through the gunnery course 543

Number of merchant seamen trained

in gunnery at the Crystal Palace . . . 3,964
Number of ships visited by officer

instructors ... ... ... 6,927

Numbers attending these lectures :

Masters 1,361

Officers 5,921

Number of officers and men instructed

in signalling ... 10,487

The keenness shown by officers and men of the mer-
chant service contributed in a marked degree to the success
of the courses instituted ; just one example may be given.
I visited the Royal Naval Depot at the Crystal Palace
early in 1918, and amongst other most interesting scenes
witnessed a large number of men of the merchant ser-
vice at gun drill. I questioned several of them as to their
experiences, and many of the men had had their ships
torpedoed under them three, four or five times. Amongst
the gun crews was a steward who had been through this
experience four times. On my asking why he, as a
steward, should be going through the gunnery course, he
replied that he hoped that by so doing he might stand
a chance of getting his own back by assisting to sink a
submarine.

The knowledge which I possessed of the measures in-

Anti-Submarine Operations 101

traduced during the year 1917 to combat the German
submarine warfare, and the continual increase in the
efficiency of the anti-submarine work which I knew would
result from increased production of anti-submarine
vessels and weapons, led me in February, 1918, to state
that in my opinion the submarine menace would be "held"
by the autumn of the year 1918. The remark, which
was made at what I understood to be a private gathering,
was given very wide publicity, and was criticized at the
time, but it was fulfilled, as the figures will indicate.

As a matter of interest relative to this chapter, a small
chart (C) is included in the pocket at the end ; it shows the
barred zone declared by the Germans as the area in which
all ships would be sunk without warning.

CHAPTER IV

THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM

The question of the introduction of convoys for the
protection of merchant ships was under consideration at
various times during the war. The system had been
employed during the old wars and had proved its value
in the case of attack by vessels on the surface, and it was
natural that thoughts should be directed towards its re-
introduction when the submarine campaign developed.
There is one inherent disadvantage in this system
which cannot be overcome, although it can be mitigated
by careful organization, viz. the delay involved. Delay
means, of course, a loss of carrying power, and when ton-
nage is already short any proposal which must reduce its
efficiency has to be very carefully examined. The delay
of the convoy system is due to two causes, (a) because the
speed of the convoy must necessarily be fixed by the speed
of the slowest ship, and (b) the fact that the arrival of a
large number of ships at one time may cause congestion
and consequent delay at the port of unloading. However,
if additional safety is given there is compensation for this
delay when the risk is great. One danger of a convoy
system under modern conditions should be mentioned,
viz. the increased risk from attack by mines. If ships
are sailing singly a minefield will in all probability sink
only one vessel — the first ship entering it. The fate of
that ship reveals the presence of the field, and with
adequate organization it is improbable that other vessels
will be sunk in the same field. In the case of a convoy

102

The Introduction of the Convoy System 103

encountering a minefield, as in the case of a fleet, several
ships may be sunk practically simultaneously.

During the year 1916, whilst I was still in command
of the Grand Fleet, suggestions as to convoys had been
forwarded to the Admiralty for the better protection of
the ocean trade against attack by surface vessels; but it
was pointed out to me that the number of cruisers avail-
able for escort work was entirely insufficient, and that,
consequently, the suggestions could not be adopted. This
objection was one that could only be overcome by remov-
ing some of the faster merchant ships from the trade
routes and arming them. To this course there was the
objection that we were already — that is before the inten-
sive campaign began — very short of shipping.

Shortly after my taking up the post of First Sea Lord at
the Admiralty, at the end of 1916, the question was
discussed once more. At that time the danger of attack
by enemy raiders on shipping in the North Atlantic was
small; the protection needed was against attack by
submarines, arid the dangerous area commenced some
300-400 miles from the British Islands. It was known
that unrestricted submarine warfare was about to com-
mence, and that this would mean that shipping would
usually be subjected to torpedo attack from submarines
when in a submerged condition. Against this form of
attack the gun armament of cruisers or armed merchant
ships was practically useless, and, however powerfully
armed, ships of this type were themselves in peril of being
torpedoed. Small vessels of shallow draught, possessing
high speed, offered the only practicable form of protec-
tion. Shallow draught was necessary in order that the
protecting vessels should themselves be comparatively
immune from successful torpedo fire, and speed was essen-
tial for offensive operations against the submarines.

104 The Crisis of the Naval War

Convoy sailing was, as has been stated, the recognized
method of trade protection in the old wars, and this
was a strong argument in favour of its adoption in
the late war. It should, however, be clearly understood
that the conditions had entirely changed. Convoy sailing
for the protection of merchant ships against torpedo
attack by submarines was quite a different matter from
such a system as a preventive against attack by surface
vessels and involved far greater difficulties. In the days of
sailing ships especially, accurate station keeping was not
very necessary, and the ships comprising the convoy sailed
in loose order and covered a considerable area of water.
On a strange vessel, also a sailing vessel, being sighted,
the protecting frigate or frigates would proceed to investi-
gate her character, whilst the ships composing the convoy
closed in towards one another or steered a course that
would take them out of danger.

In the circumstances with which we were dealing in
1917 the requirements were quite otherwise. It was
essential for the protection of the convoy that the ships
should keep close and accurate station and should be
able to manoeuvre by signal. Close station was enjoined
by the necessity of reducing the area covered by the con-
voy ; accurate station was required to ensure safety from
collision and freedom of manoeuvre. It will be realized
that a convoy comprising twenty to thirty vessels occupies
considerable space, even when steaming in the usual
formation of four, five or six columns. Since the number
of destroyers or sloops that could be provided for screen-
ing the convoy from torpedo attack by submarines was
bound to be very limited under any conditions, it was
essential that the columns of ships should be as short as
possible ; in other words, that the ships should follow one
another at close intervals, so that the destroyers on each

The Introduction of the Convoy System 105

side of the convoy should be able as far as possible tc
guard it from attack by submarines working from the
flank, and that they should be able with great rapidity
to counter-attack a submarine with depth charges should a
periscope be sighted for a brief moment above the surface,
or the track of a torpedo be seen. In fact, it was neces-
sary, if the protection of a convoy was to be real protec-
tion, that the ships composing the convoy should be
handled in a manner that approached the handling of
battleships in a squadron. The diagram on p. 107 shows
an ideal convoy with six destroyers protecting it, disposed
in the manner ordered at the start of the convoy system.

How far this ideal was attainable was a matter of
doubt. Prior to 1917 our experience of merchant ships
sailing in company had been confined to troop transports.
These vessels were well officered and well manned, carried
experienced engine-room staffs, were capable of attaining
moderate speeds, and were generally not comparable to
ordinary cargo vessels, many of which were of very slow
speed, and possessed a large proportion of officers and men
of limited sea experience, owing to the very considerable
personnel of the Mercantile Marine which had joined the
Royal Naval Reserve and was serving in the Fleet or in
patrol craft. Moreover, even the troop transports had not
crossed the submarine zone in company, but had been
escorted independently ; and many naval officers who had
been in charge of convoys, when questioned, were not
convinced that sailing in convoy under the conditions
mentioned above was a feasible proposition, nor, more-
over, were the masters of the transports.

In February, 1917, in order to investigate this aspect
of the question, a conference took place between the
Naval Staff and the masters of cargo steamers which
were lying in the London docks. The masters were

106 The Crisis of the Naval War

asked their opinion as to how far their ships could be
depended on to keep station in a convoy of 12 to 20
vessels. They expressed a unanimous opinion that it
was not practicable to keep station under the conditions
mentioned, the difficulty being due to two causes : (1)
the inexperience of their deck officers owing to so many
of them having been taken for the Royal Naval Reserve,
and (2) the inexperience of their engineers, combined
with the impossibility of obtaining delicate adjustments
of speed by reason of the absence of suitable engine-room
telegraphs and the poor quality of much of the coal used.
When pressed as to the greatest number of ships that
could be expected to manoeuvre together in safety, the
masters of these cargo steamers, all experienced seamen,
gave it as their opinion that two or possibly three
was the maximum number. The opinions thus expressed
were confirmed later by other masters of merchant
ships who were consulted on the subject. It is to
the eternal credit of the British Merchant Marine, which
rendered service of absolutely inestimable value to the
Empire throughout the war, that when put to the test
by the adoption of the convoy system, officers and men
proved that they could achieve far more than they them-
selves had considered possible. At the same time it should
be recognized how severe a strain was imposed on officers,
particularly the masters, of vessels sailing in convoy.

The matter was kept constantly under review. In
February, 1917, the Germans commenced unrestricted
submarine warfare against merchant ships of all nation-
alities, and as a consequence our shipping losses, as well
as those of Allied and neutral countries, began to
mount steadily each succeeding month. The effect o£
this new phase of submarine warfare is best illustrated
by a few figures.

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The Introduction of the Convoy System 109

During the last four months of 1916 the gross tonnage
lost by submarine attach alone gave the following monthly
average: British, 121,500; Allies, 59,500; neutrals,
87,500 ; total, 268,500.

In the first four months of 1917 the figures became,
in round numbers :

British.

Allies.

Neutrals.

Total.

January

. ... 104,000

62,000

116,000

282,000

February .

. ... 256,000

77,000

131,000

464,000

March

. ... 283,000

74,000

149,000

506,000

April *

... 513,000

133,000

185,000

831,000

NOTE.-

—In neither case is the loss of fishii

ig craft included.

It will be realized that, since the losses towards the end
of 1916 were such as to give just cause for considerable
anxiety, the later figures made it clear that some method
of counteracting the submarines must be found and found
quickly if the Allied cause was to be saved from disaster.

None of the anti-submarine measures that had been
under consideration or trial since the formation of the
Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff in December,
1916, could by any possibility mature for some months,
since time was necessary for the production of vessels and
more or less complicated materiel, and in these circum-
stances the only step that could be taken was that of
giving a trial to the convoy system for the ocean trade,
although the time was by no means yet ripe for effective
use of the system, by reason of the shortage of destroyers,
sloops and cruisers, which was still most acute, although
the situation was improving slowly month by month as
new vessels were completed.

Prior to this date we had already had some experience
of convoys as a protection against submarine attack. The
coal trade of France had been brought under convoy in

* The United States entered the war on April 6, 1917.

no The Crisis of the Naval War

March, 1917. The trade between Scandinavia and North
Sea ports was also organized in convoys in April of the
same year, this trade having since December, 1916, been
carried otit on a system of "protected sailings." It is
true that these convoys were always very much scattered,
particularly the Scandinavian convoy, which was composed
largely of neutral vessels and therefore presented excep-
tional difficulties in the matter of organization and
handling. The number of destroyers which could be
spared for screening the convoys was also very small.
The protection afforded was therefore more apparent
than real, but even so the results had been very good in
reducing the losses by submarine attack. The protection
of the vessels employed in the French coal trade was
entrusted very largely to trawlers, as the ships composing
the convoy were mostly slow, so that in this case more
screening vessels were available, although they were not
so efficient, being themselves of slow speed.

For the introduction of a system of convoy which
would protect merchant ships as far as their port of
discharge in the United Kingdom, there were two re-
quirements : (a) A sufficient number of convoying cruisers
or armed merchant ships, whose role would be that of
bringing the ships comprising the convoy to some selected
rendezvous outside the zone of submarine activity, where
it would be met by the flotilla of small vessels which would
protect the convoy through the submarine area. It was
essential that the ships of the convoy should arrive at this
rendezvous as an organized unit, well practised in station-
keeping by day, and at night, with the ships darkened,
and that the vessels should be capable also of zigzagging
together and of carrying out such necessary movements as
alterations of course, etc. ; otherwise the convoy could not
be safely escorted through the danger area, (b) The

The Introduction of the Convoy System in

other essential was the presence of the escorting flotilla in
sufficient strength.

It has been mentioned that there was an insufficient
number of vessels available for use as convoying cruisers.
It was estimated that about fifty cruisers or armed
merchant ships would be required for this service if the
homeward-bound trade to the British Isles alone was con-
sidered. An additional twelve vessels would be necessary
to deal with the outward-bound trade. At the time only
eighteen vessels were available, and these could only be
obtained by denuding the North Atlantic entirely of
cruisers.

The situation in regard to destroyers or other fast
vessels presented equal difficulties. Early in February,
1917, we had available for general convoy or patrol work
only fourteen destroyers stationed at Devonport and
twelve sloops at Queenstown, and owing to repairs and
the necessity of resting officers and men periodically, only
a proportion of these were available at any one time.
A number of these vessels were required to escort troop
transports through the submarine danger zone. During
the month of February six sloops were diverted from their
proper work of minesweeping in the North Sea and added
to the patrol force at Queenstown, and eight destroyers
were taken from the Grand Fleet and sent to southern
waters for patrol and escort duty. There were obvious
objections to this weakening of the North Sea forces, but it
was necessary in the circumstances to ignore them.

This total of forty destroyers and sloops represented
the whole available force at the end of February. Simul-
taneously a careful investigation showed that for the
institution of a system of convoy and escort for homeward-
bound Atlantic trade alone to the United Kingdom, our
requirements would be eighty-one destroyers or sloops and

ii2 The Crisis of the Naval War

forty-eight trawlers (the latter vessels being only suitable
for escorting the slow 6-7-knot ships of the trade from
Gibraltar to the United Kingdom). For the outward
Atlantic trade from the United Kingdom our estimated re-
quirements were forty-four additional destroyers or sloops.
The deficiency in suitable vessels of this class is best
shown by the following table, which reveals the destroyer
position at different periods during the year 1917 :

4)
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■«

ts
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January.
Flotilla Leaders .

Modern destroyers

Destroyers of River class
and earlier construction

P boats

10
97*

2
45

11
5

14
6

9
10

9
1

29
8

June.
Flotilla Leaders .

Modern destroyers

Destroyers of River class
and earlier construction

P boats

10
95*

3
23

4
29

10
6

38
5

16
8

7
9

29
1

32 1

November.
Flotilla Leaders .

Modern destroyers

Destroyers of River class
and earlier construction

P boats

11
101*

4
24

6
26

10
6

37
4

8
31

30
1

35|

32
8

* Includes destroyers detached for protection work in other commands,
t Includes United States destroyers.

The Introduction of the Convoy System 113

There was the possible alternative of bringing only a
small portion of the trade under convoy by taking all
the available fast small craft from patrol duty and utilizing
them to escort this portion of the trade, but it was felt
that as this would leave the whole of the remaining trade
entirely without protection, and no fast patrol craft
would be on the trade routes to pick up the crews of any
merchant ships that might be sunk by submarines, the step
was not justified.

The next point for consideration was the possibility
of obtaining destroyers or sloops from other sources with
which to increase the forces for trade protection. The
only commands on which it was possible to draw further
were the Grand Fleet, the Harwich and Dover forces,
the destroyers of old types working on the East Coast, or
the destroyers and " P " boats protecting our cross-
Channel communications west of the Dover Command.

It was out of the question to reduce the Harwich or
Dover flotillas materially, as we were already running
the gravest risks from the inadequacy of these forces to
deal with enemy destroyers and submarines operating in
southern waters from Zeebrugge or from German ports,
and in addition the Harwich Force furnished the sole
protection for the weekly convoy running between the
Thames and Dutch ports, besides being much required
for reconnaissance and offensive operations in the Heligo-
land Bight so far as it could be spared for this purpose.
However, the emergency was such that destroyers
were taken from Harwich, as the force obtained new
vessels of a faster and more powerful type. The destroyers
on the East Coast and in the Portsmouth Command were
already inadequate to afford proper protection to the trade
and the cross-Channel communications, as evidenced by
our losses. Here again, however, in order to meet the

ii4 The Crisis of the Naval War

very serious situation, some destroyers were eventually
transferred to Devonport from Portsmouth, but at the
expense of still less protection and fewer opportunities
for offensive action against submarines. There remained
only the Grand Fleet destroyers on which we could draw
yet further. It had always been held that the Grand
Fleet required a total force of one hundred destroyers
and ten flotilla leaders for the double purpose of
screening the ships from submarine attack when at sea
and of countering the enemy's destroyers and attacking
his heavy ships with torpedo fire in a fleet action. We
had gradually built the destroyer force of the Grand Fleet
up to this figure by the early spring of 1917, although,
of course, it fell far short of requirements in earlier months.
It was well known to us that the High Sea Fleet would
be accompanied by at least eight flotillas, or eighty-eight
destroyers, when proceeding to sea at its selected
moment, and it was quite probable that the number
might be much higher, as many more vessels were
available. At our average moment, even with a nominal
force of one hundred destroyers and ten flotilla leaders,
we could not expect that more than seventy destroyers
and eight leaders would be present with the Fleet, since,
in addition to those absent refitting, a considerable
number were always engaged on trade protection or anti-
submarine work in northern waters which could not join
up in time to accompany the Fleet to sea. When the
Scandinavian convoy was started in April, 1917, one.
flotilla leader and six destroyers from the Grand Fleet
were used for its protection; other vessels in northern
waters also depended on Grand Fleet destroyers for
protection. Any further transference, therefore, of
destroyers from the Grand Fleet to southern waters for
trade protection was a highly dangerous expedient, involv-

The Introduction of the Convoy System 115

ing increased risk from submarine attack on the heavy
ships in the event of the Fleet proceeding to sea, as well as
disadvantages in a Fleet action. The necessity, however,
was so great that the risk had to be faced, and for some
months of 1917 from eight to twelve Grand Fleet
destroyers were used for trade protection in the Atlantic,
principally from Irish ports, in addition to those protecting
trade in the North Sea.

It is interesting to note the number of persons who
claim to have been the first to urge the Admiralty to
adopt convoys as a method of protecting merchant ships
against submarine attack. The claimants for this dis-
tinction are not confined to Great Britain; the great
majority of them are people without any knowledge of
the sea and naval matters, certainly none of them pos-
sessed any knowledge of the number of vessels needed
to afford protection to the ships under convoy, nor of the
vessels which we could produce for the purpose at the
time.

Possibly the facts related above may serve to show
that convoys were commenced by Admiralty direction,
and that they were started as soon as and extended
as rapidly as the necessary protecting vessels could be
provided. Those who argued then, or who have argued
since, that we should have reduced the number of
destroyers with the Grand Fleet will not, I think, meet
with any support from those who served in that Fleet,
especially from the officers upon whom lay the responsi-
bility for countering any move of the High Sea Fleet.

The entry of the United States into the war early
in April eased the situation somewhat. First it was hoped
that the United States Navy would assist us with de-
stroyers and other small craft, and secondly it was a fact
that the great majority of the material imported into

n6 The Crisis of the Naval War

countries contiguous to Germany came from the United
States. There was reason to anticipate that steps would be
taken by the United States authorities in the direction of
some form of rationing of these countries, and in these
circumstances it was justifiable to reduce gradually the
strength of our blockading squadron of armed merchant
vessels known as the 10th Cruiser Squadron. By this
means we could at once provide additional vessels to act
as convoying cruisers.

Vice- Admiral W. S. Sims had arrived in this country
in March, 1917, after passing through an exciting experi-
ence, the ship in which he crossed (the United States
steamer St. Louis) being mined outside Liverpool. He
came to visit me at the Admiralty immediately after his
arrival in London, and from that day until I left the
Admiralty at the end of the year it was my privilege and
pleasure to work in the very closest co-operation with him.
My friendship with the Admiral was of very long standing.
We had during many years exchanged views on different
naval subjects, but principally on gunnery questions. I,
in common with other British naval officers who had the
honour of his acquaintance, had always been greatly struck
by his wonderful success in the post of Inspector of Target
Practice in the United States Navy. That success was
due not only to his intimate knowledge of gunnery, but
also to his attractive personality, charm of manner,
keen sense of humour, and quick and accurate grasp of
any problem with which he was confronted. It was for-
tunate indeed for the Allied cause that Admiral Sims
should have been selected to command the United States
forces in European waters, for to the qualities mentioned
above he added a habit of speaking his mind with
absolutely fearless disregard of the consequences. This
characteristic has led him on more than one occasion into

The Introduction of the Convoy System 117

difficulty, but in the circumstances with which we had to
deal in 1917 it was just the quality that was needed. It
was a very difficult matter for those in authority in the
United States, separated as they were by 8,000 miles of
sea from the theatres of war, to realize the conditions in
European waters, for the Admiralty was not concerned
only with the North Sea and Atlantic, and the
terse and straightforward reports of Admiral Sims,
and his convincing statements, went a long way towards
bringing home to the United States people at that time
the extreme gravity of the situation and the need for
immediate action. He was consistently backed up by that
great ambassador, the late Mr. W. H. Page, who also
honoured me with his confidence, and to whom I spoke
perfectly freely on all occasions.

The assistance from the United States that it was
hoped was now in sight made the prospect of success
following on the adoption of the convoy system far more
favourable, and preparations were put in hand for the
institution of an ocean convoy system on a large scale.
In order to gain some experience of the difficulties attend-
ing the working of cargo ships, directions were given for
an experimental convoy to be collected at Gibraltar. The
necessary officers were sent out to Gibraltar with orders
to assemble the convoy, to instruct the masters in the work
that lay before them, and to explain to them the system
of sailing, the manner in which the convoy would be
handled, and the protection that would be afforded. This
naturally took time, and the convoy did not arrive in
England until after the middle of May. The experience
gained showed, however, that the difficulties apprehended
by the officers of the Mercantile Marine were not insuper-
able, and that, given adequate protection by cruisers and
small fast craft, the system was at least practicable.

u8 The Crisis of the Naval War

It was accordingly decided to put it into operation at
once, and to extend it as rapidly as the increase in the
numbers of our destroyers and sloops permitted.

The North Atlantic homeward-bound trade was
brought under convoy in May, 1917, and the Gibraltar
homeward-bound trade in July, but for some months it
was impossible to provide for the institution of a complete
convoy system. At first some 40 per cent, of the home-
ward-bound trade was convoyed. Then the system was
gradually extended to include first 60 per cent., then
80 per cent., and finally 100 per cent, of the homeward
Atlantic trade and the trade from Gibraltar, trawlers
being used as escorts for the Gibraltar trade, as the
majority of the ships therein engaged were slow. But
trawlers are unsatisfactory escort vessels.

In the early stages of the convoy system difficulties
were experienced from the fact that all the available
destroyers and most of the sloops were used as escorts,
with the result that the ships not under convoy were left
with but little protection.

CHAPTER V

THE CONVOY SYSTEM AT WORK

As has been mentioned in Chapter II., the first ships
to be brought under a system of convoy were those
engaged in the French coal trade and in the trade between
Scandinavia and the United Kingdom.

In the case of the French coal trade, commencing in
March, 1917, the steamships engaged in the trade were
sailed in groups from four different assembly ports, viz. :

Southend to Boulogne and Calais.
St. Helens to Havre.
Portland to Cherbourg.
Penzance to Brest.

Between Southend and Boulogne and Calais the pro-
tection was given by the vessels of the Dover Patrol in
the course of their ordinary duties, but for the other three
routes special escort forces were utilized, and daily convoys
were the rule.

Owing to the great demand for coal in France, sail-
ing vessels were also used, and sailed under convoy from
several of the south-west ports.

A large organization was required to deal with the
trade, and this was built up under the supervision
of Captain Reginald G. H. Henderson, C.B., of
the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff, working
under Vice- Admiral (then Rear- Admiral) Sir Alexander
Duff, head of the Division, in conference with the Com-

119

120 The Crisis of the Naval War

manders-in-Chiei, Portsmouth and Plymouth, under
whose direction and protection the convoys were run. The
immunity of this trade, carried out in the infested waters of
the English Channel, from successful attack by submarines
was extraordinary. No doubt the small size of the vessels
concerned and their comparatively shallow draught were a
contributory cause to this immunity. The figures for the
period March to August, 1917, show that 8,825 vessels
crossed the Channel under convoy, and that only fourteen
were lost.

The history of the Scandinavian and East Coast
convoys dates back to the autumn of 1916, when heavy
losses were being incurred amongst Scandinavian ships
due to submarine attack. Thus in October, 1916, the
losses amongst Norwegian and Swedish ships by sub-
marine attack were more than three times as great as
the previous highest monthly losses. Some fear existed
that the neutral Scandinavian countries might refuse to
run such risks and go to the extreme of prohibiting
sailings. Towards the end of 1916, before I left the Fleet,
a system of "protected" sailings was therefore intro-
duced. In this system the Commander-in-Chief, Grand
Fleet, fixed upon a number of alternative routes between
Norway and the Shetland Islands, which were used by
all vessels trading between Scandinavia and Allied
countries. The particular route in use at any given
moment was patrolled by the local forces from the
Orkneys and Shetlands, assisted when possible by
small craft from the Grand Fleet. The Admiral
Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands was placed
in charge of the arrangements, which were carried
out by the Senior Naval Officer at Lerwick, in the Shet-
land Islands. At this period the intention was that the
shipping from Norway should sail at dusk, reach a certain

The Convoy System at Work 121

rendezvous at dawn, and thence be escorted to Lerwick.
The shipping from Lerwick sailed at dawn under pro-
tection, dispersed at dark, and reached the Norwegian
coast at dawn. Difficulties, of course, arose in the event
of bad weather, or when the slow speed of the ships pre-
vented the passage of about 180 miles being made in
approximately twenty-four hours, and by April, 1917, it
was evident that further steps were necessary to meet these
difficulties, which were again causing heavy losses. Early
in April, then, by direction from the Admiralty, a con-
ference was held at Longhope on the subject. Admiral
Sir Frederick Brock, Commanding the Orkneys and Shet-
lands, presided, and representatives from the Admiralty
and the Commands affected were present, and the adoption
of a complete convoy system to include the whole trade
between the East Coast and Norway was recommended.
This proposal was approved by the Admiralty and was
put into force as soon as the necessary organization had
matured. Escorting vessels had with difficulty been
provided, although in inadequate numbers. The first
convoys sailed towards the end of April, 1917.

The system may be described briefly as follows.
The convoys all put into Lerwick, in the Shetland Islands,
both on the eastward and westward passages, so that
Lerwick acted as a junction for the whole system. From
Lerwick, convoys to Scandinavia left in the afternoon
under the protection of two or three destroyers, and, with
some armed patrol vessels in company up to a certain
stage, made the Norwegian coast at varying points, and
there dispersed, and the destroyers then picked up the
west-bound convoy at a rendezvous off the Norwegian
coast shortly before dark, and steered for a rendezvous
between Norway and the Shetland Islands, where an
escort of armed patrol vessels joined the eonvoy at daylight

i22 The Crisis of the Naval War

to assist in its protection to Lerwick. From Lerwick con-
voys were dispatched to various points on the coast of the
United Kingdom ; those making for southern ports on the
East Coast were escorted by a force composed of some of
the old " River " class or of 30-knot class destroyers, and
trawlers belonging to the East Coast Command based
on the Humber, and those making for more northerly
ports or ports on the West Coast were escorted merely
by armed patrol vessels, as the danger of submarine attack
to these convoys was not so great.

The main difficulty was the provision of the destroyers
required for the proper protection of the convoys, and
to a lesser degree the provision of armed patrol vessels
of the trawler, whaler, or drifter types.

The conference held early in April, 1917, had reported
that whilst stronger protection was naturally desirable, the
very least force that could give defence to the convoys
between Lerwick and the East Coast ports would be a
total of twenty-three destroyers and fifty trawlers, whilst
for each convoy between Lerwick and Norway at least
two destroyers and four trawlers were needed. The de-
stroyers for the latter convoys were provided by the Grand
Fleet, although they could ill be spared. The total
number so utilized was six. It was only possible to
provide a force of twenty old destroyers and forty-five
trawlers for the East Coast convoys instead of the numbers
recommended by the conference, and owing to 'the age
of a large majority of these destroyers and the inevitable
resultant occasional breakdown of machinery, the number
available frequently fell below twenty, although it was
really marvellous how those old destroyers stuck to the
work to the eternal credit of their crews, and particularly
the engineering staffs. The adoption of the system, how-
ever, resulted during the comparatively fine summer

The Convoy System at Work 123

weather in a considerable reduction in the number of
merchant ships lost, in spite of the fact that great difficulty
was experienced in keeping the ships of the convoys to-
gether, particularly at night, dawn frequently finding the
convoy very much scattered.

It became obvious, however, that with the approach
of winter the old destroyers of the 30-knot class would
have the greatest difficulty in facing the heavy weather,
and very urgent representations were made by Sir
Frederick Brock for their replacement by more modern
vessels before the winter set in. All that could be
effected in this direction was done, though at the expense
of some of the Channel escorts. Urgent requests for
good destroyers were being received at the Admiralty from
every Command, and it was impossible to comply with
them since the vessels were not in existence.

Certain other steps which may be enumerated were
taken in connection with the Scandinavian traffic.

The convoys received such additional protection as
could be given by the airships which were gradually
being stationed on the East Coast during the year 1917,
and decoy ships occasionally joined the convoys in order
to invite submarine attack on themselves. This pro-
cedure was indeed adopted on all convoy routes as they
were brought into being, the rule being for the decoy
ship to drop behind the convoy in the guise of a straggler.

Some of our submarines were also detailed to work
in the vicinity of convoy routes in order that they might
take advantage of any opportunity to attack enemy
submarines if sighted; due precautions for their safety
were made.

Among the difficulties with which the very energetic
and resourceful Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and
Shetlands had to contend in his working of the convoys

124 The Crisis of the Naval War

was the persistent mining of the approach to Lerwick
Harbour by German submarines; a second difficulty
was the great congestion that took place in that harbour
as soon as bad weather set in during the autumn of
1917. The weather during the latter part of 1917 was
exceptionally bad, and great congestion and consequent
delay to shipping occurred both at Lerwick and in the
Norwegian ports. As the result of this congestion it
became necessary to increase largely the number of ships
in each convoy, thereby enhancing the difficulty of
handling the convoy.

At the commencement it had been decided to limit
the size of a Scandinavian convoy to six or eight vessels,
but as the congestion increased it became necessary to
exceed this number considerably, occasional convoys
composed of as many as thirty to forty ships being
formed. A contributory cause to the increase in the
size of convoys was due to the fact that the trade between
Lerwick and the White Sea, which had been proceeding
direct between those places during the first half of 1917,
became the target of persistent submarine attack
during the summer, and in order to afford them pro-
tection it was necessary in the autumn to include these
ships also in the Scandinavian convoy for the passage across
the North Sea. Between the coast of Norway and the
White Sea they proceeded independently, hugging terri-
torial waters as far as possible.

It will be realized that the institution of the convoy
system of sailing for the Scandinavian trade necessitated
an extensive organization on the Norwegian as well as
on the British side of the North Sea. For this reason
Captain Arthur Halsey, R.N., was appointed in March,
1917, as Naval Vice-Consul at Bergen, and the whole
of the arrangements in regard to the working of the

The Convoy System at Work 125

convoys, the issue of orders, etc., from the Norwegian
side came under him and his staff, to which additions were
made from time to time. The position was peculiar in
that British naval officers were working in this manner
in a neutral country, and it says much for the discretion
and tact of Captain Halsey and his staff and the courtesy
of the Norwegian Government officials that no difficulties
occurred.

Steps were also taken to appoint officers at British
ports for the work of controlling the mercantile traffic,
and as the organization became perfected so the condi-
tions gradually improved.

By the end of September the bad weather prevalent
in the North Sea had caused great dislocation in the
convoy system. Ships composing convoys became much
scattered and arrived so late off Lerwick as to prevent
them proceeding on their passage without entering
harbour. Owing to the overcrowding of Lerwick Har-
bour the system of changing convoy escorts without
entering harbour had been introduced, and the delays
due to bad weather were causing great difficulties in
this respect. The question of substituting the Tyne for
Lerwick as the collecting port was first discussed at this
period, but the objections to the Tyne as an assembly
port were so strong as to prevent the adoption of the
proposal.

The system of convoy outlined above continued in
force from April to December, 1917, during which period
some 6,000 vessels were convoyed between Norway and
the Humber with a total loss of about seventy ships.

There was always the danger that Germany would
attack the convoys by means of surface vessels. The
safeguard against such attacks was the constant presence
of forces from the Grand Fleet in the North Sea. In

126 The Crisis of the Naval War

view of the fact, however, that the distance of the convoy
routes from the Horn Reef was only between 300 and
350 miles, and that on a winter night this distance could
almost be covered at a speed of 20 knots during the
fourteen or fifteen hours of darkness that prevailed, it
will be seen that unless the convoys were actually accom-
panied by a force sufficient to protect them against opera-
tions by surface vessels, there was undoubted risk of suc-
cessful attack. It was not possible to forecast the class of
vessels by which such an attack might be carried out or
the strength of the attacking force. The German decision
in this respect would naturally be governed by the value
of the objective and by the risk to be run. Admiral
S cheer in his book states that on one occasion, in April,
1918, the German battle-cruisers, supported by the battle-
ships and the remainder of the High Sea Fleet, attempted
such an attack, but found no convoy. It was always
realized by us that an attack in great force might be made
on the convoy, but such risk had to be accepted.

The movements of the ships of the Grand Fleet were
a matter for the Commander-in-Chief, provided always
that no definite orders were issued by the Admiralty or
no warning of expected attack was given to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, and, prior to the first attack on the
Scandinavian convoy, no special force of cruisers or light
cruisers accompanied the convoy to guard it against attack
by surface vessels, although a strong deterrent to attack
lay in the frequent presence of forces from the Grand Fleet
to the southward of the convoy routes, which forces would
seriously threaten the return of any raiding German
vessels. As the enemy would naturally make the north-
ward passage by night we could hardly expect to sight
his ships on the outward trip.

The first attack took place at daylight on October

The Convoy System at Work 127

17. The convoy on this occasion consisted of twelve
ships, two British, one Belgian, one Danish, five
Norwegian and three Swedish, and was under the
anti-submarine escort of the destroyers Mary Rose
and Strongbow, and two trawlers, the Elsie and
P. Fannon. At dawn, shortly after 6.0 a.m., two strange
vessels were sighted to the southward, and were later
recognized as German light cruisers. They were chal-
lenged, but replied by opening fire at about 6.15 a.m.,
disabling the Strongbow with the first salvo fired. The
Mary Rose steamed gallantly at the enemy with the
intention of attacking with torpedoes, but was sunk by
gunfire before she could achieve her object. The enemy
vessels then attacked the convoy, sinking all except
the British and Belgian vessels, which escaped un-
damaged. The Strongbow, shelled at close range,
returned the fire, using guns and torpedoes, but was
completely overwhelmed by the guns of the light cruisers
and sank at about 9.30 a.m. The trawler Elsie effected
very fine rescue work amongst the survivors both from
the Strongbow and ships of the convoy, whilst under fire,
and both trawlers reached Lerwick. The enemy sheered
off soon after 8.0 a.m. Most unfortunately neither the
Strongbow nor the Mary Rose succeeded in getting a
wireless signal through to our own vessels to report
the presence of enemy ships, otherwise there can be little
doubt that they would have been intercepted and sunk.
We had in the North Sea, during the night before the
attack and during the day of the attack, a particularly
strong force of light cruisers comprising four or possibly
five* squadrons (a total of not less than sixteen vessels), all
to the southward of the convoy route, and had the informa-

* At this distance of time I do not recollect whether the number of
squadrons was four or five. — J.

i28 The Crisis of the Naval War

tion of the attack come through from the destroyers, these
vessels would have been informed at once and would have
had an excellent chance of intercepting the enemy. The
extreme difficulty of preventing the egress of raiders from
the North Sea at night, even when so large a force is cruis-
ing, was well illustrated by this incident, although a little
reflection on the wide area of water to be covered, together
with a knowledge of the distance that the eye can cover on
a dark night (some 200 to 800 yards), would show how
very great are the chances in favour of evasion.

This disaster to the Scandinavian convoy was bound to
bring into prominence the question of affording to it pro-
tection against future attacks by surface vessels, for neces-
sarily the protection against surface vessels differed from
that against submarines, a point which was sometimes
overlooked by those who were unfamiliar with the demands
of the two wars which were being waged — the one on the
surface and the other under the surface. It was very
difficult to furnish efficient protection against the surface
form of attack from the resources of the Grand Fleet if
the practice of running a daily convoy was continued, be-
cause it was impossible to forecast the strength or exact
character — battle-cruisers, cruisers or destroyers — of the
attack; and the first step was to reduce the number of
convoys and to increase correspondingly the number of
ships in each convoy. A telegram was sent to the
Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands on
October 26 asking whether the convoys could be con-
veniently reduced to three per week. A reply was
received on the 29th to the effect that the convoy could
be run every third day under certain conditions; the
important conditions were the use of the Tyne instead
of the Humber as a collecting port, and the provision of
eight extra trawlers and nine modern destroyers. Sir

A Convoy Zigzagging.

{Taken from the Air.)

A Convoy with an Airship.

The Convoy System at Work 129

Frederick Brock stated that he was assuming cruiser
protection to the convoys and that the details would need
to be worked out before the change could be made. He
suggested a conference. He was requested on October 31
to consult the Vice-Admiral Commanding East Coast of
England as to the practicability of using the Tyne as a
convoy collecting port. Meanwhile Sir F. Brock had
prepared a scheme for giving effect to his proposals, and
on November 5 he sent copies of this scheme to the Vice-
Admiral Commanding East Coast of England and other
officers concerned for their consideration.

In forwarding proposals to the Admiralty on November
22, the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet stated
that the destroyers asked for could not be provided from
the Grand Fleet. Amongst other reasons it was pointed
out that the destroyers required for screening the light
cruisers protecting the convoys would have to be supplied
from that source, thus bringing an additional strain
on the Grand Fleet flotillas. He suggested the provision
of these vessels from other Commands, such as the
Mediterranean, and pointed out the manifest advantages
that would result from providing a force for this convoy
work that would be additional to the Grand Fleet flotillas.
Consideration of the proposals at the Admiralty showed
once again the great difficulty of providing the
destroyers. It was impossible to spare any from the
Mediterranean, where large troop movements needing
destroyer protection were in progress, and other Com-
mands were equally unable to furnish them. Indeed, the
demands for destroyers from all directions were as
insistent as ever. The unsuitability of the Tyne as a
collecting port was remarked upon by the Naval Staff, as
well as other objections to the scheme as put forward
from Scapa. In order to decide upon a workable scheme,

130 The Crisis of the Naval War

directions were given that a conference was to assemble
at Scapa on December 10. An officer from the Naval
Staff was detailed to attend the conference, to point out
the objections which had been raised and, amongst other
matters, to bring to notice the advantage of the Firth of
Forth as a collecting port instead of the Tyne.

Meanwhile steps had been taken to furnish as much
protection as possible from Grand Fleet resources to the
convoys against attack by enemy surface vessels.

The conference of December 10 came to the conclu-
sion that the Firth of Forth Was the best assembly place,
and that the port of Methil in that locality would offer
great advantages. The conference made recommendations
as to the provision of destroyers as soon as they were
available, and, amongst other matters, mentioned the'
necessity for an increase in the minesweeping force at
Rosyth to meet a possible extension of enemy mine-
laying when the new system was in operation.

On December 12 a second attack on the convoy took
place. In this instance the attack was carried out by four
German destroyers. Two convoys were at sea, one east-
bound and one west-bound, the east-bound convoy being
attacked. It was screened against submarine attack by two
destroyers — the Pellew and Partridge — and four armed
trawlers, and comprised six vessels, one being British and
the remainder neutrals. The attack took place in approxi-
mately Lat. 59.50 N., Long. 3.50 E., and the action
resulted in the Partridge, the four trawlers, and the whole
of the convoy being sunk, and the Pellew was so severely
damaged as to be incapable of continuing the action. At
the time of this attack a west-bound convoy was at sea to
the westward of the other convoy, and two armoured
cruisers — the Shannon and Minotaur — with four de-
stroyers were acting as a covering force for the convoys

The Convoy System at Work 131

against attack by surface vessels. A wireless signal from
the Partridge having been intercepted, this force steamed
at full speed for the scene of the action, the destroyers
arriving in time to pick up 100 survivors from the convoy
and trawlers, but not in time to save the convoy. The
3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, also at sea, was some 85
miles to the southward and eastward of the convoy when
attacked, but neither this force nor the Shannon's force
succeeded in intercepting the enemy before he reached
port. The short hours of daylight greatly facilitated his
escape.

On receipt of the report of the meeting of Decem-
ber 10, and in view of the attack of December 12, the
question of the interval between convoys was specially
considered in its relation to the ability of the Grand Fleet
to furnish protection against surface attack. It was
decided that for this reason it would only be possible to
sail convoys from Methil every third day so as to avoid
having two convoys at sea at a time, a situation with
which the Grand Fleet could not deal satisfactorily. The
organization then drawn up actually came into effect on
January 20, 1918, after my departure from the Admiralty,
and was continued with certain modifications to the end
of the war. The principal modification was an increase
of the interval between convoys, first, to four, and later
to five days in order to relieve the strain on the Grand
Fleet arising from the provision of covering forces ; the
disadvantage of the resultant increased size of the convoys
had to be accepted. Under the new system the
Commander-in-Chief Coast of Scotland at Rosyth —
Admiral Sir Cecil Burney — became responsible for the
control of the Scandinavian convoys, the Admiralty
selecting the routes.

The introduction of the convoy system for the Atlantic

132 The Crisis of the Naval War

trade dates from the early days of May, 1917, when the
prospect — for it was only then a prospect — of increas-
ing assistance from the U.S. Navy in regard to
destroyers and other small craft for escort duty as
well as convoy cruisers for ocean work, made the system
possible. Action taken with the U.S. authorities for the
introduction of a system by which the trade from that
country in neutral shipping was controlled enabled the
ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron to be gradually with-
drawn from blockade duties and utilized as ocean convoy
cruisers. Even with assistance from the U.S. Navy in
the shape of old battleships and cruisers, the use of the
10th Cruiser Squadron, the withdrawal of the 2nd Cruiser
Squadron of five ships from the Grand Fleet, the use of the
ships of the North American and West Indies Squadron
and of some of our older battleships from the Mediter-
ranean, there was still a shortage of convoy cruisers; this
deficiency was made up by arming a number of the faster
cargo vessels with 6-inch guns for duty as convoy cruisers.
These vessels usually carried cargo themselves, so that no
great loss of tonnage was involved.

On May 17 a committee was assembled at the
Admiralty to draw up a complete organization for a
general convoy system.* This committee had before it
the experience of an experimental convoy which arrived
from Gibraltar shortly after the commencement of the
committee's work, as well as the experience already gained
in the Scandinavian and French coal trade convoys, and
the evidence of officers such as Captain R. G. Henderson,
R.N., who had made a close study of the convoy question.

On June 6 the report was completed. This valuable

* The committee was composed of the following officers :
Captain H. W. Longden, R.N. Fleet Paymaster H. W. E. Manisty, R.N.
Commander J. S. Wilde, R.N. Lieutenant G. E. Burton, R.N.,and
Mr/N. A. Leslie, of the Ministry of Shipping,

The Convoy System at Work 133

report dealt with the whole organization needed for the
institution of a complete system of convoy for homeward
and outward trade in the Atlantic. In anticipation of
the report steps had already been taken to commence
the system, the first homeward bound Atlantic convoy
starting on May 24. A necessary preliminary for the
successful working of the convoys was a central organiza-
tion at the Admiralty. This organization — termed the
Convoy Section of the Trade Division of the Naval Staff
— worked directly under Rear- Admiral A. L. Duff, who
had recently been placed on the Board of Admiralty with
the title of Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (A.C.N.S.),
and who was in immediate control of the Anti-Submarine,
Trade and Minesweeping Divisions of the Staff. Fleet
Paymaster H. W. E. Manisty was appointed as Organiz-
ing Manager of Convoys, and the Convoy Section, com-
prising at first some ten officers, soon increased to a total
of fifteen, and was in immediate touch with the Ministry
of Shipping through a representative, Mr. Leslie. His
function was to make such arrangements as would ensure
co-operation between the loading and discharging of car-
goes and convoy requirements, and generally to co-
ordinate shipping needs with convoy needs.

The organizing manager of the convoys and his staff
controlled the assembly, etc., of all convoys and vessels.

The routeing of the convoys and their protection, both
ocean and anti-submarine, was arranged under the
superintendence of the A.C.N.S.

In addition to the central Admiralty organization, an
officer with the necessary staff was appointed to each
convoy port of assembly at home and abroad. This
officer's duties comprised the collection and organization
of the convoy and the issue of sailing orders and necessary
printed instructions to the masters of the vessels, seeing

134 The Crisis of the Naval War

that they were properly equipped for sailing in company,
and forwarding information to the Admiralty of the
movements of the convoy.

An essential feature of the system was the appoint-
ment of a convoy commodore. This officer was quite
distinct from the commanding officer of the vessel form-
ing the Ocean escort, but acted under his orders when in
company. The duty of the convoy commodore, whose
broad pennant was hoisted in one of the ships, was, subject
to instructions from the commanding officer of the
escorting vessel, to take general charge of the convoy.

The convoy commodores were either naval officers,
admirals or captains on the active or retired lists, or
experienced merchant captains. The duties were most
arduous and responsible, but there was no lack of volun-
teers for this work. Many of the convoy commodores had
their ships sunk under them. The country has every
reason for much gratitude to those who undertook this
difficult and very responsible task.

By July we had succeeded in increasing the strength
of the anti-submarine convoy escorting force to thirty-
three destroyers (eleven of which belonged to the United
States Navy) and ten sloops, with eleven more destroyers
for the screening of troop transports through the sub-
marine zone and for the protection of the convoys east-
ward from the Lizard, the position in which the other
screening force left them. We had remaining twelve
sloops, which, with trawlers, were engaged in protecting
that considerable portion of the trade making for the
south of Ireland, which we could not yet bring under
convoy. It was intended to absorb these sloops for
convoy protection as soon as circumstances permitted.

At this stage it was considered that a total of thirty-
three more destroyers Or sloops was needed to complete

The Convoy System at Work 135

the homeward convoy system. The Admiralty was
pressed to weaken yet further the Grand Fleet destroyer
force in order to extend the convoy system, but did not
consider such a course justified in view of the general naval
situation.

In arranging the organization of the Atlantic convoy
system it was necessary to take into consideration certain
other important matters. Amongst these were the
following :

1. The selection of ports of assembly and frequency
of sailing. During the latter half of 1917 the general
arrangements were as follows for the homeward trade :

Port of Assembly.

Frequency of Sailing. Destination.

Gibraltar

. Every 4 days. Alternately to

E. & W. c'ts.

Sierra Leone

>> ° »>

Either coast.

Dakar

»> 8 ,,

Either coast.

Hampton Roads (U.S. A

•/ 5» * 5)

Alternately to

E. &W. c'ts.

New York ,

») 8 ,,

Ditto.

Halifax, N.S

>5 8 ,,

West coast.

Sydney (Cape Breton) ..

>) 8 ,,

Alternately to
E. & W. c'ts.

Each port served a certain area of trade, and vessels
engaged in that trade met at the port of assembly for
convoy to the United Kingdom or to France.

The total number of merchant ships sailing thus in
convoy every eight days in September, 1917, was about
150, in convoys comprising from 12 to 30 ships, and the
total escorting forces comprised :

50 ocean escort vessels (old battleships, cruisers, armed
merchant ships and armed escort ships),

13 6 The Crisis of the Naval War

90 sloops and destroyers,

15 vessels of the " P" class (small destroyers),

50 trawlers,
in addition to a considerable force for local escort near
Gibraltar, consisting of sloops, yachts, torpedo boats,
U.S. revenue cruisers, U.S. tugs, etc.

At this period (September, 1917) outward convoys
were also in operation, the arrangement being that the
outward convoy was escorted by destroyers or sloops to
a position 300 to 400 miles from the coast clear of the
known submarine area, and there dispersed to proceed
independently, there being insufficient ocean escort
vessels to take the convoy on ; about twelve more were
needed for this work. The escorting vessels used for the
outward convoys were destroyers or sloops which were due
to proceed to sea to meet a homeward convoy, the routine
being that the outward convoy should sail at such a time
as would ensure the homeward convoy being met by the
escort without undue delay at the rendezvous, since any
long period of waiting about at a rendezvous was impossible
for the escorting vessels as they would have run short of
fuel. It was also undesirable, as it revealed to any
submarine in the neighbourhood the approach of a
convoy.

It will be realized by seamen that this procedure
(which was forced upon us by the shortage of escorting
vessels) led to many difficulties. In the first place
the homeward convoys were frequently delayed by bad
weather, etc., on passage across the Atlantic, and, owing
to the insufficient range of the wireless installations, it was
often not possible for the commodore to acquaint the
Admiralty of this delay in time to stop the sailing of the
outward convoys. Again, outward convoys were often
delayed by bad weather, resulting in the homeward con-

The Convoy System at Work 137

voy not being met before entering the submarine zone. As
the winter drew near this was a source of constant anxiety,
since so many of the vessels outward bound were in ballast
(empty), and their speed was consequently quickly reduced
in bad weather. The ships under these conditions became
in some cases almost unmanageable in a convoy, and the
responsibilities of the escorts were much intensified.

In September, 1917, the following was the position in
respect to outward bound convoys :

Port of Assembly.

Frequency of Sailing. Destination.

Lamlash

... Every 4 days. Atlantic ports

Milford Haven

,, 4 ,, Gibraltar.

Queenstown ...

,, 4 ,, Atlantic ports

Falmouth

,, 8 ,, Gibraltar.

Plymouth

,, 4 ,, Atlantic ports

About 150 vessels sailed every eight days in convoys
varying in strength from 12 to 30 ships.

There was still a good deal of Atlantic trade that
was not sailing under convoy. This comprised trade
between Gibraltar and North and South America, between
the Cape, South America and Dakar, and the coastal
trade between North and South America. It was
estimated that an additional twenty-five to thirty ocean
escorts and eleven destroyers would be needed to include
the above trade in convoy.

The Mediterranean trade is dealt with later.

The question of speed was naturally one of great
importance in the convoy system. As has been stated
earlier, the speed of a convoy like that of a squadron or
fleet is necessarily that of the slowest ship, and in order
to prevent delay to shipping, which was equivalent to
serious loss of its carrying power, it was very necessary
that convoys should be composed of ships of approximately

138 The Crisis of the Naval War

the same speed. In order to achieve this careful
organization was needed, and the matter was not made
easier by the uncertainty that frequently prevailed as to
the actual sea speed of particular merchant ships. Some
masters, no doubt from legitimate pride in their vessels,
credited them with speeds in excess of those actually
attained. Frequently coal of poor quality or the
fact that a ship had a dirty bottom reduced her
speed to a very appreciable extent, and convoy commo-
dores had occasionally to direct ships under such conditions
to drop out of the convoy altogether and make their
passage alone. Obviously this action was not taken lightly
owing to the risk involved. Decision as to the sea speed
of convoys was taken by the convoy officer at the collect-
ing port, and he based this on the result of an examination
of the records in the different ships. As a rule convoys
were classed as " slow " and " fast." Slow convoys com-
prised vessels of a speed between 8 and 12 J knots. Fast
convoys included ships with a speed between 12^ and
16 knots. Ships of higher speed than 16 knots did not
as a rule sail in convoys, but trusted to their speed and
dark hours for protection in the submarine area. The
Gibraltar convoy (an exception to the general rule)
contained ships of only 7 knots speed.

With the introduction of convoys the provision
of efficient signal arrangements became a matter of
importance. The issue of printed instructions to each
master and the custom introduced of assembling the
masters to meet the captain of the escorting cruiser before
sailing, so that the conduct of the convoy might be
explained, had the effect of reducing signalling to a
minimum, but it was necessary that each ship should have
a signalman on board, and the provision of the number
of signalmen required was no easy matter. A good wire-

The Convoy System at Work 139

less installation .was essential in the escorting cruiser and
in the Commodore's ship in order that the course of the
convoy could be diverted by the Admiralty if the known
or suspected presence of submarines rendered it necessary,
and also for the purpose of giving to the Admiralty early
information of the position of a convoy approaching the
coast, so that the escorting destroyers could be dispatched
in time.

Fortunately for us, German submarines constantly
used their wireless installations when operating at sea, and
as a consequence our wireless directional stations were
able to fix their positions by cross bearings. This
practice on the part of the enemy undoubtedly went far
to assist us both in anti-submarine measures and in
diverting trade to a safe course.

The introduction of the convoy system rendered the
provision of anti-submarine protection at ports of assembly
a matter of great importance, owing to the very large
number of vessels that were collected in them. Some of
the ports were already in possession of these defences, but
amongst those for which net protection was prepared and
laid during 1917 were Halifax, Sydney (Cape Breton),
Falmouth, Lamlash, Rosslare (on the south-east coast
of Ireland), Milford Haven, Sierra Leone and Dakar.
This involved extensive work, and was undertaken and
carried out with great rapidity by Captain F. C. Lear-
month and his staff, whose work in the production of net
defences during the war was of inestimable value, not only
to ourselves, but to our Allies, for whom large supplies
of net defences were also provided. The U.S.A. also
adopted our system of net defence for their harbours on
entry into the war. Many anxious months were passed
at the Admiralty and at the ports named until the anti-
submarine defences were completed.

140 The Crisis of the Naval War

The escort of the convoys through the submarine
zone imposed very heavy work upon the destroyers,
sloops and other screening vessels. This was due partly
to the fact that there were not sufficient vessels to admit
of adequate time being spent in harbour to rest the crews
and effect necessary repairs, and partly to the nature of
the work itself and the weather conditions under which
so much of it was carried out. It will be realized by
those who have been at sea in these small craft that
little rest was obtainable in the Atlantic between the west
coast of Ireland and the mouth of the Channel and
positions 300 to 400 miles to the westward, except in
the finest weather. When to this is added the constant
strain imposed by watching for the momentary appear-
ance of a periscope or the track of a torpedo, and the
vigilance needed, especially on dark and stormy nights,
to keep touch with a large convoy of merchant ships
showing no lights, with the inevitable whipping up of
occasional stragglers from the convoy, some idea may
be gathered of the arduous and unceasing work accom-
plished by the anti-submarine escorts.

It had been my practice during 1917 to call for
returns from all commands of the number of hours that
vessels of the destroyer and light cruiser type were
actually under way per month, and these returns showed
how heavy was the strain on the destroyers, particularly
those engaged in convoy work.

For several months, for instance, the destroyers in
the flotillas stationed at Devonport were under way on an
average for just under 50 per cent, of the month.

This meant that several destroyers in these flotillas
averaged quite 60 per cent, or even 70 per cent, of their
time under way, as other vessels of the flotilla were laid up
during the periods under review for long refits due to

The Convoy System at Work 141

collision or other damage, in addition to the necessary
four-monthly refit.

Anyone familiar with the delicate nature of the
machinery of destroyers — which needs constant attention
— and the conditions of life at sea in them will appreciate
the significance of these figures and the strain which the
conditions imposed on those on board as well as on the
machinery.

It was evident in November, 1917, that the personnel
and the machinery, whilst standing the strain in a wonder-
ful manner, were approaching the limit of endurance, and
anxiety was felt as to the situation during the winter.

Reports came in from the Grand Fleet indicating that
the work of the destroyers engaged in protecting the
ships of the Scandinavian convoy was telling heavily on
the personnel, particularly on the commanding officers,
and one report stated that the convoy work produced far
greater strain than any other duty carried out by
destroyers. No mean proportion of the officers were
suffering from a breakdown in health, and since the whole
of the work of the Devonport, Queenstown and North
of Ireland flotillas consisted of convoy duty, whilst only
a portion of the Grand Fleet destroyers was engaged in
this work, the opinions expressed were very disquieting
in their relation to the work of the southern flotillas.

However, the destroyers held on here as elsewhere,
but it is only just to the splendid endurance of the young
officers and the men who manned them to emphasize as
strongly as I can the magnificent work they carried out in
the face of every difficulty, and without even the incentive
of the prospect of a fight with a foe that could be seen,
this being the compensation given in their work to the
gallant personnel of the Dover, Harwich and Grand
Fleet flotillas. The convoy flotillas knew that their only

142 The Crisis of the Naval War

chance of action was with a submarine submerged, a form
of warfare in which the result was so very frequently
unknown and therefore unsatisfactory.

Under the new conditions the Admiralty took upon
itself responsibility for the control of the ships of the
Mercantile Marine in addition to its control of the move-
ments of the Fleet. Indeed the control of convoys was
even more directly under the Admiralty than was the
control of the Fleet. In the latter case the proper system
is for the Admiralty to indicate to the Commander-
in-Chief, Grand Fleet, or to other Commands the
objective, and to supply all the information possible
regarding the strength of the enemy, his intentions
and movements and such other information as can
be of use to the Commander-in-Chief, but to leave the
handling of the force to the Commander-in-Chief con-
cerned. This is the course which was usually followed
during the late war. It was my invariable practice when
at the Admiralty.

In the case of convoys, however, a different system
was necessary owing to the difficulty of transmitting
information, the great delay that would be caused were
this attempted, and the impossibility of control being
exercised over all convoys at sea except by the Admiralty.
Consequently the actual movements of convoys for the
greater part of their passage were directed by the Naval
Staff. Owing to ships not showing lights at night,
convoys were diverted clear of one another by wireless
signal if they were getting into dangerous proximity ; they
were directed to alter course as necessary to avoid areas in
which submarines had been located, and occasionally it
became necessary to alter the destination of some ships
as they approached home waters. The movements of all
convoys were " plotted" from day to day, indeed from

The Convoy System at Work 143

hour to hour, on a large-scale chart at the Admiralty, and
it was easy to see at a glance the position of all the ships
at any given time.

As the convoy approached home waters the ships
came within the areas of the Commanders-in-Chief, Coast
of Ireland, Devonport, and Portsmouth, and the Vice-
Admiral Commanding the Dover Patrol, and were taken
in charge by one or other of them. At each port a staff
existed which kept a constant record of the movements of
ships passing through or working in the Command, and
enabled the Commander-in-Chief to take instant action
if occasion arose.

The success of the convoy system in protecting trade
is best shown by the figures relating to the year 1917 on
the succeeding page (p. 144). In considering these figures
the loose Station-keeping of the ships in the Scandinavian
convoy must be borne in mind. A large proportion of
the ships in this convoy were neutrals, and it was naturally
not possible to bring these vessels under discipline as was
the case with convoys composed of purely British ships.
Consequently there was much straggling, and the losses
were proportionately heavier than in most of the Atlantic
convoys. The comparatively heavy losses in the Gibraltar
convoys were probably due to these convoys traversing two
dangerous submarine zones. The extraordinary im-
munity of the French coal trade convoy from serious
losses is remarkable and is probably due to the short pas-
sage which enabled most of the distance to be traversed at
night and to the ships being of light draught.

The table on the following page would not be complete
were no reference made to the heavy losses which were
experienced during the year amongst ships which were
unescorted through the danger zones, owing to the fact
that no escorting vessels were available for the work.

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The Convoy System at Work 145

There were naturally loud complaints of these losses, but
these were inevitable in the absence of escorting vessels,
and no one realized the dangers run more than those
responsible for finding protection; every available vessel
was not only working at highest possible pressure, but, as
has been mentioned, breakdowns from overwork amongst
escorting craft were causing very considerable anxiety.

The following figures show the dangers which were
run by unescorted vessels :

Losses amongst British merchant
steamships in 1917 by submarine
attack, under separate escort, under
Period, convoy or unescorted.

Ships under Ships shiDs
separate under unesC0 P rtedi
escort. convoy.

Quarter ending June 30 17 26 158

Quarter ending September 30 ... 14 29 148

October and November 12 23 90

In considering the above table it should be pointed
out that a large proportion of the losses shown under the
heading "Ships unescorted" took place amongst ships
which had either dispersed from a convoy or which were
on their way to join up with a convoy at the port of
assembly. It was unfortunately quite impossible to provide
escorts for all ships either to their ports of discharge or from
their loading ports to the ports of assembly for the convoy,
as we had so few vessels available for this work. Thus,
in the month of November, 1917, out of 13 vessels
engaged in the main oversea trade that were lost, 6
were in convoy, 5 had left or had not joined their
convoy, and 2 were not joining a convoy and were
unescorted.

November was the month of smallest British losses
during the period of unrestricted warfare in 1917, and it

146

The Crisis of the Naval War

is of interest to examine the losses for that month. The
total number of ships lost was 51. As many as 1,197
vessels entered or left home waters in overseas trade
exclusive of the Mediterranean trade. Of this aggregate
87.5 per cent, were in convoy, and the total number
of these vessels sunk (18) was divided amongst the
following trades : North America, 1 ; Gibraltar, 5 ;
West Africa and South America, 1 ; the Bay of Biscay,
Portugal and Spanish ports west of Gibraltar, 5 ; Scan-
dinavian, 1. In the same month there were 2,159 cross-
Channel sailings and ten losses, nine of these vessels
being unescorted.

Particulars of the locality of the total British losses
of 51 ships for the month of November are as follows :

East Coast north of St. Abb's

East Coast between St. Abb's and Yarmouth

East Coast, Yarmouth to the Downs

English Channel

Bristol Channel

Irish Sea

Bay of Biscay ...

South of Cape St. Vincent

Mediterranean

East of Suez ...

1 2 by mine.

f7 by mine.

tBy mine.

4*
21t

1
11

In order to give some idea of the great volume of
traffic on the East Coast and the consequent difficulty
of affording proper protection, it may be mentioned that
in the month of October, 1917, the number of vessels
passing between Spurn Head (River Humber) and
St. Abb's Head (to the northward) was 740 going north
and 920 going south. Of this total only 223 of the

The Convoy System at Work 147

northward- and 413 of the southward-bound vessels were
in convoy or under escort, the total losses being eleven,
all amongst the unaccompanied ships.

Mention should be made here of the very serious
situation which arose during the year 1917 owing to
the success attending the attacks by enemy submarines
on oil tankers bringing oil fuel to the United Kingdom
for the use of the Fleet. A great many of these tank
vessels were of great length and slow speed and presented
the easiest of targets to the torpedo attack of a submerged
submarine. So many vessels were sunk that our reserve
of oil fuel became perilously low. Instead of a reserve
of some five or six months we were gradually reduced
to one of about eight weeks, and in order to economize
expenditure of fuel it actually became necessary at one
time to issue directions that the speed of oil-burning war-
ships was to be limited except in cases of the greatest
urgency. Such an order in war was a matter of much
gravity ; the great majority of our light cruisers and
destroyers were fitted to burn oil fuel only, as well
as our latest and most powerful battleships. The crisis
was eventually overcome by drawing upon every source
(including the Grand Fleet) for destroyers to escort the
tankers through the submarine danger areas, and by the
assistance given us by the Ministry of Shipping in bring-
ing supplies of oil fuel to this country in the double
bottoms of merchant ships. By the end of 1917 the
situation had greatly improved.

The losses of shipping during 1917 were particularly
heavy in the Mediterranean. Apart from the fact that
the narrow waters of that sea render difficult a policy
of evasion on the part of merchant shipping and give
great advantages to the submarine, it was thought that
the heavy losses in the early part of the year were

148 The Crisis of the Naval War

partly due to the method of routeing the ships then in
force, and in reply to representations made to the French
Admiralty this system was altered by the French Com-
mander-in-Chief. It should be noted that the Mediter-
ranean outside the Adriatic was under French naval
control in accordance with the agreement entered into
with France and Italy. The cordial co-operation of the
French Admiralty with us, and the manner in which our
proposals were met, form very pleasant memories of my
term of office at the Admiralty. During the greater
part of the year 1917 Admiral Lacaze was Minister of
Marine, whilst Admiral de Bon held office as Chief of the
Naval Staff during the whole year. Nothing could exceed
the courtesy extended to me by these distinguished officers,
for whom I conceived great admiration and respect.

The result of the altered arrangement was a decided
but temporary improvement, and the losses again became
serious during the summer months. I then deemed it
desirable that the control of the traffic should be placed in
the hands of officers stationed at Malta, this being a central
position from which any necessary change in the arrange-
ments could be made more rapidly and with greater facility
than by the French Commander-in-Chief, who was also
controlling fleet movements and who, for this reason alone,
was not in a position to act quickly.

A unified command in the Mediterranean would
undoubtedly have been the most satisfactory and efficient
system to adopt, but the time was not ripe for proposing
that solution in 1917, and the alternative was adopted of
British control of the traffic routes throughout the whole
Mediterranean Sea subject to the general charge of the
French Commander-in-Chief which was necessary in
such an eventuality arising as an attempted " break out "
of the Austrian Fleet.

The Convoy System at Work 149

Accordingly, with the consent of the French and
Italian Admiralties, Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Somerset
Gough-Calthorpe, K.C.B., was dispatched to the Mediter-
ranean as British Commander-in-Chief ; he was in control
generally of all British Naval forces in the Mediterranean,
and especially in charge of all the arrangements for the
protection of trade and for anti-submarine operations, the
patrol vessels of all the nationalities concerned being placed
under his immediate orders for the purpose, whilst
the whole of the Mediterranean remained under the
general control of Vice-Admiral Gauchet, the French
Commander-in-Chief. Admiral Calthorpe was assisted by
French and Italian officers, and the Japanese Government,
which had previously dispatched twelve destroyers to the
Mediterranean to assist in the protection of trade, also gave
to Admiral Calthorpe the control of these vessels.

In the requests which we addressed to the Japanese
Admiralty I always received great assistance from
Admiral Funakoshi, the Naval Attache" in London. His
co-operation was of a close and most cordial nature.

The services of the Japanese destroyers in the Medi-
terranean were of considerable value to the Allied cause.
A striking instance of the seamanlike and gallant conduct
of their officers and men was furnished on the occasion
of the torpedoing of a British transport by an enemy
submarine off the coast of Italy, when by the work of
the Japanese escorting destroyers the great majority of
those on board were saved.

Admiral Calthorpe on leaving England was charged
with the duty of organizing convoys in the Mediterranean
on the lines of those already in force in other waters as
soon as the necessary vessels were available, and a con-
ference of Allied officers sat at Malta soon after his arrival,
when a definite scheme of convoy was prepared. There

150 The Crisis of the Naval War

had always, however, been a great scarcity of fast patrol
vessels in the Mediterranean for this work. Divided
control of the forces in that area was partly responsible
for this. The Austrian destroyers were considered by the
Italian Admiralty to be so serious a menace in the Adriatic
as to render it necessary to keep in that sea the great
majority of the Italian destroyers as well as several French
vessels of this class. The situation at the eastern end of
the Mediterranean necessitated a force of some eight
British destroyers being kept in the -<Egean Sea to deal
with any Turkish vessels that might attempt to force the
blockade of the Dardanelles, whilst operations on the
Syrian coast engaged the services of some French and
British destroyers. Continual troop movements in the
Mediterranean also absorbed the services of a considerable
number of vessels of this type.

Consequently there was a great shortage of fast small
craft for escort and mercantile convoy work. It was
estimated that the escort force required for the protection
of a complete system of convoy in the Mediterranean was
approximately 290 vessels, the total number available
being about 215.

In spite, then, of the success of Admiral Calthorpe's
work, the result was that convoys were not started in the
Mediterranean until October, and they were then but
inadequately protected, and losses were heavy, both from
this cause and from the fact already mentioned — that the
Mediterranean is a sea which, by reason of its confined
nature, is particularly suited for operations by submarines
against trade. Its narrowness at various points, such as
the Straits of Gibraltar, the Malta Channel, the Straits
of Messina, and the passages to the ^Egean cause such
convergence of trade as to make it a very simple matter
for a submarine to operate with success. Evasion by

The Convoy System at Work 151

change of route is almost impossible. Operations designed
to prevent the exit of submarines from the Adriatic were
difficult, because the depth of water in the Straits of
Otranto militated against the adoption of effective mining
and the laying of an effective net barrage.

For the above reasons the Admiralty was always very
averse to the sending of a large volume of our Far East-
ern trade through the Mediterranean, and strongly urged
the Cape route instead; but the shortage of shipping,
combined with the increased length of the Cape route,
influenced the Ministry of Shipping to press strongly for
the Mediterranean as opposed to the other route. A
"through" convoy from England to Port Said was
started in October, and by the end of November two
ships had been sunk out of the thirty-five that had been
under convoy. The return convoy, Port Said to
England, was only started in December.

The losses of British merchant steamships per
quarter in the Mediterranean during 1917 is shown
below :

Quarter ending June 80 69

,, ,, September 80 29

October and November ... ... ... 28

It is impossible to close this chapter describing the
convoys without mention being made of the fine work
accomplished by those upon whose shoulders fell the task
of organizing and working the whole system. I cannot
hope that I have succeeded in conveying to readers of
this volume an adequate conception of the great and
marvellously successful performance that it was or a full
appreciation of what immense difficulties the staff had
to contend >vith. They were very completely realized by

152 The Crisis of the Naval War

me, who saw them appear day by day and disappear under
treatment.

The head of the organization was, of course, Rear-
Admiral A. L. Duff, the member of the Board and Staff
immediately responsible also for the whole anti-submarine
organization. Only those who witnessed Admiral Duff's
work at the Admiralty during 1917 can realize the
immense debt that the country owes to his untiring ability,
patience, energy and resource. Capt. R. G. Henderson,
who had been associated with the convoy system from its
start, was an invaluable assistant, as also was Commander
I. W. Carrington. Capt. Richard Webb, the Director
of the Trade Division, and Capt. Frederic A. Whitehead,
the Director of the Mercantile Movements Division, took
an important share in the work of organization, whilst the
work of Convoy Manager was carried through with quite
exceptional skill by Paymaster-Commander H. W. E.
Manisty. These officers were assisted by most capable
staffs, and the Ministry of Shipping, without whose
assistance the work could not possibly have been success-
fully carried out, co-operated most cordially.

CHAPTER VI

THE ENTRY OF THE UNITED STATES ; OUR NAVAL POLICY

EXPLAINED

The entry of the United States of America into the .war
in April, 1917, had an important although not an imme-
diate effect upon our Naval policy. That the effect was
not immediate was due to the fact that the United States
Navy was at the time indifferently provided with the par-
ticular classes of vessels which were so greatly needed for
submarine warfare, viz. destroyers and other small surface
craft, submarines and light cruisers ; further, the United
States mercantile fleet did not include any considerable
number of small craft which could be usefully employed
for patrol and escort duty. The armed forces of the United
States of America were also poorly equipped with aircraft,
and had none available for Naval work. According to our
knowledge at the time the United States Navy, in April,
1917, possessed twenty-three large and about twenty-four
small destroyers, some of which were unfit to cross the
Atlantic ; there were about twelve submarines capable of
working overseas, but not well suited for anti-submarine
work, and only three light cruisers of the " Chester " class.
On the other hand about seven armoured cruisers were
available in Atlantic waters for convoy duties, and the
Navy included a fine force of battleships, of which fourteen
were in full commission in April.

At first, therefore, it was clear that the assistance
which could be given to the Allied Navies would be but

i53

154 The Crisis of the Naval War

slight even if all available destroyers were sent to European
waters. This was, presumably, well known to the members
of the German Naval Staff, and possibly explains their
view that the entry of the United States of America would
be of little help to the Allied cause. The Germans did
not, however, make sufficient allowance for the productive
power of the United States, and perhaps also it was
thought in Germany that public opinion in the United
States would not allow the Navy Department to send over
to European waters such destroyers and other vessels of
value in anti-submarine warfare as were available at once
or would be available as time progressed. The German
Staff may have had in mind the situation during the
Spanish-American War when the fact of Admiral
Cervera's weak and inefficient squadron being at large was
sufficient to affect adversely the naval strategy of the
United States to a considerable extent and to paralyze the
work of the United States Navy in an offensive direction.
Very fortunately for the Allied cause a most dis-
tinguished officer of the United States Navy, Vice-
Admiral W. S. Sims, came to this country to report
on the situation and to command such forces as were
sent to European waters. Admiral Sims, in his earlier
career before reaching the flag list, was a gunnery officer
of the very first rank. He had assimilated the ideas of
Sir Percy Scott of our own Navy, who had revolutionized
British naval gunnery, and he had succeeded, in his
position as Inspector of Target Practice in the United
States Navy, in producing a very marked increase in
gunnery efficiency. Later when in command, first of a
battleship, then of the destroyer flotillas, and finally as
head of the United States Naval War College, his close
study of naval strategy and tactics had peculiarly fitted
him for the important post for which he was selected, and

Entry of the United States 155

he not only held the soundest views on such subjects
himself, but was able, by dint of the tact and persuasive
eloquence that had carried him successfully through his
gunnery difficulties, to impress his views on others.

Admiral Sims, from the first moment of his arrival
in this country, was in the closest touch with the
Admiralty in general and with myself in particular. His
earliest question to me was as to the direction in which
the United States Navy could afford assistance to the
Allied cause. My reply was that the first essential was
the dispatch to European waters of every available
destroyer, trawler, yacht, tug and other small craft of
sufficient speed to deal with submarines, other vessels of
these classes following as fast as they could be produced ;
further that submarines and light cruisers would also be
of great value as they became available. Admiral Sims
responded wholeheartedly to my requests. He urged the
Navy Department with all his force to send these vessels
and send them quickly. He frequently telegraphed to the
United States figures showing the tonnage of merchant
ships being sunk week by week in order to impress on the
Navy Department and Government the great urgency of
the situation. I furnished him with figures which even we
ourselves were not publishing, as I felt that nothing but the
knowledge given by these figures could impress those who
were removed by 8,000 miles of sea from the scene of
a Naval war unique in many of its features.

Meanwhile the British Naval Commander-in-Chief in
North American waters, Vice-Admiral Sir Montague
Browning, had been directed to confer with the United
States Navy Department and to point out our immediate
requirements and explain the general situation.

On April 6 the United States declared war on Ger-
many. On April 13 we received information from Wash-

156 The Crisis of the Naval War

ington that the Navy Department ,was arranging to
co-operate with our forces for the protection of trade in
the West Atlantic should any enemy raiders escape from
the North Sea, that six United States destroyers would
be sent to European waters in the immediate future, and
that the United States would undertake the protection
of trade on the west coast of Canada and North America
as well as in the Gulf of Mexico. It was further indicated
that the number of United States destroyers for European
waters would be increased at an early date. The vital
importance of this latter step was being constantly urged
by Admiral Sims.

When Mr. Balfour's mission left for the United States
in April, Rear- Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair, the
naval representative on the mission, was requested to
do all in his power to impress on the United States
Navy Department the very urgent necessity that existed
for the immediate provision of small craft for anti-
submarine operations in European waters and for the
protection of trade.

He was informed that the position could not be con-
sidered satisfactory until the number of trawlers and sloops
available for patrol and escort duty was greatly increased
and that a total of at least another hundred destroyers was
required.

It was pointed out that difficulty might arise from the
natural desire of the United States Government to retain
large numbers of small craft for the protection of ship-
ping in the vicinity of the United States coast, but it
was at the same time indicated that our experience showed
that the number of submarines that the Germans could
maintain on the western side of the Atlantic was very
small, and that the real danger therefore existed in
European waters.

Entry of the United States 157

Admiral de Chair was asked amongst other matters
to emphasize the assistance which United States sub-
marines could render on the eastern side of the Atlantic,
where they would be able to undertake anti-submarine
operations, and he was also directed to endeavour to
obtain assistance in the production of mines, and the
provision of ships for minelaying work. Great stress
was, of course, laid upon the very important question of
a large output of merchant ships and the necessity for
repairing and putting into service the German merchant
ships interned in U.S. ports was urged; directions were
also given to Admiral de Chair to ascertain from Mr.
Schwab, of the Bethlehem Steel Company, and other
firms, to what extent they could build for the British
Navy destroyers, sloops, trawlers and submarines, and the
rapidity of such production.

The need for sloops was so great that I sent a
personal telegram to Mr. Schwab, whose acquaintance I
had made in October, 1914, on the occasion of the loss
of the Audacious, begging him to build at once a hundred
of these vessels to our order. I felt certain from the
experience we had gained of Mr. Schwab's wonderful
energy and power, as illustrated by the work accomplished
by him in providing us in 1915 with ten submarines built
in the extraordinarily short period of five months, that
he would produce sloops at a very rapid rate and that
there would be no delay in starting if he undertook the
Work. The drawings had already been sent over. How-
ever he was not able to undertake the work as the U.S.
Government decided that his yards would all be required
for their own work. This was unfortunate, as I had hoped
that these vessels would have been built in from four to six
months, seeing that the drawings were actually ready ; they
would have been invaluable in the latter part of 1917.

158 The Crisis of the Naval War

Whilst the mission was in the United States constant
communications passed on these subjects, the heavy losses
taking place in merchant ships were stated, and every
effort was made to impress upon the Navy Department
the urgency of the situation.

The tenor of our communications will be gathered
from these quotations from a personal telegram sent by
me to Admiral de Chair on April 26, viz. :

" For Rear-Admiral de Chair from First Sea Lord.

" You must emphasize most strongly to the United States
authorities the very serious nature of the shipping position.
We lost 55 British ships last week approximately 180,000 tons
and rate of loss is not diminishing.

" Press most strongly that the number of destroyers sent
to Ireland should be increased to twenty-four at once if this
number is available.

" Battleships are not required but concentration on the
vital question of defeat of submarine menace is essential.

" Urge on the authorities that everything should give way
to the submarine menace and that by far the most important
place on which to concentrate patrols is the S.W. of Ireland.
******

" You must keep constantly before the U.S. authorities
the great gravity of the situation and the need that exists for
immediate action.

" Our new methods will not be effective until July and the
critical period is April to July."

It was very necessary to bring home to the United
States Navy Department the need for early action.
Admiral Sims informed me — as soon as he became aware
of the heavy losses to merchant shipping that were taking
place — that neither he nor anyone else in the United States
had realized that the situation was so serious. This was,
of course, largely due to the necessity which we were under

Entry of the United States 159

of not publishing facts which .would encourage the enemy
or unduly depress our own people. Further, he informed
me that an idea was prevalent in the United States that
the moral of the German submarine crews had been com-
pletely broken by their losses in submarines. This im-
pression was the successful result of certain action on our
part taken with intent to discourage the enemy. What-
ever may have been the case later in the year, we had,
however, no evidence in the spring of 1917 of deterioration
of moral amongst German submarine crews, nor was there
any reason for such a result. It was therefore necessary
to be quite frank with Admiral Sims ; we knew quite well
that we could not expect new measures to be effective for
some few months, and we knew also that we could not
afford a continuance of the heavy rate of loss experienced
in April, without a serious effect being produced upon
our war effort. We were certainly not in the state of
panic which has been ascribed to us in certain quarters,
but we did want those who were engaged in the war on the
side of the Allies to understand the situation in order that
they might realize the value that early naval assistance
would bring to the Allied cause. There is no doubt that
great difficulty must be experienced by those far removed
from the theatre of war in understanding the conditions in
the war zone. This was exemplified at a time when we had
organized the trade in convoys and the system was showing
itself effective in greatly reducing losses from submarine
attack. We were pressing the United States to strengthen
our escorting forces as far as possible in order to extend the
convoy system, when a telegram arrived from Washington
to the effect that it was considered that ships which were
armed were safer when sailing singly than when in convoy.
It has also been stated that the Admiralty held the view
at this time that no solution of the problem created by

160 The Crisis of the Naval War

the enemy's submarine campaign was in sight. This is
incorrect. We had confidence in the measures — most of
them dependent on the manufacture of material — which
were in course of preparation by the time the United
States entered the war, but our opinion was that there
was no immediate solution beyond the provision of
additional vessels for the protection of shipping, and the
reason for this view was that time was required before other
measures could be put into effective operation; this is
evident from the final paragraph of my telegram to
Admiral de Chair, dated April 26, which I have quoted.

The first division of six United States destroyers,
under the command of Lieut. -Commander T. K. Taussig,
arrived in British waters on May 2, and they were most
welcome. It was interesting to me personally that
Lieut. -Commander Taussig should be in command, as
he, when a sub-lieutenant, had been wounded on the
same day as myself during the Boxer campaign in China,
and we had been together for some time subsequently.

At about this time our advice was sought by the
United States Navy Department as to the best type of
anti-submarine craft for the United States to build; on
this subject a very short experience in the war theatre
caused Admiral Sims to hold precisely similar views to
myself. As a result of the advice tendered a great build-
ing programme of destroyers, large submarine-hunting
motor launches and other small craft was embarked upon.
Although the completion of these vessels was delayed
considerably beyond anticipated dates, they did, in 1918,
exercise an influence on the submarine war.

The Germans made one great mistake, for which
we were thankful. As already mentioned, it was
anticipated that they would send submarines to work
off the United States coast immediately after the declara-

■ ■ " , | U ,'i\|.',1 ill

"'**f.A." r i fit .

i* '■" ! Tfi ; i

' i ? #1 if '' A

Entry of the United States 161

tion of war by that country. Indeed we were expecting
to hear of the presence of submarines in the West Atlantic
throughout the whole of 1917. They did not appear
there until May, 1918. The moral effect of such action
in 1917 would have been very great and might possibly
have led to the retention in the United States of some of
the destroyers and other small craft which were of such
assistance in European waters in starting the convoy
system. Admiral Sims was himself, I think, anxious on
this head. When the Germans did move in this direction
in 1918 it was too late; it was by that time realized in
the United States that the enemy could not maintain
submarines in sufficient numbers in their waters to exercise
any decisive effect, although the shipping losses might be
considerable for a time, and consequently no large change
of policy was made.

As is well known, Admiral Sims, with the consent of
the United States Navy Department, placed all vessels
which were dispatched to British waters under the British
flag officers in whose Command they were working. This
step, which at once produced unity of command, is
typical of the manner in which the two navies, under the
guidance of their senior officers, worked together through-
out the war. The destroyers operating from Queenstown
came under Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly ; Captain Pringle,
the senior United States officer on the spot, whose services
were ever of the utmost value, was appointed as Chief
of the Staff to Sir Lewis Bayly, whilst on the occasion
of Sir Lewis Bayly, at my urgent suggestion, consent-
ing to take a few days' leave in the summer of 1917,
Admiral Sims, at'our request, took his place at Queens-
town, hoisting his flag in command of the British and
United States naval forces. The relations between the
officers and men of the two navies in this Command were

162 The Crisis of the Naval War

of the happiest possible nature, and form one of the
pleasantest episodes of the co-operation between the two
nations. The United States officers and men very quickly
realized the strong personality of the Commander-in-Chief
at Queenstown, and became imbued with the same feelings
of great respect and admiration for him as were held by
British officers and men. Also he made the officers feel
that Admiralty House, Queenstown, was their home when
in port, and saw that everything possible was done for
the comfort of the men. The very high standard of
duty set by Sir Lewis, and very fully sustained by him,
was cheerfully and willingly followed by the United
States force, the personnel of which earned his warmest
admiration. I think it will be agreed in years to come
that the comradeship between the two navies, first
initiated in the Queenstown Command, went very far
towards cementing the bonds of union between the two
great English-speaking nations.

This was the first step in co-operation. The next was
taken when the United States Navy Department, as the
result of a request made by us to Admiral Sims, sent to
Gibraltar a detachment of three light cruisers and a
number of revenue cutters as patrol and escort vessels,
placing the whole force under the British senior naval
officer at Gibraltar, Rear-Admiral Heathcote Grant.
Here again the relations between the two navies were
of the happiest nature. Finally, later in the year, I
discussed with Admiral Sims the desirability of a small
force of United States battleships being sent to reinforce
the Grand Fleet.

When the project was first mentioned my object in
asking for the ships was that they might relieve some of
our earlier " Dreadnoughts," which at that time it was
desired to use for another purpose. I discussed the matter

Entry of the United States 163

also with Admiral Mayo, the Commander-in-Chief of the
United States Atlantic Fleet, during his visit to this
country in August, 1917, and with Admiral Benson, the
Chief of Operations in the United States Navy Depart-
ment, when he came over later in the year. Admiral
Benson gave directions that four coal-burning battleships
should be sent over. We were obliged to ask for coal-
burning battleships instead of the more modern vessels
with oil-fired boilers owing to the great shortage of oil
fuel in this country and the danger of our reserves being
still further depleted. These vessels, under Rear- Admiral
Hugh Rodman, arrived in British waters early in Decem-
ber, 1917, and formed a division of the Grand Fleet. The
co-operation afloat was now complete, and all that was
needed was further co-operation between the British
Admiralty and the United States Navy Department.

This had already formed the subject of discussions,
first between Admiral Sims and myself, and later with
Admirals Mayo and Benson.

During the summer of 1917 Admiral Sims had been
invited to attend the daily meetings of the naval members
of the operations side of the Board, an invitation which
he accepted, and his co-operation was of great value"; but
we both felt it desirable to go a step farther, and I had
suggested the extreme desirability of the United States
Navy Department sending officers of experience of
different ranks to work in the Admiralty, both on the
operations and material side, officers upon whom the
Navy Department could rely to place before us the views
of the Department and to transmit their view of the
situation as the result of their work and experience at
the Admiralty. We had pressed strongly for the adop-
tion of this course. Admiral Benson, after discussions,
assented to it, and the officers on the material side qom-

164 The Crisis of the Naval War

menoed work in the Admiralty towards the end of 1917,
whilst those on the operations side joined the War Staff
early in 1918.

It was felt that this course would complete the
co-operation between the navies of the two countries
and, further, that the United States Navy Department
would be kept in the closest possible touch with the British
Admiralty in all respects.

It is particularly to be remembered that even before
we had established this close liaison the whole of the
United States naval forces in British waters had been
placed under the command of British naval officers.
This step, so conducive to good results owing to the unity
of command which was thus obtained, won our
highest admiration, showing as it did a fine spirit of
self-effacement on the part of the senior American naval
officers.

The visits of Admirals Mayo and Benson to this
country were productive of very good results. The
exchange of information which took place was most
beneficial, as was the experience which the admirals
gained of modern naval warfare. Moreover, the utterly
baseless suggestion which had, unfortunately, found
expression in some organs of the Press of the United
States that we were not giving the fullest information to
the Navy Department was completely disproved.

When Admiral Mayo arrived in England he informed
me that the main objects of his visit as Commander-in-
Chief of the Atlantic Fleet were :

(1) To ascertain our present policy and plans.

(2) To inquire as to the changes, if any, that
were contemplated in the immediate or more distant
future.

Entry of the United States 165

(3) To ascertain what further assistance it was
desired that the United States should provide from
resources then available or likely to be soon available,
and the measures that the United States should take
to provide future forces and material.

Papers were prepared under my direction for Admiral
Mayo giving full information of our immediate needs, of
past procedure and of future plans. As to our needs, the
main requests were :

(1) An increase in the number of destroyers, in
order to enlarge the convoy system and to provide
better protection for each convoy. An additional
55 destroyers were stated to be required for this
service.

(2) An increase in the number of convoy cruisers
for the same reason. The total addition of cruisers
or old battleships was given as 41.

(8) An increase in the number of patrol craft,
tugs, etc., for anti-submarine work.

(4) The rapid building of merchant ships.

(5) The supply of a large number of mines for
the proposed barrage in the North Sea, and assist-
ance towards laying them by the provision of United
States minelaying vessels.

(6) Aircraft assistance in the shape of three large
seaplane stations on the coast of Ireland, with some
36 machines at each station.

(7) The provision of four coal-buming battleships
of the "Dreadnought" type to replace Grand
Fleet "Dreadnought" battleships which it was
desired to use for other purposes.

Admiral Mayo was informed that some 100,000 mines

166 The Crisis of the Naval War

would be required from the Americans for forming and
maintaining that portion of the North Sea Barrage which
it was suggested should be laid by them, in addition to
the large number that it was proposed that we ourselves
should lay in the barrage, and that as the barrage would
need patrolling by a large number of small craft, great
help would be afforded if the United States could provide
some of these vessels. It was estimated at that time that
the barrage would absorb the services of some 250 small
vessels in order that a sufficient number might be kept
constantly on patrol.

It may be of interest to give the history of the North
Sea Barrage so far as I can recollect it. Our views on
such a scheme Were sought by the United States Navy
Department in the spring of 1917. Owing to various
military circumstances, even at that time we had no pros-
pect of obtaining mines in adequate numbers for such
work for at least nine to twelve months, nor could we
provide the necessary craft to patrol the barrage. Our
view was that such mines as became available during the
last months of 1917 would be more effective if laid nearer
to the German North Sea naval bases, and in the Straits
of Dover, than at such a distance from these bases as
the suggestion involved. Apart from our desire to stop
the submarines near their bases, the pros and cons
of the scheme were as follows :

The advantages were :

(1) That, except for the difficulty of preventing
the submarines from using Norwegian territorial
waters for egress, a North Sea Barrage would
be a menace to submarines using the Kattegat
exit as well as those coming from North Sea bases.

(2) That the enemy would be unable to sweep up

Entry of the United States 167

the minefield, owing to its distance (over 200 miles)
from his bases.

The disadvantages were :

(1) The immense number of mines required —
some 120,000, excluding reserves — and the improb-
ability of producing them in Great Britain.

(2) The great depth of water in which many of
them were to be moored, a depth in which no mines
had ever been successfully laid before ; time would
be required to devise arrangements that would enable
the mines to be laid at such depths.

(3) The very large number of patrol craft that
would be needed to force submarines to dive into
that portion of the minefield which was safe for
surface vessels and the difficulty of maintaining them
at sea in bad North Sea weather.

(4) The difficulty of preventing egress by the sub-
marines in Norwegian territorial waters, in which,
even if mines were laid, they would have to be
moored at such a depth as not to constitute a danger to
vessels on the surface.

Shortly after the subject was broached to us we
learned that the United States Navy had devised a mine
that it was expected would be satisfactory for the purpose
of the barrage. An experienced mining officer was at
once sent over by us to inspect the mine and to give to
the United States officers such assistance as was possible
due to his great knowledge of mining under war
conditions.

When he arrived in the United States the mine was
still in the experimental stage, but later he reported that
it promised to be successful, and in view of the great
manufacturing resources in America, it appeared that a

168 The Crisis of the Naval War

considerable proportion of the mines for the barrage could
be provided by the United States Navy. Our own efforts
to produce a mine suitable for very great depths were also
proving successful and anticipations as to manufacture
were optimistic. Accordingly plans were prepared for
a barrage across the North Sea, which were given to
Admiral Mayo before he left England on his return to
the United States. Without seriously relaxing our
mining operations in the Heligoland Bight, and without
interfering with our mine barrage on the Folkestone —
Grisnez line, we anticipated at this time that we could
provide mines for our portion of the North Sea Barrage
by the time that the United States supply of mines was
in readiness to be laid.

Admiral Mayo was also furnished with papers dealing
at length with our naval policy at the time and the
intended future policy, both in home waters and abroad.
Papers were given him relating to our air policy, to
the attitude of neutral countries, to the Belgian coast
problem, to the blockade, to the defence of trade (includ-
ing one on the convoy system), to such subjects as the
defensive armament of merchant ships with guns, smoke
apparatus and mine defence gear, the instruction of
the personnel in their use, and the system of issuing
route instruction to merchant ships. An important state-
ment was also supplied giving a detailed account of our
anti-submarine policy, both at the time and in the future.

These papers gave the fullest information on the
naval problem, and were intended to put the United
States Naval Department in a position to appreciate the
whole position and its many embarrassments, though we
realized that these could be appreciated only by those
who, like Admiral Sims, were in daily contact with the
problems. It will possibly be of further interest if

Entry of the United States 169

mention is made of some of the points to which attention
was drawn.

Admiral Mayo, for instance, was informed that
British naval policy was being directed in 1917, as during
the remainder of the war, to exerting constant economic
pressure upon the enemy with a view to forcing him to
come to terms. We also endeavoured to prevent the
enemy from interfering with the conduct of the war by
ourselves and our Allies. In the effective pursuit of that
policy the duty of the Navy involved :

(1) The protection of the sea communications of
the Allied armies and the protection of British and
Allied trade.

(2) The prevention of enemy trade in order to
interfere with his military operations and to exert
economic pressure.

(8) Resistance to invasion and raids.

It was pointed out that the question at issue in each
case was the control of sea communications, and in order
to attain that control permanently and completely the
enemy's naval forces both above and below water had to
be destroyed or effectually masked. As the weaker
German Fleet not unnaturally refused decisive action and
as its destruction had hitherto not been achieved, we
had adopted a policy of guarding an area between our
vital communications and the enemy's ports, and of
guarding the areas through which the trade and transports
passed ; these were the only methods of frustrating attacks
made either by surface vessels or by submarines which
succeeded in reaching open waters. It was pointed out
that a combination of these two methods had been in force
during the wars of the eighteenth century, blockades
being combined with the convoy system and the patrol

170 The Crisis of the Naval War

of local areas by frigates, etc. History, in fact, was
repeating itself.

We mentioned that a close blockade of the German
North Sea and Baltic ports presented insuperable diffi-
culties under the conditions of modern warfare, and the
alternative of controlling the Dover and Norway —
Scotland exits to the North Sea had been adopted. The
former protected the communications of the armies in
France, whilst the two combined covered the maritime
communications of the world outside the North Sea and
Baltic, and if they could be effectively guarded our first
two objects would be attained.

So far as the Dover exit was concerned we stated
that the narrowness of the waters, with the consequent
risk to the enemy from our mines and torpedoes, had so
far acted as a deterrent to his capital ships ; we had to
depend on the light forces at Harwich and Dover to deal
with any enemy surface craft attacking the southern area
from German ports.

We pointed out that the control of the Norway —
Scotland exit depended upon the presence of the Grand
Fleet at Rosyth or at Scapa. This fleet ensured the
safety of all the vessels engaged in protecting trade and
in hunting submarines outside the North Sea.

Mention was made of the fact that the enemy could
not open the sea routes for his own war ships without
risking a serious action, and that so far he had shown no
inclination to run that risk. The Battle of Jutland having
been fought in the previous year, any future movement of
the High Sea Fleet into the North Sea would probably
be merely with the object of drawing our capital ships into
prepared areas so as to bring about a process of attrition
by mines and torpedoes. Such a movement had been
carried out on August 19, 1916. The reasons which had

Entry of the United States 171

led to the adoption of the Orkney — Faroe — Iceland
blockade line were also explained.

It was pointed out that in the early stages of the war.
the foregoing general dispositions had sufficed to protect
the Allies' communications and to throttle those of the
enemy outside the Baltic. Although enemy cruisers in
foreign waters and a few raiding vessels which had evaded
the blockade had inflicted losses on trade, losses from such
causes could not reach really serious proportions so long
as the enemy trusted to evasion and refused to face the
Grand Fleet. The danger of serious loss from attack by
raiding surface craft had also been greatly minimized by
the adoption of the convoy system. But as the enemy's
submarines increased in size, efficiency and numbers, the
situation had been modified, for evasion by submarines
of the command exercised by the Grand Fleet was easy,
and our vital sea communications could be attacked by
them without the risk of a fleet action.

So far as the protection of trade was concerned, the
effect therefore of the submarine campaign had been to
remove the barrier established by the Grand Fleet and
to transfer operations to the focal areas and approach
routes.

As the situation developed, a policy of dealing with
the submarines by armed patrol craft and decoy ships in
these areas had therefore been put into force. Merchant
ships had been armed as rapidly as possible, and in addition
efforts had been made to intercept the submarines en
route to these areas both in the vicinity of German waters
and farther afield.

The great area covered by the approach routes and
the increasing radius of submarine operations had made
the provision of a sufficient number of patrol vessels
a practical impossibility and had led to a general adoption

172 The Crisis of the Naval War

of the convoy system as rapidly as the supply of fast small
craft made this possible.

The methods of attacking German submarines before
they could reach open waters, by extensive mining in
the Heligoland Bight, with the exception of Dutch and
Danish territorial waters, were also mentioned.

As regards future naval policy it was pointed out that
the enemy submarine campaign was the dominating
factor to such an extent that any sustained increase in
the then rate of sinking merchant ships might eventually
prove disastrous.

Mention was made of the fact that the enemy was
still producing submarines faster than the Allies were
destroying them; the policy of coping with submarines
after they reached the open sea had not as yet been
sufficiently effective to balance construction against
losses, even in combination with the extensive minefields
laid in the Heligoland Bight.

The future policy was therefore being directed towards
an attempt at a still more concentrated and effective
control in the areas between the enemy's ports and our
trade routes, and it was proposed to form some descrip-
tion of block or barrage through which the enemy sub-
marines would not be able to pass without considerable
risk. Four forms had been considered :

(1) A method of blocking either mechanically
or by mines all the exits of the submarines from
their North Sea or Baltic bases.

(2) A barrage of mines at different depths,
from near the surface of the sea to near the
bottom.

(8) A combination of deep mines with a patrolling
force of surface craft and aircraft whose object would

Entry of the United States 173

be to force the submarines under the surface into

the minefield.

(4) A force of surface craft and aircraft patrolling

an area of sufficient extent to prevent submarines

coming to the surface to recharge their batteries

during the hours of darkness.
Admiral Mayo was informed that in our opinion the
first scheme as given above, viz. that of absolutely sealing
the eocits, was the only radical cure for the evil, but that
there were very great difficulties to be overcome before
such an operation could be successfully carried out. He
was shown the plan that had been prepared for a
mechanical block of all the enemy North Sea bases, and
he entirely concurred in the impracticability of carrying
it out. Such a plan had -been advocated by some officers
and by other people; it was, of course, most attractive
in theory and appealed strongly to those who looked at
the question superficially. When, however, a definite
operation came to be worked out in detail the difficulties
became very apparent, and even enthusiastic supporters
of the idea were forced to change their views. It was
not a matter for surprise to me that the idea of sealing
the exits from submarine bases was urged by so many
people on both sides of the Atlantic. It was, of course,
the obvious counter to the submarine campaign, and it
appealed with force to that considerable section which
feels vaguely, and rightly, that offensive action is needed,
without being quite so clear as to the means by which
it is to be carried out.

In this particular case I informed the clever and able
officers to whom the planning of the operation was
entrusted that they were to proceed on the assumption that
we intended to seal the enemy's ports somehow, and that
they were to devise the best possible scheme, drawing up

174 The Crisis of the Naval War

all the necessary orders for the operations. This was done
in the most complete detail and with great care and
ingenuity, but at the end there was no difference of
opinion whatever as to the inadvisability of proceeding
with the operations.

It is to be observed in connexion with this question
that sealing the North Sea bases would not have been a
complete cure, since submarines could still make their
exit via the Kattegat, where we could not block channels
without violating the neutrality of other nations.

The final conclusion arrived at was to use a combina-
tion of the last three alternatives provided that a satis-
factory type of mine could be produced in sufficient
numbers and a sufficient supply of small craft provided
by ourselves and the United States.

Full details were given to Admiral Mayo of the
proposed North Sea Barrage on a line totalling 230 miles
in length, which was divided into three parts, Areas A,
B and C, of which Area A only would be dangerous to
surface vessels.

It was estimated that Area A would require 86,800
mines, and it was proposed that this area should be mined
by the United States forces with United States mines.

It was proposed that the British should mine Area B,
the requirements being 67,500 mines, and that the United
States should mine Area C, for which 18,000 United
States mines would be required.

The reasons governing the selection of the mine bar-
rage area were fully given, and the advantages arising
from the use of the United States pattern of mine instead
of the British mine for Areas A and C were stated.

Admiral Mayo was also informed of our intention
to establish a mine barrage in the Channel, on the
Folkestone — Grisnez line, as soon as mines were available,

Entry of the United States 173

with a strong force of patrol vessels stationed there, whose
duty it would be to compel enemy submarines to dive into
the minefield. He was further made acquainted with
our intended policy of still closer minelaying in the
Heligoland Bight.

Although Admiral Mayo was not actually informed of
the details of the future policy which it was hoped to
adopt in the Adriatic for the improvement of the Otranto
Barrage, various schemes were at the time being worked
out between the British, French and Italian Admiralties,
having as their object the prevention or obstruction of
the exit of enemy submarines from the Adriatic, in the
same way as it was hoped to obstruct German submarines
from making their exit from the North Sea without
incurring heavy losses. The great depth of water in the
southern part of the Adriatic constituted the main
difficulty facing us in the solution of this problem.
In August, 1917, it was, however, definitely decided to
establish a barrage of nets and mines across the Straits
of Otranto, and the work was put in hand. This became
effective during 1918.

The paper on Naval Air Policy showed the aim of
the Admiralty to be :

To provide in sufficient numbers a type of airship
which would be able to scout with the Grand Fleet, and,
in this respect, to perform the duty of light cruisers.
Airship stations had been established on the East Coast
for this purpose.

To provide also a type of airship for coastal patrol
work and for the escort of merchant ships in convoy.
For these airships stations had been established on the
East, South and West Coasts and at Scapa.

To provide a sufficient supply of kite balloons for the

176 The Crisis of the Naval War

work of the Grand Fleet. Fleet kite balloon stations had
already been established at Rosyth and Scapa, and the
resources of the latter station were supplemented by a
kite balloon ship. It was intended also to provide kite
balloons for flotillas or single vessels engaged in submarine
hunting or in convoy work. A large number of kite
balloon stations for anti-submarine work had been or were
being established round the coast for this work.

As to the future programme of rigid airships, Admiral
Mayo was told that it was under consideration to con-
struct three new rigid stations, also that three new
stations for the use of non-rigids for anti-submarine work
were to be established, while it was also proposed to
provide sufficient resources to allow of a number of kite
balloons being worked in vessels between the North of
Scotland and Norway and to the eastward of the English
Channel.

Admiral Mayo was also informed that it was proposed
to provide sufficient " heavier than air " craft of various
types for the Fleet, both to insure adequate air recon-
naissance and to drive off hostile aircraft. The Grand
Fleet was at the time already provided with three sea-
plane carriers, and the Furious and other special vessels
were being fitted to carry aircraft. Many of the armoured
vessels and light cruisers of the Fleet had also been fitted
to carry aircraft, whilst the Harwich light cruiser force
possessed one seaplane carrier ; two carriers were devoted
to anti-submarine work, and three were employed in the
Mediterranean.

It was further stated that machines for naval
reconnaissance were working from several East Coast
stations, and that lighters to carry seaplanes for more
extended reconnaissance and offensive work were under
construction. The work carried out by our naval aircraft

Entry of the United States

177

off the Belgian coast, comprising the duty of keeping the
coast under constant observation, of spotting the gunfire
of ships, of fighting aircraft and bombing objectives of
importance, were also mentioned, as well as the work in
the Mediterranean, where there were four bases in the
Mgean.

The extensive anti-submarine patrol work round the
British Isles and in the Mediterranean was touched upon,
there being " heavier than air " stations at the time at

Houton Bay.

Dundee.

South Shields.

Bembridge.

Calshot.

Portland.

Killingholme.

Yarmouth.

Felixstowe.

Westgate.

Dover.

Newhaven.

Cherbourg.

Plymouth.

Newlyn.

Scilly.

Fishguard.

Steps were being taken to extend the number of
stations as soon as possible, the new programme including
stations at such places as

Padstow.
Wexford.
Queenstown.
Berehaven.
Loch Foyle.

Loch Ryan (or in the

Hebrides).
Shetlands.
Peterhead.

In the event of the United States being in a position
to co-operate in the work, it was recommended that the
three main seaplane stations in Ireland should be taken
over by the Americans, and equipped, manned and
controlled entirely by United States personnel.

178 The Crisis of the Naval War

In regard to the convoy system a full description of
the whole organization was given, with the results up to
date, and details of the vessels available and still needed
for its protection.

Full information was afforded on the subject of the
arming of merchant ships and fitting other defensive
measures to them, and the routeing system in use for
merchant ships was described in detail.

In the remarks on our anti-submarine warfare it was
pointed out that anti-submarine measures were carried
out both on the surface, under water, and in the air.

The surface measures were described as follows :

In twelve of the twenty-two areas into which, the
waters round the United Kingdom were divided, regular
hunting flotillas were at work, comprising trawlers and
motor launches fitted with hydrophones. Before the
institution of the convoy system a few fast vessels, such
as destroyers Or "P" boats, had been formed into
hunting flotillas, but the convoy work had necessitated the
withdrawal of all these vessels, and the work of the flotillas
had suffered in consequence, the speed of trawlers being
too slow to offer the same prospect of success in such
anti-submarine measures. The flotillas of motor launches
which had been formed were of considerable utility in
fine weather, but they could only operate in comparatively
smooth water.

At the time of Admiral Mayo's visit a force of
thirty-two trawlers to work with about six sloops or
destroyers was being organized as vessels became avail-
able, to operate in the North Sea with a view to engaging
enemy submarines on passage in those waters.

It was also pointed out to Admiral Mayo that the
coast patrol vessels which were not actually in the hunting
flotillas were all engaged in anti-submarine work and

Entry of the United States 179

did frequently come into action against the German
submarines.

Finally Admiral Mayo was informed that the convoy
system itself was looked upon as an offensive measure
since the German submarines would, in order to attack
vessels under convoy, be forced into contact with the
fast craft engaged in the work of escort and thus place
themselves in positions in which they could themselves
be successfully attacked.

Admiral Mayo, during his stay in European waters,
inspected some of our naval bases and paid a visit to the
Grand Fleet.

He crossed to France in order that he might see the
work being carried out at French ports by vessels of the
United States Navy, and while returning from this visit
he honoured the British Navy by accompanying Sir
Reginald Bacon and myself in H.M.S. Broke to witness
a bombardment of Ostend by the monitor Terror. On
this occasion Admiral Mayo's flag was hoisted in the
Broke and subsequently presented to him as a souvenir
of the first occasion of a United States Admiral having
been under fire in a British man-of-war. It is satisfactory
to record that subsequent aerial photographs showed that
much damage to workshops, etc., had been caused by
this bombardment.

The Admiral and his Staff very quickly established
themselves in the high regard of British naval officers, and
it was with much regret that we witnessed their return
to the United States. My own associations with the
Admiral had led to a feeling of great friendship. He left
behind him his Chief of Staff, Captain Jackson, who to
our great regret had been seriously injured in a motor
accident.

Admiral Benson's visit took place later in the year.

i8o The Crisis of the Naval War

I had written to him urging him to come across so that
he might have first-hand knowledge of the state of affairs
and of the policy being followed. During his visit the
same questions were discussed as with Admiral Mayo,
and important action was taken in the direction of closer
naval co-operation between the Allies by the formation
of an Allied Naval Council consisting of the Ministers
of Marine and the Chiefs of the Naval Staff of the Allied
Nations and of the United States. This proposal had
been under discussion for some little time, and, indeed,
naval conferences had been held on previous occasions.
The first of these during my tenure of office at the
Admiralty was on January 23 and 24, 1917, and another
was held during the visit of Admiral Mayo and at
the instigation of the Government of the United States
on September 4 and 5, 1917. On this latter occasion
important discussions had taken place, principally on the
subject of submarine warfare, the methods of dealing
with it in home waters and in the Mediterranean, and
such matters as the provision of mercantile shipping for
the use of our Allies.

There was, however, no regular council sitting at
specified intervals, and it was this council which came
into being in the early part of December. Its functions
were to watch over the general conduct of the naval war
and to insure co-ordination of the effort at sea as well
as the development of all scientific operations connected
with the conduct of the war.

Special emphasis was laid upon the fact that the
individual responsibility of the respective Chiefs of the
Naval Staff and of the Commanders-in-Chief at sea
towards their Governments as regards operations in hand
as well as the strategical and technical disposition of the
forces placed under their command remained unchanged ;

Entry of the United States 181

this proviso .was a necessity in naval warfare, and was very
strongly insisted upon by the Admiralty.

The attention of the Council was directed at the
earliest meetings to the situation in the Mediterranean,
where naval forces from the British Empire, France,
Greece, Italy, Japan and the United States were work-
ing, and where the need for close co-operation was most
urgent. The real need in the Mediterranean, as was
frequently pointed out, was the inclusion of the naval
forces of all the Allied nations under one single com-
mand. In 1918 strong efforts were made to carry out
this policy, and indeed the actual Admiralissimo was
selected, but the attempt failed in the end.

Both these distinguished American officers were
reminded, as indeed they must have seen for themselves,
that the successful combating of the submarine danger
depended largely on the manufacture of material, and
that the resources of this country, with its great fleet
and its large and increasing armies, were so seriously
taxed that the execution of the plans of the Admiralty
were being constantly and gravely delayed. The
Admiralty was, indeed, seriously embarrassed by diffi-
culties in the adequate supply of mines and other means
of destroying submarines as well as of fast craft of various
descriptions. The Admiralty, as was pointed out, were
doing not what they would like to do, but what they
could do, both in the way of offensive and defensive
action. The supplies of raw material and labour con-
trolled in large measure the character and extent of the
operations at sea.

CHAPTER VII

PATROL CRAFT AND MINESWEEPING SERVICES

It is difficult to give an idea of the truly magnificent
.work achieved by the patrol and minesweeping services
during the year 1917 without showing how these services
expanded after the outbreak of war in 1914.

When war was declared the only vessels immediately
available for the work consisted of seven torpedo gunboats
manned by officers and men of the Royal Navy, and
fourteen trawlers manned by fishermen. All these
vessels were fitted for regular minesweeping work, and
the crews of the trawlers formed a part of what was known
as the "Trawler Reserve." Other trawlers, exceeding
eighty in number, became, however, almost immediately
available at the outbreak of war under the organized
Trawler Reserve which had been set up a year or
two preceding the outbreak of war. Men belonging to
this reserve had been trained in the work of minesweeping
and were paid a small retaining fee.

As soon as the German methods of indiscriminate
minelaying and submarine attacks upon merchant ships
commenced, a great expansion of this force became
necessary. The matter was handled energetically by the
Admiralty at the time, and by the end of 1914 over 700
vessels (yachts, trawlers and drifters) were employed on
patrol and minesweeping duties, and the Admiralty had
also commenced to build vessels of the trawler type
specially for this work.

182

Patrol Craft and Minesweeping Services 183

By the commencement of 1917 there were in use
some 2,500 yachts, trawlers and drifters, the great
majority of them manned by fishermen or men of the
R.N.R. or R.N.V.R. and officered by trawler or drifter
skippers or officers of the R.N.R. or R.N.V.R., many
of them having temporary commissions in these
services.

Early in the war the coast of the United Kingdom
had been divided into areas for purposes of patrol and
minesweeping, and each area was under the command
of a naval officer on either the active or retired list.

The Chart D shows the respective areas at one
period. No very important changes took place in the
delimitation of the areas during the war, and the chart
may therefore be considered generally representative of
the organization. Chart E shows the zones into which
the Mediterranean was divided.

In December, 1917, the number of vessels of different
classes actually appropriated to various areas is given on
the next page in Table A for the British Isles and
Table B for the Mediterranean.

It will be seen that the total number of British patrol
and minesweeping craft, exclusive of the stationary boom
defence vessels, was at this time 3,084. Of this number
478 were in the Mediterranean, 824 were in the English
Channel between The Nore and Falmouth, 557 were in
Irish waters or on the west coast of England, and the
remaining 1,230 were on the east coast of England and
the east and west coasts of Scotland and the Orkneys and
Shetlands.

The work of these vessels was almost entirely of an
anti-submarine or minesweeping nature.

The trawlers were engaged in patrol duty, convoy
escort service, and minesweeping. The drifters worked

184 The Crisis of the Naval War

TABLE

AUXILIARY

PATROLS IN HOME WATERS.

Area
No.

■5

1
a
6

■53

c
a

v
§ g

a
ft.

•a.

Q £

S3
a

8 .
-~

—

119

112

—

VIII

—

x {

16
53

—

6
6

—

2
1

—

101

—

XII

—

4
19

31
15

XIII

__,

XIIIa

—

XIV

—

14
6
8

XVI

—

XVII

—

XVIII

—

XIX

—

XXI

—

XXII

—

TABLE B; AUXILIARY PATROLS IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN ZONES.

VIII

7
1
2
1
1
2
2
1

9
12
61
51

22
4

—

19
42
21
18
17

116
25

—

5
5

2
2

Patrol Craft and Minesweeping Services 185

drifting nets fitted jvith mines as an anti-submarine
weapon, and also in the case of the Dover area they laid
and kept efficient a barrage of mine nets' off the Belgian
coast. Some were also fitted with hydrophones and
formed hunting flotillas, and some were engaged in mine-
sweeping duties, or in patrolling swept channels. At
Fleet bases a small number were required to attend on
the ships of the Fleet, and to assist in the work of the
base. The whalers, being faster vessels than the trawlers,
were mostly engaged on escort duty or on patrol. The
motor launches were employed for anti-submarine work,
fitted with hydrophones, and worked in company with
drifters and torpedo-boat destroyers, or in minesweeping
in areas in which their light draught rendered it advan-
tageous and safer to employ them instead of heavier
draught vessels to locate minefields, and in the Dover
area they were largely used to work smoke screens for
operations on the Belgian coast.

As the convoy system became more general, so the
work of the small craft in certain areas altered from
patrol and escort work to convoy duty. These areas were
those on the East Coast and north-west of Scotland
through which the Scandinavian and East Coast trade
passed, and those in the Channel frequented by the vessels
employed in the French coal trade. The majority of
these ships were of comparatively slow speed, and trawlers
possessed sufficient speed to accompany them, but a
few destroyers of the older type formed a part of the
escorting force, both for the purpose of protection and
also for offensive action against submarines attacking the
convoys, the slow speed of trawlers handicapping them
greatly in this respect.

The difficulty of dealing with submarines may be
gauged by the enormous number of small craft thus

186 The Crisis of the Naval War

employed, but a consideration of the characteristics of a
submarine and of the great volume of traffic passing up
and down our coasts will assist in a realization of the
varied and difficult problems set to the British Navy.

For instance, the total number of vessels passing
Lowestoft during the month of April, 1917, was 1,837
British and Allied and 208 neutral, giving a daily average
of 62 British and Allied and 7 neutral ships; and as
Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon has mentioned in his book,
" The Dover Patrol, 1915-17 " (page 51), an average of
between 80 to 100 merchant vessels passed Dover daily
during 1917. A study of these figures gives some idea
of the number of targets offered daily to ordinary sub-
marines and minelaying submarines in two of the areas off
our coasts. When it is borne in mind that the Germans
had similar chances of inflicting heavy losses on our mer-
cantile marine all round the coasts of the United Kingdom,
and that it was obviously impossible to tell where an under-
water attack would take place, it will be realized that
once submarines reached our coasts, nothing short of an
immense number of small craft could deal satisfactorily
with the situation, and afford any degree of protection
to trade. Minelaying by submarines was a particularly
difficult problem with which to deal ; the enemy frequently
changed his methods, and such changes when discovered
involved alterations in our own procedure. Thus for
some time after the commencement of minelaying by
submarines, the. whole of the mines of one submarine
would be laid in a comparatively small area. It was
fairly easy to deal with this method as a dangerous area
Was proclaimed round the spot where a mine was dis-
covered, and experience soon showed the necessary extent
of area to proclaim. Later the submarines laid mines in
groups of about six. This necessitated the proclamation

Patrol Craft and Minesweeping Services 187

of more than one area, and was naturally a more difficult
problem. At a further stage the submarines scattered
their mines in even smaller numbers, and the task of
ensuring a safe channel was still further increased. The
most difficult artifice to deal with, however, was the
introduction by the Germans of a delay action device in
their mines, which caused them to remain at the bottom
for varying periods after being laid. The ordinary mine-
sweep, the function of which was to catch the mooring
rope of the mine and drag the mine clear of the channel,
was, of course, ineffective against the mine on the bottom,
and there was no guarantee that mines might not be
released from the bottom and rise to a depth at which they
were dangerous, after the channel had been swept and
reported clear. To deal with this danger a chain-sweep
to work on the bottom was introduced, but its use pre-
sented many difficulties, especially over a rocky bottom.

When a regular swept and buoyed channel was in
use the enemy had little difficulty in deciding on the
positions in which to lay mines by reason of the presence
of the buoys. This fact constituted the principal disad-
vantage in the use of a buoyed channel, but in certain
places where the traffic was heavy the procedure was
inevitable, and it greatly simplified the work of the patrol
craft and minesweepers; the only precautions possible
lay in the use of alternative marked channels, and in the
laying of defensive deep minefields outside the channel
in which enemy submarines might compass their own
destruction. As rapidly as our supply of mines admitted,
this latter device was adopted in positions where the mine-
fields could not constitute a danger to our own submarines.
False buoyed channels with mined areas round them could
also be laid in which to catch the submarine. Another
device was that of altering the position of light vessels

188 The Crisis of the Naval War

and buoys with the object of putting a submarine on to a
shoal.

The situation with which our patrol and mine-
sweeping craft had to deal having now been stated, it
remains to speak of the magnificent manner in which they
accomplished their task.

I regret very deeply that, in spite of a strong desire to
undertake the task, I have neither the information nor the
literary ability to do justice to the many deeds of indi-
vidual gallantry, self-sacrifice and resource performed by
the splendid officers and men who manned the small craft.
No words of mine can adequately convey the intense
admiration which I felt, and which I know was shared
by the whole Navy, for the manner in which their arduous
and perilous work was carried out. These fine seamen,
though quite strange to the hazardous work which they
were called upon to undertake, quickly accustomed them-
selves to their new duties, and the nation should ever be full
of gratitude that it bred such a race of hardy, skilful and
courageous men as those who took so great a part in
defeating the greatest menace with which the Empire
has ever been faced.

There are, however, just two cases in 1917, typical
of many others, which I cannot forbear from mentioning.
The first occurred off the East Coast of England.

On August 15 the armed fishing craft Nelson and
Ethel and Millie were attacked by gunfire by a German
submarine on the surface at a range of four to five
miles.

The submarine first concentrated her fire on the
Nelson, which immediately slipped her trawl and went
to action stations. The third shot from the submarine
pierced the trawler's bows, and, having established the
range, the submarine poured a well-directed fire into

Patrol Craft and Mincsweeping Services 189

the Nelson, under which she rapidly began to settle
down.

The seventh shot struck the skipper, Thomas Crisp,
D.S.C., R.N.R., taking off both his legs and partly
disembowelling him.

In spite of the terrible nature of his injuries he
retained consciousness and gave instructions to the mate,
who was his son, to send a message by carrier pigeon to
the senior officer of his base reporting that he was engaged
with the enemy ; he then bade him fight to the last.

The Nelson, armed with one small gun, replied to
the enemy's fire until the heavy heel which she had
assumed made it impossible to bring the gun to bear.
As she was then on the point of sinking the mate decided
to abandon her and take to the boat, and begged his father
to give them leave to carry him. This, however,
the old man sternly refused to do, and ordered his son
to throw him overboard.

The nature of his wounds being such that he would
have died if he had been moved, they deemed it best,
after consultation, to leave him where he lay. Accord-
ingly, yielding to his reiterated order to abandon the
ship, they left this most gallant seaman lying in his blood,
and embarked in the boat as the Nelson sank.

The submarine in the meanwhile concentrated her
fire on the Ethel and Millie, and having eventually sunk
her, made the survivors of the crew prisoners, and steamed
away.

The crew of the Nelson were rescued by a man-of-war
after being in their boat for forty-four hours.

The second case occurred in the Adriatic. On the
night in question our drifter patrol in the Straits of
Otranto was attacked by a force of Austrian light cruisers.
The drifters were each armed with a 8-pounder gun, and

igo The Crisis of the Naval War

the light cruisers .with 4-inch and 6-inch guns. The
drifters were, of course, quite unable to defend them-
selves. Nevertheless the indomitable skipper, I. Watt, of
the drifter Gowan Lea, when summoned to surrender by
an Austrian light cruiser which was firing at his craft,
shouted defiance, waved his hat to his men, and ordered
them to open fire with the 3-pounder gun. His orders
were obeyed, and, surprising to relate, the light cruiser
sheered off, and this fine seaman with his gallant ship's
company brought the Gowan Lea into port in safety.

Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, in his most interesting
narrative of the work of the Dover Patrol, has brought
to light many individual instances of work gallantly per-
formed ; it is much to be hoped that before recollection
fades, those who can speak of the actions of individuals
in other areas will tell their countrymen something of
the great deeds performed.

A feature of the patrol service of much interest was
the manner in which a large number of retired officers,
including many of flag rank — who had reached mature
age — volunteered for service in the yachts and other small
craft engaged in the work. The late Admiral Sir Alfred
Paget was one of the first, if not the first, to come for-
ward, and in order to avoid any difficulty in the matter
of rank, this fine veteran proposed to sink his Naval
status and to accept a commission as captain of the Royal
Naval Reserve. Sir Alfred, in common with many other
officers who took up this work, was over sixty, but age
did not deter these gallant seamen from facing the hard-
ship and discomfort of service in small craft in the North
Sea and elsewhere. To name all the officers who under-
took this duty, or who were in charge of patrol areas,
would be impossible, and it may seem invidious to
mention names at all ; but I cannot forbear to speak of

Patrol Craft and Minesweeping Services 191

some of those with whom I came most frequently into
contact during 1917. Sir James Startin, K.C.B., who
was the life and soul of the patrols and minesweepers
working from Granton, was frequently at sea in decoy
ships fitted out there, as well as in minesweepers, etc., and
together with his son won the Albert Medal for saving
life during the war; Admiral J. L. Marx, C.B., D.S.O.,
served also in a decoy ship ; Admiral John Denison,
D.S.O., was in charge first at Falmouth and later at
Kingstown; Admiral T. P. Walker, D.S.O., had his
yacht sunk under him ; Admiral Sir Charles Dare,
K.C.M.G., C.B., won great distinction in command of
the patrols, etc., working from Milford Haven; and
Rear-Admiral C. H. Simpson's Peterhead trawlers,
splendidly manned, took a heavy toll of enemy sub-
marines. A large number of retired Naval officers below
the rank of admiral served in minesweepers and patrol
craft, and in command of various areas, and their work
was of the greatest possible value. A few of those with
whom I came into personal contact during the year 1917
were the late Captain F. Bird, C.M.G., D.S.O., who
was most conspicuous in command of the drifters of the
Dover Patrol; Captain W- Vansittart Howard, D.S.O.,
who commanded the Dover Trawler Patrol with such
ability; Commander Sir George Armstrong, Bart., who
so successfully inspired the minesweeping force working
from Havre; and Commander H. F. Cayley, D.S.O.,
whose services in the Harwich minesweeping force,
working under his brother, Rear-Admiral C. G. Cayley,
were invaluable.

So much for the patrol craft. The great work carried
out by the minesweepers can be best judged by quoting
a few figures for 1917, during which year the mine
menace attained its maximum intensity, owing to the

10,2

The Crisis of the Naval War

large increase in the number of German submarine
minelayers.

During the year 1916 the average number of mines
swept up per month was 178.

Statistics for 1917 show the following numbers of
mines swept up per month :

January

250

February

380

March

473

April

515

May

360

June

470

July

404

August

352

September

418

October

237

November

184

December

188

making the average per month in 1917 355 mines.

It will be noticed how rapidly the figures rose in the
early part of the year, and how great was the diminu-
tion in the figures for the later months. This decrease
was due to the fact that the extension of anti-submarine
measures was beginning to take effect, and the destruc-
tion of German submarines, and especially of sub- .
marine minelayers of the U.C. type, was becoming
considerable.

The heavy work involved a great strain on the mine-
sweeping service, and the greatest possible credit is due
to the personnel of that service for the fine response made
to the call for additional exertions and heavier risks.

At the same time the organizing work achieved at

»»s*»r^--

A Paddle Minesweeper.

A German Mine on the Surface.

Patrol Craft and Minesweeping Services 193

Headquarters by the minesweeping section of the Naval
Staff should not be forgotten. At the head of this
section was Captain Lionel G. Preston, C.B. ; he had
succeeded to the post of Head of the Minesweeping Ser-
vice early in 1917, after two and a half years of strenuous
and most successful minesweeping work in the Grand
Fleet flotillas, and he at once grappled with the task of
dealing with the large number of mines then being lai^
by German submarines.

Instructions were issued to fit all patrol craft round
the coast for minesweeping work in addition to their
patrol duties, and they were used for sweeping as re-
quired. Many drifters were also fitted for minesweeping
in addition to the trawlers hitherto employed; and
although there was some prejudice against these vessels
on account of their slower speed, they proved to be of
great assistance. Every available small craft that could
be fitted for the work was pressed into the service, in-
cluding a considerable number of motor launches.

There was unfortunately great delay in the building
of the " Hunt " class of minesweeper, which was the type
ordered in 1916 and repeated in 1917, and in spite of
very large additional orders for this class of vessel having
been placed early in 1917 (a total of 100 extra vessels
being ordered), the number completed during that year
was only sixteen, together with a single paddle
sweeper. Consequently we were dependent for the largely
increased work on improvised craft, and the very greatest
credit is due to all who were concerned in this arduous
and dangerous duty that the waters were kept compara-
tively clear of mines, and that our losses from this cause
were so small when the immense number of mines swept
up is considered.

Fortunately the enemy lost very heavily in submarines

194 The Crisis of the Naval War

of the U-C, or minelaying type, largely because they
were working of necessity in .waters near our coast, so
that our anti-submarine measures had a better chance,
since they were easier to locate and destroy than sub-
marines working farther afield. By the commence-
ment of 1918 the average number of mines swept up
monthly showed a very remarkable decrease, the average
for the first two months of that year being only 159 per
month, eloquent testimony to the efficiency of the anti-
submarine measures in operation during 1917. I have no
information as to the figures for the remaining months
of 1918.

The record of minesweeping work would not be com-
plete without figures showing the damage caused by
mines to minesweeping vessels.

During the last six months of 1916 the average number
of these craft sunk or damaged by mines per month was
5.7, while for the first six months of 1917 the figures rose
to ten per month. For the second six months of 1917
the figures fell to four per month, a reduction even on
the losses towards the end of 1916, in spite of the fact
that more mines were being dealt with. This reduction
may have been due to improvements effected in
organization as the result of experience.

Similarly the total number of merchant ships sunk or
damaged by mines, which during the first six months of
1917 totalled 90, dropped in the second six months to 49.

By far the greater proportion of mines swept up were
laid in Area 10 — i.e. the Nore, Harwich and Lowestoft
area. This part of the coast was nearest to the German
submarine base at Zeebrugge, and as the greater part of
the east coast traffic passed through the area it naturally
came in for a great deal of minelaying attention. Out
of some 2,400 mines swept up in the first half of 1917,

Patrol Craft and Minesweeping Services 195

over 800 came from Area 10 alone. The greatest num-
ber of casualties to merchant ships from mines during
this same period also occurred in Area 10, which in this
respect was, however, rivalled by Area 8 — the Tyne.
Many ships also struck mines in Areas 11 and 12 in the
English Channel, and in both of these areas a considerable
number of mines were swept up.

In addition to ithe daily risks of being themselves
blown up which were run by the vessels engaged
in this work, many very gallant deeds were performed
by individual officers and men of the minesweeping
force, who were one and all imbued with the idea
that their first duty was to keep a clear channel
for traffic regardless of the consequence to themselves.
I must leave to abler pens than mine the task of recording
in fitting phrase some of the courageous actions of our
small craft which will be looked upon as amongst the most
glorious episodes of the Naval part of the Great War, and
content myself to mention only one case, that of the
trawler Grand Duke, working in the Milford area in May,
1917. In this instance a flotilla of minesweepers was
employed in sweeping when two mines exploded in the
sweep towed by the second pair of minesweeping trawlers
in the flotilla. The wire parted and one of the two
trawlers proceeded to heave in the " kite," the contrivance
employed to keep the sweep at the required depth. When
hove short up it was discovered that a mine was foul of
the wire and that it had been hauled up against the ship's
side. Just beneath the surface the circular outline of a
second mine could also be detected entangled in the wire
and swirling round in the current beneath the trawler's
counter. In the circumstances, since any roll of the
ship might suffice to strike one of the horns of either
mine and detonate the charges, the officer in charge of

196 The Crisis of the Naval War

the trawler chose the best course open to him in view of
his responsibility for the lives of those under his command,
and ordered the trawler to be abandoned.

The senior officer of the division of minesweepers
thereupon called for a volunteer, and accompanied by the
engineman, boarded the abandoned trawler, and disre-
garding the imminent probability of an explosion caused
by the contact of the ship and the mine, cut the sweep
and kite wires. The mines fell clear without detonating,
and by means of a rope passed to another trawler they
were towed clear of the spot.

It is appropriate to close this chapter by giving a
synopsis of the losses amongst our patrol escort and mine-
sweeping vessels between the commencement of the war
and the end of 1917 due (1) to enemy action, and
(2) to the increased navigational dangers incidental to
service afloat under war conditions.

Under the first heading — enemy action — the losses
were 8 yachts, 6 motor launches, 3 motor boats, 150
trawlers, 59 drifters, and 10 paddle minesweepers; and
the losses due to navigational risks were 5 yachts, 55
trawlers, 7 motor launches, 3 motor boats, 30 drifters,
and 1 paddle minesweeper, whilst the total loss of life was

197 officers and 1,782 men.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DOVER PATROL AND THE HARWICH FORCES

Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon has given* a most
valuable record of the varied work carried out in the
Straits of Dover and on the Belgian coast during the
period of his command. There is little to be added to
this great record, but it may be of interest to mention
the general Admiralty policy which governed the Naval
operations in southern waters during the year 1917, and
the methods by which that policy was carried out.

The policy which was adopted in southern waters, and
especially in the Straits of Dover, was that, so far as the
means at our disposal admitted, the Straits should be
rendered impassable for enemy ships of all kinds, from
battleships to submarines, with a view to protecting the
cross-Channel communications of our Army in France,
of affording protection to trade in the Channel, and
preventing a military landing by the Germans either
in the south of England or on the left flank of the
Allied Army in France. So long as the Belgian coast
ports remained in German possession, the Naval force
that could be based there constituted a very serious menace
to the cross-Channel traffic. This really applied more
to destroyers than to submarines, and for this reason :
submarines have an infinitely larger radius of action than
destroyers, and if the Belgian coast ports had not been
in German occupation, the additional 210 miles from the

♦"The Dover Patrol, 1915-1917." (Hutchinson & Co., 1919.)
197

198 The Crisis of the Naval War

Ems would not have been a matter of serious moment to
them, and if sighted on the longer passage they could
submerge. The case was quite different with destroyers
or other surface vessels ; in the first place they were open
to attack by our vessels during the passage to and from
the Ems, and in the second the additional distance to be
traversed was a matter for consideration, since they carried
only limited supplies of fuel.

A fact to which the Admiralty frequently directed
attention was that, although annoyance and even serious
inconvenience might be caused to the enemy by sea and
air operations against Ostend and Zeebrugge, no
permanent result could be achieved by the Navy alone
unless backed up by an advance on land. The Admiralty
was heart and soul for an audacious policy, providing the
form of attack and the occasion offered a reasonable pros-
pect of success. Owing to the preoccupations of the Army,
we had to be satisfied with bombardments of the ports
by unprotected monitors, which had necessarily to be
carried out at very long ranges, exceeding 25,000 yards,
and necessitating direction of the fire by aircraft.

Bruges, about eight miles from the sea, was the real
base of enemy submarines and destroyers, Zeebrugge and
Ostend being merely exits from Bruges, and the use of
the latter could only be denied to the enemy by land
attack or by effective blocking operations at Ostend and
Zeebrugge, for, if only one port was closed, the other
could be used.

Neither Zeebrugge, Ostend, nor Bruges could be
rendered untenable to the enemy with the guns available
during 1917, although Ostend in particular, and Zee-
brugge to a lesser extent, could be, and were frequently,
brought under fire when certain conditions prevailed,
and some temporary damage caused. Indeed, the fire

The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 199

against Ostend was so effective that the harbour fell into
disuse as a base towards the end of 1917. We were
arranging also in 1917 for mounting naval guns on shore
that would bring Bruges under fire, after the enemy had
been driven from Ostend by the contemplated operation
which is mentioned later. When forced to abandon this
operation, in consequence of the military advance being
held up by the weather, these guns were mounted in
monitors.

In the matter of blocking the entrance to the ports
of Zeebrugge and Ostend, the fact had to be recognized
that effective permanent blocking operations against de-
stroyers and submarines were not practicable, mainly
because of the great rise and fall above low water at
ordinary spring tides, which is 14 feet at Ostend and 13
feet at Zeebrugge for about half the days in each month.
Low water at Ostend also lasts for one hour. Therefore,
even if block-ships were sunk in the most favourable
position the operation of making a passage by cutting
away the upper works of the block-ships was not a diffi-
cult matter, and the Germans are a painstaking people.
This passage could be used for some time on each side
of high water by vessels like destroyers drawing less
than 14 feet, or submarines drawing, say, 14 feet.
The block would, therefore, be of a temporary and not a
permanent nature, although it would undoubtedly be a
source of considerable inconvenience. At the same
time it was realized that, although permanent blocking
was not practicable, a temporary block would be of
use, and that the moral effect alone of such an operation
would be of great value. These considerations, together
with the abandonment of the proposed landing on the
Belgian coast, owing to unfavourable military conditions,
led to the decision late in 1917 to undertake blocking

200 The Crisis of the Naval War

operations concurrently with an attack on the vessels
alongside the Mole at Zeebrugge.

In order to carry out the general policy mentioned, the
eastern end of the Straits of Dover had been heavily mined
at intervals during the war, and these mines had proved
to be a sufficient deterrent against any attempt on the
part of surface vessels larger than destroyers to pass
through. Owing to the rise of tide enemy destroyers
could pass over the minefields at high water without risk
of injury, and they frequently did so pass. Many
attempts had been made to prevent the passage of enemy
submarines by means of obstructions, but without much
success ; and at the end of 1916 a " mine net barrage " —
i.e. a series of wire nets of wide mesh carrying mines —
was in process of being placed by us right across the
Straits from the South Goodwin Buoy to the West Dyck
Bank, a length of 28 miles, it being arranged that the
French would continue the barrage from this position to
the French coast. The construction of the barrage was
much delayed by the difficulty in procuring mooring
buoys, and it was not completed until the late summer
of 1917. Even then it was not an effective barrier owing
to the tidal effects, as submarines were able to pass over
it during strong tides, or to dive under the nets as an
alternative ; it was not practicable to use nets more than
60 feet deep, whilst the depth of water in places exceeded
120 feet.

Deep mines were laid to guard the water below the
net, but although these were moored at some considerable
distance from the barrage, trouble was experienced owing
to the mines dragging their moorings in the strong tide-
way and fouling the nets. One series had to be entirely
swept up for this reason. Many devices were tried with
the object of improving this barrage, and many clever

The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 201

brains were at work on it. And all the time our drifters
with their crews of gallant fishermen, with Captain Bird
at their head, worked day after day at the task of keeping
the nets efficient.

In spite of its deficiencies the barrage was believed to
be responsible for the destruction of a few submarines,
and it did certainly render the passage of the Straits more
difficult, and therefore its moral effect was appreciable.
Towards the end of 1917, however, evidence came into
our possession showing that more submarines were actually
passing the Straits of Dover than had been believed to
be the case, and it became a question whether a proportion
of the drifters, etc., required for the maintenance of the
nets of the barrage should be utilized instead for patrol
work in the vicinity of the mine barrage then being laid
between Folkestone and Cape Grisnez. This action was
taken, drifters being gradually moved to the new area.

In April, 1916, a net barrage, with lines of deep mines
on the Belgian side of the nets, had also been laid along
the Belgian coast covering the exits from the ports of
Ostend and Zeebrugge as well as the coast between those
ports. These nets were laid at a distance of some 24,000
yards from the shore. This plan had proved most success-
ful in preventing minelaying by submarines in the Straits
of Dover, and the barrage was maintained from May to
October, but the weather conditions had prevented its
continuance from that date.

The operation was repeated in 1917, the barrage being
kept in position until December, when the question of
withdrawing the craft required for its maintenance for
patrol work in connection with the minefield laid on the
Folkestone-Grisnez line came under discussion.

The Belgian coast barrage being in the nature of a
surprise was probably more useful as a deterrent to sub-

202 The Crisis of the Naval War

marine activity in 1916 than in 1917. In both years a
strong patrol of monitors, destroyers, minesweepers,
drifters for net repairs, and other vessels was maintained
in position to the westward of the barrage to prevent in-
terference with the nets by enemy vessels and to keep
them effective.

These vessels were patrolling daily within 13 or 14 sea
miles of the two enemy destroyer and submarine bases,
and although occasionally attacked, were not driven off
in spite of the superior destroyer force which the enemy
could always bring to bear. In 1917 actions between
our vessels and those of the enemy, and between our own
and enemy aircraft, were of very frequent occurrence.
The Germans also introduced a new weapon in the form
of fast motor boats controlled by a cable from the shore
and guided by signals from aircraft, these boats being
heavily loaded in the fore part with explosives which
detonated on contact with any vessels attacked. On only
one occasion in four attacks were the boats successful in
hitting their mark, and the monitor Terror, which was
struck in this instance, although considerably damaged
in her bulge protection, was successfully brought back to
port and repaired.

Whilst our monitors were on patrol near the barrage,
as well as on other occasions, every favourable opportunity
was taken of bombarding the bases at Zeebrugge and
Ostend. In the former case the targets fired at were
the lock gates, and in the latter the workshops, to which
considerable damage was frequently occasioned, as well
as to vessels lying in the basin.

These bombardments were carried out in 1917 at
distances exceeding 25,000 yards. The long range was
necessary on account of the net barrage, and also because
of the rapidity with which the " Knocke " and " Tirpitz "

The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 203

shore batteries obtained the range of monitors attacking
them, one hit on an unprotected monitor being sufficient
to sink her.

They were also invariably carried out under the pro-
tection of a smoke screen; in the autumn of 1917 the
enemy commenced to start a smoke screen himself as soon
as we opened fire, thus interfering with our observation of
fire even from aircraft, but in spite of this much damage
resulted from the bombardments. Our observation of fire
being necessarily carried out by aircraft, and the enemy
attempting similar measures in his return gunfire, resulted
in aerial combats over the monitors being a frequent
occurrence.

The carefully organized arrangements made by Ad-
miral Bacon for these coastal bombardments excited my
warm admiration. He left nothing to chance, and every-
thing that ingenuity could devise and patient preparation
could assist was done to ensure success. He received
assistance from a staff Which, though small in number,
was imbued with his own spirit, and he brought to great
perfection and achieved wonderful success in methods of
warfare of which the Navy had had no previous experience.

During the year 1917 aerial bombing attacks were
persistently carried out on the German naval bases in
Belgium by the Royal Naval Aix Force at Dunkirk,
which came within the sphere of the Dover Command.
These attacks had as their main object the destruction of
enemy vessels lying in these bases, and of the means for
their maintenance and repair. The attacks, under the
very skilful direction of Captain Lambe, R.N., were as
incessant as our resources and the weather admitted,
and our gallant and splendidly efficient airmen of the
R.N.A.S. were veritable thorns in the sides of the Ger-
mans. Our bombing machines as well as our fighting

204 The Crisis of the Naval War

aircraft were often required to attack military instead
of naval objectives, and several squadrons of our fighting
machines were lent to the military for the operations
carried out during the year on the Western Front ; they
did most excellent work, and earned the high commenda-
tion of Sir Douglas Haig.* But we were still able to work
against naval objectives. Zeebrugge, for instance, was
bombed on seven nights during April and five nights dur-
ing May, and during September a total weight of 86 tons
of bombs was dropped on enemy objectives by the Dun-
kirk Naval aircraft, and we had good reason to be satisfied
with the results achieved. During this same month
18 enemy aircraft were destroyed and 43 driven down.
Attacks upon enemy aerodromes were very frequent, and
this form of aerial offensive undoubtedly exercised a very
deterrent influence upon enemy aerial activity over Eng-
land. Two submarines also were attacked and were
thought to be destroyed, all by our machines from Dun-
kirk. To Commodore Godfrey Paine, the Fifth Sea Lord
at the Admiralty, who was in charge of the R.N.A.S.,
and to the staff assisting him our thanks were due for
the great work they accomplished in developing new and
efficient types of machines and in overcoming so far as was
possible the difficulties of supply. The amount of bomb-
ing work carried out in 1917 cannot, of course, compare
with that accomplished during 1918, when production had
got into its stride and the number of machines available
was consequently so very much larger.

Whether it was due to our aerial attacks on Bruges
that the German destroyers in the autumn months
frequently left that base and lay at Zeebrugge cannot be
known, but they did so, and as soon as we discovered this
fact by aerial photographs, plans were laid by Sir Reginald

* Now Earl Haig,

The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 205

Bacon for a combined naval and aerial night operation.
The idea was for the aircraft to bomb Zeebrugge heavily
in the vicinity of the Mole, as we ascertained by trial that
on such occasions the enemy's destroyers left the Mole
and proceeded outside the harbour. There we had our
coastal motor boats lying off waiting for the destroyers
to come out, and on the first occasion that the operation
was carried out one German destroyer was sunk and
another believed to have been damaged, if not also sunk,
by torpedoes fired by the coastal motor boats, to which
very great credit is due for their work, not only on this,
but on many other occasions ; these boats were manned by
a very gallant and enterprising personnel.

Numerous other operations against enemy destroyers,
torpedo boats and submarines were carried out during the
year, as recounted in Sir Reginald Bacon's book, and
in the autumn, when supplies of the new pattern mines
were becoming available, some minelaying destroyers
were sent to Dover; these vessels, as well as coastal
motor boats and motor launches, were continually laying
mines in the vicinity of Zeebrugge and Ostend with
excellent results, a considerable number of German de-
stroyers and torpedo boats working from Zeebrugge being
known to have been mined, and a fair proportion of them
sunk by these measures.

In addition to the operations carried out in the
vicinity of the Belgian coast, the Dover force constantly
laid traps for the enemy destroyers and submarines in
waters through which they were known to pass.

Lines of mined nets laid across the expected track of
enemy vessels was a device frequently employed; sub-
marines, as has been stated, were used on the cross-
Channel barrage to watch for the passage of enemy sub-
marines and destroyers, and everything that ingenuity

206 The Crisis of the Naval War

could suggest was done to catch the German craft if they
came out.

Such measures were supplementary to the work of
the destroyers engaged on the regular Dover Patrol, the
indomitable Sixth Flotilla.

A great deal depended upon the work of these de-
stroyers. They formed the principal, indeed practically
the only, protection for the vast volume of trade passing
the Straits of Dover as well as for our cross-Channel
communications. When the nearness of Zeebrugge and
Ostend to Dover is considered (a matter of only 72 and
62 miles respectively), and the fact that one and some-
times two German flotillas, each comprising eleven large
and heavily armed torpedo-boat destroyers, were usually
based on Bruges, together with a force of large modern
torpedo boats and a very considerable number of sub-
marines, it will be realized that the position was ever one
of considerable anxiety. It was further always possible
for the enemy to send reinforcements of additional flotillas
from German ports, or to send heavier craft with mine-
sweepers to sweep a clear channel, timing their arrival to
coincide with an intended attack, and thus to place the
German forces in a position of overwhelming superiority.

Our own Dover force at the commencement of 1917
consisted of one light cruiser, three flotilla leaders,
eighteen modern destroyers, including several of the old
" Tribal " class, eleven old destroyers of the 30-knot class
(the latter being unfit to engage the German destroyers),
and five " P " boats. Of this total the average number
not available at any moment may be taken as at least
one-third. This may seem a high estimate, but in addi-
tion to the Ordinary refits and the time required for boiler
cleaning, the vessels of the Dover Patrol working in very
dangerous, foggy and narrow waters suffered heavy

The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 207

casualties from mines and collisions. The work of the
Dover force included the duty of escorting the heavy traffic
between Dover and Folkestone and the French ports,
this being mostly carried on during daylight hours owing
to the prevalence of submarine-laid mines and the neces-
sity for sweeping the various channels before the traffic
— which included a very large troop traffic — was allowed
to cross. An average of more than twenty transports
and hospital ships crossed the Straits daily during 1917,
irrespective of other vessels. The destroyers which were
engaged during daylight hours in this work, and those
patrolling the barrages across the Straits and off the
Belgian coast, obviously required some rest at night, and
this fact reduced the number available for duty in the dark
hours, the only time during which enemy destroyer attacks
took place.

Up to the spring of 1917 the examination service of
all. vessels passing the Straits of Dover had been carried
out in the Downs. This led to a very large number of
merchant ships being at anchor in the Downs at night, and
these vessels were obviously open to attack by enemy craft
of every description. It was always a marvel to me that
the enemy showed such a lack of enterprise in failing to
take advantage of these conditions. In order to protect
these vessels to some extent, a light cruiser from Dover,
and one usually borrowed from Harwich, together with a
division of destroyers either from Dover, or borrowed also
from Harwich, were anchored off Ramsgate, and backed
by a monitor if one was available, necessitating a division
of strength and a weakening of the force available for
work in the Straits of Dover proper.

The result of this conflict of interests in the early part
of the year was that for the patrol of the actual Straits
in the darkness of night on a line some 30 miles in length,

208 The Crisis of the Naval War

the number of vessels available rarely if ever exceeded six
— viz. two flotilla leaders and four destroyers, with the
destroyers resting in Dover (four to six in number) with
steam ready at short notice as a reserve.

An attack had been made on the Dover Patrol in
October, 1916, which had resulted in the loss by us of
one destroyer and six drifters, and serious damage to
another destroyer. A consideration of the circumstances
of this attack after my arrival at the Admiralty led me to
discuss with Sir Reginald Bacon the question of keeping
such forces as we had in the Straits at night concentrated
as far as possible. This disposition naturally increased
the risk of enemy vessels passing unobserved, but ensured
that they would be encountered in greater, although not
equal, force if sighted.

Steps were also taken to reduce the tempting bait
represented by the presence of so many merchant ships in
the Downs at night. Sir Reginald Bacon proposed that
the portion of the examination service which dealt with
south-going ships should be moved to Southend, and the
transfer was effected as rapidly as possible and without
difficulty, thereby assisting to free us from a source of
anxiety.

During the early part of 1917 the enemy carried out
a few destroyer raids both on English coast towns in the
vicinity of Dover and the French ports of Dunkirk and
Calais. As a result of these raids, which, though regret-
table, were of no military importance, a good deal of ill-
informed criticism was levelled at the Admiralty and the
Vice-Admiral commanding at Dover. To anyone con-
versant with the conditions, the wonder was not that the
raids took place, but that the enemy showed so little
enterprise in carrying out — with the great advantages he
possessed — operations of real, if not vital, military value.

The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 209

The only explanation is that he foresaw the moral effect
that his tip-and-run raids would produce; and he
considered that the effect of the resulting agitation
might be of no inconsiderable value to himself; the
actual damage done was almost negligible, apart from
the loss of some eight lives, which we all deplored. It is
perhaps natural that people who have never experienced
war at close quarters should be impatient if its conse-
quences are brought home to them. A visit to Dunkirk
would have shown what war really meant, and the bearing
of the inhabitants of that town would have taught a
valuable lesson.

The conditions in the Straits have already been men-
tioned, but too much emphasis cannot be laid on them.
The enemy who possessed the incalculable advantage of
the initiative, had at his disposal, whenever he took heart
to plan an attack, a force of at least twenty-two
very good destroyers, all unfortunately of higher speed
than anything we could bring against them, and more
heavily armed than many of our destroyers. This force
was based within seventy miles of Dover, and as the Ger-
mans had no traffic of any sort to defend, was always
available for offensive operations against our up and down
or cross-Channel traffic. Our Dover force was inferior
even at full strength, but owing to the inevitable absence
of vessels under repair or refitting and the manifold duties
imposed upon it, was bound to be in a position of marked
inferiority in any night attack undertaken by the Germans
against any objective in the Straits.

The enemy had a great choice of objectives. These
were : first, the traffic in the Channel or the destroyers
watching the Straits (the most important military
objective); second, the merchant ships anchored in the
Downs; third, the British monitors anchored off

210 The Crisis of the Naval War

Dunkirk; fourth, the French ports, Dunkirk, Boulogne
and Calais, and the British port of Dover ; and fifth, the
British undefended towns of Ramsgate, Margate, Lowes-
toft, etc., which German mentality did not hesitate to

clXtclC-K.*

A glance at Chart F will show how widely separated
are these objectives and how impossible it was for the
small Dover force to defend them all simultaneously,
especially during the hours of darkness. Any such
attempt would have led to a dispersion of force which
would have been criminal. The distance from Dunkirk
along the French coast to Calais, thence to Dover
and along the English coast to the North Foreland is
60 miles. The distance at which an enemy destroyer
can be seen at night is about a quarter of a mile,
and the enemy could select any point of the 60 miles
for attack, or could vary the scene of operations by
bombarding Lowestoft or towns in the vicinity, which
were only 80 miles from Zeebrugge and equally vulner-
able to attack, since the enemy's destroyers could leave
their base before dark, carry out their hurried bombard-
ment, and return before daylight. In whatever quarter
he attacked he could be certain of great local superiority
of force, although, of course, he knew full well that the
first sign of an attack would be a signal to our forces to
try to cut him off from his bases. Therein lay the reason
for the tip-and-run nature of the raids, which lasted
for a few minutes only. The enemy realized that we
should endeavour to intercept his force as soon as it had
disclosed its presence. The Germans had naturally to
take the risk of encountering our vessels on the way to
his objectives, but at night this risk was but slight.

As it was obviously impossible to prevent bombard-
ments by stationing destroyers in adequate force for

The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 211

the protection of each town, the only possible alterna-
tive, unless such bombardments were ignored, was to
give the most vulnerable points protection by artillery \
mounted on shore. This was a War Office, not an
Admiralty, responsibility ; but as the War Office had not
the means available, the Admiralty decided to take the
-matter in hand, and in the spring of 1917 some 6-inch
naval guns taken from our reserves were mounted in the
vicinity of the North Foreland. Further, an old monitor,
which was of no use for other work owing to her
machinery being unfit, was moored to the southward of
Ramsgate, and her guns commanded the Downs. Search-
lights were also mounted on shore, but more reliance was
placed on the use of star shells, of which the earliest
supplies were sent to these guns. The result was imme-
diately apparent. German destroyers appeared one night
later on off the North Foreland and opened fire,
which was returned by the monitor and the shore guns.
The enemy immediately withdrew, and never appeared
again in 1917 in this neighbourhood.

Meanwhile efforts had been made to increase the
strength of the Dover force, and by the end of June it
stood at 4 flotilla leaders, 29 modern destroyers (includ-
ing "Tribal" class), 10 old 30-knotters, and 6 "P"
boats. The increase in strength was rendered possible
owing to the relief of destroyers of the " M " and " L "
classes at Harwich by new vessels recently completed and
by the weakening of that force numerically. The flotilla
leaders were a great asset to Dover, as, although they were
coal-burning ships and lacked the speed of the German
destroyers, their powerful armament made it possible for
them to engage successfully a numerically greatly
superior force. This was clearly shown on the occasion
of the action between the Broke and Swift and a

212 The Crisis of the Naval War

German force of destroyers on the night of April 20-21,
1917.

The flotilla leaders on that occasion were, as was
customary, patrolling at the Dover end of the cross-
Channel barrage. The enemy's destroyers were in two
detachments. One detachment, consisting apparently of
four boats, passed, it was thought, round the western
end of the barrage at high tide close to the South Good-
win Buoy, and fired a few rounds at Dover. The other
detachment of two boats went towards Calais, and the
whole force seems to have met at a rendezvous prior to its
return to its base.

The Broke and Swift intercepted them on their
return, and after a hot engagement succeeded in sinking
two of the enemy vessels, one being very neatly rammed
by the Broke (Captain E. R. G. R. Evans, C.B.), and the
second sunk by torpedoes. Some of the remaining four
boats undoubtedly suffered serious damage. Our flotilla
leaders were handled with conspicuous skill, and the enemy
was taught a lesson which resulted in his displaying even
greater caution in laying his plans and evincing a greater
respect for the Dover force for many months.

The success of the Broke and Swift was received with
a chorus of praise, and this praise was undoubtedly most
fully deserved, but once again an example was furnished
of the manner in which public attention becomes riveted
upon the dramatic moments of naval warfare whilst the
long and patient labour by which the dramatic moments
are brought about is ignored.

Thus in this case but little attention was drawn to
the years of arduous work performed by the Sixth Flotilla
in the Straits of Dover by day and by night, in dense
fogs, heavy gales and blinding snowstorms, in waters
which were constantly mined, and in the face of an enemy

The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 213

who was bound to be in greatly superior force whenever
he chose to attack.

Little thought was given either to the wonderful and
most gallant work carried out by the drifters of the
Patrol, manned largely by fishermen, and practically
defenceless against attack by the German destroyers.

The careful organization which conduced to the
successful action was forgotten. Sir Reginald Bacon has
told the story of all this work in his book, and I need not
repeat it. But let it be added that victory depends less
on such enheartening incidents, welcome as they are, than
on the patient and usually monotonous performance of
duty at sea by day and by night in all weathers, and on
the skill in organization of the staff ashore in foreseeing
and forestalling enemy activity on a hundred and one
occasions of which the public necessarily knows nothing.

It has been stated that reliable information reached
us in the autumn of 1917 that enemy submarines were
passing the Straits of Dover in much greater numbers
than we had hitherto believed to be the case, and the
inefficiency of the net barrage in preventing the passage
was apparent.

Early in the year (in February) Sir Reginald Bacon
had put forward a proposal for a deep minefield on the
line Folkestone — Cape Grisnez, but confined only to the
portion of the line to the southward of the Varne
Shoal.

It was known that enemy submarines as a rule made
this portion of their passage submerged, and the mine-
field was designed to catch them.

The proposal was approved after personal discussion
with Admiral Bacon, and directions were given that the
earliest supplies of the new pattern mines were to be
allocated for this service; these mines commenced to

214 The Crisis of the Naval War

become available early in the following November, and
were immediately laid.

Admiral Bacon suggested later the extension of
the minefield to the westward of the Varne Shoal, so as
to make it a complete barrier across the Channel. This
was also approved and measures were taken to provide the
necessary mines.

The question of illuminating at night the area covered
by the deep minefield was also discussed at length with
Sir Reginald Bacon. Various proposals were considered,
such as the use of searchlights on Cape Grisnez and at
Folkestone, together with the provision of small light-
ships fitted with searchlights and moored at intervals
across the Channel, and also the use of flares from patrol
craft. Tlares had already been experimented with from
kite balloons by the Anti-Submarine Division of the War
Staff, and they were found on trial to be efficient when
used from drifters, and of great use in illuminating the
patrol area so that the patrol craft might have better
opportunities for sighting submarines and the latter be
forced to dive into the minefields.

A committee had been meanwhile appointed by the
First Lord to consider the question of the Dover Barrage
in the light of the information we then possessed as to
the passage of enemy submarines through the Straits of
Dover. This committee visited Dover on several occa-
sions, and its members, some of whom were naval officers
and some civilian engineers, were shown the existing
arrangements.

The committee, which considered at first the question
of providing an obstruction, ended by reporting that the
existing barrage was inefficient (a fact which had become
apparent), and made proposals for the establishment of
the already approved minefield on the Folkestone —

The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 215

Grisnez line. I do not recollect that any definite new,
ideas .were evolved as the outcome of the labours of this
committee ; some ideas regarding the details of the mine-
field, particularly as to the best form of obstruction that
.would catch submarines or other vessels on the surface,
were put forward, as also some proposals for erecting
towers in certain positions in the Straits. I do not think
that these latter ever matured. The manner in which the
minefield should be illuminated at night was discussed by
the committee, and arrangements were made for the
provision of the vessels proposed by Admiral Bacon.

Some disagreement arose on the subject of the pro-
vision of the necessary number of vessels for patrolling
the minefield with a view to forcing the submarines to
dive. In my view a question of this nature was one to be
left in the hands of the Vice-Admiral at Dover, with
experience on the spot, after I had emphasized to him the
extreme importance attached to the provision of an ample
number of patrol craft at the earliest possible moment.
Interference by the Admiralty in such a detail of a flag
officer's command would in my opinion have been danger-
ous and incorrect, for so long as a flag officer retains the
confidence of the Board he must be left to work his com-
mand in the manner considered best by him after having
been informed of the approved general policy, since he is
bound to be acquainted with the local situation to a far
greater extent than any officer serving at the Admiralty
or elsewhere. I discussed the matter personally with Sir
Reginald Bacon, and was satisfied that he was aware of
the views held by me and of the necessity for providing
the patrol craft even at the expense of other services, as
soon as he could make the requisite arrangements.

Sir Reginald Bacon's three years' experience at Dover
was a great asset in dealing with this matter, as with

216 The Crisis of the Naval War

other questions connected with the Command, more
especially the difficult and embarrassing operations on
the Belgian coast. His ingenuity, originality, patience,
power of organization and his methodical preparations for
carrying out operations were always a great factor in
ensuring success. These qualities were never shown more
clearly than during the preparations made for landing a
force of some 14,000 officers and men with tanks, artillery
and transport on the coast of Belgium under the very
muzzles of the German heavy coast artillery. It was
estimated that the whole force would be put on shore
in a period of twenty minutes. The scheme is described
in full in Chapter IX. of the first volume of Sir
Reginald Bacon's book on the Dover Patrol. He.
had put the proposal before Admiral Sir Henry
Jackson, my predecessor, who had expressed his
concurrence so far as the naval portion of the scheme
was concerned, and provided that the army made the
necessary advance in Flanders. When the scheme was
shown to me shortly after taking office as First Sea
Lord I confess that I had some doubts as to the
possibility of manoeuvring two monitors, with a pontoon
550 feet in length secured ahead of and between the bows
of the monitors, but in view of the immense importance
of driving the Germans from the Belgian coast and the
fact that this scheme, if practicable, promised to facilitate
greatly such an operation, approval was given for the con-
struction of a pontoon, and after witnessing the first trials
of the pontoon secured between two monitors which were
themselves lashed together, I became convinced that this
part of the operation was perfectly feasible. The remaining
pontoons were therefore constructed, and preparations
commenced in the greatest secrecy for the whole operation.
The next matter for trial was the arrangement

The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 217

devised by Sir R. Bacon for making it possible for tanks
to mount the sea wall. These trials were carried out with
great secrecy against a model of the sea wall built at the
Headquarters of the Tank Corps in France, and were
quite successful. It was necessary to see actual photo-
graphs of the tanks mounting the coping at the top of
the sea wall to be convinced of the practicability of the
scheme. A matter of great importance was the necessity
for obtaining accurate information of the slope of the
beach at the projected landing places in order that the
practicability of grounding the pontoon could be ascer-
tained. This information Sir R. Bacon, with his charac-
teristic patience and ingenuity, obtained by means of
aerial photographs taken at various states of tide.

Finally, to gain exact knowledge of the rise and fall
of the tide, Admiral Bacon employed a submarine which
submerged in the vicinity of Nieuport and registered the
height of water above her hull for a period of twenty-four
hours under conditions of spring and neap tides.

The preparations for the landing involved much colla-
boration with the military authorities, and Sir Reginald
Bacon was frequently at G.H.Q. for the purpose. As soon
as it was decided that the 1st Division was to provide the
landing party, conferences took place between Admiral
Bacon and General Sir Henry Rawlinson (now Lord
Rawlinson), and I took the opportunity of a visit paid
by Sir H. Rawlinson to London to confer with him
myself. Subsequently a conference took place at the War
Office at which Sir Douglas Haig was present.

There was entire unanimity between the Navy and
Army over the proposed operation, and we greatly
admired the manner in which the Sister Service took up
the work of preparing for the landing. Secrecy was
absolutely vital to success, as the whole scheme was

218 The Crisis of the Naval War

dependent on the operation being a surprise, more par-
ticularly in the selection of the landing place. Admiral
Bacon describes in his book the methods by which
secrecy was preserved. As time passed, and the atrocious
weather in Flanders during the summer of 1917 prevented
the advance of our Army, it became more and more
difficult to preserve secrecy; but although the fact that
some operation of the kind was in preparation gradually
became known to an increasing number of people, it is
safe to say that the enemy never realized until long after
the operation had been abandoned its real nature or the
locality selected for it.

Some officers with experience of the difficulties
encountered during the landings at Gallipoli expressed
doubts of the practicability of the operation in the face
of the heavy fire from large guns and from machine guns
which might be expected, but the circumstances were so
different from those at Gallipoli that neither Sir Reginald
Bacon nor I shared these doubts. The heavy bombard-
ment of the coast batteries by our own shore guns, which
had been greatly strengthened for the purpose, the rapidity
of the landing, the use of a dense smoke screen, the fact
of the landing being a complete surprise, the use of tanks
for dealing with hostile machine guns, the interruption
to the enemy's shore communications by heavy artillery
fire, and the bombardment by monitors of the coast well
to the eastward of the landing place as a feint, were all new
factors, and all promised to assist towards success.

Of the supreme importance of the operation there
could be no question. Ever since 1914 the Navy had
been pressing for the recapture of the ports on the Belgian
coast, and they could only be taken by means of a com-
bined operation. Sir John French* himself had in the

* Now Field-Marshal Viscount French.

The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 219

early days of the war pointed out the great importance of
securing the coast, but circumstances beyond his control
were too powerful for him.

It was in these circumstances that the decision to
undertake the operation was made, and when it became
necessary to abandon it owing to the inability of the Army
to co-operate the intense disappointment felt by all those
who had worked so hard to ensure its success can be
realized.

The Harwich force, consisting of the 5th Light
Cruiser Squadron and the flotilla of destroyers, was the
only other British force stationed in south-eastern waters
if we except the local craft at the Nore. The 5th Light
Cruiser Squadron and the flotilla were under the com-
mand of Commodore (now Rear- Admiral) Sir Reginald
Tyrwhitt, an officer whose vessels were, if we except
the Dover patrol, more frequently in contact with
the enemy than any other British force in Home waters.
Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt had several functions to perform :

(1) It was always hoped that he would be able
to join forces with the Grand Fleet should events
foreshadow a meeting with the High Sea Fleet.

(2) We depended very largely on him for recon-
naissance work in the southern part of the North
Sea and into the German Bight.

(3) It fell to his lot as a rule to provide the
covering force for aerial operations carried out from
seaplane carriers in southern waters.

(4) His force was best placed to cut off any enemy
light craft that might be located in southern waters
and to attack Zeppelins at sea on their return from
raids over England.

220 The Crisis of the Naval War

(5) He was called upon almost weekly to cover
the passage of the convoy of merchant ships between
the Thames and Holland known as the "Dutch
Convoy."

(6) He was constantly called upon the provide
reinforcements for the Dover Patrol or to assist in
operations carried out by the latter force.

These miscellaneous duties involved a great deal of
work for the Harwich force and particularly for the
destroyers.

The necessity for continually providing reinforcements
from the Harwich force for the Dover Patrol was a stand-
ing handicap to Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt's operations;
he took the matter philosophically, although I always
realized how difficult it made his work at times, and
whenever, as was frequent, combined operations were
carried out by the two forces, the greatest harmony pre-
vailed between the Commands.

At the commencement of 1917 the Harwich force
comprised 8 light cruisers, 2 flotilla leaders and 45
destroyers. During the year new vessels were either
added to it or replaced older craft which were withdrawn
for other services, and at the end of the year the force
included 9 light cruisers, 4 flotilla leaders and 24
destroyers.

The force was constantly operating in the outer waters
of the Heligoland Bight to seaward of our minefields.
The objects of the presence of our ships in these waters,
in addition to reconnaissance work and aerial operations,
were :

(a) To intercept any enemy light forces which
might be intending to operate off our coasts or which
might be on passage between German ports.

The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 221

(6) To surprise and attack enemy minesweeping
vessels.

(d) To capture enemy merchant ships trading
between Dutch and German ports, or neutrals with
contraband trading to Germany.

The opportunities that were given to the force under
heading (a) were exceedingly rare during the year 1917,
when even the light forces of the High Sea Fleet were
content to remain almost constantly in port except when
engaged in the operations in the Baltic, and excepting
also on the two occasions on which attacks were made on
the Scandinavian convoy ; but a portion of the Harwich
force succeeded on one occasion in intercepting a flotilla
of German destroyers en route to Zeebrugge from German
ports with the result that one destroyer was seriously
damaged and forced into the Dutch port of Ymuiden and
another either sunk or badly damaged.

Forces from Harwich also succeeded in capturing or
sinking twenty-four merchant ships trading between
Antwerp and Dutch ports and Germany during the year,
but the main result of the operations of this force was
shown in the refusal of the enemy to risk his vessels
except under cover of darkness in the area in which the
Harwich force worked.

The duty of protecting the Dutch convoy imposed a
heavy strain upon the Harwich force. During the year
1917, 520 eastbound and 511 westbound vessels were con-
voyed between Dutch and British ports with the loss of-
only four ships by submarine attack, one by destroyer
attack, and one by mine. The price paid by the force for
this success was the loss of four destroyers by mines, and

222 The Crisis of the Naval War

one by collision, and the damage of three destroyers by
mine or torpedo, and of five destroyers and one light cruiser
by collision. The frequent collisions were due to the condi-
tions under which the traffic was carried out at night
without lights, and to the prevalence of fogs. The pro-
cedure adopted by the force was frequently changed as
it necessarily became known to the Germans.

The extraordinarily small losses in the convoys were
a very great tribute to the handling of the protecting
force and to the organization in Holland for arranging
sailings, when it is borne in mind that it was almost
impossible to prevent leakage of information to German
agents once the time of sailing was given out, and that
the convoys were open to attack from destroyers and sub-
marines operating either from Zeebrugge or from the
Ems or other German ports. The orders of course eman-
ated from the Admiralty, and of all the great work
achieved by Vice- Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, the Deputy
Chief of the Naval Staff, during his service at the Admir-
alty in the year 1917 and indeed in the two preceding
years, the success attending the work of this convoy was
certainly not the least.

It is difficult to put into words the great admiration
which I felt for Sir Henry Oliver's work throughout the
war. Our association commenced during my command
of the Grand Fleet, but became of course much closer at
the Admiralty, and during my service there his assistance
was of immense help to me and of incalculable value to
the nation.

It was fortunate indeed for the Allied cause that he
held such important Staff appointments during the most
critical periods of the war.

CHAPTER IX

THE SEQUEL

The foregoing chapters have been devoted to describing
the measures that were devised or put into force or that
were in course of preparation during the year 1917 to
deal with the unrestricted submarine warfare against
merchant shipping adopted by Germany and Austria in
February of that year. It now remains to state, so
far as my information admits, the effect of those
measures.

British anti-submarine measures were almost non-
existent at the commencement of the war. Sir Arthur
Wilson, when in command of the Channel Fleet in the
early days of the submarine, had experimented with nets
as an anti-submarine measure, and shortly before the
war submarines were exercised at stalking one another in
a submerged condition ; also the question of employing a
light gun for use against the same type of enemy craft
when on the surface had been considered, and some of our
submarines had actually been provided with such a gun of
small calibre. Two patterns of towed explosive sweeps had
also been tried and adopted, but it cannot be said that we
had succeeded in finding any satisfactory anti-submarine
device, although many brains were at work on the subject,
and therefore the earliest successes against enemy sub-
marines were principally achieved by ramming tactics.
Gradually other devices were thought out and adopted ;
these comprised drift and stationary nets fitted with

223

224 The Crisis of the Naval War

mines, the depth charge, decoy ships of various natures,
gunfire from patrol craft and gunfire from armed
merchant ships, as well as the numerous devices
mentioned in Chapter III.

Except at the very commencement of the war, when
production of craft in Germany was slow, presumably as
a result of the comparatively small number under construc-
tion when war broke out, the British measures failed until
towards the end of 1917 in sinking submarines at a rate
approaching in any degree that at which the Germans
were producing them.

Thus Germany started the war with 28 submarines;
five were added and five were lost during .1914, leaving
the number still 28 at the commencement of 1915.

During 1915, so far as our knowledge went, 54
were added and only 19 were lost, the total at the
commencement of 1916 being therefore 63.

During 1916 it is believed that 87 submarines
were added and 25 lost, leaving the total at the
commencement of 1917 at 125.

During 1917 our information was that 78 submarines
were added and 66 lost, leaving the total at the end of
the year at 187.

The losses during 1917, given quarterly, indicate
the increasing effectiveness of our anti-submarine
measures. These losses, so far as we know them, were :

First quarter ... 10 Third quarter ... 20
Second quarter ... 12 Fourth quarter ... 24

During 1918, according to Admiral S cheer*, 74 sub-
marines were added to the fleet in the period January to
October. The losses during this year up to the date of

* " Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War " (page 335).

Two Depth Charges after Explosion.

{Taken from the Air.)

The Tell-tale Oil Patch.

{Taken from the Air.)

The Sequel 225

the Armistice totalled 70, excluding those destroyed by
the Germans on the evacuation of Bruges and those blown
up by them at Pola and Cattaro. Taken quarterly the
losses were :

First quarter ... 18 Third quarter ... 21

Second quarter ... 26 Fourth quarter (to

date of Armistice) 6

It will be seen from the foregoing figures for 1917
and 1918 that the full result of the anti-submarine
measures inaugurated in 1917 and previous years was
being felt in the last quarter of 1917, the results for 1918
being very little in advance of those for the previous half-
year.

According to our information, as shown by the
figures given above, the Germans had completed by
October, 1918, a total of 326 submarines of all classes,
exclusive of those destroyed by them in November at
Bruges, Pola and Cattaro.

Admiral von Capelle informed the Reichstag Com-
mittee that a total of 810 was ordered before and during
the war. It follows from that statement that over 400
must have been under construction or contemplated at the
time of the Armistice.

It is understood that the number of submarines
actually building at the end of 1918 was, however, only
about 200, which perhaps was the total capacity of the
German shipyards at one time.

At the risk of repetition it is as well to repeat here
the figures giving the quarterly losses of merchant ships
during 1917 and 1918, as they indicate in another
and effective way the influence of the anti-submarine
measures.

226 The Crisis of the Naval War
These figures are :

1917

1918

British.

Foreign.

Total.

British.

Foreign.

Total.

1st quarter
2nd quarter
3rd quarter
4th quarter

911,840

1,361,870

952,938

782,887

707,533
875,064
541,535
489,954

1,619,373
2,236,934
1,494,473
1,272,843

697,668
630,862
512,030
*83,952

445,668
331,145
403,483
•93,582

1,143,336
962,007
915,513

•177,534

* Month of October only.

The decline of the losses of British shipping was pro-
gressive from the second quarter of 1917 ; in the third
quarter of 1918 the reduction in the tonnage sunk became
very marked, and suggested definitely the approaching
end of the submarine menace.

The fact that during the second quarter of 1918 the
world's output of tonnage overtook the world's losses was
another satisfactory feature. The output for 1917 and
1918 is shown in the following table :

United
Kingdom
Output.

Dominions,

Allied and

Neutral

Countries.

Total for
World.

1917

1st quarter
2nd quarter
3rd quarter
4 th quarter

246,239
249,331
248,283
419,621

340,807
435,717
426,778
571,010

587,046
685,048
675,061
990,631

1918

1st quarter
2nd quarter
3rd quarter
4th quarter, Oct. only

320,280
442,966
411,395
136,100

550,037
800,308
972,735
375,000

870,317
1,243,274
1,384,130

511,100

It will be noticed that by the last quarter of 1918 the
output of shipping in the United Kingdom alone had
overtaken the losses of British shipping.

It is not possible to give exact information as to the

The Sequel 227

particular means by which the various German submarines
were disposed of, but it is believed that of the 186 vessels
mentioned as having been lost by the Germans at least
thirty-five fell victims to the depth charge, large orders
for which had been placed by the Admiralty in 1917, and
it is probably safe to credit mines, of which there was a
large and rapidly increasing output throughout 1917, with
the same number — thirty-five — a small proportion of these
losses being due to the mines in the North Sea Barrage.
Our own submarines accounted for some nineteen.

Our destroyers and patrol craft of all natures sank at
least twenty by means of gunfire or the ram, and some
four or five more by the use of towed sweeps of various
natures. Our decoy ships sank about twelve; four
German submarines are known to have been sunk by
being rammed by men-of-war other than destroyers, four
by merchant ships, and about ten by means of our nets.
It is fairly certain that at least seven were accounted for
by aerial attack. Six were interned, some as the result
of injury after action with our vessels.

The total thus accounted for is 156. It was always
difficult to obtain exact information of the fate of sub-
marines, particularly in such cases as mine attack, and
the figures, therefore, do not cover the whole of the
German losses which we estimated at 185.

CHAPTER X

"production" at the admiralty during 1917

The anti-submarine measures initiated during the
year 1917 and continued throughout the year 1918, as
well as those in force in the earlier years of the war,
depended very much for their success on the work carried
out by the Admiralty Departments responsible for design
and production, and apart from this these departments,
during the year 1917, carried out a great deal of most
valuable work in the direction of improving the efficiency
of the material with which the vessels of the Grand Fleet
and other warships were equipped.

Early in 1917 certain changes were made in the Naval
Ordnance Department. When Captain Dreyer took up the
post of Director of Naval Ordnance in succession to Rear-
Admiral Morgan Singer on March 1, the opportunity
was seized of removing the Torpedo Department, which
had hitherto been a branch of the Naval Ordnance
Department, from the control of the Director of Naval
Ordnance, and Rear- Admiral Fitzherbert was appointed
as Director of Torpedoes and Mines, with two assistant
Directors under him, one for torpedoes and the other for
mines. It had for some time been apparent to me that
the torpedo and mining work of the Fleet required a larger
and more independent organization, and the intention to
adopt a very extensive mining policy accentuated the
necessity of appointing a larger staff and according it
greater independence. The change also relieved the

328

"Production" during 1917 229

D.N.O. of some .work and gave him more liberty to
concentrate on purely ordnance matters.

Captain Dreyer, from his experience as Flag Captain
in the Iron Duke, was well aware of the directions in
which improvement in armament efficiency was necessary,
and a variety of questions were taken up toy him with
great energy.

Some of the more important items of the valuable work
achieved by the Naval Ordnance Department during the
year 1917, in addition to the provision of various anti-
submarine measures mentioned in Chapter III, were :

(1) The introduction of a new armour-piercing
shell of far greater efficiency than that previously
in use ; the initial designs for these shells were pro-
duced in the drawing office of the Department of the
Director of Naval Ordnance.

(2) The introduction of star shell.

(3) The improvement of the arrangements made,
after our experience in the Jutland action, for
preventing the flash of exploding shell from being
communicated to the magazines.

Taking these in order, the New Armour-piercing Shell
would have produced a very marked effect had a Fleet
action been fought in 1918. Twelve thousand of these
new pattern shell had been ordered by November,
1917, after a long series of experiments, and a con-
siderable number were in an advanced stage of con-
struction by the end of the year. With our older
pattern of shell, as used by the Fleet at Jutland and in
earlier actions, there was no chance of the burst of the
shell, when fired at battle range, taking place inboard,
after penetrating the side armour of modern German
capital ships, in such a position that the fragments might

236 The Crisis of the Naval War

be expected to reach and explode the magazines. A large
proportion of the shell burst on the face of the armour,
the remainder while passing through it. In the case of the
new shell, which was certainly twice as efficient and which
would penetrate the armour without breaking up, the
fragments would have a very good chance of reaching the
magazines of even the latest German ships.

The greatest credit was due to the Ordnance Depart-
ment and to our enterprising manufacturers for the feat
which they achieved. We had pressed for a shell of this
nature as the result of our experience during the Jutland
action, and it was badly wanted.

We had experienced the need for an efficient Star Shell
both in the Grand Fleet and in southern waters, and after
the Jutland action the attention of the Admiralty had been
drawn by me to the efficiency of the German shell of this
type. In the early part of 1917, during one of the
short night bombardments of the south coast by
German destroyers, some German star shell, unexploded,
reached the shore. Directions were at once given
to copy these shell and not to waste time by trying to
improve upon them, a procedure dear to technical minds
but fatal when time is of the first importance. Success
was soon attained, and star shell were issued during 1917
to all our ships, the vessels of the Dover and Harwich
patrol force and the shore battery at the North Foreland
being the first supplied.

Important experiments were carried out in 1917 on
board H.M.S. Vengeance to test the Anti-ftash arrange-
ments with which the Fleet had been equipped as the
result of certain of our ships being blown up in the Jutland
action. Valuable information was obtained from these

"Production" during 1917 231

experiments and the arrangements were improved
accordingly.

The work of the Torpedo and Mining Department was
also of great value during 1917. The principal task lay
in perfecting the new pattern mine and arranging for its
production in great numbers, in overcoming the difficulties'
experienced with the older pattern mines, and in arrang-
ing for a greatly increased production of explosives for
use in mines, depth charges, etc.

These projects were in hand when the new organization
involving the appointment of an Admiralty Controller
was adopted.

The circumstances in which this great and far-
reaching change in organization was brought about were
as follows. In the spring of 1917 proposals were made
to the Admiralty by the then Prime Minister that some of
the work carried out at that time by the Third Sea Lord
should be transferred to a civilian. At first it was under-
stood by us that the idea was to re-institute the office of
additional Civil Lord, which office was at the time held
by Sir Francis Hop wood (now Lord Southborough),
whose services, however, were being utilized by the
Foreign Office, and who had for this reason but little time
to devote to Admiralty work. To this proposal no
objection was raised.

At a later stage, however, it became evident that the
proposal was more far reaching and that the underly-
ing idea was to place a civilian in charge of naval material
generally and of all shipbuilding, both naval and mer-
cantile. Up to the spring of 1916 mercantile shipbuilding
had been carried out under the supervision of the Board
of Trade, but when the office of Shipping Controller was
instituted this work had been placed under that Minister,

232 The Crisis of the Naval War

who was assisted by a committee of shipbuilders termed
the " Shipbuilding Advisory Committee." Statistics show
that good results as regards mercantile ship production
were not obtained under either the Board of Trade or the
Shipping Controller, one reason being that the supply
of labour and material, which were very important
factors, was a matter of competition between the claims
of the Navy and those of the Mercantile Marine,
and another the fact that many men had been withdrawn
from the shipyards for service in the Army. There was
especial difficulty in providing labour for the manufacture
of machinery, and at one time the Admiralty went so far
as to lend artificers to assist in the production of engines.
The idea of placing the production of ships for both
services under one head appealed to and was sup-
ported by the Admiralty. The next step was a pro-
posal to the Admiralty that Sir Eric Geddes, at that time
the head of the military railway organization in France
with the honorary rank of Major-General, should become
Admiralty Controller. This would place him in charge
of all shipbuilding for both services as well as that
portion of the work of the Third Sea Lord which related
to armament production. I was requested to see Sir
Erie whilst attending a conference in Paris with a view to
his being asked to take up the post of Admiralty Con-
troller. This I did after discussing the matter with some
of the heads of the War Office Administration and mem-
bers of General Headquarters in France.

I learned from Sir Eric Geddes that he felt capable of
undertaking the work on the understanding that he was
assured of my personal support ; he said that experience
in his railway work in France had shown the difficulty
of taking over duties hitherto performed by officers,
and stated that it could not have been carried through

"Production" during 1917 233

.without the strong support of the Commander-in-Chief ;
for this reason he considered he must be assured of
my support at the Admiralty. In view of the import-
ance attached to combining under one administration the
work of both naval and mercantile shipbuilding for the
reasons already stated, and influenced in some degree by
the high opinion held of Sir Eric Geddes by the Prime
Minister, I came to the conclusion that his appointment
would be of benefit to Admiralty work, and therefore
gave him the assurance and said that I would do my best
to smooth over any difficulties with the existing Admiralty
officials, whether naval or technical.

In these circumstances Sir Eric Geddes was offered
the post of Admiralty Controller by Sir Edward Carson,
then First Lord, and accepted it. It was arranged that
a naval officer should continue to hold the post of Third
Sea Lord and that he should be jointly responsible, so far
as the Navy was concerned, for all design work on its
technical side, whether for ships, ordnance material, mines,
torpedoes, etc., etc., whilst the Controller became entirely
responsible for production. It was obvious that goodwill
and tact would be required to start this new organization,
which was decidedly complicated, and that the post of
Third Sea Lord would be difficult to fill. At the request
of Sir Eric Geddes Rear-Admiral Lionel Halsey, C.B.,
who at that time was Fourth Sea Lord, was asked if he
would become Third Sea Lord in the new organization.
He consented and was appointed. When the detailed
organization, drawn up to meet the views of Sir E.
Geddes, was examined by the naval officers responsible
for armament work, strong objections were raised to that
part of the organization which affected their responsibility
for the control and approval of designs and of inspection.

Sir Eric held the view that inspection should come

234 The Crisis of the Naval War

under the officials in charge of production and that the
designing staff should also be under him, the designs
being drawn up to meet the views of the naval officers
and finally approved by them. Personally I saw no
danger in the proposals regarding design, because the
responsibility of the naval officer for final approval was
recognized; but there was a certain possibility of delay
if the naval technical officer lost control over the design-
ing staff. I fully agreed with the criticisms on the subject
of inspection, the argument being that only naval officers
accustomed to use the ordnance material could know the
dangers that might arise from faulty inspection, and that
the producer had temptations in his path, especially under
war conditions, to make inspection subservient to rapidity
of production. Sir Eric Geddes finally waived his objec-
tions. He informed me that he based his arguments
largely on his experience at the Ministry of Munitions,
with which he had been associated earlier in the war. The
contention of the naval officers at the Admiralty was that
even if the organization proposed was found to be work-
able for the Army, it would not be satisfactory for the
Navy, as in our case it was essential that the responsibility
for approval of design and for inspection should be inde-
pendent of the producer, whether the producer was a
Government official or a contractor. Apart from ques-
tions of general principle in this matter, accidents to
ordnance material in the Navy, or the production of
inferior ammunition, may involve, and have involved,
the most serious results* even the complete loss of battle-
ships with their crews, as the result of a magazine
explosion or the bursting of a heavy gun. I could not
find that the organization at the Ministry of Munitions
had, even in its early days, placed design, inspection and
production under one head ; inspection and design had

"Production" during 1917 235

each its own head and were separate from production.
In any case in 1918 the Ministry of Munitions reverted
to the Admiralty system of placing the responsibility for
design and inspection under an artillery expert who was
neither a manufacturer nor responsible for production.

The matters referred to above may appear unim-
portant to the civilian reader, but any question relating
to the efficiency of its material is of such paramount
importance to the fighting efficiency of the Navy that
it is necessary to mention it with a view to the avoidance of
future mistakes.

The new organization resulted in the creation of
a very large administrative staff for the purpose of
accelerating the production of ships, ordnance material,
mines, etc. Indeed, the increase in numbers was so great
that it became necessary to find additional housing room,
and the offices of the Board of Education were taken over
for the purpose. The personnel of that portion of the
Admiralty dealing with design, inspection and production
at different dates, as well as the Staff organization, is
given in the appendices. It was felt that the increase in
staff, though it involved, of course, very heavy expendi-
ture, would be justified if it resulted in increased rapidity
of production. It will be readily understood that such
an immense change in organization, one which I had
promised to see through personally, and which was
naturally much disliked by all the Admiralty depart-
ments, threw a vast volume of extra work on my shoulders,
work which had no connexion with the operations of war,
and this too at a period when the enemy's submarine
campaign was at its height. I should not have undertaken
it but for the hope that the change would result in greatly
increased production, particularly of warships and mer-
chant ships.

236 The Crisis of the Naval War

The success of this new organization can only be
measured by the results obtained, and by this standard,
if it were possible to eliminate some of the varying and
incalculable factors, we should be able to judge the extent
to which the change was justified. It was a change for
which, under pressure, I bore a large share of responsi-
bility, and it involved replacing, in the middle of a great
war, an organization built up by experts well acquainted
with naval needs by one in which a considerable proportion
of the personnel had no previous experience of the work.
The change was, of course, an experiment ; the danger lay
in the fact that, until technical and Admiralty experience
has been gained, even men of the greatest ability in other
walks of life may find it difficult to produce satisfactory
results even if there are no limits imposed on the size of
the Staff which assists them.

The question of production is best examined under
various headings and the results under the old Admiralty
organization compared with those under the new, although
comparison is admittedly difficult owing to changing
conditions.

Warship Production

Under the Admiralty organization existing up to
May, 1917, the Third Sea Lord — as the Controller was
termed when changes were introduced by Mr. Churchill
in 1912 — was head of the Departments of the Director
of Naval Construction and Engineer in Chief, and of that
part of the work of the Director of Naval Ordnance which
dealt with the design and production of guns and gun
mountings. Under the new organization a civilian Con-
troller became responsible for production, the Third Sea
Lord being associated with him on technical matters of
design.

A special department for warship production and

"Production" during 1917 237

repairs was set up under a Deputy Controller, the Third
Sea Lord having no authority over this department
except by his association with the Controller.

Under the old organization it had been the custom
during the war for the Third Sea Lord to give to the
Board and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet
a personal forecast of the anticipated dates of completion
of all warships under construction. My experience whilst
in command of the Grand Fleet had been that this
personal forecast was generally fairly accurate for six
months ahead.

As an example it may be stated that in the first four
months of 1917 the delivery of destroyers was within one
of the forecast made in October, 1916, four vessels of
the class being slightly behind and three ahead of the
forecast. Of thirteen " E " class submarines forecasted
in October, 1916, for delivery by March, 1917, all except
two were delivered by April; of twelve " K " class sub-
marines forecasted for delivery in the same period, all
except three were delivered by April, 1917. It should
be stated that these "K " class submarines were vessels
of a new type, involving new problems of some difficulty.

On the other hand there was considerable delay in
the completion of a number of the thirty "P"
boats forecasted in October, 1916, for delivery during the
first seven months of 1917, and the April forecast showed
that only twenty out of the thirty would be delivered
during that period. TJhere was also some delay in the
delivery of twin screw minesweepers, twenty of which
were shown in the forecast of October, 1916, as due for
delivery in the first six months of 1917. The April,
1917, forecast showed that six had been delivered or
would complete in April, ten more would complete within
the estimated period, and the four remaining would be

238

The Crisis of the Naval War

overdue and would not be delivered until July or
August.

These figures show the degree of reliance which could
be placed on the personal forecasts of the Third Sea Lord
under the old organization. It is, of course, a fact that
accurate forecasts do not necessarily mean that the rate
of production is satisfactory, but only that the forecast
is to be depended on. We were never at all satisfied with
the rate of production, either under the old or the new
organization. Accuracy of forecast was, however, of
great use from the Staff point of view in allotting new
ships to the various commands and in planning operations.

To turn now to the figures given by the Admiralty
Controller under the new organization. The table below
shows the forecasts (" F ") given in June, 1917, and the
deliveries (" D ") of different classes of warships month
by month during the period of July to November of that
year :

Class of

July.

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

^ Nov.

Deficit in

Vessel.

5 months.

Flotilla Leaders

and T.B.D's.
Submarines
Sloops
" P." Boats

5
2
3
6

2
5

7
4
5
6

8
4
2
5

8
5
4
3

5
1
2
3

5
3
3
3

5
3
1
2

6
6
3
1

6
1
7
1

Amongst vessels which were classed as auxiliaries
the figures were :

Class of

July.

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Deficit in

Vessel.

F '

5 months.

Minesweepers .
Trawlers

5 3
25 18

4
23

4
14

3
30

1
13

3
27

2
28

2
33

7
41

It will be seen from these figures that the forecast
of June was inaccurate even for the three succeeding

"Production" during 1917 239

months, and that the total deficit in the five months was
considerable, except in the case of T.B.D.'s and "P"
boats.

The most disappointing figures were those relating to
submarines, trawlers and minesweepers. The case of the
submarines may be put in another way, thus :

In the June forecast twenty-six submarines were
forecasted for delivery during the period July to the end
of December, the dates of three, however, being some-
what uncertain; of this total of twenty-six, only nine
were actually delivered. Of the remainder, seven were
shown in a November forecast as delayed for four months,
two for five months, and one for nine months.

The attention of the Production Departments was
continually directed to the very serious effect which the
delay was producing on our anti-submarine measures,
and the First Lord, Sir Eric Geddes, was informed of
the difficult position which was arising. In the early
part of December I pointed out to the Third Sea
Lord and the Admiralty Controller, Sir Allan Anderson,
that it was obviously impossible for the Naval
Staff to frame future policy unless some dependence could
be placed on the forecast of deliveries. The Controller
in reply stated that accurate forecasts were most difficult,
and proposed a discussion with the Third Sea Lord and
myself, but I had left the Admiralty before the discussion
took place.

The delays, as will be seen from the tables given,
were most serious in the ^ase of vessels classed as
auxiliaries. Sir Thomas Bell, who possessed great experi-
ence of shipbuilding in a private capacity, was at the
head of the Department of the Deputy Controller for
Dockyards and Shipbuilding, and the Director of War-
ship Production was a distinguished Naval constructor.

240

The Crisis of the Naval War

The Deputy Controller of Auxiliary Shipbuilding was
an officer lent from the War Office, whose previous
experience had lain, I believe, largely in the railway
world; some of his assistants and staff were, however,
men with experience of shipbuilding.

When I became First Sea Lord at the end of 1916
the new building programme, which had received the
sanction of the Cabinet, was as follows :

8 Flotilla leaders.
65 T.B.D.'s.
34 Sloops.

48 Screw minesweepers.
16 Paddle

500 Trawlers.
60 Submarines.
4 Seaplane carriers.
60 Boom defence vessels.

During the early part of 1917 it was decided to sub-
stitute 56 screw minesweepers and 8 paddle sweepers for
the approved programme of this class of vessel and to add
another 50 screw minesweepers to meet the growing mine
menace, as well as to substitute 115 drifters for 50 of the
trawlers, and to request the Canadian Government to
build 36 trawlers and 100 drifters mainly for use in
Canadian waters. It was also decided to lay down 36
mercantile decoy ships and 12 tugs, and to build 56
motor skimmers on the lines of the coastal motor boats,
which were then showing their value off the Belgian coast.
The programme therefore, in May, 1917, was as follows :

Flotilla leaders

T.B.D.'s

.. 65

Patrol boats

Sloops

Minesweepers (screw)

.. 56

,, (paddle)

Additional twin-screw minesweepers

.. 50

Production" during 1917

241

Submarines

Trawlers

450

Drifters

115

Canadian trawlers

,, drifters

100

Boom defence vessels

Mercantile decoy ships

Seaplane carriers

Tugs

Motor skimmers

Meanwhile intelligence had been received which
indicated that Germany was building such a considerable
number of light cruisers as to jeopardize our supremacy
in this class of vessel, and it was decided by the Board
that we ought to build eight more light cruisers even
at the cost of appropriating the steel intended for the con-
struction of six merchant ships.

Further, the German submarine programme was
developing with great rapidity, and our own submarines
of the " L " class were taking a very long time to build.
It was therefore proposed to substitute eighteen additional
" H " class submarines for four of the " L " class, as
the vessels of the " H " class were capable of more
rapid construction, thus making the total number of
submarines on order 74. Approval was also sought for
the addition of 24 destroyers and four "P" boats
to the programme, bringing the number of destroyers
on order up to a total of 89.

The programme was approved, a slight change being
made in the matter of the seaplane carriers by fitting out
one of the "Raleigh" class of cruisers as a seaplane
vessel in order to obtain an increased number of vessels
of this type more rapidly than by building. Later in the

242 The Crisis of the> Naval War

year the cruiser Furious was also converted into a sea-
plane carrier, and she carried out much useful work in
1918.

Mercantile Shipbuilding

A greatly increased output of merchant ships had
been anticipated under the new organization, which
placed mercantile construction under the Admiralty Con-
troller instead of under the Ministry of Shipping. It was
expected that the difficulties due, under the previous
arrangement, to competing claims for steel and labour
would vanish with very beneficial results.

It was, as previously stated, mainly with this object
that the Admiralty had agreed to the change. The start
was promising enough. After a review of the situation
hopes were held out that during the second half of 1917
an addition of about 1,000,000 tons of shipping from the
shipyards within the United Kingdom would be effected.
This figure, indeed, was given to the House of Commons
by the Prime Minister on August 16, 1917.

On comparing this figure with that of the first half
of the year (a total of about 484,000 tons) there was
distinct cause for gratification ; it is right to state that
Admiralty officials who had previously been watching
mercantile shipbuilding regarded the estimate as very
optimistic. Further, it was anticipated by the then
Admiralty Controller, Sir Eric Geddes, that during the
year 1918, with some addition to the labour strength, a
total output of nearly two million tons was possible, pro-
vided steel was forthcoming, whilst with considerably
greater additions to the labour strength and to the supply
of steel, and with the help of the National Shipyards
proposed by the Controller, the total output might even
reach three million tons.

The actual results fell very short of these forecasts.

"Production" during 1917

243

The total output for the second half of the year was
only 620,000 tons, the monthly totals in gross tonnage
for the whole year being :

January

46,929

July ■-..]

. 81,188

February .

.. 78,436

August

. 100,900

March

.. 115,654

September ..

60,685

April,

67,536

October

. 145,844

May ...

.. 68,083

November . .

. 158,826

June ...

.. 108,397

December . .

. 112,486

In January, 1918, the total dropped to 58,568 tons,
and in February was only 100,038 tons. In March it was
announced that Lord Pirie would take the position of
Controller General of Merchant Shipbuilding. The sub-
sequent results in the direction of output of merchant
ships do not properly come within the scope of this book,
which is intended to deal only with work during the year
1917, but it may be of interest to give here the output
month by month. It was as follows :

January . . . 58,568

July ...

141,948

February ... 100,038

August

124,675

March ... 161,674

September ...

144,772

April ... 111,533

October

136,000

May 197,274

November ...

105,093

June ... ... 134,159

December . . .

118,276

Total for the year

... 1,534,110

It will be seen that the results for 1918 were an
improvement on those for 1917, the exact figure for that
year being 1,163,474 tons; these results, however, fell
very short of the optimistic estimates given in July, 1917.

Mercantile Repair Work

The Controller's Department undoubtedly succeeded
in the work of improving the arrangements for the repair

244 The Crisis of the Naval War

of merchant ships. This is shown by an analysis of the
total number of vessels that completed repairs during
various months.

In August, 1917, the number was 382, with a
tonnage of 1,183,000. In November the figure became
542 ships, with a tonnage of 1,509,000. There remained
under repair at the end of August 326 ships, and at the
end of November 350 ships, these figures indicating that
the greater number of completions was not due to the
smaller number of vessels being damaged or the damages
being less in extent.

Considerable credit is due to the Department for this
successful acceleration of repair work which naturally had
a great influence on the shipping situation.

Armament Production

It was not, I think, realized either by the Government
or by the civilians brought into the Admiralty during the
year 1917 that there was a very great difference between
the Admiralty and the War Office organizations in the
matter of production of material, nor was it recognized
that naval officers are by their training and experience
better fitted to deal with such matters on a large scale
than are military officers, except perhaps officers in the
Artillery and Royal Engineers. Whatever may be the
case in the future, the Navy in pre-war days was so much
more dependent on material than the Army as to make
questions relating to naval material of for greater import-
ance that was the case with military material. This fact
is apt to be forgotten by those writers on naval affairs
who think that an intimate knowledge of questions
relating to naval material and its use is of little importance.
I trust that this belief will never become general in the
service, for the naval officer who is not familiar with the

"Production" during 1917 245

design and production of material is handicapped when
he comes to use it.

Ignorance of the great experience of the Admiralty
in handling problems of production and of the past success
of Admiralty methods in this respect gave rise to a good
deal of misconception. The fact that it had been necessary
to form a separate Ministry (that of Munitions) to deal
with the production of war material for the Army probably
fostered the idea that matters at the Admiralty should be
altered in a similar direction.

The post of Deputy Controller of Armament Pro-
duction was created under the new organization, and
all matters concerning the production of guns, gun-
mountings, projectiles, cordite, torpedoes, mines, para-
vanes and all other war material was placed under him.
I have dealt earlier in this chapter with the questions of
design and inspection over which some disagreement
arose.

I was not conscious that the new organization suc-
ceeded in speeding up armament production during 1917,
and during the latter part of the year I was much con-
cerned with the delays in ordnance production as revealed
during 1917 and as exposed by the forecasts for 1918.

It is very possible, on the other hand, that in the case
of mines the results were good. The old Admiralty
organization had not been equipped to deal with such
an immense number of mines as were on order, and
although a large organization for their production was
started by Sir Lionel Halsey, when Fourth Sea Lord,
with the assistance of Admiral Fitzherbert and Captain
Litchfield-Speer, it had not been sufficiently long at
work for an opinion to be given as to whether the
results in production would have been as good as under
the D.C.A.P.

246 The Crisis of the Naval War

In considering the whole question of production
during the year 1917 it should be borne in mind that
very extensive orders were placed in the early part of
that year for guns, gun-mountings, mines, warships of
the smaller class and patrol craft, and that if we compare
only the actual output for 1917 with that of previous
years without taking the above fact into account, we
might form an incorrect impression as to the success of
the organization for production. For instance, in the
last quarter of 1917, 1,515 guns of all calibres were
delivered, as against 1,101 in the first quarter; in the
month of November 1,335 mines of all natures and 2,078
depth charges were filled, as compared with 625 mines
and 542 depth charges in July. These figures were the
result of the large orders placed early in the year, and it
was not until 1918 that the full fruits of the orders placed
in 1917 became apparent. The figures for that year j how-
ever, are not at my disposal.

One great .advantage which resulted from the new
organization, viz., the creation of a Directorate of
Materials and Priority, must be mentioned. This
Directorate controlled the distribution of all steel for all
services and produced a very beneficial effect on the issue
of supplies of steel to shipbuilders. The growth of the
Admiralty Organization for Production at different stages
is shown in the appendices. The immense increase in
staff which resulted from the institution of the office of
Admiralty Controller is exhibited in the lists of staff in
1918 as compared with the staff in the early part of 1917.

CHAPTER XI

NAVAL WORK

The main effort of the Navy during the year 1917 was
directed towards the defeat of the enemy's submarines,
since the Central Powers confined their naval effort almost
entirely to this form of warfare, but many other problems
occupied our attention at the Admiralty, and some of
these may be mentioned.

Considerable discussion took place in the early part
of the year on the subject of the policy to be pursued in
the Eastern theatre of war, and naval opinion on the
possibility of effecting a landing in force at different points
was invited and given. It need only be said here that
the matter was brought forward more than once, and that
the situation from the naval point of view was always
clear. The feasible landing places so far as we were con-
cerned were unsuited to the military strategy at that
period; the time required to collect or build the great
number of lighters, horse boats, etc., for the strong force
required was not available, and it was a sheer impossibility
to provide in a short period all the small craft needed for
an operation of magnitude, whilst the provision of the
necessary anti-submarine defences would have taxed our
resources to the utmost and have prevented essential work
of this nature in other theatres.

The work of the Navy, therefore, off the coast of
Palestine was confined to protecting the left flank of the
advancing army and assisting its operations, and to

247

248 The Crisis of the Naval War

establishing, as the troops advanced, bases on the coast
at which stores, etc., could be landed. This task was
effectively carried out.

The anchorages on this coast are all entirely open to
the sea, and become untenable at very short notice, so
that the work of the Navy was always carried out under
considerable difficulty. Nor could the ships working on
the flank be adequately guarded against submarine
attack, and some losses were experienced, the most im-
portant being the sinking of Monitor Ml5 and the
destroyer Staunch by a submarine attack off Deir eLBelah
(nine miles south of Gaza) in November.

The Navy continued its co-operation with the Army
in the Salonika theatre of war, assisted by the Royal
Naval Air Service, and bombardments were continually
carried out on military objectives. Similarly in the
Adriatic our monitors and machines of the R.N.A.S.
assisted the military forces of the Allies ; particularly was
this the case at the time of the Austrian advance to the
Piave, where our monitors did much useful work
in checking enemy attempts to cross that river.

Off the Gallipoli Peninsula the Naval watch on the
mouth of the Dardanelles was continued ; extensive new
minefields were laid during the year, and were effective
in sinking the Breslau and severely damaging the Goeben
when those vessels attempted a sortie on January 20, 1918.
The R.N.A.S. during the year carried out many long
distance reconnaissance and bombing operations over
Constantinople and the vicinity.

In the Red Sea Naval^ operations were carried out in
conjunction with friendly Arabs, and the Arabian coast
cleared of Turkish forces.

In the White Sea during the latter part of 1917 the
whole of the Naval work fell upon British Naval forces

Naval Work 249

when the Russian ships, which had co-operated hitherto,
had come under the influence of the political situation.
Our force in these waters consisted largely of trawlers
engaged in minesweeping and escort work. The latter
duty imposed a very heavy strain on officers and men,
involving as it did the safe conduct during the year of
no fewer than one thousand ships carrying stores and
munitions for the Russian military forces.

In the Baltic the situation became very difficult owing
first to the Russian revolution and, finally, to the Russian
debacle. Our force in these waters consisted of seven
submarines. It became evident at the beginning of
October, 1917, that the Germans were intending to carry
out some operations in the Baltic against Russia, and the
question of affording assistance was at once considered by
the Naval Staff. It was surmised that but little depend-
ence could be placed on the Russian Baltic Fleet (events
showed this surmise to be accurate), and in order to keep
our control over the North Sea and ensure the safety of
our communications with France it was obvious that for
any action we might decide to take we should be obliged
to divide the Grand Fleet, sending such portion of that
Command into the Baltic as could successfully engage
the High Sea Fleet if encountered, as well as to secure
the return passage via the Great Belt, and retaining a
sufficient force to deal with such German vessels as might
attempt operations in the North Sea or Channel during
our raid into the Baltic.

There were many ways in which the Germans might
seriously hamper, if not entirely prevent, the return of
our fleet from the Baltic unless we secured the exits."
The Great Belt could easily be closed by block-ships at
its narrowest points, and extensive minefields could be
laid. It was obvious, therefore, that to secure the exit

250 The Crisis of the Naval War

a strong force would be required, and that it would
necessarily occupy a position where it would be open to
serious attack.

The initial operation of gaining access to the Baltic
via the Great Belt, though not impossible, was difficult,
involving as it did sweeping passages through very
extensive minefields, and even when our ships were
in the Baltic fairly constant sweeping would be
necessary.

Finally, the whole operation would be complicated by
the question of fuel supply, especially to the destroyers
and other small craft with a limited radius of action,
since we could not depend upon Russian sources of supply.
These were amongst the considerations which made it
clear that the operation was not one that I could recom-
mend. The Russian naval view is given in the following
statement which appeared in the Russian Press in
October :

The Naval General Staff categorically denies the rumours
circulated in Petrograd on the 8th and 9th instant, to the
effect that the British or French Fleet had broken through to
the Baltic Sea.

At the same time it is pointed out that it would be a physical
impossibility for the Allies' Fleet to come in from the western
entrance, because it would be necessary to, pass through the
Sound or through one of the two Belts.

Entry to the Sound through Danish or Swedish waters
could not also be affected owing to the fact that these waters in
part are only 18 feet deep, while large-sized vessels would
require at least 30 feet of water.

As regards the entry to the Belts, this would be an ex-
tremely hazardous undertaking as parts of the routes are under
control of the Germans who have constructed their own
defences consisting of mines and batteries.

In these circumstances, according to the opinion of our
naval experts, an entrance into the Baltic by the Allies'

Naval Work 251

fleets could only be undertaken after gaining possession of
these waters and the adjacent coast ; and then only with the
co-operation of land forces.

The Germans had an easy task in the Baltic, as the
Russian resistance was not of a serious nature ; our sub-
marines attacked on every possible occasion, and scored
some successes against German vessels. Towards the end
of the year it became necessary to consider the action to
be taken in regard to our submarines, as the German
control of the Baltic became effective, and the demobili-
zation of the Russian fleet became more and more
pronounced. Many schemes for securing their escape
from these waters were discussed, but the chances of
success were so small, and the submarines themselves
possessed so little fighting value owing to their age, that
eventually instructions were sent to the senior officer to
destroy the submarines before they could fall into German
hands.

CHAPTER XII

THE FUTURE

It is natural that the task of recounting the facts in the
foregoing chapters should cause one's thoughts to turn
to the future. The Empire has passed through a period
of great danger, during which its every interest was
threatened, and it has come successfully out of the ordeal,
but to those upon whom the responsibility lay of initiating
and directing the nation's policy the serious nature of the
perils which faced us were frequently such as to justify the
grave anxiety which sprang from full knowledge of events
and their significance.

An international organization is in process of being
brought into existence which, if it does not entirely
prevent a recurrence of the horrors of the four and a half
years of war, will, it is hoped, at least minimize the chances
of the repetition of such an experience as that through
which the world has so recently passed. But the League
of Nations is still only a skeleton to be clothed with
authority and supported by the public opinion of the
world if it is to be a success. It is in its infancy, and so
far the most optimistic have not advanced beyond
hopes in its efficiency ; and if the lessons of the past are
correctly interpreted, as they were interpreted by our
forefathers in their day, those upon whom responsibility
lies in future years for the safety and prosperity of the
Empire will see to it that, so far as lies in their power,
whatever else may be left undone, the security of the

252

The Future 253

sea communications of the Empire is ensured . Not one
of us but must have realized during the war, if he did
not realize it before, that the all-important thing upon
which we must set our minds is the ability to use the
sea communications of the far-flung Empire, which is
only united by the seas so long as we can use them. But
while governments may realize their duty in this matter,
and set out with good intentions, it is, after all, upon the
people who elect governments that the final responsibility
lies, and therefore it is to them that it is so necessary to
bring home in season and out of season the dangers that
confront us if our sea communications are imperilled.

The danger whieh confronted the British peoples was

never so great in any previous period as it was during

the year 1917 when the submarine menace was at its

height, and it may be hoped that the lessons to be learned

from the history of those months will never be forgotten.

The British Empire differs from any other nation or

empire which has ever existed. Our sea communications

are our very life-blood, and it is not greatly exaggerating

the case to say that the safety of those communications

is the one consideration of first-class importance. Upon

a solid sense of their security depends not only our

prosperity, but also the actual lives of a large proportion

of the inhabitants. There is no other nation in the world

which is situated as the people of these islands are situated ;

therefore there is no other nation to whom sea power is

in the least degree as essential as it is to us. Four out

of five of our loaves and most of our raw materials for

manufacture must come to us by sea, and it is only by

the sea that we can hold any commercial intercourse with

the Dominions, Dependencies and Crown Colonies, which

together make up what we call the Empire, with a

population of 400,000,000 people.

254 The Crisis of the Naval War

What, then, are we to do in the future to ensure the
safety of the communications between these islands and
the rest of the Empire? As a matter of course we should
be in a position to safeguard them against any possible
form of attack from whatever quarter it may come. So
far as can be seen there is no present likelihood of the
transport of food or raw materials being effected in any-
thing but vessels which move upon the surface of the sea.
It is true that, as a result of the war, people's thoughts
turn in the direction of transport, both of human beings
and of merchandise, by air or under the water, but there
is no possible chance, for at least a generation to come,
of either of these methods of transport being able to
compete commercially with transport in vessels sailing
on the sea. Therefore the problem of guarding our com-
munications resolves itself into one of securing the safety
of vessels which move upon the surface of the sea, what-
ever may be the character of the attack.

I do not desire to enter into any discussion here as
to the method by which these vessels can be protected,
except to say that it is necessary for us to be in a position
of superiority in all the weapons by which their
safety may be endangered. At the present time
there are two principal forms of attack : (1) by vessels
which move on the surface, and (2) by vessels which move
under water. A third danger — namely, one from the air
— is also becoming of increasing importance. The war
has shown us how to ensure safety against the first two
forms of attack, and our duty as members of a great
maritime Empire is to take steps to maintain effective
forces for the purpose.

In order to carry out this duty it will be greatly to our
advantage if the matter can be dealt with by all the con-
stituent parts of the Empire. A recent tour of the

The Future 255

greater part of the British Empire has shown me that
the importance of sea power is very fully realized by the
great majority of our kith and kin overseas, and that
there is a strong desire on their part to co-operate in what
is, after all, the concern of the whole Empire. It seems
to me of the greatest possible importance that this matter
of an Empire naval policy and an Empire naval organiza-
tion should be settled at the earliest possible moment,
and that it should be looked at from the broadest point
of view.

I do not think that we in this country can
claim to have taken into sufficient account the very
natural views and the very natural ambitions which
animate the peoples overseas. We have, in point
of fact, looked at the whole question too locally, whilst
we have been suggesting to the Dominions that they are
inclined to make this error, and unless we depart from
that attitude there is a possibility that we shall not reap
the full benefit of the resources of the Empire, which
are very great and are increasing. In war it is not only
the material which counts, but the spirit of a people, and
we must enlist the support, spontaneous and effective, of
every section of the King's Dominions in the task of sea
defence which lies before us, consulting fully and un-
reservedly the representatives of our kith and kin, and
giving them the benefit of whatever instructed advice we,
with ancient traditions and matured knowledge, may
possess.

In framing our future naval policy it is obvious that
we must be guided by what is being done abroad. We
are bound to keep an absolutely safe margin of naval
strength, and that margin must exist in all arms and in
all classes of vessels. At the moment, and no doubt for
some time to come, difficulties in regard to finance will

256 The Crisis of the Naval War

exist, but it would seem to be nothing more than common
sense to insist that the one service which is vital to our
existence should be absolutely the last to suffer for need
of money. During a period of the greatest financial
pressure it may be necessary to economize somewhat in
the construction of new ships, and in the upkeep of certain
of our naval bases which the result of the war and
consequent considerations of future strategy may suggest
to be not of immediate importance, although even here
it may well be necessary to develop other naval bases to
meet changed conditions; but we cannot afford to fall
behind in organization, in the testing and development
of new ideas, or in the strength of our personnel
or in its training. A well trained personnel and a care-
fully thought out organization cannot by any possibility
be quickly extemporized.

It is the height of economic folly to stint experimental
research, for it is in times of stress that the value of past
experimental work is shown. In the matter of organiza-
tion we must be certain tha£ adequate means are taken
to ensure that the different arms which must co-operate
in war are trained to work together under peace con-
ditions. A modern fleet consists of many units of
different types — battleships, battle-cruisers, light cruisers,
destroyers and submarines. Before I relinquished the
command of the Grand Fleet, large sea-going submarines
of high speed, vessels of the " K " class, had been built
to accompany the surface vessels to sea. It is very
essential that senior officers should have every opportunity
of studying tactical schemes in which various classes of
ships and kinds of weapons are employed. In consider-
ing the future of the Navy it is impossible to ignore
aircraft. There are many important problems which the
Navy and the Air Service ought to work out together. A

»2S

A Submarine Submerging.

"J?i

?„-■■■&»**

Periscope of Submerged Submarine Travelling at Slow Speed.

A Submarine Submerged.

The Future 257

fleet without aircraft will be a fleet without eyes, and
aircraft will, moreover, be necessary, not only for recon-
naissance work, but for gun-spotting, as well as, possibly,
for submarine hunting. Air power is regarded by many
officers of wide practical experience as an essential com-
plement to sea power, whatever future the airship and
aeroplane may have for independent action. A captain
who is going to fight his ship successfully must have
practised in time of peace with all the weapons he will
employ in action, and he must have absolute control over
all the elements constituting the fighting power of his
ship. In a larger sense, the same may be said of an
admiral in, command of a fleet ; divided control may mean
disaster. The advent of aircraft has introduced new and,
at present, only partially explored problems into naval
warfare, and officers commanding naval forces will require
frequent opportunities of studying them. They must be
worked out with naval vessels and aircraft acting in close
association. With the Air Service under separate control,
financially as well as in an executive and administrative
sense, is it certain that the Admiralty will be able to
obtain machines and personnel in the necessary numbers
to carry out all the experimental and training work that
is essential for efficiency in action? Is it also beyond
doubt that unity of command at sea, which is essential
to victory, will be preserved? In view of all the possi-
bilities which the future holds now that the airship and
aeroplane have arrived, it is well that there should be no
doubt on such matters, for inefficiency might in conceiv-
able circumstances spell defeat.

Then there is the question of the personnel of; the
fleet. • It would be most unwise to allow the strength of
the trained personnel of the Navy to fall below the limit
of reasonable ; safety, because it is upon that trained

258 The Crisis of the Naval War

personnel that the success of the enormous expansions
needed in war so largely depends. This was found during
the late struggle, when the personnel was expanded from
150,000 to upwards of 400,000, throwing upon the pre-war
nucleus a heavy responsibility in training, equipment and
organizing. Without the backbone of a highly trained
personnel of sufficient strength, developments in time of
sudden emergency cannot possibly be effected. In the
late war we suffered in this respect, and we should not
forget the lesson.

In future wars, if any such should occur, trained
personnel will be of even greater importance than it was
in the Great War, because the advance of science
increases constantly the importance of the highly trained
individual, and if nothing else is certain it can surely be
predicted that science will play an increasing part in war-
fare in the future. Only those officers and men who
served afloat in the years immediately preceding the open-
ing of hostilities know how great the struggle was to gain
that high pitch of efficiency which the Navy had reached
at the outbreak of war, and it Was the devotion to duty
of our magnificent pre-war personnel that went far to
ensure our victory. It is essential that the Navy of the
future should not be given a yet harder task than fell
to the Navy of the past as a result of a policy of starving
the personnel.

There is, perhaps, just one other point upon which I
might touch in conclusion. I would venture to suggest
to my countrymen that there should be a full realization
of the fact that the Naval Service as a whole is a highly
specialized profession. It is one in which the senior
officers have passed the whole of their lives, and during
tlieir best years their thoughts are turned constantly in
one direction — namely, how they can best fit the Navy and

The Future 259

themselves for possible war. The country as a whole has
probably but little idea of the great amount of technical
knowledge that is demanded of the naval officer in these
days. He must possess this knowledge in addition to the
lessons derived from his study of war, and the naval officer
is learning from the day that he enters the Service until
the day that he leaves it.

The Navy, then, is a profession which is at least as
highly specialized as that of a surgeon, an engineer, or
a lawyer. Consequently, it would seem a matter of
common sense that those who have not adopted the Navy
as a profession should pay as much respect to the pro-
fessional judgment of the naval officer as they would to
that of the surgeon or the engineer or the lawyer, each
in his own sphere. Governments are, of course, bound
to be responsible for the policy of the country, and policy
governs defence, but, both in peace and in war, I think
it will be agreed that the work of governments in naval
affairs should end at policy, and that the remainder should
be left to the expert. That is the basis of real economy
in association with efficiency, and victory in war goes to
the nation which, under stress and strain, develops the
highest efficiency in action.

APPENDICES

Appendices

Frequent references have been made in this volume to the organiza-
tion and development of the staff at the Admiralty, on whom the duty
devolved of initiating and directing naval operations, both those con-
cerned with the war on the surface and those connected with the
mining and submarine campaigns conducted by the enemy. It has
been thought that it will tend to render the references to staff organiza-
tion more intelligible if complete statements are appended of (a) the
Staff as it existed towards the end of October, 1916, (b) after the re-
organization which took place in the early months of 1917, (c) as it
existed towards the end of December, 1917, and (d) as it was towards
the end of November, 1918. Similarly the Staff of the Admiralty
Departments engaged in the work of Design, Inspection and Production
is also shown.

It may be suggested also that these lists have a personal interest
to the large number of officers of the Royal Navy and Royal Marine,
as well as to the civilians, who rendered conspicuous service to the
country at the Admiralty during the last two years of the war. The
lists may also prove useful in future years when the staff organization
of the Admiralty is discussed in the light of new conditions.

The lists do not include members of the Board of Admiralty other
than those on the " Operations " side, or many Admiralty Depart-
ments not engaged in Staff work or in the " Materiel " Departments.

(«) ADMIRALTY, END OF OCTOBER, 1916.

First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, K.O.B.

ADMIRALTY WAR STAFF.

Chief of the War Staff. rice-Admiral (act.) Sir Henry F. Oliver. K.O.B., ic.v.o.

Assistant to the Chief of the War Staff. Captain Arthur de K. L. May.

Staff Clerk W. H. Hancock, Esq. lad.)

> OPERATIONS DIVISION.

Director of the Operations Division Beat Admiral Thomas Jackson, o.b.. m.v.o.

Assistant Directors of the Operations Division Captain Henry W. Grant.

Lieut.-Col. Walter T. 0. Jones, d.s.o„ e.h.l.i.

Naval and Marine Staff.

Captain A. Q. Allgood tret.).

A. F. Beal.

E. P. Clutton tret.).

O. Q. S. Bales (ret.).

W. M. Kerr.

O. Seymour,

H. J. L. W. K. WUlcoi.

Charles D. Eoper (temp.).

Staff Clerk O. J. Blckman. Esq.

2 Second Division Clerks.

1 Confidential Shorthand Writer.

Commander Raymond Fltzmaurlce, d.s.o.
Frederic G. S. Pelle.
Charles 0. Dix, d.s.o.
F. Bowden-Smith.lreO.
E. V. Brooke-Webb tret.).
8. V. S, 0. Messum (ret.).
T. W. Stirling (emerg.).
Leonard Eoblnson (act.).

M di iS"} Wtzstepnen J. F. French.
Lieut.-Com. 3. P. Gibbs.

Civil Staff.

11 Assistant Clerks. '

2 Accountant Clerks.

3 Extra Clerks.

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.
Director of the Intelligence Division...Captain William E. Hall, O.B., AdC.
Assistant Directors of the IntcWomct Division^— Captain Baymond A. Nugent (temp.).

Captain Thomas E. Wardle, d.s.o. .

Captain ... Herbert W. W. Hope.

Commander Vivian B. Brandon.
Francis G. G. Chilton.
Oolpoys C. Walcott

(ret.).
Lewis D. Penlold

(ret.).
Ernest F. Gregory.
Gerald C. Dickens.

Commander \
(Emerg.) I

Henry F.O. Caven-
dish.

Commander \ Lord Herechell.
R.S.F.B. I H.v.0.

Bon. William
Cozens-Hardy, K.O.

Staff Clerka~-

Hugh Broadbent, Esq.

Naval and Marine Staff.
Lieut.-Com. Walter^T. Bagot.

James F. Houstoun.
Arthur W. Wood (ret.).

Lieut. EogeriV. deJHalpert

(ret.) (tempv.).
Eng. Com... .Percy Wheater.
Maim Frank V. Temvle,

B.M.L.I.

Walter Sinclair.

R.M.L.I.

Captain ...Percy E. Heycock,
Cecil's. S. Wright.

R.M.L.I.

Bernard F. Trench,

R.M.L.I.

J. C. Farmer, r.m.l.i.

Civil Staff.
Cartographer —

0. Brlokenden, Esq.
11 Second Division Clerks.

264

Captain 1 Charles B. Mulliim.
B.M.L.I. I Cuthbert E. Blnns.
Lieut.-Com.\ „ DoMt
B.N.V.B. /H. Paget.
Lieut.R.N.R. Alastalr P. Hadow.
Lieut. 1 Arthur E. Watts.

B.N.VJt. ST. Bomer.
Lieut. 1 C. P. Serocold.

B.N.VM. /Henry Howard.
Naval Instr. Guy V. Bayment, b.a.
Fleet Pawn. Charles J. E. Botter.

O.B.

Ernest W. C. Thrlng.

C. Betton Boberts.
Asst. Povffl. Lloyd Hirst.
Assl. Pawn. 1 William H.

B.N.VM. I Osman.

Midshipman George H. Carbutt.

1 Confidential Shorthand Writer.

1 Assistant Clerk. 1 Extra Clerk.

2 Boy Clerks, 29 Women Clerks.
e Draughtsmen.

Appendix 265

The following gentlemen have been appointed or lent for temporary service during the War :
Sir P. W. Baker- Wilbraham, St. il.b.. F. Cavendish-Bentinok. H. N. Dickson. M.A., r>.sc. Esqs
2nd Lieut, E. L. Hobaon (London Beat.). T. W. H. Insklp. Esq.. K.o.. 2nd Lieut. S. S. O. Leeson.
. Major B. J. Lugard (Indian Army, retd.), Capt. P. Phlpps. E. G. O. Poole, J. Bandall and H. Eunsell.
Esqrs.

TRADE DIVISION.
Acting Director of Trade Division.. .Captain Blohard Webb. O.B.. b.h.
Acting Assistant Director of Trade Division... Captain Horace W. Longden.

Captain Sidney E. Diury Lowe. O.M.Q.

W. H. D. Margesson [ret.).

B. H. Smith (ret.).

T. H. Poster (ret.).

Philip Walter (ret.).
Commander Thomas Fisher.

A. n. Tarletoo. m.v.o. (emerg.).

Sir Charles L. Cust, Bt. k.o.v.o..
c.b., o.m.g.. o.i.b. (ret.).

Maxwell H. Anderson (act.) (ret.).

Oscar V. de Satge (ret).

John Kiddie.

Lieut.-Com. John O. Wyatt (ret.).

Walter P. Koe (ret.).

John W. Pugh (ret.).
Lieut.-Com. i William Ginman.
R.N.VJt. f W. E. Arnold-Foreter.

X j^ m) } Hugh 0. Arnold-Forster.

Lieut.R.NM. W. H. Stewart.

Lieut. i F. H. McOormlck-Goodhart.

RJf.VJt. I L. McOormick-Goodhart.
Lieut.-Col. ...Thomas H. Hawkins, b.h.l.1.
Fleet Pavm. ...H. W. Eldon Manlsty. o.m.q.

Alfred E. Parker.
Asst. Pavm. Harold B. Tufflll.

R.N.R. W. A. J. Boxford.

Civil Staff.
Staff Clerk.. .J. T. CoMon. Esq. (act.). I 2 Clerical Assistants.

3 Second Division Clerks (one lent). ! IS Temporary Clerks.

1 Accountant Clerk (lent). | 14 Women Clerks.

The following have been appointed for temporary service during the War :

H. S. Moss Blundell. ll.d., Esq.

(unpaid).
Sir Frederick Bolton (unpaid).
E. Buras-Pre. Esq. (unpaid).
Mrs. C. H. Campbell (unpaid).

A. H. Charteris, Esq.

H. O. Cnmberbatch, Esq. (unpaid).

Q. D. Hardlnge-Tyler, Esq.

W. E. Hargreaves, Esq. (unpaid).

Cllye Lawrence, Esq.,

Barrister -at- Law.
Lieut. E. Maclay

(The Cameronians).
The Earl of Sandwich (unpaid).

SIGNAL SECTION.

Head of Signal Section Captain Christopher E. Payne.

Naval Staff.
Commander Basil E. Eelnold. I Asst. Pavm.... Edward W. H. Travis.

Everard J. Hardman-Jones. Wt. Writer ...HartingtonEatcliffe.

Staff Pavm. John E. A\ Brown. I 2 Chief Wrltere (1 pensd.).

Civil Staff.
4 Hired Extra Clerks. | 49 Women Clerks.

MATERIEL DEPARTMENTS.

DEPARTMENT OP THE DIEECTOE OP NAVAL EQOTPMENT.
Director of Naval Equipment.. .Captain Clement Grea tores, o.b., m.v.o.. e.n.

(Is also Naval Assistant to Third Sea Lord.)
Assistant Directors of Naval Equipment... Captain Geary L. Cochrane, b.n.

Captain Christopher P. Metcalfe, D.i.o. (for Salvage
work) (ret.).
Salvage Officer in Home Waters... Captain H. Pomeroy.

Eng. Captain. .(Retd.) Henry E. Teed. Carpenter Lieutenant... Thomas L. Soper.
1 Dockyard Clerk, 2nd grade, 1 Tempy. Clerk, 8 Women Clerks, 1 Boy Clerk. ;

Superintendents of Contract-built Ships.

Onnijiim mrfin w Tf n.rf Mnt m vn ( ror Con*™ ' Work (not Including Destroyers) on the Clyde.
Captam Brian H. F. Barttelot. M.v.o. \ Address— 8. Clyde View. Partlck. Glasgow.

i-For Contract Work (not^includlng_Destroyers) on the Tyne,

Cap tain Laurence E. Power, o.b. , J Thames. Mersey, at Barrow-in-Furness, and at Sunderland

m.v.o.. AdC | Address — i. Eslington Terrace. Jesmond, Newcastle-on-
>- Tyne.

Superintendent of Torpedo Boat Destroyers building by Contract.

Captain Cyril Asser, B.H. Address— 47, Victoria Street, S.W.

Commander George H. H. Holden (ret.). Commander James H. Datban'lref.).

Commander Vernon S. Bashlelgh. Commander Lewis G. E. Crabbe.

Commander Sydney B. Boyd-Eichardson. Commander R.N.R. James W. Gracey (act.).

Commander Frank F. Eose. d.s.o. Lieut.-Com. George M. Skinner/

266

Appendix

DEPABTMENT OP THE DIEECTOB OF NAVAL CONSTBTTCTION.
Director of Naval Construction.
E. H. Tennyson d'Eyncourt, Esq., 03.

Superintendent of Construction Accounts and
Contract Work.
W. H. Waiting. Esq., O.B.

Assistant Directors of Naval Construction
W. J. Berry. Esa.
W. H. Gard. Esa.. o.B.. m.v.o.
H. Fledge. Esq. tact).
A. E. Richards, Esq.

Superintendent of Admiralty Experiment Works...'B. E. Fronde. Esq.. o.B.. llj>„ f.h.s.
Senior Constructive Officer {reentered for tempv. service durimi tot War).. J. A. Yates. Esq.

Chief Constructors.
E. L. Attwood (act.), i o. F. Monday (act.).

S. E. Boyland (act.)
W. H. Carter (act.),
T. Dally.
A. W. Johns {act.).

0. H. Ball.

G. Bulkeley (act.).

O. I. B. Campbell (act.).

S. V. Goodall {act.).

C. E. Goodyear.

A. H. Gould (ret.)

(tempy.).
O. Hannaford lad.).
E. B. Harres (act.).
A. J. HobBon.
J. C. Joughin (act.).

J. II. Narbctli, m.v.o.

E. A. J. Pearce (act.).

F. L. Pethlck.
Esqrs.

Constructors.

C. W. Kerridge (act.).

W. J. Martin.

T. L. Mathlas (act.).

F. L. Mayer (act.).

O. A. Payne.

J. Rogers.

W. O. Banders (act.).

O. Scott (act.).

A. W. Watson (act.).

L. Woollard (act.).

Assistant Constructors. First Class.

A. Adams.
T. H. Bentley.
a M. Carter.

E. B. Charlg.
G. H. Child.

F. Hlekey.

C. J. W. Hopkins.

J. Innes.
O. S. LUlicrap.
J. McQueen.
S. Payne.
E. F. Spanner.
A. G. W. Stantan.
L. 0. Williamson.
Esqrs.

Assistant Constructors, 2nd Class.

F. T. Blackman.
A. P. Cole.
W. A. D. Forbes.
E. W. I.. Gawn.

Temporary Constructor.

T. B. Abell. Esq.

Temporary Assistant Constructors.

A. Akester. B.sc.
J. Angus. B.sc.
a W. Blon. B.sc

E. L. Champness. b.sc.

F. C. Cocks.

D. A. Coskery, b.sc.

W. J. Craig.

J. L. Davles.

D. L. Evans, B.sc.

K. Falrley.

T. Graham, b.sc.

W. B. Hockaday.
R. K. McMillan.
M. M. Parker.
G. McL. Paterson, B.A.
A. P. Patterson, b.sc
P. G. Bouse. B.i.

H. S. Pengelly.
F. O. C. Sogers.
F. Sutcllffe,

Esqrs

J. H. Sowden, B.sc.
T. E. Sowden. B.SC.
F. W. Thome.
J. 0. M. Wilson.

Esqrs.

Temporary Acting Assisting Constructors.

G. Chase. W. J. Laughton. H. Philpot. A. Warren.

W. H. Eastcott. P. J. Pannlter. F. Skeens. i 8. B. Wells.

H. E. Hodge. G. Penney. A. Taylor.! G. H. Whitew&r.

G. Hunnlsett. A. F. Perkins. S. F. Thorn. Esqrs.

Inspecting Officer of Smiths' Work. ..ft. T. Pearson. Esq.
Survevor...C E. Rawbone, Esq. (Lent from Board of Trade).

Curator of Drawings... W. J. Moore, Esq.
Examiner of Construction Accmnts. ..George H. Taylor, Esq.
Confidential Clerks to DJX.0....3. Luffman and S. W. E. Pippett (act.). Esqrs.
Technical Clerk... .W. H. Malpas. Esq.
Clerical Assistant to S.C.JP....B. 3. Wright, Esq. (act.).
32 First Class and 91 Second Class Draughtsmen, S Second and 6 Third Grade Dockyard Clerks, 1
Hired Writer, 13 Hired Extra Clerks, 21 Women Clerks, 6 Boy Clerks, 1 Interpreter (temvv.) 4 Modellers.
The following gentleman has been re-entered for temporary service—
W. 0. Thomas. Esq. (Inspecting Officer retii.)
Superintending Electrical Engineer.... C H. Wordingham. Esq., m.i.o.e., h.i.k.e., m.i.e.e.
Electrical Engineers, Higher Grade.. ..A. D. Constable, m.i.e.e.. William McClelland, a.m.i.e.e. and E. T.

Williams, m.i.e.e. (act.), Esqrs.
Electrical Engineers. ...H. Melville Ackery. m.i.e.e., J. 8. Beddoe (act.), F. P. Fletcher, a.h.i.o.e.
i.M.i.B.E. (act.), F. C. Forster. m.i.e.e.. A. G. Ncwington. m.i.e.e., and W.P. Scott. ajc.i.e.e. (act.), Esqrs.
First Assistant Electrical Engineers... .W. H. Chatten (act.), H. H. E. Green, a.m.i.e.e., and J. Shaw

(act.), Esqrs.
Temvv. Asst. Electrical Engineers... .F. Morton, a.m.i.ee., and B. W. Willis, a.m.i.e.e., Esqrs.

Examiner of Electrical Accounts. ...E. E. Sogers, Esq. (act.)
2 Second Assistant Electrical Engineers (act.), 8 First Class, 7 Second Class, and 6 Temporary Draughts-
men. 6 Tempy. Clerks, 6 Women Clerks and 2 Boy Clerks.

.DEPARTMENT OF THE ENGINEER IN CHIEF.

Engineer-in- Chief of the Fleet. ..Eng. Vice-Admiral Sir Henry J. Oram, k.c.b., r.B.S).
Deputy Engineer-in-Chief...Eng. Sear-Admiral G. G. Goodwin, o.B.
Eng. Bear-Admiral William J. Anstey.

(Eng. Bear-Admiral Edouard Gaudin,
Eng. Captain Francis H. Lister (Lent Priority Section).
Eng. Captain Charles W. J. Bearblock (temp.).
Eng. Captain Edward A. Short (ret.) (temp.)

Appendix

267

Engineer Inspectors.
Eng. Captain... John H. Jenkln.
Bna. Captain... Arthur S. Crisp.
Eng. Commander John McLaurin.
Bng. Commander David J. Carruthers.
Bna. Commander Charles O. Ware.
Eng. Commander Arthur E. Hyne.
Bna. Commander Francis A. Gordon (tempv.).
Bng. Commander Lionel M. Hobbs {lent from B.N,

Coll.. Greenwich).
Bng. Commander Thomas G. Procter.

Civilian Engineer-Overseers W. G. Gibbons,

Engineer Inspectors — continued.
Bng. Commander William H. Ham.
Bng. Commander John Hamilton.
Bng. Commander Joseph J. Elrwln.
Bng. Commander Ernest Nlbbs (act.). '
Bng. Commander James J. Sargent (act.).

Engineer Dieutenant-Commomders.

Leonard W. Curgenven.
William S. Mann.
Harold A. Brown.
Ernest A. Archard.
Bertram W. Knott.

Walter W. Lock.
Frederick J. Pcdrick.
Stanley C. Church.
George Preece {temp.).
Jesse H. Harrison.

Engineer Lieutenant.
Frederick B. G. Turner.
, O. Grey, W. Letty. W. G. Mathews and M. Ord

Examiners of Engineering Accounts .. .Edwin Gedye, and W. J. Stallion. Esqrs. (act.). 85 Draughts-
men, 10 Tempy. Draughtsmen, 1 Dockyard Clerk (Third Grade). 3 Hired Writers,
4 Extra Clerks, 8 Tempy. Clerks, 11 Women Clerks and 2 Boy Clerks.

DEPAETMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF DOCKYAEDS.
Director of Dockyards and Dockyard Work.. .Sir James B. Marshall, e.c.b.

For Special Service —

Bng. Bear-Admiral Robert Mayston, 0.1
(ret.) (tempv.).

Bng. Rear-Admiral Charles Bndd (ret.).

Engineer Assistant to Director of Dockvards-
Bng. Captain John W. Ham.

Superintendent of Dockyard Branch —
H. J. Webb, Esq.

Manager, Constructive Department —

F. B. Ollls, Esq. (tempv.) (For special
service.)

Chief Constructors —

G. M. Apsey (tempv.).

E. E. Bate. Esq.. ladd'l).
0. H. Crozford, Esq. (act.) (tempv.).

Constructors —

F. Bryant. Esq. Engmeer Assistants—

W. T. Da^ EOT. (fefWV.l. Eng. Commander Samuel P. Ferguson.

G. F. Lndford (act.).
H. B. Wood (act.), E. E. Langmald, Esq.

Chief Engineer.. .T. E. Elvy, Esq. (lent from Haulbowlme Dockyard).
Examiners of Dockyard Work —
T. H. Harries. E. A. Lakey. J. D. Gibby (act.). J. Ellis, W. L. Coles. F. Sanders.
O. Henwood (act.), F. J. Fletcher (act.), and J. A. Fage (act.), Esqrs.

First Assistant Electrical Engineer.. .E. L. Brain, Esq. (act).

CterieaUssistaMs{ £ ^^JX,,

Visiting Inspectors of Timber.. ,VT. H. Hooper and Alfred James, Esqrs.
1 Dockyard Clerk (First Grade), 2 Dockyard Clerks (Second Grade), ? Dockyard
Clerks (Third Grade), and 9 Hired Writers.

DOCKYABD EXPENSE ACCOUNTS DEPAETMENT.
(88, Victoria Street, S.W.)
Inspectors of Dockyard Expense Accounts... W. G. BoS, Esq., i.s.o.
Assistant to ditto...!. Kyan.JEsq.
Expense Accounts Offtcer...'B. W. W. Burrell. Esq.
Deputy Expense Accounts Officer... Or. T. Jones, Esq.
Assistant Expense Accounts Officer.. .T. Piatt, Esq. (for Stocktaking Duties).

T. Jennings, Esq. (for Stocktaking Duties), and
J. A. Jeffery, Esq. (act.)
F. Hall. Esq. (lent).
Examiner of Accounts. . .H. Haggis, Esq.
Assistant Examiner of Accounts... J. E. Horswell, Esq.
2 Dockyard Clerks (Second Grade). 6 Dockyard Clerks (Third Grade), 3 Hired Writers
1 Assistant Clerk, 3 Tempy. Clerks and Women Clerks.

DEPAETMENT OF THE DIEECTOB OF NAVAL OEDNANCE.

Director of Naval Ordnance and Torpedoes. . .Bear-Admiral Morgan Singer, o.b.
Assistant-Director of Torpedoes.. .Captain Philip W- Dumas, c.v.o., o.b.
Assistant-Director of Naval Ordnance... Captain Herbert B. Norbury.

268

Appendix

Assistants to Director of Naval Ordnance and Torpedoes.

Commander Charles A. Scott.
Commander Frederic E. K. G. Schreiber.
Commander Edward 0. Cochrane.
Commander James 8. 0. Salmond.
Commander (ret.) Malcolm K. Grant.
Commander latum W. Gibson, m.t.o.
Commander Bernard W. M. Falrbairn.
Lieul.-Com. Kenneth B. M. Churchill.
Acting Com. Archibald Gilbert (lemvv.).

Acting Commander Gerard B. Riley (ret.) (tempv.).
Acting Commander Carlton C. Sherman (ret.)

(tempv.).
Commr. B.N.V.R. John G. Henderson {act.).
Lieut. Walter B. Gilbert.
Lieut. Willie D. Kilror. h.n.v.r. (tempv.).
Lieut. Herbert O. Mock. h.n.v.b. (tempi/.).
Sub.-IAeut. W. H. J. Elridge, r.n.v.b. {temw.).

Lieutenant... Patrick P. Coleman.

Chief Gunners. . .Frederick J. Payne, Malcolm A. McKenzle.

Gunner... (T) Leonard Eepton. W. Thorogood. Walter F. Williamson.

Engineer Inspectors.

Bng. Bear-Admiral Ernest F. Ellis, o.B. Wet.).
Bng. Captain Thomas Thome Uempv.).
Eng. Commander Henry Wall.
Eng. Commander Edward O. Hefford.

Eng. Commander William Hart.

Eng. Commander Alfred R. Kempt.

Eng. Lieut. Commander Frederick L. Robertson.

Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance... Commander (act.) John A. Duncan, o.b.

Assistants to Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance.. .Commander Digby St. A. P. Weston (ret.).

Commander Henry G. B. Bevan (ret.).
Commander {act.) Leslie J. L. Hammond {ret.).
Captain Freeman C. N. Bishop, b.m.a.

The following gentleman has been lent for special service during the War. ..J. Storey, Esq.
Naval officers employed on Inspection and Experimental Ordnance Duties.
Under Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance : —
Inspector of Steel.. .Commander Harold G. Jackson {ret.).
Assistant Inspectors of Steel.

Admiral {ret.) Sir Edmund S. Poe. o.o.v.o.. k.c.b.

MaSor-Qeneral B. Waco. c.n. Uempv.).

Captain H. B. Evans, e.n. (ret.).

Captain William H. M. Daniel), k.n. (ret.).

Captain Claude W. M. Plenderleath. e.n. (ret.).

Commander Henry Thompson (ret.).

Commander Charles K. McCallum (ret.).

Commander John E. Bray (ret.).

Commander T. S. Gooch (Emergy.).

Commander A. H. Tremayne (re*.).

Commander Reginald 0. Brenton (Emergy.Htempv).

Lommander W. F. Caborne, O.B., r.n.k. (ret.).

Lieut.-Com. Arthur W. Tomllnson.

Lieul.-Com. Frank B. Willis.

Lieut.-Com. Hugh J. On (ret.).

Cieut.-Com. Llewellyn E. H. Llewellyn (ret.),

Lieut.-Com. John G. M McHardy (ret.).

Lieul.-Com. Albert D. Grant (ret.).

Lieul.-Com. Robert F. Veasey (ret.).

Lieut.-Com. Alister W. McDonald (ret.).

The following gentlemen have also been appointed for temporary service during the War :

H. B. Halls. 0. J. Hill. A. E. Lee. L. T. Jarvis, J. W. Capstick. C. E. Moss.

W. B. C. Hockln, B. Carey-Brenton, T. W. Sheppard. Bears.

Lent from Rome Office.
H. Topham. S. B. Bennett A. C. Lowe. G. C. Sumner. E. L. Mecklln. C. F. Hunter. W. H. Mead,
W. Turner, F. Bowen, A. A. Hepburn, C. II. Taylor, O. E. Plumbe, F. W. Cockshott, A. Fother-
Ingham. L. D. Hooper, H. T. Ringdove, and W. C. Evans. Esars.

Under War Office.
Lieut-Corn. John A. L. Hay. I Captain Nathaniel F. Trotman. e.h.a.

Lieut-Corn. Archibald 0. GooMen (ret.). \

Lieut.-Com. Ralph B. Bodilly (ret.).

Lieut.-Com. William H. Callwell (ret.).

Lieut.-Com. Henry L. Cheston (Emergy.) (act.).

Lieut.-Com. Frederick J. Davis. B.D., b.n.b. (ret.).

Lieut.-Com. W. E. Compton (ret.).

Lieut.-Com. W. G. H. Cree (ret.).

Lieut.-Com. H. J. G. Lawrence (ret.).

Lieut.-Com. J. H. C. Ogilvy (ret.).

Lieut. Henry S. H. Ellis (ret.).

Lieut. Robert J. Sweet (ret.).

Lieut. R.N.R. Beauchamp H. Venner (ret.).

Colonel 3. R. J. Jocelyn, b.a. (ret.) (tempv.).

Lieut.-CoUmel T. English, b.e. (ret.) (tempv.).

Lieut-Col. G. Mackinlay. b.a. (ret.) (tempv.).

Lieut.-Col. B. L. Haines (ret.) (tempv.).

Major Charles A. Bishop. R.H.A,

Contain G. B. Macpherson Grant (lempy.).

Captain Alfred D. B. Godfray. b.h.a.

Eng. Capt. H. W. Metcalfe (ret.).

The following gentlemen have been appointed for temporary service during the War :
J. L. Capes, H. Jackson, A. McPherson. and P. B. Courser. Esars.

Superintending Clerk. . .Thomas G. Anderson, Esq.
Deputy Superintending Clerk.. .W. P. Daniels, Esq. (act.).
Assistant Superintending Clerks.. .V. Morrison, S. W. Smith (act.) and G. Stevens (act.), Esars.
Second Division Clerk, Dockyard Clerks (including Acting) First Grade 1. Second Grade 8. Third Grade
9, Temporary Clerks and Boys 48. Draughtsmen 7.

Appendix 269

Superintendent of Ordnance Stores.. .Captain Barrlngton H. Ohevalller, b.h. {retired).
Assistant Superintendent of Ordnance Stores. ..H. Fathers. '

Frederick Ward (aoM.
Q. E. Woodward loot.), Esqrs.
Superintending Clerk.. .A.. MoFarlane, Esq. (act.).
Naval Ordnance Store OMcer...W. A. Mortimer (act.). Esq.

Deputi/ Ordnance Store Offlcere T. W. Mldmer (detached for Special Duty). W. H. Rowe (ml.), N. Thomas.

and W. Vaughan. Esqrs.

Assistant Ordnance Store OtHcers J. A. W. Ballard (act.), G. C. Cusens (act.), W. E. Eyles (ad.).

O. H. Murray (net.), and A. X. Reed (act.). Esqrs.
Examiner of Naval Ordnance Work.. .W. D. Evans. Esq.. (act.).

1 Ordnanoe Depot Clerk, First Grade.
4 Ordnance Depot Clerks, First Grade (act.).
13 Ordnance Depot Clerks, Second Grade (act.).
a Ordnance Depot Clerks, Third Grade.
7 Ordnance Depot Clerks, Third Grade (act).
1 Hired Writer.

13 Temporary Hired Extra Clerks.

14 Temporary Women Clerks.

6 Boy Clerks and Boy Writers.

Actino Assistant Ordnance Store OMcer... Sheffield.. .<3. SwKt. Esq..
Chief Analyst.. .Sheffield.. .John C. W. Humfrey Esq.

Notb. — Offlcers o( the Naval Ordnance Department serving at Woolwich and at the Ports are not
given.

AIK DEPARTMENT.

Director of Air Services Rear-Admiral Charles L. Vaughan-Lee.

Civil Assistant W. G. Perrin, Esq.

Private Secretary Paymaster (act.) G. H. Thomson.

Superintendent of Aircraft Construction Captain Murray F. Sueter, o.B.

(Commodore 1st Class.)

Naval Assistant Captain A. V. Vyvyan, d.s.o.

AssU Supts. of Aircraft Construction CaptainD. T. Norris.

Captain A. J. Davies.

Wing Commander R. H. Clark-HalM

Asst. Supt. of Engines Wing Commander (E) W. Brlggs (act.).

Personnel Captain Captain H. Edwards, D.s.o.

Inspecting Captain of Air Training Wing Commander H. D. Briggs. '

Captain Lord Dunboyne.

Military Liaison Officer Lieut. J. E. Pike, E.r.o.

Commander A. D. Warrington-Morris.

Wing Commanders.
J. L. Forbes. I C. R. J. Randall. ! H. L. Woodcock.

R. C. S. Hunt. I J. W. Seddon. I

Sauadron Commanders.
P. F. M. Fellowes. I J. D. Mackworth. I H. A. Williamson.

C. H. K. Edmonds, d.s.o. ! I

Flight Commanders.
J. W. K. Allsop. I H. A. Mlchell. I S. V. Slppe. D.s.o.

J. Bird (ad.). ! R. 0. M. Pink. I

Lieutenant-Commander J.I.Harrison.

Engineer-Commander Francis Ranken (act.).

Eng.-Lieut.-Commander A. Leamon-Berry.

Emrmeer-Lieutenant R. Stansmore.

W. A. C. Sandford-Thompson.

Flight Lieutenants.

F. A. Brock.
W. A. Bums.

G. W. Cranfleld.
A. 0. French-Brewster.

L. H. HardstaS.
L. J. Killmayer.
W. C. Michie.
E. J. O. Roberts.

Flight Sub-Lieut. D.W.Gray.

F. P. Reeves

Warrant Officers (1st grade).
F. W. Soarfl.

E. V. Sassoon.
M. E. A. Wright.

270

Appendix

L. 0. Abbott.
J. V. Collins.
H. G. Cooper.
W. T. Ourtiss.

Warrant Officers (2nd grade).

W. N. Formby.
J. H. Hobba.
O. Layzell-Appa.
J. S. Matthias.

C. Y. Mitchell.

J. OrmBby.

W. G. J. Wardle.

W. A. Briatow.

Lord Eiskine. ;

Lieut.-Commanders. R.N.V.R.

G. Holmes.
O. F. Jenkin.

F. C. H. Sinclair.

0. R. Abbott.
M. H. P. Allen.
C. E. Andrews.
P. T. Armstrong.
J. Arthur. ^
T. M. Barlow.
T. B. Barrlngton.
W. O. Bentley.
B. B. Berkley.

A. L. Bligh.

T. S. H. Blunt.
J. P. Bourke.
J. S. Buchanan.
P. A. Bumpus.
G. Caird.
J. D. Carmlohael.

B. C. Carter.
G. H. Childs.

E. n. Cocksbott.
.T. Craig.

J. G. T. Crawford.
J. G. Currle.
J. K. Curwen.

C. E. D'Arcy.
H. I. Dear.
H. Dodd.

J. G. Dothia
J. W. Eckford.
J. P. Elsden.
A. T. Evans.
A. W. Farrer.

A. C. Baker.
J. G. M. Bevan.
E. C. Blake.
E. Butt.
C. A. Crow.
J. W. 0. Dobbyn.

Lieutenants, R.N.V.R.

W. E. Flint.
3. Flower.
J. M. Eraser.

A. S. Gendle.

E. D. N. Gillmore.
E. S. Goddard.

D. Gordon.
W. C. Grant.

J. E. A. Greatorex.

B. T. Hamilton.
J. F. Hedley.

H. A. Hetherington.
S. E. Hill.

E. Hogg.

T. C. B. Hooke.
W. H. Horden.
E. C. Horsley
D. C. M. Hume.
A. J. Hurst.
A. G. Ionides.
0. Kent.
A. Landells.
W. A. Lawrence.
H. B. Leach.
Q. E. Lygo.
G. McAlpiue.
W. L. Marah.
T. A. Monckton,'
S. E. Milliard.
W. H. Mulville.

Sub-Lieutenants, R.N.V.21.

H. Eves.
J. D. Greenwood.
A. E. Griggs.
J. H. Hagon.
E. H. Haworth.
G. Hazelton.

2nd Lieutenant... A. Berry.
Ch. Gunner... A. Baynton.

C. J. Murfltt.
G. C. Neilson.
T. F. Norbury.
T. L. Oliver.
T. A. Parker.

E. M. N. Perks

F. E. Pollard.
W. J. Polybank.
O. H. Powell.
L. S. M. Pyke.

G. M. T. Eees.
A. Robertson.
F. E. Rogers.
E. 8. Saunders.
J. C. Savage.
K. Seoretan.

E. G. Shire.
N. Sladden.

A. F. H. Smallplece.

S. P. Smyth.

S. E. Spencer.

C. A. W. Taylor.

A. K. Toulmln-Smith.

S. M. TJdale.

J. B. Vernon.

H. N. Warburton.

A. H. White.

W. S. Waitelaw.

F. C. 'Williams.
H. E. Wimperis.

M. J. H. Molyneux.

A. P. Eeed.

B. Thomson.
T. M. Wilson.
N. H. Wood.

C. H. Wright.

Civil Staff.

Deputy Superintending Clerk.. .E. W. Orlffln. Esq.
Chief Examiner ..J. H. Jones. Esq. (act.).

(Lent from Inland Revenue.)
Examiner.. .G. E. Pledger. Esq. {act.).

{Lent from Inland Revenue.)
Inspector of Aircraft Armament... H. D. Dow. Esq.

2 Minor Staff Clerks (act.).

4 Second Division Clerks (2 serving with Army).

g Assistant Clerks (1 serving with Army).

1 Extra Clerk. 1st Class.

1 Tempy. Accountant Clerk. 1st Class.

2 Asst. Inspectors of Aircraft Armament.
81 Temporary Clerks.

Improvers.

3 Temporary Women Clerks, Higher Grade.
73 Temporary Women clerks.

7 Boy Clerks.
Civilian Technical Assistant... Harris Booth. Esq.
Asst. Technical Adviser... H. Bolaa. Esq. (tempy.).
A. J. S. Plppard. Esq.
F. E. Cowlin. Esq.
9 Draughtsmen.

Note, — The Officers of the Royal Naval Air Service are not shown.

(A) ADMIRALTY, APRIL, 1917.

Fint Sea Lord Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, G.C.B., &c.

ADMIRALTY WAR STAFF.

Chief of ttte War Staff. Vice-Admiral (act.) Sir Henry F. Oliver. K.c.r.. m.t.o.

Assistant to (he Chief of the War Staff. . . Contain Arthur de K. L. May.

Staff Cleric W. H. Hancock, Esq. tact.).

OPERATIONS DIVISION.

Directors of the Operations Division Bear Admiral Thomas Jackson, c.b., m.v.o.

Cavtain George P. W. Hope. o.b.. AdC.
Assistant Directors of the Operations Division.. .Cavtain Henry W. Grant.

Litut.-Col. Walter T. C. Jones, d.s.0.. e.m.l.i.

Naval and Marine Staff.

Cavtain A. G. Allgood (ret.)

A. F. Beal.

E. P. Clutton (ret.).

C, Q. S. Seles tret.).

W. M. Kerr.

O. Seymour.

H. J. L. W. K. Wilicox.

CharleB D. Eoper Uemv.).

Herbert Mad. Edwards (temp.).

Staff Clerk. . .G. J. Biekman, Esq..
2 Second Division Clerks.
1 Confidential Shorthand Writer.

Commander Frederic G. S. Pcile.
Charles G. Dix, d.s.o.
F. Bowden-Smlth (ret.).
S. V. S. C. Hessnm tret.).
T. W. Stirling (emera.).
Leonard Boblnson (act.).
Hugh A. Williamson tart.).

Mai. <t Bl.Lt.
Col. B.M.A.
Lieut.-Com. J. P. Gibbs,

Fitzstephen J. F. French.

Civil Staff.

11 Assistant Clerks.

2 Accountant Clerks.

3 Extra Clerks.

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.
Director of the Intelligence Division. ..Captain William E. Hall. ex.. AdC.
Assistant Directors of the Intelligence Division—Captain Baymond A. Nugent (temp.).

Cavtain Thomas E. Wardle. D.s.0.

Contain Herbert W. W. Hope.

Argentine H. Aling-

ton.
Eupert S. Gwatkin-

Wllliams (ret.).
Commander Vivian K. Brandon.
Francis G. G. Chilton.
Colpoys C Walcott

treL).
Ernest F. Gregory.
Gerald C Dickens-
Morris E. Cochrane,

D.s.0. (ret).
John Casement.
Geoffrey B. Splcer-

Simson. d.s.o.
Eeginald A. Norton

(temp.).
Commander i Henry F. C. Caven-
(Emerg.) ) dish.
Commander \hord Herschell.
S.N.VJt. I k.o.v.o.

Hon. William

Cozens-Hardy, k.o.

a P. Seroccld.
f Lord Ablnger.

Naval and Marine Staff.
Lieut.-Com. Walter T. Bagot.
Arthur W. Wood
(ret).

Ens. Com....Percy Wheatcr.

Temple,

Mai.&Bt.\
Lt.-Col. >

Frank V.

K.K.L.T.

Major Walter

B- si. L.I.

Percy B.

B.H-A.

Sinclair.
Heycock.

S. Wright,

Bt. Mai.
Captain

Cecil E.

R.3I.L.I.

Bernard F. Trench,

B .11. L.I.

J. a Farmer.

B.H.L.I.

b*ml!i. ) CharIes B - MuIIins -
Lieul.-Com. \ „ p ,

Lieu*. B.N.B. Alastair P. Hadow.

Lieut.
B.N.V.B.

1 Arthur E. Watts.
I F. Eomer.

Lieut.
B.N.VM.

Hyde Kennard.

} Henry M. Howard.

Naval Instr. Guy V. Eayment, b.a
FleelPovm. Charles J. E. Rotter,

C.B.

Emest W. C. Turing.
C. Betton Eoberts.

Asst. Pawn. Lloyd Hirst.

Asst. Pawn. I William H.
EJI.rJt. > Osman.

Midshipman George H. Carbutt.

271

272

Appendix

Staff Clerks...

Hugh Broadbent, Esq.
W. G. Johns. Esq. (act.).
A. Backhouse, Ksq. {act.).

Civil Staff.
Cartographer...

C. Brickenden. Esq.
6 Second Division Clerks.
1 Confidential Shorthand Writer.

1 Assistant Clerk, S Extra Clerks.

2 Boy Clerks. 37 Women Clerks.
6 Draughtsmen.

The following gentlemen have been appointed or lent /or temporary service during the War :
Sir P. w. Baker-Wllbraham. Bt.. ll.b.. F. Cavendish-Bentinck. A. Cecil. H. N. Dickson, M.A.. D.sc,
G. H. Fltzmaurice. Esqrs.. 2nd Lieut. B. L. Hobson (London Regt.). T. W. H. Inskip. Esq., K.o..
2nd Lieut. S. S. G. Leeson. H. Leveson, Esq., Major E. J. Lugard (Indian Army. ret.). T. G. F.
Palmer. Dr. C. Copland Perry. J. Randall. H. Eussell. and F. N. Schiller, Esqrs.

TEADE DIVISION.

Captain .

Acting Director of Trade Division.. .Captain Richard Webb, O.B., e.n.
Acting Assistant Director of Trade Division.. .Captain Horace W. Longden.

..W. H. D. Margesson (ret.).
B. H. Smith (ret.).
T. H. Foster (ret.).
Philip Walter (ret.).
Reginald L. Crlchton (ret.).

Commander Thomas Fisher.

A. H. Tarleton. m.t.o (emerg.).
Sir Charles L. Cost, Bl.. k.o.v.o., c.

o M.G., a. i.e. (ret).
Maxwell H. Anderson (act.) (ret.).
Oscar V. de Satge (ret.).
John Kiddle.

Walter P. Eoe (ret.), (act.).
Hugh B. Mulleneux.
Edward B. Compton (ret.).
Andrew L. Strange.

Com sS. } H - w - Kenriok - H ' D - {Tetx

LlPJt.-Com. John 0. Wyatt (ret.).
John W. Pugh (ret.).
Francis J. Alexander (ret.).

IAcut-Com.
B.N.V.R.

Lieut.
B.N. VJt.

Eng. Com.

Lieut. -Col.
Fleet Pawn.

William Glnman.

W. E. Arnold-Forster (temporarily
detached).

Lieut Lionel A. Cazalet (tempv.).

William A. Wlllock (tempv.).

"wmerg.). } Hugh 0. Arnold-Forster.
Lieut.R.N.R. W. H. Stewart.

" F. H. McCormick-Goodhart.
L. McCormick-Goodhart.
John B. D. Joce.
Arthur N. Fielden.
.Henry 0. Rush (ret.).
Thomas H. Hawkins, r.m.li.
H. W. Eldon Manisty. o.ji.g.
Alfred R. Parker.
Staff Paym. John Siddalls (tempv.).
Sub. -Lieut. \ Henry J. R. Maltland.
R.N.V.R. 'Alexander R. Mollison.
Asst. ) Harold B. Tufflll.

Paym. \ W. A. J. Boxford.
R.N.R. ' Joseph H. Wilson.

Civil Staff.

Staff Clerk.. .J. T. Cotton, Esq. (acting).
3 Second Division Clerks (one lent).
1 Accountant Clerk (lent).

2 Clerical Assistants.
18 Temporary Clerks.
14 Women Clerks.

The following have been appointed for temporary service during the War :

H. S. Moss Blundell. ll.d., Esq.

(unpaid).
Sir Frederick Bolton (unpaid).
E. Burns-Pye, Esq. (unpaid).
Mrs. C. H. Campbell (unpaid).
A. H. Charteris, Esq.

H. C. Cumberbatch. Esq. (un-
paid).
Allan Deacon, Esq. (unpaid).
G. D. Hardinge-Tyler, Esq.
W. E. Hargreaves, Esq. (unpaid)-

Cllve Lawrence, Esq.,

Barrieter-at-Law.
Lieut. E. Maclay (The Comer-

onians).
The Earl of Sandwich (unpaid).

ANTI-SUBMABINE DIVISION.

Director... Bear- Admiral Alexander L. Duff. c.B.

Secretary... I. D. M. Cavanagh.
Assistant Directors... Captain H. Walwyn. D.s.o.

Claude Seymour, d.s.o.

Staff.

Commander... (TIC) I. W. Carrington.
(S.B.) G. B. Lewes.
(Q) E. H. Russell.
(Q) Reginald G. H. Henderson.

Captain of Mime Sweeping..

Commander. ..A.. M. Yeats-Brown.
Lieut-Corn. <T) H. L. Hitchlns.

(N) I. W. Clayton.
Eng.-Com. E. W. Riley.
Captain L. G. Preston, o.B.

SIGNAL SECTION.
Head of Signal Section.. .Captain Christopher E. Payne.
Naval Staff.
Commander...Bverard J. Hardman-Jones. I Paymaster Edward W. EL Travis (act.),

Capt. ifc Bt. Mai. R.M.A. Stephen 0. Wace. Wl. Writer. ...Hartington Ratclifle.

Staff Paym. ...John E. A. Brown. | 2 Chief Writers (1 pensd.).

Civil Staff.
4 Hired Extra Clerks. | 49 Women Clerks.

Appendix

273

MATERIEL DEPARTMENTS.

DEPABTMENT OF THE DIKECTOE OF NAVAL EQUIPMENT.
Director of If aval Equipment. ..Captain Clement Greatorex, o.b.. h.v.o., r.s.
il> alio Naval Assistant to Third Sea Lord).

Assistant Director! of Naval Equipment. ..Captain Alan G. Hotham, b.n.

Captain Christopher P. Metcalfe, D.a.o. [for
Salvage work) (ret.).
Salvage Officer in Borne Waters... Captain H. Pomeroy.

Bno. Captain... USetd.) Henry E. Teed. Carpenter Lieutenant... Thomas L. Soper.
1 Dockyard Clerk (2nd grade). 1 Tempy. Clerk. 3 Women Clerks. 1 Boy Clerk.

Superintendents of Conlraci-built Ships.

rw«in nrt-m tt w nath-iot r n .. n (^« Contract Work (not including Destroyers) on the Clyde.
Captain Brian H. F. Barttelot, O.B.. *.T.O. \ xdazesa-S, Clyde View. Partlck. Glasgow.

f For Contract Work (not Including Destroyers) on the Tyne,
Rear- Admiral Laurence E. Power, o.b.. I Thames, Mersey, at Barrow-in-Furness, and at Bunder-
M.v.o. -> land.

I Address — I, Esllngton Terrace. Jesmond, Newcastle-on-
l Tyne.

Superintendent of Torpedo Boat Destroyers buildina by Contract.

Captain Cyril Asser, b.s. Address — 17. Victoria Street, S.W.

Captain Stephen B. Badoliffe.
Commander George H. H. Holden (ret.).

Vernon S. Baahleigh.

Sydney B. Boyd-Blchardson.

Frank F. Base, d.s.o.

Commander James H. Dathan (ret.).

Lewis G. E. Crabbe.
Commander R.N.R. James W. Gracey (act.).
IAeut.-Com. Guybon C. C. Damant (ret.).
Lieut. R.N.R. George J. Wheeler.

DEPAETMENT OF THE DIBECTOB OF NAVAL CONSTRUCTION.

Director of Naval Construction.

Sir Eustace H- Tennyson d'Eyncourt, e.c.b.

Superintendent of Construction
Contract Work.
W. H. Whiting, Esq., c.b.

Accounts and

Assistant Directors of Naval Construction.
W. J. Berry, Esq.
W. H. Gard, Esq.. C.B.. h.v.o.
H. Pledge. Esq. iact.).
A. E. Bichards, Esq.

Superintendent of Admiralty Experiment Works. ..Ti. E. Froude, Esq., 03.. u.j>.. f.e.s.
Senior Constructive Officer (re-entered for tempv. service during the War)... J. A Yates. Esq.

Chief Constructors.

E. L. Attwood (act.).
S. E. Boyland (act.).
W. H. Carter (ad.).
T. Dally.
A W. Johns (act.).

C. F. Munday (act.).
J. H. Narbeth. h.v.o.
E. A. J. Pearce (act.).
P. L. Pethick. Esqrs.

G. H. Ball.

G. Bulkeley (act.).

C. I. S. Campbell (act).

S. V. Goodall (act.).

C. E. Goodyear.

A. H. Gould (ret.)

(tempv.).
C. Hannaford (act.).
E. B. Harries (act.).
A J. Hobson.
J. C. Joughln (act.).

Constructors.

C. W. Kerridge (act.).

W. J. M*rH"

T. L. Mathlas (act.).

F. L. Mayer (act.).

O. A. Payne.

J. Sogers.

W. G. Sanders (act.).

£ Scott (act.).
D. Stansfeld (ad.).
A. W. Watson (ad.).
L. Woollard (act.). Esqrs.

Assistant Constructors, Firsi_Class.

A Adams.
C.M. Carter.

E. B. Charig.
G. H. Child.

F. Hickey.

C. J. W. Hopkins.

J. Innes.
0. S. LUllcrap.
E. F. Spanner.
A. G. W. Stantan.
L. 0. Williamson.
Esqrs.

Assistant Constructors. Second Class,

A. P. Cole.
G. McCloghrie.
H. May.
D. E. J. Offord.

Temporary Constructor.
T. B. Abell, Esq. .

Temporary Assistant Constructors.

A. Akester, B.sc.
J. Angus, b.80.
0. W. Bion, B.sc.
W. T. Butterwick.

E. L. Champness. B.sc

F. C. Cocks.

D. A. Coskery. b.sc.

W. J. Craig.

J. L. Davles.

D. L. Evans, b.sc.

K. Fatrley.

T. Graham, B.sc.

W. B. Hockaday.

A Klmberley.

B. K. McMillan.

M. M. Parker.

G. McL. Paterson. b.a.

A P. Patterson, b.sc.

V. G. Shepheard.
F. C. C. Sogers.
F. Sutclifle, Esqrs.

P. G. Bouse, b.a.
J. H. Sowden, B .sc.
T. E. Sowden. b.bo.
F. W. Thome.
J. C. M. Wilson.

Esqrs.

274

Appendix

6. Chase.

W. H. Eaetcott.
H. E. Hodge.
Q. Hunnisett.

Temroraru Acting Assistant Constructors.
H. Phllpot.

W. J. Laughton.
P. J. Paimlter.
G. Penney.

A. F. Perkins.

F. Skeens.
A. Taylor.
S. F. Thorn.

A. Warren.
8. R. Weill.
Q. H. Whiteway.

Esqre.

Inspecting Officer of Smiths' Work.. JR. T. Pearson, Esq.

Surveyor...tX E. Bawbone, Esq. (Lent from Board of Trade).

Curator ofDratdngs...Vf. J. Moore. Esq.

Examiner of Construction Accounts... George H. Taylor, Esq.

Confidential Clerks to D.N.C....J. Luflman and S. W. B. Plppett {act.). Esqrs.

Technical Clerk.. .Vf. H. Malpas, Esq.

Clerical Assistant to 8. C. W....B. J. Wright, Esq. tact.).

82 First Class and SI Second Class Draughtsmen. 8 Second and 6 Third Grade Dockyard Clerks, 1 Hired
Writer. 13 Hired Extra Clerks, 21 Women Clerks, 5 Boy Clerks, 1 Interpreter {temp.), * Modellers.

The following gentleman has been re-entered for temporary service —
W. 0. Thomas. Esq. {Inspecting Officer retd.).

Superintending Electrical Engineer. ..C. H. Wordlngham. Esq., M.I.O.B.. U.I.U.E., K.I.E.E.

Electrical Engineers, Higher Qradc.k. D. Constable, M.I.B.E.. William McClelland, a.m. I. i.e.. and
E. T. Williams, m.i.b.e. tact.). (Esqrs.).

Electrical Engineers... n. Melville Ackery, h.i.e.b., J. S. Beddoe tact.). F. P. Fletcher, a.h.i.o.e., a.m.i.e.e.
{act.), F. 0. Forster, m.i.e.i.. A. G. Newlngton, h.i.e.b., and W. P. Scott, a.m.i.e.e. (act.), Esqrs.

first Assistant Electrical Engineers ...W. H. Chatten tact.), H. H. B. Green, a.m.i.e.e.. and J. Shaw

A.M.I.E.E. {act.), Esqrs.

Temvv. Asst. Electrical Engineers.. .F. Morton, A.H.I.H.B., and B. W. Willis, a.m.i.e.e.. Esqrs.

Examiner of Electrical Accounts... E. E. Bogers, Esq., a.m.i.e.k. (act.).

Clerk in Charge...!. Hall, Esq.

2 Second Assistant Electrical Engineers {act.), 8 First Class, 7 Second Class, and 6 Temporary Draughts-
men, Tempy. Clerks, 5 Women Clerks and 2 Boy Clerks.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ENGINEEB IN CHIEF.
Engineer-in- Chief of the Elect ...Eng. Vice-Admiral Sir Henry J. Oram. K.O.B., F.B.S.
Deputy Engineer-in-Chief ...Eng. Bear-Admiral G. G. Goodwin, 03.
Eng. Bear-Admiral William J. Anstey. o.b.

Eng. Bear-Admiral Edouard Gaudln.
Eng. Captain Francis H. Lister (Lent Priority Section).
Eng. Captain Charles W. J. Bearblock {temp.).
Eng. Captain Edward A. Short (ret.) {temp.).

Assistant Enoineers-in- Chief

Engineer Inspectors.
Eng. Captain Percy D. Martell {act.) {tempy.).
Eng. Commander John McLaurln.

David J. Carrnthers.

Charles G. Ware.

Arthur E. Hyne.

Francis A. Gordon {tempy.).

Lionel M. Hobbs {lent from R. N.
Coll., Greenwich).

Thomas G. Procter.

William H. Ham.

John Hamilton.

Joseph J. KIrwin.

Engineer Inspectors — continued.

Eng. Commander Frederick W. Marshall.

Ernest Nibbs (act.).

James J. Sargent tact.).

George Preece {tempy.).

Engineer Lieutenant-Commanders.

William S. Mann.
Bertram W. Knott.
Walter W. Lock.
George W. Odam.
Frederick J. Pedrick,

Stanley C. Church.
Jesse H. Harrison.
George Vlllar.
Harry H. Carter.
Edwin F. St. John.

Engineer Lieutenant Frederick B. G. Turner.
John S. Orr.

Civilian Engineer-Overseers ...W. G. Gibbons, 0. Grey, W. Letty, W. G. Mathews and M. Ord,
Esqrs.

Examiners of Engineering Accounts. . .Edwin Gedye, and W. J. Stallion, Esqrs. (act.), 86 Draughts
men, 10 Tempy. Draughtsmen, 1 Dockyard Clerk (Third Grade), 3 Hired Writers, 4
Extra Clerks, 8 Tempy. Clerks, 11 Women Clerks and 2 Boy Clerks.

Appendix 275

DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF DOCKYARDS.
Director of Dockyards and Dockyard Work.. Sir James B. Marshall, e.c.b.

Superintendent of the Dockyard Branch —

H. J. Webb. Esq.
Manaaer Constructive Department —

F. B. Ollis. Esq. (tempv.). (For Special
service.)

Chief Constructors —

G. M. Apsey (tempv.).

E. R. Bate. Esq. (adaTl.).

0. H. Crojford. Esq. (act.) (tempv.).
Constructors —

F. Bryant. Esq.
W. T. Davis, Esq. (tempv.).

G. F. Ludford (act.).
J. McQueen (act.).
H. B. Wood (ad.).

For Special Service —

Ena. Bear-Admiral Robert Mayston,
(ret.) (tempv.).

Ena. Bear-Admiral Charles Rudd.
Engineer Assistant to Director of Dockyards —

Engineer Assistants —

Eng. Commander Samuel H. Ferguson.
Percival 0. W. Howe.
T. E. Elvy, Esq.
E. R. Langmaid. Esq.
Chief Engineer.. .T. E. Elw. Esq. (lent from Bautbowline Dockyard).
Examiners of Dockyard Work.
T. H. Harries. E. A. Laker. J. D. Glbby (no*.). J. Ellis. W. L. Coles. F. Sanders.
O. Henwood (act.). F. J. Fletcher (act.), and J. A. Fage (ad.), Esqrs.
First Assistant Electrical Engineer... Ti. L. Brain, Esq. (ad.).

Olmivd J*si*binla {°- W ' Loveridge, Esq.
Llerwal Assistants \ Q & stanbvuT> Es(1 . (acU ,

Visiting Inspectors of Timber... W. H. Hooper and Alfred James, Esqrs.
1 Dockyard Clerk (First Grade). 2 Dockyard Clerks (Second Grade), 7 Dockyard Clerks
(Third Grade), and 9 Hired Writers.

PRIORITY SECTION.

Director... Vice-Admiral Arthur Y. Moggridge.
Assistant Director (Naval) ...Engineer Captain F. H. Lister, e-».
Assistant Director (Civil). .M. F. Gauntlett. Esq., c.i.e.. i.c.b. (templv. lent from India Office).
Eng. Bear-Admiral Charles W. Gregory (rd.).
James M. Thompson (ret.).
Albert E. L. Westaway (rd.) (Bristol).
Eng.-Capt. Jasper W. A. Parrott (ret.).
William A. Howlett (rd.).
Joseph Langmaid (rd.).
Assistant Examiner, 1st Qtade (ad.)...C W. Bailey, Esq. (lent from Contract Department).
1 Assistant Olerk. 1 Improver, and 10 Women Clerks.

The following gentlemen have been appointed or lent from other Departments for temporary service during

the War

J. T. Gwynn, I.O.S.. c.h.b. Kendall, i.e.s. (India OMce).
G. B. Sansom. (Foreign OMce), and E. L. Winter, i.o.s., Esqs.

DOCKYARD EXPENSE ACCOUNTS DEPARTMENT.

(68, Victoria Street. S.W.)

Inspector of Dockyards Expense Accounts... W. G. Ron", Esq.. i.b.o.

Assistant to ditto... J. Ryan, Esq.

Expense Accounts Officer.. .F. W. W. Burrell. Esq.

Deputy Expense Accounts Officer... G. T. Jones, Esq.

Assistant Expense Accounts Officer.. .T. Piatt. Esq. (for Stocktaking Duties).

T. Jennings. Esq. (for Stocktaking Duties), and
J. A. Jeffrey, Esq. (ad.).
F. Hall. Esq. (lent).
Examiner of Accounts... H. Haggis, Esq.
Assistant Examiner of Accounts. ..J. E. Horawell, Esq.
2 Dockyard Clerks. Second Grade. 6 Dockyard Clerks. Third Grade, 3 Hired Writers,
1 Assistant Clerk. 3 Tempy. Clerks and 6 Women Clerks..

276

Appendix

DEPARTMENT OF THE DIREOTOB OF NAVAL ORDNANCE.

Director of Naval Ordnance... Captain Frederic C. Dreyer, c.B.
Assistant Director of Naval Ordnance.. ..Captain Herbert B. Norbury.

Assistants to Director of Naval Ordnance.

Commander Charles A. Scott.

Edward O. Cochrane.

Iaham W. Gibaon, m.v.o.

Bernard W. M. Fairbairn.

Archibald Gilbert (act.).
Commr. B.N.7.R. John G. Henderson (oc(.).

Lieut.-Com. Kenneth B. M. Churchill.
Lieut. Walter E. Gilbert.

Willie D. Kilroy. k.n.v.r. (tempv.).

Herbert O. Mock, h.k.v.r. (tempv-).
Sub-Lieut. W. H. J. Elrldge, r.n.v.b. itempv.).

Lieutenant... Frederick J. Payne.
Chief Gunner... Malcolm A. MacKenzie

Engineer Inspectors.

Eng. Bern-Admiral Ernest G. Ellis, c.B. (ret.)
Eno. Captain Thomas Thome (tempv.).
Eng. Commander Henry Wall.

Edward 0. Heflord.

Eng. Commander William Hart.

Alfred B. Kempt.
Vernon A. A. Ter Veen.
Frederick L. Bobertson (act.).

Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance... Commander (act.) John A. Duncan, C.B.
Assistants to Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance.. .Commander Dlgby St. A. P. Weston (ret.).

Commander Henry G. B. Bevan (ret.).
Commander (act.) Leslie J. L. Hammond (ret.).
Captain Freeman C. N. Bishop, r.m.a.
The following gentleman has been lent for special service during the War. ..J. Storey, Esq.

Naval Officers employed on Inspection and Experimental Ordnance Duties.

Under Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance : —
Inspector of Steel.. .Commander Harold G. Jackson (ret.).
Acting Inspector of Steel... Lieut. -Com. Llewellyn E. H. Llewellyn (ret.)

Assistant Inspectors of Steel.

Admiral (ret.) Sir Edmund S. Poe, a.o.v.o., K.C.B.
Major-General E. Wace, c.B., r.a. (tempv.).
Captain H. E. Evans, r.n. (ret.).

William H. M. Daniell. r.n. (ret.).
Claude W. M. Plenderleath. b.n. (ret.).
William H. F. Taylor. b.n. (ret.).
Commander Henry Thompson (ret.).

Charles K. McCallum (ret.).

John E. Bray (ret.).

T. S. Gooch (Emergv.).

A. H. Tremayne (ret.).

Reginald C. Brenton (Emergv.)

(tempv.)-
Commander B.N.B. W. F. Caborne, O.B., b.d. (ret.).
Lieut.-Com. Arthur W. Tomlinson.

Frank E. Willis.

Hugh J. Orr (ret.).

John G. M. McHardy (ret.).

Bobert F. Veasey (ret.).

Allster W. McDonald (ret.).

Lieut.-Com. Ralph B. Bodilly (ret.).

William H. Callwell (ret.).

Henry L. Cheeton (Emergv.) (act.).

Frederick J. Davis, B.D., r.n.r. (ret.).

W. E. Compton (ret.).

W. G. H. Cree (ret.).

H. J. G. Lawrence (ret.).

J. H. C. Ogilvy (ret.).
Lieut. Henry S. H. Ellis (ret).

Robert J. Sweet (ret).
Lieut. B.NB. Beauchamp H. Vernier (ret).
Lieut. L.y.V.R. TomM. Chambers.
Colonel (temp. Brio. -Gen.) Cooper Penrose. r.e.
Colonel J. B. J. Jocelyn, B.A. (ret.) (tempv.).
Lieut.-Col. T. English, r.e. (ret) (tempv.).

G. Mackinlay, R.A. (ret.) (tempv.).
B. L. Haines (ret.) (tempv.).
Major Charles A. Bishop, r.m.a.
Captain C. B. Macphersbn Grant (tempv.).
Captain Alfred D. B. Godfrey, r.m.a.
Eng. Capt. H. W. Metcalfe (ret.).

The following gentlemen have also been appointed for temporary service during the War :

H. B. Halls. C. J. Hill. A. E. Lee, L. T. Jarvis, J. W. Capstick, C. E. Moss,
W. E. 0. Hockin. E. Carey-Brenton, T. W. Sheppard. E»qrs.

Lent from Home OMce.

H. Topham, S. E. Bennett, A. C. Lowe. G. C. Stunner, E. L. Mecklln, C. F. Hunter, W. H. Mead,
W. Turner. F. Bowen. A. A. Hepburn. C. H. Taylor. C. E. Plumbe. F. W. Cockshott, A. Fotheringham.
L. D. Hooper. H. T. Eingdove, and W. C. Evans, Esqrs.

Lieut.-Com. John A. L. Hay.
Lieut.-Com. Archibald C. Goolden (ret.)

Under War OMce.

j Captain Nathaniel F. Trotman, e.m.a.

Appendix 277

The following gentlemen have been appointed for temporary service durino the War :
J. L. Capes, H. Jackson, A. McPheraon. and P. H. Coursey. Esqrs.

Superintending Clerk... Thomas G. Anderson. Esq.
Deputy Superintending Clerk.. .W. P. Daniels, Esq. {act.).
Assistant Superintending derkt...V. Morrison. S. W. Smith (act.), and G. Stevens (act.). Esqrs.
Seoond Division Clerk, Dockyard Clerks (including Acting) First Grade 1, Second Grade 0, Third Grade 9,
Temporary Clerks and Boys 43, Draughtsmen 7.

Superintendent of Ordnance Stores... Captain Barrington H. Chevallier, r.n. (retired).
Assistant Superintendents of Ordnance Stores... VS. Fathers.

Frederick Ward (act.).
G. E. Woodward (act.), Esqrs.
Superintending Clerk.. .A. McFarlane. Esq. {act.)
Naval Ordnance Store Ofllcer...W. A. Mortimer (act.). Esq.

Deputy Ordnance Store Officers ...T. W. Mldmer (detached for Special Duty). W. H. Bowe (act.). N. Thomas,
and W. Vaughan. Esqrs.
tsistant Ordnance Store Officers ...J. A. W. Ballard (act.), G. C. Cusens (act.). W. E. Eyles (act.)
C. H. Murray and A. T. Reed (act.). Esqrs.
Examiners of Naval Ordnance Work...W. D. Evans (ad.), and P. J. Payne, Esqrs. (act.)

1 Ordnance Depot Clerk, First Grade.
4 Ordnance Depot Clerks, First Grade (act.).
18 Ordnance Depot Clerks, Second Grade (act.).

6 Ordnance Depot Clerks, Third Grade.

7 Ordnance Depot Clerks, Third Grade (act.).
1 Hired Writer.

IS Temporary Hired Extra Clerks.
14 Temporary Women Clerks.
6 Boy Clerks and Boy Writers.

Acting Assistant Ordnance Store Officer... Sheffield... G. Swift. Esq.
Chief Analyst. ..Sheffield.. .John C. W. Humfrey, Esq.

The following hone been appointed for special temporary service :
Dr. C. Weizmann.
Dr. Ida S. Maclean, Dr. J. 0. Gavrowsky, H. Davles, E. G. Batnbrldge, and H. Spiers, Esqrs.

Note — Officers of the Naval Ordnance Department serving at Woolwich and at the Ports are not shown.

DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF TORPEDOES AND MINING.

Director of Torpedoes and Mining .« Rear-Admiral The Eon. Edward S. Fitzherbert.

Secretary Paymaster (act.) Paul S. Strickland.

Assistant Director (T) | Assistant Director (M).

Captain Algernon H. C. Candy. | Captain F. Shirley Litchucld-Speer. D.s.o.

Assistant Director (F) Captain Vernon H. S. Haggard.

Naval Staff.

Captain Claude G. B. Brandon (ret.).

Gordon C. Fraser (ret.)

Bryan G. Godlrey-Faussett. c.v.0., o.M.a.. (ret.).
Commander EvanC. Bunbury.

Geoffrey C. Candy.

Thomas B. Fforde.

Malcolm K. Grant (ret.).

Walter G. Bigg, d.s.o. (act.) (ret.).

Gerard B. Riley (ret.).

James S. 0. Salmond.

Frederic E. E. G. Schrelber.

Carlton C. Sherman (ret X
Lieut.-Oommr Bertram Vigne,

278

Appendix

Lieutenant Patrick P. Coleman.

Benjamin B. O. E. Jameson.

Allied J. Parkes.

Eng. Commr. Charles J. M. Wallace.

Ch. Own/Mr James Wood.

Ghmner Leonard Bepton.

Walter Thorogood.

Walter F. Williamson.

Civil Staff.
DmOv Superintending Clerk J p E curatta. Esa;
Inspector of Mimes and Mining > w peajce, Esq.

AIS DEPABTMENT.

Director of Air Services (Fifth Sea Lord) Commodore Godfrey M. Paine, O.B., M.V.O.

Private Secretary Paymaster 0. A. Shove.

Naval Assistant Captain A. V. Vyvyan. D.s.o.

Asst. Sunt, for Airships Captain D. T. Norrto.

Armament Captain..... Captain A. J. Daries.

Asst. Supt. for Engines Wing Commander (E) W. Briggs (act.)

Personnel Captain Captain John D. Edwards, o.B.

Personnel Commander Wing Com. B. C. S. Hunt.

Captain Lord Dunboyne.

Military Liaison Officer Lieut. J. E. Pike, r.f.o.

Commander A. D. Warrington-Morris (act.).

J. L. Forbes.
A. M. Longmore.
J. D. Mackworth.

P. E. T. Hewlett.
D. H. Hyde-Thomson.

J. Bird (act.).
P. A. Brock.
P. Q. Brodrlbb.
Q. W. Cranfleld.

Wing Commanders.
A. Ogilvle.
0. E. J. Bandall.

Souadron Commanders.
T. D. Hackle.
C. E. Maude.

Flight Commanders.
E. H. Dunning, d.s.o.
J. 1. Harrison.
T. Hlnshelwood.
P. W. Lucas.

Francis Banken (act.).
H. L. Woodcock.

The Master of Semplll.

W. 0. Mlchle.
E. J. 0. Eoberts.
6. V. Slppe. D.s.o.'
N. B. Tomllnson.

Engineer-Lieutenants E. Stansmore.

C. T. Freeman, d.s.o.

D. M. B. Galbralth. D.S.O.
P. A. Johnston.

W. A. C. Sandford-Thomrjson.

Flight Lieutenants.
L. J. Kmmayer.

I E. A. Held.

P. W. Strong.
I M. E. A. Wright.

Flight Suo.-Lieut. T. P. M. Alexander.

G. V. Leather.
R. P. S. Leslie.

L. C. Abbott.
G^H. Brown.
J. E. Catt
J. V. Collins.
H. G. Cooper.

T. B. Harrington.
W. A. Bristow.
J. Craig.
Lord Ersklne.
J. M. Frasor.

Warrant Officers (1st grade).
P. W. Scarff.

Warrant Officers (2nd Grade).
W. T. Curtis.
A. Deakln.
J. Hobbs.

F. J. Hooper.

C. Layzell-Apps.

Commander RJf.V.B.
G. Holmes.

Lieut.-Commanders, R.N.T.R.
C. W. Gamble.
E. W. Hogarth.
0. P. Jenkln.
A. Landells.

G. McAlplne.

J. S. Mathlas.
C. Y. Mitchell.
J. H. Ormsby.
A. B. Bedstone.
W. G. J. Wardle.

T. A. Monokton.
P. C. H. Sinclair.
P. C. Williams.

H. E. WlmperlR

Appendix

279

C. K. Abbott
M. H. P. Allen.
O. K. Andrews.
J.Arthur.
F. A. Baldwin.
T. M. Barlow.
W. O. Bentley.
AL, Bligh.
J. P. Bourke.
J. S. Buchanan.

F. A. Burapua.
W. Bnrklnshaw.
E. E. W. Butt.
O. Caird.

J. D. Cannlobael.
B. a Carter.

E. H. GockBhott.
J. G. T. Crawford.

G. Crawler.
J. K. Curwen.
O. E. D'Arcy.

F. R. E. Davis.
H. Dodd.

J. Q. Dothie.
A. J. Dronafleld.
J. P. Elsdea.
A X. Evans.
H. Eves.
E. B. Falkner.
A. W. Farrer.
S. J. V. Fill.
S. Flower.*
P. Garton.

A. S. Gendle.

B. D. N. Gillmore.
B. S. Goddard.

J. G. M. Bevan.
E. O. Blake.
8. D. Claris.
0. A Crow.
W. B. Daniels.
A L. Davis.
P. M, Dawson.
T. A Ellis.
J. D. Greenwood.

S. B. F. Carter.

Lieutenants, It.N.V.R.

D. Gordon.
G. M. Gordon.
W. O. Grant.

J. E. A. Greatorez.
J. W. Griggs.
Bon. L. G. Guest.

B. T. Hamilton.
G. Hazelton.

J. F. Hedley.
8. B. Hill.

E. Hogg.

T. 0. B. Hooke.
W. H. Horden.
H. G. Home.
E. O. Horsley.
H. Howard.

D. 0. M. Hume.
A J. Hurst.

A. G. Ionides.
W. B. Jones.

C. Kent.

W. A Lawrence.
n. B. Leach.
G. W. Lester.
C. Lightfoot.
A. B. Low.
W. L. Marsh.
3. J. Meakin.
S. B. Mallard.
O. J. Murfltt.
G. H. Murphy.
G. C. Neilson.
T. F. Norbury.
T. L. Oliver.
A Orr.
T. A Parker.

Sub- Lieutenants, R.N.T.R.

T. H. Harkness.
G. A Harrison.

E. H. Haworth.
E. A. Hoghton.

A. H. Horsneld.
0. It Lymn.

J. T. Matthews.

B. H. Methold.

M. J. H. Molyneauz.

Aset. Pawns. R.N.R.

A. E. Penn.

B. M. N. Perks.
W. E. Plalster.

F. E. Pollard.
W. J. Polybank.
O. H. Powell.
L. 8. M. Pyke.
A. P. Beed.

G. M. T. Bees.
J. D. K. Bestler.

F. B. Bigby.

A. Robertson.
E. C. St. John.

E. S. Saunders.
J. C. Savage.
K. Secretin.
H. Shaw.

G. G. Shepherd.

B. G. Shire.
N. Bladden.

C. A Slater.

A. F. H. Sniallpieoe.

F. H. Spragg.
J. E. Steele.
C. Suckling.

P. J. H. Summer.

0. A. W. Taylor.

A. K. Toulmln-Smlth.

E. F. Turner.

S. M. TJdale.

E. C. 'Walker.

H. N. Warbnrton.

A. H. White.

W. S. Whitelaw.

H. 0. Woodward.

A D. Newbury.
G. C. Palsh.

E. H. Pollett.

H . u* xt. XC6C8.

W. B. Sinclair.
T. M. Wilson.
N. H. Wood.
C. H. Wright.

G. F. Green.

Civil
Deputy Superintending Clerk. ..TS. W. Griffln. Esq.
Chief Examiner.. .J. H. Jones, Esq. (act.).

(Lent from Inland Revenue.)
Examiner. ..C. B. Pledger, Esq. (act.).

(tent from Inland Revenue.)
Inspector of Aircraft Armament... B. ,D. Dow, Esq.

2 Minor Staff Clerks (act.).

4 Second Division Clerks (2 serving with Army).

8 Assistant Clerks (1 serving with Army).

1 Extra Clerk. 1st Class.

1 Tempy. Accountant Clerk, 1st Class.

Staff.

2 Asst. Inspectors of Aircraft Armament.
31 Temporary Clerks.

Improvers.

3 Temporary Women Clerks. Higher Grade.
73 Temporary Women Clerks.

7 Boy Clerks.
Civilian Technical Assistant. ..Harris Booth. Esq.
Asst. Technical Advaer.. .H. Solas, Esq. (temvv.).
F. E. Cowlin, Esq.
H. B. Howard, Esq.
A. J. 8. Pippard, Esq.
9 Draughtsmen.

The following have been appointed for temporary service during the War :
Major L. N. G. Fllon, T.B.S. | A. Berry, Esq.

Note. — The Officers of (he Royal Naval Air Service and of the Air Stations are not shown.

First Sea Lord and Chief of the Natal Staff. Admiral Sir Rosslyn E. Wemyss. E.O.B., O.M.O., H.v.o.

THE NAVAL STAFF.

Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff Vice-Admiral (act.) Sir Henry P. Oliver, e.c.b.. m.t.o.

Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff, c.b.

Deputy First Sea Lord Sear-Admiral George P. w. Hope. O.B.

Secretary to A.O.N. S Fleet Pavm. tact.) John D. M. Cavanagh.

Staff Clerk W. H. Hancock, Esq. {act.).

OPERATIONS DIVISION.

Director of the Operations Division (Borne) Captain A, D. P- Pound.

Deputy Director of the Operations Division Captain Henry W. Grant, c.b.

Assistant Directors of the Operations Division Captaim Charles P. R. Coode. d.s.o.

Lieut-Col. Walter T. C. Jones. D.S.O.. e.m.l.i.

Captain ... A. Q. Allgood (ret.).

A. F. Beal.

R. P. Clutton (ret.).

O. G. S. Eeles (ret.).

Cecil H. Pilcher.

Charles D. Roper (temp.).
Commander Kenneth G. B. Dewar.

F. Bowden-Smith (ret.).

S. V. S. C. Messum (ret.).

T. W. Stirling (emerg.).

Leonard Robinson (act.)
Commr. B.N.B. Duke of Sutherland.
Wing. Commr. Hugh A. Williamson.
Lieut-Corn. Ron. Joseph M, Kenworthy (temp.)

M ck. t.M'.A!'} mU3teBben J - F " Frenoa '

Naval and Marine Staff.

TAeut-Com. J. P. Gibbs.

•^^■jHerbert Ingram.

Lieut.R.N.r.R. Sidney T. Morris.

Harold I. Dear.

Charles F. Yeomans.

Leonard E. Lander.

Wilfred A. Johnson.

Thomas 0. Spurway.
Fit. Sub-Lieut. Stanley F. Ingram.

SV BJf!v.B. JcyHS- Goddard.

AS R.nTr. JtfrankJ.Maeec

Civil Staff.

Staff Cleric.. .F. R. Bailey. Esq. (act.).
2 Second Divisions Clerks.
I Confidential Shorthand Writer.

11 Assistant Clerks.

2 Accountant Clerks.

3 Extra Clerks.

Director of Flans

Assistant Directors of Flans

Naval Staff.
Commander James S. McL. Ritchie.
Alfred F. B. Carpenter.
Lieutenant Charles W. L. Meynell.

PLANS DIVISION.

Rear-Admiral Roger J. B. Keyes, c.b., o.ii.a., M.v.o . D.s.o.

Captain Cyril T. M. Fuller, c.u.G., d.s.o.

Captain Godfrey P. Orde, e.m.l.i.

am staff.

Staff Clerk. ..A. Backhouse, Esq. (act.).

Additional Officers borne temporarily for the Naval Staff were shown in the November ** List "
under ' President'

280

Appendix

281

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

Director of the Intelligence Division.. .Rear-Admiral Sir W. Reginald Hall. K.O.M.Q., O.B.
Assistant Directors of the Intett'mence Division... Captain Baymond A. Nugent.

Captain Henry K. Kitson.

Captain ...William M. James.
Commander Vivian E. Brandon.
Francis G. G. Chilton.
Colpoys C. Walcott

(ret.).
Morris E. Cochrane.

D.S.O. (ret.).
Geoffrey B. Spicer-

Siroson. n.s.o.
Walter C. Lucas.

(Staff Officer 2nd

Qrade.)
Alfred C. Dewar (ret.).

B. O. Orme-Webb.
Commander \Lord Herschell.

R.N.V.R. I k.o.v.o.

Bon. William
Cozens-Hardy. k.o.

C. P. Serocold.

K. J. B. Hippisley.
George G. Eady.

Commander 1 Norman Craig, k.o..
SJf.V.B. I mj>.

D. C. Calthrop (act).
A. G. Denntoton.

W. Dudley Ward.

M.P.

E. F. Wood.
H. Paget.

Cecil N. E. Wright.
E. A. Gardner
(tempy.),

Lieut.-Com. Walter T. Bagot.

Arthur W. Wood (ret.).
Eoger V. de Halpert
(ret.).

Lieul.-Com. IF E. Adcock.
R.N.V.R. ITS. de Grey.
James Eandall.

Eng. Com. Percy Wheater."

Naval and Marine Staff.

Mai. db Bt. I Frank V. Temple,
Lt.-Col. I R. M.L.I.

Percy E. Heycock,

K.M.A.

Major Walter Sinclair,

R.M.L.I.

Bernard F. Trench.

R.M.L.I.

Arthur Peel, r.m.l.i.

(Staff Officer 2nd

Grade.)
Cecil E. 8. Wright.

R.M.L.I.

Charles B. Mullins.

R.M.L.I.

Capt J. C. Farmer, r.m.l.i.

Lieut Edward S. Williams.

Andrew H. M. Haggard.
F. B. BelSeld (act.).

Lieut. 1 Arthur E. Watts.
R.N. V.R.I F. Eomer.

Hyde Kermard.

Frank C. Tiarks.

Frank Birch.

A. V. Stevenson.

Henry M. Howard.

A. D. Knox.

E. Harrison.

E. C. J. Green.

E. Bullough.

G. L. N. Hope.

L. A. WUloughby.

Lionel E. Wix.

W. F. Clarke.

Dudley F. N.

Fitzgerald.

Frederick S. Le B.
Smith.

John P. Curwen.

Denys Bond.

Herbert A. Morrah.

Douglas L. Savory.

Lieut. 1 Benjamin 8. F. '
R.N.V.R. I Phillips.

Neville Forbes.

Burton 8. B. Cope.

J. D. Beazley.

E. C. Quiggin.

G. S. Eawson.

Desmond
MacCarthy (unpaid).

Harold G. S. Dillon.

Eeginald J. Hope.

Charles W. L. Manby.

Walter H. Bruford.

Herbert T. Sullivan.

Wm tiS f >™*E.Bowen.
Naval Instr. Guy V. Eayment.

B.A.

fleet Pavm. Charles J. E. Hotter.

O.B.

Ernest W. C. Taring.
William H. Eves.

Staff Pavm. John N. Fletcher.
Lloyd Hirst (act.).

RJT.R.

Sub.-Lieut.
R.N.V.R.

Asst. Pavm.
RJT.R.

Asst. Pavm.
R.N.Y.R.

Schlmr.
Lieut, (act.).

Midshipman

J. Simeon.

Sam B. Williamson.

} H. Foster.

J. P. Loughnan.

} William H.

' Osman.

William Cawthera.

F.J. L. EoberUon.

P. E. Swanston.

] Frederick Bush.
George H. Carbut.

Staff Clerks—

Hugh Broadbent. Esq.

Civil Staff.

Cartographer —

C. Brlckenden, Esq.
4 Second Division Clerks.
1 Confidential Shorthand Writer.

1 Assistant Clerk, 1 Tempy. Clerks.
1 Supervising Asst. Clerk (act.)i
4 Boy Clerks. 76 Women Clerks.
10 Draughtsmen.

The following have been appointed or lent for temporary service during the War :

W. H Anstie. h.a. (Lent from Dartmouth College). Esq... Sir P. W. Baker- Wilbraham, Bt.. ll.b., L. W.
Baskcomb, H. E. B. Boulton, Esqrs., 2nd Lieut. E. N. Eudmose Brown. Lieut. Calder. A Cecil.
E. Russell Clarke, O. S. Cocks, cj.m.g., Esqrs.. Eon. G. Colville (unpaid). Lieut. Dickie, H. N. Dickson.
m.a., d.sc. O. B. E. Ellis (Lent fron Local Govt. Board), Esqrs.. G. H. Fitzmaurice, C.B., c.m.g..
H. E. Ford, Esqrs., 2nd Lieut. W. L. Fraaer. J. W. Goodwin, A. C. Grant Duff, Cecil Hanbury
(unpaid), Esqrs., Miss H. Haines (unpaid), Capt. E. H. Handley, 2nd. Lieut. E. L. Hobson (London
Real.), Q. W. C. Hunt, Esq., Lieut. J. H. Inksip. R.F.C., T. W. H. Insldp, k.o., H. W. Lawrence,
Esqrs., 2nd Lieut. S. 8. G. Leeson, E. Lewin, Esqrs., Capt. Lock, Major E. J. Lugard (Indian
Army ret.). The Earl of Lytton. Capt. E. H. Holyneuz, Lord Monk-Bretton, o.b.. Rev. W.
Montgomery, m.a.. Miss Max Muller (unpaid), E. Nevill. E. D. Norton, Esqrs., Rev. W. O. G.
Oesterley, 2nd Lieut. Orr, Capt. E. F. Ould, G. W. Prothero, H Eackham, m.a., H. Russell. E. 0.
Trench. Esqrs., Capt. H. B. Usher, Lieut. V. N. E. H. Vincent, E. Vaughan-Wi? Hams, k.o. (maid).
G. Young, m.v.o.. Esqrs.

282

Appendix

TRADE DIVISION.
Director of Trade Division.. .Captain Alan 6. Hotham.
Acting Assistant Director of Trade Division.. .Captain Horace W. Longden. O.H.Q.
Secretary to D.T.D.—Staff JPavm. John Siddalls.

Captain W. D. H. Margesson Wet.).

T. H. Foster, Wet.).

Philip Walter {ret.).

Reginald I/. Crlchton (ret.).
Commander Maxwell H. Anderson (act.) (ret.).

William C. Castle (act).

Edward B. Compton Wet.).

Sir Charles I/. Oust. Bt„ x.c.v.0.,

C.B., O.M.G.. O.I.E. Wet.).

Oscar V. de Satge (ret.).
Thomas Fisher.
Walter P. Koe Wet.).
Andrew L. Strange.
A. H. Tarleton. M.r.o. (emerg.).
Francis C. Yaughan (tempi/.).
Henry de B. Tupper (.temvv.).
Robert O. Wilson. D.s.o.

(William Ginman.
W. E. Arnold-Forster {temporarily
detached).

"wmerg.) }«0.
Lieut Jt.N.R. W. H. Stewart,

Civil Staff.
2 Second Division Clerks.

1 Accountant Clerk {lent).

2 Clerical Assistants.

Lieut.-Oom.
R.N.V.B.

Arnold-Forster.

Lieut. IF. H. McCormick-Goodhart.

R.N.V.R. /L. McCormlck-Qoodhart.

John B. D. Joce.

Eugene A. Lang.

Arthur N. Fielden.

John McK. Eobertson.
Eno. Com. ...Henry 0. Bush Wet.).
LUut.-Col. ...Thomas H. Hawkins, O.H.Q.. B.M.I.I.
Fleet Paym. Graham Hewlett.
Staff Paym. Cunningham Prior.

William B. Scotland.
Staff Paym. \ Harold B. Tufflll.

B.N.B. >W. A. J. Bozford (act.).

} Henry J. E. Maltland.
Alexander B. Mollison.
Arthur Bright-Smith.

Sub.-Lieut.
R.N.V.B.

Asst. Paym.
B.N.B.

Asst. Paym.
R.N.VJI.

| Joseph H. Wilson.

!Sholto O. Douglas.
Hugh S. Kingston!.
Frederiok J. J. Shirley.

15 Temporary Clerks.

2 Boy Clerks.

3 Higher Grade Women Clerks.
35 Women Clerks.

The following have been appointed for temporary service during the War :

H. S. Moss Blundell, Esq., o.b.e.,

ll.d. (unpaid).
Sir Frederick Bolton {unpaid).
E. Burns-Pye, Esq. (unpaid).

Mrs. C. H. Campbell (unpaid).
H. C. Cumberbatch, Esq. (un-
paid).
Allan Deacon, Esq. (unpaid).

J. J. Fenton, Esq.
G. D. Hardlnge-Tyler. Esq.
W. E. Hargreavee. Esq. (unpaid).
J. Heron Lepper, Esq.

SIGNAL DIVISION.
Acting Director of Signal Division.. . Commander.. .Bichard L. Nicholson, D.s.o.

Naval
Lieut. -Coin. Gerald B. Vllliers.

Lieut. Francis P. 0. Bridgeman.

Frederick W. Boswell.
Lieut. R.N.V.R. W. Cleveland-Stevens.

Frederick W. Atterbury.
Lionel W. Huntingdon.
Major R.M.A. Stephen 0. Wace.
Capt. (act. Maior) R. Id. Edward Gillespie, D.a.o.

(Staff Offr. 2 Grade)
Fleet Pawn.. ..John E. A. Brown (act.).
Staff Paym. John L. Syson.

Alexander 0. Home (act.).
Edward W. H Travis (act.).
George H. Russell (act.).

Staff.

Paym. R.N.R. John W. Sells. D.S.O. (ad.).
Sab-Lieut. R.N.V.R. Brian Rhys.

William 0. Phelps.

Gordon 0. Young.

John B. N. Charter.

Laurence 0. Robinson.

Harold S. Parnell.

William G. Willmot.

James L. A. Huggan.

John L. P. Lambe.
Wt. Teleg. ...John B. Barnes.
Wt. JTriter.... John G. Attersoll (act.).

2 Chief Writers (1 pensd.).

6 Hired Extra Clerks.

Civil Staff.

| 154 Women Clerks.

ANTI-SUBMARINE DIVISION.

Director of the Anti-Submarine Division Captain William W. Fisher, M.V.O., B.N.

Assistant-Director of the Anti-Submarine Division Captain Claude Seymour, d.s.o., k.n.

Secretary to D.A.S.D.
Captain (act.) A. M. Yeats-Brown, n.s.0.
Commander ...John W. Carrington, d.s.o.

George B. Lewis.

Edward H. Russell.

Lionel H. Hordern.

Leveson G. B. A. Campbell, D.s.o.

Henry L. Hltchlns.
Bng. Captain Henry W. Metcalfe Wet.).
Eno. Com. ...Edgar W. Eiley.
Temp. Bng. Lieul.-Com. Thomas Curr (act.).
Lieul.-Com.... Stephen S. English.

.Staff Paym. (act.) Marcus Blake.
Lieul.-Com. ...Archibald M. Wllloughby (emerg.).
Lieut-Corn. R.N.TJI. Louis C. Bernacchl (act.).
Taoy M. W. Wallis (act.).
Lieutenant ...Anthony H. Goatley.

Colin A. G. Hutchison (temp.).
Lieut. R.N.VJI. William L. Preece.

Henry V. M. Haszard.
Cecil A. V. Roper.
Pakenham W. A. H. M. Beatty.
Donald H. Morris.
Staff Paym. (act.)...Qwaoa Franklin.
Sub-Lieut. B.W.FJJ....Paul McG. Moffat,

Appendix

283

Staff Clerk....

1 Clerical Assistant.
Temporary Clerks.

Civil Staff.

W. 6. Johns. Esq. (act.).

W. K. Bale, Esq. (act.).

I 6 Women Clerks.

I 2 Boy Clerks.

MINESWEEPING DIVISION.

Director of Minesweepinj Captain Lionel G. Preston, c.B.

Contain (act) Harry F. Cayley. D.S.O. (ret) (Liaison Officer).

Commander Henry M. J. Bundle (act.).
Lieut.-Com. Graham C. Glen, d.s.o.
Thomas a MacGlll.

2 Temporary Clerks.

Lieutenant Charles H. Powell, r.n.t.k.
Gerald M. Morse, b.n.v.b.
Staff Pavm. Beglnald 13 Ford (act), r.h.b.
2 Women Clerks.

MERCANTILE MOVEMENTS DIVISION.

Director of Mercantile Movements... Captain Frederic A. Whitehead.
Secretary. ..Staff Paym. (act.) Paul S. Strickland.

Contain Bertram H. Smith (ret).
Captain R^i.N. George F. Hyde.
Commander Hugh B. Mulleneux.

John Kiddle.

Cnthbert D. Longataff.
Commander R.N M. Herbert W. Kenrlok. Rsi.iret.).
Lieut.-Com. Claude B. Evans.
Lieut.-Com. R.N.R. Cecil E. Pliklnfrton.
Lieutenant R.N Jt. James E. Harding.
Lieutenant R.N.V.R. Frederick C. Lldstone.
Sub-Lieut. R.N.V.R. Philip S. Knowles.

Fleet Pavm. H. W. Eldon Manlsty, c.h.g.

(Organising Manager of Convoy.)
Commander Begihald C. L. Owen (ret.).
Commander R.N.V.R. Henry D. King, d.s.o.. v.d.

Eollo Appleyard.
Lieut.-Com. John O. Wyatt (ret).
Lieutenant Geoffrey E. Burton.
Lieutenant R.N.rjt. Hubert M. FJsdell.
Geoffrey F. Gilbert.
Alan P. Herbert.

Staff Pavm. John M. Hodge.

Asst. Paym. R.N.R. Philip K. Hutchinson.

Asst. Pavm. R.N.VJI.

Eobert W. Carroll.
Eobert P. White.
C. Bobbins.

Eobert H. B. St. John.
Hubert G. Hickman.
Thomas Sherratt.
N. A. Leslie, Esq.

Captain Herbert M. Edwards.
Commander Frederic G. S. Peile.

...Cathcart E. Wason. c.m.g. (Captain of
Naval Tims).
Commander... Hartley B. G. Moore.

Norman B. Youel (ret.).

Staff Pavm Eyre S. Duggan (act.).

1 Minor Staff Clerk. 6 Temporary Clerks. 1 Boy Clerk, 12 Women Clerks.

TRAINING DIVISION.
Director of Training. ..Rear-Admiral James C. Ley, o.v.o.

MATERIEL DEPARTMENTS.

DEPABTMENT OF THE DLBECTOB OF NAVAL EQUIPMENT.

Director of Naval Enulpmmt... Captain Edward M. Phillpotts, o.b., AdC.
Assistant Director of If aval Equipment. . . Captain Humphrey T. Walwyn. D.S. 0.

Captain Alexander Farrlngton.

Claude G. B. Brandon (ret.).

Commander ...George H. H. Holden (ret.).
Frank F. Rose, d.s.o.
Sydney B. Boyd-Blchardson.
Allck Stokes.

Edmund L. B. Lockyer, d.s.o.
(ret.) (act.).

Commander Lewis G. E. Crabbe.

U * Ui R?Nji. } John W - wllUams " D - 8 -°-

Lieut. R.NJI.. Arthur P. Croiford.

Lieut "I Norman Wilkinson (tempv.).

R.N.T.R. I Charles Thomas (tempv.).
C. Payne (tempv),
Hubert A. Yockney.
Cecil King.
Oswald B. Moser.

Engvneeer Capt. Henry E. Teed (ret.).
Carp. Lieut. ...Thomas L. Soper.
Carpenter Joseph S. Legg.

10 Lieutenants R.N.V.B. for work at Outports.
1 Dockyard Clerk, 2nd Grade. 1 Higher Grade Woman Clerk. 16 Temporary Women Clerks.
2 Modellers. 1 Woman Modeller.

284

Appendix

SALVAGE SECTION.

Assistant Director of Naval Equipment {Jor Salvage) ■Captain Christopher F. Metcalfe, D.s.o. (ret.)
Commander ... James H. Dathan (ret.). | Staff Pavm. ...Arthur W. B. Messenger.

8 Women Clerks.

Salvage Officers.
Commander \ James W. Gracey (act.).
B.N.B. I Ivo J. Kay (act).

Charles K. Borissow (ad.) (temvv.).
(And as Chief Salvage Officer
in Mediterranean).
George J. Wheeler (act.) (tempy.).
Commander y Herbert E. Malet (act.) (tempy.).
B.N.F.B. /Da-rid W. McGuffle (act.Htempv.).
Assistant Salvage Officers —

Lieut.-Oom Guybon C. C. Damant (ret.).

(Temvv. Assistant Salvage
Officer).

Lieut. B.N.B.

...George Davis (tempy.).
James O. Ingram (act.) (temvv.).

Lieut. B.N.V.B. Cecil H. Bisshopp (temvv.) ■
Gilbert E. George (temvv.).
John E. McQueen (temvv.).
John E. F. GIbney (temvv.).
James Smith (temvv.).
Gerrard L. V. Jones.

}... Joseph H. Vine (act.) (temvv.).

Eng. Lieut.-
Com.

Eng. Lieut. Charles F. Smith (temvv-).

Naval Salvage Adviser...!?. W. Young, Esq.. m.i.m.e.

Superintendents of Contract-built Ships —

Bear-Admiral John F. E. Green, o.b.

(For Contract Work (not Including Destroyers) on the
J Clyde

Address — Broomhall, Broomhlll Drive, Partlck, Glasgow.
("For Contract Work (not Including Destroyers) on the
Tyne. Thames, Mersey, at Barrow-ln-Furnes;, and
at Sunderland.
Address— 4, Osborne Villas, Osborne Avenue, Newcaatle-
l. on-Tyne.
Captain Superintendent of Torvedo Boat Destroyers building bv Contract.

Captain Cyril Asser. Address — 47, Victoria Street. S.W.I.

Bear-Admiral Alfred E. A. Grant

DEPARTMENT OF THE CONTEOLLEB.

Controller. ..Sir Alan Garrett Anderson, k.b.e
Civil Assistant...!. A. C. Champion, Esq.

Secretariat.
Secretary... It. B. Scott. Esq., o.s.i.. Assistant Secretary of the Admiralty (act.).
Principal Clerk.. .3. B. Abraham, Esq. (act.).
Assistant Principal Clerks. ..S. T. Blackwell. Esq. (act.).

J. A. C. Champion, Esq. (act.).
0. W. Loveridge. Esq. (Oct.).
Staff Clerks.. .E. J. Tozer, Esq., Alfred Wotton, Esq. (act.).
2 Acting Minor Stair Clerks, 2 Second Division Clerks, 1 Acting Second Grade, 1 Acting Third Grade
Dockyard Clerks, 13 Tempy. Clerks, and 38 Women Clerks.
The following have been appointed for temporary service daring the War:
A. C. Clauson. k.o. (unpaid), and A. Gilbert, Esqrs.

DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL CONSTETJCHON.

Director of Naval Construction.. ..Sir Eustace H. Tennyson d'Eyncourt, k.c.b.

Deputy Director of Naval Construction.. .W. H. Gard, Esq., O.B., M.v.o. (act.).

Assistant Directors of Naval Construction... T. Dally, Esq. (act.) (Superintendent of Natal

Construction), A. W. Johns, Esq., (act.), J. H. Narbeth, Esq., m.v.0. (act.),

H. Pledge, Esq.. A. E. Richards. Esq.

Superintendent of Admiralty Experiment Works. ..E. E. Froude, Esq., O.B., ll.d.. F.E.B.

Assistant Constructors, First Class.

T. H. Bentley

(Overseeing).

Chief Constructors.

E. L. Attwood (act.).
S. E. Boyland (act.).

F. Bryant (act.).
A. J. Hobson (act).

0. W. Knight (act.).
C. F. Munday (act.).
O. A. Payne (act.).
P. L. Pethlck, Esqrs.

Constructors.

G. A. Bassett (act.)

(Overseeing).
0. M. Carter (act.).
E. B. Charlg (act.).
Q. H. Child (act.).
S. V. Goodall (act.)

(Tempy. detached).
C. Hannaford (act.).

E. B. Harries (act.).

F. Hlckey (act.)

C. J. W. Hopkins (act.)
A.JB. Horley (act).
O. W, Kerridge (act.).

F. M. lee (act.).
O. S. lillicrap (act.).
W. J. Martin.
T. L. Mathias (act.).
F. L. Mayer (act.).
E. D. Meryon (act.)

(Overseeing).
A. Nicholls (act.).
W. G. Sanders (act.).
A. W. Watson (act.).
L. 0. Williamson (act.).
L. Woollard (act.).

Esqrs.

A Cannon

(Overseeing).
E. S. Curphey

(Overseeing).
W. Froude (Haslar).

G. Hackney

(Overseeing).
W. E. Noble

(Overseeing).
R. P. Pether:
F. C. C. Eogers.
W. H. Wallond, Esqrs.

G. McCloghrle.

E. J. Monk.
J. E. P. Moon.

F. 0. C. Eogers,

Assistant Constructors, 2nd Class.

V. G. Shepheard.

S. N. Trevan.

K. H. Watldns. Esqrs,

Appendix

285

A. G. Akeuter. b.so.
J. Angus. B.so.
C. W. Bion. B.so.

E. L. Champuesa. B.sc.

F. 0. Cocks.

G. Chase.
J. S. auk.

W. H. Eastcott.
Q. Hunnisetfc.

Temporary Assistant Constructors.

A. E. Kimberley.
M. M. Parker.

G. McL. Paterson.

B.sc.
A. P. Patterson. B.sc.

D. A. Coskery. b.so.
J. L. Davles.
D. L. Evans, b.sc.
T. Graham, b.so.
W. E. Hockaday.

Temporary Acting Assistant Constructors.

W. L. Laughton.
P. J. Parmiter.
G. E. Peach.
G. Penney.

A. F. Perkins.
H. Philpot.
F. Skeens.
A. Taylor.

F. J. A. Pound.
P. G. Bouse, b.a.
J. H. Sowden, b.sc.
I. E. Sowden, b.so.
J. C. M. Wilson, Esqrs.

S. F. Thorn.

A. Warren.

G. H. Whlteway, Esqrs.

Temporary Assistant. ..E. W. Dana. Esq., M.A.
Inspecting OMccr of Smiths' Work.. A T. Pearson. Esq.
Curator of Drawings... W. J. Moore, Esq.
Confidential Clerk to D.N.C....J. Luffman, Esq.
Technical Clerk to D.N.C....W. H. Malpas, Esq.
56 Principal and 285 Assistant Overseers.
27 First Class and 114 Second Class Draughtsmen. 1 First (acting) and 1 Third Grade Dockyard Clerks
10 men and 17 Women Typists and Clerks, 1 Boy Clerk, 1 Modellers, and 2 S imprinters.
Superintending Electrical Engineer.... C. H. Wordingham. Esq.. m.i.c.e.. m.i.si.e.. m.i.e.e.
Electrical Bngineers. Higher Grade. ..A. D. Constable, m.i.e.e.. and E. T. Williams, m.i.e.e. tact.). Esqrs.
Electrical Bngineers. — H. Melville Ackery. m.i.e.e.. J. S. Beddoe. a.m.i.e.e. tact.). F. F. Fletcher,
A.M.I.O.B.. A.M.I.E.E. (Oct.), F. O. Forster. M.I.E.E.. W. P. Scott, a.m.i.e.e. tad.), and E. Wightman, Esqrs.
First Assistant Electrical Engineers... .W. H. Chatten (act). H. H. K. Green, a.mj.e.e.. and J. Shaw,

a.m.i.e.e. (act.), Esqrs.

Tempy. Asst. Electrical Engineers,.. .F. Morton, a.m.i.e.e.. and E. W. Willis, a.m.i.e.e., Esqrs.

Second Assistant Electrical Engineers (ad.), 8 First Class, 7 Second Class, and 5 Temporary

Draughtsmen, 6 Tempy. Clerks, S Women Clerks and 2 Boy Clerks.

DEPAETMENT OF THE ENGINEEB IN CHIEF.

Bngineer-in-Ohief of (he Fleet... Ena. Vice-Admiral George G. Goodwin, o.b

Deputy Engineer -in-Chief and Superintendent of Naval Engineering —

Eng. Bear-Admiral Edouard Gaudtn.

A<™,i m i vms***,, t*. nhSitS®KH- Captain Charles W. J. Bearblock (kmpv.)
Asnstant Engmeers-in-Ch%ef [ Mng _ Cmtain Joon MoLaarm .

Eng. Captain Edward A. Short (ret.) (temp.).

Engineer Inspectors.
Eng. Captain... David J. Carruthers.

Ena. Commander... Frederick \V. Marshall.
Arthur E. Eyne.
Joseph J. Klrwin.
Lionel M. Hobbs.
John Hamilton.
Thomas G. Proctor.
William S. Mann.
Eobert Beeman.
James F. Shaw.

Eng. Lieut. -Commander. ..Stanley C. Church.

Engineer Commanders.
James J. Sargent.
Jesse H. Harrison.
Ernest Nlbbs.

Engineer Lieutenant-Commanders.
Lortram W. Knott.
Frederick J. Pedrick.
Walter W. Lock.
Harold B. Tostevin, d.s.o.
George W. Odam.
Edwin F. St. John (ref.l.
Harry H. Carter.
John S. Orr.
Edwin Williamson^
Lawrence Turner;
Engineer L ie id. ..Brian J. H. Wilkinson.

Civilian Engineer-Overseers... W. Letty and M. Ord, Esqrs.
Examiner of Dockyard Work...%. Fage, Esq. (act.).
Examiners of Engineering Accounts. ..1. J. Hartnell (act.) and J. F. W. Hetterley (act.). Esqrs.

10 1st Class Draughtsmen. 21 2nd Class Draughtsmen. 14 Temporary Draughtsmen,
2 Dockyard Clerks, 1 Hired Writer, 5 Temporary Clerks, 2 Extra Clerks, 22 Women
Clerks, 2 Boy Clerks.

DEPABTMENT OF THE DEPUTY CONTEOLLEB FOE DOCKYARDS AND
SHIPBUILDING.

Deputy Controller... Sir Thomas Bell, e.b.e
Director of Dockyards and Repairs. ..Bear Admiral Laurence E. Powpi. cvb., c.v.o.
Deputy Director of Dockyards and Repairs. ..E. E. Bate. Esq.
Superintendent of Dockyard Branch — Assistant Director of Dockyards and Repairs —

H. J. Webb. Esq. Eng. Captain Eobert B. Dixon, u.

Electrical Engineering Assistant.. .W. McClelland, Esq., hj.b.b.
Secretary to D-CD-S.-.F. C. Eoutly. Esq.

286 Appendix

Manager, Constructive Department —

F. B. OIHr, Esq. (tempy). {For special
service.)

Chief Constructors —

G. M. Apsey. Esq. (tempv.).

0. II. Croxford. Esq. (act.) (tempv.).
C. G. Hall, Esq. (act.) (tempv.).
Constructors —

W. T. Davis, Esq. (tempy.).
O. F. Ludford. Esq. {act.).
J. McQueen, Esq. (act.).
H. B. Wood. Esq. (act.).

For Special Service —

Eng. Bear-Admiral Robert Mayston. o.B.

(ret.) (tempv.)
Eng. Rear-Admiral Charles Sudd.
Eng. Captain Albert E. Tompkins (ret), k.n.
Ena. Captain 0. W. Murray (ret.), e.n.

Engineer Assistants —

Eng. Commander Samuel P. Ferguson.

Eng. Lieut-Commander J. G. Budge.

T. E. Elvy, Esq. (Lent from Haulbowline

Dockyard.)
E. R. Langmaid, Esq.

Examiners of Dockyard Work —
T. H. Harris. E. A. Lakey, J. D. Gibby (act.). J. Ellis. W. L. Coles, F. Sanders.
O. Henwood (act.). F. J. Fletcher (act.). 3. A. Fage (ad.), and J. H. Martin (act.). Esqrs.

Electrical Engineer Higher Grade.. .T. Edge, Esq. (tempv ).

Electrical Engineers...!. S. Beddoe, a.m.i.e.e. (act.) and A. E. Frankling (act.), Esqrs.

First Assistant Electrical Engineers... H. P. Blake (act.), E. L. Brain (act.),

J. Macey (act.) and J. H. Ward (act.). Esqrs.

Clerical Assistant... G. C. Stanbury. Esq. (act).

Senior Visiting Inspector of Timber... ,W, H. Hooper, Esq.

Visiting Inspector of Timber... Alfred James, Esq.

3 Dockyard Clerks (First Grade), 6 Dockyard Clerks (Second Grade), 1 Senior Draughtsman,

6 First Class Draughtsmen. 14 Second Class Draughtsmen, 14 Dockyard Clerks (Third Grade),

3 Hired Writers, 4 Temporary Clerks, 22 Female Clerks, and 9 Boys.

WABSHD? PEODTJCTION SECTION.

LONDON STAFF.

Director of Warship Production... W. J. Berry, Esq.. O.B.

Deputy Director of Warship Production... Engineer Contain J. G. Liversldge, r.n.

Assistant Director of Warship Production.. .E. A. Pearce, Esq.

Superintendent of Warship Production.. .W. H. Carter, Esq.

Senior Engineer Assistant... Engineer Captain P. D. Martell. r.k.

Senior Constructive Officer.. .J. A. Yates, Esq.
Superintendent of Warship Electrical Work... J. McCaffery, Esq.
Secretary to Director of Warship Production.. .R. J. Wright. Esq.
Constructors.. .A. Adams (act.). G. Bulkeley (ad.). C. E. Goodyear. J. C. Joughin (act.),
E. F. Spanner (act.) and L. D. Stansneld (act.), Esqrs.
Engineer Assistants. ..Engineer Commander W. A. Wilson, c.u.0.. R.N.
Engineer Commander F. A. Gordon, B.N.. W. J. Stallion (act.). Esq., W. G. Mathews (tempv.), Esq.
Electrical Engineers. ..A. J. Foord (act.), A. Moore (act.), Esqrs.
Assistant Constructors ...W. Butterwlck (tempy.). W. J. Craig. b.so. (tempv.). E. Falrley (tempv.).
B. McMillan (tempy.). D. E. J. Oltord, J. W. Westlake (tempv.), Esqrs.
Financial Inspectors... E. Gedye. B. C. Knight (tempv.), Esqrs.
Engineer Inspectors (tempv.)— B. N. Brown. G. Burton, I/. H. Forsyth, W. A. Guthrie, Esqrs., Lieut,
a. W. Gill, D. A, McFarlane, C. Tillotson, T. EL Mathews, D. Hutcheon, S. H. Warren, E. H. PoIIett,
I/._J.^Nobbs, Esqrs.

Inspecting Officer. ..W. C. Thomas (ret.), Esq.

First Assistant Electrical Engineers... C. B. Jowett (act.), C. H. Klyne (act.),

E. F. Kill (act.), Esqrs.

Examiners of Accounts ...E. E. Rogers (tempy.), G. Taylor (tempi/.), and

W. E. Vanstone (act.), Esqrs.

Assistant Examiners of Accounts. ..T. Batt (act.), J. Boulden (act.), W. Bray (act.), W. J. Case (act.).

F. G. Gay (act.), A. H. Hollis (act.). S. W. B. Plppett (act.), G. E. Wilson (act.), Esqrs.
2 Dockyard Clerks (act.) (First Grade), 4 Dockyard Clerks (act.) (Second Grade), 7 Draughtsmen,
2 Dockyard Clerks (act.) (Third Grade), 32 Temporary Clerks (female), and
14 Temporary Clerks (male).

OUTDOOB STAFF.

CLTDH.

Warship Production Superintendent.. .H. J. Blandford, Esq. (Address.. .105. West George Street. Glasgow.

Deputy Warship Production Superintendent...!?. W. Searle, Esq.
Warship Production Inspectors. ..A. 0. Beard, F. J. Berry, J. Bryant. W. E. Head, W. T. Hoskln,
W. B. Hugman, F. G. McCulloch. F. W. Eobson. E6qrs.
Warship Production Inspectors (Engineer)...!. Appleby, W. Bugg, D. McMillan, M. Munro, Esqrs.

Appendix 287

Ttne.
Warship Production Superintendent. ..A. M. Worthlnston, Esq. (Address. . .' Milburn House," Newcastle-

on-Tyne).

Deputy Warship Production Superintendent...!. luncs. Esq.

Worship Production Inspectors... E. 3. F. Leatherby. J. J. N. Batey. A. S. Blatchford, A. E. Moore.

J. W. Tomer, J. Sampson, Esqrs.
Warship Production Inspectors (Engineers)...?. Cowe, J. Findlay. T. McBride, C. Stuart. Esqrs.

Mmw av.

Warship Production Superintendenl...tl. P. Payne, Esa. (Address... 238. Royal Liver Buildings, Liverpool).

Deputy Warship Production Superintendent.. .P. Wright. Esq.

Warship Production Inspectors.. M. J. Bunday. E. A. Gawden, H. W. M. Harrison,

T. M. Taylor. Esqrs.

Warship Production Inspectors (Engineer)... S. Gould, J. Howells. 0. Verity. Esqrs.

London and Sodthekn District.

Warship Production Superintendent... 3. W. Dippy, Esq., Admiralty (Block V.).

Manchester, Sheffield, and Leeds District.

Engineer Inspector... E. Anthony, Esq.

BmoNOHAH, Coventry, and Leicester District.

Engineer Inspector.. .H. H. Peters, Esq.

8 Dockyard Clerks (Seoond Grade). 9 Dockyard Clerks (Third Grade).

DEPARTMENT OP THE DEPUTY CONTROLLER FOR AUXILIARY SHIP-
BUILDING.

Deputy Controller.
Mojor-Qeneral A. S. Collard. O.B., R.E.
Director ol Auxiliary Shipbuilding.
Deputy Director of Auxiliary Shipbuilding... A. W. Sampson, Esq.
Assistant Directors of Auxiliary Shipbuilding...']:. A. Aboil. EBq.. T. W. Davis. Esq.. R. M. Gillies, Esq
Peter Stable, Esq.. Dr. H. A. Treadgold and Lieut.-Col. E. W. R. Plnkney. d.s-o.. a.s.o.
Deputy Assistant Directors of Auxiliary Shipbuilding.. .Major F. L. Pickersgill. b.f.a., Henry
A. Butt. Esq.. C Scott, Esq.
Directors of Ship Repairs.. .G. S. F. Edwards, Esq. and H. M. Grayson, Esq.
Assistant Directors of Ship .Repairs... H. E. Parlett. Esq. (act.) and A. W. Davidson, Esq.
Deputy Assistant Director of Ship Repairs... J. W. Jack, Esq. (act.).
Inspectors of Shipping... n. L. J. Wlllson. Esq. (act.) ; Carp- Lieut.-Com. (ret.) George Hickey. r.n..
Carp. Lieut.-Com. (ret.) Robert G. Withell, r.n.. Carp. Lieut, (ret.) George Reeves, b.n..
Corp. Lieut, (ret.) John E. Elstone. r.n. and Ch. Carp. George Sim. B.H.
Outport Staff.. .14 Senior Inspectors and 21 Inspectors of Shipping.
Chief Inspector of Auxiliary Shipbuilding... D. Warn, Esq.
Assistant Inspectors of Auxiliary Shipbuilding... J. Catto, J. W. Donovan, Esqrs.
23 District Superintendents with Deputies.
Technical Assistants... J. H. Bell. W. H. Benoy. W. Bradney (tempi/.). J. E. Cole (tempy.), G. Fuller,
E. Graham (tempy.). H; G. Hodge. E. E. Oldershaw (tempy.), Blanchard Peskett, T. C. Rolland
(tempy.), Henry Sanderson, 0. P. Sanderson, D. S. Smith (tempy.), Allan Stevenson. W. L. Stuart
(tempy.), Alexander Urwin (tempy.). F. Walker, and S. R. Wells. Esqrs.
Technical Assistant Engineers... Benjamin Allen (tempy.), H. T. Backhouse. John Barr (tempy.), H. P.
Claridge, Norman A. Collard (tempy.), John Denny (tempy.). w. Howie, John G. Johnstone, W. M.
Morison, F. G. Postle, J. R. Robb. J. Robertson. G. C. Thompson. J. W. Thompson, and F. L.
Williams, Esqrs.
Tempy. Assistant Engineers... Frederick Bolton, J. T. Carr, Thomas C. 0. Chant. J. Collie, A. Drew.
H. E. Farmer, F. B. Gripper. A. E. Hnrse, J. EJrkwood. G. F. Mackay, J. Mitchell, J. O. Morgan.
Lieut. W. T. Nash. B.N.V.B.. O. F. H. Nightingale. W. Robson. C. M. Skinner, P. Thomas, W. F.
Ware, J. B. Whyte. C. X. Wilkinson, and J. S. Young, Esqrs.

Administrative OfUcers. ..Lynden H. E. Blake, F. F. Hopkins. John R. E. MacEenzie,

J. G. M. Smith, and W. H. Sykes. Esqrs.
Administrative Assistants... T. A. Lawrenson. A. Pickersgill, C. W. Ward, Esqrs., and
Copt. W. Ross-Brown, r.o.a.
Superintendent of Shipyard Extensions.. .Major G. W. Brims, k.c. . r.f.a.
Tempy. Clerical Assistant. ..w. Winstanley, Esq.
Assistant Superintendent of Forgmgs..M. F. W. Flower, Esq.
Tempy. Assistants... Oopt, 0. R. G. Beadle, r.o.a.. Capl. T. B. Coull. Major J. W. Hamilton. P. M.
Lang. Esq., Capt. 3. Robinson, Lieut. Thomas Y. Stout, r.n.v.s.. and Capt. E. H. S. White.

288 Appendix

DEPARTMENT OF THE DEPUTY CONTROLLER FOE ARMAMENT PRODUCTION.

Deputy Controller. ..Sir Vincent L. Raven. K.B.B.
Secretary... "W. H. Pettifor. Eaa.
Naval Assistant... Erie. Com. Arthur E. Lester. D.S.O.. B.N.
Civilian Assistants to D.C.A.P....V. T. Heap. Esa. and Evelelgh Nash. Esq.
Director of Production, Guns. Mountings and Sights.. .L. I. G. Leveson, Esq.
Deputy Director of Production, Quns. Mountings and Sights. ..H. B. Rowell, Esq.
Assistant Directors of Production, Quns, Mountings and Sights. ..R. T. Glascodine. Esa.. and
Major W. Klrke Smith, D.s.o.
Deputy Assistant Directors of Production, duns. Mountings and Sights. ..Chas A. Baker, Esq. and

C. J. S. Orion. Esq.

Director of Production.. .Torpedoes tc Mines... A. H. Hall, Esq.

Deputy Director of Production.. .Torpedoes 4c Mines... Commander Carlton C. Sherman. B.H. (act.) (ret.).

Assistant Director of Production... Torpedoes and Mines,. .H. A. D. Acland, Esq.

Paravane Section... Lieut.-Commr. W. H. McConnell. e.n.v.e.

Technical Adviser to B-A.M....V. T. Heap, Esq.

Director of Production.. .Ammunition.. .a. E. Woodward, Esq.

Deputy Director of Production.. .Ammunition.. .Major F. L. Watson, M.C.

Assistant Director tact.) of Production... Ammunition... Lieut. H. S. H. Ellis, k.n. (ret).

Deputy Assistant Director of Production... Ammunition... TL. S. Rayner, Esq.

AIRSHIP PRODUCTION.

Director of Airship Production... E. C. Given. Esq.
Airship Section.. .Wing Capt. Edward A. D. Masterman. r.k.
Wing Commr. Harold L. Woodcock, e.n.
Commander J. Malcolm Eraser, e.n.v.b.
Airship Engine Section... Eng. Commr. Leslie Robins, r n.

Eng. Lieut. Frederick R. G. Turner, n.s.
Eng. Lieut. Rey G. Parry. D.s.o., e.k.
Hydrogen Section. ..Lieut. Commr. Sidney R. Lowcock, r.n.v.r.
Lieut. Charles A. Slater, e.n.v.b.
Lieut. Alfred H. White, B.N.V.B.
Lieut. John B. Butler, e.n.v.e.
Lieut. Cecil Llghtfoot, k.n.v.e.
Electric and W/T Section... Lieut. Arthur Price Reed, E.N.V.R.
Lieut. Arthur J. Osborne, e.n.v.e.
Airship Constructor. ..C. I. R. Campbell, Esq.
Assistant Constructors.. .H. B. W. Evans. S. A. McCarthy. L. J. Bartlett, S. Payne, H. May,
A. P. Cole, F. Sutcllffe, Esqrs.
Costs.. .A. E. Wigfield. Esq.
Airship Production and Inspection.. .1. Turton Jones Esq.

Flight Lieut. M. Bartlett.
Lieut. E. H. Haworth, e.n.v.e.
Lieut. J. D. Greenwood, e.n.v.e.
Sub. Lieut. D, Greenwood, e.n.v.e.
Administrative Staff OMcer... Major S. Robinson.
Civil Assistant to D.A.P....B. Page, Esq.
Chief Draughtsman. ..C. Wale, Esq.

District Progress Engineers.. .C. F. Dowdlng, Esq.. London; W. 8. Edwards, Esq.. Brimbngham : J. H.
Hollis. Esq.. Glasgow ; C. G. Howsin, Esq., Manchester ; J. S. Orton, Esq., Barrow : A. H. Romans,
Esq., Sheffield ; Major F. W. Yates, E.B.. Grantham ; and Captain H. Wilson Young. NewcastU-on-
Tvne.

SHIPYARD LABOUR DEPARTMENT.

Director of the Shipyard Labour Department.. .Sir Lynden Macassey, EBq., E.B.B., E.o.

Assistant Directors. ..G. P. Morrlsh, Esq. {General Div.).
J. R. Bond, Esq. {Technical Div.).
C. J. Spencer (Labour Div.).

Vice-Admiral W. De Balls, m.v.o. {Substitution Dim.).
Major R. Williams (Priority and Transfer Div.).

Secretary... R. E. A. Elliott, Esq., i.o.s. (act). I Intelligence Officer. ..G. F. Farrar.

Asst. Secretary... S. F. James, Esq. I Establishment Officer.. ,H. Watson. Esq.

Appendix

289

Substitution Division.
Eng. Cant, (ret.) Jasper W. A. Panott.

General Division.

Superintendent of General Section... W. Wrench Lee. Esq.
Superintendent of Negotiation Section.. .H. B. Batcliffe. Esq.
Liaison Section... B. Wicks, Esq.

Labour Division.

Superintendent Legal Division... V.. H. Fox. Esa.

Legal Assistants... C. H. W. Johnson. Esq., E. F. Bingwood, Esq.

Technical Division.

Chief Technical Inspector. ..A. McDermott Service, Esq.
Inspector of Women's Work. ..Lady Gertrude Crawford.

Priority and Transfer Division.
Assistant {1st Glass)... Lieutenant A. L. S teahouse.

The following have also been appointed, or lent from other Departments for temporary service
durino the War :

W. Adam. J. J. Biddlestone. W. dough, W. Graham, F. Gray, H. L. Heywood. J. B. Hill. Austin
Kendall, W. Knowles. Esqs.. Miss E. L. Macassey. W. S. Batcliffe, H. A. Sharpe.
Esqs., Miss K. Toogood, C. H. Yeatman. Esq.

District Directors.
A. L. Ayxe (Glasgow).
J. E. Baker (Barrow).
J. H. Brewerton (Southampton).
A. W. Chantler (Belfast).
Lt.-Col. W. Cooper {Liverpool).
Lt.-Col. A. Gadie (London).
Eng. Rear-Adml. (ret.) 0. W.

Gregory (Leeds).
H. G. Jekin (Hull).
Eng. Gapt. (ret.) J. Langmaid

(Birmingham).
H. H. McClure (Newcastle).
J. Gordon (Cardiff).
Eng. Rear-Adml. (ret.) A. E. L.

Westaway (Bristol).

Shipyard Technical OMcers.
Eng. Rear-Adml. (ret.) J. H.

Adams (Dundee).
J. D. McD. Barbour (Liverpool).
E. L. Botham (Cardiff).
H. Bucknall (Newcastle).
S. G. D. Cuer (Liverpool).
A. Dudgeon (Glasgow).
J. Duncan (Aberdeen).
E. C. Farquhar (Glasgow).
J. Grigg (Cteuow).
J. D. Guthrie (Bristol).
Johnston Hughes (Belfast).
J. F. James (Liverpool).
G. Johnson (London).
J. Laidman (Newcastle).
G. M. Mackay (Sunderland).
J. D. C. Mackenzie (Glasgow).

D. M. McKay (Glasgow).

E. J. Mills (Newcastle).

F. Moorsom (Cardiff).
T. E. Beath (Glasgow).

Superintendents of Shipyard Labour.
Lltul.-Colon.el W. Cooper (Afersei/).
Lieut-Colonel A. Gadie.
Bw. Caj>«. (ret.) J. Langmaid (Birmingham),
A. I/. Ayre (Glasgow).
J. E. Baker (Barrow).
J. H. Brewerton (Southampton).
H. G. Jeken (HuiO.
H. W. Johnson (Cardiff).

Local Areas.

F. W. Sturdy (Sfocfcton).
C. B. Thomas (LeUh).
P. Webster (Gtosotw).

G. P. Wells (ffuB).
J. Wilson (BrisfoB.

.Enoineer Technical OMcers.

W. T. Andrews (London).
J. Bonthrone (Liverpool).
R. Boucher (London).
J. H. Chambers (Belfast).
A. Cordiner (HuK).

C. H. Doldge (Butt).
E. Edwards (Birroinoftam).
J. W. Elliott (Manchester).
L. T. G. Evans (London).

D. Gray (Leeds).
J. E. Hamilton (Barrow).
G. A. Hart (Leeds).
S. B. B. Hebb (Hartlepool).
C. E. Henzell (Leeds).
G. S. Home (Afancftester).
C. A. Bowarth (Glasgow).
G. B. Johnston (Glasgow).
A. MacDonald (Glasgow).
G. N. McVicar (Glasgow).
W. Murdoch (Sunderland).
G. B. Nicholson (Cardiff).
J. F. Phillips (Wewcasfte).
J. S. Eeid (Glasgow).
G. B. Richards (Birmingham).
A. Robertson (Glasgow).
H. M. Sayers (London).
S. J. Sewell (Leeds).
Eng. Bear-Adml. (ret.) E. J. Tench

(Southampton).
G. Turner (Bristol).
W. H. Warwick (Leeds).

T. Warde (Liverpool).
T. Yorston Wewcosfle).

Labour Regulation OMcers.

P. Black (London).

H. Blair (Belfast).

J. Cox (Birmingham).

W. G. Cruickshank (Glasgow).

J. Cunningham (Belfast).

J. Evans (Liverpool).

W. H. Fisher (Ztuerpoo!).

W. M. Gibson (London).

T. Griffiths (Liverpool).

H. Haddon (Cardiff).

The Earl of TJard'wicke (London).

T. D Heppel (London).

F. A. Herd (Birmwwftam).
M. Hodgson (WetccasWe).
B. B. Holt (Newcastle).
W. J. Jackson (Glasgow).
H. W. Johnson (Cardiff).

A. W. E. Kewley (Newcastle).
A. G. Lawrence (London).
J. M. Lithgow (Glasgow).

A. Magnay (Newcastle).
W. Marsh (Southampton).
W. Nelson (Southampton).

B. W. Owen (Liverpool).

G. H. Pearson (Newcastle).
W. Bamsden (Liverpool).
J. D. Bees (Cardiff).

S. Shaw (Leeds).
G. C. Steel (Newcastle).
B. Towart (Glasgow).
E. J. Waters (Newcastle).
W. J. White (Newcastle).
W. P. Williams (Bristol).
J. C. Wood (Glasgow).

Superintendents of Shipyard Labour — contd,
J. M. Lithgow (Glasgow).
H. H. McClure (N.E. Coast).

Deputy Chief Labour Organising OMcers.
M. Hodgson (N.E. Coast).
W. Nelson (Southampton).

Transfer OMcer,
E. J. Walters (N.E. Coast).

290 Appendix

MATEEIALS AND PEIOEITY DEPARTMENT.
Director of Materials and Priority. ..Lieut.-Col. E. S. Home.
Personal Assistant to Director. ..Lieut. T. Q. Eobertaon, r.n.v.k.
Assistant Directors.. .Eng. Gapt. John A. EichardB (act.).

J. Sogers, Esq. (acting Chief Constructor).
M. Kissane. Esq.
F. Smith, Esq.

Lieut-.Gom. A. M. MacEobert, r.n.v.b.
Deputy Assistant Directors... Eng. Com. Henry C. Anstey lad.) (emergy.).
Cavt. J. H. Bkelton.
Capt. James Caldwell.
Adrian Lumley, Esq.
Administrative and Technical Assistants. ..Lieut. L. Nicoll, Sub. Lieut. W. E. Sugden b.h.v.b,.
Sec. Lieut. A. Milner, Sec. Lieut. G. H. M. Thompson, Sec. Lieut. F. H. Saunders, r.e„
Sec. Lieut. A. G. Mayor, b.b., J. P. Powell, E. Juniper, D. Cameron, E. C. Hawthorn
E. Butler, S. J. Arkwright. C. McQueen, E. P. Padbury. Hawkins Turner, H. G. Brodle, Esqrs.
Statistical Assistants... H. L. Tutill, Esq.

Assistant Paymaster... C. H. Clemetson.
Examiner of Accounts... G. W. Brown (act.).
9 Tempy. Clerks, 66 Tempy. Women Clerks and Typists.

STATISTICS DEPARTMENT.

Director of Statistics. ..Lieut.-Col. J. O. Beharrell, D.g.o.
Deputy Director... Lieut. H. Macrae.
Heads of Sections.. .Lieut. J. C. M. Butterworth.
2nd Lieut. J. Hambly.
J. N. Brunton, Esq.
A. E. Kirkus, Esq.
W. D. Duffield, Esq.
C. Collins, Esq.
Asst. Pavm. B.N.R... .William H. Anstice.

FINANCE DIVISION

Assistant Accountant-Qeneral... A. Cunnison, Esq. (act.).
Superintending Clerk. ..A. H. M. Fox, Esq. (act.).
Deputy Accounts Officers in charge of Branches.. .W. J. Hean, Esq. (act.) : E. G. Peirce, Esq. (act.).
Deputy Accounts Officers. ..H. B. Bain, Esq. (act.) ; G. H. Court, Esq. (act.)
W. J. S. Greenland, Esq. (act.).
Assistant Accounts Officers... E. H. Westlake. Esq. ; H. E. Denny, Esq. (act.) (lent from
Inland Revenue) ; F. E. Johnson, Esq. (lent from Inland Revenue).
Assistant Expense Accounts Officer (lent by Inspector of Dockyard Expense Accounts)... F. Hall. Esq.
Assistant Auditors (lent from National Insurance Audit Department)... A. J. Camm, A. E. Codd,
H. Foulds, L. H. Gibson, E. G, Kench, A. Page, Esqrs.
4 Supervising Assistant Clerks, 1 Assistant Clerk, 1 Hired Accountant Clerk, 10 Temporary Clerics
Assistants, 7 Temporary Assistant Accountants, 21 Temporary Men Clerks, 2 Higher Grade Women
Clerks. 70 Temporary Women Clerks and Typists, and 15 Improvers and Boy Clerks.
(With the exception of the Asst. Expense Accounts Officer, the Staff of this Divison was
also shown under the Dept. of (he Accountant-General.)

COSTINGS INVESTIGATION DIVISION.

Advisor upon Costs of Production \ , .. mv„.„„.„ x..„ _ „ , ,„„, i
Assistant Account General / A - F - Whinney, Esq.. F.O.A. (act.).

Deputy. ..F. W. Papworth, Esq., a.s.a.a. (Acting Superintending Clerk).
Heads of Sections. ..c. D. Britten, Esq., A.O.A.
W. Elles Hill, Esq., A.O.A.
F. N. Kidson, Esq. F.O.A.
C. H. Oldfield, Esq., A.O.A.
H. F. Palmer. Esq., A.O.A.

C. J. Sturt. Esq., a.s.a.a. (Acting Assistant Accounts Officer).
Assistant Auditors (lent from National Insurance Audit Dept.). ..J. A. Clarkson, a.s.a.a. ; W. E. Karamelli,

a.s.a.a.. S. Whincup, a.s.a.a.. Esqrs.
Superintending Accountants. ..E. A. Blackford, A.O.A. : D. M. Butcher, a.s.a.a. : E. H. Nickson, A.C.A. ;
W. J. Phillips, a.s.a.a. ; B. G. Pocock, A.S.A.A. ; M. Price. F.O.A. ; P. W. Bumble,
A.S.A.A. ; C. W. Weston. A.C.A. : H. G, Wilson, p.o.A., Esqrs.

Appendix

291

Accountants... U. E. Baker. A.O.A. i* A. B. Bayley. A.O.A. : N. Bell, o.A. : E. L. Biggs, A.O.A. : W. H.
Cooper, a.3.a.a. ; J. Dickson, o.A. ; H. V. Edwards, a.c.a. : p. Egllngton. a. o.A. :
A. Fielding, a. o.A. ; H. Oarman. a.c.a. ; B. G. Greenshields, o.A. ; C. T. Grimes, a.c.a. :
A. Hosklng, A.3.A.A. ; B. C. Howard, a.s.a.a. ; J. A. Lewcock, a.s.a.a. ; II. Luker,
A.S.A.A. : W. E. Mansell, A.S.A.A. ; W. J. Morton, A.S.A.A. ; G. T. Needham. A.O.A. :
0. V. Oldfleld. A.O.A. ; J. Potter, a.s.a.a. : B. Smith, a. o.A. ; J. S. Stuart, a.s.a.a.
E. M. Taylor. A.O.A. : B. 8. Tewson, A.O.A. : H. Tweedale, A.O.A. : P. H. Walker,
A.S.A.A. ; 0. C. Wlllson. F.a.A.A. ; E G. Wolfe. a.o.a. : T. 0. Whlttaker. A.8.A.A.. Esqrs

61 Temporary Assistant Accountants, 1 Temporary Man Clerk, 20 Temporary Women Clerks, 5 Boy
Clerks, 91 Third Grade Clerks and Recorders.

DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL OEDNANCE.
Director of Naval Ordnance... Captain Frederic 0. Dreyer. o.B.
Assistant-Director of Naval Ordnance.. .Captain Joseph C. W. Henley.
Assistants to Director of Naval Ordnance.

Commander Charles A. Scott.

Edward O. Cochrane.
Isham W. Gibson, m.v.o.
Bernard W. M. Fairbairn.
Archibald Gilbert {act.).
Edward G. de S. Jukes-Hughes.
(G) Stanley T. H. Wilton.

Commander (G) Gerald F. Longhurst, o.a.o.(temp
Commr. B.N.V.B. John G. Henderson [act.).
Lieut. Walter E. Gilbert.

Willie D. Kilroy. r.n.v.e. (tempy.).
Sub-Lieut. W. H. J. Elridge, r.n.v.r (tempy.) .
Chief Gunner Herbert D. Jehan.
Commissioned Armourer Ernest Addy.

L ieutenant... Frederick J. Payne.

Malcolm A. McKenzie.

Engineer Inspectors.

Ens. Captain Thomas Thome (tempy.).
Henry Wall.

Eng. Commander William Hart.

Eng. Commander Walter G. Heppel.

Frederick C. E. Paton (tempy.).

Frederick Eobertson (act.).
Eng. Lieut.- Com. Stanley W. Cooke.

Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance. ..Commander (act.) John A. Duncan. o.B.
Assistants to Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance ...Commander Henry G. E. Bevan (ret.).

Commander Ralph G. Dinwiddy.
Commander Leslie J. L. Hammond (ret.).
Commander (act.) John A. L. Hay.
Captain Freeman C. N. Bishop, b.m.a.
A. H. Dodd, Esq..
Examiner of Gun-Moimting Accounts. ..A. H. Duffleld. Esq. (act.).
Examiner of Gun- Mounting Work...W. E. D. Helmer, Esq. (act.) (tempi/.).
The following gentleman has been lent for special service during the War... J. Storey, Esq.
Naval OMcers employed on Inspection and Experimental Ordnance Duties.

Under Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance : —
Inspector of Steel.. .Commander Harold G. Jackson (ret.).
Deputy Inspector of Steel. ..Colonel J. E. J. Jocelyn, r.a. (ret.).
Civilian Inspector of Steel.. .Lieut. D. E. Horwood.
Acting Inspector of Steel.. .Commander (act.) Llewellyn E. H. Llewellyn (ret.).

Assistant Inspectors of Steel.

Admiral (ret.) Sir Edmund S. Poe. a.o v.o.. k.c.b.
Major-General R. Wace, c.b., r.a. (tempy.).
Captain H. E. Evans, b.n. (ret.).

William H. M. Daniell, b.n. (ret.).
Claude W. M. Plenderleath. b.n. (ret.)
William H. F. Taylor, b.n. (ret.).
Commander Henry Thompson (ret.).

Charles K. McCallum (ret.).

John E. Bray (ret.).

T. S. Gooch (Emerg.).

A. H. Tremayne (ret.).

Reginald C. Brenton (Emerg.).
Commander B.N.B. W. F. Caborne. c.b.. b.d. (ret.).
Lieut.-Com. Arthur W. Tomlinson.

Frank E. Willis.

Hugh J. Orr (ret.).

John G. M. McHardy (ret.).

Robert F. Veasey (ret.).

Aliater W. McDonald (ret.).

Ralph B. Bodilly (ret).

William H. Callwell (ret.).

Henry L. Cheston (Emerg.) (act.).

Frederick J. Davis. B.D., e.n.b. (ret.).

W. E. Compton (ret.).

W. G. H. Cree (ret.).

Lieut.-Com. John H. C. Ogllvy (ret.).

Robert A. C. Montagu (ret.).
Lieut. Robert J. Sweet (ret.).
Lieut. B.N.R. Beauchamp H. Venner (ret.).
Lieut. B.N.V.B. Tom M. Chambers.
Colonel (temp. Brig.-Gen.) Cooper Penrose, e.e.
Colonel C. L. RobinBon (ret.) (tempy.).

W. H. Williams, o.m.q.

H. D. Olivier.

D. A. Mills. B.B. (ret.).

A. L. Mein, b.b. (ret.).

M. H. Purcell, b.e. (ret.).

W. Huckisson, C.M.G., b.e. (ret.).
Bt. Col. S. V. Thornton, e.a. (tempy.).
Bt. Col. H. O. Nelson, r.a. (tempy.).
Lieut.-Col. G. Mackinlay, r.a. (ret.) (tempy.).

F. H. Eliott. o.s.i., i.a. (ret.) (tempv-).
Allan Wadmore (tempy.).
A. Tracery (tempv.).
Major & Bt. Lt. Col. Frederick L. Dibblee, b.m.a
Major Charles A. Bishop, k.m.a.

R. E. Fitzgerald-Lombard (ret.).
Captain G. B. Macpherson Grant (tempy.';.
Captain Alfred D. B. Godfray, r.m.a.
Captain A. 3. Beckett, b.e.

Gunner (ret.) Richard W- Lawrence.

292 Appendix

The following gentlemen have also been appointed for temporary service durma (he War :

G. B. Bowell. J. W. Capstick. E. H. Deane, T. I. Drever. S. E. Fox. H. B. Halls, O. J. Hill, W. R. C.
Hockln. Dr. 0. H. Ivinson. L. T. Jarvis, A. Johnson. J. L. Eltto. E. Lake. A. E. Lee, Louis
Mackenzie. E. Maslin, C. H. Moore. C. E. Moss, A. S. Napier, E. Pereival, D. Ficton Pilchard,
G. Weston Ramsey. C. Seaman. T. W. Sheppard, J. W. Slater, E. L. Trench Watson. G. Turnman,
A. Warey. G. H. Wells and H. Wise, Esqrs.

Lent from Home Office.

H. Topham, S. B. Bennett, A. C. Lowe, G. C. Sumner, E. L. Mecklin. C. F. Hunter. W. H. Mead.
W. Turner, F. Bowen. A. A. Hepburn, C. H. Taylor. C. E. Plumbe. F. W. Cockshott. A. Fother-
lnghani, L. D. Hooper. H. T. Ringdove, and W- C. Evans. Esqrs.

E. H. C. Newby, Esq.. Deputy Cashier {ad.), under the Inspector of Steel, Sheffield
(lent from the National Health Insurance Commn.).

Under War Office.
Oomdr. Archibald C. Goolden (act.) [ret.). I Major (Tempv. Lietut.-Col.) Nathaniel F.

Major R.M.A. Henry K. Stephens. | Trotman, R.M.A.

The following- gentlemen have been appointed for temporary service during the War :
J. L. Capes, H. Jackson, A. McPherson. and P. R. Coursey. Esqrs.

Superintending Clerk... Thomas G. Anderson. Esq.

Deputy Superintending Clerk... W. P. Daniels. Esq. (act.).

Assistant Superintending Clerks...A. C. Jones (act.). F. Morrison. S. W. Smith (act.) and

G. Stevens (act.). Esqrs.

1 Second Division Clerk. Dockyard Clerks (including Acting) First Grade 1, Second Grade 8, Third

Grade 8, Temporary Clerks and Boys 38. Draughtsmen 7.

Superintendent of Ordnance Stores. ..Captain Herbert R. Norbury. B.N.
Deputy Superintendent of Ordnance Stores. ..H. Fathers, Esq., i.s.o. (act.).
Assistant Superintendents of Ordnance Stores. ..A. McFarlane (act.).

G. E. Woodward (act.). Esqrs.
Naval Ordnance Store Officers.. .W. A. Mortimer (act), W. Eowe (ad.). N. Thomas (act.).
W. Vaughan (ad.), and B. W. Wharhirst, Esqrs.

Deputy Ordnance Store Officers.. .W. E. Eyles (ad.). H. G. Hibberd (ad.).

C. H. Murray (ad.), and A. T. Seed, (ad.), Esqrs.

Assistant Ordnance Store Officers. ..A. H. Beard (act.), W. E. Harrison (ad.). J. A. Keightley (act.),
E. W. Lambe (ad.), G. Sansford (ad.), E. H. Priddon (act.),
and E. L. Tournay, Esqrs.

Examiners of Naval Ordnance Work...W. D. Evans (ad.) and P. J. Payne, Esqrs. (ad.).
1 Ordnance Depot Clerk. First Grade.
8 Ordnance Depot Clerks. First Grade (ad.).

5 Ordnance Depot Clerks, Second Grade (act.).
3 Ordnance Depot Clerks, Third Grade.

6 Ordnance Depot Clerks. Third Grade (ad.).
1 Assistant Clerk.

23 Temporary Hired Extra Clerks.
31 Temporary Women Clerks.
3 Boy Clerks and Boy Writers.

Acting Assistant Ordnance Store Officer. ..SIieffield...G. Swift. Esq.
Chief Analyst. ..Sheffield.. .John C. W. Humfrey. Esq.

The following have been appointed for special temporary service :
Dr. C. Weizmann.
Dr. Ida S. Maclean. H. Davies. E. G. Bainbridge. and H. Spiers, Esqrs.

DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF TORPEDOES AND MINING.

Director of Torpedoes and Miming Rear-Admiral The Hon. Edward S. Fitzherbert.

Secretary

Assistant Director (T). I Assistant Director (M).

Captain Algernon H. C. Candy. | Captain F. Shirley Litchtleld-Speer, O.M.O.. D.s.o

Assistant Director (P) Captain Vernon H. S. Haggard.

Appendix

293

Naval
Rear Admiral ..B. S. Pbjpps-Hornby, c.m.g.

(tempv.)
Captain Gordon C. Eraser int.).

Bryan G. Godfrey-Faussett, o.v.o,
o.m.o. (ret.).
Commander ...Evan C. Bunbury.

Geoffrey 0. Candy.

Thomas E. Ft orde.

Malcolm K. Grant (ret.).

Robert W. Dalgety, D.B.O.

Gerard B. Biley (ret.).

(T) Archibald A. Lovett-Cameron.

Kobert J. Howard (act.) {ret.).
Lieut.-Commr. Charles O. Alexander.

Bertram Vigne.
Lieutenant ...Patrick P. Coleman.

Staff.
Lieutenant Kodolpb H. F. de Sails. D.s.c.

Alfred J. Parkes.

Harry Simpson.
Lieut. IE. W. Taylor.

R.N.V.R. 'Bobert J. Carruthers. d.s.o.

John E. K. Wameford.

Eng. Capt. F. J. Moore (ret.).

(Asst. Inspector of Mines).
Eng. Commr.. ..Charles J. M. Wallace.

Edward O. Hefford.

Alfred B. Kempt.

Vernon A. A. Ter Veen.
Ch. Ovmner ...James Wood.
Gunner Leonard Bepton.

Walter Thorogood.

Walter F. Williamson.

Civil Staff.

Deputy Superintending Clerk (act.)..... P. E. Couratin. Esq..

Inspector of Mines <& Minim Qear W. Pearce. Esa.

1 Dockyard Clerk. First Grade (act.).

2 Dockyard Clerks. Second Grade tact.).
1 Dockyard Clerk, Third Grade.

1 Dockyard Clerk. Third Grade (act.).

2 Draughtsmen.

5 Temporary Clerks.

Torpedo Stoke Division.

Superintendent of Torpedo Stores Frederick Ward, Esa.

Assistant Superintendent of Torpedo Stores T. W. Midmer. Esa.

Torpedo Store Officer J. W. Ballard, Esa. (act.).

Deputy Torpedo Store Officers G. aCusens tact.) and W. E. Fuller (act.) Ebots.

Assistant Torpedo Store Officers W. Evans (act.) (tempv.) and F. Stokes (act.) Esare.

2 Torpedo Depot Clerks, First Grade (act.)

3 Torpedo Depot Clerks, Second Grade (act.).
13 Temporary Hired Extra Clerks.

11 Temporary Women Clerks.
6 Boy Clerks and Boy Writers.

AIB DEPABTMENT.
Chief of Naval Air Services {Fifth Sea Lord) Commodore Godfrey M. Paine, O.B., h.v.o.

^Lo^d'. '.**.. s . e ^..^.. N .T!..^!!:.!°..^.. B .^ Castain **»»»« v - VyTTan - »*°-

Civil Assistant to C.N~A.S W. A. T. Shorto. Esa. {Lent Controller's

Dept.)
F. G. C. Young. Esa. {act.) {lent)
Secretary to C.N.A.S. Staff Pavm. C. A. Shove.

Assistant to CJT.A.S Wina Captain H. D. Briggs.

Captain Supt. for Airships Wing Captain E. M. Maitland, d.s.o.

Asst. Supt. for Engines Wing Commander (E) W. Briggs (act.).

Personal Captain Captain John D. Edwards, c.b.

Personal Commander Squadron Commander J. W. O. Dalgliesb.

Armament Captain Captain (act.) Son. Arthur Stopford.

Commander H. T. A. Bosanauet.

A. D. Warrington-Morris.

Wing Commanders.

F. A. Brock (act.). j J. D. Mackworth. E. D. M. Eobertson.
J. L. Forbes. Francis Eanken (act.). H. L. Woodcock.

A. M. Longmore. |

Squadron Commanders.

J. Bird (act.). I T. D. Mackle. | J. P. Wilson. D.S.C.

D. Hyde-Thomson. I The Master c/Sempil). |

Flight Commanders.

T. A. Batcbelor. I B. F. S. Leslie, d.s.c. I E. J. C. Roberts.

G. W. Cranfleld. F. W. Lucas.

W. P. Groves (act.) \ B. E. Penny. I

Engineer-Lieutenant F. W. Scarff (act.).

294

Appendix

T. P. M. Alexander.

B. P. Chase.

M. J. G. Day.

D. GUI.

W. H. Greer.

Flight Lieutenants.
K. B. S. Gretg.
H T. Jonea.
3. Nixon.
G. G. Ommanney.
J. E. M. Pritchard.

11. A. Keid.
G. G. Simpson, c.s.o.
E. B. Soar, d.b.c.
D. C. Waylen.
A. W. Williams.

Observer Lieut

Flight Sub-Lieuts.

B. E. H. Allen.
G. H. Brown.
J. E. Catt.
G. F. Cole.
J. Coles.
J. V. Collins.

A. W. Farrer.
G. Holmes.

C. E. Abbott.

M. H. P. Allen.

0. E. Andrews.

J. Craig.

J. K. Curwen.

F. E. E. Davis (act).

S. T. Dockray.

S. Flower.

J. M. Fraser.

C. W. Gamble.

L. C. Abbott.

C. J. E. Alsford.

F. A. Baldwin.
H. Batsl'ord.
E. C. Blake.

J. P. Bourke.

B. J. P. Briggs.
W. Burkinshaw.
J. B. Butler.

E. E. W. Butt.

D. Cameron-Swan.
J. D. Carmlchael.
W. H. Clegg.

J. W. Cole.
T. A. Cotton.
J. E. Craig.
J. G. T. Crawford.

G. Crawley.
S.Curtis.

C. E. D'Arcy
A. L. Davis.
P. M. Davoon.
H. Dodd.

A. J. Dronsfleld.
J. P. Elsden.
W. G. Evans.
H. Eves.

N. Fawkes.
P. L. E. Fraser.
N. E. Fuller.
J. E. Gibb.

B. D. N. GIMmoie.

D. Goad.

G. M. Gordon.

T. E. Grant.

W. O. Grant.

J. E. A. Greatorex.

J. D. Greenwood.

J. W. Griggs.

Hon. L. G. W. Quest.

B. D. Hallam.

E. F.Turner.

S. F. Freeman.

A. W. Kay.

P. C. C. Passman.

H. J. Roach.
Warrant Officers (2nd grade).

H. G. Cooper.
W. T. Curtis.
A. Deakin.

A. H. Ellis.
J. Hobbs.

F. J. Hooper.

Commander. R.N.V.R.
C. H. Meares.

IAeut.-Commander, R.N.B.

J. Hills.

Lieut. -Commanders. R.N.V.R.

B. T. Hamilton.
J. Hills.

E. W. Hogarth.
E. Hogg.

C. Kent.

S. E. Lowcoek.

G. HcAlplne.

T. A. Monckton.
0. J. Murfltt.
T. F. Norbury.

Lieutenants. R.N.V.R;
J. E. Harland.
E. H. Haworth.
G. Hazelton.
J. F. Hedley.
S. E. Hemmingway.
S. B. Hill.
J. B. Homer.
T. C. B. Hooke.
H. E. Home.
E. C. Horsley.
H. Howard.

D. C. M. Hume.
A. J. Hurst.

K. H. Kennedy-Skipton.

A. J. S. Kennett.

W. H. M. Knox.

W. A. Lawrence.

C. Layzell Apps.

G. W. Lester.

M. V. E. Leveaux,

C. Lightfoot.

A. E. Low.

W. Makower.

E. Mansbridge.
M. Marsden.
W. L. Marsh.
O. H. Mason.
J. T. Matthews.
E. T. Methold.
T. B. Meyer.

M. J. H. Molyneux.3
J. W. Moore.
C. G. More.
N. P. MorriB.
W. A. Morrison.
S. B. Mullard.
N. D. Newall.
A. D. Newbury.
T. L. Oliver.
E. E. Ollerenshaw.
J. H. Ormsby.

C. Y. Mitchell.
C. W. PIdcock.
A. B. Bedstone.
W. Eenshaw.
A. Shires.

J. E. Steele.

G. C. Neilaon.
W. E. Plaister.
G. M. T. Eees.
J. D. K. Eestler.
J. C. Savage (act).
C. F. Steele.
F. C. Williams.
H. E. Wimperis.

A. J. Osborn.
G. L. T. Owen.
T. A. Parker.

D. E. Parry-Jones.
W. J. Polybank.
O. H Powell.

L. S. M. Pyke.
J. Eee.
A. P. Heed.

A. E. Eeed.

F. B. Eigby.

B. V. Boche.
K. Secretan.
W. Shearer.

G. G. Shepherd.

F. 0. H. C. Sinclair.
N. Sladden.

C. A. Slater.

A. F. H. Smallpiece.
H Spink.

F. II. Spragg.
A. M. Steele.
C. Suckling.

J. A. C. Sumner.
P. J. H. Sumner.

E. St. C. Talboys.
E. L. Taylor.

A. K. Toulmin-Smith.

G. L. Tyser. .
E. G. Walker.

H. N. Warburton;
W. G. J. Wardle.
H. A. Watts.
P. Westacott.
A. H. White.
G. Wilder.
N. H. Wood.
T. M. Wilson.
H. C. Wright.

Appendix

295

Staff Paymaster. R.N.R S. B. IT. Carter.

Sub-Lieutenants. R.N.V.R.

F. A. Barton.

A. Berry.

B. S. Cain.

n Churchman.
B. E. Cook.

A. B. Davies.

B. M. J. Davis.

H. A. Evans.
T. P. Erancis.
S. Gilflllan.
D. Greenwood.
J. H. Grills.
G. Harris.
H. W. Hern.

E. A. Hoghton.
E. C. Hubbard.
J. Logic.
D. P. Lucking.
W. B. Sinclair.
C. B. Skinner.

G. E. Green.

Asst. Payms. R.N.R.

I N. C. I. Pnghe.

Asst. Pavm. R.N.V.R T. P. Legard.

Wt. Teleg. R.N.R S. E. S. McLeod.

2nd Lieut A. Berry.

Civil Staff.

Deputy Superintending Clerks. ..E. W. Griffin and

W. A. Medrow {act.) Esqrs.
Chief Examiner. ..J. H. Jones. Esq. (act.)

(Lent from Inland Revenue).
Examiner. ..C. R. Pledger, Esq. (act.)

(Lent from Inland Revenue.)
Inspector of Aircraft Armament.. .B. D, Dow. Esq.

2 Minor Staff Clerks (act.).

4 Second Division Clerks (2 serving with
Army).

3 Assistant Clerks (1 serving with Army).
1 Extra Clerk, 1st Class.

1 Tempy. Accountant Clerk, 1st Class.

2 Asst. Inspectors of Aircraft Armament.
31 Temporary Clerks.

3 Temporary Women Clerks. Higher Grade.
73 Temporary Women Clerks.

7 Boy Clerks.

4 Draughtsmen.

id) ADMIRALTY, END OF NOVEMBER, 1918.

First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff. Admiral Sir Kosslyn E. Wemyss, k.o.b., 0.11.0.. h.v.o.

THE NAVAL STAFF.

Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff Vice-Admiral loot.) Sydney E. Fremantle, O.B., m.v.o.

Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff Vice- Admiral Sir Alexander L. Duff, k.o.b.

Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff Bear- Admiral Herbert G. W. Hope, o.B.

OPERATIONS DIVISION.

Directors of {he Operations Division Captain Charles P. R. Coode, d.s.o.

Captain Alfred D. P. E. Pound.
Deputy Directors of the Operations Division Captain Bernard St. G. Col lard, D.B.O.

Captain Arthur de K. L. May.
Assistant Directors of the Operations Division Captain Henry E. F. Aylmer.

Lieut. -Col. Walter T. C. Jones, d.s.o., r.m.l.i.

Naval and Marine Staff.

Captain

.E. P. Clutton (ret.).
Guy M. Marston (act.).
George T. C. P. Swabey, D.a.o.
Herbert O. J. Grant (ret.).

Commander... George F. B. Edward-Collins.
Hugh T. England.
Leonard Robinson (act.).
Henry F. H. Wakefield.
Thomas F. P. Calvert.

Commr. R.N.R. The Duke of Sutherland.
G. Hamilton (ret.).

tieut.-Com Melville A. Hawes.

Major R.A.F. Harold I. Dear.

Lieut. R.N.V.R. Sidney T. Morris.

Captain R.A.F. Cyril S. Goddard.

Thomas C. Spurway.
Charles J. Turner.

Civil Staff.

Staff Clerk in Charge F. E. Bailey, Esa. (act.).

(And for Ounnery and Torpedo Division.)

1 Minor Staff Clerk (act.).
1 Second Division Clerk.
3 Assistant Clerks.

1 Confidential Shorthand Writer.
1 Accountant Clerk.
10 Temporary Clerks.
4 Women Clerks.

Cartographer... A.. F. Gibson, Esq.

PLANS DIVISION.

Director of Plans Captain Cyril T. M. Fuller, O.M.O., d.s.i

• Captain Eagnar M. Colvin.

Assistant Directors of Plans < Captain Kenneth G. B. Dewar.

V Captain Alfred F. B. Carpenter v.o.

Naval and Marine Staff.

Commander Alfred H. Taylor.

Henry T. Dorling, D.s.o.
Colonel R.A.F. Cecil J. L'Estrange-Malone.
Lieutenant Charles W. L. Meynell.

Lieut. R.N.V.R. Hugh Micklem.

Lt.-Col Lewis S. T. Halllday, v.o.. o.b., b.m,

Major Godfrey P. Orde, k.m.l.1.

I Paym. Lieut.-Commr. Ernest D. G. Colics (act.).

296

Appendix

297

Civil Staff.
Staff Clerk ...A. Backhouse, Esq. (act.).
4 Temporary Clerks. 4 Women Clerks.

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.
Director of Naval InteUioence... Rear-Admiral Sir W. Reginald Hall, e.c.m.o.. o.b.
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence... Captain Kaymond A. Nugent, o.m.q.
Assistant Directors of Naval Intelligence. ..Captain 'William M. James.

Captain Kaymond Fitzmaurlce, d.s.o.

Captain Vivian K. Brandon tact.).

Lieut.-Col. Walter Sinclair, r.m.l.i.

Lieut.-Col. Arthur Feel, r.m.l.i.

Commandant Intelligence School Mal.-Qen. J. F. Danlell, o.si.a.. h.m l.i

Civil Assistant Hugh Broadbent, Esq.

Commander Morris E. Cochrane,
D.9.0. tret.).

Geoflrey B. Splcer-
Slmson. D.9.0.

Walter C. Lucas.

Malcolm H. S. Mac-
Donald, D.S.O.

Arthur W. Wood
tact.) Wet.).

Lionel E. H. Boyle.

Bernard Buxton,
D.s.o.

Wilfrid A. Thompson

Geoflrey S. P. Nash.

George H. Lang,
D.s.o.

Walter T. Bagottacf.) .

Commander \ Lord Herschell,
B.N.VJt. I K.O.V.O.

0. F. Serocold, o.b.b.
A. G. Denntston.

O.B.B.

Lieut.-Com. Boger V. de Halpert
tret.).

Z b!w.fT'} f - e - Adcock - OBB -

James Randall. o.b.b.
Frank C. Tiarks

tact.).
William F. Clarke

tact.).
H. Paget, o.b.b.
Cecil N. B. Wright.
E. A. Gardner.
P. L. Birch.
James A. Dawes, m.p.
W. T. Ditcham.
Norman Craig, k.o.,

m.p.
Henry M. Howard

(act.).

Naval and Marine Staff.
Major Cecil E. S. Wright.

B.M.L.I.

Charles B. Mulllns.

K.M.L.I.

Chandos E. W. Hill,

R.M.L.I.

B. A. Marriott, d.s.o.,

b.h.a. (ret.). I
J. C. Farmer, r.m.l.i.
J. W. Seigne, r.m.l.i.

Lieut. Edward S. Williams.

Andrew H. M. Hag-
gard.
P. B. Belfleld.
Kenneth P. Collier.

Lieut. R.N.R. Wilfred A. Atwell

(lempy.).

Lieut. I Arthur E. Watts.
BJf.r.lt.' P. Bomer.

A. F. Stevenson.

A. D. Knox.

E. Harrison.

E. O. J. Green.

E. Bullough.

G. L. N. Hope.

L. A. Willoughby.

Lionel E. Wix.

Dudley P. N. Fitz-
gerald.

Frederick S. Le B.
Smith.

John F. Curwen.

Denys Bond.

Benjamin S. F.
Phillips.

Neville Forbes.

Burton S. B. Cope.

J. D. Beazley.

E. C. Qulggin.

Desmond MacCarthy.

Harold G. S. Dillon.

Walter H. Bruford.

Spencer S. G. Leeson.

Barrel] Wilson.

Gabriel S. Woods."

Gilbert Waterhouse.

Henry B. Bowlby.

John Hooper.

Ena. Capt.... Percy Wheater tact.)
^■^■■jjotmZ. Deacon.
Additional Officers borne temporarily for the Naval Staff, were shown in the Navy List under ' President.'

Lieut. IE H. Anderaon.
R.N.V.R.S'R. P. Keigwin.

G. L. Lawrence.

O. T. H. Bishbeth.

J. S. Blake-Beed.

Alexander H. Smith.

John F. Toye.

Douglas G. Fugh.

Henry W. O. Tinker.

Maurice H. L. Met-
calfe.

John E. Bevan tact.).

J. C. Fowter tact.).
Capt. R.M. G. W. Carew-Hunt.

G. H. Dummett.

G. L. Blckersteth.

^^-^-jFrankKBowen.
Capt. R.M. IS. O. K. Christie.
(unattached) I C. W. Hardisty.
C. T. Onions.
B. Orr-Paterson.
J. D. Steel.
Lieut. S.M. Gordon H. Robinson.
Instr. }Guy V. Bayment.

Commr. J b.a.
Paym. I Charles J. E. Botter

Capt. I o.b. (act.).
Paym. 1 Ernest W. C. Thring.

Commr. J William H. Eves.

Paym. 1 John N. Pletcher.

Lt.-Com. (Lloyd Hirst (act.).

b5Eu*l}<»" *»**"*•

F Si. l H « rbert s - Burgess

R.N.R.

(act.).

Svi-UetaX^f-y^Z ^

R.N.V.R. / M p^ e L W -

R.N.R. J Vernon -
Paym. ~\F. J. L. Bobertson.
Sub-Lieut. fP. B. Swanston.
R.N.V.R. J a. P. Mackeson.

ffflTta*). }*•*■** «-«'•

Midshipman Harry P. Green-
wood (lempy.).

Staff Clerks—

A. G. T. Turner, Esq. (act.).

Civil Staff.
Cartographer —

C. Brlckenden, Esq., m.b.e.
2 Second Division Clerks.
1 Confidential Shorthand Writer.

2 Assist. Clerks, 7 Temp. Clerks.
1 Supervising Asst. Clerk (act.).

1 Boy Clerks, 91 Women Clerks.
22 Draughtsmen.

2 Photographers:

298

Appendix

The following have been appointed or lent for temporary service during the War : —

The Bon. Mrs. Adam {unpaid), W. H. Anstie, m.a. (Lent from Dartmouth College). Esq., Sir P. W.
Baker- Wilbraham, St.. ll.b., Lieut. J. M. Ball. Miss Barlow {unpaid). Rev. p. M. Barnard,
Lieut. E. G. Barnes, L. W. Baskcomb, Esq., Miss Beevor {unpaid), Lieut. E. J. Bolton, H. E. B.
Boulton, F. B. Bourdillon (unpaid). Esqs.. 2nd Lieut. E. N. Eudmose Brown, T. Brace (unpaid),
Esq.. Capt. L. W. W. Buxton, 2nd Lieut. W. M. Calder. C. W. Campbell (unpaid), Esa.. Miss Cecil
(unpaid), A. Cecil, C. S. Cbeston (unpaid), W. J. Childs (unpaid), C. S. Cocke, c.m.o.. Esqs.. E. G.
Collingwood (unpaid), Esa.. Lieut. W. E. Collinson, Capt. F. J. F. Cullman, O. M. Dalton (unpaid),
Esq., 2nd Lieut. A. 0. Dickie, H. N. Dickson, c.b.e.. m.a., d.sc. Esq., Miss E. Dodd, Mrs. Dugdale
(unpaid), 3. M. Dyer (unpaid), Esq., ita). G. Edmundson (unpaid), C. B. E. ElliB (Lent from Local
Govt. Board), M. Fanshawe (unpaid), E. Fetterlein, C. P. Fisher (unpaid). G. H. Fitzmaurice,
o.B., c.m.o. , H. E. Ford, Esqs.. Lieut. W. L. Eraser, Lieut. D. H. Puller, Mrs. A. M. Gerard, J. L.
Gerrard (unpaid). L. Giles (unpaid), Esqs., .Mrs. Goldschmid (unpaid). Mrs. Gooch (unpaid). 3. W.
Goodwin, Esq., Dr. E. C. Gough, Miss Grahame, A. C. Grant Duff, Esq., Miss Graseman (unpaid),
Lieut. E. M. Gunning, Copt. E. D. Hanly. Capt. S. G. Harvey, Professor 3. B. Henderson (unpaid),
Lieut. E. L. Hobson (London Beat.), Miss K. Horsefall, Mrs. Howarth (unpaid), O. 3. Howarth
(unpaid), 3. B. Hutton, Esqs., Lieut. 3. H. Inksip. R.A.F., H. B. Irving, Esq., Miss M. E. Jenkin,
F. W. Sell (unpaid), Esq., Capt. 3. Eennaway, W. S. Kennedy, H. W. Lawrence, E. Lewin, E.
Lobel (unpaid), Esqs., Capt. D. H. Loch, Major E. J. Lugard, o.b.e., d.s.o. (Indian Army, retd.),
3. E. Moreton Macdonald, (unpaid) Esq., Professor A. A. Macdonell (unpaid), H. Macfarlane
(unpaid), 3. Macfarlane (unpaid), H. W. Mardon (unpaid), Esqs., Lieut. K. C. Marlowe, Copt.
E. H. Molyneux. D. Montgomerie, Esq., Rev. W. Montgomery, m.a.. Mrs. Moon (unpaid), Mrs. Stuart
Moore (unpaid). L. G. Collison Morley (unpaid), D. Morrison (unpaid), E. Nevill. E. D. Norton
Esqs.. Miss M. V. Nugent, Miss D. G. N. O'Connor, Lady Alexandra Paget (unpaid). H. J. Faton
(unpaid), Lieut. V. N. Peel, G. W. Prothero, Esq., Lieut. F. W. Eix. Miss M. I. Eobertson, H. Euesell,
Esq., Miss Salter (unpaid). Dr. F. E. Sandbach, Miss C. A. Sinunins. Lord Stanmore, Professor
W. B. Stevenson (unpaid). C. G. Stone (unpaid), Esq., Lieut. F. N. Stringfleld, P. Studer (unpaid),
Esq., Capt. W. H. Tapp. Miss Taylor (unpaid), E. C. Trench. Esq., E. Vaughan-Willlams, e.o.
(unpaid), Esq., Lieut. A. Ventura, B. C. Wallis (unpaid), Esq., Rev. A. E. Ward, Miss Welby(unpaid),
Miss E. M. Welsford.

TRADE DIVISION.

Director of Trade Division Captain Alan G. Hotham.

Assistant Director of Trade Division ...Captain Charles T. Hardy.
Secretary to D.T.D Paym, Commr. (act.) John Siddalls.

Captain W. H. D. Margesson (re*.).

Philip Walter (ret.).
Frederick K. C. GibbonB (ret.).
Lawrence L. Dundas, c.m.o.
Hubert G. Alston, &B.
Thomas Fisher (act.)

Commander Sir Charles L. Cust, Bt„ k.o.v.o..

O.B., C.M.G., CLE. (ret).

Oscar V. de Satge (rei.).

A. H. Tarleton, m.v.o. (emerg.).

Francis E. Wrottesley.

Francis H. L. Lewin.

Guy E. Livingstone (ret.).

Hugh W. Innes Lillingston (ret.).

C ^ n ^ der ) Walter H. Wilkes, R.». (ret.).

C rnTs' } willlam Glnm» n <<«*■>•

t ■ , /i_~ ( W. E. Arnold-Forster (femporariti/
^■ST'l detached).
R.N.Y.R. \ L McCormlck-Goodhart (act.).

Lieut. 1 F. H. McCormlck-Goodhart
R.N.T.R. I Eugene A. Lang.

John McE. Eobertson.

Arthur Bright-Smith.

Albeit P. Mecklenburg, m.o. (act.)

Una. Capt Henry C. Bush (act.) (ret.).

Lieut.-Col. ...Thomas H. Hawkins, c.m.o., e.m.l.i.

Paym. Capt. Graham Hewlett (act.).

Cunningham Prior.

William E. Scotland.

Geoffrey T. Smyth.

George W. Watson.

Paym.
Lieut-
Commr.

}

aym. *\

XAeut- t

Commr. \

R.N.R. J

m. )

tb-Lt. V

N.R. )

aym. \

Sub-Lt. [

N.r.R. )

f Paym.

Paym.

Lieut.

R.N.R.
Sub-Lieut.
Paym.

Sub-

R.
Paym.

W. A J. Boxford (act.).

Joseph H. Wilson.

Voltleln St. J. Van der Byl.

Stanley G. Wood.

W. J. Gadd.

Thomas Bawden-Provis.

S. Johnstone Douglas.
Hugh S. Kingsford.

Civil Staff.

Staff Clerk..

2 Second Division Clerks.
4 Clerical Assistants.
18 Temporary Clerks.

...C. Brown, Esq. (act.)

8 Boy Clerks.

4 Higher Grade Women Clerks
83 Women ClerkB.

The following have been appointed for temporary service during the War :
H. S. Moss Blnndell, Esq., C.B.E.. | Sir Frederick Bolton (unpaid). | W. E. Hargreaves. Esq. (unpaid).

ll.d. (unpaid).

I G. D. Hardinge-Tyler, Esq.

I J. Heron Lepper, Esq.

Appendix

299

SIGNAL DIVISION.'
Acting Director of Signal Division Captain... Richard L. Nicholson, D.s.o. (act.):

Naval Staff.

Captain John A. Slee (act.) (Head of WIT

Board).
Commander ...Gerald B. Villiers.
Lieut.-Com. ...Edward L. B. Oliphant.

R.N Vji ■» ^* Cleveland-Stevens [act.).

Lieut Frederick W. Boswell.

Usui. R.lf.r.lt.. .. Frederick W. Atterbury.

Lionel W. Huntington.
Major R.M.A . ■ . .Stephen O. Wace.
Major R.M.... Edward Gillespie, d.s.o.
Cop*. R.M ...Arthur J. Mellor.
Pawn. Com.. ..John E. A. Brown (act.).
Pawn. Lt.-Com.... Bernard A. S. Bromley.

Pavm. Ztf.-Coro....AJ«ander C. Home (act.).
Edward W. H. Travis (act.).
George R. Russell (act.).
Pavm. Lt.-R.N.R....3ahn W. Sells, d.s.o.
Gerald T. E. Cockerill.

Sub-Lt. R.N.V.R Laurence O. Robinson.

George H. Lindsay.
Russell Williams.
John F. H. Grant.
Pavm. Sub-Lt. R.N.V.R... .Alfred Banner.

William G. Willmott.
James L. A. Huggan.
Brian Rhys.
John C. F. Davidson.
Ralph C. Seal.
Sydney R. Gilbert.
Gilbert Eace.

2 Chief Writers (pensd.).

6 Hired Extra Clerks.

Civil Staff.
I 6 Higher Grade Women Clerks.

2 Women Clerks.

ANTI-SCBMAEINE DIVISION.

Director of the And- Submarine Division Captain William W. Fisher, O.B.. h.v.o., b.n.

Aesistant-Director, oftke Anti- Submarine l*U~{%32i aSZSaEtJS""- ^ *"

Associates for Experiment and Research.

Professor W. H. Bragg, c.b.e.. f.b.s.
Philip V. Hunter, Esq.. m.i.e.e.

Naval Staff.

Captain John W. Carrlngton, d.s.o

Commander ...George B. Lewis.

John R. Middleton, d.s.o.
Edward H. Russell.
James S. McL. Ritchie.
Henry L. Httchins.
Henry E. Sawbridge.
Lionel H. Hordem (ret.).
Maurice C. Bomford.
Claude C. Dobson. d.s.o.
Charles D. Burney. c.u.o. (act.).

lA-eut.-Corn. ...Ernest R. Cloag.

Stephen S. English.

Harold W. Morey.

Charles V. L. Noroock (ret.).

Eng. Captain... Henry W. Metcalfe (ret.).

lieut.-Com. 1 Louis C. Bernacchi (act.).
R.N.V.R. I Xacy M. W. Wallis (act.).

Lieut James L. L. Sloan.

Valentine G. C. Shortridge.

Lieut. X

R.N.V.R. I

Cecil A. V. Roper.
Lancelot E. Gaunt.
Reginald W. Jones.
Leonard Cowtan-Hatton.
Frederic Bacon.
Joseph Flrmlnger.
Harold S. Sharp.
H. Russell-Jones.
Roger M. Lucey.
Thomas V. Hughes.

Pavm.Lifat.-T, Gordon Franklin.
Commr. (act.) I,

Pavm. Lieut. 1 Henry J. Crane (act.).
R.N.R. > Stanley V. Moon (act.)

Sub-Lieut. I Oliver Holmes.

R.N.Y.R.

George W. Knight.
Raoul S. B. Sergent.

Civil Staff.

I w. G. Johns, Esq, (act.)."
Staff Clerics \ w E- Ha i e _ Bs a , (act.).

2 Clerical Assistants.
7 Temporary Clerks.

9 Women Clerks.
2 Boy Clerks.

Chief Designer. ..A.. E. H. Pew, Esq.
e Draughtsmen. 4 Inspectors. 3 Tracers.

3oo

Appendix

The following have been appointed or lent for Service during the War :
S. E. Blades Eaq., Malcolm H. Ersklne. II. A., Rev. E. Moreton Pilchard. 0. F. Scott, Esq. (U.S.A.).

Experimental Station. Parkeston Quay. Harwich.

Research Staff.
Resident Director \Colonel A. S. Eve. o.b.e,.

of Research I f.r.s.. d.so.

Deputy Resident \A. O. Bankine, Esq.,

Director of Research I d.so.
C. V. Drysdale, Esq., d.so.
F. B. Young. Esq., B.A., m.sc.
A. LI. Hughes, Esq., d.so.

E. W. Boyle, Esq., D.so.
H. Gerrard, Esq., 11.SO.

L. S. Hartshorn, Esq., b.so.

F. L. Hopwood, Esq., m.sc.
J. H. Powell, Esq.. m.sc.

W. P. Bawlinson, Esq., m.sc.

A. B. Wood, Esq., h.sc.

H. B. Elvers-Moore. Esq., B.SO.

B. S. Smith, Esq.
J. T. Irwin. Esq.

Capt. A. J. Ionides, h.a.p.. b.a.
Capt. A. J. Boberts. r.a.k.
Lieut. A. E. Wells, b.so.
A. J. Jolley, Esq.
E. E. Brooks. Esq., b.so.

E. S. J. Spllsbury. Esq., b.so.
W. Place, Esq., b.so.

A. Craig, Esq.

F. P. Burch, Esq.

W. Jevona. Esq., m.so.

Sub-Lieut. G. F. Partridge, r.n.v.r., b.sc.

J. Anderson. Esq.

Capt. J. C. Manson, Can. Eng.

Capt. E. H. S. Boulding, r.m.. :

J. B. Milne. Esq., d.sc.

Lieut. W. Kerr. B.so.

6. Williamson, Esq., m.so.

D. G. Dunbar. Esq.

Lieut. E. S. Bieler, o.f.a.. b.a.

Lieut. G. A. Wallace, r.m.

Capt. H. C. B. Brown, b.a.

Superintendent Major 3. H. W. Gill, r.e.

Electrical Eng. and \Capt. C. G. B. Cosens,
Technical Assistant 1 h.e.

Lieut. B. Lucas, r.n.v.r.

Lieut. C. E. Wylie, r.n.v.r.

Lieut. D. V. Hotchklss, r.n.v.r.

Lieut. H. Hamilton, r.n.v.r.

0. Menkens, Esq. {Works Manager).

O. Le M. Knight, Esq.

Wt. Shipwright E. C. Staddon.

W. W. Burgess. Esq. {Technical Assist.).

A. L. Orchard, Esq.

A. L. Turner, Esq.

Eng. Lieut, {act.) H. J. Lyle, r.n.r.

W. F. Yates, Esq.

E. F. Kent. Esq.

MINESWEEPING DIVISION.

Director of Minesweeping Captain Lionel G. Preston, o.b.

Assistant Director of Minesweepiw Commander Henry M. J. Bundle, o.b.e. tact.)

Captain Hugh S. Curry, n.s.o.

Captain (act.) Harry F. Cayley, d.s.o. (ret.)

(Liaison Officer).
Com. R.N.R. ...Beginald Salmon, d.s.o. (act.)

(tempy.).
Lieut. I Charles H. Powell.

R.N.T.R.I

2 Temporary Clerks.

Lieut. 1 Arthur Scott-Elliott.

R.N.V.R. /John W. Wooding.
Louis N. Sanderson.

Temp. Sig. Boatswain George J. Bore (act.).
8 Women Clerks.

MEBOANTILE MOVEMENTS DIVISION.

Director of Mercantile Movements. ..Captain Frederic A. Whitehead.
Secretary to D.M.M....Pavm. Lieut.-Commr. (act.) Paul S. Strickland.

Captain Bertram H. Smith.

Walter J. C. Lake.
Commander ...John Kiddle.

Cuthbert D. Longstaff.
Capt. R.N.R.... Hubert W. Kenrick. o.b.e., k.d.

(act.) (ret.).
Lieut.-Com. ...Claude B. Evans.
Lieut. R.N.R. James B. Harding.
Lieut. R.N.V.R.... Arthur H. Churchill (tempy).

Paym. Capt. ...H. W. Eldon Manlsty, o.m.o. (act.)
(Organising Manager of Convoy.)
Commander ...Harold V. Dundas.
Com. S.N.VJI.... Henry D. Ring, d.s.o.. T.D.

Eollo Appleyard.
Lieut.-Com... .John O. Wyatt (ret.).

Boland A. Clark.
Lieut.-Com. fl.tf.fl.... Henry McConkey.

Lieut Geoffrey E. Burton.

Ueut. R.N.R. William L. Wilson.

Lieut. R.N.T.R. ...Hubert M. Elsdell.

Thomas B. Westray.

Geoffrey F. Gilbert.

Alan P. Herbert.

H. E. Ashley Sparks.

Eng.-Commr. Francis J. Sutton.

Eng.-Lieut. George S. McKenzle.

Paym. Lt.-Com. ...John M Hodge.
Paym. Lt. R.N.R. Philip K. Hutchinson (act.).
Paym. Sub- LI. I Hubert G. Hickman.
R.N.Y.R. I Bobert W. Carroll.

W. J. Gregory.

Thomas Sherratt.

Clifton Bobbins.

Bobert P. White.

William A. Harris.

Captain Cathcart B. Wason, c.m.o. (Capt.

of Naval Tugs).
Commander ...Hartley B. G. Moore.

John Horton (act.).
Paym.Lt.-Com.R.N.R....Cnl\ Cox.

1 Minor Staff Clerk, 10 Tempy. Clerks, 1 Boy Clerk, 12 Women Clerks.

Appendix 301

AIR DIVISION.

Director 0/ Air Division Tempv. Brio. Gen. Robert M. Groves, O.B., D.s.o.. A.F.c., B.A.F.

Civil Assistant to D.A.D W. A. Medrow, Esq., m.b.e.

Lieut.-CoL C. H. K. Edmonds. D.8.O.. B.A.F.

Tempv. Lieul.-Col. Lawrence H. Strata, D.s.o. .R.A.F.
Tempi/. Major .. .Reginald E. Niooll. r.a.f.

S. J. Rutland, d.s.o., r.a.f.

William 0. Michie. r.a.f.
Tempy. Major Reginald F. Maitland, b.a.f.

Henry A. J. Wilson, r.a.f.

Tempy. Captain.... Alan M. Walstell, d.s.c, b.a.f.
H. Sherwood, b.a.f.
F. S. Hargreaves, b.a.f.
Leonard E. Lander, r.a.f.
R. Talboys. b.a.f.

8 Temporary Womcn'Clerks.

GUNNERY AND TORPEDO DIVISION.

Director of Naval Artillery and Torpedo ...Captain Frederlo C. Dreyer, o.b.

Assistant Directors of Naval Artillery and Torpedo Captain Norton A. Sulivan.

Captain Howard J. Kennard. '

Naval Staff.

Co mmander... Wilfred A, Egerton.
(For Civil Staff see wader Operations Divisions.)

TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION.

Director of Training and Staff Duties. ..Captain Herbert \V. Richmond, e.n.
Deputy Director of Training and Staff Duties.. .Lieut.-Col. Sir Rhys Williams, Jit.. D.s.o., k.o.
Assistant Director of Training and Staff Duties.. .Captain Guy P. Bigs-Wither, r.n.
Naval and Marine Staff.

Commander. ..Alfred C. Dewar (ret.), b.n.

Commander. . .Walter F. Koe, R.N.

Major R.M.A... .Edward W. Harding.

CHIEF CENSOR'S DEPARTMENT.

Chief Censor.
Commodore Sir Douglas Brownrigg. Bart, o.b

Assistants to Chief Censor.

Commander Ernest H. Rldeout, R.N. I Pawn. Commr. Edward H. Shearme, o.b.e.. h.n.

I Paym. Commr. (act.) Charles F. Webber, r.n.

Attached to Chief Censor.
Lieutenant Stephen D. Neal, E. N. V. R., Official Naval Photographer.
Sub.-Lieutenant Frederick W. Engholm. R.N.V.R., Official Naval Cmematograplur.

For Duty at Press Bureau:

Captain The Hon, Sir Seymour Fortescue, k.c.v.o.

O.M.O., R.N.

Captain Richard Sullivan, b.n.
Commander Andrew W. Davies, o.b.e., r.n.
Commander Bertie W. H. Greenfield, e.n.
Commander (act.) Henry A. B. Shrubb. r.n. I

Lieut.-Commander The Bon. D'Arcy Lambton, b.n.
Lieut.-Commander Stuart D. Blair, b.n.
Lieutenant Charles B. Scholefleld. b.n.v.b.
Lieutenant George H. Cundell, r.n.v.r.
Lieutenant Henry J. Mason, b.h.v.b.

For Duty at the War Office.
Commander Harold G. Grenfell, r.n. I Major Roland M. Byne, o.b.b., b.m.

Paymaster Lieutenant (act.)... Herbert H. Sergent, R.N.E.

302

Appendix

NAVAL PUBLICITY DEPARTMENT.

Director of Naval Publicity ... Bear- Admiral Sir Guy E. A' Gaunt, k.o.m. a., c.b.

Commander ...... Colpoys O. Walcott (ret.).

R. Orme Webb (ret.).
Com. R.N.V.R...V. W. Belt, d.s.o. (act).
Lieut.-Commr. \J. M. Gilliland.

R.N.V.R. Sq. E. Beer.
Lieut. R.N.R. ...E. H. Gordon.
Lieu*. B.W.F.B. H. T. Sullivan

J. St. V. Crowder.

W. D. Baniitt.

R. H. Smith.

D. Maxwell.

Naval and Marine Staff.
Major R.M.

Lieut. R.M. ..

Pavm. Lieut.-
Commr.
R.N.V.R.

Pavm. Lieut.'
R.N.R.

...F. E. Dood.

H. McEvoy.

C. Pears.
...Gordon H. Eobiusou.

Colling wood J. Hughes.

1 J. P. Loughnan (act.).
J H. Foster (act.).

(For Civil Staff see under InteUwence Division.)

The following have been appointed or lent for temporary service during the War :
Captain P. Connard, O. Hanbury, Esq., Sir J. Lavery. A.R.A.. Glyn Pbilpot, E. G. Roberts,
H. F. Wyatt Esqrs.

MATERIEL DEPARTMENTS.

DEPARTMENT OF THE CONTROLLER.

Third Sea Lord and Controller... Commodore Charles M. de Bartolomg, c.b.
Civil Assistant... J. A. C. Champion. Esq., o.b.e.

DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL CONSTRUCTION.

Director of Naval Construction... Sir Eustace H. Tennyson d'EyDcourt, k.cb.
Deputy Director of Naval Construction. ..W. H. Gard, Esq., c.b.. ai.v.o (act ).
Assistant Directors of Naval Construction... .T. Dally, Esq., o.b.e. (act.) (Superintendent of Naval
Construction), A. W Johns, Esq. (act.), J. H. Narbeth, Esq., m.v.o. (act.),
H. Pledge, Esq., c.b.e., A. E. Richards, Esq.
Superintendent of Admiralty Experiment Works. ..E. E. Froude, Esq., O.B., ll.d., f.e.s.

Chief Constructors.

E. L. Attwood, o.b.e.
(act.).

S. E. Boyland, o.b.e.
(act.).

F. Bryant, o.b.e. (act.).
A. J. Hobson (act.).

C. F. Munday.
M. P. Payne (act.).
O. A. Payne (act.).
P. L. Pethick, Esqrs.

Constructors.

G. A. Bassett (act.).

(Overseeing).
C. M. Carter, m.b.e.

(act.).
E. B. Chang (ad.).
G. H. Child (act.).
S. V. Goodall, m.b.e.
(act.).
(Tem/py. detached).
C. Hannaford (act.).

E. B. Harries (act.).

F. Hlokey (act.).

C. J. W. Hopkins (act.).
A. E. Horley (act.).
C W. Kerrldge (act.).

A. G. Akester, B.so.
J. Angus, b.so.
C. W. Bion, b.so.

E. L. Champness, b.so.

F. C. Cocks.

F. M. Lee (act.).

C. S. Lillicrap, m.b.e.

(act.).
W. J. Martin.
T. L. Mathias (act.).
E. D. Meryon (act.).

(Overseeing).
A. Nloholls (act.).
W. E. Noble (act.).
R. P. Pether (act.).

W. G. Sanders (act.).
A. W. Watson (act.).
L. C. Williamson (act.).
L. Woollard. Esqrs.

Assistant Constructors, First Class.

W. Froude (Baslar).

T. H. Bentley

(Overseeing).

E. S. Curphey

(Overseeing).

G. Hackney.

(Overseeing).

W. H. Wallond, Esqrs.

Assistant Constructors, Second Class.
F. T. Blackman. I G. McCloghrle.

W. A. D. Forbes. J. E. P. Moon. Esqrs.

R. W. L. Gawn.

Temporary Constructor...!?. F. Hill. Esq. (Overseeing).

Temporary Assistant Constructors.

Copt. R. S. Johnson.
A. E. EJmberley.
M. M. Parker.
G. McL. Paterson, B.s

D. A. Coskery, B.so.
J. L. Davies.
R. Falrley.
T. Graham, b.so.
W. R. Hockaday.

A. P. Patterson. B.so.
P. G. Rouse, B.A.
J. H. SowdeD, B.so .
T. E. Sowden, B.so.
J. C. M. Wilson, Esqrs.

Appendix

303

Temporary Acting Assistant Constructors.

G. H. a. Smith.

A. Taylor.

S. F. Thorr

A. Warren.

G. H. Whiteway, Esqrs,

T. Burch. E. J. Horawell. P. J. Parmiter.

G. Chase. W. H. Humphrey. G. E. Peach.

J. S. Clark. F. Hunnisett. G. Penney.

W. H. Eastcott. J. 0. W. Hutson. A. F. Perkins.

F. T. W. Harris. W. J. Laughton. H. Philpot.

W. E. Macey.
Temporary Assistant. ..~R. W. Dana, Esq., o.b.b.. m.a.
Inspecting Officer of Ship Fitting Work...B. A. Truscott. Ebq
Inspecting OMcer of Smiths' Work.. .E. T. Pearson. Esq.
Curator of Drawings... W. J. Moore. Esa.
Confidential Clerks to D.N.C....3. Luffman, Esa.

F. O. Bamford, Esq. (act).
Teclmical Clerk to D.N.C....W. H. Malpas, Esq.
64 Principal and 802 Assistant Overseers.
t20 First Class and 94 Second Class Draughtsmen. 1 First and 1 Third Grade Dockyard Clerks, 9 Men
and 30 Women Typists and Clerks. 1 Boy Clerk, 4 Modellers, and 2 Sunprinters.

DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING.

Director of Electrical Engineering. ..C. H. Wordlngham, Esq., cb.e., m.i.o.e.. m.i.m.e.. m.i.e.e.
Assistant Directors of Electrical Engineering. ..A. D. Constable, o.b.e., m i.e.e. [act.) and

E. T. Williams, M.I.E.E. (act.), Esqrs.

Electrical Engineers. Higher Grade...]?. P. Fletcher, o.b.e., a.m. i.e.e. {act.), and

R. Wightman, a.m.i e.e. (act.). Esqrs.

Electrical Engineers. Lower ffraoe...H. Melville Ackery, M.I.E.E., F. C. Forster, m.i.e.e. H. R. Green,

a.m.i.e.e.. (act.), W. P. Scott, a.m.i.e.e. (act.) and H. H. Stratton. a.m. i.e.e. (act.), Esqrs.

Tempy. Electrical Engineers... A Dimmack. m.i.e.e.. a. m.i.m.e., J. Brodie. F Morton, a.m.i.e.e..

J. Shepherd, m.i.o.e., m.i.e.e., J. M. L. Slater. R. W. White, and A. E. Wilson, Esqrs.

First Assistant Electrical Engineers... A. W. Abraham (act.), E. C. Allen (act.), F. Amor (act.). G. W. Braby

(act.). W. H. Chatten (act.). W. M. Couch (act.). E. E. J. Marks (act.), T. Pedrick (act.), J. Shaw, a.m.i.e.e.

(act.). W. J. Spencer (act.), and L. A. Tippen (act.). Esqrs.
Tempy. First Assistant Electrical Engineers.... M. R. Gardner, P. L. Gill, a.m.i.e.e., T. D. Trees and W.

Simpson, Esqrs.

Technical Secretary. ..F. Morton, a.m.i.e.e., Esq.

10 Principal Electrical Overseers. 108 Assistant Electrical Overseers.

9 First Class, 4 Second Class, and 12 Temporary Draughtsmen. 5 Women Tracers,

8 Tempy. Clerks, 11 Women Clerks and 8 Boy Clerks.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ENGINEER-IN-CHIEF.

Engmeer-in-Chief of the Fleet. ..Eng. Vice-Admiral Sir George G. Goodwin, k.c.b.
Deputy Engvneer-vn- Chief and Superintendent of Naval Engineering —
Eng. Rear-Admiral Edouard Gaudin, o.b.
Assistant EvmneersAn-ChielS Eng - Oo » toi " Charles W. J. Bearblock, O.B. (tempy.).
Assistant Mngineers-m-iyhw}^ SmJ captain John McLaurin.

Eng. Captain Edward Short (ret.) (temp.).

Engineer Inspectors.

Eng. Captain David J. Carruthere.

Frederick W. Marshall.
Charles C. Sheen, o.b.
Eng. Commander Arthur E. Hyne.

Joseph J. Kixwin, o.b.e.
John Hamilton.
Thomas G. Proctor.
William S. Mann.
Robert Beeman.
Jesse H. Harrison.
Ernest Nibbs.
Frederick J. Pedrick.
Alfred Turner.
James Legate.

Edwin F. St. John (ret.) (act.)
Eng. Lieut.-Com...JBs.iold B. Tostevin, d.s.o.
Examiners of Marine Engineering Work...S, Goodchild (act.), J. Hocking (act.), J. G. Newton (act.)
J. F. M. Parkinson (act.), F. Russell (act.), A. J. Smith (act.), Esqrs.

Examiner cf Dockyard Work...TS. Fage, Esq. (act.)
Examiner of Engineering Accounts. ..J. F. W. Hetterley (ad.), Esq.
Confidential Clerk to E.-in-C....W. J. Pask, Esq. (act.).
10 1st Class Draughtsmen, 21 2nd Class Draghtsmen, 14 Temporary Draughtsmen, 2 Dockyard Clerks,
1 Hired Writer. 5 Temporary Clerks. 2 Extra Clerks, 22 Women Clerks, 2 Boy Clerks.

Engineer Lieutenant-Commanders.
George W. Odam.
John S. Orr.
Edwin Williamson.
Lawrence Turner.
Augustus Shackle.
Sydney R. Dight.
Herbert A. Slade.
George B. Allen.

Tempy. Eng. Lieut.-Commanders.
Frank Hucks.
Alick R. Kyle (act.).
John McD. Scott (act.).
Engineer Lieutenant Brian J. H. Wilkinson.
Lieut. (E.)... Edward R. Micklem.
Lieut. R.N.V.R.... Charles H. Hayward.

Admiralty. Engineering Laboratory, City and Guilds (Engineering) College. Exhibition Road. S.W.7.

Superintendents. ..Eng. Commander Charles J. Hawkes, R.N.

Chief Designer... A. W. Newman, Esq. | Testing Engineer... J. Aitkin, Esq.

Metallurgist... F. H. Hudson, Esq.

(There were a number of Associates for Experiments and Research).

304 Appendix

ENGINEER OVERSEERS AND STAFF.

At Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworlh <fe Co.. Walker Yard, Newcastte-on-Tyne (for B.M.S. " Eaglet '
Eng. Cant. W. J. MaudTmo. B.N.

Sunderland. Middlesbrough and Hartlepool Districts.
Km- Capt. R. B. Garde. B.N. Address — c/o Messrs. Dozford & Son. Sunderland
Eng. Lieut.. ..C. J. Brown, r.n. (ret.).
10 Civil Assistants and 2 Clerks.

London District. I.
Eng. Capt. T. S. Guyer, B.N. Address— 8. Lassa Koad Elthaui, S.E.9
6 Civil Assistants.

At Fairfield Shipbuilding Co., Govan, and Messrs. A. Stephens. Lvnthouse.

Eng. Capt. G. G. Knight. B.N. Address— c/o Messrs. Fairfield, Govan.
11 Civil Assistants and 2 Clerks.

Barrow-in-Furness district (and Machinery Depot. Carlisle and Moreoahbe).
Eng. Capt. B. B. Avers, M.V.O., B.N. Address— c/o Messrs. Vlekers & Co.. Barrow.
Eng. Lieut. 3. W. Tomlin. r.n.
Artif. Eng. G. E. Peckham, r.n.
8 Civil Assistants and 2 Clerks.

At Messrs. Palmers S. <fc E. Co., Jarroui-on-Tyne.
Eng. Capt. W. WalMs. B.N.

5 Civil Assistants.

At Messrs. Beardmore eft Co., Dalmuir, and Messrs. Denny * Co., Dumbarton.

Eng. Capt. T. H. Pounds, B.N. Address— c/o Messrs. Beardmore & Co., Dalmuir.
Eng. Lieut.-Com. H. Leverett, r.n.
9 Civil Assistants and 2 Clerks.

Glasgow District.
Eng. Capt. J. B. Pedrick. B.N. Address— 62. Robertson Street, Glasgow.
8 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk.

Leeds District.
Eng. Capt. G. E. Bench, B.N. Address— Quebec Chambers, Quebec Street, Leeds.
Ch. Artif. Eng. J. Dornan. r.n.
6 Civil Assistants and 2 Clerks.

Midland District.
0. Capt. W. J. Kent. B.N. Address — 71. Temple Row. Birmingham.
Eng. Capt. A. C. Darley, r.n.
Eng. Lieut.-Com. A. F. R. Northcott, B.N.
Eng. Lieut. A. Sandy, r.n.
Act. Artif. Eng. V. W. Stephens, r.n.
25 Civil Assistants and 4 Clerks.

Southampton District.

Eng. Capt. J. H. B. Ireland, M.V.O., B.N. Address— c/o Messrs. Thoraycroft & Co,

Woolston. Southampton.

Eng. Lieut. M. J. Speer, r.n.

Eng. Lieut. A. Shcrrin". r.n.

Eng. LUut. R. F. Pearne, r.n.

11 Civil Assistants and 3 Clerks.

At Messrs. Hawthorn, Leslie is Co., St. Peters Works, Newoastle-on-Tyne.
Eng. Capt. P. Maim. B.N.

7 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk.

Derby, Nottingham, and Loughborough Districts (and Machinery Depots, Derby
and Birkenhead).
Eng. Capt. V. E. Snook, B.N.

Eng. Lieut. J. A. Reynolds, r,n.
Eng. Lieut. C. E. Walton, r.n.
8 Civil Assistants and 8 Clerks.

At Messrs. Babcock & Wilcox, Benfrew.
Eng. Capt. H. E. H. Ash, BJf.

Artif. Eng. J. H. Carter, r.n.
t Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk.

Appendix 305

Scotland District.
Ens. Capt. J. E. Watson. R.N. Address— 62. Eobertaon Street. Glasgow.
Eng. Com. J. Maxwell.
Eng. Lieut. D. E. McFarlane. r.n.
Ens. Lieut. P. A. Drwy. r.n.
Ch. Artif. Ena. W. Shakespeare. b.n.
11 Civil Assistants and 3 Clerks.

At Parsons' Steam Turbine Co. and North Eastern Marine Ens. Co., Wattsend-on-Tvne.

Ens. Capt. C. H. Bill, R.N. Address— c/o Messrs. Parsons" M.S.T. Co., Wallsend-on-Tyne.
4 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk.

Ipswich District.

Ens. Cavt. W. J. Bender, R.N. Address— c/o Messrs. Vickers. Ltd., Ipswich Works, Ipswich
4 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk.

Isle of Wight and Portsmouth District.

Ena. Capt. A. V. Blake, R.N. Address— c/o Messrs. J. S. White & Co., East Cowes, Isle of Wight
4 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk.

Edinburgh District.

Ens. Cavt. O. C. Both. M.V.O., RJf. Address— c/o Messrs. Brown Bros., Eosebank Ironworks
Edinburgh.
2 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk.

At Messrs. Yarrow & Co., Scotstoun.

Eng. Cavt. E. S. Silk. B.N. Address— c/o Messrs. Yarrow & Co.. Scotstoun.
Act. Artif. Ens. 3. H. Smith, rjt.
2 Civil Assistants.

North of England District.

Ens. Cavt. B. W. Irish, B.N. Address— 21. Collingwood Buildings, Newcastle-on-Tyne.
7 Civil Assistants and 2 Clerks.

Belfast District.

Eng. Capt. B. Edwards. R.N. Address— c/o Messrs. Harland & Wolff, Belfast.
Eng. Lieut. W. J. Haiublr. R.N. (ret.).
Ens. Lieut. A. T. Lloyd. r.n. <reO.
4 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk.

Greenock District.

Ena. Cavt. W. C. S. P. Bartwett, B.N. Address— c/o Messrs. Scotts, S. & E.. Co., Greenock.
6 Civil Assistants.

At Wattsend Slipviay <£ Ens. Co., and Messrs. Swan, Bunier. <fc Wiaham Richardson, Wallsend-on-Tyne.
Ens. Cavt. a. F. Thompson. RJf. Address— WallBend Slipway Co.. Wallsend-on-Tyne.
Ch. Artif. Ens. M. B. OliTer, R.N.
7 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk.

Manchester District.

Ens. Cavt. B. E. Bond. C.M.C.. D.S.O.. R.N. Address— 37. Arcade Chambers, St. Mary's

Gate. Manchester.

Eng. Lieut. T. Williams, r.n.

H. Watson. r.n.

Ch. Artif. Ena. E. Booth, r.n.

5 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk.

Liverpool District.

Ens. Capt. T. B. Buddy. RJI. Address — c/o Messrs. Cammell Laird & Co., Birkenhead.
Ens. Lieut. E. T. Eider, b.n.
9 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk.

it Messrs. J. Brown <L- Co., Clydebank.

Ens. Commr. A. T. B. Stone, R.N.

Artif. Ens. A. Astbury, r.n.
J. B. Gibbs. R.N.
F. W. Oldreive. r.n.
3 Civil Assistants and 2 Clerks.

306 Appendix

At Messrs. Armstrong. WhUworih & Co., Elswick. Newcastle-on-Tvne. (For Submarines.
Eng. Commr. B. Spence, D.S.O., B.N.

3 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk.

Sheffield District.

Eng. Commr. Mark Bundle, D.S.O., B.N. Address — 123, Surrey Street, Sheffield.

Eng. Lieut.-Com. H. Batey. r.n.

L. Jackson, r.n.

8 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk.

Lincoln, Hull, and Grimsby Districts.
Eng. Capt. T. H. Turner, B.N. Address — c/o Messrs. Buston, Proctor & Co., Lincoln
Ena. Lieut. W. C. Williams, r.n.

C. Marchant. r.n.
ArVtf. Eng. J. M. Bolley, r.n.
2 Civil Assistants and 2 Clerks.

Rugby District.
Eng. Commr. J. L. Ember, B.N. Address — c/o Messrs. Willans & Robinson, Ltd., Rugby
Eng. Lieut. G. Davison, r.n.
3 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk.

At Messrs. Armstrong, WhUworih <& Co., Naval Yard, Walker-on-Tvne (for Machinery Depot).
Eng. Commr. T. Soper, r.n.
ArtU. Eng. W. Williams, b.n.

At Messrs. Tickers, Barrow-m-Furness [for Suomarmes).

Eng. Commr. H. W. Qrant. B.N.
Tempy. Eng. Lieut. P. S. Oram, r.n.
5 Civil Assistants and 2 Clerks.

London District, n.
W. Lettv, Esq. Address— 126, Wrottesley Eoad, Harlesden, N.W.10.
6 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk.

London District, in.
if. C. Ord, Esq. Address — 276, Trinity Eoad, Wandsworth, S.W.18.
9 Civil Assistants and 3 Clerks.

F. T. WeUard. Esq., Principal Boiler Overseer. Address— 172, Eotton Park Eoad, Edgbaston
Birmingham.

DEPARTMENT OF THE DIBECTOE OF NAVAL OEDNANCE.

Director of Naval Ordnance Captain Henry E. Crooke.

Assistant- Director of Naval Ordnance... Captain Joseph C. W. Henley.
Assistants to Director of Naval Ordnance.

Commander Bernard W. M. Fan-bairn.

Eustace E. D. Long.
William B. C. Boss (act.).
(G) Stanley T. H. Wilton.
(G) Gerald F. Longhurst, d.s.o
(G) John C. Hamilton.
Philip W. Douglas.
Archibald Gilbert (act.).

Commr. B.N.V.B. John G. Henderson (act).
Lieut.-Com. Dennis E. Bahilly.
Lieutenant Frederick J. Payne.

Malcolm A. McKenzie.
Lieut. B.N.V.B. Willie D. Kilroy (tempv.h
William D. S. Faulkner.
Lieut. B N.V.B. ...Michael P. B. Dalton.

Chief Gunner... Herbert D. Jehan.
Commissioned Armourer.. .Ernest Addy.

Engineer Inspectors.

Eng. Captain Henry Wall, ch.o. I Eng. Commander ...Frederick C. B. Faton (temp.).

Eng. Commander ...William Hart. | F. Leslie Eobertson.

Walter G. Heppel. | Eng. Lieut.-Com. ...Stanley W. Cooke.

Examiner of Gun-Mounlmo Accounts. ..A. H. Duffleld, Esq. (act.).
Examiner of Gun- Mounting Wortc.W. E. X>. Hehner, Esq.. (act.) (tempv.).
Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance — Commander (act.) John A. Duncan, 03.
Assistant Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance... Commander (act.) John A. L. Hay.
Assistants to Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance... Commander Henry G. E. Bevan (ret.).

Commander Ralph G. Dlnwlddy.
Commander Leslie J. L. Hammond (ret.).
Commander John E. Bray (ret.).
Commander Reginald O. B. Carey-Brenton (emerov.
Commander Percy Harvey (ret.).
Major Freeman C. N. Bishop, k.ii.a.

Appendix

307

The following gentlemen have teen lent for special service during the War — G. A. Becks. W. Pettlt. and
J. Storey, m.b.e., Eaqrs.

Naval 0Mcer8 employed on Inspection and Experimental Ordnance Duties.

Under Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance : —

Inspector of Steel.. .Commander Harold G. Jackson (ret.).

Acting Inspector of Steel... Commander (act.) Llewellyn E. H. Llewellyn (ret.).

Deputy Inspectors of Steel.. .Colonel J. E. J. Jocelyn, B.A. (ret.) (tempy.)
Colonel W. H. Williams, o.m.g.
Commander Hugh J. Orr (ret.).
Commander Henry Thompson (ret.).
IAeut.-Com. Arthur W. Tomlinsons
IAeut.-Com. Prank E. Willis.
IAeut.-Com. John G. M. McHardy (ret)
IAeut.-Com. Eobert F. Veasey (ret.).
Major R. M. A. Charles A. Bishop
Major B.M.A. Alfred D. B. Godfray.
H. Topham, m.b.e., Esq.
W. R. O. Hocking, Esq.

Head of Inspection of High Explosive Section. ..Thomas J. G. Gougb, Esq.

Assistant Inspectors of Steel.

Maior-Oeneral 3. T. J. Johnson, o.b. (ret.) (tempy.).

Charles L. Gordon, r.m.l.i. (tempy).

A. E. Marcnant, o.b. (ret.) (tempy.).

W. Huckisson, O.M.G., b.b. (ret.)

(tempy.).

Brio. -General H. S. Fitzgerald, o.b. (tempy.).

C. Greville Harston, Canadian Forces

(tempy.).
O. M. E. Thackwell, b.b. (ret.)
(tempy.).
Captain H. E. Evans, b.n. (ret.), (tempy.).

William H. F. Taylor, b.n. (ret.) (tempy.).
N. G. Macalister, K.H. (ret.) (tempy.).
Roland Berkeley, r.n. (tempy.).
George F. S. Knowling (ret.) (tempy.).

Commander Charles K. McCallum (ret.) (tempy-).
T. S. Gooch (emergy.).
A. H. Tremayne (ret.) (tempy.).

Commander, B.N.B. W. F. Caborne, O.B., B.D. (ret.)
(tempy.).

Lieut.-Com. Allster W. McDonald (ret.) (tempy.).
Ralph B. Bodilly (ret.) (tempy.).
Henry L. Cheston (emergy.) (tempy.).
Frederick J. Davis, r.d., r.k.r. (ret.)

(tempy.).
W. E. Compton (ret.) (tempy.).
W. G. H. Cree (ret.) (tempy.).
John H. C. Ogilvy (tempv.).

IAeut. William Pollington (ret.) (tempy.).
George E. Frew (ret.) (tempy.).
Eobert J. Sweet (ret.) (tempy.).

Lieut. S.N.B. Beauchamp H. Venner (ret.) (tempy.).
Eng. Copt. William J. Brown (ret.) (tempy.).
Em. Com. H, F. Davies, E.». (ret.) (tempy.).
Eng. IAeut.-Com. T. F. Brown (ret.) (tempy.).

Colonel (temp. Brig.-Oen.) Cooper Penrose, be.

(tempy.).
Colonel C. L. Robinson (ret.) (tempyi '
H. D. Olivier (ferouv.t.

D. A. Mills, r.e. (ret.) (tempy.).
A. L. Mem, r.e. (ret.) (tempy.).
M. H. Parcel], E.B. (ret.) (tempv.).

C. E. Nairnes, o.b., b.e. (ret.) (tempy.).
W. F. Hawkins, b.e. (ret.) (tempy.).

E. A. Inglis, o.m.q. (ret.) (tempy.).
J. V. Jeffreys. r.e. (tempv.).

Bt. Col. S. V. Thornton. B.A. (tempv.)
H. O. Nelson, r.a. (tempv.).
Lieut.-Col. F. H. Eliott. O.S.L., i.a. (ret.) (tempv.).
Altan Wadmore (tempy.).
A. Tracey (tempy.).
H. C. Evans, r.m.l.i. (tempy.).
F. C. Searle (Indian Army) (ret.) (tempy.).
Major <* Bt. Lt.-CoL Frederick L. Dlbblee, r.m.a.
Major B. E. Fitzgerald-Lombard (ret.).

E. Nash, b.a. (ret.) (tempy.).
Captain G. B. Macpherson Grant (tempy.).
A. J. Beckett, b.b. (tempy.).
C. A. Pettit, k.o.y.l.1. (tempy.).
T. S. Bowen (Welsh Beat.) (tempy.).
G. E. B. Bairnsfather, o.b.b., r.n.
(tempv.).
Lieut. D. E. Horwood, b.a. (emergy.).
0. W. Wedeklnd. r.e. (tempy.).
Chief Gunner William J. Bonsey (tempy.).
Albert G. T. Brown (tempy.)
Gtmner (ret.) Eichard W. Lawrence.

George E. Cock (tempy.).
Daniel J. O'Leary (temvvi
Frederick J. Lusoombe (tempy.).
James C. Hartnett (tempy.).
John B. Cobb (tempy.).

The following gentlemen have also been appointed for temporary service during the War :
E. W. Archer, H. A. Armstrong. E. H. Belgrove. F. J. Bell. A. T. Binnie. G. B. Bowell, Prof. T. J.
fcomwich. F.B.S., C. B. Buchan. H. Burrell. F. Cameron. A. G. Cameron. EB. Cole,B. S o
J. F. Cunningham. H. W. H. Darlaston, E. H. Deane. A. H. Dodd. J. A. Doran. F. J. East.
H E, Felix, J, Ford. S. E. Fox, E. Froude. E. P. Gibson. H. C. A. Goodall, G. F Green. A. P.
Grenfell. L. T. Jarvis. A. Johnson, J. L. Kitto. K. M. W. Knights, E. Lake J. L. Lambe.
A. E. Lee. A. L'Estrasge. A. H. McConnell. E. Maslin. J Maxwell. E.MoffattW. N. Moles-
worth. C. H. Moore. ITs. Moss-Blundell. F. G. Murray W. Musk. A. S. Napier T J. C. Palm.
W. Pay. E. Percival. D. Pictoh Prichard. G. Weston Ramsey, G. H. S. Bollison. T. W.
Sheppaid. 8. Sherman, J. W. Slater. E. W. Smith, E. H. Sumner. E. L. Trench Watson G.
Tunman. E. H. Voice. A. Wasey. G. H. Wells. J. Winn. H. Wontner-Smith, C. H. Wright
and J. H. Wright, Esqrs.

308 Appendix

Lent from Home OSUx.

S. E. Bennett. A. C. Lowe. G. C. Sumner. E. L. Mecklln. C. F. Hunter. W. H. Mead, W. Turner, A. A.
Hepburn. C. H. Taylor, C. E. Plumbe, A. Fotheringham. H. T. Bingrose. and W. C. Evans.
Esqrs.

E. H. 0. Newby, Esq.. Deputy Cashier {act.) under the Inspector of Steel, Sheffield.

(lent from the National Insurance Commn.).

O. Trice. Esq., Act. Asst. Cashier under the Inspector of Steel, Sheffield.

Under War OMce.

Com&r. Archibald C. Goolden (act.) (ret.). | Major (Tempy. Lieut.-Col.) Nathaniel F.
Major R.M.A. Henry K. Stephens. | Trotman, r.m.a.

The following gentleman has been appointed for temporary service during the War :
H. Jackson.

Superintending Clerk... Thomas G. Anderson. Esq., o.b.e.

Deputy Superintending Clerk.. .W. F. Daniels. Esq. (act.).

Assistant Superintending Clerks. ..A. C. Jones (act.), G. D. McFarlane tad.), S. W. Smith (act.). G. Stevens
(act.), and C. H. Webb, Esqre.

Dockyard Clerks (including acting)... First Grade 3. Second Grade 5, Temporary Clerks and Boys 123,
Draughtsmen 17. Computers 7.

Superintendent of Ordnance Stores ...Captain Herbert B. Norbury, e.h.

Deputy Superintendent of Ordnance Stores... IB.. Fathers. Esq., i.s.o. (act.).

Assistant Superintendents of Ordnance Stores. ..A. McFarlane. Esq.. o.b.e. (act.).

W. A. Mortimer. Esq. (act.).
B. W. Wharhlrst. Esq. (act.).

Naval Ordnance Store 0Mcers...3. Hutt. m.b.e. (act.), W. H. Eowe (act.), N. Thomas (act.), and
W. Vaughan (act), Esqrs.

Deputy Ordnance Store Officers. ..Tf?. E. Eyles (act.), H. G. Hlbberd, m.b.e. (act.),
0. H. Murray (act.), A. T. Eeed (act.), E. L. Toumay (act.), and
J. A. Vignaux (act.), Esqrs.

Assistant Ordnance Store Officers... W. Baker (act.), A. H. Beard (act.), E. J. Fuller (act.),

H. Harrison (act.), W. E. Harrison (act.), W. A. Jordan,
L. A. Keightley (act.), E. W. Lambe (act.), W. Martin
(act.), B. T. Matthews (act.). C. A. Noise (act.). H. E.
Priddon (act.), H. D. Bobbins (act.). Q. Sansford (act.),
and H. Weale (act.), Esqrs.

Temporary Assistant Ordnance Store Officers. ..A. J. Atkins, Esq., Capt.'TL. E. Batty. F. Graham

Brown. E. Durrani. W. Hoathcr. Esqrs., Card. H.
G. Laing. H. F. Miller, Esq., Capt. C. D. Marshall
S. Smith, and C. Uppleby, Esqrs.

Chief Examiner of Naval Ordnance Work...V. J. Payne, Esq. (act.).

Examiners of Naval Ordnance Work.-Vf. D. Evans (act.), O. Harrison (act)., and

C. Vinson (act.), Esqrs.

9 Ordnance Depot Clerks. First Grade (act.).

7 Ordannce Depot Clerks, Second Grade (act.).

1 Ordnance Depot Clerk, Third Grade.

1 Ordnance Depot Clerk, Third Grade (act.).
79 Temporary Hired Extra Clerks.
67 Temporary WomenlClerks.
15 Boy Clerks and Boy Writers.

Acting Deputy Ordnance Store OMcer — Sheffield ...G. Swift, Esq. , j,

Acting Assistant Ordnance Store OMcer — Sheffield. ■ .J. Cheadle, Esq.

Chief Analyst — Sheffield... John C. W. Humfrey, Esq.

Note. — Officers of the Naval Ordnance Department serving at Woolwich and at the Ports are not shown:

DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF TORPEDOES AND MINING.

Director of Torpedoes and Mining Captain Frederick L. Field, O.B., AdC.

Assistant Director of Mining Captain Herbert N. Gamett. o.m.o.

Assistant Director of Torpedoes Captain Algernon H. O. Candy.

Assistant Director Electrical Section ...Captain John K. Im Thurn.
Assistant Director of Paravanes Captain (act.) George L. Massey.

Appendix

309

Natal Staff.

Vice-Admiral ...E. S. Phlpps-Hornby, o.m.o.
(tempv.).

Captain Bryan G. Godfrey-Faussett,

o.v.o., O.M.Q. (ret.).
Captain (act.) ...Edgar B. Morant, d.b.o.
Commander Geoffrey C. Candy.

Thomas E. Fforde.

Archibald A. Loyett-Cameron.

Edward W. MacKichan.

William B. Mackenzie (W.

Stephen D. Tillard.

Brian Egerton.

Balph Leatham.

Eric L. Wharton.

Malcolm E. Grant (ret.).

Gerard B. Riley (ret.).

Robert J. Howard (ret.).

Bobert W. Dalgety. b.s.o. (ret.).

Noel A. Marshall (act.) (ret.).
Lieut.-Commr.... 'Bertram Vigne.

£i«(.-Commr....Eodolph H. F. de Sails, d.s.o.

George F. S. Bowles (emergy.)
(act.).
Lieutenant Patrick P. Coleman.

Harry Simpson.
Lieut. B.N.B. ...Cyril Smith.
Lieut. B.N.V.B. Thomas J. Gibson.

Edward W. Taylor.

Norman W. Prangnell.
Eng. Commr Edward O. Hefford.

Alfred E. Kempt.
Lt.-Col. R.M. ...Chetwode G. C. Crawley.

£S-itf.V. B ><™.Lawson.
(For duty with D.D.M.)
Ch. Gunner James Wood.

Leonard Eepton.

Walter Thorogood.

Walter F. Williamson.

Captain of Defensive Mining... Captain Gordon C. Fraser (ret.).
Assistant to.. .Commander H. Strickland (ret.).
Lieut.-Com. Francis T. Hewson.

Seabobxmht Paktt.

Warrant Electrician. ..Albert B. Williams.
George Haysom.

Warrant Electrician... Sydney H. Brown (act.).

Civil Staff.

Superintending Clerk (act.) P. E. Couratin. Esq., m.b.e.

Deputy Superintending Clerk (act.) F. Morrison, Esq.

Assistant Superintending Clerks (act.) H. Beeman and E. Elliss, Esars.

Examiner of Torpedo Tubes (act.) B. Woollard, Esq.

2 Dockyard Clerks, First Grade (act.), 6 Draughtsmen, 2 Women Tracers, 6 Temporary Men Clerks,
28 Temporary Women Clerks and Typists, 1 Boy Clerk.

The following gentlemen have been appointed for temporary service during the War : —
Inspectors of Wireless Telegraphy in Auxiliary Patrol Vessels. ..J. L. Capes and P. E. Coursey, Esqrs.

Lent by War Office for Special Duty. ..Captain A. M. Low, r.a.f.

The following gentlemen have been appointed for temporary service :■ —

Supervising Inspectors... F. C. Asbury and Lieut. C. L. Treleaven.

Chief Inspectors. ..Dr. J. W. Capstick. Lieut. E. Edwards and Lieut. J. T. Jenkins.

Inspectors... D. S. Ainslie. W. B. Ball, F. B. Cooley, T. A. Daniel, E. T. Elworthy, H. E. Foreman, H;

Holmes, H. J. C. Ireton, L. H. Kirby. J. McKellar. Lieut. J. McQueen, V. F. Murray, W. W. E

Boss, A. E. Self, W. G. Spencer, and J. F. T. Young, Esqrs.

MUSES INSPECTION STAFF.

Head Office — 47. Victoria Street. S.W.I.

Mead of Mines Inspection Dept. (H.M.I.D.) Eng. Captain William E. Parsons, o.b.b., b.n.

Chief Inspector of Mines William S. Pearce.

Secretary to H. M.I.I) Miss E. M. Richards, Asst. Principal, W.E.N.S.

Technical Staff.

Charge Inspectors... W. A. Stephens, C. Soilness. J. K. Green and B. S. Brown.
Assistant Inspectors... Lieut. B.N.V.B. 3. Stephens, G. Vincett, It. M. Andrews, and Gunner (T) E. A.

McGill (ret.).

Examiner of Mining Accounts (ac£.)...W. H. Collins, Esq.

2 Draughtswomen, i Typists, and 6 Lady Clerks

A.
J.
E.
J.
J.
J.
J.
Er,
E.
J.
E.
W.

Divisional Inspectors
C. Flint, Esq. (Portsmouth). W.

T. Finnle, Esq., (North of England).
S. Atherton, Esq. (Yorks.).
Ormond, Esq. (Lincoln).
Ward. Esq. (Colchester).
Marsden. Esq. (Birmingham).
Marshall, Esq. {Birmingham).
iff. Capt. (ret.) J. K. C. Moore, r.n. (Bath).
E. Lewis, Esq. (South Wales).
Cleverley, Esq. (Manchester).
Chicken, Esq. (Manchester).
S. Gibson, Esq. (Glasgow).

of Areas.

Salter, Esq. (East Scotland).
. Gill, Esq. (Oxford).
O. Hillsdon, Esq. (North-East London).
T. H. Fildes, Esq. (South and Soufh-West
London).

W. Oakley, Esq. (North and North-West
London).
Gladstone, Esq. (Eastbourne).
Grant, Esq. (Cravford).
: Johnston, Esq. (Grangemouth).
J. Potter, Esq. (Immimgham).

3io

Appendix

TORPEDO STORE DIVISION.

Superintendent of Torpedo Stores Frederick Ward. Esq.

Assistant Superintendent of Torpedo Stores T. W. MIdmer, Esq.

Torpedo Store OMcers J. A. W. Ballard, Esq., m.b.b. (act.).

G. C. C'usens, Esq., m.b.e. (act.).

Deputy Torpedo Store OMcers J. A. Jeffrey, Esq., (act.).

P. Stokes, Esq. (act.).

Assistant Torpedo Store OMcers W. Evans, Esq. (act.) (ternpy.).

J. Gray, Esq. (act.).

G. Heron, Esq. (act.).

W. P. Trenery, Esq. (act.).

Technical Assistant Eng. Lieut. Duncan P. Bauchop (ternpy).

3 Torpedo Depot Clerks, First Grade (act.).

3 Torpedo Depot Clerks. Second Grade (act.).

2 Torpedo Depot Clerks, Third Grade (act.).
13 Temporary Hired Extra Clerks.
15 Temporary Women Clerks.

1 Established Woman Clerk (on loam from E.M.O.W.).

7 Boy Clerks and Boy Writers.

Officers of the Paravane Department accommodated in the War College were shown under

H.M.S. Vernon.

DEPARTMENT OP THE DIRECTOR OP NAVAL EQUIPMENT.

Director of Naval Equipment Sear-Admiral Edward M. Phlllpotts, o.B.

Assistant Director of Naval Eouipment... Captain Percy Withers.

Captain Alexander Farrlngton.

Commander George H. H. Holden (ret.).

Alick Stokes.

Henry P. H. Wakefield (ternpy.).

John P. Champion, D.S.O.

(ternpy.).
jLachlan D. I. Macklnnon

(ternpy.).
Edmund L. B. Lockyer. d.s.o.

(ret.) (act.).

Lieut.-Com. l John W. Williams, d.s.o.
R.N.R. /Arthur P. Croxford (act.)

^X™R. }Herbert 0. Mock.

Lieutenant Alfred J. Parkes.

U X t N v B }cedl W. Bateson.

Eng. Com Prank S. Moss.

Charles J. M. Wallace.
Shipwright Lt. Thomas L. Soper.

10 Lieutenants R.N.V.R. for work at Outports.

1 Dockyard Clerk (Second Grade). 1 Higher Grade Woman Clerk. 15 Temporary Women Clerks.

2 Modellers. 1 Woman Modeller.

SALVAGE SECTION.
Bead of Salvage Section... Bon. Captain Fred W. Young, o.b.e., M.i.Mech.E., E.N.B.

Eng. Capt Henry R. Teed (ret.).

Commander. James H. Dathan (ret.).

Commander I Charles C. Talbot, e.d

R.N.R. > John Vigers, b.d.
Paym. Com. ...Arthur W. B. Messenger.

Naval Staff.
Lieut.

\ Harry Salmon (act.).
RJf.V.B. /Edward Smith (act.).

P< ^^« ( }MatthewRush.

Sub-Lieut. \Fred Breary.
R.N.V.R. /William J. Perry.

Civil Staff.
Salvage Finance OMcer...'EieS. H. Lowe, Esq.
Salvage Accounts Offlcer...G. T. Jones, Esq. (act).
G. Sudbury, Esq. (act.).
S Second Grade Clerks, 5 Temporary Clerks, and 11 Temporary Women Clerks.

Oomm(m*r...Guybon C. C. Damant (act.) (ret.).
Commander I James W. Gracey (act.).
RJf.R. 'Charles K. Borlssow (act).

Ivo J. Kay (act.).

George Davis (act.).

George J. Wheeler (act.).

Salvage OMcers.

Commander

Bn RN < R" }<*»* l < ! * F - Smith (act.).

Appendix

311

Assistant Salvage Officers.

IA r!n?VjL } Harr y M- Tumor (act.).
Lieut. R.N.B. ...Alexander M. Tarver.

Peter McM. Cunningham.

Harold H. Hamilton.

William Price (act.).

lieut.RJf.VJi. Cecil H. Bisshopp.
Gilbert E. George.
John E. McQueen.

Lieut. R.N.V.R John E. P. Gibney:
James Smith.
Leonard Elder.
Bobert Brooks.
Eichard G. Whitford.
Robert Edmond.
Matthew G. Gibbs.
James Garrick.

Eng. Com.
R.NJL.

} William H. Hewitt (act.).

Contain Cecil H. Fox. o.B..

Superintendents of Contract-bum Ships —

(For Contract Work (not including Destroyers) on the
... < Clyde—

( Address — Eroomhall Broomblll Drive. Partick. Glasgow

(For Contract Work (not including Destroyers) on the
Tyne. Thames. Mersey, at Barrow-in-Fumess. and
at Sunderland.
Address — 4, Osborne Villas, Osborne Avenue.
Newcastle-on-Tyne.

Captain Superintendent of Torpedo Boat Destroyers building by Contract-
Captain Frank F. Eose, d.s.o. Address— 47. Victoria Street, S.W.I.

DEPARTMENT OF THE DEPUTY CONTBOLLEE FOE DOCKYARDS AND SHTPBUTLDING.

Deputy Controller. ..Sir Thomas Bell, e.b.e.

Director of Dockyards and Repairs. ..Rear Admiral Laurence E. Power, C.B., c.v.o.

Deputy Director of Dockyards and Repairs. ..E. R. Bate, Esq., c.b.

Superintendent of Dockyard Branch — I Assistant Director of Dockyards and Repairs —

H. J. Webb, Esq.. c.b.e. ] Eng. Captain Bobert B. Dixon, c.b.. r.n.

Electrical Engineering Assistant... W. McClelland. Esq. O.B.E.. m.i.e.e.

Secretary to D.CM.S. F. C. Eoutly. Esq.

Manager, Constructive Department —

F. B. Ollls, Esq. (tempi/.). (For special service)
Chief Constructors —

G. M. Apsey. Esq. (tempv.).

C. H. Croxford. Esq. (act.) (tempy.).
Commander W. T. Davis, bjt.v.b. (act.) (temp.).
C. G. Hall. Esq. (act.) (tempy.).
Constructors —

C. J. D. Bell, Esq.. m.b.e. (act.).
G. F. Ludford. Esq. (act).
J. McQueen. Esq. (act.).
H. B. Wood. Esq. (act.).

For Special Service —

Eng. Rear-Admiral Charles Kudd.
Eng. Copt. Albert E. Tompkins (ret.), r.n.
Eng. Capt. 6. W. Murray (ret.). B.N.
Eng. Capt. Arthur S. Crisp, E.N.

Engineer Assistants —

Eng. Commander Samuel P. Ferguson.

Eng. Commander James G. Budge.

T. E. Elvy, Esq.. o.b.e. (Lent from Baulbow-

line Dockyard.)
E. E. Langmaid, Esq.

Examiners of Dockyard Work —
W. H. C. Coombe (act.). T. H. Harries. E. A. Lakey. J. D. Gibby (act.). J. Ellis. W. L. Coles.
F. Sanders, O. Benwood (act.), F. J. Fletcher (act.). J. A. Fage. m.b.e. (act.). W. J. Lewis (act.),
J. H. Martin (act.), and G. Moody (ad.), Esqrs.

For Special Service.
Chief Administrative Officer. ..Major A. B. Wilson, h.m.l.i.

Electrical Engineers Higher Grade.. .T. Edge (tempy.), and J. S. Beddoe, m.b.e., a.m.i.e.e. (act.). Esqrs.

Electrical Engineers... E. L. Brain, m.b.e. (act.), and A. E. Franklin (act.), EsqrB.
First Assistant Electrical Engineers.. M. P. Blake (act.), G. R. Davis (act.), C. B. Irvine (act.). J. Macey (act.).
and A. H. Williams (act.). Esqrs.
Clerical Assistant.. .G. C. Stanbury, Esq. (act.).
Senior Visiting Inspector of Timber.. -W. H. Hooper, Esq.
Visiting Inspector of Timber... Alfred James, Esq.
4 Dockyard Clerks (First Grade), 6 Dockyard Clerks (Second Grade). 1 Senior Draughtsman. 8 First
Class Draughtsmen, 15 Second Class Draughtsmen, 17 Dockyard Clerks (Third Grade), 2 Hired
Writers, 14 Temporary Clerks. 27 Female Clerks. 3 Female Tracers, and 10 Boys.

WAESHD? PEODTJCTION SECTION.

LONDON STAFF.

Director of Warship Production... W. J. Berry. Esq.. o.B.

Deputy Director of Warship Production.. .Engineer Rear-Admiral J. G. Liversidge. b-n. (ret.).

Assistant Director of Warship Productions... Eng. Captain P. D. Martell, b s.. E. A. J. Pearce. Esq.. 0.1

Superintendent of Warship Production... W. H. Carter, Esq.

Senior Engineer Assistant.. .Engineer Captain (ret.) Jasper W. A. Parrott.

Superintendent of Warship Electrical Work.. -J. McCaffery, Esq., o.b.e.

3i2 Appendix

Chief Examiner and Secretary to Director of Warship Production... ~R. 3. Wright, Esq.

Constructors... A. Adams (act), G. Bulkeley (act.), J. W. Dippy (act.), 3. C. Joughln, M.B.E..

F. L. Mayer (act.), and E. F. Spanner (act.), Esqrs.

Engineer Assistants... Engineer Captain W. A. Wilson o.M.a. (arf.), B.N., Engineer Commander William

H. Clarke, d.s.o„ r.n.. Engineer Commander F. A. Gordon, r.n., E. A. Anthony, Esq., W. G.

Mathews (tempi/.), Esq.

Electrical Engineers... A. J. Foord (act.), A. J. Moore, a.m.i.e.e. (act.), Esqrs.
Assistant Constructors. ..D. E. J. Offord (2nd class), H. S. Pengelly (2nd class), V. G. Shepheard (2nd class),
3. W. Westlalte (tempi/, acta.). W. E. Saunders (tempji. acta.), W. J. Craig, b.so. (tempi/.), G. L.
Harvey (temvv.). W. J. Mares (tempi/.), E. Macmillan (temim.), and E. Whiting (tempi/.), Esqrs.
Financial Inspectors. .. B. C. Knight (tempi/.). W. J. Stallion (act.), Esqrs.
Engineer Inspectors (tempi/. )...E. N. Brown, G. Burton, P. Fenton, L. H. Forsyth, W. Guthrie, Esqrs
Lieut. H. W. GUI, E. Hood. C. Tillotson. D. Hutcheon. L. J. Nobbs, Esqrs.
Inspecting Officer.. .W. C. Thomas (ret.), Esq.
.First Assistant Electrical Engineers. ..C. E. Jowett (act.), C. H. Klyne (act.). E. F. Kill (act.),
H. D. Thompson, Esqrs.
Examiners of Accounts... 3. T. Hartnell, Esq. (act.), E. E. Eogers (tempi/.), G. Taylor (tempi/.), and
W. E. Vanstone (act), Esqrs.
Assistant Examiners of Accounts. ..T. Batt (act.), J. Boulden (act.), W. Bray (act.), W. J. Care (act)

F. G. Gay (act.), A. H. Hollls (act.). S. W. E. Pippett (act.). G. E. Wilson (act.), Esqrs.
2 Dockyard Clerks (act.) (First Grade). 5 Dockyard Clerks (act.) (Second Grade), 8 Draughtsmen. 5 Dock-
yard Clerks (act.) (Third Grade), 60 Temporary Clerks (female), and 28 Temporary Clerks (male)

OUTDOOE STAFF.

Clyde.

Warship Production Superintendent... B. E. Boyland, Esq. Address — 105, West George Street, Glasgow.

Deputy Warship Production Superintendent. ..F. W. Searle, Esq.
Warship Production Inspectors... A. C Beard, F. J. Berry, J. Bryant, W. E. Head, W. T. Hosldn,
W. B. Hugman, F. G. McCulloch, Esqrs.
Warship Production Inspectors (Engineer). ..3. Appleby, W. Bugg, D. McMillan, M. Munro, Esqrs.
Warship Production Inspectors (Electrical)...!?. W. Eobson and H. J. Stephens, Esqrs.

Tyke.

Warship Production Superintendent... Address — " Milburn House," Newcastle-on-Tyne.

Deputy Warship Production Superintendent... 3. Innes, Esq.

Warship Production Inspectors. ..E. J. F. Leatherby. J. J. N. Batey, A. S. Blatchford. A. E. Moore,

J. W. Turner, J. Sampson, Esqrs.

Warship Production Inspectors (Engineer)... P. Cowe. J. Findlay, T. McBrlde, C. Stuart, Esqrs.

Warship Production Inspectors (Electrical)... ,E. E. Meams and E. Smith, Esqrs.

Mersey.

Warship Production Superintendent. . .L. D. Stansfleld, m.b.e., Esq. Address — 233, Eoyal Liver Buildings.

Liverpool.

Deputy Warship Production Superintendent.. .P. Wright, Esq.

Warship Production Inspectors. ..W. J. Bunday, E. A. Gawden, H. W. M. Harrison, T. M. Taylor, Esqrs.

Warship Production Inspectors (Engineer)... 8. Gould, J. Howells, C. Verity, Esqrs.

Warship Production Inspectors (Electrical)... F. H. Auger and A. M. Penner. Esqrs.

Warship Production Inspector (Engineers). ..F. McFarlane, Esq.

London and Southern District.
Warship Production Superintendent... L. E. Limming, Esq.

Manchester, Sheffield, and Leeds District.
Engineer Inspector. ..S. H. Warren, Esq.

BIRMINGHAM, COVENTRY, AND LEICESTER DISTRICT.

Engineer Inspector... H. H. Peters, Esq.

S Dockyard Clerks (Second Grade), 9 Dockyard Clerks (Third Grade), and 20 Temporary Clerks.

DIEECTOEATE OF AUXILIARY VESSELS.

Director of Auxiliary Vessels A. W. Sampson, Esq.

Assistant Directors of Auxiliary Vessels Commander 3. Bloomneld,

E. M. Gillies. Esq.
Deputy Assistant Directors of Auxiliary Vessels Major T. B. Coull, e.e.

C. Scott. Esq.

Capt. W. T. Turner. r.e.
Administrative OMcer H. W. Butler, Esq.

Appendix

3*3

Technical Assistants.

Lieut. H. Ashworth.
Q. C. Alward.
0. N. Ash.
W. H. Benoy.

D. P. Black.
H. G. Bone.

Major 0. C. Bond, r.e.
Captain B. A. Brodie, B.B.

E. Carr.

K. Chalmers.

2nd Lieut. J. P. Duguid, r.e.

Major D. Dawson, b.b.

J. Dunsmuir.

J. V. Puller.

W. Oalbraith.

Lieut. W. Oammell.

Captain J. Q. Harrison, r.e.

J. G. Hart.

H. E. Hodge.

Lieut. B. Q. Holmes, r.e.

A. Krles.

M. H. MoEwan.

Lieut. J. M. MacGllchrist.

J. Miller.

T. K. Morrison.

J. Munn.

Lieut. P. J. S. Murray, r.e.

End. Liml.-Com. P. Page, r.n.

Lieut. B. Purely. R.E.

Ena.-Lieut. J. Sampson, r.k.

H. Sheppard.

Men*. E. A. Bhott, R.E.

JSntf. Sub-Lieut. O. W. L. Slater, r.n.i

iki'i. J. W. Smith, R.E.

Captain D. Strang, r.e.

Lieut. E. A. Stow, r.e.

Lieuf. S. Towoshead. r.e.

U. Watson.

S. K. Wells,

DEPARTMENT OP THE DEPUTY CONTROLLER POR ARMAMENT PRODUCTION.

Deputy Controller.. .Sir Vincent L. Raven, k.b.e.

Secretary — W. H. Pettlfor, Esq., o.b.e.

Naval Assistant... Una. Com. Arthur E. Lester, D.S.O., r.n.

Civil Assistant to D.CM.P.. ..Eveleieh Nash, Esq.

Technical Assistant. ..D. T. Heap, Esq. Adminislrative'^StaSS Officer. ..Major S. Robinson.

Chief Draughtsman... 0, Wale, Esq.

Director of Production, Guns, Mountings and Sights. ..L. I. G. Leveson, Esq.

Deputy Director of Production, Guns, Mountings and Sights... H. S. Rowell. Esq.

Assistant Directors of Production, Ghuns, Mountings and Sights. ..Ii. T. Glascodine. Esq., and

Major D. Klrke Smith, d.s.o.

Deputy Assistant Director of ProducHon, Owns, Mountings and Sights. . .C. J. S. Orton, Esq.

Technical Assistants — Guns, <bc. Division. ..J. Ooulton. H. T. Dobbs, W. Methven {act.).

P. R. Roberts, Esqrs.. and Lieut. R. H. E. M. P. de Lisle, r.n.

Director of ProducHon — Torpedoes and Mines. ..A. H. Hall, Esq., o.b.e.

Deputy Director of Production — Torpedoes and Mines.. .Commr. Carlton C. Sherman, o.b.e., r.n. {act.) tret.).

Assistant Director of ProducHon — Torpedoes and Mines. ..H. A. D. Acland, Esq.

Technical Assistants — Mine Division.. .W. A. Harris, A. I. Jack, L. King, C. S. Leathard, N. E. Noble,

and J. S. McLaren, Esqrs.

Assistant Director of ProducHon — Mines — Group Section.. .Lieut. R.N.V.R. Leslie G. Shadbolt.

Technical Assistants — Mines — Group Sections... .W. E. 0. Evans, G. V. Powler, T. V. Goodman.

E. V. Hemsley, H. H. Ilett. G. W. Kettlewell. W. J. Scott, W. G. Smith, and J. Torrie. Esqrs.

Paravane Section.. .Lieut.-Commr. W. H. McConnell. o.b.e.. b.n.v.r.

Minesweeping Section.. .A. H. Norfolk, Esq.

Director of Production — Ammunition. ..Or. E. Woodward, Esq., c.b.e.

Deputy Director of ProducHon — Ammunition. ..Lieul.-Com. H. S. H. Ellis, B.N. (ret).

Assistant Directors of Production — Ammunition...!?. S. MacNalty and A. H. Romans, Esqrs.

Deputy Assistant Directors of Production — Ammunition... W. P. Jesson and W. A. Reeve, Esqrs.

echnical Assistants — Ammunition Division. ..Lieut. O. J. Barton, r.f.a., E. B. Denbeigh. E. Knight,

R. Haddock, and H. M. Rae. Esqrs, and Mrs. Wyat Hayward.

Airship Production.

Director of Production... E. C. Given, Esq.

Deputy Director. ..Captain J. Malcolm Eraser {act.), r.n.v.r.
Head of Supply Section. ..K. O. Boggan, Esq.
Administrative Staff Officer. ..Lieut, (Tempy. Capt.) Prank Edwards, b.a.f.
Airship Engine Design. ..Ens. Commr. Leslie Robins, r.n.

Eng. Lieut.-Com. Frederick R. G. Turner, b.n.
Captain Rey G. Parry, d.s.o., r.a.f.
Captain Alexander McD. Steele, r.a.p.
Technical Assistant.. .F. Warren, Esq.

Armament... Lieut. (Tempy. Capt.) E. S. Pearce. B.A.F.
Electric and WIT Section... Capt. (Tempy. Major) Arthur Price-Heed, B.A.F.
Captain Arthur J. Osborne, r.a.f.
Captain E. G. Batt, r.a.p.
Lieut. (Tempy. Capt.) William B. Garrett, R.A.F.

314 Appendix

Central Hydrogen Section.. .Major {Tempy. Lt.-Col.) Sidney E. Lowcock. e.a.p.
Major George M. T. Bees, r.a.f.
Captain Charles A. Slater, r.a.f.
Captain Alfred H. White, R.A.F.
Captain Cecil Liglitfoot, r.a.f.
Captain Lazarus S. M. Pyke. B.A.F.
Captain Arthur F. H. Smallpiece, K.A.F.
Captain John I). Butler, e.a.f.
Captain Reginald E. Ollerenshaw, r.a.f.
Lieut. Charles G. A. P. Spry, r.a.f.
Lieut Stanley P. Elliott, b.a.f.
Lieut. Alfred C. Tapster, e.a.f.
Lieut. Bernard E. C. Davis, e.a.f.
Lieut. Harold Slaney. r.a.f.
2nd Lieut. Andrew 6. Allan, r.a.f.
Technical Assistant {Laboratory). ..A. E. Griggs, Esq.

Airship Design Constructor... C. I. B. Campbell, Esq.
Assistant Constructors. ..A. P. Cole, Esq.
H. May, Esq.
F. Sutclifle, Esq.
Progress and Inspection... T. Turton Jones, Esq.

Technical Assistants. ..Major Albert V. Thompson, e.a.f.

Captain (Temvy. Major) Harry Welch, e.a.f.
Captain Edwin H. Haworth, r.a.f.
Captain John D. Greenwood, e.a.f.
Lieut. David Greenwood, r.a.f.
2nd Lieut. Donald Y. Mattinson, r.a.f.
E. Adamson and C. F. Smith, Esqrs.
Works.. .Lieut. {Tempy. Copt.) John W. V. Paul, B.A.F.
Captain Perclval M. Davson, b.a.f.
Walter Sarel, Esq.
Costs.. .A. E. Wingfleld and S. F. Hlggins, Esqrs.
Overseers. ..Eng. Commr. Bertram Harvey, r.n.
Assistant Constructors. ..H. B. W. Evans, Esq.
J. L. Bartlett, Esq.
S. Payne, Esq.

District Progress Engineers D.C.A.P. Sept.. ..Eng. Copt. W. H. Adams, B.H., London ; Eng. Copt. W
J. Black, e.n., Barrow-in-Furness ; Eng. Copt. B. Collingwood, r.n.. Newmxtle-on-Tync ;
W. Clemence, Esq., Nottingham ; N. Clough, Esq., Manchester ; W. S. Edwards, Esq., Bir-
mingham ; and J. H. Hollis, Esq.. Glasgow.

FINANCE DIVISION.

Assistant Accountant General... A. Cunnison, Esq. (act.).
Superintending Clerk. ..A. H. M. Fox, Esq. (act.).
Deputy Accounts Offkers in charge of Branches. ..H. B. Bain, Esq. {act.), G. H. Court, Esq. {act.), W. J.

Hean. Esq. {act.). B. G. Peirce, Esq., m.b.e. {act.).
Deputy Accounts Officers... A. J. Camm, EBq. {act.) {lent from National Insurance Audit Department).

H. E. Denny, Esq. {act.) {lent from Inland Revenue). L. H. Gibson, Esq., a.s.a.a. {act.) {lent

from National Insurance Audit Department). W. J. S. Greenland, Esq. {act.). F. E. Johnson,

Esq. {act.) {lent from Inland Revenue).
Assistant Accounts OSkers.. .G. J. Dear, Esq., S. T. Pepler, Esq. {act.). H. F. Skinner, Esq. {act.).

E. Underwood, Esq. {act.), B. H. Westlake. Esq.
Assistant Expense Accounts Officer... F. Hall, Esq. {lent by Inspector of Dockyard Expense Accounts).
Assistant Auditors {lent from National Insurance Audit Department). ..A. E. Codd, Esq., H. Foulds, Esq.,

E. G. Kench. Esq.
1 Supervising Assistant Clerk, 1 Assistant Clerk, 1 Hired Accountant Clerk, 14 Temporary Clerical

Assistants, 6 Temporary Assistant Accountants, 89 Temporary Men Clerks, 2 Higher Grade

Women Clerks, 86 Temporary Women Clerks and Typists, and 18 Improvers and Boy Clerks.

Paymaster. Controller's Department.. .Paym. Commr. Henry Horniman, b.n.

COSTINGS INVESTIGATION DIVISION.

Adviser upon Costs of Production) A j, Whinney. Esq., F.O.A. {act.).
Assistant Accountant General ' ' " *' »•"■"• >■»*•'•

Deputy.. .V. W. Papworth, Esq., a.s.a.a. {Acting Superintending Clerk).
Assistant. ■ H. F. Palmer, Esq., m.b.e.. a.o.a.
Beads of Branches.. .C. D. Britten, Esq., a.o.a.
W. Elles Hill, Esq., A.C.A.
W. L. Karamelli, Esq., a.s.a.a. {Acting Deputy Accounts Officer, lent from Nationa

Insurance Audit Dept.).
F. N. Kidson, Esq., f.o.a.
C. H. Oldfleld, Esq., a.o.a.
Martin Price, Esq., f.c.a.

Appendix 3*5

Assistant Auditors (lent from National Insurance Audit Sept.). ..J. A. Clarkson, a.s.a.a., S. Whincnp

A.S.A.A., Esqis.

Superintending Accountants. ..lit. Bell, O.A., B. L. Biggs. A.O.A., B. A. Blackford, a.c.a., D. M. Butcher
a.s.a.a., W. H. Cooper, a.s.a.a.. H. V. Edwards, a.c.a., J. A. Lewcock, a.s.a.a. : E. H. Kick-
son, A.O.A., 0. V. Oldfleld. A.O.A., W. J. Phillips, A.S.A.A., P. W. Rumble. A.S.A.A., B. S. Tewson,
A.O.A., W. L. Threlford, f.ca., J. M. Warren. A.S.A.A., C. W. Weston, a.ca., O. C. Willson.

P.S.A.A., H. G. Wilson, M.B.E.. F.O.A., Esqrs.

Accountants. ..S. Allen, a.o.a.. F. W. Ardran, a.c.a.. 6. Ashley, a.s.a.a., H. C. Barbour, O.A.. A. B. Barley,
a.ca.. W. Benson. A. Birch, a.c.a.. H. M. Brittain. a.c.a., H. Bruckshaw. W. E. Cox, a.o.a..
J. Dickson. c.A.. P. Dixon. E. E. Dodd, J. B. Dunlop, C.A., F. Eglington. a.c.a., H. Ellett.
a.c.a.. A Fielding, a.c.a.. H. Garman, a.c.a.. G. Gibson, a.c.a.. B. G. Greenshields. c.A.. J. P.
Griffiths, a.s.a.a.. C. T. Grimes, a.c.a.. P. T. Haslam. a.s.a.a.. A. Hosking, A.S.A.A., B. C.
Howard, a.s.a.a.. T. A Kitson. a.c.a.. H. Lees, a.c.a.. H. Luker, a.s.a.a.. W. E. Mansell. a.s.a.a..
S. H. Meams. a.c.a.. W. J. Morton, A.8.A.A., B. Murray, C.A., O. Myers, A.S.A.A., G. T. Needham,
a.c.a.. B. K. Norton, a.o.a., H. Ogle, a.c.a., 0. A. Porter, a.c.a.. G. W. Roberts, a.c.a., A. Boyle,
A.C.A., S. Smith, a.c.a., J. 3. Stuart, a.s.a.a., E. M. Taylor, a.c.a., A. E. Thomas, a.ca. : H.
Trenchard, O.A.. H. Tweedale, A.O.A., H. L. Tvreedie. a.c.a., P. H. Walker. AJS.A.A.. G. Water-
worth, o.a., V. Watts. A.S.A.A., T. C. Whlttaker, a.s.a.a.. J. S. Wilson, a.c.a., E. G. Wolfe, a.c.a.
Esqrs.

Pavm. IAeut.-Commr. R.N.R... John P. Griffiths.

Pawn. Sub-Lieut. R.N.R....'Robert Ashworth, Charles Collins. Arthur Fitton, John L. Goodwin.
Robert W. Hunton, Beglnald F. Weekes.

69 Temporary Assistant Accountants. 2 Temporary Men Clerks, 34 Temporary Women Clerks
1 Assistant Clerk, 2 Boy Clerks, 107 Third Grade Clerks and Recorders.

DOCKYARD EXPENSE ACCOUNTS DEPARTMENT.

(68, Victoria Street, S.W.I.)

Inspector of Dockyard Expense Accounts. ..J. Byan. Esq., o.b.e.

Assistant Inspector of Dockyard Expense Accounts... F. W. W. Burrell, Esq.

Expense Accounts Offlcer...J. H. Jeffrey, Esq. (act.).

Deputy Expense Accounts Officer... F. H. Hall, Esq. tact.).

Assistant Expense Accounts Officer. ..W. A Stevens, Esq. tact.) Ifor Stocktaking Duties), and

H. Haggis. Esq. tact.).

Examiner of Accounts — J. E. Horswell. Esq. tact.).

Assistant Examiner of Accounts... 0. Band. Esq. tact.).

2 Dockyard Clerks Second Grade, 12 Dockyard Clerks Third Grade (6 acting), 2 Temporary Clerks,

12 Women Clerks, and 1 Boy Writer.

DEPARTMENT OF THE CONTEOLLEE-GENEEAL OF MEECHANT SHIP-
BUILDING.

Co(droJteT-General...The Right Eon. Lord Pirrie, K.P.

Private Secretary.. .W. H. Sykes. Esq.

Personal Secretary... Wss Edmiston.

Director-General of Administration. ..Major-General A: S. Collard. c.b., c.v.o., e.e.
Personal Assistant.. .Capt. A. T. Marshall.

Secretary. ..W. A. T. Shorto, Esq., o.b.e.
Personal Assistant.. .Capt. A. Briggs.

Naval Assistant.. .Commr. F. S. Bising. B.N. (act.) (emerov.).

Administrative Officers.. .Major H. S. Wescott (act.), Lieut. W. J. Collins, F. F. Hopkins, and

E. Wotton, Esqrs.

Head of Statistical Section.. .Captain W. Gott.

Head of Personnel Section ...E. P. Evans, Esq.

Assistant to D.G.A....G. Spencer Hawes, Esq.

Directorate of Medical and Sanitary Services.

Deputy Director... Brevet Lieut.-Col. E. M. Carter, O.B., Liu.

Deputy Assistant Director... Dr. F. C. Blakiston.

Assistant to Controller General of Merchant Shipbuilding. ..C. J. 0. Sanders. Esq, cb.e. (lent).
Assistants.. .T. G. Austin, G. Montgomery. L. Parker, W. H. Thomas, Esqrs.

316 Appendix

Directorate of Merchant Shipbuilding.

Director. ..Lieut.-Col. J. Lithgow. M.O., R.Q.A.

Personal Assistants. . .D. E. Smith and A. Stevenson, Esqrs.

Assistant Directors. ..Major P. 6. Denton, k.f.a.. Major F. L. Pickersgill. k.f.a., T. W. Davis, J. Fulton,

A. Hamilton, and P. Stobie, Esqrs.

Technical Assistants. ..Lieut. T. W. Cunningham, G. H. Bell, H. P. Claridge. J. Cole,

W. McA. Morrison, Esqrs., and Lieut. N. J. Miller, m.g.o.

Chief Inspectors of Auxiliary Shipouilding... Major 3. E. Muir, o.b.e., r.e.. and D. Wawn, Esq.

Inspector— Captain D, H. Young, r.e.

Directorate of Designs.

Deputy Director.. .E. Wilding, Esq.

Assistant Director. ..Professor T. B. Abell.

Deputy Assistant Director. ..Lieut. A. M. Bobb.

Technical Assistants. ..Lieut. G. Knowles, r.e.. and Lieut. S. G. West, re.

Directorate of Extensions.

Director.. .Major C. W. Brims, m.o., r.f.a.

Deputy Assistant Directors. ..Captain E. H. Emra and Lieut. C. W. Lucas.

Technical Assistants... Major P. H. Bowater. R.F.A., D. Earnshaw, Esq., A. Freeh, Esq.,

Lieut. W. H. Hull, Lieut. E. G. S. Vaughan.

Administrative Officer.. -N. Moore, Esq.

Resident Engineers... Maior C. S. Berry, Captain 3. W. Goldson, T. C. Ormiston Chant, and

C. M. Skinner, Esqrs.

Directorate of Engineering.

Assistant Director. ..Major G. E. Cockburn, o.b.e.. r.e.

Technical Assistants... Lieut. C. E. Street, J. E. Andrews, J. Cumming-Smlth, H. E. Farmer, G. A. Garrett.

0. E. Lewis, A. L. Oubridge, A. Pendlebury. W. L. Stuart,' C. T. Wilkinson, J. P. N. Young, Esqrs.

Directorate of Ship Repairs (Home).

Director... G. S. P. Edwards, Esq.

Deputy Director.. .Capt. G. W. Edwards.

Assistant Directors... A. W. Davidson and H. E. Parlett, o.b.e., Esqrs.

Technical and Administrative Assistants. . . J. W. Jack and J. T. Staples. Esqrs.

Administrative Officer... Captain 3. Robinson.

Directorate of Ship Repairs (Foreign).

Headquarters.

Director... Lt.-Col. H. M. Grayson, r.m.

Assistant Director... T. A. Lawrenson, Esq.

Technical Assistants. ..T. Drewry. Esq., Capt. T. C. Holland, r.m., and H. S. Smaridge, Esq.

Administrative Officer — Lieut W. H. Woods, r.n.r.

Overseas.

Paris — Assistant Director.. .Major W. J. Douglas, n.M.

Technical Assistants— Capt. P. W. D. Hamilton, W. Graham, J. MacLeod and P. E. Stewart. Esqrs.

Italy — Assistant Director. ..W. Murray Isdale, Esq.

Chief Inspector (North Italy). ..0. Stewart, Esq.

Chief Inspector (South Italy)... J. L. Manson, Esq.

Technical Assistants.. .A. Cousins, E. J. Bobson. A. Holland, and S. P. E. Watson, Esqrs.

Malta — Chief Surveyor. ..J. H. Barbour. Esq.

Buenos Ayres — Assistant Director. ..Lieut. Bryan Laing.

South Africa — Deputy Director... ¥. W. Girdler Brown, Esq.

Directorate of Reinforced Concrete Construction.

Director. ..S. P. Staples. Ksq.

Deputy Director.. .L. E. Clark, Esq.

Technical Assistants... K. A. Pllnn, H. Gibbon, Esqrs., Dr. G. H. Salmon, Capt. J. de W. Waller, r.e.

Lieut. A. L. Palmer, r.n.v.r.. and 2nd Lieut. 3. T. Morris.

Directorate of Supplies.

Director—Major 3. W. Hamilton, R.F.A.

Assistant Directors. ..Major 3. L. Marr, o.b.e., r.g.a., H. Cocks, W. G. Bidden, o.b.e., and J. C. Telford,

Esqrs.
Deputy Assistant Directors... 3. Denny, G. F. Dowdlng, J. A. Muirhead, Esqrs., and Lieut. A. Milner.
Technical Assistants. ..Capt. G. B. Cross, r.e.. Capt. E. H. S. White, F. A. Field, E. B. Irwin, W. C. Jones,

and G. L. Precious, Esqrs.
Administrative Officers... Capt. E. A. Blanch, r.f.a., Lieut. H. S. Short, R.Q.A., and N. C. Blanch, Esq.
Inspectors... Lieut. 3. G. Mortimer, Lieut. 3. Bussell, 2nd Lieut. P. V. Brownhill, R.E., 2nd Lieut. F. G.
Cooney, r.b., 2nd Lieut. W. Copeland, r.b., W. Arnot, H. B. Chaldecott, O.B.E.. W. H. Cutten,
J. Dunlop, H. H. Earle, C. Fox-Dixon, and J I. Paton. Esqrs.

Appendix 3*7

Otter Section.

Offleer in Charge... Commander Edward A. Digby, r.n.

Assistants. ..Lieut. L. J. Beare. r.n.r.. Lieut. John MacPhea, B.H.B.. Lieut. J. Plumpton, r.n.r.. £i«j(.
S. A. Smith, bji.b., Lieut. Y. H. F. Wells, bjj., Asst. Pavmstr. A. H. Turpln. B.N.B., D. A.
Bradley, C. Oockburn. and E. P. Burke. Esars.

Dazzle Section.

Senior Dazzle Officer. ..Lt.-Comdr. Norman Wilkinson, o.b.e.. r.n.v.e.

Assistants... Lieut. C. C. G. King. r_n.v.r.. Lieut. J. Jellieoe, r.n.v.r.. Lieut. C. Clark, b.n.v.r., Lieut.
S. Spurrier, rj9.v.b„ Lieut. F. Mason, r.n.v.r., Lieut. B. Wadsworth, b.n.v.r., Lieut. B. Kort-
right, B.N.T.B., Lieut. C. Taylor, b.n.v.r.. Lieut. B. Jackson. B.N.V.B., Lieut. H. A. Yockney.
b.n.v.r.. ii«rf. E. M. Waylett, r.n.v.b.. Lieut. C. W. Wyllie. b.n.v.e.. Lieut. B. Hook, h.n.v.r.
Xfeui. C. Townsend, r.n.v.e., Lieut. C. Thomas, r.n.v.r„ Lieut. M. Smythe. e.n.v.b.. Lieut.
C. Payne, b.n.v.b.. Lieut. M. Dawson, r.n.v.r., Lieut. K. Cleaver, b.n.v.r.. Lieut. F. Stone-
lake, B.N.V.B., Lieuti O. R. Moser. b.n.v.e., and A. Parkinson, Esq.

Information Section.

Director... T. Wareham Smith, Esq.

News Editor... F. Grundy, Esq.
Assistant... 2nd Lieut. A. P. Bobbins.'

Temporary Assistants. Clerks and Draughtsmen — 328.
Temporary Women Clerks and Typists — 28.

ADMIRALTY LABOTJB. DEPARTMENT.

Director of the Admiralty Labour Department —

Deputy Director of the Admiralty Labour Department... H. H. McClure, Esq.
Assistant Directors. ..Vice-Admiral W. De Sails. M.v.o. (Substitution Div.).
J. R. Bond, Esq. (Technical and Labour Dm.).
Major J. C. Akerman (Labour Supply and Housing Div.).
Major W. T. David (Dilution Dm.).
Secretary ...B. E. A. Elliott, Esq., I.C.S. | Establishment Officer... E. M. Pearson, Esq.

Substitution Division.

Superintendent of General Section.. ,W. Wrench Lee. Esq.
Superintendent of Negotiation Section.. ,H. S. Eatclifie, Esq.. o.b.e.
Liaison Section. . .B. Wicks, Esq.

Labour and Technical Division.

Superintendent of Labour Regulation.. .J. Evans. Esq.
Superintendent of Disputes Section...,!. D. McGregor, Esq.
Superintendent of Shipyard Section.. .John Ban*. Esq.
Superintendent of Engineering Section.. .S. B. B. Eebb, Esq.

Legal Division.

Superintendent 'of Legal Division... E. H. Fox, Esq.
Legal Assistant. . .Peter Andersen, Esq.

Dilution Division.
Superintendent of Dilution Division... W. G. Weekes, Esq.
Chief Technical Inspector. ..A. McDermot Service, Esq.

Labour Supply and Housing Division.

Administrative Assistants... A. H. Groom, Esq., A. C. Eidsdale. Esq., and
W. T. Wallace, Esq.

The foVmomg have also been appointed, or lent from other Departments, for temporary service
during the War —
E. B. Ehvin, A. D. Farmer. P. Gray, M.B.B.. D. A. Hastings- Wilson. H. L. Heywood. J. B. Hill. Austin
Kendall. Esqrs., Lieut. G. Knowles, F. Pickersgill. Esq., Lieut. H. A. Sharpe. N. SievwHgnt,
F. Turner, Esqrs., Lieut. A. M. W. Wells, bji.v.b., H. G. White, P. K. Wilson, C. H. Yeatman.

3i8

Appendix

District Directors.

J. E. Baker (Barrow).

E. L. Botham {Cardiff).
J. H. Brewerton (Soulliampton).
Lt.-Col. W. Cooper {Liverpool).
LU-Ool. A. Gadle (London).
Eng. Bear-Adml. Wet.) C. W.
Gregory (Leeds).

B. B. Holt (JVeiocostte).
J. F. James {Belfast).
H. G. Jekln (Hull).

iiw. Cap(. (ret.) J. Langmaid

(Birmmglum).
J. Gordon (Glasgow).
Eng. Bear-Adml. (ret.) A. E. L.

Westaway {Bristol).

Shipyard Technical Officers.

W. Adam (Glasgow).

Eng. Bear-Admt. (ret.) J. H.

Adams (Dundee).
T). McD. Barbour (Liverpool).
R. Boucher (Norwich).
H. Bucknall (Neiocastle).
S. G. D. Cuer (itoerj)oo!).
A. Dudgeon (Glasgow).
J. Duncan (.ioerdeen).
E. O. Farquhar (Glasgow).
J. Grigg (Glasgow).
J. D. Guthrie (Bristol).
Johnston Hughes (Belfast).
j. Laldman (Neiocastle).
G. M. Mackay (Sunderland).
J. D. C. Mackenzie (Glasgow).

D. M. McKay (Glasgow).

E. J. Mills (Newcastle).

F. Moorsom (Cardiff).
T. E. Seath (Glasgow).
W. Y. Seath (Barrow).
F. W. Sturdy (Stocfcton).

C. B. Thomas (£e«/i).

Local ^rcos.

P. Webster (Glasgow).
G. P. Wells (HmS).
J. Wilson (Bristol).

Bnoineer Technical Officers.

W. T. Andrews (London).
A. Archer (Glasgow).
■T. Bonthrone (Liverpool).
J. H. Chambers (Belfast).
A. Cordiner (HuB).
A. Currie (Lwerpoot).
E. W. Dixon (Leeds).

C. H. Doidge (HiiB).

E. Edwards (Birminffftam).
J. W. Elliott (Manchester).
L. T. G. Evans (London).
T. M. Gibson (Cardiff).

D. Gray (Leeds).

J. E. Hamilton (Barrow).
G. A. Hart (Leeds).
J. Hopkinson (Liverpool).
G. S. Home (Manchester).
C. A. Howarth (Glasgow).
G. B. Johnston (Glasgow).
A. J. Lawrence (Cardiff).
A. MacDonald (Glasgow).
G. N. MoVicar (Ctenoid.
W. Murdoch (Sv/nderland).
G. B. Nicholson (Cardiff).
J. F. Phillips (Newcastle).
J. S. Eeid (Gteooto).
G. Beaufort-Richards

(Birmingham).
A. Robertson (Glasgow).
H. W. Sanders (BirminoTMBn).
H. M. Sayers (London).
S. J. Sewell (Leeds).
G. Turner (Bristol).
W. H. Warwick (Leeds).
T. Warde (Lisawofl.
T. Yorston (Newcastle).

Labour Regulation Officers.

A. J. Benson (Liverpool).

P. Black (London).

H. Blair (Belfast).

S. Bunton (Glasgow).

J. Cox (Birmingham).

W. G. Crulckshank (Glasgow).

J. Cunningham (Belfast).

S. B. Edmunds (Bristol).

W. M. Gibson (London).

H. Grainger (Newcastle).

T. Griffiths (Lfeerjiooi).

H. Haddon (Cardiff).

The Earl of Hardwicke (London).

H. C. Hart (London).

T. D. Heppel (London).

F. A. Herd (Birmingham).
M. Hodgson (Newcastle).
W. J. Jackson (Gteootc).

A. W. E. Kewley (Newcastle).
A. Magnay (Newcastle).
W. Marsh (Southampton).
W. C. Millard (Bull).
W. Nelson, m.b.b. (Southamp-
ton).
E. W. Owen (Liverpool).

G. H. Pearson (Newcastle).
W. Eamsden (Liverpool).
J. D. Eees (Cardiff).

E. N. Scott (Cardiff).
S. Shaw (Leeds).
G. C. Steel (Newcastle).
G. H. Stevens (Liverpool).
E. Towart (Giosfloto).
E. J. Waters (Newcastle).
W. J. White (Newcastle).
W. P. Williams (Brietoi).
A. E. Wilson (Liverpool).
J. C. Wood (Glasgow).

MATEE1ALS AND PEIOEITY DEPAETMENT.

Director of Materials and Priority. ■■ G. E. Chadwyck-Healey. Esq.

Personal Assistant to Director... H. Hawkins Turner, Esq.

Additional Personal Assistant to Director.. .Brig.-Gen. C. P. Triscott, O.B., cm. a., d.b.o., h.a. (re(.)

Assistant Directors. ..Eng.Capl. John A. Richards, k.n. (act.).

John Sogers, Esq., o.b.e.. (acting Chief Constructor).
M. Kissane, Esq., o.b.e.
Frederick Smith, Esq., o.b.e.
Alexander M. MacBobert, Esq.

Deputy Assistant Directors... Eng. Com. Henry 0. Anstey, h.i.c.e., ii.n. (act.) (emergy.).
Major J. H. Skelton, r.e.
Adrian Lumley, Esq.
Cant. B. B. Blacke. r.e.
J. P. Powell, Esq.

Administrative and Technical Assistants... Capt. Goldthorpe. Lieut. L. Nlcoll, r.e., Copt. W. B. Parson
age, B.A.F., Lieut. W. E. Sugden, r.n.v.r.. Cotnmr. John Howard Temple, r.n.v.r.. 2nd Lieut.
G. H. M. Thompson, Eng. Lieut.- Com. H. H. Wilklns, r.n.. D. Anderson, T. Aitchison, P. B.
Abberley, J. B. Ballingall, B. Butler, H. G. Brodie, G. W. Brown, W. T. Bearpark, J. H. Bre-
meld, W. E. Baker, H. S. Bowkett, J. Benstead, A. A. Buckton, D. Cameron, E. Cameron
H. J. Collard, T. F. Crossley, A. Dey, C. M. Duncan, J. Dobson, G. Embleton. J. F. Elliott,
E. J. Eyres, H. J. Gould, C. B. Guthrie, E. C. Hawthorne, E. G. Hartley, E. Irvine, B. Knowles,
W. J. MacKenzie. C. McQueen, W. G. Mann, P. H. Marqnand, J. J. Morgan, G. L. Neal, J. H.
Osselton. E. P. Padbury. H. Parker, J. P. Powell, W. E. Poole, C. F. Partridge, Neil Earn
«ey. E. G. Eichers. W. Eolland, T. Eees, A. Stanley. G. M Stevenson. J. W. Simpson. M. Smith.
, D. L. Stewart, H. Strain, H. B. Sinclair, W. D. Spraggon, C. E. Sutton, H. T. Thomas, I) .
Thorburn, S. Topping, J. Warne, A. Wells. J. A. Williams. D. M. Wilson, E. Wilson, G. Walk-
land, M. Ward, and Arthur Willocks, Esqrs.

Chief Steel Superintendent. ..G. P. West, Esq. o.b.e.

Appendix

319

District Representatives —

Superintendent (Steel)—
G. W. Langford, Esq. • ■ •
H. J. Eastoott, Esq., h.b.b.
T. G. Sogers, Esq.

A. Hore. Esq

H. A. Clift. Esq.
W. H. Jago, Esq.

. Scotland
N.E. Coast
South Wales
Midlands
Sheffield

. N.W. Coast

Superintendent (Tubes) —

A. W. Long, Esq Birmingham

Assistant Superintendents {Tubes) —

S. P. Bobbins. Esq Birmingham

B. A. W. Elllcott. Esq. ... Glasgow

C. B. Barrable, Esq Swansea

C. 0. Staines. Esq London

Deputy Superintendents {Steel) —

W. E. Black, Esq N.E. Coast

F. P. Chappie, Esq South Wales

D. J. S uter, Esq. Midlands

T: Moore. Esq. Sheffield

H. B. Dunlop, Esq N.W. Coast

1 Second Grade Clerk, 2 First and 5 Second Class Draughtsmen, 1 Woman Clerk, 20 Temporary Clerks,
160 Temporary Women Clerks and Typists,

District Progress Officers (Wire) —

A. Hewlett. Esq Wifian

P. Sylvester, Esq Newcastle-

on-Tvne

F. Else, Esq Sheffield

E. Fellows, Esq. Birmingham

STATISTICS DEPABTMENT.

Director of Statistics... Lieut.- Col. 3. G. Benarrell. D.S.O.

Deputy Director... Lieut. II. Macrae.

Beads of Sections. ..3. N. Brunton, Esq., o.b.e.
A. H. Butt, Esq.
C. Collins. Esq.
W. D. Dnffleld, Esq.

A. P. Evans, Esq.
2nd Lieut. J. Hambly.

B. O. Hopkins, Esq.

A. E. Kirkus. Esq., O.B.E.

Statistical Assistants... H. L. Tutill, Esq.
Pavm. Sub-Lieut. B.N.B.... William H. Anstice.

INDEX

Abdiel as minelayer, 93
Admiralty, the, American co-operation
at, 163, 164
and the control of convoys, 141
anomalies at, 9
lack of naval officers at, 8
naval air policy of, 175
official summary of changes in

personnel of Board, 21
over-centralization at, 9
" production " at, in 1917, 228 et

seq.
reorganization at, 8, 16, 21, 232 el

seq.
the Staff in October, 1916, 264 el
seq. ; in April, 1917, 271 et seq. }
end of December, 1917, 280 et
seq. ; end of November, 1918, 296
et seq.
Admiralty Controller, appointment of

an, 231
Admiralty Organization for Produc-
tion, growth of the, 246
Adriatic, the, Austrian destroyers in,
149
R.N.A.S. assists military forces of
Allies in, 248
Mgean Sea, the, British destroyers in,

150
Aeroplane, the Handley-Page type of,

71, 73
Aeroplane stations, 177
Air Ministry, the, establishment of, 25
Air power as complement to sea power,

257
Aircraft, bombing attacks by, 72, 177,
203, 204, 205
for anti-submarine work, 55, 70 et

the eyes of a fleet, 198, 257
Airship stations, 175
V

Airships as protection for convoys, 123
Allied Naval Council, formation of, 180
America enters the war, 94, 109 (note),

115, 153 (see also United States)
American battleships and destroyers in

British waters, 160, 163
Anderson, Sir A. G., 22, 239
Anti-flash arrangements, improvements

of, 229, 230
Anti-submarine convoy escorting force,

the, strengthened, 134
Anti-submarine devices, 54, 70, 96

187, 223
Anti-submarine Division of Naval Staff.

Directors of, 7, 12, 119, 133
formation of, 6-7, 10, 14
Anti-submarine instructional schools,

98, 99
Anti-submarine operations, 53 et seq.
Anti-submarine protection for ports of

assembly, 139
Approach areas, and how protected,

43, 174
Arabian coast cleared of Turkish

forces, 248
Arabic, 38

Armament production, 244
Armed merchant ships, 7, 39, 55, 68,

98
Armour-piercing shell, an improved,

229
Armstrong, Commander Sir George,

191
Atlantic convoys, losses in, 143, 144
organization of system of, 131, 134

et seq.
Audacious, loss of, 157
Auxiliary patrols, deficiency in de-
liveries of, 238
in home waters and in Mediterra-
nean zones, 184

321

322

Index

Bacon, Sir Reginald, 88

a daring scheme of, abandoned,

216-218
author's tribute to, 216
his book on the " Dover Patrol,"

186, 190, 197
his proposal for Folkestone-Cape

Grisnez minefield, 213, 214
organizes coastal bombardments,

203
witnesses bombardment of Ostend,
179
Baker, Rear-Admiral Clinton, 95
Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J., a mission to
the United States, 156
offers author post of First Sea
Lord, 6
Baltic, the, a difficult situation in, 249
Barrage, Folkestone-Cape Grisnez, 96,
201, 213, 215
four forms of, 172
off Belgian coast, 201
the Dover, 200, 214
the North Sea 56, 94, 95, 166, 168,

174
the Otranto, 175
Bayly, Admiral Sir Lewis, in command

at Queenstown, 161
Belgian coast, barrage off, 201

mining the, 92, 94, 185
Bell, Sir Thomas, 239
Benson, Admiral, and author, 163

visits England, 179
Bergen, Capt. Halsey's appointment to,

124
Bethlehem Steel Company, the, 49,

157
Bird, Captain F., of the Dover patrol,

191, 201
Blackwood, Commander M., 83
Blockade of German ports, difficulties

of, 170 et seq., 199
Board of Invention and Research, the

(B.I.R.), 25, 27
Bomb-throwers and howitzers, 56
Bonner, Lieutenant Charles G.,

awarded the V.C., 84
Boxer campaign in China, the, 160
Breslau, loss of, 248

British and German production of sub-
marines, etc., compared, 46, 47
British Empire, the, importance of
security of sea communications
of, 253
British merchant steamships, losses
from submarines, 4, 38, 226
losses of unescorted, 143, 145
submarine sinks enemy destroyer,
35
Brock, Admiral Sir Frederick, 121, 123,
129
and the disaster to the Scandina-
vian convoy, 128
Broke, action with German destroyers,
211-212
conveys author to witness bom-
bardment of Ostend, 179
Brown, Commander Yeats, 53
Browning, Vice-Admiral' Sir Montague,
confers with U.S. Navy Depart-
ment, 155
Bruges, aerial attacks on, 72, 204
as enemy base, 198, 206
enemy evacuation of, 225
proposed long-range bombardment
of, 199, 216-218
Burney, Admiral Sir Cecil, at Rosyth,
131
Second Sea Lord, 6, 14
Burney, Lieutenant Dennis, a clever

device of, 67
Burton, Lieutenant G. E., 132 (note)

Calais, enemy destroyer raids on, 208
Calthorpe, Admiral (see Gough-Cal-

thorpe)
Campbell, Captain Gordon, 82
awarded the V.C., 80-1
fights with submarines, 77, 81, 82
sinks an enemy submarine, 77
Canadian Government asked to build
vessels for use in Canadian
waters, 240
Cape Grisncz-Folkestone mine bar-
rage, 96, 201, 213, 215
Capelle, Admiral von and submarine
construction, 225

Inde?

323

Cardiff, instructional anti-submarine
school at, 99

Carrington, Commander I. W., 152

Carson, Sir Edward, a tribute
to, 7
and the defensive arming of mer-
chant ships, 68
becomes First Lord, 7
leaves the Admiralty, 14
offers post of Admiralty Controller
to Sir Eric Geddes, 233

Cassady, Lieut. G. L., awarded the
D.S.C., 64

Cattaro, Germans destroy their sub-
marines at, 225

Cayley, Rear-Admiral C. G., 191

Cayley, Commander H. F., 191

Cervera, Admiral, and the Spanish-
American War, 154

Chain-sweep, a, introduction of,
187

Chatham, gunnery courses for cadets
and apprentices at, 99
instructional anti-submarine school
at, 99

Chief of the Staff, duties and responsi-
bilities of, 9, 11

Churchill, Right Hon. Winston, and
Staff organization, 9

Coal-ships, French, convoy of, 109, 119,
143, 144

Coastal motor boats, 55, 88, 205

Coastal traffic, regulation of : typical
instructions, 46

Colville, Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley,
73, 87, 97

Constantinople, bombing operations in
vicinity of, 248

Convoy commodores, appointment of,
133-4

Convoy Section of Trade Division of
Naval Staff, the, 133

" Convoy sloops," 74

Convoy system, the, a committee on,
at the Admiralty, 132
growth of, 13

introduction of, 102 el seq.
successful organization and work-
ing of, 151
the system at work, 119 el seq.

Convoys, as protection against sub-
marine attack : success of,
109
enemy attacks on, 124, 126, 130
losses in homeward and outward
bound, 144
Coode, Captain C. P. R., 23
Crisp, Thomas, of the Nelson, 189
Cross-Channel sailings and losses, 146
Crystal Palace, Royal Naval Depot at,
99
author's visit to, 100

Dakar convoy, the, 137, 144
Dare, Admiral Sir Charles, 191
Dartmouth, a successful attack on an

enemy submarine off, 64
Dazzle painting for merchant ships,

system of, 56
De Bon, Admiral, 148
De Chair, Rear-Admiral Sir Dudley,

and the U.S. mission, 156-7
Decoy ships, 49, 55, 73, 223

and the convoy of merchant ship-
ping, 123
fitted with torpedo tubes, 75
number of enemy submarines sunk

by, 227
typical actions fought by, 76 el seq.
Delay action fuses, 58
Denison, Admiral John, 191
Depth charge throwers, 55, 87
Depth charges, 51, 55, 59, 223

enemy submarine victims to, 227
Deputy Controller of Armament Pro-
duction, appointment of a, 245
Destroyers, American, in British
waters, 160
and patrol craft, number of enemy

submarines sunk by, 227
available force in February, 1917

111
average output of British, 47
enemy flotilla of, intercepted, 221
essential to Grand Fleet, 2
fitted with " fish " hydrophones, 63
heavy strain on, 140, 141
hunting flotillas of, 178

324

Index

Destroyers, inadequate number of
British, 6, 32, 33, 47, 83, 109 et
seq., 122, 129, 256
of the Dover Patrol, 206
time taken in building, 47, 48
Devonport, gunnery courses for cadets

and apprentices at, 99
D'Eyncourt, Sir Eustace T., 74
Directional hydrophones, 64
Directorate of Materials and Priority,

creation of, 246
Dover, daily average of mercantile
marine passing, 186
enemy destroyer raids on, 208
Dover Patrol, the, 197 et seq.
an enemy attack on, 208
Sir Reginald Bacon's book on, 186,

190, 197
the Sixth Flotilla and its arduous
work, 206, 212
Dover, Straits of, inefficiency of the
barrage, 200, 214
minelaying in, 51, 56, 92, 200
passage of U-boats through, 200
213, 214
Dreyer, Captain F. C, 7, 53

and the defensive arming of mer-
chant ships, 68
appointed Director of Naval Ord-
nance, 12, 53, 228
energy of, 229
Drift nets, mines fitted to, 223
Drifters, work of, 183 et seq., 213
Duff, Rear-Admiral A. L., 7, 11, 53
a tribute to, 54, 152
becomes A.C.N.S., 12, 133
Dunkirk, enemy destroyer raids on, 208
Royal Naval Force at, and their
work, 72, 203-4
Dunraven (decoy ship), a gallant fight

by, 82
Dutch convoy, the, 220, 221

East Coast and Norway, trade be-
tween, convoyed, 120, 121

East Coast, the, volume of trade on,
and difficulty of proper protec-
tion of, 146

Electrical submarine detector, the,

96
Elsie, 127
English coast towns, destroyer raids

on, 208
Escorts for merchant shipping, 109 el

seq., 119 et seq.
Ethel and Millie sunk by submarine

188-9
Evans, Captain E. R. G. R., of the

Broke, rams an enemy vessel, 212

Falmouth convoy, the, 137
losses in 1917, 144

Farrington, Captain Alexander, and
decoy ships, 74

" Fish " hydrophones, invention of, 62

Fisher, Lord, 25

destroyer programme of, 48

Fisher, Captain W. W., Director of
Anti-Submarine Division, 12, 23,
53
tribute to, 54

Fitzherbert, Rear-Admiral the Hon.
Edward, 92
appointed Director of Torpedoes
and Mines, 228, 245

" Flares," 95

for night illumination of mine-
fields, 56, 96

Folkestone-Cape Grisnez mine barrage,
96, 201, 213, 215

Ford Company, the (U.S.A.), 49

France, the Staff organization at
G.H.Q. in, 18

Fremantle, Rear-Admiral Sydney, 21

French, Sir John (Field-Marshal Vis-
count), 218

French Admiralty, the, cordial co-
operation with Allies, 147

French coal trade, the, convoy of, 109,
119, 143
losses in 1917, 144

Fuller, Captain C. T. M., 23

Funakoshi, Admiral, Japanese Naval
Attache in London, 149

Furious converted into a seaplane
carrier, 176, 242

Index

325

Gallipoli, hydrophone training school
at, 67
naval work at, 248
Gauchet, Vice-Admiral, 149
Geddes, Sir Eric, becomes Admiralty
Controller, 232
becomes First Lord, 15
disappointing forecasts of, 242
General Headquarters in France, Staff

organization at, 18
German Army, von Schellendorff on

Staff work in, 30
German attacks on convoys, 130
campaign against merchant ship-
ping, 4
operations in the Baltic against

Russia, 249, 251
prisoners assist a decoy ship to port,

79
star shells, efficiency of, 230
submarine commanders and decoy

ships, 75, 76
submarine fleet at commencement
of war and subsequent additions,
224-5
view of entry of America into the
war, 154
Germans, the, a new weapon of, 202
destroy their submarines, 225
their choice of objectives for night

attacks, 209
their lack of enterprise, 160, 207,

208
tip-and-run raids by, 208 et seq.
Germany, America declares war on, 155
estimated total of submarines in

1917, 37
her submarine production, 38, 46,

47, 48
naval programme of, 241
submarine force of and her losses,
224, 227
Gibb, Colonel Alexander, 24
Gibraltar, an American detachment at,
163
an experimental convoy collected
at, 117
Gibraltar convoy, the, 137, 138, 145
a reason for heavy losses in, 143

Gibraltar convoy, the, losses in 1917 »
144

Glen (decoy ship), 81

Goeben severely damaged, 248

Gough-Calthorpe, Vice-Admiral the
Hon. Sir Somerset, his Mediter-
ranean command, 148, 149, 150

Gowan Lea, 190

Grand Duke trawler, 195

Grand Fleet, the, changes in command
of, 6
destroyers and, 2
destroyers used for Atlantic trade,
115

Grant, Captain H. W., 44

Grant, Rear-Admiral Heathcote, his
command at Gibraltar, 162

Greenock, instructional anti-submarine
school at, 99

Gunnery courses for cadets and ap-
prentices, 99

Haio, Sir Douglas (Earl), commends

work of air force, 204
Halifax convoy, the, 135, 144
Hall, Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald, 23
Halsey, Captain Arthur, appointed
Naval Vice-Consul at Bergen, 124
Halsey, Commodore (Rear-Admiral)
Lionel, 6, 92, 95, 245
becomes Third Sea Lord, 21, 233
Hampton Roads and New York con-
voy, 135
losses in 1917, 144
Harwich, hydrophone station at, 66
Harwich force, the, and its commander
219
duties of, 209 et seq.
intercepts a flotilla of German de-
stroyers, 221
Hawkcraig, hydrophone station at, 66
Heath, Vice-Admiral Sir H. L., 21
Heligoland Bight, mining of, 51, 56, 89,
90, 92, 175
proclaimed a dangerous area, 91
Henderson, Captain Reginald G. H. t
53
a tribute to, 151

326

Indc

Henderson, Captain ReglnaldtG. H.,
and the convoy system, 119, 132

Homeward-bound convoys, losses in,
144

Hope, Rear-Admiral George P. W., ap-
pointed Deputy First Sea Lord,
21, 22, 26

Hopwood, Sir Francis (Lord South-
borough), 231

Hotham, Captain A. G., 23

Howard, Captain W. Vansittart, 191

Howitzers and bomb-throwers, 56

Hydrophone stations and training
schools, 65 et seq.

Hydrophones, 50, 55, 61
directional, 64
fitted to auxiliary patrols, 185

Irvine, Lieutenant, fights a sub-
marine, 78

Jackson, Admiral Sir Henry, 7

First Sea Lord, 5, 216
Jackson, Captain, injured in a motor

accident, 179
Japanese destroyers in the Mediterra-
nean, 47, 149
Jellicoe, Admiral (Viscount Jellicoe of
Scapa), a personal telegram to
Mr. Schwab, 157

a tour of the British Empire and
its lessons, 255

amicable relations with U.S. Navy,
155 et seq.

and merchant ship construction,
5

and the building programme of
1916, 240

and the Dover Patrol, 208

and the future naval policy, 252 et
seq.

and the reorganization at the Ad-
miralty, 231 et seq.

and the submarine menace, 32 et

Jellicoe, Admiral (Viscount Jellicoe of

Scapa), becomes First Sea Lord

and Chief of Naval Staff, 6, 10

12
confers with Mr. Balfour, 5
friendship with Admiral Mayo, 179
his admiration for the work of

Admiral Sir Henry Oliver

222
his proposals for Admiralty re-
organization, 15 et seq
on the convoy system, 102 el seq.
on the work of destroyers, 140 et

seq.
praises work and organization of

convoys, 151
relations with Admiral Sims, 116,

155
unveils a memorial to Lieut.-Com-

mander Sanders, 80
visits New Zealand, 80
witnesses bombardment of Ostend,

179
wounded in the Boxer campaign,

160
Jutland battle, and the shells used in,

229, 230

Kite balloons, 95, 175

Lacaze, Admiral, 148
Lambe, Captain C. L., and his com-
mand, 73, 203
Lamlash convoy, the, 137

losses in 1917, 144
League of Nations, the, 252
Learmonth, Captain F. C, 139
Lerwick as junction for convoy sys-
tem, 121

enemy mining of, 124
Leslie, N. A., 132 (note), 133
Ley, Rear-Admiral J. C, 23
Litchfield-Speer, Captain, 245
Lockyer, Commander E. L. B., 99
Longden, Captain H. W. 132 (note) ._

Index

327

Lowestoft, average daily number of
vessels passing, 186
bombardment of, 210
Lusilania, loss of, 38

Macnamara, Right Hon. T. J., 22
Madden, Admiral Sir Charles, 6
Malta, hydrophone training school at,

67
Manisty, Fleet Paymaster H. W. E.,
132 (note)
appointed Organizing Manager of
Convoys, 133, 152
Margate, bombardment of 210
Mark-Wardlaw, Lieutenant, decoy ship

of, 73
Marx, Admiral J. L., 191
Mary Rose, sinking of, 127
Mayo, Admiral, and author, 163

object of his visit to England,

164
visits Grand Fleet, 179
witnesses bombardment of Ostend,
179
Mediterranean, the, Japanese de-
stroyers in, 47, 149
narrow waters of, 147, 150
need of a unified command in, 181
shipping losses in 1917 in, 147, 148,
150, 151
Mercantile marine, daily average of,
passing Lowestoft and Dover, 186
schools of instruction for, 98
wireless for, 99
(See also Merchant ships)
Mercantile Movements Division, forma-
tion of, 13, 14
its head, 23, 152
Mercantile repair work, 243

shipbuilding, 242
Merchant ships, arming of, 7, 39, 55,
68, 98
convoying, 102 et seq.
losses of, 4, 38, 226
route orders for, 41
submarines and, 1 et seq.
(Cf. Mercantile marine)
Merz, Sir Charles H., 25

Milford Haven convoy, the, 137

losses in 1917, 144
Mine-cutters (see Paravanes) j
Minelayers, fleet of, strengthened, 93
Minelaying, British and German

methods of, contrasted, 91
Minelaying by submarines, 93

difficulty of dealing with problem
of, 186
Mine net barrage, definition of, 200
Mines, American, 94, 167

British, number laid in 1915-17,

92 et seq.
number of submarines sunk by, 227
Mines and minefields, 50, 51

as protection against enemy sub-
marines, 50, 89
" H " type of, 92, 93
improved type of, 55, 92
inadequate supply of, 181
influence of, in Great War, 3
Minesweepers, delay in deliveries of,

193, 239
Minesweeping and patrol services, 182

et seq.
Minesweeping craft, damage caused by
mines to, 194
gallantry of officers and men of, 188,
195
Minesweeping Division, formation of

the, 12
Minesweeping, introduction of a chain-
sweep, 187
statistics for 1916, 1917, 192
Ministry of Munitions, formation of,

245
Minotaur, 130

Mobilization and Movements Depart-
ment, formation of, 8
Monitor M15, loss of, 248
Monitors, bombardment of enemy

ports by, 198
Morris, Sub-Lieutenant K., 81
Motor boats, coastal, 55, 88

launches as submarine hunters, 65,
178
fitted with hydrophones, 63, 178
in home waters and in the Medi-
terranean, 184
Murray, Sir O., 22

328

Index

N
Nash, Mr., invents the " fish " hydro-
phone, 62
Naval Ordnance Department, the,

changes in, 228
Naval Staff and the movements
of convoys, 142
confers -with masters of cargo

steamers, 105
minesweeping section of, 193
Operations Division of, strength-
ened, 14
reorganization of, 8, 15
Navy, the, a specialized profession, 258
considerations on the future of, 252

el seq.
personnel of : importance of, 257
Staff work in, 29
work of, during 1917, 247
Nelson attacked and sunk, 188-9
Net barrage at Dover, 200
Net protection against torpedo Are, 55,
86
at ports of assembly, 139
Nets as an anti-submarine measure,

175, 223
New York and Hampton Roads con-
voy, 135
losses in 1917, 144
Nicholson, Captain R. L., 23
North Foreland, the, naval guns
mounted in vicinity of, 211
star shells supplied to, 230
North Sea barrage, the, 56, 94, 95, 168,
174
advantages and disadvantages of,
166-7
North Sea, the, convoy system at

work in, 120 el seq.
Norway convoy, the, 120, 121

Oil tankers, serious loss of, 146-7
Oliver, Vice-Admiral Sir Henry, 11, 21

and mining operations, 90

becomes D.C.N.S., 12

his valuable work, 222
Ommanney, Admiral R. N., an ap-
preciation of his services 94

Operations Division of Naval Staff

strengthened, 14
Ordnance production, delay in, 245
Ostend, bombardment of, 179, 198, 202
Otranto, hydrophone station at, 67
Otranto, Straits of, a drifter patrol at-
tacked by Austrian light cruisers,
189
mining the, 175
" Otter " mine destroyers, 55, 67
Outward-bound convoys, losses in, 144
Overseas trade, vessels sunk in 1917,
146

" P " boats, fitted with " fish " hydro-
phones, 63
hunting flotillas of, 178
P. Fannon, 127
Page, Mr. W. H., relations with author,

117
Paget, Admiral Sir Alfred, 190
Paine, Commodore Godfrey, 70, 204

joins the Air Council, 21
Palestine, work of the Navy off coast

of, 247
Paravanes, and their use, 67
Pargust (decoy ship), 80
Partridge, sinking of, 130
Patrol craft and minesweeping services,
182 el seq.
a tribute to officers and men of,

188
as decoy vessels, 74
hydrophones for, 63
lack of British, 44
retired officers volunteer for work

in, 190-1
synopsis of losses among, 196
Patrol gunboats, 83
Pease, Mr. A. F., 21, 22
Pellew, damaged in action, 130
Persius, Captain, and the construction
of German submarines, 48 (note)
Personnel of the Navy, importance of,

257
Piave, the, Austrian advance to, 248
Pirie, Lord, becomes Controller-Gen-
eral of Merchant Shipbuilding,
243

Index

329

Pitcher, Petty- Officer Ernest, awarded
V.C., 82

Plymouth convoy, the, 137
losses in 1917, 144

Pola, Germans destroy their subma-
rines at, 225

Portland, submarine-hunting flotillas
at, 63

Ports of assembly for Atlantic convoy
system, 135, 137, 139

Portsmouth, gunnery courses for cadets
and apprentices at, 99
instructional anti-submarine school
at, 99

Pound, Captain A. D. P., 23

Preston, Captain Lionel G., Head of
Minesweeping Service, 23, 193

Pretyman, Right Hon. E. G., 22

Prince Charles, success of, against an
enemy submarine, 73

Pringle, Captain, appointed Chief of
Staff to Sir Lewis Bayly, 161

Prize sinks a submarine, 78-9

Production of warships, etc., and fore-
casts of, 236 et seq.

Projectiles, anti-submarine, 58

" Protected sailings," system of, 110,
120

Q-boats (see Decoy ships)

Q22 in action with a submarine, 78

Queenstown, amicable relations be-
tween British and U.S. Navies at,
161

Queenstown convoy, the, 137, 144

Ramsgate, bombardment of, 210
Rawlinson, General Sir Henry (Lord),

confers with Admiral Bacon, 217
Red Sea, naval operations in, 248
Rodman, Rear-Admiral Hugh, 163
Route orders, and principle on which

compiled, 41 et seq.
Royal Naval Air Service, the, activities

of, 70
bombs enemy bases, 203

Royal Naval Air Service, the, in the
Eastern theatre of war, 248

Russian Baltic Fleet, the, 249
demobilization of, 251

Russian Navy, the defection of, 248.

Russo-Japanese war, the, 3

Ryan, Captain, experimental work of,
54, 61, 62, 64, 66

St. Louis mined outside Liverpool, 116
Salonika, Navy co-operation with

Army in, 248
Sanders, Lieutenant W. E., actions
with submarines, 78, 80
awarded the V.C., 80
memorial to, 80
Scandinavian convoy, the, 110, 114
120 et seq.
enemy attacks on a, 126, 130
loose station-keeping of ships in, 143
losses in 1917, 144
Scapa, a conference at, 130
Scarlett, Wing-Captain F. R., 23
Scheer, Admiral, his work on the High
Sea Fleet, 224
on the convoy system, 126
Schellendorff, von, on German Army

Staffs, 30
Schwab, Mr., 49, 157
Sea, the, considerations on future safe-
guarding of, 252 et seq.
Seaplane, advent of " America " type

of, 71, 72
Seaplane carriers, 176
Seaplane stations, 177
Searchlights, 95
Shannon, 130

Shipbuilding Advisory Committee, 232
Shipbuilding programme of 1916, Brit-
ish, 240
Shipping (British, Allied and neutral),

losses in 1917, 51
Shipping Controller, appointment of a

231
Sierra Leone convoy, the, 135, 144
Signalling arrangements for convoys,
138
instruction in, 100

330

Index

Simpson, Rear-Admiral C. H., 191
Sims, Vice-Admiral W. S., arrives in
London, 116
ensures unity of command, 161
his career, 154

hoists his flag at Queenstown, 161
in command of U.S. forces in
European waters, 116
Singer, Admiral Morgan, 228
Smoke screens, 55, 59, 203
Spanish-American War, the, 154
Special service or decoy ships, 73 et seq.
Specialist training in the Navy, 29
Speed, importance of, in convoy sys-
tem, 137
Star shells, introduction of, 229, 230
Startin, Admiral Sir James, the Albert

Medal for, 191
Staunch sunk by submarine, 248
Slonecrop (decoy ship) sinks a sub-
marine, 85
Slrongbow, sinking of, 127
Submarine attacks on decoy ships, 77
et seq.
campaign of 1917, the, 32 et seq.
danger, the, difficulties of combat-
ing, 181, 185
detector, an electrical, 96
-hunting flotillas, 63, 178
warfare, offensive and defensive
measures against, 32 et seq.
Submarines, British, delay in deliv-
eries of, 238, 239
estimated number of enemy sink-
ings by, 227
fitted as minelayers, 93
length of time taken in construction

of, 48
offensive use of, 49
operations against enemy sub-
marines, 96, 172
production of, 47

value of depth charges against, 60
Submarines, German, 33 el seq.
aircraft attacks on, 71
Allied losses by, 1916-17, 109
as minelayers, 186
devices for circumventing, 54, 70,

96, 187, 223
losses of, 224, 227

Submarines, German, rapid construc-
tion of, 48
success of, in the Mediterranean,
147, 150

Swift, action with German destroyers,
211-212

Sydney (Cape Breton) convoy, the, 135

Syrian coast, the, operations on, 151

Taussig, Lieut.-Commander T. K.,

160
" Taut wire " gear, value of the device,

90
Terror, bombardment of Ostend by, 179

damaged, 202
Thames Estuary, mines laid in the, 92
Torpedo and Mining Department, the

valuable work of, 231
Torpedo, the, in general use, 7, 40
Tothill, Rear-Admiral H. H. D., 21
Trade Division of the Naval Staff, the,

10, 98, 99, 152
" Trawler Reserve," the, 182
Trawlers as minesweepers, 182 ei
seq.
convoy work of, 86
delay in deliveries of, 238, 239
hunting flotilla work of, 178
Troop transports, escorts for, 105
Tyrwhitt, Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald,
and his command, 219

U-boats, various types of, 36 (see also

Submarines, German)
Unescorted ships, losses by submarine

attack in 1917, 143, 145
United Kingdom, the, approach areas
for traffic to, 43, 174
coast divided into areas for patrol
and minesweeping, 183
United States Navy, a detachment dis-
patched to Gibraltar, 162
co-operation with British Navy, 161
in 1917, 153
United States, the, a new type of mine
produced in, 94

Index

33i

United States, the, and the convoy
system, 159
declares war on Germany, 155
rate of ship production in, 49
(See also America)
" Unrestricted submarine warfare,"
object of, 38
opening of, 106

Vengeance, experimental tests in, 230
Villiers, Captain Edward C, net pro-
tection device of, 86

White Sea, the, British naval work in,
248

Whitehead, Captain Frederic A., Di-
rector of Mercantile Movements
Division, 23, 152

Wilde, Commander J. S., 132 (note)

Wilson, Admiral Sir Arthur, anti-sub-
marine measures of, 91, 223

Wireless, importance of, in convoys,
138, 139
provided for the Mercantile Ma-
rine, 99

Warship production in 1917, 236
Watt, I., skipper of Gowan Lea, 190
Webb, Captain Richard, in charge of

Trade Division, 10, 98, 99, 152
Wemyss, Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn, be-
comes Deputy First Sea Lord, 15
Chief of Naval Staff, 21
Whalers and their work, 184, 185

Yachts, patrol work of, 183, 184

Zeebbugge, aerial bombing attacks

on, 204, 205
bombardment of, 198, 202
Zeppelin assists in a hunt for a

British submarine, 34, 35

Printed by

Cassell & Company, Limited, La Bmae Sauvagb,

London, E.C.4

25.1020

J O Potter, /»5 Minor, ts.E I

J D Potter. 1*5 Mlnortes, E.l.

Longitude 15 "West of Greenwich

J D Potter, 1*5 Mlnortes, El

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